COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing harmonised requirements in the internal market on transparency of interest representation carried out on behalf of third countries and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) No 1024/2012 and (EU) 2018/1724 as regards certain requirements laid down by Directive (EU) XXXX/XXXX
Date: 2023-12-12
Institutions: Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, European Commission
Subjects: access to information, administrative cooperation, administrative transparency, decision-making, economic activity, exchange of information, information system, interest group, single market, third country, transparency in decision-making

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Strasbourg, 12.12.2023  SWD(2023) 663 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT  Accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing harmonised requirements in the internal market on transparency of interest representation carried out on behalf of third countries and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937      and      Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council      amending Regulations (EU) No 1024/2012 and (EU) 2018/1724 as regards certain requirements laid down by Directive (EU) XXXX/XXXX {COM(2023) 637 final} - {SEC(2023) 637 final} - {SWD(2023) 660 final} - {SWD(2023) 664 final}  
 
 
Table of content 

1. 

INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT ............................................... 5 

2.  WHAT IS THE PROBLEM AND WHY IT IS A PROBLEM? ........................................... 9 

2.1.  What are the problems? .............................................................................................. 9 
2.1.1. Obstacles to the internal market for interest representation activities carried out on 
behalf of third countries. ......................................................................................... 9 
2.1.2. Unknown magnitude, trends and actors of interest representation activities carried 
out on behalf of third countries. ............................................................................ 12 
2.2.  Magnitude of the problems ....................................................................................... 15 
2.3.  How will the problems evolve? ................................................................................ 16 

3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? ........................................................................................ 17 

3.1.  Legal basis ................................................................................................................ 17 
3.2.  Subsidiarity: Necessity and added value of the EU action ....................................... 19 

4.  OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? ............................................................... 21 

4.1.  General objectives .................................................................................................... 21 
4.2.  Specific objectives .................................................................................................... 21 

5.  WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? .................................................... 21 

5.1.  What is the baseline from which policy options are assessed? ................................ 21 
5.2.  Scope of the policy intervention ............................................................................... 22 
5.2.1. Option A ............................................................................................................... 23 
5.2.2. Option B ................................................................................................................ 24 
5.2.3. Option C ................................................................................................................ 24 
5.2.4. Other possible scope ............................................................................................. 24 
5.2.4.1.  Interest representation carried out on behalf of any government or entity . 24 
5.2.4.2.  Exclusion of some entities from the scope ................................................. 25 
5.3.  Description of the policy options ............................................................................. 26 
5.3.1. Policy Option 1: Non-legislative measures ........................................................... 29 
5.3.2. Policy Option 2: Legislative intervention ............................................................. 30 
5.3.2.1.  Policy Option 2.1: Targeted requirements .................................................. 30 
5.3.2.2.  Policy Option 2.2: Extended requirement .................................................. 33 

6.  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? ........................................... 34 

6.1.  The baseline scenario ............................................................................................... 34 
6.2.  Assessment of the options ........................................................................................ 35 
6.2.1. Economic impacts ................................................................................................. 35 
6.2.1.1.  Functioning of the internal market ............................................................. 35 
6.2.1.2.  Competitiveness ......................................................................................... 36 
6.2.1.3.  Costs and administrative burdens for economic actors (+SMEs) ............... 37 
6.2.1.4.  Costs for public authorities of measures addressed to economic actors. .... 39 
6.2.2. Social impacts ....................................................................................................... 40 
6.2.2.1.  Transparency of interest representation activities carried out on behalf of 

third countries. ............................................................................................ 40 

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6.2.2.2.  Improve knowledge about the magnitude, trends and actors of interest 

representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries. ............... 41 
6.2.2.3.  Enforcement and supervision by authorities............................................... 41 
6.2.3. Fundamental rights impacts .................................................................................. 43 
6.2.3.1.  Right to private life and to the protection of personal data ........................ 43 
6.2.3.2.  Freedom of association ............................................................................... 44 
6.2.3.3.  Freedom of the arts and sciences ................................................................ 47 
6.2.3.4.  Freedom of expression and information ..................................................... 48 
6.2.3.5.  Freedom to conduct a business ................................................................... 49 
6.2.4. Geopolitical implications ...................................................................................... 49 
6.2.5. Digital by default principle ................................................................................... 53 

7.  HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? ............................................................................ 54 

7.1.  Effectiveness ............................................................................................................ 55 
7.2.  Efficiency ................................................................................................................. 55 
7.3.  Coherence with other EU initiatives ......................................................................... 56 
7.4.  Proportionality .......................................................................................................... 60 
7.5.  Comparison of options ............................................................................................. 60 

8. 

PREFERRED OPTION ...................................................................................................... 61 

8.1.  Description of the preferred option .......................................................................... 60 
8.2.  The choice of instrument .......................................................................................... 61 
8.3.  Application of the “one in, one out” approach ......................................................... 62 

9.  HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? ................. 62 

ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ........................................................................... 65 

ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS ................................................................... 69 

ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW? ......................................................................... 89 

ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL METHODS .................................................................................... 96 

ANNEX 5: COMPETITIVENESS CHECK .............................................................................. 143 

ANNEX 6: EVIDENCE OF CURRENT AND POTENTIAL FUTURE FRAGMENTATION IN 
THE REGULATION OF INTEREST REPRESENTATION ACTIVITIES ACROSS THE 
INTERNAL MARKET ..................................................................................................... 144 

ANNEX  7:  ANALYSIS  OF  ADMINISTRATIVE  FINES  AND  THRESHOLDS  FOR 
INFORMATION REQUESTS .......................................................................................... 162 

ANNEX 8: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IMPACT ................................................................... 168 

ANNEX 9: THE BASELINE .................................................................................................... 174 

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Glossary and acronyms 

Term or acronym  Meaning 

Actions  on  behalf  of 
third countries  

Actions that can ultimately be attributed to a central government or 
public  authorities  of  a  country.  It  would  cover  situations  where  a 
government is behind the decision of another entity to have interest 
representation  activities  carried  out  on  its  behalf,  in  particular  by 
giving  instructions  or  directives  to  that  entity1.  It  would  also  cover 
entities that are controlled2 by the government or a public authority3.  

AVMSD  

Audiovisual Media Services Directive  

CER Directive  

Critical Entities Resilience Directive  

CFSP 

Common Foreign and Security Policy  

Civil society 
organisation (CSO)  

Non-governmental  organisations  and  institutions  of  civil  society, 
active  in  the  field  of  fundamental  rights,  which  are  voluntary  self-
governing bodies or organisations established to pursue the essentially 
non-profit-making objectives of their founders or members.4 

DSA 

ECNE  

EMFA  

FDI  

FIMI  

Digital Services Act  

European Cooperation Network on Elections  

European Media Freedom Act  

Foreign direct investment  

Foreign information manipulation and interference 

Foreign influence 

Intervention by third country governments to influence the democratic 
sphere  including  legislation  and  policies,  also  by  shaping  public 
opinion in a way which benefits their interests.  

Foreign interference  Foreign  interference  is  used  to  differentiate  between  influencing 
activities that are integral to diplomatic relations and activities that are 
carried out by, or on behalf of, a foreign state-level actor, which are 
coercive,  covert,  deceptive,  or  corrupting  and  are  contrary  to  the 
sovereignty, values, and interests of the Union.5 

1   This would cover instructions by the government, though directives or legal requirements. 
2   A government or a public authority would control an entity carrying interest representation where through economic rights, 
contractual arrangements, or any other means, either separately or combination confer the possibility of exercising decisive 
influence on that entity. 

3   Based on Article 3(3) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 

on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market. 

4   See Article 10 of Council Regulation (EC) No 168/2007 establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
and the Council of Europe Recommendation  CM/Rec(2007)14 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the 
legal status of non-governmental organisations in Europe. 

5   There is no common definition of foreign interference in EU law. Furthermore, no common definition exists in academia. 
In order to ensure consistency with recent EU publications, the definition is based on the definition used in the Commission 
Staff Working Document on Tackling Research and Innovation foreign interference (European Commission, Directorate-
General for Research and Innovation, Tackling R&I foreign interference – Staff working document, Publications Office 
of  the  European  Union,  2022,  https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2777/513746).  This  definition  uses  elements  from  the 

iii 

 
 
 
GDPR  

General Data Protection Regulation  

IMI system  

Internal Market Information System 

Interest 
representation 

Interest representation means an activity conducted with the objective 
of  influencing  the  development,  formulation  or  implementation  of 
policy  or  legislation,  or  public  decision-making  processes  in  the 
Union.  

It covers a broad range of activities. It would include both activities 
that aim to influence public decision-making both directly (e.g. direct 
the 
engagements  with  public  officials)  and 
indirectly  (e.g. 
dissemination  of  research  outputs, 
the  organisation  of  and 
participation in conferences / events, and the provision of education, 
training  and  cultural  engagement,  when  performed  with  the  same 
objective).  

NGO  

OECD  

OSCE  

Non-governmental organisation  

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  

Public Official 

Member States and Union officials. 

TEU  

TFEU  

Treaty on European Union  

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union  

Third country 

Countries outside of the European Economic Area (EEA).  

Third country entity  The central government and public authorities at all other levels of a 
third country as well as a public or private entity whose actions can 
be attributed to such central government or public authorities. 

Australian foreign interference legislation which is often used as a reference when defining foreign interference (i.e. that 
foreign  interference  is  by  nature  coercive,  covert,  deceptive,  or  corrupting,  'Foreign  Influence  Transparency  Scheme’, 
Australian  Government, 
at:  https://www.ag.gov.au/integrity/foreign-influence-transparency-scheme.).  
Additionally,  the  definition  was  complemented  by  an  extract  from  a  briefing  by  the  European  Parliament’s  Research 
Service  on  “Lobbying  and  foreign  influence”,  which  clarifies  that  foreign  interference  is  different  form  legitimate 
influencing activities that are integral to diplomatic relations (European Parliamentary Research Service, Lobbying and 
foreign influence, 2021, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/mt/document/EPRS_BRI(2021)698754). 

available 

iv 

 
 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT  

Together with the rule of law and fundamental rights, democracy is a founding value of the 
European  Union.  For  democracy  to  function  well,  citizens  must  be  able  to  express  their 
preferences and elect their representatives freely.  

One  important  characteristic  of  democratic  systems  is  that  stakeholders,  citizens  and  civil 
society  organisations  (CSOs),  are  consulted  and  involved  in  the  preparation  of  laws  and 
policies on the basis of transparent processes, at European, national, regional and local levels. 
The space for public debate in Europe is and must remain open, also to ideas from across the 
world6.  

There is a growing concern that the openness of European societies is being exploited for covert 
interference7 from foreign governments to manipulate decision-making processes and public 
opinion in the EU. The European Parliament8 and the Council9 have underlined the importance 
of  addressing  the  threat  to  democracy  posed  by  such  covert  foreign  interference. 
Governments10, citizens11 and civil society organisations12 are concerned by the impact of such 
external interference on European democracies and the public sphere. For example, a recent 
Flash Eurobarometer survey on Citizenship and Democracy found that about 8 in 10 Europeans 
agree that foreign interference in European democratic systems is a serious problem that should 
be addressed13. Concerns have intensified after Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and 
the  so-called  “Qatar-gate”,  a  corruption  scandal  involving  Members  of  the  European 
Parliament  and  EU  staff.  The  Union  witnessed  numerous  instances  of  some  third  countries 
seeking to covertly influence in its politics and decision-making14. While the full scale of this 
phenomenon is unknown, reports of such activities exist15.  

‘A  new  push  for  European  democracy’  is  a  headline  priority  of  the  Commission  and  many 
initiatives have been adopted over recent years, including in the framework of the European 
Democracy Action Plan16 presented in 2020, that put forward a comprehensive approach to 
‘empower  citizens  and  build  more  resilient  democracies  across  the  EU’.  Existing  policy 

6   Communication on a Global Approach to Research and Innovation, COM(2021) 252 final. 
7   The term ‘foreign interference’ is defined in the glossary. For more information on this see Annex G of the supporting 

study.   

8   Since 2019, the European Parliament established two Special Committees INGE and INGE2 on foreign interference in all 
democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation, and the strengthening of integrity, transparency 
and accountability in the European Parliament that adopted resolutions in this area. See European Parliament resolution of 
9  March  2022  on  foreign  interference  in  all  democratic  processes  in  the  European  Union,  including  disinformation 
(2020/2268(INI)),  European  Parliament  resolution  of  13  July  2023  on  recommendations  for  reform  of  European 
Parliament’s rules on transparency, integrity, accountability and anti-corruption (2023/2034(INI)), European Parliament 
resolution  of  1  June  2023  on  foreign  interference  in  all  democratic  processes  in  the  European  Union,  including 
disinformation (2022/2075(INI)). 

9   Council  Conclusions  “Complementary  efforts  to  enhance  resilience  and  counter  hybrid  threats”,  10  December  2019, 
14972/19;  Council  conclusion  “Global  approach  to  Research  and  Innovation  -  Europe's  strategy  for  international 
cooperation  in  a  changing  world”,  28  September  2021,  12301/21;  Council  conclusions  “on  Foreign  Information 
Manipulation and Interference (FIMI)”, 18 July 2022, 11173/22. 

10   See various consultations with Member States detailed in Annex 2, for example the focus group meeting with Member 

State authorities of 30 March 2023 and the focus group meeting with local authorities of 28 March 2023. 
11   See Flash Eurobarometer 528 on Citizenship and Democracy, and Flash Eurobarometer 522 on Democracy.  
12   See various consultations with CSOs detailed in Annex 2, for example the focus group meeting with CSOs of 14 February 
2023  and  the  focus  group  meeting  with  CIV  grants  beneficiaries  working  on  projects  related  to  the  2024  European 
Parliament elections of 1 March 2023.  

13   See Flash Eurobarometer 528 on Citizenship and Democracy. 
14   See note 8. 
15   See supporting study. See also “The landscape of Hybrid Threats: A Conceptual Model”, Giannopoulos, G., Smith, H. and 

Theocharidou, M. editor(s), Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2021. 

16   Communication on the European Democracy Action Plan, COM/2020/790 final. 

5 

 
 
interventions include updating rules governing European political parties and foundations17, 
regulating  various  aspects  of  online  platforms18,  addressing  disinformation19,  detecting, 
analysing  and  countering  foreign  information  manipulation  and  interference  (FIMI)20, 
regulating political advertising including on social media21, supporting free, fair and inclusive 
elections,  supporting  free  and  plural  media22,  addressing  questions  of  investments  by  third 
countries in electoral infrastructure23, cybersecurity24, anti-money laundering and corruption25.  

Instead  of  relying  on  traditional  and  formal  diplomatic  channels  and  processes,  foreign 
governments increasingly rely on lobbyists and other forms of influence to promote their policy 
objectives26.  Typically,  states  have  resources  that  private  actors  might  not  have  and  pursue 
different  aims.  As  noted  by  the  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development 
(OECD),  foreign  governments  “can  have  a  transformative  impact  on  the  political  life  of  a 
country,  not  only  on  domestic  policies  but  also  on  its  foreign  policy,  its  election  system, 
economic interests and its ability to protect its national interests and national security”27 and 
the risks involved in lobbying and influence activities of foreign government are higher than 
the risks posed by purely domestic lobbying and influence activities28. 

Several democratic countries outside the Union have already adopted measures including to 
enhance  transparency  of  interest  representation  activities  carried  out  on  behalf  of  third 
countries and support democratic accountability. These include Australia and the US, while 

17   Proposal  for  a  Regulation  on  the  statute  and  funding  of  European  political  parties  and  European  political  foundations 

(COM(2021)734 final). 

18   Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For 

Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act). 

19   The  2022 

strengthened  EU  Code  of  Practice  on  Disinformation 

at:  https://digital-
strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/code-practice-disinformation; The Commission guidelines for teachers and educators on 
tackling  disinformation  and  promoting  digital 
: 
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/a224c235-4843-11ed-92ed-01aa75ed71a1/language-en.  

through  education  and 

is  available  at 

available 

training 

literacy 

is 

20   Information  about  the  EU’s  actions  on  FIMI  is  available  at:  https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/tackling-disinformation-

foreign-information-manipulation-interference_en  

21   Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the transparency and targeting of political 

advertising (COM/2021/731 final). 

22   Proposal for a Regulation establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market (European Media 
Freedom Act) and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (COM/2022/457 final); Proposal for a Directive on protecting persons 
who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings (“Strategic lawsuits against 
public  participation”)  (COM/2022/177  final);  Commission  Recommendation  (EU)  2022/758  of  27  April  2022  on 
protecting  journalists  and  human  rights  defenders  who  engage  in  public  participation  from  manifestly  unfounded  or 
abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’). 

23   Regulation (EU) 2019/452 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union (FDI 

Screening Regulation). 

24  Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high 
common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2 Directive); Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA (the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and 
communications  technology  cybersecurity  certification  (EU  Cybersecurity  Act);  Regulation  (EU)  2022/2554  of  the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on Digital Operational Resilience for the Financial Sector 
(DORA Regulation); Proposal for a Regulation on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements 
(Cyber Resilience Act) (COM/2022/454 final). 

25   Proposed package of legislative proposals on anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism legislative 
package, including the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mechanisms to be 
put in place by the Member States for the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering 
or terrorist financing and repealing Directive (EU) 2015/849 (COM/2021/423 final), and the Proposal for a Directive on 
combating  corruption,  replacing Council Framework  Decision  2003/568/JHA  and  the  Convention  on  the  fight  against 
corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union and 
amending Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council (COM (2023) 234 final). 

26   OECD (2021), Lobbying in the 21st Century: Transparency, Integrity and Access, OECD Publishing, Paris, available at: 

https://doi.org/10.1787/c6d8eff8-en, page 43. 

27   See note 26, page 44. 
28   See note 26, page 45. 

6 

 
 
other  democracies,  like  the  UK  and  Canada  are  considering  adopting  similar  measures.29 
International organisations and fora such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE), OECD and G7 have also been working on the issue.  

In the internal market, a wide range of cross-border activities which seeks to influence decision-
making processes is conducted on behalf of third countries. Such activities involve different 
types  of  EU-based  commercial  and  non-commercial  entities  such  as  think  tanks,  lobbying 
firms, CSOs, or law firms. Interest representation involves direct contact with decision-makers, 
communication  and  other  efforts  to  represent  a  particular  interest  and  influence  decision-
makers and the wider debate. While these activities can be conducted transparently, this is not 
always the case, and national measures intended to ensure the transparency and accountability 
of such activities are not always effective in isolation at the national level.  

Where  they  are  regulated,  interest  representation  activities  carried  out  on  behalf  of  third 
countries  are  regulated  together  with  other  interest  representation  activities.  Currently,  15 
Member States30 have a transparency register on interest representation activities, albeit only 
at sub-national level for some31. In those Member States, where such a regulatory framework 
exists, it is highly fragmented across the EU32. The scope of the entities and activities covered 
differ widely33. There are different definitions of interest representation activities, thresholds 
on the size of entities or level of activities triggering transparency or registration requirements, 
as well as record-keeping34. Moreover, the existence, powers, structures and independence of 
supervisory authorities differ greatly across the EU. The same goes for the nature of sanctions, 
and  amounts  of  pecuniary  fines,  where  they  exist35.  12  Member  States  do  not  regulate  the 
transparency of interest representation activities36. 

The  internal  market,  already  fragmented  by  existing  rules,  risks  being  further  fragmented. 
Member States have expressed increasing concerns about covert influence by third countries 
in  democratic processes  in  the  EU. Some Member States  are thinking  to  adopt  measures to 
protect  their  democratic  sphere.  Member  States  generally  agree  that  EU  action  is  needed 
against the background of the need to address foreign interference. 

In its Work Programme for 2023, the Commission announced that it would present a “Defence 
of  Democracy”  package  to  increase  transparency  and  accountability,  thus  promoting 
“institutional trust and democratic values in the EU” and protecting “the EU democratic sphere 
from covert interference in democratic processes”.  

29   Although these legislations are not comparable to the so-called “foreign agent laws” as they are in place or have been 
proposed in Russia or Georgia, some of these acts have been criticized as being too broad and vague in their definitions 
and scope as well as envisaging criminal sanctions. The proposed measures consider these concerns and, therefore, define 
key terms very precisely, envisage a targeted scope and proportionate sanctions. 

30   DE, IE, EL, ES, FR, IT, CY, LT, LU, NL, AT, PL, RO, SI, FI. 
31   ES, IT. 
32   See Section 2.1.1. 
33   For example, FR has a law on the transparency of public life that requires lobbyists to register with a public register and 
report on their activities, such as those with foreign interests. Other Member States, such as IE or NL, also have laws or 
regulations governing lobbying activities, although the scope and requirements of these laws vary significantly.  

34   As  further  examples  of  the  potential  effect  of  differing  registration  requirements,  an  entity  carrying  out  interest 
representation  in  BE  would  need  to  disclose  the  names  of  the  customers  represented  by  them;  meanwhile,  in  LU,  the 
identity of clients do not have to be entered into the register. In a similar vein, there is a discrepancy between obligations 
to report financial figures on the expenditures that concern specifically interest representation activities. The federal lobby 
register established in DE makes it mandatory to enter data on the annual financial expenditures of the organisation for 
interest representation. In contrast, there is no comparable rule in the IE Regulation of Lobbying Act. 

35   A complete mapping of this fragmentation is available in Annex 6 and 7.   
36   BE, BG, CZ, DK, EE, HR, LV, HU, MT, PT, SK, SE. 

7 

 
 
The package builds upon and is complementary to the European Democracy Action Plan and 
fully aligned with its logic37. The initiative related to interest representation activities is a key 
component  of  the  Defence  of  Democracy  package.  The  package  will  also  include  non-
legislative measures aiming to promote high standards for elections to the European Parliament 
and elections and referenda at national level and to foster an enabling civic space and promote 
the inclusive and effective participation of citizens and civil society organisations in the public 
policy-making processes. 

The main aim behind this initiative is to introduce common transparency and accountability 
standards  in  the  internal  market  for  interest  representation  activities  carried  out  on 
behalf  of  third  countries.  By  providing  common  transparency  requirements  for  such 
activities, the initiative will improve the functioning of the internal market for such activities, 
by creating a level playing field, reducing unnecessary cost for entities that seek to carry out 
interest  representation  activities  on  behalf  of  third  countries  across  borders  and  prevent 
regulatory arbitrage.  

This intervention would also enhance the integrity of, and public trust in, the EU and Member 
State democratic institutions by ensuring the transparency of interest representation activities 
carried  out  on  behalf  of  third  countries  on  the  basis  of  proportionate  standards,  and  by 
improving  the  knowledge  of  the  magnitude,  trends  and  actors  of  interest  representation 
activities carried out on behalf of third countries. The initiative would ensure full respect of 
fundamental  rights  and  democratic  values;  strong  safeguards  should  mitigate  the  potential 
negative impacts on concerned entities.  

This  initiative  will  provide  for  common  transparency  standards  in  the  context  of  legal  and 
legitimate interest representation activities carried out in the interests of third countries in the 
internal market. While interest representation activities carried out covertly on behalf of third 
countries could amount to foreign interference, foreign interference encompasses a wide range 
of activities that are carried out by or on behalf of a foreign state or a state actor, and which are 
coercive, deceptive or corrupting and are contrary to the sovereignty, values and interests of 
the Union and its Member States. This can for example include disinformation, corruption of 
officials or cyber-attacks on the IT infrastructure supporting elections. This initiative does not 
aim to exhaustively address all foreign interference activities.  

The  legislative  initiative  complements  existing  measures  at  EU  level  that  contribute  to 
enhancing transparency and addressing certain activities carried out by or on behalf of third 
countries. As regards activities impacting the democratic sphere, this includes the proposal for 
a  Regulation  on  the  transparency  and  targeting  of  political  advertising,  the  proposal  for 
European Media Freedom Act38 (EMFA), the Digital Services Act39 (DSA), the Regulation on 
European political parties and European political foundations and the proposal to amend it40 
and  non-legislative  measures  for  combating  disinformation  and  other  forms  of  foreign 
interference, including the Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Toolbox. It also 
complements and is coherent with other legislative proposals, legislation and initiatives beyond 

37  It also builds on the package reinforcing democracy and integrity of elections presented by the Commission on 25 November 

2021. 

38   Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common framework for media 
services in the internal market (European Media Freedom Act) and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (COM(2022) 457 
final),  which  aims  to  address  fragmented  national  regulatory  approaches  related  to  media  freedom  and  pluralism  and 
editorial  independence  to  ensure  the  free  provision  of  media  services  within  the  internal  market,  while  ensuring  that 
Member States remain able to adapt media policy to their national context, in line with their competences. 

39  Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For 

Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EU (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1). 

40  Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 on the statute 

and funding of European political parties and European political foundations (OJ L317, 4.11.2014, p. 1). 

8 

 
 
 
the European Democracy Action Plan which enhance the transparency of activities affecting 
democratic processes, such as the Anti-Money Laundering Directive and the Whistle-blower 
Directive. 

The transparency achieved by these EU instruments and initiatives leaves an important part 
uncovered which this initiative aims to address – interest representation carried out on behalf 
of third countries.  

2.  WHAT IS THE PROBLEM AND WHY IS IT A PROBLEM? 

2.1. What are the problems? 

2.1.1.  Obstacles  to  the  internal  market  for  interest  representation 

activities carried out on behalf of third countries. 

In Member States where it is regulated, interest representation activities carried out on behalf 
of third countries are regulated together with other interest representation activities. 
At present, 15 Member States41 regulate the transparency of interest representation activities 
and have a transparency register on interest representation activities, albeit only at sub-national 
level for some42. In those Member States, where such a regulatory framework exists, it is highly 
fragmented  across  the  EU43,  and  only  9  of  those  Member  States  impose  a  specific  legal 
obligation  to  register  before  carrying  out  interest  representation  activities44.  Conversely,  12 
Member States do not regulate the transparency of interest representation activities45. 

Fragmentation of the internal market for interest representation activities. 
The definition of interest representation activities46, and the scope of the entities and activities covered 
differ widely leading to gaps in entities and activities covered. The actors required to register are usually 
formulated in general terms across Member States47, with natural and legal persons conducting interest 
representation activities having an obligation to register themselves. In 5 Member States, more precise 
rules exist on the personal scope for registering48.  

10  Member  States49  do  not  have  any  thresholds  in  place  for  registration.  In  2  Member  States50, 
thresholds are purely financial, while in the 3 others51, they are non-financial and based on criteria such 

41   DE, IE, EL, ES, FR, IT, CY, LT, LU, NL, AT, PL, RO, SI, FI. . 
42   ES, IT. 
43   A complete mapping of this fragmentation is available in Annexes 6 and 7.   
44   DE, IE, EL, FR, LT, LU, AT, PL, RO.  
45   BE, BG, CZ, DK, EE, HR, LV, HU, MT, PT, SK, SE. 
46   For example, in IE, an interest representation activity is defined as “any communication with a designated public officer 
that relates to a “relevant matter”; while, in LT interest representation activities are defined as actions taken by a natural 
or legal person, in an attempt to exert influence over defined public officials to have legal acts adopted or rejected in the 
interests of the client or the beneficiary of lobbying activities.  

47   DE, IE, ES, IT, CY, LT, LU, RO, SI. 
48   BE,  IE,  FR,  NL,  AT.  In  AT,  a  limitative  list  exists  with  4  categories  of  entities:  lobbying  companies,  companies  that 
employ corporate lobbyists, self-governing bodies, and interest groups. In BE, the Rules of the House of Representatives 
specify the entities that are obliged to register. The list includes, for example, specialised law firms, NGOs and think tanks. 
In FR a lobbyist is defined as natural person as part of a professional activity, or legal entity in which an executive manager, 
an employee or a member conducts interest representation work as their main or regular activity. In IE, different groups 
of lobbyists are required to register (interest body, advocacy body, professional lobbyist, any person communicating about 
the development or zoning of land). In NL, 3 groups are defined who need to register in the public register of lobbyists: 
public affairs and public relations employees; agency representatives of CSOs; and representatives of municipalities and 
provinces.  

49   BE, IE, EL, ES, CY, LT, LU, NL RO, SI. 
50   FR, NL. 
51   DE, AT, IE. For instance, an entity paid to carry out interest representation professionally on behalf of a client that has 
less than 10 employees would not need to register in IE, but it would need to register in DE for the same activity, since DE 
law requires the registration of interest representation of a commercial nature. 

9 

 
 
as the frequency of contacts, the number of employees, or the time dedicated to lobbying  activities. 
Record-keeping obligations also differ across Member States52.  

With  regard  to  supervision,  enforcement  and  sanctions,  in  9  Member  States53,  the  registers  are 
supervised  by  an independent  authority.  3  other Member  States54  tasked  their  government  with  this 
supervision, while 3 others55 tasked their parliament. All Member States that have a supervisory regime 
also  have  sanctions  regimes.  Pecuniary sanctions exist  in  10 Member  States56.  In  all  those Member 
States, pecuniary sanctions are of an administrative nature, except in France where pecuniary sanctions 
are  of  a  criminal  nature.  Criminal  sanctions  exist  in  Member  States  such  as  France  and  Ireland57. 
Suspension or removal from a register is present as an enforcement measure in 2 Member States58.  

This  fragmentation  causes  several  obstacles  in  the  internal  market  for  interest 
representation  activities  carried  out  on  behalf  of  third  countries  that  undermine  the 
proper functioning of the internal market.   

First,  there  is  an  uneven  playing  field.  Geographically,  the  transparency  of  interest 
representation  activities  is  regulated  differently  in  different  Member  States.  This  regulatory 
fragmentation results in a landscape in which interest representation activities are costly and 
complex to perform in some Member States and not, or not to the same extent, in others. Among 
providers of interest representation activities,  diverging requirements at Member State level 
impact different types of stakeholders in different ways, making them subject to more stringent 
requirements than others although they would be performing the same activities59. 

Uneven playing field between different actors 

Stakeholder views: 
During  the  focus  group  with  representatives  of  the  legal  profession60,  a  majority  of  participants 
emphasised the importance of setting up transparency requirements that apply to all entities performing 
interest representation activities in the internal market. Among other, certain participants expressed the 
view that there are loopholes in the current regimes regarding CSOs which carry out similar activities 
while not being subject to similar transparency requirements regarding the funding of their activities 
influencing decision-making processes in the EU. 

During  the  second  focus  group  with  commercial  actors  involved  in  interest  representation61,  one 
participant noted that in its Member State some of the exemptions are too broad and for example exclude 
lawyers from registration requirements although they may carry similar activities.  

Illustrative case study n°1:  
Commercial Company A carries out interest representation activities in Germany and in Lithuania and 
faces different competitors in both Member States which do not face the same regulatory requirements. 
In  Germany,  many  of  its  competitors  are  organised  like  it,  in  the  form  of  a  commercial  company. 
However, it also faces competition from law firms which also perform interest representation activities 
but do not always incur regulatory costs related to these activities when working in Germany at local 

52   For example, some Member States conflate record keeping obligations with registration obligations, for example by not 
distinguishing what is to be disclosed upon registration and what data has to be recorded and kept afterwards, as is the case 
in AT. Specific rules on record-keeping exist for example in DE, where the federal lobby register makes it mandatory to 
record  and  update  data  on  the  annual  financial  expenditures  of  the  organisation  for  interest  representation,  while,  in 
contrast, there are no comparable rules in IE. 

53   IE, EL, ES, FR, IT, CY, LT, SI, FI. Note that, in ES, this supervision only happens at regional level. 
54   LU, AT, RO. 
55   BE, DE, NL. 
56   DE, IE, EL, ES (albeit at regional level), FR, CY, AT, SI, LT, PL. These can differ widely, between EUR 300 000 in ES 
and EUR 4 500 in LT. A complete mapping of this fragmentation regarding sanctions is available in Annexes 6 and 7.   

57   In FR up to 1 year of imprisonment, in IE up to 2 years of imprisonment. 
58   DE, EL.  
59   For example, in LT, CSOs are explicitly excluded from the scope of registration and transparency requirements. In DE, 

legal professionals are also not required to register when they perform interest representation activities.  

60   See focus group with legal professionals of 15 December 2022. 
61   See second focus group meeting with commercial actors involved in interest representation of 1 March 2023.  

10 

 
 
level, as legal professionals only fall under the scope of rules on registration and transparency in some 
Länder (e.g. Baden-Württemberg62) whereas other Länder do not include them in the scope of their 
transparency registers (e.g. Brandenburg63)64. In Lithuania, Commercial Company A faces regulatory 
requirements which do not apply to civil society organisations performing similar activities, because 
these  are  excluded  from  the  scope  of  the  registration  and  transparency  requirements  existing  in 
Lithuania65.  

Second, there are unnecessary costs for entities that wish to operate across borders in the 
internal market. At present, the process of entering a new market in another Member State than 
the state of establishment is made difficult by the costs of complying with fragmented rules.  

Compliance with different regulatory frameworks 

Stakeholder views 
Interest representation service providers expressed their desire to expand beyond their Member State’s 
market66. During a focus group consultation with commercial actors involved in cross-border interest 
representation  activities,  participants  explained  their  difficulties  to  comply  with  all  the  different 
transparency registers’ requirements, in particular with the need to maintain up-to-date information in 
all of them, as the obligations vary across Member States. 

Illustrative case study n°2 
A small-sized service provider established in Sweden, specialised in interest representation activities 
on  behalf  of  third  country  A,  wants  to  carry  out  these  activities  in  several  other  Member  States.  It 
therefore  has  to  comply  with  different  rules  and  requirements  in  each Member State  which  implies 
costs.  It  decides  to  start  with  Greece  and  Slovenia.  At  present,  Sweden67  does  not  regulate  interest 
representation activities while Greek68 and Slovene69 laws require to declare information such as the 
institutions or bodies it intends to direct its interest representation activities to, the policy areas and 
types of decisions it intends to target, and the intended results of its interest representation activities. 
The service provider needs to ensure that its internal record-keeping allows it to easily comply with 
Greek and Slovene laws.  

The service provider then decides to enter the German market. However, its internal record-keeping is 
not fit for purpose in this new context because Slovenia70 requires financial disclosures to be based on 
payments received from interest regroups for each matter handled while in Germany71 these are based 
on expenditures linked to interest representation activities. 

62   See Gesetz über ein Transparenzregister, Landtag von Baden-Württemberg, Drucksache 16/9883. 
63   See Führung eines Lobbyregisters, Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt für das Land Brandenburg, Part 1, No. 20, Annex 10, 25 

June 2020. 

64   However, at the federal level in DE, legal professionals do not fall under the scope of the registration and transparency 
requirement  (i.e.  when  they  write  legal  opinions,  give  legal  advice  etc.),  unless  they  engage  in  activities  that  aim  at 
adopting, changing or abolishing a legal text by the Bundestag or the federal government. 

65   Article  7(11)  of  the  Law  on  Lobbying  Activities  of  the  Republic  of  Lithuania,  available  here:  https://vtek.lt/wp-

content/uploads/2021/06/EN_Law_on_Lobbying_Activities_2021.docx. 

66   See focus group with commercial actors involved in cross border interest representation activities of 1 March 2023.   
67   See Annex 6. 
68   Article 7(1)(a) of the Law Np. 4829 on Enhancing transparency and accountability in State institutions, available here: 

Law 4829/2021 Government Gazette A 166/10.9.2021 (taxheaven.gr). 

69   Integrity  and  Prevention  of  Corruption  Act,  Article  64,  available  here:  https://www.kpk-rs.si/kpk/wp-

content/uploads/2018/06/ZintPK-ENG.pdf.pdf. 

70   Integrity  and  Prevention  of  Corruption  Act,  Article  64,  available  here:  https://www.kpk-rs.si/kpk/wp-

content/uploads/2018/06/ZintPK-ENG.pdf.pdf. 

71   Lobby Register Act (Gesetz zur Einführung eines Lobbyregisters für die Interessenvertretung gegenüber dem Deutschen 
-  LobbyRG)),  2021,  available  at: 

Bundestag  und  gegenüber  der  Bundesregierung 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/lobbyrg/BJNR081800021.html, paragraph 6(1)6. 

(Lobbyregistergesetz 

11 

 
 
Later on, the interest representation service provider decides to also expand into Ireland and Lithuania. 
While the mandatory update timeframes to the Greek72 and Slovene73 registers are the same, i.e. annual, 
the requirements in Ireland74 are to update registration information every 4 months, and in Lithuania75 
within  7  days  following  each  lobbying  activity.  This  will  lead  to  creating  an  on-going  mechanism 
throughout  the  year  instead  of  performing  a  disclosure  exercise  once  yearly,  as  well  as  potentially 
dedicating resources to maintain registrations up-to-date across the markets it operates in. 

This situation also leads to one main consequence. The uneven playing field directs cross-
border  interest  representation  activities  away  from  more  regulated  Member  States 
towards less regulated ones or where enforcement is limited. In other words, there is a risk 
of forum shopping and regulatory arbitrage by entities seeking to evade regulation in certain 
Member  States.  This  risk  is  especially  high  in  those  Member  States  that  have  a  regulatory 
regime for the transparency of interest representation, but do not make registration compulsory 
or  lack  monitoring  or  enforcement  mechanisms.  Beyond  the  internal  market-related 
consequences described here, this phenomenon of regulatory arbitrage could also present an 
opportunity for third-country actors to evade transparency requirements and covertly influence 
decision-making in the EU.   

2.1.2.  Unknown magnitude, trends and actors of interest representation 

activities carried out on behalf of third countries 

The scale of interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries in the 
Member states is largely unknown.  

There  are  indications  that  the  broader  phenomenon  of  foreign  interference  exists  and  is 
increasing. Some stakeholders have indicated that third country governments provide funding 
with clear objectives which aim at legal or policy changes76. There are also numerous media 
reports of foreign interference from third countries whereby interest representation activities 
are  being  carried  out  on  behalf  of  third  countries  covertly  to  influence  decision-making 
processes, sow distrust and undermine the EU’s democratic processes77.  

Interest  representation  activities  can  take  very  different  forms  such  as  direct  lobbying  of 
decision-makers, organising or participating in meetings, conferences or events, contributing 
to  or  participating  in  consultations  or  parliamentary  hearings,  organising  communication  or 
advertising  campaigns,  organising  networks  and  grassroots  initiatives,  preparing  policy  and 
position papers, legislative amendments, opinion polls, surveys or open letters, or activities in 
the  context  of  research  and  education,  where  they  are  specifically  carried  out  with  that 
objective. They can be conducted both at European, national, and sub-national level and they 
can have a harmful and disruptive impact on decision-making processes. However, Member 
States do not consistently collect or systematically share information on interest representation 
carried out on behalf of third countries and there is no reliable and consistent data on these 

72   Article 10(1) of the Law Np. 4829 on Enhancing transparency and accountability in State institutions, available here: Law 

4829/2021 Government Gazette A 166/10.9.2021 (taxheaven.gr). 

73   Integrity  and  Prevention  of  Corruption  Act,  Article  63,  available  here:  https://www.kpk-rs.si/kpk/wp-

content/uploads/2018/06/ZintPK-ENG.pdf.pdf. 

74   Sections 7 and 12(1) of the Regulation of Lobbying Act. 
75   Article  10(1)  of  the  Law  on  Lobbying  Activities  of  the  Republic  of  Lithuania,  available  here:  https://vtek.lt/wp-

content/uploads/2021/06/EN_Law_on_Lobbying_Activities_2021.docx. 

76   In the consultation, 5 CSOs explained that “few government donors, including the EU itself, regularly provide operating 
grants. The EU and other governments generally provide project-based funding with clear objective – many of which aim 
at  legal  or  policy  changes”.  Another  CSO  explained  that  many  CSOs,  especially  those  in  the  field  of  human  rights, 
“currently rely on funding by foreign foundations and public entities to carry out their advocacy and campaigning work”. 
1  CSO  clarified  that  “the  mere  fact  that a  CSO benefits  from  funding  form a  foreign government or  associated  entity 
supporting legal or policy change is not sufficient to cast doubts over the legitimate nature of its activities”. 

77   See chapter 2 and Annex C of the supporting study which includes an extensive collection of covert foreign influence in 

decision-making processes in the EU. 

12 

 
 
activities.  This  results  in  difficulties  to  identify  and  map  interest  representation  activities 
carried out on behalf of third countries and do so in a coordinated and efficient way across the 
EU. This makes the situation prone to foreign interference operations, as third countries may 
seek to exploit the information asymmetry among authorities. In turn, it has an effect on wider 
perceptions about the integrity of public decision-making.  

The  lack  of  transparency  and  inconsistency  of  regulation  and  oversight,  the  many  different 
ways in which interest representation activities on behalf of third countries are carried out and 
the difficulty of measuring them, do not allow to monitor these activities accurately, especially 
with  quantitative  data.  It  also  risks  conflating  legitimate  interest  representation  by  third 
countries with covert activities which may not pursue such ends. 

Differences in data collection requirements  
Discrepancies  in  data  collection  requirements  in  Member  States  make  it  difficult  to  shed  light  and 
identify patterns on the magnitude of the phenomenon of interest representation activities carried out 
on behalf of third countries, be it with regard to the entities, the activities they perform, and the amounts 
of money involved. 

While  12  Member  States78  require  identification  data  of  interest  representatives  (e.g.  name  of  the 
lobbyist), only 8 Member States79 request specific information on the client represented by the entity 
carrying out interest representation activities (e.g. name of the client). Furthermore, only 10 Member 
States80  require  entities  to  provide  information  on  the  policy  field  in  which  they  pursue  interest 
representation for their clients, while 6 Member States81 ask for information on the budget/expenditure 
from entities carrying out interest representation activities, albeit in different ways82.  

Data comparisons are further complexified by the differences in regimes with regard to the updates of 
that data. For example, in Ireland83, updates have to take place 3 times a year, while in countries such 
as France84 or Greece85 updates take place once yearly. In other Member States such as Finland86 or 
Germany87, only some information has to be updated yearly while other information has to be updated 
twice yearly (e.g. financial information in Finland) or at the end of every quarter (e.g. basic personal 
data  such  as  addresses  and  contact  details  in  Germany).  Another  system  exists  for  example  in 
Lithuania88 where updates have to take place within 7 days of an interest representation activity taking 
place.  

Lastly, data analysis is rendered difficult by the fact that not all registers are public, and that for those 
that are, not all data is publicly accessible. The data of transparency registers on lobbying is made public 
on the websites of 10 Member State89 authorities, while it is not the case in 2 others90. In the Member 

78   BE, DE, IE, EL, FR, IT (at subnational level), LT, LU, NL, AT, RO, SI. 
79   BE, DE, EL, FR, IT (at subnational level), LU, NL, AT. 
80   BE, DE, IE, EL, FR, IT (at subnational level), LT, LU, AT, SI. 
81   DE, ES (at regional level), FR, IT (at subnational level), AT, SI. 
82   For example, in SI, financial information on payments received from interest groups for each matter concerned, while in 
DE, information on financial expenditures involved in the representation of interests are required as well as on the sums 
of any public allowances or grants received. 
of 
and 

83   Sections 

Regulation 

Lobbying 

available 

12(1)(6) 

here: 

Act, 

the 

of 

7 

https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2015/act/5/enacted/en/print.html.  

84   See Articles 3 et seq. Décret No. 2017-879 du 9 mai 2017 relatif au répertoire numérique des représentants d’intérêts, 

available at the following link : https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000034633293/. 

85   Article  10(1)  of 

the  Law  No.  4829  on  Enhancing 

transparency  and  accountability,  available  here: 

https://www.taxheaven.gr/law/4829/2021. 

86   Finnish 

Transparency 

Register  Act 

23.3.2023/430, 

section 

8, 

paragraph 

1, 

available 

at: 

https://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/ajantasa/2023/20230430.   

87   Lobby Register Act (Gesetz zur Einführung eines Lobbyregisters für die Interessenvertretung gegenüber dem Deutschen 
-  LobbyRG)),  2021,  available  at: 

Bundestag  und  gegenüber  der  Bundesregierung 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/lobbyrg/BJNR081800021.html, paragraph 3(3). 

(Lobbyregistergesetz 

88   Article 

10(1) 

of 

the 

Law 

on 

Lobbying 

Activities, 

available 

here: 

https://vtek.lt/wp-

content/uploads/2021/06/EN_Law_on_Lobbying_Activities_2021.docx. 

89   BE, DE, IE, ES (at regional level), FR, IT (at subnational level), LT, LU, NL, AT, RO, SI. 
90   EL, CY. 

13 

 
 
States where transparency registers are publicly accessible, certain restrictions exist. For example, in 
Austria91, the legal regime only requires the disclosure of general information about the purposes and 
amounts  spent  on interest representation  activities  and  does  not  include  most  of  the  information  on 
clients that certain other Member States require (e.g. names and contact details of the clients or granular 
description of the sums received). 

The lack of transparency undermines democratic processes and impacts EU citizens’ trust 
in related processes and/or decision-makers and their ability to exercise their rights and 
responsibilities.  

Citizens  are  concerned  about  the  impacts  of  foreign  government  meddling  with  decision-
making processes in the EU. A recent Eurobarometer on Citizenship and Democracy showed 
that about 8 in 10 Europeans agree that foreign interference in European democratic systems 
is a serious problem that should be addressed92. According to the Online Public Consultation 
84.5% of respondents considered that lobbying or public relations activities remunerated by or 
controlled by third countries triggered a high risk of covert foreign interference. 65% of them 
considered that the activities of think tanks remunerated by third countries triggered  such a 
risk.  A  survey  conducted  by  Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung  on  European  sovereignty  in  8  EU 
Member States93 found that 93% of respondents considered that it is essential or important to 
have common tools to combat foreign interference for Europe to be sovereign94. Due to the 
lack of information on the magnitude, trends and actors of interest representation carried out 
on  behalf  of  third  countries,  it  is  difficult  to  assess  the  reality  and  the  risks  caused  by  this 
phenomenon and establish the data needed to develop evidence-based policy.  

This problem is a European one. Interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third 
countries  is  a  transnational  issue  with  cross-border  implications  that  can  affect  the  policy 
decisions and political processes of other countries. This is because third countries often engage 
in activities aimed at influencing policy decisions and political processes in Member States, 
which can have an impact beyond each Member States’ borders. It is not necessary to exercise 
influence at the European level to impact EU decision-making.  

91   Federal Act on Ensuring Transparency in the Exercise of Political and Economic Interests (Lobby law)‘ (Bundesgesetz 
zur  Sicherung  der  Transparenz  bei  der  Wahrnehmung  politischer  und  wirtschaftlicher  Interessen  (Lobbying-  und 
Interessenvertretungs-Transparenz-Gesetz 
at: 
– 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=20007924 
,  paragraphs 
9(2) and 10(2). 

LobbyG)), 

available 

2012, 

92   See flash Eurobarometer 528 on Citizenship and Democracy. 
93   DE, ES, FR, IT, LT, PL, RO and SE were the countries participating in the study with 8000 citizens from the selected 

countries participating in the interviewing process. 

94   58% of respondent considered such tools “essential”, and 35% considered them “important but not essential”, available at: 

https://www.fes.de/en/survey-europeeignty    

14 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Problem tree: 

2.2. Magnitude of the problems 

As presented in detail in Annexes 3 and 4, the estimates place the number of players in the 
internal market for interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries (the 
population  of  enterprises  that  would  be  subject  to  requirements  under  the  proposed  policy 
options) at between 712-1,068 enterprises95. The number of market actors does not prejudge 
the influence of such activities on the democratic sphere (see section 2.1.2). 

Currently,  there  is  no  comprehensive  data  available  on  the  size  of  the  market  for  interest 
representation across the EU, or the specific market for interest representation activities carried 
out on behalf of third countries. Furthermore, even if interest representation activities carried 
out on behalf of third countries are a transnational issue, there is also a lack of data on the cross-
border activities of these entities carrying out interest representation activities on behalf of third 
countries.  

95   By  Member  State,  FR  (260-390),  DE  (126-189)  and  IT  (74-111)  have  the  most  service  providers  and  contribute 

approximately 65% of all such service providers across the EU-27. 

15 

 
 
 
 
The current legal fragmentation described in the previous section contributes to explain this 
lack of information. Data collection across Member States is not unified and cannot provide a 
sufficient basis to highlight how much of the interest representation activities taking place in 
the internal market happen across borders nor to estimate the size of the market. This issue is 
further compounded by the lack of transparency generally characterising the market for interest 
representation activities. 

The fragmentation of the internal market for interest representation activities carried out on 
behalf of third countries is presented in section 2.1.1. Annex 6 presents the regulatory situation 
in the Member States.  

As explained in Section 2.1.2 comprehensive information on the magnitude, trends and actors 
of interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries is lacking. 

2.3. How will the problems evolve? 

Regarding  the  first  problem,  obstacles  in  the  internal  market,  the  issues  related  to  the 
uneven  playing  field,  the  risk  of  regulatory  arbitrage  and  the  unnecessary  costs  for  entities 
carrying out  interest representation  activities  that wish to  operate across  Member States are 
bound to increase.  

This problem is driven in a large part by the fragmentation of the internal market which is itself 
likely  to  increase.  The  consultations  carried  out  during  the  preparation  of  the  initiative,  in 
particular in the context of focus group meetings and contributions provided by Member State 
authorities showed an increasing risk awareness in Member States about the issue of interest 
representation carried out on behalf of third countries, and an increase in  national plans for 
regulatory interventions to address this  issue. For example, in countries like Poland and the 
Netherlands96, draft laws have been put forward which would impact foreign funding, which 
could affect entities carrying out interest representation on behalf of third countries. In both 
cases, stakeholders expressed concerns, which were also  reflected in  the 2022 Rule of Law 
Report97. Some Member States, such as France, have indicated their interest in regulating in 
particular interest representation carried out on behalf of third countries98. Furthermore, draft 
laws regulating interest representation in general are either under discussion or planned in 12 
Member  States99.  Furthermore,  the  fact  that  Member  States  do  not  consistently  collect  or 
systematically  share  information  on  interest  representation  carried  out  on  behalf  of  third 
countries leads to different levels of awareness of the issue that could result in Member States 
responding  divergently  to  this  phenomenon.  Such  fragmentation  would  exacerbate  the 
obstacles faced by entities carrying out interest representation on behalf of third countries in 
the internal market.  

The  second  problem,  the  unknown  magnitude,  trend  and  actors  of  covert  interest 
representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries, will not be solved over 
time within the current  baseline scenario. Both the issues of the lack of transparency in the 
market  for  interest  representation  activities  carried  out  on  behalf  of  third  countries  and  the 
willingness  of  third  countries  to  covertly  influence  decision-making  in  the  EU  are  likely  to 
remain  or  increase.  While  it  is  in  the  interest  of  many  actors  in  this  market  to  operate 
transparently to preserve the reputation of their industry and of their other clients, the market 

96   See Annex 6. 
97   See 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapters on the rule of law situation in Netherlands and Poland, available at: 
https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2022-

(europa.eu) 

and 

44_1_193999_coun_chap_netherlands_en.pdf 
07/48_1_194008_coun_chap_poland_en.pdf.  

98   Bi-lateral meeting between the Commission and the French Haute Autorité pour la Transparence de la Vie Publique of 14 

September 2023.  

99   According to the supporting study this includes BE, BG, CZ, IE, ES, FR, IT, LV, MT, NL, PL, SK, see Annex 6. 

16 

 
 
for  interest  representation  activities  cannot  by  itself  promote  more  transparency  without 
regulatory interventions.  

In  addition,  an  increase  in  reports  of  interference  operations  carried  out  via  interest 
representation activities would lead to more distrust from citizens in decision-making processes 
and  decision-makers.  The  Commission’s  2021  Strategic  Foresight  Report  indicates  that 
pressure  on  democratic  models  of  governance  and  values  is  likely  to  persist  in  the  coming 
decades due to rising geopolitical tensions, and that “the long-term performance of democratic 
systems hinges on their capacities to adapt to new realities and to remain resilient to internal 
and external challenges”100. As reported by the OECD, foreign governments increasingly rely 
on lobbyists and other forms of influence to promote their policy objectives101. 

3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? 

3.1. Legal basis 

Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) allows for the 
adoption of measures which have as their object the establishment or functioning of the internal 
market and which are considered necessary for the approximation of the provisions laid down 
by law, regulation or administrative action in the Member States. In accordance with Article 
288  TFEU,  these  measures  may  take  the  form  of  regulations,  directives,  decisions, 
recommendations, and opinions. 

The  Court  of  Justice  has  confirmed  that  recourse  to  Article  114  TFEU  as  a  legal  basis  is 
possible  if  the  aim  is  to  prevent  the  emergence  of  future  obstacles  to  trade  as  a  result  of 
divergences in national laws, where the emergence of such obstacles is likely and the measure 
in question is designed to prevent them102. 

Article  114  TFEU  does  not  presuppose  the  existence  of  a  link  with  the  free  movement  of 
services  in  every  situation  covered  by  the  measures  founded  on  that  basis103.  It  permits 
additional objectives to be pursued104. Measures based on Article 114 TFEU may touch upon 
many  different  areas,  because  the  economic  and  the  non-economic  aspects  of  national 
provisions pursuing an objective in the public interest are many times closely intertwined. As 
confirmed by the Court, the EU legislature cannot be prevented from relying on that legal basis 
on the ground that the protection of other policy objectives is a decisive factor in the choices 

100  Commission’s 

2021 

Strategic 

Foresight 

Report, 

available 

at: 

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-

content/EN/ALL/?uri=COM%3A2021%3A750%3AFIN  

101  See note 26, page 43. 
102  Judgments  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  3  December  2019,  Czech  Republic  v  Parliament  and  Council,  C-482/17,  
EU:C:2019:1035, paragraph 35; of 4 May 2016, Poland v Parliament and Council, C-358/14, EU:C:2016:323, paragraph 
33; of 8 June 2010, Vodafone and others v Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, C-58/08, 
EU:C:2010:321,  paragraph  33;  of  14  December  2004,  Arnold  André,  C-434/02,  EU:C:2004:800,  paragraph  31;  of  14 
December 2004, Swedish Match, C-210/03, EU:C:2004:802 paragraph 30; of 12 July 2005, Alliance for Natural Health 
and  Others,  joined  cases  C-154/04  and  C-155/04,  paragraph  29;  and  of  5  October  2000,  Germany  v  Parliament  and 
Council, C-376/98, EU:C:2000:544, paragraph 86. 

103  Judgment of the Court of Justice of 20 May 2003, Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others, joined cases C-465/00 and C-
138/01, EU:C:2003:294, paragraphs 41 and 42. In this case, the Court ruled that the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC 
(at that time based on Article 100A of the Treaty establishing the European Community) could be applied even though it 
applied to a wholly internal situation. See also judgment of the Court of Justice of 6 November 2003, Lindqvist, C-101/01, 
EU:C:2003:596, paragraphs 40 and 41. 

104   Judgments of the Court of Justice of 28 April 1998, Kohll v. Union des caisses de maladie, C-158/96, EU:C:1998:171; 
Decker  v.  Caisse  de  maladie  des  employés  privés,  C-120/95,  EU:C:1998:167;  of  9  October  2001,  Netherlands  v 
Parliament,  C-377/98,  ECLI:EU:C:2001:523,  paragraph  27;  and  of  11  June  1991,  Commission  v  Council,  C-300/89, 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:244, paragraph 13. 

17 

 
 
to be made105. What is relevant is that the measures adopted on that basis be actually intended 
to improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market106.The 
Court focuses on the fulfilment of the conditions for the use of Article 114 TFEU, i.e., that the 
measure in question effectively pursues the internal market objective.  

Currently,  Member  States  have  divergent  approaches  to  defining  and  regulating  interest 
representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries in the internal market. These 
differences restrict the freedom to provide services107 and therefore have a direct effect on the 
functioning of the internal market108. In the absence of EU action, some Member States  are 
likely to implement national legislation. Draft laws regulating interest representation in general 
are either under discussion or planned in 12 Member States109. Poland, the Netherlands and 
France  are  considering  legislations  which  would  affect  in  particular  entities  carrying  out 
interest representation on behalf of third countries. 

In  light  of  the  existing  fragmentation  (see  section  2.1.1),  which  is  likely  to  increase,  it  is 
necessary to  provide for harmonised  transparency  measures  to  create  an  even playing field, 
reduce  existing  compliance  costs  and  regulatory  arbitrage  as  well  as  the  emergence  of 
additional obstacles in the internal market for interest representation activities carried out on 
behalf of third countries, resulting from an inconsistent development of national laws.  

The objective of this intervention is to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market for 
interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries through harmonisation 
of regulatory approaches regarding the transparency of such activities.  

Even  though  Article  114(3)  TFEU  does  not  mention  the  resilience  of  EU  democracies  and 
decision-making  processes  (unlike,  for  example,  a  high  level  of  health  protection, 
environmental protection or consumer protection), it is inherent to the purpose of Article 114 
TFEU  that  the  objectives  of  the  national  rules  which  are  to  be  approximated  through 
harmonisation  should  be  taken  into  account.  The  objective  of  ensuring  the  transparency  of 
activities affecting public decision-making and the functioning of democratic institutions is a 
legitimate public goal. It therefore follows from the purpose of Article 114 TFEU that EU rules 
harmonising national  rules  adopted to  regulate  an  activity in the pursuit of  these goals may 
themselves  pursue  the  same  ends.  In  this  regard,  this  intervention  also  aims  to  enhance  the 
integrity of, and public trust in, the EU and Member State democratic institutions by ensuring 
the transparency of interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries.   

Furthermore, in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) democracy is recognised as 
one of the essential values on which the Union is founded. The Court has ruled on 16 February 
2022 on the rule of law conditionality regulation that “the EU must be able to defend those 
values, within the limits of its powers as laid down by the Treaties”110. This case law indicates 
that the EU legislature is empowered to ensure the protection of the values mentioned in Article 

105  Judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  10  December  2002,  The  Queen  v  Secretary  of  State  for  Health,  ex  parte  British 
American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd., C-491/01, EU:C:2002:741, where the policy objective 
at hand was public health protection. 

106  See note 103, in particular judgment of the Court of Justice of 6 November 2003, Lindqvist, C-101/01, EU:C:2003:596, 

paragraphs 40 and 41. 

107  For example, during the second focus group meeting with commercial actors involved in interest representation of 1 March 
2023,1 participant expressed its difficulty to maintain up-to-date registration information in all the markets in operates in 
across the Union (in its case, BE, DE, NL, as well as the EU TR). 

108  Judgments  of  the  Court of  Justice  of  12  December  2006,  Germany  v  Parliament and  Council  (Tobacco 2),  C-380/03, 
EU:C:2006:772, paragraph 37; of 4 May 2016, Poland v Parliament and Council, C-358/14, EU:C:2016:323, para 32; and 
of 8 June 2010, The Queen, on the application of Vodafone Ltd and Others v Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise 
and Regulatory Reform (Vodafone), C-58/08, EU:C:2010:321, paragraph 32. 

109  According to the supporting study this includes BE, BG, CZ, ES, FR, IE, IT, LV, MT, NL, PL, SK, see Annex 6. 
110  Judgment of the Court of Justice of 16 February 2022,  Hungary v Parliament and Council, C-156/21, EU:C:2022:97, 

paragraph 127. 

18 

 
 
2 TEU and of other fundamental rights (such as the right to receive information) where it has 
an appropriate legal basis for taking legislative action. 

EU action focusing on transparency is needed to prevent obstacles to the provision of interest 
representation  activities  carried  out  on  behalf  of  third  country  entities,  ensuring  the 
establishment  and  functioning  of  the  internal  market.  It  will  also  contribute  to  improve  the 
knowledge on the magnitude, trends and actors of interest representation activities carried out 
on behalf of third countries. Importantly, the intervention does not aim to restrict the provision 
of  interest  representation  activities  carried  out  on  behalf  of  third  countries  in  the  internal 
market.  

3.2. Subsidiarity: Necessity and added value of the EU action 

According  to  the  principle  of  subsidiarity  (Article  5(3)  TEU),  action  at  EU  level  should  be 
taken only when the aims envisaged cannot be achieved sufficiently by Member States alone 
and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects, be better achieved by the EU.  

As Member States’ rules affecting interest representation on behalf of third countries diverge 
in their scope, content and effect, a patchy framework of national rules is appearing and risks 
to increase, especially when it comes to interest representation activities carried out on behalf 
of third countries. It undermines the internal market by creating an uneven playing field and 
unnecessary  costs  for  entities  that  seek  to  carry  out  cross-border  interest  representation 
activities  on  behalf  of  third  countries.  It  invites  regulatory  arbitrage  to  avoid  transparency 
measures  which  in  turn  impacts  the  citizens’  confidence  and  trust  in  the  effectiveness  of 
regulation.  

Only intervention at EU level can solve these problems, as regulation at national level already 
results  in  the  creation  of  obstacles  to  cross-border  interest  representation  activities  in  the 
internal market. In contrast, the effects of any action taken under national law would be limited 
to a single Member State and risks being circumvented or be difficult to oversee in relation to 
entities carrying out  interest  representation on behalf of third  countries  from  other Member 
States. Furthermore, some Member States are currently considering legislative initiatives in the 
field of foreign influence that might not align with the proportionate and targeted approach of 
this initiative and that might  not  provide with  a  comprehensive system  of safeguards. Only 
action at EU level can address this consistently across the internal market. Introducing common 
and proportionate standards for transparency of interest representation carried out on behalf of 
third countries at EU level is essential to ensure that such measures are established consistently 
across  all  Member  States  with  respect  to  all  fundamental  rights  and  in  particular  subject  to 
comprehensive safeguards including access to the courts. 

Finally,  interest  representation  activities  carried  out  on  behalf  of  third  countries  is  a 
transnational  issue  with  cross-border  implications  that  need  to  be  addressed  at  EU  level. 
Influencing policy decisions and political processes in one Member State can have an impact 
beyond that Member State’s borders, in another Member State or at the European level. The 
absence of EU-level action may result in some Member States being less knowledgeable than 
others about  interest  representation  activities carried out  on behalf of third countries, and it 
seems  unlikely  that Member States would converge on  aligned standards on how to  collect 
comparable data on interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries, or 
establish  a  systematic  EU  wide  cooperation  mechanism  to  exchange  information  with  each 
other and the Commission. 

19 

 
 
Figure 2. Intervention logic: 

20 

 
4.  OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? 

4.1. General objectives  

There are 2 general objectives: 

•  Ensure the proper functioning of the internal market for interest representation activities 

carried out on behalf of third countries. 

•  To contribute to the transparency, integrity of, and public trust in, EU and Member State 

decision-making processes, with regard to the influence of third countries. 

4.2. Specific objectives  

In line with the general objectives, the following are the specific objectives:  

•  Facilitate cross-border interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third 

countries when done transparently. 

• 

Improve knowledge about the magnitude, trends and actors of interest representation 
carried out on behalf of third countries. 

There may be trade-offs between facilitating cross-border interest representation activities and 
imposing common transparency standards on entities carrying out interest representation on 
behalf of third countries.  

5.  WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? 

5.1. What is the baseline from which policy options are assessed? 

The  baseline  is  formed  by  Member  States’  fragmented  regulatory  frameworks  or  its 
absence, which has been illustrated in the previous sections. There is currently no EU action 
that directly address the obstacles encountered in the internal market for interest representation 
activities carried out on behalf of third countries.  

The EU has, however, an existing toolbox of measures that aim at addressing issues in certain 
areas, potentially exploited by some third countries, and that continue to evolve (dynamically). 
An overview of those current  and planned measures is  presented in  Annex 9. They include 
updating  rules  governing  European  political  parties  and  foundations111,  regulating  various 
aspects  of  online  platforms,  addressing  disinformation,  detecting,  analysing  and  countering 
foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI)112, regulating political advertising 
including on social media113, supporting free, fair and inclusive elections, supporting free and 
plural  media114,  addressing  questions  of  investments  by  third  countries  in  electoral 
infrastructure115, cybersecurity116, anti-money laundering and corruption117. These instruments 
are  relevant  for  defining  the  broader  environment  in  which  a  potential  EU  initiative  under 
consideration will insert itself and evaluate its complementarity, coherence, added value.  

111  See note 17. 
112  See note 20.  
113  The 2022 strengthened EU Code of Practice on Disinformation,  see note 19; the Digital Services Act, see note 18; the 

proposal for a Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, see note 21. 

114  The proposal for a European Media Freedom Act, the proposal for an anti-SLAPP Directive and Recommendation, see 

note 22. 

115  The FDI Screening Regulation, see note 23. 
116  The NIS2 Directive, the ENISA Regulation, the DORA Regulation and the Cyber Resilience Act, see note 24. 
117  The proposal for the 6th AML Directive and the proposed anti-corruption Directive, see note 25. 

21 

 
 
5.2. Scope of the policy intervention 

Specific options have been discarded on the basis of the following analysis. 

The scope of the intervention could be modulated on the basis of i) the geographical location 
and ii) the nature of the entity on whose behalf the interest representation activity is carried 
out. 

When it comes to the geographical location, the available possibilities would be to cover either: 

•  some third countries: this option would seek to include in the scope only activities on 
behalf of specific third countries identified based on objective criteria. In its resolution 
on foreign interference in all democratic processes, the European Parliament expressed 
the  preference  for  a  risk-based  approach  based  on  some  criteria  which  includes: 
“engagement  in  activities  of  foreign  interference,  an  intellectual  property  theft 
programme  directed  against  the  EU  and  its  Member  States,  legislation  that  forces 
national non-state actors to participate in intelligence activities, consistent violation 
of  human  rights,  revisionist  policy  towards  the  existing  international  legal  order, 
enforcement  of  authoritarian  ideology  extraterritorially”118.  Similarly,  to  the  Anti-
Money laundering Directive119, a list  of such countries would be established by the 
Commission through delegated acts. EEA Member States would not be included; or 

•  all third countries (with additional requirements for some countries based on a 
risk-based approach): this option would include activities on behalf of entities in all 
third countries, but specific requirements could be imposed when an entity carries out 
interest representation activities on behalf of a third country that has spent a significant 
amount on interest  representation  in  a Member State or the EU as a whole120 (risk-
based approach). EEA Member States would not be included. 

The scope of the legislative intervention would also change on the basis of the type of entity 
on whose behalf the interest representation would be carried out:  

•  governments and affiliated entities (that is, governments and entities whose action 
can  be  attributed  to  them):  it  would  cover  i)  the  central  government  and  public 
authorities  at  all  other  levels  of  a  third  country  (except  EEA)  as  well  as,  to  avoid 
circumvention, ii) public or private entities, including EU citizens and legal persons 
established  in  the  EU,  whose  actions  can  ultimately  be  attributed121  to  a  central 
government  or  public  authorities  of  a  country.  It  would  cover  situations  where  a 
government  is  behind  the  decision  of  another  entity  to  have  interest  representation 
activities carried out on its behalf, in particular by giving instructions or directives to 
that entity122. It would also cover entities that are controlled123 by the government or a 
public authority. In terms of actors covered, all public or private entities, including EU 

118  European Parliament resolution of 1 June 2023 on foreign interference, see note 8, point 6. 
119  Article 9 of Directive (EU) 2015/849 of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes 

of money laundering or terrorist financing. 

120  This approach is based on the observation that the amounts spent on interest representation translates into bigger influence. 
As highlighted by the OECD: “The evidence is that policy-making is not always inclusive. At times, a monopoly of influence 
may be exerted by the financially and politically powerful, at the expense of those with fewer resources. Inequity in power 
and  lobbying  budgets  exacerbates  the  disadvantages  of  groups  lacking  in  the  capacity  and  capability  to  engage  in 
formulating policy.” See note 26, page 16. 

121  The concept is inspired by Article 3(3) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 

14 December 2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market. 

122  This would cover instructions by the government, through directives or legal requirements. 
123  A government or a public authority would control an entity carrying interest representation where through economic rights, 
contractual arrangements, or any other means, either separately or combination confer the possibility of exercising decisive 
influence on that entity. 

22 

 
 
citizens  and  legal  persons,  i.e.  for  example  commercial  entities,  CSOs,  cultural  or 
research organisations, law firms etc., could fall under the scope given that their actions 
can ultimately be attributed to a central government or public authorities of a country.  

•  all entities established in the designated countries. This would include activities on 
behalf of governments and affiliated – as defined above –, but also cases where they 
are  carried  out  on  behalf  of  other  entities,  including  private  actors  or  other 
organisations  such  as  or  international  organisations  (e.g.,  lobbying  on  behalf  of  a 
company)  

Table 1: possible approaches to scope of the measures 

Governments and affiliated 
All entities 

Some 3rd countries 
Option A 
Option B 

All 3rd countries 
Scope of the initiative  
Option C  

5.2.1.  Option A  

This policy option requires to establish a list of third countries that have attempted to conduct 
foreign interference. This option faces 4 types of operational difficulty.  

Firstly,  assessing  whether  a  third  country  meets  the  criteria  mentioned  by  the  European 
Parliament (in particular: consistent violation of human rights, revisionist policy towards the 
existing  international  legal  order,  enforcement  of  authoritarian  ideology  extraterritorially) 
might  prove  challenging  as  the  criteria  are  subject  to  interpretation.  This  lack  of  objective 
criteria might lead to a political decision instead of an objective technical one124. 

Secondly, the management of the list will be very difficult. In light of the subjective nature of 
the  criteria,  agreeing  on  common  criteria  could  prove  difficult,  making  it  likely  that  only  a 
limited  number  of  third  countries  would  be  included,  limiting  the  effectiveness  of  the 
instrument.  Furthermore,  if  a  third  country  targets  only  1  or  2  Member  States,  it  might  be 
politically  difficult  to  include  such  third  country  on  a  common  list,  thereby  limiting  the 
possibility  of  the  concerned  Member  States  to  provide  for  transparency  for  such  activities. 
Establishing a list at Member State level may lead to an even more uneven playing field within 
the single market. In addition, the list of third countries would need to be constantly reviewed 
and adapted on the basis of the evolving political situation in the concerned third countries. 

Stakeholder views: 
1 CSO (out of 11) stated that imposing “transparency requirements only on entities from third countries, 
drawing up a list of specific third countries could be very risky, as countries could be selected on the 
basis of the political and economic interests of Member States. The list would therefore be incomplete 
and  leave  out  third  countries  that  were  not  on  the  European  Commission's  radar  because  of  their 
advocacy activities.” 

2 out of 15 Member States cautioned against such an approach. 1 of them stated that “it would be almost 
impossible to objectively define such countries”. 

Thirdly,  because  the  scope  would  only  focus  on  third  countries  specifically  identified,  the 
entities that would fall into scope would be subject to significant risks of stigmatisation, a key 
concern of expressed by CSOs in the consultation process.  

124  Using existing lists like government or government-linked entities not subject to EU restriction measures; third country 
whose  nationals  are  not  exempt from  the  requirement  to  be in possession  of visas  when  crossing the  external borders 
pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2018/1806; countries listed as a high-risk third country pursuant to Anti Money Laundering 
Directive would not solve this issue as criteria for establishing these lists are not linked to the propensity of these countries 
to engage in foreign interference. 

23 

 
 
 
Similarly, the geopolitical implications concerning the identified third countries could be more 
severe.  

This option has therefore been discarded.  

5.2.2.  Option B  

This policy option may be discarded in light of the elements underlined in A and C 

5.2.3.  Option C  

Policy Option C would cover interest representation activities seeking to influence decision-
making in the EU carried out on behalf of any entities established in a third country. Such scope 
would  be  designed,  not  based  on  a  genuine  link  with  the  risk  of  covert  influence  by  third 
countries administrations but on an overshooting presumption made on the principle that any 
interest  representation  activity  on  behalf  of  a  natural  or  legal  person  established  in  a  third 
country could be source of covert influence by said third country government. Such a broad 
scope would not be targeted enough in view of the pursued aim of the initiative and therefore 
be disproportionate125. Option C has therefore been discarded.  

5.2.4.  Other possible scope 

5.2.4.1. 

Interest representation carried out on behalf of any government 

or entity  

It could be considered to enlarge the scope of the initiative to cover 1) interest representation 
carried out on behalf of any governments (including EU Member States and EEA countries) or 
2) to cover interest representation carried out on behalf of any entity.  

Stakeholder views: 
Extending the scope to cover intra-EU activity has been suggested by 6 CSOs (out of 11), 6 Members 
States (out of 15) and 2 industry associations (out of 3) in their contributions. 1 Member State explicitly 
opposed this by indicating that “harmonisation of all the measures governing interest representation in 
the  Member  States  would  go  far  beyond  the  purpose  of  the  Commission’s  initiative  and  would  be 
difficult to achieve at least in the short term.”  

As highlighted in sections 2 and 4, the intervention covered by this initiative focuses on interest 
representation  carried  out  on  behalf  of  third  countries.  Taking  into  account  the  geopolitical 
context, an increasing number of Member States are considering specific measures related to 
interest representation activities carried out on behalf of foreign governments (see section 2.3). 
The targeted scope of the intervention logic seeks to remove obstacles in the market of interest 
representation  activities  by  establishing  common  transparency  standards  for  activities 
influencing  decision-making  processes  in  the  EU  carried  out  on  behalf  of  third  countries. 
Covering interest representation carried out on behalf of any entity would further harmonise 
requirements in the internal market, but it would require moving away from the issue of foreign 
interference.  

As reported by the OECD, instead of relying on traditional and formal diplomatic channels and 
processes, foreign governments increasingly rely on lobbyists and other forms of influence to 
promote  their  policy  objectives126.  Third  country  governments  may  engage  in  lobbying, 
including by contracting public relations firms to conduct lobbying on their behalf. They may 
also  fund  other  entities  to  produce  evidence  supporting  their  goals,  including  by  providing 

125  See by analogy judgment of the Court of Justice of 18 June 2020, Commission v. Hungary, C-78/18, paragraphs 86 to 93. 
126  See note 26, page 43. 

24 

 
 
benefits  in  kind  such  as  material  gifts.  This  type  of  influence  activities  by  third  country 
governments, if done covertly, is concerning as it undermines the principles of transparency 
and accountability when trying to influence public decision-making processes in the EU.  

The impact of such influence is increasingly acknowledged in international fora. The OECD 
considers that foreign governments “can have a transformative impact on the political life of a 
country,  not  only  on  domestic  policies  but  also  on  its  foreign  policy,  its  election  system, 
economic interests and its ability to protect its national interests and national security127” and 
the risks involved in lobbying and influence activities of foreign government are higher than 
the risks posed by purely domestic lobbying and influence activities128. Covert foreign funding 
seeking to influence a decision making process is by definition difficult to demonstrate due to 
its secret nature.  

Covering interest representation carried out on behalf of any entity would benefit economic 
actors  as  it  would  remove  obstacles  to  the  internal  market  for  other  interest  representation 
activities. 1 CSO also argues that it could limit stigmatisation. A wider scope covering interest 
representation on behalf of any entities would also be disproportionate to achieve the targeted 
objectives of this initiative. An intervention covering all types of interest representation would 
affect around 3.5 million entities in the EU129, when it can be estimated that only around 700 
to 1100 entities provide interest representation on behalf of third country governments in the 
EU130.  In  addition,  since  2020,  the  Commission  monitors  with  specific  recommendations, 
under  the  anti-corruption  pillar  of  the  Rule  of  Law  Report,  the  regulation  of  all  interest 
representation in Member States, within the framework of existing European and international 
standard131.  

Covering interest representation activities carried out by other Member States/EEA countries 
would  not  be  aligned  with  the  second  objective  aiming  to  contribute  to  the  transparency, 
integrity of, and public trust in, EU and Member State decision-making processes, with regard 
to the influence of third countries. This is coherent with the principle of mutual trust, which is 
a general principle of Union law whose fundamental importance has been recognized by the 
European  Court  of  Justice  (see  e.g.  Case  C‑34/17).  There  is  also  no  specific  concern  being 
expressed  regarding  the  conduct  of  influence  activities  by  EU  Member  States  and  no 
corresponding anticipated national legislation to address this. 

Finally,  it should be underlined that a broader scope would not  mean that exactly the same 
measures would be provided for all interest representation activities as different situations may 
justify different types of measures to adapt to different needs. 

Stakeholder views: 
1 CSO (out of 11) considered that harmonising interest representation in general “would be a crucial 
first step in the right direction towards more transparency. However, they would not bring sufficient 
transparency of lobbying by third countries (…). Stronger and more targeted legislation is needed.” 

5.2.4.2. 

Exclusion of some entities from the scope 

As proposed by 4 out of 11 CSOs consulted, it could be considered to exclude from the scope 
some  non-profit  organisations  carrying  out  interest  representation  (for  example  through  a 

127  See note 26, page 44. 
128  See note 26, page 45. 
129  See Annex 4, sections 2.2 for details. 
130  See Annex 4, sections 2.3 for details. 
131  See Annex 9. 

25 

 
 
threshold), in light of their specific role in a democratic society as part of the system of checks 
and balances. This position is not shared by all CSOs consulted. 

It can be understood from existing transparency registers, that CSOs form a large portion of 
the  entities  carrying  out  interest  representation  activities  (Non-governmental  organisations 
(NGO),  think  tanks,  trade  associations  etc.)132.  Excluding  CSOs  carrying  out  interest 
representation  activities  in  the  internal  market  from  the  scope  would  in  addition  create  an 
uneven playing field between the actors in the interest representation market (see section 2.1.1). 
It  would  also  create  a  risk  of  circumvention  with  some  entities  in  a  position  of  covertly 
influencing decision-making on behalf of third countries in the EU while other entities carrying 
out similar activities would be subject to transparency requirements. 

Stakeholder views: 
Industry  representatives  considered  that  “equal  rules should  apply  to  all  organisations  carrying out 
interest  representation activities.  There  are  many  examples  in  national  jurisdictions  where  creating 
exemptions has led to loopholes which malign interests use to circumvent transparency requirements.” 

11 out of 15 Member States would prefer not to include such exemptions133. 

As this option would not be coherent with the internal market objective of this initiative and 
would  severely  limit  the  effectiveness  of  the  measure  seeking  to  enhance  transparency  of 
interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries, it should be discarded. 

5.3. Description of the policy options 

The proposed intervention would concern interest representation activities. It would cover a 
broad  range  of  activities  conducted  with  the  objective  of  influencing  the  development, 
formulation or implementation of policy or legislation, or public decision-making processes in 
the EU134. 

• 

It  would  include  activities  that  aim  to  influence  public  decision-making  both 
directly  (e.g.  direct  engagements  with  public  officials)  and  indirectly135  (e.g.  the 
dissemination  of  research  outputs136,  the  organisation  of  and  participation  in 
conferences/events, and the provision of education, training and cultural engagement, 
when performed with the same objective). It would cover activities carried out online 
and offline.  

132  DE, IE, EL, FR, AT, RO and SI include CSOs in their national registers. In the EU transparency register 28% of registered 
entities are NGOs, platforms and networks and similar (3 506 out of 12 540 registration), in national transparency registers, 
Advocacy/charities represent 7.2% of all registered entities (873 out of 12 199 entities), see Annex 4, section 2.1 for details.  
133  4 Member States (out of 15) propose to exclude some other entities from the scope. 2 of them want to exclude organisations 
presenting certain group-specific interests like chambers of commerce or trade unions, 2 would like to do the same for 
entities that carry out activities at the instigation of a functionary (e.g. responses to a public consultation), and 1 Member 
State wants to exempt activities related to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms from the transparency 
requirements. 

134  The  definition  is  inspired  by  Article  3(1)  of  the  interinstitutional  agreement  of  20  May  2021  between  the  European 
Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on a mandatory transparency register. 
135  A clear and substantial link should exist between the activity and the likelihood that it would influence a public decision-
making process in the Union. Account should be taken of factors such as the content of the activity, the context in which 
it is conducted, its objective, the means by which it is carried out, or whether the activity is part of a systematic or sustained 
campaign. The activities covered should  not be limited to activities with the objective to promote a change in a given 
policy, legislation but should also cover activities aiming to maintain the status quo. 

136  As highlighted by the OECD: “One way in which different interests influence government policies is through financing 
third-party  organisations,  such  as  think  tanks,  research  institutions  or  research  more  generally,  and  grassroots 
organisations. The aim is to contribute expert opinions, evidence and data, and public mobilisation to the policy-making 
process. As with any other form of lobbying, however, there is a risk of undue influence. (…) This increases the risk of 
providing biased or false information, with the aim of misleading or confusing public opinion or public officials”, see note 
26,  page  53.  The  OECD  also  notes  that  foreign  governments  “may  also  fund  grassroots  organisations,  foundations, 
academic institutions and think tanks to produce evidence supporting their goals”, ibid, page 44. 

26 

 
 
• 

It would cover only interest representation that seeks to influence decision-making in 
the EU, regardless at which level (EU, national, regional or local level). It would not 
cover  activities  carried  out  in  the  EU  or  in  a  third  country  that  seeks  to  influence 
decision-making in a third country. 

• 

It  would  not  cover  activities that are  connected  with  the  exercise of official 
authority, including activities related to the exercise of diplomatic relations 
between States  or international  relations, nor would  it cover the provision  of 
legal and other professional advice in the course of legal proceedings137 or 
ancillary activities, which are activities that support the provision of an interest 
representation activity but have no direct influence on its content (e.g. a caterer 
supplying  a  lobbying  event  or  intermediary  service  provided  by  an  online 
platform). 

In line with the Article 114 TFEU legal basis, the legislative instrument would approximate 
laws regulating the market for interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third 
countries. The initiative does not prohibit the conduct of such activities but could deter them 
as  it  provides  common  transparency  (disclosure)  standards.  Illegal  activities  would  remain 
governed by other rules, for instance rules on corruption138.  

The legislative instrument would cover: 

• 

Interest  representation  service  provided  to  a  third  country  entity.  This  would  cover 
interest  representation  activities  normally  provided  for  remuneration.  Where 
remuneration  is  provided,  it  would  cover  a  large  spectrum  of  different  types  of 
consideration, such as loans, capital injection, debt forgiveness, fiscal incentives or tax 
exemptions. Remuneration would also cover benefits in kind, such as the provision of 
office space. 

•  The  essential  characteristic  of  remuneration  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  constitutes 
consideration (‘contra-prestation’) for the services in question139. Contributions to the 
core funding of an organisation or similar financial support, for example provided 
under a third country donor grant scheme, would not be considered as remuneration 
for  an  interest  representation  service  where  they  are  unrelated  to  an  interest 
representation activity, that is, where the entity would receive such funding regardless 
of  whether  it  carries  out  the  specific  interest  representation  activity  at  issue.  Such 
contributions would not be covered by this intervention. In line with the case law (and 
to  prevent  circumvention),  anything  received  in  return  for  an  interest  representation 
service  should  be  considered  as  remuneration  for  the  purposes  of  this  legislative 
intervention. This could cover financial contributions, such as loans, debt forgiveness 

137  The distinction between interest representation activities of legal and other professionals and advice in the course of legal 
proceedings  would  be  based  on  the  distinction  established  in  Article  4(1)(a)  of  the  interinstitutional  agreement  on  a 
mandatory transparency register. Legal advice and other professional advice are defined as advice in order to help ensure 
that entities and their activities comply with existing legal requirements or to represent an entity in judicial or extra-judicial 
proceedings. That means, while law firms are excluded from the scope of the legislative intervention when giving such 
advice, they still fall within the scope if they conduct interest representation activities on behalf of a third country like 
lobbying.  

138  E.g. bribery of public officials on behalf of a third country or corruption (addressed by other initiatives, see e.g. Article 7 
of the Proposal for a Directive on combating corruption, COM/2023/234 final). The harmonised transparency requirements 
could  however  support  the  detection  and  prosecution  of  such  illegal  behaviours  by  relevant  competent  authorities, 
including the circumvention of sanctions where interest representation activities are carried out for or on behalf of an entity 
subject to restrictive measures. 

139  Judgement  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  27 June  2017, Congregación  de  Escuelas  Pías  Provincia  Betania,  C‑74/16, 

EU:C:2017:496, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited. 

27 

 
 
etc., received in return for an interest representation activity. Remuneration could also 
include benefits in kind, such as the provision of office space140.  

• 

It  will  be  for  national  authorities  to  monitor  whether  the  contributions  to  the  ‘core 
funding’ of an entity aim to circumvent the rules applicable to interest representation 
activities. The advisory group of competent national authorities to be established would 
be  tasked  with  sharing  best  practices  on  relevant  criteria  and  indicators  to  assess 
circumvention.  The  Commission  could  also  facilitate  exchanges  and  sharing  of 
information  and  best  practices.  A  specific  provision  will  require  Member  States  to 
prohibit and sanction the circumvention of the obligations of the initiative. 

Stakeholder views: 
2 out of 11 CSOs that participated in the targeted consultation via a questionnaire considered 
that “There should be a clear distinction, e.g., between receiving foreign funding to carry out 
the mission of an organisation and the receipt of funding to represent someone as a service. 
Legitimate CSO funding should not be considered as income for interest representation unless 
it is provided specifically under such a contract.” 

• 

Interest representation activities provided by an entity whose conduct can be attributed 
to a third country government, and which is of a commercial or economic nature and 
comparable to an interest representation service provided to a third country entity. 
•  Establishing specific safeguards: to avoid circumvention and ensure a level playing 
field  between  actors,  the  following  options  would  cover  any  natural  or  legal  person 
carrying  out  interest  representation  on  behalf  of  third  country  entities.  They  would 
cover different types of commercial entities (e.g. consulting firms, law firms, individual 
businesses) and non-commercial entities (e.g. think tanks, education, research, cultural 
and academic institutions, business, trade or professional associations, or CSOs). To 
limit risks of gold plating and frame Member States’ action in this field, the legislative 
intervention would provide for a full harmonisation. Supervision would be entrusted to 
independent  supervisory  authorities  with  clearly  established  powers  and  national 
authorities would need to ensure that no adverse consequences, such as stigmatisation, 
arise from the mere fact that an entity falls within the scope of the legislative instrument. 
For example, Member States would be prevented from requiring the entities that fall 
within the scope of the initiative to register ‘as an organisation in  receipt of support 
from abroad’ or indicate on their internet site and in their publications and other press 
material the information that they are organisations in receipt of support from abroad. 
The right to judicial redress would also be guaranteed. 

Stakeholder views: 
1 CSO (out of 11) indicated that “the legal instrument should be delivered with clear and strong wording 
against the negative labelling of the registered entities as “foreign agents” by Member States. It should 
also prevent governments and policymakers from making disparaging statements in the press and/or in 
campaigns  that  clearly  aim  to  stigmatise  these  entities,  especially  CSOs  and  organisations  that 
represent  minority  groups.  Additionally,  the  information  provided  by  registered  entities  on  the 
transparency registers that are publicly available should be limited to what is strictly necessary and 
presented in a “neutral” way to avoid stigmatisation.” 

•  Furthermore, strong safeguards would be included to address potential risks for specific 
actors. To limit, among other, negative implications for entities active in third countries, 
entities  would  be  able  to  request  that  all  or  part  of  the  information  gathered  for  the 

140  In such situations, the interest representation services provider would be responsible for estimating the value of the benefit 

received, for example by reporting it using the market rate. 

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purpose  of  the  transparency  requirement  is  not  made  public  based  on  an  overriding 
interest.  

All the options would recommend or require Member States to provide for similar requirements 
on transparency of interest representation carried out on behalf of third countries and address 
SO1  (facilitate  cross-border  interest  representation  activities  carried  out  on  behalf  of  third 
countries done transparently).  

All the options would recommend or require Member States to provide for comparable and 
publicly available information on the entities carrying out interest representation activities, the 
activities conducted and the entities on whose behalf the activity is conducted141 and would 
thus  address  SO2  (improve  knowledge  about  the  magnitude,  trends  and  actors  of  interest 
representation carried out on behalf of third countries). 

Activities that are currently illegal or even criminalised in Member States, such as corruption, 
would  not  be  affected  by  this  initiative.  The  harmonised  transparency  requirements  could 
however  support  the  detection  and  prosecution  of  such  illegal  behaviours  by  relevant 
competent authorities, including the circumvention of sanctions where interest representation 
activities are carried out for or on behalf of an entity subject to restrictive measures. 

5.3.1.  Policy Option 1: Non-legislative measures 

The first option considered takes the form of a non-legislative intervention142.  

This policy option would consist of recommending to Member States a set of measures to 
be applied to interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries. 
Member  States  would  be  encouraged  to  provide  for  similar  and  proportionate  transparency 
measures aimed at facilitating accountability and oversight and addressing the challenges for 
democratic  processes  associated  with  such  activities.  This  could  include,  for  example,  a 
recommendation to Member States with lobbying registers to request interest representatives 
to provide, on a voluntary basis, an indication in their lobbying registry of whether the interest 
represented is that of a third country, and to other Member States to establish, on a voluntary 
basis,  registers  covering  activities  affecting  decision-making  processes  funded  by  third 
countries.  The  recommendations  would  also  include  references  to  safeguards  that  Member 
States should establish, including to prevent stigmatisation of the registered entities.  

This policy option would build upon and be complementary to the recommendations that have 
been  issued  by  the  Commission  in  the  context  of  its  annual  Rule  of  Law  Reports  regularly 
inviting Member States to introduce or improve rules on lobbying and interest representation.  

Additionally, this policy option would go beyond these recommendations as it provides for a 
list of specific standards related to record-keeping, registration and transparency (1), a detailed 
but voluntary reporting on the application of the specific standards (2) and a monitoring of the 
implementation of the recommendation (3). It would also include references to safeguards that 
Member States should establish, including to prevent stigmatisation of the registered entities. 

Due  to  the  non-binding  nature  of  the  initiative,  Member  States  could  rely  on  the  EU 
Recommendation  while  not  being  bound  by  law  regarding  the  necessary  safeguards  when 
implementing the recommended standards. Hence, there is a risk of gold-plating. 

141  10 Member States (out of 15) have pointed out that it is in the interest of the general public to have more transparent and 

accessible information about interest representation activities carried out in the EU on behalf of third countries. 

142  3 Member States (out of 15) have expressed preference for this option. An additional 2 Member State seem to prefer a 
recommendation instead of a legislative intervention as well. Only 1 CSO (out of 11) prefers this option and none of the 
industry supports it. 

29 

 
 
Appropriate monitoring of implementation of the Recommendations would be conducted. A 
report would assess the effects of the Recommendation and consider other measures including 
possible future legislation.   

Use would be made of existing expert groups as governance structures. The Commission would 
be able to rely on exchanges on the implementation of the voluntary measures to support their 
take up in existing networks, such as the European Cooperation Network on Elections or the 
membership of the Rule of Law contact group and on the reporting by the Commission on the 
follow-up given to the Recommendation. 

5.3.2.  Policy Option 2: Legislative intervention  

The  second  policy  option  takes  the  form  of  a  legislative  intervention  harmonising  the 
requirements143 in the internal market, based on Article 114 TFEU. It would not seek to 
directly prevent interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries but 
would provide transparency requirements for entities carrying out such activities. With regard 
to the transparency and related obligations, two options are possible: targeted requirements 
(PO2.1) or extended requirements (PO2.2).   

5.3.2.1. 

Policy Option 2.1: Targeted requirements144 

Entities carrying out interest representation activities on behalf of third country entities would 
be required to register and keep certain records. In addition, interest representation service 
providers  would  have  the  possibility  to  take  measures  to  identify  the  recipients  of  the 
services. 

▪  Record-keeping: Entities would be required to keep, for a reasonable period, information 
on the identity of the entity on whose behalf the activity is carried out, a description of 
the purpose of the interest representation activity, contracts and key exchanges with the 
entity to the extent that they are essential to understand the nature and purpose of the interest 
representation carried out, as well as information or material constituting key components 
of the interest representation activity. 

▪  Registration:  Entities  would  be  required  to  register  in  a  national  register  and  provide 
information145 on themselves,  the activities conducted, and the entities they  conduct  the 
activities on behalf of.  

−  On  the  entity:  information  could  include  name,  contact  details,  category  of 
organisation  (e.g. law firm,  consultancy, think tank etc.),  address  of the  place of 
establishment, etc. 

−  On  the  activity:  information  could  include  the  type  of  activity  provided,  the 
Member  States  in  which  it  will  be  carried  out  (the  Member  State  of  registration 
should notify the Member State where the activity is performed), the policy sought 
to influence, the remuneration received covering all the tasks carried out with the 
objective  of  influencing  the  development,  formulation  or  implementation  of  the 

143  6 Member States (out of 15) have explicitly expressed preference for harmonised requirements at EU level. An additional 
3 Member States have expressed support for requirements that would require a legislative intervention. 4 CSOs (out of 11) 
are explicitly against such legislative intervention while 2 are in favour. All three industry representatives are in favour of 
establishing harmonised measures at EU level. 

144  6 Member States (out of 15) as well as 2 industry representatives (out of 3) have explicitly expressed preference for targeted 
requirements. 2 CSOs (out of 11) consider that transparency requirements should differ according to the level of risk that 
entities  might  pose  for  foreign  interference.  3  CSOs  consider  that  any  potential  regulation  should  not  impose  overly 
burdensome and additional financial or narrative reporting on CSOs. 

145  The specific information to be included in the registration could be adapted through a delegated act. 

30 

 
 
same proposal, policy or initiative, where relevant, the name of the service provider 
entrusted with the publication or dissemination of information to the public (such 
as a newspaper). 

−  On  the  entity  on  whose  behalf  the  activity  is  carried  out:  information  could 
include their name, contact details and the third country on whose behalf the entity 
is acting. 

Upon  registration,  the  entity  would  receive  a  registration  number  that  could  be  used 
throughout the internal market, which would serve as a mean to facilitate the identification 
across the Union of entities registered pursuant to the legislative initiative. The format of 
such number could be specified in the legislative initiative (e.g. in an Annex), and should 
include a country code. Existing registration numbers that may be issued by Member States 
regulating  interest  representation  would  still  be  maintained  for  those  activities  falling 
outside the scope of the legislative initiative. Entities would need to include such national 
registration numbers as part of their registration. 

Information  necessary  for  the  enforcement,  such  as  the  name  and  address  of  the  entity, 
would need to be updated regularly. Other information would need to be updated at least 
annually. 

The  information  necessary  to  ensure  public  accountability  would  be  made  public. 
Information that would not be necessary to ensure public accountability, such as certain 
type of personal data, would only be accessible to supervisory authorities to facilitate 
enforcement.  

▪  Transparency: Entities carrying out interest representation as well as their subcontractors 
would  have  to  provide  their  registration  number  when  in  direct  contact  with  public 
officials. 

Member States would be required to ensure that publicly available national registers are 
in  place  and  that  they  cover  the  information  and  reporting  requirements  included  in  the 
intervention. They would need to designate or set up supervisory authorities ensuring 
proper implementation. Member State authorities could also be required to participate in 
the  established  governance  and  information  sharing  structures.  Where  available, 
Member States should be able to make use of existing transparency registers. Depending 
on their organisation, they should be able to establish one or multiple registers. 

To facilitate coordination and access to the registers, where an entity carries out activity in 
a Member State other than that of registration, the Member State of registration should 
notify the Member State where the activity is performed of the name of the concerned 
entity, its registration number and the link to the national registers where the registration 
took place. That Member State should include in its own register the information laid down 
in that notification.  

▪  Reporting: In order to increase transparency and accountability of the magnitude, trends 
and  actors  of  interest  representation  activities  carried  out  on  behalf  of  third  countries, 
Member States would need to publish an annual report based on the data entered in the 
register146.  This  annual  report  could  include  aggregated  data  on  the  annual  amounts  per 
third  country  and  per  category  of  organisation  for  each  third  country  in  the  preceding 
financial year.  

146  The specific information to be included in the annual report could be adapted through a delegated act. 

31 

 
 
A risk-based approach: To enable Member States to monitor interest representation activities that are 
particularly likely to have a significant influence on public life and public debate, supervisory authority 
should be able to request the records kept by entities carrying out interest representation activities on 
behalf of third countries if: (i) these entities receive more than EUR 1 000 000 from a single third 
country entity in the preceding financial year or (ii) when they carry out interest representation activities 
for a third country entity whose action can be attributed to a third country that has spent a EUR 1 
500 000 on interest representation in a Member State or EUR 8 500 000 in the EU as a whole in 
one of the last 5 years. Entities that receive, in the preceding financial year, an aggregate remuneration 
of less than EUR 25 000147 would not be covered by this risk-based approach. 

The reasoning behind the establishment of the different threshold levels is detailed in Annex 
7. It can be summarised as follows: 

o  The EUR 1 000 000 and EUR 25 000 (de minimis) thresholds come from an analysis of 
data of the EU Transparency Register. They respectively  would create  a possibility for 
additional  scrutiny  over  the  2.5%  largest  relevant  entities,  while  excluding  the  36% 
smallest relevant entities from the scope of the information requests requirements. 

o  The EUR 8 500 000148 and EUR 1 500 000149 thresholds were obtained by extrapolating 
data from the closest existing benchmark available, the US FARA, adapted to account for 
the specificities of the internal market.  

Governance, supervision and sanctions: At national level, Member States would be required 
to establish or designate one or more authorities responsible for national registers and 
one or more independent supervisory authorities150 responsible for the supervision and 
enforcement of the Directive. They could also designate the same authority for both tasks and 
they could rely on existing authorities, as long as the requirements of the initiative are complied 
with.  The  policy  option  would  also  include  appropriate  monitoring  and  enforcement 
mechanisms, for instance where a supervisory authority has reliable information of possible 
non-compliance by an entity it may ask that entity to provide the records kept necessary to 
investigate  the  possible non-compliance.  Reports  of  breaches  or  attempts  to  circumvent  the 
obligations  by  whistle-blowers  would  be  possible.  The  initiative  would  provide  for  cross-
border cooperation and information sharing mechanisms among  supervisory  authorities 
from  different  Member  States.  The  Internal  Market  Information  System  (‘IMI  system’) 
Regulation  would  support  the  administrative  cooperation  and  the  exchange  of  information 
using  existing  IT  tools.  At  the  EU  level,  a  governance  cooperation  mechanism  (e.g.  an 
advisory group chaired by the Commission) would be established to facilitate exchanges and 
cooperation between the Member States supervisory authorities and ensure interoperability of 
the data collected. Among other things, they would exchange best practices on the technical 
arrangements for the national registers. The advisory group would also assist the Commission 
on possible guidance on the implementation of the Directive. The initiative would not envisage 
a  direct  enforcement  role  for  the  Commission.  The  Commission  would  be  responsible  for 

147  These thresholds could be adapted based on a delegated act. For more see Annex 7. 
148  The analysis found that 11 selected third countries spent an average the equivalent EUR 11 284 730.04 in 2020 (latest year 
for which data was available) on core interest representation services. The EU’s economy in 2020 was 25% smaller than 
the US’, resulting in an equivalent of EUR 8 463 547.53, which was rounded up to establish the threshold of EUR 8 500 
000. 

149  The threshold of EUR 1 500 000 was found by dividing the EUR 8 500 000 threshold by the share of GDP of each Member 
State. Based on this, the resulting threshold for France was used as a benchmark, rounded up, namely of 16.72% of EU 
GDP in 2022 or EUR 1 421 200, to establish the threshold of EUR 1 500 000. Importantly, the Directive foresees that this 
threshold can later be adapted by a Delegated Act, once more data is available after its entry into force. Setting a high bar 
at first permits to scope in fewer entities and reduce risks of overburdening. 

150  Responding  to  the  questionnaire  sent  by  the  Commission,  1  CSO  (out  of  11)  indicated  that  “the  establishment  of  an 

independent oversight body would ensure that the transparency register is regularly and properly monitored”. 

32 

 
 
publishing a summary of the data received from the Member States and a list of third countries 
in the context of the risk-based approach. However, to efficiently monitor the implementation 
of the legislative initiative and improve the knowledge on the size and distribution of the overall 
interest representation activities that are carried out on behalf of third countries in the Union; 
the Commission will be able to request data from Member States.  

Sanctions would be fully harmonised administrative fines which would represent a maximum 
of 1% of the entities’ annual worldwide turnover. Sanctions would take into account the nature, 
recurrence and duration of the infringement in view of the public interest at stake, the scope 
and kind of activities carried out, and the economic capacity of the entity carrying out interest 
representation activities.  

The sanctions regime shall in each individual case be effective, proportionate and dissuasive, 
with due respect for fundamental rights including freedom of expression, association, academic 
freedom  and  freedom  of  scientific  research,  safeguards  and  access  to  effective  remedies, 
including the right to be heard. This option would ensure that entities would not be exposed to 
the threat of criminal penalties or dissolution. 

A detailed explanation on the reasoning around the maximum sanctions amount of 1% of the 
entities’  worldwide  turnover  is  provided  in  Annex  7.  In  essence,  this  was  determined  by 
analogy with the Digital Services Act’s Article 52(3)151 which similarly relates to issues with 
information disclosures. 

Stakeholder views: 
1  out  of  11  CSOs  indicated  that  “administrative  sanction  is  the  most  proportionate  option  to  deter 
misconduct.  The  receipt  of  funds  is  not  in  itself  a  criminal  office,  so  a  criminal  sanction  would  be 
disproportionate.” 

On the harmonisation of sanctions, out of the 15 Member that answered the questionnaire 4 prefer not 
to harmonise administrative fines while 3 are in favour. The remaining 8 did not pronounce themselves 
on the issue.  

5.3.2.2. 

Policy Option 2.2: Extended requirement  

Entities carrying out interest representation activities on behalf of third country entities would 
face the same requirement as in PO2.1, they would also face some additional requirements. 

▪  Record-keeping:  In  addition  to  the  elements  included  in  PO2.1,  these  entities  would  be 
required to keep records of all contracts and exchanges (written and oral) with the entity 
on whose behalf the  activity is  carried out  as  well as  all information or  material  on the 
interest representation activity.  

▪  Prior authorisation / licencing:152 For each new interest representation activity above a 
certain financial threshold, these entities would have to apply to the competent national 
authority for a licence to conduct said activity. 

−  The  request  would  require  submitting  the  same  information  as  those  provided 

under the registration of PO2.1.  

151  DSA Article 52(3): “Member States shall ensure that the maximum amount of the fine that may be imposed for the supply 
of  incorrect,  incomplete  or  misleading  information,  failure  to  reply  or  rectify  incorrect,  incomplete  or  misleading 
information and failure to submit to an inspection shall be 1 % of the annual income or worldwide turnover of the provider 
of intermediary services or person concerned in the preceding financial year”. 

152  4 Member States (out of 15) and 1 CSO (out of 11) are in favour of a prior authorisation/licensing system,  6 Member 

States, 5 CSOs and 1 industry representative (out of 3) have expressed themselves against such mechanism. 

33 

 
 
−  Licences would be refused only where in light of the information provided and of 
the  entity(ies)  the  interest  representation  is  carried  out  for  (taking  into  account, 
where applicable the risk-based approach) the activity is likely to seriously affect 
public security153.  

−  To support the decision-making process regarding the refusal of a license and ensure 
consistency  in  the  EU,  the  legislative  instrument  would  create  a  cooperation 
mechanism154 whereby, the competent authority in the Member State assessing the 
application would notify the other Member States’ authorities and the Commission. 
Other Member States would be able to submit comments if the activity is likely to 
seriously affect public security in their Member States. The Commission may issue 
an  opinion  if,  based  on  the  information  transmitted  by  the  concerned  Member 
States, the activity is likely to seriously affect public policy in a Member State.  

−  Where a licence is granted despite comments submitted by a Member State or an 
opinion  from  the  Commission,  a  publicly  available  flag  would  be  added  in  the 
registration of the said entity.  

−  Entities would receive a licence number that could be used throughout the internal 
market.  In  the  same  condition  as  in  PO2.1,  upon  obtaining  the  licence,  the 
information provided by the entities would be published in national transparency 
registers. 

−  The failure to abide by these requirements would lead to significant penalties.  

▪  Transparency: As in PO2.1, these entities as well as their subcontractors would have to 

provide their licence number when in direct contact with public officials.  

Risk-based approach: Entities carrying out interest representation activities on behalf of third 
countries  would  be  required  to  automatically  share  all  the  records  when  they  fulfil  the 
conditions of the risk-based approach set out in PO2.1. 

Governance,  supervision  and  sanctions:  building  on  PO2.1,  this  option  would  require 
Member State authorities to set up a prior authorisation/licencing system.  

6.  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? 

6.1. The baseline scenario 

The dynamic baseline scenario is already presented under the section dedicated to the problem 
definition  and  its  evolution  (see  sections  2  and  3.2),  while  Annex  9  provides  a  detailed 
description of the measures currently in place or proposed in this area.  

Even existing initiatives and legislation  at  EU level  (from  the European Democracy Action 
Plan  and  beyond)  would  continue  to  ensure  transparency  of  certain  attempts  of  foreign 
influence, such transparency would leave an important part uncovered  – the role of interest 
representatives or lobbyists. Interest representation activities would not be effectively covered 
by the following instruments: 

153  The concept of public security covers both a Member State’s internal and external security and threats to the functioning 
of the institutions and essential public services and the survival of the population, as well as the risk of a serious disturbance 
to foreign relations or to peaceful coexistence of nations, or a risk to military interests (Judgment of the Court of Justice 
of 23 November 2010, Tsakouridis, C-145/09, paragraphs 43 to 44). 

154  This mechanism is inspired by the FDI regulation, see note 23. 

34 

 
 
- 

- 

- 

- 

the Political Advertising Regulation would not cover interest representation activities 
which do not also qualify as ‘political advertising’ (e.g. lobbying); 
the European Media Freedom Act would not ensure transparency of instances where 
a third country obtains interest representation activities from a media service provider;  

the Digital Services Act would not cover providers of interest representation activities 
covered by the initiative as they are not ‘intermediary services’; 
the  Audiovisual  Media  Services  Directive155  (AVMSD)  would  not  cover  interest 
representation  activities  given  that  advertising  campaigns  covered  by  the  notion  of 
interest  representationare  unlikely  to  fall  within  the  scope  of  the  AVMSD,  whose 
advertising rules are focused on the promotion of goods and services; 

-  The EU transparency register would continue to apply. However, such Register is not 
binding, and the standards are limited to interest representation activities directed at EU 
institutions and its decision-makers. Interest representation activities carried out with 
the objective of influencing national policy, legislation or decision-making processes 
would not be covered. 

The EU’s toolbox to tackle Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI Toolbox) 
would continue to inventory the EU’s approach to FIMI and disinformation. However, in the 
absence of an initiative on interest representation, it would not benefit from the data obtained 
through this initiative, which could support developing an overview of such activities when 
used to manipulate or interfere. 

In a nutshell, other initiatives would not address the objective of reducing the fragmentation in 
the regulation of cross-border interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third 
countries in the internal market (which is expected to increase). As regards the objective of 
improving knowledge about the magnitude, trends and actors of interest representation carried 
out on behalf of third countries, the existing initiatives at EU level do not address the lack of 
an overall understanding of the phenomenon and the specific collection of data.  

Furthermore, any interventions at Member State level would not necessarily be equipped with 
the robust safeguards envisaged by the initiative and may result disproportionate.  

6.2. Assessment of the options 

The policy options were evaluated for the following economic, social, fundamental rights and 
geopolitical impacts. The assessment of impacts did not identify any relevant environmental 
impacts.  The  options  will  therefore  respect  the  “do  no  significant  harm”  principle  and  is 
consistent  with  the  climate  neutrality  objective,  its  intermediate  targets  and  the  adaptation 
objectives as set out in the European Climate Law156. 

6.2.1.  Economic impacts 

6.2.1.1. 

Functioning of the internal market 

All 3 options would have a positive effect on the functioning of the internal market. 

The  2  legislative  options  (PO2.1and  PO2.2),  and,  assuming  that  its  recommendations  are 
followed, the non-legislative option (PO1), would result in similar transparency requirements 

155  Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual 
media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) (OJ L 95, 15.4.2010, p. 1). 

156  Regulation  (EU)  2021/1119  of  30  June  2021  establishing  the  framework  for  achieving  climate  neutrality  (European 

Climate Law). 

35 

 
 
in all Member States, thereby levelling the playing field and limiting the risks of regulatory 
arbitrage. However, unlike the legislative measures in  Option  2.1  and Option 2.2,  Option  1 
would not provide entities with a registration number that could be used throughout the internal 
market; entities carrying out interest representation on behalf of third countries cross border 
would  still  need  to  comply  with  different  rules,  including  registration  requirements,  in  the 
different Member States in which they operate.  

The  legislative  measures  PO2.1  and  PO  2.2),  by  providing  fully  harmonised  transparency 
requirements, would reduce the costs resulting from legal fragmentation and uncertainty for 
economic actors, thereby facilitating the offering of interest representation activities on behalf 
of third country entities across borders. In addition, these harmonised requirements would add 
legal predictability for interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third country 
entities in several Member States. In particular, the possibility to obtain a registration number 
that  could  be  used  throughout  the  internal  market  would  remove  the  need  for  multiple 
registrations157. This would imply that for each Member State (outside the Member State of 
main establishment where a registration is currently required) in which an entity carries out 
interest representation on behalf of third countries, that entity would  be able to obtain some 
savings  due  to  synergies  permitted  by  similar  registration  and  information  disclosures 
requirements158. 

Stakeholder views: 
1 CSO (out of 11) considered that “the introduction of harmonised measures at EU level can increase 
coherence (…) and would reduce the compliance burden for companies that previously had to register 
in different Member State with different requirements and obligations.” 

By providing the same level of transparency and supporting  coordination among competent 
authorities, both of these options contribute to improving the regulatory outcome with regard 
to interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third country entities. 

The licensing/prior authorisation system set out in the legislative option PO2.2, could lead to a 
limited  regulatory  arbitrage  as  economic  actors  might  seek  to  obtain  said  licence  in  more 
lenient jurisdiction159.  

6.2.1.2.  Competitiveness 

All 3 options are expected to have a positive impact on the competitiveness, innovation and 
investment  in  cross-border  interest  representation  activities  carried  out  on  behalf  of  third 
countries.  By  levelling  the  playing  field  and  reducing  the  compliance  costs  linked  to  cross 
border  activities,  they  will  enable  existing  national  enterprises  to  scale  up.  By  increasing 

157  To facilitate coordination and access to the registers, where an entity carries out activity in a Member State other than that 
of registration, the Member State of registration should notify the Member where the activity is performed of the name of 
the concerned entity, its registration number and the link to the national registers where the registration took place. That 
Member State should include in its own register, the information laid down in that notification. 

158  Cross-border companies will  be subject to reduced administrative burden in these additional Member States stemming 
from: (i) The need to provide exactly the same information (i.e. when operating on behalf of a given third countries in 
multiple Member States). In this scenario, the costs of registration and information disclosure for additional Member States 
would be limited solely to the submission of information as there would be no need to collect additional information. (ii) 
The need to provide different information but for the same types of information (i.e. when operating in different Member 
States on behalf of different third countries). In this scenario, likely minor efficiency gains would be possible, for instance, 
through the use of the same information recording and retrieval systems across all Member States. However, entities would 
still be required to conduct the same internal liaison and information collection tasks, as well as the information submission 
tasks. Annex 4 provides further details on the analysis of costs and savings.  

159  Where a licence is granted despite comments submitted by a Member State or an opinion from the Commission that the 
activity is likely to seriously affect public security, a publicly available flag would be added in the registration of the said 
entity. 

36 

 
 
transparency,  they  would  decrease  popular  distrust  in  these  activities,  strengthening  the 
attractiveness of entry to this market. 

In  particular,  the  legislative  measures  (PO2.1  and  PO2.2),  by  fully  removing  the  obstacles 
resulting from legal uncertainty and fragmentation, as well as reducing the need for multiple 
registration would help create a stable market to enable SMEs to scale up their operations and 
stimulate the development of new services offered at EU level. 

All 3 policy options would only provide for transparency requirements and would thus have 
no impact on the capacity to innovate of the entities falling within their scope. 

6.2.1.3.  Costs and administrative burdens for economic actors (+SMEs) 

All 3 options would add compliance costs for economic actors providing activities which are 
in scope. These are expected to be compensated by the efficiencies realised from the removal 
of  legal  fragmentation  that  facilitate  the  cross-border  provision  of  interest  representation 
activities on behalf of third countries, in particular with regard to the legislative policy options 
(see section 6.2.1.1).  

In light of the removal for the need for multiple registrations, the net expected result is a cost 
reduction against the baseline for the legislative policy options.  

The extended requirements of PO2.2 introduce a prior authorisation/licencing system over the 
other  options  and  the  baseline.  By  having  the  possibility  to  refuse  to  authorise  an  interest 
representation activity that is likely to seriously affect public security, this option would create 
a  positive  reputational  impact  for  economic  actors  that  have  been  granted  a  licence,  which 
could be leveraged for commercial gains.160 

Annex 4 details the methodology used to determine the costs for economic actors. 

Table 3: Estimates of costs for obligations addressed to economic actors. 
Option 2.1: 
Type of cost 
targeted legislative 
requirements 

Option 1(*): 
non-legislative 
measures 
Basic familiarisation costs: 
Entities  that  carry  out  interest  representation  activities  will  conduct  some  basic 
familiarisation  with  the  new  regulatory  framework  to  assess  whether  their 
operations  would  fall into scope.  Such  cost  would  be  around  EUR  20 to  60 per 
organisation161. 

Option 2.2: 
extended legislative requirements 

Extended familiarisation costs: 
Entities  concerned  by  the  new  regulatory  framework  would  need  to  assess  the 
practical implication, develop compliance strategies and allocated responsibilities 
for  compliance  related  tasks.  These  costs  would  be  around  EUR  80  to  240  per 
organisations162   
N/A 

Establishing and implementing record keeping processes: 
Concerned  entities  would  need  to  identify  and  assess  the  risks 
related to  each  new  engagements  and then  implement  a  record 
keeping process. While there would be a need to formalise these 
processes,  stakeholders  confirmed  that  these  costs  could  be 
considered as business as usual163. 

Familiarisation 
costs 

Record 
keeping 

160  5 CSOs underlined that any requirements to obtain a licence would place an important burden on smaller actors involved 

in interest representation, including not-for-profit organisations. 

161  See Annex 4, section 2.2 for details. 
162  See Annex 4, section 2.3 for details. 
163  See Annex 4, section 4.2 for details. 

37 

 
 
Registration 

Prior 
authorisation 
/licencing 

Registration costs: 
In  the 15  Member States that currently maintain a transparency register,  entities 
would need to update their registration. In the 12 other Member State, they would 
need  to  register.  In  all  27  Member  States,  concerned  entities  would  need  to 
regularly  update  their  registration.  Furthermore,  the  larger  the  firm,  the  more 
complex and costly the reporting process.  The total registration would thus cost 
around  EUR  828  per  organisation  per  year  for  small  entities164,  EUR  1  686  for 
medium entities165 and EUR 3 314 for  large entities166. 97.3% of entities falling 
under the scope of the initiative would be small entities167. 
N/A 

N/A 

Within  the  application  for  a  licence, 
concerned  entities  would  be  required  to 
submit the same information as under the 
registration  obligations.  Thus,  the  core 
activities, and direct costs, stemming from 
the  prior  authorisation/licencing  system 
would  be  covered  by  the  “Registration” 
cell above.168  

(*)  For the purpose of this table, it is assumed that  Member  States enact legislation to adopt the transparency 
measures recommended in Option 1. Further analysis is provided in Annex 4. 

SME test 

It  is  not  possible  to  fully  exempt  SMEs  from  the  transparency  requirements  as  they  are 
important actors in the market for interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third 
countries169.  Legal  fragmentation  in  the  internal  market  for  entities  carrying  out  interest 
representation  activities  on  behalf  of  a  third  country  is  a  significant  barrier  for  SMEs, 
amounting to prohibitive legal and financial obstacles to such enterprises. SMEs are also more 
affected by policies established by some Member States  which require entities  carrying  out 
interest representation to registered in that Member State.  

The obligation to maintain updated registration included in all 3 options involve an ongoing 
compliance  cost.  While  the  ongoing  costs  depend  on  the  number  of  interest  representation 
activities  carried  out  on  behalf  of  third  countries,  the  described  cost  affect  SMEs 
proportionately more than other actors.  

The legislative options (PO2.1 and PO2.2) offer more opportunities for such costs to be offset 
by savings resulting from simplification of the rules and the elimination of the need for multiple 
registration when offering activities across borders. This would increase cross-border activity 
in particular for SMEs, which could offer their activities to clients outside their Member State 
of establishment and would have the opportunity to scale up to operate at EU level. Support to 

164  Defined as having less than 10 full-time equivalent personnel (FTEs) working on interest representation activities. 
165  Defined as having between 10 and 20 full-time equivalent personnel (FTEs) working on interest representation activities. 
166  Defined as having more than 20 full-time equivalent personnel (FTEs) working on interest representation activities. 
167  See Annex 4, section 2 for details. 
168  Within the application for a licence, entities within scope would be required to submit the same information as under the 
registration obligations of policy option 2.1.  While this could lead to hassle costs (e.g. from delaying the provision of 
services), the core activities, and direct costs, stemming from the prior authorisation / licencing system would be covered 
by the registration and information update costs detailed above. Annex 4 provides further details on this analysis.  

169  In its answer to the Commission’s questionnaire, 1 CSO underscored that “all entities involved in interest representation 
and receiving funding from governments should be equally accountable, which means that transparency requirements 
should apply to all bodies involved in the EU legislative process. However, small and large actors should not be in unequal 
situations  in  terms,  amongst  others,  of  the  administrative  burden  of  registering.  According  to  the  principle  of 
proportionality  and  equality,  SMEs  and  other  small  actors  should  benefit  from the  removal  of unnecessary  burdens.” 
Additionally, no Member State argued that SMEs should benefit from a derogation and only 1 Member State (out of 15) 
emphasized that “additional excessive administrative burdens on CSOs, social partners, and SMEs” should be avoided. 
All  3  industry  representatives  are  not  in  favour  of  any  specific  exemptions  for  certain  entities  or  of  any  de  minimis 
threshold. 

38 

 
 
compliance to transparency requirements would be offered by competent national authority, 
notably on the notion of third country entity or on the scope.  

To limit administrative burden, in particular for SMEs, an obligation would be introduced to 
make information on the registration obligations and formalities established by the legislative 
options available via the Single Digital Gateway170 which, through the Your Europe web portal, 
sets up a one-stop-shop that provides businesses and citizens with information about rules and 
procedures in the Single Market, at all levels of government and direct, centralised, and guided 
access to assistance and problem-solving services as well as to a wide range of fully digitised 
administrative  procedures.  In  addition,  the  procedure  for  registration  is  fully  online  and 
organised in accordance with the ‘once only’ principle to facilitate the reuse of data. 

Finally,  the  risk-based  approach  and,  in  PO2.2,  the  prior  authorisation/licencing  would  be 
subject to a de minims, to avoid imposing excessive burden on SMEs. 

6.2.1.4.  Costs  for  public  authorities  of  measures  addressed  to  economic 

actors. 

The  2  legislative  options  (PO2.1  and  PO2.2)  would  aim  to  streamline  oversight,  providing 
better access to needed information, more opportunities for coordinated action and resource-
sharing  and  clarity  about  the  responsible  authority.  This  would  result  in  more  effective 
regulatory  outcomes.  It  also  provides  support  to  Member  State  authorities  to  request 
information  and  facilitate  cross-border  oversight  via  the  Internal  Market  Information 
System171, while focusing on entities whose main establishment lie in their jurisdiction.  

As  detailed  in  Annex  4,  it  could  result  in  some  costs  for  national  authorities:  one-off 
familiarisation costs, 15 Members States that have a publicly accessible transparency register172 
would have a one-off cost to amend their regime, while the 12 other Member States173 would 
need to establish such register. All Member States would need to maintain the registers and 
maintain appropriate management, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms174. These costs 
are expected to be partialy offset against the efficiency savings expected from the harmonised 
obligations and streamlined and strengthened oversight process. 

If fully implemented, PO1 would lead to the same costs as the targeted requirements in Option 
2.1without the benefits stemming from the streamlined oversight and cooperation systems. 

Should the recommendation under PO1 not be implemented fully, the costs under a scenario 
of 50% take up by Member States has also been assessed, which would lead to lower costs for 
Member States authorities175. 

In addition to the costs and benefit of the PO2.1, the extended requirements of PO2.2 introduce 
some additional specific obligations over the other options and the baseline which would imply 
additional costs. 

170  Regulation (EU) 2018/1724 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 October 2018 establishing a single digital 
gateway to provide access to information, to procedures and to assistance and problem-solving services and amending 
Regulation (EU) 1024/2012. 

171  Regulation  (EU)  1024/2012  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  25  October  2012  on  administrative 
cooperation through the Internal Market Information System and repealing Commission Decision 2008/49/EC (‘the IMI 
Regulation’). 

172   IE, EL, ES, FR, IT, CY, LT, LU, NL, AT, FI, DE, PL, RO, SI. 
173  BE, BG, CZ, DK, EE, HR, LV, HU, MT, PT, SK, SE. 
174  See Annex 3, section 3.1 for details. 
175  Details on the costs analysis in that 50% take up scenario are provided in Annex 4. 

39 

 
 
6.2.2.  Social impacts 

6.2.2.1.  Transparency of interest representation activities carried out on 

behalf of third countries 

The  2  legislative  options  (PO2.1  and  PO2.1),  and  assuming  that  its  recommendations  are 
followed, the non-legislative option (PO1) enhance the transparency of interest representation 
activities carried out on behalf of third countries. As voters, citizens are important decision-
makers in their own right, and as such, they can be the target for certain interest representation 
activities. By revealing the information on the interest representation activity conducted and 
the entity on whose behalf the activity is carried out, all 3 options would enable citizens and 
public officials to easily recognise influence campaigns by third countries thereby contributing 
to  the integrity  of, and public trust  in,  EU and Member State decision-making  processes.  It 
would support oversight  by competent  authorities as well as scrutiny from  interested actors 
(including  CSOs,  political  actors,  researchers,  elections  observes  or  journalist)  to  monitor 
interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries. The strengthening of 
the quality of information available would help enrich the political debate.  

Stakeholder views: 
10 Member States (out of 15) pointed out that it is in the general interest of the society to know about 
interest representation activities on behalf of third countries seeking to influence the formulation or 
implementation of policy or legislation or public decision-making processes in the EU. For example, 1 
of them emphasized that “it is not sufficient that only decision-makers have access to such information. 
Such  access  should  be  made  available  to  every  person  interested  to  be  informed  about  lobbying 
activities, while, at the same time respecting any limitations with regard to confidentiality or GDPR.”  

The 2 legislative options (PO2.1 and PO2.2) could have limited impacts on the confidentiality 
of the registered entity. However, no derogation to confidentiality requirements will be sought. 
If such requirements apply, entities will be able to refer to them in order to not have their data 
published in the register or to have only a limited set of data published. Furthermore, financial 
amounts  would  be  published  in  ranges,  since  publicity  on  the  granularity  of  the  specific 
amounts paid is not strictly needed for the objective of public accountability.  

The  2  legislative  options  (PO2.1  and  PO2.2)  would  require  entities  carrying  out  interest 
representation on behalf of third country entities to provide their registration number when in 
direct contact with public officials.  

Stakeholder views: 
5 out of 11 CSOs considered that a requirement for all registered entities to provide their registration 
number  when  in  direct  contact  with  public  officials  would  unduly  restrict  CSOs  access  to  policy-
making. 5 out of 15 Member States expressed similar concerns. 6 Member States actively support such 
requirements.  According  to  1  of  them  “this  would  help  ensure  transparency  and  accountability  in 
lobbying activities.”  

Neither of these two policy options would regulate the transparency or ethical requirements 
that  Member  States  may  imposed  on  public  officials.  Except  when  carrying  out  interest 
representation activities on behalf of third country entities, concerned entities would be free to 
interact with public official without additional requirements under EU law. The requirement 
would be limited to providing the registration number and would ensure that decision-makers 
can easily access the information on the interest represented, and thus  critically analyse the 
content to which they are exposed and make informed choices. It  would not unduly restrict 
access to public officials. 

40 

 
By providing for similar transparency requirements in each Member States, and thus limiting 
forum shopping, the 3 options would ensure that entities do not carry out interest representation 
on behalf of third countries covertly.  

6.2.2.2.  Improve  knowledge  about  the  magnitude,  trends  and  actors  of 
interest  representation  activities  carried  out  on  behalf  of  third 
countries 

The  2  legislative  options  (PO2.1  and  PO2.2),  and  assuming  that  its  recommendations  are 
followed PO1, would improve knowledge about the magnitude, trends and actors of interest 
representation  activities  carried  out  on  behalf  of  third  countries,  by  providing  for  publicly 
available  data  on  such  activities.  In  particular,  Members  States  would  be  able  to  establish 
aggregate data on the interest representation activities being carried out, the decision-making 
processes  targeted,  the  amounts  spent  by  each  third  country.  They  will  enable  journalists, 
CSOs, researchers as well and national or European authorities to map the entities carrying out 
interest representation on behalf of each third country as well as the means, such as a newspaper 
or online platform disseminating ads, by which the content of an interest representation is being 
disseminated to the public. They will be able to assess the evolution of that market over the 
years. The publication of some of these aggregate amounts and the establishment of machine-
readable176 register would strengthen of the quality of information  available on this subject, 
help enrich the political debate and inform future policy-making. This information could also 
serve to build capacity and help citizens and policy-makers understand and, where relevant, 
react to influence campaign of third countries. 

The  2  legislative  options  (PO2.1  and  PO2.2),  would  greatly  facilitate  comparison  between 
Member States and establishing trends at EU level, by providing identical information to be 
provided  upon  registration,  and  promoting  harmonized  publication  standards  of  aggregated 
data  through  their  respective  governance  cooperation  mechanism.  These  legislative  options 
also provide for a flexible and evolutive approach to this data collection by enabling to adapt 
the information requested upon registration  as well as the aggregate data to be made public 
through for delegated act.  

By  providing  for  an  early  assessment  of  the  information  provided,  the  prior  authorisation 
system  in  PO2.2  would  ensure  that  the  information  provided  in  the  register  is  correct  and 
complete  and  would  further  the  knowledge  on  the  magnitude,  trends  and  actors  of  interest 
representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries. 

6.2.2.3. 

Enforcement and supervision by authorities 

By limiting the risk of forum shopping (see section 6.2.1.1 above), PO1 would be a limited 
improvement compared to the baseline, as interest representatives are less likely to direct their 
operations towards less regulated Member States, enabling Member States to better monitor 
interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries in their jurisdiction. 

The  2  legislative  options  (PO2.1  and  PO2.2),  entail  further  improvement  by  strengthening 
regulatory  coordination  among  competent  authorities  especially  via  the  establishment  of  a 
governance  cooperation  mechanism  such  as  an  advisory  group,  and  information  sharing 

176  Information should be considered machine readable if it is provided in a format that software applications can automatically 
process, without human intervention, in particular for the purpose of identifying, recognising and extracting specific data 
from it. 

41 

 
 
structures. This would ensure that oversight on a common set of transparency requirements is 
better coordinated among national authorities177.  

In addition, both legislative options provide for gradual enforcement mechanism thanks to a 
risk-based approach. In PO2.1, supervisory authorities would be able to request, without any 
justification, the records kept by entities fulfilling the risk-based approach criteria. In PO2.2, 
entities in the scope of the instrument would also be required to keep records of all contracts 
and  exchanges  with  the  third  country  entity,  if  they  fall  within  the  scope  of  the  risk-based 
approach,  and  these  entities  would  be  required  to  automatically  share  all  of  these  records. 
These provisions will facilitate the enforcement of the transparency requirements with regard 
to entities that carry out interest representation activities that are particularly likely to have a 
significant influence on public life and public debate. It will also enable authorities to have 
access to contracts and key exchanges enabling them to better understand and supervise interest 
representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries. The risk-based approach would 
be flexible and evolutive, as the threshold could be modified via a delegated act using the data 
collected over time. 

Stakeholder view: 
7 out of 11 CSOs and all of the industry representatives who answered the questionnaire (3) highlighted 
the risk of circumvention. 2 of them stated that in the absence of transparency standards applicable to 
all forms of  interest representation “external entities will invariably discover avenues to wield their 
influence, notably through private entities registered within EU Member States”.  

By conditioning interest representation to the respect of transparency requirements, all 3 policy 
options  (assuming  that  the  recommendations  in  PO1  are  implemented  through  legislation) 
would ensure that interest representatives do not carry out interest representation activities on 
behalf of third countries covertly. In the 2 legislative options (PO2.1 and PO2.2), the risk of 
circumvention would be limited thanks to the broad notion of third country entity. This notion 
would include public or private entities, including EU citizens and legal persons established in 
the EU, whose actions can ultimately be attributed to a central government or public authorities 
of  a  third  country178.  Guidance  could  be  offered  by  competent  national  authorities,  to  help 
concerned entities apply this concept. Where a supervisory authority has reliable information 
of possible non-compliance, e.g. a private entity registered in the EU trying to cover up its work 
on  behalf  of  third  countries,  it  may  ask  that  entity  to  provide  the  records  kept  necessary  to 
investigate the possible non-compliance. These 2 policy options would also enable reports of 
breaches or attempts to circumvent the obligations by whistle-blowers179. 

By having the possibility to refuse to authorise an interest representation activity that is likely 
to  seriously  affect  public  security,  the  legislative  option  PO2.2  would  enable  supervisory 
authorities to prevent activities that could pose a threat to the functioning of the institutions and 
essential public services, as well as the risk of a serious disturbance to foreign relations or to 
peaceful coexistence of nations. 

177  1 Member State (out of 15) considered that a network for national supervisory authorities “should serve as a platform for 

regular exchange of information and structured cooperation between supervisory authorities”. 

178  The concept is inspired by Article 3(3) of Regulation on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market, see note 3. 
179  2 CSOs (out of 11) support such compliance mechanism, 1 of them stating: “CSOs and human rights defenders, in their 
quality  as  trusted  actors  that  contribute  to  the  promotion  and  protection  of  democratic  standards,  should  be  put  in  a 
position to report to supervisory authorities any elements coming to their knowledge which points to a risk of malicious 
covert foreign interference”. 

42 

 
 
6.2.3.  Fundamental rights impacts  

6.2.3.1. 

Right to private life and to the protection of personal data180 

All 3 policy options impose limited restrictions on the right to private life (Article 7 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, hereinafter ‘the Charter’181) and the right to the protection of 
personal data (Article 8 of the Charter), insofar as they require that entities keep and provide 
certain information to the national authorities and provide access for the public to a part of that 
information  which  might  include  personal  data.  The  legislative  policy  options  (PO2.1and 
PO2.2) provide in addition for the exchange of such information among competent national 
authorities. 

As voters, citizens are important decision-makers in their own right, and as such, they can be 
the target for certain interest representation activities. All 3 policy options enhance the integrity 
of, and public trust in, the EU’s and Member States’ democratic institutions by ensuring the 
transparency of interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries, and by 
improving  the  knowledge  about  the  magnitude,  trends  and  actors  of  interest  representation 
activities carried out on behalf of third countries (see sections 6.2.2.1 and 6.2.2.2)182. The CJEU 
has recognised that the objective consisting in increasing transparency is an overriding reason 
in  the  public  interest183.  The  aim  pursued  by  the  3  policy  options  therefore  constitutes  an 
objective  of  general  interest  that  is  capable  of  justifying  interferences  with  the 
fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter in line with Article 52 
thereof. 

All 3 policy options provide for public access to a proportionate, clearly defined and limited 
set  of  information,  which  excludes  information  that  is  not  absolutely  needed  to  reach  the 
purposes pursued. The limitations on the right to private life and the right to the protection of 
personal  data  respect  the  essence  of  those  rights,  genuinely  meet  a  general  interest 
recognised by the EU, and are proportionate and limited to the minimum necessary.  

In particular, in the legislative policy options (PO2.1 and PO2.2), the set of data to be made 
available  to  the  public  is  limited  to  what  is  necessary  to  improve  knowledge  about  the 
magnitude,  trends,  and  actors  of  interest  representation  carried  out  on  behalf  of  third 
countries184. It is clearly and exhaustively defined and fully harmonised throughout the EU. 
Most of the information contained in the register would not consist of personal data. The data 
minimisation  principle  contained  in  the  GDPR  would  be  uphold  in  this  context  by  limiting 
personal  data  made  publicly  available  to  the  minimum  required  for  citizens  to  be  informed 
about the entity carrying out interest representation and the activity carried out on behalf of 
third  country  entities.  Information  of  relevance  only  to  the  competent  national  authorities, 
supervising  and  monitoring  compliance  with  those  options,  would  not  be  made  publicly 
available, to safeguard against the risks of abuse of the information provided. 

In addition, the legislative policy options (PO2.1 and PO2.2), beyond fully harmonising the set 
of data to be made public, provide for additional and specific safeguards by enabling entities 
to  request  that  all  or  part  of  the  information  gathered  for  the  purpose  of  the  transparency 
requirement is not made public based on an overriding interest. The requirement in PO2.2 that 

180  For a full analysis, see Annex 8. 
181 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 391–407 (BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, 

EN, FR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV). 

182  As stated by the Venice Commission, “lobbying activities fall (…) in between the political party activities and ordinary 
NGO  activities.  (…)  The  public  has  a  clear  interest  in  knowing  the  lobbying  actors  who  have  access  to  government 
decision-making process  for  the  purpose  of  influence,  including  their  financial  sources  whether  domestic  or  foreign”. 
Venice Commission Report on Funding of Associations CDL-AD(2019)002, paragraph 105. 

183  See note  125, paragraph 79. 
184  See section 5.3.2.1 for details on the information to be made public. 

43 

 
 
entities falling within the scope of the risk-based approach are required to automatically share 
all of their records with the supervisory authorities could go beyond what is necessary to ensure 
the transparency of interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries. 

6.2.3.2. 

Freedom of association185 

The right to freedom of association is guaranteed under Article 12 of the Charter, it applies 
to associations, including CSOs, interest groups, trade unions and political parties.  

Careful  consideration  is  being  given  to  the  potential  spill  over  effect  of  the  measures  and 
unintended  negative  consequences  for  the  operation  of  CSOs,  which  are  operating  in  a 
shrinking civic space186.  

Stakeholder views: 
7 out of 11 CSOs voiced concerns about the risk of “creating a negative presumption and stigmatising 
CSOs  who  received  foreign  funding”  and  about the  risk  that  they  might  be  “misused  by Member 
States  in  expansive  transposition”.  4  CSOs  argued  that  the  proposed  measures  do  not  “remove 
potential  obstacles  to  the  functioning  of  the  internal  market,  [but]  that  they  introduce  additional 
obstacles […] by limiting the ability of organisations to seek and receive funds.” 

Freedom of association constitutes one of the essential pillars of a democratic and pluralistic 
society, in as much as it allows citizens to act collectively in fields of mutual interest and to 
contribute to the proper functioning of public life187. Associations must be able to pursue their 
activities,  operate  without  unjustified  interference,  and  obtain  resources  to  support  their 
operations. The Court considers that legislation which renders significantly more difficult the 
action or operations of associations, whether by strengthening the requirements in relation to 
their  registration,  by  limiting  their  capacity  to  receive  financial  resources,  by  imposing 
obligations of declaration and publications such as to create a negative image of them or by 
exposing them to  the threat  of penalties, in  particular of dissolution,  is  to be classified as a 
limitation to the freedom of association188.  

The  examined  policy  options  are  limited  to  ensuring  transparency  regarding  interest 
representation activities carried out on behalf of third country entities and seeking to influence 
decision-making processes in the EU. They do not affect as such the possibility for entities to 
carry out these activities (with the exception of PO2.2). However, transparency requirements 
could have a spill over effect on other activities of CSOs for instance their advocacy work. 

All 3 policy options enhance the integrity of, and public trust in, the EU’s and Member States’ 
democratic institutions by ensuring the transparency of interest representation activities carried 
out on behalf of third countries, and by improving the knowledge about the magnitude, trends 
and  actors  of  interest  representation  activities  carried  out  on  behalf  of  third  countries  (see 
sections  6.2.2.1  and  6.2.2.2)189.  The  CJEU  has  recognised  that  the  objective  consisting  in 
increasing transparency is an overriding reason in the public interest190. As such, it is possible 
to justify the limited and proportionate impact on freedom of association resulting from the 
initiative  –  in  as  much  as  the  requested  organisations  would  have  to  comply  with  the 
registration and reporting obligations and pay the related costs.  

185  For a full analysis, see Annex 8. 
186  The 2022 FRA’s report highlights that in 2020, 15% CSOs faced legislations on transparency and lobby laws negatively 
affecting  their  freedom,  available  at:  https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2022/fundamental-rights-report-2022-fra-
opinions. 

187   See note 125, paragraph 112.  
188  See note 125, paragraph 114; Judgment of the ECtHR of 14 June 2022, Ecodefense v. Russia, n°9988/13, paragraph 81. 
189  See note 182. 
190  See note 125, paragraph 79. 

44 

 
 
The limited transparency obligations would, furthermore, not affect the essence of the right to 
freedom of association. In particular, while imposing transparency obligations, the proposed 
measures do not restrict the right to seek for funding and resources as none of the policy options 
ban foreign funding. 

All 3 policy options thus meet the objective of general interest, in light of the principles of 
openness and transparency, which must guide the democratic life of the EU in accordance with 
the second paragraph of Article 1 and Article 10(3) TEU and in conformity with the democratic 
values shared by the EU and its Member States pursuant to Article 2 TEU. 

With regard to the proportionality of the limitation, all 3 options apply indiscriminately to 
any entity receiving financial support from abroad by reason of the type of activity they 
carry out. In particular, the legislative policy options (PO2.1 and PO2.2) would not cover any 
funding given by a third country entity191, but only the funding which is related to an interest 
representation  activity  (structural  grants,  donations,  etc.  are  therefore  excluded).  These 
legislative options only focus on the activities that are genuinely likely to have a significant 
influence  on  public  life  and  public  debate.  Secondly,  none  of  the  policy  options  target 
specifically  CSOs  or  other  associations,  significantly  reducing  the  risk  of  stigmatisation. 
They regulate a specific type of activity – interest representation activities carried out on behalf 
of third country governments – regardless of the natural or legal person carrying it out.  

The  legislative  policy  options  (PO2.1  and  PO2.2)  contain  specific  safeguards  to  avoid 
stigmatisation. Firstly, the national public registers would have to be presented in a neutral 
manner and in such a way that it does not lead to stigmatisation of the entities included in the 
register (e.g. Member States would be prevented from requiring the entities that fall within the 
scope  of  the  initiative  to  register  ‘as  an  organisation  in  receipt  of  support  from  abroad’  or 
indicate on their internet site and in their publications and other press material the information 
that  they  are  organisations  in  receipt  of  support from  abroad).  In  particular,  the  publication 
should not be presented with or be accompanied by statements or provisions that could create 
a climate of distrust with regard to the registered entities, apt to deter natural or legal persons 
from  Member  States  or  third  countries  from  engaging  with  them  or  providing  them  with 
financial support. 

Secondly,  Member  States  should  ensure  that  when  carrying  out  their  tasks,  the  national 
authorities  ensure  that  no  adverse  consequences  arise  from  the  mere  fact  that  an  entity  is 
registered.  

Thirdly, the registered entities would be able to request that all or part of the information is not 
made publicly available where there are overriding legitimate interests preventing publication. 
By imposing a full harmonisation of the transparency requirements, these 2 options ensure 
that registered entities  may not  be required to  present  themselves to  the  general  public in  a 
manner liable to stigmatise them192.  

Additionally,  the  full  harmonisation  responds  to  the  concerns  of  CSOs  that  the  legislative 
instrument could be “misused by Member States in expansive transposition”. This would not 
be possible as Member States would be prohibited from exceeding the limits imposed by the 
legislation  and  could  not  lay  down  more  stringent  protective  measures  on  the  grounds  of 
transparency.  

Furthermore, the reporting obligations would be fully harmonised. The reports available to the 
public would present the amounts in an aggregated data and per type of entity registered (i.e., 

191  Third country governments and entities whose action can be attributed to them, see section 5.2. 
192  Upon registration, these entities would only be required to provide their registration number in their contacts with public 

officials, not the wider public. 

45 

 
 
no amounts spent by specific entities would be provided). When it comes to the information 
available in  the registers, the ranges in  which the amounts should be public would be fully 
harmonised. 

The legislative policy options (PO2.1 and PO2.2) also include proportionate sanctions and a 
comprehensive  system  of  safeguards,  including  effective  judicial  review193.  These  options 
would ensure that CSOs and other associations would not be exposed to the threat of criminal 
penalties or dissolution.  

Stakeholder views:  
1 (out of 11) CSOs highlights that “registration procedures must be manageable by volunteers and 
amateurs, since unlike business corporations, CSOs are often staffed by volunteers.” 

The  targeted  requirements  included  in  PO2.1  are  proportionate  and  will  not  overburden 
concerned entities, also not those run by smaller teams or by volunteers. (i) In terms of record-
keeping, the concerned entities would be required to keep, for a limited period, a clearly defined 
set of information194. (ii) In terms of registration, the concerned entities would only be required 
to provide limited information on themselves, the activities conducted, and the third country 
entities they conduct the activities for. The registration would include an approximation195 of 
the remuneration received. Only the information necessary for the application and oversight of 
the  legislative  initiative  would  need  to  be  updated  regularly.  Other  information  would  only 
need to be updated annually. (iii) Apart from where it is necessary to examine non-compliance 
with  the  registration  requirements,  registered  entities  can  only  be  requested  to  share  their 
records  with  the  supervisory  authority  as  part  of  a  risk-based  approach  where,  based  on 
objective factors, they are particularly likely to have a significant influence on public life and 
public debate. (iv) As illustrated in section 6.2.1.3 and Annexes 3 and 4, the costs for private 
entities  are  not  likely  to  render  significantly  more  difficult  the  action  or  operations  of 
associations and are limited to what is necessary to ensure transparency. 

The extended requirements included in PO2.2 impose additional burdens on the concerned 
entities  as  compared  to  the  targeted  requirements  included  in  PO2.1196.  These  additional 
provisions enhance the restrictions on the right to freedom of association. Member States 
would be able to refuse granting a licence on the ground that the activity is likely to seriously 
affect public security. While such measure would be suitable to address threats to internal and 
external security, it would still place de facto prior authorisation obligations on the mechanisms 
by which associations  use  certain  remunerations  from  third countries. Such measures  could 

193  Supervision would be entrusted to independent supervisory authorities with clearly established powers, whose requests for 
further information would need to be motivated and subject to effective judicial remedy. Sanctions would be designed in 
a  way  that  would  avoid  a  chilling  effect  on  the  concerned  entities  and  sanction  related  powers  subject  to  appropriate 
safeguards, including the right to effective judicial review. They would be fully harmonised and limited to administrative 
fines under a specific ceiling based on the entity’s economic capacity. Sanctions would only be imposed following a prior 
early warning except for breaches of the anti-circumvention clause. 

194  These records would include information on the identity of the third country entity on whose behalf the activity is carried 
out, a description of the purpose of the interest representation activity, contracts and key exchanges with the third country 
entity to the extent that they are essential to understand the nature and purpose of the interest representation carried out as 
well as information or material constituting key components of the interest representation activity. 

195  During the registration the precise amount would not be requested. Concerned entities would have to indicate in which 
bracket (e.g.: EUR 25,000 < 50,000; or EUR 50,000 < 100,000) the  remuneration would fall, this remuneration would 
cover all the tasks carried out with the objective of influencing the development, formulation or implementation of the 
same proposal. Information on the annual amounts declared would be made public within wider brackets corresponding 
the level of detail necessary for the purpose of informing citizens their representatives and other interested parties. 

196  These additional requirements include: (i) a requirement to apply to national-level authorities for an EU-wide licence to 
conduct interest representation activities on behalf of a third country entity; and (ii) a requirement to keep records of all 
contracts and exchanges with the entity on whose behalf the activity is carried out as well as all information or material on 
the interest representation activity.    

46 

 
 
have  a  disproportionate  impact  in  the  light  of  the  objective  that  it  seeks  to  achieve197. 
Furthermore, this system of prior authorisation  would  give Member States a certain  leeway 
which could create a risk of arbitrariness in the decisions to grant said licence. Finally, the fact 
that a publicly available flag would be added in the registration of the entity who received a 
licence  despite  comments  submitted  by  a  Member  State  or  the  Commission,  could  lead  to 
stigmatisation of the said entity. 

The  non-legislative  option  (PO1)  would  not  provide  for  the  extended  requirements  of  the 
PO2.2. However, it would only provide for recommendations, leaving Member States a large 
room  of  manoeuvre  to  implement  transparency  requirements  and  would  not  ensure  the 
implementation of the safeguards provided by the legislative options. In the questionnaire that 
was  sent  to  Member  States,  CSOs,  and  industry  representatives,  6  out  of  11  CSOs  have 
expressed concerns that such recommendations could be misused. 

6.2.3.3. 

Freedom of the arts and sciences  

The freedom of the arts and sciences is guaranteed under Article 13 of the Charter.  Among 
other198, Article 13 of the Charter protects the freedom of researchers to express their opinion 
without  being  disadvantaged  by  the  institution  or  system  in  which  they  work  or  by 
governmental or institutional censorship.  

In the recent decades, research, innovation and higher education have increasingly expanded 
beyond  national  borders  to  become  fully  internationalised.  While  generally  a  welcome 
development,  this  also  creates  challenges  as  some  third  countries  may  seek  to  influence 
scientific  research  or  shape  educational  activities  to  further  their  own  goals  and  influence 
decision-making in the EU.199 By ensuring the transparency of interest representation activities 
carried out on behalf of third countries via education, research and academic institutions, all 3 
policy options would shed light on potential cases of foreign interference in this field. 

Stakeholder views: 
1  member  of  Academia  indicated  in  a  follow-up  paper  after  a  focus  group  meeting200  that  “to limit 
global dialogue, there must be a concrete and identifiable risk; blanket bans will undermine the long-
term  benefits  of  openness  to  the  world.  Here,  the  people-to-people  aspect  of  academic  exchanges 
remains an essential instrument for mutual understanding. This must not be hampered by general bans 

197  “As to the necessity and proportionality of measures taken to secure the above-mentioned aims, interference with the right 
of associations to seek and obtain financial and material resources should be the least intrusive of all possible means that 
could have been adopted. The authorities should be able to prove that the legitimate aim pursued by the measure cannot 
be  reached  by  any  less  intrusive  measures.  In  particular,  an  outright  ban  on  foreign  funding,  or  requiring  prior 
authorisation from the authorities to receive or use such funds, is not justified.” Venice Commission Report on Funding 
of  Associations,  CDL-AD(2019)002,  paragraph  147;  see  also  Report  by  the  UN  Special  Rapporteur  on  the  rights  to 
freedom of peaceful assembly and of association (A/HRC/50/23) paragraphs 20 to 22. 

198  The freedom of the arts and sciences ensures the freedom of academic staff and students to engage in research, teaching, 
learning and communication in and with society without interference nor fear of reprisal. Freedom of scientific research 
encompasses  the  right  to  freely  define  research  questions,  choose  and  develop  theories,  gather  empirical  material  and 
employ academic research methods, to question accepted wisdom and bring forward new ideas. It entails the right to share, 
disseminate and publish the results thereof, including through training and teaching. It is also the freedom to associate in 
professional or representative academic bodies. In addition, within the European Higher Education Area, Ministers stated 
that they commit to upholding institutional autonomy, academic freedom and integrity, participation of students and staff, 
and public responsibility for and of higher education. They adopted the definition of academic freedom as freedom of 
academic  staff  and  students  to  engage  in  research,  teaching,  learning  and  communication  in  and  with  society  without 
interference nor fear of reprisal (Rome Communiqué 2020 adopted on 19 November 2020 at the Ministerial conference of 
the European Higher Education Area (EHEA)). 

199  ‘Commission publishes a toolkit to help mitigate foreign interference in research and innovation’, Directorate-General for 
January  2022,  available  at:  https://research-and-

Research  and 
innovation.ec.europa.eu/news/all-research-and-innovation-news/commission-publishes-toolkit-help-mitigate-foreign-
interference-research-and-innovation-2022-01-18_en. 

Innovation,  European  Commission,  18 

200  Focus group meeting of 17 November 2022 with 7 representatives from Academia and research organisations.  

47 

 
 
and obstacles unless there is a clear risk for foreign interference against the interest and  values of 
Europe’s democracies”. 

None of the policy options regulate the freedom to define research questions, nor the right to 
disseminate and publish the results. None of the policy options would include a general ban on 
international collaboration (only the extended requirements included in the PO2.2 would limit 
an interest representation on an individual basis, in the specific situation where the activity is 
likely to seriously affect public security). The policy options would only introduce common 
transparency standards in the internal market for interest representation activities carried out 
on behalf of third countries. They would not affect the institutional autonomy of EU Higher 
Education Institutions to set their own organisations, recruit independently, set the structure of 
content or degrees or to borrow money or set tuition fees. 

With  regard  to  the  risks  of  stigmatisation  or  obstacles  to  academic  freedom,  the  analysis 
provided with regard to the freedom of association is applicable mutatis mutandis (see section 
6.2.3.2). 

6.2.3.4. 

Freedom of expression and information  

With regard to the freedom of expression and information (Article 11 of the Charter), both policy 
options would positively contribute to the right of individuals to receive and impart information 
and ideas without interference by public authority.  

Citizens would gain better access to information on interest representation activities carried out 
on  behalf  of  third  countries  affecting  public  decision-making.  This  would  strengthen  their 
understanding of such activities, reinforce their confidence in the integrity of public decision-
making processes and deter manipulative foreign interference.  At the same time, safeguards 
ensure that the right to the protection of personal data of natural persons providing information 
to  national  registries  is  guaranteed.  In  addition,  in  specific  situations  where  organisations 
registered justify an overriding interest,  the publication of information may exceptionally be 
withheld.  

In this regard, the legislative measures in the proposal would improve the transparency and 
accountability  of  entities  that  carry  out  interest  representation  activities  on  behalf  of  third 
countries and enhance the knowledge about the magnitude, trends and actors of such activities. 
The fundamental right to receive information would be reinforced as citizens would gain useful 
information to exercise their democratic rights and hold their public officials accountable.  

None of the policy options regulate the content of the interest representation activities.  

None of the policy options require transparency in terms of funding of operating expenditure, 
which are unrelated to  an interest  representation  activity like structural  grants  or donations. 
This implies that the freedom of CSOs and other concerned entities, to express an opinion on 
their own behalf, would a priori not be affected by the different policy options.  

The provision of transparency measures could have a chilling effect on the decision to carry 
out  interest  representation  activities  and  could  restrict  the  freedom  of  expression  of  entities 
whose action can be attributed to a third country government (such as a private entity controlled 
by a third country)201. These measures pursue an objective in the general interest capable of 
justifying  interference  with  this  freedom  (see  section  6.2.3.2).  Furthermore,  the  specific 

201  This restriction would also exist to PO1 to the extent that the Recommendation is implemented in a way that applies to 

entities beyond third country governments (such as third country entities as defined in section 5.2.). 

48 

 
 
requirements  imposed  by  PO1  and  the  targeted  requirements  in  PO2.1  are  not  more  far-
reaching than would be required to achieve this objective (see section 6.2.3.2). 

The system of prior authorisation in the extended requirements included in the PO2.2 imposes 
additional restrictions on the freedom of expression of entities whose actions can be attributed 
to a third country government. Member States would be able to refuse granting a licence on 
the ground that the activity is likely to seriously affect public security. Such measure  could 
have a disproportionate impact at the light of the objective that it seeks to achieve (see section 
6.2.3.2). 

6.2.3.5. 

Freedom to conduct a business 

Article 16 of the Charter recognises the freedom to conduct a business in accordance with EU 
law and national laws and practices. The harmonised requirements would facilitate and reduce 
the  obstacles  for  the  cross-border  provision  of  services  by  entities  carrying  out  interest 
representation activities on behalf of third countries, which would support such entities in the 
exercise of their freedom to conduct a business.  

The freedom to conduct a business differs from the wording of the other fundamental freedoms 
laid  down  in  Title  II  of  the  Charter,  such  as  the  freedom  of  association,  the  freedom  of 
expression  and  information  and  the  freedom  of  the  arts  and  sciences  (see  sections  6.2.3.2, 
6.2.3.3 and 6.2.3.4), and may be subject to a broad range of interventions on the part of public 
authorities which may limit the exercise of economic activity in the public interest202. 

All 3 options impose limited restrictions on economic activities, insofar as they impose on the 
entities  the  obligation  to  comply  with  certain  requirements  when  carrying  out  interest 
representation on behalf of third countries.  

The transparency measures for interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third 
countries are measures which pursue an objective in the general interest capable of justifying 
interference with this freedom. Furthermore, the specific requirements imposed by PO1 and 
the targeted requirements in PO2.1 are not more far-reaching than would be required to achieve 
this objective.  

The  system  of  prior  authorisation  in  the  extended  requirements  included  in  PO2.2  imposes 
additional restrictions on economic activities. Member States would be able to refuse granting 
a  licence  on  the  ground  that  the  activity  is  likely  to  seriously  affect  public  security.  Such 
measure  would  seek  to  address  threats  to  internal  and  external  security  which  pursue  an 
objective  in  the  general  interest  capable  of  justifying  interference  with  this  freedom.  Such 
measure would apply in limited individual cases and would need to be justified and would not 
impede  concerned  entities  to  carry  out  other  interest  representation  activities  for  which  a 
licence has been granted. This additional requirement would thus not be more far-reaching than 
would be required to achieve this objective. 

6.2.4.  Geopolitical implications 

The Union is committed to supporting democracy and human rights in its external relations, in 
accordance with its founding principles of freedom, respect to human dignity, democracy and 
respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law203. The Union has a large 

202  Judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  22  January  2013,  Sky  Österreich  GmbH  v  Österreichischer  Rundfunk,  C-283/11, 

ECLI:EU:C:2013:28, paragraph 46. 

203  Article 2, 3(5) and 21(1) TEU. 

49 

 
 
set of tools to support and protect democracy and human rights worldwide204. With its Member 
States, it is the world’s largest  provider of democracy  support  and human rights  assistance, 
financing  programmes  with  both  state  and  non-state  actors  in  the  vast  majority  of  third 
countries.  All  operations  are  guided  by  the  Human  Rights  Based  Approach,  encompassing 
principles of respect for human rights, participation, inclusion, transparency and accountability. 

The  Union  consistently  condemns  any  undue  limitation  on  fundamental  freedoms  and 
restrictions on civic and political space in violation of international human rights law, including 
so-called “foreign agent laws”205. These laws often include measures that unduly limit the civic 
space and restrict human rights that are key pillars of a democratic society. For example, the 
Russian Regulation of the Activities of Non-profit Organisations Performing the Functions of 
a Foreign Agent, adopted in 2012 and amended in 2022 has been used to “stigmatise […] and 
seriously hamper”206 the activities of individuals from different groups of society, including 
CSOs, unregistered public associations, media outlets, journalists, activists and human rights 
defenders.  Other  attempts  to  enact  laws  aiming  to  scrutinize  the  work  of  CSOs  receiving 
support from abroad include the Georgian draft law on transparency of foreign influence and 
the Republika Srpska’s draft law on the Special Register and Transparency of the Work of the 
non-profit organisations207.  

In contrast to so-called ‘foreign agent laws’, which take a restrictive starting point, none of the 
policy  options  seek  to  regulate  CSOs  in  particular  nor  negatively  label  their  activities,  nor 
restrict  fundamental  freedoms  and  civic  space.  Instead,  the  policy  options  are  designed  to 
provide transparency requirements and more democratic accountability to citizens on interest 
representation  activities  carried  out  on  behalf  of  third  country  entities.  None  of  the  policy 
options  ban  foreign  funding  or  require  transparency  in  terms  of  funding  of  operating 
expenditure of CSOs (such as structural grants or donations)208. 

204  See for example the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024. The EU regularly discusses issues 
related to the respect for democracy and human rights in political dialogues as well as in dedicated human rights dialogues 
with third countries and regional or multilateral organisations. In addition to the dialogues, bilateral trade agreements and 
the various association and cooperation agreements between the EU and third countries or regional organisations include 
human rights clause defining respect for human rights as an ‘essential element’ of the said agreements. There are also 
specific mechanisms that have been established for enlargement countries that adheres to EU’s commitment to democracy 
and human rights. Before joining the EU, these countries have to develop stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the 
rule of law, human rights and respect for and the protection of minorities, a process actively supported by the EU. 

205  See  inter  alia:  ‘Russia:  Declaration  by  the  High  Representative  on  behalf  of  the  EU  on  the  10th  anniversary  of  the 
introduction  of  the  Law  on  Foreign  Agents’,  Council  of  the  European  Union,  20  July  2022,  available  at:  
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/07/20/russia-declaration-by-the-high-representative-on-
behalf-of-the-eu-on-the-10th-anniversary-of-the-introduction-of-the-law-on-foreign-agents/;  ‘Georgia:  Statement  by  the 
High Representative on the adoption of the Georgian “foreign influence” law’, European Union External Action, 7 March 
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/georgia-statement-high-representative-adoption-
2023, 
%E2%80%9Cforeign-influence%E2%80%9D-law_en; ‘EU in BiH on recent developments in the RS’, Delegation of the 
European Union to Bosnia and Herzegovina & European Union Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 27 
March 2023, available at:  https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/bosnia-and-herzegovina/eu-bih-recent-developments-
rs_en?s=219. 

available 

at: 

206  Venice Commission, Opinion on Federal Law N. 121-FZ on Non-Commercial Organisations (“Law on Foreign Agents”), 

CDL-AD(2014)025, paragraph 132.  

207  According  to  Republika  Srpska’s  draft  law,  foundations  as  well  as  foreign  and  international  non-governmental 
organisations receiving any form of foreign funding or other assistance of foreign origin would be designated as “Non-
profit  organisations”  (hereinafter  “NPOs”).  This  draft  law  would  prohibit  NPOs  from  carrying  out  political  activities, 
requiring them to register in a special registry and all their published materials to include the mark “NPO”, and to submit 
additional reports compared to those already required by the existing legal framework. NPOs would also be subject to an 
additional legal regime of oversight and inspections, and a range of sanctions for violations of the provisions of the draft 
law  that  may  result in  the ban  of  the  NPOs’  activities  and  thereby  of  the  NPO itself.  The  joint  opinion  of  the  Venice 
Commission and OSCE/ODIHR on Republika Srpska’s draft law indicates several areas of concern due to non-compliance 
at: 
rights 
with 
https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2023)016-e. For instance, the Draft Law 
is not based on any risk assessment or consultation with associations and others potentially affected.  

international 

standards, 

available 

human 

208  For more details see Section 6.2.3.2 and Annex 8. 

50 

 
 
Risk of retaliatory measures by third countries 

Stakeholder views: 
8 out of 11 CSOs and 5 out of 15 Member States considered there are associated geopolitical risks. 1 
CSO explained that the legislative policy options “bring a risk of reciprocity, in which organisations in 
third countries receiving EU funds would be specifically targeted by third country governments”.  

Following  the  targeted  questionnaire,  a  few  Member  States  expressed  views  that  measures 
addressing  interest  representation  could  have  an  impact  on  diplomatic  relations  with  third 
countries unless exceptions are provided for diplomatic work and international organisations. 
A number of foreign influence laws have been introduced worldwide. There does not seem to 
be a clear causal relationship or direct temporal link between the introduction of, on the one 
hand, foreign  influence laws, such  as  the  US  Foreign  Agents  Registration Act  (‘FARA’, in 
force since 1938) or the Australian Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act (‘FITSA’, in 
force since 2018), and, on the other hand any of the foreign agent laws as they exist in Russia 
(in force since 2012), Nicaragua (in force since 2020), El Salvador (proposed in 2021), Georgia 
(proposed in 2023), or Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Republika Srpska (adopted in 2023).  The 
increasing number of proposed and/or adopted foreign agent laws in recent times shows that 
these laws come into force independently of EU action, and rather illustrates the broader trend 
of direct and indirect restrictions on civic and political space.  

However,  given  the  prominent  role  and  stance  of  the  Union  regarding  the  defence  and 
promotion of democracy and human rights, EU legislative initiatives, due to their visibility, 
present  a  significant  risk  of  manipulation  and  misuse.  This  can  happen  in  two  ways.  First, 
regardless  of  factual  differences,  third  country  governments  might  attempt  to  justify  their 
foreign agent laws with reference to the EU’s legislation. This has been the case for the US 
FARA since both the governments of Russia and Georgia have explicitly referred to the act 
when introducing their legislation.209 Second, accusations of hypocrisy or ‘double standards’ 
could be expected, especially from those actors who will try to spin it for their own justification 
but also more widely if the differences between legislations are not clearly communicated and 
understood, regardless of factual differences. The geopolitical impacts of the policy options 
will vary from third country to third country and may be difficult to assess in advance. 

For all 3 policy options, such consequences could be mitigated by diplomatic exchanges and 
information activities that will be conducted to present and explain in details the targeted aims 
and the proportionality of the measures as well as the strong safeguards. This will imply to 
explain in details the important and manifest differences between the selected policy option 
and the so-called “foreign agents laws”210, managing false narratives and potential unfounded 
assimilations through adapted explanations of the content of the EU initiative.  

Clarity  on  the  differences  will  be  crucial.  These  include:  the  focus  of  the  EU  proposal  on 
interest representation activities impacting decision-making processes in the European Union 
rather  than  individual  organisations,  the  exclusion  of  operating  grants  for  CSOs  or  private 
donors from the scope, the absence of any regulations that might be used to hinder the work of 

209  The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (2017), ‘FARA’s Double Life Abroad’, Washington D.C., available at: 
https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/FARA-briefing_Final_c.pdf, page 1; Judgment of the European Court of Human 
Rights of 14 June 2022, Ecodefence and others vs. Russia, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2022:0614JUD000998813, paragraph 41, 44; 
.‘Shalva Papuashvili to Dunja Mijatovic concerning the so-called draft laws on agents’, Parliament of Georgia, 03 March 
2023,  available  at:  https://parliament.ge/en/media/news/shalva-papuashvili-dunia-miatovichs-minda-dagartsmunot-
saparlamento-diskusiebi-ikneba-inkluziuri-rom-moidzebnos-sauketeso-versia-romelits-gaitvalistsinebs-rogorts-
sakartvelos.  

210  Most  recently  the  new  foreign  agent  law  in  BiH’s  Republika  Srpska,  see  ‘Bosnia  and  Herzegovina:  Statement  by  the 
Spokesperson on the “foreign agent” law in Republika Srpska’,  European Union External Action, 28 September 2023, 
available  at:  https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/bosnia-and-herzegovina-statement-spokesperson-%E2%80%9Cforeign-
agent%E2%80%9D-law-republika-srpska_en.  

51 

 
 
CSOs and the absence of criminal sanctions and other restrictive measures. Furthermore, the 
proposed measures include important safeguards like the possibility of judicial redress as well 
as the possibility to request that some of the information gathered will not be made public based 
on an overriding interest which differentiate them from other measures. 

The proposed measures also do not cover any activities related to the exercise of diplomatic 
relations between states or international relations.  

Additionally, all 3 policy options take into account the feedback related to US FARA and the 
Australian FITSA. These two legislations are fundamentally different from foreign agent laws 
in place or proposed in other third countries. Some CSOs and academics consider that the US 
FARA is too broad and vague in its definitions and scope, and expressed concerns regarding 
criminal sanctions.211  

Taking into account this feedback, all policy options define interest representation on behalf of 
third countries in very clear terms and none of the proposed measures uses wordings such as 
“foreign agent”212 or “foreign principal”213.  

Providing for criminal penalties would be disproportionate, creating an atmosphere of distress 
for  concerned  entities.  PO2.1  and  PO2.2  envisage  exclusively  administrative  fines  for  non-
compliance with the proposed measures.  

All policy options would provide for coherent transparency measures for all third countries. As 
raised by 3 Member States (out of 15) in the targeted consultation, a targeted approach towards 
only  some  third  countries  would  be  more  likely  to  lead  to  retaliatory  measures  or  create 
diplomatic tensions214. The risk-based approach as proposed in the legislative policy options 
(PO2.1  and  PO2.2)  is  based  on  an  objective  set  of  indicators  and  would  not  be  arbitrarily 
singling out one or several countries. The risk of retaliatory measures would thus be limited. 

Due to the non-binding nature of the policy recommendations set out in PO1, their geopolitical 
impacts  would  depend on their implementation  by Member States. Such a recommendation 
could potentially have a beneficial geopolitical impact as it would clarify the EU standard in 
this area, and it would prevent it from being used as a carte blanche by certain third countries 
to  introduce  legislation  not  in  line  with  international  human  rights  law  and  standards.  In 
comparison, the current fragmented approach by Member States is more likely to be damaging 
to the EU’s reputation as it lacks  consistency and coherence. 

The geopolitical impact of the targeted requirements in PO2.1 is likely to be more important 
compared  to  PO1,  as  a  coordinated  legislative  proposal  would  have  greater  geopolitical 
visibility. Compared to the non-legislative option, this PO further limits the risk of gold-plating 
by  introducing  fully  harmonised  measures  and  allows  the  Commission  to  monitor  its 
implementation in Member States and react to any breaches, including of fundamental rights. 
Furthermore,  an  EU  coherent  and  proportionate  approach  focusing  on  transparency  and 
democratic accountability to address the challenges posed by interest representation on behalf 
of third country entities, could serve to set standards.   

The geopolitical impact of the extended requirements of PO2.2 is likely to be more negative 
than that of PO2.1 since it includes the requirement for organisations to obtain a license before 

211  The  International  Center  for  Not-for-Profit  Law  (2022),  Recommendations  to  the  Justice  Department  on  FARA 
Concerning Its Impact on Civil Society, Washington D.C., available at: https://www.icnl.org/post/analysis/u-s-program-
comments-faras-impact-on-civil-society.  

212  ‘Foreign Agents Registration Act’, U.S. Department of Justice, available at: https://www.justice.gov/nsd-fara.  
213  'Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme’, Australian Government, available at: https://www.ag.gov.au/integrity/foreign-

influence-transparency-scheme.  

214  See Section 5.2.1. 

52 

 
 
they are allowed to engage in any interest representation activities. There is a possibility for 
pushback from third countries currently engaging in influence activities in the Union if their 
activities  would  not  be  approved.  Similarly,  to  the  extent  this  option  may  include 
disproportionate restrictions to the right to freedom of association, the EU’s reputation could 
also  be  negatively  impacted,  and  the  EU  might  be  perceived  as  setting  a  precedent  for  far-
reaching legislation on covert foreign influence.  

Risk to entities covered by the policy options 

Concerning  the  work  of  covered  entities  in  third  countries,  there  is  a  risk  that  certain  third 
countries  might  use  EU  legislation  as  a  pretext  to  apply  foreign  agent  legislation  against 
them,215 or otherwise restrict their activities. 

Stakeholder views: 
1  CSO  (out  of  11)  explained  that  it  receives  funding  from  non-EU  governments  and  related  public 
institutions in third countries and that part of this funding is used to support work in high-risk countries. 
It explained that “publicly accessible information about our funding sources is therefore currently very 
limited because it puts people and organisations [they] work with at physical and legal risks, it can 
also jeopardise our ability to work in those countries by alerting local authorities”. 

To address this point, the legislative policy options (PO2.1 and PO2.2) provide for additional 
and  specific  safeguards  by  enabling  entities  to  request  that  all  or  part  of  the  information 
gathered  for  the  purpose  of  the  transparency  requirement  is  not  made  public  based  on  an 
overriding interest. Due to its non-binding nature, PO1 would not ensure the implementation 
of the safeguards provided by the legislative options. 

Even  if  consultations  with  stakeholders  did  not  suggest  that  similar  legislation  like  the  US 
FARA  or  the  Australian  FITSA  have  led  to  a  relevant  decrease  of  foreign  donations  for 
American or Australian CSOs, 6 CSOs (out of 11) voiced concerns that the proposed measures 
may  impact  funding  from  international  donors.  The  impacts  of  the  policy  options  on  the 
freedom of association are analysed in section 6.2.3.2.   

Lastly, because the policy options cover any entity (established within or outside the EU) that 
carries  out  interest  representation  activity  on  behalf  of  third  counties  to  influence  decision-
making processes in the EU, none of them will impact the competitive position of EU firms 
with regard to non-EU competitors. 

6.2.5.  Digital by default principle  

Under  PO1,  Member  States  would  be  invited  to  use  digital  tools.  To  the  extent  that  these 
recommendations  are  followed,  PO1  would  be  in  line  with  the  Digital  by  default  principle. 
Under the legislative policy options (PO2.1 and PO2.2), the transparency registers would have 
to  be  supported  by  publicly  accessible  IT  tools  in  line  with  the  2030  Digital  Compass 
Communication216  and  the  need  to  promote  “digital  by  default”  policy-making  in  EU 
legislation217. Exchanges between authorities would also be supported by existing IT tools. 

Table 5: Summary of the impacts for each of option considered (compared to the baseline) 
Impact assessed 

Option 2.1 

Option 1 

Baseline 

Option 2.2 

215  See for example the listing of the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe as ‘foreign agents’ by Russia after the United 
States  had  asked  RT  TV  America  and  Sputnik  to  register  under  FARA:  Robinson,  N.,  ‘‘Foreign  Agents’  in  an 
interconnected world: FARA and the Weaponization of Transparency’, Duke Law Journal, Vol. 69, No 5, 2020, p. 1087.  
216  Commission Communication, 2030 Digital Compass: the European way for the Digital Decade, (COM(2021) 118 final). 
217  Berlin declaration on digital society and value-based digital government, signed at the ministerial meeting of 8 December 
2020:  Call  on  the  Commission  to  ensure  through  the  ‘better  regulation’  framework  that  policies  and  legislative  acts 
proposed by the European Commission are digital-ready and interoperable by default. 

53 

 
 
Economic impacts 
Functioning of the internal market 
Competitiveness 
Costs and administrative burdens on 
economic operators (+SMEs) 
Costs for public authorities 
Social impacts 
Transparency of interest representation 
activities carried out on behalf of third 
countries 
Improved knowledge about the 
magnitude, trends and actors 
Enforcement and supervision 
Fundamental rights impacts 
Right to private life and right to the 
protection of personal data 
Freedom of association 
Freedom of the arts and sciences 
Freedom of expression and 
information 
Freedom to conduct a business 
Geopolitical implications 
Digital by default principle 
Overall 

0 
0 
0 
0 

0 
0 
0 

0 

0 
0 
0 

0 
0 
0 

0 
0 
0 
0 

Non 
legislative 

+ 
+ 
+ 

- 

- 
+ 

++ 

+ 

+ 
-  

- - 

- - 
- - 

+ 

- 
+ 
0 
+ 

Legislative 
targeted 
requirements 
++ 
+++ 
++ 

Legislative 
Extended 
requirements 
+ 
++ 
++ 

+ 

- 
++ 

++ 

++ 

+++ 
- 

- 

- 
- 

+ 

- 
- 
+ 
++ 

+ 

- - 
++ 

++ 

+++ 

+++ 
- - 

- - 

- - - 
- - -  

- 

- - 
- - 
+ 
- 

The table should be read in vertical: ‘+++’ means positive impact of very high magnitude compared to the 
baseline, ‘++’ means positive impact of high magnitude compared to the baseline, ‘+’ means positive impact 
of moderate magnitude compared to the baseline, ‘0’ means neutral impact compared to the baseline, ‘-’ 
means negative impact of moderate magnitude compared to the baseline, ‘- -’ means negative impact of 
high magnitude compared to the baseline, ‘- - -’ means negative impact of very high magnitude compared 
to the baseline, ‘n.a’ means not applicable. 

7.  HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? 

The  options  were  compared  on  the  basis  of  the  criteria  of  Effectiveness218,  Efficiency219, 
Coherence with existing and planned EU initiatives and Proportionality220. Methodology is 
explained in Annex 4. 

7.1. Effectiveness 

1.  Facilitate  cross-border  interest  representation  activities  carried  out  on  behalf  of  third 

countries when done transparently.  

All  3  options  would  provide  for  similar  transparency  requirements  in  all  Member  States, 
thereby  levelling  the  playing  field  compliance  cost  and  limiting  the  risks  of  regulatory 
arbitrage.  However,  the  non-binding  nature  of  the  proposed  non-legislative  measures,  PO1 
makes  it  difficult  to  determine  if  and  how  Member  States  would  implement  the  proposed 
transparency standards and further fragmentation will a priori not be preventable.  

218  How the measures achieve the two objectives: Facilitate cross-border interest representation services carried out on behalf 
of third countries done transparently; Improved knowledge about the magnitude, trends and actors of interest representation 
activities carried out on behalf of third countries. 

219  How  the  measure  relates  to  the  anticipated  costs  of  the  measures  against  the  expected  benefits  of  the  increased 

effectiveness. 

220  How the measures relate effectiveness against efficiency and any negative impacts. 

54 

 
 
 
 
The legislative options (PO2.1 and PO2.2) would increase legal certainty and reduce the scope 
for divergent legislation, they would also provide for the recognition, throughout the internal 
market,  of  the  registration  in  1  Member  State  thereby  facilitating  cross-border  interest 
representation activities on behalf of third countries entities.  

Divergence in implementation of the prior authorisation/licensing system in the PO2.2 could 
reintroduce limited regulatory arbitrage. 

2. 

Improve knowledge about the magnitude and trends of interest representation activities 
carried out on behalf of third countries. 

All  3  options  would  improve  knowledge  about  the  magnitude  and  trends  of  interest 
representation  activities  carried  out  on  behalf  of  third  countries.  The  2  legislative  options 
(PO2.1 and PO2.2), would be more effective, as by providing a fully harmonized set of data to 
be collected and definition, they would greatly facilitate comparison between Member States 
and the establishment of trends at EU level. Transparency of interest representation carried out 
on behalf of third countries would  be decisively enhanced as  citizens  could  access  a  public 
register on all interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries in the 
EU.  Researchers,  CSOs  and  journalists  could  also  use  the  information  in  order  to  better 
understand how foreign influence unfolds, who is targeted, and what impacts it has on decision-
making  processes.  Given  that  this  knowledge  is  communicated  to  a  broader  public  and  to 
decision-makers, the harmonisation of transparency requirements would present an important 
added value for democratic decision-making.  

Furthermore, the flexible and evolutive approach to this data collection would enable to easily 
adapt the data collection to the trends observed. Finally, the gradual and coordinated approach 
to supervision, as well as the measures included to limit circumvention (see section  6.2.2.3) 
would help ensure that the data collected is correct.  

Due to its non-binding nature, PO1is unable to ensure a comparable collection of data and the 
supervision of activities would remain inconsistent. 

7.2. Efficiency 

The efficiency of the options weighs the qualitative cost-benefit analysis described in Annexes 
3 and 4, as well as in the description of the impacts in section 6 above.  

In all 3 options, entities carrying out interest representation on behalf of third countries would 
face some compliance costs to comply with the transparency requirements.  

The non-legislative measures in PO1 and the targeted requirements in PO2.1 would impose 
similar cost, however PO1 would not give the same benefits in terms of faciliating cross-border 
interest  representation  activities  on  behalf  of  third  countries,  nor,  for  public  authorities, 
efficency  gains  in  terms  of  cooperation  between  authorites  with  regard  to  enforcement  and 
supervision. 

The  extended  requirements  in  PO2.2  would  imply  additional  compliance  costs  for  national 
administration.  

7.3. Coherence with other EU initiatives 

Issues with coherence were not detected for any of the three policy options.  

55 

 
PO1  would  build  upon  and  be  complementary  to  the  recommendations  issued  by  the 
Commission  in  the  context  of  the  Rule  of  law  reports221,  in  terms  of  scope  and  content. 
Additionally, this policy option would go beyond these recommendations as it provides for a 
list of specific standards related to record-keeping, registration and transparency (1), a detailed 
but voluntary reporting on the application of the specific standards (2) and a monitoring of the 
implementation of the recommendation (3). It would also include references to safeguards that 
Member States should establish, including to prevent stigmatisation of the registered entities. 

As the scope of legislative measures in PO2.1 and PO2.2 are the same they will be assessed 
together in relation to other EU initiatives.  

The  two  legislative  policy  options  will  complement  the  proposal  for  a  Regulation  on  the 
transparency and targeting of political advertising222. The proposal on political advertising 
seeks to  provide a high  level  of transparency for political  advertising services in  the Union 
regardless of the medium used, and to provide additional safeguards applicable to the targeting 
of political advertising based on the processing of personal data. This initiative has a different 
scope  from  the  proposal  on  political  advertising:  it  covers  interest  representation  activities 
carried out on behalf of a third country entity. This includes interest representation activities 
consisting of the organisation of communication or advertising campaigns, which could also 
be considered as political advertising. However, interest representation mainly covers activities 
which are not also ‘political advertising’ (e.g. lobbying individuals directly). Also, the political 
advertising regulation covers activities within its scope regardless whether they are provided 
on behalf of a third country entity. 

Under the proposal on political advertising, transparency is ensured in particular by making 
available  to  individuals  certain  information  with  each  political  advertisement.  In  addition, 
political  advertising  publishers  that  are  very  large  online  platforms  within  the  meaning  of 
Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 (‘the Digital Service Act’) would have to make the information 
contained  in  the  transparency  notice  available  through  the  repositories  of  advertisements 
published, pursuant to Article 39 of that Regulation. The current initiative complements this 
by  providing  public  access  to  complementary  information  in  the  national  registers  of  the 
Member States related to the providers of the interest representation activities, in particular a 
clear indication as to the third country on behalf of which the interest representation activity is 
carried out, the Member States where the interest representation will be carried out, and the 
legislative proposals, policies or initiatives targeted by the interest representation activity. 

These policy options would complement the Digital Services Act (DSA)223, which requires 
providers of online platforms to make available certain information about advertisements they 
present on their online interfaces. In addition, the Digital Services Act requires providers of 
very large online platforms or of very large online search engines that present advertisements 
on their online interfaces to compile and make publicly available in a specific section of their 
online interface, through a searchable and reliable tool, a repository containing information on 

221  For instance, in the 2022 Rule of law report, Denmark, Slovakia was recommended to introduce rules on lobbying, and 
Romania  was  invited  to  introduce  rules  on  lobbying  for  Members  of  Parliament.  Belgium  was  called  to  complete  the 
legislative  reform  on  lobbying,  establishing  a  framework  including  a  transparency  register  and  a  legislative  footprint, 
covering both members of Parliament and Government. In the same report, Spain was recommended to continue efforts to 
table legislation on lobbying, including the establishment of a mandatory public register of lobbyists. No more detailed 
recommendations were issued. 

222  Proposal for a Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, see note 21. This proposal seeks to 
provide for a high level of transparency in the field of political advertising online and offline and to provide additional 
safeguards applicable to targeting of political advertising based on the processing of personal data. 

223  The  Digital  Services  Act  (see  note  18)  requires  providers  of  online  platforms  to  provide  certain  information  about 

advertisements they present on their online interfaces. 

56 

 
 
the advertisements.  It  also obliges  such providers to  assess and mitigate risks related to  the 
functioning, design or use of their service that have actual or foreseeable negative effects on a 
series  of  societal  risks  including  as  regards  civic  discourse,  electoral  processes  and  public 
security. 

The policy options have a different scope to the Digital Services Act, as  they cover interest 
representation activities on behalf of third countries. Such activities can involve (e.g. as part of 
the organisation of and advertising or communication campaign) placing advertisements on the 
online interfaces of online platforms within the scope of the Digital Service Act. When this is 
the case, the current initiative provides that these online platform services should be named by 
the provider of interest representation activities in the registration of the entity, and the relevant 
costs attributed to their services should be included in the amount of remuneration declared by 
the  entity  carrying  out  the  interest  representation  activity.  However,  this  initiative  does  not 
regulate responsibilities of online intermediaries and would not impose requirements directly 
on the providers of online platform services themselves in that situation. 

Similarly,  the  provision  of  media  services  as  defined  in  Article  2  of  the  proposal  for  a 
European Media Freedom Act (EMFA)224 and the provision of audiovisual media services 
as defined in Article 1 of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive225 would not fall within 
the  scope  of  application  of  these  policy  options.  However,  interest  representation  activities 
carried out on behalf of third country entities by media service providers would. Where media 
service providers or video-sharing platform providers disseminate advertisements as a service 
for  entities  carrying  out  interest  representation  activities  on  behalf  of  third  countries,  these 
policy  options  would  provide  that  such  media  service  providers  should  be  named  in  the 
registration  of  the  entity,  and  the  relevant  costs  should  be  included  in  the  amount  of 
remuneration declared. Just like for providers of online platforms, these policy options would 
a  priori  not  impose  requirements  on  media  service  providers  or  video-sharing  platform 
providers.  

In  the  rare  cases  where  a  media  service  provider  itself  carries  out  interest  representation 
activities on  behalf of  a  third country entity, it would  be subject  to  the requirements of the 
policy options. The information to be provided would be complementary. While the EMFA 
would provide information on the beneficial owner of a media service provider providing news 
and current affairs, these two policy options would provide information on the entity on whose 
behalf the interest representation is carried out. 
The proposed Directive on combating corruption226 seeks to protect democracy as well as 
society  from  the  impact  of  corruption  and  proposes  updating  the  Union  criminal  legal 
framework  to  include  beyond  the  offences  of  bribery  and  misappropriation,  also  trading  in 
influence, abuse of functions, obstruction of justice,  and enrichment from corruption. When 
the offender committed these offences for the benefit of a third country, the proposed Directive 
wants Member States to consider this an aggravating circumstance. The policy options would 
complement this proposal as the transparency of interest representation activities on behalf of 
third country entities is likewise expected to make a positive contribution to the prevention and 
detection of corruption. 

224  European Media Freedom Act, see note 22. 
225  Directive (EU) 2010/13 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual 
media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive). 
226  Proposal for a Directive on combating corruption, see note 25. 

57 

 
 
These policy options are coherent with the annual Rule of Law Reports227 of the Commission 
which,  since  2020,  monitor,  under  their  anti-corruption  pillar,  the  regulation  of  interest 
representation and lobbying in all Member States, within the framework of existing European 
and international standards. It is recommended to Member States to have in place a footprint 
of rules for lobbying, and to secure a thorough and consistent application of similar rules to 
different types of lobbyists and lobbying activities228.  

These policy options are coherent with the proposal for a revision of the Regulation on the 
funding  of  European  political  parties  and  European  political  foundations  (EUPP/F)229 
which  are  in  ongoing  negotiations.  Depending  on  the  outcome  of  the  negotiations,  the 
Regulation could ban all contributions from third countries to European political parties except 
limited contributions from certain third countries with a high level of transparency concerning 
the financing of political parties230.  

These two policy options  would slightly amend  the  Internal  Market Information System 
(‘IMI system’) Regulation231 to implement the administrative cooperation and the exchange 
of  information  provided  for  by  this  initiative  using  existing  IT  tools.  These  policy  options 
would slightly amend the Single Digital Gateway Regulation232 to provide for easy online 
access to information on the rights and obligations stemming from this option, as well as to 
ensure that access to and completion of the procedure for registration required by this option is 
fully online. The Whistle-blower Directive233 would also be slightly amended to ensure that 
whistle-blowers are able to alert the supervisory authorities of actual or potential infringements 
of the policy options’ requirements. 

These policy options would not affect the prohibition to make available, directly or indirectly, 
funds or economic resources to or for the benefit of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies, 
or  natural  or  legal  persons,  entities  or  bodies  associated  with  them  which  are  listed  in  EU 
restrictive measures adopted pursuant to Article 29 TEU and Article 215 TFEU. 

These policy options will have a link to the proposal for a Directive on cross-border activities 
of associations (ECBAs)234. While the ECBA proposal envisages measures to coordinate the 
conditions  for  establishing  and  operating  European  cross-border  associations  (ECBAs)  and 
thereby  simplifying  the  cross-border  activities  of  associations,  including  soliciting  and 
receiving  funding,  the  policy  options  create  transparency  standards  for  their  interest 
representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries.  They do not cover funding 
given by a third country entity (such as a structural grant, donations, etc.) that is unrelated to 
an interest representation activity. In practice, ECBAs will have to comply with the targeted 

227  ‘Rule  of 

law  mechanism’,  European  Commission,  available  at:  https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-

policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/rule-law/rule-law-mechanism_en. 

228  See Annex 9 for details.  
229  See note 17. 
230  These could include EFTA Member States, former EU Member States, candidate countries, countries entitled to use the 
euro as official currency on the basis of a monetary agreement with the EU, partner countries having a stabilisation and 
association  agreement  with  the  EU  as  well  as  European  countries  with  whom  the  EU  has  concluded  Association 
Agreements  comprising  a  Deep  and  Comprehensive  Free  Trade  Area.  During  the  focus  group  with  representatives  of 
European  political  parties  and  foundations,  participants  underscored  the  high  level  of  transparency  which  applies  to 
EUPP/F and raised the question of providing a level playing field in terms of transparency requirements between entities 
influencing decision-making processes. (Focus group with European political parties and foundations of 21 March 2023). 

231  See note 171. 
232  See note 170. 
233  Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons 

who report breaches of Union law. 

234  Proposal  for  a  Directive  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  European  cross-border  associations 
(COM/2023/516  final)  which  address  the  fragmentation of national  rules  for  associations  and non-profit  organisations 
across the EU and facilitate their activities across borders in the internal market. 

58 

 
 
transparency  requirements  under  these  two  policy  options  only  if  they  carry  out  interest 
representation activities on behalf of third country entities.  

These  policy  options  would  not  affect  the  prerogatives  of  the  Commission  to  initiate  and 
conduct  investigations  into  distortive  foreign  subsidies  under  the  Foreign  Subsidies 
Regulation235 or to issue opinions under the EU Regulation on Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) Screening236.  

Finally,  the  policy  options  affect  the  target  of  reducing  burdens  associated  with  reporting 
requirements,  set  in  the  Commission’s  long-term  competitiveness  Communication237. 
Reducing  administrative  burdens  is  crucial  to  maintaining  the  competitiveness  of  European 
businesses.  In  some  cases,  entities  carrying  out  interest  representation  on  behalf  of  third 
countries could fall under the scope of the Directive on corporate sustainability reporting 
(CSRD)238. These cases would be limited and restricted to the situation were the actions of a 
large company would be attributed to a third country239. In that case, the large company will 
have  to  register  according  to  the  requirement  of  the  policy  options  and  apply  the  CSRD 
requirements. The CSRD, reporting obligations are to be done annually and include reporting 
obligations on political influence and lobbying activities. 
The  transparency  registered  established  under  these  two  policy  options  would  be  separate 
instruments than the EU transparency register240. 

This initiative would contribute to the available legal and policy instruments presented in the 
Foreign  Information  Manipulation  and  Interference  (FIMI)  Toolbox,  which  frames  and 
inventories the EU’s comprehensive approach to tackle FIMI and disinformation. In instances 
where interest representation activities can be linked to FIMI incidents, this will help efforts 
initiated through the toolbox to develop a common analytical framework and methodology to 
collect systematic evidence of FIMI incidents, improve the understanding of tactics, techniques 
and procedures used to manipulate, and contribute to an interoperable methodology aimed at 
supporting a whole-of-society approach to tackling FIMI. In this sense, it could also support 
different measures of the Common Foreign and Security Policy where interest representation 
activities can be linked to FIMI activities. 

7.4. Proportionality  

PO1 and the targeted requirements in PO2.1 are proportionate to the objectives set (see sections 
6.2.1, 6.2.3 and 6.2.4). PO2.1 proposes safeguards that prevent in particular the stigmatisation 
of legitimate interest representation. They notably include equal transparency requirements for 
all  entities,  the  obligation  for  Member  States’  authorities  to  ensure  that  no  adverse 
consequences arise from the mere fact of registration, the non-publishment of data based on an 

235  Regulation on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (see note 3) aims to establish a harmonised framework to 

address distortions of competition on the internal market caused, directly or indirectly, by foreign subsidies. 

236  The FDI Screening Regulation (see note 23) provides an EU framework for the screening of direct investments from third 

countries on the grounds of security or public order. 

237 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions  on  the  Long-term  competitiveness  of  the  EU:  looking  beyond  2030 
(COM(2023) 168). 

238  Directive (EU) 2022/2464 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 amending Regulation 
(EU)  No  537/2014,  Directive  2004/109/EC,  Directive  2006/43/EC  and  Directive  2013/34/EU,  as  regards  corporate 
sustainability reporting. It applies to applies to all Limited Liability Companies (LLC) which are not SMEs as defined by 
the accounting Directive, and all LLC companies listed on a regulated market (including listed SMEs) but excluding micro-
enterprises. 

239  Where a company is listed on the stock exchange, they are unlikely to be controlled by a third country government. The 
assessment would need to be made on whether they are acting based on instruction from a third country government. 

240  See note 142. 

59 

 
 
 
overriding legitimate interest, and thresholds limiting the powers of supervisory authorities to 
ask for information.  

However the extended requirements in PO2.2 would impose more costs and further restrict the 
freedom  to  conduct  a  bussiness  and  could  have  disportionate  effects  on  the  freedom  of 
association and the freedom of the arts and sciences and have greater geopolitical implications.  

7.5. Comparison of options  

The  options  are  compared  against  the  criteria  of  effectiveness,  efficiency,  coherence  and 
proportionality.  

In  the  context  of  this  initiative,  effectiveness  describes  to  what  extent  each  option  would 
achieve  the  specific  objectives  defined  in  chapter  4.2,  i.e.  to  facilitate  cross-border  interest 
representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries when done transparently (1) 
and to improve knowledge about the magnitude, trends and actors of interest representation 
carried out on behalf of third countries (2). PO2.1 proves to be most effective with regard to 
objective 1, PO2.1 and PO2.2 are equally effective with regard to objective 2.  

Efficiency  assesses  the  anticipated  costs  of  the  measures  against  the  expected  benefits  of 
increased  effectiveness.  PO2.1  performs  best  in  terms  of  efficiency,  notably  because  of  the 
higher costs that PO2.2 would generate without being more effective.  

Coherence  describes  how  the  proposed  measures  would  complement  existing  and  planned 
initiatives. Both PO2.1 and PO2.2 would be most coherent with other initiatives.  

Proportionality  relates  effectiveness  against  efficiency  and  any  negative  impacts.  PO1  and 
PO2.1  would  be  proportionate  to  the  objectives  set  while  PO2.2  would  impose  more  costs, 
further restrict the freedom to conduct a business and could have disproportionate effects on 
other freedoms and diplomatic relations.  

Table 6: Comparison of options against the baseline 
Options 

Effectiveness 

Efficiency 

Coherence 

Proportionality  Result  

Baseline 
Option 1 
Option 2.1 

Option 2.2 

1 
0 
+ 
+++ 

++ 

2 
0 
+ 
++ 

++ 

0 
+ 
++ 

+ 

0 
+ 
++ 

++ 

0 
+ 
++ 

- 

Preferred 
option  

The  table  should  be  read  in  horizontally:  the  symbols  have  the  same  meaning  as  in  table  5.  Methodology  is 
explained in Annex 4. 

8.  PREFERRED OPTION 

8.1. Description of the preferred option  

Against this assessment, the preferred option consists in a legislative intervention with targeted 
requirements.  

This option would best meet the general objectives as well as the specific objectives of this 
intervention. The harmonised requirements should provide the legal certainty and level playing 
field necessary to remove the obstacles identified in the internal market. It would also prevent 
further fragmentation. The transparency requirements should provide sufficient information to 
improve knowledge about the magnitude and trends of interest representation carried out on 
behalf of third countries. This option is less intrusive as it would limit the costs on national 
administration while facilitating carrying out interest representation activities on behalf of third 
country  entities  across  borders  and  facilitate  cross-border  cooperation  between  national 

60 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
authorities. Finally, this option is less intrusive in terms of impacts on fundamental rights, in 
particular with regard to the freedom of association and the freedom of the arts and sciences 
and has limited geopolitical implications.  

8.2. The choice of instrument 

With regard to  the choice of instrument,  under the legal  basis of Article 114 TFEU, both  a 
Regulation, or a Directive providing for full harmonisation, would support the attainment of 
the general and specific objectives. In the stakeholder consultation, 4 CSOs out of 11 and 1 
Member State out of 15 have expressed a preference for a Regulation. 5 Member States do not 
want to harmonise transparency requirements for interest representation carried out on behalf 
of  third  countries  and  prefer  policy  option  1.  The  other  9  Member  States  do  not  position 
themselves on the choice of instrument under the legal basis of Article 114 TFEU.  
Having recourse to a Regulation241 has the advantage of being of direct application without 
having to wait that Member States have transposed the Directive in national law, which could 
be a benefit due to the urgency to take action against the problems identified by the initiative.  

A Directive providing for full harmonisation of the transparency requirements applicable to 
entities  carrying  out  interest  representation  on  behalf  of  third  countries  conducted  with  the 
objective  of  influencing  the  development,  formulation  or  implementation  of  policy  or 
legislation,  or  public  decision-making  processes  in  the  internal  market,  is  the  most  suitable 
option. It would set legally binding standards to be met in all Member States while leaving 
some flexibility in particular regarding the articulation with existing transparency registers.  

By  providing  for  full  harmonisation,  the  Directive  will  provide  a  uniform  regulatory 
framework,  removing  internal  market  barriers  and  increasing  legal  certainty  for  interest 
representatives in the internal market on the basis of a proportionate standard. Member States 
would, within the framework of the harmonised rules, be prohibited from diverging from the 
rules  including  by  laying  down  more  extensive  transparency  requirements  (so-called  “gold 
plating”). The Directive would provide for a harmonised comprehensive system of safeguards, 
including  effective  judicial  review,  harmonised  sanctions  limited  to  administrative  fines, 
independent  supervisory  authorities,  obligations  to  prevent  stigmatisation,  in  particular  to 
ensure that no adverse consequences arise from the inclusion of an entity in the register. 

The competence of Member States to establish rules, in full respect of EU law, for the aspects 
not covered by the harmonised rules will not be affected, for example, to establish rules for 
their public officials contacting entities carrying out interest representation activities on behalf 
of third countries or regulating the legality of the availability of interest representation activities 
carried out on behalf of third countries. 

8.3. Application of the “one in, one out” approach 

An overview of estimated costs is provided in Annex 3 with methodology in Annex 4. 

Table 7: Costs related to the ‘one in, one out’ approach 

Citizens 
One-off 

Recurrent 

Businesses 
One-off 

Recurrent 

241  A Regulation must be complied with fully by those to whom it applies and is directly applicable in Member States. This 
means that it applies directly after its entry into force in Member States, without needing to be transposed into national 
law, that can create rights and obligations for individuals, who can therefore invoke it directly before national courts, and 
that  it  can  be  used  as  a  reference  by  individuals  in  their  relationship  with  other  individuals,  Member  States  and  EU 
authorities. 

61 

 
 
 
 
Direct and 
indirect 
adjustment 
costs  
Administrative 
costs per year 

n/a 

n/a 

EUR 71.2 million to 
EUR 213.8 million total 
familiarisation costs 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

EUR 615,000 to EUR 
921,000 registration and 
information disclosure 
costs (average EUR 
768,000) 

9.  HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? 

A report on the implementation of the legislative measures contained in the preferred option 
would take place at the latest by 12 months after the deadline for Member States to transpose 
the  Directive.  The  Commission  would  also  carry  out  an  evaluation242  of  those  legislative 
measures at the latest by 4 years after the transposition deadline. This evaluation will also assess 
potential changes to the scope of the Directive, as well as the effectiveness of the safeguards 
provided therein.  

Data on the following objectives and indicators will be collected through Eurobarometer and 
other surveys directed to citizens and stakeholders (entities carrying out interest representation 
activities on behalf of third countries, interest parties (journalist, researchers), public officials 
and enforcement authorities), as well as through cooperation with Member States authorities 
in charge of the implementation of the measures contained in the preferred policy option. Data 
from external agencies and stakeholders (CSOs, researchers, etc.), could also be used. This data 
collection effort will also be addressed specifically in the work programme for the European 
Cooperation Network on Elections (ECNE)243.

242  The Commission will present these reports to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social 

Committee. 

243  The European Cooperation Network on Elections (ECNE) brings together representatives of Member States’ authorities 
with  competence  in  electoral  matters  and  allows  for  concrete  and  practical  exchanges  on  a  range of  topics  relevant  to 
ensuring free and fair elections. Meetings are organised by the Commission. 

62 

 
 
Table 6: monitoring and evaluation of the impacts 

Specific 
objectives 
SO1: Facilitate 
cross-border 
interest 
representation 
activities 
carried  out  on 
behalf  of  third 
countries when 
done 
transparently  

SO2: Improve 
knowledge 
about the 
magnitude and 
trends of 
interest 
representation 
carried out on 
behalf of third 
countries 

Operational Objectives 

Proposed indicators 

Data sources 

common 

transparency 

Establish 
intrest 
representation  activites  carried  out  on  behalf  of  third  country 
entities which provide economic actors with: 
• Clear common framing for intrest representation activites 

standards 

for 

carried out on behalf of third country entities; 

•  Access to the cross-border 

market for interest 
representation activities carried 
out on behalf of third countries 
(baseline unknown). 

• Clear and proportionate specific obligations for entities 

•  Increase in the completeness of 

carrying out intrest represenation on behalf of third country 
entites, on the basis of clearly defined key terms; 

• Reduced costs and risk for providing intrest representation 
activites carried out on behalf of third country entities; 
• A level playing field for all relevant economic operators. 

Ensure that the common standards established at EU level 
provide individuals with sufficient transparency to enable them 
to: 
• Know  the  magnitude  of  intrest  representation  carried  out  on 
behalf of third countries in their Member States and the EU. 
• Know  the  identity  of  the  actors  and  interests  represented  on 

behalf of thrid country entities. 

information provided on 
interest representation activities 
carried out on behalf of third 
countries (e.g. name of entities 
whose action can be attributed 
to third country goverments, 
description of the interest 
representation, information on 
the remuneration provided);  

• Estimates 

intrest 
repesentation  carried  out  on 
behalf of third countries; 

of 

Ensure that the common standards established at EU level provide 
stakeholders  including  researchers,  journalists  interested  in 
the political process of interest representation activites carried out 
on behalf of third countries with sufficient transparency about 

• Compliance 
transparency 
reported 

with 
standards 

the 
as 
interested 

by 

Data  collected  in  the  national 
registers  (on  trends  in  terms  of 
cross 
intrest 
border 
representation,  completeness  of 
the data provided, etc.) (baseline 
unknown) 

Stakeholders’ 
baseline 
is 
response to the consultations) 

(the 
the  respondents’ 

reports 

Number  of  legal  dispute  relating 
to the enforcement of the prefered 
policy option244 (some of the data 
of  Member  States  with  registers 
may be used as a baseline) 
Data  collected  in  the  national 
registers  (aggreagate  numbers  of 
entires  in  the  national  registers) 
(some  of  the  data  currently  in 
national registers may be used as 
a baseline) 

Surveys  of  citizens  (the  baseline 
is  the  respondents’  response  to 
the 
the 
Eurobarometers245). 
Eurobarometers 
unknown) 

(baseline 

OPC 

and 

244  It could cover, for examples dispute liked to the obligation to register, to correct or delete data, or to contest acts taken by Member States supervisory authorities. 
245  Flash Eurobarometer 528 on Citizenship and Democracy. 

63 

 
 
Specific 
objectives 

Operational Objectives 

Proposed indicators 

Data sources 

• The network of actors involved;  
• The amounts of money spent on interest representation activites 
carried out on behalf of third countries per activity and per third 
country; 

• Meaningful  details  about  the  interest  representation  activities 
being carried out, the decision-making processes targeted, and 
link this to any wider associated campaign. 

stakeholders 
qualitative). 

(mainly 

Ensure that the common standards established at EU level provide 
public  officials  with  sufficient  transparency  to  enable  them  to 
determine: 
• Whether they are in  contact  with  an  entity  carring  out  intrest 

representation activity on behalf of a third country entity;  

• Compliance 
transparency 
reported 
stakeholders 
qualitative). 

with 
standards 

the 
as 
interested 
(mainly 

by 

and 

Survey 
stakeholders’ 
journalists, 
unknown) 

reports 
of 
(researchers, 
(baseline 

etc). 

Comparaison  with  stakeholder 
data  where  available.  (baseline 
unknown) 
Survey 
stakeholders (public officials) 
(baseline unknown)  

reports 

and 

of 

• Meaningful  details  about  the  entity  whose  intrest  is  being 
represented, the interest representation activities being carried 
out and the decision-making processes targeted. 

Ensure that the common standards established at EU level provide 
supervisory  authorities  of  Member  States  with  sufficient 
transparency  to  enable  oversight  and  enforcement  of  the 
transparency  measures  provided  by  the  preferred  option  by 
enabling them to obtain 
• Effective access to records  kept  by  entity carrying  out  intrest 
representation  on  behalf  of  third  countries  identified  as 
spending significant amounts on intrest representation in the EU 
or a Member State (risk-based approach)  

• Effective cross-border sharing of information; 
• A  mapping  of  the  actors  involved  in  interest  represtnation 

activites;  

• The amounts of money spent on interest representation activites 
carried out on behalf of third countries per activity and per third 
country; 

• Meaningful  details  about  the  decision-making  processes 

targeted, and link this to any wider associated campaign. 

64 

• Compliance  with  the  EU  level 
standards by entities carriyng out 
interest representation on behalf 
of thrid country entities. 

• Number 

of 

cross-border 

information requests. 

Data  shared  by  Member  States 
(some  of  the  data  currently  in 
national registers may be used as 
a baseline) 

Comparaison of the data collected 
in the national registers to identify 
outliers 
the  data 
currently  in  national  registers 
may be used as a baseline) 

(some  of 

Stakeholders’  reports  (including 
report  by  the  advisory  groups 
composed  of  representatives  of 
national  supervisory  authorities) 
(baseline unkown) 

 
 
 
Annex 1: Procedural information  

1.  Lead DG, Decide Planning, CWP references 

The  Staff  Working  Document  was  prepared  by  the  Directorate-General  for  Justice  and 
Consumers.  

The Decide reference of this initiative is PLAN/2023/68.  

This initiative was announced in the September 2022 State of the Union speech by President 
of the Commission von der Leyen and follows the Commission Work Programme for 2023. 

2.  Organisation and timing 

The Impact Assessment was prepared by DG JUST as the lead Directorate General. 

The Inter-Service Steering Group (ISSG) was set up in October 2022 under the coordination 
of the Secretariat-General and gathered representatives of the Legal Service, DG JRC (Joint 
Research  Center),  DG  NEAR  (Neighbourhood  &  Enlargement  Negotiations),  DG  HOME 
(Migration  &  Home  Affairs),  DG  GROW  (Internal  Market,  Industry,  Entrepreneurship  & 
SMEs),  DG  INTPA  (International  Partnerships),  DG  RTD  (Research  &  Innovation),  DG 
CNECT (Communications Network, Content & Technology), DG COMP (Competition), DG 
EAC (Education, Youth, Sport and Culture) and the European External Action Service. 

The ISSG was consulted on the concept note, the consultation strategy, main legislative and 
non-legislative options and the interim and final reports of the supporting study. On a number 
of other deliverables, such as the questionnaire for the Open Public Consultation, services were 
consulted separately in writing.  

ISSG meetings, chaired by the Secretariat-General, were held on 10 October and 30 November 
2022, 31 March, 26 September 2023.  

The last meeting of the ISSG, chaired by the Secretariat-General of the European Commission 
was held on 5 October 2023. 

3.  Consultation of the RSB  

An  upstream  meeting  took  place  on  18  September  2023  and  the  recommendations  of  the 
Regulatory Scrutiny Board were duly taken into account.  

The Regulatory Scrutiny Board discussed the draft impact assessment in the hearing that took 
place on 15 November 2023. 

The  Board  issued  a  positive  opinion  with  reservations  on  the  draft  impact  assessment.  The 
Board’s recommendations have been taken into account in the Impact Assessment, as the table 
below displays.  

Opinion of the Board 

Implementation 

The  report  should  provide  a  coherent  and 
unambiguous  narrative  for  this  initiative 
focusing  on  legal  interest  representation 
services  on  behalf  of  third  countries  in  the 

The  introduction  and  the  description  of 
options  sections  have  been  updated  to 
provide a clearer narrative for this initiative 
focusing  on  legal  interest  representation 

65 

 
internal  market  of  EU.  The  assessment 
should more precisely identify the gaps this 
initiative intends to fill and how it articulates 
with  the  wider  set  of  initiatives  on  the 
defence  of  democracy.  The  report  should 
provide  a  clear  scope  for  the  EU  action, 
especially 
terms  of  activities  and 
organisations to be regulated. It should make 
it  clear  that  the  initiative  covers  legal 
activities.   

in 

The  analysis  should  bring  out  more  clearly 
the key policy choices of the policy options. 
The  report  should  better  explain  how  the 
various  measures  would  work  in  practice. 
The  assessment  should  better  articulate  the 
mitigation  measures  regarding  potential 
issues  of  ‘stigmatisation’  of 
legitimate 
representation  activities. It should elaborate 
in more detail on measures to avoid potential 
circumvention  of  the  transparency  rules  for 
third  country  interest  representation  taking 
into account that “core funding” of relevant 
actors is not per se in scope of this initiative.   

The  impacts  of  the  different  policy  options 
in 
should  be  adequately  differentiated, 
particular as regards a realistic evaluation of 
the  degree  of  take  up  of  the  various  policy 
measures in case of a recommendation. The 
report should better explain how the potential 
sanctions would work and how effective they 
could be.  

services  on  behalf  of  third  countries  in  the 
internal  market  of  EU.  The 
impact 
assessment clarifies in the baseline how the 
initiative  relates  to  other  legislation  and 
initiatives  proposed  in  the  context  of  the 
Commission’s  ambition  to  strengthen  and 
defend  democracy.  The  added  value  of  the 
further  highlighted.  The 
initiative  was 
section on the policy options and the scope 
was  modified  in  order  to  clarify  that  the 
initiative  only  covers  legal  activities,  i.e. 
interest  representation  activities  carried  out 
on behalf of third countries, and that there are 
limited, but  clearly defined  exceptions with 
regard to the organisations and activities that 
are covered.    

The  description  of  policy  option  has  been 
updated  and  drafting  has  been  improved  to 
evidence  the  key  policy  choices  (targeted 
intervention  or  extended  intervention).  A 
chapter on discarded policy options has been 
added to highlight options considered but not 
pursued further. The mitigation measures to 
reduce the risk of stigmatisation were further 
detailed in the chapter on the impacts of the 
initiative on the freedom of association. The 
description of the policy options (section 5.3) 
explains better why core funding is not per se 
in the scope of the initiative and how national 
supervisory  authorities  shall  prevent  that 
contributions to the core funding of entities 
are  used  to  circumvent  the  transparency 
rules.   

The  impact  assessment  was  refined  by 
two  different  costs  scenarios 
providing 
according to different levels of take-up of the 
legislative measures by Member States (full 
take-up  and  50%  take-up),  with  a  detailed 
analysis in Annex 4. 

In  section  5.3.2.1,  the  impact  assessment 
describes  in  more  detail  how  the  sanctions 
regime  would  work,  notably  which  factors 
would  be  taken  into  account  in  order  to 
determine  the  exact  amount  of  a  potential 
sanction.  

66 

 
 
The  report  should  describe  in  greater  detail 
the  considered  governance  structure,  and 
how  it  would  work  to  ensure  appropriate 
implementation  and  enforcement.  It  should 
explain  what  new  elements  and  structures 
would  be  developed  and  who  would  be 
responsible  for,  e.g.,  IT  tools  (including 
registers), governance structure, supervisory 
bodies, annual reports, etc. It should further 
supervisory 
clarify  how 
the  national 
authorities  would  operate, 
and  how 
cooperation among Member States would be 
structured.  Finally,  it  should  better  explain 
the 
this 
role  of 
governance structure. 

the  Commission 

in 

that 
System 

The impact assessment was refined regarding 
the governance structure foreseen by the two 
legislative  options.  The  obligations  for 
Member States to establish or designate one 
or more authorities were further detailed.  It 
Internal  Market 
was  added 
the 
Information 
system’) 
(‘IMI 
Regulation would support the administrative 
cooperation and the exchange of information 
using  existing 
impact 
assessment  describes  in  greater  detail  how 
the cooperation among Member States would 
be  structured  via  a  governance  cooperation 
mechanism at  EU level.  The Commission’s 
(no  direct 
role 
enforcement  role,  but  right  to  request  data 
from Member States). 

tools.  The 

is  better 

explained 

IT 

4.  Evidence, sources and quality  

The evidence base is drawn from internal and external research, literature review, extensive 
consultation activities, bilateral meetings with stakeholders, and was supported by an external 
study  available  here:  https://commission.europa.eu/document/455c1bda-8c39-48f0-971c-
86758f8b7c90_en . In particular, evidence was based on the following:  

•  The  preparatory  studies  and  open  consultation  for  the  European  Democracy  Action 
Plan,  transparency  of  political  advertising  initiative  and  the  2020  EU  Citizenship 
Report; 

•  The  implementation  of  the  Commission’s  September  2018  electoral  package,  as 

described in the Commission’s report on the 2019 elections;  

•  The Commission toolkit on Tackling R&I foreign interference; 

•  European Parliament resolution of 10 October 2019 on foreign electoral interference 
and disinformation in national and European democratic processes (2019/2810(RSP));  

•  European  Parliament  resolution  of  9  March  2022  on  foreign  interference  in  all 
including  disinformation 

the  European  Union, 

in 

democratic  processes 
(2020/2268(INI));  

•  European  Parliament  resolution  of  17  February  2022  with  recommendations  to  the 
Commission  on  a  statute  for  European  cross-border  associations  and  non-profit 
organisations (2020/2026(INI));  

•  European Parliament studies, including those prepared for the INGE committee; 

• 

International organisations and bodies documents, research and recommendations, such 
as the OECD, the OSCE, the Council of Europe or International IDEA; 

67 

 
 
•  An Open Publication Consultation; 

•  A series of Focus Group meetings with relevant stakeholders;  

•  A Flash Eurobarometer on Citizenship and Democracy; 

•  A Flash Eurobarometer on Democracy; 

•  The work of the European Cooperation Network on Elections 

•  A targeted consultation with relevant stakeholders 

68 

 
 
 
 
Annex 2: Stakeholder consultations 

1.  The consultation strategy  

The  Commission  conducted  a  first  wave  of  wide  consultations  of  stakeholders  on  issues 
relevant  to  transparency  of  interest  representation  activities  carried  out  on  behalf  of  third 
countries, free, fair and resilient elections, and civic engagement, between October 2022 and 
May 2023. 

Following on the first wave of consultations, the Commission sent out additional questionnaires 
on potential policy options to Member States authorities, commercial entities and CSOs on 4 
August 2023 with a (extended) deadline for contribution on 25 September 2023.  

A  Public  Consultation,  accompanied  by  feedback  on  the  Call  for  Evidence  document  was 
published on 16 February 2023 and ran until 14 April (8 weeks). Feedbacks and contributions 
from stakeholders helped further developing problem definitions and policy options.  

The Commission also ran a Flash Eurobarometer on Citizenship and Democracy and a second 
on Democracy. The 2 Eurobarometers are still unpublished.  

The  Commission  organised  in  this  period  a  series  of  focus  groups  meetings  with  relevant 
stakeholders, to gather additional evidence and data on the issues addressed by the package, 
the potential policy options, and their impacts. It also conducted bilateral consultations and met 
with stakeholders, at their own initiative. The Commission received additional feedbacks.  

Finally, the Commission contracted an external study to support its work on this package. As 
part of this study, the contractor also conducted a series of individual consultations with key 
stakeholders.  

Relevant  work  in  the  European  Parliament  (including  the  Special  Committee  for  foreign 
interference in all democratic processes in the EU, including disinformation) provided further 
input  to  the  Commission  analytical  process.  The  Council  of  the  European  Union’s  work 
(including in the relevant working parties) has also provided valuable input.   

The original  consultation  strategy  had  identified the following stakeholders with  the aim of 
gathering their input:  

1.  Commercial  actors,  covering  entities  engaged  in  interest  representation  activities, 

including public relations and lobbying firms; 

2.  Legal professionals involved in interest representation;  

3.  International organisations and standards setting bodies;  

4.  Research bodies, education entities and Academia;  

5.  Non-commercial actors, including CSOs, human rights defenders and think-tanks; 

6.  Political  actors  –  including  candidates,  parties,  foundations,  campaign  and  activist 
organisations in the Member States, at national and European level. Local and regional 
political  actors  should  be  considered,  as  well  as  their  representative  bodies  at  a 
European level.  

69 

 
7.  Public  authorities  –  national  authorities  with  competence  to  monitor  and  enforce 
relevant  rules, transparency obligations and electoral commissions, including via the 
European Cooperation Network on Elections;   

8.  General public, including EU and non-EU citizens, through the Public Consultation.  

The methodology, consultation tools, overview and analysis of the results are further described 
below.  

2.  Public consultation  

The Public Consultation was launched on 16 February and ran until 14 April (8 weeks). It was 
opened to everyone, from EU citizens to private companies. A communication campaign on 
the  Public  Consultation  was  organised  by  the  Commission,  including  social  media  posts  to 
reach out to specific entities and individuals, and communication on the Commission’s website. 
This campaign reached out to 6,501,095 people. 

In total, 852 responses were received in the context of the Public Consultation. The majority 
of respondents were from the EU, with only 12 from outside the EU. Their main countries of 
origin were France, Slovakia, Belgium and Spain. The vast majority of feedback was received 
from  EU  citizens  (92%).  Non-Governmental  Organisations  amounted  for  3.5%  of  the 
respondents. However, only 3 company/businesses replied to the consultation.  

2.1. Results 

The public consultation was divided into 4 main sections, with some answers available only to 
those ticking dedicated boxes corresponding to specific requirements.  

a.  On interest representation and foreign interference  

This  specific  section  of  the  public  consultation  examined  perceptions  on  entities  that  can 
significantly  influence  public  decision-making  processes  and,  more  specifically,  posed  the 
question  of  which  entities  are  more  likely  to  create  a  risk  of  covert  interference  of  third 
countries in the European democratic space. 

−  Lobbying  is  perceived  as  having  the  highest  potential  to  significantly  influence 
legislation in the EU. A total of 802 respondents (96.4%) labelled lobbying as either 
very (83.2%) or somewhat (13.2%) influential. 

−  The activities of ‘Public relations, advertising, media campaigns, including social 
media’,  and  of  political  parties  are  also  considered  as  having  the  potential  to 
significantly  influence  legislation  or  other  public  decision-making  processes.  More 
specifically, public relations activities were considered as very or somewhat influential 
by a combined 91.2% of respondents, while the same figure for activities of political 
parties was 91.5%.  

−  Whilst  the  extent  of  influence  for  the  remaining  activities  listed  (‘Education  and 
training’, ‘Research’ and the ‘Organisation of conferences’) was not perceived to be as 
influential,  respondents  still  considered  them  to  be  able  to  influence  the  legislation 
making process to some degree.  

70 

 
 
The public consultation then focused on examining the EU perception of risks of interference 
with the European democratic space and public debate related to the control or remuneration 
of influential activities by third countries.  

−  Lobbying and public relations activities remunerated by or controlled by third countries 
are  perceived  by  stakeholders  to  pose  the  greatest  risk  to  the  European  democratic 
space, with 86.6% considering this factor to trigger a high risk.  

−  A  total  of  79.8%  considered  political  parties  funded  by  third  countries  or 
funded/supported by entities based in third countries to be a factor that can trigger high 
risk.  

−  Cyberattacks on digital election tools and electoral infrastructures are also perceived to 
be  likely  to  create  particular  risks,  as  74.5%  labelled  these  activities  as  a  factor 
triggering a high risk and 16.9% a moderate risk.  

−  Finally,  the  activities of  think tanks remunerated  by or  controlled by third countries 
were  perceived  by  66.9%  to  constitute  a  high-risk  factor  and  by  25.8%  to  pose  a 
moderate one. 

Therefore, the public  consultation  illustrates that, while all noted  activities are  perceived to 
carry the potential to influence and a risk of interference, lobbying entities and political parties 
are both perceived to retain a particularly high level of influence towards legislation and at the 
same time can trigger the highest risk of third country covert interference. 

b.  On transparency and other requirements 

Overall,  the  public  consultation  responses  highlighted  just  how  much  transparency 
requirements are valued and perceived to be imperative across the EU-27. Almost the entirety 
of respondents (95.6%) believes that there is a need to provide more transparency in the EU 
regarding lobbying, public relations activities or any other activity conducted for third countries 
that significantly impacts the democratic sphere. 

In addition, the respondents largely agreed that every single type of information listed in the 
public  consultation  should  be  provided  by  entities  conducting  such  activities  (more  than 
92.5%). This includes information about the origin and amount of funding, the position of third 
countries and other entities vis-à-vis financing, and the purpose of financing. This continues to 
highlight a trend found across the public consultation responses of a need for more information 
to be made available and for transparency across the EU.  

Considering  other  means  to  combat  the  influence  risks  highlighted  in  the  first  section, 
respondents were asked about the role of civil society and citizens more generally in the context 
of policy-making. Effective and inclusive engagement with both independent civil society 
and citizens in the context of policy-making processes is perceived to be important or very 
important by a large majority of respondents. 

On  this  basis,  respondents  were  then  asked  about  possible  measures  to  improve  the 
engagement, inclusiveness and effectiveness of participatory processes for citizens and CSOs. 
The  measure  considered  most  necessary  –  selected  by  64.2%  of  respondents  –  was  the 
implementation  of  dedicated  structures  to  support  civil  participation  in  policy-making 
processes (such as open online consultation, platforms to provide feedback). Following this, 
the  most  popular  response  options  were  the  dissemination  of  clear,  adequate  and  timely 
information about participation opportunities, modalities and objectives (51.3%) and capacity 

71 

 
 
building for citizens, including at local levels, on how to better engage in the policy-making 
process (41.9%). 

Finally,  the  vast  majority  of  respondents  agreed  or  strongly  agreed  that  there  is  a  need  to 
increase the engagement of CSOs and citizens through purposefully organised processes in 
policy-making at all local, national and European levels (more than 60% strongly agreed and 
more than 20% agreed in all cases). 

c.  On codes of conducts, self-regulation and standards  

The questionnaire then focused on the topic of codes of conduct, self-regulation and standards, 
and showed that even though the stakeholders agree that the prioritisation of transparency and 
accountability is crucial, there seems to be a lack of knowledge or availability of best practices 
on the topic across the EU.  

d.  On free, fair and resilient elections  

The  final  section  of  the  public  consultation  related  to  the  topic  of  free,  fair  and  resilient 
elections,  where  questions  focused  on  measures  that  could  be  taken  to  promote  resilient 
electoral processes and protect election-related infrastructure. 

When questioned about  the importance of certain measures that could be taken by Member 
States to promote resilient electoral processes and protect the infrastructure that is critical for 
the organisation of elections, it is notable that respondents perceived each of the measures listed 
to be important. The most heavily supported measure was the need to focus on cyber security 
of electoral processes and related infrastructure, such as introducing incident notification rules.  

Two additional sections (‘Other’ and ‘Concluding remarks’) were available to respondents to 
add any further information and/or upload any concise document. In total, 24 documents were 
received  from  respondents,  mostly  from  CSOs  and  more  specifically  Non-Governmental 
Organisations, which were carefully analysed. 

2.2. Position of stakeholders in the public consultation 

a.  Position of EU Citizens 

Overall,  EU  Citizens  indicated  that  EU  action  is  needed  to  tackle  foreign  interference  in 
democratic processes and to increase transparency of lobbying, public relations activities and 
any  other  activities  that,  when  carried  out  on  behalf  of  third  countries,  could  significantly 
impact the democratic sphere. EU Citizens have expressed support for proposing transparency 
on  this  matter,  while  stricter  transparency  requirements  and  ethical  obligations  for  public 
officials, candidates to elections and their staff were also mentioned.  

In addition, the majority of respondents called for more involvement of CSOs and citizens in 
the policy-making process, and for more education about the EU.   

b.  Position of CSOs 

CSOs expressed their support to a package aiming at defending democracy and to EU-wide 
measures increasing transparency of lobbying and public relations activities. However, some 
expressed strong concerns over the Directive potentially being seen as a “Foreign Agent Act”, 
based  on  international  precedents.  Many  of  them  stressed  the  need  to  fight  against  all 
democratic  challenges,  including  those  coming  from  within  the  EU,  and  not  focus  only  on 
foreign risks. Most of them stressed the need to respect fundamental rights and the principle of 
proportionality and to avoid any potential stigmatisation of CSOs.  

72 

 
Additionally,  CSOs  called  for  more  long-term  funding  opportunities  and  reminded  of  the 
important role they plan in defending and protection democratic values. They asked to be more 
involved in decision-making processes and called for more regular and inclusive consultations 
of CSOs and citizens.  

3.  Feedback on the call for evidence document 

Feedback on the Call for Evidence document ran from 16 February to 14 April 2023, on the 
Have Your Say portal.  In total,  1,198  responses  were provided, the vast  majority being  EU 
Citizens (91%), with further inputs by 63 non-governmental organisations (5.2%). Most of the 
feedback  was  submitted  by  stakeholders  based  in  Slovakia  (70.3%),  most  of  whom  were 
responding as EU citizens. Other notable countries of origin of respondents were DE, FR, BE 
and AT.  

A  significant  number  of  responses  with  similar  (or  identical)  sentiments  were  submitted, 
spanning  multiple  languages  and  countries  of  origin.  Indeed,  the  Have  your  say  website 
identified a campaign of similar feedback, based on  11 matching  submissions submitted by 
anonymous respondents from DE.  

In addition, some submissions appeared to be copy-pasted with guide words, potentially used 
as  part  of  a  coordinated  campaign.  For  example,  “support  the  opinion:”  (or  “Podporujem 
názor:” in Slovak) was included at the beginning of the submissions. 

4.  Dedicated stakeholders’ meetings 

4.1. Focus Groups 

The Commission organised a series of focus group meetings from November 2022 to  April 
2023, with relevant stakeholders as identified in  the consultation strategy. The aim of these 
focus groups was to gather additional evidence and data on the issues addressed by the package 
from actors on the ground, to build on their experience.  

Focus  groups  lasted  1.5  hours  and  the  discussions  were  organised  around  4  main  strands: 
foreign interference, transparency measures, safeguards and free, fair and resilient elections. A 
list of guiding questions was sent to all participants ahead of the meetings, containing general 
questions  posed  to  all  stakeholders,  as  well  as  more  specific  questions  targeted  at  the 
particularities of the different groups.  

While  organising  the  focus  groups,  the  Commission  ensured  representativeness  and 
inclusiveness in the selection of all participants.  

Overall,  participants  to  the  Focus  Groups  expressed  their  support  for  an  initiative  covering 
foreign interference and common transparency rules for interest representation activities.   

a.  Focus group with international standard setting bodies 

This  focus  group  gathered  representatives  of  the  Council  of  Europe,  including  the  Venice 
Commission,  ODIHR,  International  IDEA,  the  OECD  and  UNESCO.  Colleagues  from  the 
EEAS also attended the focus group.  

Participants expressed concerns about the influence of third countries in democratic processes 
and  stated  that  some  of  their  organisations  were  currently  working  on  this  issue.  They 
highlighted that key stakeholders need to be equipped with adequate tools to tackle it, and that 

73 

 
 
additional evidence is needed to understand the best policy-making solutions, notably to close 
legislative loopholes.  

Participants  agreed  that  transparency  is  the  best  solution  to  tackle  the  problem  of  foreign 
interference. Some of them additionally highlighted the need to tackle disinformation and to 
discuss  foreign  funding  of  political  activities.  Finally,  they  discussed  safeguards  to  be 
considered  (e.g.  elections  observations,  oversight  bodies  to  enforce  transparency  measures 
related to candidates or politicians, etc) and potential risk-assessments.  

b.  Focus group with academia and research organisations  

This focus group gathered members of academia and research organisations talking in their 
personal capacities.  

Most  researchers  agreed  that  there  is  some  urgency  when  it  comes  to  interference  by  third 
countries  in  the  research  sector,  with  a  few  experts  disagreeing  based  on  lack  of  evidence. 
Participants  emphasized  the  role  of  individual  researchers  in  responding  to  the  issues  of 
interference and agreed that any measures taken would have to be taken cautiously in order to 
respect the principles of independent review.  

Participants underlined the importance of international cooperation in research and indicated 
that only authoritarian states should be considered to be a threat (and not all third countries). It 
was also agreed on by the participants that transparency could contribute to the awareness and 
ethics of researchers but not necessarily bring more incidents into light.  

c.  Focus group with legal experts 

This focus group gathered legal professionals and experts, such as lawyers, representatives of 
law associations and of administrative judges’ associations.  

The  majority  of  participants  agreed  that  the  issue  of  interference  by  third  countries  in  the 
democratic sphere of the EU should be tackled urgently, as there is evidence of it having an 
impact on legal professions. In particular, most of them emphasised the importance of setting 
up transparency requirements on the funding of CSOs and foundations aiming at influencing 
EU policies.  

Finally, participants finally discussed the differences between legal representations of clients 
and interest  representation  activities.  Many of them  consider the distinction  achieved  in  the 
Transparency Register appropriate. 

d.  Focus group with commercial entities involved in interest representation  
This focus group gathered professionals working for commercial entities involved in interest 
representation, notably lobbying firms, consultancy companies and representatives of lobbying 
associations.  

Participants all indicated to be registered in the EU Transparency Register, and most of them 
declared to also incentivise their clients to register, which they all believe is a useful tool. They 
highlighted  the  fact  that  the  issue  of  foreign  interference  might  lie  with  the  entities  not 
registered.  

Moreover, participants  confirmed that consultancies conduct due diligence before taking on 
new clients. Participants also agreed that policy-makers should only be allowed to meet with 
entities registered in the EU TR.  

74 

 
Several participants declared to be in favour of a harmonisation of all Transparency Registers 
with  a  single  EU-wide  number  for  registrants.  They  emphasised  that  the  different  systems 
across  the  EU  related  to  registration  and  transparency  requirements,  which  are  highly 
distinctive  between  each  market,  pose  a  major  challenge  to  interest  representation  as  an 
industry. 

e.  Focus group with members of the European Lobby Registrars Network  

This focus group gathered EU members of the European Lobby Registrars Network.  

Participants presented the specificities of their national lobby registers, their rules, the actors 
covered, accompanying codes of conducts, as well as oversight and compliance mechanisms. 
Participants  identified  foreign  interference  as  an  important  topic  and  expressed  the  need  to 
tackle it. Finally, they discussed the safeguards and legislative loopholes to be addressed.  

f.  Focus group with CSOs and non-commercial actors involved in the defence of 

democracy 

The focus group with CSOs and non-commercial actors involved in the defence of democracy 
was introduced by a member of the cabinet of Commission Reynders, who emphasised the key 
role of CSOs for the well-functioning of our democracies and introduced the package.  

Some participants expressed their concerns that CSOs seem to be considered as a problem, and 
not  a  solution  to  tackle  foreign  interference  and  protect  the  EU  democratic  sphere.  They 
condemned the presumption of culpability when it comes to relations between institutions and 
CSOs.  The  majority  of  participants  declared  never  to  have  been  confronted  with  issues  of 
foreign influence. They asked for more support to CSOs, included more funding from the EU.  

Participants added that additional transparency measures could be burdensome and difficult to 
comply with for most CSOs, agreeing that they already must comply with many reporting and 
transparency requirements. They stated that public officials should follow integrity standards.  

g.  Focus  group  with  commercial  entities  involved  in  cross-border  interest 

representation services  

Following a first meeting with professionals involved in interest representation (see point d. 
above),  this  second  focus  group  gathered  commercial  entities  involved  in  interest 
representation,  with  the  aim  to  focus  on  cross-border  activities  and  having  to  comply  with 
different registration and transparency requirements.  

Participants expressed their support for an initiative covering foreign interference, and stated 
they  would  welcome  common  transparency  rules,  as  this  would  not  only  facilitate  their 
registrations but also prevent market and reputational issues for companies and clients. They 
emphasised the challenges of having to comply with different systems and rules across Member 
States. 

h.  Focus  group  with  grants  beneficiaries  of  CERV  programme  working  on 

projects related to the 2024 elections to the European Parliament  

This  meeting  was  a  second  focus  group  gathering  CSOs,  with  the  aim  to  focus  on  those 
receiving funds under the CERV programme and working on projects related to the upcoming 
elections to the European Parliament.  

During  this focus group,  participants  largely  considered that the main barriers to  turnout in 
elections to the European Parliament were the lack of information about  the EU among the 

75 

 
general population, and the lack of participative and deliberative democracy between elections. 
They argued that actions at the local level and more engagement and support to CSOs would 
help  increasing  turnout,  inclusiveness  and  understanding  of  elections.  They  highlighted  the 
importance of increasing trust and transparency of decision-making processes at the EU level. 

i.  Focus group with European Political Parties and Foundations 

A focus group was organised with European Political Parties and European Foundations. Most 
participants said never to have been directly affected by foreign interference, but agreed it was 
a pressing issue. Some of them, however, declared that any additional measures on political 
parties would be burdensome, or even counter-productive, as some of their members are parties 
based in third countries. The question of providing a level playing field in terms of transparency 
requirements between entities impacting democracy was raised. 

On the part related to free, fair and resilient elections, participants agreed there is a general lack 
of knowledge about citizen’s rights, the elections to the European Parliament and the general 
functioning of the EU. References were made to the proposed new electoral law, as a means to 
increase turnout and citizen’s representativeness in elections.  

j.  Focus group with Local Authorities 

This focus group gathered representatives of local authorities.  

While  some  participants  agreed  foreign  interference  is  a  growing  problem  for  local 
democracies, others said not to have experienced it at the local level. A participant mentioned 
that a priority for Baltic cities was to ensure resilience of cities and local authorities. Most of 
participants also expressed concerns on cyberattacks and disinformation.  

Participants  additionally  shared  best  practices  and  examples  of  local  democratic  processes, 
such as innovative participatory mechanisms and co-governing processes.  

k.  Focus groups with Member States 

Two  Focus  groups  were  organised  with  Member  States,  which  welcomed  the  upcoming 
package, agreeing that foreign interference in democratic processes is a growing issue which 
needs  to  be  tackled.  They  recalled  the  need  to  respect  the  principles  of  subsidiarity, 
proportionality,  fundamental  rights  and  to  keep  a  whole-of-society  approach.  All  Member 
States consider transparency as a key measure to tackle foreign interference.  

On free, fair and resilient elections, Member States discussed the fight against disinformation, 
asked  for  more  inclusiveness  in  elections  and  called  for  more  awareness-raising  among 
citizens.  

Discussion  with  Member  States  also  took  place  in  Council  Working  Groups  and  in  the 
framework of the European Cooperation Network on Elections. 

4.2. Meetings with stakeholders  

The Commission conducted bilateral meetings with a diverse range of stakeholders, including 
Member States and CSOs, at their own initiative.  

The Commission held regular meetings of the European Cooperation Network on Elections 
(ECNE) as follows: 15th ECNE meeting November 2022, 16th ECNE Meeting January 2023 
and 17th ECNE meeting 29th March 2023. At the last meeting, Member States exchanged their 
views on the package.  

76 

 
On several occasions, the Commission also met with Members of the European Parliament, 
notably from the INGE committee.  

5.  Ad hoc contributions  

The Commission received 25 written contributions via email outside of the official consultation 
process. Some of these contributions were made following the different focus groups, while 
others were sent due to having missed the deadline of the Open Public Consultation.  

The Commission received 3 follow-up emails to the focus groups from CSOs, expressing their 
concern on the way the discussion on the package was framed and asking to avoid any potential 
stigmatisation of CSOs.  

The EU Foundation Sallux provided further input on the status and challenges of European 
political parties and Foundations.  

The Fundamental Rights Agency sent a letter to  the Commission to stress the need that the 
Defence of Democracy package should aim to protect the fundamental rights enshrined in the 
Charter and called for proportionate measures.  

The  European  Institute  for  Gender  Equality  (EIGE)  welcomed  the  Commission’s  call  for 
evidence and provided further data on gender equality in the EU in relation to the Defence of 
Democracy package, notably on gender inequality in elections.   

The  Public  Relations  company  First  PR  (based  in  Poland)  sent  additional  information  they 
gathered on the future of disinformation and the importance to tackle the issue to protect our 
democracies.  

The  company  The  Logically  Ltd.  shared  their  written  contribution,  focusing  notably  on  the 
impact that online disinformation can have on voter turnout. They called Member States and 
political  parties  to  step  up  efforts  to  promote  voter  turnout  and  inclusive  participation  in 
elections.  

The  Society  of  European  Affairs  Professionals,  recalled  its  commitment  to  the  highest 
standards of ethical conduct in public affairs. They reminded the Commission of the benefits 
of lobbying within the EU decision-making process and that it is a legitimate act of political 
participation,  when  done  transparently  and  with  integrity.  SEAP  stated  that  the  impact  on 
public  affairs  professionals  of  additional  transparency  requirements  regarding  activities 
conducted for third countries would vary according to the measures envisaged but could be 
burdensome  for  smaller  actors  involved  in  interest  representation,  including  not-for-profit 
organisations.  

An individual EU citizen sent a note to the Commission asking to take into consideration the 
outcome of the Conference on the Future of Europe in the drafting of the package.  

The  European  University  Association  welcomed  the  package  but  emphasized  the  need  to 
carefully  balance  the  instruments,  to  fully  empower  civil  society  as  democratic  actors,  and 
ensure dialogue. They called the Commission to respect academic freedom and protect it.  

The Erfurt University of Applied Sciences also welcomed the initiative and the recognition of 
civil  society as  a cornerstone of democracy, but  argued there is  an urgent  need to  focus on 
ensuring long-term funding of CSOs.  

77 

 
Finally, the Commission received position papers from several CSOs246, expressing common 
concern about the potential impacts of the Directive on civic space, fundamental rights  and 
pointed the risk of misuse by malicious actors. They regretted the lack of an impact assessment 
accompanying  the  Defence  of  Democracy  package  and  recalled  the  need  to  respect  the 
principles  of  proportionality  and  necessity.  These  position  papers  generally  welcome  the 
inclusion of a recommendation on civic engagement, called for more structured dialogue and 
collaboration with Civil Society Organisations and for better long-term funding opportunities.  

Following  the  focus  groups,  10  Member  States  (France,  Poland,  Spain,  Finland,  Belgium, 
Lithuania, Slovenia, Romania, Germany, and Ireland) also sent their contributions via email. 
Member  States  welcomed  the  initiative  and  agreed  that  tackling  foreign  interference  is  a 
growing issue and that transparency is a key priority at national level. They, however, stressed 
the importance of respecting fundamental rights, the principles of proportionality, subsidiarity 
and taking a whole-of-society approach.  

Ad hoc bi-laterals between the Commission and interested Member States and their authorities 
also took place.  

6.  Specific consultations conducted by contractor  

The contractor conducted a specific and extensive consultation, by the means of interviews, 
targeted at different stakeholder groups. The interview programme originally aimed to consult 
35-40 stakeholders across key groups.  

This table presents a breakdown of the individual stakeholders contacted (16), as well as the 
62 interviews performed across key stakeholder groups.  

Stakeholder types 

CSOs 

International, EU and national authorities 

Law firms 

Professional consultancies 

Think 
institutions 

tanks  & 

academic/research 

Trade & business associations 

Trade unions & professional associations 

Total 

Interviews 
Performed 

Total 
Contacted 

14 

16 

5 

9 

7 

10 

1 

62 

22 

40 

10 

34 

25 

14 

1 

146 

246  These letters and position papers were for instance received from the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), Transparency 
International EU, European Civic Forum (ECF; along with 230 civil society organisations), Civil Society Europe (CSE, 
along  with  12  civil  society  organisations),  European  Partnership  for  Democracy  (EPD,  along  with  47  civil  society 
organisations), and Philea.  

78 

 
 
1.  The think tanks / research institutes / CSOs interviewed cover both: i) organisations that conduct advocacy activities and 
are experts in lobbying transparency / foreign interference; and ii) organisations that are purely included as they conduct 
advocacy activities. 

2.  The stakeholders interviewed from trade / business / professional associations, in many cases, also represented specific 

public affairs / public relations consultancies. 

7.  Flash Eurobarometer on Citizenship and Democracy (Flash EB 528) 

Flash  Eurobarometer  528  on  Citizenship  and  Democracy,  indicates  considerable  popular 
support for several initiatives of the Defence of democracy package. In the following, a brief 
overview is provided with respect to the findings relevant for the contents of the package. 

7.1. On more transparency in interest representation services 

About 8 in 10 respondents (81%) agree that foreign interference in our democratic system is a 
serious problem that should be addressed, and over 7 in 10 (74%) agree that such interference 
can  affect  citizens’  voting  behaviour. Views  are  somewhat  more  divided  on  the  question  of 
whether foreign countries are justified in aiming to influence EU election outcomes to defend 
their interests: 42% agree that they are justified, while 55% disagree.   

Still, there is strong majority support for tackling such covert interference in our democratic 
systems. About 8 in 10 respondents (81%) agree that entities representing foreign governments 
should be registered to prevent the problem. 

The proportion agreeing that foreign interference in our democratic system is a serious problem 
holds at over 8 in 10 in all Member States with the exception of the Scandinavian countries, 
and Hungary and Romania, where it ranges from 69% (in Finland) to 75% (in Sweden). The 
proportion  agreeing  that  foreign  interference  can  affect  citizens’  voting  behaviour  similarly 
holds at a majority level in all countries and, indeed, is notably higher than average in Slovakia 
(80%), Croatia (82%), Slovenia (83%), Sweden (83%) Cyprus (84%) and Czechia (85%). 

8.  Flash Eurobarometer on Democracy, 2023 (Flash EB 522) 

Flash Eurobarometer 522 on Democracy, indicates considerable popular  support for several 
initiatives of the Defence of Democracy package. In the following section, a brief overview is 
provided with respect to the relevant findings for the contents of the package. 

8.1. Overall findings 

When asked about their degree of satisfaction with the way democracy works in their country, 
close to half of respondents reply being ‘very satisfied’ (10%) or ‘somewhat satisfied’ (37%), 
in contrast to about1 in 2 respondents who reply they are ‘not very satisfied’ (31%) or ‘not at 
all satisfied’ (20%). A handful of respondents (2%) answer that they ‘don’t know’. 

Respondents  were  asked  which  institutions  or  actors  they  have  confidence  to  defending 
democracy in  their  country. The largest  share reply  that they have  confidence in  citizens to 
defend democracy in their country (9% ‘very confident’ and 45% ‘somewhat confident’). More 
than half of respondents show confidence in EU institutions, including the European Court of 
Justice  (15%  ‘very  confident’  and  39%  ‘somewhat  confident’),  followed  by  about  half  of 
respondents who trust CSOs to defend democracy (9% ‘very confident’ and 44% ‘somewhat 
confident’). 

Smaller shares of respondents have confidence in national courts (49%), electoral authorities 
(48%), public administration (46%), in their national (and local) government (44%), in their 

79 

 
national (and local) parliament (42%) or in the media (38%). Finally, about 3 in 10 respondents 
(29%) put confidence in political parties and politicians to defend democracy in their country. 

8.2. On more transparency in interest representation services 

Respondents  were  presented  with  a  list  of  10  items  that  may  constitute  a  serious  threat  to 
democracy in their country. They were asked to select up to 3 threats. The threat to democracy 
listed  most  frequently  by  respondents  is  ‘false  and/or  misleading  information  in  general 
circulating  online  and  offline’  (38%);  this  is  followed  by  ‘growing  distrust  and  scepticism 
towards democratic institutions’ (32%).  

Another 4 of the threats are selected by more than1 in 5 respondents: ‘lack of engagement and 
interest  in  politics  and  elections  among  regular  citizens’  (26%),  ‘lack  of  opportunities  for 
citizens to voice their opinions’ (23%), ‘propaganda and false/misleading information from a 
non-democratic foreign source’ (22%), ‘covert foreign interference in the politics and economy 
of your country, including through financing of domestic actors’ (21%).  

In 22 countries, respondents  are most likely  to  reply  that one of the most serious threats  to 
democracy in their country is ‘false and/or misleading information in general circulating online 
and offline’. The proportion selecting this threat varies between 24% in Bulgaria and 48% in 
Hungary and Malta. 

8.3. On electoral resilience 

Respondents were presented with a list of 6 elements associated with free, fair and resilient 
elections, and they were asked which elements they consider the most important to define free, 
fair and resilient elections (they could select up to 3 elements). 

About 1 in 2 respondents (51%) select ‘voters having access to accurate information to make 
an informed choice’ as one of the most important elements of free, fair and resilient elections, 
followed by 47% selecting ‘the electoral administration being independent and impartial’.  

Respondents were also presented with a list of 6 elements associated with free, fair and resilient 
election campaigns, and they were asked which elements they consider the most important to 
define such campaigns (up to 3 elements could be selected).  

The  largest  shares  of  respondents  select  ‘debates  and  campaigns  avoiding  hate  speech, 
manipulation and lies’ (46%) and ‘candidates and political parties having equal opportunity to 
access the media’ (41%). Each time about a third of respondents refer to ‘voters know who 
finances  candidates  and  political  parties’  (35%),  ‘voters  can  engage  with  candidates  and 
political  parties  in  debate’  (33%)  and  ‘voters  know  who  finances  political  advertising  and 
sponsored content and can distinguish between sponsored content and non-paid for political 
information’ (32%) as important elements of free, fair and resilient electoral campaigns.  

9.  Additional meetings with stakeholders 

On  6  July  2023  a  meeting  took  place  at  political  level  with  Civil  Society  Organisations 
representatives to discuss the ‘Defence of Democracy’ Package in the context of the preparation 
of an impact assessment and broader consultations.  

CSOs  highlighted  the  importance  of  the  continued  engagement  with  civil  society  and  the 
importance on conducting a thorough IAs in preparation of the proposal. They welcomed the 

80 

 
 
inclusion of strong safeguards, further enquired about the scope and the organisations possibly 
captured by the instrument. 

CSOs flagged the possible risks and issues: the risk to fail to capture the issue as a whole and 
fall short foreign funded interest representations happening internally to the EU; the risk that 
other undemocratic regimes would use EU action as a pretext for acting with wrong intentions; 
possible misuse of the data captured by the envisaged registries;  the issue for organisations 
advocating  in  repressive  regimes  for  which  globally  it  was  difficult  to  get  support  and 
resources. 

10. Additional questionnaires 

Lastly,  the  Commission  sent  out  additional  questionnaires  on  potential  policy  options  to 
Member States authorities, commercial entities and CSOs on 4 August 2023 with a deadline 
for contribution on 25 September 2023.  

The  Commission  has  received  29  replies:  11  replies  from  CSOs,  15  replies  from  Member 
States, and 3 replies from organisations representing the interest representation industry. 

10.1. 

Replies from CSOs 

Scope of the transparency measures 

Some  respondent  CSOs  took  a  stance  on  the  issue  of  the  nature  of  the  instrument  to  be 
considered in the intervention with 4 out of 11 CSOs considering that the intervention should 
take  the  form  of  a  Regulation,  1  of  which  expressing  that  a  Directive  could  be  misused  by 
Member State. 5 CSOs noted that a Recommendation could encourage Member States to adopt 
transparency rules, but that it would not be sufficient to solve the issues at hand. 

9  CSOs  expressed  a  view  that  the  legislative  intervention  should  cover  all  types  of  interest 
representation activities and not be limited to those carried out on behalf of third countries.  

2 CSOs highlighted that focusing on third countries is not sufficient and interferences from EU 
Member States into CSOs activities should also be covered.  

3 CSOs raised the issue of the risk of circumvention through private entities. 

3  respondents  expressed  the  need  to  provide  a  clear  definition  of  the  notion  of  interest 
representation. 

Registration and transparency requirements 

The majority of CSOs expressed that all entities should provide information on the Member 
States of registration, the Member States where the interest representation takes place, clear 
information on the actors involved, and clear information on the legislation, policy or initiative 
of interest. 

3 respondent CSOs emphasized the need of balancing the right of access to information with 
the right to privacy data and personal data. 

Most CSOs highlighted the need to assess coherence with other measures, with 3 responses 
emphasising the EU Transparency Register as a reference point. Some of them expressed that, 

81 

 
 
when it comes to CSOs, registration and disclosure requirements existing at EU and, overall, 
at  national  level  already  provide  an  adequate  framework  to  increase  transparency,  with  4 
respondents  indicating  that  undertaking  a  comprehensive  comparative  analysis  of  existing 
requirements  is  necessary.1  respondent  in  particular  underlined  the  need  for  registration 
requirements not to hinder the freedom of association.  

All but 3 respondent CSOs put an emphasis on the issue of avoiding stigmatisation, explaining 
that registration should not lead to stigmatisation but to normalisation of interest representation, 
as legitimacy of interest representation does not depend on whose interest is being represented, 
but on the ethical standards that are applied when carrying out interest representation activities.  

The majority of CSOs indicated that a prior authorisation/licence system would risk amounting, 
in  particular  if  applied  to  CSOs,  to  a  disproportionate  interference  on  the  right  to  public 
participation. – 5 of which indicating that such a system would run afoul of international and 
EU human rights law. However, 1 respondent indicated that it would be useful to create such 
a  requirement,  while  3  others  did  not  answer  or  address  the  questions  related  to  prior 
authorisation/licensing. 

4 CSOs expressed that it would be disproportionate to create a general requirement to disclose 
a registration number before meeting EU or Member States officials. 

On the information  which should be made publicly  available in  national  registers to  ensure 
accountability, 1 contribution suggested to make publicly available an annual budget (income 
and expenditure) and an annual activity report. 

1  CSO  proposed  that  the  registration  mechanism  be  user-friendly  and  easily  accessible  to 
anyone, including people with disabilities.  

Derogations and safeguards 

Most CSOs were of the opinion that entities involved in interest representation activities aiming 
to  influence  policy-making  should  not  be  exempt  from  requirement  to  register.  CSOs 
highlighted  that  the  Commission  should  put  in  place  safeguards  including  on  the  language, 
enforcement and democratic impact.  

4 CSOs highlighted the need to create a minimum threshold for certain types of entities in order 
to avoid that all CSOs would fall under the obligation to register.  

2 respondent CSOs expressed that there should be no exemption for CSOs from the scope of 
the initiative, while 2 other respondents expressed on the contrary that they should benefit from 
an exemption (the first exemption proposed was to exclude youth organisations, while the other 
concerned entities known to bona fide pursue public interest). 

1  respondent  underlined  the  need  to  avoid  creating  a  system  of  double  registration:  in  one 
register for interest representation activities in general and in another one for when they are 
carried out on behalf of third countries.  

4 respondents expressed that requirements should rely on a strict risk-based approach in order 
to avoid discriminatory practices.  

2 respondents expressed that there should be no white list or black list of third countries,1 of 
which stressing that it should especially not be left to Member States to draw up such lists as 

82 

 
countries would risk being excluded or included based on political or economic ties with that 
Member State, thereby creating circumvention risks. However, 1 respondent expressed that as 
part of a risk-based approach there should still be a distinction between democratic and non-
democratic countries.  

1 respondent highlighted that principles of transparency and accountability inherent to the right 
to good administration should be taken into account, and 3 respondents specifically referred to 
the need to ensure safeguards required by the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial.  

Monitoring and sanctions 

7  CSOs  welcomed  the  establishment  of  an  independent  oversight  body  to  ensure  that  the 
transparency register is regularly and properly monitored. 1 of them suggested that there should 
be cooperation with the Transparency Register Secretariat managed by the Commission. 

2 respondents also  suggested that the Commission  could  facilitate  an exchange  at  EU level 
among  existing  supervisory  authorities,  and  provide  recommendations  as 
their 
independence,  fairness,  and  effectiveness.  Only  1  respondent  expressed  that  an  EU-level 
governance mechanism would not be useful. 

to 

2 respondents expressed that proportionate administrative sanctions are the most appropriate 
option to deter misconduct and that a fully harmonised sanction regime should be created at 
EU level, 1 of which highlighting that a full harmonisation of the enforcement and sanctions is 
essential  to  avoid  adverse  consequences  and  misuse  by  Member  States.  On  the  contrary,  1 
respondent  expressed that  the Commission  should not  propose any sanctions regime before 
having  conducted  a  comprehensive  comparative  analysis  of  existing  sanctions  regimes  in 
Member States. 

10.2. 

Replies from Member States 

5 out of 15 Member States expressed the view that it is necessary to put in place harmonised 
measures enhancing the transparency of interest representation activities seeking to influence 
decision-making processes. 1 Member State however expressed concern that a regulation that 
has  the  effect  of  a  “foreign  agent  law”  or  can  be  understood  as  such,  could  cause  negative 
consequences.  

5 Member States expressed some reservations as to whether harmonisation at EU level would 
be the best option.  

3  Member  States  suggested  to  opt  for  the  first  proposed  policy  option  –  a  non-legislative 
solution  promoting  common  standards.  Transparency  recommendations  resulting  in  a 
combination of various non-legislative solutions promoting common standards would allow 
Member  States  to  evaluate  their  current  sets  of  measures  and  to  introduce  where  necessary 
additional tailored improvements. 

On a potential obligation to obtain prior authorisation/license at EU level to carry out interest 
representation activities on behalf of third countries, 1 Member State expressed that a prior 
authorisation scheme does not appear to be the most proportionate solution for achieving the 
objective  pursued,  and  suggested  that  a  transparency  regime  based  on  a  reporting  regime, 
coupled with the application of ethical obligations, would appear more appropriate. 

Scope of the transparency measures 

83 

 
1  Member  State  highlighted  that  complicating  the  exchange  between  lobbyists  and  policy-
makers, could discourage interest representations from participating in the political decision-
making  process.  It  added  that  it  could  therefore  negatively  impact  the  participation  of  civil 
society. 

Member States broadly  agreed that society has a fundamental interest to  be informed about 
interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries. 

1 Member State expressed concerns about specifying at EU level whether and which contacts 
at  the  national  level  are  permissible,  or  whether  and  to  what  extent  contacts  of  national 
parliamentarians or government representatives have to be published. 

1 Member State expressed concerns about the measures to introduce binding rules for national 
transparency  registers.  It  stated  that  deciding  on  the  degree  of  transparency  for  national 
processes falls within the competence of the Member States.  

6 Member States argued that it would be desirable to transparently handle all types of interest 
representation activities that attempt to influence the formulation or implementation of policies, 
legislation or public decision-making processes in the EU, and not to focus only on the cases 
where such activities are carried out on behalf of third countries. 

1  Member  State  expressed  that  in  addition  to  further  national  initiatives  to  promote 
transparency, measures developed on an EU wide basis would play a crucial role in fostering 
accountability and trust.  

1  Member  State  expressed  that  harmonisation  of  all  the  measures  governing  interest 
representation in the Member States would go far beyond the purpose of the  Commission’s 
initiative and would be difficult to achieve at least in the short term. This Member State added 
that  the  establishment  of  a  general  regime  covering  interest  representation  activities  for  the 
benefit of strictly private actors and activities for the benefit of third countries might not be 
sufficient to effectively regulate the latter type of activity. 

1 Member State emphasized that the influence measures which deserve particular attention, 
and  which  must  therefore  be  covered  as  a  matter  of  priority  are  those  involving  elected 
representatives,  former  elected  representatives  and  certain  public  officials;  with  a  view  to 
influencing public life. 1 other Member State expressed it was in favour of an obligation for 
public officials to also provide information on their meetings with entities carrying out interest 
representation activities. 

1 Member State warned that too extensive regulation has its risks from the point of view of 
democratic values and the rule of law. 

1 Member State suggested that new forms of lobbying, such as digital lobbying and lobbying 
using artificial intelligence should also be covered. 

Registration and transparency requirements 

7  Member  States  stated  that  information  on  the  names  and  owners  of  entities  should  be 
disclosed, 6 of which stating that the name of the countries from which fundings are received. 
1 Member State specified that publication could cover data relating to the identity of the natural 
person or, in the case of a legal person, its directors, the nature of influence actions carried out, 
as well as, where applicable, the amount of expenditure incurred in respect of those actions, 

84 

 
specifying the foreign power of foreign political organisation for the benefit of which they are 
carried out.  

1 Member State expressed that publication should cover, when talking about natural persons, 
their nationality, all citizenships they have or have had in the past, business relations with third-
country entities, natural and legal persons. When it comes to legal entities, information about 
the  country  of  registration,  its  history  of  changes,  implemented  projects,  partners  linked  by 
cooperation ties. 

5 Member States expressed that the interlocutors of the meetings with public officials and the 
numbers of meetings be disclosed. 3 Member States expressed that the topics of discussions 
and purpose of the activities be disclosed as well. 2 Member States stated that the time and 
place of the activities should be registered as well.  

Member  States  largely  agreed  on  the  need  to  follow  the  GDPR  principles  when  publishing 
personal data. 

1  Member  State  expressed  that  registration  requirements  could  be  analogous  to  those  for 
lobbyists registration, where such laws exist. In addition, information on connections, affiliated 
entities, etc, would be required. The information submitted should be crossed checked using 
specialized tools and databases developed and maintained by Member States. 

4 Member States expressed that they were in favour of a prior authorisation/licensing system, 
while 6 explained that they were against such a system.  

1 Member State wrote that it was in favour of an obligation for entities carrying out interest 
representation activities to provide their registration number before meeting decision-makers. 

Derogations and safeguards 

1 Member State highlighted that its legislation contains exemptions of the obligation to register. 

1  Member  State  expressed  that  certain  exemptions  could  be  necessary;  however,  overly 
generous exemptions could dilute the purpose of the registration requirements. That Member 
State  emphasized  that  measures  addressing  interest  representation  could  have  an  impact  on 
diplomatic relations with third countries. It would be therefore important to provide for some 
exceptions also at EU level, as otherwise international exchange would be restricted, and could 
lead to a chilling effect. 

1 Member State  considered that the exclusion of civil  society organisations and SMEs as a 
matter of principle does not seem desirable, since these entities could serve as any other conduit 
for influence activities carried out on behalf of foreign powers. 

2 Member States highlighted that the legislative proposal must be designed with due regard for 
fundamental  rights.  Moreover,  the  principles  of  legality,  necessity  and  proportionality  must 
therefore be fully respected. 

1 Member State expressed that there should not be any specific exemptions. 

4 Member States  stated  that SMEs should not  benefit from  specific derogations.  1 of those 
Member States however distinguished for CSOs, stating that for them a general derogations 

85 

 
could apply with regard to protection of fundamental rights, exercise of constitutional rights 
and sensitive personal data protection. 

2 Member State wrote that activities directed at safeguarding or representing the interests of a 
party  or  participant  in  connection  with  an  administrative  or  judicial  procedure  should  be 
exempt.  

3 Member States explained that diplomatic actors and activities should not be covered. 

1 Member State raised the issue that the adoption of a legislative instrument might lead to risks 
of stigmatisation for certain entities.  

2 Member States proposed a system whereby one part of the register can only be accessed by 
authorities. 

Monitoring and sanctions 

1 Member State warned that setting up a sanctions regime that restricts activities of actors from 
third countries in the EU may lead some of these countries to establish reciprocal rules, and 
this could restrict the work of local civil society organisations in third countries which have so 
far been supported through European development cooperation and whose active role is very 
important. 

1 Member State expressed that supervisory authorities entrusted with monitoring would not 
necessarily have to be “completely independent”, but they may also be located in a ministry, 
and be removed from an undue influence by decision-makers by other measures. 

On  the  obligation  to  obtain  prior  authorisation/license  at  EU  level  to  carry  out  lobbying 
activities  on  behalf  of  third  countries,  1  Member  State  expressed  that  a  prior  authorization 
scheme  does  not  appear  to  be  the  most  proportionate  solution  for  achieving  the  objective 
pursued, and suggested that a transparency regime based on a reporting regime, coupled with 
the application of ethical obligations, would appear more appropriate. 

1  Member  State  emphasized  that  Member  States  should  have  autonomy  in  designating  the 
competent authority for their national register. 

2  Member  States  highlighted  that  sanction  regimes  must  leave  the  Member  States  a  wide 
margin of discretion. 

4 Member States advocated for a sanctions regime defined at Member State level, 2 of which 
mentioning the possibility to establish guidelines to ensure enforcement consistency. 

7  Member  States  expressed  that  supervisory  authorities  should  be  permitted  to  ask  specific 
information from registered entities, subject to safeguards.  

1 Member State expressed that the implementation of monitoring should be entrusted to the 
institutions responsible for the regulation of lobbying activities and compliance with national 
security interests. 

1 Member State suggested that a network of authorities could serve as a platform for regular 
exchanges of information and structured cooperation. 

86 

 
3 Member States expressed that non-penal/administrative sanctions should also be considered, 
varying in accordance with the gravity of the misconduct. 

10.3. 

Replies from organisations representing interest industry 

Scope of the transparency requirements 

1 out of 3 industry representatives explained that establishing harmonized measures to enhance 
transparency in interest representation activities conducted on behalf of third countries at EU 
level is necessary. According to that respondent to define which specific third countries should 
fall under such measures, it suggests employing a set of criteria: the geopolitical significance 
of a country, and security and strategic interests. 

1 respondent expressed that,  at  present,  commercial  interest  representation activities carried 
out on behalf of third countries and seeking to influence the formulation or implementation of 
policy or legislation or public decision-making processes in the EU are transparent. Another 
respondent expressed a similar opinion, that its member organisations are also complying with 
applicable regulatory frameworks.  

2 respondents recommended the Commission to take into consideration all forms of interest 
representation activities and not to harmonise only those performed on behalf of third countries.  

1 industry representative highlighted the importance to discern between the public and private 
sector of the public authorities, the transparency in the exercise of the activity, whether they 
are elected or named, there must be some limits that allow the necessary confidentiality derived 
from the protection of privacy. 

All 3 industry representatives considered that no specific entity should benefit from exemptions 
for the scope of transparency requirements, in order to avoid risks of circumvention.  

2 respondents expressed that transparency requirements should not lead to stigmatisation such 
as ‘organisations supported from abroad’ or lead to the creation of ‘special foreign influence 
register’.  

1 respondent expressed that it is in favour of a harmonised transparency register at EU level, 
and cautions against the risks associated with the creation of a parallel registration system for 
interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries.  

1  respondent  underlined  the  challenge  of  balancing  transparency  with  the  need  for 
confidentiality in certain diplomatic matters. 

Registration and transparency requirements 

All  3  industry  representatives  favour  registration  and  transparency  requirements  to  be 
harmonised  at  EU  level  but  are  not  in  favour  of  a  licensing/prior  authorisation  mechanism, 
although 1 expressed it would be in favour of a mandatory registration system. 

All 3 industries are in favour of an obligation to provide a registration number before being 
able to meet public officials. 1 respondent underlined that it would be essential to implement 
this requirement in a practical and user-friendly manner. 

1 industry representative stated that any new harmonised system should base itself on the EU 
Transparency Register as a model. 

87 

 
 
1  respondent  considered  that  potential  registration  requirements  could  include  mandatory 
registration. 

Derogations and safeguards 

All 3 industry representatives are not in favour of any specific exemptions for certain entities 
or of any de minimis threshold.  

1  respondent  considered  that  safeguards  should  encompass  a  range  of  measures,  including 
rigorous monitoring and auditing of interest representation activities to verify compliance with 
transparency requirements, and that regular compliance reviews should be conducted.  

Monitoring and sanctions 

1 industry representative considered that the Register must be independently considered from 
a functional and administrative point of view and must depend on an independent body. 

All  3  industry  representatives  expressed  that  they  are  in  favour  of  providing  supervisory 
authorities  with  powers  to  request  additional  information  from  registered  entities  about  the 
nature of their activities or the veracity of the information in the register (although 1 was not 
in favour of allowing information requests about contracts above certain thresholds). 

1  respondent  expressed  that  it  is  in  favour  of  administrative  sanctions  and  suggested  that 
sanctions to deter misconduct could include the possibility to be banned from registers and to 
have their names published. Repetitive misconduct should be taken into account as a criteria in 
assessing the type and level of sanctions to be applied. Another respondent similarly expressed 
that a registration ban is an appropriate sanction mechanism. 1 other  respondent stated that 
restricting sanctions to limited administrative measures may be a reasonable approach. 

Another respondent underlined that the obligations imposed in the register cannot be enforced 
without an adequate framework for defining violations and the corresponding penalties for non-
compliance. 

1  industry  representative  emphasized  the  need  to  appropriately  enforce  currently  existing 
transparency  regimes  before  considering  the  creation  of  new  or  enhanced  transparency  and 
registration requirements.  

1 industry representative highlighted the important of the right to due process and the rights of 
defendants against accusations of bad behaviour, with the possibility of having access to an 
independent judicial authority to provide redress.  

88 

 
 
 
 
Annex 3: Who is affected and how? 

This  annex  provides  in-depth  information  and  estimated  cost  figures  on  the  stakeholders 
affected by the initiative. All figures were gathered through the supporting study.  

1.  Practical implications of the initiative  

The following table presents a description of the categories of stakeholders considered by the 
initiative, with a summary analysis of how they will be affected by the proposed measures. 

Categories 
of 
stakeholders 
Commercial 
entities 

Non-
commercial 
entities 

Description of the 
stakeholders 

Measures affecting the stakeholders 

firms 

firms 

For  example,  public 
relations 
and 
consultancies,  public 
and 
affairs 
consultancies, 
legal 
services  firms,  private 
companies,  and  any 
kinds 
interest 
of 
representation  services 
providers,  so  long  as 
they  carry  out  interest 
representation  services 
activities  on  behalf  of 
third countries.  
For 
civil 
example, 
society  organisations, 
and  business 
trade 
trade 
associations, 
unions 
and 
professional 
think 
associations, 
tanks 
research 
and 
institutions,  academic 
institutions,  advocacy 
groups,  charities,  so 
long  as  they  carry  out 
interest  representation 
activities  on  behalf  of 
third countries. 

Due to the Article 114 TFEU legal basis of the 
intervention, the proposed measures would not 
differentiate commercial and non-commercial 
entities in their application.  

Record-keeping: Entities would be required to 
keep,  for  a  reasonable  period,  information 
such  as  the  identity  of  the  entity  on  whose 
behalf the activity is carried out, a description 
of  the  purpose  of  the  interest  representation 
activity. 

themselves, 

information  on 

Registration:  Entities  would  be  required  to 
register  in  a  national  public  register  and 
provide 
the 
activities  conducted,  and  the  entities  they 
conduct  the  activities  on  behalf  of  (e.g. 
regarding the entity, the activity and the entity 
on  whose  behalf  the  activity  is  carried  out). 
This  information  would  need  to  be  updated 
regularly.  

Transparency:  
•  Entities 

out 

carrying 

interest 
representation 
their 
subcontractors  would  have  to  provide 
their  registration  number  when  in  direct 
contact with public officials.  

as  well 

as 

•  Member  State  would  be  required  to 
ensure  that  publicly  available  national 
registers are in place and that they cover 
reporting 
the 
requirements included in the intervention. 
They  would  need  to  designate  or  set  up 
supervisory  authorities  ensuring  proper 
implementation.  They  would  need  to 

information 

and 

89 

 
 
 
 
 
• 

publish an annual report based on the data 
entered in the register.  
Interest  representation  service  providers 
take 
would  have 
measures to identify the recipients of the 
services. 

the  possibility 

to 

Member  States  would  have  to  establish  new 
authorities  or  task  existing  authorities  to 
administer,  manage,  supervise,  enforce  or 
sanction  the  application  of  the  proposed 
transparency and registration requirements set 
forth in the initiative. 

Member  State  authorities  would  have  to 
establish new or adapt existing registers on the 
transparency 
representation 
activities.  

interest 

of 

Member 
States  

State 
Member 
authorities in charge of 
administering, 
managing, supervising, 
or 
enforcing 
the 
sanctioning 
application 
the 
proposed  transparency 
and 
registration 
requirements  set  forth 
in the initiative.  

of 

They  would  have  to  administer  and  monitor 
the use of these register. 

to  participate 

in  a 
They  would  have 
governance  mechanism  at  EU  level,  and 
exchange  information  with  other  Member 
the 
States  authorities 
administrative 
to 
cooperation 
supervise  and  enforce  the  requirements  set 
forth in the initiative.   

the  context  of 
needed 

in 

They  would  have  to  enforce  and  adopt 
sanctions  against  entities  which  would  not 
respect  the  requirements  set  forth  in  the 
initiative.  

2.  Who is affected? 

This  section  presents  an  estimated  size  of  the  internal  market  for  interest  representation 
activities carried out on behalf of third countries and entities affected by the preferred policy 
option. Information on the methodology used for this estimation is provided in Annex 4.  

Estimates  of  the  number  of  entities  carrying  out  interest  representation  activities  on 
behalf of third countries by scenario, EU-27  

Country  

Total entities 
carrying out 
interest 
representation 
activities on 

Entities carrying out interest representation activities on 
behalf of third countries – estimates by scenario  
Low scenario 
(0.02%)  

Middle scenario 
(0.025%)  

High scenario 
(0.03%)  

90 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
behalf of third 
countries 
118,286  
Austria  
117,446  
Belgium  
14,187  
Bulgaria  
28,294  
Croatia  
6,548  
Cyprus  
96,049  
Czechia  
101,445  
Denmark  
23,781  
Estonia  
109,465  
Finland  
1,298,857  
France  
628,972  
Germany  
6,794  
Greece  
63,907  
Hungary  
33,823  
Ireland  
369,791  
Italy  
11,905  
Latvia  
Lithuania  
14,813  
Luxembourg  8,695  
Malta  
2,928  
Netherlands   48,454  
74,177  
Poland  
68,765  
Portugal  
61,698  
Romania  
20,198  
Slovakia  
26,731  
Slovenia  
101,562  
Spain  
103,267  
Sweden  
3,560,838  
EU-27  

24   
23   
3   
6   
1   
19   
20   
5   
22   
260   
126   
1   
13   
7   
74   
2   
3   
2   
1   
10   
15   
14   
12   
4   
5   
20   
21   
712   

30   
29   
4   
7   
2   
24   
25   
6   
27   
325   
157   
2   
16   
8   
92   
3   
4   
2   
1   
12   
19   
17   
15   
5   
7   
25   
26   
890   

35   
35   
4   
8   
2   
29   
30   
7   
33   
390   
189   
2   
19   
10   
111   
4   
4   
3   
1   
15   
22   
21   
19   
6   
8   
30   
31   
1,068   

3.  Costs and benefits 

3.1. Costs to Member State authorities 

Costs to Member State authorities over a 10-year time horizon can be summarised as follows. 
Information on the methodology used for this estimation is provided in Annex 4. 

Summary of total costs to Member State authorities (over 10-years) 

Cost item 

Familiarisation costs 
Ensuring an appropriate 
register is in place 
IT tool maintenance (15 
Member States with existing IT 
tools) 

Low scenario 
(EUR) 

Middle scenario 
(EUR) 

High scenario 
(EUR) 

1,533.06  

4,599.17  
Not possible to ascertain EU-wide costs based on the 
available data. 

3,066.11  

Costs are considered to be business as usual (BaU) 
costs.  

91 

 
 
 
Cost item 

IT tool maintenance (12 
Member States without existing 
IT tools) 
Implementing appropriate 
management, monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms 
Total: 

Low scenario 
(EUR) 

Middle scenario 
(EUR) 

High scenario 
(EUR) 

540,000.00  

2,160,000.00  

4,860,000.00  

5,654,945.59  

7,068,681.99  

8,482,418.39  

6,196,478.65  

9,231,748.10  

13,347,017.56  

3.2. Costs for entities carrying out interest representation activities on behalf of 

third countries 

In total, under the preferred policy option, the estimated costs to entities carrying out interest 
representation activities on behalf of third countries yearly and over a 10-year horizon can be 
summarised as follows. Information on the methodology used for this estimation is provided 
in Annex 4. 

Estimated average costs per entity, per size class 

Average total costs per 
entity 

Micro / 
Small 
(97.3%) 

Medium 
(2%) 

Large 
(0.7%) 

General average 
costs across all 
entities 

828.49  1,656.97  3,313.94 

862.45 

Estimated total costs to interest representation entities within scope (over 10-years) 

Cost item 

Basic familiarisation 
costs 
Extended familiarisation 
costs 
Registration and 
information disclosure 
costs 
Record-keeping costs 
Other costs (incl. admin 
sanctions, registration 
fees) 

Low scenario 
(EUR) 

Middle scenario 
(EUR) 

High scenario 
(EUR) 

71,165,916.06  

142,338,950.84  

213,519,104.36  

56,949.82 

142,374.54  

256,274.18  

6,142,119.10 

7,677,648.90 

9,213,178.70 

Business as usual (BaU) – No incremental costs 

No total cost estimates possible due to lack of evidence on 
possible frequency and actual scale of fines. 

Total: 

77,364,984.98 

150,158,974.28 

222,988,557.24 

4.  Summary of costs and benefits 

I. Overview of Benefits (total for all provisions) – Preferred Option 
Description 

Amount 

Comments 

Direct benefits 

Benefits for Member 
State authorities. 

Economic benefits: 

Benefits are provided in a qualitative 
way, not in a quantitative way.  

92 

 
 
 
 
 
• 

Increased knowledge and 
understanding of the market for 
interest representation activities 
carried out on behalf of third 
countries due to increased 
transparency. 

Social benefits:  

• 

Increased knowledge of the 
magnitude, trends and actors of 
interest representation activities 
carried out on behalf of third 
countries. 

•  The establishment of a governance 
structure at EU level facilitates 
cooperation between Member 
States and improve coordination in 
addressing certain problems related 
to interest representation.   

Economic benefits: 

•  Create a level playing field and 

enhance legal certainty for interest 
representation activities carried out 
on behalf of third countries; 
•  Facilitate service provision across 
multiple Member States as only 1 
registration would be necessary; 
•  Help normalising, legitimising and 

destigmatising interest 
representation via an enhanced level 
of transparency and trust in the 
sector. 

Social benefits: 

• 

• 

enable citizens and public officials 
to easily recognise influence 
campaigns by third countries 
thereby contributing to the integrity 
of, and public trust in, EU and 
Member State decision-making 
processes 
support scrutiny from interested 
actors (including CSOs, political 
actors, researchers, elections 
observes or journalist) to monitor 
interest representation activities 
carried out on behalf of third 
countries.  

•  The strengthening of the quality of 

information available would help 
enrich the political debate 

Benefits for private 
entities.  

Benefits for society at 
large. 

Benefits are provided in a qualitative 
way, not in a quantitative way. 

Benefits are provided in a qualitative 
way, not in a quantitative way. 

Indirect benefits 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

93 

 
 
 
 
 
Administrative cost savings related to the ‘one in, one out’ approach* 

Recurrent 
(direct/indirect)  

One-off 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

II. Overview of costs – Preferred option 

Citizens/Consumers 

Businesses 

Administrations 

One-off  Recurrent  One-off 

Recurrent  One-off 

Recurrent 

Direct 
adjustment 
costs 

n/a 

n/a 

EUR 71.2 
million to 
EUR 213.8 
basic 
familiarisati
on costs 

EUR 57,000 
to EUR 
256,000 
extended 
familiarisati
on costs 

n/a 

Preferre
d policy 
option  

Direct 
administrative 
costs 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

EUR 
615,000 to 
EUR 
921,000 
registratio
n and 
informatio
n 
disclosure 
costs per 
year  

EUR 1,500 
– 4,600 
familiarisati
on costs for 
national 
authorities 

EUR 
60,000 to 
EUR 
540,000 
maintenan
ce costs 
(12 MS 
authorities 
without 
existing IT 
tools)  

Business-
as-usual 
costs (15 
MS with 
existing IT 
tools)  

n/a 

n/a 

Direct 
regulatory fees 
and charges 

Direct 
enforcement 
costs 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

EUR 
565,000 to 
EUR 
848,000 

94 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Indirect costs  n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

Costs related to the ‘one in, one out’ approach 

n/a 

n/a 

Direct and 
indirect 
adjustment 
costs  

Administrative 
costs (for 
offsetting) 

Total   

n/a 

EUR 71.2 
million to 
EUR 213.8 
million total 
familiarisati
on costs 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

EUR 
615,000 to 
EUR 
921,000 
registratio
n and 
informatio
n 
disclosure 
costs 
(average 
EUR 
768,000) 

III. Overview of relevant Sustainable Development Goals – Preferred option 
Expected progress towards the Goal  Comments 
Relevant SDG 

SDG no. 16 – Promote 
peaceful and inclusive 
societies for sustainable 
development, access to 
justice for all and build 
effective, accountable 
and inclusive 
institutions at all levels 

The initiative aims to enhance the 
integrity of, and public trust in, EU and 
Member State democratic institutions, 
including through increased transparency 
in interest representation activities 
carried out on behalf of third countries 
and through measures promoting 
inclusiveness, accessibility, transparency 
and security of electoral and decision-
making processes. 

In particular, this initiative will 
contribute to the following SDG 
16 sub-goals: 
•  16.6: Develop effective, 

accountable and transparent 
institutions; 

•  16.7: Ensure responsive, 

inclusive and representative 
decision-making; and 

•  16.10: Ensure public access to 

information and protect 
fundamental freedoms. 

95 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 4: Analytical methods 

1.  Analytical framework 

The impact assessment is prepared on the basis of a supporting study, a Public Consultation, a 
Call  for  Evidence,  2  Flash  Eurobarometers,  a  series  of  stakeholders  focus  group  meetings, 
targeted questionnaires circulated to civil society organisations, Member States and sector of 
the industry concerned, intensive direct stakeholder consultations as well as relevant literature 
and recent EU publications (reports, studies and policy documents). It includes a full analysis 
of the baseline, include:  

•  The  relevant  legal  frameworks  and  anticipated  evolutions,  at  both  EU  and  national 
level, including a qualitative description of gaps, overlaps, commonalities and conflicts.  

•  A  summary  of  the  scope  and  context  for  the  impact  assessment  is  provided  in  the 
annexes, including a market analysis drawn from the supporting study and case studies 
to illustrate the various processes involved and to highlight where difficulties lie.  

The objectives, options and assessment of their various impacts were prepared on this basis. 
Quantitative  data  on  the  specific  market  for  interest  representation  activities  carried  out  on 
behalf  of  third  countries  was  investigated  although  the  inherent  nature  of  such  activities 
rendered that effort challenging.  

2.  Main definitions and actors concerned 

For the purposes of the overall impact assessment, the following definition was used for the 
term “interest representation”: “Interest representation means an activity conducted with the 
objective  of  influencing  the  development,  formulation  or  implementation  of  policy  or 
legislation,  or  public  decision-making  processes  in  the  Union.”.  The  term  “third  country” 
refers  to  countries  outside  of  the  European  Economic  Area  (EEA).  The  term  “foreign 
influence” was defined as follows: “Intervention by third country governments to influence the 
democratic sphere including legislation and policies, also by shaping public opinion in a way 
which benefits their interests”. On the other hand, “Foreign interference is used to differentiate 
between influencing activities that are integral to diplomatic relations and activities that are 
carried  out  by,  or  on  behalf  of,  a  foreign  state-level  actor,  which  are  coercive,  covert, 
deceptive,  or  corrupting  and  are  contrary  to  the  sovereignty,  values,  and  interests  of  the 
Union.” 

This  approach  to  these  definitions  reflects  a  broad  understanding  of  the  issue  of  interest 
representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries. This approach was adopted in 
order to ensure that the issues at hand be tackled in the most comprehensive way possible. As 
such, the establishment of these definitions drew on definitions of existing or related notions 
at  both  EU  and  Member  State  levels,  mapped  through  extensive  consultations  as  well  as  a 
dedicated supporting study. These definitions ensure an objective and proportionate approach 
to the issues and actors and activities concerned by the intervention.  

The activities covered by the intervention are any interest representation activities conducted 
with the objective of influencing the development, formulation or implementation of policy or 
legislation,  or  public  decision-making  processes  on  behalf  of  a  third  country  in  the  EU, 
regardless of the entity which performs them. In line with the Article 114 TFEU legal basis, 
such activities would be covered by the intervention only when they are normally provided for 
remuneration. The analyses, mappings and consultations found that the main actors concerned 

96 

 
 
 
by  this  intervention  will  be  both  commercial  entities  (e.g.  consulting  firms,  law  firms, 
individual businesses) and non-commercial entities (e.g. think tanks, education, research and 
academic institutions, business, trade or professional associations, or CSOs).  

The  section  below  presents  key  stakeholder  groups  that  fall  under  current  regulatory 
obligations,  as  well  as  an  estimated  size  of  the  internal  market  for  interest  representation 
activities, an estimation of the market for interest representation activities carried out on behalf 
of third countries specifically, and key stakeholder groups that will be affected by the Policy 
Options.  

2.1. Key stakeholder groups that fall under the main existing regulatory obligations 

Where possible, stakeholders are distinguished between for-profit organisations and non-profit 
organisations.  Indeed,  evidence  shows  that  1)  commercial  entities,  mainly  consulting 
companies  and  law  firms  providing  remunerated  public  /  regulatory  affairs  /  relations  or 
communication  services,  and  2)  non-profit  organisations  (CSOs),  e.g.  NGOs,  think  tanks, 
stand-alone research centres and those tied to higher education establishments, have been used 
to carryout interest representation activities on behalf of third countries.   

The review of type of registrants to the EU Transparency register and to  and a selection of 
national registers has allowed us to complement the identification of key stakeholders.   

•  The (self) categorisation of registrants in the EU Transparency Register (5 February 
2023  data)  presented  below  shows  that  28%  are  non-governmental  organisations, 
platforms and networks and similar (3,506), 25% are companies & groups (3,083) and 
21% are trade and business associations (2,655). Interestingly, 2 entities, respectively 
from Norway and the Channel Islands, are categorised as “Entities, offices or networks 
established by third countries”.  

•  Based on publicly available data outlined below, across the 10 Member States for which 
data  is  available,  a  total  of  12,199  organisations  and  individuals  are  registered  in 
national  lobbying  or  transparency  registers  to  conduct  lobbying  activities,  with 
Germany,  France  and  Ireland  comprising  a  significant  proportion  (88%)  of  the  total 
registrants across these 9 countries247. It is noted that this geographical concentration 
mirrors the stringency of regulatory requirements, which are high in those countries. 
With regard to the types of entities represented, and based on an incomplete dataset 
across  4  of  the  9  Member  States,  the  table  shows  that  business  associations  (4,692 
registrants)  followed  by  advocacy  organisations  /  charities  (873  registrants)  and 
research firms / consultancies (465 registrants) represent the highest number of entries 
in national lobbyists / transparency registers in the EU.  

Categorisation of registrants in the EU Transparency Register (5 February 2023 data)  

Category of registration  

Total 

Non-governmental  organisations,  platforms  and  networks  and 
similar  
Companies & groups  
Trade and business associations  
Trade unions and professional associations  

3,506  

3,083  
2,655  
982  

247  DE (5,676 registrants), FR (2,604 registrants) and IE (2,454 registrants) are the countries with the most registrants; they 

also comprise a significant proportion (88%) of the total registrants across these 9 countries. 

97 

 
 
 
Think tanks and research institutions  
Professional consultancies  
Other organisations, public or mixed entities  
Academic institutions  
Associations and networks of public authorities  
Self-employed individuals  
Law firms  
Organisations representing churches and religious communities  
Entities, offices or networks established by third countries  
Total   

568  
549  
455  
309  
154  
144  
85  
48  
2  
12,540  

National  transparency  registers:  Available  data  on  number  of  entities  registered,  by 
entity type  

M
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10   3,027  

41     
26     

385 
385 
175   175  

1,341(3)    
15   278(4)   228    
1   46(6)  

32(1)   104  
525(2)  7  
24   21   158   34   107   303   73  
13(5)   6  

AT 
BE  
DE  
FR  
IE  
IT  
LT  
LU  
RO  
SI  
Total  24   21   158   101  107   873   190  
(1)   Includes organisation under public law (e.g. corporations, institutions and foundations under public law).  
(2)   Encompasses associations and foundations – associations could be representing any kind of interest.  
(3)   Encompasses companies and professional organisations.  
(4)   Includes Agribusiness, Aerospace, Construction, Defence, Retail Telecommunications, Transport.  
(5)   Includes NGOs.  
(6)   Includes Companies and groups, Trade and trade association, Trade unions and professional associations.  

295   2,167   5,676  
155   550   2,604  
1,213   2,454  
84  
3  
303   303  
183   183  
253   253  
82  
82  

26   4,692   228  465   5,314   12,199  

15  

2.2. The internal market for the provision of interest representation activities 

Based on available data, the sub-sections below provide a selection of affected entities in EU27: 
1) enterprises that deliver public relations and communication activities, 2) think tanks and 3) 
CSOs. Data notably shows that most of those entities are found in France, Belgium, Germany, 
Italy and Sweden, i.e. suggesting that those countries would most likely be most affected by 
the preferred policy option.   

Data and method limitations  

98 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
The  first  caveat  is  that  within  each  category  of  stakeholders  that  delivers  interest 
representation  and/or political  services or activities, the sub-category that does so  for 
governments and state-linked entities / individuals specifically is unknown. Moreover:  

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

NACE code M70.21 of the Eurostat’s Structural Business Statistics 
(SBS) provides data on the number of enterprises conducting ‘Public 
relations and communication activities’. However, enterprises that 
deliver public relations and communication activities also provide 
such services for corporate clients (not only to the public sector and 
individuals) for business purposes, that are unrelated to influencing 
the democratic sphere. It has not been possible to distinguish them 
by size class either, to assess the proportion of SMEs in the market.  

Data  on  the  number  of  think  tanks  per  Member  State  have  been 
extracted  from  the  2020  Global  Go  To  Think  Tank  Report.  The 
dataset does not allow distinguishing the proportion of think tanks 
listed  that  are  1)  corporate  (i.e.  for-profit  affiliated  with  a 
corporation  or  operating  on  a  for-profit  basis),  2)  those  that  are 
government-affiliated,  3)  those  that  are  university-affiliated,  and 
those that are 4) political party-affiliated.  

Data on the size of the CSO sector in the internal market presented 
here  is  based  on  a  compilation  of  data  provided  in  factsheets 
developed  within  the  context  of  a  study  to  support  the  Citizens, 
Equality,  Rights  and  Values 
the 
environment  for  CSOs  in  each  country.  Given  important  data 
variations, e.g. source years, types of entities covered, definition of 
civil society, the data is to be considered as indicative. In particular, 
it  is  not  clear  in  many  cases  if  think  tanks  and  educational 
institutions are included.  

(CERV)  programme  on 

By combining the data on: i) public relations and communications enterprises; ii) non-profit 
organisations; and iii) think tanks, the following table presents a proxy for the total number of 
possible interest representation service providers per Member State. However, this should be 
viewed with the abovementioned caveats and limitations in mind.  

Estimates of the number of interest representation service providers, EU-27  

Country  

Austria  
Belgium  
Bulgaria  
Croatia  
Cyprus  
Czechia(1)  
Denmark  
Estonia  
Finland  
France  

PR 
communications 
(M70.21) – 2020(4)  
1,200  
7,431  
404  
171  
40  
3,444  
1,393  
159  
830  
28,582  

and 

CSOs 
source years(5)  

–  mixed 

Think  Tanks  – 
2020  

Total  

86  
85  
47  
20  
8  
39  
52  
24  
41  
275  

118,286  
117,446  
14,187  
28,294  
6,548  
96,049  
101,445  
23,781  
109,465  
1,298,857  

117,000  
109,930  
13,736  
28,103  
6,500  
92,566  
100,000  
23,598  
108,594  
1,270,000  

99 

 
2,546  
Germany  
520  
Greece  
2,819  
Hungary  
469  
Ireland  
7,004  
Italy  
365  
Latvia  
Lithuania  
789  
Luxembourg  184  
Malta  
36  
Netherlands   4,369  
4,105  
Poland  
682  
Portugal  
983  
Romania  
65  
Slovakia  
258  
Slovenia  
Spain(2)  
1,467  
4,145  
Sweden  
EU-27(3)  
74,460  
(1)   Data  on  number  of  CZ  enterprises  missing  from  M70.21.  Estimated  by  calculating  M70.21  as  an  average 
proportion  of  the  total  NACE  category  [M]  (the  lowest  level  at  which  CZ  data  was  available)  across  the 
Member States and applying that proportion to the CZ data for [M].  

626,160  
6,217  
61,034  
33,331  
362,634  
11,526  
14,000  
8,500  
2,887  
44,000  
70,000  
68,000  
60,657  
20,100  
26,466  
100,000  
99,021  
3,484,560  

628,972  
6,794  
63,907  
33,823  
369,791  
11,905  
14,813  
8,695  
2,928  
48,454  
74,177  
68,765  
61,698  
20,198  
26,731  
101,562  
103,267  
3,560,838  

266  
57  
54  
23  
153  
14  
24  
11  
5  
85  
72  
83  
58  
33  
7  
95  
101  
1,818  

(2)   Rough estimate based on unofficial sources has been used for the number of Spanish CSOs.  
(3)   EU-27 total for M70.21 is different to the total on Eurostat. Following the inclusion of the CZ estimate, the 

EU-27 now presents the sum of the Member State-specific data.  

(4)   Eurostat data: Annual detailed enterprise statistics for services (NACE Rev. 2 H-N and S95).  
(5)   Source year of the data on CSOs varies across the Member States: 2023 (1MS – FI); 2022 (1 MS – RO); 2021 
(13 MS – BG, HR, CY, CZ, DK, EE, HU, IE, LV, LT, LU, PL, SI); 2020 (3 MS – NL, PT, SK); 2019 (4 MS 
– DE, IT, MT, SE); 2018 (2 MS – FR, EL); 2017 (1 MS – BE); 2010 (1 MS – AT); ES).  

The geographical distribution is presented in the table above. France accounted for 40% of all 
EU27 enterprises that delivered public relations and communication, and Belgium and Italy for 
10% each. Similarly, France accounted for 28% of EU27 annual turnover of said-enterprises, 
Belgium for 16% and Germany for 14% (Based on the 2020 Global Go To Think Tank Index 
Report,  edited  by  the  University  of  Pennsylvania248,  1,818 think  tanks  are  listed  in  EU27, 
noting that, amongst the categories of Think Tank Affiliations249, some are corporate (ie. for-
profit affiliated with a corporation or operating on a for-profit basis), others are government-
affiliated or university-affiliated or political party-affiliated. France ranks sixth in their top 20 
world ranking of countries with the largest number of think tanks, with 275 think tanks. It is 
followed by Germany with 266 think tanks. Italy ranks 11th with 153; Sweden is 16th with 101 
and Spain  follows ranking 17th  with  95 think  tanks. The full  EU27 breakdown is  presented 

248  McGann,  J.  G.,  ‘2020  Global  Go  To  Think  Tank  Index  Report’,  Global  Go  To  Think  Tank  Index,  University  of 
Pennsylvania, Scholarly Commons TTCSP, , Reports Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program (TTCSP), 2021, available 
at 2020 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report (delegfrance.org) and https://repository.upenn.edu/think_tanks.  

249  AUTONOMOUS  AND  INDEPENDENT:  Significant  independence  from  any  one  interest  group  or  donor,  and 
autonomous in its operation and funding from government. QUASI-INDEPENDENT: Autonomous from government but 
controlled by an interest group, donor or contracting agency that provides most of the funding and has significant influence 
over operations of the think tank. GOVERNMENT-AFFILIATED: A part of the formal structure of government. QUASI-
GOVERNMENTAL: Funded exclusively by government grants and contracts but not a part of the formal structure of 
government. UNIVERSITY-AFFILIATED: A policy research center at a university. POLITICAL-PARTY AFFILIATED: 
Formally affiliated with a political party. CORPORATE (FOR-PROFIT): A for-profit public policy research organization, 
affiliated with a corporation or merely operating on a for-profit basis. 

100 

 
 
below. France and Germany representing each 15% of EU27 think tanks listed in 2020 Global 
Go To Think Tank Index Report.  

2.3. The internal market for interest representation activities carried out on behalf 

of third countries 

Due to the lack of reliable data on interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third 
countries  (see  section  2.1.2)  the  method  to  estimate  the  internal  market  for  interest 
representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries draws on the Australian Foreign 
Influence Transparency Scheme (FITS) and the US Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). 
As explained in details in the supporting study, the proportion of the interest representation 
markets  for  foreign  principals/agents  in  Australia  and  the  US  was  used  to  estimate  the 
proportion of the total interest EU representation market that provide services to third countries. 
It  was  found  that  0.02%  of  possible  interest  representation  service  providers  are  directed  / 
remunerated  by  foreign  countries  in  Australia,  while  this  figure  is  0.03%  in  the  US.  Both 
proportions, as well as the average of the proportions for the 2 countries (i.e. 0.025%), were 
applied to estimate the EU interest representation market.   

The  below  table  presents  estimates  for  the  number  of  entities  carrying  out  interest 
representation activities on behalf of third countries in each Member State.   

Estimates  of  the  number  of  entities  carrying  out  interest  representation  activities  on 
behalf of third countries by scenario, EU-27  

Country  

Total entities 
carrying out 
interest 
representation 
activities on 
behalf of third 
countries 
118,286  
Austria  
117,446  
Belgium  
14,187  
Bulgaria  
28,294  
Croatia  
6,548  
Cyprus  
96,049  
Czechia  
101,445  
Denmark  
23,781  
Estonia  
109,465  
Finland  
1,298,857  
France  
628,972  
Germany  
6,794  
Greece  
63,907  
Hungary  
33,823  
Ireland  
369,791  
Italy  
11,905  
Latvia  
14,813  
Lithuania  
Luxembourg  8,695  
2,928  
Malta  

Entities carrying out interest representation activities on 
behalf of third countries – estimates by scenario  
Low scenario 
(0.02%)  

Middle scenario 
(0.025%)  

High scenario 
(0.03%)  

24   
23   
3   
6   
1   
19   
20   
5   
22   
260   
126   
1   
13   
7   
74   
2   
3   
2   
1   

30   
29   
4   
7   
2   
24   
25   
6   
27   
325   
157   
2   
16   
8   
92   
3   
4   
2   
1   

101 

35   
35   
4   
8   
2   
29   
30   
7   
33   
390   
189   
2   
19   
10   
111   
4   
4   
3   
1   

 
 
Netherlands   48,454  
74,177  
Poland  
68,765  
Portugal  
61,698  
Romania  
20,198  
Slovakia  
26,731  
Slovenia  
101,562  
Spain  
103,267  
Sweden  
3,560,838  
EU-27  

10   
15   
14   
12   
4   
5   
20   
21   
712   

12   
19   
17   
15   
5   
7   
25   
26   
890   

15   
22   
21   
19   
6   
8   
30   
31   
1,068   

In light of the prominent caveats and limitations, the estimates place the size of the  internal 
market for interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries (and thus 
the population of enterprises that would be subject to requirements under the proposed policy 
options)  at  between  712-1,068  enterprises.  By  Member  State,  France  (260-390),  Germany 
(126-189)  and  Italy  (74-111)  have  the  most  entities  carrying  out  interest  representation 
activities on behalf of third countries and contribute approximately 65% of all such entities 
across the EU-27.  

2.4. Interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries across 

borders in the Union 

Out  of  the  number  of  entities  identified  in  the  previous  section,  a  further  estimate  of  the 
population of entities carrying out interest representation activities on behalf of third countries 
across border in the Union is detailed below.  

In this context, operating cross-border is understood to mean an entity is either: i) operating in 
its EU Member State of establishment and at the EU-level; or ii) operating in its EU Member 
State of establishment and in at least one other EU Member State. 

The identification of this sub-population of entities implies several methodological caveats.  

First, there is limited publicly available data on the extent to which this population of entities 
operates cross-border. Many Member States do not have registers or lists of entities conducting 
these types of activities. Furthermore, exploratory comparisons were conducted for a selection 
of national transparency registers. These led to the identification of only a very small number 
of entities that are registered in more than one of the Member States mentioned; entities that 
were almost exclusively individual companies. 

Feedback  from  commercial  stakeholders  conducting  interest  representation  activities  also 
suggested  that  cross-border  activity  was  limited  by  the  nature  of  the  national-level  interest 
representation  markets,  which  are  characterised  by  national  decision-making  and  cultural 
specificities (e.g. language, political systems, contacts). In this context, the qualitative evidence 
further indicates that businesses tend to operate cross-border either by acquiring local interest 
representation entities or by working alongside independent local firms. 

Second, the estimates already calculated for the total number of entities carrying out interest 
representation  in  general,  as  well  as  the  total  number  of  entities  carrying  out  interest 
representation on behalf of third countries are based on a set of assumptions that limit the level 
of  certainty  on  the  accuracy  and  precision  of  the  estimates.  Additional  assumptions,  which 
bring their own caveats, would further decrease that level of certainty. 

102 

 
With  these  challenges  clearly  established,  it  is  possible  to  generate  a  rough  estimate  of  the 
population  of  entities  carrying  out  interest  representation  on  behalf  of  third  countries  and 
operating cross-border using assumptions based on data from the EU Transparency Register 
(EU TR). Specifically, this estimate assumes that all EU-based entities from  relevant  entity 
categories  registered  in  the  EU  TR  with  a  ‘Head  office  country’  that  is  not  Belgium  are 
operating  at  both  the  EU-level  and  in  the  Member  State  in  which  they  are  established. 
Conversely,  this  assumes  that  entities  established  in  Belgium  and  registered  in  the  EU  TR 
mostly operate at the EU level. 

This aims to generate a rough estimate of the proportion of entities registered in the EU TR 
that conduct  interest  representation  activities at  the EU level  and  at  the national  level.  This 
proportion  can  then  be  applied  to  the  previously  generated  estimates  on  the  population  of 
entities carrying out interest representation on behalf of third countries to determine the number 
of entities operating at the EU-level and in at least one Member State. 

A total of 7,460 entities within the categories included in this analysis are registered in the EU 
TR. The proportion of these entities that have their head office in Belgium is 26.8%, ranging 
from 7.4% for academic institutions to 38.8% for self-employed individuals. The figure 73.2% 
was therefore applied for each Member State across the three scenarios developed to estimate 
the  total  number  of  entities  carrying  out  interest  representation  activities  on  behalf  of  third 
countries. As illustrated in  the detailed table below, an estimated 521-782 of the 712-1,068 
entities operate cross-border. 

However,  a  range  of  further  caveats  need  to  be  highlighted.  Given  the  data  deficiencies 
discussed above, it is not possible to calculate the number of entities that do not operate at the 
EU-level, but operate cross-border. Beyond the assumptions based on ‘head office country’, 
these estimates also assume that all entities are active at both the EU-level and in their Member 
State of establishment, while it also assumes that the proportion of entities operating at both 
the  EU  and  national  level  holds  true  for  their  activities  with  third  countries  (rather  than  in 
general). There is limited evidence to support these activity-based assumptions. 

In addition, the entities excluded (i.e. those established in Belgium) may operate at the EU-
level, but also at the national-level in Belgium. Given the time available to conduct the analysis 
and the number of entities, it has not been possible to ascertain to what extent these excluded 
entities are operating solely at the EU-level. 

Total – Estimate of entities carrying out interest representation activities on behalf of 
third countries across border in the EU 

Country 

Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czechia 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 

Low scenario 
(0.02%) 

Middle scenario 
(0.025%) 

High scenario 
(0.03%) 

17 
17  
2  
4  
1  
14  
15  
3  
16  
190  
92  

103 

22  
21  
3  
5  
1  
18  
19  
4  
20  
238  
115  

26  
26  
3  
6  
1  
21  
22  
5  
24  
285  
138  

 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembour
g 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
EU-27 

1  
9  
5  
54  
2  
2  

1  

0  
7  
11  
10  
9  
3  
4  
15  
15  
521 

1  
12  
6  
68  
2  
3  

2  

1  
9  
14  
13  
11  
4  
5  
19  
19  
652  

1  
14  
7  
81  
3  
3  

2  

1  
11  
16  
15  
14  
4  
6  
22  
23  
782  

3.  Assessment of fragmentation 

On the basis of extensive consultation with Member States as well as research conducted for 
the supporting study, including the preparation of a mapping of relevant rules and policies, the 
national  frameworks  applicable  to  interest  representation  activities  were  described  and  an 
analysis of the fragmentation in the internal market of rules applicable to the various categories 
of commercial and non-commercial actors identified was prepared and is explained in details 
in Annex 6. 

4.  Estimation for costs for entities and Member States authorities 

This section provides detailed information on the cost analysis for the calculation of the impacts 
of the policy options. All the figures provided in this annex come from the supporting study.  

4.1. Costs to Member State authorities 

In  line  with  the  assessment  of  the  practical  implications  of  the  proposed  policy  options 
presented in chapter 6, Member State authorities will be required to bear a range of costs. 

All Member States will be required to familiarise themselves with the legislative provisions. 

Under  policy  option  1,  the  nature  and  scale  of  the  costs  will  depend  significantly  on  the 
decisions taken by Member State authorities in response to the recommendations provided by 
the Commission. 

For  policy  options  2.1  and  2.2,  Member  State  authorities  will  need  to  ensure  the 
implementation of a transparency regime and register that is in line with the proposed 
interventions. In this regard, policy option 2.2 goes beyond option 2.1 by requiring Member 
State authorities to establish a system to conduct prior authorisation checks on entities carrying 
out interest representation activities and grant licences to operate on that basis. 

Across all 3 options, as for entities conducting interest representation activities, the nature of 
the  practical  implications  and  related  costs  for  a  specific  Member  State  authority  will  also 

104 

 
 
 
 
 
depend on: i) whether a transparency register for interest representation already exists, as well 
as  the  characteristics  of  the  existing  register;  and  ii)  whether  monitoring  and  enforcement 
activities are already implemented. 

In this context, Member States with an existing register and/or monitoring and enforcement 
regime will be required to amend the existing systems, while Member States without a register 
/ regime will need to create and develop new systems. Costs in this category will include both 
one-off costs associated with the initial development / amendment of a transparency register / 
regime,  as  well  as  recurrent  costs  related  to  the  maintenance  and  management  (including 
monitoring,  enforcement,  reporting  and  participation  in  an  EU-level  advisory  group)  of  the 
regime.  

Beyond  these  core  costs,  Member  State  authorities  will  also  be  called  on  to  support  the 
establishment  of  an  interconnection  between  national  registers  or  appropriate 
information sharing mechanisms. However, while it is assumed that costs in this category 
will mostly be borne by the European Commission, Member State authorities interviewed for 
the supporting study were also not able to provide feedback on: i) the nature of the changes 
stemming from this activity; or ii) the scale of associated costs. As such, it has not been possible 
to quantify the costs for Member State authorities related to this cost item. 

The  following  sections  present  the  available  evidence,  calculations,  assumptions  and 
limitations / caveats for the main costs borne by Member State authorities, by policy option. 

4.1.1.  Policy option 1: Non-legislative measures 

4.1.1.1. 

Scenario 1: Full take-up of the non-legislative measures 

The  costs  for  Member  State  authorities  stemming  from  policy  option  1  would  depend 
significantly on the extent to which each authority implements the recommended measures, as 
well as the consistency and coherence between those measures. However, if implemented to 
the  extent  where  the  provisions  across  the  Member  States  would  be  similar  enough  to 
contribute to the stated aims, the costs would be largely similar to those borne by Member State 
authorities under policy option 2.1. 

Should a given Member State decide to act – in line with the currently regulatory environment 
across the Union – they could implement this recommendation by either: i) establishing a new 
transparency regime and register for entities carrying out interest representation activities 
on behalf of third countries; or ii) amending an existing general transparency regime for 
interest representation or lobbying to explicitly capture any additional elements covered by the 
recommendations.  

Beyond ensuring the existence of a transparency regime / register for interest representation, 
Member  State  authorities  would  need  to  make  decisions  on  the  alignment  with  any 
recommendations on the composition of such a regime, including issues related to the scope of 
the transparency regime / register (e.g. the definition and coverage of interest representation 
activities), the types of requirements implemented (e.g. information disclosure and reporting 
regimes,  the  types  of  information  to  be  covered,  record-keeping  obligations  etc.),  and  the 
governance, supervision mechanisms and sanctions. 

The following table indicates the different national-level responses required within this context 
based on existing provisions: 

105 

 
 
Table 1: Summary of existing transparency provisions for interest representation across 
the Member States and actions required to implement policy option 1 under Scenario 1 
(Full take-up of the non-legislative measures) 

Existing provisions 

Countries 

No existing law or 
register 
No existing law, but a 
register 
Existing law, but no 
register 
Existing law and 
register 

9 (BG, CZ, DK, EE, HR, 
LV, PT, SK, SE) 
2 (IT, NL) 

3 (BE250, HU, MT) 

13 (AT, CY, DE, EL, ES, 
FI, FR, IE, LT, LU, PL, 
RO, SI) 

Actions to implement policy 
option 1 
Establish new legal regime 
Establish new register 
Establish new legal regime 
Adapt existing register 
Adapt existing legal regime 
Establish new register 
Adapt existing legal regime 
Adapt existing register 

In  addition,  a  total  of  11  Member  States  spanning  all  4  categories  are  in  the  process  of 
developing or amending their transparency regimes for interest representation or lobbying (BE, 
BG,  CZ,  ES,  IE,  IT,  LV,  MT,  NL,  PL,  SK).  Any  updates  in  this  regard  would  impact  the 
changes required to implement policy option1 in those Member States. 

While the costs are detailed more comprehensively in relation to policy option 2 (see below), 
the  maximum  costs  for  Member  State  authorities  over  a  10-year  time  horizon  under  policy 
option 1 are summarised in the following table. Key points to note in this regard are: 

•  The low/middle/high scenarios in this context refer to the scenarios elaborated within 
the baseline on the estimated population of entities impacted by the policy options – i.e. 
entities carrying out interest representation activities on behalf of third countries.  

•  The familiarisation costs are based on the type and scale of human resource required 
(seniority of staff and time). It is assumed in this context that the activity is conducted 
by professionals at ISCO 2 level and requires 2-6 hours of their time. 

•  While some evidence was provided by stakeholders on the costs related to ensuring an 
appropriate register is in place (i.e. costs of developing a new register or amending an 
existing register), it was not possible to develop EU-wide cost estimates. This is because 
the examples provided are too disparate and too few to establish a solid basis on which 
to approximate costs. 

•  The Member States with an existing register/IT tool already incur certain maintenance 
costs. Due to the limited number of entities estimated to be within scope, it was assumed 
that  a  notable  increase  in  maintenance  costs  would  not  be  experienced  by  these 
countries. As such, these costs are considered to be business-as-usual (BaU) costs. 

•  For Member States without an existing register / IT tool, data on the annual maintenance 
costs in various Member States with registers (e.g. LT, IT, AT) were used to estimate 
the maintenance costs for those Member States without registers – 3 cost scenarios were 
developed (EUR 5,000 – low; EUR 20,000 – middle; EUR 45,000 – high). However, 
as for the costs on register development, these cost estimates face a range of challenges 
related to the representativeness and comparability of the available data. 

250  While a register exists in BE, there is currently no IT tool; instead, the register is published as a PDF document. As such, 

it is assumed that the BE authorities would need to develop a new IT tool. 

106 

 
 
•  As for the familiarisation costs, the  costs associated with  managing,  monitoring and 
enforcement have been calculated as a product of the type and scale of human resource 
required to conduct these activities. 3 scenarios were developed using data provided by 
representatives  of  Member  State  authorities  on  the  incremental  increase  in  FTEs 
anticipated  as  a  result  of  the  introduction  of  the  policy  measures  described.  More 
specifically, low (2 FTEs), middle (2.5 FTEs) and high (3 FTEs) scenarios were used. 
Evidence on the seniority of staff involved in these activities and the division of labour 
between  staff  was  then  used  to  calculate  Member  State  specific  costs,  which  were 
extrapolated to the EU level. It was assumed in this context that each FTE was split 
between an ISCO 2 professional (0.3 FTEs) and an ISCO 4 level clerk (0.7 FTEs). 

Table 2: Policy option 1 – Summary of maximum total costs to Member State authorities 
(over 10-years) under Scenario 1 (Full take-up of the non-legislative measures) 

Cost item 

Familiarisation costs 
Ensuring an appropriate 
register is in place 
IT tool maintenance (15 
Member States with existing IT 
tools) 
IT tool maintenance (12 
Member States without existing 
IT tools) 
Implementing appropriate 
management, monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms 
Total: 

Low scenario 
(EUR) 

Middle scenario 
(EUR) 

High scenario 
(EUR) 

1,533.06 

4,599.17 
Not possible to ascertain EU-wide costs based on the 
available data. 

3,066.11 

Costs are considered to be business as usual (BaU) 
costs.  

540,000.00 

2,160,000.00  

4,860,000.00  

5,654,945.59 

7,068,681.99  

8,482,418.39  

6,196,478.65 

9,231,748.10  

13,347,017.56  

4.1.1.2. 

Scenario 2: 50% take-up of the non-legislative measures 

To further accommodate the lack of certainty on the nature and scale of the PO1 costs, this 
section  assesses  an  additional  scenario  reflecting  medium  uptake  of  the  soft-law  measures 
contained within the option. Given the range of parameters that could differ in national level 
implementations  (e.g.  whether  or  not  a  register  is  developed/adapted  in  a  given  country, 
whether  registration  is  mandatory,  what  exact  registration  and  information  disclosure 
obligations will be implemented, which Member States have developed a register etc.), it is 
complex to establish such a medium uptake scenario. 

As such, a simple assumption is proposed, considering that 50% of Member States implement 
the measures fully (i.e. such that they are similar enough to contribute to the stated aims of the 
intervention).  However,  this  assumption  limits  the  level  of  certainty  on  the  accuracy  and 
precision of the estimates. 

Under this assumption, the costs for Member State authorities over the 10-year time horizon 
are summarised in the below table. While it is considered more likely that Member States with 
existing registers would take steps to implement PO1, as less effort would be required, there is 
no concrete evidence for this. On this basis, these estimates further assume that approximately 
half of the Member States with an existing register (8 of 15) and half of the Member States 
without an existing register (6 of 12) will implement the measures under PO1. The amended 

107 

 
 
 
familiarisation  costs  and  costs  associated  with  implementing  management,  monitoring  and 
enforcement mechanisms are a product of the above figures (i.e. under the full implementation 
scenario) multiplied by the proportion of Member States covered (14 of 27, 51.9%). 

Table 3: Policy option 1 – Summary of maximum total costs to Member State authorities 
(over 10-years) under Scenario 2 (50% take-up of the non-legislative measures) 

Cost item 

Familiarisation costs 
Ensuring an appropriate 
register is in place 
IT tool maintenance (15 
Member States with existing IT 
tools) 
IT tool maintenance (12 
Member States without existing 
IT tools) 
Implementing appropriate 
management, monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms 
Total: 

Low scenario 
– # of entities 
(EUR) 

Middle scenario 
– # of entities 
(EUR) 

High scenario 
– # of entities 
(EUR) 

794.92 

2,384.75 
Not possible to ascertain EU-wide costs based on the 
available data. 

1,589.83 

Costs are considered to be business as usual (BaU) 
costs.  

270,000.00 

1,080,000.00 

2,430,000.00 

2,932,194.01 

3,665,242.51 

4,398,291.02 

3,202,988.93 

4,746,832.35 

6,830,675.77 

4.1.2.  Policy option 2.1: Targeted legislative intervention 

In line with the above categorisation of costs, the below table summarises the nature of the 
different costs to Member State authorities that are relevant within policy option 2.1. 

Table 4: Policy option 2.1 – Summary of costs to Member State authorities 

Cost  items  –  Member 
State authorities 

Familiarisation costs 
Adjustment cost 

Establish  new  register  / 
regime 
Adjustment cost 

Amend existing register / 
regime 
Adjustment cost 

One-off 
vs. 
recurrent 

One-off 

Type 

Frequen
cy 

Number of 
Member States 

Implementati
on 

Year 1 

EU-27 

One-off 

Equipment 

Year 1 

One-off 

Equipment 

Year 1 

12  MS  (BE251,  BG, 
HR,  CZ,  DK,  EE, 
HU,  LV,  MT,  PT, 
SK, SE) 
15 MS (AT, CY, FI, 
FR, DE, EL, IE, IT, 
LT,  LU,  NL,  PL, 
RO, SI, ES) 

IT maintenance 
Adjustment cost 

Recurrent 

Implementati
on 

Years  2-
10, 
annual 

EU-27 

251  While a register exists in BE, there is currently no IT tool; instead, the register is published as a PDF document. As such, 

it is assumed that the BE authorities would need to develop a new IT tool. 

108 

 
 
 
Cost  items  –  Member 
State authorities 

One-off 
vs. 
recurrent 

Type 

Frequen
cy 

Number of 
Member States 

operate 

and 
Amend 
management, 
monitoring 
enforcement systems 
Enforcement cost 

& 

Recurrent 

Direct  labour 
costs 
+ 
overheads 

Years  1-
10, 
annual 

EU-27 

4.1.2.1. 

Familiarisation costs 

Familiarisation  costs  will  be  borne  by  all  Member  State  authorities,  as  they  will  need  to 
understand  the  implications  of  the  legislative  text  and  plan  for  the  implementation  of  the 
provisions. The following assumptions are made in this context: 

•  This cost is borne by all Member State authorities equally, regardless of the presence 

of an existing register / transparency regime.  

•  As  for  interest  representation  service  providers,  this  activity  is  conducted  by 

professionals at ISCO 2 level. 

•  The time required is on par with the extended familiarisation costs borne by interest 
representation  service  providers  within  scope,  due  to  the  need  to  develop 
implementation and compliance strategies. As such, 3 scenarios are presented for the 
time commitments for these activities (low, 2 hours; middle, 4 hours; high, 6 hours). 

The below table presents the Member State-specific and total costs for the 3 scenarios. As can 
be seen, the estimated familiarisation costs to Member State authorities would range from 
EUR 1,500 to EUR 4,600. 

Table 5: Estimated familiarisation costs: Member State authorities 

Country 

Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czechia 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Latvia 

ISCO 2 
income: 
EUR per 
hour(1) 

Cost scenarios in EUR (time spent * ISCO 2 income) 

Low scenario (2 
hr) 

Middle scenario (4 
hrs) 

High scenario (6 
hrs) 

42.18  
50.42  
7.25  
13.62  
25.76  
17.07  
50.23  
16.91  
41.02  
44.06  
46.81  
21.74  
12.16  
48.08  
42.39  
13.60  

84.35  
100.85  
14.50  
27.24  
51.52  
34.13  
100.47  
33.82  
82.04  
88.11  
93.61  
43.49  
24.31  
96.16  
84.78  
27.21  

109 

168.71  
201.70  
29.00  
54.49  
103.03  
68.26  
200.93  
67.64  
164.08  
176.23  
187.23  
86.98  
48.63  
192.32  
169.55  
54.42  

253.06  
302.55  
43.50  
81.73  
154.55  
102.39  
301.40  
101.45  
246.12  
264.34  
280.84  
130.46  
72.94  
288.48  
254.33  
81.63  

 
 
Country 

Lithuania 
Luxembou
rg 
Malta 
Netherlan
ds 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 

ISCO 2 
income: 
EUR per 
hour(1) 

Cost scenarios in EUR (time spent * ISCO 2 income) 

Low scenario (2 
hr) 

Middle scenario (4 
hrs) 

High scenario (6 
hrs) 

11.81  

46.01  

20.30  

41.76  

13.19  
20.77  
12.92  
14.27  
19.51  
29.59  
43.10  
Total: 

23.62  

92.02  

40.60  

83.53  

26.38  
41.53  
25.84  
28.55  
39.02  
59.17  
86.20  
1,533.06  

47.25  

184.04  

81.20  

167.06  

52.76  
83.06  
51.68  
57.09  
78.04  
118.35  
172.40  
3,066.11  

70.87  

276.07  

121.81  

250.59  

79.14  
124.59  
77.52  
85.64  
117.05  
177.52  
258.61  
4,599.17  

(1) EU wage tariffs: Hourly earnings  2018 plus non-wage labour costs (NWLC) and 25% overheads (OH), per 
Member State and ISCO (International Standard Classification of Occupations) category, last updated January 
2021. ISCO 2 covers professionals, including legal, social and cultural professionals. 

4.1.2.2.  Ensuring an appropriate transparency regime and register exists 

This  cost  type  can  be  broken  down  into  3  main  components:  i)  ensuring  an  appropriate 
register/IT  tool  is  in  place;  ii)  maintaining  the  IT  tool;  and  iii)  ensuring  an  appropriate 
management, monitoring and enforcement regime is in place. Data on the nature and scale of 
these costs was  collected through interviews with authorities from  7 Member State with  an 
existing register (AT, BE, DE, FR, IE, LT, RO) and 2 Member States (CZ, LV) without an 
existing register, as well as a review of documentation related to existing transparency laws 
and  registers  (e.g.  Austrian  Court  of  Audit  report  on  the  national  register  for  lobbying  and 
interest representation252). 

In  general,  Member  State  authorities  were  unable  to  provide  concrete  data,  considering  the 
costs  of  conducting  the  activities  necessary  to  comply  with  the  proposed  legislative 
intervention, but, in some cases, also the costs related to the development and management of 
existing registers. Certain authorities could not provide information on decisions related to IT 
funding, as this information was not available to them (e.g. on the original costs of developing 
a register) or these costs were not within their remit. Furthermore, authorities stated that it was 
difficult to estimate future costs without knowing the full details of the proposed intervention. 
In this context, it is important to highlight that, in many cases, feedback was provided before 
the final scope of the policy options were finalised. 

With  these  caveats  established,  however,  some  data  was  provided  across  the  interviewed 
authorities.  This  evidence  on  the  nature  and  scale  of  different  cost  components  is  now 
presented. 

•  Ensuring an appropriate register is in place: This will require one-off costs to be 
borne by Member State authorities in  year 1 relating  to  either:  i) establishing  a new 

252  ‘Lobbying und Interessenvertretungs Register’ (‘Lobbying and advocacy register’), Rechnungshof Österreich, Bericht – 
at:  
Auditors, 

Federal 
https://www.rechnungshof.gv.at/rh/home/home/BUND_2019_45_Lobbying_Register.pdf. 

available 

Court 

2019, 

of 

110 

 
 
register (for up to 12 countries); or ii) amending an existing register (for a minimum of 
15 countries).  While 11  Member States currently have new or updated transparency 
laws  for  interest  representation  or  lobbying  in  development,  it  is  assumed  for  the 
purposes  of  this  analysis  that  these  interventions  are  not  implemented  prior  to  the 
adoption of the proposed EU legislative initiative. As further explained in the below 
table, it is only possible to provide examples that are indicative of the magnitude of the 
compliance costs. 

Table 6: Costs associated with ensuring an appropriate register is implemented 

Evidence on the scale of the cost: Ensuring an appropriate register is in place 

Data  on  the  initial  transparency  register  development  costs  were  provided  in  Austria, 
Lithuania and Germany. The Lithuanian register cost around EUR 130,000 to develop, while 
the costs for the development and maintenance of the German register were reported to be 
EUR 2-3 million. The Austrian register reportedly cost at least EUR 87,716.16 and less than 
EUR 100,000; however, the exact costs are not completely clear. Furthermore, the Austrian 
Court of Audit determined that a planned amendment to the functionality of the Austrian 
register would cost at least EUR 3,487.53. 

While these data provide useful indications of the possible scale of the costs, they are also 
too few and too disparate to establish a basis on which the approximate costs of developing 
or amending a transparency register for interest representation or lobbying can be calculated 
for: i) those Member States where data is not available; and ii) extrapolation to the entire 
EU.  

More  specifically,  significant  efforts  have  been  made  to  adjust  the  known  costs  of  both 
developing a new register and amending an existing register, for instance by adjusting the 
figures  to  account  for  the  whole  population  or  the  register  user  population  (i.e.  interest 
representation service providers). However, this approach is limited as there is significant 
variance in the cost examples, both in general and in proportion to other relevant factors (e.g. 
user population), while the register development costs appear to be heavily dependent on the 
nature of the system implemented and limited technical details on the systems in place are 
available. 

•  Maintenance  of  the  IT  tool:  Once  established,  Member  States  will  be  required  to 
ensure the proper functioning of the IT tool. This will bring annual maintenance costs. 
It is assumed that costs related to the maintenance of the IT tool in year 1 are covered 
by  the  above  equipment  costs.  As  such,  the  maintenance  costs  will  be  calculated  as 
recurrent across years 2-10 within the 10-year time horizon. The below table presents 
the evidence on the estimated scale of the IT maintenance costs. 

Table 7: Costs associated with maintenance of the IT tool 

Evidence on the scale of the cost: Maintenance of the IT tool 

Data on the annual maintenance costs for existing registers were provided in Lithuania (EUR 
20-30,000 per year), Ireland (EUR 20-25,000 per year) and Austria (EUR 5,000 per year), 
while maintenance was included in the total cost of the German register provided above. On 
this basis, it is assumed that the Member States with existing registers will not experience a 
notable increase in maintenance costs due to the limited number of interest representation 
service providers within scope of the intervention. As such, annual IT maintenance costs will 
be  considered  as  business  as  usual  (BaU)  costs  for  the  15  Member  States  with  existing 

111 

 
registers. The incremental costs in this category will therefore be borne solely by those 12 
Member States that do not currently have registers. 

However,  as  for  the  cost  data  related  to  ensuring  an  appropriate  register  is  implemented, 
there are a range of challenges related to the extrapolation of the data on IT maintenance 
costs to these Member States. In particular, the scale of the costs has no notable link to the 
scale of the register and appears to rely on the nature of the maintenance required and the 
scope of the systems  in  place.  For instance, the  Lithuanian and  Austrian registers have a 
similar number of registrants – 385 in AT versus 303 in LT – but the maintenance costs in 
Lithuania are reportedly up to 6x more per year than in Austria. 

Taking  rough  low  (EUR  5,000),  middle  (EUR  20,000)  and  high  (EUR  45,000)  cost 
scenarios, based on the data provided and the insight that more costly and complex registers 
exist (e.g. in Germany), it is estimated that the total incremental costs across the 12 Member 
State authorities without existing IT tools will be between EUR 60,000 and EUR 540,000. 

Across  years  2-10  of  the  10-year  time  horizon,  this  would  equate  to  approximately  EUR 
540,000 to EUR 4.86 million. 

•  Ensuring an appropriate management, monitoring and enforcement regime is in 
place:  This  will  require  Member  State  authorities  to  bear  costs  in  year  1  related  to 
either: i) establishing and operating a new management, monitoring and enforcement 
regime;  or  ii)  amending  and  operating  an  existing  regime.  These  costs  will  then  be 
recurrent  across  years  2-10.  The  below  table  presents  the  evidence  gathered  on  the 
estimated scale of the management, monitoring and enforcement costs. 

Table  8:  Costs  associated  with  ensuring  an  appropriate  management,  monitoring  and 
enforcement regime is implemented 

Evidence on the scale of the cost: Ensuring an appropriate management, monitoring 
and enforcement regime is implemented 

Data on the existing costs for management, monitoring and enforcement were provided by 
Member State authorities in 6 countries, as follows: Austria (around 1 FTE across 2 teams), 
Germany  (around  8  FTEs),  Ireland  (around  4  FTEs),  Lithuania  (around  1.5  FTEs)  and 
Romania (around 2 FTEs). In Austria, additional detail is provided by the Court of Audit 
report, which notes that 0.3 FTEs are provided by the judicial / prosecutorial service and 0.7 
FTEs are provided by the general administration. Furthermore, in Germany, it was noted that 
the  suggested  changes  to  be  implemented  through  the  proposed  legislative  intervention 
would require an addition 2-3 FTEs. 

Using these data, it is possible to provide rough estimates of the human resource required for 
management, monitoring and enforcement across the Member States, as well as the costs 
associated with that resource. In this context, the following process was conducted: 

•  Three scenarios have been developed utilising the data from Germany on the increase 
in FTEs required as a result of the potential legislative intervention. These include a 
low (2 FTEs), middle (2.5 FTEs) and high (3 FTEs) scenario. These scenarios have 
been used to calculate the proportional increase in human resources in the Member 
States where data is available. 

•  Building on the data from Austria, responsibility for management, monitoring and 
enforcement will be split between 0.3 FTEs of an ISCO 2 level professional and 0.7 
FTEs of an ISCO 4 level clerk. This time split has been applied to the proportional 
human resource increases calculated for each scenario in each Member State. The 

112 

 
EU wage tariffs, which combine direct labour costs and overheads, for ISCO 2 and 
ISCO 4 workers in each Member State were then applied to the proportions to obtain 
estimated costs for each scenario. 

•  For the Member States where no data was available, costs were calculated based on 
the median cost per organisation for each scenario in the 6 Member States with data 
and the annual ISCO 2 and ICSO 4 labour costs. 

•  This requires assumptions related to the scale of the additional resource required, as 
well  as  the  nature  and  responsibilities  of  the  workers  involved  in  management, 
monitoring and enforcement activities. In addition, the annual wages for ISCO 2 and 
ISCO  4  workers  in  each  Member  State  were  calculated  using  averages  of  251 
working days per year and 8 working hours per day. 

On this basis, it is estimated that the incremental costs associated with the implementation 
of appropriate register management, monitoring and enforcement systems will cost Member 
State authorities between approximately EUR 565,000 and EUR 848,000 per year. As such, 
across the 10-year time horizon, the total costs to Member State authorities are estimated to 
be in the region of EUR 5.65-8.48 million. The estimates are presented in the below table. 

Table  9:  Estimated  annual  incremental  costs  of  register  management,  monitoring  and 
enforcement 

Country 

Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czechia 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembour
g 
Malta 
Netherland
s 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Slovakia 

Low scenario (EUR 
per year) 

Middle scenario (EUR 
per year) 

High scenario (EUR 
per year) 

20,250.75  
26,142.32  
3,157.89  
6,297.96  
1,457.52  
21,379.56  
22,580.65  
5,293.41  
24,365.82  
99,157.39  
172,324.87  
1,512.28  
14,225.06  
83,737.13  
82,311.81  
2,649.93  
8,337.31  

1,935.42  
651.74  

10,785.38  
16,511.06  
15,306.41  
10,457.68  
4,495.87  

16,200.60  
20,913.85  
2,526.31  
5,038.37  
1,166.02  
17,103.64  
18,064.52  
4,234.73  
19,492.66  
79,325.91  
137,859.90  
1,209.82  
11,380.05  
66,989.70  
65,849.45  
2,119.95  
6,669.85  

1,548.34  
521.40  

8,628.30  
13,208.85  
12,245.13  
8,366.15  
3,596.70  

113 

24,300.90  
31,370.78  
3,789.46  
7,557.56  
1,749.02  
25,655.47  
27,096.78  
6,352.10  
29,238.99  
118,988.87  
206,789.85  
1,814.73  
17,070.08  
100,484.56  
98,774.17  
3,179.92  
10,004.77  

2,322.50  
782.09  

12,942.46  
19,813.28  
18,367.69  
12,549.22  
5,395.05  

 
Country 

Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 

Total: 
Over 10 
years 

Low scenario (EUR 
per year) 

Middle scenario (EUR 
per year) 

High scenario (EUR 
per year) 

4,760.04  
18,085.36  
18,388.97  
565,494.56  

5,950.06  
22,606.69  
22,986.21  
706,868.20  

7,140.07  
27,128.03  
27,583.45  
848,241.84  

5,654,945.59  

7,068,681.99  

8,482,418.39  

4.1.2.3. 

Summary of costs: Member State authorities 

In total, under policy option 2.1, the estimated costs to Member State authorities over a 10-year 
time horizon can be summarised as follows: 

Table 10: Policy option 2.1 – Summary of total costs to Member State authorities (over 
10-years) 

Cost item 

Familiarisation costs 
Ensuring an appropriate 
register is in place 
IT tool maintenance (15 
Member States with existing IT 
tools) 
IT tool maintenance (12 
Member States without existing 
IT tools) 
Implementing appropriate 
management, monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms 
Total: 

Low scenario 
(EUR) 

Middle scenario 
(EUR) 

High scenario 
(EUR) 

1,533.06  

4,599.17  
Not possible to ascertain EU-wide costs based on the 
available data. 

3,066.11  

Costs are considered to be business as usual (BaU) 
costs.  

540,000.00  

2,160,000.00  

4,860,000.00  

5,654,945.59  

7,068,681.99  

8,482,418.39  

6,196,478.65  

9,231,748.10  

13,347,017.56  

4.1.3.  Policy option 2.2: Extended legislative intervention 

Many of the costs to be borne by Member State authorities under policy option 2 would also 
be relevant under policy option 2.2. Concretely, this includes: 

•  Familiarisation  costs:  While  the  provisions  of  the  interventions  proposed  under 
options 2.1 and 2.2 will be different, it is assumed that the time required for Member 
State  authorities  to  familiarise  themselves  with  the  provisions  and  develop  an 
implementation strategy would be the same. 

•  Implementing, managing, monitoring and enforcing an appropriate transparency 
regime / register: As for policy option 2.1, policy option 2.2 would require Member 
States  to  ensure  that  an  appropriate  transparency  regime  /  register  for  interest 
representation on behalf of third countries is in place. The activities required to monitor 
and enforce that regime would also be largely similar.  

However, option 2.2 would also require Member States to establish a system for managing 
and granting applications for EU-wide licences to conduct interest representation activities 

114 

 
 
 
on behalf of third countries. This system would bring additional recurrent costs for Member 
State authorities. 

The below table summarises the nature of the different costs to Member State authorities under 
policy option 2.2.  

Table 11: Policy option 2.2 – Summary of costs to Member State authorities 

Cost  items  –  Member 
State authorities 

Familiarisation costs 
Adjustment cost 

Establish  new  register  / 
regime 
Adjustment cost 

Amend existing register / 
regime 
Adjustment cost 

One-off 
vs. 
recurrent 

One-off 

Type 

Frequen
cy 

Number of 
Member States 

Implementati
on 

Year 1 

EU-27 

One-off 

Equipment 

Year 1 

One-off 

Equipment 

Year 1 

12  MS  (BE253,  BG, 
HR,  CZ,  DK,  EE, 
HU,  LV,  MT,  PT, 
SK, SE) 
15 MS (AT, CY, FI, 
FR, DE, EL, IE, IT, 
LT,  LU,  NL,  PL, 
RO, SI, ES) 

IT maintenance 
Adjustment cost 

Recurrent 

Implementati
on 

Years  2-
10, 
annual 

EU-27 

& 

system 

operate 

Amend 
and 
management, 
monitoring 
enforcement systems 
Enforcement cost 
Establish 
processing 
applications 
Adjustment cost 
Operate  the  system  for 
licence 
processing 
applications 
Enforcement cost 

for 
licence 

Recurrent 

Direct  labour 
costs 
+ 
overheads 

Years  1-
10, 
annual 

EU-27 

One-off 

Implementati
on 

Year 1 

EU-27 

Recurrent 

Direct  labour 
costs 
+ 
overheads 

Years  1-
10, 
annual 

EU-27 

4.1.3.1.  Establish and operate a system for processing prior authorisation / 

licensing applications 

Novel costs will be borne by all Member States related to establishing and operating a system 
for  processing  and  granting  licences  to  carry  out  interest  representation  on  behalf  of  third 
countries. More specifically, Member States will be required to: 

Establish a system for processing licence applications, which could include activities such 
as  stipulating  the  information  to  be  provided  within  applications  and  the  process  by  which 
applications  will  be  submitted,  developing  tools  to  support  the  application  process,  and 
determining  the  criteria  on  which  applications  should  or  should  not  be  granted,  as  well  the 

253  While a register exists in BE, there is currently no IT tool; instead, the register is published as a PDF document. As such, 

it is assumed that the BE authorities would need to develop a new IT tool. 

115 

 
 
 
responsibilities for such activities. The costs related to establishing the system would be borne 
in year 1 following the adoption of policy option 2.2. 

Given  the  novel  nature  of  these  costs,  no  feedback  was  provided  directly  by  relevant 
stakeholders on their scale. However, many of them could  be considered as covered by the 
other cost items. More specifically, the information to be provided, the criteria against which 
applications should be judged and the allocation of responsibilities could be incorporated into 
the familiarisation costs with limited impact on the scale of those costs. 

Operate the system for processing licence applications. This cost would take the form of the 
human  resources  required  to  review,  request  further  information  (if  necessary)  and  make 
decisions on individual applications. This cost is recurrent in all years. However, the scale of 
this cost will depend significantly on the scale of applications per year and will therefore differ 
by Member State. 

As above, no feedback was provided directly by relevant stakeholders on the scale of these 
costs. While it is therefore difficult to assess the scale of the costs with certainty, it is possible 
to develop rough estimates of: i) the number of applications per year using data on the estimated 
number of entities within scope and data on new registrants per year as a proportion of total 
active registrants from FITS and FARA; and ii) logical data estimates on the amount of time 
taken and the type of human resource required to process an application. Noting the caveats 
associated with this approach, as described throughout, these 2 estimates can then be used to 
develop  an  estimate  for  the  total  annual  costs  of  operating  the  system  for  processing 
applications in each Member State. 

Given previous points related to the potential for entities to stop conducting such activities on 
behalf of third countries, or the risk that certain entities do not apply, the number of entities 
applying in the first year may not reach 100%. However, for the purposes of this scenario, it is 
assumed that all entities within scope register in year 1 and that, over subsequent years, a certain 
number of new entities apply each year. In FARA, the average number of new registrants in a 
given year over the past 5 years of operation for which data is available (2016-2020) reached 
25.8% of the total number of active registrants. This figure rises to 49.1% under FITS, where 
only 3 full years of data (following year 1, from 2019-2022) were available. 

The below table presents the number of first year applicants and the number of average new 
applicants per year according to these estimates and assumptions. The low end of the range for 
new applicants was calculated using the FARA figure of 25.8%, while the upper end of the 
range was calculated using the FITS figure of 49.1%. 

It is important to note that there are few additional challenges relating to these estimates. As 
highlighted  previously,  there  are  significant  differences  between  the  transparency  registers 
implemented, as well as the markets for interest representation, between the EU, its Member 
States, FITS and FARA. This could impact the accuracy of these figures. Moreover, FITS and 
FARA do not take a prior authorisation / licencing approach, which could further impact the 
proportion of entities within scope that apply for a licence under policy option 2.2. These data 
should be read in this context. 

Table 12: Policy option 2.2 – Estimated applications per year 

First year applicants 

Average new applicants per 
year 

Low scenario 
Middle scenario 
High scenario 

712 
890 
1,068 

116 

184-350 
229-437 
275-524 

 
 
To determine the costs stemming from each application, it is necessary to understand: i) the 
types of staff that would be involved in processing and granting applications; and ii) the time 
that  would  be  required  to  process  each  application.  Building  on  the  evidence  provided  in 
relation to the other cost items on these elements, it is assumed that most of the processing 
activity is conducted by ISCO 2 category professionals (2-6 hours per application), with limited 
sign-off by ISCO 1 category managers or officials (0.5 hours per application in all scenarios). 
This would cover an initial review of the inputs provided by the application to check that all 
required  inputs  have  been  provided,  cross-checking  with  existing  data,  requesting  any 
additional information that is required and ultimately granting the application. 

To  illustrate  a  selection  of  different  scenarios,  the  below  data  tables  consider  the  different 
possibilities in terms the number of entities within scope (across 3 scenarios), the lower and 
upper bounds of the estimated new applicants per year, and 3 scenarios for the time taken by 
the ISCO 2 category worker to process each application (2, 4 and 6 hours).  

The table below presents the estimated year 1 costs per Member State and in total across 3 
scenarios: the low scenario combines the low estimate for the number of entities within scope 
with the low estimate for time required to complete processing, the middle scenario combines 
the middle estimates for these data, and the high scenario combines the high estimates for these 
data. 

Table 13: Policy option 2.2 – Estimated costs of processing licence applications (Years 1) 

Low scenario 
(number of entities) 
2 hours - 
0.5 hours 
ISCO 2 
- ISCO 1 

Middle scenario 
(number of entities) 
4 hours - 
0.5 hours 
ISCO 2 
- ISCO 1 

High scenario 
(number of entities) 
6 hours - 
0.5 hours 
ISCO 2 
- ISCO 1 

Year 1 costs 

Country 

Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czechia 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 

France 

Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 

735.87   1,995.57  
759.75   2,368.88  
41.14  
16.02  
154.16  
51.86  
67.47  
31.46  
247.02  
655.66  
751.82   2,038.36  
160.84  
49.85  
754.47   1,796.08  

7,624.25   22,889.69  

21.55  
109.87  
169.51  

4,716.28   11,776.07  
59.09  
310.77  
650.47  
2,749.55   6,269.92  
64.78  
69.99  
160.03  
23.78  
809.47  
391.34  
571.17  
318.86  

21.13  
23.69  
60.46  
7.94  
271.96  
131.47  
207.07  
97.68  

919.83   4,988.93  
949.69   5,922.20  
102.85  
20.02  
385.41  
64.83  
168.67  
39.32  
308.78   1,639.14  
939.78   5,095.90  
402.11  
62.31  
943.09   4,490.21  

1,103.80   8,980.08  
1,139.63   10,659.95  
185.13  
24.03  
693.74  
77.79  
303.60  
47.19  
370.53   2,950.45  
1,127.73   9,172.61  
723.79  
1,131.71   8,082.37  

74.78  

9,530.31   57,224.23   11,436.38  

103,003.6

2  
7,074.42   52,992.30  
32.32  
265.91  
164.80   1,398.46  
254.27   2,927.13  
4,124.32   28,214.64  
291.53  
31.70  
314.93  
35.54  
720.12  
90.69  
106.99  
11.91  
407.94   3,642.60  
197.20   1,761.02  
310.61   2,570.28  
146.51   1,434.88  

5,895.35   29,440.17  
147.73  
26.93  
137.33  
776.92  
211.89   1,626.18  
3,436.93   15,674.80  
161.96  
174.96  
400.07  
59.44  
339.95   2,023.67  
978.35  
164.34  
258.84   1,427.93  
797.16  
122.09  

26.41  
29.62  
75.58  
9.92  

117 

 
Year 1 costs 

Country 

Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
EU-27 Total 
(per ISCO) 
Total 

Low scenario 
(number of entities) 
2 hours - 
0.5 hours 
ISCO 2 
- ISCO 1 

Middle scenario 
(number of entities) 
4 hours - 
0.5 hours 
ISCO 2 
- ISCO 1 

High scenario 
(number of entities) 
6 hours - 
0.5 hours 
ISCO 2 
- ISCO 1 

115.32  
44.43  
81.19  
208.60  
416.35   1,201.95  
654.04   1,780.36  

288.30  
55.54  
101.48  
521.49  
520.44   3,004.88  
817.55   4,450.90  

518.93  
66.65  
121.78  
938.69  
624.52   5,408.79  
981.06   8,011.62  

20,806.54   56,949.82   26,008.18  

77,756.36  

142,374.5

4  
168,382.72  

31,209.81  

256,274.1

8  
287,483.99  

The 2 tables below present the lower and upper bounds, respectively, of the estimated costs of 
processing licence applications per Member State and in total across years 2-10 and across 3 
scenarios.  The  first  table  presents  the  lower  bound  (based  on  the  FARA  proportion  of  new 
registrants), while the second presents the upper bound (based on the FITS proportion of new 
registrants). The scenarios are formulated as above, combining the low/middle/high scenarios 
for the number of entities with the low/middle/high scenarios for the time required. 

Table 14: Policy option 2.2 – Estimated costs of processing licence applications (Years 2-
10, lower bound) 

Years 2-10 - 
Lower bound 

Country 

Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czechia 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 

France 

Low scenario 
(number of entities) 
2 hours - 
0.5 hours 
ISCO 2 
- ISCO 1 
514.86 
189.85 
611.17 
196.02 
10.61 
4.13 
39.77 
13.38 
17.41 
8.12 
169.16 
63.73 
525.90 
193.97 
41.50 
12.86 
463.39 
194.65 

1,967.06 

5,905.54 

Middle scenario 
(number of entities) 
4 hours - 
0.5 hours 
ISCO 2 
- ISCO 1 
1,287.14 
237.32 
1,527.93 
245.02 
26.53 
5.17 
99.44 
16.73 
43.52 
10.15 
422.90 
79.66 
1,314.74 
242.46 
103.74 
16.08 
1158.47 
243.32 
14,763.8
5 

2,458.82 

Germany 

1,216.80 

3,038.23 

1,521.00 

7,595.56 

Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 

5.56 
28.35 
43.73 
709.38 
5.45 
6.11 
15.60 
2.05 
70.17 
33.92 
53.42 
25.20 

15.25 
80.18 
167.82 
1,617.64 
16.71 
18.06 
41.29 
6.13 
208.84 
100.97 
147.36 
82.27 

6.95 
35.43 
54.67 
886.73 
6.81 
7.64 
19.50 
2.56 
87.71 
42.40 
66.78 
31.50 

38.11 
200.45 
419.56 
4,044.10 
41.79 
45.14 
103.22 
15.34 
522.11 
252.41 
368.41 
205.67 

118 

2,950.59 

High scenario 
(number of entities) 
6 hours - 
0.5 hours 
ISCO 2 
- ISCO 1 
2,316.86 
284.78 
2,750.27 
294.02 
47.76 
6.20 
178.98 
20.07 
78.33 
12.17 
761.22 
95.60 
2,366.53 
290.96 
186.74 
19.29 
2,085.25 
291.98 
26,574.9
3 
13,672.0
1 
68.60 
360.80 
755.20 
7,279.38 
75.21 
81.25 
185.79 
27.60 
939.79 
454.34 
663.13 
370.20 

8.34 
42.52 
65.60 
1,064.07 
8.18 
9.17 
23.40 
3.07 
105.25 
50.88 
80.14 
37.80 

1,825.20 

 
Years 2-10 - 
Lower bound 

Country 

Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
EU-27 Total 
(per ISCO) 
Total (per 
year) 
Total (Years 
2-10) 

Low scenario 
(number of entities) 
2 hours - 
0.5 hours 
ISCO 2 
- ISCO 1 
29.75 
11.46 
53.82 
20.95 
310.10 
107.42 
459.33 
168.74 
14,693.0
5 

5,368.09 

Middle scenario 
(number of entities) 
4 hours - 
0.5 hours 
ISCO 2 
- ISCO 1 
74.38 
14.33 
134.55 
26.18 
775.26 
134.27 
1,148.33 
210.93 
36,732.6
3 

6,710.11 

High scenario 
(number of entities) 
6 hours - 
0.5 hours 
ISCO 2 
- ISCO 1 
133.89 
17.20 
242.18 
31.42 
1,395.47 
161.13 
2,067.00 
253.11 
66,118.7
4 

8,052.13 

20,061.14 

43,442.74 

74,170.87 

200,611.41 

434,427.42 

741,708.70 

Table 15: Policy option 2.2 – Estimated costs of processing licence applications (Years 2-
10, upper bound) 

Years 2-10 - 
Upper bound 

Country 

Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czechia 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 

France 

Low scenario 
(number of entities) 
2 hours - 
0.5 hours 
ISCO 2 
- ISCO 1 
979.83 
361.31 
1,163.12 
373.04 
20.20 
7.87 
75.69 
25.46 
33.13 
15.45 
321.93 
121.29 
1,000.83 
369.14 
78.97 
24.48 
881.88 
370.45 
11,238.8
4 

3,743.51 

Germany 

2,315.69 

5,782.05 

10.58 
53.94 
83.23 

29.01 
152.59 
319.38 

Middle scenario 
(number of entities) 
4 hours - 
0.5 hours 
ISCO 2 
- ISCO 1 
2,449.57 
451.64 
2,907.80 
466.30 
50.50 
9.83 
189.24 
31.83 
82.82 
19.31 
804.82 
151.61 
2,502.09 
461.43 
197.43 
30.60 
2,204.69 
463.06 
28,097.1
0 
14,455.1
2 
72.53 
381.47 
798.46 

13.22 
67.43 
104.04 

4,679.38 

2,894.62 

1,350.03 

3,078.53 

1,687.53 

7,696.33 

10.38 
11.63 
29.69 
3.90 
133.53 
64.55 
101.67 
47.96 

31.81 
34.36 
78.57 
11.67 
397.45 
192.15 
280.45 
156.56 

12.97 
14.54 
37.11 
4.87 
166.92 
80.69 
127.09 
59.95 

79.52 
85.91 
196.43 
29.19 
993.62 
480.37 
701.11 
391.40 

119 

Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 

Italy 

Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 

5,615.26 

High scenario 
(number of entities) 
6 hours - 
0.5 hours 
ISCO 2 
- ISCO 1 
4,409.22 
541.97 
5,234.04 
559.56 
90.90 
11.80 
340.63 
38.20 
149.07 
23.17 
1,448.67 
181.93 
4,503.75 
553.72 
355.38 
36.72 
3,968.45 
555.67 
50,574.7
8 
26,019.2
2 
130.56 
686.65 
1,437.22 
13,853.3
9 
143.14 
154.63 
353.58 
52.53 
1,788.52 
864.66 
1,262.01 
704.53 

15.56 
17.45 
44.53 
5.85 
200.30 
96.83 
152.51 
71.94 

15.87 
80.92 
124.85 

3,473.54 

2,025.04 

 
 
Years 2-10 - 
Upper bound 

Country 

Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
EU-27 Total 
(per ISCO) 
Total (per 
year) 
Total (Years 
2-10) 

Low scenario 
(number of entities) 
2 hours - 
0.5 hours 
ISCO 2 
- ISCO 1 
56.62 
21.82 
102.42 
39.86 
590.16 
204.43 
874.16 
321.13 
27,962.3
6 

10,216.01 

Middle scenario 
(number of entities) 
4 hours - 
0.5 hours 
ISCO 2 
- ISCO 1 
141.55 
27.27 
256.05 
49.83 
1,475.40 
255.53 
2,185.39 
401.42 
69,905.9
0 

12,770.01 

High scenario 
(number of entities) 
6 hours - 
0.5 hours 
ISCO 2 
- ISCO 1 
254.80 
32.72 
460.90 
59.79 
2,655.72 
306.64 
3,933.71 
481.70 
125,830.
62 

15,324.02 

38,178.37 

82,675.92 

141,154.64 

381,783.72 

826,759.16 

1,411,546.40 

On this basis, the total costs associated with processing and granting licence applications for 
entities carrying out interest representation activities on behalf of third countries range from 
EUR 278 thousand to EUR 1.7 million across the 10-year time horizon. These are summarised 
in the below table. 

Table 16: Policy option 2.2 – Total estimated costs of processing licence applications 

Lower bound (years 
1-10) 
Upper bound (years 
1-10) 

Low scenario 
(entities & time) 

Middle scenario 
(entities & time) 

High scenario 
(entities & time) 

278,367.77 

602,810.14 

1,029,192.69 

459,540.08 

995,141.88 

1,699,030.39 

4.1.3.2. 

Summary of costs: Member State authorities 

In total, under policy option 2.2, the estimated costs to Member State authorities over a 10-year 
time horizon can be summarised as follows: 

Table 17: Policy option 2.2 – Summary of total costs to Member State authorities (over 
10-years) 

Cost item 

Familiarisation costs 
Ensuring an appropriate 
register is in place 
IT tool maintenance (15 
Member States with existing IT 
tools) 
IT tool maintenance (12 
Member States without existing 
IT tools) 
Implementing appropriate 
management, monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms 

Low scenario 
(EUR) 

Middle scenario 
(EUR) 

High scenario 
(EUR) 

1,533.06 

4,599.17 
Not possible to ascertain EU-wide costs based on the 
available data. 

3,066.11 

Costs are considered to be business as usual (BaU) 
costs.  

540,000.00 

2,160,000.00 

4,860,000.00 

5,654,945.59 

7,068,681.99 

8,482,418.39 

120 

 
 
 
Cost item 

Operating the system for 
processing licence applications 
Total: 

Low scenario 
(EUR) 

Middle scenario 
(EUR) 

High scenario 
(EUR) 

278,367.77 

798,976.01(1) 

1,699,030.39 

6,474,846.42 

10,030,724.11 

15,046,047.95 

(1) Given the use of 2 bounds in the calculation of the estimated costs of processing licence applications, the middle 
scenario presented here is an average of the lower and upper bounds in the middle scenario. 

4.2. Costs for entities carrying out interest representation activities on behalf of 

third countries 

In line with the detailed assessment of the practical implications of the proposed policy options 
presented,  the  following  main  cost  types  are  relevant  to  entities  conducting  interest 
representation activities across the 3 policy options. 

•  Familiarisation costs: It is assumed that all entities in the impacted sectors will need 
to  spend  time  familiarising  themselves  with  the  new  requirements,  even  if  only  to 
determine that they are out of scope. As such, the familiarisation costs will apply to all 
commercial and non-commercial entities carrying out interest representation activities, 
not just those operating on behalf of third countries. It is assumed that such costs will 
occur once per entity. 

For policy options 2.1 and 2.2, these costs will result directly from the proposed EU 
intervention and will be the same for both options. For policy option 1, no costs will 
stem  directly  from  the  recommendations  proposed.  However,  costs  will  be  incurred 
indirectly  by  such  entities,  due  to  the  need  to  familiarise  themselves  with  measures 
implemented  independently  by  Member  State  authorities  as  a  result  of  the 
recommendations under option 1. 

•  Registration and information update costs:  Depending  on whether  a transparency 
register for interest representation or lobbying already exists in a Member State, entities 
that  are  within  scope  will  need  to  either:  i)  update  information  on  their  existing 
registration; or ii) register for the first time. While it is assumed that all relevant entities 
are already registered in Member States with  existing registers, this is likely not the 
case in practice. Across the national-level stakeholders interviewed for the supporting 
study (including public authorities, service providers and representative associations), 
there  was  limited  insight  into  compliance  rates,  while  insufficient  monitoring  and 
enforcement  activities,  as  well  as  the  voluntary  nature  and  limited  scope  of  some 
regimes mean that existing registers almost certainly do not capture all relevant entities. 

Beyond these initial costs, borne in year 1, there will be a need for entities within scope 
to regularly ensure the information is correct and submit any additional information on 
material changes to the circumstances of the interest representation activities they carry 
out on behalf of third countries. According to feedback from service providers, different 
approaches  are  taken  across  industry  and  across  different  registers  regarding  the 
frequency  of  such  checks  and  updates.  For  instance,  within  the  context  of  the  EU 
Transparency Register, commercial entities interviewed for the supporting study have 
reported conducting updates once a year or quarterly, in both cases supplemented by ad 
hoc updates whenever they begin representing new interests. These costs will be borne 
on an annual basis across years 2-10. 

As  discussed  further  below,  there  may  be  some  synergies  in  this  context  that  could 
reduce the costs associated with regular information provision, through the submission 

121 

 
of  the  same  information  across  multiple  registers  and/or  through  business  as  usual 
(BaU) costs linked to existing information provision obligations. 

The  nature  and  scale  of  these  costs  in  this  regard  are  largely  similar  across  policy 
options 2.1 and 2.2; the key difference being the requirement to self-declare compliance 
with the record-keeping obligations (see below) on an annual basis. For policy option 
1,  entities  within  scope  will  face  no  direct  costs;  however,  entities  will  likely  face 
indirect  costs  stemming  from  the  implementation  of  measures  by  Member  State 
authorities adopted in accordance with the Commission’s recommendations. The scale 
of these costs and the potential synergies due to improved harmonisation of rules will 
depend  on  the  nature  and  scale  of  the  adoption  of  provisions  recommended  by  the 
Commission. 

•  Record-keeping costs: Entities within scope will be required to keep, for a reasonable 
period, information on the identity of the third country entity whose interests they are 
representing,  a  description  of  the  purpose  of  the  interest  representation  activity, 
contracts and key exchanges with the third country entity. As above, the provisions and 
related costs under policy options 2.1 and 2.2 are largely similar, while the costs under 
option  1  depend  heavily  on  the  nature  and  scale  of  the  measures  implemented  by 
Member State authorities. 

In addition to the above cost types, which are relevant across all policy options, the following 
2 cost types are only relevant in the case of policy option 2.2: 

•  Prior  authorisation  /  licencing  costs:  The  information  requirements  necessary  to 
obtain a licence,  and thus the direct  costs of the  licencing  application, would  be the 
same as those noted above. However, as noted by industry stakeholders interviewed for 
the supporting study, the licencing system could have indirect costs for entities with 
scope stemming from the additional time taken to process a licence application. 

Beyond these core costs, entities carrying out interest representation activities on behalf of third 
countries may be subject to additional costs across all options stemming from: i) administrative 
sanctions; ii) registration fees; and iii) potential loss of business from decisions taken by such 
entities not to work with third countries due to the possible reputational impact. In addition, 
under policy options 2.1 and 2.2, entities subject to the risk-based approach will face further 
information disclosure costs when they either receive particularly high amounts from a third 
country or third country entity or carry out interest representation on behalf of a third country 
that has spent a significant amount in a Member State or the Union as a whole. However, it 
was not possible to quantify these costs. 

For each policy option and cost type, the  following sections present the available evidence, 
calculations, assumptions, and limitations / caveats. 

4.2.1.  Policy option 1: Non-legislative measures  

The  cost  implications  of  policy  option  1  will  not  stem  directly  from  the  Commission 
recommendations, but will result from any measures implemented by Member State authorities 
as a result of the recommendations. However, the nature and scale of the costs will depend 
significantly on the extent to which the Member States implement the measures recommended, 
the extent to which the measures implemented are consistent and coherent across the EU, as 
well as the Member States in which the entities operate.  

In this context, as under policy option 2.1, the main costs these stakeholders would potentially 
be required to conduct will include: 

122 

 
•  Familiarisation  activities.  As  for  Member  State  authorities,  all  entities  conducting 
interest  representation  activities  would  need  to  familiarise  themselves  with  the 
measures implemented in the Member State(s) in which they operate. This would apply 
at  a  basic  level  to  all  entities  conducting  interest  representation  (i.e.  to  determine 
whether they are within scope) and to a greater extent for those entities within scope of 
the measures (i.e. to determine compliance strategies). 

•  Ensuring compliance with the provisions stipulated in the national-level measures, 
including  registration  and  information  update  requirements  and  record-keeping 
obligations.  As  detailed  further  under  policy  option  2.1,  in  Member  States  where 
transparency  registers  are  developed  or  amended  to  cover  third  country  interest 
representation activities, entities carrying out such activities would likely be required 
to: i) provide relevant information on these activities; and ii) ensure that information is 
updated  and  remains  accurate.  Furthermore,  where  record-keeping  obligations  are 
introduced,  entities  within  scope  would  be  required  to  ensure  their  processes  and 
systems are sufficient to ensure the retention of relevant information. 

Beyond  the  costs  linked  to  the  practical  implications  of  the  measures,  as  described  above, 
additional costs could stem from registration fees and fines for non-compliance. 

4.2.1.1. 

Scenario 1: Full take-up of the non-legislative measures 

As for the Member State authorities, it is difficult to concretely assess the scale of the costs of 
policy option 1 to entities carrying out interest representation. However, if implemented to the 
extent where the provisions across the Member States are similar enough to contribute to the 
stated  aims  of  the  intervention,  the  costs  and  benefits  would  be  largely  similar  to  those 
documented under policy option 2.1.  

The  following  table  presents  a  summary  of  the  maximum  costs  to  interest  representation 
entities over a 10-year time horizon under scenario 1. 

Table 18: Policy option 1 – Summary of maximum costs to interest representation entities 
(over 10 years) under Scenario 1 (Full take-up of the non-legislative measures) 

Cost item 

Basic familiarisation 
costs 
Extended familiarisation 
costs 
Registration and 
information disclosure 
costs 
Record-keeping costs 
Other costs (incl. admin 
sanctions, registration 
fees) 

Low scenario 
(EUR) 

Middle scenario 
(EUR) 

High scenario 
(EUR) 

71,165,916.06  

142,338,950.84  

213,519,104.36  

56,949.82 

142,374.54  

256,274.18  

6,142,119.10 

7,677,648.90 

9,213,178.70 

Business as usual (BaU) – No incremental costs 

No total cost estimates possible due to lack of evidence on 
possible frequency and actual scale of fines. 

Total: 

77,364,984.98 

150,158,974.28 

222,988,557.24 

4.2.1.2. 

Scenario 2: 50% take-up of the non-legislative measures 

Under the assumptions detailed above in section 4.1.1.1 and 4.1.1.2., the direct costs for entities 
conducting interest representation over the 10-year time horizon are summarised in the below 

123 

 
 
table. However, should these firms operate cross-border where one country has implemented 
the  measures  and  one  country  has  not,  they  will  face  additional  costs  due  to  these 
inconsistencies. 

Table 19: Policy option 1 – Summary of maximum costs to interest representation entities 
(over 10 years) under Scenario 2 (50% take-up of the non-legislative measures) 

Cost item 

Basic familiarisation 
costs 
Extended familiarisation 
costs 
Registration and 
information disclosure 
costs 
Record-keeping costs 
Other costs (incl. admin 
sanctions, registration 
fees) 

Low scenario 
(EUR) 

Middle scenario 
(EUR) 

High scenario 
(EUR) 

35,582,958.03 

71,169,475.42 

106,759,552.18 

28,474.91 

71,187.27 

128,137.09 

3,071,059.55 

3,838,824.45 

4,606,589.35 

Business as usual (BaU) – No incremental costs 

No total cost estimates possible due to lack of evidence on 
possible frequency and actual scale of fines. 

Total: 

38,682,492.49 

75,079,487.14 

111,494,278.62 

4.2.2.  Policy option 2.1: Targeted legislative intervention  

In line with the categorisation of costs, the below table summarises the nature of the different 
costs to entities carrying out interest representation activities on behalf of third countries that 
are relevant within policy option 2.1. 

Table 20: Policy option 2.1 – Summary of costs to interest representation entities within 
scope 

Cost  items  –  Interest 
representation  service 
providers 

Basic familiarisation 
costs 
Extended 
familiarisation costs 
Initial registration 
costs & new 
registrations per year 
Initial information 
update costs 
Regular information 
provision 
Establishing record-
keeping processes 
Implementing record-
keeping processes 

One-off 
vs. 
recurren
t 

One-off 

One-off 

One-off 

One-off 

Recurren
t 

One-off 

Recurren
t 

Type 

Frequen
cy 

Service providers 
covered 

Implementati
on 
Implementati
on 

Administrativ
e 

Administrativ
e 
Administrativ
e 
Implementati
on 
Implementati
on 

Year 1 

Out of scope entities 

Year 1 

In scope entities 

Year 1 
Years 2-
10 

Year 1 

Years 2-
10 

In scope entities in MS 
without register 

In scope entities in MS 
with register 

In scope entities 

Year 1 

In scope entities 

Years 1-
10 

In scope entities 

124 

 
 
 
4.2.2.1. 

Familiarisation costs 

Basic  familiarisation  costs  will  be  borne  by  all  entities  conducting  interest  representation 
activities  in  the  EU,  as  it  is  assumed  that  each  entity  conducting  activities  covered  by  the 
intervention will need to assess whether its operations are in scope. In addition, it is assumed 
that  entities  conducting  interest  representation  activities  that  are  within  scope  will  need  to 
conduct extended familiarisation activities, as follows: 

•  Basic  familiarisation  costs:  This  will  require  a  large  number  of  entities  to  spend  a 
small  amount  of  time  reviewing  the  legislative  text  and  any  related  guidance.  It  is 
assumed  that  all  entities  conducting  interest  representation  activities,  minus  those 
entities within scope, will conduct only this basic familiarisation. 3 scenarios have been 
developed based on the assumed time spent by a legal professional. As detailed in Table 
22, the scenarios assume that the time spent on basic familiarisation costs is 30 minutes 
(low scenario), 1 hour (middle scenario) or 1.5 hours (high scenario). In these scenarios, 
the total costs across all entities would range from approximately EUR 71.2  – 213.8 
million at around EUR 20–60 per organisation. 

•  Extended familiarisation costs: This will require a much smaller number of entities 
(i.e. those  within  scope  of  the  proposed  legislative  intervention)  to  spend  more  time 
reviewing the legislative text and any related guidance, but also to assess the practical 
implications, develop compliance strategies and allocate responsibility for compliance-
related  tasks.  Table  23  presents  3  scenarios  for  these  costs:  2  hours  (low  scenario), 
4 hours (middle scenario) and 6 hours (high scenario). The associated costs would range 
from approximately EUR 57–256 thousand at around EUR 80–240 per organisation. 

On this basis, the total familiarisation costs across the 3 scenarios are summarised below. An 
approximate total of EUR 71.2 million to EUR 213.8 million worth of resource will be spent 
on familiarisation for this proposed intervention. It is assumed that the familiarisation costs are 
the same across all policy options. 

Table 21: Summary of familiarisation cost estimates 

Cost type 

Basic familiarisation 
costs 
Extended 
familiarisation costs 
Total familiarisation 
costs 

Low scenario (in 
EUR) 

Middle scenario (in 
EUR) 

High scenario (in 
EUR) 

71,165,916.06 

142,338,950.84 

213,519,104.36 

56,949.82 

142,374.54 

256,274.18 

71,222,865.88 

142,481,325.39 

213,775,378.54 

125 

 
Table 22: Estimated basic familiarisation costs: Interest representation entities out of scope of the proposed intervention 

Country 

Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czechia 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 

ISCO 2 
income: 
EUR per 
hour(1) 

Number of entities (total interest representatives 
– non-EU/EEA interest representatives) 
Middle 
Low 
scenario 
scenario 

High scenario 

42.18 
50.42 
7.25 
13.62 
25.76 
17.07 
50.23 
16.91 
41.02 
44.06 
46.81 
21.74 
12.16 
48.08 
42.39 
13.60 
11.81 
46.01 
20.30 
41.76 
13.19 
20.77 
12.92 
14.27 
19.51 
29.59 
43.10 
Total 

118,251  
117,411  
14,183  
28,286  
6,546  
96,020  
101,415  
23,774  
109,432  
1,298,467  
628,783  
6,792  
63,888  
33,813  
369,680  
11,901  
14,809  
8,692  
2,927  
48,439  
74,155  
68,744  
61,679  
20,192  
26,723  
101,532  
103,236  
3,559,770  

118,256  
117,417  
14,183  
28,287  
6,546  
96,025  
101,420  
23,775  
109,438  
1,298,532  
628,815  
6,792  
63,891  
33,815  
369,699  
11,902  
14,809  
8,693  
2,927  
48,442  
74,158  
68,748  
61,683  
20,193  
26,724  
101,537  
103,241 
3,559,948  

118,262  
117,423  
14,184  
28,288  
6,547  
96,030  
101,425  
23,776  
109,443  
1,298,597  
628,846  
6,793  
63,894  
33,816  
369,717  
11,903  
14,810  
8,693  
2,927  
48,444  
74,162  
68,751  
61,686  
20,194  
26,726  
101,542  
103,246  
3,560,126  

Cost scenarios in EUR (number of entities * time spent * ISCO 2 income) 

Low scenario (30 
mins) 
 2,493,718.33  
 2,960,209.35  
 51,408.22  
 192,647.04  
 84,308.01  
 819,324.08  
 2,547,184.04  
 200,993.58  
 2,244,430.12  
 28,603,532.66  
 14,715,668.41  
 73,841.50  
 388,345.59  
 812,847.40  
 7,835,048.81  
 80,955.62  
 87,455.19  
 199,973.84  
 29,711.53  
 1,011,529.98  
 489,026.02  
 713,751.15  
 398,458.73  
 144,105.17  
 260,668.36  
 1,501,991.15  
 2,224,782.18  
 71,165,916.06  

Middle scenario (1 
hour) 

High scenario (1.5 
hours) 

 4,987,686.10  
 5,920,714.81  
 102,821.57  
 385,313.36  
 168,624.46  
 1,638,730.13  
 5,094,622.88  
 402,007.26  
 4,489,084.76  
 57,209,926.52  
 29,432,808.83  
 147,690.38  
 776,730.02  
 1,625,776.11  
 15,670,881.37  
 161,919.34  
 174,919.13  
 399,967.68  
 59,426.03  
 2,023,161.14  
 978,100.96  
 1,427,573.69  
 796,957.31  
 288,224.75  
 521,362.80  
 3,004,132.55  
 4,449,786.90  
 142,338,950.84  

 7,481,903.32  
 8,881,516.38  
 154,240.07  
 577,998.94  
 252,949.34  
 2,458,218.12  
 7,642,316.51  
 603,041.05  
 6,733,963.90  
 85,819,181.60  
 44,151,421.25  
 221,546.65  
 1,165,153.30  
 2,438,786.13  
 23,507,497.66  
 242,891.15  
 262,391.82  
 599,981.52  
 89,143.51  
 3,034,893.49  
 1,467,224.81  
 2,141,467.64  
 1,195,495.75  
 432,358.75  
 782,083.31  
 4,506,424.19  
 6,675,014.17  
 213,519,104.36  

(1) EU wage tariffs: Hourly earnings 2018 plus non-wage labour costs (NWLC) and 25% overheads (OH), per Member State and ISCO (International Standard Classification of Occupations) 
category, last updated January 2021. ISCO 2 covers professionals, including legal, social and cultural professionals. 

126 

 
 
Table 23: Estimated extended familiarisation costs: Interest representation entities within scope of the proposed intervention 

Country 

Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czechia 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 

ISCO 2 
income: 
EUR per 
hour(1) 

42.18 
50.42 
7.25 
13.62 
25.76 
17.07 
50.23 
16.91 
41.02 
44.06 
46.81 
21.74 
12.16 
48.08 
42.39 
13.60 
11.81 
46.01 
20.30 
41.76 
13.19 
20.77 
12.92 
14.27 
19.51 
29.59 
43.10 
Total 

Number of entities (total interest representatives 
– non-EU/EEA interest representatives) 
Middle 
Low 
scenario 
scenario 

High scenario  Low scenario (2 hrs) 

Cost scenarios in EUR (number of entities * time spent * ISCO 2 income) 

 24  
 23  
 3  
 6  
 1  
 19  
 20  
 5  
 22  
 260  
 126  
 1  
 13  
 7  
 74  
 2  
 3  
 2  
 1  
 10  
 15  
 14  
 12  
 4  
 5  
 20  
 21  
 712  

 30  
 29  
 4  
 7  
 2  
 24  
 25  
 6  
 27  
 325  
 157  
 2  
 16  
 8  
 92  
 3  
 4  
 2  
 1  
 12  
 19  
 17  
 15  
 5  
 7  
 25  
 26  
 890  

 35  
 35  
 4  
 8  
 2  
 29  
 30  
 7  
 33  
 390  
 189  
 2  
 19  
 10  
 111  
 4  
 4  
 3  
 1  
 15  
 22  
 21  
 19  
 6  
 8  
 30  
 31  
 1,068 

 1,995.57  
 2,368.88  
 41.14  
 154.16  
 67.47  
 655.66  
 2,038.36  
 160.84  
 1,796.08  
 22,889.69  
 11,776.07  
 59.09  
 310.77  
 650.47  
 6,269.92  
 64.78  
 69.99  
 160.03  
 23.78  
 809.47  
 391.34  
 571.17  
 318.86  
 115.32  
 208.60  
 1,201.95  
 1,780.36  
 56,949.82  

Middle scenario (4 hrs) 

High scenario (6 hrs) 

 4,988.93  
 5,922.20  
 102.85  
 385.41  
 168.67  
 1,639.14  
 5,095.90  
 402.11  
 4,490.21  
 57,224.23  
 29,440.17  
 147.73  
 776.92  
 1,626.18  
 15,674.80  
 161.96  
 174.96  
 400.07  
 59.44  
 2,023.67  
 978.35  
 1,427.93  
 797.16  
 288.30  
 521.49  
 3,004.88  
 4,450.90  
 142,374.54  

 8,980.08  
 10,659.95  
 185.13  
 693.74  
 303.60  
 2,950.45  
 9,172.61  
 723.79  
 8,082.37  
 103,003.62  
 52,992.30  
 265.91  
 1,398.46  
 2,927.13  
 28,214.64  
 291.53  
 314.93  
 720.12  
 106.99  
 3,642.60  
 1,761.02  
 2,570.28  
 1,434.88  
 518.93  
 938.69  
 5,408.79  
 8,011.62  
 256,274.18 

(1) EU wage tariffs: Hourly earnings 2018 plus non-wage labour costs (NWLC) and 25% overheads (OH), per Member State and ISCO (International Standard Classification of Occupations) 
category, last updated January 2021. ISCO 2 covers professionals, including legal, social and cultural professionals. 

127 

 
4.2.2.2.  Registration and information update costs  

The  second  cost  type  examined  is  the  need  for  entities  within  scope  to  conduct  initial 
activities  to  either:  i)  register;  or  ii)  update  or  add  information  to  an  existing  registrant 
profile. In both cases, this cost type will be one-off and occur in year 1 of the proposed 
intervention.  The  nature  of  the  practical  changes  required  for  each  entity  conducting 
interest representation activities within scope would depend on: 

•  Whether  a  transparency  register  for  interest  representation  or  lobbying  already 

exists in an entity’s Member State(s) of operation; and 

• 

In Member States  with existing transparency registers, whether such entities are 
already registered. 

Considering the first point, the below table summarises the situation as regards existing 
Member State legal regimes / registers, and the type of action entities carrying out interest 
representation activities will need to take in each country. 

Table  24:  Overview  of  Member  State  legal  frameworks  and  resulting  compliance 
activities under the proposed policy options 

Current legal framework 

Country 

Existin
g law(1) 

Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czechia 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembou
rg 
Malta 
Netherland
s 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 

X 
X 

X 

X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

Existi
ng 
regist
er 
X 
(2) 

Existing 
monitoring & 
enforcement 
regime 
X 

X 

X 
X 
X 
X 

X 
X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 
X 
X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

128 

Immediate activities required 
by entities within scope 

Initial 
Registration 

Information 
update 

X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 

X 

X 

X 

X 
X 

X 

X 
X 

X 
X 
X 
X 

X 
X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spain 
Sweden 
Total 

X 

X 

X 

16 MS  15 MS 

12 MS 

X 
12 MS 

X 

15 MS 

(1) In addition to the existing laws, the legal and policy mapping conducted for the supporting study identified 
that relevant laws are in development in 11 Member States (BE, BG, CZ, IE, IT, LV, MT, NL, PL, SK, ES). 

(2) While a  register exists in BE, there is currently no IT tool; instead, the register is published as a PDF 
document. As such, it is assumed that the BE authorities would need to develop a new IT tool. 

The  differentiation  of  impacts  based  on  the  second  point  (i.e.  the  number  of  entities 
carrying out interest representation activities within scope that are already registered) is 
more challenging to assess. As highlighted above, interview feedback from national-level 
stakeholders  interviewed  for  the  supporting  study  (including  public  authorities,  interest 
representation providers and representative associations) demonstrated limited insight into 
registration compliance rates across the EU, while the voluntary nature of registration in 
some Member States (e.g. BE, IT, RO), the differences  in  scope  across Member States 
(e.g. no coverage of existing interest representation on behalf of third countries; coverage 
of lobbying versus interest representation more broadly) and the wide variance in number 
of registrants across Member States (e.g. 82 in SI and 84 in IT compared with 5,676 in DE 
and 2,454 in IE), mean that it is not possible to estimate with any certainty the proportion 
of entities conducting interest representation activities that are already registered. For those 
entities that are operating on behalf of third countries, it is even more difficult. 

As such, while this may not be the case in practice, it is assumed that all entities within 
scope operating in a Member State with an existing register are already registered in that 
country. 

The characteristics of these 3 core costs are now described, before the data collected on 
the scale of the costs is presented: 

•  Initial  registration  costs:  In  Member  States  that  currently  do  not  have  existing 
registers  (i.e.  12  Member  States),  entities  conducting  interest  representation 
activities on behalf of third countries will be required to register. 

•  Initial  information  update  costs:  In  Member  States  that  currently  maintain 
existing registers, entities carrying out interest representation activities on behalf 
of  third  countries  will  be  required  to  update  existing  information  to  explicitly 
disclose the third country interests they represent. 

•  Ongoing 

interest 
information  disclosure  costs:  All  entities  conducting 
representation activities on behalf of third countries will be required to ensure the 
information  submitted  to  registers  across  the  Union  is  regularly  updated  and 
remains accurate. 

The  costs  related  to  both  initial  registration  and  updating  of  information  will  be 
administrative, one-off costs, borne in year 1. The ongoing information disclosure costs 
will be administrative in nature, but will be recurrent, borne annually in years 2-10. The 
costs will take the form of human resources spent collecting and submitting the required 
information  (i.e.  time  of  direct  labour  costs  and  related  overheads).  As  for  the 
familiarisation costs, the EU wage tariffs, based on ISCO employee categories, have been 
used to calculate the different costs associated with registration and information disclosure. 

The following table presents the available evidence on the estimated scale of these costs. 

129 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 25: Costs associated with registration and updating information at the Union 
and national levels 

Evidence on the scale of the cost: Initial registration and information update costs 

to  commercial  and  non-commercial  entities  conducting 

interest 
According 
representation  activities  interviewed  for  the  supporting  study,  as  well  as  their 
representative  associations,  registration  and  information  update  activities  require  the 
following  tasks:  i)  the  collection  of  relevant  information  through  liaison  between 
different  professionals  (e.g.  legal  and  compliance  teams,  delivery  teams,  board 
members);  ii)  the  submission  of  that  information  to  the  register/authorities  through  a 
dedicated form/portal; and iii) any additional internal processes, such as staff training on 
record-keeping and retrieval. 

In line with the detailed explanation of policy option 2.1, entities within scope would be 
required to provide the following types of information at initial registration: 

• 

• 

• 

Information on the entity conducting interest representation activities, including 
their  name,  contact  details,  category  of  organisation,  address  of  place  of 
establishment. 

Information  on  the  activities  conducted,  including  the  type  of  activity,  the 
Member State in which it will be conducted, the policy being targeted and the 
remuneration received. 

Information  on  the  third  country  entity  on  whose  behalf  the  interest 
representation is being conducted, including their name, contact details and the 
third country. 

The information update will only require submission of new information explicitly on 
third country interests represented. 

Most  experiences  discussed  with  interviewees  in  this  regard  referred  to  the  EU 
Transparency  Register;  however,  experiences  of  registration  and  information  update 
procedures in Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Slovenia were also shared. 

In  general,  there  was  a  consensus  across  these  stakeholders  that  the  processes  of 
registration and information disclosure place a minimal burden on these entities. 
However,  the  following  complexities  and  considerations  were  highlighted  by 
stakeholders: 

• 

It is often difficult to determine the extent to which certain activities are within 
scope and thus  what  data (including financial data) needs to  be provided. For 
instance, many commercial firms conduct legislative monitoring activities within 
the context of broader engagements with clients. 

•  Mixed feedback was provided on the differentiation of impacts between larger 
and  smaller  organisations.  While  larger  consultancy  firms  noted  that  the 
registration  exercise  is  more  burdensome  for  them,  given  the  complexity  of 
collecting data on more clients, many stakeholders stated that the impact would 
be proportionally higher on SMEs, who may not have the systems in place to 
easily  access  the  required  information.  Others  noted  that  some  firms  rely  on 
software systems to track key information or outsource certain activities related 
to  these  transparency  obligations,  while  one  commercial  firm  noted  that  the 
administrative costs related to registration are built into their fees. 

130 

 
•  Within the EU Transparency Register, there is also a need for commercial firms 
to ensure their clients are registered. This is reported as being burdensome for 
those firms and should be considered within the reading of the below figures. 

Considering the time required to register and update the relevant information, estimates 
from  entities  conducting  interest  representation  activities  focused  on  the  following 
elements: 

•  Registration / information provision only: Estimates ranged from 5 minutes to 
register in Belgium to up to 1 hour to register in the EU Transparency Register. 

•  Overall annual cost of compliance: Quantitative estimates provided include 1-
2  weeks  a  year  and  approximately  10  days  per  year  split  equally  between  a 
partner and an administrative staff member (in Belgium, this equates to around 
EUR 3,500  per  year),  up  to  as  much  as  EUR  40,000  per  year  to  ensure 
compliance with EU, national and regional registers over the course of a year 
(e.g.  for  entities  operating  in  Germany).  However,  qualitatively,  other 
stakeholders  noted  the  light  administrative  burden  associated  with  existing 
transparency  registers.  Furthermore,  given  these  estimates  reflect  information 
disclosure related to all lobbying or interest representation activities conducted 
by an organisation, or efforts across multiple registers, the costs for information 
disclosure  related  to  interest  representation  carried  out  on  behalf  of  third 
countries will likely be reduced. However, it is not possible to assess the scale of 
this reduction. 

In this  context, 3 scenarios have been developed  to  assess the possible costs associated 
with  these  information  obligations.  The  low  scenario  assumes  2.5  days  per  year  split 
equally  between  one  ISCO  1  (senior  managers)  and  one  ISCO  4  (clerks)  category 
employee. Using the same division of labour, the middle and high scenarios assume 5 days 
and 10 days per year, respectively. 

The following assumptions are also relevant in this context: 

•  Given the data available and their limited scale, the costs associated with the initial 
act of registration is considered to be part of the overall annual cost of compliance, 
which  is  assumed  to  be  the  same  in  year  1  as  in  the  other  years.  As  such,  the 
calculations use the annual cost of compliance as a proxy for the 3 different types 
of costs noted above. 

•  While some organisations will experience synergies due to cross-border or multi-
national interest representation service provision, which will lead to cost-savings, 
there  is  limited  indication  of  the  scale  of  multi-national  or  cross-border  interest 
representation  (in  general  or  for  third  countries).  Moreover,  the  scale  of  these 
synergies  will  differ  based  on  the  nature  of  an  organisation’s  engagements  with 
such third countries. For instance, a commercial firm working with the same client 
in multiple Member States will experience direct synergies with regard to both the 
types  of  information  to  be  provided  and  the  specific  information;  however,  a 
commercial  organisation  working  in  multiple  Member  States  but  with  different 
clients will only benefit from synergies related to the types of information to be 
provided. 

With these caveats and assumptions established, the costs were calculated by multiplying 
the number of working days by the relevant ISCO category wage for each country and the 
estimated number of entities within scope (as per the above estimates). It is important to 
note that, alongside the number of working days, the estimates for the number of entities 

131 

 
within scope also change across the 3 scenarios presented. This is primarily due to the way 
in  which the estimates  for the number of entities  conducting interest  representation  per 
Member State were calculated (i.e. across 3 scenarios). More specifically, the low / middle 
/ high scenarios for the number of entities are used in conjunction with the low / middle / 
high estimates for the number of working days. 

On this basis, the annual registration and information disclosure activities to be conducted 
by entities carrying out interest representation activities on behalf of third countries will 
cost  between  approximately  EUR 590,000 and EUR 3.5 million  at  approximately EUR 
828 – 3,314 per organisation. Across the 10-year time horizon, this will reach a total cost 
of approximately EUR 5.9 and EUR 35.4 million. The detailed breakdown of the annual 
cost estimates per Member State is presented in the below table. 

Table 26: Estimated registration and information disclosure costs 

Low scenario (2.5 
days) 

Middle scenario (5 
days) 

High scenario (10 days) 

Country 

Austria 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czechia 

Denmark 

Estonia 

Finland 

France 

Germany 

Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 

Italy 

Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembou
rg 
Malta 
Netherland
s 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 

ISCO 1 
1.25 
days 
14,717.3

ISCO 4 
1.25 
days 

ISCO 1 
2.5 days 

ISCO 4 
2.5 days 

ISCO 1 
5 days 

ISCO 4 
5 days 

15,195.0

5   6,630.45   36,793.38  

118.08  
504.41  
165.89  

320.39  
1,037.22  
629.17  

6   6,478.72   37,987.64  
800.98  

16,576.1
3  
16,196.8
0  
295.21  
2,593.06   1,261.04  
414.71  
1,572.93  
4,940.41   2,030.04   12,351.03   5,075.09  
19,959.4
15,036.4
2  
2,492.59   1,313.58  
14,382.8
3  
170,583.

4   7,983.77   37,591.11  

5   5,753.13   37,723.62  

381,212.5

15,089.4

997.03  

525.43  

88,304.12   39,782.72  

91,170.34   38,872.32  
708.50  
3,026.49  
995.31  
29,642.48   12,180.22  

1,922.36  
6,223.34  
3,775.03  

90,218.66   47,902.61  
3,152.59  

5,982.21  

90,536.68   34,518.79  

04  

94,325.6

152,485.

1  
430.92  

68,233.5
5  
36,454.5
4  
193.23  
2,197.30   1,011.99  
3,390.30   1,830.08  
17,792.3
54,990.9
2  
205.78  
224.91  

2  
422.62  
473.89  

9  

86   914,910.23   409,401.27  

235,814.0

91,136.3

4  
1,077.30  
483.06  
5,493.25   2,529.98  
8,475.74   4,575.20  
44,480.8
137,477.2

5   565,953.69   218,727.23  
1,159.36  
2,585.51  
6,071.96  
13,183.81  
20,341.78   10,980.48  

9  
1,056.55  
1,184.73  

0   329,945.50   106,753.91  
1,234.71  
1,349.49  

2,535.72  
2,843.34  

514.46  
562.29  

1,209.24  
158.79  

514.62  
79.83  

3,023.10   1,286.54  
199.57  

396.99  

7,255.44  
952.77  

3,087.70  
478.96  

5,439.20   2,623.80   13,598.00   6,559.50  
6,573.44   2,727.10  
2,629.37   1,090.84  
4,141.43   1,402.05   10,353.58   3,505.12  
4,883.78   1,964.08  
1,953.51  

785.63  

32,635.19   15,742.80  
6,545.03  
15,776.25  
8,412.28  
24,848.58  
4,713.79  
11,721.08  

132 

 
Low scenario (2.5 
days) 

Middle scenario (5 
days) 

High scenario (10 days) 

Country 

Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 

Sweden 

Total  per 
category: 
Total cost: 

ISCO 4 
2.5 days 

ISCO 1 
2.5 days 

ISCO 4 
1.25 
days 
392.66  
685.78  

ISCO 1 
1.25 
days 
2,221.64  
981.66  
888.66  
1,623.75  
4,059.37   1,714.44  
8,326.99   3,713.02   20,817.48   9,282.55  
16,164.2
13,080.7
0  
434,725.
1,040,327.
57 
06 
1,475,052.63 

173,890.
23 
590,021.05 

4   6,465.68   32,701.86  

416,130.
82 

ISCO 1 
5 days 

ISCO 4 
5 days 

5,331.94  
9,742.49  

2,355.97  
4,114.66  
49,961.95   22,278.12  

78,484.45   38,794.07  
1,043,341.
2,496,784.
36 
94 
3,540,126.31 

Moreover, in line with the above considerations, it is assumed that the size of the entity 
impacts  the  scale  of  the  effort  required  to  conduct  the  required  annual  information 
disclosure  tasks.  The  data  on  full-time  equivalents  (FTE)  working  on  interest 
representation  activities  from  the  EU  Transparency  Register  illustrates  that,  while  the 
number of reported FTEs reaches a maximum of 85.5 FTEs and a total of 17,882 FTEs, 
the mean (2 FTEs), median (1 FTE) and mode (0.25 FTEs) are all significantly lower. On 
this basis, tailored definitions for micro / small (<10 FTEs), medium (10-19 FTEs) and 
large  (>=20  FTEs)  entities  were  assumed  in  this  context.  The  data  are  presented  in  the 
below table.  

Table 27: Estimated number of entities per size class (EU Transparency Register) 

Size classification & 
rationale 
Micro / Small (<10 FTEs) 
Medium (10-19 FTEs) 
Large (>=20 FTEs) 
Total 

Number of entities 

Percentage of entities 

8,562 
175 
59 
8,796 

97.3% 
2.0% 
0.7% 
100% 

To achieve more nuanced estimates of the costs based on firm size, the rationale was used 
that the larger the firm, the more complex and costly the reporting process to assume that: 
micro / small entities require 2.5 days to comply with the foreseen information disclosure 
and reporting requirements; medium-sized entities require 5 days; and large entities require 
10 days. These estimates are in line with the 3 scenarios for the number of working days 
calculated above. 

Under  these  assumptions,  the  costs  were  calculated  by  applying  the  above  entity-size 
percentages to the 3 scenarios for the estimated number of entities carrying out interest 
representation  activities  on  behalf  of  third  countries.  These  proportions  were  then 
multiplied by the average cost per organisation across the EU-27 per scenario (i.e. low, 
middle, high). For instance, as shown in the first of the below tables, approximately 693 
of the 712 estimated entities conducting interest representation on behalf of third countries 
across the EU-27 are micro / small entities, while 14 are medium-sized and 5 are large. 
The  same  breakdown  of  entities  by  size  class  has  been  done  for  the  middle  and  high 
scenarios for the number of entities within scope. 

Table 28: Estimated number of entities per size class, per scenario 

Number of 
entities 
(scenarios) 

Micro / Small 
(97.3%) 

Medium (2%)  Large (0.7%) 

Total 

133 

 
Low scenario (# 
of entities) 
Middle scenario 
(# of entities) 
High scenario (# 
of entities) 

693 

866 

1,039 

14 

18 

21 

5 

6 

7 

712 

890 

1,068 

On this basis, the following table illustrates the calculated costs per entity size class. These 
calculations suggest that, in practice across the 3 scenarios, the estimated total costs will 
sit somewhere between EUR 614,000 and EUR 921,000 at an average cost per entity of 
EUR 862.45. Across the 10-year time horizon, total costs will reach approximately EUR 
6.1 mn to EUR 9.2 mn. 

Table 29: Estimated costs per entity size class, per scenario per year  

Number of entities 
(scenarios) 

Low scenario (# of 
entities) 
Middle scenario (# of 
entities) 
High scenario (# of 
entities) 

Micro / 
Small 
(97.3%) 

Medium 
(2%) 

Large 
(0.7%) 

Total 

574,090.48  23,600.84  16,520.59 

614,211.91 

717,613.10  29,501.05  20,650.74 

767,764.89 

861,135.72  35,401.26  24,780.88 

921,317.87 

Conversely, the table below provides a summary of the estimated average costs per entity 
per information update scenario (i.e. 2.5 / 5 / 10 days). For the purpose of calculating the 
average costs across the body of entities, it has been assumed that micro / small entities 
experience the lower average costs (i.e. EUR 828.49), medium-sized firms experience the 
middle average costs (i.e. EUR 1,656.97) and large firms experience the higher average 
costs (i.e. EUR 3,313.94). 

Table 30: Estimated average costs per entity, per size class 

Average total costs per 
entity 

Micro / 
Small 
(97.3%) 

Medium 
(2%) 

Large 
(0.7%) 

General average 
costs across all 
entities 

828.49  1,656.97  3,313.94 

862.45 

4.2.2.3.  Record-keeping costs  

The third cost type examined is the need for entities within scope to ensure appropriate 
record-keeping. This would include retaining, for a reasonable period: i) information on 
the identity of the third country entity on whose behalf the interest representation activities 
are being carried out; ii) a description of the purpose of the interest representation activity; 
and iii) contracts and key exchanges with the third country entity to the extent that they are 
essential to understand the nature and purpose of the interest representation carried out or 
information or material constituting key components of the interest representation activity. 

Beyond  supporting  the  entities  in  their  registration  and  information  disclosure 
requirements  (see  above),  the  purpose  of  this  record-keeping  is  to  ensure  sufficient 
transparency is possible in response to possible supervision or enforcement requests. 

134 

 
 
 
In this context, entities within scope will need to: i) establish the processes and systems to 
identify and securely retain key information (one-off in year 1); and ii) implement those 
processes  and  systems  to  ensure  the  continued  identification  and  retention  of  that 
information over the remainder of the time horizon (recurrent in years 2-10). 

However, given the existing importance of this information to the provision of services by 
entities  within  scope,  it  is  assumed  that  the  costs  of  formalising  such  record-keeping 
obligations in this context could be characterised as business as usual (BaU) costs, thereby 
adding no incremental costs to the intervention. 

4.2.2.4.  Other costs (e.g. administrative sanctions, risk-based 

approach, etc.)  

Beyond these core costs, there are a range of additional costs that could be incurred by 
entities  within  scope  depending  on  the  implementation  specifics.  These  include 
i) administrative sanctions; ii) registration fees; iii) costs related to the risk-based approach. 
Each additional cost item is briefly discussed here. 

The proposed administrative sanctions regime within policy option 2.1 would allow the 
imposition of fines on non-compliant interest representation service providers. However, 
it was not possible to estimate the scale or frequency of potential fines due to a lack of 
available  data  on  breaches  of  existing  interest  representation  transparency  registers  and 
related sanctions at the national level, twinned with challenges regarding the adequacy of 
monitoring and enforcement resources and activities across the Member States. 

In addition, while not explicitly included (or excluded) in policy option 2.1, Member States 
may  impose  registration  fees  on  entities  within  scope.  This  is  a  practice  that  already 
occurs  in  some  Member  States  (e.g.  in  Slovenia).  However,  it  has  not  been  possible  to 
ascertain the number of Member States that would implement such a registration fee, nor 
the size of such fees. As such, it has not been possible to quantitatively assess this cost 
item. 

The  final  cost  item  to  note  in  relation  to  policy  option  2.1  relates  to  the  risk-based 
approach proposed. Under this option, entities will be required to provide, at the request 
of  national  independent  supervisory  authorities,  the  records  kept  on  certain  interest 
representation activities (as detailed above). This may be necessary under 2 scenarios: i) 
when the entity has received a particularly high amount from a particular third country; or 
ii)  when  the  entity  is  carrying  out  interest  representation  activities  on  behalf  of  a  third 
country that has spent a significant amount on interest representation across the Union as 
a whole. However, it has not been possible to assess the extent to which entities within 
scope would be subject to such requests for records, primarily due to limited quantitative 
data available on the scale of interest representation conducted on behalf of third countries 
across the EU. As such, it has not been possible to quantify this cost item. 

4.2.2.5. 

Summary of costs under policy option 2.1: Entities within 

scope  

In  total,  the  estimated  incremental  costs  of  policy  option  2  to  entities  conducting 
interest  representation  activities  on  behalf  of  third  countries  over  a  10-year  time 
horizon can be summarised as follows: 

135 

 
Table 31: Policy option 2.1 – Summary of total costs to interest representation entities 
within scope (over 10-years) 

Cost item 

Basic familiarisation 
costs 
Extended 
familiarisation costs 
Registration and 
information disclosure 
costs 
Record-keeping costs 
Other costs (incl. admin 
sanctions, registration 
fees) 

Low scenario 
(EUR) 

Middle scenario 
(EUR) 

High scenario 
(EUR) 

71,165,916.06  

142,338,950.84  

213,519,104.36  

56,949.82 

142,374.54  

256,274.18  

6,142,119.10 

7,677,648.90 

9,213,178.70 

Business as usual (BaU) – No incremental costs 

No total cost estimates possible due to lack of evidence on 
possible frequency and actual scale of fines. 

Total: 

77,364,984.98 

150,158,974.28 

222,988,557.24 

4.2.3.  Policy option 2.2: Extended legislative intervention  

The description of the policy options and the categorisation of costs highlights that many 
of the costs borne under policy option 2.1 by interest representation entities within scope 
will also be relevant under policy option 2.2. Concretely, this includes: 

•  Basic  and  extended  familiarisation  costs:  While  the  provisions  of  the 
interventions under option 2.1 and 2.2 will be different, it is assumed that the time 
taken for familiarisation, as well as the population of entities impacted is the same 
for  both  options.  Thus,  the  cost  of  both  the  basic  and  extended  familiarisation 
activities will be the same under policy option 2.2 and under policy option 2.1. 

•  Registration  and  information  update  costs:  The  registration  and  information 
disclosure obligations under policy option 2.2 remain the same as under option 2.1. 
Therefore, the costs will also be the same. 

•  Record-keeping  costs:  While  there  are  some  subtle  differences  between  the 
record-keeping requirements under policy options 2.1 and 2.2, they are in practice 
largely similar in nature. Moreover, as for policy option 2.1, these obligations could 
be characterised as BaU costs due to the existing importance of the information to 
be retained. 

•  Other  costs:  Entities  within  scope  could  be  subject  to  further  costs  related  to 
administrative  sanctions  for  non-compliance,  registration/application  fees  and 
additional information disclosure under the risk-based approach. For the reasons 
stated under option 2.1, it has not been possible to quantify these other costs. 

Beyond these costs, however, entities within scope will face additional costs under policy 
option 2.2 that would not be borne under option 2.1. These include due costs related to the 
prior authorisation / licencing system. 

The below table summarises the nature of the different costs to entities carrying out interest 
representation activities on behalf of third countries that are relevant within policy option 
2.2. 

136 

 
 
Table  32:  Policy  option  2.2  –  Summary  of  costs  to  interest  representation  entities 
within scope 

Cost  items  –  Interest 
representation  service 
providers 
Basic familiarisation 
costs 
Extended 
familiarisation costs 
Initial registration 
costs & new 
registrations per year 
Initial information 
update costs 
Regular information 
provision 
Establishing record-
keeping processes 
Implementing record-
keeping processes 
Prior authorisation / 
licencing 

One-off 
vs. 
recurrent 

One-off 

One-off 

One-off 

One-off 

Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

One-off 

Type 

Frequen
cy 

Service providers 
covered 

Implementati
on 
Implementati
on 

Administrati
ve 

Administrati
ve 
Administrati
ve 
Implementati
on 
Implementati
on 
Administrati
ve 

Year 1 

Out of scope 
entities 

Year 1 

In scope entities 

Year 1 
Years 2-
10 

Year 1 

Years 2-
10 

In scope entities in 
MS without 
register 
In scope entities in 
MS with register 

In scope entities 

Year 1 

In scope entities 

Years 1-
10 

In scope entities 

Year 1 

In scope entities 

Given the costs for the first 3 overarching categories are the same as in policy option 2.1, 
the focus in this section is on the costs stemming from the prior authorisation / licencing 
system. 

4.2.3.1. 

Prior authorisation/licensing system  

Under  the  prior  authorisation  /  licencing  system,  entities  carrying  out  interest 
representation  activities on behalf of third countries with  the objective of influencing  a 
public decision-making process would be required to apply at the Member State level for 
an EU-wide licence to conduct such interest representation activities. 

Within the application for a licence, entities within scope would be required to submit the 
same information as under the registration obligations of policy option  2.1. Thus, while 
this  could  lead  to  hassle  costs  (e.g.  from  delaying  the  provision  of  services),  the  core 
activities, and direct costs, stemming from the prior authorisation / licencing system would 
be covered by the registration and information update costs detailed above. 

The Better Regulation Toolbox categorises hassle costs as direct costs of regulation, stating 
that  “hassle  costs  are  often  interpreted  as  ‘regulatory  annoyance’  resulting  from 
unnecessary  waiting  time,  delays,  redundant  legal  provisions,  corruption,  etc.”,  further 
noting that “as this category of costs is not well-defined, in most cases it is not analysed in 
impact assessments, evaluations and fitness checks”. 

In line with  this  description, the hassle costs identified within the context of PO2.2 are 
difficult  to  define  such  that  quantification  is  possible.  The  primary  cost  foreseen  is 
‘delaying the provision of services’ due to having to wait for a licence to be granted. 

While this should not prevent an entity from conducting other economic activity as it waits, 
it  could  ultimately  delay  payment  for  the  services  to  be  delivered,  or  even  impact  the 
business  relationship  with  the  third  country  on  whose  behalf  the  entity  is  conducting 
interest representation activities. However, it is not possible to quantify these costs. 

137 

 
Nonetheless, the system may have an indirect economic impact on entities within scope 
that it is not possible to quantify. While registration is necessary under option 2.1, it is a 
simple process with activities only required by the entities within scope before they can 
obtain a registration number and conduct interest representation activities on behalf of third 
countries. Contrastingly, the prior authorisation system to be implemented under policy 
options 2.2 also requires activities from national authorities – i.e. to assess an application 
and grant (or not) a licence to operate. The time taken from submitting an application to it 
being granted could negatively impact the economic capacity of the entity, for instance 
resulting in a concentration of contracts with entities that are already registered. 

4.2.3.2. 

Summary of costs under policy option 2.2: Entities within 

scope 

In  total,  the  estimated  incremental  costs  of  policy  option  2.2  to  entities  conducting 
interest  representation  activities  on  behalf  of  third  countries  over  a  10-year  time 
horizon can be summarised as follows: 

Table 33: Policy option 2.2 – Summary of total costs to interest representation entities 
within scope (over 10-years) 

Cost item 

Basic familiarisation 
costs 
Extended familiarisation 
costs 
Registration and 
information disclosure 
costs 
Record-keeping costs 
Other costs (incl. admin 
sanctions, registration 
fees) 
Prior authorisation / 
licencing 

Low scenario 
(EUR) 

Middle scenario 
(EUR) 

High scenario 
(EUR) 

71,165,916.06  

142,338,950.84  

213,519,104.36  

56,949.82 

142,374.54  

256,274.18  

6,142,119.10 

7,677,648.90 

9,213,178.70 

Business as usual (BaU) – No incremental costs 

No total cost estimates possible due to lack of evidence on 
possible frequency and actual scale of fines. 

Covered through the registration and information update 
costs (above) 

Total: 

77,364,984.98 

150,158,974.28 

222,988,557.24 

5.  Potential administrative simplification and costs savings 

An  analysis  on  the  scale  of  potential  administrative  simplification  and  cost  savings  for 
entities  conducting  interest  representation  on  behalf  of  third  countries  requires  an 
assessment of: i) how the registration and information disclosure costs could decrease as 
an entity enters additional Member State markets; and ii) how these cost savings can be 
applied to the overall population of entities potentially working cross-border. This section 
first  sets  out  the  key  information  on  this  issue  from  the  report,  before  discussing  these 
additional analytical tasks. 

The report presents the following information of relevance to this aim: 

•  Provides  estimates  for  the  potential  population  of  entities  conducting  interest 
representation  activities  on  behalf  of  third  countries  in  the  Union  as  well  as  an 
estimate of the proportion of entities within scope that operate cross-border. 

138 

 
 
 
• 

Indicates  that  entities  are  required  to  conduct  the  following  tasks  to  meet  the 
registration and information disclosure obligations:  “i) the collection of relevant 
information  through  liaison  between  different  professionals  (e.g.  legal  and 
compliance  teams,  delivery  teams,  board  members);  ii)  the  submission  of  that 
information  to  the  register/authorities  through  a  dedicated  form/portal;  and  iii) 
any  additional  internal  processes,  such  as  staff  training  on  record-keeping  and 
retrieval.” 

•  Notes that entities working cross-border will likely experience cost savings related 

to these tasks. 

•  Highlights the challenges associated with quantifying cost savings in this context: 
o  Limited  evidence  exists  on  the  scale  and  nature  of  cross-border  interest 
representation, including how many entities work cross-border and, where 
they do work cross-border, in how many and in which Member States. 
o  Limited evidence on the scale and nature of the synergies that entities will 
experience due to the implementation of harmonised rules across the Union 
when operating cross-border. 

o  Limited  evidence  on  the  granular  breakdown  of  costs  stemming  from 
registration and information disclosure compliance tasks. While estimates 
have been provided by entities for the overall time/cost spent on compliance 
with  registration  and  information  disclosure  obligations,  this  was  not 
broken down by the specific tasks  conducted  (e.g. liaising with  different 
professionals  internally  to  collect  relevant  information,  the  act  of 
submitting the information). 

o  The fact that the costs under the baseline scenario differ based on whether 
a Member State already has a register. For instance, currently, entering a 
new  market  might  not  bring  any  additional  registration  and  information 
disclosure costs. 

On this basis, it should be clearly stated that any estimates of the scale of possible cost 
savings are subject to an extensive set of assumptions based on limited concrete evidence 
that limit the level of certainty in the accuracy and precision of the estimates. 

In terms of the cost savings, the key assumption in this context is that entities conducting 
interest representation activities on behalf of third countries will experience synergies and 
thus cost savings when they enter Member State markets outside their Member State of 
establishment. More specifically, they will be subject to reduced administrative burden in 
these additional Member States stemming from: 

•  The need to provide exactly the same information (i.e. when operating on behalf of 
a given third countries in multiple Member States). In this scenario, the costs of 
registration  and  information  disclosure  for  additional  Member  States  would  be 
limited solely to the submission of information as there would be no need to collect 
additional information. 

•  The need to provide different information but for the same types of information 
(i.e.  when  operating  in  different  Member  States  on  behalf  of  different  third 
countries).  In  this  scenario,  likely  minor  efficiency  gains  would  be  possible,  for 
instance, through the use of the same information recording and retrieval systems 
across all Member States. However, entities would still be required to conduct the 
same internal liaison and information collection tasks, as well as the information 
submission tasks. 

139 

 
Moreover, it is assumed that any additional costs stemming from other internal processes 
noted by entities, such as staff training, can be considered as business-as-usual (BaU) costs. 
While it is not anticipated that such costs would be significant, they would be borne in any 
case when moving into a new Member State market. 

To develop a quantitative estimate of the potential cost savings, one would need to generate 
assumptions for: i) the costs associated with the granular tasks of liaison and information 
collection, compared with the information submission; and ii) the extent to which entities 
conducting interest representation activities on behalf of third countries would be subject 
to each of the above categories of synergies.  

However, in line with the above caveats and limitations, it has not been possible to find an 
appropriate solution for generating these assumptions. Primarily, this is because the cost 
estimates  currently  presented  for  registration  and  information  disclosure  are  based  on 
evidence  of  the  total  compliance  costs  of  entities  conducting  interest  representation, 
thereby already reflecting cross-border operations (or at least engagement with multiple 
registers). As such, the cost estimates cannot be used as a basis on which to calculate the 
cost savings because, in theory, they already reflect the identified synergies. 

The  summary  of  costs  and  benefits  in  Annex  3  therefore  provides  benefits  only  in  a 
qualitive way instead of a quantitative way.  

6.  Comparison of options and proportionality 

Criterion 

Key Questions 

Indicators/Methods for 
comparison 

Effectiveness 

Efficiency  

What would be the 
(quantitative and 
qualitative) effects of each 
option? 

Comparison of expected 
effectiveness of each policy 
option against the 
evaluation baseline 

Which policy option would 
be most effective in 
achieving the set 
objectives of the current 
initiative? 

Comparison of expected 
effectiveness of the policy 
options against each other; 

Identification of a preferred 
option, where possible. 

Comparison of potential 
costs and benefits borne by 
each stakeholder group 
under each policy option;  

Identification of a preferred 
option, where possible. 

What would be the 
incurred costs and benefits 
under each policy option? 

To what extent will the 
costs associated with the 
intervention be 
proportionate to the 
benefits it is expected to 
generate? 

How proportionate will be 
the costs of the 
intervention borne by 
different stakeholder 
groups, taking into account 

140 

 
 
Coherence 

Proportionality  

Identification of overlaps 
and/or synergies between 
policy options and relevant 
initiatives; 

 Identification of contrasts 
and/or discrepancies 
between policy options and 
relevant initiatives; 

Identification of a preferred 
option, where possible. 

Ensuring that the policy 
approach and its intensity 
match the identified 
problem/objective. 

the distribution of 
associated benefits? 

Which policy option would 
be most cost-effective? 

To what extent is each 
policy option coherent 
with other relevant EU 
initiatives?  

To what extent is each 
policy option coherent 
with wider EU policy?  

To what extent is each 
option is contributing to 
establish a coherent 
framework by reducing the 
legal fragmentation across 
Member States? 

Does the initiative go 
beyond what is necessary 
to achieve the 
problem/objective 
satisfactorily? 

Is the initiative limited to 
those aspects that Member 
States cannot achieve 
satisfactorily on their own, 
and where the Union can 
do better?   

Is the form of Union as 
simple as possible, and 
coherent with satisfactory 
achievement of the 
objective and effective 
enforcement? 

Does the initiative create 
unjustified financial or 
administrative cost for the 
Union, national 
governments, regional or 
local authorities, economic 
operators or citizens? Are 
these costs commensurate 
with the objective to be 
achieved? 

Does the Union action 
leave as much scope for 

141 

 
national decision as 
possible while achieving 
satisfactorily the objectives 
set? 

While respecting Union 
law, are special 
circumstances applying in 
individual Member States 
taken into account? 

The table in chapter 6 of the Impact Assessment should be read in vertical:  ‘++’ means 
positive impact of high magnitude compared to the baseline, ‘+’ means positive impact of 
moderate magnitude compared to the baseline, ‘0’ means neutral impact compared to the 
baseline, ‘-’ means negative impact of moderate magnitude compared to the baseline, ‘- -’ 
means  negative  impact  of  high  magnitude  compared  to  the  baseline,  ‘n.a’  means  not 
applicable. 

This table summarises the impacts of each the options with regard to both legislative and 
non-legislative measures considered. The table provides an overview of how the options 
compare.  The  corresponding  narrative  sections  provide  explanations  as  to  why  which 
option is considered better for each category. 

142 

 
 
 
 
Annex 5: Competitiveness check  

1.  Overview of impacts on competitiveness 

Dimensions of 
competitiveness 
Cost and price competitiveness 
Capacity to innovate 
International competitiveness 
SME competitiveness 

Impact of the initiative 
(++ / +/ 0 / - / --/ n.a.) 
+ 
0 
0 
+ 

References to sub-sections of 
the main report or annexes 
Sections 6.2.1.1, 6.2.1.2 & 6.2.1.3 
Section 6.2.1.2 
Section 6.2.4 
Section 6.2.1.2 

The  table  should  be  read  in  horizontally:  ‘++’  means  positive  impact  of  high  magnitude,  ‘+’  means 
positive  impact  of  moderate  magnitude,  ‘0’  means  neutral  impact,  ‘-’  means  negative  impact  of 
moderate magnitude, ‘- -’ means negative impact of high magnitude, ‘n.a’ means not applicable. 

2.  Synthetic assessment 

2.1. Cost and price competitiveness  

The  preferred  option  is  expected  to  have  a  positive  impact  on  the  competitiveness, 
innovation and investment in cross-border interest representation activities carried out on 
behalf of third countries by: 1) reducing the fragmentation of the regulatory environment 
in the internal market and providing legal certainty to concerned entities; 2) levelling the 
playing field through the elimination of diverging obligations for different types of entities 
carrying out similar activities and 3) reducing administrative costs for entities carrying out 
interest representation activities on behalf of third countries, in particular compliance costs, 
because the initiative would reduce the need for multiple registrations.  

The costs savings, better competitive environment, and the possibility to register in only 1 
Member  State  permitted  by  the  initiative  will  have  positive  effects  on  the  capacity  of 
concerned entities to expand beyond their Member State’s domestic market. 

It is to be noted nonetheless that some entities will only bear extra costs, in the case that 
they  were  operating  in  a  Member  State  which  did  not  have  any  rules  on  interest 
representation activities. 

2.2. Capacity to innovate  

The  preferred  options  would  only  provide  for  proportionate  (see  section  6.2.3) 
transparency requirements and would thus have no impact on the capacity to innovate of 
the entities falling within their scope. 

2.3. International competitiveness  

The preferred option is not expected to affect international competitiveness of EU entities 
carrying out interest representation activities.  

2.4. SME competitiveness  

The  proposed  obligation  to  maintain  updated  registration  would  involve  an  ongoing 
compliance  cost  which  could  affect  SMEs  proportionately  more  than  other  actors. 
However, other elements of the proposed initiative also will result in savings that can offset 
those costs, in particular thanks to the simplification of the rules and the elimination of the 
need for multiple registration when offering services across borders. Overall, the proposed 
measures  would  increase  cross-border  activity  for  SMEs,  which  would  have  the 
opportunity to scale up to operate at EU level.  

143 

 
 
 
Annex 6: Evidence of current and potential future 
fragmentation in the regulation of interest representation 
activities across the internal market 

This  annex  provides  an  overview  of  the  evidence  of  fragmentation  in  the  regulation  of 
interest  representation  activities  across  the  internal  market.  The  detailed  information 
contained in this annex has been extracted from the supporting study. The cut-off date is 
January 23. 

1.  Overview of transparency rules, obligations and national transparency registers 

on interest representation activities 

One of the drivers of the lack of transparency in interest representation activities carried 
out on behalf of third countries is the insufficient regulation of these activities at EU and 
Member State level.  

This  sub-section  first  provides  an  analysis  of  the  interest  representation  activities  rules 
applicable in the Member States, including information on available self-regulation and 
guidelines adopted by the authorities, as well as any information available on draft laws in 
the legislative pipeline of selected Member States (including for non-profit organisations). 
This  sub-section  also  specifies  to  what  extent  interest  representation  activities  rules  in 
Member States also apply to such activities when carried out on behalf of third countries. 
A  comparative  overview  of  national  transparency  registers  for  interest  representation 
activities  in  place  in  the  Member  States  is  then  provided.  Information  on  national 
monitoring and enforcement is then detailed. 

Overall,  national  rules  on  interest  representation  activities  vary  significantly  across  the 
Member  States.  While  some  Member  States  have  detailed  legislation  on  interest 
representation in place, others do not have any current or draft legislation.  

1.1. Member State legislation on interest representation activities 

While the laws of Member States do not contain specific rules on interest representation 
activities carried out on behalf of third countries, 16 Member States (BE, DE, EL, ES254, 
FR, FI, CY, LT, HU, IE, LU, MT255, AT, PL, RO256, SI) have legislation on interest 
representation activities in general, which is applicable by default to interest representation 
activities carried out on behalf of third countries. Transparency registers for lobbying exist 
in most of these Member States. The table below provides an overview (grouped by type 
of provision) of several common provisions found in Member State laws regulating interest 
representation. 

254  Regulated at regional level. 
255  While  relevant  provisions  are  found  in  various  laws,  these  are  not  specifically  addressed  to  lobbying  by  third 

countries and illegal activities specifically in the context of foreign influence lobbying are not defined. 

256  RO  does  not  currently  have  specialized  legislation  regulating  foreign  lobbying  activities,  but  it  does  have  some 

secondary legislation concerning lobbying (although this term is not specifically used). 

144 

 
 
Overview of some common provisions, grouped by type 

Provisions on interest representation 
Specific 
before 
representation activities 
Public national transparency register 

legal  obligation  to  register 
interest 

undertaking 

Reporting/declaration  requirements  for 
registrants 
Entry  restrictions 
decision-makers 

to  buildings  of 

Countries 
DE257, IE, EL, FR, LT, LU, AT, PL, RO258 

BE,  DE,  IE,  EL,  ES259,  FR,  IT,  LT,  LU, 
NL260, AT261, RO, SI 
CY262, LT263 

DE 

In Austria, lobbyists are obliged to register in the Lobby Register before taking up their 
activities264. The Lobby Law provides for a differentiated system according to the type of 
lobbyist/entity for registration in the Lobby Register, which is useful to detail265. 4 types 
of  lobbyists  (Types  A,  B,  C,  D  below)  are  foreseen  and  for  one  such  type,  different 
threshold were defined in practice266: 

•  A: Lobbying companies: a company whose business purpose includes taking on 
and fulfilling a lobbying mandate, even if it is not of a permanent nature. What is 
important is whether lobbying is part of its business and whether the company takes 
on lobbying assignments for a fee. This refers to lobbying assignments as defined 
in the Lobby Law, i.e. the direct, structured and organised exertion of influence on 
the public authorities. 

•  B: Companies that employ corporate lobbyists: Companies that do not use lobbying 
companies to represent their individual interests vis-à-vis the public authorities, but 
have this  task performed by their own bodies or employees.  Such employees or 
organs of the company are called corporate lobbyists by the Lobby Law.  

•  C: Self-governing bodies: a non-territorial self-governing body established by law 
or  ordinance  which  looks  after  professional  or  other  common  interests  of  its 
members, as well as an association of self-governing bodies which looks after these 
interests  nationwide 
(e.g.  various  chambers  of  commerce,  professional 
organisations and professional associations). The Lobby Law applies to such self-

257  Registration is mandatory only for those lobbyists who are contacting representatives of the DE Bundestag and/or 
DE Federal government. In addition to the mandatory requirement of registration, the Lobby Register Act contains 
a long list of those who may register voluntarily. 

258  There is no special transparency register related to  interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third 
countries  in  RO.  However,  there  is  a  Sole  Register  of  Interests  Transparency,  which  is  a  governmental  online 
platform (website) administered by the General Secretariat of the  RO Government, by means of which decision-
makers register their meetings with specialised groups who manifest, of their own initiative, their interest for a certain 
field falling under the prerogatives of the central and/or local public administration, for the purpose of promoting a 
public policy initiative. 

259  At the regional level. 
260  The Travel Register and The Register for Side Activities are public. 
261  However, access to data on clients of lobbyists and on principals of lobbyists is limited. 
262  Semi-annual reports. 
263  A lobbyist shall declare lobbying activities by submitting a declaration of transparent legislative processes for each 

draft legal act. 

264  ‘Federal  Act  on  Ensuring  Transparency  in  the  Exercise  of  Political  and  Economic  Interests  (Lobby  law)‘ 
(Bundesgesetz  zur  Sicherung  der  Transparenz  bei  der  Wahrnehmung  politischer  und  wirtschaftlicher  Interessen 
(Lobbying- 
at: 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=20007924. 

Interessenvertretungs-Transparenz-Gesetz 

LobbyG)), 

available 

2012, 

und 

– 

265  § 9 in conjunction with § 4 Lobby Law Vademecum to the Lobby Law (Section 6). 
266  Confirmed in interviews conducted with Austrian stakeholders. 

145 

 
 
governing bodies only to a limited extent (e.g. no sanctions may be imposed on 
their employees, such as an administrative fine if they misbehave in the context of 
interest representation, it is up to the respective chamber to take the appropriate 
measures). 

•  D: Interest groups: an association or contractual grouping of several persons whose 
activities  include  the  representation  of  common  interests  and  which  is  neither  a 
lobbying  firm  nor  a  self-governing  body.  The  representatives  (organs  or 
employees) of these associations are also interest representatives according to the 
Lobby  Law,  so  the  same  considerations  as  described  for  self-governing  bodies 
apply here.  

Total  exemptions  from  the  Lobby  Act  apply  to  political  parties  and  to  stakeholder 
association for example. The Act is not applicable to them if they have no employees, who 
are  predominantly  active  –  relative  to  their  annual  working  hours  –  as  interest 
representatives  in  this  field.  With  this,  the  legislature’s  intention  was  to  exempt  small 
associations267.  

Non-compliance  with  the  registration  requirement  is  an  offence  and  is  sanctioned  by 
administrative  penalties:  fine  of  up  to  EUR  20,000  may  be  imposed, in  cases  of  repeat 
violations even up to EUR 60,000.  

The  registration  obligations  are  also  ranked  in  relation  to  which  company  or  which 
institution performs the lobbying or the interest representation. Lobbying companies are 
subject  to  the  most  comprehensive  registration  obligations.  Registration  obligations  for 
companies with  in-house lobbyist  are less far-reaching. Registration obligations require 
only a minimum of data for self-governing bodies and private stakeholder  associations. 
Lobbying companies must communicate data on their lobbying contract: includes the name 
of their client with all key data and the task area agreed. 

The  Austrian  Court  of  Audit  (ACA)  presented  reports  on  the  lobby  register  in  2019268 
established that there were a lot of gaps in the register and inaccurate information and data 
was not  always up-to-date. A further point  being raised  was that not  all sections of the 
register were open to the public, only the contracting parties of a lobbying order as well as 
functionaries with whom a lobbyist could come into contact had the right to inspect the 
register  section  A2  (lobbying  orders  from  lobbying  companies).The  ACA  criticised  the 
fact that the responsible Ministry did not feel responsible for examining the informational 
value of the entries or to assess whether the obligation to register was fulfilled. No sanction 
imposed by the Ministry for those lobbyists who failed to comply with the obligation to 
register. 

In Belgium, actors who are directly or indirectly influencing parliamentarians can register 
in  the  Lobby  Register269.  However,  there  are  no  penalties  for  non-compliance  with  the 
registration requirement, as there is no obligation to register and it is done on voluntary 

267  ‘The  Austrian  Transparency  Act  2013  for  Lobbying  and  Interest  Representation’,  Austrian  Federal  Ministry  of 
https://www.bmj.gv.at/dam/jcr:99f2bda7-4e79-4e7d-8b10-

2014, 

Justice, 
available 
975c64cf0374/report_on_the_austrian_transparency_act2013.pdf. 

at: 

268  See note 252. 
269  Article 163ter du règlement de la Chambre des Représentants du 2 octobre 2003, Chapitre IIIter, Le register des 
lobbies (Article 163ter of Rules of the Belgian House of Representatives of 2 October 2003, Chapter IIIter. - The 
register 
at: 
lobbies), 
https://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/pdf_sections/publications/reglement/reglementFR.pdf.  These 
regulations  go 
beyond soft law rules of procedure because they are based on a constitutional provision on the exercise of the powers 
of the chambers. They are a source of public law published in the national gazette. 

available 

of 

146 

 
 
basis. It should be noted that Belgian MEPs are not required to mention their meetings with 
lobbyists. 

In  Cyprus,  a  law  adopted  in  2022270  regulates  the  participation  of  representatives  of 
interests (lobbyists) in public decision-making. However, interest representation activities 
carried  out  on  behalf  of  third  countries  is  not  distinguished  in  the  law.  All  interest 
representatives shall be registered in a Register of Lobbyists, although it is not accessible 
to the public. The Register is operated by the Independent Authority against Corruption. 
No  specific  threshold  is  set  for  the  registrants  to  declare  the  amount  of  remuneration 
received for lobbying services or any threshold for the amount of remuneration received 
for each client. The registrants are obliged to submit semi-annual reports to the Authority 
on  any  involvement  in  a  public  decision-making  process  that  took  place  during  the 
preceding 6 months. These reports shall contain, inter alia, data referring to the identity of 
the  client,  the  objective  of  the  lobbying  services,  the  timeline  for  the  provision  of  the 
services etc. 

The law also foresees several cases of offence. Particularly, the following are committing 
an offence: 

•  Any person that is involved in decision-making procedures and actions and is not 

registered with the Register271; 

•  Anyone registered with an untrue application272; 
•  A registered person that fails to report to the Authority273; 
•  Anyone who submits an untrue complaint before the Authority274. 

In addition, the Authority may impose an administrative fine of up to EUR 100,000 or to 
suspend or withdraw the registration of the registered lobbyist when the lobbyist commits 
an act or omission. This holds true regardless of whether the act or omission is punishable 
under the provisions of Law. 

In  Finland,  in  November  2023,  an  act  entered  into  force  which  aims  to  establish  a 
transparency register. The purpose of the Act is to improve the transparency of decision-
making and thereby prevent undue influence and to strengthen citizens’ trust. The Ministry 
of Justice is currently preparing to also update the Act on the Openness of Government 
Activities.  The Act lays down a registration obligation for private traders and legal persons 
engaged  in  advocacy  activities  and  related  advice  as  a  business.    Besides  that,  tnterest 
representation  is  currently  indirectly  regulated  to  some  extent  based  on  general 
legislation275. Particularly, provisions on administrative transparency are mainly laid down 
in  the  Act  on  the  Openness  of  Government  Activities.  Pursuant  to  this  Act,  a  public 
authority must, on request, provide information on public documents in its possession and, 
in some cases, proactively communicate them. In some cases, letters and e-mails sent and 
received by ministers, their political assistants and ministry officials may contain informal 
influence and, as documents held by public authorities, fall within the scope of the Act on 
the  Openness  of  Government  Activities  unless  they  are  internal  work  between  civil 
servants. 

270  Law No. 20(I) 2022, available at: http://www.cylaw.org/nomoi/enop/non-ind/2022_1_20/full.html. 
271  Subject to 1 year of imprisonment or a fine of up to EUR 10,000. 
272  Subject to 3 years of imprisonment or a fine of up to EUR 30 000. 
273  Imprisonment not more than 6 months or a fine not exceeding EUR 5 000. 
274  Imprisonment or fine. 
275  Such as the Civil Service Act, the framework formed by the Act on the Openness of Government Activities and the 
Administrative Procedure Act, as well as the administrative regulations, such as the guidelines for consultation on 
legislative drafting. 

147 

 
 
A registration requirement exists also in France, where, inter alia, interest representatives 
have to provide information on the resources devoted to interest representation activities. 
This platform is the Directory of the High Authority for the Transparency of Public Life 
(HATVP). 

A requirement to register with the Lobby Register exists also in Germany. Registration is 
mandatory  only  for  those  lobbyists  who  are  contacting  representatives  of  the  German 
Bundestag and/or German Federal government. In addition to the mandatory requirement 
of registration, the Lobby Register Act276 contains a long list of those who may register 
voluntarily. In addition, the entry into the Bundestag is limited for lobbyists: for instance, 
only the registered lobbyists with up-to-date data on the Register have the possibility to 
participate in public hearings of committees as respondents. The provision of incorrect or 
incomplete  information  at  registration,  the  failure  to  register  in  time  and  the  failure  to 
update the information are offences punishable by a fine. Notably, to ensure transparency 
in every contact with representatives of the German Bundestag or Federal government, in 
addition to disclosing their (or their principal’s) identity and request when interacting with 
the abovementioned public officials, lobbyists must indicate that they are registered in the 
lobby register and name the code of conduct on the basis of which they act. 

In Greece, there is an obligation for lobbyists to register with the National Transparency 
Authority’s (NTA) Register. The NTA has the power to conduct audits, adopt a code of 
conduct for the registered lobbyists, and investigate any complaints for potential violations. 
In case of violation, the NTA has the power to impose sanctions ranging from corrective 
action notices, to fines from EUR 5,000-20,000 or even suspension of the right to exercise 
lobbying activities and temporary/permanent exclusion from the Register. 

In Hungary, the sector was regulated by Act XLIX of 2006 on lobbying (which included 
provisions on a lobbying register). This was repealed and replaced in 2010 by Act CXXXI 
on  public  participation  in  the  preparation  of  legislation277.  The  act  regulates  ‘direct 
negotiations’.  In  this  framework,  the  minister  creates  ‘strategic  partnerships’  with 
organisations  ready  to  provide  reciprocal  cooperation  and  which  represent  wider  social 
interests. According to this act, the existence of such strategic partnerships must be public, 
while the written opinions/views of strategic partner organisations must be made public 
only  to  the  parliamentary  committee  responsible  for  the  legislative  proposal,  if  the 
committee requests it. Furthermore, a memo including the views of the strategic partner 
must be made for in-person  negotiations with  strategic partners. These memos  must be 
published  on  the  website  operated  by  the  Minister  of  Justice.  Nevertheless,  interest 
representation carried out on behalf of third countries is not mentioned in this act. 

In Ireland, the relevant legislation278 does not explicitly specify whether it is applicable to 
cases of foreign lobbying. Nonetheless, it should be noted that “communications by or on 
behalf of a country or territory other than the State” are “excepted communications” (i.e. 
are not deemed lobbying activities). The main gap left by the Act is the lack of regulation 
over the lobbying of Irish public officials taking place outside of Ireland279. Similarly to 

276  Vis-à-vis the German Bundestag and vis-à-vis the Federal Government (Lobby Register Act) (Gesetz zur Einführung 
eines  Lobbyregisters  für  die  Interessenvertretung  gegenüber  dem  Deutschen  Bundestag  und  gegenüber  der 
Bundesregierung 
http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/lobbyrg/BJNR081800021.html. 
277  Act  CXXXI  on  public  participation 

the  preparation  of 

(Lobbyregistergesetz 

legislation,  2010, 

-  LobbyRG)), 

available 

available 

2021, 

at: 

at: 

in 

https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=a1000131.tv. 

278  Regulation of Lobbying Act 2015, available at: https://revisedacts.lawreform.ie/eli/2015/act/5/revised/en/html. 
279  The counterargument to this has been that the onus should be on the lobbyists to register their activities. However, 
that cannot be enforced when the lobbying takes place outside of the territory of Ireland. Therefore, regulating this 

148 

 
 
 
the  abovementioned  Member  States,  Ireland  also  has  a  Register  of  Lobbying,  where 
lobbyists are obliged to register before carrying out lobbying activities. 

The Register is available free of charge on a website (save for personal data) maintained 
or  used  by  the  Standards  in  Public  Office  Commission  (SIPO),  which  establishes  and 
maintains the Register. According to an interview conducted with SIPO, the system works 
with 2,400 registrants at the moment. 

In addition, under the Lobbying Act of 2015, the following are considered offences: 

•  Failing to register as a lobbyist; 
•  Failing to make a return by the deadline; 
•  Providing SIPO with inaccurate or misleading information; 
•  Failing to co-operate with an officer who is investigating possible contraventions; 
•  Obstructing an investigation; 
•  Committing these offences can result in a fine or imprisonment of up to 2 years. 
The  Lithuanian  legislation280  contains  general  restrictions  on  lobbying  (albeit  not 
specifically on foreign lobbying). Particularly, only persons on the List of Lobbyists shall 
have the right to carry out lobbying activities. Moreover, a lobbyist shall declare lobbying 
activities  by  submitting  a  declaration  of  transparent  legislative  processes  for  each  draft 
legal act. Therefore, lobbying activities shall be considered illegal if (i) a lobbyist has failed 
to declare lobbying activities or (ii) a person, who is not on the List of Lobbyists, carries 
out lobbying activities. The Register is available publicly (in Lithuanian) on the website of 
the Chief Official Ethics Commission. Lobbying activities in violation of the requirements 
of the Law on Lobbying Activities shall be punishable by a fine of EUR 1000-4500281. 

In Luxembourg, any legal or natural person representing a third party or mandated by a 
third party and acting on behalf of the latter or for himself or herself wishing to contact 
Members  with  a  view  to  influencing  in  any  way  their  legislative  work  or  the  decision-
making process of the Chamber of Deputies (Lower House of the Parliament) must, prior 
to any organised contact, register on the transparency register which is published on the 
Chamber’s website  (available to  the public). Without  such registration, there can be no 
organised contact with Members to influence their legislative work or the decision-making 
process of the Lower House. 

While  there  is  no  specific  legislation  on  lobbying  in  Malta,  relevant  provisions  can  be 
found in various laws. Trading in influence is a criminal offence under Article 121A of the 
Criminal  Code.  Moreover,  the  General  Elections  Act  expressly  provides  for  undue 
influence as one type of corrupt practice under the Act. The Standards in Public Life Act 
provides  for  the  appointment  of  a  Commissioner  for  Standards  in  Public  Life  and  a 
Standing Committee on Standards in  Public Life with  power to  investigate breaches of 
statutory or ethical duties of categories of persons in public life matters. The Act applies 

gap would require placing the onus on the public officials, which was not agreed upon by the legislators. In these 
situations,  “international  lobbyists  are  merely  encouraged  to  disclose  such  information,  without  any  legal 
obligations.”  See  M  Reilly,  ‘What  the  Irish  Regulation  of  Lobbying  Act  2015  has  failed  to  tackle’  Regulating 
Lobbying,  available  at:  https://sites.google.com/view/regulating-lobbying/home/work-of-colleagues/the-curious-
case-of-international-lobbying. However, guidance has been adopted to address this issue: see “How does the Act 
apply 
link: 
https://www.lobbying.ie/media/6262/frequently-asked-questions-june.pdf.  

take  place  outside  of 

Ireland?”,  available  at 

to  communications 

following 

that 

the 

280  Law Amending the Law on Lobbying Activities No. VIII-1749 of the Republic of Lithuania, 2020, available at: 

https://vtek.lt/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/EN_Law_on_Lobbying_Activities_2021.docx. 

281  Article  14(1)(2) of  the  Law on Lobbying  Activities of the  Republic of Lithuania,  available  at:  https://vtek.lt/wp-

content/uploads/2021/06/EN_Law_on_Lobbying_Activities_2021.docx. 

149 

 
 
to members of the House of Representatives including Ministers, Parliamentary Secretaries 
and Parliamentary Assistants and ‘persons of trust’ (Article 3(1) of the Act). A ‘person of 
trust’ is defined in Article 2 of the Act as: any employee or person engaged directly from 
outside the public service and the public sector to act as consultant or staff in the private 
secretariat of a Minister or a Parliamentary Secretary; or a person engaged when a post 
remains vacant following repetitive public calls for engagement; or a person who has been 
engaged by a Minister or Parliamentary Secretary as a person of trust. 

In Poland, the Exercise of Legislative Initiative by Citizens Act stipulates that a committee 
may not  cover the expenses related to  the exercise of a legislative initiative with  funds 
(and, accordingly, non-monetary values) coming from: 

•  natural persons not residing in the territory of the Republic of Poland, excluding 

Polish citizens residing abroad; 
foreigners residing in the territory of the Republic of Poland; 
legal persons not residing in the territory of the Republic of Poland; 

• 
• 
•  other  entities  not  domiciled  in  the  Republic  of  Poland,  capable  of  undertaking 

• 
• 

obligations and acquiring rights on their own behalf; 
legal persons with foreign participation; 
foreign  diplomatic  representations,  consular  offices,  special  missions  and 
international  organisations,  as  well  as  other  foreign  representations  enjoying 
diplomatic  and  consular  immunities  and  privileges  under  agreements,  laws  or 
commonly established international customs. 

The Lobbying Act282 stipulates that a public register of entities performing professional 
lobbying activity is kept in the law-making process. Professional lobbying activity may be 
carried out after obtaining an entry in the register. 

In  Romania,  there  is  secondary  legislation  concerning  lobbying.  Particularly,  there  are 
minimum  transparency  rules  concerning  the  recommended  framework  of  cooperation 
between decision-makers at the level of central and local public administration authorities 
and interested persons in civil society and specialized groups for the purpose of promoting 
public policy initiatives. In addition, the Sole Register of Interests Transparency (Registrul 
unic al transparenţei intereselor, RUTI) is the relevant transparency register for lobbying. 

In Slovenia, lobbying is regulated by strict provisions in the Integrity and Prevention of 
Corruption Act. Foreign lobbying is allowed in Slovenia on the condition that the lobbyist 
is registered in the Register of Lobbyists. The Register is maintained by the Commission 
for the Prevention of Corruption. Notably, the persons lobbied may agree to have contact 
with  the  lobbyist  only  after  verifying  whether  the  lobbyist  is  entered  in  the  register  of 
lobbyists. If, during contact with a particular lobbyist, a conflict of interest arises on the 
part  of  the  person  lobbied,  the  person  lobbied  shall  refuse  any  further  contact  with  the 
lobbyist.  At  every  contact  with  a  lobbyist,  the  person  lobbied  shall  make  a  record 
containing detailed information about the lobbyist. 

Spain does not currently have legislation at state level. However, at regional level, some 
Spanish regions have regional rules regulating the “activity of interest groups.” 

1.2. National obligations on intermediaries in the context of interest 

representation activities 

282  Act of 7 July 2005 on lobbying activities in the law-making process (OJ 2005 No. 169, item 1414, i.e. OJ 2017 No. 

248), available at: https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WDU20051691414. 

150 

 
 
There are no rules directly focused on the role of intermediaries in the context of lobbying. 
However, 3 Member States’ laws (DE, IT, FI) mention intermediaries that can be relevant 
to lobbying. In Germany, as noted earlier, the Lobby Register Act contains a list of actors 
who may register voluntarily in the Register. This list includes “intermediary organisations 
in foreign cultural and educational policy, insofar as they are institutionally supported with 
funds from the (German) Federal budget.” In Finland, the Accounting Act and the Auditing 
Act  read  together  with  the  Act  on  the  Prevention  of  Money  Laundering  and  Terrorist 
Financing can contain obligations for intermediaries in certain cases. Similarly, the anti-
money laundering legislative framework in Italy imposes obligations on intermediaries283. 

1.3. Draft laws/proposals on interest representation activities 

According to the supporting study, in January 2023, draft legislation related to lobbying 
was in discussion in 11 Member States (BE, BG, CZ, IE, ES, IT, LV, MT, NL, PL, SK).  

The fourth edition of the Rule of Law Report issued by the Commission in July 2023 also 
contains information on recent development on the regulation of lobbying activities in the 
Member States. 

More information is provided in Annex D of the supporting study. 

1.4. Draft laws/proposals on transparency on (foreign) funding of non-profit 

organisations 

According to the supporting study, in January 2023, specific regulations were considered 
on transparency on (foreign) funding of non-profit organisations in the Netherlands and 
Poland. Since then, other Member States (SK and HU) have announced new measures.  

More information is provided in Annex D of the supporting study. 

1.5. Codes of conduct on interest representation activities 

Codes of conduct on lobbying are available in 11 Member States (DE, IE, ES, HR, LV, 
MT, NL, AT, RO, SI, FI). These codes are adopted by public authorities or by private 
entities. An overview is provided in the table below, with further details provided in the 
text. 

Overview of codes of conduct in Member States based on the adopting entity 

Adopting entity 
Codes  of  conducts  adopted  by  public 
authorities  (including  codes  contained  in 
laws and orders of public authorities) 

Member States 
DE, IE, ES284, MT, NL, RO, FI. 

283  The legislative framework includes Legislative Decree No. 231 of November 21, 2007, most recently amended by 
Legislative Decree No. 125 of October 4, 2019, and the relevant implementing provisions issued by the Minister of 
Economy and Finance, the Financial Intelligence Unit for Italy, and the sector supervisory authorities. 

284  At the regional level in Valencia. 

151 

 
 
Adopting entity 
Codes 
conducts 
organisations / companies 

of 

adopted 

by 

Member States 
DE285, AT286, HR287, LV288, SI289 

The Austrian legislation requires that each lobbying company or a company that engages 
lobbyists  to  adopt  its  own  code  of  conduct.  Every  company  registered  in  the  lobbying 
register should have such a code that should be available on its website. These codes of 
conduct include a range of due diligence rules for lobbyists towards politicians. 

In  Croatia,  lobbying  organisations  are  often  registered  as  consulting  companies  or 
business advisors. In this light, it should be noted that some consultants have registered 
with the Croatian Chamber of Commerce as the ‘Association of Business advisors’, which 
includes some lobbying organisations. The Chamber has issued a Catalogue of Advisory 
Services,290 which contains a Code of Ethics in business. However, this document does not 
contain guidelines in respect of (foreign) funding. 

The self-regulation of lobbing in Finland is mostly sectoral and voluntary. Meanwhile, the 
Code  of  Conduct  for  civil  servants  and  persons  entrusted  with  top  executive  functions, 
which consolidates existing guidelines, was published in May 2021291.  

The  Lobby  Register  Act  in  Germany  requires  that  the  Bundestag  and  the  Federal 
government, with civil society, prepare and adopt a code of conduct for lobbyists. This 
Code was  adopted in June 2021  and has been in force since 1 January 2022.  It  largely 
reiterates the provisions of the Lobby Register Act. In addition to this, some companies 
and associations also have internal codes of conduct for lobbying activities292. Moreover, 
some companies are members of the German Association of Policy Consulting293, which 
has its own code of conduct294, and participating companies adhere to this code295. 

In Ireland, the Standards in Public Office Commission has adopted a Code of Conduct296, 
which sets out several principles by which persons carrying out lobbying activities should 
govern  themselves.  The  Code  of  Conduct  elaborates  on  the  principles  in  separate 
sections/chapters297 and should apply to all communications with persons in public office. 

285  Some companies are members of the German Association of Policy Consulting, which has its own code of conduct, 

and participating companies adhere to this code. 

286  Each lobbying company or a company that engages lobbyists is required to adopt its own code of conduct. 
287  Some of the lobbying organisations which are formed as consultants are registered with the Croatian Chamber of 
Commerce. The Chamber has issued a Catalogue of Advisory Services, which contains a Code of Ethics in business, 
although does not contain guidelines in respect of (foreign) funding. 

288  Some organisations have such codes but may have not  addressed how to engage with public officials in terms of 

participation in decision-making processes. 
289  Lobbyist organisations can adopt codes of ethics. 
290  Catalogue of Advisory Services, Croatian Chamber of Commerce, available at https://www.hgk.hr/documents/hgk-

katalog-savjetodavnih-usluga-zajednice-poslovnih-savjetnika-drugo-izdanje596737316fb04.pdf. 

291  Code of Conduct for administration, available at: https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/handle/10024/163089. 
292  Examples  include  the  law  firm  Taylor  Wessing  (https://www.taylorwessing.com/de/about-us/lobbyregister-
deutschland),  the  association  of  real  estate  industry  ZIA  Central  Real  Estate  Committee  (https://zia-
deutschland.de/project/verhaltenskodex-des-zia-im-rahmen-des-lobby-und-transparenzregisters/), 
the 
multinational 
(https://www.bayer.com/de/nachhaltigkeit/unsere-richtlinien-fuer-
verantwortungsbewusste-interessenvertretung). 

company 

Bayer 

and 

293  De'ge'pol - Deutsche Gesellschaft für Politikberatung e.V. 
294  Code of Conduct, available at: https://www.degepol.de/ethik-t. 
295  For example, the bank ING (https://www.ing.de/ueber-uns/menschen/positionen/). 
296  Standards in Public Office Commission, ‘Code of Conduct for persons carrying on lobbying activities’, published in 
2018 and in force from 1 January 2019, available at: https://www.lobbying.ie/media/6119/code-of-conduct-english-
final-version-for-web.pdf. 

297  These principles are: 1. Demonstrating respect for public bodies; 2. Acting with honesty and integrity; 3. Ensuring 
accuracy of information; 4. Disclosure of identity and purpose of lobbying activities; 5. Preserving confidentiality; 

152 

 
 
 
Among their obligations on identification, the lobbyists also “must not conceal or try to 
conceal  the  identity  of  a  client,  business  or  organisation  whose  interests  they  are 
representing.”  Moreover,  a  person  carrying  out  lobbying  activities  should  always  the 
elected or appointed public official of any personal interests they may have in the matter. 
In  addition,  Chapter  6  on  the  principle  of  avoiding  improper  influence  stipulates  that  a 
person  who  is  carrying  out  lobbying  activities  should  not  “seek  to  create  a  sense  of 
obligation on the part of the elected or appointed official by making any offer of gifts or 
hospitality.” Moreover, such a person should not seek to influence an elected or appointed 
public official “other than by providing evidence, information, arguments and experiences 
which support their lobbying activities.” 

In  Latvia,  most  organisations  currently  lack  applicable  codes  of  conduct/ethics,  while 
many  of  those  that  do  have  such  codes  have  not  addressed  how  to  engage  with  public 
officials in terms of participation in decision-making processes. 

The First and Second Schedules to the Maltese Standards in Public Life Act contain Codes 
of  Ethics  applicable  to  members  of  the  House  of  Representatives  and  to  Ministers, 
Parliamentary Secretaries and Parliamentary Assistants respectively. The codes, inter alia, 
(i) prohibit  members  of  the  House  of  Representatives  to  receive  any  remuneration  or 
compensation for their work, except for their official remuneration, (ii) prohibits them from 
using any improper influence, threats or undue pressure in the course of their duties, (iii) 
prohibits Ministers, Parliamentary Secretaries and Parliamentary Assistants from putting 
themselves  in  a  position  of  being  influenced  by  a  financial  obligation  or  otherwise  of 
persons  or  organizations  that  try  to  do  so,  or  making  improper  use  of  information  that 
comes  to  their  knowledge  because  of  their  office  to  give  undue  advantage  to  someone 
whilst  disadvantaging  others,  (iv)  prohibits  acceptance  of  any  decoration  from  foreign 
countries, except with the Prime Minister’s permission. 

In  the  Netherlands,  the  sector  of  lobbying  is  regulated  by  the  Code  of  Conduct  for 
Members of the House of Representatives298, which in Rules 1 and 2 states that in their 
relations with lobbyists, “members should always be aware of their independent position 
and the duties that the Constitution assigns to them.” The Rules also state that although for 
some degree of information lobbyists are important, “a degree of distance must always be 
maintained from lobbyists. A member must therefore refrain from making promises in the 
event of an offer from a lobbyist (not being information) about certain actions.” Notably, 
foreign trips paid for in whole or in part by lobbyists are also deemed offers. The Code 
stresses that a lobbyist “should be understood broadly” and may include “not only persons 
working for lobbying firms, but also others who approach a Member of Parliament to stand 
up for particular interests.” Furthermore, Members of the House of Representatives “must 
declare their outside activities and income, interests that can reasonably be regarded as 
relevant, foreign travel whose transportation and accommodation expenses were paid in 
whole  or  partially  paid  by  third  parties,  including  lobbyists,  and  gifts  and  benefits  that 
exceed an amount of EUR 50 in excess299”. 

In addition, a Code of Conduct for the Senate obliges Senate Members to “guard against 
improper  influence”  and  maintain  transparency  when  engaging  with  third  parties.  The 
explanation to Article 3 of the Code specifically stipulates that “Members of the Senate 
are  expected  to  be  transparent  about  their  contacts  with  third  parties,  including  foreign 

6.  Avoiding  improper  influence;  7.  Observing  the  provisions  of  the  Regulation  of  Lobbying  Act;  and  8.  Having 
regard to the Code of Conduct. 

298  Code  of  Conduct  for  Members  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  rules  of  conduct  1  and  2,  available  at: 

https://www.tweedekamer.nl/sites/default/files/atoms/files/gedragscode_leden_-_maart_2021.pdf. 

299  See note 298, rule of conduct 3. 

153 

 
 
entities.” The explanation, however, adds that not all such contacts must be registered and 
made  public,  justifying  the  lack  of  a  lobby  register  (called  “active  disclosure”  in  the 
explanation) by the lack of feasibility due to the large number of contacts maintained by 
the Members. Nonetheless, “if asked, members should disclose what contacts they have 
had  with  third  parties  regarding  certain  files”  (called  “passive  disclosure”  in  the 
explanation). 

It should be noted that a gift register is established “in which members shall record gifts 
received by them in their capacity as members of the Chamber with a value greater than 
EUR 50, not later than1 week after receiving the gift300”. This register should be available 
for inspection by anyone. 

Lastly, there is a Handbook for government officials, also called the “blue book301” which 
stipulates that for a period of 2 years after their resignation, former ministers and  other 
government officials are not allowed to lobby employees of their former ministry on behalf 
of a company, semi-public organisation or a lobbying organisation representing interests 
in the former minister’s policy area. 

The  largest  professional  association  for  lobbyists  in  the  Netherlands,  the  Professional 
Association for Public Affairs302, has its own Code of Conduct, which contains rules of 
conduct regarding transparency, integrity, and conflicts of interest. The government calls 
on lobbyists to  join and acknowledge this Code  of Conduct303. The Code applies to  all 
members of the Association, is public and reviewable. Nonetheless, it should be noted that 
it does not contain rules related to interest representation activities carried out on behalf of 
third countries specifically. 

In Romania, Order no. 1056/2022 of the General Secretariat of the Romanian Government 
also  includes,  in  its  Annex  2,  a  code  of  conduct  for  specialized  groups  participating  in 
meetings with decision-makers. It includes transparency, ethics and responsibility rules to 
be respected by specialised groups in their relations with decision-makers304. 

In Slovenia, Article 57 of the Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act305 gives lobbyist 
organisations  the  right  to  adopt  codes  of  professional  ethics.  They  summarise  the 
provisions of the Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act or uphold, in very general 
terms, the importance of integrity and prevention of corruption in Slovenia. 

At the regional level  in  Spain, the region  of Valencia  regulates lobbying by, inter alia, 
setting out a code of conduct that interest groups must meet306. 

1.6. Guidelines on interest representation activities/ interest representation 

activities carried out on behalf of third countries 

300  Code of Conduct for Senate Integrity, article 3, available at: https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0042225/2019-06-11. 
301  Handbook 
at: 
available 
the 
https://open.overheid.nl/repository/ronl-a594769961105e6f150dc7b2726729961fa404ec/1/pdf/handboek-voor-
bewindspersonen.pdf. 

government 

paragraph 

officials, 

6.2.2, 

book, 

blue 

for 

or 

302  In Dutch, ‘Beroepsvereniging voor Public Affairs’ (BVPA). 
303  3559 Questions by the members Van Baarle (DENK) and Sneller (D66) to the Minister of Internal Affairs on the 
report that the Netherlands would fall far behind with rules for lobbyists would fall far behind (submitted May 28, 
2021), available at: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/ah-tk-20202021-3559.pdf. Reply by Minister Ollongren 
(Internal Affairs) (received July 13, 2021). 

304  Example of these rules are: the obligation to declare their interests, objectives and purposes and to clarify who are 
the clients or members that they represent in the meeting; the obligation not to obtain or to seek to obtain information 
or to persuade public decision-makers by the use of illicit means. 

305  Text in English available at:  https://www.kpk-rs.si/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2021/03/ZintPK-ENG-3.pdf). 
306  Article  12  of  Law  25/2018,  of  10  December,  regulating  the  activity  of  interest  group  groups  of  the  Region  of 

Valencia, available at: https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-2019-967. 

154 

 
 
Only Estonia and France have Guidelines adopted by public authorities which to some 
extent  are  relevant  for  the  transparency  interest  representation  activities.  In  2021,  the 
Estonian government adopted the document on “Good Practice in Communicating with 
Lobbyists for Official307”. According to the Good Practice, “information on the meetings 
that have taken place is published on the websites of authorities on a quarterly basis.” In 
contrast, in Denmark, the access to diaries/calendars of Ministers in office is specifically 
exempt from the right to access to information308. In France, the only relevant guidelines 
on the topic are the ones issued by the High Authority for the Transparency of Public Life 
(HATVP) on the Directory of Interest Representatives. 

1.7. Member States with no regulation of the issue 

4 Member States (DK, HR, PT, SE) do not have legislation, self-regulation or guidelines 
related to lobbying.  

In Croatia, there is no draft law as of November 2023. However, the Croatian Association 
of  Lobbyists  is  hoping  that  a  law  will  be  adopted  in  the  course  of  2023.  The  lack  of 
regulation  of  the  topic  and  the  lack  of  transparency  has  been  raised  as  a  concern  from 
various  sides  in  Denmark.  A  draft  legislation  was  proposed  in  Portugal  in  2018309. 
However since then the Parliament was dissolved in 2022 and the proposal was left aside, 
with  no discussions  on it  as of  November  2023. Lobbying  generally is  not  regulated in 
Sweden, save for recent rules imposing quarantine on ministers and secretaries of state to 
work in the private sector310. Calls for introducing a transparency register for lobbying in 
the country are regularly dismissed in the name of the freedom of opinion. 

2.  Transparency registers related to interest representation activities 

This  sub-section  provides  a  comparative  analysis  of  transparency  registers  related  to 
interest  representation  activities,  taking  into  consideration  specific  rules  on  interest 
representation  activities  carried  out  on  behalf  of  third  countries.  More  precisely,  the 
analysis  focuses  on  Member  State  rules  on  reporting  and  due  diligence  requirements 
towards  interest  representatives  as  well  as  on  required  thresholds  for  transparency 
registers. Applicable monitoring rules and sanctions for non-compliance are also analysed. 
Similarities  and  divergences  across  Member  State  rules  are  discussed.  The  below  table 
provides a brief overview of the most significant findings under this sub-chapter. 

Overview of main findings regarding transparency registers 

related 

Transparency register approaches 
15  Member  States  with  transparency 
register 
interest 
representation  
(No  Member  State  with  transparency 
register  specifically  related  to  interest 
representation  activities  carried  out  on 
behalf of third countries)  

to 

Countries 
BE, CY, DE, IE, EL, ES, FR, IT, LT, LU, 
NL, AT, RO, SI, FI. 

of 

Estonia 

307  Good Practice in Communicating with Lobbyists for Officials, Approved by the decision of the Government of the 
Republic 
at: 
18 
https://www.korruptsioon.ee/sites/www.korruptsioon.ee/files/elfinder/dokumendid/good_practice_in_communicati
ng_with_lobbyists_for_officials_0.pdf. 
308  § 22 of the Act on Access to Information. 
309  Available at: https://www.parlamento.pt/ActividadeParlamentar/Paginas/DetalheIniciativa.aspx? BID=43223. 
310  The Act on Restrictions for Ministers and Secretaries of State to take up positions in the Private Sector 2018:676. 

available 

March 

2021, 

of 

155 

 
 
 
Transparency register approaches 
8  Member  States  with  mandatory 
transparency registers  

Countries 
DE, ES, FR, CY, LU, NL, AT, RO 

2.1. Scope of transparency registers 

12 Member States (BG, CZ, DK, EE, HR, LV, HU, MT, PL, PT, SK, SE) do not have a 
transparency register covering interest representation activities and/or do not have specific 
rules on interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries.  

15 Member States (BE, DE, IE, EL, ES, FI, FR, IT, CY, LT, LU, NL, AT, RO, SI) have 
a  form  of  transparency  register  in  place  to  monitor  interest  representation  activities. 
Belgium has a transparency register at federal level, and not on the level of its regions and 
communities. Spain has transparency registers in place only in  certain regions311, but a 
draft national level law is in the legislative pipeline312. 

The  scope  of  rules  related  to  transparency  registers  in  the  Member  States  where  such 
transparency registers exist show some similarities. 

The actors required to register are usually formulated in general terms (DE, IE, ES, IT, 
CY,  LT,  LU,  RO,  SI).  In  other  words,  natural  and  legal  persons  conducting  lobbying 
activities have an obligation to register themselves as lobbyists (sometime national laws 
refer to lobbyists as interest representatives). In 5 Member States (BE, IE, FR, NL, AT) 
more precise rules exist on the personal scope for registering: 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

In  Austria:  4  types  of  lobbyists  (Types  A,  B,  C,  D  as  explained  above)  are 
obliged to register; 
In Belgium, the Rules of the House of Representatives specify the entities that 
are obliged to  register. The list  includes, for example, specialised law firms, 
NGOs and think tanks; 
In  France,  the  Act  on  Transparency,  Action  against  Corruption  and 
Modernisation  of  Economic  Life  (Law  Sapin  II)  lays  down  that  interest 
representatives  must  register.  The  law  defines  who  can  be  regarded  as  an 
interest  representative  (for  example,  certain  actors  under  the  Commercial 
Code); 
In Ireland, different groups of lobbyists are required to register (interest body, 
advocacy  body,  professional  lobbyist,  any  person  communicating  about  the 
development or zoning of land); 
In the Netherlands, 3 groups are defined who need to register in the public 
register  of  lobbyists:  public  affairs  and  public  relations  employees;  agency 
representatives of CSOs; and representatives of municipalities and provinces. 
At this point, it is noted that further registers exist for parliamentarians, namely 
a  travel  register  (for  example  it  includes  information  on  who  bore  the 
accommodation costs of a certain trip), a register of side activities (for example 
includes  information  on  income  of  ancillary  activities  exercised  by  a 
parliamentarian) and gift registers for the House of Representatives and for the 

311  In the following regions: Aragon, Asturias, Castilla-La Mancha, Catalonia, Madrid, Navarre and Valencia.  
312  Draft  Law  on 

in 
https://www.hacienda.gob.es/Documentacion/Publico/NormativaDoctrina/Proyectos/Ley-Transparencia-Ley-NT8-
11-22-1.pdf. 

the  Activities  of  Interest  Groups,  available  at: 

the  Transparency  and  Integrity 

156 

 
 
 
 
Senate (includes information on gifts of parliamentarians received from third 
parties). 

No Member State legislation with a transparency register in force distinguishes between 
domestic  and  foreign  lobbyists.  The  existing  rules  apply  to  interest  representatives 
regardless  of  their  domestic  or  foreign  nature  and  no  specific  provisions  applicable  to 
interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries exist. Similarly, 
Member State laws do not require registrants to distinguish between sources of domestic 
or foreign origin. 

Furthermore, the definition of lobbying activities varies by Member State. The common 
denominator  is  that  lobbying  activities  cover  activities  aimed  at  influencing  public 
decision-making  processes.  3  Member  States  (DE,  LU,  NL)  have  a  more  restrictive 
approach,  as  they  narrow  down  the  regulation  of  lobbying  activities  to  the  scope  of 
contacting members of the government and/or the parliament. 

2.2. Registration process and IT solution used 

In 8 Member States (DE, ES313, FR, CY LU, NL, AT, RO) with an existing transparency 
register, registering for lobbyists is mandatory (as mentioned earlier, this is primarily an 
obligation for the state authorities in Romania). It should be noted that Germany keeps the 
option for voluntary registration for certain actors (e.g. for religious communities). In 2 
Member States (BE, IT) registration is voluntary.  

Information  regarding  the  IT  solutions  used  for  the  registration  process  is  limited  in  3 
Member States (EL, ES, CY). 

In most Member States with a transparency register for lobbying activities, the registration 
of  interest  representatives  takes  place  online,  through  a  website.  An  exception  is  the 
Netherlands, where lobbyists wishing to be registered in the transparency register need to 
pick up a form at the State Passes Service Desk of the House of Representatives (these 
forms then can be submitted after they are filled out and the data provided is made publicly 
available online). In the other Member States, where the registration is online, the websites 
for registering are operated by various bodies: 

• 

• 
• 

In  3  Member  States  (BE,  DE,  LU),  the  website  is  maintained  by  the  (federal) 
parliament; 
In 3 Member States (IT, AT, RO) the website is maintained by the government; 
In  6  Member  States  (IE,  EL,  FR,  CY,  LT,  SI)  the  website  is  maintained  by  a 
certain state body (e.g. by the National Transparency Authority in Greece). 

As part of the registration process, most Member States require a specific online form (or 
questionnaire)  to  be  filled  out  and  submitted,  accessible  on  the  website.  However,  in  2 
Member States (LU, RO) specific rules are in place: 

• 

In Luxembourg, registration can take place once a lobbyist has sent an email with 
relevant data requesting registration to the Chamber of Deputies. The Chamber of 
Deputies  operates a specific email  address314 for such requests. An Excel  file is 
accessible on the website of the parliament, which contains specific information on 
registered lobbyists. 

313  In Valencia, mandatory registration for interest groups contacting regional administration. 
314  The request must be sent to the following email address: registredetransparence@chd.lu 

157 

 
 
• 

In  Romania,  the  registration  process  is  in  inverse  compared  to  other  Member 
States.  This  means  that  decision-makers  must  administer  contacts  prior  to  a 
meeting with lobbyists into the online transparency register (RUTI), the platform 
operated by the government. Lobbyists are obliged to provide necessary data to the 
state representatives. 

Moreover, as part of the IT solution, 4 Member States (DE, IE, IT, LT) require the creation 
of an account on their website before registering. In 7 Member States (BE, EL, FR, CY, 
LU, NL, AT) an account is not required to complete the registration process. 

In addition, 3 Member States (FR, RO, SI) have more detailed provisions related to the 
registration process: 

• 

• 

• 

In France, lobbyists must complete registration no later than  2 months after the 
date the entity meets the conditions to be regarded as an interest representative; 

In Romania, registration by the authorities in the RUTI must be completed at least 
48 hours before the meeting with lobbyists takes place. 

In Slovenia, following an application by the interest representative, the authority 
(Commission for the Prevention of Corruption) sends a confirmation form to the 
applicant,  which  must  be  returned  by  the  lobbyist  within  8  days.  Following  the 
receipt of the application form, the authority makes a decision within 15 days. A 
fee is charged for the entry into the transparency register. 

2.3. Data required 

In terms of data required for transparency registers, Member States with such an instrument 
in force show similarities. 

The most recurring data required by transparency registers are the following: 

•  12 Member States (BE, DE, IE, EL, FR, IT, LT, LU, NL, AT, RO, SI) require 

identification data of interest representatives (e.g. name of the lobbyist). 

•  10 Member States (BE, DE, IE, EL, FR, IT, LT, LU, AT, SI) oblige lobbyists to 
provide information on the policy field in which they pursue interest representation 
of clients. 

•  8 Member States (BE, DE, EL, FR, IT, LU, NL, AT) request specific information 

on the client represented by the lobbyist (e.g. name of the client).  

•  5  Member  States  (DE,  ES315,  FR,  IT,  AT)  ask  for  information  on  the  (annual) 
budget/expenditure from entities conducting lobbying activities, while SI requests 
information on payments received from interest groups for each matter concerned.  

No  data  is  available  on  what  type  of  information  should  be  provided  in  Cyprus  when 
registering. 

Beyond these similar rules, 5 Member States (DE, FR, AT, RO, SI) have specific rules on 
types of data necessary to be included in their transparency registers: 

315  In regions of ES with a transparency register, interest representatives must provide financial information. However, 

in Valencia, data specifically on received funding is required. 

158 

 
 
• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

In Austria, legislation differentiates 4 types of lobbyists (lobbying company acting 
on behalf of others; lobbying company acting in their own interest; interest group; 
self-governing body) which provide different data when registering. For example, 
lobbying  companies  need  to  declare  their  turnover  and  the  number  of  their 
contracts,  while  interest  groups  and  self-governing  bodies  need  to  share 
information on their total budget for lobbying (certified by an auditor). 

In  Germany,  individual  donations  and  grants  from  the  public  sector  exceeding 
EUR 20,000, as well as individual gifts from third parties over EUR 20,000 are to 
be  announced  by  lobbyists.  In  addition,  data  on  the  number  of  employees  of  a 
lobbyist is necessary to add into the register. 

In France, expenditure related to interest representation activities must be provided 
(broken down by human and financial resources mobilised for lobbying activities). 
The expenses must be communicated by indicating various ranges (e.g. expenses 
between EUR 10,000 and EUR 25,000). Furthermore, information on all interest 
representation actions aimed at influencing decision-making need to be forwarded, 
as well as data on the number of staff employed annually. 

In  Romania,  the  authority  registers  information  related  to  meetings  between 
lobbyists and authorities, including the date and format of the meeting, as well as 
names of all the participants in such a meeting. 

In Slovenia, data on the amount of payment received from interest groups must be 
provided by the lobbyist (in case lobbying activities are part of a service contract, 
the  value  of  the  contract  must  be  stated).  Furthermore,  certain  provisions  exist 
regarding  foreign  lobbyists.  On  the  one  hand,  foreign  lobbyists  must  hand  in 
officially translated documents for the registration to  be  approved. On the other 
hand, foreign natural persons acting as lobbyist can be registered, if proven (with 
an extract from the transparency register) that they act in the interest of a registered 
lobbying entity (except if they are an employee or legal representative of an interest 
group). 

The data of transparency registers on lobbying is made public on websites of Member State 
authorities in most Member States (BE, DE, IE, ES, FR, IT, LT, LU, NL, AT, RO, SI). 
In 2 Member States (EL, CY), the data is not publicly available. In the Member States 
where transparency registers are publicly accessible, certain restrictions exist. In Austria, 
data related to clients of lobbyists is limited. In Germany, some pieces of personal data in 
the register are not public. In Slovenia, the tax ID number of lobbyists is not accessible. 

2.4. Applicable thresholds for registration 

Concerning applicable thresholds, 10 Member States (BE, IE, EL, ES, CY, LT, LU, NL, 
RO, SI) do not have such thresholds in place. In the remaining 5 Member States (DE, IE, 
FR, NL, AT), various rules on thresholds are in place. The thresholds are either purely 
financial (FR, NL) or it is based on non-financial thresholds such as frequency of contacts, 
the  number  of  employees,  or  the  time  dedicated  to  lobbying  activities.  These  types  of 
thresholds are presented below: 

• 

In Austria, what is interesting to note is that applicable thresholds differ according 
to the type of lobbyist: 

o  The Act  provides  a  threshold  for  company  lobbyist:  When  determining 
whether an employee, including directors, board etc, is a corporate lobbyist, 

159 

 
lobbying must be “more than minor duty” which was defined as more than 
5% of the total working time. 

o  For advocacy groups, 1 employee has to spend at least 15% of their time 
conducting  lobbying  activities  (it  must  be  an  employee  of  the  advocacy 
group, not e.g., its president). 

• 

In  Germany,  legislation  lays  down  that  in  case  a  certain  condition  is  met,  the 
obligation to register is established. These thresholds are non-conjunctive (i.e. if1 
of the 4 stands, the obligation is present). 2 out of 4 obligations are related to the 
frequency of lobbying activity (lobbying is carried out regularly, or carried out on 
a permanent basis). Another condition that can create the obligation is when the 
lobbying activity has a commercial nature. Also, a lobbyist must be registered in 
case  such  activity  was  conducted  with  50  different  contacts  in  3  consecutive 
months.  This  last  condition  ensures  that  the  registration  obligation  is  not 
circumvented by non-regular or non-permanent activities. Furthermore, as already 
mentioned on the previous page, financial thresholds to provide data on individual 
donations,  grants  and  gifts  exceeding  a  certain  amount  exist  in  German  federal 
legislation. 

• 

In  France,  financial  thresholds  exist  in  relation  to  turnover  to  be  declared  and 
annual  expenditure.  The  range  for  turnover  is  to  be  declared  indicating  an 
approximate,  between  various  ranges  (indicated  in  increments),  as  mentioned 
earlier under the previous sub-heading.  

• 

In Ireland, persons who are carrying on lobbying activities are required to register, 
if they meet all the following conditions: 

o  They  are  communicating  either  directly  or  indirectly  with  a  “Designated 

Public Official”; and 

o  That communication is about “a relevant matter”; and 

o  That communication is not specifically exempted; and 

o  They are one of the following: 

▪  An  employer  with  more 

than  10  employees  where 

the 

communications are made on the employer’s behalf. 

▪  A representative body with at least 1 employee communicating on 
behalf  of  its  members  and  the  communication  is  made  by  a  paid 
employee or paid office holder of the body. 

▪  An advocacy body with at least 1 employee that exists primarily to 
take up particular issues and a paid employee or paid office holder 
of the body is communicating on such issues. 

▪  A professional lobbyist being paid to communicate on behalf of a 
client  (where  the  client  is  an  employer  of  more  than  10  full  time 
employees or is a representative body or an advocacy body which 
has at least1 full-time employee). 

• 

In  the  Netherlands,  the  gift  register  for  the  Members  of  the  House  of 
Representatives includes a specific threshold. According to rules, gifts exceeding 
the value of EUR 50 must be registered, specifying the nature of the gift, the price 
of the gift and the person providing the gift. 

3.  Monitoring and enforcement of national transparency registers 

160 

 
In this sub-chapter, monitoring practices and enforcement rules in Member States with a 
transparency  register  in  place  are  outlined.  Lobbying  carried  out  on  behalf  of  third 
countries  is  not  addressed  by  any  Member  State,  neither  for  monitoring,  nor  for 
enforcement rules. A raft law in Spain316 would introduce a mandatory public transparency 
register, which would be complemented by monitoring and enforcement rules. 

In  9  Member  States  (IE,  EL,  ES317,  FR,  IT,  CY,  LT,  SI,  FI)  the  national  register  is 
supervised  by  an  independent  authority.  In  the  6  other  Member  States  that  have  a 
transparency  register,  3  (LU,  AT,  RO)  tasked  their  government  with  this  tasked  and  3 
tasked their parliament (BE, DE, NL). 

3.1. Monitoring 

2 Member States (BE, IT) with existing transparency registers lack rules on monitoring 
and enforcement in this regard. 11 Member States (DE, EL, ES318, FR, CY, LT, LU, NL, 
AT, RO, SI) implement monitoring and enforcement regimes, which differ in strictness. 

Several Member States have introduced reporting obligations. On the one hand, 3 Member 
States (FR, CY, SI) oblige lobbyists to report periodically (e.g. annually) on their activities 
involving public decision-making. On the other hand, 4 Member States (LT, LU, RO, SI) 
oblige parliamentarians and/or public officials to inform the competent authority on their 
contacts with lobbyists. Additionally, in Slovenia, clients of lobbyists must also provide 
details related to lobbying activities to the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption. 

2 Member States (DE, NL) have established rules on an access protocol into the premises 
of their respective parliaments. In other words, unregistered lobbyists do not receive the 
necessary pass to enter parliament. These measures also aim to ensure that lobbyists keep 
their registered data updated. 

In Greece, the National Transparency Authority has the power to conduct audits and create 
codes of conducts for registered lobbyists as part of their monitoring system.  

3.2. Enforcement 

In terms of enforcement, currently 5 Member States (DE, IE, EL, CY, LT) have sanctions 
in place for non-compliance with registering rules. Fines as a form of sanctions are applied 
by all aforementioned Member States, while suspension or removal from the transparency 
register is present as an enforcement measure in 2 Member States (DE, EL). In addition, 
in  Ireland,  offences  to  registration  rules  (as  detailed  previously)  can  result  in  an 
imprisonment of up to 2 years. 

316  A draft law (‘Draft Law on the Transparency and Integrity in the Activities of Interest Groups’) at national level is 
at: 

under 
https://www.hacienda.gob.es/Documentacion/Publico/NormativaDoctrina/Proyectos/Ley-Transparencia-Ley-NT8-
11-22-1.pdf. 

discussion, 

available 

317  Catalonia. 
318  Solely on regional level. 

161 

 
 
 
Annex 7: Analysis of administrative fines and thresholds for 
information requests 

This  Annex  provides  explanations  on  the  proposed  pecuniary  sanctions  and  thresholds  for 
requests for additional information by supervisory authorities set out in the preferred policy 
option.  

1.  Administrative fines 

To  determine  the  figures  for  the  amounts  of  the  administrative  fines  proposed  under  the 
preferred policy option, the following methodology was used.  

First, figures for the average turnover per entity  were obtained from the Eurostat Structural 
Business  Statistics  (SBS)  annual  detailed  enterprise  statistics  for  services  for  NACE  code 
M70.21 on “Public relations and communication activities”. 

Second, benchmarks from percentage figures based on other recent EU regulatory instrument 
were compared to existing pecuniary sanctions regime in Member States. In the table below, 
the figures of 2% and 4% of global turnover are the maximum fines for different types of GDPR 
violations, while 1% and 6% are the maximum fines for different types of DSA violations. Data 
on existing maximum fine amounts in Member States is provided where possible, along with 
approximate equivalents in proportion of turnover.  

Lastly, the benchmark retained was that of the penalties under Article 52(3) of the DSA which 
relates to failures to comply with transparency requirements, namely, penalties of “1% of the 
annual  income  or  worldwide  turnover”  for  “for  the  supply  of  incorrect,  incomplete  or 
misleading  information,  failure  to  reply  or  rectify  incorrect,  incomplete  or  misleading 
information and failure to submit to an inspection”. 

162 

 
 
Member 
State319 

EU-27 
Ireland 
Germany 
Spain 
Luxembourg 
Austria 
Finland 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Cyprus 
Sweden 
Malta 
Italy 
Slovakia 
Croatia 
Portugal 
Slovenia 
France 
Romania 
Poland 
Latvia 
Hungary 
Greece 
Lithuania 
Bulgaria 

TABLE 1: Benchmarks for administrative fines 

Average 
turnover 
per entity 
(EUR million) 

Existing maximum 
fines (EUR) 

Amounts 

Equivalent in 
proportion of 
turnover (approx.) 

Proposed fines (EUR) – Proportion of turnover 

0.25% 

0.50% 

1% 

2% 

4% 

6% 

140,809.83 
627,505.33 
540,219.95 
334,015.00 
286,956.52 
223,833.33 
220,481.93 
219,701.25 
211,414.21 
205,000.00 
167,768.40 
150,000.00 
132,224.44 
130,769.23 
128,070.18 
124,046.92 
103,875.97 
97,159.05 
95,218.72 
85,797.81 
76,712.33 
68,002.84 
62,115.38 
57,541.19 
39,108.91 

- 
25,000 
50,000 
300,000320 
- 
60,000 
- 
- 
- 
100,000 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
100,000 
15,000321 
- 
12,000 
- 
- 
20,000 
4,500 
- 

- 
4% 
10% 
10% 
- 
25% 
- 
- 
- 
50% 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
10% 
1.5% 
- 
15% 
- 
- 
30% 
8% 
- 

352.02 
1,568.76 
1,350.55 
835.04 
717.39 
559.58 
551.20 
549.25 
528.54 
512.50 
419.42 
375.00 
330.56 
326.92 
320.18 
310.12 
259.69 
242.90 
238.05 
214.49 
191.78 
170.01 
155.29 
143.85 
97.77 

704.05 
3,137.53 
2,701.10 
1,670.07 
1,434.78 
1,119.17 
1,102.41 
1,098.51 
1,057.07 
1,025.00 
838.84 
750.00 
661.12 
653.85 
640.35 
620.23 
519.38 
485.80 
476.09 
428.99 
383.56 
340.01 
310.58 
287.71 
195.54 

1,408.10 
6,275.05 
5,402.20 
3,340.15 
2,869.57 
2,238.33 
2,204.82 
2,197.01 
2,114.14 
2,050.00 
1,677.68 
1,500.00 
1,322.24 
1,307.69 
1,280.70 
1,240.47 
1,038.76 
971.59 
952.19 
857.98 
767.12 
680.03 
621.15 
575.41 
391.09 

2,816.20 
12,550.11 
10,804.40 
6,680.30 
5,739.13 
4,476.67 
4,409.64 
4,394.03 
4,228.28 
4,100.00 
3,355.37 
3,000.00 
2,644.49 
2,615.38 
2,561.40 
2,480.94 
2,077.52 
1,943.18 
1,904.37 
1,715.96 
1,534.25 
1,360.06 
1,242.31 
1,150.82 
782.18 

5,632.39 
25,100.21 
21,608.80 
13,360.60 
11,478.26 
8,953.33 
8,819.28 
8,788.05 
8,456.57 
8,200.00 
6,710.74 
6,000.00 
5,288.98 
5,230.77 
5,122.81 
4,961.88 
4,155.04 
3,886.36 
3,808.75 
3,431.91 
3,068.49 
2,720.11 
2,484.62 
2,301.65 
1,564.36 

8,448.6 
37,650.33 
32,404.20 
20,640.90 
17,217.39 
13,430.01 
13,228.92 
13,182.09 
12,684.84 
12,300.00 
10,066.11 
9,000.00 
7,933.47 
7,846.14 
7,684.20 
7,442.82 
4,155.04 
5,829.54 
5,713.11 
5,147.88 
4,602.75 
4,080.18 
3,726.93 
3,452.46 
2,346.54 

319  Data on turnover was not available in CZ, EE and NL. 
320  In ES, pecuniary sanctions only exist at regional level. 
321  In FR, the sanctions amounts provided are of criminal nature, as in they are the highest amounts possible. Figures for all other Member States concern administrative sanctions. 

163 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.  Thresholds for information requests 

As  part  of  the  risk-based  approach  set  forth  in  the  preferred  policy  option,  thresholds  are 
proposed in order to allow supervisory authorities to request records kept by entities carrying 
out interest representation activities on behalf of third countries.  

The thresholds are as follows:  

•  The first threshold sets that supervisory authorities will be able to request information 
to an entity if it received more than EUR 1 000 000 from a single third country entity 
in the preceding financial year. 

•  The  second  thresholds  establish  that  Supervisory  authorities  will  be  able  to  request 
information  to  an  entity  if  it  carries  out  interest  representation  activities  for  a  third 
country entity whose action can be attributed to a third country that has spent a EUR 1 
500 000 on interest representation in a Member State or EUR 8 500 000 in the Union 
as a whole in 1 of the last 5 years. 

•  The  third  threshold  is  a  de  minimis  to  exclude  entities  that  received  an  aggregate 

remuneration of less than EUR 25 000 in the preceding financial year.  

The figures for the first and third thresholds are based on the data coming from the annual 
costs for entities in the EU Transparency Register (EU TR) whose head office is located outside 
the Union and who “Promote their own or collective interests”. Limitations in the data of the 
EU TR did not permit to provide further detail, e.g. per sector or policy area. As detailed in the 
table  below,  the  first  threshold,  at  EUR  1  000  000,  permits  to  cover  the  top  3.58%  largest 
entities with enhanced information disclosure requirements (see below highlighted in green). 
The third thresholds, de minimis, at EUR 25 000 permits to exclude from the scope the 36.21% 
smallest entities which carry out only very limited amounts of interest representation activities 
on behalf of third countries (see below highlighted in orange). 

164 

 
 
 
 
TABLE 2: EU TR – Annual costs of entities whose head office is outside the 
Union and that “Promote their own or collective interests” 

Brackets of reported annual costs 
(EUR) 

Number 
of 
entities 

Proportion 
of entities 
(in %) 

Cumulated 
proportion of 
entities 
(approx., in 
%) 

0.00 – 0.00 
0.00 – 10,000.00 
10,000.00 – 24,999.00 
25,000.00 – 49,999.00 
50,000.00 – 99,999.00 
100,000.00 – 199,999.00 
200,000.00 – 299,999.00 
300,000.00 – 399,000.00 
400,000.00 – 499,999.00 
500,000.00 – 599,999.00 
600,000.00 – 699,999.00 
700,000.00 – 799.999.00 
800,000.00 – 899,999.00 
900,000.00 – 999,999.00 
1,000,000.00 – 1,249,999.00 
1,250,000.00 – 1,499,999.00 
1,500,000.00 – 1,749,999.00 
1,750,000.00 – 1,999,999.00 
2,000,000.00 – 2,249,999.00 
2,250,000.00 – 2,499,999.00 
2,750,000.00 – 2,999,999.00 
3,000,000.00 – 3,499,999.00 
4,000,000.00 – 4,499,999.00 
4,500,000.00 – 4,999,999.00 
5,000,000.00 – 5,499,999.00 
6,000,000.00 – 6,499,999.00 
6,500,000.00 – 6,999,999.00 
Total 

29 
321 
146 
133 
171 
171 
117 
64 
55 
33 
27 
22 
14 
18 
14 
13 
1 
4 
2 
4 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1,370 

2.12 
23.43 
10.66 
9.71 
12.48 
12.48 
8.54 
4.67 
4.01 
2.41 
1.97 
1.61 
1.02 
1.31 
1.02 
0.88 
0.07 
0.29 
0.15 
0.29 
0.22 
0.15 
0.15 
0.07 
0.07 
0.07 
0.07 
- 

2.12 
25.55 
36.21 
45.92 
58.40 
70.88 
79.54 
84.09 
88.10 
90.51 
92.48 
94.09 
95.11 
96.42 
97.44 
98.32 
98.39 
98.68 
98.83 
99.12 
99.34 
99.45 
99.64 
99.71 
99.78 
99.85 
99.92 
100 

With regard to the second thresholds, as explained in the problem definition chapter, no data 
currently exists as to how much third countries spend on interest representation activities in the 
EU. It is therefore difficult to estimate at which pecuniary amount to draw to line. The only 
closest possible benchmark that could be used is that from the FARA portal for 2020. However, 
this approach suffers from several limitations: (i) The market in the US is vastly different and 
amounts spent in interest representation activities tend to be much higher, and (ii) FARA covers 
a broader set of activities than the EU TR (for example, it includes spending by embassies, as 
well  as  spending  on  broadcast  and  media  content  which  are  excluded  from  both  the  EU 
Transparency Register). 

165 

 
 
 
 
Nonetheless,  the  table  below  shows  the  total  amount  spent  on  so-called  ‘core’  interest 
representation services under FARA322 by a selected set of countries in 2020, as well as the 
total  amounts  they  reported  under  FARA  that  same  year.  These  figures  were  used  as  a 
benchmark  to  help  the  definition  of  the  second  thresholds.  Among  the  11  selected  third 
countries under the US FARA, the average amount spent by the selected third countries in 2020 
in the US was USD 12,090,456.12, which is equivalent to EUR 11 284 730.04. Because the 
EU economy was approximately 25% smaller than that of the US in 2020323, a factor of 25% 
was applied to this amount, leading to a threshold of EUR 8 463 547.53324. This figure was 
then approximated to EUR 8 500 000.  

TABLE 3: Lobbying costs reported under US FARA 

Selected 3rd Country  

Canada  
Russia  
Morocco  
Iraq  
South Korea  
Japan  
China  
UAE  
Turkey  
Qatar  
Saudi Arabia  
Average across selected 3rd 
countries 

Total amounts 
reported under FARA 
in 2020325 

 USD 12,602,960.45  
USD 45,320,532.84  
USD 4,090,941.91  
USD 3,413,684.68  
USD 31,051,235.52  
USD 37,434,911.22  
USD 58,840,168.30  
USD 26,230,546.06  
USD 24,803,996.99  
USD 53,748,327.60  
USD 40,175,849.53  
USD 33,771,315.41 

Total amounts spent on core interest 
representation services in 2020 

USD 1,244,662.12  
USD 2,992,033.28  
USD 3,149,269.29  
USD 3,383,533.79  
USD 3,805,698.95  
USD 4,943,798.86  
USD 16,941,737.95  
USD 17,949,480.51  
USD 21,101,502.22  
USD 22,507,594.28  
USD 34,975,746.10  
USD 12,090,456.12 

Lastly, the threshold at EUR 1 500 000 was obtained by dividing the EU-wide EUR 8 500 000 
threshold by the share of GDP of each Member State. This results in the figures in the table 
below.  The  Commission  decided  to  use  as  a  benchmark  the  resulting  thresholds  of  France, 
rounded to the nearest 100 000 above. It is important to note that this is an initial threshold that 
it will be possible to modify via a Delegated Act after the entry into force of the legislative 
instrument once more data is available on the phenomenon of interest representation activities 
carried out on behalf of third countries. Setting a high bar at first permits to scope in fewer 
entities and reduce risks of overburdening.  

322  Core  interest  representation  services  in  the  FARA  system  relate  to  the  following  categories:  “Legal  and  Other 

Services/Lobbying”, “Lobbying”, “Public Relations”, “U.S. Policy Consultant”. 

323  According to World Bank data for 2020, the US nominal GDP was of USD 20,893,746 bn, and that of the EU was of USD 
15,292,101 bn, making the EU’ economy approximately 25% smaller than that of the US. Figures available at the following 
link: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?most_recent_value_desc=true.  

324  EUR 11,284,730.04*0.75= EUR 8,463,547.53 
325  For countries like China or Russia, the vast majority of the total spending reported under FARA falls into activities which 
are covered by FARA but that would not fall into the scope of the preferred option, such as “Broadcast spent in broadcast 
services etc.”, hence the drops in amounts. 

166 

 
 
 
 
TABLE 4: Thresholds for information requests based on individual 
Member States’ portions of EU GDP 

Member State  Percentage of EU GDP 

(nominal)326 

Possible 
thresholds (EUR) 

Germany  
France  
Italy  
Spain  
Netherlands  
Poland  
Sweden  
Belgium  
Ireland  
Austria  
Denmark  
Romania  
Czechia  
Finland  
Portugal  
Greece  
Hungary  
Slovakia  
Bulgaria  
Luxembourg  
Croatia  
Lithuania  
Slovenia  
Latvia  
Estonia  
Cyprus  
Malta  

24.46  
16.72  
12.08  
8.41  
5.96  
4.14  
3.53  
3.49  
3.18  
2.83  
2.37  
1.81  
1.75  
1.69  
1.51  
1.32  
1.07  
0.68  
0.53  
0.49  
0.43  
0.42  
0.37  
0.25  
0.23  
0.17  
0.11  

2,164,100  
1,421,200  
1,026,800  
714,850  
506,600  
351,900  
300,050  
296,650  
270,300  
240,550  
201,450  
153,850  
148,750  
143,650  
128,350  
112,200  
90,950  
57,800  
45,050  
41,650  
36,550  
35,700  
31,450  
21,250  
19,550  
14,450  
9,350  

326  Figures  from:  ‘Percentage  share  of  the  European  Union’s  Gross  Domestic  Product  (GDP)  in 2022,  by  member  state’, 

Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1373419/eu-gdp-percentage-share-member-state-2022/.  

167 

 
 
Annex 8: Fundamental rights impact 

1.  Right to private life and the right to the protection of personal data 

All 3 policy options impose limited restrictions on the right to private life (Article 7 of 
the Charter) and the right to the protection of personal data (Article 8 of the Charter), 
insofar as they require that entities keep and provide certain information to the national 
authorities  and  provide  access  for  the  public  to  a  part  of  that  information  which  might 
include personal data. The legislative policy options (PO2.1 and PO2.2) provide in addition 
for the exchange of such information among competent national authorities. 

As noted by the Court, provisions imposing or allowing the communication of personal 
data such as the name, place of residence or financial  resources  of natural  persons to  a 
public authority must be characterised as an interference in their private life and therefore 
as a limitation on the right guaranteed in Article 7 of the Charter, without prejudice to the 
potential justification of such provisions. The same is true of provisions providing for the 
dissemination  of  such  data  to  the  public327.  Furthermore,  the  Court  has  considered  that 
making personal data available to the public in a manner that such data are accessible to a 
potentially  unlimited  number  of  persons  constitutes  a  serious  interference  with  the 
fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter328. 

However, as also stated by the Court, fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of 
the Charter are not absolute rights, but must be considered in relation to their function in 
society. These rights may be restricted if such restriction is provided by law, it respects the 
essence of these rights and if it is strictly necessary and proportionate in relation to the 
objective of general interest recognised by the European Union. In this regard, Article 8(2) 
of the Charter requires that personal data must be processed for specified purposes and on 
the basis of consent or some other legitimate interest laid down by law329.    

For all 3 policy options, by providing for citizens’ access to information on entities active 
in the internal market carrying out interest representation activities carried out on behalf 
of third countries, as well as the third country entities they represent, seek to ensure that 
citizens,  public  officials  and  stakeholders,  like  journalists  and  CSOs,  can  exercise  their 
democratic scrutiny while knowing with which entities they themselves, or their elected 
representatives, may be confronted with. As voters, citizens are important decision-makers 
in their own right, and as such, they can be the target for certain interest representation 
activities.  

All 3 policy options enhance the integrity of, and public trust in, the EU’s and Member 
States’  democratic  institutions  by  ensuring  the  transparency  of  interest  representation 
activities carried out on behalf of third countries, and by improving the knowledge about 
the magnitude, trends and actors of interest representation activities carried out on behalf 
of third countries (see sections 6.2.2.1 and 6.2.2.2)330. The CJEU has recognised that the 
objective  consisting  in  increasing  transparency  is  an  overriding  reason  in  the  public 

327  See, to that effect, judgments of the Court of Justice 20 May 2003, Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others, C‑465/00, 
C‑138/01 and C‑139/01, EU:C:2003:294, paragraphs 73 to 75 and 87 to 89; of 9 November 2010, Volker und Markus 
Schecke and Eifert,  C‑92/09 and C‑93/09, EU:C:2010:662, paragraphs 56 to 58 and 64; and of 2 October 2018, 
Ministerio Fiscal,  C‑207/16, EU:C:2018:788, paragraphs 48 and 51). 

328  Judgment of the Court of Justice of 22 November 2022, Luxembourg Business Registers, joined cases C-37/20 and 

C-601/20, EU:C:2022:912, paragraphs 42 to 44. 

329  See note 328, paragraphs 45 to 63 and the case-law cited. 
330  See note 182, paragraph 105. 

168 

 
 
 
 
interest331.The aim pursued by the 3 policy options therefore constitutes an objective of 
general interest that is capable of justifying interferences with the fundamental rights 
enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter in line with Article 52 thereof. 

Furthermore, the seriousness of the interference with the fundamental rights enshrined in 
Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter should be balanced against the importance of the objective 
of general interest of ensuring that citizens can exercise their right of democratic scrutiny 
while knowing with which entities they themselves, or their elected representatives, may 
be confronted with. It must be noted that, in contrast with the situation that gave rise to the 
judgment  in  Luxembourg  Business  Registers  concerning  the  general  public’s  access  to 
information  on  beneficial  ownership,  ensuring  transparency  of  activities  affecting 
democratic decision-making is a priority for all citizens, and not just a matter for public 
authorities. 

All  3  policy  options  provide  for  public  access  to  a  clearly  defined  and  limited  set  of 
information,  which  excludes  information  that  is  not  adequately  related  to  the  purposes 
pursued. As a result, making publicly available information that is so related does not in 
any way undermine the essence of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Articles 7 and 
8 of the Charter332. 

Public access to information on interest representation activities carried out on behalf of 
third countries is appropriate for contributing to the attainment of the objective of general 
interest  pursued,  since  the  public  nature  of  that  access  and  the  increased  transparency 
resulting  therefrom  contribute  to  the  creation  of  an  environment  of  greater  democratic 
scrutiny and accountability.  

All  3  policy  options  provide  for  public  access  to  a  proportionate,  clearly  defined  and 
limited  set  of  information,  which  excludes  information  that  is  not  absolutely  needed  to 
reach the purposes pursued. The limitations on the right to private life and the right to the 
protection of personal data, genuinely meet a general interest recognised by the EU, 
and are proportionate and limited to the minimum necessary.  

In particular, in the legislative policy options (PO2.1 and PO2.2), the set of data to be made 
available  to  the  public  is  limited  to  what  is  necessary  to  improve  knowledge  about  the 
magnitude,  trends,  and  actors  of  interest  representation  carried  out  on  behalf  of  third 
countries333. It  is  clearly and exhaustively  defined  and fully harmonised throughout  the 
EU.  In  addition,  the  personal  data  made  publicly  available  is  limited  to  the  minimum 
required for citizens to be informed about the entity carrying out interest representation 
and the activity carried out on behalf of third country entities. Information of relevance 
only to the competent national authorities, supervising and monitoring compliance with 
those options, would not be made publicly available, to safeguard against the risks of abuse 
of the information provided. 

In addition, the legislative policy options (PO2.1 and PO2.2), beyond fully harmonising 
the set of data to be made public, provide for additional and specific safeguards by enabling 
entities  to  request  that  all  or  part  of  the  information  gathered  for  the  purpose  of  the 
transparency requirement is not made public based on an overriding interest. 

The requirement in PO2.2 that entities falling within the scope of the risk-based approach 
is required to automatically share all of their records with the supervisory authorities could 

331  See note 125, paragraph 79. 
332  See note 328, paragraphs 51 to 52. 
333  See section 5.3.2.1 for details on the information to be made public. 

169 

 
 
go beyond what is necessary to ensure the transparency of interest representation activities 
carried out on behalf of third countries. 

2.  Freedom of Association 

The fundamental right to freedom of association is guaranteed both under Article 12 of 
the  Charter  and  Article  11  of  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  to  all 
associations, including CSOs, interest groups, trade unions and political parties.  

Careful consideration is being given to the potential spill over effect of the measures and 
unintended  negative  consequences  for  the  operation  of  CSOs,  which  are  operating  in  a 
shrinking civic space. 

The  2022  FRA’s  report334  highlights  that  in  2020,  15%  CSOs  faced  legislations  on 
transparency  and  lobby  laws  negatively  affecting  their  freedom.  Examples  of  burden 
include  costly  registration  procedures  and  disproportionate  transparency  regulations335. 
Moreover, the risk of such laws being abused arises when laws prohibit CSO registration, 
allow their dissolution, or criminalise CSO membership, for example, on the basis of a lack 
of adherence to democratic values.  

The  Hungarian  Transparency  Act  (Law  No  LXXVI  of  2017)  introduced  restrictions  on 
financing of civil organisations. The law applied indiscriminately to any financial support 
from  any  other  Member  State  or  any  third  country336.  Among  other  requirements,  it 
required CSOs to systematically present themselves to the public as ‘organisation in receipt 
of support from abroad’, thereby creating a climate of distrust towards them, apt to deter 
natural or legal persons from other Member States or third countries from providing them 
with financial support337. 

Following an infringement  procedure initiated by the Commission, the Court of Justice 
ruled  that  by  adopting  the  legal  provisions  in  question,  which  impose  obligations  of 
registration,  declaration  and  publication  on  certain  categories  of  CSOs  directly  or 
indirectly receiving support from abroad exceeding a certain threshold and which provide 
for  the  possibility  of  applying  penalties  to  organisations  that  do  not  comply  with  those 
obligations,  Hungary  introduced  discriminatory  and  unjustified  restrictions  on  foreign 
donations  to  CSOs,  in  breach  of  its  obligations  under  Article  63  TFEU  on  the  free 
movement of capital and Articles 7, 8 and 12 of the Charter338. 

Outside the EU, countries have put in place legislation with the objective of restricting or 
controlling  CSO  activities.  The  Russian  Regulation  of  the  Activities  of  Non-profit 
Organisations Performing the Functions of a Foreign Agent, adopted in 2012 and amended 
in 2022 has been used to stigmatise and significantly limit the rights of different groups of 
society,  including  CSOs,  unregistered  public  associations,  media  outlets,  journalists, 
activists and human rights defenders339. Other attempts to enact laws aiming to scrutinize 
the  work  of  CSOs  receiving  support  from  abroad  include  the  Georgian  draft  law  on 
transparency  of  foreign  influence  and  the  Republika  Srpska’s  draft  law  on  the  Special 

334  ‘Fundamental  Rights  Report  2022’,  European  Union  Agency  for  Fundamental  Rights,  available  at: 

https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2022/fundamental-rights-report-2022-fra-opinions.  

335  See also the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the 2023 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation 
in the European Union (COM(2023) 800 final). 

336  See note 125, paragraph 82. 
337  See note 125, paragraph 58. 
338   See note 125. 
339 Judgment of the ECtHR, Ecodefense v. Russia, see note 188. 

170 

 
 
 
Register and Transparency of the Work of the non-profit organisations340, which have been 
condemned by the EU341. 

Freedom  of  association  constitutes  one  of  the  essential  pillars  of  a  democratic  and 
pluralistic society, in as much as it allows citizens to act collectively in fields of mutual 
interest and to contribute to the proper functioning of public life342. Associations must be 
able to pursue their activities, operate without unjustified interference, and obtain resources 
to support their operations. The Court considers that legislation which renders significantly 
more  difficult  the  action  or  operations  of  associations,  whether  by  strengthening  the 
requirements in relation to their registration, by limiting their capacity to receive financial 
resources,  by  imposing  obligations  of  declaration  and  publications  such  as  to  create  a 
negative  image  of  them  or  by  exposing  them  to  the  threat  of  penalties,  in  particular  of 
dissolution, is to be classified as a limitation to the freedom of association343.  

The  examined  policy  options  are  limited  to  ensuring  transparency  regarding  interest 
representation  activities  carried  out  on  behalf  of  third  country  entities  and  seeking  to 
influence decision-making processes in the EU. They do not affect as such the possibility 
for  entities  to  carry  out  these  activities  (with  the  exception  of  PO2.2).  However, 
transparency requirements could have a spill over effect on other activities of CSOs for 
instance their advocacy work. 

While imposing transparency obligations, which may be considered as having an impact 
on  the  effective  enjoyment  of  the  right  to  freedom  of  associations  –  in  as  much  as  the 
requested organisations would have to comply with the registration/reporting obligations 
and  pay  the  related  costs  –  all  3  policy  options  do  not  affect  the  essence  of  that  right. 
Moreover, with specific regard to the right to seek for funding and resources, none of the 
policy options ban foreign funding. 

All 3 policy options enhance the integrity of, and public trust in, the EU’s and Member 
States’  democratic  institutions  by  ensuring  the  transparency  of  interest  representation 
activities carried out on behalf of third countries, and by improving the knowledge about 
the magnitude, trends and actors of interest representation activities carried out on behalf 
of third countries (see sections 6.2.2.1 and 6.2.2.2)344. The CJEU has recognised that the 
objective  consisting  in  increasing  transparency  is  an  overriding  reason  in  the  public 
interest345. All  3  policy options meet the objective of general  interest, in light  of the 
principles of openness and transparency, which must guide the democratic life of the Union 
in  accordance  with  the  second  paragraph  of  Article  1  and  Article  10(3)  TEU  and  in 

340  According  to  Republika  Srpska’s  draft  law,  foundations  as  well  as  foreign  and  international  non-governmental 
organisations receiving any form of foreign funding or other assistance of foreign origin would be designated as 
“Non-profit organisations” (hereinafter “NPOs”). This draft law would prohibit NPOs from carrying out political 
activities, requiring them to register in a special registry and all their published materials to include the mark “NPO”, 
and to submit additional reports compared to those already required by the existing legal framework. NPOs would 
also be subject to an additional legal regime of oversight and inspections, and a range of sanctions for violations of 
the provisions of the draft law that may result in the ban of the NPOs’ activities and thereby of the NPO itself. The 
joint opinion of the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR on Republika Srpska’s draft law, indicates several areas 
of concern due to non-compliance with international human rights standards. For instance, the Draft Law is not based 
on any risk assessment or consultation with associations and others potentially affected. As mentioned by the Venice 
Commission, legitimate reasons for imposing transparency requirements on private organisations include receiving 
funding  from  public  sources  or  performing  essential  democratic  functions.  Particular  attention  should  be  paid to 
avoiding stigmatisation and duplication of existing registration and reporting obligations. Moreover, the joint opinion 
stressed the need to ensure proportionality of sanctions and obligations and to provide effective remedies, in full 
respect of fundamental rights, including the right to protection of personal data. 

341  See note 210. 
342   See note 125, paragraph 112.  
343  See note 125, paragraph 114; Judgment of the ECtHR, Ecodefense v. Russia, see note 188, paragraph 81. 
344  See note 182. 
345  See note 125, paragraph 79. 

171 

 
 
conformity with the democratic values shared by the Union and its Member States pursuant 
to Article 2 TEU. 

With regard to the proportionality of the limitation, all 3 options apply indiscriminately 
to any entity receiving financial support from abroad by reason of the type of activity 
they carry out. In particular, the legislative policy options (PO2.1 and PO2.2) would not 
cover any funding given by a third country entity346, but only the funding which is related 
to  an  interest  representation  activity  (structural  grants,  donations,  etc.  are  therefore 
excluded). These legislative options only focus on the activities that are genuinely likely 
to  have  a  significant  influence  on  public  life  and  public  debate.  Secondly,  none  of  the 
policy options target specifically CSOs or other associations, significantly reducing the 
risk of stigmatisation.  They regulate a specific type of  activity  – interest representation 
activities carried out on behalf of third country governments – regardless of the natural or 
legal person carrying it out.  

The legislative policy options (PO2.1 and PO2.2)  contain specific  safeguards to avoid 
stigmatisation347. By imposing a full harmonisation of the transparency requirements, 
these 2 options ensure that registered entities may not be required to present themselves to 
the public in a stigmatising manner348.  

The legislative policy options also include proportionate sanctions and a comprehensive 
system of safeguards, including effective judicial review349. These options would ensure 
that CSOs and other associations would not be exposed to the threat of criminal penalties 
or dissolution.  

The  targeted  requirements  included  in  the  PO2.1  are  proportionate  and  will  not 
overburden concerned entities. (i) In terms of record-keeping, the concerned entities would 
be  required  to  keep,  for  a  limited  period,  a  clearly  defined  set  of  information350.  (ii)  In 
terms  of  registration,  the  concerned  entities  would  only  be  required  to  provide  limited 
information  on  themselves,  the  activities  conducted,  and  the  third  country  entities  they 
conduct  the  activities  for.  The  registration  would  include  an  approximation351  of  the 
remuneration received. Only the information necessary for the application and oversight 

346  Third country governments and entities whose action can be attributed to them, see section 5.2.1. 
347  Firstly, the national public registers would have to be presented in a neutral manner and in such a way that it does 
not  lead  to  stigmatisation  of  the  entities  included  in  the  register  (e.g.  Member  States  would  be  prevented  from 
requiring the entities that fall within the scope of the initiative to register ‘as an organisation in receipt of support 
from abroad’ or indicate on their internet site and in their publications and other press material the information that 
they are organisations in receipt of support from abroad). Secondly, Member States should ensure that when carrying 
out their tasks, the national authorities ensure that no adverse consequences arise from the mere fact that an entity is 
registered. Thirdly, the registered entities would be able to request that all or part of the information is not made 
publicly available where there are overriding legitimate interests preventing publication. 

348  Upon registration, these entities would only be required to provide their registration number in their contacts with 

public officials, not the wider public. 

349  Supervision  would  be  entrusted  to  independent  supervisory  authorities  with  clearly  established  powers,  whose 
requests for further information would need to be motivated and subject to effective judicial remedy. Sanctions would 
be designed in a way that would avoid a chilling effect on the concerned entities and sanction related powers subject 
to  appropriate  safeguards,  including  the  right  to  effective  judicial  review.  They  would  be  fully  harmonised  and 
limited to administrative fines under a specific ceiling based on the entity’s economic capacity. Sanctions would only 
be imposed following a prior early warning, except for breaches of the anti-circumvention clause. 

350  These records would include information on the identity of the third country entity on whose behalf the activity is 
carried out, a description of the purpose of the interest representation activity, contracts and key exchanges with the 
third  country  entity  to  the  extent  that  they  are  essential  to  understand  the  nature  and  purpose  of  the  interest 
representation  carried  out  as  well  as  information  or  material  constituting  key  components  of  the  interest 
representation activity. 

351  During the registration the precise amount would not be requested. Concerned entities would have to indicate in 
which bracket (e.g.: EUR 25,000 < 50,000; or EUR 50,000 < 100,000) the remuneration would fall, this remuneration 
would  cover  all  the  tasks  carried  out  with  the  objective  of  influencing  the  development,  formulation  or 
implementation of the same proposal. Information on the annual amounts declared would be made public within 
wider brackets corresponding the level of detail necessary for the purpose of informing citizens their representatives 
and other interested parties. 

172 

 
 
of the legislative initiative would need to be updated regularly. Other information would 
only need to be updated annually. (iii) Apart from where it is necessary to examine non-
compliance with the registration requirements, registered entities can only be requested to 
share their records with the supervisory authority as part of a risk-based approach where, 
based on objective factors, they are particularly likely to have a significant influence on 
public life and public debate. (iv) As illustrated in section 6.2.1.3 and Annexes 3 and 4, the 
costs for private entities are not likely to render significantly more difficult the action or 
operations of associations and are limited to what is necessary to ensure transparency. 

The  extended  requirements  included  in  the  PO2.2  impose  additional  burdens  on  the 
concerned  entities  as  compared  to  the  targeted  requirements  included  in  the  PO2.1352. 
These  additional  provisions  enhance  the  restrictions  on  the  right  to  freedom  of 
association. Member States would be able to refuse granting a licence on the ground that 
the  activity  is  likely  to  seriously  affect  public  security.  While  such  measure  would  be 
suitable to  address  threats  to  internal  and external  security, it would still place  de facto 
prior  authorisation  obligations  on  the  mechanisms  by  which  associations  use  certain 
remunerations from third countries. Such measures could have a disproportionate impact 
at the light of the objective that it seeks to achieve353. Furthermore, this system of prior 
authorisation  would  give  Member  States  a  certain  leeway  which  could  create  a  risk  of 
arbitrariness in the decisions to grant said licence. Finally, the fact that a publicly available 
flag  would  be  added  in  the  registration  of  the  entity  who  received  a  licence  despite 
comments submitted by a Member State or the Commission, could lead to stigmatisation 
of the said entity. 

The non-legislative option (PO1) would not provide for the extended requirements of the 
PO2.2. However, it would only provide for recommendations, leaving Member States a 
large room of manoeuvre to implement transparency requirements and would not ensure 
the implementation of the safeguards provided by the legislative options.  

352  These additional requirements includes: (i) a requirement to apply to national-level authorities for an EU-wide licence 
to conduct interest representation activities on behalf of a third country entity; and (ii) a requirement to keep records 
of all contracts and exchanges with the entity on whose behalf the activity is carried out as well as all information or 
material on the interest representation activity    

353  “As to the necessity and proportionality of measures taken to secure the above-mentioned aims, interference with the 
right of associations to seek and obtain financial and material resources should be the least intrusive of all possible 
means that could have been adopted. The authorities should be able to prove that the legitimate aim pursued by the 
measure cannot be reached by any less intrusive measures. In particular, an outright ban on foreign funding, or 
requiring prior authorisation from the authorities to receive or use such funds, is not justified.” Venice Commission 
Report  on  Funding  of  Associations,  CDL-AD(2019)002,  paragraph  147;  see  also  Report  by  the  UN  Special 
Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association (A/HRC/50/23) paragraphs 20 to 22. 

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Annex 9: The baseline  

The  European  Democracy  Action  Plan  adopted  in  December  2020  set  out  specific 
measures to promote free and fair elections and strong democratic participation, to support 
free  and  independent  media,  and  counter  disinformation.  With  this  Action  Plan,  the 
Commission announced measures, both  legislative and non-legislative to strengthen the 
resilience of EU democracies.  

This includes a proposal for legislation to ensure greater transparency in the area of 
sponsored content in a political context (‘political advertising'), and a proposal for a 
revision of the Regulation on the funding of European political parties and European 
political foundations (EUPP/F)354 which are in ongoing negotiations.  

Stakeholder views: 
During  the  focus  group  with  representatives  of  European  political  parties  and  foundations355, 
participants underscored the high level of transparency which applies to EUPP/F  and raised the 
question of providing a level playing field in terms of transparency requirements between entities 
influencing decision-making processes. 

It  set  up  a  new  joint  operational  mechanism  through  the  European  Cooperation 
Network on Elections to support the deployment of joint expert teams to counter threats 
to electoral processes.  

With  regard  to  strengthening  media  freedom  and  media  pluralism,  under  the  European 
Democracy Action Plan, a recommendation on the safety of journalists was presented in 
2021 with a structured dialogue under the European News Media Forum, with Member 
States, stakeholders and international organisations set up to prepare and implement the 
Recommendation.  

On strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP), the Commission put forward a 
recommendation356 and a Proposal for a Directive on protecting persons who engage 
in public participation from SLAPP. 

Other  measures  also  included  support  for  EU  cooperation  between  national  media 
councils, other media self-regulatory bodies, independent media regulators and networks 
of journalists, and initiatives promoting journalistic partnerships and standards. Measures 
to support media pluralism also include the setting up of a Media Ownership Monitor pilot 
project,  promoting  transparent  and  fair  allocation  of  state  advertising,  fostering  media 
diversity and a European approach on the prominence of audiovisual  media services of 
general interest. In addition, in September 2022, the Commission put forward a Proposal 
for a Regulation establishing a common framework for media services in the internal 
market  (European  Media  Freedom  Act),  which  aims  to  address  fragmented  national 
regulatory approaches related to media freedom and pluralism and editorial independence 
to ensure the free provision of media services within the internal market. In particular, it 
will  provide  for  transparency  measures  regarding  to  media  ownership,  audience 
measurement and state advertising. 

In addition, the Audiovisual Media Services Directive357 aims to create and ensure the 
proper functioning of a single market for audiovisual media services while contributing to 

354  See note 17. 
355  Focus group with European political parties and foundations of 21 March 2023. 
356  See note 22.  
357  See note 225. 

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the promotion of cultural diversity and providing an adequate level of consumer and child 
protection. 

On  the  EU's  Toolbox  for  countering  foreign  information  manipulation  and  interference 
(FIMI), developed under the Democracy Action Plan and then reinstated by the Strategic 
Compass358, a set of initiatives and actions were proposed that allow for the imposing of 
costs  on  perpetrators  and  putting  in  place  a  new  protocol  to  strengthen  existing 
cooperation structures to fight foreign information manipulation and interference including 
disinformation. In addition, the revision of the Code of Practice on Disinformation was 
carried out by the Signatories and prospective Signatories on the basis of the Commission’s 
detailed guidance on how to step up commitments and measures against disinformation, 
and set up a robust framework for its monitoring. The strengthened Code of Practice was 
presented in June 2022. 

Since 2015, the European External Action Service significantly improved its capacity 
to  tackle  foreign  information  manipulation  and  interference  (FIMI),  including 
disinformation by, inter alia, developing structures such as the EU Rapid Alert System 
on  Disinformation,  developing  a  comprehensive  framework  and  methodology  for 
systematic  collection  of  evidence  of  foreign  information  manipulation  and  interference 
(FIMI)  incidents  and  by  strengthening  strategic  communications  in  the  Eastern 
Partnership, the Southern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans. The EEAS, in a close 
cooperation with the Commission and the Member States, is continuously strengthening 
the  EU’s  Toolbox  to  tackle  Foreign  Information  Manipulation  and  Interference  (FIMI 
Toolbox), to impose costs on the perpetrators. 

The  initiatives  foreseen  under  the  European  Democracy  Action  Plan,  in  particular  the 
guidance on strengthening the Code of Practice on Disinformation and legislation to ensure 
greater  transparency  in  the  area  of  sponsored  content  in  a  political  context  are 
complementary to the measures that have been proposed under the Digital Services Act.  

The  Digital  Services  Act  set  out  a  horizontal  framework  for  regulatory  oversight, 
accountability and transparency of the online space in response to the emerging risks. It 
proposes  rules  to  ensure  greater  accountability  on  how  platforms  moderate  content,  on 
advertising and on algorithmic processes. Very large platforms will be obliged to assess 
the risks their systems pose not only as regards illegal content and products. They will have 
to  do  the  same  as  regards  systemic  risks  to  the  protection  of  public  interests  and 
fundamental rights, public health and security. The Digital Services Act establishes a co-
regulatory backstop for the measures, which were included in the revised and strengthened 
Code of Practice on Disinformation.  

In 2022, as a deliverable of the Digital Education Action Plan, the Commission published 
a set of guidelines for teachers and educators on tackling disinformation and promoting 
digital literacy through education and training359. They provide advice on how to use digital 
technologies  responsibly  and  how  to  assess  student  competences  concerning  digital 
literacy.  In  particular,  they  focus  on  how  to  encourage  young  people  to  fact-check 
information and think critically, and how to understand the ethical or economic dimensions 
of disinformation.  

358  More 

information  on 

the  EU’s  Strategic  Compass 

for  Security  and  Defence  available  here: 

https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en. 

359 European Commission, Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture, Guidelines for teachers and 
educators on tackling disinformation and promoting digital literacy through education and training, Publications 
Office of the European Union, 2022.  

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Since 2022, the Commission has been making recommendations to Member States in the 
context  of  the  Rule  of  Law  Reports,  including  on  aspects  relevant  to  interest 
representation.  For  instance,  in  2022,  Denmark  and  Slovakia  were  recommended  to 
introduce rules on lobbying, while Romania was invited to introduce rules on lobbying for 
Members  of  Parliament.  Belgium  was  called  to  complete  the  legislative  reform  on 
lobbying,  establishing  a  framework  including  a  transparency  register  and  a  legislative 
footprint, covering both members of Parliament and Government. In the same year, Spain 
was  recommended  to  continue  efforts  to  table  legislation  on  lobbying,  including  the 
establishment of a mandatory public register of lobbyists360.  

In  2023,  the  Commission  noted  in  the  context  of  the  Rule  of  Law  Reports  that 
developments  in  the  area  of  lobbying  continued,  as  some  Member  States  revised  their 
lobbying transparency rules, in line with 2022 recommendations. For example, in Latvia, 
a new lobbying law was adopted, which provides for the creation of a lobbying register. In 
Estonia, the authorities have continued efforts to effectively implement the guidelines on 
lobbying.  Cyprus  adopted  an  implementing  regulation  on  lobbying,  which  clarifies  the 
procedure  for  declaring,  recording,  and  publishing  lobbying  activities.  In  Lithuania, 
current rules on lobbying gave positive results in terms of submitted declarations. The 2023 
Rule of Law Report also addresses further recommendations to Member States related to 
lobbying and interest representation, where recommendations from 2022 were not yet fully 
addressed or new challenges have emerged361. 

Most recently, following up on the European Parliament resolution of 17 February 2022, 
aiming  to  promote  associations  and  other  non-profit  organisations  in  the  Union  in 
completing the internal market, protecting their fundamental rights and fostering an EU 
democratic space, the Commission put forward a Proposal for a Directive on European 
cross-border associations. 

When  it  comes  to  investments  by  third  countries,  the  FDI  Screening  Regulation362, 
provides an EU framework for the screening of direct investments from third countries on 
the grounds of security  or public order; while  Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 on Foreign 
Subsidies Distorting the Internal Market, aims to establish a harmonised framework to 
address distortions of competition caused, directly or indirectly, by foreign subsidies. 

Under the 2020 EU Cybersecurity Strategy, the Commission adopted several measures to 
bolster Europe's collective resilience against cyber threats, including by third countries, 
and  help  to  ensure  that  citizens  and  businesses  can  fully  benefit  from  trustworthy  and 
reliable services and digital tools: the NIS 2 Directive363 sets out a common cybersecurity 
regulatory framework aiming to enhance the level of cybersecurity in the European Union, 
requiring  Member  States  to  strengthen  cybersecurity  capabilities,  and  introducing 
cybersecurity risk-management measures and reporting in critical sectors, along with rules 
on cooperation, information  sharing, supervision, and enforcement;  the  Critical  Entities 
Resilience (CER) Directive364 aims to reduce vulnerabilities and strengthen the physical 
resilience of critical entities in the Union to ensure the uninterrupted provision of services 
that are essential for the economy and society. It covers digital infrastructures, including 
electronic communications services, data centres and public administration. The work of 

360  In the 2022 Rule of Law Report, further recommendations on lobbying concerned DE, EE, IE, FR, HR, 

IT, LV, LU, HU, NL and PL.  

361  Further recommendations related to lobbying concern DE, CZ, DK, DE, IE, ES, FR, HR, IT, LV, LU, 

HU, NL, AT, PL, RO and SK.   

362  See note 23. 
363  The NIS 2 Directive, see note 24. 
364  Directive (EU) 2022/2557 on the resilience of critical entities. 

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the  Commission  is  also  supported  by  ENISA,  the  European  Union  Agency  for 
Cybersecurity. Additional work is ongoing on the proposal for a Cyber Resilience Act365, 
which lays down rules for the placing on the market of products with digital elements to 
ensure the cybersecurity of such products, setting out essential requirements, obligations 
for economic operators and rules on market surveillance.  

In the financial sector, the DORA Regulation,366 entered into force in January 2023, aims 
at strengthening the IT security of financial entities such as banks, insurance companies 
and investment firms and making sure that the financial sector in Europe is able to stay 
resilient  in  the  event  of  a  severe  operational  disruption.  In  the  field  of  anti-money 
laundering, negotiations are ongoing on a package of legislative proposals: the EU “single 
rulebook”  –  regulation  –  with  provisions  on  conducting  due  diligence  on  customers, 
transparency of beneficial owners and the use of anonymous instruments, such as crypto-
assets, and new entities, such as crowdfunding platforms; the 6th Anti-Money Laundering 
Directive, containing national provisions on supervision and Financial Intelligence Units, 
as well as on access for competent authorities to necessary and reliable information, e.g. 
beneficial  ownership  registers  and  assets  stored  in  free  zones  and  the  regulation 
establishing the European Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA) with supervisory 
and investigative powers to ensure compliance with AML/CFT requirements.  

The anti-corruption package, include: i) a joint communication on EU anti-corruption 
policy; and ii) a proposal for a Directive on combating corruption and iii) Expanding the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) sanctions toolbox to cover serious acts of 
corruption, which seeks to protect democracy as well as society from the corrosive impact 
of corruption. These initiatives will update the Union legal framework on corruption to 
ensure  compliance  with  international  standards  such  as  the  United  Nations  Convention 
Against Corruption (UNCAC). They will ensure a level  playing field  between Member 
States, as well as coordination and common standards on the fight against corruption. In 
particular,  the  proposal  for  a  Directive  includes  as  an  aggravating  circumstance  for  the 
offences of bribery, misappropriation, trading in influence, abuse of functions, obstruction 
of justice, enrichment form corruption, and incitement, aiding and abetting and attempt, 
when the offender committed these offences for the benefit of a third country. 

Directive  (EU)  2022/2464  on  corporate  sustainability  reporting367,  empowers  the 
Commission  to  adopt  delegated  and  implementing  acts  to  specify  how  competent 
authorities  and  market  participants  shall  comply  with  the  obligations  laid  down  in  the 
Directive. It contains annual reporting obligations that include one governance standard 
(business conduct) which would be relevant for this initiative. 

The Commission also provide a wide range of funding opportunities to foster access to 
democratic participation, civic engagement, and trust in democracy, most notably in the 
context  of  the  Citizens,  Equality,  Rights  and  Values  (CERV)  funding  programme,  the 
Creative  Europe  programme,  Erasmus+  and  Horizon  Europe.  Actions  to  help  tackle 
disinformation  through  funding  are  supported  in  the  current  financing  period  under 
Erasmus+,  European  Solidarity  Corps  and  the  Media  programme,  Citizens,  Equality, 
Rights and Values programme and Horizon Europe. 

365  Proposal for a Regulation on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements and amending 

Regulation (EU) 2019/1020. 
366  DORA Regulation, see note 24. 
367  See note 238. 

177