Futures of social confrontations and effects on European democracies 2040 : scenarios and policy implications : foresight.
Date: 2023-12-08
Institutions: Directorate-General for Research and Innovation
Subjects: EU research policy, democracy, foresight, innovation, participatory democracy, research and development, research programme, research project, social sciences

Futures of Social 
Confrontations 
and Effects 
on European 
Democracies 
2040 

Scenarios and 
policy implications 

 
 
 
 
 
Futures of Social Confrontations and Effects on European Democracies 2040: 
Scenarios and Policy Implications 

European Commission 
Directorate-General for Research and Innovation 
Directorate G - Common Policy Centre 
Unit G1 - Common Strategy and Foresight Service  
Contact 
Email 

Nikos Kastrinos 
Nikolaos.kastrinos@ec.europa.eu  
RTD-PUBLICATIONS@ec.europa.eu  

European Commission 
B-1049 Brussels 

Manuscript completed in October 2023 
First edition 

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EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Futures of Social 
 Confrontations and Effects 
 on European Democracies 
2040:  
Scenarios and  

Policy Implications 

Susanne Giesecke 

Sergiu Mișcoiu  

Masafumi Nishi 

Klaus Schuch  

Richard Wilkinson  

Sohail Inayatullah   

2023 

Directorate-General for Research and Innovation 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of contents 

SUMMARY .......................................................................................... 3 

1. 
CONFRONTATIONS ........................................................................... 5 

INTRODUCTION: ANALYSING SOCIAL 

1.1. 

1.2. 

The study of social confrontations: an overview ........................ 5 

How to Avoid Social Fragmentation and System 

Breakdown? ............................................................................................ 8 

2. 

SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT ................................................. 10 

2.1. 

Scenario 1: A Resilient and Consensual European 

Confederation ......................................................................................... 13 

2.2. 

Scenario 2: European Democracy Defending Itself Against ...... 16 

Totalitarian Tendencies .............................................................................. 16 

2.3. 

2.4. 

3. 

4. 

Scenario 3: The European Fortress ............................................. 18 

Scenario 4: Cultural hegemony through global capitalism ........ 21 

REFLECTIONS ON R&I POLICY IMPLICATIONS ................ 24 

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................... 28 

ANNEX I: METHODOLOGICAL NOTE ............................................... 33 

2 

 
 
SUMMARY 

Social confrontations signify the struggle about how we want to shape our futures. Rooted in 
different narratives represented by different social groups they are often competing for the 
sovereignty  of  interpretation  of  what  a  particular  future  may  look  like  and  how  we  are  to 
achieve it. These diverging perspectives are usually rooted in past collective experiences and 
value  systems  and  their  interpretations  and  constitute  a  point  of  reference  for  a  personal 
identity that reinforces a person belonging to a certain group. Social confrontations are not a 
singular phenomenon; instead, we live in a world of multiple social confrontations, and they 
co-exist, overlap, and compete. The divides social confrontations create can go across all 
spheres of life: education, care, health, nutrition, energy, mobility, communication, race, gen-
der, political power, migration, etc.  

This policy brief explores how these developments have been perceived in science and so-
ciety and how they are likely to impact the futures of democracy in Europe. To this end, it 
presents  four  scenarios  that  chart  diverging  pathways  on  how  social  confrontations  could 
evolve in the next 15 years under various drivers and trends and what role they could play 
for democratic development in the EU. Finally, the policy brief presents implications for R&I 
policymaking from the scenarios.  

The four scenarios explore divergent possibilities and do not depict preferable futures. From 
our point of view, scenario 1 (“A Resilient and Consensual European Confederation”) is the 
most positive one of the four and it is helpful to filter the preferable developments that can be 
influenced by R&I policy-making. But also, the other three, less preferable scenarios (“Euro-
pean Democracy defending itself against totalitarian tendencies”, “The European Fortress”, 
“Cultural Hegemony Through Global Capitalism”) contribute to thinking through negative de-
velopments that could be contained or prevented by R&I policy-making.   

In drawing implications for R&I policy we focus on the relationship between R&I and some 
root causes of current as well as future confrontations. These include inequality and the cli-
mate and environmental crises, some emerging areas of social confrontations with a strong 
technological character, and efforts to democratise science and technology which  relate to 
avoiding social confrontations. These implications are presented in four parts.  The first part 
raises the question of how R&I policy on the macro-level can have an impact toward more 
equity and equality. This part discusses how to apply social criteria for public R&I funds, such 
as human dignity, solidarity and justice, environmental sustainability, transparency and co-
decision-making  and  their  relevance  for  projects  and  companies.  Further  consideration  is 
given to marginalised groups and how they could profit from social and technological innova-
tions. 

The second part is dedicated to the notion of more democratisation and participation in the 
process of R&I priority setting and funding and how different social groups can be involved 
to include broader societal perspectives in the  decision-making process. This includes, for 
example, structures that prepare decision-making on R&I investments. New approaches to 
democratize the decision-making processes on how investments in R&I are taken may lead 
the way forward but may also contribute to more social confrontations. To such end, it might 
be important to include employees and other social groups in the decision-making process, 
so as to have a better representation of people who will be affected by the consequences in 
the future, e.g. the younger generation. An additional set of suggested changes involves the 
governance structures of decision-making processes as such: new procedures need to be 
learned and taught to achieve results that are acceptable for society as a whole and for social 
groups in particular.  

3 

 
How R&I policy could be geared towards the stimulation of more socio-ecological transfor-
mation is the focus of the third part, discussing the point on how to limit the footprint of R&I 
outcomes.  The  climate  crisis  might  be  a  major  cause  of  adversity  and  desperation  in  our 
society in the future. It could bring about more inequity, more inequality and more social con-
frontation. Accordingly, containing and mitigating the effects of the climate crisis needs to be 
the focus of socially responsible R&I policy that gives answers to the question if ecological 
transformation and economic growth are contradictions or if they can be reconciled.  

The fourth and final part of the policy implications looks into some future European R&I focus 
areas of relevance to the four scenarios, especially on artificial intelligence and technology 
platforms  as  well  as  on  alternative  forms  of  living.  The  latter one  is  discussing  options  for 
adapting housing to changing demands – individually as well as collectively, e.g., responding 
to changing lifestyles as well as the climate change paradigm. Topics for Artificial Intelligence 
and Information Technology include new approaches to assess the quality and reliability of 
information and sources as well as socially responsible products that pay tribute to our di-
verse populations and cultures.  

This brief is the result of one of eight Deep Dive Foresight Studies in the project ‘European 
R&I Foresight and Public Engagement for Horizon Europe’ conducted by the Foresight on 
Demand’  consortium  for  the  European  Commission.  During  the  spring  of  2023,  an  expert 
team  identified  factors  of  change  and  organised  two  scenario  and  one  policy  implications 
workshops also engaging experts from academia, business and public administration around 
Europe.  The  process  was  also  supported  by  discussions  in  the  Horizon  Europe  Foresight 
Network. Further information and room for interactive discussion is provided on the project’s 
website: www.futures4europe.eu 

4 

 
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION: ANALYSING SOCIAL CONFRONTATIONS   

Social confrontations signify the struggle about how we want to shape our futures. Rooted in 
different narratives represented by different social groups they are often competing for the 
sovereignty  of  interpretation  of  what  a  particular  future  may  look  like  and  how  we  are  to 
achieve it. These diverging perspectives are usually rooted in past collective experiences and 
value  systems  and  their  interpretations  and  constitute  a  point  of  reference  for  a  personal 
identity that reinforces a person belonging to a certain group. Social confrontations are not a 
singular phenomenon; instead, we live in a world of multiple social confrontations, and they 
co-exist, overlap, and compete. The divides social confrontations create can go across all 
spheres of life: education, care, health, nutrition, energy, mobility, communication, race, gen-
der, political power, migration, etc. 

1.1. 

The study of social confrontations: an overview 

From an analytical point of view, the borders between social mobilization, social involvement 
and social confrontation have been blurring. Social theorists from the last century saw social 
change driven by the antagonists of (political) leaders on the one hand and citizens on the 
other. This demarcation does not work anymore in the 21st century as new fault lines have 
emerged (with nature, with colonies, and with technologies, as well as the changing regional 
and global demographics). While Olsen (1989) defined social mobilization as “leader-initiated” 
with a “downward” dynamic, social involvement as reciprocal from both leaders and citizens, 
he states that social confrontation involves an “upward” dynamic from the citizens against the 
leaders. Similarly, the notion that social conflict is always rooted in structures of domination 
(Oberschall,  1978)  has  gained  many  more  facets.  Social  conflict  analysis  overlaps  with 
macro-sociological theories about stratification, social change, group formation and collective 
action.  

Today we witness many lines of confrontation, not only between leaders and citizens but also 
among different groups of citizens. To name just a few, there is an increasing confrontation 
against independent women (even increasing numbers of femicides in European countries), 
as well as the women’s liberation movement in Iran (Kaiser, 2020) or the ‘me-too’ revelations. 
Just recently we saw confrontations of the anti-immunization lobby with vaccination propo-
nents (Prainsack, 2022). Young people are organizing in groups to protest against climate 
change and some even take more drastic measures than just taking to the streets. These 
groups are not (only) protesting against governmental leaders but against their parents’ gen-
eration and lifestyle as inappropriate for the following generations. (Dirth, 2019; Fabel et al. 
2022).   

While in the past most social protests were demanding more equality and democratisation 
(e.g., the proletariat, women’s movement, students’ protests in the 1960s, movement of the 
landless, etc.) (see also Dahrendorf, 1959), today confrontations are focussing on democracy.  
There are attacks  against  democratic  institutions  (US:  Jan.  6  Capitol  attack  (see  Kleinfeld 
2022), Reichsbürger planned attack on the German Parliament (see Keil 2022), as well as 
citizen  protests  to  maintain  democratic  institutions  that  are  endangered  by  ruling  govern-
ments (Israel and Georgia, March 2023).  

Important factors in 21st-century social confrontations are, of course, digitalisation, social me-
dia and artificial intelligence (Ebner, 2023). One radical form is the troll army installed by the 
Russian Internet Research Agency that operated highly divisive accounts such as “Secured 
Borders” and “Blacktivist” during the US 2016 election (Kirby, 2016). The role of social media 
and  information  technology  in  amplifying  and  accelerating  social  confrontation  is  highly 

5 

 
 
complex. In some cases, these phenomena function as amplifiers of features that already 
exist in society. In other cases, they ignite protest movements and contribute to the bi-parti-
san  divide  in  society  (Törnberg  2022).  In  any  case,  confrontation  in  the  current  system  is 
unlikely to decrease.  

The analysis of such social groups and social confrontations has mostly focused on promi-
nent protest groups. Some of the first prominent theorists have been Karl Marx and Friedrich 
Engels (1848). In their publications, they studied the success factors of the proletarian move-
ment. They developed a theory of the social forces struggling for social hegemony, their ma-
terial  preconditions,  ideologies  and  strategies.  Today,  this  branch  of  political-philosophical 
approach is reflected in “Critical Theory” and in some of the discussions on discourse and 
hegemony (Brand, 2005; Brand, 2006; Demirovic, 2010, Laclau & Mouffe 2006). This school 
of  thought  also  refers  to  Antonio  Gramsci,  an  Italian  political  philosopher  a  hundred years 
ago, who said that the hegemony of a ruling class is propagated by the cultural hegemony of 
this class, meaning capitalism at that time. To rise from lower social status, the working class 
would need to define their own culture and defeat the bourgeoisie.   

More  recent  analyses  of  social  confrontations  and  protests  are  embedded  in  the  study  of 
social movements and became more prominent during the 1950s and 1960s, especially in 
English-speaking countries. Quite a variety of approaches have been developed and con-
tested to explain this phenomenon. This work is primarily dedicated to the analysis of success 
factors of mobilising social movements, their strategies, political and discursive structures, 
struggle for resources, forms of protests, identity and collective interpretative patterns (Rucht, 
1994; della Porta, 2009; Meyer & Tarrow, 1998). Such analyses mostly conclude that social 
protest  arises  primarily  from  the  deprivation  or collective  discontent  of  certain  groups.  But 
eventually, this explanation did not seem sufficient, thus further research focussed on factors 
of social structures, theories of resource mobilisation (McCarthy & Zald, 1977): social protests 
embedded in social movements depend on the availability or lack of resources, determining 
the role and impact of actors. A further approach was the theory of political opportunity struc-
tures which states that the degree of openness or closure of a political system and its ability 
to absorb political protest and demand for change is crucial for the performance of protest 
groups (Eisinger, 1973; Kitschelt, 1999).  

Referring to the assumptions of the political opportunity structure, more recent approaches 
argue that social protest movements depend on what is called the “framing” of the interpre-
tation of reality. Social and political protest can take off when activists manage to frame cer-
tain  events,  grievances,  and  topics  in  such  a  way  that  their  followers  can  make  sense  in 
participating  in  this  movement  (Snow  et  al.  1986).  The  frame  serves  as  a  kind  of  sense-
making interpretation of what is going on in the world and in a participant’s life. Or in more 
recent cases even the “invention” of truth (Götz-Votteler & Hespers, 2019).   

Political  polarization  cannot  always  be  explained  through  traditional  behavioural  –  rational 
analysis. The study on affective (versus ideological) polarisation states that not only in the 
US but also increasingly in Europe is the animosity of the disliked political parties on emo-
tional,  unreflected  roots  tying  certain  partisan  proponents  stronger  together  (Reiljan  2020; 
Gidron et al., 2019; Wagner 2020). The narrative thus more and more plays a crucial part in 
identity creation and possible social confrontation.  

Post-structuralist approaches as propagated by Laclau and Mouffe are further developing the 
above-mentioned opportunity structure model. They say that there is no prior structure on the 
side of the protesters. Rather, their formation as a group encountering some kind of estab-
lishment is contingent: It is through contingent opportunity that certain people and/or groups 
identify the same interest or goal and form a protest group (for some time) but without an 
original identity.   

6 

 
Figure 1: Fraction of countries with social unrest events 12-month moving average. Barrett et al. 2022  

Figure 2: Social unrest events are rising but remain below pre-pandemic peaks (% of countries with 
reported Social Unrest Index-identified events) (Barrett, 2022)

7 

 
 
  
 
  
Today we are confronted with the question: Are we witnessing an unusual rise and new qual-
ity  of social confrontations? Figures  1  and  2  indicate such  a  trend  (see  also  Bartlett  et  al. 
2022; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2023; V-Dem Institute 2023). While in 
the past there seem to have been protest groups forming some kind of critical mass and an 
identity for a longer period, some even having an impact on economic, political,  and social 
developments. In contrast, most of the current social confrontation movements and incidents 
do not seem to have a longer-lasting effect or homogenous identity. Even though they some-
times reach a (political or other) goal, they do not offer a continuous narrative for personal or 
group identity or cultural hegemony. Instead, social confrontation is very much fragmented 
and heterogeneous (Vey, 2016). Today, most of the emerging protest groups don’t seem to 
have the same degree of “closure” as former movements used to have. Yet, they can still be 
as harmful to challenging existing structures, institutions, or actors.   

1.2. 

How to Avoid Social Fragmentation and System Breakdown?   

A number of tendencies seem to conspire together to threaten societies with forms of social 
dysfunction and perhaps breakdown.  Social cohesion and social capital have declined very 
substantially over the last generation (Wilkinson/Pickett 2009, 2019). So too have levels of 
trust – not only in how much people feel they can trust others, but also public trust in national 
governments and in parliaments (see figure 3 below, Standard Eurobarometer 98  - Winter 
2022-2023).   Many occupations command much less respect than they used to, including 
politicians, the media, the police, banks and big business (Arrighi et al. 2022). 

Figure 3: How much trust do you have in certain institutions? Question A6 Standard Eurobarometer 
98 - Winter 2022-2023  

At the same time, democracy is increasingly threatened by factors such as growing political 
polarisation, caused not only by the increasing numbers of people who believe in conspiracy 
theories (Keil 2022), but also by the growing importance of money in politics, by the growth 
of  inequality  and  the  rise  of  populism  and  the  far  right  (Wilkinson/Pickett  2009; 
Carother/Wong 2020). To this mix will be added high levels of disruption and unemployment 
caused by the development of AI. As many argue, jobs in every category are likely to disap-
pear (Inayatullah, 2022).  While these developments on the societal level challenge the na-
ture of work and meaning, we should also pay attention to recent trends at an individual level. 
There  have  also  been  adverse  trends  in  the  psychological  characteristics  of  populations. 
Jean Twenge (2010) and others have shown major rises among the US population in narcis-
sism, a sense of entitlement, materialism and in anxiety and depression over the last  half-
century or so.  Similar, though less pronounced changes have also been shown in Europe.  
These  social  and  psychological  changes  make  societies  less  adaptable  and  less  able  to 

8 

 
  
make the changes required by a transition to environmental sustainability (Wilkinson/Pickett 
2019).   

Against that background, governments attention will be increasingly taken up by ever more 
frequent emergencies and disruptions caused by the climate crisis, including increasing in-
ternational conflict, more frequent new diseases and attempts to deal with increasing num-
bers of refugees and migrants. This governmental “actionism” is both the source, and conse-
quence, of the multiplication of think tanks, monitoring systems and social media dealing with 
the poly-crisis. At the same time, the focus fon long-term solutions gets lost. In fact, it is not 
only the climate response that suffers but all long-term government planning functions.   

The difficulty of dealing with these issues is likely to be exacerbated by underfunded, and 
consequently inadequate, public services. In this hectic, perhaps chaotic, context, policies to 
minimise or adapt to the climate crisis will not get the attention they urgently need, and pro-
tective environmental targets will be missed.     

If people find that the systems and services on which they rely, cannot be relied upon and 
life seems increasingly difficult, there may well be a tendency for frustration, political apathy 
and the susceptibility of people to populist promises of “easy” solutions. This is especially the 
case when the image of the future promised is in conflict with the reality of today, and the 
likely future that will emerge from it. This image contradiction is at the root of social confron-
tations – the world that is expected or promised is not the reality that is emerging. This is 
especially the case with the demographic transition that is unfolding: wealthy and aged soci-
eties confronting youthful poorer societies (Inayatullah, 1999, 2016).   

To  avoid  further  social  disorder  and  forms  of  social  breakdown,  some  social  and  political 
scholars say, our societies need to be able to produce coherent and coordinated responses 
to  new  threats  and  adversity  (Habermas  2011;  Frazer  2022;).  The  key  lies  not  just  in  the 
competence of government and institutions, but also, very substantially, in the cohesion, mu-
tual support and cooperation of populations. These are all powerfully affected by the level of 
economic inequality in society. Fairness must be at the heart of policy. More equal societies 
are more cohesive, have higher levels of trust in political institutions, lower levels of violence 
and people are more cooperative and mutually supportive. Risks of social disorder and break-
down  are  substantially  lower  in  more  equal  societies.  More  egalitarian  societies  are  more 
resilient, adaptable and better able to ride out the storms that societies and the world econ-
omy face. (Wilkinson/Picket 2009; Dörre 2022)  

While the above section is focused on the theoretical framework, below we focus on possible 
futures. Thus, this project explores how social confrontations can evolve in the next two dec-
ades and in what effect they could have on social cohesion and the quality of democracy in 
the EU. The scenarios below raise the question of how social confrontations could aggravate 
and if and how such developments could be alleviated by policy measures. While the chal-
lenges are global, they are addressed especially from the perspective of the European re-
search and innovation policy.    

We consider the root causes of social confrontations (values, social problems, access to re-
sources, environmental issues) and escalation of conflicts (both online and offline). We take 
a global perspective, relating to the positioning of the EU in the world and  focus on social 
confrontations undermining the foundations and institutions of the EU, including R&I.     

The following questions gave guidance to the thematic exploration:  

•  Will new threats reduce or increase confrontation? 

9 

 
•  Will the tech platforms stay in just providing the fora or will they also participate in 

confrontations?     

•  Will the governments take action? Will they, for example, engage in life-long learning 

so as to break the silos of the mind as well as silos in organizations?   

•  What will be the effects of changing views of democracy and democratic practices 

in the EU?  

2.  SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT 

For the creation of a small set of scenarios that look into the development of social confron-
tation up to the year 2040, the expert group made use of the quantitative data and synthe-
sised  qualitative  information  from  scanning  to  describe  the  major  influencing  factors  of 
change (see Annex). To give the creation of the scenarios an anchoring point, we used two 
archetypical dimensions of governance challenged by social confrontations that develop in 
extreme directions: democratisation vs. authoritarianism and the growing influence of the pri-
vate economy vs. increasing significance of public governance (see figure below). In three 
scenarios the public governance gains more significance because social confrontation is of-
ten (though not always) a conflict with the ruling class and the ruling authorities (in terms of 
structures, processes and actors). One of those depicts a society that experiences more de-
mocratisation (“A Resilient and Consensual European Confederation”), whereas societies in 
the  other  two  scenarios  experience  a  move  toward  more  authoritarianism:  “the  European 
Fortress” and “European Democracy Defending Itself Against Totalitarian Tendencies”. One 
scenario, the “Cultural Hegemony Through Global Capitalism”, describes a development to-
ward more consumerism and control by large tech companies. The notion of liberty here is 
very subjective but constitutionally, the societies have not changed from today. While there 
are numerous other scenario methods, this was considered the most efficient and wisest way 
to ensure that the extremes were well presented. 

Figure 4: Critical Uncertainties for Scenario Development  

Source: FOD 2023  

The following four sketches summarise the scenarios and illustrate the broad variety of future 
pathways of social confrontations could chart. They are not meant to be realistic.   

10 

 
  
 
1.  A Resilient and Consensual European Confederation: social confrontations take 
bifurcations in many directions and social spheres and become an important element 
of political and institutional reform. Civil society participates in many social groups to 
claim more influence in policy-making, seeking new forms of structured dialogue with 
different stakeholder groups, new forms of reconciliation, and critical reflection, and 
thus contributes to social transformation.  

2.  European  Democracy  Defends  Itself  Against  Totalitarian  Tendencies:  right-
wing extremists openly and covertly try to take over democratic forces in the EU and 
to dissolve major democratic institutions of the EU. More states exit. Social confron-
tations go in both directions: in countries where civil rights are infringed, citizens take 
on the streets for protest. There is the pendulum response to extremism.  

3.  The European Fortress defends its borders against all sorts of external attempts of 
infiltration, undermining its sovereignty directly as well as indirectly, including sub-
versive  attacks  from  foreign  troll  armies.  The  defensive  position  is  also  taking 
measures against migration from outside Europe. Still, there are various forces and 
groups within and outside Europe that wage social confrontations within the Euro-
pean society. Europe is self-sufficient in itself, e.g. through geo-engineering, autar-
chy, EU internet instead of global internet. New technologies help build and reinforce 
the fortress.  

4.  Cultural Hegemony Through Global Capitalism has ended almost all social con-
frontation.  A  few  multinational  tech  companies  have  taken  over  the  control  of  all 
communication  around  the  globe  and  have  designed  autonomous  algorithms  that 
are optimising the digital technologies in order to infiltrate people toward more con-
sumption and less social protest.  

11 

 
 
 
 
The main features and differences of the scenarios are summarized in the table below. 

Scenario   
title  

A Resilient and   
Consensual Euro-
pean Confedera-
tion  

European Democ-
racy defends itself 
against totalitarian 
tendencies  

The self-suffi-
cient  
European for-
tress  

Cultural hegem-
ony through 
global   
capitalism   

Core 
driver  

Solidarity leads the 
way  

Data and confronta-
tion lead the way  

International affairs 
lead the way  

Deep democracy   Mafia-like tribal 

structures  

EU has soft power   EU in decline  

Fragmentation  

EU defends  

Social/   
politics  
EU 
agency  
Research   
focus  

Research is partici-
patory  

Research reflects a 
society in deep con-
flict and tension. It is 
used for political pur-
poses  
Fragmenting bridges  The fortress  

Research for tech-
nologies that en-
hance self-suffi-
ciency  

Research for con-
sumption  

The tech giant  

Core   
metaphor  

The connected 
community  

Personalized tech-
nologies through 
corporate capital-
ism lead the way  
Individualized and 
corporatized  
EU corporatizes  

It is worth noting that the scenario context is shaped by drivers which are based on current 
trends and conditions. We did not use emerging issues analysis or methods to explore ex-
treme outliers and disruptions (Molitor, 2003; Inayatullah, 2015). The scenarios are framed 
by elements we know today and not by unknowns of tomorrow. The scenarios thus should 
be recognizable to policymakers and the implications for research and innovation considered 
within actionable frames of reference. For example, we did not imagine the EU run by mostly 
AI systems or social confrontation between humans and AI systems or the end of 90% of all 
jobs. These while interesting were outside the terms of reference of this project.  

12 

 
  
  
 
 
 
2.1. 

Scenario 1: A Resilient and Consensual European Confederation   

As a response to the dramatic conflicts with the illiberal anti-Western empires and especially 
with Russia and China that took place in the late 2020s, the European states entered a phase 
of re-solidarization, similar in certain aspects to the post-WW2 one. In the mid-2030s, in order 
to cope with foreign competition and to pro-
tect 
themselves  against  anti-European 
threats,  the  European  Union’s  Member 
States  decided  to  accept  the  progressive 
transfer of most of their competences in the 
military and political fields to the reformed 
EU  institutions,  where  the  Parliament  and 
the European Citizens’ Assembly – a wide 
and  inclusive  popular  parliament  selected 
through sortition – concentrate most of the 
decision-making  power.  Hence,  by  2040, 
the transformation of the EU into a confed-
eration close to the model of post-national 
constellation  (Habermas,  2011)  is  almost 
complete  and  reflects  the  Europeans’  re-
newed  trust  in  democracy  to  enhance  the 
prosperity and well-being of the citizens.  

Figure 5: A Resilient and Consensual European 
Confederation  

Source: GettyImages 

The  path  to  this  democratic  post-national 
reconciliation has been anything but smooth. By the end of the 2020s, the public acknowl-
edgement about the devastating effects of the severe socio-economic polarization, of climate 
change  and  of  many  governments’  authoritarian  slide  was  general  and  pushed  numerous 
European  citizens  from  all  over the  continent  to  engage in  an  increasingly  effective  set  of 
actions, such as general strikes, boycotts, protests, occupations, riots and overt civic disobe-
dience. While the initial reaction of the member states’ authorities was to quash the protest 
movements severely and violently, the widespread economic and societal deadlocks made 
the governments aware of the huge potential of vulnerability in the eventual case of a foreign 
military or hybrid attack. Consequently, under the pressures of civil society, on one hand, and 
of the top EU’s supranational bodies, on the other, most national governments accept, one 
by one, to open a social, political and environmental dialogue with their wider societies. Public 
debates are initially limited to a series of punctual claims, and rapidly expand to wider topics, 
as  the  “undomesticated”  interlocutors  refuse  to  resign  themselves  to  accepting  the  rather 
superficial  reforms  proposed  by  the  decision-makers.  Their  insistence,  combined  with  the 
maintained massive street meetings, finally pays off and the national dialogue meetings pro-
gressively  reshape  from  roundtables  to  permanent  self-empowering  organs,  claiming  the 
moral and legitimate right to propose constitutional amendments. As there is a process of 
“contamination” from one country to the other, the emerging national citizens’ organs created 
a pan-European platform – a demarche that was strongly encouraged by the European Com-
mission and by the European Parliament, who are directly interested in reforming both the 
national and the EU institutional frameworks and practices to strengthen the supranational 
level.   

The  result  of  these  unexpected  but  very  substantial  grass-route  initiatives  that  turned  into 
trans-European platforms is the launch of a series of reforms both in terms of constitutional 
arrangements and in terms of political practices. By 2037, most of the EU states were about 
to complete their constitutional revisions. The new political frameworks are much more inclu-
sive than the previous, providing strong guarantees for deliberative and participatory democ-
racy, wider and less biased political representation, and the inclusion of all types of minority 
groups into the decision-making structures at all levels and into the societal frameworks. On 

13 

 
the social and economic side, the new constitutions recognize, among other things, the prin-
ciples of economic fairness and of enhanced social cohesion and the universal opposable 
right to housing. The right to a healthy environment is literally concretized in the new consti-
tutions by adding a series of specific binding provisions on green energy and decarbonization.   

At the same time, the EU commits itself to a deep process of institutional reform. Following 
the unequivocal demands of the European citizens, the EU leadership promotes a project of 
enhanced integration, switching the centre of gravity of the decision-making processes from 
the European Council and the Council of the EU to the EU Parliament, the latter being se-
conded by a European Citizens’ Assembly, which is composed of several hundred regular 
citizens selected for two-and-a-half-year terms through sortition (selection of public officials 
using a random representative sample). The role of this wide and inclusive popular assembly 
is to co-work with the EU Parliament to adopt legislation that genuinely reflects the European 
citizens’ variety of interests and opinions. These major changes made the Union more open 
to  the  candidate  countries  –  Moldova,  Serbia,  Montenegro,  Albania,  Kosovo,  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina,  Macedonia,  and  Ukraine  –  which joined  the  EU between  2037  and  2039  by 
using a new fast track of European accession.   

Within this newly created framework, social conflicts have become less frequent. Although 
recent, this new institutional arrangement seemed to have succeeded in considerably reduc-
ing the degree of violent social antagonism, while allowing at the same time for a more equi-
table  representation  of  the  different  and  sometimes  competing  interests.  By  putting  in  the 
core of the new democratic deal the participation of the very diverse citizens and groups of 
the EU’s member states, the reformed national and European institutional frameworks suc-
ceed now to manage in a rather smooth and pacific way the ideological, religious, ethnocul-
tural, moral and social differences among the confederation’s 520 million citizens. As virtually 
all types of claims raised by the Europeans reach consent-oriented policy-making and deci-
sion-making levels thanks to the renewed and reinforced petitioning, participatory, delibera-
tive, and direct democracy mechanisms, their inclination to protest against the institutional 
systems and the political collective leadership is by far less prominent as in the past. Internet 
fora and platforms play an important part in the exchange of opinion and for developing in-
novative solutions to societal problems. A crucial factor for the mediating role of such tools is 
that they are regulated in terms of size and controlled in terms of content. Regulations stem 
also from participatory discussions and consent-making approaches.  

Moreover, in order to handle dissensus at the micro- and meso- levels, the authorities set up 
a series of institutions and practices that function according to the principle of subsidiarity. 
Thus, any contending issue should be solved at the closest level possible to the individuals, 
their groups and their communities. A flexible process based on the empowerment and the 
accountability  of  the  local  and  regional  authorities,  which  are at  their  turn  increasingly  as-
sisted by citizens’ assemblies, guarantees to a higher extent the prompt acknowledgment of 
the problems for which immediate action is required. While contentious issues are still present 
at all levels and the contending actors’ demands are even more audible than in the past (as 
the actors are more confident that their claims will be solved if made public), the degree of 
antagonism and especially that of irreconcilable conflictuality have importantly diminished.  

In the process of emergence of this new order, digitalization has played a key role, providing 
tools for the citizens to create and to develop virtual transnational European and global com-
munities and to overcome in this way some classical obstacles such as costs, money, dis-
tance, availability etc. Keen to support the new wave of civic democratic engagement, the 
European Union increased the budgets for inclusive digitization and for fighting against the 
technological gaps in society. Moreover, the enlarged EU’s decision-making bodies articu-
lated  a  systematic  and  pro-active  long-term  strategy  to  finance  and  politically  support  the 
pan-European research institutes, such as the renewed European Institute of Technology. 

14 

 
Research and innovation became both more important in terms of policy priority and more 
appreciated by European citizens, as they reflected a double transformation: on one hand, 
the decisions for investing in fields such as green and digital technologies became progres-
sively democratic, with the cooperation of all the relevant societal actors, and on the other 
hand, the profits resulting out of the investments were much more equitably socialized.   

International research activities are flourishing. There is an active exchange of actors within 
the EU and between the EU and other countries to tackle technological and social challenges 
in basic as well as in applied research. Diversity and inter-disciplinarity are guiding transna-
tional research strategies. A lot of emphasis is put on future orientation and the way people 
want  to  live.  Thus,  people  likely  to  be  affected  by  research  and  innovation  outcomes  are 
integrated into the design and/or assessment of research strategies and projects and their 
implementation.  

The implementations of social contracts reinforced collective resilience at both the national 
and the European levels, which facilitated the fulfilment of a higher degree of European stra-
tegic autonomy. While cultivating the Euro-Atlantic close partnership within NATO, the EU 
became more self-reliant in its relationship with the US in terms of security and foreign policy.  
By concentrating their resources, focusing their efforts and speaking on a single voice, the 
EU and its member states are about to become strong global economic competitors for China 
and the US. In the Global South, thanks to better-targeted investments and to the more overt 
and efficient policy of conditionality, the European Union succeeded to surpass the ghost of 
the colonial past, to largely regain its influence and to contain the expansion of the Russian 
and Chinese illiberal influence. This allowed for the negotiation of a new development-migra-
tion deal: by investing in key sectors of the Southern states’ economies, such as critical in-
frastructures, decarbonized energy and intensive education, the youth encounter now many 
more opportunities to find decent jobs without leaving their home countries. Thus, by 2040, 
the South-North and East-West sizable migration fluxes diminish, and the EU’s mix of soft 
power contributes to the stabilization of several countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin Amer-
ica, the Middle East and Southeast Asia.   

15 

 
 
 
2.2. 
Totalitarian Tendencies 

Scenario 2: European Democracy Defending Itself Against  

Data supremacy, that is to say the 
control over data – who owns and 
controls  data  -  plays  a  crucial  role 
in  this  scenario.  The  coalition  be-
tween populist political parties and 
social  media  in  some  European 
countries generates ever new nar-
ratives  on  supposedly 
lingering 
threats to European society, or ra-
ther what these populist parties de-
fine  as  European  society,  that  is 
white, male, of Caucasian ethnicity, 
and with regular income. However, 
European society is so diverse that 
the  majority  is  quite  the  contrary, 
that  is  of  multiple  ethnicities  and 
with migration backgrounds, of di-
verse genders, with an overload of 
people at the higher end of the age pyramid. Many of those narratives have the tenor that 
migration and everything foreign are destroying traditional European society, identities, and 
values. Fake news, conspiracy theories, manipulated surveys, populist influencers and the 
like find a lot of followers and they drive frightened voters into the arms of right-wing populists. 
These parties gain power in more and more European countries, inside and outside of the 
EU. If they manage to keep their power over longer periods checks and balances are manip-
ulated or disempowered step by step; media pluralism is destroyed. Many of the other social 
groups feel infringed of their civil rights and protest against the political developments in their 
countries. Compared to 2023, the EU has become smaller, some countries left after having 
turned  authoritarian;  others  were  excluded  after  the  EU had  reformed  its  decision-making 
procedures.  

With the help of social media and client data from retail companies but also by the use of 
face recognition the behaviour of the population is monitored, and deviants can be identified 
and easily separated. Diverse data pools are combined and smart algorithms can filter what 
is appropriate in the sense of the ruling government and where opposition might evolve even-
tually.  

All over Europe but also beyond, governing populist  leaders learn from each other how to 
maintain their power even if they lose their strongholds in their countries, they manifest their 
power through the alignment of the media and the judiciary with the government’s course. 
With the help of (social) media that is propagating right-wing populist views such leaders and 
their parties are present everywhere in the public space whereas alternative policy-makers 
hardly have the chance to be visible.  

Climate change incidents wage social confrontations. Severe floods in coastal regions and 
river basins on the one hand, long-lasting droughts in large parts of Europe on the other hand 
deprive many Europeans of their material possessions, their savings, jobs,  and even their 
family members. Many are desperate and have to leave their home regions. But the lack of 
solidarity and the fear of falling among the wealthy or middle-income families make it hard to 
re-integrate  the  deprived  people  –  even  within  the  same  country.  The  crime  rate  rises  as 

16 

 
 
people who have not much left to lose are looting whatever is left in the deprived regions and 
also in the still functioning regions.   

Regional, national, and European governance mechanisms are overburdened and not fit to 
deal with the poly-crisis situations. Corruption which is very common within these structures 
makes it almost impossible to restore the authority of government institutions and the rule of 
law. This negative development contributes to the desperation of the people who cannot par-
ticipate in economic wealth. Trust in institutions is diminishing and people get cynical about 
justice, democracy and their own future and that of their families.  

Some see the only option to turn to mafia-like clan structures where the illusion of being all 
part of a big family, where the members are helping each other in the end, leads to a crime-
haunted society.  

Those European countries still having a functioning democracy in the traditional (post-Cold-
War)  sense,  however,  are  shaken  by  social  confrontations  as  well.  Some  social  protest 
groups use violent methods to point to the fact that climate change is the most severe threat 
for humans and their environment – at least in their eyes. Some groups protest peacefully by 
marching on the streets or blocking car and air traffic with their own bodies. Other groups are 
more  violent  and  sabotage  the  infrastructure  that  is  crucial  for individual  transport.  Not  all 
these groups are local. They form Europe-wide networks and coordinate their attacks.   

But sabotage attacks are also carried out by right-wing extremist groups in democratic EU 
countries. They directly target democratic institutions and persons. Their means include at-
tacks on power infrastructure causing local blackouts. There are bomb attacks on institutions 
of the public administration, police, courts, ministries as well as directly on politicians, unfor-
tunately with fatal casualties. The ultimate goal of such a group is to undermine democracy 
and establish an authoritarian regime.  

The  ideologies  and  means of  the  very  extreme  or even  radical  right-  and  left-wing groups 
cannot be reconciled it seems. However, some countries have had very positive experiences 
in finding solutions of opposite social groups on single issues. New forms of participation and 
experiments  further  developed  the  set  up  of  citizen  councils,  for  example,  to  solve  traffic 
problems in some cities, the expansion of LGBTQI rights, privacy of data, taxation of million-
aires, integration of migrants, unconditional basic income, location of new power plants etc. 
Through complex but transparent procedures that involved a large scale of citizens repre-
sentative of the individual country or region with the guidance of professional facilitators ac-
ceptable solutions could be found that subsequently were implemented by policymakers and 
eliminated at least some issues of social confrontations. Here also, communities and coun-
tries learn from each other, coping and adjusting success models.   

Despite this progress, it is hard to build bridges in order to overcome the genuine cleavages 
and eradicate the roots of social confrontations.  

In this scenario, R&I cannot be “neutral”. It is always politicised in either one direction or the 
other:  
1. Authoritarian governments use science and technology to control the population, for their 
propaganda in public debate, and to quash opposition.  

2. The political divide reaches scientific institutions. Part of science goes underground; thus 
social divides are reflected in science.   

3.  Scientific mobility – outward – increases, whereas science in authoritarian countries faces 
repressions if not aligned with the government’s course.  

17 

 
4.  For  authoritarian  governments  some  science  projects  serve  prestige  purposes  to  show 
that the country can compete at the scientific edge with other countries and confirm the gov-
ernment’s ideology and policies.  

In short, R&I does not stop the confrontations but reflects them.  

2.3. 

Scenario 3: The European Fortress    

In the last 35 years, Europe faced a 
number of multiple crises. Some of 
them were   

(i) 

imported,   

▪ 

such as the previous war be-
tween the Russian Federation 
and Ukraine 

▪ 

or the Covid-19 pandemic, 

(ii)  some were partly to blame, like   

▪ 

the effects of the sub-prime 
crisis   

▪ 

or the refugee crisis   

(iii)  and a few, unfortunately, were 

home-made, like   

▪ 

▪ 

the erosion of European policies by some member states,   

the social unrest caused by antisocial and conflict-laden policies by right-wing parties 
and  

▪ 

the failure to establish its own European military defence.  

Now in 2043, Europe has turned in towards itself and has decided to adopt a defensive po-
sition. Caused by the disappointments of the last years, a cohesive basic understanding has 
developed in most of the European countries and their populations that Europe must go its 
own way and can no longer rely on the United States or on a naïve approach to globalisation. 
The coalition with the US has ultimately led to the EU suffering significant losses in the eco-
nomic war with China. The break with the U.S. was sobering, especially in the context of the 
American withdrawal from Ukraine after the conflict was frozen.   

The nationalist narrative of right-wing parties has been replaced by a European supra-na-
tional narrative. The engineering of a "national" European identity is facilitated by the contin-
uing threats from outside. This new “national” social populism has become a hallmark of far-
right parties. On the one hand, the predominantly right-wing to centrist governments are im-
plementing a strict almost-zero-migration regime at the EU’s external borders supported by 
high-tech surveillance, without shying away from armed violence. Family reunification of for-
mer migrants is handled restrictively, which motivates some people emigrating again. On the 
other hand, the EU is facing high internal migration from southern Spain and other parts of 
southern Europe due to the collapse of agriculture triggered by climate change. It increasingly 
also faces domestic re-settlements caused by flooding of coastal areas.  

18 

 
 
 
In the last 20 years, there has been an increase in social fragmentation that has greatly chal-
lenged society as a whole. “Identitarians” have faced multicultural urbanites, LGBTQI+ move-
ments  confronted  neo-Catholic  family  supporters,  climate  and  animal  activists  challenged 
passive consumers, and so on. Although the political parties have taken sides (mostly the 
conservative side), no group has been able to gain real dominance. Overall, the EU remained 
a diverse society with local togetherness and, in some cases, tolerated coexistence with cau-
tious self-governing structures for very heterogeneous social groupings. Even right-wing gov-
ernments try to maintain nowadays an integrative polity domestically in order to keep ethnic, 
religious and social tensions under control. They do not shy away from using AI to monitor 
potential trouble spots. However, the enemy is no longer seen so much at home, but abroad, 
which has led to a “unit behind the flag” feeling. Of course, this also led to internal hostility 
(e.g.  towards  the  Chinese  and  the  Orthodox  Church)  if  a  connection  to  external  enemies 
could be established.  

To ensure public peace, many community centres and other public spaces where individuals 
meet and engage in dialogue have been established to improve living together. Relatively 
high transfer payments as well as an indexed basic income and a relatively relaxed housing 
market due to the reduction of external migration and the fading of the baby-boomer gener-
ation contribute to an elastic society that looks for balance and aims to absorb social con-
frontations at the local level.   

Social democratic parties are increasingly able to commit themselves to the new European 
model of a self-sufficient fortress, which secures an acceptable level of equal opportunities 
and social justice within the borders of the EU. Social democratic parties are thus increasingly 
again represented in quite some of the national governments, although some of the parties 
had previously undergone processes of secession.   

Apart from a few religious extremist and radical left and anarchist splinter groups, European 
identity paired with a certain degree of multi-culturalism, and social justice is seen as a value 
in itself by the heterogeneous European population. The soul of Europe is a frozen melting 
pot that wants to become highly self-sufficient economically, politically and militarily and to 
emancipate and separate itself from the rest of the world. Significant investments are made 
in military armament, technology development, and education and training programmes to 
promote European cultural sensitivity and European identity.   

Global engagement is limited to cooperation with a number of foreign states that follow a third 
path between the poles USA, China and India. The few developing countries among them 
receive  costly  economic  support from  the  EU in  return for certain  raw  materials  (including 
solar energy).   

The European Court of Justice and the European Parliament have been upgraded in relation 
to national institutions. Qualified majorities are necessary for decisions. There is no longer a 
right of veto. Exclusion procedures are negotiated against those countries that do not partic-
ipate in this Europeanisation process.   

New technologies play a central role in driving this transformation to make the EU autarchic. 
Technological progress is focused and used to a large extent for (i) the green transition (in-
cluding climate change adaptation and geo-engineering), (ii) for the substitution of raw mate-
rials (including rare earths) and labour (by increased robotics) to make the EU’s economy 
independent from risky suppliers and competitive against wage dumping countries, and (iii) 
for a C02-neutral energy turnaround to become self-sufficient at a low price for end consum-
ers. There are also great efforts in the field of medicine and public health. This investment in 
science  and  technology is  accompanied  by  wide-ranging  efforts  and  propaganda  to  boost 

19 

 
people's confidence in technological progress. The implementation of radical new technolo-
gies is supported by social experiments and participation to minimize resistance to techno-
logical change.  

The social sciences are  understood primarily in instrumental terms and are commissioned 
accordingly to better understand crisis phenomena and trouble spots in order to be able to 
implement appropriate countermeasures. Critical social sciences, however, are being thinned 
out financially. Humanities are experiencing a minor renaissance due to their contribution to 
tourism, cultural diversity and the perceived importance of European identity.  

The bulk of R&D funding, however, is invested in strategic technologies that help to make the 
EU as good as possible at self-sufficiency. This is based on a technocratic understanding of 
politics. 3D printers, cellular agriculture, and embedded AI lead the way to ensure food and 
production are localized and tailored for European needs.  

The focus on 30 central missions, of which about two-thirds also have a technological com-
ponent and half of which even depend centrally on technology breakthroughs, also changes 
the  European  and  national  research  (funding)  system.  The  twelfth  European  Research 
Framework Programme essentially emphasises the implementation of the technology-rele-
vant missions, but the share of collaborative research declines sharply compared to the pre-
decessor programmes. Two-thirds of this by far the largest European funding pot will go di-
rectly into research carried out by a few European research institutions. These are pan-Eu-
ropean research institutions concentrated under European law but distributed across several 
European locations. They are new establishments, but not greenfield investments. They have 
emerged from various mergers of large national research institutions. Only companies that 
are predominantly European-owned can become shareholders, but the bulk of the funding 
(85%) comes consciously from the public sector.  However, Europeans are destined to be 
trapped into a dilemma engaging in missions that are very costly but will never generate any 
profits, e.g. building one European spaceship for costs they will never recover in contrast to 
other nations such as China that does it for profit.  

In 2043, almost 80% of Europe's youth enjoy higher education. But universities change fun-
damentally.  They  mainly  become  educational  institutions  in  which  research  hardly  plays  a 
role  anymore.  Moreover,  university  education  becomes  much  more  flexible  and  is  not  be 
limited to one or two physical locations but is composed of virtual curricula from a wide range 
of providers.   

Technologically, Europe is investing heavily in seawater desalination plants to support agri-
cultural areas affected by climate change, but this is not a solution for landlocked countries 
like Northern Macedonia and Kosovo. Massive investments are also being made in wind en-
ergy, solar energy and hydrogen technologies. A preferred partnership has been negotiated 
with Morocco in order to secure energy needs for the next decades, even in winter, by means 
of sustainable solar energy supply. The recycling rate is significantly increased through im-
proved collection systems and recycling technologies (which already start with product de-
sign). Europe has become a global leader in renewable energy and sustainable development, 
with significant investments in clean energy technologies and the creation of green jobs.   

However, some of these economic activities are not globally competitive and are protected 
by high tariffs. These are considered temporary but make it difficult to export European prod-
ucts because other countries also put up tariff barriers. Overall, economic activity is therefore 
increasingly shifting to the European single market, whose growth is supported by generous 
monetary policy and extensive public investment. In 2043, the European single market in-
cludes all EFTA countries, all South-Eastern European countries, as well as Ukraine.   

20 

 
2.4. 

Scenario 4: Cultural hegemony through global capitalism  

Capitalist  culture  takes  over 
and cohesive digital platforms 

In this 2040 scenario, cultural he-
gemony through global capitalism 
has  ended  almost  all  social  con-
frontation. A few multinational tech 
companies with origins in the U.S. 
and  China  have  taken  over  the 
control  of  all  social  experiences 
and  systems  around  the  globe. 
There  is  hardly  any  corporate 
competition. Instead, a handful of 
corporate executives have estab-
lished a cartel-like structure of tol-
erated corporate co-existence, al-
ways  innovating  in  ways  to  ap-
pease  and  satisfy  the  customers. 
The world is run and organized by 
these  digital  amazons.  Capitalist 
growth is the superior value that guides most parts of the world. Coherent digital platforms 
(like those formerly known as metaverse but now invented and regularly recreated through 
advanced artificial intelligence) are designed by autonomous algorithms in order to infiltrate 
people toward more consumption and less social protest. The platforms started from social 
media and online shopping and are now taking over every aspect of human life: education, 
e-governance,  health,  and  finance,  etc. People  are highly  individualised  and  isolated  from 
each other except for digital communication, which weakens local community ties and divides 
society based on their own thoughts and values. Profiting are only the big tech companies 
and their shareholders because the big tech companies control the consumption activities of 
their consumers. New smart technologies are always surveying not only the consumers’ pur-
chases but also all other activities of their lives, thus the tech companies are always able to 
suggest new products that promise to make the consumers’ lives easy and rosy. They antic-
ipate the changing needs of citizens.  

Since the digital platform individualises the people, each person’s need is satisfied – however, 
only if it is beneficial for the tech companies. The processes and products are tailored, each 
person experiences what they need. Feminist and LGBTQ+ movement were integrated into 
market economy where many apps (for chatting, dating, etc.) and products aimed for people 
with any kind of sexual orientations. Social movements have been replaced by fun and pop 
culture of consumption whereas legal status for sexual minorities has not improved. There 
are myriad virtual communities for any kind of people’s preferences and orientations. How-
ever, those communities have no strong solidarities to each other. Rather they are divided 
through their ideologies and opinions, which is sometimes intentionally induced by misinfor-
mation to control the population. In fact, some members of communities are just chatbots, 
not real humans. 2nd live platforms – also controlled by the tech companies – offer an illu-
sionary escape from the miseries of climate change and provide colourful and flashy visions 
of what the future could bring if we all just consumed more. Everyone is different, everyone 
can enjoy their individual lives; that is fine as long as it makes money…. Identity, while tailored, 
is also fluid, and becoming. Distinguishing between environments – physical and virtual, aug-
mented, and traditional – is nearly impossible. Reality is no longer what it used to be. Groups 
live in their own imagined and created worlds.  

21 

 
 
European cohesion only for economic purposes   

The tech companies cooperate with the governments as both are looking for driving economic 
growth for their own benefits. Accordingly, the political-industrial complex releases misinfor-
mation to manipulate the people to align with the official policies. EU laws do not have the 
power to contain them, or policy-makers do not have an interest to take actions. The Euro-
pean market is well unified primarily for economic purposes, not for political and social ones. 
There is a single European market, but it is mostly only for the companies not for consumers. 
Everything about innovation is supported by EU policies. As a result, services can be better 
for consumers. Labour laws are not unified but depend on national policies. Abusing those 
differences in national policies, immigration mediators facilitate exploitative immigration. The 
exploitation of illegal migrants on low-skilled labour such as agriculture generates forms of 
modern slavery.   

Big tech companies provide all infrastructures for governance mechanisms in the EU and the 
MS. It is hard to tell if they are appropriate or not. In any case, opposing voices do not have 
any chance to be heard or spread, except through hacks. There is a tight network between 
policy-making  and  the  tech  giants.  The  dependence  on  the  industry’s  infrastructure  has 
grown stronger over the years so that no independent alternatives could be developed. Low 
competition also leads to innovation lock-ins.   

The ties between the tech giants and some populist parties have become extremely close as 
they  cooperate  to  manifest  their  power. While  the  tech  giants  finance  campaigns  of  these 
parties, they in turn, once in power, pass laws and regulations that help the tech companies 
to expand their business. Leaders of the parties are shareholders of such companies.  

Greenwashing and ignorance of the climate crisis   

For the most part, the population as well as policymakers ignore the ongoing climate crisis, 
some  even  deny  it.  There  is  not  much  debate  on  it  in  the  platform-controlled  media.  The 
economy is business as usual: striving for growth driven by competition and the craving for 
innovation. Not only a consequence but also a driver for this economic model is the demand 
for consumption. Consumption is also the quest for social acceptance, notwithstanding the 
ecological and social consequences.  

EU policies from the 2020s to pursue digitalisation and a green economy are merely used as 
excuses for further production and innovation. For example, some tech companies sell sev-
eral energy-intense geoengineering technologies (e.g., direct carbon capture technology) to 
the rich capitalists who are eager to conceal their high environmental burden ratio and create 
a good impression about their business for consumers and the governments. The EU and 
governments do not preserve or reserve green areas for CO2 capture and improvement of 
living quality, but rather implement costly geoengineering technologies such as solar radia-
tion  management  into  periphery  area,  burdening  marginalised  residences  into  unliveable 
conditions.   

Due to a lack of climate change mitigation, the incidents of the climate crisis are punctual and 
in the form of singular events. But they keep coming and their effects are getting more severe 
every time. The effects are more dire in the global south and on the poorer part of the popu-
lation. Also, in Europe, more and more regions are affected and only the well-to-do part of 
the society has the financial means to escape from such events in due time because they 
own various properties, can afford cooling systems against the increasing summer heat, can 
afford the rising prices of food, energy, mobility, housing, and to cope with the growing re-
source scarcity.   

22 

 
The race for resources that are getting scarce, not only rare earth, gas, or oil, but also water 
and arable land, is often the cause of military conflict between countries, especially in the 
global south. The race for ever-new innovations and profitable technologies, e.g., geoengi-
neering leads to neo-colonialism. Military conflicts over resources accelerate, and tech com-
panies prioritise profits rather than people. These consequences contribute to the migration 
and refugee movement, to inequality and impoverishment of large shares of society.  

The demographic shift has a slow but steady impact on the developments of this scenario. 
The ageing population in the highly developed countries demands more high-tech solutions 
for everyday life as well as cheap caregivers who often are migrants from the global south.  
At the same time, a growing middle-aged population from the global south expects to partic-
ipate  in  growing  wealth  and  economic  prosperity  that  is  (falsely)  propagated  in  the  social 
media of the highly developed countries.     

Climate migration   

The increasing climate crisis brings about more and more refugee movements, not only to 
Europe but in other parts of the globe as well. Even in certain areas of Europe, people have 
to migrate, e.g., from flooded coastal areas to the inner land or even to neighbouring countries. 
Even though it is not perceived in the mainstream (social) media, migration to the EU causes 
a lot of social confrontation, because EU inhabitants are not prepared for foreign cultures and 
the need of deprived people from abroad. Thus, while tailored products by corporations lead 
to low confrontation within Europe, there remains confrontation with migrants. The migrants 
are usually not compatible with the high-tech European labour market, only in the low-skilled 
segment can they find jobs, but these don’t pay enough to ensure their participation in the 
mainstream  economic  and  social  life.  It  makes  their  integration  difficult.  Thus,  this  causes 
additional  confrontation  but  hardly  anybody  notices  or  engages  in  dialogue  on  these  and 
other salient issues.   

Playing the nuclear card   

After a long and destructive war in some countries of the global north, there was a period of 
a political vacuum and some thugs and spies smuggled nuclear material and sold it to some 
developing countries in the global south via the dark web. Some countries that perceive them-
selves as exploited or underprivileged, now can develop nuclear weapons and blackmail the 
global north. Some countries demand more participation in the capitalist production pattern 
via  transfer  payments,  while  others  want  Western  companies  and  institutions  out  of  their 
countries and use scarce resources on their own.   

The illusionary peacefulness in the EU Member States is occasionally distorted by foreign 
(mis)information.  Hacked  social  media  channels  spread  the  information  of  the  division  of 
worlds, waging distrust between different social groups that have found their niches of social 
identity within the various sections of the tech platforms. It is hard to tell the average media 
user  and  consumer  what  information  is  true  or  not.  There  is  worrisome  information  about 
climate change incidents in various parts of the world, about power abuse, the media elite 
and new technologies that can either solve all problems or cause new ones.  

Religions and consumption merge together. Religious practices go online and form worldwide 
networks. The online networks are in part sponsored by commercials that are launched by 
the  big  tech  platforms,  of  which  some  even  host  certain  religious  groups.  More  and  more 
separatist religious groups are growing, some call themselves spiritual, some exist as online 
communities only. Though certain religious groups openly oppose others and compete for 
followers there are hardly any confrontational developments.  Only a few serious opposition 

23 

 
groups with religious or spiritual background with a focus on nature worship originate from 
the  global  south  and  find  followers  in  niches  in  many  other parts  of  the  world,  calling  into 
question the dominant consumption pattern that exploit the resources and people that to a 
large share live in the global south.  

3.  REFLECTIONS ON R&I POLICY IMPLICATIONS  

The scenarios deal with various bifurcations social confrontations might take in the future and 
their impact on European democracy. R&I developments partly reflect the confrontations, as 
R&I can be a tool in the hands of confronting parties, and partly shape the conditions of the 
confrontations by forming a layer of social deliberation that frames confrontations and strat-
egies. 

In drawing implications for R&I policy we focus on the relationship between R&I and some 
root causes of current as well as future confrontations, such as inequality and the climate and 
environmental crises, some emerging areas of social confrontations with a strong technolog-
ical character, such as AI, social media and housing, and on efforts to democratise science 
and technology which relate to avoiding social confrontations with a technological content. 
These implications are classified and presented in four parts.   

The first part raises the question of how R&I policy on the macro-level can have an impact 
toward more equity and equality. The second part is dedicated to the notion of more democ-
ratization  and  participation  in  the  process  of  R&I  priority  setting.  How  R&I  policy  could  be 
geared towards the stimulation of more socio-ecological transformation is the focus of the 
third part. The fourth and final part explores future European R&I focus areas of relevance to 
the four scenarios.  

Can R&I policy contribute to more equity and equality?  

The context of social confrontation and the four scenarios give us the unique chance to look 
at R&I policy for a social equity and equality perspective. This is usually not the policy arena 
for R&I. but since R&I policy is at the crossroads of many policy arenas, societal effects are 
always at stake, directly or indirectly. R&I policy at the MS level is more likely to play a role 
here than the EC, but the EC could implement good practice examples, e.g., by taking the 
following measures to have a more explicit impact on social gains of R&I:  

•  Social  innovations  programmes  and  the  opportunity  for  integrating  marginalized 

groups  

Stimulating  and  funding  social  innovation  can  focus  on  integrating  marginalized 
groups and give them a chance for their own agency and the opportunity of “Teilhabe” 
(participation in social and economic life). Social innovations can serve as means to 
reduce the potential for harmful social confrontations, even if they will not be totally 
eradicated. As BEPA put it: “Social innovations are social in both their ends and their 
means. [They are] new ideas (products, services and models) that simultaneously 
meet social needs (more effectively than alternatives) and create new social rela-
tionships  or  collaborations.  In  other  words,  they  are  innovations  that  are  not  only 
good for society but also enhance society’s capacity to act”. (BEPA 2010).  

•  Criteria for public R&I funds for new products and processes 

When distributing R&I funds to projects, criteria can be defined on the common good 
quality  of  the  project  objectives  and  the  recipients,  for  example:  Human  dignity, 

24 

 
solidarity  and  justice,  environmental  sustainability,  transparency  and  co-decision-
making.   

•  Socializing the profits of publicly funded innovations  

When allocating R&I funds to projects, the project plan could entail approaches how 
the benefits of innovation can be socialized in a fair manner, so that the taxpayer 
can benefit from the investments at least in a second order, e.g., as each taxpayer 
benefits from the public school system.  Interdisciplinary research needs to focus on 
the confrontational nature of profits related to innovation, on profit maximation and 
over profits, how more transparency on the gains can be achieved and what alter-
native IPR models could be. 

Can the process of R&I policy enhance stakeholder/public participation for investment deci-
sions?  

•  Democratizing decisions on investment (e.g., in industrial R&I, public R&I)  

Not only in publicly funded research projects but especially in public research organ-
isations as well as in private and public companies, new approaches can be charted 
to democratise the decision-making processes on how some investments in R&I are 
made and for what purpose. These can be – or maybe even have to be – approaches 
that grant more decision-making power to the people involved and affected, to em-
ployees, for example, without infringing the secrecy of strategic directions. Co-deci-
sion making on R&I investments could also be one of the criteria mentioned above 
for the allocation of public R&I funds. By the same token, these changes in govern-
ance might usher additional confrontations and need to be assessed, e.g., the long-
term consequences of investment decision taking and the implications for democ-
racy.  

•  Tripartite decision-making processes on future investments: government, industry, 

social groups 

At member state level, the co-decision-making process on R&I investments and on 
setting research priorities can be organized in a tripartite manner: between govern-
ment  representatives,  industry,  and  social  groups.  Based  on  the  old  corporatist 
model, it is crucial, however, to include more than the traditional union representa-
tives. Instead, other groups of society need to be incorporated as well in a fair and 
representative manner, e.g., the younger generation. This way, some decisions for 
R&I could be assessed if they are future-proof (e.g., sustainable for the next gener-
ations). 

•  Experiments for new forms of governance  

Co-decision-making processes in the context of R&I investments are not yet com-
mon in the EU. One way to better deal with social confrontation and use them as a 
resource for a more stable and resilient democracy is to learn and practice co-deci-
sion-making  process  from  early  on  and  on  as  many  occasions  as  possible.  Even 
though  it  might  appear complex  and cumbersome  at  the  start, it  will  save  a lot  of 
costs if social groups don’t have to waste resources when confronting each other to 
have  things  their  way.  Thus,  corporate  companies  and  research  organisations  as 

25 

 
  
well as R&I institutions including policymaking need to define strategies for how a 
higher level of co-decision-making can be achieved, e.g., by consent-orientation.   

Confrontations are a challenge for governance and there is a need to experiment 
with improving governance. More dialogue needs to be initiated to inspire creative 
solutions and mutual learning activities, across Europe and beyond. 

What alternative approaches of R&I towards socio-ecological transformation need to be de-
signed?  

The climate crisis is often seen as a major cause of adversity and desperation in our society 
in the future. It could bring about more inequity, more inequality and more social confrontation. 
Containing and mitigating the effects of the climate crisis needs to be the focus of socially 
responsible R&I policy.  

•  Role of R&I in ecological transformation/degrowth  

The  climate  effects  of  R&I  investments  need  to  be  assessed  before  these  invest-
ments are made. It is quite contested if more growth contributes to the climate crisis 
or what alternatives there are, e.g., for degrowth. Many potential social  confronta-
tions around technologies and climate change will have to deal with this polarisation. 

•  Dealing with the (uneven) consequences of climate change and uncertainty 

 A task for R&I policy is to figure out a good way of implementing proper concepts 
that compensate or avoid further stress to the climate while developing and using 
new technologies. How to share and distribute the severe consequences of climate 
change evenly between the global north and south is still an open question and one 
that  accompanies  many  technological  innovations.  To  some  degree,  there are al-
ready  considerations  to  put  up  funds  for  disaster-prone  regions,  especially  in  the 
global south that are suffering more from the climate crisis effects than the causers 
(who to a large degree reside in the global north). However, a more systematic ap-
proach to assess the global effects of R&I needs to be co-developed 

Future European R&I focus areas of relevance to the four scenarios  

The four scenarios discuss various development paths that from a normative position do not 
always depict a preferable future. Scenario 1 is the most positive one of the four – in our view 
- and it is helpful to filter the preferable developments that can be influenced by R&I policy-
making.  But  also,  for  the  other  three,  less  preferable  scenarios  it  is  necessary  to  identify 
negative developments that could be contained or prevented by R&I policy-making. Among 
these issues are the following:  

•  Alternative forms of living  

The shortage of affordable housing was an issue that was identified in the scenarios as 
a  root  cause  for  social  confrontation.  It  is  not  only  an  issue  for  governments  to  take 
enough money into their hands and build new homes but of equal importance is to start 
a discussion on the ways we want to live in the future that are compatible with the triple 
transition of digital, green and just transformation. Increasing, more people combine living 
and working under one roof, grow their own vegetables, require homes that save energy 
and provide a cool place during heat waves, but also need to be safe against the negative 
effects of climate change, new approaches need to be developed from all parts of society 

26 

 
and new technologies. Migration waves, earthquake disasters and other impactful events 
require a quick response to put up decent and protective dwellings, maybe even flexible 
and transportable ones. These issues may be addressed by new R&I approaches for the 
future.  Besides,  housing  and  ‘Teilhabe’’  directly  relate  to  the  reduction  of  inequalities 
across regional innovation systems. For the triple transition, ‘housing and ‘Teilhabe’’ are 
crucial aspects as the life cycles of built environments are often more than 100 years and 
longer, and intelligent planning is required to make constructions fit for ecological and 
social transformation, without missing the opportunities modern digital technologies can 
provide to such end. Matters of value chains, productions, consumptions, especially with 
regard to food and the transformation of the agro-sector are strongly connected to the 
ways we live and the houses we live and work in in the future. This gives us the chance 
to build resilient communities where citizens engage in dialogue with each other to solve 
disputes over confrontational issues.   

•  New technologies and social approaches to detect troll armies and fake news  

While there are already some technologies in place to detect troll armies and fake 
news that can harm democratic and economic processes, it is necessary to make 
these simpler and applicable for the average users. What is needed, are automatic 
tools that alert people when fake news and troll army operations appear on their IT 
gadgets, and education to use and interpret them. At best, detecting tools will always 
be a step ahead or at least at the same level of development as malware producers.  

•  Providers responsible for content 

Though the recent Digital Services Act (DSA) aims to tackle social media problems 
as wide-ranging as content regulation and the protection of users, such as misogyny, 
disinformation and consumer fraud, some concerns remain. One deficit is that  the 
providers do not take full responsibility for the content. In order to provide fair infor-
mation, the content needs to be controlled before it is put online. More research is 
needed to find solutions for this challenge and to provide moderated intervention on 
disputed topics. If automated tools like algorithms can really offer a solution needs 
to be assessed as well as their impact on democratic procedures. Socially respon-
sible AI  

Average AI tools, e.g. algorithms, reflect mainstream users and discriminate against 
minorities. White, male, young, urban, originating from the global north are the at-
tributes used in the context of AI programming. They perpetuate cultural biases from 
the real world to the virtual world and back. To break through this wall of biases new 
approaches have to be developed that take the patterns of other ethnicities, cultures, 
genders, ages etc. into account and create a  more diverse and democratic virtual 
world.  

27 

 
 
 
 
 
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Malleson,  T.  (2023)  Against  Inequality:  The  Practical  and  Ethical  Case  for  Abolishing  the 

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31 

 
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32 

 
  
 
  
  
 
 
ANNEX I: METHODOLOGICAL NOTE 

The Expert Process     

Within this FoD project, a small expert team was formed. The members were known for both 
their foresight expertise and thematic expertise.  Some experts were part of the FoD consor-
tium, some were external scholars. 

The  first  step  for  the  expert  group  was  to  identify  from  rapid  exploration  paper  and  other 
sources further factors to demarcate the topic. Through this horizon scanning some 30 factors 
with relevance to the future development of social confrontations were identified. A catchy 
title, a short paragraph and selected references were prepared on each factor. The STEEPV 
categorisation  was  used  for clustering  the  factors  and  to  make  sure that  each  category  is 
served.  

Subsequently, the factor collection was fed into s background paper for a first workshops, 
presenting  the  factors  and  the  scenario  structure for four  scenarios.  This  workshop and  a 
second one were used to connect and adjust the factors to each scenario through discussion 
with the participants. External participants were also taking part. Accordingly, the expert team 
developed four scenario narrative drafts which were presented in the HEFN steering meeting 
for further refinement and first implications for R&I policy. Subsequently, the scenarios were 
explored further and as an input for the first dissemination event of the project. This event 
should also serve to collect more inputs for R&I policy implications that should then be final-
ized in the last version of the Policy Brief.  

Collection of Factors 

The horizon scanning aims to collect relevant data about trends in the landscape. By scoping 
of the search field based on preliminary subject-related desk research, one can define key-
words and the most relevant sources for horizon scanning. Horizon scanning can combine 
qualitative  and  quantitative  methods  to  collect  and  synthesize  data  of  existing  knowledge 
(e.g., from other Foresight on Demand projects) about relevant mega-trends and long-term 
trends and their drivers, as well as weak signals and wild cards.  The following list of factors 
is tentative and represents general trends that are expected to have significant influence on 
the further development of social confrontations.    

33 

 
Table for collecting factors of change   

Social  

Title (self-ex-
planatory neu-
tral topic, no 
future projec-
tions)   
Inequality  

 Migration   

Description including possible future projections   

References (hyperlinks/ literature)   

 Economic difference and the narrative that well-to-do people 
have to defend their wealth and live at the expense of the poorer 
classes has waged conflict throughout human history.  
KSCH: Although it is increasingly becoming a consensus that 
economic growth is no longer the solution to social inequalities 
but is increasingly coming to be an amplifier of social inequalities, 
the ruling capitalist class will try to kidnap politics even more 
shamelessly than before, which will lead to doubts about the ca-
pacity for democracy. Small local but violent uprisings will follow. 
Populist regimes will exploit anti-establishment sentiment. New 
"communist" parties will re-enter national parliaments.   

Arabadjieva, K. (2022). The missing link between social inequal-
ities and the European Green Deal narrative. 
https://www.etui.org/news/missing-link-between-social-inequali-
ties-and-european-green-deal-narrative   
Piketty, T. (2022). A Brief History of Equality . Harvard University 
Press   

Malleson, T. (2023) Against Inequality: The Practical and Ethical 
Case for Abolishing the Superrich. Oxford University Press  
Finanz Wende e.V. (n.d.). Finanz Wende e.V. Retrieved May 19, 
2023, from https://www.finanzwende.de/  

 People migrating to different regions, countries causes conflicts 
for resources, cultural and ethnic identity.  
KSCH: Due to enormous, albeit initially rather small-scale, climate 
disasters, large migration flows will be set in motion, mainly af-
fecting migration to the southern edge of the Mediterranean and 
Turkey. This will require a Green Deal with the Mediterranean 
countries in the form of massive investments in agricultural infra-
structure through efficient desalination plants, irrigation systems 
and reforestation.   
Moreover, the further desertification of large areas of land in 
southern Spain, Turkey and Sicily will lead to massive internal mi-
gration.   

Dennison, J., Geddes, A. (2021). Thinking Globally about Atti-
tudes to Immigration: Concerns about Social Conflict, Economic 
Competition and Cultural Threat. The Political Quarterly 92(3), 
541-551.  
Vike, K. et al., (2023). Migration in the Context of Climate For-
eign Policy. DGAP Policy Brief. 5 April 
2023.  https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/migration-con-
text-climate-foreign-policy  

34 

 
  
  
   
  
  
  
  
   
  
  
Isolation/ indi-
vidualisation  

Pandemics  

demographic 
shifts  

weak commu-
nity life  

Long before COVID19 have we witnessed an increasing singular-
isation of the European society. Crisis situations make psycholog-
ical consequences obvious and people more prone to digital ad-
diction and precarious group identities  
KSCH: But there will also be contrary perceptions due to in-
creased digitalisation. These include holograms and second real-
ity virtual worlds that simulate a normal social life in the digital 
realm with many "players" interacting with each other. Through 
neuronal networking, sensory impressions in the virtual world will 
be increasingly perceived as "true". Many people will voluntarily 
migrate to these virtual worlds because they can live a more so-
cial and less isolated life there, which also distracts from the 
dreary real life conditions.  
In addition, drug use among young people, especially young men, 
will become so widespread that there will be massive genera-
tional cuts (including 25+NEETs). The first dramatic signs are al-
ready visible in the USA.  

Kolb, M. (2016, January 25). Drogentote in USA: Weiß, männ-
lich und immer jünger. Süddeutsche.de. https://www.sueddeut-
sche.de/politik/thema-im-us-wahlkampf-drogentote-in-den-usa-
weiss-maennlich-und-immer-juenger-1.2829860  

GEO PLUS MAGAZINE. (2022, January 5). Die stille Epidemie: 
Amerikas Drogenkrise wütet wie nie zuvor. geo.de. 
https://www.geo.de/wissen/gesundheit/-amerikas-drogenkrise-
wuetet-wie-nie-zuvor-31476666.html  

Der Spiegel. (2018, November 29). USA: Lebenserwartung sinkt 
- durch Drogen und Suizide. Der Spiegel. https://www.spie-
gel.de/gesundheit/diagnose/usa-lebenserwartung-sinkt-durch-
drogen-und-suizide-a-1240993.html  

World Economic Forum (2021) Global Risks Report. 
https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-risks-report-2021/   

Economic and other differences between social groups are made 
obvious and are amplified through pandemics. As the COVID19 
crisis has shown, new coalitions are formed between some very 
radical and some less radical groups. The COVID-19 pandemic 
and its economic fallout have exacerbated existing social and 
economic inequalities, leading to increased social tensions and 
protests. They were echoed in several new as well as established 
radical political parties.  
Slowing global population growth and rising median age will help 
some developing economies. But rapidly aging and contracting 
populations will weigh on many developed economies. It will be 
difficult to keep the progress in education, health and poverty re-
duction.  
The lack of a network in civil communities is a deficit when it 
comes to compensate for crisis situation. Especially when gov-
ernmental authorities are overburdened with certain develop-
ments it is important for civil society to rely on strong community 

35 

The National Intelligence Council (2021) Global Trends 2040, 
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/gt2040-home/gt2040-media-and-
downloads, ISBN 978-1-929667-33-8    

Marston, C., Renedo, A., & Miles, S. (2020). Community partici-
pation is crucial in a pandemic. The Lancet, 395(10238), 1676–
1678. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)31054-0  

 
  
  
   
  
  
higher rates of 
violence  

structures and build on social innovations to help people that are 
marginalized or to prevent cleavages in society.  
Notwithstanding empirical crime rates, security is always a sub-
jective perception. Dominant narratives of violence and crime 
cause feelings of uneasiness and insecurity in civil society and 
hamper public life, often also economic development. If counter 
measures by public authorities are not successful, the rate of 
weaponisation within civil society is likely to rise and/or some so-
cial groups are organizing themselves to take the law into their 
own hands, leading to a vicious spiral of crime and violence.  

Walby, S. (2013). Violence and society: Introduction to an 
emerging field of sociology. Current Sociology, 61(2), 95–111. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0011392112456478  

Technological & science-related  

Description including possible future projections   

Title (self-ex-
planatory neu-
tral topic, no 
future projec-
tions)   
(Digital) technol-
ogies  /Impact 
of social media 
in public de-
bate    

Social media echo chambers often increase societal polarisation 
when algorithms and user preferences lead to echo chambers of 
like-minded people. Alternatively, social media platforms could 
offer means to learn from alternative and opposing view-
points.         
KSCH: AI will deepen and expand existing echo chambers - in-
cluding through fake news that makes prevailing conspiracy 
myths seem more credible. This leads to profound uncertainty 
and further fragmentation of society. Among other things, it will 
also lead to a splitting off of people who would like to live as far 
as possible without digitization.  

36 

References (hyperlinks/ literature)   

Benson, T. (2023, January 20). The Small but Mighty Danger of 
Echo Chamber Extremism. Wired. 
https://www.wired.com/story/media-echo-chamber-extremism/   

Travierso, M. (2021). Measuring magnetism: How social media 
creates echo chambers. Nature Italy. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/d43978-021-00019-4 (https://www.na-
ture.com/articles/d43978-021-00019-4)  
Fukuyama, F., Richman, B., & Goel, A. (2020, November 24). 
How to Save Democracy From Technology. Foreign Affairs, Jan-
uary/February 2021. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/arti-
cles/united-states/2020-11-24/fukuyama-how-save-democracy-
technology  

Jan-Werner Müller (2020) Was ist Populismus? Frankfurt/Main: 
Suhrkamp  

 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Science  

Digital technolo-
gies to control 
populations  

New technolo-
gies like AI, au-
tomation  

Druckman, J. N. (2022). Threats to Science: Politicization, Misin-
formation, and Inequalities. The ANNALS of the American Acad-
emy of Political and Social Science, 700(1), 8–24. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/00027162221095431  

The role of science and its “objectivity” have been contested in 
the past years in the context of climate change and the COVID19 
pandemic.  
KSCH: Science in some key areas will be characterized by insti-
tutional mergers and institutional funding. Because these institu-
tional grants will consume enormous amounts of money, project 
grants will become less important. This will lead to massive insti-
tutional inefficiencies but also to the development of new key 
technologies in the field of energetics, synthetic materials, ge-
oengineering, digital optimization of subsystems (agriculture, 
transport). SSH are further instrumentalized. Their enlightening 
role further downgraded.  
Moreover, in key technologies that are of high commercial inter-
est (especially AI), the share of private "dark" science will con-
tinue to increase, further outpacing publicly funded science in 
these areas.  

In government hands these technologies can be used to control 
opposition groups and anybody whom the government distrusts. 
But also private groups, internal and from foreign countries as 
well as from the industry sector can spy on people in order to 
control their moves and thoughts and to manipulate them and stir 
people against each other.  
Causing unemployment, new job opportunities, demand for new 
qualifications  

Wang, M. (2021, April 8). China’s Techno-Authoritarianism Has 
Gone Global. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/arti-
cles/china/2021-04-08/chinas-techno-authoritarianism-has-gone-
global  

Broecke, S. (2021). Artificial Intelligence and Employment: NEW 
EVIDENCE FROM OCCUPATIONS MOST EXPOSED TO AI. 
OECD. https://www.oecd.org/future-of-work/reports-and-data/AI-
Employment-brief-2021.pdf  

37 

 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
Economic  
Title (self-ex-
planatory neu-
tral topic, no 
future projec-
tions)   
 Financial cri-
ses  

resource scar-
city  

Environmental  
Title (self-ex-
planatory neu-
tral topic, no 
future projec-
tions)   
Climate 
change  

Description including possible future projections   

References (hyperlinks/ literature)   

 Financial crises usually increase inequality and worsen the current 
social and economic disparities. Often, civil society has the impres-
sion that governmental intervention is more motivated by supporting 
the stumbling financial institutions and not the people who suffer 
from the impacts.  In the end the tax payer has to pay for the  finan-
cial stability measures. This is hard to communicate to the public in a 
time where a very small percentage of wealthy people are even get-
ting richer where as the rest is not improving or at least not signifi-
cantly.  
KSCH: Enormous advances in technology will mean that key rare 
earths and materials can be replaced by synthetic products, but this 
will require enormous energy consumption, risky infrastructures, and 
the use of alternative resources (which are also only finitely  

 World Economic Forum (2021) Global Risks Report  

The National Intelligence Council. (2021). Global Trends 
2040, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/gt2040-home/gt2040-
media-and-downloads, ISBN 978-1-929667-33-8    

Description including possible future projections   

References (hyperlinks/ literature)   

 The burden will be unevenly distributed, heightening competition, 
contributing to instability, straining military readiness, and en-
courage political movements. The effects put a lot of burden to 
socially deprived groups more than on others. This leads to con-
flict not only between groups of different equity, also between 
generations, ethnicities, etc.  

Wilk, R. (2009). Consuming ourselves to death. In S. Crate (ed.), 
Anthropology and climate change: from encounters to actions 
(pp. 265–76). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.  
Pybus, K., Power, M., Pickett, K. E., Wilkinson, R. (2022).  
Income inequality, status consumption and status anxiety: An 
exploratory review of implications for sustainability and directions 
for future research. Social Sciences & Humanities 6 (1), 100353, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssaho.2022.100353  

38 

 
  
  
  
  
The carbon 
challenge  

Finding solutions for the climate crises and energy source that 
make carbon usage superfluous is one of the big challenges for 
policy making and the economy. At the same time the necessary 
policy measures have to take care to make the transformation 
acceptable for civil society, especially for marginalized groups. 
Rising cost of energy hit poor people the hardest. They might 
thus exert resistance to go with the transformative approaches.  

Schiermeier, Q., Atkinson, K., Mega, E.R., Padma T.V., Stoye, 
E., Tollefson, J., Witze, A. (2019). Scientists worldwide join 
strikes for climate change. Nature. 573(7775), 472-473. doi: 
10.1038/d41586-019-02791-2. PMID: 31551548.  
 Jonathan Colmer: How does climate change shape inequality, 
poverty and economic opportunity? In: Economics Observatory, 
5 Oct 2021. https://www.economicsobservatory.com/how-does-
climate-change-shape-inequality-poverty-and-economic-oppor-
tunity   

Political  

Title (self-ex-
planatory neu-
tral topic, no 
future projec-
tions)   
 Military con-
flicts  

Feminism  

Governance 
structures / 
democratiza-
tion  

Description including possible future projections   

References (hyperlinks/ literature)   

 A direct threat to human security and a major challenge to the 
very existing of the European Union, a confederation of states 
based on pacifism and welfare.  
The progress of the feminist movement and increasing inde-
pendent life-style of women (as well as the LGBTQ community) 
makes some (hetero) male feel endangered in their historically 
rooted power positions and may cause aggressive sentiments 
against individual women or women in general (or LGBTQ mem-
bers), physically, psychologically, online  
The spreading of authoritarianism and of authoritarian practices 
among semi-consolidated democracies.  

Moustakis, F. (2004). Soft security threats in the new Europe: the 
case of the Balkan region. European security, 13(1-2), 139-156.  

Kaiser, S. (2020) Hass gegen Frauen: Rechtsextrem und Sexist. 
Die Zeit online. https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2020-
02/hass-frauen-rechtsterrorismus-motive-taeter-hanau-feminis-
mus?utm_referrer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.freistilberlin.de%2F   

Glasius, M. (2018). “What authoritarianism is … and is not: a 
practice perspective”, International Affairs, 94 (3), pp. 515–533, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiy060  
Enyedi, Z. (2020). Right-wing authoritarian innovations in Central 
and Eastern Europe. East European Politics, Vol. 36, No. 3, 363-
377; doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2020.1787162  

39 

 
  
 
  
European co-
hesion  

Foreign Infor-
mation Manip-
ulation and In-
terference  

Some groups in EU MS use incidents like Covid 19 or EU wide 
regulations to contest their membership, often motivated by pop-
ulist considerations  
KSCH: In 2040, there will be several lengthy lawsuits against EU 
member states that could only be resolved by kicking them out of 
the EU. However, most states are not prepared to do this. On the 
contrary, the accused states, which are characterized primarily 
by nationalistic and populist policies or are on the brink of eco-
nomic collapse, will fight for a massive reorganization of EU law 
in order to push through their concerns. This will lead to a weak-
ening of the EU and its erosion.  As a result, the EU will split into 
several diadochal communities of states.  
FIMI is a key global threat post to democracies by foreign states 
or other actors to take a negative impact on values, procedures 
and political processes, often through manipulative IT/social me-
dia devices and in combination with other hybrid activities. Often, 
proxies are used in the country under attack.  

Disequilibrium 
and mismatch 
of governance 
structures  

Growing com-
petition be-
tween China 
and US  

Future challenges might overwhelm existing governance and ad-
ministrative structure to react in due time in order to manage 
(multi-) crisis situations. Thus people/groups establish their own 
substitute structures which could undermine governmental au-
thority, also when it comes to weapons sovereignty. This could 
bring armed conflicts or even civil-war-like developments to the 
fore. A more peaceful scenario would be a patchwork society 
where different group live next to each other but with little inter-
action  
The US and China will have great influence on global dynamics, 
supporting competing visions if the international system and gov-
ernance that reflect their core interest and ideologies. This rivalry 
will affect most domains, existing alliances, international organi-
zations but also the race for resources, for expanding technologi-
cal knowledge, for more power over information, military, econ-
omy as well as for more soft cultural power.   

40 

European Commission. Directorate General for Regional and Ur-
ban Policy. (2022). Cohesion in Europe towards 2050: Eighth re-
port on economic, social and territorial cohesion. Publications Of-
fice. https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2776/624081  

European Union External Action Service. (2023). 1st EEAS Re-
port on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference 
Threats: Towards a framework for networked defence. 
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/docu-
ments/2023/EEAS-DataTeam-ThreatReport-2023..pdf   

Bradford, C. (2005). Global Governance Reform for the 21st Cen-
tury. OECD, 14. https://search.oecd.org/dev/34983436.pdf  

The National Intelligence Council (2021) Global Trends 2040, 
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/gt2040-home/gt2040-media-and-
downloads, ISBN 978-1-929667-33-8    

 
  
  
  
  
More corrup-
tion  

Increasing corruption especially with in government and adminis-
trative structures are causing distrust within civil society and are 
undermining the rule of law.   

Habibov, N., Fan, L., & Auchynnikava, A. (2019). The Effects of 
Corruption on Satisfaction with Local and National Governments. 
Does Corruption ‘Grease the Wheels’? Europe-Asia Studies, 
71(5), 736–752. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2018.1562044  

Disinfor-
mation  

The effects of mass disinformation practiced by non-European 
powers and illiberal actors in Europe eroding democratic resili-
ence   

Populism and 
Euroscepti-
cism  

The development of populist and other radical platforms fighting 
against the EU supra-national competences and more generally 
against Europeanization  

Guess, A. M., & Lyons, B. A. (2020). Misinformation, disinforma-
tion, and online propaganda. Social media and democracy: The 
state of the field, prospects for reform, 10. https://www.opo-
lisci.com/wp-content/uploads/pdf-front/Social_Media_and_Demo-
cracy.pdf#page=30   
Reinhard C. Heinisch, Christina Holtz-Bacha, Oscar Mazzoleni 
(eds.), Political Populism. A Handbook, Editors: Frankfurt-am-
Mein, Ed. Nomos, 2017 https://www.nomos-eli-
brary.de/10.5771/9783845271491/political-populism?page=1   

Description including possible future projections   

References (hyperlinks/ literature)   

Value-related  
Title (self-ex-
planatory neu-
tral topic, no 
future projec-
tions)   
 Religion  

Jera, E. (2014). Freedom of Religion and Social Conflict. Academic 
Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, 3(3), 553-555. Retrieved from 
https://www.richtmann.org/journal/index.php/ajis/article/view/3835  

 Freedom of religion  is guaranteed in European constitutions 
but not all religious communities comply to civil rights. There 
might be potential for a conflict that some religious groups 
are manipulating their member (especially young ones) and 
thus undermining rule of law and civil right. Some religious 
leaders start exerting their power on several spheres of soci-
ety (education, culture) and they even influence the political 
class, democratic elections, and law making. On the other 
hand, some governments like to survey religious groups be-
cause they are afraid of radicalisation and thus infringe pri-
vacy rights.  

41 

 
  
  
  
  
A struggle for a 
supremacy of 
values.  

Chopin, T., & Macek, L. (2018). In the face of the European Union’s 
political crisis: The vital cultural struggle over values. Fondation Eo-
bert Schuman / European Issue, 479, 1–10. https://www.robert-schu-
man.eu/en/doc/questions-d-europe/qe-479-en.pdf  

Will the future see more fractioning of society into polarized 
groups that confront each other or will a common consensus 
unite civil society (at least in Europe) in sharing the same 
values and promote European cohesion?   
KSCH: The delay of important sustainability policies, includ-
ing those related to climate catastrophe, biodiversity loss and 
increased animal welfare awareness, by populist and con-
servative parties that serve farmers and the food sector as 
their core clientele, among others, is giving rise to new social 
movements that will make such sustainability issues a matter 
of survival. This will lead to the emergence of new political 
parties or strengthen the existing green parties. However, 
some of these new movements will also radicalise and be-
come involved in militant or clandestine operations against 
governments - in the USA also with firearms and will encoun-
ter an equally radicalised counter-movement of property 
preservationist and reactionary groups that will not shy away 
from firearms either. This clash of values will also exacerbate 
intergenerational fault lines. Counter-movements to this will 
be supported by right-wing and populist as well as moderate 
parties. Distinct countercultures will establish themselves on 
both sides, which will fight for influence and the distribution of 
resources.  

42 

 
  
  
   
   
  
  
  
GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU 

In person 
All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct centres. You can find the ad-
dress of the centre nearest you online (european-union.europa.eu/contact-eu/meet-us_en). 

On the phone or in writing 
Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European Union. 
You can contact this service: 
  by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls), 
  at the following standard number: +32 22999696,  
  via the following form: european-union.europa.eu/contact-eu/write-us_en. 

FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU 

Online 
Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on 
the Europa website (european-union.europa.eu). 

EU publications 
You can view or order EU publications at op.europa.eu/en/publications. Multiple copies of free 
publications can be obtained by contacting Europe Direct or your local documentation centre 
(european-union.europa.eu/contact-eu/meet-us_en). 

EU law and related documents 
For access to legal information from the EU, including all EU law since 1951 in all the official 
language versions, go to EUR-Lex (eur-lex.europa.eu). 

EU open data 
The portal data.europa.eu provides access to open datasets from the EU institutions, bodies 
and agencies. These can be downloaded and reused for free, for both commercial and non-
commercial purposes. The portal also provides access to a wealth of datasets from European 
countries. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This policy brief explores how social confrontations relate to 
science  and  society,  and  how  may  they  affect  the  future  of 
democracy in Europe. The brief presents four scenarios that 
chart diverging pathways on how social confrontations could 
evolve  in  the  next  15  years  and  how  they  could  influence 
democratic  developments  in  the  EU.  From  these  scenarios 
we extract conclusions and implications for R&I policymaking.  

Research and Innovation policy