COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive (EU) 2015/637 on the coordination and cooperation measures to facilitate consular protection for unrepresented citizens of the Union in third countries and Directive (EU) 2019/997 establishing an EU Emergency Travel Document
Date: 2023-12-06
Institutions: Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, European Commission
Subjects: EU Member State, EU national, European passport, consulate, diplomatic protection, embassy, third country

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 6.12.2023  SWD(2023) 941 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  IMPACT ASSESSMENT    Accompanying the document Proposal for a Council Directive  amending Directive (EU) 2015/637 on the coordination and cooperation measures to facilitate consular protection for unrepresented citizens of the Union in third countries and Directive (EU) 2019/997 establishing an EU Emergency Travel Document {COM(2023) 930 final} - {SEC(2023) 930 final} - {SWD(2023) 940 final} - {SWD(2023) 942 final}  
 
 
CONTENT 

1. 

INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT .....................................4 

2.  PROBLEM DEFINITION ...........................................................................................7 

2.1.  Preparedness to ensure the protection of fundamental rights ............................7 
2.2.  What is the problem and why is it a problem? ...................................................8 
2.2.1. Overview ........................................................................................................8 
2.2.2. Limitations resulting from the lack of preceding evaluation .........................9 
2.2.3. Imprecise definition of ‘unrepresented citizens’ ............................................9 
2.2.4. Unclear  assignment  of  roles  and  tasks  at  local  consular  cooperation 

networks .......................................................................................................10 
2.2.5. Ineffective contingency planning .................................................................11 
2.2.6. Ineffectiveness of Lead State concept ..........................................................13 
2.2.7. Legal uncertainty related to the role of the EU and EU delegations ...........14 
2.2.8. Inconsistent information to EU citizens .......................................................16 
2.2.9. Lack of reliable information on EU citizens living or traveling abroad ......17 
2.2.10. Complexity and ineffectiveness of reimbursement procedure ...................18 
2.3.  Magnitude of the problem ................................................................................19 
2.3.1. Estimated number of unrepresented EU citizens .........................................19 
2.3.2. Estimated number of cases of assistance to unrepresented EU citizens ......20 
2.3.3. Feedback from EU delegations ....................................................................21 
2.4.  How will the problem evolve? .........................................................................21 
2.4.1. Consular networks .......................................................................................21 
2.4.2. Unrepresented EU travellers ........................................................................22 
2.4.3. Number of crises requiring consular assistance ...........................................22 

3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? ...............................................................................23 

3.1.  Legal basis .......................................................................................................23 
3.1.1. Mandate of the EEAS and function of EU delegations ...............................24 
3.1.2. Compatibility of the role of EU delegations with the Vienna Convention 

on Consular Relations ..................................................................................25 
3.2.  Subsidiarity: Necessity and added value of EU action ....................................26 

4.  OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? ......................................................27 

4.1.  General objective .............................................................................................27 
4.2.  Specific objectives (‘SO’) ................................................................................27 

5.  WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? ...........................................28 

5.1.  What is the baseline from which options are assessed? ...................................28 
5.2.  Description of the policy options per specific objective ..................................28 

 
 
 
5.2.1. SO1: Enhance the legal certainty for EU citizens with respect to the scope 

of the right to consular protection ................................................................28 

5.2.2. SO2:  Ensure  clear  roles,  coordination  and  cooperation  mechanisms 

between Member States and EU delegations, including in times of crisis. .29 

5.2.3. SO3:  Improve  the  information  provision  and  communication  with 

(unrepresented) EU citizens. ........................................................................30 

5.2.4. SO4:  Increase  the  efficiency  and  use  of  the  financial  reimbursement 

procedures ....................................................................................................30 
5.3.  Options discarded at an early stage ..................................................................31 

6.  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE DIFFERENT POLICY OPTIONS AND 

WHO WILL BE AFFECTED? ..................................................................................32 

6.1. 
Impacts on fundamental rights .........................................................................32 
6.2.  Economic impacts ............................................................................................33 
6.3.  Compliance with the ‘Digital by Default’ principle ........................................38 
6.4.  Assessment of options ......................................................................................38 
6.4.1. Assessment of options for SO1 ....................................................................39 
6.4.2. Assessment of options for SO2 ....................................................................41 
6.4.3. Assessment of options for SO3 ....................................................................46 
6.4.4. Assessment of options for SO4 ....................................................................48 

7.  HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? ..................................................................50 

8.  PREFERRED COMBINATION OF OPTIONS .......................................................53 

Impacts of the preferred combination of options .............................................54 
8.1. 
8.2.  REFIT – Preferred option ................................................................................54 

9.  HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? ........55 

GLOSSARY ......................................................................................................................57 

ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION .................................................................58 

ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION ...........................................................70 

ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW? ...............................................................86 

ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL METHODS ........................................................................102 

ANNEX  5:  RELEVANT  PROVISIONS  OF  THE  DIRECTIVE  AND  HOW  IT 

WORKS ...................................................................................................................111 

ANNEX  6:  LEVEL  OF  MEMBER  STATES’  REPRESENTATION  IN  THIRD 

COUNTRIES ...........................................................................................................113 

ANNEX 7: FACTORS LIKELY TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF CRISES WITH 

AN IMPACT FOR CONSULAR PROTECTION ..................................................120 

ANNEX 8: INTERVENTION LOGIC ............................................................................122 

ANNEX 9: BASELINE SCENARIO ..............................................................................123 

ANNEX 10: MEASURES NOT REQUIRING A POLICY CHOICE ............................126 

 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT 

European Union (EU) citizens travelling to or living in a third (that is, non-EU) country where 
their Member State of nationality is not represented (‘unrepresented EU citizens’) are entitled 
to the protection of the diplomatic and consular authorities of any other Member State under 
the  same  conditions  as  the  nationals  of  that  Member  State.  This  right  is  set  out  in  Articles 
20(2)(c) and 23 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and in Article 
46 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’).  

This protection is an essential element attached to EU citizenship. It is an expression of EU 
identity and the external dimension of EU citizenship, one of the practical benefits of being an 
EU citizen1, and a tangible example of European solidarity appreciated by many EU citizens2. 
On this basis of this right, unrepresented EU citizens in need of assistance abroad, be it in case 
of accident, illness, being victims of crime, or loss of their travel documents, can turn to the 
diplomatic and consular authorities of other Member States. 

On  20  April  2015,  the  Council  adopted  Directive  (EU)  2015/637  on  the  coordination  and 
cooperation measures to facilitate consular protection for unrepresented citizens of the Union 
in  third  countries  (from  here  on  the  Directive  or  the  Consular  Protection  Directive)3.  This 
Directive  lays  down  the  coordination  and  cooperation  measures  necessary  to  facilitate  the 
exercise of the right of EU citizens to enjoy, in the territory of a third country in which the 
Member State of which they are nationals is not represented, consular protection on the same 
conditions as the nationals of the represented Member State providing assistance. The Member 
States  had  three  years,  until  May  2018,  to  transpose  the  Directive  into  their  national 
legislation4.  

The Directive replaced the ten-year long intergovernmental sui generis legal framework that 
used to govern the implementation of the EU citizenship right to consular protection5. It does 
not  exist  in  a  legal  vacuum,  however,  and  the  following  instruments  are  relevant  to  ensure 
effective consular protection to EU citizens: 

•  The  1963  Vienna  Convention  on  Consular  Relations  (VCCR)6  as  the  basis  for 

international consular cooperation between States; 

•  The European External Action Service (EEAS) Decision7 outlining the mandate of the 
EU delegations (EUDEL). According to Article 5(10) of that Decision, the EU delegations 
are  to  “acting  in  accordance  with  the  third  paragraph  of  Article  35  of  the  Treaty  on 
European Union (TEU), and upon request by Member States, support the Member States 
in their diplomatic relations and in their role of providing consular protection to citizens 
of the Union in third countries on a resource-neutral basis”; 

1  

2  

3  

4  
5  

6  
7  

See Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on Consular protection for citizens of the European 
Union abroad, COM(2011)881 final, Explanatory Memorandum. 
According to Flash Eurobarometer 485, around three quarters of respondents (76%) are aware of this 
right. 
Council  Directive  (EU)  2015/637 of  20  April 2015 on  the  coordination  and  cooperation measures  to 
facilitate  consular  protection for  unrepresented  citizens  of the  Union  in  third  countries  and  repealing 
Decision 95/553/EC (OJ L 106, 24.4.2015, p. 1). 
Article 17(1) of the Directive. 
See Decision 95/553/EC of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within 
the Council of 19 December 1995 regarding protection for citizens of the European Union by diplomatic 
and consular representations (OJ L 314, 28.12.1995, p. 73). 
See at https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_2_1963.pdf  
Council  Decision  2010/427/EU  of  26  July  2010  establishing  the  organisation  and  functioning  of  the 
European External Action Service (OJ L 201, 3.8.2010, p. 30).  

4 

 
 
 
•  Council Directive (EU) 2019/9978 (the ‘ETD Directive’) on the issuance of Emergency 
Travel  Documents  (ETD),  which  is  a  single-journey  document,  allowing  the  bearer  to 
return home, or, exceptionally, to another destination, in the event that they do not have 
access to their regular travel documents, for example because they were stolen or lost. EU 
ETDs  were  first  introduced  by  Decision  96/409/CFSP9  in  1996.  The  ETD  Directive 
provides for a modernised, harmonised and more secure EU ETD format. The issuance of 
ETDs is one of the six types of consular assistance expressly mentioned by the Consular 
Protection Directive; 

•  The  European  Union  Civil  Protection  Mechanism  (UCPM),  which  may  be  used  to 
provide  civil  protection  support  to  consular  assistance  to  the  citizens  of  the  Union  in 
disasters  in  third  countries10.  During  the  COVID-19  crisis,  the  UCPM  was  activated  an 
unprecedented  number  of  times  in  support  of  consular  assistance  requests  (408  flights, 
100 313  passengers  repatriated  on  UCPM-financed  flights)11.  The  UCPM  also  played  a 
significant role during the 2021 consular emergency in Afghanistan, supporting 98 flights 
which evacuated 10 000 passengers (including a number of eligible persons who were not 
EU  citizens).  The  Union  co-financed  75%  of  the  costs  of  these  repatriation  flights. 
According  to  Article  13(4)  of  the  Consular  Protection  Directive,  the  Lead  State  or  the 
Member State(s) coordinating assistance to unrepresented citizens can resort to the UCPM 
for help in crisis situations. Under the UCPM, Member State(s) are directly cooperating 
with nine UCPM Participating States12. It should also be noted that in crisis situations, there 
is the possibility to use UCPM’s co-financed flights to send teams of civil protection or 
consular experts to the crisis-hit third country; 

•  Consular protection provisions/clauses included in several international agreements13 
with  a  view  to  enabling  represented  Member  States  to  provide  consular  protection  to 
unrepresented EU citizens and dispensing with the obligation to notify the receiving State 
pursuant to Article 8 VCCR.  

8  

9  

10  

11  

12  

13  

Council Directive (EU) 2019/997 of 18 June 2019 establishing an EU Emergency Travel Document and 
repealing Decision 96/409/CFSP (OJ L 163, 20.6.2019, p. 1).  
Decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council 
of 25 June 1996 on the establishment of an emergency travel document (OJ L 168, 6.7.1996, p. 4). 
See Article 16(7) of Decision No 1313/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 
December 2013 on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism (OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 924). 
Map summarising the UCPM support to Member States and UCPM Participating State in organising the 
repatriation  of  EU  citizens  from  across  the  world  during  the  COVID-19  pandemic:  https://civil-
protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/news-stories/stories/bringing-stranded-citizens-home_en 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Norway, Serbia, Türkiye and 
Ukraine. 
See, for example: Strategic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, 
of the one part, and Canada, of the other part ; Partnership Agreement on Relations and Cooperation 
between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and New Zealand, of the other part; 
Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, 
of the one part, and the Republic of Kazakhstan, of the other part; Framework Agreement on Partnership 
and Cooperation between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Malaysia, of 
the  other  part;  Political  dialogue  and  Cooperation  Agreement  between  the  European  Union  and  its 
Member  States,  of  the  one  part,  and  the  Republic  of  Cuba,  of  the  other  part;  Comprehensive  and 
Enhanced  Partnership  Agreement  between  the  European  Union  and  the  European  Atomic  Energy 
Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the other part; 
Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development between the European Union and its Member 
States, of the one part, and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, of the other part. 

5 

 
 
 
A  short  description  of  the  provisions  of  the  Directive  and  examples  on  how  it  works  are 
presented in Annex 5. 
As mentioned in the 2020 EU citizenship report14, the 2021 Commission work programme15 
announced a review of the EU rules on consular protection to improve the EU’s and Member 
States’ preparedness and capacity to protect and support EU citizens in times of crisis. This 
would  involve  strengthening  the  EU’s  supporting  role16  and  making  best  use  of  its  unique 
network of EU delegations.  

In addition, the Commission, in its Communication in the follow up on the Conference on the 
Future  of  Europe17,  committed  to consider  new  areas  of  action,  such  as  making  “European 
citizenship more tangible to citizens, including by reinforcing the rights attached to it and by 
providing reliable and easily accessible information about it.”  

The  Strategic  Compass  for  Security  and  Defence  –  For  a  European  Union  that  protects  its 
citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security adopted by the 
Council in March 202218 announced that “the EEAS crisis response mechanisms, our consular 
support and field security will also be reviewed and strengthened to better assist Member States 
in  their  efforts  to  protect  and  rescue  their  citizens  abroad,  as  well  as  to  support  our  EU 
delegations when they need to evacuate personnel”19. 

On  2  September  2022,  the  Commission  published  a  report  on  the  implementation  and 
application of the Directive (the ‘Commission Report’)20, which notes that crises resulting in 
requests for consular protection are increasing in number and scale. In particular, the COVID-
19 pandemic (unprecedented in scale and complexity), the crisis in Afghanistan, Russia’s war 
of aggression against Ukraine and the subsequent consular crises provided a context to identify 
gaps and reflect on how to strengthen Union citizens’ rights related to consular protection and 
to further facilitate its exercise.  

Improving  the  consular  protection  of  EU  citizens  abroad  by  reinforcing  EU  solidarity  and 
cooperation  in  this  field  would  ensure  that  EU  citizens  continue  to  benefit  from  this 
fundamental right according to the highest standards.  

14  

15  
16  

17  

18  
19  

20  

Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European  Economic  and 
Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions: EU Citizenship Report 2020 Empowering citizens 
and protecting their rights (COM(2020) 730 final). 
COM(2020) 690 final. 
See Article 5(10) of the Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning 
of the European External Action Service (2010/427/EU). 
Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European  Economic  and 
Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions: Conference on the Future of Europe  – Putting 
Vision into Concrete Action (COM(2022) 404 final and Annex). 
ST 7371/22. 
Following on this call, an EEAS Crisis Response Centre (CRC) was created in July 2022 as the EEAS 
permanent  crisis  response  capability,  liaising  with  all  EU Institutions’,  Member  States’ and partners’ 
crisis cells.  
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation and 
application of Council Directive (EU) 2015/637 of 20 April 2015 on the coordination and cooperation 
measures to facilitate consular protection for unrepresented citizens of the Union in third countries and 
repealing Decision 95/553/EC (COM(2022) 437 final). 

6 

 
 
 
 
 
2.  PROBLEM DEFINITION 

2.1. Preparedness to ensure the protection of fundamental rights 

“In  times  of  increasingly  rapid  change,  growing  complexity,  and  critical  uncertainty, 
responsible governance requires preparing for the unexpected”21.  

Consular  preparedness  implies  to  anticipate  and  address  the  main  issues  related  to  the 
protection  of  EU  citizens  abroad  irrespective  of  whether  hypothetical  scenarios  materialise. 
This applies to regular consular protection but is even more relevant in crisis situations where 
rapidity and adequacy of response is of utmost importance for an effective assistance.  

Against this  backdrop, there is  a need  to  pinpoint  existing  weaknesses in  the  Member 
States and EU assistance coordination in order to address them and to prevent risks for 
EU citizens. Crisis management is not limited to responding to emergencies, but rather is a 
dynamic process that includes (1) prevention, (2) preparation (also called mitigation) and (3) 
response and recovery actions.  

Prevention  activities  aim  to  forecast  critical  events  and  identify  possible  crisis  situations  in 
advance to avoid that EU citizens become victims of predictable dangers. These actions mainly 
consist in offering travel information based on the assessment of a situation in a third country, 
also known as ‘travel advice’. After having identified the most plausible risk scenarios, it is 
essential to prepare accordingly in order to be ready to act if and when the emergency actually 
occurs.  

Good  planning  ahead  of  a  possible  crisis  is  essential  to  make  the  crisis  response  phase  as 
effective  as  possible.  Finally,  the  recovery  phase  involves  the  evaluation  of  the  results 
achieved, thus giving the opportunity to learn from successes and failures. It follows that while 
crises could appear as ad-hoc problems, since they are often unforeseen and distinct from 
each other, the mechanisms necessary to deal with them should not be ad-hoc ones. 

In the case of consular protection, lack of preparedness and failure to provide protection in a 
timely and effective manner may have serious consequences for EU citizens in a distressing or 
even dangerous situation, either an everyday one or, most importantly, a crisis situation.  

Even though most persons do not experience any serious trouble when travelling, it can occur 
that a person or a group of persons suddenly face a life-or-death situation or require different 
types of protection at once. In particular, situations where a large number of citizens require 
the intervention of the diplomatic and consular representations can be particularly challenging. 
Failures to provide effective consular protection to EU citizens in distress not only has concrete 
negative  consequences  on  the  citizens  concerned  and  their  families,  but  it  also  poses  a 
reputational risk for the Member States and the EU. 

Another important aspect to consider, when analysing problems in the provision of consular 
protection, is the fact that from a practical point of view, consular assistance from the Member 
States and the support of EU delegations is a dynamic process that is not only strictly connected 
to the capacity of the diplomatic and consular missions on the ground, and to the resources 
available for managing emergencies, but also to the existence of clear procedures and legal 
safeguards providing a framework for an effective response.  

Legal  uncertainties  for  the  actors  involved  in  consular  protection  activities,  including  EU 
delegations, in particular in crisis response, undermine their capacity to respond effectively to 

21  

OECD, Strategic Foresight see at https://www.oecd.org/strategic-foresight/whatisforesight/. 

7 

 
 
 
the situation, therefore hindering EU citizens’ enjoyment of their fundamental right to consular 
protection.  

In conclusion, the context of the provision of consular protection has specific characteristics, 
including prevention and preparedness that are to be taken into account when illustrating the 
problems and their magnitude in the next sections.  

2.2. What is the problem and why is it a problem? 

2.2.1.  Overview 

The figure below presents the key problems22 identified, as will be explained in the following 
sections.  

Figure 1: Overview of problems identified and their consequences  

In  addition  to  the  study  carried  out  to  support  this  impact  assessment23,  the  problems  were 
identified on the basis of the Commission Report and the evidence gathered for its preparation, 
an inception impact assessment, the discussions among Member States in the Council Working 
Party on Consular Affairs (COCON) and the public consultation for the 2020 EU Citizenship 
report  and  the  Flash  Eurobarometer  485  on  EU  Citizenship  and  Democracy.  For  more 
information, see Annex I. 

22  

23  

Please note that an additional set of problems were investigated as part of the study. The rationale for not 
including these in the impact assessment is presented in Annex I and II of the study.  
Study supporting the impact assessment, including its annexes.  

8 

unrepresented citizens face risks of not being assistedCoordination challenges in LCC meetings in assisting unrepresented citizensCoordination problems in relation to Joint Consular Crisis Preparedness FrameworksInefficiencies in crisis situations when there is a Lead State   unrepresented citizens face risks of not receiving effective consular protection EU citizens are not consistently or correctly informed on the risks of travelling and on whom they can ask/rely for assistanceMember States have difficulties in identifying EU citizens to assist  Financial reimbursements are burdensome and not used1) Imprecise definition of unrepresented citizens 2) Unclear assignment of roles and tasks at Local consular cooperation networks3) Ineffective contingency planning (Joint Consular Crisis Preparedness Frameworks)4) Ineffectiveness of Lead State concept5) Legal uncertainty related to the role of the EU and EU Delegations in the provision of consular assistance 6) Inconsistent information to EU citizens7) Lack of reliable information on EU citizens living or traveling abroad8) Complexity and ineffectiveness of financial reimbursements  
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.2.  Limitations resulting from the lack of preceding evaluation 

A  derogation  from  the  ‘evaluate  first’  principle  was  granted  given  the  preparation  of  the 
Commission  Report  and  the  fact  that,  shortly  after  the  transposition  of  the  Directive,  the 
datasets were insufficient to carry out a fully-fledged evaluation. 

However, it must be acknowledged that the absence of such an evaluation has a negative impact 
on  the  data  and  evaluative  evidence  available  for  this  impact  assessment,  notably  when 
determining  the  scale  of  the  problems  and  subsequently  the  proportionality  of  the  possible 
policy options. In view of these limitations, they are specifically addressed in the assessment 
of the proportionality of the different options. 

2.2.3.  Imprecise definition of ‘unrepresented citizens’  

In practice: Nadine, a citizen of Member State A, was victim of a robbery on holidays in 
third  country  X.  She  is  without  travel  document.  The  embassy  of  Member  State  A  is 
2 000 km away and it would be very difficult for her to reach it. Member State B consulate 
is in the same area where Nadine is located. When Nadine goes to the consulate of Member 
State B, Member State B refuses to provide consular protection because Member State A is 
present in the third country. Nadine is not provided with the consular protection needed. 

Articles 4 and 6 of the  Directive define ‘unrepresented citizen’ as every citizen holding the 
nationality of a Member State which is not represented in a third country, which is the case if 
it has no embassy or consulate established there on a permanent basis, or if it has no embassy, 
consulate  or  honorary  consul  there  which  is  ‘effectively  in  a  position  to  provide  consular 
protection in a given case’. Accordingly, when a citizen’s Member State of nationality has an 
embassy, consulate or honorary consul established in a third country, but these are, for any 
reason, unable to provide the protection the citizen concerned would otherwise be eligible to 
receive  according  to  national  law  or  practice  in  a  given  case,  that  citizen  should  also  be 
considered ‘unrepresented’. 

A citizen who seeks consular protection from the embassy or consulate of another Member 
State should not be redirected to the embassy, consulate or honorary consul of his or her own 
Member State of nationality when it is not possible. This might be due to local circumstances 
(e.g.  as  a  result  of  disruptions  to  the  transport  system  due  to  a  natural  disaster)  or  lack  of 
resources for the citizen to safely reach or be reached by the consular authorities of his or her 
Member  State  of  nationality  to  receive  consular  protection.  There  are  no  quantitative  data 
available on such cases as Member States do not collect such information. However, the survey 
of EU delegations conducted in the context of the study suggests that cases where EU citizens 
were  wrongly  considered  represented  and  were  not  assisted  or  redirected  according  to  the 
procedures of the Directive have indeed occurred 24. 

In addition, as noted in the Commission Report, some Member States have voiced difficulties 
in determining whether an existing embassy, consulate or honorary consul is ‘effectively’ in a 
position  to  provide  consular  protection  as  stated  in  Article  6  of  the  Directive.  While  some 
Member States consider the issue of remoteness or capacity as a factor in the assessment, others 
do  not.  Some  Member  States  noted  difficulties  in  determining  to  what  extent  a  lack  of 
proximity could give rise to a lack of representation. Some Member States expect citizens to 

24  

Out of the 77 EU delegations that answered the survey, 8 EU delegations stated that they had encountered 
such cases, of which two EU delegations stated this happened frequently. See Annex II, study, p. 38. 

9 

 
 
 
make an effort to access representations of their Member State of nationality, including over 
larger distances.  

Generally,  most  Member  States  take  the  view  that  the  threshold  for  assessing  whether  an 
individual  is  unrepresented  varies  depending  on  the  nature  and  urgency  of  the  situation.  In 
particular  in  crisis  situations,  where  Member  States  are  faced  with  urgent  requests  for 
assistance,  it  can  be  very  difficult  for  them  to  confirm  rapidly  whether  a  citizen  is 
unrepresented. 

For example, large land surface third countries, even while covered by Member States, raise 
issues due to the size of the country. That is, while Member States may be represented in the 
capital or in the main cities of a large country, large sections of the territory of that country 
may remain uncovered, resulting in the Member States not being in a position to effectively 
provide consular protection to citizens in those areas. 

This legal uncertainty concerning representation hinders the effective exercise of EU citizens’ 
right  to  consular  protection  as  unrepresented  citizens  may  be  deprived  of  the  provision  of 
consular protection they are entitled to, both in crisis and non-crisis situations. 

2.2.4.  Unclear assignment of roles and tasks at local consular cooperation networks  

In practice: 7 Member States are represented in third country X, where an EUDEL is also 
established. They meet  every month in  a local consular cooperation meeting.  Since the 
chairing arrangements, as defined until now by the group, task the country holding the 
rotating Presidency of the Council to chair the group, the LCC meeting is chaired only 
every 2 years by a Member State present in third country X. In other instances, the group 
is either chaired by the EUDEL, by the incoming Presidency, when present in the country 
or, upon their request, by the Member States holding the Presidency accredited but not 
present. This situation creates confusion with regards to the respective roles within the 
LCC and compromises effective cooperation by failing to ensure, amongst other aspects, 
business continuity as well as institutional memory. 

Local consular cooperation (LCC) meetings are meetings held between consular officials of 
usually25 represented Member States in a third country and the consular correspondent in the 
EU delegation. The purpose of these meetings is to improve communication and cooperation 
between local actors. In those meetings issues such as contingency planning, safety of citizens, 
prison conditions or consular access are typically discussed. 

Article 12 of the Directive lays out that the Chair of the LCC meetings must be a representative 
of a Member State unless otherwise agreed, in close cooperation with the EU delegation. As 
per  Recital  18  of  the  Directive,  the  competences  and  respective  roles  of  all  relevant  actors 
should be clarified. As noted in the Commission Report, Member States with lightly staffed 
representations highlighted how local coordination is crucial, both as a source of information 
and  as  a  practical  tool  to  solve  issues  arising  from  the  provision  of  consular  protection. 
However,  Member  State  and  EU  stakeholders  consulted  noted  that  it  is  difficult  for  lightly 
staffed Member States to participate in all LCC discussions, let alone chair meetings. This is 
particularly difficult for unrepresented Member States, notably due to the different time zones. 
The COVID-19 crisis has led to a development of remote access/videoconference format for 
these meetings allowing also unrepresented Member States to join when relevant. 

25  

In some cases, unrepresented Member States also participate virtually in the meetings.  

10 

 
 
 
A  few  Member  States  noted  as  a  shortcoming  that  the  information  discussed  during  LCC 
meetings is not always available or accessible to those Member States not present in the third 
country concerned (e.g. capitals or geographically close embassies). One Member State noted 
in  this  regard  the  lack  of  sharing  of  information  about  repatriation  flights,  which  was 
considered an issue during the COVID-19 crisis. One Member State noted that although the 
minutes of meetings are uploaded into the closed online information exchange platform CoOL 
operated by the EEAS, in order to facilitate discussion and feedback, the EU delegations could 
inform unrepresented Member States capitals of agenda of LCC meetings in advance to ensure 
that  continuous  information  flow  takes  place.  In  a  similar  vein,  another  Member  State 
highlighted that the functionality of the meetings could be further improved by identifying one 
channel through which reporting is coordinated and disseminated to all Member States. 

There does not seem to exist a clear practice of who chairs LCC meetings. In particular, the 
role of EU  delegations  in  LCC is  not  correctly reflected in  the Directive.  It  is  important to 
reiterate that problems that might seem of purely administrative/technical nature in a non-crisis 
context  can  become  concrete  and  significant  obstacles  to  smooth  operations  during  crisis 
situations. This is the case for arrangements in LCC meetings, which might lead to ineffectively 
assisting EU citizens due to uncoordinated actions at local level.  

2.2.5.  Ineffective contingency planning 

In practice: A sudden political crisis erupts in third country X, for which no Joint Consular 
Crisis Preparedness Frameworks (JFW) has been developed, and a military coup takes 
place. Borders  are closed and riots erupt. EU citizens seek to  leave the  country. The 9 
Member States represented in the country turn to the EU delegation to organize a crisis 
meeting,  but  have  no  updated  key  contact  list  for  crisis  situations,  no  pre-established 
procedures  on  cooperation  within  the  LCC  or  with  local  authorities  and  like-minded 
partners,  no  agreed  communication  strategy  with  EU  citizens  and  no  overview  of  the 
number or location of EU citizens, including unrepresented ones. Unrepresented Member 
States turn to the EEAS and ask about coordination measures in third country X. As there 
is  no  joint  framework  in  place,  compiling  this  information  takes  time  and  hampers 
adequate  coordination  of  EU  efforts.  EU  citizens  face  delays  in  receiving  adequate 
information and assistance. 

Joint Consular Crisis Preparedness Frameworks (JFWs) are a practical planning tool to map 
the  risks,  the  presence  of  EU  citizens  and  consular  assets,  and  to  establish  mechanisms  of 
consular cooperation in accordance with specific local conditions and in response to different 
scenarios. They are a suitable tool for LCCs to establish cooperation and response measures 
and the division of responsibilities in crisis situations.  

As noted in the Commission Report, JFWs are considered particularly useful by the national 
authorities of Member States already due to the mere fact that they raise awareness of the need 
for crisis preparedness as such. They also allow for the different capacities, experiences, and 
resources of Member States to be shared. But already the simple fact that they provide contact 
numbers  to  reach  representations  through  satellite  phones  is  essential  in  cases  where  other 
channels  become  unavailable.  A  few  Member  States  further  noted  that  a  clear  division  of 
responsibilities between represented and unrepresented Member States and the EU delegation 
was essential to ensure adequate crisis preparedness and crisis management.  

Two thirds of Member States consulted for the study agreed to a moderate or to some extent 
that there are inefficiencies in the way the provision of consular protection to unrepresented 

11 

 
 
citizens  is  coordinated,  especially  in  crisis  situations26.  However,  as  illustrated  by  the 
successful repatriation of 600 000 EU citizens at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic27, 
such  coordination  mechanisms  are  of  utmost  importance  to  provide  effective  and  timely 
assistance, all over the world. 

Although JFWs have been put in place in more than 100 third countries, they do not exist for 
all third countries or in the same level of quality. They may not be up-to-date or may not have 
been subject to exercises to test their effectiveness in practice. Member States agreed to the 
need for the organisation of practical exercises to be held on a regular basis (due to the rotation 
of diplomatic personnel). The EU’s COVID-19 lessons-learned exercise highlighted the need 
to  review the JFWs locally in  view of local  experiences28. What  is  more, in third countries 
without Member State presence, the main responsibility for preparing the JFW falls on the EU 
delegations. This role is not adequately reflected in the Directive.  

In this context, Member States consider that a certain level of universal approach should be in 
place  and  rules  for  the  periodic  assessment  of  JFWs  should  be  adopted29.  Member  States 
recognise the role of EU delegations in coordinating the drafting of JFW and support to reflect 
this practical role in the Directive30. 

In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the need for Member States to work together 
and support each other in the context of multi-disciplinary crisis teams also known as ‘Joint 
Consular Teams’ (JCTs). Their role can be critical in helping to prevent that Member States 
representations in third countries become overstretched and thereby rendered inoperable in the 
event  of  a  large-scale  crisis.  Although  the  Directive  already  envisages  the  possibility  of 
‘intervention teams’ (see Articles 11 and 13),  it  does not  provide  the principles  that should 
govern these teams31.  

26  

27  
28  

29  

30  

31  

In this context,  see also the  Council conclusions on enhancing preparedness, response capability and 
resilience  to  future  crises  of  23  November  2021  where  the  Council  stated  that  ‘Many  recent  lessons 
learned derive from the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite shortcomings, the EU has coped well, thanks to 
coordination and solidarity. While exposing gaps in terms of preparedness and response to cross-sectoral 
crises, our response to the pandemic has proven the necessity and added value of working together. The 
use of EU consular cooperation and coordination for the successful repatriation by Member States with 
support from the EEAS and Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) of EU nationals stranded abroad 
because  of  emergency  travel  restrictions  (…)  underlines  where  relevant  the  importance  of  consular 
coordination and cooperation during crises and the need to draw lessons from the response to the COVID-
19 outbreak and other crises, and awaits the presentation of a Commission proposal in 2022 on a revision 
of  the  EU  consular  protection  directive.’  (https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14276-
2021-INIT/en/pdf). 
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/good-stories-consular-support-eu-citizens-stranded-abroad_en. 
EEAS: COVID-19 – The Global Joint Consular Response: Discussion Paper for the attention of Member 
States in the Council Working Party on Consular Affairs (WK 6381/2020 REV 1). 
In particular in COCON discussions under Czech Presidency, see Outcome of the proceedings COCON 
61  15876/22  available  at:  https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15876-2022-INIT/en/pdf 
and  WK  17059/2022  in  List  of  working  papers  (WK)  distributed  in  the  Working  Party  on  Consular 
Affairs in 2022 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5013-2023-INIT/en/pdf.  
See,  for  example,  the  EU’s  role  on  Consular  crisis  management  –  Non-paper  by  Belgium,  Finland, 
Luxembourg, 
at: 
https://europeanunion.diplomatie.belgium.be/sites/default/files/2023-
05/The%20EU%E2%80%99s%20role%20on%20Consular%20crisis%20management%20-%20Non-
paper%20by%20Belgium%2C%20Finland%2C%20Luxembourg%2C%20Poland%20and%20The%20
Netherlands.pdf  
In that regard, Member States in COCON agreed the principles regarding the creation and operation of 
Joint  Consular  Teams,  namely  participation  (voluntary),  solidarity  (opportunity  for  unrepresented 

Netherlands, 

available 

Poland 

2022, 

April 

The 

and 

12 

 
 
 
 
2.2.6.  Ineffectiveness of Lead State concept 

In practice: Member State A has the largest representation in third country X. Its citizens 
represent 90% of EU citizens present in the country. Only three other MS are represented, 
with small embassies and consular sections. Member States present in country X suggest 
not  to  adopt  a  JFW,  as Member  State  A  plays  the  role  of  lead  state  and  is  expected  to 
coordinate local consular cooperation, in particular should an evacuation of EU citizens 
be  considered.  Unrepresented  Member  States  trust  that  Member  State  A  will  take  the 
necessary measures in case of a crisis to provide assistance to their citizens. However, they 
have  not  pre-established  procedures  on  cooperation  with  Member  State  A  and  other 
Member  States  present  in  the  country  (nor  with  like-minded  partners),  which  therefore 
have  no  information  about  all  EU  unrepresented  citizens  present  and  risk  being 
overburdened with the provision of assistance. 

The ‘Lead State’ concept was adopted by the Council as conclusions in June 200732. According 
to the Council conclusions, the Lead State was responsible for transporting unrepresented EU 
citizens  to  a  place  of  safety.  Guidelines  on  the  implementation  of  the  consular  Lead  State 
concept were developed in 200833. The Directive codifies this soft law practice, bringing the 
concept of the Lead State within a legally binding EU act. It defines ‘Lead State’ as “one or 
more Member State(s) represented in a given third country, and in charge of coordinating and 
leading the assistance of unrepresented citizens during crises”. In practice, it seems that the 
Lead State concept as codified by the Directive is generally viewed favourably, particularly by 
Member States that are regularly unrepresented.  

However, in the context of discussions in COCON, a number of Member States noted that the 
concept  of  ‘Lead  State’  as  currently  referred  to  in  the  Directive  is  outdated.  Member  State 
considered that further clarification of the role of the Lead State within the JFWs is needed. 
Since the interrelation  between JFWs and Lead  State is  not  considered, overreliance on the 
Lead State might lead to an overall lower level of preparedness. In addition, Member States 
that are the only ones represented in a given third country may still decide not to assume the 
role of Lead State. Some Member States also question the overall feasibility of the concept, in 
particular in crisis situations, when the Lead State may become overburdened.  

However, other Member States insisted that the Lead State remains an operational concept but 
stressed the need for fairer burden sharing among Member States. According to the study, some 
Member  States  are  currently  of  the  opinion  that  some  Lead  States  have  too  many 
responsibilities looking after their own citizens during a crisis to effectively play the role of 
Lead State. In other cases, one Member State felt it had to play this role in crisis situations in 
practice due to the size of their consular presence. Finally, the implementation of the Lead State 
concept  varies  between  countries  and  regions  in  terms  of  what  the  role  entails,  with  little 
consistency in practice. 

Member  States  to  cooperate  with  represented  ones),  equality  (with  regard  to  decisions  on  internal 
working structures), simplicity (regarding composition of teams – national and EU experts – and cost-
sharing  -  Member  States  answer  for  own  operational  cost),  flexibility  (targeted  to  specific  needs), 
visibility (of the coordinated EU response) and openness (the teams should remain open to third, like-
minded countries). 
Council Conclusions on the Lead State Paper (10671/07).  
European  Union  guidelines  on  the  implementation  of  the  consular  Lead  State  concept  (OJ  C  317, 
12.12.2008, p. 6).  

32  
33  

13 

 
 
 
2.2.7.  Legal uncertainty related to the role of the EU and EU delegations 

In practice: A group of citizens from Member State A are travelling through third country 
X on a cruise. While they are supposed to transit only, they are stopped there because of a 
bus accident injuring many of  them. Some are unable to  travel  for several  months.  The 
injured  citizens  need  consular  protection,  but  Member  State  A  has  no  representation  in 
third country X. Only Member State Z has an embassy there but with a very limited number 
of  officials.  The  embassy  of  Member  State  Z  requests  support  from  the  EU  delegation 
present  in  country  X  to  provide  protection  to  the  unrepresented  EU  citizens.  The  EU 
delegation is in principle in a position to provide support to Member State Z. However, the 
possibility  and  terms  of  the  support  to  be  given  are  not  provided  for  in  the  Directive, 
creating legal uncertainty as to the possibility of the EU delegation to act. 

Non-crisis  situation:  The  Directive  specifies  that  EU  delegations  have  a  cooperation  and 
coordinating  role.  However,  unlike  the  EEAS  Decision34,  it  falls  short  from  allocating 
responsibilities or assigning specific duties to support Member States (upon their request) in 
their  role  of  providing  consular  protection  to  unrepresented  EU  citizens.  In  particular,  the 
Directive  does  not  provide  for  the  conditions  and  boundaries  of  such  support,  including 
whether EU delegations can assist unrepresented EU citizens directly (even though this can be 
occasionally the case35). 

A number of Member States highlighted the need to strengthen the role of EU delegations in 
supporting Member States providing assistance to unrepresented EU citizens. In addition, the 
latest  Eurobarometer36  showed  that  EU  citizens  are  also  in  favour  of  support  from  EU 
delegations:  respondents  stated  that  if  they  were  in  a  country  outside  the  EU  where  their 
Member State of nationality was not represented, they would like to seek support from an EU 
delegation instead. 

Most Member States are of the opinion that the Directive does not properly reflect the actual 
role played by the EU delegations in practice. Several of them consider EU delegations are 
well placed to provide assistance to EU citizens upon request from Member States, notably in 
third countries with no or low Member State representation. As the Directive does not provide 
for  this  possibility,  it  creates  legal  uncertainty  as  to  the  possibilities  and  conditions  for  EU 
delegations to act, effectively undermining the provision of assistance by EU delegations to the 
detriment of unrepresented EU citizens in need.  

There are 25 countries in the world which have no Member State diplomatic and/or consular 
representation37.  In  2019,  an  estimated  12  200  EU  citizens  lived  in  these  uncovered  third 
countries and 332 600 EU citizens travelled there. In many more third countries, the consular 
or  diplomatic  presence  of  Member  States  is  very  low,  and  thus  at  high  risk  of  being 

34  

35  
36  

37  

See Article 5(10) of the EEAS Decision: the EU delegations shall “acting in accordance with the third 
paragraph of Article 35 TEU, and upon request by Member States, support the Member States in their 
diplomatic relations and in their role of providing consular protection to citizens of the Union in third 
countries”. 
See Commission Report. 
Flash  Eurobarometer 
https://data.europa.eu/data/datasets/s2260_485_eng?locale=en. 
Six  of  these  countries  were  previously  covered  by  the  UK  but  are  now  uncovered  since  the  UK’s 
withdrawal from the EU (Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Solomon Islands and the Bahamas). In 
2019, 2 590 EU citizens lived in these six countries and 200 625 EU citizens travelled there.  

and  Democracy;  February/March 

485:  EU  Citizenship 

2020; 

14 

 
 
 
 
overwhelmed  if  a  larger-scale  crisis  occurs:  in  13  third  countries,  only  1  Member  State  is 
represented, and in 9 third countries, only 2 Member States are represented38.  

When  compared  to  the  consular  network  of  EU  delegations,  among  the  25  third  countries 
without the Member States present, five have an EU delegations present39. The Directive does 
not address situations with no Member State embassy or consulate present, creating additional 
legal uncertainty as to EU delegations’ role in providing assistance in such situations. In those 
13  third  countries  where  there  is  only  one  Member  State,  5  countries  also  have  an  EU 
delegation present. Out of the 9 third countries with only two Member States represented, the 
EU delegations cover 7 of them40.  

Problems in the provision of consular protection in countries  with low or no Member State 
representation do occur in particular in crisis situations, where Member States’ diplomatic and 
consular authorities can be quickly overburdened and in no position to provide assistance to 
unrepresented  EU  citizens41.  The  five  EU  delegations  that  are  present  in  an  “uncovered 
country” confirmed that they occasionally receive requests from unrepresented EU citizens in 
need of assistance.  

Several Member States highlighted that the Directive’s lack of provisions regarding uncovered 
third countries poses particular problems, notably regarding the issuance and delivery of ETDs. 
from  abroad  by  accredited 
Those  cannot  be 
embassies/consulates42.  

solved  efficiently  by  coverage 

It has to be taken into account that the impact of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU cannot yet 
be  assessed  fully,  as  the  UK  was  still  applying  the  Directive  until  2020.  In  addition,  travel 
outside of the EU has not fully returned to pre-pandemic levels yet. The UK’s departure from 
the EU represents an estimated 7% loss in the overall number of Member States’ embassies 
and consulates providing consular functions.  

Finally, while some Member States have increased the use of digital tools to provide remote 
consular  protection,  this  is  yet  to  be  fully  developed  and  has  its  own  challenges  and 
limitations43.  

Crisis-situation:  The  Directive  lays  out  that  EU  delegations  are  to  closely  cooperate  and 
coordinate  with  Member  States’  embassies  and  consulates  to  contribute  to  local  and  crisis 
cooperation and coordination, in particular by providing available logistical support, including 
office  accommodation  and  organisational  facilities,  such  as  temporary  accommodation  for 
consular staff and for intervention teams.  

The Directive does not  reflect  the actual  engagement of EU  delegations in  crisis  situations, 
where they have exercised a more substantial role than the cooperation and coordinating role 

38  
39  
40  
41  

42  

43  

See Table 16 in Annex 6 on the Level of Member States representation in third countries  
Afghanistan, Barbados, Eswatini, Guyana, Lesotho. For further information, see Annex IV of the Study. 
WK 10712/2022 INIT. 
See concrete examples of the EU delegations’ role in crisis situations in the Commission Report, p.16 
https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2022-09/1_1_196921_impl_rep_cons_en_1.pdf.  
There are multiple limitations such as the lack of contacts with local authorities, the possible difficulties 
in accessing the country in times of crisis (i.e. if the borders are closed, in case of a natural disaster), the 
lack of situational awareness and expertise on the country, the urgent character or the complexity of the 
assistance required, etc., which make the provision of consular protection more difficult when there is 
no consular presence on the ground. 
This is further described in section 2.7 in Annex II of the Study. 

15 

 
 
 
by providing substantive support to Member States in assisting EU citizens44. At the same time, 
a  lack  of  specification  of  the  role  of  EU  delegations  creates  legal  uncertainty  and  even 
incentivises  inaction,  thereby  undermining  unrepresented  EU  citizens’  effective  consular 
protection.  For  example,  the  EU  delegations  may  be  reluctant  to  provide  assistance  to  EU 
citizens directly in cases where no Member State is present in a third country. 

2.2.8.  Inconsistent information to EU citizens 

In practice: A binational couple from Member State A and Member State B is travelling 
to third country X. When sudden violent riots erupt, Member State A advises its citizens to 
leave  the  country,  while  Member  State  B  does  not  change  its  travel  advice.  Whereas 
Member State A is represented in country X, Member State B is not, but the agreement it 
has with Member State A on the consular protection of its citizens is not well known, and 
Member State B citizens are not necessarily aware of their right to seek assistance from 
other  Member  States.  The  EUDEL’s  website  is  not  reflecting  this  arrangement  either, 
providing  incomplete  information.  This  creates  uncertainty  regarding  the  most 
appropriate course of action. 

Honorary  consuls:  EU  citizens  do  not  always  have  access  to  up-to-date  information  on  the 
extent to which honorary consuls are competent to provide consular protection. Some Member 
States  stated  that  it  would  be  helpful  to  have  further  information  regarding  the  level  of 
assistance provided by each Member State’s honorary consuls. 

Inaccurate  information  for  unrepresented  EU  citizens:  Article  10(4)  and  Recital  16  of  the 
Directive require Member States to provide and update information on relevant contact points 
in  the  Member  States  through  CoOL45  in  order  to  ensure  swift  and  efficient  cooperation. 
However,  it  does  not  provide  any  timeframes  for  these  notifications.  Member  States’ 
information  on  consular  presence  in  third  countries  is  currently  not  provided  in  machine-
readable format, neither is it automatically updated on the closed CoOL platform nor on the 
public Commission website. As a result, outdated and inaccurate information may be provided 
to visitors of the Commission website.  

Bilateral  arrangements:  To  facilitate  consular  assistance  to  unrepresented  EU  citizens,  the 
Directive provides that permanent or practical arrangements can be put in place between the 
Member State of nationality and another Member State. Article 7(2) of the Directive requires 
the EU and the Member States to publicise the bilateral agreements and practical arrangements 
concluded  for  the  purpose  of  transparency  to  unrepresented  citizens.  A  number  of  Member 
States noted the lack of up-to-date and centrally available information on the practical and local 
arrangements in place, both for Member States and EU citizens. This lack of information causes 
delays in receiving assistance when citizens are not aware of the existing arrangements and are 
redirected to another Member State embassy or consulate. 

In addition, there are problems of coordination between Member States regarding travel advice. 
While  both  the  EU  and  the  Member  States  have  websites  and  other  platforms  providing 
different  types  of  information,  and  while  discussions  on  travel  advice  for  Member  States’ 
nationals take occasionally place in COCON and travel advice is shared in the CoOL platform, 

44  

45  

See concrete examples of the EU delegations’ role in crisis situations in the Commission Report, p.15 
https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2022-09/1_1_196921_impl_rep_cons_en_1.pdf.  
CoOL is also used to keep an overview of Member States travel advice to third countries, serves as a 
repository for the activities of LCC groups, and features a “discussion board” which Member States use 
in times of crises to exchange consular information. 

16 

 
 
 
 
there is currently no obligation to coordinate regarding the provision of travel advice for third 
countries,  emergency/crisis  communication,  or  on  the  provision  of  information  on  consular 
protection by Member States. As a result, an EU citizen assessing whether it is safe to travel to 
a  third  country  may  be  faced  with  an  array  of  different  advice  from  different  sources  of 
information, which may not be aligned with one another and/or provide up to date information 
to the same extent. There could even be manifestly conflicting situations where a sole Member 
State represented in a third country would advise its citizens to leave the country immediately, 
while unrepresented Member States could still advise their citizens only against non-essential 
travel.  

Member States consider that a harmonization of travel advice is difficult to achieve due to the 
difference  between  tourists,  the  regions  visited,  language  barriers  and  the  difference  in  the 
standards used to evaluate danger and safety. However, they raised the need for increased co-
operation, both locally and at capital level, at an early stage when Member States are planning 
to  change  the  level  of  their  travel  advice.  They  also  positively  assess  the  cooperation  and 
exchange  of  information  that  took  place  during  the  COVID-19  crisis  and  highlighted  their 
willingness for more support and coordination during crises.  

2.2.9.  Lack of reliable information on EU citizens living or traveling abroad 

In practice: Most Member States have encouraged their nationals permanently residing 
in country X to register with their embassies (for instance by making it a pre-requisite to 
receive consular services). However, the large majority of EU citizens travelling on short 
term trips (study, business, tourism) never register as they consider country X to be a safe 
country or have privacy concerns. When a crisis hits country X, Member States have no 
realistic estimate of the number of travellers present and face difficulties in assessing the 
scope of the response needed. 

All Member States offer the possibility for citizens to register their residence in a third country 
or their travel abroad. Most of the Member States (24 out of 27) offer to their nationals the 
possibility  to  register  their  contact  details  on  a  dedicated  website/app  for  the  purpose  of 
emergency communication during their travel (with the exception of one Member State, which 
requires their nationals to send an email to the Consular Directorate General and respective 
diplomatic  mission/consular  post  about  the  trip).  These  websites/apps  are  divided  in  their 
functionality: some are limited only to travelling citizens (six Member States), others also allow 
citizens living abroad to register (18 Member States)46. 

The difficulty in providing effective consular services in crisis situations is related to the lack 
of reliable information on EU citizens presented in the area affected by the crisis. As a result, 
during crises, Member States are not aware of the number of their citizens requiring assistance 
and thus cannot provide this information to the Lead State or the Member State(s) coordinating 
assistance,  nor  can  they  effectively  reach  these  citizens  through  targeted  communication 
(emergency SMS, phone calls, etc.). The Afghanistan conflict has shown that Member States’ 
knowledge regarding the presence of their nationals who also have the nationality of the third 
country concerned is  limited.  Furthermore, according  to  Member States, only  a minority of 
travelers  register  their  trips  (10-20%).  The  figure  is  higher  regarding  the  nationals  living 
abroad:  for  instance,  France estimates that 60-70% of people living  abroad register.  This  is 
likely due to the fact that most EU citizens are not aware of this possibility or are unwilling to 
register their travel abroad. In addition, the majority of the surveyed Member States were of 

46  

See Annex II of the Study, section 2.4.4. 

17 

 
 
 
 
the view that the increasing number of expats and travellers creates new difficulties in reaching 
out to stranded citizens (see table 1) in particular due to the lack of knowledge of how many 
and where EU citizens are both in the world and within a third country.  

Table 1: Level of agreement with “Statement 6: With the increasing number of expats and travellers, it is 
becoming increasingly challenging to reach out to stranded citizens in case of an emergency/crisis situation 
and to provide them with travel advice before departure.” (N=25) (from the Questionnaire sent to Member 
States) 

Not at 
all 
3 
12% 

To a small 
extent 

4 
16% 

To some 
extent 
8 
32% 

To a moderate 
extent 
4 
16% 

To a great 
extent 
6 
24% 

Number 

Share of 
total 

2.2.10. Complexity and ineffectiveness of reimbursement procedure 

In practice: Jonah, citizen of Member State A, was travelling in third country X when a 
tsunami struck its coast, causing serious devastation and leading to the repatriation of all 
tourists. While Jonah’s Member State A is present in country X, Jonah has an opportunity 
to be repatriated in a flight made available by Member State B. However, Member State B 
is planning to use the reimbursement procedure provided for in the Directive, which does 
not apply to Jonah since he is represented in country X. This may hinder him from seizing 
the opportunity to be repatriated as Member State B is not accepting direct payments by 
citizens  and  it  is  not  guaranteed  to  be  reimbursed  of  the  flight  costs  because  the 
reimbursement procedure under the Directive only applies to unrepresented EU citizens. 

Currently, the Directive provides that Member States assisting unrepresented EU citizens may 
ask for the reimbursement of costs incurred from the unrepresented citizens’ Member State of 
nationality.  The  unrepresented  EU  citizen  assisted  then  repays  his  or  her  Member  State  of 
nationality for the cost of consular protection if so requested. The assisting Member State can 
also request reimbursement from the Member State of nationality for any unusually high but 
essential and justified costs in relation to assistance provided in cases of arrest or detention. 
For this, there are two standard forms in the Annexes of the Directive, one to be used by citizens 
and one to be used by the assisting Member States.  

The financial reimbursement procedures are only applied in a very limited manner across the 
Member States, which could already be an indication of their complexity. The Commission 
Report highlighted issues with the implementation of the Directive’s provisions on financial 
reimbursements. In fact, in those cases where reimbursement was sought, this was not done in 
a consistent way across the Member States: while some Member State follow the procedure 
outlined in the Directive (using the standard forms presented in the Annexes and requesting 
reimbursement  from  the  Member  State  of  nationality),  other  Member  States  seek  direct 
reimbursement  from  the  unrepresented  citizens  assisted,  or  have  a  hybrid  approach  of  first 
seeking  reimbursement  from  the  citizen,  and  if  they  are  not  successful,  they  seek 
reimbursement from the Member State of nationality. There is also evidence to suggest that the 
standard form in Annex I is not used consistently in the regular procedure of Article 14, and 
that the lack of use of the Annex I form under the facilitated procedure (Article 15) may mean 
citizens are not always clear about the need to reimburse the costs of assistance once they are 
repatriated.  

18 

 
 
 
 
The  scope  of  the  Directive  is  limited  to  unrepresented  EU  citizens,  which  means  the 
reimbursement forms in the Annex of the Directive only apply to unrepresented EU citizens. 
Some  Member  States  reported  having  provided  consular  protection  to  represented  citizens 
during  crises  due  to  the  difficulty  of  distinguishing  between  represented  and  unrepresented 
citizens,  for  example  when  organising  repatriations.  Moreover,  assistance  to  represented 
citizens is also possible under the UCPM, where the EU co-finances up to 75% of the costs of 
repatriation  flights.  Therefore,  there  is  currently  an  uncertainty  regarding  the  possibility  of 
using  the  reimbursement  forms  in  the  Annex  of  the  Directive  when  consular  protection  is 
provided to represented citizens. This has a potential disproportionate impact on those Member 
State with the most extensive consular network.  

Furthermore, the financial reimbursement mechanism does not apply to EU delegations. This 
creates additional difficulties if they are requested by Member States to support the provision 
of  assistance  to  unrepresented  EU  citizens  while  complying  with  the  resource-neutrality 
obligation of the EEAS Decision.  

According to the study, there also seems to be the perception among some Member States that 
the reimbursement procedure is lengthy and entails a disproportionate administrative burden 
when compared to the relatively low cost of providing consular assistance to a low number of 
unrepresented  citizens.  In  COCON  discussions,  many  Member  States  also  voiced  concerns 
regarding the absence of a timeframe for the provision of the statement of expenses for costs 
incurred by the assisting Member State, which has caused administrative issues between the 
Member States. Member States clearly expressed the need to improve and simplify the current 
financial reimbursement procedures.47  
2.3. Magnitude of the problem48  

2.3.1.  Estimated number of unrepresented EU citizens 

As can be seen in the table 2 below, the study estimates that of the 125 million trips that EU 
citizens had made to third countries in 2019, 14.2 million trips were to third countries where 
the EU citizens were not represented. In addition, the study estimates that 225 000 EU citizens 
live in third countries where their Member State is not represented49. 

This shows that the number of unrepresented EU citizens potentially impacted by the problems 
outlined above is significant. For example, due to the sizeable number of trips to third countries 
where  the  EU  citizens’  Member  State  of  nationality  is  not  represented,  the  number  of  EU 
citizens  who  could  potentially  be  negatively  affected  by  the  imprecise  definition  of 
‘unrepresented citizen’ is considerable. In addition, the large number of estimated trips to third 
countries where EU citizens are unrepresented exacerbates problems linked to insufficient or 
inconsistent information. 

47  

48  

49  

of 

the 

COCON 

Outcome 

proceedings 

See 
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15876-2022-INIT/en/pdf.  
The methodology for this chapter is presented in Annex VI of the Study, which provides more detailed 
analysis, including data on case number by type of protection, the number of refusals and the proportion 
of  unrepresented  EU  citizens  assisted.  The  Annex  also  compares  the  estimates  against  the  estimates 
presented in the 2011 Impact Assessment. 
I.e. unrepresented EU expatriates excluding dual nationals, who hold an EU passport but were born in 
the relevant third country. 

15876/22 

available 

61 

at: 

19 

 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Summary table on estimated number of unrepresented citizens  

EU  citizens 
living 
abroad 
2019 

unrepresented 
EU 
citizens  living  abroad 
(estimation) 

EU  citizens 
trips 
abroad 
(2019) 

unrepresented 
EU 
citizens  trips  abroad 
(estimation) 

16.7 million 

25 000 

238 million 

2.6 million 

16.1 million 

225 000 

125 million 

14.2 million 

36.2 
million 

250 000 

363 million 

16.8 million 

Within the 
EU 

Outside the 
EU /third 
countries 

TOTAL 

2.3.2.  Estimated number of cases of assistance to unrepresented EU citizens 

In the absence of a legal obligation, Member States do no collect statistics on the number of 
represented  and/or  unrepresented  EU  citizens  assisted  in  a  systematic  or  comparable  way. 
Some Member States do not collect this data at all, while others collect it only for some types 
of  protection  (e.g.  ETD  or  repatriations).  However,  based  on  the  limited  data  reported  by 
Member States on the number of unrepresented EU citizens, the following two estimates have 
been made: 

Table 3: Estimations on the number of unrepresented EU citizens assisted50 

Normal situation/average year51 
(2018/2019) 

Global/large scale crisis situation52 
(2020) 

Low-end 
estimate 

Average 
per MS 

High-end 
estimate 

Average 
per MS 

1 300 

48 

40 000 

1 574 

6 000 

222 

177 500 

6 574 

The  data  shows  that  the  number  of  unrepresented  citizens  assisted  is  only  a  fraction  when 
compared  to  consular  assistance  provided  to  Member  States’  own  citizens:  Member  States 
reported between 1-3% of cases relating to unrepresented EU citizens in 2018 and 2019. The 
share of unrepresented citizens assisted significantly increased in 2020 for two out of the three 
Member States that provided data across all 3 years. This could suggest that in a crisis such as 
the COVID-19 pandemic, unrepresented citizens place a higher burden on Member States. 

The  wide  range  between  low-end  and  high-end  estimate  are  due  the  limited  data  available, 
given the absence of a legal obligation to collect data in a systematic or comparable manner. 
By using these wide ranges, an attempt was made to ensure that when assessing the impacts of 

50  
51  
52  

The detailed methodology used for both estimates is further outlined in Annex VI of the Study. 
Refers to an average year outside global pandemic. The 2018 and 2019 data was used for the estimation. 
This refers to situations that fall out of the norm in terms of scale, frequency, or duration. The year 2020 
was used for the estimation due to the large scale and impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. 

20 

 
 
 
 
 
the  different  policy  options  available,  the  clearly  existing  limitations  and  uncertainties  in 
assessing the scale of the problem can be taken into account adequately. 

2.3.3.  Feedback from EU delegations 

During the survey of EU delegations conducted in the context of the study, a majority of EU 
delegations responded that, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, they had sporadically received 
requests for assistance from EU citizens. Since the outbreak of the pandemic, there appeared 
to be a substantial growth in the number and frequency of EU delegations receiving requests 
for assistance from EU citizens directly.  

The increase in requests seems to be dependent on the presence of Member States in a given 
third  country.  EU  delegations  in  third  countries  were  all  or  nearly  all  Member  States  were 
present  did  not  report  an  increase  in  the  number  of  requests,  with  the  exception  of  the  EU 
delegation  in  Russia.  At  the  same  time,  EU  delegations  in  third  countries  with  a  smaller 
Member State presence experienced an exceptionally large increase in the number of requests.  

EU delegations reported that prior to the pandemic, they had been most commonly approached 
with requests for the issue of emergency travel documents. Not surprisingly, this changed with 
the outbreak of the pandemic, when the majority of EU delegations most commonly received 
requests concerning repatriation. 

According  to  the  survey,  requests  from  unrepresented  citizens  would  arise  most  frequently 
when the embassy or consulate of a Member State present in the third country had refused to 
provide assistance or when EU citizens did not know how consular protection was provided or 
which Member State they could turn to. Finally, responding EU delegations noted challenges 
regarding the  travel  information  made available to  and  emergency  communication  with EU 
citizens. 

This data supports the finding that there is a lack of clarity as regards the role of EU delegations 
as well the information provided to EU citizens who find themselves in a situation where they 
require consular assistance. 

2.4. How will the problem evolve? 

2.4.1.  Consular networks 

There are currently only four third countries – the United States of America, India, Russia and 
the United Kingdom – where all 27 Member States are represented53. It is not possible to predict 
if Member States  will increase  their consular network or not  in the coming years, in  which 
countries (i.e. countries with low or high levels of EU representation) and with what level of 
capacity. Only 12 Member States provided data on their consular network both in 2018 and in 
2020.  Of  these  12  Member  States,  eight  saw  an  increase  in  the  number  of  embassies  and 
consulates exercising consular functions. Two had a decrease and two remained unchanged. 
Together, these 12 Member States had a 7% collective increase in the number of embassies 
and/or consulate exercising consular functions from 786 in 2018 to 838 in 2020. While these 
findings are limited due to missing data, they nonetheless suggest that Member States have 
increased their consular footprint between 2018 and 2020. 

The data collected from the questionnaire’s qualitative questions confirms that, out of the 26 
Member States that replied, 14 (BG, EE, FI, HR, HU, LT, LU, MT, RO, SI, PL, ES) reported 
an increase and only two reported a decrease (DK and FR). Seven replied “remained the same” 
(AT, BE, DE, PT, SE, NL, LV) and one Member State (CZ) did not know. The digitalisation 

53  

Equal to around 3% of all non-EU countries. 

21 

 
 
 
of consular services, notably visa applications, could also have an impact on Member States’ 
decisions regarding their consular networks54. 

2.4.2.  Unrepresented EU travellers  

The study  shows that the number of EU  travellers and expatriates is  likely  to increase55. In 
order to estimate how the number of EU travellers will evolve in the future, the study followed 
the two scenarios used by UNWTO in their latest update on International Tourist Arrivals dated 
31 March 202156. 
Figure 2: future trends of EU-27 unrepresented travellers57 

Source: Annex II, section 2.7 of the underlying study. 

2.4.3.  Number of crises requiring consular assistance 

Over the last few years, several events have posed challenges to the consular protection of EU 
citizens, in particular the COVID-19 pandemic, the conflict in Afghanistan and Russia’s war 
of aggression against Ukraine and, more recently, the conflict in Sudan. When it comes to the 
increasing number of events requiring consular intervention, Section II of the 2021 Strategic 
Foresight Report58 identifies important structural global trends towards 2050 that will affect 
the  EU’s  capacity  and  freedom  to  act:  climate  change  and  other  environmental  challenges; 
digital  hyperconnectivity  and  technological  transformations;  pressure  on  democracy  and 
values; shifts in the global order and demography. Consular protection is prone to become more 
relevant in the future as the frequency, severity and duration of crises are likely to increase, 
including the crises related to global warming, causing unavoidable numerous climate hazards 
and presenting multiple risks to ecosystems and humans59. All these trends would impact the 

54  
55  

56  

57  

58  
59  

For additional information see Annex 6. 
A  detailed  overview  of  the  estimated  evolution  of  the  number  of  unrepresented  EU  citizens  needing 
consular protection under the Directive over the next 10 to 30 years and their impact on the four problem 
areas described above, is provided under Annex II, section 2.7 of the Study.  
The Figure above shows the number of unrepresented EU-27 travelers under these two scenarios, based 
on linear extrapolation of 2008-2019 trends of international visitors from the OECD outbound tourism 
dataset,  and  assuming  that  the  consular  presence  of  Member  States  in  third  countries  will  remain 
constant. 
Note: the above slope appears broken after 2025 but it still follows the same trend as in the past. This 
apparent break is only due to the change of scale of the horizontal axis (from one year to five years). 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/strategic_foresight_report_2021_en.pdf.  
See report of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change “Climate Change 2022, Impacts Adaptation 
and  Vulnerability”  page  15.  See  also  “Summer  2022:  Living  in  a  state  of  multiple  crises”  by  Hans 
Bruyninckx, 
at 
https://www.eea.europa.eu/articles/summer-2022-living-in-a.  

Environmental 

Executive 

European 

Director 

Agency 

22 

 
 
 
 
need  for  consular  protection  by  unrepresented  EU  citizens  as  explained  in  more  details  in 
Annex 7. 

The  2021  Strategic  Foresight  Report  highlights  that  the  “EU  needs  to  continue  to  play  an 
essential role in preventive diplomacy and support, adapting and upgrading its tools to ensure 
effectiveness of its actions. Building trust and coordination amongst Member States, as well as 
the capacity to better anticipate risks, while learning from experience, could provide the EU 
with greater influence and the ability to act jointly on defence and security matters”. Moreover, 
“the increased likelihood of extreme weather events, future pandemics or other natural and 
man-made disasters reaffirms the need for a stronger EU response and cooperation on civil 
protection, including to improve prevention, preparedness and response to disasters such as 
floods, wildfires and infectious diseases”.  
As noted in a recent European Parliament study60, the “world is increasingly characterised by 
challenges  with  cross-sectoral,  trans  geographical  and  global  consequences  […].  If  the 
different types of crisis not only coincide in time but also persist for a considerable period, it 
means societies move towards a paradigm of so-called 'permacrisis'.” 

In this perspective, the EU’s capacity and freedom to act, based on a clear understanding of 
megatrends, uncertainties and opportunities, should be enhanced also in relation to consular 
protection, as these trends will impact the way the EU is able to assist its citizens abroad.  

3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? 

3.1. Legal basis 

Article 3(5) TEU provides that “[i]n its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold 
and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens”. 

Article 35, third paragraph, TEU provides that the EU delegations “shall contribute to the 
implementation  of  the  right  of  citizens  of  the  Union  to  protection  in  the  territory  of  third 
countries” as referred to in Article 20(2)(c) TFEU and of the measures adopted pursuant  to 
Article 23 TFEU. 

Pursuant to Article 20(2)(c) TFEU, EU citizens have “the right to enjoy, in the territory of a 
third country in which the Member State of which they are nationals is not represented, the 
protection  of  the  diplomatic  and  consular  authorities  of  any  Member  State  on  the  same 
conditions as the nationals of that State”. 

Article 23 TFEU provides that every “citizen of the Union shall, in the territory of a third 
country in which the Member State of which he is a national is not represented, be entitled to 
protection  by  the  diplomatic  or  consular  authorities  of  any  Member  State,  on  the  same 
conditions as the nationals of that State”. Article 23 TFEU also requires Member States to 
“adopt the necessary provisions and start the international negotiations required to secure this 
protection” and allows the Council, “acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure 
and  after  consulting  the  European  Parliament”  to  “adopt  directives  establishing  the 
coordination and cooperation measures necessary to facilitate such protection”. The special 
legislative procedure requires qualified majority in Council.  

Article 46 of the Charter provides that “Every citizen of the Union shall, in the territory of a 
third country in which the Member State of which he or she is a national is not represented, be 

60  

Future Shocks 2023, Anticipating and weathering the next storms, EPRS 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2023/751428/EPRS_STU(2023)751428_EN.p
df  

23 

 
 
 
 
entitled to protection by the diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member State, on the 
same conditions as the nationals of that Member State.” 

Article 25, second paragraph, TFEU contains a so-called “passerelle clause” providing for 
a  simplified  procedure  for  expanding  EU  citizenship  rights  under  the  Treaty,  whereby  the 
Council,  acting  unanimously  and  after  obtaining  the  consent  of  the  European  Parliament, 
adopts  provisions  to  strengthen  or  to  add  to  the  rights  of  Union  citizens61.  The  use  of  the 
passerelle clause could first expand the scope of the EU citizenship right to consular protection, 
which could subsequently serve as a basis for proposing secondary legislation in line with the 
newly extended scope. These provisions enter into force after their approval by the Member 
States “in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements”62. 

The use of this clause must be based on reporting by the Commission on the application of EU 
citizenship rights.  In its  2020 Citizenship Report, the Commission  announced that it would 
reflect on whether to expand the EU citizenship right to consular protection based on Article 
25(2) TFEU. 

3.1.1.  Mandate of the EEAS and function of EU delegations 

The EEAS was established to assist the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy in Article 27(3) TEU, which states that it “shall work in cooperation with 
the diplomatic services of the Member States”. Its organisation and functioning is regulated by 
the 2010 EEAS Decision. 

EU  delegations  are  required,  pursuant  to  Articles  4(3)  and  35  TEU,  to  cooperate  with  the 
Member States for the purpose of ensuring the EU’s objective of protecting EU citizens in the 
world.  Article  35  TEU  provides  that  that  “[t]he  diplomatic  and  consular  missions  of  the 
Member States and the Union delegations [...] shall: 

•  cooperate in ensuring that decisions defining Union positions and actions adopted […] 

are complied with and implemented. 

•  shall  step  up  cooperation  by  exchanging  information  and  carrying  out  joint 

assessments. 

•  shall contribute to the implementation of the right of citizens of the Union to protection 
in the territory of third countries as referred to in Article 20(2)(c) of the TFEU and of 
the measures adopted pursuant to Article 23 of that Treaty.” 

The  mandate  of  the  EU  delegations  in  the  field  of  consular  protection  is  to  “support”  and 
“cooperate”, as per the following provisions: 

•  Article 221 TFEU provides that EU delegations “shall act in close cooperation with 

Member States' diplomatic and consular missions”.  

•  Article 3(1) of the EEAS Decision states that “[t]he EEAS shall support, and work in 

cooperation with, the diplomatic services of the Member States”. 

•  Article 5(10) EEAS  Decision provides  that the “Union delegations shall,  acting in 
accordance with the third paragraph of Article 35 TEU, and upon request by Member 
States,  support  the  Member  States  in  their  diplomatic  relations  and  in  their  role  of 

61  

62  

Hilpold P. (2021) Article 25 [Monitoring and Further Development of Union Citizenship]. In: Blanke 
HJ., Mangiameli S. (eds) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – A Commentary. Springer 
Commentaries on International and European Law. Springer, Cham.  
K. Lenaerts, EU Citizenship and Democracy, New Journal of European Criminal Law, Vol. 7, Issue 2, 
2016, 164-175. 

24 

 
 
 
providing consular protection to citizens of the Union in third countries on a resource-
neutral basis.” 

3.1.2.  Compatibility of the role of EU delegations with the Vienna Convention on 

Consular Relations  

The right to consular protection as provided by EU law is carried out in the sovereign territory 
of third countries. This means that it depends, for its implementation, on compliance with the 
applicable public international law, in this case the VCCR. Article 8 VCCR provides for the 
“Exercise of consular functions on behalf of a third State”, specifying that: “Upon appropriate 
notification to the receiving State, a consular post of the sending State may, unless the receiving 
State objects, exercise consular functions in the receiving State on behalf of a third State”.  

Consistent  with  this  notification  requirement,  Article  23  TFEU  requires  Member  States  to 
adopt the necessary provisions and start the international negotiations required to secure this 
protection. With a few exceptions63, this obligation has been mostly implemented by means of 
the conclusion of  international  agreements between the EU and third countries.  In practice, 
Member States have experienced little to no objections by receiving third states to the exercise 
of consular protection on behalf of another Member State.  

Presently, EU delegations have, pursuant to Article 5(10) of EEAS Decision, the obligation to 
support  represented  Member  States  in  providing  consular  protection  to  unrepresented  EU 
citizens, which does not require the notification of third countries. However, the question arises 
whether EU delegations could provide some of the consular assistance falling within the list of 
Article 5 VCCR directly to unrepresented EU citizens.  

The EU is not a party to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) nor to the 
VCCR. However, it is widely accepted that EU delegations can rely on the VCDR by analogy 
(a  principle  generally  agreed  in  the  Establishment  Agreements  between  the  EU  and  the 
receiving States). Accordingly, diplomatic relations, including sensitive questions relating to 
the status of the EU delegation in the host state, immunities and privileges are governed by the 
rules  contained  in  the  VCDR.  In  view  of  the  agreement  by  receiving  States  to  grant  the 
application by analogy of the provisions of the VCDR, it is arguable that upon request by the 
EU, the receiving States would likely accept that the provisions of the VCCR may also apply 
by analogy to the EU delegation.  

If  no  objection  is  raised  pursuant  to  Article  8  VCCR,  the  Delegation  should,  in  terms  of 
international  law,  in  principle  be  able  to  provide  certain  types  of  consular  assistance  to 
unrepresented citizens. While some of the consular functions enumerated in Article 5 VCCR, 
such as issuing passports (lit. d) or acting as notary or civil registrar (lit. f), would clearly not 
be  carried  out  by  EU  delegations,  other  consular  functions,  notably  helping  and  assisting 
citizens (lit. e), could, from an international law perspective, be available to EU delegation as 
well. 

63  

E.g. Italy and Portugal.  

25 

 
 
 
 
 
3.2. Subsidiarity: Necessity and added value of EU action 

The legal framework for the exercise of EU citizens’ right to consular protection involves the 
interaction of EU and (inter)national rules. Indeed, the obligation of Member States to provide 
consular protection  to  (unrepresented) nationals  of other Member  States has by definition a 
cross-border dimension. This means that it cannot effectively be addressed by Member States 
acting individually. The fact that the Treaty of Lisbon assigned this competence to the EU, 
compared to the previous intergovernmental approach, is a clear sign that further action at EU 
level was needed.  

However, the provision of consular protection remains inherently linked to the national laws 
of Member States in the way they provide consular protection. Nonetheless, the provision of 
consular  protection  to  unrepresented  EU  citizens  will  always  require  cooperation  and 
coordination with the national authorities of the unrepresented EU citizen, and at times with 
the local authorities. To ensure the effectiveness of EU citizens’ right to consular protection, 
this coordination and cooperation should be as efficient as possible. With a central role in the 
implementation  of  the  right  to  consular  protection,  the  EU  would  be  best  placed  to  further 
streamline the procedures to ensure that they are uniformly implemented by the Member States.  

Providing  for  common  EU  standards,  safeguards  and  clear  procedures  for  cooperation  and 
coordination  regarding  unrepresented  EU  citizens  is  better  achieved  at  EU  level.  A  general 
subsidiarity  check  of  whether  the  EU  is  best  placed  to  act  in  the  field  of  coordination  and 
cooperation of consular protection to unrepresented citizens was already carried out at the time 
of the adoption of the Directive64, and remains valid. EU citizens’ right to consular protection 
is still, obviously, a cross-border issue and an integral part of EU citizenship, requiring better 
cooperation and coordination at EU level.  

Since the expiry of its transposition deadline in 2018, the Commission has closely monitored 
the  implementation  of  the  Directive,  as  demonstrated  by  the  recent  publication  of  the 
Commission  Report.  Combined  with  further  consultations,  the  report  showed  that  further 
action at EU level is needed. Without timely and effective EU action, the problems identified 
in  the  report  and  their  causes  would  continue  to  hinder  the  exercise  by  unrepresented  EU 
citizens of their right to consular protection.  

The Treaty of Lisbon also created the legal basis for the creation of the EEAS, set up to assist 
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President 
of the European Commission (HR/VP) in ensuring coherent and effective EU external action. 
Its establishment has resulted in the reallocation of certain consular coordination tasks from 
the Member States to the EU delegations. Subsidiarity check for these tasks, in particular EU 
delegations’  supporting  role  to  Member  States  in  providing  consular  assistance  to 
unrepresented EU citizens was performed at the moment of the adoption of the EEAS Decision. 
EU delegations’ role and contribution in supporting Member States and ensuring cooperation 
and  coordination  among  Member  States  is  an  essential  element  of  the  legal  framework 
governing  consular  protection  of  unrepresented  EU  citizens.  Improving  EU  delegations’ 
functioning and the way they support Member States and EU citizens in consular protection 
activities could not be achieved without an EU intervention.  

64  

Commission Staff Working paper – Impact Assessment accompanying the Proposal for a Directive of 
the Council on coordination and cooperation measures regarding consular protection for unrepresented 
EU citizens (SEC(2011) 1556 final). 

26 

 
 
 
Overall, without EU intervention, the effectiveness of EU citizens’ right to consular protection 
as outlined in the problems sections would continue to be put at risk and the added value of EU 
delegations in this context would remain underexploited.  

Subsidiarity  check  of  additional  coordination  tasks  in  crisis  situations:  Fostering  EU 
cooperation to support all EU citizens in need abroad can only be achieved by a coordinated 
EU intervention. The EU, and in particular the EEAS and its network of EU delegations around 
the world, are well placed to take on such a coordinating role, in a way and to an extent not 
possible for Member States acting on their own initiative and capacities. 

Subsidiarity check of the role of EU delegations in providing direct assistance to unrepresented 
EU citizens on their request: in third countries where no Member State embassy or consulate 
is present, EU delegations would be best placed to fill in this gap and ensure that EU citizens’ 
fundamental right to consular protection is effectively protected. 

4.  OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? 

4.1. General objective 

The overarching general objective of the policy initiative in this area is to improve the exercise 
of the right to consular protection by unrepresented EU citizens. 

4.2. Specific objectives (‘SO’) 

This general objective can be broken down into four specific objectives: 

•  SO1: Enhance the legal certainty for EU citizens with respect to the scope of the right 

to consular protection.  

•  SO2: Ensure clear roles, coordination and cooperation mechanisms between Member 

States and EU delegations, including in times of crisis.  

•  SO3: Improve the information provision and communication with (unrepresented) EU 

citizens. 

•  SO4: Increase the efficiency and use of the financial reimbursement procedures. 

The overall intervention logic and how each of the problem is linked to a specific objective is 
illustrated in Annex 8. 

As  the  main  objective  of  the  initiative  would  be  to  strengthen  an  EU  citizenship  right  of 
consular  protection,  it  should  contribute  to  target  10.365  and  target  5.c66  of  the  Sustainable 
Development Goals.  

65  

66  

“Ensure equal opportunity and reduce inequalities of outcome, including by eliminating discriminatory 
laws, policies and practices and promoting appropriate legislation, policies and action in this regard”. 
“Adopt and strengthen sound policies and enforceable legislation for the promotion of gender equality 
and the empowerment of all women and girls at all levels”. 

27 

 
 
 
 
 
 
5.  WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS?67 

5.1. What is the baseline from which options are assessed?  

The  baseline  is  the  current  situation,  under  which  the  Directive  and  the  other  instruments 
continue in their current form as described in the problem description section, together with 
ongoing  coordination  and  cooperation  activities  (a  short  summary  of  ongoing  and  future 
activities can be found in Annex 9). Under the baseline scenario, the existing problems outlined 
above would aggravate (see details in Annex 9), in particular those stemming from the current 
wording of the Directive or which could only be addressed through changes to the wording of 
the Directive (e.g. problems number 2, 3, 4, 5 and 8). 

As explained in section 2.4, the need for consular protection is likely to increase as foresight 
studies suggest that large disruptions to travel and other human activities are likely to increase 
further,  resulting  from  either  man-made  events  (such  as  wars,  conflicts  or  social  unrest), 
phenomena linked to global warming (such as fires or floodings) or large-scale health crises 
and epidemics.  

While  the  consular  network  of  the  Member  States  might  possibly  increase  somewhat  (see 
Section 2.4.2), this has to be seen together with the fact that, following the UK’s withdrawal 
from  the EU, EU citizens  are no longer  entitled to seek assistance  from  UK  embassies and 
consulates. In addition, given that the number of unrepresented citizens is expected to increase, 
the number of persons potentially affected by the problems under the baseline scenario would 
increase as well.  

The current and planned non-legislative initiatives would be able to mitigate the evolution of 
the problems identified only to a certain extent but will not be able to resolve them significantly, 
as explained in Annex 9. 

5.2.  Description of the policy options per specific objective  

Under each objective, several options to achieve them have been identified. Measures that do 
not require a policy choice are described in Annex 10.  

5.2.1.  SO1: Enhance the legal certainty for EU citizens with respect to the scope of 

the right to consular protection 

Option 1a) Combination of soft measures: The Commission/EEAS would develop and share 
guidance  and  best  practices  on  the  definitions  and  personal  scope  of  the  Directive. 
Recommendations on training on the definitions and personal scope of the Directive to national 
consular staff and training to EU delegations would also be produced. 

Option  1b)  Improvement  to  the  definition  through  legislative  amendments:  Similar  to 
option 1a), clarification of the scope of the Directive regarding the term ‘unrepresented citizen’ 
would be done through legal amendments. Rewording the current provisions would enhance 
legal certainty as to what it means for an EU citizen to be ‘unrepresented’ and in particular the 
types of situations in which a representation should not be considered “effectively in a position 
to  provide  consular  protection”.  Indicative  criteria  for  the  assessment  of  those  types  of 
situations could also be added in order to further support a coherent approach to the definition. 
At the same time, such an amendment would not alter the geographical scope of the Directive 
–  unrepresented  citizens  would  continue  to  enjoy  a  right  to  consular  protection  from  other 
Member States in each third country where their Member State of nationality is not represented.  

67  

The  options  have  been  based  on  the  three  options  presented  in  the  inception  impact  assessment,  and 
refined on the basis of the findings in the problem definition and the related policy objectives. 

28 

 
 
 
Option  1c)  Introduction  of  the  concept  of  “presumption  of  unrepresentedness”:  A 
rebuttable “presumption of “unrepresentedness” would be introduced in the Directive through 
amendments. The level of intervention is the same as under option 1b, but this option presents 
a shift in the approach. By introducing a “presumption of unrepresentedness”, the burden of 
proof  would  be  on  the  Member  State,  and  not  on  the  EU  citizen,  to  demonstrate  the 
“representativeness”,  otherwise  the  citizen  will  be  considered  to  have  the  right  to  consular 
protection. The presumption of unrepresentedness could be linked to the urgency of the request 
for assistance (where it is difficult, or impossible for a Member State to confirm, in a timely 
manner, whether a citizen is unrepresented). 

5.2.2.  SO2: Ensure clear roles, coordination and cooperation mechanisms between 

Member States and EU delegations, including in times of crisis. 

The  options  presented  under  this  specific  objective  address  separate  problems,  as  outlined 
below.  

Unclear responsibilities in local consular cooperation networks  

Option 2a) Guidelines on local cooperation: The Commission/EEAS would adopt guidelines 
and  best  practices  on  local  cooperation  for  consular  staff  that  would  better  structure  the 
different responsibilities in LCCs. 

Option 2b) EU delegations  to chair local  consular cooperation networks meetings:  EU 
delegations would systematically chair LCC meetings in all locations where they are present 
unless  Member  States  decide  otherwise.  Where  there  is  no  EU  delegation,  Member  States 
would agree on the local  arrangements. This  can be introduced through amendments  to the 
Directive.  

Ineffective contingency planning and Lead State concept 

Given  that  the  problems  ‘ineffective  contingency  planning’  and  ‘ineffective  Lead  State 
concept’ are closely related, one option is presented to address both. 

Option 2c) Review of the concept of Lead State and formalisation of the JFWs and JCTs: 
The JFWs would establish a new division of labour, in which the responsibilities entrusted to 
the Lead State would be clarified. JFWs would become compulsory in all third countries and 
the Directive would require that the EU delegation leads on the drafting of the JFW (with input 
from Member States). The Directive’s references to the Lead State concept would be reviewed. 
This option would also enhance coordination in crisis situations by including a description of 
the role and deployment conditions of JCTs, supported by the EEAS Crisis Response Centre 
and the ERCC at the EU level. 

Legal uncertainty regarding the role of EU delegations in providing consular assistance 

It should be noted that amendments under option 2d) can be proposed on the basis of Article 
23(2) TFEU, whereas amendments under option 2e) would require the use of the passerelle 
clause under Article 25 TFEU (see section 3.1).  

Option  2d)  Detail  the  supporting  role  of  EU  delegations:  Legal  amendments  would 
strengthen  and  clarify  the  supporting  role  of  EU  delegations  by  aligning  it  with  the  EEAS 
Decision.  This  amendment  would  further  specify  the  supporting  role  of  EU  delegations  to 
Member States in the provision of consular protection to unrepresented citizens. Member States 
would be able to request assistance from the EU delegations to support them in their role of 
providing consular protection to unrepresented citizens in third countries. 

29 

 
 
Option  2e)  EU  delegations  can  provide  direct  consular  assistance  to  EU  citizens  in 
uncovered  third  countries:  Legal  amendments  would  be  introduced  to  enable  the  EU 
delegations to provide direct consular protection to unrepresented EU citizens without the need 
for a prior Member State request in uncovered third countries. They would support Member 
States in covered third countries. 

5.2.3.  SO3:  Improve 

the 

information  provision  and  communication  with 

(unrepresented) EU citizens. 

Inconsistent information to EU citizens 

Option  3a)  Legal  amendments  with  new  requirements  regarding  the  provision  of 
information: Legal amendments would include requirements for Member States to provide 
the Commission and the EEAS with information within a certain timeframe and in machine-
readable format, namely:  

1.  up-to-date lists of contacts for their consular networks, including honorary consuls and 
their functions if the Member State has chosen to apply Article 2(2) of the Directive; 

2.  information  on  the  extent  to  which  honorary  consuls  are  competent  to  provide 

assistance to unrepresented EU citizens, and on the scope of such assistance;  

3.  bilateral and practical arrangements.  

The  legal  amendments  would  explicitly  assign  the  Commission/EEAS  with  the  task  of 
disseminating the information on the practical arrangements in place to all Member States on 
the basis of notifications received.  

The legal amendments  would also require the Member States to endeavour coordination on 
travel advice at local (LCC) and capital level (using CoOL), at an early stage when Member 
States are planning to change the level of their travel advice. 

Option 3b) An EU travel advice portal: A European travel advice portal would be established 
compiling information made available from individual Member States portals. 

Lack of reliable information on EU citizens living or traveling abroad  

Option 3c) Communication campaign: An EU-wide campaign would be conducted to raise 
awareness on the consular right to consular protection and the importance of registering prior 
to traveling and/or living abroad. 

Option 3d) Member States required to promote measures to inform on/record citizens: 
Through legal amendments, Member States would be required to promote measures supporting 
the possibility for their citizens to be able to inform  consular authorities and/or record their 
travelling or residence abroad.  

5.2.4.  SO4:  Increase  the  efficiency  and  use  of  the  financial  reimbursement 

procedures 

Option 4a): Guidelines and training: The Commission would develop guidelines to clarify 
the process of financial reimbursement and training would be provided to the Member States. 

Option 4b) Legal amendments to improve the procedure: This option proposes to introduce 
legal amendments adding the option for unrepresented EU citizens to pay the assisting Member 
State,  or,  as  the  case  may  be,  the  EU  delegation directly  either  before  or  after  the  consular 
assistance has been provided. A deadline would be introduced for an assisting Member States 
and EU delegations to provide the statement of expenses for costs incurred to the Member State 

30 

 
 
of  nationality.  Finally,  this  option  would  introduce  a  revised  form68  in  the  Annex  to  cover 
reimbursement  both  for  unrepresented  EU  citizens  and,  in  crisis  situation,  for  represented 
citizens  when  assistance  is  exceptionally  provided.  The  revised  standard  form  would  also 
mention EU delegations.  

5.3. Options discarded at an early stage 

Agreements  with  third  countries:  Agreements  with  like-minded  countries  (e.g.  UK)  to 
provide  consular  protection  to  EU  citizens  in  third  countries  without  Member  State 
representation  were not  considered as they would fail to  provide unrepresented EU citizens 
with the guarantees ensured by the fundamental right to consular protection. This is because 
third countries providing assistance would not be under an EU law obligation to provide non-
discriminatory treatment to EU citizens and to comply with other fundamental rights in the 
Charter (e.g. right to personal data protection, right to an effective remedy). In addition, such 
agreements would fail to deliver on the right of EU citizen to receive consular protection from 
other Member States. In fact, as consular affairs remain a national competence, this scenario 
would possibly require bilateral agreements between the Member States and the relevant third 
countries, which would result in different levels of consular protection to unrepresented EU 
citizens from the same like-minded country. 

EU  delegations  as  exclusive  providers  of  consular  protection  to  unrepresented  EU 
citizens: The inception impact assessment initially foresaw an option including “provisions for 
local EU delegations to directly and exclusively take care of unrepresented EU citizens and 
provide them with all types of consular protection beyond crisis situations”. However, when 
such an option was tested with stakeholders, it became clear that such an exclusive role for EU 
delegations would have a very low technical, political and legal feasibility.  

Options  aiming  to  address  problems/measures  that  were  considered  outside  of  the 
scope/reach of the Directive: The problem where national authorities of third countries refuse 
to  recognise  dual  nationals  (EU  citizenship  and  third  country  nationality),  hampering  their 
access to consular protection from Member States, was identified at the inception phase of the 
study and was eventually discarded as it was considered to be outside the remit of the initiative. 
In addition, one of the solutions considered to address the delays caused by the lack of clarity 
around the process of redirecting and lack of up-to-date information of bilateral agreements, 
was to prohibit Member States to put such agreements in place in the first place. However, it 
was then agreed that such a prohibition would not be legally feasible, as it is the prerogative of 
Member States to make such bilateral agreements. 

Different  combination  of  options:  a  different  combination  of  options  was  not  taken  into 
account as it was considered that the best option for each problem, assessed separately, would 
remain  the  best  option  also  when  taken  together  with  the  preferred  options  for  the  other 
problems. Synergies between the different measures, such as on coordination and cooperation 
and on reimbursement procedures, have been taken into account. In addition, the assessment 
of  each  measure  separately  allows  to  cover  all  problems  but  to  evaluate  different  levels  of 
intervention (legislative and non-legislative) depending on the problem. A package of all non-
legislative measures was not considered from the start, given that some of the problems could 
not have been solved without a legislative intervention.  

68  

A procedure may be further established to facilitate future update of the forms by delegated acts. 

31 

 
 
 
 
 
 
6.  WHAT  ARE  THE  IMPACTS  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  POLICY  OPTIONS  AND  WHO  WILL  BE 

AFFECTED? 

No environmental impacts (including the climate consistency check) and impacts on SMEs and 
competitiveness  have  been  identified.  None  of  the  options  have  social  impacts,  including 
impacts  on  employment,  working  conditions  or  income  distribution.  There  are  no  direct 
impacts on access to and adequacy of social protection and inclusion, but any improvements 
in consular protection of unrepresented citizens can have indirect positive impact on access to 
social protection. 

6.1. Impacts on fundamental rights 

•  Article 46 of the Charter – right to consular protection  

All measures considered have a positive – albeit to a different extent – direct impact on Article 
46 of the Charter, as the general objective of the initiative is to improve the exercise of that 
right.  

Option  1a)  would  have  a  limited  positive  impact,  as  the  effective  application  of  the  new 
definition would depend on the Member States voluntary implementation of the non-binding 
guidance  issued  under  this  option.  On  the  other  hand,  option  1b),  by  legally  clarifying  the 
scope of the Directive, would have a more significant direct positive impact on the effective 
application of Article 46 of the Charter, given that unrepresented citizens would be able to rely 
on a new binding definition of what it means to be unrepresented. Option 1c) would have the 
strongest  impact  on  the  effective  application  of  Article  46  of  the  Charter,  as  due  to  the 
presumption  of  unrepresentedness,  chances  are  lowest  that  EU  citizens  would  be  denied 
consular protection. 

Both  Option  2a)  and  option  2b)  would  contribute  to  smoother  cooperation  among  actors 
involved  in  the  provision  of  consular  assistance  to  unrepresented  EU  citizens.  They  would 
facilitate  procedures  necessary  for  its  effective  application  and  therefore  contribute  to 
enhancing the right to consular protection, as those actors and their collaboration are key to 
deliver  such  protection.  In  the  same  vein,  option  2c)  would  have  a  positive  impact  on  the 
provision  of  consular  assistance  to  unrepresented  EU  citizens  by  improving  the  processes 
necessary for its effective application, and in particular in crisis situations. Option 2d) would 
strengthen the role of EU delegations. By resolving the legal uncertainties currently in place 
for the activities of EU delegations, this measure would strengthen the fundamental right to 
consular  protection  of  unrepresented  EU  citizens.  By  giving  a  new  role  to  EU  delegations, 
option 2e) would be especially beneficial in securing the citizen’s right to consular protection 
in uncovered third countries.  

The new requirements for provision of information under option 3a) would allow citizens to 
make  better  informed  decisions  with  regard  to  where  and  how  they  can  travel  and  receive 
consular  assistance.  It  would  thus  have  a  positive  impact  on  their  enjoyment  of  effective 
consular protection. The centralised information of travel advice under Option 3b) would also 
contribute to better informed citizens with regard to where to travel. By increasing awareness, 
it would improve effective consular protection in time of crisis due to better preparedness by 
those who decide to travel, or by limiting travel to riskier third countries. 

The  communication  campaign  in  Option  3c)  might  have  a  positive  impact  on  the  right  to 
consular protection of unrepresented citizens, especially in crises situation. Option 3d) is also 
considered to have a positive impact to facilitate the right of consular protection. 

Finally, Option 4a) and 4b) do not have direct impacts on the right to consular protection.  

32 

 
 
•  Article 41 of the Charter – Right to good administration 

Article 41 of the Charter contains the fundamental right of EU citizens to have their affairs 
handled fairly, transparently, and efficiently by EU institutions and other bodies. Any measures 
taken to improve services provided by such bodies to unrepresented EU citizens would have a 
positive effect on the principles enshrined in Article 41. 

Several  measures have direct  and beneficial impacts  on the application of Article 41  of the 
Charter  as  they  strengthen  or  extend,  respectively,  the  role  and  the  functioning  of  EU 
delegations (option 2d) and option 2e)).  

Option 2b) and option 2c) have a positive impact on the right enshrined in Article 41 of the 
Charter as these options envisage smoother collaboration among different actors with a leading 
role for EU delegations.  

Very limited impacts on the right to good administration is identified by the soft measures in 
option 2a). 

•  Article 21 – non-discrimination on the basis of nationality  

All measures considered have a positive – albeit to a different extent – direct impact on Article 
21 of the Charter, as the general objective of the initiative is to improve the exercise of the right 
to  consular  protection  on  a  non-discriminatory  basis,  that  is,  on  the  same  conditions  as  the 
nationals of that State. 

•  Other fundamental rights 

The measures outlined in Annex 10 would reinforce the right to an effective remedy and to a 
fair trial (Article 47 of the Charter) and the rights to respect for private and family life and data 
protection (Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter). 

6.2. Economic impacts 

When considering the economic outcomes of the options presented, it should be noted that such 
impacts would concern  only Member States and EU delegations rather than having a direct 
impact  on  EU  citizens.  The  economic  impacts  are  difficult  to  quantify  but  are  considered 
overall  very  limited.  More  information  on  the  methodology  for  assessment  of  costs  can  be 
found in Annex 4. 

Option 1a) Combination of soft measures on the scope of the right to consular 
protection 

Costs 

Direct costs 

Member 
States 

Member States being perceived as providing a better level of service could see 
an  increase  in  the  number  of  requests  for  assistance  from  unrepresented  EU 
citizens, but it is not possible to estimate the recurrent costs of such increase and 
their different distribution, if any, among different Member States. The training 
to  national  consular  staff  is  expected  to  be  provided  by  the  Member  States 
directly as it will be recurrent. Increased participation of unrepresented Member 
States  in  LCC  meetings  might  imply  some  recurrent  costs  in  terms  of  time 
dedicated to the meetings by consular staff.  

EU or 

The  estimated  resources  needed  to  produce  guidelines  from  the  COM/EEAS 
would  be  a  maximum  of  1  full-time  equivalents  (FTE)  for  one  month  at  the 

33 

 
 
EUDELs   outset.  For  trainings,  the  training  modules  for  EU  delegations  are  to  be 
developed by the EEAS internally, by existing staff involved in the current training 
programme (no involvement of external trainers). Some EU delegations might 
see an increase in the number of requests for support by Member States, but 
this  should  not  imply  increased  costs  if  those  costs  were  reimbursed  by  the 
citizens concerned.  

Option 1b) Improvement to the definition through legislative amendments 

Costs 

Direct costs 

Member 
States 

Member States could see an increase in the number of requests for assistance 
from  unrepresented  citizens.  It  is  expected  that  Member  States  with  larger 
consular networks will be proportionally more impacted.  

EU or 

EUDELs 

Some  EU  delegations  might  see  an  increase  in  the  number  of  requests  for 
support  from  Member  States  due  to  the  clarification  in  the  definition  of 
‘unrepresented citizen’. 

Option 1c) Introduction of the concept of “presumption of unrepresentedness” 

Costs 

Direct costs 

Member 
States 

The costs related to the potential additional number of de facto unrepresented 
citizens  to  be  assisted  due  to  the  introduction  of  a  “presumption  of 
unrepresentedness”  is  difficult  to  estimate.  For crisis  situations,  it  will  largely 
depend on where those crises occur and how many consular offices are present. 
Member States with larger consular networks are likely to bear a bigger part of 
the costs associated with this measure given their denser consular footprint in 
larger third countries and wider presence in general. 

It is likely that situations will arise where it is established later that the citizen 
that  was  provided  with  consular  assistance  during  the  crisis  was  in  fact  not 
entitled to protection. These are additional costs that assisting Member States 
would incur.  

EU or 

EUDELs 

Some  EU  delegations  might  see  an  increase  in  the  number  of  requests  for 
support  from  Member  States.  The  issue  of  costs  with  assisting  citizens  not 
entitled  to  protection  would  also  apply  to  EU  delegations,  albeit  to  a  lesser 
extent given their supporting role.  

Option 2a) Guidelines on local cooperation 

Costs  

Direct costs 

Member 
States 

No costs  

34 

 
 
or 

EU 
EUDEL  

The  estimated  resources  needed  to  produce  guidelines  from  the  COM/EEAS 
would be a maximum of 1 FTE for one month at the outset. 

Option 2b) EU delegations to chair local consular cooperation networks meetings 

Costs 

Direct costs 

Member 
States 

No  costs.  Member  States  are  expected  to  make  small  recurrent  savings  in 
administrative burden by not having to chair these meetings. 

EU or 
EUDEL  

The  additional  recurrent  costs  to EU delegations  would be  marginal,  as  this  is 
partially already established practice.  

Option 2c) Review of the concept of Lead State and formalisation of the JFWs and 
JCTs 

Costs 

Direct costs 

Member 
States 

Current  Lead  States  will  see  savings  while  other  Member  States  might  have 
limited costs due to the assignment of new tasks under JFWs. All Member States 
might  face  some  costs  for  the  application  of  these  revised  concepts  and 
procedures, but these are difficult to quantify exactly, notably in view of their 
contingent nature.  

EU or 

EUDELs  

The  only  additional  costs  incurred  could  come  from  the  mandatory  annual 
update of all JFWs requiring only limited additional resources, given that this is 
to a large extent already established practice. The EEAS Consular Affairs Division 
would  be  responsible  for  the  activity.  The  use  of  Joint  Consular  Teams  (JCT) 
would be cost-neutral for the EEAS. The EEAS Consular Affairs Division (CRC2) 
has  been  reinforced  with  the  creation  of  a  crisis  preparedness  and  response 
team. Participating in JCT is part of their duties, making this option cost-neutral.  

Option 2d) Strengthen the supporting role of EU delegations 

Costs:  

Direct costs 

Member 
States 

For  some  Member  States,  the  salary  costs69  of  5  seconded  national  experts 
(SNEs) to work in EU delegations (5 in total). 

EU or 

EUDELs  

The  role  of  EU  delegations  to  support  Member  States  will  entail  a  limited 
increase in staff and some additional training of existing staff to ensure they are 
able to provide these services. Assuming EU delegations would mostly receive 
requests from Member States in countries with low levels of representation, 

69  

The salaries depend on national salaries and benefits of the SNEs and a precise calculation is not possible 
in advance. Based on the limited data available, estimations show that a costs for Member States for 1 
cost-free SNE could range from 980 EUR net per month, for a civil servant in the first grade in Bulgaria 
to 8 177.83 EUR gross monthly salary for a high-raking diplomat in Finland. For a detailed illustration 
of the data and the estimations of costs, see Annex 4.  

35 

 
 
 
this option would require at least 5 cost-free SNEs in total as stated above. In 
addition  to  the  salary  costs  for  some  Member  States  (to  be  allocated 
accordingly  to  regional  needs  by  establishing  the  key  EU  delegations),  this 
would imply operating expenditure for the EU budget of 37 500 EUR per year 
for 5 SNEs70.  

Option 2e) EU delegations can provide direct consular assistance to EU citizens in 
uncovered third countries 

Costs:  

Direct costs 

Member 
States 

EU or 

EUDELs  

The salary costs of a total of 10 SNEs to work in EU delegations71. There would 
also be savings as consular protection would be provided directly on the spot 
by the EU delegation instead of being provided either remotely, by dispatching 
a consular officer on the field, or by the use of honorary consuls.  

The extension of the role of EU delegations to have the capacity to provide 
consular protection will entail an increase in staff and the training of existing 
staff  to  ensure  they  are  able  to  provide  these  services.  This  option  would 
require at least 10 cost-free SNEs: in total, this would amount to EUR 75 000 
per  year  in  terms  of  operating  expenditure,  in  addition  to  the  salary  costs 
borne by Member States72.  

Option 3a) Legal amendments with new requirements for provision of information 

Costs:  

Direct costs 

Member 
States 

Member  States  would  have  to  share  additional 
information  with  the 
Commission and the EEAS. However, this information is already collected by the 
Member States and would thus not add an additional burden beyond sharing 
some additional data in CoOL and at local level and adjusting the information 
into the machine-readable format required by the Commission.  

EU or 

EUDELs  

The main costs under this option would be in enhancing the functionalities of 
CoOL  but  this  option  would  not  create  additional  costs  as  the  platform  is 
constantly  upgraded  with  new  functionalities  (some  recently  added  new 
functionalities  refer  to  topic-specific  collaborative  tables,  possibility to  attach 
files  to  messages  and  to  link  messages).  Updating  the  Europa  website  would 
require  one  FTE  for  three  months  at  the  beginning  and  one  month  per  year 

70  
71  

72  

See Annex 4 for the methodology applied to estimate the additional costs. 
The salaries depend on national salaries and benefits of SNEs and a precise calculation is not possible in 
advance. Based on the limited data available, estimations show that a costs for Member States for 1 cost-
free SNE could range from EUR 980 net per month for a civil servant in the first grade in Bulgaria to 
EUR 8 177.83 gross monthly salary for a high-raking diplomat in Finland. For a detailed illustration of 
the data and the estimations of costs, see Annex 4.  
See Annex 4 for the methodology applied to estimate the additional costs. 

36 

 
 
 
thereafter. Using the standard rate of EUR 171 000 per year, the cost for the first 
year would be EUR 42 750 and then EUR 14 250 per year thereafter73. 

Option 3b) An EU travel advice portal 

Costs 

Direct costs 

Member 
States 

As  the  information  would  be  gathered  from  Member  States  national  travel 
advice websites there would be no additional costs for the Member States.  

EU or 

EUDELs 

It is estimated that one FTE at EEAS or in the Commission would be needed to 
collect and aggregate the information received from the Member States. This 
corresponds to EUR 171 000 per year. In addition, based on the yearly budget 
of the consular protection website operated by DG JUST, it is estimated that 
the operation, maintenance and development of a new dedicated website for 
European travel advice would amount to around EUR 80 000 per year. While 
the existing Europa website could be used as an alternative, the development 
of  a  tailored  independent  website  is  recommended.  Information  would  be 
gathered from Member States national travel advice websites74.  

Option 3c) Communication campaign 

Costs: 

Direct costs 

EU or 
EUDELs  

An awareness campaign would cost an estimated EUR 50 000 to EUR 100 00075. 
For more effectiveness it should be recurrent.  

Member 
States 

If  the  campaign  is  also  supported  by  Member  States  at  national  level,  costs 
would be between EUR 500 000 and EUR 1 million. 

Option 3d) Member States required to promote measures to inform on/record citizens 

Costs:  

Direct costs 

Member States  As  all  Member  States  already  offer  some  possibility  for  citizens  to 
register when traveling or living abroad, no new information tools would 
be  needed  but  the  registration  system  could  be  expanded  to  the 
category  not  currently  covered  (residents  or  travellers),  which  could 
involve some marginal software costs. Additional costs  would arise for 
the  Member  States  to  further  improve  the  effectiveness  of  their 
registration systems by rising their citizens’ awareness of the importance 
to  register  their  travels/residence  abroad  by  means  of  information 
campaigns at airports or by cooperating with insurance/travel/telecom 
companies. The costs of these activities will depend on Member State 

73  
74  
75  

See Annex 4 for more information on estimation of costs. 
See Annex 4 for more information on estimation of costs. 
See Annex 4 for more information on estimation of costs. 

37 

 
 
 
capacity  and the  measures  chosen.  However,  it is  estimated  that  they 
would be recurrent to comply with the requirements.  

EU or EUDELs  

No costs. 

Option 4a) Guidelines and training to increase the efficiency and use of the financial 
reimbursement procedures 

Costs 

Direct costs 

Member  

States 

No  costs,  with  some  very limited  savings that  might  arise  from the  voluntary 
applications of the guidelines.  

EU or 
EUDELs  

The estimated resource needed to produce guidelines from the Commission or 
EEAS would be a maximum of 1 FTE for one month. 

Option 4b) Legal amendments to improve the procedure of financial reimbursement  

Costs:  

Direct costs 

Member 
States 

The option would result in a considerable reduction of administrative costs for 
the  Member  States  and  increase  the  likeliness  of  Member  States  having  the 
costs  of  providing  consular  assistance  to  unrepresented  citizens  reimbursed. 
This  would  result  in  savings  for  the  Member  States  providing  assistance. 
Member States would also be able to reduce administrative costs when the EU 
delegations support unrepresented EU citizens as EU delegations would be able 
to be reimbursed by citizens directly without mediation by the Member States. 

EU or 
EUDELs  

No costs, as EU delegations would be able to be reimbursed by citizens following 
the same procedures for reimbursement of Member States. 

6.3. Compliance with the ‘Digital by Default’ principle  

Options 3a) and 3b) would seek to make use of the possibilities offered by digitalisation by 
providing for the provision of information in machine-readable format, allowing for easier 
and automated processing and online presentation to the public. 

6.4. Assessment of options  

The  options  are  assessed  against  the  following  criteria:  effectiveness,  efficiency76, 
proportionality, coherence and political feasibility, with a proposed scoring of low (●), medium 
(●●) and high (●●●)77.  

76  
77  

For more information on the methodology for assessment of costs, see Annex 4. 
See Annex 4 for more information on the assessment of each criterion. 

38 

 
 
 
 
 
6.4.1.  Assessment of options for SO1 

Option 1a) Combination of soft measures 

Effectiveness:  This  option  would  have  a  somewhat  positive  impact  on  achieving  SO1  by 
fostering a gradual better understanding of the way in the scope of the Directive in terms of the 
definition of “unrepresented” is to be defined and applied. It would further help in clarifying 
situations in which an embassy or consulate is not “effectively in a position to provide consular 
protection in a given case”, whether this is due to an honorary consul who is not authorised to 
undertake certain action, a remoteness issue, or because of a temporary closure (due to a man-
made/natural disaster). This would support the development of a clearer understanding of when 
an EU citizen is to be considered unrepresented. The effects of taking such a measure would 
equally apply in future crisis and non-crisis situations, for the benefits of unrepresented EU 
citizens and Member States. Both would profit from time savings in assessing “representation”. 
However, clarifying rules through soft measures  would not fully achieve SO1. The specific 
objective  aims  at  ensuring  legal  certainty  for  the  unrepresented  EU  citizens  and  addresses 
wrong assessments of specific situations as the major cause for certain cases of non-assistance. 
Despite some level of compelling effect, soft measures are not legally binding and therefore 
cannot  be  directly  enforced  by  the  Commission  or  relied  upon  by  citizens  when  seeking  to 
uphold their rights. (Score: ●) 

Efficiency: As illustrated in the previous chapter, the costs associated with the combination of 
soft measures are very limited. Their application would also bring some benefits to EU citizens 
by clarifying the Directive’s scope, albeit to a limited extent only. (Score: ●●)  

Coherence: Improving the definition of unrepresented citizens is coherent with the objectives 
of the ETD Directive as it contributes to facilitating the issuing process of an EU ETD. (Score: 
●●) 

Proportionality: These measures are considered fully proportionate to achieve the objectives 
as  the  very  low  costs  for  Member  States  and  the  EU  correspond  to  a  certain  level  of 
effectiveness  in  achieving  the  general  objective  of  improving  the  consular  assistance  of 
unrepresented EU citizens. This is reinforced by the uncertainties regarding the scale of the 
problems identified resulting from the limited data available. (Score: ●●●) 

Political  feasibility:  As  guidelines  are  issued  by  the  Commission  or/and  the  EEAS,  their 
political feasibility is very high. Their adoption will only entail some collaboration between 
the Commission/EEAS and the Member States. According to the study, Member States were 
generally  in  favour  of  receiving  further  guidance  and  training  on  the  application  of  the 
Directive. It is thus expected that there would be support for this option 1 from a political point 
of view. (Score: ●●●) 

Option 1b) Improvement to the definition through legislative amendments  

Effectiveness: This option would achieve SO 1 and increase legal certainty for unrepresented 
EU citizens. Similarly to option 1a), the amendments would benefit Member States by guiding 
them in the assessment of concrete and quite often complex situations.  This measure would 
help to facilitate the identification of unrepresented EU citizens, leading  to a more efficient 
assessment by Member States regarding a citizen’s situation. Legal definitions and objective 
criteria would produce unambiguous,  enforceable results for the  same set  of circumstances, 
ensuring a coherent application of the Directive across the world, both in time of crisis and 
non-crisis. Transposition and application could be monitored more effectively. (Score: ●●) 

39 

 
 
Efficiency:  In  light  of  the  analysis  in  the  previous  chapter,  it  appears  that  the  costs  of  this 
measure, requiring the revision of the current legal framework, would be minimal for the EU 
and the Member States while it would deliver substantial benefits and positive impacts on the 
right  to  consular  protection  of  unrepresented  EU  citizens  but  also  for  Member  States,  as 
explained above, arising in particular from the additional legal certainty. (Score: ●●●) 

Coherence:  Improving  the  definition  would  facilitate  the  cooperation  and  coordination 
between  the  assisting  Member  State  and  the  unrepresented  citizen’s  Member  State  of 
nationality and consequently will also contribute to achieve the objectives of the ETD Directive 
as they increase the security and the speed of the issuing process of an EU ETD. (Score: ●●●) 

Proportionality: The evidence identified shows that this option would not require excessive 
effort from Member States to implement the measures and it is considered proportional to the 
achievement of the objective of the initiative. In addition, the changes would merely clarify the 
existing scope of the Directive rather than extending it. This is also in line with the estimates 
regarding the scale of the problem, notably on the number of trips by unrepresented citizens. 
(Score: ●●●) 

Political feasibility: While most stakeholders consulted are content with the current wording 
of the definition in Articles 4 and 6 of the Directive, there appears to be agreement that further 
clarification would be helpful. Only two Member States stated that a revision of the measures 
for provision of consular protection to unrepresented EU citizens is not needed. (Score: ●●) 

Option 1c) Introduction of a “presumption of unrepresentedness” 

Effectiveness:  The  measure  proposed  would  have  a  positive  impact  on  achieving  SO  1  as 
citizens  would  have  greater  certainty  to  be  covered  in  case  of  need  for  protection.  The 
presumption of “unrepresentedness” would accelerate the procedure of assistance as it would 
not require the Member States of nationality to confirm the identity of its own nationals. This 
can be critical for consular protection in crisis situations where assistance frequently has to be 
provided as a matter of urgency. At the same time, this measure could result in assistance being 
provided  to  citizens  that  are  not  legally  entitled  to  protection  (e.g.  undocumented  third 
countries nationals posing as EU citizens). (Score: ●●●) 

Efficiency: This measure is particularly beneficial for unrepresented EU citizens, as it has the 
best and most effective impact on the improvement of their right to consular protection, hence 
it  is  the  most  effective  to  achieve  the  objective  of  the  initiative.  However,  there  is  a  non-
negligible  risk  that  Member  States,  in  particular  those  with  larger  networks,  might  end  up 
providing assistance to citizens who are later found not have been entitled to protection due to 
their  Member  State  of  nationality  being  represented  in  the  third  country  concerned.  On  the 
basis of the assessment of costs and their distribution across actors, and taking into account the 
scale of the problems, the efficiency of this option is therefore considered low. (Score: ●) 

Coherence: The ETD Directive allows for the issuance of EU ETDs without consulting the 
Member State of nationality in cases of “extreme urgency” (Article 4(6)), therefore there is not 
a particular conflict with the issuance of ETDs in crisis situations and the introduction of the 
presumption of “unrepresentedness”. Some conflict might arise in non-crisis situations. (Score: 
●●) 

Proportionality:  The  introduction  of  a  presumption  of  “unrepresentedness”  would  expose 
Member  States  and  EU  delegations  to  the  risk  of  assisting  citizens  who  are  not  entitled  to 
consular  protection  under  the  Directive.  This  measure  is  therefore  going  beyond  what  is 
necessary to achieve the objective of legal certainty for unrepresented EU citizens. In addition, 

40 

 
 
the uncertainties regarding the scale of the problem make such a shift in the approach regarding 
the concept of ‘representation’ appear disproportionate. (Score: ●) 

Political  feasibility:  The  idea  to  introduce  a  presumption  of  “unrepresentedness”  was  not 
viewed favourably by many Member States and therefore its political feasibility is considered 
low. (Score: ●) 

6.4.2.  Assessment of options for SO2 

•  Unclear responsibilities in local consular cooperation networks  

Option 2a) Guidelines on local cooperation  

Effectiveness: The guidelines and best practices would have a  somewhat positive impact on 
achieving SO2. This option would ensure that all relevant experiences are shared and would 
help to codify lessons learnt such as some of the difficulties experienced during the COVID-
19  pandemic.  Guidelines  could  help  to  strengthen  some  cooperation  and  coordination 
procedures  in  the  organisation  of  local  cooperation,  such  as  the  involvement  of  the 
unrepresented  Member  States,  but  it  would  still  leave  the  chairing  of  the  meetings  to  a 
representative of a Member State (unless otherwise agreed by Member States, see Article 12 
of the Directive). Therefore, it is likely that business continuity as well as institutional memory, 
the two main issues linked to such meetings, might not be fully resolved. (Score: ●●) 

Efficiency: Based on the assessment of limited costs and limited benefits, including  limited 
impact on fundamental rights, the efficiency of this option is medium. (Score: ●●) 

Coherence: This policy option is considered largely coherent with the Commission’s priorities. 
(Score: ●●●) 

Proportionality: This policy option is considered fully proportionate to achieve the objective. 
as the choice of guidelines would be very simple instrument to implement and would bring 
certain benefits in the definition of the roles of the actors involved in local cooperation. This is 
reinforced by the uncertainties regarding the scale of the problems identified. (Score: ●●●) 

Political feasibility: Guidelines have a high political feasibility as they are not binding. (Score: 
●●●) 

Option 2b) EU delegations will chair local consular cooperation networks meetings 

Effectiveness: This policy option on LCCs would have a positive impact on achieving SO2. A 
major benefit of this measure is the standardisation of LCC meetings (e.g. work on preparation 
and update of JFWs, involvement of unrepresented Member States, circulation of agendas and 
minutes), increasing their usefulness and overall improving consular cooperation. By giving 
this  task  to  EU  delegations  when  they  are  present  in  a  third  country,  it  would  increase  the 
consistency of the meetings and secure businesses continuity in a much more effective way 
than  where  different  Member  States  alternate  in  chairing  these  meetings  as  describe  in  the 
problem  section.  It  would  strengthen  EU  delegation’s  ownership  of  consular  coordination, 
therefore  improving  information  flows  on  consular  matters  towards  the  EEAS  CRC  and 
Commission ERCC. The reinforcement of the overall coordination of EU delegations by EEAS 
headquarters  on  the  basis  of  this  legal  amendment  would  create  a  clear  benefit  to  the 
functioning of local cooperation meetings. This would be very useful in third countries where 
there is a very low level of representation of Member States, as EU delegations would lift the 
coordination burden from the few Member States present, enabling them to focus on practical 
assistance to EU citizens. Even in countries where almost all Member States are represented, 
there is space and need for better, more extensive coordination and therefore EU delegations 

41 

 
 
could be well placed to  streamline LCC meetings and ensuring everyone’s participation for 
better consular crisis preparedness and, ultimately, response. (Score: ●●●) 

Efficiency: This option has low costs and only for EU delegations, while Member States will 
see small savings. The benefits of this measures are instead significant, including with regard 
to the impact on fundamental rights as explained above, the efficiency of this option is therefore 
scored high. (Score: ●●●) 

Coherence:  Giving  the  possibility  to  EU  delegations  to  chair  LCCs  would  increase  the  EU 
delegation’s role on consular matters in third countries. It would facilitate a coherent consular 
coordination  response  at  EU  level  and  will  align  the  practice  with  the  chairing  of  Local 
Schengen  Cooperation  (LSC)  meetings,  which  are  already  chaired  by  EU  delegations  and 
already  gather  consular  officials  from  Member  States  to  discuss  the  issuance  of  short-term 
visas. Therefore, this measure would be coherent with raising the profile of the EU action in 
third countries as per Commission’s priorities. (Score: ●●●) 

Proportionality: This policy option is considered fully proportionate to achieve the objective 
of better coordination without creating excessive burden and not requiring excessive efforts by 
the  actors  involved,  in  particular  if  Member  States  are  given  the  option  to  agree  on  an 
alternative chair. This assessment is not affected by the uncertainties regarding the scale of the 
problems identified. (Score: ●●●) 

Political feasibility: Member States expressed both in the study and in COCONs meetings that 
are favourable on the option that EU delegations chair LCC meetings. (Score: ●●●) 

•  Ineffective contingency planning, Lead State concept and JCTs 

The measures for these two problems are presented together under the same option because of 
their correlation and synergies. As only one option is proposed, its added value is compared 
with the baseline scenario (description of problems section).  

Option 2c) Review of the concept of Lead State and formalisation of the JFW and JCTs. 

Effectiveness: The review of the concept of Lead State and the formalisation of JFWs and JCTs 
would lead to a more effective and proportionate sharing of the burden of assistance between 
Member  States  and  EU  delegations.  It  would  also  clarify  and  simplify  the  mechanisms  of 
consular cooperation among Member States in third countries. Not only  would this directly 
benefit EU citizens, but it would also reinforce solidarity among Member States. It would have 
a  positive  impact  notably  in  crisis  situations.  As  JFW  have  become  the  cornerstone  of  EU 
consular protection preparedness, their explicit reference in the Directive together with rules 
for their periodic assessment would ensure their systematic implementation, effectiveness and 
broaden their use. The JCTs concept brings valuable synergies for optimising Member States’ 
and  EU  consular  response  in  crises  (including  the  participation  of  EEAS  CRC  crisis 
preparedness and response and Commission civil protection teams). Overall, these measures 
would be effective in achieving SO2.  

Efficiency: based on the assessment of costs and benefits, including the impact on fundamental 
rights, this option is considered efficient. 

Coherence: According to Article 13(4) of the Directive, Lead States or the Member State(s) 
coordinating assistance for unrepresented EU citizens may seek support from instruments such 
as the UCPM and the crisis management structures of the EEAS. Therefore, measures that are 
effective  in  simplifying  and  improving  the  procedures  for  cooperation  and  coordination 
between the Member States and EU delegations, in particular clarifying their tasks and roles in 
crisis situations would also be coherent with the EEAS Decision and the UCPM by supporting 

42 

 
 
the deployment of their capacities and capabilities for the benefit of unrepresented citizens. 
This  measure is  also  coherent  with  the Commission’s objective to  increase Member States’ 
solidarity in this field.  

Proportionality: this policy option is considered fully proportionate to achieve the objective. 
The choice of building on and strengthening EU instruments and processes already in place 
would contribute to a policy intervention that remains as simple as possible, proportional and 
effective in achieving the policy objectives.  While available data is limited, estimates show 
that the scale of the problems identified is likely to increase in crisis situations (see Section 
2.3.2). 

Political feasibility: The majority of Member States consulted during the study saw an added 
value in EU delegations playing a larger coordination role in implementing JFWs and in setting 
up JCTs. In COCON, JFW were identified by Member States as a suitable tool for LCC to 
appoint  a  leading  authority  (or  authorities).  They  expressed  clearly  the  need  for  further 
clarification of the tasks assigned to a leading authority within the JFW. Member States also 
expressed that a certain level of universal approach should be in place and rules for the periodic 
assessment of JFW should  be included in  the relevant  provisions of the  Directive. Member 
States also recognized and highly appreciated the leading role of EU delegations in the process 
of drafting JFW and some of them supported a suggestion to reflect this practical role in the 
Directive. The study also collected positive feedback on the changes to the Lead State, JFW 
and the role of EU delegations (see table below).  

Table 4: Member States’ opinions on the replacement of the Lead State concept (n=26) 

Yes  No  Maybe  N/A 

Do you see the need to replace the concept of lead State with a system where 
responsibilities are shared among the represented MS and EU delegations, 
which are agreed upon and defined in the JFW? 

12 

7 

Do you see the need for the EU delegations to take a greater role to support 
the Member States in the preparation and implementation of joint 
contingency plans (JFW)? If so, what specifically could be improved? Are there 
any barriers to an increased role for EU delegation? 

14 

4 

- 

- 

7 

8 

Do you see the need for the JFW to also cover the provision of consular 
protection services in non-crisis situations? 

3 

13 

- 

10 

Source: Questionnaire with Member States national authorities 

The feedback received by Member States in the study also reflects the large majority of the 22 
Member States that replied to the COVID-19 lessons learned questionnaire78 that they would 
be  open  to  consider  a  concept  for  a  future  model  of  JCTs.  However,  a  few  Member  States 
raised  reservations  with  regards  to  an  institutionalised  concept  of  JCTs.  The  majority  of 
Member States saw an added value in EU delegations playing a larger coordination role in the 
LCC meetings, in implementing JFWs and in setting up JCTs. 

78  

The  EU’s  “Consular  response  to  the  COVID-19  crisis”  (WK  6381/2020REV  1)”  working  paper 
highlights several lessons learned, which were validated with the Member States through a COVID-19 
lessons learned questionnaire. 

43 

 
 
 
 
 
 
•  Legal uncertainty with the role of EU delegations in providing consular assistance 

Option 2d) Detail the supporting role of EU delegations through legal amendments  

Effectiveness:  This  policy  option  would  increase  legal  certainty  for  EU  delegations  and 
unrepresented EU citizens by providing a clearer framework for EU delegations to operate in 
support  of  Member  States  and  aligning  the  role  of  the  EU  delegations  as  defined  in  the 
Directive with their mandate in the EEAS Decision. Under this option, in times of crisis, the 
EU delegations could alleviate some of the pressures faced by the Member States, especially 
in  countries  with  a  low  level  of  representation.  In  normal  times,  they  could  usefully 
complement the action of Member States in those countries (which are normally staffed with 
very limited resources) when they provide consular assistance to unrepresented EU citizens. 
The position of consular correspondents would be reinforced and formalized, entrusting them 
with a number of key tasks and activities that would increase the EU delegations’ capacity to 
support Member States. Overall, citizens would be better assisted by Member States with the 
support of EU delegations, especially in those countries with low to very low Member States 
presence. (Score: ●●●) 

Efficiency: The costs of Member States and EU delegations would be counterbalanced with 
benefits  for  all  actors  involved  in  consular  protection  activities  and  would  have  significant 
impacts on fundamental rights. Therefore, this measure is considered efficient. (Score: ●●●) 

Coherence: This measure would ensure coherence with the EEAS Decision and increase the 
uniformity of the EU approach in third countries. Therefore, it is highly compatible with the 
Commission’s  priorities.  This  measure  is  also  coherent  with  the  “Strategic  Compass”  and 
instruments of EU law, such as the EU ETD Directive. (Score: ●●●) 

Proportionality: This policy option is considered fully proportionate to achieve the objective. 
The policy choice of aligning the role of the EU delegations as defined in the Directive with 
their mandate in the EEAS Decision is a  simple choice but would satisfactorily achieve the 
objective of the initiative to increase legal certainty. While available data is limited, estimates 
show  that  the  scale  of  the  problems  identified  is  likely  to  increase  in  crisis  situations  (see 
Section 2.3.2). (Score: ●●●) 

Political feasibility: In the context of the COCON discussions, there was an interest among 
many  Member  States  to  clarify  the  role  of  EU  delegations  under  certain  conditions.  Some 
Member  States  would  support  to  identify  “specific  missions  that  the  EEAS  could  best 
address”79. Several Member States in COCON stated their interest in the possibility to assign 
consular tasks (including issuance of ETD) to EU delegations in third countries with no or very 
low presence of Member States (often referred to as situations in which two Member States or 
less are present). A significant number of Member States stressed that their final position on 
this topic would also depend on a specific wording and proposed conditions. The majority of 
Member States consulted for the study were in favour of allowing EU delegations to provide 
some  form  of  consular  protection  to  unrepresented  citizen  directly  and  upon  request  of  the 
Member  States.  On  this  basis,  targeted  legal  amendments  to  the  Directive  under  Article  23 
TFEU as proposed in this option would require a special legislative procedure, which entail a 
qualified  majority  in  Council  and  consultation  of  the  European  Parliament,  which  has 

79  

The EU’s role on Consular crisis management - Non-paper by Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg, Poland 
at: 
available 
and 
https://europeanunion.diplomatie.belgium.be/sites/default/files/content/download/files/non-
paper_be_fi_lu_nl_pl_-_eu_consular_crisis_management.pdf 

Netherlands, 

2022, 

April 

The 

44 

 
 
 
historically  been  very  positive  about  an  increased  role  for  EU  delegations80.  Overall,  the 
political feasibility of this is considered medium-high as the majority of the Member States are 
supportive of the measures proposed and the qualified majority required to adopt the proposed 
measures might allow for the adoption of these measures. (Score: ●●) 

Option 2e) EU delegations can provide direct consular assistance to EU citizens in uncovered 
third countries  

Effectiveness:  This  option  would  empower  EU  delegations,  by  means  of  the  activation  of 
Article 25 TFEU (the passerelle clause), to provide consular protection to unrepresented EU 
citizens directly, upon their own request (and not of Member States), in third countries where 
only EU delegations are present. It would therefore be effective in enhancing the role of EU 
delegations  and a concrete help  to  EU citizens in  those countries where  Member States are 
unable  to  provide  direct  and  immediate  protection.  The  option  would  alleviate  some  of  the 
pressures  faced  by  the  Member  States  (upon  their  request)  in  times  of  crisis,  especially  in 
countries with no or a low level of representation. In both crises and non-crises, EU delegations 
would  be  able  to  act  within  an  enhanced  role  and  with  a  clear  legal  mandate  which  would 
bolster  legal  certainty.  As  such,  this  would  have  a  very  positive  impact  on  achieving  SO3. 
(●●●) 

Efficiency: The costs for EU delegations would be counterbalanced with benefits for citizens 
and  Member  States  in  uncovered  countries,  therefore  this  measure  is  considered  efficient. 
(Score: ●●●) 

Coherence: This measure is fully coherent with the Commission’s objectives of strengthening 
the identity of the EU in third countries, reinforcing the external dimension of EU citizenship 
and  Member  States’  solidarity.  As  the  measure  would  require  an  extension  of  EU  right  to 
consular protection, it would not be coherent with the EEAS Decision (which provides only a 
supporting role to EU delegations on consular protection) nor with the other instrument of EU 
law, such as the ETD Directive, which would need to be amended accordingly. (Score: ●●) 

Proportionality:  This  policy  option  is  considered  not  fully  proportionate  to  achieve  the 
objective. The measure envisages an extension of the right to consular protection that would 
apply only in a limited number of countries and therefore could be considered as going beyond 
what is necessary to achieve the objective of effective consular protection to unrepresented EU 
citizens. However, the measure would be limited to those aspects that Member States cannot 
achieve  satisfactorily  on  their  own.  In  addition,  the  uncertainties  regarding  the  scale  of  the 
problem  raise  questions  whether  such  a  shift  in  the  approach  regarding  the  provision  of 
consular protection would be proportionate. (Score: ●●) 

Political feasibility: Proposed measures are subject to the passerelle clause under Article 25 
TFEU to strengthen or add to the existing right of consular protection, which would require a 
unanimous decision by the Member States which seems, for the moment, difficult to achieve 
giving  the  opposition  of  several  Member  States  to  the  use  of  that  mechanism  to  grant  EU 

80  

See as most recent example the European Parliament recommendation of 15 March 2023 to the Council 
and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security  Policy  taking  stock  of  the  functioning  of  the  EEAS  and  for  a  stronger  EU  in  the  world 
(2021/2065(INI)) where the European Parliament calls for the establishment of  “the consular function 
of EU embassies in third countries and strengthen and ensure cooperation and coordination between 
EU Member State embassies  and EU delegations in third countries, in particular in countries where 
Member States have no consular representation; provide delegations with sufficient means to be able to 
more  effectively  assist  EU  citizens,  including  in  times  of  crisis,  inter  alia  those  facing  criminal 
proceedings and those in prison or on death row;” (see point (ai)). 

45 

 
 
 
delegations new competences on consular protection. In addition, the provision of assistance 
to unrepresented EU citizens without explicit request from a Member State is expected to have 
a very limited support from Member States. Therefore, the political feasibility of this option is 
very low. (Score: ●) 

6.4.3.  Assessment of options for SO3 

•  Inconsistent information to EU citizens 

Option 3a) Legal amendments with new requirements for provision of information  

Effectiveness: The option would ensure up to date information on the bilateral agreements and 
other  arrangements  in  place  in  third  countries,  as  well  as  travel  advice.  Increasing  the 
information available to EU citizens and their clarity would make sure that EU citizens know 
from which Member States they can seek consular assistance and reduce the number of justified 
redirecting procedures by Member States. This would also help Member State staff to quicker 
assess whether it is appropriate to assist a citizen or if the case should be transferred to the 
embassy or consulate designated as competent under the terms of arrangement in place. This 
would have a positive impact on achieving SO3 by developing a better sharing of up-to-date 
information about the presence and the function of the consular presence (including honorary 
consuls)  of  Member  States  and  EU  delegations.  Furthermore,  the  improvement  of  the 
information available on the CoOL would also be beneficial in fostering effective cooperation 
amongst Member States’ consular networks providing consular protection to unrepresented EU 
citizens. What is more, the coordination of travel advice at local and capital level (e.g. exchange 
of primary information at an early stage or having a common structure of levels of risk) could 
substantially improve the quality and consistency of travel advice to EU citizens, enabling them 
to make better informed decisions and plans for safe travels abroad. (Score: ●●●) 

Efficiency: The measures are  considered to  be efficient when  comparing  the costs involved 
with their advantages. The additional burden on Member States will be minimal as they already 
collect that information, and it will be a matter of adjusting the information into the machine-
readable format required by the Commission. The impact on EU citizens will be important as 
receiving the correct information is essential for them in all situations. Member States will also 
save time and be more efficient as they will have to deal with less out-of-scope requests. (Score: 
●●●) 

Coherence:  New  standards  for  information  to  EU  citizens  are  coherent  with  Commission’s 
objectives. They are also coherent with the ETD Directive and would be very helpful for the 
Member  States  that  receive  ETD  applications  by  reducing  the  number  of  out-of-scope 
applications. (Score: ●●●) 

Proportionality: Providing comprehensive information  regarding consular protection cannot 
be achieved by Member States on their own without coordination mechanisms. Information is 
key for unrepresented EU citizens and therefore the minimum costs for Member States can be 
seen as those necessary. This policy option is considered to be proportionate to achieve the 
objective, also taking into account that Member States would retain their competence to issue 
travel advice. While available data is limited, estimates show that the number of EU citizens 
travelling to third countries where they are not represented is considerable. (Score: ●●●)  

Political feasibility: The political feasibility can be assumed to be average as Member States 
would not object to EU delegations sharing information that is already publicly available on 
their website regarding their consular presence, the bilateral and other arrangements in place 
or travel advice. As to the high-level obligation to coordinate limited aspects of travel advice, 

46 

 
 
this objective is presently actively pursued by the Member States in COCON, albeit on a non-
binding level, its political feasibility is assessed as somewhat high. (Score: ●●) 

Option 3b) An EU travel advice portal  

Effectiveness:  This  option  would  help  achieve  SO3  by  centralising  on  an  EU  website  a 
comprehensive compilation of the travel advice provided by the Member States to EU citizens. 
It would streamline the provision of information for all EU citizens: they would be able to see, 
for any third country, what travel advice, if any, is being provided. With the increasing mobility 
of EU citizens within the EU, a single, user-friendly source of information where travel advice 
provided by all 27 Member States is accessible could be useful for EU citizens temporarily or 
permanently located outside of their country of nationality. However, information which would 
not be comparable, as displayed in different languages, with different levels of travel advice 
and details being provided, may not be of much use and even have adverse effects. Overall, the 
option is considered to have a positive impact to the achievement of SO3. (Score: ●●) 

Efficiency: Considering the limitations outlined above, especially the non-comparability of the 
information, the measure is not considered particularly efficient, considering the costs. (Score: 
●●) 

Coherence: The measure in this option is coherent with the Commission’s objectives to raise 
EU  visibility  and  Member  States’  solidarity  in  the  external  dimension  of  EU  citizenship. 
(Score: ●●●) 

Proportionality: This policy option is not considered proportionate to achieve the objective, 
given that its administrative scope, legal complexity and costs outweigh its benefits despite the 
estimated number of EU citizens travelling to third countries where they are not represented. 
(Score: ●) 

Political feasibility: The political feasibility of developing a central gateway of information on 
travel advice for EU citizens is considered as low. Member States saw the benefits in the EU 
delegations providing emergency information to (unpresented) EU citizens in crisis situations. 
Several countries recognised the experience of the COVID-19 crisis and repatriation exercise 
as  a  positive  example  of  such  a  solution.  A  central  web-based  portal  could  re-use  existing 
sources  of  information  such  as  Member  States  own  travel  advice  websites  and  CoOL. 
However, a number of critical issues would need to be taken into account. Where data from 
national sources of individual Member States would be used, questions were raised concerning 
responsibility for data made available, cybersecurity, language barriers. This lowers the score 
of political feasibility. (Score: ●) 

•  Lack of reliable information on EU citizens living or traveling abroad 

Option 3c) Communication campaign  

Effectiveness: Raising awareness of registration tools and their importance would increase the 
number of EU citizens registering when traveling, which is important to allow Member States 
to have a better picture of the (un)represented citizens living and/or travelling in a given third 
country in order to better coordinate their actions in crisis situations. DG JUST regularly runs 
information  campaigns  about  consular  protection  rights  of  unrepresented  EU  citizens.  A 
communication  campaign  tailored  to  the  necessity  and  importance  of  registering  before 

47 

 
 
travelling could have a positive impact on SO3. However, the direct effect of such a campaign 
is difficult to estimate81. (Score: ●●) 

Efficiency: Considering the costs of such campaign and the uncertainty regarding the benefits, 
it is considered not particularly efficient. It should be considered that the more citizens register 
the lower would be the financial cost per citizen registered. (Score: ●●) 

Proportionality: This policy option is considered fully proportionate to achieve the objective. 
While available data is limited, estimates show that the number of EU citizens travelling to 
third countries where they are not represented is considerable. (Score: ●●●) 

Political feasibility: A communication campaign run by the Commission focused on supporting 
registrations  of  unrepresented  EU  citizens  in  a  third  country  with  their  Member  State  of 
nationality should not pose any subsidiarity concerns. As the campaign would be run by the 
Commission  but  the  registration  systems  are  established  nationally,  a  high  level  of 
collaboration with Member States will be necessary. (Score: ●●●) 

Option 3d) Member States will be required to promote measures supporting the possibility for 
their citizens to inform on/record their travelling 

Effectiveness: This policy option would require Member States to provide their citizens with 
the possibility to inform competent national authorities, by appropriate means and tools, their 
travels  or  residence  abroad  and  would  thus  facilitate  that  these  citizens  receive  relevant 
information in times of crisis. This requirement would further incentivize them to implement 
measures  encouraging  citizens  to  register  (e.g.  national  information  campaigns  at  airports, 
incentives, cooperation with insurance and travel companies as well as telecom providers). It 
would be left to the Member States to decide what are the best and most appropriate measures 
to implement this measure, taking into account their national circumstances. The measure is 
expected to contribute to a more accurate knowledge of the number and whereabouts of EU 
citizens traveling or residing abroad which is a crucial element for effective coordination in 
times of crisis. The option is considered to have a positive impact for the achievement of SO3. 
(Score: ●●) 

Efficiency: Considering the limited costs and benefits, the option is somewhat efficient. (Score: 
●●) 

Proportionality: This policy option is considered fully proportionate to achieve the objective. 
This measure leaves as much scope for national decision on possibilities for citizens to inform 
on/record their travelling as possible while achieving satisfactorily the objectives set. While 
available  data  is  limited,  estimates  show  that  the  number  of  EU  citizens  travelling  to  third 
countries where they are not represented is considerable. (Score: ●●●) 

Political feasibility:  The political  feasibility  of this option is  considered high,  as it leaves a 
scope for Member States to implement the new requirement. (Score: ●●●) 

6.4.4.  Assessment of options for SO4 

Option 4a) Guidelines and training  

Effectiveness: The development of soft measures under policy option 4a) would have very little 
impact in achieving SO4. Some clarity on the procedures in place and greater awareness could 
promote their use and contribute to uniformity in their application both in crisis and non-crisis 
situations. However, this impact would be limited. Soft measures could not sufficiently solve 
the issues that are connected to  financial reimbursement by represented citizens. Confusion 

81  

Similar previous campaign run by DG JUST through social media reached 5.6 million people. 

48 

 
 
 
and insufficiency of procedures would partially remain and might continue to discourage the 
use those procedures. (Score: ●) 

Efficiency: Overall, costs and benefits for this measure would be very limited. (Score: ●●) 

Coherence: Since the financial procedures provided for in Article 14 of the Directive apply to 
the  issuance  of  EU  ETDs  to  unrepresented  EU  citizens,  clarifying  those  procedures  would 
ensure coherence to some extent with the ETD Directive. In addition, clarification of current 
procedure might help Member States to ensure that the repayment of repatriation costs does 
not result in double funding with co-financing received from the UCPM. (Score: ●●) 

Proportionality: This policy option is considered fully proportionate to achieve the objective, 
also in view of the uncertainties regarding the scale of the problems identified. (Score: ●●●) 

Political feasibility: Guidelines are legally non-binding documents. As they are issued by the 
Commission or/and the EEAS, their political feasibility is therefore very high. Their adoption 
would only entail some collaboration between the Commission/EEAS and the Member States. 
However, feedback collected by Member States highlighted their need to review the current 
rules and therefore, they might be less open to a solution which would simply clarify existing 
provisions without adjusting them. (Score: ●●) 

Option 4b) Legal amendments to improve the procedure  

Effectiveness:  This  policy  option  would  enable  assisted  EU  citizens  to  pay  the  assisting 
Member State directly for the assistance provided (or an EU delegation in case the Member 
State requested its support). It would considerably reduce the current administrative burden for 
both the assisting and the Member State of nationality. This would increase the efficiency and 
use of the financial reimbursement procedures, and thus achieving SO6. For EU citizens, this 
would also allow a better and much more efficient service, as they would not be phased with 
later  reimbursement  requests  by  their  Member  State  of  nationality.  This  measure  would 
therefore have a very positive impact both on Member States and EU citizens. (Score: ●●) 

Efficiency: Given the limited costs for Member States and the significant benefits in recovery 
of such costs, this option is considered very efficient. (Score: ●●●) 

Coherence:  Reforming  and  simplifying  the  financial  procedures  and  making  them  more 
efficient  and  applicable  also  to  represented  EU  citizens  would  be  fully  coherent  with  the 
objectives of the ETD Directive and with the UCPM. Presently, the UCPM allows Member 
States to request EU citizens to contribute to the costs of the transport while the Directive only 
foresees a contribution from the unrepresented citizen’s Member State of nationality. It follows 
that this option will ensure more consistent financial procedures preventing the risk of double 
funding. (Score: ●●●) 

Proportionality: This policy option is considered fully proportionate to achieve the objective. 
The  choice  of  legal  amendments  to  improve  the  financial  procedures  is  coherent  with  the 
satisfactory  achievement  of  the  objective  and  could  not  be  achieved  by  the  Member  States 
acting alone. While available data is limited, estimates show that the number of EU citizens 
travelling to third countries where they are not represented is considerable. (Score: ●●●) 

Political feasibility: The majority of Member States consulted for the study were in favour of 
allowing  EU  citizens  to  pay  for  consular  assistance  directly,  as  it  would  reduce  the 
administrative burden relating to the reimbursement requests. However, two Member States 
have national laws in place which prevent them from seeking reimbursement directly from the 
citizen. In addition, one Member State noted it was better left for the Member States to organise 
the reimbursement between themselves rather than involving individuals. One Member State 

49 

 
 
highlighted its concerns regarding the types of costs which would be reimbursed under this 
mechanism82.  Five  Member  States  stated  that  there  is  the  need  to  incentivize  financial 
compensation83.  In  COCON,  most  Member  States  favoured  establishing  a  deadline  for  an 
assisting Member States to provide the statement of expenses for costs incurred to the Member 
State of nationality. This would complement the deadline for reimbursement already provided 
in  Article  14(2)  of  the  Directive.  The  period  of  12  months  seemed  to  be  adequate  to  most 
Member States with an option for an extension in more complex cases, after prior notice of the 
assisting Member States. As such, there would be a strong political support for the development 
of a standard form for reimbursement of assistance to represented EU citizens. (Score: ●●●) 

7.  HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE?  

SO1: Conclusion/comparison of options:  

Option 1a) 
Combination of 
soft measures 

Option 1b) 
Improvement to the 
definition through 
legislative 
amendments 

Option 1c) Introduction of 
the concept of 
“presumption of 
unrepresentedness” 

● 

●● 

●● 

●●● 

●●● 

Effectiveness 

Efficiency 

Coherence 

Proportionality  

Political 
feasibility  

Result  

●● 

●●● 

●●● 

●●● 

●● 

Preferred Option  

●●● 

● 

●● 

● 

● 

82  

83  

An  example  mentioned  in  this  regard  was  that  the  respective  Member  State  did  not  cover  medical 
repatriation  as  it  was  considered  too  costly.  However,  some  Member  States  did  cover  this  type  of 
assistance for their nationals and thus for unrepresented citizens. Therefore in theory these costs could 
be sought to be reimbursed if their nationals received such assistance. 
The EU’s role on Consular crisis management - Non-paper by Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg, Poland 
and The Netherlands, April 2022, available at: 
https://europeanunion.diplomatie.belgium.be/sites/default/files/2023-
05/The%20EU%E2%80%99s%20role%20on%20Consular%20crisis%20management%20-%20Non-
paper%20by%20Belgium%2C%20Finland%2C%20Luxembourg%2C%20Poland%20and%20The%20
Netherlands.pdf  

50 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SO2: Conclusion/comparison of options:  

Option 2a) Guidelines on 
local cooperation 

Option 2b) EU delegations will chair 
local consular cooperation networks 
meetings 

Effectiveness 

Efficiency 

Coherence 

Proportionality  

Political feasibility  

Result  

●● 

●● 

●●● 

●●● 

●●● 

SO2: Conclusion/comparison of options:  

●●● 

●●● 

●●● 

●●● 

●●● 

Preferred option 

Option 2d) Detail the 
supporting role of EU 
delegations through legal 
amendments  

Option 2e) EU delegations can 
provide direct consular assistance to 
EU citizens in uncovered third 
countries  

Effectiveness 

Efficiency 

Coherence 

Proportionality  

Political 
feasibility  

Result  

●●● 

●●● 

●●● 

●●● 

●● 

Preferred option 

●●● 

●●● 

●● 

●● 

● 

Synergies among the combination of preferred options to ensure better coordination:  

Option 2b) Local coordination meetings would be chaired by the EU delegations. 

Option 2c) Review of the concept of Lead State and formalization of tasks under JFW and 
the EU delegations will lead on the drafting of the JFW.  

Option 2d) Strengthen the supporting role of EU delegations and align it with the Council 
Decision setting up the EEAS. 

A combination of the best options results in a limited increase in the role of EU delegations for 
coordination and cooperation purposes with specific assigned tasks, including the chair of local 
coordination meetings and the drafting of the JFW. Their explicit reference in the Directive 

51 

 
 
 
 
 
 
will provide a solid basis to further enhance legal certainty, consistency, business continuity, 
innovation and largely improve effectiveness of local coordination. 

In the case of option 2d, EU delegations would enjoy of a legally certain and better-defined 
role for their actions in support of Member States, offsetting present concerns regarding their 
competences. As EU delegations’ activity would primarily focus on the support to the weakest 
nodes  of  Member  States’  collective  consular  network,  it  would  tap  into  unused  resources, 
trigger synergies and improve the overall effectiveness of EU right to consular protection. 

This combination of options would streamline procedures in non-crisis situations, under the 
lead  of  EU  delegations,  and  would  improve  preparedness  for  crisis  situations.  Overall,  the 
effect of these options would increase the visibility of EU delegations and EU action with the 
Member States and most importantly, with EU citizens, who are the ultimate beneficiaries of 
the right to consular protection.  

SO3: Conclusion/comparison of options:  

Option 3a) Legal amendments with new 
requirements for provision of information  

Option 3b) An EU 
travel advice portal  

Effectiveness 

Efficiency 

Coherence 

Proportionality  

Political 
feasibility  

Result  

●●● 

●●● 

●●● 

●●● 

●● 

Preferred option 

SO3: Conclusion/comparison of options:  

●● 

●● 

●●● 

● 

● 

Option 3c) 
Communication 
campaign  

Option 3d) Member States required to 
promote measures supporting the possibility 
for their citizens to inform on/record their 
travelling 

Effectiveness 

Efficiency 

Proportionality 

Political 
feasibility 

Result 

●● 

●● 

●●● 

●●● 

●● 

●● 

●●● 

●●● 

Preferred option for coherence with the other 
measures and their level of intervention  

52 

 
 
 
 
 
 
SO4: Conclusion/comparison of options:  

Option 4a) Guidelines and 
training  

Option 4b) Legal amendments to 
improve the procedure  

Effectiveness 

Efficiency 

Coherence 

Proportionality  

Political feasibility  

Result  

● 

●● 

●● 

●●● 

●● 

8.  PREFERRED COMBINATION OF OPTIONS 

Specific Objective

Preferred options  

●● 

●●● 

●●● 

●●● 

●●● 

Preferred option  

SO1: Enhance the legal 
certainty for EU citizens 
with respect to the scope 
of the right to consular 
protection 

Option 1b) Legal amendments to clarify the definition of what 
it means for an EU citizen to be unrepresented and in 
particular the types of situations in which a Member State 
representation should not be considered “effectively in a 
position to provide consular protection”.  

SO2:  Ensure  clear  roles, 
coordination 
and 
cooperation  mechanisms 
between  Member  States 
and 
delegations, 
including in times of crisis 

EU 

Option 2b) Local coordination meetings are chaired by the EU 
delegations 

Option 2c) Review of the concept of Lead State and definition 
of division of tasks under JFW, formalization of JFWs and JCTs  

Option 2d) Strengthen the supporting role of EU delegations 
and align it with the EEAS Decision  

SO3: Improve the 
information provision 
and communication with 
(unrepresented) EU 
citizens 

Option 3a) a requirement for Member States to provide the 
Commission and the EEAS with information in a certain 
timeframe and in machine readable format on honorary 
consuls functions and on bilateral and practical arrangements 
in place. 

Option 3d) Member States required to promote measures to 
inform consular authorities and/or record citizens’ presence 
abroad 

SO4: Increase the 
efficiency and use of the 

Option 4b) legal amendments adding the option for 
unrepresented citizens to pay the assisting Member State or 

53 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
financial reimbursement 
procedures  

the EU delegation. Establish a timeframe for reimbursement 
procedures and clarify application to represented citizens 

It  is  suggested  to  propose  a  targeted  revision  of  the  existing  legislative  framework  of  the 
Directive.  Such  an  approach  would  maximise  the  effect  of  consolidating  the  relevant  rules 
governing consular protection of unpresented citizens, and achieve maximum impact for the 
effective  exercise  of  their  fundamental  right,  while  respecting  national  competences.  The 
preferred option will be complemented by the measures presented in Annex 10.  

8.1. Impacts of the preferred combination of options  

The impacts of the preferred combination of options would be positive compared to the status 
quo and are expected to adapt the present consular protection framework to present and future 
challenges. A clarification of the scope in the Directive would bring increased legal certainty, 
resulting in a more effective consular assistance to EU citizens (SO1). Increased legal certainty 
and effectiveness of the Directive’s rules applicable to crisis and non-crisis situations would 
result  in  a  strengthened  EU  delegations’  supporting  role,  a  clearer  division  of  tasks  among 
Member States and EU delegations in local cooperation meetings, JFWs and JCTs (SO2). The 
effect of a more efficient and smooth coordination would be a better assistance to EU citizens, 
especially in  crisis situations, making best use of all EU resources allocated to that task. In 
addition, a more effective and consistent communication with EU citizens on consular matters 
would flow from enhanced cooperation between Member States’ consular networks and the 
EU. More registrations  of citizens  abroad would  allow Member States  to better assist  them 
(SO3). Finally, simplification and reduction of the current administrative burden for both the 
assisting  and  the  Member  State  of  nationality  would  increase  the  usefulness  of  financial 
reimbursement procedures. What is more, the extension of the reimbursement mechanism to 
EU delegations would contribute to filling in a gap hindering their practical support to Member 
States on the provision of assistance to EU citizens on a cost-neutral basis (SO4)84.  

There are no administrative costs and savings that would fall into the ‘one-in-one out’ tool.  

8.2. REFIT – Preferred option  

Table 5 shows efficiencies for authorities due to legal certainty, increased synergies and better 
processes.  

Table 5: REFIT - Scope for simplification and improving the efficiency of the existing legislation 

Description 

Comments 

Increased clarity on various essential elements of the Directive (e.g. 
scope and key terms) resulting in its more efficient application and 
more streamlined procedures, reduction of delays, complexity and 
costs. 

Benefitting MS 
consular 
authorities and 
EU citizens 

Cost savings through efficiency gains realised through the improved 
coordination with EU delegations and improved cooperation with 
other Member States. 

Benefitting MS 
consular 
authorities and 
EU citizens 

84  

A more complete picture of the implications of the initiative is given in Annex 3. 

54 

 
 
 
Cost savings due to the increased legal certainty on the application 
of personal data protection rules in the context of consular 
protection. 

Cost savings due to the reduction in burden when allowing citizens 
to pay for the assistance provided directly; this would in turn 
increase the likeliness of Member States having the costs of 
providing consular assistance to unrepresented citizens be 
reimbursed, which result in further savings. 

Benefitting MS 
consular 
authorities and 
EU delegations 

Benefitting MS 
and EU 
delegations 

9.  HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? 

The envisaged indicators are presented in table 6 below.  

Table 6: Monitoring and evaluation indicators  

SO 

Indicator  

Baseline  

Target / How to 
improve  

Sources of 
information  

SO1  Number of 

unrepresented EU 
citizens assisted. 

Number of 
unrepresented 
citizens assisted, 
based on 
estimations85: 

2018: 1087 

2019: 1354 

2020: 6046 

SO1  Number of citizen 
complaints 
received. 

Total number of 
complaints was 
10.  

An increase of the 
overall number is 
expected because of 
the factors 
influencing the 
evolution of the 
problem. However, it 
is not possible to 
estimate the 
numbers (which will 
notably depend on 
future crises). 

No complaints 
received on lack of 
assistance to 
unrepresented 
citizens. 

Member State 
reporting based on 
a legal obligation in 
the Directive. 

DG JUST Member 
State questionnaire 

Complaints 
received by EU 
delegations 
(collected from EU 
delegations 
directly). 

85  

Table 47: Number of unrepresented EU citizens assisted between 2018-2020, as reported by Member 
States in Annex VI of the study.  

55 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No baseline 
indicators at the 
moment. 

Data of Year 1 and 
increases in the 
following years.  

Data collected by 
EU delegations and 
EEAS. 

76% as per Flash 
Eurobarometer 
485. 

Increase to more 
than 80%.  

Opinion polls 
(Eurobarometer). 

SO2 

Number and type 
of requests from 
Member State 
authorities to EU 
delegations for 
support. 

SO3   Level of 

awareness of EU 
citizens about 
their right to 
consular 
protection. 

SO4  Number of 

No baseline.  

reimbursement 
requests 
submitted and 
received. 

Baseline to be 
established in year 1.  

Member State 
reporting based on 
a legal obligation in 
the Directive. 

Given positive past experiences from the implementation report and preparation of this impact 
assessment, the proposed sources of information are considered realistic. In particular, Member 
States are, pursuant to Article 19(1) of the Directive, under an obligation to provide relevant 
information.  The  feasibility  of  conducting  opinion  polls  will  depend  on  available  financial 
resources. 

Pursuant to Article 19(1) of the Directive, the Commission was obliged to submit a report to 
the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  on  the  implementation  and  application  of  the 
Directive by 1 May 2021. In that Commission Report, the Commission had to evaluate the way 
in which the Directive had operated and consider the need for additional measures, including, 
where appropriate, amendments to adapt the Directive with a view to further facilitating the 
exercise of Union citizens’ right to consular protection.  

In line with the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making86, the amended Directive 
should provide for its evaluation by the Commission. To ensure that there is enough practical 
experience and information available, given the time needed to carry out the evaluation, and in 
order not to impose unnecessary burden on national authorities, the evaluation report should 
be published eight years after the transposition of the amendments87. 

86  

87  

Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and 
the European Commission on Better Law-Making (OJ L 123, 12.5.2016, p. 1). 
toolbox 
See 
https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2023-09/BR%20toolbox%20-%20Jul%202023%20-
%20FINAL.pdf  

regulation’ 

available 

‘Better 

2023, 

also 

tool 

44, 

at: 

# 

56 

 
 
 
 
Term or acronym  Meaning or definition 

Glossary 

COCON 

CoOL 

EUDEL 

EUDPR 

ETD 

GDPR 

JCT 

JFW 

LCC 

SO 

Consular Affairs Working Party of the Council of the EU 

Consular Online platform maintained by the EEAS 

EU delegation 

Regulation  (EU)  2018/1725  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 
Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with 
regard to the processing of personal data by the Union  institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, 
and  repealing  Regulation  (EC)  No  45/2001  and  Decision  No 
1247/2002/EC 

Emergency Travel Document 

Regulation  (EU)  2016/679  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 
Council  of  27  April  2016  on  the  protection  of  natural  persons  with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of  such  data,  and  repealing  Directive  95/46/EC  (General  Data 
Protection Regulation) 

Joint EU Consular (crisis response) Team 

Joint EU consular crisis preparedness frameworks 

Local Consular Cooperation  

Strategic Objective 

UCPM  

European Union Civil Protection Mechanism 

57 

 
 
 
 
 
Annex 1: Procedural information 

1.  Lead DG, Decide Planning/CWP references 

The  Staff  Working  Document  was  prepared  by  the  Directorate-General  for  Justice  and 
Consumers (DG JUST). The Decide reference of this initiative is PLAN/2020/8637. 

The preparatory work for the Commission’s initiative to review the provisions to secure the 
protection of unrepresented EU citizens in third countries benefitted from two derogations from 
the Better Regulation guidelines88.  

First,  the  initiative  was  granted  a  derogation  from  the  requirement  of  conducting  a  public 
consultation.  This  was  due  mainly  to  the  inherent  limitations  in  reaching  out  to  the  direct 
beneficiaries  of  the  Directive89  but  also  because  of  the  evidence  gathered  in  the  public 
consultation for the 2020 EU Citizenship report (9 July 2020 – 1 October 2020)90 and the Flash 
Eurobarometer 485 on EU Citizenship and Democracy91, which already surveyed opinions of 
EU citizens on consular protection.  

Nevertheless, the publication of an inception impact assessment on the Commission’s website 
offered an opportunity  for external  feedback92 and, in  addition, the  study  developed a short 
survey on EU citizens’ experiences on consular protection abroad93.  

Secondly, a derogation to the “evaluate first” principle was granted, taking into account the 
parallel  delivery  of  the  Commission  Report  and  the  limited  data  available  soon  after  the 
transposition of the Directive.  

The  study  includes  the  results  of  consultations  with  different  stakeholders,  such  as  EU 
delegations94, as well as the results of a questionnaire to national authorities of the Member 
States95. In addition, the views of the Member States were available as the result of discussions 
at the Council working party on consular affairs (‘COCON’) on further facilitating the exercise 
of EU citizens’ right related to consular protection in third countries in the context of a possible 
up-date of the Directive, between September and November 202296. 

88  

89  

90  

91  

92  
93  
94  
95  

96  

SWD(2021) 305 final, https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-making-process/planning-and-proposing-
law/better-regulation/better-regulation-guidelines-and-toolbox_en.  
These are EU citizens who received assistance and their family members. The reasons for these intrinsic 
limitations are justified by data protection requirements.  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12455-EU-Citizenship-Report-
2020/public-consultation_e.  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12455-EU-Citizenship-Report-
2020/public-consultation_e. 
The feedback period was 13 January 2021 to 10 February 2021. Only 5 contributions were received.  
Seven EU citizens replied to the survey.  
Overall 77 EU delegations completed the survey (response rate of 60%). 
Data  collection  at  Member  State  level  includes  the  use  of  a  comprehensive  questionnaire  to  collect 
quantitative data on Member States’ national legislation and procedures; on their consular networks and 
assets;  on  the  consular  protection  they  provided  to  unrepresented  citizens;  and  on  their  travel  and 
communication channels. Additionally, Member States were also asked to provide qualitative feedback 
on the application of the Directive; on proposed policy options; and on the COVID-19 pandemic lessons 
learnt. 
Minutes of discussions at the Council working party on consular affairs are not publicly available. The 
Czech  Presidency  held  three  COCON  meetings  focusing  on  options  to  further  facilitate  consular 
protection of EU citizens in third countries based on the Commission´s report on the implementation and 
application of the Directive, COM (2022) 437, see Outcome of the proceedings COCON 61 15876/22 

58 

 
 
 
 
2.  Organisation and timing 

The Impact Assessment was prepared by DG JUST as the lead Directorate-General. 

The Inter-Service Steering Group established for this initiative was associated and consulted 
several times in the process, under the coordination of the Secretariat-General. It included the 
following services: DG JUST, EEAS, ECHO, SJ, MOVE, NEAR, INTPA, SANTE, HOME 
and FPI. The group had four meetings: 25 November 2020, 18 March 2021, 9 December 2021 
and 24 May 2023. In addition, the group was regularly consulted in writing on the progress of 
the study, including on the various deliverables (interim reports, final report) in both draft and 
final form. 

3.  Consultations of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB) 

An upstream meeting took place on 10 March 2020, and the recommendations of the RSB were 
duly  taken  into  account.  DG  JUST,  working  in  close  cooperation  with  the  co-lead  EEAS, 
submitted the draft Impact Assessment for the revision of the rules on consular protection to 
the RSB on 22 December 2021 and a complementary input on 1 February 2022. A hearing of 
the  RSB  took  place  on  2  February  2022.  On  4  February  2022,  the  RSB  issued  a  negative 
opinion.  

The  RSB’s  recommendations  have  been  taken  into  account  in  the  Impact  Assessment,  as 
outlined in the below table. 

BOARD’s SUGGESTED 
IMPROVEMENTS 

IMPLEMENTATION  

lacks 

report 

(1)The 
the  solid 
analytical  basis  that  an  evaluation 
of 
the  Directive  would  have 
provided.  It  should  clearly  explain 
why  no  evaluation  has  been 
undertaken.  In  its  absence,  the 
problem 
should 
description 
complement the lack of evaluative 
evidence.  It  should  avoid  drawing 
lines  of 
conclusions  along  the 
the 
evaluation 
its 
implementation 
findings  cannot  be  considered  as 
reliable evidence of a problem. 

report,  as 

criteria 

from 

Two derogations to the “evaluate first” principle have 
been  granted  for  this  initiative  and  it  is  better 
explained in Annex 1. At the same time, on substance, 
a  detailed  assessment  of  the  implementation  and 
application  of  the  Directive  has  been  recently 
published. See Report issued on 2 September 2022, 
COM(2022) 
at: 
https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2022-
09/1_1_196921_impl_rep_cons_en_1.pdf 

available 

final, 

437 

Wrong  references  to  the  evaluation  criteria  in  the 
report and the deriving wrong conclusions have been 
removed.  The  problem  description  has  been 
expanded.  

(2)  The  report  should  be  clear 
about the existence and nature of 
the problem. Theoretical problems 
not 
occur 
that  may 

are 

Qualitative  elements  and  examples  in  the  problem 
description have been added (See sections named “in 
practice”  at  the  beginning  of  each  problem)  and 
appropriate  references  are  made  to  concrete 

available  at:  https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15876-2022-INIT/en/pdf  and  WK 
17059/2022 in List of working papers (WK) distributed in the Working Party on Consular Affairs in 
2022 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5013-2023-INIT/en/pdf.  

59 

 
 
 
 
substantiated with the evidence of 
relevant  recurring  cases  needing 
further  regulatory  coverage.  For 
example,  there  is  no  evidence  in 
the 
report  of  citizens  being 
deprived of assistance in a context 
of  crisis;  there  is  no  evidence  of 
from 
citizens  being  deprived 
receiving  consular  protection  as  a 
result  of  the  practice  of  deferring 
requests either. The report should 
differentiate  between  endemic 
problems requiring changes to the 
framework  and  ad  hoc, 
legal 
occasional problems relating to the 
unpredictable  nature  of  crises.  It 
should  narrow  down  its  scope  to 
real  general 
focus  only  on 
problems for which there is reliable 
and consistent evidence. 

(3)  The  report  should  indicate  the 
scale  of  the  problem.  It  should 
estimate  the  amount  of  support 
from UK consulates that EU citizens 
in  distress  received  in  countries 
with no other EU representation. It 
should  provide  information  about 
bilateral 
agreements  Member 
States  or  the  EU  have  with  third 
countries (e.g. Switzerland, Canada 
or  possibly  in  the future  also with 
the  UK)  and  to  what  extent  these 
mitigate  the  problems.  It  should 
clearly  set  out  the  relationship 
between  the  Directive  and  the 
Union  Civil  Protection  Mechanism 
in  crisis  situations. 
It  should 
substantiate  with  evidence,  the 
premise  that  there  is  a  growing 
number  of 
crises  worldwide 
requiring  consular  assistance  and 
that  existing  arrangements  are 
these. 
insufficient 
clearly 
it 
Finally, 
that  all  Member 
demonstrate 

to  address 
should 

examples  contained  in  the  Commission’s  report  on 
implementation and application of the Directive (link 
above).  

The scope and the number of problems was reduced 
to  focus  on  structural  problems.  Explanations  have 
been added as to why problems that can be perceived 
as of a small scale are, instead, of general importance. 
See  new  Section  2.1  on  Preparedness 
for 
fundamental rights’ protection.  

linked  to  the 

Drafting  has  been  improved  to  better  present  the 
scale of the problems. Explanations have been added 
why  there  is  a  question  of  inadequacy  of  bilateral 
agreements  as  a  possible  solution  for  ensuring  the 
consular protection of EU citizens in view of the policy 
objective 
implementation  of  the 
fundamental right to consular protection for reasons 
related  to  the  legal  guarantees  associated  to  that 
fundamental  right  and  the  consistency  of  the 
protection  (see  the  section  on  disregarded  policy 
legal 
options).  Section  1  on  the  context  and 
framework chapter has been extended and provides 
more  detail  on  the  use  of  Union  Civil  Protection 
Mechanism  in  crisis  situations.  Annex  5  contains  a 
short overview of the provisions of the Directive and 
an  illustrative  example  of  a  crisis  and  a  non-crisis 
situation.  

For  the  increasing  number  of  crises,  megatrends  as 
identified  by  the  European  Commission  2021 
Strategic Foresight Report have been used as a driving 
factor of future crises. See section 2.4 and Annex 7. 
Finally,  Member  States’  views  have  been  better 
integrated,  as  expressed  in  the  context  of  the 
Consular Affairs Working Party of the Council on the 

60 

 
 
 
basis of the exchanges on the Commission report on 
the implementation of the Directive, throughout the 
text and added a section on “Political Feasibility” for 
the assessment of options.  

Considering the review of the Impact Assessment, the 
preferred  option  is  now  a  legislative  intervention 
which  does  not  require  the  use  of  Article  25  TFEU. 
This  should  resolve  the  proportionality  concerns 
between  the  problems  identified  and  the  solutions 
proposed.  

The majorities required in the Council for both Article 
25 TFEU and Article 23 TFEU have been clarified (see 
section on legal basis). 

States favour the EU taking on the 
coordinating role in crises. 

of 

proportionality 

(4) The report should better justify 
the 
the 
proposed legal basis, which, for the 
preferred option, includes a Treaty 
change via the use of the Article 25 
TFEU  passerelle  clause.  This  does 
not  seem  justified  by  either  the 
nature  or  scale  of  the  identified 
problems.  The  report  should  also 
demonstrate  that  this  approach 
would  not  go  beyond  the  cited 
Council  conclusions  that  advocate 
the 
a  potential 
Directive, rather than of the Treaty. 
It  should  also  clearly  specify 
upfront that recourse to this Treaty 
Article  requires  unanimity  at  the 
Council  since  this  is  relevant  to 
the 
both 
the 
preferred  option  and 
political feasibility. 

justification  of 
to 

revision  of 

the 

An explanation has been added to the section on the 
legal basis in the form of a dedicated paragraph.  

(5)  The  report  should  explain  the 
role  of  the  Vienna  Convention  on 
Consular Relations as the basis for 
international consular cooperation 
between  states  and  how  EU 
delegations  would  fit 
into  this 
framework. 

(6)  The  report  should  be  more 
explicit about the rationale behind 
the  policy  options  and  the  3 
proposed  packages.  The  options 
design  should  focus  on  real  policy 
options,  leaving  technical  choices 
in an annex. The baseline cannot – 
by  definition  –  be  a  policy  option 
and  should  not  be  discarded.  The 
report 
the 
difference  between  the  dynamic 

explain 

should 

The  policy  choices  have  been  simplified,  their 
organisation  re-structured  and  their  presentation 
improved  in  order  to  be  more  reader-friendly.  The 
organisation  in  packages  has  been  removed.  The 
options design now focus on real policy options and 
technical choices have been moved to Annexes. (See 
section  on  policy  options  and  Annex  8  with  the 
updated  intervention  logic  and  Annex  10  for  the 
measures without policy choice).  

The  reference  to  the  baseline  as  policy  option  has 
been removed. A description of ongoing initiatives of 

61 

 
 
 
the  dynamic  baseline  scenario  has  been  added  to 
Annex 9. 

The options concerning the role of EU delegations has 
been simplified further. They are now only 2 instead 
of  4  (now  option  2d)  and  2e))  and  have  been 
differentiated  more.  Option  2d)  does  not  require 
Treaty change while option 2e) requires the use of the 
passerelle  clause.  Option  2e)  was  also  reconsidered 
and the new extended role of EU delegations is now 
limited to “uncovered third countries”. The reference 
to new rapid reaction consular crisis response teams 
has been removed.  

the  measures 
and 
baseline 
proposed 
in  the  non-legislative 
option. It should clearly set out the 
extent to which the identified and 
substantiated  problems  could  be 
addressed  by  the  combination  of 
the  dynamic  baseline  and  this 
It  should  also  clearly 
option. 
highlight 
the  differences  and 
similarities between option 2B and 
option  3,  given  that  both  require 
Treaty  change.  It  should  clarify  if 
option  3  is  actually  different  to 
option  2B  only  because it  extends 
beyond  crisis  situations.  It  is  not 
clear  how  option  2B  could  work 
only  in  crisis  situations  given their 
the 
unpredictability 
corresponding need therefore for a 
universal 
consular 
standing 
capability  in  all  EU  delegations 
worldwide.  The  proposal  that  the 
capabilities under option 2B could 
only be triggered ad hoc in a crisis 
in  the 
situation  by  unanimity 
Council calls into question both the 
need for this standing capability as 
well  as  the  need  to  revise  the 
Treaty  to  provide  it.  The  idea  of 
rapid 
crisis 
response  teams  is  not  covered  or 
analysed in the impact assessment 
and cannot therefore be assessed. 

consular 

reaction 

and 

(7)  The  political  acceptability  by 
Member  States  of  the  options 
should  be  taken  into  account  and 
could  be  used  as  a  criterion  to 
discard some options. It is not clear 
how  the  political  feasibility  of 
option  2B  differs  from  that  of 
option  3  given  they  both  require 
recourse  to  the  passerelle  clause 
and  therefore  unanimity.  It  is  not 
therefore  clear  on  this  basis  why 
only  option  3  is  not  considered 

Member  States’  views  collected  through  the  study 
and as discussed in the context of the Consular Affairs 
Working  Party  of  the  Council  on  the  basis  of  the 
implementation  report  of  the  Directive  have  been 
integrated better to assess the political feasibility. In 
the  outcome  of  proceedings  of  the  meeting  of  the 
Working  Party  on  Consular  Affairs  (COCON)  on  12 
December  2022)  the  Czech  Presidency  concluded  in 
view  of  the  discussions  held  that  “there  is  scope  to 
review  the  Directive,  in  particular  based  on  the 
experiences  from  consular  crises  in  the  past  years.” 
here: 
See 

62 

 
 
proportionate.  The  report  should 
make a clear distinction between a 
normal and a crisis situation as this 
has  an  impact  on  proportionality, 
i.e.  if  the  capabilities  proposed  in 
option 2B are to be triggered only 
on  an  ad-hoc  basis,  it  is  not  clear 
why  options  1  or  2A  would  not 
suffice. 

issue. 

issue  by 

geographical 

(8)  The  impact  analysis  should  be 
comprehensive  and  clearly  show 
the benefits and costs. The report 
should  clarify  the  effectiveness 
assessment  of  the  options, 
in 
particular  regarding  the  personal 
scopes, 
and 
accessibility and communication. It 
should add the cost assessment for 
each  option 
It 
should  indicate  clearly the precise 
costs the initiative will entail, their 
amount  and  their  timeframe.  It 
should  explain  how  this  could  be 
covered  by  redeployment  and 
identify  exactly  when  and  where 
the  savings  would  come  from.  If 
new  financial  resources  would  be 
required,  it  should  set  out precise 
costings  and  explain  how  these 
fit  with  the  budgetary 
would 
ceilings 
2021-2027 
Multiannual  Financial  Framework. 
It should also address the need to 
cost-neutrality 
revise 

the 

the 

of 

https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-
15876-2022-INIT/en/pdf 

The drafting for the criterion of political feasibility to 
compare  the  remaining  policy  options  has  been 
improved.  For option  2d)  and 2e) on  the role of  EU 
delegations,  the  difference  in  terms  of  political 
feasibility has been clarified. Concretely, in option 2d) 
EU  delegations  maintain,  while  strengthening,  their 
actual supporting role to Member States in providing 
assistance  to  unrepresented  EU  citizens  while  in 
option 2e) they are endowed with new competences 
and an autonomous role in uncovered third countries 
while keeping the supporting one in other countries. 
This  makes  a  big  difference  in  terms  of  political 
feasibility.  

The  drafting  to  explain  why  preparedness  in  a  non-
crisis  situation  is  important  to  address  a  crisis 
situation  has  been 
(Section  2.1  on 
Preparedness for fundamental rights’ protection).  

improved 

A comprehensive analysis of impacts has been added, 
which  includes:  effectiveness,  efficiency, coherence, 
proportionality and political feasibility. An analysis of 
impacts  on  fundamental  rights  has  been  added  as 
part of the effectiveness analysis.  

The  calculation  of  costs  has  been  improved  and 
added  per  each  policy  option  and  measure  to  the 
extent possible. Costs and benefits are summarised in 
Annex 3.  

The costs for this initiative for the EU are limited and 
the majority of them is represented by one off costs. 
Given  the  tight  situation  of  Heading  7  (European 
Public  Administration)  any  additional  costs  will  be 
covered  by 
internal  redeployments  within  the 
relevant entity. Therefore, there is no risk that due to 
this initiative the budgetary ceiling of the 2021-2027 
MFF would be exceeded.  

In addition, an explanation has been added as to why 
there 
is  no  need  to  revise  the  cost-neutrality 
requirement of Article 5(10) of the EEAS Decision for 
the  preferred  option  (see  assessment  of  option  2d 
and  Annex  4).  However,  it  is  also  explained  that,  in 
order  to  ensure  cost-neutrality,  there  is  a  need  to 

63 

 
 
requirement of Article 5(10) of the 
EEAS  Decision  for  the  preferred 
option, given the additional human 
and financial resources that would 
be required 

extend  the  reimbursement  mechanism 
Directive to EU delegations.  

in  the 

competence 

(9)  The  report  should  provide  the 
justification  for  the  quantitative 
and  qualitative  cost  assessment 
conclusions. The cost assessments 
lack 
for  the  preferred  option 
credibility. It is not clear what the 
justification  for  low  quantitative 
estimates  and  ‘limited’  or  cost 
‘neutral’  qualitative  conclusions  is 
and what evidence they are based 
on.  A  Treaty  change  to  give  EU 
for 
delegations 
consular assistance would give rise 
to 
legitimate 
expectation  on  the  part  of  EU 
citizens that they would be able to 
enjoy  this  right  universally.  That 
cannot by definition, and given the 
wide  range  of  consular  work,  be 
achieved  on  a  resource-neutral 
basis. The report should also clarify 
how  the  gradual  approach  would 
work 
universal, 
justiciable right the initiative would 
create.  Such  an  ad  hoc  approach 
would seem to be more compatible 
with a non-legislative option. 

justiciable 

given 

the 

a 

(10)  The  absence  of  a  dedicated 
public  consultation  is  problematic 
in  terms  of the  evidence  basis.  By 
way  of  mitigation,  the  views  of 
stakeholders – including dissenting 
ones  –  expressed  in  the  public 
for  the  2020  EU 
consultation 
the  Flash 
Citizenship  Report, 
Eurobarometer 
EU 
Citizenship  and  Democracy  and  in 
with 
targeted 
Member States and EU delegations 

consultations 

485 

on 

The  quantitative  and  qualitative  cost  assessment 
conclusions  of  the  preferred  option  have  been 
improved,  which  no  longer  implies  a  Treaty  change 
(see methodology in Annex 4).  

The views of stakeholders have been included where 
possible  and  in  particular  those  of  the  Member 
States,  both  in  the  problem  description  and  the 
political  feasibility  sections.  Additional  information 
on  the  views  of  the  Member  States  were  gathered 
following discussions at the Council working party on 
consular affairs (‘COCON’) on further facilitating the 
exercise  of  the  right  to  consular  protection  in  third 
countries in the context of a possible up-date of the 
Directive, between September and November 2022.  

64 

 
 
 
 
 
should  be  presented  throughout 
the report, not only in the problem 
analysis.  The  views  of  Member 
States are not sufficiently reflected 
in the report. The initiative by eight 
Member States favouring a review 
of 
given 
the  Directive 
The 
disproportionate  weight. 
views of the remaining 19 Member 
States  on  the  proposals  in  the 
including  dissenting 
initiative  – 
views – should be clearly set out. 

is 

DG JUST, working in close cooperation with the co-lead EEAS, re-submitted the draft Impact 
Assessment to RSB on 8 June 2023. On 6 July 2023, the RSB issued a positive opinion with 
reservations.  The  RSB’s  recommendations  have  been  taken  into  account  in  the  Impact 
Assessment, as the table below displays. 

BOARD’s SUGGESTED 
IMPROVEMENTS 

IMPLEMENTATION  

Based on Article 23 TFEU, unrepresented EU citizens 
already enjoy a justiciable right to be assisted by the 
diplomatic and consular authorities of other Member 
States in third countries where their Member State of 
nationality  is  not  represented.  The  initiative  would 
not  affect  the  current  scope  of  this  right  as 
established  by  the  Treaty.  This  has  been  clarified  in 
the description of policy option 1b). 

The  demonstration  of  compliance  with  Article  10 
(cost-neutrality)  of  the  EEAS  Decision  is  outlined  in 
Annex 4. 

of 

right 

initiative 
(1)  The  scope  of  the 
remains  unclear,  in  particular  in 
what  specific  circumstances  the 
proposed  legal  changes  on  the 
unrepresented 
definition 
nationals  would  give  rise  to  a 
for 
consular 
justiciable 
citizens 
EU 
unrepresented 
worldwide,  or whether this  would 
be 
third 
countries where no Member States 
is  present  with  consular  service. 
This should be clarified as it could 
have  a  direct  bearing  on  the 
for  EU 
implications 
resource 
delegations and Member States.  

specific 

limited 

to 

The  report  should  demonstrate 
compliance  with  Article  10  (cost-
neutrality) of the EEAS Decision. 

(2) The scale of the problem is not 
apparent  raising  doubts  as  to  the 
proportionality  of,  or  justification 
for,  legally  binding  EU  action.  The 
report should present how big the 

The text has been redrafted to clarify the size of the 
problem, in particular problem 1. In addition, further 
elements  have  been  added  in  Section  2  on  the 
limitations  of  the  data  available  resulting  from  the 

65 

 
 
in  all 
problems  are  bringing 
available evidence. If the problems 
are  small,  this  should  be  clearly 
stated  upfront  and  the  scale  and 
nature  of  the  measures  proposed 
should be commensurate with this. 

The 

baseline 

is 
(3) 
underdeveloped, 
insufficiently 
presented  in  the  main  report  and 
not dynamic. The report is not clear 
on  why  certain  non-regulatory 
for  each 
measures  presented 
problem could not already be done 
under  the  baseline  scenario.  This 
should be dynamic and go beyond 
the  expected 
a  narrative  on 
continuation of the current regime. 
It  should  integrate  the  expected 
evolution of the problems covering 
the envisaged changes in consular 
network  and 
the  number  of 
unrepresented  EU  travellers,  the 
effects  of  the  UK  leaving  the  EU 
and  the  expected 
increase  of 
crises. 

(4)  The  report  should  explain  that 
not all the options are alternatives 
and  thus  comparable,  as  they 
address  different  problems  under 
the same specific objective. 

The  report  should  clarify  whether 
other  combinations  of  options 
have been considered, for instance 
a  combination  of  exclusively  non-
regulatory  measures  only,  and  if 
not, explain why. 

a 

should  make 

It 
critical 
assessment  of  the  limitations  of 
the baseline as a reliable basis for 
comparison of the options. 

lack of preceding evaluation and on the magnitude of 
the problem. 

The assessment of the proportionality of the different 
policy  options  has  been  expanded  to  better  explain 
how  their  proportionality 
impacted  by  the 
limitations  and  uncertainties  as  to  the  scale  of  the 
problem.  

is 

The description of the baseline in the main text has 
been  expanded,  in  particular  by  adding  information 
from the evolution of the problem, notably in terms 
of the changes to consular networks and number of 
travellers,  as  well  as  the 
impact  of  the  UK’s 
withdrawal from the EU. 

In addition, explanations were added as to why some 
of  the  problems  could  not  be  addressed  under  the 
baseline  scenario  due  to  them  being  linked  to  the 
current wording of the Directive. 

See also expanded section on the baseline in Annex 9.  

Additional explanations have been added as to why 
not  all  the  options  are  alternatives  given  that  they 
address  different  problems  under  the  same  specific 
objective (see notably specific objective 2). 

In 
the  section  on  discarded  policy  options, 
explanations  have  been  added  an  alternative 
combination  of  measures  has  not  been  considered, 
including a package non-legislative measures.  

Elements have been added to Annex 9 to reflect the 
uncertainties  of  the  baseline  scenario,  in  particular 
when it comes to future actions of the Member States 
and the need for consular protection as a result of an 
increase in crises with a consular element. 

66 

 
 
 
 
(5)  The  impact  analysis  should  be 
further  developed.  The  report 
should 
include  an  explicit  and 
the 
distinct 
assessment of the impacts of each 
policy option. 

section 

with 

The  report  needs  to  distinguish 
clearly  between  the  categories  of 
impacts  assessed  and  the  criteria 
the  comparison  of 
on  which 
options is based. 

All  mandatory 
categories  of 
impacts should be examined, and it 
should be clearly noted if they are 
deemed  not 
relevant  or  not 
significant. 

The  impact  analysis  has  been  separated  from  the 
chapter on the assessment of impacts of each policy 
option (Chapter 6 and 7).  

All mandatory categories of impacts have been added 
and examined in Chapter 6.  

It is clearly explained that no social or environmental 
impacts, 
identified 
impacts  on  SMEs  could  be 
(Chapter 6), nor impacts on competitiveness (Annex 
3), given that the Directive does directly not concern 
commercial entities. 

The  assessment  of  the  costs  under  the  economic 
impacts  and  the  analysis  of  the  benefits  have  been 
reviewed.  

The assessment of the costs should 
be  further  developed  as  they 
appear  to  be  understated  (see 
the 
point  1),  particularly 
amendments  give 
to  a 
universal 
justiciable  right,  and 
should  be  fully  worked  through 
and set out. 

rise 

if 

Broad  statements  that  the  costs 
will  be  “very  limited”  should  be 
sufficiently  substantiated  by  the 
analysis  to  allow  policy  makers  to 
take an informed assessment. The 
analysis  of  the  benefits  should  be 
further  developed  to  assess  all 
relevant types of benefits. 

(6)  The  assessment  of the  options 
against  the  comparison  criteria 
should be based on evidence. The 
report  should  elaborate  on  the 
assessment  of  proportionality  for 
all  options  rather  than  merely 
is 
stating 
considered  fully  proportionate  to 
achieve the objective’. The scoring 
of  the  options  is  arbitrary  and 
should  instead  be  supported  by 

‘this  policy  option 

The assessment of proportionality for each option has 
been expanded. 

The  scoring  has  been  reviewed  and  updated.  An 
explanation  of  the  scoring  system  can  be  found  in 
Section 4 of Annex 4. 

67 

 
 
and consistent with the preceding 
analysis. The report should explain 
why  the  scoring  of  options  with 
different  characteristics  is  often 
the  same,  or  options  with  similar 
characteristics score differently. 

(7) The report does not sufficiently 
reflect  and  take  account  of  the 
views  of  different  stakeholder 
groups.  It  should  include  a  clear 
explanation  why  the  “evaluate 
first”  principle  was  not  respected 
and 
from 
how 
into 
stakeholders  was 
account to compensate for the lack 
of evaluative evidence, particularly 
in the problem definition. 

feedback 

taken 

should  be 

(8) The monitoring and evaluation 
provisions 
further 
developed.  The  report  should  be 
more specific on the targets set for 
the indicators beyond an expected 
increase.  It  should  re-assess  the 
statement  that  there  is  currently 
no  existing  data  for  any  of  the 
proposed indicators. It should also 
assess  how 
the 
proposed  sources  of  information. 
Evaluation  provisions  and  their 
timing should be added. 

realistic  are 

Additional explanations have been added to Section 
2.2. as to how stakeholder feedback was considered 
for the problem definition. 

A  new  subsection  has  been  added  to  Section  2.2 
explaining why a derogation from the ‘evaluate first’ 
principle  had  been  granted  and  acknowledging  the 
limitations resulting from the subsequent lack of data 
and evaluative evidence. 

 More information can be found in Annex 1. 

Where  possible,  targets  and  available  baselines  for 
the indicators have been added. 

An assessment of the sources of information has been 
added. 

Explanations  as  to  the  evaluation  of  the  proposed 
action,  with  reference  to  existing  legal  provisions, 
have been added. 

4.  Evidence, sources and quality 

The evidence base is drawn in particular from the following:  

• 

the Inception Impact Assessment97 and the responses provided by organisations in response 
to it; 

• 

the Flash Eurobarometer 485 on EU Citizenship and Democracy98; 

97  

98  

European Commission, Inception Impact assessment on Consular Protection – review of EU rules, Ref. 
Ares(2021)282291 – 13/01/2021. 
Flash  Eurobarometer 
https://data.europa.eu/data/datasets/s2260_485_eng?locale=en.  

and  Democracy;  February/March 

485:  EU  Citizenship 

2020; 

68 

 
 
 
 
 
• 

the  Joint  Frameworks  of  four  selected  third  countries  (Costa  Rica,  Montenegro,  Russia, 
Ethiopia). 

•  an anonymised sample of citizen’s complaints received by DG JUST; 

• 

the  2020  EU  citizenship  report99,  including  its  Open  Public  Consultation  survey  with 
consular questions; 

•  Member States’ replies to the questionnaire developed by the Expert Group Meeting on 
Consular  Protection  of  8  December  2020/  Discussion  Note  on  the  implementation  of 
Council Directive (EU) 2015/637, Chapter 1: General Provisions and Scope and Chapter 
2:  Coordination  and  cooperation  measures.  This  dedicated  questionnaire  collected 
quantitative data on Member States’ national legislation and procedures; on their consular 
networks and assets; on the consular protection they provide to (un)represented citizens; 
and on their travel and communication channels. Additionally, Member States were also 
asked  to  provide  qualitative  feedback,  through  interviews,  on  the  application  of  the 
Directive and the problem definition; on the proposed policy options; and on the COVID-
19 pandemic lessons learnt; 

•  an online survey sent to EU delegations (77 out of 134 responded); 

•  a short survey collecting anecdotal information from a sample of unrepresented citizens; 

• 

interviews with stakeholders (citizens, industry, selected EU bodies); 

•  Report on the implementation and application of Directive 2015/637/EU, COM(2022) 437 
https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2022-

at: 

final, 
available 
09/1_1_196921_impl_rep_cons_en_1.pdf 

•  discussions  at  the  Council  working  party  on  consular  affairs  (‘COCON’)  on  further 
facilitating the exercise of EU citizens’ right related to consular protection in third countries 
in the context of a possible up-date of the Directive, between September and November 
2022100. 

•  Data on consular activities provided by the EEAS Consular Affairs Division; 

•  A dedicated study from a contractor, which gathered and analysed the evidence mentioned 

above101. 

99  

100  

101  

https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/eu-citizenship-report-2020-empowering-citizens-and-protecting-their-
rights_en.  
Minutes of discussions at the Council working party on consular affairs are not publicly available. The 
Czech  Presidency  held  three  COCON  meetings  focusing  on  options  to  further  facilitate  consular 
protection of EU citizens in third countries based on the Commission´s report on the implementation and 
application of the Directive, COM (2022) 437, see Outcome of the proceedings COCON 61 15876/22 
available  at:  https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15876-2022-INIT/en/pdf  and  WK 
17059/2022 in List of working papers (WK) distributed in the Working Party on Consular Affairs in 
2022 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5013-2023-INIT/en/pdf.  
Study supporting the impact assessment, including its annexes. 

69 

 
 
 
 
 
Annex 2: Stakeholder consultation  

This impact assessment included the following stakeholder consultations: 

1.  Online survey with EU delegations 

The approved survey questionnaire was uploaded into EU survey by the  contractor, and the 
survey link was then distributed to the EU delegations by the EEAS on 19 April 2021. The 
survey was live for 3 weeks, from 19 April until 10 May 2021, as the initial deadline of 3 May 
2021 was extended one week upon request by a number of EU delegations.  

The survey data was then reviewed in the week of 10 May 2021 and duplicate entries were 
clarified with the relevant EU delegations. Overall 77 EU delegations completed the survey 
(response  rate  of  60%).  Through  this  survey,  EU  delegations  were  consulted  on  their 
assessment of the situation under the status quo (including under times of crisis, such as around 
the COVID-19 outbreak), on their views regarding the functioning of the Directive, as well as 
on their views  regarding the policy options. The responses regarding the  policy options are 
reported below102. 

Policy option 1: Status quo  

Directive 2015/637 would remain in force and only soft measure would be introduced, like for 
instance providing more effective outreach for travel advice and communication channels, or 
carrying  out  better  training  and  exercises  for  consular  protection  and  joint  consular  crisis 
preparedness.  

What  types  of  soft  measures  would  improve  the  way  in  which  consular  assistance  is 
provided to unrepresented EU citizens (e.g. training for consular staff, guidelines, best 
practice guides, coordination exercises)? Describe and specify if these should be targeted 
at the Member States, the EU delegations or both. 

The EU delegations identified a number of soft measures that would improve the way in which 
consular  assistance  is  provided  to  unrepresented  EU  citizens.  One  of  the  most  common 
suggestions were more training to be offered for the staff (e.g. Eswatini, Fiji), as well as clearer 
guidelines and instructions by the HQ (e.g. Albania). Some EU delegations also pointed out 
the  fact  that  they  require  more  personnel  in  order  to  properly  perform  their  consular 
responsibilities (e.g. Malaysia). This could be potentially amended if additional resources were 
assigned to employ local staff and agents with consular attributions (e.g. Papua New Guinea). 
Furthermore,  some  EU  delegations  mentioned  the  need  to  organise  joint  EU  delegation  – 
Member State consular coordination exercises (e.g. Barbados, Mauritania). Lastly, there are 
challenges  in  reaching  out  to  EU  citizens  in  countries  where  local  conditions  make  it  very 
difficult to use modern media (e.g. Eritrea).The EU delegation in Panama proposed to create 
and maintain an updated database that would contain information on the citizens present in the 
country;  and  all  contacts  of  relevant  persons  tasked  with  consular  responsibilities  from 
embassies, consulates and/or concurrent embassies. 

102  

Note that the policy option descriptions presented below are those provided to the survey respondents, 
and differ from the policy options presented in this Impact Assessment. 

70 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: In your opinion, does this policy option suffice to address the issues identified? (N=77) 

Yes 

No 

Not applicable / I don't know 

No Answer 

Answers  Ratio 

28 

16 

31 

2 

36.36% 

20.78% 

40.26% 

2.6% 

Only  around  one  third  of  the  EU  delegations  considered  soft  measures  as  sufficient  in 
addressing the identified issues; almost an equal number did not have an opinion or viewed 
soft  policy  options  as  not  applicable  in  their  case.  As  previously,  a  notable  number  of  EU 
delegations claimed that the problems are due to capacity constraints which will not be solved 
with  soft  measures  (Gambia,  Iceland,  India,  Malaysia).  Furthermore,  some  EU  delegations 
highlighted  the  need  for  more  consular  tools  under  their  disposal  (El  Salvador).  The  EU 
delegation in Russia also emphasised the need for Member States to persuade their diplomatic 
missions to make use of the Directive more actively.  

Policy  Option  2:  Measures  establishing  further  and  tighter  rules  on  coordination  and 
cooperation.  

A new legal instrument would amend the existing Directive and aim to achieve the following 
results: 

- enhance cooperation among Member States 

- strengthen the EU’s supporting role, making best use of its unique network of EU delegations.  

- preparation and implementation of joint contingency plans would be further elaborated.  

- the voluntary use, by Member States, of joint consular teams in crisis situations.  

- clarify the possibilities under the Union Civil Protection Mechanism,  

- clarify provision of travel advice to citizens and information in times of crisis. 

-  financial  procedures  overhauled,  including  by  adding  provisions  on  the  reimbursement  of 
costs for the assistance provided to represented citizens in crisis situations.  

Under  this  policy  option,  the  scope  of  the  Directive  would  be  extended  to  also  cover 
represented citizens in crisis situations. This would mean that any EU citizen could turn 
to  any  MS  embassy/consulate  present  in  a  third  country,  in  crisis  situations,  to  seek 
consular protection, even when her/his country is represented. What would be the impact 
of this extended scope on your delegation, considering your current role in supporting 
Member States? 

The proposed policy option raised certain  concerns among  EU delegations surveyed. In the 
first place, there was a shared view is a potential lack of resources to manage a new stream of 
requests. This is especially the case of countries with a limited diplomatic presence of Member 
States but with a significant population of EU citizens (e.g. Uruguay). On the other side, EU 
delegations in third countries with a minor population of EU citizens (e.g. Ethiopia) or with a 
large network of diplomatic missions of the Member States (e.g. the U.S.) did not consider this 
policy  option  as  providing  significant  change.  EU  delegations  in  countries  like  Papua  New 

71 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Guinea were more supportive of this policy option, as they considered it offers better protection 
for the citizens. The second potential concern is that the proposed policy option would lead to 
confusion and ‘forum shopping’ (e.g. Fiji), as the EU citizens would try to choose diplomatic 
representation  that  would  offer  better  chances  of  receiving  more  comprehensive  consular 
assistance. However, the  EU  delegation  in  Gambia considered that this policy option could 
offer greater visibility for the EU, provided that it will be able to meet its new responsibilities.  

Figure 4: To what extent do you think the role foreseen for EU delegations as captured in the Directive is 
in  line  with  the  role  and  activities  currently  carried  out  by  your  Delegation  in  practice  in  non-crisis 
situations? (N=77) 

To a great extent 

To some extent 

To a little extent 

To no extent 

Not applicable / I don't know 

No Answer 

Answers  Ratio 

27 

23 

12 

2 

10 

3 

35.06% 

29.87% 

15.58% 

2.6% 

12.99% 

3.9% 

The broad majority of the delegations participating from the survey agreed to a great extent or 
to some extent that the role foreseen for EU delegations as captured in the Directive is in line 
with the role and activities currently carried out by a delegation. Almost one fifth of delegations 
consulted were of the view that this is the case to a little or no extent.  

Do you think that there is a need to strengthen the mandate and further define the role 
of the EU delegations in the provision of consular protection to unrepresented citizens in 
the Directive? If so, in what way? 

The EU delegations were mostly open to new ways to strengthen their mandate and further 
define  their  role  in  the  provision  of  consular  protection  to  unrepresented  citizens  in  the 
Directive.  Among  the  suggestions,  it  was  proposed  to  create  a  position  of  an  EU  consul 
recognised  by  the  third  country  (e.g.  Bangladesh).  In  view  of  the  EU  delegations,  the 
strengthened mandate should also help in the situation where Member States are unwilling to 
comply with the provisions of the Directive. Furthermore, a clearer division of labour between 
the Member States and  EU delegations  would benefit every party. However, as highlighted 
above, there is some concern in relation to the limited resources of EU delegations for consular 
assistance (e.g. Iceland, Malaysia). 

Do you see a role for the EU delegation in the setting up of joint consular teams in crisis 
situations? If yes, what would this role be? What would be the benefits and challenges? 
If no, why not? 

The broad majority of EU delegations saw benefits in establishing joint consular teams in crisis 
situations. They viewed it as a chance to establish a more comprehensive assessment of the 
situation,  to  better  coordinate,  and  share  information  (e.g.  Cuba,  Mauritania).  The  EU 
delegation in Russia was of the view that EU delegations can act as central information points 
- gathering all relevant information from all stakeholders, streamlining and systematising it, 
and then sharing it back with the Member States.  

72 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Some EU delegations raised their reservations on a more active role in the setting up of joint 
consular teams in crisis situations because of the perceived lack of resources (e.g. Malaysia). 
Others considered that the present arrangements (for e.g. the joint coordination within the LCC) 
offer enough coordination between the EU delegation and the Member States in crisis situations 
(e.g. Egypt). EU delegations in third countries with a large presence of Member States (e.g. 
Russia) did not see the need for additional coordination activities by the EU delegation.  

If the Directive would foresee a role for the EU delegation to provide consular protection 
to  unrepresented  EU  citizens  directly,  what  would  this  mean  for  your  delegation  in 
practice? Would you need additional  staff, budget, or tools? What  would be the main 
benefits and challenges? 

The great majority of EU delegations agreed that such a role would bring enhanced visibility 
to the work of the Delegations and provide unrepresented citizens with better and easier access 
to consular protection. 

Most EU delegations agreed that the main challenge to exercising a more active role is the lack 
of  resources.  Some  EU  delegations  were  also  concerned  about  potential  reactions  of  the 
Member States and meeting increased expectations of EU citizens (e.g. El Salvador, Eswatini).  

With the exception of Egypt – where it is stated that nothing would really change, since almost 
all Member States maintain their diplomatic presence – the consulted EU delegations agreed 
that  they  would  need  additional  staff,  budget  and  tools  to  provide  consular  protection  to 
unrepresented EU citizens directly.  

How  would  your  answer  change  if  the  Directive  would  also  foresee  a  role  for  the  EU 
delegation  to  provide  consular  protection  to  represented  EU  citizens  directly  in  crisis 
situations?  

When  consulted  if  they  would  be  willing  to  provide  consular  protection  to  represented  EU 
citizens, EU delegations confirmed that they would need additional resources for this, including 
an  increased  budget  and  more  staff.  Without  an  increase  in  capacity,  this  change  would 
overwhelm  EU  delegations.  However,  many  delegations  agreed  that  Member  States  with 
diplomatic missions on the ground are better equipped to assist their citizens in crisis situations, 
which would minimise the need for such change.  

73 

 
 
 
 
Figure 5: In which types of situations do you think it is appropriate/feasible for the EU delegation to 
provide consular protection directly to unrepresented EU citizens? Please select all that apply. (N=77) 

Arrest or detention 

Being a victim of crime 

Serious accident or serious illness 

Death 

Relief and repatriation in case of an emergency 

Need for emergency travel documents as provided for in Decision 
96/409/CFSP 

None of the above 

Not applicable / I don't know 

No Answer 

Answers  Ratio 

29 

24 

24 

20 

36 

26 

19 

10 

2 

37.66% 

31.17% 

31.17% 

25.97% 

46.75% 

33.77% 

24.68% 

12.99% 

2.6% 

The EU delegations held divergent views on the types of situations where it is appropriate for 
the Delegation to provide consular protection directly to unrepresented EU citizens. “Relief 
and  repatriation  in  case  of  an  emergency”  was  the  most  common  response,  with  c.  47%  of 
choices,  followed  by  “arrest  and  detention”  with  c.  38%  of  choices.  While  many  EU 
delegations chose every possible option, they also emphasised the need for greater resources. 
One quarter of the EU delegations did not see the need to provide consular protection directly 
to unrepresented EU citizens.  

If the EU delegations would be responsible for providing up to date information to EU 
citizens (such as contacts of Member States consulates) and summarising travel advice, 
what would this mean for your delegation in practice? Would you need additional staff, 
budget, or tools? What would be the main benefits and challenges? 

The great majority of the EU delegations consulted would need additional staff, budget and 
tools if they were responsible for providing information to EU citizens and summarising travel 
advice. Only 14 EU delegations stated they have adequate resources: some have mentioned 
that they already do this on a routine basis (e.g. Togo, Philippines).  

In terms of the benefits that this could bring, most EU delegations agreed that it would bring 
new  visibility  to  the  delegations  and  provide  unrepresented  citizens  with  better  and  easier 
access to consular protection. 

When asked to reflect on the challenges, the broad majority of the EU delegations consulted 
would have limited resources to perform these tasks and be overburdened with work. Some EU 
delegations mentioned difficulties associated with communicating in certain EU languages and 
the possible reactions of the Member States (e.g. India, Mongolia and Panama).  

If in crisis situations, the EU delegations would be responsible to reach out and provide 
emergency communication to EU citizens, what would this mean for your delegation in 
practice? Would you need additional  staff, budget, or tools? What  would be the main 
benefits and challenges?  

74 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If the EU delegations were responsible to reach out and provide emergency communication to 
EU citizens in crisis situations, the great majority would need additional staff, budget and tools 
for this task. Only 4 EU delegations stated they have adequate resources (Dominican Republic, 
Egypt – if joint effort with the Member States, Mauritius, Togo). 

In terms of the benefits that this could bring, most EU delegations agreed that it would bring 
new  visibility  to  the  Delegations  and  provide  unrepresented  citizens  with  better  and  easier 
access to consular protection. 

When asked to reflect on the challenges, the broad majority of the EU delegations consulted 
would have limited resources to perform these tasks and be overburdened with work. Some EU 
delegations mentioned difficulties associated with communicating in certain EU languages and 
the possible reactions of the Member States (e.g. Bangladesh, Congo, El Salvador).  

Can  any  improvements  be  made  to  the  development  and  implementation  of  the  joint 
contingency  plans/joint  frameworks?  What  additional  role  could  the  EU  delegations 
have? 

The  great  majority  of  the  EU  delegations  consulted  welcomed  potential  changes  to  the 
development and implementation of the joint contingency plans / joint frameworks with a view 
to  making  these  plans  more  practical,  with  better  defined  roles  for  EU  delegations,  Lead 
Country, and other Member States. Some EU delegations would also seek more guidance from 
HQ on how to make the joint frameworks as operational as possible (e.g. Albania). However, 
there were a number of EU delegations that questioned the utility of having joint contingency 
plans/joint frameworks (e.g. Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Singapore; they all were of the view that 
no amount of planning can really prepare for a crisis situation) or argued that Member States 
did  not  see  the  real  utility  of  the  joint  contingency  plans/joint  frameworks  in  real  life  (e.g. 
Malawi, Russia; they prefer to act ad hoc in a crisis situation).  

Figure 6: To what extent do you see the need to clarify the possibilities under the Union Civil Protection 
Mechanism? (N=77) 

To a great extent 

To some extent 

To a little extent 

To no extent 

Not applicable / I don't know 

No Answer 

Answers  Ratio 

19 

27 

5 

3 

21 

2 

24.68% 

35.06% 

6.49% 

3.9% 

27.27% 

2.6% 

The majority of the EU delegations consulted in the survey agreed to a great extent or to some 
extent on the need to clarify the possibilities under the UCPM (c. 58%). In their view, both the 
EU delegations and the Member States were not entirely aware of the possibilities under the 
UCPM.  The  EU  delegations  mentioned  that  the  UCPM  was  difficult  to  understand  (e.g. 
Mauritius), difficult to implement (e.g. Guyana) or that there was difficulty in finding reliable 
information  (Bolivia).  Only  three  EU  delegations  claimed  to  have  an  adequate  knowledge 
about the UCPM (Iceland, Mozambique and Norway). One in every four delegations consulted 
had no opinion or considered the matter not applicable to their specific situation. 

75 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy Option 3: Measures enabling EU delegations to provide consular protection to EU 
citizens beyond crisis situations 

This option would build on option 2 by introducing further elements of a harmonised approach: 

- provisions for local EU delegations to directly and exclusively take care of unrepresented EU 
citizens and provide them with all types of consular protection beyond crisis situations.  

- Creation of a common information tool to advise EU citizens travelling to third countries,  

- establish a single channel for communicating with EU citizens in third countries in times of 
crisis. 

If EU delegations would directly and exclusively take care of unrepresented EU citizens 
in  non-crisis  situations  and  provide  them  with  all  types  of  consular  protection,  what 
would this mean for your delegation in practice? Would you need additional staff, budget, 
or tools? What would be the main benefits and challenges? 

If the EU delegations were responsible for taking care of unrepresented EU citizens in non-
crisis situations and providing them with all types of consular protection, the great majority 
would need additional staff, budget and tools for this task.  

In terms of the benefits that this could bring, most EU delegations agreed that it would bring 
new visibility to delegations and provide unrepresented citizens with better and easier access 
to consular protection. 

When asked to reflect on the challenges, the broad majority of the EU delegations consulted 
would have limited resources to perform these tasks and be overburdened with work. They also 
would not have the required expertise (e.g. Eswatini), would require additional office space 
(e.g. Chile), would have difficulties in tracking unrepresented citizens (e.g. Ecuador), would 
need  to  set  up  additional  representations  outside  the  capitals  (India),  and  would  encounter 
potential obstacles from the resident state (Russia).  

What do you see as the main benefits and challenges of this policy option (e. mandatory 
extension of scope, mandatory use of joint consular teams, creation of Common European 
Travel  advice  tool  and  crisis  communication  channel,  direct  activation  of  UCPM,  EU 
consular protection fund and/or IT system to digitalise reimbursement)?  

The great majority of EU delegations agreed that this policy option would bring greater clarity, 
better protection for citizens, greater efficacy, more visibility, and money savings. 

However,  they  would  not  have  sufficient  resources  to  implement  the  measures  in  practice. 
Furthermore, the EU delegations mentioned that Member States are better qualified for this 
kind  of  responsibilities  (Bangladesh).  Also,  this  policy  option  would  require  overcoming 
cultural challenges (Cameroon), could create confusion as to the delineation of responsibilities 
between the Member States and delegations (Congo), would not be welcome by the Member 
States (e.g. Dominican Republic, Eswatini), and would create new responsibilities that would 
be very difficult to meet (e.g. Uzbekistan).  

2.  Interviews in 5 selected third countries  

Table 7 below presents a detailed breakdown of the in-depth interviews carried out within the 
selected third countries. As no response was received from the relevant contact within the EU 
delegation  in  China,  it  was  agreed  with  DG  JUST  and  EEAS  to  replace  this  country  with 
Russia. 

76 

 
 
 
 
Table 7: Progress interviews in selected third countries. 

Stakeholder contacted/interviewed 

Selected third 
country 

EU 
delegation 

MS 
(embassy/consulate) 

representation 

Other 
organisation) 

(tourist 

or 

expat 

Russia 

Interview 
completed 

interviews  completed 

2 
(DE and FI) 

Ethiopia 

Interview 
completed 

interviews  completed 

2 
(FR and DE) 

Costa Rica 

Interview 
completed 

interview  completed 

1 
(DE), 1 declined (ES) 

interview  conducted  with 
1 
European 
of 
Association 
in  Russia.  Three 
Business 
additional 
organisations 
identified  and  contacted,  but 
no response. 

tour 

organisation 
Two 
identified  and  contacted  (one 
conducted),  one 
interview 
French 
expat  organisation 
contacted (no response). 

No  EU  tourist  identified.  One 
expat  organisations  contacted 
(no response). 

Montenegro 

Interview 
completed 

2 interviews completed (IT 
and SI) 

One  EU  tourist  organisations 
identified, but no response. 

Fiji 

Interview 
completed 

1 
interview  completed 
(ES),  1  contacted  but  no 
response (FR) 

No  EU 
organisations identified. 

tourist  or  expat 

TOTAL  

5 

8 conducted  

2 conducted 

Overall, 15 interviews were completed: 

• 

• 

• 

EU delegations: All interviews with EU delegations were completed across the five 
selected countries.  

Member  State  representations:  Member  States  were  suggested  by  the  EU 
delegations, in most cases due to their role as Lead State in the country.  

Tourist and expat organisations: Names of relevant organisations representing EU 
tourists  and  expats  were  requested  from  the  EU  delegations  and  Member  States 
representations using the snowball technique, but this proved to be more challenging. 
In some countries the stakeholders confirmed no such organisations were present (e.g. 
in  Costa  Rica,  expats  rather  organised  themselves  through  a  Facebook  group,  and 
tourist organisations were mainly from the US), while in other cases the organisations 
contacted  did  not  reply.  It  was  discussed  with  the  EEAS  to  go  back  to  the  EU 
delegations once more to ask about any relevant expat organisations, even if those are 

77 

 
 
 
only for citizens of a specific Member State. Three further expat organisations were 
contacted in Russia, Ethiopia and Costa Rica in June, but no responses were received. 

3.  Interviews with industry stakeholders 

The  objective  of  the  interviews  with  industry  stakeholders  was  to  gather  their  views  and 
experiences in the types of challenges their passengers might have faced when seeking consular 
protection,  and  feedback  on  their  awareness  and  provision  of  information  to  and 
communication  with  their  passengers  in  the  field  of  consular  protection.  During  the  data 
collection phase, the contact details in the selected organisations representing the EU private 
sector were identified by the contractor with the help of DG JUST, the EEAS and DG MOVE 
with the aim to carry out up to five interviews with these industry stakeholders.  

A number of organisations were contacted, but the majority was unable to answer, due to the 
limited capacity they had over the period or the limited experience they had on the topic. Eight 
organisations did not respond to the request for an interview. It was subsequently decided to 
extend the scope of the exercise by contacting additional cruise line companies, and as a result 
a  round  table  was  organised  with  members  of  the  Costa  Cruises  Group  (AIDA  cruises  and 
Costa Cruises).  

Table 8: Overview of industry stakeholders contacted and status 

Type 

Name 

Tourism/Travel 

The  European  Travel  Agents' 
and Tour Operators' Association 
(ECTAA) 

Date 
contacted 

Number 
of 
reminders sent 

Status 

22/4/21 

Declined 

European  Tourism  Association 
(ETOA) 

27/4/21 

European  Travel  Commission 
(ETC) 

5/5/21 

World  Travel  and  Tourism 
Council (WTTC) 

5/5/21 

2 

2 

Declined 
forwarded 
request to ECTAA 

– 
the 

No answer 

No answer 

Aviation 

International  Air 
Association (IATA) 

Transport 

27/4/21 

Declined 

Airlines for Europe (A4E) 

22/4/21 

2 

No answer 

European 
Regional Airlines (ERA) 

Association 

of 

27/4/21 

Declined 

Airlines 
International 
Representation  in  Europe  (AIR-
E) 

Cruise 
Lines 
Association Europe (CLIA) 

International 

27/4/21 

2 

No answer 

27/4/21 

2 

No answer 

78 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cruise 
industries 

Line 

Carnival 

MSC 

Royal Caribbean 

Costa  Cruise  Line  (AIDA  cruises 
and Costa Cruises). 

1 

1 

1 

20/5/21 

20/5/21 

20/5/21 

06/2021 

No answer 

No answer 

No answer 

Completed 

4.  Interviews with EU bodies with a supporting role in consular protection 

Interviews were carried out with six EU officials to directly inform: 

• 

• 

the  data  collected  through  the  document  review  on  the  EU  network  of  consular 
correspondents and assets103; 

the policy objectives and policy options.  

The  final  list  of  interviewees  is  presented  in  the  table  9  below.  In  addition,  the  contractor 
consulted extensively with DG JUST and the EEAS in relation to the feasibility of the proposed 
policy objectives and policy options. 

Table 9: Interviews conducted with EU level stakeholders 

EU  

EEAS  

Proposed 
interviewee 

Role/Unit 

Status 

Victor  Madeira 
dos Santos 

Head  of  Division,  Consular 
Affairs 
Division 
EEAS.SG.CRC.2  

Completed 
(22/06/2021) 

Paulo Silva 

Consular  Affairs  Division 
EEAS.SG.CRC.2  

Members of the Consular Task Force 
set  up  by  the  EEAS  as  part  of  the 
COVID pandemic 

Soren Liborius 

and 
Officer, 

Information 
Communication 
SG.AFFGEN.7; 
formerly Deputy Head of the 
Consular Affairs Division,  

Completed 
(02/07/2021) 

DG  ECHO  /  European  Commission’s 
Emergency  Response  Coordination 
Centre (ERCC) 

Dana Nicolau  

Esther 
Haddad 

Emergency 
Coordination 
ECHO.A1 

El 

Response 
Group, 

Completed 
(23/06/2021) 

Council  Working  Party  on  Consular 
Affairs 

Leni  Rikkonen  – 
Le Villain 

General  Secretariat  of  the 
Council, RELEX.2.C 

Completed 
(23/06/2021) 

Portuguese presidency  

Ricardo Cortes  

Current chair of COCON 

103  

See Annex III of the Study. 

Christopher 
Marques 

79 

Completed 
(22/06/2021) 

 
 
 
 
 
5.  Consultation  with  unrepresented  EU  citizens  that  were  in  need  of  consular 

protection, and with EU citizens in general 

The study originally did not foresee consultations with EU citizens  directly, due to the data 
protection rules and other challenges foreseen in identifying and contacting such stakeholders. 
However, upon request  of the Steering Group, the contractor agreed to  replace some of the 
interviews foreseen with expat and tourist organisations to seek the opinions from EU citizens 
directly.  The  approach  proposed  as  part  of  the  revised  inception  report,  was  to  organise  an 
online focus group with up to 12 EU citizens who were stranded abroad during the COVID-19 
pandemic in the five selected third countries, to discuss experiences of EU citizens related to 
consular protection in times of crisis, including the challenges they faced abroad, the support 
they received, the communication channels they identified and used, and any other additional 
aspects linked to their stories.  

As the recruitment of participants through EU delegations and Member State representations 
proved to be challenging due to data protection restrictions, additional efforts to obtain this 
feedback were attempted:  

• 

• 

The contractor developed a short survey on EU citizens’ experiences on consular 
protection  abroad,  aiming  to  generate  real  life  stories  which  would  enrich  the 
reporting  process,  as  well  as  help  identify  candidates  for  follow-up  interviews  if 
anything particularly relevant came up. It was live between 18 May and 18 June 2021 
and was disseminated via DG JUST’s Twitter account.  

The contractor reviewed additional sources with potential to provide feedback from 
the EU citizens’ perspective, referenced in: the inception impact assessment document 
(feedback on the review of EU rules on consular protection)104 (five responses), 2020 
EU  Citizenship  report105  and  Flash  Eurobarometer  485  on  EU  Citizenship  and 
Democracy106). Considering the coverage that these large-scale surveys have provided 
in  terms  of  consultation  opportunities  for  the  public,  the  impact  assessment  has  a 
derogation for an Open Public Consultation (‘OPC’), which is therefore not required.  

The summary of these two points is presented below. 

a) Complaints by EU citizens 

EU citizens have the fundamental right to consular protection (as specified in Article 46 ECFR, 
among others) and are the ultimate beneficiaries of consular protection under the Directive. 
Therefore, it is important to understand how they have experienced the exercise of their right 
as unrepresented citizens abroad in need of assistance. The complaints revolved mostly around 
two  main  issues:  lack  of  assistance  in  repatriation  required  in  relation  to  the  COVID-19 
outbreak (4 complaints), and the impossibility to issue or renew a passport (3 complaints). The 
complaints  involved  a  range  of  Member  States  and  third  countries,  but  none  of  them  was 
involved more than once. The overview of the complaints is presented in the table 10 below. 

104  

105  

106  

The  OPC  for  the  Inception  Impact  Assessment  received  feedback  submissions  from  5  stakeholders, 
which are summarised in Annex VII of the Study. 
The public consultation for the 2020 EU Citizenship report, covering the period from 9 July to 1 October 
2020 contained questions on consular protection and received 343 valid feedback instances.  
This  Flash  Eurobarometer  survey  was  carried  out  by  the  Kantar  network  in  the  27  Member  States 
between 27 February and 6 March 202. It was completed by 25,563 respondents in total. 

80 

 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Overview of sample of EU citizen’s complaints reviewed 

MS in 
question 

3rd 
Country 

Representation in 
3rd Country 

Complainer’s 
nationality 

Matter of the complaint 

SE 

ES 

Malaysia 

Present 

Mexico 

Present 

RO 

UK 

FR 

Tunisia 

Present 

HR 

Egypt 

Present 

ES, IT 

Equatorial 
Guinea 

a) 
Present 

ES: 

b) 
IT: No 
representation 

SE 

ES 

RO 

FR 

HR 

IT 

DE 

Cambodia 

Present 

DE 

Impossibility to renew a passport of a 
Swedish national 

“Ignorance” of Spanish nationals (exchange 
students) by the Embassy; presumably in 
relation to repatriation 

Impossibility to renew a passport and/or an 
ID card of a Romanian national* 

Lack of assistance in repatriation of a French 
national 

Delayed passport issuance for a Croatian 
national’s new-born child 

Lack of assistance in consular protection in 
relation to the violation of the Italian 
complainer’s fundamental rights violation 
during an imprisonment – presumed non-
application of the Directive 2011/95 

German embassy not willing to assist a 
German national “whose life was in danger”; 
presumed violation of Decision 1995/553 by 
staff 

EL 

Ecuador 

Embassy in Peru 
accredited 

EL 

Lack of assistance in repatriation of a Greek 
national 

BE, LU 

Mauritius 

c) 
BE: 
Embassy in 
Tanzania 
accredited;  

LU: 

d) 
Honorary 
Consulate 

BE, LU 

Lack of assistance in repatriation of a Belgian 
and Luxembourg national (the complaint 
does not address any of the respective 
embassies) 

Source: Information provided by DG JUST 

* This complaint seems to be obtained twice.  

b) Inception Impact Assessment references 

i. Feedback received during preparatory stages of the impact assessment 

As part of the preparatory work to the impact assessment, the Commission sought feedback on 
the review of EU rules for consular protections as part of its consultation process. The feedback 
period was 13 January 2021 to 10 February 2021 and the responses were intended to feed into 
the preparation of the impact assessment analysis. This part of the consultation received five 
feedback submissions from the following stakeholders, summarised below:  

81 

 
 
 
• 

• 

• 

EU citizens (two);  

Non-governmental organisations (two);  

Business association (one). 

Victim  Support  Europe  (VSE)  (Belgium)  made  the  following  recommendations  for  the 
review of Directive 2015/637 and provision of assistance to victims in consular services:  

• 

• 

• 

• 

Strengthening  co-ordination  by  identifying  specific  co-ordination  action  to  assist 
victims of crime;  

Equal access to basic standards of victim assistance irrespective of which consulate or 
embassy assists, by harmonisation of standards across all Member States;  

Specifically recognise planning to assist 
contingency plans for crisis situations;  

victims 

of 

terrorism, 

notably 

in 

Support exchange of best practices between Member States and with third countries 
and facilitate the review and development of policies and practical measures to support 
victims of terrorism. 

At the Commission’s request, the contractor contacted VSE for a follow up interview, which 
took place on 28 June 2021. Their additional feedback is summarised below.  

Victims of crime are vulnerable by definition and the trauma experienced often warrants higher 
standards  of  care  and  specific  steps  to  be  taken  when  providing  them  with  assistance.  The 
Victims’  Rights  Directive107  establishes  minimum  standards  on  the  rights,  support  and 
protection of victims of crime and ensures that persons who have fallen victim to crime are 
recognised  and  treated  with  respect.  They  must  also  receive  proper  protection,  support  and 
access to justice. 

VSE note that victims of crime abroad have highly variable experiences when seeking support 
from  representations.  It  appears  that  their  trauma  can  be  compounded  when  facing  the 
challenge to approach an Embassy or Consulate from a Member States which is not their own.  

National  representations  abroad  play  an  important  role  in  the  support  that  is  provided  to  a 
victim of crime. The victim of a crime abroad would approach the embassy / consulate often 
in the immediate aftermath of the accident. It is very important that there is staff who knows 
how to handle people who have been the victims of crime. The  embassy / consulate should 
know how: 

➢ 

➢ 

➢ 

➢ 

107  

to help victim to liaise with police authorities of the third country to report the crime 
and start proceedings; 

to help victim find accommodation, food, flights; 

to connect the victim to services in their home country;  

(if  an  unrepresented  citizen)  to  connect  them  with  their  national  authorities  as 
efficiently as possible given the situation.  

Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing 
minimum  standards  on  the  rights,  support  and  protection  of  victims  of  crime,  and  replacing  Council 
Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA (OJ L 315, 14.11.2012, p. 57). 

82 

 
 
 
But how well do the staff in national representations of Member States across the world deal 
with supporting victims?  

In  this  view,  VSE  consider  that  the  Consular  Protection  Directive  should  at  least  make 
reference to the special standards of care (set in the Victims’ Rights Directive) needed in the 
treatment of an unrepresented citizen who has been the victim of a crime, as this would be an 
opportunity  to  harmonise  the  legislations  of  Member  States  for  the  very  specific  cases  of 
victims of crime abroad. VSE consider that  enshrining  the special standards of care for the 
treatment of victims of crime in legislation ensures that the regime is applied by all Member 
States and not only the high-performing ones. The more detailed provisions, the better as it 
would  enable  the  enforcement  of  a  general  regime  on  victim  protection  (in  the  context  of 
consular assistance to unrepresented citizens).  

For instance, this could be done in a recital to the Consular Protection Directive, but better in 
the Article on the types of assistance offered (currently Article 9). It is arguable whether the 
Consular Protection Directive is an appropriate vehicle for such regime and whether it should 
include detailed provisions for such specific instances. However, the basic requirements of the 
Victims’ Rights Directive for the safeguarding of victims of crime seeking consular assistance 
advocated by VSE would be helpful. These could include, but would not be limited to, these 
categories  of  the  Victims’  Rights  Directive  as  can  be  adapted  for  the  Consular  Protection 
Directive context:  

1) 

2) 

3) 

4) 

5) 

respectful treatment and recognition as victims;  

protection from intimidation, retaliation and further harm by the accused or suspected;  

support, including immediate assistance following a crime, physical and psychological 
assistance and practical assistance; 

access to justice to ensure that victims are aware of their rights and understand them, 
and are able to participate in proceedings; 

requirement for JFWs to include processes and procedures which are victim-centric. 

The German Federal Association ANUAS e.V., also a victim support organisation, called for 
access to uncomplicated consular support for relatives of missing or dead persons, as well as 
advice and help in the respective country which should not be conditional to the involvement 
of lawyers and victim support organisations. Their contribution was developed in connection 
with a number of cases of missing or dead persons in Greece. The same issue is relayed in one 
of the EU citizens’ contributions. The other EU citizen welcomes the initiative.  

Finally, a business association from Mexico (JFMO SERVICIOS EN INTERMEDIACIÓN 
PÚBLICA) noted that guidance on consular protection should not be limited to legal guidance 
for  criminal  acts,  but  also  cover  commercial,  educational,  labour  and  social  aspect,  and 
reminded that few countries and consular services comply with legal guidance and assistance 
for their citizens abroad. 

ii. 2020 EU Citizenship report 

The  public  consultation  for  the  2020  EU  Citizenship  Report  Empowering  citizens  and 
protecting their rights report took place between 9 July 2020 – 1 October 2020 and contained 
questions on consular protection. The 2020 EU Citizenship Report recalls that the right to equal 
access to consular protection is one of the specific rights that the Treaties grant to EU citizens 
and  is  a  tangible  example  of  European  solidarity.  The  Report  references  the  unprecedented 
repatriation effort, in  which Member States, supported by the EC  and the EEAS, managed, 

83 

 
 
between February and May 2020, to bring home over half a million European citizens affected 
by COVID-19 travel restrictions across the world. The report highlights that when organising 
the repatriation of EU citizens stranded abroad due to the COVID-19 outbreak, Member States 
rightly did not treat unrepresented and represented EU citizens differently. Where repatriation 
capacities were available, all European citizens were assisted. Finally, the Report notes that the 
COVID-19 crisis has demonstrated the need to further strengthen EU solidarity to better protect 
EU citizens abroad, in particular during crises.  

The 2020 EU Citizenship Report estimated that, in 2020, 76% of EU citizens are aware of the 
right to seek assistance from other Member States, in case their own does not have an embassy 
or consulate in a third country. 

iii. Flash Eurobarometer 485 on EU Citizenship and Democracy 

The Commission published a survey on a range of issues associated with EU citizenship and 
democracy, for which fieldwork was done in 27 Member States in February/March 2020. The 
survey  also  explored  Europeans’  understanding  of  the  rights  conferred  by  EU  citizenship, 
including to consular support while staying in a non-EU country.  

Overall, more than nine in 10 respondents agree that, if they were in a country outside the EU 
where their Member State of nationality was not represented, they would like to seek support 
from  an  EU  delegation  instead.  On  an  individual  country  level,  more  than  eight  in  10 
respondents in 25 Member States would seek such support if in need. Lower numbers (though 
still over three quarters of respondents in these countries) would be interested in doing so in 
Estonia (77%) and Hungary (78%). Most likely to seek such support were respondents from 
Portugal, Spain and Cyprus (over 96%).  

iv. Survey on EU citizens’ experiences on consular protection 

The contractor developed a short survey on EU citizens’ experiences on consular protection 
abroad, aiming to generate real life stories which would enrich the reporting process, as well 
as help identify candidates for follow-up interviews if anything particularly relevant comes up. 
It was live from 18 May to 2 July 2021 and was disseminated via DG JUST’s Twitter account 
and a selection of EU delegations (see further explained in section 1.1).  

Seven EU citizens replied to the survey and were originating from five Member States (Czech 
Republic, Greece, Hungary and Italy) and one third country (Venezuela) (one participant did 
not provide their nationality). Five of the respondents sought assistance in Costa Rica and two 
– in Venezuela. All seven instances concerned assistance for repatriation during the COVID-
19 crisis in 2020.  

The main point of contact for respondents was the consulate or embassy of their Member State 
of nationality, located in the third country where consular assistance was sought (chosen by 
three survey participants each). The next popular choice was the EU delegation in the country 
in question. Only one respondent mentioned the representation of another Member State in the 
country in question. The respondent who selected “Other” initially contacted the government 
of their Member State of official residence, as they were a national of the third country they 
wanted to leave. In the end, four respondents stated that they received existence from the EU 
delegation in the third country, and three from the representation of another Member State in 
the country where they were. 

84 

 
 
Most of the respondents (four) received help in a matter of days, one in a few hours and one – 
a few weeks. The final respondent declined the repatriation flight as they were waiting for a 
direct flight to Europe which took 1.5 months. All but one respondent considered this delay as 
reasonable. This respondent was from Italy and reported a very negative experience with their 
consulate in Venezuela, tempered by the can-do attitude of the local EU delegation though the 
latter did not resolve their situation. Another respondent received a response on their request 
for consular assistance in a few days, but not solution and ended up waiting four months for a 
flight  to  Europe  from  Costa  Rica  (Hungarian  national  who  contacted  their  national 
representation in a neighbouring country and the local EU delegation). 

Two others responded noted very uplifting experiences with the representation of a Member 
State  other  than  their  own.  For  one,  the  contrast  with  the  unhelpful  attitude  of  their  own 
representation in a neighbouring country was striking.  

6.  Consultation of Member States 

Through the use of a comprehensive questionnaire complemented by interviews conducted by 
the  contractor,  quantitative  data  was  collected  on  Member  States’  national  legislation  and 
procedures; on their consular networks and assets; on the consular protection they provided to 
(un)represented  citizens;  and  on  their  travel  and  communication  channels.  Additionally, 
Member States were also asked to provide qualitative feedback, through follow-up interviews, 
on the application of the Directive and the problem definition; on the proposed policy options; 
and on the COVID-19 pandemic lessons learnt. The output is summarized in Annexes IV and 
VI of the study. 

85 

 
 
 
 
 
Annex 3: Who is affected and how? 

Practical implications of the initiative 

Non-crisis situations: First, a clearer definition of unrepresented EU citizens and the situation 
in which a Member State mission/consulate should not be considered effectively in a position 
to provide assistance (Option 1b) would better define the scope of the Directive and ensure 
that EU citizens in  need are correctly assisted. This  would be strengthened by the fact  that 
unrepresented  EU  citizens  would  be  better  informed  from  the  beginning,  thanks  to  the 
improved  quality  of  the  information  and  communication  channels,  about  the  fact  of  being 
unrepresented when travelling to a third country (Option 3a). They could also count on clearer 
information on practical and bilateral arrangements between Member States and the function 
of  honorary  consuls,  which  would  prevent  them  to  lose  time  in  searching  for  the  correct 
authority that could  help them and, at  worst, avoid  being  redirected by different  authorities 
(even in justified cases) (Option 3a). Member States, on the other hand, would have to deal 
with  fewer  out-of-scope  requests  for  assistance  and  they  would  have  the  necessary  legal 
certainty to ask support from EU delegations (Option 2d) in case of need. Industrial sectors 
of  tourism  and  transport  would  benefit  from  better  quality  of  the  information  as  well.  The 
clarifications on personal data protection rules would ensure smooth communication among 
Member States, EU delegations and other actors. All this would improve the means and quality 
of  assistance  to  unrepresented  EU  citizens.  EU  citizens  would  have  the  option  to  pay 
immediately  the  assistance  received  (to  Member  States  or  to  the  EU  delegation  in  case  the 
support  was  requested  by  a  Member  State)  or  to  pay  it,  in  a  timely  manner,  upon  a 
reimbursement  request  from  their  national  authorities  (Option  4b).  Should  a  EU  citizen 
consider that he or she was wrongly denied the assistance requested, he/she would have the 
means to complain to the competent authorities and seek legal redress where necessary.  

Crisis preparedness phase: Thanks to their leading role in local cooperation meetings, EU 
delegations would be able to foster cooperation and coordination actions and improve crisis 
preparedness among Member States (Option 2b). In the long term, this would result in better 
planning  and  best  practices  shared  across  the  world  under  coordination  of  EEAS.  The 
integration of Member States duties and tasks into the JFW would be effective in providing 
increased  coherence  across  the  world  and  would  allocate  the  different  tasks  according  to 
capacity of Member States (Option 2c).  As JFWs  would  be updated at  least  annually, they 
would  maintain  their  relevance.  Member  States,  included  unrepresented  Member  States, 
would  be  assigned  tasks  corresponding  better  to  their  actual  capacity  on  the  ground  and 
possible over-reliance on a lead state would cease. In the meantime, a larger number of citizens 
would be aware of the risks incurred by travelling to a zone potentially at risk of a crisis of any 
nature (natural disasters or political unrest for instance). EU citizens would also gain increased 
awareness of the possibility to register to be contacted by their Member State in case of a crisis 
(Option 3d).  

Crisis  situations:  Building  on  the  preparation  explained  above,  local  cooperation  meetings 
would be more effective through up-to-date procedures and sharing of information between 
Member States and unrepresented Member States  and EU delegations  would be smoother 
(Option  2b  and  2d).  Therefore,  more  coherent  travel  advice  would  be  shared  and  updated 
frequently, also impacting positively the industrial sectors of tourism and transport linked to 
the provision of information (Option 3a). As the JFW would be up-to-date and tasks among 
Member  States  would  be  distributed  efficiently,  no  Member  State  would  be  overburdened 
with  requests  for  assistance,  making  crisis  response  more  effective  (Option  2c).  A  clearer 

86 

 
 
definition of “being unrepresented” would also contribute to this increased efficiency in crisis 
situations  (Option  1b).  As  more  citizens  would  be  informed  about  the  importance  of 
registering  (Option  3d),  it  would  be  easier  to  reach  out  to  them  and  organise  consular 
assistance,  also  thanks  to  the  reinforced  legal  basis  for  the  exchange  of  their  personal  data 
among  all actors involved.  EU delegations would see their coordinated role  reinforced and 
have  a  solid  legal  basis  to  support  Member  States  in  providing  consular  assistance  to  EU 
citizens (Option 2d). EU citizens would receive better consular assistance in crisis situations.  

Table 11 below summarize the types of stakeholders identified above as being affected by the 
preferred combination of options.  

Table 11: Assessment of the stakeholders affected by the preferred combination of options identified 

EU 
delegat
ions 

(DG 

Other  EU 
stakehold
ers 
JUST, 
EEAS,  DG 
ECHO) 

EU27 
National 
Authoriti
es  (MFA 
and 
diplomat
ic 
represen
tations) 

Unrepresented 
EU  citizens  & 
their 
non-EU 
family members 

Industry 
(tourist, 
travel 
and 
transpo
rt 
organis
ations) 

X 

X 

X 

XX 

X 

XX 

XX 

87 

Option 1b) Legal 
amendments to clarify the 
definition of what it means 
for an EU citizen to be 
unrepresented and in 
particular the types of 
situations in which a 
Member State 
representation should not 
be considered “effectively 
in a position to provide 
consular protection”.  

Local 
2b) 
Option 
coordination  meetings  are 
chaired 
EU 
by 
delegations 

the 

Option  2c)  Review  of  the 
concept  of  Lead  State  and 
definition  of  division  of 
JFW, 
under 
tasks 
formalization  of  JFWs  and 
JCTs  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X108 

X109 

XX 

XXX  

X 

Option  2d)  Strengthen  the 
role  of  EU 
supporting 
delegations  and  align 
it 
with the EEAS Decision 

the 

Option  3a)  a  requirement 
for  Member  States 
to 
provide  the  Commission 
EEAS  with 
and 
information 
in  a  certain 
timeframe  and  in  machine 
readable 
on 
honorary consuls functions 
and  on  bilateral 
and 
practical  arrangements  in 
place 

format 

Option 3d)  Member  States 
promote 
required 
to 
measures 
inform 
consular authorities and/or 
record  citizens’  presence 
abroad 

to 

Option 
legal 
4b) 
amendments  adding  the 
option  for  unrepresented 
citizens to pay the assisting 
Member  State  or  the  EU 
delegation. 
a 
for 
timeframe 
reimbursement procedures 
and  clarify  application  to 
represented citizens 

Establish 

X 

XX 

X 

Updated  of  the  rules  on 
personal data protection  

XX 

Measures on legal redress  

XX 

XX 

XX 

XX 

108  

109  

Article 11 of the Directive specifies that Union Delegations shall also make general information available 
about the assistance that unrepresented citizens could be entitled to, particularly about agreed practical 
arrangements if applicable. 
Article  7(2)  states  that  Member  States  shall  notify  the  Commission  and  the  EEAS  of  practical 
arrangements, which shall be publicised by the  Union and Member States to ensure transparency for 
unrepresented citizens. 

88 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Given that the Directive does not directly cover commercial undertakings, there is no impact 
in relation to competitiveness. The impacts on such entities, mentioned in the table above, is 
limited to efforts of Member States to increase the awareness of the right to consular protection 
by cooperating with airlines, tourist, travel and transport organisations. 

89 

 
 
 
 
Summary of benefits and costs  

I. Overview of Benefits (total for all provisions) – Preferred Option 

Description 

Amount 

Comments 

Increased legal 
certainty  

Direct benefits 

- 

- 

- 

Legal certainty for actions of Member States and EU 
delegations and improves overall effectiveness on 
the provision of consular assistance to 
unrepresented EU citizens 
Better protection arising from more frequent and 
systematic EU delegations’ support to Member 
States both in crisis and non-crisis situations 
Better protection from further development, 
effectiveness and innovation in local coordination in 
particular in crisis situations 

-  More effective, consistent and streamlined 

- 

communication with EU citizens 
Reduced scope for litigation due to clearer and more 
adequate rules 

Applies to unrepresented EU 
citizens in third countries, 
Member States and EU 
delegations 

The current legal uncertainty and 
administrative burden may cause 
emotional distress and does 
hinder the provision of consular 
assistance to EU citizens when 
travelling to or residing in a third 
country, and especially in a crisis 
situation. The amendments 
stand to tackle the existing 
problems by providing a more 
complete, clearer and sounder 
legal framework, thereby 
improving the exercise by EU 
citizens of their right to consular 
protection  

Increased 
protection of 
the 
fundamental 
rights 

Time and 
burden savings  

Efficiencies for 
administrations 

- 

Strengthened and more effective right to consular 
protection 

Applies to unrepresented EU 
citizens in third countries 

-  Higher level of compliance with the right to personal 

Applies to unrepresented EU 
citizens in third countries 

Member States’ administrations 
and EU delegations  

- 

- 

- 

- 
- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

data protection 
Effective access to the right to an effective remedy 
and to a fair trial 

Less time and effort needed to be recognised as 
unrepresented. 
Improved EU citizens’ access to information on who 
can be assisted  
Smoother and quicker financial payments  
Easier registrations before travelling or when 
residing abroad  
Better and more efficient provision of EU citizens 
location information during crisis situations  

Better service provided to unrepresented EU citizens 
in assessing their situation and in deciding if the 
person should be assisted or not.  
Better distribution of the burden of assistance 
among Member States and between Member States 
and EU delegations  
Smoother and more effective coordination and 
cooperation procedures  
Improved registration procedures will result in 
efficiencies for administrations when contacting 
citizens in case of crisis situations 

90 

 
 
 
 
- 

Easier recovery of costs incurred for assisting 
Member States 

-  More coordinated and consistent travel advice  

91 

 
 
 
Option 1b) Legal 
amendments to 
clarify the 
definition of what 
it means for an EU 
citizen to be 
unrepresented and 
in particular the 
types of situations 
in which a Member 
State 
representation 
should not be 
considered 
“effectively in a 
position to provide 
consular 
protection”. 

Local coordination 
meetings are 
chaired by the EU 
delegations 

Direct adjustment 
costs 

Direct 
administrative costs 

Direct regulatory  
fees and charges 

Direct enforcement 
costs 

Indirect costs 

Direct adjustment 
costs 

Direct 
administrative costs 

II. Overview of costs – Preferred option 

Citizens  

EU institutions/EU delegations  

National Administrations 

One-off  Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

For Member States 
administration to 
learn and apply the 
new definition.  

Some costs related to regular 
training of consular staff.  

Time dedicated to the 
additional requests for 
support by Member States 
for the assistance of a 
potential increase of 
unrepresented EU citizens.  

Some costs for the increased 
requests by unrepresented EU 
citizens. It is assumed that Member 
States with larger consular 
networks will be impacted more by 
these requests.  

Some additional costs 
for EU delegations to 
organise coordination of 
LCCs and their 
standardisation.  

Very limited costs for EU 
delegations linked to 
chairing those meetings and 
coordinate. As they already 
participate to those 
meeting on a regular basis, 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the additional costs should 
be limited.  

Some costs for EU 
delegations for the 
reorganisation of tasks 
in relation to 
preparation and update 
of JFWs, involvement of 
unrepresented Member 
States, circulation of 
agendas and minutes. 

Some costs related 
to the application of 
these revised 
concepts and 
procedures. 

Some additional costs for 
the EEAS Consular Affairs 
Division from the 
mandatory annual update 
of all JFWs. 

Limited costs for some Member 
States due to the assignment of 
new tasks under JFWs. 

Direct regulatory  
fees and charges 

Direct enforcement 
costs 

Indirect costs 

Direct adjustment 
costs 

Direct 
administrative costs 

Direct regulatory  
fees and charges 

Direct enforcement 
costs 

Indirect costs 

Review of the 
concept of Lead 
State and 
definition of 
division of tasks 
under JFW, 
formalization of 
JFWs and JCTs  

93 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Direct adjustment 
costs 

Strengthen the 
supporting role of 
EU delegations and 
align it with the 
EEAS Decision 

Direct 
administrative costs 

Direct regulatory  
fees and charges 

Direct enforcement 
costs 

Indirect costs 

Direct adjustment 
costs 

Direct 
administrative costs 

A requirement for 
Member States to 
provide the 
Commission and 
the EEAS with 
information in a 
certain timeframe 
and in machine 
readable format on 
honorary consuls 
functions and on 
bilateral and 

5 cost-free Seconded 
National Experts for an 
average estimation of costs 
of 145 000 euros for all 5 
SNEs per year for operating 
expenditure and 80 000 for 
mission and security. 

For some Member States salary 
costs of a Seconded National Expert 
(SNE) to work in EU delegations (5 
in total) 1 cost-free SNE salary could 
range from 980 EUR net per month, 
for a civil servant in the first grade 
in Bulgaria to 8 177.83 EUR gross 
monthly salary for a high-raking 
diplomat in Finland. 

Marginal costs for 
adjusting the 
information into the 
machine-readable 
format. 

We estimate that 
updating the Europa 
website would require 
one FTE person for 
three months at the 
beginning. Assuming a 
grade AD7 Commission 

One month per year 
following the first year for 
updating the Europa 
website. Assuming a grade 
AD7 Commission official 
would carry out the 
updates (average cost of 

94 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
practical 
arrangements in 
place 

Direct regulatory 
fees and charges 

Direct enforcement 
costs 

Indirect costs 

Direct adjustment 
costs 

Direct 
administrative costs 

Direct regulatory 
fees and charges 

Member States 
required to 
promote measures 
to inform consular 
authorities and/or 
record citizens’ 
presence abroad 

the EU official, which is 
171.000 EUR per year), it 
would cost EUR 14 250 per 
year thereafter. 

official would carry out 
the updates (average 
cost of the EU official, 
171 000 EUR per year), 
the cost for the first 
year would be EUR 
42 750. 
Due to the stable 
staffing principle, this 
post will be found 
through internal 
redeployment. 

Additional costs to improve the 
effectiveness of their registration 
systems by rising their citizens’ 
awareness of the importance to 
register their travels/residence 
abroad by means of information 
campaigns at airports or by 
cooperating with 
insurance/travel/telecom 
companies.  

95 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Direct enforcement 
costs 

Indirect costs 

Direct adjustment 
costs 

Direct 
administrative costs 

Direct regulatory 
fees and charges 

Direct enforcement 
costs 

Indirect costs 

Legal amendments 
adding the option 
for unrepresented 
citizens to pay the 
assisting Member 
State or the EU 
delegation. 
Establish a 
timeframe for 
reimbursement 
procedures and 
clarify application 
to represented 
citizens 

Updated personal 
data protection 
rules  

Direct adjustment 
costs 

Some initial costs for EU 
delegations to adjust 
their procedures. 

96 

Some initial costs for 
Member States to 
adjust their 
procedures. 2 
Member States 
indicated that they 
have to change their 
legislation in order 
to allow request of 
reimbursement from 
citizens directly and 
might therefore 
incur in more 
adjustment costs.  

Some initial costs for 
Member States to 
adjust their 
procedures. Some 
Member States 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legal redress  

Direct administrative 
costs 

Direct regulatory 
fees and charges 

Direct enforcement 
costs 

Indirect costs 

Direct adjustment 
costs 

Direct administrative 
costs 

Direct regulatory 
fees and charges 

Direct enforcement 
costs 

Indirect costs 

might have to adjust 
their legislation  

Some initial costs for 
Member States to 
adjust their 
procedures. Some 
Member States 
might have to adjust 
their legislation 

97 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. Application of the ‘one in, one out’ approach – Preferred option(s) 

One-off 

Recurrent 

Total 

[M€] 

(annualised total net present 
value over the relevant 
period) 

(nominal values per year) 

Businesses 

New administrative 
burdens (INs) 

Removed administrative 
burdens (OUTs) 

Net administrative 
burdens* 

None 

None 

None 

None 

None 

None 

Adjustment costs** 

None 

  None 

Citizens 

New administrative 
burdens (INs) 

Removed administrative 
burdens (OUTs) 

Net administrative 
burdens* 

None 

None 

None 

Adjustment costs** 

None 

Total administrative 
burdens*** 

None 

None 

None 

None 

  None 

  None 

  None 

  None 

  None 

  None 

  None 

  None 

  None 

(*) Net administrative burdens = INs – OUTs;  
(**) Adjustment costs falling under the scope of the OIOO approach are the same as reported in Table 2 above. Non-
annualised values;  
(***) Total administrative burdens = Net administrative burdens for businesses + net administrative burdens for 
citizens. 

98 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sustainable Development Goals – Preferred combination of options 

Table 12: Overview of relevant Sustainable Development Goals – Preferred combination of Options 

Relevant SDG 

Expected progress towards the Goal 

SDG no – 5 Achieve gender equality and 
empower all women and girls 

SDG  no.  10  –  Reduce  inequality  between  and 
within countries  

In particular target 3: Ensure equal opportunity 
and  reduce  inequalities  of  outcome,  including 
by eliminating discriminatory laws, policies and 
practices 
appropriate 
legislation, policies and action in this regard. 

promoting 

and 

consular 

protection 

Equal 
for 
unrepresented  EU  citizens  who  are 
women  and  better  consular  protection 
in  case  of  unrepresented  EU  citizens 
who are part of vulnerable groups.  

Enhance  the  EU  fundamental  right  to 
‘diplomatic  and  consular  protection’ 
under  Article  46  of  the  Charter,  by 
clarifying the content of this right and by 
facilitating 
and 
coordination procedures necessary for its 
application. 

cooperation 

the 

Ensure  application  of  the  right  of  non-
discrimination on the basis of nationality 
under Article 21 of the Charter  

Impact on fundamental rights – Preferred combinations of options  

EU citizens’ rights confer a clear individual entitlement for unrepresented citizens to be treated 
by the consular and diplomatic authorities of another Member State as if they were their own 
nationals, when in the territory of a third country. 

One of the main objectives of the revision is to ensure a higher level of protection of citizens’ 
fundamental right to consular protection and promote EU values such as non-discrimination 
and mutual solidarity by fostering the implementation of EU citizenship as a concrete reality 
for unrepresented EU citizens.  

The preferred combination of option enhances the EU fundamental right to ‘diplomatic and 
consular protection’ under Article 46 of the Charter, by clarifying the content of this right and 
by facilitating the cooperation and coordination procedures necessary for its application.  

The  measures  of  cooperation  and  coordination  protects  the  EU  citizens'  right  to  good 
administration  by  the  institutions  and  bodies  of the  EU  (Article  41  of  the  Charter).  Clearer 
responsibilities  and  improved  burden-sharing  in  crisis  situations  ensure  non-discrimination 
also in times of crisis when fundamental rights are a sensitive issue.  

Measures  aimed  to  facilitate  the  exchange  of  personal  data  of  unrepresented  EU  citizens 
between  Member  States,  EU  delegations,  third  countries  and  international  organisations, 
contribute to  implement  Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental  Rights on the right to 
protection of personal data.  

The measures also reinforce the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial (Article 47 of 
the Charter) and contribute to the implementation of the principles of non-discrimination, life, 

99 

 
 
 
 
integrity of the person and presumption of innocence and right of defence (Articles 2, 3, 21 and 
48 of the Charter).  

 Preferred options  
Option 1b) Legal amendments to clarify 
the definition of what it means for an EU 
citizen to be unrepresented and in 
particular the types of situations in which a 
representation should not be considered 
“effectively in a position to provide 
consular protection”.  

Option 2b) Local coordination meetings are 
chaired by the EU delegations 

Option  2c)  Review  of  the  concept  of  Lead 
State  and  definition  of  division  of  tasks 
under JFW, formalization of JFWs and JCTs  

Option  2d)  Strengthen  the  supporting role 
of EU delegations and align it with the EEAS 
Decision 

Option  3a)  a  requirement  for  Member 
States  to  provide  the  Commission  and the 
in  a  certain 
EEAS  with 
timeframe and in machine readable format 

information 

Option 3d) Member States are required to 
promote  measures  to  inform  on/record 
citizens 

4b) 

Option 
amendments 
legal 
unrepresented citizens to pay the assisting 
Member  State.  Establish  a  timeframe  for 
reimbursement  procedures  and  clarify 
application to represented citizens 

better 

service 

providing 

Impact on Fundamental rights  
Direct  positive  impact  on  the  effective 
application of Article 46 of the Charter and 
on  the  right  of  non-discrimination  on  the 
basis  of  nationality  under  Article  21  of the 
Charter. 
By 
to 
unrepresented EU citizens, this measure has 
also  a  positive  impact  on  application  of 
Article 41 of the Charter EU citizens' right to 
good administration. 
cooperation  among  actors 
Smoother 
involved 
in  the  provision  of  consular 
assistance for unrepresented EU citizens will 
facilitate  procedures  necessary 
its 
for 
therefore 
application 
effective 
contributing  to  enhance  the  right  to 
consular protection under Article 46 of the 
Charter.  

and 

As the measures concern better procedures 
the  EU 
among  Member  States  and 
delegations,  they  contribute  directly  to  a 
positive impact on EU citizens' right to good 
administration (Article 41). 

By  providing  better  service  with  regard  to 
information provision to unrepresented EU 
citizens, this measure has a positive impact 
on EU citizens' right to good administration 
(Article 41).  

their  protection 

A  better  sharing  of  information  among 
Member  States  and  EU  delegations  of  the 
personal data of unrepresented EU citizens, 
line  with 
ensure 
applicable rules (Article 8 of the Charter). 
Although  the  measure  does  not  have  a 
major  impact  on  fundamental  rights,  it 
could contribute to EU citizens' right to good 
administration  by  improving  the  financial 
reimbursements.  

in 

100 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Updated personal data protection rules  

Measures on legal redress  

and 

countries 

thereby  contributing 

This  measure  facilitates  the  exchange  of 
personal data of unrepresented EU citizens 
between  Member  States,  EU  delegations, 
international 
third 
organisations, 
to 
applying Article 8 of the Charter on the right 
to protection of personal data.  
The  measure  reinforces  the  right  to  an 
effective  remedy and to  a  fair  trial  (Article 
47  of  the  Charter)  and  contributes  to  the 
implementation  of  the  principles  of  non-
discrimination,  life,  integrity  of  the  person 
and presumption of innocence and right of 
defence  (Articles  2,  3,  21  and  48  of  the 
Charter).  

101 

 
 
 
 
 
Annex 4: Analytical methods 

1.  Analytical framework 

The  impact  assessment  is  prepared  on  the  basis  of  a  supporting  study,  intensive  direct 
stakeholder  consultation,  and 
literature  and  EU  publications  (reports, 
Eurobarometers, studies and policy documents).  

the  relevant 

2.  Methodology used to collect data 

Data collection at 
Member State level  

Mapping of Member States’ national legislation and procedures 
implementing the Directive 

Mapping of Member States’ consular networks and consular assets 

Collection of quantitative data on the number of unrepresented 
citizens and the number and type of consular protection provided 
to EU citizens abroad 

Mapping of Member States’ travel and communication channels 

Validation with national authorities: prefilled questionnaire and 
interviews 

Data collection at Member State level was carried out by a team of national researchers between 
March and May 2021. Through the use of a comprehensive questionnaire, quantitative data 
was  collected  on  Member  States’  national  legislation  and  procedures;  on  their  consular 
networks and assets; on the consular protection they provided to (un)represented citizens; and 
on their travel and communication channels. Additionally, Member States were also asked to 
provide qualitative feedback on the application of the Directive and the problem definition; on 
the proposed policy options; and on the COVID-19 pandemic lessons learnt.  

To  collect  this  information,  a  questionnaire  was  developed  and  prefilled  by  the  national 
researchers on the basis of desk research and existing information shared by DG JUST and the 
EEAS. Namely: 

•  Member States’ replies to the questionnaire developed by the Expert Group Meeting 
on Consular Protection of 8 December 2020/ Discussion Note on the implementation 
of  Council  Directive  (EU)  2015/637,  Chapter  1:  General  Provisions  and  Scope  and 
Chapter 2: Coordination and cooperation measures; 

•  2021  CoOL  data  on  “Member  States’  presence  in  third  countries”  collected  and 
provided by EEAS based on information received from EU delegations and Member 
States; 

•  Member States’ replies to DG JUST’s questionnaires reporting on the implementation 

of Directive 2015/637; 

•  Member States’ replies to the questionnaire included in the EU Consular work during 
COVID-19 crisis – Discussion Paper, Consular Affairs Working Party (COCON), 23 
June 2020. 

102 

 
 
 
On 30 March 2021, the national researchers sent the pre-filled questionnaire to the national 
authorities  and  a  Q&A  session  was  held  to  address  any  questions  they  might  have.  Once 
completed  and  returned  by  the  national  authorities,  the  national  researchers  reviewed  the 
questionnaires and scheduled interviews with the national authorities to discuss any missing 
information  and  to  elaborate  on  the  answers  provided  by  the  national  authorities.  These 
interviews were conducted between 23 April and 7 May 2021.  

Between 7 May and 21 May 2021, the completed questionnaires were reviewed by the study 
team. Errors, missing data, and inconsistencies were flagged and followed up with the national 
researchers and when relevant, with the national authorities. The data was then extracted from 
the questionnaires and compiled into one Excel sheet, to allow for the analysis by the study 
team to inform the second interim report.  

Response rate and data availability / limitations 
In total, twenty-six Member States completed the questionnaire110, with only Greece declining 
to participate. As Greece did not provide input to the survey launched by DG JUST nor on the 
questions concerning the implementation of the Detective (with the exception of data for 2020), 
the information on Greece is limited as reflected in this report.  

The following section highlights the general limitation of the quantitative and qualitative data 
collected: 

Quantitative data  

Overall,  the  quantitative  data  provided  by  the  26  Member  States  was  very  limited,  as  this 
information was not collected in a systematic manner by most Member States and had to be 
compiled specifically for the purpose of the study by contacting the Member States’ individual 
representations in the third countries (which was challenging for Member States given the time 
constraints). For instance, only thirteen Member States provided data on their consular budget 
in 2018, 2019 and 2020, seven Member States on their number of consular staff in 2018, 2019 
and 2020, and eight Member States on their number of diplomatic staff in 2018, 2019 and 2020. 
Additionally,  the  information  provided  by  the  Member  States  was  in  most  cases  not 
comparable. For instance, among the 13 Member States that provided data on their consular 
budget,  the  amount  varied  from  EUR  3 000  to  EUR  170  million  as  the  types  of  expenses 
included  when  calculating  the  budget  (i.e.  staff  cost,  facilities  cost,  etc.)  varied  between 
Member States. Similarly, the type of staff that fell under the categories “diplomatic staff” and 
“consular  staff”  varied  from  one  Member  State  to  the  next  due  to  overlaps  between  both 
categories  and  diverging  Member  States’  interpretations.  Lastly,  only  ten  Member  States 
provided data on the total number of cases of assistance provided by Member States in third 
countries  and  only  16  provided  data  on  the  number  of  cases  of  assistance  provided  to 
unrepresented EU citizens in third countries. 

Interviews conducted with the national authorities revealed that most Member States could not 
provide the data requested as they did not collect these statistics. The reliability of this data is 
further brought into question due to cases of double reporting (i.e. Member States providing 
the same data for the total number of cases and the total number of unrepresented cases) and 
instances whereby Member States reported a higher number of unrepresented citizens assisted 
than  the  total  number  of  citizens  assisted  (i.e.  a  mathematical  impossibility).  However, 
mitigating  actions  were  taken  to  caveat  and  address  these  limitations.  For  instance,  all 

110  

BE provided their input to the open questions through the interview, rather than through completing the 
questionnaire. 

103 

 
 
 
inconsistent or unexpected data was checked with the national  authorities and mistakes and 
outliers were disregarded. Additionally, estimations such as on the number of unrepresented 
citizens,  were  calculated  through  a  process  of  triangulation  of  data  from  both  internal  and 
external  sources,  and  ranges  between  conservative  estimate  and  worse-case  scenario  were 
calculated to allow for a margin of error.  

Qualitative data  

Regarding the mapping of Member States’ national legislation and procedures implementing 
the Directive, all Member States provided their transposition measures in the national language. 
However, seven Member states (BE, CY, DE, FR, IT, LU and RO) did not provide the English 
translation  of  these  transposition  measures  and  13  Member  States  did  not  provide  the 
explanatory  documents  (AT,  BE,  CY,  DE,  DK,  FR,  IT,  LT,  LU,  MT,  RO,  SE,  and  SL). 
Nonetheless, the validation and filling of the questionnaire by the national authorities together 
with  the interviews conducted with  them were sufficient  to  address  these  limitations and to 
conduct the legal mapping. The documents provided by DG JUST and EEAS were sufficient 
to map Member States’ existing bilateral agreements on consular protection (permanent and 
practical arrangements). Similarly, Member States’ replies to the questionnaire developed by 
the  Expert  Group  Meeting  on  Consular  Protection  of  8  December  2020  and  the  Discussion 
Note  on  the  implementation  of  Council  Directive  (EU)  2015/637  were  sufficient  to  collect 
Member  States  feedback  on  the  COVID-19  lessons  learnt.  Similar  to  the  legal  mapping, 
instances of missing data were addressed to a satisfactory extent during the validation of the 
questionnaires and the interviews conducted with the national authorities. 

Overall, while all 26 Member States provided answers to the questions on the application of 
the Directive, the problem definition and on the proposed policy options, the feedback received 
to the open questions was in most cases limited to short answers and in a large number of cases 
left blank or answered by yes/no. Answers to the policy options were particularly limited with 
several  Member  States  highlighting  their  reluctance  to  provide  feedback  on  what  they 
considered to be a political topic. However, during the interviews the national authorities were 
more  open  to  providing  feedback  as  interviews  provided  the  opportunity  to  provide  further 
context and nuance to their replies and the oral format of the interview was perceived as less 
formal  and  committing  than  written  responses.  The  study  team  was  thus  able  to  caveat  the 
limitation of the written responses.  

Desk research   EU level desk research (EU legislation, EU citizens’ complaints, mapping 

of EU consular network and assets) 

Desk research for a selection of third countries 

The desk research involved a review of: 

-  EU-level legal and policy documents to inform the political and legal context, the 

intervention logic of the current Directive, the analysis on the EU legal basis for the new 
initiative, as well as the mapping of the EU consular network and assets; 

-  Data on the countries covered by the EU delegations, as well as the financial and human 
resources of the selected EU bodies to inform the mapping of the EU consular network 
and assets; 

- 

Joint Frameworks in the four out of the five selected third countries (Fiji confirmed no 
such JFW is in place); 

104 

 
 
-  Available documentation which reports feedback collected from EU citizens directly on 
their right to consular protection, including a sample of citizen’s complaints received by 
DG JUST, the responses provided by organisations in response to the Inception Impact 
Assessment, the EU citizenship report and the Flash Eurobarometer 485 on EU 
Citizenship and Democracy.  

Stakeholder 
consultation 

Survey with EU delegations  

Interview Programme 

The study included the following stakeholder consultations: 

•  Online survey with EU delegations; 

• 

• 

• 

Interviews in selected 5 countries; 

Interviews with industry stakeholders; 

Interviews with EU bodies with a supporting role in consular protection; 

•  Consultation with unrepresented EU citizens that were in need of consular protection. 

The stakeholder consultations are outlined in Annex 2.  

3.  Methodology for the calculation of costs 

A detailed assessment of the costs involved – in terms of monetary cost, human resources, and 
organisational  effort  –  requires  a  level  of  data  that  is  not  currently  available  to  this  impact 
assessment.  

The  below  cost  assessments  therefore  rely  on  a  number  of  assumptions  to  provide  a  first 
indication of the range of costs that may be required. As the exact design and implementation 
of the measures will vary, the assessment seeks to present a range of costs, depending on how 
extensive the ultimate formulation of a measure is. All costs are presented as possible excess 
cost to the current expenditure – e.g. if a measure envisions four additional meetings, this is to 
be understood as four meetings in additions to those already occurring currently. 

Many  of  the  implementation  costs  either  entail  human  resource  costs  at  the  EU  level 
(Commission, EEAS) and the Member State level (competent authorities, practitioners). Costs 
associated with administrative burden have been estimated using the Commission’s Standard 
Cost Model (SCM), outlined in the EU Better Regulation Guidelines.  

Costs are estimated based on the amount of work required for each specific objective under 
each option, in light for instance of the cost of existing comparable work. Due consideration is 
taken regarding costs that would be one-off, recurring or absorbed in the existing work. The 
below table shows the costs reported by the EU and its network of delegations, on the financial 
and human resources dedicated to consular protection. 

105 

 
 
 
 
Table 13: Cost of consular protection incurred by key EU institutional actors 

Institutional  actor 
in 
consular 
protection 

DG JUST 
Democracy, Union 
Citizenship and 
Free Movement 
unit (JUST.C.4) 

Annual  budgets  dedicated  to  consular 
protection (2020) 

involved 

Staff 
affairs (2020)  

in  consular 

Consular protection website - yearly budget 
around 
(operation, 
maintenance and development). 

78-79 000 

EUR 

1 FTE 

Ad-hoc costs such as in for 2022 – Support 
the  development  of  the  EU  Emergency 
Travel  Document  technical  specifications  – 
EUR 200 000 

Resources for actions in the area of consular 
protection (conferences/workshops, studies 
and  communication  campaigns)  –  ranging 
from EUR 50-100 000.  

EEAS Consular 
Affairs Division – 
EEAS CRC.2 

No data available 

including  2 
11  positions 
Seconded  National  Experts 
from 1 August 2021 

EU delegations  

No data available. EU delegations 
confirmed in the survey that no specific 
budgets exist to support the coordination 
of consular protection in crisis situations. 
Only very few EU delegations dedicated 
specific parts of their budget to consular 
protection during the COVID-19 pandemic. 

135 Consular Correspondents, 
which are also DG ECHO-ERCC 
EUCPM Focal points, and 133 
Backup Consular 
Correspondents. 

This varies per EU delegation. 
Most consular correspondents 
would spend c. 20% of their 
time on consular matters 
(except in times of crisis. At 
the peak of the COVID-19 
crisis, some EU delegations 
reported 3-5, or even more 
than 5 FTEs, spent exclusively 
on the provision of consular 
assistance). 

The  first  assumption  when  evaluating  costs  based  on  additional  work  for  EU  officials  (e.g. 
Commission official updating Europa website, etc.) is that they would be of grade AD7. In line 
with  relevant  rules and internal  guidance, the  average  annual  cost  of the EU official  equals 
EUR 171 000. The amount of work is calculated in FTE. As the principle of stable staffing 
continues to apply in the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework, such a post would have 
to be found through internal redeployment.  

The second assumption when evaluating costs based on additional work for EU delegations is 
that the additional staff are composed by cost-free SNEs, as they would bring the necessary 

106 

 
 
 
 
 
consular expertise to EU delegations and expenses have only marginal impact on Heading 7 of 
2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework. This is in line thus with the requirements of the 
2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework.  

The costs for cost-free SNEs within the EEAS budget cover operating expenditure, such as 
building and IT related costs, missions (EUR 5 000 per SNE) and security-related expenditure 
(EUR 2 500 per SNE). Applying EEAS standard budget methodology, this thus amounts to 
EUR 7 500 annually per cost-free SNE.  

Calculation of costs of national salaries of SNEs in EU delegations.  

The first factor to take into account for the calculations of the national salaries of SNEs who 
could be deployed in EU delegations is the profile of the candidates.  

In this regard, SNEs usually belong to foreign services and diplomatic corps, but they can also 
be civil servants in other departments of national administrations.  

In terms of calculation of costs, this already makes a significant difference as foreign services 
and diplomatic corps, depending on the Member State, can have a different salary scale to those 
belonging to civil servants in national administration.  

Data on the average remuneration of national  civil  servants  in  central  public is  available in 
Eurostat111: average net remuneration per month in 2022 range from EUR 980 in Bulgaria to 
EUR 6 057 in Luxembourg.  

Data on the remuneration of civil servant belonging to foreign services and diplomatic corps 
are not publicly available for many Member States. However, for illustrative purposes, some 
information could be gathered for:  

Italy:  Salaries  of  Italian  diplomatic  service  and  civil  servants  of  the  Foreign  Ministry  are 
publicly available112. The estimated gross salaries range per month from EUR 2 940.81 to EUR 
7 996.70.  

Finland: Salaries of Finnish diplomatic service and civil servants of the Foreign Ministry are 
based on the collective agreement for 2023-2025113. The salary is based on two factors: nature 
of the position (required skills, importance of the position, how demanding etc.), defined as 
level between 4 and 13 and personal performance, levels 1-13. Based on the combination of 
these two factors, the estimated gross salaries per month range from EUR 1 906.46 to EUR 
8 177.83.  
Austria: According to  the relevant  Austrian Law114 and the information  on the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, gross salary per month starts at EUR 3 289.40.  

The second important factor to take into account for the calculations of the national salaries of 
SNEs is the amount of benefits that are given when the person is deployed in another country. 

111  
112  

113  

114  

https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/PRC_REM_AVG/default/table?lang=en 
https://www.esteri.it/it/trasparenza_comunicazioni_legali/personale/informazioni_dirigenti/ 
retribuzioni_dirigenziali_mae/ 
https://um.fi/documents/35732/0/Hallinnonalakohtainen+tarkentava+virkaehtosopimus+ulkoasiainhalli 
nnon+virkamiesten+uudesta+palkkaus-j%C3%A4rjestelm%C3%A4st%C3%A4.pdf and 
https://um.fi/documents/35732/0/P%C3%B6yt%C3%A4kirja+ulkoasiainhallinnon+virkamiesten+palk
kausj%C3%A4rjestelm%C3%A4n+uudistamisesta.pdf 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer= 
10008115 

107 

 
 
 
These amounts are extremely variable and depend notably, on the Member State of origin, the 
place of posting, the family situation of the individual.  

Another option to estimate the SNEs’ national salaries costs for the Member States is to use 
the  Eurostat  salary  calculator115,  which  provides  an  average  gross  wage  according  to  the 
variables  entered  by  the  user:  gender,  age,  education,  profession,  job  experience,  type  of 
contract, NUTS region, NACE economic activity and enterprise size, for each Member State 
of the European Union (EU). The official earning statistics based on occupation come from the 
structure of earnings survey (SES)116. SES data on the economic activity sector (NACE rev.2) 
for Public Administration is only collected on a voluntary basis at this stage. 

As all the variables of the salary calculator are mandatory, data inserted are: male, 40 years 
old,  with  Upper  Tertiary  Education,  Senior  government  official,  Public  Administration  & 
Defence,  10  years  of  experience,  with  indefinite  contract  working  full  time.  Assuming  that 
Member  States  that  have  high  remuneration  of  civil  servants  according  to  Eurostat  data 
mentioned above, also have highest remuneration for diplomats/employees of the Ministry of 
Foreign  Affairs,  calculation  is  made  for:  Germany  (as  Luxembourg  is  not  available)  and 
Bulgaria.  

For Germany, the estimation of the average monthly gross salary is: EUR 7 016. 

For Bulgaria, the estimation of the average monthly gross salary is EUR 3 017.  

Finally, for completeness sake, we could also take as a proxy the costs of cost-shared SNEs.  

According to the relevant rules and applicable guidance, average cost for 1 cost-shared SNE 
deployed in an EU delegation is EUR 93 000 a year, of which the salary is EUR 64 400 a year.  

On  the  compatibility  of  the  additional  costs  for  EU  delegations  with  EEAS  Council 
Decision on cost neutrality:  

Costs  to  support  Member  States  under  the  meaning  of  Article  5(10)  of  the  EEAS  Decision 
qualify as operational costs (which involve expenses to improve the outside world for its direct 
benefit such as repatriating EU citizens) and are part of the operational budget. EU delegations 
should ask reimbursement of costs from the Member State of nationality of the unrepresented 
citizens when they spend parts of their operational budget for such support activities. This could 
be done (as proposed in option 4d) by extending the reimbursement mechanism of Articles 14 
and 15 of the Directive to EU delegations. It should be noted that the costs of SNEs mentioned 
above are not part of the operational budget but of the administrative budget and therefore are 
not covered by the cost-neutrality clause. Human resources costs are part of the administrative 
budget  as  they  are  linked  to  the  institution’s  staff  (in  a  wide  sense)  working  to  realise  its 
objectives and for its direct benefit (e.g. salaries, offices, missions, and IT equipment/systems).  

Estimation of costs for option 2d) related to the role of EU delegations: The increase in 
resources  is  projected  to  be  gradual  and  would  not  concern  immediately  the  full  range  of 
identified  Delegations,  but  rather  create  5  regional  pools  and  focus  only  on  those  locations 
where support is needed in practice taking into account, amongst other aspects, the represented 
Member States human resources. In crisis situations, the costs for the measures could be also 

115  

116  

A simple tool providing estimates of the average gross wages according to the variables entered by the 
user: gender, age, education, profession, job experience, type of contract, NUTS region, NACE economic 
activity and enterprise size, for each Member State of the European Union (EU). These estimates are 
based on microdata collected through the EU Structure of earnings survey (SES) 2018 and extrapolated 
with the Labour Cost Index (LCI) up to reference year 2022. 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/earn_ses_main_esms.htm#quality_mgmnt 

108 

 
 
 
be met through deployment of existing resources within EEAS/EU delegations. A longer-term 
assessment of yearly needs beyond the initial period of implementation would have to be done 
in light of the observed increase in the workload. 

Estimation of costs for option 2e) related to the role of EU delegations: For this option the 
estimation costs is based on similar parameters as option 2d). However, in order to enable EU 
delegations  in  uncovered  third  countries  to  assist  EU  citizens,  the  necessary  expertise  on 
consular matters in terms of quality and quantity would need to be ensured. For instance, in a 
country like Barbados, a popular touristic destination among EU citizens, the EU delegation 
would need to be reinforced from the outset to provide assistance to EU citizens.  

Estimation  of  costs  for  option  3a)  related  to  new  requirements  for  provision  of 
information: As showed in the table above, past communication campaigns carried out by the 
EU have costed between EUR 50 000 and 100 000, therefore a similar budget is estimated for 
the additional campaign.  

Estimation of costs for option 3b) EU travel advice portal: As showed in the table above, 
costs for the consular website is around EUR 80 000 therefore a similar budget is estimated for 
the additional campaign. 

4.  Methodology for comparison of options  

Effectiveness: Under this section, options are evaluated for their effectiveness to achieve their 
specific objectives. In addition, as the main objective of the revision is to ensure a higher level 
of protection of citizens’ fundamental rights and promote EU values such as non-discrimination 
by clarifying the content of the right to consular protection and by facilitating the cooperation 
and coordination procedures necessary for its application, impact on fundamental rights is also 
assessed in this section. There is a direct correlation between effectiveness of the measures and 
impact  on  fundamental  rights,  as  the  EU  intervention  is  expected  to  enhance  the  EU 
fundamental  right  to  ‘diplomatic  and  consular  protection’  under  Article  46  of  the  Charter. 
Proposed  scoring:  ●  Minor  contribution  towards  objectives;  ●●  Major  contribution,  but 
without fully achieving objectives; ●●● Achieving objectives 

Efficiency:  An analysis of the costs of each option and its benefits  is  performed under this 
section. This criterion also assesses positively in case an option brings a simplification to the 
EU legislation/removes red tape without at the same time reducing its benefits (or negatively 
in case it complexifies it/adds red tape). It should be noted that main costs are on the Member 
States and the EU/EU delegations. No costs were found for EU citizens who should, on the 
contrary,  benefit  from  the  measures  proposed.  No  indirect  costs  were  detected.  Proposed 
scoring: ● Considerable additional costs or effort, non-proportionate to the benefits and with 
difficult implementation; no simplification ●● Neutral or small increase in costs, proportionate 
to the additional benefits; some simplification; ●●● Any increases in costs are outweighed by 
the benefits, important simplification.  

Coherence: under this criterion, the analysis considers if the measures are coherent with the 
Commission’s objectives of strengthening the identity of the EU in third countries, reinforcing 
the  external  dimension  of  EU  citizenship  and  Member  States’  solidarity  and  improving 
Member  States’  cooperation  with  regard  to  consular  crisis  preparedness  and  response.  In 
options where relevant,  coherence with  the EEAS Decision, the  EU ETD Directive and the 
UCPM  are  analysed.  Proposed  scoring:  ●  Lacks  coherence  with  legislation;  ●●  Broadly 
coherent with legislation, but some gaps; ●●● Coherent with legislation.  

109 

 
 
Proportionality:  Proportionate  EU  action  should  ensure  that  unrepresented  EU  citizens 
receive adequate consular assistance on equal basis to own nationals without creating excessive 
burden on the EU and the Member States. It should further build on and integrate previous 
legal measures as well as recent developments.  Proposed scoring: ● Not proportionate; ●● 
generally proportionate ●●● Fully proportionate. 

Political feasibility: examines political support for the each of the options proposed under their 
respective legal basis. Proposed scoring: ● low; ●● medium ●●● high 

110 

 
 
 
 
Annex 5: Relevant provisions of the Directive and how it 
works  
The Directive lays down the coordination and cooperation measures necessary to facilitate the 
exercise of the right of EU citizens to  enjoy, in the territory of a third country in which the 
Member  State  of  which  they  are  nationals  is  not  represented  (i.e.  where  they  are 
‘unrepresented’), the protection of the diplomatic and consular authorities of any Member State 
on the same conditions as the nationals of that Member State, as set out in Article 20(2)(c) 
TFEU.  In  particular,  the  Directive  provides  the  definitions  and  procedures  necessary  to 
implement this right. 

The Directive contains the following elements:  

•  The general principle of consular protection by Member States to unrepresented EU 

citizens on the same conditions as to their own nationals (Article 2).  

•  The possibility that the Member State of nationality of an unrepresented citizen requests 
the  Member  State  from  whom  an  unrepresented  citizen  seeks  or  receives  consular 
protection to redirect the case to his/her own Member State of nationality, which the 
requested Member State should relinquish (Article 3).  

•  The personal scope of the protection, determining who is entitled to consular protection 

(Articles 4, 5 and 6).  

•  The conditions to access such protection, namely which Member State and what type 

of body unrepresented EU citizens can seek protection from (Article 7).  

•  Rules on how to identify unrepresented EU citizens (Article 8).  

•  A  non-exhaustive  list  of  the  types  of  situations  that  may  give  rise  to  the  need  for 

consular protection (Article 9).  

•  Rules on how Member States are to cooperate and coordinate with one another and the 

EU to ensure protection of unrepresented citizens (Article 10).  

•  Specifications regarding the role of EU delegations (Article 11).  

•  Requirements for local cooperation between Member States (Article 12) and for crisis 
preparedness and cooperation of Member States and EU delegations in third countries 
(Article 13).  

•  Rules on the reimbursement of the costs of consular protection (Articles 14 and 15). 

111 

 
 
 
 
Figure 7: An example of the provision of consular assistance under the current legal framework (Consular 
Protection Directive) in a non-crisis situation.  

Source: European Commission 

(1) Zuzana is from Czechia, and lives in 
third  country  A.  She  needs  consular 
assistance as  her travel  documents have 
been stolen, but Czechia does not have a 
consulate or embassy in third country A.  

(2)  Italy,  France  and  Poland  have  an 
embassy  in  third  country  A.  Zuzana 
decides  to  seek  assistance  from  the 
French embassy.  

(3)  French  embassy  asks  Czechia  to 
confirm Zuzana’s nationality and provide 
necessary information, which it does.  

(4)  The  French  Embassy  delivers  the 
required assistance to Zuzana and issues 
an emergency travel document allowing 
Zuzana to return home.  

Figure 8: An example of the provision of consular assistance under the Directive in crisis situation. 

Source: European Commission 

(1)  Many EU citizens are stranded in 
third country B because of a hurricane. 

States 

(2)  Member 
organize 
evacuation flights for their citizens and 
share with other Member States and the 
EEAS/EU  delegations  information  on 
available evacuation capacities.  

(3)  The  EEAS/EU  delegations  and 
Member  States  coordinate 
locally 
(passenger  lists  and  other  logistical 
unrepresented 
aspects) 
Member  States  and  ensure  that  all  EU 
citizens  have  access 
to  evacuation 
flights.  

and  with 

(4)  The  UCPM 
co-finance 
evacuation flights if citizens from more 
than one Member States are on board.  

can 

112 

 
 
 
 
 
Annex 6: Level of Member States’ representation in third 
countries 
This Annex presents a global mapping of consular network, providing an overview of the third 
countries  in  which  Member  States  provide  consular  services  and  the  countries  where  no 
Member State is represented. It includes:  

o  a comparison  of the  CoOL  data and the data collected through the questionnaire by the 

study;  

o 

the  evolution  of  Member  States’  consular  network,  including  information  collected  in 
COCON in 2022; 

o 

the impact of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU on the consular network. 

The  table  below  provides  an  overview  of  Member  States’  level  of  representation  in  third 
countries, based on data collected from the Member States through the questionnaire. It shows 
in  which  third  country  Member  States  have  a  low  presence  in  (0-25%  of  Member  States 
represented) and a high presence (27 Member States represented) in 2021.  

Methodological caveat 

The  overall  methodology  for  the  data  collection  at  the  Member  State  level,  including  on 
Member States’ consular network, is presented in Annex I. This methodological box further 
explains  the  caveat  of  this  mapping,  namely  that  for  the  purpose  of  this  mapping,  only 
embassies and consular posts (consulates and consulates-general) have been taken into account. 
The following types of diplomatic presence were thus excluded: 

-  Honorary  consuls  were  not  included  in  the  mapping  as  the  national  authorities  of  most 
Member States confirmed that these generally provide consular protection to a more limited 
extent when compared to the assistance provided by embassies and consulates. In addition, the 
legal  mapping  confirmed  that  only  very  few  Member  States  have  decided  to  extend  the 
application of the Directive to Honorary Consuls (see Chapter 3.1) for further details.  

-  While  an  accredited  embassy  and/or  consular  post  has  the  same  consular  protection 
competences in  the country it is  accredited to  as an embassy/  consulate post located in  that 
country would have, accredited embassies and consular posts were excluded from the mapping 
as they may not offer consular protection as effectively, in particular in cases of emergency 
requiring fast action or in times of crisis impacting transport routes such as during the COVID-
19 pandemic. For instance, if travel to third country A is restricted or reduced, an accredited 
consul or ambassador based in third country B may not be able to assist EU citizens in third 
country A. As such, and according to the Directive, a Member State is not represented in a third 
country if it has no embassy or consulate established there on a permanent basis, or if it has no 
embassy,  consulate  or  honorary  consul  there  which  is  effectively  in  a  position  to  provide 
consular protection in a given case. 

According  to  the  data  collected,  the  following  conclusions  can  be  drawn  on  the  level  of 
representation of the Member States in 2021: 

1.  At the time, only 5 third countries (China, India, Russia, UK, and USA) were covered 

by all 27 Member States (3% of all third countries); 

2.  41% of third countries are covered by seven Member States or less;  

113 

 
 
3.  In 21 of the 173 third countries listed, Member States are not present. Thus, 12% of the 
173 third countries can  be considered  “uncovered”. Six  of these third countries  (the 
Bahamas,  Barbados,  Belize,  Grenada,  Guyana,  Solomon  Islands)  were  previously 
covered  by  the  UK.  The  departure  of  the  UK  from  the  EU  has  therefore  decreased 
Member States’ consular coverage of third countries by 3%; 

4.  The  Member  States  that  have  the  largest  consular  network  and  that  are  therefore 
represented in the most third countries are France (present in 136 third countries), 
Germany (127), Spain (103), Italy (101), Sweden (95) and the Netherlands (88);  

5.  The  Member  States  that  have  the  smallest  consular  network  and  that  are  therefore 
represented  in  the  least  third  countries  are  Estonia  (present  in  19  third  countries), 
Luxembourg (19), Malta (19), Cyprus  (22), Latvia (22) Lithuania (24), and Slovenia 
(24). 

Table 14: level of representation based on the data collected through the Questionnaire 

Level 
States representation 

of  Member 

No  Member 
represented 

State 

0-25% 
of  Member 
States  represented  (7 
MS or less) 

Number of third countries covered (2021) 

%  

12%  of  third 
countries 
(21 
out of 173) 

41%  of  third 
countries 
(71 
out of 173) 

21  countries  (Antigua  and  Barbuda,  the 
Bahamas,  Barbados,  Belize,  Bhutan,  Cook 
Island,  Dominica,  Eswatini,  Grenada,  Guyana, 
Kiribati,  Lesotho,  Liechtenstein,  the  Maldives, 
Marshall  Islands,  Micronesia,  Nauru,  Palau 
Republic,  Samoa,  Solomon  Islands,  Tonga, 
Tuvalu)  

71  countries  (Andorra,  Bahrein,  Bangladesh, 
Benin,  Bolivia,  Botswana,  Brunei  Darussalam, 
Burundi,  Cambodia,  Cameron,  Cabo  Verde, 
Central  African  Republic,  Chad,  Comoros, 
Congo  Republic,  Costa  Rica,  Cote  d’Ivoire, 
Djibouti,  Dominican  Republic,  Ecuador,  El 
Salvador,  Equatorial  Guinea,  Eritrea,  Fiji, 
Gabon,  The  Gambia,  Guatemala,  Guinee 
Bissau,  Guinea  Republic,  Haiti,  Holy  See, 
Honduras, Iceland, Jamaica, Korea Pyongyang, 
Kyrgyzstan, 
Liberia,  Macao, 
Madagascar,  Malawi,  Mali,  Mauritania, 
Mauritius,  Mongolia,  Namibia,  Nepal, 
Nicaragua,  Papua  New  Guinea,  Paraguay, 
Rwanda  Republic,  Saint  Kitts  and  Nevis,  Saint 
Lucia,  Saint  Vincent  and  the  Grenadines,  San 
Marino,  Sao  Tome  and  Principe,  Seychelles, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, 
Suriname, Syria, Tajikistan, Timor Leste, Togo, 

Lao  PDR, 

114 

 
 
Trinidad  and  Tobago,  Turkmenistan,  Vanuatu, 
West Bank Gaza, Yemen, and Zambia.  

All  Member 
represented 

States 

5 countries (China, India, Russia, UK and USA) 

3%  of 
countries 
out of 173) 

third 
(5 

Source: Study questionnaire to Member States (March 2021) providing an overview of Member 
States presence in 173 third countries117 in 2021.  

If honorary consulates as well as accredited embassies and consular posts are included, there 
are no uncovered third countries. While honorary consulates can only provide partial consular 
protection  and  accredited  embassies/consular  posts  may  not  be  able  to  provide  consular 
protection as effectively as in-country embassies/consular posts, their presence should not be 
ignored. 

For instance, while Bhutan may be uncovered, 16 Member States have accredited embassies 
and consular post in neighbouring countries. Similarly, while Lesotho and Eswatini may be 
uncovered, these two countries are located within South Africa from where 20 Member States 
have accredited embassies and/or consular post providing consular protection to EU citizens in 
Lesotho and 18 accredited embassies and/or consular post providing consular protection to EU 
citizens in Eswatini. 

Additionally, while certain third countries may be uncovered, their proximity to Member State 
territory should not be overlooked. For instance, Dominica may be uncovered however it is 
situated  less  than  50km  away  from  Guadeloupe  and  Martinique,  two  French  departments. 
Similarly,  Antigua  and  Barbuda  is  situated  less  than  100km  from  Guadeloupe.  However,  it 
should be stressed that proximity and/or coverage by accredited embassies/consulates is not a 
solution  that  can fully  compensate the lack of in-country representation. There  are multiple 
limitations  such  as  the  lack  of  contacts  with  local  authorities,  the  possible  difficulties  in 
accessing the country in times of crisis (i.e. if the borders are closed), the lack of situational 
awareness, etc which make the provision of consular protection more difficult. Additionally, 
an oversea territory or department may also not have the logistic capacity to help, or to be in a 
position  to  do  so  for  legal  and/or  political  reasons.  Notably,  the  local  authorities  of  EU 
territories are not under a legal obligation to provide consular protection to unrepresented EU 
citizens of neighbouring countries. 

When  compared  to  the  consular  network  of  EU  delegations,  among  the  21  third  countries 
uncovered  by  the  Member  States,  EU  delegations  are  present  in  four  (Barbados,  Eswatini, 
Guyana, Lesotho).  

Comparison of CoOL data and the data collected through the questionnaire 

The data collected through the questionnaire for the purpose of the study largely corresponds 
to the data extracted from the CoOL tool. The table below provides an overview of the CoOL 
data. The differences between both data sets are the following: 

1.  Macao SAR, New Caledonia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, St Vincent and the Grenadines were 
reported as uncovered in CoOL. The study did not consider New Caledonia as a third 
country  but  as  a  territory  of  France  and  therefore  did  not  include  it  in  its  mapping. 
Portugal reported being  present and providing consular protection in Macao. Sweden 

117  

Including islands (e.g. Cook Islands), and territories not formally recognized by all Member States. 

115 

 
 
 
reported being present and providing consular protection in Saint Kitts and Nevis and in 
St Vincent and the Grenadines.  

2.  Andorra and the Holy See were not included in CoOL. However, as both are recognised 
third countries, the study team has decided to include them in the mapping. Six Member 
States reported being present and providing consular protection in the Holy See and two 
Member States in Andorra. 

3.  Burkina  Faso,  Hong  Kong  SAR,  Myanmar,  and  Niger  were  previously  included  in 
CoOL among the third countries with seven or less Member States present. However, 
results  collected  through  the  questionnaire  revealed  a  higher  level  of  representation 
(Nine Member States in Burkina Faso, eleven Member States in Hong Kong SAR, eight 
Member States in Myanmar and eight Member States in Niger.) 

Table 15: level of representation based on CoOl data 

of  Member 
Level 
States  Member  States 
representation 

No  Member 
represented 

State 

0-25% 
of  Member 
States  represented  (7 
Member States or less) 

Number of third countries covered (2021) 

%  

15%  of  third 
countries 
(26 
out of 171) 

42%  of  third 
(72 
countries 
out of 171) 

26  countries  (Antigua  and  Barbuda,  the 
Bahamas,  Barbados,  Belize,  Bhutan,  Cook 
Island,  Dominica,  Eswatini,  Grenada,  Guyana, 
Kiribati,  Lesotho,  Liechtenstein,  Macao  SAR, 
the  Maldives,  Marshall  Islands,  Micronesia, 
Nauru,  New  Caledonia,  Palau  Republic,  Saint 
Kitts and Nevis, St Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu)  

72  countries  (Bahrein,  Bangladesh,  Benin, 
Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina 
Faso,  Burundi,  Cambodia,  Cameron,  Cabo 
Verde,  Central  African  Republic,  Chad, 
Comoros,  Congo  Brazza,  Costa  Rica,  Cote 
Republic, 
d’Ivoire,  Djibouti,  Dominican 
Ecuador,  El  Salvador,  Equatorial  Guinea, 
Eritrea,  Fiji,  Gabon,  The  Gambia,  Guatemala, 
Guinee  Bissau,  Guinee  Conakry,  Haiti, 
Honduras,  Hong  Kong  SAR,  Iceland,  Jamaica, 
Korea Pyongyang, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Liberia, 
Madagascar,  Malawi,  Mali,  Mauritania, 
Mauritius,  Mongolia,  Myanmar,  Namibia, 
Nepal,  Nicaragua,  Niger,  Papua  New  Guinea, 
Paraguay,  Rwanda  Republic,  Saint  Lucia,  San 
Marino,  Sao  Tome  and  Principe,  Seychelles, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, 
Suriname, Syria, Tajikistan, Timor Leste, Togo, 

116 

 
 
All  Member 
represented 

Trinidad  and  Tobago,  Turkmenistan,  Vanuatu, 
West Bank Gaza, Yemen, and Zambia.  

States 

5 countries (China, India, Russia, UK, and USA)  3%  of 

third 
(72 

countries 
out of 171) 

Source: EEAS 2021 CoOL data which provides an overview of Member States presence in 171 
third countries118 in 2021.  

Finally, table below focuses on Member States representation with low level of representation:  
Table 16: level of representation based on Member States reporting in COCON in 2022119 

Level of Member 
States representation 

No Member State 
represented 

Number of third countries (2022) 

25 countries (Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, 
Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Cook Island, Dominica, Eswatini, 
Grenada, Guyana, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, the Maldives, 
Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau Republic, Saint Kitts 
and Nevis, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Solomon 
Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu)  

One Member State 
represented  

13 countries (Central African Republic, Comoros, Macao (SAR), 
Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, Saint Lucia, San Marino, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, Timor Leste, Vanuatu, 
Yemen)  

Two Member State 
represented  

9 countries (Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Djibouti, Fiji, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Suriname, Tajikistan, Togo) 

Between 3 and 7 
Member States 
represented  

50 countries (Bahrein, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cambodia, Cameron, Cabo Verde, Chad, Congo 
Brazzaville, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, The 
Gambia, Guatemala, Guinee Bissau, Guinee Conakry, Haiti, 
Honduras, Hong Kong SAR, Iceland, Jamaica, Korea Pyongyang, 
Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, 
Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Paraguay, Rwanda 
Republic, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Syria, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Turkmenistan, West Bank Gaza and Zambia.) 

All Member States 
represented 

5 countries (China, India, Russia, UK and USA) 

118  
119  

Including islands (e.g. Cook Islands), and territories not formally recognised by all Member States. 
WK 10712/2022 INIT. 

117 

 
 
 
Evolution of the Member States consular network  

In  order  to  understand  the  evolution  of  the  consular  network  between  2018  and  2020,  it  is 
relevant  to  look  at  the  information  provided  by  Member  States  to  the  DG  JUST’s  survey 
reporting on the implementation of the Consular Protection Directive. Only 12 Member States 
provided data on their consular network both in 2018 and in 2020. Of these 12 Member States, 
eight saw an increase in the number of embassies and consulates exercising consular functions 
(not counting honorary consuls or countries covered from other countries). Two had a decrease 
and two remained unchanged. Together, these 12 Member States had a 7% collective increase 
in the number of embassies and/or consulate exercising consular functions from 786 in 2018 
to 838 in 2020. While these findings are limited due to missing data, they nonetheless suggest 
that Member States have increased their consular footprint between 2018 and 2020. 

This  was  further  collaborated  by  the  data  collected  from  the  questionnaire’s  qualitative 
questions,  which  asked  the  national  authorities  whether  their  consular  network  increased 
decreased or remained the same between 2018-2021. Out of the 26 Member States that replied, 
14 (BG, EE, FI, HR, HU, LT, LU, MT, RO, SI, PL, ES) reported an increase and only two 
reported a decrease (DK and FR). Seven replied “remained the same” (AT, BE, DE, PT, SE, 
NL, LV) and one Member State (CZ) did not know. 

Figure  9:  Question  1.  In  how  many  countries  do  you  have  an  embassy  or  a  consulate  exercising  consular 
functions (not counting honorary consuls or countries you cover from other countries)? 

250

200

150

100

50

0

Source: EEAS 2021 CoOL data, which provides an overview of Member States presence in 
171 third countries120 in 2021. 

2018

2019

2020

120  

Including islands (e.g. Cook Islands), and countries not formally recognised by all Member States (e.g. 
Hong Kong). 

118 

 
 
 
 
 
Impact of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU on the consular network of Member States 
Since the end of the transition period provided for in the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement121 on 
31 December 2020, EU citizens no longer enjoy a right to request consular protection from UK 
embassies or consulates abroad under the Consular Protection Directive. In addition, the UK is 
longer able to serve as a Lead State, i.e. leading the assistance of unrepresented EU citizens 
during crises, and shouldering the burdens of non-crisis consular assistance. 

In 2018, the UK was the third most important Member States in terms of number of embassies 
and  consulates  exercising  consular  functions  (France  did  not  provide  replies  to  the  2018 
questionnaire). The withdrawal of the UK from the EU therefore results in a considerable loss 
in  consular  footprint.  21  Member  States  and  the  UK  indicated  having  1 710  embassies  and 
consulates exercising consular functions in 2018. Factoring in the 6 Member States122 that did 
not  provide  data  on  their  consular  network  results  in  an  estimated  2 176  Member  State 
embassies and consulates in 2018123. The UK’s departure from the EU therefore represents an 
estimated 7% lost in the number of Member State embassies and consulates providing consular 
functions. 

Currently, in 2021, the mapping identified 21 uncovered countries out of 173 third countries, 
with six of these third countries (the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Solomon 
Islands) having previously been covered by the UK. The withdrawal of the UK from the EU 
has therefore decreased the EU’s consular coverage of third countries by 3%, not including 
third countries where the UK was one of the few Member States present. 

Following the UK’s withdrawal, unrepresented EU citizens need to rely on available embassies 
and consulates of the 27 remaining Member States, which adds additional burdens to certain 
Member States that are “second in line” regarding the density of their representations. At the 
same  time,  the  UK’s  withdrawal  also  relieves  the  strain  on  the  EU  network  of  consular 
protection in that UK nationals no longer enjoy a right to consular protection by the Member 
States.  Beyond  quantitative  data  on  the  number  of  representations,  the  UK  also  plays  an 
important role in many aspects of consular affairs due to its long-standing diplomatic tradition 
and  extensive  local  networks,  which  make  it  an  effective  player  in  consular  matters.  For 
example, according to a final report on Consular Cooperation Initiatives (CCI) by the Council, 
the UK had a lead role in joint lobbying activities in Cambodia and was primarily in charge of 
providing assistance in Nepal, which were two out of five countries where the CCI ran. 

Finally,  by  changing  the  status  of  the  UK  from  Member  State  to  third  country,  the  UK’s 
withdrawal  also  widened  the  territorial  scope  of  application  of  the  Consular  Protection 
Directive. 

121  

122  
123  

Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the 
European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (OJ C 384I, 12.11.2019, p. 1). 
Cyprus, France, Greece, Hungary, Netherlands and Romania. 
(1 710/22 = an estimated 78 embassies and consulates per Member State; 78*28 Member States = 2 176). 

119 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 7: Factors likely to increase the number of crises 
with an impact for consular protection 
Climate change has already impacted every region on earth in unprecedented and irreversible 
ways.  On  the  current  trajectory,  global  warming  will  likely  surpass  1.5°C  in  the  next  two 
decades and head towards 2°C by 2050. Every additional 0.5°C will increase the intensity and 
frequency  of  extreme  weather  events,  droughts,  wildfires  or  floods,  including  in  locations 
where  this  was  uncommon  in  the  past.  Over  the  past  decade,  weather-related  events  have 
triggered an estimated displacement of around 23 million people on average each year, and the 
migration  pressures  will  only  increase.  By  2050,  over  200  million  people  could  need 
humanitarian assistance every year partly due to climate-related disasters124. There is also an 
important interlinkage between climate change, biodiversity loss, environmental degradation 
and  public  health.  Loss  of  biodiversity,  pressure  on  animal  habitats,  the  excessive  use  of 
antibiotics,  risks  relating  to  biological  research  of  highly  pathogenic  microbes,  unhealthy 
lifestyles – all these factors make future pandemics or diseases more likely. As showed by the 
COVID-19  pandemic,  this  triggered  a  global  consular  emergency  due  to  the  very  severe 
transport restrictions, quarantine measures and border closures which created a need to urgently 
repatriate EU citizens (tourists and short-term travellers) stranded in third countries. 

Hyperconnectivity  is  another  force  of  current  transformations.  It  results  in  an  increased 
convergence  of  industries,  products,  technologies  and  services.  The  number  of  connected 
devices globally  might  increase from  30.4 billion in  2020 to  200 billion in  2030. Increased 
connectivity  of  objects,  places  and  people  will  result  in  new  products,  services,  business 
models, life and work patterns. At the same time, it results in the increased risk of cyber-attacks 
and  network  outages,  in  both  digital  and  physical  world,  e.g.  essential  infrastructures  like 
pipelines  and  hospitals.  Hyperconnectivity  has  only  accelerated  with  the  pandemic  and  its 
social impact needs to be carefully monitored. The impact on consular protection is yet to be 
felt but  should not  be underestimated.  In this regard, by allowing us to connect  and stay in 
touch  without  much  effort,  technology  has  increased  the  possibility  of  working  remotely, 
including from third countries (e.g. digital nomads). This could contribute to more EU citizens 
travelling abroad. Against this background, the digitalization of consular services may allow 
Member States  to  provide some types of assistance even where they are  not  present  on the 
ground. 
Democratic governance is also declining globally125 and its consequences are likely to lead to 
an increase demand for action at consular level. 2020 was the 15th consecutive year of a decline 
in political rights and civil liberties at a global level, exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic 
in  many regions. Zones  of instability and conflict  close to  the  EU  and beyond are likely  to 
persist  and  may  even  grow.  Repression  of  freedoms  and  democratic  reforms,  as  well  as 
continued  instability  in  countries  and  regions  in  near  and  further  EU  neighbourhood,  will 
continue to have an impact on consular protection. 

Global  rivalry  and  fragility  are  likely  to  increase.  The  USA-China  competition  could 
become  a  defining  feature  of  the  geopolitical  landscape.  The  energy  transition  will  further 
contribute to the redistribution of power. The EU can expect continued tensions and adverse 
competition (including from China and Russia), requiring robust policies to project stability 

124  
125  

International Committee of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2019), The Cost of Doing Nothing. 
Also: “The global state of democracy 2021, building resilience in a pandemic era”, 2021, International 
Idea. The study concludes that ‘more countries are moving towards authoritarianism that  at any other 
point since 1995’. 

120 

 
 
 
and  prosperity,  particularly  in  its  neighbourhood.  Increasing  threats  from  organised  crime, 
corruption, extremism, terrorism, and hybrid threats, including the use of migration for political 
purposes, could increasingly threaten EU security and raise the need for contingency planning, 
including at consular level. 

121 

 
 
 
 
Annex 8: Intervention Logic  

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES SO 4: Increase the efficiency and use of the financial reimbursement procedures SO 1: Enhance the legal certainty for EU citizens with respect to the scope of the right to consular protection SO 2: Ensure clear roles, coordination and cooperation mechanisms between Member States and EU Delegations, including in times of crisis. SO 3: Improve the information provision and communication with (unrepresented) EU citizensPROBLEMS GENERAL OBJECTIVEimprove the exercise of the right to consular protection by unrepresented EU citizens1) Imprecise definition of unrepresented citizens 2) Unclear assignment of roles and tasks at Local consular cooperation networks 3) Ineffective contingency planning (Joint Consular Crisis Preparedness Frameworks)4) Ineffectiveness of Lead State concept 5) Legal uncertainty related to the role of the EU and EU Delegations in the provision of consular assistance 6) Inconsistent information to EU citizens7) Lack of reliable information on EU citizens living or traveling abroad8) Complexity and ineffectiveness of financial reimbursements POLICY OPTIONS 1a) Combination of soft measures1b) Improvement to the definition through legislative amendments1c) Introduction of the presumption of unrepresentedness2a) Guidelines on local cooperation 2b) EU delegations will chair local consular cooperation networks meetings2c) Review of the concept of Lead State and formalisation of JFW and JCTs2d) Detail the supporting role of EU delegations through legal amendments  2e) EU delegations can provide direct consular assistance to EU citizens in uncovered third countries 3a) Legal amendments with new requirements for provision of information 3b) An EU travel advice portal 3c) Communication campaign 3d) Member States required to promote measures to inform on/record citizens4a) Guidelines and training 4b)Legal amendments to improve the procedure  
 
 
Annex 9: Baseline Scenario 
The  baseline  scenario  assumes  that  ongoing  coordination  and  cooperation  activities  will 
continue to be carried out, as outlined below. 

Member States will continue to meet regularly in COCON to discuss common approaches on 
consular protection (including the sharing of best practices), coordinate consular crisis response 
and related consular crisis preparedness issues, such as by: 

• 

identifying and addressing so-called “consular hotspots”, where certain types of consular 
issues or problems arise regularly; 

•  discussing ways to exchange information on travel advice; 

• 

identifying  ways  to  improve  crisis  preparedness  and  response,  including  through  the 
development of JFWs and local consular exercises. 

Consular dialogues with like-minded  third countries (currently USA, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand), chaired by the Council Presidency, will continue. 

Member  States  will  start  using  the  new  uniform  EU  Emergency  Travel  Document  format 
established by the ETD Directive as of December 2025. This will improve the security features 
of the documents and simplify the formalities to obtain them. 

The Expert Group on Consular Protection will continue to meet to exchange on development 
of national policies and implementation of the Directive.  

The EEAS will continue developing its key activities, notably: 

• 

responding to consular crises, with the recently established EEAS Crisis Response Centre 
as the permanent crisis response capability and the single entry point on all crisis related 
issues in the EEAS, bringing together diplomatic, security and intelligence capabilities, and 
ensuring a close interaction between delegations, missions and operations on the ground 
when facing a consular crisis; 

•  developing strategies, policies and tools to facilitate access to consular protection for EU 
citizens  through  EU  cooperation  and  coordination  (e.g.  rollout  of  joint  frameworks, 
management of the Consular Online platform); 

• 

supporting  EU  delegations,  in  particular  the  network  of  consular  correspondents  in  EU 
delegations,  to  play  their  coordination  role  at  local  level  (e.g.  contingency  planning, 
training, sharing of best practices, advice); 

•  working with Member States to facilitate access to consular protection for EU citizens (e.g. 

in COCON); 

• 

• 

• 

engaging with like-minded third countries to exchange and cooperate on consular matters 
of mutual interest (e.g. in consular dialogues with Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the 
USA); 

addressing, together with the Commission, legal issues relating to consular protection (e.g. 
negotiation and applications in international agreements, joint consular démarches, notes 
verbales); 

contributing to informing EU citizens of the right to consular protection for unrepresented 
citizens. 

123 

 
 
Ahead of touristic seasons, the Commission and the EEAS run social media campaigns, also is 
relayed through EU delegations. The EEAS also supports EU delegations in including locally-
tailored information on the right to consular protection on their website and/or to adapt this 
information in case of a consular crisis.  

In 2023, the Commission will conduct an awareness raising initiative on EU citizenship rights, 
including consular protection, at the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the establishment of 
EU citizenship by the Maastricht Treaty.  

It has to be noted that activities outlined above, such as the exchanges of best practices among 
relevant Member States’ authorities in COCON, are part of the baseline scenario and are not 
new activities. In the current scenario, where the measures are in place, the problems identified 
in section 2 have already materialised. This means that by themselves, the measures outlined 
are insufficient to address the problems identified, which will instead continue. In particular, 
where these problems are linked to current wording of the Directive, they cannot be sufficiently 
addressed through non-regulatory measures. 

In addition, in a situation where all activities described above would continue to be carried out, 
but no further action is taken, all problems identified under Chapter 2 will not only persist but 
will worsen. The external factors described in Chapter 2 and Annex 7, such as the increase of 
the number and frequency of crisis and the increase in the number of unrepresented residents 
and travellers in third countries would put at risk the effective exercise of the right to consular 
protection. Larger number of EU citizens would be affected by an increased number of crisis, 
and the scale and the nature of the problems identified would increase as per below: 

•  Based on the predicted increasing number of crises and on the increasing number of EU 
travellers, with more cases of ‘unrepresentedness’ and no precise definition in the wording 
of the Directive, the currently few reported cases of refusal of assistance and ‘redirection’ 
of EU citizens considered ‘unrepresented’ would likely become more frequent. As a result, 
the risk of cases of EU citizens left without effective consular assistance would increase. 
As outlined above, such a situation is also likely to cause reputation risks for Member States 
and  the  EU.  Due  to  the  absence  of  a  clear  definition  in  the  Directive,  even  a  possible 
increase in the consular network of Member States is unlikely to compensate this problem, 
in particular when difficult cases arise. 

• 

In absence of clear assignments of tasks to the different actors, including EU delegations, 
and the absence of a clear structure for Joint Consular Crisis Preparedness Frameworks, 
coordination  at  local  level  is  likely  to  become  more  and  more  difficult  at  a  time  of 
‘permacrisis’ as described by a recent European Parliament study126. A legal clarification 
of such processes and clarification of roles is important to save time and efforts in a likely 
scenario of increased crises and reduced timeframe for anticipation and preparedness – as 
well as to provide the impetus to invest in the necessary preparedness, notably through the 
drawing  up  of  JFWs,  even  in  third  countries  historically  seen  as  less  prone  to  consular 
crises. Especially for lightly staffed Member States and in third countries with low Member 
States  presence,  coordination  is  likely  to  become  more  burdensome.  Digitalisation  and 
remote  meetings  could  help  to  alleviate  the  burden  but  would  not  solve  the  underlying 
issues.  

126  

Future Shocks 2023, Anticipating and weathering the next storm, EPRS: 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2023/751428/EPRS_STU(2023)751428_EN.p
df 

124 

 
 
 
•  Aspects  of  administrative/technical  nature,  such  as  organisation  of  LCCs,  minutes  of 
meetings, sharing of information and burden between Member States and EU delegations 
and  business  continuity  in  a  non-crisis  context  have  the  potential  to  become  concrete 
obstacles to smooth operations in crisis situations if they are not streamlined sufficiently.  

•  Organisation  and  provision  of  information  in  situations  that  are  likely  to  evolve  more 
rapidly is essential. Problems with EU citizens not being able to find the right information 
about their rights and who could and should offer help in a situation of need will likely 
increase with an increasing number of travellers and number of unrepresented citizens in 
non-crisis situation. This will likely be exacerbated in crisis situations. Use of websites and 
online  information  channels  is  widespread  in  the  field  of  provision  of  information  on 
consular protection. With the increased use of digital tools and services in the next years 
by citizens, the need for reliable, unique source of information will also increase. Member 
States will have to adapt to the requirements of such environment.  

•  The problem of lack of reliable information on EU citizens living or traveling abroad would 
also pose more risks to effective provision of consular protection by Member States. At this 
stage, it cannot be predicted if Member States would, absent an intervention at EU level, 
take coordinated measures to improve the level of information they have on their nationals 
living or travelling abroad. If that is not the case, the coordination of actions at EU level on 
how to best assist citizens would become more and more challenging, given their increasing 
number. Reaching out to people will become more difficult especially in crisis situations. 
In situations where a Member State is not aware of the presence of an increased number of 
its nationals in a certain third country where it is not represented, it might not help be able 
to support the Member States present on the ground that are seeking to provide consular 
protection to its nationals.  

•  Finally, the complexity and ineffectiveness of reimbursement procedures is likely to also 
worsen as more unrepresented EU citizens seek to be assisted with consular protection. In 
the  view  of  rising  costs  of  provision  of  consular  protection,  inefficient  reimbursement 
procedures  are  likely  to  strain  the  budgets  of  those  Member  States  more  frequently 
requested to provide consular protection due to their larger consular networks. This could 
result in undermining the spirit of solidarity and collaboration among Member States that 
is the foundation for the fundamental right to consular protection.  

The evolutions of the problems under the baseline scenario will necessarily depend on outside 
factors  –  notably  the  number,  scale  and  geographical  distribution  of  future  crises  with  a 
consular element – that cannot be predicted with certainty at this stage (see also Section 2.4.3).  

125 

 
 
 
 
Annex 10: Measures not requiring a policy choice 

1)  EU citizens’ right to an effective legal remedy and redress 

Article  2(1)  of  the  Directive  provides  that  Member  States’  embassies  or  consulates  must 
provide consular protection to unrepresented citizens on the same conditions as to their own 
nationals. 

Article 47 of the Charter provides that ‘[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by 
the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal’. The 
provisions of the Charter are also addressed to the Member States when they are implementing 
EU law (Article 51 of the Charter).  

Consequently,  Member  States  should  provide  explicit  access  to  effective  legal  remedy  and 
redress mechanisms to unrepresented EU citizens, to ensure they have a venue to seek legal 
remedy when their EU citizenship rights related to consular protection have been violated. 

In this regard, although they did not identify many cases in which EU citizens were refused 
assistance or treated in a discriminatory manner when receiving consular assistance, it seems 
that such cases do exist.  

The  lack  of  official  complaints  and  court  cases  could  indicate  that  such  problems  are  not 
frequent. Alternatively, this could be an indication that unrepresented EU citizens face barriers 
in accessing the national redress mechanisms in place. In COCON, Member States indicated 
that they provide unrepresented citizens with access to means of redress already available to 
their own citizens, noting though that, in some cases their national legislation does not contain 
any specific provisions to that effect. Some Member States reported an increase in litigation 
associated to the provision of consular assistance to represented EU citizens. 

Absence of national rules explicitly enabling redress for unrepresented EU citizens is  not in 
line with the requirements of the Charter and the case law of the Court. What is more, such 
absence  creates  legal  uncertainty  and  hinders  unrepresented  EU  citizens’  exercise  of  their 
fundamental  right  to  a  legal  remedy  as  they  might  not  have  or  be  sufficiently  aware  of  the 
avenues available to them to complain to the assisting Member State (they may instead choose 
to turn to their own Member State or simply wave on the exercise of their right).  

MEASURE  PROPOSED:  Introduction  of  legal  amendment  that  would  require  Member 
States  to  provide  access  under  equal  conditions  to  an  effective  legal  remedy  and  redress  to 
unrepresented citizens. 

2)  Legal uncertainty on conditions to process personal data for consular protection 

purposes  

Article 10 of the Directive provides for the exchange of information on the unrepresented EU 
citizen  between  the  Member  State  of  nationality  and  the  assisting  Member  State  (including 
honorary consuls who may be nationals of a third country) and, as the case may be, the EU 
delegation, when a request  for assistance is  submitted by an EU citizen or when a Member 
State is informed of an individual emergency situation. Personal data of EU citizens will also 
need  to  be  processed  and  exchanged  by  Member  States  (and  possibly  EU  delegations)  and 
possibly transferred from Member States to third country authorities (including like-minded 
countries) and international organisations (e.g. United Nations), in particular in the context of 
crisis situations.  

126 

 
 
Some  Member  States  refuse  to  share  information  on  unrepresented  (and  represented)  EU 
citizens,  arguing  that  this  would  be  in  breach  of  data  protection  requirements127.  Although 
bilateral cooperation between Member States was assessed to be good, some problems remain 
due to the lack of legal clarity in the Directive as to the processing of personal data. A fortiori, 
this also applies to personal data transferred to third countries and international organisations.  

While  Articles  11  and  13  of  the  Directive  and  Article  5(10)  of  the  EEAS  Decision  assigns 
certain tasks to EU delegations to be carried out in the public interest, EU delegations could 
benefit from the introduction, in the Directive, of a clear legal basis to process personal data. 

Finally, while GDPR and EUDPR provide a legal basis for processing personal data in cases 
necessary to  protect  the  vital  interests of the data subject, this  only  covers situations  where 
processing is “necessary to protect an interest which is essential for the life of the data subject 
or that of  another natural  person”128. However, this  legal  basis could  be relied on in  crisis 
situations only if there is a concrete or imminent danger to a data subject or a third person and 
no another legal basis, such as data subject’s consent, could be used to justify the processing.  

In  addition,  asking  EU  citizens 
their 
for  consent 
safety/health/integrity might be at risk or where the Member State representative is not in a 
position to inform the data subjects at least of the identity of the controller and the purpose of 
the  processing  due  to  the  prevailing  security/logistical  conditions  in  the  area  of  operations, 
would not  be appropriate, since  the requirements of a freely-given and/or informed  consent 
required by EU data protection rules will not be met.  

in  crisis  situations,  where 

MEASURE  PROPOSED:  amendments  to  the  Directive  to  introduce  provisions  on  the 
processing by, exchange or transfer of personal data among Member States, EU delegations, 
third countries and international organisations. 

3)  Other amendments  

In  addition,  some  other  clarifications  will  be  needed  to  ensure  uniform  application  of  the 
Directive as identified in the Commission Report:  

-  Overall, there appears to be a lack of clarity and understanding regarding the procedure for 
redirecting applications from unrepresented EU citizens. In addition, although the Directive 
allows for bilateral agreements to be put in place between Member States, there seems to 
be a need to further clarify that this is not a precondition for providing consular assistance 
to unrepresented EU citizens;  

-  The Directive itself is silent on the accessibility of consular protection for certain vulnerable 
groups  among  unpresented  citizens.  This  may  include,  inter  alia,  demands  for  consular 
protection  by  pregnant  women,  unaccompanied  minors,  persons  with  reduced  mobility 
(PRM), persons with disabilities, or individuals subject to discrimination on any ground. 
Moreover, the Directive does not outline a specific regime for the consular assistance of 
victims  of  crime,  which  may  include  victims  of  domestic  and  gender-based  violence 
(though such assistance is included in the types of assistance which can be provided as per 
Article 9 of the Directive). Wording to the Directive would be strengthen in line with the 
priorities of the EU Victims’ Rights Strategy129. 

127  
128  
129  

Study. 
See recital 46 GDPR. 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, EU Strategy On Victims' Rights (2020-2025), 
COM/2020/258 Final EUR-Lex - 52020DC0258 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu). 

127