JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL State of play of EU-Türkiye political, economic and trade relations
Date: 2023-11-29
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: EU relations, Türkiye, bilateral relations, common foreign and security policy, cooperation policy, foreign policy, migration policy, political situation, regional security, trade relations

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY Brussels, 29.11.2023  JOIN(2023) 50 final  JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL State of play of EU-Türkiye political, economic and trade relations  
 
 
I.  

INTRODUCTION 

The  European  Council  of  29-30  June  2023  invited  the  High  Representative  and  the 
Commission to submit a report on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations, building on the 
instruments and options identified by the European Council, and with a view to proceeding in 
a strategic and forward-looking manner. 

This Joint Communication responds to this invitation. It builds on and updates the joint report 
submitted by the Commission and the High Representative in March 20211. The purpose of 
this  report  is  to  outline  the  state  of  play  of  EU-Türkiye  relations  in  key  areas.  It  sets  out 
elements  to  develop  this  relationship,  in  the  context  of  Russia’s  war  of  aggression  against 
Ukraine and a broader, fast-changing geopolitical and security environment. The Commission 
already  published  the  2023  Communication  on  Enlargement  Policy  and  its  regular  country 
report on Türkiye on 8 November reflecting the state of play in the accession process2. 

II.  

POLITICAL RELATIONS 

EU-Türkiye relations are currently framed by the June 2021 European  Council Conclusions, 
previous European Council and Council Conclusions as well as the March 2021 Statement of 
the  Members  of  the  European  Council  and  the  March  2021  Commission  and  High 
Representative Joint Communication on the state of play of the EU-Türkiye relationship. 

Beyond the bilateral and economic ties set out below, there are other factors that profoundly 
shape the complex and challenging context of EU-Türkiye relations: the need for a sustainable 
de-escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean; the Cyprus issue; Türkiye’s position on Russia’s 
war  of  aggression  against  Ukraine;  NATO  enlargement;  Türkiye’s  position  on  foreign  and 
regional  policy  issues,  including  the  Middle  East  and  particularly  since  the  Hamas  terrorist 
attacks against Israel on 7 October; and the domestic human rights and rule of law situation. 

Since  2021,  the  focus  in  EU-Türkiye  relations  has  shifted  to  concrete  steps  towards  re-
engagement, including strong EU support in the aftermath of the  devastating earthquakes in 
2023. The European Council has repeatedly underlined that the EU has a strategic interest in a 
stable  and  secure  environment  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  and  in  the  development  of  a 
cooperative  and  mutually  beneficial  relationship  with  Türkiye.  The  EU  also  reaffirmed  its 
determination to use the instruments and options at its disposal to uphold regional stability and 
defend its interests and those of its Member States through scalable yet reversible restrictive 
measures, as set out in the March 2021 Joint Communication.   

The High Representative and the Commission have undertaken continuous efforts to create a 
conducive environment for engagement. However, the full positive potential of the EU-Türkiye 
relationship has not yet materialised. 

1 JOIN(2021) 8 final/2, 22.03.2021 
2 COM(2023) 690 final and SWD(2023) 696 final, 8.11.2023 

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1.  

Eastern Mediterranean 

Relations  between  Greece  and  Türkiye  deteriorated  until  early  2023  with  hostile  rhetoric, 
violations  of  Greek  national  airspace  including  overflights  of  Greek  inhabited  areas  and 
threatening statements regarding the sovereignty of Greek islands. Following the devastating 
earthquakes in Türkiye on 6 February 2023, there was a marked improvement in the relations. 
Greece rapidly provided humanitarian aid and support to Türkiye, followed by several high-
level phone calls and meetings.  

As  of  February  2023,  violations  of  Greek  national  airspace  diminished  drastically,  and  no 
flights of Turkish fighter jets over Greek inhabited areas were reported. Meetings at ministerial 
and leaders’ level intensified. Greece and Türkiye agreed to build on the positive momentum 
and activated multiple channels of communication, including holding a meeting of the High-
Level Cooperation Council, after a hiatus of several years.  

Since  June  2021,  there  were  no  unauthorised  drilling  activities  by  Türkiye  in  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean, including in the areas encompassing parts of the Exclusive Economic Zones of 
Greece and Cyprus. Delimitation of the continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zones has 
not  been  addressed  through  dialogue  and  negotiations  in  good  faith,  in  accordance  with 
international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 
and having recourse, if necessary, to the International Court of Justice.  

Unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations, to international agreements and to the 
principle  of  peaceful  settlement  of  disputes  in  accordance  with  the  UN  Charter,  as  well  as 
abstaining from unilateral actions which run counter to EU interests, violate international law 
and the sovereign rights of EU Member States, remains an essential requirement to ensure a 
stable  and  secure  environment  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  and  the  development  of  a 
cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship between the EU and Türkiye. 

2.  

Cyprus issue 

The Cyprus settlement issue is a core element of Türkiye’s strong disagreements with the EU 
in the Eastern Mediterranean. 

The situation in Cyprus continued to deteriorate due to the consistent efforts of Türkiye and 
the Turkish Cypriot leadership to undermine the basis of the settlement of the Cyprus issue 
enshrined in the UN framework (a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation with political equality 
in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions).  

In this  context, Türkiye  and the Turkish  Cypriot leadership intensified efforts to  pursue the 
recognition  of  the  so  called  “Turkish  Republic  of  Northern  Cyprus”  in  international 
organisations such as the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS), as well as unilateral actions in 
particular in Varosha in defiance of the UN Security Council Resolutions. Türkiye continued 
to criticise the decision of the UN Security Council to renew the mandate of the United Nations 
Peacekeeping  Force  in  Cyprus  (UNFICYP)  without  the  consent  of  the  Turkish  Cypriot 
community.  

The EU remains fully committed to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, within 
the  UN  framework  and  in  line  with  the  EU  acquis  and  the  principles  on  which  the  EU  is 

2 

 
 
 
founded. The EU has called, most recently in the European Council conclusions of June 2023, 
for the speedy resumption of negotiations  and expressed  readiness  to  play an  active  role in 
supporting  all  stages  of  the  UN-led  process  and  step  up  its  practical  support  to  facilitate  a 
comprehensive settlement, with all appropriate means at its disposal. The  EU’s engagement 
and support to the Cyprus issue is a sine qua non for easing tensions in the region. The EU also 
continuously expressed its support to the UN leadership regarding a renewed effort to bring the 
sides to the negotiating table and, in this regard to the call for the nomination of an UN Envoy. 
The EU stands ready to support the UN process. 

Some progress was made in agreements on implementation of confidence building measures 
(CBMs),  key  in  creating  an  environment  conducive  to  building  trust.  Yet  more  efforts  are 
required  to  inject  much  needed  dynamism  in  the  setlement  process.The  successful 
implementation  of  the  EU  Halloumi/Hellim  protected  designation  of  origin  (PDO)  scheme, 
could  become  a  positive  example  for  further  bi-communal  cooperation  and  trust  building, 
including  support  and  resulting  economic  benefit  to  Turkish  Cypriot  businesses,  linked  to 
progress on compliance with EU standards. The EU will continue to support and reinforce such 
efforts  through  its  instruments  and  policies  towards  the  Turkish  Cypriot  community  and  in 
particular towards civil society.  

Türkiye’s overall stance on the Cyprus issue and the non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus 
continues  to  hamper  different  paths  of  cooperation,  including  in  the  areas  of  security  and 
defence. Türkiye must reaffirm its commitment to the UN-led settlement talks on Cyprus, in 
line  with  the  relevant  UN  resolutions,  including  their  external  aspects.  Exploiting  the  full 
potential of a positive agenda with Türkiye will therefore remain extremely challenging in the 
absence of a solution to the Cyprus issue. 

3.  

Eastern Mediterranean Conference 

The underlying rationale behind the tasking of the October 2020 European Council to the High 
Representative/Vice-President  with  organising  an  Eastern  Mediterrranean  Conference, 
involving Türkiye, is still valid. A scoping of different ideas and concepts was set in motion, 
in particular in view of Türkiye’s improved relations with Greece and with Egypt, and the 2022 
Israel-Lebanon agreement on maritime borders. However, the increasing tensions in the region 
following  the  Hamas  terrorist  attacks  against  Israel  require  a  constant  assessment  of  the 
situation and the appropriate timing for a launch of new regional cooperation initiatives. 

A standing Eastern Mediterranean Conference (EMC) as an inclusive yet flexible and demand-
driven platform, could serve as a framework to discuss and develop cooperation opportunities, 
including in the context of new EU legislative acts and instruments in specific areas such as 
energy and economic security, connectivity, digital and green transition and industrial policy.  

4.  

The broader region  

Türkiye is a significant and assertive foreign policy actor. It pursues policies placing Türkiye’s 
security interests and strategic autonomy at the core of its actions, including the use of military 
means in several theatres. Türkiye has started seeking options for cooperation with some EU 
Member States bilaterally and in the region. This trend intensified in particular after Russia 
launched  its  war  of  aggression  against  Ukraine  in  February  2022.  Yet  Türkiye  is  currently 

3 

 
 
clearly at odds with EU priorities under the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 
maintaining a very low alignment rate of on average 10%. Stepping up its alignment would be 
a significant signal of Türkiye's commitment to the EU in the new geopolitical context. 

Türkiye  continues  to  oppose  Russia’s  military  aggression,  and  engages  diplomatically, 
including in the initially successful facilitation of the export of Ukrainian grain via the Black 
Sea  Grain  Initiative  (BSGI).  The  Turkish  leadership  invested  in  facilitating    prisoners’ 
exchanges  and  worked  on  de-escalation  and  a  cease-fire.  At  the  same  time,  Türkiye’s  non-
implementation  of  the  EU  restrictive  measures  against  Russia,  while  intensifying  trade  and 
economic ties with Moscow, poses serious risks of circumvention of EU restrictive measures 
which must be addressed. The Turkish stance on Sweden’s accession to NATO was also seen 
negatively.    

Türkiye intensified a “regional normalisation” policy with the Arab states and the Gulf region. 
In the absence of a political solution to the Syria conflict, the initial resumption of high level 
contacts  with  the  Syrian  regime  in  2022,  facilitated  by  Russia,  is  at  odds  with  EU  policy. 
Nevertheless, Türkiye is an important actor in Syria, and shares with the EU the objective of 
achieving a stable and prosperous Syria. Türkiye maintains a significant military presence in 
parts of northern Syria and continues military cross-border operations into the region, in the 
context of its anti-terrorism operations against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).     

Türkiye also  continued its anti-terrorism military operations against PKK in  Iraq and in the 
Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The operations were strongly condemned by the Iraqi government. 
While the EU considers the PKK a terrorist organisation, countries in the region are encouraged 
to coordinate anti-terrorist activities and act proportionally and in full respect of the rule of law.  

With  Iran,  Türkiye  maintained  channels  of  cooperation  at  various  levels,  although  tensions 
were noticeable in the contexts of the Syrian and north-Iraqi theatres. This relationship remains 
historically complex as both Iran and Türkiye are competing for influence in the region through 
supporting often opposing proxies. Yet Iran, Iraq and Türkiye are also major trade partners. 

Following the Hamas terrorist group’s attacks against Israel on 7 October 2023, Türkiye not 
only refrained from condemning and qualifying them as terrorism but also spoke out in support 
of  Hamas,  in  complete  disagreement  with  the  EU  common  position3.  Türkiye,  while 
condemning the loss of civilian lives on both sides, criticised Israel’s response strongly and  
proposed to  act  as  a  mediator  and  to  participate  as  a  guarantor  in  a  post  conflict 
environment. More broadly, Türkiye is currently re-evaluating its ties with Israel. At the same 
time, it remains an important humanitarian donor in the region and remains committed to a two 
state solution. 

The  Türkiye-Armenia  normalisation  process  continued  through  contacts  between  Special 
Envoys.  The  leaders  met  in  2022  and  2023.  Türkiye  continues  to  link  progress  of  the 
normalisation  process  with  Armenia  with  developments  in  Armenia-Azerbaijan  relations, 
especially  as  regards  the  Nagorno-Karabakh  conflict.  Türkiye  supports  all  actions  by 
Azerbaijan regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, and its stance towards Armenia in general. Türkiye 
expressed full support to the military actions undertaken by Azerbaijan in 2022 and in 2023. 

3 Statement of the Members of the European Council on the situation in the Middle East – 15 October 2023 

4 

 
 
 
Türkiye underlined the need to respect the rights of Karabakh Armenians and voiced support 
for the peace negotiations and the opening of trade and energy links.  

In Libya, Türkiye advocates an agreement in  the framework of the Libyan-led and Libyan-
owned political process. Based on the 2019 Türkiye-Libya maritime delimitation arrangement, 
in  October 2022, Türkiye signed a Memorandum  of Understanding  (MoU) with  the Libyan 
Government of National Unity to develop, inter alia, commercial cooperation in the field of 
hydrocarbons.  The  EU  considers  the  2019  Türkiye-Libya  MoU  an  infringement  upon  the 
sovereign rights of third States, non-compliant with the Law of the Sea and having no legal 
consequences for third States. Türkiye, as a flag state, has repeatedly withheld its consent to 
the EU Naval Force Mediterranean Operation IRINI’s requests to inspect vessels and its lack 
of cooperation continued to hamper the EU’s efforts to implement the UN embargo effectively. 

In  light  of  Türkiye’s  assertive  foreign  and  regional  policy,  it  remains  essential  to  sustain 
diplomatic work with a view of reaching a deeper understanding of respective interests, defuse 
possible tensions and identify mutually benefitting areas of cooperation.   

5.  

Cooperation on Common Security and Defence Policy and Counter Terrorism  

Türkiye is a longstanding partner of the EU in crisis management, an important contributor to 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations and the biggest non-
EU  troops  contributor  in  Operation  European  Union  Force  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina 
Operation  ALTHEA.  Most  recently,  Türkiye  took  over  the  command  of  NATO  KFOR  in 
Kosovo*. Türkiye seeks further involvement in CSDP and EU defence initiatives, whilst at the 
same time continuing to exclude a Member State from all possible cooperation with NATO. 
The non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus and Türkiye’s narrow interpretation of the EU-
NATO  cooperation  framework,  on  the  basis  of  agreed  framework  of  2003  (“Berlin  Plus” 
arrangements)  continue  to  create  practical  and  serious  operational  difficulties  for  further 
developing a genuine EU-NATO organisation-to-organisation relationship.  

In line with the EU’s Strategic Compass4, the EU remains committed to continue cooperation 
in areas of common interest and develop a mutually beneficial partnership, on the basis of an 
equal commitment on Türkiye’s side to advance on a path of cooperation and de-escalation.  

On  counter-terrorism,  the  EU  is  supporting  Türkiye’s  efforts  to  improve  the  exchange  of 
information,  cross-border  investigations  and  prosecutions,  in  particular  of  foreign  terrorist 
fighters and individuals suspected of planning or carrying out terrorist offences. At the same 
time, the broad definition of terrorism in domestic legislation remains fundamentally at odds 
with European standards and contravenes the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).  

III.   BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND TÜRKIYE 

1. 

Association Agreement 

*  This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ 
Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence 
4 ST-7371-2022-INIT_en.pdf (SECURED) (europa.eu) 

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The Association Agreement of 19635 has succeeded in laying a firm basis for bilateral relations. 
However, its implementation keeps encountering serious impediments. The unresolved Cyprus 
issue has had an impact ever since the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU in 2004. 
Türkiye  decided  in  July  2005  not  to  implement  the  Additional  Protocol  to  the  Association 
Agreement extending its Customs Union with the EU towards the Republic of Cyprus, which 
had  serious  implications  to  the  accession  process.  Türkiye  does  neither  allow  direct  trade 
between the Republic of Cyprus and Türkiye nor direct air and maritime connections, or any 
other  direct  link.  Türkiye  is  also  blocking  the  Republic  of  Cyprus’  accession  to  several 
international organisations. The absence of the recognition of Cyprus by Türkiye also prevents 
the direct exchange of information with Türkiye (e.g., in the context of judicial cooperation or 
the fight against tax avoidance) and the smooth functioning of the Customs Union overall.  

In  light  of  the  unauthorised  drilling  activities  of  Türkiye  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean,  the 
Council  decided  in  July  2019  not  to  hold  for  the  time  being  the  EU-Türkiye  Association 
Council. Preparatory Association Committees, chaired at senior officials’ level, have not taken 
place either. Technical cooperation within eight sectoral sub-committees continues. 

2. 

Accession negotiations, accession criteria and pre-accession aid  

Türkiye  was  granted  the  status  of  candidate  country  in  December  1999.  In  light  of  the 
continued, serious backsliding  on core EU principles and values, the Council noted in  June 
2018 that Türkiye had been moving away from the European Union and therefore its accession 
negotiations had “effectively come to a standstill and no further chapters can be considered 
for opening or closing”. The Council has been reconfirming this position since, most recently 
in December 20226.The facts leading to this assessment still hold as it was set out in the recent 
Enlargement report of the Commission.  

Under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance for 2021-2027 (IPA III), the EU provides 
support to Türkiye in areas of key EU interest, in line with the evolving relationship with the 
country. In 2022, the EU allocated EUR 221 million for actions in Türkiye, reflecting the level 
of  ambition  of  Türkiye  in  its  reforms.  In  2022,  the  Commission  established  a  Turkey 
Investment  Platform  (TIP)  under  the  European  Fund  for  Sustainable  Development  plus 
(EFSD+), which will provide EU guarantees in support of private and public investments in 
key sectors. In early 2023, the TIP Operational Board endorsed 14 guarantee programmes for 
a value of EUR 317 million guarantee coverage and an expected volume of up to EUR 2 billion 
in  investments.  They  span  sectors  from  finance  to  Micro-  Small-  and  Medium-sized 
Enterprises, via energy and transport to sustainable agriculture and new climate technologies.  

Since the 2019 Council conclusions, which called on the European Investment Bank (EIB) 
to review its operations in Türkiye, the EIB stopped all new operations in the country, with the 
exception  of  one  framework  loan  of  EUR  400  million,  decided  in  the  wake  of  the  2023 
earthquakes. The Commission will mobilise EU budget resources to guarantee this new EIB 
loan.   

5 OJ L 361/29, 31.12.1977 
6 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/60797/st15935-en22.pdf  

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3. 

Migration and the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement 

The March 2016 EU-Turkey Statement7 provides the overall framework for the cooperation 
on migration. Since the start of its implementation, there has been a substantial decrease in the 
number  of  irregular  crossings  from  Türkiye  to  Greece.  Even  though  tragic  incidents 
continued, the number of lives lost in  the Aegean Sea has significantly decreased since the 
record numbers in 2015-2016. 

Türkiye remains an important transit country for irregular arrivals into the EU via the Western 
Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean routes, with a 34% increase in irregular arrivals in the first 
ten months of 2023 compared with the period 2022, mostly led by an acute surge in irregular 
arrivals to the Greek islands, where figures more than tripled (+237%). On the other hand, there 
was  a  significant  decrease  in  irregular  arrivals  in  Italy  in  2023  (-63%).  Arrivals  to  the 
government-controlled areas of the Republic of Cyprus after crossing the Green Line increased 
in  2021,  reached  a  peak  in  2022  (with  a  123%  plus  compared  to  2021),  and  subsequently 
decreased by 64% between January and September 2023. In Bulgaria, a 30% drop was recorded 
in irregular arrivals in 2023. All these routes remain active in 2023 and require close political 
attention.  In  this  context,  the  Commission  welcomes  the  renewed  political  engagement  and 
trilateral operational initiatives between Türkiye, Greece, and Bulgaria to address the issue of 
irregular migration. 

The slow pace of returns to Türkiye has been an issue ever since the adoption of the Statement. 
The  Turkish  authorities  unilaterally  suspended  readmissions  under  the  Statement  in  March 
2020, citing COVID-19 restrictions. Despite repeated requests by the Greek authorities and the 
Commission,  the  issue  has  not  been  resolved  yet.  The  Commission  continues  to  insist  that 
Türkiye must fully stand by its commitments under the EU-Turkey Statement. 

Resettlement  from  Türkiye  to  the  EU  thus  continues  to  outpace  the  number  of  returns  to 
Türkiye. While some 40,000 Syrian refugees have been resettled from Türkiye to the EU, only 
2,140  irregular  migrants  and  asylum  seekers,  whose  applications  have  been  declared 
inadmissible crossing from Türkiye to the Greek islands, have been returned. 20 Member States 
contributed to this resettlement effort. To maintain a steady pace, the Commission provides 
funding to the Member States, while the EU Agency for Asylum lends operational support. 

The EU-Turkey Statement envisages the activation of a Voluntary Humanitarian Admission 
Scheme  once  irregular  crossings  have  ended  or  at  least  been  substantially  and  sustainably 
reduced. In December 2017, Member States endorsed the Standard Operating Procedures, but 
they have not yet decided to activate the scheme. 

Since  2011,  the  EU  has  mobilised  around  EUR  10  billion  to  assist  refugees  and  host 
communities in Türkiye. The EUR 6 billion budget of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey has 
been  fully  committed  and  contracted,  with  more  than  EUR  5.1  billion  disbursed  so  far. 
Disbursements are set to continue until the end of Facility project implementation scheduled 
for 2025. This assistance has been closely coordinated with Member States, other donors and 
especially  the  Turkish  authorities.  It  remains  critical  for  basic  needs,  protection,  access  to 
health care and education, and socio-economic development. The Facility has thus been a major 

7 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/ 

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tool of support and stabilisation. For instance, under its basic needs assistance, more than 2.6 
million refugees have received direct support allowing them to live in dignity.  

In 2020, the EU mobilised an additional EUR 535 million in bridge funding, and in 2021 the 
European Council authorised the allocation of a further EUR 3 billion to refugee support in 
Türkiye for 2021-2023. Both envelopes have been fully programmed. However, the situation 
of refugees in Türkiye continues to deteriorate, aggravated by the economic downturn and the 
earthquakes. Therefore, continued EU support will be required, as set out in the Commission’s 
proposals  under  the  mid-term  review  of  the  EU  Multi-annual  Financial  Framework  in  June 
20238. The Commission proposal of EUR 3,5 billion, if accepted, would mobilise additional 
resources on top of the EUR 0.5 billion already foreseen in the EU budget 2024, to continue 
covering immediate needs of refugees and host communities, including humanitarian needs, as 
well as ensuring the longer-term sustainability of EU assistance, support continued migration 
management and border control at the Turkish borders, intensified joint actions against migrant 
smugglers, and safe and dignified voluntary returns to the countries of origin. 

On  18  October  2023,  the  Commission  presented  an  Action  Plan  for  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean migration route to address the challenges more effectively. The plan outlines 
concrete  measures  to  prevent  irregular  departures,  combat  smuggling  and  provide  legal 
pathways.  Moreover,  the  actions  under  the  plan  will  improve  border  management,  support 
return and readmission cooperation, and support reception capacity.  The Turkish authorities 
and airline companies also work to improve the effectiveness of passenger screening and border 
controls at Istanbul airport. 

Türkiye  has  repeatedly  requested  an  accelerated  implementation  of  the  2016  Statement,  in 
particular  of  its  non-migration  elements:  the  restart  of  the  accession  negotiations,  rapid 
Customs Union modernisation and visa liberalisation. Under the Statement, all those elements 
remain subject to known and agreed conditions, benchmarks and decision-making procedures.  

4. 

Summits and high-level dialogues 

Regular high-level dialogues constitute an important platform to discuss joint opportunities and 
challenges and contribute to improving overall EU-Türkiye relations.  

In line with the guidance of the European Council of 2021, the Commission held high level 
dialogues with Türkiye on various issues: on climate (September 2021 and April 2022), health 
(November  2021),  migration  and  security  (October  2021  and  November  2023),  agriculture 
(May 2022), and science, research, technology and innovation (November 2022). Additionally, 
the EU-Türkiye Political Dialogue at senior officials’ level took place on 31 May 2022 and a 
counter-terrorism dialogue was held in November 2021. Further dialogues on agriculture and 
science, research, technology and innovation are scheduled in coming months.  

In light of the unauthorised drilling activities of Türkiye in the Eastern Mediterranean, in July 
2019 the Council decided to suspend for the time being meetings of the high-level dialogues in 
certain areas. In consequence, no high-level political dialogue or high-level sectoral dialogues 
on economy, energy and transport have taken place to date.  

8 COM (2023) 336 final, 20.06.2023 

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5. 

EU response following the 2023 earthquakes in southern Türkiye  

Following the devastating earthquakes in February 2023, the EU immediately mobilised search 
and  rescue  teams,  and  deployed  field  hospitals  to  provide  relief.  The  Commission  and  the 
Swedish Presidency of the Council organised an international donors conference on 20 March 
2023, “Together for the people in Türkiye and Syria”, at which EUR 6 billion were pledged 
for  earthquake-affected  people  in  Türkiye,  including  EUR  3.6  billion  in  a  Team  Europe 
approach including EUR 1 billion from the EU budget. Currently the European Commission 
has already mobilised:  

• 
EUR 67.3 million of non-committed and repurposed IPA II funds, to cover health and 
protection,  heritage,  rehabilitation  and  reconstruction  of  local  public  infrastructure  and 
economic recovery in rural areas.  

EUR 356 million of both IPA III and Neighbourhood, Development and International 
• 
Cooperation Instrument (NDICI)-Global Europe funds under the Assistance for Refugees in 
Türkiye for infrastructure rehabilitation with focus on health, education and sports; support for 
urban rehabilitation and employment-generating actions; and a Project Preparation Facility for 
loans pledged at the Donors’ Conference.  

EUR  400  million  to  Türkiye  under  the  European  Solidarity  Fund,  following  an 

• 
application by Türkiye. 

• 
EUR 35 million of IPA III funds, to accompany an EIB reconstruction framework loan 
of EUR 400 million for rehabilitation, construction and extension of drinking water, sewerage 
and stormwater networks. 

• 

6. 

EUR 120 million in humanitarian and civil protection assistance. 

People-to-people contacts and Türkiye’s participation in EU programmes 

For  the  2021-2027  period,  Türkiye  has  joined  Erasmus+,  Horizon  Europe,  the  European 
Solidarity Corps programme, the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, the Customs programme, 
the Single Market and Digital Europe programmes, the European Environmental Agency and 
the  European  Monitoring  Centre  for  Drugs  and  Drug  Addiction.  Despite  initial  interest, 
Türkiye has  not  pursued participation  in  the Creative Europe, LIFE,  Fiscalis, InvestEU and 
EU4Health programmes. 

Türkiye remains an  active participant of Erasmus+ and the European Solidarity Corps. The 
number  of  participants  who  carried  out  a  mobility  activity  (from  and  to  Türkiye)  exceeds 
280 000. Türkiye performs well in Horizon Europe and continues to raise awareness of  this 
programme. 

7. 

Visa liberalisation 

On 16 December 2013, the EU and Türkiye launched a Visa Liberalisation Dialogue, parallel 
to  the signature of the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement9. This  Dialogue is  based on the 
roadmap towards a visa free regime, which sets out 72 benchmarks that Türkiye needs to meet.  

9 L 134/3, 7.5.2014 

9 

 
 
 
 
However, six benchmarks remain outstanding10, while those considered provisionally fulfilled 
also  require continuous monitoring.  The Commission, together with  the Council of Europe, 
continues to offer technical assistance to Türkiye to meet the remaining conditions. 

8. 

EU restrictive measures 

The framework of restrictive measures established in 2019 in light of Türkiye’s illegal drilling 
activities in the waters surrounding Cyprus, remains in place along with the listings that were 
adopted on 27 February 202011. In November 2023, following the fourth annual review, the 
Council extended the framework until end of November 2024.  

IV.   ECONOMY AND TRADE 

1. 

EU-Türkiye trade framework, including current irritants 

The European Council in March 2021 invited the Commission to intensify talks with Türkiye 
to  address  current  difficulties  in  the  implementation  of  the  Customs  Union,  ensuring  its 
effective  application  to  all  Member  States.  Since  early  2022,  there  has  been  constructive 
engagement by Türkiye and subsequent progress regarding 14 trade irritants out of 2612.  

In 2022, Türkiye removed additional duties on 500 product groups coming from third countries, 
which had been imposed in violation of the Common Customs Tariff. In 2023, Türkiye phased 
out the discriminatory treatment of EU tractors and removed the discriminatory requirement of 
a  safety  assessment  report  for  cosmetics.  It  also  advanced  considerably  on  the  removal  of 
another barrier – the localisation requirement and domestic prioritisation of pharmaceuticals. 
Five other barriers were declared obsolete as they no longer pose a problem for EU industry.  

Further efforts by Türkiye are ongoing towards the removal of another five trade barriers13. The 
Customs  Union  Joint  Committee  on  27-28  November  2023  was  another  occasion  to  check 
progress in resolving these EU priority issues. The next meeting of the bilateral trade working 
group in early 2024 will allow for further reviewing the state of play. 

2. 

Modernisation of the Customs Union 

10 The six outstanding benchmarks are: 1) Concluding an operational cooperation agreement with Europol; 2) 
Aligning legislation on personal data protection to EU standards, 3) Adopting measures to prevent corruption, 4) 
Offering effective judicial cooperation in criminal matters to all EU Member States; 5) Revising legislation and 
practices on terrorism in line with European standards; 6) implementing the EU-Turkey readmission agreement 
in all its provisions, including those related to the readmission of third country nationals. 
11 They concern a Vice-President and a Vice-Director of the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO), as TPAO 
plans, directs and implements the unauthorised drillings. 
12 As listed in the Commission’s market access database. 
13 The Turkish Ministry of Trade agreed to the following actions: First, to addressing at the Ministerial level the 
issues related to export taxes on hides, skins and wet-blue leather, Second, to addressing at the Ministerial Level, 
export registration requirements on copper scrap, clays and feldspar. Third, to engaging in technical discussions 
with the participation of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry to facilitate a transparent administration of the 
quotas for live bovine and beef meat for EU operators. Fourth, to hold a technical meeting with EUDEL in Ankara 
on conformity assessment procedures and the implementation of the risk based TAREKS system with a view to 
determining the priority issues to be addressed; and develop a road map that would address in a more systemic 
way  possible  difficulties  faced  by  EU  operators.  Finally,  Turkish  Ministry  of  Trade  agreed  to  working  on  a  
prioritised list of EU products that can be exempted from the scope of import surveillance regime, and work on 
alternative ways to solve specific problems encountered by EU companies. 

10 

 
 
 
 
The Commission submitted to the Council in December 2016 draft negotiating directives on ‘a 
new agreement to modernise the Customs Union (CU) and extend the scope of the bilateral 
preferential trade relationship’ with Türkiye.  The draft directives seek the modernisation of the 
1995  Customs  Union,  notably  by  including  an  effective  dispute  settlement  mechanism, 
increased mutual liberalisation on trade in agricultural and fisheries and an extension to new 
areas such as services, public procurement, investment and sustainable development.  

The impact assessment prepared by the Commission at the time noted that the modernisation 
would have a substantial positive impact and bring economic benefits both to Türkiye and the 
EU. The fundamentals of this assessment still stand today. However, the Council discontinued 
its deliberations in 2017 in the context of the deteriorating EU-Türkiye relationship.  

The European Council in  June 2021  noted  ‘the  EU’s readiness to  engage with  Türkiye in  a 
phased, proportionate, and reversible manner to enhance cooperation in a number of areas of 
common interest, subject to the established conditionalities set out in March and in previous 
[...] conclusions.’ As set out above, the Commission was invited to intensify talks with Türkiye 
and the Council was asked to work on draft negotiating directives for the modernisation of the 
Customs Union. It was noted that a mandate may be adopted by the Council subject to additional 
guidance by the European Council. Discussions were held in the Council in June 2021 but not 
continued. 

The fact that Türkiye does not ensure the effective application of the current Customs Union to 
all Member States remains a serious issue. Yet, Türkiye’s recent efforts in addressing concrete 
issues, in particular progress on nine barriers and the commitment to lift or phase out five more, 
are a basis for closer engagement. In a rapidly evolving global context, coupled with the EU’s 
green and digital transformations  and the need for resilient supply chains,  progress  on trade 
issues  is  in  our  mutual  interest.  Given  the  limits  of  the  current  Customs  Union,  only  its 
comprehensive  modernisation,  including  an  effective  dispute  settlement  mechanism  and 
safeguards, will allow reaping the full potential of the EU-Türkiye economic relationship.  

3. 

EU restrictive measures against Russia 

Despite being a candidate country sharing a Customs Union with the EU, Türkiye has chosen 
not to align with the EU sanctions regarding Russia’s aggression against Ukraine14. Overall, 
the alignment of Türkiye with CFSP measures is very low. There are growing commercial and 
financial flows with Russia and several Turkish banks continue to facilitate trade payments. 

The Commission actively monitors the considerable evidence of Türkiye’s territory being used 
to divert sanctioned goods to Russia, notably as regards Common High Priority Items15.  

The most recent statisticsshow that Türkiye’s exports of Common High Priority Items to Russia 
increased significantly in January-September 2023 compared to pre-war data16.  

14 https://www.sanctionsmap.eu/#/main 
15 List of Common High Priority Items (europa.eu) - These high-priority goods, as defined by the Commission in 
coordination with the US, the UK and Japan, include prohibited dual-use goods and advanced technology items 
used  in  Russian  military  systems  and  found  on  the  battlefield  in  Ukraine,  and  items  which  are  critical  to  the 
development, production or use of these systems. 
16 These discrepancies indicate a possible pattern of circumvention by mis-declaring the country of destination. 
11 

 
 
 
On 7 September, the Commission published due diligence guidance to exporters to help them 
mitigate  their  exposure  to  sanctions  circumvention  schemes.  Moreover,  the  EU  has  already 
listed specific entities  operating in  several  third countries for undermining EU sanctions by 
supporting  Russia’s  defence  or  security  sector.  It  is  proposed  to  list  further  such  entities, 
registered in a variety of countries, in the 12th sanctions package17. 

Given that the EU and Türkiye share a Customs Union where goods are in free circulation, the 
Commission has been calling consistently for the implementation of additional measures by 
Türkiye to effectively stop the re-export of these crucial “battlefield items” (45 HS codes). This 
urgent request remains at the core of the outreach efforts of the EU Sanctions Envoy.  

The Commission welcomed Türkiye’s measures introduced in March 2023, which prohibit the 
re-export of goods subject to the EU’s sanctions when these are in transit, in warehouses or in 
free zones in Türkiye, and also more recent commitments. Implementing additional effective 
measures to stop the re-export of sanctioned goods, especially “battlefield items”, is crucial. 

The Commission will continue monitoring trade flows and check how the stated commitments 
of Türkiye - that it does not want to be used as a platform for sanctions circumvention, will be 
implemented rapidly and effectively.  

4. 

Economic cooperation: ERP, economic dialogue, IFI/DFI support 

Since 2015, all candidate countries and potential candidates, including Türkiye, have submitted 
annual Economic Reform Programmes (ERP), as part of efforts to strengthen their economic 
governance. The ERP contains medium-term macroeconomic projections, budgetary plans for 
the  next  three  years  and  structural  reform  plans.  Based  on  the  ERP  and  the  Commission’s 
assessment, the annual  Economic and Financial Dialogue between the  EU and the  Western 
Balkans and Türkiye at ministerial level provides targeted economic policy guidance. A High-
level Economic Dialogue was set up in 2015 but suspended for the time being in 2019. The 
European  Investment  Bank  Group18  and  the  European  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and 
Development19 focus current operations in Türkiye on the private sector. 

5. 

Other priority sectors 

Türkiye is one of the most climate-vulnerable countries in the region. Its emissions have risen 
sharply over the last  decades.  Türkiye ratified the Paris Agreement in  2021, announcing  its 
plan  to  reach  net-zero-emissions  by  2053.  The  overall  emission  reduction  objective  in 
Türkiye’s updated Nationally Determined Contribution is slightly higher than in the previous 
NDC but remains very unambitious (in the main scenario emissions can still grow by over 30% 
until 2030). Türkiye is working on a Climate Law, on an update of its adaptation strategy, and 
is preparing a long-term low-emission development strategy.  

17  Note  that  the  listing  of  companies  in  Annex  IV  of  the  economic  sanctions  Regulation  does  not  entail  any 
attribution of responsibility for their actions to the jurisdiction in which they are operating. 
18 The EIB has been operating in the country since 1965 and financed more than EUR 30 billion in operations 
since then. EIB lending to Türkiye fell substantially since 2016 and following the EU restrictive measures of 2019, 
no loans to Türkiye were signed (with the exception of a multi-regional credit line facility including the country 
in 2022). In July 2023, the EIB approved a framework loan to support the areas affected by the earthquakes. 
19 The EBRD continued to support private sector operations in Türkiye in 2022 with a total investment of EUR 
1.6 billion.  In  2023  the  Bank  also  commenced  highly  selective  lending  for  reconstruction  of  sustainable 
infrastructure in municipalities, such as Hatay and Gaziantep, affected by the February 2023 earthquake. 

12 

 
 
 
The extensive cooperation on climate action between the EU and Türkiye is also financed under 
the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance and supported via the High-level dialogue (HLD) 
on  climate  launched  in  September  2021.  This  has  notably  been  instrumental  to  enhance 
cooperation on carbon pricing. It also has a working group on adaptation to climate change. 
The last ministerial meeting under the HLD took place in Ankara in April 2022. 

The  energy  sector  is  of  strategic  importance  in  EU-Türkiye  relations.  Technical  exchanges 
focus on security of supply in the EU and in Türkiye and clean energy transition. The High-
level Dialogue on energy was set up in 2015 but suspended for the time being in 2019. In 2023, 
Türkiye published a National Energy Plan and Hydrogen Technologies Strategy and Roadmap 
both aiming at meeting the country’s 2053 net zero emission targets. Türkiye’s energy policy 
is  driven  by  its  own  energy  security  concerns  and  the  need  for  increasing  domestic  energy 
production. At the same time, Türkiye seeks to increase its role as regional energy trading hub. 
In  2023,  Türkiye  signed  gas  export  agreements  with  Bulgaria,  Hungary,  Romania  and 
Moldova. It launched its first nuclear reactor at the Akkuyu power plant in April 2023, built 
with a 99.2% investment by Russia’s Rosatom which will own and operate the plant. Türkiye 
ratified the Joint Convention on the safety of radioactive waste management in July 2022 and 
is committed to stress tests using the EU model. 

Transport relations between Türkiye and the EU remain challenging despite shared interests. 
Türkiye  has  shown  strong  interest  in  encouraging  sustainable  maritime  and  aviation  fuels 
production and uptake. Discussions have started on the renewal of the working arrangements 
between Türkiye and the EU Aviation Safety Agency, although aviation safety in the Eastern 
Mediterranean area continues to be seriously compromised due to the continuous refusal by air 
traffic  control  centres  in  Türkiye  to  coordinate  with  air  traffic  control  centres  in  Cyprus. 
Turkish  authorities  and  transport  operators  are  cooperative  in  assisting  the  EU  on  irregular 
migration into the EU. Concerning the TENT-T network, Türkiye’s lack of compliance with 
the Ankara protocol continues to hamper the finalisation of the TEN-T network extension. In 
2019, the Council decided to suspend for the time being the High-Level dialogue on transport. 

The  Council  adopted  conclusions  on  22  February  202120  on  the  revised  EU  list  of  non-
cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes. Türkiye was requested to solve all open issues as 
regards  effective  exchange  of  information  with  all  Member  States.  In  February  202321,  the 
Council concluded that Türkiye should continue technical work and activate effective exchange 
relationships with all EU Member States to enable the automatic exchange of financial account 
information, this was confirmed by Council conclusions on 17 October 202322.  

On  public  health,  Türkiye  was  recovering  from  the  impact  of  COVID-19,  when  two 
earthquakes hit the country in February 2023. The disaster had a direct impact on 15 million 
people and the capacity of the healthcare system was seriously affected. The EU will continue 
supporting access to public health for migrants and refugees, benefitting also host communities.  

Türkiye is a participating state in the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM). In the wake of 
the February 2023 earthquakes, Türkiye activated the Mechanism. Subsequently, all member 

20 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6329-2021-INIT/en/pdf 
21 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6375-2023-INIT/en/pdf 
22 Council 13879/23 FISC 221 ECOFIN 976 

13 

 
 
 
and  participating  states  offered  major  collaborative  support  via  the  Emergency  Response 
Coordination Centre (ERCC) of the European Commission. 

In the field of fisheries and maritime affairs, an efficient partnership is taking place in the 
Regional Fisheries Management organisations, such as General Fisheries Commission for the 
Mediterranean  and  International  Commission  for  the  Conservation  of  Atlantic  Tunas.  The 
relations between EU and Türkiye in fisheries reveal good potential for cooperation.  The EU 
is ready to engage with Türkiye to join the fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated 
fishing  activities  (IUU)  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  and  invite  Türkiye  to  cooperate 
constructively  with  its  neighbouring  EU  Member  States  in  a  collective  effort  to  fight  IUU 
fishing activities. 

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

V.  
Since the last assessment of the EU-Türkiye relations by the European Council in March and 
June 2021, efforts have been pursued, on both sides, to stop the escalatory dynamics in the 
Eastern  Mediterranean  and  pursue  cooperation  in  areas  defined  by  previous  conclusions. 
Türkiye  has  shown  a  more  constructive  attitude  on  various  issues,  including  in  its  bilateral 
relations  with  several  EU  Member  States  and  on  a  number  of  long-standing  trade  irritants. 
These are positive steps forward which must be sustained. In the context of Russia’s war of 
aggression against Ukraine, Türkiye has led some useful initiatives, including on facilitating 
vital exports by Ukraine. At the same time, its recent efforts to address sanctions circumvention 
via its territory still need to yield tangible results. 

Nevertheless, this process of re-engagement remains fragile. Türkiye’s stance on the Cyprus 
issue  and  its  vocal  promotion  of  a  “two  state  solution”  for  the  island  constitute  a  major 
challenge. Türkiye’s support to military means in regional conflicts and its views on Hamas 
are at odds with EU positions. Also, due to the grave domestic human rights and rule of law 
situation,  including  the  non-implementation  of  ECtHR  judgements,  the  EU-Türkiye 
relationship  clearly  has  many  hurdles  to  overcome.  Dialogue  on  the  rule  of  law  and 
fundamental  rights  will  remain  an  integral  part  of  the  EU-Türkiye  relationship.  Pursuing 
dialogue in good faith, including on the Cyprus issue, while abstaining from unilateral actions 
could lead to the development of a more cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship.  

The  EU  clearly  has  a  strategic  interest  to  develop  such  a  relationship  with  Türkiye  in  all 
possible areas, based on trust and a culture of consensus, not least against the background of 
broader geopolitical shifts. Efforts to bridge the key differences with Ankara must continue. A 
progressive,  proportionate  and  reversible  approach  to  energise  key  areas  of  cooperation,  as 
defined in the European Council Conclusions of June 2021, should continue to apply. At the 
same time, the second pillar of the approach set out by the 2021 Joint Communication on EU-
Türkiye relations also remains valid, namely the determination of the EU to use, if need be, the 
instruments and options at its disposal to defend its interests and those of its Member States. 

The  current  state  of  play  allows  for  some  further  steps  towards  constructive  engagement, 
building  on  the  positive  elements  suggested  in  2021.  The  Commission  and  the  High 
Representative propose the following actions to energise key areas of our cooperation. They 
should be pursued incrementally and on the basis of the established conditionality, provided 

14 

 
 
 
that Türkiye’s constructive efforts in some areas, including as regards the sovereign rights of 
EU Member States, are sustained and EU concerns are addressed. 

High-level Dialogues 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Reinstate the EU-Türkiye High-level Dialogues on Economy, Energy and Transport 
suspended in 2019, under the condition that Türkiye continues to refrain from all illegal 
drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean and all other actions that do not respect 
the sovereignty and sovereign rights of EU Member States. These political dialogues are 
also in the Union’s interest in order to address bilateral issues and pursue EU interests. 
In  the  same  logic,  resume  meetings  of  the  Association  Council  and  the  High-level 
Political Dialogue at ministerial level. 
Organise further rounds of sectoral High-level Dialogues on climate, health, migration 
and security, agriculture as well as research and innovation.  
Set up a new High-level Dialogue on Trade by the Commission, with the aim to tackle 
the remaining bilateral trade irritants and discuss further areas of cooperation. 

CFSP, Foreign Policy and Regional issues, CSDP 

• 

• 

• 

Conduct the EU-Türkiye dialogues on foreign policy and regional issues regularly in 
a more structured way, with a view to be more effective and operational, in parallel with 
decisive steps by Türkiye to increase alignment with the EU CFSP.  
Invite the Foreign Minister of Türkiye to informal meeting(s) of EU Foreign Ministers 
(“Gymnich” meetings), when relevant.  
Encourage Türkiye to increase its contributions to CSDP missions and operations, in 
line with relevant EU Council decisions and to embrace a more constructive approach 
for further strengthening, deepening and expanding the EU-NATO srategic partnership.  

Sectoral Cooperation 

Trade and Connectivity 

•  Resume discussions on the draft negotiating framework for the modernisation of the 
EU-Türkiye Customs Union, as proposed by the Commission, on the understanding 
that Türkiye keeps addressing the circumvention of EU restrictive measures against 
Russia via its territory rapidly and efficiently and continues to resolve trade irritants.  
In particular, Türkiye should implement effective measures to stop the re-export of 
Common High Priority (“battlefield”) items.  

• 

•  On this  basis, and in  a broader environment  conducive to  the  resumption of Cyprus 
settlement talks, the Council should adopt the negotiating directives and authorise 
the Commission to open negotiations for the modernisation of the Customs Union. 
•  Where relevant and possible, consider granting access to Türkiye to EU databases 
related to EU technical legislation, once Türkiye has fulfilled the necessary conditions. 

•  Adopt new negotiating directives for a Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement. 

Investments 

15 

 
 
 
•  Accelerate the signature of contracts under the Turkey Investment Platform to boost 
public  and  private  investments,  in  particular  in  the  fields  of  connectivity,  digital, 
energy, transport and green deal, in close cooperation with European and international 
financial institutions. 
the European Investment Bank is invited to resume operations across all sectors in 
Türkiye. 

• 

Migration management and financial support to refugees and host communities 

•  A more effective and mutually beneficial implementation of key areas of the 2016 EU-
Turkey  Statement,  notably  on  migration  management  is  necessary,  along  the 
following actions:  

•  Step  up  efforts  by  Türkiye  to  stem  irregular  migration  flows  to  the  EU,  by 
preventing departures and dismantling the criminal smuggling networks that facilitate 
them, and strenghtening border protection, building on the positive trend since October 
of increased interception of migrant smugglers and reduction of irregular departures.  
•  Step  up  EU  and  Member  States  engagement  with  Türkiye  in  a  Team  Europe 
approach. Political and technical dialogue is ongoing, following the recent EU-Türkiye 
High-level  Dialogue  on  migration  and  security  of  23  November  2023,  including 
enhancing cooperation of EU and Türkiye’s migration and law enforcement Agencies. 

•  Resume readmissions from the Greek islands and address the migration situation in 
Cyprus,  and  prevent  irregular  departures  on  routes  to  the  EU,  building  on  the 
recent  increase  in  interceptions  of  migrant  smugglers  and  reduction  of  irregular 
departures since October 2023. 

•  Continue ongoing work with the Turkish authorities and airline companies to improve 
the effectiveness of passenger screening and border controls at Istanbul airport.  
•  Conversely, step up resettlements from Türkiye to the Union by EU Member States, 
building on the progress made so far. This should especially cover the most vulnerable 
groups of Syrian refugees in Türkiye. Consider activating the Voluntary Humanitarian 
Admission Scheme. 

•  Continue support to refugees and host communities in Türkiye as proposed by the 
Commission  in  the  mid-term  review  of  the  EU  Multi-Annual  Financial  Framework. 
This would build on the successful and effective aid of the last years, fit for the current 
realities on the ground. 

•  Support the safe, dignified and voluntary returns to the countries of origin, in close 

cooperation with IOM and UNHCR. 

Visa Procedures 

•  As a matter of priority, explore possibilities with Member States to facilitate access to 
visa applications, in particular for certain specific categories of Turkish citizens when 
applying  for  visa  to  the  EU  (business  people,  students,  Turkish  citizens  with  family 
members in the EU etc.). This should also include making full use of the flexibilities 
of the Visa Code to allow the issuing of multiple entry visas with a long validity. 

16 

 
 
 
The Commission and the High Representative will update the European Council on the state 
of play on the aforementioned steps as required. 

17