COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive (EU) 2015/2302 to make the protection of travellers more effective and to simplify and clarify certain aspects of the Directive
Date: 2023-11-29
Institutions: Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, European Commission
Subjects: carriage of passengers, consumer protection, contractual liability, financial solvency, package travel, payment, provision of services, termination of a contract, travel agency, traveller

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 29.11.2023  SWD(2023) 906 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT    Accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive (EU) 2015/2302 to make the protection of travellers more effective and to simplify and clarify certain aspects of the Directive           {COM(2023) 905 final} - {SEC(2023) 540 final} - {SWD(2023) 905 final} - {SWD(2023) 907 final} - {SWD(2023) 908 final}  
 
 
Table of contents 

1. 

2. 

INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT ............................................................... 1 

PROBLEM DEFINITION .................................................................................................................... 6 

3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? ........................................................................................................ 29 

4.  OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? ............................................................................... 30 

5.  WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? .................................................................... 31 

6.  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? ........................................................... 45 

7.  HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? ............................................................................................ 77 

8. 

PREFERRED OPTION ...................................................................................................................... 81 

9.  HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? .................................. 85 

ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ............................................................................................ 88 

1. 

LEAD DG, DECIDE PLANNING/CWP REFERENCES .................................................................. 88 

2.  ORGANISATION AND TIMING ...................................................................................................... 88 

3. 

4. 

CONSULTATION OF THE RSB....................................................................................................... 88 

EVIDENCE, SOURCES AND QUALITY ......................................................................................... 97 

ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION (SYNOPSIS REPORT) .............................................. 100 

1.  OVERVIEW OF CONSULTATION ACTIVITIES ......................................................................... 100 

2.  KEY RESULTS OF THE CONSULTATIONS................................................................................ 105 

2.1 KEY FEEDBACK ON THE EVALUATION ...................................................................................... 105 

2.2  KEY FEEDBACK REGARDING THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT ................................................. 108 

3.  USE OF STAKEHOLDER FEEDBACK ......................................................................................... 115 

ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW? ........................................................................................ 117 

1. 

2. 

3. 

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE INITIATIVE................................................................... 117 

SUMMARY OF COSTS AND BENEFITS ..................................................................................... 117 

RELEVANT SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS ............................................................. 123 

ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL METHODS ................................................................................................... 124 

1.  METHODOLOGY  OF  THE  STUDY  TO  SUPPORT  THIS  EVALUATION  AND  IMPACT 

ASSESSMENT ................................................................................................................................. 124 

2.  ANALYSIS  AND  PROCESSING  OF  THE  RESULTS  OF  THE  PUBLIC  AND  TARGETED 

CONSULTATIONS .......................................................................................................................... 130 

3. 

JUSTIFICATION OF BASELINE ESTIMATES AND METHODS USED FOR CALCULATIONS130 

4.  ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS AND COMPARISON OF OPTIONS .................................................. 131 

ANNEX 5: COMPETITIVENESS CHECK .............................................................................................. 134 

1. COMPETITIVENESS CHECK: ............................................................................................................ 134 

2. SYNTHETIC ASSESSMENT ................................................................................................................ 134 

ANNEX 6: SME TEST .............................................................................................................................. 137 

ANNEX 7: PROBLEM TREE ................................................................................................................... 139 

ANNEX 8: ANNEX ON PRICE SENSITIVITY FOR TRAVEL SERVICES .......................................... 140 

ANNEX  9:  IMPACTS  ON  CONSUMER  RIGHTS,  FUNDAMENTAL  RIGHTS  AND  RELATED 

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS ................................................................................... 143 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX  10:  RESULTS  OF  BENEFITS  AND  COSTS  ANALYSIS,  SCORING  OF  OPTIONS  AND  THE 

SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS .............................................................................................................. 147 

1. 

CALCULATIONS, SCORING AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS ................................................. 147 

2.  ADDITIONAL RANKING OF OPTIONS ....................................................................................... 170 

ANNEX 11: PRESENTATION OF THE PACKAGE TRAVEL DIRECTIVE ........................................ 171 

ANNEX 12: LINKED TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS .............................................................................. 178 

ANNEX 13: EVALUATION ......................................................................................................................... 0 

 
 
 
Term or 
acronym 

Glossary 

Meaning or definition 

ADR 

Alternative Dispute Resolution 

APRR 

Air Passenger Rights Regulation 

CPCs 

Consumer Protection Cooperation Authorities 

CJEU 

Court of Justice of the European Union 

BEUC 

Bureau  Européen  des  Unions  de  Consommateurs  (European  Consumer 
Organisation) 

B2B 

Business-to-Business 

ECA 

European Court of Auditors 

CJEU 

Court of Justice of the European Union 

EEA  

European Economic Area 

EGFATT 

European Guarantee Funds' Association for Travel and Tourism 

EQ 

EU 

Evaluation Questions 

European Union 

GDP 

Gross Domestic Product 

GO 

IA 

General Objective 

Impact Assessment 

LTA 

Linked travel arrangement 

 
 
 
 
NCA 

National Competent Authority 

NPV 

Net Present Value 

PTD 

Package Travel Directive 

Q 

Question (usually with a number behind, signalling the question numbers in the 
consultations) 

Quarter (if in combination with a year) 

SDG 

Sustainable Development Goals 

SMEs 

Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 

SO 

Specific Objective 

TEU 

Treaty on European Union 

TFEU 

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 

2013 IA 

2013  Impact  Assessment  accompanying  the  document  on  package  travel  and 
assisted  travel  arrangements,  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  2006/2004l  and 
Directive 2011/83/EU and repealing Council Directive 90/314/EEC, SWD(2013) 
263 final 

 
 
 
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT  

1.1. 

International and EU economic context 

Tourism plays an increasingly important  role in the global economy,  accounting for  over 10% of 
global gross domestic product (GDP) directly and indirectly. Driven rising incomes, falling travel-
related costs and an increasing range of available tourism activities, the global number of tourists 
rose from 680 million in 2000 to over 1.5 billion in 2019.1 The European Union, is the world’s No 1 
tourist destination,2 receiving approximately two-thirds of international tourist arrivals in 2022.3 The 
tourism industry plays a key role in the EU economy, with some  2.3 million tourism businesses and 
10.9 million people working in the industry in 2020.4 

European consumers use a range of ways to book travel services for the same trip or holiday. For 
instance, they can make separate bookings for transport and/or accommodation directly with service 
providers  or  via  intermediaries.  Alternatively,  they  can  buy  online,  or  offline  pre-arranged  or 
customised packages composed of different types of travel services.5 They can use, for instance, the 
services  of  a  tour  operator,  travel  agency  or  any  other  trader  offering  packages.6   Directive  (EU) 
2015/2302 on package travel and linked travel arrangements (‘the Directive’, ‘the Package Travel 
Directive’ or ‘the PTD’)7  regulates such packages but does not apply to stand-alone services or the 
mere combination of different modes of transport.  

Between 2014 and 2017, the number of packages8 accounted on average for 9% of the total number 
of trips for personal reasons in the EU27.9 Considering that, at that time, the definition of package of 
the 1990 Directive still applied, this figure will likely not include dynamic packages.10 In the same 
period, package travel accounted for some 23% of the total spending for travel for personal reasons 
in the EU-27.11 Package travel was expected to represent 10.5% of the travel and tourism market in 

- 

in 

at: 

at: 

263 

final, 

facts, 

Travel 

Europe 

(2022), 

tourism 

Statista, 

available 

available 

SWD(2013) 

1 International Monetary Fund, (2021), Tourism in the Post-Pandemic World. Economic challenges and opportunities for 
Asia-Pacific and the Western Hemisphere, no. 21/02.  
2 European Commission, (2013), Impact Assessment accompanying the document on package travel and assisted travel 
arrangements, 
https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SWD:2013:0263:FIN:EN:PDF  
3 
statistics  & 
and 
https://www.statista.com/topics/3848/travel-and-tourism-in-europe/#topicHeader__wrapper  
4 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Tourism_industries_-_economic_analysis 
5 For more details on the definition of packages, see Section 1.2 below. 
6  European  Commission,  (2019),  Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  on  the 
provisions of Directive (EU) 2015/2302 on package travel and linked travel arrangements, applying to online bookings 
made at different points of sale (COM(2019) 270 final, p.1). 
7 Directive (EU) 2015/2302 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on package travel and 
linked  travel  arrangements,  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  2006/2004  and  Directive  2011/83/EU  of  the  European 
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 90/314/EEC (OJ L 326, 11.12.2015, p. 1). Any references 
to specific articles of the Directive, are references to the 2015 Directive. 
8 In that period, the relevant definition of ‘package’ as in Article 2(1) of Directive 90/314/EEC on package travel, package 
holidays and package tours (pre-arranged combinations).  
9  Data  from  “Eurostat  –  Number  of  trips  by  type  of  organisation  (from  2014  onwards),  purpose  –  personal  reasons, 
world”, 
partner 
duration 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/TOUR_DEM_TTPUR/default/table?lang=en&category=tour.tour_dem.t
our_dem_tt.tour_dem_tttc; no data available after 2017.   
10 Dynamic packaging is a method used in package holiday bookings to enable consumers to build their own package of 
flights, accommodation, and car rental instead of purchasing a pre-defined package. Dynamic packages were not covered 
by the definition of a package under the 1990 Directive. 
11  Study  to  support  the  preparation  of  an  evaluation  of  the  Package  Travel  Directive  back-to-back  with  an  impact 
assessment  on  its  potential  revision,  not  yet  published,  prepared  by  external  consultant,  ICF  S.A,  not  yet  published 
(hereinafter “ICF study”).: “The sector generated spending of around EUR 66.50 bn in 2014, which accounted for 23% 

countries 

night 

over, 

the 

all 

or 

of 

– 

– 

1 

1 

 
 
 
 
2023 and 10.7% by 2027 in terms of “user penetration”.12 As such, the market share of package travel 
remains relatively stable since 2014. 

The COVID-19 pandemic starting in 2020, with lockdowns and other measures taken by the Member 
States, inevitably affected these trends. The contribution of tourism to the total GDP in Europe halved 
from 9.5% in 2019 to 4.9% in 2020. Following the re-opening of borders and easing of COVID-19 
related measures, the World Economic Forum reported on signs of recovery in the tourism market, 
with a 27% rise in 2021 in nights spent in tourist accommodation in the EU, as compared to 2020. 
However, this  remained 37% lower than in  2019.13 For 2022  there were prospects  that the region 
would recover 70% of the pre-pandemic travel demand.14 This trend is confirmed by Statista based 
on January 2023 figures, with the EU-27 total package travel sector revenue expected to reach EUR 
96.4  bn  in  2023.  Revenue  is  expected  to  show  an  annual  growth  rate  of  1.02%,15  resulting  in  a 
projected market volume of EUR 100.4 bn by 2027. The number of travellers using package holidays 
is expected to amount to 94.6 million by 2027.16   

1.2.  The Package Travel Directive and related instruments or initiatives 

A first directive on package travel, package holidays and package tours was adopted in 1990.17 This 
Directive  was  replaced  with  Directive  (EU)  2015/2302  on  package  travel  and  linked  travel 
arrangements (‘the Directive’, ‘the Package Travel Directive’ or ‘the PTD’).18 The Directive is part 
of the EEA acquis and thus applies in the 30 EEA-countries.19 The PTD contains a broader definition 
of what constitutes a package than the 1990 Directive and introduced the new concept of linked travel 
arrangements  (LTAs)  for  loser  combinations  of  travel  services.20  Packages  and  linked  travel 
arrangements  are  combinations  of  at  least  two  different  types  of  travel  services  (e.g.,  passenger 
transport, such as a flight, and accommodation or car rental, however not the mere combination of 

of the total spending in the EU for travels for personal reasons. In 2017, the package sector generated an expenditure of 
roughly EUR 85.04 bn, which continued to account for  23% of the  total spending in the  EU for travels for personal 
reasons.” 
12  Statista,  Mobility  Market  Insights,  Travel  &  Tourism,  Package  Travel  Outlook,  downloaded  on  28  April  2023, 
https://www.statista.com/outlook/mmo/travel-tourism/package-holidays/eu-27?currency=EUR. The forecasts have been 
updated in January 2023 and take into account the impact on prices and market trends of the war on Ukraine. 
13  World  Economic  Forum,  (2022),  How  quickly  is  tourism  recovering  from  COVID-19?,  available  at: 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/03/europe-tourism-has-slow-pandemic-recovery/  
14  European  Travel  Commission,  (2022),  European  Tourism  2022  –  Trends  &  Prospects  (Q2/2022),  available  at: 
https://etc-corporate.org/uploads/2022/07/Quarterly-Report-Q2-2022_Public-1.pdf 
15 Expected compound annual growth rate (CAGR) for the period 2023-2027. 
16  Statista,  Mobility  Market  Insights,  Travel  &  Tourism,  Package  Travel  Outlook,  downloaded  on  28  April  2023, 
https://www.statista.com/outlook/mmo/travel-tourism/package-holidays/eu-27?currency=EUR.  The  predictions  have 
been updated in January 2023 and take into account the impact on prices and market trends of the war on Ukraine. 
17 Council Directive 90/314/EEC of 13 June 1990 on package  travel, package holidays and package tours  (OJ L 158, 
23.6.1990, p. 59). 
18 Directive (EU) 2015/2302 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on package travel and 
linked  travel  arrangements,  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  2006/2004  and  Directive  2011/83/EU  of  the  European 
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 90/314/EEC (OJ L 326, 11.12.2015, p. 1). Any references 
to specific articles of the Directive, are references to the 2015 Directive. 
19  Decision  of  the  EEA  Joint  Committee  No 187/2017  of  22  September  2017  amending  Annex  XIX  (Consumer 
protection) to the EEA Agreement [2019/] (efta.int). https://www.efta.int/eea-lex/32015L2302. 
20  Under Article 3(5) PTD, LTAs are those where ‘at least two different types of travel services purchased for the purpose 
of the same trip or holiday, not constituting a package, resulting in the conclusion of separate contracts with the individual 
travel service providers’ Depending on how the services are booked, there can be two types of LTAs: type (a) where  a 
trader facilitates the separate selection and separate payment of each travel service by travellers on the occasion of a 
single visit or contact with his point of sale; type (b) where  a trader facilitates in a targeted manner, the procurement of 
at least one additional travel service from another trader where a contract with such other trader is concluded at the latest 
24 hours after the confirmation of the booking of the first travel service. 

2 

 
 
 
different modes of transport). Depending on the booking process such combinations can be packages, 
offering full protection, or LTAs, offering more limited protection. The protected party in the PTD 
is the ‘traveller’, encompassing consumers and certain business travellers. This report uses ‘traveller’ 
and ‘consumer’ interchangeably. Organisers of a package are responsible for the proper performance 
of a package and are subject to various other obligations under the PTD. Where packages are sold 
via a third party (intermediary), this trader is referred to as a ‘retailer’.  

Package travellers enjoy the same comprehensive rights across the EU,21 including in relation to pre-
contractual information, the content of a contract, cancellations and contract changes, liability for 
improper  performance,  assistance,  as  well  as  protection  against  the  insolvency  of  an  organiser 
(refunds of pre-payments and repatriation). 

The Directive started applying in July 2018. In June 2019, the Commission issued a report on the 
provisions  of  the  Directive  on  online  bookings  made  at  different  points  of  sale  (‘click-through 
bookings report’).22,23  

After the adoption of the first Package Travel Directive in 1990, five Regulations on passenger rights 
in different modes of transport were adopted at EU level. For example, Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 
(the ‘Air Passenger Rights Regulation’ or ‘APRR’)24 which provides for rights of air passengers in 
relation to flight cancellations, denied boarding or delays. This Regulation is complementary to the 
PTD, given that flights are often part of a package, and the relationship between both instruments is 
regulated in different provisions of the PTD and the APRR, aiming to achieve coherence between the 
two instruments.25 

Overall, the PTD is more comprehensive in terms of consumer rights and provides for a higher level 
of consumer protection. For instance, unlike under the PTD, there is no compulsory protection for 
passengers  against  the  air  carrier’s  insolvency  and  no  cancellation  right  for  passengers  due  to 
unavoidable  and  extraordinary  circumstances  under  the  APRR.  However,  the  Air  Services 

21 The PTD, unlike the repealed 1990 Directive, is a full harmonisation directive (Article 4). Still, it gives the Member 
States regulatory options in a few specific respects (e.g., regarding the full liability of retailers in addition to the liability 
of organisers). 
22  Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  on  the  provisions  of  Directive  (EU) 
2015/2302 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on package travel and linked travel 
arrangements  applying  to  online  bookings  made  at  different  points  of  sale  (COM(2019)270  final,  21.6.2019(, 
accompanied by the Staff Working Document (SWD(2019) 270 final).  
23 In line with Article 3(2)(b)(v) of the PTD, a ‘click-through package’ is a combination of at least two different types of 
travel services for the purpose of the same trip or holiday that is purchased from separate traders through linked online 
booking processes where the traveller's name, payment details and e-mail address are transmitted from the trader with 
whom the first contract is concluded to another trader or traders and a contract with the latter trader or traders is concluded 
at the latest 24 hours after the confirmation of the booking of the first travel service. 
24 Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common 
rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of 
flights,  and  repealing  Regulation  (EEC)  No  295/91  (Text  with  EEA  relevance)  -  Commission  Statement  (OJ  L  46, 
17.2.2004, p. 1). 
25 Certain notions are similar in the two instruments, e.g., ‘unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’ are used in the 
PTD (regarding cancellations by organisers and travellers and the organiser’s liability) and ‘extraordinary circumstances’ 
in the APRR (in Article 5(3), excluding compensation for flights cancelled by the air carrier on these grounds). There 
are, in both acts, references to the other instrument to clarify their relationship: e.g., in PTD Article 13(7): extended stay 
if  return  journey  delayed  due  to  unavoidable  and  extraordinary  circumstances  or  Article  14(5)  regarding  parallel 
compensation  claims  (no  over-compensation);  in  the  APRR,  e.g.  Article  8(2)  from  which  it  follows  that  the  right  to 
reimbursement under paragraph (1)(a) of that same provision does not apply where such a right arises under the PTD.  

3 

 
 
 
Regulation26  provides  for  a  strict  financial  oversight  regime  for  airlines.  An  overview  of  the  key 
consumer rights under the PTD and of the APRR is provided in Annex 11.  

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic led to mass cancellations of package holidays, while no 
new bookings came in. Due to the knock-on liquidity problems of organisers, many travellers did not 
receive  refunds  or  only  considerably  later  than  the  14  days  required  under  the  PTD.  In  its 
Recommendation 2020/648 of May 2020 (’the 2020 Recommendation’),27 the Commission set out 
principles on the use of voluntary vouchers and ways to make them more attractive for travellers, 
including by protecting them against the insolvency of the organiser. Uptake of the Recommendation 
has varied across the Member States. Several Member States even adopted legislation deviating from 
the Directive, extending the periods for refunds or making vouchers mandatory for travellers. In July 
2020, the Commission therefore opened infringement proceedings against 11 Member States.28  

The Commission’s report of 26.2.2021 (‘PTD Application Report’)29 provides an overview of how 
the Directive has been applied since July 2018, and how it has been transposed by the Member States 
into national law. It highlights several challenges, including those emerging from the 2019 Thomas 
Cook bankruptcy and the COVID-19 pandemic. The difficulties in applying the PTD, highlighted in 
the report, include the complexity and uncertainty caused by the provisions on LTAs, difficulties in 
issuing refunds and effective insolvency protection in a major crisis, including the lack of rules on 
vouchers and uncertainty on insolvency protection cover for vouchers and refund claims for cancelled 
packages. Moreover, the Commission has conducted an evaluation of the Directive, which can be 
found in Annex 13 to this staff working document (‘SWD’).  

The European Court of Auditors (‘ECA’) issued a special report on the non-respect of air passenger 
rights during COVID-19.30 In its recommendations, the ECA asked the Commission to examine how, 
including through legislative changes, the rights of air passengers and travellers can be strengthened, 
including in a crisis, regarding refunds for cancelled trips and the insolvency of operators. 

In parallel to this review, the Commission is reviewing the passenger rights regulatory framework, 
under the initiative ‘Travel – better protection for passengers and their rights’,31 including also the 
APRR.32 The review of the APRR comprises refunds for cancelled flights where intermediaries are 

26 Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 2008 on common rules 
for the operation of air services in the Community (Recast), OJ L 293, 31.10.2008, p. 3–20.  
27 Commission Recommendation 2020/648 of 13.5.2020 on vouchers offered to passengers and travellers as an alternative 
to  reimbursement  for  cancelled  package  travel  and  transport  services  in  the  context  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic, 
C/2020/3125 (OJ L 151, 14.5.2020, p. 10). 
28 15 Member States adopted specific rules temporarily allowing organisers of packages to impose vouchers, instead of 
reimbursing payments in money, for cancelled trips, or to postpone reimbursement beyond the 14-day period, which is 
contrary the PTD. The Commission opened infringement proceedings against 11 Member States.  
See  Commission’s  press  communications  of  2  July  and  30  October  2020  (under  point  5  –  Justice): 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/INF_20_1212 
and 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_20_1687  
29 European Commission (2021): Report on the application of Directive (EU) 2015/2302 of the European Parliament and 
of  the  Council  on  package  travel  and  linked  travel  arrangements,  COM(2021)  90  final,  (‘PTD  Application  Report’): 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2021%3A90%3AFIN  
30  Special  Report  15/2021:  Air  passenger  rights  during  the  COVID-19  pandemic:  Key  rights  not  protected  despite 
Commission efforts, https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR21_15/SR_passenger-rights_covid_EN.pdf  
31https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13290-Travel-better-protection-for-
passengers-and-their-rights_en 
32 Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common 
rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of 
flights,  and  repealing  Regulation  (EEC)  No  295/91  (Text  with  EEA  relevance)  -  Commission  Statement  (OJ  L  46, 
17.2.2004, p. 1). 

4 

 
 
 
 
involved. In addition,  the review of the Air Services Regulation, which remains to  be completed, 
could increase coherence between air passenger rights and the PTD. This review covers the financial 
resilience of air carriers, including  the  question of insolvency protection for air carriers,  potential 
limitations of prepayments, possible cancellation rights for air passengers and price transparency.   

Given the comprehensive character of the PTD, the purpose of the amendments considered in this 
IAR is to fill specific gaps and clarify specific issues in this legal act. Given that the scope and purpose 
of the other acts and initiatives is different, the need to tackle these issues in the PTD is independent 
of these acts  and initiatives.  The filling of gaps  and the clarifications considered  for the PTD  are 
particularly important for the protection of travellers in a crisis but would add value to the PTD also 
at  normal  times.  The  targeted  changes  considered  relate,  for  instance,  to  the  absence  of  rules  on 
vouchers, uncertainty on insolvency protection for vouchers and refund claims and specific aspects 
of the cancellation of packages due to unavoidable circumstances.  

In as much as this can be done in the PTD, the envisaged revision will further improve coherence 
between the PTD and the APRR, e.g., through the introduction of rules on vouchers and a business-
to-business  refund  right.33  The  measures  on  pre-payments,  insolvency  protection  and  crisis 
mechanisms,  which  are  part  of  the  preferred  option,  take  into  account  the  state  of  play  regarding 
passenger rights.  Any further steps towards more coherence between the legislation on packages and 
transport services depend on developments in legislation managed by DG MOVE, for instance, in 
relation to the Air Services Regulation.34  

The evaluation and review of the PTD is listed in the New Consumer Agenda of 13 November 2020,35 
where the Commission announced that by 2022 it would carry out a ‘deeper analysis into whether 
the current regulatory framework for package travel, including as regards insolvency protection, is 
still fully up to the task of ensuring robust and comprehensive consumer protection at all times, taking 
into account also developments in the field of passenger rights.’ Moreover, the initiative contributes 
to  the  Sustainable  Development  Goal  (‘SDG’)  SDG  no.  10  –  reduced  inequalities,  by  facilitating 
better information provision by organisers and better protection of travellers’ rights. It further aims 
at  reducing  the  number  of  travellers  needing  recourse  to  dispute  resolution  or  legal  procedures, 
thereby contributing to SDG no. 16 – peace, justice and strong institutions. Finally, it contributes to 
SDG No. 8 – decent work and economic growth, by promoting growth of SMEs, as most package 
organisers belong to this category. 

The PTD is in the scope of application of the Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation (‘CPC 
Regulation’)36 and the Representative Actions Directive (‘RAD’).37 Thanks to these instruments, its 
enforcement will become more effective. Already today, the CPC Regulation provides, inter alia, for 
joint enforcement actions against non-compliant traders. Furthermore, through the recent initiative 

33 See the description of the relevant measures in Section 5.3. 
34 Such questions were originally included in the review of passenger rights. However, DG MOVE considered that it 
would be better to look at the impact of measures to mitigate the risk of a liquidity crisis or disorderly insolvency of an 
air carrier, and the reimbursement and repatriation in such cases, in the context of the impact assessment regarding the 
Air Services Regulation. 
35 COM/2020/696 final, EUR-Lex - 52020DC0696 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu) 
36  Regulation  (EU)  2017/2394  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  12  December  2017  on  cooperation 
between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws and repealing Regulation (EC) 
No 2006/2004, OJ L 345, 27.12.2017, p. 1–26, EUR-Lex - 32017R2394 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu) 
37 Directive  (EU)  2020/1828  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council of  25  November 2020  on representative 
actions  for  the  protection  of  the  collective  interests  of  consumers  and  repealing  Directive  2009/22/EC,  OJ  L  409, 
4.12.2020, p. 1-27, EUR-Lex - 32020L1828 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu)  

5 

 
 
 
on Consumer protection – Strengthened Enforcement Cooperation,38 this system will be strengthened 
also in relation to large EU-wide infringements. The RAD applies from June 2023, and increases the 
level of protection of travellers’ and consumers’ collective interests, both at national and cross-border 
level, for example by seeking injunctive and redress measures. Since the PTD lays down substantive 
rules, whereas the CPC Regulation and RAD are procedural rules, the instruments are complementary 
without raising potential coherence issues.  

The  recent  Commission  proposal  on  insolvency39  aims  to  create  more  predictable  conditions  for 
cross-border investment in the EU by harmonising targeted aspects of substantive insolvency law. 
The PTD and the Insolvency Proposal aim at the proper functioning of the internal market but have 
a  different  purpose.  Both  instruments  are  complementary,  and  no  potential  conflict  has  been 
identified.  

2.  PROBLEM DEFINITION 

2.1.  What are the problems? 

In the EU, package travel is a highly regulated market. Indeed, the PTD contains detailed rules on 
aspects such as pre-contractual information requirements, contract changes, cancellations, liability 
for  improper  performance,  alternative  arrangements,  assistance  to  travellers  and  insolvency 
protection requirements for package organisers. In this way, the Directive aims to ensure a high level 
of protection for travellers and to contribute to fair competition in the internal market. 

This  initiative  seeks  to  address  three  main  problems  which  have  contributed  to  the  fact  that  the 
Directive is only partially effective, as found in the evaluation and described in more detail below, 
along with their regulatory and practical drivers. These three problems are: Problem 1 – Travellers 
face  difficulties  in  recovering  prepayments  for  cancelled  packages,  in  particular  in  the  event  of  a 
major  crisis,  Problem  2  –  Prepayments  made  by  travellers  are  not  sufficiently  protected  against 
insolvency of the organiser, and Problem 3 – Difficulties in implementing the Directive. 

These three problems interact and have a cumulative impact on the effectiveness of the Directive. 
Problem 1, as well as certain aspects of problems 2 and 3 manifested themselves, in particular, during 
the COVID-19 pandemic, whereas certain aspects of problems 2 and 3 were identified already before 
or  independently  of  COVID-19.  Most  aspects  covered  by  the  three  problems  concern  regulatory 
failure in  the form  of legal  gaps and uncertainty regarding certain  provisions  and concepts of the 
Directive.  In  addition,  certain  aspects  of  problems  1  and  2,  i.e.  the  challenges  posed  by  the  pre-
payment model in the face of mass cancellations and the limited availability of insolvency protection 
insurance in some Member States, relate to market failure, predominantly in a major crisis. 

https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13535-Consumer-protection-strengthened-

38 
enforcement-cooperation_en 
39  (COM(2022)702),  https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12592-Insolvency-laws-
increasing-convergence-of-national-laws-to-encourage-cross-border-investment_en 

6 

 
 
 
 
2.1.1.  Problem  1:  Travellers  face  difficulties  in  recovering  prepayments  for  cancelled 

packages, in particular in the event of a major crisis 

Traditionally, pre-payments are the standard payment model in the package travel sector.40 However, 
prepayments imply that, in case of cancellation, the organiser must reimburse travellers under certain 
conditions. 41  

Under the PTD, travellers and/or organisers have the right to cancel packages free of charge ‘in the 
event of unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’, travellers being entitled to a full refund of 
any  payments  made  for  the  package  within  14  days  from  the  termination  of  the  contract.42  As 
explained further below, before the COVID-19 pandemic, although travellers experienced problems 
in  recovering  prepayments  in  the  event  of  cancellations  of  package  travel  contracts  due  to 
‘“unavoidable  and  extraordinary  circumstances’”,  the  related  refunds  became  problematic  for 
travellers and organisers in particular during the COVID-19 pandemic.   

Before  the  COVID-19  period,  the  losses  experienced  by  travellers  related  to  the  cancellation  of 
packages can be estimated based on the annual consumer expenditures for package travel. In 2017, 
these were  estimated to  reach  58 billion EUR (762 EUR per trip) for trips  within the EU and  36 
billion EUR (1.756 EUR per trip) for trips to other parts of the world.43 This corresponds to around 
76.1 million trips within the EU and 20.5 million trips to countries outside the EU. Based on the PTD 
Application Report, around 4.4% of package travellers experienced financial loss,44 a fact that may 
have an impact of 5.4 billion EUR on trip values (both within and outside the EU). It is unlikely that 
the losses suffered by the affected travellers would have amounted to the total value of their trips. 
Considering that the value of the affected services represents between 10-30%45 of the total package 
price, the losses suffered by travellers are estimated at between 540 million to 1.6 billion EUR per 
year in a normal year.46  

According to consumer organisations, travellers faced challenges in recovering prepayments, albeit 
to a lesser extent as during the COVID-19.47 This suggests that there were certain compliance issues 

The 

average 

40  Commission  Staff  Working  Document  Impact  Assessment,  Accompanying  the  document  on  package  travel  and 
assisted  travel  arrangements,  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  2006/2004l  and  Directive  2011/83/EU  and  repealing 
Council  Directive  90/314/EEC  /*  SWD/2013/0263  final  */,  page  76  (SWD/2013/0263  final),  https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A52013SC0263 
41 A presentation of all the situations where organisers must reimburse travellers following the cancellation of the contract 
is included in Annex 11. Presentation of the Package Travel Directive   
42 In accordance with Article 12(2) and (5) 
43 PTD Application Report, p.2, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2021%3A90%3AFIN    
44 The report states that 11% of all package travel consumers experienced problems, and 40% of these – that is 4.4% of 
all package travel consumers - experienced financial loss. PTD Application Report, p.3. 
45 
passenger 
(https://www.statista.com/statistics/1125265/average-ticket-price-selected-airlines-europe/),  and  the  average  long-haul 
price is 350 EUR per passenger (https://media.hopper.com/research/consumer-airfare-index-report-march-2022) which, 
in case of cancellation or delays would make up 12% of  average intra-EU and 20% of international package travel price. 
Noting that the quoted airfares concern individually purchased tickets, it is assumed that airfares included in package 
trips may be more economical. Moreover, for the calculation of consumer losses, both flights (outgoing and return) would 
not necessarily be impacted. In terms of consumer losses related to accommodation services, an average hotel price per 
night in the EU between 100-200 EUR is considered. Consequently, losses resulting from unsatisfactory accommodation 
can impact 13-26% of package travel prices. Similarly, to airfare however, we estimate that accommodation is sold at a 
discount for package trips and consider that not the entirety of costs may be linked to consumer losses.  
46 In addition, based on an alternative calculation, ICF estimated the yearly consumer detriment at between EUR 126 
million and EUR 378 million. ICF study (for full reference see footnote 11), not yet published, page 122-123 
47 Targeted survey for consumer organisations: According to replies to Q6,  travellers received a full refund within 14 
days or at least within one month only ‘occasionally’ before COVID-19. Moreover, travellers ‘often’ received a refund 

intra-EU 

around 

flight 

EUR 

price 

per 

90 

an 

of 

is 

7 

 
 
 
 
also at ordinary times, but, in the absence of more specific information, it must be assumed that, in 
terms of the volume of refunds and the extent of the delay of refunds, the problems were much smaller 
than during the COVID crisis.  

‘To reinforce the enforcement and consumer protection’, BEUC calls for automatic refunds for clear 
cut  cases.48,49  The  organisers  have  travellers’  data  and  ‘could  simply  transfer  the  money  to  them 
automatically without the need for consumers to complain first. […] Similar schemes already exist 
in several sectors, including rail, energy in the UK or public transport in Denmark.’50  

The outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020 was a severe public health emergency, which also caused a major 
economic shock with unprecedented pressure on the EU’s travel and tourism sectors.  

To contain the COVID-19 pandemic, travel and other health-related restrictions were implemented 
since  March  2020  at  European  and  worldwide  level.  Those  restrictions  led  to  a  vast  number  of 
cancellations of package travel contracts, impacting the tourism sector in all Member States and the 
EEA. For example, ‘according to the Bulgarian authorities […] the spread of COVID-19 in 2020 led 
to  a collapse of the tourism sector’51 In Austria,  ‘[d]uring  the first  lockdown […] in  spring 2020, 
overnight tourist stays in the country dropped by almost 100%. Over the summer of 2020, despite 
temporary  recovery,  tourism  activity  remained  clearly  below  2019  levels.  As  of  October  2020, 
another economic downturn in the Austrian tourism sector began due to the increase in the number 
of COVID-19 infections  and the related travel  warnings adopted in  neighbouring countries. On 2 
November 2020, a second lockdown was imposed during which accommodation establishments and 
restaurants  had  to  close.  […]  overnight  tourist  stays  in  Austria  dropped  again  by  around  95%  in 
November  2020.  On  2  December  2020,  the  Austrian  government  announced  that  Austrian 
accommodation establishments would not reopen before January 2021. In January 2021, the website 
of  the  Federal  Ministry  for  Agriculture,  Regions  and  Tourism  announces  that  accommodation 

only after filing a complaint, and ‘rarely’ without this procedure. National consumer authorities also pointed out that 
challenges regarding reimbursements (e.g., agreement of parties on whether the situation qualified as ‘unavoidable and 
extraordinary circumstances’ or  significantly affected the package in question) that were observed ‘to a small extent’ 
before COVID-19 turned into significant ones during the pandemic. (See Annex 13, Evaluation, EQ 5.) 
48 The Package Travel Directive: BEUC’s Position on how to regain consumers’ trust in the tourism sector, p. 6 and 8,  
beuc-x-2021-115_package_travel_directive_beuc_s_views_on_how_to_regain_consumer_trust_in_the_tourism_sector.pdf. 
Passenger  Rights  2.0:  Towards  better  consumer  protection  and  a  more  resilient  travel  sector,  p.  20,  BEUC-X-2022-
125_Better_Protection_of_Passengers_and_their_Rights.pdf  
49 'Even simple refund and compensation claims often end up in vain due to the crippled enforcement procedures. This 
ends  up  being  very  frustrating’  for  consumers.  See  Passenger  Rights  2.0:  Towards  better  consumer  protection  and  a  more 
resilient travel sector, p. 20. 
50 Rail in the UK: several rail companies propose automated reimbursement arrangements to their customers. Similar 
initiative 
(https://d3cez36w5wymxj.cloudfront.net/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/16173333/AGENCY-REPORT-delays-and compensation.pdf). 
Energy  in  the  UK:  https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications/customers-entitled-automatic-compensation-switching-
problems-1-may.  
Public  transport  in  Denmark:  https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications/customers-entitled-automatic-compensation-
switching-problems-1-may.  
Automatic compensation is also an official recommendation of the European Court of Auditors formulated in its report 
on passenger rights, published in December 2018.  
https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR18_30/SR_PASSENGER_RIGHTS_EN.pdf 
51  State  Aid  SA.101306  (2021/N)  –  Bulgaria  COVID-19:  State  aid 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases1/202204/SA_101306_D0F7727E-0000-C49E-A61B-
14A989909127_54_1.pdf 

tour  operators,  available  at: 

Sweden 

railway 

sector 

exist 

the 

in 

in 

to 

8 

 
 
 
establishments will remain closed also in February 2021.’52,53 The German authorities estimated ‘that 
revenues of the travel industry in Germany decreased by EUR 10.8 billion by the end of June 2020.’54 
In Sweden, ‘the revenues for travel agencies and tour operators […] was in average 78% lower from 
May 11 to November 11 2020, compared to the years before the COVID-19 outbreak.’55 According 
to the French authorities, the COVID-19 gravely impacted the tourism sector ‘representing between 
7.5 and 9% of Gross Domestic Product’ and the package travel market in particular, ‘representing 
between 20 and 30% of this percentage.’56 

While it is not possible to arrive at a robust estimate of the value or number of cancelled packages, 
the  data  available  for  flights  can  give  an  indication  on  the  magnitude  of  the  cancellation  also  for 
packages. ‘The total reduction in passenger numbers was estimated at 346 million for the first six 
months  of  the  year  of  2020  by  Eurostat,  and  at  800  million,  or  67%,  for  the  full  year  by  the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO).’57 According to the estimation of the European 
Court of Auditors (ECA), roughly 50 million tickets were cancelled between March and May 2020.  

In  the  Impact  Assessment  (IA)  accompanying  a  proposal  for  a  Regulation  for  common  rules  for 
enforcement  of  passenger  rights,  passenger  rights  for  multimodal  journeys,  and  reimbursements  of 
airline tickets bought via an intermediary,58 it is assumed that the percentage of tickets in terms of number 
of passengers59,60 of scheduled and charter flights as part of package travel would be 1.5-3% each. 61 

of 

and 

travel 

linked 

services, 

available 

organisers 

facilitators 

52  Study  from  the  Austrian  National  Bank  (OeNB)  „Totalausfall  der  Wintervorsaison  bis  Neujahr  lässt  ein 
für  das  Gesamtjahr  2020  von  36  %  erwarten“,  Wien,  04.12.2020,  available  at: 
Nächtigungsminus 
https://www.oenb.at/Presse/20201204.html  ,  State  Aid  SA.60521  (2020/N)  –  Austria  COVID-19:  State  guarantee  to 
package 
at: 
travel 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases1/20216/291287_2244193_99_2.pdf  
53 According to the Austrian authorities, the tourism sector, including the package travel market, is an important pillar of 
the Austrian economy contributing 7.3% to the Austrian value added. State Aid SA.60521 (2020/N) – Austria COVID-
19:  State  guarantee  to  package  travel  organisers  and  facilitators  of  linked  travel  services,  available  at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases1/20216/291287_2244193_99_2.pdf 
54 State Aid SA.57741 (2020/N) – Germany COVID-19: Aid in the form of guarantees on vouchers issued for package 
tours, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases1/202032/287255_2178558_45_2.pdf 
55 State Aid SA.59639 (2021/N) – Sweden, COVID-19: aid scheme for travel agencies and tour operators, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases1/20217/291810_2244846_57_2.pdf 
56 State Aid SA.104022 (2022/N) – France State guarantee fund for travel operators (“Fonds de garantie des opérateurs 
de voyages et de séjours” or “FGOVS”), available at SA_104022_404A4C87-0000-C6F0-AC80-
40B28799B06E_68_1.pdf (europa.eu)  
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases1/202314/SA_104022_404A4C87-0000-C6F0-AC80-
40B28799B06E_68_1.pdf 
57 European Court of Auditors, Special Report 15/2021: Air passenger rights during the COVID-19 pandemic: Key rights 
not  protected  despite  Commission  efforts,  https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR21_15/SR_passenger-
rights_covid_EN.pdf, p13 
58  SWD(2023) 386-SWD(2023) 389, page 84, Table: Airline ticket payment flows 
59 Based on evidence provided by IATA and estimates in the context of the impact assessment support study (based on 
evidence gathered by a group of 5 airlines, which shows that approximately 36% of all passengers’ book via intermediary 
ticket vendors).  
60 Comparing the information provided by air carriers on the share of tickets sold via intermediary ticket vendors and the 
information provided by IATA on the amount (in euros) of ticket flows in ticket, it has been  assumed that the share of 
tickets sold via intermediary ticket vendors is more or less proportional to the share of tickets sold (in paid amounts, as 
provided by IATA). The share of tickets sold via intermediary ticket vendors is considered proportional to the share of 
passengers booking via intermediary ticket vendors. 
61 Given the lack of clarity on the share of tickets, it has been assumed, using a cautious approach, that between 25% and 
75% of ticket flows may fall within the scope of the Passenger Rights Regulation. The mid-point of this range has been 
considered, i.e., 3%. In addition, it has been considered that 3% of ticket flows are under the Package Travel Directive. 

9 

 
 
 
Between March and May 2020, at the beginning of COVID-19, the cancellation of approx. 50 million 
flight  tickets,62  triggered  a  decrease  of  flights  of  around  76%  and  a  decrease  of  around  75%  in 
expenditure  on  package  trips  in  2020  as  compared  to  2019.63  Based  on  this  data,  and  using  the 
abovementioned estimate that the value of the affected flights included in packages would represent 
between 10-30% of the total package price, the losses could range from 500-1500 million during the 
first three months of the pandemic.64 

Travellers from all Member States faced major difficulties in recovering prepayments within 14 days 
for cancelled packages during the COVID-19 pandemic.65 By December 2020, thousands of travellers 
had not yet received a refund in money for cancelled holidays, according to Bureau Européen des 
Unions de Consommateurs (BEUC).66,67,68 

More specifically, 85% (23 of 27) of national authorities indicated that refunds of prepayments were 
not  provided  within  14  days.69  Organisers  denied  or  postponed  the  refunds  either  by  imposing 
vouchers/credit notes on travellers,70 or extending the 14-day deadline for refunds by more than a 
month.71 Travellers often received a refund only after filing a complaint to an enforcement body.72 
Travellers were often not informed on their right to refuse vouchers 73 and sometimes traders refused 

62 European Court of Auditors, Special Report 15/2021: Air passenger rights during the COVID-19 pandemic: Key rights 
not  protected  despite  Commission  efforts,  https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR21_15/SR_passenger-
rights_covid_EN.pdf, p13 
63 According to Eurostat, in EU-27, there was a total of 1146,44 million flights in 2019, 277 million flights in 2020 and 
374 million flights in 2021.  
Based on Eurostat for 2014, 2017, 2020, 2021, interpolated values for 2015, 2016, 2018, 2019, 2022, 2023 and on firm 
level data (ORBIS) as well as on the European Commission 2023 Spring Economic Forecast,  it resulted that the total 
expenditure for package trips was EUR 110.709 million in 2019, EUR 27.627 million in 2020, EUR 35.879 million in 
2021, EUR 76.673 million in 2022 and EUR 110.709 million in 2023, the same level of 2019. 
Based on Eurostat for 2014, 2017, 2020, 2021, interpolated values for 2015, 2016, 2018, 2019, 2022, 2023 and on firm 
level data (ORBIS) as well as on the European Commission 2023 Spring Economic Forecast, it resulted that the average 
package price in EU-27, for trips within the EU and to the rest of the world, was of EUR 1.202 million in 2017, EUR 
1.239 million in 2020, EUR 1.274 million in 2021, EUR 1.383 million in 2022 and EUR 1.475 million in 2023. 
64 An estimation of 4.029.660 cancelled packages during March – May 2020. 
65 Annex 13, Evaluation, EQ 5 
66  BEUC  (‘Bureau  Européen  des  Unions  de  Consommateurs’)  is  the  umbrella  group  for  45  independent  consumer 
organisations from 31 countries. BEUC represents the national consumer organisations to the EU institutions and defend 
the interests of European consumers. 
67 BEUC’s Evaluation of the Member States Implementation of the EU Commission Recommendation on ‘vouchers’ 
of 14.12.2020, https://www.beuc.eu/publications/travel-voucher-chaos-continues-several-eu-countries-and-travel-
industry-still-flouting/html  
68 ‘No less than half of European households lost money as a result of the crisis’ during the pandemic. Furthermore, there 
was 
to  BEUC 
complaints 
https://www.beuc.eu/sites/default/files/publications/beuc-x-2020-030_position_on_travelers_rights_in_the_covid-
19_context.pdf, p 1, incl. footnote 1 
69 Targeted survey for NCAs (regulatory and enforcement), Q1 
70 Public consultation, Q41: 86% (18 of 21) of consumer organisations and 58% (11 of 19 ) public authorities. And see 
BEUC position papers submitted to the Inception Impact Assessment and to the public consultation that describes issues 
around imposition of vouchers. 
71 Public consultation, Section III additional questions for consumer organisations and public authorities, Q44: 52% (11 
out of 21) of consumer organisations and 74% (14 out of 19) of public authorities. In Q36, a similar question addressed 
to individuals using packages, this scenario was indicated by 20% (10 out of 49) of EU citizens. (Non-EU citizens did 
not reply to this question).  
72 Public consultation Q44: When asked what happened frequently with regard the refund, 81% (17 of 21) of consumer 
organisations and 53% (10 of 19) of public authorities. In Q36, a similar question addressed to individuals, this scenario 
was indicated by 14% (7 of 49) of EU citizens. 
73  Targeted  business  survey  Q15:  Travellers  were  explicitly  informed  that  they  were  not  legally  obliged  to  accept  a 
voucher: 32% of 22 - to a small extent. 

‘tremendous 

according 

consumer 

increase 

issues’, 

travel 

about 

in 

10 

 
 
 
to reimburse money for expired vouchers.74 Moreover, some travellers did not use the vouchers for 
alternative  trips  and  were,  between  February  and  May  2022,  still  waiting  for  their  money.75  In 
addition, travellers were referred from one trader to another, as the organiser and the retailer could 
not agree on who was responsible for the refund, thus triggering delay or no reimbursement.76  

Therefore,  the  problems  faced  by  travellers  in  recovering  prepayments  caused  loss  in  consumer 
welfare,  including  by  impeding  travellers  to  dispose  freely  of  the  prepaid  amount,  and  personal 
detriment (e.g., time loss, hassle and other psychological detriment).  

For organisers, it proved difficult to comply with  refund rights triggered by the PTD. On the one 
hand,  organisers  had  booked  travel  services  in  advance  for  travellers,  by  making  partial  or  full 
payments to service providers, while, on the other hand, travellers were cancelling their trips, asking 
for  reimbursement,  without  the  possibility  for  organisers  to  recover  prepayments  from  service 
suppliers.77 Since the number of bookings also collapsed, companies were unable to generate new 
sources of revenue to execute refunds, which had an impact on their liquidity.78 At the same time, if 
service providers became insolvent in the meanwhile, organisers might not receive refunds at all.  

Article 22 of the PTD79 refers to a right of redress of organisers against third parties. However, this 
provision does not specify that service providers are obliged to make a refund to organisers within a 
given period where a service or a package is cancelled.  

The losses experienced by organisers during the COVID-19 period (2020 and 2021 combined) could 
be estimated at 15 billion EUR based on the macro-estimate of total reduction in value.80 However, 
the loss continued after the immediate COVID-19 years and could arrive at up to 25 billion  EUR 
until the end of 2023. Nevertheless, in order to arrive at a net loss figure, state support measures and 
lower operating costs (e.g., fuel not used) would need to be deducted. Based on a rough gap analysis, 
support measures could have cushioned up to 40% of immediate crisis losses suffered by organisers. 

74 Public consultation Q44: 57% (12 of 21) of consumer organisations and 11% (2 of 19) of public authorities. 
75 Public consultation Q44: 81% (17 of 21) of consumer organisations, 42% (8 of 19) of public authorities and in Q36, a 
similar  question  addressed  to  individuals  using  travel  services,  6%  (3  of  49)  of  EU  citizens  indicated  the  following 
scenario as frequently happening with regard to refund: travellers received vouchers of the same value but have not used 
them for alternative trips until the expiration date  and are still waiting for their money. 52% (11 of 21) of consumer 
organisations and 11% (2 of 19) of public authorities indicated the scenario “Many travellers are still waiting for their 
money.” 
76 Public consultation Q44: 67% (14 of 21) of consumer organisations and 32 % (6 of 19) of public authorities. 
77 ECTAA, (2020), COVID-19 and Tourism in Europe: Which Consequences for Travel Agencies and Tour Operators - 
Impact of Package Travel Directive and other EU legislation on the travel companies in the context of the pandemic, p. 
6.  
78 Ibidem.  
79 Article 22 PTD reads as follows: ‘In cases where an organiser or, in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 
13(1) or Article 20, a retailer pays compensation, grants price reduction or meets the other obligations incumbent on him 
under this Directive, Member States shall ensure that the organiser or retailer has the right to seek redress from any third 
parties which contributed to the event triggering compensation, price reduction or other obligations.’ 
80 Based on data provided by Eurostat and on the European Commission 2023 Spring Economic Forecast  

11 

 
 
 
Organisers had to take out loans to cover the costs of refunds to travellers at least ‘to a moderate 
extent’.81 In several, but not all Member States, there were aid schemes for package organisers and 
other travel companies. 82,83  

Several Member States adopted temporary rules deviating from the PTD, 15 of them giving package 
organisers the possibility to significantly extend the periods for reimbursements or make vouchers 
mandatory for travellers. In July 2020, the Commission opened infringement proceedings against 11 
Member  States.84  The  infringement  proceedings  were  closed  after  the  relevant  Member  States 
repealed the legislation deviating from the PTD or after the relevant measures had expired. On 8 June 
2023, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) confirmed the Commission’s interpretation 
in the one remaining infringement case and in a preliminary ruling.85 The CJEU confirmed that the 
PTD aims at full harmonisation86 and that the term ‘refund’ in the PTD implies a refund consisting in 
an  amount  of  money  which  travellers  can  dispose  of  freely  and  does  not  include  the  idea  of  a 
voucher.87 The CJEU concluded that the Member States were not allowed to adopt national legislation 
releasing organisers temporarily from the obligation to reimburse prepayments to travellers within 
14 days of the termination of the contract.  

Overall, these national measures and the infringement cases demonstrate that the rules on refunds of 
prepayments of the PTD were often not respected during COVID-19. This is also confirmed by the 
ECA report of 29 June 2021.88  

The protection of prepayments is an area needing improvement as noted in particular by consumer 
organisations, with BEUC recommending that the Commission ‘consider amending the Directive to 
ensure  that  all  European  consumers  benefit  from  a  broader  scope  of  financial  protection  of 
prepayments,  including  for  cancelled  travel  in  extraordinary  circumstances  and  for  respective 
vouchers.’89  

Many national authorities believe that the protection of prepayments should be increased, indicating 
that this can be best addressed through amendments to the PTD,90 while some believe it can be best 

81 Targeted business associations survey, Q15 N = 21: 38% indicated “To a large extent”, 19% indicated “To a moderate 
extent”. To be noted that 43% of respondents replied that they did not know whether organisers had to take out loans to 
cover the costs of refunds to travellers. 
82 Because of the impact of the pandemic on the economy in general as well as on the travel industry specifically, the 
European Commission enabled Member States to use  the full flexibility foreseen under State aid rules to support the 
economy.  In  March  2020,  the  Temporary  Framework  was  adopted  to  e.g.,  alleviate  the  aftermath  of  the  travel  ban 
measures and other sanitary restrictions which weighed on the EU’s economy. The State Aid Temporary Framework. 
Available at: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/coronavirus/temporary-framework_en 
83 See also Annex 13, Evaluation, Appendix IX. Package travel during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
84  See  Commission’s  press  communications  of  2  July  and  30  October  2020  (under  point  5  –  Justice): 
and 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/INF_20_1212 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_20_1687   
85 Case C-407/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:449, CURIA - List of results (europa.eu) and Case C-540/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:450, 
CURIA - List of results (europa.eu)   
86 Case C-407/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:449, paragraph 59, Case C-540/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:450, paragraph 23  
87 Case C-407/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:449, paragraphs 30 and 33 and Case C-540/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:450, paragraph 69  
88  Special  Report  15/2021:  Air  passenger  rights  during  the  COVID-19  pandemic:  Key  rights  not  protected  despite 
Commission efforts, https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR21_15/SR_passenger-rights_covid_EN.pdf  
89 BEUC (2020) BEUC’s Position on traveller’s rights during the COVID-19 crisis, page 6. 
90 Targeted survey for NCAs (regulatory and enforcement), Q32, N=26: 62% (16 of 26) 

12 

 
 
 
addressed through enforcement,91 and a few believe that protection of prepayments does not require 
further action.92  

Finally, most businesses pointed out that they would welcome a new EU rule that requires service 
providers to reimburse organisers where the cancellation is justified under the PTD, within a specific 
time-limit,93 shorter than 14 days.94  

Therefore, during COVID-19, market failures in relation to the prepayment model as well as payment 
and refund flows became apparent, while gaps and uncertainties in the legislation (regulatory failure), 
for  instance,  the  lack  of  provisions  on  vouchers,  made  it  more  difficult  for  stakeholders  to  find 
appropriate solutions.  

Purely  market-based  insurance  solutions  to  tackle  Problem  1  are  not  available.  Under  the  PTD, 
travellers  are  legally  entitled  to  a  full  refund  if  a  package  is  cancelled  due  to  unavoidable  and 
extraordinary circumstances as well as to protection against the insolvency of an organiser. Therefore, 
there  would  be  no  need  or  demand  for  insurance  policies  for  travellers  to  double  these  legal 
guarantees. Travel insurance policies available to travellers usually cover only certain personal risks 
(e.g., health care at the travel destination, including repatriation if the traveller has had an accident 
or is seriously ill, or cancellation because of the traveller’s illness, including or excluding illness due 
to  COVID-19).  By  contrast,  such  insurance  policies  usually  exclude  cancellations  because  of 
unavoidable  and  extraordinary  circumstances  such  as  a  pandemic  or  large-scale  catastrophes  or 
environmental disasters.  

Therefore,  it is  necessary to  examine what  measures could  be taken  to  make the PTD  rules more 
crisis-proof to the extent this is possible for a shock caused by an event of the magnitude of COVID-
19, while taking into account that measures affecting the rules and the market at normal times must 
be proportionate.  

2.1.2.  Problem  2:  Prepayments  made  by  travellers  are  not  sufficiently  protected  against 

insolvency of the organiser 

Travellers  have  been  protected  against  the  insolvency  of  the  organiser  or,  where  relevant,  of  the 
retailer,95 for over 30 years.96,97 Organisers must provide security for the refund of all payments made 
by or on behalf of travellers and, insofar as a package includes the carriage of passengers, for the 

91 Ibidem: 35% (9 of 26) 
92 Ibidem: 15% (4 of 26) 
93 Targeted business survey, Q22: 65% (15 out of 23) of the respondents. 
94 Targeted business survey, Q23: 60% (9 out of 15) of the respondents. 
95 In accordance with recital 42, Member States are ‘allowed to require retailers to take out insolvency protection as well’, 
‘[g]iven the differences in national law and practice regarding the parties to a package travel contract and the receipt of 
payments made by or on behalf of travellers’. 
96 Council Directive 90/314/EEC of 13 June 1990 on package travel, package holidays and package tours laid down 
requirements  for  organisers  and/or  retailers  to  provide  security  for  the  refund  of  pre-payments  and  repatriation  of 
travellers in the event of insolvency. 
97  Various  rationales  for  insolvency  protection  can  be  considered.  Specifically  for  the  package  travel  sector,  where 
prepayments are the standard model, ‘[i]nsolvency is a problem from an economic perspective, since it would allow some 
traders to gain particular benefits from consumers and to engage in risky behaviour, exposing themselves to the danger 
of insolvency. In the absence of a security mechanism, the trader could hence externalise the costs of insolvency to the 
consumers, which, in turn, would lead to under-deterrence.’, Security mechanisms for insolvencies in the package travel 
sector: an economic analysis, Michael Faure, Franziska Weber, Article in Journal of Consumer Policy, December 2013 
DOI: 10.1007/s10603-013-9222-4,  
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/257552200_Security_Mechanisms_for_Insolvencies_in_the_Package_Travel
_Sector_An_Economic_Analysis 

13 

 
 
 
traveller's repatriation in the event of the organiser's insolvency. Furthermore, the PTD introduced 
the principle of mutual recognition of insolvency protection among Member States and facilitated 
administrative cooperation between them, through a network of Central Contact Points.98,99 

The PTD leaves it to Member States to establish the details of their national insolvency protection 
systems, provided that the security to be arranged is effective, meeting the criteria of Article 17 and 
Recitals 39-40.100  

Overall, the 2015 PTD has led to a significant improvement of the national insolvency protection 
systems compared to the situation under the 1990 PTD.101 While there is no evidence that the national 
insolvency  protection  systems  had  general  problems  in  covering  refunds  and  the  repatriation  of 
travellers, there were certain challenges in some Member States, in particular during major crises. 
The  evaluation  found  that:  (i)  the  different  insolvency  protection  systems  across  the  EU  could 
potentially  affect  the  effectiveness  of  the  PTD;  (ii)  there  is  uncertainty  and  there  are  different 
practices on whether refund claims and vouchers are covered where a package is cancelled before an 
organiser becomes insolvent; (iii) there appear to be insufficient insurance solutions in the market or 
insurance solutions offered only at prohibitive prices, in particular during a crisis. These findings are 
further illustrated below.  

Different insolvency protection systems 

Member  States  have  opted  for  different  means  to  ensure  that  travellers  are  protected  in  case  of 
insolvency. The vast majority of the Member States rely on private insolvency protection solutions, 
such  as  insurance  policies  to  be  taken  out  by  organisers,  provided  either  on  a  sole  basis  or  in 
combination  with  other  insolvency  protection  arrangements.  Other  private  forms  include  bank 
guarantees. In some Member States there is a guarantee fund established as a public entity or a mixed 
system, where a form of private security is complemented by a publicly administered guarantee fund 
(double layer) or there are guarantee funds administered by private-public organisations. 

Therefore, there is a landscape of diverse insolvency protection systems across the EU.102 This does 
not necessarily imply that travellers are less well protected in some Member States than in other ones 
or that there is a potential distortion of competition in the EU that could lead companies to establish 
their  businesses  in  Member  States  where  insolvency  protection  requirements  are  less  stringent. 
Indeed, organisers seem to use mutual recognition of insolvency protection only rarely.103 Still, there 

98  See  Article  17  Effectiveness  and  scope  of  insolvency  protection,  Article  18  Mutual  recognition  of  insolvency 
protection and administrative cooperation, and Article 19 Insolvency protection and information requirements for linked 
travel arrangements, recitals 38-44. 
99 Member States are obliged to recognise insolvency protection under the law of the Member State of establishment. In 
order to facilitate the administrative cooperation and supervision of organisers and, where applicable, retailers which are 
operating  in  different  Member  States  with  regard  to  insolvency  protection,  Member  States  are  obliged  to  designate 
central contact points. 
100  In  accordance  with  recital  39  and  Article 17(5),  effectiveness  implies  the  security  must  become  available,  free  of 
charge, ‘as soon as, as a consequence of the organiser's liquidity problems, travel services are not being performed, will 
not  be  or  will  only  partially  be  performed,  or  where  service  providers  require  travellers  to  pay  for  them.’  For  travel 
services  that  have  not  been  performed,  refunds  must  be  provided  without  undue  delay  after  the  traveller's  request. 
Furthermore, travellers must benefit from the protection regardless of their place of residence, the place of departure or 
where the package is sold and irrespective of the Member State where the entity in charge of the insolvency protection is 
located.   
101 PTD Application Report, p. 9,  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2021%3A90%3AFIN  
102  For  details  on  the  national  insolvency  protection  systems,  see  Annex  13,  Evaluation,  Appendix  X.  Overview  of 
national insolvency protection systems. 
103 Annex 13, Evaluation, EQ 3 

14 

 
 
 
are  indications  that  different  level  of  traveller  protection  and  distortion  of  competition  may  have 
occurred or could occur in practice.  

According to most consumer organisations and public authorities,104 travellers in some Member States 
benefit from a higher level of protection than those in other Member States due to such differences, 
while  these  differences  imply  insufficient  protection  of  travellers  in  some  Member  States.105,106 
However, no concrete examples were provided to support this view.  

Nevertheless, most public authorities consider that, at least ‘to some extent’, the main factor affecting 
the  effectiveness  of  the  PTD’s  provisions  on  insolvency  protection  was  the  difference  between 
insolvency protection systems in the EU/EEA Member States/countries.107 

These statements are relevant given that a substantial percentage of retailers often sells packages from 
organisers  located  in  another  EU  or  EEA  State,  some  even  from  organisers  located  outside  the 
EU/EEA.108,109, 110  

104 Targeted survey for consumer organisation, Q15 and Targeted survey for NCAs (insolvency protection), Q16: 58% 
(7 of 12) consumer organisations agree and 33% (4 of 12) tend to agree while 46% (6 of 13) NCAs agree and 23% (3 of 
13) tend to agree,  
105 Public consultation Q17: In total, 28% (125 of 453) of respondents, including 59% of the public authorities (13 of 
22) and 86% of consumer organisations (18 of 21). 
106  Similarly,  in  the  targeted  survey,  a  significant  share  of  consumer  organisations  indicated  that  travellers  are  not 
sufficiently  protected  in  some  Member  States.  NCAs  (insolvency)  authorities  indicated  that  travellers  face  problems 
because of the different insolvency protection rules applying in different Member States. Targeted survey for consumer 
organisation, Q15: 58% (7 of 12) consumer organisations and targeted survey for NCAs (insolvency protection), Q16: 
58% (7 out of 12) 
107 Targeted survey for NCAs (insolvency protection), Q17, 93%, 12 out of 13 
108  Public  consultation  Q60:  40%  of  retailers  (33  of  83)  indicated  to  often  sell  packages  from  organisers  from  other 
countries in the EU/EEA, 41% (34 of 83) to do so rarely and 19% (16 of 83) never to sell such packages. Q61: 16% of 
retailers (13 of 83) indicated to often sell packages from organisers from outside the EU/EEA, 40% (48 of 83) to do so 
rarely and 30% (36 of 83) never to sell such packages. It is important to note that  companies often indicated several 
activities from the list that included retailer, organiser, carrier etc. More information on the activities of the responding 
companies in Annex 2. Section 1 and Annex 4 Section 2. 
109 While no exact data are available concerning the number of such cross-border packages, the available information 
indicates that around 20,000 cross-border complaints were lodged with the European Consumer Centres in 2022. Most 
travellers do not lodge complaints, so that the overall number of cross-border packages is likely substantially higher. The 
European  Consumer  Centres  Network  (ECC-Net)  Anniversary  Report  2005-2020,  p.  19,  indicates  that  during  the 
timespan  of  their  existence,  on  average  17%  of  the  complaints  received  by  ECC-Net  concerned  package  travel. 
https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2021-01/ecc_net_anniversary_report_2020-_15_years_of_ecc_net.pdf;  The 
ECC-Net  report  “ECC-Net  in  2022”,  https://www.eccnet.eu/publications,  indicates  that  118  142  enquiries  have  been 
made during 2022. ECC-Net deals only with cross-border disputes. As on average 17% of complaints concern package 
travel, one could estimate that the number of cross-border PTD complaints was around 20 085 cases in 2022. 
110 It has been reported that, in case of insolvency of an organiser from another Member State, it is difficult for travellers 
to obtain information on insolvency proceedings and to recover prepayments (Replies by Member States Central Contact 
Points on insolvency protection to targeted question from the Commission, March 2023) 
Some national authorities called for better communication between the Central Contact Points and more transparency on 
the securities of organisers in different Member States. Some Member States complain that their counterparts from other 
MS do not reply to requests or that they do not have access to registries and details on securities of organisers in other 
MS. In addition, one national authority dealing with insolvency protection explained that ‘Member States are generally 
unaware of the national law of other Member States or of the insolvency proceedings for the use of the security in other 
Member States.’ Therefore, cooperation between national central contact points is essential to ensure the efficiency of 
the PTD, especially with increasing cross-border activities. Moreover, a national central contact point signalled that they 
had no enforcement rights if an organiser established outside the EU/EEA does not want to use the guarantee system 
available in a Member State. However, such issues depend less on the text of the PTD (see Annex 13, Evaluation, EQ 3). 

15 

 
 
 
Insolvency protection in times of crisis, insurability of risks, coverage of refund claims and vouchers 
where a package is cancelled before an organiser becomes insolvent 

The PTD faced particular challenges in certain crisis situations, such as the Thomas Cook bankruptcy 
and the COVID-19 pandemic in  relation  to  refunds for cancelled trips  as  well as  the solidity and 
scope of insolvency protection.  

The bankruptcy of Thomas Cook in 2019,111 was the only bankruptcy of a large organiser with a cross-
border  impact  in  recent  years.112  In  this  context,  for  example,  the  German  insolvency  protection 
system proved to be insufficient. While around 140 000 travellers were repatriated, there was only 
limited insurance cover for refunds to travellers because of a liability cap for insurance companies in 
the German transposition. The subsequent improvement of the German system involved the creation 
of a travel guarantee fund organised as a private company under State supervision.113 It appears that, 
after Thomas Cook, Member States and EEA did not experience bankruptcies of large organisers114. 

The COVID-19 pandemic triggered numerous travel bans, travel warnings and restrictions at borders 
that led to a vast number of cancellations and many people being unable to travel. Several Member 
States devised  aid schemes to support national  guarantee/insolvency protection funds  for package 

111 Thomas Cook plc. was one of the world’s leading leisure travel groups, with sales of £9.6 billion and around 19 million 
clients in 2018. 
112 The German subsidiaries of Thomas Cook left around 140 000 travellers stranded abroad. These were repatriated with 
the help of the insolvency protection provider. The insolvency protection, however, was insufficient to fully cover the 
refunds of travellers not yet at their destination, because of a liability cap for insurance companies covering this risk in 
the  previous  German  transposition.  The  federal  government  committed  to  compensate  all  affected  travellers  for  the 
difference between their pre-payments and the amount of refunds received from the insurance company covering the 
insolvent  Thomas  Cook  companies.  At  the  same  time,  the  German  legislation  was  amended,  and  the  protection  of 
travellers improved.  
In France, more than 53 000 travellers were affected. Around 11 000 travellers were repatriated, and more than 30 000 
customers could spend their holidays with other tour operators.  The refund of about 25 000 packages could start only 
once the insolvency procedure was finalised and all eligible refund files were completed. The total amount to be paid by 
guarantee funds reached around EUR 42 million in France.  
The main Belgian insolvency protection body organised the repatriation of 11 000 passengers.  In addition, competent 
authorities dealt with thousands of refund claims. The total amount to be paid by guarantee funds reached EUR 27 million 
in Belgium. EC, Meeting of the Stakeholder Expert Group to discuss the draft report on the application of the Package 
Travel 
2020, 
Linked 
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/expert-groups-
register/screen/meetings/consult?lang=en&meetingId=23419&fromExpertGroups=false.  
Spain introduced urgent measures to alleviate the effects of the opening of insolvency proceedings against the corporate 
group Thomas Cook. Among other things, it created a credit line with Thomas Cook defaults, a State Financial Fund for 
Tourism Competitiveness, coordination policies in the field of employment between the central state and the Autonomous 
Regions and other support and information measures for those directly affected by the Thomas Cook crisis. 
In Greece, the number of foreign stranded tourists was estimated at around 55 000 when Thomas Cook’s insolvency was 
announced in 2019. An operational centre was set up by the Ministry of Tourism and repatriation was accomplished. 
113 The Fund relies on government-backed guarantees up to EUR 750 million, approved under state aid scheme in the 
context of the COVID-19. In addition, a state aid scheme of EUR 840 million in the form of guarantees on vouchers 
issued to travellers who booked package tours prior to 8 March 2020 that had to be cancelled because of COVID-19 was 
approved. According to estimates by the German travel industry, at the end of April 2020, advance payments totalling 
EUR 6 billion were made for all trips booked prior to 8 March 2020. A large part of this amount has been repaid by travel 
organisers or offset against new bookings. The German authorities estimated that €1.5 billion worth of secured vouchers 
will be issued. 
114 Targeted survey for NCAs (Insolvency), Q3: three open text responses from AT, PT, SK (12 respondents in total). 

Arrangements 

(2015/2302), 

November 

Directive 

Travel 

and 

24 

16 

 
 
 
organisers115, to cover the costs of refunds to travellers116 and/or to support package organisers and 
other travel companies by temporary and targeted compensation scheme to cover all or part of their 
fixed costs or losses.117 

During COVID-19, an increase of organisers’ insolvencies in the period February/March 2020 - end 
of 2022, as compared to the period July 2018 - February/March 2020 was noticed in some Member 
States, but there were usually not major insolvencies, inter alia thanks to State aid.118  

Furthermore,  at  least  in  some  Member  States,  organisers  reportedly  find  it  difficult  to  obtain 
insolvency  protection  which  covers  prepayments  and  repatriation.  This  is  due  to  insufficient 
insurance  solutions  in  the  market  or  insurance  solutions  offered  only  at  prohibitive  prices,  in 
particular  during  a  crisis.119,120  During  COVID-19,  ‘[r]elatively  few  travel  guarantee  funds  and 
insurance  companies  provide[ed]  insolvency  protection.  It  has  been  reported  that  banks  were  no 
longer providing security for organisers and that also some of the already relatively few insurance 
companies offering insolvency protection are pulling out of the market’ (e.g., in Austria121, Belgium122 
and France123).124 In addition, ‘[r]isks related to pandemics are often excluded from insurance policies, 
in particular travel cancellation insurance.’125  

A  very  relevant  question  that  became  evident  in  the  context  of  the  COVID-19  crisis,  is  whether 
pending refund claims for reimbursements from travellers, including under the form of vouchers, are 
‘covered by the insolvency protection systems provided in accordance with the PTD’ as divergent 
practices in the Member States were revealed.126 The Court of Justice of the European Union is still 

(2021/N) 

SA.101306 

State  Aid 

–  Bulgaria, 

115  See  e.g.  State  Aid  SA.58102  (2020/N)  –  Poland,  287812_2191234_87_2.pdf  (europa.eu);  State  Aid  SA.57985 
(2020/N) – the Netherlands, 287238_2180735_74_2.pdf (europa.eu); State Aid SA.64370 (2021/N) – The Netherlands, 
296304_2314634_55_2.pdf  (europa.eu);  State  Aid  SA.63063  (2021/N)  –  Germany,  294812_2298237_100_2.pdf 
(europa.eu); State Aid SA.56856 (2020/N) – Denmark, 285305_2145144_78_2.pdf (europa.eu); State Aid SA.100368 
(2021/N) – Denmark, SA_100368_B07B9E7D-0000-CA62-A6C1-E617EBC17BDE_48_1.pdf (europa.eu).  
116  E.g., 
SA_101306_D0F7727E-0000-C49E-A61B-
14A989909127_54_1.pdf (europa.eu), State Aid SA.59639 (2021/N) – Sweden, 291810_2244846_57_2.pdf (europa.eu). 
See also Annex 13, Evaluation, Appendix IX. Package travel during the COVID-19 pandemic.  
117 E.g., State Aid SA.57932 (2020/N) – Denmark, 287013_2179779_79_2.pdf (europa.eu), State Aid SA.57352 (2020/N) 
– Denmark, 286250_2162043_37_2.pdf (europa.eu), State Aid SA.57423 (2020/N) – Latvia, 286194_2160641_28_2.pdf 
(europa.eu). See also annex 7, Evaluation, Annex IX. Package travel during the COVID-19 pandemic.  
118 E.g., number of insolvencies before Covid-19 vs insolvencies from February/March 2020 to the end of 2022: Poland: 
12  vs 18; Lithuania: 1 vs 6; Finland: 3 vs 9, Belgium: 14 vs 35; Cyprus: no insolvency before the COVID-19 until the 
end of 2022; Czech Republic: 4  vs 27; Denmark: 7 vs 18; Estonia: 0 vs 5; Latvia: 1 vs 3; Sweden 2 vs 46; Iceland: 2 vs 
7. Not all Member States offered data on the number of insolvencies.  See also Annex 13, Evaluation, Appendix IX. 
Package travel during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
119 Targeted survey for NCA (Insolvency), replies to Q6, indicating that the prices of insurance-based solutions have 
increased. 
120  Section  3  of 
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/expert-groups-
register/screen/meetings/consult?lang=en&meetingId=45937&fromExpertGroups=true  
121 State aid SA.60521 - Austria, https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_60521 
122 See minutes of the 4th meeting of the PTD stakeholder expert group (24.11.2020), Register of Commission expert 
groups and other similar entities (europa.eu) 
123  State  Aid  SA.104022  (2022/N)  –  France,  SA_104022_404A4C87-0000-C6F0-AC80-40B28799B06E_68_1.pdf 
(europa.eu)  
124 PTD Application Report, p.11, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2021%3A90%3AFIN 
125 See e.g., the analysis of the Belgian consumer organisation Test Achats published on 22.10.2020, https://www.test-
achats.be/argent/assurances-assistance-voyage/dossier/coronavirus. 
126 The current practice in the Member States varies. Six Member States replying in the consultation process already 
cover vouchers and/or refund claims by insolvency protection up to a certain extent, while six do not.  Targeted survey 

the  Meeting  of  the  Central  Contact  Points  of  10  November  2022, 

the  Minutes  of 

17 

 
 
 
 
to rule on this question.127 Consumer organisations and some Member States suggest that the PTD 
should  clarify  that  vouchers  and  refund  claims  are  covered  by  insolvency  protection.128  Also 
businesses are largely in favour of such clarification.129  

Insurance policies for travellers 

Insurance policies available to travellers cannot tackle the different aspects of problem 2. As stated 
under problem 1, such insurance policies usually cover only certain personal risks. Furthermore, there 
is no need or demand for an insurance policy to be taken out by travellers which would duplicate the 
legal guarantees under the PTD. In addition, the Commission is not aware of insurance policies being 
offered to travellers to cover any gaps in the insolvency protection which organisers are obliged to 
arrange for the benefit of travellers.  

Conclusion 

Therefore, while the feedback from stakeholders is often not very specific, it is still clear that the 
current degree of harmonisation has left scope for different implementation in the Member States, 
leading to certain variations in the level of consumer protection and, consequently, in the costs for 
businesses,  including  in  relation  to the question  of whether vouchers and refund claims  are  to  be 
covered by insolvency protection  (regulatory failure).  In addition,  there is evidence that  there are 
limits for the effectiveness of insolvency protection where it is based exclusively on solutions offered 
by the insurance market (market failure), in particular, in a major crisis. 

2.1.3.  Problem 3: Difficulties in implementing the Directive  

Stakeholders faced difficulties in the implementation of the PTD in relation to the interpretation and 
enforcement  of  concepts  of  ‘click-through  package’  and  LTA,  in  determining  whether  the 
cancellation  of  a  package  travel  contract  was  justified  by  unavoidable  and  extraordinary 
circumstances, which became apparent during COVID-19, as well as in the implementation of certain 
information obligations.  

These problems can, to some extent, be explained by practical difficulties, but are, to a large extent, 
linked to the content of certain provisions (regulatory failure). 

for national insolvency authorities Q8: 12 responses from AT, CY, DE, DK, EE, FI, HU, HR, LV, PT, SE, and IS. 6 
authorities  (5  MS  and Iceland)  replied  that  the  current  rules  on  insolvency  protection  in  place  in  their  country  cover 
vouchers and/or refund claims (for cancelled packages) to a certain extent. In general, this protection has ensued in the 
context of the COVID-19. In addition, Ireland confirmed during a meeting with the EC that vouchers and refund claims 
were covered by the rules on insolvency protection. Only Denmark, Estonia and Ireland seem to fully cover vouchers. 
127 The interpretation of Article17(1) in this respect is raised in two pending requests for preliminary rulings from Austria 
and Belgium in cases C-771/22 HDI Global and C-45/23 MS Amlin Insurance  
128 Public consultation Q19: 77% of public authorities (17 of 22), 86% of consumer organisations (18 of 21),52% of EU 
citizens (35 of 67), and 14% of companies and business associations (49 of 359) indicated that refund rights against an 
organiser  should  be  protected  in  case  of  insolvency.  As  for  vouchers:  73%  of  public  authorities  (16  of 22), 95%  of 
consumer organisations (20 of 21), 45% of EU citizens (30 of 67), and 18% of companies and business associations (65 
of 359) indicated that these should be protected in case of insolvency. According to most business respondents (284 of 
359, 79%), the existing insolvency protection is sufficient, an extension would cause excessive costs. 
129 Opinion of the Fit for future platform on the PTD, Suggestion 4: Clarification of uncertainties regarding insolvency 
protection,  ‘further  uncertainties  include  for  example  insolvency  protection  in  case  of  re-bookings,  respectively  of 
vouchers and a possible difference between a voucher for a package as opposed to a voucher just stating an amount of 
money.’  https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-making-process/evaluating-and-improving-existing-laws/refit-making-
eu-law-simpler-less-costly-and-future-proof/fit-future-platform-f4f/adopted-opinions_en 

18 

 
 
 
The problems are common to all Member States as the concepts come directly from the Directive. 
For example, during the consultation process, 50% (6 of 12) of national authorities indicated it was 
‘to a very great extent’ difficult to implement and enforce insolvency protection for ‘click-through 
packages’.130 On LTAs, most stakeholders indicated that the introduction of the concept of LTA did 
not improve the protection of travellers.131 Finally, 69% (18 of 26) of the national authorities indicated 
that the organisers and travellers did not agree on whether the situation qualified as ‘unavoidable and 
extraordinary circumstances’ and whether it significantly affected the package in question. 132 

Given that the legal text is unclear or there are gaps in the legislation, the identified problems could 
not be addressed exclusively through stronger enforcement against non-compliant traders. 

2.1.3.1.Concepts of ‘click-through package’ and Linked Travel Arrangement (LTA) 

The evaluation showed that the PTD lacks effectiveness in relation to evolving market trends, e.g., 
online  bookings  of  combinations  of  travel  services.133  The  PTD  meant  to  address  this,  inter  alia, 
through  the  new  concepts  of  ‘click-through  package’134  and  LTA.  Still,  both  concepts  raised 
implementation and enforcement challenges, reducing the possibility of travellers to make informed 
choices and benefit from the protection under the PTD.135 Stakeholders outlined that it was difficult 
‘to prove whether a package, an LTA or none of them was concluded’.136,137,138   

In June 2019, the Commission issued a first report, on the provisions of the Directive applying to 
online bookings made at different points of sale. The report suggested that “the offer of ‘click-through 
packages’ appears to be a rather rare phenomenon’ indicating that there was not a clear ‘picture of 
the  prevalence  of  ‘click-through  packages’  on  the  market.”139  Further,  according  to  some 
stakeholders, the concept of ‘click-through package’ has no or very limited practical value, is difficult 
to apply in practice,140 or changes should be made.141 Most national authorities declared that it was 

130 Targeted survey for NCAs (enforcement and regulatory), Q17. 
131  Public  consultation  (Q26):  67%  (276  out  of  397)  respondents  declared  that  LTA  type  (a)  did  not  improve  the 
protection for travellers. In particular, 95% of consumer organisations (19 of 20), 81% of public authorities (17 of 21), 
61% of companies (140 of 228), and 78% of business associations (38 of 49).  
132 Targeted survey for NCAs (enforcement and regulatory), Q1 
133 Public consultation Q3: According to 55% (257 of 468) of respondents the PTD is not well adapted to market trends. 
134 According to Article 3(2)(b)(v) a ‘click-through package’ package is formed where specific personal data (name, e-
mail and payment details of the traveller) are transferred from one trader to another trader in connection with the booking 
of different travel services for the same trip or holiday and where the second contract is concluded within 24 hours of the 
first contract. Travellers must receive a specific standard information form.  
135 Annex 13, Evaluation, EQ1 
136 PTD Application Report, p. 6. COM(2021) 90 final.  
137 Annex 13, Evaluation, EQ 1 
138 Public consultation Q26a: According to 70% of respondents (191 of 273) ‘the distinction of whether the services were 
selected jointly (package) or separately (LTA) is difficult to verify for travellers and enforcement authorities’. 
139  Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  on  the  provisions  of  Directive  (EU) 
2015/2302 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on package travel and linked travel 
arrangements  applying  to  online  bookings  made  at  different  points  of  sale,  COM(2019)270  final,  21.6.2019, 
https://eur-
SWD(2019) 
accompanied 
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SWD:2019:0270:FIN:EN:PDF  
140 Public Consultation Q7: 37% (168 of 454). Looking at specific stakeholders: 19% of consumer organisations (4 of 
21), 37% of companies (101 of 274), and 47% of business associations (21 of 45).  
141 Public Consultation Q7: 27% (122 of 454). Looking at specific stakeholders: 33% of consumer organisations (7 of 
21), 24% of companies (66 of 274), and 40% of business associations (18 of 45). 

Staff  Working  Document 

final, 

270 

p.4, 

the 

by 

19 

 
 
 
difficult to implement and enforce insolvency protection for these packages142 and that the concept 
did not contribute to achieving the general objectives of the PTD.143 

The application of the concept of LTA144 ‘has arguably raised the highest number of questions’ with 
‘consumer and business stakeholders consider[ing] the LTA definition overly complex and difficult 
to apply in practice.’145  

According to  consumer organisations, ‘concerns have also been raised that, with the exception of 
insolvency  protection  and  certain  pre-contractual  information  requirements,  the  PTD  does  not 
provide for the liability of traders facilitating an LTA for the performance of the relevant services.’146 
Furthermore, the evidence collected indicates that the definition of LTA types (a) and (b)147 did not 
contribute to achieving its general objectives.148  

The evaluation identified interpretational and enforcement difficulties that could be grouped in two 
main categories: lack of clarity in key elements of the definition of LTA types (a) and (b), and unclear 
delimitation between packages and LTAs.149,150 Travellers find it difficult to understand what kind of 
protection they can expect and whether they will benefit from insolvency protection.151  

142 Targeted survey for NCAs (insolvency) Q17: 50% (6 of 12) replied ‘to a very great extent’.  
143 Targeted survey for NCAs (insolvency) Q15: 33% (4 of 12) replied ‘not at all’.  
144 Under Article 3(5) PTD, LTAs are those where ‘at least two different types of travel services purchased for the purpose 
of the same trip or holiday, not constituting a package, resulting in the conclusion of separate contracts with the individual 
travel service providers’ Depending on how the services are booked, there can be two types of LTAs: type (a) where  a 
trader facilitates the separate selection and separate payment of each travel service by travellers on the occasion of a 
single visit or contact with his point of sale; type (b) where  a trader facilitates in a targeted manner, the procurement of 
at least one additional travel service from another trader where a contract with such other trader is concluded at the latest 
24 hours after the confirmation of the booking of the first travel service. 
145 PTD Application Report, COM(2021) 90 final, p. 5. See also: BEUC (2021) “The Package Travel Directive: BEUC’s 
Position on how to regain consumers’ trust in the tourism sector”: ‘it is very difficult, if not impossible, for consumers 
and  enforcement  authorities  to  prove  whether  a  package  or  an  LTA  was  concluded’.  Available  online  at: 
https://www.beuc.eu/sites/default/files/publications/beuc-x-2021-
115_package_travel_directive_beuc_s_views_on_how_to_regain_consumer_trust_in_the_tourism_sector.pdf.  See  also 
Annex 13, Evaluation, EQ1  
146 PTD Application Report, p. 6 
147 Under Article 3(5)(a) and (b), LTAs are those where ‘at least two different types of travel services purchased for the 
purpose of the same trip or holiday, not constituting a package, resulting in the conclusion of separate contracts with the 
individual travel service providers.’ Depending on how the services are booked, there can be two types of LTAs: type (a) 
where  a trader facilitates the separate selection and separate payment of each travel service by travellers on the occasion 
of a single visit or contact with his point of sale; type (b) where  a trader facilitates in a targeted manner, the procurement 
of at least one additional travel service from another trader where a contract with such other trader is concluded at the 
latest 24 hours after the confirmation of the booking of the first travel service. See also Annex 12. 
148  Public  consultation  (Q26):  67%  (276  out  of  397)  respondents  declared  that  LTA  type  (a)  did  not  improve  the 
protection for travellers. In particular, 95% of consumer organisations (19 of 20), 81% of public authorities (17 of 21), 
61%  of  companies  (140  of  228),  and  78%  of  business  associations  (38  of  49).  Also,  targeted  surveys:  for  NCAs 
(regulatory  and  enforcement)  Q21  and  Q15,  for  Consumer  organisations  Q33  and  for  Business  associations  Q47: 
presentation of the replies in Annex 2 Stakeholder consultation (Synopsis report) to the Impact Assessment 
149 The distinction between certain packages and certain LTAs can be difficult. See flowchart “Package travel or not?” at 
https://commission.europa.eu/document/653055bf-a1ae-4280-a26d-bf7142fccfa9_en.  
See also PTD Application Report, p. 5. A travel agent who books a flight and a hotel for a customer and issues one invoice 
for both services sells a package. When the same services were not selected jointly, the travel agent that books them one 
after the other and does not charge a total price facilitates an LTA. 
150 For further explanations on these difficulties, see Annex 12 Linked Travel Arrangements. 
151  Public  consultation  Q28a:  in  total  70%  (200  of  284)  of  respondents,  in  particular  57%  (35  of  42)  of  business 
associations, 39% (94 of 145) of companies, 68% (18 of 19) from consumer organisations, 51% (29 of 41) of EU citizens, 
100% (3 of 3) NGOs, 50% (6 of 12) of Other, 42% (13 of 19) of public authorities indicated this. 

20 

 
 
 
A consequence of the uncertain  boundaries between LTAs and packages is  the low  awareness of 
travellers regarding the distinction between these concepts and the associated rights, preventing them 
from making informed choices and benefiting from their rights. These findings suggest that, although, 
intellectually, a distinction can be made between a joint and a separate selection of travel services at 
one point of sale, such distinction can be difficult in practice and is difficult to verify for travellers 
and enforcement bodies, giving rise to a grey area.  

In some cases, the complexity and the uncertainties related to LTAs has led to abuse by traders.152 It 
also  appears  that  some  traders  changed  their  business  models/booking  processes  to  avoid  being 
considered as package organisers. As a result, travellers were deprived of the guarantees for packages, 
including  in  relation  to  liability  for  the  combination  of  travel  services  and  effective  insolvency 
protection.153,154  

In  addition,  according  to  some  stakeholders,  the  provisions  on  LTAs  type  (b)  are  not  applied  in 
practice.155  

The fact that there are hardly any figures on LTAs points to the potential core issue affecting LTAs, 
namely the difficulties for stakeholders in discerning, in practice, whether an LTA has been created. 
This makes it difficult to collect data on LTAs and, most likely, to rely on rights related to LTAs. 156 
Indeed, the difficult distinction between certain packages and certain LTAs, along with the fact that 
most obligations  for traders  (information  requirements  and, where relevant,  insolvency protection 
requirements) kick in only once a first transaction has been completed, make it difficult to enforce 
these provisions.  

In light of the above, the excessive complexity and lack of clarity of the rules on LTAs, combined 
with actions by traders and difficulties in enforcing these rules, hampered the proper functioning of 
the package travel market and resulted in a lower level of consumer protection than intended by the 
reform of the PTD in 2015. At the same time, the rules on click-through packages have largely been 
ineffective.  These  problems  are  independent  of  the  problems  that  manifested  themselves  during 
COVID-19. 

at 

of 

2022 

January 

152 BEUC, Factsheet ‘How a revised Package Travel Directive can regain consumers’ confidence in the tourism industry’, 
https://www.beuc.eu/sites/default/files/publications/beuc-x-2022-
BEUC-X-2022-003 
003_how_a_revised_package_travel_directive_can_regain_consumers_confidence_in_the_tourism_industry.pdf   
153 Insofar as traders considered they were offering LTAs, there is, in principle, insolvency protection under Article 19 
PTD. However, in light of uncertainties regarding LTAs, such protection will often not be effective. 
154 Public consultation Q28a regarding LTA type b): 79% (15 of 19) of consumer organisations stated that traders may 
use LTAs to avoid the liability of package organisers. Similar trend in replies to Q26a regarding LTA type a): According 
to 71% (15 of 21) of consumer organisations, traders may use LTAs to avoid liability of package organisers. 
155  Public  consultation  Q28:  in  total  70%  (276  of  396)  of  respondents,  in  particular  95%  (19  of  20)  of  consumer 
organisations, 90% (19 of 21) of public authorities, 71% of business associations (35 of 49), 68% (41 of 60) of EU citizens 
156 Annex 13, Evaluation, EQ1 

21 

 
 
 
 
2.1.3.2. Cancellation rights due to unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances 

During the Covid-19 pandemic, different interpretations of travellers’ right to cancel the contract in 
the  event  of  ‘unavoidable  and  extraordinary  circumstances’157,158  emerged,  triggering  disputes 
between travellers159 and organisers. 160  

The main interpretation issues arose in relation to the place where the unavoidable and extraordinary 
circumstances  occur;161  the  different  legal  regimes  applicable  to  organisers  under  the  PTD  and 
transport service providers under the specific legislation;162 the variety of travel warnings/advice by 
the Member States during the COVID-19.163 

The  PTD  itself  is  silent  in  respect  of  the  legal  value  of  travel  warning  or  advice  issued  by 
governments.  In  practice,  ‘travel  warnings’  are  a  key  aspect  for  justifying  the  cancellation  of  a 
package  travel  contract  due  to  unavoidable  and  extraordinary  circumstances.  Travellers  and 
businesses consider that the absence of rules on ‘travel warnings’ hinders the effectiveness of the 
definition of ‘unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’.164  

Consumer  organisations  called  for  more  clarity  on  the  appropriate  time  for  cancellation  of  the 
contract due to ‘unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’ as well as on the relevance, evidence, 
and legal value of official travel warnings.165  

157 Under Article 3(12), ‘unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’ means a situation beyond the control of the party 
who invokes such a situation and the consequences of which could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures 
had been taken;’ Recital 31 offers several non-exhaustive examples of ‘unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’ 
158  As  shown  in  section  2.1.1.  on  Problem  1,  during  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  travellers  faced  major  difficulties  in 
recovering prepayments within 14 days for packages cancelled due to unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances. The 
interpretation  issues  related  to  the  right  of  travellers  to  terminate  the  contract  under  Article  12(2)  contributed  to  the 
difficulties faced by travellers.  
159 Targeted survey for consumer organisations, Q6: when asked whether, on the justification for terminating a package 
travel contract since COVID-19 pandemic, they observed the scenario in which ‘the parties did not agree on whether the 
situation qualified as ‘unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’ or whether it significantly affected the package in 
question’, 10 of 12 (83%) respondents pointed out that the scenario was observed ‘to a large extent’. 
160 Targeted survey for business associations, Q12: when asked whether, on the justification for terminating a package 
travel contract since COVID-19 pandemic, they observed the scenario in which ‘the parties did not agree on whether the 
situation qualified as ‘unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’ or whether it significantly affected the package in 
question’, 12 of 20 (55%) respondents replied that this was the case ‘to a large extent’.  
161 Article 12(2) provides that ‘the traveller shall have the right to terminate the package travel contract before the start 
of the package without paying any termination fee in the event of unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances occurring 
at the place of destination or its immediate vicinity and significantly affecting the performance of the package’. It 
must  be  noted  that  during  the  COVID-19,  the  restrictions  on  movement  or  quarantine  requirements  at  the  place  of 
departure were rendering, de facto, impossible for a traveller to start the package travel contract (for instance, travellers 
may have not been able to reach the airport in case it was located in another region and the movement among regions 
was limited. 
162 Contrary to the PTD, passengers who cancel a flight or other transport service themselves do not have a right to  be 
refunded under the EU passenger rights Regulations, even in case of extraordinary circumstances. Therefore, if a traveller 
cancelled a package travel contract  with a flight component, the organiser must reimburse the traveller in accordance 
with the PTD. Nevertheless, the organiser has no right under EU law to claim a refund from the airline if the flight was 
operated. 
163 Public consultation, Section II. Additional questions for travellers Q35: 31% (18 of 58) of EU citizens indicated that 
the organiser/retailer accepted the cancellation only where there was a travel warning advising against the trip; 38% (22 
of 58) indicated that it was difficult to contact/communicate with the organiser/retailer as the organiser/retailer did not 
reply to e-mails or phone calls or the office was closed; 52% (30 of 58) pointed to the great disparity of the official travel 
advice and health-related decisions and their rapid change in my country, the destination country or transit countries 
164 Annex 13, Evaluation, EQ5,  
165 Targeted survey for consumer organisations, free text replies to Q7, – N = 10. 

22 

 
 
 
Most  national  competent  authorities  called  for  clarifications  on  the  rules  on  trip  cancellations.166 
Several questions have been referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union in relation to the 
cancellation right under Article 12(2).167 

2.1.3.3. Issues with information obligations  

The evaluation168 points to limited compliance with the information obligations of traders where they 
act as organisers or retailers of a package or as facilitators of an LTA. This is likely to be linked to 
issues with the understanding of certain concepts of the PTD, including the definition of LTAs and 
the borderline between packages and LTAs.169  

Stakeholder  positions  seem  to  indicate  that  there  is  a  certain  degree  of  confusion  about  the 
information requirements that traders (organisers, retailers, facilitators of LTAs) must provide before 
a traveller is bound by a contract. The evaluation also showed an enforcement problem regarding the 
information obligations of traders.  In addition, travellers do not understand the information in the 
current forms on LTAs and it is difficult for organisers to determine the correct form.170 Also this 
particular  aspect  is  closely  linked  to  the  structural  issues  regarding  LTAs  and  contributed  to 
hampering  the  proper  functioning  of  the  package  travel  market  and  resulted  in  a  lower  level  of 
consumer protection,171 and thus to the PTD not achieving its main objectives.172 

In addition, the evaluation highlighted that travellers may not always understand the exact role of 
different traders (organisers, retailers, and service providers) and, consequently, may not properly 
identify  the  trader  responsible  for  the  performance  of  the  contract,  the  refund  of  payments  or  for 
compensation.173,174 This problem became very obvious during the COVID-19 crisis, but reflects  a 
general issue. 

The Opinion of the Fit for future platform, in its Suggestion 5: Clarification ‘other tourist services’, 
states that ‘[i]n practice, there is a lot of uncertainty when it comes to defining a particular service as 
“other tourist service”. This particularly applies to single travel service providers who offer another 
tourist service and become therefore organisers within the meaning of the PTD, without being aware.’ 

However,  the  PTD  explains  and  limits  the  notion  of  ‘other  tourist  service’,175  thus  avoiding  that 
combining  accommodation and other tourist services lead to  a disproportionate application of the 

166 See targeted survey for NCAs (regulatory and enforcement), free text replies to Q2.  
167 For the case references, see Annex 13, Evaluation, Appendix IX.Package travel during the Covid-19 pandemic  
168 Annex 13, Evaluation, EQ1  
169 See section 2.1.3.1. and Annex 13, Evaluation, EQ 1 
170 Annex 13, Evaluation, EQ 1, sub-section 4.1.1.2. Information requirements 
171 Public consultation Q3: According to 55% of (257 of 468) respondents the PTD is not well adapted to market trends. 
172 Annex 13, Evaluation, EQ1, sub-section Linked travel arrangements 
173 Annex 13, Evaluation, EQ 1, sub-section on Organisers’ liability for the performance of the contract and EQ5, sub-
section. Problems with the reimbursement of pre-payments alongside the different actors in the value chain (B2B rights), 
(a) Referral of travellers from organisers to retailers and vice-versa 
174 Furthermore, the Fit for future Platform Opinion highlights that ‘[i]n light of the COVID-19 crisis, it became clear 
that there is a notable lack of transparency regarding the role of different parties. When signing a contract, it has been 
reported that travellers are not always fully aware about who are the organiser, retailer and service provider in relation to 
a package. This problem even increases when the involved travel companies are similar in name or make part of larger 
travel agencies with often non-transparent corporate structures. Consumers risk being confused and sent back and forth 
between the companies, especially regarding refunds for cancelled trips.’  
Suggestion 1: Better information on the identity of the contractual partners and on contact details and better enforcement 
of  rules,  https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-making-process/evaluating-and-improving-existing-laws/refit-making-
eu-law-simpler-less-costly-and-future-proof/fit-future-platform-f4f/adopted-opinions_en 
175 In Article 3(1)(c), Article 3(2)(2) and recitals 17 and 18. 

23 

 
 
 
PTD.176  Neither  the  opinion  of  the  Fit  for  future  platform  nor  other  consultation  exercises 
demonstrated  the  need  for  further  clarifications  nor  provided  solutions.  The  different  views  on 
whether  more  or  fewer  combinations  should  be  exempted  from  the  definition  of  package  do  not 
indicate  that  the  current  provision  is  not  effective  for  the  pursuit  of  the  Directive’s  objectives.177 
Furthermore, the limited evidence for the alleged problems or the absence of proposed solutions made 
it difficult to identify this as a problem and further take it up in the impact assessment.   

2.2.  What are the problem drivers? 

The three main problems identified above, have several, sometimes overlapping, drivers. 

2.2.1.  Drivers  of  Problem  1  –  Travellers  face  difficulties  in  recovering  prepayments  for 

cancelled packages, in particular in the event of a major crisis 

The  main  driver  for  Problem  1  is  that  the  business  model  implemented  by  service  providers  and 
organisers  of  packages  is  based  on  prepayments  from  travellers.178  In  the  event  of  cancellations, 
prepayments  need  to  be  refunded.  In  this  context  and  given  the  structure  of  the  package  travel 
industry, with a vast majority of businesses being SMEs, problems appear, in particular, in case of 
massive disruptions of the travel sector, as witnessed during COVID-19. 

The  extent  of  prepayments  depends  on  different  factors,  including  the  share  of  transport  in  the 
package, scheduled flights as opposed to  chartered flights,179 traditional tour operator packages as 
opposed  to  dynamic  packages,  but,  to  some  extent,  also  the  Member  States  concerned.  By  using 
travellers’  prepayments,  certain  organisers  can  purchase  large  allotments  of  services  in  advance, 
which allows them to keep package prices at a reasonable level.180 Service providers, especially in 
the air transport sector, require full payment of the tickets upon booking, allowing them to optimise 
transport service operations economically and environmentally. Package organisers must take into 
account this business practice of carriers. Some organisers plan their packages well in advance and 
book seats in transport means and hotel rooms in bulk to obtain better prices and be in a position to 
offer advantageous packages to their customers. These advance bookings with travel service suppliers 
are  usually  made  through  prepayments  and/or  guaranteed  by  cancellation  penalties.  Organisers 
finance  such  bookings  thanks  to  prepayments  from  travellers  (around  30%  of  the  package  price 
several months before the start of the package, while the remainder often must be paid up to a month 
prior to the start of the package). This system allows package organisers to limit the need to advance 
the cost of bookings through their own funds. However, if many travellers cancel packages due to 
unavoidable  and  extraordinary  circumstances,  as  was  the  case  during  the  COVID-19  pandemic, 
organisers must refund all prepayments disbursed to third parties and this within 14 days.181 This can 
put at risk the liquidity of organisers. 

176 Tourist services that are intrinsically part of accommodation (e.g., access to on-site facilities and transfers to/from an 
airport or railway station), other tourist services (e.g., rental of sports equipment, spa treatments or courses) that do not 
represent 25% or more of the value of a package or services that travellers add while being at the accommodation do not 
lead to the application of the PTD. Furthermore, the PTD provides many examples. 
177 See also Annex 2 Stakeholder consultation (Synopsis report) 
178 PTD Application Report, p. 12. 
179 Reply by a business organisation representing organisers to an ad hoc targeted consultation in December 2022 by the 
Commission (see Annex 2). 
180 PTD Application Report, p. 12. 
181 Annex 13, Evaluation, EQ5 and Appendix IX. Package travel during the COVID-19 pandemic of the Evaluation 

24 

 
 
 
 
Lack of liquidity of organisers when faced with many concurrent requests for a refund could become 
acute and lead to their bankruptcy if they do not receive (timely) refunds from service providers.182 
As experienced during the pandemic, many organisers did not have sufficient liquidity to reimburse 
travellers’ prepayments within the mandatory period.183,184  

The  PTD  does  not  regulate  the  business-to-business  (B2B)  effects  of  the  termination  of  package 
travel contracts. There is only a very general provision on redress in Article 22. Therefore, in relations 
with service providers, organisers rely on contractual obligations and general  contract law, which 
does not  seem  to  have given rise to  particular problems at  normal  time. Still, under contract  law, 
organisers can only claim money back for services (e.g., flights) that have not been performed. Where 
a package is cancelled due to unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances, but the relevant service 
may still be performed, organisers would not have a right  to get reimbursed, while still having to 
reimburse  travellers.  This  happened  during  certain  phases  of  the  pandemic,  partially  due  to 
differences in cancellation rights under the PTD as compared to the APRR.185 Stakeholders pointed 
out  that  one  of  the  major  drivers  behind  organisers’  lack  of  liquidity  and  difficulty  to  refund 
consumers,  was  the  lack  of  precise  rules  on  B2B  refunds.  This  resulted  in  delays  and  disputes. 
186,187,188,189 

Recovering  prepayments  from  airlines  proved  particularly  difficult.  Businesses  ‘explained  that 
refunds in  normal  times  go through the global distribution systems  (GDSs) that ensure  automatic 
refunds.  However,  during  the  pandemic,  airlines  chose  to  go  through  a  manual  process,  allowing 
them to hold on to the refunds for 8-9 months.’ 190 

The  dysfunctionalities  in  the  B2B  relationships  proved  to  have  a  negative  impact  on  travellers, 
triggering  two  main  problems  regarding  refunds  of  pre-payments:  (a)  referral  of  travellers  from 
organisers to retailers and vice-versa, making it very difficult for travellers to obtain their rights and 
(b) delay in reimbursing travellers due to the difficulties that organisers faced in recovering the pre-
payments from service providers, e.g., airlines and hotels. 

182 The lack of rules on  B2B refund was mentioned by stakeholders as one of the key drivers for the impossibility to 
refund travellers during the Covid-19 pandemic, PTD Workshop 1 with businesses and consumer representatives, October 
2022. 
183 Annex 13, Evaluation, EQ5 and Appendix IX. Package travel during the COVID-19 pandemic of the Evaluation 
184 Service providers also faced similar liquidity issues during the pandemic. 
185 Annex 13, Evaluation, EQ5, Appendix IX. Package travel during the COVID-19 pandemic  
186 Targeted business survey, Q15, N = 22. During the Covid-19 pandemic, organisers were unable to provide timely 
refunds  to  travellers  because they did not receive  timely refunds from  service  providers,  but  have,  in  the  meantime, 
received refunds from service providers: 45% replied to a large extent, 14% to a moderate extent, 14% to a small extent. 
During  the  Covid-19 pandemic,  organisers  were  unable  to provide  timely refunds  to  travellers  because  they  did  not 
receive timely refunds from service providers and have still not received refunds from service providers: 19% to a large 
extent, 10% to a moderate extent, 33% to a small extent.  
187 Interview with a German business association indicated that some providers had to wait a long time before the money 
came back for hotels and airlines so there was a gap between the time the tourist paid and the service partners who has 
to pay through the customer.  
188 Targeted survey for NCAs (regulatory and enforcement), Q4, N = 27: During the Covid-19 pandemic, organisers 
were unable to provide timely refunds to travellers because they did not receive timely refunds from service providers, 
but have, in the meantime, received refunds from service providers: 23% to a large extent, 23% to a moderate extent, 
8% to a small extent.  During the Covid-19 pandemic, organisers were  unable to provide timely refunds to travellers 
because  they did  not  receive timely  refunds  from  service  providers  and  have  still  not  received  refunds  from  service 
providers. 16% to a large extent, 8% to a moderate extent, 20% to a small extent. 
189 PTD Workshop 1 organised for the supporting study with businesses and consumer representatives, October 2022 
190 Meeting with a business travel organisation during the consultation process.  

25 

 
 
 
There  are  currently  no  specific  rules  on  the  use  of  vouchers  in  the  PTD.  During  the  pandemic 
organisers often imposed vouchers/credit notes on travellers instead of a refund upon cancellation of 
a package due to unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances and did not make it clear that travellers 
were not obliged to accept vouchers.191 At the same time, the rights of travellers regarding vouchers 
are unclear.192 

In the 2020 Recommendation on vouchers,193 the Commission set out principles in relation to make 
voluntary vouchers more attractive for travellers.194  

Most of the Member States which introduced systems of voluntary vouchers did not have data on the 
share of travellers who accepted vouchers following cancellations due to COVID-19.195,196 Given the 
non-binding nature of recommendations, package organisers continued to issue vouchers as they saw 
fit or in line with national rules breaching the PTD and the Recommendation, with the consequence 
that travellers in different EU countries were treated differently.197,198 

Consumer organisations emphasise that travellers should not be deprived of their right to a monetary 
refund, as the choice of whether to accept a voucher or to receive a cash refund ultimately belongs to 
consumers.199 Nevertheless, in reality, travellers often did not have this choice. On the other hand, an 
industry stakeholder explained that often travel agents had no choice but to impose vouchers on their 
customers, even if not the best solution, as they were the only short-term alternative solution to help 
traders  to  avoid  bankruptcy.200  Furthermore,  travel  industry  representatives  outlined  the  problem 
rising  from  the  divergent  regime  applicable  to  organisers  under  the  PTD,  who  must  reimburse 

191 Public consultation, Section III. Additional questions for consumer organisations and public authorities, Q41: 18 of 
21 (81%) of consumer organisations and 11 of 19 (58%) public authorities. And see BEUC position papers submitted as 
feedback to the Inception Impact Assessment (IIA), and to the public consultation that describes issues around imposition 
of vouchers. 
192 PTD Workshop 1 organised for the supporting study with businesses and consumer representatives, October 2022 
193  Commission  Recommendation  2020/648  of  13.5.2020  on  vouchers  offered  to  passengers  and  travellers  as  an 
alternative  to  reimbursement  for  cancelled  package  travel  and  transport  services  in  the  context  of  the  COVID-19 
pandemic, C/2020/3125, OJ L 151, 14.5.2020, p. 10–16 
194 First, travellers should have the choice  to accept vouchers or to claim cash refund. If they accept a voucher, they 
should be able to request a full refund if they have not used it by the end of its validity. In addition, such vouchers should 
be covered in the event of insolvency of the airline or travel organiser. Member States should ensure that such (existing) 
insolvency protection is sufficiently robust to guarantee those vouchers. 
195  Targeted  survey  NCAs  (regulatory  and  enforcement)  Q7, N  =  18:  Less  than  10%: 2;  Between  10%  and 30%:  3; 
Between 30% and 50%: 1; Between 50% and 75%: 2; More than 75%: 0; Don’t know: 10. 
196 Targeted Business survey Q17, N = 20:4 out of the 20 respondents indicated that the share of travellers who accepted 
vouchers was between 30% and 50%.  The  rest selected the following: Less than 10%: 0; Between 10% and 30%: 2; 
Between 50% and 75%: 3; More than 75%: 1; Don’t know: 10. Targeted survey for consumer organisations Q12, N = 8: 
Whereas 2 out of 8 consumers organisation replied that the share was between 10% and 30%. Less than 10%: 1; Between 
30% and 50%: 1; Between 50% and 75%: 0; More than 75%: 1; Don’t know: 3. 
197 European Court of Auditors, (2021), Air passenger rights during the COVID-19 pandemic […]. 
198 In a December 2020 report, BEUC mentions that ‘[h]owever, although this Recommendation and these proceedings 
have been welcomed by BEUC, their concrete effects are limited.’ BEUC (2020), COVID-19 and EU Travellers’ Rights, 
Evaluation  of  the  Member  States  Implementation  of  the  EU  Commission  Recommendation  on  ‘vouchers’,  p.  1, 
https://www.beuc.eu/position-papers/covid-19-and-eu-travellers-rights-evaluation-member-states-implementation-eu  
199 BEUC, (2021), The Package Travel Directive: BEUC’s Position on how to regain consumers’ trust in the tourism 
sector, p.17.  
200 ECTAA, (2020), COVID-19 and Tourism in Europe: Which Consequences for Travel Agencies and Tour Operators 
[…], p. 7.  

26 

 
 
 
travellers in money, and that applicable to some service providers, such as hotels, allowed to issue 
vouchers during the pandemic.201  

Finally, academic research suggests that vouchers should benefit travellers and tour organisers alike, 
and this cannot be the case in the framework of mandatory vouchers.202  

2.2.2.  Drivers of Problem 2 – Prepayments  made by travellers are not sufficiently protected 

against insolvency of the organiser 

The evaluation  confirmed that there are  differences between  insolvency protection systems in  the 
Member States as the PTD leaves it to Member States to determine the details of their systems.203  

Moreover,  COVID-19  brought  to  light  divergent  practices  in  the  Member  States  as  regards  the 
coverage by insolvency protection of vouchers and open refunds claims for trips cancelled before an 
organiser becomes insolvent.  204 The Court of Justice of the European Union is still to rule on the 
question whether the wording of Article 17(1) regulates such coverage.205 Consumer organisations 
and some Member States suggest that the PTD should clarify that vouchers and refund claims are 
covered by insolvency protection. Also, businesses are largely in favour of such clarification. 206  

At least in some Member States, organisers reportedly find it difficult to obtain insolvency protection 
covering prepayments and repatriation. This is due to insufficient insurance solutions in the market 
or insurance solutions offered only at prohibitive prices, in particular during a crisis.207,208 

2.2.3.  Drivers of Problem 3 – Difficulties in implementing the Directive 

Several drivers were identified for the difficult implementation of the Directive. Certain provisions 
are not sufficiently clear, contain gaps or are too complex. This leads to uneven levels of consumer 
protection and distortions of competition across the EU as the Directive is applied in different ways.209 

201 European Commission, minutes of the meeting of the Stakeholder Expert Group to support the application of the 
Package  Travel  and  Linked  Travel  Arrangements  Directive  (2015/2302),  8  November  2022.  Details  on  the  group 
including minutes available at Register of Commission expert groups and other similar entities (europa.eu) 
202 Loos, M.B.M., (2021), One day I’ll fly away… Voucher schemes for cancelled package travel contracts after the 
outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, Amsterdam Law School Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 2021-13.  
203 See section 2.1.2. See also Annex 13, Evaluation, EQ3 
204 The current practice in the Member States varies. Six Member States replying in the consultation process already 
cover vouchers and/or refund claims by insolvency protection up to a certain extent, while six do not. Targeted survey 
for national insolvency authorities Q8: 12 responses from AT, CY, DE, DK, EE, FI, HU, HR, LV, PT, SE, and IS. 6 
authorities  (5  MS  and Iceland)  replied  that  the  current  rules  on  insolvency  protection  in  place  in  their  country  cover 
vouchers and/or refund claims (for cancelled packages) to a certain extent. In general, this protection has ensued in the 
context of the COVID-19. In addition, Ireland confirmed during a meeting with the EC that vouchers and refund claims 
were covered by the rules on insolvency protection. Only Denmark, Estonia and Ireland seem to fully cover vouchers. 
205 C-771/22 HDI Global and C-45/23 MS Amlin Insurance. See footnote 346  
206 See section 2.1.3., footnotes 128 and129. Also, see footnote in section 325 . 
207 Opinion of 22 March 2022 of the Fit for future platform on the PTD https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-making-
process/evaluating-and-improving-existing-laws/refit-making-eu-law-simpler-less-costly-and-future-proof/fit-future-
platform-f4f/adopted-opinions_en. See, furthermore, the Application Report, Sections 4.2.2. and 5.1.3. and Section 3 of 
the  Minutes  of  the  meeting  of  the  Central  Contact  Points  (CCPs)  of  10  November  2022,  available  at:  Register  of 
Commission expert groups and other similar entities (europa.eu). Furthermore, this problem is mentioned in some replies 
to Q66 and Q67 of the public consultation as well as some policy papers received. 
208 Targeted survey for NCAs (insolvency), replies to Q6, indicating that the prices of insurance-based solutions have 
increased. 
209  These 
in 
https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2023-
04/Final%20opinion%202021_SBGR3_15%20Package%20travel_fup_0.pdf 

for  Future  Platform  Opinion,22  March  2022, 

issues  were 

the  Fit 

raised 

also 

27 

 
 
 
This relates, for instance, to (i) the definitions of LTAs;210 (ii) the rules on cancellations in the case 
of unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances, 211 (iii) the complexity of the standard information 
forms212 and (iv) the role of different parties (organisers, retailers, and service providers), including 
in relation to refunds, which is not always understood by travellers, although the legal provisions are 
clear.213  In  addition,  unclear  and  complex  provisions  may  have  contributed  to  enforcement 
problems.214   

The link between the problems identified in this SWD and in its support study215, their drivers and 
their consequences are depicted in the problem tree in Annex 6.  

2.3.  How likely is the problem to persist? 

Without additional public intervention the problems identified above will remain.   

In case of a future major crisis, large-scale cancellations, the corresponding need for refunds for non-
performed packages, the identified uncertainty and risks for travellers will continue. The lack of rules 
on  vouchers  and  the  unclear  and  divergent  status  of  vouchers  and  refund  claims  in  relation  to 
insolvency protection would continue with negative effects also in the event of a smaller crisis. This, 
coupled with the absence of specific rules on B2B rights in relation to cancellations, would likely 
again  affect  package  organisers’  liquidity,  inevitably  leading  to  problems  with  refunds  of 
prepayments to travellers in particular in a major crisis. Without such improvements, many travellers 
will  continue  to  be  cautious  before  booking  packages  far  in  advance.216  It  was  also  confirmed  by 
consumer organisations that travellers received a full refund within 14 days or at least within one 
month only  ‘occasionally’ before COVID-19. Moreover, travellers  ‘often’ received a refund only 
after  filing  a  complaint,  and  ‘rarely’  without  this  procedure  even  at  normal  times.217  Without  any 
changes to the current legislation, such problems related to refunds, both outside and during crises, 
are expected to persist.  

As regards insolvency protection for package organisers, there are varied regimes of prepayment and 
insolvency  protection  mechanisms  across  the  Member  States.  Some  consumer  organisations 
suggested during the evaluation that package organisers may establish their businesses in Member 
States  with  less  stringent  insolvency  protection  requirements.218  In  addition  to  the  uncertainty  of 
insolvency protection cover for refund claims and vouchers for cancelled packages, problems were 
reported  with  the  availability  of  insurance  solutions  regarding  insolvency  protection  and  the 

210 See section 2.1.3.1., Annex 13 Linked travel arrangements, and Annex 13, Evaluation, EQ1 
211 See section 2.1.3.2, and Annex 13, Evaluation, EQ5 
212 See section 2.1.3.3. and Annex 13, Evaluation, EQ1 
213See section 2.1.3.3. and Annex 13, Evaluation, EQ1 and EQ5  
214 Ibidem. E.g., in relation to:  lack of clarity in key elements of the definition of LTA types  (a) and (b) and unclear 
delimitation  between  packages  and  LTAs,  the  implementation  of  information  requirements,  rules  on  liability  for  the 
performance of the contract and refunds during COVID-19. 
215 ICF Study, p. 93 and further  
216 According to the Consumer conditions scoreboard 2023, “Mindful of recent travel disruption, 44% of respondents 
expressed a preference for late booking of future travel plans. Nonetheless, 46% agreed that they felt confident when 
booking 
https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2023-
05/consumer_conditions_scoreboard_2023_10052023.pdf  
217 Targeted survey for consumer organisations, Q9, N = 12: Before the COVID-19 pandemic: (1) Travellers received a 
full refund within 14 days or at least within one month: 33% often  42% occasionally, 8% rarely; (2) Travellers received 
a refund without filing a complaint  8% often  25% occasionally 42% rarely; (3) Travellers received a refund only after 
filing a complaint  67% often  25% occasionally 0% rarely; (4) Traveller (a) did not receive any money or (b) received it 
with considerable delay  47% often  33% occasionally 17% rarely 
218 Annex 13, Evaluation, EQ3. Targeted survey for consumer organisations, Q15: 33% of the respondents (4 out of 12) 
tend to agree with this statement, 1 tends to disagree and the remaining 58% did not know the answer. 

advance”, 

travel 

in 

28 

 
 
 
conditions under which such insurances are offered.  Hence, if no action is taken, prepayments by 
travellers may continue to be insufficiently protected against the organiser’s insolvency at least in 
some Member States in the event of a major crisis, potentially leading to further financial losses for 
travellers. In addition, consumer organisations declared that also outside of crisis situations travellers 
‘often’ faced problems when asking for reimbursement of payments for travel services that were not 
performed following the organiser’s insolvency.219 Moreover, as regards the timeliness of the refund 
claims, national authorities highlighted several factors that may impact the effectiveness of refunds 
in practice.220 

If not amended, certain provisions will remain unclear or too complex to be applied and enforced. 
This  concerns  in  particular  the  provisions  on  LTAs  and  their  distinction  from  packages.  In  the 
baseline scenario, the potential for confusion and circumvention will continue. This could result in 
divergent levels of consumer protection and continue to limit the effectiveness of the PTD. In view 
of the increasing digitalisation, this issue will likely become even more prevalent, as more travellers 
will buy packages and/or LTAs online. Indeed, it is forecast that in the package travel segment, 78% 
of total revenue will be generated through online sales by 2027, compared to approx. 73% in 2023.221 

In  general,  package  travel  will  remain  a  very  relevant  market  segment,  slightly  growing  before 
stabilising in 2027. As a result, the scale of the problems encountered may also increase in line with 
this market trend if the status quo is maintained. 

3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? 

3.1. 

 Legal basis 

The legal basis for EU action is Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (‘TFEU’), 
which provides that "the European Parliament and the Council shall […] adopt the measures for the 
approximation of the provisions […] which have as their object the establishment and functioning of 
the Internal Market." Article 114 (3) also specifies that "the Commission, in its proposals envisaged 
in paragraph 1 concerning […] consumer protection, will take as a base a high level of protection, 
taking account in particular of any new development based on scientific facts." In addition, Article 
169(1) and Article 169(2) (a) TFEU provide that the EU must contribute to the attainment of a high 
level of consumer protection by adopting measures under Article 114 TFEU.  

At the same time, Article 114 TFEU, can be a legal basis also for the harmonisation of business-to-
business  rules,  like  specific  measures  that  are  considered  in  relation  to  problem  1,  i.e.,  possible 
business-to business rules on refunds or pre-payments. 

In line with Article 26(2) TFEU, the internal market comprises an area without internal borders in 
which  goods  and  services  move  freely  and  businesses  have  the  freedom  of  establishment. 
Harmonising  the  rights  and  obligations  regarding  package  travel  is  necessary  to  develop  a  real 
internal market in tourism and will help maintain and increase a high level of consumer protection. 

219 Targeted survey for consumer organisations, Q17: 58% (7 out of 12) respondents selected ‘Often’, and 33% (4 out of 
12) ‘rarely’. 
220 E.g., the speed with which the guarantor receives the necessary information to settle the claim. See also Annex 13, 
Evaluation 
221  Statista,  Mobility  Market  Insights,  Travel  &  Tourism,  Package  Travel  Outlook,  downloaded  on  28  April  2023, 
https://www.statista.com/outlook/mmo/travel-tourism/package-holidays/eu-27?currency=EUR.  The  predictions  have 
been updated in January 2023 and take into account the impact on prices and market trends of the war on Ukraine. 

29 

 
 
 
3.2. 

 Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action 

Package travel is cross-border, not only in the sense of travellers going abroad, but also in terms of 
package holidays sold to travellers by organisers based in other countries.222  

The revision of the  PTD aims to  modernise the  current  rules  and fix the  problems flagged  in  the 
evaluation. The two overarching objectives of the PTD are still relevant, namely to ensure that all 
travellers  in  the  EU  have  a  high  and  uniform  level  of  protection  and  to  contribute  to  the  proper 
functioning  of  the  internal  market,  remain  relevant.  EU-level  action  to  remove  the  identified 
problems,  close  gaps,  clarify  and  simplify  the  rules  of  the  current  Directive  will  give  greater 
confidence to travellers and traders in purchasing and selling packages, including across borders, and 
improve the functioning of the internal market. For instance, laying down binding rules on vouchers 
and common rules on prepayments will ensure more uniformity in the application of the Directive. 
If  Member  States  addressed  such  issues  in  an  uncoordinated  manner,  this  would  increase 
fragmentation in the internal market.  

3.3. 

 Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action 

Directive (EU) 2015/2302 seeks full harmonisation of legal provisions and therefore problems in its 
application can only be solved at EU level. This includes areas where Member States took different 
approaches  in  terms  of  legislation  or  interpretation,  such  as  regarding  insolvency  protection  for 
vouchers and refund claims. National-level action is insufficient to enable all EU citizens to exercise 
the rights provided by the Directive, including in a crisis. 

The proposed revision of the PTD also complies with the proportionality principle of Article 5(3) 
TFEU. It does not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties, as it is limited 
to aspects of travel law for which EU action is necessary.  

4.  OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? 

4.1. 

 General objectives 

The general goal of the revision of the PTD is to strengthen the level of consumer protection, at all 
times, including in the event of a major crisis, while improving the functioning of the Internal Market 
in the package travel sector. This is in line with the original objectives of the Directive, which remain 
relevant  for  the  current  needs.  The  evaluation  showed  that  the  PTD  is  only  partially  effective  in 
meeting  its  objectives  and  the  needs  of  consumers  and  traders  and  pointed  that  there’s  scope  for 
improvement and simplification. Consequently, although the PTD contains comprehensive rules in 
relation to package travel and has brought significant benefits in terms of consumer protection and 
the functioning of the internal market, the identified weak points in the legislation in terms of gaps, 
legal uncertainty and excessive complexity in some respects require targeted action.  

The tackling of these shortcomings will be important for the preparedness of a future crisis but also 
for the application of the Directive at normal times. 

In line with these findings, the specific objectives and problems identified in the IA 2013 have to be 
adapted to the current context and the specific problems identified in the application of the Directive 
to date. 

222 See footnote 104 on replies about cross-border sales in the public consultation. 

30 

 
 
 
4.2. 

 Specific objectives 

Specific Objective 1 (“SO1”): Better protection of travellers’ prepayments and their right to a swift 
refund  of  prepayments  in  the  event  of  cancellations,  including  in  times  of  a  major  crisis,  while 
maintaining the liquidity of package organisers (addressing Problem 1). 

Specific  Objective  2  (“SO2”):  Giving  travellers  greater  protection  against  the  organisers’ 
insolvency, including in the event of a major crisis, while also ensuring a level playing field in the 
internal market (Problem 2). 

Specific  Objective  3  (“SO3”):  Increase  legal  certainty  and  enforceability  by  clarifying  and/or 
simplifying some of the provisions of the Directive that  are interpreted or applied differently or are 
difficult to apply in practice (addressing Problem 3).  

The three specific objectives are inter-related in different ways. For instance, the measures aiming to 
implement  SO2  will  also  facilitate  the  achievement  of  SO1.  Furthermore,  while  certain  measures 
implementing SO3 are self-standing, for instance the ones related to LTAs, legal certainty will also 
be increased through some measures implementing SO1 and SO2, e.g., through rules on vouchers or 
clarifying that vouchers and refund claims are to be covered by insolvency protection.  

5.  WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? 

This SWD assesses policy measures addressing one or several of the three problems. As the SOs are 
interlinked, some of the policy measures (“PMs”) presented below provide (partial) solutions to more 
than  one  problem.  They  are  presented  under  the  problem  they  primarily  address.  Some  measures 
exclude each other and could not be applied simultaneously. Different combinations of these policy 
measures (‘options’) can achieve the defined SOs to different extents. The intervention logic depicts 
the interactions between the identified problems, the specific and general objectives and the proposed 
policy measures and the resulting options. This intervention logic is presented in figure 1 below.   

31 

 
 
 
Table 1 Intervention Logic 

32 

 
 
5.1. 

 What is the baseline from which options are assessed? 

The baseline (Policy option 0) implies the continuation of the current situation, the status quo, without 
the introduction of new measures (do nothing scenario), thus maintaining the Directive in its present 
form. The baseline is described and analysed in the evaluation.  

The evaluation suggests that the PTD was only partially effective in achieving its stated objectives. 
Crises  (e.g.,  COVID-19)  exacerbated  some  issues,  but  some  provisions  proved  not  to  be  fully 
effective also in non-crisis situations. While guidance and evolving case law may help interpret some 
notions or provisions, such potential is limited by the wording of the relevant provisions and concepts. 
Maintaining the Directive as it stands would thus not address its shortcomings. 

The current APRR and Air Services Regulation have certain impacts on organisers under the dynamic 
baseline scenario. Indeed, organisers reported that due to the current lack of compulsory insolvency 
protection  for  airlines,  they  face  higher  insolvency  protection  costs  than  if  compulsory  airline 
insolvency protection would exist. However, the currently envisaged changes in the APRR will not 
affect this baseline scenario, while no relevant future changes in the Air Services Regulation can be 
assumed.  

Any  strengthening  of  the  Consumer  Protection  Cooperation  Regulation  and  of  the  Directive  on 
alternative  dispute  resolution  would  increase  the  chances  of  effective  enforcement  of  the  PTD  in 
relation to traders. 

In a major crisis, but also at normal times, travellers can face problems recovering prepayments for 
cancelled packages. In some Member States there are restrictions on the amount of prepayment that 
may be asked for a package that can somewhat decrease the risk of problems with refunds to travellers 
in  case  of  a  cancellation.  E.g.,  in  Germany,  based  on  national  case-law  on  unfair  contract  terms, 
prepayments are limited to a 20% down payment at the time of booking, the rest being due not more 
than 30 days before the beginning of the trip. As an exception to this general rule, prepayment can 
be higher than 20% in circumstances where the organiser duly justifies it, due to expenditures present 
at  the  time  of  the  conclusion  of  the  contract.  A  limitation  of  prepayment  to  20%  applies  also  in 
Austria,  unless  unlimited  insolvency  protection  is  available.  In  one  Member  State,  there  are  no 
national rules on prepayments, but the industry itself applies a limitation of 20% of the price paid ten 
days  after  booking  and  the  rest  four  weeks  before  the  start  of  the  trip.  in  practice.  Also,  in  other 
Member States  the average prepayments lie around 20%-30%.223 However, prepayments can vary 
depending  on the relevance of flights and the length of the trip and the nature of  the package.  In 
particular  dynamic  packages  with  a  high  share  of  the  transport  element,  the  percentages  can  be 
considerably higher and can go up to even 100% if the package contains a large flight component.224 
A  report  commissioned  by  the  Dutch  Ministry  of  Economic  Affairs  and  Climate  found  that  the 
average prepayment rates in 6 countries, i.e., the Netherlands, Portugal, Germany, France, Denmark 

223 It was mentioned during the ECTAA Workshop in the European Parliament on 21 March 2023 that prepayments are 
in general around 20%-30% but can go up to 100% in case the package contains a flight.  
224  Source:  Workshop  with  experts  from  national  authorities  on  5  December  2022,  Minutes  available  at 
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/expert-groups-register/screen/expert-
groups/consult?lang=en&groupId=895&fromMeetings=true&meetingId=45937& 

33 

 
 
 
 
and UK, were around 25%-30%.225 Moreover, according to consumer organisations, prepayments lie 
at approximately 40% in both Malta and Spain.226  

An important feature of the status quo is that organisers do not hold travellers’ pre-payments but use 
them to pay for travel services. Therefore, in case the package is cancelled, and they need to reimburse 
travellers within 14 days  following the application of the PTD, they can find themselves short of 
funds to do so if service providers do not refund them quickly enough. While, under contract law, 
service providers have to refund prepayments for services not rendered, there is at present no explicit 
business-to-business refund right with a specific deadline in the PTD. Therefore, under the baseline 
scenario, organisers may face liquidity problems if faced with many refund requests from travellers 
at the same time, this implying a risk that many travellers will not be reimbursed within the legal 
deadline. 

In addition, certain types of payment methods used when booking the packages can in some cases 
help consumers to get money back more easily. However, no detailed figures on the payment methods 
used are directly available. In a few Member States, travellers enjoy statutory protection for services 
not  rendered  if  purchased  with  a  credit  card  and  can  claim  money  back  from  their  credit  card 
company.  Another  way  for  travellers  to  try  to  recover  their  prepayments  is  through  credit  card 
chargeback, as stated in the terms and conditions of Visa and MasterCard. On a traveller’s request, it 
allows banks to withdraw funds that were previously deposited into a service provider’s bank account 
if the service is not provided. Chargeback is a voluntary industry scheme that many banks participate 
in but is not available in all Member States. Moreover, not all travellers prepay packages by credit 
card.  In  2020-2021,  only  51%  of  adults  in  high-income  economies  used  a  credit  card  in  general. 
While no specific data are available on the means of prepayment for package holidays within the EU, 
it  is  unlikely  to  be  significantly  higher  than  the  aforementioned  51%.  In  addition,  the  experience 
during  COVID-19  showed  that  protection  mechanisms  related  to  credit  cards  are  insufficient  to 
address  the  question  of  prepayments.  Notwithstanding  the  foregoing,  potential  chargeback  is 
unrelated to the right of the traveller to get reimbursement from the organiser in case of cancellation 
under the PTD. It is, therefore, important to make sure that, when a package is cancelled, travellers 
always get a timely refund from the organiser, independently on the payment method used. Only this 
would allow for equal treatment of all travellers within the EU. As a result, the availability, or not, 
of chargeback is not taken into account in determining the magnitude of the problem in the baseline. 

Continuation of the status quo would thus likely lead to travellers’ continuing to experience financial 
losses, especially in a major crisis. Based on alternative calculations, such cumulative yearly losses 
of travellers were estimated in a support study227 at between EUR 126 million and EUR 1.6 billion.228 
Direct costs related to compliance with the PTD would remain the same for businesses.229 The costs 

225 Source: Panteia, Onderzoek financiering (pakket)reissector - Voor het ministerie van Economische Zaken en Klimaat, 
14  March  2023,  p.  56,  https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2023/03/14/onderzoek-financiering-
pakketreissector 
226 Response of BEUC to the targeted consultation. 
227 ICF Study, not yet published, p. 122-123. 
228 Based on the 2017 package sales figures, and considering a 10%-30% loss rate, ICF estimated that this could result in 
cumulative yearly losses ranging from EUR 540 million to EUR 1.6 billion. Based on an alternative calculation, ICF 
estimated the yearly consumer detriment at between EUR 126 million and EUR 378 million. 
229 These costs include awareness of the PTD requirements, administrative burden related to information provision and 
the  costs  of  insolvency  protection.  In  the  responses  to  the  targeted  survey for businesses  associations,  administrative 
burden related to information costs or costs for improper performance were estimated at respectively EUR 9.2 and EUR 
25 per package. Costs related to assistance to travellers were estimated EUR 250-300 per package. Costs to achieve and 
maintain  compliance,  including  costs  to  train  staff,  were  estimated  a  company  at  EUR  9.000  per  year.  The  costs  of 
insolvency protection vary significantly between Member States, ranging annually from 2.500 EUR to 250.000 EUR. 

34 

 
 
 
of insolvency protection, especially in relation to insurance-based solutions, went up moderately to 
significantly  in  several  Member  States  in  recent  years,230  often  in  connection  with  COVID-19.231 
Hence, if the status quo is maintained, compliance costs will either be stable or increase. 

As a reaction to the difficulties encountered during the COVID-19 pandemic, certain Member States, 
i.e.,  Poland  and  Denmark,  set  up  crisis  funds  at  national  level.  Such  funds,  allowing  for  timely 
reimbursement of travellers in case of cancellation for unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances, 
are, at least in the case of Poland, expected to remain in place.  

The  2020  Recommendation  would  formally  remain  in  place.  However,  its  scope  is  limited  to 
vouchers issued during the COVID-19 pandemic and does not address many problems identified in 
the evaluation. In addition, it is not legally binding and does not guarantee rights to travellers. Indeed, 
many Member States and traders did not follow the principles contained in it.232  

Moreover, maintaining the status quo would imply continued enforcement-related  costs and other 
costs  for  public  authorities.  The  Commission  would  continue  to  monitor  how  the  PTD  is  being 
implemented  at  national  level,  and  national  authorities  would  continue  to  enforce  compliance  by 
package  organisers  and  other  traders  with  the  current  rules.  The  median  costs,  for  national 
enforcement and insolvency protection authorities, were reported to reach approx. EUR 97,000 per 
year per Member State for national enforcement authorities and EUR 5500 for insolvency protection 
authorities, per Member State.233 Enforcement authorities would continue to cooperate through the 
Consumer Protection Cooperation (CPC) network234  and the network of central  contact  points for 
insolvency protection.  

Travellers could  continue to  seek redress  also  through alternative dispute resolution  bodies235 and 
European Consumer Centres Network (ECC-Net) or other legal means available at national level. 
From 25 June 2023, they could also do so through qualified entities under the representative action 
mechanisms for protecting consumers’ collective interests.236 

5.2.  Options discarded at an early stage 

5.2.1.  Non-legislative measures 

It  would  have  been  an  option  to  introduce  exclusively  non-legislative  measures,  such  as  a 
Commission guidance notice or a recommendation, instead of amending the PTD. This option was 
discarded at an early stage, as it corresponds largely to the baseline detailed under section 5.1. With 

230 Annex 13, Evaluation, EQ3 and EQ7 
231 Targeted survey for NCAs (insolvency protection), Q6, targeted survey for businesses associations, Q30, and public 
consultation, Q67, Q66 and 65, as well as PTD Application Report, section 4.2.2. on Insurability of risks. 
232 Annex 13, Evaluation, EQ5 and Appendix IX. Package travel during the COVID-19 pandemic of the Evaluation 
233 Data sourced by ICF from the targeted surveys reflecting median average of the reported amounts. 
234 Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 of the  European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 on cooperation 
between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws and repealing Regulation (EC) 
No 2006/2004 
235 Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on alternative dispute resolution 
for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Directive on consumer 
ADR) (OJ L 165, 18.6.2013, p. 63); Regulation (EU) No 524/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 
May 2013 on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 
2009/22/EC (Regulation on consumer ODR) (OJ L 165, 18.6.2013, p. 1) 
236 Directive (EU) 2020/1828 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2020 on representative 
actions  for  the  protection  of  the  collective  interests  of  consumers  and  repealing  Directive  2009/22/EC  (OJ  L  409, 
4.12.2020, p. 1). This is without prejudice to any possible additional mechanisms at Member State level. 

35 

 
 
 
exclusively non-legislative measures, the Specific Objectives (SOs) could be achieved only to a very 
limited  extent,  if  at  all.  Information  campaigns  have  already  been  carried  out.  Furthermore,  such 
campaigns cannot resolve the legal uncertainty identified in the evaluation and the problem definition 
above. While guidance in conjunction with evolving case law may help interpret some notions or 
provisions to some extent, such potential is limited by the wording of the relevant provisions and 
concepts. Hence, guidance cannot resolve the issues of legal uncertainty identified in the evaluation 
and  in  the  problem  definition  above  such  as  the  question  of  whether  refund  claims  and  vouchers 
should be covered by insolvency protection or the complexity of the provisions on LTAs. Many of 
the  issues  identified  (e.g.,  prepayments  not  being  sufficiently  protected,  excessive  complexity  of 
some rules) could thus not be tackled without legislative changes. Moreover, the effectiveness of soft 
law alone is uncertain, as it would depend on the will of national legislators and traders to follow any 
non-binding  guidance  or  recommendation.  As  a  result,  gaps  and  uncertainties  in  the  PTD  would 
remain.  This  implies  that  varying  levels  of  consumer  protection  and  implementation  between 
Member States, plus the absence of a level playing field would remain in important respects. Such 
discrepancies in implementation of non-legislative measures have been evidenced, for instance, in 
relation to the 2020 Recommendation on vouchers.  

As explained under the problem definition, there are no insurance products available to travellers in 
the market to address any of the identified problems.  

Purely non-legislative measures would hence not be effective. 

In any event, even if legislative amendments are proposed, the Commission retains the possibility to 
issue  guidance  and  other  non-binding  measures  at  a  later  stage  to  enhance  the  interpretation  and 
application of the Directive. Possible guidance will be more useful at a later stage, for instance, after 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has clarified certain issues in pending preliminary rulings, in 
relation to cancellations due to unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances in particular situations 
and at particular stages of the pandemic, and possibly after certain provisions and concepts have been 
clarified  in  the  PTD.  The  same  applies  to  possible  additional  information  campaigns.  Moreover, 
legislative  changes  do  not  preclude  the  active  enforcement  of  the  existing  and  new  rules  by  the 
Commission in relation to the Member States.  

5.2.2.  Legislative measures discarded after a preliminary assessment 

According to stakeholders, a total ban of prepayments to organisers would seem very difficult to 
implement, especially since many organisers prepay themselves the services included in a package 
at  the  time  of  booking.  Stakeholders  indicated  that  organisers  request  prepayments  at  the  time  of 
booking in the range of 20%-30%. This can be much higher, in particular, where the package includes 
a significant flight component, as, at least for scheduled flights, airlines usually require full payment 
of the ticket at the time of booking.237 A complete prohibition could hence lead to liquidity problems 
for organisers or the need to obtain capital to finance prepayments to service providers on the capital 
market,  as  long  as  pre-payments  for  included  services  are  not  limited.  In  addition,  a  total  ban  on 
prepayments is likely to lead to higher prices and less choice in packages and thus less protection for 
travellers. Indeed, as indicated by some stakeholders, airlines may decide in such case to offer only 
flexible, i.e., more expensive, tickets for packages. Stakeholders generally oppose this measure.238  

237 Mentioned during the ECTAA Workshop in the European Parliament on 21 March 2023. 
238 Public consultation Q22: 80% of companies and business associations (290 of 361) believe that there should be no 
prohibitions or limitations of prepayments for packages. This view is supported by 33% of public authorities (7 of 21), 

36 

 
 
 
 
Obligation for organisers to give travellers the choice between a package with prepayment and 
one with no or limited prepayments, possibly at different prices. Travellers choosing packages 
without prepayment (or with a limited one) would face higher package prices (5 % price increase 
expected239) and potentially a limited offer. While they would have the choice to book their packages 
early and still use the funds for their own purposes until shortly before departure, it is unclear to what 
extent  this  may  offset  the  increased  costs  of  packages.  Moreover,  this  measure  would  create 
considerable administrative burden for organisers, who would need to maintain a double booking and 
accounting  system  to  account  for  packages  with  different  payment  terms.  As  a  result,  businesses 
strongly oppose this measure. 240 

While  it  would  theoretically  be  possible  to  introduce  specific  rules  on  voluntary  vouchers  that 
would apply exclusively in times of crisis (as per the 2020 Recommendation), this did not seem 
appropriate. Such measure would require a central instance to declare the presence of a significant 
crisis  to  trigger  this  possibility,  which  would  raise  additional  questions  and  make  this  instrument 
unnecessarily heavy. It would also prevent legal clarifications and guarantees on the use of vouchers 
at normal times.  

Funds at EU level (rapid refund mechanism and/or insolvency back-up fund) 

New mandatory funds at EU level could serve as: (i) a rapid refund mechanism for travellers 
(crisis fund) where package organisers face liquidity problems due to a major crisis or (ii) a back-up 
where the first-line national insolvency protection system is insufficient. 
Certain Member States have put in place national temporary or permanent insolvency back-up funds 
or rapid refund mechanisms that are often backed up by State aid, especially where they were created 
during COVID-19. It would be difficult to find appropriate solutions at EU level, including in relation 
to State aid rules.  

The introduction of a rapid refund mechanism (crisis fund) at EU level would likely raise prices 
and lead to competition problems, as certain organisers might be tempted to freeride. As reported by 
some stakeholders, it would be difficult to determine when an organiser is facing only temporary 
liquidity problems (and can rightfully call upon the rapid refund mechanism), as opposed to more 
persistent liquidity issues putting him in a state of insolvency.241 Such a crisis fund at EU level would 
be in addition to similar funds already existing in certain Member States or would replace them. This 
may lead to duplication and raise subsidiarity concerns. Most businesses disagreed with the idea of 
an EU crisis fund242 and only 43% of consumer organisations were in favour of it.243 

44%  of  EU  citizens  (30  of  68).  No  consumer  organisations  agree  with  this  view.  At  the  same  time,  only  8  of  496 
respondents to this question selected “Pre-payments for packages and LTAs should be prohibited completely.”, i.e., 1 of 
310 companies, 3 of 21 consumer organisations, 3 of 68 EU citizens and 1 of 18 other stakeholders. In addition, in reply 
to the consumer survey Q13, 50% of respondents (N:10152) indicated not being willing to pay a moderately higher price 
if they would need to pay the full price only a few days before travel. 
239 Targeted business survey Q38: 8 of 13 respondents selected this answer option. 
240 Annex 2. Stakeholder consultation, Targeted business survey, Q41.5: 16 of 20 agreed; 1 disagreed; 3 don’t know. 
241  This  view  was  supported  by  certain  Member  State  authorities  who  reported  similar  facts  during  the  Covid-19 
pandemic. 
242 Public consultation Q23: 55% of companies and business associations (200 of 362) believe that there should be no 
crisis fund, believing the cost to travellers would outweigh possible benefits while 53 of 362 (15%) selected “Yes. A 
crisis fund should be created at EU-level.”.  
243 Targeted survey for consumer organisations Q23: 5 of 11 consumer organisation. Public consultation Q23: 43% (9) 
of 21 consumer organisations (as well as 37%, 7 of 19 public authorities) selected: “Yes. A crisis fund should be created 
at EU-level.” 

37 

 
 
 
Concerning a potential mandatory insolvency back-up fund at EU level, certain Member States 
have put in place such funds at national level on a temporary or permanent basis, which are said to 
work well. Therefore, an insolvency back-up fund at EU level would be in addition to such funds at 
national  level  or  would  replace  them,  raising  subsidiarity  concerns  and  possible  duplication. 
Furthermore, a back-up fund at EU-level that applies more generally would dilute the responsibility 
for  setting  up  effective  systems  at  national  level  and  would  be  difficult  to  reconcile  with  the 
differences between national insolvency systems, which will prevail, even if an amending directive 
were to increase the level of harmonisation. Consequently, while such a back-up fund might be useful 
for some, it is not necessarily so for Member States with certain types of insolvency protection funds, 
or which have found other ways to ensure the effectiveness of their insolvency protection systems. 
Accordingly, half of the national insolvency protection agencies responding to the targeted survey 
rejected the idea of a back-up fund EU-level, and only one supported it.244 Furthermore, it would be 
difficult to ensure a calculation of contributions that would correspond to the needs of all Member 
States and that would be considered fair. While many consumer organisations supported the creation 
of an EU-level back-up fund,245 most businesses rejected this idea.246   

Moreover, it would be difficult in practice to organise and manage a rapid refund mechanism and/or 
an insolvency back-up fund at EU level. Creating a specialised agency at EU level would be necessary 
to  manage  such  funds  or  the  delegation  of  responsibilities  to  a  private  institution  under  the 
Commission’s  supervision.  Consequently,  it  would  bring  about  coordination,  set-up  and 
management/administration costs. Based on the available information, this would be fairly costly.247 

Consequently, based on the preliminary assessment of available information, the added value of a 
fund or funds at EU level, as compared to solutions at Member States level, seems rather limited. In 
view of the foregoing, the option to set up such funds or mechanisms at EU level has been discarded.  

5.3.  Description of the policy options assessed in detail 

In  addition  to  policy  option  0  (status  quo),  this  SWD  examines  various  legislative  measures  that 
could, through amendments to the PTD achieve the specific objectives described in section 4.2 to 
different extents. The measures are grouped into three policy options, either favouring minimal costs 
(option A) or maximal effectiveness (option C), option B being a middle-solution.  

Option A consists of targeted amendments to the PTD aiming to clarify and simplify it and making 
it more effective, while having a limited/moderate cost impact. Option B would further improve the 
level  of  consumer  protection,  in  some  respects,  but  increase  the  costs  for  different  categories  of 
stakeholders (both businesses and travellers). Option C includes measures aiming at the highest level 
of  consumer  protection  in  relation  to  SO1  and  2,  but  at  high  costs.  In  this  way,  the  three  change 
options are structured in light of the anticipated proportionality of the included measures with regard 
to addressing problems 1 and 2, with option A making the Directive more crisis-proof compared to 
the status quo while limiting the costs at ordinary times as  compared to option B, which contains 

244Targeted survey for NCAs (insolvency protection), Q10, N=12: 1 agreed, 6 disagreed with a mandatory EU back-up 
fund,5 did not know. 
245 See footnote 242. 
246  Targeted  survey  for  business  associations,  Q32:  9  of  14  (69%)  business  respondents  were  against  a  mandatory 
insolvency back-up fund at EU level. Public consultation Q23, N=311 companies: 212 (68%) selecting no such EU or 
national fund is necessary either because costs for travellers would outweigh the benefits (191) or because current rules 
and ad hoc state aids are sufficient (21), while 41 (13%) would support an EU level mandatory back-up fund. 
247 E.g., the Single Resolution Fund set up by the Commission has 450 staff and manages around EUR 60 billion of funds. 
Any  EU-level  insolvency  back-up  fund  and/or  crisis  fund  would  be  proportionately  smaller.  However,  even  when 
considering that it may be 10 times smaller, the resulting personnel costs would still be substantial.  

38 

 
 
 
more  rigid  measures  on  prepayments  and  vouchers,  and    option  C,  which  ensures  very  effective 
preparedness for a major future crisis while implying high costs at ordinary times.  

The  detailed  policy  measures  included  in  the  options  are  presented  under  the  problem  they 
predominantly address. 

5.3.1.  Measures addressing Problem 1: Travellers face difficulties in recovering prepayments 

for cancelled packages, in particular in the event of a major crisis 

Measure 1.1 Limitation of prepayments 

To protect the money of travellers in the event of cancellations and insolvencies and limit the burden 
on the insolvency protection systems, a partial limitation of prepayment at the time of booking could 
be provided in the PTD. Under general civil law the fundamental principle is that payments for a 
service are made when it is performed and not in advance. Therefore, it is the request for pre-payment 
that  requires  justification  and  not  the  absence  thereof.  Under  the  general  unfair  contract  terms 
provisions, a deviation from this general legal principle would have to be justified to be considered 
fair and valid. This is incidentally the basis of the German case law on the limitation of prepayments.  

The prepayment could be limited to a relatively low percentage of the total price, the balance being 
due 4 weeks before the start of the package. In order not to multiply different systems of limitation 
of prepayments, the same threshold could be proposed as currently used in Germany and in Austria248, 
249.  This  level  seems  also  justified  by  the  fact  that,  in  practice,  in  some  other  Member  States  the 
average  prepayments  lie  around  20%.  E.g.,  in  one  Member  State  there  are  no  national  rules  on 
prepayments,  but  the  industry  itself  applies  a  limitation  of  20%  of  the  price  paid  ten  days  after 
booking and the rest four weeks before the start of the trip. On the other hand, a report commissioned 
by the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate found that the average prepayment rates in 
6 countries, i.e., the Netherlands, Portugal, Germany, France, Denmark and UK, were around 25%-
30%.250 This could justify setting the threshold for the prepayment limitation at 25% of the total price. 
However, prepayments can vary depending on the relevance of flights and the length of the trip. They 
can  e.g.,  go  up  to  even  100%  if  the  package  contains  a  large  flight  component.251  According  to 
consumer organisations, average prepayments lie at approximately 40% in both Malta and Spain.252  

The deadline of 4 weeks before departure for the full payment has been set to protect organisers as it 
will ensure that all services have been paid for by the traveller before the departure. This seems also 
to be in line with the current practice of prepayments. Indeed, almost all consumer organisations and 

248 In Austria, in the absence of insolvency protection, the prepayments may not exceed 20%. 
249  Public  consultation  Q22:  10%  of  companies  and  business  associations  (35  of  361)  believe  that  prepayments  for 
packages and LTAs should be limited to a maximum of 20% at the time of booking, with the rest be paid shortly before 
departure (e.g., 3 days in advance). This view is supported by 71% of consumer organisations (15 of 21), by 29% of 
public authorities (6 of 21) and 29% of EU citizens (20 of 68). It may be interesting to note that there were no significant 
differences in views between different types of companies based on their main activities (organiser, retailer, carrier, LTA 
facilitator). However, this is not necessarily the case for those choosing only one activity. E.g. in case of “pure” retailers, 
the answers were more evenly distributed between  the two answer options regarding limitation mentioned in this and 
footnote 282. Another point to consider is that the replies to this question seemed to be affected by a so-called campaign 
or coordinated reply by a high number of similar respondents (micro travel agencies). See more information in Annex 2. 
250 Source: Panteia, Onderzoek financiering (pakket)reissector - Voor het ministerie van Economische Zaken en Klimaat, 
14  March  2023,  p.  56,  https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2023/03/14/onderzoek-financiering-
pakketreissector 
251  Source:  Workshop  with  experts  from  national  authorities  on  5  December  2022,  Minutes  available  at 
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/expert-groups-register/screen/expert-
groups/consult?lang=en&groupId=895&fromMeetings=true&meetingId=45937& 
252 Response of BEUC to the targeted consultation. 

39 

 
 
 
business organisations responding to the targeted survey stated that usually travellers make a down-
payment at the time of booking, and the remaining amount is paid some time before start of contract 
(e.g., one month).253,254 

There are several ways of implementing such a limitation. Under Measure 1.1.1 - Flexible limitation 
of prepayments - part of Option A - the organiser would retain the flexibility to ask for prepayments 
higher than the threshold set, where this is justified .255 An increase would be justified where this is 
necessary to ensure the organisation and the performance of the package. This would, for example, 
be the case where organisers have to make higher advance payments to service providers or need to 
cover their other costs related specifically to the organisation of the package at the time of booking 
or shortly afterwards. Such a limitation of prepayments would not apply to package travel gift boxes 
and packages booked less than 28 days before the start of the package.  Organisers would continue 
to  be  obliged  to  inform  travellers  about  the  prepayments  they  request  before  the  conclusion  of  a 
package travel contract.  

This measure would be in line with the current practice in Germany, where, based on national case-
law on unfair contract terms, prepayments are limited to a 20% down payment at the time of booking, 
the rest being due not more than 30 days before the beginning of the trip. 256 Also in Germany the 
prepayment can be higher than threshold in circumstances where the organiser duly justifies it, due 
to expenditures present at the time of the conclusion of the contract.  

Under  measure  1.1.2  strict  limitation  of  prepayments  -  part  of  Option  B,  there  would  be  no 
flexibility for organisers, so that the maximum prepayment for travellers at booking would always be 
20% regardless of prepayments made by organisers. This stricter, fixed, threshold of 20% for the 
prepayments  would  be  justified  by  the  fact  that  this  is  the  lowest  average  level  of  prepayments 
observed in one of the Member States.257 

253 Responses of consumer organisations to the targeted consultation, several responses possible. 11 out of 12 replies 
(several responses possible) indicated that travellers make a down-payment at the time of booking, and the remaining 
amount is paid some time before start of contract (e.g. one month), 4 out of 12 that travellers make a down-payment at 
the  time  of  booking  and  the  remaining  amount  is  paid  immediately  before  the  start  of  contract  and  5  out  of  12  that 
travellers pay the full price at the time of booking. 
254  Responses  of  business  organisations  to  the  targeted  consultation,  several  responses  possible.  All  respondents  (10) 
indicated that travellers make a down-payment at the time of booking, and the remaining amount is paid some time before 
start of contract (e.g. one month), 2 out of 6 that travellers make a down-payment at the time of booking and the remaining 
amount is paid immediately before the start of contract and  3 out of 12 that travellers pay the full price at the time of 
booking. 
255 Public consultation Q58: Several factors have been quoted by companies as having a strong impact in determining 
their prepayment policy: Prepayments requested by airlines etc. have been quoted by 91% of companies (224 of 246). 
The next important factor is prepayments required for accommodation having a strong impact according to 85% (208 of 
246). This is followed by limitations on prepayments in national law or case law (79% ,194 of 245), costs of insolvency 
protection (48%, 69 of 144), possibility to offer more attractive/competitive packages (28%, 40 of 141) and other reasons 
(16%, 10 of 61). 
256 Annex 13, Evaluation EQ5. See also case law: BGH – X ZR 71/16 available at: http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-
bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&nr=79534&pos=0&anz=1  ,  BGH  -  X  ZR  85/12  available  at: 
http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-
bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&sid=46187c163b972182902743377a1dcc62&nr=70493&pos=
0&anz=1 
257  Source:  Workshop  with  experts  from  national  authorities  on  5  December  2022,  Minutes  available  at 
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/expert-groups-register/screen/expert-
groups/consult?lang=en&groupId=895&fromMeetings=true&meetingId=45937& 

40 

 
 
 
Measure 1.1.3 Strict limitation of prepayment to organisers and service providers - part of Option 
C) would limit not only prepayments from travellers to organisers, but also from organisers to service 
providers. 258 

Measure 1.2 Rapid refund mechanism (i.e. crisis or liquidity fund): 

As  confirmed  by  the  evaluation,  organisers  face  liquidity  problems  when  confronted  with  many 
simultaneous refund requests, this hindering refunds to travellers.259 A possible solution would be a 
rapid refund mechanism (a crisis/liquidity fund). During COVID-19, already under the current PTD, 
several  Member  States  designed  State  aid  schemes,  providing  loans  to  organisers  to  pre-finance 
refunds.  In  addition,  one  Member  State  –  Poland  –  created  a  permanent  crisis  fund  (rapid  refund 
mechanism).260 The European Court of Auditors has invited the Commission to assess the option of 
introducing such a permanent mechanism across the EU. Such mechanism/fund would ensure that 
travellers who do not accept vouchers receive a timely refund without endangering the liquidity of 
organisers. This fund would have to be built up over time through fees paid by all organisers.  

The mildest measure in relation to such mechanisms would be a clarification on the possibility to set 
up a crisis fund at national level –Measure 1.2.1 - part of Option A. It would be clarified in the PTD 
that  the  Member  States  may  consider  maintaining  or  introducing  such  a  mechanism  subject  to 
compliance with State aid rules. Should they indeed decide to do so, they would be obliged to inform 
the Commission and the Central Contact Points of the Member States of the introduction of such a 
mechanism, thus ensuring an exchange of information. As this issue is currently not regulated in the 
PTD, it is a priori already admissible that Member States introduce such crisis funds/mechanisms. 
Therefore, this measure would not lead to additional legal fragmentation. 

Alternatively, a crisis/liquidity fund could be made mandatory, Measure 1.2.2 – part of Option C. 

Measure 1.3 Business-to-business (B2B) refund right 

Another  way  of  increasing  the  protection  of  travellers’  prepayments  in  practice  would  be  the 
introduction of a B2B refund right. Under measures 1.3.1 part of option A and 1.3.2 part of option C, 
service providers would be obliged to refund to the organiser all prepayments for services within 7 
days of a cancellation. Since, where a package travel contract is terminated (e.g., due to unavoidable 
and  extraordinary  circumstances)  under  the  PTD,  the  organiser  must  refund  all  prepayments  to 
travellers within 14 days,261 the introduction of the B2B refund right would enable organisers to make 
timely  refunds  to  travellers  or,  where  agreed  with  the  traveller,  to  book  services  for  a  substitute 
package, while maintaining their liquidity.  

Under Measure 1.3.1 -  part of Option A  – the  B2B refund  right  would apply  only  if the  service 
provider  cancels  the  relevant  service  (e.g.,  a  flight)  and  the  7  days  would  start  running  from  that 
cancellation.  This  would  be  independent  of  any  cancellation  of  the  related  package  (e.g.,  due  to 
unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances).  

258  Public  consultation  Q22b:  62%  of  companies  and  business  associations  (174  of  282)  agree  that  prepayments  for 
packages should be prohibited only if other travel service providers, including airlines and other carriers, are subject to 
similar restrictions. 67% of public authorities (14 of 21) and 52% of EU citizens (32 of 61) agree with this statement, 
while 86% of consumer organisations (18 of 21) disagree. 
259 Annex IX. and Annex 13, Evaluation, EQ5 
260  To  be  noted  that  Poland  granted  State  aid  for  this  measure,  which  was  approved  under  the  Temporary  Crisis 
Framework. State Aid SA.58102 (2020/N) – Poland COVID-19 support to tour operators and other undertakings active 
in tourism and culture, https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases1/202039/287812_2191234_87_2.pdf 
261 Annex 13, Evaluation, EQ5, sub-section B2B rights - Delay in reimbursing travellers due to the fact that organisers 
faced problems in recovering the prepayments from service providers. 

41 

 
 
 
While  the  PTD  does  not  currently  regulate  the  business-to-business  effects  of  the  cancellation  of 
packages as such, it provides for the right of organisers to seek redress from third parties (Article 22 
PTD). Therefore, providing specifically for a refund right against the service provider who cancels a 
service would be in keeping with the spirit of the PTD. This measure is also consistent with the 7-
day business-to-business refund right included in the preferred option of the impact assessment on 
passenger rights in cases where an intermediary is involved in the sale of air tickets and the air carrier 
decides to reimburse passengers via the intermediary. 

Under Measure 1.3.2 - part of option C, service providers would have to refund all prepayments to 
organisers within 7 days after the cancellation of a package due to unavoidable and extraordinary 
circumstances and the communication of this fact to the service provider. Such refund right would 
exist even if their service was or could have been provided (e.g., the flight took place or the hotel was 
open). 

Measure 1.4 Introduction of rules on vouchers  

Under these new rules, in line with the 2020 Recommendation, organisers would be able to  offer 
vouchers instead of refunds upon cancellation of a package. Such rule would entail the following 
conditions: (i) vouchers should have at least the same value as the cancelled package; (ii) the validity 
of the voucher would be up to 12 months, but might be extended once with the explicit agreement of 
both  parties;  (iii)  if  the  voucher  is  not  redeemed  or  extended,  travellers  would  receive  a  refund 
automatically  when  its  validity  period  expires;  (iv)  vouchers  would  be  protected  against  the 
insolvency of the issuer;262 and (v) the rights of travellers must be clearly stated on the voucher. 263 

Under Measure 1.4.1 Voluntary vouchers at all times - part of Option A - vouchers could be offered 
always (during and outside a crisis) and would be voluntary, i.e., organisers would have to inform 
travellers that they are entitled to a refund within 14 days but may instead accept a voucher.  

Under Measure 1.4.2 - Mandatory vouchers in times of crisis – part of Option B - the PTD would 
permit vouchers only during a crisis and travellers would then have to accept them instead of a refund.  

5.3.2.  Measures addressing Problem 2: Prepayments made by travellers are not sufficiently 

protected against insolvency of the organiser  

Under Measure 2.1 - Strengthened rules on insolvency protection, covering vouchers and refund 
claims with insolvency protection and explicit reference to back-up funds - part of Options A and 
B  -  it  would  be  specified  that  the  organiser’s  insolvency  protection  must  cover  all  prepayments 
received at the period when the highest number of bookings takes place plus, where appropriate, the 
costs for repatriations.264 Moreover, wording would be added265 to strengthen the responsibility of the 
Member States to ensure effective insolvency protection, for instance, through exposure analysis or 
a sufficiently high minimum percentage of the organisers’ turnover to be covered by an insurance 
policy. Additionally, the PTD would refer to insolvency back-up funds as one means to address gaps, 
limits or limited availability in first-line insurance policies. Indeed, the PTD already today obliges 
the  Member  States  to  protect  travellers  effectively  against  the  insolvency  of  the  organiser.  The 
additional parameters mentioned, including the setting-up insolvency protection back-up funds are 

262 This is one of the features of the examined rules on vouchers. However, the cover of vouchers and refund claims by 
insolvency  protection  is  more  specifically  analysed  in  connection  with  Measures  2.1  and  2.2  concerning  insolvency 
protection.  
263 Annex 13, Evaluation, EQ3, sub-section Refund claims and vouchers and EQ5, sub-section Vouchers 
264 Please note that repatriations are already covered under current Article 17. 
265 in Article 17. 

42 

 
 
 
indicated as  possible  ways to  achieve this  objective and thus  aim  at  improved implementation.  266 
Information on such solutions would be exchanged within the network of central contact points of 
the Member States.  

Contributions for an insolvency back-up fund would come, in principle, from package organisers. 
The exact amount or percentage per package to be paid as fee would be determined by the Member 
States that decide to introduce such a fund and will depend on national specificities, including the 
features of the first-line insolvency protection. 

Under Measure 2.2 Strengthened rules on insolvency protection, covering vouchers and refund 
claims with insolvency protection and  mandatory back-up fund at Member State level - part of 
option C- the PTD would make such fund mandatory.  

5.3.3.  Measures addressing Problem 3: Difficulties in implementing the Directive 

Simplification of the  key concepts, including the full or partial deletion of LTA, and of related 
information requirements 

The evaluation confirmed that provisions on single-point of purchase LTAs (type (a)) as well as click-
through  LTAs  (type  (b))267  were  ineffective  in  achieving  the  PTD’s  stated  objectives.  To  achieve 
simplification, under Measure 3.1.1 - part of Option A - LTAs type (a) could be removed from the 
Directive.  For  single-point-of-purchase  packages,  the  criterion  of  services  having  been  selected 
before the traveller agrees to pay would be complemented with an alternative criterion inspired by 
the notion of ‘services booked on the occasion of a single visit or contact’, taken from the definition 
of LTAs type (a), so as to avoid the difficult distinction between these types of combinations under 
the current rules. At the same time, the vague term “on the occasion of a single visit or contact” would 
be replaced  with  a  specification of a short period of time within which the bookings are made to 
achieve a more legal certainty. This would make LTAs type (a) obsolete In addition, the definition 
of click-through package in Article 3(2)(b)(v) and the definition of single-point-of-sale package, in 
Article 3(2)(b)(i), would be adapted. All click-through bookings where the traveller’s personal data 
are exchanged between traders would be packages268, i.e., a smaller group of click-through bookings 
would be treated as packages. Type (b) LTAs would be maintained, but their definition  would be 
simplified to allow for easier application. The definition would be limited to situations where a trader 
that is party to a first contract invites a traveller to book additional types of travel services for the 
same trip or holiday and receives payments from or on behalf of travellers. Furthermore, for traders 
to  know  that  they  are  subject  to  this  obligation,  they  would  recommend  to  travellers  through  the 
information forms on linked travel arrangements recording the invitation to book additional travel 
service and the additional booking and to inform the trader with whom a first contract was concluded 
that a contract on an additional type of travel service has been concluded for the same trip or holiday 
within 24 hours following the confirmation of the first booking. To allow for this, the trader would 
need to make available to travellers a facility, such as an email address or a website, where travellers 
can register such information, and must acknowledge receipt of such information. As currently, the 

266 Public consultation Q18, N=434: respondents supported the following solutions: 1. A back-up system (e.g. a fund) at 
EU-level as a safety net for cases where the insolvency protection of an organiser is insufficient to cover all refunds and 
repatriations,  even  if  there  is  no  general  crisis  -  35%  (157  respondents),  2.  Other  suggestions:  -  19%  (81),  3.  The 
Commission should enforce the rules better in relation to the Member States - 36% (157), 4. The current rules of the PTD 
are appropriate and should not be changed - 27% (117 respondents). 
267 Type (a) LTAs are defined in Article 3(5) (a) and type (b) LTAs in Article 3(5)(b), 
268  In Article 3(2)(b)(v). A click-through package would still require the transfer of personal data but not  at the same 
time, name, email address and payment details.   

43 

 
 
 
 
second  trader  would  remain  obliged  to  communicate  to  the  first  trader  that  a  contract  has  been 
concluded. 

Under Measure 3.1.2 Deleting LTAs type (b), adapting the definition of click-through package and 
clarifying LTAs type (a) - part of Option B, LTAs type (a)269 would be kept, while LTAs type (b)270 
would be deleted. The definition of click-through package would be adapted as under measure 3.1.1. 
Regarding  LTAs  type  (a),  the  criterion  of  a  “single  visit  or  contact”  in  Article  3(5)(a)  would  be 
explained in a recital (as under Measure 3.1.2) to achieve a more uniform interpretation. In addition, 
information  on  insolvency  protection  would  be  provided  to  travellers  only  where  such  protection 
exists.  

Under Measure 3.1.3  Deleting  LTAs type (b) -  part of Option C -  only LTAs  type (b)  would be 
deleted, and the definition of click-through package adapted as under the other measures. LTAs type 
(a) and the definition of single-point-of-purchase package would remain unchanged. 

Depending  on  the  degree  of  simplification  of  the  substantive  rules  under  Measure  3.1.,  the 
information to travellers could be improved and simplified, including through the removal of some 
information forms for LTAs (three for Measure 3.1.1, two for Measures 3.1.2 and 3.1.3). 

Clarifications on cancellation rights due to unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances 

To increase clarity on the impact of travel warnings and reduce uncertainty in relation to cancellations 
due  to  unavoidable  and  extraordinary  circumstances271,272,  a  clarification  of  cancellation  rights, 
explaining the role of travel warnings, while leaving scope for a case-by-case assessment would be 
envisaged  under  Measure  3.2.1  -  part  of  Options  A  and  B).273    Under  this  measure,  it  would  be 
clarified  that  travel  warnings  are  an  important  element  to  determine  whether  unavoidable  and 
extraordinary circumstances prevail and affect the performance of the package. However, it would 
not automatically imply a cancellation right without fees in all cases, whereas the absence of a travel 
warning would not automatically prevent a cancellation right without fees. 274  

Under Measure 3.2.2 Clarification of cancellation rights  and formal value  of travel  warnings - 
part of Option C - formal value would be given to travel warnings. This means that the PTD would 
specify  that  a  travel  warning  for  the  travel  destination  issued  by  the  authorities  of  the  country  of 
departure proves the existence of unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances and the fact that the 
package  is  significantly  affected  by  those  circumstances.  In  the  absence  of  a  travel  warning,  the 
current case-by-case assessment would remain applicable.  

269 This refers to LTAs defined in Article 3(5) (a), i.e., single-point-of-purchase LTAs. 
270 This refers to LTAs defined in Article 3(5) (b), i.e., click-through LTAs. 
271 Annex 13, Evaluation, EQ5, sub-sections General Aspects and B2B rights - Delay in reimbursing.  
272 The evaluation explains that ‘the concept came under spotlight in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Disputes 
between  travellers  and  organisers  arose  as  to  whether  a  certain  situation  could  be  considered  as  unavoidable  and 
extraordinary  in  the  sense  of  Articles  3(12)  and  12(2).  It  must  be  noted  that  Article  12(2)  adds  to  the  definition  of 
‘unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’ certain conditions which must be fulfilled in order to terminate a contract 
without a fee. Therefore, the definition is analysed in the context of Article 12 (2) and (4) under EQ5.’ Consequently, it 
is rather the application of this concept in the context of Article 12(2) that poses practical problems and necessitates in 
some cases clarifications by courts. Otherwise, as showed in the evaluation, the concept is also used in conjunction with 
other provisions of the PTD for which no problems have been signalled. 
273 This measure would apply only to cancellations due to unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances and is not of a 
horizontal nature. 
274 No data was received from stakeholders to estimate the financial benefits from this measure, but they are likely to be 
limited. 

44 

 
 
 
In addition to the foregoing, under both Measure 3.2.1 and Measure 3.2.2, it would be specified that 
the situation both in the country of departure or residence and the country of destination may be taken 
into account for the assessment of whether unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances prevail and 
affect the performance of the package. 

Additional specifications and clarifications  

Since travellers may not always understand the role of organisers, retailers and service providers and 
may thus not identify the trader responsible for the performance of the contract and for the refund of 
prepayments or for compensation275, under Measure 3.3.1 Clarification of the role of the parties - 
part of Option A - the role of these parties could be further clarified, in particular, in the information 
forms  annexed  to  the  Directive.  However,  the  legal  obligation  to  refund  prepayments  would  stay 
exclusively with the organiser, unless a Member State uses the regulatory option under the first sub-
paragraph of  Article  13  (1), as under the current Directive. Under Measure 3.3.2  - Retailers also 
responsible for refund of prepayments – part of Option C- organisers and retailers would be jointly 
and severally liable for refunds.  

6.  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? 

All  assessed  policy  options  positively  contribute  to  the  achievement  of  Sustainable  Development 
Goals (SDG). By facilitating the provision of better information to travellers and better protection of 
travellers’  rights,  the  options  will  result  in  a  more  equal  position  of  all  travellers  in  the  EU, 
contributing to SDG no. 10 – reduced inequalities. The clarifications of several provisions in the PTD 
will  reduce  inequalities  between  travellers  from  different  Member  States  and  likely  decrease  the 
number  of  travellers  needing  recourse  to  dispute  resolution  or  legal  procedures.  The  proposed 
measures will hence contribute to promoting non-discriminatory laws and policies and ensuring equal 
justice, addressed by SDG no. 16 Peace, justice and strong institutions. In addition, the measures will 
contribute  to  promoting  growth  of  SMEs  –  as  most  package  organisers  belong  to  this  category  – 
thereby contributing to SDG no. 8. 

As  regards  environmental  impacts,  some  of  the  policy  measures  included  in  each  of  the  options 
considered may lead to varying price increases for packages. Such price increases could potentially 
result in fewer packages being sold. However, the level of any price increase that could be linked 
directly to changes in the Directive is unlikely to lead to a reduction in overall travel – and thus, to a 
lower  carbon  footprint  of  the  travel  sector.  On  the  other  hand,  the  proposed  options  are  thus  not 
expected to lead to an increase in the carbon footprint related to travel and thus have no significant 
environmental impact. Therefore, all policy options are consistent with the environmental objectives 
of the European Green Deal and the European Climate Law276 and with the ‘do no significant harm’ 
principle.277  

The use of digital channels to conclude package travel contracts has been on the rise in recent years. 
The  revision  of  the  previous  PTD  in  2015  already  took  this  trend  into  account.  While  certain 
provisions, e.g., on LTAs, and possible changes to them, may be relevant for this digital dimension, 

275 Annex 13, Evaluation, EQ1 and EQ5, sub-section  B2B rights. See also responses to the public consultation Q13: 
According  to  52%  (11  of  21)  of public  authorities  and  52%  (11  of  21) of  consumer  organisations,  traders  should  be 
obliged to inform travellers clearly which trader is acting as an organiser, retailer or service provider in connection with 
a  package  and  about  their  obligations  towards  travellers.  24%  (5  of  21)  of  public  authorities  and  48%  (10  of  21)  of 
consumer organisation indicated also that both organisers and retailers should be legally liable for refunds in all Member 
States. See also suggestion of the Fit for Future opinion of 22 March 2022. 
276 Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 
277 ‘Do no significant harm’ means not supporting or carrying out economic activities that do significant harm to any 

environmental objective, where relevant, within the meaning of Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2020/852.       

45 

 
 
 
the  assessed  policy  measures  are  not  expected  to  have  any  significant  impact  on  digitalisation.  
Consequently,  all  policy  options  are  expected  to  have  a  neutral  impact  on  the  application  of  the 
‘digital by default’ principle. 

As  regards  social  impacts,  any  impacts  on  consumer  protection,  consumer  trust  and  income 
distribution  are  included  in  the  economic  impacts  on  travellers  and  businesses.  Otherwise,  social 
impacts are described, in the section hereunder, along with economic impacts.  

The proposed individual measures, and the options resulting from their combination, will have an 
impact on SMEs, as many package organisers belong to this category. According to the evaluation, 
in  2019,  around  99%  of  organisers  in  the  EU  were  SMEs.278  Moreover,  96%  of  companies  that 
responded  to  the  public  consultation  are  SMEs,  the  majority  of  which  are  micro  companies.279 
Therefore, the views of organisers reported below, to a very large extent, represent the views of SMEs 
and mostly micro enterprises. The proposed changes will affect both large companies and SMEs in 
the package travel sector. None of the measures proposed are expected to influence the number of 
SMEs operating in the market significantly. Still, cost factors affecting their operations and potential 
future growth were identified. These impacts are included in the description of the economic impacts 
on companies. The detailed SME Test and impacts on competitiveness are presented in Annex 5. 
Stakeholder consultations are summarised in Annex 2.  

Some measures presented below aim to increase legal certainty, thereby decreasing litigation costs 
and the need to seek legal advice. Businesses not respecting consumer law may incur costs to change 
their business practices or are more likely to face sanctions. However, costs resulting from their past 
or future non-compliance are not considered in this impact assessment. 

A  modification  of  the  existing  Directive  will  inevitably  generate  transposition  costs  for  public 
authorities. Based on the administrative costs for transposition, alignment of procedures, guidance 
and training, monitoring and reporting of the present Directive, they are estimated at. EUR 49,677 
per Member State, i.e., approximately EUR 1.3 million for the whole EU.280 Considering that each 
legislative measure assessed below will entail changes to the Directive, such one-off transposition 
costs are not repeated separately for each option.  

6.1.  Economic and social impacts of Option A 

Option A includes the following measures addressing Problem 1: flexible limitation of prepayments 
(1.1.1), possibility to set up a crisis fund at national level (1.2.1), a B2B refund right if services are 
not performed (1.3.1) and voluntary vouchers at all times (1.4.1).  

Measure 1.1.1 Flexible limitation of prepayments 

278 Annex 13, Evaluation, Section 2.2 
279 Reply to the question about the number of employees of the responding companies: out of the total 323 companies: 
249 were micro-organisations (1 to 9 employees), 43 were small (10 to 49 employees), 18 were medium-sized (50 to 249 
employees) and 13 were large organisations (250 employees or more). Of the 323 companies that replied, 84% (271) 
were package organisers, 36% (117) stated they were retailers, 6% (20 companies) were carriers (6%). These categories 
partly overlap as respondents could choose more than one main activity. Number of companies who selected only one 
main  activity:  157  organisers,  16  retailers,  5  traders  facilitating  LTAs,  3  carriers,  3  others,  2  insolvency  protection 
providers, 1 trader providing other tourism related services, 1 car rental company, 1 hotel, 1 online platform facilitating 
bookings for stand-alone travel services and/or packages. 
280 Estimate from the ICF study, Table 23 on page 117. The measures contained in ICF’s Option 2 – Targeted revision of 
the Directive to a large extent overlap with the measures contained in Option A in this SWD. As such, ICF’s estimates 
are used in this SWD, where necessary with certain modifications. 

46 

 
 
 
This  measure  would  not  put  additional  pressure  on  the  organisers’  liquidity  and  may  decrease 
insolvency protection costs for organisers that currently ask for higher prepayments.281 Moreover, 
service providers would not face any prepayment restrictions, so that their liquidity situation will not 
change compared to the status quo.282 On the other hand, organisers who would like to request higher 
prepayments,  would need to have a justified reason to do so, such as the fact that they need to prepay 
providers of certain services included in the package or that they need higher prepayments to cover 
their own costs specifically related to the organisation and performance of the package at the time of 
booking or shortly afterwards. However, they would not need to provide any specific justification for 
higher prepayments for each package. Rather, they could calculate the necessary level of prepayments 
e.g. per type or group of packages having similar characteristics. Moreover, they would continue to 
be  obliged  to  inform  travellers,  before  the  conclusion  of  a  package  travel  contract,  about  the 
prepayments they request in the same way as it is currently done. As a result, their administrative 
burden would not increase.  

In terms of potential changes to the cost structure pursuant to the introduction of Measure 1.1.1, an 
organiser responding to the specific targeted consultation of May 2023 indicated that their high-level 
estimate for a potential price increase, if the threshold were set at 20%, would be 3-4% of the current 
cost of a package, i.e., similar to a strict limitation of prepayments. However, this estimate seems to 
overestimate the actual impacts, as in many cases (as long as they are justified) prepayments can stay 
at the current level. A service provider replied that, in their view, the costs would increase by approx. 
7.5% in the EU except for Germany. In Germany, where there is already a limitation of prepayments 
to 20%, they expect  an increase in costs between 2.5% and 5%. The only difference between the 
current German practice and the proposed measure would be the collection of the remaining sum 28 
days before the start of the package instead of the 30 days currently applied by this service provider. 
A price increase of up to 5% for receiving the funds 2 days later, does not seem plausible, and seems 
to  largely  overstate  the  actual  costs  increase  (if  any).  It,  therefore,  also  puts  into  question  the 
reliability of the cost increase figure quoted for the remainder of the EU. In addition, having only two 
data sources, puts into question the representative value of the provided estimates. Overall, the cost 
impact  for  organisers  would  likely  be  the  same  or  only  slightly  higher  than  the  status  quo.  Still 
considering the high-end 3% increase in the operating costs of organisers, and the operational costs 
representing 10% of company turnover, the high side estimate for cost increases of organisers would 
be approx. EUR 332.1 million.283 However, as explained, this seems in any event to largely overstate 
any potential cost increases. Obviously, the cost impact would be slightly lower if the threshold were 
set at 25% instead of 20%, which would be in favour of organisers, most of whom are SMEs, or even 
micro enterprises. This would justify setting the threshold rather at the level of 25% instead of 20%. 
Moreover, a threshold of 25% would be in line with the average prepayments in a number of Member 

281 To be noted that flexibility organisers not wishing to use the proposed flexibility might face higher capital costs to 
make up the difference between the limited prepayments and what service providers demand for a firm booking. This 
would, however, be their own choice and it is impossible to estimate which percentage of organisers would be concerned. 
282 A few airlines responded to the May 2023 targeted consultation. However, in their replies they did not address the 
impacts of this precise measure, but of a strict limitation of prepayments to 20% without any possibility to increase them. 
Consequently, their replies cannot be used in the context of Measure 1.1.1. 
283 On the basis of industry data, i.e. financial accounts published by companies in the sector, a rudimentary cost structure 
is estimated to be composed of 80% wages, 20% capital cost and a 10% operational margin. The calculation  takes into 
account  the  estimated  2023  industry  turnover,  considering  that  operational  costs  represent  on  average  10%  of  the 
company turnover and assuming a 3% cost increase. 

47 

 
 
 
States284, but would still allow to bring down the average prepayments in member States where they 
are substantially higher, such as Spain or Malta, where they currently lie at 40%.285   

To be noted that it has been indicated by organisers and service providers that any cost increases 
resulting from the introduction of new measures under the PTD, would be transferred onto travellers 
through corresponding increases of prices for packages.286 In view of this pass-through effect, any 
cost increases for organisers would be compensated by corresponding increases of package prices. In 
terms of benefits for organisers, with the flexible limitation of prepayments, organisers would obtain 
sufficient  funds  to  cover  prepayments  to  service  providers  but  would  also  need  to  refund  less  to 
travellers in case of cancellation for unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances. This may slightly 
positively  impact  their  liquidity  in  times  of  a  high  number  of  cancellations.  Moreover,  the 
clarification  of  the  permitted  level  of  prepayment  would  in  the  medium-  to  long-term  lead  to  a 
qualitative improvement of the industry, by  favouring sustainable business practices and levelling 
the playing field for all organisers across the EU. Overall, the measure is expected to have a neutral 
cost impact on organisers. 

The measure is not expected to have any economic impact on service providers.  

Considering that this measure harmonises rules among Member States, since some countries already 
apply prepayment limitations, it will increase effective competition and hence lead to competitiveness 
gains  within  the  EU.  It  is  not  possible,  however,  on  the  basis  of  available  data  to  quantify  the 
competitiveness gain for organisers resulting from this measure. International competitiveness will 
not  change  as  a  result  of  measure  1.1.1,  because  third  country  organisers  offering  packages  to 
consumers in the EU will also have to apply the revised PTD. 

As regards travellers, their costs will potentially increase through the cost pass-through by organisers 
described  above,  and  result  in  a  maximum  total  cost  increase  of  EUR  332.1  million.  This  would 
represent an increase of the package price of EUR 4.4 per package or approx. 0.3% of the average 
package price.287 To be noted that such a price increase would apply both in normal times and in crisis 
and may be slightly lower if the threshold is set at 25% instead of 20%.  

On the other hand, in terms of benefits, travellers would in principle prepay only 25% at booking, 
compared to often higher percentages currently.288 This implies that in case of cancellation organisers 
will need to refund only a smaller percentage of the package price to the travellers concerned, thus 
decreasing their risks of not being reimbursed. Moreover, the clarification of the permitted level of 
prepayment  is  expected  to  result  in  a  qualitative improvement  of  the  package  travel  industry  and 
increased transparency, benefiting also travellers. In addition, travellers would have legal guarantees 
and be less dependent on the business practices of organisers.  

284 Source: Panteia, Onderzoek financiering (pakket)reissector - Voor het ministerie van Economische Zaken en Klimaat, 
14  March  2023,  p.  56,  https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2023/03/14/onderzoek-financiering-
pakketreissector 
285 Response of BEUC to the targeted consultation. 
286 May 2023 targeted consultation of service providers. Most respondents indicated that they would (try to) pass 100% 
of any cost increases to travellers by increasing package prices. However, the estimates provided for this measure by the 
respondents seemed largely overstated. 
287 Based on a total price increase of approx. EUR 332.1 million and an estimated number of packages of 75.0 million 
and average package price of EUR 1475 in 2023 
288 As indicated by consumer organisations during the consultations (e.g. PTD Workshop 1 with businesses and consumer 
representatives, October 2022), the practice of prepayments creates excessive financial exposure for consumers, as it was 
shown during the pandemic. 

48 

 
 
 
Feedback from consumer organisations indicates that travellers prefer to sometimes pay substantially 
more to enjoy higher protection.289, 290 This seems also to be confirmed by evidence from the UK’s 
ATOL reform survey291, showing that travellers are willing to pay more for a package compared to 
organising the travel themselves to benefit from the increased protection granted by the PTD, notably 
regarding the protection against the risks of organisers’ insolvency. These examples of the travellers’ 
willingness to pay indicate that a slight increase in price of the package, i.e. maximum 0.3%, in return 
for a higher protection granted by a lower prepayment will likely be accepted by travellers. Moreover, 
such a small price increase because of this measure will anyway be dwarfed by price increase due to 
the  current  two-digit  inflation.  Therefore,  the  measure  is  not  expected  to  lead  to  any  decrease  in 
consumption of packages by travellers. 

The  size  of  the  benefit  for  travellers  will  vary  depending  on  the  current  practices  in  individual 
Member States and on the extent to which packages contain prepaid services.292 In Member States 
where this would lead to changes, it would reduce the risk related to refunds and improve the liquidity 
position  of  travellers.  As  mentioned  in  Section  5,  organisers  request  prepayments  in  the  range  of 
20%-30%,  increasing  to  40%-70%  or  more  where  the  package  includes  a  significant  flight  or 
transport  component,  and  reaching  100%  in  case  of  dynamic  packages.  Therefore,  it  could 
conservatively be estimated that the average prepayment rate would lie somewhere between 33% and 
50%, depending on the composition of travel arrangements and destinations in a given year. Using 
the 2022 average package price, i.e., EUR 1380, as the baseline, the current average prepayment per 
package would be between EUR 456 and EUR 691 EUR.  

The requirement to limit prepayments to 25%, unless higher prepayments are justified, makes the 
prepayment  rate  something  companies  can  compete  on  more  aggressively.  As  a  result,  it  can  be 
expected the average prepayment will decrease. In theory, the prepayments could go down by, on 
average, between 8 and 25 percentage points. However, considering that, in many cases, organisers 
will  be  able  to  defend  higher  prepayments  in  view  of  prepayment  they  have  to  make  to  service 
providers,  a reduction of an average 5 percentage points is conservatively  assumed, or around 70 
euros per package travel  arrangement compared  to  the baseline.293 This  would imply  that average 
prepayments would be between 28% and 45% of the package price, i.e., between EUR 387 and EUR 
622. As such, in case of a cancellation for unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances, travellers 
would generally need to recover a smaller percentage of the package price. This would result in a 
liquidity  gain  of  approx.  EUR  69.2  per  package  or  EUR  3.8  billion  per  year.  Considering  that 
approximately  4.4%  of  travellers  suffer  financial  loss  in  normal  times,294  the  introduction  of  this 
measure would result in a reduction of consumer detriment of approx. 4.4% of this liquidity gain, 
i.e.,  EUR  168.7  million  per  year.  It  can  be  expected  that  in  a  crisis,  the  overall  loss  suffered  by 
travellers is on average higher than outside crisis. This implies that in times of crisis the consumer 
benefit related to this measure would be higher than the EUR 168.7 million per year calculated for 
non-crisis times.  

p. 

11, 

paper, 

position 

BEUC’s 

https://www.beuc.eu/sites/default/files/publications/beuc-x-2021-

289 Replies of BEUC, VZBV and DECO to Q1 of the OPC. 
290 
115_package_travel_directive_beuc_s_views_on_how_to_regain_consumer_trust_in_the_tourism_sector.pdf 
291 https://www.atol.org/news-and-blogs/2023/06/30/atol-celebrates-protecting-uk-holidaymakers-since-1973/. 
292  This  measure,  however,  would  address  the  identified  problem  only  to  a  certain  extent,  as  many  cancellations  for 
unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances will occur  in the last 28 days before departure. Only stricter limitations 
would address the problem to a bigger extent but would have more negative effects on organisers. 
293 The EUR 70 liquidity gain would have a marginal impact, using an opportunity cost approach, and has not been further 
quantified. 
294 See footnote 58. 

49 

 
 
 
Consumer protection would thus increase, but likely against some cost increase, as specified above. 
Overall, however, consumers will likely be better off as a result of this measure. 

Member States authorities indicated that clearer rules on pre-payments would have a positive impact 
on them by ensuring better enforcement.295 On the other hand, this measure is expected to cause one-
off  transposition  costs  for  public  authorities.  These  are,  however,  included  in  the  overall 
transposition costs.296  

Overall, in view of its limited costs and benefits, the measure is considered proportionate both with 
a view to crisis preparedness and outside of crisis situations. 

Measure 1.2.1 Possibility to set up a crisis fund for rapid refunds at national level 

Given its non-mandatory nature, the impact of this measure will depend on decisions taken at national 
level.  Therefore,  it  would  have  no  direct  cost  impact  on  companies  or  travellers.  However,  the 
decision of a Member State to introduce a crisis fund would obviously generate costs for package 
organisers as they would be required to contribute to such fund. The exact fee would still need to be 
determined by each Member State. As an example, Poland – who introduced a permanent crisis fund 
– imposed a fee of EUR 5 per package on organisers. To be noted, however, that, in addition, Poland 
granted State aid, of approx. EUR 68 million, to permit the start-up of this liquidity fund.297 

Considering price level  differences between countries298, Eurostat data shows that in  2022 Poland 
was at 86% of the EU average. Therefore, the EU average cost per package for the crisis fund would 
be EUR 5.81. Taking into account the Commission’s estimate for the total number of packages in the 
EU in 2022 of 55.4 million, the total cost of crisis funds in all EU Member States would be approx. 
EUR 322.3 million, considering a 100% take-up rate. However, while at present the PTD does not 
impede  the  creation  of  a  crisis  fund,  only  Poland  decided  to  create  such  a  permanent  fund,  and 
Denmark a temporary one. It is difficult to predict the number of Member States that will establish 
such fund following the introduction of measure 1.2.1. Considering that only two Member States did 
this  so  far,  combined  with  the  fact  that,  in  the  consultation  process,  only  a  few  Member  States 
indicated openness to  the idea of a  crisis  fund, suggests that not  many will  establish such a fund 
directly following the adoption of the proposal, hence keeping the costs of this measure minimal. At 
the  same  time,  the  introduction  of  measure  1.2.1,  which  entails  an  obligation  to  inform  the 
Commission and the Central Contact Points should a Member State decide to set up such national 
crisis  fund,  will  enable  a  discussion  of  the  best  approach  based  on  real  models  and  practical 
experience without imposing a crisis fund on the Member States at this stage. The Commission could 
thus still make such proposals in the future in light of the experience gained by the Member States. 
Such a flexible measure would hence be beneficial in the long-term. The overall costs of this measure 
will hence remain substantially below the maximum costs evoked above. In addition, in the medium 
and long term, the costs for such mechanisms will depend on different factors. These will include the 
frequency of recourse to the fund, which, in turn, will depend on the frequency and extent of future 
crises, how a crisis triggering the activation of a fund is defined, as well as the rate and speed at which 
organisers benefiting from such fund are able to pay back the amounts refunded to consumers on 
behalf of them, assuming that the fund will work on the basis of loans rather than grants. 

295 European Commission, Workshop with Consumer Protection Cooperation (CPC) network, May 2022. 
296 Targeted survey for NCAs (regulatory and enforcement), two free-text responses to Q12: Authorities do not expect 
increased monitoring costs because of this measure. 
297 State Aid SA.58102 (2020/N) – Poland COVID-19 support to tour operators and other undertakings active in tourism 
and culture, https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases1/202039/287812_2191234_87_2.pdf  
298 Also known as purchasing power parity or PPP 

50 

 
 
 
As with other cost-increasing measures, such additional costs will likely be passed on from organisers 
to travellers in the form of price increases. It is expected that Member States would only introduce 
this measure if in their assessment it is cost-neutral in the long-term, i.e. consumer benefits would be 
(at least) equal to its costs. Such consumer benefits would stem from the fact that in case of a crisis 
where packages are cancelled due to unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances, travellers would 
receive  immediate  refund  of  their  prepayments  instead  of  waiting  until  organisers  are  able  to 
reimburse them.  

In terms of operating costs, Denmark, where a temporary crisis fund is in operation, found that costs 
for its set up were negligible, since the infrastructure of existing funds is used. However, its cost in 
times of crisis is estimated to be around EUR 700 000 annually.299  

Overall, this measure is thus estimated to be cost-neutral in the long-term. 

In  case  Members  States  wish  to  introduce  such  a  crisis  fund,  they  would  need  to  inform  the 
Commission  and  the  Central  Contact  Points  thereof.  Based  on  the  past  costs  for  such  reporting 
obligation and considering that only some Member State authorities would introduce such funds, the 
costs  are  expected  not  to  exceed  EUR  5,390.300  On  the  other  hand,  this  obligation  will  also  help 
decrease operating costs of such funds by facilitating the sharing of best practices. 

Measure 1.3.1 Business-to-business (B2B) refund right if the relevant service is not performed 

An obligation for service providers to make a refund to organisers within 7 days of the cancellation 
of  the  service,  i.e.  only  when  a  service  is  not  provided,  would  have  some  positive  impact  on 
organisers,  and  indirectly  travellers.301  Organisers  indicate  that  under  the  current  rules  they  face 
excessive burden, which is further exacerbated in a crisis.302 A B2B right to a refund within 7 days of 
a cancelled service could help alleviate this burden.303 While under contract law service providers 
would  anyway  have  to  refund  prepayments  for  services  not  rendered,  a  B2B  refund  right  with  a 
specific deadline in the PTD would provide a stronger basis for organisers’ receiving and claiming 
money back for a cancelled service. This has been indicated as an important element by organisers 
during consultations.  

A B2B refund right if the relevant service is not performed would not result in any change or shift 
of the responsibility between the organiser and the service provider and the responsibility towards 
the traveller would remain with the organiser. As organisers do not hold travellers’ pre-payments but 
use them to pay for travel services, a legal guarantee to be refunded by service providers within 7 
days of the cancellation of their service would increase the availability of funds to cover refunds to 
travellers and would improve the liquidity position of organisers.304 Such specific deadline, however, 
might slightly negatively affect the liquidity of certain service providers that do not already have the 
obligation to make refunds within 7 days. It would, therefore, not affect airlines, who must reimburse 

299 Sourced from interviews by ICF with the Danish insolvency fund, whose representatives stated that in times of crisis 
the expenditure could go up to approx. DKK 5 million per year. 
300 Based on numbers presented in the ICF study and on Commission’s own assumptions. 
301 Public consultation Q14: 37 of 507 respondents supported this policy option: 16% of EU citizens (11 of 68), 5% of 
public authorities (1 of 22), no consumer organisations (0 of 21) and 6% of companies and business associations (21 of 
368). 
302 PTD Workshop 1 with business and consumer representatives, October 2022. 
303 However, in their reply to the May 2023 targeted consultation, a representative organisation of package organisers 
reported not expecting big improvements from this measure and indicated that it would prefer a B2B refund right in all 
cases.  
304 The lack of B2B refund rules was mentioned by stakeholders as one of the key drivers for the impossibility to refund 
travellers during the Covid-19 pandemic, PTD Workshop 1 with businesses and consumer representatives, October 2022 

51 

 
 
 
passengers within 7 days under the APRR if they cancel a flight and will continue to be subject to 
this obligation. It is not possible to quantify the impact of this measure. In any event, it is not expected 
that the introduction of this measure would result in higher costs for packages.305  

With the proposed measure, all  service providers  – both  established within the EU and outside  – 
would, in principle, have to abide by this rule insofar as the law of an EU Member State applies to 
the  contract.  In  practice,  though,  organisers  based  in  the  EU  may  not  be  able  to  insist  on  the 
application of EU law in a business-to-business contract with a third-country service provider306 and 
to enforce a 7-day refund in relation to third country service providers.307 At the same time, it has to 
be taken into account that a difference in the possibilities to enforce refunds within and outside the 
EU already exists at present and that a refund right for services that are not performed corresponds 
largely to general principles of contract law. In addition, the new provision would allow organisers 
to  obtain  a  refund  from  (especially  EU-based)  service  providers  more  easily  (and  quickly)  than 
currently, as, in view of their smaller bargaining power they are often not able to agree to mutually 
beneficial  contract  terms  with  service  providers  such  as  airlines.  This  will,  in  turn,  put  package 
organisers  in  a  better  position  to  refund  travellers,  thus  having  a  positive  impact  on  organisers’ 
competitiveness. This may hence improve the position of organisers compared to the status quo to 
some extent in  relation  to EU service providers  and to  a lesser extent in relation  to  third  country 
service  providers.  Moreover,  whilst  overall  competitiveness  would  be  unchanged,  the  obstacle  to 
recovering funds easily from non-EU countries, as long as it is not addressed (e.g. through bilateral 
agreements between the EU and the third country concerned), could lead organisers to choose the 
services of EU providers, such as airlines, over non-EU service providers for inclusion in packages 
that they offer. As a result, this may in the longer-term lead to an improvement of the competitive 
position  of  EU  service  providers.  In  addition,  it  may  encourage  third  country  service  providers 
wishing to operate within the EU to establish a representative office and/or a subsidiary in the EU.  

This measure would hence have a neutral or slightly positive overall economic impact on businesses 
as a group (both organisers and service providers) and should not result in any cost increases.   

Travellers would also indirectly benefit from the proposed measure in terms of quicker refunds, as 
the measure would make it easier for organisers to provide such refunds within the 14-day deadline 
set in the Directive. Experiences with reimbursements in the pandemic demonstrates that it is not 
clear,  though,  whether  these  deadlines  would  be  able  to  be  respected  in  case  of  such  widespread 
disruption. 

There would be no impact on public authorities. 

Measure 1.4.1 Voluntary vouchers at all times 

The introduction of voluntary vouchers308, i.e. vouchers that could be emitted by organisers subject 
to  specific  acceptance  by  travellers,  would  have  a  positive  impact  on  the  liquidity  of  organisers. 
Upon cancellation of a package, they would not need to refund travellers accepting the voucher within 
14 days, but either would propose a different package during the validity period of the voucher or 

305 According to a response of an organiser to the May 2023 targeted consultation, a B2B refund right within a 7-day 
deadline is not expected to lead service providers to include a risk premium which would raise the costs of packages.  
306 Under Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and the Council of 17 June 2008 on the 
law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) the fundamental principle is the freedom of the parties to choose the 
applicable law. 
307 The respect, or not, of the 7-day deadline for the B2B refund would not influence the legal deadline for the organiser 
to refund the traveller within 14 days, already enshrined in the PTD. 
308 In line with the 2020 Recommendation. 

52 

 
 
 
would have to provide cash refunds only at the end of the validity of the voucher. However, the size 
of  this  effect  would  depend  on  the  acceptance  rate  of  vouchers  by  travellers.309  According  to  the 
responses  to  the  Public  Consultation,  for  most  EU  citizens,  public  authorities  and  consumer 
organisations, the PTD should specify that organisers may issue vouchers instead of a refund within 
14 days, provided that a) travellers agree and b) there is a guarantee that travellers will receive their 
money back if the voucher is  not  used within its validity period, and c)  that vouchers have to  be 
protected against the insolvency of the issuer. 50% of companies and business associations agreed 
with this statement, while 47% disagreed.310, 311 

In addition, certain guarantees included in the potential rules on vouchers, including the fact that they 
would be covered by insolvency protection under measure 2.1 (discussed below) and that they would 
be informed on this fact under measure 1.4.1, would make vouchers more attractive and are likely to 
increase the acceptance rate. The costs for businesses related to the introduction of this measure, if 
any, are expected to be minimal. 

If Member States decide to introduce a rapid refund mechanism (measure 1.2.1), voluntary vouchers 
(measure 1.4.1) would be less relevant as a means of alleviating a liquidity crisis. Indeed, travellers 
are  unlikely  to  accept  vouchers  if  they  can  obtain  immediate  refunds  through  a  rapid  refund 
mechanism, thus decreasing the effectiveness of measure 1.4.1. 

The introduction of rules on vouchers is not expected to create costs for travellers and would instead 
add  clarity  on  their  rights.  Travellers  will  not  be  forced  to  accept  vouchers  but  may  accept  them 
depending on how urgently they need their money back. 

This measure would harmonise diverse national rules and practices, thus creating stronger cohesion 
in  the  internal  market.312  It  would  also  increase  coherence  with  the  APRR,  which  has  rules  on 
vouchers. 

To  address  Problem  2,  Option  A  would  contain  Measure  2.1  -  strengthened  rules  on  national 
insolvency  protection,  including  the  coverage  of  vouchers  and  refund  claims  by  insolvency 
protection and a reference to the possibility of setting up an insolvency back-up fund at national 
level.   

This measure aims to ensure the achievement of an effective insolvency protection system, including 
in times of crisis. It would also make it clear that in all Member States refund claims and vouchers 

on 

2022, 

2023: 

survey, 

published 

27  March 

30933% of travellers agreed that they would accept a voucher instead of a refund in relation to delayed travel arrangements 
https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-
(Consumer 
policy/policies/consumers/consumer-protection-policy/key-consumer-data_en).  See  also  Annex  13,  Evaluation,  EQ  5, 
Vouchers:  Consumer  organisation  outlined  that  travellers  were  sometimes  given  a  voucher/credit  note  although  they 
would have preferred a refund - public consultation Q41: 18 of 21 (81%) of consumer organisations and 11 of 19 (58%) 
public authorities. Furthermore, in replies to the businesses survey, businesses indicated that between 30% and 50% of 
travellers accept vouchers. However, in reply to a survey among more than 10,000 individual consumers undertaken for 
the ICF support study (“Targeted consumer survey"), while 42% of the respondent indicated that they would accept a 
voucher in a crisis situation, 58% stated that they would refuse vouchers. 
310 Public consultation Q12: 66% (44 out of 67) of EU citizens, 83% (19 out of 23) of public authorities, and 76% (16 
out of 21) of consumer organisations. 50% (182 out of 367) of business respondents (aggregated companies and business 
associations) agreed with this statement, while 47% (172 out of 367) them disagreed.  
311 Interview conducted by ICF: a Norwegian consumer organisation explained that vouchers may not represent a good 
solution, especially concerning their expiration date, as consumers may decide not to book another trip within that set 
timeframe.  
312 Harmonisation could also decrease costs for traders who would face the same conditions in all Member States. 

53 

 
 
 
related to cancelled packages would be covered by insolvency protection both at normal times and in 
a crisis.  

In this way, it will bring clear benefits for the protection of pre-payments from travellers, in Member 
States  where  there  are  currently  gaps  in  the  protection  and  would  enhance  the  comparability  of 
protection levels in the Member States, thus levelling the playing field for organisers in the internal 
market.  

The obligation of effective insolvency protection and covering all  reasonably  foreseeable costs is 
already provided in the current PTD. However, the provision to be added would aim to facilitate the 
achievement of this objective. Indeed, several of the parameters to be inserted into the provisions on 
insolvency protection are already used by some Member States. For instance, some Member States 
already apply minimum percentages of annual turnover to be covered, sometimes in addition to other 
criteria.313,314 Exposure analysis will be carried out by many insolvency protection providers.315 Some 
Member States already have back-up funds in addition to first line insolvency protection. Since the 
obligation to establish an effective insolvency protection system already exists today, any additional 
measures taken by the Member States to reach this objective cannot be seen as an additional burden 
created  by  the  amendment.  Moreover,  any  additional  cost  for  the  national  insolvency  protection 
systems in some Member States must be calculated against the very real risk of State liability for 
ineffective protection of travellers through national systems, as numerous CJEU cases from the past 
demonstrate. It is hence not sure that this measure would increase net cost for Member States.  

 Should Member States decide to introduce national insolvency back-up funds, such funds may be 
financed  through  contributions  from  organisers.  It  could  be  considered  that  a  fee  of  EUR  5  per 
package could  be reasonable  in  such case. This  seems  to  be in  line with the fee requested by the 
Polish fund.316 This is a conservative cost assumption, since e.g., the UK charges a flat rate of GDP 
2,5 (approx. EUR 2.92) for fully-fledged insolvency protection.317,318   

Under the proposed measures, vouchers and pending refund claims would be covered by insolvency 
protection. The Commission saw a risk that claims  under Article 12 would  not  be covered in  the 
context  of  Article  17(1),  for  instance,  in  the  2020  Recommendation  and  in  the  PTD  Application 
Report.319 Moreover, the  current  practice in  the Member States varies.  Indeed,  six Member States 

313 Annex 13, Evaluation, EQ3 and Appendix X. Overview of national insolvency protection systems. E.g. Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Finland, Lithuania 
314 Stakeholders were divided, whether such minimum percentages should be made mandatory. Targeted business survey 
Q31: 41% (9 of 22) agreed, 27% (6 of 22) disagreed, 32% (7 of 22) did not know.  
315 Business stakeholders were divided on the question whether the PTD should specify that Member States must require 
that insolvency protection covers a sufficiently large share of the organiser’s turnover to ensure that an insolvency at the 
period of the year with the highest risk exposure is fully covered. Targeted business survey Q31: 27% (6 of 22) agreed, 
36% (8 of 22) disagreed, 36% (8 of 22) did not know.  
316 Poland charges organisers EUR 5 per package for the insolvency protection back-up fund. Furthermore, since 2021, 
in addition to the normal contribution of organisers – based on a percentage of yearly turnover – to the insolvency fund 
SGR, travellers must pay an additional contribution of EUR 5 per package, for packages whose value exceeds EUR 150.  
317 See footnote 291 
318 
EUR 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/euro_reference_exchange_rates/html/eurofxref-graph-
gbp.en.html 
319 The 2020 Recommendation: “(14) If organisers or carriers become insolvent, there is a risk that many travellers and 
passengers would not receive any refund at all, as their claims against organisers and carriers are not protected.” The 
2021  Application  Report,  section  5.2.5.  Insolvency  protection:  “The  question  arose  whether  pending  claims  for 
reimbursements from travellers were covered by the insolvency protection systems provided in accordance with the PTD. 
Article 17(1) PTD requires organisers to provide security for the refund of all payments made by the traveller “insofar 

24/08/2023. 

exchange 

based 

0.856 

GBP 

ECB 

rate 

the 

on 

of 

= 

54 

 
 
 
 
replying  to  the  consultation  activities  already  cover  vouchers  and/or  refund  claims  by  insolvency 
protection up to a certain extent, while six do not.320 In addition, the CJEU is still to rule on this issue 
in  two  pending  requests  for  a  preliminary  ruling.321  As  a  result,  introducing  a  rule  in  the  PTD 
providing that vouchers and refund claims are to be covered by insolvency protection would provide 
clarification benefits. Furthermore, it would provide indirect benefits to companies by creating a level 
playing field across the EU and by making vouchers, which help maintain the liquidity of organisers, 
more attractive for travellers.322 Indeed, a big percentage of the respondents to the consumer survey 
indicated  that  they  do  not  trust  vouchers.323  Covering  vouchers  and  refund  claims  by  insolvency 
protection would increase such trust and could lead to a higher acceptance rate. Most stakeholders 
agree  with  introducing  in  the  PTD  rules  on  vouchers  applicable  at  all  times.324  Most  consumer 
organisations  and  public  authorities  and  a  minority  of  businesses  were  in  favour  of  covering 
vouchers and refund claims by insolvency protection.325  

At the same time, this measure might have a cost impact in jurisdictions that currently do not impose 
such  coverage.  No  detailed  information  on  the  cost  burden  of  this  measure  was  provided  by 
stakeholders, and it was not possible for the Commission to quantify them precisely on the basis of 
the available data. However, such costs seem reasonable.326 The costs for covering refund claims and 
vouchers can be expected to be higher in periods of a major crisis. 327,328 However, the available data 

Fit 

for 

also 

Future 

It  was 

requested 

22  March 

Platform  Opinion, 

as the relevant services are not performed as a consequence of the organiser’s insolvency”. The Commission considered 
in  its  Recommendation  2020/648  that,  if  organisers  become  insolvent,  there  is  a  risk  that  many  travellers  would  not 
receive any refund, as their claims against organisers are not protected.” 
320 Targeted survey for NCAs (insolvency protection), Q8: 12 responses from HU, CY, LV, EE, HR, DE, AT, SE, IS, 
DK, FI, PT. 6 authorities (5 MS and Iceland) replied that the current rules on insolvency protection in place in their 
country cover vouchers and/or refund claims (for cancelled packages) to a certain extent. In general, this protection has 
ensued in the context of the COVID-19. In addition, Ireland confirmed during a meeting with the EC that vouchers and 
refund claims were covered by the rules on insolvency protection. Only Denmark, Estonia and Ireland seem to fully cover 
vouchers.  
321 The interpretation of Article17(1) in this respect is raised in two pending requests for preliminary rulings from Austria 
and Belgium in cases C-771/22 HDI Global and C-45/23 MS Amlin Insurance. 
322 
in 

the 
https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2023-
04/Final%20opinion%202021_SBGR3_15%20Package%20travel_fup_0.pdf.  
323 Targeted survey for consumers Q14, N=10152: 58.0% of all responding consumers, and 76.9% of those that would 
not accept a voucher instead of a refund, indicated that they do not trust vouchers.  
324 See footnote 310 for the replies to this question in the public consultation. 
325 See footnote 128 for the replies to this question in the public consultation.   
326 Targeted survey for business associations, Q18, N=10: in relation to the question if the costs of coverage of vouchers 
by insolvency protection would be reasonable, 1 company strongly agreed (10%), 2 tended to agree (20%), 4 strongly 
disagreed  (40%)  and  3  did  not  know  (30%);  in  relation  to  the  costs  of  covering  refund  claims  being  reasonable:  2 
respondents tended to agree (20%), 5 strongly disagreed (50%) and 3 did not know (30%). Targeted survey for NCAs 
(insolvency protection), Q4, N=11: in relation to the question if the costs of coverage of vouchers by insolvency protection 
during major crisis would be reasonable, 1 respondent strongly agreed (9%), 4 tended to agree (36%), 1 tended to disagree 
(9%) and 5 did not know (45%); in relation to the costs of covering refund claims being reasonable: 4 respondents tended 
to agree (36%), 1 tended to disagree (9%), 1 strongly disagreed (9%) and 5 did not know (45%). 
327  Public consultation, Section VI. Additional questions for providers of insolvency protection, open text Q68. When 
asked  about  the  impact  of  this  measure  on  fees  and  premiums,  two  insolvency  protection  providers  predicted  large 
increase, three predicted no or only marginal increase, however two of these specified that this would be higher in major 
crisis situation. Rest of the 11 who added comments to Q68 did not include a clear reply to this question. 
328 See previous footnote. Furthermore, this assumption is based, among other things, on the reasoning in point 26 (c) of 
the State aid decision in the case SA.62271 (2021/N) – COVID-19: SGR voucher credit facility, which shows that the 
margin  for  a  liquidity  loan  on  market  terms  in  a  such  case  would  be  very  high.  Nevertheless,  it  is  not  possible  to 
extrapolate the information from this decision to predict the costs for the coverage of vouchers (and refund claims) by 
insolvency protection for individual organisers in all Member States. This is also due to the differences in insolvency 
systems and in market conditions.  

2022, 

55 

 
 
 
shows that even in times of crisis, funds covering vouchers against insolvency protection do not seem 
to encounter high operational costs.329  

To address Problem 3, Option A would include the following measures: deletion of both types of 
LTAs  (3.1.1),  clarification  on  cancellation  rights  and  case-by-case  assessment  of  travel  warnings 
(3.2.1), and clarification of the role of the parties (3.3.1). 

Measure 3.1.1 LTAs type (a)330 to be deleted, while the definitions of click-through package and 
single-point-of-sale package and of LTAs type (b) would be adapted.  

Some business stakeholders report that currently they are unable to identify anyone as LTA type (b) 
provider and stakeholder have stated that travellers should be informed about insolvency protection 
for LTAs only in cases where such protection exists.331 Under the proposed measure, the definition 
would be limited to situations where a trader that is party to a first contract invites a traveller to book 
additional types of travel  services for the same trip or holiday  and  receives payments from  or on 
behalf travellers. Furthermore, for traders to know that they are subject to this obligation, they would 
recommend travellers in the information form on linked travel arrangements to record the invitation 
to book additional travel service and the additional booking and to inform the trader with whom a 
first contract was concluded that a contract on an additional type of travel service has been concluded 
for the same trip or holiday within 24 hours following the invitation. To allow for this, the trader 
would need to make available to travellers a facility, such as an email address or a website, where 
travellers can register such information and shall acknowledge receipt of such information. 332 While 
this may bring about minor hassle costs for travellers, it will allow them to benefit also in practice 
from insolvency protection that LTAs type (b) are supposed to offer. The overall impact on them 
would thus be positive. For traders, this additional obligation may introduce minor one-off costs to 
create and make available an email address or webform for such contacts, in cases where they do not 
already have them.  In addition,  they would face  minor costs for sending  the acknowledgments of 
receipt each time that a traveller provides them with such information. As a result, the overall impact 
of the changes on traders would be minimal. Moreover, in this way, traders will have more clarity on 
the volume of LTA sales for which they have to obtain insolvency protection and the increased clarity 
should  lead  to  savings  for  traders  over  time.  Limiting  the  requirement  to  provide  information  on 
insolvency protection for LTAs is not expected to increase operational costs and would be positive 

329 Based on the data for the year 2020 from the Danish fund, which also covers vouchers, and based on Commission’s 
own calculations, the implied price of insurance (operational) cost is 0,06% of the average package price during crisis 
times. 
330 This refers to the LTAs defined both in Article 3(5)(a) and 3(5)(b). 
331 Public consultation Q27: According to 36% of business associations (18 of 50), 18% business organisations (41 of 
232) and 40% of consumer organisations (8 of 20), in the information forms (Annex II, Parts A, B and C), travellers 
should be informed about insolvency protection before concluding the contract only in cases where they will actually 
benefit from such protection, in order to avoid false expectations. According to 40% of business associations (20 of 50), 
24% business organisations (56 of 232) and 55% of consumer organisations (11 of 20), where travellers benefit from 
insolvency  protection,  they  should  receive  confirmation  on  this  protection  and  its  limits  after  the  conclusion  of  the 
contract, so that they can invoke it, if necessary. 
332 Public consultation Q29, N=405: the majority of respondents support either abandoning the LTA type (b) and replacing 
it with simpler rules (22% or 89 respondents) or receiving official guidance on the interpretation of the definition of LTA 
type (b) (additional 35% or 141 respondents). The majority of consumers and consumer organisations (65% or 53 of 81) 
and public authorities (77%, 17 of 22) are in favour of such solutions, as are 49% of businesses and business organisations 
(137 of 280). Only few respondents consider that no changes are necessary (26, 6%). 

56 

 
 
 
for  travellers.333  No  cost  data  was  received  as  to  how  changes  to  the  definition  of  click-through 
package could impact service providers.   

Deleting LTA type (a) and treating the purchase of different types of travel services for the same trip 
or holiday at one point of sale during the same visit or contact as packages (currently considered as 
LTAs) in the same way as ‘services purchased from the same point of sale and those services have 
been selected before the traveller agrees to pay’ (currently in the definition of package under Article 
3(2)(b)(i))  would  bring  about  significant  simplification,  in  terms  of  the  substantive  rules  and 
information  requirements  and  would  remove  the  current  grey  zone  or  circumvention  potential 
between packages and LTAs type (a). At the same time, the criterion of a single visit or contact would 
be replaced with a specification of a short time window within which the transactions are concluded. 
Those  changes  would  bring  benefits  for  all  stakeholders  and  would  help  in  the  pursuit  of  the 
objectives of a high level of consumer protection and a better functioning of the internal market in 
the area of package travel. Many stakeholders were in favour of such simplification.334 However, this 
may  result  in  some  costs  for  companies  which  would  find  it  more  difficult  to  avoid  liability  as 
package organiser. However, also currently, avoidance of a package is not possible, legally speaking, 
if one of the criteria of a package is met (e.g. if there is an inclusive or total price or if there is a 
selection  of  different  travel  services  at  one  point  of  sale  before  the  traveller  agrees  to  pay)335. 
Furthermore, any additional costs for non-complying businesses cannot be taken into account.  

This  measure is  not  expected to  result in  direct costs for  travellers. Benefits  could  arise from  the 
simplification and increased legal certainty and better enforceability of their rights. Simplification 
and increased clarity could facilitate enforcement and thus reduce burden on authorities. Moreover, 
deleting LTAs type (a) would reduce administrative burden as travel businesses will spend less time 
choosing the right  information  form.  Out of the currently five information forms  for LTAs, three 
would be removed. This gain could reach at least EUR  181.4 million per year.336 It may however 
entail one-off adjustment costs for companies to get to know the new provisions, estimated at EUR 
6.5 million.337 Simplification regarding LTAs, as well as regarding the pre-contractual information to 
be provided to travellers. are also two of the suggestions of the Fit for Future platform.338 

Measure  3.2.1  Specifications  on  cancellations  due 
to  unavoidable  and  extraordinary 
circumstances: taking into account the country of destination and departure and travel warnings 
being  an  important  element  for  the  presence  of  unavoidable  and  extraordinary  circumstances. 
There would still be scope for a case-by-case assessment. 

333 Public consultation Q27: According to 40% of consumer organisations (8 of 20), in the information forms (Annex II, 
Parts A, B and C), travellers should be informed about insolvency protection before concluding the contract only in cases 
where they will actually benefit from such protection, in order to avoid false expectations. According to 55% of consumer 
organisations (11 of 20), where travellers benefit from insolvency protection, they should receive confirmation on this 
protection and its limits after the conclusion of the contract, so that they can invoke it, if necessary. 
334 Public consultation Q27 and Q29: 42% of all respondents (171 of 410) are in favour of abandoning LTAs type (a) and 
61% of respondents (246 of 405) are in favour of abandoning the LTAs type (b), with or without substitute rules. Only 
few  respondents  consider  that  no  changes  are  necessary  (26,  6%).  Over  60%  of  public  authorities  are  in  favour  of 
abandoning both types of LTAs. See footnote Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
335 According to Article 3(5), there can be an LTA only if a combination of travel services does not constitute a package. 
336 Assuming a gain of 5 minutes per booking for choosing the right form and based on own calculation of the expected 
number of bookings for 2023 and wage assumptions made by the consultant in the supporting study. 
337  If each company needed 2 hours to do so and based on the assumptions on the number of companies and on the wages 
made by the consultant in the supporting study. 
338 Fit for Future Platform Opinion on PTD, 22 March 2022, Suggestion 2: Clarification of scope  and simplification of 
the  definitions  of  package  and  Linked  Travel  Arrangements,  and  Suggestion  3:  Clarification  of  pre-contractual 
https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2023-
5), 
information 
04/Final%20opinion%202021_SBGR3_15%20Package%20travel_fup_0.pdf 

requirements 

(Art 

57 

 
 
 
No data was received from stakeholders to estimate the financial benefits from the clarification that 
travel  warnings  are  an  important  element  to  determine  whether  unavoidable  and  extraordinary 
circumstances have occurred. Anyhow, such benefits are likely to be limited. While the CJEU has 
not yet ruled on this question, national courts already include travel warnings in the case-by-case 
assessment of cancellations due to unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances and travel warning 
have de facto an important  role in  that respect. One benefit for  travellers  would be  that the  mere 
absence of a travel warning could not in practice lead to an automatic denial of a cancellation without 
fees or alternative arrangements. Benefits will be related also to the clarification that the situation in 
the country of departure, residence and destination may be taken into account to determine whether 
there are unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances that affect the performance of the package. 
Negligeable cost increases due to the inclusion of the circumstances in the place of departure in the 
assessment might arise for organisers, although they may in practice already be recognised by many 
courts. This clarification may somewhat decrease (litigation and non-refund) costs for travellers. Both 
clarifications  may,  to  some  extent,  improve  the  effectiveness  of  enforcement  by  competent 
authorities, thus leading to some savings in the medium run. In the short-term, the relevant national 
provisions may need to be adapted, potentially creating one-off transposition costs.  

Measure 3.3.1 Clarification on the role of different parties 

Under this measure, the roles of the parties would be further clarified. The compulsory information 
form would specify more clearly the roles and obligations of each party and would help achieve a 
better understanding. This would help travellers to reduce the time looking for information on who 
is the right party to contact in case of modifications or cancellation of a package. From the evaluation 
it appears that 33% travellers did not know who to contact for a refund during the COVID-19 crisis. 
Based on the ratio of cancelled flights between March – May 2020, the number of cancelled packages 
in  the  same  period  would  be  approx.  4  million.  For  33%  of  these  cancellations,  i.e.  approx.  1.34 
million cancellations, there was a time loss while trying to get a refund. It seems reasonable to assume 
that this time loss was between 1 and 3 days per cancelled package. Therefore, between 1.34 million 
and 4 million days would have been lost by travellers at EU level in finding the right party to claim 
refund between March and May 2020. It is expected that the introduction of Measure 3.3.1 would 
lead to a reduction of consumer detriment by 50%, thus resulting in reduction of time loss between 
664,894 and 1,994,682 days. However, such time loss will most likely consist mainly of frustration 
for travellers and not translate directly into a loss of income. Considering that in practice it can be 
estimated that between 1 and 3 hours would have been spent by consumers trying to identify whom 
to contact during the period March-May 2020, this would have represented an income loss of between 
EUR  38.6  million  and  EUR  115.7  million.  As  a  result,  Measure  3.3.1  is  expected  to  result  in  a 
reduction of consumer detriment by 50%, i.e., between EUR 19.3 million and EUR 57.8 million. 

For organisers, this measure could further contribute to the ease of doing business, with a negligeable 
administrative impact. Moreover, it could support the work of national enforcement bodies without 
any direct  cost for them.  It  would also  address one of the  recommendations of the Fit for Future 
Platform.339 

Option A is not expected to have any additional social impact. 

Overall impact of Option A  

339 The lack of transparency on the roles was evoked in the Fit for Future Platform Opinion, recommending the provision 
of better information on the identity of the contractual partners and on contact details, together with better enforcement 
of rules (Suggestion 1).  

58 

 
 
 
Effectiveness : +++ 

0 (no change)  + (somewhat effective)  ++ (Moderately effective) +++ (Effective) ++++ (Very effective) 
+++++ (Extremely effective) 

A flexible limitation of prepayments would be to a certain extent effective in addressing Problem 1, 
as it would decrease the amount to be reimbursed where the package is cancelled before the final 
payment,  making  it  easier  for  the  organiser  to  refund  the  prepayment.340  The  introduction  of  a 
voluntary  rapid  refund  mechanism  would  allow  timely  refunds  to  travellers  in  case  of  a  liquidity 
crisis, thus very effectively addressing Problem 1 if it is indeed introduced. An explicit 7-day B2B 
refund right upon cancellation of the relevant service would make it easier for organisers to refund 
prepayments  to  travellers  within  the  14-day  deadline  without  endangering  their  liquidity.  The 
effectiveness  of  the  measure  on  voluntary  vouchers  in  relation  to  maintaining  the  liquidity  of 
organisers  in  a  crisis  will  depend  on  the  acceptance  rate  by  travellers.  Such  acceptance  will  be 
increased by attractive conditions relating to vouchers, as set out in this measure and under measure 
2.1. However, regardless of the acceptance rate, this measure would be fully effective in providing 
legal certainty and clear information on the use of vouchers and would thus strengthen the rights of 
travellers in relation to refunds.  

Businesses interviewed highlighted the need for more harmonisation between national insolvency 
protection  systems.  The  clear  cover  of  vouchers  and  refund  claims  under  measure  2.1  would 
strengthen  insolvency  protection,  including  in  a  crisis,  for  the  benefit  or  travellers,  and  enhance 
harmonisation with benefits for travellers and furthering the level playing field for businesses (thus 
addressing Problem 2, but  also Problem 1). Otherwise, the harmonising effect is more indirect  as 
Member States would continue to decide on the specific way in which to achieve effective insolvency 
protection.  In  this  respect,  effectiveness  will  thus  depend  on  whether  Member  States  decide  to 
strengthen their national systems, for instance, by adding a back-up fund to an insolvency protection 
system based on insurance policies. Since Option A would facilitate stronger insolvency protection, 
it would help address Problem 2. To be fully effective, this measure would have to be combined with 
the  Commission’s  monitoring  of  the  national  insolvency  protection  systems,  which  is  part  of  the 
baseline. 

By  the  changes  in  the  definitions  of  package  and  LTA,  travellers  would  benefit  from  a  clearer 
definition of package and from a reduced scope for circumvention of the rules on packages by traders. 
At the same time, information for travellers would be simplified, benefitting travellers and organisers. 
This  would  simplify  the  PTD  significantly  and  would  considerably  facilitate  enforcement.  The 
measure would hence be effective in achieving SO3, and substantially more effective than the status 
quo. The clarification that travel warnings are an important element in the assessment of unavoidable 
and  extraordinary  circumstances,  while  maintaining 
the 
circumstances, would be more effective in addressing Problem 3 than the status quo, even though 
this effect would be limited. The additional clarification that not only the situation at the destination, 
but also at the place of departure should be considered for such case-by-case assessment is likely to 
address Problem 3 effectively. Most of the proposed clarifications correspond to what is expected to 
be developed by the CJEU case law but would be more transparent for the benefit of all parties if 
reflected  in  the  text  of  the  PTD.  The  proposed  clarifications  on  the  role  of  the  parties  will  be 
somewhat effective in addressing Problem 3.  

the  case-by-case  assessment  of 

340 This measure may be only partially effective in addressing SO1 in case of a major crisis.  A similar system was in 
place in Germany before the COVID pandemic and it is not clear whether the German organisers were in a better position 
to refund their clients than in similar markets where no prepayment limitation existed. 

59 

 
 
 
 
Efficiency 

Wherever possible, the benefits and costs were quantified. Where no sufficient data was available for 
quantification,  a  qualitative  assessment  of  costs  and  benefits  was  undertaken.  Therefore,  the 
quantified  cost-benefit  assessment  is  only  partial  and  had  to  be  combined  with  the  qualitative 
assessment to reach a final assessment.  

For the quantified costs and benefits both the net benefits and their Net Present Value (“NPV”) were 
calculated. For the qualitative assessment, scores between 0 and +5 for the benefits, and between 0 
and  -5  for  the  costs,  were  assigned  to  all  impacts.  These  scores  were  aggregated  to  show  the  net 
benefit.341  

The efficiency in terms of costs and benefits of the measures included in Option A are depicted in 
the table below. More detailed calculations can be found in Annex 10.  

341 To be noted that the values were normalised, i.e., represented as a proportion of the same base value, in order to allow 
for comparison.  

60 

 
 
 
 
The burden on companies overall would remain limited with a flexible limitation of prepayments, 
while only slight price increases for travellers are expected. According to the stated preferences of 
consumers342,  they  would  seem  willing  to  accept  certain  price  increases  in  return  for  higher 
protection.343 A provision specifying that Member States may put in place rapid refund mechanisms 
would be cost-neutral in the longer-term. With a B2B refund right only if the service is not performed, 
the  burden  on  companies  as  a  group  would  be  very  limited.  Voluntary  vouchers  would  increase 
organisers’ liquidity, while creating only very limited administrative burden on companies and public 
authorities from the implementation of the measure.  

342 See footnotes Error! Bookmark not defined., Error! Bookmark not defined. and 291. 
343  To  be  noted,  however,  that  in  view  of  the  high  price  elasticity  of  travel  services,  some  impact  on  sales  to  the 
economically weakest travellers cannot be fully excluded. See also Annex 8.  

61 

Benefits and costs in EUR million One off   Recurring  MethodologyBenefitsQualitative assessment scale: 0-5Measure 1.1.1 Flexible limitation of prepayments - benefit to consumers - reduction of consumer detriment in view of lower prepayment (liquidity gain)           168.7 Reduction of 5 percentage points of the average prepayments for packages on 4.4% of packages affected (in normal times) by financial loss.Measure 1.2.1 Possibility to set up a crisis fund at national level Qualitative assessment: 1. With a 100% uptake, the costs would be EUR 322.3 million, but uptake is expected to be low and hence costs minimal.  Operating costs in times of crisis: EUR 700k/year. Cost-neutral in the long-term.Measure 1.3.1 Business-to-business refund right - benefit to customers - reduction of consumer detriment in view of timelier refundsQualitative assessment: 2Measure 1.3.1 Business-to-business refund right - benefit to business -  increased liquidity for organisersQualitative assessment: 3Measure 1.4.1 Voluntary vouchers - clarification benefit for consumersQualitative assessment: 1.Measure 1.4.1 Voluntary vouchers - positive impact on liquidity organisers Qualitative assessment: 3. The size of the positive impact on organisers would depend on the acceptance rate of vouchers by travellers; 81% of consumer organisations would have preferred a refund. Measure 2.1 - Mention insolvency back-up fund and coverage of vouchers and refund claims - benefits for consumers Qualitative assessment: 3. Coverage vouchers and refund claims and potential back-up fund improves consumer protection.  Measure 2.1 - Mention of insolvency back-up fund and coverage of vouchers and refund claims - benefits for organisers Qualitative assessment: 0. Coverage vouchers will increase acceptance rate and improve iquidity of organisers (liquidity gains for organisers through higher acceptance rate taken into account under 1.4). Measure 3.1.1 LTAs (OIOO) - benefit for businesses           181.4  Significant simplification for organisers and fairer competition Measure 3.1.1 LTAs - benefits for consumers Qualitative assessment: 4. Clarification benefits and less circumvention of rules, higher consumer protection. Measure 3.1.1 LTAs - benefits for authorities  Qualitative assessment: 3. easier enforecement for MS authorities. Measure 3.2.1 Specifications on cancellations - consumers Qualitative assessment: 1. Some clarification benefits. Measure 3.2.1 Specifications on cancellations - MS  Qualitative assessment: 1. Some clarification benefits & easier enforcement. Measure 3.2.1 Specifications on cancellations - organisers Qualitative assessment: 1. Some clarification benefits. Measure 3.3.1 Clarification on the role of different parties - benefit to organisersQualitative assessment: 0. Increased ease of doing business.Measure 3.3.1 Clarification on the role of different parties - benefit to consumers - reduction in consumer detriment              38.6 Expected reduction of consumer detriment between EUR 19.3 million and EUR 57.8 million (on average EUR 38.6 million)Total Benefit                -              388.7                                                                                                                          -   CostsMeasure 1.1.1 Flexible limitation of prepayments - lower prepayments (cost pass through from organisers to travellers - increased prices )           332.1 High-level estimate of the cost increase for organisers: 3%. This will be fully passed through to consumers, resulting in a price increase of EUR 15 per package (approx 1% of the package price). Measure 1.1.1 Flexible limitation of prepayments - lower prepayments - cost pass through - increased prices - impact on number of packages sold through price elasiticty (sales organisers)Qualitative assessment: 1Measure 1.2.1 Possibility to set up a crisis fund at national level  - Qualitative assessment: 1. With a 100% uptake, the costs would be EUR 322.0 million, but uptake is expected to be low and hence costs minimal. Operating costs in times of crisis: EUR 700k/year. Full pass-through to consumers. Cost-neutral in the long-termMeasure 1.3.1 Business-to-business refund right - impact on service providers -  Qualitative assessment: 1. Might slightly negatively affect the liquidity of certain service providers; not expected that this would lead service providers to include a risk premium which would raise the costs of packages.  Measure 1.4.1 Voluntary vouchers - costs for organisers -  Qualitative assessment: 0. Costs, if any, expected to be minimal. Measure 2.1 - Mention insolvency back-up fund and coverage of vouchers and refund claims - organisersQualitative assessment: 0. Some MSs have back-up funds; obligation to create insolvency protection system already exists, any additional measures cannot be seen as an additional burden; 30% of businesses - costs of covering vouchers and refunds would be reasonable; 40% not; If there are any costs, likely 100% pass-through to travellers. Measure 2.1 - Mention of insolvency back-up fund and coverage of vouchers and refund claims - costs for consumers Qualitative assessment: 1. If there are any cost increases, likley 100% pass-through from organisers. Measure 3.1.1 LTAs  - cost to business - familiarisation (OIOO)              6.5  one-off familiarisation cost for businesses Measure 3.2.1 Specifications on cancellations  -  Qualitative assessment: 0. Negligeabe cost increases for organisers, if at all. Measure 3.3.1 Clarification on the role of different parties - businesses -   Qualitative assessment: 0. Negligeable one-off administrative impact. For all measures taken together - cost to administrations - transposition + information              0.1 Total Cost               6.6            332.1 Net Impact (Total Benefit - Total Cost)-            6.6              56.6 Benefit Cost Ratio (Total Benefit / Total Cost)               1.2  
 
 
 
 
As the PTD already requires effective insolvency protection and, considering that Option A would 
only  further  specify  how  this  objective  can  be  achieved,  this  aspect  of  Option  A  is  not  likely  to 
increase  costs.  However,  it  may  in  practice  lead  to  increased  insolvency  protection  costs  for 
companies in some Member States because vouchers and refund claims would need to be covered, 
which could imply an increased duration for the coverage of the perceived risks. Such cost increases 
may be passed on to travellers. At the same time, this measure will benefit organisers in that it will 
make  vouchers  more  attractive  for  travellers  and  would  lead  to  increased  costs  for  insolvency 
protection only insofar as many vouchers are issued or if many refunds are delayed in a crisis. Overall, 
cost increases are thus likely to be limited. Since Option A would be effective in addressing Problem 
2, it is efficient. 

Deleting type (a) LTAs and covering in the definition of package may entail some one-off costs but 
would bring clear benefits to all stakeholders in  view of substantial simplification in terms of the 
substantive provisions and information requirements. The clarifications in relation to cancellations 
and the role of the parties will have limited benefits for stakeholders, with potentially only limited 
costs. Option A would hence be more efficient than the status quo. 

Taking into account both the Net Present Value (“NPV”) of the net quantified benefits and costs, and 
the efficiency scores determined qualitatively, Option A arrives at a normalised344 efficiency score of 
0.14.345 

Coherence  

Score: 1 (from -2 to +2) 

The  flexible  limitation  of  prepayments  for  package  organisers  takes  into  account  the  rules  and 
practices  applying  to  service  providers,  including  under  the  EU  passenger  rights  regulations,  and 
avoids  incoherence  with  them.  At  present,  there  are  no  rapid  refund  mechanisms  for  standalone 
tickets under the APRR, but since option A does not impose them, while the current PTD does not 
exclude them, this measure would not raise coherence issues. A 7-day B2B refund right in case of 
cancellation of services would ensure coherence with the preferred option for the modification of the 
APRR on refunds to intermediaries in similar situations. In addition, rules on voluntary vouchers at 
all times would increase coherence with the APRR, where already today airlines may compensate 
passengers in  the form  of vouchers with  the signed agreement of the  passenger  in  case of denied 
boarding, cancellation or delay. 

With the introduction of measure 2.1, the coherence with other policies would not change. There are 
no rules on insolvency protection for carriers in the passenger rights regulations. This discrepancy 
could be removed only through changes in the transport legislation, which is outside the scope of the 
PTD.346 

344 Normalization of scores means adjusting the values measured on different scales to a notionally common scale. 
345 For details, please see the calculations in Annex 10. 
346 This has also been recognised by numerous stakeholders who have indicated on several occasions that similar rules 
(e.g., mandatory insolvency protection for airlines) should also be included in the APRR and/or Air Services Regulation.  

62 

Normalised efficiency (NPV)Normalised efficiency (qualitative)Average efficiencyA0.030.250.14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The changes in the definition of package and LTA would not lead to a change in coherence with other 
policies. If improvements on cancellation rights were introduced in the APRR, this would enhance 
coherence between these policies. However, this cannot be achieved through changes in the PTD.347  

6.2.  Economic and social impacts of Option B 

Option  B  is  composed  of  the  following  measures  addressing  Problem  1:  strict  limitation  of 
prepayments to organisers (1.1.2), and mandatory vouchers in times of crisis (1.4.2).  

Measure 1.1.2 Strict limitation of prepayments to organisers 

Introducing a stricter threshold of 20% for the prepayments would be justified by the fact that this is 
the lowest average level of prepayments observed in one of the Member States.348 However, reducing 
the  maximum  prepayments  to  that  level  without any  possibility  to increase  them,  would  result in 
bigger  liquidity  risks  for  package  organisers,  considering  that  they  would  not  be  able  to  limit 
prepayments  to  service  providers. This  impact  may be  particularly  strong  for SMEs,  representing 
99% of organisers, as they generally have fewer resources available than large enterprises. As this 
measure  is  more  difficult  to  enforce  in  relation  to  third  country  organisers  it  could  result  in  a 
competitive  disadvantage  for  EU  organisers.349  Most  businesses  estimated  that  limitations  to 
prepayments would increase the costs of packages by at least 5%.350,351,352 Such increases would be 
passed on to travellers, resulting in corresponding price increases for packages of EUR 553.5 million, 
or EUR 7.4 per package (i.e. 0.5% of the average package price). In addition, industry representatives 
allege  that  the  offer  in  packages  available  to  travellers  would  be  reduced.  It  was  not  possible  to 
estimate on the basis of stakeholder replies if, and to what extent, this would lead to a decrease in 
purchases of packages. However, as described in Annex 8, and sourced from the replies to the May 
2023 targeted survey, the average price elasticity for European Tourism is -1,29, which implies that 
the sector is very price sensitive. Therefore, there might be a negative impact on the sales of package 
organisers due to increased package prices. No impact on service providers is expected, as they could 
continue selling standalone travel services should it become uninteresting for them to include their 
services in packages.  

On the other hand, for travellers, the likely price increases would coincide with certain benefits, as 
this measure would allow them to part with their money later and reduce the amounts to be refunded 
in  case  of  a  cancellation,  thereby  reducing  the  effect  of  delays  in  reimbursements  and  potential 

347 This has also been recognised by numerous stakeholders who have indicated on several occasions that similar rules 
(e.g., similar cancellation rights in case of unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances) should also be included in the 
APRR.  
348  Source:  Workshop  with  experts  from  national  authorities  on  5  December  2022,  Minutes  available  at 
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/expert-groups-register/screen/expert-
groups/consult?lang=en&groupId=895&fromMeetings=true&meetingId=45937& 
349 It may be difficult in practice to enforce against third-country service providers without any assets in the EU. 
350 Targeted survey for business associations Q38: 8 of 13 respondents.  
351 A study commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate found that 42% of companies that 
would need external financing in case of a limitation of prepayments to 20% expects an increase of prices by more than 
6%, Panteia, Onderzoek financiering (pakket)reissector  - Voor het ministerie van Economische Zaken en Klimaat, 14 
March  2023,  p.  65-66,  https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2023/03/14/onderzoek-financiering-
pakketreissector  
352 It should be noted however that the limited increase in capital costs and/or administrative burden for organisers is 
likely to have significant consequences for them. Because price-sensitive consumers represent a very large segment of 
the travel market and because many of them compare prices via online tools (see Also Annex 13) a 2 to 3% increase in 
the pricing of travel packages induced by regulatory changes would result in customer attrition (loss of clients). Their 
economically  weakest  consumers  might  no  longer  be  able  to  afford  the  organisers’  services,  having  to  reduce  their 
travelling abroad or go for less protected options (booking single services). However, as a mitigating measure, organisers 
may wish then to consider not increasing prices for the most vulnerable travellers.   

63 

 
 
 
losses.353 Considering that the estimated current average prepayment between 33% and 50% would 
go down to 20%, the average prepayment per package would decrease from between EUR 456 and 
EUR 691 EUR to EUR 277. The reduction in prepayments per package would hence be between 151 
and 349 EUR. Considering that 55.4 million packages were sold in 2022, this represents between 
EUR 8.4 billion and EUR 19.3 billion prepayments. As approximately 4.4% of travellers suffered 
financial  loss  in  normal  times,  the  introduction  of  this  measure  would  result  in  a  reduction  of 
consumer detriment between at least EUR 369.1 million and EUR 851.7 million per year.   

This measure is expected to cause one-off transposition costs for public authorities, which are already 
included in the global transposition costs for all the amendments of the PTD.354 More Member State 
authorities supported this measure than opposed it.355 

Measure 1.4.2 Mandatory vouchers in times of crisis 

The COVID crisis has shown that mandatory vouchers, i.e. vouchers imposed on travellers without 
their agreement, can be an effective means of easing the pressure on the liquidity of organisers in 
times of crisis. However, this measure would decrease consumer protection compared to the current 
PTD. At present  the right to  a refund within 14 days is  guaranteed, while under this measure  the 
traveller would not receive the refund until the validity of the voucher ends, if the voucher is not used 
for another package beforehand. This would mean that the average waiting time for refunds would 
increase, hence resulting in a corresponding increase in consumer detriment. Therefore, this measure 
is supported only by very few stakeholders.356 In addition, the introduction of this measure would 
necessitate the determination by a central instance that there is a type and magnitude of crisis, e.g., a 
serious  liquidity  crisis,  that  justifies  the  application  of  this  measure.  This  would  raise  different 
questions and make this instrument rather heavy.  

In order to address Problem 2, Option B consists of Measure 2.1 - Strengthened rules on insolvency 
protection with explicit reference to back-up fund, as Option A. Therefore, the impacts of this policy 
measure are the same as described above for Option A.  

To address Problem 3, the following measures would be included under Option B.   

Under Measure 3.1.2, LTAs type (b) would be deleted, and the definition of click-through packages 
would be adapted to incorporate all click-through bookings where the traveller’s personal data are 
exchanged between traders.357 In addition, regarding LTAs type (a), the criterion of a “single visit or 
contact” would be explained in a recital. Finally, traders would be obliged to provide information on 
insolvency  protection  only  where  it  exists.  In  addition,  under  Measure  3.2.1,  there  would  be  a 
clarification on cancellation rights, including a case-by-case assessment in relation to travel warnings. 

353  As  indicated  by  consumer  organisations  during  the  consultations  (e.g.  at  PTD  Workshop  1  with  businesses  and 
consumer  representatives,  October  2022),  the  practice  of  prepayments  creates  excessive  financial  exposure  for 
consumers, as it was shown during the pandemic.  
354 Targeted survey for NCAs (regulatory and enforcement). two open-text responses to Q12: Authorities do not expect 
any increased monitoring costs because of this measure.  
355 Targeted survey for NCAs (regulatory and enforcement), Q13: 46% (12 of 26) of the respondents expressed favour 
for this measure, while 31% (8 of 26) opposed it.  
356  Industry  stakeholders  stated  that  mandatory  vouchers  are  not  a  feasible  solution  and  represented  a  temporary 
emergency measure during the pandemic. Commission minutes on the  “Meeting of the Stakeholder Expert Group to 
support the application of the Package Travel and Linked Travel Arrangements Directive (2015/2302)” - 8 November 
2022.  Also  sourced  from  an  interview  by ICF  with  business  organisation  selling  integrated  travel  services,  including 
package travel. 
357 Most public authorities are in favour of abandoning both types of LTAs (Q27 for type a): 64%, 14 of 22; and Q29 for 
type b): 73%,16 of 22. 

64 

 
 
 
As the content of this last measure and of the clarification of the role of the parties is the same as 
under  Option  A  the  impacts  would  be  identical  in  this  respect.  Consequently,  only  the  economic 
impacts of the measure 3.1.2 are described below. 

Some business stakeholders report that currently they are unable to identify anyone as LTA type (b) 
provider.  As  a  result,  there  should  be  no  or  only  minor  costs  connected  with  the  removal  of  this 
concept, but stakeholders were not able to quantify them. The simplification and increased clarity 
should lead to savings for traders over time and to benefits for travellers. 358 No cost data was received 
as to how clarifications to the definition of click-through packages could impact businesses. Limiting 
the requirement to provide information on insolvency protection for LTAs is not expected to increase 
operational costs and would be positive for travellers.359 However, familiarisation with the changes 
and replacing the old information documents could lead to one-off compliance costs for businesses 
of approx. EUR 6.5 million, as for Measure 3.1.1. In addition, the deletion of two information sheets 
out of five would bring about some simplification benefits for travellers and businesses, resulting in 
a benefit of approx. EUR 108.9 million.360 The proposed clarification of the criterion of a “single visit 
or contact” for type (a) LTAs is not expected to lead to cost increases for travellers and businesses 
but  would  increase  consumer  protection  and  benefit  businesses  through  improved  clarity  and 
enforceability of the rules. Simplification and increased clarity could facilitate enforcement and thus 
reduce burden on authorities.  

However, the simplification and clarification benefits for all stakeholder groups would be limited if 
LTAs type (a) continued to exist in parallel to packages.  

Social  impacts:  Introducing  a  strict  limitation  of  prepayments  could  undermine  the  competitive 
position of EU organisers. In the long-term this might lead to a decrease of jobs for EU citizens. The 
remaining measures included in Option B are not expected to have additional social impacts.  

Overall impacts of Option B  

Effectiveness : ++ 

0 (no change)  + (somewhat effective)  ++ (Moderately effective) +++ (Effective) ++++ (Very effective) 
+++++ (Extremely effective) 

If travellers were obliged to prepay only 20% of the package at the moment of booking, the need for 
a refund in the case of a cancellation due to unforeseen and extraordinary circumstances would be 
limited. While this measure would address Problem 1, the degree of its effectiveness will depend on 
the current market practice in the Member State concerned. Overall, while not completely resolving 
the problem on its own, this measure would be more effective than the status quo and could make a 
significant  contribution  to  tackling  problem  1  in  conjunction  with  other  measures.  Mandatory 
vouchers  would  help  maintain  liquidity  of  package  organisers  in  a  crisis.  However,  they  would 

358 Public consultation Q29, N=405 61% of respondents (246)  support abandoning the LTA type  (b) with or without 
substitute rules. Only few respondents consider that no changes are necessary (26, 6%). Most public authorities are in 
favour of abandoning both types of LTAs (Q27 for type a): 64%, 14 of 22; and Q29 for type b): 73%,16 of 22). 
359 Public consultation Q27: According to 40% of consumer organisations (8 of 20), in the information forms (Annex II, 
Parts A, B and C), travellers should be informed about insolvency protection before concluding the contract only in cases 
where they will actually benefit from such protection, in order to avoid false expectations. According to 55% of consumer 
organisations (11 of 20), where travellers benefit from insolvency protection, they should receive confirmation on this 
protection and its limits after the conclusion of the contract, so that they can invoke it, if necessary. 
360  Assuming a gain of 3 minutes per booking for choosing the right form and based on own calculation of the expected 
number of bookings for 2023 and wage assumptions made by the consultant in the supporting study. 

65 

 
 
 
 
seriously  weaken  the  right  of  travellers  to  a  timely  refund  of  prepayments  in  the  event  of 
cancellations. Therefore, they would be only partially effective in addressing Problem 1.  

Businesses interviewed highlighted the need for more harmonisation between national insolvency 
protection systems. Like under Option A, the clear cover of vouchers and refund claims under Option 
B  would  strengthen  insolvency  protection  for  the  benefit  of  travellers,  including  in  a  crisis,  and 
enhance harmonisation (addressing Problem 2 but also Problem 1). Otherwise, the harmonising effect 
is more indirect as Member States would continue to decide on the specific way in which to achieve 
effective insolvency protection. As under Option A, in this respect, effectiveness will thus depend on 
whether Member States decide to strengthen their national systems, for instance, by adding a back-
up fund to an insolvency protection system based on insurance policies. To be fully effective, this 
measure would have to be combined with the Commission’s monitoring of the national insolvency 
protection systems, which is part of the baseline.  

Deleting  LTA  type  (b),  broadening  the  definition  of  click-through  packages  and  adding  a  few 
clarifications  regarding  LTAs  type  (a)  would  bring  some  clarification/simplification  benefits. 
However, the difficult distinction between packages and single point of sale LTAs (type A) would 
remain and the complexity of a set-up with packages, LTAs and stand-alone services would remain. 
Therefore,  there  would  still  be  scope  for  circumvention  and  confusion  of  travellers  and  the 
simplification  effect  only  partial.  Therefore,  in  this  regard,  Option  B,  would  be  only  somewhat 
effective in addressing Problem 3. The effectiveness of the clarifications on cancellations was already 
discussed under Option A above. 

Efficiency 

Wherever possible, the benefits and costs were quantified. Where no sufficient data was available for 
quantification,  a  qualitative  assessment  of  costs  and  benefits  was  undertaken.  Therefore,  the 
quantified  cost-benefit  assessment  is  only  partial  and  had  to  be  combined  with  the  qualitative 
assessment to reach a final assessment.  

For the quantified costs and benefits both the net benefits and their Net Present Value (“NPV”) were 
calculated. For the qualitative assessment, scores between 0 and +5 for the benefits, and between 0 
and  -5  for  the  costs,  were  assigned  to  all  impacts.  These  scores  were  aggregated  to  show  the  net 
benefit.361  

The efficiency in terms of costs and benefits of the measures included in Option B are depicted in the 
table below. More detailed calculations can be found in Annex 10. 

361 To be noted that the values were normalised, i.e., represented as a proportion of the same base value, in order to allow 
for comparison. 

66 

 
 
 
A strict limitation of prepayments to organisers would result in the highest burden on EU package 
organisers, while reaching the same or similar result as other possible measures in terms of consumer 
protection. The increased consumer protection, as compared to the status quo, would likely come at 
a  significant  cost  for  travellers.  However,  cost  increases  compared  to  the  status  quo,  hence  the 
efficiency of the measure, will also depend on the current market practice in relation to prepayments 
and will likely vary from one Member State to another. Mandatory vouchers in times of crisis would 
increase the liquidity of organisers in a crisis, while creating only very limited administrative burden 
on organisers and public authorities. Overall, Option B, while taking into account both the quantified 
benefits and costs (see table above) and the ones assessed qualitatively, would be less efficient than 
the status quo.362 

The efficiency of measures addressing Problem 2 that are included in Option B was already discussed 
under Option A above. 

The  measures  included  in  Option  B  to  address  Problem  3  would  bring  some  clarification  and 
simplification  benefits,  while  entailing  some  one-off  costs.  Option  B  would  hence  be  somewhat 
efficient.  

362 See also in this respect the tables comparing the options in Section 7 and in Annex 10. 

67 

Benefits and costs in EUR million One off   Recurring  MethodologyBenefitsMeasure 1.1.2 Strict limitation of prepayments - benefit to consumers - reduction of consumer detriment in view of lower prepayment (liquidity gain)           610.4 liquidity gain of EUR 8.4 billion and EUR 19.3 billion (on average: EUR 13.9 billion) on 4.4% of packages affected (in normal times) by financial loss. This leads to a decrease of consumer detriment between EUR 369.1 million and EUR 851.7 million.Measure 1.4.2 Mandatory vouchers in times of crisis - benefits for organisers Qualitative assessment: 5. Liquidity gains  Measure 2.1 - Mention insolvency back-up fund and coverage of vouchers and refund claims - benefits for consumers Qualitative assessment: 3. Coverage vouchers and refund claims and potential back-up fund improves consumer protection.  Measure 2.1 - Mention of insolvency back-up fund and coverage of vouchers and refund claims - benefits for organisers Qualitative assessment: 0. Coverage vouchers will increase acceptance rate and improve iquidity of organisers (liquidity gains for organisers through higher acceptance rate taken into account under 1.4). Measure 3.1.2 LTAs (OIOO) - businesses           108.9  Some simplification for organisers and level playing field Measure 3.1.2 LTAs (OIOO) - travellers Qualitative assessment: 2. Clarification and simplification benefits. Measure 3.1.2 LTAs (OIOO) - authorities Qualitative assessment: 2. Clarification and simplification benefits. Measure 3.2.1 Specifications on cancellations - consumers Qualitative assessment: 1. Some clarification benefits. Measure 3.2.1 Specifications on cancellations - MS  Qualitative assessment: 1. Some clarification benefits & easier enforcement. Measure 3.2.1 Specifications on cancellations - organisers Qualitative assessment: 1. Some clarification benefits. Total Benefit               -              719.2                                                                                                                        -   CostsMeasure 1.1.2 Strict limitation of prepayment - lower prepayments (cost pass through from organisers - increased prices )           553.5  High-level estimate of the cost increase for organisers: 5%. This will be fully passed through to consumers, resulting in a price increase of packages Measure 1.1.2 Strict limitation of prepayment - lower prepayments - cost pass through -increased package prices - impact on number of packages sold through price elasiticty (sales organisers) Qualitative assessment: 3. In view of negative price elasiticty increased package prices may lead to a reduction of packages sold and hence negatively impact revenues of organisers.Measure 1.4.2 Mandatory vouchers in times of crisis - impact on organisers -  Qualitative assessment: 0. Costs for organisers for issuing vouchers, if any, expected to be minimal. Measure 1.4.2 Mandatory vouchers in times of crisis - impact on consumers Qualitative assessment: 5. Reduction in consumer protection through no immediate refund. Measure 2.1 - Mention insolvency back-up fund and coverage of vouchers and refund claims - organisersQualitative assessment: 0. Some MSs have back-up funds; obligation to create insolvency protection system already exists, any additional measures cannot be seen as an additional burden; 30% of businesses - costs of covering vouchers and refunds would be reasonable; 40% not; If there are any costs, likely 100% pass-through to travellers. Measure 2.1 - Mention of insolvency back-up fund and coverage of vouchers and refund claims - costs for consumers Qualitative assessment: 1. If there are any cost increases, likley 100% pass-through from organisers. Measure 3.1.2 LTAs - cost to business - familiarisation             6.5  one-off familiarisation cost for businesses Measure 3.2.1 Specifications on cancellations  -  Qualitative assessment: 0. Negligeabe cost increases for organisers, if at all. For all measures taken together - cost to administrations - transposition + information           0.05 Total Cost             6.5            553.5 Net Impact (Total Benefit - Total Cost)-           6.5            165.7 Benefit Cost Ratio (Total Benefit / Total Cost)              1.3  
 
 
 
 
Taking into account both the Net Present Value (“NPV”) of the net quantified benefits and costs, and 
the efficiency scores determined qualitatively, Option B arrives at a normalised efficiency score of 
0.08.363 

Coherence  

Score: -1 (from -2 to +2) 

A  strict  20%  limitation of  prepayments  for  package  organisers,  while  there  are  no  limitations  for 
service providers would lead to increased incoherence with the transport legislation, including the 
APRR. Indeed, no limitations of pre-payment are planned under the parallel revision of the APRR. 
The introduction of mandatory vouchers would decrease coherence with other legislation. 

With  the  introduction  of  measure  2.1  on  insolvency  protection,  the  coherence  with  other  policies 
would not change. There are no rules on insolvency protection for carriers in  the passenger rights 
regulations. This discrepancy could be removed only through changes in the air transport legislation, 
which is outside the scope of the PTD.364  

The measures addressing Problem 3 that are included in Option B would not change coherence with 
other policies. 

6.3.  Economic and social impacts of Option C 

Option C includes the following measures addressing Problem 1: strict limitation of prepayments to 
organisers  and  service  providers  (1.1.3),  mandatory  rapid  refund  mechanism  (1.2.2),  and  a  B2B 
refund right in all cases (1.3.2).  

Measure 1.1.3 Strict limitation of prepayments to organisers and service providers 

A  limitation  of  prepayments  from  travellers  would  lead  to  lower  amounts  to  be  refunded  by 
organisers in case of a cancellation before the payment of the last instalment. This would make it 
easier for organisers to refund such prepayments to travellers within the legal deadline. Since this 
limitation  is  accompanied  by  a  corresponding  limitation  of  prepayments  by  organisers  to  service 
providers, organisers would not face liquidity risks. This would be particularly relevant for SMEs, 
who make up 99% of organisers. In addition, a limitation of prepayments may decrease the need for 
insolvency protection of organisers, so that their costs for insolvency protection may decrease in the 
long-term.  

However, extending the limitation of prepayments to service providers would increase the liquidity 
risks of service providers. It could also  affect the competitiveness of EU as compared to non-EU 
service providers. Under  the choice-of-law principle for  B2B contracts, the latter could  avoid  the 
application of the PTD to their (B2B) contracts with EU package organisers even where a package is 
sold to EU travellers. According to an air carrier, introducing limitations on prepayments could mean 
higher fares and ultimately fewer choices  for customers as companies would likely reduce certain 

363 For details, please see the calculations in Annex 10. 
364 This has also been recognised by numerous stakeholders who have indicated on several occasions that similar rules 
(e.g., mandatory insolvency protection for airlines) should also be included in the APRR and/or Air Services Regulation.  

68 

Normalised efficiency (NPV)Normalised efficiency (qualitative)Average efficiencyB0.080.080.08 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
connections due to a lack of profitability.365 While other transport service providers were not targeted 
in the interviews, it is likely that these impacts would be relevant also for them. Similar views were 
expressed in workshops366 and in targeted consultations, where stakeholders indicated that they would 
expect cost increases of even more than 10%.367 In addition, some hospitality service providers might 
adapt the prices of their services for inclusion in package or offer stand-alone services only.368 Some 
risks for service providers, such as airlines, could be eliminated by organisers’ depositing the entire 
payment  for  the  service  in  an  escrow  account  and  making  it  accessible  only  once  payment  is 
completed by the traveller. However, this would transfer the whole liquidity risk to organisers. In 
addition, organisers dealing with service providers outside the EU may, in many cases, still have to 
prepay  the  current  amounts  to  their  service  providers  at  booking,  while  only  receiving  a  limited 
prepayment  from  their  customers,  leading  to  a  situation  similar  to  a  limitation  of  prepayments  to 
organisers as under Option B even if only for packages performed outside the EU.  

Any cost increases for service providers would in principle be transferred, through corresponding 
price  increases,  to  package  organisers  and  subsequently  consumers/travellers.  Considering  the 
announced 10% increase in costs for organisers, the corresponding cost increases for travellers would 
reach approximately EUR 1.1 billion, or EUR 14.7 per package (i.e. 1% of the package price). At the 
same  time,  in  view  of  improved  liquidity,  it  would  be  easier  for  organisers  to  make  refunds  to 
travellers. As for Measure 1.1.3, this would result in a reduction of consumer detriment between EUR 
369.1 million and EUR 851.7 million per year.   

This measure may create additional enforcement costs for national authorities, as they would need 
to start monitoring business practices of service providers in addition to those of organisers, to verify 
their compliance with the PTD. 

Measure 1.2.2 Mandatory rapid refund mechanism (crisis fund) at Member State level 

A mandatory rapid refund mechanism could be financed through contributions of organisers. The 
amount  of  the  fee  could  be  extrapolated  from  the  information  provided  by  Poland  of  EUR  5  per 
package,369 which has created such a permanent fund. Considering price level differences between 
countries370, Eurostat data shows that in 2022 Poland was at 86% of the EU average. Therefore, the 
EU  average  cost  per  package  for  the  crisis  fund  would  be  EUR  5.81.  Taking  into  account  the 
Commission’s estimate for the total number of packages in the EU in 2022 of 55.4 million, the total 
cost of crisis funds in all EU Member States would thus be EUR 322.3 million. The cost increase 
may  be  particularly  relevant  for  SMEs,  which  generally  have  fewer  resources  to  absorb  price 
increases.  Consequently,  package  organisers  may  try  to  pass  such  costs  on  to  travellers.  64%  of 
businesses disagreed that Member States should create permanent national crisis funds, as this could 
create a moral hazard with some enterprises taking more risks than others.371 On the other hand, since 
such fund would refund travellers in case of liquidity problems of organisers, fewer organisers may 
become insolvent, potentially leading to cost decreases for insolvency protection. 63% of consumer 
organisations  support  the  creation  of  national  crisis  funds.372  If  a  rapid  refund  mechanism  is 

365 Interviewed for the supporting study. 
366 Workshop organised by ICF for the supporting study on 7 December 2022. 
367 Replies of stakeholders to the targeted consultation following ICF’s workshop on 7 December 2022. 
368 Reply of a hospitality industry association to the targeted consultation following ICF’s workshop on 7 December 2022. 
369 Poland’s reply to the targeted questions sent by the Commission after the workshop with the Central Contact Points 
on 10 November 2022. 
370 Also known as purchasing power parity or PPP 
371 Targeted business survey, Q16: 9 of 14 companies disagreed. 
372 Targeted survey for consumer organisations, Q23: 63% (7 of 11) agreed a crisis fund should be a requirement under 
the PTD, notwithstanding the fact that it may result in price increases. 

69 

 
 
 
introduced  and  there  is  a  liquidity  crisis,  the  fund  -  instead  of  organisers  -  would  reimburse 
prepayments  to travellers,  thus  safeguarding  organisers’ liquidity.  All  travellers would directly or 
indirectly pay for it.373 However, only those travellers that insist on a rapid refund through such fund 
and  who  do  not  accept  a  (delayed)  reimbursement  through  a  voucher,  would  benefit  from  its 
existence. National regulatory bodies may incur additional tasks related to overseeing the operations 
of such crisis funds and monitoring their compliance. Denmark, where a – temporary – crisis fund is 
already in operation as a reaction to the COVID-19 pandemic, found that costs for its set up were 
negligible, since the infrastructure of existing funds is used. However, its cost in times of crisis is 
estimated to  be around  0.7 million EUR annually.374 No permanent  contributions  from  competent 
authorities are expected, so that no further costs would be incurred by them. However, there may be 
the need to bolster the fund in a crisis through loans or increased contributions, if it has not built up 
enough  capital,  which  would  then  have  to  be  assessed  under  State  aid  rules.  or  as  in  the  case  of 
Poland, State aid might be necessary in the start-up phase of such liquidity fund if the aim is to have 
sufficient capital available for a larger crisis at an early stage. Any State aid measure is subject to 
approval by the European Commission. The Polish crisis fund was approved under the COVID-19 
Temporary Framework, which provided for simplified and broader State aid rules for a limited time 
to support the economy in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak. Future measures will likely have 
to be approved under standard non-crisis State aid rules, implying that the Polish measure and other 
State aid measures approved in analogy to the COVID-19 Temporary Framework cannot be used as 
a template.  

Measure  1.3.2  Business-to-business  (B2B)  refund  right  in  case  of  cancellation  of  the  package 
within 7 days, independently of whether the service is offered 

The  introduction  of  such  B2B  refund  right  would  benefit  package  organisers  by  increasing  their 
liquidity.375 Moreover, organisers indicate that under the current rules there is an excessive burden on 
them, which is further exacerbated in a crisis.376 A B2B refund right would help alleviate this burden. 
Introducing  a  maximum  7-day  deadline  for  reimbursements  from  service  providers  to  organisers 
could  create  certainty  about  reimbursement  timelines  for  travellers  and  organisers.  Under  this 
measure, service providers would not be able to refuse such refunds if the termination of the package 
travel contract is justified under the PTD, regardless of whether the service provider cancelled the 
service.377 However, in case of disagreement on whether the cancellation of the package was justified, 
this  could  lead  to  more  B2B  disputes,  thus  creating  litigation  costs  for  service  providers  and 
organisers, which may be substantial in a major crisis. At the same time, the number of disputes 
between  organisers  and  travellers  regarding  refunds,  and  corresponding  litigation  costs,  should 
decrease.378  

373  Giving  travellers  the  choice  to  decide  at  the  time  of  booking  whether  they  are  willing  to  pay  for  a  rapid  refund 
mechanism or, otherwise, accept a voucher in the event of a liquidity crisis would not be practical.   
374 Sourced from interviews with the Danish insolvency fund, whose representatives stated that in times of crisis the 
expenditure could go up to approx. DKK 5 million per year. 
375 The lack of rules on B2B refund was mentioned, by stakeholders as one of the key drivers for the impossibility to 
refund travellers during the Covid-19 pandemic, e.g. PTD Workshop 1 organised for the supporting study with businesses 
and consumer representatives, October 2022. 
376 PTD Workshop 1 with businesses and consumer representatives, October 2022. 
377 It could indeed happen that during a widespread crisis packages are cancelled, while the relevant services are not. This 
was e.g., the case during the COVID-19 pandemic, where airlines operated virtually empty flights (i.e. at least 100,000 
“ghost flights”) in order not to lose airport slots. See:  https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/jan/26/airlines-
flying-near-empty-ghost-flights-to-retain-eu-airport-slots 
378 With the B2B refund right, organisers should have funds available to refund traveller, thus most likely leading to less 
disputes between travellers and organisers. 

70 

 
 
 
On the other hand, while reducing the liquidity risks of organisers, this measure would increase risks 
and costs for service providers since the B2B refund would be due whenever a package is cancelled 
even if the relevant service is not cancelled and is provided or could be provided (e.g. the flight which 
is part of a package is going ahead despite the cancellation of a package or the hotel is ready to receive 
travellers).  Service  providers  would  possibly  transfer  such  additional  costs  to  organisers  and 
indirectly travellers by charging a risk premium on services included in packages, or they may even 
contractually exclude the provision of some services from packages.379 No impact on prices of stand-
alone tickets is expected.380 In addition, given the choice-of-law principle for B2B contracts, the effect 
of the measure may be limited for third country service providers, possibly causing competitiveness 
issues for EU service providers.381  

Travellers may thus face a smaller offer of packages and/or higher prices. On the other hand, in case 
of cancellation in unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances, they are expected to benefit from the 
measure through more effective refunds. Indeed, organisers would have a right to obtain refunds from 
service providers within 7 days from the notification of the cancellation of a package. Consequently, 
they  would  likely  be  able  to  refund  travellers  within  the  mandatory  deadline.  Experience  with 
reimbursements in the pandemic demonstrates that it is not clear, though, whether, in practice, these 
deadlines would be respected in case of such widespread disruption. Stakeholders were not able to 
provide detailed data on the cost impacts of this measure. 382 Only one organiser indicated a likely 
cost increase of more than 10%, but without providing any underlying data. Considering the inherent 
limitations  of  having  just  one  data  source,  it  is  difficult  to  establish  whether  this  estimate  is 
representative. However, it must be assumed that all cost increases would be passed on to travellers. 
Conservatively taking the 10% increase in costs of travel providers as an increase in the price of the 
packages, this would result in a cost of travellers of EUR 1.1 billion. At the same time, organisers 
would have more liquidity and able to provide quicker refunds to travellers in case of cancellations, 
thus decreasing consumer detriment. 

The  measure  is  not  expected  to  have  any  material  impact  on  the  administrative  burden  of 
organisers.383  

A significant share of businesses and business organisations responding to the consultations did not 
express support for this measure, although other stakeholder groups seem to support it.384  

Some national authorities consider that B2B arrangements should remain outside the scope of the 
PTD.  

379 Sourced from replies of organisers and service providers to the May 2023 targeted consultation.  
380 Sourced from replies of organisers and service providers (especially airlines) to May 2023 targeted consultation. 
381 It would be difficult in practice to enforce in case a third-country service provider does not have any assets in the EU. 
382 Most respondents to the May 2023 targeted consultation have not provided any figures.  
383 Response of an organiser to the May 2023 targeted consultation. 
384 Public consultation Q14: in total 191 of 507 respondents with this being their second most selected option. In particular 
51% of EU citizens (35 of 68), 50% of public authorities (11 of 22), 48% of consumer organisations (10 of 21) and 35% 
of companies and business associations (127 of 368) support the idea that organisers should have the  right to a refund 
against service providers within a specific deadline to enable them to reimburse travellers. The trends are similar when 
dividing traders by their main activities. Looking at pure players (only one activity selected e.g. only organiser or only 
carrier), the very few pure service providers (carrier, hotel, other services) who replied to Q14 did not select this option. 
Targeted business survey Q22: 15 of 23 respondents would agree to a new EU rule that requires service providers to 
reimburse  organisers  where  the  cancellation  is  justified  under  the  PTD,  within  a  specific  time-limit.  6  said  no  and  2 
selected I don’t know. Of the two “pure” service providers (traders providing passenger transport services) that replied 
to Q22, one said yes, the other one said no. 

71 

 
 
 
To  address  Problem  2,  Option  C  contains  strengthened  rules  on  national  insolvency  protection, 
covering vouchers and refund claims by insolvency protection, and includes mandatory insolvency 
back-up funds at Member State level (Measure 2.2).  

Mandatory back-up funds at Member State level could be financed from contributions of organisers. 
The exact fee would still need to be determined, but looking at existing examples, the cost could lie 
around EUR 5.81 per package.385 Such additional costs will be passed on to travellers through price 
increases. This would result in additional costs for travellers of approx. EUR 322.3 million.386 The 
operating  costs  of  such  a  fund  in  times  of  crisis  can  be  estimated  at  around  0.7  million  EUR 
annually.387  In  the  targeted  survey,  businesses  were  split  on  the  usefulness  of  this  option,  38%  of 
respondents agreeing and the same percentage disagreeing with this idea.388 Businesses interviewed 
were asked but did not provide additional information on potential costs. This option would aim to 
make  insolvency  protection  more  effective  in  many  Member  States  and  address  limitations  in 
insurance-based solutions, including limited insurance offers,389 in some Member States, including in 
times of crisis. Mandatory back-up funds are not expected to burden travellers directly. However, for 
organisers in Member States where such funds do not yet exist, this could imply new costs,390 which 
may be passed on to travellers through price increases. Mandatory back-up funds will require national 
level  implementation,  creating  new  tasks  for  competent  authorities  related  to  enforcement  and 
monitoring.  Opinions  from  national  insolvency  protection  agencies  varied  on  whether  mandatory 
back-up  funds  were  necessary.  Indeed,  the  need  for  a  back-up  fund  will  depend  also  on  the 
characteristics  of  the  first-line  protection  arrangements  in  a  given  Member  State  and  the  relevant 
insurance market. Therefore, a back-up fund may not fit with all national systems and may lead to an 
unnecessary structure with associated costs.  

As regards public authorities, additional costs for a back-up fund for the Member States would have 
to be balanced against the risk of State liability for an ineffective insolvency protection system. 

For  Problem  3,  Option  C  would  include  the  following  measures:  deleting  LTAs  type  (b)  and 
broadening the definition of click-through packages without clarifications for LTAs type (a) (3.1.3), 
clarifying cancellation rights and giving formal value to travel warnings (3.2.2), the role of the parties 
would be clarified, and retailers would also be made responsible for refunds of prepayments (3.3.2.)  

Measure 3.1.3 LTAs type (b) would be deleted, without amending definitions for LTAs type (a)  

As mentioned under Option A, there should be no or only minor costs connected with a legislative 
change deleting LTAs type (b). Stakeholders were not able to quantify them. The simplification and 
increased  clarity  should  lead  to  savings  for  traders  over  time,  related  to  the  deletion  of  two 

385 Poland charges organisers EUR 5 per package for the insolvency protection back-up fund. In addition to the normal 
contribution of organisers – based on a percentage of yearly turnover – to the insolvency fund SGR, the Netherlands have 
introduced in 2021 additional contribution from travellers of EUR 5 per package with a value exceeding EUR 150.  
386 Considering that in 2022, 55.4 million packages were sold. See above and in Annex 10.1. 
387 Sourced from interviews with the Danish insolvency fund, whose representatives stated that in times of crisis the 
expenditure could go up to approx. DKK 5 million per year. 
388 Targeted business survey Q31: N=21, 8 agreed, 8 disagreed with “Member States whose insolvency protection system 
relies on insurance policies or bank guarantees, should be obliged to create back-up funds through contributions from 
organisers. The back-up funds would intervene where an insurance policy or a bank guarantee is limited” while 5 selected 
“don’t know”. 
389  See  section  2.2.2  of  this  SWD.  See,  furthermore,  Annex  13,  Evaluation,  EQ3  as  well  as  the  Application  Report, 
Sections  4.2.2.  and  5.1.3.  and  Section  3  of  the  Minutes  of  the  meeting  of  the  Central  Contact  Points  (CCPs)  of  10 
November 2022, available at: Register of Commission expert groups and other similar entities (europa.eu). Furthermore, 
this problem is mentioned in some replies to Q66 and Q67 of the OPC and some policy papers received. 
390 EUR 5 per package. 

72 

 
 
 
information forms out of five, leading to a benefit of approx. EUR 108.9 million.391 No cost data was 
received as to how clarifications to the definition of click-through packages could impact businesses. 
However, familiarisation with the changes and replacing information documents could cause one-off 
compliance cost of EUR 6.5 million.  

to  unavoidable  and  extraordinary 
Measure  3.2.2  Specifications  on  cancellations  due 
circumstances,  including  circumstances  in  the  place  of  departure,  and  formal  value  for  travel 
warnings. 

The impacts of a clarification that unavoidable and circumstances both at destination and in the place 
of departure may be taken into account would be the same as under measure 3.2.1 (described under 
Options  A  and  B).  Giving  a  formal  value  to  travel  warnings  would  make  it  more  difficult  for 
organisers to object to cancellations of packages without a fee. This may cause additional costs for 
them. However, it will reduce the litigation costs for organisers and travellers. Stakeholders have 
not provided an indication of the cost impact of this measure. Regulation of travel warnings in this 
sense could lower consumer detriment from unsuccessful reimbursement requests. It could decrease 
the cancellation costs for travellers, as no fee would be due for cancellations based on a negative 
travel  warning.  This  measure  could  lower  administrative  costs  for  the  Member  State  authorities 
related  to  court  proceedings  on  the  existence  of  unavoidable  and  extraordinary  circumstances. 
However, some authorities indicated that travel warnings may be issued by different entities and for 
different purposes. Moreover, there is a risk of a time-lapse between something happening and the 
moment that a warning is issued. Travel warnings issued by authorities of different Member States 
can also be inconsistent. Therefore, there may be concerns regarding Member States liability if there 
is an automatic link between travel warnings and cancellation rights, and some remain sceptical.392 In 
addition,  the  relevant  national  legislative  provisions  would  need  to  be  adapted,  creating  one-off 
transposition costs. A strict automatism of travel  warnings for the cancellation of packages might 
also imply certain changes in the procedures relating to travel warnings. Since several Member States 
oppose this measure and even prevented any reference to travel warnings in the current PTD, this 
idea seems difficult to put in practice from a political perspective. 

Measure  3.3.2  Retailers  would  be  made  responsible  for  refund  of  prepayment  in  addition  to 
organisers.  

Making retailers jointly and severally liable for refund of prepayments will likely increase the risks, 
and costs, for retailers who would then have to refund the traveller, and possibly only get the money 
back  from  the  organiser  at  a  later  stage.  Under  Article  13(1),  Member  States  may  have  national 
provisions  making  the  retailer  also  responsible  for  the  performance  of  the  package.  Therefore,  in 
Member  States  where  the  authorities  already  used  this  possibility,  there  would  be  no  impact.393 
However, it is likely to affect business models in most of the Member States, where retailers are not 
liable  for  the  performance  of  packages.  Especially  in  markets  where  retailers  operate  with  small 
margins this additional burden may be relevant. The proposed measure would improve the ease with 
which  travellers  obtain  refunds,  in  particular  in  cases  where  the  organiser  is  based  in  a  different 

391 Under the same assumptions as for Option B. 
392 Public consultation, Q11: 32% (7 of 22) of public authorities objected to this measure, 23% (5 of 22) raised some 
issues while not formally objecting (one requested equal treatment for travellers from different MS in case of divergent 
travel warnings, two indicated that this may depend on the status of the warning, one indicated this should be an important 
element to consider and one had no opinion), and 45% (10 of 22) fully supported the introduction of a formal value for 
travel warnings. It should be noted, however, that the question did not specify what formal value would be given to the 
travel  warnings,  i.e.  whether  they  would  have  automatic  consequences  for  cancellation  rights.  Therefore,  certain 
interpretation differences may also have influenced the replies.  
393 This is, for instance, the case of France, Spain and Romania. 

73 

 
 
 
Member State. It could result in better enforcement by public authorities but may require one-off 
transposition costs. 

Social  impacts:  A  strict  limitation  of  prepayments  to  organisers  and  service  providers  (Measure 
1.1.3) could undermine the competitive position of EU service providers, as explained below under 
economic impacts. In the long-term this might lead to a decrease of jobs for EU citizens. On the other 
hand, the introduction of a mandatory rapid refund mechanisms at Member State level might create 
additional jobs within the EU, as additional resources will likely be needed to deal with this task. 
Overall, the additional social impact of this option would rather be negative. Introducing mandatory 
national back-up funds may create additional jobs in the EU. 

Overall impact of Option C  

Effectiveness : ++++  

0 (no change)  + (somewhat effective)  ++ (Moderately effective) +++ (Effective) ++++ (Very effective) 
+++++ (Extremely effective) 

Limiting prepayments to organisers and service providers would very effectively address Problem 1. 
An explicit B2B refund right where a package is cancelled, even if the relevant service was or could 
have been provided, would make it easier for organisers to refund prepayments to travellers within 
the 14 days deadline of the PTD. This would very effectively address Problem 1 but may be less 
effective in relation to third-country service providers. A mandatory rapid refund mechanism, once 
created and having collected sufficient funds, would ensure timely refunds to travellers in a liquidity 
crisis, effectively addressing Problem 1.  

Compulsory national back-up funds would increase consumer protection in Member States where 
they would constitute a useful addition to the current protection. They would also help create a level 
playing  field  for  companies  in  the  EU.  Measure  2.2  would  thus  be  very  effective  in  addressing 
Problem 2 for the Member States where such funds are a useful addition to the current mechanism. 

Deleting LTAs type (b) would be only partially effective in addressing Problem 3, as problems related 
to LTAs type (a) and their delimitation from packages plus three information sheets for LTAs would 
remain. The clarification that the place of departure should also be taken into account for case-by-
case assessment and giving formal value to travel warnings is likely to effectively address Problem 
3. So would the measure on the parties responsible for refunds.  

Efficiency 

Wherever possible, the benefits and costs were quantified. Where no sufficient data was available for 
quantification,  a  qualitative  assessment  of  costs  and  benefits  was  undertaken.  Therefore,  the 
quantified  cost-benefit  assessment  is  only  partial  and  had  to  be  combined  with  the  qualitative 
assessment to reach a final assessment.  

For the quantified costs and benefits both the net benefits and their Net Present Value (“NPV”) were 
calculated. For the qualitative assessment, scores between 0 and +5 for the benefits, and between 0 
and  -5  for  the  costs,  were  assigned  to  all  impacts.  These  scores  were  aggregated  to  show  the  net 
benefit.394  

394 To be noted that the values were normalised, i.e., represented as a proportion of the same base value, in order to allow 
for comparison. 

74 

 
 
 
 
The efficiency in terms of costs and benefits of the measures included in Option C are depicted in the 
table below. More detailed calculations can be found in Annex 10. 

A strict limitation  of prepayments to  organisers  and service providers would  result in  the highest 
burden on EU companies of the three options. The increased consumer protection, as compared to 
the status quo, would likely come at a financial cost for travellers. However, cost increases compared 
to the status quo, and hence the efficiency of the measure in achieving its objectives, will also depend 
on the current market practices in relation to prepayments and will likely vary from one Member 
State to another. Mandatory rapid refund mechanisms will result in increased costs for organisers, 
likely to be passed on to travellers. Moreover, in times of crisis, there could be substantial costs for 
public authorities. Introducing a B2B refund right in all cases where a package is cancelled due to 
unavoidable  and  extraordinary  circumstances  would  keep  the  burden  on  companies  as  a  group 
limited. However, the liquidity risk and related costs would shift from one category of businesses 
(organisers) to another (service providers). Hence, while it may increase costs for service providers, 
it would be beneficial for organisers (99% SMEs). On the other hand, it may lead to a decreased offer 
and/or  higher  prices  for  packages,  thus  reducing  the  benefits  for  travellers  from  shorter  refund 
deadlines.  

75 

Benefits and costs in EUR million One off   Recurring  MethodologyBenefitsMeasure 1.1.3 Strict limitation of prepayments to organisers and service providers - benefit to consumers - reduction of consumer detriment in view of lower prepayment (liquidity gain)       610.4 liquidity gain of EUR 8.4 billion and EUR 19.3 billion (on average: EUR 13.9 billion) on 4.4% of packages affected (in normal times) by financial loss. This leads to a decrease of consumer detriment between EUR 369.1 million and EUR 851.7 million.Measure 1.2.2 Mandatory crisis fund at national level - benefit for consumersQualitative assessment: 5. Travellers will get their refunds without delay.Measure 1.3.2 Business-to-business refund right in all cases - benefit to customers - reduction of consumer detriment in view of timelier refundsQualitative assessment: 3Measure 1.3.2 Business-to-business refund right in all cases - benefit to business -  increased liquidity for organisers Qualitative assessment: 4Measure 2.2 - Mandatory insolvency back-up fund and coverage of vouchers and refund claimsQualitative assessment: 5Measure 3.1.3 LTAs (OIOO) - businesses       108.9  Some simplification for organisers and level playing field Measure 3.1.3 LTAs (OIOO) - travellers Qualitative assessment: 1. Clarification and simplification benefits. Measure 3.1.3 LTAs (OIOO) - authorities Qualitative assessment: 1. Clarification and simplification benefits. Measure 3.2.2 Specifications on cancellations + formal value travel warnings - benefit for consumersQualitative assessment: 5Measure 3.3.2 Clarification on the role of different parties + seller responsible  - benefit to consumersQualitative assessment: 3. Reduction in consumer detriment.Total Benefit           -          719.2                                                                                                                        -   CostsMeasure 1.1.3 Strict limitation of prepayments to organisers and service providers - lower prepayments (cost pass through - increased prices )    1,107.1  High-level estimate of the cost increase for service providers passed to organisers: 10%. This will be fully passed through to consumers, resulting in a price increase of packages Measure 1.1.3 Strict limitation of prepayment - lower prepayments - cost pass through - increased prices - impact on number of packages sold through price elasiticty (sales organisers) Qualitative assessment: 5. In view of negative price elasiticty increased package prices may lead to a reduction of packages sold and hence negatively impact revenues of organisers. This will also affect service providers who will offer fewer services for packages, leading to a shrinking package travel market.Measure 1.1.3 Strict limitation of prepayment - impact on enforcement MSQualitative assessment: 1. Potentially somewhat increased enforcement costs, as MS authorities would start monitoring also service providersMeasure 1.2.2 Mandatory crisis fund at national level       323.0  costs would be EUR 322.3 million.  Operating costs in times of crisis: EUR 700k/year.  Measure 1.3.2 Business-to-business refund right in all cases - impact on service providers - cost ass through to organisers and consumers - increased prices    1,107.1  Expected cost increase of at least 10%, passed on to cosumers and resulting in a total price increase of EUR 1.1 billion.  Measure 2.2 - Mandatory insolvency back-up fund and coverage of vouchers and refund claims - impact on organisers - cost pass-through to consumers - increased prices       323.0  costs would be EUR 322.3 million.  Operating costs in times of crisis: EUR 700k/year.  Measure 2.2 - Mandatory insolvency back-up fund and coverage of vouchers and refund claims - impact on MS Qualitative assessment: 1. New tasks for MS in enforcement and monitoring. Measure 3.1.3 LTAs  - cost to business (traders) - familiarisation          6.5  one-off familiarisation cost for businesses Measure 3.2.2 Specifications on cancellations + formal value travel warnings - impact on organisers  Qualitative assessment: 2. Clarification potentially leading to higher costs for organisers. Measure 3.2.2 Specifications on cancellations + formal value travel warnings - impact on MS authorities  Qualitative assessment: 1. Split views among MS authorities whether the measure would have a positive impact. Measure 3.3.2 Clarification on the role of different parties + seller responsible - impact on retailersQualitative assessment: 3. Likely to affect business models in most of the Member States, where retailers are not liable for the performance of packages. Especially in markets where retailers operate with small margins this additional burden may be relevant.For all measures taken together - cost to administrations - transposition + information       0.05 Total Cost          6.5     2,860.1 Net Impact (Total Benefit - Total Cost)-        6.5 -   2,140.9 Benefit Cost Ratio (Total Benefit / Total Cost)           0.3  
 
 
While the mandatory crisis fund included in Option C to address Problem 2 would entail additional 
costs for companies and public authorities, it would provide benefits to travellers in Member States 
where  it  is  a  useful  addition  to  the  current  system.  Overall,  increased  efficiency  compared  to  the 
status quo is not guaranteed. 

Giving  formal  value  to  travel  warning  would  have  substantial  benefits  for  all  stakeholders,  while 
potentially creating some costs for companies and public authorities. Consequently, it would be very 
efficient  but  may face political  opposition from  certain  Member States.  Option  C would be more 
efficient than the status quo in addressing Problem 3. 

Taking into account both the NPV of the net quantified benefits and costs, and the efficiency scores 
determined qualitatively, Option C arrives at a normalised efficiency score of -0.37. It thus performs 
worse than the status quo.395 

Coherence  

Score: -2 (from -2 to +2) 

Limiting prepayments for package organisers and service providers would be coherent within the 
PTD. However, it would create incoherence with the rules applicable to stand-alone services. Full 
coherence and elimination of negative effects on the availability of packages could only be achieved 
if  similar  limitations  applied  also  to  stand-alone  services  (e.g.,  under  the  Air  Passenger  Rights 
Regulation), which are not included in the parallel IAR on passenger rights and cannot be achieved 
through changes in the PTD. The introduction of a 7-day B2B refund right whenever a package is 
cancelled  would create the same  rules for all packages that  are cancelled due to  unavoidable and 
extraordinary circumstances and thus be beneficial for internal coherence. However, it would deepen 
the incoherence between the rules on packages and those applying to single services. This coherence 
issue could only be resolved through a cancellation right for passenger in the event of unavoidable 
and extraordinary circumstances, which, however, is not included in the parallel IAR on passenger 
rights. Moreover, there are no crisis funds for service providers. The mandatory introduction of such 
mechanism for packages would thus increase the cost gap between packages and stand-alone services 
and would reduce coherence with EU transport legislation. Moreover, such a fund would only benefit 
travellers  that  insist  on  a  rapid  refund  and  do  not  accept  vouchers  as  a  means  of  (delayed) 
reimbursement, thus creating an internal coherence issue.  

The introduction of measure 2.2 would somewhat decrease coherence, as other EU legislation does 
not require insolvency back-up funds (most sectors, incl. air transport, do not even have a first-line 
insolvency protection). 

If similar clarifications on the value of travel warnings and on cancellations were introduced in the 
APRR,  this  would  create  coherence  between  these  policies.  However,  this  cannot  be  achieved 
through changes in the PTD.  

395 For details, please see the calculations in Annex 10. 

76 

Normalised efficiency (NPV)Normalised efficiency (qualitative)Average efficiencyC-0.980.24-0.37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.  HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? 

This section compares the performance of the five policy options, based on Section 6 assessments.  

7.1.  Effectiveness: expected achievement of the initiative’s objectives 

Table 2 Effectiveness (scores from 0 to 5, normalised396 scores from 0 to 1)397 

In  the  table  above,  the  expected  achievement  of  the  objectives  is  presented  net  of  the  baseline398. 
Keeping in mind the scale used for the normalised scores, i.e. from 0 to +1, it becomes clear that all 
the options assessed are substantially more effective than the status quo. Overall, Option C would be 
the most effective option in achieving the specific objectives of the review. This is mainly due to the 
mandatory nature of the measures included in it. It is followed by Option A, with Option B being the 
least effective one. 

7.2.  Efficiency: impact on travellers and businesses 

To compare the efficiency of the different options, this report considers the costs and benefits for all 
stakeholder  categories  (businesses,  travellers  and  public  authorities),  including  any  (change  in) 
consumer detriment. The costs and benefits for all stakeholder groups have been added together to 
represent the total impact of each option, distinguishing between quantified impacts (where available) 
and qualitative ones. The quantitative and qualitative scores were normalised, i.e.,  expressed as  a 
proportion of the same base value, so as to determine a mean score. Where appropriate, e.g. in view 
of diverging impacts, the impacts per sub-group (e.g. impacts on organisers and service providers or 
retailers) were also assessed. As 99% of organisers are SMEs, the specific impact on SMEs is already 
accounted for under the impact for organisers. We took the conservative assumption that impacts on 
each stakeholder category are equally important,  thus used the same weighting for each category. 
The  overall  efficiency  score  of  each  option  is  hence  made  up  of  the  individual  scores  for  each 
stakeholder category.  

396 Normalisation of scores means adjusting values measured on different scales to a notionally common scale. 
397 For detailed calculations, please see Annex 10.  
398 Implying that the baseline is always considered to be equal to 0. 

77 

EFFECTIVENESSOption AOption BOption CM1.1 Limitation of prepayments2.004.005.00M1.2 Rapid refund mechanism2.000.005.00M1.3 B2B refund right2.000.005.00M1.4 Vouchers1.000.000.00score (objective 1)1.751.003.75normalised score (objective 1)0.350.200.75M2.1 Insolvency protection/back-up fund3.003.005.00score (objective 2)3.003.005.00normalised score (objective 2)0.600.601.00M3.1 Partial Deletion LTAs5.003.001.00M3.2 Cancellation rights/travel warnings2.002.005.00M3.3 role parties1.001.003.00score (objective 3)2.672.003.00normalised score (objective 3)0.530.400.60AVERAGE over the 3 objectives0.490.400.78 
 
 
 
For each stakeholder (sub-)group, the qualitative impacts on efficiency were assessed according to a 
scale (from worst, negative scores, to best, positive ones), with values from 0 to +5.  The baseline 
was always assigned a score of 0. The conservative assumption was applied that impacts on each 
stakeholder category are equally important, thus the same weighting was used for each category.  

For the quantified costs and benefits both the net benefits and their normalised efficiency (NPV) were 
calculated.399 It should be noted, however, that it has proven more difficult to quantify benefits than 
costs. As a result, the cost-benefit tables in Section 6 above, which only consider quantified costs and 
benefits, show a limited overall benefit-cost ratio. Taking into account both the normalised efficiency 
in terms of NPV and the normalised efficiency determined based on the qualitative scores (ranging 
between -1 and +1), the average normalised efficiency was determined.  

This average normalised efficiency for each of the assessed options is presented in Table 3 below. 

Table 3 Efficiency (average normalised efficiency score from -1 to +1)  

Based on the full efficiency scores,400 i.e., including both the NPV score and qualitative efficiency 
score, Option A would be most efficient in reaching the objectives of the review. It comes second in 
terms of NPV of the quantified measures. In view of the high costs, Option C obtains a negative NPV, 
while still scoring relatively well on the qualitatively assessed impacts but ends up being the least 
efficient option and worse than the status quo. Option B comes second in terms of overall efficiency. 

While the full efficiency scores may seem relatively low, one needs to keep in mind the scale used 
(i.e. from -1 to +1). Therefore, in terms of overall efficiency, Option A still performs better than the 
status quo. 

399 Net present value (NPV) is a financial metric that seeks to capture the total value of an initiative. The idea behind 
NPV is to project all of the future cash inflows and outflows associated with an initiative, discount all those future cash 
flows to the present day, and then add them together. 
400 The  full efficiency scores, or average normalised efficiency scores, are mentioned in the third column of Table 3 
above. For a more detailed description of the methodology, please revert to Annex 4, part 3; for the calculations – Annex 
10. 

78 

Normalised efficiency (NPV)Normalised efficiency (qualitative)Average efficiencyA0.030.250.14B0.080.080.08C-0.980.24-0.37 
 
 
 
 
7.3.  Coherence with other EU legislation and internal coherence across SOs 

Table 4 Coherence (scores from -2 to +2, normalised scores from -1 to +1) 

In the table above, the expected achievement of the objectives is presented net of the baseline. Based 
on the coherence scores established for the three options in Section 6 in light of a detailed coherence 
analysis, Option A thus achieves the highest coherence with other EU legislation. It is followed by 
Option B and C that show a decrease in terms of coherence compared to the status quo. 

7.4.  Comparison of options 

In order to find the best performing option, the three options were compared across the criteria of 
effectiveness, efficiency and coherence. The results are presented in the tables below.  

The methodology for comparison is explained in Annex 4, part 3. The detailed calculations and their 
results can be found in Annex 10. 

Table 5 Comparison of policy options based on average normalised scores for each dimension 

The multicriteria method used above compares the options based on a fully compensatory weighted 
average.401 The weights used were equal to 1, as the number of sub-criteria per dimension is already 

401 A compensatory multicriteria method weighs the positive and negative attributes of the considered alternatives and 
allows for positive attributes to compensate for the negative ones. 

79 

COHERENCEOption AOption BOption CM1.1 Limitation of prepayments0.00-2.00-1.00M1.2 Rapid refund mechanism0.000.00-1.00M1.3 B2B refund right1.000.00-1.00M1.4 Vouchers2.00-2.000.00score (objective 1)0.75-1.00-0.75normalised score (objective 1)0.38-0.50-0.38M2.1 Insolvency protection/back-up fund0.000.00-1.00score (objective 2)0.000.00-1.00normalised score (objective 2)0.000.00-0.50M3.1 Partial Deletion LTAs0.000.000.00M3.2 Cancellation rights/travel warnings0.000.000.00M3.3 role parties0.000.000.00score (objective 3)0.000.000.00normalised score (objective 3)0.000.000.00AVERAGE over the 3 objectives0.13-0.17-0.29Policy OptionsEffectivenessEfficiencyCoherenceMean MCA (equal weights)A0.490.140.130.25B0.400.08-0.170.10C0.78-0.37-0.290.04 
 
 
 
 
 
neutralised  by  having  averaged  their  normalised  scores.  The  results  in  the  table  above  show  that 
Option A performs better than Option B, which, in turn, is better than Option C.  

Table  6  Comparison  of  policy  options  based  on  the  Condorcet  outranking  method  (partial  compensation  over  8  sub-
criteria)  

The  second  multicriteria  method  tested  is  the  Condorcet  partially  compensatory  outranking 
method402,403 over the 8 individual sub-criteria that were assessed (3 for effectiveness, 3 for coherence 
and 2 for efficiency). This produces a ranking where Option A outranks (i.e., performs better in terms 
of efficiency than) Option C, which, in turn, outranks Option B. 

Table 7 Comparison of policy options based on the Condorcet outranking method (over 3 key IA criteria)  

402 The Condorcet outranking method allows to evaluate alternatives in terms of pairwise comparisons. It assigns to pairs 
of alternatives a degree of preference, dominance, or indifference, based on how well they satisfy the criteria and their 
relative importance. The result table shows for how many criteria a certain option dominates, i.e., is better than, the other 
options.  
403  The  method  is  partially  compensatory,  as  it  allows  for  compensation  across  the  different  dimensions  (i.e., 
effectiveness, efficiency and coherence). However, there is no compensation between the different sub-criteria. 

80 

YConcordanceindex(no.criteriawherexdominatesy)                         XABCno. criteria for which the option dominates another option(domination score - dominated score)/no. comparisonsA4480.21B123-0.32C3580.11no. criteria for which option is dominated by another option49619YConcordance index(no.criteriawherexdominatesy)XABCno. criteria for which the option dominates another option(domination score - dominated score)/no. comparisonsA3250.44B022-0.22C112-0.22no. criteria for which option is dominated by another option1449 
 
 
 
 
 
The final comparison of options in Table 7 above, is a mix between the first and second method. The 
Condorcet outranking method is still used. However, rather than using the options’ value for each of 
the 8 sub criteria the pairwise comparison is performed on the mean normalised scores404 for each 
dimension  (i.e.,  effectiveness,  efficiency  and  coherence).  As  a  result,  there  is  full  compensation 
between  the  various  sub-criteria  that  belong  to  each  dimension,  but  only  partial  compensation 
between  the  dimensions  themselves.    Option  A  again  scores  best.    At  the  same  time,  there  is  no 
difference in the ranking of Options B and C, as they obtain the same scores. 

The  analysis  above  shows  that,  independently  of  the  comparison  method  used,  the  overall  best 
performing option, in  terms  of  economic impacts, is  Option  A. While it  is not  the most effective 
option, it brings about benefits for travellers and businesses with the lowest costs. It also ensures the 
most coherence with other legislation. 

As regards social impacts, Option A is not expected to have any specific positive or negative impacts. 
On the contrary, the social impacts of Options B and C are rather negative overall. This again points 
to Option A being the best one, on balance.  

In  addition,  Option  A  contains  measures  that  are  less  interventionist  than  the  other  options 
considered. Consequently, it respects the balance between the objective and the means and methods 
used as well as the consequences of the action, and is, therefore, the most proportionate. 

8.  PREFERRED OPTION 

8.1.  Composition and performance of the preferred option 

Based on the impacts identified in Section 6 and the detailed analysis and comparison of options in 
Section 7, Option A is the preferred option. It contains the following measures: 

•  Regarding problem 1: flexible limitation of prepayments (1.1.1), possibility to setup of a crisis 
fund at national level (1.2.1), 7-day business-to-business refund right if the relevant service 
not performed (1.3.1) and voluntary vouchers at all times (1.4.1); 

•  Regarding  problem  2:  strengthened  rules  on  national  insolvency  protection  (covering 
vouchers and refund claims and an explicit reference to voluntary back-up funds at MS level) 
(2.1); 

•  Regarding problem 3: deletion of LTAs type (a) and adaptations in the definition of package 
and in the definition of LTAs type (b) (3.1.1), clarification on cancellation rights and travel 
warnings (3.2.1), and clarification of the role of the parties (3.3.1). 

When assessing the measures included in the preferred option, it has proven more difficult to quantify 
benefits than costs. A cautious approach was taken in this respect, as only the benefits and costs that 
could be identified were used for the calculation of the benefit-cost ratio. This resulted in a limited 
overall benefit-cost ratio (i.e. 1.2), which is still better than the status quo. Moreover, it needs to be 
taken into account that both the benefit-cost ratio and the average normalised efficiency score, i.e. 
including the costs and benefits assessed qualitatively, are calculated considering the total costs and 
benefits of the proposed measures for all stakeholder groups. As both ratios are positive, this indicates 
that – overall – stakeholders will be better off with the introduction of the preferred option than under 
the status quo. 

The distribution of costs and benefits between individual stakeholders impacted (versus collective 
outcomes,  which  for  them  matter  less)  is  key  to  showing  the  rationale  behind  the  proposed 
intervention and its value added. 

404 Normalisation of scores means adjusting values measured on different scales to a notionally common scale. 

81 

 
 
 
Under the preferred option, consumers will gain from the fact that the simplification will reduce the 
scope for circumvention and clarify the information available to travellers, hereby leading to fewer 
legal disputes, thus saving time, costs and efforts for all stakeholders. 

The  revised  PTD  will  also  ensure  better  application  and  enforcement  of  their  rights  to  timely 
reimbursement and to exercising their right to choose between reimbursement or accepting a voucher 
instead. Moreover, such vouchers would be also  protected against package organisers insolvency. 
This will contribute to consumers’ regaining trust in package travel following the recent crises. 

In exchange for these benefits to travellers, there is expected to be a small increase in package prices, 
as organisers (and service providers) are expected to pass on any increased costs onto travellers. This 
cost increase has however been shown as being very small (i.e. 0.3%) – and certainly dwarfed by the 
very high inflation that has affected most economies, including EU Member States, over the last two 
years. However, inflation is a baseline issue and is not influenced by the changes to the PTD. 

In addition, there is recent evidence (from the UK ATOL reform survey405) that travellers prefer a 
small price increase that guarantees reimbursement in case of bankruptcy of the travel operator over 
commercial  offers  that  would  not  include  such  guarantee.  Moreover,  feedback  from  consumer 
organisations  indicates  that  sometimes  travellers  prefer  to  pay  substantially  more  to  enjoy  higher 
protection.406,407  Such  stated  consumer  preferences  indicate  that  a  slight  increase  in  price  of  the 
package,  i.e.  maximum  0.3%  of  the  average  package  price,  as  a  result  of  the  introduction  of  the 
preferred  option,  in  return  for  a  higher  protection  granted  by  a  lower  prepayment,  will  likely  be 
accepted by travellers. Therefore, the measures included in the preferred option are not expected to 
lead to any decrease in consumption of packages by travellers. Overall, as a result of the preferred 
option, consumers will be better off than under the status quo. 

Hence, irrespective of the global balance between costs and benefits among consumers as a group, 
the key issue is the distribution of these expected costs and benefits among them. Travellers prefer to 
pay a little more for their package to get  easier and quicker  reimbursement,  without the need for 
repeated requests or legal action, where the need arises. In other terms, they prefer to pay a little to 
ensure that, should they be the unlucky party whose organiser cancels their trip – for instance, as a 
result of insolvency–- they will effectively get back the large sums of money they prepaid for the 
package or their equivalent in the form of a voucher. This is confirmed by feedback from national 
consumer organisations received during the public consultation408 and a publication of an EU-wide 
consumer organisation.409   

It  would  seem  that  even  if  –  despite  the  cautious  approach    of  this  SWD,  i.e.  to  concentrate  on 
quantifying costs, while most benefits are assessed qualitatively – the total benefit-cost ratio were to 
turn out slightly negative for consumers as a whole, they would still be favourable to the preferred 
option as individually they prefer to pay a little more for their package to ensure that their payments 
be effectively protected. However, this is a theoretical consideration only, as in the present case, both 
the benefit-cost ratio and the qualitatively determined efficiency for  travellers only410, at 0.62 and 

405https://consultations.caa.co.uk/corporate-communications/atol-reform-request-for-further-
information/user_uploads/atol-reform-request-for-further-information--cap2496-.pdf 

paper, 

position 

BEUC’s 

406 Replies of BEUC, VZV and DECO to Q1 of the OPC. 
407 
115_package_travel_directive_beuc_s_views_on_how_to_regain_consumer_trust_in_the_tourism_sector.pdf 
408 Replies of VZV and DECO to Q1 of the OPC. 
409 
11, 
115_package_travel_directive_beuc_s_views_on_how_to_regain_consumer_trust_in_the_tourism_sector.pdf 
410 As opposed to the total ratio for all stakeholders taken together. 

BEUC’s 

position 

paper, 

11, 

p. 

p. 

https://www.beuc.eu/sites/default/files/publications/beuc-x-2021-

https://www.beuc.eu/sites/default/files/publications/beuc-x-2021-

82 

 
 
 
0.80 respectively411, indicate that the benefits from the measures included in the preferred option quite 
substantially outweigh the costs for travellers, resulting, in particular, from package price increases. 

In addition, the distribution of costs and benefits between different types of companies, i.e. organisers 
as opposed to service providers, is an important issue to take into account. With a B2B refund right 
which  applies  only  if  the  service  is  not  performed,  which  is  included  in  the  preferred  option,  the 
burden  on  companies  as  a  group  would  be  very  limited.  However,  the  measure  would  lessen  the 
pressure on organisers from the obligation to reimburse travellers before they are themselves repaid 
by service providers for non-performed services, which was one of the key problems indicated by 
organisers. As such, it would be of direct benefit to organisers, who would be less likely to file for 
insolvency as the pressure on them is removed. At the same time, most of the costs identified will be 
borne  by  organisers,  who  are  likely  to  pass  them  on  to  travellers.  Moreover,  both  organisers  and 
service providers will gain legal clarity, while they may face only slightly negative impacts from the 
fact that it will be less easy to circumvent the PTD rules, if that were to be a negative impact at all.   

The overall economic impact of the preferred option is thus expected to be positive or at least neutral 
for all stakeholders. 

In  terms  of  impacts  on  competitiveness,  approximately  112  000  EU  package  organisers,  99%  of 
which  are  SMEs,  would  be  affected  by  the  measures  included  in  the  preferred  option.  That  is  an 
extremely small share of all companies in the EU, so with no overall impact on EU competitiveness. 
Package  organisers  would  primarily  gain  from  an  increase  liquidity  from  the  B2B  refund  right 
measure, which they identified as a need. 

In principle, all service providers – both established within the EU and outside of it but targeting their 
services at EU consumers – would be subject to Measure 1.3.1 included in the preferred option, i.e., 
a B2B refund right for organisers in case the service is not performed. In practice, though, organisers 
based in  the EU may not  be able to  insist on the application of EU law in a business-to-business 
contract with a third-country service provider and to enforce a 7-day refund in relation to third country 
service providers. However, there is already a difference at present in the scope to enforce refunds 
within and outside the EU and this will not change with the introduction of a B2B refund. Moreover, 
the right to a refund for services that are not provided corresponds broadly to general principles of 
contract  law.  Given  that this  difference already  exists,  the potential gap between the enforcement 
possibilities for organisers within and outside of EU will not become greater with the introduction of 
the preferred option. Therefore, no specific mitigation measures are considered necessary.  

By contrast the new provision would make it easier (and faster) for organisers to obtain a refund from 
(especially EU-based) service providers than at present, as, in view of their smaller bargaining power 
they are often unable to agree to mutually beneficial contract terms with service providers such as 
airlines. This will, in turn, put package organisers in a better position to refund travellers and have a 
positive  impact  on  the  organisers’  competitiveness.  This  may  therefore  put  organisers  in  a  better 
position vis-a-vis EU service providers and to a lesser extent vis-a-vis third country service providers. 
Moreover, whilst, overall competitiveness would be unchanged, the obstacles to recovering funds 
easily from non-EU countries, as long as not addressed (e.g. through bilateral agreements between 
the EU and the third country concerned), could lead organisers to choose the services of EU providers, 
such as airlines, over non-EU service providers for inclusion in packages that they offer. As a result, 
this might potentially in the longer-term lead to an improvement of the competitive position of EU 
service providers. In addition, it may encourage third country service providers wishing to operate 
within the EU to establish a representative office and/or a subsidiary in the EU.  Overall, the B2B 

411 See Annex 10.1 

83 

 
 
 
measure is hence expected to have a positive impact on the competitiveness of package organisers 
and a neutral  

A competitiveness gain within the EU is expected from the measure contained in the preferred option 
which limits prepayments, unless the need for higher prepayments is justified (measure 1.1.1). This 
measure harmonises rules among Member States, since some countries already apply it, and increases 
effective market competition. International competitiveness with the rest of the world will not change 
as a result of measure 1.1.1, because third country organisers offering packages to consumers in the 
EU also have to apply the revised PTD.  

In  general,  there  should  be  limited  impacts  on  international  competitiveness  from  the  measures 
included in the preferred option. The value added of the service provided by the package organisers 
is almost entirely generated within the EU.  As a result, the potential channel by which international 
competitiveness could suffer is very small. In any event, the estimated impacts on costs are very small 
as well (both one-off and variable) and could certainly not be considered sufficiently significant on 
their own to redirect demand to non-EU providers. 

Finally, the positive impact of the intervention in terms of increasing coherence with other legislation 
and the effectiveness in addressing the problems brought to light in the evaluation, should also be 
taken into account. In this spirit, when looking at the average normalised overall scores, it becomes 
clear that the preferred option, i.e. Option A, performs overall substantially better than the status quo. 
This clearly shows the value added of the proposed intervention. 

In order to assess whether the preferred option, i.e., Option A, performs best under various scenarios, 
a sensitivity analysis was undertaken. A summary of the results is presented in the tables below. The 
detailed  results,  also  including  assessment  through  both  the  Condorcet  outranking  method  and 
weighted sum method, are presented in Annex 10.  

Table 9 Sensitivity analysis of the options using minimum values for quantified efficiency 

Table 10 Sensitivity analysis of the options using maximum values for quantified efficiency 

Under  all  the  scenarios  considered,  and  according  to  all  comparison  methods  used,  the  preferred 
option, i.e., Option A, scores the highest. It can hence be concluded that it is indeed the best option. 

Given the nature of the measures which are part of the preferred option it does not seem necessary to 
propose  transition  periods  in  addition  to  the  transposition  period  for  the  Member  States.  Specific 
mitigating  measures  for  SMEs  such  as  transition  periods  for  these  undertakings  neither  seem 
necessary nor appropriate. Indeed, in contract and consumer protection law, different rules based on 

84 

Policy OptionsEffectiveness/Obj. 1Effectiveness/Obj. 2Effectiveness/Obj. 3Coherence/Obj. 1Coherence/Obj. 2Coherence/Obj. 3Efficiency (quantified)/ Net Present Value (discount rate 5%)Efficiency (qualitative assessment)Average of normalised scores for each dimensionA0.350.600.530.380.000.00281.67                                1.27 0.25B0.200.600.40-0.500.000.00530.840.380.10C0.751.000.60-0.38-0.500.00-17280.381.210.03Policy OptionsEffectiveness/Obj. 1Effectiveness/Obj. 2Effectiveness/Obj. 3Coherence/Obj. 1Coherence/Obj. 2Coherence/Obj. 3Efficiency (quantified)/ Net Present Value (discount rate 5%)Efficiency (qualitative assessment)Average of normalised scores for each dimensionA0.350.600.530.380.000.00894.37                                1.27 0.26B0.200.600.40-0.500.000.004257.450.380.13C0.751.000.60-0.38-0.500.00-13553.771.210.07 
 
 
 
the size of the business would be very confusing and detrimental for consumers (even if applied only 
during transition periods). They are hence not included in the preferred option. 

8.2.  REFIT (simplification and improved efficiency) 

The revision of the Directive would give rise to some costs for stakeholders, but it is also expected 
to reduce the burden on them, particularly as a result of greater legal clarity and simplification. This 
would, for instance, be the case of the removal of LTAs and new provisions on vouchers. In addition, 
some Member States have already adopted several measures of the preferred option that could lead 
to  moderate cost  increases.  For instance,  in some Member States  there  are  already (de  jure or de 
facto)  limitations  to  prepayments,  some  Member  States  cover  vouchers  and  refund  claims  by 
insolvency protection and some Member States  have insolvency back-up funds. Consequently,  in 
those Member States, businesses would not face additional costs.  

As regards reducing the burden for public administrations, the higher degree of legal clarity and the 
simplified regulatory framework are expected to increase the level of compliance and would make 
enforcement more efficient. In addition, Member States can identify best practices by looking at their 
peers that have already implemented the measures presented as voluntary under the preferred option. 
For example, Poland, as regards the crisis fund, or Czechia, Finland and Poland, which have created 
an insolvency protection back-up fund.  

8.3.  Application of the ‘one in, one out’ approach  

The proposed changes to the Directive will have moderate cost implications for stakeholders. The 
costs and cost-savings related to ‘one in, one out’ are included in the cost/benefit tables in Annex 3.  

The preferred option will result in one-off administrative costs due to familiarisation with the new 
provisions due to measure 3.1.2 of approx. EUR 6.5 million.   

At the same time, administrative yearly cost savings are expected. 

The partial removal of LTAs and related administrative simplification under measure 3.1.1 will result 
in organisers spending less time on choosing the right information form and thus will reduce their 
administrative burden by approx. EUR 181.4 million per year. 

Additionally, the simplification of several provisions and introduction of clearer criteria in the PTD 
is  likely  to  result  in  easier  monitoring,  thus  reducing  the  administrative  costs  for  Member  State 
authorities.  Since  such  cost  decreases  concern  public  authorities  only,  they  are  not  part  of  the 
Commission’s ‘one in, one out’ commitment. 

9.  HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? 

The proposed amendments, if eventually adopted by the co-legislators without major changes, will 
be successful if travellers, travel businesses and enforcement authorities consider that the PTD as 
amended  is  as  clear  as  possible  regarding  the  core  concepts  and  the  rights  and  obligations  of  the 
parties, including in relation to cancellations, refunds and vouchers at least compared to the PTD in 
the version of 2015. The amendments will also be considered as successful if travellers consider that 
they are well informed and well protected when they purchase travel packages, including in a crisis. 
To assess the effectiveness in achieving the objectives of the chosen option, the following progress 
indicators have been identified. However, reporting obligations for public authorities and businesses 
remain  unchanged  compared  to  the  current  PTD.  These  indicators  can  serve  as  the  basis  for  a 
Commission report after from five years after the Directive is adopted. The necessary information 
will be collected through surveys to stakeholder groups (including travellers, consumer organisations, 
travel businesses and national authorities). They will also be relevant for subsequent evaluations. It 

85 

 
 
will have to be considered that factors other than the PTD (e.g., market and technology developments, 
including  consumer  preferences  and  new  business  models,  other  legislation,  including  on 
environment and taxation) may contribute to developments more strongly than the PTD.  

Table 7 Monitoring indicators 

Specific Objectives 

1. Improved protection 
of travellers’ 
prepayments and their 
right to a timely refund, 
including in times of 
crisis, while 
maintaining the 
liquidity of package 
organisers 

2. Strengthened 
protection of travellers 
against the organiser’s 
insolvency, including in 
the event of a major 
crisis, while also 
ensuring a level playing 
field in the Internal 
Market 

3. Increase legal 
certainty and 
enforceability of the 
PTD by clarifying 
and/or simplifying 
certain provisions of the 
Directive that are liable 
to be subject to 
divergent 
interpretations by 
stakeholders or are 
difficult to apply in 
practice 

Indicator 
Average time before refund at 
normal times / crisis does not 
significantly exceed 14 days 
(e.g., one month), unless 
travellers accept a voucher or an 
alternative package which takes 
place later.  

Refunds from service providers 
to organisers within 7 days after 
the cancellation of services 

The share of travellers declaring 
that they are clearly informed 
on their rights regarding 
vouchers, e.g., voluntary, 
insolvency protected etc.  

Share of travellers being 
repatriated and receiving full 
refunds without undue delay 
following insolvencies of 
organisers.  

Share of package organisers that 
inform travellers correctly about 
the fact that the PTD applies to 
the combination of travel 
services booked and the 
associated rights of travellers. 

The share of travellers declaring 
that they are clearly informed 
on their rights as package 
travellers and understand the 
information provided to them 
including in relation to: 
-  whether they are being 

offered a package and on 
the associated rights 
cancellations due to 
unavoidable and 

- 

Success  
According to surveys, 
ideally at least 70 % 
of travellers are 
reimbursed within 14 
days upon 
cancellation of the 
package at normal 
times and within 28 
days in a crisis. 
According to surveys, 
ideally at least 70% of 
organisers receive 
timely refunds of 
prepayments after 
cancellations within 7 
days. 
According to surveys, 
at least 70% of 
travellers are satisfied 
with information on 
vouchers. 

According to the 
central contact points 
and possibly 
consumer 
organisations, in at 
least 90 % of cases 
there are no 
significant problems 
with repatriations and 
refunds.  
Organisers largely (at 
least 90%) comply 
with these obligations.  

Ideally, at least 70% 
of consumers 
declaring that they are 
satisfied. 

Data source 
Consumer survey, surveys of 
enforcement authorities, as 
well as national and EU 
consumer organisations,  
Feedback from the PTD Expert 
Group. 

Business survey, surveys of 
enforcement authorities, as 
well as national and EU 
business organisations,  
Feedback from the PTD Expert 
Group. 

Consumer survey, surveys of 
enforcement authorities, as 
well as national and EU 
consumer organisations,  
Feedback from the PTD Expert 
Group. 

Survey among the central 
contact points and possibly 
consumer organisation. 
Feedback from the PTD Expert 
Group. 

Surveys of enforcement 
authorities, as well as national 
and EU consumer 
organisations,  
Feedback from the PTD Expert 
Group. 

Consumer survey, surveys of 
enforcement authorities, as 
well as national and EU 
consumer organisations,  
Feedback from the PTD Expert 
Group. 

86 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
extraordinary 
circumstances  
and the role of different 
parties.  

- 

Travel businesses finding the 
new rules simpler and clearer 
compared to the 2015 rules. 

At least 50% of 
businesses replying 
positively. 

Feedback from the PTD expert 
group and surveys amongst 
businesses and business 
associations. 

87 

 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION 

1.  LEAD DG, DECIDE PLANNING/CWP REFERENCES 

The lead DG for this back-to-back evaluation and impact assessment on the review of the Package 
travel  directive  is  the  DG  for  Justice  and  Consumers  (DG  JUST).  The  Directorate  in  charge  is 
Directorate B - Consumers.  

The initiative is encoded in Decide Planning with the reference PLAN/2021/11358. The initiative 
was included in the Commission work programme 2022.412 

2.  ORGANISATION AND TIMING 

An  Interservice  Group  was  set  up  in  July  2021  with  representatives  from  the  Secretariat-General 
(SG);  Legal  Service  (SJ);  Internal  Market,  Industry,  Entrepreneurship  and  SMEs  (GROW); 
Communication  Networks,  Content  and  Technology  (CNECT),  Competition  (COMP);  Financial 
Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union (FISMA), Mobility and Transports (MOVE); 
Health and Food Safety (SANTE), and TRADE.  

The  Interservice  Group  met  four  times  during  the  evaluation  and  impact  assessment  process  and 
otherwise was consulted by email regularly on all the main steps and outputs of the process. 

The planned timing for adoption of the new act by the Commission is Q4 2023.  

The Inter-service consultation took place in Q42023. 

3.  CONSULTATION OF THE RSB 

An upstream meeting with the RSB was held on 20 September 2022 (with participants from JRC). 

A first version of this impact assessment was submitted to the RSB on 7 June 2023. The RSB hearing 
took  place  on  5  July  2023  and  the  RSB  issued  a  negative  opinion  on  7  July  2023.    The  impact 
assessment was revised to take into account the Board’s comments and was resubmitted to the RSB 
on 6 September 2023. The RSB reviewed the revised Impact Assessment draft and delivered on 28 
September a second opinion viewed as “positive with reservations”.  

Following the negative opinion of 7 July 2023, the Impact Assessment was amended. as follows: 

Recommendations 
the  Regulatory 
of 
Scrutiny  Board  [Ref.  Ares(2023)4733412  - 
7/07/2023] regarding the Impact Assessment 
Report  for  Directive  (EU)  2015/2302  on 
travel 
and 
package 
arrangements submitted on 7/5/2023 

linked 

travel 

How the recommendations of the Regulatory 
Scrutiny Board were taken on board and are 
reflected  in  the  new  updated  version  of  the 
IAR 

(B) Summary of findings 

The  Board  notes  the  additional  information 
provided and commitments to make changes to 

The  report  has  been  thoroughly  redrafted  in 
order  to  address  the  identified  issues,  as 
explained below. 

412 https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2023-01/cwp2022_en.pdf  

88 

 
 
 
the report. However, the Board gives a negative 
the 
opinion  because 
following significant shortcomings: 

the  report  contains 

(1)  The  report  is  not  sufficiently  clear  on  the 
scale  of  the  problems,  the  underlying  market 
failures,  and  the  specific  objectives  of  this 
initiative. It lacks a clear narrative in terms of 
what can be expected from this initiative. 

The  draft  IAR  now  provides  a  more  detailed 
description of the three identified problems 
during  the  application  of  the  Package  Travel 
Directive (PTD), including by inserting certain 
details  from  the  evaluation  and  referring  to 
instances  of  market  failure  (Section  2). 
Additional explanations as to why the initiative 
is  necessary  to  address  these  problems  have 
also been included. 

In  some  respects,  and,  insofar  as  this  was 
possible,  a  quantification  in  relation  to  the 
scale of the problems (reflected, in particular, 
in Section 2.1) has been added.  

Explanations regarding the general and specific 
objectives  of  the  2013  IA  and  those  of  the 
current  initiative  have  been  added  (Sections 
4.1. and 4.2.).  

The narrative in terms of what is the purpose 
of  this  initiative  and  what  can  be  expected 
from  it  has  been  improved  and  is  covered  by 
different sections (e.g., Section 1.2. and Section 
4.1).  This  becomes  clearer  also  in  the  more 
developed  table  on  the  monitoring  of  success 
(Section 9).  

It  has  been  clarified  that  the  purpose  of  the 
amendments  considered  in  this  IAR  is  to  fill 
specific gaps and clarify specific issues in the 
PTD, as  well as to  simplify certain  aspects  of 
the  Directive.  The  changes  considered  are 
particularly  important  for  the  protection  of 
travellers in a crisis but would add value to the 
PTD also at normal times. The targeted changes 
address,  for  instance,  the  absence  of  rules  on 
vouchers, uncertainty on insolvency protection 
for  vouchers  and  refund  claims  and  specific 
aspects of the cancellation of packages due to 
unavoidable circumstances.  

(2)  The  report  does  not  identify  all  relevant 
(combinations  of)  options  upfront.  It  does  not 
sufficiently explain why alternative market and 
insurance-based measures are not considered. 

relevant  options 

(combinations  of 
All 
measures)  are 
identified  upfront  now.  A 
presentation  of  the  intervention  logic  on  one 
page,  including  problems,  objectives,  policy 

89 

 
 
measures and policy option has been inserted at 
the  beginning  of  Section  5,  replacing  in  this 
section the table containing the policy measures 
and policy options.  

explanations  on  why 

the 
Furthermore, 
possibility for travellers to take out insurance 
policies (e.g., travel insurance) cannot address 
the  identified  problems  have  been  added  in 
different places (e.g., Sections 2.1.1, 2.1.2 and 
Section 5). 

there 

Moreover, 
additional 
are 
explanations on why non-legislative solutions, 
including  guidance  and  enforcement,  are 
insufficient in Section 5.  

now 

(3)  The  level  of  impact  analysis  is  not 
proportionate  to  the  size  of  the  problem  and 
expected impacts. 

(4)  The  report  does  not  provide  a  consistent 
comparison of options in terms of effectiveness, 
efficiency, coherence and proportionality. 

The  analysis  of 
impacts  has  been 
the 
strengthened in different ways. Where possible, 
expected  benefits  and  costs  have  been 
the 
quantified 
qualitative assessment of the remaining aspects 
has been refined (Sections 6 and 7). In addition, 
the comparison of the different options has been 
refined (Section 7 – see Section B(4) below). 

(mainly  Section  6)  and 

The  added  clarifications  on  the  size  of  the 
problems in Section 2 aim to ensure coherence 
with the expected impacts.  

In addition to some added quantifications, the 
performance of the three policy options is now 
compared based on a more refined qualitative 
assessment with extensive sensitivity analyses 
(in Sections 6 and 7, Annexes 3, 4 and 11): 

- to low and high ceilings of quantified costs, in 
addition  to  the  average  used  to  MCA  method 
(fully  compensatory  additive  method  versus 
partially  compensatory  Condorcet  methods 
over  all 
individual  sub-criteria  or  over 
aggregated scores for each key criterion); 

-  sensitivity  analysis  that  looks  at  options 
rankings  based  on  individual  key  criteria  or 
pairs of key criteria.  

(C) What to improve 

(1) The report should better explain the link and 
synergies  with  the  Air  Passengers  Rights 

More  detailed  explanations  have  been  added 
regarding  the  content  of  the  Package  Travel 

90 

 
 
 
Regulation  and  how  this  initiative  articulates 
with  it.  It  should  bring  out  more  clearly  the 
complementarity of the two instruments as well 
as  the  two  revision  processes.  It  should  also 
better explain its relationship to the proposal for 
the 
a  Regulation  on  common  rules  for 
enforcement  of  passenger  rights,  passenger 
rights 
and 
reimbursement of airline tickets bought via an 
intermediary.  On  that  basis,  the  report  should 
clarify what remaining gap this initiative fills. 

for  multimodal 

journeys 

Directive  as  it  stands,  as  well  as  links  and 
synergies with other legal acts and initiatives, 
including acts and initiatives in the remit of DG 
MOVE,  and  several  acts  and  initiatives  from 
within DG JUST. Through these explanations it 
becomes clear that the need for a revision of the 
PTD is rather independent of the other acts and 
initiatives.  (Section  1.2  and,  to  some  extent 
Section  5.1  and  Annex  11,  which  contains  an 
overview of the main consumer rights under the 
APRR and PTD). 

It  is  further explained that, in  as  much as this 
can be done in the PTD, the envisaged revision 
will improve coherence between the PTD and 
the  Air  Passengers  Rights  Regulation 
(APRR), e.g., through the introduction of rules 
on vouchers and a business-to-business refund 
right.  The  measures  on  pre-payments, 
insolvency  protection  and  crisis  mechanisms 
which are part of the preferred option take into 
account  the  state  of  play  regarding  passenger 
rights.  

(Section 1.2 and, to some extent Section 5.1 and 
Annex  12,  plus  the  coherence  assessment  of 
different measures). 

failures, 

(2)  The  report  should  better  demonstrate  the 
scale of the problems, differentiating business-
as-usual  situations  from  exceptional  crisis 
scenarios. It should bring out more clearly the 
underlying  market 
including  by 
explaining  why  market  and  insurance-based 
solutions  cannot  offer  the  level  of  protection 
considered  necessary.  On  that  basis,  it  should 
present a clear narrative on what the revision is 
expected  to  deliver.  This  should  feed  in  the 
definition of more specific objectives so that the 
success of this initiative can be measured. 

the 

(B)(1), 

in  Section 

In  addition  to  the  amendments  of  the  IAR 
explained 
IAR 
distinguishes now more clearly between, on the 
one hand, problems identified during COVID-
19 and solutions related to crisis preparedness, 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  measures  addressing 
problems identified independently of this crisis. 
There are also references to the proportionality 
of  measures 
enhanced 
preparedness  for  a  future  crisis.  these  two 
points are covered, for instance, Section 4 but 
also in the assessment of different measures in 
Section 6, in particular, measures in relation to 
problem 1).  

aiming 

an 

at 

The  revised  IAR  also  refers  to  instances  of 
market failure in different places (e.g., Sections 
2.1., 2.1.1., 2.1.2 and Annex 9) and explains in 
different  sections  why  insurance  solutions 
available  to  travellers  cannot  address  the 
identified problems (Sections 2.1.1. and 2.1.2).   

91 

 
 
(B)(1), 

As  explained  under  Section 
the 
narrative on what is expected from the revision 
has  been  improved  in  connection  with  the 
objectives  (Section  4.1)  and  various  other 
places  (for  instance  in  sections  1.2.,  2.1.).  In 
addition, there are detailed explanations on the 
purpose of the individual measures contained in 
the option in Section 5. 

The  indicators  for  monitoring  and  evaluation 
have  been  extensively  redrafted  in  Section  9. 
They  are  linked  to  the  specific  objectives  and 
also  make  it  clear  what  the  revision  of  the 
Directive is expected to achieve.  

Please see explanations in Section (B)(2) on the 
relevant (combinations of) options/measures. 

In  particular,  a  measure  on  strengthening 
national  insolvency  protection  is  included  in 
option A, which previously did not contain any 
measure on insolvency protection (Section 5).  

Furthermore, explanations have been added on 
why  non-legislative  measures  have  been 
discarded and existing market alternatives such 
as travel insurance cannot be further considered 
(Section  5.2.1.  but  also  other  places,  e.g. 
Section 2)   

Please  see  explanations  in  Section  (B)(3)  and 
(4). 

for  each 

Wherever possible, the benefits and costs were 
individual  measure, 
quantified 
including  for  consumers  and 
into 
account  cost  pass-through,  and  are  better 
explained. See, in particular, Section 6.  

taking 

These  costs  and  benefits  were  aggregated  to 
represent the total impact of each measure (and 
subsequently,  each  option)  on  a  given 
stakeholder  group,  distinguishing  between 
impacts  (where  available)  and 
quantified 

(3)  The  report  should  present  all  relevant 
(combinations  of)  options  upfront  and  avoid 
identifying  new  combinations  only  late  in  the 
analysis.  As  the  inclusion  (or  not)  of  the 
measure  on  strengthening  national  insolvency 
protection is one of the key policy choices, the 
report should present an additional option that 
includes  this  measure  in  addition  to  what  is 
currently  included  in  option  A.  The  report 
should  better  explain  why  non-legislative 
measures  have  been  discarded  and  existing 
market  alternatives  such  as  travel  insurance 
have not been further considered. 

(4) The report should present a level of impact 
analysis that is proportionate to the size of the 
problem  and  expected  impacts.  It  is  not  clear 
why the quantification for various types of costs 
and  benefits  is  not  provided.  It  should  make 
further efforts to quantify the costs and benefits 
of  the  options,  differentiated  by  the  affected 
consumers and economic actors. 

(5)  The  report  should  further  develop  the 
analysis on the impact on consumers. It should 
be clearer about the benefits that the initiative 
will  bring  to  them.  It  should  provide  the 
analysis  of  the  likely  cost  pass-through.  It 
should  provide  the  reasonable  estimates  of 
resulting  potential  price  increase  of  travel 
packages.  Overall,  the  report  should  be  clear 
whether consumers will be better off in the end 

92 

 
 
 
considering  all  monetised  and  non-monetised 
benefits and likely cost pass-through. 

qualitative  ones 
(these  quantitative  and 
qualitative  scores  were  normalised  so  as  to 
determine  a  mean  score).  The  analysis  of  the 
impact  on  prices  for  packages  which  the 
different measures/options could bring about is 
strengthened. 

Where  no  sufficient  data  was  available  for 
quantification, a qualitative assessment of costs 
and benefits was undertaken.  

the 

quantified 

total  efficiency, 

Therefore, 
cost-benefit 
assessment  is  only  partial  and  had  to  be 
combined  with  the  qualitative  assessment  to 
reach a final  assessment. All  the options  have 
been  assessed  and  compared  with  regard  to 
i.e.,  quantified  and 
their 
qualified  costs  and  benefits,  including  for 
consumers.  As  becomes  clear  from 
this 
comparison, the preferred option, i.e. Option A, 
is  the  most  efficient  one,  thus  showing  that 
overall the stakeholders will be better off with 
the introduction of this Option. 

(6)  When  comparing  the  options,  the  report 
should present all options and impacts (cost and 
benefits, including key quantitative estimates). 
The  report  should  better  explain  the  used 
scoring  methodology  and  apply  it  coherently 
throughout the impact analysis and comparison 
of options. The scores attributed to the options 
in the various summary tables should be fully 
consistent with the findings of the analysis. The 
report should review critically all scorings and 
their aggregation throughout the text. It should 
also  better  justify  the  relative  weights  of  the 
three basic comparison criteria and ensure that 
these  weights  are  coherent  with  the  refined 
objectives of the initiative. 

(Section 6 and 7, as well as Annexes 3 and 11) 

efficiency 

The  options  were  compared  by  analysing 
simultaneously  their  effectiveness  (assessed 
qualitatively), 
(assessed 
quantitatively  and,  where  quantification  was 
not  possible,  qualitatively),  and  coherence 
(assessed  qualitatively).  This  is  done  in  the 
analysis  of  the  individual  options  (Section  6) 
and  when  comparing  the  different  options 
(Section 7) 

The comparison was done using two different 
MCA  methods:  i.e.  the  Condorcet  outranking 
method (partially compensatory) over a total of 
8  sub-criteria  (3  covering  effectiveness  with 
respect  to  the  3  key  specific  objectives,  3 
covering  coherence  and  2  covering 
the 
quantified  and  complementary  qualitative 
assessment  of  efficiency)  and  the    simple 
weighted  sum  (fully  compensatory)  method 
over  the  3  key  IA  criteria  (of  effectiveness, 
efficiency  and  coherence  –  with  values  based 
on the average of the normalised value of each 
related  sub-score;  and  with  equal  weights,  as 
weights are not needed to counter the effect of 

93 

 
 
the number of sub-criteria - since the average of 
the  normalised  scores  of  the  sub-criteria  were 
used).  

It  was  also  deemed  of  interest  to  check  the 
options’  ranking  based  on  a  mix  of  the  two 
methods  (Condorcet  outranking  method  but 
based  on  the  mean  normalised  scores  of  the 
weighted sum method). 

Additional sensitivity analyses were performed 
to  check  the  stability  of  the  options’  ranking 
when  using  (instead  of  the  average  quantified 
impact  of  a  given  measure)  their  minimum 
(respectively  maximum)  quantified 
impact 
(using conservative cost assumptions).  

The  detailed  results  of  the  costs  and  benefits 
calculations,  as  well  as  of  the  comparison  of 
options  and  their  sensitivity  analyses,  are 
presented in Annex 10.  

Annex  4  on  Analytical  Methods  has  been 
further developed. 

The  IAR  presents  now  detailed  impacts  on 
competitiveness  in  Annex  5  and  the  detailed 
SME Test in Annex 6. 

In addition, considering that 99% of organisers 
are SMEs, the detailed impacts  of the options 
on their costs are described in Section 6. 

Simplification  and  cost  reductions  are 
considered  in  the  description  (Section  5)  and 
assessment (Section 6) of the options.  

Section 8.2 of the IAR elaborates on the REFIT 
element in terms of simplification.  

References 
to  and  explanations  on  all 
recommendations  from  the  ‘Fit  for  Future’ 
Platform opinion are included in different parts 
of the IAR, with a reference to all suggestions 
in Section 2 and in relation to relevant topics or 
measures  (e.g.,  Section  6  and  Annex  2). 
Furthermore,  while  four  out  of  five  f4f 
recommendations  are  taken  up,  it  is  clarified 

in 

the 

and 

states 

(7)  While 
the 
report 
competitiveness  test  that  SMEs  may  benefit 
from  the  preferred  option,  it  should  be  more 
specific  on  how  the  initiative  will  affect  their 
cost 
competitiveness 
considering  the  international  context  in  which 
the sector operates, and the potential constraints 
the EU package travel  sector would face  with 
respect  to  issues  such  as  business-to-business 
refunds. 

international 

(8) The report should further develop the scope 
for simplification and cost reduction. It should 
elaborate  the  REFIT  element  in  terms  of 
simplification,  in  particular  regarding  burden 
for  SMEs  and  citizens.  It  should  also  explain 
how  it  has  considered  all  recommendations 
from the ‘Fit for Future’ Platform in its opinion. 

94 

 
 
 
Some more technical comments have been sent 
directly to the author DG. 

why  one  recommendation  is  not  taken  up 
(Section 2.1.3.3. and Annex 2). 

As announced the replies sent to the RSB on 4 
July 2023, the technical comments sent to DG 
JUST  prior  to  the  hearing  have  also  been 
addressed in the revised draft IAR. 

Further to the positive opinion received on 28 September 2023, the Impact Assessment was revised 
as follows to take into account the final RSB recommendations: 

regarding 

the  Regulatory 
of 
Recommendations 
Scrutiny  Board  [Ref.  Ares(2023)6584428  - 
Impact 
28/09/2023] 
(EU) 
Assessment  Report 
2015/2302  on  package  travel  and  linked 
travel 
on 
6/9/2023 

for  Directive 

arrangements 

resubmitted 

the 

How the recommendations of the Regulatory 
Scrutiny Board were taken on board and are 
reflected in the further revised version of the 
IAR of October 2023 

(B) Summary of findings 

The report has been further revised to address 
the issues identified, as explained below. 

The  Board  notes  that  the  report  has  been 
substantially redrafted. However, the report still 
contains  significant  shortcomings.  The  Board 
gives  a  positive  opinion  with  reservations 
because  it  expects  the  DG  to  rectify  the 
following 
aspects:  
(1)  The  report  is  not  sufficiently  clear  on  the 
overall 
consumers.  
(2) The report should strengthen the qualitative 
analysis to better demonstrate the rationale for 
intervention. 

impact 

on 

(1) The report should provide a clearer analysis 
of the overall impact on consumers. It should be 
clear whether consumers will be better off in the 
end, reflecting the potential price increase (cost 
pass-through).  It  should  also  be  clear  on  the 
underlying  baseline  estimates  (e.g.  industry 
operation  costs  vs  package  revenues)  and 
justify the chosen analytical approach reflecting 
stakeholder  evidence  on  potential  price 
increase.  

The underlying baseline estimates (e.g. industry 
operation  costs  vs  package  revenues)  and  the 
chosen 
reflecting 
stakeholder  evidence  on  potential  price 
increases are elaborated in Section 6 (pages 46-
68) and in Annex 4 (new section 3). 

analytical 

approach 

The  overall  impact  on  consumers  has  been 
detailed  in  Section  8.1  (pages  80-84).  It  was 
also  clarified,  in  the  same  section,  that  the 
benefits outweigh the costs of the intervention, 
both  when  considering  only  consumers,  and 
when taking all stakeholders together. 

95 

 
 
 
 
 
 
In any event it should clarify whether the non-
monetised benefits (higher consumer protection 
as  a  result  of  more  legal  certainty)  will 
outweigh the potential price increase.  

(2) Given that the total quantified net benefit is 
rather  low  and  the  Benefit  Cost  Ratio  is  just 
above one the report should further strengthen 
the  qualitative  analysis  to  demonstrate  more 
clearly the rationale for and clear value-added 
of the intervention. 

The  qualitative  analysis  to  demonstrate  more 
clearly the rationale for and clear value-added 
of the intervention has been strengthened in the 
SWD. This is done mainly in Section 6 (pages 
46-68), Section 7 (pages 76-77) and Section 8.1 
(page 80-84). 

(3)  The  report  should  further  develop  the 
international 
potential 

impact 

on 

impacts 

(or  absence 

Likely 
thereof)  on 
international competitiveness have been further 
detailed and reported on in Section 6.1 (pages 
46-52),  Section  8.1  (pages  80-84)  and  in 

96 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
competitiveness by better substantiating it with 
quantitative evidence.  

Annexes 3.2, 5 and 6 (as ca. 99% of organisers 
are SMEs).  

Quantification 
elements: 
Number  of  EU  package  organisers  affected 
(99%  of  which  are  SMEs):  112  000.  They 
primarily  gain  from  an  increase  in  liquidity 
from the new B2B refund right (which package 
organisers 

identified 

as 

a 

need).   

4.  EVIDENCE, SOURCES AND QUALITY 

This back-to-back evaluation and impact assessment draws on pre-existing sources, such as the 2013 
impact assessment for the PTD, several reports quoted below, as well as extensive original research 
and targeted consultation activities. A study supporting the Evaluation and Impact assessment was 
carried out by an external consultant on behalf of the Commission.413 This study included interviews, 
targeted consultations, organisation of workshops and desk research. 

A public consultation ran from February to May 2022. Several workshops with the main stakeholders 
(Member states authorities, experts, businesses and consumer associations) were carried out by the 
external  consultant  and  directly  by  the  Commission.  Amongst  the  workshops  organised  by  the 
Commission,  there  were  two  meetings  of  the  PTD  expert  group414  and  different  workshops  with 
national authorities in 2022. In addition, on several occasions, DG JUST sent targeted questions to 
specific stakeholders to get  further details  and data on certain  topics to  complement  the feedback 
given in the workshops or consultations. See details in Annex 2 on Stakeholder consultation (synopsis 
report)  that  contains  a  comprehensive  overview  of  all  consultation  activities  from  the  call  for 
evidence through public consultation to the targeted surveys. 

The most reliable sources have been used. Similar data were cross-checked whenever possible. It is 
acknowledged that some data are estimates, which is clearly indicated in the respective sections of 
this SWD. 

Quantification of impacts has been consistently attempted, but sometimes limitations of data have 
made only a qualitative analysis possible. Therefore, qualitative assessment has been used as much 
as possible to supplement scarce quantitative data.  

Several factors contributed to the difficulty to gather sufficient and solid quantitative data: 

To start with, packages are quite complex, therefore it was less straightforward to obtain information 
on  packages  compared  to  stand-alone  services.  For  certain  aspects,  quantitative  information  was 

413  Study  to  support  the  preparation  of  an  evaluation  of  the  Package  Travel  Directive  back-to-back  with  an  impact 
assessment on its potential revision; Not yet published 
414  Details  on 
groups/consult?lang=en&groupId=3617&fromMeetings=true&meetingId=45600  

the  group  available  at  https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/expert-groups-register/screen/expert-

97 

 
 
 
 
 
 
simply  not  available  at  all,  e.g.,  on  LTAs  -  which  is  in  line  with  the  finding  and  feedback  by 
stakeholders that LTAs are not used or difficult to identify in practice.  

Secondly, the package travel industry is characterised by the fact that 99% of organisers are SMEs. 
They – and their business associations – do not have the means to gather detailed and comprehensive 
data and report on them. As a result, they were not able to provide quantitative information on many 
of the questions asked. The same applies to consumer organisations, many of which have very limited 
resources. 

In  addition,  we  have  tried  using  other  sources,  such  as  quantitative  information  from  State  aid 
decisions approved during the Covid-19 crisis, e.g., in relation to vouchers. However, in view of the 
variety of systems in place in the MS and the resulting differences in the set-up of State aid schemes, 
it was difficult to extrapolate such data for the purposes of cost calculations for some of the proposed 
measures. 

Finally,  the challenges  of gathering  reliable quantitative evidence may be partly explained by the 
recent transposition and implementation of the PTD in the Member States. 

The targeted consultations conducted by the external consultant had a relatively low response rate 
and data regarding the concrete impacts gathered during the consultation activities is limited. Where 
possible the above limitations were remedied  using data collected through desk research and data 
gathered  in  the  consultation  process,  as  well  as  with  available  Eurobarometer  data.  Moreover, 
subsequent  targeted  questions  have  been  sent  to  certain  stakeholders  to  obtain  more  detailed 
(qualitative, and where possible quantitative) data. 

Data and information were collected, amongst others, from the following sources: 

•  2013 Impact Assessment, SWD/2013/0263 final available at: https://eur-

• 

lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SWD:2013:0263:FIN:EN:PDF  
2019 click through report COM/2019/270 available at https://op.europa.eu/webpub/com/refit-
scoreboard/en/policy/11/11-3.html  

•  New Consumer Agenda Strengthening consumer resilience for sustainable recovery, 

• 

COM/2020/696 final available at EUR-Lex - 52020DC0696 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu) 
2021 application report COM/2021/90 final available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2021:90:FIN  

•  Special Report 15/2021: Air passenger rights during the COVID-19 pandemic: Key rights not 

protected despite Commission efforts, 
https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR21_15/SR_passenger-
rights_covid_EN.pdf  

•  Commission Recommendation 2020/648 of 13 May 2020 on vouchers offered to passengers 
and travellers as an alternative to reimbursement for cancelled package travel and transport 
services in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, EUR-Lex - 32020H0648 - EN - EUR-Lex 
(europa.eu) 

•  European Commission, Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport, Kouris, S., Study on 

the current level of protection of air passenger rights in the EU: final report: study contract, 
Publications Office, 2020, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2832/529370 

•  Panteia, Onderzoek financiering (pakket)reissector - Voor het ministerie van Economische 

Zaken en Klimaat, 14 March 2023, p. 56, 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2023/03/14/onderzoek-financiering-
pakketreissector 

98 

 
 
•  Eurostat data bases, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat 

Additional  sources  of  evidence,  including  relevant  academic  literature  articles,  reports  and 
conference papers, online and data sources, as well as further policy documents and guidelines, are 
listed in the support study415 or cited as footnotes, where referred to. 

415 See footnote 9. 

99 

 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION (SYNOPSIS REPORT) 

1.  OVERVIEW OF CONSULTATION ACTIVITIES 

Several consultation activities were carried out for this initiative, such as feedback on the Inception 
Impact Assessment (IIA), public consultation, consultations in the context of the supporting study 
(surveys  and  interviews  for  national  authorities,  for  consumer  associations  for  companies  and 
business associations, and for consumers), workshops, meetings, other types of stakeholder input (Fit 
for Future platform’s opinion, ad hoc contributions etc.). This section provides an overview of and 
basic information on the different consultations and section 2 presents their results in more detail. 

Feedback on the Inception Impact Assessment (IIA)416 

The IIA was published on 6 August 2022 and the feedback period ran from 6 August to 17 September 
2021. 24 submissions received from: 9 business associations, 5 companies, 5 consumer organisations, 
3 Other and 2 NGOs. They were from the following countries: Belgium, Germany, France, Spain, 
Austria, Portugal, and Malta.  

The feedback took the form of policy papers outlining the preferences and views of the stakeholders 
on: Refund rights including B2B aspects, insolvency protection, limitation of prepayments, vouchers, 
cancellation rights, unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances, complexity of some definitions and 
concepts, information requirements and scope of the Directive. 

Public consultation417 

The public consultation was launched on 15 February 2022 and closed on 10 May 2022 (13 weeks). 
The objective of the public consultation was to gather inputs and feedback from stakeholders on their 
experiences, perceptions, and opinions on the application of the current rules of the PTD and about 
the potential impacts of options for future action.   

The public consultation collected a total of 520418 responses on EUsurvey, mostly from companies.419 
122420 respondents also submitted position papers. Replies came from 22 EU Member States, as well 
as Norway, Iceland, Serbia, UK, Canada, USA.  

Respondents were invited to share information and views on the major issues identified for the PTD 
review:  market  developments;  definitions  and  scope  of  application;  cancellations,  liquidity  and 
reimbursements; insolvency protection, prepayments and preparation for a liquidity crisis; Linked 
Travel Arrangements (LTAs).  

Out of the total 520 responses, 62% came from companies (323); 13% from EU citizens (68); 10% 
from business associations (53); 5% from public authorities (25); 3% from consumer organisations 
(21);  1%  from  non-EU  citizens  (3);  1%  from  non-governmental  organisations  (3);  <1%  from 
academic and research institutions (1), <1% from trade unions (1) and 4% from others (22). Out of 
the 323 companies, 96% were SMEs (310): 249 were micro-organisations (1 to 9 employees), 43 
were small (10 to 49 employees), 18 were medium-sized (50 to 249 employees) and 13 were large 
organisations (250 employees or more). Vast majority of the 323 companies indicated being package 
organiser (271, 84%), followed by package retailer (117, 36%), trader facilitating LTAs (74, 23%) 

416 Package travel – review of EU rules (europa.eu)  
417 Package travel – review of EU rules (europa.eu)  
418 In addition, three respondents submitted contributions outside of the EUsurvey tool by email. These contributions 
were reviewed but not included in the statistical analysis of the closed questions. 
419 The respondent category was called “company/business organisation” but referred to as companies in the report and 
the annexes. 
420  In  addition  to  these  122  via  EUsurvey  tool,  of  the  three  additional  respondents  mentioned  in  footnote  270,  two 
submitted additional position papers too. 

100 

 
 
 
and trader providing other tourism related services (26, 8%).421 It is important to note that while many 
companies  indicated  one  main  activity  (mostly  organiser)422  many  also  indicated  several  main 
activities (mostly including organisers).  

Two  potential  campaigns  (coordinated  replies  by  10  or  more  respondents)  were  identified.  The 
presentation of the results includes these replies. The first potential campaign concerns around 100 
Dutch companies, mostly small/micro travel agencies, which responded in a strongly similar way to 
the closed and open questions. Among these, 16 provided identical responses to all closed questions, 
and around 100 provided strongly similar replies to most open and closed questions. Many closed 
questions were also left blank by these respondents. The second potential campaign concerns around 
22 German companies. These responded in an identical or near-identical way to at least five open-
ended  questions.  Furthermore,  there  is  a  strong  degree  of  similarity  between  the  responses  to  the 
closed questions in this group. The response rate for closed questions for this group of respondents 
is  notably  higher  than  for  the  first  potential  campaign.  The  main  views  in  these  two  potential 
campaigns were: both campaigns find the existing insolvency protection sufficient and find that an 
extension would lead to excessive costs. They also do not support any prohibitions or restrictions of 
prepayments for packages. They believe that no new rules on environmental impacts of travel and 
tourism should be included in the PTD, and that there should be no new additional provisions on 
enforcement and fines in the PTD. 

Targeted surveys conducted by the external consultant 

Targeted  surveys  were  used  to  gather  information  from  relevant  stakeholder  groups  on  questions 
pertaining  to  the  evaluation  and  impact  assessment.  Four  targeted  surveys  were  launched  on  17 
October 2022 and ran until 2 December 2022. The consumer survey was launched and completed in 
January 2023. The following stakeholder groups were consulted:  

•  Companies and business associations: 29 responses received  
•  Consumer organisations: 12 responses received   
•  Consumers: 10.152 responses received  
•  NCAs   

-  Regulatory & Enforcement: 28 responses received   
-  Insolvency protection agencies: 13 responses received   

The  surveys  collected  information  on  stakeholders’  views  and  experiences  regarding  the  current 
market trends in package travel including cancellation  rights, voucher use and reimbursements.  It 
also sought to establish the main challenges of the current legislation as well as its primary costs and 
benefits. Member State enforcement and insolvency protection authorities and agencies were also 
asked  to  define  the  key  characteristics  of  their  national  schemes  alongside  their  main  challenges, 
costs and benefits. Consumer organisations were consulted on the scale on consumer detriment and 
specific  challenges.  Participants  at  large  were  asked  to  comment  on  potential  policy  measures 
included in the Impact Assessment. 

Interviews conducted by the external consultant 

421 Online platforms facilitating bookings for stand-alone travel services and/or packages (25, 8%), Carrier (provider of 
passenger transport services) (20, 6%), Hotels, guest houses and other providers offering accommodation (with or without 
meals) for tourism purposes (16, 5%), Other (10, 3%), Online platforms providing information services, such as price 
comparison and aggregation of available offers, irrespective of whether those services are provided to consumers or to 
other  businesses  (8,  2%),  Car  rental  company  (6,  2%),  Insolvency  protection  provider,  e.g.  a  travel  guarantee  fund 
(whether publicly or privately run), insurance company (primary insurance or re-insurance), bank etc. (4, 1%). 
422 Number of companies who selected only one main activity: 157 organisers, 16 retailers, 5 traders facilitating LTAs, 3 
carriers,  3  others,  2  insolvency  protection  providers,  1  trader  providing  other  tourism  related  services,  1  car  rental 
company, 1 hotel, 1 online platform facilitating bookings for stand-alone travel services and/or packages. 

101 

 
 
 
 
 
The interviews were conducted in two stages comprising a set of scoping interviews and full-scale 
stakeholder interviews.   

At the start of the study, in early 2022, eight scoping interviews were carried out with the aim to 
support the early-stage scoping and fine tuning the approach of the study. Officials from the European 
Commission,  European  and  national  consumer  organisations,  and  industry  associations  were 
interviewed. Following the scoping stage, further targeted interviews were carried out with the aim 
of gathering qualitative and quantitative information on the evaluation of the PTD and the potential 
measures to be analysed. The targeted interview process had a duration of 9 weeks, from 12 October 
to  9 December 2022. Interviewees were invited to take part in  an online meeting lasting  from  45 
minutes to one hour.  

The study team conducted 49 such interviews with stakeholders: 6 consumer organisations (2 EU 
level and 4 Member State level), 17 business associations (7 EU level and 10 Member State level), 7 
companies  (3  EU  level  and  4  Member  State  level),  2  individual  experts  (one  EU  level  and  one 
Member State level), and 17 national competent authorities. A total of 211 stakeholders were invited 
to the interview process, with 62 responding and 49 interviews completed at the time of the deadline.  

Interviewees  were  asked  to  comment  on  a  variety  of  issues  related  to  the  PTD,  with  the  help  of 
questionnaires tailored to three respective stakeholder categories: consumer organisations, companies 
and business associations, and national competent authorities. They were asked to contextualise their 
role  in  and  knowledge  of  the  PTD,  and  to  provide  their  views  on  market  trends  (including 
prepayments and cancellation rights), definitions, insolvency protection, and enforcement.  

The questions were designed to gather information regarding transposition and enforcement issues 
(for public authorities), trends in particular business sectors (for companies and business associations) 
and  consumer  complaints  (for  consumer  organisations),  but  the  questionnaire  design  allowed 
interviewees  to  also  respond  along  the  lines  of  other  cross-cutting  issues.  Furthermore,  the 
questionnaires  encouraged  interviewees  in  charge  of  or  with  experience  with  running  insolvency 
protection funds to provide more detailed figures related to costs, staffing and infrastructure.  

Workshops organised by the external consultant 

Within the study, two stakeholder workshops were organised with the aim of updating participants 
(business associations and individual companies both including travel sector specific ones, consumer 
organisations  including  European  Consumer  Centres)  on  the  progress  of  the  study  and  gathering 
information  in  an interactive format on the key findings such as the problem  areas identified and 
potential proposed measures to remedy current challenges. Both workshops were held online, on 26 
October and on 7 December 2022.  

Meetings of the PTD expert group423 

DG JUST  organised two workshops  (24 March and 8 November 2022) of the Stakeholder expert 
group to support the application of the Package Travel and Linked Travel Arrangements Directive 
(2015/2302)  (E03617).  The  group  consists  of  EU-level  or  national  organisations  representing 
consumers and/or travellers, EU-level business organisations representing traders active in the travel 
sector  and  involved  in  the  provision  of  package  travel  and/or  linked  travel  arrangements, 
Organisations  representing  entities  providing  insolvency  protection  for  the  travel  sector,  national 
alternative dispute resolution bodies specialised in (package) travel and/or tourism (See more info on 
the webpage of the group). 

423 Details on the group including minutes available at Register of Commission expert groups and other similar entities 
(europa.eu) 

102 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During  these  meetings  the  problems  and  possible  solutions  as  assessed  in  this  impact  assessment 
were  discussed.  There  was  overall  support  for  targeted  amendments  to  the  PTD  with  a  view  to 
simplification, clarification, and the closing of certain gaps. However, there were also different views 
on possible legislative changes from consumer representatives as opposed to business representatives 
and between different categories of businesses, which were visible also in other consultation formats. 
Further details can be found in the minutes of the expert group meetings.424 

Further workshops and meetings organised by DG JUST 

There were two workshops with the Central Contact Points as referred to in Article 18(2) PTD, one 
on  12  May  and  a  second  one  on  10  November  2022.425  The  discussions  in  this  format  related  in 
particular to  insolvency  protection.  In  addition,  there  was one meeting with national  enforcement 
authorities (Consumer Protection Cooperation network or CPC) on 12 May 2022,426 which focused 
in particular on enforcement aspects, and one further meeting with experts from national authorities 
on 5 December 2022.427 The latter meeting covered all topics related to this impact assessment. 

Meetings at high or political level 

The review of the PTD was raised also at political level, in particular, at informal ministerial meetings 
during different Council Presidencies. It was also discussed at the European Tourism forum off 12 
November 2022 in Prague with stakeholders and among Directors-General in charge of tourism. 

Ad hoc targeted consultations 

On different occasions, mostly as follow-up to the above-mentioned workshops and meetings, DG 
JUST  contacted  different  stakeholders  (public  authorities,  consumer  organisations,  business 
associations) by email to obtain additional information. Following the meeting with Central Contact 
Points (see above) on 10 November 2022, DG JUST sent a list of specific targeted questions to the 
Central  Contact  Points  about  the  mechanisms  of  their  insolvency  protection.  In  December  2022, 
targeted questions about a possible limitation of prepayments  and B2B refund rights were sent to 
some stakeholders, including to the German authorities in relation to national case law which limits 
prepayments and to a few business associations. In May 2023, a list of complementary questions, in 
particular on cost impact of limitation of prepayments, were sent to some companies and associations 
representing key stakeholders in a final effort to fill in some of the data/feedback gaps. 

Workshops organised by stakeholders 

DG JUST also took part in different meetings or workshops organised by stakeholders. This included 
a workshop organised by European Guarantee Funds' Association for Travel and Tourism (EGFATT) 
together with the European Association of Travel Agents and Tour Operators (ECTAA) on 13 May 
2022  which  focused  on  insolvency  protection  in  the  travel  sector.  Another  such  workshop  was 
organised by ECTAA at the European Parliament on 21 March 2023 regarding prepayments. 

The Fit for Future Platform’s (F4F) opinion of 22 March 2022 

As part of the Regulatory fitness and performance (REFIT) programme,428 the F4F Platform,429 a high-
level expert group, aims to help the Commission in its efforts to simplify EU laws and to  reduce 
related  unnecessary  costs.  The  platform  consists  of  two  groups:  the  Government  group  and  the 
Stakeholder group. The Government group is composed of representatives from national, regional 

424 Register of Commission expert groups and other similar entities (europa.eu) 
425 Minutes available at Register of Commission expert groups and other similar entities (europa.eu) 
426 Minutes available at Register of Commission expert groups and other similar entities (europa.eu)   
427 Minutes available at Register of Commission expert groups and other similar entities (europa.eu) 
428 REFIT – making EU law simpler, less costly and future proof (europa.eu)  
429 Fit for Future Platform (F4F) (europa.eu)  

103 

 
 
 
and  local  authorities  from  all  EU  countries,  as  well  as  from  the  Committee  of  the  Regions.  The 
Stakeholder  group  is  composed  of  experts  on  better  regulation  representing  business  and  non-
governmental organisations, plus the European Economic and Social Committee. 

The platform issues opinions on the potential for simplification of EU laws and reducing unnecessary 
costs.  In its opinion of 22 March 2022 on the PTD,430 the F4F Platform identified five problems and 
made five related suggestions - to be implemented either by legislative changes or non-legislative 
guidance: 

1  Lack of transparency regarding the role of different parties – to be addressed through better 
information  on  the  identity  of  the  contractual  partners  and  on  contact  details  and  better 
enforcement of rules; 

2  Lack  of  clarity  around  LTAs:  definition  unclear  and  allows  for  abuse,  difficult  to  differentiate 
between LTA and package – to be addressed through clarification of scope and simplification of 
the definitions of package and LTA; 

3  In the case of LTAs, the selection of the right standard information form is complex given the 
number of options available – to be addressed through clarification of pre-contractual information 
requirements;  

4  Lack of clarity on the scope insolvency protection in particular in case of mass cancellation of 
contracts, including clarity about vouchers and re-bookings – to be addressed through clarification 
of uncertainties regarding insolvency protection; 

5  Uncertainty around the definition of 'other tourist services’ - to be addressed through clarification 

of 'other tourist services’. 

Measures related to the first four suggestions are part of the evaluation and impact assessment and 
are part of the preferred policy option. There were questions related to the fifth suggestion in the 
public consultation.  

However, it has to be taken into account that the PTD explains and limits the notion of ‘other tourist 
service’,431 thus avoiding that combinations of accommodation and other tourist services lead to a 
disproportionate application of the PTD.432 Neither the opinion of the Fit for future platform nor other 
consultation exercises demonstrated the need for further clarifications nor provided solutions. This 
made it difficult to identify this as a problem and further take it up in the impact assessment.  The 
different views amongst stakeholders on whether more or fewer combinations should be exempted 
from the definition of package do not indicate that the current provision is not effective for the pursuit 
of the Directive’s objectives.433  

Furthermore, the likely intention behind this suggestion consisting in narrowing this definition would 
lower consumer protection and thus compromise one of the main objectives of the PTD.  

430 Adopted opinions (europa.eu) 
431 In Article 3(1)(c), Article 3(2)(2) and recitals 17 and 18. 
432 Tourist services that are intrinsically part of accommodation (e.g., access to on-site facilities and transfers to/from an 
airport or railway station), other tourist services (e.g., rental of sports equipment, spa treatments or courses) that do not 
represent 25% or more of the value of a package or services that travellers add while being at the accommodation do not 
lead to the application of the PTD. Furthermore, the PTD provides many examples. 
433 See also Annex 2 Stakeholder consultation (Synopsis report) 

104 

 
 
 
 
2.  KEY RESULTS OF THE CONSULTATIONS  
2.1 KEY FEEDBACK ON THE EVALUATION 
2.1.1 Companies434 and business associations 

Companies and business associations referred to the following problems in their  feedback on the 
Inception Impact Assessment: 435 

•  Organisers have difficulties to retrieve prepayments from service providers 
•  Some  service  providers,  in  particular  airlines,  which  also  have  great  power,  ask  for  full 

prepayment 

•  14  days  for  a  refund  under  the  current  rules  is  too  short.  Vouchers  are  necessary  in  these 

circumstances 

•  There is lack of clarity regarding travel advice/warnings from public authorities. 
•  The right of travellers to terminate a package holiday contract by invoking force majeure gives 

them a wide margin of interpretation and could lead to abuse. 

•  LTA  concept  very  unclear,  confuses/misleads  consumers,  it  dilutes  the  messages  around  the 
protection for packages. Enforcement difficult or even impossible as very difficult to establish 
whether an LTA has been formed. 

•  Package definition and/or scope of the Directive too broad  
•  Pre-contractual  information  obligations  create  significant  administrative  burden  and  legal 

uncertainty due to the unreasonable amount of information to be provided,  

•  Great  uncertainty  regarding  the  standard  information  forms  to  be  provided  to  the  consumer 
depending on the type of trip. Before concluding the travel contract, the professional does not 
necessarily know what case he is in, 

•  Online platforms, hotels and airlines use the loopholes of the PTD, which undermines one of its 

main aims. 

In the public consultation, 57% of companies and business associations (193 of 336) stated that the 
PTD is not well adapted to market trends. 57% of companies and business associations (208 of 366) 
state that the rules on cancellation rights are not sufficiently clear, while 30% (94 of 316) find them 
sufficiently clear. Most companies and business associations state that the provisions on LTAs have 
not improved the protection for travellers and not contributed to fair competition (64%, 178 of 277 
regarding LTA type Article 3(5)(a) and 65%, 177 of 273 regarding Article 3(5)(b)). 

Replies by companies and business associations to the targeted survey: 
•  The  market  is  “to  a  large  extent”  impacted  by  Covid-19  (96%  of  responses)  and  by  new 
technologies (57% of responses). This is in line with consumer organisations’ views in their survey  
•  Rules on LTAs, on the cancellations of packages, on refunds for cancelled packages (each with 
54%,  7  of  13)  are  the  biggest  obstacles  to  achieve  the  PTD  objectives  in  increasing  consumer 
protection and contributing to the proper functioning of the single market. 

•  The  liability  for  the  performance  of  the  package,  including  compensation  for  improper 
performance and alternative arrangements (57%, 8 of 14) and insolvency protection (50%, 7 of 
14), have been highly costly and burdensome provisions. 

•  39%, (9 of 23) indicated that the price of both bank guarantees, and insurance policies have gone 

up significantly, in particular since 2020. 

434 It is important to recall that in the public consultation 96% of the companies were SMEs and 80% of these SMEs were 
micro enterprises (i.e. 77% of companies were micro companies). Therefore, when talking about companies’ views it is 
mostly SMEs’ and micro companies’ views that is meant. 
435 Feedback on IIA was provided in the form of position papers, therefore no statistical analysis was carried out. 

105 

 
 
 
 
 
 
In the Interviews, several companies and business associations mention that misalignments between 
the PTD and the Air Passenger Rights legal framework are points of particular attention in the future 
and  have  often  been  problematic  for  their  business.  Some  question  whether  there  should  be  a 
definition of “unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances” set out in the PTD, saying that a case-
by-case basis is more helpful as a way of handling cancellations. 

2.1.2  Public authorities 

In  the  public  consultation,  45%  of  public  authorities  (10  of  22)  stated  that  the  PTD  is  not  well 
adapted to market trends. 54% (7 of 13) reported experiencing a low degree of compliance with the 
information requirements for potential LTAs under Article 19(2) and Annex II (Parts A, B and C) to 
the PTD (in relation to LTAs as defined in Article 3(5)(a) (single point of sale)) and 54% (7 of 13) 
report experiencing a low degree of compliance with the information requirements for potential LTAs 
under Article 19(2) and Annex II (Parts D and E) to the PTD (in relation to LTAs as defined in Article 
3(5)(b) (facilitation in a targeted manner)). 80% (18 of 20) state that there has not been a significant 
number of bankruptcies of organisers and/or retailers since February 2020. Most considered that the 
provisions  on  LTAs  have  not  improved  the  protection  for  travellers  and  not  contributed  to  fair 
competition (81%, 17 of 21 regarding LTA type Article 3(5)(a) and 90%, 19 of 21 regarding Article 
3(5)(b)). 

Targeted  survey  with  National  Competent  Authorities  (NCA)  in  charge  of  insolvency 
protection: 66% (9 of 12) state that their country has taken sufficient measures to ensure that in case 
of the package organiser’s insolvency, insolvency protection systems are able to cover vouchers and 
refund claims fully. 
These NCAs consider that the PTD has been effective in achieving the objective of contributing to 
the proper functioning of the internal market, “to some extent” (54%,7 of 13). They stated that that 
the PTD has been effective in achieving the objective of increasing consumer protection, “to some 
extent”  (46%,  6  of  13),  and  “to  a  great  extent”  (38%,  5  of  13).  According  to  8  of  12,  regulating 
package travel at EU-level benefits the package travel and linked travel arrangements sectors “to a 
great extent” compared to regulating it differently in each EU country.  

Targeted survey with national regulatory and enforcement authorities: 71% agreed (20 of 28) 
or tended to agree (25%, 7 of 28) that withdrawing the PTD would see consumers not be sufficiently 
protected in the package travel market. 72% (21 of 29) stated that, “to  a great  extent”, regulating 
package travel at EU-level benefits companies and consumers compared to regulating it differently 
in each EU country. They stated that to a great extent (37%, 10 of 27) or to some extent (52%, 14 of 
27), the PTD has been effective in ensuring consumer protection and in achieving the objective of 
contributing to the proper functioning of the internal market, “to some extent” (58%,15 of 26), and 
“to a great extent” (15%, 4 of 26). They experienced the following main compliance issues under the 
PTD:  refunds  (78%,  18  of  23),  lack  of  consumer  information  on  refunds  when  purchasing  from 
retailers  (60%,  15  of  25),  termination  of  contracts  (57%,  13  of  23),  contractual  information 
requirements, and LTAs promoted/sold as single travel services (each with 43%, 10 of 23). 

Meeting of  12  May 2022 with  Central  Contact Points436  as referred to in Article 18(2)  PTD: 
CCPs reported on the measures adopted to ensure better preparation for future crises and reported on 
their  experiences:  A  CCP  explained  that  insolvency  protection  covers  refund  claims  before 
insolvency of the organisers, gift cards and vouchers in their Member state. In their experience, during 
the  pandemic,  travellers  demanded  refunds  in  money  instead  of  vouchers  for  the  cancelled  trips. 
Refunds were made from a fund of EUR 17 million. The delegation reported that there have not been 
insolvencies of traders offering LTAs and that it is difficult for travellers to build up a case for such 

436 Minutes available at Register of Commission expert groups and other similar entities (europa.eu) 

106 

 
 
 
 
 
 
a trader. A delegation explained that it is very difficult for organisers of any size to find insurance on 
the national market. Another set up a travel protection fund, privately run and financed from fees of 
the  secured  organisers  (minimum  1%  of  annual  turnover  for  the  capital  +  admission  fee  +  bank 
guarantee or insurance of 5% of annual turnover as collateral). The aim is to reach a capital of EUR 
750  million,  which  should  cover  the  insolvency  of  the  largest  plus  one  medium-sized  package 
organiser. After the capital is collected, the annual fee and the guarantees can be lowered. It was also 
explained that prepayments are limited to 20% by the national courts with travellers having to pay 
the rest 30 days before departure and that vouchers were secured against insolvency. 

Meeting  of  10  November  2022437  with  Central  Contact  Points:  CCPs  reported  problems 
encountered in their MS: high cost of insurance mainly for SMEs, the limitations of the insurance 
coverage,  difficulties  to  obtain  insurance  or  bank  guarantee,  insurance  market  small,  A  Central 
Contact Point mentioned that there is a duplication of guarantees as credit card companies demand 
guarantees from organisers to handle payments, in particular after the Thomas Cook insolvency and 
the Covid-19 pandemic. Problems due to different approaches to insolvency protection across MS 
and the difficulty for travellers to claim refunds in cross-border packages (while these are likely to 
increase) was also mentioned. 

Meeting  of  12  May  2022  with  the  Consumer  Protection  Cooperation  (CPC)  network438:  In 
general,  the  CPC  authorities  welcomed  the  review  of  the  PTD.  During  the  discussion  on  the 
interpretation and implementation of the main concepts of the PTD, authorities provided feedback on 
LTAs, information requirements, the refund of prepayments, coherence between the PTD and the 
passenger rights regulations, as well as compliance and enforcement in general. During the discussion 
on issues related to cancellations, refunds and insolvency protection in connection with the Thomas 
Cook insolvency and other insolvencies, the COVID-19 crisis and in general, the CPC authorities 
expressed different  views on the interpretation  of Article 17 of the PTD, respectively  whether all 
prepayments made by travellers should be secured against the insolvency of the organiser and several 
CPC authorities outlined that, in most cases, prepayments were necessary to ensure the package travel 
model. CPCs explained if and which way prepayments are regulated in their MS, e.g. in some MS, 
prepayments are limited to 20%. 

2.1.3.  Consumer organisations 

In  their  feedback  on  the  Inception  Impact  Assessment,439  consumer  organisations  raised  the 
following issues: 

•  LTA raises uncertainties, often unclear what ‘facilitation’ of the booking mean. Consumers often 

have the impression they bought a package, when in fact they bought an LTA 

•  Many traders adapt their business model based on LTAs, when in fact they are selling packages.  
•  Complicated for consumers to distinguish among the different categories of travel contracts 
•  Consumers are very unprotected in case of LTAs  
•  Many and major problems with reimbursement (for both air tickets and travel packages) 
•  Many  consumer  complaints  about  the  impossibility  or  at  least  difficulty  to  contact  travel 
organisers/airlines to receive updated information (essential during a crisis), insufficient/wrong 
contact information provided 

Public  consultation:  57%  of  consumer  organisations  (12  of  21)  stated  that  the  PTD  is  not  well 
adapted to market trends, similarly to other major stakeholder groups, including companies, business 
associations,  public  authorities  and  EU  citizens.  56%  (10  of  18)  experienced  a  low  degree  of 

437 Minutes available at Register of Commission expert groups and other similar entities (europa.eu) 
438 Minutes available at Register of Commission expert groups and other similar entities (europa.eu) 
439 Feedback on IIA was provided in the form of position papers, therefore no statistical analysis was carried out. 

107 

 
 
 
 
 
 
compliance with the information requirements for potential LTAs under Article 19(2) and Annex II 
(Parts A, B and C) to the PTD (in relation to LTAs as defined in Article 3(5)(a) (single point of sale)) 
and 54% (10 of 17) a low degree of compliance with the information requirements for potential LTAs 
under Article 19(2) and Annex II (Parts D and E) to the PTD (in relation to LTAs as defined in Article 
3(5)(b) (facilitation in a targeted manner)). 57% (12 of 21) state that there has not been a significant 
number of bankruptcies of organisers and/or retailers since February 2020. Most considered that the 
provisions  on  LTAs  have  not  improved  the  protection  for  travellers  and  not  contributed  to  fair 
competition (95%, 19 of 20 regarding LTA type Article 3(5)(a) and 95%, 19 of 20 regarding Article 
3(5)(b)). 

Targeted survey with consumer organisations: Similarly to companies and business associations, 
consumer organisations considered that the Covid-19 pandemic “to a large extent” (100%, 12 of 12) 
and new technologies “to a moderate extent” (50%, 6 of 12) were the factors that most impacted the 
package travel sector. All 12 consumer organisations reported that travellers “rarely received a full 
refund within 14 days or with a short delay (within one month)” in the context of prepayments due 
to unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances during the COVID-19 pandemic. Only 8% (1 of 12) 
reported  this  before  the  Covid-19  pandemic.  They  considered  the  PTD  effective  in  increasing 
consumer protection “to a great extent” (45%, o 5 of 11), and “to some extent” (45%, or 5 out of 11), 
and in contributing to the proper functioning of the internal market “to some extent” (64%, 7 of 11). 
Like companies and business associations, consumer organisations stated that rules on LTAs (80%,8 
of 10), rules on the cancellations of packages (each with 60%, 6 of 10) are the biggest obstacles for 
the PTD to achieve its objectives in increasing consumer protection and contributing to the proper 
functioning of the single market. 

2.1.4.  Consumers/EU citizens 

Public consultation: According to 45% of EU citizens (30 of 66) the PTD is not well adapted to 
market trends. 46% (31 of 68) stated that the rules on cancellation rights are not sufficiently clear and 
34%  (23  out  of  68)  state  that  they  are  sufficiently  clear.  Most  EU  citizens  considered  that  the 
provisions  on  LTAs  have  not  improved  the  protection  for  travellers  and  not  contributed  to  fair 
competition (63%, 39 of 62 regarding LTA type Article 3(5)(a) and 68%, 41 of 60 regarding Article 
3(5)(b)). 

Targeted survey for consumers: 64% were not aware of the introduction of new package travel 
rules in 2018. 74% were not aware of the differences between packages and LTAs. 70% book their 
travels online (e.g., website of a tour operator or travel agency). 
13% pay the full amount at booking, 41% pay a deposit at booking and 46% pay the full amount 
when the trip commences. 77% are aware of their right to claim cash refund in case of cancellation 
by the tour operator. 34% are aware of their right to transfer the package to another traveller. 64% 
are aware of the right to seek a price reduction or compensation if there are problems during the trip.  

2.2  Key feedback regarding the Impact Assessment 

2.2.1 Feedback provided during stakeholder workshops organised by the external consultant 

•  4 participants in the first stakeholder workshop each opposed and supported the idea of a crisis 
fund  at  national  level.  6  participants  opposed  the  idea  of  a  crisis  fund  at  EU  level,  against  3 
participants who supported the idea. 

•  Participants in the first stakeholder workshop opposed creating a crisis fund at EU level replacing 

national insolvency protection systems (0 votes for, 6 votes against). 

•  Most  participants  voting  in  the  first  stakeholder  workshop  (11  votes  for,  2  against)  expressed 

support for a B2B refund right for package organisers against service providers. 

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•  When asked to vote on preferred measures to strengthen insolvency protection through increased 
harmonisation, participants in the follow-up workshop expressed interest in the specification of 
the amounts to be covered, e.g. minimum percentage of turnover (9 votes for, 5 votes against). 
•  When asked to vote on preferred measures related to back-up funds, participants to the participants 
in the follow-up workshop expressed interest in a potential EU back-up fund (13 votes for, 3 votes 
against) compared to national back-up funds (9 votes for, 2 votes against) 

•  Participants in the follow-up workshop opposed the suggestion of an obligation/encouragement 
for organisers to offer, alternatively, packages without prepayments (0 votes for, 13 votes against).  
•  Like in the first workshop, most voting participants in the follow-up workshop supported a B2B 

refund right against service providers (5 votes for, 1 vote against). 

2.2.2 Companies and business associations 

Companies and business associations voiced the following views and suggestions in their feedback 
on the Inception Impact Assessment:440 

•  There should be a right for organisers to withhold refund to consumers until the service provider 

refunds the organiser or a B2B refund right with aligned refund periods 

•  Insolvency protection should cover all reimbursements to travellers, but should exclude payments 

received from traveller’s own insurance or third parties (in particular airlines) 

•  In principle, opposing to limitation or prohibition of prepayments, and if there should be such a 

new ban, then only if all travel service providers are also subject to similar rules. 

•  EU back up or crisis fund supported if not financed only by package travel industry/organisers 
•  More harmonisation of national insolvency protection systems to avoid distortion of competition 

and to ensure that a potential EU-support fund works properly  

•  Calling for strong insolvency protection also for airlines 
•  Limitation of liability for performance in exceptional circumstances, in particular if traveller was 
aware of those (and traveller should get additional insurance in that case), i.e. risk should be shared 
•  Holding payments from organizers to Travel Service Providers on escrow until service completion 
•  Align  APR  and  PTD  regarding  cancellation  rights  and  unavoidable  and  extraordinary 

circumstances 

•  Guidelines on travel advice, ‘significant changes’ under Article 11(2), specifically that this will 

not apply to flight schedules, which are not controlled by organizers 

•  Regulation of vouchers for ‘ordinary’ times (voluntary use) and unavoidable  and extraordinary 

circumstances 

•  LTAs should be abandoned, as the concept is unclear and not useful. If maintained: “a single visit”, 
“facilitation”, “in a targeted manner” to be clarified and relevant forms simplified. Finally, clarity 
shall be provided on how to comply with rules on insolvency protection when facilitating “in a 
targeted manner”. 

•  The obligation to provide a standard information form in the pre-contractual phase should also be 

abolished. 

•  Distinction  between  an  intermediary  and  a  tour  operator  should  be  objective,  definitions  need 
clarification and further streamlining to allow the creation of new and innovative business models. 

•  All business trips and some sports services should be excluded from scope 
•  The right to charge an administration fee for all the work, if a trip is cancelled due to extraordinary 

circumstances, which is not possible under the existing law. 

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Public consultation: According to  44% of companies and business  associations (161 of 364) the 
definition of packages should include fewer combinations of travel services, compared to 20% (75 
of  364)  arguing  that  the  definition  should  be  clarified  and  17%  (64  of  364)  that  it  should  be 
maintained.  
62% of companies and business associations (227 of 367) believe that the PTD should not specifically 
regulate the consequences of “official travel warnings” for cancellations because of unavoidable and 
extraordinary circumstances.  
50% of companies and business associations agree (182 of 367) (against 47% who disagree, 172 of 
367) that the PTD should specify that organisers may issue vouchers instead of a refund within 14 
days, provided that a) travellers agree and b) there is a guarantee that travellers will receive their 
money back if the voucher is  not  used within its validity period, and c)  that vouchers have to  be 
protected against the insolvency of the issuer.  
82%  of  companies  and  business  associations  (283  of  344)  stated  that  there  should  not  be  any 
additional provisions on enforcement and fines in the PTD. 
35% of companies and business associations (127 of 368) are in favour of the idea that organisers 
should have the right to a refund against service providers within a specific deadline to enable them 
to reimburse travellers.  
80%  of  companies  and  business  associations  (284  of  359)  stated  that  insolvency  protection  is 
sufficient.  Only  14%  (49  of  359)  of  companies  and  business  associations  state  that  refund  rights 
against  an  organiser  should  be  protected  in  case  of  insolvency.  Only  18%  (65  of  359)  state  that 
vouchers issued by organisers should be protected in case of insolvency.   
80% of companies and business associations (290 of 361) believe that there should be no prohibitions 
or limitations of prepayments for packages 
62% of companies and business associations (174 of 282) agree that prepayments for packages should 
be prohibited only if other travel service providers, including airlines and other carriers, are subject 
to similar restrictions.  
55% of companies and business associations (200 of 362) state that there should be no crisis fund, 
believing the cost to travellers would outweigh possible benefits. 

In their position papers, micro-companies state that the definition of package travel should be further 
clarified as there is ambiguity and uncertainty as to its scope in relation to how ‘other tourist services’ 
are defined. In exceptional circumstances where trips cannot be carried out, such as the Covid-19 
pandemic, these companies believe organiser liability should be limited. The submissions explained 
that risk in the chain is currently imbalanced as travel companies bear full responsibility, which has 
a significant impact on micro-companies. As these companies frequently work with partners outside 
of the EU, recovering costs is difficult and legally unenforceable. In some instances, the companies 
fully reimbursed customers but were left covering the costs for funds already spent with partners who 
did not provide refunds.   

Targeted Survey with companies and business associations: 65% (15 of 23) of companies and 
business  associations  would  agree  to  a  new  EU  rule  that  requires  service  providers  to  reimburse 
organisers where the cancellation is justified under the PTD, within a specific time-limit. 
64% (9 of 14) would oppose the creation of an EU insolvency protection fund which would replace 
the existing national insolvency protection systems. 
43% of companies and business associations (9 of 21), state that a strict limitation of prepayments 
(e.g.  no  down  payments,  payment  at  the  earliest  two  weeks  before  departure)  would  result  in  a 
significant (more than 10%) increase of costs per package. 
Most companies and business associations (76% 16 of 21) object to a potential EU rule requiring 
organisers  to  offer  travellers  the  option  of  booking  a  package  without  prepayments  (until  shortly 
before departure) as an alternative to a package with prepayments. 

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Interviews: Several companies and business associations have emphasized their opposition to any 
suggestion of limitations on prepayments, underlining their importance to the structure and existence 
of  the  industry.  Small  and  large  business  organisations  alike  have  expressed  the  importance  of 
prepayments  to  their  business.  This  reflects  the  opinions  gathered  from  companies  and  business 
associations in the other consultation activities. 

Ad  hoc  targeted  consultations  of  November,  December  2022  and  May  2023441:  During  these 
consultations,  the  following  information  was  received  from  relevant  business  stakeholders,  in 
particular organisers on one hand and service providers on the other: 

•  extent of prepayments depends on different factors, including the share of transport in the package, 
scheduled flights as opposed to chartered flights, traditional tour operator packages as opposed to 
dynamic packages, but, to some extent, also the Member States concerned 

•  a  strict  limitation  of  prepayments  to  organisers  and  service  providers  may  lead  to  cost 
increases  of  more  than  10%  and  according  to  hospitality  industry  association  some  hospitality 
service providers might  adapt the prices of their services for inclusion in  package or, focus on 
stand-alone services only 

•  the average price elasticity for European Tourism is -1,29, 
•  an  association  active  in  the  package  travel  sector  estimated  the  additional  time  spent  on 
administration  at  1  hour  per  booking  if  they  must  justify  any  higher  prepayment  (flexible 
limitation of prepayments), according to an organiser a potential price increase is estimated to 
be 3-4% of the current cost of a package, a service provider estimated 2.5-5% 

•  According to an organiser, booking takes place on average 6 months before the travel date.  
•  Service  providers  indicated  that  they  would  (try  to)  pass  100%  of  a  potential  cost  increase  to 

travellers 

•  An organisation representing package organisers does not expect big improvements from a B2B 
refund right only if the relevant service cancelled; they prefer a B2B refund right in all cases. 
•  An organiser stated that  a specific deadline for the refund by service providers  would not lead 

service providers to include a risk premium which would raise the costs of packages. 

•  While reducing liquidity risks of organisers, B2B refund right in all cases would shift these risks 
to service providers, who would possibly transfer them to travellers by charging a risk premium 
on services  included in  packages or even contractually  exclude the provision  of some services 
from packages. No impact on prices of stand-alone tickets is expected.  

•  According to organisers such B2B refund right may lead service providers to reduce their offer of 

services for inclusion in packages. 

•  Stakeholders were not able to provide detailed data on the cost impacts, which would be passed 

on to travellers. 

•  According to an organiser, the measure is also not expected to have any material impact on the 

administrative burden of organisers. 

2.2.3 Public authorities 

Public consultation: According to 32% (7 of 22) the definition of package should be maintained 
while 32% (7 of 22) indicated that it should be clarified. 48% (11 of 23) stated that current rules on 
cancellation  rights  could  be  better  explained  through  non-binding  guidance,  while  39%  (9  of  23) 
stated that the current rules are not sufficiently clear and should be amended. 
45% (10 of 22) believe that consequences of “official travel warnings” for cancellations because of 
unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances should be regulated by the PTD, 32% (7 of 22) do not. 

441 Specific questions were sent to target specific stakeholders (organisers, service providers incl. airlines) to fill in data 
gaps (see more info Section 1 of this annex: overview of consultation activities) 

111 

 
 
 
 
 
35% (7 of 20) are not in favour of additional fines and enforcement in the PTD, while 35% (7 of 20) 
say there should be fines for widespread cross-border infringements with a maximum amount of at 
least 4% of the trader’s annual turnover in the Member State(s) concerned. 
According to 83% (19 of 23) the PTD should specify that organisers may issue vouchers instead of 
a refund within 14 days, if a) travellers agree and b) there is a guarantee that travellers will receive 
their money back if the voucher is not used within its validity period, and c) that vouchers have to be 
protected against the insolvency of the issuer.  
50% (11 of 22) are in favour of the idea that organisers should have the right to a refund against 
service providers within a specific deadline to enable them to reimburse travellers. 77% (17 of 22) 
state that refund rights against an organiser should be protected in case of insolvency and 73% (19 of 
22) state that vouchers issued by organisers should be protected in case of insolvency. According to 
18% (4 of 22) insolvency protection is sufficient.  
33% (7 of 21) believe that there should be no prohibitions or limitations of prepayments for packages. 
29%  of  public  authorities  (6  of  21)  consider  that  prepayments  for  packages  and  LTAs  should  be 
limited to a maximum of 20% at the time of booking, with the rest to be paid shortly before departure. 
67% of public authorities (14 of 21) agree that prepayments for packages should be prohibited only 
if  other  travel  service  providers,  including  airlines  and  other  carriers,  are  subject  to  similar 
restrictions. According to 48% (9 of 19) a crisis fund is necessary under the PTD. 

Targeted surveys with national authorities in charge of insolvency protection: 50% (6 of 12) 
support a back-up system (e.g. a fund) at EU-level, which would function as a safety net to cover 
insolvencies of large organisers or waves of insolvencies, where the protection under the national 
system proves to be insufficient, on the assumption that contributions to such fund would have to 
come from organisers. 45% (5 of 11) agree with the creation of an EU insolvency protection fund 
that would replace the existing national insolvency protection systems (18%, 2 of 11 disagree). 

Targeted surveys with national regulatory and enforcement authorities: According to 68% (19 
of 28) the PTD should specify that circumstances occurring at the place of departure (e.g. restrictions 
on movement or quarantine requirements) can also justify the termination of a package travel contract 
without  fees.  50%  (16  of  32)  believe  that  protections  on  prepayments  should  be  increased, 
specifically, that this can be best addressed through a review of the PTD, while 28% (9 of 32) believe 
it can be best addressed through enforcement, and 4 of 32 believe that protection of prepayments 
does not require further action. 77% (20 of 26) would agree to a new EU rule that requires service 
providers to reimburse organisers where the cancellation is justified under the PTD, within a specific 
time-limit. 44%, or 8 of 18 recommend that this time limit be set at 14 days. 
41% (11 of 27) are in favour of a new EU rule to require organisers to offer travellers the option of 
booking a package without prepayments (until shortly before departure) as an alternative to a package 
with prepayments. 33% (9 of 27) were not in favour of this rule. 

Meeting 10 November of 2022442 with Central Contact Points (CCPs) as referred to in Article 
18(2)  PTD:  Regarding  possible  solutions  of  the  problems  regarding  insolvency  protection,  CCPs 
mentioned  the  importance  of  B2B  rights  and  clarification  that  vouchers  are  protected  
(as this would contribute to reduce differences between MS systems). 
Some Central Contact Points expressed doubts about a limitation of prepayments: prepayments are 
specificity of the sector, suppliers would continue requesting it, limitation would harm also small 
organisers besides potentially raising prices for travellers. 
Some reported issues regarding retailers who ask high prepayment but forward only a small part of 
it  to  the  organiser  and  in  case  retailer  goes  bankrupt,  organiser  wants  to  only  reimburse  only  the 
received amount. 

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112 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Some found the idea of an EU fund a good solution, referring to the DK and DE systems as positive 
models. Some others were rather against it for the following reasons: a national guarantee fund has 
been set up; the national markets are different; effective and efficient national systems are a better 
solution.  According  to  a  Central  Contact  Point,  an  EU  back-up  fund  might  be  too  difficult  and 
burdensome to administer. 
A contact point considered that the back-up fund is the most important instrument – it creates a level-
playing field for all organisers, in particular in light of the fact most organisers are small companies 
without bargaining power. Some contact points expressed support for more or full harmonisation of 
the insolvency protection systems. A delegation considers that a possible percentage should be related 
to the size of the organiser. If turnover is the basis, then seasonality should be taken into account (e.g. 
ski resorts operating only few months a year). A CCP explained that insurance protection system uses 
insurance policies calculated based on a comprehensive mathematical formula. All traders provide a 
full coverage security based on prepayment levels. However, a financially sound organiser, whose 
risk of insolvency is deemed low, may apply for reduced security. 

During the meeting of 5 December 2022, experts from national authorities443 were consulted on 
potential measures for: vouchers, limitation of prepayments, B2B refund right, crisis fund, insolvency 
protection, including increased harmonisation of the insolvency protection systems and national/EU 
back-up funds. In general, experts supported rules on voluntary vouchers. They reported on rules in 
place  in  their  country  regarding  prepayment,  some  expressed  worries  about  the  effect  of  general 
limitation of prepayments. Some pointed out the difficulty to implement and enforce a potential new 
B2B rule to  suppliers  in third countries.  Some expressed concerns regarding  crisis funds  creating 
additional administrative burden. In their view, having in place insolvency protection systems should 
be sufficient. As for information of travellers on the role of different traders, several emphasised that 
the organiser should remain responsible towards travellers, it being important for travellers to clearly 
understand the role of the parties and to benefit from a one-stop-shop. Several considered that the 
concept of LTAs should be abandoned as it was difficult to implement and enforce. The unclear rules 
offered the possibility to organisers to  circumvent  them while consumers were not  aware of their 
rights. Therefore, no complaints are received in that respect. Some expressed concerns regarding the 
regulation  of  travel  advice/warnings  explaining  that  there  are  different  types  of  travel 
advice/warnings in the Member States that could be issued at different moments, which sometimes 
could be contradictory. Some did not support the idea of sanctions in line with the Modernisation 
Directive  (EU)  2019/2161,  considering  that  Member  States  should  have  flexibility  regarding  the 
penalty regime. 

2.2.4 Consumer organisations 

Consumer organisations made the following suggestions in their feedback on the Inception Impact 
Assessment: 

•  Support for limitation of prepayment, e.g., 20%, 40%-60 or some even called for prohibition 
•  Prepayments of the travel price should only be requested if the tour operator can also ensure that 
the package will be carried out. These rights should not exclusively be linked to a concrete travel 
advice of national authorities, but to the circumstances in the origin and destination countries 

•  Support for an EU insolvency back-up fund 
•  Common minimum criteria for national insolvency protection schemes;  
•  Insolvency protection should cover voluntary vouchers and pending reimbursements;  
•  Improve information obligations and contact options for travellers (e.g. Should be clear who is 

organiser/contracting party) 

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113 

 
 
 
 
•  Contracts  cancelled  prior  to  organiser’s  insolvency  must  be  clearly  covered  by  insolvency  - 

major interpretation disputes 

•  Clarification  of  the  appropriate  time  period  in  which  the  withdrawal  can  be  declared  under 
Article 12(2). Clarification of the relevance and evidence given through government warnings 
•  Urgent creation of a legal framework for automated refunds and compensation payments without 

the need to submit a request 

•  Support only for voluntary vouchers also covered by insolvency protection and paid out if not 

used, e.g. within 12 months. 

•  Clarify that payment to be reimbursed to whoever the consumer paid, regardless of where the 

money is at that moment. 

•  Regarding LTAs, simplification and clarification (e.g. clarify concept of “facilitation”) needed 

to discourage abuse  

•  Clear liability rules for all actors and obligations 
•  Reimbursement rules and period of 14 days should not be amended  
•  Better enforcement and raising awareness to traveller’s rights is needed 
•  Align  PTD  and  passenger  rights  regulations  regarding  cancellation,  refund  and  insolvency 

protection 

Public  consultation:  According  to  57%  of  consumer  organisations  (12  of  21)  the  definition  of 
packages should be maintained, while 24% (5 of 21) favoured more combinations of travel services. 
76% (16 of 21) believe that rules on cancellation rights are not sufficiently clear, similarly to other 
stakeholder  groups,  including  companies  and  business  associations,  public  authorities  and  EU 
citizens. 75% (15 of 20) are in favour of additional fines and enforcement in the PTD. 55% (11 of 
20)  also  believe  that  there  should  be  fines  for  widespread  cross-border  infringements  with  a 
maximum amount of at least 4% of the trader’s annual turnover in the Member State(s) concerned. 
81% (17 of 21) believe that the consequences of “official travel warnings” for cancellations because 
of unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances should be regulated by the PTD, in opposition to the 
opinion voiced by companies and business associations.  
According to 76% of consumer organisations (16 of 21) the PTD should specify that organisers may 
issue vouchers instead of a refund within 14 days, if a) travellers agree and b) there is a guarantee 
that travellers will receive their money back if the voucher is not used within its validity period, and 
c) that vouchers have to be protected against the insolvency of the issuer.  
48% (10 of 21) are in favour of the idea that organisers should have the right to a refund against 
service providers within a specific deadline to enable them to reimburse travellers.  
Only 5% of consumer organisations (1 of 21) stated that insolvency protection is sufficient. 86% (18 
of 21) believe that refund rights against an organiser should be protected in case of insolvency and 
95% (20 of 21) believe that vouchers issued by an organiser should be protected in case of insolvency. 
52%  (11  of  21)  state  that  claims  for  price  reduction  or  compensation  for  improper  performance 
existing before an organiser becomes insolvent should be protected in case of insolvency. 
No  consumer  organisation  (0  of  21)  selected  the  option  that  there  should  be  “no  prohibitions  or 
limitations of prepayments for packages.” 86% (18 of 21) disagree that prepayments for packages 
should be prohibited only if other travel service providers, including airlines and other carriers, are 
subject to similar restrictions. 81% of consumer organisations (17 of 21) believe that a crisis fund is 
necessary in the PTD. 

Targeted survey with consumer organisations: 45% stated that they  would  not  be in  favour of 
creating  an  EU  insolvency  protection  fund  which  would  replace  existing  national  insolvency 
protection systems, against 9% (1 of 11) who would be in favour. When asked which measures to 
improve the effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of insolvency protection they would support, 
58% (7 of 12) stated that insolvency protection for each organiser should cover a specific minimum 

114 

 
 
 
 
percentage of the organiser’s annual turnover, e.g. 15-25%. According to 75% (9 of 12) the PTD 
should specify that Member States must require that insolvency protection covers a sufficiently large 
share  of  the  organiser’s  turn-over  to  ensure  that  an  insolvency  at  the  period  of  the  year  with  the 
highest risk exposure is fully covered. 92% (11 of 12) stated that guarantee funds should have a buffer 
for bad times or be able to obtain liquidity on short notice and be obliged to refill the fund, if required. 
92% (11 of 12) also stated that insolvency protection bodies should be obliged to refund prepayments 
within a specific period (e.g. within 90 days) after the traveller requests it. Finally, 75% (9 of 12) 
support  an  obligation  for  Member  States  whose  insolvency  protection  system  relies  on  insurance 
policies or bank guarantees to be obliged to create back-up funds. 

According  to  many  consumer  organisations  interviewed  the  effectiveness  of  the  sanctions  and 
enforcement in the PTD could be improved to better protect consumers. Similarly to companies and 
business associations, several consumer organisations believe that the PTD should be better aligned 
with the Air Passenger Rights Regulation in the future.  

2.2.5 Consumers/EU citizens 

Public consultation: 35% of  EU  citizens (24 of 68) held  the view that the definition of package 
should include more combinations of travel services, 28% (19 of 68) that it should be maintained and 
26% (18 of 68) that it should be clarified. 41% (26 of 63) support additional fines and enforcement 
in the PTD; 41% (26 of 63) believe that there should be no additional fines and enforcement in the 
PTD. According to 63% (43 of 68) the consequences of “official travel warnings” for cancellations 
because of unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances should be regulated by the PTD. 66% (44 
of 67) believe the PTD should specify that organisers may issue vouchers instead of a refund within 
14 days, provided that a) travellers agree and b) there is a guarantee that travellers will receive their 
money back if the voucher is  not  used within  its  validity period, and c)  that vouchers have to  be 
protected against the insolvency of the issuer. According to 51% of EU citizens (35 of 68) organisers 
should have the right to a refund against service providers within a specific deadline to enable them 
to reimburse travellers and according to 44% (30 of 68) there should be no prohibitions or limitations 
of prepayments for packages. 60% (39 of 65) believe that a crisis fund is necessary in the PTD. 

3.  USE OF STAKEHOLDER FEEDBACK 

The  results  from  the  consultation  activities  have fed  into  the  evaluation  (Annex  13)  and  IA  from 
problem definition to possible options and their impacts. Several references to the feedback can be 
found in the text as well as in the footnotes. In addition, even if not explicitly referenced in the main 
report or the evaluation, all the above-described stakeholder feedback provided valuable input and 
thus informed the process and the focus of the assessment.  
In addition to the topics examined in the impact assessment, some business stakeholders called for444: 

•  Complete exemption of business travel from the scope of the PTD (i.e. not only in case of general 

agreements), Article 2(2)(c)445 

•  Narrowing  of  definitions  of  travel  service  (Article  3(1))  and  of  package  (Article  3(2))  (e.g. 

specific (sport) services or SME hotels should be excluded) 

444 For example, in position papers and free text replies such as to (Q9) as well as replies to close-ended questions (see 
next footnotes) in the public consultation.  
445 Raised for example in position papers and free text replies submitted in the public consultation, in particular in the 
coordinated  replies  of  a  number  of  Dutch  SME  respondents  (See  Section  1.  on  general  information  about  public 
consultation respondents). 

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All these ideas would result in a narrower scope of the PTD. The first suggestion would lower the 
protection for small businesses booking travel arrangements for themselves or for their employers. 
As explained in recital 7, these SME travellers require the same level of protection as consumers.  

Any measure  limiting  the scope, including  the definition of package, would  inevitably result in  a 
lower level of consumer protection, in some cases falling back behind the protection level of the 1990 
Directive and compromising one of the main objectives of the Directive. Consumer organisations 
clearly  oppose  any  such  measure,  and  many  businesses  do  not  support  such  ideas  either.446 
Furthermore, the limited evidence for the alleged problems or the absence of proposed solutions made 
it difficult to take these up in the impact assessment. However, such points are usually referred to in 
the evaluation.  

Some consumer organisations called for creation of a legal framework for automated refunds and 
compensation payments without the need to submit a request. However, under Article 12(4) PTD, 
the 14-day refund period is triggered by the termination of the contract and the traveller is not required 
to make an additional refund request already today. If it were to be stated explicitly in Article 12(4) 
that  no  specific  refund  request  is  required,  to  make  this  even  clearer,  this  would  not  change  the 
substantive law and would thus not require an assessment of impacts.  

Furthermore, consumer organisations indicated a preference for new rules on information about the 
environmental  impacts  of  package  travel,  like  on  the  CO2  footprint  of  travel  packages.  Business 
stakeholders and public authorities largely opposed such rules. At least for the time being, it was 
concluded that such specific issues are better addressed by sector-specific legislation and that there 
should first be an agreement on the methodology of calculating the CO2 footprint.447 

446 Public consultation Q5: 57% of consumer organisations (12 of 21) and 16% of companies (51 of 316) indicated that 
the definition of a ‘package’ should be maintained. See also BEUC’s position paper submitted to the public consultation, 
requesting that the definition should be kept broad. According to 45% of companies (143 of 316) and 18 of 48 (38% of) 
business  associations  the  definition  of  ‘package’  should  cover  fewer  combinations  of  travel  services,  without  any 
consumer organisations in favour of this point. The rest of the business respondents was almost equally divided between 
the following replies: It should be maintained, It should clarified or It should cover more combinations.  
447 Public consultation Q31: 15 of 20 consumer organisation called for such rules: According to 8 ”The PTD should oblige 
traders to inform travellers about the environmental footprint of packages before booking.”, and according to 7 ”There 
should be information on the environmental footprint of packages (as in the previous option). In addition, the PTD should 
help reduce the environmental impacts of travel and tourism also in other ways.” However, overall, 81% (391) of the 477 
respondents confirmed that no such rules are necessary and that environmental impacts should be regulated in sector-
specific legislation. Among them: 16 of 22 public authorities, 40 of 49 business associations, 271 of 304 companies. 

116 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW? 

1.  PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE INITIATIVE 

The revision of the Package Travel Directive primarily affects the following stakeholders: package 
travel  organisers,  travellers,  public  authorities,  and  to  a  certain  extent  service  providers  such  as 
airlines and/or hotels (for instance, in relation to the B2B refund right proposed).  

For  the  preferred  option,  the  overall  practical  implications  have  been  assessed  for  each  group  of 
stakeholders. In summary, stakeholders would face the following practical implications:  

Package organisers would to some extent face moderately higher costs, in particular in Member States 
where  there  are  currently  no  limitations  of  prepayments  at  all  and/or  where  vouchers  and  refund 
claims are currently not covered by insolvency protection. At the same time the liquidity of organisers 
would be protected through the rules on vouchers and the B2B refund right, and they would overall 
benefit from more legal certainty. Businesses – mostly organisers, but to some extent also service 
providers  –  would  have  to  familiarise  themselves  with  the  new  rules  and  adapt  some  internal 
processes to comply. Service providers will need to ensure that they refund organisers within 7 days. 
Overall, organisers will need to ensure clearer information of travellers on their rights. 

Public  authorities  would  be  required  to  transpose  the  changes  to  the  PTD  into  their  national 
legislation. They will also need to get familiar with the new rules in order to effectively monitor the 
implementation by companies. 

Also, travellers will benefit from more legal certainty and the closing of certain gaps in the legislation. 
It will become easier for them to obtain and understand the information on their rights and whom to 
turn to in case of problems. In addition, any refund claims or vouchers they receive will be protected 
against the insolvency of the organiser everywhere in the EU.  They will hence enjoy even higher 
consumer protection than now, and more evenly so across borders (which  would thus help widen 
their consumer choice of PT services across internal borders). 

It is important to note that, besides consumer benefits that we sought to  quantify below, there are 
further expected direct or indirect non-quantified benefits, not just as regards Consumer rights but 
also with respect to Fundamental Rights and some UN Sustainable Development Goals, which are 
further detailed in annex 10 below (based on the related BR tools’ checklists). 

2.  SUMMARY OF COSTS AND BENEFITS 

I. Overview of Benefits448 (total for all provisions) – Preferred Option 

Description 

Amount 

Direct benefits 

Comments 

Reduction of consumer detriment in view of lower 
prepayments. 

At  least  EUR  168.8 
million per year. 

The  limitation  of  prepayments  will  improve  the 
travellers’ liquidity, as they will be able to dispose 
of their funds for a longer period before making the 
full payment. In addition, and more importantly, it 

448 Notwithstanding very elaborate consultations with stakeholders (i.e. public consultation, several targeted consultations 
and  meeting,  several  workshops),  stakeholders  have  not  provided  any  quantitative  data  that  would  permit  to  assess 
quantitatively the expected benefits and costs of any options, including the preferred option. The (qualitative and as far 
as available quantitative) information provided by stakeholders is described in detail in the assessment of impacts of 
individual  measures  in  Section  6.  As  a  result,  the  cost-benefit  assessment  presented  here  could  only  be  made  on  a 
qualitative basis.  

117 

 
 
 
will reduce the amount at risk of not being refunded 
in case of a cancellation. 
For the  quantification a reduction of 5 percentage 
points of the average prepayments for packages was 
assumed. In addition, it was considered that 4.4% 
of  packages  are  affected  (in  normal  times)  by 
financial loss. 

If a national crisis fund is introduced, travellers will 
face  less  risks  of  not  obtaining  refunds  in  case  of 
cancellations due to unavoidable and extraordinary 
circumstances. 

Travellers  will  receive  quicker  refunds  due  to  the 
introduction  of  the  reduction  of  prepayments  and 
the B2B refund right. No quantified data available. 

The  introduction of the rules on vouchers and the 
B2B  refund  right  will  improve  the  organisers’ 
liquidity, as they will quicker receive refunds from 
service  providers  and  will  be  able  to  extend  the 
period  for  refund  to  travellers  by  proposing 
vouchers. No quantified data available. 

There  will  be  clarification  benefits  for  traveller 
from  the  rules  on  voluntary  vouchers,  hence 
improving consumer protection. 

Coverage  of  vouchers  and  refund  claims  by 
insolvency  protection  will 
improve  consumer 
protection  and  increase  the  acceptance  rate  for 
vouchers,  thus  improving  organisers’  liquidity  in 
case of crisis. 

The  clarifications  and  specifications  of  several 
provisions  in  the  PTD  will  provide  clarification 
benefits  to  all  stakeholders.  No  quantified  data 
available. 

Limitation of prepayment will apply to all package 
organisers  offering  services  to  consumers  in  the 
EU, whether the firms are based within or outside 
the EU. Therefore, this measure will not result in an 
uneven  playing  field  and  will  hence  not  affect 
international  competitiveness.  
negatively 
Approximately  112  000  EU  package  organisers 
(99% of which are SMEs) would be affected.  
The  limitation  of  prepayments  may,  over  time, 
result in a decrease in insolvency protection  costs 
for  organisers,  which  will  be  beneficial  for  their 
competitiveness. No quantified data available. 

their 

The  simplification  of  several  provisions  and 
introduction  of  clearer  criteria  in  the  PTD  may 
result in easier monitoring, less traveller complaints 
and potentially lower litigation costs. No quantified 
data available. 

The suppression of LTAs and related administrative 
simplification will result in organisers spending less 
time  on  choosing  the  right  information  form,  thus 
reducing their administrative burden.  

Voluntary crisis fund at national level 

Assessed 
qualitatively 

Reduction  of  consumer  detriment  in  view  of 
timelier refunds. 

Assessed 
qualitatively 

Increased liquidity for organisers. 

Assessed 
qualitatively 

Introduction of voluntary vouchers – clarification 
benefits for travellers 

Assessed 
qualitatively 

Strengthened insolvency protection and coverage 
of vouchers and refund claims 

Assessed 
qualitatively 

Increased ease of doing business and reduction in 
consumer detriment in view of clarifications. 

Assessed 
qualitatively 

Possible  decrease  in  insolvency  protection  costs 
for organisers. 

Assessed 
qualitatively 

Indirect benefits 

Possible  costs  savings  related  to  monitoring  of 
compliance by Member State authorities. 

Assessed 
qualitatively 

Administrative  cost  savings  related 
suppression of LTAs type (a) 

to 

the 

At  least  EUR  181.4 
million per year.  

118 

 
 
 
Administrative cost savings for public authorities 
through easier monitoring 

Assessed 
qualitatively 

The gains for organisers were calculated assuming a 
gain of 5 minutes per booking for choosing the right 
form  and  using  the  average  wage  for  all  the 
undertakings concerned. 

The  simplification  of  several  provisions  and 
introduction of clearer criteria in the PTD is likely 
to  result  in  easier  monitoring,  thus  reducing  the 
administrative  costs  for  Member  State  authorities. 
No quantified data available 

Administrative cost savings related to the ‘one in, one out’ approach* 

Recurrent (direct) 

At  least  EUR  181.4 
million per year.  

Administrative  cost 
suppression of LTAs type (a). 

savings 

related 

to 

the 

One-off 

- 

- 

II. Overview of costs – Preferred option 

Citizens/Travellers 

Businesses 

Administrations 

One-off 

Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

For 
all 
measures 
taken 
together 

Direct 
adjustment 
costs 

Direct 
adjustment 
costs 

Direct 
administrative 
costs 

Direct 
regulatory fees 
and charges 

Measure 
1.1.1   

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

Indirect costs 

- 

pass-
100% 
through 
of 
cost  increases 
for  organisers 
travellers 
to 
through 
package  price 
increases; 
EUR 
million. 

332.1 

- 

- 

- 

- 

Direct 
adjustment 
costs 

449 Based on estimates in the ICF study. 

119 

EUR 

Approx. 
60.5k 
(transposition)449 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measure 
1.2.1450   

Direct 
administrative 
costs 

Direct 
regulatory fees 
and charges 

Indirect costs 

Measure 
1.3.1   

Direct 
adjustment 
costs 

Direct 
administrative 
costs 

Direct 
regulatory fees 
and charges 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

Indirect costs 

- 

Measure 
1.4.1   

Direct 
adjustment 
costs 

Direct 
administrative 
costs 

Direct 
regulatory fees 
and charges 

Indirect costs 

Measure 
2.1451   

Direct 
adjustment 
costs 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

EUR  0  –  the 
measure 
be 
would 
cost-neutral in 
the long-term  

- 

- 

- 

- 

Not  expected 
to  lead  to  any 
risk  premium 
charged 
by 
service 
providers 

- 

- 

Costs,  if  any, 
minimal. 
EUR 0 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

450 Measure 1.2.1 concerns the voluntary introduction of a crisis fund at national level. Considering its voluntary nature, 
it is impossible to foresee how many Member States may wish to implement such a fund. At present, this has only been 
done by Poland, with recourse to State aid, by incorporating this fund in an existing fund structure. Hence, the set-up 
costs for the Polish authorities were negligible. In case other Member States decide to start a crisis fund, they may choose 
a  similar  or  a  totally  different  structure.  Such  choice  will  have  consequences  for  the  administrative  costs  of  public 
authorities, but also for the regulatory fees (and potentially administrative costs) requested from companies. For these 
reasons,  it  is  not  possible  to  estimate  the  potential  average  costs,  and  consequently  the  potential  total  costs  that  this 
measure may entail for the stakeholders in Member States that implement it. Therefore, these costs are not included in 
the table. 
451 Measure 2.1 includes the possibility to introduce a voluntary insolvency back-up fund at national level. At present, 
only a few Member States have a back-up fund, often with recourse to State aid. Considering its voluntary nature and the 
differences in the set-up of national insolvency protection systems, it is impossible to estimate how many Member States 
may wish to implement such a fund. It is also impossible to foresee what structure and set-up they may choose for such 

120 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 

- 

- 

Direct 
administrative 
costs 

Direct 
regulatory fees 
and charges 

- 

- 

Indirect costs 

- 

Possibility 
that  prices  of 
packages 
might rise. 
No  quantified 
data available. 

- 

- 

Possible  cost 
impact 
in 
some  MS  due 
to 
covering 
vouchers  and 
refund  claims 
by  insolvency 
protection. 
No  quantified 
data available, 
but  the  costs 
are considered 
reasonable by  
30%  business 
respondents 
and  45%  of 
insolvency 
protection 
bodies.452  

- 

Potentially 
higher 
insolvency 
protection 
costs. 
quantified 
data available. 

No 

Measure 
3.1.1  

Direct 
adjustment 
costs 

- 

- 

- 

Familiarisatio
n with the new 
provisions. 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

fund. Such choices will have consequences for the administrative costs of public authorities, but also for the regulatory 
fees (and potentially administrative costs) requested from companies. For these reasons, it is not possible to estimate the 
potential average costs, and consequently the potential total costs that the – voluntary – introduction of a national back-
up  fund  may  entail  for  the  stakeholders  in  Member  States  that  implement  it.  Therefore,  these  potential  costs  are  not 
included in the table. 
452 Targeted survey for business associations, Q18 (N=10): in relation to the question if the costs of coverage of vouchers 
by insolvency protection would be reasonable, 1 company strongly agreed (10%), 2 tended to agree (20%), 4 strongly 
disagreed  (40%)  and  3  did  not  know  (30%);  in  relation  to  the  costs  of  covering  refund  claims  being  reasonable:  2 
respondents tended to agree (20%), 5 strongly disagreed (50%) and 3 did not know (30%). Targeted survey for insolvency 
protection bodies, Q4 (N=11): in relation to the question if the costs of coverage of vouchers by insolvency protection 
during major crisis would be reasonable, 1 respondent strongly agreed (9%), 4 tended to agree (36%), 1 tended to disagree 
(9%) and 5 did not know (45%); in relation to the costs of covering refund claims being reasonable: 4 respondents tended 
to agree (36%), 1 tended to disagree (9%), 1 strongly disagreed (9%) and 5 did not know (45%).  Targeted survey for 
business  associations,  Q18  (N=10):  in  relation  to  the  question  if  the  costs  of  coverage  of  vouchers  by  insolvency 
protection would be reasonable, 1 company strongly agreed (10%), 2 tended to agree (20%), 4 strongly disagreed (40%) 
and 3 did not know (30%); in relation to the costs of covering refund claims being reasonable: 2 respondents tended to 
agree (20%), 5 strongly disagreed (50%) and 3 did not know (30%). Targeted survey for insolvency protection bodies, 
Q4 (N=11): in relation to the question if the costs of coverage of vouchers by insolvency protection during major crisis 
would be reasonable, 1 respondent strongly agreed (9%), 4 tended to agree (36%), 1 tended to disagree (9%) and 5 did 
not know (45%); in relation to the costs of covering refund claims being reasonable: 4 respondents tended to agree (36%), 
1 tended to disagree (9%), 1 strongly disagreed (9%) and 5 did not know (45%).  

121 

 
 
 
 
Approx.  EUR 
6.5 million453 
Possible 
costs 
minor 
for 
creation 
email  address 
or  webform 
for contacts in 
cases  where 
traders  do  not 
have them yet. 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

Negligible 
one-off 
administrative 
impact.  EUR 
0 

- 

Potential  new 
costs 
for 
companies 
that  would  be 
considered 
organisers. 
No  quantified 
data available. 

- 

- 

Negligeable 
costs. EUR 0 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

Direct 
administrative 
costs 

- 

- 

Direct 
regulatory fees 
and charges 

Indirect costs 

- 

- 

- 

Possibility  of 
hassle 
small 
costs 
related 
to 
transmission 
of information 
service 
to 
in 
provider 
to 
relation 
LTAs type (b). 
No  quantified 
data available. 

Measure 
3.2.1   

Direct 
adjustment 
costs 

Direct 
administrative 
costs 

Direct 
regulatory fees 
and charges 

Indirect costs 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

Measure 
3.3.1   

Direct 
adjustment 
costs 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

453 Assuming that each company would need 2 hours to do so and based on wage assumptions made by the consultant in 
the supporting study. 

122 

 
 
 
 
Direct 
administrative 
costs 

Direct 
regulatory fees 
and charges 

- 

- 

Indirect costs 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

Total   

Direct and 
indirect 
adjustment 
costs  

Administrative 
costs (for 
offsetting) 

Costs related to the ‘one in, one out’ approach 

EUR 0 

EUR 0 

EUR 0 

EUR 0 

EUR 0 

EUR 0 

EUR 
million454 

6.5 

EUR 0 

3.  RELEVANT SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS 

III. Overview of relevant Sustainable Development Goals – Preferred Option(s) 

Relevant SDG 

Expected progress towards the Goal 

Comments 

SDG  no.  8  -  Promote 
inclusive,  and 
sustained, 
sustainable 
economic 
growth, full and productive 
employment,  and  decent 
work for all 

The  proposed  measures  will  contribute  to  the 
ease of doing business for package organisers, 
thus facilitating the growth of SMEs. 

to  Target  8.3  “Promote 
This  contributes 
that  support 
development-oriented  policies 
productive  activities,  decent 
job  creation, 
entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation, and 
encourage  the  formalization  and  growth  of 
micro-,  small-  and  medium-sized  enterprises, 
including through access to financial services”. 

SDG  no.  10  –  reduced 
inequalities 

By facilitating better information provision by 
organisers  and  better  protection  of  travellers’ 
rights, the preferred policy option will result in 
more equal position of all travellers in the EU. 

Contributes  to  Target  10.3  “Ensure  equal 
opportunity and reduce inequalities of outcome, 
including  by  eliminating  discriminatory  laws, 
policies 
promoting 
appropriate  legislation,  policies  and  action  in 
this regard.” 

practices 

and 

and 

SDG  no.  16  –  peace, 
strong 
and 
justice, 
institutions 

The  clarifications  of  several  provisions  in  the 
PTD will reduce inequalities between travellers 
from  different  Member  States  and  likely 
decrease  the  number  of  travellers  needing  to 
have  recourse  to  dispute  resolution  or  legal 
procedures. 

This  contributes  to  Target  16.3  “Promote  the 
rule  of  law  at  the  national  and  international 
levels and ensure equal access to justice for all” 
and  Target  16.b  “Promote  and  enforce  non-
discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable 
development” 

454 Considering that each company would need 2 hours to get to know the new provisions and Annexes to the Directive 
and based on wage assumptions made by the consultant in the supporting study. 

123 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL METHODS 

1.  METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY TO SUPPORT THIS EVALUATION AND IMPACT ASSESSMENT455 

Overview 

The  study  has  relied  on  data  from  a  combination  of  desk-based  research,  EU  statistics,  public 
consultation,  targeted  surveys,  consumer  survey,  interviews  with  a  wide  group  of  relevant 
stakeholders and workshops.  

Literature review 

Targeted  desk  research  focused  on  the  evaluation  and  impact  assessment research  frameworks.  It 
followed the main research questions and sub-questions, as well as the main indicators of the research 
frameworks. Findings from desk research have been triangulated with the evidence collected through 
the public consultation, the scoping interviews, interviews with stakeholders, the targeted surveys 
and the workshops.  

In addition, the study team reviewed a list of documentation (see Annex 1 to the study) independently 
researched or received from DG JUST. The desk research included also legal research to help map 
and assess the state of play of the transposition and application of the PTD in the EU-27 Member 
States and EEA countries. 

Social media listening    

The consultant’s in-house data scientist team performed a social media listening exercise. Through 
data  science  techniques,  the  team  extracted  background  information  from  Twitter  relating  to 
consumer  experiences  with  travel  packages  and  LTAs  and  their  main  relevant  dimensions  (e.g., 
vouchers, refunds). This included a preliminary “sentiment analysis” of consumers’ satisfaction. This 
exercise  combined  consumer  experiences  with  travel  packages  and  LTAs  together  with  their 
opinions/reactions as expressed on social network Twitter. It included the following tasks:   

•  Collecting and merging key hashtags relating to travel package, LTAs, and PTD main concepts;   
•  Translating hashtags and other keywords into all EU27/EEA official languages;   
•  Collecting 3.291 tweets from EU27/EEA countries;  
•  Developing illustrative visuals presenting the degree of satisfaction of consumers vis-à-vis the 

main concepts of the PTD. 

Public consultation 

The external consultant provided analysis of the closed questions, in form of excel tables and word 
summaries, following discussions with DG JUST. The study also included an analysis of some open-
ended questions and position papers that fed into the final report of the study. 

For  further  details  regarding  the  public  consultation,  see  Annex  2,  section  1  “Overview  of 
consultation activities” and section 3 “Other methods” of this annex. 

455 ICF Study, not yet published (see full reference in footnote 11) 

124 

 
 
 
 
Targeted consultations, Interviews, Workshops 

See Annex 2, section 1. Overview of consultation activities. 

The following section outlines the main methodological steps followed by the external consultant, 
and the main decisions on the study that were taken together with DG JUST.  

Task-by-task methodology for the back-to-back evaluation 

This study lasted 12 months during which five main tasks were performed (see Figure 5), several 
sub-tasks, for which a full breakdown is provided in this section. As the study supported a back-to-
back  evaluation  and  impact  assessment,  the  main  tasks  of  the  study,  especially,  Task  4  (Data 
collection)  were  carried  out  in  parallel,  for  both  the  evaluation  and  the  Impact  Assessment 
(hereinafter  “IA”).  A  logical  sequence  between  the  evaluation  and  the  IA  were  respected  to  the 
maximum  possible  extent,  with  the  findings  of  the  former  constituting  the  starting  point  for  the 
assessment  performed  in  the  latter.  The  figure  below  provides  an  overview  of  the  task-by-task 
methodology for the back-to-back evaluation and impact assessment.  

Task-by-task methodology for the back-to-back evaluation and impact assessment 

Source: ICF 

Inception 

The  inception  phase  laid  the  foundations  for  the  study  and  aimed  at  promoting  a  common 
understanding of the context, priorities and expected results between the Commission and  ICF, as 
well as reaching a common view on the most appropriate method for the back-to-back study. The 
entire approach to the study was structured in line with European Commission guidelines on impact 
assessment,  as  set  out  in  the  EC  Better  Regulation  Guidelines  (BRG)  and  Toolbox  (updated  in 
November 2021).  

Kick-off meeting 

The  kick-off  meeting  was  held  on  17  February  2022  in  the  form  of  a  videoconference. 
Representatives from the ICF study team, responsible Commission departments participated to the 

125 

 
 
 
meeting that provided an opportunity for the two project management teams to introduce themselves 
and to discuss the work plan, explain and clarify the tasks and the approach and discuss the content 
of the study reports.  

Research framework 

ICF reworked and refined the research frameworks presented in the Technical Offer and reiterated in 
the Inception Report. The research frameworks constitute the guiding principle of each study carried 
out for the Commission services and, thus, requiring careful design at inception phase. In this phase, 
ICF refined the study questions, the indicators to be used for the assessment of the questions, the 
success criteria, and the methods to be applied for data collection and analysis and, where relevant, 
the  foreseeable  risks  and  the  related  mitigation  measures.  As  part  of  the  revision  of  the  research 
frameworks, the study team, inter alia, provided a reasoned restyle of the main clusters of research 
questions,  suggesting  amendments  to  the  original  research  questions  as  included  in  the  Tender 
specifications, Technical Offer, and Inception Report.  

ICF submitted three main research frameworks, namely (a) Background study research frameworks, 
(b)  Evaluation  framework,  (c)  Impact  Assessment  framework,  and  a  draft  template  for  the  legal 
research in date 29 February 2022 (ICF uploaded the documents on Teams and confirmed this with 
DG JUST via email). DG JUST enabled the ISSG group for the revision of the research frameworks, 
resulting  in  several  rounds  of  revisions,  and  an  extensive  mole  of  comments  received  from  all 
Commission services part of the ISSG. This resulted in 7 versions of the research frameworks that 
were finally validated by DG JUST only in July 2022.   

Task 1.3:  Stakeholder consultation strategy 

The  stakeholder  consultation  served  to  collect  information  and  insights  from  a  wide  range  of 
stakeholder groups. See Section 2.2 for the full breakdown of the stakeholder groups consulted as 
part of the study.  

Stakeholders’ register and stakeholder tracker 

From an operational perspective, ICF prepared during the inception phase a list of stakeholders to be 
consulted, broken down by categories. This list was prepared in the form of an Excel Table named 
‘Stakeholders  register’,  which  has  been  compiled  iteratively,  by  putting  together  information 
stemming from desk research, including contacts from previous studies with DG JUST and the wider 
European Commission. DG JUST supported ICF by providing, for instance, contacts of the Central 
Contact  Points  responsible  for  insolvency  protection  systems,  upon  reception  of  consent  for  the 
transmission  of  information  related  to  personal  data  (name,  profession,  organisation  and  contact 
details) to ICF, which DG JUST had obtained beforehand. The register also underwent several rounds 
of checks, revisions, and refinements, resulting in rounds of exchanges between DG JUST and ICF.  

The stakeholder register was maintained throughout the study and updated with new stakeholders, as 
applicable.  

Preparation of the interview topic guides 

At inception phase of the study, ICF initiated the design of the interview protocol that have been 
presented in the Inception Report in full detail. A key part of the interview process is represented by 
the Topic Guides, which are tools that guide the interviewers to shape the interviews by following a 
certain  structure,  ensuring  that  appropriate  information  is  collected  from  each  stakeholder.  Topic 

126 

 
 
 
 
guides  focused  on  the  content  relevant  to  the  research  questions  that  each  stakeholder  group  is 
expected to contribute to. The topic guides prepared in the context of the PTD study were three: (i) 
Member State authorities (for a. regulatory and  enforcement bodies, and b. insolvency protection 
authorities), (ii) Business organisations/associations, and (iii) Consumer organisations.  

ICF prepared a preliminary list of topics per stakeholder types to be considered in the framework of 
the topic guides in date 26 May 2022, with the corresponding draft topic guides that were sent in June 
2022.  The  topic  guides  underwent  several  rounds  of  revisions,  resulting  in  extensive  rounds  of 
comments, culminating in up to 9 versions of the topic guides. The topic guides were approved, on 
different dates, across September/October 2022, thus, with a significant delay in relation to the study 
plan.  This situation delayed the conclusion of the Inception phase of the project.  

Task 1.4:  Scoping interviews 

Scoping  interviews  allowed  ICF  to  get  a  better  understanding  not  only  of  the  key  issues  to  be 
addressed by the evaluation and impact assessment, but also helped flagging any elements that require 
further clarification and start mapping relevant stakeholders and documentation (see Section 2.2 for 
additional information).  

Task 1.5:  Refining the methodological approach 

The aim of this task was to refine the approach to the evaluation and IA study, based on the feedback 
received at the kick-off meeting, the scoping interviews, and the research framework. The key aspects 
of the evaluation and study that needed revision included the research questions, intervention logic, 
the problem statement and policy objectives, as well as the tools for the consultation (including the 
draft interview guides and survey questions).   

Task 2: Evaluation 

The  purpose  of  this  Task  was  to  provide  a  thorough  and  clear  explanation  of  how  key  tasks  can 
support DG JUST’s evaluation of the PTD in its Staff Working Document.  

Task 2.1: Develop the intervention logic 

The  draft  intervention  logic  for  the  evaluation,  was  finalised  outside  the  inception  report,  and 
underwent several rounds of revisions and discussions upon between the study team and DG JUST. 
The draft of the intervention logic was used as a dynamic tool that was further refined over the course 
of the evaluation, in line with the Better Regulation Guidelines. 

Task 2.2: Define the evaluation baseline 

As per the Better Regulation Guidelines, the baseline of an intervention should be clearly identified 
in evaluations of EU legislation, policies and programmes which will allow comparison over time. 
At sub-task 2.2 the study team defined the baseline period of the evaluation, including the different 
timeframes around which the analysis would have been organised. Task 1 fed into the definition of 
the evaluation baseline.  

In  agreement  with  DG  JUST,  the  general  periodisation  of  the  evaluation  (reflected  in  the  data 
collection tools) was as follows: (a) At the time of 2013 Impact assessment (baseline); (b) 2013-July 
2018; (c) July 2018-outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020; (d) Since COVID-19 to the present day.  

Task 2.3:  Analyse the market practices and developments 

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Linked to Task 2.2 under this Task, the team carried out a thorough analysis of market practices and 
developments. The evidence from this task fed both the Baseline part of the evaluation and Annex 
X. The output of this task fed directly into the evaluation part of the interim and final reports, with a 
dedicated section on the market situation and developments. In terms of the approach to the research 
(what kind of information is collected, and how) this is explained in detail in the data collection Task 
4, in particular Task 4.1 of the Inception Report.  

Task 2.4:  Establish the current state of play in the application of the Directive 

This  task consisted of two main steps. The first step was to  provide  an  overview of the practical 
application of the Directive, and the second step was outlining the key issues.  

Mapping of the state of play of the Directive. 

The mapping covered all EU/EEA Member States. Besides the practical implementation measures 
adopted in the Member States, the study team mapped guidance and documentation that has been 
developed to facilitate implementation in each Member State as well as any relevant case-law. The 
output of this overview has been a comparative overview, building on the conformity assessment 
reports.  

Analysis of key issues 

The  next  step  aimed  to  provide  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  extent  to  which  the  provisions  of  the 
Directive have been implemented in practice. In case a provision of the Directive has in fact not been 
implemented, we identified the underlying reason/s (e.g., gaps, omissions, ambiguities in the wording 
of  the  Directive).  In  terms  of  output,  the  evaluation  team  added  the  findings  in  the  reports.  The 
comparative analysis indicated how provisions have been implemented and identified any obstacles 
or problems, as well as any national implementation strategies and guidelines.  

Task 2.5:  Review of efficiency and effectiveness of existing insolvency protection 
systems 

Building  on the  pool  of documentation  provided  to  ICF  by  DG  JUST,  ICF  analysed  the  baseline 
features on the efficiency and effectiveness of the insolvency protection systems across the EU/EEA 
Member States/countries. This resulted in a section added to the Baseline (see Section 2.4.1) that 
should read in conjunction with the analysis of EQ3 under Effectiveness, in the evaluation.  

Task 2.6:  Data analysis, synthesis and triangulation 

In this task, the study team performed the data analysis, synthesis and triangulation, by following the 
methodology  indicated  in  the  inception  report.  The  completion  of  this  crucial  step  of  the  study 
occurred only in the Draft Final Report/Final Report stage, due to the time needed for the validation 
of the data collection tools. The later launch of the survey questionnaires and consumer survey also 
pushed back the analysis and synthesis of data.   

Task 2.7:  Answer the evaluation questions 

Following the synthesis and triangulation of the evidence, ICF built a structured and clear elaboration 
of responses to each evaluation question. The main findings emerging from this exercise are reflected 
in  the  First  Interim  Report,  Second  Interim  Report,  Draft  Final  Report,  and  Final  Report.  The 
approach will follow the standards set out by the Better Regulation Guidelines (see Inception Report 
for a detailed breakdown of the methodology).  

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Task 3: Impact Assessment 

The aim of Task 3 was to go through the logical steps of an Impact Assessment and how this could 
feed directly into DG JUST’s impact assessment. This was done through a series of tasks that follow 
the outline of the impact assessment by defining the problem, policy objectives, assessing the EU’s 
right to act, develop the policy options, assess the impacts and compare.  

Task 3.1: Finalise the intervention logic and the problem tree 

As part of Task 3.1, the study team finalised the intervention logic of the PTD, and its problem tree 
listing the main problems (general and specific problems, at times also operational problems), which 
are linked to consequences if left unaddressed. The consequences are then visually directed to the 
policy objectives (at strategic/general, specific and possibly operational level). This helped to sketch 
the  problems,  their  consequences  and  how  the  Commission  aims  to  address  them.  A  preliminary 
problem tree was discussed and approved with DG JUST in the early stage of the study at inception 
phase. A final version of the problem tree was then discussed with the stakeholders from the sector 
in occasion of ICF WS1 of the PTD (26 October 2022).  

Task 3.2: Develop the problem definition  

In  this  task,  the  study  team  set  out  the  problems  and  their  drivers  and  the  objectives  of  the 
intervention, thereby covering Steps 1 and 3 of the IA process according to the Better Regulation 
Guidelines. The problem definition was initially based on Commission’s detailed information already 
provided in the tender specifications, the Roadmap/IIA456 and the preliminary problem tree shared 
with ICF at the inception stage of the study. The analysis carried out in the problem definition has 
been stabilised and completed throughout the course of the whole sub-tasks of the data collection and 
included in the Final Report.  

Task 3.3: Develop the policy objectives 

At sub-task 3.3., the study team defined the objectives, in order to inform the design of the proposed 
policy options and the selection of key criteria to be used in assessing their impacts. In this case, the 
general  objective  of  the  intervention  had  already  been  specified  in  the  Commission’s  Roadmap, 
which states that the general objective “is to contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market 
and to better ensure a high level of consumer protection including in times of crisis”.  

Task 3.4: Assess the EU right to act 

In  this  task,  we  confirmed  the  legal  basis,  including  as  regards  any  further  element  of  EU  action 
envisaged  when  reviewing  this  legislation  to  address  the  problem  and  problem  drivers  identified, 
following  the  approach  described  in  the  BRG  (Tool  #5).  This  included  (i)  verifying  whether  the 
Union  has  exclusive  competence  or  not,  (ii)  performing  the  necessity/relevance  test  and  (iii) 
performing the added value test. The task has been supported by the study team’s legal experts.    

Task 3.5: Develop the policy options 

The process of identifying and defining the options began with a list of all the possible measures that 
could be introduced to address the identified problem drivers and contribute to the achievement of 
the desired objectives. The development of the policy options was done as an iterative process of 

456  See:  https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13117-Package-travel-review-of-EU-
rules_en 

129 

 
 
 
screening and narrowing down the options, with the final choice of measures and options finalised 
by Commission before assessing their impacts.  

Potential  individual  policy  measures  were  discussed  by  ICF  and  the  Commission  on  various 
occasions, starting from March 2022. The measures were presented by ICF to stakeholders at WS1 
on the PTD in October 2022 and at WS2 early in December. ICF combined the individual measures 
into 3 options. 

Task 3.6: Assess the impacts of the options 

At Task 3.6 ICF assessed the social, economic, fundamental rights and environmental impacts of the 
policy options for the possible revision of the PTD. For the detailed method of approach of this task, 
please see Technical Offer, and Inception Report.  

Task 3.7: Compare the policy options 

In this step, ICF assessed all significant impacts that were not considered in the cost-benefit analysis 
of the baseline scenario nor of each other options. Where possible, this was done quantitatively and 
if not, then qualitatively. For the detailed method of approach of this task, please see Technical Offer, 
and Inception Report.  

Task 4.2:  Consumer survey 

In this task ICF and Dynata worked closely with DG JUST to design and launch the consumer survey 
part of the study, whose methodological bases were presented in the Inception Report and are not 
replicated here. The first draft of the consumer survey was provided on 16 of June and finalised after 
various modifications in September. The consumer survey was completed in January 2023.  

2.  ANALYSIS AND PROCESSING OF THE RESULTS OF THE PUBLIC AND TARGETED CONSULTATIONS  

In addition to the methods described under section 1 of this annex, DG JUST used excel tables to 
analyse and process the results of the public consultation. For example, with the help of export as 
table or as statistics function of the EUsurvey tool as well as of the DORIS tool developed by DG 
CNECT. Statistics were produced for all respondents as well as for subgroups of respondents, based 
on their answers to questions in the first section, “About you”, of the questionnaire. In addition to the 
standard questions in this first section, companies and business associations were asked to indicate 
their main activity/ies from a list that included: package organiser, package retailer as well as other 
option (see the outcome of this question in Annex 2, section 1.) The replies were used to provide 
further granularity to the analysis of certain questions. However, since many traders indicated more 
than one activity, the replies when looking at for instance organisers vs service providers were not 
very meaningful as the vast majority (also) indicated being an organiser, hence the trends in replies 
were similar as when looking at all companies. Looking at those which only selected one activity 
(“pure traders”), the number of responses became too low to draw meaningful conclusions; we still 
reported this additional information whenever relevant in the report’s footnotes. 

A similar approach, with similar challenges and conclusions, was taken to get more granular results 
from the targeted business survey.  

3.  JUSTIFICATION OF BASELINE ESTIMATES AND METHODS USED FOR CALCULATIONS 

DG JUST has used a combination of official statistics (Eurostat) and industry data (financial accounts 
published by companies in the sector) in gauging the baseline estimates.  

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On the benefits side, the most important gains are assessed qualitatively as explained below. There 
is a small liquidity gain due to a lower average prepayment requirement; based on the assumption of 
a  5  percentage  points  lower  prepayment,  on  average  consumers  would  need  to  prepay  around  70 
euros  less  per  package  compared  to  the  situation  in  2022.  This  is  a  marginal  impact  using  an 
opportunity cost approach, which is why it has not been further quantified.  

On the cost side, the operational costs are one-off and are expected to be negligible. Using sector 
specific  wages  and  the  assumption  of  a  very  pessimistic  estimate  of  one  person  hour  increase  in 
operation costs in line with stakeholder feedback, the average package price would increase by 4 euro 
cents  (EUR  0.04).  On  the  basis  of  stakeholder  feedback,  DG  JUST  assumed  operational  costs  of 
organisers to increase by 3%, 5% and 10% respectively under measure 1.1.1, 1.1.2 and 1.1.3.  

From industry data, DG JUST has estimated a rudimentary cost structure of 80% wages, 20% capital 
cost  and  a  10%  operational  margin.  Assuming  full  pass-through  to  consumers  (assuming  a  fully 
competitive market for package travel), this translates into increases of average prices of packages 
by EUR 4, EUR 7, and EUR 15, or 0.3%, 0.5% and 1% respectively of average package prices (based 
on  2023  estimates).  These  are  high-end  estimates,  i.e.  it  is  very  likely  that  they  overestimate  the 
impact. In addition, it implicitly assumes that the current market is fully efficient. If at least some 
inefficiencies prevail in the current market setting, the price increases will be smaller and could be 
zero  or  even  negative  depending  on  increase  in  competition  and  the  importance  of  market 
imperfections. 

4.  ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS AND COMPARISON OF OPTIONS 

We  assessed  individual  measures  in  terms  of  their  expected  costs  and  benefits.  As  the  available 
evidence  did  not  allow  to  determine  the  quantitative  impact  of  all  the  measures  compared  to  the 
baseline, certain measures were subject to a qualitative analysis.  

The costs and benefits for all stakeholder groups (i.e., travellers, businesses and public authorities) 
were  aggregated  to  represent  the  total  impact  of  each  measure  and  subsequently  each  option, 
distinguishing between quantified impacts (where available) and qualitative ones. The quantitative 
and qualitative scores were normalised, i.e., expressed as a proportion of the same base value, so as 
to determine a mean score.  

Where appropriate, e.g., in view of diverging impacts, the costs and benefits were assessed per sub-
group. This concerns only the stakeholder category of businesses, where the sub-groups concerned 
are organisers, service providers and – to a small extent – retailers.  As 99% of organisers are SMEs, 
the specific impact on SMEs is already accounted for under the impact on organisers. The qualitative 
impacts  related  to  efficiency  were  also  assessed  for  each  stakeholder  (sub-)group,  according  to  a 
monotonous qualitative scale from 0 to 5. The qualitative impacts for costs were assigned negative 
values, while those for benefits – positive ones.   

The effectiveness and coherence of the measures were assessed globally (i.e., not per stakeholder 
sub-group). The scale used for such qualitative assessment was from -5 to +5 for effectiveness, and 
from -2 to +2 for coherence. The baseline was always assigned a score of zero.  

Even though the PTD is a consumer protection instrument, the cautious assumption was applied that 
impacts  on  each  stakeholder  group  (i.e.,  travellers,  businesses  and  public  authorities)  are  equally 
important, and thus the same weight was used for each group.  

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Where  possible,  the  economic  costs  and  benefits  were  quantified  (with  the  total  annual  costs  or 
benefits of an option discounted457 over a 10-year baseline after adding to them 1/10th of total one-
off costs of the option) and the related Net Present Value (“NPV”)458 calculated.  

The benefit-cost ratio459 and Return On Investment460 were also calculated but for simplicity were not 
included  in  the  comparison  of  options,  as  including  them  had  no  effect  on  the  options  ranking. 
Instead,  the  qualitative  assessment  of  costs  and  benefits  (for  option  measures  that  could  not  be 
quantified) was taken into account to compare the options under two multicriteria (MCA) methods461 
(based on their nominal value for the Condorcet outranking method462 and based on the average of 
the quantified and qualitative scores after normalising these, in the weighted-sum MCA) - to ensure 
against sensitivity to MCA method.  

The options were compared by analysing simultaneously their effectiveness (assessed qualitatively), 
efficiency (assessed both quantitatively and qualitatively, where quantification was not possible), and 
coherence (assessed qualitatively).  

The comparison was done using two different MCA methods.  

The  first  one  is  the  Condorcet  outranking  method  (partially  compensatory)  over  a  total  of  8  sub-
criteria: 3 covering effectiveness with respect to the 3 key specific objectives, 3 covering coherence 
and 2 covering the quantified and complementary qualitative assessment of efficiency. 

The Condorcet outranking method allows to evaluate alternatives in terms of pairwise comparisons. 
It assigns to pairs of alternatives a degree of preference, dominance, or indifference, based on how 
well  they  satisfy  the  criteria  and  their  relative  importance.  The  result  table  shows  for  how  many 
criteria a certain option dominates, i.e., is better than, the other options. The method used is partially 
compensatory,  as  it  allows  for  compensation  across  the  different  dimensions  (i.e.,  effectiveness, 
efficiency and coherence). However, there is no compensation between the different sub-criteria. 

The  second  method  used  is  the  simple  weighted  sum  (fully  compensatory)  method.  The  simple 
weighted sum  method involves scalarizing multiple functions into a single objective, normalizing 
values, and subsequently multiplying each term by a user defined weight, indicative of importance. 
The method is deemed fully compensatory, as it weighs the positive and negative attributes of the 
considered alternatives and allows for positive attributes to compensate for the negative ones. 

457 with a 5% discount rate; the use of a lower (1%) or higher (10%) rate as also checked and did not change the ranking 
of the options. 
458 Net present value (NPV) is a financial metric that seeks to capture the total value of an initiative. The idea behind 
NPV is to project all of the future cash inflows and outflows associated with an initiative, discount all those future cash 
flows to the present day, and then add them together. 
459 The benefit-cost ratio (BCR) is an indicator showing the relationship between the relative costs and benefits of an 
initiative, expressed in monetary or qualitative terms. If a project has a BCR greater than 1.0, the initiative is expected to 
deliver a positive net present value to the stakeholders. 
460 Return on Investment (ROI) is a profitability metric used to evaluate how well an initiative performs. ROI is expressed 
as a percentage and is calculated by dividing an investment's net profit (or loss) by its initial cost or outlay. 
461 A Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA) can be used to identify and compare different policy options by assessing their 
effects, performance, impacts, and trade-offs. MCA provides a systematic approach for supporting complex decisions 
according to pre-determined criteria and objectives. It allows identifying a single preferred alternative, or to rank or short-
list possible alternatives. 

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This method was applied over the 3 key IA criteria, i.e., effectiveness, efficiency and coherence. The 
values  used  were  based  on  the  average  of  the  normalised  value  of  each  related  sub-score.  Equal 
weights were used, as weights are not needed to counter the effect of the number of sub-criteria, since 
the average of the normalised scores of the sub-criteria were used.  

In  addition,  it  was  deemed  of  interest  to  check  the  options’  ranking  based  on  a  mix  of  the  two 
methods,  i.e.,  the  Condorcet  outranking  method  but  based  on  the  mean  normalised  scores  of  the 
weighted sum method. 

The  preferred  option  –  Option  A  –  was  consistently  found  to  rank  first  across  these  three  MCA 
methods.  Interestingly,  the  fully  compensatory  weighted  sum  method  did  not  provide  the  same 
ranking as the Condorcet methods regarding the 2nd best and worst options – with option B ranking 
higher 
fully  compensatory  method. 
Whereas  the  fact  that  Option  A  performed  best  independently  of  the  MCA  method  used  further 
increases trust in option A.  

than  option  C  only  under 

the  weighted  sum 

Additional sensitivity analyses were performed to check the stability of the options’ ranking when 
using - instead of the average quantified impact of a given measure - respectively their minimum and 
maximum quantified impact (using high-end cost assumptions).  

The detailed results of the costs and benefits calculations, as well as of the comparison of options and 
their sensitivity analyses, are presented in Annex 10.  

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ANNEX 5: COMPETITIVENESS CHECK 

1. COMPETITIVENESS CHECK: 

Overview of impacts on competitiveness  

Impact of the 
initiative 
(++ / + / 0 / - / -- / 
n.a.) 

References to sub-sections of the 
main report or annexes 

0 

0/+ 

0 

0/+ 

Section 6 and Annex 3.2 

Section 6 and Annex 3.2 

Section 6 and Annex 3.2 

Section 6 and Annexes 3.2 and 6 

Dimensions of 
Competitiveness 

Cost 
and 
competitiveness 

price 

International competitiveness  

Capacity to innovate 

SME competitiveness 

2. SYNTHETIC ASSESSMENT  

Cost and price competitiveness 

Several of the measures included in the preferred option may result in a slight cost increase 
for  organisers.  This  would  be  the  case  for  measure  1.1.1  (flexible  limitation  of 
prepayments) and potentially also measure 2.1 (covering vouchers and refund claims by 
insolvency protection in Member States where this is not yet the case). It should also be 
taken into account that voluntary measures, such as a crisis fund or insolvency back-up 
fund (1.2.1 and 2.1) may also have cost impacts if Member States decide to introduce such 
solutions. However, organisers have indicated that any cost increases resulting from the 
introduction  of  new  measures  in  the  PTD  will  be,  as  much  as  possible,  passed  on  to 
travellers in the form of price increases for packages. In any event, any possible cost – and 
corresponding price – increases are expected to be small. On the other hand, other measures 
included in the preferred option, such as 1.3.1 (B2B refund right in case a service is not 
provided),  may  result  in  slight  cost  decreases,  while  measure  1.4.1  (possibility  to  use 
vouchers instead of direct refunds) would improve organisers’ liquidity position. 

It  should  also  be  taken  into  account  that  voluntary  measures,  such  as  a  crisis  fund  or 
insolvency back-up fund (1.2.1 and 2.1.1) may also have cost impacts if Member States 
decide  to  introduce  such  solutions.  However,  organisers  have  indicated  that  any  cost 
increases resulting from the introduction of new measures in the PTD will be , as much as 
possible, passed on to travellers in the form of price increases for packages. Overall, any 
impact on cost and price competitiveness will hence remain very limited. 

International competitiveness 

Approximately  112  000  EU  package  organisers,  99%  of  which  are  SMEs,  would  be 
affected  by  the  measures  included  in  the  preferred  option.  Package  organisers  would 

134 

 
 
 
primarily gain from an increase liquidity from the B2B refund right measure, which they 
identified as a need. Based on the information available it has not been possible to quantify 
the overall potential impact of this measure on international competitiveness of organisers 
and service providers. 

In principle, all service providers – both established within the EU and outside of it but 
targeting their services at EU consumers – would be subject to Measure 1.3.1 included in 
the  preferred  option,  i.e.,  a  B2B  refund  right  for  organisers  in  case  the  service  is  not 
performed. In practice, though, organisers based in the EU may not be able to insist on the 
application  of  EU  law  in  a  business-to-business  contract  with  a  third-country  service 
provider463 and to enforce a 7-day refund in relation to third country service providers.464 
However, there is already a difference at present in the scope to enforce refunds within and 
outside the EU and this will not change with the introduction of a B2B refund. Moreover, 
the  right  to  a  refund  for  services  that  are  not  provided  corresponds  broadly  to  general 
principles  of  contract  law.  Given  that  this  difference  already  exists,  the  potential  gap 
between  the  enforcement  possibilities  for  organisers  within  and  outside  of  EU  will  not 
become  greater  with  the  introduction  of  the  preferred  option.  Therefore,  no  specific 
mitigation measures are considered necessary. 

By contrast, the new provision would make it easier (and faster) for organisers to obtain a 
refund from (especially EU-based) service providers than at present, as, in view of their 
smaller bargaining power they are often not able to agree to mutually beneficial contract 
terms with service providers such as airlines. This will, in turn, put package organisers in 
a  better  position  to  refund  travellers,  and  have  a  positive  impact  on  the  organisers’ 
competitiveness. This may therefore put organisers in a better position vis-a-vis EU service 
providers and to a lesser extent vis-a-vis third country service providers. 

Moreover, whilst overall competitiveness would be unchanged, the obstacles to recovering 
funds  easily  from  non-EU  countries,  as  long  as  not  addressed  (e.g.  through  bilateral 
agreements  between  the  EU  and  the  third  country  concerned),  could  lead  organisers  to 
choose the services of EU providers, such as airlines, over non-EU service providers for 
inclusion in packages that they offer. As a result, this might potentially in the longer-term 
lead to an improvement of the competitive position of EU service providers. In addition, it 
may  encourage  third  country  service  providers  wishing  to  operate  within  the  EU  to 
establish a representative office and/or a subsidiary in the EU. Overall, the B2B refund 
right contained in the preferred option is hence expected to have a positive impact on the 
competitiveness of package organisers and a neutral impact on EU service providers. 

A  competitiveness  gain  within  the  EU  is  expected  from  the  measure  contained  in  the 
preferred  option,  which  limits  pre-payments,  unless  there  are  justified  reasons  for 
increasing  them  due  to  prepayments  to  service  providers  or  to  cover  organisers’  costs 
directly  related  to  the  preparation  of  the  package    (measure  1.1.1).  This  measure 
harmonises  rules  among  Member  States,  since  some  countries  already  apply  it,  and 
increases effective market competition. It is not possible, however, on the basis of available 
data to quantify the competitiveness gain for organisers resulting from this measure. The 
flexible  limitation  of  prepayments  does  not  have  any  impact  on  service  providers. 
International  competitiveness  with  the  rest  of  the  world  will  not  change  as  a  result  of 

463 Under Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and the Council of 17 June 
2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) the fundamental principle is the freedom of 
the parties to choose the applicable law. 
464 The respect, or not, of the 7-day deadline for the B2B refund would not influence the legal deadline for 
the organiser to refund the traveller within 14 days, already enshrined in the PTD. 

135 

 
 
measure 1.1.1, because third country organisers offering packages to consumers in the EU 
also have to apply the revised PTD.  

In  general,  there  should  be  limited  impacts  on  international  competitiveness  from  the 
measures  included  in  the  preferred  option.  The  value  added  of  the  service  provided  by 
package organisers is almost entirely generated within the EU. As a result, the potential 
channel by which international competitiveness could suffer is very small. In any event, 
the estimated impacts on costs are very small as well (both one-off and variable) and could 
certainly not be considered sufficiently significant on their own to redirect demand to non-
EU providers. 

Capacity to innovate 

The proposed measures are not expected to result in substantial changes to the companies’ 
capacity to innovate. This concerns both organisers and service providers.   

SME competitiveness 

Certain  (sub-)measures included in  the preferred option, e.g.,  those related to  increased 
insolvency protection (coverage of vouchers and refund claims) where this was not yet the 
case (measure 2.1) may have an impact on SME competitiveness, as described in Section 
6.2 and Annex 3 (sub-section 2) and Annex 6. The introduction of a B2B refund right if 
the  relevant  service  is  not  performed  (measure  1.3.1)  may  lead  to  quicker  refunds  to 
organisers.  This  would  enable  organisers  to  make  quicker  refunds  to  travellers  without 
having to use their own funds or borrow money from the capital market, thus improving 
the  liquidity  position  of  organisers.  It  might,  however,  slightly  negatively  affect  the 
liquidity of certain service providers, which are currently not obliged to provide refunds 
within the proposed 7-day deadline. It should also be considered that service providers in 
the context of packages  are often airlines  and hotels. As such, the percentage of SMEs 
among all service providers is lower than among all organisers (99% of all organisers). 
Therefore, this measure would be beneficial for SMEs. Consequently, it could facilitate 
market entry for new SMEs and increase competition in the internal market. 

136 

 
 
ANNEX 6: SME TEST 

Step 

Identification of affected 
businesses 

IA study approach taken, 
outputs and mitigation 
The evaluation has identified the 
share of SMEs affected by PTD.  

Consultation of SME stakeholders  The  consultant  working  on  the 
supporting study for the evaluation 
and impact assessment reached out 
to representatives of SMEs inviting 
the 
them 
consultations  (interviews  and  the 
massively 
SMEs 
surveys). 
participated 
public 
in 
consultation.  SME  representatives 
also  responded  to  the  targeted 
survey  and 
the 
interviews.   

to  participate 

took  part 

the 

in 

in 

Measurement of the impact on 
SMEs 

the  assessment  of 

the 
During 
various options and measures, the 
impacts  on  SMEs  are  identified 
and highlighted, whenever relevant 
or disproportionate. In the absence 
of quantifiable data, impacts were 
assessed qualitatively.   

137 

Estimated outcome/results 

the 

fewer 

than  10  people). 

According  to  the  evaluation,  approx.  99%  of 
travel  agencies, 
tour  operators  and  other 
reservation services in the EU identified as SMEs 
in 2019, i.e. around 112 000 companies. Approx. 
94% of these businesses were micro enterprises.  
The proposed measures would have an impact on 
both  larger  companies  and  SMEs.  In  certain 
cases,  both  organisers  and  service  providers 
could  be  impacted.  None  of  the  measures 
proposed are expected to significantly influence 
the  number  of  SMEs  operating  in  the  market. 
Nevertheless,  cost  factors  impacting  on  their 
operations  and  potential  future  growth  were 
identified.  
Out  of  the  323  businesses  participating  in  the 
public consultation 310 identified as SMEs, out 
of which 249 were micro enterprises (employing 
fewer 
targeted 
In 
for  businesses  and  business 
consultation 
associations, out of the 30 responses only 6 came 
from  businesses.  Amongst  those,  only  one 
company 
identified  as  a  small  company 
than  50  people).  216 
(employing 
stakeholders were identified for interviews. Out 
of  these,  24  were  businesses  and  38  were 
business  associations.  Altogether  7  interviews 
with businesses were held, of which 4 with SME 
representatives. The remaining companies either 
did  not  respond  to  the  invitation  or  were 
unavailable.  
Information on business and SME impacts were 
collected  from  the  targeted  survey,  interviews 
and 
literature  available.  The  public 
consultation  contained  limited  quantifiable  cost 
data.  Most  quantifiable  cost 
impacts  were 
collected  in  relation  to  Option  0,  the  baseline 
scenario,  as  these  were  built  on  past  practices. 
Relatively limited quantifiable cost impacts were 
identified for the proposed measures. This was in 
part due the inability of stakeholders to delineate 
certain cost items from their overall operational 
costs. In the absence of cost data, impacts were 
assessed qualitatively. SME impacts were found 
to align with overall business impacts with little 
to  no  disproportionality.  The  assessment  noted 
the  impact  that  exogenous  factors  can  have  on 
SMEs ability to adopt or cope with the proposed 
regulatory  changes.  These  factors  include  the 
financial  health  of  the  company,  its  consumer 
base  and  the  selection  of  its  offers,  amongst 
others.  

the 

 
 
the  measures 

The assessment found that measures with higher 
flexibility offer more opportunities for SMEs to 
adapt  their  practices  in  line  with  the  regulatory 
changes.  Some  of 
identified 
increasing consumer trust as potential medium to 
long-term impact,  which could positively affect 
demand and the turnover of businesses, including 
SMEs.  
Longer transition periods were also identified as 
potential  theoretical  mechanisms  to  support  the 
adaptation  of  SMEs  in  case  of  mandatory 
large  majority  of 
the 
measures.  However, 
package  organisers  (99%),  are  SMEs.  It  would, 
therefore,  not  seem  justified  to  set  different 
transition  periods  depending  on  the  size  of 
in  contract  and 
undertakings.  Furthermore, 
consumer protection law, different rules based on 
the size of the business would be very confusing 
and  detrimental  for  consumers  (even  during 
transition  periods).  In  addition,  most  of  the 
measures contained in the preferred option would 
have a positive impact on SME organisers (e.g. 
vouchers or B2B refund if a service is cancelled, 
various  clarifications)  and  are  not  expected  to 
(international) 
impact 
competitiveness, either. It would hence be in the 
interest  of  SMEs  that  they  are  applicable  as 
quickly as possible. On the other hand, there may 
be some (neutral or somewhat negative) impact 
from the coverage of vouchers and refund claims 
by  insolvency  protection  and/or  the  flexible 
limitation of prepayments. Overall, however, the 
positive  impacts  will  prevail,  so  that  a  quicker 
application  of  the  new  measures  would  be 
beneficial for organisers, including SMEs. 

negatively 

their 

Assessment 
mechanisms 
measures 

of 
alternative 
and  mitigating 

During  the  assessment  of  various 
measures,  mitigating  measures 
were  considered  and  identified 
where relevant.  

138 

 
 
ANNEX 7: PROBLEM TREE 

139 

 
 
 
ANNEX 8: ANNEX ON PRICE SENSITIVITY FOR TRAVEL SERVICES 

Price sensitivity 

Price sensitivity is the way in which the cost of a product affects consumers' purchasing decisions. It 
is also known as price elasticity of demand.465  

Travel  services  are  known  to  be  particularly  price  elastic  as  even  minor  fluctuations  in  price  are 
associated with changes in demand. Depending on the channels of distribution,466 the percentage of 
price-sensitive travellers may go from 87% (metasearch environment) 467, to 76% (leisure travellers 
booking through online travel agencies)468 and 33%.469 

PWC in its 2017 study for the European Commission estimated that the average price elasticity for 
European Tourism was -1,29 (figure used to assess the impact of tax increases, but which could also 
be used to assess the impact of administrative or regulatory burdens).470  

Recent studies show that this trend is currently increasing because of high inflation and interest rates, 
combined with the progressive end of the so-called ‘revenge tourism’. Price sensitivity remains top 
of  mind  for  travellers  according  to  Expedia  ‘2023  Q1  Travel  Insights  Report’’  based  on  industry 
insights  and  findings  gathered  in  its  Traveler  Value  Index  2023”.  This  index  underlines  that  low 
pricing is a leading factor when booking travel services – where full refunds or cleaning practices 
were dominant during COVID times.  

This finding is confirmed by the survey of Jan 2023 done for the “Salon mondial du tourisme de 
Paris”  which  concludes  that  price  is  now  the  first  criterion  for  49%  of  French  respondents  when 
choosing a type of holidays and also item per item (transport, accommodation …) as well as by the 
March 2023 survey done for the European Travel Commission, ‘Monitoring sentiment for domestic 
and intra-European travel’. Last but not least, these expressed preferences are confirmed by revealed 
preferences, with early bookings quickly recovering ground over last-minute bookings to secure best 
prices.471 To be noted, however, that the quoted surveys do not make a distinction between package 
travel and booking of stand-alone services. In some cases, the described trends seem to refer to stand-
alone services, with, among others, the above-mentioned survey ‘Monitoring sentiment for domestic 
and intra-European travel’ referring to consumers having booked “parts of their trip”.   

465 Harvard Business Review (2015), “A Refresher on Price Elasticity”. 
466 In the behavioural economics literature, framing of choices is often found to be very influential on how individuals 
perceive and choose between options. Behavioural Study on Consumers’ Engagement in the Circular Economy Final 
Report  October  2018.  LE  Europe,  VVA  Europe,  Ipsos,  ConPolicy,  Trinomics  October  2018  (covering  the  impact  of 
different energy label framings on consumer behaviour). 
467 Ward Nicholas, ‘Rate, Position, and Brand Preference in Metasearch’, 4 June 2015 (Koddi - advertising technology 
company). 
468 Google ‘Traveller’s road to decision’ (2014 June). 
469 Kah, J.A.; Lee, S.-H.; Kim, J.S. (2022), “The Effects of Travelers’ Price Sensitivity on Information Search Behaviors”, 
Sustainability,  #  14,  3818  (survey  conducted  in  April  2020,  i.e.  when  South  Korea  managed  the  first  COVID  wave 
without lockdown or severe restriction measures).  
470 PWC (2017), "The Impact of Taxes on the Competitiveness of European Tourism", for the European Commission. 
“[…] while the price sensitivity of tourists to a change in price is driven by a number of factors including location-specific 
factors and the purpose of travel of the tourists themselves, the price sensitivity of tourism in general has been increasing. 
With the development of price comparison sites and the availability of online ratings which provide better information 
about  quality,  consumers  have  become  far  better  informed  about  the  price  and  quality  of  competing  destinations, 
influencing their decisions on holiday destinations.” 
471 Industry data covered by non-disclosure condition.  

 
 
 
Price increase of a 20% prepayment limitation 

Business  models  (traditional  packages,  dynamic  packages,  gift  boxes  …)  and  prices  vary  widely 
across the Single Market.  

In  the  absence  of  public  statistics  or  consolidated  industry  data  (not  available  because  of  their 
commercially  sensitive  nature),  typical  examples  may  illustrate  the  likely  consequence  of  a  20% 
prepayment limitation on the price of travel packages.472 It needs to be highlighted, though, that this 
example relates to a strict limitation of prepayments, as the one considered in Measure 1.1.2, and not 
the flexible one (Measure 1.1.1) included in the preferred option. As a result, its relevance for the 
assessment of the preferred option is only limited.  

In April 2023, Expedia presented at the European Parliament the following example:473  

•  For a dynamic package of EUR 1,000 Euro, the travel organiser would have to prepay 
around EUR 700 (about EUR 500 for the flight -full payment - and EUR 200 for the 
accommodation – down payment) or 70% of the package.  

•  On a yearly basis, the cost of capital474 for a travel organiser is currently around 10%. 

•  As a booking is most of the time made 6 months in advance, the additional financial cost for 

the travel organiser would be around EUR 35 (EUR 70 / 2)  

•  Most travel organisers, weakened by the COVID crisis and high inflation, will have to pass 
on this cost to the consumer, i.e. EUR 35 EUR on top of EUR 1,000 or 3,5% price increase. 

Likely consequences of this price increase 

A pre-COVID study done by a company leading in advertising technology may shed some light on 
the likely consequences of a price increase of less than 3,5%. This study looked at how consumers 
wishing to book hotel accommodation online are responding to price, position, and advertiser-types 
in a controlled metasearch environment.475  

It shows that price has the highest impact on selection and Click-Through-Rate (CTR).476 Confronted 
with mock-ups presenting various prices for the same hotel on different platforms (metasearch ad 
auction), the “low price” was 8 times more likely to get clicked. 

472 See ECTAA infographic on prepayments (2023 April).  
473 Workshop “Payment in the tourism value chain: Where does the money go?”, European Parliament, 21 March 2023, 
co-organised by MEP István UJHELYI and ECTAA (European Travel Agents' and Tour Operators' Associations). Speech 
of  Jean-Philippe  Monod  de  Froideville,  Senior  Vice-President  Global  Government  and  Corporate  Affairs  at  Expedia 
Group. 
474 The cost of borrowing money from creditors or raising it from investors (equity) to finance its operations.  
475 Ward Nicholas, ‘Rate, Position, and Brand Preference in Metasearch’, 4 June 2015 (Koddi - advertising technology 
company). 
476 CTR = number of clicks an Ad receives divided by the number of times the Ad is shown (also called impressions). 

141 

 
 
 
These results were published in 2015, but it is very likely that this behaviour is even stronger today 
for reasons above-mentioned reasons (disposable income for travel being under pressure because of 
energy prices …).  

In  conclusion,  increasing  the  price  of  travel  package  is  likely  to  have  a  major  impact  on  travel 
agencies because: 

•  Price-sensitive consumers represent a very large segment of the travel market.  
•  They tend to compare prices via online tools.  
•  When confronted with a very small difference in prices, an overwhelming majority goes for 

the cheapest option.  

•  When looking for hotel accommodation, they overwhelmingly tend to opt for direct booking 
with the hotel, depriving themselves of the Package Travel Directive protection, because of 
a strong bias in favour of suppliers.477  

•  The selection rate between suppliers and Online Travel Agencies evens out only when the 

latter are 10% cheaper than suppliers.  

477 Some surveyed consumers did so because they were more familiar with hotel brands than OTAs brands (trust factor). 
Many opted for direct bookings with hotels in the hope of a better customer service (better room location, more likely 
upgrades, …). 

142 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX  9:  IMPACTS  ON  CONSUMER  RIGHTS,  FUNDAMENTAL  RIGHTS 
AND RELATED SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS 

Key Consumer impacts questions: 

(1) Would the policy option affect consumers’ ability to benefit from the four fundamental freedoms 
of the internal market? Attention should be paid to ensuring equal access to retail goods and services, 
the ability to move freely, access to various services at distance and the possibility to purchase cross-
border products. Particular attention should be paid to any possible discrimination or other barriers 
based on nationality or place of residence (non-discrimination principle).  

No, on the contrary the PTD revision is expected to contribute to a more even-playing field across 
the EU, which is likely to boost cross-border services and competition, and thus to accessing cross-
border services in the PT field, without any discrimination based on nationality or place of residence. 

(2) Would the policy option affect the prices, quality, availability or choice of consumer goods and 
services?  

Increasing consumer protection through a more even-playing field across the EU is likely to boost 
cross-border services and competition, which is likely to lead to lower consumer prices, more choice 
of  goods  and  services  and  possibly  also  better  quality.  This  must  however  be  done  without  any 
substantial  costs  increase  for  PT  operators  and  service  providers  to  avoid  that  such  increases  be 
passed onto consumers or that competition be reduced by market consolidation towards the bigger 
players, in a market which includes a lot of SMEs. 

(3) Would the policy option affect consumer information, knowledge, trust or protection?  

Yes, simplifying the PTD should help reduce asymmetric access to information or excessive costs of 
accessing information, which may remedy a market failure, allow consumers to make better-informed 
decisions, reduce the scope for unfair practices by traders and generally increase consumer trust and 
protection. Similarly, knowledge of consumer rights, awareness of and trust in redress mechanisms 
are key to ensuring that consumers fully benefit from the legal protections available.  

(4) Would the policy option affect the safety of consumer goods and services?  

No 

(5) Would the policy option contribute to more sustainable consumption patterns? 

No. 

143 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Fundamental Rights impacts questions: 

A - Does the option impact on any of the fundamental rights endorsed by the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights:    

1 – Dignity (right to life, personal integrity, prohibition of torture, slavery, forced labour, the death 
penalty)  

No 

2 – Freedoms (liberty, privacy, protection of personal data, marriage, thought, conscience, religion, 
expression, assembly, arts and sciences, education, conduct business, work, property and asylum)    

o Does the option affect any of the individual’s freedoms?  

No 

o Does the option involve the processing of personal data and are the individual’s right to access, 
rectification and objection guaranteed? 

No  

o  Does  the  option  affect  the  freedom  to  conduct  a  business  or  impose  additional  requirements 
increasing the transaction costs for the economic operators concerned?  

The  proposed  measures  may  increase  transaction  costs  for  some  of  the  economic  operators 
concerned, but will also decrease some of these costs, thanks to simplification and improved legal 
certainty  which  the  PTD  revisions  would  entail.  These  impacts  are  specified  in  detail  under  the 
competitiveness  and SME test annex. The further harmonisation  entailed across Member states is 
expected to lead to a more “even playing field” and thus facilitate the development of cross-border 
trade/services within the EU in the field of package travel. 

o Are property rights  affected (land, movable property, tangible/intangible assets)?  Is acquisition, 
sale or use of property rights limited?  

No 

3 – Equality (equality before the law, non-discrimination on basis of sex, race, colour, ethnic or social 
origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a 
national  minority,  property,  birth,  disability,  age  or  sexual  orientation,  cultural,  religious  and 
linguistic diversity, the rights of children and the elderly, integration of persons with disabilities).   

o Does the option safeguard the principle of equality before the law and would it affect directly or 
indirectly  the  principle  of  non-discrimination,  equal  treatment,  gender  equality  and  equal 
opportunities for all?   

The PTD revision safeguards the principle of equality before the law. Positive impacts from a better 
functioning internal market in the field of Package Travel are likely to enable more EU citizens to 
benefit  from  it  under  clearer  conditions  and  with  higher  guarantees  of  getting  reimbursed  for 
prepayments made (or being provided with equivalent vouchers) also in case of bankruptcy of the 
operators or service providers involved. 

o Does the option have (directly or indirectly) a different impact on women and men?   

No. 

144 

 
 
   
 
  
 
o Does the preferred option ensure respect for the rights of people with disabilities in conformity with 
the UN Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities?  

The revised PTD does not impact negatively the rights of people with disabilities. The simplifications 
and improved information to travellers proposed are also expected to impact them positively. 

o Does the option affect the rights of the child (or group) and respect of the UN Convention on the 
rights of the child?    

No 

4 – Solidarity (right to fair working conditions, protection against unjustified dismissal, and access 
to health care, social and housing assistance) 
The preferred option does not entail any negative impact on these issues.  

5 – Citizens’ Rights (to vote in European Parliament and local elections, to move freely within the 
EU, to good administration, to access documents and to petition the European Parliament)    

The  preferred  option  is  expected  to  facilitate  free  movement  of  citizens  both  within,  across  and 
outside  the  EU,  through  simpler  and  clearer  legislation  related  to  package  travel  services  and  a 
reinforcement  of  travellers’  rights  related  to  pre-payments  in  case  of  bankruptcy  or  in  some 
exceptional crisis periods.  

6 – Justice (the right to an effective remedy, a fair trial, to the presumption of innocence, the principle 
of legality, non-retrospectivity and double jeopardy)   

The simplification and higher legal certainty entailed in the measures are expected to favour effective 
remedies, the legality principle and swifter and lighter proceedings where needed. 

o Does the option affect the individual’s access to justice?   

Yes, but it would only affect them positively - not just for individuals (see above) but also for groups 
resorting to PT services. 

B - Are the rights in question absolute rights, which may not be subject to limitations? 

No (i.e. the preferred option does not affect negatively any absolute right or subject it to limitations).  

C - Do the options have opposing impacts on different fundamental rights? 

The combination of policy measures proposed seeks to strike a balance between consumer rights and 
the rights to conduct businesses in the field of package travel, after having assessed the costs and 
benefits entailed in the various measures (and their combination).  

145 

 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Impacts on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): 

By facilitating better information provision by organisers and better protection of travellers’ rights, 
the  preferred  option  will  result  in  more  equal  position  of  all  travellers  in  the  EU.  It  will  hence 
contribute to SDG no. 10 – reduced inequalities.  

In  addition,  the  clarifications  of  several  provisions  in  the  PTD  will  reduce  inequalities  between 
travellers form different Member States and likely decrease the number of travellers needing recourse 
to dispute resolution or legal procedures. The proposed measures will hence contribute to promoting 
non-discriminatory laws and policies and ensuring equal justice, addressed by SDG no. 16 Peace, 
justice and strong institutions.  

Finally, the measures will contribute to promoting growth of SMEs  – as most package organisers 
belong  to  this  category  –  thereby  contributing  to  SDG  no.  8  -  Promote  sustained,  inclusive,  and 
sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment, and decent work for all. 

146 

 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 10: RESULTS OF BENEFITS AND COSTS ANALYSIS, SCORING OF 
OPTIONS AND THE SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 

1.  CALCULATIONS, SCORING AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 

The calculations of costs and benefits, the detailed scoring of options on effectiveness, efficiency and 
coherence, as well as the sensitivity analysis, are included on the following pages. 

147 

 
 
 
Input quantification: 

Data sources201420152016201720182019202020212022202371,915 €78,396 €85,461 €93,162 €101,557 €110,709 €27,627 €35,879 €76,673 €110,709 €million euro in current prices2017201920202021202220231,202 €1,202 €1,202 €1,202 €1,220 €1,239 €1,239 €1,274 €1,383 €1,475 €euro in current prices20172019202020212022202359,820,493                       65,211,735                       71,088,212                       77,494,219                       83,216,925                       89,382,180                       22,304,975                       28,152,766                       55,429,887                       75,079,086                                        count2019202020211146277374million flights50million flights18.1%-19.0%calculated-75.9%-75.0%March-May 20204,029,660                       4,991,147,565 €10%30%499,114,756 €1,497,344,269 €5001500millionduring crisis months Again, consumer perspective with a focus on cancellation.112,000                             businesses (ICF data)calculatedcalculatedICF study: assumption of final financial loss during normal timescalculatedICF studyEurostat for 2014, 2017, 2020, 2021; interpolated values for 2015, 2016, 2018, 2019, 2022, 2023 based on firm level data (ORBIS) and European Commission 2023 Spring Economic Forecast Eurostat for 2014, 2017, 2020, 2021; interpolated values for 2015, 2016, 2018, 2019, 2022, 2023 based on firm level data (ORBIS) and European Commission 2023 Spring Economic Forecast Eurostat for 2014, 2017, 2020, 2021; interpolated values for 2015, 2016, 2018, 2019, 2022, 2023 based on firm level data (ORBIS) and European Commission 2023 Spring Economic Forecast EurostatECA 2021 report Impact on industry for the whole year of 2020 is consistent with the "trend" of the three months of March-May.This is more the consumer perspective as cancellations concentrated in those three months.1. Ok, if we clearly state that those cancelled packages and the loss ratio are for the period March-May 2020 and not for the entire 2020                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  3. In normal times, in 2017, using an estimate between 10-30%, consumer losses could range from 540 million to 1.6 billion EUR. The contractor estimated cumulative yearly losses of travellers  between EUR 126 million and EUR 1.6 billion 
 
 
 
 
Quantification Measure 1.1 

149 

BenefitsCostsReduction of consumer detriment lower prepaymentinputTotal expenditure for package trips EU-27 in 202264,520,465,139 €inputinputAverage prepayment rate (baseline)33%50%inputoutputTotal prepayment by travellers in 202221,291,753,496 €32,260,232,570 €inputoutputAverage prepayment per package456.47 €691.62 €outputinputAverage future prepayment rate20%10% margin (80% wages, 20% capital)outputAverage future prepayment per package276.65 €Price increase due to lower prepayments11070.89177outputTotal prepayment based on future rate for 202212,904,093,028 €3% operational cost increase for operators for M1.1.14.4332,126,753 €3%2023 estimatesoutputReduction in money spent for prepayment8,387,660,468 €19,356,139,542 €5% operational cost increase for operators for M1.1.27.4553,544,588 €5%2023 estimatesoutputLiquidity gain per travel package (consumer)151 €349 €10% operational cost increase for operators for M1.1.314.71,107,089,177 €10%2023 estimatesCost fully passed over to consumers (one-off adjustment cost for consumers)4 €estimated maximum price increase per package 2023 estimates0.30%estimated increase in average price 2023 estimatesNew average prepayment rate28%45%18,065,730,239 €29,034,209,313 €387.31 €622.46 €Around 70 euros of "benefit" for the consumer (reduction in average prepayment requirement)69.16 €69.16 € 
 
 
 
 
Quantification Measure 1.2 

150 

CostsCost of voluntary crisis fund = take-up rate EU27 * number of packages * cost per packageM1.2.1minimal costs because of low take-up, cost-neutral over timeM1.2.2Cost per package PL5EURPPP PL 202286%EU averageCost per package EU average5.81EURExtrapolation cost of crisis fund EU27 (2022 data)322,266,786          EUR 
 
 
 
 
 
Quantification Measure 2.1, 2.2 

151 

 
 
 
Quantification Measure 3.3 

152 

BenefitsSourceReduction of consumer detriment clarification role of different partiesinputTime loss when travellers did not know who to contact for a refund13daysinputNumber of cancelled packages during March-May 2020 (COVID-19)4,029,660                            input%travellers who did not know who to contact for a refund during COVID-1933.00%could be 50% or even two thirdsoutputTotal number of packages for which it was not clear know who to contact for a refund1,329,788                             outputTotal time loss COVID-19 (total consumer detriment during crisis)1,329,788                             3,989,364                                   daysReduction of consumer detriment due to measure 3.3.150%assumptionReduction in time loss during crisis 3.3.1664,894                                1,994,682                                  daysReduction of consumer detriment due to measure 3.3.275%assumptionReduction in time loss during crisis 3.3.2997,341                                2,992,023                                  daysMonetisationTime effectively spent on determining who to contact13hours - assumption of 1h spent / day lostAverage hourly rate EU-2729 €using ICF dataTotal monetised time loss COVID-19 (total consumer detriment March-May 2020)38,563,848 €115,691,544 €Reduction in consumer detriment due to measure 3.3.119,281,924 €57,845,772 €using above assumptionReduction in consumer detriment due to measure 3.3.228,922,886 €86,768,658 €page 106 in evaluation document sent to RSB ("issues reported by consumers on refund rights due to unavoidable circumstances under Article 12)  
 
 
Costs for Member States – overview 

153 

Total costs of all average annual costs of all measures included within the PO (average costs for reported for cost savings i.e. average of the average yearly cost for each measure, across all measures)Total costs of all average annual costs of all measures included within the PO (average costs for reported for cost savings i.e. average of the average yearly cost for each measure, across all measures)Average annual cost savings presented (not totals)Total costs of all average annual costs of all measures included within the PO (average costs for reported for cost savings i.e. average of the average yearly cost for each measure, across all measures)Average annual cost savings presented (not totals)ECMonitoring/enforcement costsRecurring                         -                            -                            -   MSAdministrative costs for transposition, alignment of procedures, guidance and training, monitoring and reporting (coloured green)One-off                   49,677                    49,677                    49,677 Monitoring costsRecurring                         -                            -                            -   Reporting to the EUOne-off                    5,390                          -                            -   ConsumersCost savings resulting from simplification Recurring                         -                            -                            -   IndustryCost savings resulting from simplificationRecurring                         -                            -                            -   Totals55,067                 49,677                 49,677                 Cost itemsType of costsOption AOption BOption C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Costs Member States – assumptions 

154 

EC/MS/Employers/TCNCost itemCommentTypeValue [increment cf baseline or new]SourceAssumption [Y/N]Description of assumptionMSTransposing revised text of the PTD into National lawsOne-off cost 18.0Own assumptionYDerived from the baseline assumption re FTE for the transposition of the PTD into national law per MS. Here we assume that transposition of amendments will take 20% of the total time required to transpose the whole PTD back in 2015.ECMonitoring/enforcement complianceOngoing cost0Own assumptionYECIssuing of guidelines, clarificationsOne-off cost 0Own assumptionYMSMonitoring complianceOngoing cost0Own assumptionYNo additional compliance monitoring obligationsMSReporting to EUOne-off cost 0.625Own assumptionYDerived from the baseline assumption re FTE for reporting (i.e. 1 official per MS 2 to 3 days per year)Here we assume that additional one-off reporting costs, related to the notification obligation of crisis and/or insolvency back-up funds will take 25% of the costs in 2015 for Option A , 12.5% for Option B, and 0% for Option C.CONSCost savings resulting from better quality information on the EU PTD status, reducing the need for legal advice and therefore reducing legal disputesOngoing cost saving 
 
 
 
Costs Member States – preferred option 

155 

Transposing revised text of the PTD into National laws - Public administration [MS]Type of cost: Personel cost20222023202420252026202720282029203020312032TotalAustria1,910                      1,910                    Belgium2,710                      2,710                    Bulgaria376                         376                       Croatia963                         963                       Cyprus2,275                      2,275                    Czechia822                         822                       Denmark4,193                      4,193                    Estonia906                         906                       Finland2,973                      2,973                    France2,576                      2,576                    Germany2,799                      2,799                    Greece910                         910                       Hungary657                         657                       Ireland4,396                      4,396                    Italy2,898                      2,898                    Latvia650                         650                       Lithuania675                         675                       Luxembourg2,295                      2,295                    Malta1,722                      1,722                    Netherlands3,186                      3,186                    Poland1,041                      1,041                    Portugal842                         842                       Romania467                         467                       Slovakia826                         826                       Slovenia1,510                      1,510                    Spain2,067                      2,067                    Sweden3,032                      3,032                    EU2749,677                   49,677                  
 
 
 
156 

Reporting to the EU - Public administration [MS]Type of cost: Personel cost20222023202420252026202720282029203020312032TotalAustria66                           66                           66                           66                           66                           66                           66                           66                         66                         66                         663                       Belgium94                           94                           94                           94                           94                           94                           94                           94                         94                         94                         941                       Bulgaria13                           13                           13                           13                           13                           13                           13                           13                         13                         13                         131                       Croatia33                           33                           33                           33                           33                           33                           33                           33                         33                         33                         334                       Cyprus79                           79                           79                           79                           79                           79                           79                           79                         79                         79                         790                       Czechia29                           29                           29                           29                           29                           29                           29                           29                         29                         29                         285                       Denmark146                         146                         146                         146                         146                         146                         146                         146                       146                       146                       1,456                    Estonia31                           31                           31                           31                           31                           31                           31                           31                         31                         31                         315                       Finland103                         103                         103                         103                         103                         103                         103                         103                       103                       103                       1,032                    France89                           89                           89                           89                           89                           89                           89                           89                         89                         89                         895                       Germany97                           97                           97                           97                           97                           97                           97                           97                         97                         97                         972                       Greece32                           32                           32                           32                           32                           32                           32                           32                         32                         32                         316                       Hungary23                           23                           23                           23                           23                           23                           23                           23                         23                         23                         228                       Ireland153                         153                         153                         153                         153                         153                         153                         153                       153                       153                       1,527                    Italy101                         101                         101                         101                         101                         101                         101                         101                       101                       101                       1,006                    Latvia23                           23                           23                           23                           23                           23                           23                           23                         23                         23                         226                       Lithuania23                           23                           23                           23                           23                           23                           23                           23                         23                         23                         234                       Luxembourg80                           80                           80                           80                           80                           80                           80                           80                         80                         80                         797                       Malta60                           60                           60                           60                           60                           60                           60                           60                         60                         60                         598                       Netherlands111                         111                         111                         111                         111                         111                         111                         111                       111                       111                       1,106                    Poland36                           36                           36                           36                           36                           36                           36                           36                         36                         36                         362                       Portugal29                           29                           29                           29                           29                           29                           29                           29                         29                         29                         292                       Romania16                           16                           16                           16                           16                           16                           16                           16                         16                         16                         162                       Slovakia29                           29                           29                           29                           29                           29                           29                           29                         29                         29                         287                       Slovenia52                           52                           52                           52                           52                           52                           52                           52                         52                         52                         524                       Spain72                           72                           72                           72                           72                           72                           72                           72                         72                         72                         718                       Sweden105                         105                         105                         105                         105                         105                         105                         105                       105                       105                       1,053                    EU271,725                      1,725                      1,725                      1,725                      1,725                      1,725                      1,725                      1,725                    1,725                    1,725                    17,249                  
 
 
Quantification – Option A 

157 

Benefits and costs in EUR million One off   Recurring   Minimum Values  Maximum values MethodologyBenefitsQualitative assessment scale: 0-5AMeasure 1.1.1 Flexible limitation of prepayments - benefit to consumers - reduction of consumer detriment in view of lower prepayment (liquidity gain)           168.7            168.7           168.7 Reduction of 5 percentage points of the average prepayments for packages on 4.4% of packages affected (in normal times) by financial loss.M1.1.1Measure 1.2.1 Possibility to set up a crisis fund at national level Qualitative assessment: 1. With a 100% uptake, the costs would be EUR 322.3 million, but uptake is expected to be low and hence costs minimal.  Operating costs in times of crisis: EUR 700k/year. Cost-neutral in the long-term.1Measure 1.3.1 Business-to-business refund right - benefit to customers - reduction of consumer detriment in view of timelier refundsQualitative assessment: 22Measure 1.3.1 Business-to-business refund right - benefit to business -  increased liquidity for organisersQualitative assessment: 33Measure 1.4.1 Voluntary vouchers - clarification benefit for consumersQualitative assessment: 1.1Measure 1.4.1 Voluntary vouchers - positive impact on liquidity organisers Qualitative assessment: 3. The size of the positive impact on organisers would depend on the acceptance rate of vouchers by travellers; 81% of consumer organisations would have preferred a refund. 3Measure 2.1 - Mention insolvency back-up fund and coverage of vouchers and refund claims - benefits for consumers Qualitative assessment: 3. Coverage vouchers and refund claims and potential back-up fund improves consumer protection.  3Measure 2.1 - Mention of insolvency back-up fund and coverage of vouchers and refund claims - benefits for organisers Qualitative assessment: 0. Coverage vouchers will increase acceptance rate and improve iquidity of organisers (liquidity gains for organisers through higher acceptance rate taken into account under 1.4). 0Measure 3.1.1 LTAs (OIOO) - benefit for businesses           181.4            181.4           181.4  Significant simplification for organisers and fairer competition M3.1.1Measure 3.1.1 LTAs - benefits for consumers Qualitative assessment: 4. Clarification benefits and less circumvention of rules, higher consumer protection. 4Measure 3.1.1 LTAs - benefits for authorities  Qualitative assessment: 3. easier enforecement for MS authorities. 3Measure 3.2.1 Specifications on cancellations - consumers Qualitative assessment: 1. Some clarification benefits. 1Measure 3.2.1 Specifications on cancellations - MS  Qualitative assessment: 1. Some clarification benefits & easier enforcement. 1Measure 3.2.1 Specifications on cancellations - organisers Qualitative assessment: 1. Some clarification benefits. 1Measure 3.3.1 Clarification on the role of different parties - benefit to organisersQualitative assessment: 0. Increased ease of doing business.0Measure 3.3.1 Clarification on the role of different parties - benefit to consumers - reduction in consumer detriment              38.6             19.3             57.8 Expected reduction of consumer detriment between EUR 19.3 million and EUR 57.8 million (on average EUR 38.6 million)M3.3.1Total Benefit                -              388.7            369.4           408.0                                                                                                                          -   1.77CostsAMeasure 1.1.1 Flexible limitation of prepayments - lower prepayments (cost pass through from organisers to travellers - increased prices )           332.1            332.1                -   High-level estimate of the cost increase for organisers: 3%. This will be fully passed through to consumers, resulting in a price increase of EUR 15 per package (approx 1% of the package price). M1.1.1Measure 1.1.1 Flexible limitation of prepayments - lower prepayments - cost pass through - increased prices - impact on number of packages sold through price elasiticty (sales organisers)Qualitative assessment: 11Measure 1.2.1 Possibility to set up a crisis fund at national level  -  -  - Qualitative assessment: 1. With a 100% uptake, the costs would be EUR 322.0 million, but uptake is expected to be low and hence costs minimal. Operating costs in times of crisis: EUR 700k/year. Full pass-through to consumers. Cost-neutral in the long-term1Measure 1.3.1 Business-to-business refund right - impact on service providers -  -  -  Qualitative assessment: 1. Might slightly negatively affect the liquidity of certain service providers; not expected that this would lead service providers to include a risk premium which would raise the costs of packages.  1Measure 1.4.1 Voluntary vouchers - costs for organisers -  -  -  Qualitative assessment: 0. Costs, if any, expected to be minimal. 0Measure 2.1 - Mention insolvency back-up fund and coverage of vouchers and refund claims - organisersQualitative assessment: 0. Some MSs have back-up funds; obligation to create insolvency protection system already exists, any additional measures cannot be seen as an additional burden; 30% of businesses - costs of covering vouchers and refunds would be reasonable; 40% not; If there are any costs, likely 100% pass-through to travellers. 0Measure 2.1 - Mention of insolvency back-up fund and coverage of vouchers and refund claims - costs for consumers Qualitative assessment: 1. If there are any cost increases, likley 100% pass-through from organisers. 1Measure 3.1.1 LTAs  - cost to business - familiarisation (OIOO)              6.5  one-off familiarisation cost for businesses M3.1.1Measure 3.2.1 Specifications on cancellations  -  -  -  Qualitative assessment: 0. Negligeabe cost increases for organisers, if at all. 0Measure 3.3.1 Clarification on the role of different parties - businesses -  -  -   Qualitative assessment: 0. Negligeable one-off administrative impact. 0For all measures taken together - cost to administrations - transposition + information              0.1 Admin and transpositionTotal Cost               6.6            332.1            332.1                -   1             Net Impact (Total Benefit - Total Cost)-            6.6              56.6             37.3           408.0 Benefit Cost Ratio (Total Benefit / Total Cost)               1.2               1.1 #DIV/0!Net B-N1.27        Option benefitsOption costs 
 
 
 
158 

Benefits from 2026 (discounted from 2025)baseline duration10years1010discount ratelowmediummediummediumhigh Option A1%5%5%5%10%1384.8             370.2               351.8              388.5                               353.4                                                                                                                                            2381.0             352.5               335.1              370.0                               321.2                                                                                                                                            3377.3             335.8               319.1              352.4                               292.0                                                                                                                                            4373.5             319.8               303.9              335.6                               265.5                                                                                                                                            5369.8             304.5               289.4              319.7                               241.3                                                                                                                                            6366.2             290.0               275.7              304.4                               219.4                                                                                                                                            7362.5             276.2               262.5              289.9                               199.5                                                                                                                                            8358.9             263.1               250.0              276.1                               181.3                                                                                                                                            9355.4             250.5               238.1              263.0                               164.8                                                                                                                                            10351.9             238.6               226.8              250.5                               149.9                                                                                                                                            IA baseline sum3,681.4             3,001.3                2,852.4              3,150.2                                    2,388.3                                                                                                                                                                            Costs from 2026 (discounted from 2025)cost=332.8                   332.8                  0.7                                            (yearly costs plus 1/10 of fixed costs)baseline duration10yearsyearsyearsdiscount ratelowmediummediummediumhigh Option A1%5%5%5%10%1329.5             316.9               316.9              0.6                                   302.5                                                                                                                                            2326.2             301.8               301.8              302.2                               275.0                                                                                                                                            3323.0             287.5               287.5              287.8                               250.0                                                                                                                                            4319.8             273.8               273.8              274.1                               227.3                                                                                                                                            5316.6             260.7               260.7              261.0                               206.6                                                                                                                                            6313.5             248.3               248.3              248.6                               187.8                                                                                                                                            7310.4             236.5               236.5              236.7                               170.8                                                                                                                                            8307.3             225.2               225.2              225.5                               155.2                                                                                                                                            9304.3             214.5               214.5              214.7                               141.1                                                                                                                                            10301.3             204.3               204.3              204.5                               128.3                                                                                                                                            IA baseline sum3,151.9             2,569.7                2,569.7              2,255.7                                    2,044.8                                                                                                                                                                            Net Present Value (NPV - Total discounted Benefits - Total discounted Costs)529.5                 431.7                   282.8                  894.5                                       343.5                                                                                                                                                                                high boundmediummediummediumlow boundBenefit cost ratio (BCR)1.171.171.111.401.17Return on investment0.170.170.110.400.17 
 
 
Quantification Option B 

159 

Benefits and costs in EUR million One off   Recurring   Minimum Values  Maximum values MethodologyBenefits BMeasure 1.1.2 Strict limitation of prepayments - benefit to consumers - reduction of consumer detriment in view of lower prepayment (liquidity gain)           610.4            369.1            851.7 liquidity gain of EUR 8.4 billion and EUR 19.3 billion (on average: EUR 13.9 billion) on 4.4% of packages affected (in normal times) by financial loss. This leads to a decrease of consumer detriment between EUR 369.1 million and EUR 851.7 million.M1.1.2Measure 1.4.2 Mandatory vouchers in times of crisis - benefits for organisers Qualitative assessment: 5. Liquidity gains  5Measure 2.1 - Mention insolvency back-up fund and coverage of vouchers and refund claims - benefits for consumers Qualitative assessment: 3. Coverage vouchers and refund claims and potential back-up fund improves consumer protection.  3Measure 2.1 - Mention of insolvency back-up fund and coverage of vouchers and refund claims - benefits for organisers Qualitative assessment: 0. Coverage vouchers will increase acceptance rate and improve iquidity of organisers (liquidity gains for organisers through higher acceptance rate taken into account under 1.4). 0Measure 3.1.2 LTAs (OIOO) - businesses           108.9            108.9            108.9  Some simplification for organisers and level playing field M3.12Measure 3.1.2 LTAs (OIOO) - travellers Qualitative assessment: 2. Clarification and simplification benefits. 2Measure 3.1.2 LTAs (OIOO) - authorities Qualitative assessment: 2. Clarification and simplification benefits. 2Measure 3.2.1 Specifications on cancellations - consumers Qualitative assessment: 1. Some clarification benefits. 1Measure 3.2.1 Specifications on cancellations - MS  Qualitative assessment: 1. Some clarification benefits & easier enforcement. 1Measure 3.2.1 Specifications on cancellations - organisers Qualitative assessment: 1. Some clarification benefits. 1Total Benefit               -              719.2            477.9            960.5                                                                                                                        -   1.875CostsBMeasure 1.1.2 Strict limitation of prepayment - lower prepayments (cost pass through from organisers - increased prices )           553.5            553.5            553.5  High-level estimate of the cost increase for organisers: 5%. This will be fully passed through to consumers, resulting in a price increase of packages M1.1.2Measure 1.1.2 Strict limitation of prepayment - lower prepayments - cost pass through -increased package prices - impact on number of packages sold through price elasiticty (sales organisers) Qualitative assessment: 3. In view of negative price elasiticty increased package prices may lead to a reduction of packages sold and hence negatively impact revenues of organisers.3Measure 1.4.2 Mandatory vouchers in times of crisis - impact on organisers -  -  -  Qualitative assessment: 0. Costs for organisers for issuing vouchers, if any, expected to be minimal. 0Measure 1.4.2 Mandatory vouchers in times of crisis - impact on consumers Qualitative assessment: 5. Reduction in consumer protection through no immediate refund. 5Measure 2.1 - Mention insolvency back-up fund and coverage of vouchers and refund claims - organisersQualitative assessment: 0. Some MSs have back-up funds; obligation to create insolvency protection system already exists, any additional measures cannot be seen as an additional burden; 30% of businesses - costs of covering vouchers and refunds would be reasonable; 40% not; If there are any costs, likely 100% pass-through to travellers. 0Measure 2.1 - Mention of insolvency back-up fund and coverage of vouchers and refund claims - costs for consumers Qualitative assessment: 1. If there are any cost increases, likley 100% pass-through from organisers. 1Measure 3.1.2 LTAs - cost to business - familiarisation             6.5  one-off familiarisation cost for businesses M3.1.2Measure 3.2.1 Specifications on cancellations  -  -  -  Qualitative assessment: 0. Negligeabe cost increases for organisers, if at all. 0For all measures taken together - cost to administrations - transposition + information           0.05 Total Cost             6.5            553.5            553.5            553.5 1.5Net Impact (Total Benefit - Total Cost)-           6.5            165.7 -           75.6            407.0 Benefit Cost Ratio (Total Benefit / Total Cost)              1.3               0.9                1.7 Net B-N0.38Option quantified benefitsOption quantified costsAdmin and transposition 
 
 
 
 
160 

Benefits from 2026 (discounted from 2025)baseline duration10yearsyearsyearsdiscount ratelowmediummediummediumhigh Option B1%5%5%5%10%1712.1           685.0              455.2              914.8              653.8                                                                                                                                         2705.1           652.4              433.5              871.2              594.4                                                                                                                                         3698.1           621.3              412.8              829.7              540.4                                                                                                                                         4691.2           591.7              393.2              790.2              491.2                                                                                                                                         5684.3           563.5              374.5              752.6              446.6                                                                                                                                         6677.5           536.7              356.6              716.8              406.0                                                                                                                                         7670.8           511.1              339.7              682.6              369.1                                                                                                                                         8664.2           486.8              323.5              650.1              335.5                                                                                                                                         9657.6           463.6              308.1              619.2              305.0                                                                                                                                         10651.1           441.5              293.4              589.7              277.3                                                                                                                                         IA baseline sum6,812.0            5,553.7              3,690.4              7,417.0               4,419.3                                                                                                                                                                         Costs from 2026 (discounted from 2025)cost=554.2                  554.2                  554.2                   (yearly costs plus 1/10 of fixed costs)baseline duration10yearsyearsyearsdiscount ratelowmediummediummediumhigh Option B1%5%5%5%10%1548.7           527.8              527.8              527.8              503.8                                                                                                                                         2543.3           502.7              502.7              502.7              458.0                                                                                                                                         3537.9           478.7              478.7              478.7              416.4                                                                                                                                         4532.6           455.9              455.9              455.9              378.5                                                                                                                                         5527.3           434.2              434.2              434.2              344.1                                                                                                                                         6522.1           413.6              413.6              413.6              312.8                                                                                                                                         7516.9           393.9              393.9              393.9              284.4                                                                                                                                         8511.8           375.1              375.1              375.1              258.5                                                                                                                                         9506.7           357.2              357.2              357.2              235.0                                                                                                                                         10501.7           340.2              340.2              340.2              213.7                                                                                                                                         IA baseline sum5,249.0            4,279.4              4,279.4              4,279.4               3,405.3                                                                                                                                                                         Net Present Value (NPV - Total discounted Benefits - Total discounted Costs)1,563.0            1274.31-589.003137.611,014.0                                                                                                                                                                         high boundmediummediummediumlow boundBenefit cost ratio (BCR)1.301.300.861.731.30Return on investment0.300.30-0.140.730.30 
 
 
 
Quantification Option C 

161 

Benefits and costs in EUR million One off   Recurring   Minimum Values  Maximum values MethodologyBenefits CMeasure 1.1.3 Strict limitation of prepayments to organisers and service providers - benefit to consumers - reduction of consumer detriment in view of lower prepayment (liquidity gain)       610.4        369.1        851.7 liquidity gain of EUR 8.4 billion and EUR 19.3 billion (on average: EUR 13.9 billion) on 4.4% of packages affected (in normal times) by financial loss. This leads to a decrease of consumer detriment between EUR 369.1 million and EUR 851.7 million.M1.1.3Measure 1.2.2 Mandatory crisis fund at national level - benefit for consumersQualitative assessment: 5. Travellers will get their refunds without delay.5Measure 1.3.2 Business-to-business refund right in all cases - benefit to customers - reduction of consumer detriment in view of timelier refundsQualitative assessment: 33Measure 1.3.2 Business-to-business refund right in all cases - benefit to business -  increased liquidity for organisers Qualitative assessment: 44Measure 2.2 - Mandatory insolvency back-up fund and coverage of vouchers and refund claimsQualitative assessment: 55Measure 3.1.3 LTAs (OIOO) - businesses       108.9        108.9        108.9  Some simplification for organisers and level playing field M3.1.3Measure 3.1.3 LTAs (OIOO) - travellers Qualitative assessment: 1. Clarification and simplification benefits. 1Measure 3.1.3 LTAs (OIOO) - authorities Qualitative assessment: 1. Clarification and simplification benefits. 1Measure 3.2.2 Specifications on cancellations + formal value travel warnings - benefit for consumersQualitative assessment: 55Measure 3.3.2 Clarification on the role of different parties + seller responsible  - benefit to consumersQualitative assessment: 3. Reduction in consumer detriment.3Total Benefit           -          719.2        477.9        960.5                                                                                                                        -   3.375CostsCMeasure 1.1.3 Strict limitation of prepayments to organisers and service providers - lower prepayments (cost pass through - increased prices )    1,107.1     1,107.1     1,107.1  High-level estimate of the cost increase for service providers passed to organisers: 10%. This will be fully passed through to consumers, resulting in a price increase of packages M1.1.3Measure 1.1.3 Strict limitation of prepayment - lower prepayments - cost pass through - increased prices - impact on number of packages sold through price elasiticty (sales organisers) Qualitative assessment: 5. In view of negative price elasiticty increased package prices may lead to a reduction of packages sold and hence negatively impact revenues of organisers. This will also affect service providers who will offer fewer services for packages, leading to a shrinking package travel market.5Measure 1.1.3 Strict limitation of prepayment - impact on enforcement MSQualitative assessment: 1. Potentially somewhat increased enforcement costs, as MS authorities would start monitoring also service providers1Measure 1.2.2 Mandatory crisis fund at national level       323.0        323.0        323.0  costs would be EUR 322.3 million.  Operating costs in times of crisis: EUR 700k/year.  M1.2.2Measure 1.3.2 Business-to-business refund right in all cases - impact on service providers - cost ass through to organisers and consumers - increased prices    1,107.1     1,107.1     1,107.1  Expected cost increase of at least 10%, passed on to cosumers and resulting in a total price increase of EUR 1.1 billion.  M1.3.2Measure 2.2 - Mandatory insolvency back-up fund and coverage of vouchers and refund claims - impact on organisers - cost pass-through to consumers - increased prices       323.0        323.0        323.0  costs would be EUR 322.3 million.  Operating costs in times of crisis: EUR 700k/year.  M2.2Measure 2.2 - Mandatory insolvency back-up fund and coverage of vouchers and refund claims - impact on MS Qualitative assessment: 1. New tasks for MS in enforcement and monitoring. 1Measure 3.1.3 LTAs  - cost to business (traders) - familiarisation          6.5  one-off familiarisation cost for businesses Measure 3.2.2 Specifications on cancellations + formal value travel warnings - impact on organisers  Qualitative assessment: 2. Clarification potentially leading to higher costs for organisers. 2Measure 3.2.2 Specifications on cancellations + formal value travel warnings - impact on MS authorities  Qualitative assessment: 1. Split views among MS authorities whether the measure would have a positive impact. 1Measure 3.3.2 Clarification on the role of different parties + seller responsible - impact on retailersQualitative assessment: 3. Likely to affect business models in most of the Member States, where retailers are not liable for the performance of packages. Especially in markets where retailers operate with small margins this additional burden may be relevant.3For all measures taken together - cost to administrations - transposition + information       0.05 Total Cost          6.5     2,860.1     2,860.2     2,860.2 2.166667Net Impact (Total Benefit - Total Cost)-        6.5 -   2,140.9 -   2,382.3 -   1,899.6 Benefit Cost Ratio (Total Benefit / Total Cost)           0.3            0.2            0.3 Net B-N1.21Option quantified benefitsOption quantified costsAdmin and transposition 
 
 
 
 
162 

Benefits from 2026 (discounted from 2025)baseline duration10yearsyearsyearsdiscount ratelowmediummediummediumhigh Option C1%5%5%5%10%1712.1       685.0         455.2         914.8         653.8                                                                                                                                         2705.1       652.4         433.5         871.2         594.4                                                                                                                                         3698.1       621.3         412.8         829.7         540.4                                                                                                                                         4691.2       591.7         393.2         790.2         491.2                                                                                                                                         5684.3       563.5         374.5         752.6         446.6                                                                                                                                         6677.5       536.7         356.6         716.8         406.0                                                                                                                                         7670.8       511.1         339.7         682.6         369.1                                                                                                                                         8664.2       486.8         323.5         650.1         335.5                                                                                                                                         9657.6       463.6         308.1         619.2         305.0                                                                                                                                         10651.1       441.5         293.4         589.7         277.3                                                                                                                                         IA baseline sum6,812.0      5,553.7         3,690.4         7,417.0         4,419.3                                                                                                                                                                         Costs from 2026 (discounted from 2025)cost=2,860.8         2,860.8         2,860.8         (yearly costs plus 1/10 of fixed costs)baseline duration10yearsyearsyearsdiscount ratelowmediummediummediumhigh Option C1%5%5%5%10%12,832.5    2,724.6      2,724.6      2,724.6      2,600.7                                                                                                                                      22,804.4    2,594.8      2,594.9      2,594.9      2,364.3                                                                                                                                      32,776.7    2,471.3      2,471.3      2,471.3      2,149.4                                                                                                                                      42,749.2    2,353.6      2,353.6      2,353.6      1,954.0                                                                                                                                      52,722.0    2,241.5      2,241.5      2,241.5      1,776.3                                                                                                                                      62,695.0    2,134.8      2,134.8      2,134.8      1,614.8                                                                                                                                      72,668.3    2,033.1      2,033.1      2,033.1      1,468.0                                                                                                                                      82,641.9    1,936.3      1,936.3      1,936.3      1,334.6                                                                                                                                      92,615.7    1,844.1      1,844.1      1,844.1      1,213.3                                                                                                                                      102,589.8    1,756.3      1,756.3      1,756.3      1,103.0                                                                                                                                      IA baseline sum27,095.5    22,090.3       22,090.6       22,090.6       17,578.4                                                                                                                                                                       Net Present Value (NPV - Total discounted Benefits - Total discounted Costs)20,283.5-    16,536.6-       18,400.2-       14,673.6-       13,159.0-                                                                                                                                                                       high boundmediummediummediumlow boundBenefit cost ratio (BCR)0.250.250.170.340.25Return on investment-0.75-0.75-0.83-0.66-0.75 
 
 
Sensitivity Analysis – Option A/preferred option 
(impacts assessed are net of the baseline, so no need to include also the status quo option) 

163 

Average values of quantified efficiency AUTOMATED sensitivity calculations (comparing 3 options)Policy OptionsEffectiveness/Obj. 1Effectiveness/Obj. 2Effectiveness/Obj. 3Coherence/Obj. 1Coherence/Obj. 2Coherence/Obj. 3Efficiency (quantified) /Net Present Value (discount rate 5%)Efficiency (qualitative assessment)Average of normalised scores for each dimensionA0.350.600.530.380.000.00431.67                                                    1.27 0.25BESTB0.200.600.40-0.500.000.001274.310.380.102nd best  C0.751.000.60-0.38-0.500.00-16536.651.210.04worstNormalised efficiency (NPV)Normalised efficiency (qualitative)Average efficiency (NPV)/effectiveness/coherenceA0.030.250.22BESTB0.080.080.102nd best  (impacts assessed are net of the baseline, so no need to include also the status quo option)C-0.980.24-0.16worstEFFECTIVENESSBaselineOption AOption BOption CCOHERENCEBaselineOption AOption BOption CM1.1 Limitation of prepayments0.002.004.005.00M1.1 Limitation of prepayments0.000.00-2.00-1.00M1.2 Rapid refund mechanism0.002.000.005.00M1.2 Rapid refund mechanism0.000.000.00-1.00M1.3 B2B refund right0.002.000.005.00M1.3 B2B refund right0.001.000.00-1.00M1.4 Vouchers0.001.000.000.00M1.4 Vouchers0.002.00-2.000.00score (objective 1)0.001.751.003.75score (objective 1)0.000.75-1.00-0.75normalised score (objective 1)0.000.350.200.75normalised score (objective 1)0.000.38-0.50-0.38M2.1 Insolvency protection/back-up 0.003.003.005.00M2.1 Insolvency protection/back-0.000.000.00-1.00score (objective 2)0.003.003.005.00score (objective 2)0.000.000.00-1.00normalised score (objective 2)0.000.600.601.00normalised score (objective 2)0.000.000.00-0.50M3.1 Partial Deletion LTAs0.005.003.001.00M3.1 Partial Deletion LTAs0.000.000.000.00M3.2 Cancellation rights/travel 0.002.002.005.00M3.2 Cancellation rights/travel 0.000.000.000.00M3.3 role parties0.001.001.003.00M3.3 role parties0.000.000.000.00score (objective 3)0.002.672.003.00score (objective 3)0.000.000.000.00normalised score (objective 3)0.000.530.400.60normalised score (objective 3)0.000.000.000.00AVERAGE over the 3 objectives0.000.490.400.78AVERAGE over the 3 objectives0.000.13-0.17-0.29 
 
 
 
 
 
164 

Condorcet outranking method (partial compensation over 8 sub-criteria)Weighted sum method over 3 key IA criteria (full aggregation)Y             Concordance index (no. ABCno. criteria for which the option dominates (domination score - dominated score)/no. Policy OptionsEffectivenessEfficiencyCoherenceMean MCA (equal weights)A4480.21BESTA0.490.140.130.25BESTB123-0.32worstB0.400.08-0.170.102nd best C3580.112nd best  C0.78-0.37-0.290.04worstno. criteria for which option is dominated by 4961919(impacts assessed are net of the baseline, so no need to include also the status quo option)Normalised efficiency (NPV)Normalised efficiency (qualitative)Average efficiencyA0.030.250.14B0.080.080.08C-0.980.24-0.37 
 
 
165 

Minimum values of quantified efficiency AUTOMATED sensitivity calculations (comparing 3 options)Policy OptionsEffectiveness/Obj. 1Effectiveness/Obj. 2Effectiveness/Obj. 3Coherence/Obj. 1Coherence/Obj. 2Coherence/Obj. 3Efficiency (quantified)/ Net Present Value (discount rate 5%)Efficiency (qualitative assessment)Average of normalised scores for each dimensionA0.350.600.530.380.000.00282.78                                                    1.27 0.25BESTB0.200.600.40-0.500.000.00-589.000.380.082nd best  C0.751.000.60-0.38-0.500.00-18400.211.210.02worstNormalised efficiency (NPV)Normalised efficiency (qualitative)Average efficiency (NPV)/effectiveness/coherenceA0.0167989610.25                                                   0.21BESTB-0.034990620.0750.072nd best  (impacts assessed are net of the baseline, so no need to include also the status quo option)C-1.0931034430.241666667-0.20worstEFFECTIVENESSBaselineOption AOption BOption CCOHERENCEBaselineOption AOption BOption CM1.1 Limitation of prepayments0.002.004.005.00M1.1 Limitation of prepayments0.000.00-2.00-1.00M1.2 Rapid refund mechanism0.002.000.005.00M1.2 Rapid refund mechanism0.000.000.00-1.00M1.3 B2B refund right0.002.000.005.00M1.3 B2B refund right0.001.000.00-1.00M1.4 Vouchers0.001.000.000.00M1.4 Vouchers0.002.00-2.000.00score (objective 1)0.001.751.003.75score (objective 1)0.000.75-1.00-0.75normalised score (objective 1)0.000.350.200.75normalised score (objective 1)0.000.38-0.50-0.38M2.1 Insolvency protection/back-up 0.003.003.005.00M2.1 Insolvency protection/back-0.000.000.00-1.00score (objective 2)0.003.003.005.00score (objective 2)0.000.000.00-1.00normalised score (objective 2)0.000.600.601.00normalised score (objective 2)0.000.000.00-0.50M3.1 Partial Deletion LTAs0.005.003.001.00M3.1 Partial Deletion LTAs0.000.000.000.00M3.2 Cancellation rights/travel 0.002.002.005.00M3.2 Cancellation rights/travel 0.000.000.000.00M3.3 role parties0.001.001.003.00M3.3 role parties0.000.000.000.00score (objective 3)0.002.672.003.00score (objective 3)0.000.000.000.00normalised score (objective 3)0.000.530.400.60normalised score (objective 3)0.000.000.000.00AVERAGE over the 3 objectives0.000.490.400.78AVERAGE over the 3 objectives0.000.13-0.17-0.29 
 
 
 
166 

Condorcet outranking method (partial compensation over 8 sub-criteria)Weighted sum method over 3 key IA criteria (full aggregation)YConcordance index(no.criteria where x dominatesy)XABCno. criteria for which the option dominates another option(domination score - dominated score)/no. comparisonsPolicy OptionsEffectivenessEfficiencyCoherenceMean MCA (equal weights)Y             Concordance index (no. criteria wherexdominatesy)XABCno. criteria for which the option dominates another option(domination score - dominated score)/no. comparisonsA5490.32BESTA0.490.140.130.25BESTA3250.44BESTB022-0.42worstB0.400.02-0.170.082nd best B022-0.22worst ex aequoC3580.112nd best  C0.78-0.43-0.290.02worstC112-0.22worst ex aequono. criteria for which option is dominated by another option310619no. criteria for which option is dominated by another option1449Condorcet outranking method (over 3 key IA criteria) 
 
 
167 

Maximal values of quantified efficiency AUTOMATED sensitivity calculations (comparing 3 options)Policy OptionsEffectiveness/Obj. 1Effectiveness/Obj. 2Effectiveness/Obj. 3Coherence/Obj. 1Coherence/Obj. 2Coherence/Obj. 3Efficiency (quantified)/ Net Present Value (discount rate 5%)Efficiency (qualitative assessment)Average of normalised scores for each dimensionA0.350.600.530.380.000.00894.51                                                    1.27 0.26BESTB0.200.600.40-0.500.000.003137.610.380.122nd best  C0.751.000.60-0.38-0.500.00-14673.601.210.06worstNormalised efficiency (NPV)Normalised efficiency (qualitative)Average efficiency (NPV)/effectiveness/coherenceA0.0531402930.2538461540.22BESTB0.1863965520.0750.142nd best  (impacts assessed are net of the baseline, so no need to include also the status quo option)C-0.8717162710.241666667-0.13worstEFFECTIVENESSBaselineOption AOption BOption CCOHERENCEBaselineOption AOption BOption CM1.1 Limitation of prepayments0.002.004.005.00M1.1 Limitation of prepayments0.000.00-2.00-1.00M1.2 Rapid refund mechanism0.002.000.005.00M1.2 Rapid refund mechanism0.000.000.00-1.00M1.3 B2B refund right0.002.000.005.00M1.3 B2B refund right0.001.000.00-1.00M1.4 Vouchers0.001.000.000.00M1.4 Vouchers0.002.00-2.000.00score (objective 1)0.001.751.003.75score (objective 1)0.000.75-1.00-0.75normalised score (objective 1)0.000.350.200.75normalised score (objective 1)0.000.38-0.50-0.38M2.1 Strengthed insolvency protection (back-up fund) & coverage 0.003.003.005.00M2.1 Strengthed insolvency protection (back-up fund) & 0.000.000.00-1.00score (objective 2)0.003.003.005.00score (objective 2)0.000.000.00-1.00normalised score (objective 2)0.000.600.601.00normalised score (objective 2)0.000.000.00-0.50M3.1 Partial Deletion LTAs0.005.003.001.00M3.1 Partial Deletion LTAs0.000.000.000.00M3.2 Cancellation rights/travel 0.002.002.005.00M3.2 Cancellation rights/travel 0.000.000.000.00M3.3 role parties0.001.001.003.00M3.3 role parties0.000.000.000.00score (objective 3)0.002.672.003.00score (objective 3)0.000.000.000.00normalised score (objective 3)0.000.530.400.60normalised score (objective 3)0.000.000.000.00AVERAGE over the 3 objectives0.000.490.400.78AVERAGE over the 3 objectives0.000.13-0.17-0.29 
 
 
168 

Condorcet outranking method (partial compensation over 8 sub-criteria)Weighted sum method over 3 key IA criteria (full aggregation)YConcordance index(no.criteria where x dominates y)                 ABCno. criteria for which the option dominates another (domination score - dominated score)/no. comparisonsPolicy OptionsEffectivenessEfficiencyCoherenceMean MCA (equal weights)Y             Concordance index ABCno. criteria for which the option dominates another option(domination score - dominated A4480.21BESTA0.490.150.130.26BESTA3250.44BESTB123-0.32worstB0.400.13-0.170.122nd best B022-0.222nd best C3580.112nd best  C0.78-0.32-0.290.06worstC112-0.22worstno. criteria for which option is dominated by another option49619no. criteria for which option is 1449Condorcet outranking method (over 3 key IA criteria) 
 
 
Preferred Option – costs & benefits for travellers only 

169 

Benefits and costs in EUR million One off   Recurring   Minimum Values  Maximum values MethodologyBenefitsQualitative assessment scale: 0-5AMeasure 1.1.1 Flexible limitation of prepayments - benefit to consumers - reduction of consumer detriment in view of lower prepayment (liquidity gain)           168.7            168.7                          168.7 Reduction of 5 percentage points of the average prepayments for packages on 4.4% of packages affected (in normal times) by financial loss.M1.1.1Measure 1.2.1 Possibility to set up a crisis fund at national level Qualitative assessment: 1. With a 100% uptake, the costs would be EUR 322.3 million, but uptake is expected to be low and hence costs minimal.  Operating costs in times of crisis: EUR 700k/year. Cost-neutral in the long-term.1Measure 1.3.1 Business-to-business refund right - benefit to customers - reduction of consumer detriment in view of timelier refundsQualitative assessment: 22Measure 1.4.1 Voluntary vouchers - clarification benefit for consumersQualitative assessment: 1.1Measure 2.1 - Mention insolvency back-up fund and coverage of vouchers and refund claims - benefits for consumers Qualitative assessment: 3. Coverage vouchers and refund claims and potential back-up fund improves consumer protection.  3Measure 3.1.1 LTAs - benefits for consumers Qualitative assessment: 4. Clarification benefits and less circumvention of rules, higher consumer protection. 4Measure 3.2.1 Specifications on cancellations - consumers Qualitative assessment: 1. Some clarification benefits. 1Measure 3.3.1 Clarification on the role of different parties - benefit to consumers - reduction in consumer detriment              38.6             19.3                            57.8 Expected reduction of consumer detriment between EUR 19.3 million and EUR 57.8 million (on average EUR 38.6 million)M3.3.1Total Benefit                -              207.2            188.0                          226.5                                                                                                                          -   0.92CostsAMeasure 1.1.1 Flexible limitation of prepayments - lower prepayments (cost pass through from organisers to travellers - increased prices )           332.1            332.1                               -   High-level estimate of the cost increase for organisers: 3%. This will be fully passed through to consumers, resulting in a price increase of EUR 15 per package (approx 1% of the package price). M1.1.1Measure 2.1 - Mention of insolvency back-up fund and coverage of vouchers and refund claims - costs for consumers Qualitative assessment: 1. If there are any cost increases, likley 100% pass-through from organisers. 1Total Cost                -              332.1            332.1                               -   0             Net Impact (Total Benefit - Total Cost)               -   -          124.9 -         144.2                          226.5 Benefit Cost Ratio (Total Benefit / Total Cost)             0.62               0.6 #DIV/0!Net B-N0.80        Option benefitsOption costs 
 
 
 
2.  ADDITIONAL RANKING OF OPTIONS 

In addition to the scoring and ranking of options presented in the main text of this SWD and in part 
1 of this Annex 10, the options have also been ranked based on individual assessment criteria.  

as the results of this ranking are shown in Table below (ranking from 1= best performing to 4=worst 
performing) 

Assessment 

Ranking 

Status quo  Under  the  baseline  option,  i.e.  the  status  quo,  there  would be  no  change  compared  to  the 

Option A 

Option B 

Option C 

current state of affairs. 
Effectiveness:4th  | Efficiency: 3rd  | Coherence: 2nd   
Option A ensures the highest degree of efficiency and legal coherence.  It ranks second in 
terms of effectiveness, behind Option C.  
Effectiveness: 2nd | Efficiency: 1st | Coherence: 1st  
Option B scores second on efficiency and coherence. It scores third of the change options on 
effectiveness.  
Effectiveness: 3rd  | Efficiency:  2nd | Coherence: 3rd   
Option  C  would  lead  to  the  most  significant  improvement  in  terms  of  effectiveness.  In 
contrast, it performs the worst of the change options with regard to efficiency and coherence. 
Effectiveness: 1st | Efficiency: 4th | Coherence: 4th    

4 

1 

2 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 11: PRESENTATION OF THE PACKAGE TRAVEL DIRECTIVE 

I. Overview of the Package Travel Directive 

➢  Date of application 

Directive (EU) 2015/2302 (‘the Package Travel Directive’, ‘the Directive’, ‘the 2015 Directive’ or 
‘the PTD’) had to be transposed by the Member States by 1 January 2018. It started applying on 1 
July 2018.478  

The 2015 Directive repealed Directive 90/314/EEC (‘the 1990  Directive’) with effect from 1 July 
2018.479 It was incorporated into the European Economic Area Agreement on 22 September 2017. 

➢  Aim 

The  Directive  aims  ‘to  contribute  to  the  proper  functioning  of  the  internal  market  and  to  the 
achievement of a high and as uniform as possible level of consumer protection by approximating 
certain aspects of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States in respect 
of  contracts  between  travellers  and  traders  relating  to  package  travel  and  linked  travel 
arrangements.’480 

The current Directive, unlike the repealed 1990 PTD, is a full harmonisation directive (Article 4). 
Still, it gives the Member States regulatory options in a few specific respects (e.g., regarding the full 
liability of retailers in addition to the liability of organisers). 

➢  Scope 

The Directive applies to:  
- packages offered for sale or sold by traders to travellers;  
- to linked travel arrangements facilitated by traders for travellers. 

The Directive does not apply to travel arrangements: 
- covering less than 24 hours, unless an overnight stay is included; 
- offered occasionally, on a not-for-profit basis and only to a limited group of travellers; 
- purchased as part of a general agreement for travel relating to a business or profession.481 

➢  Main features of the 2015 Directive 

Key terms 
The  concept  of  packages  already  existed  in  the  1990  Directive,  but  it  is  broader  under  the  2015 
Directive, going beyond pre-arranged combinations of travel services.  

Under Article 3(2) of the Directive, packages are: 
- a combination of at least two different types of travel service (e.g., a flight or rail trip combined 
with hotel accommodation): 

478 Directive (EU) 2015/2302 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on package travel and 
linked  travel  arrangements,  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  2006/2004  and  Directive  2011/83/EU  of  the  European 
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 90/314/EEC, (OJ L 326, 11.12.2015, p. 1–33);  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32015L2302#:~:text=Directive%20%28EU%29%202015%2F2302%20of%20the%20
European%20Parliament%20and,of%20the%20Council%20and%20repealing%20Council%20Directive%2090%2F31
4%2FEEC  
479 Council Directive 90/314/EEC of 13 June 1990 on package travel, package holidays and package tours 
(OJ L 158, 23.6.1990, p. 59–64); EUR-Lex - 31990L0314 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu) 
480 Article 1  
481 Article 2 

 
 
 
 
o  pre-arranged or customised, as part of the same trip, sold by one trader and a single contract is 

concluded  

or 

o  irrespective of whether separate contracts are concluded with individual traders, if one of the 

following is met: 

- 

- 
- 
- 

- 

the combination was purchased from a single point of sale and the travel services have been 
selected before the traveller agrees to pay, within the same booking process482  
it was offered, sold or charged at an inclusive or total price, 
advertised or sold under the term ‘package’ or under a similar term, 
combined after the conclusion of a contract which entitled the traveller to choose among a 
selection of travel services (i.e., travel gift boxes) 
click-through packages: combinations purchased from separate traders through linked online 
booking  processes  where  the  traveller's  name,  payment  details  and  e-mail  address  are 
transmitted  from  the  trader  with  whom  the  first  contract  is  concluded  to  another  trader  or 
traders and a contract with the latter trader or traders is concluded at the latest 24 hours after 
the confirmation of the booking of the first travel service. 

A new concept was introduced: linked travel arrangement (LTA) as a category between packages 
and mere stand-alone services. 
Under Article 3(5), there is a linked travel arrangement where at least two different types of travel 
services  are  purchased  for  the  same  trip  or  holiday,  usually  under  separate  contracts  with  the 
individual travel service providers and if, in addition, the conditions of letters (a) or (b) are met.  

Under letter (a) the bookings of the travel services must take place on the occasion of a single visit 
or contact with a point of sale (online or off-line) and the services are selected and paid for  separately;  
or  
Under letter (b) the booking of a second service is facilitated in a targeted manner and the contracts 
for additional travel services are concluded within 24 hours from the confirmation of the booking of 
the first travel service. 

There can be no LTA if the criteria of a package are met.  

Other relevant terms: 
Travel services include  
- carriage of passengers,  
-  accommodation  that  is  not  intrinsically  part  of  carriage  of  passengers  and  is  not  for  residential 
purposes,  
-rental of cars and of other motor vehicles,  
-any other tourist service483 not intrinsically part of a travel service mentioned earlier.484  

If other tourist services are combined with a travel service, for instance accommodation, this leads to 
the  creation  of  a  package  or  linked  travel  arrangement  only  if  the  tourist  services  account  for  a 
significant proportion of the value of the package or linked travel arrangement or are advertised as 

482 Recital 10 
483 Rectal 18: ‘Other tourist services which are not intrinsically part of carriage of passengers,  accommodation or the 
rental of motor vehicles or certain motorcycles, may be, for instance, admission to concerts, sport events, excursions or 
event parks, guided tours, ski passes and rental of sports equipment such as skiing equipment, or spa treatments.’  
484 Article 3(1) 

172 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
or otherwise represent an essential feature of the trip or holiday. ‘If other tourist services account for 
25 % or more of the value of the combination, those services should be considered as representing a 
significant proportion of the value of the package or linked travel arrangement.’485 

Organiser is a ‘trader who combines and sells or offers for sale packages, either directly or through 
another  trader  or  together  with  another  trader,  or  the  trader  who  transmits  the  traveller's  data  to 
another trader’ in the case of click-through packages.486 

Retailer is ‘a trader other than the organiser who sells or offers for sale packages combined by an 
organiser’.487 

Traveller is ‘any person who is seeking to conclude a contract or is entitled to travel on the basis of 
a contract concluded, within the scope of this Directive’.488 

Unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances are situations beyond the control of the party who 
invokes them ‘and the consequences of which could not have been avoided even if all reasonable 
measures had been taken’. ‘This  may cover for  example warfare, other serious security problems 
such as terrorism, significant risks to human health such as the outbreak of a serious disease at the 
travel destination, or natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes or weather conditions which make 
it impossible to travel safely to the destination as agreed in the package travel contract’.489 

Key rights 

➢  Pre-contractual and contractual information of travellers 

For Packages 
Organisers  or  retailers  must  provide  to  the  traveller  information  on  the  main  characteristics  of 
packages  and  rights  of  travellers,  inter  alia  through  a  standardised  information  form  prior  to 
conclusion of the contract. 

The standardised information form includes information on: 
- the fact that the combination of travel services constitutes a package; 
-  the  identity  and  the  liability  of  the  organiser  (and,  where  appropriate,  the  retailer)  for  the 
performance of the package travel contract.; 
- the fact that insolvency protection is in place (including the right to the refund of payments and the 
right to repatriation where carriage of passengers is included)  
- contact details of the insolvency protection entity  
- key rights of package travellers. 

After booking, the package travel contract must be provided on a durable medium. It must contain 
the full content of the agreement.  

For LTAs 

485 Recital 18 
486 Article 3(8) 
487 Article 3(9) 
488 Article 3(6) 
489 Recital 31 

173 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
Prior to conclusion of the contract(s), traders must inform travellers, through one of five available 
forms, on: 
- the fact that the traveller does not benefit from the rights applying to packages and that each service 
provider is responsible for his service,  
- the conditions under which travel services become an LTA (if the traveller books an additional 
travel service during the same visit) 
- information on insolvency protection 

Some important rights in relation to packages 

➢  Price changes (Article 10) 

8% cap for possible price increases by the trader, beyond which travellers have the right to cancel the 
package free of charge.  

Price increases are only allowed if the contract expressly reserves that possibility  and if they directly 
result from: 
- the cost of fuel or other power sources; 
- third-party tax or fee increases; 
- exchange rates. 
Any price increase should be notified at least 20 days before the start of the package. 
If the contract reserves the possibility of price increase, the organiser also has to grant price reductions 
where relevant. 

➢  The right of travellers to a full refund of any payments in the event of cancellation of 

the contract under certain conditions  

- If, before the start of the package, the organiser is constrained to alter significantly any of the main 
characteristics of the travel services or cannot fulfil the special requirements or proposes to increase 
the price of the package by more than 8 %, the traveller may within a reasonable period specified by 
the  organiser  (a)  accept  the  proposed  change,  or  (b)  terminate  the  contract  without  paying  a 
termination fee. (Article 11(2)) 

- If the traveller does not accept a substitute package, the organiser shall refund all payments made 
by or on behalf of the traveller without undue delay and in any event not later than 14 days after the 
contract is terminated. (Article 11(5)) 
- If the traveller or the organiser cancel the contract before departure in the event of ‘unavoidable and 
extraordinary  circumstances’,  such  as  natural  disasters,  war,  or  other  serious  situations  at  the 
destination, otherwise cancellation against compensation. (Article 12(2) and (3)) 

➢  Clear identification of the liable party for the performance of the contract (Article 13, Article 

16 and Article 20 plus the forms in Annex 1) 

- Liability of the organiser of the package for all included travel services across the EU; Member 
States may decide whether the retailer is jointly liable. 
- If the organiser is established outside of EEA, the EU retailer is subject to the obligations laid down 
for organisers if the organiser does not comply. 
-  The  organiser  is  obliged  to  offer  suitable  alternative  arrangements,  if  impossible,  provide 
repatriation and accommodation for three nights  
- The organiser is obliged to provide assistance without undue delay to a traveller in difficulty. 

➢  Insolvency protection ((Article 17, Article 18 and Article 19)  

174 

 
 
 
 
  
 
 
- Insolvency protection requirements for package organisers and LTA facilitators  
- The insolvency protection covers: (a) refunds without undue delay if a service is not performed; (b) 
repatriation, and if necessary, accommodation, where carriage of passengers is included in package; 
for LTAs, repatriation if the facilitator is responsible for the carriage of passengers 
-  Mutual  recognition  of  insolvency  protection  of  insolvency  protection  and  administrative 
cooperation. Any insolvency protection an organiser provides in accordance with the measures in the 
Member State of its establishment have to be recognised by any other Member State. To facilitate 
the administrative cooperation and supervision of organisers operating in different Member States, 
Member States must designate central contact points.  

II. Transposition and implementation 

According to Article 28(1), Member States were required to transpose the PTD by 1 January 2018. 
The Commission opened infringement procedures for non-communication of national transposition 
measures  against  14  Member  States.  Two  Member  States  transposed  the  Directive  only  after  the 
Commission had issued a reasoned opinion pursuant to Article 258 of the TFEU. By March 2019, all 
Member States had notified the Commission of the complete transposition of the Directive.490 

Potential non-conformity issues on different aspects of the Directive may exist, to a different extent, 
in  all  Member  States,  particularly  in  relation  to  definitions  (including  the  main  concepts),  pre-
contractual information requirements, travellers’ termination rights and termination fees, liability for 
lack of or improper performance of the contract, the obligations of traders facilitating LTAs, liability 
for booking errors, and the effectiveness of the transposition regarding insolvency protection.491 The 
Member States were obliged to apply the rules transposing the PTD from 1 July 2018.  

After this date, Member States and some EEA countries492 adopted further measures in relation to the 
PTD.493 Several Member States adopted temporary rules deviating from the PTD, 15 of them giving 
package organisers the possibility to significantly extend the periods for reimbursements or make 
vouchers mandatory for travellers.494 In July 2020, the Commission opened infringement proceedings 
against 11 Member States.495 The infringement proceedings were closed after the relevant Member 
States repealed the legislation deviating from the PTD or after the relevant measures had expired. On 
8  June  2023,  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union  (CJEU)  confirmed  the  Commission’s 
interpretation  in  the  one  remaining  infringement  case  and  in  a  preliminary  ruling.496    The  CJEU 
confirmed that the PTD aims at full harmonisation497 and that the term ‘refund’ in the PTD implies a 
refund consisting in an amount of money which travellers can dispose of freely and does not include 

490 PTD application report, p. 3. 
491 Ibidem, p. 3 and 4. 
492 E.g., Norway, Iceland. No relevant information was identified in Lichtenstein. 
493 The national transposition measures in all Member States are publicly available at:  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/NIM/?uri=CELEX:32015L2302. 
In addition, Annex VIII to this SWD presents the measures adopted by the MS/EEA countries since July 2018. 
494 See also Annex 13, Evaluation, Appendix IX.  Package travel during the COVID-19 pandemic  
495  See  Commission’s  press  communications  of  2  July  and  30  October  2020  (under  point  5  –  Justice): 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/INF_20_1212 
and 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_20_1687   
496 Case C-407/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:449, CURIA - List of results (europa.eu) and Case C-540/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:450, 
CURIA - List of results (europa.eu)   
497 Case C-407/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:449, paragraph 59, Case C-540/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:450, paragraph 23  

175 

 
 
 
 
the  idea  of  a  voucher.498 The  CJEU  concluded  that  the  Member  States  were  not  allowed  to  adopt 
national legislation releasing organisers temporarily from the obligation to reimburse prepayments to 
travellers within 14 days of the termination of the contract.499 

There  were  also  aid  schemes  to  provide  support  to  transport  and  travel  businesses,  including 
guarantee schemes in the event of their insolvency as well as refunds to travellers in the event of 
cancellations.500   

III.  Overview of some consumer rights under the Air Passenger Rights Regulation  (EC) No 
261/2006 (APRR) and the Package Travel Directive (EU) 2015/2302 (PTD)  

498 Case C-407/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:449, paragraphs 30 and 33 and Case C-540/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:450, paragraph 
69  
499 Case C-407/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:449, paragraph 76  
500 Annex 13, Evaluation, Appendix IX The package travel during the Covid-19 pandemic contains data on state aid 
schemes  

176 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                               .                                                                            ,                                           .                                                                             ,                                                                                                                                    .                                                   7     ,                                .                                                                                  .                                                                                                                                                                        .                               .                                                            .                                                                                        ,                                                                                     .                                                                                                                                                                                                                          .                                                   14     ,                                                                                                              .                                                                              ,                                             .                                                                             61    6                                              15  3                                                                                                                                       .                                                 . 
 
ANNEX 12: LINKED TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS 

The evaluation identified interpretational and enforcement difficulties that could be grouped in two 
main categories: lack of clarity in key elements of the definition of LTA types (a) and (b) and unclear 
delimitation between packages and LTAs. 

A) Lack of clarity in key elements of the definition of LTA types (a) and (b)  

Elements of the definition of ‘linked travel arrangement’ lack clarity and would benefit from further 
clarifications,  according  to  national  authorities,  businesses  (package  travel  sector,  airlines,  and 
private insolvency protection funds), and consumer organisations.  

The following elements have been indicated as the most challenging in terms of interpretation and 
implementation in practice: - notion of ‘facilitation by a trader’ (related to both LTA types (a) and 
(b)), - ‘single visit’ (related to LTA type (a)), - ‘facilitation in a targeted manner’ (LTA type (b)), - 
‘the procurement of at least one additional travel service from another trader where a contract with 
such other trader is concluded at the latest 24 hours after the confirmation of the booking of the first 
travel service’ (LTA type (b)). 

B) Unclear delimitation between packages and LTAs 

The distinction between certain packages and certain LTAs can be difficult.501 A travel agent, who 
books a flight and a hotel for a customer for the same trip or holiday and issues one invoice for both 
services, sells a package. When the same services were selected separately, the travel agent that books 
them one after the other and does not charge a total price facilitates an LTA.502 

According to stakeholders, it was difficult for travellers and enforcement authorities to distinguish 
whether the services were selected jointly (package) or separately (LTA).503 The uncertain boundaries 
between packages and LTAs, but also between LTAs and single travel services, made the respective 
definitions of ‘package’ and ‘linked travel arrangements’ difficult to implement in practice. This is 
likely to have contributed to the fact that stakeholders - businesses, consumers or public authorities - 
have not been able to properly identify this type of combination of travel services and hence detect 
any LTA or LTA-related issues in practice. 504 

501  See  flowchart  “Package  travel  or  not?”  at  https://commission.europa.eu/document/653055bf-a1ae-4280-a26d-
bf7142fccfa9_en  
502 COM(2021) 90 final, p. 5. 
503 Public Consultation (26a): 70% (191 out of 273) respondents declared that ‘the distinction of whether the services 
were selected jointly (package) or separately (LTA) is difficult to verify for travellers and enforcement authorities’.  
504 This issue was reiterated almost unanimously everywhere in the data collection by stakeholders of all types. 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX 13: EVALUATION 

EN 

  EN 

 
 
Table of contents 

1. 

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1 

Purpose and scope of the Evaluation ............................................................... 1 

2.  WHAT WAS THE EXPECTED OUTCOME OF THE INTERVENTION? ......................... 2 

2.1 Description of the intervention logic and its objectives ............................ 2 
2.2 Points of comparison ................................................................................. 6 

3.  HOW HAS THE SITUATION EVOLVED OVER THE EVALUATION PERIOD? ......... 10 

Current state of play ...................................................................................... 10 

4. 

EVALUATION FINDINGS (ANALYTICAL PART) ......................................................... 14 

4.1. TO WHAT EXTENT WAS THE INTERVENTION SUCCESSFUL AND WHY? .. 14 
4.1.1. EFFECTIVENESS .............................................................................. 14 
4.1.2. EFFICIENCY ...................................................................................... 45 
4.1.3. COHERENCE ..................................................................................... 52 
4.2. HOW DID THE EU INTERVENTION MAKE A DIFFERENCE AND TO WHOM?
 ............................................................................................................. 55 
4.3. Is the intervention still relevant? ............................................................. 59 

5.  WHAT ARE THE LESSONS LEARNED AND THE CONCLUSIONS? .......................... 60 

5.1. Lessons learned ...................................................................................... 60 
5.2. Conclusions ............................................................................................ 61 

APPENDIX I:   PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ....................................................................... 63 

APPENDIX II. METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL MODELS USED ............................... 63 

APPENDIX III. EVALUATION MATRIX ................................................................................... 64 

APPENDIX IV. OVERVIEW OF BENEFITS AND COSTS ........................................................ 74 

APPENDIX V. STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTATION - SYNOPSIS REPORT .......................... 80 

APPENDIX VI. PRESENTATION OF THE PACKAGE TRAVEL DIRECTIVE ....................... 81 

APPENDIX VII. LINKED TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS ........................................................... 87 

APPENDIX  VIII.  MEASURES  ADOPTED  BY  THE  MEMBER  STATES/EEA  COUNTRIES 
SINCE JULY 2018 ............................................................................................................... 88 

APPENDIX IX. PACKAGE TRAVEL DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC ...................... 107 

APPENDIX X. OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL INSOVENCY PROTECTION SYSTEMS ....... 119 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Glossary 

Term or acronym 

Meaning or definition 

ADR 

APRR 

CPCs 

CJEU 

BEUC 

B2B 

ECA 

EEA  

Alternative Dispute Resolution 

Air Passengers Rights Regulation 

Consumer Protection Cooperation Authorities 

Court of Justice of the European Union 

Bureau  Européen  des  Unions  de  Consommateurs  (European 
Consumer Organisation) 

Business-to-Business 

European Court of Auditors 

European Economic Area 

EGFATT 

European Guarantee Funds' Association for Travel and Tourism 

EQ 

EU 

GO 

IA 

LTA 

NCA 

PTD 

Evaluation Question 

European Union 

General Objective 

Impact Assessment 

Linked travel arrangement 

National Competent Authority 

Package Travel Directive 

 
 
 
SMEs 

SO 

TEU 

TFEU 

Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 

Specific Objective 

Treaty on European Union 

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 

2013 IA 

2013 Impact Assessment 

 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION 

1.1. 

Purpose and scope of the Evaluation 

This Staff Working Document presents the result of the evaluation of Directive (EU) 2015/2302 
on package travel and linked travel arrangements (‘the Package Travel Directive’, ‘the Directive’, 
‘the 2015 Directive’ or ‘the PTD’).505 

In  view  of  a  decision  on  whether  the  PTD  should  be  revised  or  whether  other  solutions  are 
preferable,  this  evaluation  was  conducted  back-to-back  with  an  impact  assessment  of  possible 
policy options. 

The Directive, adopted on 25 November 2015 and applied since 1 July 2018, protects travellers in 
the area of package travel and linked travel arrangements (LTAs). It replaced Council Directive 
90/314/EEC of 13 June 1990 on package travel, package holidays and package tours506 (‘the 1990 
Directive’), building on its key features related to information requirements, contract changes and 
liabilities, as well as on the protection of consumers in case of the insolvency of the organiser.    

Its legal basis is Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).507 
According to Article 169(1) and point (a) of Article 169(2) of the TFEU, the Union is to contribute 
to the attainment of a high level of consumer protection through measures adopted pursuant to 
Article 114 TFEU. Furthermore, in accordance with Article 26(2) TFEU, the Directive aims to 
create a real consumer internal market in this area, ‘striking the right balance between a high level 
of consumer protection and the competitiveness of businesses’508 by harmonising the rights and 
obligations arising from contracts relating to package travel and LTAs. 

Since  its  start  in  July  2018,  certain  challenges  have  appeared  in  the  application  of  the  PTD  at 
normal  times  and  during  a  crisis,  such  as  the  Thomas  Cook  bankruptcy  and  the  COVID-19 
pandemic, as highlighted in the Commission’s report of 26.2.2021509 on the application of the PTD. 
In the context of these crises, challenges appeared in relation to refunds for cancelled trips as well 
as the solidity and scope of insolvency protection under the Directive.  

In its New Consumer Agenda of 13 November 2020, the Commission announced that it would 
carry  out  a  ‘deeper  analysis  into  whether  the  current  regulatory  framework  for  package  travel, 
including  as  regards  insolvency  protection,  is  still  fully  up  to  the  task  of  ensuring  robust  and 
comprehensive consumer protection at all times, taking into account also developments in the field 
of passenger rights.’510 

 Council Directive 90/314/EEC of 13 June 1990 on package travel, package holidays and package tours. 

505 Directive (EU) 2015/2302 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on package travel 
and linked travel arrangements, amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2011/83/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 90/314/EEC 
506 
507 "the European Parliament and the Council shall […] adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions 
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as their object the establishment 
and functioning of the Internal Market." Article 114(3) of the Treaty specifies that "the Commission, in its proposals 
envisaged in paragraph 1 concerning health, safety, environmental protection and consumer protection, will take as 
a base a high level of protection, taking account in particular of any new development based on scientific facts." 
508 Recital 5 PTD. Hereinafter if articles and recitals are quoted in this document, by default they are of the 2015 
Directive. 
509 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and  the Council on the application of Directive (EU) 
2015/2302  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  package  travel  and  linked  travel  arrangements, 
COM(2021)  90  final,  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=COM:2021:90:FIN  (COM(2021) 
90 final) 
510  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council,  New  Consumer  Agenda 
Strengthening  consumer  resilience  for  sustainable  recovery,  p.  4,  EUR-Lex  -  52020DC0696  -  EN  -  EUR-Lex 
(europa.eu) 

 
 
 
On  29  June  2021,  the  European  Court  of  Auditors  (ECA)  published  a  special  report  on  air 
the  ECA  made 
passenger  rights  during 
recommendations, asking the Commission to examine how, including through legislative changes, 
the rights of air passengers and package travellers can be strengthened,  including in a crisis, in 
relation to refunds for cancelled packages and the insolvency of an operator. 

the  COVID-19  pandemic.511  In 

this  report, 

Subsequently, the Commission launched an evaluation to assess whether the PTD provides robust 
and comprehensive consumer protection at all times, including in times of crisis.  

In line with the Better Regulation guidelines and toolbox,512 this evaluation assesses whether the 
Directive fulfils its main objectives  (effectiveness) and what  are its costs and benefits  for each 
stakeholder group (efficiency). It also examines the internal coherence of the PTD and its external 
coherence with other EU instruments513 as well as the EU added value, including the scope for 
burden  reduction  and  simplification.  Finally,  it  assesses  whether  it  responds  to  the  needs  and 
expectations of travellers and traders in all Member States/EEA countries (relevance). 

The evaluation focuses on developments since 2015 in the 27 EU Member States and in the EEA 
countries. It  addresses questions concerning the application of the PTD that are common to all 
Member States/EEA countries, although in some instances information and data gathering covered 
only a limited sample. These instances are indicated in this document.   

The evaluation relies on the results of a study,514 prepared by a contractor, ICF S.A., involving desk 
research, targeted surveys, interviews and workshops. In addition, the Commission carried out its 
own  consultation  activities, 
including  a  public  consultation  and  several  workshops. 
Methodological  information  on  how  the  evaluation  was  conducted  is  detailed  in  Appendix  4: 
Analytical methods to the Impact Assessment.515 

The  protected  party  in  the  PTD  is  the  ‘traveller’  as  defined  in  Article  3(6)  of  the  Directive, 
encompassing consumers and certain business travellers. This report uses the terms ‘traveller’ and 
‘consumer’ interchangeably.  

2.  WHAT WAS THE EXPECTED OUTCOME OF THE INTERVENTION? 

2.1 

  Description of the intervention logic and its objectives 

The 2015 Directive raises the level of consumer protection as compared to the repealed Council 
Directive 90/314/EEC, taking into account new online booking models for combinations of travel 
services. This implied, in particular, a broader definition of ‘packages’,516 including traditional pre-
arranged  packages,  but  also  dynamic  or  custom-made  packages  offered  by  different  types  of 

511  
Special report No 15/2021 - Air passenger rights during the COVID-19 pandemic: Key rights not protected 
despite Commission efforts (2021/C 258/05),  Special Report 15/2021: Air passenger rights during the COVID-19 
pandemic: Key rights not protected despite Commission efforts (europa.eu) 
512  European  Commission,  Better  Regulation:  Guidelines  and  Toolbox.  https://ec.europa.eu/info/better-regulation-
guidelines-and-toolbox_en  
513 E.g. recent and future developments in the field of passenger rights and legislation on specific modes of transport 
514 Study to support the preparation of an evaluation of the Package Travel Directive back-to-back with an impact 
assessment on its potential revision 
515 Due to the fact that the evaluation was conducted back-to-back with an impact assessment, some of the annexes 
are common to the two SWD 
516 ‘Packages’  are combinations of at least two different types of travel services that an organiser, such as a  tour 
operator, an online or physical travel agency, an airline or a hotel puts together for travellers. See Article 3(2). 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
traders.517 A new category of linked travel arrangements (LTAs), between stand-alone services and 
packages,  was  created.518  Whether  there  is  a  package,  an  LTA  or  merely  a  stand-alone  service 
depends on the booking process.  

The  PTD  aims  to  respond  to  the  following  key  needs.  Primarily,  the  1990  Directive  was  not 
adapted to the various packages and customised combinations of travel services that existed in the 
EU market. At the same time, enhanced transparency and increased legal certainty for travellers 
and traders was needed, in particular clarifications regarding the liable party for the performance 
of the package contract towards travellers, and the price after the conclusion of the contract, as 
well as regarding the lack of a right for travellers to terminate the contract before departure.  

The PTD has two main objectives: to contribute to the functioning of the internal market and to 
achieve a high and as uniform as possible level of consumer protection in the package travel sector. 
These  general  objectives  were  specified  through  related  specific  objectives.519  For  travel 
businesses, those specific objectives relate to competitiveness, the creation of a level playing field 
and  the  increase  of  cross-border  offers  and  the  reduction  of  unjustified  compliance  costs.  For 
travellers,  the  specific  objectives  are  to  reduce  consumer  detriment  and  increase  transparency 
about the type of product consumers are buying and the related protection, as well as to reduce 
consumer detriment stemming from unclear and outdated provisions. 

The  objectives  of  the  Directive  are  linked  to  a  set  of  specific  provisions  (inputs),  such  as 
harmonised  definitions,  information  at  the  advertising  and  pre-contractual  stages,  including 
standardised information sheets, traders’ liability and, strengthened insolvency protection   

To attain its objectives, the Directive:  

•  Lays  down  common  definitions  for  the  key  concepts  of  the  Directive,  e.g.,  ‘packages’,520 

‘travel service’, ‘linked travel arrangements’, ‘organiser’, and ‘traveller”.  

•  Obliges  organisers521  or  retailers522  to  provide  to  the  traveller  information  on  the  main 
characteristics of packages and rights of travellers, in a standardised information form prior 
to conclusion of the contract. This form clearly identifies the liable party for the performance 
of  the  package  travel  contract,523  and  informs  travellers  on  the  organiser’s  liability  and 
insolvency  protection.  The  PTD  also  obliges  traders  to  provide  information  on  LTAs, 
including on insolvency protection, through standardised information forms. 

517 E.g., tour operators, online or off-line travel agencies, carriers etc. 
518 Linked travel arrangements (LTAs) represent looser combinations of travel services where separate services are 
selected and paid for by the traveller on one visit to the same point of sale or where the traveller is offered another 
travel service within 24 hours of having booked a first one. See Article 3(5). 
519 As highlighted in the 2013 Explanatory memorandum, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of  the  Council  on  package  travel  and  assisted  travel  arrangements,  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  2006/2004, 
Directive 2011/83/EU and repealing Council Directive 90/314/EEC, /* COM/2013/0512 final - 2013/0246 (COD) 
*/https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A52013PC0512  
And in accordance with Article 114 of the Treaty. See also Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment, 
Accompanying the document on package travel and assisted travel arrangements, amending  Regulation (EC) No 
2006/2004l and Directive 2011/83/EU and repealing Council Directive 90/314/EEC /* SWD/2013/0263 final */, page 
24 (SWD/2013/0263 final), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A52013SC0263 
520 The new ‘wide definition of ‘package’ includes ready-made holidays offered by a tour operator and the customised 
selection of components for a trip or holiday by the traveller at a single online or off-line point of sale’. 
521 Article 3(8): “‘organiser’ means a trader who combines and sells or  offers for sale packages, either directly or 
through another trader or together with another trader, or the trader who transmits the traveller's data to another trader 
in accordance with point (b)(v) of point 2” 
522  Article 3(9): “‘retailer’   means a trader other than the organiser who sells or offers for sale packages combined 
by an organiser;” 
523 In addition, Member States may decide that the retailer (often a travel agent) is jointly liable. If the organiser is 
established outside of EEA (Article 20), then the EU retailer is subject to the obligations laid down for organisers if 
the organiser does not comply. 

3 

 
 
•  Creates  strong  cancellation  rights  for  travellers,  i.e.,  free  cancellation  before  departure  in 
case of significant changes proposed by the organiser after the conclusion of the contract or 
in  the  event  of  unavoidable  and  extraordinary  circumstances.524 Otherwise,  travellers  can 
cancel against a fee.   

•  Establishes clear conditions under which the package travel contract, including the price, can 

be changed by the organiser.  

•  Provides for increased protection for travellers in case of the insolvency of the organiser. It 
also introduces the principle of mutual recognition of insolvency protection among Member 
States  and  facilitates  administrative  cooperation  between  them,  through  a  new  network  of 
Central Contact Points. 

The current Directive, unlike the repealed 1990 PTD, is a full harmonisation directive.525 Still, it 
gives  the  Member  States  regulatory  options  in  a  few  specific  respects  (e.g.,  regarding  the  full 
liability of retailers in addition to the liability of organisers). 

These inputs led to outputs at Member State level (transposition, setting up the appropriate bodies 
for implementation and monitoring, enforcing, and ensuring access to redress) and at the level of 
traders (compliance and the training of staff). 

The  expectation  (results  and  impacts)  was  that  travellers  and  traders  would  benefit  from  the 
internal market by cross-border agreements governed by the harmonised rules of the PTD. Also, 
travellers would benefit from being better informed and thus enjoy the various rights granted by 
the PTD. In turn, traders would benefit from modernised rules, a level playing field and the mutual 
recognition  of  insolvency  protection,  while  national  authorities  would  benefit  from  enhanced 
cooperation and exchange of information on the insolvency protection systems. 

The figure below presents the intervention logic. The aim of the intervention logic is to guide the 
evaluation process by identifying the needs to which the adoption of the PTD responded and the 
general  and  specific  objectives  of  the  PTD.  It  explains  how  the  measures  taken  (input)  can  be 
translated into actions (outputs) that lead to the desired results and impacts. The intervention logic 
also covers the external factors. 

524 Such as natural disasters, war, and significant risks to human health significantly affecting the performance of the 
package or the carriage of passengers to the destination. 
525 Article 4 

4 

 
 
 
Figure 1 Intervention logic 

 
 
 
2.2 Points of comparison 

The package travel sector starting from 2013 up to 2018/spring 2019 

The main baseline for the evaluation is the situation prior to the adoption of the Directive, starting 
with 2013, when the Impact Assessment for the 2015 revision was finalised.  

The period from January 2016 to July 2018 is considered as ‘transition period’, during which the 
PTD was being transposed by the Member States. However, some Member States transposed it 
only after the stipulated deadline.526  

This section presents the market context and the main challenges related to the implementation of 
the 1990 Directive.    

a)  Market context  

The tourism industry plays a key role in the EU economy due to its economic and employment 
potential.  Driven  by  rising  income  levels  and  falling  costs  in  aviation  and  accommodation, 
globally the number of tourists grew from 680 million in 2000 to over 1.5 billion in 2019.527 The 
2013 Impact Assessment (2013 IA) notes that over the last decades the EU has retained its position 
as the world’s leading destination for tourism.528,529  

The data on the package travel market from 2013 to 2019 displayed below draws on data from 
Eurostat,530 the 2013 IA and information in the literature, as well as on the analysis of relevant 
questions from the public consultation and targeted consultations conducted for this evaluation, 
such as targeted surveys, interviews, and workshops. 

In  2013,  the  EU  travel  market  comprised  approximately  90000  tour  operators  and  travel 
agencies, with SMEs constituting 99% of these businesses, of which micro enterprises represented 
92%.531  The  number  of  travel  agencies  and  other  reservation  services  progressively  increased 
between 2013 and 2018/2019. From 2013 to 2015, the number of operators in the EU increased 
by 9%, and in the period 2016-2018 by 7%.532 According to Eurostat data, the number of travel 
agencies,  tour  operators  and  other  reservation  services  in  the  EU  in  2019  was  approximately 
112.000533 – of which almost 100% were SMEs.534 By contrast, large companies – more than 250 

526  COM(2021)90  final,  page  3.  ‘In  March  2018,  the  Commission  opened  infringement  procedures  for  non-
communication of national transposition measures against 14 Member States. […] By March 2019, all Member 
States had notified the Commission of the complete transposition of the Directive.’ 
527  International  Monetary  Fund,  (2021),  Tourism  in  the  Post-Pandemic  World.  Economic  challenges  and 
opportunities for Asia-Pacific and the Western Hemisphere, no. 21/02, p. 3.  
528 SWD/2013/0263 final, p. 5.  
529  In  2018,  over  one  in  ten  enterprises  in  the  European  non-financial  business  economy  belonged  to  tourism 
industries. They accounted for 2.3 million enterprises which employed roughly 12.3 million persons.  
The non-financial business economy includes the sectors of industry, construction, distributive trades and services.  
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Glossary:Non-financial_business_economy 
See  European  Parliament 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_3.4.12.pdf 
530 Figures in the tables in the section below are rounded.  
531 European Commission, (2013), Impact Assessment SWD(2013)263 final. 
532 ICF study, NOT PUBLISHED YET 
533 Ibidem 
534 The number of SMEs accounted for 99.9%. According to Eurostat data, in 2019 travel agency, tour operator and 
other reservation service and related activities enterprises, in the EU, with 250 persons employed or more were 139.  

the  European  Union  –  Tourism,  available  at: 

(2022),  Factsheets  of 

6 

 
 
 
employees  –  accounted  for  0.1%  of  EU-27  travel  enterprises.  Nevertheless,  bigger  companies, 
although much fewer in number, generated higher turnover than SMEs.535  

According to estimates in the 2013 IA, pre-arranged packages accounted for about 23% of the 
total market value (i.e., around 118 million trips), not taking into account the dynamic packages 
which the 2015 Directive aimed to include536 and which have been effectively included since July 
2018. Eurostat figures show that, in 2014, the number of travel package accounted for 9%537 of the 
total number of trips for personal reasons in the EU (i.e. around 86 million trips).538,539 In 2017, 
packages540  continued to represent 9% of all tourism trips in the EU27.541 Since, in this period, the 
1990 Directive  applied,  this figure does not  reflect  any changes brought  about  by the changed 
definition of packages and the creation of the new concept of LTAs. Furthermore, the divergence 
between figures based on the value of trips (23%) as opposed to the number of trips (9%) is not 
surprising, as it can be assumed that packages will tend to have a higher value than stand-alone 
services. 542 

Estimates made for the 2013 IA showed that out of 500 million holiday trips, roughly 15 million 
were ‘multi-trader assisted’ travel arrangements, as they are called in that study, and which the 
2015 Directive aimed to capture largely as ‘linked travel arrangements’ (LTAs). Additionally, it 
showed that the overarching category of travel arrangements customised by travellers, which can 
include  dynamic  packages  but  also  LTAs,  was  on  the  rise.543  However,  it  is  very  difficult  to 
indicate percentages of what would have been LTAs before July 2018 and of LTAs from July 
2018.  

b)  Main challenges related to the implementation of the 1990 Directive 

The 1990 Directive aimed at creating harmonised minimum standards for package travel across 
the EU and ensuring the protection of travellers. It  applied to  pre-arranged packages,  typically 
consisting of transport and accommodation (and/or other tourism services) sold together.  

The 1990 Directive ensured that consumers received essential information before and after signing 
a  package  travel  contract.  It  provided  that  organisers  and/or  retailers  were  responsible  for  the 
proper  performance  of  the  package  and  regulated  what  happened  if  there  were  changes  to  the 

at: 

263 

final, 

available 

SWD(2013) 

arrangements, 

535 ICF study, Tables 5, 6 and 7, NOT PUBLISHED YET 
536 European Commission, (2013), Impact Assessment accompanying the document on package travel and assisted 
travel 
https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SWD:2013:0263:FIN:EN:PDF 
537 Comparability with data on pre-arranged packages provided in the 2013 IA is however not possible, given that 
the sources and the definitions considered might differ.  
538 Information on package travels is gathered through Eurostat datasets, accordingly definitions used are derived 
from  the  regulatory  framework  in  force  during  the  timeframe  considered.  For  2014,  the  definition  of  package  is 
contained at art.  2.1 of Council Directive 90/314/EEC of 13 June  1990 on package travel, package holidays and 
package tours.  
539 Trips by trip arrangement (2014-2019), Statistics | Eurostat (europa.eu) 
540 In 2017, the definition of package contained in Directive 90/314 still applied and not Article 3(2) of Directive 
(EU) 2015/2302 on package travel and linked travel arrangements.  
541 SWD/2013/0263 final, page 2 
542 The package travel sector generated a spending of around EUR 66.50 billion in 2014, which accounted for 23% 
of the total spending in the EU for personal travel. In 2017, the package travel sector generated an expenditure of 
roughly  EUR  85.04  billion,  which  continued  to  account  for  23%  of  the  total  spending  in  the  EU  for  travels  for 
personal reasons. Elaborated by ICF based on “Eurostat – Expenditure by type of organisation (from 2014 onwards), 
purpose – personal reasons, duration – 1 night or over, partner – all countries of the world, trip arrangement – package 
travel. Regarding EEA countries, the only available data is the number of packages in Norway in 2017, which was 
approximately 2 million, and constitutes almost 9% of the total number of travel services sold in Norway, generating 
a total spending of EUR 3 billion, in 2017. ICF study. 
543  SWD/2013/0263  final,  p  12:  ‘data  shows  that  23%  of  EU  citizens  buy  them  every  year  but  the  figures  are 
substantially above average for Ireland (46%), Sweden (44%), Italy (36%) and Slovenia (42%).’ 

7 

 
 
package travel contract. It also ensured that travellers received a refund of pre-payments and were 
repatriated in the event of the organiser's and/or retailer's insolvency.544  

The adoption of the Directive in 1990 made ‘a significant contribution to the development of a 
single  market  for  an  important  part  of  the  travel  market  and  created  important  guarantees  for 
European  travellers.’545  However,  it  became  evident  that  the  Directive  was  not  adapted  to  the 
emerging market trends, driven in particular by the expansion of the use of internet. Moreover, 
significant differences remained in the national laws transposing the Directive ‘due to its minimum 
harmonisation approach’ and the broad discretion given to Member States, e.g. with regard to the 
liable party towards travellers, and ambiguities in the text.546 Different rules in the Member States 
discouraged travellers as well as organisers from buying or selling packages and combinations of 
travel services in another Member State.547 It was hence ‘necessary to further approximate the laws 
of the Member States relating to packages and linked travel arrangements’.548 

Therefore,  in  2013,  the  Commission  proposed  to  modernise  EU  rules  on  package  travel.  For 
travellers, the 2013 IA549 indicated inadequate protection because:  

-  Packages combined at the traveller's request were not explicitly covered by the legislation. An 
increasing number of holidays booked by travellers,550 were not protected, falling outside the scope 
of the 1990 Directive. An increasing number of consumers, in addition to buying pre-arranged 
packages,  used  to  put  together  their  trips  themselves  according  to  their  own  needs  based  on 
specific offers coming from one or more traders.551 A trend observed at the time were the so-called 
‘dynamic packages’. An example of dynamic packaging is where an internet platform, e.g., for 
booking flights, also offers other services such as car-hire, insurance or hotel accommodation that 
can be added to a shopping basket. Although commercially linked, there may be contracts with 
each  service  provider.552  Therefore,  it  was  often  difficult  for  travellers  to  understand  whether 
customised travel arrangements which they bought with the assistance of a trader were protected 
or  not  against  the  insolvency  of  that  trader.  67%  of  consumers  who  bought  customised  travel 
arrangements ‘through an intermediary with billings by different companies wrongly believed that 
they would receive a refund in case of bankruptcy of one of them.’ This confusion could lead to 
significant  detriment  for  travellers,  particularly  when  the  travel  company  went  bankrupt,  and 
travellers were left stranded abroad or unable to get their money back.553  

-  There  were  uncertainties  related  to  final  prices  for  packages.  Under  the  1990  Directive, 
businesses were allowed to revise the price of the package due to certain increased costs. There 
was no cap for the possible price increase and consequently travellers lacked certainty in relation 
to the final price of their package. Travellers could cancel the contract if the price change was 
significant. However, the term "significant change" was open to interpretation. 

544 Explanatory memorandum, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the  Council on package 
travel  and  assisted  travel  arrangements,  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  2006/2004,  Directive  2011/83/EU  and 
repealing Council Directive 90/314/EEC, /* COM/2013/0512 final - 2013/0246 (COD) */ 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A52013PC0512 
545 SWD/2013/0263 final, p. 5.   
546 Ibidem. 
547 Recital (6).  
548 Ibidem. 
549 SWD/2013/0263 final, p. 14-23. 
550 Packages customised by travellers. 
551 Ibidem. 
552  Study  on 
the  Package  Travel  Directive,  European  Parliament,  2012 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2012/475084/IPOL-IMCO_ET(2012)475084_EN.pdf    
553  Ibidem,  p.  20  and  21:  ‘For  example,  an  estimated  1.4-2.2 million  air  passengers  were  impacted  by  an  airline 
insolvency between 2000 and 2010 of these, 12% were stranded away from home incurring the average costs of over 
€79.668’ 

Implementation  of 

the 

8 

 
 
- 

-  Travellers did not have the right to terminate the contract before its start in the event of a serious 
situation at the place of destination such as a violent conflict, an ecological disaster, or a dangerous 
and contagious disease. 
It was unclear which party (organiser, retailer, or both) was liable for the performance of the 
package and the procurement of insolvency protection. Divergences in national rules concerning 
the liable party could be detrimental to travellers, especially if the package was purchased cross-
border or where the retailer and the organiser were established in different Member States or where 
the organiser was based outside the EU. It could lead to situations where the organiser and the 
retailer referred the traveller to the other party and neither of them would take responsibility. 
-  The  access  to  justice  was  cumbersome  as  the  Directive  did  not  set  up  any  contact  points  for 
complaints, minimum prescription periods or mechanisms for out of court dispute resolutions. The 
1990 Directive did not establish any contact points for complaints, minimum prescription periods 
or mechanisms for out of court dispute resolutions, which had been criticized by and called for by 
various consumer organisations/bodies. 

-  There  was  uncertainty  as  to  the  right  to  compensation  for  non-material  damages  and,  in 
particular,  that  such  compensation  can  arise  from  the  loss  of  enjoyment  due  to  the  improper 
performance of the travel contract. 
For businesses, the 2013 IA554 outlines: 

-  The  absence  of  a  level  playing  field  leading  to  distortion  of  competition.  Some  of  the  market 
players competing for the same customers and selling combinations that could include exactly the 
same  components  were  covered  by  the  Directive  and  others  not  or,  at  least,  did  not  consider 
themselves to be covered. 

-  Unnecessary/unjustified  compliance  costs,  e.g.,  outdated  information  requirements;  unjustified 
costs  for  package  travel  organisers  in  case  of  delays,  cancellations,  force  majeure  events  and 
accidents related to transport due to insufficient redress mechanisms; lack of coherence with EU 
passenger  rights  rules  -  unlimited  liability  in  case  of  force-majeure  events;  duplication  of 
protection for business trips.555 

-  Legal discrepancies between the Member States leading to additional costs and obstacles to cross-
border  trade  because  of  differences  in  national  legislations,  e.g.,  divergent  information 
requirements,  different  scope  of  the  protection  rules,  different  national  rules  on  liability  and 
obligations  of  the  contractual  parties.556  Also,  in  cross-border  trading,  divergent  insolvency 
protection  schemes  and  lack  of  mutual  recognition  had  resulted  in  multiple  payments  for 
insolvency  protection  made  by  some  retailers  or  organisers  for  insolvency  protection  already 
secured in their Member State of establishment. 

554 Ibidem, p.14. 
555 The 2013 IA refers to the obligation to print binding brochures for the organisers that should have been reprinted 
in case of changes in prices, accommodation, etc., causing significant costs, unjustified in ‘today's Internet world’. 
Furthermore, where transport was included in the package, in most cases, both the package organiser and transport 
carriers  were  obliged  to  provide  compensation  and  assistance  in  case  of  delays,  cancellations  or  accidents  to 
passengers under EU rules on passenger rights.  
556 The 1990 Directive was based on minimum harmonisation. This resulted in legal discrepancies between Member 
States, generating additional compliance costs for businesses wishing to trade cross-border.  

9 

 
 
 
3. 

HOW HAS THE SITUATION EVOLVED OVER THE EVALUATION PERIOD? 

Current state of play 

This section presents the measures taken by the Member States to transpose and implement the 
Directive, the market context and business trends since July 2018, and the main challenges related 
to the implementation of the Directive.    

a)  Transposition and implementation  

According to Article 28(1), Member States were required to transpose the PTD by 1 January 2018. 
The  Commission  opened 
infringement  procedures  for  non-communication  of  national 
transposition measures against 14 Member States. Two Member States transposed the Directive 
only after the Commission had issued a reasoned opinion pursuant to Article 258 of the TFEU. By 
March 2019, all Member States had notified the Commission of the complete transposition of the 
Directive.557 

Potential  non-conformity  issues  on  different  aspects  of  the  Directive  may  exist,  to  a  different 
extent, in all Member States, particularly in relation to definitions (including the main concepts), 
pre-contractual  information  requirements,  travellers’  termination  rights  and  termination  fees, 
liability for lack of or improper performance of the contract, the obligations of traders facilitating 
LTAs, liability for booking errors, and the effectiveness of the transposition regarding insolvency 
protection.558  

The Member States were obliged to apply the rules transposing the PTD from 1 July 2018.  

After this date, Member States and some EEA countries559 adopted further measures in relation to 
the PTD.560 Many countries introduced emergency measures to face COVID-19, mostly limited in 
time  (until  the  country’s  ending  date  of  the  COVID-19  state  of  emergency).  Most  measures 
concerned the possibility to offer vouchers as an alternative to reimbursement in money and/or an 
extension  of  the  period  for  reimbursement  in  case  of  cancelled  packages  in  the  context  of  the 
COVID-19  pandemic.  There  were  also  aid  schemes  to  provide  support  to  transport  and  travel 
businesses,  including  guarantee  schemes  in  the  event  of  their  insolvency  as  well  as  refunds  to 
travellers in the event of cancellations.561   

b)  Market context since July 2018, the application date of the PTD  

In  2022,  the  European  region  remains  the  global  leader  in  international  tourism,  welcoming 
roughly two-thirds of all international tourist arrivals worldwide.562,563  

557 COM(2021) 90 final, p. 3. 
558 Ibidem, p. 3 and 4. 
559 NO, IS. No relevant information was identified in Lichtenstein. 
560 The national transposition measures in all Member States are publicly available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/NIM/?uri=CELEX:32015L2302. 
In addition, Appendix VIII to this SWD presents the measures adopted by the MS/EEA countries since July 2018. 
561 Appendix IX The package travel during the Covid-19 pandemic contains data on state aid schemes.  
562  Statista, 
https://www.statista.com/topics/3848/travel-and-tourism-in-europe/#topicHeader__wrapper  
563 According to Eurostat data, the number of travel agency, tour operator and other reservation services in the EU in 
2019 was approximately 112 000 of which almost 100% were SMEs563 – employing 470 000 persons. This number 
has progressively increased over the years, with an overall growth of 26% from 2013 to 2019. Elaborated by ICF 
based on “Annual enterprise statistics for special aggregates of activities (NACE Rev. 2) [sbs_na_sca_r2], Nace_r2 
– Travel agency, tour operator and other reservation service and related activities”. ICF study. 

(2022),  Travel 

statistics  & 

in  Europe 

available 

tourism 

facts, 

and 

at: 

- 

10 

 
 
The  industry  of  travel  agencies  and  related  services  is  predominantly  composed  of  micro-
enterprises.  In  2019,  94%  of  the  EU’s  travel  agencies  were  companies  of  0-9  employees.  The 
remaining 6% was composed of small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs). By contrast, large 
companies,564  accounted  for  0.1%  of  EU-27  travel  enterprises.  Figures  on  turnover  are  not 
comparable due to limited data available.565  
According  to  some  stakeholders,  nowadays,  consumers  are  booking  fewer  package  holidays, 
although the part of the market that is still willing to conclude package travel contracts exists, such 
as people travelling in group.566 However, the Market Monitoring Survey found that 81% of EU27 
travellers trust the package holiday and tour services market, with figures varying from a high 
of 90% in Croatia and Portugal to a low of 60% in Poland.567 According to 75% of stakeholders, 
travellers  prefer  packages  because  it  is  easier  to  find  all  the  services  at  the  point  of  sale.568  In 
addition, 70% of stakeholders also indicate the offer of more guarantees as a reason for preferring 
packages.569  

At  the  same  time,  since  July  2018  until  February/March  2020,  the  annual  share  of  packages 
appears  to  remain  stable  for  offline  sales  while  it  increased  for  the  online  ones.  After 
February/March 2020 until Mid-2022, both offline and online sales decreased.570 However, there 
are no reliable figures indicating how the share of packages as defined in the PTD has developed 
since July 2018.  

It is well known that the COVID-19 pandemic hit the travel sector at global level from 2020. All 
stakeholders consulted indicated that the health crisis impacted the package travel sector to a large 
extent.571,572  Moreover,  around  90%  of  EU  SMEs  were  negatively  affected  by  COVID-19 
restrictions, suffering loss of turnover and increasing unemployment rates.573  However, the World 
Economic Forum has reported on signs of recovery in the market.574 The outlook remains positive, 

Survey 

Market 

European 

Monitoring 

Commission, 

representatives, 

564 With more than 250 employees. 
565 However, bigger companies, although fewer in number, generated higher turnover than SMEs, as also mentioned 
in Section 2.2., point a). 
566 Scoping interview with consumer organisation – PTD Study, (2022); Minutes of the Workshop of the PTD Study 
with  businesses  and  consumer 
(2022).  https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/expert-groups-
register/screen/meetings/consult?lang=en&meetingId=45600&fromExpertGroups=false  
567 
(2021), 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/new-cars-mms20-ppt_en.pdf  
The Market Monitoring Survey does not provide further details as to what the level of trust exactly entails. 
568 Public consultation Q1: 354 out of 471 respondents. 
569 Ibidem: 332 out of 471 respondents. 
570 Business targeted survey Q.4 – July 2018-Feb/March 2020: Packages sold offline, n. 6 = 3 Increase, 3 Decrease; 
Packages sold online, n. 7 = 5 Increase, 2 Decrease. Feb/March 2020-July 2021: Packages sold offline, n. 6 =  1 
Increase, 5 Decrease; Packages sold online, n. 7 = 1 Increase, 6 Decrease. July 2021-present: Packages sold offline, 
n. 6 = 2 Increase, 4 Decrease; Packages sold online, n. 7 = 4 Increase, 3 Decrease. 
571 Targeted survey - consumer organisations (Q2) = n. 12 to a large extent. 
572 Targeted survey – national authorities (regulatory and enforcement) (Q22) = n. 27, of which 26 to a large extent, 
1 to a small extent.  
573  SME  United  (2020),  A  view  on  the  COVID  impact  on  and  support  measures  for  SMEs,  available  at: 
https://www.smeunited.eu/admin/storage/smeunited/200417-covid19-impact1.pdf  
574 27% rise in nights spent in tourist accommodation in the EU, in 2021 in comparison to 2020, although still 37% 
less  than  in  2019.  World  Economic  Forum,  (2022),  How  quickly  is  tourism  recovering  from  COVID-19?, 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/03/europe-tourism-has-slow-pandemic-recovery/ 

2020, 

6, 

p. 

11 

 
 
with travel demand in 2022 projected to be just between 20%575 and 30%576 below pre-pandemic 
levels. 

According to a recent consumer survey,577 after COVID-19, 23% of the respondents are confident 
to book travel services well in  advance of the trip, while 22% prefer booking late, 15% would 
accept a voucher instead of a refund and are confident about the protection in case of insolvency.   

Regarding LTAs, there are very limited data on the volume of bookings.578 In the framework of 
the consultation for this evaluation, most stakeholders stated that they did not have specific data 
on LTAs. The reasons for this might include the fact that it is difficult to detect when an LTA is 
formed.579  

Lastly,  businesses  were  asked  whether  there  are  differences  in  the  share  of  packages  sold  in 
different Member States and the reasons why. The limited number of responses limits the validity 
of this finding.580 

c)  Business trends 

The 2013 IA emphasised that the growing number of internet users triggered the travel market to 
significantly shift online, travel services being the most popular category purchased online.  

The  trend  of  purchasing  travel  services  online  is  continuing.  Currently,  the  tourism  sector 
outperforms other industries in the share of businesses selling online.581 43% of travellers who had 
purchased package holidays and tour services had indeed done so online.582 

The  increased  use  of  the  internet  by  travellers  has  influenced  the  way  actors  in  the  travel  and 
tourism sectors conduct their business.583 The traditional supply chain of which tourist services, 
including transport providers, depended on has been transformed into a complex system of actors, 
with the advent of new technologies.584 Frequently online service providers work in partnership 

575  European  Travel  Commission,  (2022),  European  Tourism  2021  –  Trends  &  Prospects  (Q4/2021),  https://etc-
corporate.org/reports/european-tourism-2021-trends-prospects-q4-2021/  
576 European Travel Commission, (2022), European Tourism 2022  – Trends & Prospects (Q2/2022), available at: 
https://etc-corporate.org/uploads/2022/07/Quarterly-Report-Q2-2022_Public-1.pdf  
577 Consumer survey, 2022, published on 27 March 2023 and carried out by Ipsos for the European Commission, 
between  11  and  24  October  2022.  25  676  phone  interviews  across  27  Member  states.  Representative  sample  of 
citizens  aged  18  and  over.  https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/consumers/consumer-
protection-policy/key-consumer-data_en  
578 Business stakeholders were asked if the annual share of sold LTAs since July 2018 – when the PTD entered into 
force – had increased, but the very limited number of answers to this question (three replies) does not allow to reach 
any conclusion. 
579 This is addressed under EQ1, sub-section on link travel arrangements 
580  Business  targeted  survey  Q2,  N  =11:  4  businesses  out  of  11  believe  that  there  are  differences,  whereas  the 
remaining  7  do  not  know.  One  stakeholder  explained  that  what  makes  the  sale  of  packages  differ  is  consumer 
behaviour and buying patterns for travel 
581 OECD, (2020), OECD Tourism trends and policies - Chapter 2: Preparing tourism businesses for the digital future. 
See also European Commission, Behavioural study […], p. 20. Also, according to Statista’s Digital Market Outlook 
in 2018, the main global driver for the travel booking market is the internet. 
582 European Commission, (2021), Market Monitoring Survey 2020, p. 6,  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/new-cars-mms20-ppt_en.pdf  
583 OECD-sponsored research revealed that, on average, 77% of accommodation and food and beverage companies 
in OECD countries – including 22 EU countries as well as Norway and Iceland – have a website, and 70% use social 
media to conduct their business. OECD, (2020), OECD Tourism trends and policies […] 
584  The  agents  who  now  participate  in  the  creation  and  distribution  of  travel  information  have  multiplied, 
encompassing Online Travel Agencies (OTAs), supplier websites, tour operators, consolidators and meta-search and 

12 

 
 
 
with  other  travel  providers.  Consequently,  they  can  propose  on  their  websites  their  partners’ 
options, or they can refer to the website of the respective partner company for the completion of 
the booking or for adding additional services.585 Hence, the practices are relevant for the possible 
conclusion of LTAs, as well.  

As  already  mentioned,  to  address  these  trends,  the  2015  PTD  extended  the  level  of  consumer 
protection,  taking  into  consideration  new  online  booking  models  for  combinations  of  travel 
services. This implied in particular a broader definition of ‘packages’, introducing the so called 
‘click-through packages’, but also the new category of LTAs.586 In some cases, the uncertainties 
related to the concept of LTAs has led to abuse by traders. It appears that some traders changed 
their business models/booking processes to avoid being considered as package organisers. 587 

d)  Main challenges related to the implementation of the 2015 Directive 

The  period  from  July  2018  to  2022,  i.e.,  ‘the  application  period’,  corresponds  to  the  current 
situation. The ‘application period’ of the evaluation period is further split into two timeframes: 
before the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, from July 2018 to February/March 2020 and after 
the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic to the present day.  

Before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic (February/March 2020)  
According to the 2021 application report,588 stakeholders pointed out the following challenges: the 
broad scope of package definition, unclear definition of LTAs, delimitation between package and 
LTAs and, finally, burdensome information requirements. 
The 2022 Opinion of the Fit for future platform comprises five suggestions: ‘1. Better information 
on the identity of the contractual partners and on contact details and better enforcement of rules; 
2.  Clarification  of  scope  and  simplification  of  the  definitions  of  package  and  Linked  Travel 
Arrangement; 3. Clarification of pre-contractual information requirements (Art 5); 4. Clarification 
of uncertainties regarding insolvency protection; 5. Clarification of “other tourist services”.589 

After the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic  
During the COVID-19 pandemic, thousands of travellers did not receive a refund in money for 
cancelled holidays.590 They were either imposed a voucher or suffered a considerable delay or were 
asked for a termination fee. At the same time, organisers were facing liquidity issues, while the 
travel service providers refused or delayed the reimbursement of pre-payments.591  

corporate  enterprises.  All  these  channels  have  acquired  a  central  role,  particularly  because  there  is  increased 
travellers’ dependence on them, for their purchase decision-making. European Commission, 2020, Behavioural study 
[…], p.9. Behavioural study on advertising and marketing practices in travel booking websites and apps - Publications 
Office of the EU (europa.eu)  
585 Ibidem, p. 35. 
586 Article 3(2)(v) of the PTD defines the ‘click-through packages’. Article 3(5) defines the LTAs. 
587 See EQ1  
588 COM(2021) 90 final, p. 4. 
589 https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-making-process/evaluating-and-improving-existing-laws/refit-making-eu-
law-simpler-less-costly-and-future-proof/fit-future-platform-f4f/adopted-opinions_en  
590  See  BEUC’s  Evaluation  of  the  Member  States  Implementation  of  the  EU  Commission  Recommendation  on 
‘vouchers’ of 14.12.2020, https://www.beuc.eu/press-releases/travel-voucher-chaos-continues-several-eu-countries-
and-travel-industry-still   
591 See section 4.1., EQ5. See also Appendix IX. Package travel during the COVID-19 pandemic. 

13 

 
 
4. 

EVALUATION FINDINGS (ANALYTICAL PART) 

This section presents the findings of the evaluation, grouped under each of the Better Regulation 
criteria,592  and  based  on  the  triangulation  of  evidence  collected  through  the  different  means 
presented in Appendix III. Evaluation matrix.  

4.1. TO WHAT EXTENT WAS THE INTERVENTION SUCCESSFUL AND WHY?  

4.1.1.  EFFECTIVENESS 

The  assessment  of  effectiveness  looks  at  the  extent  to  which  the  Directive  has  succeeded  in 
meeting its objectives.  

This section analyses to what extent the Directive’s objectives of contributing to the functioning 
of the internal market and achieving a high and as uniform as possible level of consumer protection 
in the package travel sector have been achieved since the introduction of the Directive. The section 
also looks at the specific objectives as identified by the 2013 IA.593 For businesses operating in 
the travel market, the specific objectives aimed to ensure a more competitive and fairer playing 
(SO1), increase the cross-border offer of package travel services by reducing costs and obstacles 
to cross-border trade in the package travel market (SO2), and reduce unjustified compliance costs 
(SO3). For consumers, the specific objectives aimed to reduce consumer detriment and increase 
transparency for travellers who buy combinations of travel services that were not covered by the 
1990 Directive by addressing new market developments (SO4) and to reduce consumer detriment 
stemming from unclear and outdated provisions (SO5). 

Various  aspects  of  the  Directive,  notably  the  harmonised  definitions,  the    information  to  be 
provided  to  travellers  (in  particular  in  a  standardised  way),  the  liability  of  organisers  towards 
travellers, the protection of travellers against the insolvency of organisers, ensuring refunds of pre-
payments  and  repatriation  as  well  as  the  mutual  recognition  of  insolvency  protection  and 
administrative cooperation, are important in contributing to the functioning of the internal market 
and preserving a high level of consumer protection.594  

EQ1. To what extent do the observed effects correspond to the PTD objectives, and which 
are the elements that have contributed to improving consumer protection, including in the 
areas which were previously not explicitly covered by the Directive? 

4.1.1.1. Harmonised definitions 

The provision of harmonised definitions for the package travel sector was a key aspect to attain a 
more competitive and fairer level playing field for businesses operating in the travel market (SO1 
- businesses), and to reduce consumer detriment by covering combinations of travel services that 
were  not  covered  by  the  1990  Directive  and  increasing  transparency  in  that  respect  (SO4  - 
consumers).  

a) ‘Package’ (Article 3(2)) 

The  definition  of  ‘package’  is  crucial  for  the  scope  of  the  PTD.  The  amended  definition  of 
‘package’ was expected to respond to the new purchasing methods developed in particular in the 
on-line environment.595 In this respect, the definition covers ‘combined travel arrangements’ where 

592 Effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, EU added value of the intervention and relevance. 
593 SWD/2013/0263 final, p. 24 
594 See Intervention Logic, p.5 
595 SWD/2013/0263 final, p. 70 

14 

 
 
 
travellers may reasonably expect to be protected by the PTD given, in particular, how those travel 
arrangements  are  presented  to  travellers.596  This  should  ensure  the  same  scope  of  protection 
granted within the internal market and an even level of competition and consumer protection. 

The evaluation finds that the definition of ‘package’ has been overall effective in achieving the 
PTD’s stated objectives.597 However, evidence points to disagreements between businesses and 
consumers on the types and range of combination of different travel services that should constitute 
a ‘package’, with businesses pleading for the introduction of certain exemptions and consumers 
firmly opposing this possibility. While these views/policy perspectives are relevant for the future 
development of the PTD, they do not hinder the effectiveness of the definition of ‘package’ in the 
context of the current Directive.  

The new concept of ‘click-through package’ raised implementation challenges that could affect 
the effectiveness of the PTD. According to some stakeholders, the concept has no or very limited 
practical value, is difficult to apply in practice, or changes should be made. Also, most national 
authorities competent for insolvency protection  matters declared that insolvency protection for 
these packages was difficult to implement and enforce and that the concept did not contribute to 
achieving the general objectives of the PTD, travellers being deprived by the protection against 
the insolvency of organisers. 

The  broadened  definition  of  ‘package’  limited  the  exemptions  from  the  scope  of  the  PTD.598 
Consumers and businesses have different views on this point. Consumer associations indicated 
that  the  definition  should  be  maintained  or  that  it  should  cover  more  combinations  of  travel 
services, while businesses indicated that the definition should cover fewer combinations of travel 
services.599  

In  principle,  a  broad  definition  of  ‘package’  ensures  the  highest  protection  for  travellers,600 
simultaneously pursuing the general objective of achieving a high and as uniform as possible level 
of  consumer  protection  and  the  specific  objective  to  reduce  consumer  detriment  and  increase 
transparency  for  travellers  with  regard  to  travel  services  that  were  not  covered  by  the  1990 
Directive.  

Some business stakeholders called for complete exemption of business travel from the scope of 
the PTD601,602 or/and for narrowing of definitions of travel service and of package.603 The business 

596 Recital 10  
597 Targeted survey: (a) NCAs (regulatory and enforcement) (Q21): 76% (19 out of 25) indicated that the definition 
of  ‘package’  (Article  3(2))  contributed  to  the  achievement  of  the  PTD  objectives  ‘positively’,  and  8%  ‘very 
positively’; (b) Consumer organisations (Q33): 40% (4 out of 10) of the respondents from consumer organisations 
stressed that the definition of ‘package’ represented a major obstacle for the pursuit of PTD objectives; (c) Business 
associations (Q47): 31% (4 out of 13) of the respondents from business associations stressed that the definition of 
‘package’ represented a major obstacle for the pursuit of PTD objectives. 
598 COM(2021) 90 final, p. 4  
599 Public consultation (Q5): 21% (106 of 504) of the respondents indicated that the definition of a ‘package’ should 
be maintained, in particular 57% of consumer organisations (12 of 21) and 16% of companies (51 of 316); According 
to 34% (172 of 504) of the respondents the definition of ‘package’ should cover fewer combinations of travel services, 
in particular 45% of companies (143 of 316) without any consumer organisations in favour of this point. This point 
was reiterated by BEUC during the ICF Workshop 1 of the PTD, and during the targeted interview carried out by 
ICF. 
600 BEUC (2021), “The Package Travel Directive. BEUC’s Position on how to regain consumers’ trust in the tourism 
sector”: p. 26: a ‘broad scope grants consumers strong protection’.  
601 Article 2(2)(c), i.e., not only in case of general agreements.  
602 Raised for example in position papers and open text replies submitted in the public consultation, in particular in 
the context of the coordinated replies of a number of Dutch SME respondents. 
603 Article 3(1) and (2), e.g., specific (sport) services or SME hotels should be excluded. 

15 

 
 
stakeholders consider disproportionate to apply the PTD to such a wide range of combinations of 
travel services,604 especially in light of the pursuit of the reduction of unjustified compliance costs 
(SO3).605,606 

Nevertheless, these ideas would result in a narrower scope of the PTD, lowering the protection for 
small businesses booking travel arrangements for themselves or for their employers. These SME 
travellers require the same level of protection as consumers.607 Any measure aimed at limitation 
of  the  scope,  including  the  definition  of  package,  would  inevitably  result  in  a  lower  level  of 
consumer protection, in some cases falling back behind the protection level of the 1990 Directive 
and compromising one of the main objectives of the PTD. Consumer organisations clearly oppose 
any such measure, and many businesses do not support such ideas.608 Furthermore, there is limited 
evidence, if any, for the alleged problems. 

The 2015 PTD introduced additional clarifications. For instance, it establishes conditions under 
which certain combinations of travel services are not considered as packages.609 Some stakeholders 
seem to face practical difficulties when discerning whether certain combinations of travel services 
constitute a package.610,611 However, the different views on whether more or fewer combinations 
should be exempted from the definition of package do not indicate that the current provision is not 
effective for the pursuit of the Directive’s objectives.  

One means of addressing the emerging trends in the package travel sectors, i.e., online bookings 
of  combinations  of  travel  services,  was  the  introduction  of  a  definition  of  ‘click-through 
package’.612 Under this definition, a package is formed where specific personal data (name, e-mail 
and payment details of the traveller) are transferred from one trader to another trader in connection 
with the booking of different travel services for the same trip or holiday and where the second 

604  Public consultation Q5a (open question): in their open-text answers, several companies and business associations 
reiterated this point, stressing that further widening of the definition of ‘package’ would result in disproportionate 
burdens for the package travel sector. For instance, an EU-level business association highlighted that ‘extending the 
definition of a “package” to other types of travel combinations involving e.g., de minimis ‘other services’ (theatre 
ticket or a pre-paid meal), or to standalone travel services would be highly disproportionate, unduly burdening the 
entire travel industry with excessive obligations and resulting in an increase in costs for consumers’. Several other 
similar replies were provided.  
605 The Opinion of the Fit for future platform, in its suggestion 2, stated that ‘[t]he definition of package is sufficient 
and reflects the realities of the market; however, albeit considering that consumers need to benefit from the same 
high  level  of protection  regardless  of  the  size  of  the  operator,  an  assessment  of  its  impact  on  SMEs  activities  is 
suitable  in  the  context  of  the  evaluation  in  particular  to  assess  whether  or  not  and  how  SMEs  comply  with  the 
requirements and at what costs.’ 
606 In this respect, the consultations during the evaluation confirm the views reflected in the in the 2021 Application 
Report, COM(2021) 90 final, p. 4.  
607  As  explained  in  Recital  7:  ‘At  the  same  time,  it  is  not  always  easy  to  distinguish  between  consumers  and 
representatives of small businesses or professionals who book trips related to their business or profession through 
the same booking channels as consumers. Such travellers often require a similar level of protection.’ 
608 Public consultation Q5: 143 of 316 (45% of) companies and 18 of 48 (38% of) business associations stated that 
the  definition  of package  should  cover  fewer  combinations  of  travel  services.  The  rest  of  these  respondents  was 
almost equally divided between the following replies: it should be maintained, it  should clarify or it should cover 
more combinations. 
609  Only  an  ‘other  tourist  service’  of  ‘25%  or  more  of  the  value  of  the  combination’  should  be  considered  as 
contributing,  in  combination with  other  types  of  travel  services  mentioned  by  Article  3(1),  to  the  formation of  a 
‘package’. See second sub-paragraph of Article 3(2)(b). Recital 18 explains the conditions for this exemption. 
610  Public consultation, Q8: presentation of the replies in Appendix 2 Stakeholder consultation (Synopsis report) to 
the Impact Assessment  
611 The Opinion of the Fit for purpose platform, in its Suggestion 5: Clarification ‘other tourist services’, states that 
‘[i]n practice, there is a lot of uncertainty when it comes to defining a particular service as “other tourist service". 
This particularly applies to single travel service providers who offer another tourist service and become therefore 
organisers within the meaning of the PTD, without being aware.’  
612 Article 3(2)(v) 

16 

 
 
contract  is  concluded  within  24  hours  of  the  first  contract.  Travellers  must  receive  a  specific 
standard information form.  

In June 2019, the Commission issued a first report, on the provisions of the Directive applying to 
online bookings made at different points of sale. The report suggested that ‘the offer of ‘click-
through packages’ appears to be a rather rare phenomenon’ indicating that there was not a clear 
‘picture of the prevalence of ‘click-through packages’ on the market.’613 

There  are  implementation  and  enforcement  challenges  regarding  the  two  conditions  in  the 
definition,  (transmitting  all  three  types  of  personal  data  and  the  24-hour  limit),  especially  on 
‘prov[ing] whether a package, an LTA or none of them was concluded’.614 More than one third of 
stakeholders indicated that the definition should be repealed, as it has no or very limited practical 
value or is difficult to apply in practice,615 while another significant share considered that certain 
other changes should be made.616 Also, most national authorities (NCAs) competent for insolvency 
protection matters declared that the definition of ‘click-through packages’ did not contribute to 
achieving the general objectives of the PTD,617 and that is difficult to implement and enforce the 
insolvency protection for these packages.618 This indicates that, with regard to the definition of 
click-through package, the PTD was only partially effective in achieving its general and specific 
objectives.  

b) Linked travel arrangement (Article 3(5))  

There are indications that the definition of Linked Travel Arrangements (LTAs), for both type (a) 
and type (b),619 has proved not effective in achieving PTD’s stated objectives. The lack of clarity 
in key elements of the definition of LTAs led to interpretation and enforcement difficulties and to 
unclear delimitation between packages and LTAs. Furthermore, in some cases, the uncertainties 
related to the concept of LTAs has led to abuse by traders.620 It appears that some traders changed 
their business models/booking processes to avoid being considered as package organisers. As a 

by 

the 

p.4, 

270 

final, 

Staff  Working  Document 

613 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the provisions of Directive (EU) 
2015/2302 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on package travel and linked travel 
arrangements  applying  to  online  bookings  made  at  different  points  of  sale,  COM(2019)270  final,  21.6.2019, 
https://eur-
SWD(2019) 
accompanied 
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SWD:2019:0270:FIN:EN:PDF  
614 Various stakeholders pointed out that the condition of ‘at the latest 24 hours after the confirmation of the booking 
of the first travel service’ is difficult to apply in a uniform manner. COM(2021) 90 final, p. 6.  
615 Public Consultation (Q7): 37% (168 out of 454). Looking at specific stakeholders: 19% of consumer organisations 
(4 of 21), 37% of companies (101 of 274), and 47% of business associations (21 of 45).  
616 Public Consultation (Q7): 27% (122 out of 454). Looking at specific stakeholders: 33% of consumer organisations 
(7 of 21), 24% of companies (66 of 274), and 40% of business associations (18 of 45). 
617 Targeted survey (Q15): 33% (4 out of 12) of the NCA (insolvency) replied ‘not at all’.  
618 Targeted survey (Q17): 50% (6 out of 12) of the NCA (insolvency) replied ‘to a very great extent’.  
619 Under Article 3(5)(a) and (b), LTAs are those where ‘at least two different types of travel services purchased for 
the purpose of the same trip or holiday, not constituting a package, resulting in the conclusion of separate contracts 
with the individual travel service providers’ Depending on how the services are booked, there can be two types of 
LTAs:  type  (a)  where    a  trader  facilitates  the  separate  selection  and  separate  payment  of  each  travel  service  by 
travellers on the occasion of a single visit or contact with his point of sale; type (b) where  a trader facilitates in a 
targeted manner, the procurement of at least one additional travel service from another trader where a contract with 
such other trader is concluded at the latest 24 hours after the confirmation of the booking of the first travel service. 
620 BEUC,  Factsheet  ‘How  a  revised  Package  Travel  Directive  can  regain  consumers’  confidence  in  the  tourism 
industry’,  BEUC-X-2022-003  of  January  2022  at  https://www.beuc.eu/sites/default/files/publications/beuc-x-2022-
003_how_a_revised_package_travel_directive_can_regain_consumers_confidence_in_the_tourism_industry.pdf   

17 

 
 
result, travellers were deprived of the guarantees for packages, including in relation to liability for 
the combination of travel services and effective insolvency protection.621 

The fact that there are hardly any figures on LTAs  points to the potential core issues affecting 
LTAs, namely the difficulties for stakeholders in discerning, in practice, whether an LTA has been 
created.622,623 This makes it difficult to collect data on LTAs.  

The concept of LTA was seen as one means to overcome the limitations of the 1990 Directive and 
to  pursue  its  general  and  specific  objectives.  However,  ‘[t]he  application  of  this  concept  has 
arguably  raised  the  highest  number  of  questions’  with  ‘consumer  and  business  stakeholders 
consider[ing] the LTA definition overly complex and difficult to apply in practice.’624,625  

According to consumer organisations, ‘concerns have also been raised that, with the exception of 
insolvency  protection  and  certain  pre-contractual  information  requirements,  the  PTD  does  not 
provide  for  the  liability  of  traders  facilitating  an  LTA  for  the  performance  of  the  relevant 
services.’626 Furthermore, the evidence collected indicates that the definition of LTA types (a) and 
(b) did not contribute to achieving its general objectives.627  

to 

an 

the 

was 

LTA 

enforce 

actually 

concluded’. 

621 Insofar as traders considered they were offering LTAs, there is, in principle, insolvency protection under Article 
19. However, in light of uncertainties regarding LTAs, such protection will often not be effective. 
622 Several stakeholders outlined issues with discerning whether an LTA is created in practice, this preventing them 
to also gather relevant data on LTA. For instance, during the CPC meeting (12 May 2022) some ‘CPC authorities 
pointed out that LTAs were rarely or not at all used as the concept was very complicated and consumers did not 
understand it. Therefore, there were no complaints from consumers. Consequently, as enforcement authorities relied 
on consumer complaints, it was difficult for them to enforce the PTD provisions on LTAs.’  
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/expert-groups-register/screen/meetings/consult?lang=en&meetingId=43477&fromExpertGroups=true   
623 BEUC (2021) “The Package Travel Directive: BEUC’s Position on how to regain consumers’ trust in the tourism 
sector”: ‘it is very difficult, if not impossible, for consumers and enforcement authorities to prove whether a package 
or 
https://www.beuc.eu/sites/default/files/publications/beuc-x-2021-
115_package_travel_directive_beuc_s_views_on_how_to_regain_consumer_trust_in_the_tourism_sector.pdf; EU Travel Tech 
(2021), “Revision of the Package Travel Directive. EU Travel Tech comments on the Inception Impact Assessment 
Roadmap”, ‘The difficulty to determine whether an LTA has been formed or not makes it impossible for enforcement 
6-7. 
p. 
authorities 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13117-Package-travel-review-of-EU-
rules/F2671051_en. Also targeted interview with national authorities.  
624 COM(2021) 90 final, p. 5. See also: BEUC (2021) “The Package Travel Directive: BEUC’s Position on how to 
regain consumers’ trust in the tourism sector”: ‘it is very difficult, if not impossible, for consumers and enforcement 
authorities 
at: 
https://www.beuc.eu/sites/default/files/publications/beuc-x-2021-
115_package_travel_directive_beuc_s_views_on_how_to_regain_consumer_trust_in_the_tourism_sector.pdf.  
Interview with one business association representing small service providers. Two consumer associations (DE, and 
NL)  and  a  MS  authority  (IE)  interviewed  as  part  of  the  study  also  suggested  that, given  the  complexity of  LTA 
definition, it should be completely abolished.  
625 In addition, Recitals 12 and 13, while providing ‘some guidance as regards the concept of LTA’, did not contribute 
to improving the effectiveness of the definition of ‘LTA’. COM(2021) 90 final, p. 6 
626 COM(2021) 90 final, p. 6 
627 Public consultation (Q26): 67% (276 out of 397) respondents declared that LTA type (a) did not improved the 
protection for travellers. In particular, 95% of consumer organisations (19 of 20), 81% of public authorities (17 of 
21), 61% of companies (140 of 228), and 78% of business associations (38 of 49).  
Also,  targeted  survey:  (a)  NCAs  (regulatory  and  enforcement)  (Q21)  and  Q(15),  Consumer  organisations  (Q33). 
Business associations (Q47): presentation of the replies in Appendix 2 Stakeholder consultation (Synopsis report) to 
the Impact Assessment 

concluded’.  Available  online 

to  prove  whether 

a  package  or 

an  LTA  was 

the  Directive 

provisions 

regard’, 

this 

of 

in 

18 

 
 
For both types of LTAs, stakeholders specified that travellers find it difficult to understand what 
kind of protection they can expect and whether they will benefit from insolvency protection.628 

For  LTA  type  (a),  stakeholders  indicated  that:  -  the  distinction  of  whether  the  services  were 
selected jointly (package) or separately (LTA) is difficult to verify for travellers and enforcement 
authorities, and - traders may use LTAs to avoid the liability of package organisers, according to 
consumer organisations.629  

For LTA type (b), stakeholders indicated that: - it is often not clear whether the booking of a second 
travel service was facilitated in a targeted manner, - it is often not clear to traders facilitating a 
potential  LTA  whether  the  traveller  made  a  booking  with  a  second  trader  within  24  hours. 
Furthermore, some stakeholders have stated that LTAs type (b) do not exist in the market.630 

The evaluation identified interpretational and enforcement difficulties that could be grouped in 
two main categories: lack of clarity in key elements of the definition of LTA types (a) and (b) and 
unclear delimitation between packages and LTAs.631 

A consequence of the uncertain boundaries between LTAs and packages is the low awareness of 
travellers regarding the distinction between these concepts and the associated rights, preventing 
them from making informed choices and benefiting from their rights. These findings suggest that, 
although, intellectually, a distinction can be made between a joint and a separate selection of travel 
services at one point of sale, such distinction can be difficult in practice and is difficult to verify 
for travellers and enforcement bodies, giving rise to a grey area. 

The overall lack of clarity regarding the LTA concept and uncertainty in distinguishing packages 
from LTAs in practice was coupled with several observed trends in the package travel market, i.e., 
change of business practices, and potential circumvention and enforcement issues of the PTD by 
certain categories of traders, leaving consumers with a lower level of protection.  

Certain changes in the market practices of the package travel sector coincided with the entry into 
force of the PTD in July 2018.632 There are indications that traders may have reduced their offers 

628 Public consultation Q28a regarding LTA type b): 79% (15 of 19) consumer organisations stated that traders may 
use LTAs to avoid the liability of package organisers. Similar trend in replies to Q26a regarding LTA (a): According 
to 71% (15 of 21) of consumer organisations traders may use LTAs to avoid liability of package organisers. 
629 Public consultation (Q28a): 79% (15 of 19) consumer organisations stated that traders may use LTAs to avoid the 
liability of package organisers.  
630 Public consultation (Q28a), regarding LTA type (b), 67% (190 out of 284) of respondents indicated that ‘It is 
often not clear whether the booking of a second travel service was facilitated in a targeted manner’. 
631 For detailed explanations on these difficulties, see Appendix VII Linked Travel Arrangements. 
632 Targeted survey: (a) Business associations (Q5): The start of the application of the PTD in 2018 impacted the 
package travel market: according to 36% (8 of 22) ‘to a large extent’ and according to 32% (7 of 22) ‘to some extent’; 
(b) Consumer organisations (Q2): 42% (5 of 12) ‘to a large extent’ and 17% (2 of 12) ‘to some extent’; (c) NCA 
(regulatory and enforcement): 19% (5 of 27) ‘to a large extent’, 33% (9 of 27) ‘to a moderate extent’, 22% (6 of 27) 
‘to a small extent’.  

19 

 
 
in packages,633 that certain categories of traders have changed their booking processes or paths,634 
and that some traders present their offer as LTAs, when, in fact, they sell packages.635 Stakeholders 
also stated that traders may decide to either reduce their offer of packages or change their business 
model in order not to fall within the obligations applying to packages.636 

This reduced the effectiveness of the harmonised definitions and the possibility of travellers to 
make  informed  choices  and  benefit  from  the  protection  of  the  PTD  thereby  reducing  the 
effectiveness of the PTD in achieving its general and specific objectives.  

 While no precise figures are available, from the reactions of stakeholders during the consultation 
process, it seems that the PTD has not led to a higher share of packages amongst overall bookings 
of travel services.  

c) ‘Unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’ (Article 3(12)) 

The definition of ‘unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’ was effective in achieving the 
general and specific objectives of the Directive.  

The concept is used, inter alia, where travellers have the right to cancel packages free of charge 
‘in the event of unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’ in accordance with Article 12(2). 
In such cases, travellers are entitled, within 14 days from the termination of the contract to a full 
refund of any payments made for the package. Challenges with the application of Article 12(2) 
emerged during the COVID-19 pandemic (see EQ5).  

633 Targeted survey: (a) Business associations (Q6): 18% (2 of 11) respondents indicated that traders reduced their 
offers in packages as a response to the entry into force of the PTD in 2018 ‘to a large extent’, and 27% (3 of 11) of 
them  indicated  that  this  was  the  case  only  ‘to  some  extent’;  (b)  Consumer  organisations  (Q1):  17%  (2  of  12) 
respondents indicated that this was the case ‘to a moderate extent’, and 42% (5 of 12) pointed out that this was the 
case only ‘to a small extent’; (c) NCA (regulatory and enforcement): 8% (2 of 26) declared that this was the case ‘to 
a large extent’, 12% (3 of 26) ‘to a moderate extent’, 19% (5 of 26) ‘to a small extent’, 31% (8 of 26) ‘not at all’.  
634 Targeted survey: (a) Business associations (Q6): 17% (2 of 12) respondents indicated that certain categories of 
traders have changed their booking processes or paths after the entry into force of the PTD in 2018 ‘to a large extent’, 
and 33% (4 of 12) ‘to a small extent’; (b) Consumer organisations (Q1): 42% (5 of 12) ‘to a large extent’, while the 
25% (3 of 12) ‘to a small extent’; (c) NCA (regulatory and enforcement) (Q23): 26% (7 of 27) ‘to a moderate extent’, 
and 22% (6 of 27) ‘to a small extent’. Also, One NCA (regulatory and enforcement) specified that in their Member 
State, traditional tour operators were, in general, compliant with the information requirements regarding package 
travel, whereas online travel agents did not take responsibility for the packages they sold and did not fulfil the duties 
on pre-contractual information and the standard information forms. Workshop with experts from national authorities 
- Consumer Protection Cooperation (CPC) network 12 May 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/expert-groups-
register/screen/meetings/consult?lang=en&meetingId=43477&fromExpertGroups=true   
635 Targeted survey: (a) Business associations (Q6): 25% (3 of 12) respondents indicated that some traders present 
their offer as linked travel arrangements, when, in fact, they sell packages after the entry into force of the PTD in 
2018 ‘to some extent’, and 25% (3 of 12) ‘not at all’ the case; (b) Consumer organisations (Q1): 33% (4 of 12) ‘to a 
moderate extent’, while the 25% (3 of 12) to ‘a small extent’; (c) NCA (regulatory and enforcement) (Q23): 24% (6 
of 25) ‘to a small extent’, and 20% (5 of 25) ‘not at all’. 
636 Public Consultation (open-ended questions Q5a, Q8a): In their free text replies, several stakeholders pointed out 
that uncertainties in the definition of ‘package’ and ‘LTA’ may lead to traders deciding to change their business 
models in order not to be considered package organisers. In reply to Q2 about potential changes observed since 2018, 
40% of the 468 respondents stated: “Many traders changed their business model/booking processes in order not to 
be  considered as package organisers.” 36% selected: “Many traders claim that they are not organising packages, 
although, in fact they do.”  

20 

 
 
The 1990 Directive used the concept of ‘force majeure’637 to regulate the rights and obligations of 
the parties in the event of unforeseeable circumstances. The 2015 PTD introduced and defined the 
notion of ‘unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’.638 

By introducing related provisions on termination of a package travel contract and on the refund 
of any payments made for the package due to the emergence of such circumstances,639 the 2015 
PTD aimed, in particular, to address ‘the lack of termination rights for consumers’640 for reasons 
of unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances. 

Therefore, the definition of ‘unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’ is part of the PTD’s 
efforts  to  pursue  its  objective  of  ensuring  a  high  level  of  consumer  protection,  by  granting 
travellers the new right to terminate the package travel contract before the start of the trip, free of 
charge, in those circumstances.  

The concept came under spotlight in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Disputes between 
travellers and organisers arose as to whether a certain situation could be considered as unavoidable 
and extraordinary in the sense of Articles 3(12) and 12(2). It must be noted that Article 12(2) adds 
to the definition of ‘unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’ certain conditions which must 
be fulfilled in order to terminate a contract without a fee. Therefore, the definition is analysed in 
the context of Article 12 (2) and (4) under EQ5 further below.  

The notion is also used in conjunction with other provisions of the PTD, such as the liability of 
the organiser for the performance of the contract.641 In the 1990 Directive, ‘there were no limitation 
to the organiser's liability to provide alternative arrangements’ where the traveller was prevented 
from returning home according to the planned schedule because of ‘force majeure’.642 The 2013 
IA concluded that this was ‘clearly a burdensome rule for businesses, since such situations’ were 
beyond the control of organisers.643 To address this, the 2015 PTD provides that the organiser has 
to bear the cost of necessary accommodation for a period not exceeding three nights where the 
traveller's return is impossible as agreed in the package travel contract because of unavoidable and 
extraordinary circumstances.644 Also, under the PTD, a trader is not liable for booking errors which 
are caused by unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances645 (see EQ6). Finally, the organiser is 
exempted from compensation for damages (but not from granting a price reduction) if it proves 
that the lack of conformity is due to unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances.646 

4.1.1.2. Information requirements  

637  In  Article  4(6)(b)(ii)  of  the  1990  Directive,  the  concept  of  ‘force  majeure’  is  described  as  ‘unusual  and 
unforeseeable circumstances beyond the control of the party by whom it is pleaded, the consequences of which could 
not have been avoided even if all due care had been exercised’ 
638 Article 3(12): ‘unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’ means a situation beyond the control of the party 
who invokes such a situation and the consequences of which could not have been avoided even if all reasonable 
measures  had  been  taken;’  Recital  31  offers  several  non-exhaustive  examples  of  ‘unavoidable  and  extraordinary 
circumstances’. 
639 In Article 12(2) 
640 SWD(2013) 263 final, p. 14  
641 Article 13(7) 
642 SWD(2013)0263 final, page 96 
643 Ibidem. 
644 Article 13(7). Furthermore, the Article provides that ‘[w]here longer periods are provided for in Union passenger 
rights legislation applicable to the relevant means of transport for the traveller's return, those periods shall apply.’ 
645Article 21, Liability for booking errors. 
646 Article 14(3)(c) 

21 

 
 
Findings point to limited compliance with the information obligations of traders where they act as 
organisers  or  retailers  of  a  package  or  as  facilitators  of  an  LTA.  This  is  likely  to  be  linked  to 
potential issues with the understanding of certain concepts of the PTD, including the definition of 
LTAs and the borderline between packages and LTAs. 

The  standard  information  forms  are  perceived  as  highly  complex  by  stakeholders.  There  is  a 
certain degree of confusion about the information requirements that traders (organisers, retailers, 
facilitators of LTAs) must provide before a traveller is bound by a contract. Also, travellers do not 
seem to understand the information in the current forms on LTAs.  

This hampered the proper functioning of the package travel market and resulted in a lower level 
of consumer protection. 

The  2013  IA  stated  that  the  information  requirements  and  obligations  laid  down  by  the  1990 
Directive  were  substantially  outdated  and  therefore  caused  unnecessary  compliance  costs  for 
businesses.647 Also, the 2013 IA concluded that the divergent information requirements across the 
Member States – some having stricter rules than others – resulted in traders selling packages in 
several Member States having to check the specific information requirements applicable in the 
different Member States concerned. Notwithstanding the unjustified costs for businesses, the 2013 
IA outlined that the information requirements worked rather well.648 

To address the challenges identified at the time of 2013 IA, the 2015 PTD introduced enhanced 
information  requirements,  while  attempting  a  simplification  and  standardisation  of  the  overall 
process to avoid unnecessary costs for businesses. Businesses are obliged ‘[to] inform travellers 
whether they are offered a package or linked travel arrangement and on their key rights through 
standardised information forms’ and to ‘provide information on the features and characteristics of 
the package, its  price and any additional charges.’649 The PTD pursued the standardisation and 
simplification  of  information  requirements  in  its  Article  5  (pre-contractual  information  for 
package travel contracts) and Article 19(2)(b) (for linked travel arrangements). Importantly, the 
list  of  information  requirements  is  exhaustive,  facilitating  the  cross-border  marketing  of  travel 
services. 

Standard information form for packages (Appendix I PTD) 

73% of the consumer organisations and 47% of national authorities (regulatory and enforcement) 
indicated  that  online  traders  often  do  not  provide  this  form  although,  in  reality,  they  offer 
packages.650 A large share of consumer organisations (64%) indicated the same situation for off-
line traders (face-to-face contacts).651 However, these statements may also be related to uncertainty 
or  divergent  interpretations  regarding  the  distinction  between  package  and  LTAs.  Consumer 
organisations  and  national  authorities  also  stated  that  where  packages  were  sold  via  a  retailer, 
travellers  did  not  always  understand  the  role  of  the  organiser  and  the  retailer  with  regard  to 
payments and refunds.652 

647 See section 2.2. 
648 2013 IA, SWD(2013) 263 final: p. 18 and 74 
649 COM(2021) 90 final, p. 2 
650 Targeted surveys (Q30 and Q18): 73% ((8 of 11) consumer organisations and 47% (9 of 21) NCAs (regulatory 
and enforcement). E.g., they may provide one of the forms in Appendix II or no form at all. 
651 Targeted surveys (Q30): 64% ((7 of 11) consumer organisations  
652 Targeted surveys (Q30 and Q18): 64% (7 of 11) consumer organisations and 71% (15 of 21) NCAs (regulatory 
and enforcement) 

22 

 
 
 
 
Standard information forms for LTAs (Appendix II - LTA type (a) and type (b)) 
For both, LTAs types (a) and (b), national authorities and consumer organisations indicated a low 
degree of traders’ compliance with the information requirements. 653,654  

Most  consumer  organisations  pointed  out  that  Appendix  II  proved  difficult  for  enforcement 
authorities  and  consumer  organisations  to  check  compliance,655  and  that  travellers  do  not 
understand their rights in relation to LTAs, including with regard to insolvency protection.656 

Overall, stakeholders indicate that there is a certain degree of confusion in the sector about the 
information requirements that traders (organisers, retailers, facilitators of LTAs) must provide for 
packages, and for LTAs.657 

Ultimately, findings suggest that there is a lack of effectiveness of the PTD in this respect because: 
-  the  information  forms  are  too  complex  and  potentially  burdensome  for  both  consumers  and 
traders,658,659 - there is an overall lack of clarity of the concepts of ‘package’ and ‘linked travel 
arrangement’  affecting  the  mandatory  information  requirements.660  To  a  significant  extent,  the 
identified complexity and burden related to these information forms is related to the substantive 
rules on which the forms aim to inform travellers. 

4.1.1.3.  Organisers’ liability for the performance of the contract 

The  introduction  of  strict  rules  on  liability  for  the  performance  of  the  contract  was  overall 
effective  in  ensuring  the  pursuit  of  PTD’s  general  and  specific  objectives.  However,  there  are 

653 For LTAs type (a) (single point of sale), Article 19(2) requires traders to comply with the information requirements 
set out at Article 19(2)(a) and (b) and Appendix II (Parts A, B, and C).  
For LTAs type (b) (facilitated in a targeted manner), Article 19(2) requires traders to comply with the information 
requirements set out at Article 19(2)(a) and (b) and Appendix II (Parts D and E). 
654 Public consultation (Q38): public authorities (54%, 7 of 13) and consumer organisation (56%, 10 of 18) indicated 
a low degree of compliance with the information requirements for LTAs type (a).   
Public consultation (Q39): public authorities (54%, 7 of 13) and consumer organisation (59%, 10 of 17) indicated a 
low degree of compliance with the information requirements for LTAs type (a). 
655 Targeted survey – consumer organisations (Q31) N = 11: 82% (9) stated this.  
656 Ibidem: N=11, 73% (8) stated this. 
657 Under Article 5 and Appendix I and under Article 19(2) and Appendix II (parts A to E) 
658  Public  consultation  Q40  addressed  to  public  authorities  and  consumer  organisations:  14  of  17  consumer 
organisations and 7 of 15 public authorities found that “Travellers do not understand the information forms contained 
in Appendix II.” 
Furthermore,  the  Opinion  of  the  Fit  for  future  (F4F)  platform  outlined  in  Suggestion  3:  Clarification  of  pre-
contractual information requirements (Art 5) that ‘[i]n the case of linked travel arrangements, the selection of the 
right standard information form is complex given the number of options available. Furthermore, they are considered 
“technical”  and  difficult  to  read,  especially  on  mobile  devices.  https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-making-
process/evaluating-and-improving-existing-laws/refit-making-eu-law-simpler-less-costly-and-future-proof/fit-
future-platform-f4f/adopted-opinions_en 
659 Public consultation, open question Q40a: A consumer organisation (LV).  
660 Public consultation, open question Q40a: a national authority stressed that the degree in which the mandatory 
information requirements are used in practice is impossible to assess since LTAs are not visible to them, and they 
did  not  come  across  them  in  their  supervisory  activities.  The  Opinion  of  the  F4F  platform,  its  Suggestion  2: 
Clarification of scope and simplification of the definitions of package and Linked Travel Arrangement,  indicates 
that: ‘First, the definition of LTAs is complex and not easily understandable for all stakeholders. Furthermore, this 
definition falls short and allows for abuse to consumers’ detriment. As a result, as highlighted by the report on the 
application of the Directive, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for consumers and enforcement authorities to prove 
whether a package or an LTA was concluded. […] Second, the differentiation between LTA and packages has led to 
difficulties.  In  case  of  LTA  contracts,  the  Directive  merely  prescribes  provisions  relating  to  the  pre-contractual 
information  to  be  given  to  consumers  and  insolvency  protection  provisions.  However,  contractual  obligations 
resulting from LTA contracts are currently not defined in the text.’ 

23 

 
 
 
indications that travellers may not always understand the exact role of different traders (organisers, 
retailers,  and  service  providers)  and,  consequently,  may  not  properly  identify  the  trader 
responsible  (acting  as  organiser)  for  the  performance  of  the  contract  and  for  the  refund  of 
prepayments or for compensation. 

The 2013 IA pointed out that the wording of the 1990 Directive made it difficult in designating 
‘one particular party as being responsible’,661 leaving the choice to Member States to decide who 
should  be  the  liable  party.  This  situation  led  to  divergences  across  the  Member  States  and 
determined three main problems: (a) detriment to consumers as ‘it can be unclear which party is 
responsible,  especially  if  the  package  holiday  is  purchased  cross-border’;  (b)  liability  issues 
between the traders involved, as ‘it can also lead to situations where the organiser and the retailer 
are blaming each other without any of them taking the responsibility’; (c)  an ‘obstacle to cross-
border  trade  since  legal  fragmentation  can  deter  traders  from  selling  travel  packages  cross-
border.’662  

The  2015  PTD  addressed  these  problems  by  introducing  more  specific  rules  on  liability, 
establishing that ‘apart from certain exceptions, the organiser of a package is liable if something 
goes wrong’663 irrespective of whether those services are to be performed by the organiser or by 
any travel service providers. However, the PTD allowed Member States to ‘maintain or introduce 
in their national law provisions under which the retailer is’ responsible for the performance of the 
package’ along  with the organiser, who remains responsible in any situation.664,665 Furthermore, 
travellers have the possibility to contact the organiser via the retailer, the latter being obliged to 
facilitate the communication between the traveller and the organiser. 

However, there are some indications that travellers may not always understand the exact role of 
different traders and, consequently, may not properly identify the trader responsible (acting as 
organiser)  for  the  performance  of  the  contract  and  for  the  refund  of  pre-payments  or  for 
compensation.  Businesses  (51%)  indicated  that  the  current  rules  are  clear  enough,  while  this 
opinion is shared by a minority of national authorities (19%) and by no consumer organisation. At 
the same time, national authorities (52%) and consumer organisations (52%) indicated, on the one 
hand,  that  traders  should  be  obliged  to  inform  travellers  clearly  which  trader  is  acting  as  an 
organiser, retailer or service provider in connection with a package and about their obligations 
towards travellers and, on the other hand, that both organisers and retailers should be legally liable 
for refunds in all Member States (24% national authorities, 48% of consumer organisations).666  

Furthermore, the Opinion of the Fit for future platform stated that ‘[i]n light of the COVID-19 
crisis, it became clear that there is a notable lack of transparency regarding the role of different 

661 SWD(2013) 263 final, p. 81. 
662 SWD(2013) 263 final, p. 81. 
663 COM(2021) 90 final, p. 2.  
664  Article  13(1)  establishes  the  organiser’s  responsibility  for  the  performance  of  the  package.  The  second  sub-
paragraph of Article 13(1) provides that ‘Member States may maintain or introduce in their national law provisions 
under which the retailer is also responsible for the performance of the package.’ 
665 According to desk research conducted by ICF for the study, 11 Member States introduced the responsibility of 
the retailers within their national system, whereas 16 Member States did not.  
666 Public consultation (Q13): 51% (25 of 49) of business associations and 19% (4 of 21) of public authorities consider 
that the current rules are clear enough and do not need to be amended, while no consumer organisation share this 
opinion. According to 52% (11 of 21) of public authorities and 52% (11 of 21) of consumer organisations traders 
should be obliged to inform travellers clearly which trader is acting as an organiser, retailer or service provider in 
connection with a package and about their obligations towards travellers. 24% (5 of 21) of public authorities and 
48% (10 of 21) of consumer organisation said that both organisers and retailers should be legally liable for refunds 
in all Member States.   

24 

 
 
parties.  […]  Consumers  risk  being  confused  and  sent  back  and  forth  between  the  companies, 
especially with regard to refunds for cancelled trips.’667 

Nonetheless, the standard information forms in Appendix I to be provided before the conclusion 
of  a  package  travel  contract  clearly  identify  the  party/the  parties668  that  is  responsible  for  the 
performance  of  the  contract,  and,  under  Article  7,  the  organiser’s  core  obligations  have  to  be 
identified in the contract.669 

Under  Article  15,  the  retailer  must  facilitate  the  communication  between  the  traveller  and  the 
organiser by forwarding travellers’ messages to the organiser. In particular in the context of the 
Covid-19  pandemic,  it  emerged  that  there  were  certain  difficulties  for  travellers  to 
contact/communicate with the organiser/retailer as the organiser/retailer did not reply to e-mails 
or  phone  calls  or  the  office  was  closed.670  Nevertheless,  the  evaluation  did  not  detect  any 
effectiveness-related issues concerning Article 15 during ‘normal’ times. 

Most national authorities (60%)671 indicate that where the package was purchased via a retailer, 
travellers often do not have enough information  on whom to contact for a refund and they are 
often sent from one trader to another without an effective resolution of their claims, this being 
among the main non-compliance issues identified by them.  

It follows that the application of the division of roles and responsibilities between organisers and 
retailers may have presented certain practical and enforcement issues, in particular in relation to 
refunds during COVID-19. At least to some extent this could be related to business-to-business 
issues in assuming the legal responsibilities by organisers and retailers, but also raises the question 
of  whether  the  information  for  travellers  on  the  liable  parties  and  contact  points  could  still  be 
improved. 

While these factors may, to some extent, hamper the effectiveness of the PTD in achieving its 
objectives, they could be addressed through smaller improvements in the information of travellers, 
so that the PTD can be considered as largely effective in this respect.  

667 Further explaining that ‘When signing a contract, it has been reported that travellers are not always fully aware 
about who are the organiser, retailer and service provider in relation to a package. This problem even increases when 
the involved travel companies are similar in name or make part of larger travel agencies with often non-transparent 
corporate structures.’ Suggestion 1:  
Better  information  on  the  identity  of  the  contractual  partners  and  on 
contact details and better enforcement of rules,  https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-making-process/evaluating-
and-improving-existing-laws/refit-making-eu-law-simpler-less-costly-and-future-proof/fit-future-platform-
f4f/adopted-opinions_en  
668 For Member States opting for the parallel liability of retailers under Article 13(1) second sub-paragraph. 
669 The Opinion of the Fit for future platform points out that the problems mentioned above ‘have been identified 
despite the fact that in the mandatory standard information forms […] the party responsible for the performance of 
the package (i.e., the organiser) has to be identified, and that the contact details of the organiser and retailer, where 
applicable, have to be provided (Article 5(1)(b)).’ Suggestion 1:  
Better  information  on  the  identity  of  the 
contractual partners and on contact details and better enforcement of rules,  https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-
making-process/evaluating-and-improving-existing-laws/refit-making-eu-law-simpler-less-costly-and-future-
proof/fit-future-platform-f4f/adopted-opinions_en 
670 Public consultation (Q41 addressed to consumer organisations and public authorities): 79% (15 of 19) of public 
authorities  and  95%  (20  of  21)  of  consumer  organisations  indicated  that  it  was  difficult  for  travellers  to 
contact/communicate with the organiser/retailer as the organiser/retailer did not reply to e-mails or phone calls or the 
office was closed. 
671 Targeted survey – NCAs (regulatory and enforcement): 60% (15 of 25) of respondents selected ‘Yes’ to this point.  

25 

 
 
EQ2. How has the still growing role of online intermediaries (in a broad sense, including 
organisers) and other novel business models affected the effectiveness of the PTD? 

While the evidence collected for the evaluation confirmed the importance of online intermediaries 
and other novel business models for the package travel sector, there are no indications that these 
actors affected the effectiveness of the PTD. Concerns were voiced that some traders appear to 
have changed their business  model in  order not  to  be considered package organisers. Findings 
suggest that the potential changes in business practices may be related to the implementation of 
‘package’ and ‘LTAs’, as presented in the previous section.  

Businesses and consumers stressed that the PTD is not well adapted to market trends, including to 
the  online  booking  and  of  bookings  on  mobile  devices.672  Most  businesses  and  consumer 
organisations pointed out that the new technologies had an impact on the package travel market at 
least to some extent.673 According to most national authorities (regulatory and enforcement bodies) 
certain categories of traders674 have changed their booking processes and paths and offered LTAs 
or stand-alone travel services instead of packages at least to some extent.675  

Furthermore,  stakeholders  indicated  that  there  have  been  significant  changes  in  the  business 
practices  and related  consumer experiences because of the  entry into force of the PTD in  July 
2018. Some traders changed their business model/booking processes to avoid being considered as 
package  organisers  or  declared  they  are  not  organising  packages,  when,  in  fact,  they  do.676 
Moreover, business stakeholders pointed out that the ‘strict rules on liability’ set out by the PTD 
where a trader acts as a package organiser ‘led to inappropriate results and burdens (bureaucracy, 
additional  costs),  which  from  the  point  of  view  of  travel  agencies  and  hotel  industry  are 
disproportionate.677  

EQ3. How effective are the PTD rules on insolvency protection and the national insolvency 
protection systems based on those rules? 

The  PTD  rules  on  insolvency  protection  have  been  to  a  large  extent  effective  in  ensuring  the 
achievement  of the PTD’s objectives, although there were  certain  challenges in  some Member 
States in relation to the Thomas Cook insolvency and COVID-19.  

672 Public consultation (Q3): 55% (257 out of 468) respondents indicated that the PTD is not well adapted to market 
trends,  including  the  constant  expansion  of  sales  by  online  booking  and  of  bookings  on  mobile  devices.  More 
specifically, 72% (36 of 50) of business associations, 55% (157 of 286) of companies, 57% (12 of 21) of consumer 
organisations, 45% (30 of 66) of EU citizens, 2 of 3 NGOs, 45% (10 of 22) of public authorities. In the targeted 
survey,  most  NCAs  responsible  for  insolvency,  also  pointed  out  that  the  expansion  of  sales  by  online  booking 
impacted the effectiveness of the PTD  to some  extent (4 of 11 respondents to Q17) or  to a great extent (2 of 11 
respondents to Q17).   
673 Targeted survey: companies/business organisations (Q5) indicated that new technologies had an impact on the 
package travel sector to a large extent (13 of 23) and to some extent (6 of 23). According to consumer organisations 
(Targeted survey for consumer organisations Q34), they impacted the sector to a large extent (4 of 10 respondents) 
and to some extent (4 of 10 respondents).  
674 E.g., traditional travel agencies, online travel agencies, carriers, and hotels etc. 
675 See section 4.1.1.1., point b) on Link travel arrangements. 
676 See section 4.1.1.1., point b) on Link travel arrangements. 
677 COM (2021)90 final., p.2. Also, public consultation Q2a: open text replies by two  business associations (AT, 
FR). 

26 

 
 
 
However, there are different views on whether the rules on refund and repatriation worked well in 
practice.678 Notwithstanding the criticism expressed by some stakeholders, there is no evidence 
that  the  national  insolvency  protection  systems  had  general  problems  in  covering  refunds  and 
repatriation  of  travellers.  However,  there  are  different  practices  on  whether  refund  claims  and 
vouchers are covered where a package is cancelled before an organiser becomes insolvent. 

The insolvency protection systems differ across the EU, as the PTD leaves it to Member States to 
determine  the  details  of  their  systems  and  such  differences  could  potentially  affect  the 
effectiveness of the PTD.  

It has been reported that in case of insolvency of an organiser from another Member State, it is 
difficult  for  travellers  to  obtain  information  on  insolvency  proceedings  and  to  recover 
prepayments.679 Such cross-border issues may also affect the effectiveness of the PTD. At the same 
time, organiser seem to use mutual recognition of insolvency protection only rarely. Some national 
authorities  called  for  better  communication  between  the  Central  Contact  Points  and  more 
transparency on the securities of organisers in different Member States.680 However, such issues 
depend less on the text of the PTD. 

Finally,  the  difficult  implementation  and  enforcement  of  insolvency  protection  for  LTAs  and 
‘click-through packages’ hindered the effectiveness of the PTD ‘to a very great extent’, according 
to nearly half the respondents from national insolvency authorities.681  

The 1990 Directive established requirements for organisers and/or retailers to provide security for 
the refund of pre-payments and repatriation of travellers in the event of insolvency.682 The 2013 
IA identified two main problems:   

1. There were numerous diverging methods for providing insolvency protection in the Member 
States. Also, some Member States offered  a wider scope of protection than merely  insolvency 
protection for services included in the package. These were caused by the fact that Member States 
could establish themselves the requirements for the insolvency protection system. The 2013 IA 
concluded that ‘there seems to be significant differences in the level of consumer protection in the 
Member States’. 
2. ‘Different national rules regarding the obligation to provide insolvency protection have also 
resulted in a situation where some retailers or organisers who are trading cross-border had to pay 

678 On rules for refund: targeted survey for consumer organisation, Q15 and Targeted survey for NCAs (insolvency 
protection), Q16: 58% (7 of 12) of consumer organisations tend to disagree, while 46% (6 of 13) of NCAs tend to 
agree that the rules on refunds after an insolvency work effectively. On the  guarantee for repatriation:  Targeted 
survey – Consumer organisations (Q16): 42% (5 of 12) respondents considered that the guarantee has been effective 
in practice only to a certain extent; Targeted survey – national authorities competent in insolvency matters (Q2): 75% 
(9 of 12) of respondents declared they did not experience any enforcement issues. 
679  Replies  Member  States  Central  Contact  Points  on  insolvency  protection  to  targeted  question  from  the 
Commission. 
680 Some Member States complain that their counterparts from other MS do not reply to requests or that they do not 
have access to registries and details on securities of organisers in other MS. In addition, one national authority dealing 
with insolvency protection explained that ‘Member States are generally unaware of the national law of other Member 
States or of the insolvency proceedings for the use of the security in other Member States.’ Therefore, cooperation 
between national central contact points is essential to ensure the efficiency of the PTD, especially with increasing 
cross-border activities. Moreover, a national central contact point signalled that they had no enforcement rights if an 
organiser established outside the EU/EEA does not want to use the guarantee system available in a Member State. 
681 Targeted survey, Q17 
682 Article 7 of the 1990 Directive reads as follow: “The organizer and/or retailer party to the contract shall provide 
sufficient evidence of security for the refund of money paid over and for the repatriation of the consumer in the event 
of insolvency”. 

27 

 
 
several  times  for  insolvency  protection  which  already  had  been  secured  in  another  Member 
State.’683 

To  address  these  problems,  the  2015  PTD  introduced  Articles  17  (Effectiveness  and  scope  of 
insolvency  protection),  18  (Mutual  recognition  of  insolvency  protection  and  administrative 
cooperation),  and  19  (Insolvency  protection  and  information  requirements  for  linked  travel 
arrangements). In this way, the PTD pursued its general and special objectives, by obliging traders 
to provide guarantees (for refunds and repatriation) in case of bankruptcy and by ensuring mutual 
recognition of insolvency protection and administrative cooperation. 

Effectiveness of insolvency protection (Article 17)  
The 2015 PTD provides additional criteria to guide Member States in enhancing the effectiveness 
and robustness of their national insolvency protection systems. Nevertheless, the PTD still leaves 
it  purposely  to  Member  States  to  establish  the  details  of  their  national  insolvency  protection 
systems, provided that the security to be arranged meets the criteria of Article 17 and Recitals 39-
40.684  

Therefore, there is a landscape of diverse insolvency protection systems across the EU. This 
does not necessarily imply that travellers are less protected in some Member States than in other 
ones  or  that  there  is  a  potential  distortion  of  competition  in  the  EU  market  that  could  lead 
companies  to  establish  their  businesses  in  Member  States  where  insolvency  protection 
requirements are less stringent. However, there are indications that these two scenarios may have 
occurred or could occur in practice.  

According to most consumer organisations and national authorities685 travellers in some Member 
States benefit from a higher level of protection than those in other Member States due to such 
differences,  these  differences  imply  insufficient  protection  of  travellers  in  some  Member 
States.686,687 No concrete examples were provided to support this view.  

Most public authorities and businesses indicated that they do not know whether the insolvency 
protection standards for organisers are considerably lower in some Member States than in others.688 
In  contrast,  most  consumer  organisations  consider  that  there  are  Member  States  with  lower 
insolvency protection standards than others,689 but without providing examples. Moreover, most 

683 2013 IA, SWD(2013) 263 final: p. 83.  
684  For  details  on  the  national  insolvency  protection  systems,  see  Appendix  X.  Overview  of  national  insolvency 
protection systems. 
685 Targeted survey for consumer organisation, Q15 and Targeted survey for NCAs (insolvency protection), Q16: 58% 
(7 of 12) consumer organisations agree and 33% (4 of 12) tend to agree while 46% (6 of 13) NCAs agree and 23% 
(3 of 13) tend to agree,  
686 Public consultation Q17: In total, 28% (125 of 453) of respondents, including 59% of the public authorities (13 of 
22) and 86% of consumer organisations (18 of 21). 
687 Similarly, in the targeted survey, a significant share of consumer organisations indicated that travellers are not 
sufficiently protected in some Member States. NCAs (insolvency) authorities indicated that travellers face problems 
because  of  the  different  insolvency  protection  rules  applying  in  different  Member  States.  Targeted  survey  for 
consumer  organisation,  Q15:  58%  (7  of  12)  consumer  organisations  and  Targeted  survey  for  NCAs  (insolvency 
protection), Q16: 58% (7 out of 12) 
688  Public  consultation  Q16:  64%  (289  of  453)  of  respondents,  67%  of  the  public  authorities  (14 of 21),  71%  of 
companies (194 of 272) and 43% of business associations (21 of 49).  
689 Public consultation Q16: 28% (125 of 453) of respondents, 67% of the consumer organisations (14 of 21), and 
33% of the public authorities (7 of 21).  

28 

 
 
consumer organisations and national authorities in charge of insolvency do not know if businesses 
choose to organise their insolvency protection in Member States with lower protection levels.690  

A large share of businesses pointed out that the differences among the national protection systems 
may influence their decisions with regard to the place of business or where to ensure insolvency 
protection691 and may lead to unfair competition within the internal market.692 However, half of the 
businesses declared that  they do not  arrange insolvency protection in  Member States with  less 
strict/costly insolvency protection requirements, while a minority of them declared that this was 
the case.693  

Although stakeholders indicated a need for further harmonisation of the insolvency protection 
systems,694 there was very little feedback on how the rules should be further harmonised. Some 
stakeholders also considered that, in principle, the current rules of the PTD are appropriate and 
should not be changed.695  

There is disagreement between consumer organisations and national authorities (insolvency) on 
whether  the  rules  on  refunds  worked  well  in  practice.  Most  consumer  organisations  ‘tend  to 
disagree’  while  public  authorities  ‘tend  to  agree’  on  this  point.696  Moreover,  most  national 
authorities (regulatory and enforcement) indicated that the rules on insolvency protection of the 
current PTD contributed to the Directive’s achievement of its stated objectives either ‘positively’ 
or  ‘very  positively’.697    However,  consumer  organisations  declared  that  travellers  faced  ‘often’ 
problems when asking for reimbursement of payments for travel services that were not performed 
following the insolvency of the organiser.698  

Regarding the timeliness of the refund claims, national authorities highlighted several factors that 
may  impact  the  effectiveness  of  refunds  in  practice,  e.g.,  the  speed  with  which  the  guarantor 
receives the necessary information to settle the claim.699   

690 Targeted survey for consumer organisation, Q15 and Targeted survey for NCAs (insolvency protection), Q16: 
58% (7 of 12) of consumer organisations and 54% (7 of 13) of NCAs. 
691 Public consultation (Q17): In total, 49% (221 of 453) of respondents, including 50% of the public authorities (11 
of 22), 2 of the 3 NGOs, 52% of consumer organisations (11 of 21), 45% of companies (121 of 270) and 58% of 
business associations (29 of 50). 
692 Public consultation (Q17): 45% (202 out of 453) of respondents, 32% of the public authorities (7 of 22), 2 of the 
3 NGOs, 48% of consumer organisations (10 of 21), 43% of companies (116 of 270) and 66% of business associations 
(33 of 50). 
693 Targeted survey – Businesses (Q27): 50% (11 of 22) respondents selected ‘No’, and 9% (2 of 22) respondents 
‘Yes’.  
694 Public consultation (Q18): 39% (168 out of 434) of respondents, including 41% of the public authorities (9 of 22), 
76% of consumer organisations (16 of 21), 34% of companies (85 of 251), and 41% of business associations (21 of 
51). 
695 Public consultation (Q18): 27% (117 of 434) respondents.14% of the public authorities (3 of 22), 5% of consumer 
organisations (1 of 21), 30% of companies (76 of 251), and 33% of business associations (17 of 51). 
696 Targeted survey for consumer organisation, Q15 and Targeted survey for NCAs (insolvency protection), Q16: 
58% (7 of 12) of consumer organisations tend to disagree, while 46% (6 of 13) of NCAs tend to agree that the rules 
on refunds after an insolvency work effectively.  
697 Targeted survey – NCAs (regulatory and enforcement) (Q21): 69% (18 of 26) of respondents selected ‘positively’, 
and 8% (2 of 26) ‘very positively’.  
698 Targeted survey – Consumer organisations (Q17): 58% (7 of 12) respondents selected ‘Often’, and 33% (4 of 12) 
‘rarely’.  
699 Targeted survey – NCAs (Insolvency) (Q3): one open text response from HU (12 respondents in total). Similarly, 
another respondent (EE) stressed that ‘the refund of the payments is paid to consumers after the Consumer Protection 
and Technical Regulatory Authority has gathered the  claims of travellers and checked the justifiability of timely 

29 

 
 
 
The guarantee for repatriations700 has been effective in practice only to a certain extent according 
to consumer organisations.701 In contrast, most national authorities (insolvency) indicated that they 
did  not  experience  enforcement  issues  concerning  the  guarantee  for  effective  repatriation  of 
travellers  in  their  Member  State/EEA  country.702  While  a  significant  share  of  consumer 
organisations  also  declared  that  they  ‘tend  to  disagree’  to  the  statement  that  rules  on  the 
repatriations of stranded travellers in case of insolvency worked effectively, national authorities 
would ‘tend to agree’ on this aspect.703  

However, one third of respondents to the 2022 Consumer Conditions Survey are not confident that 
they are well protected if an organiser goes bankrupt.704 

Despite such criticism, there is no evidence that the national insolvency protection systems had 
general problems in covering refunds and the repatriation of travellers.705 

Furthermore, unlike in previous years, after the transposition of the PTD, the Commission received 
no  complaints  pointing  to  specific  problems  in  specific  national  systems.  One  exception  was 
Germany, which, however, changed its insolvency protection system in 2021. Therefore, while 
there is scope for clarification in the PTD in some respects, the available evidence does not suggest 
that a radical change is called for. Also, the fact that, in line with the Court’s case law, the Member 
States are liable for damage caused to travellers due to inadequate national insolvency protection 
systems,706 is an incentive for operating effective systems. In addition, the Commission can raise 
specific problems in specific Member States through a structured dialogue with the Member States 
concerned and/or infringement proceedings, based on complaints or of its own motion. 

The COVID-19  crisis brought  to  light  divergent  practices in  the Member States  as  regards the 
coverage by insolvency protection of pending refund claims for reimbursements from travellers, 
including under the form of vouchers..707 The Court of Justice of the European Union is still to 

(32%).”, 

submitted claims’, thus, suggesting that the timeliness of the refund depends on the speed to which the information 
are processed by the competent bodies.   
700 In line with Article 17(4) 
701 Targeted survey – Consumer organisations (Q16): 42% (5 out of 12) respondents selected ‘Yes’.  
702 Targeted survey – NCAs (insolvency) (Q2): 75% (9 out of 12) of respondents declared that this did not constitute 
an enforcement issue.  
703 Targeted survey for consumer organisation, Q15 and Targeted survey for NCAs (insolvency protection), Q16: 
42% (5 out of 12) of consumer organisations tend to disagree, while 46% (6 out of 13) of NCAs tend to agree that 
the rules on repatriation of stranded travellers work effectively. 
704 See Consumer Conditions Survey 2022: “Furthermore, more consumers (38%) do not have the confidence that 
they  are  well  protected  if  the  package  organiser  goes  bankrupt  than  the  proportion  that  are  confident  in  such a 
scenario 
https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/consumers/consumer-protection-
policy/key-consumer-data_en#consumer-conditions-surveyhttps://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-
policy/policies/consumers/consumer-protection-policy/key-consumer-data_en#consumer-conditions-survey  
705 One Member State declared that since its insolvency protection system has been only recently amended to comply 
with the PTD, there is still a lack of experience in this respect. Targeted survey – NCAs (Insolvency) Q3: open text 
responses from DE. 
706 See Case C-6/90 Francovich and Bonifaci v Italy; C-48/93 Brasserie du pêcheur 
707 The current practice in the Member States varies. Six Member States replying in the consultation process already 
cover vouchers and/or refund claims by insolvency protection up to a certain extent, while six do not. Targeted survey 
for national insolvency authorities Q8: 12 responses from AT, CY, DE, DK, EE, FI, HU, HR, LV, PT, SE, and IS. 6 
authorities (5 MS and Iceland) replied that the current rules on insolvency protection in place in their country cover 
vouchers and/or refund claims (for cancelled packages) to a certain extent. In general, this protection has ensued in 
the context of the COVID-19. In addition, Ireland confirmed during a meeting with the EC that vouchers and refund 
claims were covered by the rules on insolvency protection. Only Denmark, Estonia and Ireland seem to fully cover 
vouchers. 

30 

 
 
rule on the question whether the wording of Article 17(1) regulates such coverage.708 Consumer 
organisations and some Member States suggest that the PTD should clearly state that vouchers 
and refund claims are covered by insolvency protection.709 Also businesses are largely in favour 
of such clarification.710 

Regarding the possibility to provide continuation of the package in case of insolvency, around 
one third of consumer organisations and of national authorities (insolvency) ‘tend to agree’ that 
this possibility is used while a large share of respondents indicated that they do not know.711  

The  difficult  implementation  and  enforcement  of  insolvency  protection  for  LTAs  and  ‘click-
through packages’ hindered the effectiveness of the PTD ‘to a very great extent’, according to 
nearly half the respondents from national insolvency authorities.712  

Concerning cross-border cases, a substantial  percentage of retailers often sells packages from 
organisers located in another EU or EEA State, and some even from organisers located outside the 
EU/EEA.713, 714 It has been reported that in case of insolvency of an organiser from another Member 
State, it is difficult for travellers to obtain information on insolvency proceedings and to recover 
prepayments.715 Such cross-border issues may also affect the effectiveness of the PTD.  

708 The interpretation of Article17(1) in this respect is raised in two pending requests for preliminary rulings from 
Austria and Belgium in cases C-771/22 HDI Global and C-45/23 MS Amlin Insurance.  
709  Public  consultation  Q19:  In  a  question  where  respondents  could  choose  more  than  one  reply,  77%  of  public 
authorities (17 of 22), 86% of consumer organisations (18 of 21) and 52% of EU citizens (35 of 67) believe that 
refund rights against an organiser should be protected in case of insolvency, against 14% of companies and business 
associations (49 of 359). 73% of public authorities (16 of 22). 95% of consumer organisations (20 of 21) and 45% of 
EU citizens (30 of 67) believe that vouchers issued by an organiser should be protected in case of insolvency, against 
18% of companies and business associations (65 of 359). 
710 Opinion of the Fit for future platform on the PTD, Suggestion 4: Clarification of uncertainties regarding insolvency 
protection, ‘further uncertainties include for example insolvency protection in case of re-bookings, respectively of 
vouchers and a possible difference between a voucher for a package as opposed to a voucher just stating an amount 
of  money.’  https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-making-process/evaluating-and-improving-existing-laws/refit-
making-eu-law-simpler-less-costly-and-future-proof/fit-future-platform-f4f/adopted-opinions_en 
711 Targeted survey for consumer organisation, Q15 and Targeted survey for NCAs (insolvency protection), Q16: 
tend to agree 33% (4 out of 12) of consumer organisation, 31% (4 out of 13) of NCAs; do not know: 42% (5 out of 
12) of consumer organisation, 38% (5 out of 13) of NCAs. 
712 Targeted survey, Q17 
713 Public consultation Q60: 40% of retailers (33 of 83) indicated to often sell packages from organisers from other 
countries in the EU/EEA, 41% (34 of 83) to do so rarely and 19% (16 of 83) never to sell such packages. Q61: 16% 
of retailers (13 of 83) indicated to often sell packages from organisers from outside the EU/EEA, 40% (48 of 83) to 
do so rarely and 30% (36 of 83) never to sell such packages. It is important to note that companies often indicated 
several activities from the list that included retailer, organiser, carrier etc.. 
714 While no exact data are available concerning the number of such cross-border packages, the available information 
indicates that around 20,000 cross-border complaints were lodged with the European Consumer Centres in 2022. 
Most travellers do not lodge complaints, so that the overall number of cross-border packages is likely substantially 
higher. The European Consumer Centres Network (ECC-Net) Anniversary Report 2005-2020, p. 19, indicates that 
during the timespan of their existence, on average 17% of the complaints received by ECC-Net concerned package 
https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2021-01/ecc_net_anniversary_report_2020-
travel. 
_15_years_of_ecc_net.pdf; The ECC-Net report “ECC-Net in 2022”, https://www.eccnet.eu/publications, indicates 
that 118 142 enquiries have been made during 2022. ECC-Net deals only with cross-border disputes. As on average 
17% of complaints concern package travel, one could estimate that the number of cross-border PTD complaints was 
around 20 085 cases in 2022. 
715  Replies  Member  States  Central  Contact  Points  on  insolvency  protection  to  targeted  question  from  the 
Commission. 

31 

 
 
The evaluation finds that the mutual recognition of insolvency protection as per Article 18 is 
either rarely or never used in practice716, and that, where used, did not present problems for most 
business stakeholders.717 However, there are indications that the system is used.718 Furthermore, 
different  reasons  outside  of  the  PTD  could  explain  the  –  possibly  –  more  limited  practical 
relevance  of  this  mechanism  and  do  not  make  these  provisions  ineffective.  Some  national 
authorities (insolvency) called for better communication between the Central Contact Points and 
more transparency on the type of securities organisers had in different Member States.719 However, 
such issues seem to depend more on the Member States rather than the text of the PTD. 

Regarding bankruptcies of large organisers, the bankruptcy in September 2019 of the UK based 
Thomas Cook Group plc.,720 has been the only bankruptcy of a large organiser with a cross-border 
impact so far, demonstrating insufficiency of some national insolvency protection systems set up 
under the PTD.721 

716 Public consultation (Q55): 40% of business associations (14 of 35 – mostly selected answer by them), and 12% 
of companies (22 of 189) selected ‘rarely’, and 9% of business associations (3 of 35) and 39% of companies (73 of 
189) ‘never’, Important to point out that the biggest share of companies replied “don’t know” 80 of 189). 
717 Public consultation (Q56): 90% of companies (134 of 149) and 47% of business associations (15 of 32). (Q56a) 
open text reply from a micro company (BE).  
718 During the consultation process, several Member States indicated that the system was used (BE, DK, EE, LT, LV, 
SE).  
719 Some Member States complain that their counterparts from other MS do not reply to requests or that they do not 
have access to registries and details on securities of organisers in other MS. In addition, one national authority dealing 
with insolvency protection explained that ‘Member States are generally unaware of the national law of other Member 
States or of the insolvency proceedings for the use of the security in other Member States.’ Therefore, cooperation 
between national central contact points is essential to ensure the efficiency of the PTD, especially with increasing 
cross-border activities. Moreover, a national central contact point signalled that they had no enforcement rights if an 
organiser established outside the EU/EEA does not want to use the guarantee system available in a Member State. 
720 One of the world’s leading leisure travel groups, with sales of £9.6 billion and around 19 million clients in 2018 
721  
The German subsidiaries of Thomas Cook left around 140 000 travellers stranded abroad. These were repatriated 
with the help of the insolvency protection provider. The insolvency protection, however, was insufficient to fully 
cover the refunds of travellers not yet at their destination, because of a liability cap for insurance companies covering 
this  risk  in  the  previous  German  transposition.  The  federal  government  committed  to  compensate  all  affected 
travellers  for  the  difference  between  their  pre-payments  and  the  amount  of  refunds  received  from  the  insurance 
company covering the insolvent Thomas Cook companies. At the same time, the German legislation was amended, 
and the protection of travellers improved. COM(2021) 90 final, p 10. See also Appendix X. Overview of national 
insolvency protection systems 
In France, more than 53 000 travellers were affected. Around 11 000 travellers were repatriated, and more than 30 
000 customers could spend their holidays with other tour operators. The refund of about 25 000 packages could start 
only once the insolvency procedure was finalised and all eligible refund files were completed. The total amount to 
be paid by guarantee funds reached around EUR 42 million in France. COM(2021) 90 final, p 10. 
The main Belgian insolvency protection body organised the repatriation of 11 000 passengers. In addition, competent 
authorities dealt with thousands of refund claims. The total amount to be paid by guarantee funds reached EUR 27 
million in Belgium. EC, Meeting of the Stakeholder Expert Group to discuss the draft report on the application of 
(2015/2302),  24  November  2020, 
the  Package  Travel  and  Linked  Travel  Arrangements  Directive 
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/expert-groups-
register/screen/meetings/consult?lang=en&meetingId=23419&fromExpertGroups=false. 
Spain  introduced  urgent  measures  to  alleviate  the  effects  of  the  opening  of  insolvency  proceedings  against  the 
corporate  group  Thomas  Cook.  Among  other  things,  it  created  a  credit  line  with  Thomas  Cook  defaults,  a  State 
Financial Fund for Tourism Competitiveness, coordination policies in the field of employment between the central 
state and the Autonomous Regions and other support and information measures for those directly affected by the 
Thomas Cook crisis. 
In Greece, the number of foreign stranded tourists was estimated at around 55 000 when Thomas Cook’s insolvency 
was announced in 2019. An operational centre was immediately set up by the Ministry of Tourism and repatriation 
was accomplished. 

32 

 
 
Nevertheless, after the bankruptcy of Thomas Cook, it appears that, in general, Member States 
and  EEA  have  not  experienced  bankruptcies  of  large  organisers722  and/or  the  simultaneous 
bankruptcies  of  several  organisers,723  therefore  it  was  difficult  for  them  to  assess  the 
effectiveness of their national systems in such circumstances.724 

During COVID-19, an increase of organisers’ insolvencies in the period February/March 2020 - 
end of 2022, as compared to the period July 2018 - February/March 2020 was noticed in some 
Member States, but there were usually not major insolvencies, inter alia thanks to State aid.725  

At  least  in  some  Member  States,  organisers  reportedly  find  it  difficult  to  obtain  insolvency 
protection  which  covers  prepayments  and  repatriation  This  is  due  to  insufficient  insurance 
solutions  in  the  market  or  insurance  solutions  offered  only  at  prohibitive  prices,  in  particular 
during  a  crisis.726,727   During COVID-19,  ‘[r]elatively  few  travel  guarantee  funds  and  insurance 
companies  provide[ed]  insolvency  protection.  It  has  been  reported  that  banks  were  no  longer 
providing  security  for  organisers  and  that  also  some  of  the  already  relatively  few  insurance 
companies  offering  insolvency  protection  were  pulling  out  of  the  market’  (e.g.,  in  Austria728, 
Belgium729  and  France730).731  In  addition,  ‘[r]isks  related  to  pandemics  are  often  excluded  from 
insurance policies, in particular travel cancellation insurance.’732   

Finally, most of the NCAs (insolvency) (83%) considered that, at least ‘to some extent’, the main 
factor affecting the effectiveness of the PTD’s provisions on insolvency protection was the 
difference  between  insolvency  protection  systems  in  the  EU/EEA  Member  States/countries.  In 
addition,  the  difficult  implementation  and  enforcement  of  insolvency  protection  for  LTAs  and 
‘click-through packages’ hindered the effectiveness of PTD ‘to a very great extent’, according to 
nearly half of NCAs (insolvency) (see Figure 2 below).  

722 Targeted survey – NCAs (Insolvency) (Q3): three open text responses from AT, PT, SK (12 respondents in total). 
723 Targeted survey – NCAs (Insolvency) (Q3): two open text responses from SK and IS (12 respondents in total).  
724 During the consultation process, one national Central Contact Point reported the insolvencies of two national large 
organisers in 2020 and 2021. However, the Central Contact Point could not provide further data. 
725 E.g., number of insolvencies  before Covid-19 vs insolvencies from February/March 2020 to the end of 2022: 
Poland: 12  vs 18; Lithuania: 1 vs 6; Finland: 3 vs 9, Belgium: 14 vs 35; Cyprus: no insolvency before the COVID-
19 until the end of 2022; Czech Republic: 4  vs 27; Denmark: 7 vs 18; Estonia: 0 vs 5; Latvia: 1 vs 3; Sweden 2 vs 
46; Iceland: 2 vs 7. Not all Member States offered data on the number of insolvencies.  
726 Targeted survey of national insolvency protection authorities, question 6, showing that the prices of insurance-
based solutions have increased. 
727  Section 
3 
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/expert-groups-
register/screen/meetings/consult?lang=en&meetingId=45937&fromExpertGroups=true  
728 
aid 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_60521 
729 See minutes of the 4th meeting of the PTD stakeholder expert group (24.11.2020), Register of Commission expert 
groups and other similar entities (europa.eu) 
730 State Aid SA.104022 (2022/N) – France, SA_104022_404A4C87-0000-C6F0-AC80-40B28799B06E_68_1.pdf 
(europa.eu)  
731 
content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2021%3A90%3AFIN 
732  See  e.g.,  the  analysis  of  the  Belgian  consumer  organisation  Test  Achats  published  on  22.10.2020, 
https://www.test-achats.be/argent/assurances-assistance-voyage/dossier/coronavirus. 

the  Central  Contact  Points 

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-

10  November 

the  Minutes 

Application 

SA.60521 

Austria, 

Report, 

2022, 

p.11, 

State 

PTD 

of 

of 

of 

- 

33 

 
 
Figure 2. Factors affecting the effectiveness of the PTD’s provisions on insolvency protection 

Source: ICF elaboration based on Q17 – Targeted survey NCAs (insolvency) – N=13.  

To  enhance  the  effectiveness  and  robustness  of  the  PTD  rules  on  insolvency  protection, 
stakeholders indicated an overall need for better enforcement of the existing rules733 and further 
harmonisation of the insolvency protection systems.   

In  addition  to  the  above,  there  are  strong  demands  from  consumer  organisations,  package 
organisers and other stakeholders for the introduction of mandatory insolvency protection for 
standalone tickets.734 

Passengers are currently not protected by EU law against the insolvency of carriers if they book 
standalone  tickets,  such  as  flight  tickets,  even  though  losses  for  affected  passengers  are 
considerable.735  Improving  the  protection  of  passengers  for  standalone  services  would,  among 
others, contribute to fairer burden sharing in the package travel supply chain, where organisers 
currently have to bear the risk of carriers, such as airlines, going bankrupt.736 

733 Public consultation (Q18): 36% (157 out of 434) of respondents, including 27% of public authorities (6 of 22), 
81% of consumer organisations (17 of 21), 33% of companies (83 of 251), and 41% of business associations (21 of 
51).  
734  The  European  Court  of  Auditors  recommended  to  assess  this  option.  See  Special  Report  No  15/2021  -  Air 
passenger  rights  during  the  COVID-19  pandemic:  Key  rights  not  protected  despite  Commission  efforts  (2021/C 
258/05), Also, BEUC, ECTAA, eutt position papers. Furthermore, in 2015, the Danish Government introduced a 
mandatory insolvency protection for airlines covering standalone tickets. 
735 It is estimated that more than 5 million passengers in the EU were affected by 91 airline bankruptcies between 
2010-2019. Even if this represents only 0,14 per cent of the total number of passengers in the EU, the detriment for 
those affected is substantial with EUR 1.1 billion. In 2019 alone, 1.8 million passengers were affected. Data from 
Steer Davies Gleave (2011, 2020) 
736  When  dealing  with  an  airline  insolvency, organisers,  mostly  SME-sized,  have  to finance  the  costs  of  the  lost 
tickets  towards  travellers.  https://www.ectaa.org/Uploads/documents/Reforming-Package.pdf,  Point  1.1.1,  EU 
Travel Tech position on the revision of the Package Travel Directive, September 2021 

34 

 
 
 
 
 
Under  the  initiative  ‘Better  protection  for  passengers  and  their  rights’,737  the  Commission  is 
reviewing  the  passenger  rights  regulatory  framework,  which  is  made  up  of  five  regulations, 
including Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 (the Air Passenger Rights Regulation or APRR). 738   

EQ4. Is there clarity for traders facilitating an LTA on the insolvency protection cover they 
have to obtain, and, for consumers, on the fact that they are entitled to insolvency protection, 
where the conditions under Art. 19 PTD are satisfied? 

The evaluation finds that it is very difficult for travellers to understand their rights in relation to 
LTAs, including in relation to insolvency protection.739 Similarly, for traders facilitating an LTA 
it is often unclear to what extent they need insolvency protection cover.   

Travellers do not understand their rights in relation to LTAs, including on insolvency protection.740 
In addition, most travellers,741 having booked an LTA since 2018, did not read the information 
explaining  they  were  booking  an  LTA  with  the  associated  warning  and  their  entitlement  to 
insolvency protection.742  

Businesses and consumers considered that it was unnecessary and misleading in practice to inform 
consumers that they do not benefit from rights applying to packages under the PTD, where the 
conditions laid down at Article 19(1) are not met.743  

In addition, the distinction whether travel services were selected jointly (package) or separately 
(LTA)  was  difficult  to  verify  for  travellers  and  enforcement  authorities  (see  EQ1).  Evidence 

for 

rights 

cancellation 

air  passengers, 

carriers,  possible 

https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13290-Travel-better-protection-for-

737 
passengers-and-their-rights_en   
738 Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing 
common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or 
long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (Text with EEA relevance) - Commission Statement 
(OJ L 46, 17.2.2004, p. 1). 
The  APRR  regulates  the  rights  of  passengers,  for  instance,  where  flights  are  cancelled.  This  Regulation  is 
complementary to the PTD and the relationship between both instruments is regulated in different provisions of the 
PTD  and  the  APRR.  The  review  of  the  APRR  comprises  the  question  of  refunds  for  cancelled  flights  where 
intermediaries are involved. In addition, the on-going review of the Air Services Regulation (Regulation (EC) No 
1008/2008) is relevant for the coherence between air passenger rights and the PTD. The review of the Air Services 
Regulation covers the financial resilience of carriers, including the possible introduction of insolvency protection for 
air 
transparency.  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13255-Revision-of-the-Air-Services-
Regulation_en    
739 Targeted survey – consumer organisations (Q31): when asked what kind of problems, if any, they had noticed 
with  the  standard  information  forms  in  Appendix  II  (LTAs),  73%  (8  out  of  11)  respondents  from  consumer 
organisations indicated that ‘travellers do not understand their rights in relation to LTAs, including with regard to 
insolvency protection’. In addition, in the public consultation, most stakeholders indicated that the rules on LTA type 
(a) did not effectively contribute to the achievement of PTD’s objectives (Q26: 67% (269 of 403) of the respondents, 
including 81% of the public authorities (17 of 21), 95% of consumer organisations (19 of 20), 61% of companies 
(140 of 228), and 78% of business associations (38 of 49).  
740 See EQ1, point b) Linked travel arrangements. 
741 Consumer survey (Q7 – N=8,138: “Insofar as you booked a linked travel arrangement (LTA) since 2018, did you 
read the information explaining to you that you are booking an LTA?): 2,941 indicated Yes and 5,197 No. In the 
public  consultation,  73%  of  the  respondents  indicated  that  travellers  find  it  difficult  to  understand  what  kind  of 
protection they can expect in relation to LTAs and whether they will benefit from insolvency protection (Q26a: 200 
out of 273 respondents. N=273).   
742 Nevertheless, within the minority of travellers that read the information attached to the booking of an LTA, it 
appeared  that  most  of  them  found  the  information  clear.  Consumer  survey  (Q7.1  –  N=  2942),  2,586  consumers 
indicated that the information was clear, while 356 indicated it was not.   
743 Interview with a large consumer organisation and a business association. ICF workshop on the PTD (26 October 
2023).  

as  price 

as  well 

35 

 
 
gathered for the evaluation suggests that the overall lack of clarity for traders facilitating an LTA 
on the insolvency protection cover they must obtain and on providing the necessary information 
to travellers, is also determined by the following factors:  

- uncertainties about the formation of LTAs of types (a) and (b) imply that traders do not know 
whether they are LTA facilitators under the PTD;744 
- scarce understanding and limited / incorrect practical use of the PTD Appendixes for LTAs.  

EQ5.  How  effective  is  the  PTD  in  ensuring  effective  and  efficient  reimbursement  of  pre-
payments under Article 12(2) and (4), including in times of crisis? 

This section analyses the effectiveness of the right of travellers to terminate the package travel 
contract without a termination fee in the event of ‘unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’, 
and  to  be  reimbursed  all  pre-payments745  within  14  days  after  the  package  travel  contract  is 
terminated.746 

The  evaluation  found  that  the  effectiveness  of  reimbursement  of  pre-payments  following  the 
cancellation of a contract due to ‘unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’ under Article 12 
had been reduced considerably during COVID-19.  

Organisers  denied  or  postponed  the  refunds,  either  by  imposing  vouchers/credit  notes  on 
travellers, or extending the 14-day deadline for refunds. Reimbursement of travellers was often 
delayed by more than a month and travellers received a refund only after filing a complaint to an 
enforcement body. In addition, travellers were referred from one trader to another, as the organiser 
and the retailer could not agree who was responsible for the refund, thus triggering delay or no 
reimbursement. 

Lack of specific rules on vouchers in the PTD added further uncertainties on travellers. In addition, 
problems with the reimbursement of pre-payments alongside the different actors in the value chain 
affected the liquidity of organisers. 

Even  though  actions  by  traders  (or  Member  States),  which  are  not  compatible  with  the  PTD, 
cannot be attributed to the PTD, it is necessary to consider changes and clarifications in the PTD 
to ensure a better response to crisis situations and address the detriment that may be caused to 
travellers.  

Prior  to  the  pandemic,  it  appeared  to  be  difficult  for  travellers  to  recover  their  pre-payments 
without filing a complaint. Nevertheless, travellers were affected to a lesser extent. 

a) General aspects 
With the introduction of the right for travellers to terminate of the package travel contract in 
the event of ‘unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’ and the subsequent refund rights, 
the 2015 Directive responded to the problems highlighted by the 2013 IA. 

The 2013 IA outlined that while ‘the organiser is entitled to cancel the package contract without 
any obligation to pay damages for non-performance of the contract if the cancellation is for reasons 
of force majeure, solely depending on his assessment of the security situation’, the traveller does 

744 See also EQ 2 and Appendix IX. Package travel during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
745 By ‘pre-payments’ it is understood advance payments made for packages before the start of the trip. Stakeholders 
may also use downpayments with the meaning of advance payments made by traveller at the time of booking the 
package or shortly thereafter. 
746 In accordance with Article 12(2) and (4). 

36 

 
 
 
not have a similar right to cancel in the event of force majeure’. In addition, the 2013 IA clarified 
that ‘there are examples of organisers refusing to cancel the package even though national travel 
advice  advised  against  travelling  to  the  destination.’  In  this  respect,  consumer  lawyers  were 
‘arguing that the consumer can have a legitimate need for an option to cancel the contract if there 
is a force majeure situation in the area of the destination, e.g., warfare or natural disasters, which 
is likely to have a negative impact on the enjoyment or the safety during the holiday and where 
the organiser does not take initiative to cancel the package.’747 

Traditionally, pre-payments are the standard payment model in the package travel sector.748 In 
case of cancellation of the package, organisers must reimburse travellers. 

The  PTD  does  not  regulate  the  amounts  of  pre-payments  package  organisers  or  retailers  may 
accept  nor  their  timing  before  the  start  of  the  package.  It  follows  that  there  are  differences  in 
national laws and practices regarding the receipt of payments made by or on behalf of travellers. 
The extent of pre-payments depends on different factors, including the share of transport in the 
package, scheduled flights as opposed to chartered flights, traditional tour operator packages as 
opposed to dynamic packages, but, to some extent, also the Member States concerned. By using 
travellers’ prepayments, certain organisers can purchase large allotments of services in advance, 
which allows them to keep package prices at a reasonable level.749 Service providers, especially in 
the air transport sector, require full payment of the tickets upon booking, allowing them to optimise 
transport service operations economically and environmentally. 

Currently, two Member States have rules on limitation of pre-payments to protect travellers.750  

Under the PTD, travellers and/or organisers have the right to cancel packages free of charge ‘in 
the event of unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’, travellers being entitled to a full refund 
of any payments made for the package within 14 days from the termination of the contract.751 As 
explained  further  below,  before  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  although  travellers  experienced 
problems in recovering prepayments in the event of cancellations of package travel contracts due 
to ‘“unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’”, the related refunds became problematic for 
travellers and organisers in particular during the COVID-19 pandemic.   

Before  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  the  termination  of  the  contract  under  Article  12(2)  raised 
disputes  between  travellers  and  organisers  only  to  a  moderate/small  extent,  according  to  both 

747 SWD(2013) 263 final, Appendix 3 – Specific Problems with the Package Travel Directive: p. 78. 
748 SWD(2013) 263 final, p. 76. 
749 COM(2021) 90 final, p. 12. 
750  In  Germany,  based  on  national  case-law  on  unfair  contract  terms,  pre-payments  are  limited  to  a  20%  down 
payment at the time of booking, the rest being due not more than 30 days before the beginning of the trip. As an 
exception to this general rule, pre-payment can be higher than 20% in circumstances where the organiser duly justifies 
it, due to expenditures present at the moment of the package contract conclusion. BGH – X ZR 71/16,  
http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&nr=79534&pos=0&anz=1 ,  
BGH 
bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&sid=46187c163b972182902743377a1dcc62&nr=70493&pos=0&anz=1   
In Austria, legislation provides that customers’ pre-payments may be accepted at the earliest eleven months before 
the agreed end of the trip, and that no more than 20% of the package price can be accepted earlier than 20 days before 
the start of the trip. However, where unlimited insolvency protection is available, these restrictions do not apply. 
Package Travel Order (Pauschalreiseverordnung),  
https://ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=20010321 
751 In accordance with Article 12(2) and (5) 

http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-

85/12, 

ZR 

X 

- 

37 

 
 
consumers752 and businesses.753 Travellers faced difficulties in recovering their pre-payments, but 
to  a  smaller  extent  than  during  COVID-19754  (see  also  Table  1  further  below).  For  instance, 
travellers received a full refund within 14 days or at least within one month only ‘occasionally’ 
before COVID-19. Moreover, consumers indicate that the refund right under Article 12 was never 
something they enjoyed automatically as, both before and during COVID-19, travellers ‘often’ 
received a refund only after filing a complaint, and ‘rarely’ without this procedure. There are also 
indications  that  travellers  did  not  receive  any  money  or  received  it  with  considerable  delay, 
irrespective of the period under examination.755  

The losses experienced by travellers before the COVID-19 period, related to the cancellation of 
packages can be estimated based on the annual consumer expenditures for package travel. In 2017, 
these were estimated to reach 58 billion EUR (762 EUR per trip) for trips within the EU and 36 
billion EUR (1.756 EUR per trip) for trips to other parts of the world.756 This corresponds to around 
76.1 million trips within the EU and 20.5 million trips to countries outside the EU. Based on the 
PTD Application Report, around 4.4% of package travellers experienced financial loss,757 a fact 
that may have an impact of 5.4 billion EUR on trip values (both within and outside the EU). It is 
unlikely that the losses suffered by the affected travellers would have amounted to the total value 
of their trips. Considering that the value of the affected services represents between 10-30%758 of 
the total package price, the losses suffered by travellers are estimated at between 540 million to 
1.6 billion EUR per year in a normal year.759  

752  Targeted  survey  -  Consumer  organisations  (Q6):  when  asked  whether,  on  the  justification  for  terminating  a 
package travel contract before COVID-19 pandemic, they observed the scenario in which ‘the parties did not agree 
on  whether  the  situation  qualified  as  ‘unavoidable  and  extraordinary  circumstances’  or  whether  it  significantly 
affected the package in question’, 33% (4 of 12) of consumer organisations pointed out that the scenario was observed 
‘to a moderate extent’, while 42% (5 of 12) selected ‘to a small extent’.  
753 Targeted survey - Business associations (Q12): when asked whether, on the justification for terminating a package 
travel contract before COVID-19 pandemic, they observed the scenario in which ‘the parties did not agree on whether 
the  situation  qualified  as  ‘unavoidable  and  extraordinary  circumstances’  or  whether  it  significantly  affected  the 
package  in question’65% (13 of 20) of respondents replied that this was the case only ‘to a small extent’ before 
COVID-19 pandemic. 
754 Interview with a large EU-level consumer organisation.  
755 N respondents of targeted survey – consumer organisations (Q9), N = 12. Before the COVID-19 pandemic: (1) 
Travellers received a full refund within 14 days or at least within one month: 33% often  42% occasionally, 8% 
rarely; (2) Travellers received a refund without filing a complaint  8% often,  25% occasionally, 42% rarely; (3) 
Travellers received a refund only after filing a complaint  67% often  25% occasionally 0% rarely; (4) Traveller (a) 
did not receive any money or (b) received it with considerable delay  47% often  33% occasionally 17% rarely 
756 
Report, 
content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2021%3A90%3AFIN    
757 The report states that 11% of all package travel consumers experienced problems, and 40% of these – that is 4.4% 
of all package travel consumers - experienced financial loss. PTD Application Report, p.3. 
758 
passenger 
(https://www.statista.com/statistics/1125265/average-ticket-price-selected-airlines-europe/),  and  the  average  long-
haul  price  is  350  EUR  per  passenger  (https://media.hopper.com/research/consumer-airfare-index-report-march-
2022) which, in case of cancellation or delays would make up 12% of  average intra-EU and 20% of international 
package travel price. Noting that the quoted airfares concern individually purchased tickets, it is assumed that airfares 
included in package trips may be more economical. Moreover, for the calculation of consumer losses, both flights 
(outgoing and return) would not necessarily be impacted. In terms of consumer losses related to accommodation 
services,  an  average  hotel  price  per  night  in  the  EU  between  100-200  EUR  is  considered.  Consequently,  losses 
resulting  from  unsatisfactory  accommodation  can  impact  13-26%  of  package  travel  prices.  Similarly,  to  airfare 
however, we estimate that accommodation is sold at a discount for package trips and consider that not the entirety of 
costs may be linked to consumer losses.  
759 In addition, based on an alternative calculation, ICF estimated the yearly consumer detriment at between EUR 
126 million and EUR 378 million. ICF study (for full reference see footnote11), not yet published, page 122-123 

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-

Application 

intra-EU 

average 

around 

flight 

EUR 

price 

PTD 

The 

p.2, 

per 

90 

an 

of 

is 

38 

 
 
According  to  consumer  organisations,  travellers  faced  challenges  in  recovering  prepayments, 
albeit  to  a  lesser  extent  as  during  the  COVID-19.760  This  suggests  that  there  were  certain 
compliance issues also at ordinary times, but, in the absence of more specific information, it must 
be assumed that, in terms  of the volume of refunds and the extent of the delay of refunds, the 
problems were much smaller than during the COVID crisis.  

Travellers  faced  major  difficulties  during  the  COVID-19  pandemic  related  to  the 
reimbursement  of  pre-payments  within  14  days  where  organisers  or  travellers  terminated  a 
package travel contract due to unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances. More specifically, 
organisers  denied  or  postponed  the  refunds,  usually  by  imposing  vouchers/credit  notes  on 
travellers,761 the reimbursement was delayed by more than a month,762 travellers received a voucher 
and used it for alternative trips or received their money back in the end,763 received a refund only 
after filing a complaint to an enforcement body,764 received vouchers but have not used them for 
alternative trips until the expiration date and are still waiting for their money.765 

Many consumer organisations indicated experiencing further situations, namely: the trader refused 
to  reimburse  money  for  expired  vouchers  arguing  that  it  had  no  further  obligations  towards 
travellers,766 the organiser and the retailer could not agree which one of them was responsible for 
the refund, triggering delay or no reimbursement,767 and many travellers are still waiting for their 
money.768 

While it is not possible to arrive at a robust estimate of the value or number of cancelled packages, 
the data available for flights can give an indication on the magnitude of the cancellation also for 
packages. ‘The total reduction in passenger numbers was estimated at 346 million for the first six 
months  of  the  year  of  2020  by  Eurostat,  and  at  800  million,  or  67  %,  for  the  full  year  by  the 

760 Targeted survey for consumer organisations: According to replies to Q6, travellers received a full refund within 
14 days or at least within one month only ‘occasionally’ before COVID-19. Moreover, travellers ‘often’ received a 
refund only after filing a complaint, and ‘rarely’ without this procedure. National consumer authorities also pointed 
out  that  challenges  regarding  reimbursements  (e.g.,  agreement  of  parties  on  whether  the  situation  qualified  as 
‘unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’ or significantly affected the package in question) that were observed 
‘to a small extent’ before COVID-19 turned into significant ones during the pandemic. (See Appendix 8. Evaluation, 
EQ 5.) 
761 Public consultation, Q41: 18 of 21 (86%) of consumer organisations and 11 of 19 (58%) public authorities. And 
see BEUC position papers submitted to the Inception Impact Assessment and to the public consultation that describes 
issues around imposition of vouchers. 
762 Public consultation (Q44): 52% (11 of 21) of consumer organisations and 74% (14 of 19) of public authorities. In 
Q36, a similar question addressed to individuals using packages, this scenario was indicated by 20% (10 of 49) of 
EU citizens. (Non-EU citizens did not reply to this question). Also, 85% (23 of 27) of national authorities indicated 
that  refunds  of  prepayments  were  not  provided  within  14  days.  Targeted  survey  for  NCAs  (regulatory  and 
enforcement), Q1. 
763 Public consultation (Q44): 57% (12 of 21) of consumer organisations and 63% (12 out of 19) of public authorities. 
In Q36, a similar question addressed to individuals using travel services, this scenario was indicated by 22% (11 of 
49) of EU citizens. (Non-EU citizens did not reply to this question).  
764 Public consultation (Q44): 81% (17 of 21) of consumer organisations and 53% (10 of 19) of public authorities. In 
Q36, a similar question addressed to individuals using travel services, this scenario was indicated by 14% (7 of 49) 
of EU citizens. 
765 Public consultation (Q44): 81% (17 of 21) of consumer organisations and 42% (8 of 19) of public authorities. In 
Q36, a similar question addressed to individuals using travel services, this scenario was indicated by 6% (3 of 49) of 
EU citizens.  
766 Public consultation (Q44):  57% (12 of 21) consumer organisations and 11% (2 out of 19) public authorities. 
767 Public consultation (Q44):  67% (14 of 21) consumer organisations and 32% (6 out of 19) public authorities. 
768 Public consultation (Q44): 52% (11 of 21) consumer organisations and 11% (2 out of 19) public authorities. 

39 

 
 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO).’769  According to the estimation of the European 
Court  of  Auditors  (ECA),  roughly  50  million  tickets  were  cancelled  between  March  and  May 
2020.  

In  the  Impact  Assessment  (IA)  accompanying  a  proposal  for  a Regulation for  common  rules  for 
enforcement of passenger rights, passenger rights for multimodal journeys, and reimbursements of 
airline tickets bought via an intermediary,770 it is assumed that the percentage of tickets in terms of 
number of passengers771,772 of scheduled and charter flights as part of package travel would be 1.5-
3%773 each. 

Between March and May 2020, at the beginning of COVID-19, the cancellation of approx. 50 
million flight tickets,774 triggered a decrease of flights of around 76% and a decrease of around 
75% in expenditure on package trips in 2020 as compared to 2019.775 Based on this data, and using 
the abovementioned estimate that the value of the affected flights included in  packages  would 
represent between 10-30% of the total package price, the losses could range from 500-1500 million 
during the first three months of the pandemic.776 

not 

despite 

protected 

Commission 

769 European Court of Auditors, Special Report 15/2021: Air passenger rights during the COVID-19 pandemic: Key 
rights 
efforts, 
https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR21_15/SR_passenger-rights_covid_EN.pdf, p13 
770  SWD ….(2023), page …., Table Error! Main Document Only.: Airline ticket payment flows – to be insert 
once MOVE colleagues have a stable version 
771 Based on evidence provided by IATA and estimates in the context of the impact assessment support study (based 
on  evidence  gathered  by  a  group  of  5  airlines,  which  shows  that  approximately  36%  of  all  passengers  book  via 
intermediary ticket vendors).  
772 Comparing the information provided by air carriers on the share of tickets sold via intermediary ticket vendors 
and the information provided by IATA on the amount (in euros) of ticket flows in ticket, it has been assumed that 
the share of tickets sold via intermediary ticket vendors is more or less proportional to the share of tickets sold (in 
paid  amounts,  as  provided  by  IATA).  The  share  of  tickets  sold  via  intermediary  ticket  vendors  is  considered 
proportional to the share of passengers booking via intermediary ticket vendors. 
773 Given the lack of clarity on the share of tickets, it has been assumed, using a conservative approach, that between 
25% and 75% of ticket flows may fall within the scope of the Passenger Rights Regulation. The mid-point of this 
range has been considered, i.e., 3%. In addition, it has been considered that 3% of ticket flows are under the Package 
Travel Directive. 
774 European Court of Auditors, Special Report 15/2021: Air passenger rights during the COVID-19 pandemic: Key 
rights 
efforts, 
https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR21_15/SR_passenger-rights_covid_EN.pdf, p13 
775 According to Eurostat, in EU-27, there was a total of 1146,44 million flights in 2019, 277 million flights in 2020 
and 374 million flights in 2021.  
Based on Eurostat for 2014, 2017, 2020, 2021, interpolated values for 2015, 2016, 2018, 2019, 2022, 2023 and on 
firm level data (ORBIS) as well as on the European Commission 2023 Spring Economic Forecast, it resulted that the 
total expenditure for package trips was EUR 110.709 million in 2019, EUR 27.627 million in 2020, EUR 35.879 
million in 2021, EUR 76.673 million in 2022 and EUR 110.709 million in 2023, the same level of 2019. 
Based on Eurostat for 2014, 2017, 2020, 2021, interpolated values for 2015, 2016, 2018, 2019, 2022, 2023 and on 
firm level data (ORBIS) as well as on the European Commission 2023 Spring Economic Forecast, it resulted that the 
average package price in EU-27, for trips within the EU and to the rest of the world, was of EUR 1.202 million in 
2017, EUR 1.239 million in 2020, EUR 1.274 million in 2021, EUR 1.383 million in 2022 and EUR 1.475 million 
in 2023. 
776 An estimation of 4.029.660 cancelled packages during March – May 2020. 

Commission 

protected 

despite 

not 

40 

 
 
By December 2020, thousands of travellers had not yet received a refund in money for cancelled 
holidays, according to Bureau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs (BEUC).777,778,779 

Therefore, the problems faced by travellers in recovering prepayments caused loss in consumer 
welfare, including by impeding travellers to dispose freely of the prepaid amount, and personal 
detriment (e.g., time loss, hassle and other psychological detriment).  

For organisers, refund rights triggered by Article 12 proved burdensome. Organisers had, at least 
‘to a moderate extent’, to take out loans to cover the costs of refunds to travellers.780 In several, 
but  not  all  Member  States,  there  were  aid  schemes  for  package  organisers  and  other  travel 
companies.781 Since the number of bookings also collapsed, companies were unable to generate 
new sources of revenue to execute refunds, which had an impact on their liquidity.782 At the same 
time, if service providers became insolvent in the meanwhile, organisers might not receive refunds 
at all.  

Article 22 of the PTD783 refers to a right of redress of organisers against third parties. However, 
this provision does not specify that service providers are obliged to make a refund to organisers 
within a given period where a service or a package is cancelled.  

The losses experienced by organisers during the COVID-19 period (2020 and 2021 combined) 
could be estimated at 15 billion EUR based on the macro-estimate of total reduction in value.784 
However, the loss continued after the immediate COVID-19 years and could arrive at up to 25 
billion EUR until the end of 2023. Nevertheless, in order to arrive at a net loss figure, state support 
measures and lower operating costs (e.g., fuel not used) would need to be deducted. Based on a 
rough gap analysis, support measures could have cushioned up to 40% of immediate crisis losses 
suffered by organisers. 

Several Member States adopted temporary rules deviating from the PTD, 15 of them giving 
package organisers the possibility to significantly extend the periods for reimbursements or make 
vouchers  mandatory  for  travellers.  In  July  2020,  the  Commission  opened  infringement 

increase 

777  BEUC (‘Bureau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs’) is the umbrella group for 45 independent consumer 
organisations from 31 countries. BEUC represents the national consumer organisations to the EU institutions and defend 
the interests of European consumers. 
778 BEUC’s Evaluation of the Member States Implementation of the EU Commission Recommendation on ‘vouchers’ 
of  14.12.2020,  https://www.beuc.eu/publications/travel-voucher-chaos-continues-several-eu-countries-and-travel-
industry-still-flouting/html  
779 ‘No less than half of European households lost money as a result of the crisis’ during the pandemic. Furthermore, 
there  was  ‘tremendous 
to  BEUC 
in  consumer  complaints  about 
https://www.beuc.eu/sites/default/files/publications/beuc-x-2020-030_position_on_travelers_rights_in_the_covid-
19_context.pdf, p 1, incl. footnote 1 
780 N respondents of targeted survey – consumers (Q9) = 22. 38% To a large extent, To a moderate extent 19%. To 
be noted that 43% of respondents replied that they did not know whether organisers had to take out loans to cover 
the costs of refunds to travellers. 
781 See Appendix IX. The package travel during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
782 Ibidem.  
783 Article 22 PTD reads as follows: ‘In cases where an organiser or, in accordance with the second subparagraph of 
Article  13(1)  or  Article  20,  a  retailer  pays  compensation,  grants  price  reduction  or  meets  the  other  obligations 
incumbent on him under this Directive, Member States shall ensure that the organiser or retailer has the right to seek 
redress  from  any  third  parties  which  contributed  to  the  event  triggering  compensation,  price  reduction  or  other 
obligations.’ 
784 Based on data provided by Eurostat and on the European Commission 2023 Spring Economic Forecast  

issues’,  according 

travel 

41 

 
 
proceedings  against  11  Member  States.785  The  infringement  proceedings  were  closed  after  the 
relevant  Member  States  repealed  the  legislation  deviating  from  the  PTD  or  after  the  relevant 
measures  had  expired.  On  8  June  2023,  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union  (CJEU) 
confirmed  the  Commission’s  interpretation  in  the  one  remaining  infringement  case  and  in  a 
preliminary ruling.786 The CJEU confirmed that the PTD aims at full harmonisation787 and that the 
term ‘refund’ in the PTD implies a refund consisting in an amount of money which travellers can 
dispose  of  freely  and  does  not  include  the  idea  of  a  voucher.788  The  CJEU  concluded  that  the 
Member  States  were  not  allowed  to  adopt  national  legislation  releasing  organisers  temporarily 
from the obligation to reimburse prepayments to travellers within 14 days of the termination of 
the contract.  

Overall, these national measures and the infringement cases demonstrate that the rules on refunds 
of prepayments of the PTD were often not respected during COVID-19. This is also confirmed by 
the ECA report of 29 June 2021.789  

Termination  of  the  contract  under  Article  12(2)  gave  rise  to  numerous  disputes  between 
businesses790  and  travellers.791  The  main  causes  of  the  disputes  were:  -  different  interpretations 
regarding the justification for the termination of the contract under Article 12(2) corroborated with 
Article 3(12), - the variety of travel warnings/advice issued by the Member States, - difficulties in 
contacting the organiser/retailer.792,793   

In response to these problems, consumer organisations called for more clarity on the appropriate 
time for cancellation of the contract due to ‘unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’ as well 
as on the relevance, evidence, and legal value of official travel warnings.794  

efforts, 

785  See  Commission’s  press  communications  of  2  July  and  30  October  2020  (under  point  5  –  Justice): 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/INF_20_1212 
and 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_20_1687   
786  Case  C-407/21,  ECLI:EU:C:2023:449,  CURIA  -  List  of  results  (europa.eu)  and  Case  C-540/21, 
ECLI:EU:C:2023:450, CURIA - List of results (europa.eu)   
787 Case C-407/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:449, paragraph 59, Case C-540/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:450, paragraph 23.  
788  Case  C-407/21,  ECLI:EU:C:2023:449,  paragraphs  30  and  33  and  Case  C-540/21,  ECLI:EU:C:2023:450, 
paragraph 69  
789 Special Report 15/2021: Air passenger rights during the COVID-19 pandemic: Key rights not protected despite 
Commission 
https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR21_15/SR_passenger-
rights_covid_EN.pdf  
790 Targeted survey - Business associations (Q12): when asked whether, on the justification for terminating a package 
travel contract since COVID-19 pandemic, they observed the scenario in which ‘the parties did not agree on whether 
the  situation  qualified  as  ‘unavoidable  and  extraordinary  circumstances’  or  whether  it  significantly  affected  the 
package in question’, 55% (12 of 20) respondents replied that this was the case ‘to a large extent’.  
791  Targeted  survey  -  Consumer  organisations  (Q6):  when  asked  whether,  on  the  justification  for  terminating  a 
package travel contract since COVID-19 pandemic, they observed the scenario in which ‘the parties did not agree on 
whether the situation qualified as ‘unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’ or whether it significantly affected 
the package in question’, 83% (10 of 12) respondents from consumer organisations pointed out that the scenario was 
observed ‘to a large extent’. 
792  Public  consultation  (Q35):  31%  (18  of  58)  of  EU  citizens  indicated  that  the  organiser/retailer  accepted  the 
cancellation only where there was a travel warning advising against the trip; 38% (22 of 58) indicated that it was 
difficult to contact/communicate with the organiser/retailer as the organiser/retailer did not reply to e-mails or phone 
calls or the office was closed; 52% (30 of 58) pointed to the great disparity of the official travel advice and health-
related decisions and their rapid change in my country, the destination country or transit countries 
793 Aspects related to official travel warnings and different interpretation issues of Article 12(2) and Article 3(12) are 
further addressed in Appendix IX. Package travel during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
794 Consumer organisations targeted survey, free text replies to Q. 7 – Open question, n = 10. 

42 

 
 
Table 1. 

Main scenarios detected by national authorities on refund rights due to ‘unavoidable and extraordinary 
circumstances’ under Article 12 of the current PTD 

Scenarios 

Extent 

Before 
COVID-19 

Since 
COVID-19 

To a large extent 
To a moderate extent 
To a small extent 

The parties did not agree on whether the situation 
qualified as ‘unavoidable and extraordinary 
circumstances’ or whether it significantly affected the 
package in question  
Refunds of pre-payments were not provided within 14 
days. 

Justification of a termination fee  

To a large extent 
To a moderate extent 
To a small extent 
To a large extent 
To a moderate extent 
To a small extent 
To a large extent 
To a moderate extent 
To a small extent 
Source: ICF targeted survey – NCAs (regulatory and enforcement) (Q1795).  

The amount of the termination fee 

7% 
11% 
56% 

11% 
11% 
56% 
7% 
22% 
37% 
11% 
22% 
37% 

42% 
27% 
15% 

74% 
11% 
4% 
27% 
27% 
15% 
27% 
19% 
23% 

b) Vouchers  
There are currently no specific rules on the use of vouchers in the Directive.  For organisers, a 
rapid temporary solution to the difficulties posed by COVID-19 was to issue vouchers instead of 
reimbursing  travellers.  Businesses  and  national  authorities  (regulatory  and  enforcement) 
confirmed that vouchers were rarely used before COVID-19 and frequently used since its outbreak 
(see Table 2 below).  

Table 2 Frequency with which package organisers used vouchers as a refund in case of termination of a 

package travel contract before its start, in case of ‘unavoidable and extraordinary 
circumstances’ under Article 12 of the current PTD.  

Frequency  Business 

NCAs (regulatory and enforcement) 

Before COVID-
19 

Since the outbreak of 
COVID-19 

Before COVID-
19 

Since the outbreak of 
COVID-19  

Frequently  20% 
44% 
Rarely  
Never  
12% 
Source: ICF targeted survey – business (Q16)796, and NCAs (regulatory and enforcement (Q5).797 

100% 
0% 
0% 

72% 
4% 
0% 

0% 
38% 
10% 

Even if vouchers were frequently used during COVID-19, businesses acknowledged that travellers 
were explicitly informed that they were not obliged to accept vouchers only to a small extent and, 
when informed, travellers accepted vouchers to a moderate extent.798 Travellers stated that they 

795 Targeted survey – NCAs (regulatory and enforcement) (Q1) = 28. From this number the indicated percentages of 
the table have been calculated.  
796 N respondents of targeted survey  – businesses (Q16) = 25. From this number the indicated percentages of the 
table have been calculated.  
797 N respondents of targeted survey – NCAs (regulatory and enforcement) (Q5) = 24. From this number the indicated 
percentages of the table have been calculated 
798 Targeted survey – businesses (Q15) = 22. Travellers were explicitly informed that they were not legally obliged 
to accept a voucher: 32% to a small extent, 23% to a moderate extent, 23% to a large extent. Travellers accepted 
vouchers that were not compulsory under national provisions: 55% to a moderate extent, 27% to a large extent, 0% 
to a small extent 

43 

 
 
were ‘rarely’ explicitly informed that they were not legally obliged to accept a voucher (see Table 
3 below).  

Table 3 Main scenarios reported by consumers relating to voucher and refund rights due to ‘unavoidable 

and extraordinary circumstances’ under Article 12 of the current PTD 

Scenarios 

Extent 

Period 

Travellers were explicitly informed that they were not 
legally obliged to accept a voucher   

Travellers accepted vouchers that were not compulsory 
under national provisions, even if they knew they were 
not legally obliged to accept them   
Source: ICF targeted survey – consumer (Q9).799  

Often 
Occasionally 
Rarely 

Often 
Occasionally 
Rarely 

Before COVID-
19 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 

During 
COVID-19 
0% 
18% 
82% 

8% 
25% 
33% 

58% 
33% 
8% 

According to 66% of EU citizens, 83% of public authorities and 76% of consumer organisations,  
the PTD should specify that organisers may issue vouchers instead of a refund within 14 days, 
provided that a) travellers agree and b) there is a guarantee that travellers will receive their money 
back if the voucher is not used within its validity period, and c) that vouchers have to be protected 
against the insolvency of the issuer. 50% of companies and business associations agreed with this 
statement, while 47% disagreed.800, 801 

c) Problems with the reimbursement of pre-payments alongside the different actors in the value 
chain  
As already mentioned, the organiser of a package is liable for the performance of the contract, 
including for refunds, irrespective of whether retailers are involved or whether those services are 
to be performed by the organiser or by any travel service providers. However, in some Member 
States, retailers are also responsible. Furthermore, under the PTD, travellers have the possibility 
to contact the organiser via the retailer, the latter being obliged to facilitate the communication 
between the traveller and the organiser. 802  

The PTD establishes clear legal responsibilities for organisers and retailers on their information 
obligations towards travellers and on performance of the contract, including on refunds. However, 
circumvention of these rules or practical issues may appear in practice.   

The dysfunctionalities in the business-to-business (B2B) relationships proved to have a negative 
impact on travellers, triggering two main problems regarding refunds of pre-payments: (i) referral 
of travellers from organisers to retailers and vice-versa, making it very difficult for travellers to 

799 N respondents of targeted survey – consumers (Q9) = 12. From this number the indicated percentages of the table 
have been calculated.  
800 Public consultation (Q12): 66% (44 out of 67) of EU citizens, 83% (19 out of 23) of public authorities, and 76% 
(16 out of 21) of consumer organisations. 50% (182 out of 367) of business respondents (aggregated companies and 
business associations) agreed with this statement, while 47% (172 out of 367) them disagreed.  
801 Interview conducted by ICF: a Norwegian consumer organisation explained that  vouchers may not represent a 
good solution, especially concerning their expiration date, as consumers may decide not to book another trip within 
that set timeframe.  
802 See EQ1, sub-section Organisers’ liability for the performance of the contract. 

44 

 
 
 
   
 
obtain their rights and (ii) delay in reimbursing travellers due to the difficulties that organisers 
faced in recovering the pre-payments from service providers, e.g., airlines and hotels.803   

Most  businesses  pointed  out  that  they  would  welcome  a  new  EU  rule  that  requires  service 
providers  to  reimburse  organisers  where  the  cancellation  is  justified  under  the  PTD,  within  a 
specific time-limit,804 shorter than 14 days.805  

EQ6.  How  effective  has  the  liability  for  booking  errors  introduced  in  Article  21  been  in 
practice? 

The  evaluation  findings  do  not  allow  for  a  conclusive  assessment  of  the  effectiveness  of  the 
liability of booking errors introduced in Article 21. Consulted stakeholders were overall not able 
to  indicate  neither  the  relevance  of  Article  21  in  practice,  nor  to  gather  sufficient  evaluative 
evidence in this respect.806 The paucity of available data on the liability for booking errors laid 
down by Article 21 may also derive from the fact that the entry into force of the PTD (July 2018) 
is still too recent to allow stakeholders to gather sufficient information.  

4.1.2. EFFICIENCY 

The analysis of efficiency covers administrative and adjustments costs, assessing the benefit to 
cost  ratio that various stakeholder groups  encountered in  relation  to  the  implementation  of the 
PTD. Moreover, the analysis explores the potential for simplification and burden reduction.  

During the consultation, costs and burden for stakeholders deriving from the PTD were identified. 
These  include  difficulties  in  understanding,  applying  and  enforcing  certain  concepts  of  the 
Directive, e.g.,  LTAs,  limited awareness  of certain  rights  and/or difficult  implementation,  e.g., 
cancellation rights. However, the comparison between the situation emerging from the 2013 IA 
and the current situation, shows that the 2015 PTD has brought benefits to all stakeholders. Many 
stakeholders consider that these benefits have been achieved at a reasonable cost. Nevertheless, 
the analysis also shows that there is room for improvement and simplification, in order to improve 
the cost benefit ratio and make the PTD more efficient. 

EQ7. What are the costs and the benefits (monetary and non-monetary) of the PTD for the 
different stakeholders involved (Member States authorities, businesses, consumers)?  

The costs for public administrations (estimated at EUR 305.400 for the period 2018-2022) include 
one-off costs to transpose the Directive, train the staff, purchase equipment, costs with personnel 
and  recurring  costs  for  enforcement  activities.  During  the  same  period,  the  costs  for  traders 
(organisers, retailers, facilitators of LTAs) include one-off costs (adaptation of systems, training 
of staff) and recurrent costs related to implementation of the requirements on pre-contractual and 
contractual  information,  liability  for  the  performance  of  the  contract,  assistance  offered  to 
travellers in difficulty and insolvency protection. However, a quantitative estimation of the costs 
was not possible given the lack of data. 

803 See Appendix IX. The package travel during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
804 Targeted survey – businesses (Q22): 65% (15 out of 23) of the respondents. 
805 Targeted survey – businesses (Q23): 60% (9 out of 15) of the respondents. 
806  Nevertheless,  available  evidence  points  to  the  fact  that  Article  21  has  been  largely  contributing  to  the  PTD’s 
achievement of its stated objectives. At least according to the majority NCAs (regulatory and enforcement bodies) 
surveyed as part of the evaluation Targeted survey – NCAs (regulatory and enforcement) (Q21): 76% (19 out of 26) 
selected ‘positively’, and 8% (2 out of 26) ‘very positively’.  

45 

 
 
 
 
 
The  qualitative  benefits  of  the  Directive  relate  to  the  improved  cooperation  between  national 
competent  authorities,  better  assistance  to  travellers  and  businesses.  Also,  the  PTD  improved 
harmonisation,  enhanced  transparency  and  strengthened  legal  certainty  for  both  travellers  and 
traders.  Benefits  to  businesses  arise  from  further  harmonisation  of  the  rules  and  reduction  of 
fragmentation of the internal market. Travellers benefit from more rights, such as termination of 
the package before its start, as well as from improved security for refunds and repatriation in the 
event of the insolvency of organisers.  

Member State Authorities 

Regulatory, including administrative costs 
The main costs categories identified by national competent authorities are related to: enforcement, 
transposition, staff training, equipment purchase and other costs. According to national authorities, 
among the measures which were most costly and burdensome to monitor and enforce, were the 
new stricter rules on insolvency protection.807 Enforcement and monitoring costs in relation to the 
PTD may include costs associated with internal legal procedures and are generally considered to 
be within the day-to-day operative tasks of the relevant public authorities. Additional enforcement 
costs  can  include  monitoring  and  reporting  of  compliance  as  well  as  information  campaigns, 
training programs etc.  

The following table summarises the median data on costs based on the information provided.  

Table 4 Average808 recurring and one-off costs for national authorities  

Cost categories 

Type of cost  Costs for 

Recurring 
Enforcement  
One-off 
Transposition 
Staff training 
One-off 
Equipment purchase  One-off 
One-off  
Other costs 

enforcement 
authorities 
116.000 EUR 
97.000 EUR 
27.000 EUR 
34.000 EUR 
25.000 EUR 

Costs for insolvency 
protection authorities 

NA 
5.500 EUR 
925 EUR 
NA 
NA809 

Apart from equipment purchase, personnel costs are the main element in the remaining category 
(here  labelled  as  “other  costs”)  Under  the  category  of  other  costs,  regulatory  and  enforcement 
bodies monetised the times employees spent with guidance to consumers, internal consultation, 
explanation of the norms, EU-requests, contact point costs. 

Benefits 
Enforcement national authorities identified improved collaboration between them and other public 
authorities  as  well  as  improved  assistance  to  travellers.  Some  national  authorities  with 
responsibilities on insolvency protection pointed  out  that cooperation between Central  Contact 
Points needed to be improved. 

807 Targeted survey – national competent authorities (regulatory and enforcement), Q25 open question = 15.  
808 Data sourced from the targeted surveys reflecting median average of the reported amounts. ICF study, section 3, 
sub-section 3.6.3.2 
809 Costs of EUR 300 million were indicated by an authority, however those costs do not seem representative for all 
national authorities and therefore have not been included in the table.  

46 

 
 
 
In  terms  of  the  internal  market,  national  authorities  considered  that  the  PTD  improved 
harmonisation,  enhanced  transparency  and  strengthened  legal  certainty  for  both  travellers  and 
traders in cross-border transactions.810    

National  authorities  also  reported  some  improvement  due  to  enhanced  legal  clarity  and  in  the 
ability to support travellers and assist businesses (see Figure 3 below).  

Source: ICF, targeted survey, national authorities (regulatory and enforcement).811 
Most national authorities agreed that the benefits of the PTD for the authorities and for the society 
overall have been achieved at a reasonable cost, as well as that, overall, the costs caused by the 
Directive are justified and proportionate to the benefits (see the Figure 4 below).  

810 Targeted survey – businesses (Q56): 16 out of 22. Benefits to businesses also arise from further harmonisation of 
the rules and reduction of fragmentation of the internal market. ICF study, section 3, sub-section 3.6.3.2 
811 NCAs Regulatory and Enforcement survey, Q. 26 –N = 24, 69% (11 out of 24) of respondents. 

47 

 
 
 
Source: ICF, based on answers received to the NCAs Regulatory and Enforcement targeted survey. 812 

Businesses 

Costs of PTD compliance, including administrative burden 
In response to some of the key problems faced by businesses as identified in the 2013 IA,813 the 
2015 PTD introduced standard information forms to be provided to travellers. At the same time, 
the obligation for traders to  inform  consumers about  their rights  was, on the one hand, further 
extended,814 and, on the other hand, limited by specifying that the list is exhaustive and by requiring 
only  general  information  in  relation  to  specific  aspects,  e.g.,  information  on  passport  and  visa 
requirements.815 Most of businesses consider that information requirements are burdensome to 
a moderate or low extent.816,817 Some business associations noted the complexity of the standard 
information forms and of the contract.  

Other  cost  categories  related  to  the  implementation  of  the  PTD  included  liability  for  the 
performance of the package, including compensation for improper performance and alternative 
arrangements. Most of the businesses indicated that these requirements caused moderate or high 

812  NCAs  Regulatory  and  Enforcement  survey,  Q28  –  N  =  23.  To  add  F4F  opinion,  PTD  expert  group, position 
papers. 
813 See Section 2.2 Points of comparison. 
814 See Section 2.1 Intervention Logic and Appendix VI. The presentation of the Directive 
815 Article 5(f) plus Recitals 27 and 28 
816  Targeted  survey  –  businesses  (Q48)  =  16.  44%  (7  of 16)  indicated  that  information requirements  determined 
moderate costs, 31% (5 of 16) low costs and 25% (4 of 16) high costs. 
817 During interviews with business associations conducted by ICF, in terms of information costs, businesses and 
associations responding to the targeted survey identified a cost per package of 9.2 EUR. Although it was noted that 
information provision is part of doing business and its costs are often considered to be insignificant compared to the 
costs for insolvency protection and costs associated with liability for the performance of the package. 

48 

 
 
 
costs.818,819 In terms of costs related to assistance to travellers, the PTD determined moderate costs 
for businesses,820 estimated at EUR 65.2 per package on average.821 

Businesses indicated that the measures on insolvency protection range from a high to a moderate 
cost  or  burden.822  Currently  the  conditions  of  insolvency  protection  including  its  costs,  vary 
significantly between Member States. The minimum insurance contributions are sometimes linked 
to percentage of turnover or a fixed amount, which can range between the Member States from 
EUR  2  500  to  EUR  250  000  annually.823  Some  EU  countries  have  put  in  place  insolvency 
protection  funds,  while  others  rely  on  insurance  policies,  bank  guarantees  etc.,  and  there  are 
various  combinations  of  these  elements.  Reported  insurance  costs  for  businesses  to  cover 
insolvency  protection,  as  percentage  of  annual  turnover  are  0.1%  to  1.1%  in  Italy,  0.023%  in 
Belgium, 0.06% to 0.26% in France.824,825,826  

Businesses also indicated that costs were incurred from hiring of new staff (29%), training of staff 
(79%) and purchase of IT equipment (57%)827 although exact figures were not provided.828  

Benefits  
73%  businesses  indicated  that  the  PTD  has  provided  benefits  to  companies.829  Benefits  to 
businesses also arise from further harmonisation of the rules and reduction of fragmentation of the 
internal market. Also, the PTD enhanced transparency and strengthened legal certainty for both 
travellers  and  traders  in  cross-border  transactions.830  Some  national  authorities  also  voiced  the 
view that the PTD has simplified legal obligations for travel agencies.  

818 Targeted survey – businesses (Q48) = 14. 57% (8 of 14) high costs, 29% (4 of 14) moderate costs, 14% (2 of 14) 
low costs. 
819 During interviews with business associations conducted by ICF corroborated with the reply to the targeted survey 
Q49,  only  one  stakeholder  quantified  the  costs  for  liability  of  the  performance  of  the  package  including 
compensations for improper performance and identified a 25 EUR per package cost for businesses.  
820 Targeted survey – businesses (Q48) = 15. 40% (6 of 15) moderate costs, 33% (5 of 15) low costs, 27% (4 of 15) 
high costs.  
821 Targeted survey – businesses (Q52) = 5, including businesses associations.  
822 Targeted survey – businesses (Q48) = 14. 50% (7 of 14) high costs, 43% (6 of 14) moderate costs, 7% (1 of 14) 
low costs.  
823 ICF study, section 3, sub-section 3.6.3.2 and Appendix 6 
824 Sourced from interviews with business association. ICF study, section 3, sub-section 3.6.3.2.   
825 While not being able to provide specific figures, one leading business association interviewed noted that many of 
its members have faced rising insurance costs for coverage of insolvency protection. Sourced from interview with 
business association. ICF study, section 3, sub-section 3.6.3.2.    
826 Some businesses state that the volume of their insurance costs as a percentage of turnover is determined by the 
structure of the insurance market in their home country, such as in Belgium, where only two companies offer this 
kind of insurance. Sourced from interview with businesses. ICF study, section 3, sub-section 3.6.3.2.    
827 Targeted survey business, Q53: 14. Cost factors arising from the hiring of new staff (29%, 4 out of 14 respondents) 
training of staff (79%, 11 out of 14 respondents), purchase of IT equipment (57%, 8 out of 14 respondents). According 
to  data  from  an  interview,  a  company  estimated  EUR  9.000  per  year  in  staff  training  to  comply  with  rules  on 
insurance. ICF study, section 3, sub-section 3.6.3.2 
828 One leading operator in Belgium stated that costs to achieve and maintain compliance, though difficult to specify 
in detail, are non-negligible. This included staff costs related to ensuring a correct classification of a product as an 
LTA or a package, additional administration costs related to separate purchase orders for services sold under LTAs, 
as well as approximately €9 000 per year in staff training to comply with rules on insurance. However, this operator 
stated  that  these  costs  were  not  noticeably  financially  damaging  to  their  business  and  stressed  that  they  were 
necessary. Sourced from interview with businesses. 
829 Targeted survey – businesses (Q56): 16 out of 22. Benefits to businesses also arise from further harmonisation of 
the rules and reduction of fragmentation of the internal market. ICF study, section 3, sub-section 3.6.3.2 
830  In  addition,  the  2013  Impact  Assessment  showed  that  due  to  the  fact  that  the  1990  Directive  was  based  on 
minimum  harmonisation,  legal  discrepancies  appeared  between  Member  States.  This  fragmentation  generated 

49 

 
 
 
Travellers 

Costs 
Although  the  PTD  benefited  travellers,  contributing  to  a  reduction  of  their  detriment,  some 
challenges remain.  

The 2021 application report states that 11% of all package travellers experienced problems, and 
40%  of  these  –  that  is  4.4%  of  all  package  travellers  experienced  financial  loss.  There  is  no 
information on the per person costs arising from these losses. However, according to Eurostat,831 
in 2017, Europeans booked over a 110 000 package travel trips, which made up 9% of all trips. If 
we project this to the number of travellers832 we find that, in 2017, in the then EU-28 there were 
around 24 million people833 using package holidays and around 960 000 people (4.4%) may have 
been affected by financial losses.834  

Travellers were also affected by the 2019 insolvency of Thomas Cook.835 Nevertheless, in general, 
rules  on  insolvency  of  the  organiser  proved  to  have  worked  well  for  packages,  while  being  a 
challenge to implement them in the case of LTAs.836  

On  standard  information  forms  for  packages,  most  consumer  organisations  indicated  that 
traders often do not provide them and that where packages are sold via a retailer, travellers do not 
understand the role of organiser and retailer regarding payments and refunds. Also, it may be 
that some traders circumvent the rules on packages.837 Accordingly, consumer detriment could be 
further  reduced  by  clarifications  of  certain  provisions  and  simplification  of  the  standard 
information forms so that travellers fully understand their rights.  

On standard information forms for LTAs, travellers do not understand their rights in relation 
to LTAs.838 Therefore, it is uncertain to what extent the forms contributed to limiting consumer 
detriment.  

The 2013 IA found problems linked to the termination of the contact, e.g., lack of consumers’ 
right  to  terminate  the  contract  before  the  start  of  the  package,  this  contributing  to  consumers’ 

additional compliance costs for businesses wishing to trade cross-border. ‘Businesses that trade across borders have 
to pay about € 375 to research information about the Member State in which they want to get active. They also have 
to bear recurring costs of adapting their information materials to the requirements of different Member States. Taking 
into account the average number of EU companies which make cross-border sales, this translates into about additional 
€2 per package out of which €1.7 is a one-off cost. The overall baseline administrative burden associated with cross-
border trade has been estimated at € 26 million (out of which €21m are one-off costs for researching Member States' 
differing national legal requirements and legal advice; €5.1m are recurring annual administrative costs)’. See Impact 
Assessment SWD (2013) 263 final, p. 17. 
831 Eurostat: number of trips by type of organisation  
832 In 2017, in the then EU-28, Eurostat recorded 267,572,859 travellers. 
833 Based on Eurostat: Participation in tourism for personal purposes and calculating with 9% of the travellers in 2017 
- 267,572,859 people. 
834 While data on the financial losses for package travel are not available, a Study on the current level of protection 
of air passenger rights in the EU (2020) provides some basis for a comparative estimation. The study focused on 
airline  insolvencies  in  the  period  2011  -  2019  and  showed  that  5.6  million  passengers  were  impacted  by  airline 
insolvencies, and it estimated that on average these passengers have incurred €431 in costs. A large majority of these 
(83% or €357) could not be recovered under the relevant regulatory mechanisms. https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-
detail/-/publication/f03df002-335c-11ea-ba6e-01aa75ed71a1 
835 COM(2021) 90 final. Also, section 4.1.1, EQ3 
836 Section 4.1.1, EQ3 and EQ4 
837 See section 4.1.1, EQ1 
838 See section 4.1.1, EQ1 

50 

 
 
 
detriment.  The  2015  PTD  introduced  rules  in  this  respect.839  The  rules  on  contract  termination 
raised disputes between travellers and organisers, in particular during COVID-19. However, this 
cannot  detract  from  the  overall  benefit  for  travellers  created  by  this  cancellation  right. 
Furthermore, it is not possible for legislation to include specific rules for each kind of situation 
that might occur in practice. 

Also, travellers are not always sufficiently aware of their rights particularly when it comes to the 
termination of the package travel contracts.840 Low awareness can contribute to unnecessary costs 
for travellers who are not  able to  use remedies for bankruptcies of organisers, cancellations or 
other challenges encountered during their tips.841  

Benefits 
Overall, 91% consumer organisations indicated that the PTD has provided benefits for travellers.842 
The PTD provides protection against insolvency, lays down cancellation and refund rights, the 
right  to  pre-contractual  and  contractual  information,  and  rules  on  the  liability  for  the 
performance of the contract.   

A Commission behavioural study concludes that the PTD “helps reduce damages to consumers by 
about €430 million a year […] and form[s] the backbone of consumer protection and rights across 
the  European  Member  States  ensuring  transparency  and  high  levels  of  consumer  protection. 
Namely,  the  Travel  Package  Directive  ensures  better  protection  of  consumer  rights  on  all 
platforms, in line with the evolving digital travel market.”843 National authorities stated that to a 
great extent or to some extent, the PTD has been effective in ensuring traveller protection.844  

Potential for simplification and improvement  
In relation to the potential for simplification and improvement of the PTD to reduce the costs and 
detriment  to  stakeholders,  all  stakeholders  emphasised  the  need  for  simplified  and  clearer 
definitions, particularly regarding LTAs, and clearer rules on termination rights in the event of 
‘unavoidable  and  extraordinary  circumstances’,  including  on  refunds.845  In  addition,  consumer 
organisations emphasised the need for rules on limitation of pre-payments. Both businesses and 
consumer organisations called for rules on insolvency protection measures for transport providers, 
in particular for air carriers.846   

EQ8. What factors influenced the efficiency of reaching the objectives set by the PTD? 

As it emerges from EQ7, in particular the lack of clarity of certain provisions (e.g., LTAs, ‘click-
through packages’) as well as differences in national approaches towards insolvency and refunds 

839 See section 4.1.1, EQ5 
840 COM(2021) 90 final, p. 2 
841 In addition, whenever travel plans are overturned due to no fault of the consumer, consumers must also become 
knowledgeable about their rights. This introduces administrative burdens as consumers need to undertake research, 
engage  with organisers over the phone or via email, submit documentation and in case of no resolution seek out 
support from competent authorities, claim agencies or lawyers which will require further resources. See European 
Commission (2020), Study on the current level of protection of air passenger rights in the EU.  
842 Targeted survey – consumer organisations (Q41) = 10 of 11 
843 European Commission, Behavioural study […], p 10. Behavioural study on advertising and marketing practices 
in travel booking websites and apps - Publications Office of the EU (europa.eu). 
844 Targeted survey for NCAs (regulatory and enforcement): Q20 (N=27): to a great extent (10 out of 27), to a small 
extent (14 out of 27), to a small extent (3 out of 27).    
845 Business targeted survey, Q55 open question, N. = 15,.. 
846 Consumer organisations targeted survey, Q39, open question n. = 4,. Positions papers of BEUC, ECTA, eutt.  

51 

 
 
 
following the cancellation of contracts during COVID-19 were contributing factors to a somewhat 
less efficient PTD.  

4.1.3. COHERENCE 

EQ9.  Internal  coherence:  Are  there  any  discrepancies  and/or  inconsistencies/lack  of 
coherence between the provisions of the PTD?  

 The evaluation found the PTD to be overall coherent internally, except some specific issues, i.e., 
the lack of clarity in key elements of the definition of LTA, the different roles of the companies 
involved in a travel package, insolvency protection of refund claims and vouchers issued by an 
organiser before its insolvency.  

Regarding external coherence, overall, air passengers’ rights legislation is generally coherent with 
the PTD excepting provisions on the termination of the contract, on the concept of ‘(unavoidable 
and) extraordinary circumstances’ and on vouchers. 

Definitions 
Most  definitions  in  the  PTD  did  not  raise  any  internal  coherence  issues.  However,  in  a  few 
instances, a potential lack of coherence between different provisions was identified. 

As explained in EQ1, the lack of clarity in key elements of the definition of LTA types (a) and (b) 
as well as unclear delimitation between packages and LTAs result in a lack of practical application 
of LTAs and, consequently, in travellers not being protected against the insolvency of the trader 
or in being deprived of the rights for packages. 

During COVID-19, travellers found it difficult to understand the different roles of the companies 
involved in a travel package.847 This question was also covered by suggestion 1 in the opinion of 
the Fit for Future Platform.848 However, it is not clear to what extent this issue is related to the 
definitions of the Directive, the specificities of national law in relation to the role of retailers or 
whether the information forms are not clear enough in this respect. 

 Insolvency protection 
Regarding  the  insolvency  protection,  Article  17(1)  and  (2)  should  be  read  in  conjunction  with 
Recitals  39  and  40.  However,  divergent  practices  in  the  Member  States  were  revealed  as  to 
whether refund claims and vouchers issued by an organiser before its insolvency are covered by 
insolvency protection.849  

Other provisions 
The pre-contractual information that the organiser or retailer must provide to the traveller, as per 
Article 5, does not include a reference to the right to terminate the contract without termination 
fee  in  accordance  with  Article  12(2).  This  right  appears  in  the  information  form  for  packages 
(Appendix I of the PTD) only after the traveller has clicked on a link. Furthermore, the fact that 
this right is not mentioned in Article 5, whereas the right to cancel the contract subject to a fee is 
mentioned there, could potentially be confusing for travellers and result in a lack of awareness of 
this right.   

847 See Section 4.1.1, EQ1 section Liability of organisers. 
848 Suggestion 1:  Better  information  on  the  identity  of  the  contractual  partners  and  on  contact  details  and  better 
enforcement  of  rules,  https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-making-process/evaluating-and-improving-existing-
laws/refit-making-eu-law-simpler-less-costly-and-future-proof/fit-future-platform-f4f/adopted-opinions_en 
849 See EQ3 

52 

 
 
EQ10. External coherence: To what extent is the PTD coherent with wider EU policies, such 
as  rules  on  free  movement  of  services,  fundamental  rights,  consumer  rights,  mutual 
recognition,  competition, 
industrial  policy,  transport  and  mobility,  environmental 
protection (sustainability), health and trade, digital policies? 

Several EU-level legislative instruments touch upon aspects that are covered by the PTD or are 
relevant for provisions in the PTD. 

Consumer protection instruments  
The  PTD  is  overall  coherent  with  the  legislation  in  the  field  of  consumer  protection.  Certain 
synergies exist with Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices 
in  the  internal  market,850  Directive  2006/114  on  misleading  and  comparative  advertising,851 
Directive  2011/83/EU  on  consumer  rights.  Regarding  alternative  dispute  resolution  and 
representative actions, the PTD is complementary to Directive 2013/11/EU on alternative dispute 
resolution for consumer disputes,852 Regulation (EU) No 524/2013 on online dispute resolution for 
consumer disputes853 and Directive (EU) 2020/1828 on representative actions for the protection of 
the collective interests of consumers.854  

Passenger rights instruments  
The objectives and scopes of all passenger rights instruments are complementary to the PTD. The 
instruments  generally  aim  at  establishing  a  minimum  level  of  passengers’  rights,  thereby 
contributing  to  maintaining  a  high  level  of  consumer  protection.  Several  consumer  protection 
aspects overlap with passengers’ rights (e.g., the right to information, refunds and compensation, 
assistance).  However,  legislation  on  passengers’  rights  explicitly  regulates  that  the  PTD  is 
applicable instead of passenger right legislation, thus preventing (to a certain extent) conflicting 
rules or legal uncertainty.855 Conversely, the PTD aims to achieve coherence with the passenger 
rights  regulations  in  different  respects,  e.g.,  references  to  passenger  rights  in  Article  13(7)  on 
accommodation to be provided in case of a delayed return journey and in Article 14(5), which 
provides for the parallel application of compensation under the two instruments preventing over-
compensation.  

850 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-
to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 
97/7/EC,  98/27/EC  and  2002/65/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  and  Regulation  (EC)  No 
2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the  Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’) (OJ L 149, 
11.6.2005, p. 22–39). 
851  Directive  2006/114/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  12  December  2006  concerning 
misleading and comparative advertising (OJ L 376, 27.12.2006, p. 21–27). 
852  Directive  2013/11/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and of the  Council  of  21  May  2013 on  alternative  dispute 
resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Directive 
on consumer ADR) (OJ L 165, 18.6.2013, p. 63). 
853 Regulation (EU) No 524/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on online dispute 
resolution  for  consumer  disputes  and  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  2006/2004  and  Directive  2009/22/EC 
(Regulation on consumer ODR) (OJ L 165, 18.6.2013, p. 1). 
854 Directive (EU) 2020/1828 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2020 on representative 
actions for the protection of the  collective interests of consumers and repealing Directive 2009/22/EC (OJ L 409, 
4.12.2020, p. 1–27).  
855 E.g., Regulation 1177/2010 on the rights of passengers when travelling by sea and inland waterway, recital 20; 
Regulation 1107/2006 on the rights of disabled persons and persons with reduced mobility when travelling by air, 
recital 3; Regulation 261/2004 on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of 
cancellation or long delay of flights, Articles 3(6) and 8(2); Regulation 181/2011 on the rights of passengers in bus 
and coach transport, Article 2(8).  

53 

 
 
Compared to the PTD, provisions on information requirements in passengers’ rights legislation 
are more tailored to  the offered transportation services, and thereby, are complementary to  the 
PTD.  

Overall,  air  passengers’  rights  legislation  is  generally  coherent  with  the  PTD  except  for:  (a) 
termination of the contract, (b) concept of ‘(unavoidable and) extraordinary circumstances’ and 
(c) provisions of vouchers. 

(a) Under Article 12(1) and (2), the traveller has the right to terminate the package travel contract 
before  its  performance  either  against  a  fee  or  free  of  charge  in  the  event  of  ‘unavoidable  and 
extraordinary circumstances’. In the latter case, the organiser must reimburse the traveller all pre-
payments within 14 days (Article 12(4)).856 Under Regulation (EC) No 261/2004, even in the event 
of ‘unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’, the passenger does not have the right to cancel 
the transport contract (unless the passenger bought a – more expensive - refundable ticket). This 
leads  to  situations  where  the  package  travel  contract  is  cancelled  due  to  ‘unavoidable  and 
extraordinary  circumstances’  but  the  air  carrier  refuses  to  reimburse  the  organiser  because  the 
flight  is  operated.  Problems  emerged  during  COVID-19  where  under  Article  12(2)  and  (4), 
travellers should have been reimbursed by organisers, which, however, were not reimbursed by 
air carriers in such situations.   

(b) While the PTD defines the concept of ‘unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’, adding 
criteria justifying termination of the contract by the traveller,857 Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 does 
not define the concept as such, although an air carrier has to reimburse passengers the price of air 
ticket but is exempted from paying compensation if ‘it can prove that the cancellation is caused 
by extraordinary circumstances which could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures 
had been taken.’858 Still, this wording demonstrates the parallel nature of this concept in the two 
instruments,  in  particular  since  under  Article  14(3),  the  organiser  is  not  obliged  to  pay 
compensation  if  it  can  invoke  unavoidable  and  extraordinary  circumstances.  On  numerous 
occasions,  the  CJEU  has  been  requested  by  national  courts  to  clarify  the  provisions  related  to 
‘extraordinary circumstances’ under Regulation 261/2004 and hence a rich jurisprudence exists in 
this respect.859 Different interpretations of this concept under the PTD and Regulation (EC) No 
261/2004 could be problematic. However, it is not evident that there is actual incoherence between 
the two instruments in this respect. The main difference between the two instruments is the lack 
of  a  cancellation  right  for  passengers  under  Regulation  (EC)  No  261/2004,  which  can  have  a 
negative impact also on organisers and travellers, as explained in point (a). 

(c) Regarding vouchers, while Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 provides for the possibility of air 
carriers to use vouchers for compensation ‘with the signed agreement of the passenger’, the PTD 
has no such provision. Therefore, there is a potential gap in the PTD in this respect.860,861 

Another  apparent  inconsistency  refers  to  the  different  deadlines  for  reimbursement  of  pre-
payments  in  the  event  of  cancellation  of  a  package  or  flight.  Under  the  PTD,  organisers  must 

the  most  relevant  Court  of  Justice  of 

856 See section 4.1.1., EQ5  
857 Articles 3(12) and 12(2).  
858 Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 
859  Summary  of 
https://transport.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-03/2022-summary-of-the-most-relevant-cjeu-judgements.pdf, p12 
860 The need for rules on vouchers under the PTD has been a recurrent point discussed by stakeholders in several 
fora. E.g., PTD study, Minutes of the Second Workshop, 7th December 2022; Meeting of the PTD expert group of 
24  March  2022  and  of  8  November  2022;  The  Package  Travel  Directive:  BEUC’s  position  on  how  to  regain 
consumers’ trust in the tourism sector, 10 December 2021. 
861 See also Section 4.1.1., EQ5 

the  European  Union  (CJEU) 

judgements, 

54 

 
 
refund  travellers  within  14  days,  whereas  reimbursement  must  take  place  within  7  days  under 
Regulation (EC) No 261/2004.862 Nevertheless, the different deadlines do not seem to affect the 
implementation neither of the PTD nor of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004.  

Insolvency legislation 
The  PTD  and  Regulation  (EU)  2015/848  on  insolvency  proceedings863  aim  at  the  proper 
functioning  of  the  internal  market  but  have  a  different  purpose.864  In  that  respect,  no  potential 
conflict has been identified.  

Regarding passengers’ rights legislation, insolvency protection under the PTD is in some cases 
complementary  to  it,  however  the  lack  of  insolvency  protection  for  carriers,  in  particular  for 
airlines,  increases  the  financial  burden  on  organisers.865  The  lack  of  protection  against  the 
insolvency  of  airlines  in  the  EU  legislation  has  been  raised  as  a  key  coherence  issue  by 
representatives of consumers and travel package organisers on many occasions.866 

State aid instruments, health related instruments and EU trade commitments  
The research did not find any major coherence issues in these fields. Overall, national state aid 
measures and EU State aid rules, as well as health related instruments may complement the PTD. 
EU  trade  commitments  under  WTO  General  Agreement  on  Trade  in  Services867  are  also 
compatible with the PTD and vice versa and have not led to any issues.  

Environmental protection legislation 
The  PTD  is  silent  about  information  on  environmental  aspects  of  travel  packages  (e.g., 
environmental footprint), which could  constitute a potential gap in  light  of the EU’s policy on 
climate protection, but not a matter of incoherence with other legislation.868   

4.2. HOW DID THE EU INTERVENTION MAKE A DIFFERENCE AND TO WHOM? 

EU added value 

The  following  section  presents  the  main  benefits  of  the  PTD  and  explains  to  what  extent  the 
positive  effects  could  not  have  been  achieved  at  national  level.  It  is  partially  based  on  desk 
research,  but  mainly  on  consultations,  including  surveys,  a  public  consultation,  interviews  and 
stakeholder workshops. 

862 Article 12(4) PTD and Article 8(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 
863  Regulation  (EU)  2015/848  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  20  May  2015  on  insolvency 
proceedings (recast) (OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 19–72). 
864  While  the  PTD  aims  to  ensure  that  travellers  recover  pre-payments  made  for  unperformed  services  as  a 
consequence  of  the  organiser's  insolvency,  Regulation  2015/848  aims  to  ensure  the  efficient  administration 
of insolvency  proceedings involving  an  individual  or  business  with  business  activities  or  financial  interests  in 
a Member State other than the one in which they are usually based. 
865 See section 4.1, EQ3 
866 E.g., PTD study, Minutes of the First Workshop, 26th October 2022; Meeting of the PTD expert group of 24 March 
2022.  
867 
members_tourism_commitments.pdf (wto.org) 
868 82% of respondents in the public consultation do not consider the need to include rules on environmental impacts 
in the PTD. Public consultation Q31: 391 of 477 respondents. However, 8 out of 20 consumer organisations supported 
the idea of additional rules on environmental impact. 

of  WTO  Members  with 

Specific  Commitments 

Schedules 

Services, 

Tourism 

on 

55 

 
 
EQ11. What is the added value resulting from the application of the PTD, compared to what 
could reasonably have been expected from Member States acting at national and/or regional 
levels? What would be the most likely consequences of withdrawing the PTD?  

There is clear added value for EU action in package travel legislation above and beyond what 
can be achieved at the level of the Member States. Although there is room for improvement in 
specific respects, overall, it provides clear rules and equal treatment of travellers across the EU, 
while for businesses it creates, largely, a level playing field, which would not have been the case 
without the PTD.  

The added value of the Directive remains considerable despite specific aspects that still require 
some  improvement.  This  is  mostly  due  to  the  changes  in  market  triggered  by  e.g.,  the 
developments of technologies and major crises.       

The clear added value is reflected in the views of stakeholders. 72% of the NCAs, 73% of business 
associations and 91% of consumer organisations stated that regulating package travel at EU-level 
benefits  traders  and  travellers  to  a  great  extent”  compared  to  regulating  it  separately  –  and 
differently - in each EU country.869,870,871 

The PTD provides a high degree of protection for consumers in all Member States, which would 
not  have  been  achieved  with  the  Member  States  acting  individually.  Several  consumer 
organisations  stated  that  the  PTD  ‘has  added  value’,  emphasising  the  need  for  travellers  to  be 
protected and the way that this has been reached at EU-level by the PTD.872 National authorities 
considered the PTD has been effective in ensuring consumer protection and consumers would not 
be sufficiently protected in the package travel market if the PTD were withdrawn.873 BEUC has 
also expressed consumers’ desire for protection, noting that they were often willing to pay a higher 
price to guarantee it.874 It follows that there is clear awareness amongst relevant stakeholders that 
withdrawing the PTD would be detrimental to consumer protection.875  

The value of the PTD for ensuring consumer protection was also confirmed during COVID-19. 
At the start of the crisis, several Member States temporarily amended their national legislation 
transposing the PTD to make vouchers mandatory for consumers or to postpone their right to a 
monetary refund beyond the prescribed 14 days.876 The Commission called for compliance with 
the PTD through its Recommendation on vouchers877 and aimed to guarantee the right of travellers 
to  a  monetary  refund  in  relation  to  pandemic-related  cancellations.  BEUC  stated  that  that  the 

869 Targeted survey for NCAs (regulatory and enforcement) (Q30) N = 29, 72% (21 out of 29) ‘to a great  extent’, 
28% (8 out of 29) ‘to a small extent’, 0% (0 out of 29) ‘not at all’.  
870 Targeted survey business associations (Q56) N = 22, 73% (16 out of 22) ‘to a great extent’, 23% (5 out of 22) ‘to 
a small extent’, 5% (1 out of 22) ‘not at all’. 
871 Targeted survey consumer organisations (Q41) N = 11, 91%(10 out of 11) ‘to a great extent’, 9% (1 out of 11) ‘to 
a small extent’, 0% (0 out of 11) ‘not at all’ 
872 Scoping interview with consumer organisations – PTD Study, (2022).  
873 Targeted survey for NCAs (regulatory and enforcement), Q20 N=27: to a great extent (10 out of 27), to a some 
extent (14 out of 27), to a small extent (3 out of 27).    
874 BEUC (2020) BEUC’S Position on traveller’s rights during the COVID-19 crisis, p. 3. 
875 Targeted survey for NCAs (regulatory and enforcement): Q31 (N=28): Agree (20 out of 28), Tend to agree (7 out 
of 28), Disagree (1 out of 28).  
876 European Court of Auditors, (2021), Special Report: Air passenger rights during the COVID-19 pandemic: Key 
rights not protected despite Commission efforts.  
877 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2020/648 of 13 May 2020 on vouchers offered to passengers and travellers 
as an alternative to reimbursement for cancelled package travel and transport services in the context of the COVID-
19 pandemic https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32020H0648  

56 

 
 
Recommendation was “strongly welcomed” by it and its members. In July and October 2020, the 
Commission  also  launched  infringement  procedures  against  11  Member  States  for  adopting 
COVID-19 related measures contravening the PTD.878  

Withdrawing the Directive would lead to regulatory gaps and divergence of standards. Some 
industry  stakeholders  argued  that  any  change  –  even  removing  the  Directive  –  would  lead  to 
adaptation costs simply because every change implies new costs. 

For pre-contractual information, a withdrawal of the Directive could have detrimental effects 
for industry and consumers, leading additional costs and more effort for businesses, in particular 
in cross-border sales, as well as legal uncertainty and lack of clarity for consumers. Removal of 
the organiser’s liability for the performance of the contract and for refunds could add confusion 
for  consumers  and  decrease  their  possibilities  in  defending  their  rights.  The  provisions  on 
termination of the contract aim at ensuring the same high level of protection for traveller and a 
level playing field for traders. Different rules at EU level on insolvency protection would lead to 
increased costs for industry and could negatively impact the protection of consumers.  

Therefore, without the Directive, uncertainty and legal confusion, as well as costs, would most 
likely increase.  

Withdrawing the Directive could lead to an increasingly fragmented approach to the regulation 
of market developments, with associated differences in levels of consumer protection. Reduced 
harmonisation of the provisions covered by the Directive would adversely impact cross-border 
sales. Greater differences between Member States would heighten the difficulties for organisers 
to  comply  with  the  varying  regulations  and  possibly  imply  higher  costs.  It  would  furthermore 
distort competition due to a reduction of the current level-playing field. 

EQ12. To what extent do the issues addressed by the PTD continue to require action at EU 
level?  

Some issues addressed by the PTD continue to require further action at EU level, i.e., travellers 
recover of pre-payments for cancelled packages in the event of a major crisis; better protection of 
pre-payments,  including  of  refunds  and  vouchers,  against  the  insolvency  of  the  organiser; 
clarifications of certain issues, e.g., on the termination of the contract in the event of ‘unavoidable 
and extraordinary circumstances’, on the concept of LTAs.   

Travellers face difficulties in recovering pre-payments for cancelled packages in the event of a 
major crisis, e.g., COVID-19  
The  right  of  travellers  to  be  reimbursed  within  14  days  should  be  respected  regardless  of  the 
circumstances.  Reimbursement  of  pre-payments  is  an  area  needing  improvement  as  noted  in 
particular by consumer organisations, with BEUC recommending that the Commission “consider 
amending the Directive to ensure that all European consumers benefit from a broader scope of 
financial protection of pre-payments, including for cancelled travel in extraordinary circumstances 
and  for  respective  vouchers.”879  The  protection  of  pre-payments  was  addressed  on  multiple 
occasions during the consultation process, including various workshops, where different policy 
options were discussed, such as limitation of pre-payments, explicit rules on business-to business 
refund rights or voluntary vouchers.880 Many national authorities believe that the protection of pre-

878  The  EU  Member  States  concerned  were  Bulgaria,  Czechia,  Cyprus,  Croatia,  France,  Greece,  Italy,  Lithuania, 
Poland, Portugal and Slovakia. 
879 BEUC (2020) BEUC’s Position on traveller’s rights during the COVID-19 crisis, page 6. 
880 See EQ5 

57 

 
 
 
payments should be increased, specifying that this can be best addressed through amendments to 
the PTD, while some believe it can be best addressed through enforcement, and a few believe that 
protection of pre-payments do not require further action.881  

Better protection of pre-payments against the insolvency of organisers 
The evaluation found that, despite the strengthening of insolvency protection in many Member 
States, there are still differences between the national systems and there is at least a perception 
that the protection may not be solid enough in some Member States. One specific problem is that 
Member States have divergent approaches regarding the protection of pre-payments in the event 
a  package  organiser  goes  bankrupt  after  issuing  a  voucher  or  delaying  the  reimbursement  of 
consumers following a cancellation.882 

Further  EU  action  seems  necessary,  involving  the  clarification  of  Article  17(1),  some  further 
specification  of  the  means  to  ensure  effective  insolvency  protection,  and,  where  necessary, 
enforcement activities by the Commission in relation to the Member States.  

In  addition,  BEUC,  along  with  several  business  associations,  have  called  for  “creat[ing]  a 
protection scheme for airline insolvencies”, covering the refund, financial protection and potential 
repatriation  of  passengers.883,884 For  instance,  in  Denmark,  an  insolvency  protection  scheme  for 
airlines has been set up (after an agreement from relevant parties, including consumer groups), 
which  is  highly  appreciated  by  all  stakeholders.885  Further  EU  action  regarding  insolvency 
protection,  possibly  following  this  example  at  Member  State-level,  could  be  a  key  factor  in 
increasing travellers’ protection and achieving a more balanced sharing of risks in the package 
travel supply chain. Extending the scope of insolvency protection to cover a wider range of actors 
in  the travel market, specifically to  actors occupying  a significant  percentage of the price of a 
package, would likely be of benefit to consumers paying for airline tickets in advance, in the event 
of the airline’s insolvency. However, this question is subject to revision of the passenger rights 
regulations.  

Legal clarity and practical implementation of the Directive   
Some provisions of the PTD are not sufficiently clear, contain gaps or are too complex, thereby 
contributing to uneven levels of consumer protection in practice and distortions of competition. 
This concerns, for instance, the definition of and provisions on LTAs or certain details regarding 
cancellation  rights.  Furthermore,  targeted  improvements  in  the  information  to  be  provided  to 
travellers, e.g., on the role of different parties (organisers, retailers, and service providers) could 
be beneficial. This could be addressed, at least partially, through simplification and clarification, 
which would enhance the enforceability of the PTD. 

RELEVANCE 

This section aims to assess the extent to which the objectives of the PTD correspond to current 
needs, in particular in times of crisis.  

881 Targeted survey for NCAs (regulatory and enforcement): Q32, N=26: 20 of 28 Agree, 7 of 28 Tend to agree, 1 of 
28 Disagree.  
882 See EQ3 
883 BEUC (2020) BEUC’S Position on traveller’s rights during the COVID-19 crisis, page  
884 Minutes of the Workshop 1 of the PTD Study with business and consumer organisations (2022). 
885 Minutes of the Workshop 1 of the PTD Study with business and consumer organisations (2022). 

58 

 
 
 
 
4.3.  Is the intervention still relevant? 

EQ13.  To what extent do the initial objectives of the PTD still correspond to the current 
needs?  

The evaluation found that the objectives of the Directive were in line with the expected needs 
of consumers and traders at the time the Directive was introduced and remain relevant for the 
current needs. 

Considering the share of packages in the tourism market in the EU,886 the PTD still responds to the 
need for a regulatory framework to ensure the functioning of the internal market in the package 
travel sector and the protection of consumer rights. However, some areas - such as legal clarity of 
some provisions, reimbursement of pre-payments for cancelled packages in the event of a major 
crisis,  protection  of  pre-payments  –  may  require  targeted  actions  to  take  into  account  market 
developments, practical experience in the application of the PTD and added pressures caused by 
crises.   

Objective 1: Proper functioning of the internal market 
The rapid evolution of the package travel market, influenced in particular by the widespread use 
of  the  internet,  changed  the  way  in  which  consumers  arrange  and  book  the  services  for  their 
holidays.887 The evaluation indicate that the lack of clarity of some of the definitions in the PTD, 
e.g.,  the  new  concept  of  LTAs,  led  some  traders  to  change  their  business  models/booking 
processes to avoid being considered as package organisers. There are strong indications that there 
is  a  grey  zone,  which  traders  are  likely  to  use  to  different  extents.  This  hampered  the  proper 
functioning  of  the  package  travel  market.  Furthermore,  in  the  public  consultation,  57%  of 
respondents considered that the PTD is not well adapted to market trends.888  

On insolvency protection, 889 the introduction of the mutual recognition mechanism contributed to 
addressing challenges with barriers to cross-border trade linked to divergent insolvency protection 
schemes. While, overall, the insolvency protection systems are stronger than they were in 2013, 
the  fact  that  the  PTD  still  leaves  room  for  the  Member  States  to  organise  their  insolvency 
protection  system,  could  indicate  that  the  objective  of  a  more  comparable  level  of  insolvency 
protection across the EU has not yet been fully met. 

Objective 2: Achievement of a high and as uniform as possible level of consumer protection 
The PTD introduced a number of elements to address key problems faced by travellers before its 
revision.890 To address those issues, the PTD introduced enhanced information requirements, strict 
rules on liability, stronger cancellation rights, as well as assistance to travellers in the event of 
unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances. The PTD also extended the definition of package 
and, on the other hand, introduced the concept of LTAs. Although, the PTD has brought significant 

886 See sections 2.2 and 3 
887 European Commission, (2013), Impact Assessment, SWD(2013) 263 final. 
888 Public consultation Q3: 257 out of 468 respondents. N=468. 
889 The 2013 IA also highlighted that under the 1990 PTD there were no explicit requirements for the actual methods 
of ensuring insolvency protection and as a consequence, diverging methods of insolvency protection in the Member 
States emerged. This, together with the lack of explicit rules on mutual recognition of insolvency protection, led to a 
situation where some retailers or organisers trading cross-border had to pay several times for insolvency protection. 
SWD(2013) 263final, p.17. 
890 According to the 2013 IA, consumer detriment could be divided in two categories. One category related to specific 
problems stemming from unclear and outdated rules resulting in uncertainty in relation to prices, liability, right to 
compensation and cumbersome access to justice. The second category is related to the detriment suffered by travellers 
purchasing a ‘combined’ travel arrangement. Ibidem p.20. 

59 

 
 
benefits in terms of consumer protection, the uncertainty in relation to some provisions as well as 
certain gaps in the PTD could cause remaining consumer detriment, in particular in times of crisis.  

EQ14. To what extent are key concepts of the PTD still fit for purpose?  

The evaluation found that the concept of LTAs as currently defined in the PTD may no longer be 
fit for purpose.  

In particular, the current gradual approach with fully protected packages at one end and stand-
alone services (not regulated by the PTD) at the other and two types of LTAs in the middle has 
turned out to be overly complex and too difficult to apply in practice.  

Indeed, certain concepts appear to be too narrow or necessary elements are difficult to establish in 
practice, as in the case of LTAs.891 Regarding type (b) LTAs, it appears to be difficult to identify 
whether the conditions have been met. At the same time, type (a) LTAs are difficult to distinguish 
from certain packages in practice.  

The difficulty for travellers to understand the nature of their travel contract (package, LTA, stand-
alone  services)  prevents  them  from  understanding  the  extent  of  their  rights  and  degree  of 
protection.892  Most  stakeholders  consider  that  the  provisions  on  LTAs  have  not  improved  the 
protection for travellers.893 Considering the apparent ease with which the rules of packages can be 
avoided  or  circumvented  through  the  rules  on  LTAs,  while  LTAs  are  difficult  to  identify  in 
practice and therefore to enforce, this element of the PTD appears to be unfit for purpose.894 

In  addition,  the  difficult  implementation  and  enforcement  of  insolvency  protection  for  LTAs 
hindered the effectiveness of PTD’s provisions on insolvency protection ‘to a very great extent’.895   

5.  WHAT ARE THE LESSONS LEARNED AND THE CONCLUSIONS? 

Lessons learned 

The evaluation found that the objectives of the Directive were in line with the expected needs 
of travellers and package travel organisers/retailers at the time when the Directive was adopted 
and  remain  relevant.  However,  developments  in  the  market  (mostly  due  to  the  increasing 
digitalisation  and  changes  in  business  practices),  practical  experience  in  the  application  of  the 
Directive  and  problems  caused  by  the  COVID-19  crisis,  reveal  that  some  consumer  needs 
(protection and refunds of pre-payments, complexity of products, presentation of information) are 
not fully addressed by the Directive as it stands and require further action. 

The challenges found by the evaluation can be grouped in three main problems hampering the 
effectiveness of the PTD.  

The first problem relates to challenges with refunds for cancelled travel packages in particular 
in  a  major  crisis.  There  are  four  drivers  for  this  problem.  The  first  driver  is  the  practice  of 
prepayments. The second is the lack of liquidity of organisers when faced with many concurrent 
requests for a  refund. Since organisers use the prepayments received from travellers to  prepay 

891 COM(2021) 90 final, p. 6 
892 BEUC (2021), The Package Travel Directive: BEUC’s Position on how to regain consumers’ trust in the tourism 
sector, p.25. 
893 Public consultation Q26: 67% of respondents (269 out of 403). N=403. 
894 See section 4.1.1., EQ1  
895 See section4.1.1., EQ3 

60 

 
 
certain services included in a package, they depend on refunds from service providers in order to 
reimburse  travellers  if  the  package  is  cancelled.  As  experienced  during  the  pandemic,  many 
organisers did not receive (timely) refunds from service providers (e.g., airlines and hotels) and 
so were unable to reimburse travellers within the mandatory period. The PTD does not contain 
business-to-business  rules  on  refunds  in  the  event  of  cancellations.  In  addition,  there  is  legal 
uncertainty about the use of vouchers. In fact, during the pandemic, following the cancellation of 
a package due to unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances, organisers often imposed vouchers 
on travellers instead of a refund, and the rights of travellers in relation to vouchers were unclear. 
Several  Member  States  even  adopted  temporary  legislation  allowing  organisers  to  impose 
vouchers on travellers or providing for the suspension of refund rights under the PTD, triggering 
infringement proceedings. In May 2020, the Commission adopted a recommendation on voluntary 
vouchers issued during the pandemic. The uptake in the Member States was mixed.   

The  second  identified  problem  relates  to  the  fact  that  prepayments  from  travellers  are  not 
sufficiently protected  against the insolvency of the  organiser.  The evaluation identifies three 
relevant drivers. There are divergent practices in the Member States as to whether vouchers as 
well as refund rights stemming from a cancellation which have not been settled before an organiser 
goes  bankrupt  are  protected  against  the  organiser’s  insolvency.  Furthermore,  significant 
differences remain between the national insolvency protection systems. Moreover, at least in some 
Member  States,  package  organisers  find  it  difficult  to  obtain  insolvency  protection,  especially 
during a crisis. This is, for instance, due to insufficient or expensive insurance solutions available 
in some markets. 

The third problem relates to difficulties in the implementation of the PTD. Several drivers were 
identified.  Certain  provisions  of  the  PTD  are  not  sufficiently  clear,  contain  gaps  or  are  too 
complex,  thereby  contributing  to  uneven  levels  of  consumer  protection  and  distortions  of 
competition. This concerns, for instance, the concept of ‘click-through packages’ and provisions 
on LTAs as well as the cover of refund claims and vouchers by insolvency protection and the 
rules on cancellations in the case of unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances. In addition, 
the role of different parties (organisers, retailers, and service providers), including in relation to 
refunds,  is  not  always  understood  by  travellers.  Finally,  the  standard  information  forms  are 
complex to use.  

Conclusions 

Provisions on reimbursement of pre-payments for packages cancelled due to unavoidable and 
extraordinary circumstances and, in particular, in the event of a major crisis and on the protection 
of pre-payments in the event of the insolvency of the organiser may need to be clarified or 
amended to ensure their effectiveness at all times, in particular in times of crisis, after assessing 
the impacts of possible amendments and there is scope for simplification and clarification. 

Regarding insolvency protection, it may be beneficial to add some details and clarifications so as 
to  enhance  the  effectiveness  of  the  current  regime,  while  maintaining  the  responsibility  of  the 
Member States for the details of the systems implemented at their level.  

Furthermore,  targeted  improvements  in  the  information  to  be  provided  to  travellers,  for 
instance, on the role of different parties (organisers, retailers, and service providers) including 
in relation to refunds, and clarification and simplification of the standard information forms, 
together  with  the  clarification  of  the  key  concepts  of  the  Directive,  could  be  beneficial.  Also, 
certain clarifications regarding cancellation rights may contribute to the achievement of a high 

61 

 
and  as  uniform  as  possible  level  of  traveller  protection  as  well  as  a  level  playing  field  for  the 
businesses operating in the travel market.   

Such  improvements  could  be  expected  to  enhance  the  application  and  enforceability  of  the 
Directive and could be expected to lead to better compliance by traders and fairer competition. 

62 

 
 
 
 
APPENDIX I:   PROCEDURAL INFORMATION 

SEE  ANNEX  1:  PROCEDURAL  INFORMATION  TO  THE  IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT 

APPENDIX II. METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL MODELS USED 

SEE ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL METHODS TO THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 

63 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX III. EVALUATION MATRIX  

N 

Research questions  

Sub-questions 

Indicators 

Sources 

I. Effectiveness 

1 

To  what  extent  do  the 
observed 
effects 
correspond  to  the  PTD 
objectives  and  which  are 
the  elements  that  have 
improve 
contributed 
protection 
consumer 
the  areas 
in 
including 
which were previously not 
explicitly  covered  by  the 
Directive? 

to 

in 

Are  there  gaps  or  uncertainty  in  the 
legislation,  as  possibly  demonstrated  by 
changes 
or 
business 
experiences from travellers/consumers that 
can  be  identified,  and  is  the  level  of 
harmonisation  now  appropriate  or  should 
further harmonisation be envisaged? 

practices 

 Do  travellers  understand  their  rights  in 
relation to LTAs? 

Are there typical cases in practice that may 
cause  confusion  regarding 
the  border 
between package and LTAs? 

Do  travellers  receive  clear  information 
regarding the package travel or the linked 
travel arrangements they are purchasing an 
on the rights and obligations of the parties? 
removed 
Have 

the  grey  areas  been 

64 

 Comparison  with  the  situation  prior  to  the 
adoption of the 2015 Directive, starting with 
2013,  when  the  Impact  Assessment  was 
finalised. 

Case  examples  of  whether  the  difference 
between package and LTA may be unclear.  

Stakeholders’  opinions  on  the  extent  to 
which the PTD has achieved its objective of 
ensuring a high level of consumer protection 
across the Union 

Stakeholders’  opinions  on  the  extent  to 
which  there  is  now  effective  protection  of 
consumers in the areas that were previously 
considered  grey  areas,  and  extent  to  which 
previously 
been 
reduced/removed 

areas 

have 

grey 

including 

  Report  on 

the 
Desk  research, 
Impact 
Assessment, 
accompanying  the  document  on 
package 
travel  and  assisted 
travel  arrangements,  amending 
Regulation  (EC) No 2006/2004l 
and  Directive  2011/83/EU  and 
repealing  Council  Directive 
(SWD/2013/0263 
90/314/EEC 
final), 
the 
the 
application  of  Directive  (EU) 
  (COM(2021)  90 
2015/2302 
final),  Report on the  provisions 
of  Directive  (EU)  2015/2302 
applying 
to  online  bookings 
made  at  different  points  of  sale 
(COM(2019) 270 final), Special 
-  Air 
report  No  15/2021 
the 
passenger  rights  during 
COVID-19 pandemic: Key rights 
despite 
not 

protected 

 
 
completely or are there possibly new grey 
areas (i.e. have they possibly shifted)? 

Member States’ national legal provisions in 
areas considered as grey areas 

Do travellers understand correctly the role 
of  different  parties 
the 
performance of the package travel contract 
(organiser, retailer, service provider)?  

involved 

in 

2 

How  has  the  still  growing 
role 
online 
of 
intermediaries (in a broad 
including 
sense, 
organisers) 
other 
novel  business  models 
affected  the  effectiveness 
of the PTD? 

and 

Do stakeholders see any gaps in the PTD?  

Are there any aspects / means / actors that 
render certain aspects of the Directive more 
or less effective than others and if there are, 
what lessons can be drawn from this? 

What  are,  if  any,  the  consequences  or 
effects  (either  positive  or  negative)  that 
were not originally planned? 

Is the PTD well adapted to market trends, 
including  the  constant  expansion  of  sales 
by  online  booking  and  of  bookings  on 
mobile devices? 

Have  the  business  models  of  operators 
changed since the PTD became applicable? 
Is there any data suggesting that traders or 
certain categories of traders have changed 
their  business  model  in  order  not  to  be 
considered as package organisers?  

65 

Evolution  in  the  online  intermediaries  and 
other  novel  business  models  in  the  travel 
market.  
Stakeholders’  opinions  on  the  extent  to 
which the PTD has achieved its objective of 
ensuring a high level of consumer protection 
across the Union 

Stakeholders’  opinions  on  the  extent  to 
which  there  is  now  effective  protection  of 
consumers in the areas that were previously 
considered  grey  areas,  and  extent  to  which 

efforts  of 

Commission 
the 
European Court of Auditors,   Fit 
for Future Platform Opinion,  
- transposition of the PTD in the 
MS,  
-stakeholders’ position papers. 

the  public 

to 

Contributions 
consultation. 
Targeted surveys. 
Interviews. 
Workshops. 

including 

the 
Desk  research 
Report  on  the  application  of 
2015/2302 
Directive 
(EU) 
final)  and  
(COM(2021)  90 
stakeholders’  position  papers, 
statistic data. 
Contributions 
consultation  
Targeted surveys. 
Interviews. 
Workshops. 

the  public 

to 

 
 
 
If yes, have the rules of the PTD influenced 
businesses to change their business model? 

previously 
reduced/removed 

grey 

areas 

have 

been 

 Estimates  on  number  of  insolvency  cases 
and  on  businesses  and  consumers  who 
resorted to insolvency protection, before and 
during the Covid-19 pandemic.  

Differences  in  the  standards  of  insolvency 
protection applied in the EU Member States. 

Stakeholders’  opinions  on  the  effectiveness 
of  the  PTD  rules  on  insolvency  protection 
insolvency  protection 
and 
systems based on those rules 

the  national 

Number/value of refunds given to travellers 

3 

on 

How effective are the PTD 
insolvency 
rules 
the 
and 
protection 
national 
insolvency 
protection  systems  based 
on those rules? 

in 

there  differences 

Are 
the  national 
insolvency systems set up by the Member 
States? Do these differences pose problems 
for  travellers  or  travel  businesses  or  lead 
businesses to organise this protection under 
less strict rules of some Member States? 

Have the national insolvency systems been 
effective 
insolvencies  of 
organisers, including of large organisers? 

in  case  of 

Have travellers face problems when asking 
for  reimbursement  of  payments  for  travel 
services that were not performed following 
the organiser’s insolvency? 

Has  the  guarantee  for  repatriations  been 
effective in practice? 

Is the continuation of packages referred to 
in  Article  17(1),  first  sub-paragraph,  third 
sentence  relevant  in  practice  and  to  what 
extent  is  it  the  preferred  solution  of 
travellers,  organisers  and 
insolvency 
protection bodies? 

66 

including 

the 
Desk  research, 
Impact 
Assessment, 
accompanying  the  document  on 
package 
travel  and  assisted 
travel  arrangements,  amending 
Regulation  (EC) No 2006/2004l 
and  Directive  2011/83/EU  and 
repealing  Council  Directive 
(SWD/2013/0263 
90/314/EEC 
final), 
the 
the 
application  of  Directive  (EU) 
2015/2302 
  (COM(2021)  90 
final),      Fit  for  Future  Platform 
Opinion,   
- transposition of the PTD in the 
MS, in  particular the provisions 
regarding 
insolvency 
the 
protection systems,  
-stakeholders’ position papers. 

  Report  on 

to 

the  public 

Contributions 
consultation. 
Targeted surveys. 
Interviews, in particular with the 
national  central  contract  points 
for insolvency protection.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Is  the  mutual  recognition  of  insolvency 
protection mechanism used in practice and 
is it effective?  

Are  there  gaps  in  the  current  scope  of 
protection  that  can  still  lead  to  material 
exposure of travellers in case of insolvency 
of organizers?   

Do  traders  understand  their  rights  on 
insolvency in relation to LTAs? 

 Do  travellers  understand  their  rights  on 
insolvency in relation to LTAs? 

travellers 

and 
receive 
Do 
repatriation in cases where a travel service 
was not performed because a facilitator of 
an LTA went bankrupt? 

refunds 

4 

Is there clarity for traders 
facilitating an LTA on the 
protection 
insolvency 
cover they have to obtain, 
and, for consumers, on the 
fact  that  they  are  entitled 
to  insolvency  protection, 
where 
conditions 
under  Art.  19  PTD  are 
satisfied?  

the 

Workshops. 

Traders facilitating LTAs who indicate they 
understand the provisions on the insolvency 
protection cover  

Views from insolvency protection bodies  on 
the extent to which traders  facilitating LTAs  
secure themselves against  insolvency  

including 

Desk  research, 
the 
Report  on  the  application  of 
2015/2302  
(EU) 
Directive 
(COM(2021)  90  final),    Fit  for 
Future Platform Opinion,   
-stakeholders’ position papers. 

to 

the  public 

Contributions 
consultation. 
Targeted surveys. 
Interviews, in particular with the 
national  central  contract  points 
for insolvency protection.  
Workshops. 

(particularly 

Stakeholders 
consumer 
organisations) views on the extent to which 
travellers are aware that they are entitled to 
insolvency protection under Art 19 PTD 

Estimate  on  number  of  travellers  who  are 
aware  that  they  are  entitled  to  insolvency 
protection under Art 19(1) PTD in relation to 
(a)  LTAs  in  general  and  (b)  in  relation  to 
specific LTAs they have book.  

Estimate on number of travellers  who have 
benefited  from  insolvency  protection  under 
Art. 19(1) PTD a) in relation to potential to 

67 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LTAs in general and b) in relation to actual 
insolvencies of traders facilitating LTAs 

Types of evidence most  frequently used by 
travellers  to  show  that  they  are  entitled  to 
insolvency protection 

travellers  regarding 
Problems  faced  by 
reimbursement of pre-payments in the event 
of contract termination  due to ‘unavoidable 
and extraordinary circumstances’, including 
during the Covid-19 pandemic. 

Average  time  for  reimbursement  (days) 
during  and  outside  of  a  major  crisis  ,  e.g. 
COVID-19. 

Stakeholders’ views on the extent to  which 
the  PTD  is  well  adapted  to  ensure  the 
effective and efficient reimbursement of pre-
payments even during a major crisis. 

5 

How  effective  is  the  PTD 
in  ensuring  effective  and 
efficient reimbursement of 
pre-payments 
under 
Article  12(2)  and  (4)  even 
in times of crisis? 

Are the provisions of Article 12(2) and (4) 
clear  for  traders,  travellers  and  national 
authorities? 

Did travellers face difficulties in recovering 
pre-payments  within  14  days  from  the 
termination  of 
to 
extraordinary 
‘unavoidable 
the 
circumstances’, 
COVID-19  pandemic? 
If  yes,  what 
problems did they face? 

the  contract  due 
and 
including  during 

Did traders face difficulties in reimbursing 
pre-payments  within  14  days  from  the 
termination  of 
to 
extraordinary 
‘unavoidable 
circumstances’, 
the 
COVID-19  pandemic? 
If  yes,  what 
problems did they face? 

the  contract  due 
and 
including  during 

68 

including 

the 
Desk  research, 
Impact 
Assessment, 
accompanying  the  document  on 
package 
travel  and  assisted 
travel  arrangements,  amending 
Regulation  (EC) No 2006/2004l 
and  Directive  2011/83/EU  and 
repealing  Council  Directive 
(SWD/2013/0263 
90/314/EEC 
final), 
the 
the 
application  of  Directive  (EU) 
  (COM(2021)  90 
2015/2302 
final),    Fit  for  Future  Platform 
Opinion,  
- transposition of the PTD in the 
MS,  
-stakeholders’ position papers. 

  Report  on 

the  public 

to 

Contributions 
consultation. 
Targeted surveys. 
Interviews. 
Workshops. 

 
 
 
 
6 

7 

How  effective  has 
the 
liability for booking errors 
introduced  in  Article  21 
PTD been in practice? 

To what extent did travellers experience a 
booking  error  as  a  result  of  a  technical 
defect in the booking system?  

Number / proportion of travellers who have 
experienced a booking error as a result of a 
technical defect in the booking system. 

In the event of a booking error caused by a 
technical  error in  the booking  system,  did 
affected travellers receive compensation? 

Number / proportion of such travellers who 
received compensation because of a booking 
error  caused  by  a  technical  error  in  the 
booking system. 

Case  examples  of  where  Art  21  has  been 
used in practice. 

the 

Stakeholders’  opinions  on  the  extent  to 
which 
liability  for  booking  errors 
introduced in Art 21 PTD remains relevant in 
practice 

Public consultation 
Consumer survey 
Targeted surveys 
Interviews 
Workshops 

are 

and 
costs 
What 
benefits 
(monetary  and 
non-monetary) of the PTD 
different 
the 
for 
involved 
stakeholders 
States 
(Member 
authorities, 
businesses, 
consumers)?  

To  what 
proportionate to the benefits? 

extent 

are 

these 

II. Efficiency 

costs 

Category 
of 
enforcement). 

cost 

(direct, 

indirect, 

or 

reduce 

Are  there  opportunities  to  simplify  the 
legislation 
unnecessary 
regulatory  costs  without  undermining  the 
intended objectives of the PTD (i.e. could 
similar effectiveness levels be achieved at 
lower costs)? 

Type of cost (one-off or recurring), and the 
timeframe  over  which  it  has  arisen  or  will 
arise. 

Estimates on number of stakeholders group 
affected, organised per group (e.g., national 
legislators, businesses, consumers). 

New  administrative  procedures  concluded 
for  ensuring  the  enforcement  of  the  PTD’s 

69 

Desk  research,  statistics  from 
Eurostat,  data 
in  marketing 
monitoring survey 
Public consultation 
Targeted surveys 
Interviews 
Workshops 
Cost-benefit analysis 
Multi-criteria analysis 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
provisions  and  for  monitoring  their  correct 
implementation. 

Category of benefit (direct, indirect) 

Type  of  benefit  (one-off  or  recurring),  and 
the  timeframe  over  which  the  benefit  is 
expected to arise or have arisen. 

Estimates on number of stakeholders group 
affected, organised per group (e.g., national 
legislators, businesses, consumers). 

Cost-benefit ratio between achieved benefits 
and spending. 

Proportion  of  stakeholders  who  agree  that 
the  costs  of  the  PTD  are  justified  and 
proportionate with the benefits 

Factors  that  influenced  the  efficiency  of 
reaching the objectives set by the PTD 

Targeted surveys 
Interviews 
Workshops 

III. Coherence 

Evidence from qualitative (legal) analysis – 
identification  of  provisions  that  conflict  or 
contradict. 

Desk research 
Public consultation 
Targeted surveys 
Interviews 
Workshops 

70 

8 

9 

What  factors  influenced 
the  efficiency  of  reaching 
the  objectives  set  by  the 
PTD? 

/  

/ 

Internal  coherence:  Are 
there  any  discrepancies 
and/or 
inconsistencies/ 
lack of coherence between 
the provisions of the PTD?  

 
 
 
Evidence from qualitative (legal) analysis – 
identification  of  provisions  that  may  give 
rise to legal uncertainty. 

Complementary issues spotted. 

Stakeholders  who  agree  that  the  provisions 
of the PTD are internally coherent. 

Stakeholders’ opinions on any discrepancies 
or inconsistencies between the provisions of 
the PTD. 

Evidence  from  analysis  of  the  elements  of 
the PTD which complement or overlap with 
other EU legislation with similar objectives. 

Desk research (legal analysis). 

10 

/ 

External  coherence:  To 
what  extent  is  the  PTD 
coherent  with  wider  EU 
policies,  such  as  rules  on 
free movement of services, 
fundamental 
rights, 
consumer  rights,  mutual 
recognition,  competition, 
industrial policy, 
transport  and  mobility, 
environmental  protection 
(sustainability), health and 
trade, digital policies? 

11 

What  is  the  added  value 
resulting 
the 
application  of  the  PTD, 
compared  to  what  could 

from 

To  what  extent  does  regulating  package 
travel  at  EU-level  benefit  traders  and 
travellers? 

Evidence from qualitative analysis. 

Proportion  of  stakeholders  who  agree  that 
the  PTD  has  provided  added  value  beyond 

Desk research 
Public consultation 
Targeted surveys 
Interviews 

 IV. EU added value 

71 

 
 
 
 
reasonably  have  been 
expected  from  Member 
States  acting  at  national 
levels? 
and/or  regional 
What  would  be  the  most 
likely 
consequences  of 
withdrawing the PTD? 

Does  the  PTD  provide  a  high  degree  of 
protection  for  consumers/travellers  in  all 
MS, which would have not been achieved 
acting 
with 
individually? 

the  Member 

States 

Would the withdrawal of the PTD lead to 
regulatory  gaps  and  divergences  of 
standards? 

To  what  extent  do  the 
issues  addressed  by  the 
PTD  continue  to  require 
action at EU level? 

Are there issues that require further action 
at EU level? 

what  could  have  been  achieved  unilaterally 
by the Member States, or through bi-lateral 
or  multi-lateral 
between 
countries  

agreements 

Workshops 

Proportion  of  stakeholders  who  agree  that 
the  PTD  has  provided  added  value  beyond 
what  could  have  been  achieved  through 
voluntary or other non-legislative action  

Examples  identified  through  consultation 
with  key  stakeholders  and  literature  review 
of  where  the  Directive  has  provided  added 
value  compared  to  what  could  have  been 
achieved  by  Member  States  acting  on  their 
own 

Evidence from qualitative analysis. 

Proportion  of  stakeholders  who  agree  that 
the issues addressed by the PTD continue to 
require action at EU level. 

Desk research 
Public consultation 
Targeted surveys 
Interviews 
Workshops 

To  what  extent  do  the 
initial  objectives  of  the 
PTD still correspond to the 
current needs? 

How  well  adapted  is  the  PTD  to  market 
trends,  including  in  particular  due  to  the 
constant  expansion  of  sales  by  online 
intermediaries  and  the  constant  expansion 
of bookings on mobile devices? 

Main market trends, including trends in the 
proportion  of  sales  made  by  online 
intermediaries, proportion of bookings made 
on mobile devices, etc. 

Desk research 
Public consultation 
Targeted surveys 
Interviews 
Workshops  

V. Relevance 

Current needs and comparison to needs at the 
time the Directive was adopted. 

72 

12 

13 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How  well  adapted  is  the  PTD  to  crisis 
situations  (taking  into account  the lessons 
learned from the Thomas Cook bankruptcy 
and the COVID-19 pandemic)? 

Timeline  of  changing  needs  since 
introduction 
implementation  of 
Directive. 

/ 

the 
the 

Stakeholders’  opinions  on  the  extent  to 
which the initial objectives of the PTD still 
correspond to the current needs. 

Stakeholders’  opinions  on  the  extent  to 
which  the  PTD  is  well  adapted  to  market 
trends, in particular to the expansion of sales 
by  online  intermediaries  and  the  expansion 
of bookings on mobile devices. 

Stakeholders’  opinions  on  the  performance 
of the PTD, including in time of crisis (e.g., 
during the Covid-19 pandemic and following 
the bankruptcy of Thomas Cook) 

14 

To  what  extent  are  key 
concepts of the PTD still fit 
for purpose?   

Is the concept of LTAs fit for purpose? 

 Evidence from qualitative analysis. 

Are the ‘click-through packages’ relevant in 
practice? 

Desk research 
Public consultation 
Targeted surveys 
Interviews 
Workshops 

73 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
APPENDIX IV. OVERVIEW OF BENEFITS AND COSTS  

74 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Overview of costs and benefits identified in the evaluation 

Citizens/Travellers 

Businesses 

Administrations896 

Quantitative  

Comment 

Quantitative  

Comment 

Quantitative 

Comment  

- 

- 

adjustment 

one-off 

Direct 
costs  

Costs description: 

Businesses 
also  identified 
additional  cost 
factors  arising 
from the hiring 
of  new  staff 
(29%,  4  out  of 
14 
respondents), 
the  training  of 
staff  (79%,  11 
out 
14 
of 
respondents) 
and 
necessary 
purchase  of  IT 
equipment 
(57%,  8  out  of 
14 
respondents).897  
figures 
Exact 

the 

75 

- EUR 97.000 
(transposition 
costs 
for 
national 
enforcement 
authorities) 

-  EUR  5.500 
(transposition 
costs 
for 
insolvency 
protection 
authorities)  

- EUR 27.000 
(staff training 
costs 
for 
national 
enforcement 
authorities) 

 
                        
 
 
 
were 
provided. 

not 

Enforcement costs:    recurrent 

- 

- 

- 

- 

EUR 
925 
(staff training 
for 
insolvency 
protection 
authorities) 

EUR  34.000 
(equipment 
purchase 
costs 
enforcement 
authorities) 

for 

EUR  25.000 
(personnel 
costs 
enforcement 
authorities 

for 

EUR 
116.000898 

-  

896 ICF study, section 3, sub-section 3.6.3.2. Data sourced from the targeted surveys reflecting median average of the reported amounts. 
897 Targeted survey – businesses (Q53). According to data from an interview, a company estimated EUR 9.000 per year in staff training to comply with rules on insurance. ICF study, 
section 3, sub-section 3.6.3.2 
898 Annually recurring cost per Member State 

76 

 
 
- 

- 

- 
requirements 

Information 

recurrent 

recurrent 

the 
-  Liability 
for 
the 
performance  of 
including 
package, 
compensation 
for 
improper  performance 
alternative 
and 
arrangements 

Assistance 

- 
travellers 

recurrent 

- 

to 

- 

- 

- 

EUR  9.2  per 
package 
on 
average899  

-  The  PTD  determined 
moderate 
the 
costs 
industry900 

for 

EUR  25  per 
package 
on 
average901 

- The PTD determined high or 
moderate 
the 
costs 
industry902 

for 

EUR  65.2  per 
package 
on 
average903 

-  The  PTD  determined 
moderate 
the 
costs 
industry904 

for 

899 Targeted survey – businesses (Q49) = 5, including businesses associations. ICF study, section 3, sub-section 3.6.3.2 
900 Targeted survey – businesses (Q48) = 16, including businesses associations. 44% (7 of 16) indicated that information requirements determined moderate costs, 31% (5 of 16) indicated 
low costs and 25% (4 of 16) high costs.  
       In addition, the 2013 Impact Assessment had already emphasised how the evolution in the package market had made provisions in the 1990 PTD outdated and unclear, hence bringing 
unnecessary and unjustified costs. See Impact Assessment SWD (2013) 263 final, p. 15. 
901 Sourced from interview with businesses: only one stakeholder quantified the costs for liability of the performance of the package including compensations for improper performance 
and identified a 25 EUR 
902 Targeted survey – businesses (Q48) = 14, including businesses associations. 57% (8 of 14) indicated that the liability for the performance of the package, including compensation for 
improper performance and alternative arrangements determined high costs, 29% (4 of 14) indicated moderate costs and 14% (2 of 14) low costs.  
903 Targeted survey – businesses (Q52) = 5, including businesses associations.  
904 Targeted survey – businesses (Q48) = 15, including businesses associations. 40% (6 of 15) indicated that assistance to travellers determined moderate costs, 33% (5 of 15) indicated 
low costs and 27% (4 of 15) high costs.  

77 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 

- 

- 
protection 

Insolvency 

recurrent 

- The PTD determined high or 
moderate 
the 
costs 
industry907 

for 

Costs 
can 
range  annually 
2.500 
from 
to 
EUR 
250.000 
EUR905 
between 
Member 
States906 

the 

Indirect costs  

One-off 

- 

- 

- 

- 

Benefits description: 

Direct benefits  

of 

91% 
consumer 
organisations 
in  the  targeted 
survey 
consider 
the 
PTD 

that 
current 
has 

terms  of 

In 
its  overall 
benefits,  73%  of  businesses 
responding  to  the  targeted 
survey consider that the PTD 
has  provided  benefits 
to 
companies.910 

- 

- 

- 

Improved 
collaboration, 
between  NCAs  and 
other 
public 
authorities  as  well  as 
improved  assistance 
to travellers. 

905 ICF study, section 3, sub-section 3.6.3.2 and Appendix 6 
906 According to data from interviews with business associations, reported insurance costs to businesses to cover insolvency protection, as percentage of annual turnover are 0.1% to 1.1% 
in Italy906, 0.023% in Belgium906, 0.06% to 0.26% in France. ICF study, section 3, sub-section 3.6.3.2 
907 Targeted survey – businesses (Q48) = 14, including businesses associations. 50% (7 of 14) indicated that insolvency determined high costs, 43%  (6 of 14) indicated moderate costs 
and 7% (1 of 14) low costs.  
910 Targeted survey – businesses (Q56): 16 out of 22. Benefits to businesses also arise from further harmonisation of the rules and reduction of fragmentation of the internal market. ICF 
study, section 3, sub-section 3.6.3.2 

78 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
provided 
benefits 
travellers.908 

for 

The 
PTD 
“helps  reduce 
damages 
to 
consumers  by 
€430 
about 
million  a  year 
[…]ensuring 
transparency 
and high levels 
of 

Protection 
against 
insolvency, 
cancellation 

The  PTD  improved 
harmonisation, 
enhanced 
transparency 
and 
strengthened 
legal 
for  both 
certainty 
travellers  and  traders, 
also  in  cross-border 
transactions.911 

908 Targeted survey – consumer organisations (Q41) = 10 of 11 
Consumer organisations interviewed highlighted the importance of the transparency of rules that the PTD  has introduced in terms of information provision to consumers as well as 
insolvency protection. 
911 In addition, the 2013 Impact Assessment showed that due to the fact that the 1990 Directive was based on minimum harmonisation, legal discrepancies appeared between Member 
States. This fragmentation generated additional compliance costs for businesses wishing to trade cross-border. ‘Businesses that trade across borders have to pay about € 375 to research 
information about the Member State in which they want to get active. They also have to bear recurring costs of adapting their information materials to the requirements of different 
Member States. Taking into account the average number of EU companies which make cross-border sales, this translates into about additional €2 per package out of which €1.7 is a one-
off cost. The overall baseline administrative burden associated with cross-border trade has been estimated at € 26 million (out of which €21m are one-off costs for researching Member 
States' differing national legal requirements and legal advice; €5.1m are recurring annual administrative costs)’. See Impact Assessment SWD (2013) 263 final, p. 17. 

79 

 
 
 
 
 
and 
refund 
rights,  right  to 
pre-contractual 
and 
contractual 
information 

consumer 
protection.909 

Indirect benefits  

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

APPENDIX V. STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTATION - SYNOPSIS REPORT  

See Annex 2: Stakeholder consultation (Synopsis report) to the Impact Assessment 

909  European  Commission,  Behavioural  study  […],  p  10.  Behavioural  study  on  advertising  and  marketing  practices 
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/d79a2522-ddd4-11ea-adf7-01aa75ed71a1  

in 

travel  booking  websites  and  apps,  

80 

 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX VI. PRESENTATION OF THE PACKAGE TRAVEL DIRECTIVE 

I. Overview of the Package Travel Directive 

➢  Date of application 

Directive  (EU)  2015/2302  (‘the  Package  Travel  Directive’,  ‘the  Directive’,  ‘the  2015 
Directive’ or ‘the PTD’) had to be transposed by the Member States by 1 January 2018. It 
started applying on 1 July 2018.912  

The 2015 Directive repealed Directive 90/314/EEC (‘the 1990 Directive’) with effect from 
1  July  2018.913  It  was  incorporated  into  the European  Economic  Area  Agreement on  22 
September 2017. 

➢  Aim 

The Directive aims ‘to contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market and 
to the achievement of a high and as uniform as possible level of consumer protection 
by approximating certain aspects of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of 
the  Member  States  in  respect  of  contracts  between  travellers  and  traders  relating  to 
package travel and linked travel arrangements.’914 

The  current  Directive,  unlike  the  repealed  1990  PTD,  is  a  full  harmonisation  directive 
(Article 4). Still, it gives the Member States regulatory options in a few specific respects 
(e.g., regarding the full liability of retailers in addition to the liability of organisers). 

➢  Scope 

The Directive applies to:  
- packages offered for sale or sold by traders to travellers;  
- to linked travel arrangements facilitated by traders for travellers. 

The Directive does not apply to travel arrangements: 
- covering less than 24 hours, unless an overnight stay is included; 
- offered occasionally, on a not-for-profit basis and only to a limited group of travellers; 
- purchased as part of a general agreement for travel relating to a business or profession.915 

➢  Main features of the 2015 Directive 

Key terms 

912  Directive  (EU)  2015/2302  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  25  November  2015  on 
package  travel  and  linked  travel  arrangements,  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  2006/2004  and  Directive 
2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 90/314/EEC, 
(OJ L 326, 11.12.2015, p. 1–33);  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32015L2302#:~:text=Directive%20%28EU%29%202015%2F2302%20of
%20the%20European%20Parliament%20and,of%20the%20Council%20and%20repealing%20Council%20
Directive%2090%2F314%2FEEC  
913 Council Directive 90/314/EEC of 13 June 1990 on package travel, package holidays and package tours 
(OJ L 158, 23.6.1990, p. 59–64); EUR-Lex - 31990L0314 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu) 
914 Article 1  
915 Article 2 

81 

 
 
 
 
 
The concept of packages already existed in the 1990 Directive, but it is broader under the 
2015 Directive, going beyond pre-arranged combinations of travel services.  

Under Article 3(2) of the Directive, packages are: 
- a combination of at least two different types of travel service (e.g., a flight or rail trip 
combined with hotel accommodation): 

o  pre-arranged or customised, as part of the same trip, sold by one trader and a single 

contract is concluded  

or 

o  irrespective of whether separate contracts are concluded with individual traders, if 

one of the following is met: 

- 

- 
- 
- 

- 

the combination was purchased from a single point of sale and the travel services 
have  been  selected  before  the  traveller  agrees  to  pay,  within  the  same  booking 
process916  
it was offered, sold or charged at an inclusive or total price, 
advertised or sold under the term ‘package’ or under a similar term, 
combined after the conclusion of a contract which entitled the traveller to choose 
among a selection of travel services (i.e., travel gift boxes) 
click-through  packages:  combinations  purchased  from  separate  traders  through 
linked online booking processes where the traveller's name, payment details and e-
mail  address  are  transmitted  from  the  trader  with  whom  the  first  contract  is 
concluded to another trader or traders and a contract with the latter trader or traders 
is concluded at the latest 24 hours after the confirmation of the booking of the first 
travel service. 

A new concept was introduced: linked travel arrangement (LTA) as a category between 
packages and mere stand-alone services. 
Under Article 3(5), there is a linked travel arrangement where at least two different types 
of  travel  services  are  purchased  for  the  same  trip  or  holiday,  usually  under  separate 
contracts with the individual travel service providers and if, in addition, the conditions of 
letters (a) or (b) are met.  

Under letter (a) the bookings of the travel services must take place on the occasion of a 
single visit or contact with a point of sale (online or off-line) and the services are selected 
and paid for separately;  
or  
Under letter (b) the booking of a second service is facilitated in a targeted manner and the 
contracts  for  additional  travel  services  are  concluded  within  24  hours  from  the 
confirmation of the booking of the first travel service. 

There can be no LTA if the criteria of a package are met.  

Other relevant terms: 
Travel services include  
- carriage of passengers,  
-  accommodation  that  is  not  intrinsically  part  of  carriage  of  passengers  and  is  not  for 
residential purposes,  
-rental of cars and of other motor vehicles,  

916 Recital 10 

82 

 
 
 
 
 
-any other tourist service917 not intrinsically part of a travel service mentioned earlier.918  

If other tourist services are combined with a travel service, for instance accommodation, 
this  leads  to  the  creation  of  a  package  or  linked  travel  arrangement  only  if  the  tourist 
services account for a significant proportion of the value of the package or linked travel 
arrangement, or are advertised as or otherwise represent an essential feature of the trip or 
holiday. ‘If other tourist services account for 25 % or more of the value of the combination, 
those services should be considered as representing a significant proportion of the value of 
the package or linked travel arrangement.’919 

Organiser is a ‘trader who combines and sells or offers for sale packages, either directly 
or through another trader or together with another trader, or the trader who transmits the 
traveller's data to another trader’ in the case of click-through packages.920 

Retailer is ‘a trader other than the organiser who sells or offers for sale packages combined 
by an organiser’.921 

Traveller is ‘any person who is seeking to conclude a contract, or is entitled to travel on 
the basis of a contract concluded, within the scope of this Directive’.922 

Unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances are situations beyond the control of the 
party who invokes them ‘and the consequences of which could not have been avoided even 
if all reasonable measures had been taken’.  ‘This may cover for example warfare, other 
serious security problems such as terrorism, significant risks to human health such as the 
outbreak of a serious disease at the travel destination, or natural disasters such as floods, 
earthquakes  or  weather  conditions  which  make  it  impossible  to  travel  safely  to  the 
destination as agreed in the package travel contract’.923 

Key rights 

➢  Pre-contractual and contractual information of travellers 

For Packages 
Organisers  or  retailers  must  provide  to  the  traveller  information  on  the  main 
characteristics  of  packages  and  rights  of  travellers,  inter  alia  through  a  standardised 
information form prior to conclusion of the contract. 

The standardised information form includes information on: 
- the fact that the combination of travel services constitutes a package; 
- the identity and the liability of the organiser (and, where appropriate, the retailer) for the 
performance of the package travel contract.; 

917  Recital  18:  ‘Other  tourist  services  which  are  not  intrinsically  part  of  carriage  of  passengers, 
accommodation or the rental of motor vehicles or certain motorcycles, may be, for instance, admission to 
concerts, sport events, excursions or event parks, guided tours, ski passes and rental of sports equipment 
such as skiing equipment, or spa treatments.’  
918 Article 3(1) 
919 Recital 18 
920 Article 3(8) 
921 Article 3(9) 
922 Article 3(6) 
923 Recital 31 

83 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-  the  fact  that  insolvency  protection  is  in  place  (including  the  right  to  the  refund  of 
payments and the right to repatriation where carriage of passengers is included)  
- contact details of the insolvency protection entity  
- key rights of package travellers. 

After booking, the package travel contract must be provided on a durable medium. It 
must contain the full content of the agreement.  

For LTAs 
Prior to conclusion of the contract(s), traders must inform travellers, through one of five 
available forms, on: 
- the fact that the traveller does not benefit from the rights applying to packages and that 
each service provider is responsible for his service,  
-  the  conditions  under  which  travel  services  become  an  LTA  (if  the  traveller  books  an 
additional travel service during the same visit) 
- information on insolvency protection 

Some important rights in relation to packages 

➢  Price changes (Article 10) 

8% cap for possible price increases by the trader, beyond which travellers have the right 
to cancel the package free of charge.  

Price increases are only allowed if the contract expressly reserves that possibility  and if 
they directly result from: 
- the cost of fuel or other power sources; 
- third-party tax or fee increases; 
- exchange rates. 
Any price increase should be notified at least 20 days before the start of the package. 
If the contract reserves the possibility of price increase, the organiser also has to grant price 
reductions where relevant. 

➢  The  right  of  travellers  to  a  full  refund  of  any  payments  in  the  event  of 

cancellation of the contract under certain conditions  

- If, before the start of the package, the organiser is constrained to alter significantly any 
of the main characteristics of the travel services or cannot fulfil the special requirements 
or proposes to increase the price of the package by more than 8 %, the traveller may within 
a  reasonable  period  specified  by  the  organiser  (a)  accept  the  proposed  change,  or  (b) 
terminate the contract without paying a termination fee. (Article 11(2)) 

-  If  the  traveller  does  not  accept  a  substitute  package,  the  organiser  shall  refund  all 
payments made by or on behalf of the traveller without undue delay and in any event not 
later than 14 days after the contract is terminated. (Article 11(5)) 
-  If  the  traveller  or  the  organiser  cancel  the  contract  before  departure  in  the  event  of 
‘unavoidable  and  extraordinary  circumstances’,  such  as  natural  disasters,  war,  or  other 
serious situations at the destination, otherwise cancellation against compensation. (Article 
12(2) and (3)) 

➢  Clear identification of the liable party for the performance of the contract (Article 

13, Article 16 and Article 20 plus the forms in Appendix 1) 

84 

 
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
- Liability of the organiser of the package for all included travel services across the EU; 
Member States may decide whether the retailer is jointly liable. 
- If the organiser is established outside of EEA, the EU retailer is subject to the obligations 
laid down for organisers if the organiser does not comply. 
- The organiser is obliged to offer suitable alternative arrangements, if impossible, provide 
repatriation and accommodation for three nights  
-  The  organiser  is  obliged  to  provide  assistance  without  undue  delay  to  a  traveller  in 
difficulty. 

➢  Insolvency protection ((Article 17, Article 18 and Article 19)  

- Insolvency protection requirements for package organisers and LTA facilitators  
-  The  insolvency  protection  covers:  (a)  refunds  without  undue  delay  if  a  service  is  not 
performed;  (b)  repatriation,  and  if  necessary,  accommodation,  where  carriage  of 
passengers is included in package; for LTAs, repatriation if the facilitator is responsible 
for the carriage of passengers 
- Mutual recognition of insolvency protection of insolvency protection and administrative 
cooperation.  Any  insolvency  protection  an  organiser  provides  in  accordance  with  the 
measures  in  the  Member  State  of  its  establishment  have  to  be  recognised  by  any  other 
Member State. To facilitate the administrative cooperation and supervision of organisers 
operating in different Member States, Member States must designate central contact points.  

II. Transposition and implementation 

According  to  Article  28(1),  Member  States  were  required  to  transpose  the  PTD  by  1 
January 2018. The Commission opened infringement procedures for non-communication 
of  national  transposition  measures  against  14  Member  States.  Two  Member  States 
transposed the Directive only after the Commission had issued a reasoned opinion pursuant 
to  Article  258  of  the  TFEU.  By  March  2019,  all  Member  States  had  notified  the 
Commission of the complete transposition of the Directive.924 

Potential  non-conformity  issues  on  different  aspects  of  the  Directive  may  exist,  to  a 
different extent, in all Member States, particularly in relation to definitions (including the 
main  concepts),  pre-contractual  information  requirements,  travellers’  termination  rights 
and  termination  fees,  liability  for  lack  of  or  improper  performance  of  the  contract,  the 
obligations of traders facilitating LTAs, liability for booking errors, and the effectiveness 
of the transposition regarding insolvency protection.925 The Member States were obliged 
to apply the rules transposing the PTD from 1 July 2018.  

After  this  date,  Member  States  and  some  EEA  countries926  adopted  further  measures  in 
relation to the PTD.927 Several Member States adopted temporary rules deviating from the 
PTD,  15  of  them  giving  package  organisers  the  possibility  to  significantly  extend  the 
periods for reimbursements or make vouchers mandatory for travellers. In July 2020, the 

924 PTD application report, p. 3. 
925 Ibidem, p. 3 and 4. 
926 E.g., Norway, Iceland. No relevant information was identified in Lichtenstein. 
927  The  national  transposition  measures  in  all  Member  States  are  publicly  available  at:  https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/NIM/?uri=CELEX:32015L2302. 
In addition, Appendix VIII to this SWD presents the measures adopted by the MS/EEA countries since July 
2018. 

85 

 
 
 
 
Commission  opened  infringement  proceedings  against  11  Member  States.928  The 
infringement  proceedings  were  closed  after  the  relevant  Member  States  repealed  the 
legislation deviating from the PTD or after the relevant measures had expired. On 8 June 
2023, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) confirmed the Commission’s 
interpretation in the one remaining infringement case and in a preliminary ruling.929  The 
CJEU confirmed that the PTD aims at full harmonisation930 and that the term ‘refund’ in 
the PTD implies a refund consisting in an amount of money which travellers can dispose 
of  freely  and  does  not  include  the  idea  of  a  voucher.931  The  CJEU  concluded  that  the 
Member  States  were  not  allowed  to  adopt  national  legislation  releasing  organisers 
temporarily from the obligation to reimburse prepayments to travellers within 14 days of 
the termination of the contract.932 

There  were  also  aid  schemes  to  provide  support  to  transport  and  travel  businesses, 
including guarantee schemes in the event of their insolvency as well as refunds to travellers 
in the event of cancellations.  

928  See  Commission’s  press  communications  of  2  July  and  30  October  2020  (under  point  5  –  Justice): 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/INF_20_1212 
and 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_20_1687   
929  Case  C-407/21,  ECLI:EU:C:2023:449,  CURIA  -  List  of  results  (europa.eu)  and  Case  C-540/21, 
ECLI:EU:C:2023:450, CURIA - List of results (europa.eu)   
930 Case C-407/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:449, paragraph  59, Case C-540/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:450, paragraph 
23  
931 Case C-407/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:449, paragraphs 30 and 33 and Case C-540/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:450, 
paragraph 69  
932 Case C-407/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:449, paragraph 76  

86 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX VII. LINKED TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS 

The  evaluation  identified  interpretational  and  enforcement  difficulties  that  could  be 
grouped in two main categories: lack of clarity in key elements of the definition of LTA 
types (a) and (b) and unclear delimitation between packages and LTAs. 

A) Lack of clarity in key elements of the definition of LTA types (a) and (b)  

Key concepts of the definition of ‘linked travel arrangement’ lack clarity and would benefit 
from  further  clarifications,  according  to  national  authorities,  businesses  (package  travel 
sector, airlines, and private insolvency protection funds), and consumer organisations.  

The  following  elements  have  been  indicated  as  the  most  challenging  in  terms  of 
interpretation and implementation in practice: - notion of ‘facilitation by a trader’ (related 
to both LTA types (a) and (b)), - ‘single visit’ (related to LTA type (a)), - ‘facilitation in a 
targeted manner’ (LTA type (b)), - ‘the procurement of at least one additional travel service 
from another trader where a contract with such other trader is concluded at the latest 24 
hours after the confirmation of the booking of the first travel service’ (LTA type (b)). 

B) Unclear delimitation between packages and LTAs 

The  distinction  between  certain  packages  and  certain  LTAs  can  be  difficult.933  A  travel 
agent who books a flight and a hotel for a customer for the same trip or holiday and issues 
one  invoice  for  both  services  sells  a  package.  When  the  same  services  were  selected 
separately, the travel agent that books them one after the other and does not charge a total 
price facilitates an LTA.934 

According  to  stakeholders,  it  was  difficult  for  travellers  and  enforcement  authorities  to 
distinguish  whether  the  services  were  selected  jointly  (package)  or  separately  (LTA).935 
The uncertain boundaries between packages and LTAs, but also between LTAs and single 
travel  services,  made  the  respective  definitions  of  ‘package’  and  ‘linked  travel 
arrangements’ difficult to implement in practice. This is likely to have contributed to the 
fact that stakeholders - businesses, consumers or public authorities - have not been able to 
properly identify this type of combination of travel services and hence detect any LTA or 
LTA-related issues in practice. 936 

933 See flowchart “Package travel or not?” at https://commission.europa.eu/document/653055bf-a1ae-4280-
a26d-bf7142fccfa9_en  
934 COM(2021) 90 final, p. 5. 
935 Public Consultation (26a): 70% (191 out of 273) respondents declared that ‘the distinction of whether the 
services  were  selected  jointly  (package)  or  separately  (LTA)  is  difficult  to  verify  for  travellers  and 
enforcement authorities’.  
936 This issue was reiterated almost unanimously everywhere in the  data  collection by stakeholders of all 
types. 

87 

 
 
APPENDIX VIII. MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE MEMBER STATES/EEA COUNTRIES SINCE JULY 2018 

LEGISLATIVE AND OTHER MEASURES ADOPTED IN MS SINCE JULY 2018 

MS/EE
A 
countrie
s  

New 
measures 
since July 
2018  

Typology of the 
measures  

References 

Comments on the measures 

AT 

YES 

Legislative measure  

Temporary legislative measure to face the Covid-19 
emergency: two amendments in 2020 and 2021 (600. 
Verordnung der Bundesministerin für Digitalisierung 
und Wirtschaftsstandort, mit der die Verordnung über 
Pauschalreisen  und  verbundene  Reiseleistungen 
(Pauschalreiseverordnung – PRVand 
575. 
Verordnung der Bundesministerin für Digitalisierung 
und Wirtschaftsstandort, mit der die Verordnung über 
Pauschalreisen  und  verbundene  Reiseleistungen 
(Pauschalreiseverordnung – PRV) 
2021) to 
(Verordnung  der 
Travel  Package  Ordinance 
und 
Bundesministerin 
Wirtschaftsstandort 
und 
verbundene 
Reiseleistungen 
(Pauschalreiseverordnung – PRV)) 

für 
über  Pauschalreisen 

Digitalisierung 

for 

During  the  Covid-19  crisis,  the  government  decided  that  the  state,  via  the 
Austrian Tourism bank (ÖHT), should provide an insurance (for which the 
state is the guarantor) to SME travel organisers, in accordance with § 3 Para. 
3 Z 2 PRV. The State intervention was necessary given the withdrawal of 
banks  and  insurance  providers  from  package  travel  insurance  and  the 
difficulties  for  package  travel  organisers  and  facilitators  of  linked  travel 
services to find affordable guarantees on the market. Since June 15, 2022, no 
new applications for ÖHT insolvency protection can be submitted. The term 
of the issued declarations of liability ended on December 31, 2022. 

BE 

YES 

Soft-law measure 
Administrative measure 

Non-binding Guidelines on the application and scope 
of  the  transposition  measure  (Guidelines  Loi  du  21 
novembre  de  relative  à  2017  la  vente  de  voyages  à 
forfait, prestations de voyage liées et de services de 
voyage) 
Temporary  legislative  measure  to  face  Covid-19 
emergency:  Ministerial  Order  on  vouchers  (Arrêté 

The objective of the Guidelines was to provide a framework for the practical 
application of the law and to specify and explain to stakeholders how to best 
comply with the law. 

Ministerial Order introduced rules on vouchers issued due to the Covid-19 
emergency (with validity from the 20th of March 2020 until the 19th June 
2020). The vouchers had a minimum validity period of one year and when 

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Comments on the measures 

ministériel  du  19  Mars  2020  relatif  aux  activités  à 
caractère  privé  ou  public,  de  nature  culturelle, 
sociale, festive, folklorique, sportive et recreative). 

not used by this period, consumers had a right to a monetary reimbursement. 
However, tour operators and organisers were granted an additional six-month 
period to proceed with the monetary reimbursement. 

BG 

YES  

Legislative measures  
Soft-law measure 

по 

Minor  amendments  to  the  Tourism  Act  in  the  parts 
transposing the PTD, with no or very limited impact 
on the transposition of the PTD. 
Temporary measure to face the Covid-19 emergency: 
Article  25  of  the  Act  on  the  measures  and  actions 
during the emergency state, declared with a decision 
of  the  Parliament  on  13  March  2020  and  for 
overcoming  its  consequences  (Закон  за  мерките  и 
действията 
извънредното 
време 
положение,  обявено  с  решение  на  народното 
събрание от 13 март 2020 г. и за преодоляване на 
последиците), promulgated State Gazette No 28 of 
24 March 2020, last amended State Gazette, No 32 of 
2022. 
for 
Ministry  of  Tourism 
application  for  financial  support  for  tour  organisers 
and traders for compensation of loss due to Covid-19 
(Насоки  за  кандидатстване  по  схемата  за 
безвъзмездни  финансови 
предоставяне 
средства  на  туроператори  и  туристически 

(2021),  Guidelines 

на 

на 

Article 79(5) (about school and children’s package travels)937 and Article 79a 
(about tour operators)938 of the Tourism Act are amended. Finally, Article 75 
of  the  Act  to  amend  and  supplement  the Tourism  Act introduced  the 
obligation  for  the  Commission  for  consumer  protection  to  apply  an 
administrative measure of ‘suspension of any activity’ upon non-conclusion 
of the insurance contract by a tour operator facilitating LTAs.  

In the context of the Covid-19 emergency, it introduces the possibility for the 
tour operators to reimburse a traveller for a trip cancelled due to Covid-19 to 
offer a voucher for the amount paid and extended the period for repayment 
from  14  days  to  1  year  after  the  cancellation  made  by  the  organizer.  The 
measure was applicable for the period from the 13 March 2020 until the state 
of emergency was lifted. In addition, the government provided financial aid 
for the repayment to the travellers for their cancelled travels. 

The  objective  of  the  guidelines  is  to  provide  guidance  to  organisers  and 
traders  on  how  to  get  compensation  of  the  loss  suffered  during  Covid-19 
crisis. 

937 The amendment is due to the revision of the Act on bus transportation (Act to amend and supplement the Road Transport Act (Закон за изменение и допълнение на Закона за автомобилните 
превози), promulgated SG No. 60 of 07 July 2020). It clarifies that any travel should take place between 6.00 and 21.00 instead of “daylight hours”. 
938 Obligation for tour operators to conclude – directly or via a travel agent – a contract for the travel package before its implementation, for an average period of 2 years. 

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CY  

YES 

Legislative measure 

агенти за компенсиране на загуби в резултат от 
COVID-19) 

Temporary  legislative  measure  to  face  Covid-19 
emergency: Law No. 59(I)/2020 in May 2020939 

Comments on the measures 

It establishes temporary measures allowing the use of vouchers for cancelled 
package holiday contracts instead of the refund in cash in case of cancellation 
due  to  the  COVID-19  emergency.  The  vouchers  could  be  used  by  the 
consumer  until  31  December  2021.  If  at  the  end  of  the  validity  period 
consumers  have  not  used  the  voucher,  they  can  ask  for  a  monetary 
reimbursement.  It  establishes  the  obligations  of  the  organizers  to  provide 
insurance coverage and/or bank guarantee for the vouchers.  
The vouchers for cancelled package holidays are covered against insolvency 
by the Cypriot Government, complementing private guarantors.  

CZ 

YES 

Legislative measures  

Temporary  legislative  measure  to  face  Covid-19 
emergency: Lex Voucher - 185/2020 Coll. 
Legislative  measure  on  insolvency  protection:  Lex 
Covid - 191/2020 Coll.  
Temporary  legislative  measure  to  face  Covid-19 
emergency: Act No. 189/2020 Coll.  
Temporary  legislative  measure  to  face  Covid-19 
emergency: Financial programme of the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade940  

the  organizer,  due 

It regulates the possibility for organisers to provide travellers with vouchers 
instead of refunds in money due to the cancellation of contracts that should 
be executed between the 20 February and the 31 August 2020 by both the 
traveller  or 
to  unavoidable  and  extraordinary 
circumstances. 
It deals with this issue indirectly and mainly regulates the options in case of 
insolvency.  
In  connection  with  the  Covid-19  pandemic,  an  amendment  to  Act  No. 
159/1999  Coll.  was  adopted  in  relation  to  trades  acting  in  the  capacity  of 
travel service provider (e.g. Airbnb). In the case of online mediation of the 

939 In July 2020 the European Commission launched an infringement procedure against Cyprus for not complying with the EU Recommendation on vouchers. The procedure was closed 
in October 2020.  
940 Available at: https://www.mpo.cz/cz/rozcestnik/informace-o-koronavirus/covid-2022---sektorova-podpora--266644/  

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DE 

YES  

Legislative measures  

conclusion of a travel service contract, at the request of the municipal trade 
office, to provide information on the mediated services, including the type 
and scope of the mediated services and the identification of the persons who 
provided the mediated services to the travellers. 
Financial programme to support small and medium-sized organisers to help 
them take out statutory insolvency protection insurance during the COVID-
19 emergency. 

It  establishes  rules  valid  during  the  Covid-19  pandemic.  These  rules 
concerned all travels paid for prior to 8 March 2020. The rules introduced an 
option for travel organisers to offer to travellers a voluntary voucher in case 
that the travel was cancelled due to the Covid 19 pandemic (for both sides – 
in case of the traveller and the organiser). The vouchers were also guaranteed 
by the state in case of insolvency of the travel organiser. Vouchers for travel 
packages  booked  after  8  March  2020  were  not  guaranteed. 

It  changed  the  requirements  to  ensure  effectively  that  payments  can  be 
reimbursed  in  case  of  insolvency  of  the  travel  organiser.  It  set  up  a  new 
Travel Insurance Fund (Reisesicherungsfonds).  

Temporary  legislative  measure  to  face  Covid-19 
emergency: Act to Mitigate the Consequences of the 
COVID-19  Pandemic  in  Package  Travel  Contract 
Law and to Ensure the Functioning of the Chambers 
in the Area of the Federal Lawyers' Act, the Federal 
Notaries'  Act,  the  Auditors'  Act  and  the  Tax 
Consultancy  Act  During  the  COVID  19  Pandemic 
{Gesetz zur Abmilderung der Folgen der COVID-19-
Pandemie  im  Pauschalreisevertragsrecht  und  zur 
Sicherstellung  der  Funktionsfähigkeit  der  Kammern 
im  Bereich  der  Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung,  der 
Bundesnotarordnung,  der  Wirtschaftsprüferordnung 
und  des  Steuerberatungsgesetzes  während  der 
(COVFRAG) 
COVID-19-Pandemie 

Act  on 
Insurance  Funds 
RSG), 25 June 2021 

Insolvency  Protection 

(Reisesicherungsfondsgesetz 

through  Travel 
- 

DK 

YES  

Legislative measures  

Legislative  measure  to  face  the  Covid-emergency: 
Act nr 326 of 31/03/2020 (LOV nr 326 af 31/03/2020) 

It expands the scope of the travel guarantee fund to provide protection for 
travellers also in cases where a package tour has been cancelled by the travel 

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Comments on the measures 

Legislative  measure  to  face  the  Covid-emergency: 
Act nr 612 of 14/05/2020 (LOV nr 612 af 14/05/2020) 
Legislative  measure  to  face  the  Covid-emergency: 
Act  nr  1054  of  30/06/2020  (LOV  nr  1054  af 
30/06/2020) 

EE 

YES 

Legislative measures  

Amendments  to  the  Estonian  Tourism  Act  with  no 
impact on the transposition of the PTD 

provider  or  by  the  traveller  due  to  ‘extraordinary  situations  affecting 
significant parts of the travel industry’. 
It enables travel providers and intermediaries to receive protection from the 
travel guarantee fund, where they are forced to interrupt a package tour as a 
result of extraordinary situations affecting significant parts of the industry, 
and they would be obliged under the Act on package travel and linked travel 
arrangement’ (APT) to grant the traveller a  full or partial reduction in the 
price or to pay for additional costs for home transport. 
It empowers the Minister of Trade and Industry to issue rules on the provision 
of subsidies to travel providers and intermediaries. 

There have been amendments to the Tourism Act (entering into force on 1 
January  2019)  because  the  Consumer  Protection  Board  was  joined  with 
another state authority. All the changes of the Tourism Act are due to the fact 
that the Tourism Act now correctly refers to the Consumer Protection and 
Technical  Regulatory  Authority  (Tarbijakaitse  ja  Tehnilise  Järelevalve 
Amet).  

EL 

YES  

ES 

YES  

Legislative 
measure  

Legislative 
measures  

Temporary legislative measure to face the covid-19 
emergency: Act of legislative content n. 84 of 13 
April 2020, as ratified by Law 4960/2020 and 
amended by Law 4722/2020.  

It provides exceptions to the rights and obligations of consumers and tourism 
businesses about the possibility to issue vouchers in case of termination of a 
contract in the context of the covid-19 pandemic. The act regulates business-
to-consumer and business-to-business issues.  

Legislative measure to face the consequences of the 
bankruptcy  of  Thomas  Cook:  Royal  Decree  law 
12/2019, 11 October 2019.  

Temporary legislative measure to face the Covid-19 
pandemic: Royal Decree 11/2020, 31 March 2010,  

It  introduced  urgent  measures  to  alleviate  the  effects  of  the  opening  of 
insolvency proceedings against the corporate group Thomas Cook. Among 
other  things,  it  created  a  credit  line  with  Thomas  Cook  defaults,  a  State 
Financial  Fund  for  Tourism  Competitiveness,  coordination  policies  in  the 
field of employment between the central state and the Autonomous Regions 
and other support and information measures for those directly affected by the 

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Comments on the measures 

Legislative measure amending temporary legislative 
measure: Royal Decree-law 21/2020, 9 June 2020.  

It  has  to  be  noted  that  the  insolvency  protection 
system  in  Spain  is  under  the  competence  of  the 
Autonomous  Regions.  Legislation  at  regional  level 
has  been  modified  in  several  Autonomous  Regions 
since the application date  of the PTD. Currently, in 
some  parts  of  the  territory  a  system  based  on 
securities that are directly enforceable by the traveller 
exists, whereas there are still few regions that require 
the  provisions  of 
treasury 
‘bonds’ 
administrations, not allowing the travellers to enforce 
their rights prior to a formal decision (e.g. judgement 
or arbitration award). 

the 

to 

FI 

YES 

Legislative 
measures  

Temporary measure to face the Covid-19 emergency: 
Act  on  providers  of  combined  travel  services, 
matkapalveluyhdistelmien 
921/2017 
tarjoajista, Riksdagen), 1 July 2018 (MPT), Chapter 
2, Section 10a 

(Laki 

Temporary measure to face the Covid-19 emergency: 
Two amendments (act 870/2021 and act 241/2022) to 
the  MTM  act  922/917  (Lag  om  en  tillsyns-  och 
insolvensskyddsavgift 
av 
för 
kombinerade resetjänster) – Section 5a 

leverantörer 

93 

Thomas 

Cook 

crisis.  

It  adopted  additional  urgent  social  and  economic  measures  to  address 
COVID-19.  It  allowed  organisers  of  travel  packages  to  issue  a  voucher 
instead  of  reimbursing  the  payment  received  by  the  traveller.  This  was 
possible in cases where the organiser could prove that it had not received the 
necessary reimbursements from other service providers in order to pay the 
refund to the traveller.  

It provided that the acceptance of the vouchers had to be on a voluntary basis 
by the traveller.  

Introduced in 2020 as a temporary measure (in place between the 26 October 
2020 and 31 December 2022) to enable travellers to be reimbursed by the 
Government  in  case  of  cancellations  which  are  due  to  unavoidable  and 
extraordinary circumstances caused by the Covid-19 epidemic.  

Inserting  a  temporary  Section  5a  into  the  MTM,  by  which  the  fee  for  the 
insolvency protection scheme was waived in 2020 and 2021 respectively. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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FR 

YES  

Typology of the 
measures  

References 

Comments on the measures 

Administrative 
measure  

Temporary measure to face the Covid-19 emergency: 
Ordinance n°2020-315, 25 March 2020. 

It  is  related  to  extraordinary  circumstances.  The  ordinance  provides  that 
when  a  travel  contract  is  cancelled  between  the  1  March  2020  and  15 
September 2020, the organiser may offer, instead of a money, a voucher of 
equal value, with a validity period of 18 months. If the voucher is not used 
or  partially  used  by  consumers,  they  will  be  able  to  ask  for  the  whole 
monetary  reimbursement  or  the  remaining  price  difference  for  the  unused 
part at the end of the validity period.  

HR 

YES 

Legislative 
measures  

Temporary measure to face the Covid-19 emergency: 
Act  amending  the  Act  on  Provision  of  Tourism 
Services (Zakon o izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o 
pružanju  usluga  u 
turizmu),  National  Gazette 
(Narodne novine) No. 42/2020 (Article 38a).  
Legislative  measure  adopted  to  repeal  previous 
legislation:  Act  amending  the  Act  on  Provision  of 
Tourism  Services  (Zakon  o  izmjenama  i  dopunama 
Zakona  o  pružanju  usluga  u  turizmu),  National 
Gazette No. 70/2021. 

Article  38a  regulates  rights  and  obligations  of  the  parties  to  the  package 
travel  contract  in  case  of  non-performance  of  contract  due  to  COVID-19 
pandemic  (with  respect  to  all  package  travel  contracts  that  were  to  be 
performed after 1 March 2020). Organisers can issue vouchers to travellers. 
Should a traveller decide to exercise their right to rescind the contract, the 
organiser is bound to make a refund of any payments made by the consumer 
within 14 days after the expiry of 180 days following the cessation of special 
circumstances. The voucher is covered by insolvency protection mechanism 
agreed for the package travel in question.  
It has repealed Article 38a introduced by Act No. 42/2020. 

HU 

YES 

Legislative 
measure  

Temporary measure to face the Covid-19 emergency: 
Government Decree No. 242/2020. 

94 

It introduced special rules applicable for package travel contracts during the 
Covid-19 emergency. In these cases, instead of the repayment of the fee or 
advance paid for the travel package, the tour operator could issue a voucher. 
If the traveller did not accept the voucher, the organiser had to refund all pre-
payments 
traveller.  
The financial coverage defined in Section 6/F(2)(d) of Act CLXIV of 2005 
on  Commerce  covers  the  amount  satisfactory  for  the  repayment  of  the 
vouchers issued under the aforementioned decree in case of the insolvency 
of the tour operator.  

made 

the 

by 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LEGISLATIVE AND OTHER MEASURES ADOPTED IN MS SINCE JULY 2018 

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IS 

YES 

Typology of the 
measures  

References 

Comments on the measures 

 Legislative 
measures  

Legislative  measure  implementing  the  PTD:  Act 
21/2020 (entered into force on 21 March 2020).  

It amended the role of the Tourist Board in supervision and enforcement of 
the  Act  on  package  tours  and  interconnected  travel  arrangements  (LSPF), 
providing some additional powers. 

Temporary legislative measure to face the Covid-19 
emergency:  Act  78/2020 (entered  into  force  on  17 
July 2020). 

Temporary legislative measure to face the  Covid-19 
emergency:  Act  111/2020 (entered  into  force  on  17 
September 2020). 

Legislative  measure  implementing  the  PTD:  Act 
91/2021 (entered into force on 8 July 2021). 

IE 

YES 

Legislative 
measures  

Legislative measure implementing the PTD: S.I. No. 
80  of  2019  European  Union  (Package  Travel  and 
Linked Travel Arrangements) Regulations 2019  

Legislative measure implementing the PTD: S.I. No 
105  of  2019  European  Union  (Package  Travel  and 
Linked  Travel  Arrangements)  (No.  2)  Regulations 
2019  

Temporary measure to face Covid-19 emergency: S.I. 
No 218 of 2020 Transport (Tour Operators and Travel 

95 

It  introduced  temporary  measures  to  address  the  negative  effects  of  the 
Covid-19  pandemic  on  the  activities  of  organisers  or  retailers  and  to 
safeguard the interests of consumers. This included the establishment of a 
Travel Liability Fund, which enables travel organisers to receive loans for an 
amount equal to any unpaid reimbursement claims, under the condition that 
the loans are used exclusively to reimburse legally justified reimbursement 
claims by travellers.  

It extended deadlines set out in the temporary measures introduced by Act 
78/2020. 

It amended provisions regulating the administration of the Travel Insurance 
Fund. 

It implements the PTD into national legislation. 

It amends Schedules 1-4, the Standard information forms and the template 
terms of security to be provided by an organizer or trader and guaranteed by 
a bank. 
It establishes the meaning and refund conditions for voluntary refund credit 
notes issued by a tour operator or travel agent to a customer in respect of the 
cancellation due to Covid-19 of an overseas travel contract. 
It amends several definitions and establishes the Travellers’ Protection Fund, 
to reimburse customers. It also defines in extenso what the Fund covers. 
It covers payments from the Travellers’ Protection Fund made to a customer 
who  holds  a  refund  credit  note  where  the  tour  operator  or  travel  agent  is 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
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Comments on the measures 

IT 

YES 

Legislative 
measures  

unable or fails to meet the financial or contractual obligations owed to the 
customer under the refund credit note concerned. 
It extends from 60 to 120 days the time period within which a customer may 
make  a  claim  for  refund  of  monies  paid  or  for  the  reimbursement  of 
reasonable expenses incurred as a result of the inability or failure of the tour 
operator  or  travel  agent  to  meet  his  financial  or  contractual  obligations 
concerning an overseas travel to which the Regulations apply. 

Agents)  Act  1982  (Disbursements  from  Fund) 
Regulations 2020  

Temporary measure to face Covid-19 emergency: S.I. 
No  219  of  2020  European  Union  (Package  Travel) 
Regulations 2020 

Temporary measure to face Covid-19 emergency: S.I. 
No 105 of 2021 Transport (Tour Operators and Travel 
Agents)  Act,  1982,  (Disbursements  from  Fund) 
Regulations 2021.  

Temporary measure to face Covid-19 emergency: S.I. 
No 290 of 2021 Transport (Tour Operators and Travel 
(Claims  by  Customers) 
Agents)  Act,  1982, 
Regulations, 2021. 

Temporary legislative measure to face the Covid-19 
emergency: Law Decree No. 18, 17 March 2020. 
Temporary legislative measure to face the Covid-19 
emergency: Law Decree No. 34, 19 May 2020. 
Legislative  measure  amending  Law  Decree  No.  18, 
17 March 2020:  Law No. 77, 17 July 2020. 
Legislative  measure  amending  Law  Decree  No.  18, 
17 March 2020: Decree Law No. 160, 10 September 
2021, converted with amendments in Law n. 27, 24 
April 2020 
Temporary legislative measure to face the Covid-19 
emergency: Law No. 69, 21 May 2021.  

Article 88-bis of this Law has derogated to the discipline provided in Article 
41 of Legislative Decree No 79 of 23 May 2011 on the right to cancel the 
package  contract  before  the beginning of  the package  travel.  It  contains  a 
series  of  provisions  concerning  the  reimbursement  of  travel  tickets  and 
packages cancelled because of the COVID-19 crisis.  
Article 182 (3-bis) of Law Decree No. 34 of 19 May 2020 established a fund 
for  the  compensation  of  consumers  holding  vouchers  issued  pursuant  to 
Article 88-bis of Law Decree No. 18 of 17 March 2020, not used by the end 
of their validity, and not reimbursed due to insolvency or bankruptcy of the 
tour operator or carrier. Article 182(1) of the same Law has foreseen direct 
subsidies to tour operators and travel agencies to compensate for losses by 
establishing a fund.  

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Comments on the measures 

Temporary legislative measure to face the Covid-19 
emergency: Decree No. 228, 30 December of 2021, 
converted with amendments in Law No. 15, 25 March 
2022. 

of 

on 

topic 

intervened 

It 
vouchers. 
the 
First, the validity period of vouchers is prolonged to 18 months. Second, in 
the cases indicated, vouchers can be used for services taking place after the 
final term of validity as long as those services are booked within the validity 
term of the voucher. Thirdly, after 18 months from their issuing, vouchers 
not used or not used to book services are refunded within fourteen days of 
expiry. 
Another area of intervention concerns the times within which the withdrawal 
from contracts must be exercised by the operator or by the customer in the 
cases provided for by the law. 
The Decree Law No. 160, 10 September 2021, converted in Law n. 27, 24 
April 2020, established the criteria for the utilisation of the guarantee fund 
created by Article 88-bis (12-ter) of Law Decree No. 18, 17 March 2020, as 
amended  by  Law  No.  27  of  24  April  2020,  as  well  as  the  coverage  of 
vouchers against insolvency. 
Law  No.  69  of  21  May  2021  has  extended  the  validity  of  vouchers  to  24 
months. 
Decree No. 228 of 30 December 2021, converted with modifications in Law 
No 15 od 25 March 2022, has extended the validity of vouchers from 24 to 
30 months. 

LT 

YES 

Legislative 
measures  

Legislative  measure  implementing  the  PTD:  Order 
No.  V-132  (2018)  of  the  Director  of  the  State 
Department  of  Tourism  under  the  Ministry  of  the 
Economy of the Republic of Lithuania on approval of 
the  Standard  Terms  and  Conditions  for  Package 
Travel Contracts. 
Legislative  measure  implementing  the  PTD:  Order 
No.  V-133  (2018)  of  the  Director  of  the  State 
Department  of  Tourism  under  the  Ministry  of  the 

It established standard terms and conditions for package travel contracts. 
It established standard information forms. 
It established standard information forms after the enforcement of package 
travel was assigned to SCRPA’s competence. 
It established standard terms and conditions for package travel contracts after 
the enforcement of package travel was assigned to State Consumer Rights 
Protection Authority’s (SCRPA) competence. 
It  introduced  amendments  to  the  Description  that  have  been  enacted 
transposing the PTD.  

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Comments on the measures 

The  amendments  established  the  coupon  system  in  cases  of  war,  state  of 
emergency,  mobilisation,  quarantine,  emergency  situation  or  emergency 
event or when citizens of the Republic of Lithuania are forbidden to leave 
the country or citizens of other countries are forbidden to enter the Republic 
of Lithuania, and, as a  result  thereof, it becomes impossible for the travel 
organiser  to  fulfil  his/her  obligations  under  the  contract  of  the  organised 
tourist trip. These amendments were addressing the tourism sector’s financial 
situation in the context of the COVID-19 crisis. 
The amendments changed the Description in line with changes described in 
paragraph 6 and aligned the secondary legislation with the Law on Tourism 
(LOT). 
It established that the period for reimbursement of all amounts paid by or on 
behalf of the tourist for the package tour was extended to 90 days thereby 
addressing  the  tourism  sector’s  financial  situation  due  to  the  COVID-19 
crisis  and  shortly  thereafter  restored  to  14  days  from  of  the  date  of 
termination of the package tour contract.  
It set out a new version of the Law on Tourism. The main changes include 
e.g. introduction of the concept of “traveller”, rules on the withdrawal of the 
tour organisers’ certificate, etc. 
It  brought  amendments  on  e.g.  amount  of  performance  security;  financial 
guarantees, etc.  
The amendments changed the Description in line with changes described in 
paragraph 1  above  and  aligned  the  secondary  legislation  with  the  Law  on 
Tourism.  

Economy of the Republic of Lithuania on approval of 
Standard Information Forms.  
Legislative  measure  implementing  the  PTD:  Order 
No. 1-58 (2018) of the Director of the State Consumer 
Rights Protection Authority on approval of Standard 
Information Forms.  
Legislative  measure  implementing  the  PTD:  Order 
No. 1-57 of the Director of the State Consumer Rights 
Protection Authority (SCRPA) [‘Valstybinė vartotojų 
teisių  apsaugos  tarnyba’]  on  approval  of  Standard 
Terms and Conditions for Package Travel Contracts.  
Legislative  measure  clarifying/implementing 
the 
PTD: Resolution of the Government of the Republic 
of  Lithuania  No  756  on  the  Description  of  the 
Procedure for Ensuring the Fulfilment of Obligations 
of a Tour organiser.  
Temporary legislative measure to face the Covid-19 
emergency:  Law  on  amending  Articles  2,  15  of  the 
Law on Tourism and adding Article 17-1 to the Law.  
Legislative  measure  clarifying/implementing 
the 
PTD:  Resolution  No  697  on  amendments  to  the 
Government of the Republic of Lithuania No 756 "On 
the approval of the description of the  procedure for 
securing  the  fulfilment  of  the  obligations  of  a  tour 
organiser  and  a  seller  of  a  package  of  tourist 
services".  
Temporary legislative measure to face the Covid-19 
emergency:  Law  on  amending  Article  6.751  of  the 
Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania.  

98 

 
 
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A 
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New 
measures 
since July 
2018  

Typology of the 
measures  

References 

Comments on the measures 

Legislative measure implementing the PTD: Law on 
amending Law on Tourism (Law on Tourism of the 
Republic of Lithuania), (draft law). 
Legislative measure implementing the PTD: Law on 
amending Articles 9, 10, 15, 23, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 
34, 36, 37, 38, 39 and 41 of the Law on Tourism. 
the  PTD: 
Legislative  measure 
Resolution  No  903  on  amendments 
the 
to 
Government of the Republic of Lithuania No 756 "On 
the approval of the description of the  procedure for 
securing  the  fulfilment  of  the  obligations  of  a  tour 
organiser  and  a  seller  of  a  package  of  tourist 
services". 

implementing 

LU 

YES 

Legislative 
measure  

Temporary legislative measure to face the Covid-19 
emergency: Special Regulation of 27 March 2020. 

It provided for the provisional suspension of the  effects of cancellation in 
respect  of  package  travel  in  the  context  or  coronavirus  to  postpone  the 
reimbursement of consumer advances.  

LV 

YES  

Legislative 
measures  

Temporary legislative measure to face the Covid-19 
emergency: Law on the Management of the Spread of 
COVID-19 Infection (Covid-19 infekcijas izplatības 
pārvaldības likums) of 5 June 2020.  
Legislative  measures  clarifying/implementing  the 
PTD:  Amendments  to  the  Tourism  Law  (Grozījumi 
Tūrisma likumā) of 8 October 2020.  

It  regulates  the  certification  (voucher)  system:  an  organiser,  instead  of 
refunding the traveller, was entitled to draw up a certification (voucher) to 
the traveller for the amount of the unused trip, if the package travel contract 
had been terminated (a) due to the declaration of the emergency situation in 
Latvia  caused  by  the  spread  of  COVID-19  infection  or  (b)  due  to  force 
majeure circumstances in the holiday destination in relation to the spread of 
COVID-19  infection.  If  a  traveller  refused  to  receive  the certification,  the 
tour  operator  and  traveller  might  agree  on  another  solution,  including 
repayment of the money and repayment time limit which could not exceed 

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Comments on the measures 

12 months from the day when the emergency situation was revoked in the 
State. The organiser must have the special licence and valid security in the 
form of an insurance policy issued by an insurer, or a guarantee issued by a 
credit institution. It also lowered the amount of security to be provided by 
the organiser to prevent mass insolvency of companies in the travel  sector 
(this provision applied until 30 June 2022). 
Among  other  things,  Article  16(5)  of  the  Tourism  Law  was  amended  by 
including (i) a clarification that the amount of security provided by organisers 
and  traders  facilitating  linked  travel  arrangements  must  be  sufficient  and 
effective and (ii) an explanation of the turnover in the sector of package travel 
and linked travel arrangements, stating that it is the total amount of money 
received  from  travellers  within  a  specified  period  for  a  package  travel 
arrangement or a service included in a linked travel arrangement. 

It  amends  Subsidiary  Legislation  (S.L.)  No.  409.19,  in  particular,  the 
provisions on the termination of the contract and reimbursement to traveller. 
In case of termination of package travel contract between the 1st of March 
2020 and 31st May 2020, L.N. 80 of 2020 extends the repayment period from 
fourteen days (as indicated in the PTD) to six months after the package travel 
contract is cancelled. 

Although  no  emergency  temporary  legislation  was  adopted  in  the  NL,  in 
April 2020, the Dutch Government formally asked the national enforcement 
bodies to suspend the enforcement of the Air Passenger Rights Regulation 
traveller 
(261/2004).  Following 
legislations for both package travel and standalone tickets, consumers had to 
wait between six and twelve months to get their monetary reimbursement.  

this  suspension  of  enforcement  of 

MT 

YES 

Legislative 
measures  

Temporary legislation to face Covid-19 emergency: 
Legal Notice No. 80 of 2020. 

NL 

NO 

N/A 

N/A 

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Typology of the 
measures  

References 

Comments on the measures 

MS/EE
A 
countrie
s  

New 
measures 
since July 
2018  

 NO 

YES 

Legislative 
measure 
Administrative 
measure 

Legislative  measure  clarifying/implementing 
PTD:  Amendment 
transposing the PTD. 

to  Norwegian 

the 
legislation 

Temporary legislative measure to face the Covid-19 
emergency: Government Regulations of April 2020. 

PL 

YES 

Legislative 
measures  

Temporary legislative measure to face the Covid-19 
for 
emergency:  Act  on  special  arrangements 
preventing,  countering  and  combating  COVID-19, 
other  communicable  diseases  and  emergencies 
caused 
szczególnych 
zapobieganiem, 
rozwiązaniach 
przeciwdziałaniem i zwalczaniem COVID-19, innych 
chorób  zakaźnych  oraz  wywołanych  nimi  sytuacji 
kryzysowych)  of  2  March  2020,  Journal  of  Laws  of 
2020, item 374 with further amendments. 

związanych 

(Ustawa 

them 

by 

o 

z 

101 

Right  after  the  publication  of  the  Commission’s  recommendation  on 
vouchers,  the  Minister  of  Infrastructure  withdrew  the  suspension  of 
enforcement.941  

This amendment did not affect any of the topics regulated under the PTD. 

The deadline for reimbursement was extended in April 2020 by Government 
Regulations to 90 days to refund consumers in the event of the cancellation 
of package travel with a departure date between 14 March and 14 June 2020. 
This  measure  was  retroactive  and  included  also  overdue  claims.  The 
situations in which this reimbursement obligation applies according to the 
main transposing legislation includes those set out in the PTD. 

This  measure  modified  the  general  cancellation  right,  both  in  terms  of  its 
temporal effects (by postponing legal effects of cancellation), and by adding 
additional reason for the professional, which was not previously covered by 
the provisions implementing PTD. According to Article 15k(2), cancellation 
of an agreement can be replaced with offering a consumer a voucher for a 
future  tourist  service.  The  sums  in  question  are  subjected  to  the  general 
financial insurance of the tourist service organizer. 
The new provisions established two additional guarantees for repayment to 
consumers  the  sums  they  transferred  as  a  price  for  a  tourist  service.  The 
organizer of the tourist service may ask for re-financing consumer expenses 
from the Tourist Found of Returns (Turystyczny Fundusz Zwrotów), created 
at the Bank of National Economy (Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego), i.e. a 
state-owned bank that provides financial services to the government and the 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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measures  

References 

Comments on the measures 

territorial  self-government  structures.  The  fund  provides  repayments  to 
consumers whose tourist services were cancelled and who were not offered 
vouchers or did not accept them. 
Another  guarantee  for  consumer  financial  interest  introduced  during  the 
Covid-19  pandemic,  is  the  Tourist  Assistance  Fund  (Turystyczny  Fundusz 
Pomocowy),  which  constitutes  a  part  of  the  Insurance  Guarantee  Fund 
(Ubezpieczeniowy 
Gwarancyjny).  
Payments from the Assistance Fund are to be made in the event that the tour 
operator is unable to provide travellers with refunds for the tourist event, if 
the event was cancelled due to unexpected circumstances (under Article 47 
TSA). 
The Tourist Assistance Fund, has also recently been applied by 
the Polish government to tourist events cancelled due to the war 
in Ukraine. 

Fundusz 

It  amends  Decree-Law  (DL)  No.  17/2018  of  8  March  2018  (which 
establishes the regime for accessing and exercising the activity of travel and 
tourism agencies and came into force on 1 July 2018). It approves the Legal 
Regime  for  Economic  Administrative  Offenses  (Regime  Jurídico  das 
Contraordenações  Económicas).  This  act  has  included  the  concept  of 
‘economic offense’ in DL 17/2018 and subsequently amended the provisions 
regulating the administrative offenses and the respective sanctions. 
In  the  context  of  the  COVID-19  crisis,  it  established  exceptional  and 
temporary measures regarding the epidemiological situation of COVID-19. 
In its Article 11, it prohibited school trips, or similar trips, and obliged travel 
agencies to reschedule them, rather than providing for refund.  
It revoked Decree-Law No. 10-A/2020. 
It  established  exceptional  and  temporary  measures  relating  to  the  tourism 
sector, within the scope of the COVID-19 disease pandemic. It includes a set 

PT 

YES 

Legislative 
measures  
Administrative 
measures 

Legislative measure implementing the PTD: Decree-
Law  No.  9/2021  (Decreto-Lei  no.  9/2021)  of  29 
January 2021.  
Temporary legislative measure to face the Covid-19 
emergency: Decree-Law No. 10-A/2020, of 13 March 
2020 (Decreto-Lei no. 10-A/2020).  
Legislative  measure  repealing  temporary  legislative 
measure: Decree-Law No. 22-A/2021 Decreto-Lei no. 
22-A/2021) of 17 March 2021.  
Temporary legislative measure to face the Covid-19 
emergency:  Decree-Law  No.  17/2020  (Decreto-Lei 
no. 17/2020) of 23 April 2020.  

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measures 
since July 
2018  

Typology of the 
measures  

References 

Comments on the measures 

Legislative measure repealing temporary emergency 
measure:  Decree-Law  No.  62-A/2020  (Decreto-Lei 
no. 62-A/2020) of 3 September 2020.  
Financial  measure:  Legislative  Order  No.  4/2020 
(Despacho Normativo no. 4/2020) of 25 March 2020.  
Financial  measure:  Legal  Order  No.  9/2022 
(Despacho Normativo no. 9/2022) of 3 June 2022.  

of measures aiming to mitigate the constraints caused in the tourism sector 
and lays down provisions regarding (i) trips organized by travel and tourism 
agencies (package  travel) (ii) cancellation of reservations in tourist resorts 
and local accommodation establishments, and (iii) relations between travel 
and tourism agencies, tourist entertainment operators and tourist resorts and 
local accommodation establishments.  
It included a provision exclusively regulating package travel organised by 
travel  and  tourism  agencies,  Article  3,  which  stated  that,  in  the  event  of 
cancellation  of  a  package  travel,  the  consumer  could  choose  one  of  two 
solutions: the issuing of a voucher equal to the amount paid, valid until 31 
December 2021, or rescheduling the trip to this same date.  
It reinstated the normal regime of reimbursements.  
It set up a financial support line aimed at facing the treasury needs of tourist 
micro-enterprises,  whose  activity  was  strongly  affected  by  the  economic 
effects  resulting  from  the  outbreak  of  the  COVID-19  disease.  It  has  been 
amended several times. 
With this Act, the Government approved the extension of the deadline, from 
2  to  4  years,  for  the  reimbursement  of  the  financial  support  that  the 
companies were granted through the support line.  
A second line of support was also set out in 2021. 

RO 

YES 

Legislative 
measures  

Legislative  measure  clarifying/implementing 
the 
PTD:  Order  No.  874/2019  for  amending  legislation 
concerning  the  tourism  sector  (Ordinul  874/2019 
pentru modificarea unor acte normative din domeniul 
turismului),  issued  by  the  Ministry  of  Tourism, 
published in the OGR, No. 845, 17 October of 2019.  
Legislative  measure  clarifying/implementing 
the 
PTD:  Order  No.  1183/2018  for  the  approval  of  the 
and 
form, 

content,  method  of 

submission 

103 

It amends the provision of Article 3 (2) of Order No. 156/2019, stating that 
organising travel agencies guarantee the amount paid by or on behalf of the 
traveller regardless of whether the packages are sold directly to the traveller 
agency.  
or 

intermediary 

through 

travel 

an 

Order  No.  1183/2019  has  also  suffered  minor  amendments  through  Order 
No.  874/2019,  by  the  introduction  of  Art.  6  failure  to  comply  with  the 
obligations  set  forth  by  the  Order  or  failing  to  comply  with  the  date  of 

 
 
 
 
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measures 
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2018  

Typology of the 
measures  

References 

Comments on the measures 

the  organising 

tourism  agencies 

management of Statement on the activity carried out 
(Ordinul 
by 
1183/2019 pentru aprobarea modelului, conţinutului, 
modalităţii de depunere şi gestionare a ''Declaraţiei 
privind activitatea desfăşurată de către agenţiile de 
turism  organizatoare'')  issued  by  the  Ministry  of 
Toursim, published in the OGR, No. 878, 18 October 
of 2018. 

SE 

YES 

Legislative 
measures  

Government 
Ordinance 

the  PTD:  Förordning 
och 
paketresor 
för 

Legislative measure linked to the PTD transposition, 
lately  amended:  Lag  (2018:1220)  om  ändring  i 
marknadsföringslagen (2008:486)  
implementing 
Measure 
om 
standardformulär 
sammanlänkade 
researrangemang 
Legislative measure linked to the PTD transposition, 
Lag (2018:1336) om ändring i sjölagen (1994:1009)  
Legislative measure linked to the PTD transposition, 
lately amended: Lag (2018:1338) om ändring i lagen 
(2005:59)  om  distansavtal  och  avtal  utanför 
affärslokaler  

104 

submission of the Statement of activity is penalised with an administrative 
fine of RON 10 000 (approx. EUR 2000). 

It  amended  the  "Marketing  Act"  by  inserting  a  reference  to  the  Package 
Travel Act into the non-exhaustive list of acts to which the Marketing Act 
shall be applicable in Section 1 of that Act. With the following amendment 
this  reference  had  been  removed,  and  replaced  with  a  more  generalised 
statement which does mention the PTD. 
It  identified  the  Swedish  Consumer  Agency  (Konsumentverket)  as  the 
authority responsible for issuing certain standard forms listed in the Package 
Travel Act. 
It amended the Maritime Act (1994:1009) through amendment of its Chapter 
15,  Section  8.  This  provision  applies  to  contracts  for  maritime  passenger 
transport, and prohibits such passengers from transferring their rights under 
a  contract  referring  to  specific  passengers  to  another  passenger.  The 
amendment excluded contracts falling under the  Package Travel Act from 
the scope of this provision. 
It amended the Distance and Off-Premises Contracts Act (2005:59), which 
serves to regulate consumer protection for distance contracts and contracts 
entered  into  outside  of  business  premises.  The  amendment  concerned 
Chapter  2,  Section  1  of  this  Act,  on  the  scope  of  Chapter  2  of  the  Act 
regulating  the  provision  of  non-financial  services.  Via  the  amendment, 
contracts falling under the Package Travel Act were excluded from the scope 
of Chapter 2 of the Distance and Off-Premises Contracts Act. This provision 

 
 
 
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Comments on the measures 

SI 

YES 

Legislative 
measures  

SK 

YES 

Legislative 
measures  

has since been further amended, as the exclusion of contracts falling under 
the  Package  Travel  Act  is  now  instead  stated  in  a  separate  provision,  i.e. 
Chapter 2, Section 1 a, with effect from the 1 September 2022.  
It  regulates  the  reimbursement  possibilities  in  case  of  cancellation  of  the 
package travel contract in the context of the Covid-19 emergency. In cases 
where  the  package  travel  contract  is  not  fulfilled  due  to  unavoidable  and 
extraordinary circumstances caused by the epidemic, the travel organizer can 
issue  a  value  note  (voucher)  to  the  consumer  in  the  amount  of  all  the 
consumer's payments. Those consumers, who do not agree with the issuance 
of  the  voucher,  can  demand  from  the  travel  organizer  the  return  of  all 
payments, which the organizer is obliged to return within 12 months after the 
declaration of the end of the epidemic. The guarantee that the tour operator 
must provide under the Consumer Protection Act (ZVPot) also applies to the 
issued voucher.  

It extended the rights of the traveller. 
It provided for rights and obligations arising specifically from the pandemic 
emergency (including mandatory vouchers and a postponement for payment 
until September 2021). 
It introduced a new obligation for the tour operator agencies. For package 
travel organised in the territory of another country, the tour operator agency 
has  the  obligation,  at  the  request  of  the  supervisory  authority,  to  submit  a 
copy  of  the  authorisation  to  conduct  business  in  the  field,  a  copy  of  the 
arrangement of related tourism services issued under the relevant legislation 
of  the  country  of  establishment  of  the  trader,  as  well  as  a  copy  of  the 
documents relating to its insolvency protection. The provision detailed the 
information that must be contained in the insolvency protection documents. 
A  single  provision  was  introduced  stating  that  the  traveller  is  entitled  to 
refuse the replacement tour in writing within 14 days of the date of receipt of 

Epidemic 

Temporary legislative measure to face the Covid-19 
emergency: Act on Amendments and Supplements to 
the  Act  on  Intervention  Measures  to  Curb  the 
COVID-19 
its 
consequences for citizens and the economy (Zakon o 
spremembah  in  dopolnitvah  Zakona  o  interventnih 
ukrepih za zajezitev epidemije COVID-19 in omilitev 
njenih  posledic  za  državljane  in  gospodarstvo, 
Uradni  List  RS,  št.  49/20  z  dne  10  April  2020 
(ZIUZEOP)). 

and  mitigating 

Legislative  measure  clarifying/implementing 
the 
PTD:  Amendment  (1  June  of  2019)  to  Act  No. 
170/2018 (which is relevant for the transposition of 
PTD). 
almost 

provisions 

the 

all 

of 

Temporary legislative measure to face the Covid-19 
emergency: Amendment (29 May of 2020) to Act No. 
170/2018. 

Legislative  measure  clarifying/implementing 
the 
PTD:  Amendment  (21  July  of  2020)  to  Act  No. 
170/2018. 

105 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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2018  

Typology of the 
measures  

References 

Comments on the measures 

Legislative measure amending temporary legislative 
measure:  Amendment  (1  April  of  2022)  to  Act  No. 
170/2018. 

the notification of the replacement tour if, during an emergency situation due 
to  COVID-19  in  the  Slovak  Republic,  is  included  in  the  register  of  job 
seekers. 

106 

 
APPENDIX IX. PACKAGE TRAVEL DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC 

1. Context 

The outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020 was a severe public health emergency. Besides health 
considerations, which were by far the most important  for the EU, this crisis  was also  a 
major  economic  shock.  The  pressure  on  the  EU’s  travel  and  tourism  sectors  was 
unprecedented.  The  COVID-19  pandemic  led  to  mass  cancellations  of  travel  bookings, 
including packages. All types of travel service providers were concerned, including many 
SMEs. Many of them were facing direct liquidity issues and were seeking support from 
the public authorities, including the EU.  

At the same time, citizens were impacted by the cancellation of nearly all national  and 
international travel and tourism services.  

The number of cancellations skyrocketed in 2020. The pandemic resulted in numerous 
travel bans, warnings and restrictions at borders that led to a vast number of cancellations 
and many people being unable to travel. As a result, the tourism sector virtually came to a 
standstill. In April 2020, there were 88% fewer flights in the EU than in April 2019, with 
99% fewer passengers and roughly 50 million flight tickets cancelled between March and 
May 2020. In the EU, the effect of travel restrictions on flights has been more widespread 
than  in  other  parts  of  the  world.942  In  addition,  by  May  2020  there  had  been  an  85% 
reduction in long-distance railway passenger services compared to 2019, an 80% drop in 
regional rail passenger services and 90% in cruise and passenger ships services.943 In the 
1st wave of the pandemic (March-June 2020) international rail passenger volumes dropped 
by  almost  100%  for  all  operators.944  The  sector  experienced  EUR  24  billion  loss  in 
revenues  for  passenger  services  over  2020,  in  comparison  to  2019.  While  data  on  the 
number of packages in 2020 is not available, nor on the number of travel services which 
formed part of a package, the sharp reduction of bookings and increase in cancellations 
strongly suggest a similar decline for the package sector. 945  

The organisers of package travel are subject to the harmonised regime of Directive (EU) 
2015/2302.  The  Directive  provides  that  the  organiser  must  reimburse  the  traveller  for 
payments made if the trip is cancelled due to unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances, 
and that not later than 14 days after the package travel contract is terminated.  

942  European  Court  of  Auditors,  (2021),  Special  Report:  Air  passenger  rights  during  the  COVID-19 
pandemic: Key rights not protected despite Commission efforts, p. 12-13.  
943 European Commission, (2020), Commission Recommendation (EU) 2020/648 on vouchers offered to 
passengers  and  travellers  as  an  alternative  to  reimbursement  for  cancelled  package  travel  and  transport 
services in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, p. 1.  
944  European  Parliament  TRAN  Committee,  (2022),  Relaunching  transport  and  tourism  in  the  EU  after 
COVID-19, 
at: 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2022/690899/IPOL_STU(2022)690899_EN.pdf  
945 Study carried out by ICF 

available 

107 

 
 
 
 
 
While it is not possible to arrive at a robust estimate of the value or number of cancelled 
packages,  the  data  available  for  flights  can  give  an  indication  on  the  magnitude  of  the 
cancellation also for packages. ‘The total reduction in passenger numbers was estimated at 
346 million for the first six months of the year of 2020 by Eurostat, and at 800 million, or 
67  %,  for  the  full  year  by  the  International  Civil  Aviation  Organisation  (ICAO).  We 
estimate that roughly 50 million tickets were cancelled between March and May 2020.’946  

In the  Impact  Assessment  (IA) accompanying  a  proposal  for a Regulation  for  common 
rules for enforcement of passenger rights, passenger rights for multimodal journeys, and 
reimbursements  of  airline  tickets  bought  via  an  intermediary,947  it  is  assumed  that  the 
percentage of tickets in terms of number of passengers948,949 of scheduled flights as part of 
package travel would be 1.5-3%950, while charter flights as part of package travel would 
represent 1.5-3%. 

For  the  COVID-19  period,  a  macro-estimate  of  the  value  of  cancelled  package  contracts 
arrives at around 150 billion EUR (1% of EU27 GDP) for 2020 and 2021 combined. 

The  losses  experienced  by  travellers  related  to  the  cancellation  of  packages  can  be 
estimated based on the annual consumer expenditures for package travel. In 2017, these 
were estimated to reach 58 billion EUR (762 EUR per trip) for trips within Europe and 36 
billion EUR (1.756 EUR per trip) for trips to other parts of the world.951 This corresponds 
to around 76.1 million trips within Europe and 20.5 million trips to countries outside of 
Europe.  Based  on  the  PTD  Application  Report,  around  4.4%  of  package  travellers 
experienced financial loss,952 a fact that may have an impact of 5.4 billion EUR on trip 
values (both external and internal to the EU). It  is unlikely that consumer losses would 
have amounted to the total value of the trips. Using an estimate of between 10-30%953 , the 

not 

rights 

despite 

protected 

Commission 

946 European Court of Audit, Special Report 15/2021: Air passenger rights during the COVID-19 pandemic: 
efforts, 
Key 
https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR21_15/SR_passenger-rights_covid_EN.pdf, p13 
947 SWD ….(2023), page …., Table Error! Main Document Only.: Airline ticket payment flows  
948 Based on evidence provided by IATA and estimates in the  context of the impact assessment support 
study (based on evidence gathered by a group of 5 airlines, which shows that approximately 36% of all 
passengers book via intermediary ticket vendors).  
949 Comparing the information provided by air carriers on the share of tickets sold via intermediary ticket 
vendors and the information provided by IATA on the amount (in euros) of ticket flows in ticket, it has been 
assumed that the share of tickets sold via intermediary ticket vendors is more or less proportional to the 
share of tickets sold (in paid amounts, as provided by IATA). The share of tickets sold via intermediary 
ticket vendors is considered proportional to the share of passengers booking via intermediary ticket vendors. 
950 Given the lack of clarity on the share of tickets, it has been assumed, using a conservative approach, that 
between 25% and 75% of ticket flows may fall within the scope of the Passenger Rights Regulation. The 
mid-point of this range has been considered, i.e., 3%. In addition, it has been considered that 3% of ticket 
flows are under the Package Travel Directive. 
951 
content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2021%3A90%3AFIN    
952 The report states that 11% of all package travel consumers experienced problems, and 40% of these  – 
that is 4.4% of all package travel consumers - experienced financial loss. PTD Application Report, p.3. 
953  The 
around  90  EUR  per  passenger 
intra-EU 
(https://www.statista.com/statistics/1125265/average-ticket-price-selected-airlines-europe/), 
the 
average  long-haul  price  is  350  EUR  per  passenger  (https://media.hopper.com/research/consumer-airfare-
index-report-march-2022) which, in case of cancellation or delays would make up 12% of  average intra-
EU  and  20%  of  international  package  travel  price.  Noting  that  the  quoted  airfares  concern  individually 
purchased tickets, it is assumed that airfares included in package trips may be more economical. Moreover, 
for the calculation of consumer losses, both flights (outgoing and return) would not necessarily be impacted. 
In terms of consumer losses related to accommodation services, an average hotel price per night in the EU 
between 100-200 EUR is considered. Consequently, losses resulting from unsatisfactory accommodation 

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-

average  price  of 

Application 

Report, 

flight 

PTD 

p.2, 

and 

an 

is 

108 

 
 
 
losses could range from 540 million to 1.6 billion EUR.954 Between March and May 2020, 
at  the  beginning  of  COVID-19,  the  cancellation  of  approx.  50  million  flight  tickets,955 
triggered a decrease of flights of around 76% and a decrease of around 75% in expenditure 
on package trips in 2020 as compared to 2019.956 Based on this data, and using an estimate 
between 10-30%, the losses could range from 500-1500 million during the first three month 
of the pandemic.957 

Throughout  Europe,  travel  agencies,  tour  operators  and  airlines  were  confronted  with 
millions of refund claims and complaints from travellers.958  

Package organisers faced difficulties, on the one hand, as they had booked travel services 
in advance for travellers, by making partial or full payments to service providers, while, 
on the other hand, travellers were cancelling their trips, asking for reimbursement, without 
the possibility for organisers to get their money back from service suppliers.959 Since the 
number of bookings  also  collapsed, companies were unable to  generate new sources of 
revenue to execute refunds, which had an impact on their liquidity.960 At the same time, if 
service providers went bankrupt in the meanwhile, organisers might not receive refunds at 
all. ‘This can result in an unfair sharing of the burden among operators in the travel eco-
system.’961  

Therefore,  due  to  liquidity  problems  of  organisers,  contrary  to  the  Directive,  many 
travellers did not receive refunds or received them only considerably later than the 14 days 
required by the PTD. 

2. Vouchers 

Travel  agencies,  tour  operators,  airlines  and  railway  companies  started  to  offer  their 
customers a voucher instead of a cash refund or to postpone the reimbursement. According 
to Member States authorities, package organisers rarely or never offered vouchers before 

not 

Key 

rights 

despite 

protected 

Commission 

can impact 13-26% of package travel prices. Similarly, to airfare however, we estimate that accommodation 
is sold at a discount for package trips and consider that not the entirety of costs may be linked to consumer 
losses.  
954 Introduce reference to ICF study, page  
955  European  Court  of  Auditors,  Special  Report  15/2021:  Air  passenger  rights  during  the  COVID-19 
pandemic: 
efforts, 
https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR21_15/SR_passenger-rights_covid_EN.pdf, p13 
956 According to Eurostat, in EU-27, there was a total of 1146,44 million flights in 2019, 277 million flights 
in 2020 and 374 million flights in 2021.  
Based on Eurostat for 2014, 2017, 2020, 2021, interpolated values for 2015, 2016, 2018, 2019, 2022, 2023 
and on firm level data (ORBIS) as well as on the European Commission 2023 Spring Economic Forecast, it 
resulted that the total expenditure for package trips was EUR 110.709 million in 2019, EUR 27.627 million 
in 2020, EUR 35.879 million in 2021, EUR 76.673 million in 2022 and EUR 110.709 million in 2023, the 
same level of 2019. 
Based on Eurostat for 2014, 2017, 2020, 2021, interpolated values for 2015, 2016, 2018, 2019, 2022, 2023 
and on firm level data (ORBIS) as well as on the European Commission 2023 Spring Economic Forecast, it 
resulted that the average package price in EU-27, for trips within the EU and to the rest of the world, was 
of EUR 1.202 million in 2017, EUR 1.239 million in 2020, EUR 1.274 million in 2021, EUR 1.383 million 
in 2022 and EUR 1.475 million in 2023. 
957 An estimation of 4.029.660 cancelled packages during March – May 2020. 
958 ECTAA, (2020), COVID-19 and Tourism in Europe: Which Consequences for Travel Agencies and Tour 
Operators  - Impact of Package Travel Directive and other EU legislation on the travel companies in the 
context of the pandemic, p. 5.  
959   Ibidem, p. 6.  
960   Ibidem.  
961 Recital 13 of the Commission Recommendation (EU) 2020/648. 

109 

 
 
COVID-19,  whereas  they  started  to  frequently  offer  them  since  the  outbreak  of  the 
pandemic.962 One Member State authority explained that, before the pandemic, if a voucher 
was issued, this was only on a contractual basis between the organiser and the traveller.963 
Businesses also shared that before the pandemic vouchers were offered rarely, while being 
offered frequently since the outbreak of COVID-19.964 

Several  Member  States  adopted  legislation  deviating  from  the  Directive,  significantly 
extending the periods for reimbursements or making vouchers mandatory for travellers. In 
July 2020, the Commission opened infringement proceedings against 11 Member States.965  

Consumer organisation outlined that travellers were sometimes given a voucher/credit note 
although they would have preferred a refund,966 hence pointing to certain non-compliance 
with the PTD and enforcement problems regarding imposition of vouchers.  

In  a  recommendation  on  vouchers  of  May  2020  (Commission  Recommendation  on 
vouchers)967, the Commission  set  out  principles in relation  to  make  voluntary vouchers 
more attractive for travellers. First, travellers should have the choice to accept vouchers or 
to claim cash refund. If they accept a voucher, they should be able to request a full refund 
if they have not used it by the end of its validity.  In addition, such vouchers should be 
covered in the event of insolvency of the airline or travel organiser. Member States should 
ensure that such (existing) insolvency protection is sufficiently robust to guarantee those 
vouchers. 

3. Implementation of the Recommendation on Vouchers 

The  Commission  report  on  the  application  of  the  PTD968  indicates  that  ‘Germany969, 
Hungary970, Latvia971 and Cyprus972 have adopted national rules setting a legal framework 
for vouchers proposed for voluntary acceptance by travellers in the package travel sector, 
along  the  lines  of  the  Commission  Recommendation,  in  particular  regarding  protection 
against  the  insolvency  of  the  issuer.  Italy  and  Greece  have  followed  parts  of  the 
Recommendation  when  amending  their  laws  after  the  opening  of  infringement 
proceedings.  Spain  amended  its  legislation  to  prevent  the  opening  of  the  infringement 

962 NCAs Regulatory and Enforcement targeted survey Q.5  – n. 24: Before COVID-19: 0 frequently, 16 
rarely, 4 never. Since the outbreak of COVID-19: 20 frequently, 0 rarely, 0 never. 
963 Interview with Member State NCA, 25th November 2022. 
964 Business targeted survey Q. 16 – n. = 25: Before COVID-19: 5 frequently, 11 rarely, 3 never, 6 don’t 
know. Since the outbreak of COVID-19: 18 frequently, 1 rarely, 0 never, 6 don’t know. 
965  See  Commission’s  press  communications  of  2  July  and  30  October  2020  (under  point  5  –  Justice): 
and 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/INF_20_1212 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_20_1687   
966 Public consultation (Section III for public authorities and consumer organisations, Q41): 18 of 21 (81%) 
of consumer organisations and 11 of 19 (58%) public authorities. And see BEUC position papers submitted 
as feedback to the IIA, and to the public consultation that describes issues around imposition of vouchers. 
967  Commission  Recommendation  of  13.5.2020  on  vouchers  offered  to  passengers  and  travellers  as  an 
alternative  to  reimbursement  for  cancelled  package  travel  and  transport  services  in  the  context  of  the 
COVID-19 pandemic, C/2020/3125, OJ L 151, 14.5.2020, p. 10–16 
968 COM(2021) 90 final, p. 19 
969 Act of 10 July 2020 to mitigate the consequences of the COVID-19 outbreak in package travel contract 
law, BGBl 2020 Teil I Nr. 35 of 16.7.2020, p. 1643. 
970 Government Decree 242/2020 of 27 May on the special rules applicable to contracts for travel services 
during an emergency. 
971 Law on the Management of the Spread of COVID-19 Infection, chapter V, section 46, Latvijas Vēstnesis, 
110A, 09.06.2020, OP number: 2020/110A.1. 
972 The Emergency Measures in the Tourism Sector Law of 2020, Law 59(I)/2020 of 22 May 2020. 

110 

 
 
proceedings. Ireland introduced State-backed refund credit notes that may be offered to 
customers of tour operators and travel agents operating in Ireland instead of a cash refund, 
if the customer agrees.973’ 

In  the  framework  of  the  consultations  for  the  evaluation974,  Member  States  which 
introduced systems of  voluntary vouchers were asked about the share of travellers who 
accepted vouchers in connection with cancellations related to COVID-19. The majority of 
the  respondents  did  not  have  this  information.975  The  same  question  was  asked  to 
businesses  and  consumer  organisations.  In  both  cases,  the  majority  of  the  respondents 
replied that they did not know the share. Regarding businesses, 4 respondents out of 20 
said  that  the  share  of  travellers  who  accepted  vouchers  was  between  30%  and  50%,976 
whereas 2 out of 8 consumers organisation replied that the share was between 10% and 
30%.977 

However,  given  the  non-binding  nature  of  recommendations,  package  organisers 
continued to issue vouchers as they saw fit or in line with national rules breaching the PTD 
and the Recommendation, with the consequence that travellers in different EU countries 
were treated differently.978 In a December 2020 report, BEUC mentions that ‘[h]owever, 
although  this  Recommendation  and  these  proceedings  have  been  welcomed  by  BEUC, 
their concrete effects are limited.’979 

The study carried out by ICF identified mixed stakeholder views on the matter. Consumer 
organisations emphasised that travellers should not be deprived of their right to a monetary 
refund, as the choice of whether to accept a voucher or to receive a cash refund ultimately 
belongs to consumers.980 However, in reality, travellers often did not have this choice. On 
the other hand, an industry stakeholder explained that often travel agents had no choice but 
to impose vouchers on their customers, even if not the best solution, as they were the only 
short-term alternative solution to help traders to avoid bankruptcy.981 Academic research 
suggests that vouchers should benefit travellers and tour organisers alike, and this cannot 
be the case in the framework of mandatory vouchers.982  

The  above  has  been  confirmed  by  the  social  media  listening  exercise  conducted  in  the 
framework of the study, which detected several reasons behind the negative experiences 

973 https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/1ae3d-refund-credit-note/  
974 Study to support the preparation of an evaluation of the Package Travel Directive back-to-back with an 
impact assessment on its potential revision, prepared by ICF SA,  
975 NCAs Regulatory and Enforcement targeted survey Q. 7 – n. = 18: Less than 10%: 2; Between 10% and 
30%: 3; Between 30% and 50%: 1; Between 50% and 75%: 2; More than 75%: 0; Don’t know: 10. 
976 Business targeted survey Q. 17 – n. = 20: Less than 10%: 0; Between 10% and 30%: 2; Between 30% 
and 50%: 4; Between 50% and 75%: 3; More than 75%: 1; Don’t know: 10. 
977 Consumer organisations targeted survey Q. 12 – n. = 8: Less than 10%: 1; Between 10% and 30%: 2; 
Between 30% and 50%: 1; Between 50% and 75%: 0; More than 75%: 1; Don’t know: 3. 
978 European Court of Auditors, (2021), Air passenger rights during the COVID-19 pandemic […]. 
979 BEUC (2020), COVID-19 and EU Travellers’ Rights, Evaluation of the Member States Implementation 
of the EU Commission Recommendation on ‘vouchers’, p. 1, https://www.beuc.eu/position-papers/covid-
19-and-eu-travellers-rights-evaluation-member-states-implementation-eu  
980 BEUC, (2021), The Package Travel Directive: BEUC’s Position on how to regain consumers’ trust in 
the tourism sector, p.17.  
981 ECTAA, (2020), COVID-19 and Tourism in Europe: Which Consequences for Travel Agencies and Tour 
Operators […], p. 7.  
982 Loos, M.B.M., (2021), One day I'll fly away… Voucher schemes for cancelled package travel contracts 
after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, Amsterdam Law School Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 
2021-13.  

111 

 
 
shared by consumers. These included delays in receiving refunds or vouchers from travel 
companies after travel arrangements were cancelled, the timeframes that issued vouchers 
needed to be used by, and the difficulties consumers encountered when they sought refunds 
instead of vouchers.983  

4. Cancellation of package travel contracts under Article 12(2)  

Cancellations  of  package  travel  contracts  due  to  ‘unavoidable  and  extraordinary 
circumstances’  and  refunds  became  problematic,  in  particular  for  travellers,  during  the 
COVID-19 pandemic.  

On the one hand, as mentioned above, some Member States adopted national emergency 
measures on refunds of packages as a result of COVID-19 pandemic infringing the PTD 
and also leading to different rules related to refunds across Member States.984  

In addition, different interpretations of Article 12(2) emerged and most national competent 
authorities called for clarifications on the rules on trip cancellations.985 Several questions986 
have  been  referred  to  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union  in  relation  to  the 
cancellation right under Article 12(2). In C-396/21 the CJEU, in relation to the right to a 
price reduction in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Court ruled on the traveller’s 
right to a price reduction and compensation for damages according to Article 14 because 
of the lack of conformity of travel services. Whether this is attributable to the organiser or 
to persons other than that traveller or that it is due to circumstances beyond the control of 
that organiser such as ‘unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’, within the meaning 

983 The social media listening collected Twitter data from the EU 27/EEA from June 2020 - June 2022 for 
commentary discussing travel packages, including vouchers and refunds, during the Covid-19 crisis. The 
collected  data  includes  all  Twitter  comments  (excluding  retweets)  which  mention  the  set  of  pre-defined 
keywords related to travel packages. 3,291 tweets were collected, translated and then modelled in English. 
984 See BEUC, Covid-19 and EU travellers’ rights - Evaluation of the Member States Implementation of the 
EU Commission Recommendation on ‘vouchers’ 
985 See NCAs Regulatory and enforcement targeted survey, open Q2.  
986  AT  (Request  for  a  preliminary  ruling  from  the  Oberster  Gerichtshof  (Austria)  lodged  on  16 August 
2022 — GF v Schauinsland-Reisen GmbH (Case C-546/22) (2022/C 408/45);  Request for a preliminary 
ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria) lodged on 21 June 2022 — DocLX Travel Events GmbH v 
Verein für Konsumenteninformation (Case C-414/22) (2022/C 359/48); Request for a preliminary ruling 
from the Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria) lodged on 11 March 2022 — TR, UQ v FTI Touristik GmbH (Case 
C-193/22) (2022/C 237/44); Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesgericht Salzburg (Austria) 
lodged on 5 May 2021 — FC v FTI Touristik GmbH (Case C-287/21) (2021/C 278/47)), DE (Request for a 
preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Frankfurt am Main (Germany) lodged on 29 July 2022 — AQ v 
trendtours Touristik GmbH (Case C-511/22) (2022/C 441/08); Request for a preliminary ruling from the 
Landgericht Frankfurt am Main (Germany) lodged on 9 August 2022 — PA v trendtours Touristik GmbH 
(Case C-529/22) (2022/C 441/09); Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) 
lodged on 5 September 2022 — QM v Kiwi Tours GmbH (Case C-584/22) (2022/C 441/24); Request for a 
preliminary  ruling  from  the  Amtsgericht  Düsseldorf  (Germany)  lodged  on  15 December  2021 —  EV  v 
Alltours Flugreisen GmbH (Case C-776/21) (2022/C 138/12)); ES (Request for a preliminary ruling from 
the Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Cartagena (Spain) lodged on 8 February 2022 — RTG v Tuk Travel, 
S.L.  (Case  C-83/22)  (2022/C  213/33);  LT  (Request  for  a  preliminary  ruling  from  the  Lietuvos 
Aukščiausiasis  Teismas  lodged  on  4 May  2022 —  M. D.  v  ‘Tez  Tour’  UAB  (Case  C-299/22)  (2022/C 
311/05).  Two  other  requests  for  preliminary  rulings  have  been  lodged  on  related  issues,  namely  on  the 
voluntary  or  mandatory  nature  of  vouchers  (DE  Request  for  a  preliminary  ruling  from  the  Landgericht 
München I (Germany) lodged on 17 November 2021 — RSD Reise Service Deutschland GmbH v QL (Case 
C-690/21)  (2022/C  51/29))  and  on  the  possible  derogation  to  obligation  to  a  refund  (FR  Request  for  a 
preliminary  ruling  from  the  Conseil  d’État  (France)  lodged  on  2 July  2021 —  Union  fédérale  des 
consommateurs — Que choisir (UFC — Que choisir), Consommation, logement et cadre de vie (CLCV) v 
Premier ministre, Ministre de l’Économie, des Finances et de la Relance (Case C-407/21) (2021/C 357/18)). 

112 

 
 
of Article 3(12), does not affect the existence of that traveller’s right to a price reduction 
and compensation for damages.  

In addition, the circumstances occurring at the place of departure constituted a key aspect 
of  the  COVID-19  pandemic  crisis  as,  e.g.,  while  the  restrictions  on  movement  or 
quarantine requirements at the place of departure were rendering, de facto, impossible for 
a traveller to start the package travel contract (for instance, travellers may have not been 
able to reach the airport in case it was located in another region and the movement among 
regions was limited)987, the organiser/retailer often did not accept this as a justification for 
the termination without fees able to trigger the conditions of Article 12(2). When asked 
whether a potential recast of the current PTD would need to include the circumstances at 
the  place  of  departure  within  the  boundaries  of  Article  12(2),  the  sector  is  polarised 
between consumers that almost unanimously are in favour of this,988 and most businesses 
that are against.989  

Travel  industry  representatives  outlined  the  problem  rising  from  the  divergent  regime 
applicable to organisers under the PTD, who must reimburse travellers in money, and that 
applicable to some service providers, such as hotels, allowed to issue vouchers during the 
pandemic.990  

The dysfunctionalities in the business-to-business (B2B) relationships  proved to  have a 
negative  impact  on  travellers,  triggering  two  main  problems  regarding  refunds  of  pre-
payments: (a) referral of travellers from organisers to retailers and vice-versa, making it 
very difficult for travellers to obtain their rights and (b) delay in reimbursing travellers due 
to  the  difficulties  that  organisers  faced  in  recovering  the  pre-payments  from  service 
providers, e.g., airlines and hotels 

(i) Referral of travellers from organisers to retailers and vice-versa 

According to consumer organisations, travellers have been ‘occasionally’ unaware whom 
to contact for a refund under Article 12 before the COVID-19 pandemic and ‘often’ during 
the  pandemic.  Situations  in  which  (i)  organisers  referred  travellers  to  retailers  for  the 
refund,  and  (ii)  retailers  referred  travellers  to  organisers  for  the  refund  have  been 
experienced ‘often’ by consumers in practice (see Table below).991    

Main B2B related scenarios/issues reported by consumers on refund rights due to 

‘unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’ under Article 12  

Scenarios 

Extent 

Period 

Before COVID-19 

During COVID-19 

987 Interview with a worldwide business association representing the airline sector.  
988 Targeted survey – Consumer (Q8): 92% (11 out of 12) respondents from consumer organisations selected 
‘Yes’.  
989 Targeted survey – Business (Q14): 69% (9 out of 13) respondents from business organisations selected 
‘No.  
990  European  Commission,  minutes  of  the  meeting  of  the  Stakeholder  Expert  Group  to  support  the 
application of the Package Travel and Linked Travel Arrangements Directive (2015/2302), 8 November 
2022. 
991 According to a Dutch consumer organisation interviewed for the study, there are also problems with tour 
operators making use of resellers, resulting in stipulating contracts that are invisible for travellers. Thus, if 
the travellers are not bound directly to a contract with the tour operator but with a reseller, then they do not 
understand where the money goes, becoming ‘invisible’ to the consumers, especially with bank transfers. 
This organisation would welcome solutions entailing a direct payment to the tour operator.  

113 

 
 
 
Travellers were unaware 
whom to contact for a refund   

Organisers referred travellers 
to retailers for the refund 

Retailers referred travellers 
to organisers for the refund   

Often 
Occasionally 
Rarely 
Often 
Occasionally 
Rarely 
Often 
Occasionally 
Rarely 

8% 
67% 
17% 
50% 
33% 
8% 
58% 
25% 
8% 

Source: ICF targeted survey – consumer organisations (Q9).992  

33% 
50% 
17% 
67% 
17% 
17% 
75% 
17% 
8% 

Most national authorities (regulatory and enforcement), confirmed this, i.e., that, where the 
package was purchased via a retailer, travellers often did not have enough information on 
whom to contact for a refund and they were often sent from one trader to another without 
an effective resolution of their claims.993 

Travellers are confused regarding the division of responsibilities for the performance of a 
package travel contract among the various actors of the value chain.994    

The confusion in the division of roles and responsibilities between organisers and retailers 
is to the detriment of travellers, and at the same time impacts the level playing field for 
businesses  and  hinders  the  effectiveness  of  the  PTD  and  the  achievement  of  its  stated 
objectives.   

(ii)  Delay  in  reimbursing  travellers  due  to  the  difficulties  that  organisers  faced  in 
recovering the pre-payments from service providers 

A significant share of businesses (45%) indicated that, during the COVID-19 pandemic, 
organisers were unable to provide timely refunds to travellers as they did not receive timely 
refunds from service providers.995,996 NCAs (regulatory and enforcement) confirmed they 
noticed this challenge, although to a lesser extent (23%).997 

992 N respondents of targeted survey – consumer organisations (Q9) = 12. From this number the indicated 
percentages of the table have been calculated.  
993 Targeted survey – NCAs (regulatory and enforcement) (Q17): 60% (15 out of 25) selected ‘Yes’ to this 
point.  This  point  was  partially  confirmed  by  individuals  using  travel  services  in  the  public  consultation 
(Q35): when asked about the main problems they faced before the start or during a package travel contract, 
14% of citizens indicated that the organiser referred them to the retailer through whom I had bought the 
package, but the retailer sent them back to the organiser, or vice versa. 
994 See EQ1, sub-section Organisers’ liability for the performance of the contract 
995 Targeted survey – businesses (Q15) N = 22. During the Covid-19 pandemic, organisers were unable to 
provide timely refunds to travellers because they did not receive timely refunds from service providers, but 
have, in the meantime, received refunds from service providers: 45% replied to a large extent, 14% to a 
moderate extent, 14% to a small extent. During the Covid-19 pandemic, organisers were unable to provide 
timely refunds to travellers because they did not receive timely refunds from service providers and have still 
not received refunds from service providers: 19% to a large extent, 10% to a moderate extent, 33% to a 
small extent. 
996  Interview  with  a  German  business  association  indicated  that  some  providers  had  to  wait  a  long  time 
before the money came back for hotels and airlines so there was a gap between the time the tourist paid and 
the service partners who has to pay through the customer.  
997 N respondents of targeted survey – NCAs (regulatory and enforcement) (Q4) = 27. During the Covid-19 
pandemic, organisers were unable to provide timely refunds to travellers because they did not receive timely 
refunds from service providers, but have, in the meantime, received refunds from service providers: 23% to 

114 

 
 
 
‘The  uneven  character  of  the  business-to-business  relation  is  further  aggravated  by  the 
different legal regimes of organisers and transport services providers. Contrary to the PTD, 
passengers who cancel a flight or other transport service themselves do not have a right to 
reimbursement under the EU passenger rights Regulations, even in case of extraordinary 
circumstances.  In  such  a  case,  the  legal  consequences  and  in  particular  the  passenger’s 
right  to  reimbursement  are  determined  by  the  terms  and  conditions  of  the  contract 
concluded between the passenger and the transport operator and the applicable law of the 
Member States. For example, if a traveller who booked a package with a flight component, 
cancelled  the  package  travel  contract  in  accordance  with  the  PTD,  the  organiser  has  to 
reimburse the traveller, but has no right under EU law to claim a refund from the airline if 
the flight was operated. The organiser would rather need to assert a possible right to refund 
under the relevant law of the Member State concerned.’998 

In general, service providers had not invoked legal reasons for delaying significantly the 
refunds to organisers. Several European umbrella organisations of businesses outlined that 
‘during the Covid19 pandemic, the main reason why package organisers/retailers could not 
refund their customers stems from their inability  to recover the traveller’s monies from 
service providers (in particular airlines).’999 

Businesses  explained  that  there  were  ‘many  cases  where  organisers  had  to  reimburse 
travellers who cancelled their package, but organisers were not reimbursed by the airlines. 
[…] During  2021 and 2022  Member States issued travel  warnings due to  the Covid-19 
pandemic. In this context, many travellers cancelled their package contracts, while airlines 
operated flights and hence refused to refund organisers, who, in any event, had to refund 
travellers.’1000   

Businesses also ‘explained that refunds in normal times go through the global distribution 
systems (GDSs) that ensure automatic refunds. During the pandemic, it was a deliberated 
choice of airlines to go through a manual process, allowing them to hold the refunds 8-9 
months.’1001 

Even if, in the end, organisers received some refunds from service providers, the negative 
impact that those delays had on travellers and organisers was still significant. 

5. Official travel warning or advice 

An official travel warning of national authorities is an important indicator that a package 
travel  contract  can  be  cancelled  due  to  unavoidable  and  extraordinary  circumstances 
affecting the performance of the trip. However, the PTD itself is silent in respect of the 
legal value of travel warning or advice issued by governments, as, at the moment of its 

a large extent, 23% to a moderate extent, 8% to a small extent. During the Covid-19 pandemic, organisers 
were unable to provide timely refunds to travellers because they did not receive timely refunds from service 
providers and have still not received refunds from service providers. 16% to a large extent, 8% to a moderate 
extent, 20% to a small extent. 
998 COM(2021) 90 final, p.18 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52022DC0180  
999 ECTAA, position paper in reply to the targeted survey 
1000 Meeting with business organisation  during the consultation process  
1001 Ibidem 

115 

 
 
adoption, 1002 some Member States were strongly opposed to any reference to official travel 
advice in the Directive.’1003  

In the public consultation, stakeholders were asked whether, in case of a recast of the PTD, 
they  would  foresee  the  need  to  specify  the  consequences  of  ‘official  travel  warnings’ 
within the package travel context (e.g., their legal value in connection with cancellations 
because of unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances). Overall, the public consultation 
illustrated  that  regulating  ‘official  travel  warnings’  within  the  cancellation  rights  under 
Article 12(2) due to ‘unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’ would not be a viable 
option for most stakeholders.1004 In this regard, there is a certain division in the sector, with 
most  consumer  organisations1005  in  favour  of  this  possibility,  while,  in  contrast,  public 
authorities,1006 and businesses1007 endorsing this option to a more limited extent.  

Stakeholders noted that travel warnings are crucial in enabling the refund right in light of 
unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances, both in the remit of the PTD and of the Air 
Passengers Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 1008 (APR).1009  

6. State aid measures 

The  Commission  Recommendation  on  vouchers  also  points  to  instruments  available  to 
help  easing  the  uncontested  liquidity  needs  of  undertakings  in  the  transport  and  travel 
sectors, without compromising consumers’ rights.   

Because of the impact of the pandemic on the economy in general as well as on the travel 
industry  specifically,  the  European  Commission  enabled  Member  States  to  use  the  full 
flexibility  foreseen  under  State  aid  rules  to  support  the  economy.  In  March  2020,  the 
Temporary  Framework  was  adopted  to  e.g.,  alleviate  the  aftermath  of  the  travel  ban 
measures and other sanitary restrictions which weighed on the EU’s economy.1010  

1002  The  Commission  proposal  for  the  PTD,  COM(2013)  512  final  of  9.7.2013,  stated  in  its  recital  26: 
“Unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances should in particular be deemed to exist where reliable and 
publicly  available  reports,  such  as  recommendations  issued  by  Member  State  authorities,  advise  against 
travelling to the place of destination.” This statement was deleted during the legislative negotiations. 
1003 COM(2021) 90 final, p.19 
1004 Public consultations (Q11): when asked whether the PTD should specifically regulate the consequences 
of ‘official travel warnings’, e.g., their legal value in connection with cancellations because of unavoidable 
and extraordinary circumstances, 53% (266 out of 502) of the stakeholders selected ‘No’, while 42% (209 
out of 502) ‘Yes’.  
1005 Public consultations (Q11): 81% of the consumer organisations (17 of 21) were in favour of regulating 
the  consequences  of  ‘official  travel  warnings’,  e.g.,  their  legal  value  in  connection  with  cancellations 
because of unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’.  
1006 Public consultations (Q11): 45% of the public authorities (10 of 22) were in favour of regulating the 
consequences of ‘official travel warnings’, e.g., their legal value in connection with cancellations because 
of unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’. 
1007 Public consultations (Q11): 33% of the companies (104 of 319)  and 42% of the business associations  
were  in  favour  of  regulating  the  consequences  of  ‘official  travel  warnings’,  e.g.,  their  legal  value  in 
connection with cancellations because of unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’. 
1008 
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32004R0261.  
1009 Interviews with a large consumer organisation, and a large business association. The point was mentioned 
during ICF WS1 (26 October 2022) and during the PTD Expert Group meeting (8 November 2022) by the 
same organisations.  
1010  The  State  Aid  Temporary  Framework.  Available  at:  https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-
aid/coronavirus/temporary-framework_en 

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-

Regulation 

261/2004: 

(EC) 

No 

116 

 
 
The Temporary Framework is based on Article 107(3)(b) TFEU1011 and complements other 
possibilities  available  to  Member  States  to  mitigate  the  social-economic  impact  of  the 
coronavirus  outbreak  in  line  with  EU  State  aid  rules,  e.g.,  the  possibility  under  Article 
107(2)b TFEU1012 to compensate specific companies or specific sectors for the damages 
directly  caused  by  ‘exceptional  occurrences’  (i.e.,  the  coronavirus  epidemic).  Several 
amendments were adopted to extend the scope of the Temporary Framework.1013 

Since the beginning of the coronavirus outbreak, 108 State aid measures have been adopted 
under  Article  107(2)b,1014  38  under  Article  107(3)b,1015  four  under  Article  107(3)c 
TFEU1016 and about 700 under the Temporary Framework.1017 All measures available in 
the  Commission  website.1018  Only  those  adopted  under  Article  107(3)b)  and  under  the 
Temporary Framework are relevant to the PTD. Most of the Member States made use of 
State aid measures. The decisions have different characteristics and purposes, such as: 

1. providing travel organisers with sufficient liquidity to continue their activities during 
and after the coronavirus outbreak. For example: 

-  On  3  December  2021,  the  European  Commission  approved  an  approximately  €23 
million (DKK 173.55 million) Danish scheme to support travel operators in the context 
of the  coronavirus pandemic. The  aid  took  form  of direct  grants,  available to  travel 
operators  registered  in  the  Danish  Travel  Guarantee  Fund  (‘Rejsegarantifonden'), 
which  aims  at  refunding  travellers  in  case  of  cancellation  of  travel  packages.  The 
purpose of the scheme was to support the liquidity needs of travel operators that had to 
pay additional fees to cover the liquidity shortages of the Fund due to the coronavirus 
pandemic.1019 

- On 3 February 2022, the Commission approved a €300 million Austrian scheme to 
support package travel organisers and facilitators of linked travel services affected by 
the coronavirus pandemic. The scheme was a re-introduction of a measure approved 
by  the  Commission  in February  2021 (SA.60521)  which  expired  on  30  June  2021. 
Under the scheme, the aid takes the form of State guarantees. The guarantees covered, 
for a limited period of time, 100% of the beneficiaries' liability for travel services which 
could not be provided in full or in part due to the coronavirus pandemic. The scheme 

in 

on 

were 

2020 

April 

2020: 

adopted 

Amendments 

3 
8 
29 

1011 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12008E107&from=EN . 
1012 Ibidem 
1013 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_570), 
(https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_838), 
(https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1221) 
(https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1872);  and 
2021(https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_261) 
(https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_6092). 
1014 One in 2023, 15 in 2022, 48 in 2021, 44 in 2020 
1015 One in 2022, 9 in 2021, 18 in 2020. 
1016 All 4 in 2020. 
1017  Communication  from  the  Commission  Temporary  Framework  for  State  aid  measures  to  support  the 
economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak 2020/C 91 I/01, C/2020/1863, OJ C 91I , 20.3.2020, p. 1–9.  
1018 https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-
02/State_aid_decisions_TF_and_107_2b_107_3b_107_3c.pdf.  
1019  3 December 2021: Commission approves €23.33 million Danish scheme to support travel operators in 
the context of the coronavirus outbreak (SA.100368) (daily news: MEX/21/6598). See Daily News 03 / 12 
/ 2021 (europa.eu). 

(see 
2020 
May 
2020 
June 
2020 
October 
in  2021:  on  28  January 
2021 

18  November 

and 

and 

13 

117 

 
 
 
was temporary in nature and ensure adequate protection of the beneficiaries against the 
risk of insolvency until 31 December 2022.1020  

- On 10 May 2021, the Commission found an approximately € 1.9  billion (CZK 50 
billion) Czech scheme to support companies affected by the coronavirus outbreak. The 
aim of the scheme was to provide the beneficiaries with sufficient liquidity to continue 
their activities during and after the coronavirus outbreak.1021 

- On 9 July 2021 the Commission approved a €750 million German scheme in the form 
of a State guarantee for loans that may be taken out by the Travel Insolvency Fund, to 
reimburse travellers in case of insolvency of package travel organisers.1022 

- On 18 November 2020, the Commission approved a BGN 51 million (approximately 
€26 million) Bulgarian scheme to support tour operators and travel agents in the context 
of the coronavirus outbreak, taking the form of direct grants. The aid was granted to 
tour operators and travel agents: (i) to refund customers whose travel packages were 
cancelled between 1 March and 31 December 2020 due to the coronavirus outbreak; 
and  (ii)  to  cover  the  costs  incurred  to  carry  out  their  main  activities  over  the  same 
period.1023 

2. supporting vouchers be guaranteed against insolvency, in line with the Commission’s 
Recommendation on vouchers1024. For example: 

- On 30 July 2020, the Commission approved a German State guarantee scheme worth 
€840 million to cover vouchers issued by travel operators for cancelled travel packages 
booked prior to 8 March 2020.1025 
-  The  Commission  also  approved  state  aid  for  Cyprus,  covering  credit  notes  from 
organisers to travellers to cover gaps in the insurance cover, but also credit notes issued 
by certain service providers to organisers and travellers.1026  
- The Commission also approved state aid for the Netherlands, extending coverage to 
include expiring crisis vouchers, which were issued from March 2020.1027 

3. The Commission approved state aid decisions with direct link to refunds of travellers, 
for  example  for  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Lithuania,  Poland,  and 
Sweden.1028  

1020 3 February: €300 million Austrian scheme for package travel organisers and facilitators of linked travel 
services in the context of the coronavirus pandemic (SA.101114) (daily news: MEX/22/803).  
1021  10  May:  €11.6  million  Czech  scheme  to  support  travel  agencies  in  context  of  coronavirus  outbreak 
(SA.61837) (daily news: MEX/21/2441).  
1022 9 July: €750 million German State guarantee scheme for the Travel Insolvency Fund in the context of the 
coronavirus outbreak (SA.63063) (press release: IP/21/3611) 
1023 18 December: €26 million Bulgarian scheme to support tour operators and travel agents in the context of 
coronavirus outbreak (SA.59990) (daily news: MEX/20/2507). 
1024 European Commission, Recommendation (EU) 2020/648 (…). 
1025 30 July: €840 million German guarantee scheme to protect consumers and support the travel industry in 
the context of the coronavirus outbreak (SA.57741) (press release: IP/20/1431). 
1026 SA.59668  
1027 SA.62271 
1028 SA.62887 BG, SA.57665 LT, SA.58102 PL 

118 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX X. OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL INSOVENCY PROTECTION SYSTEMS 

Memb
er 
State 

Austri
a  

Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

N/A 

Three different 
systems are available 
to protect consumers in 
the event of 
insolvency:  

insurance contract 
bank guarantee  
guarantee declaration 
of a public 
corporation  

These three systems can be 
seen as alternatives 
to each other. All 
systems include the 
same sum insured and 
this is calculated in the 
same way. The 
difference is therefore 
only in the person of 
the insurance provider. 

NO 
[Austria
n Law 
does 
not 
differ 
betwee
n a 
travel 
organis
er and 
a 
trader 
facilitati
ng 
LTAs 
but 
refers 
to 
person
s 
entitled 
to 
exercis
e travel 
service
s 
(Sectio
n 1, 
Paragr
aph 3 
of 
Packag
e 
Travel 
Regula
tion)] 

The sum insured to be 
determined (...) shall 
be based on the 
intended turnover 
dates of the (...) 
calendar year. The 
sum insured shall be  

1. at least EUR 13,000 
or  
2. at least 18 % of the 
turnover of that 
calendar year, or  
3. at least 50 % of the 
turnover of the peak 
month,  

The higher of those 
amounts must be 
covered.  
The premium is 
calculated according to 
the insurance-relevant 
turnover. There is a 
minimum premium 
(EUR 340, - to EUR 
400, - depending on 
the type of cover). The 
minimum sum 
insured according to 
the PRG is EUR 
13,000. There are 
different premium rates 
depending on the 
insurance variant 
(limited or unlimited 
liability).  

1. the 
prepayments 
already made 
by the 
traveller 
(down 
payments 
and balance 
payments) if, 
as a result of 
the 
insolvency of 
the person 
entitled to 
perform the 
travel 
services, the 
travel 
services are 
not provided 
in whole or in 
part or if the 
service 
provider 
demands 
payment 
from the 
traveller 

2. the 
expenses 
necessary for 
the 
repatriation 
and, if 
necessary, 
the costs of 
accommodati

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

NO 

NO 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

NO 

The 
maximum 
liability 
amount is 
based on 
the 
insured 
insurance
-relevant 
cost 
announce
d by the 
policyhol
der. If the 
sum 
insured is 
not 
sufficient, 
an aliquot 
settlemen
t is made 
to the 
travellers. 
The 
exception 
to this 
rule is the 
case of 
unlimited 
liability. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

on before the 
repatriation 
which have 
arisen as a 
result of the 
insolvency of 
the travel 
organiser or - 
in the case of 
responsibility 
for the 
carriage of 
passengers - 
of the trader 
facilitating 
LTAs, and 

3. where 
appropriate, 
the costs 
necessary for 
the 
continuation 
of the trip. 

According to 
Article 12 of 
the Royal 
Decree of 29 
May 2018: 
(i) The 
continuation 
of the trip, if 
possible; 
(ii) The 
reimburseme
nt of 
prepayments 
paid when 
contracting 

NO 

YES - 
The 
organis
er and 
the 
retailer 
are 
each 
liable 
for the 
refund 
of all 
paymen
ts 
already 
made 

The cost 
or 
repatriati
on is 
defined 
by each 
insurance 
company 
in 
consultati
on with 
the 
recipient 
of the 
insurance 
(organise

YES - 
The only 
difference 
is that 
according 
to Article 
5 of the 
Royal 
Decree of 
29 May 
2018, the 
insurer 
can 
exempt a 
“microco
mpany” 

NO 

Belgiu
m  

The only protection 
mechanism which is 
put into place in 
Belgium is the 
obligation for the 
organisers/traders to 
take an insolvability 
insurance (Articles 54, 
55 and 65 of the 
Implementing Law; 
Royal Decree of 29 
May 2018). 

A similar guarantee 
should also be 
provided by an 

The 
Implemen
ting Law 
has no 
exception
s on the 
coverage, 
in 
complianc
e with 
Article 17 
and 
Recitals 
39-40 of 
Directive 

The Implementing Law 
and the Royal Decree 
of 29 May 2018 do not 
set out a methodology, 
or provide factors to be 
taken into account, for 
the calculation of 
insurance premium. 

However, Article 4 of 
the Royal Decree of 29 
May 2018 provides 
that an insolvency 
insurance is only 
granted or maintained 
when: 

120 

 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

2015/230
2. 

organiser or retailer 
selling separately, as 
intermediary, travel 
services (Article 72 of 
the Implementing Law). 

(i) the capital of the 
trader constitutes of at 
least 15% of its 
assets, unless the 
trader has an 
additional bank 
guarantee provided 
that its capital 
exceeds EUR 25,000; 
(ii) the trader 
communicates its 
annual reports within 
one month after their 
approval by the 
General Assembly; 
(iii) the trader has 
made all relevant 
payments to the VAT 
fund, social security, 
and income taxes as 
legally required. 

with the 
trader; 
(iii) The 
reimburseme
nt of the 
travel 
services that 
cannot be 
provided 
anymore as a 
result of the 
trader’s 
insolvency; 
(iv) The 
repatriation 
of the 
travellers, 
when the 
execution of 
the contract 
with the 
trader has 
already 
started and 
that such 
contract 
includes the 
travellers’ 
transportatio
n and, if 
needed, an 
accommodati
on when 
waiting for 
the 
repatriation. 

r/trader 
facilitatin
g LTAs’). 

by or on 
behalf 
of 
traveller
s 
insofar 
as the 
relevant 
service
s are 
not 
perform
ed as a 
conseq
uence 
of their 
insolve
ncy. 

(microsoc
iété) to 
fulfil 
certain 
condition
s for 
obtaining 
an 
insurance 
(in 
particular, 
the 
obligation
s to have 
a capital 
which 
constitute
s at least 
15% of its 
assets or 
to 
communi
cate its 
annual 
reports 
(obligatio
ns set out 
under 
Article 4 
of the 
Royal 
Decree of 
29 May 
2018)). 

NO 

Bulgar
ia  

Insurance contracts 
are the only insolvency 
protection mechanism 
in place in Bulgaria for 

The most 
common 
insurance 
providers 

Package travel 
contracts  
The amount of the 
insurance coverage is 

According to 
review of 
some of the 
largest and 

N/A 

NO  

NO 

No 
specific 
rules on 
determini

121 

 
 
  
 
Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

ng the 
cost of 
repatriati
on were 
identified 
in the 
law. 

Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

both package travel 
contracts and LTAs.  

include 
the 
following 
exception
s in their 
contracts:  
(a) 
Activities 
of the 
Insured 
outside 
the scope 
of his tour 
operator's 
activity 
within the 
meaning 
of the 
Tourism 
Act and 
its 
subordina
te 
legislation
; (b) 
Unlicense
d activity 
or in the 
process 
of 
suspensio
n or 
revocatio
n of a 
license, or 
ascertain
ed 
another 
violation 
of the 

to be determined on 
the basis of the 
annual turnover of 
the tour operator for 
the preceding year but 
in any case, should 
not be less than 
statutory defined 
minimum amounts as 
per the category in 
which the tour 
operator falls 
according to its 
turnover (Article 104 
of TA). According to 
Appendix 9 to TA, 
titled “Table setting out 
the minimum limits of 
liability upon 
conclusion of contract 
for mandatory 
insurance under Article 
97(1)”, the following 
minimum amounts for 
the insurance of tour 
operators are 
determined (i.e. the 
minimum amounts to 
which it is allowed for 
the liability of the 
insurer for paying 
compensation to the 
insured to be capped 
under the insurance 
contract, both per 
insured event and in 
the aggregate; the 
parties to the contract 
are free to set a higher 

most 
common 
insurance 
providers in 
Bulgaria, the 
following 
risks are 
covered:  

The liability 
of the 
Insured for 
damage 
caused to 
the user (s) 
of packages 
and LTA […] 
including in 
the event of 
his 
insolvency 
or 
bankruptcy.  
In these 
cases, the 
Insurer shall:  

Refund the 
amount paid 
by the 
traveller 
under the 
respective 
contract;  
Pay the 
difference 
when only 
part of the 
contract 
services is 

122 

 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

provided 
during the 
journey;  
Pay the costs 
of returning 
(repatriating) 
the user to 
the starting 
point of the 
trip;  
Pay the costs 
(court 
expenses) of 
settling 
claims made 
with his 
express 
written 
consent. 

regulation
s;  
(c) 
Actions or 
omissions 
of a travel 
agent or 
other 
counterpa
rties, 
partners, 
suppliers, 
creditors 
to the 
Insured or 
any third 
party 
beyond 
the 
control of 
the tour 
operator;  
(d) 
Quality 
difference 
in the 
tourist 
services 
between 
the 
agreed 
and the 
actually 
provided 
during the 
travel 
(including 
a lower 
category 
of hotels; 

insurance amount 
(limit of liability)): 

[Note: first column 
“Declared turnover 
achieved in the last 
financial year – BGN”; 
second column “Limit 
of liability per event 
and aggregate liability 
for all insured events 
during the term of 
validity of the 
insurance (BGN)”] 

The sum insured under 
the compulsory 
insurance of a tour 
operator which 
provides a package 
including a charter 
flight may not be less 
than BGN 500,000.  

LTAs 

123 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

accommo
dation, 
dining 
establish
ments 
and 
entertain
ment, 
vehicles, 
etc.);  
(e) Force 
majeure 
or event 
that is 
beyond 
the 
control of 
the tour 
operator 
or for 
which he 
is not 
responsibl
e;  
(f) 
Financial 
losses 
and other 
pecuniary 
damage 
suffered 
by the 
Insured 
during the 
performan
ce of his 
business;  
(g) 
Personal 
injury, 

The amount of the 
insurance coverage is 
to be determined on 
the basis of the annual 
turnover of trader for 
the preceding year 
but in any case 
should not be less 
than statutory 
defined minimum 
amounts (Article 106 
of TA).  

1. The minimum sum 
of insurance is set at 
10 per cent of the 
turnover achieved in 
the last year in respect 
of linked travel 
arrangements for 
which the trader 
facilitating the 
provision of linked 
travel arrangements 
has received payment 
from or on behalf of 
the traveller and 
whereupon the trader 
facilitating the 
provision of linked 
travel arrangements 
effects payment to the 
provider of the relevant 
travel service within a 
period longer than one 
working day from 
receiving the payment. 
The amount of 
insurance coverage 
for this type of 

124 

 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

traders may not be 
less than BGN 5,000.  

2. In cases where the 
trader facilitating the 
provision of linked 
travel arrangements is 
a party responsible for 
the carriage of 
passengers, the extent 
of the insurance 
liability shall be set at 
20 per cent of the 
annual turnover in 
respect of passenger 
transport services as 
part of linked travel 
arrangements for 
which the trader 
facilitating the 
provision of linked 
travel arrangements is 
responsible. The 
amount of insurance 
coverage for this 
type of traders may 
not be less than BGN 
10,000. 

illness 
(incl. 
Stress) or 
death of 
the 
traveller 
occurred 
during the 
organized 
travel;  
(h) Acts of 
terrorism;  
(i) Acts of 
the 
travellers 
which 
resulted 
in 
damages;  
(l) 
Damage 
or 
destructio
n of 
property 
(movable 
or real 
estate) 
that is 
yours 
property 
or 
property 
of the 
traveller.  

NO 

Cypru
s 

Two main insolvency 
protection systems:  

Not 
known 

Insurance contracts 
(Article 17 of Law 
186(I)/2017) 

Not known  

NO 

Not 
known 

NO 

Insurance contract 

125 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

Financial security 
from a financial 
institution 

The two systems are 
are overlapping, and 
mandatory in the 
Cypriot legal order. In 
addition, they both aim 
at protecting travellers 
from any failure in the 
performance of the 
contract by the trader 
that is caused by his 
insolvency/bankruptcy.  

The difference is that in 
case of protection 
through insurance only 
an insurance company 
is involved in the 
system, while in the 
case of protection 
through financial 
security from a 
financial institution a 
financial institution and 
an approved body are 
involved (a corporation, 
association, club, 
foundation, union or 
association of tour 
operators, retailers and 
travel agents that has 
been incorporated, 
registered and 
operates under the 
Company Law or the 
Associations and 

The following factors 
should be taken into 
consideration:  
(a) The type of 
packages sold, 
including means of 
transport,  
(b) the travel 
destination,  
(c) the organiser's 
legal constraints or 
commitments with 
regard to the amounts 
of prepayments he 
may receive; and  
(d) the time of their 
occurrence before the 
start of the package.  

No further guidance is 
given by the national 
provisions.  

Financial security 
from a financial 
institution (Article 18 
of Law 186(I)/2017) 
This protection covers 
the largest of any of 
the following amounts:  
(a) 20% or more of all 
payments received 
by the organiser in 
accordance with 
package sales for the 
period immediately 
preceding twelve 
months from the date 
of entry into force of 
the security, or  

126 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

Institutions and Other 
Related Issues Law)  

NO 

Croati
a 

Two mechanisms:  
insurance contract (at 
an insurance 
company); 
bank guarantee (at a 
bank) 

The two protection 
systems of insolvency 
insurance and 
insurance against 
liability are 
complementary to each 
other. Their similarity is 
that they are both 
mandatory in the 
Croatian legal order. 
However, they serve a 
different purpose.  

The most 
usual 
exception
s of 
coverage 
in the 
insuranc
e 
contracts 
of the 
organiser
s of travel 
packages/
the 
traders 
facilitating 
LTAs 
(provided 
by 

(b) the maximum 
amount of all 
payments the 
organiser expects to 
have at any time in 
his possession, in 
respect of packages 
that have not been 
fully executed.  

The approved body 
shall calculate the 
minimum amount of 
the financial security in 
line with the 
abovementioned 
method. Under no 
circumstances may 
the amount of the 
financial security be 
less than EUR 5,000.  

Article 50(2) and (3) of 
the PTS [which 
corresponds to Article 
17(2) of the Directive] 
provides for a 
calculation method. 
This calculation 
method stipulates the 
minimum threshold of 
the security and that is 
10% of the total 
amount realized from 
the sale of packages 
in the previous 
business year, or at 
least 10% of the 
planned annual 
amount anticipated 
to be realized from 

127 

NO 

NO 

Refund of all 
payments 
made by or 
on behalf of 
the traveller 
in connection 
with the 
package 
travel 
contract for 
services 
which have 
not or will not 
be performed 
or will be only 
partially 
performed as 
a 
consequence 

NO 

The cost 
or 
repatriati
on is 
defined 
by each 
insuranc
e 
company 
in 
consultati
on with 
the 
recipient 
of the 
insurance 
(organise
r/trader 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

of the 
organiser's 
insolvency or 
bankruptcy 

Repatriation 
costs for 
travellers in 
the event of 
the 
organizer's 
insolvency  
if necessary, 
the financing 
of 
accommodati
on prior to 
the 
repatriation. 

the sale of packages 
in the current 
business year, 
provided that the 
annual package sale 
plan in the current 
year exceeds the 
package sales 
realized in the 
previous year.  

For the organiser who 
did not realize turnover 
from the sale of 
packages in the 
previous year, they 
also are obligated to 
provide insolvency 
security in the 
minimum amount of 
10% of the planned 
annual package sale in 
the current year 

The insolvency 
insurance (both in the 
form of insurance 
contracts and a bank 
guarantee) is intended 
to protect travellers 
from any failure in the 
performance of the 
contract by the trader 
that is caused by 
his/her insolvency / 
bankruptcy.  

Whereas the 
insurance against 
liability for damage 
has a purpose to 
protect travellers in 
general (irrelevant on 
the solvency status of 
the organiser) by 
covering any damage 
incurred by the 
traveller as a result of 
non-performance, 
partial performance or 
undue performance of 
the obligations related 
to a package trip. 

Croatian 
Obligation
s Act in 
order to 
cover the 
risk of 
their 
insolvenc
y) are the 
following:  
The most 
significant 
exception 
of 
coverage 
is the 
occurrenc
e of any 
risk, 
including 
insolven
cy due to 
intent or 
fraud of 
the 
recipient 
of the 
insuranc
e or the 
insured 
or the 
beneficia
ry of the 
insuranc
e. In this 
case, the 
insurance 
company 
is 
exempted 

128 

facilitatin
g LTAs’).  

Usually 
this cost 
has a 
quantitat
ive limit 
(per 
traveller)
, in the 
insuranc
e 
contract
s, as well 
as all 
traveller
s per 
event (of 
insolvenc
y)/per 
period of 
insurance
. 

However
, this 
cost limit 
varies 
consider
ably 
dependi
ng on 
the 
insuranc
e 
company
.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

No 
informatio
n 
available 
on this 
limit.  

Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

from the 
payment 
of the 
indemnity.  
Risk 
occurs 
due to the 
following 
circumsta
nces: (a) 
War 
events or 
riots, (b) 
Cases of 
force 
majeure: 
Earthquak
e, 
sediment
ation, 
landslide, 
storm, 
tsunami, 
volcanic 
eruption 
or other 
natural 
phenome
na.  

These 
exception
s are not 
provided 
in the 
Croatian 
law, but 
they are 
included 
most of 

129 

 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

the times 
in the 
insurance 
contracts.  

The 
insurance 
companie
s do not 
cover also 
damages 
or losses 
of 
personal 
belonging
s, 
luggage, 
money, 
valuables 
and travel 
document
s  

In relation 
to the 
bank 
guarante
e, which 
is 
regulated 
by the 
Croatian 
Obligation
s Act in 
Articles 
1039-
1043, 
there are 
no 
exception

130 

 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

NO 

Czech 
Repub
lic 

There are three 
security mechanisms in 
place in Czech 
Republic:  

Insurance 
Bank guarantee  

These two 
mechanisms are 
alternative, although, 
bank guarantees are 
never used in practice 
(in other words, all 
respective travel 
agencies use 
insurance as a method 
of protection).  

On top of said primary 
security mechanism is 
a complementary 
(subsidiary) 
mechanism in form of 
the Guarantee Fund 
for the cases when the 
security proves 
inefficient. The 
Guarantee Fund is 
financed by obligatory 
contributions of travel 
agencies based on the 
planned revenue from 
sale of packages and 
LTAs and is managed 
by the State Fund for 
Development of 
Housing with the 

s in 
coverage. 

Exception
s of 
coverage 
practically 
do not 
exist 

According to Section 
7b paragraph 2 of the 
Act No. 159/1999, 
organiser’s/trader 
facilitating LTAs’ and 
the insurer are 
requested to arrange 
for a security in such a 
way that the 
insurance indemnity 
is equal to at least 30 
% of planned 
revenue from sale of 
packages or from 
sale of packages in 
the last calendar 
year, whichever is 
higher.  

[Risk assessment 
related to the following 
factors: risk profile of 
the organizer/trader in 
question and include 
the type of services 
sold, rating of the 
organizer/trader in 
question, volume of 
sales, distribution 
channels, financial 
collaterals provided by 
the organizer/trader to 
the insurance 
company, destinations 
of travel services and 
related potential costs 
of repatriation, 
amounts of 

With respect 
to the 
insurance 
contracts of 
travel 
organiser’s/tr
ader 
facilitating 
LTAs’, these 
by law have 
to cover all 
risks 
connected to 
failure of the 
organiser’s/tr
ader 
facilitating 
LTAs’ to 
provide 
respective 
services due 
to insolvency, 
i.e. provision 
of 
repatriation 
(in case of 
LTAs, only if 
the trader is 
responsible 
for transport), 
reimburseme
nt of all 
payments 
made by 
traveller if the 
package/LTA 
was not 
provided, or 

131 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

YES 

NO  

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

NO 

The costs 
of the 
repatriati
on 
typically 
do not 
need to 
be 
calculate
d with 
respect to 
individual 
travellers, 
because 
the 
insurer is 
required 
by law to 
directly 
arrange 
the 
repatriati
on, e.g., 
in relation 
to the 
traveller 
all costs 
are 
covered. 
Neverthel
ess, if the 
traveller 
arranges 
his or her 
own 
repatriati
on, the 
traveller 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

NO 

Denm
ark 

Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Ministry for Regional 
Development.  
Individual travel 
agencies are entitled to 
draw from the 
Guarantee Fund 
according to Section 
10i of Act No. 
159/1999 if the 
financial amount due to 
travellers exceeds the 
insurance indemnity. In 
case that if the 
amount of finances in 
the Guarantee Fund 
proves to be 
insufficient to cover 
said claims of 
respective insurers, 
under Section 10g 
para. 5 of Act No. 
159/1999 the 
Guarantee Fund has to 
obtain additional 
liquidity on financial 
market or can be 
provided a subsidy or 
financial aid from the 
state budget.  

There is only one 
protection mechanism, 
The Danish Travel 
Guarantee Fund, 
which is a private 
body (Foundation) 
but on the 
guardianship of the 
State. 

prepayments accepted 
etc] 

reimburseme
nt of all costs 
for paid but 
not provided 
part of the 
services. 

is only 
liable for 
the 
payment 
of the 
real costs 
it would 
have had, 
if the 
repatriati
on had 
been 
provided 
by the 
insurer.  

NO 

NO 

Denmark 
does not 
have 
insurance 
contracts. 
However, 
if the 
revenue 
of the 
organiser/
trader 

The foreseeable 
amounts of the 
insolvency protection 
(the size of the 
guarantee), including 
the foreseeable cost 
for repatriation, are 
calculated on the 
basis of the turnover 
of the organiser or 
the trader facilitating 

The intention 
of the 
guarantee 
issued by the 
organizer/tra
der 
facilitating 
LTA’s in 
favor of the 
Guarantee 
Fund is to 

In case of 
bankruptc
y, The 
Danish 
Travel 
Guarante
e Fund 
will 
arrange 
and pay 
for 

YES - 
The level 
of the 
guarante
e is 
based on 
the 
revenue 
of the 
organizer 
in 

132 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

repatriati
on for 
customer
s who are 
already at 
their 
destinatio
n. 
Customer
s who 
arrange 
repatriati
on 
themselv
es are 
not 
guarante
ed 
reimburs
ement of 
such 
costs. 

question. 
Organiser
s/traders 
providing 
LTA’s 
which 
annual 
income 
does not 
exceed 1 
million 
DKK 
(approx. 
133.000 
EUR) 
shall 
register 
with the 
Danish 
Travel 
Guarante
e Fund 
but is 
under no 
obligation 
to issue a 
guarante
e in 
favour of 
the Fund.  

cover the 
Fund's risk, 
which is the 
prepayment 
amount from 
travel 
customers 
plus an 
additional 
cost to cover 
the costs of 
repatriation. 

facilitating 
LTA does 
not 
exceed 
DKK 1 
million, 
no 
guarante
e shall be 
made in 
favour of 
the 
Danish 
Travel 
Guarante
e Fund.  

.  

LTA’s. This method of 
calculation of the size 
of the guarantee is set 
out in Section 8(4) of 
RGF (1 EUR amounts 
to approx. 7,45 DKK):  

If revenue does not 
exceed DKK 1 million, 
no guarantee is made.  
If revenue exceeds 
DKK 1 million, but not 
DKK 5 million, the 
guarantee shall be 
DKK 150,000.  
If revenue exceeds 
DKK 5 million, but not 
DKK 10 million, the 
guarantee shall be 
DKK 300,000. 
If revenue exceeds 
DKK 10 million, but not 
DKK 15 million, the 
guarantee shall be 
DKK 600,000.  
If revenue exceeds 
DKK 15 million, but not 
DKK 50 million, the 
guarantee shall be 
DKK 900,000.  
If revenue exceeds 
DKK 50 million, but not 
DKK 100 million, the 
guarantee shall be 
DKK 1.35m 
If revenue exceeds 
DKK 100 million, but 
not DKK 250 million, 
the guarantee shall be 
DKK 1.8m.  

133 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

NO 

Estoni
a 

No 
exception
s 

The types of security 
provided in Estonia are 
insurance or 
guarantee. Security 
may be issued by an 
insurance company, 
credit institution or 
financial institution 
located in a Member 
State of the European 
Economic Area 

If revenue exceeds 
DKK 250 million, the 
guarantee shall be 
DKK 2.25m plus an 
additional DKK 1m for 
every 100m the 
revenue exceeds DKK 
250m.  

% from the travel 
undertaking’s planned 
annual total sales of 
packages (Section 151 
of the TA):  
Security shall be at 
least 7% from the 
planned annual total 
sales of packages, 
where travel services 
are provided outside of 
Estonia and include 
charter flights and 
intermediation of 
packages combined by 
a travel undertaking of 
a state outside the 
EEA; 
Security shall be at 
least 3% from the 
planned annual total 
sales of packages, 
where travel services 
include travel services 
provided outside of 
Estonia and include 
scheduled flights.  
Security shall be at 
least 7% of the travel 

134 

Management 
risks of a 
trader – no 
further 
information 
identified 

NO 

YES - 
the 
amount 
of the 
security 
depends 
on the 
type of 
package 
sold and 
the 
mode of 
transpor
tation 
included 
(charter 
flight, 
schedul
ed flight 
or 
transpor
t, which 
is 
neither 
charter 
nor 
schedul
ed flight) 

NO 

 The cost 
of 
repatriati
on 
depends 
on the 
fact how 
the 
repatriati
on of the 
traveler is  
arranged. 
The 
Consume
r 
Protectio
n and 
Technical 
Regulator
y 
Authority 
would 
request 
for  
the price 
offers 
and from 
these 
offers the 

 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

undertaking’s 
planned annual total 
sales of packages, 
where packages 
include travel services 
provided outside of 
Estonia, except for 
charter flights or 
scheduled flights. 
Security shall be at 
least 3 % of the 
undertaking’s 
planned annual total 
sales of linked travel 
arrangements;  

Requirement to take 
the actual sales of 
previous year into 
account if these 
sales are higher than 
the planned annual 
sales (Section 151(6) 
of the TA) 

The insurance 
premium is calculated 
on the basis of the 
insurance amount and 
the financial 
capabilities of the 
travel undertaking.  

There is no minimum 
or maximum 
insurance premium 
fixed 

135 

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

(Section 
15 TA) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

most 
optimal 
offer is 
chosen. 

If the 
Consume
r 
Protectio
n and 
Technical 
Regulator
y 
Authority 
arranges 
for the 
plane to  
take all 
the 
travelers 
back to 
Estonia, 
then the 
traveler 
would not 
incur any 
repatriati
on  
costs. If 
the 
traveler 
purchase
s a plane 
ticket 
back 
home, 
then the 
Consume
r 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

Protectio
n  
and 
Technical 
Regulator
y 
Authority 
would 
verify 
why costs 
incurred 
(i.e. why 
the 
traveler  
did not 
return to 
Estonia 
with the 
means of 
transport
ation 
arranged 
by the 
Consume
r  
Protectio
n and 
Technical 
Regulator
y 
Authority)
. In 
addition, 
if the 
costs of 
return of 
the  
traveler 
are 
excessive 

136 

 
 
Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

NO 

Finlan
d 

Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

(i.e. 
traveler 
purchase
d a 
business 
class 
ticket), 
then this 
may be a  
factor 
that is 
taken into 
account 
and may 
lead to 
the fact 
that not 
all the 
costs are  
compens
ated. 

Repatriation 
are 
costs 
in 
included 
the  financial 
security  the 
trader lodges 
with 
the 
FCCA.  

Repatriation 
costs 
are 
calculated 
according  to 
a  principle 
of 
probability 
and based on 
a calculation 
formula  that 
takes 
into 
account 
monthly 

YES - 
Smaller 
companie
s have 
lower 
administr
ative 
costs 
since 
they are 
not 
required 
to  
provide 
audited 
financial 
statement
s 
according 

YES 

NO 

The system 
relies on 
individual 
guarantees 
that cover a 
trader’s 
exposure.  
There is 
therefore a 
risk that the 
security 
would be 
insufficient in 
an insolvency 
situation. 
Should this 
be the case, 
however, the 
state 

collected 

prepayments 

are 
The 
the 
calculated  based  on 
sales, 
trader’s  monthly 
payment terms and number 
of  passengers,  taking  into 
account when bookings are 
made  and  when  payments 
(payment 
are 
terms  for  booking  fee  and 
final payments). A trader’s 
security  may  be  periodical 
to 
seasonal 
variations,  or  it  can  be  the 
same  amount  year-round. 
the 
adequacy  of 
The 
checked 
is 
security 
regularly, 
traders 
and 
provide  follow-up  reports 
on  their  activities  at  least 
twice  annually.  All  traders 
are also required to provide 

reflect 

Travellers 
shall not 
be 
covered 
by the 
insolvenc
y 
protection 
mechanis
m if 
claims 
guarantee
d under 
the 
security 
are paid 
to the 
traveller 
under 

137 

the 

insofar  as 

Organisers  and/or  traders 
facilitating  LTAs  should 
lodged 
provide  security, 
with 
Finnish 
Competition and Consumer 
Authority  (FCCA),  for  the 
refund  of  all  payments 
made  by  or  on  behalf  of 
travellers 
the 
services  are  not  performed 
as  a  consequence  of  the 
organiser 
trader 
facilitating 
LTAs’ 
insolvency  (Sections  3(1), 
3(3), 3(4) and 4(3) of MPT 
[which 
to 
Articles 17(1) and (3) of the 
Directive]).  The  terms  of 
the  security,  either  first 
demand or escrow account, 
are  defined  in  the  law  and 
must cover the trader’s full 
exposure.  In  addition  to 

correspond 

and/or 

 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

another 
Finnish 
legislation 
(Section 
10(5) of 
MPT).    

annually. 

securities,  Finland  has  a 
back-up system in the form 
of a State appropriation that 
covers 
repatriations  and 
secures  full  compensation 
to travellers in the event that 
the  security  turns out  to  be 
insufficient. 
This 
appropriation is matched by 
an insolvency protection fee 
collected  from  registered 
The 
traders 
insolvency protection fee is 
a  percentage  fee  based  on 
the  turnover  from  sales  of 
travel  services 
combined 
(currently 
0,024  %). 
Traders  are  also  subject  to 
an  annual  supervision  fee 
determined  on  the  basis  of 
the maximum amount of the 
security  calculated  for  the 
party  liable  for  payment  in 
the  year  preceding 
the 
payment year, as follows: 

reports on the actual figures 
once a year.  

than 

Pursuant  to  Section  7  of 
MPT,  a  financially  sound 
organiser  may  apply  for 
reduced  security,  which 
means  that  the  company 
may  operate  with  a  lower 
it 
security 
computationally 
should, 
provided  the  trader  fulfils 
certain 
conditions. 
Reduced  security  can  be 
granted  to  a  trader  whose 
risk  of 
is 
deemed  low.  Security  is 
reduced  by  the  amount  by 
which  the  trader’s  equity 
exceeds 
security 
the 
imposed on it. The reduced 
security must, however, be 
the 
least  50%  of 
at 
approved security amount.  

insolvency 

As Finland employs a 
system on individual 
securities, no 
insurance premiums 
are calculated. No 
minimum or maximum 
security. 

appropriation 
(funded by 
the 
insolvency 
protection 
fee) would 
cover it. 

passenger 
amounts, 
travel 
destination 
and  duration 
of trip.  

Travellers 
do  not  have 
the  right  to 
compensatio
for 
n 
repatriation 
if they fail to 
comply  with 
the 
instructions 
on 
repatriation 
given by the 
Competition 
and 
Consumer 
Authority 
without 
justified 
reason. 

to Section 
25 of 
MPT 
referring 
to 
relevant  
provision
s of the 
Auditing 
Act 
(1141/20
15). Also, 
the 
supervisi
on fees 
are 
staggered
. Smaller 
business
es 
generally 
have 
lower 
security 
amounts, 
i.e., they 
pay lower 
fees. 

NO 

Franc
e  

Financial guarantees 
(of banks, insurers, as 
well as the APST and 
UNAT).  

There is 
no 
exception
s on 
coverage 

There is no minimum 
amount required for 
the guarantee. 
The amount of the 
financial guarantee is 

The risks 
covered are 
the risks of 
failure and 
insolvency 

NO-  
All type 
of 
packag
es are 

YES - 
the 
retailers 
are 
require

The cost 
of 
repatriati
on are 
directly 

No. All 
compagn
ies have 
to be 
complete

138 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

in order to 
be in 
conformit
y with 
European 
law. 

determined 
contractually in 
between the guarantor 
and the travel 
agencies. It depends 
of the business volume 
of the sales and the 
risk of the product 
sold.  

applies according to  

of Travel 
agencies. 
Guarantee 
covers 
either 
repatriation, 
replacement 
with 
departure 
(when 
possible) or 
reimbursem
ent. 

[The information below 
dates before the Covid-
19 pandemic. It needs 
to be updated] 
There are currently 
about 39 guarantors in 
France for about 6688 
professionals 
(information provided 
by the Ministry of 
Finance). These 
guarantors are 
comprised of banks, 
insurers, as well as the 
APST and UNAT:  
APST is the leader 
with 51% of the market 
share (of which 75% 
are travel agencies, the 
rest being tour 
operators, tourist 
offices and 
accommodation 
managers who do 
linked travel 
arrangements). The 
APST is a non-profit 
association which is 
funded solely by 
membership fees  
Groupama with 
around 2200 members. 
Groupama is an 
insurer. Travel 
insurance is only one 
aspect of the group's 
activities.  
Spanish insurer 
Atradius (around 800 
operators). Again, 

139 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

calculate
d by the 
guarantor
s (cost of 
5 million 
euros for 
the 
repatriati
on of the 
Thomas 
Cook 
customer
s in 2019) 

ly 
covered 
by a 
financial 
guaranto
r no 
matter of 
their size 
and 
volume 
of 
business
. 

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

covered 
as 
require
d by 
Europe
an Law    

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

d to 
have an 
insolve
ncy 
protecti
on. 
Regardi
ng the 
relation
ship 
betwee
n the 
rules on 
the 
respons
ibility of 
the 
retailer 
and the 
organis
er. It is 
Article 
L. 211-
16 that 
states 
the 
rules of 
the 
respons
ibility, 
and it 
should 
be 
noted 
that 
both 
organis
er and 
retailer 
have 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

travel insurance is just 
one of the group’s 
activities.  
UNAT is a guarantor 
for operators of the 
social and solidarity 
economy (mainly 
associations). It is also 
a non-profit association 
and is funded by 
membership fees 
The rest of the 
guarantors are either 
insurers or banks, 
which provide 
generally a guarantee 
only for one operator 
(typically, a customer 
they have had for a 
long time). 
France also requires 
a professional 
liability insurance for 
the travel agencies. 

the 
same 
respons
ibility. 
Also, 
the 
same 
rules 
apply 
both for 
organis
er and 
retailer 
without 
any 
distincti
on.  

140 

 
 
 
 
 
No 

Germa
ny 

No 
exception
s 

The primary means of 
insolvency protection is 
a fund (Deutscher 
Reisesicherungsfonds) 
organized under 
private law as a limited 
liability company. All 
tour operators with 
annual sales of 10 
million euros or more 
from the sale of 
package tours or LTAs 
must pay into this fund. 
The fund itself is under 
government 
supervision.  

No 

No 

The following 
risks are 
covered in 
case of 
insolvency of 
the tour 
operator: 

• Payments of 
travellers for 
travel 
services that 
are cancelled  

• Payments of 
travellers on 
request of 
service 
providers 
whose 
claims for 
payment 
have not 
been met by 
the tour 
operator  

• Return 
transportatio
n and 
accommodati
on until the 
time of return 
transportatio
n 
(Repatriation
) 

Option to 
choose 
the 
means of 
insolvenc
y 
protection 
(see 
column 
on type of 
insolvenc
y 
protection
) 

The fund 
calculate
s 
repatriati
on costs 
based on 
travel 
provider 
data on 
the 
number 
of 
travellers, 
destinatio
ns and 
travel 
duration. 
The 
calculate
d costs 
per 
traveller 
for a 
certain 
destinatio
n are 
based on 
expert 
estimates
. 

The amount of the 
contributions to the 
insolvency protection 
fund is based on the 
annual turnover of the 
respective company 
(currently 1%, which is 
the minimum 
contribution during the 
initial buildup phase of 
the fund till oktober 
2027).  
In addition, the tour 
operators must provide 
a security deposit, 
which is also based on 
the annual turnover 
(currently between 5% 
and 9%) and is utilized 
by the fund in the 
event of insolvency. 
This security can be 
provided by insurance 
or a bank guarantee. 
After the buildup phase 
of the funds the 
contributions must be 
calculated in such a 
way that the target 
capital (cf. § 5 
Reisesicherungsfonds
gesetz) is not fallen 
short of. The funds 
must take into account 
the administrative 
costs and the 
insolvency cases to be 
expected in average 
years. After an above 
average insolvency 
case, the target capital 
of the funds must be 
reached again within a 
reasonable period of 
time (cf. § 7 II 
Reisesicherungsfonds
gesetz). 

141 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

NO 

Greec
e 

Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Insurance contract 
covering both package 
travel contracts (Articles 
16(1) and 16(3) of P.D. 
7/2018 [which 
correspond to Articles 
17(1) and (3) of the 
Directive] and LTAs 
(Article 18(1) of P.D. 
7/2018, [which 
corresponds to Article 
19(1) of the Directive]; 
Lodging of a letter of 
guarantee payable in 
favour of the Ministry of 
Tourism of Greece. 
Pursuant to Article 4 of 
Law 393/1976 “On the 
establishment and 
operation of Tourist 
Offices” (Government 
Gazette, 199 A), the 
licensing of a tourist 
agency requires, inter 
alia, to lodge a letter of 
guarantee of EUR 
5.000,00, issued by 
financial institutions 
established either in 
Greece or in another 
EU member state and 
payable in favour of the 
Ministry of Tourism of 
Greece. According to 
Article 5(2) “The letter 
of guarantee shall be 
forfeited [...] to cover 
any consumer claims 
arising from their 
transactions with the 

Occurre
nce of 
any risk, 
including 
insolven
cy due 
to deceit 
or gross 
neglige
nce of 
the 
recipien
t of the 
insuran
ce or 
the 
insured 
or the 
benefici
ary of 
the 
insuranc
e or the 
persons 
living 
with 
them or 
their 
legal 
represen
tatives 
or their 
represen
tatives 
or third 
parties 
who 
have 
been 
professi

The insurance 
premium is calculated 
according to the 
probability law 
(mathematics) to 
cover the insurance 
risk. The percentage 
of management costs, 
the percentage of 
profit of the insurance 
company and the 
commission of its 
brokers and insurance 
agents are added to 
this amount. In 
determining the 
premium, the pricing 
method followed by 
the insurance 
company through its 
actuaries is decisive.  
In Greece, the pricing 
method is limitless and 
is designed in 
accordance with the 
techno-economic 
needs of each 
enterprise (Article 148 
(2) of Law 4364/2016). 
The usual factors that 
are taken into account 
in the calculation of 
the premium most of 
the times in the 
insurance contracts of 
the organiser/trader 
facilitating LTAs’ are 
the following:  
i. The total number of 
clients handled last 

The risks that 
are usually 
covered by 
the insurance 
contracts of 
travel 
organiser’s/tr
ader 
facilitating 
LTAs’ are the 
following: 
i. 
Repatriation 
costs for 
travellers in 
the event of 
the 
organizer's 
insolvency.  
ii. 
Repatriation 
costs for 
travellers in 
the event of 
the 
organizer's 
bankruptcy.  
iii. 
Professional 
Civil 
Liability of 
the organiser 
(This 
coverage 
includes any 
reimburseme
nt of the 
sums paid by 
the travellers 
for services 

142 

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

N/A 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

NO 

YES - 
The 
organis
er and 
the 
retailer 
have 
joint 
and 
several 
liability 
for the 
perform
ance of 
the 
contract
. This 
means 
that the 
organis
er and 
the 
retailer 
of the 
same 
packag
e are 
obliged 
(each of 
them) 
to fulfil 
the 
contract 
in its 
entirety, 
but the 
traveller 
can be 
compen
sated 

The cost 
for 
repatriati
on is 
defined 
by each 
insurance 
company 
in 
consultati
on with 
the 
recipient 
of the 
insurance 
(organise
r/trader 
facilitatin
g LTAs’). 
Usually 
this cost 
(from an 
examinati
on of 
several 
insurance 
contracts) 
is set at 
up to 
1.000,00 
EUR per 
traveller. 
In 
addition 
to this 
quantitati
ve limit 
(per 
traveller), 
in the 

 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

not provided 
in the event 
of the 
organizer's 
insolvency/b
ankruptcy).  
iv. Coverage 
of costs for 
deflecting 
legal claims. 

only 
once 
accordi
ng to 
Article 
481 of 
the Civil 
Code. 

insurance 
contracts, 
there is 
also a 
total cost 
limit for 
the 
repatriati
on of all 
travellers 
per event 
(of 
insolvenc
y) / per 
period of 
insurance
. 
However
, this 
cost limit 
varies 
consider
ably 
dependi
ng on 
the 
insuranc
e 
company
. 

tourist agency”, 
including those resulting 
from the 
insolvency/bankruptcy 
of the tourist agency. 
Furthermore, article 
5(1) states that “[...] The 
letter of guarantee, 
which has a duration of 
five years, states that its 
validity shall be 
automatically extended 
for a further semester 
after the date of 
withdrawal of the 
License of Operation for 
any reason, as well as if 
no other letter of 
guarantee valid for five 
years is submitted 
before its expiry”.  
The letter of guarantee 
is not an alternative 
choice regarding the 
insurance contracts. 
Both of these 
protection 
mechanisms are 
mandatory for the 
traders (travel 
agencies) in the Greek 
legal order.  
However, according to 
the law, they serve 
different purposes:  
a. The letter of 
guarantee aims to 
protect consumers from 
any failure in the 
performance of the 

onally 
entruste
d with 
the 
safekee
ping of 
insuranc
e. A 
slight 
negligen
ce of the 
insured 
persons 
may 
result in 
a 
reductio
n of the 
indemnit
y 
instead. 
Exceptio
n of 
coverag
e exists 
also 
when 
the 
insuranc
e risk 
occurs 
due to 
the 
following 
circumst
ances: 
(a) War 
events 
or 
actions, 

year (globally) for 
whom the 
organiser/trader 
facilitating 
LTAs’/provided a 
travel package.  
ii. The gross 
income/fees/commis
sions received from 
clients (for the past 
year, the current year 
an estimate for the 
next year).  
iii. A description of 
the activities of the 
organiser/trader 
facilitating LTAs’.  
iv. Whether the 
organizer's activity 
concerns retail or 
wholesale market.  
v. Whether the 
organiser operates 
its own travel 
packages or sell 
travel packages to 
other travel agents 
or affinity and/or 
non-affinity groups.  
vi.The involvement of 
organiser in the sale of 
Student and/or 
Adventure Tours (i.e. 
skiing, rafting, etc.).  
vii. The existence of 
any claims against 
the organiser during 
the five past years. 
The amount and the 
history of each claim.  

143 

 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

contract by the trader–
regardless of the cause 
of this failure;  
b. The insurance 
contracts are intended 
to protect travellers 
from any failure in the 
performance of the 
contract by the trader 
that is caused by 
his/her insolvency / 
bankruptcy. 
However, in practice, 
traders' insolvency 
insurance contracts 
cover generally all 
consumer claims arising 
from the trader's 
professional liability.  
Regarding the letter of 
guarantee, the Greek 
legislation does not 
require the provision of 
a set of information to 
the consumer. The only 
way for a consumer to 
find out about the 
existence of this 
protection mechanism 
is to consult a Greek 
lawyer with 
knowledge of tourism 
law. In fact, the 
reimbursement through 
a letter of guarantee is 
done only after the final 
court decision.   
It should be mentioned 
that this letter of 
guarantee is 

civil war, 
revolutio
n, 
popular 
riots 
[Article 
13(1) of 
L. 
2496/19
97]. (b) 
Cases of 
force 
majeure: 
Earthqu
ake, 
sedimen
tation, 
landslide
, storm, 
tsunami, 
volcanic 
eruption 
or other 
natural 
phenom
ena. 
These 
exceptio
ns are 
not 
provided 
in the 
Greek 
law, but 
they are 
included 
most of 
the 
times in 
the 

viii. The awareness of 
any circumstances 
which may give rise 
to a claim against the 
organiser/trader 
facilitating LTAs’.  
ix. Copy of the 
organiser/trader 
facilitating LTAs’ 
MoT current license  
x. Company statute 
and the last two 
published balance 
sheets if the 
organiser/trader 
facilitating LTAs’ is an 
S.A. or an L.T.D. 
company.  
xi. Fully detailed 
Expense/Revenue 
Budget for the 
current year if the 
organiser is an 
individual enterprise.  
xii. The Company 
Profile-the 
professional 
experience of the 
organiser if he/she is 
an individual 
enterprise. 

144 

 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

mandatory for every 
travel agency operating 
in Greece. Therefore, 
as mentioned in Article 
2(3) of P.D. 7/2018, 
since carrying out 
LTAs requires for the 
traders to operate in 
the context of a travel 
agency, this letter of 
guarantee covers any 
monetary claims 
arising from LTAs’ too. 

insuranc
e 
contract
s.  
The 
insuranc
e 
compani
es may 
not 
cover 
also 
travel 
package
s 
performe
d by 
means 
of 
transport 
belongin
g to the 
organise
r or 
leased 
by him, 
including 
reservati
ons and 
related 
work for 
this 
purpose.  
The 
insuranc
e 
compani
es do 
not 
cover 

145 

 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

also the 
repatriati
on of 
traveller
s in 
cases 
where, 
for 
various 
reasons, 
traveller
s will 
have to 
return 
via 
another 
organise
r/trader 
facilitatin
g LTAs. 

N/A 

Not specified 
within the 
national 
legislation  

NO 

Hunga
ry  

(a) Financial security 
which is without further 
conditions mandatory 
to establish for both 
organisers and traders 
facilitating LTAs. Three 
types (Article 8(1) of 
GD 213/1996):  
guarantee contract 
concluded with a credit 
institution;  
one or more 
insurance contracts 
concluded with an 
insurance service 
provider which may 
also be concluded for 
several passengers 
(directly for the 

The 
insurance 
company 
is relieved 
from its 
obligation 
to provide 
insuranc
e 
coverage 
(as per 
Article 
6:464(1) 
of the Ptk) 
if it proves 
that the 
damage 
was 
caused 

The national legislation 
does not provide for a 
mechanism to 
calculate the 
insurance premium 
and no 
minimum/maximum 
amount is set out in 
the national legislation. 
Concerning the 
financial security, no 
calculation mechanism 
needs to be set out. 
The amount of 
compensation to be 
received can be 
determined solely by 
taking into 
consideration the 

146 

NO 

NO 
Howeve
r, some 
rules 
apply to 
retailers 
in 
relation
ship to 
the 
activity 
of the 
organis
er as a 
result of 
the 
protecti
on 
being 

The 
national 
legislatio
n does 
not set 
out a 
system 
for the 
calculati
on of the 
costs of 
repatriati
on which 
are to be 
covered 
by the 
mandator
y 
insurance

 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

passengers as 
beneficiaries),  
cash deposit – an 
amount of money 
separated and blocked 
by the travel 
entrepreneur with a 
credit institution for the 
purposes of insolvency 
protection. 

The forms of financial 
security may be 
applied separately or 
also jointly (Article 8(2) 
of GD 213/1996).  

 (b) Mandatory 
insurance which 
organisers and traders 
facilitating LTAs are 
only required to take 
out if the services 
concerned also include 
the carriage of 
passengers. It is 
offered in the form of 
an insurance 
contract.  

The system, overall, 
can be viewed as 
being composed of 
two ISPs which are 
also subject to different 
national provisions 
(Articles 8 and 10 of 
GD 213/1996 (financial 
security) and Article 
9/A of GD 213/1996 

unlawfully
, 
intentional
ly or by 
grossly 
negligent 
conduct 
by 
(exemplifi
catory 
list):  

(a) the 
contractin
g party 
(the 
organiser 
or the 
trader 
facilitating 
LTAs) or 
the 
beneficiar
y (the 
traveller);  
(b) a 
close 
relative of 
the above 
who lives 
in the 
same 
househol
d, their 
member 
authorise
d to direct 
the 
business 
or the 

amounts that have 
been paid as down 
payment or 
participation fee by the 
traveller in exchange 
for the services which 
remain unperformed 
as a result of the 
insolvency of the 
organiser or the trader 
facilitating LTAs.  

The initial amount of 
the financial security, 
irrespective of its form 
(see the different forms 
explained above in 
question 3), must be 
provided until 31 
December of the year 
in which the underlying 
contract is established.  

The factors considered 
in the course of the 
calculation include:  
the place of start of 
the package 
whether a border is 
crossed in the 
package 
where the package is 
sold 
whether the carriage 
of passengers is 
included  
the amount of the net 
sales revenue of the 
travel entrepreneur 
calculated in 

147 

. 
However, 
since 
these 
costs are 
covered 
by an 
insurance 
contract, 
the 
calculati
on of the 
costs of 
repatriati
on is 
done in a 
procedur
e for the 
mitigatio
n of 
costs. 

provide
d 
through 
the 
organis
er.  

The 
Hungari
an legal 
system 
does 
not 
require 
retailers 
to take 
out 
protecti
on with 
respect 
to their 
own 
insolve
ncy. 
Accordi
ng to 
the 
national 
provisio
ns 
(Article 
13/A of 
GD 
213/199
6), the 
retailer, 
when a 
traveller 
conclud
es a 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

contract 
with the 
retailer, 
is 
require
d to pay 
within 
four 
working 
days 
the 
amount 
of the 
down 
paymen
t, the 
further 
instalm
ents of 
the 
entire 
fee or 
the 
entire 
fee to 
the 
organis
er.  

(mandatory 
insurance)).  

An important difference 
and connection 
between the two ISPs 
is that the amount of 
overall coverage in 
the case of the 
financial security to 
be provided by the 
organiser or trader 
facilitating LTAs is 
directly calculated with 
a view to the annual 
net sales revenue, the 
type and location of 
holidays and trips and, 
ultimately, the amounts 
paid by travellers while 
the amount of overall 
coverage of the 
mandatory insurance 
is capped in a 
percentage, 10% or 
20% depending on 
whether a charter 
flight is used for 
carriage of 
passengers, of the 
financial security 
provided by the 
organiser or trader 
facilitating LTAs.  

employee
, member 
or 
assignee 
with a 
position 
designate
d in the 
general 
terms and 
conditions 
of the 
insurance 
company;  
(c) in a 
beneficiar
y that is a 
legal 
person, 
the 
managing 
officer or 
the 
member, 
employee 
or 
assignee 
assigned 
to 
manage 
the 
ensured 
property 
item as 
specified 
in the 
general 
terms and 
conditions
.  

accordance with Act C 
of 2000 on accounting. 

It is important to note 
that the national 
legislation only 
considers domestic 
sales to account for 
the amount of the 
financial security and 
the mandatory 
insurance. 

Financial security 
In accordance with the 
above categories, 
three main brackets of 
financial security are 
set out by GD 
213/1996:  
1. 
3% of the net sales 
revenue but at least 
HUF 500 thousand 
(approx. EUR 
1,533.00) originating 
from sale in Hungary 
of package travels 
combined by the 
organiser; commenced 
in Hungary; not 
involving crossing the 
border of Hungary 
With respect to 
package travels which 
are not subject to point 
1; combined by the 
organiser and sold in 
Hungary  
2. 

148 

 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

12% of the net sales 
revenue but at least 
HUF 5 million 
(approx. EUR 
15,336.00) originating 
from package travels 
for the period covered 
which do not include 
the carriage of 
passengers;  
12% of the net sales 
revenue but at least 
HUF 7 million 
(approx. EUR 
21,209.00) originating 
from package travels 
for the period covered 
which do include the 
carriage of 
passengers, by road, 
rail or water or by 
scheduled flight or 
flights;  
3. 
20% of the net sales 
revenue but at least 
HUF 50 million 
(approx. EUR 
151,495.00) originating 
from sale in Hungary 
of package travels 
combined by the 
organiser; concerning 
a trip or holiday from 
domestic territory 
abroad, or from abroad 
to abroad, provided 
that in the period 
covered:  

As for 
guarante
e 
contracts
, Article 
6:436 of 
the Ptk 
provides 
for similar 
exception
s, 
however, 
employing 
a different 
regulatory 
technique
. If, on the 
basis of 
the 
informatio
n 
available 
to the 
provider 
of the 
guarantee
, the 
beneficiari
es are 
clearly 
abusing 
the right 
of call or 
exercising 
it in bad 
faith, the 
provider 
of the 
guarantee 

149 

 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

is not 
obliged to 
make a 
payment 
and may 
reclaim 
the 
payment 
already 
made. 
It is noted 
that the 
national 
legislation
, in 
particular 
the Ptk, 
does not 
provide 
for similar 
exception
s for the 
case of 
the cash 
deposit 

Seats of a non-
scheduled airplane 
(charter flight) are 
used to combine the 
package travel, 
irrespective of the 
place of departure of 
the journey,  
Its obligations under 
the guaranteed 
contract exceed 25% 
of the annual turnover 
from the activities of 
the organiser.  

Moreover, the highest 
net sales revenue shall 
be taken into 
consideration for the 
above calculation, 
provided that the net 
sales revenue 
accounted until 31 
December of the year 
of the conclusion of the 
contract is less than: a) 
the net sales revenue 
in the previous year. or 
b) the forecast net 
sales revenue for the 
next year.  

Where the travel 
entrepreneur is 
engaged in both 
activities in points 2 
and 3 above, the 
higher amount shall be 
taken into 
consideration overall 

150 

 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

for the calculation of 
the coverage for the 
financial security. 
However, the amount 
of the financial security 
shall be calculated 
separately where the 
activity in point 1 and 
an activity in point 2 or 
3 are also engaged by 
the travel 
entrepreneur.  

Adaptation in the case 
of increased risk for 
the financial security. 
Until 31 May each 
year, the travel 
entrepreneur is 
required to adapt the 
financial security to the 
level of annual net 
sales revenue of the 
year in which the 
financial security was 
created.  

However, the financial 
security shall always 
cover the payments 
made by travellers in 
the form of down 
payment or 
participation fee. The 
amount of the financial 
security shall be raised 
based on the 
payments by travellers 
for which no service 
has been performed 

151 

 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

yet where the overall 
amount of those 
exceeds the the 
amount of the 
turnover underlying 
the certified financial 
security provided by 
the travel 
entrepreneur by at 
least 10%. The 
calculation of the 
amount of raise is 
subject to the same 
rules as the calculation 
of the financial security 
itself.  

Mandatory insurance 
The national legislation 
does not set out 
detailed calculation 
requirements. It only 
lays down that the 
coverage provided by 
the insurance 
undertaking shall 
amount to at least 
10% of the financial 
security (as defined 
above) and in the 
case of the carriage 
of passengers by 
means of charter 
flights at least 20% of 
the financial security 
(as defined above).  

Italy 

NO 

Two complementary 
mechanisms in place 
to protect consumers in 
case of insolvency: 

The most 
usual 
exception
s of 

There are no specific 
mechanisms in place 
in Italy to ensure that 
the insolvency 

i. Total 
annulment of 
the journey: 
this coverage 

In the 
practice 
of 
insuranc

YES - 
Both 
the 
organiz

The cost 
of 
repatriati
on is 

NO 

152 

 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

1. Insolvency 
insurance protection 
scheme, which is 
mandatory for travel 
traders under the 
Italian law 
implementing the 
Directive. This scheme 
is legally (and 
contractually) divided 
into two instruments:  
(a) traders' insolvency 
insurance contracts, 
generally covering all 
consumer claims 
arising from the 
trader's professional 
liability; or 
(b) bank guarantees 
against the risk of 
bankruptcy/insolvency 
[least used in practice]  

The security can be 
provided also by 
private guarantee 
funds, which can be 
set up by insurance 
companies and/or 
market actors (e.g. 
consortium of travel 
agencies or LTAs).  

Until July 1st, 2016, 
there was a public 
guarantee fund 
managed under the 
supervision of the 
Ministry of Cultural 

coverage 
in the 
insurance 
contracts 
of 
organiser
s of travel 
packages/ 
traders 
facilitating 
LTAs 
(provided 
by law or 
contract) 
in order to 
cover the 
risk of 
their 
insolvenc
y are the 
following: 

Insolvenc
y due to 
deceit or 
gross 
negligenc
e of the 
party to 
the 
contract 
or the 
insured 
party or 
the 
beneficiar
y (Article 
1892 of 
the Italian 
Civil Code 

protection provides a 
sufficient cover 
compared to the size 
of the business of the 
individual 
organiser/trader. That 
means that there is no 
public control ex ante 
of the suitability of the 
insurance contracts 
and bank guarantees.  

As a result, 
everything depends 
on the practice of 
insurance 
companies. Their 
practice shows that 
insurance companies 
consider the size of the 
business, the number 
of contracts or clients 
etc. to set the 
insurance premium in 
the individual case.  

The variables to be 
considered in setting 
the premium are not 
fixed by law but 
depend largely on the 
discretion of the 
insurer. The practice 
of the insurance 
companies in respect 
of Recitals 39-40 and 
Article 17(1-3) 
normally consists in 
asking for a monthly 
premium on the basis 

includes the 
full refund of  
the package 
price paid by 
travellers that 
could not use 
any service 
in the  
event of the 
insolvency/ba
nkruptcy. 
ii. Partial 
annulment of 
the journey: 
this coverage 
includes any  
reimburseme
nt of the 
sums paid by 
the travellers 
for services 
not  
provided in 
the event of 
the 
insolvency/ba
nkruptcy. 
iii. 
Repatriation 
costs and 
other 
unforeseen 
extra costs 
(e.g.  
accommodati
on, meals 
etc.) for 
travellers in 
the event of 
the  

153 

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

e 
compani
es, the 
security 
require
ments 
are 
calculat
ed 
based 
on a 
process 
called 
risk 
assess
ment. A 
risk 
assess
ment of 
an 
insuranc
e 
contract 
of an 
organise
r/trader 
facilitatin
g LTAs 
usually 
takes 
into 
account 
factors 
such as 
the 
annual 
turnove
r of the 
busines
s, the 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

er and 
the 
retailer 
have to 
take out 
insolve
ncy 
protecti
on. This 
means 
that the 
organis
er and 
the 
retailer 
of the 
same 
packag
e are 
obliged 
(each of 
them) 
to 
provide 
the 
traveller 
with a 
security 
to 
refund 
all the 
paymen
ts 
receive
d from 
the 
traveller 
or on 
his 
behalf 

calculate
d on the 
basis of:  

- the 
cost of 
the 
return 
ticket: if 
the 
traveller 
wants to 
return 
immediat
ely, the 
insurance 
company 
may take 
charge of 
the return 
ticket 
directly 
(with no 
out-of-
pocket 
money by 
the 
traveller), 
if the 
already 
existing 
return 
ticket is 
not 
useable 
by the 
traveller. 
However, 
some 
insurance 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

organizer/ret
ailer/trader’s 
bankruptcy 

Heritage and 
Tourism, which had 
only very limited 
funding. After the 
abolishment of the 
public guarantee fund, 
many private 
guarantee funds have 
been built up. These 
private guarantee 
funds have been built 
up by multiple travel 
agencies business 
associations. That 
landscape is quite 
fragmented and not 
subject to public 
registration, so that it is 
impossible to exactly 
determine the number 
of the funds, the 
number of their 
members and the 
funds at their disposal.  

While insurance 
providers, intended as 
financial institutions 
selling insurance 
products, are subject to 
the bulk of regulation 
collected in the Italian 
“Code of Private 
Insurances” 
(disciplining the 
company form, the 
liabilities, capital ratios 
etc.), this does not 
apply to private funds 
run by business 

and exists 
in all 
insurance 
contracts 
as an 
exception
al clause, 
including 
insolvenc
y 
protection 
schemes)
.  The 
level of 
negligenc
e could 
also 
determine 
a 
reduction 
of the 
compens
ation due 
in case of 
risk;  
The 
insurance 
risk 
occurs 
due to the 
following 
circumsta
nces: 
war 
(declared 
or not); 
revolution
, popular 
riots; acts 
of 

of the volume of 
contracts signed by the 
insured party in the 
previous year (taking 
into consideration also 
other data such as the 
business size, total 
annual turnover and 
number of clients) and 
by covering, for each 
single policy referred 
to in the PTC, all the 
payments made by the 
traveller to the insured 
party.  

Under Article 47(4) of 
Chapter I of Title VI of 
Appendix I to Lgs.D. 
79/2011 [which 
corresponds to Article 
17(2) of the Directive], 
the security shall cover 
reasonably 
foreseeable costs, the 
amounts of payments 
made by or on behalf 
of travellers in respect 
of packages, taking 
into account the length 
of the period between 
down payments and 
final payments and the 
completion of the 
packages, as well as 
the estimated cost for 
repatriations in the 
event of the 
organiser's or the 

154 

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

type of 
package
s sold, 
includin
g the 
mode of 
transpor
t, the 
travel 
destinati
on, the 
total 
number 
of 
clients 
handled 
in the 
previous 
year, the 
number 
of 
booking
s per 
month, 
the 
experien
ce of the 
manage
rs etc.  

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

for the 
travel 
packag
e 
service
s in 
case of 
their 
insolve
ncy or 
bankrup
tcy. In 
other 
words, 
the 
organis
er could 
not be 
asked 
to cover 
the 
damage
s 
caused 
by the 
retailer’
s 
insolve
ncy and 
vice 
versa.  

Criteria 
for 
setting 
the 
insuran
ce 
premiu

policies 
go for an 
ex-post 
reimburs
ement 
scheme. 
Both the 
two 
cases are 
allowed 
under 
Italian 
law, 
which 
does not 
specify 
anything 
in this 
respect;  
- the 
original 
docume
ntation 
and 
receipts 
of all 
payment
s by the 
traveller, 
demonst
rating 
the sums 
effectivel
y paid 
due to 
the fact 
that an 
immediat
e return 
was not 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

associations, which are 
under the sole control 
of their members and 
statutory organs (e.g., 
board of auditors).  

Generally, the 
business association 
demands an entry fee 
(e.g., 50€) and then 
determine an annual 
membership quota 
on the basis of the 
amount of package 
travel contracts 
intermediated or 
organised by the 
member in the 
previous year.  

2. General contractual 
civil responsibility 
borne by travel 
organisers for all 
contractual 
obligations not 
performed (Article 
1218 of the Italian Civil 
Code), however, not 
covering obligations 
unperformed due to 
unforeseen 
unavoidable 
circumstances and 
considering the 
insolvency quota. This 
protection is of limited 
value for the 
consumer.  

terrorism; 
acts of 
vandalism 
and 
looting; 
strikes; 
Cases of 
force 
majeure: 
earthquak
e, 
sediment
ation, 
landslide, 
storm, 
tsunami, 
volcanic 
eruption, 
calamity 
and other 
events 
occurred 
in 
connectio
n with 
energetic 
adjustme
nts or 
transform
ation of 
atoms, 
either 
natural or 
artificially 
induced 
or other 
natural 
phenome
na. 

retailer’s insolvency or 
bankruptcy. 

With regard to LTAs, 
as in the case of 
package travel 
contracts, the has to 
cover reasonably 
foreseeable costs, the 
amounts of payments 
made by or on behalf 
of travellers in respect 
of packages, taking 
into account the length 
of the period between 
down payments and 
final payments and the 
completion  
of the packages, as 
well as the estimated 
cost for repatriations in 
the event of the 
trader’s insolvency or 
bankruptcy. 

The insurance 
premium is 
calculated according 
to the probability law 
(mathematics) to 
cover the insurance 
risk. The percentage 
of management costs, 
the percentage of profit 
of the insurance 
company and the 
commission of its 
brokers and insurance 
agents, are added to 
this amount. In 

155 

possible, 
and the 
traveller 
had to 
stay 
longer 
(accomm
odation; 
meals 
etc.). 

m seem 
to apply 
to both 
traders’ 
and 
retailers
’ 
insolve
ncy 
insuran
ce 
policies. 
Traders 
and 
retailers 
are all 
jointly 
and 
severall
y liable 
for the 
perform
ance of 
the 
contract
, so 
that, if 
the 
organis
er 
become
s 
insolve
nt and 
cannot 
perform 
the 
contract
, 
traveller

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

determining the 
premium, the pricing 
method followed by  
the insurance 
company through its 
actuaries is decisive. 
In the practice of the 
insurance 
companies, the usual 
factors that are taken 
into account in the 
calculation of the 
premium (most of the 
times) in the insurance 
contracts of the 
organiser/trader 
facilitating LTAs’ are 
the following: 
i. The total number of 
clients handled in the 
previous year 
(globally) for whom the 
organiser/trader 
facilitating 
LTAs’/provided a travel 
package. 
ii. The gross 
income/fees/commissi
ons received from 
clients (for the past 
year, the current year 
an estimate for the 
next year). 
iii. A description of the 
activities of the 
organiser/trader 
facilitating LTAs’. For 
example: a) Ticketing 
b) Hotel bookings 
(Local-in Greece) c) 

156 

s can 
ask the 
retailer 
to 
ensure 
the 
perform
ance of 
the 
contract
. The 
obligati
on to 
perform 
the 
contract 
is 
covered 
by the 
policy 
insuran
ce for 
professi
onal 
liability, 
which 
both 
organis
ers and 
retailers 
are 
mandat
ed to 
have 
under 
Italian 
law. 
Should 
the 
retailer 

 
 
 
Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

also go 
bankrup
t, its 
insolve
ncy 
protecti
on 
would 
kick in. 

Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

Hotel bookings 
(International, EU and 
other countries) d) 
Foreign Incoming 
Travel (Outgoing) -
Organizing outgoing 
group tours e) FIT 
(Incoming) f) Group 
Travel (Outgoing)-
Organizing incoming 
group tours g) Group 
Travel (Incoming) h) 
Cruise bookings i) 
Conferences & 
Incentives j)  
Adventure Holidays. 
iv. Whether the 
organiser sells its 
travel packages 
directly or sells travel 
packages via travel 
agents. 
v. The involvement of 
organiser in the sale of 
Student and/or 
Adventure Tours (i.e. 
skiing, rafting, etc.). 
vi. The existence of 
any claims against the 
organiser during the 
five past years. The 
amount and the history 
of each claim. 
vii. The awareness of 
any circumstances 
which may give rise to 
a claim against the 
organiser/trader 
facilitating LTAs’. 

157 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

viii. Company statute 
and the last two 
published balance 
sheets if the 
organiser/trader 
facilitating LTAs’ is an 
S.A. or an L.T.D. 
company 
ix. Fully detailed 
Expense/Revenue 
Budget for the current 
year if the organiser is 
an individual enterprise  
x. The Company 
Profile-the professional 
experience of the 
organiser if he/she is 
an individual 
enterprise. 

The security can be 
provided also by 
private guarantee 
funds, which can be 
set up by insurance 
companies and/or 
market actors (e.g. 
consortium of travel 
agencies or LTAs).  

In order to get access 
to the guarantee, 
market operators are 
requested to pay an 
annual fee and a 
monthly premium, 
which may be 
calculated on the basis 
of various parameters 
designed by each  

158 

 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

guarantee fund, as 
there are no 
implementing 
provisions in addition 
to the transposition of 
the wording of the 
Directive. The private 
guarantee funds 
consider roughly the 
same variables as 
insurance companies 
to set the monthly 
premium, with all the 
diversities due to the 
bigger size of the 
financial assets and 
actuarial calculations 
characterizing 
insurance companies. 

Concerning (a) and 
(b), both types of 
security are valid for 
not more than one 
year from the date of 
commencement, are 
available to the CAR 
for refund of travellers 
for a period of not 
more than 6 months 
following expiry where 
not replaced by a new 
security, and are 
available to the CAR 
regardless of when the 
package travel 
contract or LTA was 
made with the traveller 

159 

N/A 

YES 

NO 

NO 

Costs of 
repatriati
on are 
calculate
d 
following 
submissi
on of 
receipts 
proving 
reasonabl
e 
expenses
. On this 
point 
there are 
indication
s that in 

Irelan
d  

YES – 
Back-
up fund 
not 
availabl
e for 
LTAs 
traders  

N/A 

The Commission for 
Aviation Regulation 
(“CAR”) is responsible 
for licensing travel 
agents and tour 
operators.  

It also administers an 
Irish scheme of 
protection for 
consumers of these 
companies. All tour 
operators and travel 
agents trading in 
Ireland are required 
by law to be licensed 
and bonded to buy or 
sell overseas travel 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

IE there 
is no a 
priori 
formula 
to 
calculate 
the cost 
of 
repatriati
on, but 
there is a 
sort of 
compens
ation a 
posteriori.  

contracts originating in 
Ireland to destinations 
outside Ireland or 
Northern Ireland.  

All licensees are 
required to provide a 
bond. The current 
bond required from 
travel agents and tour 
operators is a 
percentage of 
projected annual 
licensable turnover.  

Under this scheme, if a 
licensed travel agent or 
tour operator 
collapses, the costs of 
claims and associated 
administrative costs of 
processing those 
claims are paid from 
the bond that the firm 
posted when getting a 
licence.  

The size of the bond 
is 4 and 10 per cent 
of projected 
licensable turnover 
(PLTO) for travel 
agents and tour 
operators 
respectively. Should 
the bond be 
insufficient to fund all 
claims, the 
Travellers’ Protection 
Fund (TPF) is used to 

(Section 24(1) of Act 
No. 17/1995).  

Both types of security 
shall be an amount 
that is 4% of the 
turnover of an 
organiser or a trader 
facilitating LTAs for 
the latest financial 
year, or such other 
amount as shall satisfy 
the CAR is sufficient to 
comply with Section 22 
or 22A, and shall not 
be less than 4% and 
not more than 10% of 
the projected 
turnover of the 
organiser or trader 
for the year in which 
the security is being 
arranged 

160 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

fund the remainder. 
The TPF was originally 
funded by a levy on 
tour operators, but 
since 1987 there has 
been no levy on the 
basis that the Fund 
was always deemed to 
be sufficient to provide 
financial protection to 
customers. 

As noted above, the 
Travellers’ Protection 
Fund acts as a back-
up when bonding is 
insufficient to cover all 
claims in the event of 
an insolvency. It has 
not been replenished 
since 1987 and has 
been depleted by 
almost 80% in the 
last decade.  

Linked Travel 
Arrangement 
providers such as 
airlines are unable to 
access the Travellers’ 
Protection Fund 
under the current 
legislation and have 
obtained insurance to 
comply with 
legislation. 

The security provided 
by organisers and 
traders facilitating 

161 

 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

LTAs can take one or 
more of the following 
forms:  

(a) A sum of money 
deposited in a bank 
or financial 
institution in Ireland in 
the sole name of the 
Commission for 
Aviation Regulation 
which shall, in the 
event of the insolvency 
of the organiser or the 
trader, be fully and 
exclusively available to 
the CAR, without 
restriction or condition; 
(b) a contract of 
guarantee secured 
with an insurance 
undertaking or the 
holder of a licence or 
authorisation referred 
to in the national 
legislation (i.e. a bank) 
which shall, in the 
event of the insolvency 
of the organiser or 
trader, be fully and 
exclusively available to 
the CAR, without 
restriction or condition; 
or 
(c) a contract for 
insurance secured 
with an insurance 
undertaking, the 
proceeds of which 
shall, in the event of 

162 

 
 
 
Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

Latvia   YES 

Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

the insolvency of the 
organiser or trader, be 
fully and exclusively 
available, without 
restriction or condition. 

In Latvia there are two 
complementary 
protection systems, 
requiring organisers to 
provide  
security in the form of 
an insurance policy 
issued by insurer or a 
guarantee issued by a 
credit institution  
AND  
security for 
travellers’ 
repatriation in 
accordance with Article 
19(1) of the Directive 
(see the transposing 
national measure 
Article 16(3) of the 
Tourism Law) 

The two mechanisms 
(in case of organisers) 
are complementary, 
requiring organisers 
to provide both. 

As to the former, e.g., 
insurance policy or 
bank guarantee, 
pursuant to Point 34 of 
Regulations No. 380, 
an increased amount 
of security must be 
provided by the 

The usual 
exception
s of 
coverage 
insuranc
e 
contracts 
(irrespecti
ve of 
whether 
they have 
been 
provided 
to 
organiser/
trader 
facilitating 
LTAs) will 
differ from 
one 
insurance 
company 
to 
another, 
however, 
the most 
common 
grounds 
include, 
but are 
not limited 
to deceit, 
fraud, 
gross 
negligenc

1. The amount of 
security for organiser 
or provider of linked 
travel arrangements, 
that does not offer 
passenger transport, 
shall be: 
not less than the 
amount of advance 
payments made by 
travellers or on behalf 
of travellers for 
package and  linked 
travel arrangements in 
accordance with all 
concluded and 
unfulfilled contracts. 
In addition, it is 
ensured that the 
amount of security is 
at least 5% of the 
turnover of package 
or linked travel 
arrangements in the 
previous year 
(operating income from 
sale of package or 
linked travel 
arrangements to 
travellers), but not 
less than  
EUR 3,000 if travel 
services are provided 
only in the territory of 

In addition to 
the standard 
risks covered 
by insurance 
policies, the 
following 
specific risks 
are usually 
covered by 
the insurance 
contracts of 
traders 
facilitating 
LTAs: (i) 
estimated 
repatriation 
costs in the 
event of the 
traders’ 
facilitating 
LTAs 
insolvency, 
provided the 
trader 
facilitating 
LTAs 
provides 
transportatio
n services.  

As noted, 
organisers 
are required 
to pay a 
separate 

163 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

YES 

NO 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

NO 

The costs 
of 
repatriati
on are 
calculate
d from 
the data 
available 
on 
organiser
s/traders 
facilitatin
g LTAs 
net 
turnover. 
The costs 
are 
determin
ed by 
grouping 
(as per 
they 
turnover) 
organiser
s/traders 
facilitatin
g LTAs, 
looking at 
their 
yearly 
turnover, 
calculatin
g the 
amount 
of 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

state fee in 
the amount 
of 40 EUR 
that is used 
to cover 
repatriation 
costs, thus 
their 
insurance 
policies are 
not required 
to cover 
repatriation 
costs.  

e, force 
majeure, 
lost profits 
etc..  

As to the 
security in 
form of a 
bank 
guarante
e, there is 
no set of 
general 
exception
s that 
such a 
security 
may 
provide 

organiser or trader 
facilitating linked travel 
arrangements if it is 
engaged in the 
carriage of 
passengers.  

As to the latter, 
organisers are required 
to obtain a special 
licence (section 2 of 
Regulation No. 380), 
the cost of which for 
one organiser is 
EUR40 per year.  

Traders facilitating 
linked travel 
arrangements are 
solely required to 
provide security in 
the form of an 
insurance policy 
issued by insurer or a 
bank guarantee 
issued by a credit 
institution. The risk of 
repatriation is included 
in such a security.  

Thus, only organisers 
are bound by the 
complementary 
mechanism providing 
two sets of securities 
→ insurance 
policy/bank guarantee 
+ state fee for licence 
covering repatriation 
expenses.  

the Republic of Latvia, 
or  
 EUR 5,000 if travel 
services are provided 
only in the territory of 
the Republic of Latvia, 
the Republic of Estonia 
and the Republic of 
Lithuania, or  
EUR 15,000, if travel 
services are provided 
outside the territory of 
the Republic of Latvia, 
the Republic of Estonia 
and the Republic of 
Lithuania, or  
EUR 30,000, if travel 
services are provided 
in a country that is not 
a country of the 
European Union or the 
European Economic 
Area, the Swiss 
Confederation or the 
United Kingdom 
or 
EUR 200,000 if the 
tour operator 
organizes charter 
flights. 
2. If the provider of a 
linked travel 
arrangements offers 
passenger transport, 
the amount of the 
security shall be not 
less than the amount 
of advance 
payments made by 
travelers or on 

164 

packages 
(as 
opposed 
to the 
total 
number 
of travel 
services 
provided) 
and 
applying 
different 
elements 
(duration 
of 
package; 
seasonali
ty factor 
etc.) to 
calculate 
repatriati
on 
expenses 
for one 
organiser
s/traders 
facilitatin
g LTAs 
within the 
respectiv
e group. 
Based on 
the 
experienc
e of 
Estonia 
and 
Lithuania, 
evidencin
g that 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

Traders facilitating 
LTAs are only required 
to provide insurance 
policy/bank guarantee 
in which the risk of 
repatriation is included. 

behalf of travelers 
for package and 
linked travel 
arrangements in 
accordance with all 
concluded and 
unfulfilled contracts. 
In addition, it is 
ensured that the 
amount of security is 
at least 10% of the 
turnover of the linked 
travel arrangements 
in the previous year, 
but not less than EUR 
5,000 if travel services 
are provided only in 
the territory of the 
Republic of Latvia, or  
EUR 10,000 if the 
travel services are 
provided only in the 
territory of the 
Republic of Latvia, the 
Republic of Estonia 
and the Republic of 
Lithuania, or 
EUR 20,000 if the 
travel services are 
provided outside the 
territory of the 
Republic of Latvia, the 
Republic of Estonia 
and the Republic of 
Lithuania or  
EUR 50,000, if travel 
services are provided 
in a country that is 
not a country of the 
European Union or 

165 

repatriati
on may 
be 
necessar
y on 
average 
once a 
year (N/B 
Latvia 
has not 
witnesse
d any 
cases 
requiring 
repatriati
on of a 
traveller 
due to 
insolvenc
y of 
organiser
/trader 
facilitatin
g LTAs ), 
and 
taking 
into 
account 
all risks, 
the 
average 
yearly 
repatriati
on costs 
constitut
e 
16,438.3
6 EUR.  

 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

the European 
Economic Area, the 
Swiss Confederation 
or the United 
Kingdom 
or 
EUR 200,000 if the 
provider of a linked 
travel arrangements 
organizes charter 
flights. 

3. The security for 
organiser and the 
provider of linked 
travel arrangements 
that commences 
economic activities 
in the field of travel 
services shall be  
EUR 3,000 if travel 
services are provided 
only in the territory of 
the Republic Latvia,    
EUR 5,000 if travel 
services are provided 
only in the territory of 
the Republic Latvia, 
the Republic of 
Estonia and the 
Republic of Lithuania,   
EUR 15,000 if travel 
services are provided 
outside the territory of 
the Republic of Latvia, 
the Republic of 
Estonia and the 
Republic of Lithuania,  
EUR 30,000, if travel 
services are provided 

166 

 
 
  
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

in a country that is not 
a country of the 
European Union or the 
European Economic 
Area, the Swiss 
Confederation or the 
United Kingdom. 
EUR 200,000 if the 
tour operator or 
provider of a linked 
travel arrangements 
organizes charter 
flights 

If any of the 
characteristics 
mentioned in the 
previous points 
coincide, the 
correspondingly larger 
amount of collateral 
shall be determined. 
According to the 
information provided 
for in the ex-ante 
impact assessment 
report (abstract) of 
Regulations No. 380, 
the amount of security 
is determined by taking 
into account the 
following several 
factors:  
(i) repatriation costs 
are covered from the 
pool of payments for 
the yearly licence; (ii) 
the total number of 
active organisers and 
traders facilitating 

167 

 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

LTAs in Latvia; (iii) the 
total amount of 
turnover of such 
organisers and traders 
facilitating LTAs in 
Latvia; (iv) average 
costs of a package 
travel service in Latvia; 
(v) the cost of 
insurance policy 
(amounts to 2% of the 
insurance coverage); 
(vi) number of 
packages purchased in 
Latvia; (vii) on average 
20% of a travel/trip 
price is paid for by 
means of a down 
payment, whereas the 
remaining sum not 
later than 30 days 
before the start of the 
travel/trip; (viii) the 
sector is characterized 
by seasonality that 
during summer may 
increase up to 3 times. 

Taking into account 
the said factors, the 
amount of security is 
calculated pursuant to 
the following formula: 
Amount of security = 
net turnover of 
packages * down 
payment % (15-30% 
each individually) * 
1/12 (due to being 
paid before the start 

168 

 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

of the travel/trip) * 3 
(seasonality rate).  
The Center can decide 
freely at its own 
discretion whether the 
provided security is 
sufficient for meeting 
organisers’/traders' 
facilitating LTAs 
obligations in case of 
insolvency. The 
organiser/trader 
facilitating LTAs shall 
immediately increase 
the amount of the 
security according to 
the information 
provided by the 
Consumer Rights 
Protection Centre. 

NO 

Lithua
nia  

NO 

The package travel or 
LTAs can either be 
protected by means of:  
a suretyship 
insurance (from an 
insurance company) or 
a financial guarantee 
(from a financial 
institution, e.g., a bank) 
or  
by both at the same 
time  

They serve the same 
purpose and are 
considered to be the 

The 
security 
shall not 
cover:  
damages 
suffered 
by the 
tourist as 
a result of 
the 
services 
offered by 
the tour 
organiser 
being of 

A mathematical 
method is used that 
estimates the sum 
insured depending on 
the turnover of the 
tour organiser or the 
vendor of LTAs. More 
precisely, this method 
is established in the 
rules of Articles 13 and 
23 (since 01/05/2023 
Article 24) of Law VIII-
667, explained below.  

Package travel 
contract  

The risks that 
are covered 
by the 
suretyship 
insurance 
contract 
and/or the 
financial 
guarantee of 
travel 
organiser/ven
dor of LTA in 
the case of 
insolvency, 
bankruptcy 
proceedings 

Packag
e travel 
contrac
ts  
The 
amount 
of the 
security 
depend
s on 
whether 
the tour 
organis
er 
provide
s local 

NO 

The 
SCRPA 
represent
s tourists’ 
interests 
in the 
event of 
tour 
organiser’
s/vendor 
of LTAs 
insolvenc
y or 
bankruptc
y and 
organise

169 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

same insolvency 
protection 
mechanism.  

The standard form of 
the financial guarantee 
was adopted by the 
State Consumer Rights 
Protection Authority 
(hereinafter ‘SCRPA’), 
while no such standard 
form is present with 
regard to the 
suretyship insurance.  

Moreover, Lithuanian 
bankruptcy law 
establishes a general 
redress mechanism 
for all creditors. This 
is, however, NOT a 
specific insolvency 
protection 
mechanism with 
regard to the 
Directive. If, 
hypothetically, the 
insurance company 
does not cover all the 
tourists’ losses, it 
would be possible to 
join the creditor list in 
bankruptcy 
proceedings.  

However, in practice, 
this is only a formal 
remedy as there is no 
money left for such a 
creditor at the end of 

insufficien
t quality;  
non-
material 
damages 
suffered 
by the 
tourist;  
damages 
suffered 
by the 
tourist 
where, in 
the cases 
provided 
for in the 
Civil Code 
and/or in 
a 
package 
travel 
contract, 
the tour 
organiser 
is not 
held 
liable for 
the non-
fulfilment 
of 
obligatio
ns 
undertak
en in 
respect 
of the 
tourist; 
damages 
suffered 
by the 

The tour organisers 
established in 
Lithuania shall have a 
valid suretyship 
insurance and/or a 
financial guarantee.  

The tour organiser who 
provides only local and 
inbound tourism 
services or since 
01/05/2023 only 
inbound tourism shall 
have a security, which 
is a minimum amount 
of EUR 3000.  

The tour organiser who 
provides outbound 
tourist services 
(including the tour 
organiser who 
provides mixed 
outbound, inbound and 
local services) or since 
01/05/2023 only 
inbound tourism shall 
have a security, which 
must be the greatest of 
the following:  

i. EUR 50 000, where 
no charter flights are 
organised; since 
01/05/2023 EUR 20 
000, if annual turnover 
of the tour organiser is 
less than EUR 1 000 
000; only inbound 
tourism EUR 3 000; 

being taken 
against them, 
initiation of 
extrajudicial 
bankruptcy or 
liquidation 
proceedings 
or the death 
(in the case 
of a natural 
person) are 
the following:  
repatriation 
costs;  
necessary 
accommoda
tion costs 
until the 
tourist is 
returned to 
the initial 
place of 
departure;  
refund of 
the sum of 
money paid 
by the 
tourist for 
travel 
services not 
provided. 

With regard 
to a vendor 
of LTAs, the 
insurance 
and/or 
guarantee 
also covers 
the money 

or 
outbou
nd or 
inboun
d 
tourist 
service
s or 
both 
(Article 
13(1), 
(2) and 
(3), 
since 
01/05/20
23 
Article 
13(1), 
13(2), 
13(3) 
and 
13(4) of 
Law 
VIII-
667).  

Moreove
r, the 
minimu
m 
amount 
of the 
security 
depend
s on 
whether 
the 
outbou
nd tour 
organis

170 

s the 
repatriati
on of 
tourists 
to their 
initial 
point of 
departure
.  

Accordin
g to point 
6 of 
Order 4-
513, the 
SCRPA, 
having 
approved 
the 
repatriati
on 
schedule, 
shall 
enter into 
a contract 
with the 
carrier of 
passenge
rs of its 
choice for 
the return 
of the 
tourist(s) 
to their 
initial 
destinatio
n, taking 
into 
account 
the most 

 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

bankruptcy 
proceedings. 

paid for 
improperly 
provided 
service. 
However, as 
previously 
mentioned, 
this is not in 
line with the 
Directive. 

tourist as 
a result of 
services 
not 
included 
in the 
package 
not being 
provided 
by the 
tour 
organiser 
(Article 
15(3)).  

According 
to Article 
15(7), the 
insuranc
e 
company 
and the 
financial 
institutio
n shall 
have the 
right not 
to pay 
the 
suretyshi
p 
insuranc
e benefit 
and/or the 
amount 
covered 
by the 
financial 
guarantee 
when the 

ii. EUR 200 000, 
where charter flights 
are organised;  
iii. 7% of the sum of 
revenue from the last 
four most recent 
completed 
consecutive quarters 
from the sale of 
package travel in 
accordance with all the 
package travel 
contracts signed by the 
tour organiser;  
iv. the total cash 
receipts received 
under all package 
travel contracts 
signed by the tour 
organiser and which 
have not yet been 
executed.  

Based on the above 
information, the 
minimum amount of 
the security is either 
EUR 3,000, 20,000, 
50,000 or EUR 
200,000 (depending on 
whether the tour 
organiser provides 
charter flights or not).  

However, point (iii) or 
(iv) shall apply, if the 
amount is greater 
than the minimum 
amount.  

171 

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

er 
offers 
charter 
flights 
or not 
(Article 
13(2)(1) 
and 
(2)(2) , 
since 
01/05/20
23 
Article 
13(3)(1) 
and 
(3)(2) of 
Law 
VIII-
667). 
Also, the 
revenue 
from the 
last four 
most 
recent 
complet
ed 
consecu
tive 
quarters 
from the 
sale of 
package 
travel in 
accorda
nce with 
all the 
package 
travel 
contract

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

economi
cally 
advantag
eous and 
time-
optimise
d offer of 
the air 
carrier or 
bus 
carrier. 

Unless, 
dependin
g on the 
situation, 
the tourist 
returns to 
the initial 
place of 
departure 
independ
ently. In 
that case, 
he can 
claim the 
money 
back in 
accordan
ce with 
the 
procedur
e 
explained 
under 
points  

The 
repatriati
on costs 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

losses 
are fully 
compens
ated by 
the tour 
organiser
, vendor 
of LTAs 
or the 
third 
party or 
to reduce 
the 
suretyshi
p 
insuranc
e benefit 
in 
proportio
n to the 
amount 
paid by 
the tour 
organiser
, the 
vendor 
or LTAs 
or the 
third 
party.  

The right 
to claim 
the surety 
insurance 
benefit or 
part 
thereof 
shall pass 
to the 

[The explanatory note 
of the Ministry of the 
Economy provides for 
an example. If the sum 
of revenue from the 
four quarters is EUR 1 
million, then 7% of that 
amount would be EUR 
70 thousand. If the 
total amount of 
revenue on day X 
equals EUR 120 
thousand, and 
according to the 
arithmetic logic, the 
security amount ‘shall 
be whichever is the 
greatest’ (EUR 70,000 
< EUR 120,000) Thus, 
the amount of the 
security should be 
EUR 120 thousand 
(unless the tour 
organiser provides 
charter flights)]. 

LTAs 
The minimum 
security of a vendor 
of LTAs shall be EUR 
10,000.  

However, if the vendor 
is a party responsible 
for the carriage of 
passengers, the 
amount of the security 
shall be calculated in 
accordance with Article 
13(2)(1) since 

172 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

will be 
calculate
d based 
on the 
supportin
g 
document
s the 
tourist 
provides 
to the 
SCRPA. 

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

s signed 
by the 
tour 
organise
r, as 
well as 
the sum 
of cash 
receipts 
received 
under all 
package 
travel 
contract
s signed 
by the 
tour 
organise
r (and 
which 
have not 
yet been 
execute
d) are 
taken 
into 
account 
(Article 
13(2)(3) 
and 
(2)(4), 
since 
01/05/20
23 
Article 
13(3)(3) 
and 
(3)(4) of 
Law 

 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

third party 
in 
accordan
ce with 
the 
procedure 
establishe
d by the 
Civil 
Code.  

01/05/2023 Article 
24(7) of Law VIII-667 
(which is equal to EUR 
50,000). Moreover, 
Article 20(3)(4) since 
01/05/2023 Article 
21(3)(4)  of Law VIII-
667 provides that the 
amount of the security 
has to correspond to 
the minimum amount 
of security (i.e. EUR,10 
000 or EUR 50,000 (if 
the vendor is 
responsible for the 
carriage of 
passengers)) or the 
sum of cash receipts 
of the vendor under 
all contracts signed 
by the vendor of 
LTAs and not yet 
executed. This 
means that, if the 
sum of cash receipts 
is greater than the 
minimum amount, 
then the former sum 
shall apply to the 
security.  

173 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

VIII-
667).  

LTA 
LTAs 
The 
minimu
m 
amount 
of the 
security 
depend
s on 
whether 
the 
vendor 
of LTAs 
is 
respons
ible for 
the 
carriage 
of 
passen
gers or 
not 
(Articles 
23(3) 
and (4) 
of Law 
VIII-667 
since 
01/05/20
23 
Articles 
24(6) 
and (7) 
of Law 
VIII-
667). 

 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Moreove
r, Article 
20(3)(4) 
and 
since 
01/05/20
23 
Article 
21(3)(4)   
of Law 
VIII-667 
provides 
that the 
amount 
of the 
security 
has to 
correspo
nd to the 
minimu
m 
amount 
of 
security 
or the 
sum of 
cash 
receipts 
of the 
vendor 
under all 
contract
s signed 
by the 
vendor 
of LTAs 
and not 
yet 
execute
d  

174 

 
 
Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

NO   

Memb
er 
State 

Luxe
mbour
g 

Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

N/A 

N/A 

The national measures 
do not provide any 
indications as to how 
to calculate insurance 
premiums in 
Luxembourg since 
these calculations fall 
within the freedom to 
conduct business in 
Luxembourg. 
However, it is to be 
presumed that the 
insurance premium is 
calculated according to 
the probability law 
(mathematics) to cover 
the insurance risk. 

NO 

The cost 
or 
repatriati
on is 
defined 
by each 
insurance 
company 
in 
consultati
on with 
the 
recipient 
of the 
insurance 
(organise
r/trader 
facilitatin
g LTAs’). 

NO  
It is 
only in 
the 
cases 
of 
Article 
20 of 
the 
PTD, 
where 
the 
retailer 
may be 
held 
liable 
under 
the 
conditio
ns 
therein. 

Insurance contracts 
as a mechanism of 
guarantee for 
‘package’ travel 
contracts and security 
for LTAs 

The Law 
of 27 July 
1997 on 
Insurance 
Contracts 
provides, 
unless 
otherwise 
provided 
in the 
insurance 
contract, 
exception
s of 
coverage 
when the 
insurance 
risk 
occurs 
due to the 
following 
circumsta
nces: • 
when 
damages 
have 
been 
caused 
intentional
ly (Article 
14) – 
damages 
caused as 
a result of 
negligenc
e (even 
gross) of 
the 
recipient 
of the 

175 

 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

insurance 
or the 
insured or 
the 
beneficiar
y of the 
insurance 
should be 
covered 
by the 
insurer, 
unless the 
insurance 
contract 
explicitly 
and 
restrictivel
y provides 
otherwise; 
• war or 
by any 
other 
circumsta
nce of 
similar 
nature 
and by 
civil war 
(Article 
15) 

N/A 

Malta   YES 

Package Travel 
Insolvency Fund 
Regulations (S.L. 
419.19) established the 
Insolvency Fund in 
2018  

The Fund was set up 
by the Insolvency Fund 
Managing Board which 

Not specified 
by law 

NO 

NO 

It is 
calculate
d at the 
discretion 
of the 
Manage
ment 
Board of 
the 

YES -  
Regulatio
n 12 (1), 
second 
para. of 
S.L. 
409.19 
provides 
that when 
a 
package 
travel 

The Managing Board 
of the Fund may 
decide from time to 
time the amount of 
coverage that package 
travel organisers have 
to pay to the Fund 
(Regulation 8 (6) of 
S.L. 409.19 ). 
Currently, in 

176 

 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

Insolvenc
y Fund 

contract 
is sold by 
a retailer, 
the 
retailer is 
also 
responsib
le for the 
performa
nce of 
the 
package 
and any 
provision
s 
applicabl
e to the 
organiser 
in so far 
as 
insolvenc
y 
protectio
n is 
concerne
d, are 
also 
applicabl
e to the 
retailer.  

is appointed by the 
Minister responsible for 
tourism and consists of 
five voting members 
(appointed in terms of 
S.L. 409.18) (two 
persons nominated by 
the Malta Tourism 
Authority, two persons 
nominated by the 
Federated Association 
of Travel and Tourism 
Agents of Malta 
(FATTA) and one 
person nominated by 
the Minister 
responsible for 
tourism)  

All package organisers 
are obliged to 
contribute to the 
Insolvency Fund. LTAs 
facilitators are not 
legally obliged to 
contribute to the Fund. 
The latter, in any case, 
are required to provide 
a security cover for 
pre-payments (e.g., in 
the form of an 
insurance contract). 
This aspect, however, 
is not regulated or 
specified by law.  

accordance with Point 
6 of the current Terms 
of Reference and 
Proceedings of the 
Managing Board of the 
Package Travel 
Insolvency Protection 
Fund for Travellers,  

“every licenced travel 
agent (used in its wide 
sense to include all 
package travel 
organisers/retailers) 
shall deposit a cash 
bond of EUR 10,000 
into the fund”.  

Such bond remains in 
the fund until the agent 
relinquishes the 
licence, unless there is 
claim on the Fund 
resulting from the 
agent’s insolvency.  

Regulation 8 (8) of S.L. 
409.18 provides that 
the Fund must at all 
times be kept at a 
minimum threshold 
of five hundred 
thousand euro, or any 
other higher amount as 
shall be determined by 
the Malta Tourism 
Authority or Minister 
for tourism from time to 
time. 

177 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

YES 

Memb
er 
State 

Nether
lands  

Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Not specified  Not 

NO 

specifie
d 

There are currently 
four privately-funded 
security funds 
operating in the 
Netherlands, which 
may be joined by 
organisers:  

SGR (Stichting 
Garantiefonds 
Reisgelden) 
GGTO (Garantiefonds 
voor Gespecialiseerde 
Touroperators) 
STO (Stichting Take 
Over)  
HISWA (HISWA 
boekingsgarantie) 

These security funds 
are all endorsed by the 
Authority for 
Consumers and 
Markets (Autoriteit 
Consumenten en 
Markt, ACM). These 
security funds 
guarantee the re-
payment of all 
payments made by 
travellers or on their 
behalf for any not yet 
performed travel 
service, regardless 
whether the insolvency 
takes place before or 
after the start of the 
travel. GGTO and 
HISWA offer 
insolvency protection 

The usual 
exception
s are: 

- Airline 
tickets 
which are 
not part of 
a 
package  
- 
Consume
rs who 
cannot 
provide a 
booking 
confirmati
on or a 
proof of 
payment  
- 
Consume
rs can 
recover 
the loss 
from third 
parties  
- Amount 
limit: 
12.500 
Euro per 
consumer 
per claim; 
10.000 
Euro per 
consumer 
per 
consumer 
contributi
on to 

As the security funds 
are private, there are 
no specific 
requirements for the 
calculation of the 
amount of security that 
they need to comply 
with nor do they ask 
for additional 
contributions in case of 
increased risks.  

It is left to the security 
funds to decide what 
contributions from their 
members they require 
to cover any 
foreseeable financial 
difficulties of their 
members. 

SGR calculates the fee 
for the participation in 
their security fund 
mainly based on the 
annual turnover of 
the trader (275 Euro 
for annual turnover 
between 0-0.25 million 
Euro; 798 Euro for 
annual turnover 
between 0.25-2.50 
million Euro; 1476 
Euro for annual 
turnover between 2.50-
12 million Euro; 2250 
Euro for annual 
turnover between 12-
50 million Euro; 5250 
Euro for annual 

178 

The costs 
of 
repatriation 
are not 
pre-
calculated, 
but rather 
paid on the 
basis of 
invoices for 
the actual 
costs of the 
repatriation 
of 
travellers. 

Dutch law 
does not 
specify to 
what place 
the 
repatriatio
n needs to 
be 
guarantee
d – 
whether to 
the place 
of 
traveller’s 
residence 
or to the 
place of 
departure 
for the 
travel. This 
has not 
been 
further 
specified in 
any of the 
documenta
tion 
available 
on the 
websites of 
the security 
funds. In 

a 

the 

YES  -  there 
is  a  special 
security 
fund  set  up 
that 
facilitates 
smaller 
package 
travel 
organisers  – 
GGTO. 
Joining 
security 
fund 
requires 
one-time 
payment  of 
Euro. 
400 
The  annual 
payment 
is 
0.125%  of 
the  turnover 
from  selling 
packages  in 
the  previous 
financial 
year,  with  a 
minimum  of 
250  Euro.  If 
a trader joins 
the  security 
fund  during 
the 
year, 
they  pay  a 
proportion 
of 
appropriate 
the 
to 
amount 
of 
months  that 
they 
will 
participate 
in  the  fund. 
Every 
booking  that 
travellers 
make 
(regardless 

the  fee, 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

how  many 
travellers are 
involved 
with 
one 
booking) has 
to  include  a 
charge of 15 
Euro 
for 
GGTO, 
unless 
booking 
for 
amount 
higher 
than 
10.000 Euro, 
as  then  the 
charge  is  15 
for 
Euro 
every 10.000 
Euro 

the 
is 
an 

the 
interviews 
it has been 
confirmed 
that 
repatriation 
is offered if 
the 
traveller 
has 
already 
started 
their 
package 
travel and 
the 
continuatio
n of the 
travel 
cannot be 
guaranteed
. The costs 
of 
repatriation 
are 
covered 
based on 
the 
expenses 
to 
repatriate 
the 
travellers 

only to traders that are 
package organisers; 
SGR and STO also to 
LTAs facilitators.  

Furthermore, 
organisers and LTA 
traders are also 
allowed to take other 
measures to ensure 
sufficient insolvency 
protections 

The Dutch legislator 
allows organisers to 
arrange for other 
insolvency protection 
than joining one of the 
existing security funds. 
For example, they could 
join a foreign security 
fund, arrange for 
additional insolvency 
protection insurance 
cover from a big 
insurance company, and 
provide a sufficient bank 
deposit to another party, 
who then takes over the 
obligation to help 
travellers in case of 
insolvency. It is, 
however, uncommon for 
traders in the Dutch 
travel sector not to join 
one of the private 
security funds, but to 
take a private insurance 
instead. 

insolvenc
y 
protection 
scheme  
- 
Payments 
made to 
the 
organiser 
after it 
has been 
published 
in the 
media 
that the 
organiser 
is in 
financial 
inability  
- 
Payments 
made to 
the 
organiser 
in 
advance 
contrary 
to its 
terms and 
conditions  
- 
Payments 
that are 
not part of 
travel 
costs: 
insurance 
premiums
, policy 
fees, 

turnover between 50-
100 million Euro; and if 
the annual turnover is 
higher than 100 million 
Euro than the fee is 
calculated upon 
request). If a trader 
joins the security fund 
during the year, they 
pay a proportion of the 
fee, appropriate to the 
amount of months that 
they will participate in 
the fund. A trader 
needs to pay a fixed 
amount of 30 Euro per 
every office or website 
they conduct their 
business from. 

STO – to join STO, 
travel companies pay 
one-time 75 Euro. 
Thereafter, STO 
charges travel 
companies an annual 
fee of 75 Euro. 
Additionally, every 
booking that travellers 
make via Certo Escrow 
costs between 9-12 
Euro, depending on 
the package. 

GGTO – joining the 
security fund requires 
a one-time payment of 
400 Euro. The annual 
payment is 0.125% of 
the turnover from 

179 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

costs of 
changes, 
telephone 
costs, 
credit 
card 
costs, 
security 
deposits, 
legal 
costs, 
interest 
costs, 
costs for 
acquiring 
visas etc.  
- 
Bookings 
made on 
the basis 
of 
lotteries, 
saving 
stamps, 
airmiles, 
not paid 
for in 
cash or 
by bank 
transfer  
- 
Vouchers 
that have 
not 
resulted 
in a 
booking  

Not 
specified 

NO 

Polan
d  

According to Article 
7(2) of the PTA, there 
are several ways in 

selling packages in the 
previous financial year, 
with a minimum of 250 
Euro. If a trader joins 
the security fund 
during the year, they 
pay a proportion of the 
fee, appropriate to the 
amount of months that 
they will participate in 
the fund. Every 
booking that travellers 
make (regardless how 
many travellers are 
involved with one 
booking) has to include 
a charge of 15 Euro for 
GGTO, unless the 
booking is for  
an amount higher than 
10.000 Euro, as then the 
charge is 15 Euro for 
every 10.000 Euro  

Bank guarantee 
In Poland the amount 
to be covered (the 

The 
discussed 
securities are 

YES 

NO 

NO 

Not 
specified 
by law 

180 

 
 
  
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

which the Polish tour 
operators and 
entrepreneurs 
facilitating linked travel 
arrangements may 
secure the 
continuation, refund of 
the costs of the travel 
contracts and 
repatriation in case of 
their insolvency.  

First pillar of the 
security: 
Taking out a bank 
guarantee or 
insurance guarantee in 
accordance with the 
model form and the 
provisions laying down 
the minimum 
guarantee amount or 
(Art. 7(2) point (1) of 
the PTA)  
Taking out an 
insurance policy 
covering travellers in 
accordance with the 
model form and the 
provisions laying down 
the minimum insurance 
amount or (Art. 7(2) 
point (2) of the PTA)  
Concluding an amount 
concerning a travel 
escrow account in 
accordance with the 
model agreement and 
receiving the travellers’ 
payments exclusively 

minimum amount) by a 
bank guarantee or 
insurance guarantee 
that underlies 
travellers’ protection is 
determined by the 
minister competent 
for financial 
institutions acting in 
agreement with the 
minister competent 
for tourism by way of 
a regulation, after 
consulting the Polish 
Insurance Chamber 
(Regulation of the 
Minister for 
Development and 
Finance of 27 
December 2017)  

Insurance covering 
travellers 
An insurance policy 
covering travellers is 
determined by the 
minister competent for 
financial institutions 
acting in agreement 
with the minister 
competent for tourism 
by way of a regulation, 
after consulting the 
Polish Insurance 
Chamber. The 
Regulation lays down 
the minimum amount 
of insurance covering 
travellers depending 
on the type of the 

aimed at 
covering the 
costs 
incurred by 
the travellers 
in the event 
of the 
insolvency of 
travel 
companies.  

According to 
the Polish 
law, the 
different 
types of 
securities 
cover the 
same risks In 
addition, the 
Polish 
Ministry of 
Sport and 
Tourism 
replied: 1) 
the covering 
of the costs 
of package 
continuation 
or of the 
travellers’ 
repatriation, 
including in 
particular the 
costs of 
transport and 
accommodati
on, also 
covering 
reasonable 

181 

 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

to that account, if 
performing packages 
or facilitating linked 
travel arrangements 
provided only in the 
territory of the Republic 
of Poland;  

Second pillar of the 
security:  

Payment of due 
contribution to the 
Tourist Guarantee 
Fund. Whereas the 
first three methods 
function alternatively 
(first pillar) and depend 
on the choice of the 
tour operator and 
entrepreneurs 
facilitating linked travel 
arrangements, the 
fourth method 
(second pillar) is 
conceived as a 
source of protection 
when all the previous 
securities do not 
suffice to cover all 
the costs of the 
travellers. 

service, the nature, 
scope and type of 
activities conducted by 
tour operators and 
entrepreneurs 
facilitating linked travel 
arrangements as well 
as on the time and 
amount of 
prepayments received 
from travellers by tour 
operator and on the 
declared annual 
revenue from the 
provision of 
packages and 
facilitating linked 
travel arrangements, 
taking into account the 
need to ensure the 
appropriate protection 
and security for the 
travellers and sufficient 
funds to cover the 
costs and refund the 
payments.  

Contributions to the 
Tourist Guarantee 
Fund  
Poland’s security 
system for travel 
package contracts 
consists also of the 
establishment of the 
Tourist Guarantee 
Fund (functioning as 
the II pillar of the 
security system). In 
line with Article 36(9) 

costs 
incurred by 
the travellers 
when the tour 
operator or 
entrepreneur 
facilitating 
linked travel 
arrangement
s fails to 
ensure such 
continuation 
or 
repatriation 
as required, 
2) the refund 
of payments 
made for the 
package or 
for every 
service that 
has been 
paid for to an 
entrepreneur 
facilitating 
linked travel 
arrangement
s if, for 
causes 
attributable to 
the tour 
operator, 
entrepreneur 
facilitating 
linked travel 
arrangement
s or persons 
acting on 
their behalf 
the package 

182 

 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

of the PTA, similarly to 
the above-mentioned 
regulations, the 
minister for financial 
institutions acting in 
agreement with the 
minister for tourism, 
after consulting the 
Insurance Guarantee 
Fund, stipulated in the 
Regulation on 
contributions to Travel 
Guarantee Fund the 
amount of the 
contribution to the 
Fund. The amounts 
are established taking 
into account the nature 
of activities conducted, 
type of service, place 
of performance of the 
package or linked 
travel arrangement, 
mode of transport and 
the type of means of 
transport provided, as 
well as the need to 
ensure the appropriate 
protection and security 
to travellers and 
having regard to the 
Fund’s financial needs 
linked to the 
performance of its 
tasks, with the 
possibility of setting 
the minimum 
contribution at PLN 0. 
The Regulation 
specified the 

or any 
service that 
has been 
paid for to an 
entrepreneur 
facilitating 
linked travel 
arrangement
s has not or 
will not be 
performed, 3) 
the refund of 
the part of 
payments 
made for a 
package 
correspondin
g to a part of 
the package 
or for every 
service that 
has been 
paid for to an 
entrepreneur 
facilitating 
linked travel 
arrangement
s 
correspondin
g to a part of 
the service 
that has not 
or will not be 
performed for 
causes 
attributable to 
the tour 
operator, 
entrepreneur 
facilitating 

183 

 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

linked travel 
arrangement
s or persons 
acting on 
their behalf. 

contribution rates 
which shall apply to 
the conclusion of 
different types of 
package travel 
contracts (between 0 
PLN to 15 PLN 
approx.3.47 EUR). 

The minimum level of 
the bank guarantee or 
insurance guarantee 
required in connection 
with the activity carried 
out by tour operators 
and businesses 
facilitating the 
procurement of linked 
travel arrangements 
ranges/is:  

 0.5 % of the annual 
revenue obtained from 
facilitation of the 
procurement of linked 
travel arrangements in 
states sharing a land 
border with Poland (in 
the case of Russia - 
within the Kaliningrad 
region and on Polish 
territory), if no 
transport service is 
provided but not less 
than the equivalent of 
EUR 600 for travel 
companies which 
accept payment 
exclusively upon 
completion of the 

184 

 
 
 
 
  
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

package travel or 
linked travel 
arrangements. 
Up to 20.0 % of the 
annual revenue 
obtained from 
organisation of 
package travel using 
air charters in the 
European states 
listed in the Appendix 
to this Regulation and 
in non-European 
states, but not less 
than the equivalent of 
EUR 250,000 for 
travel companies 
which request 
prepayment for 
future package travel 
or future linked travel 
arrangements in an 
amount 
corresponding to 
more than 30 % of 
the price of the 
package travel or 
linked travel 
arrangements more 
than 180 days prior 
to the start of the 
package travel or 
provision of linked 
travel arrangements. 
The equivalent of EUR 
950 applies to travel 
companies which 
accept payment 
exclusively upon 
completion of the 

185 

 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

package travel or 
linked travel 
arrangements and 
which commence an 
activity: facilitation of 
the procurement of 
linked travel 
arrangements in states 
sharing a land border 
with Poland (in the 
case of Russia - within 
the Kaliningrad region 
and on Polish 
territory), if no 
transport service is 
provided.  
The equivalent of EUR 
250,000 applies to 
travel companies 
which commence the 
activity: organisation 
of package travel using 
air charters in the 
European states listed 
in the Appendix to this 
Regulation and in non-
European states.  

The minimum level of 
insurance taken out on 
behalf of travellers 
required in connection 
with the activity carried 
out by tour operators 
and businesses 
facilitating the 
procurement of 
linked travel 
arrangements ranges 
fully corresponds to 

186 

 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

the minimum level 
applicable for 
insurance or bank 
guarantees and is:  
From 0.5 % of the 
annual revenue 
obtained from 
facilitation of the 
procurement of 
linked travel 
arrangements in 
states sharing a land 
border with Poland (in 
the case of Russia 
within the Kaliningrad 
region and on Polish 
territory), if no 
transport service is 
provided but not less 
than the equivalent of 
EUR 600 for travel 
companies which 
accept payment 
exclusively upon 
completion of the 
package travel or 
linked travel 
arrangements. 
Up to 20.0 % of the 
annual revenue 
obtained from 
organisation of 
package travel using 
air charters in the 
European states listed 
in the Appendix to this 
Regulation and in non-
European states, but 
not less than the 
equivalent of EUR 

187 

 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

250,000 for travel 
companies which 
request prepayment 
for future package 
travel or future linked 
travel arrangements 
in an amount 
corresponding to more 
than 30% of the price 
of the package travel 
or linked travel 
arrangements more 
than 180 days prior to 
the start of the 
package travel or 
provision of linked 
travel arrangements. 
The equivalent of 
EUR 950- for travel 
companies which 
accept payment 
exclusively upon 
completion of the 
package travel or 
linked travel 
arrangements and 
which commence an 
activity of facilitation 
of the procurement 
of linked travel 
arrangements in 
states sharing a land 
border with Poland (in 
the case of Russia 
within the Kaliningrad 
region and on Polish 
territory), if no 
transport service is 
provided.  

188 

 
 
Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

NO 

Portu
gal 

Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

The equivalent of 
EUR 250,000 for travel 
companies which 
commence their 
activity, in respect of 
organisation of 
package travel using 
air charters in the 
European states listed 
in the Appendix to this 
Regulation and in non-
European states. 

The law states that the 
FGVT has a minimum 
amount of 4 000 000 
EUR. This means that, 
in the event of 
bankruptcy of a trader 
invoicing in high 
season 30, 40 or 50 
million euros, there will 
not be enough money 
to cover the repayment 
of sums paid to 
customers who have 
not travelled. In 
practice, however, 
the amount is much 
higher, currently 
reaching over € 
5,500,000.00. 

The FGVT is financed 
by travel and tourism 
agencies by means of 
a single contribution 
of 2,500 EUR. More 
particularly, when 
entering the market, 
DL 17/2018 requires 

189 

There is only one 
mechanism in place in 
Portugal to protect 
consumers in case of 
insolvency: the Travel 
and Tourism 
Guarantee Fund 
(FGVT). This 
mechanism is 
regulated under 
Articles 37 to 40 of DL 
17/2018 [which 
correspond in part to 
Article 17(1), first 
subparagraph and (2) 
of the Directive]. It 
applies both in case of 
travel packages and 
LTAs. 

The FGVT is jointly 
and severally liable for 
the payment of 
travellers’ claims 
arising from breach of 
services contracted 
from travel and tourism 
agencies. 

The 
payments 
relating to 
the 
isolated 
purchase 
of air 
travel 
tickets 
and those 
relating to 
travel on 
the basis 
of a 
general 
agreemen
t for the 
arrangem
ent of 
business 
travel are 
specificall
y 
excluded 
from the 
scope of 
the 
FGVT. 

NO  

NO 

Risks 
covered by 
the civil 
liability 
insurance, 
as follows: 

In addition to 
subscribing to 
the FGVT, a 
travel and 
tourism agency 
has to have a 
civil liability 
insurance. As 
laid down in 
Article 41(1) of 
DL 17/2018 
[which 
corresponds in 
part to Article 
17(1), first 
subparagraph 
of the 
Directive], 
such insurance 
covers the 
risks arising 
from the 
activity of 
travel and 
tourism 

YES -  
in the 
case of 
package 
travel, 
organisin
g travel 
and 
tourism 
agencies 
are jointly 
and 
severally 
liable 
with the 
retail 
agencies.  

The civil 
liability 
insurance 
covers 
the cost 
for 
repatriati
on of 
travellers, 
although 
it is not 
clear 
whether 
those 
costs are 
also 
covered 
in case of 
insolvenc
y of the 
organiser
.  

No 
formula 
to 
calculate 
this cost 

 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

In addition to 
subscribing to the 
FGVT, a travel and 
tourism agency has to 
have a civil liability 
insurance. Such 
insurance covers the 
risks arising from the 
activity of travel and 
tourism agencies, 
ensuring the 
reimbursement of 
claims for personal 
injury and damage to 
property caused to 
clients or third parties 
by actions or omissions 
of the agency or its 
representatives. The 
insurance also covers, 
among others, the 
repatriation of clients 
and their assistance. It 
does not cover, 
however, costs of 
repatriation due to 
insolvency of the 
organisers 

agencies, 
ensuring the 
reimbursement 
of claims for 
personal 
injury and 
damage to 
property 
caused to 
clients or third 
parties by 
actions or 
omissions of 
the agency or 
its 
representative
s.  

Risks covered 
by the 
insolvency 
protection 
unclear 

Claims for 
compens
ation for 
property 
or non-
property 
damage, 
or travel 
or 
accident 
assistanc
e 
expenses 
incurred 
while 
traveling 
are not 
covered 
by the 
FGVT but 
by the 
civil 
liability 
insurance
. The 
FGVT 
also does 
not cover 
requests 
in the 
context of 
Regulatio
n (EU) 
261/2004. 
Turismo 
de 
Portugal, 
I.P. also 
replied 
that so 

that all companies 
have to pay 2500 
EUR, regardless of 
their volume of 
invoicing.  

Retailers are 
hampered due to the 
disproportionate 
contributions to the 
FGVT. Small and 
medium retail 
companies (which 
only trade) will have 
to pay, 
proportionally, more 
than large companies 
(responsible for 
creating the package 
and the respective 
risk). 

In cases where the 
FGVT falls below 3 
000 000 EUR, Turismo 
de Portugal, I.P 
(National Tourism 
Authority, a public 
institute under the 
supervision of the 
Ministry of Economy) 
notifies the travel and 
tourism agencies to 
make an additional 
contribution until the 
FGVT reaches the 
minimum amount of 
4 000 000 EUR. This 
was also confirmed 
directly by Turismo de 

190 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

far, it has 
not had a 
concrete 
situation 
leading to 
an 
analysis 
of 
possible 
limits on 
reimburse
ment. 

Portugal, IP. Such 
contribution shall be 
paid within 30 days 
and, at the same time, 
the travel and tourism 
agency must make 
access available to the 
Simplified Company 
Information (IES) 
submitted for tax 
purposes as proof of 
its turnover.  

The contributions are 
further regulated under 
Appendix I to DL 
17/2018. Such 
Appendix provides 
that: 
- for the provision of 
services ≤ 1 million 
EUR, the amount of 
annual contribution to 
the FGVT shall be of 
200 EUR 
- for the provision of 
services > 1 to 5 
million EUR, the 
amount of annual 
contribution to the 
FGVT shall be of 500 
EUR 
- for the provision of 
services > 5 to 10 
million EUR, the 
amount of annual 
contribution to the 
FGVT shall be of 1500 
EUR 

191 

 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

- for the provision of 
services > 10 to 30 
million EUR, the 
amount of annual 
contribution to the 
FGVT shall be of 3500 
EUR 
- for the provision of 
services > 30 to 60 
million EUR, the 
amount of annual 
contribution to the 
FGVT shall be of 7000 
EUR 
- for the provision of 
services > 60 to 100 
million EUR, the 
amount of annual 
contribution to the 
FGVT shall be of 10 
000 EUR 
- for the provision of 
services > 100 million 
EUR, the amount of 
annual contribution to 
the FGVT shall be of 
15 000 EUR. 

Thus, all travel 
agencies (including 
those which did not 
marketed the package) 
are liable for additional 
contributions to the 
FGVT. The national 
law sets out therefore 
an objective liability in 
this regard. In 
addition, companies 

192 

 
 
 
Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

NO 

Calculate
d by each 
insurance 
policy 
covering 
distance 
and 
location  

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

YES 

YES - 
The 
organiz
er and 
the 
retailer 
have 
joint 
and 
several 
liability 
for the 
perform
ance of 
the 
contract
. 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

YES 

Roma
nia  

Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

In Romania there is a 
single mechanism for 
protecting consumers 
in case of insolvency: 
organising travel 
agencies must provide 
securities for the 
refund of all payments 
made by or on behalf 
of travellers. 

These securities are 
represented by: 
- bank guarantee 
letter, 
- insurance policies, 
- fiduciary contracts, 
- guarantee fund for 
package travels (not 
described as only a 
project for the time 
being without any 
further clarification on 
its functionning) or 
- other legally 
established security 
instruments (which 
are not 
listed/explained). 

Bank guarantee 
letter:  
The object of this 
instrument is the 
guarantee by the bank 
of the risk of non-
payment by the 
organising travel 

The most 
usual 
exception
s of 
coverage 
in the 
insurance 
contracts 
of the 
organiser
s of travel 
packages/
the 
traders 
facilitating 
LTAs 
(provided 
by law or 
contract) 
in order to 
cover the 
risk of 
their 
insolvenc
y are the 
following: 
a. The 
most 
important 
clause of 
the 
agreemen
t is the 
one 
mentione
d in 
Article 
2205 of 

that invoice less pay 
proportionally more. 

The amount covered 
by the insolvency 
protection is normally 
calculated based on 
common criteria set 
out by the insurers 
(and, thus, not 
regulated by law) such 
as, e.g., the number 
of package sold and 
the amount of pre-
payment received in 
one month.  

193 

The risks that 
are usually 
covered by 
the insurance 
contracts of 
travel 
organiser’s/tr
ader 
facilitating 
LTAs’ are the 
following: 
i. Repayment 
of the 
amounts 
already paid 
by the 
travellers; 
ii. 
Repatriation 
costs for 
travellers in 
the event of 
the 
insolvency 
iii. 
Repatriation 
costs for 
travellers in 
the event of 
the 
bankruptcy 
iv. 
Professional 
Civil Liability 
of the 
organiser 
(This 
coverage 

 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

agency of the amounts 
paid by travellers, 
caused by the total or 
partial non-
performance of the 
contracts of regarding 
the packages of travel 
contracts concluded 
with them, in case of 
insolvency organising 
travel agency. The 
bank is the issuer of 
the bank guarantee 
letter, the organising 
travel agency is the 
authorizing officer of 
the bank guarantee 
letter (within the 
meaning of the 
provisions of Art. 2321 
of the Romanian Civil 
Code) and the Ministry 
of Tourism is the 
beneficiary of the letter 
of bank guarantee. The 
traveller is reimbursed 
by the issuer of the 
letter (in this case the 
bank). As the 
mechanism is 
described in the RO 
Procedure, the bank 
does not have an 
obligation to 
repatriate the 
traveller, but only to 
reimburse the costs 
of such operation. 
The traveller must 
inform the issuer of the 

Romanian 
Civil 
Code, 
which 
mentions 
that the 
insurance 
contract 
becomes 
void if, 
prior to 
the 
moment 
when the 
insurer’s 
obligation 
produces 
effects, 
the 
insured 
risk 
occurred. 
b. The 
most 
significant 
exception 
of 
coverage 
is the 
damage 
resulting 
from other 
causes, 
other than 
the 
insolvenc
y. 
c. 
Exception 
of 

includes any 
reimburseme
nt of the 
sums paid by 
the travellers 
for services 
not provided 
in the event 
of the 
organizer's 
insolvency/ba
nkruptcy). 
v. Coverage 
of costs for 
deflecting 
legal claims. 

194 

 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

guarantee letter (the 
bank) about the refuse 
of repatriation (if 
applicable) by the 
travel agency.( which is 
supposed to organise 
it) 

Insurance policy: 
 The insurance policy 
consists in 
guaranteeing by the 
insurance company the 
risk of non-payment by 
the travel agency of the 
amounts paid by 
travellers, caused by 
the total or partial non-
performance of the 
contracts of regarding 
the packages of travel 
contracts concluded 
with them, in case of 
insolvency organising 
travel agency. The 
insurance company 
accepts to guarantee 
to the travellers, 
beneficiaries of the 
insurance policy, in 
case of the insolvency 
of the organizing travel 
agency, the payment 
of the amounts paid 
by them, as well as 
the repatriation or 
reimbursement of the 
cost of repatriation, 
as the case may be. 
The insurance policy 

coverage 
exists 
also when 
the 
insurance 
risk 
occurs 
due to the 
following 
circumsta
nces: 
i. War 
events or 
actions, 
civil war, 
revolution
, popular 
riots. 
ii. Cases 
of force 
majeure: 
Earthquak
e, 
sediment
ation, 
landslide, 
storm, 
tsunami, 
volcanic 
eruption 
or other 
natural 
phenome
na. These 
exception
s are not 
provided 
as an 
example 
in the 

195 

 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

with franchise is 
forbidden. The 
insurance company 
has the obligation, 
when notified by the 
traveller, that within 12 
hours to insure the 
repatriation of 
travellers or to offer 
alternative services. 

Fiduciary contract: 
They are 
conceptualised as the 
signing in authentic 
form of this type of 
contract, according 
with the provisions of 
Title IV, Art. 773-791 of 
the Romanian Civil 
Code, between the 
organising travel 
agency, as a 
constituent, and a 
trustee, for the benefit 
of the travellers. The 
original of the contract 
must be provided to 
the Ministry of Tourism. 
The trustee will pay the 
travel packages and 
transport services 
necessary for the 
repatriation of the 
passengers based on 
the documents and 
data made available by 
the organising agency 
(the constitutor), 
through its legal 

Romanian 
law, but 
they are 
included 
most of 
the times 
in the 
insurance 
contracts. 
d. The 
insurance 
companie
s do not 
cover also 
damages 
to the 
applicant 
for loss of 
earnings 
unless 
expressly 
mentione
d therein 
[Article 
2222(2) of 
Romanian 
Civil 
Code]. 
e. The 
insurance 
companie
s do not 
cover also 
damages 
or losses 
of 
personal 
belonging
s, 
luggage, 

196 

 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

representatives, being 
exempted from any 
liability in case of non-
transmission or 
improper transmission 
of the situations 
regarding the affected 
traveller or other 
information required to 
make payments. 

These securities could 
work either separately 
or jointly, but this is 
only optional for each 
organising travel 
agency to provide at 
least two separate 
securities. 

money, 
valuables 
and travel 
document
s. 
f. The 
insurance 
companie
s do not 
cover 
other 
costs 
claimed 
by the 
tourist 
(exceptin
g the 
amount 
spent and 
the cost 
of 
repatriatio
n). 
g. The 
insurance 
companie
s do not 
cover the 
fraud or 
bad 
intentions 
of the 
traveller. 
In 
addition, it 
should be 
noted that 
the 
insurance 
contracts 

197 

 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

covering 
the 
insurance 
risk of the 
organiser'
s/trader’s 
facilitating 
LTAs’ 
insolvenc
y are 
always 
combined 
in practice 
with the 
trader's 
general 
civil and 
professio
nal 
liability 
insurance 
contract. 
Thus, 
these 
contracts 
contain 
extra 
exception
s relating 
to the 
insurance 
of general 
civil 
liability 
(and 
professio
nal 
liability). 
In case of 
a fiduciary 

198 

 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

contract, 
the 
trustee is 
exempted 
from any 
liability in 
case of 
non-
transmissi
on or 
improper 
transmissi
on of the 
situations 
regarding 
the 
affected 
traveller 
or other 
informatio
n required 
to make 
payments
. 
In the 
case of 
letter of 
guarantee 
the sole 
exception 
is 
regarding 
the abuse 
or fraud 
events, 
when the 
issuer is 
not 
obliged to 
pay the 

199 

 
 
Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

Spain   YES - 

The 
nationa
l 
legislati
on on 
insolve
ncy 
schem
es 
applies 
to 
packag
e 
travels 
and 
linked 
travel 
arrang
ements
.  

Nevert
heless, 
the 
nationa
l 
legislati
on on 

Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

covered 
amount. 
The 
Guarante
e Fund is 
not 
effective 
at this 
moment 
in 
Romania. 

N/A 

According to the 
national legislation 
transposing the 
Directive, the 
insolvency security 
may be provided under 
the form of an 
"individual security" 
(an insurance, a bank 
guarantee or another 
financial guarantee), a 
"collective security" 
(through business 
associations that are 
lawfully set up, by 
making contributions to 
a solidarity security 
fund) or "a specific 
insurance" for each 
package (an insurance 
for each traveller). 

This national legislation 
(based on "securities") 
has been adapted into 
the regional legislation 
of some regions 
(Andalusia, Aragon, 
Canary Islands, 

This is rather a 
competence of the 
Spanish regions 
where there are 
different approaches. 
Some regions 
(Andalusia, Aragon, 
Canary Islands, 
Galicia, La Rioja, 
Madrid, Valence and 
Catalonia) require a 
“security” to cover the 
risk of the activity (in 
general terms) and the 
insolvency (in 
particular) of 
organisers and 
retailers, under one of 
the following 
modalities: 

(a) Individual 
security: consisting of 
an insurance, a bank 
guarantee or other 
financial guarantee. 
During the first year of 
activity, this security 
shall cover a 

200 

N/A 

NO 

Not 
regulated  

NO 

YES -  
Organise
rs and 
retailers 
have the 
same 
obligation
s, without 
making 
any 
distinctio
n among 
them. 
They are 
subject to 
the same 
insolvenc
y rules.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

the 
obligati
on to 
have a 
contrac
t 
securit
y only 
applies 
to 
packag
e 
travels 

Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Gallice, La Rioja, 
Madrid, Valence and 
Catalonia), while other 
regions have not 
adapted their 
legislation (based on 
"bonds" in favour of the 
corresponding public 
administrations) 
(Asturias, Balearic 
Islands, Cantabria, 
Castilla-La Mancha, 
Castilla and Leon, 
Murcia, Navarre, 
Basque Country, Ceuta 
and Melilla). 
As a consequence, at 
regional level, there 
are two systems in 
place: securities (in 
line with the Directive) 
and bonds. These 
bonds may be 
formalised by means 
of a transfer of 
money to the 
competent regional 
authority or a deposit 
of public bonds with 
the competent 
regional 
administration, a 
bank guarantee in 
favour of the given 
authority or a caution 
policy in favour of 
that same authority. 

minimum amount of 
EUR 100.000. From 
the second year of 
activity, the amount 
of this security shall 
be equal, at least, to 
5% of the turnover 
arising from the 
sales of packages by 
the organiser or the 
retailer during the last 
year and, in any case, 
the amount shall not 
be less than EUR 
100.000. 

In the case of 
Catalonia, the 
individual security may 
be provided by means 
of a bank guarantee or 
caution policy, and 
during the first year of 
activity, this security 
shall cover a minimum 
amount of EUR 
100.000. From the 
second year of activity, 
the amount of this 
security shall be equal, 
at least, to 3% of the 
annual turnover of the 
travel agent and, in 
any case, the amount 
shall not be less than 
EUR 100.000 and not 
exceed EUR 300.000. 

Securities (in line with 
the Directive) may be 

(b) Collective 
security: through 

201 

 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

directly enforced by 
travellers in case of 
insolvency of the 
organiser or the 
retailer, while the 
bonds are only 
enforceable by the 
given public authority 
that is the beneficiary 
of the bond if a judicial 
resolution or arbitration 
award is rendered. 
Both securities and 
bonds may be 
individual (provided 
by individual 
organisers, retailers or 
traders) or collective 
(provided by an 
association of 
organisers, retailers or 
traders to which they 
are adhered). 

In addition to the 
insolvency security, the 
national law requires 
the hiring of a contract 
security to ensure 
compliance with the 
services of the 
package contract, 
which may be enforced 
by travellers directly to 
the cover scheme 
directly. 

This security is a 
general contract 
security, while the 

business associations 
that are lawfully set up, 
by making 
contributions to a 
solidarity security fund. 

The amount of this 
collective security 
shall be minimum 50% 
of the sum of the 
earnings of the travel 
agencies that should 
severally provide 
according to the above 
point. In no case the 
amount of the global 
fund may be less than 
EUR 2.500.000.  

(c) Security of each 
package: an insurance 
is hired for each user of 
the package. On the 
other hand, other 
regions (Asturias, 
Balearic Islands, 
Cantabria, Castilla-La 
Mancha, Castilla and 
Leon, Murcia, Navarre, 
Basque Country, Ceuta 
and Melilla) require the 
provision of "bonds" 
(fianzas) to the treasury 
administrations of the 
corresponding regions 
to secure the same risks 
of insolvency or 
bankruptcy, so they are 
directly enforceable by 
the corresponding 
administrations only if a 
judicial resolution or 
arbitration award is 
rendered.  

In general terms, these 
bonds may be provided 

202 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

insolvency protection 
required by some 
Spanish regions is a 
specific insurance for 
insolvency situations. 

As a consequence, 
according to the 
national measure, it 
can be concluded that 
insolvency situations 
must not be covered by 
the general contract 
liability security, 
although account 
should be taken of the 
specific terms of each 
contract liability 
security with regard to 
the liability of the 
organiser and traveller 
for their services. In the 
light of those specific 
terms, there may be a 
duplication of 
security with regard to 
insolvency situations if 
the contractual 
obligations of the 
organiser or retailer are 
not fulfilled, but not 
because of a 
mandatory requirement 
of the national 
measure. 

In any event, nothing 
is provided regarding 
the relationship 
between the 

by cash transfer or 
public bond; bank 
guarantee; or caution 
insurance policy; and 
the bond may be 
provided individually or 
collectively, by means of 
their voluntary inclusion, 
through associations 
lawfully established, to a 
solidarity security fund.  

Generally speaking, the 
minimum amount of the 
individual bonds shall be 
approximately:  
(a) For retailers: EUR 
60.000  
(b) For wholesalers: 
EUR 120.000.  
(c) For wholesalers-
retailers: EUR 180.000.  

At the same time, the 
travel agencies, in their 
different modalities, 
which have more than 
six commercial 
establishments shall, in 
general, increase the 
individual bond in the 
amount of EUR 12.000 
for each additional 
establishment.  

In general, the 
minimum amount of 
collective bonds 
shall be 50% of the 
sum of the individual 
bonds that, according 
to the above, should 
be provided by the 
associated companies, 
and in no case of less 
than EUR 2.400.000 

203 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

NO 

Slove
nia 

Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

N/A  

insolvency protection 
security and the 
contractual liability 
security, and account 
should be taken of the 
specific terms of the 
contractual liability 
security, although the 
approach of the 
national measure is 
that they are 
complementary and 
not overlapping. 

A travel organiser can 
provide security for the 
case of its liquidity 
problems in any of the 
following forms (Article 
58.a(6) of ZVPot and 
Article 4 of UJLTOP):  
Insurance with an 
insurance company  
Dedicated bank 
deposit 
Bank guarantee  
Participation in a 
guarantee scheme.  

Each of the 
mechanisms should 
cover the same risks to 
the same extent. 
Travel organisers are 
free to choose which of 
these mechanisms 
they will use in order to 
protect consumers in 

for national or 
regional associations 
(some regions reduce 
this requirement for 
regional associations). 
When any of these 
companies have more 
than six commercial 
establishments, the 
amount of the 
collective bond shall, in 
general, be increased 
by EUR 6.000 for each 
additional 
establishment.  

The methodology for 
calculating the annual 
turnover related to the 
implementation of 
tourist packages, the 
conditions of operation 
of the guarantee 
scheme and the 
minimum amount of 
the required 
guarantee, which is 
considered effective, 
for an each of the 
mechanisms are 
determined by a 
governmental decree.  

ZVPot requires in 
Article 58.a(1-2) that 
the security provided 
must be effective and 
must cover reasonably 
foreseeable costs, 
including the cost of 
the consumers’ 

204 

NO 

The 
insurance 
contracts 
must cover 
the risks as 
prescribed in 
law. As 
follows from 
Article 58 of 
ZVPot, the 
risk covered 
is that the 
travel 
organiser will 
not be able to 
provide travel 
services 
already 
agreed and 
paid for by 
consumers 
due to its 
liquidity 
problems. If 
the package 

NO - 
The 
rules 
requiring 
travel 
organise
rs and 
undertak
ings 
providin
g LTAs 
to 
provide 
security 
in case 
of 
liquidity 
problem
s do not 
distingui
sh 
between 
different 
types of 
package

NO 

The 
calculatio
n of 
repatriati
on costs 
is not 
regulate
d in 
legislatio
n. 
Insurance 
companie
s expect 
that in a 
situation 
where 
repatriati
on of 
travellers 
is 
required, 
they will 
cooperat
e with 
their 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

s or 
LTAs or 
between 
different 
modes 
of 
providin
g these 
services 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

assistanc
e partner 
in the 
relevant 
country, 
who will 
get into 
touch 
with 
transport
ation 
service 
providers 
to find the 
most 
appropria
te 
repatriati
on option 

Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

case of liquidity 
problems.  

[A guarantee scheme 
is defined in Article 6 of 
UJLTOP as a 
collection of funds that 
are collected for the 
purpose of reimbursing 
all consumer payments 
and covering the costs 
of repatriating 
consumers under the 
responsibility of the 
travel organiser. The 
guarantee scheme 
may be formed within 
any legal entity that 
becomes the holder of 
the guarantee scheme. 
If a guarantee scheme 
is formed within an 
economic interest 
grouping, membership 
of that grouping must 
not be a condition for 
inclusion in that 
scheme. In any case, 
funds raised for the 
purpose of providing 
security must be kept 
in a separate dedicated 
account] 

includes 
carriage of 
passengers, 
the insurance 
must cover 
also the risk 
of having to 
cover the 
cost of the 
consumers’ 
repatriation in 
case of travel 
organiser’s 
liquidity 
problems 

repatriation, where the 
package also includes 
carriage of 
passengers.  

The security must be 
sufficient to cover all 
payments made by the 
consumer for the 
purposes of the tourist 
package during the 
period of the year for 
which demand is 
highest. When 
calculating the 
required amount of 
security, the type and 
price of the tourist 
packages, the type of 
transport and the 
length of the period 
between advance 
payments and final 
payments and the 
completion of the 
tourist package must 
be taken into account 
UJLTOP prescribes in 
Article 5 that the 
minimum amount of 
the required 
guarantee in the form 
of insurance with an 
insurance company, 
a dedicated bank 
deposit or a bank 
guarantee must 
provide coverage of 
at least 10 percent of 
the annual turnover 

205 

 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

of the travel 
organisers.  

For a travel organiser 
who has not had 
annual turnover in 
the previous financial 
year the minimum 
amount of the 
guarantee required 
must provide 
coverage of at least 
10 percent of the 
planned annual 
turnover.  

In case of guarantee 
schemes, the 
minimum amount of 
the required 
guarantee must be at 
least 2 percent of the 
combined total 
annual turnover of all 
travel organisers 
included in the 
guarantee scheme.  

The annual turnover is 
calculated on the basis 
of sales revenue from 
the organisation of 
travel and the 
provision of linked 
travel arrangements 
during the previous 
financial year. The 
planned annual 
turnover is calculated 
on the basis of the 

206 

 
 
 
 
 
Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

NO 

Slova
kia  

Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Insurance agreement 
or bank guarantee 
agreement concluded 
between a tour 
operator agency and 
the provider of 
protection in the case 
of insolvency (Section 
2(d) of Act No 
170/2018). TO agency 
free to decide between 
the two. The 
insolvency protection 
based on insurance is 
the preferred one. 

projected turnover 
from the organization 
of travel and the 
provision of linked 
travel arrangements in 
the current financial 
year.  

The amount of 
insurance premium is 
determined by the 
insurance company, 
on the basis of various 
factors resulting from 
the data in 
questionnaire, which a 
tour operator agency 
completes before 
entering into insurance 
agreement.  

Minimum and 
maximum insurance 
premium is not set by 
national legislation, but 
the insurance 
company has the right 
to set minimum 
insurance premiums in 
the insurance 
agreement. It should 
also be noted that 
pursuant to Section 
9(2) of Act No 
170/2018, a tour 
operator agency shall 
agree with the provider 
of insolvency 
protection on the sum 
ensuring protection 
that must amount to at 

207 

The  most 
usual 
exceptions 
of  coverage 
in 
the 
insurance 
contracts: 

Quality of 
the 
services 
provided 
in the 
contract;  
Claims of 
those 
persons 
who are 
employee
s, 
statutory 
members 
or 
persons 
taking 
part in the 
business 
of the tour 
operator 
agency or 
their 
spouse, 
relatives 
in a direct 

YES 

NO 

Reimbursem
ent of the 
sums paid by 
the travellers 
for services 
not provided 
in the event 
of the tour  
operator 
agency's 
insolvency 
and 
repatriation 
for travellers 
in the event 
of the 
insolvency. 

NO 

The 
national 
legislatio
n does 
not set 
out a 
system 
for the 
calculatio
n of the 
costs of 
repatriati
on. In the 
event that 
the 
traveller 
arranges 
their own 
repatriati
on, the 
insurer's 
liability 
shall be 
limited to 
the actual 
expenses 
that 
would 
have 
been 
incurred 
had the 
repatriati

 
 
 
Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

on been 
provided 
by the 
tour 
operator 
agency/in
surer 
itself. 

Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

least 30 % of the 
planned annual 
revenue from the 
sale of package 
travel and LTAs.  

If the planned 
revenues are to be 
lower than in the 
previous year, the tour 
operator agency shall 
agree on a sum 
ensuring insolvency 
protection that 
amounts to at least 30 
% of the revenues 
from the sale of 
package travel and 
the facilitation and 
sale of LTAs in the 
previous year.  

line, or a 
person 
living with 
them in 
the 
common 
househol
d, unless 
agreed 
otherwise 
Damage 
arising 
from 
technical 
failure, 
war, war 
events, 
terrorist 
acts, 
strikes, 
natural 
disasters 
etc 
Damage 
resulting 
from the 
insolvenc
y of a 
person 
other than 
the 
policyhold
er (e.g., 
other than 
the tour 
operator 
agency in 
question) 
Any 
conseque

208 

 
 
 
 
 
Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

NO 

Swede
n 

Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

ntial 
damage 
(e.g. 
fines, lost 
profits) 

National legislation 
establishes one 
mechanism for 
protecting travellers in 
case of insolvency. It 
can, however, be 
arranged in a number of 
different ways. In line 
with RGL Section 13, a 
travel guarantee can 
consist of:  

1) a payment pledge 
that has been issued 
by a bank, a credit 
institution or and 
insurance company 
and that it honoured 
upon request,  
2) insurance cover,  
3) deposited funds, or  
4) any other similar 
commitment.  

If  a  package 
or  a  linked 
travel 
arrangement 
does 
not 
contain 
carriage  of 
passengers 
and 
if  all 
payments are 
in 
made 
arrears, 
the 
travel 
service 
operator 
does 
need 
arrange 
insolvency 
protection 
for 
package 
/LTA.  

not 
to 

that 

Where the travel 
guarantee consists of an 
insurance policy, the 
policy shall be issued by 
an insurer who is 
authorised to pursue and 
insurance activity in an 
EEA country or in a 
country that is a member 
of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation 
and Development 
(OECD).  

However, the 
Kammarkollegiet may 
approve a travel 

The 
traveller 
does not 
have the 
right to be 
reimburse
d if they 
have 
received 
reimburse
ment for 
the 
package 

N/A 

YES 

NO 

Calculation of the 
guarantee: 
Details and guidelines 
on calculating the 
premium are available 
at the website of 
Kammarkollegiet. The 
information available 
there specifies that the 
size of the guarantee 
is established on a per 
month basis and 
needs to be applicable 
until further notice. The 
following factors are 
taken into 
consideration in the 
calculation: 

- Number of travellers 
per month; 
- The cost of the 
arrangements; 
- How much the 
traveller paid in 
advance in fees and 
cancellation cover; 
- When the down 
payment is to be 
made; 
- How long before 
departure the final 
payment must be 
made; and 

209 

NO 

In 
accordan
ce with 
Section 
6, second 
subparag
raph of 
the 
Travel 
Guarante
e Act, the 
travel 
guarante
e shall 
ensure 
home 
transport 
and 
accommo
dation in 
connectio
n with 
home 
transport. 
Kammark
ollegiet 
requests 
document
ation 
from the 
trader 
and asks 
him/her 
to 
indicate 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

/LTA 
elsewhere
. 

- Standard cost for 
home transport. 

The sum of the items is 
increased by ten percent 
to cover any increase in 
the number of travellers 
and costs in relation to 
what was budgeted. The 
sum is rounded to an 
even amount. The 
minimum amount which 
can be arrange in a 
travel guarantee is SEK 
50,000 (approximately 
4,700 EUR). No 
maximum amount is 
provided.  

guarantee in the form of 
an insurance policy 
arranged by someone 
other than an insurer as 
referred to in the first 
paragraph if the 
requirements applicable 
to the party responsible 
for the travel guarantee 
are sufficient to assume 
that the party is in a 
position to meet its 
commitments.  

Where the travel 
guarantee consists of 
deposited funds, these 
funds shall be deposited 
with the 
Kammarkollegiet, with a 
credit institution 
authorised to carry out 
banking or financial 
operations pursuant to 
the Banking and 
Financial Operations Act 
(2004:297) or with a 
credit institution within 
the meaning of Article 
4(1)(1) of Regulation 
(EU) No 575/2013 of the 
European Parliament 
and of the Council of 26 
June 2013 on prudential 
requirements for credit 
institutions and 
investment firms and 
amending Regulation 
(EU) No 648/2012 which 
is authorised and 
supervised by the 
competent authorities of 
another country within 
the EEA 

210 

the 
number 
of 
travellers 
each 
month as 
well as 
the 
means of 
transport 
in 
question. 
Based on 
this 
informatio
n, 
Kammark
ollegiet 
makes a 
calculatio
n of how 
much a 
trader's 
travel 
guarante
e should 
be, and in 
connectio
n with 
this, adds 
a 
standard 
amount 
that 
varies 
dependin
g on the 
means of 
transport 
for home 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of insolvency 
protection 
mechanisms and 
relation among them  

Exceptio
ns on 
coverage  

Risks 
typically 
covered by 
insolvency 
protection  

Method to determine 
the security 
requirements, such 
as insurance 
premium calculation 
and factors 
considered in the 
calculation (including 
minimum amount) 

Memb
er 
State 

Insolv
ency 
protect
ion 
require
ments 
differ 
for 
packa
ge 
organi
sers 
and 
traders 
facilita
ting 
LTAs 
(YES/N
O) 

Calculati
on of the 
costs for 
repatriati
on 

Different 
requirem
ents for 
smaller 
compani
es 
(SMEs) 
(YES/NO) 

Respo
nsibilit
y of the 
retailer 
(Article 
13) 
(YES/N
O) and 
relevan
t B2B 
mecha
nisms  

Securit
y 
depend
s on the 
type of 
packag
es/LTAs 
sold 
(includi
ng the 
mode of 
transpo
rt, the 
travel 
destinat
ion) 

transport 
costs for 
each 
specified 
traveller. 

211