Is the European Union providing a regulatory model for other countries?.
Date: 2023-11-27
Institutions: Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs
Subjects: European Union, environmental protection, export, financial regulation, health control, international trade, market, plant health control, product safety, trade agreement

 
 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs 
Directorate A - Strategy & Economic Analysis 
Unit A.1 - Chief Economist Unit 

The opinions expressed in this paper are the authors' alone and cannot be attributed to the European Commission. 

Contact: Cristina Herghelegiu and Fernando Martin 

Corresponding authors: cristina-daniela.herghelegiu@ec.europa.eu; fernando.martinespejo@kuleuven.be 

Acknowledgements:  The  authors  are  grateful  to  Román  Arjona  Gracia,  William  Connell  Garcia,  Francesco  Di  Comite,  Lionel  Fontagné, 
Maria Garrone, Kerstin Jorna, Kamil Kiljański, Josefina Monteagudo, Paolo Pasimeni, Marc Pirrung, Thomas Sampson, Ralph Schmitt-Nilson, 
Outi  Slotboom,  Bruno  Standaert,  Georg  Strasser,  Mary  Veronica  Tovsak  Pleterski,  Anne  Van  Bruggen,  Frank  Vandermeeren,  Xose-Luis 
Varela-Irimia,  and  participants  at  the  Academic  conference  on  the  30th  anniversary  of  the  single  market  (Prague,  Czechia),  the  CEN-EC 
Seminar (Brussels, Belgium), and the 25th INFER Annual Conference (Valencia, Spain) for useful comments and suggestions. All remaining 
errors are the sole responsibility of the authors. 

European Commission 
B-1049 Brussels 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Is the European Union providing a regulatory 
model for other countries? 

Single Market Economics Papers 

Cristina Herghelegiu 

Fernando Martin 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Is the European Union providing a regulatory 
model for other countries? 

Cristina Herghelegiu and Fernando Martin1,2,3 

Abstract 

We examine whether the European Union (EU) is providing a model for other countries for product 
requirements  aimed  at  protecting  health,  safety,  and  the  environment.  The  analysis  draws  upon 
information  on  detailed  categories  of  sanitary  and  phytosanitary  (SPS)  measures  and  technical 
barriers to trade (TBTs) introduced on specific products by 86 countries across the world over the 
2009-2019 period. First, we examine whether the existence of requirements within a given product-
level  SPS/TBT  category  in  other  countries  is  associated  with  the  prior  existence  of  requirements 
within  the  same  product-level  SPS/TBT  category  in  the  EU,  and  document  a  positive  and 
significant correlation. Second, we delve into potential mechanisms likely to explain the subsequent 
adoption of requirements by other countries within the same product-level SPS/TBT categories as 
the EU. The results indicate the presence of both market-driven forces, such as the importance of 
the EU as an export market for other countries, and treaty-driven forces, such as the existence of 
trade  agreements  between  the  EU  and  other  countries.  Finally,  we  show  that  the  EU’s  role  in 
providing  a  regulatory  model  for  other  countries  for  product  requirements  aimed  at  protecting 
health,  safety,  and  the  environment  is  (1)  predominant  when  compared  to  the  United  States  or 
China, and (2) reinforced in the area of environmental protection. 

Keywords: European Union, Product Requirements, Health, Safety, Environment, 

International Trade  

JEL classification: F13, F14, I18, K32 

1  The  opinions  expressed  are  those  of  the  authors  only  and  should  not  be  considered  as  representative  of  the 
European Commission’s official position. 

2 Corresponding author: Cristina Herghelegiu: Chief Economist Team, DG Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and 
SMEs,  European  Commission,  1049  Brussels  (Belgium),  cristina-daniela.herghelegiu@ec.europa.eu.  Fernando  Martin: 
LICOS 
(Belgium), 
fernando.martinespejo@kuleuven.be. 

Institutions  and  Economic  Performance,  KU  Leuven,  3000  Leuven 

-  Centre 

for 

3 The authors are grateful to Román Arjona Gracia, William Connell  Garcia, Francesco Di Comite, Lionel Fontagné, Maria 
Garrone,  Kerstin  Jorna,  Kamil  Kiljański,  Josefina  Monteagudo,  Paolo  Pasimeni,  Marc  Pirrung,  Thomas  Sampson,  Ralph 
Schmitt-Nilson,  Outi  Slotboom,  Bruno  Standaert,  Georg  Strasser,  Mary  Veronica  Tovsak  Pleterski,  Anne  Van  Bruggen, 
Frank Vandermeeren, Xose-Luis Varela-Irimia, and participants at the Academic conference on the 30th anniversary of the 
single  market  (Prague,  Czechia),  the  CEN-EC  Seminar  (Brussels,  Belgium),  and  the  25th  INFER  Annual  Conference 
(Valencia, Spain) for useful comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the authors. 

6 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1. Introduction 

The European single market is considered as one of the most important forces of cohesion of the 
EU as it enables integration through guaranteeing the free movement of goods. Product regulations 
and  other  product-related  legal  instruments  have  been  a  powerful  tool  to  foster  trade  in  goods 
within  the  single  market,  while  safeguarding  health,  safety,  and  the  environment.  Although  the 
primary  goals  of  the  EU  as  a  product  regulator  have  been  internal,  over  time,  the  EU  product 
requirements have gained an important external role.4 For instance, the EU has restricted the use 
of phthalate plasticisers in toys, leading China to revise its  rules on toys in 2014, in order to align 
them with the prevailing  EU requirements (Bradford,  2020,  p.  204). Following  the  EU  measure  in 
establishing  minimum-type  sizes  for  labels,  Morocco  and  Algeria,  among  other  countries,  have 
adopted  new  labelling  rules  in  2013  to  adhere  to  the  EU  requirements  (Bradford,  2020,  p.190). 
More recently, a new EU deal to  ban the import of goods linked to deforestation appears to have 
created a blueprint for law proposals in other countries, including the  United States.5 In the same 
vein, the EU proposal on packaging regulations aiming to reduce plastic waste might pave the way 
for  similar  proposals  in  other  countries.6  For  instance,  in  the  context  of  the  United  Nations 
negotiations  over  a  global  agreement  on  plastic  waste,  the  EU  is  leading  by  example,  proposing 
various policies such as minimums on recycled content and reusable packaging, limits on the use 
of  labels  claiming  biodegradability,  and  “eco-design”  criteria.  Several  other  countries,  including 
Australia, Canada, Ghana, Senegal,  and  the  United  Kingdom, also adhere to the EU’s  objectives 
and might adopt similar requirements in order to end plastic pollution. 

This paper seeks to examine whether the EU is providing a model for product requirements aimed 
at  protecting  health,  safety,  and  the  environment  for  other  countries,  relying  on  a  quantitative 
analysis.  To  trace  product  requirements  aimed  at  protecting  health,  safety,  and  the  environment, 
the analysis draws upon information on product-level SPS measures and TBTs, which are types of 
non-tariff  measures  (NTMs).7  Gathering  quantitative  information  on  NTMs  is  complex  for  several 
reasons.  First,  many  NTMs  exhibit  a  qualitative  character,  necessitating  their  classification  into 
predetermined  categories  to  enable  cross-country  comparisons.  Second,  NTMs  are  outlined  in 
legal  documents  which  may  be  exclusively  available  in  the  local  language,  demanding  a  deep 
understanding of their context and purpose. Finally, the legal documents detailing NTMs are often 
not centralized but dispersed across various regulatory agencies. As a first step to overcome these 
challenges,  UNCTAD  has  established  the  Multi-Agency  Support  Team  (MAST)  to  work  on  the 
taxonomy  of  NTMs  in  2006.8,9  The  mandate  of  MAST  encompassed  defining  NTMs,  developing 

4  Several  papers  investigate  the  impact  of  cross-country  harmonization  of  regulatory  standards  on  trade,  both  within  the 
single  market  and  with  respect  to  third  countries.  De  Frahan  and  Vancauteren  (2006)  explore  the  trade  effects  of 
harmonization initiatives in EU Directives on intra-EU trade in food products over 1990-2001 and find a large and positive 
effect on import intensity both at the aggregate level and for individual food sectors. Chen and Mattoo (2008) analyse the 
influence  of  EU  Harmonization  Directives  and  Mutual  Recognition  Agreements  on  intra-  and  extra-EU  trade  and  find  that 
harmonization  boosts  trade  among  harmonizing  countries.  They  show  that  exports  to  the  region  of  excluded  developed 
countries increase, while exports of excluded developing countries decline. Baller (2007) adopts the same approach using 
data  on  both  EU  and  ASEAN  harmonization  and  mutual  recognition  agreements  and  finds  similar  results.  Shingal  and 
Ehrich  (2019)  study  the  replacement  of  national-level  regulation  on  Maximum  Residue  Levels  (MRLs)  in  pesticides  with 
harmonized Community-wide regulation in 2008 and find adverse effects of regulatory heterogeneity on intra-EU trade in the 
pre-harmonization period. Their findings also suggest that the EU’s MRL harmonization may have improved access for non-
EU, including non-OECD, exporters to the Common Market. 

5  See  The  Guardian,  EU  ban  on  deforestation-linked  goods  sets  benchmark,  say  United  States  lawmakers  available  at 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/05/eu-ban-on-deforestation-linked-goods-sets-benchmark-say-us-
lawmakers. Consulted on April 7, 2023. 

6  See  Bloomberg, 
at 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2023-02-27/the-eu-is-cracking-down-on-plastic-will-other-countries-follow.  Consulted  on  March 
27, 2023. 

plastic:  Will 

The  EU 

available 

cracking 

follow? 

others 

down 

on 

is 

7 Besides traditional trade instruments such as price controls and quotas, NTMs also encompass instruments of a technical 
nature,  such  as  SPS  measures  and  TBTs.  SPS  measures  aim  at  protecting  human  and  animal  life,  as  well  as  the 
environment, plant life and biodiversity. TBTs refer to mandatory technical regulations and voluntary standards that lay down 
specifications  for  product  characteristics,  production  methods  processes,  or  even  some  terminology  provisions  (such  as 
symbols,  packaging,  marking  or  labelling  requirements)  applying  to  a  product,  process  or  production  method.  These 
technical NTMs, which are increasingly used in international trade are driven by higher standards of living worldwide, which 
push consumers’ demand for safe and high-quality products, and by growing environmental problems encouraging the use 
of environmentally-friendly products (WTO, 2021). 

8 UNCTAD stands for United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 

7 

 
 
 
                                                 
their classification system, optimizing data collection methods based on member agencies' existing 
practices,  and  offering  guidelines  for  data  utilization,  including  quantification  techniques.  MAST's 
work played a pivotal role in establishing the International Classification of NTMs, which is currently 
the  standard  classification  for  product-related  NTMs.  When  collecting  NTM  information  at  the 
product  level  in  a  country,  data  collectors  extensively  review  all  local  language  legal  documents 
from  various  regulatory  agencies,  using  this  classification  to  categorize  regulations,  directives, 
rules,  and  other  legal  texts.10  Relying  on  this  framework,  UNCTAD  has  led  the  NTM  information 
gathering since 2012, ensuring a comprehensive and standardized collection across countries. The 
dataset includes 57 different categories of SPS measures and TBTs (i.e. 34 SPS categories and 23 
TBT  categories)  to  classify  all  legal  texts  concerning  product  requirements  aimed  at  protecting 
health,  safety,  and  the  environment  in  a  given  country.11  It  also  includes  information  on  every 
product to which a given SPS/TBT category applies, every jurisdiction affected by a given SPS/TBT 
category, as well as the implementation date of each SPS/TBT category. 

We leverage all the information from the dataset to explore whether the EU sets a precedent for the 
adoption of measures within a given product-level SPS/TBT category in 86 third countries over the 
2009-2019  period.  For  instance,  one  of  the  SPS  categories  refers  to  the  requirement  of  using 
irradiation to kill or devitalize microorganisms, bacteria, viruses, or insects that might be present in 
food  and  feed  products.  Assuming  that  the  EU  has  an  irradiation  requirement  in  place  for  dried 
fruits, we can identify all third countries that have subsequently introduced irradiation requirements 
for dried fruits. However, since many  other elements might affect countries’ regulatory  behaviour, 
we  must  establish  whether  third  countries  are  really  following  the  EU’s  lead  or  their  decision  is 
independent of the EU’s behaviour.  Effectively accounting for these other factors allows to isolate 
the role of the EU in establishing a model for third countries’ regulatory behaviour. While for some 
of  these  factors  data  are  readily  available  allowing  us  to  directly  control  for  their  effect  in  our 
analysis (e.g. size of a country, its level of development, its import/export value at the product level, 
its  level  of  tariff  protection  at  the  product  level),  for  many  other  factors  data  are  unavailable  or 
challenging  to  obtain  (e.g.  regulatory  environment,  product  quality,  consumer  preferences, 
participation  in  international  agreements,  technological  innovation).  However,  we  rely  on  fixed 
effects  techniques  to  take  into  consideration  these  unobserved  factors  to  the  extent  possible.  In 
other words, our exercise investigates whether the existence of measures within a given SPS/TBT 
category on a specific product in the EU sets a precedent for the adoption of measures within the 
same  SPS/TBT  category  on  the  same  product  in  other  countries,  after  controlling  for  other 
confounding factors.  

We  acknowledge  that,  despite  belonging  to  the  same  product-level  SPS/TBT  category,  specific 
measures might not be identical between the EU and other countries. For example, when it comes 
to the use of irradiation for dried fruits, a country may adopt measures requiring the use of ionizing 
radiation and another country may adopt measures requiring the use of infrared radiation. While an 
ideal  scenario  would  allow  us  to  trace  identical  measures  between  the  EU  and  third  countries 
within  a  given  product-level  SPS/TBT  category,  the  challenges  previously  outlined  make  it 
impossible to have comparable data across countries at such a level of granularity. Nevertheless, 
we  believe  that  an  analysis  focusing  on  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories  still  provides  useful 
insights  into  the  role  of  the  EU  in  providing  a  model  for  third  countries  in  terms  of  product 
requirements  aimed  at  protecting  health,  safety,  and  the  environment.  Countries  have  specific 
production  processes  and,  while  specific  measures  might  be  different,  they  share  comparable 
goals  which  are  broadly  reflected  by  the  product-level  SPS/TBT  category  under  which  they  are 
included. 

9  The  international  organizations  involved  in  MAST  include:  Food  and  Agriculture  Organization  of  the  United  Nations, 
International Trade Centre, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development, United Nations Industrial Development Organization, World Bank, and World Trade Organization. 

10  See  UNCTAD,  “Guidelines  for  the  Collection  of  Data  on  Official  Non-Tariff  Measures  2021  Version”  available  at: 
https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/ditctab2020d5_en_0.pdf. Consulted on October 14, 2023.  

11 More details about the dataset and the categorization of SPS measures and TBTs are provided in Section 3. 

8 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
The specific objectives of the paper are twofold. First, as already mentioned, we examine whether 
the  likelihood  of  third  countries  to  have  in  place  measures  within  an  SPS/TBT  category  on  a 
specific  product  is  associated  with  the  prior  existence  of  measures  within  the  same  SPS/TBT 
category  on  the  same  product  in  the  EU.  Second,  we  investigate  potential  mechanisms  likely  to 
explain why third countries subsequently adopt measures within the same product-level SPS/TBT 
categories as the EU.  

Our results show that the probability of third countries to have in place requirements within specific 
product-level  SPS/TBT categories is positively correlated  with  the  prior existence of  requirements 
in the same product-level SPS/TBT categories in the EU. Specifically, our results suggest that the 
prior existence of EU measures within specific product-level SPS/TBT categories is associated with 
a 7% increase in the probability of third countries to implement measures within the same product-
level  SPS/TBT  categories.  Furthermore,  we  find  evidence  for  two  mechanisms  explaining  the 
subsequent  adoption  of  measures  by  third  countries  within  the  same  product-level  SPS/TBT 
categories as the  EU. First, market forces appear to  play a significant role, as an increase in the 
EU’s share in a country’s total exports of a product, as well as an increase in the total export value 
of a product to the EU, are both positively correlated with the country’s adoption of measures within 
the  same  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories  as  the  EU.  Second,  treaty-driven  forces  are  also 
important,  as  the  existence  of  free  trade  agreements  with  the  EU  is  positively  associated  with 
higher  adoption  rates  of  measures  by  the  EU’s  partners  within  the  same  SPS/TBT  categories  as 
the EU. Furthermore, we provide additional insights into the role of the EU in establishing a model 
for measures within product-level  SPS/TBT categories around the  world. We begin  by comparing 
the EU’s role in providing a model for third countries in terms of product-level SPS/TBT categories 
to  the  potential  role  exerted  by  other  major  players,  such  as  the  United  States  and  China.  Our 
analysis  finds  no  significant  evidence  for  the  role  of  the  United  States,  but  we  document  a 
significant result for the role of China. However, China’s role in providing a model for the adoption 
of measures in specific product-level SPS/TBT categories in third countries appears to be 35 times 
less important than the EU’s role over the period under analysis. Next, we highlight that the role of 
the EU in providing a regulatory model for other countries is reinforced in the environmental arena. 
Specifically,  we  find  that  measures  in  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories  encouraging  responsible 
consumption and production and the protection of marine life are more likely to be adopted by other 
countries  if  the  EU  has  measures  within  the  same  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories  already  in 
place. 

This  paper  mainly  relates  to  the  empirical  literature  on  the  determinants  of  SPS  measures  and 
TBTs.  Several  papers  show  that  the  adoption  of  such  measures  has  considerably  expanded 
following  trade  liberalization  episodes  through  tariff  reductions  (Hoekman  and  Nicita,  2011; 
Baldwin,  2016).  In  particular,  some  authors  find  evidence  that  these  product  requirements  are 
being used to offset the negative domestic effect of the reduction or elimination of tariffs (Corden, 
1974; Lavergne, 1983; Moore and Zanardi, 2011; Beverelli et al., 2014; Orefice, 2017; Herghelegiu, 
2018;  Niu  et  al.,  2018;  Kuenzel  and  Sharma,  2021).  While  a  decrease  in  tariffs  increases  the 
probability of adopting SPS measures and TBTs in general, there is heterogeneity in the adoption 
of such measures following tariff reductions, driven by the initial level of tariffs, the sector affected 
(Kuenzel and Sharma, 2021), or a country’s income level (Bratt, 2017).12 

Besides  tariff  reductions,  the  literature  also  analyses  the  role  of  other  factors  in  shaping  the 
adoption  of  SPS  measures  and  TBTs.  Belloc  (2015)  looks  at  the  impact  of  business  groups  and 
shows  that  consultations  organized  by  the  European  Commission  with  business  groups  have  a 
significant  and  positive  impact  on  the  adoption  of  such  measures.  Also,  industries  with  higher 
employment  levels  have  a  higher  probability  of  being  covered  by  these  measures  (Belloc,  2015; 
Caves, 1976).  

12 For instance, Beverelli et al. (2014) show that policy substitution between tariffs and TBTs prevails in developed countries, 
where it is less costly to comply with product standards. 

9 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Our paper adds to this literature by analysing yet another factor likely to shape countries’ regulatory 
decisions.  More  precisely,  we  explore  whether  the  adoption  of  SPS  measures  and  TBTs  is  also 
shaped by the regulatory behaviour of other countries such as the EU. The economic literature in 
this  area  is  scarce.  To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  there  is  one  paper  by  Christen  et  al.  (2022) 
aiming to quantify the regulatory  influence  of the EU,  but the goal of the authors is different than 
ours.  While  we  aim  at  determining  the  role  of  the  EU  in  providing  a  model  for  third  countries  in 
terms  of  specific  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories  and  understanding  potential  mechanisms 
behind  this  role,  Christen  et  al.  (2022)  assume  that  there  is  an  implicit  role  of  the  EU  in  shaping 
third  countries’  regulatory  decisions  and  seek  to  quantify  its  trade  effects  in  the  network  of  trade 
agreements of the EU. To this end, the authors analyse whether: (1) trade between country pairs in 
which both partners have a trade agreement with the EU increases, (2) countries that have a trade 
agreement with the EU face lower trade costs with all the other countries, and (3) countries having 
a trade agreement with the EU put in place a lower number of  NTMs and are therefore generally 
more open to international trade.  

The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 exposes the theoretical arguments 
that guide our empirical analysis. Section 3 introduces the data used in the analysis and presents 
descriptive evidence for third countries' alignment with the EU in implementing measures within the 
same product-level SPS/TBT categories. Section 4 investigates the probability of third countries to 
adopt measures in specific product-level SPS/TBT categories conditional on the EU already having 
in place measures within the same product-level SPS/TBT categories, explores mechanisms likely 
to  explain  the  subsequent  adoption  of  measures  by  third  countries  in  the  same  product-level 
SPS/TBT categories as the  EU, and  presents additional insights  into the EU’s role in  providing  a 
model for third countries’ regulatory behaviour. Section 5 concludes. 

2. Theoretical arguments guiding the empirical analysis 

Our goal is to  understand to  what  extent  the  EU provides a model for other countries in terms of 
product requirements aimed at protecting health, safety, and the environment. While the available 
data  only  allow  us  to  conduct  this  analysis  for  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories,  our  exercise 
closely  aligns  with  the  idea  of  exploring  the  “Brussels  Effect”.  The  “Brussels  Effect”  is  a 
phenomenon through which the EU’s rules are transmitted to both foreign firms and governments 
(Bradford, 2020). This section presents this phenomenon, the factors contributing to its emergence, 
as well as the channels through which it can unfold, and serves as basis for our empirical analysis. 

According to Bradford (2020), five elements could explain why certain countries are able to export 
their rules abroad. First, an important market size is a precondition for unilateral regulatory power, 
as  it  is  usually  associated  with  global  economic  influence.  The  market  size  is  not  an  absolute 
concept  and  should  be  interpreted  in  light  of  the  attractiveness  of  a  country’s  consumer  market 
compared to other markets. It is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a country to become a 
global  regulator.  Indeed,  not  all  states  with  large  markets  become  sources  of  global  rules.  The 
second  condition  that  needs  to  be  fulfilled  by  a  country  to  be  able  to  exert  global  regulatory 
authority  is  to  possess  sufficient  regulatory  capacity  to  promote  and  enforce  legislation.  This 
requires  regulatory  expertise  and  resources.  Thus,  the  power  of  the  market  size  cannot  be 
activated  in  absence  of  developed  regulatory  institutions.  Third,  these  two  conditions  have  to  be 
augmented by a willingness of these regulatory institutions to actually promulgate stringent rules to 
protect  their  consumers,  while  imposing  additional  costs  on  businesses.  This  phenomenon  can 
therefore more easily be observed in wealthy countries where consumers are willing to pay higher 
prices  for  products  fulfilling  minimum  quality  criteria  and  where  businesses  are  willing  to  weather 
adverse effects for a period. The preference for stringent rules also explains why some countries 
with an important market size but with a lower level of per capita income cannot export their  rules 
abroad.  

Fourth, a country can exert unilateral regulatory power only if the adoption of stringent rules affects 
inelastic targets such as consumer markets. The requirements  aimed at consumer markets, have 
to  be  respected  by  all  domestic  and  foreign  producers  wishing  to  reach  these  consumers  and 

10 

 
 
 
 
 
 
cannot be circumvented. Finally, the last condition that needs to be fulfilled for a country to become 
a  global  source  of  rules  is  non-divisibility.  This  implies  that  producers  adopt  regulatory  standards 
associated  with  a  given  jurisdiction  and  apply  them  to  govern  their  production  and  operations 
across  the  world.  In  other  words,  producers  do  not  customize  their  production  in  line  with  the 
divergent rules of each jurisdiction even though these rules are laxer, as this can turn to be more 
costly.  Usually,  producers  adopt  stricter  rules  that  automatically  fulfil  the  requirements  of  all 
jurisdictions in order to benefit from economies of scale.  

Various combinations of these five elements allow to  understand the  occurrence of the  “Brussels 
Effect”  in  different  policy  areas.  First,  the  size  of  the  single  market,  which  is  the  most  important 
asset of the EU, ensures that the EU can export its rules to third countries. Second, the EU has an 
important  regulatory  capacity  which  has  been  driven  by  the  objective  of  completing  the  single 
market and has continued to grow over time. Third, the EU is characterized by a large number of 
affluent  consumers  with  a  preference  for  stringent  rules.  Fourth,  the  EU  is  one  of  the  most 
important  consumer markets  in  the  world  and  all  producers  wanting  to  reach  this  market  have  to 
comply with its rules. Finally, producers complying with the EU rules might choose to apply these 
stricter requirements to their products and operations across the world, in order to reduce the costs 
of  complying  with  the  conflicting  rules  of  different  jurisdictions.  To  sum  up,  the  EU  single  market 
and  its  characteristics  can  explain  the  occurrence  of  the  “Brussels  Effect”.  On  the  other  hand, 
countries  which  do  not  fulfil  these  five  criteria  are  less  likely  to  shape  rules  in  the  global  market 
place. In certain cases, these countries might be more inclined to adhere to the rules imposed by 
other jurisdictions, essentially functioning as regulatory standards adopters. 

Braford (2020) distinguishes two types of the “Brussels Effect”. First, the de facto “Brussels Effect” 
refers  to  a  situation  where  foreign  firms,  which  have  to  abide  by  stringent  requirements  when 
exporting to the EU, adopt EU-type rules for their production and operations across the world. This 
behaviour by private actors does not necessarily lead to a regulatory reaction by the governments 
of  their  countries.  Second,  the  de  jure  “Brussels  Effect”  refers  to  a  situation  where  foreign 
governments adopt EU-type rules to be respected by all firms present in their jurisdictions. The de 
jure  “Brussels  Effect”  can  in  fact  arise  from  the  de  facto  “Brussels  Effect”.  For  instance,  foreign 
firms  adopting  EU-type  rules  for  their  production  and  operations  across  the  world  are  at  a 
competitive  disadvantage  compared  to  other  firms  in  their  jurisdictions,  which  benefit  from  lower 
costs induced by laxer national rules. Therefore, these firms may have an incentive to encourage 
their governments to adopt stricter EU-type rules in their jurisdiction, fuelling the de jure “Brussels 
Effect”. However, there could be various other channels through which the de jure “Brussels Effect” 
unfolds, which can complement or substitute the pure market channel (e.g. bilateral or international 
treaties).  In  fact,  the  market-driven  mechanism  behind  the  de  jure  “Brussels  Effect”  coexists 
alongside other treaty-driven instruments and mechanisms and it is often difficult to disentangle the 
exact forces at play driving the adoption of EU-type rules by third countries.  

This  framework  provides  the  underpinning  of  our  empirical  analysis.  First,  when  exploring  the 
adoption of measures within product-level SPS/TBT categories by third countries conditional on the 
EU  already  having  in  place  measures  within  the  same  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories,  the 
factors  explaining  the  emergence  of  a  country  as  a  standard-maker  (i.e.  market  size,  regulatory 
capacity, stringency of policy measures, inelastic targets, non-divisibility of production) need to be 
considered in the analysis, as they might impact the regulatory decisions of a country irrespective 
of  the  EU’s  behaviour.  Second,  given  that  requirements  under  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories 
are mandatory by law, when analysing the channels for the subsequent adoption of measures by 
third countries within the same product-level SPS/TBT categories as the EU, we are guided by the 
elements presented to explain the de jure “Brussels Effect”. More precisely, we explore whether the 
market channel (i.e. the importance of the EU single market for a country for a given product) and 
the  treaty  channel  (i.e.  the  existence  of  a  trade  agreement  between  a  country  and  the  EU)  can 
explain  the  subsequent  adoption  of  measures  by  other  countries  within  the  same  product-level 
SPS/TBT categories as the EU. 

11 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Data analysis 

This  section  introduces  in  more  details  the  data  sources  used  in  the  analysis  and  provides 
descriptive evidence on the implementation of requirements within specific product-level SPS/TBT 
categories by third countries. 

3.1. Data sources 

Detailed  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories.  As  previously  mentioned,  to  trace  product-level 
SPS/TBT  categories  encompassing  requirements  aimed  at  protecting  health,  safety,  and  the 
environment, we rely on UNCTAD’s NTM data, collected from official legal sources, such as laws, 
regulations,  directives,  decrees  and  rules,  and  disseminated  via  the  TRAINS  portal.13  UNCTAD 
collects  complete  and  comparable  information  on  all  types  of  NTMs  in  place  in  more  than  100 
countries representing more than 85% of world trade (UNCTAD, 2020). Based on the International 
Classification of NTMs developed by MAST, NTMs are classified in 16 chapters, ranging from more 
technical instruments intended to ensure consumer protection, such as SPS measures and TBTs, 
to more traditional trade policy tools, such as quotas, price controls, or contingent protection.14 Our 
main  focus  is  on  the  first  two  chapters,  A  and  B,  corresponding  to  SPS  measures  and  TBTs, 
respectively.15  

This paper relies on a dataset released for research purposes, which has been carefully cleaned by 
UNCTAD  and  made  publicly  available.16  Although  the  data  collection  occurs  for  more  than  100 
countries, it is worth emphasising that this dataset contains only 93 countries, including the EU. It 
encompasses  information  regarding  the  detailed  SPS/TBT  category  to  which  implemented 
measures belong, the product that falls under the scope of measures within an SPS/TBT category, 
the affected jurisdiction, and the implementation date.17 Additionally, the dataset includes the year 
of data collection, which varies between 2010 and 2019, depending on the country.  

Our  analysis  uses  the  most  detailed  classification  available  for  SPS  measures  (Chapter  A)  and 
TBTs (Chapter B), including 34 SPS categories and 23 TBT categories. In fact, chapters A and B 
are further split into two, three and even four digits. For instance, under chapter A, the subchapter 
A5 refers to Treatment for elimination of plant and animal pests and disease-causing organisms in 
the  final  product  or  prohibition  of  treatment,  and  the  subchapter  A51  refers  to  Cold  or  heat 
treatment. As stated by UNCTAD (2019), this could be a measure  requiring “cooling or heating of 
products  below  or  above  a  certain  temperature  for  a  certain  period  of  time  to  kill  targeted  pests, 
either  prior  to,  or  upon  arrival  in  the  destination  country  […].”  For  instance,  “citrus  fruits  must 
undergo cold (disinfection) treatment to eliminate fruit flies.” Also, under chapter B, the subchapter 
B7  refers  to  Product  quality,  safety  or  performance  requirements.  According  to  UNCTAD  (2019), 
the  measure  could  introduce  “final  product  requirements  concerning  safety  (for  example,  fire 
resistance),  performance  (effectiveness  in  achieving  the  intended  or  claimed  result),  quality  (for 
example,  content  of  defined  ingredients  and  durability)  or  other  reasons  relating  to  technical 
barriers  to  trade  not  covered  under  other  measures.”  For  instance,  “doors  must  resist  a  certain 
minimum high temperature or toys for children  under three  years of age shall not contain articles 
smaller  than  a  certain  size.”  The  most  detailed  categories  of  SPS  measures  and  TBTs  as 
disseminated by UNCTAD (2019) are shown in Table 1Error! Reference source not found.. 

13 TRAINS stands for Trade Analysis Information System.  

14 Table A1 Table A1in the Appendix lists the 16 chapters. 

15 All the other import measures will be included as control variables in our study, as they can influence the overall level of 
protection of a country and therefore the adoption of technical measures. The export measures are left out of the scope of 
the study. 

16 The NTM dataset has been downloaded on October 15, 2022 at https://api-trains2.unctad.org/get-researcher-file. 

17 In certain cases, the repeal date of a measure is also included. 

12 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Table 1 : Detailed classification of NTMs 

Source: UNCTAD (https://trains.unctad.org/). 

13 

A11Prohibitions for SPS reasonsA12Geographical restrictions on eligibilityA13Systems approachA14Authorization requirement for SPS reasons for importing certain productsA15Authorization requirement for importers for SPS reasonsA19Prohibitions or restrictions of imports for SPS reasons, n. e. s. A21Tolerance limits for residues of or contamination by certain (non-microbiological) substancesA22Restricted use of certain substances in foods and feeds and their contact materialsA31Labelling requirementsA32Marking requirementsA33Packaging requirementsA41Microbiological criteria of the final productA42Hygienic practices during production related to SPS conditionsA49Hygienic requirements n. e. s. A51Cold or heat treatmentA52IrradiationA53FumigationA59Treatments to eliminate plants & animal pests or disease-causing organisms in the final product n.e.s or prohibition of treatmentA61Plant-growth processesA62Animal-raising or -catching processesA63Food and feed processingA64Storage and transport conditionsA69Other requirements relating to production or post-production processes n. e. s. A81Product registration and approval requirementA82Testing requirementsA83Certification requirementsA84Inspection requirementsA851Origin of materials and parts A852Processing historyA853Distribution and location of products after deliveryA859Traceability requirements n. e. s. A86Quarantine requirementsA89Conformity assessment related to SPS conditions n. e. s. A9SPS measures n.e.s.A9SPS measures n. e. s. B14Authorization requirements for importing certain productsB15Authorization requirements for importersB19Import authorization/licensing related to TBTs n. e. s. B21Tolerance limits for residues of or contamination by certain substancesB22Restricted use of certain substancesB31Labelling requirementsB32Marking requirementsB33Packaging requirementsB41TBT regulations on production processesB42TBT regulations on transport and storageB49Production or post-production requirements n. e. s. B6Product identity requirementsB6Product identity requirementsB7Product quality, safety or performance requirementsB7Product quality, safety or performance requirementsB81Product registration/approval requirementsB82Testing requirementsB83Certification requirementsB84Inspection requirementsB851Origin of materials and partsB852Processing historyB853Distribution and location of products after deliveryB859Traceability requirements n. e. s. B89Conformity assessment related to TBTs n. e. s. B9TBT measures n.e.s.B9TBT measures n. e. s. ChapterBTechnical Barriers to Trade (TBTs)Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measuresAB2B3B4B8Detailed categoryA5A6A8B1Broad categoryA1A2A3A4Prohibitions/restrictions of imports for SPS reasonsTolerance limits for residues & restricted substance useLabelling, marking & packaging requirementsHygienic requirements related to SPS conditionsTreatment for elimination of plant & animal pests & disease-causing organisms in the final product or prohibition of treatment Other requirements relating to production or post-production processesConformity assessment related to SPS conditionsImport authorization/licensing related to TBTsTolerance limits for residues and restricted use of substancesLabelling, marking & packaging requirementsProduction or post-production requirementsConformity assessment related to TBTs 
 
 
When it comes to the product(s) affected by measures under a detailed SPS/TBT category, the 6-
digit  level  of  the  Harmonized-System  (HS)  classification  is  used  for  gathering  information.  Given 
that the data collection occurs at different points in time, the information has been recorded using 
various HS classifications.  In order to  ensure data comparability  over the  whole period across all 
countries in our sample and facilitate matching with other data sources, we transform the data into 
the  HS  2012  classification  using  correspondence  tables.  This  classification  covers  approximately 
5,200  unique  product  codes.  While  some  measures  within  a  detailed  SPS/TBT  category  can  be 
specific to a product, other measures affect groups of products. For instance, if measures affect all 
food products, those measures are assigned to all product codes corresponding to food.   

Furthermore,  when  countries  implement  SPS/TBT  measures,  the  affected  jurisdiction  can  be  a 
single partner country, in which case the measures are  bilateral, or all partner countries, in which 
case  the  measures  are  unilateral.  Our  focus  will  be  on  unilateral  measures  to  capture  a  wide-
ranging  effect.  NTMs,  for  the  most  part,  are  implemented  based  on  the  principle  of  non-
discrimination,  applying  to  all  countries  without  differentiation.  Moreover,  in  many  cases,  similar 
bilateral measures exist alongside unilateral ones. Given these aspects, our analysis is not likely to 
be affected by the exclusion of bilateral measures. When focusing only on unilateral measures, the 
number of countries included in our dataset is reduced to 91, besides the EU.  

Finally, for a specific product-level SPS/TBT category, the implementation date may correspond to 
either  the  initial  introduction  or  a  substantial  modification  of  measures.  The  timeline  of  adoption 
plays  an  important  role  in  our  analysis,  as  we  study  whether  the  EU  provides  a  model  for  third 
countries  for  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories.  We  must  therefore  examine  product-level 
SPS/TBT categories where third countries implement measures following the EU's implementation 
of  measures  within  the  same  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories.  As  our  observations  for  the  EU 
pertain  to  measures  introduced  or  significantly  amended  after  2009,  we  are  obliged  to  limit  the 
sample to the period after 2009. Then, since the dataset lacks information data beyond 2019, our 
analysis stops in 2019. By restricting the period under observation from 2009 to 2019 period for all 
the other countries, the  number of countries included in our dataset is further reduced to  88 third 
countries and the EU.  

While at this stage our dataset includes  information on 88 third countries, the availability  of other 
data required for the empirical analysis (i.e. gravity data on GDP) and detailed in the remainder of 
this  section  further  reduces  the  sample  to  86  third  countries.  To  sum  up,  the  dataset  used  in  the 
analysis includes information on all unilateral SPS measures and TBTs at the most detailed level of 
disaggregation available, imposed by 86 third countries and the EU, on around 5,200 unique HS6 
products  over  the  2009-2019  period.  This  dataset  allows  to  track  the  time  elapsed  between  the 
initial  implementation  of  measures  in  an  SPS/TBT  category  on  a  product  by  the  EU  and  the 
subsequent implementation of measures within the same SPS/TBT category on the same product 
by third countries.  

Trade flows. As previously mentioned, we aim at exploring whether the adoption of measures by 
third  countries  in  the  same  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories  as  the  EU  could  be  market-driven. 
According to Braford (2020), foreign firms complying with EU product requirements when exporting 
to  the  EU  might  have  incentives  to  encourage  their  national  governments  to  adopt  EU-like 
measures in their own jurisdictions. We use the importance of the EU as an export market for third 
countries  for  each  specific  product  to  proxy  the  market  channel.  The  trade  data  come  from  the 
BACI  dataset,  developed  by  CEPII,  which  provides  information  on  bilateral  trade  flows  for  200 
countries at the HS6 product level over the 1995-2020 period.18  

Trade  agreements.  Various  other  factors  can  influence  the  decision  of  third  countries  to  adopt 
measures within the same product-level SPS/TBT categories as the EU. Besides the market-driven 
forces, the treaty-driven factors might play a role. For instance, a third country engaged in a trade 

18 CEPII stands for Centre d'Études Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales. 

14 

 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
agreement with the EU might be more likely to adopt EU-like measures. Therefore, it is important to 
take  into  account  the  existence  of  trade  agreements  between  the  EU  and  third  countries  in  the 
analysis. We construct a database including the various types of trade agreements that the EU has 
with the third countries from the NTM dataset, relying on European Commission documents.19 We 
focus on all trade agreements in place, whether already in force or provisionally applied. The date 
of  implementation  of  a  trade  agreement  is  considered  to  be  the  date  of  provisional  application, 
when  the  agreement  already  starts  to  take  effect.  In  a  few  cases,  the  date  of  entry  into  force 
coincides with the date of provisional application. The full list of trade agreements between the EU 
and the third countries included in the NTM data is presented in Table A2 in the Appendix. 

Gravity. Third countries with a low propensity of becoming global regulators themselves might be 
more likely to align with the rules of other jurisdictions, including the EU. As described in Section 2, 
there are several elements associated with a country’s propensity to be a global regulator, namely 
market size, regulatory capacity, stringency of policy measures, inelastic targets and non-divisibility 
of production. Hence, these aspects should be accounted for in the analysis.20 The market size of a 
country  can  be  proxied  through  its  gross  domestic  product  (GDP)  or  population.  The  regulatory 
capacity  and  the  preference  for  stringent  regulatory  standards  of  a  country  are  approximated 
through  its  level  of  development,  measured  as  GDP  per  capita.  Data  on  all  these  aspects  are 
extracted from the gravity database developed by CEPII, which records information for any pair of 
countries from 1948 to 2020. 

Tariffs. We also use data on Most Favoured Nation (MFN) applied tariffs from UNCTAD’s TRAINS 
database,  obtained  through  the  World  Integrated  Trade  Solutions  portal  of  the  World  Bank.  The 
goal is to control for the protection level of a country on an HS6 product, as a high level of tariffs 
might be associated with fewer incentives to adopt measures within specific product-level SPS/TBT 
categories. Even though the primary goal of these policy measures is to protect health, safety, and 
the  environment,  a  high  level  of  tariff  protection  might  already  indirectly  do  so,  as  it  is  costly  to 
reach  the  markets  imposing  high  tariffs.  The  level  of  tariffs  is  computed  as  a  simple  average  of 
MFN applied tariffs on a product across different sources. 

3.2. Descriptive statistics 

This subsection describes the implementation of measures within specific SPS/TBT categories on 
HS6 products by third countries over the 2009-2019 period. For simplicity,  in this section, we use 
the  terms  “product-level  SPS/TBT  category”  and  “product  requirement”  interchangeably.  For 
instance,  if  there  are  measures  within  the  SPS  category  referring  to  storage  and  transport 
conditions  (i.e.  A64)  for  oranges  (i.e.  2012  HS6  code  080510)  and  watermelons  (i.e.  2012  HS6 
code 080711), we consider that there are two different product requirements, since the same SPS 
category  applies  to  two  different  product  codes.  In  the  same  vein,  if  for  oranges  (i.e.  2012  HS6 
code  080510),  there  are  measures  belonging  to  the  SPS  category  on  storage  and  transport 
conditions  (i.e.  A64)  and  measures  belonging  to  the  SPS  category  on  packaging  obligations  (i.e. 
A33),  we consider that there are two different product requirements,  since there are two different 
SPS categories applying to the same product code.  

We  start  by  providing  a  general  overview  of  the  dataset  used  in  the  analysis,  encompassing  86 
countries worldwide, besides the EU. The most well represented world region in terms of number 
of  countries  is  Asia,  with  an  important  coverage  of  all  subregions.  Some  of  the  largest  and  more 
industrialised  Asian  countries  are  included  (e.g.  China,  India,  Indonesia,  Japan,  South  Korea), 

19  More  information  on  all  EU  trade  agreements  can  be  found  at:  https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-
country-and-region/negotiations-and-agreements_en. Consulted on October 15, 2022. 

20 The last two conditions allowing a country to become a global regulator are not explicitly included in the analysis. First, 
regulations regarding health, safety, and the environment apply to consumer markets which are by default inelastic targets. 
Therefore,  this  factor  does  not  need  to  be  accounted  for  in  the  analysis.  Second,  the  non-divisibility  aspect  is  difficult  to 
measure  as  data  on  the  behaviour  of  foreign  firms  in  terms  of  applied  regulatory  standards  when  exporting  to  foreign 
jurisdictions are not available. The analysis will thus abstract from exploring this factor.  

15 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
along  with  other  less  developed  Asian  countries  (e.g.  Bangladesh,  Kazakhstan,  Pakistan).  Both 
Northern America and Latin America and the Caribbean are well represented. The dataset covers 
Canada  and  the  United  States  in  North  America,  and  countries  like  Argentina,  Brazil,  Colombia, 
Ecuador,  Peru,  and  others  in  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  subregion.  The  least  represented 
regions are Africa and Oceania. When it comes to Africa, while Northern Africa is well represented, 
Sub-Saharan Africa is covered to a lesser extent. As for Oceania, the dataset includes information 
on Australia and New Zealand. In Europe, besides the EU, the dataset covers Belarus, Russia, and 
Switzerland.  Table  A3  in  the  Appendix  describes  the  implementation  of  product  requirements 
between 2009 and 2019 for each country in the dataset, including the EU. Thus, on average, the 
third  countries  from  the  dataset  have  requirements  in  place  on  around  1,382  products  out  of  all 
5,205 products included in the HS 2012 classification of goods. Furthermore, among the products 
subject  to  at  least  one  requirement,  the  average  number  of  requirements  per  product  across  all 
countries is 3.6. As for the EU, there are requirements in place on around 4,886 products out of all 
5,205 products included in the HS 2012 classification of goods. Among the products affected by at 
least one requirement, there are, on average, 8 different requirements per product.  

Given  our  overarching  objective  of  understanding  whether  the  EU  provides  a  model  for  third 
countries in terms of product requirements aimed at protecting health, safety, and the environment, 
we  now  focus  on  identifying  EU-type  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories  among  all  product-level 
SPS/TBT  categories  of  a  particular  country.  It  is  important  to  note  that,  at  this  stage,  we  refrain 
from  drawing  any  conclusion  regarding  the  EU’s  role  as  a  model  for  third  countries  in  terms  of 
product  requirements,  as  we  do  not  account  for  potential  confounding  factors.  The  following 
analysis  serves  as  a  purely  descriptive  exercise  to  assess  the  extent  to  which  third  countries’ 
product requirements resemble those of the EU, without controlling for any confounding factors.  

We consider a product-level SPS/TBT category introduced by a third country to be in resemblance 
to the EU if the following conditions are simultaneously fulfilled: (1) the EU must be the initial entity 
over  the  2009-2019  period  to  have  introduced  measures  within  that  product-level  SPS/TBT 
category, and (2) the EU must have first introduced or substantially modified measures within that 
product-level  SPS/TBT  category  no  more  than  five  years  before  the  third  country  under  scrutiny 
followed suit. The latter condition is motivated by various considerations.  

The EU is characterized by a complex and lengthy legislative process compared to other countries. 
While in some exceptional cases the duration of the ordinary legislative process can be as little as 
six  months,  in  most  cases  the  duration  of  the  ordinary  legislative  process  can  extend  beyond 
eighteen  months  (European  Parliament,  2020).  Hence,  if  we  also  consider  the  preparatory  steps 
before the actual date of implementation of requirements in the EU, third countries have more than 
five  years  at  their  disposal  to  be  informed  about  the  new  EU  proposals  and  implement 
requirements within the same product-level SPS/TBT categories as the EU. Thus, considering that 
governments need resources and legal expertise for their regulatory proposals, we deem a period 
of  five  years  since  the  EU  implementation  as  sufficient.  A  longer  time  span  might  be  associated 
with  a  natural  convergence  of  the  world  towards  certain  regulatory  objectives.  Moreover,  Table  2 
shows  the  cumulative  share  of  all  product  requirements  for  which  the  EU  was  the  first  initiator, 
implemented by third countries at different dates after the date of implementation in the EU. Almost 
the quasi-totality (99.8%)  of EU-type  product requirements  are implemented by third countries no 
more than five years after the EU took action. Therefore, this is our preferred definition throughout 
the paper. Based on this definition,  we observe that 34.7% of all product requirements introduced 
by third countries over 2009-2019 resemble those of the EU. 

16 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 : Cumulative share of product requirements resembling those of the EU implemented by 
third countries for different time spans after the EU 

Source: Authors’ calculations based on the NTM data from TRAINS-UNCTAD. 

Third countries tend to introduce requirements within the same product-level SPS/TBT categories 
as  the  EU  with  different  intensities.  To  analyse  this  aspect,  we  start  by  computing  for  each  third 
country  the  share  of  EU-type  product  requirements,  as  previously  defined,  in  the  total  number  of 
product requirements over the 2009-2019 period. Then, using the distribution of shares, we create 
four equally sized groups of countries (i.e. quartiles). Figure 1 shows the split of third countries into 
quartiles based on the share of EU-type product requirements within their total number of product 
requirements. Since at this stage we do not control for any other confounding factors, the figures 
might simply reflect the economic structure of third countries. For instance, some countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa might only adopt a few product requirements on agricultural goods, most of which 
resemble the EU product requirements. In these cases, we might obtain a high rate of adoption of 
EU-type  product  requirements.  On  the  other  hand,  more  developed  countries  with  a  complex 
economic  structure,  might  have  in  place  product  requirements  across  a  large  number  of  sectors 
and  might  be  less  likely  to  introduce  EU-type  product  requirements  across  the  board.  In  these 
cases, we might see a lower rate of adoption of EU-type product requirements.  

Considering this limitation, we analyse to what extent third countries introduce requirements in the 
same product-level SPS/TBT categories as the EU. The countries belonging to the fourth quartile 
are characterized by a share of EU-type product requirements higher than 43.3%, and are situated 
in Northern Africa (e.g. Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia), Sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, 
Nigeria),  various  parts  of  Asia  (e.g.  Israel,  Kazakhstan,  Nepal),  Eastern  Europe  (e.g.  Belarus, 
Russia), among other regions. In the third quartile,  with a share of  EU-type product requirements 
between 32.9% and 43.2%, we observe several countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (e.g. 
Argentina,  Chile,  Colombia,  Mexico),  Northern  America  (e.g.  Canada),  Oceania  (e.g.  New 
Zealand),  various parts  of Asia (e.g. India,  Indonesia, Japan, Thailand),  Sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. 
Gambia, Togo), to name a few. The countries situated in the second quartile, having a share of EU-
type  product  requirements  between  26.0%  and  32.8%,  are  located  in  Latin  America  and  the 
Caribbean (e.g. Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru, Uruguay), various parts of Asia (e.g. Azerbaijan, 
Bahrain,  Lebanon,  Vietnam),  Northern  America  (e.g.  United  States),  Oceania  (e.g.  Australia), 
amidst others. Finally, at the bottom of the spectrum, the countries with a share of EU-type product 
requirements  below  25.9%  belonging  to  the  first  quartile,  cover  various  parts  of  Asia  (e.g. 
Afghanistan,  China,  Jordan,  Pakistan),  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  (e.g.  Bolivia,  Cuba, 
Jamaica), Sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Botswana, Ghana, Mali), among others.  

17 

1 year 27.019%2 years 56.784%3 years 76.629%4 years 86.906%5 years 99.832%6 years 99.900%7 years 99.945%8 years 99.992%9 years 99.995%10 years 100.000%Time elapsed from when the EU implemented product requirements until third countries followed suitCumulative share of product requirements implemented by third countries after the EU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Share of EU-type product requirements in the total number of product requirements of 
third countries over 2009-2019, by quartiles 

Source: Authors’ calculations based on the NTM data from TRAINS-UNCTAD. 

Furthermore, Figure 2 shows the distribution of product-level SPS/TBT categories in third countries 
across  broader  classes  of  SPS/TBT  measures  over  2009-2019,  distinguishing  between  EU-type 
and  non-EU-type  product  requirements.  On  the  one  hand,  when  it  comes  to  SPS  measures,  the 
most  significant  categories  in  terms  of  overall  number  of  product  requirements  are  Conformity 
Assessment  (A8),  Prohibitions/restrictions  for  SPS  reasons  (A1),  and  Labelling,  marking  and 
packaging  requirements  (A3).  However,  the  top  three  categories  where  requirements  resemble 
those  of  the  EU  refer  to  Hygienic  requirements  (A4),  Tolerance  limits  for  residues  and  restricted 
substance use (A2), and Labelling, marking and packaging requirements (A3), with shares of EU-
type product requirements of 68.4%, 60.5%, and 48.9%, respectively. On the other hand, the most 
important  TBT  categories  in  terms  of  overall  number  of  product  requirements  refer  to  Conformity 
assessment (B8), Product quality, safety or performance requirements (B7), and Labelling, marking 
and  packaging  requirements  (B3).  Although  not  in  the  same  order,  these  are  also  the  categories 
with the highest share of EU-type product requirements. More precisely, of all product requirements 
related  to  Labelling,  marking  and  packaging  requirements  (B3),  Product  quality,  safety  or 
performance  requirements  (B7),  and  Conformity  assessment  (B8),  58.5%,  41.4%  and  30.5%, 
respectively, align with the EU ones. 

Figure  3  shows  the  sectoral  distribution  of  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories  in  third  countries 
during  the  period  spanning  from  2009  to  2019,  distinguishing  between  EU-type  and  non-EU-type 
product  requirements.  The  sectors  where  third  countries  have  adopted  the  highest  number  of 
product  requirements  over  2009-2019  include  Animal  products,  Vegetable  products,  Products  of 
the  chemical  or  allied  industries,  Prepared  foodstuffs  &  beverages,  Mechanical  appliances; 
electrical equipment, and Textiles. However, the sectors with the highest shares of EU-type product 
requirements  are  Mechanical  appliances;  electrical  equipment  (58.5%),  Precision  &  medical 
instruments (56.6%), Vegetable products (46.1%), Textiles (42.4%), Animal or vegetable fats & oils 
(40.9%), Prepared foodstuffs & beverages (38.4%), and Footwears & gears (33.4%). 

18 

 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of product requirements adopted by third countries across broad SPS/TBT 
categories over 2009-2019 

Source: Authors’ calculations based on the NTM data from TRAINS-UNCTAD. 

Figure 3: Sectoral distribution of product requirements adopted by third countries over 2009-2019 

Source: Authors’ calculations based on the NTM data from TRAINS-UNCTAD. 

19 

 
 
 
 
 
4. Empirical strategy and results 

This  section  presents  the  empirical  strategy  and  the  results.  First,  in  Subsection  4.1.,  we  aim  at 
providing quantitative insights into the EU’s role in providing a model for third countries for product 
requirements  aimed  at  protecting  health,  safety,  and  the  environment.  To  this  end,  we  explore 
whether  the  likelihood  of  third  countries  to  have  in  place  measures  within  specific  product-level 
SPS/TBT  categories  is  correlated  with  the  existence  of  measures  within  the  same  product-level 
SPS/TBT categories in the EU, implemented at most five years before the subsequent adoption by 
third countries. Second, in Subsection 4.2., we investigate the factors associated with the adoption 
of measures by third countries in the same product-level SPS/TBT categories as the EU. Finally, in 
Subsection  4.3,  we  present  further  insights  into  the  EU’s  role  in  setting  a  precedent  for  product-
level  SPS/TBT  categories  for  third  countries.  We  start  by  putting  the  EU’s  regulatory  role  in  an 
international  perspective,  drawing  a  comparison  with  the  influence  exerted  by  the  United  States 
and China. Then, we seek to analyse whether third countries are more likely to introduce measures 
within  the  same  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories  as  the  EU,  if  these  rules  contribute  to 
environmental protection.  

4.1. The  EU’s  role  in  providing  a  regulatory  model  for 
other countries 

Empirical Strategy. We explore whether the likelihood that a country has in place measures within 
a  product-level  SPS/TBT  category  in  a  year  is  associated  with  the  EU  already  having  in  place 
measures  within  the  same  product-level  SPS/TBT  category,  introduced  at  most  five  years  before 
the third country in question.21 For this purpose, we rely on the NTM dataset, including information 
across  four  dimensions:  the  country  implementing  measures,  the  category  of  implemented 
measures, the targeted product, and the  year of implementation. To build the dependent variable 
and the main independent variable, we first square the NTM dataset for a combination of a country, 
product, and category measure across all years, and then create a binary variable set to 1 for the 
year of implementation of  measures by a country  within  a product-level SPS/TBT category  and 0 
for the years artificially created in the squaring process.  

We  construct  our  dependent  variable  as  follows.  We  trace  the  existence  of  measures  within  a 
product-level  SPS/TBT  category  in  a  third  country  over  the  2009-2019  period,  relying  on  the  first 
year  of  adoption.  More  precisely,  we  create  a  dummy  variable  set  to  1  for  all  years  following  the 
adoption of measures within a product-level SPS/TBT category in a third country and 0 for all years 
prior to the adoption. We also take into account whether measures within a product-level SPS/TBT 
category are removed in the meanwhile and assign the value of 0 to all years after their removal. 
 is a dummy variable tracing whether third country i has measures 
Our dependent variable 𝑹𝒆𝒒𝒊,𝒌,𝒕
in place within the SPS/TBT category s on product k in year t.  

𝒔

Regarding  the  main  independent  variable,  we  need  to  detect  whether,  for  the  existence  of 
measures  within  a  product-level  SPS/TBT  category  in  a  third  country,  the  EU  has  measures  in 
place within the same product-level SPS/TBT category, implemented at most five years before the 
third country in question. Thus, in the case of the EU, to trace the existence of measures within a 
product-level  SPS/TBT  category  over  the  2009-2019  period,  we  rely  either  on  the  first  year  of 
adoption or the  year  of modification.  Several scenarios are possible. First, if the  EU has adopted 
measures within a product-level SPS/TBT category no more than five years before a third country 
and has never modified them, the independent variable is a dummy set to 1 for all years following 
the  EU  adoption  and  0  for  all  years  before.  Second,  if  the  EU  has  adopted  measures  within  a 
product-level  SPS/TBT  category  no  more  than  five  years  before  a  third  country  and  has  also 
modified  them  within  this  maximum  five-year  window,  then  the  independent  variable  is  a  dummy 

21 Products are detailed at the 6-digit level of the HS2012 classification and the associated measures are classified based 
on the International Classification of NTMs by UNCTAD at the most detailed level. 

20 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
set to 1 for all years following the EU modification and 0 for all  years before.  Third, if the EU has 
adopted  measures  within  a  product-level  SPS/TBT  category  more  than  five  years  before  a  third 
country and has never modified them, the independent variable is a dummy set to 0 for all years. 
Finally,  if the  EU  has adopted  measures  within a  product-level  SPS/TBT category more than five 
years before a third country and has modified them no more than five years before the adoption by 
the third country  in question, the  independent  variable is  a dummy set to  1 for all  years following 
the  EU  modification  and  0  for  all  years  before.  Each  scenario  also  considers  whether,  over  the 
2009-2019 period, the EU is the first entity to implement measures within a product-level SPS/TBT 
category (i.e. first mover). If this is not the case, the independent variable is set to 0 for all years.22 
All  scenarios  are  summarized  in  Table  3.  To  sum  up,  for  the  existence  of  measures  within  a 
product-level  SPS/TBT  category  in  a  third  country  in  a  year,  our  main  independent  variable 
  refers  to  the  existence  of  measures  within  the  same  SPS/TBT  category  s  on  the 
𝑹𝒆𝒒𝑬𝑼,𝒌,(𝒕−𝟓,𝒕)
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
same  product  k  in  the  EU,  implemented  at  most  five  years  before  the  third  country  in  question, 
while  fully  considering  whether  the  EU  is  the  first  mover  within  that  product-level  SPS/TBT 
category. 

𝒔

Table 3: Definition of the existence of measures within a product-level SPS/TBT category in the EU 
in relation to the adoption of measures within the same category in third countries  

Measures in a product-
level SPS/TBT category 
in the EU 

Adoption no more than 
5 years before third 
country 

Adoption more than 5 
years before third 
country 

No modification 

Modification no more than 5 years 
before adoption by third country 

Scenario 1 

Scenario 2 

EU dummy = 1 for all years following 
the EU adoption (0 before) 

EU dummy = 1 for all years following 
the EU modification (0 before) 

Scenario 3 

Scenario 4 

EU dummy = 0 for all years 

EU dummy = 1 for all years following 
the EU modification (0 before) 

Note: All scenarios take into account whether the EU is the first mover and  whether the measures have been removed in 
the meanwhile. 

To study the probability that a third country has in place measures within a product-level SPS/TBT 
category  in a  year conditional on the  EU  having in place measures within the same product-level 
SPS/TBT category implemented at most five years before, we use a linear probability model (LPM) 
with fixed effects.23 Our baseline model can then be expressed as follows: 

𝑹𝒆𝒒𝒊,𝒌,𝒕

𝒔 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑹𝒆𝒒𝑬𝑼,𝒌,(𝒕−𝟓,𝒕)

̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅

𝒔

+ 𝚾 +   𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑘  +   𝐹𝐸𝑡 +   𝐹𝐸𝑠  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 

𝑠

Eq. (1) 

𝒔

Besides  the  main  independent  variable  𝑹𝒆𝒒𝑬𝑼,𝒌,(𝒕−𝟓,𝒕)
,  we  include  a  vector  𝚾  of  explanatory 
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
variables,  controlling  for  factors  likely  to  be  associated  with  the  existence  of  measures  within  a 
product-level SPS/TBT category in a third country, irrespective of the existence of measures within 
the  same  product-level  SPS/TBT  category  in  the  EU.  Since  we  adopt  a  five-year  period  for  the 
definition of EU-type product requirements, we use a five-year lag for all the additional explanatory 
variables  to  avoid  any  simultaneity  issues.  These  variables  include  various  trade  policies  (i.e. 
variation  in  average  tariffs  applied  by  country  i  on  product  k  between  t  and  t-5,  number  of  other 
categories of NTMs applied by country i on product k in t-5), annual internal demand for a product 

22  Also,  if  measures  within  a  given  product-level  SPS/TBT  category  are  removed  in  the  meanwhile,  the  dummy  variable 
corresponding to the existence of EU measures in that product-level SPS/TBT category is set to 0 for all years following the 
removal. 

23 The choice of an LPM is dictated by the fact that it allows to overcome the incidental parameter problem encountered in 
the case of probit models when specifications include high-dimensional fixed effects. 

21 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
(e.g.  total  imports  of  product  k  by  country  i  in  t-5  in  logs),  annual  external  demand  for  a  product 
(e.g. total exports of product k by country i in t-5 in logs), annual country characteristics (e.g. GDP 
and GDP per capita of country i in t-5 in logs), and participation in bilateral trade agreements (e.g. 
number of FTAs of country i in t-5).  

Various  sets  of  fixed  effects  are  also  included  to  capture  other  unobservable  characteristics.  We 
first  rely  on  country-product  fixed  effects  (𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑘 )  to  cover  any  unobserved  country-product 
characteristics  that  persist  over  time  (e.g.  regulatory  environment,  product  quality,  consumer 
preferences,  market  structure).  We  then  include  time  fixed  effects  (𝐹𝐸𝑡 )  to  control  for  any  time-
varying  factors  (e.g.  factors  that  can  affect  the  demand  for  products,  changes  in  consumer 
preferences).  Finally,  we  include  NTM  fixed  effects  (𝐹𝐸𝑠 )  to  account  for  different  considerations 
underlying the implementation of various types of regulations (e.g. product safety, labelling).  

However, to ensure that our results are not affected by other omitted variables, we also consider a 
specification  with  more  restrictive  fixed  effects,  allowing  to  control  for  a  wider  range  of 
unobservable  characteristics. We first  introduce  country-product-year  fixed  effects  (𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 ),  which 
absorb  all  the  additional  explanatory  variables  included  in  the  previous  specification  and  many 
other factors likely to affect the probability of third countries to adopt regulations (e.g. participation 
in international agreements,24 technological innovation). By encompassing the first specification and 
accounting 
this 
specification  enhances  the  explanatory  power  of  the  model.  We  also  include  NTM  fixed  effects 
(𝐹𝐸𝑠 ) to account for different rationales underlying the implementation of various types of rules. 

for  additional  unobservable  characteristics  across  multiple  dimensions, 

Results. The correlation results corresponding to the estimation of Eq. (1) are presented in Table 
4.  Column  (1)  presents  the  results  of  the  baseline  specification,  which  includes  country-product, 
year  and  NTM  fixed  effects.  Column  (2)  displays  the  alternative  specification,  including  country-
product-year  and  NTM  fixed  effects.  In  both  columns,  the  coefficient  on  the  main  independent 
variable  is  positive  and  significant.  This  suggests  that,  after  controlling  for  other  confounding 
factors, the existence of measures within a product-level SPS/TBT category in the EU is associated 
with a larger probability of existence of measures within the same product-level SPS/TBT category 
in third countries at most five years later. The likelihood of other countries adopting requirements in 
a product-level SPS/TBT category conditional on the EU having in place measures within the same 
product-level SPS/TBT category increases by 6 to 7%, depending on the specification. 

As previously mentioned, in Column (1), we introduce more control variables likely to be associated 
with  the  existence  of  measures  within  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories  in  third  countries 
regardless of the existence of measures within the same product-level SPS/TBT categories in the 
EU. Thus, we notice that both an increase in tariffs and a larger number of other types of NTMs are 
associated with a lower probability of existence of measures within specific product-level SPS/TBT 
categories in third countries. In principle, a market protected through other measures might be less 
likely to implement requirements aimed at protecting health, safety, and the environment, as unsafe 
products  are  already  less  likely  to  enter.  Furthermore,  the  results  show  that  a  larger  market  size 
proxied through GDP is correlated with a lower probability of existence of measures within specific 
product-level SPS/TBT categories, whereas a more important level of development proxied through 
GDP  per  capita  is  positively  associated  with  the  probability  of  having  in  place  measures  within 
specific  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories.  The  relationship  between  market  size  and  the 
probability  to  implement  measures  within  specific  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories  is  not  clear-
cut,  thus  the  negative  result  is  not  necessarily  surprising.  It  can  be  argued  that  in  more  sizeable 
markets  consumers  have  more  diverging  preferences,  therefore  it  is  more  difficult  to  introduce 
measures satisfying all these diverging preferences. When it comes to the level of development of 
a  country,  one  would  indeed  expect  that  a  country  with  a  larger  GDP  per  capita  is  more  likely  to 

24  Certain  requirements  within  a  product-level  SPS/TBT  category  might  originate  at  the  international  level  through 
multilateral agreements. While one can assume that the EU’s early adoption of such requirements might act as a catalyst for 
other  countries  engaging  with  the  EU  market  and  expedite  their  compliance,  it  is  still  important  to  account  for  countries’ 
participation in international agreements in our analysis.  

22 

 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
is 
implement  measures  within  specific  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories,  given 
characterized  by  more  regulatory  capacity,  willingness  to  deploy  it,  and  consumers  with  more 
stringent  preferences  who  are  ready  to  pay  the  extra  cost  associated  with  healthier  and  safer 
products. In addition, we notice that the higher the internal demand for a good in a country, the less 
likely a country is to implement measures within specific product-level SPS/TBT categories. On the 
other  hand,  the  higher  the  external  demand  for  a  good  produced  by  a  country,  the  higher  the 
probability  of  that  country  to  adopt  measures  within  specific  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories. 
Finally,  having  a higher  number of FTA partners  besides the  EU  is also associated  with a higher 
probability  of  existence  of  measures  within  specific  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories  in  third 
countries. 

that 

it 

Robustness Tests. Several sensitivity tests are conducted to further confirm the robustness of our 
previous  findings.  Since  three  sets  of  fixed  effects  can  be  too  demanding  for  some  tests,  the 
robustness tests will all be conducted based on the alternative specification of Eq. (1).25 The results 
are presented in the Appendix in Table A4. First, instead of using a linear probability model, we rely 
on a conditional logit model. Second, we focus on a subsample keeping all countries for which the 
collection  of  the  NTM  data  has  been  done  after  2014.  As  already  mentioned,  the  data  collection 
year for each country is different. Therefore, considering countries with a data collection year closer 
to  2009  could  be  problematic  as  these  countries  might  just  simply  take  longer  to  implement 
measures in the same product-level SPS/TBT categories as the EU. This robustness test ensures 
that  we  allow  a  sufficient  period  of  time  for  all  countries  in  the  dataset  to  implement  EU-type 
measures. Third, we also run a test restricting the sample to all Latin American countries for which 
the data have been collected almost every year. This ensures a proper panel dimension of the data 
for  these  countries  and  provides  a  full  picture  regarding  the  adoption,  modification  or  removal  of 
regulations.  Fourth,  we  also  run  a  test  where  we  exclude  from  the  dataset  the  top  10%  more 
developed  countries  in  terms  of  GDP  per  capita.  Thus,  the  overall  results  are  not  driven  by 
countries  that  might  share  similar  health,  safety,  and  environmental  interests  as  the  EU  and, 
therefore, might have a natural tendency to adopt similar types of product requirements. Finally, we 
use alternative definitions for the dependent and the main independent variables. More precisely, 
instead  of  studying  the  existence  of  measures  within  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories  in  third 
countries  conditional  on  the  existence  of  measures  within  the  same  product-level  SPS/TBT 
categories in the EU at most five years before, we analyse the implementation of product rules at 
specific  points  in  time.  The  dependent  variable  is  a  dummy  set  to  1  for  a  country  implementing 
measures in a product-level SPS/TBT category in a year and 0 otherwise. The main independent 
variable is a dummy set to 1 if, for measures implemented by a third country in each product-level 
SPS/TBT  category  in  a  given  year,  the  EU  implemented  measures  within  the  same  category  at 
most  five  years  before,  being  the  first  mover  for  that  product-level  SPS/TBT  category.  All  these 
tests  validate  our  previous  findings,  providing  quantitative  support  for  the  role  of  the  EU  in 
furnishing a regulatory model for third countries in terms of product-level SPS/TBT categories. 

25 The results for the tests that can be carried out based on the main specification are in line with those conducted for the 
alternative specification. 

23 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Table 4: Probability of third countries to adopt requirements within the same product-level SPS/TBT 
categories as the EU  

𝒔

𝑹𝒆𝒒𝑬𝑼,𝒌,(𝒕−𝟓,𝒕)
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅

̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ 
𝛥 𝑀𝐹𝑁 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑘,(𝑡−5,𝑡)

𝑁𝑏. 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑠𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−5 

𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−5 

𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡−5 

𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−5 

𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−5 

𝑁𝑏. 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑇𝐴 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡−5 

Observations 

Adjusted R-sq 

Fixed Effects: 
 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑘 
 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 − 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 
 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 
 𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑠 

(1) 

0.069*** 

(0.000) 

-0.151*** 

(0.004) 

-0.119*** 
(0.000) 

-0.135*** 
(0.003) 

0.202*** 
(0.003) 

-0.002*** 
(0.000) 

0.000* 
(0.000) 

0.006*** 
(0.000) 

5,477,131 

0.601 

Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 

𝒔
𝑹𝒆𝒒𝒊,𝒌,𝒕

(2) 

0.064*** 

(0.000) 

5,065,764 

0.792 

No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 

𝒔

  is  the  probability  that  country  i  has  in  place 
Note:  The  dependent  variable  𝑹𝒆𝒒𝒊,𝒌,𝒕
measures  within  the  SPS/TBT  category  s  on  the  HS6  product  k  in  year  t.  The  main 
independent  variable  𝑹𝒆𝒒𝑬𝑼,𝒌,(𝒕−𝟓,𝒕)
  is  a  dummy  set  to  1  if  the  EU  has  also  in  place 
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
measures within the same SPS/TBT category s on the same HS6 product k, implemented 
between t and t-5, and the EU is the first mover for that product-level SPS/TBT category. 
Period  of  analysis:  2009-2019.  Robust standard  errors  in  parentheses,  with  ***  denoting 
significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. 

𝒔

4.2. Explaining why third countries follow the EU’s model  

Empirical Strategy. We now analyse which factors are related to the probability of third countries 
to  implement  measures  within  the  same  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories  as  the  EU,  over  the 
2009-2019  period.  To  this  end,  we  rely  on  the  original  non-squared  NTM  dataset,  including  all 
measures implemented by the EU and third countries within product-level SPS/TBT categories in a 
given year.  

In order to build the dependent variable, we proceed as follows. Among all product-level SPS/TBT 
categories  where  third  countries  have  implemented  measures  in  a  year,  we  identify  those  where 
the  EU  also  implemented  measures  at  most  five  years  before.  Thus,  our  dependent  variable 
 is defined as a dummy set to 1 if the existence of measures within the SPS/TBT 
𝑬𝑼𝒔𝒕𝒚𝒍𝒆𝑹𝒆𝒒𝒊,𝒌,𝒕
category s implemented by the third country i on the HS6 product k in year t reflects the existence 
of measures within the same product-level SPS/TBT category in the EU, implemented at most five 
years  before.  This  variable  is  set  to  0  if  the  EU  has  not  implemented  measures  in  the  same 

𝒔

24 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
product-level  SPS/TBT  category  at  most  five  years  before.26  We  use  an  LPM  with  fixed  effects, 
which can be expressed as follows: 

𝑬𝑼𝒔𝒕𝒚𝒍𝒆𝑹𝒆𝒒𝒊,𝒌,𝒕

𝒔 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑆ℎ𝑟𝑇𝑜𝐸𝑈𝑖,𝑘,(𝑡−5,𝑡)

̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ + 𝛽2∆𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑇𝑜𝐸𝑈𝑖,𝑘,(𝑡−5,𝑡)

̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ + 𝛽3𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑤𝐸𝑈𝑖,𝑡−5 +  

                                           𝜲 + 𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑘 +  𝐹𝐸𝑠 + 𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑘,𝑡

𝑠

Eq. (2) 

̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅  is  the  variation  in  the  EU’s  share  in  country  i’s  total  exports  of  a 
where  ∆𝑬𝒙𝒑𝑺𝒉𝒓𝑻𝒐𝑬𝑼𝒊,𝒌,(𝒕−𝟓,𝒕)
product k between t and t-5, ∆𝑬𝒙𝒑𝑽𝒂𝒍𝑻𝒐𝑬𝑼𝒊,𝒌,(𝒕−𝟓,𝐭)
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ refers to the variation in country i’s export value 
of product k to the EU between t and t-5, and 𝑭𝑻𝑨𝒘𝑬𝑼𝒊,𝒕−𝟓 represents a dummy variable set to 1 if 
country  i  has  a  free  trade  agreement  with  the  EU  in  year  t-5  and  0  otherwise.  These  variables 
capture  the  main  mechanisms  we  seek  to  examine  to  understand  the  reasons  behind  third 
countries’  adoption  of  measures  within  the  same  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories  as  the  EU. 
First,  this  regulatory  behaviour  of  third  countries  can  be  driven  by  market  forces,  which  are 
represented  here  through:  (1)  the  variation  in  the  EU’s  share  in  a  country’s  exports  of  a  product, 
and  (2)  the  variation  in  a  country’s  export  value  of  a  product  to  the  EU.  Second,  this  regulatory 
behaviour  of  third  countries  can  also  be  driven  by  treaty  forces  such  as  the  existence  of  trade 
agreements  between  third  countries  and  the  EU.  Furthermore,  𝚾  represents  a  vector  of  control 
variables  at  various  levels  of  aggregation  that  can  impact  the  decision  of  third  countries  to  adopt 
measures  within  the  same  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories  as  the  EU.  For  all  control  variables 
we rely on five-year lags to avoid any simultaneity issues. As in the previous case, these variables 
include  various  trade  policies  (i.e.  variation  in  average  tariffs  applied  by  country  i  on  product  k 
between  t  and  t-5,  number  of  other  categories  of  NTMs  applied  by  country  i  on  product  k  in  t-5), 
annual  internal  demand  for  a  product  (e.g.  total  imports  of  product  k  by  country  i  in  t-5  in  logs), 
annual  external  demand  for  a  product  (e.g.  total  exports  of  product  k  by  country  i  in  t-5  in  logs), 
annual  country  characteristics  (e.g.  GDP  and  GDP  per  capita  of  country  i  in  t-5  in  logs),  and 
participation in bilateral trade agreements (e.g. number of FTAs of country i in t-5). 

Results.  The  correlation  results  from  the  estimation  of  Eq.  (2),  corresponding  to  the  factors 
explaining  the  adoption  of  measures  by  third  countries  within  the  same  product-level  SPS/TBT 
categories as the EU, are presented in Table 5. First, we notice that both an increase in the EU’s 
share in a country’s exports of a product and an increase in a country’s export value of a product to 
the  EU  are  positively  and  significantly  correlated  with  the  adoption  of  measures  within  the  same 
product-level SPS/TBT categories as the EU. Second, the existence of a trade agreement with the 
EU is also positively and significantly associated with the implementation of requirements within the 
same product-level SPS/TBT categories as the EU. These results support the hypothesis that the 
EU’s role in providing a model for third countries in terms of product-level SPS/TBT categories can 
be  explained  through  both  market-  and  treaty-driven  mechanisms.  As  for  the  other  control 
variables, we find that an increase in the average tariffs applied on a product and a higher number 
of different other NTMs on a product are negatively and significantly associated with the adoption 
of  requirements  in  the  same  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories  as  the  EU.  We  also  obtain  a 
positive  and significant coefficient  on GDP and a  negative and significant coefficient on GDP  per 
capita. On the one hand, bigger countries in terms of GDP are more likely to adopt measures within 
the  same  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories  as  the  EU,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  countries  with  a 
higher  GDP  per  capita  are  less  likely  to  do  so.  These  results  are  in  line  with  the  hypothesis  that 
more  developed  countries  are  less  likely  to  be  standard-takers,  as  they  have  the  regulatory 
capacity  to  implement  product  requirements  that  fulfil  the  criteria  imposed  by  their  consumers. 
Finally,  we  obtain  a  negative  correlation  between  the  overall  number  of  trade  agreements  of  a 
country and the probability to adopt  measures within the same product-level SPS/TBT categories 
as  the  EU,  which  suggests  that  having  multiple  trade  agreements  might  actually  lead  to  different 
requirements for consumer protection and a lower probability to adopt more stringent EU rules. 

26 This implies that the EU does not have measures within the same product-level SPS/TBT category at all or that the EU 
adopted measures within the same product-level SPS/TBT category more than five years before (and has not modified them 
in the past five years). 

25 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Robustness Tests. We perform various sensitivity tests to confirm the robustness of our results. 
As  in  the  previous  case,  three  sets  of  fixed  effects  are  demanding  for  some  tests.  In  order  to  be 
able to perform all robustness tests, we use a higher level of aggregation for the set of NTM fixed 
effects.  Thus,  instead  of  relying  on  detailed  NTM  fixed  effects  ( 𝐹𝐸𝑠),  we  introduce  NTM  broad 
categories  ( 𝐹𝐸𝑠−𝑏𝑟)  fixed  effects.27  The  results  are  presented  in  the  Appendix  in  Table  A5.  First, 
instead of using a linear probability model, we rely on a conditional logit model. Second, we focus 
on a subsample keeping all countries for which the collection of the NTM data has been done after 
2014. Third, we also run a test restricting the sample to all Latin American countries for which the 
data have been collected almost every year. Finally, we also run a test where we exclude from the 
dataset the top 10% more developed countries in terms of GDP per capita. All these tests validate 
our  previous  findings,  confirming  that  the  adoption  of  measures  by  third  countries  in  the  same 
product-level  SPS/TBT  categories  as  the  EU  is  associated  with  both  market-driven  forces  and 
treaty-driven  forces.  More  precisely,  an  increasing  share  of  the  EU  in  a  country’s  exports  of  a 
product and the prior existence of a trade agreement with the EU are correlated with an increase in 
the  probability  of  third  countries  to  implement  requirements  in  the  same  product-level  SPS/TBT 
categories. 

Table 5: Factors explaining the probability of third countries to adopt measures in the same 
product-level SPS/TBT categories as the EU  

̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ 
𝜟𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑬𝑼𝒊,𝒌,(𝒕−𝟓,𝒕)

̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ 
𝜟𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑬𝑼𝒊,𝒌,(𝒕−𝟓,𝒕)

𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑬𝑼𝒊,𝒕−𝟓 

̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ 
𝛥 𝑀𝐹𝑁 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑘,(𝑡−5,𝑡)

𝑁𝑏. 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑠𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−5 

𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−5 

𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡−5 

𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−5 

𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−5 

𝑁𝑏. 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑇𝐴 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡−5 

Observations 

Adjusted R-sq 

Fixed Effects: 
 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑘 
 𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑠 
 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 

𝑬𝑼𝒔𝒕𝒚𝒍𝒆𝑹𝒆𝒒𝒊,𝒌,𝒕

𝒔

(1) 

0.021** 

(0.010) 
0.001* 

(0.001) 
0.036*** 
(0.007) 
-0.074** 

(0.033) 
-0.034*** 
(0.003) 
0.461*** 
(0.054) 
-0.523*** 
(0.053) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 

335,155 

0.478 

Yes 
Yes 
Yes 

𝒔

Note:  Period  of  analysis:  2009-2019.  The  dependent  variable 
  is  the  probability  that  country  i  has  in  place 
𝑬𝑼𝒔𝒕𝒚𝒍𝒆𝑹𝒆𝒒𝒊,𝒌,𝒕
requirements within the SPS/TBT category s on the HS6 product k 
in  a  given  year  t  if  the  EU  has  in  place  requirements  within  the 
same  SPS/TBT  category,  on  the  same  product,  adopted  at  most 
five years before. Robust standard errors in parentheses, with *** 
denoting  significance  at the  1%  level,  **  at  the  5%  level  and  *  at 
the 10% level. 

27 The results for the tests that can be carried out using detailed NTM fixed effects are  in line with those conducted using 
NTM broad categories fixed effects. 

26 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4.3. Further  insights  into  the  EU’s  role  in  providing  a 
regulatory model for other countries 

The  EU’s  role  in  providing  a  regulatory  model  in  international  perspective.  As  previously 
mentioned,  not  every  country  can  be  a  global  regulator  for  product  requirements  aimed  at 
protecting  health,  safety,  and  the  environment.  While  this  capacity  is  associated  with  large 
economies, having a large market alone does not give a jurisdiction the power to regulate globally 
(Bradford, 2020). Other important factors such as having the regulatory capacity and willingness to 
adopt  stringent  standards  and  regulations  are  key  to  the  emergence  of  a  country  as  a  global 
regulator.  This  might  explain  why  there  is  mounting  anecdotal  evidence  supporting  an  important 
regulatory influence from the EU but not a similar one from the United States or China. Besides a 
sizeable  consumer  market,  the  EU  has  an  important  regulatory  capacity  and  the  willingness  to 
deploy it. In the case of the United States, despite the existence of a significant consumer market 
and strong regulatory capacity, there appears to be little inclination towards implementing uniform 
and  stringent  standards  and  regulations  throughout  the  country.  Regarding  China,  while  some 
progress has been made in building domestic regulatory capacity, there is still work to be done to 
ensure  that  there  is  sufficient  willingness  and  capability  to  effectively  implement  and  enforce 
stringent regulations. 

In  this  subsection,  we  aim  at  understanding  whether  the  United  States  and  China  also  provide  a 
regulatory model for other countries alongside the EU. For this purpose, we introduce in Eq. (1) two 
additional  explanatory  variables,  allowing  to  detect  the  role  exerted  by  these  countries.  More 
precisely, for the existence of measures within a product-level SPS/TBT category in a third country 
in  a  year,  our  additional  explanatory  variables  map  the  existence  of  requirements  in  the  same 
product-level  SPS/TBT  category  in  the  United  States  (𝑹𝒆𝒒𝑼𝑺,𝒌,(𝒕−𝟓,𝒕)
), 
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
implemented at most five years before the third country in question. These variables fully consider 
whether the Unites States or China are first movers.  

)  and  China  (𝑹𝒆𝒒𝑪𝑵,𝒌,(𝒕−𝟓,𝒕)
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅

𝒔

𝒔

The correlation results are presented in Table 6Error! Reference source not found.. Our analysis 
shows that there is a significant and positive relationship between the existence of requirements in 
a given product-level SPS/TBT category in the EU and the existence of requirements in the same 
SPS/TBT  category  in  third  countries.  Specifically,  the  likelihood  of  third  countries  implementing 
requirements  in  a  product-level  SPS/TBT  category  increases  by  7%  when  the  EU  has  in  place 
measures in the same product-level SPS/TBT category. However, we do not find any evidence for 
the  role  of  the  United  States  in  providing  a  model  for  third  countries  in  terms  of  product-level 
SPS/TBT categories, as the coefficient is not significant. Regarding the role of China in providing a 
regulatory  model  for  third  countries,  we  document  a  positive  and  significant  correlation. 
Nonetheless,  the  magnitude  of  this  effect  is  negligible,  as  the  existence  of  measures  in  a  given 
product-level SPS/TBT category in China only increases the probability of third countries to have in 
place measures in the same product-level SPS/TBT category by 0.2%, which is 35 times less than 
the EU. Overall, it appears that the role of the EU in setting a regulatory model for third countries 
for product-level SPS/TBT categories prevails.  

27 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Probability of third countries to adopt requirements in product-level SPS/TBT categories in 
relation to the EU, the United States and China 

𝒔

𝑹𝒆𝒒𝑬𝑼,𝒌,(𝒕−𝟓,𝒕)
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅

𝒔

𝑹𝒆𝒒𝑼𝑺,𝒌,(𝒕−𝟓,𝒕)
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅

𝒔

𝑹𝒆𝒒𝑪𝑵,𝒌,(𝒕−𝟓,𝒕)
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅

Observations 

Adjusted R-sq 

Fixed Effects: 
 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑘 
 𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑠 
 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 

𝒔
𝑹𝒆𝒒𝒊,𝒌,𝒕

(1) 

0.069*** 

(0.000) 

-0.003 

(0.002) 

0.002** 

(0.001) 

5,129,267 

0.603 

Yes 
Yes 
Yes 

in 

included 

Note: Period of analysis: 2009-2019. This specification includes all control 
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅, 
variables 
𝛥 𝑀𝐹𝑁 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑘,(𝑡−5,𝑡)
𝑁𝑏. 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑠𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−5,  𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−5,  𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡−5, 
L𝑜𝑔 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−5,  L𝑜𝑔 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−5,  𝑁𝑏. 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑇𝐴 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡−5. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, with *** denoting significance at the 
1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. 

Eq. 

(1): 

The  EU’s  role  in  providing  a  regulatory  model  in  the  environmental  arena.  The  EU  is  well 
known  for  promoting  environmental  protection  and  sustainability  through  its  policies.  Although 
environmental  policies  are  diverse  and  wide-ranging,  certain  SPS  measures  and  TBTs  can  also 
support  environmental  goals.  Some  examples  include  the  prohibition  of  the  use  of  dangerous 
pesticides  for  human  health  and  the  environment,  the  reduction  of  pollutant  emissions  and 
composition  of  pollutant  emissions  in  motor  vehicles,  or  sustainable  labelling.  Given  the  data 
limitations regarding all types of environmental regulations, the focus of this subsection is narrowed 
down to product-level SPS/TBT categories which support environmental goals and which we refer 
to as green product requirements. The analysis abstracts from exploring how successful the EU is 
in transmitting other types of environmental policies, such as the EU Emissions Trading System, for 
instance.  

However,  information  on  which  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories  also  support  environmental 
objectives  is  not  readily  available  in  our  dataset.  In  order  to  identify  green  product  requirements, 
additional  information  is  required.  Considering  the  data  limitations,  to  the  best  of  our  knowledge, 
the  only  way  to  identify  green  product  requirements  in  our  dataset  is  through  the  identification  of 
product-level  SPS/TBT  categories  which  contribute  to  the  achievement  of  the  Sustainable 
Development  Goals  (SDGs)  related  to  environmental  aspects.  Overall,  there  are  17  SDGs  put 
forward by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted by all United Nations Member 
States in 2015. Besides protecting the environment and climate, this Agenda emphasizes the need 
to fight against poverty, enhance health and education, reduce inequality, drive economic growth, 
and protect the world's forests and oceans. However, this analysis only considers those SDGs that 
include  environmental  targets,  such  as  clean  water  and  sanitation  (SDG  6),  affordable  and  clean 
energy  (SDG  7),  sustainable  cities  and  communities  (SDG  11),  responsible  consumption  and 
production (SDG 12),  climate action (SDG 13),  life below  water (SDG 14), and  life on land (SDG 
15).28  

In  order  to  identify  which  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories  support  the  achievement  of  specific 
SDG  targets,  Kravchenko  et  al.  (2019)  developed  a  separate  concordance  matrix  leveraging 
additional  qualitative  information  gathered  in  the  NTM  data  collection  process.  This  concordance 

28 The classification of environmental SDGs used in this paper is based on  the information provided in the course entitled 
“Trade and Sustainable Development Goals” by the Economic Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). 

28 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
matrix can then be merged with the ready-to-use dataset for research purposes in order to identify 
which product-level SPS/TBT categories support environmental SDGs. In their study, Kravchenko 
et  al.  (2019)  consider  a  product-level  SPS/TBT  category  to  be  directly  linked  to  an  SDG  target 
when  two  specific  conditions  are  met.  First,  the  additional  qualitative  information  gathered  during 
the data collection process for each product-level SPS/TBT category includes a clearly stated SDG 
target-related  objective.  Second,  it  is  unlikely  that  the  product-level  SPS/TBT  category  under 
scrutiny  serves  any  other  objective  than  the  one  which  is  relevant  to  an  SDG  target.  Based  on 
these elements, the derived concordance only considers the stated or implied intended objective of 
the  measure  without  considering  its  actual  impact.  Even  if  the  data  do  not  allow  to  assess  the 
their 
actual 
implementation is beneficial for the environment. As mentioned, this concordance matrix is merged 
with our dataset in order to tag green product requirements.29 

impact  of  green  product  requirements,  our  underlying  assumption 

that 

is 

As  an  illustration,  SDG  12  which  aims  at  fostering  sustainable  consumption  and  production 
patterns, encompasses several targets. For instance, targets 12.4 and 12.5 focus on ensuring the 
responsible  handling  of  chemicals  and  waste  from  their  inception  to  their  disposal  in  an 
environmentally-friendly manner. This includes decreasing waste production, as well as limiting the 
discharge of chemicals and waste into the air, water, and soil, in order to minimize their detrimental 
effects on human health and the environment. When it comes to the  product requirements  which 
contribute to the accomplishment of Target 2.15, the concordance matrix includes, among others, 
all regulations under categories B31 (i.e. labelling requirements), B32 (i.e. marking requirements), 
B33  (i.e.  packaging  requirements),  and  B7  (i.e.  product  quality,  safety  or  performance 
requirements) covering all goods under the sector referring to Plastics and articles thereof, with the 
exception of plastic waste, and a few other products (i.e. soap and organic surface-active products 
in  the  form  of  bars,  cakes,  moulded  shapes,  and  paper,  wadding,  felt  and  nonwovens, 
impregnated,  coated  or  covered  with  soap  or  detergent,  for  toilet  use;  organic  surface-active 
products and preparations for washing the skin, in the form of liquid or cream and put up for retail 
sale, whether or not containing soap;  oral or dental hygiene preparations, dentifrices). This is just 
one  example  among  many  others.  By  following  this  approach,  we  can  tag  the  product-level 
SPS/TBT  categories  which  support  the  environmental  SDG  targets  and  estimate  whether  third 
countries  tend  to  adopt  measures  within  these  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories  if  the  EU  has 
measures within the same categories in place.  

As  previously  mentioned,  in  this  subsection,  we  aim  at  exploring  to  what  extent  third  countries 
adopt measures within the same product-level SPS/TBT categories as the EU if these categories 
support environmental objectives. To this end, we consider two specifications of Eq. (1). First, we 
introduce  an interaction term between  a  dummy  variable tracing  the existence  of  requirements in 
the same product-level SPS/TBT category as the EU, as detailed in Subsection 4.1, and a dummy 
variable set to 1 if the product-level SPS/TBT category in question supports environmental SDGs, 
irrespective  of  the  specific  supported  SDG.  Second,  we  introduce  several  interaction  terms 
between  a  dummy  variable  tracing  the  existence  of  requirements  in  the  same  product-level 
SPS/TBT category as the EU and various dummy variables for the product-level SPS/TBT category 
supporting specific environmental SDGs. The results are presented in Table 7.  

Column  (1)  displays  the  correlation  results  from  the  first  specification,  where  all  environmental 
SDGs are considered together. As in the previous case, our findings indicate that the likelihood of 
third  countries  to  have  in  place  requirements  in  a  product-level  SPS/TBT  category  increases  by 
6.6% if the EU has in place requirements in the same product-level SPS/TBT category. However, 
this  result  appears  to  be  reinforced  for  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories  that  contribute  to 
environmental  objectives.  More  specifically,  the  probability  of  third  countries  implementing 

29 The concordance matrix includes information on all environmental SDGs except for SDG 13 referring to climate action. 
However, as explained by Kravchenko et al. (2019), SDG 13 does not have any targets allowing to gauge the direct impact 
of  NTMs.  The  attainment  of  this  SDG  will  primarily  depend  on  the  adoption  of  national  policies,  international  and 
intergovernmental cooperation and concerted actions under other SDGs. For instance, the curbing of CO2 emissions can be 
realised by adopting NTMs that regulate energy efficiency in various sectors of consumption and production, as stipulated in 
SDG 7 and SDG 12. Similarly, the adaptation to climate change can be achieved by implementing sustainable agricultural 
practices and building resilient cities, as mentioned in SDG 11 and SDG 15. 

29 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
requirements  in  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories  that  support  the  attainment  of  environmental 
SDGs  increases  by  7.1%  if  the  EU  has  requirements  within  the  same  product-level  SPS/TBT 
categories already in place.30 This suggests that the role of the EU in providing a regulatory model 
for other countries is enhanced when it comes to product requirements in the environmental arena.  

Furthermore, Column (2) displays the  correlation results from the second specification, where the 
various environmental SDGs are considered separately. According to this specification, there is a 
6.8%  increase  in  the  probability  that  third  countries  implement  requirements  in  a  product-level 
SPS/TBT category if the EU has requirements in the same category already in place. However, the 
reaction of third countries to the existence of product requirements in the EU might differ depending 
on  the  specific  SDG.  For  instance,  we  document  a  non-significant  impact  of  the  existence  of  EU 
requirements  in  the  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories  supporting  SDGs  6  (i.e.  clean  water  and 
sanitation), 11 (i.e. sustainable cities and communities) and 15 (i.e. life on land) on the probability 
of  third  countries  to  implement  requirements  in  the  same  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories. 
Furthermore,  we  show  that  the  existence  of  EU  requirements  in  the  product-level  SPS/TBT 
categories  contributing  to  SDG  7  (i.e.  affordable  and  clean  energy)  increases  the  probability  that 
third  countries  implement  requirements  in  the  same  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories  to  a  lower 
extent. More precisely, the likelihood of third countries implementing requirements in product-level 
SPS/TBT  categories  likely  to  foster  SDG  7  increases  by  only  3.6%  when  the  EU  has  measures 
within  the  same  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories  in  place.31  Finally,  we  document  a  reinforced 
effect  of  the  existence  of  EU  requirements  in  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories  contributing  to 
SDGs  12  (i.e.  responsible  consumption  and  production)  and  14  (i.e.  life  below  water)  on  the 
probability  of  third  countries  to  have  in  place  requirements  in  the  same  product-level  SPS/TBT 
categories.  When  it  comes  to  responsible  consumption  and  production,  the  probability  of  third 
countries  to  implement  requirements  in  the  corresponding  product-level  SPS/TBT  categories 
increases by 7.6% conditional on the EU having in place requirements in the same categories.32 As 
for  life  below  water,  the  prior  existence  of  EU  requirements  in  the  corresponding  product-level 
SPS/TBT  categories  increases  the  likelihood  of  third  countries  to  implement  measures  within  the 
same categories by 10.9%.33 All in all, the role of the EU in providing a regulatory model for third 
countries  in  the  environmental  arena  appears  enhanced  for  product  requirements  that  aim  at 
fostering responsible consumption and production (e.g. measures controlling the trading of wastes 
and chemicals) and protecting life below water (e.g. measures on fishing processes). 

30  This  result  is  obtained  by  summing  up the coefficient  on the  interaction  term  (0.005)  and  the coefficient  on the  dummy 
corresponding to the prior existence of product regulations in the EU (0.066). 

31 This result is obtained by summing up the coefficient on the interaction term (-0.032) and the coefficient on the dummy 
corresponding to the prior existence of product regulations in the EU (0.066). 

32  This  result  is  obtained  by  summing  up the coefficient  on the  interaction  term  (0.008)  and  the coefficient  on the  dummy 
corresponding to the prior existence of product regulations in the EU (0.066). 

33  This  result  is  obtained  by  summing  up the coefficient  on the  interaction  term  (0.031)  and  the coefficient  on the  dummy 
corresponding to the prior existence of product regulations in the EU (0.066). 

30 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Table 7 : The EU’s role in providing a regulatory model for third countries for product-level 
SPS/TBT categories supporting environmental goals  

𝑬𝒏𝒗𝒊𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑺𝑫𝑮𝒔𝒌

𝒔 × 𝑹𝒆𝒒𝑬𝑼,𝒌,(𝒕−𝟓,𝒕)

̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅

𝒔

𝒔  
𝑬𝒏𝒗𝒊𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑺𝑫𝑮𝒔𝒌

𝒔
𝑹𝒆𝒒𝒊,𝒌,𝒕

(1) 

(2) 

Combined SDGs 

Detailed SDGs 

0.005*** 

(0.001) 

0.009*** 
(0.001) 

𝑬𝒏𝒗𝒊𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑺𝑫𝑮 𝟔𝒌

𝒔 × 𝑹𝒆𝒒𝑬𝑼,𝒌,(𝒕−𝟓,𝒕)

̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅

𝒔

𝒔  
𝑬𝒏𝒗𝒊𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑺𝑫𝑮 𝟔𝒌

𝑬𝒏𝒗𝒊𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑺𝑫𝑮 𝟕𝒌

𝒔 × 𝑹𝒆𝒒𝑬𝑼,𝒌,(𝒕−𝟓,𝒕)

̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅

𝒔

𝒔  
𝑬𝒏𝒗𝒊𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑺𝑫𝑮 𝟕𝒌

𝑬𝒏𝒗𝒊𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑺𝑫𝑮 𝟏𝟏𝒌

𝒔 × 𝑹𝒆𝒒𝑬𝑼,𝒌,(𝒕−𝟓,𝒕)

̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅

𝒔

𝒔  
𝑬𝒏𝒗𝒊𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑺𝑫𝑮 𝟏𝟏𝒌

𝑬𝒏𝒗𝒊𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑺𝑫𝑮 𝟏𝟐𝒌

𝒔 × 𝑹𝒆𝒒𝑬𝑼,𝒌,(𝒕−𝟓,𝒕)

̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅

𝒔

𝒔  
𝑬𝒏𝒗𝒊𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑺𝑫𝑮 𝟏𝟐𝒌

𝑬𝒏𝒗𝒊𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑺𝑫𝑮 𝟏𝟒𝒌

𝒔 × 𝑹𝒆𝒒𝑬𝑼,𝒌,(𝒕−𝟓,𝒕)

̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅

𝒔

𝒔  
𝑬𝒏𝒗𝒊𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑺𝑫𝑮 𝟏𝟒𝒌

𝑬𝒏𝒗𝒊𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑺𝑫𝑮 𝟏𝟓𝒌

𝒔 × 𝑹𝒆𝒒𝑬𝑼,𝒌,(𝒕−𝟓,𝒕)

̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅

𝒔

𝒔  
𝑬𝒏𝒗𝒊𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑺𝑫𝑮 𝟏𝟓𝒌

𝒔

𝑹𝒆𝒒𝑬𝑼,𝒌,(𝒕−𝟓,𝒕)
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅

Observations 

Adjusted R-sq 

Fixed Effects: 
 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑘 
 𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑠 
 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 

0.066*** 

(0.001) 

5,477,131 

0.601 

Yes 
Yes 
Yes 

-0.007 

(0.005) 

-0.082*** 
(0.005) 

-0.032*** 

(0.006) 

0.081*** 
(0.005) 

0.011 

(0.007) 

0.022*** 
(0.002) 

0.008*** 

(0.001) 

0.006*** 
(0.001) 

0.031*** 

(0.002) 

-0.021*** 
(0.001) 

-0.002 

(0.002) 

-0.002 
(0.001) 

0.068*** 

(0.001) 

5,477,131 

0.601 

Yes 
Yes 
Yes 

Note:  Period  of  analysis:  2009-2019.  This  specification  includes  all  control  variables  from  Eq.  (1): 
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅, 𝑁𝑏. 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑠𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−5, 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−5, 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡−5, 
𝛥 𝑀𝐹𝑁 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑘,(𝑡−5,𝑡)
𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−5,  𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−5,  𝑁𝑏. 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑇𝐴 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡−5.  Robust  standard  errors  in 
parentheses, with *** denoting significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. 

31 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 

This  paper  explores  the  role  of  the  EU  in  providing  a  model  for  product  requirements  aimed  at 
protecting  health,  safety,  and  the  environment,  relying  on  detailed  information  on  product-level 
SPS/TBT categories. More precisely, the paper analyses whether third countries are more likely to 
implement requirements in a product-level SPS/TBT category if the EU has requirements within the 
same  product-level  SPS/TBT  category  already  in  place.  Then,  it  sheds  light  on  some  factors 
associated  with  the  implementation  of  requirements  by  third  countries  in  the  same  product-level 
SPS/TBT categories as the EU. Finally, the paper digs further into the role of the EU in providing a 
regulatory model for other countries for product-level SPS/TBT categories, by (1) comparing it with 
the role exerted by the United States and China, and (2) investigating whether it is reinforced in the 
environmental arena. 

We  find  that  the  probability  of  a  country  to  implement  requirements  in  a  product-level  SPS/TBT 
category  is  significantly  and  positively  associated  with  the  prior  existence  of  requirements  in  the 
same  product-level  SPS/TBT  category  in  the  EU.  More  specifically,  third  countries  are  7%  more 
likely  to  introduce  requirements  in  a  given  product-level  SPS/TBT  category  should  the  EU  have 
requirements  in  the  same  product-level  SPS/TBT  category  already  in  place.  After  controlling  for 
other confounding factors, the adoption of requirements by third countries in the same product-level 
SPS/TBT categories as the EU is associated with direct market forces, namely an increase in the 
EU’s  share  in  a  country’s  total  exports  of  a  product  and  an  increase  in  a  country’s  exports  of  a 
product to the EU, as well as treaty forces, namely the existence of trade agreements with the EU. 
We also show that the role of the EU prevails, as we document a non-significant role for the United 
States  and  a  significant  but  limited  role  for  China.  Finally,  it  appears  that  the  role  of  the  EU  is 
for  product  requirements  encouraging 
reinforced 
responsible consumption and production and protecting marine life. 

the  environmental  arena,  particularly 

in 

Finally,  analysing  the  economic  significance  of  the  EU’s  role  in  providing  a  regulatory  model  for 
product-level SPS/TBT categories for third countries is of utmost importance, maybe even more so 
than  simply  documenting  this  role.  Although  this  aspect  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper  and 
opens  avenues  for  further  research,  it  is  important  to  at  least  theoretically  discuss  the  economic 
implications  of  the  EU’s  role  in  providing  a  regulatory  model  for  product  requirements  aimed  at 
protecting health, safety, and the environment for other countries. On the one hand, when the EU 
adopts such product requirements, they have to be fulfilled by all actors serving the single market, 
whether of domestic or foreign origin. Thus, beyond protecting health, safety, and the environment, 
these  measures  help  create  a  level  playing  field  within  the  single  market  as  they  do  not 
discriminate  based  on  the  origin  of  the  firm.  On  the  other  hand,  when  EU  firms  complying  with 
domestic  product  requirements  export  to  jurisdictions  with  laxer  product  rules,  they  might  be  at  a 
competitive  disadvantage.  Given  these  considerations,  the  spread  of  EU  product  requirements  to 
third countries might also help create a level playing field for EU firms operating abroad. This may 
result  in  greater  competitiveness  for  EU  firms,  potentially  leading  to  more  efficient  production 
processes  and  enhanced  trade.  Nevertheless,  the  competitiveness  benefits  associated  with  the 
role of the EU in providing a regulatory model for third countries are not only limited to EU firms. In 
fact,  the  proliferation  of  EU-like  product  requirements  induces  more  regulatory  harmonisation 
around the world. This implies a more predictable global environment also for foreign firms, which 
might see their compliance costs decrease, as they no longer have to fulfil divergent requirements 
imposed by various jurisdictions. Moreover, foreign firms might also see their demand increase, as 
clear product rules might also boost consumer confidence in their products. All in all, the adoption 
by third countries of product requirements aimed at protecting health, safety, and the environment 
based on the model furnished by the EU has the potential to further reduce trade barriers around 
the world and promote economic integration.  

32 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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WTO  (2012).  “World  Trade  Report  2012.  Trade  and  public  policies:  A  closer  look  at  non-tariff 
measures in the 21st century.” 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report12_e.pdf  

WTO (2021). “World Trade Report 2021. Economic resilience and trade” 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/wtr21_e/00_wtr21_e.pdf  

34 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 

Table A1: Classification of NTMs, by chapter 

Source: UNCTAD (https://trains.unctad.org/). Note: The main focus of our analysis is 
on Chapters A and B. All chapters, from C to O, are also used as control variables in 
the  estimations.  Chapter  P,  which  refers  to  export-related  measures,  is  excluded 
from the analysis. 

35 

ChapterDescriptionASanitary and phytosanitary measuresBTechnical barriers to tradeCPre-shipment inspection and other formalitiesDContingent trade-protective measuresENon-automatic import licensing, quotas, prohibitions, quantity-control measures and other restrictions not including sanitary and phytosanitary measures or technical barriers to tradeFPrice-control measures, including additional taxes and chargesGFinance measuresHMeasures affecting competitionITrade-realted investment measuresJDistribution restrictionsKRestrictions on post-sales servicesLSubsidies and other forms of supportMGovernment procurement restrictionsNIntellectual propertyORules of originPExport-related measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2: EU Trade Agreements with third countries present in the NTM dataset 

Source:  Authors’  elaboration  based  on  European  Commission  documents.  The  summary  of  these  documents 
can  be  accessed  at:  https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/negotiations-
and-agreements_en. Consulted on October 15, 2022.  

36 

Partner Country NamePartner Country ISO3 CodeYear of provisional application/ entry in forceType of trade agreementAlgeriaDZA2005Association AgreementAntigua and BarbudaATG2008Economic Partnership AgreementBahamasBHS2008Economic Partnership AgreementBarbadosBRB2008Economic Partnership AgreementBotswanaBWA2016Economic Partnership AgreementCameroonCMR2014Interim Economic Partnership AgreementCanadaCAN2017Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)ChileCHL2003Association Agreement and Additional ProtocolColombiaCOL2013Trade AgreementCosta RicaCRI2013Association Agreement with a strong trade componentCote d'IvoireCIV2016Stepping stone Economic Partnership AgreementDominicaDMA2008Economic Partnership AgreementDominican RepublicDOM2008Economic Partnership AgreementEcuadorECU2017Trade AgreementEl SalvadorSLV2013Association Agreement with a strong trade componentGhanaGHA2016Stepping stone Economic Partnership AgreementGuatemalaGTM2013Association Agreement with a strong trade componentGuyanaGUY2008Economic Partnership AgreementHondurasHND2013Association Agreement with a strong trade componentIsraelISR2000Association AgreementJamaicaJAM2008Economic Partnership AgreementJapanJPN2019Global agreementJordanJOR2002Association AgreementSouth KoreaKOR2011Free Trade AgreementLebanonLBN2006Association AgreementMauritiusMUS2012Economic Partnership AgreementMexicoMEX2000Global AgreementMoroccoMAR2000Association AgreementNicaraguaNIC2013Association Agreement with a strong trade componentPalestinePSE1997Interim Association AgreementPanamaPAN2013Association Agreement with a strong trade componentPapua New GuineaPNG2009Interim Partnership AgreementPeruPER2013Trade AgreementSingaporeSGP2019Free Trade AgreementSurinameSUR2008Economic Partnership AgreementSwitzerlandCHE1973Free Trade AgreementTunisiaTUN1998Association AgreementVietnamVNM2020Free Trade AgreementZimbabweZWE2012Economic Partnership Agreement 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3: HS6 products subject to regulations in the implementing jurisdictions 

Source:  Authors’  calculations  based  on  NTM  data  from  TRAINS-UNCTAD.  This  table  reports  for  each  implementing 
jurisdiction over the 2009-2019 period: i) the number of HS6 products affected by at least one regulation; ii) the average 
number of regulations per product. Regulations include both SPS measures and TBTs at the most detailed level. 

37 

Implementing countryNb. of products affected by at least one requirementAverage number of requirements per productImplementing countryNb. of products affected by at least one requirementAverage number of requirements per productAfghanistan4963.2Jordan17742.0Algeria7692.3Kazakhstan50554.8Antigua and Barbuda4913.0Kyrgyzstan38326.2Argentina23242.4Lao Dem. Rep.20454.3Australia16793.1Lebanon4434.7Azerbaijan27054.0Liberia4631.3Bahamas2601.2Malaysia14214.9Bahrain11693.6Mali10022.0Bangladesh9797.7Mauritania814.5Belarus35666.5Mauritius2734.4Benin7582.0Mexico12052.7Bolivia7041.1Morocco8343.8Botswana3821.7Myanmar12153.0Brazil31184.5Nepal922.2Brunei Darussalam3852.1New Zealand15781.9Burkina Faso7381.2Nicaragua17373.5Cabo Verde9857.9Niger3841.1Cambodia24433.4Nigeria6861.0Cameroon531.0Oman2781.8Canada9701.5Pakistan3831.1Chile14681.9Panama15434.3China40945.1Paraguay8322.3Hong Kong8322.0Peru18183.3Colombia18072.7Philippines21374.2Costa Rica14032.6Qatar1262.0Côte d’Ivoire16531.0Republic of Korea43867.6Dominica271.0Russian Federation33846.6Ecuador20035.9Saudi Arabia24337.6El Salvador7772.7Senegal481.4Ethiopia13484.5Singapore7251.7European Union48868.0Sri Lanka13102.6Gambia77715.8Suriname82.0Ghana11184.2Switzerland10764.3Guatemala8532.8Tajikistan36422.7Guinea49701.0Thailand16534.1Guyana2261.0Togo7363.0Honduras12402.6Tunisia574.8India19865.9United Arab Emirates9762.8Indonesia28655.2United States of America23325.5Israel613.5Uruguay7861.6Jamaica111.8Viet Nam44316.6Japan33015.5Zimbabwe5531.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table  A4:  Robustness  checks  for  the  probability  of  third  countries  to  adopt  product  requirements 
conditional on EU product requirements 

𝒔  
𝑹𝒆𝒒𝒊,𝒌,𝒕

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

(5) 

Conditional 
Logit 

Data 
collection 
> 2014 

Latin 
American 
countries 

W/o top 
10% 
developed 

Adoption 

1.219*** 

0.068*** 

0.075*** 

0.064*** 

0.539*** 

(0.009) 

(0.000) 

(0.001) 

(0.000) 

(0.000) 

1,300,272 

4,774,055 

765,017 

4,848,261 

5,130,356 

0.139 

0.787 

0.767 

0.790 

0.672 

𝒔

𝑹𝒆𝒒𝑬𝑼,𝒌,(𝒕−𝟓,𝒕)
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅

Observations 

Adjusted R-sq 

Fixed Effects: 
 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 − 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 
 𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑠 

Yes 
Yes 

Yes 
Yes 

Yes 
Yes 

Yes 
Yes 

Yes 
Yes 

Note: Period of analysis: 2009-2019. Robust standard errors in parentheses, with *** denoting significance at the 1% 
level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. 

Table  A5:  Robustness  checks  for  the  factors  explaining  the  probability  to  adopt  EU-style 
regulations 

𝑬𝑼𝒔𝒕𝒚𝒍𝒆𝑹𝒆𝒒𝒊,𝒌,𝒕

𝒔

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

Conditional 
Logit 

Data 
collection 
> 2014 

𝜟𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑬𝑼𝒊,𝒌,(𝒕−𝟓,𝒕)
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ 

0.298*** 

0.024** 

𝜟𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑬𝑼𝒊,𝒌,(𝒕−𝟓,𝒕)
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ 

𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑬𝑼𝒊,𝒕−𝟓 

Observations 

Adjusted R-sq 

(0.079) 

0.021*** 

(0.006) 

0.476*** 
(0.060) 

(0.012) 

0.001* 

(0.001) 

0.070*** 
(0.008) 

235,941 

325,781 

0.233 

0.478 

Latin 
American 
countries 

0.056** 

(0.026) 

0.000 

(0.002) 

0.284*** 
(0.022) 

54,385 

0.514 

W/o top 
10% 
developed 

0.058** 

(0.026) 

0.000 

(0.002) 

0.275*** 
(0.022) 

51,576 

0.509 

Fixed Effects: 
 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑘 
 𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑠−𝑏𝑟 
 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 
Note: Period of analysis: 2009-2019. All columns include the explanatory variables that have been included in 
Equation  Eq.  (2):  𝛥 𝑀𝐹𝑁 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑘,(𝑡−5,𝑡)
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅, 𝑁𝑏. 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑠𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−5, 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−5, 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡−5, 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−5, 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−5, 𝑁𝑏. 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑇𝐴 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡−5. Robust  standard  errors  in  parentheses,  with 
*** denoting significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. 

Yes 
Yes 
Yes  

Yes  
Yes 
Yes 

Yes 
Yes 
Yes 

Yes 
Yes 
Yes 

38 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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DOI: 10.2873/100819  
ISBN 978-92-76-98614-0