COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE Alert Mechanism Report 2024
Date: 2023-11-21
Institutions: Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: economic disparity, economic growth, economic recovery, economic statistics, euro area, inflation, macroeconomics, multilateral surveillance, national accounts, public debt

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Strasbourg, 21.11.2023  COM(2023) 902 final  COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE Alert Mechanism Report 2024 {SWD(2023) 901 final} - {SWD(2023) 902 final}  
 
 
ALERT MECHANISM REPORT COMMUNICATION 

The  Alert  Mechanism  Report  (AMR)  identifies  Member  States  that  the  Commission 
considers may be affected by, or may be at risk of being affected by, imbalances, based 
on  an  economic  reading  of  the  Macroeconomic  Imbalance  Procedure  scoreboard°(1).  The 
reading  considers  the  outturn  data  for  2022,  which  are  interpreted  in  a  forward-looking  manner, 
taking  into  account  the  development  of  possible  risks  based  on  2023  in-year  economic 
developments  and  longer-term  forecasts  from  the  Commission  2023  autumn  forecast,  where 
relevant. A full analysis and an annex containing the values of the scoreboard are included in the 
staff working document accompanying this Communication°(2).  

The 2024 Alert Mechanism Report considers the evolution of macroeconomic imbalances 
at a time of  still  high but  declining  inflation and weak  economic  growth.  By  early 2023, 
the  peak  in  headline  inflation  appeared  to  have  been  reached  in  most  EU  economies,  as  energy 
prices  have  fallen  and  continuing  reductions  in  food  inflation  are  easing  price  pressures.  Despite 
substantial  falls,  as  reflected  in  the  most  recent  data,  a  stickiness  in  core  items  may  make  it 
difficult for inflation to ease to a more desirable level in the immediate future. A protracted period 
of elevated inflation exacerbates the risk of continued divergence as national economies adjust and 
redistribute  the  impact  of  the  energy  price  shock  in  different  ways.  Growth  has  stuttered  in  real 
terms  in  many  countries,  particularly  around  the  turn  of  the  year,  with  muted  consumption 
stemming  from  reduced  real  household  purchasing  power  and  monetary  tightening  dampening 
demand. The current outlook is for further, albeit slower, reductions in inflation rates and a gradual 
pick-up in real GDP growth. Risks to the outlook are driven by the global context: the new conflict in 
the  Middle  East,  Russia’s  continued  war  against  Ukraine,  and  a  generally  changing  geopolitical 
context,  which  may  impinge  on  global  trade  and  make  external  conditions  difficult.  Across  the 
globe, inflation and central banks’ responses to tackling inflationary pressures, in combination with 
the appreciation of the US dollar, have led to some financial stress outside the EU.  

Sector-specific thematic reading 

•  In  2022,  current  account  balances  declined  in  almost  all  Member  States,  but  are 
increasing in most cases in 2023. The impact of soaring energy prices reduced surpluses and 
widened  deficits.  Both  energy  and  non-energy balances  declined,  reflecting worsening  terms 
of  trade  as  well  as  still  strong,  albeit  weakening,  domestic  demand  and  exchange  rate 
depreciations  in  some  countries.  High  current  account  surpluses  narrowed  somewhat  in  2022. 
The  current  account  balances  of  most  large  net-debtor  countries  remained  below  the  levels 
conducive for their swift correction. The large net external stock positions, both positive and 
negative,  generally  narrowed  but  remained  substantial.  Throughout  2023,  external  balances 
have been making a partial return to their previous levels, owing mainly to lower energy prices 
and  weakening  demand.  While  many  moderate  current  account  deficits  are  closing,  a  small 
number  of  countries  continue  to  have  much  higher  deficits  than  before  either  2022  or  the 
COVID-19 crisis. Moreover, these deficits remain higher than what fundamentals would suggest 
or what an improvement in their external stock position towards more prudent levels would call 

(1) Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and 

correction of macroeconomic imbalances.  

(2) Commission staff working document, Alert Mechanism Report 2024, SWD(2023) 901 

1 

 
 
 
for.  The  current  accounts  of  most  large  net-debtor  countries  are  increasing  as  the  impact  of 
energy prices wanes.  

•  In 2022, the euro area current account balance fell significantly, turning negative for the first 
time  in  more  than  a  decade  as  a  result  of  the  much  higher  energy  prices,  but  has  been 
increasing ever since. With the deterioration in the terms of trade, the nominal trade balance fell 
sharply  as  imports  values  grew  much  faster  than  exports,  while  the  trade  balance  remained 
broadly stable in real terms. With an improvement in the terms of trade underway and muted 
real demand, the euro area current account started to strengthen in late 2022 and returned to a 
surplus in the second quarter of 2023. It is forecast to continue improving this year and next, 
with  a  strengthening  trade  balance.  Overall, the  narrowing  of the  net  international  investment 
positions  has  led  to  some  rebalancing  of  external  positions  within  the  euro  area;  the 
changes  in  these  positions  have  been  greater  for  net-debtor  countries  despite  some  sizeable 
reductions in their current accounts.  

•  Growth  in  unit  labour  costs  picked  up  markedly  overall  and  diverged  considerably  between 
countries  in  2022  and  into  2023  –  including  within  the  euro  area,  where  divergence  poses 
higher  competitiveness  risks.  Very  strong  growth  in  some  Member  States  marks  a  sharp 
acceleration  relative  to  recent  years.  Wage  increases  were  substantial  in  most  countries,  but 
were  still  below  the  increases  in  the  cost  of  living.  This  resulted  in  pressure  on  household 
budgets, especially for low-income earners. In 2023, wages have been accelerating. As a result, 
unit labour costs are forecast to rise even faster in 2023 than in 2022 in most countries, and 
even  where  they  moderate,  they  are  still  expected  to  grow  at  a  strong  pace.  Cumulatively, 
wages  are  forecast  to  fall  in  real  terms  over  2022 and  2023.  For  2024,  the forecast  is  for  a 
significant slowdown in unit labour costs growth rates, but uncertainty remains high as wages 
are  dependent  on  negotiations that  have  not  yet taken  place in many  countries.  The  expected 
stronger  growth  in  unit  labour  costs  in  some  net-creditor  countries  should  support  further 
symmetric rebalancing of the external positions within the euro area in 2023 and 2024.  

•  The nominal depreciation of the euro  against other major currencies in 2022 – as Europe was 
more directly affected by the energy crisis and monetary conditions remained looser – resulted 
in an overall depreciation of  the euro area’s real effective exchange  rate. The euro gained 
strength in the first half of 2023.  Within the euro area, high inflation countries have shown a 
continued  appreciation  of  their  real  effective  exchange  rates,  mainly  driven  by  differentials  in 
core  inflation.  Outside  the  euro  area,  changes  in  the  nominal  exchange  rate  have  been  a 
significant  factor  affecting  real  effective  exchange  rates,  and  in  most  countries  a  nominal 
depreciation in 2022 was followed by some appreciation in the course of 2023, even relative to 
the  euro.  Overall, the monetary  stance  tightened  more  and  earlier  in  non-euro  area  countries, 
particularly  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  inflationary  period.  However,  in  those  countries,  and 
despite  the  clear  reduction  in  headline  inflation  since  the  turn  of  this  year,  price  pressures 
remain high.  

•  Corporate debt-to-GDP ratios decreased in 2022, reflecting strong nominal GDP growth. Loan 
flows were strong for most of 2022, but started to decelerate sharply towards the end of the 
year. Profits increased overall as firms benefited from higher pricing power. However, unit profit 
growth  recently  decelerated,  with  industry  particularly  affected.  By  2023,  active  deleveraging 
was  present  in  some  countries  as  loan  flows  turned  negative.  However,  debt  stocks  remain 
sizeable in many Member States and above pre-pandemic levels in some cases and represent a 
risk  factor.  As  corporate  loans  are  typically  taken  out  with  flexible  conditions  and  short 
maturities, rising interest burdens increase pressures in some sectors, including commercial real 
estate.  In  some  countries,  non-performing  loans  and  business  bankruptcies  have  started  to 
increase  and  are  clustered  in  high-risk  sectors,  including  accommodation  and  food  and 
transport.  In  the  near  future,  rising  interest  rate  burdens,  declining  profits,  potential  cost 

2 

 
 
competitiveness  pressures  and  limited  access  to  financing  are  likely  to  increase  corporate 
vulnerabilities. The reduced recourse to new loans will also likely hamper corporate investment, 
affecting growth prospects in the future. 

•  House  prices  continued  to  accelerate  in  most  Member  States  in  the  early  months  of  2022, 
before  reaching  a  turning  point.  A  combination  of  higher  mortgage  rates  and  lower  real 
disposable  incomes  led  to  a  slowing  of  house  price  increases,  with  house  prices  falling  on  a 
quarterly  or  even  annual  basis  in  the  most  affected  countries,  leading  to  a  reduction  in 
overvaluations.  House  prices  are  expected  to  continue  adjusting  to  higher  interest  rates.  In  a 
handful of countries, however, where mortgage rates have not increased substantially or where 
financing  is  flowing  in  from  abroad,  house  prices  continue  to  experience  strong  growth  and 
construction activity is strong.   

•  Household  debt  ratios  continued  to  fall  in  2022,  despite  buoyant  mortgage  flows  over  the 
early  months  of  the  year.  Household  debt  is  decreasing  further  in  2023  due  to  reduced 
mortgage flows, and there is a weaker denominator effect than in 2022 as real GDP growth is 
slowing  and  inflation  easing.  Despite  these  continued  reductions  in  debt  ratios,  the  interest 
burden  on  some  households  has  increased  and  will  continue  to  do  so  in  many  countries  as 
higher interest rates gradually  feed through into monthly mortgage payments. The extent and 
speed  of  this  depends  on  how  long  mortgage  rates  are  fixed  for  and  the  share  of  interest 
payments in monthly payments. Across the EU, mortgage rates increased significantly over the 
course of 2022, exceeding levels observed over the last decade. In a few countries, they have 
peaked recently, but in most, the cost of borrowing was still rising in September 2023. 

•  Government  debt  fell  as  a  share  of  GDP  in  2022,  with  nominal  growth  having  a  strong 
denominator  effect,  and  further  reductions  are  underway.  Nominal  growth  also  contributed  to 
buoyant tax revenues with government deficits falling. While support measures to mitigate the 
impact  of  higher  energy  prices  weighed  on  the  deficit,  they  typically  replaced  the  sizeable 
pandemic  support  packages.  Government  debt-to-GDP  ratios  remain  higher  than  prior  to  the 
COVID-19  crisis  in  most  countries,  with  the  exceptions  being  primarily  some  very  high  debt 
countries marked by very strong real GDP growth. Over 2023 and 2024, debt levels are forecast 
to fall more slowly in most cases or to stall in others. The interest burden of government debt 
has  been  rising,  and  gross  financing  needs  remain  significant  in  many  countries,  with  high 
inflation expected to gradually feed into higher government expenditure.   

•  Higher  inflation  and  rising  interest  rates  changed  the  environment  for  the  banking  sector, 
enabling it to become more profitable as interest margins increase. Overall, the banking sector 
is well capitalised and liquidity is sufficient. Despite the pressures on borrowers, the low level of 
non-performing  loans  has  remained  stable  so  far.  The  euro  area  banking  sector  has  seen  a 
temporary reduction in its valuations following bank bankruptcies in the US and Switzerland  in 
March,  but  has  otherwise  not  shown  an  increase  in  related  vulnerabilities.  However,  the  weak 
short-term  economic  outlook  may  affect  assets  and  credit  risks,  and  certain  sectors  such  as 
commercial real estate are a source of potential stress. There is also uncertainty about possible 
hidden  vulnerabilities  in  the  financial  sector,  including  in  the  non-bank  financial  sector.  The 
results of the 2023 stress test conducted by the European Banking Authority and the European 
Central Bank point to the ability of European banks to withstand adverse outcomes and become 
more resilient relative to previous exercises.    

Outlook for economic imbalances 

Strong nominal growth has facilitated the debt deleveraging, easing some long-standing 
imbalances,  but  pressures  stemming  from tighter  financing  conditions  have  grown.  The 
inflationary environment facilitated faster passive deleveraging, reducing indebtedness as long as 

3 

 
 
no  new  stresses  emerge. For  countries  on  a  deleveraging  path,  the  current  climate  has  favoured 
and  should  continue  to  favour  an  easing  of  vulnerabilities.  A  continued  gradual  reduction  in debt 
can  continue  in  countries  with  long-standing  vulnerabilities  provided  there  are  no  additional 
financing  needs, but it  may  be  more  difficult  where  private  sector loans  have  been  taken  out  by 
overstretched households in recent years and where government financing needs are the result of 
short  durations.  In  countries  where debt  servicing  requires  large  rollovers  of debt,  and  where  the 
private sector faces fast increases in mortgage payments, increased debt servicing costs are a risk 
to the economy. Non-financial corporations with large debts may struggle to meet their increased 
financing obligations if they face additional pressures from changing economic conditions, including 
to their competitiveness. In some cases, the interest rates exceed or approach nominal GDP growth 
rates, raising the prospect of a snowball effect on government debt, which requires larger primary 
surpluses to be contained.  

The entrenchment of deteriorations in cost competitiveness is becoming a more concrete 
risk  as  price  and  cost  pressures  continue  to  diverge.  Cost  competitiveness  concerns  were 
highlighted in last year’s Alert Mechanism Report, as differentiated price and cost increases raised 
the prospect of real appreciation and subsequent risks of competitiveness losses in countries with 
strong  price  increases.  These  concerns  remain,  although  they  have  abated  in  some  cases.  Some 
high inflation countries display signs of core inflation stickiness at a high level, and are marked by 
continued high increases in unit labour costs, as other countries’ core rates reduce, increasing the 
differences  in  price  levels.  Persistent  competitiveness  losses  could  spill  over  into  other  economic 
developments if vulnerabilities such as pre-existing debt or stress in particularly indebted sectors 
are present. For euro area countries, a re-alignment of domestic costs and prices via changes in the 
nominal exchange rate is not an option. In addition, divergent inflationary effects make the task of 
the monetary authority more difficult as the uniform transmission of changes in monetary stance 
to all parts of the monetary union may be hampered by differences in real interest rates across the 
euro area, which in some cases may drive further divergence. Across the EU, countries may struggle 
to address strong inflation and subdued growth while remaining in sync with their peers.  

The  adjustment  of  external  balances  following  the  price  shock  may  be  challenging, 
particularly for countries with external deficits. A number of countries face the prospect of 
large current account deficits continuing into the near future either due to their high energy import 
dependency  or  to  resilient  domestic  demand,  which  is  often  associated  with  loose  fiscal  policies. 
Persistently high energy prices may require an acceleration of costly structural adjustments away 
from  high  import  dependency  to  avoid  the  build-up  of  external  debt  or  a  reduction  of  potential 
growth. Over time, external weaknesses and a rise in external indebtedness could lead to economic 
stress if there is an erosion of cost competitiveness and an absence of internal demand restriction. 
Most countries at risk of sustained competitiveness losses stemming from high inflation have some 
margin  on  the  external  side  as  their  underlying  starting  external  positions  are  strong.  Current 
account  surpluses  that  fell  in  2022  are  increasing  again.  Higher  long-term  energy  prices  would 
affect these countries’ output. The extent to which they will affect the current accounts will depend 
on how demand responds. The return of euro area rebalancing depends on the relative adjustments 
of  surplus  and  deficit  countries  as  economic  conditions  normalise,  and  rebalancing  is  forecast  to 
continue.  

In most cases the reversal in house price dynamics reflects a soft adjustment to higher 
interest  rates, but  in other  cases  dynamics  are  more  worrying, with possible  spillovers 
into other sectors. In most cases, the modulation or reduction in house prices that is underway 
can  be  expected  to  be  limited  to  a  level  adjustment  that  reflects  the  higher  interest  rate 
environment, before resuming their long-term upward trajectory driven by limited housing supply. 
However,  feedback  loops  into  the  economy  are  possible.  These  are  evident  in  particular  in  some 
countries where higher mortgage rates have reduced household consumption when households are 
highly indebted. In addition, differences in the translation of interest rates into loan payments can 

4 

 
 
also lead to frictions in the transmissions of monetary policy. In countries where house prices are 
contracting,  falling  prices  could  put  pressure  on  banks,  with  reductions  in  their  collateral  eroding 
asset quality and affecting capitalisation as well as  the credit supply to the rest of the economy. 
Non-financial  corporations  that  are  very  active  in  the  commercial  real  estate  sector  may  be 
particularly  affected,  and  the  same  holds  for  banks  very  exposed  to  the  commercial  real  estate 
sector. In some countries, on the other hand, prices continue to experience strong growth, possibly 
tied to interest rates being too low or external funds flowing in, and a continued build-up of risks in 
the real estate sector could result in higher vulnerabilities and a potential sharp correction in future.  

Country-specific conclusions 

In  2024,  In-Depth  Reviews  will  be  prepared  for  the  11  Member  States  that  were 
identified  as  experiencing  imbalances  or  excessive  imbalances  in  2023°(3).  The  Alert 
Mechanism Report presents an overview of the evolution of key data underlying these imbalances. 
An  economic  assessment  of  whether  these  imbalances  are  aggravating,  are  under  correction,  or 
have  been  corrected,  with  the  view  to  updating  existing  assessments  and  assessing  possible 
remaining policy needs will be undertaken in the 2024 In-Depth Reviews to be published in the first 
half of 2024. This will be the case for Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Hungary, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and Sweden.  

In addition, the economic reading of the scoreboard leads to the conclusion that an In-
Depth  Review  will  be  undertaken  for  Slovakia,  as  it  presents  particular  risks  of  newly 
emerging imbalances. In Slovakia, concerns related to cost competitiveness, external accounts, 
government  finances,  house  prices  and  household debt,  persist.  These  concerns  were  analysed  in 
an In-Depth Review in spring 2023, and were found to be overall contained in the near future, with 
the  expectation  that  they  would  ease  as  economic  conditions  normalise,  leading  to  a  conclusion 
that  no  imbalances  were  present°(4).  The  current  scoreboard  reading  for  Slovakia  shows  that  in 
2022  four  indicators  were  beyond  their  indicative  thresholds,  namely  the  net  international 
investment position, the export market share, unit labour costs, and the youth unemployment rate. 
The economic reading of the scoreboard points to risks of imbalances as the abatement of these 
risks does not appear to be clearly underway. After several years of significant increases, nominal 
unit  labour  costs  are  set  to  accelerate  further,  growing  faster  than  in  the  euro  area  overall. 
Headline and core inflation remain well above euro area peers, and the differential is not reducing 
sufficiently,  to  undo  accumulated  increases  in  price  levels.  The  current  account  deficit  remains 
sizeable,  even  if  declining  recently  owing  to  lower  energy  prices.  The  clearly  negative  net 
international  investment  position  is  expected  to  remain  stable  this  year  and  slightly  worsen  next 
year; excluding non-defaultable instruments, it is now at its lowest level in two decades. The fiscal 
deficit is set to widen, while the government debt is expected to increase going forward as nominal 
GDP  growth  moderates  and  the  deficit  increases.  Nominal  house  price  growth  turned  negative 
recently, but prices still show signs of overvaluation. The household debt-to-GDP ratio, which had 
been on an upward trend over the last two decades, is expected to decline this year on the back of 
high inflation, while credit flows remain resilient. 

For the remaining Member States, there is no need to carry out In-Depth Reviews at this 
juncture.  For  those  Member  States  that  were  subject  to  an  IDR  in  spring  2023  but  were  not 
identified  as  experiencing  imbalances  or  excessive  imbalances  (Czechia,  Estonia,  Latvia, 
Lithuania,  and  Luxembourg),  this  Alert  Mechanism  Report  concludes  that  while  some 
developments  may  be  of  concern,  associated  risks  of  imbalances  are  reducing  with  the 
normalisation of economic conditions.  

(3) Communication from the Commission 2023 European Semester - Spring Package, COM(2023) 600. 

(4) See previous footnote; see also ‘In-depth review for Slovakia’, 24 May 2023, SWD(2023) 643 final. 

5 

 
 
 
For four other Member States, the economic reading of the scoreboard leads to the conclusion that 
while  they  are  not  as  affected  by,  or  at  risk  of  being  affected  by,  imbalances,  a  number  of 
developments  or  concerns  merit  attention. 
In  Bulgaria,  developments  related  to  cost 
competitiveness,  dynamic  household  borrowing  and  strong  house  price  growth  are  of  relevance. 
Nominal unit labour costs are expected to continue growing sharply, while core inflation has been 
well above the euro area average. Nominal house price growth has moderated recently but remains 
high, and household borrowing is sustained while household debt is contained. A strong underlying 
external  position  and  the  ongoing  nominal  convergence  process  mitigate  risks.  In  Croatia,  cost 
competitiveness  pressures  have  recently  increased  and  house  prices  have  grown  strongly.  While 
nominal  unit labour costs have increased visibly substantial differentials with respect to the euro 
area are very recent, mitigating risks. Government debt, while high, is continuing to decline and is 
forecast  to  come  in  below  60%  of  GDP  by  the  end  of  next  year.  Nominal  house  price  growth 
remains high as prices continue to rise strongly. In Denmark, the large current account surplus has 
increased  further  and  non-financial  corporations  and  household  debts  are  very  high.  The  current 
account surplus is the highest in the EU and has increased over the last decade and jumped further 
in  2022.  While  moderating,  the  surplus  is  forecast  to  remain  very  high,  but  there  are  limited 
spillover  risks  and  Denmark’s  economic  fundamentals  remain  strong.  In  Poland,  developments 
related to unit labour costs and the widening high fiscal deficit are of increasing relevance. Nominal 
unit labour costs increased visibly last year, and are expected to grow more markedly this year, and 
both  headline  and  core  inflation  have  been  above  euro  area  and  EU  averages.  The  fiscal  deficit 
widened last year and is forecast to further increase substantially in 2023, but the external position 
continues to strengthen and is no longer past the scoreboard threshold, mitigating risks.  

6 

 
 
 
Graph 1:  Number  of  Member  States,  and  euro  area  and  EU  aggregates,  recording  scoreboard 
variables beyond thresholds 

The number of Member States recording scoreboard variables beyond relevant thresholds in a certain year is based on 
the vintage of the scoreboard published with the respective annual Alert Mechanism Report. EU27 and EA20 aggregates 
added  where  beyond  treshold.  Possible  ex-post  data revisions may  imply a  difference in  the  number  of values  beyond 
thresholds  computed  using  the  latest  figures  for  the  scoreboard  variables  compared  with  the  number  reported  in  the 
graph  above;  for  instance,  the  increase  in  the  number  of  Member  States  with  current  account  readings  outside  the 
thresholds  between  2019  and  2020  data  observed  in  the  graph  above  is  mostly  due  to  data  revisions.  Forecasts  for 
financial  sector  liabilities  are  performed  for  2022  only;  no  forecasts  are  performed  for  long-term  unemployment  and 
youth unemployment. 
Source: Eurostat and Commission calculations 

7 

2164210EA20201820192020202120222023f2024fActivity rate00010201820192020202120222023f2024fLong-term unemployment006106201820192020202120222023f2024fYouth unemployment5577999201820192020202120222023f2024fCurrent account12111010888201820192020202120222023f2024fNet international investment position881815161723EA20EU27201820192020202120222023f2024fUnit labour cost5140477EA20201820192020202120222023f2024fReal effective exchange rate10336611EA20EU27201820192020202120222023f2024fExport market shares781014100201820192020202120222023f2024fHouse prices001200201820192020202120222023f2024fPrivate credit flow111012111098EA20EA20EA20EA20EA20EA20EU27EU27EU27EU27EU27EU27201820192020202120222023f2024fPrivate debt13111314131312EA20EA20EA20EA20EA20EA20EA20EU27EU27EU27EU27EU27EU27EU27201820192020202120222023f2024fGovernment debt114400201820192020202120222023f2024fFinancial sector liabilitiesExternalimbalances and competitivnessInternal ImbalancesEmployment indicators5322222201820192020202120222023f2024fUnemployment rate 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 2:  AMR scoreboard indicators in 2022, by country 

Source: Eurostat and Commission calculations (See Statistical Annex, Commission staff working document, Alert 
Mechanism Report 2024, SWD(2023) 902). 

8 

Current accountNIIPREERExport market shares0.6%57.7%1.7%-1.9%-1.0%-12.9%5.8%15.5%-2.3%-19.7%13.7%-7.7%Nominal ULCScoreboardHouse prices10.1%Belgium-3.8%23.6%Bulgaria-2.1%14.8%Czechia1.6%Private credit flowPrivate sector debtGovern-ment debtFinancial sector liabilities5.7%161.4%104.3%-2.7%5.9%74.6%22.6%12.0%4.5%76.1%44.2%3.2%Unemp.L-T Unemp.Activity rateYouth unemp.5.9%0.2%1.4%1.9%5.2%-0.6%0.5%-1.4%2.5%0.0%0.5%1.2%10.2%58.2%-1.2%12.4%6.3%70.2%-0.5%-13.0%-2.6%-20.2%8.8%17.0%6.0%-116.8%-4.6%32.1%7.2%Denmark-7.4%7.2%Germany-1.3%19.0%Estonia4.5%-10.6%Ireland5.0%13.1%188%29.8%-1.6%6.7%118.4%66.1%1.5%9.2%94.3%18.5%1.6%2.0%147.1%44.4%-4.0%5.1%-0.3%1.3%0.5%3.5%-0.2%1.4%-0.2%6.2%0.4%2.0%7.0%5.5%-0.3%3.5%-2.4%-7.9%-144.2%-2.5%12.6%0.7%-60.2%-0.7%-7.8%-1.1%-23.8%-3.8%-10.7%-0.9%-25.4%-0.6%12.1%3.5%Greece4.4%10.8%Spain0.8%11.1%France1.5%11.0%Croatia3.2%1.1%100.8%172.6%-0.5%0.3%123.5%111.6%-4.5%8.7%163.9%111.8%-1.3%6.0%79.3%68.2%9.5%14.9%-3.6%0.9%-6.1%14.4%-0.3%0.2%-2.7%7.7%-0.3%1.0%-3.4%7.4%0.0%3.4%1.4%1.6%4.7%-1.9%-8.4%-8.0%-96.2%-3.0%20.7%-1.9%-26.5%5.7%15.3%1.0%-7.0%9.8%28.8%4.9%Italy-3.2%-1.2%Cyrpus-3.1%16.7%Latvia-1.0%27.7%Lithuania0.4%2.9%105.5%141.7%-5.7%-3.9%213.4%85.6%-2.3%3.0%52.5%41%4.1%6.8%51.4%38.1%1.0%9.0%-1.3%-0.2%-5.5%7.3%0.2%2.2%2.0%7.5%-0.7%-0.5%2.6%7.2%0.4%0.6%0.0%8.0%47%-0.5%-0.8%-4.5%-50.8%-8.1%-3.5%0.1%78.8%-3.1%2.7%8.8%75.2%3.2%-0.1%13.2%Luxembourg4.0%23.1%Hungary5.1%8.6%Malta1.2%9.8%Netherlands6.1%-19.5%325.5%24.7%-4.9%9.2%78.8%73.9%8.6%6.4%121.8%52.3%5.9%6.9%210.1%50.1%-3.7%5.6%0.0%1.5%0.6%3.9%0.1%2.5%-0.6%3.6%0.1%4.1%-1.0%4.2%-0.2%1.3%-0.9%1.6%17.6%0.1%-4.7%-0.4%-33.4%-0.2%16.6%-1.0%-83.6%-2.9%-1.9%-7.1%-40.6%2.6%6.7%10.7%Austria3.7%16.9%Poland-1.9%10.7%Portugal4.8%10.4%Romania-6.2%5.0%121.9%78.4%-3.0%1.9%63.5%49.3%3.0%2.9%141.1%112.4%-4.0%3.3%43.3%47.2%8.2%5.7%-0.2%0.5%0.4%3.2%0.2%3.6%0.9%6.5%-0.1%1.5%0.7%5.8%0.2%3.5%1.8%3.2%-1.5%-1.3%2.9%-3.6%-61%3.8%-6.6%-0.5%-1.7%-3.1%-2.0%5.8%34.8%-1.4%-2.7%14.3%Slovenia4.3%13.3%Slovakia1.3%8.6%Finland-4.6%5.8%Sweden-3.1%5.2%66.0%72.3%-1.4%9.3%92.7%57.8%-9.3%2.3%144.7%73.3%1.7%10.6%207.3%32.9%3.7%4.6%-0.3%1.6%2.0%6.5%0.2%1.4%2.8%7.4%0.0%2.5%-3.5%8.3%0.4%1.0%2.3%