JOINT STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Report on EU Enhanced Engagement with three Everything But Arms beneficiary countries: Bangladesh, Cambodia and Myanmar Accompanying the document Joint Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the Generalised Scheme of Preferences covering the period 2020-2022
Date: 2023-11-21
Institutions: Directorate-General for Trade and Economic Security, European Commission
Subjects: Bangladesh, Cambodia, EU market, Myanmar/Burma, common commercial policy, development aid, generalised preferences, human rights, international convention, sustainable development

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY Brussels, 21.11.2023  SWD(2023) 360 final  JOINT STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  Report on EU Enhanced Engagement with three Everything But Arms beneficiary countries: Bangladesh, Cambodia and Myanmar     Accompanying the document Joint Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the Generalised Scheme of Preferences covering the period 2020-2022               {JOIN(2023) 34 final} - {SWD(2023) 359 final} - {SWD(2023) 361 final} - {SWD(2023) 362 final} - {SWD(2023) 363 final} - {SWD(2023) 364 final} - {SWD(2023) 365 final} - {SWD(2023) 366 final} - {SWD(2023) 367 final} - {SWD(2023) 368 final}  
 
 
ENHANCED ENGAGEMENT 

1.  INTRODUCTION 

This is the second joint Staff Working Document (SWD) dedicated to enhanced engagement 
with  three  GSP  beneficiary  countries:  Bangladesh,  Cambodia  and  Myanmar.  Enhanced 
Engagement started in 2017 with these three beneficiary countries under the “Everything But 
Arms” (EBA) arrangement in the EU’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) and has not 
been extended to other EBA beneficiaries so far (1). 

Enhanced engagement is conducted by the European Commission Services and the European 
External Action Service (EEAS), aiming to facilitate and incentivise beneficiary countries to 
make  progress  on  critical  areas  with  regard  to  the  15  core  human  rights  and  labour  rights 
international conventions listed in the GSP Regulation. Article 19 of the GSP Regulation (2) 
provides  that  preferences  may  be  withdrawn  from  any  GSP  beneficiaries  in  case  of  serious 
and systematic violation of the principles of the core human and labour right conventions. On 
this  basis,  EBA  preferences  for  Cambodia  were  partially  and  temporarily  withdrawn  on  12 
February  2020 ( 3 )  due  to  serious  and  systematic  violations  of  certain  human  rights  in 
Cambodia.  

The  enhanced  engagement  with  these  three  EBA  beneficiaries  focuses  on  the  most  serious 
issues linked to the implementation of key principles laid down in United Nations (UN) and 
International  Labour  Organization  (ILO)  reports  and  recommendations.  It  also  reflects  the 
deep  concerns  regarding  the  implementation  status  of  these  EBA  beneficiaries  as  expressed 
by  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council,  international  organisations,  and  civil  society, 
including trade unions. 

In concrete terms,  the process  notably  involves dialogue  with  representatives  of the country 
concerned,  including  at  political  level,  monitoring  missions,  including  official  dialogues, 
discussions with stakeholders, on-the-spot visits and exchange of letters on progress made and 
efforts that are still needed. 

Enhanced engagement with these three EBA beneficiaries is particularly important given their 
considerable share of total EU imports from countries under the EBA arrangement, as shown 
in Table 1.  

(1)   For 

years 

2018-2019 

see 

the 

dedicated 

SWD(2020)19 

of 

10.2.2020: 

https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=SWD(2020)19&lang=en  
All links provided in this Staff Working Document were up to date as of 20 October 2023. 

(2)   Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 applying a 
scheme  of  generalised  tariff  preferences  and  repealing  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No 732/2008,  OJ  L  303, 
31.10.2012. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012R0978&from=EN  
(3)   Commission  Delegated  Regulation  (EU)  2020/550  of  12  February  2020  amending  Annexes  II  and  IV  to 
Regulation  (EU)  No  978/2012  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  as  regards  the  temporary 
withdrawal  of  the  arrangements  referred  to  in  Article  1(2)  of  Regulation  (EU)  No  978/2012  in  respect  of 
certain products originating in the Kingdom of Cambodia, OJ L127 of 22.04.2020. 

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Table 1: EU imports by GSP beneficiaries and from EBA enhanced engagement countries (4) 

Preferential EU27 imports (€ million) 

2019 
62,326 
GSP 
28,665 
GSP - general 
8,496 
GSP - plus 
GSP - EBA 
25,164 
Enhanced Engagement 
15,366 
Bangladesh 
4,174 
Cambodia 
2,471 
Myanmar 

2020 
52,618 
23,666 
7,623 
21,329 

13,050 
3,118 
2,442 

2021 
55,908 
24,216 
9,386 
22,307 

14,887 
2,517 
2,044 

2022 
80,635 
31,955 
13,274 
35,407 

22,672 
4,220 
4,005 

growth 2019-
2022 (%) 
29.4 
11.5 
56.2 
40.7 

47.5 
1.1 
62.1 

share of imports from EBA 
countries 2020-2022 (%) 

64.0 
7.6 
6.1 

The  three  EBA  beneficiary  countries  under  enhanced  engagement  present  highly  different 
political, economic and development situations, hence the engagement process has followed a 
different  track  and  focus.  The  respective  engagements  also  take  into  account  all  the  EU 
instruments available – beyond the EBA – to address the identified problems. 

The EU provides countries under enhanced engagement with every opportunity to cooperate 
and continue dialogue on any of the issues addressed in this context. Each case is assessed on 
its own merit, with a view to induce and encourage the necessary reforms.  

In  the  case  of  Bangladesh,  the  enhanced  engagement  process  allowed  for  constructive 
bilateral exchanges on labour rights. 

In  the  case  of  Myanmar,  the  February  2021  military  coup  has  deeply  influenced  the 
modalities  of  the  enhanced  engagement  process,  due  to  its  broader  impact  on  bilateral 
relations  between  the  EU  and  the  country.  The  Council  Conclusions  of  22  February  2021 
clearly  define  the  EU  position  condemning  the  military  coup  in  the  strongest  terms,  and 
stressing that the EU stands with the population, especially those people who are in the most 
vulnerable circumstances. 

In  the  case  of  Cambodia,  since  the  launch  of  the  procedure  for  a  temporary  withdrawal  in 
February  2019 ( 5),  the  interaction  with  the  country  took  place  in  the  specific  procedural 
framework  outlined  in  the  GSP  Regulation (6).  The  withdrawal  procedure  was  concluded  in 
2020 with a partial withdrawal of preferences for selected garment and footwear, travel goods 
and  selected  sugar  products.  Since  then,  the  interaction  with  Cambodia  continued  in  the 
context of the political dialogues with the EEAS. Under the GSP rules, the partial withdrawal 
will be in place until the reasons that led to it no longer apply.  

(4)   Source  for  all  statistics:  Eurostat  data  as  of  September  2023.  Statistics  presented  refer  to  imports  under 

’regime 1’ which excludes some EU imports, like goods imported for inward and outward processing. 

(5)   OJ C55 of 12.2.2019, p.11 
(6)   The  withdrawal  procedure  is detailed  in  Article  19 of  the GSP  Regulation.  It  starts  with  an  Implementing 
Decision adopted by the Commission after having consulted the EU Member States. Following a six-month 
monitoring  and  evaluation  period,  the  Commission  has  three  months  to  submit  a  Report  of  Findings  and 
conclusions  to  the  beneficiary  country,  which  then  has one  month  to  comment.  Finally, within  12  months 
from  the  start  of  the  procedure,  the  Commission  takes  a  decision  whether  or  not  to  go  ahead  with  the 
temporary withdrawal.  

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2.  BANGLADESH 

2.1.  Context 

There  has  been  sustained  cooperation  with  the  Bangladeshi  authorities  over  the  reporting 
period.  

As regards labour rights, in 2022 Bangladesh ratified ILO Convention No. 138 on minimum 
age.  The  enhanced  engagement  process  has  also  led  to  the  finalisation  of  Bangladesh’s 
National Action Plan on the Labour Sector (NAP) in 2021. Bangladesh is regularly reporting 
every six months on the progress of the implementation (the latest report was published on 18 
April 2023).  Concerns  remain  in  particular  with  respect  to  freedom  of association  including 
anti-union  discrimination  and  obstacles  to  trade  union  establishment  and  operation, 
occupational safety and health, labour inspection, and child labour and forced labour.  

At the same time, limited progress was recorded for human rights, where concerns persist for 
alleged torture, extrajudicial killings, and enforced disappearances, as well as for deficiencies 
regarding  freedom  of  expression,  freedom  of  assembly  and  the  civil  society  space  and  the 
application of the death penalty. 

2.2.  Economic situation and impact of EBA tariff preferences 

Bangladesh remains by far the most important beneficiary of the EBA arrangement in terms 
of  exports  to  the  EU.  EBA  preferences  have  contributed  significantly  to  the  country’s 
remarkable economic growth and associated social progress over the past decades.  

The  economic  performance  in  terms  of  GDP  growth  continued  to  be  positive  in  the  period 
2020 to 2022 despite the COVID-19 pandemic (contrary to many other GSP beneficiaries) (7). 
Bangladesh  met  the  (Least  Developed  Country)  LDC  graduation  criteria  in  2018  and  2021 
and  is  now  scheduled  to  graduate  from  LDC  status  in  2026,  having  been  granted  an 
exceptional  5-year  transition  period  by  the  UN  due  to  challenges  stemming  from  the 
pandemic. Graduation from LDC status will also imply exit from the EBA arrangement three 
years later according to the current GSP Regulation. 

After a decrease by  16.0% in  2020 largely  linked to  the pandemic, Bangladesh’s exports to 
the  EU  recovered  to  €15.6  billion  in  2021  (+16.5%  compared  to  2020),  and  even  more 
strongly to €23.9 billion in 2022 (+53.5% compared to 2021) (8). Exports to the EU also grew 
faster  than  Bangladeshi  total  exports  to  the  world.  The  EU’s  share  of  Bangladesh’s  exports 
reached 51.8% in 2022, making the EU the most important export market by far (9).  

Bangladesh’s exports to the EU (as well as globally) are overwhelmingly apparel (knitted and 
not knitted), accounting for more than 90% of total exports to the EU in 2022. This reflects 
Bangladesh’s  overall  export  structure,  which  has  been  strongly  based  on  its  ready-made 
garments (RMG) exports, where Bangladesh has become the second-most important exporter 

(7)   World Bank: World Development Indicators. 
(8)   Based on Eurostat data, see Table 1 above. 
(9)   Based on ITC TradeMap data using mirror statistics. 

Page | 3 

 
 
globally, after China. Virtually all Bangladeshi exports to the EU take place under the EBA 
preferences, and utilisation rates (10) have consistently been 95% or higher.  

2.3.  Key Concerns  

In the reporting period the key concerns on labour rights related to:  

•  Bringing  labour  laws  in  full  compliance  with  international  standards:  remove  legal 
obstacles  to  the  right  to  establish  trade  unions,  elect  representatives  of  trade  unions 
and  organise  freely  trade  unions’  activities,  minimum  membership  requirements  to 
form a trade union, limitations to the establishment of trade unions in some sectors and 
certain workers, and the absence of trade unions in Export Processing Zones (EPZs), 
and addressing gaps  in  implementing  occupational  safety and health in  factories  and 
workplaces; 

•  Anti-union  discrimination,  including  violence,  harassment,  dismissal,  and  arrest  of 

workers with insufficient investigations and prosecutions of cases; 
•  Shortcomings in the labour inspectorate in terms of capacity and ability; 
•  Persistence of child and forced labour. 

With respect to the key concerns on human rights, these concern  freedom of expression, both 
online and offline, freedom of assembly and civil society space; investigate cases of alleged 
torture,  ill-treatment,  extrajudicial  killings,  and  enforced  disappearances;  the  authorities 
should also fully implement the recommendations of the Human Rights Council’s Universal 
Periodic Review (UPR), including with respect to the abolition of the death penalty, as well as 
the conclusions of UN treaty monitoring bodies. 

2.4.  Process of Engagement 

Over  the  reporting  period,  the  EU  regularly  informed  Bangladesh  of  its  concerns  and 
conducted  two  monitoring  missions  in  October  2019,  and  once  the  COVID-19  pandemic 
conditions allowed again, in March 2022.  

In October 2019, the authorities of Bangladesh agreed to develop the National Action Plan on 
the Labour Sector of Bangladesh (NAP) with timelines for reforms to improve labour rights, 
notably  to  ensure  the  compliance  of  the  Bangladesh  Labour  Act  and  the  Export  Processing 
Zone Labour Act with the ILO fundamental Conventions. The final NAP was made public by 
Bangladesh in September 2021. It is a comprehensive document also addressing EU concerns 
related to child labour, labour inspection and closure of factories that cannot be remediated to 
comply with health and safety requirements.  

At the 4th EU-Bangladesh Diplomatic Consultations on 26 October 2021, the EU stressed the 
need to focus on the NAP’s implementation, in particular the respect of deadlines for specific 
actions, the shortening of the EPZ Labour Act amendment’s timeline, and the closure of non-
remediated factories without delay. In the area of human rights, the EU underlined its concern 
on  the  increasing  pressure  on  freedom  of  opinion  and  expression,  as  well  as  the  need  to 
respect the freedom of assembly.  The EU also called for a moratorium on the death penalty 

(10)  The proportion of goods eligible for GSP treatment that use it. 

Page | 4 

 
 
 
 
and  raised  concern  as  to  the  manner  in  which  the  Digital  Security  Act  was  being 
implemented.  

The  EBA  joint  monitoring  mission  to  Dhaka  from  13  to  17  March  2022  allowed  the  EU 
representatives  to  reiterate  clear  messages  on  the  need  for  Bangladesh  to  deliver  on  the 
compliance with international labour and human rights obligations. As regards the NAP,  the 
EU  acknowledged  the  steps  taken  by  the  Government  such  as  the  ratification  of  ILO 
Convention  No.  138  on  minimum  age  and  of  the  2014  Protocol  on  the  forced  labour 
Convention  No.  29.  The  EU  also  stressed  the  urgency  to  ensure  full  and  timely 
implementation,  and  to  shorten  the  timeline  for  amending  the  Export-Processing-Zones 
Labour  Act.  The  EU  also  emphasised  the  need  for  compliance  with  the  human  rights 
obligations  as  raised  several  times  during  the  enhanced  engagement  process  notably 
concerning freedom of expression, including in the digital space, the combat of extrajudicial 
killings and torture and violence against women and marginalised groups. 

At the 9th meeting of the EU-Bangladesh Subgroup on Trade and Economic Cooperation held 
on 19 May 2022 in Brussels, the EU raised concerns on a number of delays, including on the 
revision of Bangladesh labour laws, and once again underlined the importance of addressing 
the  issues  already  raised  during  the  mission  to  Dhaka.  The  EU  also  asked  to  take  the 
necessary  action  to  eliminate  child  labour  by  2025,  to  effectively  combat  harassment  and 
violence against workers, fill all existing posts of labour inspectors and create the new posts 
needed and ensure safe and healthy workplaces. In the area of human rights, the EU reiterated 
the need for the Government to deliver on the relevant requests raised since the outset of the 
enhanced engagement. 

The  10th  EU-Bangladesh  Joint  Commission  in  Brussels  on  20  May  2022  was  another 
opportunity for the EU to recall EBA’s requirements on the respect of human rights, including 
labour  rights,  as  reflected  in  the  relevant  international  conventions  listed  in  the  GSP 
Regulation. The Joint Commission discussed the situation of democracy, the rule of law and 
good governance, including the importance of holding free and fair elections. The EU raised 
concerns on human rights and emphasised the need to ensure accountability for human rights 
violations. The EU also pointed to issues of freedom of expression offline and online, notably 
in  the  framework  of  the  Digital  Security  Act,  noting  the  importance  for  legislation  and  its 
implementation in this area to remain in line with international human rights obligations. The 
EU  called  on  promoting  and  protecting  human  rights  of  all,  regardless  of  ethnicity,  age, 
gender  identity,  sexual  orientation,  religious  or  political  affiliation,  disability  or  socio-
economic  background,  noting  that  progress  in  these  areas  is  also  crucial  for  stability, 
economic growth and development. The EU also noted that it was ready to provide increased 
cooperation  in  view  of  Bangladesh’s  next  UN  Human  Rights  Council’s  Universal  Periodic 
Review in 2023.  

In April 2022, the European Parliament’s International Committee on Trade (INTA) held an 
exchange of views on the implementation of the NAP. While expressing satisfaction with its 
publication in  2021, the Committee  recalled  its  deep concerns on the labour rights  situation 
expressed  in  previous  meetings  of  the  Committee.  The  Committee  confirmed  that  it  would 
continue to follow very closely the implementation of the NAP (11).   

(11)  Accordingly, a delegation of the INTA Committee visited Bangladesh in July 2022, one of the main goals of 
the visit being the assessment of the state of play on implementation of labour reforms provided for in the 

Page | 5 

 
 
 
The first formal EU-Bangladesh Political Dialogue was held on 24 November 2022 in Dhaka. 
The EU stressed the need for comprehensive implementation of the National Action Plan on 
the  Labour  Sector  of  Bangladesh  as  per  the  stipulated  timelines.  Both  sides  highlighted  the 
shared values of democracy, fundamental freedoms, rule of law, inclusiveness, and respect for 
human rights. 

Box 1: Cooperation priorities and projects – Bangladesh  

The Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) for Bangladesh has an indicative allocation for 2021-
2024  of  €306  million.  Additional  funds  (loans)  can  be  leveraged  under  the  European  Fund  for 
Sustainable  Development  Plus  (EFSD+).  The  MIP  builds  on  existing  cooperation  in  the  fields  of 
education,  TVET  (Technical  and  Vocal  Education  and  Training)  and  Skills,  social  protection  and 
governance  and  expands  to  cover  green  energy  transition  and  environmental  protection.  The  MIP 
2021-2027  priority  areas  are  the  following:  1)  Human  Capital  Development,  2)  Green  Inclusive 
Development, and 3) Inclusive Governance. Two Team Europe Initiatives will contribute to 1) a green 
energy transition and 2) to accelerating the decent work agenda. Under this MIP, two Annual Action 
Plans were already adopted by the Commission: one in 2021 comprising two actions: EU support to 
the  National  Social  Security  Strategy  (NSSS)  and  Promoting  Justice  for  All;  and  one  in  2022 
supporting the partnership for Green Energy Transition. Further initiatives in the field of Education, 
TVET, decent work, energy transition, governance and gender are planned for the near future. 

2.5.  State of Play 

Thanks  to  progress  achieved  in  ratifying  ILO  Conventions  in  recent  years,  Bangladesh  has 
ratified all the 27 GSP+ international Conventions referred to in the GSP Regulation. 

Through various amendments to its legislation and finetuning its approach to implementation, 
in  the  reporting  period  Bangladesh  achieved  some  gradual  improvements  with  respect  to 
labour  rights.  Amendments  to  the  Labour  Act  in  2018  and  to  the  EPZ  Labour  Act  in  2019 
partially  addressed  the  comments  made  by  the  ILO  Committee  of  Experts  and  the  EU. 
However,  most  of  the  changes  to  the  Labour  Act/EPZ  Labour  Act  requested  by  the  ILO 
Committee of Experts for a number of years have either not been addressed yet or have only 
been  addressed  partially ( 12 ).  The  trade  union  registration  process  has  been  gradually 
improving,  although  further  efforts  are  needed  in  this  area  to  address  all  the  remaining 
problems.  

In response to a complaint to the ILO, in June 2021, the Government submitted a roadmap to 
the  ILO,  focussing  on  four  priority  areas  for  action:  1)  labour  law  reform,  2)  trade  union 
registration,  3)  labour  inspection  and  enforcement,  and  4)  anti-union  discrimination/unfair 
labour practices and violence against workers.  

In  September  2021,  the  Ministry  of  Labour  published  the  abovementioned  National  Action 
Plan on the Labour Sector of Bangladesh (NAP 2021-2026), following intense and productive 
technical discussions with the EU. The NAP and the ILO roadmap are mutually supportive. 

NAP.  The  Committee  also  passed  robust  messages  on  human  rights  including  on  extrajudicial  killings, 
enforced  disappearances,  the  Digital  Security  Act,  and  child  labour.  It  also  linked  a  successful 
implementation of existing commitments with any future access to GSP+. 

(12)  Many of these long-standing problems are repeated again in the CEACR report published in February 2023, 
for  instance  on  pages  105-113.  In  addition,  CEACR  has  requested  from  Bangladesh  a  “full  reply  to  its 
comments outside of the reporting cycle” until September 2023 regarding ILO Convention No. 81 on labour 
inspections (CEACR report 2023, page 69).  

Page | 6 

 
 
 
The  NAP  also  identifies  the  national  institutions  responsible  for  each  action,  and  includes 
commitments going beyond the roadmap, such as the elimination of child labour by 2025.  

The Bangladesh  Labour  Rules and the EPZ Labour Rules, sub-rules  to  the Labour Act/EPZ 
Labour  Act,  have  been  revised  and  adopted  in  2022.  However,  the  Rules  still  fall  short  of 
compliance with international labour standards (13).  

The Government has committed to establish and fill 942 additional posts for labour inspectors 
by the end of 2023, and undertaken trainings for labour inspectors, though almost 200 posts of 
labour  inspectors,  making  up  for  about  one  third  of  the  existing  posts,  remain  unfilled.  The 
Government has completed a business plan in 2021 to remediate factories under the national 
initiative for fire, electrical and structural safety; it needs to follow up on its commitments to 
remediate  factories  ensuring  the  safety  of  workers,  including  by  sending  closure  notices  to 
factories  where  necessary  as  per  the  NAP.  The  Government  should  step  up  its  efforts  to 
investigate and prosecute alleged cases of violence and harassment against workers and their 
representatives. 

In 2022, Bangladesh ratified ILO Convention No. 138 on Minimum Age, committing to the 
international  community  that  no  child  below  14  years  of  age  would  be  allowed  entry  into 
work or employment, in both formal and informal sectors. The ratification of Convention No. 
138 is an important step forward, although the challenge lying ahead is the implementation. In 
2021,  Bangladesh  published  the  National  Plan  of  Action  to  Eliminate  Child  Labour  (2020-
2025). In 2022, the Government adopted a revised list of hazardous work, extending from 38 
to  43  the  number  of  types  of  work  prohibited  for  persons  under  18  years  of  age,  while 
important sectors such as agriculture or domestic work have not been taken up. Action in the 
area of education as the most decisive instrument to eliminate child labour, as referred to in 
the  NAP,  is  however  not  mentioned  at  all  in  the  3rd  NAP  report.  The  compulsory  school 
leaving age needs to be aligned with the minimum age to take up work.   

Limited  progress  has  been  recorded  in  the  reporting  period  with  respect  to  human  rights 
concerns  expressed  by  the  EU.  With  regard  to  cases  of  alleged  torture,  ill-treatment, 
extrajudicial killings, and enforced disappearances, on multiple occasions in 2021 and 2022, 
the UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights expressed deep concern about the 
Government’s failure to complete investigations and bring the perpetrators to justice. As part 
of  the  enhanced  engagement  discussions  on  human  rights,  the  EU  repeatedly  expressed 
concern  about  some  of  the  Digital  Security  Act’s  provisions  and  encouraged  Bangladesh  to 
fully  implement  the  recommendations  that  the  Human  Rights  Council  made  during  the  last 
Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review. Bangladesh’s authorities expressed the 
intention  to  amend  the  Digital  Security  Act  and  to  align  its  provisions  with  international 
human rights standards, and in September 2023 the Act was repealed by the Cyber Security 
Act.  Preliminary  analysis  shows  that  the  Cyber  Security  Act  is  not  fully  aligned  with 
international human rights standards; its application will be monitored.  

On 14 September 2023,  the European Parliament adopted a joint motion for a resolution on 
the  human  rights  situation  in  Bangladesh,  and  in  particular  the  case  of  the  human  rights 
organisation  Odhikar,  which  coincided  with  the  sentencing  of  two  of  the  organisation’s 

(13)  For instance, the CEACR requested the Government again in its report published in February 2023 to ensure 
that  labour  inspectors  are  empowered  to  enter  freely  establishments  in  EPZs  and  SEZs  without  any 
restrictions (CEACR report 2023, page 722). 

Page | 7 

 
 
leaders. The following day, the Spokesperson the High Representative of the European Union 
for Foreign Affairs/Vice-President of the Commission issued a statement on the case and on 
the role of civil society.  

2.6.  Looking ahead 

With  respect  to  the  key  concerns  on  labour  rights,  the  authorities  in  Bangladesh  should 
increase the pace of implementing the commitments on labour rights included in the NAP and 
ILO  Road  map,  and  continue  to  report  regularly  on  progress  achieved  in  line  with  the 
timelines provided.  

With  respect  to  the  key  concerns  on  human  rights,  the  authorities  in  Bangladesh  should 
improve  freedom  of  expression,  freedom  of  assembly  and  civil  society  space;  investigate 
cases  of  alleged  torture,  ill-treatment,  extrajudicial  killings,  and  enforced  disappearances; 
fully  implement  the  recommendations  of  the  Human  Rights  Council’s  Universal  Periodic 
Review  (UPR)  including  with  respect  to  the  abolition  of  the  death  penalty,  as  well  as  the 
conclusions of UN treaty monitoring bodies. 

The full compliance with  the GSP relevant  international  conventions  should also  be seen in 
the light of the expected future graduation of Bangladesh from LDC status (14), which would 
imply moving from the EBA arrangement to standard GSP. In this context, is important that 
Bangladesh  can  demonstrate  that  it  meets  its  obligations  under  the  GSP  regulation,  in 
particular as mentioned above, the labour rights reforms under the National Action Plan and 
the respect of international human rights standards. The EU will continue to closely monitor 
the  implementation  of  Bangladesh’s  GSP  commitments,  and  will  foster  the  ongoing 
engagement, notably through an EU High-Level mission to Dhaka in November 2023. 

(14)  UN General Assembly resolution A/76/L.6/Rev.1, adopted on 24 November 2021, decided that Bangladesh 
will graduate five years after the adoption of the resolution, i.e. on 24 November 2026. Bangladesh would 
then lose EU EBA tariff preferences after a 3-year transition period as per the GSP Regulation. 

Page | 8 

 
  
 
 
 
 
3.  MYANMAR 

3.1.  Context 

On 8 November 2020, Myanmar held its first general election under the control of a civilian 
government,  the  Aung  San  Suu  Kyi-led  National  League  for  Democracy  (NLD).  Despite 
shortcomings,  which  included  the  disenfranchisement  of  some  ethnic  minority  groups, 
especially the Rohingya in Rakhine State, the election was seen as an important milestone in 
the  country’s  democratic  transition  following  sixty  years  of  direct  or  indirect  military  rule. 
International  observers  (including  the  EU’s  Expert  Mission)  concluded  that,  despite  the 
above-mentioned  shortcomings,  the  elections  were  transparent  and  largely  reflected  the  will 
of the Myanmar people. Yet, on 1 February 2021, the day of the opening of the new session 
of Parliament, the Tatmadaw (the Myanmar armed forces) seized power after arresting State 
Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint, imposing an unconstitutional state 
of emergency. 

The  general  human  rights  situation  in  Myanmar  and  its  significant  deterioration  since  the 
military coup are of very serious concern to the EU.  

The process of EBA enhanced engagement that started in 2017 in relation to human rights and 
labour rights has been overshadowed by the military coup, the democratic backsliding in the 
country, and the significant worsening of the human rights and labour rights situation. Formal 
interaction with the military regime has been put on hold. 

As  of  December  2022,  according  to  the  Assistance  Association  for  Political  Prisoners 
(AAPP),  2,565  people  have  been  killed  through  military  crackdowns  following  pro-
democracy movements since the coup and 13,068 people were in detention. The UN estimates 
that  around  25  million  people  (of  a  population  of  54  million)  lived in  poverty  during  2022, 
with the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance rising from 1 million at the start 
of 2021 to 17.6 million over the year 2022. 

Politically, a broad-based pro-democracy movement has emerged in the opposition as a result 
of  the  coup.  It  encompasses  the  National  Unity  Government  (formed  by  democratically 
elected  lawmakers  in  the  2020  elections  who  were  ousted  by  the  coup),  the  National  Unity 
Consultative  Council  the  Committee  Representing  the  Pyidaungsu  Hluttaw  (the  elected 
Members  of  Parliament  in  the  November  2020  election),  various  Ethnic  Resistance 
Organisations,  as  well  as  an  array  of  civil  society  groups.  However,  the  Political  Party 
Registration  Law  of  January  2023,  prohibiting  anyone  previously  convicted  of  a  crime  or 
serving  a  prison  term  from  joining  a  political  party,  prevents  key  members  of  the  political 
opposition from taking part in political life and running in elections. 

The Rohingya crisis continues,  and in  2022 more than 750,000 Rohingya from  the Rakhine 
State  in  Myanmar  were  forcibly  displaced  to  Bangladesh,  despite  international  efforts  and 
calls on Myanmar to create the conditions for their return. The EU continues to advocate for 
the safe, sustainable, dignified, and voluntary return of the Rohingya refugees to their places 
of  origin.  The  EU  supports  the  work  of  the  Independent  Investigative  Mechanism  for 
Myanmar (IIMM) established by the UN Human Rights Council to ensure full accountability 
for  the  crimes  committed  against  the  Rohingya  as  well  as  for  the  crimes  committed  by  the 
military junta since the military coup. 

Page | 9 

 
In view of the continuing escalation of violence, grave human rights violations and threats to 
the  peace,  security  and  stability  in  Myanmar,  as  of  July  2023  the  Council  of  the  European 
Union  has  adopted  seven  rounds  of  restrictive  measures  (sanctions) (15)  against  individuals 
and  entities  supporting  the  military  regime  and  its  human  rights  violations.  Restrictive 
measures  currently  apply  to  a  total  of  99  individuals  and  19  entities.  Those  designated  are 
subject  to  an  asset  freeze  and  a  travel  ban,  which  prevents  them  from  entering  or  transiting 
through  EU  territory.  In  addition,  EU  persons  and  entities  are  prohibited  to  make  funds 
available to those listed. 

The  restrictive  measures  come  in  addition  to  the  withholding  of  EU  financial  assistance 
directly going  to  the  Government  and the freezing of all EU assistance that may be seen as 
legitimising the junta. Therefore, the development assistance has been re-oriented to directly 
support  the  people  of  Myanmar  since  the  2021  coup.  At  the  same  time,  the  EU  continues 
providing  humanitarian  assistance  and  attempting  to  avoid  harm  for  the  most  vulnerable 
persons, including women working in the garment sector.  

On 25 July 2022, the military regime executed four pro-democracy and opposition activists, 
the  first  prisoners  to  be  executed  in  the  country  in  more  than  three  decades.  The  High 
Representative  for  the  Union  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  Security  policy  stressed  that  these 
politically  motivated  executions  represented  yet  another  step  towards  the  complete 
dismantling of the rule of law and a further blatant violation of human rights in Myanmar. As 
of  December  2022,  139  persons  had  been  sentenced  to  death  in  Myanmar  since  1  February 
2021.  

In June 2022, the International Labour Conference’s 110th session in Geneva concluded that, 
the situation in Myanmar had continuously and gravely deteriorated since the military coup. 
The  country’s  democratic  transition  had  been  halted  with  disastrous  humanitarian,  social, 
security,  economic,  and  human  and  labour  rights  consequences.  At  the  Conference,  the  EU 
and  its  Member  States  condemned  again  in  the  strongest  terms  the  continuing  widespread 
human  and  labour  rights  violations  and  abuses  perpetrated  by  the  Myanmar  military  and 
security  forces  across  the  country,  including  the  unlawful  persecution  of  civil  society 
organisations  and  its  activists,  violence  against  peaceful  protestors  and  arbitrary  arrests  and 
detentions,  intimidation  and  harassment,  unjustified  dismissals,  threats  and  acts  of  grave 
violence  and  torture,  including  killings,  against  trade  unionists  and  human  rights  defenders, 
and acts of sexual and gender-based violence.  

On  21  December  2022,  the  United  Nations  Security  Council  adopted  a  resolution  on 
Myanmar expressing deep concern at the ongoing state of emergency and its grave impact on 
the  people  of  Myanmar.  The  resolution  also  urged  concrete  and  immediate  actions  to  end 
violence  and  called  on  the  military  junta  to  release  all  political  prisoners,  including  ousted 
leader  Aung  San  Suu  Kyi,  and  implement  the  ASEAN  five-point  consensus  to  tackle  the 
political crisis in Myanmar. 

On 4 April 2023, at the initiative of the EU, the Human Rights Council adopted a resolution 
on  the  situation  of  human  rights  in  Myanmar,  strongly  condemning  the  human  rights 
violations perpetrated by the Myanmar military. The resolution included new language on the 

(15)  https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/07/20/myanmar-burma-eu-imposes-seventh-

round-of-sanctions-against-six-individuals-and-one-
entity/#:~:text=Today%2C%20the%20Council%20imposed%20a,and%20stability%20in%20Myanmar%2F
Burma.   

Page | 10 

 
 
transfer  of  surveillance  technologies  and  less-lethal  technologies,  on  politically  motivated 
arrests and executions, and on the recent Organisation Registration Law. As in previous years, 
the  resolution  expressed  strong  support  for  ongoing  accountability  efforts,  including  by  the 
Independent  Investigative  Mechanism  for  Myanmar,  the  International  Criminal  Court  and 
International  Court  of  Justice,  to  ensure  that  perpetrators  of  past  and  current  human  rights 
violations in the country are held to account. The Resolution also extended the mandate of the 
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar for a further period of one 
year. 

3.2.  Economic situation and impact of EBA tariff preferences 

Myanmar’s  economy  grew  strongly  from  2012  to  2019,  averaging  6.9%  per  year.  Growth 
continued but slowed in 2020 to 3.1%, but sharply contracted in 2021 (-18%) following the 
military coup and the ongoing political crisis, and only limited growth of 3.0% was recorded 
in 2022. GDP per capita also increased until 2020, reaching €1,411, but dropped to €1,085 in 
2021 and again to €1,042 in 2022. The poverty rate decreased from 42.2% in 2010 to 24.8% 
in 2017, but UNDP estimates that it reached almost 50% again in early 2022. 

Myanmar  met  the  LDC  graduation  criteria  for  the  first  time  in  2018  and  again  in  2021. 
However, because of concerns that the state of emergency in force since February 2021 would 
negatively  affect  the  country’s  development  trajectory,  a  decision  by  the  UN  on  graduation 
was  deferred  to  2024.  Thus,  the  earliest  graduation  from  LDC  status  could  occur  in  2027, 
while, under the current GSP Regulation, the exit from the EBA would take place only three 
years thereafter. 

Over the reporting  period, preference utilisation rates of EBA preferences have  consistently 
been  high,  at  about  95%.  Myanmar’s  exports  to  the  EU  rapidly  expanded  following  the 
reinstatement of EBA preferences in 2013, increasing at an average annual growth of 57% to 
almost  €2.8  billion  in  2019  (of  which  €2.5  billion  were  under  the  EBA  preferences). 
Importantly,  exports  to  the  EU  thereafter  fell  by  8%  to  €2.6  billion  in  2020  (of  which  €2.4 
billion  were  under  the  EBA)  and  by  another  13%  to  €2.2  billion  in  2021  (of  which  €2.0 
billion were under the EBA), but then almost doubled in 2022 to €4.3 billion (of which €4.0 
billion under the EBA). The EU’s main imported products were garments (€3.1 billion), rice, 
and footwear (€380 million each). Myanmar’s imports from the EU (mostly pharmaceuticals, 
machinery and aircraft) are significantly lower at €361 million in 2022.  

Over the last few years, the EU has become an increasingly important market for Myanmar: 
exports to the EU as a share of total exports grew to more than 21% in 2020 to 2022. In 2022, 
the  EU  was  the  country’s  third  most  important  export  destination,  just  after  Thailand  and 
China. 

Myanmar  is  one  of  the  main  beneficiaries  of  EBA  tariff  preferences.  It  ranks  number  three 
after  Bangladesh  and  Cambodia  in  terms  of  the  value  of  exports  to  the  EU  under  the  EBA 
arrangement. 

Supported  by  Myanmar’s  rapidly  growing  exports  to  the  EU,  especially  of  garments, 
employment  in  the  sector  also  quickly  expanded:  in  2015,  the  garment  sector  provided 
employment for 380,000 persons, with women accounting for 91%. By 2019, just prior to the 
COVID-19 pandemic, employment in the sector had grown to almost 700,000 people, 90% of 
whom women. However, the situation in the sector deteriorated due to the pandemic and the 
military coup. The Myanmar Garment Manufacturers Association estimated that employment 

Page | 11 

 
in the sector in September 2021 had declined to about 480,000 workers, with some of them on 
furlough  or  reduced  hours.  Out  of  those  remaining  in  jobs,  around  60%  were  estimated  as 
working in factories depending on exports to the EU – this is a higher share than the share of 
Myanmar’s  garments  exports  destined  to  the  EU  in  2020,  indicating  that  exports  to  the  EU 
were associated with a higher employment retention during the dual crisis. 

3.3.  Key concerns 

Of particular concern prior to the coup was the violence perpetrated by the Tatmadaw against 
the  Rohingya  community  in  Rakhine  State  in  2017.  Discrimination  of  ethnic  minorities  has 
persisted, and the EU and the rest of the international community became seriously concerned 
about grave human rights violations and abuses amounting to crimes against humanity (16), in 
particular  in  Rakhine,  Kachin  and  Shan  States.  In  response,  an  Independent  Investigative 
Mechanism for Myanmar was established through a joint EU-OIC tabled resolution in the UN 
Human  Rights  Council  in  September  2018  and  confirmed  by  the  UN  General  Assembly  in 
December 2018.  

Broader  EU  concerns,  exacerbated  by  the  military  coup,  relate  to  a  wide  range  of  human 
rights  and  labour  rights  issues  across  Myanmar,  including  the  use  of  violence  and  grave 
human  rights  violations,  particularly  against  ethnic  and  religious  minorities,  political 
opponents  and  worker  representatives;  impunity  of  human  rights  violators;  lack  of 
cooperation with UN bodies and procedures; prevention of humanitarian access, the situation 
of  internally  displaced  persons  and  conditions  regarding  the  return  of  refugees;  hate  speech 
and  discrimination;  restrictions  to  freedom  of  expression;  continued  prevalence  of  child 
labour and forced labour; and severe restrictions to freedom of association. 

3.4.  Process of Engagement 

During the reporting period and as a follow-up to the third biennial GSP Report for the period 
2018-2019, on 14 April 2020 the Commission communicated in writing to the authorities of 
Myanmar to set out the priorities for monitoring under EBA enhanced engagement. A more 
detailed  follow-up  ‘list  of  salient  issues’  was  sent  in  June  2020.  Myanmar  authorities 
responded  by  mid-September  2020  but  did  not  provide  evidence  of  progress  on  any  of  the 
salient issues.  

The process of engagement with Myanmar slowed down in 2020 as a result of the COVID-19 
pandemic. The EU-Myanmar 6th Human Rights Dialogue that took place on 14 October 2020 
brought  no  progress.  The  EU  reiterated  the  calls  for  further  actions  on,  among  others, 
humanitarian access to the states of Rakhine, Kachin and Shan, creating the conditions for the 
safe and voluntary return of refugees, and ensuring accountability for crimes committed. 

With  the  military  coup  of  1  February  2021,  formal  interaction  with  the  military  regime  has 
been  put  on  hold,  rendering  any  contact  or  communication  in  the  framework  of  the  EBA 
enhanced engagement impossible.  

Since then, the EU position was established in Council conclusions  adopted on 22 February 
2021, stating that ‘the EU will continue to provide humanitarian assistance and will seek to 

(16)  https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/03/un-expert-myanmar-people-betrayed-vague-declarations-

and-tedious-endless  

Page | 12 

 
 
avoid measures which could adversely affect the people of Myanmar/Burma, especially those 
people who are in the most vulnerable circumstances’ (17).  

Furthermore,  the  EU  has  maintained  its  policy  of  using  the  tools  at  its  disposal  to  continue 
putting  pressure  on  the  military  regime,  including  by  adopting  a  series  of  packages  of 
targeted – as opposed to comprehensive – restrictive measures (18).  

Enhanced  engagement  continues  through  contacts  with  business,  trade  unions  and  non-
governmental  organisations  (NGOs)  in  Myanmar.  Moreover,  regular  engagement  by  the 
EEAS is maintained with the National Unity Government, with a view to closely monitor the 
situation on a wide range of human rights and labour rights issues in relation to the EBA. The 
Commission  services  and  the  EEAS  are  actively  engaged  with  a  range  of  stakeholders  in 
Myanmar’s  society,  so  that  the  channels  of  information  and  communication  are  kept  open, 
and the labour rights situation of workers, in particular in the garment industry, is monitored. 

Box 1: Cooperation priorities and projects – Myanmar  

The  EU’s  development  interests  in  Myanmar  lie  in  the  return  to  democracy  and  the  respect  of  the 
human  rights,  and  helping  the  country  meet  the  Sustainable  Development  Goals.  Following  the 
military  coup  and  in  line  with  the  Foreign  Affairs  Council  Conclusions  of  February  2021,  EU’s 
development  cooperation  in  Myanmar  was  adjusted  to  avoid  any  legitimisation  of  the  de  facto 
authorities. A total of €268 million from the MIP 2014-2020 was put on hold, and after a review, only 
€97  million  were  devoted  to  supporting  the  people  of  Myanmar,  working  through  NGOs  and 
international organisations, notably the UN. In 2021 and 2022, the EU allocated €125 million for two 
Special  Measures  focusing  on:  Building  resilience  and  peacebuilding  at  local  level,  education  and 
sustainable  livelihoods,  to  reinforce  socio-economic  resilience  of  the  population.  Some  additional 
funding  from  the  Regional  MIP  envelope  (€8  million)  addresses  the  issue  of  providing  durable 
solutions  for  displaced  Myanmar  populations  along  the  Thailand-Myanmar  border.  The  EU  is  also 
providing support to Human Rights Defenders and Human Rights groups to document human rights 
abuses, as well as to journalists in need of protection. Since 2017, the EU has also contributed over 
€350 million in humanitarian and development funding to address the impact of the Rohingya crisis in 
Bangladesh, Myanmar, and the whole region. 

3.5.  State of Play 

Since  the  beginning  of  2020,  no  progress  regarding  the  human  rights  and  labour  rights 
situation  in  Myanmar  has  been  recorded.  To  the  contrary,  there  is  clear  evidence  of  a 
significant deterioration of human and labour rights compared to the EU’s specific concerns 
formulated  at  the  beginning  of  the  enhanced  engagement  in  2017.  Additional,  new  severe 
concerns  have  arisen  since  the  military  coup.  The  restrictions  on  the  work  of  civil  society 
organisations,  including  social  partners,  and  tripartite  institutions,  and  the  fact  that  military 

(17)  https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6287-2021-INIT/en/pdf)  
(18)  Targeted sanctions were adopted by the Council in March 2023. To date, the EU has  adopted seven rounds 
of  targeted  sanctions  (99  individuals,  19  entities  covered)  and  is  constantly  reviewing  and  updating  these 
sanctions lists. Those designated are subject to an asset freeze and a travel ban, which prevents them from 
entering or transiting through EU territory. In addition, EU persons and entities are prohibited to make funds 
available to those listed. Other EU sanctions are the embargo on arms and equipment and export restrictions 
on equipment for monitoring communications which might be used for internal repression, the export ban on 
dual-use goods for use by the military and border guard police, and the prohibition of military training and 
cooperation with the Tatmadaw. 

Page | 13 

 
 
 
authorities  do  not  engage  with  the  international  community,  even  severely  restricting  their 
engagement with organisations such as the ILO further clouds the outlook.  

While the human rights situation in Myanmar deteriorated already during 2020, a year marked 
by  elections  and  COVID-19,  this  cannot  compare  to  the  aftereffects  of  the  military  coup. 
Together with pandemic restrictions that were used to restrict freedom of movement, a perfect 
storm  for  human  rights  abuses  has  emerged.  The  Myanmar  armed  forces  have  a  history  of 
human rights violations, but the 2021 coup has brought their blatant disregard for human life 
and  physical  integrity,  previously  reserved  for  ethnic  minority  regions,  into  all  areas  of  the 
country.  

Crimes  perpetrated  under  the  current  military  regime  include  physical  and  mental  torture, 
sexual  and  gender-based  violence,  the  persecution  of  civil  society,  human  rights  defenders, 
trade  unionists  and  journalists,  arbitrary  detentions  and  unfair  trials,  attacks  on  the  civilian 
population, including ethnic and religious minorities, and the destruction of private property. 
Responsibility for atrocities is routinely denied by the regime.  

Restrictions on humanitarian assistance imposed by the regime since the coup have created a 
nationwide  humanitarian  crisis.  The  latest  escalation  by  the  junta  was  the  execution  of  four 
pro-democracy  and  opposition  leaders  in  July  2022,  which  marked  the  return  to  the  death 
penalty in Myanmar after more than 30 years. 

With  respect  to  labour  rights,  these  were  restricted  further  following  the  military  coup.  The 
ILO Governing Body expressed on several occasions its profound concern with the removal 
of the civilian Government and the events that followed, including arbitrary arrests, detention, 
intimidation,  threats  and acts  of violence  against trade union  members  and others.  ILO also 
called for the release of trade union leaders and members who had been detained. In response 
to the gravity of the situation, in March 2022, the ILO Governing Body decided to establish a 
Commission of Inquiry for Myanmar under Article 26 of the ILO Constitution in relation to 
non-compliance  with  Conventions  No.  87  (on  freedom  of  association  and  protection  of  the 
right to  organise) and  No.  29 (on the prohibition  of forced labour),  which was appointed in 
June 2022. The report of the Commission of Inquiry was made public on 4 October 2023 and 
will  be  on  the  agenda  of  the  ILO  Governing  Body  session  scheduled  for  30  October-9 
November  2023.  Commissions  of  Inquiry  represent  the  highest  level  of  ILO  supervisory 
mechanisms to address very serious violations of ILO principles.  

Myanmar  should  address  the  conclusions  of  the  Report  of  the  Commission  of  Inquiry  in 
relation  to  non-compliance  with  ILO  Conventions  No.  87  and  No.  29  Moreover,  it  should 
address the conclusions and recommendations of the ILO  supervisory bodies, as well as the 
International  Labour  Conference  (2021)  and  the  Governing  Body  issued  over  the  last  few 
years, in particular in relation to forced labour and freedom of association. 

3.6.  Looking Ahead 

The  EU’s  response  to  the  military  coup  has  been  robust  and  coordinated  with  like-minded 
partners.  As  indicated  above,  the  EU  has  imposed  multiple  rounds  of  sanctions  against  the 
military  and  their  interests,  withheld  or  reoriented  development  assistance  and  provided 
humanitarian support. The EU has also led resolutions at the UN Human Rights Council and 
General  Assembly  condemning  the  violations  of  human  rights  and  will  keep  calling  for  the 
end  of  all  acts  of  violence.  The  EU  continues  to  consider  additional  targeted  restrictive 
measures in order to promote progress in all areas of concern. 

Page | 14 

 
As  already  mentioned  in  the  previous  GSP  Report,  on  11  November  2019,  The  Gambia 
brought a case against Myanmar in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the application 
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of  Genocide. On  22 July 
2022,  the  ICJ  found  that  it  had  jurisdiction,  on  the  basis  of  Article  IX  of  the  Genocide 
Convention, to entertain the Application filed by The Gambia, and that the said Application 
was admissible. The case is ongoing. 

The  participation  of  Myanmar  in  the  EBA  arrangement  continues  to  contribute  to  the 
eradication of poverty in the beneficiary country. This is particularly important at a time of a 
dire humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. The crisis triggered by the military coup led in fact to an 
unprecedented increase in humanitarian needs. The number of people in need of humanitarian 
assistance has sharply increased from 1 million in 2021 to 17.6 million people in 2022, and 
there are currently over 1.4 million internally displaced people reported in the country, while 
humanitarian  access  is  increasingly  constrained.  Trade  preferences  under  the  EBA 
arrangement  provide  essential  livelihoods  to  a  significant  number  of  workers  and  their 
families. So far, despite a deteriorating situation as regards human and labour rights, including 
with respect to many of the 15 core conventions listed in the GSP Regulation, the position of 
a wide range of stakeholders in Myanmar (including the National Unity Government and civil 
society  organisations)  is  that  a  possible  withdrawal  of  preferences  under  the  arrangement 
would be detrimental to the livelihoods of the local population. 

The Resolutions adopted by the Human Rights Council in 2021 and 2023(19) on the situation 
of  human  rights  in  Myanmar,  called  on  all  business  enterprises,  including  transnational 
corporations and domestic enterprises operating in Myanmar or that have parts of their supply 
chain in Myanmar, to implement the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and 
the  recommendations  made  by  the  independent  international  fact-finding  mission  on  the 
economic  interests  of  the  Myanmar  armed  forces.  They  also  requested  the  home  States  of 
those enterprises to take enhanced measures so that those businesses conduct enhanced human 
rights  due  diligence  so  that  their  activities  do  not  contribute  to  or  cause  any  human  rights 
violations or abuses, in accordance with the Guiding Principles. 

The EU re-assesses on a regular basis its policy on the EBA engagement with Myanmar. To 
this  end  the  EU  is  following  closely  the  political  and  humanitarian  developments  on  the 
ground as well as international assessments, including the outcomes of the ILO Commission 
of  Inquiry.  The  EU  stands  ready  to  adapt  –  if  necessary  –  its  policy  accordingly,  including 
through  a  possible  future  application  of  Article  19  of  the  GSP  Regulation  (i.e.  temporary 
withdrawal of preferences).  

19 Human Rights Council Adopts Five Resolutions, Including on the Implementation of Resolution 31/36 and on 
the Human Rights of Rohingya Muslims and Other Minorities in Myanmar | OHCHR 

Page | 15 

 
 
 
4.  CAMBODIA 

4.1.  Context 

At the initiation of the withdrawal procedure in 2019 (20), the EU’s concerns related to four 
main  areas (21):  a)  political  rights  and  the  shrinking  of  the  democratic  space;  b)  freedom  of 
expression  and  freedom  of  association;  c)  labour  rights;  and  d)  concerns  over  land  issues 
arising from economic land concessions (ELCs) in the sugar sector.  

Between  2019  and  2020,  in  the  course  of  the  withdrawal  procedure,  Cambodia  had  made 
progress  on  some  of  the  issues  of  concern,  notably  the  ones  related  to  labour  right  and  the 
ELCs.  Despite  this  progress,  the  final  decision  of  February  2020  to  partially  withdraw 
Cambodia’s EBA preferences was based on clear evidence of serious and systematic human 
rights violations, substantiated in the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/550. The 
violations underpinning the withdrawal concern the following areas:  

- 

- 

- 

limitation of the right to political participation, 

restriction of the right to freedom of expression,  

restriction of the right to freedom of association and peaceful assembly. 

The outburst of the COVID-19 pandemic in spring 2020 pre-empted any possibility to engage 
on the ground with the Cambodian authorities. In the immediate aftermath of the withdrawal, 
discussions  could  take  place  only  virtually.  In  person  dialogue  resumed  in  2022  once  the 
COVID-19 limitations were lifted.  

In  the  reporting  period  the  European  Parliament  adopted  two  resolutions ( 22 )  drawing 
attention to the continuous crackdown of political opposition in Cambodia including through 
the mass trials against opposition members and civil society.  

4.2.  Economic situation and impact of EBA tariff preferences 

Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the Cambodian economy had a strong growth rate averaging 
over  7%  over  the  last  decade.  Major  relevant  factors  were  the  growth  of  export  industries, 
notably  garments,  footwear,  and  travel  goods  and  the  development  of  significant  exports  of 
rice and other agricultural products. Growth recovered to 3% in 2021 and 5.2% in 2022 after 

(20)  OJ  C55,  12.02.2019,  p  11.  In  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Article  19,  paragraph  1,  point  (a)  of 
Regulation EU No 978/2012 (GSP Regulation). For more details on the developments during the temporary 
withdrawal procedure, see previous SWD. 

(21)  Prior to this, the EU outlined its concerns on a number of occasions since 2017, including in particular in the 
EU  Foreign  Affairs  Council  Conclusions  in  February  2018,  the  European  Parliament  resolutions  of  13 
December 2017 and 13 September 2018, as well as by the Commission services and the EEAS throughout 
the period of enhanced engagement with Cambodia. The Commission had for many years raised its concerns 
on  issues  related  to  Economic  Land  Concessions  (ELCs)  in  the  sugar  sector,  recommending  the 
establishment of an independent and transparent mechanism in order to deal with claims for compensation 
arising from the granting of ELCs for sugar cane plantations. 

(22)  European Parliament resolution of 11 March 2021 on the mass trials against the opposition and civil society 
in Cambodia (2021/2579(RSP)):  https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2021-0087_EN.pdf 
and European Parliament resolution of 5 May 2022 on the continuous crackdown of political opposition in 
Cambodia (2022/2658(RSP)): https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2022-0201_EN.pdf 

Page | 16 

 
 
the  shock  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic  in  2020  (-3.1%  GDP)  that  decimated  tourism  and 
affected the export-oriented manufacturing sectors.  

Thanks  to  the  sustained  and  inclusive  economic  growth  over  the  last  decade,  poverty  rates 
almost  halved  between  2009  and  2019  allowing  almost  2  million  Cambodians  to  escape 
poverty ( 23 ).  Cambodia  met  for  the  first  time  in  2021  the  LDC  graduation  criteria  and, 
provided that it meets for the second time the criteria in 2024, the country will graduate from 
LDC status as early as 2027. Graduation from LDC status will also imply exit from the EBA 
arrangement three years later according to the current GSP Regulation. 

In  2021,  imports  from  Cambodia  to  the  EU  amounted  to  €3.5  billion,  which  represented  a 
significant  decrease  from  pre-COVID-19  and  pre-EBA  partial  withdrawal  (€4.6  billion  in 
2019 and €3.6 billion in 2020); but imports in 2022 strongly increased, reaching a record €5.5 
billion. Total trade in goods between the two partners equalled €6.3 billion in 2022, meaning 
that Cambodia has a large trade surplus.  In 2022, the EU was the second largest market for 
Cambodian exports (20% of total of exports) after the US (44% of total of exports). Garments 
and  footwear  represented  more  than  80%  of  total  EU  imports  from  Cambodia  (almost  €4.5 
billion).  Other  products  imported  by  the  EU  were  bicycles  (€421  million,  7.6%)  and  rice 
(€207 million, 3.7%).  

About  76%  of  these  exports  entered  the  EU  market  under  EBA  tariff  preferences  in  2022. 
This  ratio  has  been  significantly  reduced  compared  to  2018 ( 24)  (95%)  Overall,  in  2022 
Cambodia was the second largest user of EBA preferences, after Bangladesh. 

Box 3: The economic effect of the partial withdrawal of EBA tariff preferences for Cambodia  

The partial withdrawal of Cambodia’s EBA preferences started to apply in August 2020, reinstating 
EU import tariffs based on the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariffs to a selection of tariff lines within 
garments, footwear, travel goods and sugar that represented approximately 20% of total imports by the 
EU from Cambodia in 2018. The effects of the withdrawal for the last months of 2020 overlapped with 
the impact of COVID-19 lockdowns in the EU market, and it is therefore difficult to disentangle both 
effects. In 2020, imports by the EU-27 decreased sharply for both products affected by the EBA partial 
withdrawal (decrease by 20%, from €944 million in 2019 to €752 million) and products that were not 
affected by the withdrawal (decrease by 22%, from €3.7 billion to €2.9 billion). The impact of the loss 
of  preferences  was  clearer  in  2021:  While  EU  imports  of  unaffected  products  slightly  recovered, 
increasing  by  3.3%  to  €3  billion,  imports  of  products  for  which  the  preferences  were  withdrawn 
decreased by a further 33.6%, to €499 million. In 2022, imports of both categories of products rapidly 
increased  again:  unaffected  products  by  57%,  to  €4.7  billion,  and  affected  ones  by  68%,  to  €839 
million. This seems to indicate that exporters have adjusted to the partial withdrawal of preferences. In 
any case, over the period 2019 to 2022, EU imports of products affected by the withdrawal decreased 
by 11.1% whereas imports of unaffected products increased by 27.5%. This also meant that the share 
of affected products in the EU’s total imports from Cambodia dropped from 20% (until 2020) to about 
15% (in 2022). 

Figure 1: EU imports from Cambodia, products covered by the temporary partial withdrawal (PW) of 
preference vs. products for which preferences were not withdrawn, 2012-2022 (€ million and %) 

(23)  Cambodia Poverty Assessment 2022: Toward a More Inclusive and Resilient Cambodia, The World Bank, 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/cambodia/publication/cambodia-poverty-

November 
assessment-2022-toward-a-more-inclusive-and-resilient-cambodia  

2022, 

(24)  2018  is  the  last  year  in  which  Cambodia  benefitted  of  full  preferential  access  under  EBA,  before  rice 

safeguards (2019) and EBA partial withdrawal (2020). 

Page | 17 

 
 
5.000

4.500

4.000

3.500

3.000

2.500

2.000

1.500

1.000

500

0

%
7
,
2
2

%
9
,
9
1

%
1
,
8
1

%
1
,
9
1

2.947

%
3
,
9
1

3.237

%
4
,
8
1

2.539

%
7
,
9
1

%
4
,
0
2

%
6
,
0
2

4.711

25%

3.559

3.694

2.896

2.992

%
3
,
4
1

%
1
,
5
1

1.800

1.519

1.147

337

335

447

574

694

776

871

944

752

499

839

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Products not covered by PW

Products covered by PW

Share of products covered by PW in total

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

Source:  Calculations  based  on  Eurostat  COMEXT  dataset  DS-045409  -  EU  trade  since  1988  by  HS2-4-6  and 
CN8 [accessed 06.10.2023]. 

Despite the decreasing exports to the EU, Cambodian total exports keep a positive trend thanks to the 
good performance on other export markets, notably the United States. The decrease in exports to the 
EU in 2020 was largely compensated by an increase in exports to the United States and, to a lesser 
extent,  to  China.  Similarily,  the  increase  in  Cambodia’s  total  exports  in  2021 were  again  caused  by 
increasing exports to the United States and China, as well as to other markets.  

Accordingly,  the  EU’s  share  in  Cambodia’s  total  exports  fell  by  12  percentage  points  from  30%  in 
2018  to  18%  in  2021,  but  recovered  to  20%  in  2022.  For  products  affected  by  the  preference 
withdrawal, this decrease was even stronger: from 31% in 2018 to 13% in 2021, with a slight recovery 
to 14% in 2022. 

Figure 2: Cambodia – main export destinations (total 
exports less gold), 2016-2022 (USD billion and %) 

Figure 3: Cambodia’s exports to the EU and world, 
2016-2022 (USD million and index (2019=100; right 
axis)) 

2,4

0,6
0,8
0,6

2,7

0,7
0,8
0,8

3,0

3,4

3,1

0,8
1,1
0,9

3,8

2,1

2,4

3,0

2,7

0,8
1,1
1,0

3,9

4,4

0,2
0,8
1,1

1,1

3,2

3,0

1,0
1,1
1,5

3,2

3,6

1,1
1,2
1,2

4,1

5,3

7,5

9,0

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

USA

EU27

China

Japan

Canada

Others

25.000

20.000

15.000

10.000

5.000

0

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

EU - total World - total

Source: Calculations based on ITC TradeMap [accessed 06.10.2023]. 

There is not enough data to deduct any substantial impact of the EBA partial withdrawal on production 
of  garments,  footwear  and  travel  goods  in  Cambodia,  neither  in  quantitative  nor  qualitative  terms. 
While  the  sector  was  affected  in  2020  by  COVID-19  due  to  the  shortages  in  input  materials  and 
reduction of orders, the 2021 trade data suggests that the sector bounced back relatively quickly. 

Page | 18 

 
 
 
 
 
4.3.  Key Concerns  

Political participation. The local elections of 5 June 2022 showed a limited opening of civil 
and political space: 17 parties registered candidates to participate in the process, the elections 
were conducted in a peaceful manner and parties were allowed to campaign and participate. 
However,  the  main  opposition  leaders  remained  politically  incapacitated  and  unable  to 
mobilise supporters and voters. Despite that, the opposition Candlelight Party received more 
than 20% of votes. 

The  courts  continued  to  prosecute  opposition  politicians  and  activists,  including  through 
criminal charges in both mass and individual trials and increased charges under Article 495 of 
the Cambodian Criminal Code on incitement to commit a felony or to disturb social security.  

Freedom  of  expression.  Under Articles 31 and 41 of Cambodia’s Constitution, freedom  of 
expression  continues to  be  guaranteed. However, the adoption by the National  Assembly of 
the Law on Preventive Measures against the spread of COVID-19 undulied narrowed further 
the space for freedom of assembly and expression.  

Additionally, the approval by the Cambodian Government of a sub-decree regarding National 
Internet Gateway in February 2021, increased the risk for online censorship and surveillance. 
The National Internet Gateway Legislation has however not yet been implemented.  

Freedom  of  association  and  of  peaceful  assembly.  In  2021,  restriction  of  freedom  of 
association  and  peaceful  assembly  continued,  and  a  number  of  activists  and  human  rights 
defenders continued to be persecuted with criminal charges. During 2022 there was a certain 
reopening of the space for the political parties and civil society to participate in the electoral 
process, with the local elections taking place in June. Parties were able to register candidates 
and  campaign  and  civil  society  published  recommendation,  conducted  electoral  observation 
and voter awareness activities. However, in 2023 new restrictions were imposed on the right 
of political parties and individuals to participate in the parliamentary elections held on 23 July 
2023. 

Non-discrimination, land and housing rights.  The EU recognises the actions taken by the 
Cambodian  authorities  to  resolve  these  issues,  and  efforts  taken  to  grant  land  titles  to 
individual  holders.  However,  progress  on  the  registration  process  for  communal  land  and 
indigenous communities continues to be slow.  

Labour  rights,  notably  freedom  of  association  and  collective  bargaining.  In  2021  and 
2022 the ILO urged Cambodia to take immediate measures to address and prevent anti-union 
harassment  and  discrimination  problems  related  to  the  application  of  the  fundamental  ILO 
Conventions No. 87 on freedom of association and No. 98 on collective bargaining. Concerns 
over  the  Law  on  Trade  Union  remain,  even  after  certain  reforms  have  been  in  force  since 
January  2020.  The  Law  continues  to  be  not  in  line  with  the  two  conventions,  including 
because  of  restrictions  and  their  effects  on  the  right  to  join  and  establish  workers’ 
organisations.  During  the  pandemic,  further  harassments  towards  independent  trade  union 
leaders  have  been  reported,  including  unlawful  termination  of  contracts.  More  recently,  a 
protracted labour conflict has turned into criminal accusations towards the trade union leaders 
and activists, with some being placed in jail. The space for labour activism has been further 
closed, in a context of difficult economic recovery for the industry in the country. In 2023, the 
ILO also criticised violations in law and practice of fundamental Convention No. 105 on the 

Page | 19 

 
abolition  of  forced  labour  with  respect  to  prison  sentences  affecting  opposition  members, 
human rights defenders and participants in peaceful strikes. 

4.4.  Process of Engagement  

The withdrawal procedure was concluded during the reporting period, in February 2020, with 
the  adoption  of  Commission  Delegated  Regulation  (EU)  2020/55 ( 25 )  (the  withdrawal 
regulation) partially withdrawing preferences, which entered into force on 25 April 2022 and 
started to apply as from 12 August 2020 (26). 

As  detailed  in  the  withdrawal  regulation,  the  Commission  had  identified  serious  and 
systematic  violation  of  the  principles  of  the  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political 
Rights  (ICCPR),  and  notably  the  right  to  Political  Participation  (Article  25  ICCPR),  the 
freedom  of  Expression  (Article  19  ICCPR)  and  the  Freedom  of  Association  and  Peaceful 
Assembly  (Articles  21  and  22  ICCPR).  However,  in  the  same  withdrawal  regulation,  the 
Commission also noted progress, since the initiation of the temporary withdrawal procedure 
in 2019, on some of the concerns related to the economic land concessions and labour rights. 

In  practical  terms,  the  withdrawal  regulation  implies  that  the  zero-duty  tariff  preferences 
granted  to  Cambodia  under  the  EBA  are  replaced  by  the  Most  Favoured  Nation  (MFN) 
standard  tariffs  for  imports  from  Cambodia  of  selected  products  listed  in  the  withdrawal 
regulation in relation to the garment and footwear, travel goods and sugar sectors. At the time 
of withdrawal, this amounted to around one-fifth or €1 billion of Cambodia's yearly exports to 
the EU. 

After  the  adoption  of  the  withdrawal  regulation,  the  first  immediate  occasion  to  engage 
further with Cambodia was expected to be the 11th Cambodia- EU Joint Committee originally 
planned to take place in March 2020. However, the outburst of the COVID-19 pandemic and 
related travel and entry restrictions seriously hindered any possibility to engage on the ground 
with the Cambodian authorities.  

Discussions resumed when the withdrawal regulation had already become final, first in hybrid 
format in November 2020, in the context of the Sub-Group on Trade and Investment and Sub-
Group  on  Human  Rights  and  Governance  (on  that  occasion  the  Joint  Committee  Plenary 
session was cancelled due to the COVID-19 pandemic) and then in presence during the 11th 
Cambodia-EU Joint Committee that took place in Phnom Penh on 10 March 2022. It was also 
regularly raised in bilateral dialogue at the highest political level in 2022.  

In  particular,  the  re-establishment  of  the  dialogue  in  the  context  of  the  Joint  Committee 
allowed to take stock of recent developments and re-ascertain expectations of both sides as to 
the  process.  The  bilateral  dialogue  at  the  highest  political  level  was  maintained  and  further 
reinforced in the context of the 2022 Cambodia’s ASEAN Chairmanship.  

Since  then,  in  the  framework  of  Cambodia’s  Chairmanship  of  ASEAN,  there  have  been 
opportunities  for  a  more  continued  high-level  engagement.  In  August  2022,  HR/VP  Josep 

(25)  OJ L127, 22.4.2020, p.1 
(26)  Under  the  GSP  rules,  the  Commission  withdrawal  regulation  takes  effect  six  months  after  its  adoption. 
However, during this 6 months-period the European Parliament and the Council may object to the delegated 
act. Moreover, the situation on the ground may change and the reason justifying the temporary withdrawal 
may no longer apply, in which case the Commission repeals the withdrawal regulation.  

Page | 20 

 
 
Borrell  travelled  to  Phnom  Penh  to  participate  in  the  ASEAN  Regional  Forum  and  had  a 
courtesy  call  with  the  Cambodian  Prime  Minister  and  a  bilateral  meeting  with  the  Foreign 
Minister,  where  issues  of  concern  were  raised.  The  President  of  the  Council  met  the  Prime 
Minister,  on  occasion  of  his  trip  to  Tokyo  and  again  in  Phnom  Penh,  in  November  2022, 
when he travelled to the country to participate in the Open Session of the East Asia Summit.  

In December 2022, a bilateral meeting between Commission Executive Vice-President Valdis 
Dombrovskis and Minister of Commerce Pan Sorasak took place in Brussels in the margins of 
the EU-ASEAN Commemorative Summit. The bilateral relation and issues of concern related 
to the temporary partial withdrawal of EBA preferences were discussed on that occasion.  

The  EU  also  continued  to  underline  the  key  concerns  in  the  context  of  the  UN  monitoring 
bodies including in the context of the Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the 
situation of human rights in Cambodia.  

Box 4: Cooperation priorities and projects – Cambodia 

After the partial withdrawal of EBA preferences, and also due to the difficult circumstances caused by 
the COVID-19 pandemic, the EU has remained engaged with Cambodia on the necessary reforms to 
achieve  the  SDGs  and  to  support  Cambodia  to  fulfil  the  conditions  necessary  for  a  possible 
reinstatement  of  full  EBA  preferences.  Team  Europe  mobilised  €443  million  in  grants  and  loans  to 
work  with  Cambodia  in  fighting  the  global  pandemic  and  mitigate  its  socio-economic  effects.  In 
addition, under its strategy for Cambodia 2021-2027 (MIP), the EU contributes to Cambodia’s Green 
Growth and Decent Jobs, to accelerate its integration in ASEAN and global value chains and increase 
the country’s resilience to external shocks. A significant part of the MIP focuses on trade facilitation 
and  automated  customs  procedures,  to  strengthen  Cambodia’s  competitiveness  and  its  compliance 
with  multilateral  rules  under  World  Trade  Organization  (WTO)  and  World  Customs  Organization 
(WCO).  More  specifically,  the  garment  sector,  impacted  by  the  partial  withdrawal  of  EBA 
preferences,  receives  attention  to  improve  decent  labour  conditions  for  the  workers  and  to  green  its 
productivity.  Additional  support  is  also  being  laid  out  to  strengthen  labour  rights  and  working 
conditions through the empowerment of Cambodian civil society. Globally recognised principles and 
values, including the ones related to human rights and labour rights remain at the core of any initiative 
launched by the EU in partnership with Cambodia. 

In 2021 a project was approved to support NGOs in civil society monitoring of the elections, raising 
awareness of voters and voter education. 

4.5.  State of Play 

Political participation 

On  1  March  2021,  Sam  Rainsy,  former  co-leader  of  Cambodia  National  Rescue  Party 
(CNRP), and eight other senior CNRP members, were convicted in  absentia to between 20- 
and  25-years  imprisonment  on  charges  of  attempted  attack  on  the  institutions  of  Cambodia. 
On 17 March and 14 June 2022, a Cambodian court imposed new convictions to the leaders 
of  CNRP  and  some  members  and  activists  of  the  dissolved  party  in  new  mass  trials.  On  3 
March  2023  the  Municipal  Court  in  Phnom  Penh  convicted  the  former  CNRP  leader,  Kem 
Sokha,  to  27  years  of  prison  of  jail  time,  temporarily  allowed  to  serve  in  house  arrest  and 
suspended his political rights to vote and to stand for election indefinitely.  

During 2022, a limited reopening of the political space took place to conduct local elections. 
Some parties  were allowed to  register, political  campaigns took  place unobstructed, and  the 
number  of  incidents  registered  was  low.  One  opposition  party  (formerly  presided  by  the 

Page | 21 

 
 
leader in exile, Sam Rainsy) gained 20% of the votes. In May 2023 the Constitutional Court 
rejected the appeal to the National Electoral Commission decision refusing the registration of 
two parties for the parliamentary elections held in July 2023, which is an alarming restriction 
on the right of political parties to participate in elections.  

Overall,  those  elections  were  conducted  in  a  restricted  political  and  civic  space,  where  the 
opposition,  civil  society  and  the  media  were  unable  to  function  without  hindrance.  The 
elections  also  excluded  important  sectors  of  the  opposition,  due  to  criminal  convictions  of 
political  leaders and the disqualification of the Candlelight Party, which was not  allowed to 
register to take part in the vote. Amendments to the electoral law, adopted a few weeks before 
the election, also raise concern as they restrict the right to freedom of speech and the right of 
all citizens to stand for election. 

On 7 August 2023, Prime Minister Hun Sen announced he was stepping down in favour of his 
son, Hun Manet,  who  was appointed Prime Minister on the same day by royal  decree. Hun 
Manet formed a new Government which was approved by the National Assembly and took up 
its duties on 22 August 2023. 

The Law of Political Parties and the Law of Associations and NGOs (LANGO) have not been 
amended. Main political leaders remain incapacitated and unable to compete in election. The 
leadership in exile has  multiple convictions for criminal charges substantiated in absentia in 
three mass trials, in which due process was not observed and the accused were not allowed to 
come back to the country to defend themselves.  

Freedom of expression 

There  continue  to  be  restrictions  to  the  freedom  of  expression,  and  in  February  2023,  the 
Cambodian Government revoked, without following the procedure established in the Law of 
the  Press,  the  license  of  the  independent  media  outlet,  Voice  of  Democracy.  This  decision 
seriously undermines media freedom and pluralism, which are essential for any open and free 
society.  

Freedom of association and of peaceful assembly 

In 2022 there was a certain reopening of the space for the civil society to operate. With the 
celebration of the local elections in 2022, civil society was allowed to publish reports, conduct 
monitoring activities, and issue recommendations. However, restrictive legislation remains in 
place  and,  as  noted  above,  LANGO  has  not  been  amended.  NGOs  are  still  subjected  to 
cumbersome registration and reporting procedures. During 2023 the situation seems to have 
become  more  restrictive,  and  NGOs  have  reported  increased  surveillance  and  requests  to 
disclose information on funding and activities.   

Non-discrimination, land and housing rights 

Progress on registration process for communal land and indigenous communities continues to 
be slow. Conversion of protected zones into economic concessions remains one of the areas 
for possible review, since the Government  has  approved a new  Economic Land Concession 
(ELC), despite the moratorium in 2012 and has started revoking licences of unproductive or 
unused ELCs. Government  has  also  started allocating social land concession  to  the landless 
poor, together with social houses. More information is still required to know the scope of this 
measure and number of beneficiaries. 

Page | 22 

 
Labour rights, notably freedom of association and collective bargaining 

In  June  2021,  the  ILO’s  Conference  Committee  on  the  Application  of  Standards  (CAS) 
expressed deep concern at the continuing acts of violence against workers, the arrests of trade 
unionists  in  connection  with  their  activities  as  well  as  the  lack  of  effective  and  timely 
investigations in relation to these incidents. The Conference Committee also noted that, while 
some  positive  steps  have  been  achieved  in  bringing  the  law  in  line  with  the  Convention, 
serious compliance issues remain unaddressed (27). 

Some  positive  development  was  recorded  by  the  ILO’s  Committee  of  Experts  on  the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) in its report of February 2022: 
over  the  last  few  years,  the  Cambodian  Government  has  trained  several  hundred  police 
officers on the rights to strike and on peaceful demonstrations, in cooperation with the UN’s 
Office  of  the  High  Commissioner  for  Human  Rights  and  the  ILO.  However,  the  CEACR 
Committee requested further information, in particular whether disciplinary consequences of 
using excessive force were part of such training.  

An ILO Direct Contacts Mission to Cambodia took place in late March 2022 to discuss again 
options to overcome the serious deficiencies in implementing ILO Convention No. 87, but its 
recommendations to the Government (28) still remain to be implemented.  

During  2022  there  was  an  alarming  increase  in  cases  of  human  trafficking  centred  in 
Cambodia, where criminal gangs operate online scams. Authorities have taken some action to 
curtail the problem and cooperate with other countries to repatriate rescued victims. However, 
there is no transparent information on the magnitude of the problem, which continues in 2023.  

In  June  2023,  the  Committee  on  the  Application  of  Standards  (CAS)  of  the  International 
Labour  Conference  discussed  the  situation  in  Cambodia  as  one  of  the  four  most  worrying 
situations  (the  so  called  double-footnoted  cases)  among  the  187  ILO  members,  with  a 
particular  focus  on  violations  of  the  ILO  Convention  No.  105  on  the  abolition  of  forced 
labour (29).  Particularly  criticised  was  the  fact  that  imprisoned  opposition  members,  human 
rights defenders and journalists are exposed to the risk of forced labour as part of their prison 
sentences (30).  In  its  conclusions,  the  Committee  deeply  deplored  the  continued  use  of  the 
provisions  of  the  national  legislation,  including  the  Penal  Code,  to  prosecute  and  convict 
persons  who  express  their  political  views  or  views  ideologically  opposed  to  the  established 
political, social or economic system, or to punish those who participate in strikes, leading to 
penalties of imprisonment involving compulsory prison labour. In this context, the EU issued 
a  statement  underlying  that  reports  related  to  the  arrests  and  prosecution  of  trade  union 
members and leaders for participation in strikes are particularly worrisome (31). The EU also 

(27)  Summarised 

again 

in 

the  CEACR 

report 

published 

in  February 

2022 

(page 

118): 

https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_836653.pdf  
(28)  https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_845705.pdf  
(29)  https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---

relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_888016.pdf (pages 106-129) 

(30)  Article 1 of the Convention forbids forced labour “as a punishment for holding or expressing political views 
or views ideologically opposed to the established political, social or economic system”  and forbids forced 
labour “as a punishment for having participated in [peaceful] strikes”. 

(31)  https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-geneva/111th-international-labour-conference-committee-

application-standards-2_en?s=62  

Page | 23 

 
 
strongly encouraged the Cambodian authorities to implement all the other recommendations 
arising from the ILO’s Direct Contact Mission of spring 2022, to stop labour rights violations, 
and to embark on a constructive path of reform. 

4.6.  Looking ahead 

Under  the  GSP  rules,  the  partial  withdrawal  of  Cambodia’s  EBA  preferences  will  continue 
until the Commission finds that reasons that led to it no longer apply.  

Addressing the existing human rights and labour rights concerns is an essential requirement 
for the full reinstatement of the EBA preferences. The EU is committed to continue working 
with  the  Cambodian  authorities  to  achieve  the  tangible  progress  needed  to  this  effect. 
Cambodia  must  show  real,  credible  improvement  on  the  issues  of  concern  for  the  EU  to 
reinstate full EBA preferences, notably as regards civil and political rights.  

Page | 24