COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT Accompanying the document Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Directive 2013/11/EU on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes, as well as Directives (EU) 2015/2302, (EU) 2019/2161 and (EU) 2020/1828
Date: 2023-11-10
Institutions: Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, European Commission
Subjects: alternative dispute resolution, consumer protection, digital content, digital single market, electronic commerce, goods and services, provision of services, third country, trade dispute

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 10.11.2023  SWD(2023) 335 final/2 PART 1/2  CORRIGENDUM This document corrects document SWD(2023)335 final of 17.10.2023 Correcting "adjustment costs" to "administrative costs". Page 47. The text shall read as follows: COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT    Accompanying the document Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Directive 2013/11/EU on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes, as well as Directives (EU) 2015/2302, (EU) 2019/2161 and (EU) 2020/1828 {COM(2023) 649 final} - {SEC(2023) 347 final} - {SWD(2023) 334 final} - {SWD(2023) 337 final}  
 
 
Table of Contents 

1. 

2. 

INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT ............................................................... 3 

PROBLEM DEFINITION .................................................................................................................... 5 

2.1.  What are the problem drivers? .......................................................................... 6 
2.2.  What are the problems? ................................................................................... 14 
2.3.  How will the problem evolve? ........................................................................ 22 

3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? .........................................................................................................24 

3.1.  Legal basis ....................................................................................................... 24 
3.2.  Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action ............................................................... 24 
3.3.  Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action .......................................................... 24 

4.  OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? ................................................................................25 

4.1.  General objectives ........................................................................................... 25 
4.2.  Specific objectives ........................................................................................... 25 

5.  WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? .....................................................................26 

5.1.  What is the baseline from which options are assessed? .................................. 26 
5.2.  Description of the policy options .................................................................... 28 
5.3.  Options discarded at an early stage ................................................................. 32 

6.  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? ............................................................33 

7.  HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? .............................................................................................45 

8. 

PREFERRED OPTION .......................................................................................................................46 

8.1.  REFIT (simplification and improved efficiency) ............................................ 47 
8.2.  Application of the ‘one in, one out’ approach ................................................. 47 

9.  HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED?...................................47 

ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION .............................................................................................49 

ANNEX 2: SYNOPSIS REPORT: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION ..................................................52 

ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW? ...........................................................................................62 

ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL METHODS ......................................................................................................64 

ANNEX 5: COMPETITIVENESS CHECK ...............................................................................................109 

ANNEX 6: PERFORMANCE OF THE ODR PLATFORM ......................................................................110 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Term or acronym 
ADR 
AI 
B2C 
C2C 
CFREU 

CJEU 
COM 
CPC 
Dark patterns 

DSA 
ECC Net 
EEA 
EU 
EUR 
FTE 
GDP 
GDPR 
HICP 
IA 
IoT 
IT 
JRC 
MS 
NCA 
ODR 
PODR 
Sweep 

TEU 
TFEU 

UCPD 
UK 
USD 

Glossary 

Meaning or definition 
Alternative Dispute Resolution  
Artificial Intelligence  
Business to Consumer 
Consumer to Consumer 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union 
Court of Justice of the European Union 
European Commission 
Consumer Protection Cooperation 
Practices that materially distort or impair, 
either on purpose or in effect, the ability of 
recipients of the service to make autonomous 
and informed choices or decisions 
Digital Services Act 
European Consumer Centres Network 
European Economic Area 
European Union 
Euro 
Full-Time Equivalent 
Gross Domestic Product 
General Data Protection Regulation 
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices 
Impact Assessment 
Internet of Things 
Information Technology 
Joint Research Centre 
Member State 
National Competent Authority  
Online Dispute Resolution 
Private Online Dispute Resolution 
Concerted investigations of consumer markets 
through simultaneous coordinated control 
actions to check compliance with, or to detect 
infringements of, Union laws that protect 
consumers’ interests. 
Treaty on European Union 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
United Kingdom 
United States Dollar 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT 

Digitalisation  of  consumer  markets  took  an  unprecedented  leap  amidst  the  COVID-19  pandemic, 
with  constantly  evolving  business  models  and  emerging  commercial  practices  making  it 
increasingly challenging to maintain fair digital markets for consumers and a level playing field for 
businesses. 

The  EU  has  developed  a  comprehensive  legal  framework  to  attain  its  objective  to  ensure  a  high 
level of consumer protection across the single market pursuant to Article 169 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning  of  the  European  Union.  As  a  result,  EU  consumers  enjoy  a  wide  spectrum  of  rights 
affording  protection  to  their  economic  interests  and  safety,  while  businesses  can  operate  cross-
border without having to adapt their commercial practices to different sets of national rules. 

However,  for  consumers  and  traders  to  benefit  fully  from  the  harmonization  of  consumer 
legislation,  the  latter  needs  to  be  strongly  and  equally  enforced  across  the  EU.  An  effective 
enforcement of consumer law is geared to boost legal certainty, increase consumer confidence, fuel 
consumption and stimulate economic growth. 

The  enforcement  of  consumer  legislation  rests  on  two  complementary  pillars:  a)  private 
enforcement,  whereby  consumers  harmed  by  infringements  seek  to  get  redress  before  a  court  or 
through  an  out-of-court  settlement,  either  individually  or  as  a  group;  and  b)  public  enforcement, 
which  is  carried  out  mainly  by  public  authorities  seeking  to  protect  the  collective  interest  of 
consumers  by  removing  bad  practices  from  the  market  and  sanctioning  the  perpetrators.  This 
impact  assessment  concerns  Alternative  Dispute  Resolution  (ADR)  schemes  to  which  consumers 
may  refer  their  disputes  with  a  trader  in  a  simple,  fast  and  low-cost  alternative  to  judicial 
proceedings.    

The strengthening of private enforcement through the facilitation of out-of-court consumer redress 
has  long  been  an  objective  of  EU  consumer  policy.  In  its  Single  Market  Act1  of  2011,  the 
Commission identified legislation on ADR as one of the levers needed to boost growth, strengthen 
consumer confidence and make progress towards completing the single market. Thus, in 2013, the 
European Parliament and the Council adopted both the Directive 2013/11/EU on alternative dispute 
resolution for consumer disputes (“ADR Directive”). At the same time, in order to promote ADR 
processes  for  online  markets,  they  adopted  the  Regulation  (EU)  No  524/2013  on  online  dispute 
resolution (“ODR”) which provides a messaging tool run by the European Commission (the ODR 
platform).  

The ADR Directive aims to ensure that consumers within the EU have access to high-quality ADR 
processes to resolve their contractual disputes arising from the sale of goods or services by traders 
established in the single market. It provides for the availability of ADR processes for all types of 
domestic and cross-border consumer disputes, ensuring that ADR procedures within the EU meet 
the same minimum quality standards, and it requires Member States to monitor the performance of 
ADR entities. In order to increase consumer awareness and promote the use of ADR, the Directive 

1 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee 
and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions  -  Single  Market  Act:  twelve  levers  to  boost  growth  and  strengthen  confidence 
"Working together to create new growth".  

3 

 
 
 
also  mandates  that  traders  inform  their  customers  of  the  possibility  to  settle  their  dispute  out-of-
court. 

To  facilitate  the  use  of  ADR  by  consumers,  the  ODR  Regulation  establishes  an  online  dispute 
resolution platform (‘ODR platform’) which provides a means for consumers who seek to resolve a 
dispute related to an online cross-border purchase to contact a trader and propose to start an ADR 
procedure  (in  some  Member  States,  traders  can  also  use  it  to  contact  consumers).  Launched  in 
January  2016,  the  platform  is  merely  an  interactive  messaging  application  available  in  all  24 
official  languages  of  the  EU,  it  does  however  not  provide  dispute  resolution.  In  the  absence  of  a 
reply by the trader, the request made by the consumer is closed after 30 days. Its use is restricted to 
consumer residing or online businesses established within the Union. The Regulation mandates that 
all online traders provide an easily accessible link to the ODR platform on their websites, as well as 
a dedicated email address, even if they have no intention to use this system.  

In 2019, the Commission adopted a report on the implementation of the ADR Directive and ODR 
Regulation, which revealed that the Directive had led to increased coverage of consumer markets 
by  ADR  entities  throughout  the  EU2.  However,  the  report  also  identified  that  consumer  and 
business uptake of ADR procedures was still lagging behind in some sectors and Member States.   

Recent  data  provided  by  national  competent  authorities  in  early  20223,  as  well  as  targeted 
consultations conducted by the Commission suggest that there is still room for improvements and 
that  the  issues  highlighted  in  the  2019  report  persist.  The  evaluation  of  the  ADR  Directive 
conducted in 2023 (see annex 6) confirms the need for its strengthening.  

Most stakeholders have identified several factors that hinder the use of ADR schemes, including the 
lack of  awareness and understanding  of  ADR by consumers, low engagement by traders, gaps in 
ADR coverage in certain member states, high costs and complexity of ADR procedures, limited use 
of  ADR  in  cross-border  contexts,  and  barriers  for  vulnerable  consumers.  At  the  same  time,  the 
complexity  of  consumer  disputes  has  evolved  significantly  since  the  adoption  of  the  ADR 
Directive. In particular, online markets are influencing consumer decision-making to a great extent. 
These  markets  are  characterised  by  a  growing  number  of  intermediary  services,  the  increasing 
presence  of  non-EU  traders  and  the  spread  of  sophisticated  techniques  used  by  online  traders  to 
manipulate consumers’ transactional decisions and influence all their purchases through advertising 
that is sometimes difficult to recognise as such.  

The anticipated  rise of  consumer detriment stemming from  unfair digital commercial practices in 
the coming years is expected to drive more demand for fast, affordable and effective out-of-court 
resolution schemes. However, in the absence of an ADR framework that is well-suited to the digital 
age, many consumers may be forced to either rely on unregulated private online dispute resolution 
systems established by online intermediaries or forego claiming their rights in low-value disputes.   

2  Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council  and  the  European  Economic  and  Social 
Committee on the application of Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on alternative 
dispute  resolution  for  consumer  disputes  and  Regulation  (EU)  No  524/2013  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 
Council on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes. COM(2019) 425 final.  
3  Information  gathering  for assisting the  Commission  in complying  with its  obligation  under Article 26 (“reporting”) 
of the ADR Directive  and  Article 21 (“reporting”)  of the ODR Regulation.  Study  to  be  published  together  with  this 
impact assessment in the second half of 2023. 

4 

 
 
 
Based on the conclusions drawn from the accompanying evaluation and application report, which 
the  Commission  services  prepared  in  accordance  with  Article  20(6)  of  the  Directive,  this  impact 
assessment aims to examine specific interventions that can address the major shortcomings of the 
Directive and increase consumers' access to effective redress in the single market. 

2.  PROBLEM DEFINITION 

When  the  Commission  adopted  its  proposal  for  an  ADR  Directive  at  the  end  of  2011,  the  total 
value  of  e-commerce  sales  in  the  EU  was  EUR  312  billion,  representing  2%  of  the  GDP  of  the 
Union.4 In only 10 years, e-commerce rose to EUR 518 billion, accounting for 4% of the GDP in 
2021.5 These numbers illustrate the magnitude of the digital transformation that consumers markets 
have undergone. The last decade has also witnessed the surge of data-driven digital advertising and 
the  raise  of  online  intermediaries,  which  have  intervened  on  the  traditional  B2C  contractual 
relationships, increasing the complexity of consumer disputes. In digital markets, consumers should 
be able to obtain redress for issues explicitly related to the contract concluded with a trader but also 
for  damages  resulting  from  the  unfairness  of  pre-contractual  information  or  other  breach  of  their 
rights under EU consumer law.  

The  growth  of  e-commerce  has  also  brought  about  a  rise  in  transactions  with  traders  established 
outside the EU, with one in every eight EU citizens now buying goods and services from non-EU 
traders every year.6 This statistic underscores the importance of the availability of ADR procedures 
for  disputes  with  third-country  traders,  which  are  currently  excluded  from  the  scope  of  the 
Directive.  Moreover,  the  ADR  framework  is  proving  weak  in  delivering  effective  redress  for 
disputes related to cross-border shopping. Given that approximately one in five European citizens 
makes  purchases  from  traders  established  in  a  different  Member  State  on  an  annual  basis,  the 
insufficient  uptake  of  ADR  for  cross-border  disputes  may  undermine  consumer  trust  and  intra-
Union trade.  

While lacking viable redress solution for disputes arising from online transactions in cross-border 
contexts, consumers are increasingly turning to private online dispute resolution (PODR) systems 
run by online marketplaces. These in-house solutions can provide an efficient way to settle disputes 
between consumers and traders, but, unlike quality-certified ADR entities, they are not subject to 
any regulatory requirements. This often leaves the enforcement of consumer rights in the hands of a 
few private actors, without any guarantee of fair treatment for consumers or traders. In addition to 
all these challenges, the engagement in ADR by consumers and traders, despite a steady increase 
since  the  adoption  of  the  Directive,  remains  unsatisfactorily  low.7  Consumers  are  still  not 
sufficiently aware of the existence and/or the benefits of ADR, while traders often remain inactive 

Eurostat, 

4 2012 data, https://ecommerce-europe.eu/press-item/european-e-commerce-to-reach-e-312-billion-in-2012-19-growth/, 
both e-commerce sales and GDP include UK.  
5 2021-European-E-commerce-Report-LIGHT-VERSION.pdf (ecommerce-europe.eu). 
6 
onwards), 
purchases 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/ISOC_EC_IBOS__custom_3007818/default/table?lang=en.  Online  data 
code: ISOC_EC_IBOS 
7  Only  180.000  consumer  disputes  are  referred  to  ADR  entities  on  an  annual  basis.  Data  available  on:  Information 
gathering 
under Article 26 (“reporting”) 
in complying  with its 
of the ADR Directive and Article 21 (“reporting”) of the ODR Regulation (to be published in the second half of 2023).  

for assisting the  Commission 

obligation 

Internet 

sellers 

origin 

(2020 

of 

- 

5 

 
 
 
when faced with requests to settle a dispute out-of-court. As a result, the ADR framework has yet to 
reach its full potential.  

This  section  examines  the  main  drivers  and  megatrends  that  have  contributed  to  the  current 
problems  of  the  ADR  framework,  and  further  analyses  these  issues  in  their  multifaceted 
dimensions. 

2.1.  What are the problem drivers? 

MEGATRENDS AND MARKET RELATED DRIVERS 

Quick growth and increased concentration of e-commerce and online advertisement  

The  expansion  of  e-commerce  has  been  ongoing  for  several  years,  however,  the  COVID-19 
pandemic  and  related  lockdowns  have  resulted  in  an  exponential  acceleration  of  its  growth.  The 
information presented in the box below demonstrates that this trend is stable and it is unlikely that 
there will be a return to the pre-pandemic rates. 

Box: Key data on the evolution of digital markets in the EU 

6 

 
 
 
From  +19%  in  Denmark  up  to  +44%  in  Spain,  consumers  shopped  online  more  often  due  to  the 
pandemic in 2020.8 The share of enterprises' turnover on e-commerce went from 16% in 2016 to 
20% in 2021 in the EU; for large enterprises alone, it went from 22% in 2016 to 27% in 2021.9 The 
contribution  of  e-commerce  sales  to  the  European  Union’s  GDP  (i.e.  e-GDP),  rose  from  2.5%  in 
2017 to 4% in 2021.10 In the EU, e-commerce marketplaces generated EUR 115.4 billion in 2020 
and experienced growth to reach an estimated range of EUR 120 – EUR 150 billion in 2021.11 

The growth of e-commerce is driven by a number of global megatrends. According to the JRC, by 
2030,  the  middle  class,  also  referred  to  as  the  consumer  class,  is  expected  to  reach  4.8  billion 
people  worldwide,  i.e.  1.3  billion  more  people  with  increased  purchasing  power  compared  to 
today.12 The enlargement of the consumer base, combined with a widespread access to the Internet 
by  5.3  billion  people  (66%  of  the  world  population)13  and  a  widespread  ownership  of  mobile 
phones by three quarters of individuals aged 10 and above14, is set to further spur the pervasiveness 
of  online  shopping.  Fuelled  by  growing  consumption  and  increased  hyperconnectivity,  global  e-
commerce, which amounted to USD 4.25 trillion in 2014, is expected to reach USD 7.39 trillion in 
202515  (more  than  the  values  of  the  GDPs  of  France  and  Germany  combined),  representing  an 
increase of 74%. Over the same period, global retail trade is predicted to increase by only 34%16. 
As a result, the market share of e-commerce in retail trade is expected to rise by 1 percentage point 
per year, and growth rate is anticipated to persist or even accelerate in the coming years.  

In  2021,  the  average  percentage  of  internet  users  in  the  EU  who  purchased  goods  or  services  at 
least once during the year was 74%, up from 63% recorded five years prior. Over the period 2016-
2021, national disparities in e-shopping have been levelled out, largely due to the rapid acceleration 
of  e-commerce  growth  fuelled  by  the  pandemic.17  The  shift  towards  online  shopping  has  further 
reinforced the existing markets concentration of online retail and marketplace businesses. In April 
2021,  the  most  visited  online  trader  worldwide  -  Amazon  –  recorded  5.2  billion  visits,  while  the 
second  most  visited  trader  –  eBay  –  had  1.7  billion  visits.  In  comparison,  the10th  ranked  trader, 
China’s Pinduoduo, had only 242 million visits and the 80th-ranked trader, Denmark’s dba, stopped 

of 

on 

%, 

Share 

(2021), 

turnover 

Eurostat, 

“Top-100 

enterprises' 

e-commerce 

cross-border  marketplaces  Europe,  2nd 

8  PostNord.  "Share  of  respondents  in  selected  European  countries  who  shopped  online  more  often  due  to  the 
coronavirus  pandemic  in  2020  and  2021."  Chart.  November  12,  2021.  Statista.  Accessed  January  10,  2023. 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1189076/covid-19-e-commerce-growth-europe-country/. 
9 
- 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tin00110/default/table?lang=en. Online data code: TIN00110.  
10  2021  European  E-Commerce  Report,  2021-European-E-commerce-Report-LIGHT-VERSION.pdf  (ecommerce-
europe.eu). 
11  CBCommerce 
https://www.cbcommerce.eu/press-releases/second-edition-of-the-top-100-cross-border-marketplaces-europe-an-
annual-analysis-of-the-best-global-cross-border-platforms/ and Ecommerce News (2021), “Europe: online marketplaces 
sales €120 billion”, available at: https://ecommercenews.eu/europe-online-marketplaces-sales-e120-billion/. 
12 Knowledge for policy, Growing consumption, https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/growing-consumerism_en. 
13 This number refers to the proportion of individuals who used the internet from any location in the last three months – 
whether the access was made via a fixed or mobile network: https://datahub.itu.int/data/?e=701&c=&i=11624. 
14 
d/reports/statistics/2022/11/24/ff22-mobile-phone-ownership/. 
15 eMarketer. "Retail e-commerce sales worldwide from 2014 to 2026 (in billion U.S. dollars)." Chart. July 29, 2022. 
Statista. Accessed January 10, 2023. https://www.statista.com/statistics/379046/worldwide-retail-e-commerce-sales/. 
16  Estimate  based  on  eMarketer.  "Total  retail  sales  worldwide  from  2020  to  2025  (in  trillion  U.S.  dollars)."  Chart. 
February 3, 2022. Statista. Accessed January 11, 2023. https://www.statista.com/statistics/443522/global-retail-sales/. 
17 Eurostat, Online data code:  isoc_ec_ibuy and isoc_ec_ib20. 

International  Telecommunication  Union 

https://www.itu.int/itu-

(ITU),  Mobile 

ownership: 

available 

edition”, 

phone 

at: 

7 

 
 
 
at 13.5 million.18 The market concentration, which is clearly illustrated by these figures, is largely 
due to the features of core platform services such as network effects, strong economies of scale and 
availability of a vast amount of data, allowing large online traders and marketplace to play the role 
of  gatekeepers  in  digital  markets.  The  concentration  of  the  market  in  terms  of  website  visits  is 
similar in the EU. 

Furthermore,  in  2021,  the  expenditure  in  digital  advertising  worldwide  accounted  for  65%  of  the 
total  ad  revenue,  and  estimates  indicate  a  continued  growth  trend,  reaching  70%  by  2025.  This 
entails an increase from USD 500 billion to USD 690 billion,19 with an estimated annual growth of 
1  percentage  point.20  Similarly  to  e-commerce,  the  advertisement  market  is  also  highly 
concentrated:    in  2022,  Google  and  Meta  alone  accounted  for  about  53%  of  global  spending  in 
advertising, up from 46% that was recorded in 2016.21 Amazon and TikTok have also seen a rapid 
rise in their global advertising share while traditional media advertising continues to experience a 
constant decline in share.22 

Increased cross-border shopping, including with traders located outside the EU 

In 2021, cross-border e-commerce in the EU showed significant growth, with 18% of EU citizens 
engaging  in  transactions  with  traders  located  in  another  Member  State,  and  a  higher  rate  of  32% 
among regular e-commerce participants, i.e. consumers who purchased goods/services online in the 
3 months prior to the date of the data collection. The increased rate of cross-border shopping also 
encompasses transactions between consumers and traders established outside of the EU, with 12% 
of EU citizens  and one in five  regular e-shoppers making purchases from  non-EU traders.23 This 
amounts  to  an  estimated  45.5  million  EU  citizens  participating  in  cross-border  e-commerce  with 
traders located outside the EU.     

Consumer disputes in digital markets going beyond contractual issues  

The  increasing  pervasiveness  of  e-commerce  and  digital  advertising  has  resulted  in  consumer 
detriment  going  much  beyond  the  typical  issue  of  non-conformity  of  products  and  services.  In 
digital  markets,  a  significant  share  of  the  harm  suffered  by  consumers  stems  from  misleading 
advertising or lack of pre-contractual information. These practices expose their vulnerabilities and 
exploit their cognitive biases, leading them to make transactional decisions that go against their best 
interests.  The  chart  below  illustrates  the  main  unfair  commercial  practices  experienced  by 
consumers. 

18 WebRetailer, https://www.webretailer.com/b/online-marketplaces/. 
19  GroupM.  "Advertising  media  owners  revenue  worldwide  from  2014  to  2027  (in  billion  U.S.  dollars)."  Chart. 
December 5, 2022. Statista. Accessed January 10, 2023.  https://www.statista.com/statistics/236943/global-advertising-
spending/. 
20 GroupM. "Share of digital in advertising revenue worldwide from 2019 to 2027." Chart. December  5, 2022. Statista. 
Accessed January 10, 2023. https://www.statista.com/statistics/375008/share-digital-ad-spend-worldwide/ 
21 
prowl.  
22 For further information see here: Google and Meta’s Advertising Dominance Fades as TikTok, Streamers Emerge  - 
WSJ 
23 
onwards), 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/ISOC_EC_IBOS__custom_3007818/default/table?lang=en.  Online  data 
code: ISOC_EC_IBOS. 

https://www.emarketer.com/content/duopoly-still-rules-global-digital-ad-market-alibaba-amazon-on-

eMarketer, 

purchases 

Eurostat, 

Internet 

sellers 

origin 

(2020 

of 

- 

8 

 
 
 
For  example,  when  booking  holiday  accommodations  through  an  online  intermediary,  consumers 
rely on the platform's information to make informed decisions. However, they may be influenced 
by  deceptive  practices  (e.g.  dark  patterns  such  as  fake  time-limited  offers),  resulting  in  decisions 
that  are  not  in  their  best  interest.  The  current  scope  of  the  ADR  Directive  only  covers  paid 
transactions,  leaving  it  unclear  whether  the  consumer  can  seek  out-of-court  redress  and  who  is 
responsible  for  the  dispute  (the  platform  or  the  trader).  The  complexity  of  the  situation  may 
discourage the consumer from pursuing a dispute without specific assistance.24  

Significant rate of non-compliance with EU consumer law 

The growth  of e-commerce and digital advertising inevitably exposes consumers to  an increasing 
number  of  unfair  commercial  practices  online.  As  of  2021,  37%  of  EU  e-shoppers  reported 
experiencing a recent problem with their online shopping other than slow delivery.25 Additionally, 
when  searching  for  or  purchasing  products  online,  at  least  two  out  of  three  consumers  have 
encountered unfair commercial practices such as hidden advertisements  or consumer reviews that 
did not appear authentic.26 

The  findings  of  the  sweeps27  conducted  by  national  consumer  protection  authorities  under  the 
coordination  of  the  Commission  provide  a  clear  picture  on  the  rate  of  non-compliance  with 
consumer law across digital markets. In 2022, authorities screened 16.000 products sold online and 
discovered  that  43%  of  Black  Friday  discounts  were  misleading  as  they  offered  no  real  price 
advantage  to  consumers.  In  2021,  authorities  found  that  among  223  major  websites,  55% 

for 

statistics 

24 See Table “Willingness to take up ADR by claim value and procedure length; cumulated” under Problem 2 below. 
25E-commerce 
individuals, 
commerce_statistics_for_individuals#Purchasing_online_and_problems_encountered.  
26  See  Consumer  Condition  Survey:  Consumers  at  home  in  the  single  market  –  2021  edition,  available  here: 
https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2021-03/ccs_ppt_120321_final.pdf. 
27 “Sweeps”  are coordinated screenings of e-commerce websites carried out by enforcement authorities simultaneously 
and in a coordinated manner under the CPC Regulation with the purpose of identifying and addressing infringements of 
EU  consumer  law  within  a  given  business  sector.  https://commission.europa.eu/live-work-travel-eu/consumer-rights-
and-complaints/enforcement-consumer-protection/sweeps_en 

https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=E-

9 

 
 
 
 
potentially  violated  the  UCPD28  by  publishing  misleading  information  on  the  reliability  of 
consumer  reviews.  In  the  same  year,  42  out  of  118  websites  were  flagged  for  contravening  EU 
consumer  law  due  to  their  inconsistency  with  the  relevant  information  requirements  governing 
online  advertising  of  consumer  credit.  Furthermore,  in  the  two  sweeps  conducted  in  2020  on 
misleading sustainability claims and COVID-19 related claims, authorities found that almost half of 
the green claims reviewed were potentially false or deceptive,  and that 206 out of 269 monitored 
websites misleadingly promoted products in the context of the pandemic. 

Thus,  based  on  the  available  data  published  on  sweeps,29  it  is  estimated  that  30%  to  77%  of  e-
commerce  websites  across  various  categories  may  engage  in  practices  that  could  infringe 
consumers’ rights. As e-commerce continues to expand, the number of such problematic websites is 
likely  to  increase  in  the  near  future,  putting  further  pressure  on  the  ability  of  the  existing  ADR 
entities  and  private  redress  mechanisms  offered  by  certain  online  intermediaries  to  effectively 
address the increasing non-compliance. 

REDRESS-RELATED DRIVERS 

In  addition  to  the  market-related  drivers  and  megatrends  described  above,  this  report  identifies 
three  problem  drivers  related  to  the  architecture  of  the  current  ADR  framework  and  the 
development of PODR systems by online marketplaces.  

Access barriers to ADR: Lack of awareness and costs of procedures 

a) Lack of awareness 

The  report  on  the  application  of  the  ADR  Directive,  which  was  adopted  by  the  Commission  in 
201930, emphasized that the primary obstacle preventing consumers and traders from  engaging in 
ADR is their lack of awareness regarding the existence  of ADR procedures and the benefits they 
may provide. Within the EU, 43% of retailers are unaware of the existence of ADR as a means to 
resolve  disputes  with  consumers,31  while  8%  are  aware  but  not  willing  to  use  it,  and  13%  report 
being aware but not finding a suitable ADR in their sector.32 The Consumer Conditions Survey of 
202133 revealed that only 5% of EU consumers who encountered a problem reported it to an ADR 

is 

The 

data 

here: 

available 

https://commission.europa.eu/live-work-travel-eu/consumer-rights-and-

28 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-
consumer  commercial  practices  in  the  internal  market  and  amending  Council  Directive  84/450/EEC,  Directives 
97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 
of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’).  
29 
complaints/enforcement-consumer-protection/sweeps_en 
30 See Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social 
Committee on the application of Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on alternative 
dispute  resolution  for  consumer  disputes  and  Regulation  (EU)  No  524/2013  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 
Council  on  online  dispute  resolution  for  consumer  disputes.  COM(2019)  425  final:  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2019:425:FIN 
31 This figure accounts for all retailers, including those operating in sectors in which consumer disputes are unlikely to 
arise. 
32  Consumer  Conditions  Scoreboard  -  Consumers  at  home  in  the  Single  Market,  2019,  consumers-conditions-
scoreboard-2019_pdf_en.pdf (europa.eu). 
33 https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2021-03/ccs_ppt_120321_final.pdf.  

10 

 
 
 
 
 
body,  which  accounts  for  roughly  2,250,000  consumers  annually.34  This  figure  represents  a  mere 
0.75% of the total number of consumers, and only 15% of those who were dissatisfied with their 
retailer or service provider's handling of their complaint.35 Awareness remains low in spite of the 
numerous  awareness-raising36  initiatives  launched  at  national  level.  The  2022  EU  Justice 
Scoreboard37 indicates that most Member States already promote and incentivize the use of ADR 
for consumer disputes, making supplementary investment in awareness-raising unlikely to produce 
significant positive effects. 

b) Costs of ADR procedures 

The ADR Directive stipulates that consumers should only face a nominal cost when accessing an 
ADR  procedure,  which  is  appropriate  given  that  the  system  is  intended  to  provide  a  low-cost 
alternative for in-court dispute resolution. However, the issue of financing such systems remains a 
central concern. Various financing models have been implemented across Member States, ranging 
from  full  public  funding  of  an  administrative  office,  such  as  an  ombudsman,  to  complete 
privatization, where businesses bear all costs.38 The following paragraphs present a breakdown of 
the costs that are associated with the stakeholders involved. 

the 

and 

34  15%  of  the  total  number  of  consumers  (i.e.  300  million  consumers  in  the  EU  above  15  years  old)  experienced  a 
problem and took action to solve it, out of which 5% brought the matter to an ADR body. 
35 On the other hand, available estimates regarding ADR in the UK suggest that only 28% of consumers in regulated 
sectors and 16% in non-regulated sectors are aware of its existence. (Resolving consumer disputes - Alternative Dispute 
Resolution 
2018, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/698442/Final_report_
-_Resolving_consumer_disputes.pdf). 
36  Out  of  all  capacity-building  grants  awarded  to  ADR  entities  by  the  Commission  since  2018,  41  listed 
communications (i.e. awareness-raising) as a primary or secondary action.  
37 https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2022-05/eu_justice_scoreboard_2022.pdf. 
38 There are several models of funding for ADR: A)  public funding: in 22 countries there are some ADR entities that 
are funded by the state budget. In some cases, these ADR entities are set up by law; B) private funding: in 22 countries 
there are ADR entities that are self-funded (such as CZ), or professionals or federations of professionals (such as FR), 
which are thus indirectly funded by the traders through the membership fees. C) Mixed funding: in 14 countries, there 
are entities that are privately funded but also receive public money. Further information on ADR funding models can be 

System, 

Court 

11 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ADR entities: Costs for ADR entities in the EU vary and largely depend on several factors, such as 
the  size  and  location  of  the  entities,  as  well  as  the  types  of  disputes  they  are  responsible  for 
resolving. For example, in 2020, the Office of the Arbiter for Financial Services, one of the eight 
Maltese ADR entities, incurred a total cost of EUR 571,592 for staff and operations. In comparison, 
the  Insurance  Ombudsman,  one  of  the  fifteen  Belgian  ADR  entities,  spent  EUR  1,732,857  in  the 
same  year.39  These  figures  exclude  translation  costs  for  cross-border  proceedings,  which  were 
identified as a significant challenge by Member States.40 In terms of the costs incurred per dispute, 
the  Spanish  national  competent  authority  for  ADR  has  estimated  a  minimum  of  EUR  150  for  a 
case,  independent  of  whether  the  ADR  entity  is  public  or  private.  On  the  other  hand,  Lithuania, 
which operates under a public funding model, has provided precise insights  into the average cost 
per dispute, thanks to the performance audit of consumer protection conducted by the State Audit 
Office in 2019.41 According to the auditors’ calculations, one dispute costs on average about EUR 
300  to  the  Lithuanian  ADR  entities.  Based  on  Lithuania’s  average  cost  per  dispute,  and  a 
conservative estimate of at least 180,000 ADR disputes every year (figure concerning only 23 EEA 
Countries), the total cost of ADR in the EU can be inferred to be approximately EUR 54 million per 
year. This represents a significant amount that would require financing by either public funds or the 
parties  involved  in  the  dispute.  Given  that  only  three  Member  States  (Hungary,  Lithuania,  and 
Latvia)  rely  exclusively  on  a  public  funding  model  for  the  ADR  entities  operating  in  their 
territory,42  the  cost  of  ADR  services  must  generally  be  borne  by  traders  and,  to  some  extent,  by 
consumers. 

Traders: With the exception of countries where ADR is fully publicly funded, traders in the EU are 
required  to  cover  at  least  part  of  the  administrative  costs  associated  with  participating  in  ADR 
procedures.  The  financing  models  can  vary:  in  some  cases,  traders  may  be  members  of  trade 
associations, in which case the costs of ADR are typically included in their membership fee and do 
not  entail  significant  additional  costs.  However,  if  traders  are  not  members  of  such  associations, 
they are responsible for covering the costs of each ADR proceeding, which can vary depending on 
the number of disputes referred to ADR entities. These participation fees can range from an average 
of  EUR  10  (Czechia)  to  EUR  100  (Ireland).43  In  addition,  traders  have  to  bear  the  costs  of 
participating to dispute resolution, including the financial and human resources needed for dealing 
with  a dispute,  such  as  human resources  and time spent submitting information  and evidence.  At 
times, they may also incur legal advice costs. 

Consumers: To enhance accessibility to ADR for consumers, Member States have made efforts to 
either  provide  free  procedures  or  charge  only  a  nominal  fee.  Of  the  25  Member  States  that 

in 

the 

gathering 

Information 

for assisting the  Commission 

found 
under Article 26 (“reporting”) of the ADR Directive and Article 21 (“reporting”) of the ODR Regulation. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Auksciausioji audito institucija, Veiklos auditas – Ar užtikrinama vartotojų teisių apsauga (Performance audit – Is the 
protection 
at: 
https://www.valstybeskontrole.lt/LT/Product/23852. 
42  Information  gathering  for assisting the  Commission  in complying  with its  obligation  under Article 26 (“reporting”) 
of the ADR Directive and Article 21 (“reporting”) of the ODR Regulation. 
43 Ibid. 

in complying  with its 

ensured?), 

obligation 

consumer 

available 

rights 

2019, 

point 

76, 

of 

12 

 
 
  
 
 
 
responded  to  the  survey  question  on  consumer  fees,44  12  Member  States  reported  that  ADR  is 
always free-of-charge for consumers across all ADR entities in their country. In the remaining 13 
Member  States,  some  ADR  entities  charge  a  fee,  with  significant  variation:  while  in  10  Member 
States, the fees charged do not exceed EUR 70, in a few Member States, fees can range from EUR 
100 to EUR 300 or even up to EUR 1000 in certain cases, depending on the value of the dispute (as 
detailed in the table below). However, when assessing costs for consumers, it is crucial to consider 
the  effort  and  time  required  from  them,  as  well  as  potential  expenses  that  may  arise,  such  as  the 
support of legal advisors, as well as translation costs for cross-border disputes. 

Overview of fees charged to consumers by ADR entities 

Range of fees charged 
Free of charge  
Up to EUR 10 

Up to EUR 50 

Up to EUR 75 

Over EUR 100 

Member States 
AT, BG, EE, FI, FR, EL, HU, LV45, LT, LU, RO, ES 
SK (fee ranges from EUR 0 to EUR 5) 
CZ, PT46, SE (fee ranges from EUR 0 to EUR 10), 
SI  (fee ranges from EUR 0 to EUR 20); DE (fee ranges from EUR 0 to EUR 
30) and IE (fee ranges from EUR 0 to EUR 50) 
DK (fee ranges from EUR 0 to EUR 54); IE (fee ranges from EUR 0 to EUR 
60) and HR (fee charged is EUR 66) 
NL  (fee  ranges  from  EUR  0  to  EUR  127.5);  BE  (fee  ranges  from  EUR  0  to 
EUR 33247); CY (fee ranges from EUR 20 to EUR 100048). 

Increased use of private online dispute resolution systems operated by online marketplaces 

The  rapid  growth  of  e-commerce,  described  in  the  section  above  on  ‘market-related  drivers’,  has 
led to a steady increase in consumer disputes related to electronic transactions. In order to bolster 
consumer confidence in online marketplaces,49 a growing number of platform operators has started 
offering  private  online  dispute  resolution  (PODR)  services  to  their  customers.  In  the  event  of  a 
problem related to a third-party B2C or C2C transaction, the marketplace operator takes on the role 
of  a  mediator  to  facilitate  a  resolution  between  the  concerned  parties.  The  cost  of  this  service  is 
typically included in the intermediation fees charged directly or indirectly to the final consumer. 

44  Information  gathering  for assisting the  Commission  in complying  with its  obligation  under Article 26 (“reporting”) 
of the ADR Directive and Article 21 (“reporting”) of the ODR Regulation. 
45 However, two ADR bodies request to pay security deposit, which is refunded, if the claim is justified. 
46 This is the case for two ADR entities in PT. For two other ADR entities, the ADR competent authority noted the fee 
depends on the value of the damage. 
47 Only four of the 15 entities ask the consumer to pay a fee. 
48 The cost reported by CY is EUR 640 based on an 8-hour conciliation or mediation procedure. For every additional 
hour of conciliation or mediation, there is an additional fee of EUR 40 per hour for consumers regarding disputes of 
amounts  over  EUR  10 000  –  the  maximum  amount  paid  by  a  consumer  is  EUR 800.  For  arbitration,  the  maximum 
amount  paid  by  a  consumer  is  EUR  1,000.  See  European  Commission,  Cyprus  Consumer  Center  for  Alternative 
Dispute 
at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/consumers/odr/main/?event=main.adr.show2. 
49 Online marketplaces are here understood and defined pursuant to Article 2(17) of the Consumer Rights Directive as 
‘service[s] using software, including a website, part of a website or an application, operated by or on behalf of a trader 
which  allow[s]  consumers  to conclude  distance  contracts  with  other  traders  or  consumers.  The  Directive  is  available 
here:  EUR-Lex - 02011L0083-20220528 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu) 

Resolution, 

procedure, 

available 

details, 

Fees 

A. 

13 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According  to  data  from  2020,  12%  of  EU  consumers  who  experienced  a  problem  with  a  trader 
sought to resolve it directly through a PODR, while only 5% chose to resort to an ADR procedure 
and 2% pursued legal  action before a national  court.50 Given that -  in  the same year - 9% of EU 
consumers  experienced  issues  with  online  purchases,51  it  is  estimated  that  at  least  3.2  million 
consumers used a PODR mechanism. This indicates that PODR services have become an integral 
part  of  e-commerce  for  one  in  every  hundred  consumers.  PODR  services  are  designed  to  offer  a 
seamless  and  user-friendly  solution  to  consumers,  eliminating  the  need  for  them  to  search  for 
suitable  dispute  resolution  mechanisms  elsewhere.  These  systems  should  guide  users  to  a  quick 
resolution and entail minimal transaction costs, as most of the necessary data on the parties and the 
purchase is already available to the system.52 The box below provides further information on how 
the eBay PODR system works, as one of the most used such system. 

Case study: The eBay PODR system53 

The  eBay  Resolution  Center,  one  of  the  world's  largest  dispute  resolution  systems,  processes 
more than 60 million disputes annually worldwide, offering assistance to  parties  experiencing 
issues  related to  their online transactions. The most  frequently  reported disputes involve non-
receipt of an item or lack of conformity thereof. Before reporting a dispute, buyers and sellers 
are  encouraged  to  engage  in  direct  communication  to  seek  an  amicable  resolution.  The 
Resolution  Center  operates  through  a  process  of  problem  diagnosis,  followed  by  automated 
negotiation  utilizing  algorithms  that  are  purportedly  designed  to  ensure  efficient  resolution  of 
disputes.  This  process  leads  to  90%  of  amicable  resolution.  By  analysing  the  data  obtained 
through  the  resolution  process,  eBay  has  also  said  it  has  been  able  assess  and  address  in  a 
systemic manner common sources of problems.54   

2.2.  What are the problems? 

Problem 1: The ADR Directive is not fit for digital markets 

The digital transformation of EU consumer markets has presented new opportunities, but also new 
challenges  that  can  have  a  negative  impact  on  consumers'  economic  interests  and  raise  questions 
about the suitability of the ADR Directive for the digital age. The latest developments in the field 
of big data analysis and AI have raised concerns about how digital technologies could be used to 
manipulate consumer decision-making against their best interests. At the same time, the rise of the 
platform  economy  has  highlighted  the  critical  role  that  online  marketplaces  can  play  in  the 
conclusion  of  distance  contracts  between  traders  and  consumers  by  designing  digital  ‘choice 
architectures’ that influence consumers’ transactional decisions. Moreover, thanks to the borderless 
nature of digital technologies,  European consumers can now be  easily targeted by traders located 
outside the EU.  

50 Recommendations from academic research regarding future needs of the EU framework of the consumer Alternative 
Dispute Resolution (ADR). https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2022-08/adr_report_final.pdf. 
51 Market Monitoring Survey, mms-overview-report-19-20_en.pdf (europa.eu). 
52An increasing number of PODR systems offered by online marketplaces use automated decision-making. 
53 Case study: the use of AI in ODR, annex to Information gathering for assisting the Commission in complying with its 
obligation under Article 26 (“reporting”) of the ADR Directive and Article 21 (“reporting”) of the ODR Regulation. 
54 O Rabinovich-Einy and E Katsh, (2021), Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Dispute Resolution: The Age of AI-
DR,  https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3830033.  

14 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Novel  forms of  consumer disputes  are therefore  arising, but there is  a risk that they  may not  fall 
within  the  remit  of  the  ADR  Directive  as  transposed  by  Member  States  or  as  interpreted  by  the 
ADR bodies themselves. In this respect, it is important to note that Article 2 of the Directive only 
covers “procedures for the out-of-court resolution of domestic and cross-border disputes concerning 
contractual  obligations  stemming  from  sales  contracts  or  service  contracts  between  a  trader 
established in the Union and a consumer resident in the Union”. As a result, EU consumers are not 
assured that they can rely on the ADR Framework to obtain quick and affordable redress solutions 
for  disputes  related  to:  a)  harm  they  suffered  as  a  consequence  of  an  unfair  commercial  practice 
perpetrated by an online retailer or a platform that is not linked directly to the performance of the 
contract;  b) traders established outside of the EU.  Another aspect  that the ADR  Framework does 
not  cover,  but  which  has  become  a  central  feature  in  the  present  out-of-court  dispute  resolution 
landscape, concerns the  provision  of  PODR systems  by online  marketplaces. These systems  have 
become increasingly popular among consumers and are being used more and more often to settle 
disputes  out-of-court.  Considering  their  significance,  excluding  them  from  the  purview  of  the 
Directive  could  threaten  its  goal  of  broadening  EU  consumers’  access  to  justice.  The  subsection 
below explains more in detail the various dimensions of this problem. 

A)  Risk  of  being  excluded  from  out-of-court  redress  for  issues  not  explicitly  related  to  a 
contract 

According to data from ECCs, which mainly deal with issues related to e-commerce, the share of 
resolved complaints thanks to their intervention is on par with the share of unresolved complaints, 
which shows that there is a number of issues that online traders refuse to settle amicably but could 
be resolved through a fair ADR process  or in-court should consumers be encouraged to  continue 
fighting for their case. 

Number of online consumer complaints to ECCs and their outcomes, EU-27 (2006-2021) 

20000

15000

10000

5000

0

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

Resolved

Unresolved

Transfer to other agency

Unclear outcome

Rejected

Source: ECC Network.55 Note: In 2018, the data collection system was changed allowing for insights that are more detailed. In 
particular, the category “Rejected” was added and insights provided into what happened to the complaints transferred to other 
agencies.  Hence,  from  2018  onwards,  complaints  resolved  or  unresolved  by  other  agencies  are  included  in  the  respective 
general category; rejected complaints and complaints with unclear outcome are presented. 

55  Case  study  on  e-commerce,  from  Information  gathering  for  assisting  the  Commission  in  complying  with  its 
obligations under Article 40 (“reporting”) of Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 on Consumer Protection Cooperation.  

15 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Many of these issues are related to the provision of misleading pre-contractual information or lack 
thereof,56  as  well  as  to  situations  where  the  identity  of  the  contractual  counterparty  is  unclear.  In 
cases where consumers encounter issues with transactions facilitated by intermediaries, their access 
to  ADR  is  often  contingent  upon  the  intermediary's  business  model.  For  example,  if  the 
intermediary  charges  consumers  a  service  fee,  such  as  is  the  case  with  Airbnb,  a  for-payment 
contractual relationship between the intermediary and the consumer exists, and the dispute clearly 
qualifies  for  ADR.  Conversely,  if  the  intermediary  does  not  collect  a  service  fee  from  the 
consumer, as in the case with Booking.com, it will depend on the rules applied by the ADR entity 
whether the dispute can be referred to it.. Despite case-law clarifying the intermediary's liability in 
relation to their intermediary services,57 national rules or entities own rules may still limit consumer 
access to ADR due to the current wording of the Directive. 

b)  Lack  of  out-of-court  redress  solutions  for  disputes  between  European  consumers  and  non-
EU traders 

In  recent  years,  there  has  been  a  significant  increase  in  infringements  reported  by  consumers 
regarding their commercial interactions with traders established outside the EU. According to the 
ECCs’  query  handling  system,  5-7%  of  complaints  received  concern  non-EU  traders.58  However, 
this  data  is  not  entirely representative  as  ECCs  were  not  established  to  handle  complaints  of  this 
nature  and  therefore  consumers  aware  of  this  limitation  will  not  contact  ECCs.  Furthermore,  an 
EU-wide survey conducted in 2020 confirmed that issues with orders or purchases outside the EU 
were  more  prevalent  than  those  within  the  EU,  with  41%  of  non-EU  online  purchases  being 
problematic compared to 23% within the EU.59 However, the ADR Directive only covers disputes 
between  “trader  established  in  the  Union  and  a  consumer  resident  in  the  Union”.  As  a  result, 
many consumers who have engaged with  a company established outside the EU territory, even if 
the  same  company  has  addressed  its  activity  to  European  consumers,  are  not  entitled  to  refer  a 
dispute with that trader to an ADR entity under the Directive. Consequently, they have no option 
but to initiate an ordinary judicial proceeding to protect their interests, a process that is significantly 
more costly and time-consuming. . 

c) Lack of quality of PODR systems  

As mentioned above, an increasing number of online marketplaces, including major players such as 
Amazon, Airbnb and eBay, are operating PODR systems to help consumers and third-party traders 
(or other consumers in case of peer-to-peer platforms) resolve disputes that arise on their platform. 
Similarly  to  ADR,  PODR  represents  a  useful  alternative  to  in-court  litigation  because  it  is  quick 
and  typically  free  of  additional  charges,  as  the  cost  is  included  in  the  service  fees  collected  by 

56  ECC  data  (see  Annex  4)  on  2022  EU  complaints’  indicate  that  complaints  not  related  to  the  performance  of  the 
contract,  such  as  lack  of  confirmation,  other  misleading  actions  or  omissions,  refusal  to  sell/supply  product  or 
discrimination, unfair and aggressive commercial practices, together account for 4.47% of all complaints.  
57 See judgement of 24 February 2022, Tiketa, C‑536/20M, EU:C:2022:112, paragraph 36.  
58 Information gathering for assisting the Commission in complying with its obligation under Article 26 (“reporting”) of 
the ADR Directive and Article 21 (“reporting”) of the ODR Regulation. 
59  Frustrated  consumers  rather  than  happy  shoppers:  Online  marketplaces  –  consumer’  real-life  experiences 
(https://www.vzbv.de/sites/default/files/2022-03/20-12-14%20Evidenzsammlung%20Online-
Marktpl%C3%A4tze_EN_final.pdf)  &  Information  gathering  for assisting the  Commission  in complying  with its 
obligation under Article 26 (“reporting”) of the ADR Directive and Article 21 (“reporting”) of the ODR Regulation. 

16 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
online  intermediaries.  However,  unlike  ADR,  PODR  is  not  subject  to  any  specific  legal 
requirements.  Consequently,  there  are  several  questions  concerning  a)  the  qualification  and 
independence  of  the  natural  persons  in  charge  of  PODR;  b)  the  availability  of  clear  and 
understandable information that consumers need before deciding to engage in a PODR procedure; 
c)  the  fairness  of  the  PODR  process  and  the  enforceability  of  the  final  outcome  on  third-party 
traders or other consumers.  

In  order  to  gather  data  on  the  quality  standards  of  the  PODR  systems,  a  screening  of  nine  major 
online platforms operating within the EU was conducted, using the requirements set out in the ADR 
Directive  as  a  benchmark.60  The  screening  was  performed  based  on  a  structured  checklist  that 
aimed  to  assess  various  elements  such  as  the  transparency  of  the  PODR  systems  (e.g.  are  the 
dispute resolution rules clearly disclosed), their accessibility (e.g. can consumers submit complaint 
in  any  language,  and  at  any  time?  or  are  there  restrictions?),  and  fairness  (e.g.  are  the  natural 
persons in charge impartial? Can consumers be represented?).The results of the screening showed 
that correspondence with the ADR Directive quality criteria ranged from 42% for the system with 
lowest  information  provided  to  consumers  to  88%  for  the  system  with  the  most  complete 
information.  Thus,  while  millions  of  consumers  rely  on  PODRs  offered  by  online  marketplaces, 
none of these systems meet the full quality standards which the ADR Directives affords consumers 
in the context of ADR Directive.  

Problem 2: Low engagement in ADR among businesses and consumers 

Insufficient participation in ADR procedures by traders and consumers constitutes one of the main 
shortcomings  of  the  ADR  framework.  Despite  several  initiatives  at  both  national  and  EU  level 
aimed  at  promoting  the  use  of  ADR,  traders’  and  consumers’  engagement  in  ADR  procedures 
remains  persistently  low.  While  a  general  lack  of  awareness  is  a  contributing  factor,  any  policy 
interventions  designed  to  increase  engagement  in  ADR  must  first  identify  the  root  causes  of  this 
low  participation  and  provide  the  appropriate  incentives  to  consumers  and  traders.  Detailed 
examination of this issue is presented in the following subsections.        

a) Low engagement in ADR by businesses 

As noted above,  approximately 1.95 million EU consumers are willing to file complaints with an 
ADR body annually. Nevertheless, the number of cases brought to ADR between 2018 and 2021 
ranged from approximately 500 in Croatia to over 264,000 in Germany. In 2020, due to a surge of 
cases  arising  from  various  problems  linked  to  the  COVID  Crisis,  Germany  recorded  the  highest 
number of disputes launched in a given year, with over 80,000 cases, followed by Italy with over 
69,000 cases and France with 67,000 cases. The total number of eligible disputes launched by ADR 
schemes in Europe is about 300,000 per year  61, meaning that only 8% of those with a complaint 
would benefit from ADR.  

60 Details in Annex 4.  
61  Information  gathering  for assisting the  Commission  in complying  with its  obligation  under Article 26 (“reporting”) 
of the ADR Directive and Article 21 (“reporting”) of the ODR Regulation. 

17 

 
 
 
 
 
  
 
In the same period, the average proportion of ADR cases where the trader accepted to participate 
and  which  was  resolved,  ranged  from  just  17%  to  100%,  as  shown  in  the  chart  below.62  The 
majority of Member States boast a  rate of traders’ acceptance of above 50% (16 Member States). 
Based on this  fact, it can be assumed that on average,  60% of businesses accept  to  engage in 
ADR, resulting in 180,000 disputes resolved by an ADR entity in Europe every year.63 As regards 
the remaining 120,000 disputes (out of the 300,000 cases requested by consumers), data from the 
EU ODR platform indicate that approximately 20% are explicitly refused while the remainder 
is  left  without  answer  from  the  business.  By  applying  this  ratio  to  the  number  of  potential 
disputes, it emerges that 96,000 consumers  would receive no  response  from  traders while 24,000 
disputes would be explicitly refused. This high rate of non-response generates frustration and 
undermines consumer trust in the system, while also resulting in unnecessary costs for ADR 
entities.  

Note: Data for 3 Member States only covered some of the years: BE (based on data 2018-2021), FR (based on data 2019 and 2020), 
and RO (based on data 2018-2020). 

The  Directive  does  not  address  the  issue  of  whether  traders'  participation  in  ADR  procedures 
should be mandatory or voluntary; instead, it leaves that decision to the individual Member States 
or  sector-specific  EU  legislation.64  The  available  data65  indicate  that  in  eleven  Member  States, 
participation  is  entirely  voluntary,  while  in  six  others  it  is  compulsory.  In  seven  Member  States, 
trader  participation  is  mandatory  only  in  specific  sectors,  and  in  four,  it  is  mandatory  only  in 
specific situations. In cases where participation is voluntary, it is based on the goodwill of traders 
or the promotion of it made by trade associations, and therefore relies on their understanding and 
appreciation of its benefits.  

62 Ibid. 
63 Value in line with the figure for DE and IT which are the countries with most potential disputes.  
64 See, for example, Article 26(3) of the Directive (EU) 2019/944  of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 
June  2019  on  common  rules  for  the  internal  market  for  electricity,  which  states  that  ‘The  participation  of  electricity 
undertakings  in  out-of-court  dispute  settlement  mechanisms  for  household  customers  shall  be  mandatory  unless  the 
Member State demonstrates to the Commission that other mechanisms are equally effective’ 
65 Information gathering for assisting the Commission in complying with its obligation under Article 26 (“reporting”) of 
the ADR Directive and Article 21 (“reporting”) of the ODR Regulation. 

18 

 
 
 
 
Regarding information to consumers, under Article 13 of the ADR Directive, traders are required to 
inform consumers about their relevant ADR entity/entities, present this information in an accessible 
manner, and specify their intentions or not to use ADR entities when a dispute could not be settled 
directly  with  the  consumer.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  aforementioned  obligation  to  disclose 
information  on  ADR  carries  an  associated  cost  of  approximately  EUR  310  per  trader.66 
However, according to the available data on the low use of ADR by consumers when the dispute 
has not been solved amicably, this information obligation does not seem to be of assistance since 
traders  can  indicate  that  they  will  not  participate,  thus  discouraging  further  steps  by  consumers. 
This  underscores the need to  consider whether a  more efficient approach  to  increase  engagement 
among consumers and traders could be adopted through the present intervention.   

b) Low engagement in ADR by consumers 

Low consumer engagement is another key factor contributing to the insufficient uptake of ADR in 
the EU. To tackle this issue, it is important to understand what causes consumers’ disengagement. 
The table below67 illustrates how consumers would use ADR based on the value of their claim and 
the expected duration of the ADR procedure. The figures in the table are cumulative: for example, 
the 23% in the first column represents the total number of consumers who would use ADR if the 
issue  could  be  resolved  strictly  within  one  week,  those  who  would  use  it  if  the  issue  could  be 
resolved within one month, and so on, up to those who would use it regardless of the time it takes.68  

66 The Impact assessment accompanying the proposal for the current ADR Directive estimated the cost of compliance 
with individual traders to amount to EUR 254. By adjusting this number to the inflation rate  over the period 2011  – 
2023,  (EUR  254  x  1.2217),  the  current  cost  of  compliance  for  traders  is  EUR  310.  For  further  info,  see      Impact 
Assessment accompanying the document Proposal for a  Directive of the European Parliament and of the  Council on 
Alternative Dispute Resolution for consumer disputes (Directive on consumer ADR) and Proposal for a Regulation of 
the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  Online  Dispute  Resolution  for  consumer  disputes  (Regulation  on 
consumer ODR) {COM(2011) 793 final} {SEC(2011) 1409 final}. 
67  Behavioural  study  on  disclosure  of  ADR  information  to  consumers  by  traders  and  ADR  entities.  N  =  4,050  in 
Austria, Italy, Poland and Sweden. Amounts in EUR were converted for local currencies and adjusted for cost of living 
where appropriate. Data are weighted. Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
68 Hence 100% = drop the case + use ADR if the issue can be resolved within 1 week  + go to court directly + don’t 
know. The table does not provide an accurate figure for the consumers who will go to court in case the issue can be 
resolved in more than a week. For those  cases, it is assumed that the percentage of consumers going immediately to 
court would be proportionally higher.  

19 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Willingness to take up ADR by claim value and procedure length; cumulated 

Value of the claim 

n
a
h
t

s
s
e
L

0
5
€

-
0
5
€

0
0
2
€

-
0
0
2
€

0
0
5
€

-
0
0
5
€

0
0
0
,
1
€

-
0
0
0
,
1
€

0
0
0
,
5
€

-
0
0
0
,
5
€

0
0
0
,
0
1
€

0
0
0
,
0
1
€
>

Drop the case and lose the money 
Use ADR if the issue can be resolved within 1 week 
Use ADR if the issue can be resolved within 1 month 
Use ADR if the issue can be resolved within 6 months 
Use ADR if the issue can be resolved within 1 year 
Use ADR irrespective of the time it takes 
Go to court directly 
Don’t know 
Note: N = 4,050. Amounts in EUR were converted for local currencies and adjusted for cost of living where appropriate. Data are weighted. 
Coloured rows indicate the rows with cumulative percentages, adding the equivalent percentage of itself and all subsequent blue rows. 
Percentages do not add to 100% since some cells are cumulated within the table. 

8% 
77% 
61% 
29% 
18% 
11% 
4% 
10% 

3% 
70% 
62% 
52% 
43% 
31% 
17% 
11% 

58% 
23% 
16% 
11% 
8% 
5% 
3% 
16% 

17% 
67% 
32% 
21% 
14% 
9% 
4% 
12% 

4% 
79% 
68% 
50% 
21% 
12% 
6% 
11% 

3% 
76% 
69% 
53% 
39% 
15% 
10% 
11% 

4% 
39% 
32% 
26% 
21% 
15% 
43% 
14% 

The  table  indicates  that  the  speed  of  the  ADR  process  is  a  critical  factor  for  consumers  in 
determining whether to engage in ADR. For claims between EUR 1 and EUR 10,000, consumers 
are  increasingly  willing  to  use  ADR,  even  if  the  process  takes  more  than  a  year.  If  ADR 
proceedings were very fast  -  up to one week  -, almost  three  quarters of consumers would always 
use it for claims between EUR 50 and EUR 10,000. Similarly, if ADR proceedings were fast - up to 
one month – two thirds of consumers would always use it for claims between EUR 200 and EUR 
10,000. In other words, if ADR proceedings are slow, a majority of consumers with claims below 
EUR 200 is likely to give up seeking redress. Although this may represent an acceptable loss for an 
individual  consumer,  when  cumulated  at  the  EU  level,  it  results  in  several  million  claims  not 
pursued per year. In the absence of redress opportunities for low-value claims, dishonest businesses 
are  incentivised  to  continue  pursuing  dubious  commercial  practices  that  lead  to  significant  losses 
for the collective interests of consumers. The chart below displays the average duration of an ADR 
dispute in the EEA,69 ranging from 41 days in the Netherlands and Romania to 318 days in Ireland. 
According to the above mentioned data, it is likely that the disputes brought to an ADR entity are 
those worth waiting for between one and six months, i.e. claims exceeding EUR 200. For smaller 
claims, ADR may be too slow. Based on data from the EU ODR Platform, the average claim value 
is EUR 185.  

Average duration (in days) of an ADR dispute in the EEA69 

69  Information  gathering  for assisting the  Commission  in complying  with its  obligation  under Article 26 (“reporting”) 
of the ADR Directive and Article 21 (“reporting”) of the ODR Regulation, online survey of ADR competent authorities 
conducted for the study (N=29). 

20 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Failure of the EU ODR Platform to increase consumer and business engagement in ADR 

Under the ODR Regulation, the Commission had to establish the “ODR platform” as a messaging 
tool  to  promote  the  resolution  of  B2C  disputes  arising  from  electronic  transactions  via  ADR 
procedures. The objective was to increase the trust in  cross-border online shopping by promoting 
the easiness to solve disputes out of court. The ODR platform offers consumers a system to contact 
traders to propose to them to participate to an ADR procedure. It is not a complaint-handling tool in 
itself, but it is meant to facilitate communication between consumers and traders to agree and then 
choose a relevant ADR body.  

However,  the  Platform  is  clearly  not  achieving  its  intended  objectives.  Data  shows  that  while  it 
attracts a relatively high number of visitors70, only very few consumers use it to contact a trader 
and request an ADR procedure: just over 13 000 complaints were made EU-wide in 2021. The 
vast  majority  of  these  requests  (80%)  remain  un-attended  by  traders  who  chose  to  remain  silent 
while about  20% of traders explicitly  refuse. 99%  of the cases  are therefore automatically closed 
after 30 days. The number of claims that is eventually resolved thanks to the platform mechanism is 
extremely  low:  only  1%  of  the  13  000  requests  (169  in  2021).  This  low  usage  indicates  that  the 
ODR platform is not encouraging traders to participate to an ADR process and also does not 
corresponds to the needs of consumers in digital markets as only a minority of visitors try to use it. 
For more information on the ODR platform functioning and issues please see Annex 7. 

Problem 3: ADR is not sufficiently used in a cross-border context 

Data obtained from the EU ODR platform indicate that while requests to initiate an ADR procedure 
are almost equally split between national and cross-border cases, 63% of refusals made by traders 
occurred in cross-border cases.71 This finding suggests that traders are more prone to use ADR 

70  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52019DC0425&from=EN.  Since  its  launch,  the 
platform has attracted more than 8.5 million visitors in total. . 
71 On a very large sample of nearly 19,500 total refusals from traders.  

21 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
for purely domestic disputes, highlighting a gap that should be addressed to strengthen access to 
cross-border ADR. 

The  complex  legal  and  organizational  context  of  cross-border  ADR  is  the  primary  factor 
accounting for its lower uptake as compared to domestic ADR. In this respect, it must be noted that 
while  under  the  Brussels  I  Regulation72  consumers  have  the  possibly  to  submit  disputes  over  a 
consumer  contract  with  an  EU-established  trader  before  the  courts  of  their  Member  State  of 
domicile,  the  ADR  Directive  does  not  provide  any  specific  geographical  mechanism  for  cross-
border ADR disputes. However, since the ADR Directive requires the Member State in which the 
trader is established to ensure that any consumer disputes involving that trader can be submitted to 
a quality-certified ADR entity, there is always an ADR entity competent to deal with a consumer 
dispute in the Member State where the trader is established largely influencing which ADR entity 
will be most likely preferred by the trader and condition to its participation.  

This situation has the potential of reducing the effectiveness of ADR procedures in two respects: 

First,  while the ADR Directive requires  every ADR entity  to  accept  cross-border  cases, it can be 
more cumbersome  for a  consumer to  interact  with an ADR entity  established in  another Member 
State  as  the  latter  typically  works  in  the  national  language(s)  of  that  Member  State.  National 
authorities have confirmed that language is a major obstacle, citing, for example, application forms 
and rules of procedures that are often only available in the national language of the ADR entity.73 

Furthermore, ADR entities are more prone to mistakes where they operate an ADR procedure that 
requires them to take into account consumer law as applied in other Member State. An additional 
element of complexity for ADR entities lies in the imposition of a solution on the trader established 
in a different Member State. Under Article 11 of the ADR Directive, compulsory outcomes of ADR 
proceedings should be in line with the law of the consumer’s Member State of residence.74 At the 
end of the day, in practice, ADR entities tend to apply only their national law.75 

2.3.  How will the problem evolve? 

The  failure  to  intervene  with  effective  measures  will  not  only  allow  the  identified  problems  to 
persist,  but  will  most  likely  exacerbate  them,  thereby  further  undermining  the  individual  and 
collective interests of consumers. The continued growth of e-commerce is likely to be accompanied 
by an increase in unfair commercial practices notably in relation to pre-contractual stages with the 
use,  for  example,  of  manipulative  interfaces,  which  could  become  progressively  even  more 
pervasive  and  subtle  due  to  technological  development.  The  overall  number  of  potential 
consumer disputes is thus expected to significantly increase. As a consequence, only a fraction 

72 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast), OJ L 351, 20.12.2012, p. 1–
32. 
73  Information  gathering  for assisting the  Commission  in complying  with its  obligation  under Article 26 (“reporting”) 
of the ADR Directive and Article 21 (“reporting”) of the ODR Regulation. 
74  Member  States’  consumer  laws  to  a  large  extent  are  based  on  fully  harmonised  EU  instruments  and  the  relevant 
mandatory rules will therefore be the same in most cases.  
75  As  evidenced  by  the  Information  gathering  for assisting the  Commission  in complying  with its  obligation 
under Article 26 (“reporting”) of the ADR Directive and Article 21 (“reporting”) of the ODR Regulation. 

22 

 
 
 
 
 
 
of these disputes, i.e. those of clear contractual nature, risk being accepted for ADR. Over time, this 
will  prevent  an  ever-growing  number  of  consumers  from  seeking  out-of-court  redress.  In  the 
meantime, PODR systems offered and managed by online marketplaces will become increasingly 
popular  while  remaining  exempted  from  any  regulatory  requirements.  This  means  that  the 
enforcement  of  consumer  rights  online  by  the  consumers  themselves  will  depend  more  and 
more on systems provided by online marketplaces.  

The growth of e-commerce will also lead to an increase in cross-border shopping within the EU 
and between the EU and third countries. However, consumers will continue to be unable to resolve 
their disputes in relation to most of these purchases. This will potentially fuel consumer mistrust in 
cross-border  shopping  and  hinder  the  development  of  the  digital  single  market.  Moreover,  the 
current  levels  of  engagement  in  ADR,  which  are  already  unsatisfactory,  will  stagnate  and 
eventually  decrease due  to  a widespread awareness  of the limitations of ADR,  thereby leading  to 
the  discouragement  of  consumers.  As  a  result,  consumers  may  explore  other  methods  to  resolve 
their disputes, including PODR systems and private claims management companies, which usually 
collect a fee of up to 30% of the consumer claim76, or alternatively, may opt to give up on enforcing 
their rights altogether. 

The accumulation of these problems eventually results in an increase of consumer detriment. The 
extent of this detriment can be measured by considering the consumer harm that is strictly related to 
the  missed  opportunity of  not  using  ADR.  By  taking  into  account  the  120,000  eligible  disputes77 
(i.e.  filed  by  a  consumer  and  confirmed  by  an  ADR  entity,  as  per  data  transmitted  by  ADR 
Competent authorities to the Commission in 2022) that are not accepted by businesses on a yearly 
basis,  the  maximum  consumer  detriment  amounts  to  EUR  22.2  million  per  year.78  In  addition  to 
this,  the  detriment  of  consumers  who  brought  a  matter  to  the  ADR  entity  which,  for  various 
reasons, was not deemed eligible (for example in relation to  extra-contractual claims) must also be 
taken  into  account.  This  group  comprises  1.95  million  consumers,79  and  the  potential  additional 
detriment  stemming  from  the  fact  that  they  cannot  settle  their  dispute  through  ADR  amounts  to 
EUR 361 million per year80, for a total annual detriment of EUR 383 million.  

In the baseline scenario described below, these figures are taken as reference to estimate the total 
detriment that consumers may suffer in the next 10 years. 

76  Claims  management  companies  are  very  popular  for  instance  inthe  area  of  passenger  rights,  where  they  assist 
passengers affected by a cancellation, long delay or denied boarding to claim compensation under Regulation 261/2004 
with a fee of usually 30% of the amount claimed, due only in case of success.  
77 See annex IV for further information. In a nutshell, this number is the result of the difference between the number of 
eligible disputes (300 000) and the number of disputes that are actually referred to ADR entities (180 000).  
78 120,000 x EUR 185 which is an estimate of the average amount brought as dispute to an ADR based on data from the 
EU ODR Platform. This number is realistic as EUR 121 is the average value of a retail purchase, but, consumers tend to 
use ADR above a certain minimum amount which corresponds to the higher end of the statistical distribution (source: 
average value of purchases on retail shops, https://www.wolfgangdigital.com/kpi-2019).  
79 As seen above in the problem definition, under ‘access barrier to ADR’, the number of consumers potentially willing 
to refer a dispute to an ADR entity is 2,250,000. By assuming that each consumer is involved in one dispute per year, 
and  by  taking  into  account  that  the  current  average  number  of  eligible  ADR  disputes  per  year  is  only  300,000,  it  is 
possible to estimate the number of consumers who could be willing to use ADR but do not do so because the disputes is 
deemed ineligible or for other reasons.  
80 1,950,000 x EUR 185. 

23 

 
 
 
3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? 

3.1.  Legal basis 

Insofar  as  the  EU  intervention  is  likely  to  take  the  form  of  a  legislative  proposal,  the  legal  basis 
depends on the primary objective and scope of the proposal. The existing legislative intervention in 
the  field  of  consumer  ADR  has  as  its  main  objective  the  improvement  of  the  functioning  of  the 
single  market  through  the  approximation  of  the  provisions  laid  down  by  law,  regulation  or 
administrative action governing out-of-court dispute resolution schemes in the Member States, i.e. 
Article 114 of the TFEU. By proposing amendments to the current legal framework on consumer 
ADR, this initiative falls under the same legal basis and also contributes to ensure a high level of 
consumer protection in the EU in line with Article 169 of the TFEU.   

As  the  EU  has  no  exclusive  competence  in  the  field  of  consumer  protection,  which  is  instead  an 
area of shared competence pursuant to Art. 4(2)(f) of the TFEU, due regard must be given to the 
principle of subsidiarity enshrined in Article 5(3) of the TEU.  

3.2. 

Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action 

In accordance with the subsidiarity principle laid down in Article 5(3) TEU, action at EU level shall 
only be taken when the  aims  envisaged cannot  be achieved sufficiently by Member States  alone, 
and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the 
EU. 

The  rapid  evolution  of  digital  markets,  coupled  with  the  rise  of  new  business  models  and 
commercial  practices,  poses  a  new  set  of  challenges  for  consumers  shopping  online.  Given  the 
borderless  nature  of  digital  technologies,  the  emergence  of  new  types  of  threats  concerns  EU 
consumers  irrespective  of  their  country  of  residence.  While  the  ADR  Directive's  minimum 
harmonization  approach  affords  Member  States  broad  discretion  in  adapting  their  national  ADR 
frameworks  to  the  new  challenges  of  the  digital  age,  the  unilateral  exercise  of  such  discretion  in 
order to adapt to the new challenges posed by digital markets could lead to potential divergences in 
their intervention. This, in turn, could result in unequal effectiveness of out-of-court procedures for 
consumers  depending  on  their  member  State  of  residence,  lower  level  of  consumer  protection  in 
general  and  more  difficulties  for  businesses  to  settle  disputes  when  operating  across  the  single 
market. 

3.3. 

Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action 

Action taken at the EU level will ensure that the obstacles hindering consumer ADR in cross-border 
contexts  are  consistently  removed  across  the  EU.  This  will  have  the  effect  of  enhancing  the 
confidence  of  consumers  and  traders  in  purchasing  and  selling  across  borders,  thereby 
strengthening the smooth functioning of the internal market. 

In  addition,  EU  action  will  also  ensure  that  Member  States  coordinate  their  responses  to  the 
challenges posed by the digital transformation and act consistently in adopting measures to provide 
effective redress systems suited to the current complexity of consumer disputes. This will increase 
the level of protection afforded to consumers in the digital single market.   

Furthermore,  action  taken  at  EU  level  to  uniformly  increase  consumer  and  trader  engagement  in 
ADR across the Union will reduce consumer detriment and enable consumers to make significant 

24 

 
 
savings  in  both  offline  and  online  transactions,  which  may  be  used  to  purchase  additional  goods 
and  services  or  better  adapt  to  rising  inflation.    Finally,  by  providing  traders  with  comparable 
opportunities  to  settle  their  disputes  with  consumers  regardless  of  their  Member  State  of 
establishment,  EU  action  will  reduce  litigation  costs  and  foster  a  level  playing  field  for 
businesses. 

4.  OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? 

4.1.  General objectives 

The  general  objective  of  this  intervention  is  to  ensure  the  proper  functioning  of  the  retail  single 
market  and  achieve  a  high  level  of  consumer  protection  by  enabling  consumers  and  traders  to 
resolve their disputes in an efficient and effective manner, irrespective of their country of residence 
or establishment. 

4.2. 

Specific objectives 

Make ADR fit for digital markets  

The  first  specific  objective  of  the  intervention  is  to  ensure  that  ADR  in  the  EU  is  fit  for  the 
digital age. This is particularly important given the recent increasing trends in e-commerce and the 
emergence of new online business models. The aim is to ensure that ADR procedures are suitable 
for  resolving  disputes  related  to  issues  going  beyond  the  mere  provisions  of  contracts  and  thus 
covering the whole range of EU consumer rights. Furthermore, as digitalization has led to increased 
exposure of consumers to goods and services offered by traders established outside of the EU, the 
initiative seeks to provide consumers with the opportunity to refer their dispute to ADR bodies even 
where it concerns a trader established outside of the EU. This will reinforce the level playing field 
for traders and provide greater protection of consumer rights. Finally, with the rise of the platform 
economy, consumers have become increasingly reliant on PODR systems to resolve their disputes 
with  third-party  traders  quickly.  Thus,  this  intervention  also  aims  to  ensure  that  these  PODR 
systems meet consistent quality standards that apply throughout the Union. 

Improve consumers’ and traders’ engagement in ADR   

As  clearly  stated  in  the  2019  Commission  Report  on  the  application  of  the  ADR  Directive  and 
ODR  Regulation,  as  well  as  in  the  evaluation  of  the  ADR  Directive  annexed  to  this  Impact 
Assessment,  and  the  feedback  provided  by  stakeholders  on  different  occasions,  one  of  the  main 
challenges hindering the full effectiveness of the ADR framework is the low participation in ADR 
by both consumers and traders.81 Therefore, the second specific objective of this intervention is to 
address the root causes of this low uptake, namely the lack of confidence and poor understanding of 
ADR  by  consumers  and  traders,  stemming  from  the  perception  that  procedures  are  long  and 
cumbersome, possibly too costly and certainly not adapted to the quick customer journey that 
consumers experience in digital markets.  

Enhance cross-border ADR 

81COM(2019) 425 final, page 10: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2019:425:FIN  

25 

 
 
 
The third specific objective of this initiative is to remove barriers hindering the use of ADR for 
cross-border disputes, i.e. disputes where the consumer resides in a Member State different from 
the one where the trader is established.  

5.  WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? 

5.1.  What is the baseline from which options are assessed? 

In the baseline scenario, the  Commission  refrains  from  proposing  any  amendments to  the current 
legal  framework  and  launching  additional  non-legislative  initiatives.  Thus,  the  ADR  Directive 
remains unchanged, leaving Member States free to adapt their domestic ADR architectures to the 
aforementioned challenges as they see fit. 

While  the  Directive  narrowly  defines  consumer  disputes  as  concerning  “contractual  obligations 
stemming from sales contracts or service contracts between a trader established in the Union and a 
consumer  resident  in  the  Union”,  the  number  of  potential  disputes  related  to  infringements  of 
traders’  pre-contractual  and  extra-contractual  obligations  or  committed  by  traders  established 
outside the EU is set to increase due to the ongoing digital transformation. Such a narrowly defined 
scope  will  prevent  an  ever-growing  number  of  consumers  harmed  by  unfair  commercial 
practices from having access to quick redress opportunities.  

Consumer  and  trader  engagement  in  ADR  is  relatively  low,  and  is  expected  to  remain  at 
current levels. Disparities  across the Member  States  in  the use of out-of-court dispute resolution 
seen from data reported to the Commission as part of the evaluation annexed to this report will also 
persist. Likewise, the use of ADR for cross-border disputes is not expected to increase, despite 
the anticipated  growth  of  intra-EU shopping in the  coming years.  In  the absence of  effective 
cross-border  ADR,  online  marketplaces  are  likely  to  increasingly  meet  the  need  for  dispute 
settlement options in cross-border scenarios by offering PODR systems to consumers. The industry 
will  develop  these  systems  with  procedural  rules  and  standards  established  independently. 
Alternatively,  some  Member  States  may  decide  to  regulate  these  systems,  further  fragmenting 
access to fair dispute resolution systems across the EU. 

While  the  ADR  framework  remains  unchanged,  new  substantive  laws  will  come  into  play, 
increasing  and  clarifying  consumer  rights  (notably  in  relation  to  precontractual  information)  and 
this will be a motivation for consumers to seek to obtain the benefits of such rights.. For instance, 
following the 2019 amendment to the Consumer Rights Directive, the rules of this Directive apply 
to contracts where the trader provides digital content, and the consumer agrees to the use of their 
personal data (instead of paying a fee). However, given that the contractual disputes covered by the 
ADR Directive are linked to  the payment of a monetary fee, consumers may not have a practical 
way of enforcing these new rights out-of-court. A similar risk could be anticipated also in relation 
to  the  forthcoming  Consumer  Credit  Directive,82  which,  once  adopted,  will  provide  consumers 
with a more robust set of information rights at the advertisement and pre-contractual stage. There is 
also  the Commission’s proposal  on Empowering consumers in  the green transition83 that  is being 
finalised and is expected to increase the protection against misleading green claims made at the pre-

82  Proposal  for  a  Directive  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  consumer  credits:  EUR-Lex  - 
52021PC0347 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu) 
83 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52022PC0143 

26 

 
 
 
contractual  stage.  In  relation  to  all  these  new  or  clarified  rights,  the  enforcement  of  consumer 
rights  through  ADR  is  likely  to  be  hindered  by  the  fact  that  the  scope  of  the  ADR  Directive 
explicitly restricts disputes to those stemming from a contract. 

The ADR Directive coexists with the recently adopted Representative Action Directive (RAD)84, 
which enters into application in June 2023. The two frameworks are going to operate in parallel, as 
stated also in recital 27 of the ADR Directive, which affirms that ‘an effective system for collective 
claims  and  easy  recourse  to  ADR  should  be  complementary  and  they  should  not  be  mutually 
exclusive procedures". ADR systems are aimed to rapidly solve single disputes so that consumers 
can  get  an  immediate  remedy  to  their  problem.  Collective  redress  cases  aim  to  stop  systemic 
breaches of consumer law by a trader and to provide remedies to all the consumers concerned. The 
scale  of  operation,  the  complexity  of  the  legal  elements  and  the  timeframe  of  collective  redress 
cases are not at all comparable or competing with ADR systems. Certainly, collective redress cases 
will cover a few cases that  have been solved through an ADR,  but  for  the vast  majority of ADR 
cases  it  will  never  be  possible  for  consumer  associations  to  brings  collective  cases  on  all  the 
instances.  

Similarly,  individual  redress  coexists  with  the  activities  of  public  authorities  to  ensure  that 
businesses  comply  with  applicable  legislation.  These  activities  aim  first  to  obtain  a  high  level  of 
compliance  by  being  deterrent  notably  through  the  threat  of  penalties.  They  are  targeted  at  large 
cases harming the collective interest of consumers and search to stop unlawful behaviour but not to 
obtin redress for the consumers concerned. Public and private enforcement play different roles and 
are complementary to ensure that businesses respect consumer rights and repair the damages caused 
to  consumers.  An  improvement  of  public  enforcement  in  the  future  may  be  obtained  however 
thanks  to  the  review  of  the  Consumer  Protection  Cooperation  Regulation  which  is  carried  in 
parallel to the present initiative, however, this improvement should cover very large EU level cases 
but will leave unaffected a large part of the everyday practical problems that consumers face with 
the  other  businesses  and  will  still  require  individual  actions  to  obtain  concrete  remedies  such  as 
reimbursements for undue charges or not delivered goods.  

Taking  all  these  considerations  into  account,  it  could  be  estimated  that  without  legislative 
intervention,  over  the  next  decade,  consumers  will  continue  suffering  significant  financial  losses 
due  to  the  growth  of  e-commerce  and  the  simultaneous  lack  of  effective  ADR  procedures.  The 
detriment  of  EUR  383  million  (as  calculated  in  section  2.3  above)  experienced  by  consumers 
annually is likely to increase. Assuming linear growth of e-commerce at a yearly rate of 1% from 
its current representation of 20% of total  business  turnover, the detriment is  expected to increase 
proportionately  each  year.  By  applying  a  3%  standard  discount  factor  to  account  for  the  present 
value of future money flows, and using a 10 year time horizon for the assessment of the impacts, it 
is estimated that the total consumer detriment over the next decade will amount to EUR 3.4 billion 
(present value).  

The  analysis  of  the  baseline  scenario  took  as  reference  period  a  horizon  of  10  years.  The  same 
timeframe  is  used  below  for  the  assessment  of  the  policy  options,  as  it  allows  to  examine  in  full 
their impacts on various stakeholders. 

84 Directive (EU) 2020/1828 of the European Parliament  and of the Council of 25 November 2020 on representative 
actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers: EUR-Lex - 32020L1828 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu) 

27 

 
 
 
5.2.  Description of the policy options 

This  impact  assessment  report  examines  a  number  of  policy  measures  that  could  achieve  the 
specific objectives described in section 4.2. It should be noted that the measures may not all apply 
equally  to  all  Member  States  as  the  ADR  Directive  is  of  minimum  harmonisation.  So  certain 
measure  may  already  exist  in  certain  Member  States  or  not  be  needed  as  some  of  the  Member 
States have implemented stronger measures  than  required by the ADR Directive  in their national 
context. These differences however mainly concern the Member States which have implemented an 
obligation for traders to participate to an ADR requested by a consumer and therefore the studied 
measures which aim to increase traders participation may not impact the situation in those Member 
States.  For  most  of  the  other  studied  measures,  however,  they  will  apply  equally  to  all  Member 
States as they concern issues that apply in a similar manner across the Union. The below discussion 
will identify the instances  where some differences  may apply and therefore the expected impacts 
will not concern or less concern certain Member States.  

In order to have sizeable impacts, the measures are grouped coherently into four alternative policy 
bundles/options  differing  from  each  other  by  the  nature  and  the  intensity  of  the  intervention:  A) 
non-regulatory  intervention;  B)  procedural  and  geographical  scope  amendments;  C) 
substantive  scope  amendments  with  some  additional  obligations  to  traders  D)  architectural 
changes  with  increased  harmonization.  Option  A)  consists  of  a  set  of  non  legislative  measures 
aimed  at  addressing  the  above-mentioned  problems  without  making  any  changes  to  the  legal 
framework governing ADR. Option B) complements the non-legislative initiatives of Option A by 
providing Member States with some additional procedures to promote ADR including vis a vis non 
EU  traders.  Option  C)  comprises  material  scope  amendments  and  the    additional  obligation  for 
traders  to  reply  to  ADR  entities  while  simplifying  their  general  information  obligations.  Finally, 
option  D) proposes a number of measures that  would require Member  States to  make changes  to 
their domestic ADR infrastructure.  

It was considered that each of these four bundles constituted a feasible mix of measures capable of 
addressing the three objectives in a balanced manner in terms of the intrusiveness of the individual 
measures  and  of  their  complementarity.  Another  possible  bundle  could  have  been  to  extend  the 
material  scope  of  the  Directive  without  imposing  additional  reply  duties  on  traders.  This  bundle 
however  would  have  created  more  expectations  for  consumers  and  more  work  for  ADR  entities 
without  improving  participation  from  traders.  Alternatively,  extending  the  material  scope  of  the 
Directive and prescribing compulsory participation of traders without imposing certain architectural 
choices  would  have  created  the  risks  that  certain  existing  ADR  landscape  could  have  been  put 
under a lot of stress and would not be able to cope with the additional workload.  

The table below provides an overview of the four policy options.   

28 

 
 
29 

 
 
 
      
Policy Option A - Non-regulatory intervention 

Policy Option A proposes a set of non-legislative measures aimed at supporting and facilitating 
the  work  of  ADR  entities  as  well  as  supporting  the  awareness  and  other  publicity  activities  of 
competent  authorities  while  calling  on  businesses  to  develop  self  regulatory  actions.  In 
particular, it proposes to: 

• 

Increase  support  to  capacity-building  of  ADR  entities  by  providing  ad-hoc  trainings  to  the 
natural  persons  in  charge  of  ADR,  thereby  improving  their  understanding  and  ability  to 
handle  consumer  disputes  arising  online.  Under  this  policy  option,  the  Commission  would 
also  provide  a  platform  where  ADR  entities  could  exchange  best  practices  on  dispute 
resolution in digital markets. 

•  Promote  a  self-regulatory  approach  for  PODR  services  provided  by  online  marketplaces. 
Under  this  approach,  platforms  providing  dispute  resolution  services  to  their  customers 
would be encouraged to adhere to common guidelines agreed upon at the EU level, with the 
objective of increasing transparency and providing consumer-friendly PODR procedures. 
•  Support  awareness-raising  campaigns  of  Member  States  by  developing  best  practices 

guidance and interactive tools.  

•  Create  standardized,  easy-to-understand  templates  (e.g.  complaint  form,  response  form, 
additional information form, ADR outcome etc.) that ADR entities could use (on a voluntary 
basis) to handle cross-border disputes electronically. This includes supporting ADR entities 
to use machine translation for documents exchanged cross-border.  

Policy Option B – Procedural and geographical scope revision 

Policy Option B aims to propose minimal harmonisation procedural amendments to the existing 
EU  ADR  directive  complemented  by  the  non-legislative  initiatives  described  under  Policy 
Option A). Thus, this option proposes to: 

• 

Introduce guiding rules on how to treat pre-contractual information in disputes relating to a 
digital contract in order to address problem 1 and improve the fitness to digital markets.   
•  Enable ADR entities to handle disputes between consumers and traders established outside of 

the EU.  

•  To enable ADR entities and national authorities to take some publicity measures, as they see 
fit,  to  ensure  that  consumers  are  incentivised  to  choose  traders  which  engage  positively  in 
ADR, such as disclosing the identity of retailers who systematically refuse to engage in ADR 
procedures, promoting trust marks which include ADR participation. These measures aims to 
address problem 2 in improving engagement in ADR procedures 
Introduce guiding elements on how to handle cross-border disputes by ADR entities and thus 
allowing ADR entities to be more confident in taking up cross border cases.  
 through the introduction of new procedures to implement the quality criteria in the Directive. 
so that the natural persons responsible for ADR possess the necessary expertise to deal with 

• 

• 

30 

 
 
 
 
consumer  law  in  foreign  jurisdiction  and  linguistic  competences,  including  at  least 
proficiency in English.  

Policy Option C – Material scope amendments and new business obligations  

Policy  Option  C)  seeks  to  address  the  problems  outlined  above  by  amending  a  number  of 
provisions  in  the  Directive  and  adding  new  obligations  for  traders.  It  also  assigns  new 
responsibilities  to  entities  that  do  not  currently  play  a  role  under  the  Directive,  namely  market 
places which provide PODR and EU level trade associations. : 

•  Widen the material scope of the ADR Directive to cover any disputes between a trader and a 
consumer  involving  a  breach  of  the  consumer  laws  and  thus  covering  all  pre-contractual 
information requirements as well as transactions which include an exchange of personal data 
in consideration for the service provided. This would address problem 1 by ensuring that all 
digital transactions are covered including in  relation  to  what  happens at  the pre-contractual 
stages and when there is no monetary payment. Traders established outside of the Union but 
targeting  Union  consumers  would  also  be  enabled  to  agree  to  an  ADR  request  from  a 
consumer as they have to respect consumer law. . 

•  Require  online  marketplaces  that provide  PODR services  to  settle disputes between traders 
and  consumers  operating  on  the  platform  to  meet  the  quality  standards  expected  by 
consumers from quality-certified ADR entities; establish a self-certification process whereby 
online marketplaces can show that their PODR services abide by high standards of fairness, 
legality  and  quality;  establish  regular  review  by  the  Commission  of  the  documentation 
provided by online marketplaces.  

•  Replace the European ODR platform with new cost-effective signposting tools (e.g. a chat-
bot)  to  guide  consumers  looking  for  ADR  solutions  to  the  appropriate  ADR  body  for  their 
dispute.  Remove  information  obligations  for  those  traders  who  decide  not  to  use  ADR 
procedures. 
Introduce a ‘duty of reply’ for traders who receive a notification of a new consumer dispute 
from  an  ADR  entity;  traders  would  be  required  to  respond  to  the  ADR  entity  within  a 
specified deadline and indicate whether they intend to engage in ADR or not.  

• 

•  Encourage bundling of cases when ADR entity receives similar cases, inform consumers that 

they can be handled together with others.  

•  Grant  European  Consumer  Centres  (ECCs)  a  new  role  to  provide  specialised  assistance 
services  to  ADR  entities  with  cross-border  complaints;  ECCs’  assistance  would  include 
helping  consumers  navigate  ADR  procedures  and  assisting  ADR  entities  with  questions 
related to the applicable law in other countries.  

•  Establish  a  mechanism  where  trade  associations,  upon  providing  a  self-certification,  are 

authorised to set up cross-border dispute settlement systems.  

31 

 
 
 
Policy Option D – Architectural changes and increased harmonization 

Policy option D is the most ambitious among the options considered because it seeks to increase 
the  level  of  harmonization  of  the  Directive  and  intervene  on  the  existing  domestic  ADR 
infrastructure in Member States. The following measures are suggested under Policy Option D: 

•  Extend the material scope of the Directive to all applicable consumer legislation as for option 

C) 

•  Require Member States to establish a residual ADR entity responsible for cross-border and 

digital issues, including disputes with non-EU traders. 

•  Make the quality criteria laid down by the ADR Directive binding for PODR systems offered 
by online marketplaces; NCAs would be responsible for assessing whether platforms’ PODR 
services  comply  with  these  quality  requirements;  in  case  of  non-compliance,  NCAs  would 
request immediate measures to ensure compliance; if no action is taken within a certain time-
period, the NCAs could order the marketplace to discontinue their PODR system. 

•  Establish  an  EU-level  ADR  system  exclusively  for  cross-border  complaints.  The  EU-level 
ADR  system  would  have  the  necessary  resources  and  means  to  handle  different  national 
legislation  effectively;  this  measure  would  be  financed  through  a  tender  selecting  an  ADR 
body in the EU to resolve cross-border disputes.  

•  As in  Option  C, encourage bundling of cases  when ADR entity  receives  similar cases,  and 

ensure that consumers are informed that disputes can be handled together with others.  

•  Make ADR participation compulsory for traders. 
•  As in Option C, replace the ODR platform with new cost-effective signposting tools (e.g. a 
chat-bot)  to  guide  consumers  looking  for  ADR  solutions  to  the  appropriate  ADR  body  for 
their dispute.  

5.3.  Options discarded at an early stage 

In order to address the problems identified by this report, the following policy measure was also 
considered  but  discarded  earlier  in  the  process,  on  the  grounds  of  its  lack  of  effectiveness  in 
attaining  the  aforementioned  specific  objectives  and  because  it  raised  concerns  from  the 
standpoint of consistency with fundamental rights: 

Revamping  the  ODR  Platform:  This  policy  option  aims  to  upgrade  the  technology  and  the 
functionalities  of  the  ODR  platform  and  modify  its  workflow  so  that  consumers  can  directly 
complain  to  an  ADR  entity  without  the  need  for  the  trader's  prior  consent  to  participate  in  an 
ADR  process.  However,  it  is  uncertain  whether  technical  upgrades  alone  will  significantly 
improve  dispute  resolution  on  the  platform,  as  previous  upgrades  have  not  brought  any 
significant  results.  Changing  the  workflow,  on  the  other  hand,  would  align  with  how  ADR 
processes  are  typically  initiated  but  does  not  provide  any  incentives  for  traders  to  participate. 
Additionally, industry stakeholders have expressed concerns about  the relevance of  complaints 
submitted  through  the  ODR  platform,  which  increases  business  costs  by  shifting  the 
responsibility  of  handling  consumer  claims  from  businesses  complaints  handling  systems  to 
managing an ADR process involving a third party entity. Currently, half of the disputes initiated 

32 

 
 
on  the  platform  and  reaching  an  ADR  entity  are  deemed  ineligible,  and  this  creates  an 
unnecessary burden for businesses and ADR entities. 

6.  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? 

A  detailed  assessment  of  the  economic,  social,  environmental  impacts  and  the  effects  on 
fundamental rights, including all the analysis and the quantifications, divided by stakeholder, is 
presented  in  Annex  4.  A  detailed  stakeholders’  view  is  presented  in  Annex  2.To  calculate 
impacts  on  a  time  horizon  of  10  years,  a  3%  discount  factor  is  applied  in  order  to  consider 
present values.  

After the assessment of these impacts, for each policy option is presented a scoring for the three 
areas of effectiveness towards reaching each specific objective, efficiency to assess how this is 
reached and coherence with EU legislation. The scores are given with points from 0 to 5 and are 
used to  compare the options in  section  7.  The score for effectiveness  is  measured  qualitatively 
based on the assessed performance of each policy option  against each of the objectives. It also 
takes into account the impacts which cannot be quantified. As policy options address each of the 
objectives, the quantitative score takes into consideration how appropriate is each option to reach 
each  individual  objective  (average  measure).  The  score  for  coherence  is  also  awarded 
qualitatively. The score for efficiency is based on the quantified net benefit of each policy option 
for all stakeholders and gives an indication of the cost/benefit ratio for each option. A score of 5 
is  awarded  to  the  most  efficient  option  and  the  other  scores  are  given  in  proportion  (details  in 
Annex 4).  

Option A: Non-regulatory intervention 

•  Economic  impacts:  Providing  trainings  to  ADR  entities  to  improve  their  understanding  of 
digital and cross-border disputes and setting up a system to exchange best practices would entail 
recurring  costs  for  the  public  sector  (Member  States  and  the  Commission)  due  to  the  rapidly 
changing  nature  of  digital  markets.  Trainings  alone  would  not  be  effective  in  keeping  ADR  in 
par with the rapid evolution of digital markets and would not immediately increase consumers’ 
redress  opportunities.  Training  all  certified  ADR  entities  would  be  expensive  and  not  all  their 
staff  members  would  participate,  nor  would  all  new  material  be  promptly  implemented.  For 
cross-border disputes, trust and language barriers would limit the positive effects of trainings and 
thus require stronger solutions. A system for exchanging best practices would also impose costs 
on all parties involved without addressing in the short-medium term the issues arising in digital 
markets.  A  self-regulatory  approach  to  PODR  would  be  a  first  step  towards  bringing  these 
systems  in  line  with  the  ADR  framework,  but  the  voluntary  nature  of  the  measure  makes  its 
effectiveness depend on the good will of the industry. Thus, this measure is expected to have a 
limited  positive  impact  on  the  reduction  of  consumer  detriment  in  the  long  run.  Awareness 
raising  campaigns  are  expensive  in  view  of  the  large  number  of  consumers  that  need  to  be 
reached  (several  millions  euros  for  the  Commission  or  NCAs).  Previous  campaigns  have  not 
significantly improved the low level of awareness among consumers and businesses, as outlined 
in  the  problem  definition,    new  campaigns  must  therefore  be  of  a  much  higher  quality  and 
relevance to improve the situation and therefore new investment in the area should concentrate 

33 

 
 
on quality  and best  practices. Consumers' awareness  of ADR is  however highly uneven across 
the EU, as confirmed by the European Consumer Organization (BEUC) in their 2022 report on 
ADR.85  Creating  a  standardized,  easy-to-understand  information  template  that  ADR  entities 
could use to exchange information during cross border disputes could help reduce the consumer 
difficulties to participate in a cross border ADR process and thus address a part of the detriment 
linked to cross border issues not addressed, but the impact of this measure is also expected to be 
limited.  Similarly,  adoption  of  AI  tools  for  instant  translation  of  documents  by  ADR  could 
prove  helpful  with  cross-border  cases.  All  in  all,  the  reduction  in  consumer  detriment  would 
remain limited as those measures are not expected to improve participation in ADRsignificantly. 
Social impacts: This measure is expected to have positive impacts. Training programs for ADR 
entities could create additional jobs. Self-regulation of PODR by online marketplaces, if picked 
up by the platforms, would improve the governance of those businesses.   

•  Environmental impacts: None. 
• 

Impacts  on  fundamental  rights:  Since  Policy  Option  A  is  non-regulatory,  its  impact  on 
fundamental rights is expected to be limited. Nevertheless, the implementation of specific policy 
measures  within  this  option,  such  as  better  awareness-raising  campaigns  and  the  use  of 
standardized templates for information exchange between ADR entities in cross-border disputes, 
could potentially enhance consumer protection in accordance with Article 38 CFREU. 

•  Effectiveness:  To  make  ADR  more  suitable  for  digital  markets,  the  option  would  rely  on 
training  for  entities  and  enhanced  exchanges  of  best  practices  between  ADR  entities,  which  is 
expected to have limited positive impacts for consumers. Previous efforts to increase consumer 
and  trader  engagement  in  ADR  through  awareness-raising  campaigns  have  shown  limited 
success  (as  outlined  in  the  problem  definition).  Promoting  templates  for  information  sharing 
among  ADR  entities,  coupled  with  the  adoption  of  AI  tools  for  accurate  translations  of 
supporting documents could facilitate to a certain exchange cross-border ADR. Score: 2/5 

•  Efficiency:  compared  to  the  modest  results  mentioned  above,  the  costs  for  this  option  are 

relatively high for all parties involved. Score: 0/586 

•  Coherence: Policy Option A would have an overall limited impact on the coherence with other 
EU  legal  instruments  as  it  does  not  envisage  any  legislative  measures.  However,  a  number  of 
non-legislative  initiatives  proposed  under  this  policy  option  could  increase  coherence  by 
promoting  convergence  in  the  interpretation  and  application  of  EU  law  by  ADR  entities  in 
different Member States. For example, implementing a system to facilitate the exchange of best 
practices would help ensure more consistent private enforcement of consumer law across the EU. 
Similarly, using standard templates for exchanging information in cross-border cases is likely to 
reduce  fragmentation  in  ADR  outcomes.  Policy  Option  A  would  also  align  with  other  non-
legislative initiatives taken at the EU level. Providing increased capacity-building support aligns 
with  the  Single  Market  Programme's  objective  to  strengthen  the  functioning  of  the  internal 
market, while engaging in dialogue with platforms to ensure that they provide consumer-friendly 

85 BEUC, Alternative Dispute Resolution For Consumers: Time To Move Up A Gear, June 2022.   
86 See Annex 4 for the calculation. Based on net benefit for the quantifiable impacts: EUR 0.  

34 

 
 
 
PODR  services  would  be  consistent  with  similar  initiatives  that  led  online  marketplaces  to 
offering voluntary commitments, such as the Consumer Safety Pledge.87 Score: 1/5      

•  Stakeholders’  view:  Stakeholders  underscored  on  various  occasions  the  need  for  greater 
awareness-raising efforts, capacity-building investments, and the adoption of digital tools. Such 
initiatives  would  improve  the  uptake  of  ADR  and  improve  performance  of  ADR  entities. 
However, stakeholders have also emphasized that improving the ADR framework would require 
an intervention that goes beyond the enactment of non-legislative initiatives. 

Option B: Procedural and geographical scope amendments 

•  Economic  impacts:  in  addition  to  the  measures  assessed  under  Option  A,  Option  B  would 
broaden  the  scope  of  the  Directive  to  include  disputes  between  consumers  and  third-country 
traders.  According  to  the  problem  definition,  these  consumer  complaints  could  make  up 
approximately  5%  of  the  total  (ECC  data).  Out  of  the  180,000  disputes  currently  resolved  (as 
outlined in the problem definition), this would add up to 9,000 more, resulting in a cost of up to 
EUR  2.7  million  for  ADR  entities  to  process  them  (up  to  EUR  24  million  in  10  years).88 
However,  these  additional  disputes  would  pre-empt  larger  costs  that  would  be  incurred  by 
several  parties  if  the  cases  went  to  court.  If  the  consumers  win  90%  of  these  disputes89  (with 
businesses accepting the outcome of the ADR procedure), this would reduce detriment of up to 
about  EUR  1.5  million  every  year,90  i.e.  up  to  EUR  13  million  in  10  years.  It  is  unlikely, 
however,  that  many  third-country  traders  would  agree  to  participate  in  ADR  disputes.  The 
numbers  above  only  apply  if  5%  of  complaints  translate  proportionally  to  5%  of  disputes;  the 
actual figures are expected to be significantly lower. Allowing national authorities to disclose 
the  identity  of  retailers  who  do  not  engage  in  ADR  would  entail  the  preparation  and  the 
maintenance of ad-hoc databases, with costs associated for NCAs (0.5 FTEs at EUR 33.500 per 
FTE91,  i.e.  EUR  450,000  per  year  considering  all  Member  States,  EUR  4  million  in  10  years 
plus IT costs). Consumers would save time by consulting this database as they would know in 
advance whether the business they have issues with is likely to engage in ADR. Trust-marks to 
give visibility to consistent ADR engagement by businesses would be complementary with the 
use of the database.  For these businesses, this measure could boost their market reputation and 
increase their sales thanks to more consumer trust. Strengthening quality criteria to ensure that 
natural  persons  in  charge  of  ADR  are  qualified  for  cross-border  disputes  (legal  and  linguistic 

87  For  further  information  on  the  Product  Safety  Pledge,  please  see  here:  https://commission.europa.eu/business-
economy-euro/product-safety-and-requirements/product-safety/product-safety-pledge_en  
88 EUR 300 per dispute, see problem definition. Discount factor for actualised value: 3%. 
89https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/698442/Final_re
port_-_Resolving_consumer_disputes.pdf; In the absence of figures for the  EU, assumption  is based on  data  from 
the UK. 
90 9,000*90%*EUR 185 (average value of an ADR dispute, proxy data from EU ODR Platform). In an ADR, as the 
solution is amicable, the solution offered to consumers would very likely be smaller than the total, hence the EUR 
185 per dispute are to be considered a maximum value.  
91 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20221219-3. Annual average salaries in the EU.  

35 

 
 
 
expertise)  would  entail  costs  for  ADR  entities  to  hire  or  train  qualified  staff  while  reinforcing 
consumer and business trust into cross-border ADR.  

•  Social impacts:  The database  of businesses refusing to  participate  in ADR  would come at  the 
price of some reputational damages for the businesses concerned. The inclusion of third-country 
traders  within  the  scope  of  the  Directive  would  level  the  playing  field  for  EU  and  non-EU 
businesses.  Strengthening  quality  criteria  for  experts  working  for  ADR  entities  would  improve 
qualifications of ADR professionals.  

•  Environmental impacts: None. 
• 

Impacts on fundamental rights: By extending the scope of the Directive to disputes between 
EU consumers and traders established outside the EU, Policy Option B would provide consumers 
with  an  additional  avenue  to  obtain  redress,  thereby  strengthening  their  right  to  an  effective 
remedy pursuant to Article 47 of the CFREU. However, the naming and shaming of traders who 
refuse to engage in ADR could potentially encroach on their freedom to conduct business under 
Article 16 of the CFREU and raise serious issues regarding the presumption of innocence under 
Article 47 of the CFREU. 

•  Effectiveness:  The  option  would  contribute  to  the  modernisation  of  ADR  as  the  inclusion  of 
third-country  traders  reflects  the  recent  market  developments,  providing  additional  redress 
opportunities  for  consumers  buying  goods  and  services  online  from  companies  established 
outside the EU. The naming and shaming traders who do not engage in ADR while promoting 
those that do so through trust-marks would increase consumers’ and traders’ engagement in 
ADR as consumers would know upfront which businesses are willing to participate to a dispute. 
Furthermore, the strengthening of quality criteria for the natural persons in charge of ADR would 
contribute to the enhancement of cross-border ADR, but only if awareness is high. Score: 3/5 
•  Efficiency:  More  ADR  disputes  entail  more  costs  for  ADR  entities.  The  awareness  raising 
measure  also  imply  some  costs.  Stricter  quality  criteria  for  natural  persons  in  charge  of  ADR 
impose costs for ADR entities (as they would have to train/recruit specialised staff). Score: 0/592 
•  Coherence: Similar to Option A, Option B would also have limited impact on coherence since 
the proposed legislative measures aim only at providing legal clarity and additional policy tools 
to  increase  engagement  in  ADR  among  consumers  and  traders.  These  measures  would  in  any 
event be consistent with other similar initiatives undertaken at the EU level. For example, the use 
of trust marks to promote traders’ engagement in ADR could draw inspiration from the EU trust 
mark  introduced  by  the  eIDAS  Regulation93  to  enhance  the  user’s  confidence  in  online 
transactions. Score: 2/5 

•  Stakeholders’  view:  Given  the  increase  in  transactions  between  EU  consumers  and  non-EU 
traders,  stakeholders  strongly  support  extending  the  scope  of  the  Directive  to  cover  such 
transactions.  According  to  the  results  of  the  public  consultation,  76%  of  111  respondents  find 
this  extension  very  relevant  or  relevant.  However,  in  response  to  the  Call  for  Evidence  and 
during the cross-border ADR roundtable, it was highlighted that incentivizing non-EU traders to 

92 See Annex 4 for the calculation. Based on net benefit for the quantifiable impacts: EUR (-15) million. 
93 REGULATION (EU) No 910/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 23 July 
2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing 
Directive 1999/93/EC: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0910  

36 

 
 
 
participate in ADR and enforcing ADR outcomes against them would be challenging. As regards 
the  quality  criteria  laid  down  by  the  Directive,  overall  stakeholders  consider  them  sufficient, 
although monitoring should be improved to ensure independence of the natural persons in charge 
of  ADR.  Finally,  the  use  of  trust  marks  by  traders  and  platforms  as  well  as  the  naming  and 
shaming  of  traders  who  refuse  to  participate  in  out-of-court  procedures  are  regarded  as  useful 
tools to increase engagement by certain respondents. 

Option C: Material scope amendments and new obligations for traders 

•  Economic impacts: This option would make the number of potential ADR disputes increase by 
about  4.5%  as  a  direct  consequence  of  the  extension  of  the  material  scope  of  the  Directive  to 
disputes  consumer  disputes  going  beyond  strict  contractual  issues.94  Currently,  as  seen  in  the 
problem  definition,  there are approximately 2,250,000 consumers  experiencing  issues  and  who 
potentially  would  like  to  resolve  them  with  ADR.  However,  this  high  number  of  consumers 
interested  in  ADR  translates  into  only  300,000  eligible  ADR  disputes  per  year  in  the  EU.  Of 
these 2,250,000 consumers, approximately 4.5% has a dispute that today would fall outside the 
scope of the ADR Directive and would thus be ineligible for ADR (100,000 disputes). Therefore, 
potential disputes with this measure increase to 400,000. For each eligible dispute, a notification 
is sent by the ADR entity who receives a complaint to the business concerned for initiating the 
dispute  out-of-court.  Out  of  these  400,000  notifications  sent  by  ADR  entities  to  businesses, 
240,000  would  become  disputes,95  while  approximately  128,000  would  go  unanswered.96  If  a 
duty to reply is introduced in the Directive, it is estimated that the cost for businesses to send a 
single  reply  is  around  EUR  20  (including  preparation,  processing  and  sending),  resulting  in  a 
total cost for businesses of EUR 2.6 million per year, or EUR 23 million in 10 years.97 A share 
of the 128,000 potential disputes for which businesses would now have to reply98 could turn into 
actual  disputes,  with  negative  answers  from  businesses  resulting  in  enhanced  certainty  for 
consumers,  who  could  decide  to  bring  their  claim  (or  not)  elsewhere.  Out  of  the  128,000 
potential  disputes,  it  is  estimated  that  approximately  77,000  would  turn  into  actual  disputes99 
(mostly those linked to businesses previously unaware of ADR, for a total of nearly 200,000 new 

94  ECC  data  (see  Annex  4)  on  2022  EU  complaints’  categorization  used  as  a  proxy  for  general  ADR  disputes. 
Complaints on   general information requests, lack of confirmation, other misleading actions or omissions, refusal to 
sell/supply  product  or  discrimination,  and  unfair  and  aggressive  commercial  practices,  are  considered  as  the 
extension of the scope under this policy measure and together account for 4.47% of all complaints.  
95 The ratio 180,000/300,000 applying now to 400,000.  
96 96,000 as seen in the problem definition, i.e. 32% of total, which out of 400,000 is 128,000.  It is unknown how 
many unanswered notifications are from SMEs and how many from large businesses.  
97 3% discount factor applies for actualising values.  
98  Note  that,  as  seen  in  the  Evaluation  (Annex  6),  in  six  Member  States  trader  participation  is  already  always 
required  (DK,  HU,  IS,  LT,  LV,  SK).  In  other  seven  Member  States  trader  participation  is  mandatory  in  specific 
sectors  (AT,  CY,  CZ,  DE,  EL,  ES,  NL)  and  in  further  four,  trader  participation  is  required  under  specific 
circumstances  (BE,  HR,  PT,  SE).  For  simplicity  in  the  calculation,  these  estimates  do  not  take  into  consideration 
this, which is acknowledged as a limitation. 
99 Applying the same logic that approximately 60% of businesses, if solicited by ECCs, normally find an agreement 
with the consumers. Hence 60% of businesses who are solicited to reply would reply positively.  

37 

 
 
 
disputes  under  this  policy  option100).  If  consumers  win  90%  of  the  times  (with  businesses 
accepting  the  ADR  outcome),  it  would  reduce  detriment  by  EUR  33  million  annually,101  i.e. 
EUR 290 million in 10 years. However, handling these 200,000 new disputes might cost up to 
EUR  60  million  annually102  (EUR  527  million  in  10  years)  for  ADR  entities,  which  could  be 
funded  in  various  ways103.  Enabling  the  bundling  of  similar  cases  by  ADR  entities  would 
generate savings for them (as a result of more efficient handling), offsetting their costs by EUR 
11 million annually (i.e. EUR 97 million in 10 years)104. The net extra costs for ADR entities, 
taking  into  account  economies  of  scale,  could  range  from  EUR  0  to  EUR  49  million  annually 
(EUR 25 million on average), or from EUR 0 to EUR 430 million in 10 years (EUR 215 million 
on  average).  ADR  entities  incurring  costs  can  also  pass  them  on  to  the  traders,  knowing  that 
they  would  still  save  compared  to  going  to  court.  The  duty  of  reply  would  replace  the  current 
requirement to disclose information on ADR, for businesses who do not intend nor are obliged 
to resolve disputes through ADR (64%105 of traders)106. It is known from the Impact Assessment 
linked to the current ADR Directive107 that the inflation adjusted cost of providing information to 
consumers is about EUR 310 per business.108 This is mostly a one-off cost. Every year, for newly 
established businesses who do not adhere to any ADR entities,109 the total savings would amount 
to EUR 99 million annually,110 i.e. EUR 870 million in 10 years; a share of the costs stemming 
from 
receipts,  websites, 
in 
brochures/leaflets”111  would  then  be  saved  also  for  current  businesses,  for  a  total  of  EUR  165 
million  per  year,  i.e.  EUR  1.4  billion  in  10  years  (EUR  2.3  billion  in  10  years  in  total  as 
savings for businesses). Replacing the ODR platform with signposting tools would save the 

information  on  ADR 

contracts, 

invoices, 

“adding 

100 300,000-180,000 in the baseline +77,000. 
101 200,000*90%*EUR 185. 
102 EUR 300 per dispute, see problem definition. 
103  However,  one  must  take  into  account  that  ADR  entities  would  experience  economies  of  scale  after  a  certain 
point,  and  only  marginal  costs  of  adding  extra  disputes  should  be  taken  into  account.  Also,  the  costs  that  these 
additional disputes entail pre-empt larger costs to be incurred by several parties if the cases end up in court. 
104 This is a conservative estimate related to potential savings. It takes into account the number of potential disputes 
(380,000) and assumes that only 10% of them are bundled together. Considering that the average value of a dispute 
is EUR 300, the savings amount to EUR 11 millions  105 Consumer Conditions Scoreboard - Consumers at home in 
the Single Market, 2019, consumers-conditions-scoreboard-2019_pdf_en.pdf (europa.eu). 
105  Consumer  Conditions  Scoreboard  -  Consumers  at  home  in  the  Single  Market,  2019,  consumers-conditions-
scoreboard-2019_pdf_en.pdf (europa.eu). 
106 In the behavioural study on ADR/ODR it was found that “information provided on ADR entity websites does not 
seem to be a major driver of usage”. This apply especially if the trader who has to disclose this information does not 
intend to engage. 
107 Impact Assessment accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Alternative Dispute Resolution for consumer disputes (Directive on consumer ADR) and Proposal for a 
Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  Online  Dispute  Resolution  for  consumer  disputes 
(Regulation on consumer ODR) {COM(2011) 793 final} {SEC(2011) 1409 final}. 
108 EUR 254 x 1.2217 as cumulative inflation between 2012 and 2023 (in2013dollars.com/Europe). 
109 Eurostat: 500,000 new wholesalers and retailers every year in the EU x 64% = 320,000. 
110 320,000 (see footnote above) x EUR 310 (costs for traders to comply with obligation information). 
111  35% of  the  total  costs  (2011  Impact  Assessment),  i.e.  EUR  109.  We  assume  10% of  them  would need reprint 
every year, for a cost of EUR 11 per existing business who does not adhere to an ADR entity (23,000,000 x 64% = 
15,000,000).  

38 

 
 
 
European Commission about EUR 500,000 per year112, i.e. EUR 4.4 million in 10 years.113 A 
behavioural  study  conducted  on  ADR  information  requirements114  showed  that  the  currently 
requirement  for  traders  to  clearly  disclose  on  their  websites  the  ODR  link  does  not  positively 
impact on consumer’s intention to use ADR; Thus, removing it would not produce any negative 
consequences on consumer engagement in ADR. Businesses operating online would not need to 
maintain  an  e-mail  address  for  ODR  correspondence,  saving  EUR  100  per  year.115  The  total 
benefit for businesses would then be EUR 370 million saved per year, i.e. EUR 3.3 billion in 
10  years.  Also,  newly  established  businesses  in  the  EU  in  the  next  10  years  would  not  incur 
costs to provide ODR information on their website, but this estimate is already included in the 
calculations  linked  to  the  removal  of  ADR  information,  presented  above.  Regarding  the 
obligation for marketplaces that provide PODR to show abidance by high-quality dispute 
resolution standards through  self-certification, it is known from the problem definition that, 
among  nine  important  marketplaces,  the  average  perceived116  compliance  rate  with  the  quality 
criteria laid down by the Directive is 67%. The self-certification scheme will let this figure tend 
towards 100% in  the whole market,  an improvement of 33% which is  not  directly quantifiable 
but  leads  to  a  concrete  reduction  in  consumer  detriment,  as  it  would  help  consumers  by 
countering unfairness and promoting a level playing field for online marketplaces. This would 
require  large  businesses  to  be  subject  to  similar  quality  criteria  as  digital  businesses  operating 
mostly  on  domestic  markets  and  SMEs  when  using  standard  ADR.  Among  the  12  quality 
requirements  of  the  ADR  Directive  for  which  the  mini-sweep  on  PODRs  was  performed,  the 
lowest scores on perceived compliance  concerned in particular five questions.117 From these, it 
appears  that  the  most  significant  share  of  additional  costs  for  online  marketplaces  would  stem 
from  hiring  impartial  mediators  trained  on  consumer  law  and  making  sure  translation  (even 
automatic translation) is provided to the consumer. There are 438 online marketplaces selling in 
the EU with 1000 Internet domains,118 and it is estimated that half of them may already have a 
Private Online Dispute Resolution (PODR) platform or may only need marginal improvements 
to  meet  the  quality  criteria  set  by  the  ADR  Directive.  This  would  mean  that  110  businesses 

112 See Annex 7 for more information on the costs of the ODR Platform. This figure also takes into account the costs 
of replacing the ODR platform with signposting tools, which are estimated to amount 100 000 maximum. 
113 EUR 600,000 every year saved if the ODR platform stops to be maintained, minus EUR 100,000 every year for 
other  developed  solutions  to  redirect  consumers  to  the  right  ADR  entity  (e.g.  artificial  intelligence-powered 
lawbots/chatbots).  
114 Behavioural study on disclosure of ADR information to consumers by traders and ADR entities. 
115 The average cost of maintaining this e-mail address, considering the due diligence of conducting business which 
would  require  to  read  the  correspondence  on  a  daily  basis,  is  assumed  to  amount  to  EUR  0.5  per  working  day. 
Prospective  ADR  dispute  requests  (400,000  per  year)  would  only  occasionally  reach  the  mailbox  of  a  business 
(about 3,700,000 retailers operates online, Eurostat). 
116 It is important to highlight that the sweep only indicated if the information about the different criteria were found 
in the platform, it could be that some criteria are satisfied even if information is not given.  
117 Are the persons in charge of dispute resolution impartial?, Can a consumer submit the complaint in a language of 
their choice (or at least the country where they reside)?, Is there any guarantee that the persons in charge of dispute 
resolution are trained in the consumer law?, Do consumers have access to the trader's position/evidence?, Can the 
consumer be represented?, for which compliance among the 9 businesses swept was lower than 22%.  
118 CBC Commerce, https://www.cbcommerce.eu/blog/2022/09/21/top-100-marketplaces-in-europe-annual-ranking-
2022-out-now/.  

39 

 
 
 
would need to significantly improve their processes to match the criteria, incurring costs such as 
hiring lawyers expert in consumer law to oversee the dispute resolution process (EUR 100,000 
per  year)  and  purchasing  automatic  translation  tools  (EUR  10,000  lump  sum).  The  total 
estimated cost over 10 years would be EUR 97 million (or EUR 11 million per year). Granting 
ECCs  a  supporting  role  means  that  ECCs  would  have  to  assists  ADRs  with  questions  about 
applicable law in other EU countries, translating correspondence and documents relevant for the 
case,  etc.  This  is  estimated  to  require  about  50  FTEs  in  the  whole  EU,  re-absorbing  the 
equivalent number of posts acting act as ODR contact points in the Member States. This  zero-
cost  measure119 would in  turn further decrease consumer detriment  and save costs to  the ADR 
entities. The measure to establish a self-certification mechanism for EU-level trade associations 
whereby  they  could  take  on  a  role  (on  a  voluntary  basis)  in  setting  up  cross-border  dispute 
settlement  systems  is  estimated  to  have  limited  additional  costs  for  the  interested  associations. 
The option also includes extending the scope to third-country traders, but the measure is not 
included in this assessment of the economic impacts of Option C due to  its dependence on the 
willingness of traders to engage in ADR disputes, which is considered low. 

•  Social impacts: The certainty to rapidly obtain an answer to their complaints brought to a proper 
ADR would reduce drastically the stress of consumers who would better assess the feasibility of 
the various concrete  possibilities  to  solve their issue. The  extended scope of application of the 
Directive  would  also  diminish  stress  for  those  disputes  which  currently  can  only  have  their 
solution in court. Replacing the ODR Platform would have no social impact on employment as 
MS  contact  point  (about  50  FTEs  throughout  the  EU)  would  be  absorbed  by  ECCs  with  new 
cross-border ADR responsibilities. 

• 

•  Environmental  impacts:  Expanding  the  scope  of  the  Directive  to  include  extra-contractual 
disputes would allow consumers to seek redress  for damages resulting from unfair commercial 
practices, including those related to misleading green claims. The possibility of obtaining redress 
against  greenwashing  through  ADR  would  reinforce  the  efforts  of  public  consumer  protection 
authorities and contribute to achieving the goals of the European Green Deal strategy.  
Impacts  on  fundamental  rights:  Policy  Option  C  would  have  an  overall  positive  impact  on 
fundamental rights. The widened material and geographical scope of the Directive would ensure 
that consumers have access to private redress for a broader range of disputes, thereby reinforcing 
their  right  to  an  effective  remedy  as  laid  down  by  Article  47  of  the  CFREU.  The  measures 
aimed  at  ensuring  through  a  self-certification  mechanism  that  PODR  systems  adhere  to  high-
quality  standards  would  enhance  consumer  protection  (Article  38  CFREU)  without  imposing 
burdensome  obligations  that  would  negatively  impact  on  the  platforms'  freedom  to  conduct 
business (Article 16 of the CFREU). Although the introduction of a duty of reply would require 
traders  to  examine  any  potential  disputes  forwarded  to  them  by  ADR  entities,  the  fact  that 
businesses are not obliged by the Directive to participate in ADR ensures that their freedom to 
conduct business is observed. 

•  Effectiveness: The option makes ADR fit for digital markets by increasing the number of times 
ADR is used to solve disputes arising from marketing techniques typical of our era and providing 

119 ODR contact points are funded by MS budget, while ECC are co-financed by the EU. In shifting these jobs, MS 
would have less expenses and the EU some more.  

40 

 
 
 
PODR services in line with the existing quality requirements of the Directive, harnessing all their 
benefits  for  consumers  and  SMEs.  The  option  effectively  increases  consumers’  and  traders’ 
engagement in ADR through a new obligation for businesses to reply to ADR entities regarding 
the  dispute  and  replacing  the  ODR  Platform  with  AI-signposting  for  consumers,  leading 
consumer detriment to further decrease of EUR 290 million in 10 years, with less psychological 
distress.  The  option  facilitates  cross-border  ADR  through  cost-free  measures  on  empowered 
ECCs and trade associations. Score: 4/5 

•  Efficiency: The option reaches the objectives by bringing a total of EUR 5.6 billion in 10 years 
of  savings  for  businesses  thanks  to  the  removal  of  disclosure  obligations  (even  though  a  few 
large businesses are  expected to incur  costs of  EUR  97  million  in  10 year; this  would  foster a 
level playing field). This would be complemented by EUR 4.4 million in 10 years of reduction in 
costs  for  the  Commission  and  EUR  233  million  of  additional  costs  for  ADR  entities  (which 
would however pre-empt larger costs to be incurred by several parties if the cases end up in court 
and could pass the costs onto traders). Score: 5/5120 

•  Coherence:  Policy  Option  C  would  significantly  enhance  the  coherence  of  EU  consumer 
protection  legislation.  It  clarifies  the  scope  of  the  ADR  Directive  by  making  it  explicit  that  it 
applies to  any consumer disputes (regardless  of whether they are related to  contractual issues). 
This  option  would  bring  the  ADR  Directive  in  line  with  Article  11(a)  of  the  UCPD,  which 
provides  that  ‘consumers  harmed  by  unfair  commercial  practices  shall  have  access  to 
proportionate  and  effective  remedies’.  In  this  respect,  consumer  ADR  could  be  argued  to 
constitute an accessible and effective remedy against unfair commercial practices. In general, by 
broadening  the  category  of  admissible  disputes  and  increasing  awareness  of  ADR  among 
consumers and traders, this policy option would dovetail with a number of EU legal instruments, 
including  the  European  Small  Claims  Procedure121,  the  Mediation  Directive122  and  the 
Representative Action Directive123, as they all share the common objective of promoting access 
to  justice.  On a different note, the requirement for online  marketplaces  to provide high  quality 
ODR  services  to  resolve  consumer  disputes  between  their  users  would  be  coherent  with  their 
obligations under Article 20 and 21 of the DSA to provide sound complaint handling systems 
and access to out-of-court dispute settlement systems for content moderation disputes. Although 
the revised ADR and the DSA would have different targets, the former pertaining to consumer 
disputes  and  the  latter  focused  on  content  moderation  disputes,  as  well  as  different  systems  to 
attain them, the ADR Directive through self-certification and the DSA through obligations laid 
down  in  the  Regulation,  both  strive  to  facilitate  fair,  affordable  and  efficient  resolution  of 
disputes within the online ecosystem. Score: 5/5 

120 See Annex 4 for the calculation. Based on net benefit for the quantifiable impacts: EUR 5.5 billion. 
121  Regulation  (EC)  No  861/2007  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  11  July  2007  establishing  a 
European Small Claims Procedure, EUR-Lex - 32007R0861 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu). 
122  Directive  2008/52/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  21  May  2008  on  certain  aspects  of 
mediation in civil and commercial matters, EUR-Lex - 32008L0052 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu). 
123 Directive (EU) 2020/1828 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2020 on representative 
actions  for  the  protection  of  the  collective  interests  of  consumers  and  repealing  Directive  2009/22/EC  (Text  with 
EEA relevance), EUR-Lex - 32020L1828 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu). 

41 

 
 
 
•  Stakeholders’ view: The vast majority of stakeholders across all categories emphasised the need 
to  revise  the  ADR  Directive  by  widening  its  scope  to  explicitly  include  disputes  related  to 
consumer  statutory  rights  independently  of  the  existence  or  not  of  a  contract  or  what  is  in  the 
contract,  making  the  ADR  framework  more  accessible  and  used  and  thus  cost-effective,  and 
stepping  up  cross-border  ADR.  There  have  been  divergent  views  on  whether  to  incentivize 
collective  ADR  through  the  bundling  of  cases  due  to  limited  resources  and  capacity  of  some 
ADR  entities.  In  the  context  of  the  open  public  consultation,  58%  of  the  111  respondents 
expressed  their  support  for  collective  ADR.  The  cross-border  roundtable  also  concluded  that 
collective ADR should be encouraged as  a way to ensure the sustainability  of ADR  entities in 
times of crisis. However, stakeholders highlighted that the design of collective ADR should be 
left to the Member States. There is a general consensus that the EU ODR Platform is limited in 
its cost-effectiveness. While some stakeholders believe that upgrading the  role of ODR contact 
points to become de facto ADR contact points would   notably improve the potential to resolve 
cross-border disputes, the majority prefer to replace the platform with user-friendly AI tools for 
better consumer signposting. As regards the role of ECCs, the informal ministerial on consumer 
affairs  organised  by  the  Czech  Council  Presidency  in  September  2022  confirmed  that  most 
Member States are satisfied with the assistance provided by the ECC-Net to consumers in their 
cross-border disputes and envisage a stronger role to be played by ECCs in cross-border ADR. 
Lastly,  the  participants  at  the  ADR  Assembly  of  2021  emphasized  the  importance  of  reducing 
reporting  obligations  for  ADR  entities  to  free  up  resources  that  could  be  used  to  expand  their 
outreach.  

Option D: Architectural changes and increased level of harmonization  

•  Economic impacts:  If ADR were to be mandatory for traders above a certain threshold, up to 
all  the  300,000    disputes  currently  launched  yearly  would  be  solved  by  ADR  (up  to  120,000 
more).124 This  would mean, if consumers win  90% of the times (with businesses accepting the 
result of the ADR procedure), a reduction in consumer detriment of about EUR 20 million per 
year,125 i.e. up to EUR 176 million in 10 years. Obliging businesses to engage in these disputes 
would make them incur costs of participation, i.e. time and legal fees, even if they do not intend 
to  abide  by  the  outcome  of  the  process  (which  could  lead  potentially  to  further  expenses  in 
court). Assuming that for an average dispute, small amounts are a stake, businesses would spend 
EUR 100 to prepare and participate in ADR (if the cost of preparation would be higher than the 
value of the dispute and ADR were mandatory under this policy option, businesses would prefer 
to reimburse fully the consumer rather than start the proceeding), and cumulative costs would 
amount to EUR 12 million every year,126 i.e. up to EUR 105 million in 10 years. 120,000 extra 
disputes would also mean additional costs of EUR 36 million per year by ADR entities to handle 
disputes,  i.e.  a  cost  of  up  to  EUR  316  million  in  10  years.  As  in  the  assessment  of  Option  C, 

124 There is no information on the size of the businesses more involved with ADR disputes, but it is expected that a 
large number of the 300,000 eligible disputes is with large businesses.  
125 120,000*90%*EUR 185. 
126 EUR 100 x 120,000 disputes. 

42 

 
 
 
ADR entities would experience economies of scale after a certain point, and only marginal costs 
of adding extra disputes should be taken into account. The bundling measure (collective ADR 
redress)  would  also  have  an  offsetting  effect  which,  if  10%  of  disputes  are  bundled  together, 
amounting to EUR 9 million per year or EUR 79 million in 10 years.127 The total costs for ADR 
entities (which they could pass on to traders) would then be between EUR 0 and EUR 27 million 
per  year  (EUR  14  million  on  average),  i.e.  between  EUR  0  and  EUR  237  million  in  10  years 
(EUR  119  million  in  10  years  on  average).  Extending  the  quality  criteria  of  the  ADR 
directive to platform’s dispute resolution systems (under supervision and audits from ADR 
NCAs), would result in similar impacts to Option C with the difference being that there would be 
a process of certification process and audits instead of self-certification s. Hence, as in Option C, 
total costs in 10 years for online marketplaces to comply would amount to EUR 97 million, but 
in addition they would have to file the reports, for a total of 0.5 FTEs for each business (one-off) 
and 0.1 FTE every year to follow up on the file (at EUR 33.500 per FTE128), i.e. EUR 5,000,000 
in 10 years.129 The total cost for large business would therefore amount to EUR 102 million 
in 10 years. In addition, the supervision and audits from ADR NCAs over 110 large businesses 
could  translate  into  10  audits  per  year,  entailing  a  cost  of  2  FTEs  (EUR  31,700  per  FTE  the 
average in MS130) and 2 more FTEs for supervising, for a total of EUR 1,100,000 in 10 years. 
Given that six Member  States regularly perform on-the-spot checks on ADR entities as part of 
their monitoring mechanisms,131 with an estimated cost of EUR 10,000 for each Member State, 
in  10  years  this  would  amount  to  additional  EUR  500,000  for  NCAs.  Total  costs  for  NCAs 
would then amount to EUR 1.6 million in 10 years. As in option C, the benefits would be a 
concrete  reduction  in  consumer  detriment  mostly  connected  to  the  enhanced  quality  of 
PODR,  as  well  as  level  playing  field  for  businesses.  Requiring  MS  to  designate  a  residual 
entity in charge of digital disputes, as well as establishment of a residual EU-level ADR entity 
for  cross  border  complaints  (including  with  non-EU  traders)  would  provide  consumers  with  a 
convenient  one-stop-shop  solution  for  resolving  their  disputes  out-of-court.  This  would  be 
especially  beneficial  in  a  mandatory  ADR  framework,  where  confusion  about  where  to  seek 
redress could be particularly problematic. The residual entity designated by the MS would have 
to be staffed with legal experts in digital disputes, with an estimated cost of at least 2 FTEs per 
MS, totalling EUR 1,800,000 per year,132 i.e. EUR 16 million of costs in 10 years for the 27 
MS.  The  EU-level  entity  for  cross-border  disputes,  which  would  be  an  already  existing,  fully 
operational one selected by the Commission (through a tender/grant) would have the resources to 
be  able  to  handle  disputes  in  23  official  languages  of  the  EU.  Even  if  automatic  translation  is 
implemented,  the  supervision  of  at  least  1  FTE  per  language  is  envisaged.  That  would  mean 

127 30,000*EUR 300 in 10 years with a 3% discount factor.  128 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-
news/w/ddn-20221219-3. Annual average salaries in the EU.  
128 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20221219-3. Annual average salaries in the EU.  
129  EUR  33,500*0,5  FTEs*110  businesses  =  EUR  1,842,500,  and  EUR  33,500*0,1  FTEs*110  businesses  for  10 
years (3% discount rate) = EUR 3,237,000. Total = EUR 5 million. 
130 Eurostat, Average remuneration of national civil servants in central public administration. 
131  Information  gathering  for  assisting  the  Commission  in  complying  with  its  obligation  under  Article  26 
(“reporting”) of the ADR Directive and Article 21 (“reporting”) of the ODR Regulation. 
132 EUR 33,500 x 2 FTEs x 27 MS. 

43 

 
 
 
about  EUR  770,500  per  year133,  which  in  10  years  means  EUR  7  million  of  costs  for  the 
Commission.  Requiring  MS  to  have  only  one  certified  ADR  body  per  retail  sector  (to  reduce 
complexity  of  ADR  landscape),  complemented  by  the  residual  cross-border  and  digital  ADR, 
would help consumers in need to solve disputes in a framework where ADR is mandatory. This 
measure would increase competition among ADR entities in the same sector, in order to acquire 
the only available certification.134 In turn, this would make ADR faster and of better quality, as 
well as boost the reduction of consumer detriment. If disputes were three months faster, the EUR 
56 million at stake at any moment135 would generate about EUR 280,000 of interest per year136, 
i.e.  EUR  2,500,000  in  10  years  at  sure  disposal  of  consumers  or  businesses  winning  the 
dispute.  However,  some  certified  ADR  entities  that  through  this  measure  would  lose  the 
certification would certainly lose part of their revenue. As under Option C, but in a framework of 
mandatory ADR, replacing the ODR platform with signposting tools would save the European 
Commission  about  EUR  4.4  million  in  10  years  and  to  businesses  EUR  3.3  billion  in  10 
years.137  The  option  also  includes  extending  the  scope  to  third-country  traders,  but  the 
measure  is  not  included  in  this  assessment  of  the  economic  impacts  of  Option  C  due  to  its 
dependence on the willingness of traders to engage in ADR disputes, which is considered low. 
•  Social impacts: Stress for consumers might increase because mandating ADR usage across the 
most problematic economic sectors would entail an extra redress layer producing outcomes not 
binding for the parties. If businesses that do not intend to engage in such a process are obliged to 
participate,  they  are  more  likely  to  reject  the  verdict  of  the  ADR,  obliging  consumers  to  bring 
them to court or withdraw the case. This would undermine trust and societal cohesion. Replacing 
the  ODR  platform  would  have  a  negative  social  impact  on  those  jobs  as  MS  contact  points 
connected  to  its  implementation  (about  50  FTEs  throughout  the  EU).  The  new  empowered 
residual entities created might absorb some of these jobs.  

•  Environmental impacts: None.  
• 

Impacts  on  fundamental  rights:  The  architectural  changes  proposed  by  this  policy  option 
would  only  affect  national  authorities  and  the  Commission,  without  impacting  fundamental 
rights.  On  the  other  hand,  making  participation  in  ADR  mandatory  would  provide  consumers 
with  a  quick  and  affordable  way  to  resolve  their  disputes,  regardless  of  its  nature,  reinforcing 
their right to an effective remedy under Article 47 of the CFREU and promoting a high level of 
consumer  protection  in  accordance  with  Article  38  of  the  CFREU.  However,  this  very  same 
measure could potentially have negative impact on businesses right to access courts.  

•  Effectiveness:  The  option  makes  ADR  fit  for  digital  markets  by  empowering  new  residual 
entities  in  every  MS  to  deal  with  digital  disputes,  and  by  extending  quality  criteria  of  the 

133 EUR 33,500 x 23 extra languages on top of the language of the MS. 
134 But damage those entities who would lose certification after having invested resources to abide by high quality 
standards 
135 300,000*EUR 185. 
136 At 2% interest rate, in a quarter of a year EUR 56 million generate EUR 280,000. 
137 See assessment of Option C. To this it should be added about EUR 20 of savings for new businesses operating 
online  (80,000,  Eurostat)  that  do  not  need  to  place  the  ODR  link  on  their  website  anymore  (in  the  assessment  of 
Option C this was included in the ADR disclosure of information related savings), i.e. EUR 1,600,000 per year or 
EUR 14 million in 10 years.  

44 

 
 
 
Directive to PODR systems, under the supervision of NCAs. The option increases consumers’ 
and  traders’  engagement  in  ADR  through  a  strong  obligation  to  participate  in  ADR.  If 
consumer  detriment  decreases  of  EUR  176  million  in  10  years,  businesses  would  incur  larger 
costs,  i.e.  EUR  207  million  in  10  years.  Psychological  distress  could  also  increase  due  to 
mandatory  ADR.  The  measure  to  facilitate  cross-border  ADR  by  empowering  one  EU-level 
ADR entity for the whole EU could enhance cross-border ADR, but the capacity of such entity to 
deal with a great number of disputes is uncertain. Score: 3/5 

•  Efficiency:  The  reduction  of  the  costs  connected  to  the  replacement  of  the  EU  ODR  platform 
would be efficient, with EUR 3.3 billion in 10 years of business savings (as no need to disclose 
hyperlink  to  ODR  platform  and  maintain  mailbox).  However,  the  option  would  generate  EUR 
119  million  in  10  years  of  costs  for  the  ADR  entities,  considering  economies  of  scale  and 
offsetting  measures  such  as  the  bundling  of  cases,  which  they  could  pass  to  the  industry. 
However,  there  would  be  significant  costs  for  MS,  the  Commission  (partly  offset  by  the 
replacement of the EU ODR platform) and NCAs to establish new ADR entities (at national and 
EU-level) and re-design national ADR landscapes. Score: 2.8/5138 

•  Coherence: This option would produce different effects on legal coherence: on the one hand, by 
obliging Member State to restructure their domestic ADR landscape and harmonizing the rules 
governing  ADR  procedures  and  mandatory  participation  of  traders  in  ADR,  it  would  make 
consumer law more consistently enforced across the EU, thus strengthening the coherence of the 
consumer  acquis.  On  the  other  hand,  however,  the  measures  proposed  by  this  option  would 
encroach  on  Member  State’s  freedom  to  organize  consumers’  access  to  justice,  which  could 
undermine the internal coherence of their legal system. In this respect, there is uncertainty as to 
whether  increasing  the  level  of  harmonization  of  the  directive  to  such  extent  would  be 
proportionate to the objectives pursued by the policy option. Score: 3/5     

to  support 

•  Stakeholders’  view:  Although  most  stakeholders  continue 

the  minimum 
harmonisation  approach  of  the  Directive,  which  allows  Member  States  to  design  their  national 
ADR architecture according to their needs, resources and culture, certain consumer organisations 
advocate for mandatory ADR for traders, at least in sectors with a high-volume of disputes. The 
Commission's  position  thus  far  has  been  that  ADR  should  remain  voluntary,  except  when 
required by sector-specific or national legislation in the EU, especially because mandatory ADR 
could  potentially  conflict  with  constitutional  norms  in  some  Member  States.  Regarding  the 
current  consumer  ADR  landscape,  consumer  associations,  industry  representatives,  online 
retailers, and European Consumer Centres (ECCs) all seem to agree that it requires simplification 
to enable consumers to navigate it.  

7.  HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? 

To  compare  the  options  described  and  assessed  above,  a  multi-criteria  analysis  has  been 
conducted based on effectiveness, efficiency and coherence criteria. Different total scores have 
been calculated to account for sensitivity analysis, including:  

138 See Annex 4 for the calculation. Based on net benefit for the quantifiable impacts: EUR 3 billion.  

45 

 
 
 
•  A simple sum of the individual criteria scores 
•  A scenario where effectiveness accounts for 80%, efficiency 10%, and coherence 10% (emphasis 

on effectiveness) 

•  A scenario where effectiveness accounts for 10%, efficiency 80%, and coherence 10% (emphasis 

on efficiency) 

•  A scenario where effectiveness accounts for 10%, efficiency 10%, and coherence 80% (emphasis 

on coherence) 

•  A scenario where effectiveness accounts for 40%, efficiency 40%, and coherence 20% (emphasis 

on both effectiveness and efficiency). 

The highest scores for each system are in bold.  

8.  PREFERRED OPTION 

Policy  option  C,  scope  amendments  and  new  business  obligations,  has  been  identified  as  the 
preferred policy option as it received the highest score in each of the five scoring systems used to 
compare the alternatives. It maintains the current minimum harmonization approach of the Directive 
and does not require Member States  to  make participation  in  ADR mandatory for traders. Hence, 
the preferred option is consistent with the principle of subsidiarity governing EU action. It achieves 
Specific Objective 1 by extending the scope of Directive to disputes going beyond issues with the 
contract and disputes between EU consumers and non-EU traders. However, while broadening the 
scope  of  the  Directive  to  reflect  novel  forms  of  disputes  arising  in  digital  markets,  the  voluntary 
nature  of  ADR  ensures  that  the  amendments  will  not  result  in  unproportioned  costs  for  ADR 
entities, NCAs and businesses. The principle of proportionality is observed also with regards to the 
measures  concerning  PODR;  by  providing  for  a  self-certification  mechanisms  for  online 
marketplaces to show that their PODR abide by high-quality standards, the relevant measure in the 
preferred option does not impose excessive burden on these traders. As regards Specific Objective 
2, the introduction of a trader’s duty of reply to enquiries by ADR entities is expected to increase 
business engagement in  ADR. This measure entails some costs for businesses, but these costs  are 
more  than  offset  by  the  removal  of  disclosure  obligations  for  traders  who  do  not  intend  nor  are 
obliged to participate in ADR. Furthermore, the preferred option proposes to discontinue the ODR 
platform (and with it, the removal of the traders’ obligation to provide a hyperlink to the platform 
on their website), and replace it with new, more cost-efficient, signposting tools to be deployed by 
the  Commission  to  increase  consumer  awareness  and  engagement.  SMEs,  the  wide  majority  of 
businesses, are set to benefit from these measures, which will result in significant cost savings. As a 

46 

OptionsEffectivenessEfficiency CoherenceEqual weightsEffectiveness dominantEfficiency dominant Coherence dominant Effectiveness and efficiency dominantA20,011,01,40,61,01,0B30,021,72,21,01,81,6C45,054,74,44,84,84,6D32,832,93,02,93,02,9Comparison of optionsSensitivity analysis 
 
 
 
 
result,  competitiveness  of  EU  SMEs  will  be  impacted  positively  by  this  option,  as  these  savings 
could be used to boost the attractiveness of their prices, and possibly foster innovation.  
 Finally,  the  enhancement  of  cross-border  ADR  (Specific  Objective  3)  will  be  achieved  only  by 
granting  a  new  specific  role  to  the  existing  ECCs  (no  need  for  additional  resources,  as  they  will 
absorb ODR contact points)  and by enabling trade association to set up on a voluntary basis cross-
border dispute settlement systems. Thus, these measures do not go beyond what is strictly necessary 
to achieve their specific objective.   

8.1.  REFIT (simplification and improved efficiency) 

The preferred option will provide the following opportunities for improved efficiency, calculated 
on an annual basis: 

•  EUR 370M ongoing administrative cost savings for businesses (replacing of EU ODR 

Platform); 

•  EUR 264M ongoing administrative cost savings for businesses (removal of ADR 

disclosure of information obligations). 

8.2.  Application of the ‘one in, one out’ approach 

The preferred option comes with the following small annual costs: 

•  EUR 2.6M ongoing administrative costs for businesses (from duty of reply); 
•  EUR 25M ongoing adjustment costs for ADR entities (handling additional disputes);  
•  EUR 11M ongoing adjustment costs related to compliance for private ODR platform 

providers. 

This total of EUR 39 million per year is highly compensated by the EUR 634 million of annual 
cost savings coming from simplification.  

9.  HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? 

To  assess  the  effectiveness  in  achieving  the  objectives  of  the  option  introduced,  the  following 
core  progress  indicators  have  been  identified  in  line  with  the  objectives  of  the  policy  action. 
These  indicators  can  serve  as  the  basis  for  its  evaluation,  as  well  as  possible  targets  to  be 
achieved seven years after the entry into application of the revised Directive. 

Objectives  
the  number  of 
Increase 
disputes  resolved  through 
ADR in the EU 
Increase 
the  number  of 
extra-contractual  disputes 

Core indicators 
of 
Number 
disputes in the EU.  

ADR 

Number 
contractual 

of 

extra-
disputes 

Baseline 
180,000  ADR 
disputes  every 
year.  
N/A 

Target in 7 years  
400,000  ADR  disputes 
every year.  

100,000  extra-contractual 
solved  with 
disputes 

47 

 
 
 
   
 
 
 
resolved  through  ADR  in 
the EU 
Increase  awareness  of  ADR 
among 
and 
traders 

consumers 

solved  with  ADR  in  the 
EU. 
Awareness 
of  ADR 
among  consumers  and 
traders.  

ADR  in  the  EU  every 
year. 
50% of consumers aware. 
70% of retailers aware. 

of 

28% 
consumers 
aware. 
43% of retailers 
aware. 

Obtaining  a  large  number 
of self-certified private ODR 
platforms 

Sweep  on  the  number  of 
self-certified 
private 
ODR  platforms  in  the 
EU. 

N/A 

100  self-certified  private 
ODR  platforms 
the 
EU. 

in 

48 

 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION 

1.  LEAD DG, DeCIDE PLANNING/CWP REFERENCES 

Lead DG 

Decide Planning 

CWP reference 

DG JUST 

PLAN/2022/1534 

CWP 2023, Annex II: REFIT initiatives, No.8 

2.  ORGANISATION AND TIMING 

An  Inter-Service  Steering  Group  (ISSG)  assisted  DG  JUST  in  the  preparation  of  the  Impact 
Assessment and legal proposal. It included Commission Services of 8 Directorate-Generals: DG 
for  Financial  Stability,  Financial  Services  and  Capital  Markets  Union  (FISMA),  DG  Internal 
Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SME (GROW), DG Communications Networks, Content 
and  Technology  (CNECT),  DG  Mobility  and  Transport  (MOVE),  DG  for  Health  and  Food 
Safety  (SANTE),  DG  Environment  (ENV),  DG  Competition  (COMP),  DG  Energy  (ENER), 
together with the Commission’s Legal Service (SJ) and Secretariat General (SG). 

The ISSG held three meetings before the consultation of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB): 
on 26 August 2022, on 24 January 2023 and the last meeting on 20 March 2023. Pursuant to the 
requirements of the better regulation guidelines, the minutes of the last meeting were submitted 
to theRSB. 

A fourth meeting took place on 7 July 2023 to discuss the changes following the positive opinion 
of the RSB. 

3.  CONSULTATION OF THE RSB 

The  RSB  was  consulted  in  an  upstream  meeting  on  21  October  2022.  The  draft  Impact 
Assessment report and all supporting documents were submitted to the RSB on 29 March 2023, 
in view of a hearing on 26 April 2023. 

After  the  hearing,  the  RSB  issued  a  positive  opinion.  Amendments  to  the  impact  assessment, 
following the recommendation of the opinion, include: 

•  A better explanation and renaming of the policy options, in particular on how measures 

were included in each bundle; 

49 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
•  An acknowledgement of the limitations of the analysis, in particular considering that in 
some Member States and industrial sectors ADR is mandatory. Quantifications remain 
impossible; 

•  Methodology for the scoring system was better explained.  

4.  EVIDENCE, SOURCES AND QUALITY 

The impact assessment is based on several sources, using both quantitative and qualitative data. 
However, the impact assessment was not supported by a dedicated study. These sources include: 

Studies commissioned or supported by the European Commission 

•  European Commission, Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, Tetra Tech, 

VVA, CSES, Information gathering for assisting the Commission in complying with its 
obligations under Article 26 (“reporting”) of the ADR Directive and Article 21 
(“reporting”) of the ODR Regulation, (2022). 

•  European Commission, Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, Tetra Tech, 

VVA, CSES, Information gathering for assisting the Commission in complying with its 
obligations under Article 26 (“reporting”) of the ADR Directive and Article 21 
(“reporting”) of the ODR Regulation, Annex I, Case Study: the use of AI in ODR and 
Case Study – the use of ADR in E-commerce, (2022). 

•  European Commission, Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, LE Europe, 

VVA, YouGov, LinQ, Behavioural study on disclosure of ADR information to consumers 
by traders and ADR entities, (2022).  

•  Prof. dr. Stefaan Voet, Sofia Caruso, Anna D’Agostino, Stien Dethier, Recommendations 
from academic research regarding future needs of the EU framework of the consumer 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), (JUST/2020/CONS/FW/CO03/0196), 2022, 
available at https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2022-08/adr_report_final.pdf. 
•  Consumer Conditions Survey: Consumer at home in the single market – 2021 edition, 

available at https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2021-
03/ccs_ppt_120321_final.pdf 

•  Consumer Conditions Scoreboard - Consumers at home in the Single Market – 2019 
edition, available at consumers-conditions-scoreboard-2019_pdf_en.pdf (europa.eu). 

•  The 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard, available at THE 2022 EU JUSTICE SCOREBOARD 

(europa.eu). 

•  Market Monitoring Survey 2019-2020, available at mms-overview-report-19-20_en.pdf 

(europa.eu) 

Publicly available dataset/information 

50 

 
 
 
 
 
 
•  Data on sweeps (up to 2022). 

•  ODR platform statistics (2016-2022). 

•  ECCs data (up to 2022).  

•  Eurostat. 

51 

 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 2: SYNOPSIS REPORT: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION 

INTRODUCTION AND CONSULTATION STRATEGY 

This  report  presents  a  comprehensive  summary  of  all  stakeholder  consultation  activities 
conducted in preparation for the Commission proposal concerning the revision of the Alternative 
Dispute Resolution (ADR) Directive139 and the repeal of the Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) 
Regulation140.  The  report  encompasses  an  overview  of  all  the  backward  and  forward-looking 
consultation activities carried out to gather data for the Evaluation and the back-to-back Impact 
Assessment accompanying the revision of the ADR Directive. 

The consultations’ primary objective was to  offer all relevant  stakeholders, who are  concerned 
by  the  ADR  Directive  and  therefore  potentially  affected  by  its  revision,  the  opportunity  to 
express  their views  on various issues  addressed  by the Evaluation  and the  Impact  Assessment. 
Thus, this annex provides an overview of the consultations conducted for the purposes of 
both documents.  

The stakeholders which the Commission identified as relevant are:  

-  ADR National Competent Authorities (NCAs); 
-  ADR entities; 
-  Traders and trade associations; 
-  Citizens, consumer organizations and European Consumer Centers. 

In  addition,  the  Commission  on  several  occasions  consulted  experts  from  the  industry  and 
academia, reflecting their views in the Evaluation and Impact Assessment. 

CONSULTATION ACTIVITIES AND TOOLS  

Consultation  activities  have  been  taking  place  well  before  the  current  revision  process  was 
launched, reflecting the Commission's commitment to maintaining regular communication with 
stakeholders  in  the  context  of  ADR/ODR.  In  2019,  the  Commission  published  its  first  joint 
ADR/ODR application report,141 in accordance with Article 26 of the ADR Directive and Article 
21(2)  of  the  ODR  Regulation.  This  report  drew  on  the  first  round  of  national  ADR  reports 
submitted by the ADR NCAs that year. Furthermore, the Commission organized the first ADR 
Assembly  in  Brussels  in  2018,  gathering  over  350  representatives  from  the  European  ADR 
community.  This  diverse  group  included  consumer  and  business  representatives,  regulators, 
academics, and 187 representatives from ADR bodies.  

139 Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes 
and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Directive on consumer ADR). 
140  Regulation  (EU)  No 524/2013  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  21 May  2013  on  online  dispute  resolution  for  consumer 
disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Regulation on consumer ODR). 
141 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2019:425:FIN  

52 

 
 
 
In view of the revision of the ADR Directive, the Commission enhanced its exchanges with the 
ADR NCAs by setting up a WIKI platform to facilitate communication. The platform has proven 
useful for the Commission in sharing information and serving as a repository for best practices. 
Starting from 2021, the Commission has organised consultation activities to collect insights on: 
a)  the  implementation  of  the  ADR  directive  across  the  EU,  b)  existing  challenges  and 
shortcomings, and c) potential avenues for improvement.  

In  this  context,  all  relevant  stakeholders  have  been  reached  by  the  following  consultation 
activities:  

-  2021 ADR Assembly;  
-  ADR workshops; 
-  Targeted consultations in multilateral meetings with various stakeholders 
-  Online surveys and in-depth interviews with main stakeholders conducted in the 

framework of several external studies 

-  Backward-looking Open Public Consultation (OPC) for the Evaluation of the ADR 

Directive, which run from 4 April to 27 June 2022 

-  Forward-looking OPC for the Impact Assessment related to the revision of the ADR 

Directive, which run from from 28 September 2022 to 21 December 2022 

-  Call for Evidence (CfE) for the Impact Assessment, which was launched together with 

the OPC on 28 September 2022  

The public consultations were promoted using the communication channels put in place by the 
Commission for exchanges with ADR NCAs and via social media to reach the general public. 
Their results were published on the “Have Your Say” portal.142  

OVERVIEW OF CONSULTATIONS 

This  section  provides  an  overview  of  the  input  received  from  all  relevant  stakeholders  in  the 
context of the different consultation activities carried out by the Commission.   

a) 

ADR Assembly 2021 

In 2021, the Commission organised a high-level ADR assembly, which was held online a year 
later  than  initially  planned  due  to  the  COVID-19  outbreak.143  Participants  included  certified 
ADR entities from the EEA area, ADR NCAs, ECCs and academics. The closing session took 
place  in  a  public  format  with  the  presence  of  the  Commissioner  for  Justice  and  Consumers. 
During  the  two-day  event  (28-29  September  2021),  attendees  participated  in  three  workshops 
focusing on: 
-  Costs, benefits and challenges of various ADR models; 

factual 

142  The 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say_en  
143 Material of the ADR Assembly and outcome report are found here. 

summaries  of 

the  various  public  consultation  activities  can  be 

found  here: 

53 

 
 
 
 
-  Suitability of the ADR Directive for the digital markets; and 
-  Sector-specific issues (transport, energy, telecommunications, financial services). 

The slide below sums up the Assembly’s conclusions: 

b) 

ADR Workshops 

Following the ADR Assembly, the Commission organised two ADR workshops: 

1.  Consumer Summit 2022: Panel discussion on use of Digital tools in ADR processes 
The Consumer Summit 2022 took place in Strasbourg under the French Council Presidency. 144 
ADR entities, ADR NCAs and ECCs convened once again to discuss the challenges in relation to 
online redress  tools  and  the benefits  of investing in  digital tools to  improve ADR.  Participants 
emphasised the importance of digital tools in improving accessibility, speed and compliance with 
ADR  outcomes.  They  concluded  that  while  the  existing  ADR/ODR  framework  provides  a 
robust  foundation,  it  requires  updates,  such  as  incorporating  quality  requirements  for 
automated tools (e.g., chatbots, algorithmic complaint analysis, legal tech).  

2.  Cross-border ADR Roundtable 

144 Discussion paper and the recording to the panel discussion (Workshop 1, Panel Discussion 2) are available here. 

54 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The  Commission,  together  with  ECCs,  hosted  a  roundtable  on  cross-border  ADR  on  21  June 
2022.  145  60  participants  took  part  in  the  event,  including  ADR  entities,  ADR  NCAs,  ECCs, 
academics, consumer organizations, traders and trade associations. During the discussion: 

- the ECCs presented a position paper146 based on a survey conducted earlier in 2022, offering 
recommendations  on  how  to  enhance  trader  participation  in  cross-border  ADR,  closing 
ADR coverage gaps and reinforcing the role played by ECCs in cross-border ADR; 

- The European Consumer Organisation (BEUC) presented its position paper147, calling for the 
following measures: a) ensuring that NCAs conduct the necessary checks to verify that traders 
accurately  inform  consumers  about  the  availability  of  the  EU  ODR  platform;  b)  making 
ADR mandatory for traders and providing incentives for compliance with the outcomes; c) 
improving  the  information  available  on  the  EU  ODR  platform,  including  details  about 
consumer  rights  in  sectors  generating  the  highest  number  of  consumers  complaints  and 
information concerning all available redress pathways for consumers. 

-  Prof. Stefaan Voet from the University of Leuven presented a legal study commissioned by 

JUST regarding the future needs of the EU ADR framework148  

-  The external contractor carrying out the ADR data information gathering study shared 

preliminary conclusions of the study (yet to be published). 

To improve cross-border ADR, participants recommended the following measures: 

o  mandatory trader participation or strong incentives for traders to participate in 

ADR;  
increasing the use of e-translation tools or adopting English as a universal language; 

o 
o  establishing sector-specific pan-European ADR networks;  
o  providing more guidance on accreditation, monitoring, and supervision of ADR 

entities; 
improving data collection, structuring and dissemination of best practices; 
improving online interfaces of platforms; 

o 
o 
o  offering clear information to consumers about the different pathways to resolve 

their disputes (e.g., through awareness campaigns). 

Participants  emphasised  the  need  for  the  ADR  framework  to  better  address  today’s  redress 
challenges,  notably  in  digital  markets.  Digitalisation  could  foster  a  more  efficient  complaint-
handling  framework  in  cross-border  scenarios  and  enhance  cost-effectiveness.  Current  EU 

145 Discussion papers and outcome report are available here. 
146Available 
%20Alternative%20Dispute%20Resolution%20in%20Europe.pdf  
147  ADR  for  consumers:  Time  to  move  a  gear  up.  Available  here:  https://www.beuc.eu/sites/default/files/publications/beuc-x-2022-
062_adr_position_paper.pdf  
148 The study and an executive summary are available here. 

https://www.eccnet.eu/sites/default/files/2022-09/ECC%20Network%20-%20position%20paper%20-

here: 

55 

 
 
 
 
 
investment  in  digitalisation  and  available  funding  could  be  better  leveraged  to  boost  small 
companies'  IT  capacities  and  access  to  ADR.  Given  the  low  usage  of  the  European  ODR 
platform  managed  by  the  Commission,  participants  urged  the  Commission  to  consider 
revising its functionalities from a seldom-used match-making tool to a platform providing 
insights for consumers and traders on their redress needs and opportunities.  

Most participants expressed a desire for the ADR Directive to promote collective ADR for the 
sustainability of ADR entities; however, they recommended leaving the implementation of such 
mechanisms to the Member States. 

c) 

Meetings organised by JUST, Unit E3 

The  views  of  the  main  stakeholders  were  also  collected  through  a  number  of  targeted 
consultations in various meetings.  

1.  Meetings with ADR NCAs 
Objectives 

Date 
13 July 2021 

8 March 2022 

-  Take stock of the impact of COVID-19 on ADR; 
-  Share best practices (DE: research project on information 

requirements by the traders on ADR; BE: architecture of ADR in 
BE and the accreditation procedure used); 

-  Reflect on the current shortcomings of the EU ADR framework; 
-  Discuss the next steps following the Panel Discussion at the 

Consumer Summit 2022; 

-  Inform competent authorities that the Commission launched 3 

ADR-related studies; 

-  Discuss ECC project on cross-border ADR; 
-  Discuss the template for the ADR national report to be submitted 

by NCAs; 

29 August 2022 

-  Inform about external study to support evaluation of ADR 

framework; 

-  Announce the intention to revise the ADR Directive and repeal 

the ODR Regulation and that the OPC and CfE will be published 
by end of 2022; 

-  Present the main areas of concern and open discussion with 

NCAs; 

2.  Meeting with ECCs on the impact of the repeal of the ODR Regulation 

Date 
12 October 2022 

Objective 
-  Discuss the role of ECCs in view of the revision of the ADR 

Directive and the repeal of the ODR Regulation, especially as that 
many ECCs serve as ODR contact points. 

56 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.  Meetings with sector-specific ADR entities 

Date 
10 June 2020 

JUST 

Meeting  
Co-organised  by 
and 
MOVE  in  view  of  the  voucher 
recommendations. 
Participants: 
entities 
disputes. 

qualified  ADR 
travel 

dealing  with 

November 

19 
2022 

Co-organised by JUST and ENER 
in  view  of  the  increase  of  energy 
prices 
Participants: 
entities  dealing  with 
disputes 

qualified  ADR 
energy 

Objectives 
-  Present the objectives of the 

Commission 
Recommendation on 
vouchers; 

-  Enable ADRs to share their 
experiences and challenges 
they are facing in resolving 
disputes in the travel industry; 
especially voucher-related 
issues in view of COVID-19 
pandemic. 

-  Inform about the upcoming 

revision of the ADR 
Directive; 

-  Announce policy updates 

addressing the energy crisis; 
and 

-  Enable energy ADRs to share 
how they are handling the 
increase of consumer 
complaints. 

Furthermore,  the  Commission  participated  in  numerous  meetings  organised  by  stakeholders  to 
present and exchange on the substantive issues that it intends to tackle through the revision of the 
ADR/ODR framework. The table below provides an overview of these meetings. 

Event 
Spanish ADR Symposium 
ADR Conference organised by Autocontrol, Spain 
ADR  Conference  organised  by  the  Malta  Competition  and  Consumer 
Affairs Authority 
Midi du Consumateur Européen organised in Luxembourg 
ADR Training organised by Banca d’Italia 
International Conference on Consumer Arbitration in Barcelona 
ICPEN webinar on ADR 
BEUC Experts meeting on ADR 
5th Anniversary of Travel-net, Berlin 
EU ADR Conference, Oxford University 
FIN-Net meeting, Brussels 
Banca d’Italia conference on ADR 

Date 
21 September 2020 
14 September 2021 
30 September 2021 

6 October 2021 
21 October 2021 
27 October 2021 
4 April 2022 
31 May 2022 
14 October 2022 
10 November 2022 
24 November 2022 
19 December 2022 

57 

 
 
 
 
 
 
ADR  conference  organised  by  the  Office  of  the  Financial  Arbiter, 
Malta 
ADR exchange for German conciliation bodies 

23 February 2023 

28 March 2023 

d) 

External studies on ADR/ODR framework 

Stakeholders’  views  were  gathered  in  the  context  of  three  studies  conducted  by  external 
contractors  to  gather  information  to  feed  the  Evaluation  and  Impact  Assessment  related  to  the 
revision of the ADR/ODR framework. The studies are the following: 

1.  Information gathering study on ADR and ODR in the EU: This study assessed the 

effectiveness of the ADR Directive, focusing in particular on ADR awareness, diversity in the 
ADR landscape across the EU (governance, coverage, timing to resolve a dispute, compulsory 
vs. voluntary traders participation, traders compliance with ADR outcomes), the efficiency 
and cost-effectiveness of ADR/ODR, the effects of external factors (e.g., COVID-19), the 
advantages and disadvantages of using digital tools in ADR, and the ODR platform's 
functionality (e.g., user-friendliness). The external contractor conducted numerous 
stakeholder interviews (with ADR competent authorities, ADR entities, ECCs, consumer and 
trader organizations, ODR contact points, etc.). To better understand the specific context, 
dynamics, and cross-cutting issues of the ADR/ODR framework, five case studies were 
selected, including three sectoral case studies covering travel, e-commerce, and financial 
services, and two horizontal case studies on Artificial Intelligence use in ODR and 
accreditation.149 

2.  The ADR behavioural study:150 the study on disclosure of information to consumers by 
traders and ADR entities. It aimed to: a) identify optimal ways to present pre-contractual 
information on ADR on the traders’ and ADR entities’ websites by testing different disclosure 
options;  and  b) assess the use of a chatbot to assist consumers with their disputes by 
signposting them to a relevant ADR entity. 

3. Legal study:151 the study, which was conducted under the supervision of Prof. Stefaan Voet 
from the University of Leuven, critically analysed the current EU ADR/ODR framework from 
a legal point, assessing where it could be improved by drawing lessons from five jurisdictions: 
BE, DE, FR, IT and NL.  

i. 

Two Public Consultations and Call for Evidence 

149 See Annex I to the ADR Data collection study. 
150 link 
151 See footnote 10 above 

58 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Between  4  April  and  27  June  2022,  the  Commission  ran  a  backward-looking  public 
consultation152 through the” Have your Say” website to collect views on the functioning of the 
ADR/ODR framework from the general public as well as from relevant stakeholders, including 
consumer  organisations,  trade  associations,  and  ADR  entities.  The  outcome  fed  into  the 
Evaluation  of  the  ADR  Directive.  Besides  standard  profiling  questions,  the  OPC  comprised 
several questions aimed at gathering information on respondent’s awareness and opinion on the 
usefuleness of ADR. The results indicated that: 

-  Traders are more likely to use legal assistance in ADR; 
-  74% of all respondents stated that they have no intention to use the ODR Platform in the 

future or were imaware of its existence; 

-  The best medium to enhance ADR knowledge is through national/EU campaigns, social 

media, TV/radio; 

-  Top 3 challenges in ADR are: i. low awareness, ii. traders not participating in ADR, iii. 

complexity of the landscape; 

-  Two thirds of ADR entities are in favour of digitalisation, although the final decision should 

be made by a human. 

On  28  September  2022,  the  Commission  launched  in  parallel  a  forward-looking  public 
consultation and a Call for Evidence153 to support the impact assessment for the revision of the 
ADR/ODR framework.154 111 responses and 23155 reponses  were submitted to the OPC and the 
CfE  respectively.  The  summary  report156  of  the  OPC  was  published  on  the  Have  your  Say 
website on 16 February. 

The responses to the CfE were more detailed and structured as compared to the input  received 
through the OPC. 23 responses were received in total, although only 20 were taken into accout: 
157 7 came from trader organisations, 5 from ADR entities, 5 from citizens, 3 from ECCs, 1 pubic 
authority and one from an academic institution. All respondents came from EU Member States: 
five from Belgium, three from France, Germany and Poland, two from Ireland, one from Austria, 
Finland, Malta, Slovakia, Spain and Sweden. 

The salient points were the following: 

152 Outcome summary report is available here. 
153  https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13536-Consumer-rights-adapting-out-of-
court-dispute-resolution-to-digital-markets_en  
154  Consumer  Rights  –  adapting  out-of-court  dispute  resolution  to  digital  markets.  Summary  of  the  responses 
available here. 
155 20 were  actually taken into acccount; one contribution was deleted for not being compliant with the European 
Commission’s rules. Two other contributions were not within the scope. 
156 
strengthened-enforcement-cooperation/public-consultation_en  
157 One contribution from a citizen was deleted for not being compliant with the European Commission’s rules. Two 
other contributions were not within the scope. 

https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13535-Consumer-protection-

59 

 
 
 
 
•  The quality criteria for ADR entities (impartiality, independence, affordability, timely 
case-handling, sufficient understanding of EU consumer law, equal representation of 
consumer and trader organisations at governance structures) are crucial for consumer trust 
in ADR. NCAs should enhance supervision to ensure quality ADR across the EU;  

•  Cross-border ADR requres streghtening (e.g., ADR bodies should be able to work in 

English and other EU languages, more collaboration between ADR entities at EU level, 
clarity on the applicable law, etc. 

• 

• 

Incentivize traders to use ADR, especially where it's not mandatory. Repealing the ODR 
regulation benefits SMEs. Avoid placing the entire fee burden on traders. 

Implement safeguards to protect traders from vexatious disputes launched by consumers 
who fail to engage in good faith. 

•  While collective ADR is cost-effective, some doubt the capacity of ADR entities and 

prefer registered collective entities to handle such disputes. 

• 

• 

Invest more in ADR: awareness campaigns, AI tool development, case management 
improvements, and automated translation services. 

Improve ADR accessibility by limiting the number of ADR entities, filling coverage gaps, 
protecting vulnerable consumers, and preserving the human element despite increasing 
digitalization. 

•  Given the rapid development of digital markets, consider extending the ADR directive 

scope to non-EU traders, pre-contractual disputes, and B2C disputes. 

•  Align the ADR Directive revision with the Digital Services Act (DSA) regarding 

online platforms' dispute resolution obligations.158  

•  Tackle the lack of effectiveness of the ODR platform (given the low number of disputes 
resolved through it). Some stakeholders see the potential of retaining the ODR platform to 
resolve cross-border disputes and be used in collective disputes, provided that the system is 
upgraded.  

•  Support principle-based rules, preserve minimum harmonization, and allow flexibility for 

traders to compete with excellent customer service. 

CONCLUSIONS AND CONSIDERATION OF THE FEEDBACK BY THE COMMISSION 

158  Where  the  disputes  are  not  solely  about  the  seller-buyer  contractual  relationship,  but  involve  the  platforms’ 
services,  the  DSA  states that  recipients of the service  shall be entitled to select an out-of-court dispute settlement 
body certified by the Digital Service Coordinator. 

60 

 
 
 
 
 
In general,  stakeholders  are in  favor of enhancing the EU ADR framework and adapting it for 
digital markets, particularly by: 

•  broadening the geographical and material scope of the ADR Directive; 
• 
• 
• 

increasing trader participation in ADR, and ensuring enforcement of ADR outcomes; 
facilitating cross-border ADR; 
introducing safeguards for vulnerable consumers who are lack digital skills. 

Some  stakeholders  (mainly  consumer  organisations  such  as  BEUC)  have  called  for  making 
participation  in  ADR  mandatory  for  traders,  but  this  change  is  strongly  opposed  by  several 
Member States  who see potential conflicts with their constitutional rules regarding access to 
justice.  Other  Member  States  have  already  implemented  mandatory  ADR  for  disputes  below 
specific thresholds  and/or in  particular problematic sectors.  This  notwithstanding, incentivising 
participation trader in ADR is seen as a major area of concern. 

The  enhancement  of  collective  ADR  has  also  been  identified  as  an  important  goal  for  the 
revision. This mechanism is already present in the national legislation of several Member States, 
but  its  uptake  remains  limited.  Stakeholders  have  urged  the  Commission  to  take  action  in 
promoting  the  use  of  collective  ADR.  At  the  same  time,  the  importance  of  entrusting  to 
Member  States  the  implementation  of  collective  ADR,  in  accordance  with  the  minimum 
harmonization approach of the Directive, has been highlighted.  

Although  some  stakeholders  initially  proposed  enhancing  the  ODR  platform  instead  of 
discontinuing  it  by  repealing  the  ODR  Regulation,  many  of  them  were  convinced  by  the 
available  data  presented  by  the  Commission  that  replacing  it  with  user-friendly  tools  for 
improved signposting is a more efficient approach.  

Finally, stakeholders highlighted that other  non-legislative measures are necessary to improve 
the ADR framework, in particular:  

- 
- 

awareness-raising on the benefits of ADR;  
strengthened monitoring to ensure that ADR entities comply with the quality 
requirements laid down by the Directive;  

-  more investment in capacity-building and digital infrastructure for ADR entities;  
-  promotion of good governance at national level; 
-  more exchange of best practices at national, regional and EU level. 

61 

 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW? 

1.  Practical implications of the initiative 

The initiative will impact consumers, businesses, the Commission, ADR competent authorities and ADR 
entities.  

2.  Summary of costs and benefits 

I. Overview of Benefits (total for all provisions) – Preferred Option 

Amount 

Direct benefits 

Comments 

EUR 264 million annually 

Businesses 

Description 

Reduction of information 
disclosure obligations 

Replacing ODR Platform 

EUR 370 million annually 
EUR 500,000 annually 

Reduction of detriment  

EUR 33 million annually 

Businesses 
Commission 

Consumers  

Direct 

EUR 634 million annually 

Businesses 

Administrative cost savings related to the ‘one in, one out’ approach 

II. Overview of costs – Preferred option 

Citizens/Consumers 

Businesses 

Administrations 

One-off 

Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

Option C 

Direct adjustment 
costs 

Option C 

Direct 
administrative 
costs 

EUR 25 
million 
annually for 
ADR entities 
for extra 
disputes, at the 
net of bundling 
cases 

EUR 11 
million 
annually for 
putting 
platforms in 
compliance 

EUR 2.6 
million 
annually for 
duty of reply 

Costs related to the ‘one in, one out’ approach 

62 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total   

Direct adjustment 
costs  

Total 

Direct 
administrative 
costs 

EUR 36 
million 

EUR 2.6 
million 

3.  Relevant sustainable development goals 

III. Overview of relevant Sustainable Development Goals – Preferred Option(s) 
Relevant SDG 

Expected progress towards the Goal 

Comments 

SDG no. 16 – Peace, justice 
and strong institutions  

Target: 16.3 Promote the rule of law at the 
national and international levels and ensure equal 
access to justice for all. 

N/A 

Indicator: 16.3.3 Proportion of the population 
who have experienced a dispute in the past two 
years and who accessed a formal or informal 
dispute resolution mechanism, by type of 
mechanism. 

Progress is expected as ADR uptake and 
awareness by consumers and businesses will 
increase as result of the preferred option.  

63 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL METHODS 

This annex lists some more details on the calculations of the economic impacts presented in Chapter 6 of the Impact Assessment. It 
also highlights the multi-criteria analysis that was used to compare the measures.  

ASSESSMENT OF THE OPTIONS 

Option A 

Non-regulatory 
intervention 

Description of 
the measure 
Policy  Option  A 
proposes a set of 
non-regulatory 
measures  aimed 
at 
supporting 
facilitating 
and 
the  work 
of 
ADR  entities  as 
well  as  raising 
of 
awareness 
among 
ADR 
consumers  and 
traders.  Besides, 
this 
policy 
option  identifies 
a 
of 
course 
policy  actions  to 
address  certain 

Economic Impacts 

Social Impacts 

relief 

Consumers/Citizens 
Annual  training  of  all 
certified  ADR  entities 
would  be  expensive 
and  would  not  bring 
immediate 
to 
consumers because not 
the 
the  staff  of 
all 
would 
entities 
participate 
the 
training  and  not  all 
new material would be 
promptly 
implemented. 
For 
cross-border  disputes, 
the barriers of trust and 
languages would make 
ineffective 
training 

to 

to 

Consumers/Citizens 
is 
This  measure 
expected 
have 
impacts  of 
positive 
magnitude. 
limited 
Clear 
and 
comprehensive 
about 
information 
ADR  procedures  and 
outcomes 
could 
consumers 
enhance 
the 
confidence 
fairness 
and 
effectiveness  of  ADR 
mechanisms  but  it  is 
all  based  on  the  good 
will  of  the 
industry 
and  of  ADR  entities 

in 

Environmental 
Impacts 
All Stakeholders 
N/A 

Fundamental Rights 

Consumers/Citizens 

Since Policy Option A 
in 
is  non-regulatory 
nature,  its  impact  on 
fundamental  rights  is 
expected to be limited. 
the 
Nevertheless, 
implementation 
of 
specific 
policy 
measures  within  this 
option, 
as 
awareness-raising 
campaigns and the use 
standardized 
of 
templates 
for 
information  exchange 
alternative 
between 

such 

64 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cannot 
and 
address 
significantly 
the  low  awareness  of 
consumers. 
The 
trainings  could  create 
their 
jobs  but 
some 
implementation  would 
have  limited  impacts 
on 
low 
the  overall 
level of awareness.   

entities 

resolution 
dispute 
in 
(ADR) 
cross-border  disputes, 
potentially 
could 
consumer 
enhance 
in 
protection 
accordance 
with 
Article 38 CFREU. 

aspects  that  are 
not 
currently 
adequately 
covered 
in 
Directive. 

the 

because the solution to 
these barriers are more 
structural  and  cannot 
provided  with 
be 
trainings 
short 
of 
duration. 

A 
self-regulatory 
approach  of  creating 
guidelines  with  best 
practices is expected to 
have a limited positive 
the 
impact 
reduction  of  consumer 
detriment  in  the  long 
run. 

on 

Creating 
a 
standardized,  easy-to-
understand 
template 
information 
that  ADR 
entities 
could  use  to  provide 
and 
clear 
comprehensive 
information about their 
and 
procedures 
to 
outcomes 
consumers 
and 
businesses  in  different 
also 
languages 

is 

65 

 
 
 
 
to 
have 
expected 
economic 
limited 
impacts.  It  could  help 
to  reduce  a  bit  of 
consumer detriment on 
cross-border  disputes, 
but 
is 
expected  to  be  very 
marginal. 

effect 

its 

Businesses 

 N/A 

The  effect  of  AI  tools 
for  instant  translation 
of  documents  has  an 
uncertain 
effect  on 
consumer detriment. 

Businesses 

self-regulatory 
A 
approach  of  creating 
guidelines  with  best 
practices  would  create 
costs to the industry, in 
particular 
intermediaries. 

The  effect  of  AI  tools 
for  instant  translation 
of 
on 
documents 
businesses  willing  to 
participate  to  an  ADR 
with  the  consumer  is 
far to be demonstrated.  

to 

is 
have 
impacts  of 
magnitude. 
and 

Businesses 
This  measure 
expected 
positive 
limited 
Clear 
comprehensive 
information 
about 
ADR  procedures  and 
could 
outcomes 
business 
enhance 
confidence 
the 
in 
and 
fairness 
effectiveness  of  ADR 
mechanisms  but  it  is 
all  based  on  the  good 

66 

 
 
 
  
 
will  of  the 
industry 
and  of  ADR  entities 
cannot 
and 
significantly 
address 
the  low  awareness  of 
businesses.  

SME Test 
Limited positive effect 
on awareness.  

SME Test 

N/A 

Commission 

Commission 

N/A 

N/A 

SME Test 
Intermediaries  are  not 
likely 
to  be  SMEs. 
They  could  enjoy  the 
AI tools for translation 
if involved in a dispute 
but  its  effect  is  far  to 
be demonstrated.  
Commission 

Maintaining 
the 
current  scope  of  ADR 
and  provide  trainings 
to  ADR  entities 
to 
improve  understanding 
of  digital  and  cross-
border disputes and set 
up system to exchange 
best  practices  would 
be  a  recurrent  cost  for 
the 
sector 
because  of  the  highly 
dynamic  evolution  of 
digital markets. 

public 

A 

self-regulatory 

67 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
approach  of  creating 
guidelines  with  best 
practices  would  also 
create  similar  costs  to 
the  public  sector 
to 
streamline the works. 

to 

Awareness 
raising 
campaigns 
are 
be 
expensive 
effective in view of the 
large 
of 
consumers that need to 
be  contacted  (several 
millions of euro for the 
Commission  or  NCAs 
in total). 

number 

tools  for 

The implementation  of 
instant 
AI 
translation 
of 
documents  could  be 
co-funded 
the 
through 
Commission 
grants.  

by 

Member States 

the 
Maintaining 
current  scope  of  ADR 
and  provide  trainings 
to 
to  ADR  entities 

Member States 
N/A 

Member States 
N/A 

68 

 
 
 
 
 
improve  understanding 
of  digital  and  cross-
border disputes and set 
up system to exchange 
best  practices  would 
be  a  recurrent  cost  for 
the 
sector 
because  of  the  highly 
dynamic  evolution  of 
digital markets. 

public 

A 
self-regulatory 
approach  of  creating 
guidelines  with  best 
practices  would  also 
create  similar  costs  to 
to 
the  public  sector 
streamline the works. 

to 

raising 
Awareness 
are 
campaigns 
expensive 
be 
effective in view of the 
of 
large 
consumers that need to 
be  contacted  (several 
millions of euro for the 
Commission  or  NCAs 
in total). 

number 

69 

 
 
 
 
ADR entities 

ADR entities 
N/A 

ADR entities 
N/A 

A  system  to  exchange 
best  practices  would 
not  be  ideal  because  it 
would  impose  costs  to 
involved 
all  parties 
not 
and 
into 
immediately  go 
of 
direction 
the 
solving 
effectively 
between 
disputes 
and 
consumers 
businesses. 

would 

Adoption  of  AI  tools 
for  instant  translation 
of  documents  surely 
would 
help  ADR 
entities in dealing with 
cross-border cases.  

Description of 
the measure 

Economic Impacts 

Social Impacts 

Environmental 
Impacts 

Fundamental Rights 

70 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Option B 

Option  A159  + 
Procedural  and 
geographical 
scope revision 

Policy  Option  B 
to  amend 
aims 
the  existing  EU 
legal  framework 
governing  ADR 
by addressing the 
shortcomings 
described  under 
section 2 through 
the  inclusion  of 
new  provisions 
would 
that 
the 
complement 
non-legislative 
initiatives 
described  under 
Policy  Option 
A). 

Calculation  on 
number 
of 
disputes:  
5%  third-country 
traders  dispute160 

Consumers/Citizens 

Consumers/Citizens 
N/A 

All Stakeholders 
N/A 

Consumers/Citizens 

Reduced  detriment  of 
up  to  about  EUR  1.5 
million  every  year,161 
i.e.  up  to  EUR  13 
million  in  10  years 
because  of  the  extra 
disputes. 

on 

Consumers would gain 
the 
time  consulting 
the 
database 
identities  of  retailers 
who  do  not  engage  in 
ADR,  knowing  which 
are  their  chances  of 
engaging into an ADR 
with  the  business  they 
are  having  a  problem 
with.  On  top  of  that, 
they  would  also  know 
which  businesses  are 
more  risky  to  do  trade 

By 
that 
clarifying 
ADR  procedures  can 
be used also to resolve 
disputes  with  traders 
established  outside  of 
the EU, Policy Option 
B  would 
provide 
consumers  with  an 
additional  avenue  to 
obtain redress, thereby 
their 
strengthening 
right  to  an  effective 
to 
remedy  pursuant 
Article  47  of 
the 
CFREU. 

159 Impacts of Option A also apply for Option B.  
160 ECC data mentioned in the Information gathering study.  
161 
(UK 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/698442/Final_report_-_Resolving_consumer_disputes.pdf) 
*EUR 185 (average value of an ADR dispute, proxy data from EU ODR Platform). In an ADR, as the solution is amicable, the solution offered to consumers 
would very likely be smaller than the total, hence the EUR 185 per dispute are to be considered a maximum value.  

9,000*90% 

settlement 

likelihood 

consumer 

amicable 

figure 

reach 

for 

on 

an 

to 

71 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• 

Businesses 

The naming and 
shaming of traders who 
legitimately refuse to 
engage in ADR could 
potentially encroach on 
their freedom to 
conduct business under 
Article 16 of the CFREU 
and raise serious issues 
regarding the 
presumption of 
innocence under Article 
47 of the CFREU. 

with. 

over 
180,000 
current  disputes 
=  9000  disputes 
more.  

Businesses 
Promoting  the  use  of 
trust-marks 
for 
businesses 
always 
participating  in  ADR 
would  be  a  direct 
consequence  of 
the 
database.  Businesses 
100% 
a 
having 
participation could use 
this 
It 
trust-mark. 
could come with some 
their 
to  adapt 
costs 
website  but  would 
boost 
their  market 
reputation  and  might 
sales 
increase 
through 
more 
consumer confidence. 
The  provision  on  the 
extension  of  the  scope 
to third-country traders 
would 
the 
playing  field  in  favour 
of 
traders, 
correcting  a  market 
failure  and  enhancing 

level 

their 

EU 

Businesses 
of 
database 
The 
businesses  refusing  to 
to  ADR 
participate 
the 
would  come  at 
some 
price 
of 
reputational 
damage 
for 
those  businesses 
who  would  fit  in.  The 
of 
third-
inclusion 
into 
traders 
country 
the 
the 
scope  of 
Directive  would  level 
the  playing  field 
in 
favor  of  EU  traders, 
correcting  a  market 
failure.  However,  this 
would  depend 
from 
the  good  will  of  third-
traders 
to 
country 
the 
engage 
into 
disputes,  and 
is 
expected that it will be 
the  ones 
limited 
with  a  large  customer 
base in the EU. 

to 

it 

72 

 
 
 
 
 
SME Test 
The same would apply 
the  wide 
to  SMEs, 
majority 
of 
businesses.  

Commission 
N/A 

Member States 
N/A 

competitiveness. 

SME Test 
The same would apply 
to  SMEs, 
the  wide 
majority of businesses.  

SME Test 
The same would apply 
to  SMEs, 
the  wide 
majority of businesses.  

Commission 
N/A 

Commission 
N/A 

Member States 
N/A 

Member States 

national 
Allowing 
authorities  to  publicly 
disclose 
identity  of 
retailers  who  do  not 
engage  in  ADR  would 
entail  the  preparation 
and  the  maintenance 
of  such  a  database, 
with  costs  associated 
for  NCAs  (0.5  FTEs 

73 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i.e. 
per 

at  EUR  33.500  per 
FTE162, 
EUR 
450,000 
year 
considering  all  MS, 
EUR  4  million  in  10 
years plus IT costs). 

ADR entities 
Cost  of  up  to  EUR 
2,700,000  annually  to 
new 
process 
disputes  (up  to  EUR 
24  million 
in  10 
years).163 

the 

ADR entities 
Strengthening  quality 
criteria 
lawyers 
for 
for  ADR 
working 
entities would improve 
qualifications  of  ADR 
professionals. 

ADR entities 
N/A 

persons 

Strengthening  quality 
criteria  to  ensure  that 
in 
natural 
charge  of  ADR  are 
qualified 
for  cross-
border  disputes  (legal 
and 
linguistic 
expertise) would entail 
costs for ADR entities, 
train 
to 
qualified  staff.  This 
depends 
the 
actual ADR entity. 

from 

hire 

or 

162 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20221219-3. Annual average salaries in the EU.  
163 EUR 300 per dispute, see problem definition. Discount factor for actualised value: 3%. 

74 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Option C164 

Material  scope 
amendments 
and 
business 
obligations 

new 

Description of the 
measure 
Policy  Option  C) 
seeks to address the 
problems  outlined 
above by amending 
number 
a 
the 
provisions  of 
current  Directive 
and  adding  new 
for 
obligations 
also 
traders. 
new 
assigns 
responsibilities 
to 
entities  that  do  not 
currently  play  a 
role 
the 
under 
Directive. 

It 

on 
of 

Calculation 
number 
disputes: 
This  option  would 
make  the  number 

Economic Impacts 

Social Impacts 

Consumers/Citizens 
If  consumers  would 
win  90%  of  the  times 
(with 
businesses 
accepting the result of 
the  ADR  procedure), 
this  would 
reduce 
detriment  of  about 
EUR 33 million  every 
year,172  i.e.  EUR  290 
million in 10 years. 

The behavioural  study 
conducted  on  ADR 
information 
requirements173 
the 
that 
showed 
currently 
required 
ODR  link  addition  to 
information 
generic 
mentioning  ADR  as  a 
redress  solution  does 

the 

Consumers/Citizens 
to 
certainty 
The 
an 
obtain 
rapidly 
answer 
their 
to 
complaints  brought  to 
a  proper  ADR  would 
reduce  drastically  the 
stress  of  consumers 
who  would 
better 
assess  the  feasibility 
of 
various 
concrete  possibilities 
to  solve  their  issue. 
and 
The 
clarified 
scope  of 
expanded 
application 
the 
Directive  would  also 
diminish 
for 
those  disputes  which 
can  only 
currently 
have  their  solution  in 
court.  Replacing  the 

stress 

of 

Environmental 
Impacts 
All Stakeholders 
Limiting 
reporting 
obligations  would 
limited 
have  a 
impact 
positive 
carbon 
on 
the 
of 
footprint 
such 
printing 
Self-
reports. 
certification 
mechanisms 
would  also  avoid 
the 
to 
need 
prepare  and  print 
large  reports  for 
official 
certification. 
Expanding 
of 
scope 
Directive 
include 

the 
the 
to 
extra-

Fundamental Rights 

right 

Consumers/Citizens 
The  widened  material 
and 
geographical 
scope of the Directive 
would 
that 
ensure 
have 
consumers 
access 
private 
to 
redress  for  a  broader 
range  of  disputes, 
reinforcing 
thereby 
their 
an 
to 
effective  remedy  as 
laid  down  by  Article 
47  of  the  CFREU. 
The  measures  aimed 
at  ensuring  through  a 
self-certification 
that 
mechanism 
PODR 
systems 
adhere to high-quality 
would 
standards 
consumer 
enhance 

164 The option also includes the extension of the scope to third-country traders: the numbers are the ones assessed within option B and they are not included here 
are those numbers strongly depend from the willingness of third-country traders to engage into an ADR dispute and are the most optimistic scenario. 
172 200,000*90%*EUR 185. 
173 Behavioural study on disclosure of ADR information to consumers by traders and ADR entities. 

75 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
protection (Article 38 
CFREU). 

to 

ODR  Platform  would 
have  a  negative  social 
impact  on  those  jobs 
as  MS  contact  points 
connected 
its 
implementation (about 
50  FTEs  throughout 
the  EU)  but  this  is 
offset 
positive 
by 
social  impact  on  jobs 
the 
created  within 
ECC 
whole 
(which 
framework 
could  be  of  similar 
magnitude  and  even 
re-absorbing  the  same 
staff). 

of 

of  potential  ADR 
increase 
disputes 
by  about  4.5%  as  a 
direct  consequence 
of  the  clarification 
the  material 
that 
the 
scope 
Directive 
should 
cover  disputes  not 
explicitly  covered 
in  contracts  and 
relevant 
other 
law 
consumer 
provisions.165 
4.5%  of  2,250,000 
consumers  seeking 
redress  potentially 
with  ADR166  = 
100,000 
new 
eligible disputes.167  
Baseline  =  300,000 
eligible 
disputes, 
Option  C  eligible 
= 
disputes 

provide 

any 
not 
impact  on 
positive 
consumer’s 
intention 
to  use  ADR  as  a 
solution. 
Hence, 
consumers  would  not 
suffer  any  detriment 
with  this  information 
removal. 

The behavioural  study 
also  says  that  general 
information  on  ADR 
is 
beneficial. 
However,  consumers 
are 
in  most  cases 
those 
by 
misled 
mandatory  statements 
by businesses, because 
to 
businesses  need 
insert  the  information 
in 
terms  and 
conditions but they do 
not have to participate 

their 

contractual 
disputes  would 
allow  consumers 
to seek redress for 
damages resulting 
unfair 
from 
commercial 
practices, 
including 
those 
to 
related 
misleading  green 
The 
claims. 
of 
possibility 
obtaining  redress 
against 
greenwashing 
ADR 
through 
reinforce 
would 
the 
of 
efforts 
public  consumer 
protection 
authorities 
contribute 
achieving 

and 
to 
the 

165 ECC data (see Chapter 3 below in this Annex) on 2022 EU complaints’ categorization used as a proxy for general ADR disputes. Complaints on   general 
information  request,  lack  of  confirmation,  other  misleading  actions  or  omissions,  refusal  to  sell/supply  product  or  discrimination,  and  unfair  and  aggressive 
commercial practices, are considered as the extension of the scope under this policy measure and together account for 4.47% of all complaints.  
166 See problem definition, calculated through data of the Consumer Conditions Survey.  
167 Assumed eligible. One consumer is also assumed to have maximum one dispute every year.  

76 

 
 
 
 
 
300,000+100,000  = 
eligible 
400,000 
disputes. 
240,000 
would 
become  disputes168 
and  about  128,000 
would 
remain 
unanswered.169  A 
share 
the 
of 
potential 
128,000 
disputes  for  which 
businesses  would 
now  have  to  reply 
into 
would 
turn 
disputes, 
actual 
with 
negative 
from 
answers 
businesses resulting 
enhanced 
in 
about 
certainty 
claims 
consumer 
and 
empowering 
them  to  take  (or 
action 
not) 
elsewhere.  Out  of 
128,000 
these 

goals 
the 
of 
European  Green 
Deal strategy. 

Businesses 

N/A 

• 

to  an  ADR.  This  only 
confusion 
increases 
among  consumers and 
this 
option 
policy 
corrects this.  

it 

Businesses 
If  a  duty  to  reply  is 
established, 
is 
assumed  that  the  cost 
of 
businesses 
for 
sending  a  single  reply 
is  about  EUR  20  for 
preparation, 
processing 
and 
sending,  resulting  in  a 
total  cost  of  EUR  2.6 
million  per  year,  or 
EUR 23 million in 10 
years.174  

replace 

reply 
The  duty  of 
would 
the 
need  of  disclosing 
information  on  ADR, 
for  businesses  not 
any 
linked 

to 

Businesses 

The measures aimed at 
ensuring through a self-
certification mechanism 
that PODR systems 
adhere to high-quality 
standards would not 
impose burdensome 
obligations that would 
negatively impact on 
the platforms' freedom 
to conduct business 
(Article 16 of the 
CFREU). Although the 
introduction of a duty 
of reply would require 
traders to examine any 
potential disputes 
forwarded to them by 
ADR entities, the fact 

168 The ratio 180,000/300,000 applying now to 400,000.  
169 96,000 as seen in the problem definition, i.e. 32% of total, which out of 400,000 is 128,000. It is unknown how many unanswered notifications are from SMEs 
and how many from large businesses. 

77 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
that businesses are not 
obliged by the Directive 
to participate in ADR 
ensures that their 
freedom to conduct 
business is observed. 

potential  disputes 
about  77,000  every 
year would become 
disputes170, 
real 
mostly 
to 
linked 
businesses 
previously  unaware 
of  the  potential  of 
ADR, for a total of 
200,000 
nearly 
new 
disputes 
under  this  policy 
option171 
and 
380,000  disputes 
in total. 

particular  ADR  entity 
(64%175  of  the  total). 
It  is  known  from  the 
Impact  Assessment 
linked  to  the  current 
ADR  Directive176  that 
the  inflation  adjusted 
costs  of  providing 
information 
to 
consumers  are  about 
EUR 
per 
310 
business.177  These  are 
mostly  one-off.  Every 
year, 
newly 
for 
established  businesses 
who  do  not  adhere  to 
an  ADR  entity,178  the 
total  savings  would 

174 3% discount factor applies for actualising values.  
170  Applying  the  same  logic  that  approximately  60%  of  businesses,  if  solicited  by  ECCs,  normally  find  an  agreement  with  the  consumers.  Hence  60%  of 
businesses who are solicited to reply would reply positively.  
171 300,000-180,000 in the baseline +77,000. 
175 Consumer Conditions Scoreboard - Consumers at home in the Single Market, 2019, consumers-conditions-scoreboard-2019_pdf_en.pdf (europa.eu). 
176 Impact Assessment accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Alternative Dispute Resolution for 
consumer disputes (Directive on consumer ADR) and Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Online Dispute Resolution for 
consumer disputes (Regulation on consumer ODR) {COM(2011) 793 final} {SEC(2011) 1409 final}. 
177 EUR 254 x 1.2217 as cumulative inflation between 2012 and 2023 (in2013dollars.com/Europe). 
178 Eurostat: 500,000 new wholesalers and retailers every year in the EU x 64% = 320,000. 

78 

 
 
 
 
then  be  EUR  99 
annually,179 
million 
i.e.  EUR  870  million 
in 10 years; a share of 
the  costs  of  “adding 
information  on  ADR 
in  contracts,  invoices, 
receipts, 
websites, 
brochures/leaflets”180 
would  then  be  saved 
also 
current 
businesses,  for  a  total 
of  EUR  165  million 
per  year,  i.e.  EUR  1.4 
billion 
in  10  years 
(EUR  2.3  billion  in 
10  years  in  total  as 
savings 
for 
businesses). 

for 

On  the  replacing  of 
the  ODR  platform, 
businesses  operating 
online would not need 
to  maintain  an  e-mail 
costs 
address  with 

179 320,000 x EUR 310. 
180 35% of the total costs (2011 Impact Assessment), i.e. EUR 109. We assume 10% of them would need reprint every year, for a cost of EUR 11 per existing 
business who does not adhere to an ADR entity (23,000,000 x 64% = 15,000,000).  

79 

 
 
  
 
cost 

linked  to  reading  and 
the 
processing 
The 
information. 
average 
of 
this  e-
maintaining 
address, 
mail 
the  due 
considering 
diligence 
of 
conducting 
business 
which  would  require 
to 
the 
read 
correspondence  daily, 
is  assumed  equal  to 
EUR 0.5 per day,181 or 
EUR  100  per  year. 
The  total  benefit  for 
then 
businesses 
EUR  370  million  per 
year, 
i.e.  EUR  3.3 
billion  in  10  years. 
Also, 
newly 
established  businesses 
in  the  EU  in  the  next 
10  years  would  not 
to 
incur 
provide 
ODR 
information  on  their 
this 
website, 

into  costs 

but 

is 

181 ADR dispute requests (500,000 per year) would rarely arrive on the mailbox of a business (about 3,700,000 retailers operates online, Eurostat). 

80 

 
 
 
in 

is  already 
estimate 
the 
included 
calculations  linked  to 
the  removal  of  ADR 
information,  presented 
above. 

About 
self-
the 
certification of PODR: 
selling 
marketplaces 
in  the  EU  are  438 
(with  1000 
Internet 
domains),182  half  of 
them  might  have  an 
ODR  platform.  With 
perceived  compliance 
to  quality  criteria  set 
in  the  ADR  Directive 
at  about  20%,  it  can 
be assumed that actual 
full compliance would 
be  for  50%  of  these 
businesses. 
That 
it  110 
would  make 
businesses  having  to 
improve 
staff 
with lawyers expert in 
law 
consumer 

their 

182 CBC Commerce, https://www.cbcommerce.eu/blog/2022/09/21/top-100-marketplaces-in-europe-annual-ranking-2022-out-now/.  

81 

 
 
 
 
the 
supervising 
resolution 
dispute 
process (EUR 100,000 
per 
and 
year) 
automatic 
translation 
tools  (lump  sum  of 
EUR  10,000).  Total 
in  10  years 
costs 
would  amount 
to 
97  million 
EUR 
(EUR  11  million  per 
year). 

Competitiveness 
of 
EU  businesses  will  be 
impacted positively by 
this  option,  because 
the  savings  can  be 
used 
the 
to  boost 
attractiveness  of  their 
prices,  and  possibly 
foster innovation.  

SME Test 
It  is  not  known  how 
many  disputes 
are 
with  SMEs  and  how 
many  are  with  large 
the 
businesses, 
costs associated to  the 
duty  of  reply  could  in 
principle  be  shared 

so 

82 

SME Test 

N/A 

SME Test 

N/A (PODR are not 
likely to be managed 
by SMEs).  

 
 
 
 
 
with  SMEs.  However, 
as  SMEs  are  the  wide 
majority 
of 
businesses,  they  will 
the  main 
also  be 
the 
beneficiaries  of 
information  provision 
both 
savings 
cost 
connected 
the 
to 
replacing  of  the  ODR 
platform  and  ADR  in 
general. 
of 
Competitiveness 
EU  SMEs  will  be 
impacted positively by 
this  option,  because 
the  savings  can  be 
used 
the 
to  boost 
attractiveness  of  their 
prices,  and  possibly 
foster innovation. 

Commission 

Commission 

the  ODR 
Replacing 
platform 
with 
signposting  tools  will 
save  the  European 
about 
Commission 

N/A 

Commission 

N/A 

83 

 
 
 
 
 
Member States 
N/A 

ADR entities 
N/A 

500,000 
per 
EUR 
i.e.  EUR  4.4 
year, 
million in 10 years.183 

Member States 
N/A 

Member States 
N/A 

ADR entities 
N/A 

ADR entities 
These  200,000  new 
disputes  might  cost 
approximately  up  to 
to 
EUR  60  million 
handle annually (EUR 
in  10 
527  million 
years), 
for  ADR 
entities  to  be  funded 
in  different  ways.184 
Nevertheless, 
is 
not  realistic  as  ADR 
entities 
would 
experience  economies 
of scale after a certain 
only 
and 
point, 
marginal 
of 
adding  extra  disputes 

costs 

this 

183  EUR  600,000  every  year  saved  if  the  ODR  platform  stops  to  be  maintained,  minus  EUR  100,000  every  year  for  other  developed  solutions  to  redirect 
consumers to the right ADR entity (e.g. artificial intelligence-powered lawbots/chatbots).  
184 EUR 300 per dispute, see problem definition. 

84 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of 

top 

that 

should  be  taken  into 
the 
account.  Also, 
costs 
these 
additional 
disputes 
entail  pre-empt  larger 
costs to be incurred by 
several  parties  if  the 
cases  end  up  in  court. 
On 
this, 
allowing  the  bundling 
of  similar  cases  by 
ADR  entities  would 
mean that, with a total 
of  380,000  disputes 
per  year,  if  only  10% 
of  them  become  part 
of  some  bundle,185  it 
would mean offsetting 
costs  for  entities  of 
EUR 11 million  every 
year,186  i.e.  EUR  97 
million  in  10  years. 
Considering 
the 
economies  of  scale, 
the net extra costs for 
ADR  entities  can  be 
between  EUR  0  and 

185 This is a conservative assumption related to potential savings.  
186 10%*380,000 = 38,000 disputes* EUR 300.  

85 

 
 
 
EUR  49  million  per 
year  (EUR  25  million 
on 
i.e. 
average), 
between  EUR  0  and 
EUR  430  million  in 
10  years  (EUR  215 
million  in  10  years 
on  average).  ADR 
entities  which  would 
incur  some  costs  can 
also  decide 
to  pass 
them to the industry to 
participate,  knowing 
industry 
that 
would 
save 
still 
compared  to  the  costs 
of going to court. 

the 

Option D187 

Architectural 
changes 
and 
increased  level  of 
harmonization 

Description of 
the measure 
Policy  option  D 
is 
the  most 
ambitious  among 
the 
options 
considered 
because  it  seeks 

Economic Impacts 

Social Impacts 

Consumers/Citizens 

Consumers/Citizens 

If consumers win 90% 
of 
(with 
times 
the 
businesses 
accepting 
the  result  of  the  ADR 

Stress  for  consumers 
might 
increase 
because  mandating 
ADR usage across the 

Environmental 
Impacts 
All Stakeholders 
N/A 

Fundamental Rights 

Consumers/Citizens 

architectural 
The 
changes  proposed  by 
option 
this 
policy 
affect 
would  only 

187 The option also includes the extension of the scope to third-country traders: the numbers are the ones assessed within option B and they are not included here 
are those numbers strongly depend from the willingness of third-country traders to engage into an ADR dispute and are the most optimistic scenario. 

86 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to 
significantly 
increase the level 
of  harmonization 
of  the  Directive 
restructure 
and 
existing 
the 
domestic  ADR 
infrastructure 
in 
Member States. 

Calculation  on 
number 
of 
disputes: 
If  ADR  were  to 
be mandatory for 
traders  above  a 
certain  threshold, 
up 
the 
to  all 
300,000  eligible 
disputes  would 
by 
solved 
be 
ADR 
to 
(up 
120,000  more 
the 
than 
baseline).188 

a 
procedure), 
in 
reduction 
consumer  detriment 
of  about  EUR  20 
million per year,189 i.e. 
176 
to  EUR 
up 
million in 10 years. 

MS 

Asking 
to 
designate  a  residual 
entity 
in  charge  of 
digital  disputes  and 
the  Commission  one 
for  ADR  cross-border 
complaints 
including 
disputes  with  non-EU 
be 
traders  would 
to 
beneficial 
consumers  as 
there 
would  be  a  one  stop 
shop 
to 
solve  such  disputes 
and 
be 
would 
necessary  and  quicker 
in  a  framework  where 
is  mandatory 
ADR 

approach 

problematic 
most 
sectors 
economic 
would  create  an  extra 
redress 
layer  which 
would produce a result 
which  is  not  binding 
to 
If 
the  parties. 
businesses  that  do  not 
will to  engage in  such 
a  process  are  obliged 
to  do  so,  they  might 
also  reject  the  verdict 
of the ADR and oblige 
to  bring 
consumers 
them 
court  or 
to 
withdraw 
the  case. 
the  ODR 
Replacing 
Platform would have a 
negative  social  impact 
on  those  jobs  as  MS 
points 
contact 
connected 
its 
implementation (about 
50  FTEs  throughout 
the  EU).  The  new 
residual 
empowered 

to 

national 
authorities 
and  the  Commission, 
impacting 
without 
fundamental 
rights. 
On  the  other  hand, 
making  participation 
in  ADR  mandatory 
provide 
would 
consumers  with 
a 
quick  and  affordable 
way  to  resolve  their 
disputes, regardless of 
its  nature,  reinforcing 
to 
their 
an 
effective 
remedy 
under  Article  47  of 
and 
the  CFREU 
a 
promoting 
high 
consumer 
level  of 
in 
protection 
with 
accordance 
Article  38  of 
the 
CFREU.  However, 
same 
very 
this 
could 
measure 
have 
potentially 

right 

188 There is no information on the size of the businesses more involved with ADR disputes, but it is expected that a large number of the 300,000 eligible disputes 
is with large businesses.  
189 120,000*90%*EUR 185. 

87 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
right 

impact  on 
negative 
an 
to 
the 
effective  remedy  as 
Member  States  could 
implement 
by 
requiring participation 
in ADR as a condition 
for access to court. 

it 

entities  created  might 
absorb  some  of  these 
jobs. 

and  confusion  could 
affect  consumers  on 
where  to  go  to  obtain 
redress. 

one 

Obliging  MS  to  have 
only 
certified 
ADR  body  per  retail 
sector,  complemented 
by  the  residual  cross-
border 
digital 
and 
ADR,  would  also  act 
to simplify the flow of 
consumers  in  need  to 
in  a 
solve  disputes 
framework 
where 
is  mandatory. 
ADR 
This  measure  would 
increase 
competition 
among  ADR  entities 
in  the  same  sector,  in 
order  to  acquire  the 
only 
available 
certification.  In  turn, 
this would make ADR 
faster  and  of  a  better 
quality 
and  would 
boost  the  reduction  of 
consumer detriment. If 
three 
disputes  were 
the 
faster, 
months 

88 

 
 
 
EUR  56  million  at 
any 
at 
stake 
moment190 
would 
generate  about  EUR 
280,000 of interest per 
year191, 
i.e.  EUR 
2,500,000  in  10  years 
at  sure  disposal  of 
consumers 
or 
businesses  winning 
the dispute. 

Businesses 

Businesses 

N/A 

in 

Engaging 
these 
disputes  against  their 
will  would  make 
businesses  incur  into 
costs  of  participation, 
legal 
time  and 
i.e. 
fees,  even  in  the  case 
they  would 
likely 
refuse  the  outcome  of 
(which 
the  process 
could  lead  potentially 
to  further  expenses  in 
court).  Assuming  that 

Businesses 

 N/A 

190 300,000*EUR 185. 
191 At 2% interest rate, in a quarter of a year EUR 56 million generate EUR 280,000. 

89 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
for the average dispute 
where not big amounts 
are  a  stake  businesses 
would spend EUR 100 
and 
to 
prepare 
it, 
participate 
cumulative 
costs 
would amount to EUR 
12  million 
every 
year,192 i.e. up to EUR 
105  million 
in  10 
years. 

to 

Extending  the  quality 
criteria  of  the  ADR 
directive  to  platform’s 
resolution 
dispute 
systems 
(under 
supervision  and  audits 
from  ADR  NCAs), 
needed  in  Option  D 
because 
the 
mandatory  nature  of 
ADR,  would  have 
similar  impacts  as  in 
Option  C  with 
the 
that  here 
difference 
self-
no 
is 
there 

of 

192 EUR 100 x 120,000 disputes. 

90 

 
 
 
 
certification  but  an 
certification 
actual 
process  with  audits. 
Hence, as in Option C 
total  costs  in  10  years 
for large businesses to 
comply would amount 
to  EUR  97  million, 
but  in  addition  they 
would  have  to  file  the 
reports,  for  a  total  of 
0.5 
each 
FTEs 
business  the  first  time 
and  0.1  FTE  every 
year  to  follow  the  file 
(at  EUR  33.500  per 
FTE193), 
i.e.  EUR 
10 
5,000,000 
in 
years.194  The 
total 
large 
for 
cost 
business  would  then 
be  EUR  102  million 
in 10 years. 

Obliging  MS  to  have 
certified 
only 

one 

193 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20221219-3. Annual average salaries in the EU.  
194 EUR 33,500*0,5 FTEs*110 businesses = EUR 1,842,500, and EUR 33,500*0,1 FTEs*110 businesses for 10 years (3% discount rate) = EUR 3,237,000. Total 
= EUR 5 million. 

91 

 
 
 
 
ADR  body  per  retail 
sector,  complemented 
by  the  residual  cross-
border 
digital 
and 
ADR,  would  also  act 
to simplify the flow of 
consumers  in  need  to 
in  a 
solve  disputes 
framework 
where 
is  mandatory. 
ADR 
This  measure  would 
increase 
competition 
among  ADR  entities 
in  the  same  sector,  in 
order  to  acquire  the 
only 
available 
certification.  In  turn, 
this would make ADR 
faster  and  of  a  better 
and  would 
quality 
boost  the  reduction  of 
consumer detriment. If 
three 
disputes  were 
the 
faster, 
months 
EUR  56  million  at 
any 
stake 
at 
moment195 
would 
generate  about  EUR 

195 300,000*EUR 185. 

92 

 
 
 
280,000 of interest per 
year196, 
i.e.  EUR 
2,500,000  in  10  years 
at  sure  disposal  of 
consumers 
or 
businesses  winning 
the dispute. 

ADR 

As in Option C, and as 
is 
now 
mandatory, 
replacing 
the  ODR  platform 
with  signposting  tools 
needs  to  be  done  and 
will  save  businesses 
EUR 3.3 billion in 10 
years.197 

Competitiveness 
of 
EU  businesses  will  be 
impacted positively by 
this  option,  because 
the  savings  can  be 
the 
to  boost 
used 
attractiveness  of  their 

196 At 2% interest rate, in a quarter of a year EUR 56 million generate EUR 280,000. 
197 See assessment of Option C. To this it should be added about EUR 20 of savings for new businesses operating online (80,000, Eurostat) that do not need to 
place the ODR link on their website anymore (in the assessment of Option C this was included in the ADR disclosure of information related savings), i.e. EUR 
1,600,000 per year or EUR 14 million in 10 years.  

93 

 
 
 
 
 
prices,  and  possibly 
foster innovation. 

SME Test 

SME Test 
N/A 

SME Test 
N/A 

will 

would 

in 
SMEs 
particular  enjoy 
the 
savings  connected  to 
information 
the 
provision linked to the 
ODR 
platform 
replacement. 
However, 
the 
mandatory  nature  of 
ADR 
be 
detrimental  for  them, 
as 
lose 
they  would 
time  and 
significant 
to 
resources 
participate 
to 
proceedings  without 
need  to  abide  to  their 
results.  
Competitiveness 
of 
EU  SMEs  will  be 
impacted positively by 
this  option,  because 
the  savings  can  be 
used 
the 
to  boost 
attractiveness  of  their 

94 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Commission 
N/A 

Commission 
N/A 

prices,  and  possibly 
foster innovation. 

Commission 
About  asking  MS  to 
designate  a  residual 
entity 
in  charge  of 
digital  disputes  and 
the  Commission  one 
for  ADR  cross-border 
complaints 
including 
disputes  with  non-EU 
even 
traders, 
if 
automatic 
translation 
can  be  provided,  the 
supervision  of  at  least 
1 FTE per language is 
envisaged. That would 
about  EUR 
mean 
770,500  per  year198, 
which 
in  10  years 
means EUR 7 million 
the 
costs 
of 
Commission. 

for 

As in Option C, and as 
is 
now 

ADR 

198 EUR 33,500 x 23 extra languages on top of the language of the MS. 

95 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Member States 
N/A 

Member States 
N/A 

mandatory, 
replacing 
the  ODR  platform 
with  signposting  tools 
needs  to  be  done  and 
will 
the 
save 
European 
Commission 
about 
EUR  4.4  million  in 
10 years. 

110 

Member States 
The  supervision  and 
audits 
from  ADR 
NCAs  on  extending 
the  quality  criteria  of 
the  ADR  directive  to 
dispute 
platform’s 
systems 
resolution 
large 
over 
businesses 
could 
translate into 10 audits 
per year of the cost of 
2  FTEs  (EUR  31,700 
per FTE the average in 
MS199)  and  2  more 
FTEs  for  supervising 
for  a  total  of  EUR 
1,100,000 in  10 years. 
Six  MS  also  do  on-

199 Eurostat, Average remuneration of national civil servants in central public administration. 

96 

 
 
 
 
 
the-spot  checks  on 
ADR  entities  as  part 
their  monitoring 
of 
mechanisms.200 
At 
EUR  10,000  each,  in 
10 years this would be 
a further EUR 500,000 
for NCAs. Total costs 
for NCAs would then 
to  EUR 
amount 
1,600,000 in 10 years. 

About  asking  MS  to 
designate  a  residual 
entity 
in  charge  of 
digital  disputes  and 
the  Commission  one 
for  ADR  cross-border 
complaints 
including 
disputes  with  non-EU 
traders  The 
entity 
designated  by  the  MS 
would 
be 
empowered  with  legal 
in  disputes 
experts 
connected  with 
the 
digital  world.  At  least 

then 

200  Information  gathering  for  assisting  the  Commission  in  complying  with  its  obligation  under  Article  26  (“reporting”)  of  the  ADR  Directive  and  Article  21 
(“reporting”) of the ODR Regulation. 

97 

 
 
 
 
ADR entities 
N/A 

ADR entities 
N/A 

in 

legal 
2  FTEs  of 
digital 
experts 
disputes 
per  MS 
would  mean  EUR 
1,800,000  per  year,201 
i.e. EUR 16 million of 
costs  in  10  years  for 
the 27 MS. 

by 

ADR entities 
120,000 extra disputes 
would  mean  EUR  36 
in 
million  per  year 
the 
handling 
entities,  i.e.  a  cost  of 
up to EUR 316 million 
in  10  years.  As  in  the 
assessment  of  Option 
C, ADR entities would 
experience  economies 
of scale after a certain 
only 
point, 
and 
marginal 
of 
adding  extra  disputes 
should  be  taken  into 
account.  The  bundling 
measure 
(collective 
ADR  redress)  would 
also have an offsetting 

costs 

201 EUR 33,500 x 2 FTEs x 27 MS. 

98 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
effect, 
if  10%  of 
disputes  are  bundled 
the  benefit  would  be 
up  to  EUR  9  million 
per  year  or  EUR  79 
million  in  10  years.202 
The 
total  costs  for 
ADR  entities  (which 
they  could  pass  to  the 
industry)  would  then 
be  between  EUR  0 
and  EUR  27  million 
(EUR  14 
per  year 
million  on  average), 
i.e.  between  EUR  0 
and  EUR  237  million 
in 10 years (EUR 119 
million in 10 years on 
average). 
On  obliging  MS  to 
have only one certified 
ADR  body  per  retail 
some  ADR 
sector, 
that  were 
entities 
certified  and  now  lose 
the certification would 
certainly  lose  part  of 
their revenue. 

202 30,000*EUR 300 in 10 years with a 3% discount factor.  

99 

 
 
 
COMPARISON OF THE OPTIONS 

In order to compare the options a multi-criteria analysis is provided considering the effectiveness, efficiency and coherence criteria. 
Different total scorings are provided to account for sensitivity analysis: a simple sum of the individual criteria scores, a scenario where 
effectiveness  accounts for 80%, efficiency 10% and coherence 10% (effectiveness  dominant), one where effectiveness  accounts for 
10%,  efficiency  80%  and  coherence  10%  (efficiency  dominant),  one  where  effectiveness  accounts  for  10%,  efficiency  10%  and 
coherence  80%  (coherence  dominant)  and  one  where  effectiveness  accounts  for  40%,  efficiency  40%  and  coherence  20% 
(effectiveness & efficiency dominant). The highest scores for each system are in bold.  

After  the  assessment  of  these  impacts,  for  each  policy  option  is  presented  a  scoring  for  the  three  areas  of  effectiveness  towards 
reaching each specific objective, efficiency to assess how this is reached and coherence with EU legislation. The scores are given with 
points  from  0  to  5  and  are  used  to  compare  the  options.  The  score  for  effectiveness  is  given  qualitatively  based  on  the  average 
performance of each policy option towards the reaching of each the objectives. It also takes into account the impacts which cannot be 
quantified. The score  for coherence is  also  awarded qualitatively. The score for efficiency is  based on the quantified net  benefit of 
each policy option for all stakeholders and it gives an indication of the cost/benefit ratio for each option. A score of 5 is given to the 
most efficient option and the other scores are given in proportion, as per the following tables and formula. 

Calculation of the efficiency score for all policy options: 

The standardised efficiency score for the MCA is calculated as (5 x Net benefit/Best net benefit) and scores are as follows: 

100 

MeasureBenefitsCostsAnot quantifiednot quantifiedB13.000.000 €28.000.000 €C5.894.000.000 €238.000.000 €D3.483.000.000 €350.000.000 € 
 
 
 
Option C, Material scope amendments and new business obligations, is the preferred option under each of the five different systems of 
scoring. By consequence, it is the preferred option of this impact assessment.  

ECC DATA ON COMPLAINTS  

The table below shows data on ECC complaints from the year 2022, divided by category. The highlighted rows are likely to be complaints out of 
the scope of the current ADR Directive. They are the 4.47% of the total. This number is used in the assessment of options where the material scope 
of the Directive is increased.  

101 

Method 2Net benefitStandardised for MCAA0 €0,00B-15.000.000 €-0,01C5.656.000.000 €5,00D3.133.000.000 €2,77OptionsEffectivenessEfficiency CoherenceEqual weightsEffectiveness dominantEfficiency dominant Coherence dominant Effectiveness and efficiency dominantA20,011,01,40,61,01,0B30,021,72,21,01,81,6C45,054,74,44,84,84,6D32,832,93,02,93,02,9Comparison of optionsSensitivity analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
EU ODR PLATFORM DATA ON THE AVERAGE CLAIM 

The average claim disputed by consumers in ADR used throughout this impact assessment is 185€. This figure comes from the EU ODR platform, 
after removal of outliers (non-credible figures inserted only once by consumers in the form associated to the platform, when filing a complaint). 

102 

Nature of ComplaintComplaintQuestionTotalComplaintQuestionTotalGeneral information request19112268124590,90%12,42%10,39%Delayed delivery*1187818990,56%0,79%0,75%Partial delivery*27682911051,31%0,84%0,92%Non delivery3250134841673415,39%13,65%13,96%Lack of confirmation*1497318800,71%0,74%0,73%Lack of pre-contractual information*1107078170,52%0,72%0,68%Non-conformity- defective product*248983301081911,79%8,43%9,02%Non-conformity- wrong product*651217128223,08%2,20%2,35%Unsafe product/caused injury or damage*593534120,28%0,36%0,34%Privacy and data protection*211301510,10%0,13%0,13%Commercial warranty or undertaking not honoured*1244465700,59%0,45%0,48%Packaging/labelling/instructions*2165860,10%0,07%0,07%Other misleading actions or ommissions*279189721761,32%1,92%1,81%Other termination of contract*1125448156065,33%4,54%4,68%Payment arrangments*682308837703,23%3,13%3,14%Refusal to sell/supply product or discrimination*1416157560,67%0,62%0,63%Right of withdrawal (cooling off)*1991634683379,43%6,42%6,95%Subscription trap*351226626171,66%2,29%2,18%Unfair and aggressive commercial practices*18492511090,87%0,94%0,92%Supplementary charges*348223225801,65%2,26%2,15%Unfair contract terms*593604190,28%0,36%0,35%Passenger transport specific1488339810,70%0,84%0,82%Passenger transport specific - -Changes of schedule by the operator*25091711671,18%0,93%0,97%Passenger transport specific - -Delay in respect of original schedule*970327342434,59%3,31%3,54%Passenger transport specific - -Cancellation by operator*3435114011483616,27%11,54%12,37%Passenger transport specific - -Check-in baggage and other policies*702272970,33%0,23%0,25%Passenger transport specific - -Other terms and conditions and unfair commercial practices*1456077520,69%0,61%0,63%Passenger transport specific - -Damaged baggage*2216608811,05%0,67%0,73%Passenger transport specific - -Lack of confirmation (passenger transport)*1032513540,49%0,25%0,30%Passenger transport specific - -Delayed baggage*28888511731,36%0,90%0,98%Passenger transport specific - -Payment arrangements (passenger transport)*1985627600,94%0,57%0,63%Passenger transport specific - -Denied boarding*25591211671,21%0,92%0,97%Passenger transport specific - -Passenger not travelling and changes to reservation by the consumer*503169421972,38%1,71%1,83%Passenger transport specific - -Lost baggage*24289911411,15%0,91%0,95%Passenger transport specific - -Additional & ancillary services*1244986220,59%0,50%0,52%Car rental specific*750570,03%0,05%0,05%Car rental specific* - -Delay in providing vehicle*1780,00%0,01%0,01%Car rental specific* - -Lack of confirmation (car rental)*916250,04%0,02%0,02%Car rental specific* - -Other supplementary charges (eg. fuel)*1082833910,51%0,29%0,33%Car rental specific* - -Alleged damage*1574816380,74%0,49%0,53%Car rental specific* - -Lack of pre-contractual information (car hire)*829370,04%0,03%0,03%Car rental specific* - -Insurance/cover/waiver*501812310,24%0,18%0,19%Car rental specific* - -Vehicle condition/other operational problems*46691150,22%0,07%0,10%Car rental specific* - Changes to type/group/class of vehicle by trader919280,04%0,02%0,02%Car rental specific* - -Other terms&conditions/unfair commercial practices (car rental)*651732380,31%0,18%0,20%Car rental specific* - -Changes to reservation by consumer*2061810,09%0,06%0,07%Car rental specific* - -Payment arrangements (car rental)*701642340,33%0,17%0,20%Car rental specific* - -Cancellation/refusal to provide*1312363670,62%0,24%0,31%Fraud/Scam283310433871,34%3,14%2,82%Other*501598964902,37%6,06%5,41%None81180818890,38%1,83%1,58%Total Unique Issues:2111798794119911100,00%100,00%100,00% 
 
 
Value of 
complaint 

Number of 
times 

Total 
value 

10 € 

60 € 

300 € 

40 € 

500 € 

25 € 

150 € 

30 € 

20 € 

250 € 

120 € 

299 € 

80 € 

99 € 

35 € 

70 € 

1.000 € 

15 € 

90 € 

199 € 

400 € 

1 € 

30 € 

40 € 

45 € 

424 

4.240 € 

400 

24.000 € 

378 

113.400 € 

377 

15.080 € 

371 

185.500 € 

365 

9.125 € 

364 

54.600 € 

355 

10.646 € 

332 

6.637 € 

314 

78.500 € 

297 

35.640 € 

290 

86.710 € 

286 

22.880 € 

282 

27.918 € 

276 

9.660 € 

276 

19.320 € 

271 

271.000 € 

267 

4.005 € 

264 

23.760 € 

262 

52.138 € 

261 

104.400 € 

250 

249 

237 

250 € 

7.445 € 

9.478 € 

236 

10.620 € 

103 

 
 
399 € 

50 € 

15 € 

60 € 

600 € 

20 € 

69 € 

59 € 

149 € 

5 € 

49 € 

55 € 

40 € 

350 € 

5 € 

499 € 

39 € 

119 € 

25 € 

110 € 

180 € 

29 € 

129 € 

159 € 

249 € 

70 € 

89 € 

236 

94.164 € 

228 

11.398 € 

227 

3.403 € 

216 

12.958 € 

204 

122.400 € 

196 

3.900 € 

191 

13.179 € 

189 

11.151 € 

188 

28.012 € 

187 

181 

174 

169 

933 € 

8.869 € 

9.570 € 

6.743 € 

167 

58.450 € 

165 

825 € 

164 

81.836 € 

163 

6.357 € 

162 

19.278 € 

161 

4.023 € 

159 

17.490 € 

159 

28.620 € 

158 

4.582 € 

155 

19.995 € 

151 

24.009 € 

150 

37.350 € 

149 

10.429 € 

149 

13.261 € 

104 

 
 
50 € 

75 € 

179 € 

60 € 

65 € 

140 € 

130 € 

160 € 

800 € 

80 € 

100 € 

1.200 € 

85 € 

450 € 

139 € 

280 € 

40 € 

60 € 

240 € 

349 € 

1.500 € 

36 € 

700 € 

2.000 € 

79 € 

35 € 

699 € 

148 

7.385 € 

148 

11.100 € 

146 

26.134 € 

145 

144 

8.686 € 

9.360 € 

142 

19.880 € 

141 

18.330 € 

141 

22.560 € 

140 

112.000 € 

135 

10.799 € 

132 

13.199 € 

130 

156.000 € 

129 

10.965 € 

127 

57.150 € 

126 

17.514 € 

124 

34.720 € 

122 

122 

4.874 € 

7.314 € 

122 

29.280 € 

121 

42.229 € 

120 

180.000 € 

119 

4.284 € 

119 

83.300 € 

119 

238.000 € 

116 

115 

9.164 € 

4.024 € 

114 

79.686 € 

105 

 
 
12 € 

30 € 

24 € 

229 € 

32 € 

279 € 

10 € 

48 € 

189 € 

170 € 

219 € 

599 € 

13 € 

95 € 

169 € 

45 € 

37 € 

125 € 

113 

113 

112 

1.356 € 

3.384 € 

2.688 € 

112 

25.648 € 

110 

3.520 € 

110 

30.690 € 

107 

107 

1.059 € 

5.136 € 

107 

20.223 € 

106 

18.020 € 

105 

22.995 € 

105 

62.895 € 

104 

104 

1.352 € 

9.880 € 

104 

17.576 € 

103 

102 

4.634 € 

3.774 € 

101 

12.625 € 

The total value of EUR 3,305,528 divided by 17,914 times gives a result of EUR 184.5 per dispute.  

SWEEP ON PODR 

In order to gather data on the quality standards of PODR systems provided by online intermediaries, a screening of nine major online 
platforms operating within the EU was conducted to evaluate their compliance with the requirements set forth in the ADR Directive. This 

106 

 
 
 
 
screening was based on a structured checklist, which consisted of twelve questions designed to assess the quality standards of PODR 
systems offered by these intermediaries. 

Each question was graded based on a hypothetically compliant or non-compliant answer, with a score of 1 or 0, respectively. In the event 
that the information was not found or available, a score of 0.5 was assigned, unless the provision of such information was a requirement, in 
which case the score would be 0. The sum of each score expressed in percentage comprised the total score of compliance. The questions 
were the following: 

Is there a clause on applicable law? 

1.  Does the platform clearly provide its dispute resolution rules? 
2. 
3.  Are the persons in charge of dispute resolution impartial? 
4.  Are there time limits on when the claim can be submitted after purchase? 
5.  Can a consumer submit the complaint in a language of their choice (or at least the country where they reside)? 
6. 
Is there any guarantee that the persons in charge of dispute resolution are trained in the consumer law? 
7.  Can parties submit their evidence/expert opinions? 
8.  Do consumers have access to the trader's position/evidence? 
9. 
10. Is there any commitment to resolve disputes within a certain period of time? 
11. Can the consumer be represented? 
12. Is it clear how the outcome is enforced? 

Is the dispute resolution free of charge? 

The results of the screening showed a level of perceived compliance ranging from 42% to 88%, with an average of 67%, as seen in 
the following table. However, to meet the quality standards ADR Directive, these platforms should have scored a total of 100%.203 
This  highlights  the  fact  that  that  while  millions  of  consumers  rely  on  digital  platforms’  PODRs,  these  systems  do  not  meet  the 
quality standards that consumers would expect from an out-of-court dispute resolution mechanism, and which the ADR Directives 
affords to them in the context of ADR.  

203 Note that the compliance is perceived, i.e. the indicators are based on what the consumer can find about the quality criteria on the websites of the platform, 
rather than an actual indication of compliance.  

107 

 
 
 
 
 
 
PODR 
PODR 1 
PODR 2 
PODR 3 
PODR 4 
PODR 5 
PODR 6 
PODR 7 
PODR 8 
PODR 9 

Score 
8 
8.5 
8 
8 
6 
8,75 
10,5 
9,5 
5 

Compliance 
(score/12) 

67% 
71% 
67% 
67% 
50% 
73% 
88% 
79% 
42% 

108 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 5: COMPETITIVENESS CHECK 

1.  Overview of impacts on competitiveness 

Dimensions of competitiveness 

Cost and price competitiveness 

Capacity to innovate 

International competitiveness 

SME competitiveness 

2.  Synthetic assessment 

the 

of 

Impact 
initiative 
(++ / + / 0 / - / -- / n.a.) 
++ 

+ 

++ 

++ 

References  to  sub-sections  of 
the main report or annexes 

Chapter 6 - Impacts of the policy 
options, Annex 4. 

Chapter 6 - Impacts of the policy 
options, Annex 4. 

Chapter 6 - Impacts of the policy 
options, Annex 4. 

Chapter 6 - Impacts of the policy 
options, Annex 4. 

The  impacts  on  the  cost  and  price  competitiveness  under  the  preferred  option  are  expected  to  be 
positive (high magnitude), due to savings from compliance costs. Replacing the need of disclosing 
information on ADR with the duty to reply would yield for businesses a total benefit of EUR 3.3 
billion  in  10  years,  allowing  them  to  improve  their  cost  and  price  competitiveness.  Also,  newly 
established businesses in  the EU in the next  10 years would not  incur into costs to  provide ODR 
information on their website, but this estimate is already included in the calculations linked to the 
removal of ADR information, presented above. 

The  same  would  apply  for  international  competitiveness  of  EU  traders,  also  considering  that  the 
provision  on  the  extension  of  the  scope  to  third-country  traders  would  level  the  playing  field  in 
favour of EU traders, correcting a market failure. 

Considering the capacity to innovate, it is expected that the initiative would be positive of limited 
magnitude, because a re-established level playing field would encourage the development of new 
ideas in order for businesses in the same sector to be more competitive with each other.  

SMEs,  which  in  principle  are  not  likely  to  fall  under  the  scope  of  the  initiative  would  indirectly 
benefit strongly from the initiative, as ensuring a level-playing field would have positive effects of 
high magnitude on their capacity to conduct a business.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 6: PERFORMANCE OF THE ODR PLATFORM 

INTRODUCTION 

The ODR Regulation, adopted in 2013 to complement the ADR Directive, established the European 
Online  Dispute  Resolution  Platform  (“ODR  platform”)  to  facilitate  access  to  ADR  for  disputes 
stemming  from  online  purchases.  Its  Implementing  Regulation204  established  the  technical 
modalities for the functioning of the platform and the network of the ODR contact points. 

The ODR platform, open to  public since February 2016, is  a voluntary  matchmaking tool, where 
consumers who have problems with online purchases, can request the trader to refer the dispute to 
an ADR entity. It applies to both national and cross-border disputes (slightly more than half of the 
disputes are cross-border) and is available in all EU languages, plus Norwegian and Icelandic. The 
Commission  has  no  role  in  dispute  resolution,  and  may  only  access  the  database  of  cases  for 
technical and monitoring purposes.  

The  ODR  platform’s  website  is  one  of  the  most  visited  sites  of  the  European  Commission  (2,5 
million  visits  in  2022)205. Even  if  less  than  one  percent  of  the  visitors  actually  use  the  complaint 
form,  the  platform,  however,  amassed  180  thousand206  complaints  since  its  launch  in  2016,  with 
additional  87  thousand  requests  for  traders  to  settle  directly  (not  involving  ADR).207  80-85%  of 
complaints, however, go unanswered on the platform, with only about of 1% of the complaints (i.e 
about  150  cases)  resulting  in  an  ADR  outcome.208  This  low  success  rate  has  persisted  over  the 
years,  regardless  of  the  technical  and  design  improvements  on  the  platform,  or  information 
campaigns.209 

Year 

Website visits  Direct talks**  Complaints 

2016* 
2017* 
2018* 
2019* 

1.715.794 
2.743.509 
5.246.777 
2.765.583 

- 
- 
- 
5.970 

          20.176  
          32.559  
          44.979  
          31.694  

Complaints 
referred 
ADR 
406 
597 
860 
598 

ADR 
outcomes 

to 

112 
249 
396 
294 

204  Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  2015/1051  of  1  July  2015  on  the  modalities  for  the  exercise  of  the 
functions  of  the  online  dispute  resolution  platform,  on  the  modalities  of  the  electronic  complaint  form  and  on  the 
modalities  of  the  cooperation  between  contact  points  provided  for  in  Regulation  (EU)  No  524/2013 of  the  European 
Parliament and of the Council on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes 
205 This number remains relatively stable throughout the years, with an increase to 3 million visitors in 2020, during the 
COVID lockdown, and an anomalous increase in 2018 to 5 million, following a social media campaign, where half of 
the visits were recorded during one month of the campaign 
206 The tables in this Annex refer to the data up to end 2022 only (177 thousand complaints, 80 thousand direct talks) 
207 The “direct talk” functionality has been introduced following the low rate of transfers to ADR and the survey data 
that shows that more disputes are settled bilaterally outside of the platform, following the initial complaint. The direct 
talk is essentially a draft of the complaint that the consumer shares with the trader before finalising and requesting that 
the trader uses ADR.  
208  The  remaining  19-24%  complaints  were  either  closed  because  either  consumer  or  trader  withdrew,  indicating  a 
possible settlement, or ADR entity rejected or was unable to resolve the complaint.   
209 The rate for the direct talks was similarly low, where about 1% of cases are closed on the platform with “successful 
settlement”.  

110 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2020* 
2021 
2022 
Total 
2022 

3.315.599 
2.616.235 
2.455.677 
20.859.174 

30.319 
21.946 
28.111 
80.244 

2016-

          17.461  
          13.246  
          17.012  
177.127 

429 
400 
318 
3.608 

163 
169 
107 
1.490 

* Years where UK consumers, traders and ADR entities were still using the platform. While Brexit 
affected  the  number  of  submissions,  it  did  not  have  a  noticeable  change  on  the  proportion  of 
complaints reaching ADR. 
**  Direct  talks  (consumers  and  traders  exchanging  messages  on  the  platform  directly,  without 
involving ADR) were offered as of July 2019. More details are available later in this Annex.  

This annex provides statistical data and looks at the reasons behind the persistently low success of 
the platform, with regards to the regulatory choices of the ODR Regulation, platform design and the 
context of the modern digital markets in the EU/EEA. 

THE ODR REGULATION 

The sole purpose of the ODR Regulation is to provide a legal basis for the ODR platform: 

(1)  The Commission is responsible for the development and operation of the ODR platform, 
including all the translation functions necessary for the purpose of this Regulation, its 
maintenance, funding and data security. The Commission also publishes reports and 
statistical information and organises the meetings of the National Contact Points; 
(2) The Member States are responsible for establishing and maintaining the national ODR 

contact points with two national ODR advisers (which, to Member State’s discretion, may 
be delegated to an ECC, consumer association or any other body). The role of the contact 
points is to help the users with the platform, as well as provide some general advice; 

(3) The ADR entities are obliged to process the disputes arriving via the platform, if the trader 

and consumer agreed to refer the dispute to a particular ADR entity.210 

(4) The traders selling online are obliged to provide an easily accessible link to the ODR 

platform on their websites, along with an email address for the contact. Online marketplaces 
only need to provide an easily accessible link. These obligations apply irrespective of 
whether the trader is obliged or committed to use ADR and does not mean that the trader 
consents to use ODR.211 

In  practice,  the  ODR  platform  ecosystem  also  permits  to  manage  some  of  the  obligations  in  the 
ADR Directive: 

210 See Article 10(d) ODR Regulation – the ADR entities, however, are not obliged to use the platform’s case handling 
tool apart from communication the decision on admissibility and, if applicable, on the outcome of the dispute. 
211 Some traders formally comply with the link obligation, but not the email obligation, or warn consumers that they 
will not respond to complaints coming from the ODR platform. 

111 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) Notification of the national ADR entities to the Commission and publishing by the 

Commission of respective multilingual lists, including contact details, information on 
procedure and fees (Article 20(4) of the ADR Directive);212 

(2) Assistance for consumers who need access to an ADR entity operating in another Member 
State (Article 14 ADR Directive) is, in practice, performed mostly by the ODR national 
contact points as they in any case have to advise consumers on ADR. 

However,  while  the  ADR  directive  empowers  consumers  to  submit  a  complaint  to  an  ADR 
entity213,  the  ODR  Regulation’s  approach  is  that  a  consumer’s  complaint  only  reaches  the  ADR 
stage if, and only if, the trader explicitly agrees and proposes an ADR body214. In the absence of 
such  an  agreement,  the  platform  automatically  closes  the  case  in  30  days  after  submission  of  the 
complaint by the consumer. Therefore: 

(1) Only 2% of traders agree to use an ADR when asked through the platform; 

(2) Use of the ODR platform thus creates an unnecessary additional step for consumers 

compared to them submitting a complaint to the ADR entity directly, with consumers losing 
time;215 

(3) The complaint can only reach the trader if the consumer uses the proper contact email that 
traders are to provide for the purpose of reply to the ODR platform emails. However, 
traders’ compliance with the obligation to signpost the link and the e-mail has been below 
30%216. This means that the platform effectively cannot be used when the consumer does 
not know how the email of the trader behind the website.217  

(4) The use of the ODR platform is voluntary even when the trader is committed or obliged to 
use ADR. Indeed, while 4 to 9% (depending on the year) of consumers indicated in the 
complaint form that, to their knowledge, the trader was obliged or committed to use ADR, 
the actual rate of transfer to an ADR was significantly lower (2% for most years, and the 
maximum of 4% for 2018). 

When  the  trader  refuses  explicitly  to  use  ADR  (which  happens  in  only  about  10%  of  the  cases), 
about half of the traders do so because they are still looking for a solution bilaterally, over a quarter 
report  they  already  found  a  solution,  and  one  in  five  (or  2%  all  complaints  submitted  on  the 

212 The Implementing Regulation provided for an electronic notification form, which allows Member States to notify 
the ADR entities to the platform directly. Once the ADR entities nominate at least one user for the purposes of handling 
complaints arriving via the platform, and the Commission makes the necessary translations, the entities are added to the 
list semi-automatically.  
213 See, for example, recitals 24-25, or Article 1 of the ADR Directive. 
214 Article 9(3) of the ODR Regulation. While the trader should, in principle, decide whether to propose ADR or not 
within 10 days, there are no consequences for failure to do so, as the process is voluntary.  
215 Especially if the trader is not aware which ADR they should use, and ADR subsequently rejects the case.  
216 Webscraping exercise and sweep on telecommunications and digital services, both 2018.  
217 The consumers themselves may make errors, i.e. write the wrong email address, which may mean that the complaint 
would not even make it to the right department within 30 days.  

112 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
platform) state they are not interested in ADR. Most traders however remain completely silent and 
cases are closed automatically.  

(5) Automatic closure of the complaint is a constant source of frustration for the consumers 
who come to the platform218. Indeed, most contact points report that 30 days closure has 
remained the most frequent cause for consumers to contact them, and even if the voluntary 
nature of the platform is well explained and the consumers are notified of the other means 
of redress, the consumers do not understand why their case was simply closed without 
information from the trader or an ADR body. 

ODR PLATFORM AS DIGITAL SERVICE INFRASTRUCTURE 

The  ODR  Regulation  mandates  the  platform  to  be  user-friendly,  multilingual  and  compliant  with 
the Commission’s stringent security, data protection and accessibility requirements. It should work 
on a broad range of browsers and mobile devices (there is currently no app version).  

The  ODR  platform  was  built  in  2015,  using  technology  recommended  for  similar-sized 
Commission websites then, using the ColdFusion programming language. However, the technology 
is now considered obsolete in the Commission. Throughout the years, the platform was redesigned 
several times, however, each redesign met with technical difficulties and both the Commission and 
national contact points have received numerous complaints from the users, consumers and traders 
alike. 

The  Commission’s  efforts  to  improve  the  platform  are  based  on  the  feedback  of  the  users,  the 
national contact points219, and other stakeholders: 

• 

• 

• 

2017-2018 – redesign in line with the Commission corporate guidelines, 
streamlining the complaint process, rewriting notifications in a clear and specific 
language, taking measures against the notifications being classified as spam; 
2019 – introducing the self-test tool for consumers to find the best redress option 
for their problems (including, but not limited to, the ODR platform), creating a 
space for consumers and traders to connect on the platform before referring the 
dispute to ADR (and not being limited by 30 days), specific information for the 
traders; 
2019-2020 – improvements for the national contact points, functional analysis to 
re-evaluate the ODR platform’s minimum requirements under the ODR 
regulation to simplify the process, study of  new functions in order  to maximise 
consumer empowerment;  

218  As  confirmed  by  the  results  of  the  platform  exit  survey,  the  reports  of  the  national  contact  points,  and  different 
research activities performed in the framework of the platform management 
219 Bi-yearly reports of the national contact points and twice-yearly meetings under the ODR Regulation, and ad hoc 
communications  

113 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• 

2020-2021 – design thinking action to create user-friendly interfaces to be 
deployed on the next iteration of the ODR platform. Behavioural experiment 
monitoring traders’ response to different treatments informed by the behavioural 
science. 

However, as seen before, these improvements were not able to turn the tide when it  comes to the 
objective of the ODR Regulation  – the rate of complaints reaching ADR remained around 2% of 
submissions and 0,02% of visits.  

A number of issues with the ODR platform persist regardless of the improvements: 

• 

• 

• 

• 

The outdated technical solution means that the platform is often slow to respond, 
especially when the users’ internet connection is not strong;  
The helpdesk path is very complex for the user: consumers and traders must turn 
to the national contact points who often have to escalate to the technical 
helpdesk, which due to the regulatory confidentiality requirements have very 
limited access to complaints and direct talks on the platform;  
The structure of the ODR platform does not always fit well with the traders’ 
structure, who may have different branches in different countries; 
The design of the platform is perceived as complex and not user-friendly. The 
national contact points reported that the users have difficulties finding 
information even when it is, in the view of the contact points familiar with the 
platform, stated clearly and prominently. 

Some  of  these  issues  could  have  been  addressed  with  the  comprehensive  overhaul  of  the  ODR 
platform.220  However,  this  would  entail  additional  investment  upward  1  MEUR221,  while 
maintenance  of  the  ODR  platform  is  already  costing  more  than  0,5  MEUR  per  year  just  for 
technical  maintenance,  not  counting  the  staff  of  the  Commission  or  translation  costs.  Given  that 
neither  information  campaigns  nor  design  improvements  had  a  significant  and  durable  impact  on 
the traders’ engagement with ADR, the likelihood of a positive change with a revamp only is very 
low.  

THE VALUE OF THE ODR PLATFORM 

Consumers land on the ODR platform because they have a problem  which is  likely  to have been 
already dismissed by the trader222. The ODR platform, aside from its complaint function, is also an 
information  hub where the consumer learns  about  their rights  and redress options, can access  the 
contact  points and ADR entities. In this way, the existence of the platform had value  beyond the 
ODR  Regulation.  However,  and  with  a  minimal  cost,  this  value  could  have  been  achieved  by  a 
simple website offering information, signposting tools and access to a national advisor.  

220  In  2021,  DG  JUST  submitted  a  Project  Initiation  Request  for  the  revamped  ODR  platform  to  the  Information 
Technology and Cybersecurity Board. The request included externalisation of the platform technical management and 
was rejected by ITCB as, in ITCB view, there was not enough evidence to support externalisation.  
221 Estimated by DG JUST in 2021 prices 
222 See earlier footnote: 95% consumers already contacted the trader before they submit their case to the ODR platform 

114 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The  self-test  tool  has  been  one  of  the  most  successful  and  appreciated  improvements:  it 
drastically223  increased  the  level  of  engagement  with  the  platform,  and  assisted  consumers  to 
understand whether their case was in the scope of the platform and about the other means to resolve 
their disputes (going to the ADR directly, contacting the trader first, approaching an ECC). 

User engagement: self-test results vs. submissions

 250.000

 200.000

 150.000

 100.000

 50.000

 -

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Complaints

Direct talks

Self test

*  complaints  involving  UK  consumers  and  traders  (up  to  2020)  are  excluded  for  comparison 
purposes. 

As shown in the chart, the self-test and the opportunity to have direct talks significantly reduced the 
amount  of  “traditional”  complaints  on  the  platform  as  such  complaints  would  involve  a  higher 
burden for consumers (filling it the form, waiting 30 days for a reply) when it was not certain that 
the trader would agree to use ADR. On the other hand, the share of the consumers who submitted a 
complaint  without  trying  to  contact  the  trader  first  decreased  from  11%  in  2016-2018  to  5%  in 
2020-2022. The Commission is now conducting a behavioural study on the use of an AI-powered 
chatbot  that  would  build  on  the  initial  success  of  the  self-test  tool,  allowing  consumers  to  better 
understand their rights and redress options.  

The  direct  talk  module  has  been  less  successful  though,  with  only  1%  of  those  having  used  it 
coming back to the platform to record that a settlement was reached.  

223 i.e. in 2020 and 2022 there were five times more users that completed the self-test, compared to those who submitted 
a complaint. 

115 

 
 
   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Consumers and traders are invited to fill in an “exit survey” after the case had been closed on the 
platform.  224  According  to  this  Survey,  20%  of  consumers  who  posted  a  complaint  got  their  case 
resolved. Most of them report that the solution was found directly with the trader which contacted 
them directly instead of using the platform. Further 20% of consumers were have been contacted by 
the trader outside the platform, however, they do not consider that their case was resolved.  

19 thousand traders, including large platforms and small companies, are currently registered on the 
ODR platform.225  It  appears  that many of them  are willing  to  settle  – either immediately or  after 
ADR is requested through the platform – but not using the ODR platform and thus not going to an 
ADR process. This indicates that most of the issues are not considered needing an ADR by traders. 
However, because of the moral pressure created by the use of an official EU level platform, they 
are ready to make an effort and consider again the consumer request.  

Traders’  unwillingness  to  use  an  ADR  process  is  unlikely  to  be  modified  by  information 
campaigns226, technical or design improvements as it is the process itself that they reject and in fact, 
in all other situations the process is that it is the ADR body that contacts the trader, as a neutral 3rd 
party; following a complaint that the ADR received. 

The developments in digital markets also explains why the platform is unsuccessful: 

-  The ODR Regulation, adopted in 2013, did not take into account or predict the evolution of 
the digital markets and dominance of platforms, many of which offer their own, private, 
dispute resolution systems; 

-  Similarly, it was impossible to predict that the traders’ engagement in ADR will take time to 
build. If the traders are unlikely to use ADR, signposting a link to the ODR platform and 
maintaining email address creates additional burden for the trader and false expectations for 
the consumer; 
 The ODR platform is a confidential environment. This means that ODR data would be 
separated from the other data the trader has on their customers (unless the trader manually 
exports it or invests in an interoperable solution). This, on its own, is counter-productive for 
the online traders given the importance of data quality in the modern digital markets. 

- 

On  the  other  hand,  the  consumers’  satisfaction  with  the  platform,  given  its  current  premise,  rests 
mostly on whether it delivered on having a dispute resolved. Even those consumers who find the 
ODR  platform  easy  to  use  and  informative,  are  unlikely  to  return  if  the  main  function  of  the 
platform is not fulfilled. 

Would  you  use  the  site 
again for another dispute? 
Yes 

My dispute was resolved 

My dispute was not resolved 

74% 

10% 

224  Where  the  traders’  survey  has  a  very  low  rate  of  reply  (only  60  from  2019  to  date),  the 
consumers’ survey amassed 20485 responses (roughly 1/6 complaints). 
225  Due  to  the  security/privacy  considerations,  the  traders  do  not  receive  case  data  by  email,  only  notifications.  If  a 
trader wants to see the details of a case, they need to register on the ODR platform. 
226  In  2018,  the  Commission  carried  out  a  specific  campaign  for  the  traders.  This  led  to  a  temporary  increase  in 
registrations, but did not produce a durable effect 

116 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No 
I don’t know 

11% 
15% 

56% 
33% 

Source: exit survey of the ODR platform.  

CONCLUSION 

The  ODR  Regulation  and  the  ODR  platform  has  served  a  purpose  by  providing  a  space  for 
consumers to  learn about  their rights  and redress options. However, its  main function, to  transfer 
the complaints to the ADR entities, has been unsuccessful, with less than 200 outcomes (or 1% of 
the submissions per year). The dispute resolution module, which is responsible for the majority of 
the costs associated with the ADR platform, has not delivered. It would therefore be opportune to 
retain and enhance the successful features of the ODR platform, such as access to the ADR entities 
and  national  advisor,  and  automatic  assistance  on  consumer  redress,  in  lieu  of  the  further 
investment in maintaining the dispute resolution/ADR transfer components and obliging all online 
traders to maintain a link to a platform they do not want to use and to maintain and regularly check 
an email address for this purpose. 

117