COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Ukraine 2023 Report Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2023 Communication on EU Enlargement policy
Date: 2023-11-08
Institutions: Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, European Commission
Subjects: Ukraine, accession criteria, accession negotiations, pre-accession strategy, regional cooperation

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 8.11.2023  SWD(2023) 699 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Ukraine 2023 Report Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2023 Communication on EU Enlargement policy                   {COM(2023) 690 final} - {SWD(2023) 690 final} - {SWD(2023) 691 final} - {SWD(2023) 692 final} - {SWD(2023) 693 final} - {SWD(2023) 694 final} - {SWD(2023) 695 final} - {SWD(2023) 696 final} - {SWD(2023) 697 final} - {SWD(2023) 698 final}  
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 3 

1.1.  CONTEXT ................................................................................................................................. 3 
1.2. 
SUMMARY OF THE REPORT ...................................................................................................... 3 
1.3.  ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SEVEN STEPS OF THE COMMISSION'S 
OPINION ............................................................................................................................................... 9 

2.  CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS ......................... 12 

2.1. 

2.3. 

FUNCTIONING OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM .... 12 
2.1.1. Democracy....................................................................................................................................... 12 
2.1.2. Public administration reform ........................................................................................................ 16 
2.2.  RULE OF LAW AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS .......................................................................... 19 
2.2.1.  Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights ........................................................................ 19 
2.2.2.  Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security ............................................................................... 54 
ECONOMIC CRITERIA ............................................................................................................. 70 
2.3.1.  The existence of a functioning market economy ..................................................................... 70 
2.3.2.  The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union ...... 78 
2.4. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, STATISTICS, FINANCIAL CONTROL ....................................................... 81 
Chapter 5 – Public procurement ............................................................................................................. 81 
Chapter 18 – Statistics .............................................................................................................................. 82 
Chapter 32 – Financial control ................................................................................................................ 84 

3.  GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND REGIONAL COOPERATION..................... 86 

4.  ABILITY TO ASSUME THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP...................................... 88 

CLUSTER 2: INTERNAL MARKET ....................................................................................................... 88 
Chapter 1 – Free movement of goods .................................................................................................... 89 
Chapter 2 – Freedom of movement for workers ................................................................................... 91 
Chapter 3 – Right of establishment and freedom to provide services ............................................... 92 
Chapter 4 – Free movement of capital ................................................................................................... 93 
Chapter 6 – Company law ........................................................................................................................ 95 
Chapter 7 – Intellectual property law..................................................................................................... 96 
Chapter 8 – Competition policy ............................................................................................................... 97 
Chapter 9 – Financial services ................................................................................................................. 98 
Chapter 28 – Consumer and health protection ................................................................................... 100 
CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH ............................................................. 103 
Chapter 10 - Digital transformation and media ................................................................................. 103 
Chapter 16 - Taxation ............................................................................................................................. 105 
Chapter 17 – Economic and monetary policy...................................................................................... 107 
Chapter 19 – Social policy and employment ....................................................................................... 108 
Chapter 20 – Enterprise and industrial policy ..................................................................................... 111 
Chapter 25 – Science and research ....................................................................................................... 113 
Chapter 26 – Education and culture ..................................................................................................... 114 
Chapter 29 – Customs union .................................................................................................................. 116 
CLUSTER 4: THE GREEN AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE CONNECTIVITY ........................................... 117 
Chapter 14 – Transport .......................................................................................................................... 118 
Chapter 15 – Energy ............................................................................................................................... 120 
Chapter 21 – Trans-European networks .............................................................................................. 124 
Chapter 27 – Environment and climate change ................................................................................. 125 
CLUSTER 5: RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE AND COHESION ............................................................... 129 
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Chapter 11 – Agriculture and rural development ............................................................................... 130 
Chapter 12 – Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy ....................................................... 131 
Chapter 13 – Fisheries and aquaculture .............................................................................................. 133 
Chapter 22 – Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments ..................................... 135 
Chapter 33 – Financial and budgetary provisions .............................................................................. 137 
CLUSTER 6: EXTERNAL RELATIONS ................................................................................................ 138 
Chapter 30 – External relations ............................................................................................................. 138 
Chapter 31 – Foreign, security & defence policy ................................................................................ 139 
ANNEX 1 - RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND UKRAINE ............................................................... 142 

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1. 

INTRODUCTION 

1.1.  CONTEXT 

On  28  February  2022,  five  days  after  Russia  launched  its  unprovoked  and  unjustified 
aggression,  Ukraine  submitted  its  application  for  EU  membership.  On  17  June  2022,  the 
Commission issued its opinion1 and recommended to the Council that Ukraine should be given 
the perspective to become a member of the EU and that the country be granted candidate status 
on the understanding that seven steps, mainly in the rule of law area, are taken. On 23 June 
2022,  the  European  Council  recognised  the  country’s  European  perspective  and  decided  to 
grant Ukraine the status of candidate country. The European Council invited the Commission 
to report to the Council on the fulfilment of the seven steps as part of its regular enlargement 
package. This report is the Commission’s first annual enlargement report on Ukraine replacing 
the previous annual Association Implementation Reports. To complement its opinion on the 
membership  application,  the  Commission  published  the  analytical  report2  on  the  acquis 
alignment of Ukraine in February 2023. 

Russia’s  war  of  aggression  is  still  ongoing,  causing  the  loss  of  tens  of  thousands  of  lives, 
livelihoods, millions of refugees and internally displaced persons, deportation and transfer of 
Ukrainian citizens, including children, to Russia and Belarus, massive destruction of physical 
infrastructure  and  further  occupation  of  Ukrainian  territory  by  Russia.  Faced  with  this 
aggression, the Ukrainian government has shown a remarkable level of institutional strength, 
determination and ability to function. Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion and war of 
aggression, the EU has been supporting Ukraine diplomatically, financially, economically and 
militarily and through humanitarian aid on an unprecedented scale,  amounting to EUR 82.6 
billion. It has also issued 11 packages of sanctions against Russia. EU Member States host a 
large number of Ukrainians, of which close to 4 million are registered for temporary protection 
under the Temporary Protection Directive. The EU and its Member States have also supported 
efforts to ensure full accountability for war crimes and the other violations of international law 
committed  in  connection  with  Russia’s  war  of  aggression.  To  support  Ukraine’s  repair, 
recovery and reconstruction process, the Commission, together with Ukraine and G7 partners, 
has  set  up  the  Multi-agency  Donor  Coordination  Platform.  The  repair,  recovery  and 
reconstruction  process  is  firmly  embedded  in  Ukraine’s  EU  accession  path,  ensuring 
investments  go  hand  in  hand  with  accession-related  reforms.  In  June  2023,  the  European 
Commission  proposed  a  dedicated  medium-term  financing  instrument  that  will  provide 
Ukraine  with  coherent,  predictable  and flexible  support for the period 2024-2027. The new 
Ukraine Facility will support efforts to sustain macro-financial stability and promote recovery. 
The plan is for the Facility to be endowed with EUR 50 billion in grants and loans. The EU 
will continue to support Ukraine as long as it takes. 

Despite the war and its impact on all levels of Ukrainian society and the martial law in place, 
the  Ukrainian  government  and  Parliament  showed  determination  to  carry  out  the  necessary 
reforms required by the EU accession process, in particular the seven steps mentioned in the 
opinion.  Support  for  future  EU  accession  is  higher  than  ever  before.  According  to  various 
recent opinion polls around 90% of Ukrainians support EU membership. 

1.2.  SUMMARY OF THE REPORT3 

Despite Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 and its brutal war of aggression, Ukraine 

1 COM(2022) 407 final 
2 SWD(2023) 30 final 
3  This  report  covers  the  period  from  June  2022  to  June  2023.  It  is  based  on  input  from  a  variety  of  sources, 
including contributions from the government of Ukraine, the EU Member States, European Parliament reports 
3 

 
 
 
has continued to progress on democratic and rule of law reforms. The granting of candidate 
status for EU accession to Ukraine in June 2022 has further accelerated reform efforts. 

During  the  reporting period,  no elections took  place. Overall, the legal framework remains 
conducive to the organisation of democratic elections. Reform of the electoral legal framework 
should  be  continued  to  address  outstanding  recommendations  by  the  OSCE  Office  for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). 

The  work  of  the  Parliament  (Verkhovna  Rada)  continues  to  be  marked  by  extraordinary 
circumstances related to the Russian military aggression. However, legislative tasks are carried 
out systematically, laying the ground for an uninterrupted democratic decision-making process. 
Key  decisions,  especially  on  defence/security  questions,  were  adopted  by  clear  cross-party 
majorities. Considerable attention was paid to legislation related to EU integration. The Rada 
performed  important  symbolic  functions,  while  concerns  were  raised  about  limited 
transparency on security grounds and weakened oversight of the executive. 

Ukraine  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  public  administration  reform,  with 
limited progress made during the reporting period. While the Ukrainian public administration 
has  proved  its  resilience  during  the  full-scale  invasion,  reform  has  slowed  or  stopped  in  a 
number of sectors, in particular in merit-based recruitment and selection, job classification and 
salary reform, as well as the roll-out of the human resources management information system. 
The digitalisation of service delivery has reached a high level. 

On  multi-level  governance,  the  achievements  of  decentralisation  reform  continued,  with 
municipalities  acting  as  a  pillar  of  Ukrainian  resilience.  Overall,  following  the  successful 
finalisation of the territorial part of decentralisation, other elements of the reform still need to 
be completed. Local self-government in the liberated territories and those near the frontlines 
should  be  gradually  restored  where  the  security  situation  allows  it.  The  newly  established 
Ministry of Restoration should synergise infrastructure and the regional development portfolio 
to stimulate locally driven recovery and reconstruction based on the systematic involvement of 
local authorities and associations. The local fiscal base needs to be strengthened. 

On the functioning of the judiciary, Ukraine has some level of preparation and must continue 
its efforts. Despite the Russian war of aggression, Ukraine continued to deliver justice services 
and made good progress on the implementation of the 2021 reform of the judicial governance 
bodies focused on integrity and professionalism.  The High Council of Justice and the High 
Qualification Commission of Judges were re-established following a transparent process with 
the meaningful involvement of independent experts. It will allow the government to start filling 
more than 2 000 judicial vacancies again and evaluating  (vetting) the qualification of some 
1 900  sitting  judges,  which  was  suspended  in  2019.  Despite  significant  challenges,  the 
Ukrainian institutions showed remarkable resilience and introduced the necessary legislative 
and organisational measures that allow it to continue to provide justice services to citizens and 
companies during the war. In 2022, most courts maintained a clearance rate (ratio of the number 
of resolved cases over the number of incoming cases in a given year) of 100% or even higher. 

and information from various international and non-governmental organisations. It also includes the results of 
comparative assessments and indices produced by other stakeholders, in particular in the area of rule of law.  
The report uses the following assessment scale to describe the state of play: early stage, some level of preparation, 
moderately prepared, good level of preparation and well advanced. To describe progress made during the reporting 
period, it uses the following scale: backsliding, no progress, limited progress, some progress, good progress and 
very good progress. Where appropriate, interim steps have also been used. 

4 

 
 
 
 
In  August  2023,  Ukraine  enacted  legislation  enabling  a  transparent  and  merit-based 
preselection of judges of the Constitutional Court in line with the Council of Europe’s Venice 
Commission  recommendations,  and  started  the  implementation  process  by  establishing  the 
Advisory  Group  of  Experts  and  announcing  the  competitions  to  the  Constitutional  Court. 
Legislation  on  the  selection  of  judges  should  still  be  improved,  and  a  more  transparent 
procedure needs to be introduced for the selection of management-level prosecutors. In August 
and September 2023, Ukraine adopted two laws for resuming disciplinary proceedings against 
judges and for establishing an independent service of disciplinary inspectors on the basis of a 
transparent  and  meritocratic  selection  procedure  with  a  meaningful  involvement  of 
internationally-nominated experts. A new administrative court to handle cases involving the 
central  government  bodies  and  staffed  by  properly-vetted  judges  needs  to  be  established, 
following the abolition of the Kyiv District Administrative Court. Legislative and institutional 
changes  are  needed  to  ensure  stronger  disciplinary  system  for  prosecutors.  To  increase 
transparency,  efficiency  and  access  to  justice,  Ukraine  should  also  continue  its  efforts  on 
digitalisation of the judiciary. Systemic measures still need to be taken to advance the reform 
of  enforcement  of  court  decisions,  including  the  enforcement  of  decisions  of  the  European 
Court  of  Human  Rights.  To  ensure  the  sustainability  of  rule  of  law  consolidation  efforts, 
Ukraine should continue legal education reform.  

Since the start of the full-scale invasion, Ukraine has been confronted with an unprecedented 
number  of  atrocities  committed  by  the  Russian  military.  The  Ukrainian  institutions  made 
considerable efforts to address this and bring the perpetrators of international crimes to justice. 
Multiple  law  enforcement  agencies,  following  the  guidance  of  the  Office  of  the  Prosecutor 
General, started investigating these complex crimes. Specialised investigation and prosecuting 
departments were established for this purpose. As a result, 107 951 incidents related to various 
atrocity crimes have been officially registered. 267 people have been indicted and 63 people 
convicted for war crimes by Ukrainian courts. There has been close international cooperation, 
including  with  the  International  Criminal  Court  and  its  Office  of  the  Prosecutor,  Eurojust, 
Europol and numerous EU Member States. To improve the effectiveness of investigation of 
international  crimes  and  cooperation  with  the  International  Criminal  Court,  Ukraine  should 
further harmonise its legal framework with the applicable international standards.   

On the fight against corruption, Ukraine has some level of preparation. Some progress was 
made during the reporting period, in particular with the establishment and consolidation of a 
comprehensive  anti-corruption  institutional  framework  and  the  gradual  building  of  a  track 
record  in  investigating,  prosecuting  and  adjudicating  high-level  corruption  cases.  Ukraine 
stepped up reforms in this area after receiving EU candidate status. New legislative, strategic 
and  institutional  improvements  were  pursued,  including  the  adoption  of  the  national  anti-
corruption strategy, accompanied by a comprehensive state programme for its implementation. 
The  new  Heads  of  the  Specialised  Anti-Corruption  Prosecutor’s  Office  (SAPO)  and  the 
National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) were appointed in July 2022 and March 
2023  respectively,  following  transparent  and  meritocratic  selection  procedures  with  the 
involvement  of  independent  experts.  Since  their  appointment,  NABU  and  SAPO  have 
increased their cooperation and stepped up investigations into high-level corruption cases. The 
e-asset declaration system, suspended after the introduction of martial law, was restored and 
opened to the public, albeit with some potential weaknesses related to the verification powers 
of  the  National  Agency  on  Corruption  Prevention  (NACP)  and  the  data  to  be  verified.  The 
Parliament has also adopted a law that would weaken administrative liability related to e-asset 
declarations, but the President has not signed this law into effect. To ensure the impact and 
sustainability  of  anti-corruption  efforts,  Ukraine  should  continue  building  a  credible  track 
record of investigations, prosecutions and final court decisions in high-level corruption cases, 

5 

 
 
including the seizure and confiscation of criminal assets. Timely and steady implementation of 
the 2023-2025 state anti-corruption programme should also be pursued. Efforts are also needed 
to  further  streamline  and  improve  substantive  and  procedural  criminal  law.  To  cope  with 
increasing  workloads,  the  number  of  NABU  staff,  SAPO  prosecutors  and  High  Anti-
Corruption Court judges should be increased. Furthermore, SAPO should be further protected 
from possible undue interference by improving the selection procedures for the Head of SAPO 
and its key officials, increasing its organisational and procedural autonomy, and improving its 
accountability framework.    

Ukraine has some level of preparation in the area of the fight against organised crime. Some 
progress  was  made.  Ukraine  has  a  dedicated  strategic  and  institutional  framework  to  fight 
organised crime and a good level of international cooperation. There is an increasing number 
of joint operations with EU Member States. Measures are being taken to tackle the illicit flow 
of firearms, human trafficking and cybercrime. The development of the e-case management 
system in the criminal justice chain was launched. The national asset recovery strategy was 
adopted. Russia’s war of aggression had a profound impact on the institutional capacity to fight 
organised crime, but  relevant  institutions demonstrated resilience and  continued their work. 
However, the legal framework and operational capacity to fight organised crime remain weak. 
Procedural  gaps,  jurisdictional  overlaps,  widespread  corruption  and  underdeveloped  IT 
infrastructure  are  also  hampering  the  effective  fight  against  organised  crime.  Inter-agency 
coordination needs to be strengthened further. Ukraine should also launch the national serious 
organised  crime  threat  assessment  in  line  with  EU  standards  and  build  the  capacity  to 
implement  it.  The  legal  framework  and  institutional  capacity  still  need  to  be  improved  as 
regards financial investigations, asset recovery and management. Transparent and merit-based 
selection  of  management  and  staff,  along  with  a  strong  accountability  system  should  be 
introduced in the Bureau of Economic Security, a key agency tasked to fight economic crime.  

On fundamental rights, Ukraine complies overall with international human rights instruments 
and  has  ratified  most  international  conventions  on  the  protection  of  fundamental  rights. 
Citizens  suffered  severely  from  the  large-scale  violations  of  fundamental  rights  by  Russia, 
which Ukrainian authorities and civil society have sought to remedy since February 2022. At 
the  start  of  the  full-scale  invasion,  Ukraine  introduced  martial  law,  which  led  to  some 
restrictions of rights and freedoms, but these have so far remained largely in proportion to the 
actual  needs  and  have  been  applied  with  caution.  The  number  of  registered  discrimination 
against  minorities,  including  against  LGBTIQ  persons  and  national  minorities  as  well  as 
antisemitic  acts,  has  strongly  decreased.  On  the  rights  of  persons  belonging  to  national 
minorities,  Ukraine  needs  to  address  the  remaining  recommendations  of  the  Venice 
Commission Opinion of June 2023 and the follow-up Opinion of October 2023. Further efforts 
are also needed to ensure that persons with disabilities can enjoy their rights as per the UN 
Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities. 

At the same time, important reforms have been introduced and adopted, such as the new media 
law.  Ukraine  also  ratified  the  Istanbul  Convention  on  preventing  and  combating  violence 
against  women  and  domestic  violence  in  July  2022  and  adopted  the  2030  state  strategy  on 
ensuring  equal  rights  between  men  and  women,  which  should  now  be  implemented.  Only 
limited progress was made in the field of prevention of torture and ill treatment in prisons and 
other forms of detention, where a cultural change within state authorities needs to materialize 
and further measures are required to prevent and ensure accountability for such acts. A law on 
personal  data  protection,  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis,  should  be  adopted.  The  situation  of 
children  (but  also  of  older  persons)  in  care  institutions  as  well  as  persons  with  disabilities 
remains difficult, but commitments on the deinstitutionalisation of childcare and to rebuilding 

6 

 
 
Ukraine  in  a  barrier-free  manner  are  promising  and  need  to  be  implemented  as  a  priority. 
Similarly,  support  for  the  Roma4  community  needs  to  be  stepped  up  with  a  concrete  and 
targeted action plan. 

Given  the  breadth  of  issues  concerning  fundamental  rights,  in  particular  the  numerous 
violations by Russia, the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights faces serious 
challenges  with  its  existing  capacity  to  address  the  entire  range  of  its  responsibilities  in  a 
meaningful manner. 

Despite  the  context  of  a  full-scale  war,  Ukraine  is  in  between  some  and  moderate  level  of 
preparation in the area of freedom of expression. Good progress was made in the reporting 
period  with  the  adoption  of  the  media  law  in  December  2022  and  despite  the  war-time 
restrictions in access for media and journalists introduced. Ukrainian citizens enjoy freedom of 
expression, with  critical  media reporting available. However, media  concentration has been 
observed due the collapse of the media and advertising market, particularly in the television 
segment. This  has reduced people’s access to  pluralistic media in  Ukraine. The situation of 
journalists remains precarious, both economically and – since the start of the full-scale invasion 
– physically. Ukraine needs to envisage new ways to ensure a post-war structure for pluralistic 
and independent non-online media (in particular television), including the long-term outlook 
of the public broadcaster and independence of the national regulator. 

Due to the impacts of Russia’s ongoing full-scale invasion as well as the pre-existing structural 
economic  challenges,  the  Ukrainian  economy  is  between  an  early  stage  and  some  level  of 
preparation  towards  establishing  a  functioning  market  economy.  Since  the  full-scale 
invasion  by  Russia,  the  conduct  of  monetary  policy,  overall  economic  governance  and  the 
institutional  and  regulatory  environment  have  faced  considerable  difficulties.  Despite  these 
challenges, the Ukrainian authorities have responded swiftly and with overall stability in mind, 
although  the  circumstances  have  also  brought  about  some  temporary  setbacks  on  several 
important  elements  of  a  functioning  market  economy.  In  2022,  the  economy  contracted  by 
29.1%, showing  more  resilience than first  expected. To  contribute to financial stability  and 
strengthen confidence in the domestic currency, the National Bank of Ukraine suspended the 
hitherto successfully managed inflation-targeting framework, fixed and devalued the exchange 
rate and raised its main refinancing rate. The banking sector remained fully operational and 
stable  with  ample  liquidity,  also  thanks  to  previous  reforms  and  supervisory  forbearance 
measures. The state of public finances has deteriorated markedly due to the duration and cost 
of the war and its impact on the economic activity. This has undone the considerable fiscal 
consolidation and corresponding reduction in the debt stock that had been achieved in previous 
years  before  the  pandemic.  The  significant  internal  and  external  population  displacements, 
together with significant capital destruction, profoundly affected the labour market.  

Due to the impacts of Russia’s ongoing full-scale invasion as well as the pre-existing structural 
economic challenges, Ukraine is at an early stage of preparation in terms of its capacity to 
cope with the competitive pressure and market forces within the EU. The war has severely 
damaged  Ukraine’s  capital  infrastructure  and  triggered  a  massive  human  exodus  that  has 
deeply  affected  the  economy.  Investment  in  research  and  innovation  has  been  low,  and 
educational outcomes have not met the needs of the labour market, despite rather high spending 
and relatively high formal levels of educational achievement. The structure of the Ukrainian 
economy remained concentrated in sectors with low added value. While trade integration with 
the EU has been advancing recently, including thanks to the implementation of the Deep and 

4 In line with the terminology of European institutions the umbrella term ‘Roma’ is used here to refer to a number 

of different groups, without denying the specificities of these groups. 

7 

 
 
 
Comprehensive  Free  Trade  Area,  it  remains  rather  low.  At  the  same  time,  the  international 
response in support of Ukraine has been massive over the last year, and future reconstruction 
could  also  help  support  modernisation,  in  which  Ukraine  specialises  in  higher  value-added 
chains, and help strengthen its competitiveness. 

On good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation, Ukraine maintains good bilateral 
relations with other enlargement countries and with neighbouring EU Member States. These 
have  been  strengthened  amidst  Russia’s  war  of  aggression  leading  to  further  deepening 
cooperation  with  many  of  those  countries,  marked  by  a  number  of  high-level  visits  and 
considerable humanitarian, military and financial support.  

On Ukraine’s ability to assume the obligation of EU membership, the country continued to 
work on alignment with the acquis in many areas. 

The internal market cluster is key to Ukraine’s preparations for the requirements of the EU 
internal market and is of high relevance for the implementation of the Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Area. Some/good progress was made in the area of free movement of capital and 
intellectual property law. Some progress was achieved in several areas, particularly in financial 
services, free movement of goods, right of establishment and freedom to provide services, and 
company law. Progress was limited in the area of competition policy as well as consumer and 
health protection, with  no progress  in  the area of freedom  of movement  for workers due to 
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. 

The competitiveness and inclusive growth cluster and the related reforms are closely linked 
to  the  ability  and  capacity  for  recovery  and  reconstruction.  This  requires  increasing 
competitiveness  and  building  a  sustainable  and  inclusive  economy. Good  progress  was 
achieved in digital transformation and media and in the customs union. Some progress was 
made on taxation and education and culture. Limited progress was made in social policy and 
employment, enterprise and industrial policy, and science and research. No progress could be 
made  –  due  Russia’s  full  scale  invasion  which  demanded  extraordinary  economic  policy 
measures – on economic and monetary policy.  

The  Green  Agenda  and  sustainable  connectivity  cluster  and  the  related  reforms  are  also 
intricately  linked  to  Ukraine’s  reconstruction  during  and  after  the  war. Russia’s  war  of 
aggression  against  Ukraine  has  been  highly  detrimental  to  the  transport  infrastructure, 
environment and climate. Progress was achieved in several areas within the cluster, with good 
progress  on  environment,  some  progress  on  energy  and  Trans-European  networks,  while 
progress was limited in the area of climate change and transport policy.  

In  the  areas  covered  by  the  cluster  on  resources,  agriculture  and  cohesion,  progress  was 
achieved  in  particular  in  three  areas,  namely  some  progress  in  agriculture  and  rural 
development, food safety and veterinary (SPS) and phytosanitary policy as well as in the area 
of fisheries and aquaculture. Progress was limited in regional policy and the coordination of 
structural instruments and financial and budgetary provisions. 

In the external relations cluster, Ukraine has good level of preparation. As regards the foreign, 
security and defence policy, Ukraine  has made good progress, as it has increased the alignment 
rate  with  relevant  EU  decisions  and  declarations  of  the  EU’s  common  foreign  and  security 
policy to 93% (2022). Progress was limited in alignment with the EU’s trade policy.  

8 

 
 
 
1.3.  ASSESSMENT  OF  THE  IMPLEMENTATION  OF  THE  SEVEN  STEPS  OF  THE 

COMMISSION'S OPINION  

Step  1  -  enact  and  implement  legislation  on  a  selection  procedure  for  judges  of  the 
Constitutional Court of Ukraine, including a pre-selection process based on evaluation of their 
integrity and professional skills, in line with Venice Commission recommendations. 

In December and July, Ukraine adopted the necessary legislation that introduced a pre-selection 
process  for  the  Constitutional  Court  judges  on  the  basis  of  integrity  and  professionalism 
criteria,  in  line  with  the  Venice  Commission  recommendations.  Internationally-nominated 
members of the pre-selection body – the Advisory Group of Experts – obtained a temporary 
but decisive role in this body. Ukraine launched the implementation process. The Parliament 
and  the  Council  of  Judges  announced  competitions  to  fill  the  available  vacancies  in  the 
Constitutional Court. The President and the Council of Judges appointed their members and 
substitutes  to  the  Advisory  Group  of  Experts,  while  the  Parliament  is  continuing  the 
appointment procedure. In September, the Venice Commission and the international donors, 
including  the  EU,  submitted  their  nominations  of  members  and  substitutes  of  the  Advisory 
Group of Experts. In October, the Cabinet of Ministers formally  appointed them. With five 
appointed members and five substitutes, the Advisory Group of Experts became operational. 
This step is completed.   

Step 2 - finalise the integrity vetting of the candidates for the High Council of Justice members 
by  the  Ethics  Council  and  the  selection  of  candidate  to  establish  the  High  Qualification 
Commission of Judges of Ukraine. 

The Ethics Council completed the integrity vetting of the candidates for open positions in the 
High Council of Justice (HCJ). The HCJ became fully operational in January 2023 when it 
reached its quorum of 15 members. In June 2023, the renewed HCJ appointed 16 new members 
of the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ) out of a shortlist of 32 candidates 
proposed  by  the  HQCJ  Selection  Commission,  following  a  transparent  and  merit-based 
process, including an integrity and professionalism check. This step is completed.  

Step 3 - further strengthen the fight against corruption, in particular at high level, through 
proactive  and  efficient  investigations,  and  a  credible  track  record  of  prosecutions  and 
convictions;  complete  the  appointment  of  a  new  head  of  the  Specialised  Anti-Corruption 
Prosecutor’s Office through certifying the identified winner of the competition and launch and 
complete  the  selection  process  and  appointment  for  a  new  Director  of  the  National  Anti-
Corruption Bureau of Ukraine. 

Ukraine  has  further  developed  its  track  record  in  fighting  corruption.  Until  the  end  of 
September  2023,  82  indictments  against  203  persons  were  sent  to  court;  should  this  trend 
continue, the number of indictments would double in 2023 compared to previous years. The 
High  Anti-Corruption  Court  (HACC),  until  the  end  of  September  2023,  has  significantly 
increased  its  overall  performance  and  delivered  48  verdicts  against  64  defendants  in  first 
instance, and 26 verdicts against 32 defendants in second instance. The cases investigated and 
adjudicated concerned prominent high-level public officials including former deputy ministers, 
former parliamentarians and high-level judges, e.g. the serving President of the Supreme Court. 
Ukraine appointed the heads of the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) 
and  the  National  Anti-Corruption  Bureau  of  Ukraine  (NABU).  Ukraine  adopted  a 
comprehensive State Anti-Corruption Programme in March 2023 and launched the IT system 
for monitoring its implementation, as well as the Unified Portal for Whistle-blower Reports.  

The e-asset declaration system, suspended after the introduction of martial law, was restored 

9 

 
 
and  opened  to  the  public,  albeit  with  some  potential  weaknesses  related  to  the  verification 
powers of the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) and the data to be verified. 
The Parliament has also adopted a law that would weaken administrative liability related to e-
asset declarations, but the President has not signed this law into effect.  

Draft  legislation  was  developed  and  registered  in  the  Parliament  that  enhances  the 
independence of SAPO and the effectiveness of the Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes in 
the fight against high-level corruption. Also, a draft law increasing the staffing cap for NABU 
was registered in the Parliament.  

Ukraine should still enact a law raising the legislative staffing cap for the NABU and remove 
from  the  law  on  corruption  prevention  the  provisions  restricting  the  NACP’s  powers  to 
continued  verification  of  assets  that  have  already  undergone  the  verification  process  and 
limiting NACP’s powers to verify property acquired by declarants before joining the public 
service, without prejudice to the rules applying to national security during wartime.  

Step 4 - ensure that anti-money laundering legislation is in compliance with the standards of 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF); adopt an overarching strategic plan for the reform 
of the entire law enforcement sector as part of Ukraine’s security environment. 

In September 2022, the Parliament adopted a new law on ultimate beneficial ownership, while 
the  Government  subsequently  adopted  the  necessary  implementing  legislation  on  the 
registration and verification of beneficial ownership information, identification of the ultimate 
beneficial owners and liability for violations. The Government has adopted a bylaw regulating 
the supervision of non-financial businesses and professions. Ukraine has also developed and 
registered  a  new  draft  law  on  targeted  financial  sanctions  and  adopted  a  bylaw  on  the 
evidentiary standards for listing of individuals and entities on the terrorist sanctions lists. The 
Office  of  the  Prosecutor  General  issued  instructions  and  methodological  guidance  to  all 
regional  prosecution  offices  on  the  investigation  of  money  laundering  offences  and  the 
application  of  financial  investigations  in  proceeds-generating  crimes,  thus  clarifying  the 
regulatory  framework  on  financial  investigations.  Furthermore,  a  new  draft  law  on  virtual 
assets has been prepared and is undergoing an approval procedure within the Government.  

In May 2023, the President approved the comprehensive strategic plan for the reform of the 
law enforcement sector.  

Ukraine further advanced the alignment of its anti-money laundering legislation with the FATF 
standards. In October 2023, the Parliament adopted a law removing a three-year time limitation 
and reverting to a risk-based approach for former holders of prominent public functions to be 
qualified as politically exposed persons to restore a FATF-compliant definition of politically 
exposed persons. The Commission can accept the definition of PEP’s however the Commission 
encourages  the  Ukrainian  supervisor  (the  NBU)  to  issue  guidance  making  clear  to  obliged 
entities that the national list of PEPs is indicative and not exhaustive.  

This step is completed. However, the Commission assessment cannot prejudge in any way the 
future assessment of Moneyval.  

Step  5  -  implement  the  Anti-Oligarch  law  to  limit  the  excessive  influence  of  oligarchs  in 
economic, political, and public life; this should be done in a legally sound manner, taking into 
account the forthcoming opinion of the Venice Commission on the relevant legislation. 

Ukraine  has  prioritised  systemic  measures  against  oligarchs,  in  line  with  the  Venice 
Commission  recommendations  issued  in  June  2023.  Ukraine  updated  and  continued  to 
implement  its  Action  Plan  to  reduce  the  influence  of  oligarchs,  which  includes  systemic 

10 

 
 
reforms  in  key  areas  affected  by  the  vested  interests.  Beside  the  reform  of  the  judicial 
governance bodies and the Constitutional Court, adoption of a new media law, implementation 
of  the  state  anti-corruption  programme  and  the  finalisation  of  the  legal  framework  on  the 
ultimate  beneficial  ownership,  Ukraine  has  adopted  and  signed  into  effect  legislation 
strengthening the Anti-Monopoly Committee of Ukraine and restoring the financial reporting 
of political parties and the verification functions of the relevant institutions.  

Ukraine is also developing a comprehensive law on lobbying in consultation with international 
experts; public consultations have been planned. The Government also decided to postpone the 
implementation  of  the  law  on  oligarchs  that  was  criticised  by  the  Venice  Commission  by 
amending the Government’s Anti-Oligarch Action Plan and to prepare amendments to it within 
three months after the end of the martial law, taking into account the recommendations of the 
Venice Commission.  

Furthermore,  Ukraine  should  still  enact  a  law  regulating  lobbying  in  line  with  European 
standards, as part of the anti-oligarch action plan. 

Step 6 - tackle the influence of vested interests by adopting a media law that aligns Ukraine’s 
legislation with the EU audio-visual media services directive and empowers the independent 
media regulator. 

Ukraine  adopted  the  new  media  law  in  December  2022.  In  May  2023,  it  adopted  further 
amendments  to  the  advertising  law  to  align  its  law  with  EU  audio-visual  media  services 
directive  and to  address  outstanding  issues in  its media law  related to  blacklisting and hate 
speech. The step is completed. 

Step  7  -  finalise  the  reform  of  the  legal  framework  for  national  minorities  currently  under 
preparation as recommended by the Venice Commission, and adopt immediate and effective 
implementation mechanisms. 

The law on national minorities (communities) was adopted in December 2022 and amended in 
September 2023, following the Venice Commission Opinion recommendations of June 2023 
on  that  law.  The  follow-up  Venice  Commission  Opinion  adopted  on  6  October  2023 
acknowledges progress made, but also identifies a number of remaining issues where previous 
recommendations were not or only partially addressed.  

Certain implementation mechanisms were adopted, among them the State Programme “Unity 
in  Diversity”,  which  are  to  be  complemented  by  additional  implementation  measures,  in 
particular a resolution on the methodology for language use in traditional settlements of persons 
belonging to national minorities or where they make up a significant part of the population.  

In addition to that, in June 2023, Ukraine adopted a law extending the transition period for 
education in minority languages by one year for pupils who started their education before 1 
September  2018  and,  in  October,  registered  a  draft  law  in  the  Parliament  to  permanently 
exempt these pupils from the obligations of the Education Law. The Cabinet of Ministers is 
obliged,  according  to  the  final  provisions  of  the  revised  Law  on  national  minorities 
(communities), to prepare and submit to Parliament, within six months after the entry into force 
of the law, a draft law to revise the education law, the State language law and the media law.  

Ukraine  should  still  enact  a 
the  remaining  Venice  Commission 
recommendations from June 2023 and October 2023 linked to the Law on national minorities, 
also addressing the Venice Commission recommendations linked to the laws on State language, 
media and education.   

law  addressing 

11 

 
 
 
2.  CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS  

2.1.  FUNCTIONING  OF  DEMOCRATIC  INSTITUTIONS  AND  PUBLIC  ADMINISTRATION 

REFORM  

Due  to  the  Russian  war  of  aggression,  Ukraine  temporarily  invoked  martial  law  on  24 
February 2022, by Presidential decree and approved by Parliament. It has been extended eight 
times, with the current extension in place until 15 November 2023. Martial law authorises the 
military command and military administrations either independently or with the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs of Ukraine, other executive bodies and local self-government authorities, to 
introduce various restrictions on rights and freedoms of individuals as well as rights and legal 
interests of legal entities. The application of martial law has overall been proportionate. 

While  martial  law  is  in  place,  elections  are  prohibited,  as  is  amending  the  Constitution  of 
Ukraine. Regular parliamentary elections due in October 2023 had  therefore to be postponed. 

2.1.1. Democracy 

Despite Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 and ongoing war of aggression, Ukraine 
has continued to make progress on democratic and rule of law reforms. The granting of EU 
candidate status to Ukraine in June 2022 has led to a further acceleration of reform  efforts. 
Currently, a martial law is in place. 

Elections 

During  the  reporting  period,  no  elections  took  place.  Overall,  the  legal  framework  remains 
conducive  to  the  organisation  of  democratic  elections.  The  reform  of  the  electoral  legal 
framework should be continued to address outstanding OSCE/ODIHR recommendations. 

Key recommendations in the latest OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission reports were 
addressed.  The  electoral  code  adopted  in  2019  harmonised  all  electoral  procedures.  It 
introduced,  among  other  things,  an  open-list  proportional  representation  system  and 
enfranchised internally displaced persons. 

Following the 2020 local elections, work on a comprehensive revision of the electoral code has 
been ongoing, and the process has been transparent and inclusive.  

Parliament  

The  work  of  the  Parliament  (Verkhovna  Rada)  continues  to  be  marked  by  extraordinary 
circumstances related to the Russia’s war of aggression. However, legislative tasks are carried 
out systematically, laying the ground for an uninterrupted democratic decision-making process. 
Key  decisions,  especially  on  defence/security  questions,  were  adopted  by  clear  cross-party 
majorities. Considerable attention was paid to legislation related to EU integration. The Rada 
performed  important  symbolic  functions,  while  concerns  were  raised  about  limited 
transparency on security grounds and weakened oversight of the executive. Use of the urgent 
procedure  to  pass  legislation  is  relatively  limited.  Comprehensive  impact  assessments  of 
proposed  legislation  and  legislative  oversight  of  the  executive,  including  monitoring  the 
implementation of legislation, need to be strengthened. 

On 23 February 2022, the Parliament endorsed the President’s decision to introduce martial 
law  due  to  the  full-scale  Russian  military  aggression.  Despite  the  circumstances  during  the 
reporting  period,  the  Verkhovna  Rada  conducts  systematic  legislative  activity  (including 
plenary sessions and committee meetings), taking an active part in the overall reform process.  

12 

 
 
The Parliament’s rules of procedure are in place and are being amended successively in line 
with its roadmap for internal reform and capacity building. The code of conduct for members 
of parliament has not been adopted yet. The majority of rules related to integrity and prevention 
of  corruption  are  regulated  by  anti-corruption  legislation.  In  this  regard,  the  obligation  for 
members of Parliament to submit an electronic asset declaration each year has been suspended 
in connection with martial law. 

There are currently 23 committees in the Parliament. All committees are responsible for both 
legislative  and  oversight/control  functions.  Ministerial  reports,  the  consideration  of 
interpellations as well as the assessment of candidates for public offices were carried out during 
online meetings. At the same time, overall parliamentary scrutiny, including the monitoring 
and implementation of legislation, should be strengthened. 

The Parliament’s rules of procedure do not regulate the issue of gender balance. At the same 
time, according to the government’s rules of procedure, gender legal expertise is mandatory 
for all draft laws drafted by government. The percentage of female members of Parliament is 
currently at a historic high of 21%. 

The  Russian  invasion  and  subsequent  introduction  of  martial  law  had  an  impact  on  the 
transparency of parliamentary activities. At present, the sessions are not livestreamed on the 
TV  channel  Rada.  Journalists  are  not  authorised  to  attend  the  plenary  meetings,  while 
parliamentary requests, as well as requests for public information and by-name voting, are not 
available  on  the  parliamentary  website.  Furthermore,  due  to  security  reasons  there  is  no 
schedule of plenary meetings – they are to be called by the Chairman of the Parliament based 
on needs. Reinstating public consultations and scrutiny is crucial after martial law has been 
lifted. 

As of January 2022, there were 370 registered political parties in Ukraine. In May 2022, the 
law prohibiting  the activity of pro-Russian parties entered into  force. Since then, 16 parties 
have been prohibited by court.  

In 2020, an amended version of the law on political parties was prepared in a broad consultation 
and on the basis of a joint OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission Opinion. Work on the draft 
law  was  suspended  after  February  2022  and  resumed  in  September  2022.  OSCE/ODIHR 
provided legal expertise in the process. 

 The Law on restoration of financial reporting of political parties was adopted by the Parliament 
on 23 August and signed by President on 26 September. Governance 

On  multi-level  governance,  the  achievements  of  decentralisation  reform  continue  to  be 
evidenced,  with  municipalities  acting  as  a  pillar  of  state  resilience  in  mobilising  bottom-up 
support,  resetting  basic  social  services,  helping  organise  voluntary  territorial  defence  and 
receiving large numbers of internally displaced persons.  

At  the  same  time,  martial  law  gave  rise  to  the  creation  of  a  large  number  of  military 
administrations at local level. Ukraine should clarify, by law, the criteria for establishing them 
and for restoring local self-government in the liberated territories and those near the frontlines, 
where the security situation allows democratically elected bodies to perform their tasks.  

Overall, following the successful finalisation of the territorial part of decentralisation, other 
elements  of  the  reform  still  need  to  be  completed.  Draft  constitutional  amendments  in 
particular, aimed at ensuring that decentralisation reform is sustainable and irreversible, have 
not yet been taken forward due to the ban on constitutional revisions during martial law. There 
was also limited progress in key legislative files aimed at clarifying the role of the tiers of local 
administration  (regional,  district,  municipal)  to  delineate  powers  between  central  and  local 

13 

 
 
levels  and to  put  in  place appropriate internal structures  for municipal  administrations. The 
rules of supervision of local authorities’ activities, in line with the European Charter of Local 
Self-Government,  have  not  yet  been  set  up.  Work  should  also  continue  on  granting  legal 
personality  to  municipalities  under  public  law,  based  on  European  practice.  The  recently 
adopted Law on service in local self-government is likely to bring fairer and more transparent 
rules on the employment of officials at local level.   

In institutional terms, the Ministry of Restoration was set up to merge previous infrastructure 
and regional development ministries. As a way forward, the new office should synergise both 
portfolios and organise resources accordingly, including via the Agency of Restoration, with a 
view  to  stimulate  locally  driven  recovery  and  reconstruction.  This  will  also  require  more 
systematic  involvement  of  local  authorities  and  associations  in  policy  design  and 
implementation,  based  on  a  formally  embedded  coordination  mechanism.  The  Congress  of 
Local  and  Regional  Authorities,  with  its  permanent  office,  is  an  advisory  body  under  the 
President of Ukraine that has no such mandate established by law. Ukraine should refrain from 
enacting the law on urban planning in its current form as it creates integrity risks resulting from 
delegating excessive control powers in urban planning control from public to private entities, 
and leads to the disempowerment of local authorities in this sphere.  

Fiscal decentralisation was maintained, with 64% of personal income tax (PIT), and PIT from 
the  military  staff  allocated  to  municipalities  in  2023.  In  parallel,  certain  local  subsidies  for 
delegated  tasks  decreased,  and  centrally  established  exemptions  in  local  taxes  were  not 
compensated.  The  solid  local  fiscal  base  therefore  needs  to  be  ensured  to  avoid  a 
disproportionate  financial  vulnerability  of  municipalities.  This  can  be  done  through  a  fair 
distribution  of  PIT  to  municipalities  where  the  taxpayers  actually  reside  and  a  necessary 
extension of sources of local taxation.  

Civil society 

Ukraine’s vibrant civil society remains engaged in reform processes and in the response to the 
impact of Russia’s aggression. Volunteer movements and informal civil society groups often 
act as the backbone of humanitarian action across the country, including in the liberated and in 
temporarily  occupied  territories  of  Ukraine.  In  many  respects  they  are  key  to  the  country’s 
resilience.  

The legal framework continues to guarantee the rights of freedoms of association, expression 
and peaceful assembly. An ambitious multi-year civil society development strategy is in place, 
providing for more meaningful engagement with civil society. However, the impact of its full 
implementation is yet to be assessed, while the government should consider adapting it with 
respect to the ongoing war and an envisaged post-war recovery. The government should further 
expand its public funding programmes for civil society organisations and work on improving 
the dialogue and consultations with them. A draft law on public consultation that has passed 
first reading in the Verkhovna Rada already in 2021, should be adopted. Additional efforts are 
also needed to address and investigate the cases of pressure and threats against civic activists. 
Measures were taken to support the registration of civil society organisations and simplify rules 
on reporting and taxation, for instance the amendments to the Law on volunteering. 

An empowered civil society is a crucial component of any democratic system and is recognised 
and  treated  as  such  by  state  institutions.  Civil  society  remains  a  key  element  of  Ukrainian 
democracy, maintaining social bonds and fabrics, and contributing to the resilience of society 
at large. Volunteer movements and informal civil society groups often act as the backbone of 
humanitarian action across the country, including in temporarily occupied territories or newly 
liberated regions, while many of its members now also serve in Ukraine’s armed forces. 

14 

 
 
The expertise of Ukrainian civil society organisations on key sector reforms has made them an 
important partner for the government as well as for Ukraine’s international partners. Since the 
start of Russia’s war of aggression, Ukraine’s civil society has not only maintained its critical 
watchdog  function  but  has  also  stepped  up  its  efforts  in  terms  of  service  provision, 
volunteering,  humanitarian  and  human  rights  action,  complementing  the  work  of  public 
administration and government. COVID-19 restrictions introduced since 2020 and martial law 
since 2022 have not significantly restricted the activities of civil society organisations, but have 
limited their possibilities to monitor the work of public administration. 

Ukraine has several strategic documents to foster civil society engagement, including the 2021-
2026 national strategy for promoting civil society development of September 2021, the national 
barrier-free strategy, and the national human rights strategy. These documents have continued 
to be implemented despite the impact of Russia’s war of aggression and martial law. The action 
plan for the implementation of the national civil society strategy until 2024 was approved in 
February 2023 and contains 43 tasks across all four specific objectives of the strategy, which 
aim at improving the system for public participation in government policy making, creating an 
enabling environment for civil society development and promote participation of CSOs in the 
social and economic development of Ukraine and strengthen intersectoral cooperation. As part 
of  human  rights  strategy  implementation,  work  is  ongoing  to  improve  the  anti-bullying 
legislation. 

The  existing  legal  framework  guarantees  the  rights  to  the  freedoms  of  expression,  peaceful 
assembly and association. Measures have been put in place to ensure a three-day registration 
for  non-governmental  organisations  and  one-day  registration  for  charities.  The  non-profit 
status exempts civil society organisations from the obligation to pay 18% corporate income 
tax. Charitable and volunteer donations are also tax-exempt. 

Public  funding  for  civil  society  organisations  in  Ukraine  is  mandated  by  a  respective 
governmental decree. This provides a mechanism to allocate public funding at both national 
and local level, and a number of calls for proposals have been launched by several ministries 
and state funds, especially since the launch of online contest-based public funding for projects 
via the e-governance platform VzaemoDiia in 2021, which facilitated CSO access to public 
funding  while  increasing  the  transparency  of  the  procedure.  However,  since  the  start  of 
Russia’s war of aggression, levels of public funding for CSOs have been reduced and no new 
CSO institutional support mechanism has been established. The allocation of public funding 
via  VzaemoDiia  was  suspended  on  24  February  2022  and  was  only  partially  resumed  in 
September 2022. Since then, 8 online contests have been held. Both the Ukrainian Cultural 
Fund and the Ukrainian Institute reported funding cuts for their activities.  

As a result of Russia's  full-scale invasion, a high  number of people fleeing  the war beyond 
Ukraine's borders, act as volunteers from abroad, extending range of volunteer movements by 
civil  society.  The  law  on  volunteering,  amended  in  2022,  improved  for  instance  the  legal 
standing of volunteers in relation to their hosting organisations. Continued improvements are 
needed  to  implement  Ukraine’s  civil  society  development  strategy  for  2021-2026,  which 
includes  points  to  further  develop  the  legal  framework  and  expand  the  state  programme  of 
volunteering, also to cover social needs. 

CSOs  have  been  expanding  their  cooperation  with  public  institutions,  including  on 
humanitarian response, assistance to internally displaced persons as well as mental health and 
psychosocial support services. The recently adopted anti-corruption strategy for 2021-2025 is 
a good example of interactions and consultation with CSOs and proper consideration of their 
inputs.  The  legal  framework  for  public  consultations  requires  further  standardisation  and 
consolidation to ensure equal and fair access to public policy making for all stakeholders. The 
15 

 
 
final adoption of the draft law on public consultation, which passed first reading in Parliament 
in March 2021, is still pending.  

While there is an open and active civic space largely respected by Ukrainian authorities, there 
are still examples of pressure and threats against local civic activists in particular, in some cases 
leading to violence. The authorities should continue to condemn such attacks, and effective 
investigations should ensure that there is no impunity for such crimes. and that such practices 
will not become widespread as in the past. Incidents of past pressure and attacks against civil 
society representatives, before the full-scale invasion of February 2022, still need to be fully 
investigated and prosecuted. In the territories temporarily occupied by Russia, only volunteers 
and informal civil society groups and activists are able to operate due to restricted access. In 
order  to  maintain  crucial  links  with  the  Ukrainian  state  and  people  of  Ukraine  for  mutual 
support, these volunteers and informal civil society groups often face high risks to their safety. 

2.1.2. Public administration reform 

Ukraine has some level of preparation in the area of public administration reform (PAR), with 
limited progress made during the reporting period. While Ukrainian public administration has 
proved to be resilient during Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, reform has slowed or 
stopped  in  a  number  of  sectors,  in  particular  in  merit-based  recruitment  and  selection,  job 
classification and salary reform, as well as the roll-out of the Human Resources Management 
Information System. The digitalisation of service delivery has reached a high level.  

In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular: 

→  ensure timely alignment of existing legislation with the Law on administrative procedures 

in all sectors covered by its scope; 

→  restore  merit-based  recruitment  and  the  selection  process,  as  well  as  implement  job 

classification as a precondition for comprehensive salary reform; 

→  make  progress  in  the  country-wide  roll-out  of  the  Human  Resources  Management 

Information System. 

Strategic framework for public administration reform 

The 2022-2025 PAR strategy and its action plan were amended in December 2022 to take into 
account Ukraine’s EU candidate status and requirements under martial law. Both the strategy 
and the action plan continued to be monitored via a PAR Coordination Council (advisory body 
that includes  representatives of the government,  Parliament, civil  society and PAR  experts’ 
network),  albeit  less  often  (one  meeting  in  2022).  Under  martial  law,  PAR  financial 
sustainability has been deprioritised, and public financing largely relies on donor support.  

Political support for PAR remains uneven. While it has been demonstrated in digitalisation 
and  service  delivery,  in  other  areas,  in  particular  the  civil  service  and  salary  reform,  the 
practical measures fall short of the declared objectives.  

Policy development and coordination 

The  policy-making  system  is  well  established.  The  Secretariat  of  the  Cabinet  of  Ministers 
conducts  quality  assurance  and  coordination  of  draft  documents  at  the  final  stages  of  the 
process. However, the actual capacity of the government in terms of evidence-based policy-
making remains insufficient. The explanatory notes that accompany legislative proposals do 
not  often  meet  required  standards.  Line  ministries  rarely  estimate  the  cost  of  draft  policy 
documents  and  legal  acts  (in  2022,  only  two  out  of  28  policy  documents  approved  by  the 
Cabinet of Ministers included information on the implementation costs). The creation of policy 

16 

 
 
directorates in ministries and recruitment to fill reform support posts intended to address these 
gaps and provide technical support in implementing priority reforms - is incomplete. By the 
end of 2022, less than 750 reform support posts had been filled out of 3 000 planned posts, 
with a declining trend in 2023.  

Parliament shares the right of legislative initiative with the government. In practice, over 80% 
of legislation originates from Parliament. The drafts submitted by parliamentarians often lack 
proper explanatory notes and/or impact assessments, which affects the quality of laws. 

There are no formal requirements or systematic practices for monitoring the implementation 
of policies and legislation. Monitoring of the mid-term action plan and of the annual action 
plan by the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers is mostly conducted on an ad hoc basis, with 
no outcome or impact indicators. It is necessary to ensure proper standards for both ex ante and 
ex post regulatory impact assessments, in particular to prepare a framework for tackling the 
challenges related to recovery.  

Planning  and  coordination  mechanisms  for  Ukraine’s  European  integration  process  are  in 
place.  However,  the  Government  Office  for  Coordination  on  European  and  Euro-Atlantic 
Integration  lacks  resources  to  manage  the  process  effectively  from  within  the  Cabinet  of 
Ministers, while the capacities of line ministries vary. A functional framework to ensure that 
the European integration framework is incorporated into an improved national decision-making 
process is yet to be established.  

Public financial management (PFM) 

The current PFM reform strategy and action plan for 2022-2025 is broadly aligned with other 
strategic  documents,  including  the  2022-2025  PAR  strategy,  and  is  subject  to  regular 
monitoring.  

The legal basis and institutional architecture within the Ministry of Finance to support fiscal 
risk  monitoring  and  management  has  been  established.  However,  capacity  tools  need  to  be 
developed further and practically implemented. The legislative basis for implementation of a 
medium-term budgetary framework is in place. The medium-term budget declaration (2022-
2024) was put on hold due to the war. The government remains committed to a medium-term 
budgetary framework; it has made an agreement with the IMF to present the 2025 budget with 
a comprehensive framework for 2026-2028, which must be preceded by a risk analysis in the 
next year. A public investment management diagnostic assessment was finalised in late 2022. 
It flagged a number of issues to be addressed, including strengthening the role for the Ministry 
of Finance as a gatekeeper of public investments.  

Budget transparency and openness in budgeting are limited in Ukraine, as reported by the 
Open Budget Index, and worsened under martial law. It should be gradually restored where 
possible.  The  capacity  of  Parliament  and  the  Accounting  Chamber  to  oversee  the  budget 
process should be improved as a matter of priority. 

On  digitalisation,  efforts  are  being  made  to  digitalise  public  internal  financial  control 
procedures as well as the budgetary planning process. Good progress  has been made on the 
digitalisation of tax and customs administration (e.g. New Computerised Transit System Phase 
4  was  introduced  in  customs  in  autumn  2022;  call  centre,  e-cash  register  and  Single  Tax 
Account in tax), and security of data has been improved.  

Public services and human resources management 

Overall, the Law on civil service provides a sound regulation framework, although martial law 
has  affected  it  significantly.  The  merit-based  recruitment  and  selection  procedure  was 

17 

 
 
suspended  (which  was  also  the  case  under  COVID-19  measures  from  March  2020  to  April 
2021). Long periods with a lack of procedures to safeguard a professional and depoliticised 
civil service, in combination with the widespread use of non-transparent direct appointments, 
has undermined the civil service’ competitiveness and independence.  

Gender  representation  in  the  civil  service  continues  to  be  unbalanced.  By  the  end  of  2022, 
senior management comprised 70% men and 30% women, middle management 33% men and 
67% women, and at the executive level 22% men and 78% women.  

Digitalisation of the human resources framework remains insufficient. Development and use 
of the Human Resource Management Information System (HRMIS) – aiming to provide a 
digital  platform  for  all  HR  transactions  across  government  institutions  for  the  purpose  of 
policymaking,  transparency  and  accountability  –  has  progressed  very  unevenly  since  2017. 
HRMIS, including its payroll module, has been launched as the main HRM IT system by only 
a limited number of institutions and currently provides information on around 15% of posts.  

The current  job classification model only covers responsibility based on the civil servant’s 
place in the administrative and institutional hierarchy. A professional job classification model 
piloted by the National Agency on Civil Service (NACS) had no systematic follow-up. The 
remuneration system remains non-transparent and unequal. As a result, the ability to offer a 
competitive  position  varies  across  institutions.  Overall,  senior  management  turnover  is 
considerable, which results in a lack of staff stability. Systematic efforts are needed to attract, 
recruit and develop highly professional and non-partisan senior management.  

Regarding professional development, civil servants are obliged to undergo training each year. 
NACS  adjusted  the  training  programme  under  martial  law.  The  Higher  School  of  Public 
Administration  was  established  in  October  2022  as  a  state  in-service  training  institution 
reporting to NACS, based on the Ukrainian school of governance. It is tasked with training 
civil servants, heads of local state administrations, their first deputies and deputies, local self-
government officials and deputies of local councils.  

Accountability of the administration 

Parliament scrutinises the Cabinet of Ministers in line with the models operating in EU Member 
States (approval process of the government’s political programme, annual reporting, regular 
Q&A sessions, member of parliament requests, etc.). Public administration is also scrutinised 
by the Ombudsman and the Accounting Chamber. However, the Accounting Chamber has not 
fulfilled its oversight functions according to international standards, given the lack of a registry 
of recommendations and in turn the lack of a monitoring framework.  

A key development in the service delivery area was the enactment of the Law on administrative 
procedure in May 2022, which is essential for developing the right to good administration. 
The  law  unifies  currently  fragmented  administrative  procedures  across  various  sectors.  The 
government  is  also  preparing  amendments  to  sectoral  laws  and  implementing  legislation, 
internal rules and procedures, and working processes. Certain institutions have recently asked 
to be exempted from the application of the law. Ukraine should refrain from introducing new 
exemptions from application of the law  (e.g. Tax Service) as it would drastically reduce its 
overall impact.  

The constitutional right to fair trial has been maintained under martial law. Administrative 
courts  have  been  operating  on  a  regular  basis,  with  some  adjustments  due  to  security 
considerations.  However,  following  the  abolition  of  the  Kyiv  district  administrative  court, 
access to justice in cases involving central government bodies is undermined, since the new 
court is not yet established while the temporary court is overwhelmed. The Ministry of Justice 

18 

 
 
suspended the operation of state-run registers and databases. Access to public information has 
also  been  restricted  for  security  reasons  and  granted  on  a  case-by-case  basis.  A  number  of 
measures have been taken to make public registers secure, for example storing certain data on 
servers outside the country. The right to compensation is provided for in the legislation and 
applied.  

Service delivery to citizens and businesses 

The institutional and legal frameworks for public service delivery are in place to ensure a user-
oriented  public  administration.  A  broad  network  of  offline  administrative  service  centres 
established locally have continued to perform well, despite war damage, thanks to their offices, 
remote workplaces and mobile centres. 

Transforming digital service delivery (‘State in a smartphone’), followed by the creation of 
the Ministry of Digital Transformation, continued to produce positive effects.  The online portal 
for  digital  services  (Diia  portal)  and  the  mobile  application,  currently  provide  more  mature 
digital services. They are based on a remote qualified electronic signature and the full validity 
of digital documents and credentials. Both the Diia portal and Diia mobile application (17.3 
million  users)  have  played  a  crucial  role  in  continuing  to  provide  the  public  with  access  to 
extended number of digital services, including to internally displaced persons and Ukrainian 
refugees.   

2.2.  RULE OF LAW AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 

2.2.1.  Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights  

The EU’s founding values include the rule of law and respect for human rights. An effective 
(independent,  high-quality  and  efficient)  judicial  system  and  an  effective  fight  against 
corruption are of paramount importance, as is the respect for fundamental rights in law and 
in practice.  

Ukraine has some level of preparation in implementing the EU acquis and European standards 
in the area of the judiciary, fight against corruption and fundamental rights. Despite Russia’s 
war of aggression, good progress was made in this area and the relevant institutions continued 
operations,  the  delivery  of  vital  services  to  citizens  and  reform  efforts,  demonstrating 
remarkable resilience. The efforts in the area of the judiciary, anti-corruption and fundamental 
rights need to continue and be further consolidated.  

Functioning of the judiciary  

Ukraine has some level of preparation in the functioning of the judiciary. Despite the Russian 
war of aggression, good progress was made with the implementation of the 2021 reform of 
the judicial governance bodies during the reporting period. The High Council of Justice (HCJ) 
and  the  High  Qualification  Commission  of  Judges  (HQCJ)  were  re-established  following  a 
transparent and meritocratic process with the meaningful involvement of independent experts. 
It enables the government to start filling more than 2 000 judicial vacancies and to resume the 
qualification  evaluation  (vetting)  of  sitting  judges.  Ukraine  also  adopted  the  law  on  a 
transparent and merit-based preselection of judges of the Constitutional Court, in line with the 
Venice Commission recommendations, and started implementing it. Legislation was adopted 
to establish a strong service of disciplinary inspectors and to resume disciplinary proceedings 
against judges. The new administrative court to handle cases involving the central government 
bodies and staffed by properly-vetted judges needs to be established following the abolition of 
the Kyiv District Administrative Court.  

19 

 
 
 
In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular: 

→  fill  the  open  vacancies  in  the  Constitutional  Court  of  Ukraine  in  line  with  the  adopted 
legislation;  relaunch the selection of ordinary judges on the basis of the improved legal 
framework, including clear integrity and professionalism criteria and the strong role of the 
Public  Integrity  Council;  resume  the  evaluation  of  the  qualification  of  judges  (vetting), 
which  was  suspended  in  2019;  introduce  a  transparent  and  merit-based  selection  of 
management-level prosecutors by amending the legal framework and taking the necessary 
institutional measures; 

→  establish  the  service  of  disciplinary  inspectors  following  a  transparent  and  meritocratic 
selection  process  and  resume  the  handling  of  disciplinary  proceedings  against  judges 
prioritising  high-profile  cases  and  cases  nearing  the  statute  of  limitation;  take  effective 
measures  to  address  corruption  risks  in  the  Supreme  Court;  strengthen  the  disciplinary 
system for prosecutors by improving the existing legal and institutional framework;  
→  complete a comprehensive IT audit, including the existing IT systems, business processes 
and organisational structure, and based on the audit results, adopt and start implementing a 
roadmap  to  modernise  IT  in  the  judiciary,  including  the  development  of  the  new  case 
management system.  

Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine has posed major challenges to Ukraine’s judicial 
system.  By  the  end  of  April  2023,  12  members  of  its  judicial  staff  were  killed,  114  court 
buildings (15% of the total) were either destroyed or damaged by the hostilities, and a large 
number  of  case  files  were  lost.  The  material  losses  suffered  by  the  courts  are  estimated  at 
EUR 47 million. The Prosecution Service has also suffered severe damage. 6 staff members 
were killed, 64 buildings of the prosecutor’s offices were either fully or partially destroyed, 
while 173 buildings remain in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. The material 
damage exceeds EUR 22 million. The administration of justice has been affected by air strikes, 
air  raid  alerts  and  frequent  power  outages.  Parties  to  court  proceedings  were  displaced 
internally or abroad, which disrupted the handling of cases. More than 80 000 cases related to 
war  crimes,  crimes  against  humanity  and  other  war-related  offences  were  opened,  thereby 
shifting the work priorities and placing an additional burden on the criminal justice system. 
Administering  justice  in  areas  of  active  hostilities  and  temporarily  occupied  territories  has 
become impossible. Despite these significant challenges, the Ukrainian judicial, prosecution 
and  other  justice  institutions  showed  remarkable  resilience  by  continuing  to  provide  justice 
services  to  citizens  and  companies,  while  also  implementing  reforms.  The  necessary 
legislative, organisational and technical measures were taken to allow courts to swiftly adapt 
their work to the new martial law realities and protect court users, while providing continuous 
access to justice. In particular, legislation was adopted that allowed the territorial jurisdiction 
of courts to be changed and court cases to be relocated to other parts of the country if it became 
impossible to administer justice in a certain territory, along with the secondment of judges to 
other courts. 

The  reform  of  the  two  key  judicial  governance  bodies  –  the  HCJ  and  the  HQCJ  –  was 
completed. This reform was triggered by insufficient independence of the judiciary from the 
executive and legislative branches, low public trust in the judiciary, high levels of corruption 
and the strong influence of vested interests in the work of courts. The reform started in July 
2021 with the adoption of ambitious legislation that introduced robust integrity vetting for the 
HCJ sitting and candidate members, as well as integrity and professionalism checks of HQCJ 
candidates. The legislation envisaged  a temporary yet  decisive  role for independent  experts 
nominated by international donors, including the EU, in the respective selection and vetting 
bodies. The reform was fully aligned with the relevant Venice Commission recommendations, 

20 

 
 
focusing  on  strengthening  integrity  and  public  trust  in  the  judiciary.  By  law,  the  HCJ  is 
composed of 21 members. At the start of the reform, the HCJ had 15 members and 10 of them 
stepped down, leaving the HCJ with only five members, including the Head of the Supreme 
Court  as  the  ex  officio  member.  The  Ethics  Council,  composed  of  three  national  and  three 
international experts, completed the integrity check of four appointed HCJ members in May 
2022, declaring one HCJ member as non-compliant. It then proceeded with the integrity check 
of the HCJ candidates. By January 2023, 11 new HCJ members – duly vetted by the Ethics 
Council  –  were  appointed  by  the  relevant  appointing  bodies.  With  these  appointments,  the 
renewed HCJ reached 15 members and became operational again. By June 2023, two more 
duly vetted HCJ members were appointed, increasing the HCJ’s composition to 17 members.  

The integrity and professionalism check of 301 HQCJ candidates by the Selection Commission, 
composed of three national and three international experts, was completed in March 2023. The 
competition included a thorough background check of candidates and an interview with the 64 
best  candidates.  Based  on  the  results  of  this  second  stage  of  the  competition,  the  Selection 
Commission formed a shortlist of 32 candidates for further consideration by the HCJ. In June 
2023,  the  HCJ  appointed  16  new  HQCJ  members  proposed  by  the  Selection  Commission, 
following  a  transparent  interview  and  individual  voting  procedure,  making  the  HQCJ  fully 
operational.  

The reform of the judicial governance bodies was finalised against the backdrop of a high-level 
corruption case involving the Head of the Supreme Court. This case became public in mid-
May,  when  the  National  Anti-Corruption  Bureau  claimed  to  have  uncovered  an  organised 
crime group that allegedly received a bribe equivalent to EUR 2 500 000 to influence Supreme 
Court decisions favouring a particular oligarch. The Head of the Supreme Court was dismissed 
and put into custody while the investigation was ongoing.   

This  corruption  case  highlighted  on  the  one  hand  the  robustness  of  the  specialised  anti-
corruption institutions established with strong EU support after the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, 
and on the other the need to pursue reforms in the justice, law enforcement and wider public 
sector  to  address  the  existing  corruption  challenges  and  irreversibly  consolidate  integrity, 
efficiency  and  professionalism,  while  striking  the  right  balance  between  independence  and 
accountability. Effective integrity tools should be used to address corruption in the Supreme 
Court and other courts, including through the verification of integrity and asset declarations of 
judges,  disciplinary  framework  and  improved  selection  procedures  with  a  strong  focus  on 
integrity and professional ethics. These measures should help in building public trust in the 
judiciary, which remains very low. Based on opinion surveys, public trust has been growing in 
recent years (in 2021, 15.5% of respondents trusted the judiciary, while in 2023 it was 24.8%). 
Foreign business associations continue to cite problems with the judiciary and the prevalence 
of corruption as some of the main obstacles to doing business in Ukraine.    

Good progress was achieved with the reform of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU). 
In December 2022, Ukraine adopted a law to reform the selection procedure for future CCU 
judges. It  was not  fully compliant with  the Venice Commission  recommendations issued in 
December 2022. The internationally nominated members of the CCU pre-selection body – the 
Advisory  Group  of  Experts  –  were  not  provided  a  temporary  yet  decisive  role  in  the  pre-
selection procedure. This was recommended by the Venice Commission to restore trust in the 
CCU, whose reputation was damaged by corruption allegations against its judges and several 
controversial CCU decisions. In July 2023, Ukraine adopted amendments to the CCU Law, 
which  implemented  the  outstanding  Venice  Commission  recommendations  contained  in  its 
Opinions on CCU reform from December 2022 and June 2023. Following the adoption of these 
amendments, the CCU selection reform has started to be implemented. The Parliament and the 

21 

 
 
Council of Judges announced competitions to fill the available vacancies in the Constitutional 
Court. The President and the Council of Judges appointed their members and substitutes to the 
Advisory Group of Experts, while the Parliament is continuing the appointment procedure. In 
September,  upon  the  formal  request  of  the  Government,  the  Venice  Commission  and  the 
international donors, including the EU, submitted their nominations of members and substitutes 
of the Advisory Group of Experts. In October, the Cabinet of Ministers formally  appointed 
them.  With  five  appointed  members  and  five  substitutes,  the  Advisory  Group  of  Experts 
became operational and can proceed with the pre-selection of candidates to the position of the 
Constitutional Court. The reform of the CCU should continue with the adoption of a law on 
the constitutional procedure, in line with Venice Commission recommendations, to improve 
transparency and accountability in the work of the CCU and make the constitutional procedure 
more efficient. 

In December 2022, the Parliament adopted a law abolishing the Kyiv district administrative 
court (KDAC), which handled disputes involving the central government bodies. Some KDAC 
judges  were  subject  to  numerous  controversies  and  corruption  investigations.  Under  the 
adopted  law,  KDAC  was  abolished  and  obliged  to  transfer  its  cases  to  the  Kyiv  region 
administrative court until a new Kyiv city administrative court is established. Delays in the 
transfer of cases and in the establishment of the new court, along with limited capacities of the 
Kyiv region administrative court to assume new obligations, undermined access to justice. The 
law did not regulate the status of former KDAC judges. Under the general rules, KDAC judges 
may be transferred to a court of the same level without the need for a competition. Before any 
such transfer, KDAC judges should complete the qualification evaluation procedure, including 
integrity  vetting.  The  renewed  HQCJ  and  HCJ  must  launch  the  establishment  of  a  new 
administrative court to handle cases involving the central government bodies ensuring that this 
court  is  staffed  with  duly  vetted  judges.  This  will  enable  an  efficient  and  fair  handling  of 
administrative disputes involving central government.  

Strategic documents 

The 2021-2023 strategy for the development of the justice system and constitutional judiciary 
identified  the  main  reform  areas  in  the  justice  sector,  including  the  reorganisation  of  local 
courts, reform of the key judicial governance bodies, consolidation of the Supreme Court key 
function  to  guarantee  uniformity  of  jurisprudence,  development  of  alternative  dispute 
resolution,  selection  of  new  judges,  prosecutorial  reform,  as  well  as  the  reform  of  the 
Constitutional  Court.  Part  of  the  reform  measures  contained  in  the  strategy  were  duly 
implemented, in particular the reform of judicial governance bodies and the selection of CCU 
judges. No formal assessment of the implementation of the strategy was carried out. A new 
strategy for the reform of the justice system to respond to the challenges of wartime still needs 
to be developed, in a transparent and inclusive manner, and adopted.  

In May 2023, the President of Ukraine approved a comprehensive strategic plan for the reform 
of law enforcement bodies for 2023-2027. Among other measures, it provides broad reform 
guidance for the prosecution service, including the strengthening of its coordination role over 
the law enforcement agencies and raising legal certainty and uniformity of practice in criminal 
procedures.  An  action  plan,  that  will  define  the  expected  results,  tasks  and  performance 
indicators for the strategic plan, is being finalised by the inter-agency working group and with 
the  involvement  of  the  EU  experts.  Its  speedy  adoption  and  steady  and  consequent 
implementation should lead to concluding the reform process in the area.   

Management bodies 

22 

 
 
Several  governance  and  self-governance  bodies  with  different  functions  are  responsible  for 
managing  the  judicial  system  and  prosecution  service.  In  the  judiciary,  the  HCJ  is  the  key 
judicial governance body that appoints and dismisses judges, handles disciplinary cases against 
them and oversees the work of the State Judicial Administration, a body in charge of the daily 
administration of court resources. The HCJ had no quorum between February 2022 and January 
2023, following the resignation en masse of 10 out of 15 of its members ahead of their vetting 
by the Ethics Council. The HQCJ, another important judicial governance body, deals with the 
selection and qualification evaluation (vetting) of judges. The HQCJ had not been operational 
since autumn 2019, when a judicial reform law dismissing all its members entered into force. 
It resumed its functions only in June 2023 when the HCJ approved its new composition. The 
Congress of Judges and the Council of Judges are the self-governance bodies that are composed 
of judges and that represent their interests. The Council of Judges is in charge of organising 
the Congress of Judges sessions and implementing its decisions. They take part in the formation 
of the HCJ and the HQCJ, while the Congress of Judges is also an appointing authority for 
Constitutional Court judges (together with the President and the Parliament). Considering the 
institutional complexity, functional overlaps, severe shortage of funding, the large number of 
vacancies and the challenges stemming from the war, the judicial governance system should 
be improved and optimised on the basis of an independent and professional functional audit.  

In  the  prosecution  service,  the  National  Conference  of  Prosecutors  is  the  highest  self-
governance body. It appoints some of the members of the prosecutorial governance bodies – 
the Council of Prosecutors and the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors 
(QDCP) and approves their regulations. The Council of Prosecutors operates on a part-time, 
unpaid  basis  and  deals  with  the  appointment  of  prosecutors  to  administrative  (managerial) 
positions  and  with  the  protection  of  prosecutorial  independence,  whereas  the  QDCP  is 
responsible  for  selecting,  promoting  and  dismissing  prosecutors  as  well  as  conducting 
disciplinary  proceedings.  Given  the  scope  of  its  competences  and  in  view  of  the  European 
standards and good practices, the Council of Prosecutors should become a full-time body with 
autonomous resources. The renewed Training Centre of Prosecutors deals with initiation and 
in-service  training  of  prosecutors.  The  HCJ  reviews  complaints  against  the  disciplinary 
decisions of the QDCP, a competence that could in the future be transferred to the Council of 
Prosecutors.  The  activities  of  the  National  Conference  of  Prosecutors  and  the  Council  of 
Prosecutors are financed by the Office of the Prosecutor General.   

Independence and impartiality 

The constitutional and legal framework guarantees the independence of the judiciary from 
the legislative and executive branches. The Parliament and the President retain the prerogative 
to  make limited appointments to judicial and prosecuting bodies, such as the Constitutional 
Court  and  the  HCJ.  Judges  are  appointed  by  the  President  upon  submission  of  the  HCJ 
according to the procedure prescribed by law. The allocation of cases to judges within a court 
is based on a random (automatic) system based on objective criteria established by procedural 
law which, in theory, cannot be influenced by a court president or other judges. However, due 
to the structural deficiencies of the judicial system, including limited resources, and the impact 
of the war of aggression, the automatic allocation of cases is not functioning properly. 

The possibility that a judge, addressed by a request for their recusal, can still contribute to the 
review of such a request, remains an issue of concern. To ensure objectivity and impartiality in 
the  decision-making  process,  decisions  on  the  removal  of  a  judge  from  a  court  proceeding 
should be taken without their participation and be subject to appeal.  

The legislation provides prosecutors with a sufficient degree of independence and autonomy. 
However, the self-governance and governance bodies are still largely dependent on the Office 
23 

 
 
of the Prosecutor General, in particular for financing and organisational support, which should 
be addressed in line with the European standards. A random allocation of cases to individual 
prosecutors  based  on  strict  and  objective  criteria,  including  specialisation,  and  appropriate 
controls  and  safeguards  against  manipulation  still  needs  to  be  introduced,  along  with  an 
effective appeal mechanism for decisions on the disqualification of a prosecutor.  

Despite  the  legal  and  institutional  guarantees,  the  risks  of  undue  internal  and  external 
interference in the work of the judiciary and the prosecution service persist, and further efforts 
by the competent institutions are needed to effectively reduce them.  

Accountability and ethics 

Codes of professional ethics and conduct exist for both judges and prosecutors. In November 
2022,  the  Council  of  Prosecutors  approved  and  published  its  commentary  on  the  code  of 
professional  ethics  of  prosecutors.  Both  judges  and  prosecutors  are  obliged  to  submit  an 
electronic  asset  declaration  each  year  for  the  previous  year  and  provide  updates  when 
necessary. 

Following the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, Ukraine launched an extraordinary and generalised 
qualification evaluation (vetting) of judges based on professional competence, professional 
ethics and integrity requirements. Failure to pass the vetting represents grounds for dismissal. 
Some 2 500 sitting judges underwent this procedure, before it was suspended in the autumn of 
2019, when the HQCJ was dissolved by law. Some 2 000 judges must still complete the vetting 
based on a transparent procedure, clear assessment criteria and with the proper involvement of 
the Public Integrity Council. 

The  key  function  of  the  HCJ  –  the  handling  of  disciplinary  cases  against  judges  –  was 
suspended in August 2021 with the entry into force of new legislation. The function previously 
held by HCJ inspectors has been transferred to a new service of disciplinary inspectors. The 
service was not established within the legislative deadline. There is also legal uncertainty as to 
the statutory limitation deadlines in relation to disciplinary complaints received by the previous 
HCJ  composition.  Some  11 500  disciplinary  cases  are  currently  pending  with  the  HCJ.  In 
August and September 2023, Ukraine adopted two laws for resuming disciplinary proceedings 
against  judges  and  for  establishing  an  independent  service  of  disciplinary  inspectors  on  the 
basis of a transparent and meritocratic selection procedure with a meaningful involvement of 
internationally-nominated experts. The disciplinary offences relating to judges’ conduct should 
still  be  clarified  and  developed.  The  service  of  disciplinary  inspectors  should  be  urgently 
established to enable an effective and impartial handling of disciplinary cases.   

In recent years, Ukraine has implemented prosecutorial reform. It includes the attestation of 
prosecutors – where all prosecutors in office are vetted by the HR commissions on the basis 
of integrity and professionalism criteria. Since 2019, out of 11 278 prosecutors who expressed 
their intention to pass the attestation, 8 351 prosecutors passed, while more than 2 700 failed 
and were dismissed. By August 2023, 2 754 lawsuits were brought to courts by prosecutors 
challenging various aspects of the attestation reform. The courts considered 2 082 lawsuits; 1 
426  lawsuits  were  refused  (including  713  by  the  Supreme  Court)  and  523  lawsuits  were 
satisfied (including 218 by the Supreme Court). Even if a court satisfies a lawsuit, it cannot 
reinstate a prosecutor to their position – based on the legislative changes adopted at the end of 
2021,  such  a  prosecutor  still  has  to  complete  the  attestation.  The  system  of  disciplinary 
responsibility  of  prosecutors  should  be  further  improved,  as  aimed  for  by  the  state 
anti-corruption  programme  for  2023-2025.  In  particular,  it  is  necessary  to  clarify  the 
disciplinary offences to extend the range of disciplinary sanctions and the statute of limitation, 
as well as ensure that disciplinary proceedings can be launched ex officio by the Council of 

24 

 
 
Prosecutors and the heads of prosecution offices. The QDCP’s capacities, as well as its human 
and financial resources, should also be strengthened.   

Professionalism and competence 

Following the Revolution of Dignity, Ukraine has reformed its rules on the selection of judges, 
introducing  more  transparency  and  meritocratic  elements.  However,  the  relevant  legal 
framework requires further refinement, in particular in view of the length and complexity of 
the selection process. The stages of selection and mandatory training should be optimised. At 
present, more than 2 000 judicial vacancies still need to be filled urgently. The renewed HQCJ 
should refine the judicial selection and qualification evaluation rules, including by developing 
and publishing clear integrity assessment criteria and a scoring methodology. Given the low 
level  of  public  trust  in  the  judiciary  and  recurrent  judicial  corruption  cases,  the  sustained 
involvement of the Public Integrity Council (PIC) in both qualification evaluation and judicial 
selection  procedures  remains  of  critical  importance.  The  PIC  is  tasked  to  provide  reasoned 
opinions to the HQCJ on the integrity of sitting judges undergoing the qualification evaluation, 
as well as judicial candidates to higher-level courts. The new PIC, composed of 20 lawyers, 
journalists  and  civil  society  representatives  specialised  in  anti-corruption  and  justice  sector 
reforms,  was  formed  in  August  2023.  It  should  help  the  renewed  HQCJ  to  complete  the 
qualification evaluation of sitting judges and to select new judges of high integrity. The new 
law  improving  the  selection  of  judges  was  prepared  in  the  Parliament’s  Legal  Policy 
Committee and registered. Following the legislative changes, the HQCJ will have to adjust its 
own rules and procedures.    

Since the introduction of new transparent and meritocratic rules on the selection and career 
advancement of prosecutors during the interim two-year prosecutorial reform period in 2019-
2021, several rounds of external recruitments of junior prosecutors took place following the 
improved rules, which included multiple tests of legal and practical knowledge, general skills 
as well as integrity checks. As a result, 114 new prosecutors were appointed in the Office of 
the Prosecutor General, and 492 in district prosecution offices.  

Moreover,  during  the  interim  reform  period,  a  transparent  selection  procedure,  including 
integrity,  professionalism  and  leadership  checks,  was  successfully  piloted  for  management-
level prosecutors. However, since the re-establishment of the Council of Prosecutors in autumn 
2021,  these  positive  practices  have  not  been  continued.  The  procedures  for  the  selection  of 
management-level  prosecutors  remain  inadequate  as  they  lack  transparency  and  credible 
integrity, professionalism and leadership checks. The resources and capacities of the Council 
of Prosecutors to carry out its mandate in this area remain limited. These shortcomings should 
be addressed.  

The rules governing the appointment and dismissal of the Prosecutor General make the position 
vulnerable to  political  and other undue interferences, creating risks linked to  independence, 
integrity and ultimately public trust. In line with European standards and good practices, the 
selection procedure for the Prosecutor General should be made more transparent, objective and 
meritocratic, and the dismissal procedure should be depoliticised. In particular, the grounds for 
dismissal of the Prosecutor General should be exhaustive and clearly defined by law, while the 
dismissal procedure should be more transparent and credible.   

The periodic performance evaluation of judges and prosecutors on the basis of clear rules and 
assessment criteria still needs to be established by the relevant judicial and prosecuting bodies. 
The use of performance evaluations would improve human resources management in courts 
and public prosecution offices.  

25 

 
 
The National School of Judges continued to provide training to judges of all instances. Despite 
war-related challenges and a drop in funding, it provided training to 10 158 people in 2022, in 
areas ranging from EU law to court management and IT skills. The school should strengthen 
its managerial and operational capacities, introduce comprehensive training needs assessment 
and  training  evaluation,  modernise  the  training  curricula  and  teaching  methods,  including 
trainings  on  judgecraft,  ethics  and  integrity  and  improve  international  cooperation  and 
connections with judicial training networks. The collaboration of the National School of Judges 
and the Prosecutorial Training Centre with the EU judicial training providers to address war-
related training needs help to enhance institutional capacity and should continue.  

High-quality and corruption-free legal education and training of justice and law enforcement 
professionals are key to consolidating the rule of law and fulfilling EU membership obligations. 
In recent years, Ukraine has taken a  number of measures to improve legal education. Legal 
education standards were adopted and upgraded, standardised exams for entering law schools 
and  master’s  degree  programmes  were  introduced,  and  an  institutional  system  for  quality 
assurance was developed. However, progress has been uneven and further reform efforts are 
still needed, in particular for creating a clear institutional delineation of legal education and 
law  enforcement  training,  strengthening  the  law  school  admission  and  licencing  standards, 
ensuring  a  transparent  and  merit-based  allocation  of  public  funds  for  training  future  legal 
professionals,  modernising  curricula  with  a  focus  on  ethics,  practical  training,  EU  law  and 
international exchanges, implementing a unified state qualifications exam, and fighting against 
corruption and plagiarism.  

Quality of justice 

The judiciary is suffering from severe underfunding, which is further exacerbated by the war 
of  aggression  and  its  impact  on  public  finances.  The  financial  resources  allocated  to  the 
judiciary met 63.4% of overall funding needs in 2022 and only 51.4% in 2023. In particular, 
non-judge staff in courts are heavily underfunded, which causes their outflow and disrupts the 
operation of courts. During the 2022 mid-year review, there were considerable revisions to the 
budget allocation for the judiciary. Costs for all local and appellate courts were cut by more 
than  10%,  while  cuts  to  other  judicial  institutions  amounted  to  15-20%  compared  with  the 
initial  allocations  for  2022.  The  2022  budgetary  allocation  for  the  judiciary,  including  the 
Supreme Court, local, appeal and specialised courts, was about EUR 491 million, compared 
with around EUR 656 million in 2021 (based on the exchange rate at the end of 2022). Once 
the public finance situation stabilises, the government should restore funding to the judiciary, 
while pursuing a carefully planned optimisation of the expenditures and the court network.      

At  the  end  of  2022,  there  were  4  643  judges  in  Ukraine,  averaging  11  judges  per  100 000 
inhabitants,  compared  to  the  European  average  of  22.2  judges  per  100 000  inhabitants  that 
same year. In the last few years, a number of courts of first instance stopped hearing cases due 
to the severe shortage of judges and the absence of the HQCJ. More than 100 courts in Ukraine 
operated  at  a  50%  staffing  level  or  even  lower.  Significant  differences  in  workload  remain 
between the courts across the country. In some cases, the workload of judges within the same 
instance  and  jurisdiction  can  differ  multiple  times.  The  government  plans  to  address  this 
problem by optimising the court network. However, amendments to the Law on the judiciary 
from December 2022 postponed optimisation to 1 year after the end of martial law. The judicial 
governance bodies should continue applying other measures, including the recruitment of new 
judges and secondments, to balance workloads.  

There were some 9 500 prosecutors or 23 prosecutors per 100 000 inhabitants in Ukraine at the 
end of 2022, compared with the European average of 11.8 prosecutors per 100 000 inhabitants 
in 2020.   

26 

 
 
The Ukrainian courts use a unified judicial information telecommunications system. It includes 
case management, case  allocation, electronic delivery and video  conferencing  functionality. 
Over the last few years, the State Judicial Administration has made efforts to interconnect the 
e-judiciary subsystems with the government electronic services portal Diia, the unified register 
of convicts, the social information system and others. An IT service for automatic notifications 
of court summons was also introduced, saving on postal costs. However, the system is largely 
outdated and underfunded. Its hardware, software and network infrastructure, along with the 
ICT management system, are in need of a thorough overhaul. To guide the development of a 
new e-judiciary system, an independent IT audit was launched in spring 2023. Based on the 
results of the audit, the e-judiciary system is expected to be upgraded to make the judiciary 
more efficient and transparent, as well as save costs and improve access to justice services for 
citizens and businesses.  

After thorough preparation, including business process analysis, the prosecution service, with 
the support of the EU, has launched the development of a modern e-case management system 
named  SMEREKA.  Over  the  course  of  several  years,  it  will  digitalise  the  analysis  and 
processing of criminal cases, starting with cases related to international crimes. This will boost 
efficiency, transparency and integrity in the criminal justice system.   

In November 2021, the Parliament adopted a modern law on mediation. It lays the groundwork 
for mainstreaming mediation in civil, commercial and administrative disputes and in criminal 
procedures.  Despite  the  war,  implementation  of  the  law  continued  and  good  progress  was 
achieved. The government adopted legislation to ensure the provision of mediation services by 
free legal aid centres, while the Ministry of Justice approved an order for a register of mediators 
engaged in secondary legal aid and launched the first competitions for such mediators. Various 
mediation organisations and justice sector institutions continued to promote mediation services 
via training, online resources and awareness raising activities. The implementation of the law 
on mediation through adoption of additional sub-legislation, institutional capacity building and 
awareness raising among relevant target groups should continue.  

An independent, professional and accountable Bar is a key prerequisite for access to justice 
and a functioning market economy. The Bar in Ukraine is in need of reform. The Law on the 
Bar should be aligned with the Constitution, applicable European standards and good practices. 
In  particular,  the  self-governance  system  and  resource  management  of  the  Bar  should  be 
improved  and  made  more  transparent  and  accountable.  The  qualification  and  disciplinary 
procedures for lawyers require significant improvements in law and in practice. The process 
for admission to the profession remains weak and prone to corruption risks, which undermines 
the credibility and independence of the profession.  

In recent years, the Ukrainian judiciary has made major efforts to ensure the uniformity of court 
practice, which is a key element of the rule of law and legal certainty. Several procedural filters 
were introduced in the Supreme Court, and the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court became 
operational. In addition to the existing register of judicial decisions, an electronic database of 
legal  positions of the Supreme Court  was  created, to  facilitate the identification of  relevant 
guidance from the Supreme Court on the interpretation and application of specific legal norms. 
However, more efforts are needed in this area as divergent court practice, including within the 
same court, persists. Access to the Grand Chamber still requires the approval of the relevant 
Cassation Court, which undermines unification efforts. Further legal and institutional reform 
measures should be carefully calibrated and be based on a thorough assessment and inclusive 
consultations involving judges and subject matter experts.    

Efficiency 

27 

 
 
Despite the war-related  funding  and staffing  challenges,  most courts in  Ukraine maintained 
100% or even higher clearance rates in 2022. At first instance, the clearance rate was 105.5% 
in  civil  cases,  97.6%  in  commercial  cases,  111.7%  in  administrative  cases  and  99.5%  in 
criminal cases. At the appeal level, similar clearance rates are reported: 101% in civil cases, 
103% in commercial cases, 99% in administrative cases, 98.9% in criminal cases. The general 
clearance  rate  of  the  Supreme  Court  was  107.9%  in  2022.  The  clearance  rate  at  the 
Constitutional Court was 68% in 2022. As for the number of pending cases at first instance 
courts, there were 231 177 civil cases pending at the end of 2022, including 59 856 unresolved 
for over a year, 34 168 commercial cases pending, including 10 417 unresolved for over a year, 
119 471  administrative  cases  pending,  including  25 544  unresolved  for  over  a  year,  and 
110 637 criminal cases pending, including 47 544 unresolved for over a year. At the appeal 
courts, there were 23 218 civil cases pending, including 3 716 unresolved for over a year, 6 446 
commercial cases pending, including  379 unresolved for over a year, 32 487 administrative 
cases pending, including 1 305 unresolved for over a year, and 12 377 criminal cases pending, 
including 3 223 unresolved for over a year. At the Supreme Court, the total backlog of cases in 
2022 was 19 252.  

As for the disposition time (time needed for a case to be resolved in days), according to the 
latest CEPEJ statistics including 2021 data, it took 165 days to resolve a civil and commercial 
case (129 days in 2018, 122 days in 2020) and 52 days for a criminal case (271 days in 2018, 
298 days in 2020).  

Given  the  war-related  challenges,  including  displacement  of  the  population  and  businesses, 
deterioration  of  the  economic  situation  and  travel  safety  concerns,  Ukraine  should  adopt 
legislation that formally  introduces remote hearings and  regulates the procedural aspects  of 
such  hearings,  in  full  respect  of  the  procedural  rights  of  the  parties.  This  would  boost  the 
efficiency of court proceedings and facilitate access to justice, including in times of war.  

Ukraine has a high number of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
pending  execution  among  the  parties  to  the  European  Convention  of  Human  Rights.  In 
particular, execution is pending for a significant period of time and structural reform measures 
are  still  required  for  the  ECtHR  judgments  related  to  non-enforcement  of  domestic  court 
decisions  against  state  entities,  judicial  independence,  unreasonable  length  of  court 
proceedings, poor prison conditions and inefficiency of ill treatment investigations. These cases 
are subject to the supervision procedure before the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe.  Despite  several  war-related  challenges,  the  Ukrainian  authorities  have  cooperated 
closely with the relevant Council of Europe bodies and made efforts to enforce outstanding 
ECtHR judgments during the reporting period.   

To  deal  with  the  systemic  problem  of  non-enforcement  of  domestic  court  decisions,  the 
government adopted a special strategy in September 2020 and an action plan to implement this 
strategy in March 2021. The action plan envisaged among other things a revision of social-
oriented  legislation,  additional  enforcement  mechanisms  related  to  state-owned  enterprises 
protected  by  moratoria,  the  improvement  of  legislation  on  bankruptcy,  the  introduction  of 
efficient  judicial  control  over  the  enforcement  of  court  decisions,  the  improvement  of 
enforcement  procedures  and  expansion  of  powers  of  private  bailiffs,  and  the  creation  of  a 
register of court decisions rendered against state entities. Most measures in the action plan still 
need to be carried out.  

In 2022, the number of new enforcement cases fell by more than half due to the war – from 
4.1  million  to  1.7  million.  In  June  2022,  the  Parliament  adopted  a  law  that  prohibited 
enforcement cases from being opened in the temporarily occupied territories and in the war 
zone.  In  April  2023,  another  law  was  adopted  to  introduce  a  minimal  protected  amount  on 
28 

 
 
debtors’ bank accounts. This therefore improves the protection of fundamental rights during 
the enforcement procedure.  It  also  duly  addressed other war-related challenges, such as the 
transfer of enforcement cases and replacement of bailiffs, as well as enforcement proceedings 
that involve Russian residents.  

The draft law to streamline the enforcement of court decisions and improve the status of private 
bailiffs has been pending a second reading since July 2021. Russia’s war of aggression and 
sharp deterioration in public finances have slowed down reforms in this area. The government 
should  resume  these  efforts  where  possible  under  the  current  context,  as  an  effective 
enforcement system is not only a key pillar of the market economy and the rule of law, but also 
an indispensable prerequisite for swift economic recovery.  

Ukraine took large-scale legal, institutional and practical measures to ensure the security of 
court premises and the safety of judges and staff. The only courts where security cannot be 
guaranteed by the Court Security Service are those that are located in the territories of Ukraine 
temporarily  occupied  by  Russia.  The  Court  Security  Service  should  continue  building  its 
capacities to ensure effective security of the courts and their staff, including through improved 
risk  assessments  and  risk  response,  and  the  deployment  of  security  equipment  and  other 
measures.  

Domestic handling of atrocity crimes 

Ukrainian  authorities  have  been  confronted  with  the  unprecedented  scope  and  gravity  of 
atrocities committed by the Russian Army. This has led to an increased need to strengthen the 
capacities  and  provide  expertise  to  investigate,  prosecute  and  adjudicate  core  international 
crimes (also called atrocity crimes), while building on the experience that Ukraine had already 
gained  since  2014.  As  a  result,  Ukraine  started  taking  significant  measures  to  advance  its 
comprehensive framework for addressing atrocity crimes at domestic level. 

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion and war of aggression, a total of 107 951 incidents related to 
various atrocity crimes have been officially registered. 267 people have been indicted and 63 
convicted for war crimes by Ukrainian courts. Due to the large number of crime scenes, several 
law enforcement agencies and authorities are involved in domestic investigations. The National 
Police of Ukraine and the Security Service of Ukraine created specialist units to investigate 
atrocity crimes and strengthen interinstitutional cooperation; the Interagency Working Group 
on  Investigating  War  Crimes  was  established.  The  Office  of  the  Prosecutor  General  also 
adjusted its institutional strategy and structures for prosecuting such crimes by restructuring its 
War Crimes Department and establishing nine regional war crime units within its service as 
well as the Conflict Related Sexual Violence Unit and Specialised Environmental Prosecutor’s 
Office. Cases involving children are being investigated by the Department for the Protection 
of Children’s Interest and Combating Domestic Violence. There are currently 2 944 criminal 
proceedings  involving  children  as  victims  of  various  war  crimes,  including  cases  of  forced 
deportation,  recruitment  of  child  soldiers,  killings  and  sexual  violence.  The  War  Crimes 
Department developed and applied operational strategies and institutional synergies, aimed at 
improving  the  efficiency  of  investigations  into  crimes  committed  in  territories  of  Ukraine 
occupied by Russia, after their liberation. The very high number of cases creates an intense 
workload  and  great  amount  of  data  recorded  in  criminal  proceedings,  thus  raising  risks  of 
duplication. To address this problem, the Office of the Prosecutor General started creating a 
modern e-case management system (see ‘Quality of justice’ section above).  

A dedicated war crimes prosecution strategy has been adopted and additional resources put in 
place  with  the  support  of  international  assistance  providers,  including  the  European  Union 
Advisory  Mission  Ukraine,  to  improve  investigations  into  such  crimes.  Ukraine  cooperates 

29 

 
 
effectively with the Atrocity Crimes Advisory Group, a large multilateral initiative established 
by  the  EU,  the  US  and  the  UK  in  May  2022  to  provide  strategic  advice  and  operational 
assistance to the Office of the Prosecutor General in investigating and prosecuting international 
crimes in Ukraine. Relevant Ukrainian authorities advanced their coordination with the civil 
society organisations involved in documenting such crimes. 

The  Ukrainian  domestic  legal  framework  for  criminal  accountability  for  core  international 
crimes needs to be adapted to international standards. As a matter of urgency, the Criminal 
Code of Ukraine should be amended to expand on the elements of core international crimes, 
incorporate criminal liability for committing crimes against humanity and criminal liability for 
commanders and other superiors for international crimes committed by the forces under their 
effective  command  and  control  as  one  of  the  essential  means  for  prosecuting  such  crimes. 
Ukraine has not yet ratified the Rome Statute. 

Ukraine cooperates closely with stakeholders at international level for bringing perpetrators of 
atrocity crimes to justice, in compliance with the principle of complementarity. Following the 
filing of two ad hoc declarations by the Government of Ukraine accepting the jurisdiction of 
the International Criminal Court (ICC), Ukraine proactively collaborates with and supports the 
ICC’s  Office  of  the  Prosecutor  (ICC  OTP).  This  cooperation  resulted  in  high-level 
investigations  and  arrest  warrants  being  issued  on  17  March  2023  by  Pre-Trial  Chamber  II 
against  the  President  of  Russia  Vladimir  Putin  and  the  Presidential  Commissioner  for 
Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova for the war crime of unlawful deportation of population 
(children) and that of unlawful transfer of population (children) from occupied  territories of 
Ukraine  to  Russia.  In  March  2023,  the  ICC  and  Ukraine  signed  a  memorandum  of 
understanding  to  establish  an  ICC  country  office  in  Ukraine  to  further  strengthen  their 
cooperation. Ukraine also closely cooperates with the independent International Commission 
of Inquiry on Ukraine. It was established by the UN Human Rights Council in March 2022 to 
report  on  all  alleged  violations  and  abuses  of  human  rights,  violations  of  international 
humanitarian law and related crimes in the context of the Russian war of aggression against 
Ukraine. 

Together with Poland and Lithuania, Ukraine is a founding member of the Joint Investigation 
Team (JIT) that was set up in March 2022 to enable the exchange of information and facilitate 
investigations into core international crimes committed in Ukraine. Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia 
and  Romania  also  became  JIT  members,  and  the  US  Department  of  Justice  signed  a 
memorandum of understanding to improve coordination between the JIT partner countries and 
the  US  authorities  in  their  respective  investigations  in  connection  with  the  war  in  Ukraine. 
Furthermore,  the  ICC  OTP  became  a  participant  in  the  JIT.  Europol  received  an  official 
invitation to join the JIT in mid-August 2023 and discussions are ongoing about the UK signing 
a memorandum of understanding like the US. 

In July 2023, the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression against 
Ukraine (ICPA) was launched in The Hague, to support international efforts to secure evidence 
for the prosecution of the crime of aggression and facilitate the process of case building. The 
ICPA constitutes a standing structure to improve coordination on the collection, retention and 
analysis of evidence between JIT members investigating the crime of aggression under their 
respective national laws. As part of the ICPA, Ukrainian senior prosecutors work side by side 
with  prosecutors  from  the  EU  and  US,  in  close  coordination  with  the  ICC  OTP.  In  mid-
September 2023, a Register of Damage Caused by the Russian Federation Against Ukraine was 
formally established, as per a resolution of the Council of Europe (May 2023). The Register of 
Damage will receive and process information on claims of damage and evidence; categorise, 
classify and organise such claims, assess and determine the eligibility of claims for inclusion 

30 

 
 
in the Register and record the eligible claims for the purposes of their future examination and 
adjudication. 

Ukraine  co-chairs  the  work  streams  of  the  Ukraine  Accountability  Dialogue  Group,  an 
international  effort  aimed  at  promoting  exchange  and  coherence  across  the  range  of 
accountability initiatives and related donor support. In November 2022, the European Network 
for  investigation  and  prosecution  of  genocide,  crimes  against  humanity  and  war  crimes 
(Genocide Network) invited Ukraine to attend its future open sessions as well as part of the 
closed sessions upon specific interest of Ukraine and subject to agreement of all member states. 
The Genocide Network also considered to grant Ukraine observer status on an ongoing basis. 

Fight against corruption  

Ukraine has some level of preparation in the prevention of and fight against corruption. There 
was some progress, in particular with establishing and consolidating a comprehensive anti-
corruption  institutional  framework  and  the  gradual  building  of  a  steady  track  record  in 
investigating,  prosecuting  and  adjudicating  corruption  cases.  This  includes  high-level 
convictions  and  cases  moving  forward  in  the  courts  against  officials  previously  considered 
‘untouchable’. Ukraine stepped up the implementation of reforms in the area of anti-corruption 
and continued to strengthen the anti-corruption framework after receiving EU candidate status. 
New legislative, strategic and institutional improvements were pursued, including the adoption 
of the national anti-corruption strategy in June 2022, accompanied by a comprehensive state 
programme  for  its  implementation  adopted  in  March  2023,  as  well  as  the  restoration  of 
financial reporting of the political parties. Ukraine has also restored the system of electronic 
asset declarations, along with the verification functions, taking into account the situation under 
martial  law.  The  adopted  law  included  some  provisions  which  potentially  weaken  the 
verification system, but their effects still need to be monitored in practice.  

The  work  conducted  in  particular  by  the  Specialised  Anti-Corruption  Prosecutor’s  Office 
(SAPO) since its new head was appointed in July 2022, led to globally increased effectiveness 
of the anti-corruption institutions. The new head of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of 
Ukraine  (NABU)  was  selected  in  early  March  2023,  after  a  transparent  and  merit-based 
procedure.  

The  Ukrainian  authorities  are  committed  to  making  continued  efforts  to  achieve  steady 
progress, but its sustainability needs to be monitored and further supported. The main challenge 
is  to  ensure  that  the  outcome  of  the  work  of  anti-corruption  institutions  is  systemic  and 
irrevocable,  also  in  view  of  long-term  reconstruction  efforts  and  the  need  to  ensure  and 
maintain  safeguards  for  the  accountable  management  of  foreign  funding  and  investment. 
Efforts  to  strengthen the independence of key  anti-corruption institutions and increase their 
capacity need to continue, and further allocation of technical, financial and human resources 
will be important. Sectors most vulnerable to corruption require targeted risk assessments and 
dedicated measures to ensure robust corruption prevention. 

In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular: 

→  continue to further improve its track record on investigations, prosecutions and final court 
decisions in high-level corruption cases, including the seizure and confiscation of criminal 
assets,  as  well  as  ensure  timely  implementation  of  the  2023-2025  state  anti-corruption 
programme,  including  appropriate  monitoring  and  allocation  of  relevant  resources  and 
remove  undue  legal  restrictions  on  the  verification  powers  of  the  National  Agency  for 
Corruption Prevention (NACP), in order to ensure the effectiveness of the electronic asset 
declaration  system,  without  prejudice  to  the  rules  applying  to  national  security  during 
wartime; 

31 

 
 
→  revise the Criminal Procedure Code and the Criminal Code to enable higher efficiency and 
outcomes in high-level corruption cases, e.g. by preventing procedural delays, introducing 
reasonable  time  limits  for  pre-trial  investigations,  and  improving  the  regulation  of  plea 
bargain agreements; increase the number of judges of the High Anti-Corruption Court by 
reactivating the Public Council of International Experts and enable the court to adjudicate 
certain cases in single judge composition;  

→  enact legislation to improve the selection procedures for the SAPO head and key officials, 
to  strengthen  the  institutional  independence  of  SAPO  by  transforming  it into  a  separate 
legal entity, and to increase its level of procedural autonomy as well as  establish robust 
mechanisms for external and internal control and discipline. 

Track record 

Ukraine has introduced some reform measures and stepped up efforts to build a credible track 
record of investigations, prosecutions and convictions of high-level corruption cases, and to 
some extent the seizure and confiscation of criminal assets. The country continued to pursue a 
rigorous reform path to facilitate the effective functioning of key anti-corruption institutions 
for ensuring sound operational capacities.  

In 2022, NABU, responsible for the investigation of high-level corruption, initiated a total of 
456  criminal  proceedings  (2021:  633;  2020:  792).  By  the  end  of  September  2023,  NABU 
started 501 proceedings. Based on the results of its investigations, and under the procedural 
guidance  of  SAPO,  54  indictments  for  corruption  offences  against  132  people  were  sent  to 
court in 2022, which constitutes a stable number also compared with previous years (2021: 57 
indictments  against  127  people;  2020:  67  indictments  against  106  people).  By  the  end 
September 2023, 82 indictments against 203 persons were sent to court and it can be anticipated 
that the track-record will significantly increase, with the number of indictments likely being 
doubled in 2023 compared to previous years.   

The High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) was launched in September 2019 as the main court 
for adjudicating high-level corruption cases investigated and prosecuted by NABU and SAPO. 
It became operational following a transparent selection procedure of 39 judges for the court 
with the involvement of international experts (Public Council of International Experts). The 
court functions as a court of first and second instance and is independent from the ordinary 
judiciary in Ukraine, although the Supreme Court has the competence to hear cassation cases 
on verdicts delivered by the HACC. In February 2023, the judges selected a new president of 
the court.  

The HACC has continuously increased its overall operational performance and output since its 
launch. In 2022, it delivered 37 verdicts against 56 defendants in first instance and 22 verdicts 
against 27 defendants in second instance, which constitutes an increase over previous years 
(2021: 34 verdicts against 41 defendants in first instance, and 25 verdicts against 29 defendants 
in  second instance;  2020:  22 verdicts  against 25 defendants  in  first  instance, and 8 verdicts 
against  10  defendants  in  second  instance).  By  the  end  of  September  2023,  the  HACC  has 
significantly increased its overall performance and delivered 48 verdicts against 64 defendants 
in first instance, and 26 verdicts against 32 defendants in second instance. To enable the court 
to cope with the increased caseload, which is also caused by its mandate being extended to e.g. 
civil confiscations, its capacity should be strengthened by selecting and appointing new judges 
in 2024, with the involvement of the Public Council of International Experts. Furthermore, the 
Criminal Procedure Code should be amended to allow certain cases to be adjudicated in single 
judge composition. 

32 

 
 
The cases investigated and adjudicated by the anti-corruption institutions concerned prominent 
high-level  public  officials  including  former  deputy  ministers,  former  parliamentarians  and 
high-level judges, e.g. the serving President of the Supreme Court who was arrested in May 
2023  for  bribery.  Similarly,  in  2022,  NABU  and  SAPO  uncovered  suspected  high-level 
embezzlement, including in the management of PrivatBank, Ukrnafta, Ukrgazbank, the State 
Fiscal Service of Ukraine, as well as Naftogaz in 2023.  

The Asset Recovery and Management Agency processed a total of 4 401 requests in 2022 on 
the finding and tracing  of assets that can be seized and confiscated in  criminal  proceedings 
received  from  relevant  authorities.  A  total  of  EUR  864 364  in  equivalent  revenues  were 
transferred  to  the  State  Budget  of  Ukraine  from  the  management  of  seized  assets  and 
EUR 24 361 679  in  equivalent  revenues  from  the  sale  of  seized  assets.  The  HACC  applied 
special  confiscation  in  10  criminal  proceedings  in  2022  for  a  total  of  approximately 
EUR 1 million. 

During  the first  half of 2023, the NACP sent  26 cases to  courts for administrative offences 
involving  the  violation  of  conflict  of  interest  rules  (2022:  72;  2021:  937;  2020:  239).  The 
overall  percentage  of  persons  against  whom  an  administrative  fine  was  imposed  was  14% 
during the first half in 2023 (3 people), compared to 18% in 2022 (11 people), 2% in 2021 (4 
people), and 7% in 2020 (4 people). During the first half of 2023, the NACP did not conduct 
comprehensive verifications of asset declarations due to the suspension of this task, mandated 
by the application of martial  law in  March 2022. However, a total  of 1 610 comprehensive 
verifications of asset declarations were completed in previous years (2022: 124; 2021: 1 043; 
2020: 443), and the agency detected 220 cases of administrative offences (2022: 18; 2021: 171; 
2020:  31), 253 cases  of  criminal  offences (in 2022:  38;  2021:  119;  2020:  96), including  12 
cases of unfounded assets (2022: 2; 2021: 10; 2020: 0) and 1 case of illicit enrichment that 
were transferred to courts and relevant law enforcement agencies. A total of 24 people (2022: 
5,  2021:  17,  2020:  0)  were  found  guilty  of  committing  an  administrative  offence;  7  people 
(2022: 5, 2021: 2, 2020: 0) were found guilty of committing a criminal offence in the first half 
of 2023. The Constitutional Court issued a decision in 2020 partially rendering unconstitutional 
the  provisions  on  control  and  full  verification  of  declarations  as  well  as  the  criminal 
responsibility  related  to  false  declaration.  The  immediate  result  was  that  a  large  number  of 
criminal cases had to be terminated. Despite the subsequent restoration of the powers of the 
NACP and the Criminal Code article on false declaration by the Parliament in accordance with 
Venice Commission recommendations, the non-retroactive effect of criminal law provisions 
caused an accountability gap. 

The  NACP  granted  16  whistle-blowers  and  their  close  relatives  protection  out  of  27 
applications. A total of 46 criminal proceedings for corruption and corruption-related offences 
were registered and carried out based on the reports of whistle-blowers, including for high-
level corruption. 

Findings from sociological surveys show a significant decrease in recent years in the share of 
citizens who have directly experienced corruption (in 2013, the share was 60%, in early 2020 
not more than 40%). There has been a gradual increase in comparative corruption level indexes 
for Ukraine. In 2013-2022, Ukraine’s performance in the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 
increased from 25 to 33 points (maximum score is 100). The result in 2022 is the highest since 
the updated CPI methodology was launched and Ukraine now ranks 116 out of 180 countries 
in the CPI. 

According  to  the  survey  ‘Corruption  in  Ukraine:  understanding,  perception,  prevalence’ 
conducted each year by the NACP, in 2022, 29% (42% in 2021) believe that corruption has 
increased, while 16% (6% in 2021) believe it has decreased. Among business representatives, 
33 

 
 
46% believe corruption has decreased and only 16% that it has increased in 2022. There is an 
increase in the share of the population with a negative attitude towards corruption – in 2021, 
the  share  was  49%  and  in  2022  57%.  More  are  willing  to  report  corruption  cases  than  in 
previous years. Also, the share of the population and business representatives that support the 
activities  of  whistle-blowers  has  increased  –  65%  of  the  population  and  86%  of  business 
representatives support these activities. 

Institutional framework 

Prevention measures 

The National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) is the special agency responsible for 
the prevention of corruption in Ukraine. The maximum number of NACP employees is 408, 
but the actual number of employees in employment relationships remains significantly lower 
(approximately 85% of this figure). Its main mandate is anti-corruption policy, financial control 
(asset declarations), compliance review of political party financing, whistle-blower protection 
and conflict of interest resolution. The most relevant functions of the agency were suspended 
with the application of martial law in March 2022 due to national security concerns, including 
the verification of e-asset declarations and political party financing compliance review. 

Three years after a full restructuring and change of governance model under the new head of 
the agency, selected by an international selection commission, the agency has delivered good 
results  and  there  are  strong  signs  of  its  growing  independence  from  political  and  vested 
interests. The agency has also started to engage in addressing possible corruption risks linked 
to the large-scale reconstruction of the country. The term of the agency’s head will expire in 
January  2024  and  the  credible  and  transparent  selection  of  a  new  head  by  an  international 
selection commission, as required by law, will be an important priority for Ukraine. 

An independent external assessment of the effectiveness of the NACP’s activity in 2020-2021 
was conducted by an expert commission composed of three international experts appointed by 
the Cabinet of Ministers based on a proposal by international donors, as required by law. In its 
final assessment report published in July 2023, the commission concluded that the agency was 
effective and independent overall but made a set of recommendations to strengthen it further. 
The agency and other relevant stakeholders should implement these recommendations swiftly.  

The advanced electronic asset declaration system has proved to be a key tool for preventing 
corruption. However, the obligation for public officials to submit asset declarations was fully 
suspended with the application of martial law in March 2022, together with other restrictions 
on  access  to  a  number  of  state  registers,  in  order  to  address  security  concerns  and  protect 
sensitive information during wartime. In September, the Parliament adopted a law restoring the 
e-asset  declaration  system  and  its  verification  functions  by  the  NACP.  The  adopted  law 
included some provisions that limited the verification powers of the NACP and closed the e-
asset declarations to the public. The President vetoed the adopted law as regards the public 
access  to  the  declarations.  At  the  end  of  September,  the  Parliament  re-adopted  the  law 
addressing  the  President’s  request,  while  maintaining  the  other  provisions  that  could  create 
potential  weaknesses.  In  September,  the  Parliament  also  adopted  a  law  that  weakened  the 
administrative liability for non-submission/false information in the e-asset declaration, but the 
President has not signed it into effect. Deficiencies in the rules of the automated verification of 
the e-asset declarations continue to exist and should be addressed by the NACP in the medium 
term. 

Effective  implementation  of  procurement  rules  in  all  sectors  and  full  use  of  the  related 
electronic  procurement  system  should  help  in  further  preventing  corruption  in  the  public 
services sphere.  

34 

 
 
Ukraine has made progress in strengthening its comprehensive framework for the protection of 
whistle-blowers. Some outstanding  issues include further increasing  its effectiveness,  more 
awareness raising about the essential role of whistle-blowers, and launching a unified portal 
for their reports. 

Corruption risk management in public institutions is proactively handled by the NACP. It 
applies a detailed model methodology and provides guidance in developing institutional anti-
corruption programmes. Corruption risks in draft laws and sectors vulnerable to corruption are 
successfully assessed and addressed. However, further targeted streamlining and simplification 
of  applied  processes  and  methodologies  would  increase  effectiveness.  To  strengthen  the 
institutional ownership and effectiveness of the corruption risk management system, approval 
of  the  institutional  anti-corruption  programmes  could  be  transferred  from  the  NACP  to  the 
heads of the relevant state institutions.  

Ukraine’s  conflict  of  interest  framework  is  comprehensive  and  largely  aligned  with 
international anti-corruption standards. The NACP is well positioned to conduct monitoring 
and  control  over  compliance  with  conflicts  of  interest  legislation.  It  is  also  tasked  with 
guidance, consultations, training and awareness raising. To strengthen the conflict of interest 
framework,  the  NACP  should  improve  internal  proceedings  and  take  measures  to  further 
increase transparency and outreach of its work, including by reporting systematically to the 
public.  More  public  awareness  raising  about  the  importance  of  the  conflict  of  interest 
framework  in  detecting  and  preventing  corruption  is  needed.  Strong  engagement  with  civil 
society and independent media in Ukraine is key. The legislative framework should be further 
improved to also cover apparent conflicts of interest. 

Several legislative proposals on lobbying regulations were registered but not adopted yet. The 
NACP has launched the process of preparation of a new law on lobbying. The anti-corruption 
strategy  and  state  anti-corruption  programme  require  drafting  and  the  approval  of  lobbying 
regulations by April 2024. To build up mutual trust of stakeholders and reach consensus on the 
best  approach  on  a  lobbying  regulation  framework  for  Ukraine,  an  open  and  participatory 
discussion should be pursued, including a wide stakeholders’ engagement (in particular, civil 
society groups) and extensive public consultations. It will be important to ensure that lobbying 
regulations  do  not  preclude  or  limit  legitimate  activities  of  civil  society  or  put  a 
disproportionate administrative burden on them. 

The  Council  of  Europe’s  Group  of  States  against  Corruption  issued  its  interim  compliance 
report  in  March  2023,  where  it  assessed  the  measures  taken  by  Ukrainian  authorities  to 
implement  the  31  recommendations  of  the  Fourth  Round  Evaluation  Report  on  corruption 
prevention  in  respect  of  members  of  parliament,  judges  and  prosecutors.  Overall,  15 
recommendations have been implemented; nine have been partially implemented satisfactorily; 
and  seven  recommendations  remain  unimplemented.  Ukraine  should  swiftly  act  on  the 
outstanding recommendations in order to ensure further progress. 

Law enforcement 

Key  anti-corruption  institutions  responsible  for  investigating  and  prosecuting  high-level 
corruption  have  remained  fully  operational  despite  the  war.  However,  limited  budget 
allocations  have  caused  challenges  to  their  operations.  Structural  issues  with  the  legal 
framework,  overall  capabilities  and  functioning  remain,  with  a  continuous  need  to  further 
strengthen  their  independence  and  operational  autonomy.  The  deployed  electronic  case 
management system for NABU, SAPO and HACC has been put into practice but still requires 
full  integration  with  the  unified  register  of  pre-trial  investigations  and  the  unified  judicial 
information  and telecommunication system. Specialised high-quality  training is  available to 

35 

 
 
the  staff  of  anti-corruption  institutions,  including  through  international  technical  assistance 
providers. 

In July 2022, the new head of SAPO was appointed by the Prosecutor General following the 
finalisation of a selection process that was largely transparent and merit-based, but which lasted 
more than 18 months. After the appointment, the office stepped up inter-agency cooperation 
with NABU and reactivated high-profile cases. Despite significant progress, SAPO still needs 
to  further  strengthen  its  political  and  administrative  independence  from  the  Office  of  the 
Prosecutor  General  and  other  institutions.  Particularly  outstanding  issues:  improve  the 
selection procedure for SAPO head and key administrative positions of SAPO by aligning it 
with 
institutional 
independence, and increase its procedural autonomy as well as establish robust mechanisms 
for external and internal control and discipline. In early 2023, a draft law to address these issues 
was registered in the Parliament, but was rejected by the responsible parliamentary committee 
without  substantive  discussions  in  February  2023  due  to  the  lack  of  political  consensus.  In 
September, several new draft laws strengthening the SAPO’s autonomy were registered in the 
Parliament. 

to  NABU/NACP,  strengthen  SAPO’s 

the  procedures  applicable 

The  new  Director  of  NABU  was  appointed  in  March  2023  by  the  Cabinet  of  Ministers 
following a merit-based and transparent selection process conducted with the participation of 
international  members  in  the  selection  commission.  NABU  has  been  successfully  leading 
complex high-level investigations and is among the most trusted law enforcement agencies in 
Ukraine.  It  urgently  needs  additional  staff  to  work  on  investigations  (detectives,  analysts, 
technicians), with staffing issues being particularly acute in the three regional offices. A draft 
law has been registered in the Parliament to increase the number of NABU staff from 700 to 1 
000. Another reform priority should focus on the reform of the forensic services, to ensure that 
NABU has a timely and uncompromised access to forensic expertise in its high-level corruption 
investigations. Similarly, NABU should be able to conduct wiretapping without the need to 
rely on the Security Service of Ukraine for its practical implementation.  

Among other law enforcement agencies, the National Police of Ukraine and the State Bureau 
of Investigation (SBI) were given powers related to corruption investigation. The Bureau of 
Economic Security (BES) does not handle corruption cases as such, but its activities aimed at 
protecting  the  economic  security  of  the  state  are  closely  related.  SBI  is  responsible  for 
investigating  corruption  involving  public  officials  unless  the  pre-trial  investigation  of  the 
crimes falls under the jurisdiction of NABU. BES was created to succeed the tax police (branch 
of  the  State  Fiscal  Service)  in  protecting  the  economic  security  of  the  Ukrainian  state  and 
investigating sophisticated financial crimes, including potentially touching on corruption. At 
the same time, the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) has almost unlimited powers, including 
those  related  to  the  investigation  of  corruption  cases.  The  problems  of  SBI,  BES  and  SSU 
include limited public supervision and accountability, lack of inter-agency cooperation as well 
as  the  fact  that  staff  is  selected  in  processes  that  lack  integrity  control  and  transparency. 
Delineation of investigative competences is often disregarded or interfered with in practice by 
having criminal cases investigated by SBI and the Security Service of Ukraine that fall within 
the exclusive investigative powers of NABU. It will be important to introduce legal safeguards 
that  will  prevent  interference  in  the  exclusive  investigative  powers  of  NABU  by  other  law 
enforcement agencies and, in this context, also progress with the SSU reform in line with EU’s 
recommendations. 

Legal framework 

Ukraine has ratified the most important international treaties to prevent and combat corruption, 
including the UN Convention against Corruption and the Council of Europe Criminal and Civil 
36 

 
 
Law Conventions on Combating Corruption. As part of its aspirations to become a member of 
the OECD, in February 2023 the OECD Council agreed on the proposal of the Working Group 
on  Bribery  in  International  Business  Transactions  (WGB),  to  invite  Ukraine  to  become  a 
Participant to the WGB so as to facilitate its accession to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. 
Corresponding amendments to the Criminal Code, Criminal Procedure Code and Tax Code, 
and to other legislative acts are being prepared for the full implementation of the norms of the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the recommendations of the OECD Council. 

The  domestic  legal  framework  is  broadly  aligned  with  international  standards  and  allows 
Ukraine  to  conduct  complex  criminal  investigations  into  corruption  cases.  However,  the 
Criminal Procedure Code and the Criminal Code should be further improved to enable higher 
efficiency and better outcomes. The  amendments should be aimed  at  preventing procedural 
delays,  increasing  time  limits  for  pre-trial  investigations  and  improving  the  grounds  and 
procedures for concluding plea bargain agreements. The legal framework on whistle-blower 
protection should be completed and fully aligned with the EU acquis. 

To reduce the influence of oligarchs on politics, in September 2021 the Parliament passed the 
Law on prevention of threats to  national security associated with the excessive influence of 
people with significant economic and political weight in public life (oligarchs). The adoption 
of the law and the announced preparation of the register of oligarchs led some of those possibly 
affected giving up ownership of certain assets to avoid meeting the criteria for being identified 
as an oligarch under the law. Moreover, the war has disrupted economic activity, with oligarch-
owned businesses being  particularly affected. This has led to a decrease in profitability and 
resources, which has limited their ability to influence the political and media spheres. Similarly, 
martial law has resulted in restrictions on the media and with it, the ability of oligarchs to shape 
public opinion and exercise traditional influence through the media channels they control or 
controlled.  

While being in force since May 2022, the law on oligarchs has not been implemented. In June 
2023, the Venice Commission, in its Opinion on the law on oligarchs, assessed the personal 
approach  of  the  law  on  oligarchs  as  difficult  to  reconcile  with  the  principles  of  political 
pluralism  and  the  rule  of  law  and  thus  recommended  postponing  its  implementation  and 
reassessing its necessity after the end of the war. It recommended that Ukraine addresses de-
oligarchisation  through  a  systemic  approach  in  relevant  areas,  such  as  media,  competition, 
financing of political parties, taxation, anti-corruption and anti-money laundering.   

Ukraine  has  duly  prioritised  systemic  measures  against  oligarchs,  in  line  with  the  Venice 
Commission recommendations from June 2023. In particular, on the basis of the Government’s 
anti-oligarch action plan, Ukraine pursued the reforms of the judicial governance bodies and 
the  Constitutional  Court,  adopted  a  new  media  law,  continued  to  implement  the  state  anti-
corruption programme and finalised the legal framework on the ultimate beneficial ownership. 
In addition, in August, legislation strengthening the Anti-Monopoly Committee of Ukraine and 
restoring the financial reporting of political parties and the verification functions was adopted 
and later signed into effect. In September, the Government revised its anti-oligarch action plan 
to postpone the implementation of the law on oligarchs and to prepare amendments to the law 
within three months after the end of the martial law, taking into account the recommendations 
of the Venice Commission.  

Strategic framework 

The Parliament approved the anti-corruption strategy for 2021–2025 in June 2022, 2 years after 
the  NACP,  responsible  for  developing  it,  submitted  the  document.  The  adopted  strategy 
outlines highly relevant anti-corruption reforms across sectors and will also play an important 

37 

 
 
role in ensuring transparent and accountable reconstruction efforts in Ukraine. Furthermore, 
the implementation of these reform measures is likely to increase Ukraine’s track record on 
prosecutions  and  convictions  of  high-level  corruption  cases  over  time.  The  delay  in  the 
adoption of the strategy at the level of the Parliament significantly blocked an effective policy 
framework and the monitoring of the implementation of anti-corruption reforms. The need for 
having the strategy adopted as a national law should be reconsidered.  

On the basis of the strategy, the NACP developed the state anti-corruption programme (SACP), 
adopted  in  March  2023  by  the  Cabinet  of  Ministers.  The  programme  contains  detailed, 
actionable measures across sectors and also provides a strategic framework for strengthening 
the  key  anti-corruption  institutions.  It  includes  clear  key  performance  indicators  for  each 
government body. In drafting the strategy and action plan, the NACP carefully considered the 
findings of sociological surveys and other research, including recommendations and analysis 
by  Ukrainian  and  international  non-governmental  organisations.  The  NACP  also  consulted 
independent experts and the public. 

The  NACP  is  the  agency  responsible  for  coordinating,  monitoring  and  evaluating  the 
effectiveness of the implementation of the anti-corruption strategy and the SACP. It is tasked 
with  monitoring  the  implementation  of  measures  provided  in  the  programme  each  quarter. 
Based  on  the  outcomes,  it  then  provides  quarterly  information  to  relevant  Ukrainian 
stakeholders. The current level of implementation of the programme is reasonable, in particular 
the  development  and  full  operationalisation  of  the  open  access  information  system  for 
monitoring the implementation of the SACP is well advanced.  

Fundamental rights  

Ukraine generally complies with international human rights instruments and has ratified most 
international conventions on the protection of fundamental rights. The government has made 
continued efforts and progress, despite the war, on aligning its legislation with international 
standards  and  the  EU  acquis.  The  reporting  period  was  marked  by  the  Russian  invasion  of 
Ukraine, resulting in major violations of fundamental rights by Russia in Ukraine. Dealing with 
the consequences of these massive violations  and devoting attention to mitigating measures 
was  at  the  centre  of  the  work  of  the  Ukrainian  authorities  and  human  rights  civil  society 
organisations  over  the  reporting  period  and  will  represent  a  challenge  for  Ukraine’s 
prosecution, judiciary and society in the years to come.  

The introduction of martial law and other measures in the interests of national security led to a 
limited number of restrictions of rights and freedoms. Their full re-establishment at the end of 
martial law in transparent and pluralistic structures (including for the media), and in accordance 
with  European  standards,  should  already  be  envisaged  while  military  operations  are  still 
ongoing. 

The new media law as well as the Law on national minorities (communities) of Ukraine were 
adopted in December 2022. Ukraine ratified the Istanbul Convention and adopted an updated 
national  action  plan  on  the  implementation  of  United  Nations  Security  Council  Resolution 
1325. It also adopted the 2030 state strategy on ensuring equal rights between men and women.  

In, the coming year, Ukraine should in particular: 

→  adopt legislation to transpose and to implement the provisions of the Istanbul Convention;  
→  finalise  the  review  of  existing  legislation  on  the rights  of  persons  belonging  to  national 
minorities, including in education, media and on the use of state language’ and in the law 
on  national  minorities  in  line  with  the  recommendations  of  the  Venice  Commission 
Opinion of June 2023 and of its follow-up opinion of 6 October 2023;  

38 

 
 
→  introduce annual public reporting to the Parliament on the work of the Prosecutor General’s 
Office and the State Bureau of Investigation in investigating acts of torture and protecting 
victims, and organise a review of the performance of the National Preventive Mechanism;  
→  ensure  application  of  the  legislation  on  the  rights  of  persons  with  disabilities  and  that 
restored  and  reconstructed  infrastructure  is  compliant  with  barrier-free  environment 
standards. 

Ukraine has ratified most international human rights instruments. Human and fundamental 
rights  are  generally  respected  in  Ukraine,  and  the  government  has  shown  commitment  to 
protecting them. In July 2022, the country ratified the Istanbul Convention. Ukraine has yet to 
accede  to  the  Rome  Statute  of  the  International  Criminal  Court  and  the  International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant  Workers  and  Members of Their 
Families and to the Protocol amending the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with 
regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data of the Council of Europe (Convention 108+).  

However,  the  Russian  invasion  of  Ukraine  has  had  a  negative  impact  on  the  enjoyment  of 
fundamental rights by many Ukrainian citizens, in particular those in areas of active hostilities, 
in territories temporarily occupied by Russian forces or in their proximity. At the same time, 
the government has maintained its respect of human and fundamental rights and has shown 
commitment to protecting them and further aligning them with the EU acquis.  

Considering  Russia’s  full-scale  invasion,  Ukraine  has  achieved  considerable  progress  in 
implementing  the  2021-2023  national  human  rights  strategy  and  its  action  plan.  The 
introduction  of  martial  law  in  February  2022  and  its  ongoing  extension  has  not  led  to  an 
increased  level  of  violations  of  fundamental  rights,  and  is  handled  cautiously  by  Ukrainian 
authorities. At the same time, the details for a return to the full application of all fundamental 
rights still need to be worked out. It should take place in consultation with civil society and 
should  aim  at  strengthening  the  freedoms  of  Ukrainian  citizens  and  re-establishing  the 
pluralism and openness of Ukrainian society – specifically after the restrictions stemming from 
the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s full-scale invasion – while closing the remaining gaps 
with  European  standards  and  rules.  The  reintegration  of  territories  currently  not  under 
government  control  will  also  require  careful  attention  in  terms  of  the  application  of 
fundamental rights, especially on the reintegration of those territories under Russian occupation 
since 2014. This should be done in the form of an update to the national human rights strategy 
and its action plan. 

As a result of Russia’s blatant violations of international humanitarian law and international 
human  rights  law,  many  Ukrainian  citizens  were  exposed  to  deliberate  targeting  and 
indiscriminate shelling by Russia. This has resulted in killings, together with the loss of homes 
and basic services such as heating, light, water and sanitation. Many Ukrainians were victims 
of extrajudicial executions, torture and mistreatment, as well as with sexual and gender-based 
violence  committed  by  the  Russian  military.  Millions  of  Ukrainians  were  displaced.  Many 
civilians, including children, were forcibly transferred to areas temporarily under the control 
of  Russian  armed  forces  or  deported  to  the  Russian  Federation  and  Belarus.  Human  rights 
violations and abuses by Russia and its proxies in temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine 
continued unabated amid the lack of independent international actors on the ground. The large 
number of international crimes, war crimes and human rights violations committed by Russia 
poses an enormous challenge for Ukraine’s institutions to ensure effective investigations and 
prosecutions  across the  entire country. At the same time, additional mechanisms (also  non-
judicial) will be needed to overcome the consequences of Russia’s brutal war and restore justice 
in all Ukrainian territories.  

39 

 
 
Ukrainian authorities have devoted significant efforts to ensuring full accountability for war 
crimes  and  the  other  most  serious  crimes  committed  by  Russia,  including  the  crime  of 
aggression.  At  the  same  time,  Ukraine  has  yet  to  ratify  and  implement  some  relevant 
international  laws  and  conventions,  such  as  the  Rome  Statute  of  the  International  Criminal 
Court.  

In June 2023, there were 9 656 applications pending before the European Court for Human 
Rights.  The  Court  delivered  judgments  on  356  applications  and  found  breaches  of  the 
European Convention on Human Rights in 151 out of 154 cases, relating mainly to the right to 
respect for private and family life, the right to a fair trial, the right to liberty and security of 
person and the prohibition of torture and inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment. In 
the reporting period, there were 1 901 new applications allocated to a decision body. There are 
currently 580 cases under enhanced supervision by the Committee of Ministers. 

Civil  society  organisations  highlight  problems  with  implementing  the  decisions  of  the 
European Court of Human Rights adopted in favour of applicants living in Ukrainian territories 
temporarily occupied by Russia. Applicants are effectively unable to provide the Ministry of 
Justice  of  Ukraine  with  duly  certified  powers  of  attorney  given  their  lack  of  access  to  the 
government-controlled territory, institutions and legal representatives.  

On  the  promotion  and  enforcement  of  human  rights,  the  Ukrainian  Parliament 
Commissioner  for  Human  Rights  is  designated  as  the  national  human  rights  institution  and 
accredited  by  the  Global  Alliance  of  National  Human  Rights  Institutions  with  ‘A’  status 
(largely  compliant  with  the  Paris  Principles).  In  2022,  the  Commissioner’s  office  received 
42 485 petitions, including 562 collective petitions from 7 779 people and 41 923 individual 
petitions.  Its  staff  conducted  2 031  monitoring  visits  and  processed  3 784  draft  legal  and 
normative acts. Parliament appointed on 1 July 2022 Dmytro Lubinets, previously Chair of the 
Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights, to the post of the Parliament Commissioner for 
Human Rights. In the reporting period, the institution of the Parliamentary Commissioner has 
shown an active and independent approach, with efforts to adapt the institution to its existing 
responsibilities  by  organising  it  around  9  fundamental  fields  of  work,  including  issues 
associated  with  the  war  of  aggression  (war  crimes,  release  of  prisoners  of  war,  return  of 
Ukrainian children) and extending its presence to Ukraine’s regions.  

On the prevention of torture and ill treatment, in 2022 Ukraine amended relevant legislation 
by changing approaches to the use of forced feeding of convicts and detainees, strengthening 
responsibility for acts of torture and introducing a mechanism for the conditional early release 
for people sentenced to life imprisonment. Despite these legal improvements,  torture and ill 
treatment  remains  a  systemic  feature  of  Ukraine’s  prison  system.  In  addition,  the  main 
recommendations of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture issued in its 2020 
report  have  not  been  addressed.  These  covered  among  others  poor  material  conditions  of 
detention and the need to transfer medical care in prison to the general health system and should 
be addressed. 

A Human Rights Monitoring Department was established within the National Police under the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs. The aim among other things is to monitor observance of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms by the police in relation to police conduct. In addition, the 
pilot project Custody Records is being implemented in police units to improve standards of 
protection of the rights of those in police custody and ensuring detainees’ rights. At the same 
time, cooperation between the State Bureau of Investigation, prosecuting authorities and prison 
authorities remains  weak,  and the ill treatment  investigation mechanism during the pre-trial 
and prison sentence stage suffers from a lack of efficiency. There are still limited operational 
and human resources capacities and limited operational independence of the State Bureau of 
40 

 
 
Investigation to investigate ill treatment allegations, despite the establishment of a dedicated 
department  in  2019.  The  ineffective  investigation  into  allegations  of  torture  and  cases  of 
obstruction of justice are rooted among others in a general culture of mutual protection of law 
enforcement officers within the criminal justice system. 

As to statistics on cases of ill treatment or torture, 30 criminal proceedings with allegations of 
torture and 990 with allegations of abuse of power by a law enforcement officer were registered 
in  2022;  11  and  94  people  respectively  were  notified  of  suspicion,  and  6  and  58  criminal 
proceedings  respectively  were  forwarded  to  the  court.  At  the  same  time,  the  Office  of  the 
Prosecutor General reports that 484 criminal proceedings with direct allegations of torture were 
initiated in 2018-2022, with 60 people found guilty, but only 15 receiving a prison sentence. 
This highlights how criminal courts do not follow through on the seriousness of the practice of 
torture and thereby contribute to an atmosphere of impunity enjoyed by law enforcement and 
prison staff. A permanent body needs to be established that involves civil society organisations 
and the Human Rights Commissioner to consistently monitor and follow up on alleged torture 
in the prison system. 

To implement the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture in Ukraine, legal 
amendments made in 2012 assigned the Ukrainian Parliament’s Human Rights Commissioner 
the functions of the National Preventive Mechanism. This is based on the Ombudsman+ model, 
with a strong focus on joint work with civil society organisations. In 2022, the Human Rights 
Commissioner delivered 141 mandates to the representatives of civil society to conduct visits 
to  detention  places.  However,  an  inadequate  methodology  for  prison  visits  and  the  delayed 
publication of reports raises questions over the effectiveness and performance of the National 
Preventive Mechanism. The mechanism continues to suffer from limited financial resources 
and limited capacities of the Human Rights Commissioner’s office. 

The prison system and detention centres remain an issue of concern. The prison population 
has fallen sharply in recent years, from 60 621 in 2017 to 42 694 in December 2022. Despite 
this positive trend, most of the long-standing problems identified by the European Court of 
Human Rights, the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers and the European Committee 
for the Prevention of Torture remain. The issues are primarily linked to the material conditions 
of  detention,  very  poor  healthcare  services,  the  use  of  detainees  for  prison  duties  and  the 
widespread use of violence by guards. The penitentiary system was already under-resourced 
before Russia’s war of aggression and since many facilities have been badly damaged and some 
completely destroyed, complicating also the provision of basic services. Despite the national 
strategy on human rights of 2021 and the multi-annual strategy for reforming the prison system 
of 2022, the key challenges facing it have not been addressed. The poor detention conditions 
in  Ukraine have at  times served as grounds  for foreign  courts to  refuse extradition  requests 
from Ukrainian institutions. This undermines Ukraine’s fight against serious crime, including 
corruption and organised crime.  

Medical  care  in  places  of  detention  is  under  the  responsibility  of  the  Ministry  of  Justice. 
Numerous  recommendations  by  the  European  Committee  for  the  Prevention  of  Torture  to 
transfer responsibility for prison healthcare to the Ministry of Health have not been addressed.  

Probation was introduced in 2015-2016. In 2022, 110 000 people were under probation. It is 
available  through  the  country,  with  600  offices  and  3 000  probation  officers.  Remote 
monitoring was recently introduced for certain cases. There is a special probation infrastructure 
for juveniles, separate from adult probation. Together with conditional early release, probation 
is the main alternative to detention.  

41 

 
 
As a result of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the Office of the High Commissioner 
for  Human  Rights  and  non-governmental  organisations  documented  around  1  000  cases  of 
arbitrary  detention  of  civilians  perpetrated  by  Russia  and  close  to  100  cases  of  arbitrary 
detentions  by  Ukraine.  So  far,  there  is  no  designated  body  or  institution  responsible  for 
addressing this issue in Ukraine.    

On personal data protection, Ukraine continued working on alignment with the EU acquis. 
The  current  key  legislative  act  that  regulates  data  protection  is  the  Law  on  personal  data 
protection of 2010. It lacks sufficient detail and is not sufficiently enforced. Ukraine has ratified 
ILO Convention 108 on the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data. The Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights is the authority in 
charge  of  checking  compliance  with  data  protection  legislation,  but  lacks  the  appropriate 
resources  to  do  this  effectively.  A  draft  law  on  personal  data  protection  was  introduced  in 
Parliament  on  7  September  2022  and  should  be  adopted  to  meet  the  requirements  of  both 
Convention  108+  (not  yet  signed  and  ratified  by  Ukraine)  and  the  General  Data  Protection 
Regulation.  

The Constitution of Ukraine as well as related legislation and policies provide for the right to 
freedom of religion and belief. In general, Ukrainian public authorities enforce these norms, 
and  incidents  of  hate  speech  and  intimidation  due  to  religion  are  infrequent.  Religions  are 
represented among others in the Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations 
and are in dialogue with public administration mainly via the State Service for Ethnic Affairs 
and Freedom of Conscience. Representatives of religions are effectively collaborating with the 
Ukrainian  administration  to  support  Ukrainians  during  the  war  and  fight  disinformation 
campaigns  that  have  the  objectives  to  incite  inter-ethnic  and  inter-religious  conflict.  At  the 
same time, a number of issues are not yet fully regulated in Ukraine, such as the restitution and 
redistribution of church property, and the establishment of principles of relations between state 
and religious organisations in the spheres of education, social work and humanitarian activities.  

The creation of the new Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church at the beginning in 2019 
did not lead to significantly heightened tensions among Orthodox churches and communities, 
but to a large part of orthodox believers moving away from the Moscow Patriarchate, which is 
still ongoing. Since Russia’s invasion, and as a consequence of its full support by the Moscow 
Patriarchate  of  the  Russian  Orthodox  Church,  Ukraine  has  taken  legal  measures  since 
November  2022  against  the  Moscow-affiliated  Ukrainian  Orthodox  Church.  This  includes 
sanctions against some members of the church hierarchy accused of supporting Russia’s war 
of  aggression  and  conducting  searches  of  various  church  premises  in  application  of  legal 
standards  and  practices.  With  these  measures,  Ukraine  aims  to  prevent  foreign  interference 
from Russia through a religious entity, while not targeting ordinary followers of the church.  

Regarding the fight against antisemitism, in September 2021, Ukraine adopted a law on  the 
prevention and countering of antisemitism, which defines antisemitism, prohibits anti-Jewish 
acts and adds civil liability. Despite stereotypes widely spread by pro-Russian disinformation, 
antisemitism in Ukraine is significantly less widespread and has been falling continuously in 
surveys for the last decade. In 2022, the lowest number of acts of antisemitic vandalism was 
recorded in 20 years of monitoring, with no cases of antisemitic violence. As stated by Jewish 
representatives  in  June  2023,  previously  existing  low  levels  of  antisemitism  have  been 
practically non-existent in Ukraine since the start of Russia’s fully-scale invasion. Concrete 
efforts have been made regarding Holocaust education and remembrance. Activities to preserve 
Ukraine’s Jewish cultural life and heritage are supported by the state and civil society and are 
increasing. Ukraine is not a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance and 
has not adopted its definition of antisemitism. Ukraine has not appointed a national coordinator 

42 

 
 
on combating  antisemitism. Progress  has  been  made regarding the  restitutions  of properties 
confiscated by the Soviet regime. 

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

Freedom of expression 

Ukraine is in between some and moderate level of preparation in the area of freedom of 
expression. Overall, it made good progress in strengthening its legal framework during the 
reporting  period,  in  particular  with  the  adoption  of  the  Law  on  media.  This  is  a  notable 
achievement in the challenging context of Russia’s full-scale invasion, in particular due to its 
vibrant public civic space and diversity of media outlets, including at regional level. According 
to the Reporters without Borders global ranking of freedom of media, Ukraine improved its 
position 27 places from 106th to 79th place.   

Before the beginning of the Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the general context 
was  favourable  to  media  freedom  and  allowed  for  critical  media  reporting.  In  the  current 
challenging context of martial law, Ukraine has taken some decisions on restricting access for 
media and journalists in specific areas and spheres but applied these generally with restraint. 
A significant drop in advertising revenue has also had an impact on the media market in the 
country and led to the concentration in particular of TV programmes and decrease the access 
to pluralistic media. 

In the coming year, Ukraine should: 

→  develop, together with the community of journalists, simplified rules for reporting from the 

combat zone and adjacent areas, taking into account the security concerns; 

→  ensure the independence of the national regulator by providing adequate funding, including 

for necessary adjustments to its structure in line with the new Law on media. 

→  develop  a  roadmap  to  support  the  re-establishment  of  a  pluralistic,  transparent  and 

independent post-war media landscape.   

Intimidation of journalists  

There have been a limited number of reports on instances of obstructing work and attacks on 
journalists  by  individuals.  The  most  recent  was  on  journalists  covering  victory  day 
commemorations  in  Poltava  and  reporting  from  the  Kyiv-Pechersky  monastery,  both  with 
adequate  follow-up  by  law  enforcement.  Incidents  from  previous  years  are  generally  being 
followed up as well. However, the past general practice of intimidating journalists is still to be 
found,  in  particular  in  local  and  regional  contexts.  Historical  cases  such  as  the  murders  of 
Georgiy Gongadze in 2000 and Pavlo Sheremet in 2016 have been followed up with renewed 
efforts in recent years, but still need to be concluded. A special police unit was established in 
2019 to investigate attacks on journalists.  

Since  March  2023,  officers  from  the  Security  Service  of  Ukraine  (SSU)  have  repeatedly 
questioned  journalists  seeking  military  accreditation.  The  awarding  of  accreditation  is  not 
considered to follow fully transparent procedures, but no arbitrary arrests of journalists have 
been reported. In the same period, new rules on reporting from the combat zone and adjacent 
areas  have  been  introduced,  but  rules  are  not  sufficiently  simple  or  are  applied  on  an 
indiscriminatory  basis.  Independent  journalism  in  the  temporarily  occupied  territories  of 
Ukraine is only possible with severe risks to life at the hands of Russian forces and will need 
to be re-established once the Russian occupation is ended. In addition, eight journalists have 

43 

 
 
been killed by the Russian Army while performing their professional duties and 42 have died 
due to shelling by the Russian Army or in detention while not working. 

Ukraine  has  taken  some  steps  to  align  with  the  Commission’s  recommendation  on  the 
protection, safety and empowerment of journalists. Media Center Ukraine was established at 
the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion to support foreign journalists, together with a hotline 
for legal advice to journalists and media. In March 2023, the action plan for implementation of 
the information security strategy was adopted to clarify among others the rules on access and 
use of information as well as the protection of journalists’ rights. The Parliament resolution of 
March 2022 on the value of freedom of speech, guarantees of activities of journalists and mass 
media underlined the importance of independent journalism for public authorities in Ukraine. 

Legislative environment  

The main achievement in the area of freedom of expression was the adoption of the Law on 
media in December 2022, which modernised the regulation of the entire sector and made an 
important  step  towards  alignment  Ukrainian  legislation  with  the  EU’s  Audiovisual  Media 
Services Directive. It established the detailed rights of journalists for accreditation and obliges 
the public authorities to facilitate and support the work of journalists. It also empowered the 
independent  media  regulator,  which  will  now  need  sufficient  resources  to  ensure  its 
independence and sufficient capacities.    

In  March  2022,  in  the  context  of  martial  law,  the  President  signed  a  decree  on  a  unified 
information  policy  by  merging  the  programming  of  all  national  TV  channels  into  a  single 
information  platform.  This  decision  led  to  an  expansion  of    government  control  over 
broadcasting  and  some  restrictions.  Some  media  outlets  consider  these  restrictions 
disproportionate. Similarly, the exclusion of three private (opposition-affiliated) TV channels 
from  terrestrial  broadcasting  (while  the  channels  continue  working  and  remain  available 
through other means) has been criticised by the opposition on the same grounds. As regards 
defamation and blasphemy, these are not criminal offences in Ukraine. National legislation, the 
Law  on  media  in  particular,  duly  addresses  the  issue  of  hate  speech.  This  ensures  the  free 
expression of views, while prohibiting genuine and serious incitement to violence and hatred.  

Implementation of legislation/institutions 

The National Council of Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine acts as an independent 
media regulator in Ukraine. The Council is a permanent collegial body that acts on the basis of 
the  Constitution  of  Ukraine,  the  Law  on  media  and  other  Ukrainian  laws  and  regulates, 
supervises and controls media. It consists of eight members – the Parliament and the President 
each  appoint  half  of  the  members  for  a  five-year  term.  They  are  officials  and  work  on  a 
permanent basis. While performing their official duties, they cannot hold any other positions, 
including  on  public  grounds,  in  state  and  non-state  bodies,  organisations,  institutions  and 
companies,  or  engage  in  other  paid  or  entrepreneurial  activities.  They  also  cannot  hold  a 
representative mandate and be a member of a political party. 

The selection and appointment of candidates takes place on a competitive basis. The National 
Council  is  financed  exclusively  from  the  state  budget,  which  needs  to  be  strengthened  to 
address  all  aspects  of  its  mandate  and  guarantee  its  independence.  The  Law  on  media 
significantly changed and expanded the functions of the regulator, while the remuneration of 
National  Council  members  remains  within  the  limits  set  by  the  previous  law.  Access  to 
information  for  journalists  is  regulated  in  the  context  of  access  to  public  information 
legislation. The Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights is empowered to draw 
up  protocols  and  receive  appeals  on  administrative  violations  of  access  to  information. 
However, this procedure is not effective enough and should be reformed.  

44 

 
 
Public service broadcaster 

Since 2017, Ukraine has had an independent public service broadcaster, Suspilne, which has 
three  TV  and  three  radio  channels,  regional  networks  and  a  digital  broadcasting  platform. 
Suspilne  adheres  to  the  standards  of  independent  journalism,  has  the  highest  trust  ratings 
among radio and television channels and is considered politically neutral  and not subject to 
political  influence.  Its  editorial  standards  are  enshrined  in  the  Editorial  Charter,  which  is 
monitored by two bodies – the Editorial Board and the Supervisory Board of Suspilne. The 
broadcaster’s  standards  are  enshrined  in  the  Charter  and  the  Code  of  Ethics,  which  are 
monitored  by  the  Supervisory  Board  and  should  ensure  a  clear  separation  between  quality 
standards and daily editorial and managerial decisions. 

A significant factor that influences Suspilne is its funding, which comes from three sources: 
the state budget, advertising revenues and donor funds. The main source is funding from the 
state budget, which has so far fallen short of the amount prescribed by the law.  

Economic factors  

Ukrainian legislation does not include restrictions that limit or prevent the work of the media. 
The  Ukrainian  media  landscape  of  the  past  few  years  has  been  increasingly  dynamic  and 
diverse,  especially  online  media.  Previously  dominant  media  entities  with  non-transparent 
media  ownership  have  been  gradually  losing  ground  but  still  retain  a  strong  position,  in 
particular in television. The onset of the Russian war of aggression has profoundly impacted 
the media landscape and it should be a government priority to ensure the re-emergence of full 
media  pluralism  and  clear  media  ownership  transparency,  taking  into  account  security 
considerations. The state budget provides limited financial assistance to address specific issues 
in media (children, young people, persons with disabilities, science, national minorities etc.), 
also in form of financial assistance and economic support to media. 

Internet 

As regards internet freedom, since the beginning of martial law, the blocking of web resources 
has  been  conducted  by  an  extrajudicial  order  on  the  basis  of  recommendations  issued  to 
providers of electronic communication networks and/or services of basic internet resources by 
the  National  Centre  for  Operations  and  Technology  Management  of  Telecommunications 
Networks.  In  the  context  of  Russia’s  full-scale  invasion  and  its  hybrid  warfare  including 
disinformation,  these  restrictions  are  legitimately  rooted  in  national  security  concerns. 
However, the Ukrainian government should provide a clear vision for the re-establishment of 
previous rights and freedoms after martial law ends. 

Freedom of artistic expression  

The  freedom  of  artistic  expression  is  not  restricted  and  is  guaranteed  by  the  Ukrainian 
constitution.  This  is  repeated  in  the  Law  on  culture  as  well  as  in  other  related  legislation. 
Intimidation of artists is rare and is followed up in general by Ukrainian authorities. Since 2014 
and following further amendments of the Law on culture in June 2022, Ukrainian authorities 
have  implemented  a  ban  on  Russian  cultural  figures  and  their  artistic  work  in  Ukraine  in 
response  to  Russia’s  war  of  aggression  against  Ukraine  and  occupation  of  the  part  of  its 
territory.  The  ban  includes  actors,  musicians,  writers  and  artists  who  do  not  condemn  the 
aggression against Ukraine. The ban also applies to the use of symbols that represent Russia or 
Russian propaganda. 

Professional organisations and working conditions 

45 

 
 
Ukraine has a large number of journalism organisations that represent journalists, such as the 
National Union of Journalists of Ukraine and the Independent Media Trade Union of Ukraine. 
The  latter  is  a  member  of  the  International  Federation  of  Journalists  and  the  European 
Federation  of  Journalists.  Members  of  the  National  Union  of  Journalists  and  Independent 
Media  Trade  Union  must  adhere  to  standards  of  journalism  –  namely  the  Ethics  Code  of 
Ukrainian Journalists. Both are financed by contributions and donations. Cases of violation of 
the code are considered by the Commission on Journalism Ethics, a self-regulatory body of 
journalists  and  editorial  offices  in  Ukraine.  The  Independent  Media  Council  promotes  high 
professional  standards  of  journalism  and  self-regulation  in  the  Ukrainian  media  sector  by 
providing  expert  opinions,  advice  and  recommendations  based  on  international  standards, 
national  legislation  and  ethical  standards  of  professional  journalism.  These  professional 
organisations are involved in public councils that organise dialogue with the government and 
local authorities, for instance with Suspilne.  

In general, the employment of journalists is precarious given the current wartime situation and 
is more difficult for freelance journalists. An amendment to the Law on state support of media, 
guarantees of professional activity and social protection of journalists adopted in 2023 provides 
for specific guarantees  on the remuneration  and  social security for journalists, but  does not 
include freelance journalists in its scope. 

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

The right to freedom of assembly and association is guaranteed by the Ukrainian constitution, 
and the government respects these rights. Existing legislation allows for a court to restrict these 
rights in the interests of national security and public order. A comprehensive law in line with 
international standards that would regulate the process of organising and conducting events to 
make full use of the freedom of peaceful assembly in Ukraine is still missing. Restrictions on 
these rights  linked to  COVID-19 are no longer  in  force. The introduction of martial law in 
February  2022  allows  the  government  to  introduce  temporary  restrictions  on  the  right  to 
peaceful  assembly,  for  instance  curfews,  but  it  applies  them  with  restraint.  The  Ukrainian 
constitution provides for the restriction of the freedom of association by judicial procedures for 
reasons of national security. On this basis, the government suspended by degree the activities 
of 11 political parties with claimed ties to the Russian government for the duration of martial 
law. Major concerns remain over the freedom of assembly and association in the territories of 
Ukraine that Russia temporarily militarily occupies, where Ukrainian citizens are deprived of 
these rights. These freedoms are to be restored by Ukrainian authorities after these territories 
have been liberated. 

Issues  of  labour  and  trade  union  rights  are  covered  in  Chapter  19  –  Social  policy  and 
employment. 

On property rights, there has been a focus on modernising and strengthening these rights since 
2013. The State Register of Rights to Real Estate provides official recognition and confirmation 
by the state regarding the origin, transfer or termination of rights to property. However, it is 
estimated to be only 40% complete and does not include the majority of property rights that 
were acquired before its introduction and that are still stored in the State Land Cadastre (land 
register),  with  a  number  of  mismatches.  The  territories  not  under  government  control  since 
2014 possess much more limited confirmed property rights given the wide-scale violations of 
property rights by Russian-supported henchmen and their criminal activities. Before the full-
scale  invasion  by  Russia,  progress  had  been  made  in  revamping  the  State  Property  Fund, 
modernising the its procedures and also in continuing to privatise  small and large assets. In 
2022, the European Court of Human Rights adopted seven decisions against Ukraine, which 

46 

 
 
was found to be in violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on 
Human Rights. The government is following up on this.  

Since  the  start  of  Russia’s  full-scale  invasion,  property  rights  in  government-controlled 
territories have not been limited, apart from the possibilities for the Ukrainian armed forces to 
requisition property for their needs, in particular in areas near the frontline. The government 
undertook a number of measures to ensure the legal continuity of property rights and take war 
damages into account. In February 2023, Ukraine adopted among other things a real estate law 
on compensation. This enables people to claim and receive compensation for property that has 
been  damaged  or  destroyed  as  a  result  of  Russia’s  full-scale  invasion.  To  monitor  property 
damage  and  destruction,  local  military  administrations  provide  reporting,  the  state  digital 
services  platform  Diia  also  allows  for  self-reporting,  and  the  state  registry  of  damaged  and 
destroyed  property  provides  a  loss  reporting  infrastructure  for  property  rights.  In  February 
2022,  the  Criminal  Code  of  Ukraine  was  amended  to  protect  citizens  from  self-interested 
property crimes during wartime. 

In  the  area  of  non-discrimination,  Ukrainian  society  remains  open  in  general  and  tolerant 
towards  respecting  persons  in  vulnerable  situations.  The  Ukrainian  constitution  guarantees 
protection  against  discrimination.  The  law  on  the  principles  of  preventing  and  combating 
discrimination  in  Ukraine  prohibits  discrimination  on  different  grounds  with  race,  colour, 
political,  religious  and  other  beliefs,  sex,  age,  disability,  ethnic  or  social  origin,  family  and 
property status, place of residence and language receiving explicit protection. 

The Law on media adopted in December 2022 prohibits dissemination in the media and on 
platforms of shared access to videos of statements that incite hatred towards people and groups 
based  on  their  national,  racial  or  religious  characteristics,  as  well  as  statements  that  incite 
discrimination based on their ethnic and social origin, citizenship, race, religion and beliefs, 
age,  gender,  sexual  orientation,  gender  identity,  disability  or  any  other  characteristic.  The 
National Council of Ukraine for Television and Radio Broadcasting currently formalises the 
criteria for identifying such violations and has the authority to take response measures against 
any media outlets that commit such violations.  

Ukrainian criminal legislation provides for punishment of hate crimes and hate speech based 
on three  characteristics  –  race, nationality  and  religious beliefs  – but  does  not  cover sexual 
orientation and gender identity, which is recommended by the European Commission against 
Racism and Intolerance as a matter of priority. A draft law, prepared by the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs to include these other protected grounds, was introduced to Parliament in 2021, still has 
to  be  adopted.  The  National  Police  of  Ukraine  introduced  a  new  data  collection  form  to 
investigate hate crimes and offences as part of the reporting system. In the first 2 months of 
2023, it launched a pretrial investigation into 26 criminal offences based on hatred.  

The Ukrainian Parliament’s Commissioner for Human Rights is the main holder of powers to 
combat  discrimination.  It  is  an  independent  body,  with  powers  equivalent  to  the  mandate 
typically  attributed  to  national  equality  bodies.  In  2022,  it  received  395  reports  of 
discrimination  on  various  grounds  and  in  general  ensures  follow-up  by  the  authorities.  The 
capacities of police officers, prosecutors, judges  and staff of the Ombudsperson of  Ukraine 
should  be  increased  to  tackle  discrimination,  hate  speech  and  hate  crime  through  suitable 
training. The legal aid system should be strengthened to implement the legislation and combat 
discrimination, hate speech and hate crime effectively.  

As  regards  gender  equality,  Ukraine  has  several  laws  in  place,  in  particular  the  Law  on 
ensuring equal rights and opportunities of men and women of 2005, the Law on principles of 
prevention and combating discrimination  in  Ukraine of 2012 and the Law on prevention of 

47 

 
 
domestic  violence  of  2018.  However,  this  legislation  is  generally  declarative  in  nature  and 
provides  only  limited  guidance  to  the  application  of  these  laws.  The  Cabinet  of  Ministers 
adopted the 2030 state strategy on ensuring equal rights and opportunities for men and women 
in August 2022. The strategy is a comprehensive document that addresses among others gender 
inequality  and  women’s  participation  in  public  institutions,  economics  and  environmental 
issues.  

Institutionally,  since  2017  the  coordination  of  gender  policy  in  the  government  has  been 
entrusted  to  the  office  of  the  Deputy  Prime  Minister  for  European  and  Euro-Atlantic 
integration, where the Commission on Gender Policy was established in order to ensure the 
concerted and coordinated involvement of all executive bodies, allowing for a more effective 
horizontal approach on gender equality.  

On  18  July  2022,  Ukraine  ratified  the  Council  of  Europe  Convention  on  Preventing  and 
Combating  Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul  Convention), which 
entered into force on 1 November 2022. The effective implementation of the Convention is 
still to be initiated in a situation of increased priority, as gender-based violence prevention has 
suffered major setbacks in 2022 when local budget subventions were reduced due to budget 
constraints, and social services being degraded near the frontline and in temporarily occupied 
territories of Ukraine, as well as in regions experiencing massive influx of internally displaced 
persons (IDPs). While the number of cases of gender-based violence documented by the police 
has decreased by almost 50% in the first six months of 2022 (773 cases compared to 1 508 
cases during the same period in 2021), the number of non-documented cases is unknown and 
is likely to have increased. The number of such cases linked to post traumatic stress are likely 
to have increased as well, including in families of military personnel. 

Conflict-related and gender-based sexual violence emerged as an important war-related issue 
with hundreds of confirmed cases against both sexes of all ages and an estimated large number 
of  unreported  cases.  In  the  same  period,  Ukraine  revised  the  National  Action  Plan  on  UN 
Security  Council  Resolution  1325  on  women,  peace  and  security  to  address  the  changing 
realities  in  the  country  and  include  measures  on  conflict-related  sexual  violence.  To  fully 
implement the action plan, Ukraine needs to ensure the inclusion of women in the reconciliation 
negotiation process and in the decision-making process conduct mandatory systematic training 
of law enforcement agencies and the military on women’s rights.  It should also include the 
detection  of  forms  of  violence  against  women  in  their  respective  institutions  and  capacity-
building  for  police  and  armed  forces  as  first  respondents  in  cases  of  conflict-based  sexual 
violence.  

Similarly, further steps are needed to  ensure justice with  a gender-sensitive approach, fulfil 
obligations  to  prevent,  investigate  and  punish  sexual  and  gender-based  crimes  committed 
during  armed  conflicts.  This  includes  aligning  the  legal  framework  with  international 
standards. Ukrainian authorities have committed to establish a comprehensive response system, 
including  one-stop  response  centres  in  the  regions  to  assist  the  victims,  as  well  as  the 
establishment of investigation mechanisms. In May 2022, a memorandum of cooperation was 
signed  between  the  government  and  the  UN  on  the  prevention  and  counteraction  of  sexual 
violence  in  wartime.  Gender  equality  has  also  been  defined  among  seven  cross-cutting 
priorities of the government’s recovery plan. 

Since February 2022, all positions in the Ukrainian armed forces have been opened to women, 
and in March 2023 more than 60 000 women were serving in the armed forces, a large part 
being on the frontline of combat operations. This is accompanied by increased acceptance of 
equal rights for women soldiers in Ukrainian society. This implies the obligation to cater more 
to the needs of women soldiers and veterans in terms of equipment, protection against sexual 
48 

 
 
violence  and  harassment  and  medical  support  during  and  after  combat,  and  reintegration 
support to civilian life once they retire from the armed forces. 

Ukraine ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, acceded to the three Optional 
Protocols  to  the  Convention  and  endorsed  the  Paris  Commitments  to  protect  children  from 
unlawful recruitment or use by armed groups. It also ratified the Council of Europe Convention 
on  the  Protection  of  Children  against  Sexual  Exploitation  and  Sexual  Abuse  (Lanzarote 
Convention).  Ukraine  has  furthermore  signed  the  Safe  Schools  Declaration,  which  aims  at 
protecting children and ensuring their right to education in the context of conflict and war. 

The last few years have seen progress, with legislation strengthening the social protection of 
children and support for families with children, and introducing the notion of the best interests 
of  the  child.  There  is  however  still  a  need  to  develop  procedures  and  criteria  to  provide 
guidance for determining the best interests of the child, including of children in need of care 
and protection, and giving the best interests of the child due weight as a primary consideration. 
Similarly, there is room to strengthen integrated social services to prevent family separation, 
support  alternative  family  placements  and  reintegration  of  children  from  institutions  into 
families, including investing more resources into a minimum package of social services as the 
first steps towards meeting the provisions of the EU Child Guarantee and secure a social service 
workforce  trained  in  integrated  social  services  and  corresponding  case  management 
approaches. 

Since 2021, the state guarantees a right to all medical services, with equal funding and equal 
access for children. Monetary benefits are provided for children, with higher rates for children 
with  disabilities. At  the  same  time,  remaining  issues  include  a  lack  of  available  resources, 
limited data collection and monitoring policies on child rights, which should be solved. Efforts 
have been undertaken to protect children in civil and criminal proceedings, but further capacity 
building to support cases involving children needs to be envisaged.  

The existing difficulties  in  ensuring the rights  of the child have been exacerbated since the 
beginning of Russia full-scale invasion. According to OHCHR until 30 June 2023, 535 children 
were killed and 1 095 injured. Research indicates that a high number of children show signs of 
psychological  trauma.  In  many  cities,  children  cannot  receive  proper  medical  care  due  to 
constant  shelling  by  Russia  and  the  systemic  destruction  of  critical  infrastructure.  The  war 
limits  access  to  education  for  children;  3 395  educational  institutions  have  suffered  from 
bombings and shelling  and 363 have been  completely destroyed. Many children depend on 
online education, which is complicated by a lack of access to technology, internet connectivity 
and electricity availability. The government established the Coordination Headquarters for the 
Protection of Children’s Rights under Martial Law to address these challenges in light of the 
difficult wartime circumstances. 

Before  February  2022,  Ukraine  had  the  largest  number  of  children  in  institutional  care  in 
Europe.  These  institutions  are  under-resourced  and  include  outdated  and  inappropriate 
boarding schools run by the Ministry of Education, baby homes run by the Ministry of Health, 
and institutions overseen by the Ministry of Social Policy for children deprived of parental care 
by the courts. The 2017 Law on education introduced protection with special educational needs. 
Since  then,  the  number  of  inclusive  classes  and  accessibility  of  schools  have  increased 
significantly.  

Since the Russian invasion in February 2022, a number of large institutional care facilities have 
been evacuated to neighbouring countries under very difficult  circumstances, including to a 
number of EU Member States. Ukraine also asked host countries to keep groups of evacuated 
children  together.  In  February  2023,  the  President’s  Office  committed  to  the  goal  of  zero 

49 

 
 
children in institutional care and comprehensive childcare reform. UNICEF has an agreement 
with  the  Ministry  of  Social  Policy  and  the  President’s  Office  to  support  them  in  the 
deinstitutionalisation  planning  process,  including  the  short-term  ambition  of  reunifying  or 
placing all children who are in institutions as quickly as possible in safe, supported biological 
or foster families. 

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 and even before in temporarily occupied 
areas of the Donbas, Russia started to forcibly transfer and deport at least 19 000 children from 
non-government-controlled territories of Ukraine, using the pretext of ‘evacuation’. Ukrainian 
and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) report on the forced ‘russification’ 
of Ukrainian children in Russian institutions and ‘summer camps’. In 2022, Russia introduced 
legislative changes to  allow Ukrainian orphans and children  without guardianship  to  obtain 
Russian  citizenship  in  a  simplified  manner,  enabling  Ukrainian  children  to  be  adopted  by 
Russians. Ukrainian NGOs as well as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights note that there is currently no functioning mechanism for reunifying children 
with their relatives in Ukraine. The identification and monitoring of missing children and their 
families also remains challenging.  

In 2010, Ukraine ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and 
its Optional Protocol. The Law on the basis of social protection of persons with disabilities in 
Ukraine prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability and introduces quotas for companies. 
However,  integrating  persons  with  disabilities  into  the  workforce  remains  limited.  The 
application of the principle of reasonable accommodation for persons with disabilities remains 
rare. The National Strategy for Barrier-free Environment in Ukraine, covering the period up to 
2030,  was  adopted  in  spring  2021.  It  provides  a  framework  for  empowering  persons  with 
disabilities  to  fully  participate  in  society  and  ensures  their  fundamental  rights.  It  is  being 
implemented by way of annual action documents. This led to a number of actions in 2022, even 
though  they  were  limited  by  the  impact  of  the  Russia’s  full-scale  invasion.  In  June  2023, 
Ukraine  adopted  the  action  plan  for  2023-2024.  It  provides  for  monitoring  the  barrier-free 
nature of the physical environment and transport, adapting them to the needs of persons with 
reduced  mobility,  as  well  as  introducing  new  and  improved  state  construction  norms  and 
standards. The government announced that all restored infrastructure should be compliant with 
barrier-free environment standards by 2024. This now requires consistent implementation at 
all levels of government.   

As of 1 January 2020, 2.7 million persons with disabilities were registered in Ukraine, among 
them 160 000 children. This number is expected to have risen dramatically because of Russia’s 
war of aggression. It includes only persons who were able to register their disability. This leads 
to  barely  relevant  disaggregated  data  as  Ukraine  has  not  yet  introduced  the  WHO’s 
International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health for the registration of persons 
with disabilities. Furthermore, there is limited legal capacity in Ukraine to enable persons with 
disabilities  the  opportunity  to  claim  their  rights.  Persons  with  intellectual  and  psychosocial 
disabilities remain highly vulnerable due to  exceptionally high  levels  of institutionalisation, 
including  of  children  and  infants,  instead  of  family-  and  community-based  alternative  care. 
Previous reform attempts have not led to a sufficient reduction in institutionalisation, also due 
to the lack of capacity at local and regional level. This reform needs to be prioritised.  

The  situation  for  persons  with  disabilities  remains  very  challenging  as  regards  equal 
participation and opportunities. There is a distinct lack of accessible transportation, healthcare, 
social  services  and  public  buildings.  Legislation  does  not  provide  incentives  for  employing 
persons with disabilities in the open labour market. Russia’s invasion led to additional strains 
on  public  services  for  persons  with  disabilities  due  to  the  growing  number  of  war  victims 

50 

 
 
among veterans and civilians, the further extension of conflict-affected areas, as well as the 
forced displacement of persons with disabilities, their families and carers and the destruction 
of care infrastructure.  

Overall, during the reporting period the general trend of increasing tolerance and acceptance 
of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) persons in Ukrainian 
society  over  the  last  decade  was  sustained.  The  trend  towards  a  decrease  in  the  number  of 
attacks  and  hate  crimes  against  LGBTIQ  persons  continues  (–44%  since  2020).  Surveys 
conducted in 2022 show that a majority is in favour of same-sex partnerships and equal rights 
for  LGBTIQ  persons.  The  government  clearly  communicates  its  support  for  the  rights  of 
LGBTIQ persons and against hate crimes and discrimination. In addition, Kyiv Pride was held 
on 25 June 2023 in Warsaw together with the city’s Equality Parade, focusing on rights for 
LGBTIQ persons as well as on the support for Ukraine. 

Existing legislation, for instance the Labour Code, already provides some level of protection 
against  discrimination  based  on  sexual  orientation,  and  reforms  to  ensure  equal  rights  are 
currently under way. The media law, adopted on 15 December 2022, bans hate speech  and 
incitement  based  on  sexual  orientation  and  gender  identity  in  media.  The  National  Human 
Rights  Action  Plan  2021-2023  envisages  progress  in  the  status  of  LGBTIQ  persons,  for 
instance by amending the Criminal Code of Ukraine to apply the notion of the term ‘bias’ as 
regards sexual orientation and gender identity. The plan also suggests drafting a law that would 
provide for the elimination of discriminatory provisions that may violate the property and non-
property  rights  of  unmarried  partners  as  well  as  the  introduction  of  a  registered  civil 
partnership. Amendments to the provisions of the Family Code which currently discriminates 
same-sex  couples  compared  with  unmarried  couples  of  the  opposite  sex  are  necessary.  In 
March  2023,  a  draft  bill  on  legalisation  of  same-sex  marriage  was  introduced  by  MPs  to  
Parliament  and  government  has  committed  to  approve  the  bill  by  the  end  of  2023.  The 
judgment by the European Court of Human Rights of 1 June 2023 reinforced the requirement 
for the state to ensure the equal treatment of same-sex couples in Ukraine.  

Procedural rights are outlined and protected among others in the Law on the judiciary and 
status of judges and in the Criminal Procedure Code. However, the implementation of existing 
rules  and  procedures  suffers  from  a  lack  of  efficiency  and  capacity  of  the  judicial  system. 
Ukraine’s legal system is not yet aligned with the EU acquis on procedural rights for suspects 
and accused persons in criminal proceedings, but measures are being taken in this direction: 
the presumption of innocence, the right to information about the main procedural rights, the 
right of access to a lawyer and the right to be present at the trial are provided. The Criminal 
Procedure Code provides for the translation of legal documents and persons involved in the 
criminal proceedings have the right for an interpreter at the expense of the State. 

There  are  safeguards  for  children  who  are  suspects  and  accused  in  criminal  proceedings. 
During the reporting period, the free legal aid system showed a high level of stability, while 
legal services quickly adapted to the new conditions. In 2022, the right to free secondary legal 
aid  was  extended  to  people  without  documented  Ukrainian  citizenship,  victims  of  criminal 
offences  during  hostilities  and  armed  conflict,  and  to  those  deprived  of  their  liberty  in  the 
context  of  Russia’s  war  of  aggression  against  Ukraine.  The  country’s  legislation  on  victim 
rights  should  be  fully  aligned  with  the  Victims’  Rights  Directive  and  Council  Directive 
2004/80/EC relating to compensation to victims of crime.  

In 2022, the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights received 5 105 reports on 
violations of procedural rights, 790 on administrative and civil proceedings, 3 628 on criminal 
proceedings and 687 on places of detention. They refer in particular to the violation of the right 

51 

 
 
of access justice, of the right to a fair trial for excessive length of the proceedings as well as 
violation of rights by law enforcement officials. The right to a fair trial is frequently violated, 
as shown by 61 decisions delivered by the European Court of Human Rights in 2022 in cases 
against  Ukraine  regarding  violations  of  Article  6  of  the  European  Convention  on  Human 
Rights.  These  issues  reflect  structural  problems  with  the  practices  of  the  judiciary  and  law 
enforcement authorities. Recent law reforms have not yet led to a visible improvement in the 
situation, in particular as the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s full-scale invasion have further 
burdened the wide application of appropriate standards and rules in law enforcement and the 
judiciary,  in  particular  the  rights  of  access  to  justice  and  the  right  to  a  fair  trial  within  a 
reasonable time. A draft Law on excessive length of proceedings was registered in September 
2022. It proposes reducing the terms of consideration of civil, commercial and administrative 
cases, introducing a protection mechanism and providing compensation for plaintiffs, but still 
needs to be adopted. 

Regarding the respect for and protection of persons belonging to minorities, the wide range 
of national, ethnic, linguistic and religious identities in Ukraine continues to be an important 
element of Ukrainian society. Ukraine has been a party to the Council of Europe’s Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities since 1998 and to the European Charter 
for Regional and Minority Languages since 2005. Since 2017, the legal framework for national 
minorities  is  being  reformed  but  is  not  fully  implemented  yet.  This  was  addressed  by  the 
Commission's opinion on Ukraine’s application for EU membership, which recommends that 
Ukraine  ‘finalise  the  reform  of  the  legal  framework  for  national  minorities  currently  under 
preparation as recommended by the Venice Commission and adopt immediate and effective 
implementation mechanisms.’  

In general, the rights of persons belonging to ethnic, linguistic, religious or national minorities 
are upheld in Ukraine. This is despite the efforts of the Russian regime to instrumentalise uses 
the topic of the Russian minority in its disinformation campaign in order to justify its illegal 
aggression against Ukraine. Civil society organisations and international organisations are very 
concerned about this high politicisation of the topic, while the issues to be addressed revolve 
mainly around those concerning the daily lives of persons belonging to national or linguistic 
minorities,  such  as  education,  language  use  in  public  life,  media,  civic  participation  and 
representation of national minorities.    

On 13 December 2022, the Law on national minorities (communities) of Ukraine was adopted. 
It replaced the Law on national minorities adopted in 1992 as the main act regulating the rights 
of national minorities. It creates rules and structures for national minority rights in Ukraine. In 
the  preparatory  process,  efforts  were  made  to  also  consult  representatives  of  national 
minorities.  The  adopted  accompanying  implementing  measures  address  the  structures  of 
regional  centres  of  national  minorities,  financial  support  to  public  associations  of  national 
minorities,  the  methodology  for  using  minority  languages  and  the  creation  of  consultative 
bodies on national minorities, as well as a state programme ‘Unity in Diversity’ for national 
minorities, but the implementing bodies remain to be underfunded.  

The Venice Commission Opinion of 10 June 2023 provided detailed guidance on the remaining 
issues and recommended amending the Law on national minorities (communities) as regards 
the use of minority languages in public life, administration, use of minority languages in media 
and books to ensure that the law complies with European standards. As indicated in the Venice 
Commission  Opinion,  Ukraine  should  also  address  earlier  recommendations  of  the  Venice 
Commission  on  the  Law  on  education  and  the  Law  on  State  language.  On  11  June  2023, 
Ukraine adopted a law extending the transition period for education in minority languages by 
1 year for pupils starting their education before 2018. In October 2023, Ukraine registered a 

52 

 
 
draft law in Parliament to exempt these pupils from the obligations of the education law. This 
would allow Ukraine to reconsider the minority school system also in light of previous Venice 
Commission recommendations to ensure equal opportunities for persons belonging to national 
minorities, avoiding disproportionate interference with their rights. The amendment to the Law 
on  national  minorities  was  adopted  on  21  September  to  accommodate  some  of  the  Venice 
Commission comments, in particular those directly relevant to the law on national minorities 
(communities). The Venice Commission follow-up Opinion of 6 October 2023 assessed the 
progress  of the  amending law, but  also  identified those recommendations that remain to be 
addressed. According to the final provisions of the revised law, within the six months following 
its entry into force the Cabinet of Ministers has to prepare and submit to Parliament a draft law 
to revise the education law, the State language law and the media law. These need to be in line 
with the recommendations of the Venice Commission.  

The  impact  of  Russia’s  war  of  aggression  against  Ukraine  has  severely  affected  national 
minorities,  leading  to  disruptions  to  their  social  fabric  by  displacements  of  their  members, 
challenges  to  guarantee  education  in  minority  languages  as  well  as  a  general  lack  of  state 
funding to implement adopted reforms. In the medium term, in particular after the end of the 
war, this will require a broad review of Ukraine’s policies to enable the full application of the 
rights of persons belonging to national minorities. 

The  Roma  minority  remains  one  of  the  most  marginalised  communities  in  Ukraine  and 
continues  to  face  significant  challenges.  These  include  discrimination  and  antigypsyism, 
economic and social exclusion, lack of access to ID documents, lack of adequate education, 
continuing segregation in settlements, lack of poverty reduction and lack of adequate housing. 
There is a continued need for empowering women, for family planning programmes, increased 
protection  of  children’s  rights  and  the  prevention  of  teen  pregnancies,  misappropriation  of 
funds designed for child support as well as discrimination by police. These existing challenges 
were exacerbated by the impact of Russia’s full-scale invasion, which led to the displacement 
of a large part of the Roma minority within the country and abroad. At its beginning, Roma 
faced additional obstacles in various regions, preventing an efficient evacuation. Instances of 
mob violence against Roma targeting both settlements and individuals were recorded in recent 
years.  Civil  society  organisations  point  out  that  attention  should  be  paid  to  the  non-
discriminatory  nature  of  aid  delivery  in  order  to  reach  citizens  without  a  full  set  of  ID 
documents,  as  well  as  marginalised  settlements,  documentation  procedures  for  Roma 
individuals  should  be  simplified  and  accelerated,  and  the  legalisation  of  Roma  settlements 
should be ensured. Roma should also be included in the recovery and reconstruction efforts of 
Ukraine. 

In  July  2021,  Ukraine  adopted  the  strategy  promoting  the  realisation  of  the  rights  and 
opportunities of persons belonging to the Roma national minority in Ukrainian society up to 
2030. The strategy is being implemented only slowly and the related action plan, which needs 
to be fully aligned with the EU Roma strategic framework, developed with the full involvement 
of the Roma community and be given sufficient resources for its implementation, has not yet 
been adopted.  

On  7  April  2023,  the  Ukrainian  government  adopted  a  state  policy  strategy  on  internal 
displacement until 2025, together with an operational plan for 2023-2025. The strategy aims to 
properly address all issues related to internally displaced persons, and this at all stages: from 
the  decision  to  relocate  these  persons  to  the  period  when  a  person  decides  to  return  to  the 
liberated  and  safe  territory.  Implementation  of  this  strategy  will  heavily  depend  on  the 
capacities and financial resources of the Ukrainian government. According to the International 
Organization  for  Migration  (IOM),  in  June  2023,  an  estimated  5 088 000  were  internally 

53 

 
 
displaced. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in 
June 2023, 6 303 500 people Ukrainians were registered as refugees. Across Ukraine, IOM 
estimates that 4 757 000 people have returned to their place of habitual residence in Ukraine 
following a period of displacement, 20% of whom returned from abroad. Income sources of 
internally  displaced  persons  have  been  severely  affected  by  the  war.  In  addition,  given  the 
overall priority given to winning the war and the scale of the social emergencies created by the 
Russian war of aggression, increasing difficulties are reported in ensuring adequate state budget 
allocations  for  social  services.  Significant  and  continued  reliance  on  external  assistance  is 
expected by relevant ministries in charge of social policies, with few plans at the moment in 
terms  of self-sustainability.  IOM data indicates that  around one in  four internally displaced 
persons (24%) that responded stated that monthly livelihood cash assistance was their primary 
source of household income. The vast majority (72%) of internally displaced persons who rely 
on social assistance reported a total monthly household income which – when divided by the 
number  of  people  in  the  household  –  was  equal  to  or  less  than  UAH  2 500  (EUR  55),  the 
subsistence minimum as of January 2023.  

While cultural rights in Ukraine are respected and protected, also for national minorities as 
reiterated in the Law on national minorities (communities) of Ukraine, Russia systematically 
and  purposefully  carries  out  activities  that  violate  the  cultural  rights  of  Ukrainians  and 
specifically  national  minorities  in  the  temporarily  occupied  territories  of  Ukraine.  This 
concerns  illegal  archaeological  excavations  by  Russia  in  Crimea,  the  looting  of  museums, 
archives, libraries and objects of movable cultural heritage in temporarily occupied territories, 
the  nationalisation  of  Ukrainian  cultural  property,  as  well  as  persecution  of  the  Orthodox 
Church of Ukraine in Crimea. It is very difficult for Ukrainian authorities to monitor and track 
looted  objects  as  well  as  document  cultural  heritage  and  eventually  reconstitute  it  after  the 
liberation of temporarily occupied territories.  

Russia  continues  its  efforts  to  systematically  destroy  Ukrainian  identity  in  the  temporarily 
occupied  territories  of  Ukraine.  Under  the  Russian  Federal  Law  No  19  (as  of  17  February 
2023),  the  four  temporarily  occupied  territories  of  Kherson,  Zaporizhzhia,  Donetsk  and 
Luhansk regions of Ukraine are to be integrated into Russia’s federal education system. This 
includes clearing the educational space of anything Ukrainian (all school instructions are given 
in  Russian  only  and  there  are  no  subjects  related  to  Ukraine),  militarising  education  and 
instilling  Russian  civic  identity.  Ukrainian  authorities  and  citizens  are  currently  unable  to 
protect  Ukrainian  children  against  these  illegal  acts,  but  will  need  to  prepare  measures  to 
reintegrate this portion of its population into its national education system.  

The citizen rights of Ukraine are governed by the Law on citizenship of Ukraine. Anyone born 
to  at  least  one Ukrainian parent  automatically receives Ukrainian  citizenship  at  birth, while 
foreign nationals can be naturalised after living in the country for at least five years. While only 
sole citizenship is permitted in Ukraine, in practice Ukrainian citizenship is not automatically 
lost  if  foreign  citizenship  is  acquired,  resulting  in  an  estimated  large  number  of  Ukrainians 
possessing more than one citizenship, often with an additional EU citizenship. 

2.2.2.  Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security 

The EU has common rules for border control, visas, external migration and asylum. Schengen 
cooperation entails the lifting of border controls inside the EU. Member States also cooperate 
with Ukraine in the fight against organised crime and terrorism, and on judicial, police and 
customs cooperation, all with the support of the EU justice and home affairs agencies. 

Ukraine has some level of preparation in implementing the EU acquis in the area of justice, 
freedom  and  security.  Russia’s  full-scale  invasion  of  Ukraine  and  the  martial  law  regime 

54 

 
 
introduced  in  response  have  had  a  profound  impact  across  the  entire  justice,  freedom  and 
security area. Law enforcement agencies are heavily involved in defending  the country and 
protecting  the  population  and  critical  infrastructure.  Despite  the  war-related  challenges, 
including significant losses of personnel and equipment and reduced financing, the institutions 
continue  to  demonstrate  strong  resilience  and  determination  to  deliver  on  their  mandates. 
However, multiple shortcomings persist, many of which predate Russia’s full-scale invasion. 
The legal and strategic framework is underdeveloped. Integrity and accountability mechanisms 
need further strengthening across the sector. Institutional cooperation and coordination remain 
weak,  in  particular  as  regards  the  investigation  of  organised  crime,  but  also  migration  and 
border control. The smuggling of goods, including cigarette smuggling, is still not criminalised, 
despite being a low-risk and high-profit activity. Technical capacities for border control and 
surveillance need improvement, along with the anti-corruption measures. Legislation on visa 
policy and asylum is broadly aligned with the EU acquis. Limited progress was made in the 
reporting period. The overarching strategic plan for the law enforcement sector was adopted, 
while the preparation of a credible implementation plan is underway. 

In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular: 

→  adopt a time-bound and measurable action plan for the implementation of the overarching 
strategic plan on law enforcement reform, including a strong anti-corruption component, 
taking the war-related context into account, and make tangible progress in implementing 
it; 

→  adopt and implement a context-adjusted migration policy strategy and revised integrated 
border management strategy, and ensure that  corresponding action plans have indicators 
that allow for the proper assessment of implementation; 

→  adopt and start implementing legislation to criminalise the large-scale smuggling of goods, 
including  effective  prison  sentences  for  damage  to  the  state  budget  above  a  certain 
threshold. 

Fight against organised crime 

Ukraine has some level of preparation to implement the EU acquis in this area. The country 
has  a  dedicated  strategic  and  institutional  framework  to  fight  organised  crime,  along  with 
reasonable  knowledge  and  technical  means,  and  a  good  level  of  international  cooperation. 
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the martial law regime have had a profound impact 
on  the  institutional  capacities  to  fight  organised  crime.  Like  other  institutions  in  the  home 
affairs sector, the institutions that fight organised crime are heavily involved in the country’s 
defence  and  civil  protection  efforts,  demonstrating  remarkable  resilience  and  operational 
capabilities. There has also been a shift in priorities towards the investigation of international 
crimes  and  offences  committed  by  Russian  entities.  Overall,  the  legal  framework  and 
operational capacities to fight organised crime remain weak. A number of legal and procedural 
gaps, jurisdictional overlaps and institutional fragmentation, the prevalence of corruption, the 
inefficient  use  of  resources,  the  uneven  level  of  professionalism  and  underdeveloped  IT 
infrastructure  are  observed  in  this  area.  Strengthening  inter-agency  coordination  remains 
crucial.  More  efforts  are  needed  in  particular  to  combat  serious  forms  of  organised  crime, 
money laundering (including alignment with Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on combating money 
laundering  by  criminal  law)  and  other  financial  crimes.  Despite  the  difficult  context  and 
existing  challenges,  the  outlook  is  positive  as  the  country  is  determined  to  proceed  with 
implementing the strategic approach, including  the revision of the legal  framework  and the 
putting  in operational  use the national  serious organised crime threat  assessment  (SOCTA). 

55 

 
 
Some  progress  was  made  at  operational  level,  in  particular  through  participation  in  an 
increasing  number  of  joint  operations  with  EU  Member  States  and  neighbouring  countries. 
Investigations were launched against the criminal authorities (‘thieves in law’). The number of 
seized,  confiscated  and  destroyed  firearms  and  ammunition  as  well  as  convictions  for 
trafficking of small arms increased considerably. The Office of the Prosecutor General started 
developing the e-case management system in the criminal justice chain.  

In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular: 

→  develop  and  adopt  the  national  SOCTA  and  strengthen  the  institutional  capacities  to 
implement  it,  including  intelligence-led  policing,  open-source  intelligence,  information 
management  and  analysis,  inter-agency  cooperation;  establish  a  permanent  national 
coordinator to fight organised crime;  

→  adopt and start implementing a credible action plan for the implementation of the 2023-
2025 asset recovery strategy; improve the legal framework and institutional capacities for 
financial investigations, asset recovery and management;  

→  enact legislation enabling a competitive, transparent and merit-based selection, including a 
credible integrity check, of the new Head of the Bureau of Economic Security and other 
staff  and  carry  out  the  selections  based  on  the  improved  legislation,  introduce  a  strong 
integrity and accountability framework within the Bureau and start applying it; 

→  continue improving the legal framework related to firearms and other small arms and light 
weapons (SALWs), conduct regular threat assessments and continue cooperation between 
national  law  enforcement  agencies  and  the  military  to  prevent  the  illicit  possession  and 
trafficking of firearms and other SALWs. 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

In  2022,  the  National  Police  of  Ukraine  had  more  than  110 000  police  officers,  which 
corresponded  to  approximately  270  police  officers  per  100 000  inhabitants,  against  an  EU 
average of 335 officers per 100 000 inhabitants (Eurostat, 2019-2021). An attempt to reform 
the National Police was undertaken in 2019, aimed at increasing public trust in the police and 
strengthening its ability to deal with organised crime. Specialised police units were put in place 
to deal with terrorism, cybercrime and drugs.  

Since late 2022, the Ministry of Internal Affairs has acted as a temporary national coordinator 
on organised crime, in line with the strategy and action plan for combating organised crime. It 
is critical to establish a permanent national coordination body to tackle organised crime and 
upgrade  the  inter-agency  cooperation  and  coordination  mechanisms,  including  business 
processes and IT infrastructure. 

The  Bureau  of  Economic  Security  (BES)  was  established  in  November  2021  and  started 
operating in 2022. It was expected to become the central law enforcement and analytical body 
to fight financial crimes and protect the economic interests of Ukraine. However, its operational 
capacities remain very limited. Its track record in the first few years of activity raises questions 
about its effectiveness and coordination with other law enforcement agencies and institutions. 
BES remains heavily understaffed, with less than 20% of its positions filled. The head of BES 
was dismissed in April 2023. In May 2023, investigative media raised allegations of corruption 
against the acting head of BES. Legislation should be amended to enable the selection of the 
new head and other staff in a competitive, transparent, merit-based manner, including a credible 
integrity check. 

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The state financial monitoring service supervised by the Ministry of Finance performs the role 
of  a  financial  investigation  unit,  assisting  the  law  enforcement  agencies  in  anti-money 
laundering investigations. The service prepares analytical reports and ensures data exchange 
with other countries.  

The national agency for finding, tracing and management of assets derived from corruption 
and other crimes (ARMA) was established in February 2016. It is tasked with formulating and 
implementing state policy on tracing  assets  that  are subject  to  seizure and managing  seized 
assets in criminal proceedings. ARMA has access to a number of national and international 
databases. It has established cooperation with foreign asset recovery and management agencies 
and their networks. In January 2023, ARMA launched the unified state register of assets seized 
in  criminal  proceedings. The agency had no permanent  head for almost  4 years. The initial 
competition  failed  to  identify  a  suitable  candidate  in  August  2022.  A  new  competition, 
relaunched in late 2022, selected a suitable candidate. In June 2023, the Cabinet of Ministers 
appointed  her.  However,  civil  society  raised  concerns  about  the  selection  and  appointment 
process  and  the  integrity  of  the  appointee.  ARMA  has  been  criticised  for  inefficiency  and 
limited capacity, and also faces corruption allegations against its previous management.  

Ukraine has a dedicated legal framework to fight organised crime. The Law on organisational 
and legal principles of combating organised crime was adopted in 1993, but is largely outdated 
with numerous shortcomings. An assessment of compliance of Ukrainian law with EU law and 
international standards in the area of organised crime is still pending.  Legislation related to 
asset  recovery  and  management  remains  deficient  and  in  need  of  thorough  revision.  The 
legislation  for  tackling  the  proliferation  of  illicit  firearms  needs  further  improvement,  in 
particular  by  expanding  criminal  liability  for  cross-border  illicit  trafficking  of  firearms  and 
their  parts/components  within  the  meaning  of the  UN  Protocol  on  Firearms.  A  new  law  on 
firearms  is  pending  adoption.  Ukraine  ratified  the  Budapest  Convention  on  Cybercrime  in 
2006, and its substantive law is largely in line with the Convention. Ukraine also ratified the 
First Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime and signed the Second Additional 
Protocol on enhanced co-operation and disclosure of electronic evidence in November 2022; it 
still needs to be ratified. In 2006, Ukraine made a reservation not to apply paragraph 1 of Article 
6 of the Budapest Convention concerning the criminalisation of misuse of IT devices, including 
computer  programmes,  which  contradicts  the  efforts  to  tackle  organised  crime  involved  in 
cybercrime. The national cybersecurity strategy of 2021 (its action plan was adopted in 2022) 
has a cybercrime component. The Law on witness protection exists, but is largely outdated as 
it was adopted in 1993. 

A strategy and action plan on the fight against organised and serious crime are in place. The 
strategy on combating organised crime was approved in September 2020, while the action plan 
for  implementing  the  strategy  was  approved  in  September  2022.  The  key  priorities  of  the 
strategy  include  the  renewal  of  legislation,  setting  priorities  and  strengthening  analytical 
capacities,  operationalisation  of  SOCTA,  a  stronger  focus  on  criminal  networks,  the 
involvement  of  the  civil  society  and  the  establishment  of  a  national  coordinator  –  an 
interdepartmental commission for combating organised crime. The overarching strategic plan 
to reform the law enforcement sector for 2023-2027 was approved by the President in May 
2023 as part of the pre-accession reform steps set out in the June 2022 Commission Opinion 
on Ukraine’s membership application. The plan sets out six priorities that focus on increasing 
the effectiveness of the law enforcement and prosecuting bodies, consistency of the criminal 
policy,  result-oriented  management,  digital  transformation,  as  well  as  transparency, 
accountability  and  independence.  A  relevant  and  credible  action  plan  with  time-bound  and 
measurable deliverables should still be adopted to facilitate the implementation of the strategic 

57 

 
 
plan.  A  national  strategy  on  asset  recovery  for  2023-2025  was  adopted  in  August  2023,  an 
action plan for its implementation still needs to be developed. There is no formal government 
strategy  on  firearms  trafficking,  but  a  draft  action  plan  on  firearms  trafficking  is  prepared. 
Cooperation  between  the  Ukrainian  authorities  and  the  EU  is  continuing  in  this  area.  The 
current war context as well as the emerging trends and threats linked to organised crime need 
to be taken into account when developing and further updating the strategic framework.  

As for the international legal framework, Ukraine signed and ratified the main international 
agreements  and  regional  conventions  that  directly  or  indirectly  target  organised  crime.  In 
particular, Ukraine ratified the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime in 2004 
and the UN Convention Against Corruption in 2009, as well as the Council of Europe (CoE) 
Conventions  on  Civil  Law  in  2005  and  Criminal  Law  in  2009.  It  also  ratified  the  CoE 
Convention on Cybercrime in 2001 and the CoE Convention on Action Against Trafficking in 
Human  Beings  in  2005.  Ukraine  has  been  a  member  of  the  CoE’s  Group  of  States  against 
Corruption since 2006 and of the Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human 
Beings.   

Ukraine should focus heavily on strengthening integrity and anti-corruption in the criminal 
justice system, as corruption in the system undermines public trust and the fight against serious 
crime, including organised crime. In particular, the transparent and merit-based selection of 
managerial  staff,  including  credible  integrity  checks,  should  be  ensured  in  the  institutions 
fighting  organised  crime,  along  with  strong  disciplinary  and  anti-corruption  frameworks 
tailored to the local context and actual corruption risks. So far, these frameworks within the 
criminal justice institutions have not been effective. Internal security and disciplinary bodies 
are limited in their mandates, resources and independence.  

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

Ukraine is located at the crossroads of smuggling illegal goods to the EU, including arms, drugs 
and cigarettes. Illegal logging is widespread, and despite efforts made in recent years, the illegal 
trade  in  timber  persists.  Ukraine  is  a  source,  transit  and  destination  country  for  human 
trafficking. It is also a production and transit country for drugs. The Russian war of aggression 
against  Ukraine  is  changing  the  nature  of  organised  crime,  as  it  has  affected  international 
criminal networks and the traditional trafficking routes. At the same time, it is creating new 
risks that need to be addressed, in particular those linked to arms and human trafficking.   

Considering the existing challenges and the evolving threat landscape related to the war, the 
institutional capacities to tackle organised crime remain limited. Ukrainian law enforcement 
agencies are currently heavily focused on investigating international crimes. They also have to 
operate with substantially reduced budgets and staff. Even before the war, a series of ad hoc 
reforms, competition between law enforcement agencies and influence by political and vested 
interests  hampered  progress  in  civilian  security  sector  reforms.  The  unclear  division  and 
fragmentation of competences among law enforcement agencies undermines the fight against 
complex forms of organised crime. The existing rules and court practice on the inadmissibility 
of  evidence  gathered  by  a  law  enforcement  agency  that  is  not  competent  for  a  given  case, 
coupled  with  the  unclear  division  of  competences,  further  complicate  the  fight  against 
organised crime groups involved in diverse criminal activities, and open the door to corruption 
and  abuse.  Inter-agency  cooperation  among  Ukraine’s  law  enforcement,  intelligence, 
prosecuting and judicial bodies formally exists, but is not efficient and is marred by the absence 
of a permanent coordinator and clear procedures. There is also fierce competition between law 
enforcement  agencies  and  a  high  degree  of  distrust.  The  absence  of  a  modern  e-case 
management system in the criminal justice chain and limited access to the relevant registers, 
databases and intelligence information, even within a single agency, remains a problem.  

58 

 
 
The  Security  Service  of  Ukraine  (SSU)  still  retains  a  technical  monopoly  on  intercepting 
communications,  even  if  the  National  Police  of  Ukraine  (NPU)  and  the  National  Anti-
Corruption Bureau of Ukraine have been legally empowered to conduct interceptions on their 
own  since  autumn  2019.  The  systemic  problems  within  the  judiciary,  including  a  severe 
shortage  of  staff,  underfunding,  corruption,  the  absence  of  a  modern  e-case  management 
system (see Chapter 23) as well as a lack of proper specialisation undermine the adjudication 
of organised crime cases.   

The  number  of  criminal  investigations  into  organised  crime  groups  and  criminal 
organisations, although still relatively low overall, gradually increased to 499 cases in 2021 
(2020: 377 cases; 2019: 293 cases) and remained at this level in 2022: 485 criminal proceedings 
against organised crime groups were sent by the NPU to courts, 12 of them with transnational 
ties. Proactive measures are being taken to combat the subjects of increased criminal influence, 
including the ‘thieves in law’, although tangible results in the form of convictions have yet to 
be seen. The NPU continues to suffer from corruption, outdated equipment and limited capacity 
overall, including the capacity to conduct financial investigations. 

In 2022-2023, the SSU, as part of its work on organised crime, uncovered 123 organised crime 
groups (of which 99 organised groups and 24 criminal organisations. 517 people were notified 
of  being  suspected  of  committing  criminal  offences  in  organised  forms  of  complicity.  In 
particular,  28  organised  crime  groups  known  as  professional  criminals  were  identified.  27 
people  were  notified  of  being  suspected  of  establishing  or  spreading  criminal  influence, 
organising, assisting in, conducting or participating in a criminal assembly, or applying for the 
use of criminal influence. 12 people were convicted.  

Despite the transfer of competences from the SSU to the Bureau of Economic Security in 2021 
and the SSU’s increasing focus on its core activity – counterintelligence and national security 
–  the  SSU  remains  active  as  a  criminal  law  enforcement  agency.  It  causes  institutional 
fragmentation, jurisdictional overlaps and competition, and opens the door to corruption and 
abuse. Following international practice, the SSU’s pre-trial investigation functions should be 
abolished. In the meantime, the prosecution service should strengthen its role as the leader of 
pre-trial  investigations  and  prevent  jurisdictional  tension  and  abuse,  including  occasional 
breaches of the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine and 
the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office in high-level corruption cases.  

As  for  Ukraine’s  international  police  cooperation,  it  is  well  developed  and  is  producing 
positive results on the ground. Ukraine is a member of Interpol, and has a working arrangement 
in  place  with  CEPOL,  the  European  Union  Agency  for  Law  Enforcement  Training,  and  an 
operational and strategic agreement with Europol, the EU’s law enforcement agency. The law 
enforcement  agencies  of  Ukraine  capitalised  on  all  forms  of  capacity  building  provided  by 
CEPOL and this co-operation should continue. The Liaison Bureau of Ukraine in Europol was 
opened in November 2017. A second liaison officer was deployed in 2023. Ukraine has access 
to  SIENA,  the  secure  information  exchange  network  application  platform  for  EU  law 
enforcement.  Since  the  start  of  the  war,  a  strong  international  police  and  prosecutorial 
cooperation framework has played a positive role in uncovering cross-border organised crime 
activities. 

Ukraine is an active participant in the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal 
Threats  (EMPACT).  In  2022,  Ukraine  planned  to  participate  in  174  out  of  293  operational 
actions, covering all 15 operational action plans under EMPACT. However, due to the war, 
Ukraine had to scale back its participation, also in terms of the number of operational actions 
it committed to in 2023 (122). Ukraine nevertheless acted as co-action leader in 2022 for an 

59 

 
 
operational action on high-risk criminal networks and will continue doing so in 2023. It also 
took part in three joint action days organised by the platform.    

There has been limited progress in implementing intelligence-led policing. In recent years, the 
NPU  set  up  a  new  criminal  analysis  department  and  regional  departments  in  every  region. 
These  departments  provide  analytical  support  for  criminal  investigations.  In  2022,  they 
produced more than 13 000 analytical studies. However, Ukraine should still establish unified 
and up-to-date intelligence sharing tools and procedures for its law enforcement agencies. It 
should also develop a common IT platform for facilitating inter-agency cooperation and for 
gathering, analysing and sharing information and intelligence between the relevant institutions.  

The  preparation  of  the  national  serious  and  organised  threats  assessments  (SOCTA)  has 
been delayed since 2017. The absence of these national SOCTA undermines policymaking, 
priority-setting,  operational  work  and  coordination  between  agencies  tasked  with  fighting 
organised crime. In 2022, a government resolution on the introduction of SOCTA was adopted. 
To  relaunch  preparations,  an  inter-agency  working  group  was  established  in  October  2022 
under  the  lead  of  the  Ministry  of  Internal  Affairs.  Regional  groups  to  assess  the  threat  of 
organised  crime  were  created  throughout  the  country,  but  their  level  of  activity  is  unclear. 
Ukraine should develop and adopt SOCTA without further delays, and build the institutional 
capacities  to  implement  it,  including  intelligence-led  policing,  open-source  intelligence, 
information management and analysis, and inter-agency cooperation. 

The state financial monitoring service (SFMS) continued its operations despite the challenging 
operational environment. In 2022, it registered 52 123 suspicious financial transactions and 
sent 934 referrals to the law enforcement agencies. The agencies made use of SFMS referrals 
in 349 criminal proceedings. In 2022, the SFMS also processed 1 242 international requests. 
The  absence  of  a  bank  account  register  of  physical  persons  makes  its  work  and  financial 
investigations difficult. 

Financial investigations are not conducted in a consistent and sustainable manner. The Mutual 
2017 Evaluation Report issued by Moneyval, the Council of Europe’s Committee of Experts 
on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism, and 
the follow-up reports point to a lack of understanding among law enforcement agencies as to 
what  is  meant  by  financial  investigations.  To  address  these  shortcomings,  the  Office  of  the 
Prosecutor General issued instructions and methodological guidance to all regional prosecution 
offices  on  the  investigation  of  money  laundering  offences  and  the  application  of  financial 
investigations in proceeds-generating crimes. There is no legal obligation to apply them in all 
proceeds-generating  offences,  which  undermines 
their  consistent  application  when 
investigating offences linked to organised crime. The concept of financial investigations should 
be  further  embedded  in  the  legal  framework,  in  particular  in  secondary  legislation,  and 
systematically enforced  under the supervision  of prosecutors. The institutional  capacities to 
conduct them should be further strengthened across the relevant institutions. 

On  asset  confiscation,  the  legal  and  institutional  framework  is  largely  aligned  with 
international standards. However, asset confiscation and recovery tools remain underused, and 
a credible track record of seizures and confiscations still needs to be established. Inter-agency 
cooperation between the relevant law enforcement, prosecuting and judicial bodies, as well as 
SFMS  and  ARMA  and  the  institutional  capacities  of  these  bodies  should  be  further 
strengthened. The national asset recovery strategy, which could help develop a more effective 
and efficient system of asset recovery, was adopted in August 2023, but not yet implemented. 
A  comprehensive  technical  analysis  of  the  operational  effectiveness  and  independence  of 
ARMA, including related asset recovery and management functions, was conducted. On this 
basis,  comprehensive  ARMA  reform  should  be  implemented,  including  a  system  for  the 
60 

 
 
transparent  selection  of  ARMA’s  head,  fully  fledged  pre-seizure  planning,  prioritising  the 
seizure  of  assets  by  criminal  courts,  transparent  procedures  for  the  management,  sale  and 
evaluation of assets and unblocking the possibility to manage corporate property rights. 

On trafficking in human beings (THB), the assessment of alignment of the Ukrainian law 
with  the  EU  acquis  remains  to  be  conducted.  In  2022  the  NPU  stopped  activities  of  five 
organised  groups  involved  in  trafficking  in  human  beings.  133  criminal  offences  of  human 
trafficking were registered and 93 people were notified of suspicion and 63 were indicted. 66 
people were recognised as victims of human trafficking, including 36 women and 12 children. 
In  addition,  the  activities  of  12  organised  groups  and  criminal  organisations  were  stopped, 
consisting of 40 people who smuggled people across the Ukrainian border.  

In June 2023, the Cabinet of Ministers approved a targeted social programme for combating 
human trafficking up to 2025. Following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion and given the 
much  higher  trafficking  risks,  Ukraine  took  a  number  of  measures  to  prevent  and  combat 
human  trafficking.  Information  campaigns  on  the  risks  were  conducted  among  citizens 
travelling abroad and three nationwide operations were organised to combat child trafficking. 
Migration police units participate in pan-European measures to combat human trafficking for 
the  purpose  of  sexual  exploitation  and  forced  begging,  and  to  neutralise  organised  crime 
groups. Close cooperation has been established  with  national  and international  civil  society 
organisations. The Ministry of Internal Affairs established permanent communication and the 
exchange  of  information  with  the  EU  Anti-Trafficking  Coordinator.  In  addition,  the  NPU 
cooperates  closely  with  Europol  and  its  counterparts  in  the  EU  Member  States.  Four 
international anti-trafficking operations were conducted in the EU Member States.   

On  the  trafficking  of  small  arms  and  light  weapons,  following  the  start  of  the  full-scale 
invasion  of  Ukraine,  the  number  of  registered  criminal  cases  involving  firearms  increased 
almost six-fold compared to 2021 (394 and 2 206 crimes, respectively). During this period, 517 
offenders were notified of suspicion, 483 criminal proceedings were sent to the court with a 
charge. In addition, during 2022, law enforcement agencies (mainly the National Police) seized 
1 939 firearms, 25 grenades and grenade launchers, 11 000 hand grenades and 202 924 rounds 
of ammunition. The number of firearms destroyed is not included in official reports. In Ukraine, 
each manufactured, imported or deactivated firearm of a certain category is marked according 
to the special rules approved by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In June 2023, the ministry 
launched  a  unified  register  of  firearms  for  civilians,  streamlining  the  control,  permission 
management and other processes. When fully implemented, this register is expected to become 
the central database of firearms for the authorities, allowing the control all civilian firearms 
during  their  full  life-cycle  from  manufacture  to  the  destruction  or  export.  Ukraine  should 
continue its active engagement with the international law enforcement community, including 
Europol and EU Member States police forces, to address these risks.   

Ukraine  appointed  the  second  liaison  officer  to  Europol  on  cybercrime.  In  2022,  14 948 
criminal offences were detected, and suspicion announced in 7 296 criminal proceedings. 7 502 
people were sent to court with indictments. Indictments were brought  against 1 293 people. 
Cyber police took part in six international operations to neutralise and document members of 
hacker groups. The fight against cybercrime should remain a priority in the present war context 
and in view of the fact that it forms part of Russian hybrid warfare.  

Money laundering is criminalised. Prosecuting money laundering as a stand-alone crime is 
possible under Ukrainian law. However, the capacities of law enforcement to investigate cases 
and  recover  criminal  assets  are  limited.  In  2022,  across  all  law  enforcement  agencies,  523 
criminal proceedings on money laundering were registered. 117 indictments were sent to court 
and 19 verdicts were issued. 16 people were convicted for money laundering offences. 

61 

 
 
As  for  witness  protection,  the  system  is  underdeveloped  and  fragmented  among  several 
institutions. The level of training and technical equipment is low. The NPU, which is the most 
advanced  institution  in  this  area,  is  not  ready  to  ensure  a  witness  protection  programme  or 
witness relocation due to the lack of relevant legislation and resources. On the implementation 
side, the NPU’s Witness Protection Unit was dismantled in late 2019, with all trained members 
leaving. In March 2022, the NPU made the decision to re-establish it. In August 2022, seven 
operators  started  to  reorganise  the  unit.  The  lack  of  a  strong  witness  protection  system 
undermines  the  fight  against  organised  crime.  Ukraine  should  speed  up  the  adoption  and 
implementation of the new witness protection law that complies with international standards 
and best practices. 

Cooperation in the field of drugs 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

The legal framework for the fight against drugs in Ukraine is partly aligned with the EU acquis. 
The national drug policy strategy for the period up to 2030 and its action plan for 2023-2025 
is being prepared, but has not yet been adopted. The draft action plan envisages establishing a 
national  early  warning  system  on  new  psychoactive  substances.  Ukraine  is  a  party  to  the 
relevant  international  narcotic  drug  control  conventions,  including  the  United  Nations 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.  

The  Institute  of  Psychiatry,  Forensic  Psychiatric  Examination  and  Drug  Monitoring  of  the 
Ministry of Health is responsible for drug monitoring at national level.  It produces a report 
each  year  on  the  drugs  and  alcohol  situation  in  Ukraine  and  publishes  it  online  in  both 
Ukrainian and English. The Centre for Public Health of the Ministry of Health is responsible 
for  harm  reduction  measures,  social  reintegration  of  former  drug  addicts  and  research.  The 
State Service for Medicines and Drug Control is the central executive body that implements 
national  policy on control over the circulation  of narcotic drugs and combating  their illegal 
circulation. There is a certain amount of inter-agency cooperation, coordinated by the Ministry 
of Health. There is currently no national early warning system to exchange information on new 
psychoactive substances. 

The main body to prevent, detect and investigate drug trafficking is the NPU. The Security 
Service  of  Ukraine  is  also  authorised  to  investigate  drug-related  crimes.  The  State  Border 
Guards Service and the State Customs Service as well as other agencies provide detection and 
related support to investigations.  

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

Despite the war, the illicit production of synthetic drugs continues in Ukraine. As to its track 
record, in 2022 there were 34 398 registered crimes linked to illicit drug trafficking, 22 678 
notices  of  suspicion  were  sent,  and  19 701  indictments  were  issued.  In  2022,  2.4  tonnes  of 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, as well as 3 187 kg and 26 828 litres of precursors 
for  the  production  of  narcotic  drugs  and  psychotropic  substances,  were  seized.  Illegal  drug 
trafficking via the internet (dark net) with the use of cryptocurrency makes it harder to identify 
drug dealers and beneficiaries.  

A new working arrangement was signed between the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs 
and Drug Addiction and the Ministry of Health in 2022. It updates and replaces the previous 
memorandum of understanding signed in 2010. Drug monitoring efforts and the collection of 
data requested by the centre are difficult in the current security circumstances and are affected 
by the war. This makes it impossible to analyse and report on some data.  

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Despite the impact of the war on health infrastructure, the Ministry of Health and its institutions 
are partnering with a range of non-governmental organisations to ensure uninterrupted access 
to drug-related health services.  

Fight against terrorism 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

The Anti-Terrorism Centre of the Security Service of Ukraine is the inter-agency body tasked 
with coordinating national efforts to fight terrorism. Its regional branches coordinate counter-
terrorism  activities  at  local  level.  The  centre  monitors  terrorist  threat  levels,  gathers 
intelligence,  conducts  drills  at  critical  infrastructure  facilities  and  carries  out  information 
analysis on terrorism for the national security authorities. 

Ukraine  has  comprehensive  anti-terrorism  legislation  and  is  a  party  to  the  relevant  UN  and 
Council of Europe counter-terrorism conventions and protocols. The national security strategy 
and the strategy of ensuring state security are in place, as well as the concept of combating 
terrorism in Ukraine and its action plan. In 2022, Ukraine ratified the Additional Protocol to 
the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism and subsequently introduced 
amendments to the Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes, together with other legislative acts 
to improve the fight against terrorism. The legal framework on the fight against terrorism has 
not yet been assessed for compliance with the EU acquis and the principles of prevent, protect, 
pursue and respond. The 2021 Law on critical infrastructure is a part of the national security 
legislation. 

As  to  identifying  and  tracing  financial  flows  that  fund  terrorism,  the  updated  anti-money 
laundering  law  was  adopted  in  2020.  In  2022,  the  Ministry  of  Finance  adopted  relevant 
secondary legislation on risk criteria that facilitates identification and prevention of terrorism 
financing. The financial monitoring and intelligence system complies with recommendations 
from  the  Financial  Action  Task  Force.  In  2022,  Ukraine  also  adopted  a  law  protecting  the 
financial system from Russian influence and adapting legislation to specific Financial Action 
Task Force standards and provisions of the EU Directive on the prevention of the use of the 
financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

Since the beginning of Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 and especially after the full-
scale invasion in February 2022, counterterrorism activities have shifted to countering sabotage 
activities  by  Russian  intelligence  and  its  proxies.  In  2022,  287  criminal  offences  related  to 
terrorism  were  registered,  among  which  95  criminal  proceedings  were  initiated  for  acts  of 
terrorism, 1 for involvement in an act of terrorism, 2 for public incitement to commit an act of 
terrorism, 148 for the creation of a terrorist group or terrorist organisation, 1 for facilitation to 
commit an act of terrorism and 40 for financing terrorism. 

As  regards  operational  cooperation  with  European  agencies  on  fighting  terrorism, 
cooperation takes place mainly on war crimes, where Europol supports investigations through 
the analysis project on core international crimes. The Security Service of Ukraine has access 
and capacities for information exchange on counterterrorism issues with Europol through the 
secure information exchange network application (SIENA). Future steps in counterterrorism 
should  include  strengthening  cooperation  between  the  Security  Service  and  Europol  by 
establishing a direct communication through CT SIENA and capacity building for Ukrainian 
counter-terrorism authorities on modern law enforcement and intelligence collection methods. 
Ukraine has also appointed a Eurojust contact point for terrorism-related matters to enhance 
judicial cooperation against terrorism. 

63 

 
 
On external influences, the terrorism threat in Ukraine is mostly perceived as originating from 
Russian  intelligence  agencies  and  Russian-controlled  terrorist  groups,  including  private 
military companies. Russia uses terrorism-type activities aimed at intimidating the Ukrainian 
population as part of its aggression against Ukraine. The full-scale involvement of organised 
crime groups is a specific characteristic of hybrid warfare waged by Russia against Ukraine. 
This  includes  the  use  of  organised  crime  groups  and  criminals  in  occupied  territories  as 
mercenaries  in  warfare,  organised  crime  groups  and  criminals  controlled  by  Russian 
intelligence all over Ukraine, and the weaponisation of corruption at local and central levels. 

On terrorism prevention measures, the Security Service of Ukraine constantly monitors the 
situation and is ready to respond to radicalisation. The threat of religious-based radicalisation 
is low because religious communities, including Islamic ones, are considered part of Ukrainian 
society, which is also helped by a sense of community in resisting Russian aggression.  

Judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters  

The  current  legal  framework  on  judicial  cooperation  in  civil  and  criminal  matters  is 
comprehensive, appropriate and in line with EU standards. Ukraine has 87 bilateral treaties and 
agreements on cooperation in civil and criminal matters with 50 countries, Eurojust and the 
UN. 

Ukraine has been a member of the Hague Conference on Private International Law since 2003 
and  is  a  contracting  party  to  12  conventions,  including  those  on  child  abduction,  child 
protection and child support. Ukraine ratified the 2019 Hague Judgments Convention in August 
2022, which came into force on 1 September 2023. Ukraine has also ratified on 24 April 2023 
the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements that entered into force on 1 August 
2023. 

National  legislation  and  bilateral  and  international  agreements  to  which  Ukraine  is  a  party 
contain rules on mutual legal assistance, extradition, conflicts of law, mutual recognition and 
the  enforcement  of  decisions  and  judgments,  document  service  and  evidence  exchange,  the 
transfer of people sentenced to imprisonment, and the fight against terrorism and other forms 
of organised crime, including cybercrime. The specific provisions are partly aligned with the 
EU acquis.  

International  prosecutorial  cooperation  in  criminal  matters  is  successfully  managed  by  the 
Office  of  the  Prosecutor  General.  Ukraine  has  a  liaison  prosecutor  in  Eurojust  and  actively 
participates in multiple joint investigation teams facilitated by Eurojust. 

In 2022, the Ministry of Justice received and processed 2 560 requests for legal assistance in 
civil and commercial matters as well as for the recognition and enforcement of judgments. It 
processes  requests  within  30  days,  and  the  average  processing  time  by  Ukrainian  courts  is 
between 3 and 6 months.  

As for judicial cooperation in criminal matters, the Ministry of Justice processed 974 requests 
for international cooperation in 2022: 923 for international legal assistance, with the average 
processing length from 6 to 8 months, and 51 for extradition, with the average processing time 
from 5 to 6 months.  

There  is  well-established  cooperation  in  criminal  matters  with  Eurojust  as  a  result  of  the 
cooperation  agreement  signed  in  2016  and  collaboration  between  the  Ukrainian  Liaison 
Prosecutor and Eurojust, as well as between Ukraine and EU Member States. In 2022, Ukraine 
was involved in 79 new cases opened at Eurojust. Eurojust set up a joint investigation team on 
war crimes committed in Ukraine and hosts the International Centre for the Prosecution of the 
Crime of Aggression against Ukraine.  

64 

 
 
The  Ukrainian  Office  of  the  Prosecutor  General  signed  a  working  arrangement  with  the 
European  Public  Prosecutor’s  Office  (EPPO)  in  March  2022  aimed  at  facilitating  judicial 
cooperation  in  criminal  matters  and  the  exchange  of  information.  A  working  arrangement 
between the EPPO and the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) followed in 
July 2023. Both instruments rely on the European Convention on mutual legal assistance and 
its Protocols for providing mutual legal assistance. 

The  participation  of  Ukrainian  representatives  in  joint  investigation  teams  is  limited  due  to 
legal constraints that need to be urgently addressed. The reimbursement of joint investigation 
teams’  operating  costs  is  impossible  due  to  certain  provisions  of  Ukrainian  secondary 
legislation. 

Legal and irregular migration 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

Migration policy in Ukraine is developed and coordinated by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
The State Migration Service of Ukraine is responsible for implementing state migration policy 
as well as helping to develop it. The service shares responsibility for implementing the state 
migration  policy  on  border  security  and  visa  policy  with  the  State  Border  Guard  Service 
(SBGS) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Social Policy is responsible for 
developing  labour  migration  policy  and  the  Ministry  of  Economy  is  responsible  for 
implementing it. The Ministry of Education and Science determines the priority sectors for the 
provision of educational services to foreigners and stateless persons. The government continues 
to improve migration coordination, however, there is ample room for improvement. 

The State Migration Service territorial departments, which are situated in direct proximity to 
border areas or to areas with active hostilities, have been relocated, but continue to operate. 
The service plans to reduce the number of territorial units and introduce the concept of mobile 
ones. Citizens, foreigners and stateless persons can access administrative services in any of its 
territorial departments. 

The State Migration Policy Strategy for the period until 2025 is being updated. The Integrated 
Border Management Strategy has been updated in July 2023 to reflect the context of Russia’s 
war and Ukraine’s EU candidate status. The action plans for both strategies have expired and 
the new ones have not yet been approved. The legislative framework is in place for a mass 
influx of migrants. However, there is no approved implementation mechanism for inter-agency 
coordination in the event of a migration crisis. 

There is no specific legislation on long-term residence, nor a single procedure or single work 
or  residency  permits.  Legislation  on  voluntary  and  forced  return  is  in  place,  including  the 
respect of the principle of non-refoulement. The procedure for voluntary return is rarely applied 
due  to  a  lack  of  funding.  There  are  no  rules  on  passenger  information  or  visa  verification 
obligations of carriers that transport foreign nationals to Ukraine. Access to the labour market 
for foreign students, asylum seekers and stateless persons was regulated in the reporting period.  

The State Migration Service is responsible for the standard readmission procedure, while the 
SBGS is in charge of the accelerated readmission procedure. An electronic readmission case 
management  system  for  the  State  Migration  Service  and  the  SBGS  is  in  place  and  fully 
operational for readmission cases with Poland. 

The  EU-Ukraine  readmission  agreement  remains  in  force  since  2007,  though  since  the 
beginning of the war it has been used with precaution by the EU Member States. Implementing 
protocols between Ukraine and eight EU Member States (Austria, Czechia, Estonia, Poland 

65 

 
 
Lithuania  and  Benelux  States)  have  entered  into  force.  Ukraine  approved  implementing 
protocols with Romania, Latvia, Spain and Hungary.  

Readmission  dialogue  is  at  various  stages  with  12  EU  Member  States:  Bulgaria,  Croatia, 
Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden. In 
2022, the State Migration Service received 276 readmission requests, including 260 under the 
agreement between Ukraine and the EU, with 206 approved. It sent 13 readmission requests 
during the year; two people were readmitted from Ukraine.  

Ukraine  also  has  readmission  agreements  in  force  with  other  third  countries,  such  as 
Switzerland, Denmark, Belarus, Georgia, Iceland, Republic of Moldova, Norway, the Russian 
Federation, Vietnam, Türkiye, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. However, the agreements with 
the Russian Federation, Belarus and Vietnam are not applied in practice.   

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

In  2022,  the  SBGS  detained  12 068  people  for  violation  of  immigration  rules  in  Ukraine, 
including 622 foreigners detained for illegal crossing or attempted illegal crossing of the state 
border. The majority of irregular migrants were detained at the border with EU countries. They 
included citizens of Moldova, Russia, Türkiye, Pakistan, Nepal, Cuba and others.  

In 2022, the SBGS issued 271 expulsion decisions against foreigners and stateless persons who 
had illegally crossed or attempted to illegally cross the state border, with 192 forcible returns 
and 79 forcible expulsions. The State Migration Service reports that the number of irregular 
migrants decreased in 2022 (5 062) compared to 2021 (8 308).  

The  State  Migration  Service  operates  six  special  establishments  that  include  three  migrant 
accommodation  centres  with  overall  capacity  for  566  people  and  three  temporary 
accommodation centres for up to 421 foreigners and stateless persons. The staffing capacities 
are sufficient, and all centres are adequately equipped. The Chernihiv migrant accommodation 
centre was destroyed in the early phase of the war, with the migrants evacuated. The centre is 
currently being rebuilt and is not yet operational. The migrant accommodation centres in Volyn 
and Mykolaiv are operational.  

An integrated migration management information system is in place with automated business 
process  workflows  and  inter-agency  cooperation,  in  particular  between  the  State  Migration 
Service, the SBGS and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, complementary legislation 
on  the  processing  of  biometric  data  is  needed  to  fully  use  the  system  for  biometric  data 
exchange. 

The  Department  of  Migration  Police,  which  is  part  of  the  National  Police  of  Ukraine, 
cooperates  with  Europol’s  European  Migrant  Smuggling  Centre  to  identify  and  uncover 
criminal  schemes  that  involve  irregular  migration  and  human  trafficking.  In  2022,  it 
participated  in  several  large-scale  operations  run  by  Europol  to  combat  human  trafficking, 
including child trafficking, human trafficking for labour and sexual exploitation.   

Asylum 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

The State Migration Service and its territorial bodies are responsible for handling applications 
for international protection and asylum claims.  

The legislation on asylum is broadly in line with the EU acquis, in particular on the time it 
takes  to  process  applications  and  on  asylum  applicants’  rights,  such  as  the  right  to  access 
reunification  and  subsidiary  protection. 
employment,  secondary  education, 

family 

66 

 
 
Psychological and social aid are also covered in the legislation. However, limited support is 
available in practice due to the lack of capacity. Free legal assistance is available. The action 
plan for refugee integration has been in preparation since 2021, but work has stalled because 
of the war. Procedural guarantees are available for the applications of unaccompanied minors. 
Ukraine is a party to the relevant international conventions, including the 1951 Geneva Refugee 
Convention and its 1967 Protocol. 

In March 2023, amendments were introduced to the Law on refugees and persons in need of 
additional and temporary protection. In accordance with these amendments, the restriction is 
imposed on the SBGS to accept applications submitted during the legal regime of martial law 
for  recognition  as  refugees  or  persons  in  need  of  additional  protection  in  cases  where  the 
applicant crosses the Ukrainian border directly from a country where there is no danger to life. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

In  2022,  205  applications  for  recognition  as  a  refugee  or  a  person  in  need  of  additional 
protection were submitted. 20 foreigners and stateless persons were recognised as refugees, 
and  26  as  persons  in  need  of  additional  protection.  Interpretation  is  provided  by  the  State 
Migration  Service  territorial  departments  during  the  consideration  procedures  of  asylum 
applications. The national system for biometric verification and identification is operational 
and used during border controls.  

There  are  three  temporary  accommodation  centres  for  applicants  and  people  granted 
international protection with a total reception capacity of 421 people. Staff levels seem to be 
sufficient  for  the  number  of  applications  that  Ukraine  has  had.  Material  conditions  are 
sufficient,  however  there  is  room  for  improvement  with  regards  to  integration  and  psycho-
social  support.  The  financial  capacity  to  integrate  recognised  refugees  is  limited,  as  is  the 
capacity of the relevant local authorities.  

Ukraine does not have a roadmap for bilateral cooperation with the European Union Agency 
for Asylum. 

Visa policy 

Ukraine’s visa policy is broadly in line with the EU acquis on the processing of applications, 
the criteria for granting protection and the processes for issuing different visa types. However, 
the list of third countries with which Ukraine has visa-free regimes is not fully aligned with the 
EU’s  visa  policy.  The  following  countries  for  which  EU  nationals  require  a  visa  are  visa-
exempt  for  Ukraine:  Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  Bahrain,  Belarus,  Ecuador,  Kazakhstan,  Kuwait, 
Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Türkiye and Uzbekistan. 

The security features of visas and travel documents are broadly aligned with EU standards. 
Ukraine  has  been  issuing  biometric  passports  since  2015.  The  last  non-biometric  passports 
were issued in 2016, and the complete phasing out is planned for 2026 upon expiry. Ukraine 
has an electronic national visa registration database that includes biometric identifiers. 

Ukraine does not have agreements on consular and visa-issuing cooperation, joint locations or 
representation agreements on the issuing of visas with other countries. Since 24 February 2022, 
it has suspended issuing visas at the border. 

Implementation of the visa-free regime with the EU, established in 2017, has been smooth. 
The European Commission's sixth report on the Visa Suspension Mechanism5, published in 
October 2023, concluded that Ukraine continues to meet the visa liberalisation benchmarks. 

5 COM(2023)730 final 

67 

 
 
 
Thanks  to  tighter  border  controls  and  awareness-raising  campaigns,  unfounded  asylum 
applications  from  Ukrainian  citizens  in  the  EU  and  Schengen  associated  countries  have 
decreased.  In  2020,  the  number  of  Ukrainian  applicants  for  international  protection  in  EU 
Member States was 5 990, 37% less than in 2019. The recognition rate increased slightly from 
10% in 2019 to 11% in 2020. In 2022, 26 715 Ukrainians applied for international protection 
in Member States (compared to 6 460 in 2021) with a recognition rate of 90% (compared to 
17% in 2021). 

In 2022, Russia’s war of aggression led to an influx of millions of people seeking refuge in the 
EU  and  in  neighbouring  countries.  Following  a  Commission  proposal  to  activate  the 
Temporary Protection Directive for the first time, on 4 March 2022 the Council adopted the 
implementing decision to grant temporary protection status to Ukrainian nationals and other 
categories of people displaced from Ukraine on or after 24 February 2022. Furthermore, the 
Commission  adopted  operational  guidelines  for  external  border  management  to  facilitate 
border crossings at EU-Ukraine borders. There were over 21.5 million entries into the EU by 
Ukrainian nationals between 24 February 2022 and 20 August from Ukraine and Moldova6. 
Over 4.1 million active registrations for Temporary Protection are recorded by Member States, 
Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland as of mid-August 2023, of which 4.03 million in the EU 
Member States. Under these exceptional circumstances, the visa-free regime between the EU 
and  Ukraine  has  facilitated  travel  to  and  from  Ukraine,  in  particular  for  those  Ukrainian 
nationals who decided not to take up residence in the EU and those who do not fall under the 
scope of the Temporary Protection Directive. 

Schengen and external borders   

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

The SBGS is responsible for managing Ukraine’s borders. An integrated border management 
strategy for the period up to 2025 is in place and has been updated in light of new challenges 
related among others to restoring border management in the liberated area of the state border. 
The action plan for the implementation of the strategy for 2020-2022 has expired. The new 
action plan for 2023-2025 has not yet been approved. Implementation of the action plan will 
need better monitoring, as well as quantitative and concrete indicators to measure the progress 
of its implementation. There is no Schengen action plan in place yet. 

The legislative framework for border control, in particular rules on checks and surveillance 
and the strategic integrated border management framework are partly aligned with EU policy 
and best practices. Ukraine has no legislation to request advanced passenger information (API) 
from airlines for flights entering or departing its territory. The API system was piloted at Kyiv 
Boryspil international airport. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

The Inter-Agency Working Group for Integrated Border Management, chaired by the Deputy 
Prime  Minister  for  European  Integration,  was  established  in  2019  with  a  core  task  of 
monitoring implementation of the integrated border management strategy. In August 2023 it 
has convened for the first time since the beginning of the war to discuss IBM Strategy and its 
action plan.  

The SBGS has a total staff of 60 000, including  52 000 military personnel. Due to the war, 
more than half of its staff has rotated from regular border-related activities to deployments – 

6  The  number  of  exits  by  Ukrainian  nationals  (including  exits  to  Moldova)  was  nearly  18.7  million.  Figures 

indicate the number of cross-border movements and not single individuals.  

68 

 
 
 
either  on  the  frontline  or  at  the  border  with  Belarus.  The  capacities  of  integrated  border 
management agencies at border crossing points are insufficient due to the lack of appropriate 
infrastructure and technical  equipment.  Technical  resources require  a significant  upgrade to 
improve the quality of border checks, especially in relation to anti-smuggling. Border checks 
meet  minimum  standards.  However,  additional  equipment  is  needed  to  detect  weapons  and 
people hiding in large vehicles and containers. The implementation of Ukraine’s local border 
traffic agreements with neighbouring countries is satisfactory. Border surveillance is not fully 
effective. Risk analysis-based border surveillance mechanisms are satisfactory. In addition, as 
a result of the Russian war of aggression, 117  out  of 234 border crossing points have been 
closed.  Considerable  infrastructure  at  border  crossing  points  on  the  northern,  eastern  and 
southern sections of the border have been destroyed. 

SBGS risk analysis aims to gradually comply with the common integrated risk analysis model. 
The level of situational awareness and responsiveness at Ukraine’s borders could be improved 
by strengthening operational inter-agency cooperation and information exchange. The SBGS 
training  curriculum  is  partly  harmonised  with  the  common  core  curricula  of  Frontex,  the 
European Border and Coast Guard Agency. 

There  is  no  national  inter-agency  cooperation  centre  in  Ukraine.  Instead,  relevant  border 
management agencies operate coordination centres in their respective organisational structures 
to ensure intra-agency and partial inter-agency coordination and cooperation. In 2022, a virtual 
analytical centre was established to improve inter-agency coordination. There is no structured 
crisis response mechanism. 

The SBGS has had a working arrangement with Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard 
Agency,  since  2007.  Cooperation  includes  information  exchange,  joint  risk  analysis, 
participation  in  joint  operations  (as  an  observer  or  in  operations  without  executive  powers 
exercised by European border guards on the territory of Ukraine) and staff training. A Frontex 
liaison officer with a regional mandate for the Eastern Partnership has been deployed and is 
currently based in Moldova. The EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine has 
been  supporting  both  countries  since  2005  and  has  helped  them  improve  integrated  border 
management.  

Ukraine systematically provides data on invalid, lost and stolen travel documents to Interpol. 
However, only large border crossing points in Ukraine have access to Interpol’s stolen and lost 
travel documents database and stolen vehicles database.  

On  border  control,  Ukraine  uses  the  national  system  of  biometric  verification  and  citizen 
identification that allows for an automatic check of all types of biometric documents. All 166 
international and interstate border-crossing points are connected to Interpol databases. 

On  operational  cooperation  with  neighbouring  countries,  Ukraine  has  a  number  of 
agreements (with Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania), including agreements on joint patrols, 
joint cooperation centres and local border traffic management. Ukraine is currently negotiating 
bilateral agreements on joint controls, in particular with Poland.  

Some measures in place to fight border corruption consist of preventive and internal control 
measures implemented by the SBGS and the State Customs Service. However, more effective 
measures are needed to fight corruption, including preventive measures. In the reporting period, 
the SBGS reported 1 449 inspections, 19 servicemen were detained for abuse of office and the 
facilitation of illegal activities at the border. 15 border guards were found guilty of corruption 
offences. The stiffest sentence was a restriction from service for 3 years and a prison sentence 
of 6 months.  

69 

 
 
The  smuggling  of  goods,  including  cigarettes,  is  currently  decriminalised  in  Ukraine, 
constituting  an  administrative  offence.  The  draft  Law  on  the  criminalisation  of  large-scale 
smuggling is pending adoption. It also includes criminal responsibility for unintended mistakes 
in  customs  declarations.  Criminalisation  increases  the  risk  of  abuse  by  law  enforcement 
agencies if adopted. Criminalising the smuggling of all goods is a crucial element in combating 
cross-border crime.  

2.3.  ECONOMIC CRITERIA 

Table 2.1: 
Ukraine - Key economic figures 

2014-19 
average 

2020 

2021 

2022 

GDP per capita (% of EU-27 in PPS)1) 
Real GDP growth  
Economic  activity  rate  of  the  population  aged 
15-70 (%), total 
      female 
      male 
Unemployment rate of the population aged 15-
64 (%), total 
      female 
      male 
Employment  of  the  population  aged  15-64 
(annual growth %) 
Nominal wages (annual growth %) 
Consumer price index (annual growth 
%) 
Exchange rate against EUR 
Current account balance (% of GDP) 
Net  foreign  direct  investment,  FDI 
(% of GDP) 
General  government  balance  (%  of 
GDP) 
General government debt (% of GDP) 

29 
-0.8 

62.5 

56.4 
69.2 

9.0 

7.7 
10.2 

-3.3 

21.7 

18.0 

26.6 
-1.8 

2.6 

-2.3 

68.7 

30 
-4.0 

62.1 

56.3 
68.5 

9.5 

9.1 
9.9 

-4.0 

10.4 

2.7 

30.8 
3.4 

0.2 

-5.3 

60.9 

29 
3.4 

61.8 

56.1 
68.1 

9.9 

10.2 
9.6 

-1.9 

20.9 

9.4 

32.3 
-1.9 

3.8 

-3.4 

48.9 

-29.1 

N.A. 

N.A. 

N.A. 

5.9 

20.2 

40.2 
5.0 

0.3 

-16.3 

78.5 

In  line  with  the  conclusions  of  the  European  Council  in  Copenhagen  in  June  1993,  EU 
accession requires the existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. 

2.3.1.  The existence of a functioning market economy 

Due  to  the  impacts  of  Russia’s  ongoing  full-scale  invasion  as  well  as  the  pre-existing 
structural economic challenges, the Ukrainian economy is between an early stage and some 
level of preparation towards establishing a functioning market economy. Since the full-scale 
invasion by Russia, the conduct of monetary policy, overall economic governance and the 
institutional  and  regulatory  environment  have  faced  exceptional  difficulties.  Despite  the 
extraordinary challenges, the Ukrainian authorities have responded swiftly and appropriately, 
while  showing  remarkable  resilience  and  adaptability  to  preserve  macroeconomic  and 
financial  stability,  although  the  authorities  will  need  to  continue  their  efforts  to  return 
economic  and  monetary  policy  settings  to  those  conducive  to  the  smooth  long-term 
functioning of a market economy.  

70 

 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ukraine’s macroeconomic performance was somewhat muted before the full-scale invasion. 
Low levels of investment, a declining working age population, reliance on low value-added 
sectors all contributed to subdued economic growth (of around 3% per year in the four years 
before the pandemic) and a persistent gap with the standards of living in the EU. In 2022, as 
a result of the war, the economy contracted by 29.1%.  

Despite the war, the Ukrainian authorities ensured predictability, transparency and stability-
orientation in policy-making. In light of the wartime conditions, the National Bank of Ukraine 
(NBU)  took  decisive  and  appropriate  actions  to  maintain  financial  stability  and  bolster 
confidence  in  the  domestic  currency,  particularly  by  suspending  the  inflation-targeting 
framework, fixing and devaluing the exchange rate, and raising its main refinancing rate. In 
addition, the banking sector remained fully operational and stable with ample liquidity, also 
thanks to previous reforms and supervisory forbearance measures. Although the full impact 
of the war on the quality of assets in the financial sector remains to be seen, the ratio of non-
performing loans has been high and appears to have increased more recently.  

The state of public finances has deteriorated substantially due to the duration and cost of the 
war and its impact on economic activity, undoing the considerable fiscal consolidation and 
corresponding reduction in the debt stock that had been achieved in previous years before the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Tackling this, notably by introducing measures to increase the revenue 
base,  will  be  of  key  importance  going  forward.  Furthermore,  the  state  footprint  on  the 
economy, already high before the war, has increased. The significant internal and external 
population  displacements,  together  with  capital  destruction,  affected  the  labour  market, 
which was characterised by a relatively low activity rate and somewhat higher unemployment 
rate compared to the EU, already before the invasion. Despite progress, the functioning of 
product  markets  continues  to  show  a  number  of  weaknesses,  particularly  related  to 
institutions, corruption, contract enforcement, and competitiveness, which are reflected in a 
large informal economy. At the same time, this assessment also highlights the determination 
and capability of the authorities to navigate through the exceptional challenges Ukraine is 
facing. 

In  order  to  improve  the  functioning  of  the  market  economy,  and  taking  into  account  the 
ongoing war and ensuing reconstruction efforts, Ukraine should in particular: 

→  continue to implement prudent policies underpinning macroeconomic stability.  Ensure 
adequate resources to maintain core state functions, while ensuring the sustainability and 
improving  the  transparency  of  public  finances.  Safeguard  the  stability  of  the  financial 
sector, including by addressing the growing presence of non-performing loans; 

→  take  measures  to  improve  the  business  environment  with  a  view  to  prepare  for 
reconstruction  efforts,  in  particular  by  reducing  regulatory  and  administrative  burden, 
addressing  issues  related  to  corruption  and  the  rule  of  law  and  enhancing  the  anti-
monopoly  framework.  Take  steps  to  enhance  the  management  of  State-Owned 
Enterprises in line with OECD recommendations, while intensifying privatisations;  
→  develop  and  implement  a  strategy  to  attract  and  reintegrate  displaced  persons  in  the 
Ukrainian labour market and those whose participation has been disrupted by the war as 
well  as  to  address  structural  labour  market  issues  and,  take  steps  to  tackle  informal 
employment, and increase labour market participation.  

Economic governance 

The government has shown a strong commitment to implement much-needed reforms to 
encourage growth and financial stability. The authorities of Ukraine have demonstrated a 
strong  commitment  to  pursue  stability-oriented  macroeconomic  policies  since  the  Maidan 
71 

 
 
Revolution of Dignity in 2014. As part of the reform requirements outlined in successive IMF 
programmes,  important  actions  were  taken  to  reinforce  the  stability  of  the  banking  sector, 
including  measures  to  enhance  banking  supervision  and  resolution  mechanisms,  as  well  as 
reforms to improve the independence of the National Bank of Ukraine. Ukraine has also taken 
steps to bolster the transparency of public finances and institutions, in particular by publishing 
budgetary  information,  improving  the  public  procurement  system  and  introducing  asset 
reporting requirements for public officials. Additional reforms are needed to further guarantee 
the transparency of public finances, as well as prevent interference from vested interests, fight 
corruption, strengthen the rule of law, and improve the business environment.  

The  policy  and  regulatory  response  to  the  exceptional  war  situation  was  overall 
appropriate, although it has had an impact on the application of market principles and 
government  involvement  in  the  economy.  Throughout  Russia’s  full-scale  invasion,  the 
Ukrainian authorities demonstrated commendable resilience and adaptability in implementing 
policies to maintain macroeconomic and financial stability. Nevertheless, the current context 
has  inevitably  led  to  some  centralisation  of  power  and  a  reduction  in  the  independence  of 
institutions  responsible  for  economic  policy.  The  central  bank  appropriately  suspended  the 
inflation-targeting  framework,  moved  to  a  fixed  exchange  rate  regime  and  introduced 
supervisory  and  regulatory  forbearance  measures  (all  of  which  helped  safeguard  financial 
stability and bolstered confidence in the domestic currency)7. In addition, the NBU directly 
financed  about  one third of the government’s funding  needs in  2022, although this practice 
ceased  in  early  2023,  reducing  risks  for  price  and  external  stability.  The  government  also 
introduced  price  controls  on  essential  goods  and  communal  services,  and  many  taxes  were 
temporarily reduced. Support schemes to households and businesses have been expanded and 
deregulation efforts have continued, which helped improve the business environment. Overall, 
the government has shown a remarkable degree of continuity, including through the design of 
a seven-pillar national recovery and development plan, presented in May 2022 and followed-
up  by  a  government  priority  action  plan  for  the  current  year  approved  in  March  2023.  The 
continuous and evolving engagement with the IMF, as well as with the Commission under the 
Macro-Financial Assistance Plus instrument (MFA+), have also been an important anchor for 
further reform efforts. 

Macroeconomic stability 

Before  Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s macroeconomic performance was rather 
weak, owing to low levels of foreign and domestic investment, a declining population, and 
a reliance on low value-added sectors.  In 2021, total investment in Ukraine accounted for 
13.8% of GDP (EU average of 22.1%). Foreign direct investment (FDI) has remained weak at 
an average of 2.8% of GDP over 2017-2021. A decline in population, fuelled by low birth rates 
and substantial emigration, has not only reduced Ukraine's total population but also decreased 
the share of the working-age population from 70% in 2011 to 67% in 2021. This has hindered 
economic growth and added to fiscal pressures by increasing the dependency ratio. In addition, 
Ukraine’s economy is reliant on low value-added sectors – especially agriculture and mining – 
which makes the economy vulnerable to fluctuations in global commodity prices and weighs 
on its living standards. As a result, Ukraine has made limited gains in income convergence with 
the EU average over the past decade, with GDP per capita standing at 29.3% of the EU average 

7  However,  conscious  of  the  long-term  impacts  of  a  fixed  exchange  regime  on  the  economy  and  on  the 
effectiveness of monetary policy, the NBU adopted in June 2023 a strategy to ease FX controls and move 
towards  a  more  flexible  exchange  rate  once  conditions  allow.  On  3  October  2023,  the  NBU  shifted  to  a 
managed float system for the hryvnia, marking the first step in liberalising the exchange rate. 

72 

 
 
 
in 2021 in terms of purchasing-power parity (PPP). Income inequality remains low compared 
to the EU and has been stable over the past decade, with the GINI coefficient reaching 25.6 % 
in 2020, compared to an average of below 30% in the EU. 

50,0

2018

has 

% y-o-y

10
5
0
-5
-10
-15
-20
-25
-30
-35

Graph 2.1: Ukraine - Real GDP growth 
and contributions

been 
economy 
Ukraine’s 
profoundly impacted by Russia’s war 
of  aggression.    After  a  milder-than-
expected  COVID-19  recession  and  an 
incomplete  rebound  in  2021,  real  GDP 
growth  collapsed 
in  2022  (-29.1%, 
somewhat  more  resilient  than  initially 
expected).  Population  displacement, 
supply-chain  disruptions, 
inflationary 
pressures, and territorial losses due to the 
war  took  a  toll  on  economic  activity  in 
2022,  especially  on  consumption  and 
investment, which fell by 27% and 34%, 
respectively.  Net  exports  also  declined 
supply  bottlenecks 
considerably  as 
weighed on exports and  the spending  of Ukrainian refugees abroad boosted import growth. 
Despite growing by 18% in real terms due to war-related spending, the contribution of public 
consumption  to  GDP  growth  remained  small.  In  2023,  the  economy  has  started  to  recover 
somewhat despite continued Russian attacks. This is thanks to the resilience of critical energy 
infrastructure, some positive signs of a partial return of refugees, and the ability of businesses 
and households to adapt to the war economy.  

Stocks
Balance of goods and services
Gross Capital Formation
Gov. Cons.
Priv. Cons.

Source: SSSU, own calculations

-50,0

2019

2020

2021

2022

The current account turned into a surplus following Russia's invasion. In the 5 years prior 
to the pandemic, Ukraine’s registered current account deficits of 2-3% of GDP mainly due to 
a sizeable negative trade balance. This was offset in part by traditionally strong remittances 
inflows to Ukraine. The pandemic caused the current account to swing into a small surplus due 
to a compression of import volumes following the sharp contraction in economic activity over 
the course of 2020. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine led to an unprecedented trade 
deficit  of  16.2%  of  GDP  in  2022,  which  was  mainly  driven  by  a  strong  contraction  in  the 
exports of goods (-35.2%) due to production disruptions as well as transport and supply-chain 
difficulties. Still, the current account posted a record surplus of 5% of GDP, thanks to a strong 
surplus of both the primary and the secondary income balance, driven by exceptionally high 
foreign  official  grants  and  remittances  inflows,  which  stood  at  5.4%  and  15.7%  of  GDP, 
respectively.  

73 

 
 
0

10

-10

Graph 2.2: Ukraine - Current account 
selected components and FDI

fallen 
investment  has 
Foreign 
markedly  following  the  outbreak  of 
the  war.  After  a  notable  recovery  in 
2021,  foreign  investment  inflows  have 
collapsed since the outbreak of the war 
(-92% in 2022). Portfolio investment in 
Ukraine registered an outflow of 1.3% 
in  2022,  while  other 
of  GDP 
investments  in  the  country  reached 
8.5%  of  GDP,  driven  primarily  by  the 
additional  government  borrowing.  The 
an 
financial 
aggregate outflow of USD 11.1 billion 
(6.9% of GDP) in 2022. The gap to the 
current  and  capital  account  inflow  of 
USD 8.2 billion was financed through the draw-down of the official international reserves by 
USD 2.9 billion. 

2018
Work remittances balance
1.A Balance on goods and services
Current account balance

Source: IMF and Central Bank of Ukraine 

registered 

account 

% of GDP

2020

2022

2019

2021

-20

The National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) has ensured financial stability and strengthened 
confidence  in  the  domestic  currency.  Prior  to  the  war,  Ukraine implemented welcome 
reforms to enhance the autonomy and governance principles of the NBU, which successfully 
helped reduce inflation from 12.6% in January 2017 to 3.2% in January 2020. Following the 
Russian full-scale invasion, the NBU introduced swift actions to ensure financial stability and 
strengthen the confidence in the domestic currency. These included suspending the inflation-
targeting framework, fixing and devaluing the exchange rate, and raising its main refinancing 
rate. While official reserves suffered a depletion in the first months of the war, international 
financial support helped restore them to their highest historical level in July 2023. The positive 
trends in terms of improved expectations and confidence in the national currency allowed the 
NBU to refrain from a further increase in its policy rate beyond 25% (which was on the contrary 
cut by 300 basis points in July 2023 and 200 basis points to 20% in September 2023) or from 
further  devaluing  the  hryvnia  (beyond  the  25%  in  July  2022).  The  NBU  took  additional 
confidence-enhancing measures in late 2022 and early 2023, as a result of which the spread 
between the market and official exchange rates narrowed down to a rather marginal 4%. The 
central  bank  is  fully  committed  to  return  to  an  inflation-targeting  framework  in  a  flexible 
exchange rate regime as soon as circumstances permit it, as highlighted in the recently adopted 
FX strategy, as well as in the decision of the NBU on 3 October 2023 to move to a managed 
exchange rate regime. 

Inflation  declined  strongly  in  2023  after  reaching  a  6  year  high  in  2022.  After  some 
moderation  in  2020,  inflation  increased  steadily  throughout  2021,  mainly  due  to  increasing 
global commodity prices – particularly  for energy and food – as well as  supply bottlenecks 
both  in  Ukraine  and  abroad.  The  war  exacerbated  inflationary  pressures,  causing  further 
disruptions in supply chains, a decrease in the supply of some goods, and higher production 
costs. Coupled with considerable monetary financing by the central bank during the war, these 
factors led to a strong and steady rise in inflation over 2022, reaching 26.6% in December 2022. 
Inflation has nevertheless eased visibly since, reaching 8.6% in August 2023, due to increased 
supply of food and fuels, a rapid partial recovery of the energy system from Russia’s attacks, 
which reduced energy prices, as well as skilful policymaking by the NBU. Indeed, conscious 
of the adverse effects of monetary financing, including on macro-financial stability, the NBU 
has discontinued this practice since the beginning of 2023 and the government has relied on 
taxation, foreign assistance, and financing mobilised from the domestic market. This helped 

74 

 
 
reduce inflation expectations and ease pressures on core inflation.  

Graph 2.3: Ukraine - Fiscal 
developments

Public finances deteriorated markedly, reversing the gains from fiscal consolidation prior 
to the war. The state of public finances has deteriorated markedly due to the duration and cost 
of  the  war,  making  Ukraine  lose  access  to  international  debt  markets  and  rely  on  foreign 
assistance and domestic markets to finance its funding needs. Thanks largely to massive official 
foreign grants, the 2022 general government deficit was contained to 16.3% of GDP. Driven 
by spending on defence and public order, overall public expenditure increased by 65% in 2022. 
While tax revenues contracted by almost 8% in 2022, total public revenues increased by 32%, 
primarily thanks to the massive foreign grants. The war has led to a reverse in gains from the 
considerable fiscal consolidation that had 
been achieved since 2017, during which 
public  debt  had  decreased  from  around 
81% of GDP in 2016 to 49% of GDP in 
2021. Driven by the sizeable borrowing 
but also reflecting the decline in nominal 
GDP, total public debt reached 78.5% of 
GDP  at  end-2022.  The    substantial 
deterioration 
finances 
highlights the need to execute the budget 
within the available resource envelop in 
the 
by 
important efforts to increase the revenue 
base over the medium term. In addition, 
in the area of public financial management, building on significant improvements in the years 
before the war, further priority reform  areas include ensuring the  availability of fiscal  data, 
restoring the medium-term budgetary framework, improving public investment management, 
and reinforcing the mandate and functionality of the supreme audit institution. Improving the 
monitoring and management of fiscal risks, including those related to state-owned enterprises, 
public guarantees and age-related expenditure, is also an important reform priority.  

% of GDP
4
0
-4
-8
-12
-16
-20

2020
Public debt (% of GDP) (rhs)

Source: Ministry of Finance, wiiw

complemented 

short-term, 

public 

2019

2021

2022

2018

100

in 

80

60

20

40

Functioning of the product markets 

Business environment 

Weaknesses  in  the  business  environment  led  to  low  levels  of  investment.  Ukraine’s 
competitiveness  is  weak,  primarily  owing  to  weak  institutions,  the  prevalence  of  market 
dominance  and  an  ineffective  anti-monopoly  policy.  Nevertheless,  some  progress  in 
deregulating  its  economy  has  been  made,  where  the  cancellation  of  almost  one  fifth  of  the 
regulatory  acts  under  review  in  the  period  2016-2020  was  a  significant  step  to  streamline 
regulation. Despite a moderate regulatory burden and no significant legal barriers to market 
entry,  corruption,  ongoing  geopolitical  tensions  and  inefficient  contract  enforcement 
discourages private investment and cross-border business relations, including FDI.  

To  allow  companies  to  operate  during  the  war,  the  authorities  have  lifted  certain 
regulatory requirements for the period of application of the martial law and continued to 
progress  with  a  number  of  broader  reforms.  Against  the  backdrop  of  a  highly  uncertain 
outlook, business activity was supported by further steps towards deregulation and reducing 
administrative burden. As of August 2022, it is possible to set up a limited liability company 
in an automatic way on the basis of a model charter, without the need to go through a state 
registration authority. Similarly, digital tools have been deployed successfully to facilitate the 
functioning  of  the  court  system.  The  Rada  also  adopted  a  law  that  introduces  a  simplified 

75 

 
 
bankruptcy  procedure  that  avoids  summoning  the  parties,  while  simplifying  the  insolvency 
officers’ work and providing for the creation of an automated information system. 

The informal sector still constitutes a substantial share of Ukraine's economy, estimated 
at  30-40%  of  Ukraine's  GDP.  This  significantly  impacts  tax  revenues,  exacerbates  poor 
working conditions by hindering access to social protection, distorts competition and hampers 
the  effectiveness  of  policy  measures.  Several  factors  contribute  to  the  persistence  of  this 
phenomenon:  despite  deregulation,  there  is  still  a  complex  and  inefficient  regulatory 
framework; weak law enforcement; and a general lack of trust in governmental institutions. 
Furthermore, corruption creates a volatile business environment, providing a strong incentive 
for businesses to operate informally. 

State influence on product markets 

The war has exacerbated the state’s footprint in the economy. The Ukrainian state already 
had a substantial economic footprint in peace times. In 2021, the public sector accounted for 
18% of gross value added (down from 21% in 2020) and 32% of gross fixed capital formation 
(down from 35% in 2020). Ukraine’s more than 3 256 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) at central 
level accounted for one-tenth of output and 18% of employment before the war, with an average 
return on equity at 0.3% in 2019 far below that of the private sector (8%). Furthermore, SOEs 
have held a dominant role in many markets, stifling competition and making it difficult for new 
firms to enter. In 2022, for which detailed national accounts are not available yet, the relative 
share of the sector of public administration and defence jumped up to 24% of GDP (from 7.2% 
in 2021), while the share of government consumption more than doubled to 38.2% of GDP. 
The importance of many public companies, e.g. the railways, the energy provider and the post 
office, strengthened as a result of their crucial role in the emergency response to the full-scale 
invasion.    

Privatisation and restructuring 

Privatisation  and  corporate  governance  of  state-owned  enterprises  are  a  significant 
challenge  for  economic  policy.  Prior  to  the  war,  Ukraine  had  been  quite  successful  in 
privatising  small  property  and  production  assets,  notably  through  the  electronic  auctions 
platform ProZorro. In July 2022, the Rada adopted a law to simplify the procedure for small 
privatisations, which have resumed since then. Investors showed interest in two ports, several 
distilleries and other small real estate pieces. On 30 May 2023, a law was adopted that inter 
alia unblocks large-scale privatisations, which have been suspended since the beginning of the 
war, and where progress had previously been limited. The law also amends the structure of the 
State  Property  Fund  of  Ukraine  (SPFU).  The  law  also  makes  significant  changes  vis-à-vis 
sanctioned  property,  which  will  be  transferred  to  the  SPFU  for  management  and/or 
privatisation,  sale  or  lease.  As  far  as  SOEs  are  concerned,  while  progress  on  the  corporate 
governance reform was recorded before the war, it is not yet in line with OECD standards to 
ensure de-politicised, professional and transparent management.    

Functioning of the financial market 

Financial stability 

Although  the  already  high  non-performing  loans  ratio  has  increased  during  the  war, 
financial stability has been preserved thanks to swift policy action by the National Bank 
of  Ukraine.  Following  the  2014-2016  banking  crisis,  the  National  Bank  of  Ukraine 
strengthened proper oversight of the banking sector, which was characterised by a high level 
of  non-performing  loans.  Nevertheless,  after  two  rounds  of  asset  quality  reviews,  bank 
closures, and recapitalisations, non-performing loans started to decrease, declining from 58% 

76 

 
 
in 2017 to a still very high 30% in 2021. In response to the full-scale invasion, the National 
Bank of Ukraine took  steps to  safeguard banks’ liquidity  and the confidence in  the system, 
which  has  remained  strong  as  evidenced  by  the  increase  in  deposits  by  35%  y-o-y  by  end-
February  2023.  The  banking  sector  has  remained  stable  and  with  ample  liquidity,  although 
Non-Performing Loans ratio increased to 38.1% by end-2022 in light of war-related impacts 
on economic activity and collateral. Despite building additional provisions for about USD 3.5 
billion,  banks  remained  profitable  in  2022,  owing  to  high  liquidity  ratios,  which  yield 
significant interest income in a high interest rate environment. With a market share of close to 
50% over the last five years, the four state-owned banks dominate the banking sector.  

Access to finance 

Lending to the private sector remains low.  Ukraine’s financial sector is predominantly bank-
based and the total stock of bank lending to the private sector stood at just 20% of GDP in 2022 
(28%  in  2021),  much  below  the  EU  average.  Banks  showed  strong  resilience  to  the  war 
situation. This was thanks to initiatives such as Power Banking (guarantee of service despite 
power outage) and national ATM roaming (no inter-bank withdrawal charges), although both 
risk  appetite  and  loan  demand  have  decreased  against  the  backdrop  of  rising  interest  rates. 
Banks’ aggregate portfolio contracted by 4% in 2022, with corporate loans almost flat while 
loans  to  households  declined  by  13%.  To  ease  borrowers’  situation,  the  government  has 
simplified  the  conditions  for  benefitting  from  debt  restructuring  and  extended  access  to  the 
programme  of  ‘Affordable  Loans  5-7-9%’.  Even  during  the  war,  surveys  do  not  point  out 
access  to  finance  as  an  impediment  to  conducting  business.  Capital  markets  and  non-bank 
financial intermediation are in a very early stage of development.  

Functioning of the labour market 

Ukraine’s labour market suffers from labour and skills shortages, structurally high rates 
of young people not in education, employment or training (NEET), as well as informal 
employment.  Despite  witnessing  a  decline  in  labour  supply,  the  unemployment  rate  has 
fluctuated at around 9% over the past five years. Labour force participation stood at 62% in 
2021, with a low and decreasing rate of participation among women. The share of young people 
(aged  15-24)  who  were  NEET  stood  at  15.5%  in  2021.  Despite  high  formal  educational 
attainment,  skill  mismatches  persist,  which  impacts  productivity.  Improvements  in  active 
labour  market  policies  could  help  increase  employment  and  reduce  skill  gaps  by  training 
workers with the skills that employers need. Informal employment was estimated at 20% of all 
employed in 2021.   

The war has had a profound impact on the labour market and exacerbated pre-existing 
structural  challenges.  The  massive  outflow  of  people  to  other  countries,  an  estimated  5 
million internally displaced persons, and substantial job destruction in the wake of the invasion 
have reshaped the labour market landscape. At the macroeconomic level, the most important 
change was not the increase in the unemployment rate, but the dramatic fall in the labour force. 
Around 6.2 million people left the country, of which around 2.1 million were of working age. 
In addition, it has been estimated that around two thirds of refugees at working age have an 
advanced education. Coupled with the physical and mental impacts of the war on workers, this 
could exacerbate earlier trends of decreasing labour supply caused by a declining population 
at  working  age.  Additionally,  the  surge  in  internally  displaced  persons  has  intensified  skill 
mismatches and labour shortages in regions experiencing a pronounced workforce exodus and 
higher unemployment rates while fostering informal employment in recipient regions. Despite 
nominal wages remaining roughly constant, the hike in inflation has led to a collapse in real 
incomes for households.  

77 

 
 
2.3.2.  The  capacity  to  cope  with  competitive  pressure  and  market  forces  within  the 

Union 

Due  to  the  impacts  of  Russia’s  ongoing  full-scale  invasion  as  well  as  the  pre-existing 
structural economic challenges,, Ukraine is at an early stage of preparation in terms of its 
capacity to cope with the competitive pressure and market forces within the EU. The war has 
severely damaged the country’s capital infrastructure and caused a massive human exodus 
that has deeply affected the economy. Investment as a share of GDP was already very low 
before  the  war  and  infrastructure  remained  underdeveloped,  especially  trade-related 
infrastructure. Investment in research and innovation has been low, and educational outcomes 
have not met the needs of the labour market.  

The structure of the Ukrainian economy changed little in the five years before the start of the 
Russian war of aggression and remained concentrated in sectors with low added value. Even 
before  the  war,  the  stock  of  FDI  was  well  below  the  EU  average,  reflecting  persistent 
weaknesses  in  the  business  environment  and  high  perceived  corruption.  While  trade 
integration with the EU has been advancing recently, including thanks to the implementation 
of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, it remains low, while the openness of the 
Ukrainian economy overall had been decreasing before the invasion.  

At the same time, the international response in support of Ukraine has been massive over the 
last year. Future reconstruction could also help support modernization and allow Ukraine to 
specialise in higher value-added chains and strengthened competitiveness. 

To improve competitiveness and support long-term growth, Ukraine should in particular: 

→  continue  and,  when  the  situation  allows  for  it,  accelerate  repairs  and  rehabilitation  of 
infrastructure,  in  particular  the  restoration  of  energy  transmission  and  generation 
capacity,  including  from  renewable  energy  sources,  as  well  as  utilities,  transport 
infrastructure, schools and health facilities;  

→  take  measures  to  facilitate  investment,  including  for  reconstruction,  in  particular  by 
improving  public  procurement  processes,  reducing  barriers  to  project  implementation, 
reforming planning processes and strengthening the administrative capacity needed for 
investment management; 

→  take  steps  to  improve  the  quality  of  education  and  training,  including  for  Ukrainians 
returning  from  abroad,  to  ensure  outcomes  align  with  the  needs  of  the  labour  market, 
including the skills required for reconstruction. Ensure that the education system is also 
equipped to re-integrate Ukrainians returning from abroad. 

Education and innovation 

Ukraine  invests  a  relatively  large  share  of  its  GDP  in  education,  which  is  not 
proportionately reflected in outcomes. The country invests a higher proportion of GDP in 
education than the EU. This has contributed to high levels of formal educational attainment, 
with  54%  of  the  working-age  population  in  2020  enrolled  in  or  having  completed  tertiary 
education,  nearly  double  the  EU  average.  A  large  part  of  this  share  is  accounted  for  by 
vocational  education  and  training  rather  than  traditional  academic  degrees.  Ukraine  ranked 
39th out of 77 countries in the latest round of PISA reading assessments in 2018, which is low 
compared with its investment in education. 

Despite relatively high rates of investment and formal educational attainment, there is 
still a mismatch between the skills of the workforce and those demanded by employers. 
Nearly  38%  of  firms  in  Ukraine  identified  an  inadequately  educated  workforce  as  a  major 
78 

 
 
constraint, which is  much higher than the EU  average. This  rate increases to  nearly half of 
firms  with  at  least  10%  foreign  ownership.  Compared  to  relatively  large  investments  in 
vocational training within the education system, spending on active labour market policies to 
mitigate the skills mismatch remains very low at just 0.03% of GDP in 2017. 

The war has prolonged the pandemic-related disruptions to the continuity of education 
and poses a serious challenge to educational outcomes in the medium term. As of February 
2023,  an  estimated  10%  of  all  educational  institutions  in  the  country  had  been  damaged  or 
destroyed, and around 4.6 million children had been forcibly displaced by the war. According 
to the Ministry of Education and Science, only 32% of primary and secondary-school students 
are in full-time, face-to-face education as of June 2023. 

Investment in research and development remains low. Total expenditure on research and 
development, which has been declining over the last 10 years, reached 0.29% of GDP in 2021 
compared to an EU average of 2.2%. Over half of R&D spending comes from the private sector. 
According to the European Innovation Scoreboard 2022, Ukraine is regarded as an emerging 
innovator.  

Physical capital and quality of infrastructure 

The state of Ukraine’s physical infrastructure reflects a persistent lack of investment in 
the  years  before  the  war  and  will  require  significant  investment  in  order  to  support 
recovery  and  economic  growth.  The  average  ratio  of  gross  fixed  capital  formation  has 
fluctuated  at  around  17%  of  GDP  since  the  Maidan  Revolution,  which  is  about  half  of  the 
investment effort of similar emerging economies. FDI inflows averaged 2.2% of GDP over the 
five years from 2018, falling to 0.3% of GDP in 2022. The total stock of pre-war FDI remained 
low  at  around  31%  of  GDP.  The  country  ranks  very  low  on  the  quality  of  trade-related 
infrastructure and around a quarter of firms identified transportation as a major constraint in 
the  2019  World  Bank  Enterprise  Survey.  These  challenges  have  been  exacerbated  by  war-
related disruptions to export routes including in the Black Sea. Ukraine has a highly developed 
gas transmission system that is also closely integrated into the European gas network, though 
a significant part of the country’s overall energy generation and transmission infrastructure has 
been damaged in the war.  

In terms of digitalisation, Ukraine has made remarkable progress in recent years, though 
war-related damage has disrupted connectivity. In 2021, 83% of Ukrainian households had 
internet  access  at  home,  representing  an  increase  of  over  20  percentage  points  in  just  three 
years. Internet connectivity was a key driver of pre-war economic growth, in particular for the 
IT industry. Good digital connectivity has supported the country’s resilience during the war. 

The destruction of physical capital caused by the war has been immense. According to the 
Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment, direct damage in the first year of the war is estimated 
at EUR 150 billion, with the housing (38%), transport (26%) and energy (8%) sectors having 
suffered  the  greatest  damage.  Total  reconstruction  and  recovery  needs  were  estimated  in 
February 2023 at EUR 380 billion. This encompasses steps towards becoming a modern, low-
carbon, disaster- and climate-resilient country in view of becoming an EU Member State and 
takes into account  inflation, surge pricing  commonly  seen during mass construction, higher 
insurance premiums, etc. The destruction of the Kakhovka Dam in June 2023 caused severe 
economic and environmental loss. Russia has occupied, damaged or destroyed a large part of 
Ukraine’s  installed  power  capacity,  thousands  of  kilometres  of  electric,  gas  and  heating 
networks,  transformers,  compressor  stations,  heat-only  boilers  and  other  infrastructure 
facilities. Emergency repairs have continued with international support, which together with 
exceptional  efforts  by  the  transmission  system  operator  Ukrenergo  have  kept  the  grid 

79 

 
 
operational.  About  a  quarter  of  agricultural  land  could  not  be  used  for  production  before 
demining has taken place.  

Sectoral and enterprise structure 

The structure of the Ukrainian economy changed little in the five years before the start 
of  the  war  and  remained  concentrated  in  sectors  with  low  added  value.  Agriculture 
accounted  for  just  over  12%  of  GDP  (EU  average:  1.6%  of  GDP)  and  over  a  fifth  of  total 
employment in 2021. The share of manufacturing in GDP has been declining persistently in 
recent  years  from  14.4%  in  2016  to  8.6%  in  2022  due  in  part  to  labour  market  pressures 
resulting  from  high  emigration,  electricity  tariff  reform  as  well  as  the  impact  of  the  war  in 
Donetsk and Luhansk and the COVID-19 pandemic. The ICT sector, where Ukraine had been 
developing a comparative advantage, kept its relative share in output almost intact at 5.2% of 
GDP in 2022. Before the war, the trade, agriculture and industry sectors accounted for almost 
60%  of  all  employment,  suggesting  that  these  sectors  were  lagging  in  labour  productivity 
relative to the other parts of the economy. 

Nearly  all  businesses  in  Ukraine  (99.98%)  are  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises 
(SMEs), with access to finance remaining an obstacle for firms of all sizes. In 2020, SMEs 
employed 81% of workers and accounted for 62.6% of GDP and over a quarter of exports. 
Access to finance remains a key obstacle for businesses of all sizes and was identified by nearly 
half of firms as a major constraint in 2019, five times the rate in the EU. The interest rate spread 
for SMEs compared to large firms had been rising before the war, though SMEs account for an 
increasing  share  of  outstanding  loans  (61%  in  2020)  and  represent  nearly  one-third  of  new 
lending each year. The government strategy to boost SME development and open access to 
finance expired in 2020, and an updated strategic policy framework remains to be developed. 
The government introduced an affordable loan programme to improve access to bank lending 
for  small  firms.  This  has  continued  and  expanded  during  the  war,  with  an  increase  in  the 
maximum loan amount and a reduction in interest rates to 0% for the duration of martial law. 

Economic integration with the EU and price competitiveness 

The overall openness of the economy had been shrinking even before the war, with foreign 
trade relative to GDP contracting from 108% in 2015 to 88% in 2022. Despite this general 
trend, economic integration with the EU progressed further thanks to the implementation of the 
Association  Agreement  and  the  Deep  Comprehensive  Free  Trade  Agreement  (DCFTA). 
Ukrainian companies have been actively using the opportunities of the DCFTA, with 27% more 
businesses exporting to the EU in 2022 than in 2016. The share of exports to the EU, which 
consisted mostly of agricultural products, metals and minerals, increased from 28% in 2015 to 
36%  in  2021.  The  share  of  imports  from  the  EU,  which  comprised  primarily  machines, 
chemicals and minerals, also strengthened from 36% in 2015 to 41% in 2021. The EU is the 
largest source of FDI in Ukraine, accounting for three-quarters of FDI inflows in 2021. Thanks 
to the temporary suspension of all tariffs, the agreement on road transport and the effective 
implementation of logistical Solidarity lanes since the start of the war, trade integration with 
the EU has progressed further, with 39% of Ukrainian exports going to the EU in 2022 and 
about half of Ukrainian imports coming from the EU. 

80 

 
 
% of GDP

Graph  2.4a: Ukraine - Imports 
contribution

60

40

20

0

60

40

20

0

% of GDP

Graph 2.4b: Ukraine - Exports 
contributions

2018
EU

2019

CIS

2020

Asia

2021

2022
Others Source: IMF

2018
EU

2019

CIS

2020

Asia

2021

Others

2022
Source: IMF

On  price  competitiveness,  unit  labour  costs  remained  relatively  low  and  stable  in  Ukraine 
between 2014 and 2018, remaining less than a third of those in neighbouring EU Member 
States in US dollar terms. 

2.4. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, STATISTICS, FINANCIAL CONTROL 

Chapter 5 – Public procurement 

EU rules ensure that the public procurement of goods, services and works in any Member State 
is  transparent  and open  to  all EU companies on  the basis  of  non-discrimination and equal 
treatment. 
Overall, Ukraine has some level of preparation in the area of public procurement. Limited 
progress was made during the reporting period in the face of the Russian war of aggression 
against  Ukraine  and  the  application  of  martial  law.  Further  legal  alignment  with  the  EU 
acquis is needed, including on concessions and public-private partnerships (PPPs), exclusion, 
selection,  use  of  the  most  economically  advantageous  tender  criterion,  as  well  as  defence 
procurement.  
In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular:  

→  make progress in aligning the laws on public procurement with the EU acquis, including 

on concessions and PPPs; 

→  proceed  with  the  appointment  of  public  procurement  commissioners  in  the  Anti-

Monopoly Committee of Ukraine; 

→  ensure  that  exceptions  to  the  laws  on  public  procurement  are  kept  to  the  minimum 

required under martial law. 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 
The legal framework on public procurement is partially aligned with the 2014 EU directives 
on public procurement. Further alignment is needed, including on the scope of and exemptions 
from public procurement legislation, mixed contracts and value estimation, exclusion, selection 
and  award  criteria.  This  includes  the  removal  of  fixed  weights  for  the  price  criterion  and 
mandatory use of e-auctions, as  well  as adjustment  in  the use of e-catalogues.  The Law on 
concessions  was  significantly  modified  in  2019,  but  still  does  not  comply  fully  with  EU 
requirements. The defence procurement Law, adopted in 2020, is partially aligned with the EU 
Directive on defence procurement.  
An  amendment  to  the  Law  on  public  procurement,  which  entered  into  force  in  July  2022, 
introduced  temporary  domestic  content  requirements  for  a  period  of  ten  years  for  selected 
machines  and  equipment.  However,  public  procurement  in  connection  with  Ukraine’s 
international commitments is exempted from domestic content requirements.  

81 

 
 
  
 
In light  of the Russian  war of  aggression against  Ukraine, the  application of martial  law  in 
Ukraine  and  its  duration,  Ukraine  has  introduced  temporary  exceptions  from  public 
procurement legislation, including the use of direct awards and simplified procedures, by way 
of resolutions. 

An appropriate institutional framework to implement the public procurement policy is in place 
with adequate powers and functions. The role of the Authorised Body, responsible for defining 
the public procurement policy, is performed by the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine and its 
Public Procurement and Competition Policy Department; concessions and PPPs fall under the 
responsibility of the Department on Investments, Innovations and Intellectual Property of the 
Ministry of Economy. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 
Despite  the  ongoing  military  aggression,  the  authorities  have  ensured  the  continuity  of 
operations  in  public  procurement,  including  the  use  of  the  e-procurement  system  Prozorro. 
Based on the annual reports from the Ministry of Economy, the public procurement market 
represented  9.3%  of  GDP  in  2022  against  17.1%  in  2021  and  17.8%  in  2020.  There  was 
therefore a notable decrease in 2022 due to the war.  
On  the  monitoring  of  contract  awards  and  implementation,  negotiated  procedures  were 
suspended under martial law and replaced by direct award. The use of framework agreements 
and  centralised  procurement,  especially  at  regional  and  local  level,  needs  to  be  scaled  up. 
Concessions and PPPs have remained very low as the required IT solutions have not yet been 
implemented following the relevant law introduced in 2019. In 2022, the State Audit Service 
(SAS) detected irregularities in 67% of monitored procedures, down from 78% in 2021 (this 
includes all types of irregularities). Public procurement control is complex and weak due to a 
lack  of  skilled  staff,  overlapping  responsibilities,  suboptimal  quality  of  control  and 
enforcement. Although expanding, SAS coverage of monitoring and the ex post internal audit 
of public procurement remains modest; while the system of risk indicators needs improvement. 
The contracting authorities need to continue to build capacity to manage public procurement 
processes. Professional standards, a professionalisation strategy and training policy based on 
an assessment of training needs, need to be put in place. Training currently remains voluntary, 
and no statistics are available on the number of trained staff. 
Efficient remedy system  
Legislation  on  the  right  to  legal  remedy  is  partially  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis.  The 
Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine (AMCU) handles complaints about public procurement 
violations. Complaints related to violations of PPPs and concessions legislation are looked into 
by the administrative and commercial courts of Ukraine.  
The implementation capacity of the AMCU remains insufficient. Before the war, the AMCU 
was  heavily  overloaded  with  complaints  (14,828  cases  in  2021  compared  to  3,865  cases  in 
2022). Following the 2021 amendment  to  the AMCU law  establishing  commissions  for the 
consideration of public procurement complaints four commissioners out of a maximum of ten 
envisaged were recruited in 2023.   
The  ongoing  increase  of  the  number  of  commissioners  and  the  introduction  of  specialised 
commissions for public procurement is expected to increase the AMCU’s capacity to resolve 
cases. However, its internal administrative capacity would also need to be expanded. 

Chapter 18 – Statistics 

EU  rules  require  that  Member  States  are  able  to  produce  statistics  based  on  professional 
independence,  impartiality,  reliability,  transparency  and  confidentiality.  Common  rules  are 
provided for the methodology, production and dissemination of statistical information. 

82 

 
 
Ukraine has some level of preparation in the area of statistics. Limited progress was made 
during  the  reporting  period  towards  alignment  with  the  EU  acquis,  including  adoption  of 
legislation to integrate the European Statistics Code of Practice. The administrative capacity of 
the  institutions  involved  needs  to  be  further  strengthened  and  coordination  among  them 
improved. The publication of statistical information has been largely suspended while martial 
law is imposed. Data transmissions to Eurostat remained limited. 

In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular: 

→ strengthen the institutional independence and administrative capacity of the State Statistics 
Service of Ukraine (SSSU) and the coordination among relevant bodies to improve the quality 
of statistics; 

→  adopt the national strategy for the development of Ukrainian statistics for 2024-2029; 

→  increase the production and transmission of high-quality and timely data to Eurostat. 

On  statistical  infrastructure,  the  Law  on  state  statistics  provides  the  legal  framework  for 
national statistics and regulates the rights and functions of national statistical bodies. The Law 
on official statistics, which strengthens the coordinating role of the SSSU and establishes the 
Statistics Council, entered into force on 1 January 2023. The SSSU is the recognised national 
statistical authority of Ukraine in charge of production of the official statistics. It operates under 
the  Ministry  of  Digital  Transformation.  It  coordinates  the  national  statistical  system,  which 
also includes the Central Bank of Ukraine and the Ministry of Finance. The country is making 
preparations to establish a National Council of Statistics as a consultative body to the Cabinet 
of Ministers. Its exact tasks and role within the national statistical system should be clearly 
defined.  Ukraine  is  in  process  of  preparing  a  new  national  strategy  for  the  development  of 
Ukrainian statistics for 2024-2029. 

Ukraine cooperates with and regularly submits limited data in several statistical domains to 
Eurostat on a voluntary basis. In connection with the World Bank’s International Comparison 
Program, Ukraine carries out nearly all the surveys required under the relevant regulation, using 
the methodologies and classifications set out in the Eurostat-OECD Methodological manual on 
purchasing power parities.  

On classifications and registers, the main classifications are in line with the EU acquis and 
are  updated  regularly.  The  State  Statistics  Service  maintains  the  register  of  statistical  units' 
classification of economic activities.  

On macroeconomic statistics, annual  and quarterly sector accounts are compiled using the 
classification  of  institutional  sectors.  Annual  and  quarterly  indicators  for  GDP  and  its 
components use the production approach by income category and by end-use category. Ukraine 
needs to start submitting national accounts data to Eurostat. Transmission of European System 
of National and Regional Accounts (ESA) 2010 data to Eurostat is very limited.  transmitted 
to Eurostat.   

The Ministry of Finance compiles government finance statistics (GFS) based on the IMF’s 
GFS Manual 2014, which differs substantially from the System of National Accounts 2008 and 
European  System  of  Accounts  2010  in  presentation.  GFS  or  excessive  deficit  procedure 
statistics  are  not  transmitted  to  Eurostat.  Institutional  arrangements  need  to  be  carefully 
reviewed to ensure statistical independence in the delineation of the general government sector 
and the recording of its operations. 

On price statistics, the harmonised index of consumer prices is not calculated. Price statistics 
data is not transmitted to Eurostat. 

83 

 
 
Ukraine  follows  the  methodology  and  conceptual  framework  for  compiling  the  balance  of 
payments data as set out in the relevant manual (BPM6, IMF, 2009). The dissemination of 
data on the monthly and quarterly balance of payments and international investment position 
corresponds to the timelines set by Regulation (EC) 184/2005.  

On business statistics, in 2022, a new methodology for calculating indicators of demographic 
statistics  of  enterprises  was  developed  in  accordance  with  the  requirements  of  European 
Business Statistics Regulation. Business statistics data is not transmitted to Eurostat.  

On social statistics, the latest population census took place in December 2001. The next census 
is planned six months after the end of martial law. Ukraine annually provides to Eurostat the 
data  for  population  statistics  (POPSTAT)  and  demographic  statistics  (DEMOBAL) 
questionnaires. However, the data provided is only broken down by age and sex and without 
the  necessary  full  metadata  information.  Ukraine  needs  to  develop  statistics  in  the  area  of 
asylum and managed migration. Social protection statistics are implemented and comply with 
Regulation on the European System of Integrated Social Protection Statistics. Labour market 
statistics on the structure of earnings, the labour cost index, and the labour cost survey have 
been  partially  implemented.  During  the  martial  law,  state  statistical  bodies  have  not  been 
conducting sample surveys of the population (households), including the survey of the labour 
force.  

On agricultural statistics, a pilot agricultural census was conducted in 2012. The date of the 
next  census  will  be  decided  after  the  war  has  ended.  No  data  on  agricultural  statistics  is 
transmitted to Eurostat. 

On transport statistics, no transport data is provided under the regulated statistics. In 2022, 
work on identifying sources of administrative data, which are needed by the State Statistics 
Service  for  the  implementation  of  European  legislation  in  transport  statistics,  continued. 
Despite  some  data  quality  concerns,  Ukraine  is  broadly  in  line  with  the  acquis  on  energy 
statistics.  

Environment  statistics  data  is  not  transmitted  to  Eurostat.  It  is  therefore  not  possible  to 
evaluate compliance. Ukraine’s self-assessment indicates the production of some statistics on 
waste and compilation of four environmental accounts. 

Chapter 32 – Financial control  

The  EU  promotes  the  reform  of  national  governance  systems  to  improve  managerial 
accountability, sound financial management of income and expenditure, and external audit of 
public funds. The financial control rules further protect the EU’s financial interests against 
fraud in the management of EU funds and the euro against counterfeiting.  

Ukraine is at an early stage of preparation  for implementing financial control. During the 
reporting  period,  Ukraine  made  limited  progress  by  approving  the  financial  audit 
methodology for external audits and establishing audit committees within central authorities.  

In 2023, Ukraine should focus on the following recommendations:  

→  ensure tighter connectivity between public internal financial control (PIFC) reform and the 
Central Harmonisation Unit (CHU), and strengthen the CHU’s role in enforcing delegated 
managerial accountability; 

→  strengthen  the  Accounting  Chamber  of  Ukraine’s  (ACU)  independence,  mandate  and 
ISSAI-based audit work through the approval of a new ACU law, and address the shortage 
of internal auditors;  

84 

 
 
→  increase cooperation between the ACU and Parliament to strengthen oversight of the state 

budget and its implementation. 

Public internal financial control 

The strategic framework for PIFC is part of the public finance management reform strategy 
for 2022–2025. The CHU monitors progress of both key areas in PIFC, internal control and 
internal  audit.  Around  100  key  spending  units  are  responsible  for  budget  management, 
medium-term budget plans and performance management, as assigned by the budget code. 

Managerial  accountability  is  not  yet  fully  incorporated  into  legislation  and  administrative 
practice. The Cabinet of Ministers has adopted basic principles of internal financial control that 
apply to spending units at all levels, but the principles do not go into details about lower-level 
management  and  employees.  The  implementation  of  basic  managerial  accountability 
mechanisms for central government bodies remains limited in practice. 

The Budget Code of Ukraine regulates the requirement to establish internal audit practice. 
Internal  audit  units  are  mandatory  in  ministries,  central  executive  bodies  and  other  key 
spending  units  at  central  and  regional  level,  but  recommended  in  local  self-government.  In 
2023, the legal requirement of installing audit committees at central public entities came into 
force. The capacity to effectively carry out internal audits is hindered by a shortage of internal 
auditors and high staff turnover. A certification commission has been established within the 
Ministry of Finance. 

The CHU within the Ministry of Finance focuses on (i) developing internal control and internal 
audit functions; and (ii) coordinating activities related to internal audit and the evaluation and 
monitoring  of  internal  control  systems.  Its  tasks  are  described  in  the  Budget  Code  and 
secondary legislation. The CHU aims to improve efficiency in its key tasks, for example by 
developing a web-based PIFC portal.  

An enhanced cooperation between the Public Internal  Financial Control institutions and the 
auditing institution with the law enforcement agencies could help in combating corruption. 

External audit 

The Constitution does not recognise the independence of the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine 
(ACU). The legal framework limits the ACU’s mandate to audit public bodies and resources, 
including control over the national budget’s revenues and use. It does not have the mandate to 
audit local budgets, state-owned businesses or off-budget spending. While the ACU reports on 
PIFC and internal audit findings to the Ministry of Finance, exemptions should be considered 
to  maintain  its  autonomy.  Although  the  ACU  is  instructed  to  apply  international  audit 
principles,  this  has  led  to  flawed  practices  not  aligned  with  international  standards  due  to 
conflicts with Ukraine’s constitution and laws.  

The  ACU  has  recently  approved  the  methodology  for  financial  audits,  which  aligns  with 
international standards. The manual will be used in planned pilot audits in 2023. Methodologies 
for  compliance  and  performance  audits  still  require  approval.  In  practice,  the  ACU  focuses 
more on inspections than audits, as defined by international public sector auditing standards. 
There is also an overlap between the mandates of the ACU and the State Audit Service (SAS), 
with the latter having a broad mandate that includes defined public financial and IT audits.  

The current impact of the ACU’s audit work is minimal as its performance is measured based 
on the number of audits conducted rather than the actual impact  of audit  recommendations. 
implementation  of  ACU  audit 
There 
recommendations.  

is  no  formal  procedure  for  monitoring 

the 

85 

 
 
The ACU currently does not produce audit reports that are in line with recognised international 
standards. These are rather inspection reports that do not serve the purpose of promotion of 
reforms or identifying systemic issues. 

Protection of the EU’s financial interests 

The national legislation ensures some degree of EU  alignment. It addresses issues of corruption 
offences,  money  laundering  and  misappropriation.  It  is  essential  to  establish  and  strengthen 
liability for fraud that impacts the EU budget. Ukraine should adopt a national fraud strategy 
for the protection of the EU’s financial interest. 

While an anti-fraud coordination  service (AFCOS) has  not  yet  been established to  facilitate 
effective cooperation and exchange of information, including of an operational nature, with the 
European  Anti-Fraud  Office  (OLAF),  the  State  Audit  Service  (SAS)  was  nominated  as  the 
national  contact  point  for  cooperation  with  OLAF  and  the  European  Court  of  Auditors. 
Although its mandate is limited at the national level in this capacity. There is no corresponding 
AFCOS network of authorities involved in the protection of the EU’s financial interests, but a 
national mechanism was designated through the setup of the he Interdepartmental Coordination 
Council which needs to meet regularly to become effective. While Ukraine does not manage 
EU funds directly and thus does not report irregularities through the Irregularities Management 
System, the SAS has developed procedures to prevent and report violations, errors and fraud to 
relevant  bodies,  including  the  European  Commission.  Collaboration  between  OLAF  and 
relevant  institutions is  on a case-by-case basis.  The Bureau of Economic Security,  which is 
responsible for investigating offences that impact Ukraine’s financial interests, is under review, 
with the scope of its activities in protecting the EU’s financial interests yet to be determined. 

Protecting the euro against counterfeiting 

Ukraine  has  signed  and  ratified  the  1929  Geneva  Convention  for  the  Suppression  of 
Counterfeiting Currency. The Centre for the Suppression of Counterfeit Banknotes and Coins, 
which  is  operated  by  the  National  Bank  of  Ukraine,  manages,  analyses  and  processes 
counterfeit euro banknotes and those from other foreign currencies withdrawn from circulation 
by Ukrainian banks. The responsibility for combating counterfeiting lies with the Bureau of 
Economic  Security,  the  Ministry  of  Internal  Affairs,  the  State  Security  Service  and  the 
prosecution service. However, the allocation of responsibilities among these bodies requires 
further clarification.  

3.  GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND REGIONAL COOPERATION   

Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine has affected the latter’s relations with 
enlargement  countries  and  neighbouring  member  states,  as  well  as  its  activities  in  regional 
formats.  

Ukraine participates in the Eastern Partnership policy, and is part of a number of regional 
formats, including the Central European Initiative, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, the 
Organization  for  Democracy  and  Economic  Development  and  the  Regional  Cooperation 
Council.  The  level  of  engagement  of  Ukraine  in  some  formats  was  strengthened,  or  was 
profoundly shaped such as in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization without the 
participation of Russia. Some formats are being reassessed. 

Ukraine  maintains  longstanding  close  ties  with  neighbouring  Moldova.  Bilateral  political 
dialogue on all levels has improved further, following Moldova’s strong support for Ukraine 
in  the  context  of  Russia’s  war,  including  through  hosting  a  high  number  of  refugees  and 
actively supporting the export of Ukrainian products under the Solidarity Lanes initiative. Both 

86 

 
 
countries exchange on the EU accession process, on regional and security issues, the situation 
in the Transnistrian region and on management of water resources of the Nistru River, which 
remains a challenging topic.   

Ukraine and Georgia, fellow “Association Trio” members have a strategic partnership since 
2017,  but  relations  are  currently  strained.  While  Georgia,  continues  to  support  Ukraine’s 
territorial  integrity  and  sovereignty,  including  through  co-sponsorship  of  Ukrainian  UN 
resolutions and hosts a significant number of Ukrainian refugees, Ukraine considers Georgia’s 
position on the Russian aggression as ambivalent. Ukraine has criticised inter alia, the non-
alignment  of  Georgia  with  EU  sanctions  against  Russia  and  absence  of  military-technical 
cooperation. The ill health of former Georgian President Saakashvili, a Ukrainian citizen, had 
led to additional diplomatic tensions.  

Türkiye is a strategic partner for Ukraine, with important bilateral economic and people-to-
people  ties,  evidenced  by  a  bilateral  visa-free  regime  and  a  free  trade  agreement  signed  in 
February 2022 (not yet ratified). Bilateral relations have been bolstered since the beginning of 
Russia’s full-scale war by Türkiye’s technical, humanitarian and military support to Ukraine, 
by  its  co-sponsoring  of  UN  resolutions  in  favour  of  Ukraine’s  territorial  integrity  and 
sovereignty, by its closure of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits for the passage of military 
ships, as well as Türkiye’s mediation efforts contributing to prisoner of war exchanges and the 
Black  Sea  Grain  Initiative.  Türkiye  has  also  been  a  prominent  participant  in  Ukraine’s 
International  Crimea  Platform.  Nevertheless,  Türkiye  has  not  aligned  with  EU  sanctions 
against Russia in the context of the latter’s full-scale aggression. Ukraine has not joined all 
CFSP statements on Türkiye in the past. 

The  Ukrainian  authorities  have  sought  to  maintain  and  prioritise  effective  cooperation  and 
close diplomatic ties with neighbouring EU Member States, both in the context of the war of 
aggression – determined in large part by the support of individual countries – and in the context 
of Ukraine’s prospective EU integration. 

In the Western Balkans, Ukraine’s relations with Albania remain good. Albania has sponsored 
or  co-authored  all  resolutions  in  support  of  Ukraine  during  its  non-permanent  membership 
(2022-2023) of the UN Security Council. 

Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  supports  the  territorial  integrity  and  sovereignty  of  Ukraine, 
condemning Russia’s war of aggression. Bilateral relations are generally good but have been 
affected by certain statements on Russia’s role in Europe and significant hindrances, due to 
political contestation, in the implementation of restrictive measures against Russia. The two 
countries enjoy the visa-free regime. A number of agreements are in place, including on trade 
and on investment protection. Trade flows remain low. 

The ties between Ukraine and North Macedonia are strong and deepening through political 
dialogue and diplomatic support as well as military assistance in the face of Russia’s full-scale 
war. A bilateral free trade agreement was revised and upgraded in 2022, and North Macedonia 
declared its support for Ukraine as a priority for its Chairmanship of the OSCE in 2023.  

Ukraine-Montenegro relations are equally strong, bolstered by the latter’s continued support 
in UN fora as well as on sanctions, trade, technical and military assistance. 

Ukraine-Serbia relations have been challenging since 2014 by Ukraine’s perception of limited 
Serbian support in the face of Russian aggression, in particular as regards Serbia’s absence of 
alignment with EU common foreign and security policy restrictive measures. Still Serbia voted 
in favour of UN General Assembly resolutions in support of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and 
sovereignty and has confirmed this support at the Presidential level. Serbia is also Ukraine’s 

87 

 
 
first trade partner in the Western Balkans, while negotiations on a free trade agreement still 
need to be concluded.  

Ukraine has not recognised the independence of Kosovo* but has indicated continued support 
for  EU-facilitated  dialogue  between  Belgrade  and  Pristina.  Ukraine  also  participated  in  the 
NATO Kosovo Force mission until 2022, when it withdrew its contingent of servicemen and 
military equipment. Kosovo has decided on a voluntary basis to support all Declarations by the 
High  Representative  on  behalf  of  the  EU  and  has  aligned  with  EU  restrictive  measures, 
including all those related to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.  

Hungary  participates  in  initiatives  such  as  Grain  from  Ukraine  facilitating  Ukrainian  food 
exports  and  provides  financial  and  humanitarian  support  to  Ukraine.  However,  relations 
continue  to  be  affected  by  Ukrainian  legislation  relating  to  persons  belonging  to  national 
minorities, including the implementation of the recommendations of the Venice Commission 
on education, state language, use of minority languages in public life, administration, media 
and books.  

Poland has become one of Ukraine’s closest strategic partners in the context of Russian war 
of  aggression  and  has  been  providing  vital  political,  humanitarian,  economic,  technical  and 
defence  assistance.  Poland  also  continues  to  host  big  number  of  Ukrainian  refugees.  The 
introduction of exceptional and temporary preventive measures on imports from Ukraine to the 
European Union - which was requested by Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia 
- has caused tensions between the two countries.  The measures were lifted on 15 September. 

Ukraine  and  Romania  continue  to  cooperate  closely,  with  recently  strengthened  bilateral 
political dialogue. Romania participates in the Grain from Ukraine scheme and helps export 
Ukrainian food products through EU solidarity lanes. Romania hosted the Black Sea Security 
Conference under the auspices of Ukraine’s Crimea Platform in April 2023. Like Poland and 
Slovakia, Romania has hosted logistical hubs for the delivery of EU humanitarian and civil 
protection  support  to  Ukraine  since  early  2022.  Also,  a  new  trilateral  cooperation  format 
encompassing Ukraine, Moldova and Romania was established.   

Ukraine’s  good  relations  with  Slovakia  have  also  been  enhanced  during  Russian  war  of 
aggression.  Slovakia provided political, military, financial and humanitarian assistance, as well 
as its international advocacy in support of Ukraine’s policy goals. Slovakia hosts a significant 
number  of  Ukrainian  refugees  under  the  temporary  protection.    A  joint  commission  on 
economic, industrial, scientific and technical cooperation was relaunched in December 2022. 

Since  early  2022,  Poland,  Romania  and  Slovakia  have  been  hosting  logistical  hubs  for  the 
delivery of EU humanitarian and civil protection support to Ukraine.  

Relations  with  Bulgaria  were  bolstered  by  Bulgarian  political,  financial,  military  and 
humanitarian aid to Ukraine, as well as growing economic ties. They were also nurtured by 
Bulgaria’s participation in EU solidarity lanes and the Grain from Ukraine initiative.  

4.  ABILITY TO ASSUME THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP  

CLUSTER 2: INTERNAL MARKET  

This cluster covers: the free movement of goods (Chapter 1); freedom of movement for workers 
(Chapter 2); right of establishment and freedom to provide services (Chapter 3); free movement 

* This designation is without prejudice to position on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244(1999) and the ICJ 

Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence. 

88 

 
 
 
of  capital  (Chapter  4);  company  law  (Chapter  6);  intellectual  property  law  (Chapter  7); 
competition  policy  (Chapter  8);  financial  services  (Chapter  9);  and  consumer  and  health 
protection (Chapter 28).  

This cluster is key for Ukraine’s preparations for the requirements of the EU’s internal market 
and is of high relevance for the implementation of DCFTA. Ukraine is moderately prepared in 
the area of free movement of goods and is in between some and moderate preparation in the 
area of free movement of capital. Ukraine has some level of preparation in most areas of the 
internal market, namely in the area of right of establishment and freedom to provide services, 
competition policy, company law, intellectual property law, financial services and consumer 
and health protection. In the area of free movement of workers, Ukraine is at an at an early 
stage.  

In  the  area  of  free  movement  of  goods,  some  progress  was  made  on  quality  infrastructure. 
Regarding the freedom of movement of workers, no progress was made.  Ukraine demonstrated 
some  progress  in  the  area  of  right  of  establishment  and  freedom  to  provide  services,  in 
particular by adopting a new law on postal communications. In the area of free movement of 
capital, some/good progress was made with prevention of money laundering. On company law, 
some progress was made by adopting legislative amendments aimed at further alignment on 
company law, financial statements and audit. Good progress was made in intellectual property 
law, thanks to the launch of the National Intellectual Property Authority and the adoption of 
the Law on copyright and related rights. On competition policy there was limited progress. On 
financial services some progress has been demonstrated by starting to unwind some emergency 
measures, implementing the acquis on corporate governance in banks, conducting risk-based 
supervision  of banks  and introducing  legislation to  promote sustainable  and digital finance. 
Limited progress was made on consumer and health protection.  

Chapter 1 – Free movement of goods 

The free movement of goods ensures that many products can be traded freely across the EU 
based on common rules and procedures. Where products are governed by national rules, the 
principle of the free movement of goods prevents these creating unjustified barriers to trade. 

Ukraine is moderately prepared in the area of free movement of goods. Some progress was 
made during the reporting period on alignment with the EU acquis on quality infrastructure 
and on several “new and global approach” EU product acquis on products that may be covered 
under  a  potential  agreement  on  conformity  assessment  and  the  acceptance  of  industrial 
products (ACAA) envisaged under the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area.  

In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular: 

→ complete  the  alignment  of  its  legislation  with  the  acquis  on  quality  infrastructure,  in 

particular on market surveillance; 

→ further align its legislation with the acquis on harmonised sectoral legislation; 

→ re-establish the inspection and enforcement capacity of the market surveillance authorities. 

General principles  

The DCFTA contains obligations for Ukraine to align its legislation with the EU acquis in the 
harmonised area. It also provides for the possibility to conclude an ACAA once Ukraine has 
completed the alignment process in selected product sectors in terms of legislation, institutions 
and  standards.  Preparations  for  an  ACAA  are  currently  underway.  This  includes  the 
Commission’s assessment of Ukraine’s alignment with specific EU acquis in the harmonised 
area,  as  well  as  alignment  with  and  the  implementation  and  enforcement  of  the  acquis  on 
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product  conformity  assessment,  notification  and  market  surveillance,  the  institutional 
framework  for  the  production,  distribution  and  marketing  of  industrial  products.  Once 
concluded, an ACAA would enable Ukraine to participate in the single market on the same 
terms as an EU Member State for the selected sectors. 

Non-harmonised area 

In the non-harmonised area, Ukraine needs to start activities for screening national technical 
regulations  for  compliance  with  Articles  34-36  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the 
European Union.   

Harmonised area: quality infrastructure 

Ukraine’s  legislation  on  quality  infrastructure  is  partially  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis. 
Administrative  structures  already  exist  to  deal  with  technical  regulations,  standardisation, 
conformity assessment, metrology, accreditation, and market surveillance.  

On standardisation, Ukraine’s implementing legislation is fully aligned with the EU acquis. 
The national standardisation body, UkrNDNC has 123 staff. It has been an affiliate member of 
the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) and the European Committee for Electro-
technical  Standardisation  (CENELEC)  since  January  2023.  UkrNDNC  has  also  been  an 
observer to the European Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI) since 2018. Ukraine 
is  a full member of the International  Electro-technical  Commission  and of the International 
Organisation  for  Standardisation  (ISO).  National  standards  are  adopted  in  conformity  with 
European  standards  (CEN,  CENELEC  and  ETSI  standards).  During  the  reporting  period, 
26 000  European  and  international  standards  were  all  adopted  at  once  in  December  2022. 
Ukraine still has conflicting old standards that need to be withdrawn.  

Ukrainian legislation on the accreditation of conformity assessment bodies is partly aligned 
with  the  EU  acquis.  The  National  Accreditation  Agency  of  Ukraine  (NAAU)  has  104 
employees.  Ukraine  has  1 095  accredited  conformity  assessment  bodies  (722  testing 
laboratories,  38 medical  laboratories, 31 calibration laboratories, 105 certification bodies of 
management systems, 14 certification bodies of persons and 115 inspection bodies). NAAU is 
a signatory of the European Cooperation for Accreditation Multilateral Agreement (EA MLA) 
in  the  areas  of  accreditation  of  testing  and  calibration  laboratories,  medical  laboratories, 
product certification bodies, management system certification bodies, personnel certification 
bodies and inspection bodies. Ukraine is a full member of both the International Laboratory 
Accreditation  Cooperation  by  having  signed  its  Mutual  Recognition  Agreement  and  of  the 
International Accreditation Forum by signing its Multilateral Agreement.  

On metrology, four national metrology institutes operate in Ukraine. Calibration activities are 
performed by 24 state-owned enterprises. During the reporting period, the National Metrology 
Institute in Kharkiv and state-owned enterprises located in territories directly impacted by war 
faced  substantial  damage.  The  national  metrology  institutes  in  Kyiv  and  Ivano-Frankivsk 
maintain  their  capacity  and  are  operational.  Ukraine  is  a  full  member  of  the  International 
Organization  of  Legal  Metrology,  the  International  Measurement  Confederation  and  the 
International Bureau of Weights and Measures.  

In the field of market surveillance, the State Service of Ukraine on Food Safety and Consumer 
Protection is operational with 140 employees. During the reporting period, due to the ongoing 
war the number of inspections decreased in  line with  provisions of the martial  law. Market 
surveillance  inspections  and  controls  remain  suspended,  with  only  exceptional  unscheduled 
measures  taking  place.  This  suspension  limits  the  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of  market 
surveillance and may affect the quality and safety of products.  

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Harmonised area: sectoral legislation 

In  the  area  of  ‘new  and  global  approach’  product  legislation,  Ukraine  has  adopted 
implementing legislation in the reporting period designed to be fully aligned with the acquis 
on machinery, electromagnetic compatibility, low voltage and construction products. Ukraine 
had previously also adopted legislation designed to align with the acquis on radio equipment, 
toys, cosmetics, recreational craft, civil explosives, pressure equipment and personal protective 
equipment.  Ukraine  is  partly  aligned  with  the  acquis  on  lifts,  cableways,  gas  appliances, 
equipment for explosive atmospheres, simple pressure vessels, environmental noise from using 
outdoor equipment and pyrotechnic articles. More work needs to be done on alignment with 
the acquis on eco-design, energy labelling (Ukraine has been party to the Energy Community 
Treaty since 2011), measuring instruments, non-automatic weighing instruments and medical 
devices.  

On ‘old approach’ product legislation, Ukraine is partly aligned with the acquis on motor 
vehicles (EU-type approval) and 2/3 wheeled motor vehicles, and on fertilisers, pre-packaging 
and units of measurements. It is not aligned on tractors, or on non-road mobile machinery. It is 
also  not  aligned  with  the  acquis  on  chemicals,  including  the  registration,  evaluation, 
authorisation  and  restriction  of  chemicals  (REACH  Regulation),  chemicals  labelling 
(Classification, Labelling and Packaging Regulation (CLP)), good laboratory practice (GLP), 
detergents, drug precursors or aerosol dispensers. 

On  procedural  measures,  Ukraine’s  legislation  is  designed  to  align  with  the  acquis  on 
footwear  and  on  textile  labelling,  it  is  partly  aligned  with  the  acquis  on  defence  products, 
defence  procurement,  and  the  return  of  cultural  objects  unlawfully  removed  from  the 
territory of an EU Member State. It is not aligned with regard to crystal glass or firearms, or 
medicinal products pricing. 

Market  surveillance  and  product  safety  institutions  of  Ukraine  are  vulnerable  to  corruption 
risks. Current preparations for changes to the law on Market surveillance aligning to the EU 
market  surveillance  regulation  (2019/1020)  foresee  to  centralise  control  of  market 
surveillances activities with the Ministry of Economy alone, which could increase corruption 
risks in the market surveillance system of Ukraine. Further concerns are the lack of funding for 
inspection activities and the ongoing suspension of market surveillance during the martial law. 
Corruption risk mitigation strategy needs to be developed in line with overall anti-corruption 
policy framework.  

Chapter 2 – Freedom of movement for workers 

Citizens of one Member State have the right to work in another Member State and must be 
given the same working and social conditions as other workers. 

Ukraine remains at an early stage of preparation regarding the freedom of movement of 
workers.  Over  the  reporting  period,  during  Russia’s  full  scale  invasion,  there  was  no 
progress on ensuring that EU workers and their family members are treated in the same way 
as Ukrainian nationals. 

In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular: 

→  work on concluding additional agreements on social security coordination, notably with 

EU Member States; 

→  start work in preparation of joining the European Network of Employment Services. 

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Ukraine’s legislation is not aligned with the acquis on access to the labour market and free 
movement  of  workers.  Foreigners  and  stateless  persons  can  be  employed  in  Ukraine  after 
obtaining an appropriate permit issued by the State Employment Service of Ukraine. There is 
a minimum wage threshold for obtaining the permit. Foreigners cannot be employed as civil 
servants. There is no specific legislation on employment of EU nationals, who therefore fall 
under the same conditions as nationals of non-EU countries. The right of EU workers to reside 
in Ukraine can be revoked on the grounds of involuntary unemployment, illness or accident 
(and if employment is terminated). Moreover, foreigners, including EU workers’ children, only 
have free and equal access to higher education as nationals if they are permanently residing in 
Ukraine.  

There is  no dedicated body that deals  with  the  promotion, monitoring and support of equal 
treatment and free movement of workers. There are also no plans to create one for the moment. 
No steps have been undertaken to prepare for joining the European Network of Employment 
Services (EURES network). Beyond the bilateral agreements mentioned above, there are no 
further initiatives to cooperate with other countries on freedom of movement of workers, such 
as exchange of information, sharing of best practices or joint inspections. 

On the coordination of social security systems, Ukraine has several bilateral agreements with 
EU Member States on mutual employment and social services, including on pension rights, for 
Ukrainian nationals who worked abroad. These agreements also provide for equal treatment of 
EU workers and their family members as Ukrainian nationals.  

No national health insurance card has yet been implemented in Ukraine. Implementation of the 
European Health Insurance Card might therefore be challenging. 

Chapter 3 – Right of establishment and freedom to provide services 

EU natural and legal persons have the right to establish themselves in any Member State and 
to provide cross-border services. For certain regulated professions, there are rules on mutual 
recognition of qualifications. EU rules on postal  services focus on improving the quality of 
universal  service,  gradual  market  opening  to  competition,  and  the  establishment  of  an 
independent regulator.  

Ukraine has some level of preparation in the area of right of establishment and freedom to 
provide  services.  Some  progress  was  made  during  the  reporting  period,  in  particular  on 
postal services, but further efforts are needed to align legislation with the EU acquis under 
this Chapter. 

In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular: 

→  take  measures  towards  eliminating  existing  restrictions  for  the  provision  of  services, 

using the possibilities provided by the Association Agreement; 

→  complete  approximation  with  the  EU  postal  acquis,  including  with  the  Regulation  on 

cross-border parcel delivery services; 

→  continue its progress in aligning with the EU acquis on mutual recognition of professional 

qualifications.  

The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement includes rules that grant the right of establishment 
to EU natural and legal persons in Ukraine. The process of removing barriers to this right of 
establishment, as described in the Association Agreement, has not yet been initiated.  

On the freedom to provide cross-border services, the Association Agreement provides for 
the cross-border supply of services except for some sectors, for instance audiovisual services, 

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national  maritime  cabotage,  and  domestic  and  international  air  transport.  The  process  of 
removing the remaining barriers to the provision of cross-border services by EU natural and 
legal persons has not yet been initiated.  

As regards the right of establishment and the freedom to provide cross-border services, Ukraine 
will need to align its legislation also with the Services Directive (2006/123/EC). Progressive 
steps should be taken in this regard.  

On  the  mutual  recognition  of  professional  qualifications,  the  legislation  and  approach 
followed  by  Ukraine  varies  depending  on  the  sector  involved.  It  is  based on  a  comparative 
assessment of the education and professional qualifications of the applicant seeking recognition 
with the relevant professional qualifications defined by the professional standard approved in 
Ukraine. No agreement for mutual recognition of professional qualifications currently exists 
with the EU. Full implementation of EU law on professional recognition needs to take place. 
This includes the Professional Qualifications Directive, the Proportionality Test Directive and 
sector-specific legislation (e.g. for lawyers: the Establishment Directive and Lawyers Services 
Directive). 

In the area of postal services, Ukraine has made progress on alignment with the EU postal 
acquis.  On  3  November  2022,  a  new  Law  on  postal  communications  was  adopted,  which 
entered into force on 25 May 2023. The new legal framework for postal services is partially 
aligned with the Postal Services Directive 97/67/EC amended by Directives 2002/39/EC and 
2008/6/EC. It sets out the scope, main principles and financing of universal service provision 
and the role of the national  regulatory authority. The designated universal  service provider, 
which  is  state-owned,  maintains  the  exclusive  right  to  provide  a  universal  postal  service, 
including ordinary letters. Postal service provision is not licensed in Ukraine, but is based on 
notification to the national regulatory authority. There are 166 economic operators included in 
the  unified  state  register  of  providers  of  postal  services.  The  national  regulatory  authority, 
which  is  legally  separate  and  operationally  independent,  carries  out  regulatory  oversight, 
monitoring  and  enforcement  of  obligations  arising  from  the  postal  law.  Ukraine  has  also 
committed under the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement to align with the EU Regulation on 
cross-border parcel  delivery services by 2024. The Annex on rules applicable to  postal  and 
courier services was updated with the Regulation in November 2021. 

Chapter 4 – Free movement of capital 

In the EU, capital and investments must be able to move without restrictions, with common 
rules for cross-border payments. Banks and other economic operators apply certain rules to 
support the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. 

Ukraine  is  in  between  some  and  moderate  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  free 
movement of capital. Some/good progress was made in the reporting period, in particular 
as  regards  the  alignment  of  Ukrainian  anti-money  laundering  legislation  with  the  FATF 
standards. Ukraine has committed to impose no restrictions on capital movement and current 
payments in accordance with the rules in Article VIII of the Articles of Agreement of the 
IMF and Chapter 7 of the Association Agreement with Ukraine. However, the National Bank 
of Ukraine (NBU) has introduced foreign  currency (FX) restrictions under martial  law to 
safeguard macroeconomic stability. In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular: 

→  Continue preparations to apply for the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA);  

→  Continue the alignment of Ukrainian legislation and institutional practices with the FATF 

standards; 

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→  Take steps to establish the Register for holders and beneficial owners of bank accounts, 

payment accounts and safe-deposit boxes.  

On  capital  movements  and  payments,  the  NBU  introduced  temporary  capital  restrictions 
following  the  start  of  the  Russian  invasion  with  a  view  to  safeguarding  Ukraine’s 
macroeconomic stability. Restrictions are subject to constant revision by the NBU in light of 
developments in the monetary and FX markets. The NBU has drafted a roadmap on gradually 
easing  war-related  currency  restrictions  introduced  at  the  beginning  of  the  invasion  in 
cooperation with the IMF.  

As for restrictions that were in place before the war, Ukraine had already taken  some steps 
towards  currency  liberalisation  based  on  the  Law  on  currency  and  currency  operations.  It 
entered into force in 2019, and the NBU has a roadmap for its implementation. This roadmap 
provides for a gradual cancellation of all currency restrictions and the transition to a regime of 
free capital flows, taking into account the pace of improvement in macroeconomic conditions 
in Ukraine (but without any specific deadlines for removing the currency restrictions).  

The Land Code of Ukraine adopted in March 2020 banned the acquisition of agricultural land 
by foreigners for an unlimited period of time. This ban will be lifted upon referendum of which 
the  date  is  not  yet  specified.      Since  March  2022,  there  has  been  a  Cabinet  of  Ministers’ 
resolution that sets a moratorium on transactions that involve Russian assets and establishes 
the list of people deemed to be associated with the aggressor and exceptions. 

On payment systems, Ukrainian laws prescribe the same terms and conditions for domestic 
and cross-border transfers of currency valuables and there are no special rules for such transfers 
with EU Member States. One of the differences between cross-border payments and payments 
in the domestic currency is the currency supervision of cross-border payments (covering not 
only  payments  to  customers  of  EU  Member  States).  On  the  transparency  of  currency 
conversion changes, Article 30 of the Law on payment services sets the requirements on the 
information provided to users before concluding the agreement on the provision of payment 
services. The adoption of the Law on payment services, which came into force in August 2022, 
was an important step towards alignment with the EU acquis in the area of payment services. 
It incorporated the EU Payment Services Directive 2 and the E-Money Directive into national 
law. This law is an important step on Ukraine’s path to applying for the Single Euro Payments 
Area (SEPA).  

On  the  fight  against  money  laundering  and  terrorism  financing,  Ukraine  remains  in 
Moneyval’s enhanced follow-up process since December 2017. Following the start of the war, 
Moneyval suspended its evaluation of Ukraine, but in June 2023 it decided to resume it, at the 
request of Ukraine. The next Moneyval follow-up report is expected at the end of 2024.  

In September 2022, amendments were adopted on the ultimate beneficial ownership (UBO) 
framework  that  improved  the  UBO  registration  and  verification  system  and  increased  legal 
liability for failure to provide UBO information. The Ukrainian Government also adopted a 
number of bylaws to align Ukrainian anti-money laundering legislation with the international 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards, including on the ultimate beneficial ownership 
and supervision of non-financial businesses and professions. In November 2022, the Ukrainian 
Parliament changed the definition of politically exposed persons, contrary to FATF standards. 
In September 2023, the Parliament passed in the first reading a law aimed at restoring a FATF-
compliant definition of politically exposed persons, but several of its provisions were not in 
line  with  FATF  standards.  In  October  2023,  the  Parliament  adopted  a  new  legislative 
amendment removing the three-year time limitation and reverting to a risk-based approach for 

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former holders of prominent public functions to be qualified as politically exposed persons to 
restore a FATF-compliant definition of politically exposed persons. 

As regards virtual assets, Ukraine needs to either complement its 2019 law or to proceed with 
the adoption of a new comprehensive law on virtual assets in order to implement the applicable 
FATF standards. Ukraine’s alignment with the FATF standards and further reform needs to be 
formally assessed by Moneyval as part of its regular monitoring and evaluation framework. 

Chapter 6 – Company law 

The  EU  has  common  rules  on  the  formation,  registration  and  disclosure requirements  of  a 
company,  with  complementary  rules  for  accounting  and  financial  reporting,  and  statutory 
audit.  

Ukraine has some level  of preparation in the area of company law. Some progress was 
made  during  the  reporting  period  with  the  adoption  of  legislative  amendments  aimed  at 
further alignment with certain aspects of the EU acquis on company law, financial statements 
and audit. 

In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular:  

→  further align its legislation with the EU acquis, including on disclosure of company and 
foreign  branches  information,  on  encouraging  long-term  engagement  of  shareholders, 
and on takeover bids; 

→  align  national  legislation  with  the  acquis  on  cross-border  operations  (conversions, 
mergers and divisions) and on the use of digital tools and processes in company law. 

In the area of company law, a new Law on joint stock companies entered into force in January 
2023 to further align with the EU acquis on shareholders rights and listed companies, including 
electronic  voting  at  general  meetings,  management  structures  and  changes  in  corporate 
structure. The Unified State Register can be accessed electronically providing information on 
legal entities and private entrepreneurs that is in line with the EU acquis. The Law on public 
electronic registers provides for the electronic interaction of registers created in Ukraine. The 
system should be technically ready for interconnection with business registers of EU Member 
States once Ukraine joins the EU and a complete alignment with the EU acquis as regards the 
information to be disclosed by companies to the national business registers for transparency 
purposes is achieved. Further alignment is needed with the acquis on disclosure of company 
and foreign branches information, cross-border operations (mergers, divisions, conversions), 
long-term shareholder engagement, gender equality on boards of directors and use of digital 
tools  and  processes.  In  2022,  Ukraine’s  corporate  governance  code  (based  on  OECD 
principles) was extended to limited liability companies and additional liability companies that 
are professional participants on capital and organised commodity markets.  

On company reporting, national  legislation is  partially aligned with  the EU  acquis  for the 
main legal requirements, including on annual financial statements, management reports, rules 
on  auditors,  disclosure  obligations  and  sanctions.  There  is  a  simplified  financial  reporting 
regime  for  small  and  micro-companies.  Amendments  adopted  in  2022  to  the  Law  on 
accounting and financial reporting introduced the size categories of parent company groups 
and  their  subsidiaries  (small,  medium  and  large)  for  the  preparation  and  publishing  of 
consolidated financial statements, with exemption for certain small and medium-sized groups 
from their mandatory preparation (except groups that include public interest entities). Under 
martial law, administrative and/or criminal liability has been lifted for the non-submission or 
late submission of financial and audit reports. Ukraine needs to prepare to align with the 2022 
EU Directive on corporate sustainability reporting.  

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While there are provisions in national legislation harmonised with the acquis on transparency 
requirements for issuers of securities, further alignment is needed regarding the publication of 
information on sanctions applied to market participants, as well  as home/host member state 
issues and cooperation between member states.  

On statutory audit, amendments to the Law on the Audit of financial statements and auditing 
activities were adopted in September 2022 aimed at further alignment with the EU acquis in 
this area, regarding inter alia auditor certification and quality control of audit services. The law 
has specific requirements for the statutory audit of public interest entities. The Audit Public 
Oversight  Body, established in  2018, supervises  the formation, approval  and registration of 
statutory auditors, and is responsible for quality assurance of audit services through a system 
of investigations and sanctions.  

Chapter 7 – Intellectual property law 

The  EU  has  harmonised  rules  for  the  legal  protection  of  intellectual  property  rights  (IPR, 
copyright and related rights. Rules for the legal protection of IPR cover, for instance, patents 
and trade marks, designs, biotechnological inventions and pharmaceuticals. Rules for the legal 
protection  of  copyright  and  related  rights  cover,  for  instance,  books,  films,  software  and 
broadcasting. 

Ukraine has some level of preparation on intellectual property law. Good progress was made 
during the reporting period, in particular with the launch of the National Intellectual Property 
Authority and the adoption of the Law on copyright and related rights, which aims at legislative 
alignment with the EU copyright acquis, and the IPR enforcement. 

In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular:  

→  continue alignment with the EU acquis on copyright and industrial property rights, as well 

as on trade secrets;  

→  continue  improving  the  functioning  of  collective  management  organisations  and  the 

payment of royalties to right holders;  

→  further  improve  the  IPR  enforcement  system,  in  particular  by  combating  piracy  and 
counterfeit  products  and  establishing  an  intellectual  property  court  and  leverage  the 
collaboration with the European Union Intellectual Property Office. 

In the area of copyright and related rights, in December 2022, the new Law on copyright and 
related  rights  was  adopted,  which  got  further  amended  in  March  2023,  together  with  the 
collective management organisation law. Concerns remain in particular regarding the term of  
protection,  for  copyright  and  related  rights,  the  distribution  of  a  fair  remuneration  between 
performers  and  producers  of  phonograms,  the  reproduction  right  and  the  rights  of  the 
broadcasting organisations. Problems also persist with the enforcement of the current copyright 
law  regime,  for  instance  with  the  collective  rights  management,  in  particular  with  public 
broadcasting organisations that do not pay royalties to performers and phonogram producers. 

On industrial property rights, the Law on patents from August 2020, which incorporated 
the EU standards of legal protection of inventions and utility models into national legislation, 
is not fully aligned with the EU acquis.  Ukraine’s trade marks legislation is partially aligned 
with the EU acquis. The subsequent implementing rules still need to be adopted.  Ukraine’s 
legislation also includes EU standards on the legal protection of designs. 

Ukraine  needs  to  further  align  its  domestic  legislation  with  the  EU  acquis  on  compulsory 
licensing and the respective Protocol amending the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Ukraine does not have a specific law on 
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trade secrets, though there are some provisions on trade secrets in the Civil Code of Ukraine.  

Ukraine’s  Law  on  IPR  enforcement  is  broadly  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis.  However, 
shortcomings remain in combating piracy and counterfeit products, as Ukraine remains one of 
the four main transit points for shipments into the EU of counterfeit products. The competent 
authorities dealing with IPR enforcement include the National Police, the Bureau of Economic 
Security, the State Customs Service and the Office of Prosecutor General.   

Following the adoption of the IPR institutional reform in 2020, the Ukrainian National Office 
for  Intellectual  Property  and  Innovations  is  the new  institution  responsible  for  intellectual 
property  and  has  been  operational  since  November  2022.  It  functions  as  the  National 
Intellectual  Property  Office  and  as  the  coordination  platform  for  dialogue  on  intellectual 
property  rights  with  all  stakeholders.  The  agency  has  been  promoting  the  strengthening  of 
institutional  capacity  through  training  courses.  It  developed  a  closer  collaboration  with  the 
World Intellectual Property Organisation and the European Union Intellectual Property Office, 
with  which  it  signed  in  2021  a  Memorandum  of  Understanding  to  enhance  technical 
cooperation. It is a self-financed agency, through fees, and currently has 500 employees.  

Currently, the system of courts with jurisdiction over IPR cases includes common courts (civil 
jurisdiction) and commercial courts (commercial jurisdiction). The Law on judiciary and status 
of judges from 2016 provides for the establishment of an intellectual property court. However, 
the appointment of the 21 judges is pending, as the High Qualification Commission of Judges 
remained non-operational until 2022. 

Chapter 8 – Competition policy  

EU rules protect free competition. They include antitrust rules against restrictive agreements 
between companies and abuse of dominant position, and also include rules on concentrations 
between companies which would significantly impede effective competition. EU rules also set 
out a system of State aid control. Governments are only allowed to grant State aid if restrictive 
conditions are met, with a view to preventing distortion of competition. 

Ukraine has  some level  of preparation in  competition  policy. During the reporting period, 
there was limited progress in the legislative alignment with the EU acquis.  An amendment to 
the Law on the protection of economic competition was voted in in August 2023, which aims 
at further aligning that Law with the EU acquis. The Law on State aid remains suspended due 
to martial law, but this should not stand in the way of reforms in the policy area.  

In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular: 

→  further align the legislative framework in the area of competition and State aid with the EU 
acquis, including by modifying the law on State aid to cover under its scope services of 
general economic interest (SGEIs). 

→  compile a reliable and comprehensive inventory of State aid schemes instituted before the 

establishment of the authority responsible for State aid control in Ukraine.  

Antitrust and mergers  

On the legislative framework, the Law on the protection of economic competition is to a large 
extent aligned with the EU acquis. However, certain gaps still remain. For example, that law 
does not clearly differentiate between economic and non-economic activities,  lacks a clear de 
minimis rule, does not contain exemptions from the prohibition of concerted practices, and does 
not define the notion of ‘abuse’ and of ‘dominant position’. An amendment to the Law on the 
protection of economic competition was adopted in August 2023. The law introduces a number 

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of changes aiming at further aligning the Ukrainian legislation with EU regime. Those changes 
include the introduction of a leniency and a settlement mechanism and rules on joint and several 
liability of undertakings for breaches of competition law.  

On  the  institutional  framework,  the  Anti-Monopoly  Committee  of  Ukraine  (AMCU)  is 
responsible for implementing the Law on the protection of competition. It is an operationally 
independent authority financed by the national budget. It does not have the right to set priorities 
and  reject  complaints  on  the  grounds  of  priority,  while  its  powers  to  conduct  effective 
inspections are limited. Some fundamental rights such as access to the file and hearing are also 
not  fully  in  line  with  the  EU  rules.  In  addition,  no  party  can  bring  a  case  for  damages  and 
stoppage of anticompetitive conduct directly before a domestic court based on a possible breach 
of competition rules that affects their interests. They must first apply and get a decision from 
the AMCU. The amendment to the Law on the protection of economic competition, introduces 
amendments to the hearing process before the AMCU, increases AMCU’s powers of inspection 
and its ability to conduct unannounced inspections and increases the salaries of its employees,  

State aid  

On the legislative framework, the current Law on State aid transposes Articles 107 and 108 
of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  and  includes  a  notification  and 
standstill obligation. Following the outbreak of the Russian war against Ukraine, that law was 
suspended under martial law. As a result, while the Law on State aid is suspended, State aid 
granting  bodies  have  no  obligation  to  notify  to  the  AMCU  new  State  aid  and  proposals  to 
amend the terms of State aid already granted. Furthermore, State aid granted while the Law on 
State aid is suspended is considered compatible aid.  

On  secondary  legislation,  Ukraine  approved  legislation  during  the  reporting  period  on  the 
recovery  of  illegal  State  aid  and  guidelines  on  State  aid  for  culture  and  support  of  cultural 
heritage.  

On  the  institutional  framework,  even  before  the  suspension  of  the  Law  on  State  aid,  the 
enforcement of State aid rules, in particular as regards on notifications, had been challenging, 
as  granting  bodies  in  the  government  had  not  consistently  notified  State  aid  measures  to 
AMCU. As a result, AMCU was not able to compile a complete inventory of State aid schemes, 
instituted  before  AMCU  was  established.  Moreover,  the  de  minimis  State  aid  regime  is  not 
working well due to a lack of efficient control of the respective thresholds.  

Ukraine also needs to do more to improve transparency in the transactions between the State 
and public undertakings/ State-owned enterprises, aligning its legislation more closely with the 
directive  on  the  transparency  of  financial  relations  between  Member  States  and  public 
undertakings.  

Liberalisation  

Ukrainian competition and State aid legislation is fully applicable to public undertakings and 
undertakings  with  special  or  exclusive  rights.  However,  according  to  the  Law  on  State  aid, 
services  of  general  economic  interest  (SGEIs)  are  not  covered  by  the  State  aid  discipline. 
Ukraine should therefore align the Law on State aid to cover under its scope. 

Chapter 9 – Financial services  

EU rules aim at ensuring fair competition among, and the stability of, financial institutions, 
namely  banking,  insurance,  supplementary  pensions,  investment  services  and  securities 
markets. They include rules on authorisation, operation and supervision of these institutions. 

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Ukraine has some level of preparation in the area of financial services. Despite focusing on 
maintaining  macro-economic stability,  Ukraine has made  some progress in  the reporting 
period  by  starting  to  unwind  some  emergency  measures,  implementing  the  acquis  on 
corporate governance in banks, conducting risk-based supervision of banks and introducing 
legislation to promote sustainable and digital finance.  

In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular: 

→  prepare an asset quality assessment of the banking sector; 

→  strengthen  the  regulatory  powers  of  the  National  Securities  and  Stock  Market 
Commission, in line with the principles of the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions; 

→  continue efforts in alignment with the EU acquis, related to the regulation of banking 
and insurance sectors (including bank resolution and bank deposits guarantee schemes) 
and the regulation of securities markets, investment funds and investment services.  

On banking and financial conglomerates, significant reforms are envisaged under the current 
IMF programme. A first step is to unwind the emergency measures introduced under martial 
law.  These  are  causing  the  most  distortions  and  hampering  effective  financial  system 
operations and oversight. Some steps have already been taken, such as resuming the count of 
loan days past due in June 2022, introducing a procedure under martial law in October 2022 to 
resolve insolvent systemic banks, and submitting a draft law in March 2023 to improve the 
procedure for withdrawing non-systemic banks from the market under martial law. An asset 
quality assessment of banks will be necessary to evaluate the health of the banking sector in 
Ukraine and develop an effective strategy to address non-performing loans.  

During  the  reporting  period,  Ukraine  proceeded  with  implementing  the  Law  on  improving 
corporate governance in banks and other operational issues of the banking system from 30 June 
2021 to  align with the EU capital  requirement  rules. The National  Bank of Ukraine (NBU) 
developed draft regulations on the organisation of the internal liquidity adequacy assessment 
process  and on the procedures for calculating the minimum amount of regulatory capital as 
well as the leverage ratio. 

In 2022, the NBU conducted risk-based banking supervision in line with the guidelines of the 
European Banking Authority on common procedures and methodologies for the supervisory 
review and evaluation process and the recommendations of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision.  

On insurance and occupational pensions, the main rules of the new Law on insurance, which 
are aligned with the Solvency II Directive, will take effect on 1 January 2024. The NBU has 
begun to draft the implementing legislation for the Law on insurance.  

As for the financial market infrastructure, in preparation for a return to normality, a new 
financial sector development strategy was adopted on 19 July 2023 to prepare for a safe and 
prompt  unwinding  of  financial  sector  emergency  measures,  while  restoring  accounting  and 
prudential norms.  

On the securities markets and investment services, long-standing gaps remain in the powers 
of the National Securities and Stock Market Commission (NSSMC) relative to international 
standards.  The  authorities  have  committed  to  amend  the  NSSMC  Law  following  technical 
assistance from multiple international finance institutions in order to strengthen the NSSMC 
mandate in line with the standards and principles of the International Organization of Securities 

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Commissions. A Credit Unions Law was adopted on 14 July 2023, which is largely in line with 
EU legislation.   

On  sustainable  and  digital  finance,  the  National  Bank  developed  its  Sustainable  Finance 
Development Policy 2025, to further integrate sustainability considerations into the financial 
sector of Ukraine, which foresees the integration of environmental and social risks management 
into financial institutions’ activities and the mandatory disclosure by financial institutions of 
their activities’ sustainability level. Anew Law on payment services, which came into force on 
1 August 2022, has expanded the list of entities with the power to issue electronic money. It 
comprises  banks,  electronic  money  institutions,  branches  of  foreign  payment  institutions, 
postal operators, the NBU, public authorities and local self-governments. In addition, the NBU 
Resolution  from  29  September  2022  approved  the  Regulation  to  set  up  the  procedure  for 
issuing and using e-money for transactions. The Regulation also establishes requirements for 
issuers of electronic money and puts in place restrictions on the use of electronic money. A law 
on virtual assets was adopted on 17 February 2022, but will enter into force only after relevant 
amendments to the Tax Code of Ukraine. 

During the reporting period, it was agreed that Annex XVII to the EU-Ukraine Association 
Agreement, which covers the acquis on financial services, will be comprehensively updated. 
The aim is to obtain internal market treatment for this sector in future. Based on the agreed 
update of the financial services legislation, Ukraine will need to pursue further alignment with 
the EU acquis.  

Chapter 28 – Consumer and health protection 

EU rules protect consumers’ economic interests and in relation to product safety, dangerous 
imitations and liability for defective product. The EU also ensures high common standards for 
tobacco control, blood, tissues, cells and organs, and medicines for human and veterinary use. 
The  EU  also  has  rules  for  upholding  patients’  rights  in  cross-border  healthcare,  and  in 
preparing for and responding to cross-border health threats including communicable diseases.  

Ukraine  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  consumer  and  health  protection.  Over  the 
reporting period, limited progress was made on alignment with the EU acquis. 

In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular:  

→  further align national legislation with the EU consumer protection acquis; 

→  adopt a health information system strategy; 

→  adopt the national health security action plan to address threats of biological, chemical, 
environmental  and  unknown  origin;  approve  and  start  implementing  the  2023-2025 
national action plan on antimicrobial resistance.  

Consumer protection 

On horizontal  aspects, Ukraine’s  consumer legislation is partly  aligned with  the  acquis  on 
consumer rights, unfair contract terms, unfair commercial practices, price indications, package 
travel and linked travel arrangements, the sale of goods, digital content and services. It is also 
partly  aligned  with  the  acquis  on  product  safety.  It  is  not  aligned  with  the  acquis  on 
representative  actions  and  on  timeshares,  and  does  not  address  the  latest  changes  to  EU 
consumer legislation introduced by the EU Directive 2019/2161.  

Ukraine’s State Service on Food Safety and Consumer Protection is the central government 
body responsible for consumer safety and protection, market surveillance and advertising rules. 
As of 2020, the National Bank of Ukraine, the Office for Financial Services Consumer Rights 

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Protection  and  the  National  Securities  and  Stock  Market  Commission  are  responsible  for 
protecting  consumer  rights  in  financial  services  in  the  areas  of  banking,  and  capital  and 
commodity markets. To further align the legislation with the EU acquis, the law on protection 
of consumer rights was adopted in the reporting period, but has not yet entered into force. It 
introduced the concept of electronic trading platform (marketplace) and an electronic product 
comparison service (price aggregator), and authorised the State Consumer Service and internet 
service providers to restrict access to fraudulent trading websites.  

Ukraine does not have an alternative dispute resolution system in place in line with the EU 
acquis to enable consumers to resolve disputes with traders out of court. As for out-of-court 
consumer dispute resolution for financial services, the Office for Financial Services Consumer 
Rights Protection currently fulfils certain responsibilities.  

On  product  safety,  the  legal  basis  for  market  surveillance  is  the  Law  on  state  market 
surveillance and control of non-food products and the Law on general non-food product safety, 
which are partly aligned with the EU acquis. Ukraine’s market surveillance risk assessment 
methodology  was  developed  on  the  basis  of  the  EU  Rapid  Information  System  ‘RAPEX’ 
guidelines8. 

On non-safety-related issues, there was some progress on alignment with the acquis on the 
payments  market.  The  Law  on  payment  services  was  also  amended  in  April  2023, 
strengthening requirements for advertising and information disclosure during the provision of 
services in the payment market. 

Public health 

Ukraine is implementing its 2023 public health strategy. The adoption of the Law on public 
health  and  its  implementing  legislation  saw  some  progress,  but  they  remain  partly  aligned 
with the EU acquis, for example in communicable and non-communicable diseases, and cross-
border health threats. 

On  access  to  healthcare,  entitlement  to  publicly  financed  health  services  is  based  on 
citizenship  and  permanent  residence.  Refugees  are  entitled  to  the  same  health  services  as 
Ukrainian nationals, but irregular migrants and asylum seekers are entitled to emergency care 
only and must pay the full cost after treatment. Certain professional categories have additional 
entitlements funded by the government. This fragments the public funds allocated to health 
and results in unequal access to healthcare. The main barriers that people face while seeking 
healthcare are the cost of medicines and treatment, waiting times and transport.  

Despite  launching  the  e-health  system,  including  e-prescription,  there  continues  to  be 
fragmentation and overlaps in health data. Ukraine lacks a health information system strategy, 
and the legal framework needs to be completed. A lack or limited quality of disaggregated 
health-related data is one of the key systemic issues that affects the planning and policymaking 
processes as well as the implementation of health programmes.  

Ukraine’s legislation is partly aligned with the acquis on tobacco control. It has ratified the 
WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and has achieved significant progress on 
its  implementation.  However,  it  has  not  yet  ratified  the  WHO  Protocol  to  Eliminate  Illicit 
Trade in Tobacco Products.  

On communicable diseases and serious cross-border health threats, Ukraine’s legislation 
is partly aligned with the EU acquis. Implementing legislation still needs to be drawn up to 

8 The RAPEX system is now called Safety Gate. 

101 

 
 
 
ensure  effective  prevention,  preparedness  (for  example,  there  is  no  unified  epidemic 
preparedness plan) and response plan.  

Ukraine’s epidemiological surveillance systems are based on key EU principles but need to 
be improved to ensure integration with the EU early warning and response system. A national 
health security action plan to help address threats of biological, chemical, environmental and 
unknown origin has yet to be adopted. Vaccination coverage remains significantly below the 
WHO global recommendations, also due to disruptions caused by the war.  

The national 2023-2025 action plan on antimicrobial resistance is pending approval. There is 
a need to  strengthen  and ensure interoperability between health  and veterinary sectors and 
food/safety sectors on antimicrobial resistance and improve overall preparedness and response 
planning. 

The  2030  action  plan  on  non-communicable  diseases  addresses  risk  factors,  services  and 
prevention  activities.  However,  monitoring  rules  are  not  aligned  with  global  non-
communicable disease targets. The national cancer registry is harmonised with international 
registries,  but  there is  no dedicated cancer screening  programme  for the  early detection of 
cancer  apart  from  six  free  cancer  examinations  in  the  national  programme  of  medical 
guarantees  (mammography,  esophagogastroduodenoscopy,  colonoscopy,  bronchoscopy, 
cystoscopy  and  hysteroscopy).  There  is  no  monitoring  in  place  for  the  early  detection  of 
cervical and breast cancer.  

On blood, tissues, cells and organs, national legislation is partly aligned with the acquis on 
blood,  with  further  alignment  necessary  for  instance  on  blood  safety.  Responsibilities  are 
shared  between  the  Ministry  of  Health  and  various  state  bodies  to  ensure  policy 
implementation,  licensing  and  control  functions.  The  traceability  and  reporting  system  for 
blood donations is not yet fully developed. Ukrainian legislation is not aligned with the acquis 
on cells for medically assisted reproduction. It also does not regulate inspections of assisted 
reproduction  centres  or  standards  of  quality  and  safety  of  human  organs  intended  for 
transplantation. Ukraine has launched a transplantation development programme.  

The  law  on  medicines  that  will  enter  into  force  30  months  after  the  end  of  martial  law 
introduced important  changes to  previous legislation on medicines for human use. When in 
force,  it  will  be  partly  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis.  Ukraine  does  not  yet  fully  adhere  to 
international standards on the quality, safety and efficacy of medicines. It is not aligned with 
the acquis on medicines for veterinary use but is partly aligned with the acquis on medical 
devices and on in vitro medical devices. 

National legislation is partly aligned with the acquis on cross-border healthcare. There is no 
automatic  reimbursement  of  healthcare  costs  for  treatment  received  abroad  unless  it  is 
impossible  to  receive  the  required  care  from  healthcare  institutions  in  Ukraine  and  an 
application has been submitted for state funding. There is no separate legislation for healthcare 
provided to EU nationals. 

On  nutrition  and  physical  activity,  healthy  lifestyle  and  disease  prevention  could  play  a 
more prominent role while monitoring could be strengthened.   

Corruption in medical service provision and medical education and out-of-pocket payments 
in  the  public  healthcare  system  remain  a  cause  for  concern.  There  is  a  need  to  strengthen 
mechanisms to monitor healthcare service delivery and patient compliance management. The 
complaint monitoring mechanism has the potential to become an effective tool for preventing 
and investigating corruption but is not widely known. Once operational, the e-stock system 

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should provide a further useful tool for improving transparency on the supply of medicines 
across the country.   

CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH 

This  cluster  covers:  digital  transformation  and  media  (Chapter  10);  taxation  (Chapter  16); 
economic  and  monetary  policy  (Chapter  17);  social  policy  and  employment  (Chapter  19); 
enterprise and industrial policy (Chapter 20), science and research (Chapter 25); education and 
culture (Chapter 26); and the customs union (Chapter 29).  

There is a good level of preparation in Ukraine in the area of customs union, where there was 
good progress in terms of alignment with the EU acquis. The chapter on digital transformation 
and media, where numerous regulatory acts focusing on implementation of main EU principles 
have been adopted is moderately prepared/has a good level of preparation. There is a moderate 
level of preparation in the chapters economic and monetary policy, and science and research. 
Ukraine has some level of preparation in education and culture, taxation as well as enterprise 
and  industrial  policy.  Ukraine  is  at  an  early  stage  of  preparation  in  social  policy  and 
employment. Ukraine has made some progress in the area of taxation, where a law introducing 
the  OECD  standard  on  the  automatic  exchange  of  information  on  financial  accounts  was 
adopted. There was limited progress in enterprise and industrial policy as well as social policy 
and employment. This cluster and the reforms concerned are closely linked to the ability and 
capacity for recovery and reconstruction. Reforms must be pursued to increase competitiveness 
and build a sustainable and inclusive economy. 

Chapter 10 - Digital transformation and media 

The EU supports the smooth functioning of the internal market for electronic communications, 
electronic commerce and audiovisual services. The rules protect consumers and support the 
universal availability of modern services.  

Ukraine is in between moderate and a good level of preparation in the domain of digital 
transformation and media. It made good progress in this area during the reference period.  

In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular:  

→  achieve full alignment with EU roaming legislation;  

→  ensure  the  necessary  financing  and  human  resources  for  enacting  the  legal  rules  on 
expansion of the Regulator’s competencies (both telecommunications and media regulator) 
and  for  the  performance  of  the  central  executive  bodies  in  the  area  of  electronic 
communications;  

→  further align with the EU Directive on security of network and information systems (NIS). 

On  electronic  communications  and  information  technologies,  alignment  with  the  EU 
enforcement practices in the digital sector is based on core legislation, i.e. the Law on electronic 
communications and the Law on the national commission for the state regulation of electronic 
communications,  radio  frequency  spectrum  and  provision  of  postal  services  (‘the  Law  on 
regulator’).  These  two  core  laws  are  approximated  with  Directive  (EU)  2018/1972,  which 
establishes  the  European  Electronic  Communications  Code.  In  particular,  Article  5  of  this 
Directive ensures that the legal  status  of the regulatory body in  electronic communications, 
with its powers and independence, is fully compliant with European approaches.  

The regulator, as a newly established national regulatory authority, is a legally distinct and 
functionally  independent  institution  with  appropriate  decision-making  powers.  These 
include  exclusive  responsibilities to  carry  out  regulatory  tasks,  adopt  binding  decisions  and 

103 

 
 
issue  relevant  legal  and  normative  acts.  Full  implementation  of  the  two  core  laws  implies 
adoption of a series of secondary regulations. During the reporting period, numerous regulatory 
acts have been adopted. These focus on implementation of the main EU principles, including 
transparency and general authorisation together with numbering and radio spectrum. 

Due to financial constraints in general, the 2023 budget law provides the regulator with only 
limited financing. This makes it difficult for it to perform its functions as defined by the Law 
on  regulator.  The  authority  of  the  central  executive  body  in  the  areas  of  electronic 
communications and radio frequency spectrum, the State Service of Special Communications 
and Information Protection of Ukraine, faces similar challenges.  

In light of current security-related constraints related to the Russian war of aggression, Ukraine 
has not yet implemented the acts related to the regulatory framework for radio spectrum 
policy,  in  particular  the  release  of  the  700  MHz  band  from  TV  broadcasting  for  mobile 
communications. 

Ukraine has a well-advanced e-government system, where people have easy access to public 
services. The government launched its vision for electronic public service design and delivery 
known  as  ‘The  State  in  a  Smartphone’  in  2019.  It  resulted  in  the  rapid  development  of 
electronic services and has proven its resilience and adaptability throughout the war. Digital 
governance has increased the efficiency and transparency of the government  and facilitated 
government-citizen  dialogue.  The  unified  web  portal  for  electronic  services,  Portal  Diia, 
enables access to the most popular electronic public services (120 in total). Electronic public 
services are also available in the Diia mobile application (25 services) as well as on other web 
resources  of  public  authorities.  The  mobile  application  is  used  by  17.3  million  users  and 
installed on more than 32 million devices. UA should continue seeking alignment with both 
the European Interoperability Framework (latest revision in 2017) and the Interoperable Europe 
Act (2022). 

After  updating  Appendix  XVII-3  of  Annex  XVII  to  the  Association  Agreement/Deep  and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area, Ukraine has launched a process to put in place legislation 
the  EU 
that  would  align  Ukraine’s 
relevant 
telecommunications acquis. Ukraine has the prospect of joining the EU’s ‘Roam like at home’ 
scheme if it implements the EU roaming regulation and other relevant legislation subject to a 
decision granting internal market treatment. 

legislation  with 

roaming 

to  EU 

In  the  area  of  electronic  identification  and  trust  services,  Ukraine  has  a  high  degree  of 
alignment with the EU requirements (eIDAS Regulation). In January 2021, the EU and Ukraine 
adopted a joint work plan for cooperation on electronic trust services with a view to a possible 
agreement based on approximation with EU legislation and standards. While  Ukraine decided 
to legally recognise – on an experimental basis – qualified electronic signatures originating in 
EU Member States on 22 November 2022, the Commission published tools (Third Countries' 
trusted list) on 25 January 2023 that facilitate the validation of electronic signatures or seals 
created in third countries, as advanced electronic signatures and seals in EU Member States. 
Ukraine is the first ever third country included in this list. On 1 December 2022, the Ukrainian 
parliament adopted the Law amending certain legislative acts on ensuring the conclusion of an 
agreement  between  Ukraine  and  the  European  Union  on  mutual  recognition  of  qualified 
electronic trust services and implementation of the European Union legislation in the field of 
electronic identification. It provides for the obligatory conformity assessment of qualified trust 
service providers by the independent bodies according to a certification model, similar to that 
of the EU. 

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Ukrainian  open data  policy supports the reuse of open data by both  the  public and private 
sector.  Ukraine  has  achieved  a  high  level  of  transposition  of  the  Open  Data  Directive.  The 
Ministry of Digital Transformation drafted a new open data strategy in June 2022. According 
to the EU Open Data Maturity Report 2022, Ukraine ranks second (after France) in the overall 
index, and is also the best performer among the candidate countries.  

Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council is implementing a national cybersecurity 
strategy.  Its  computer  emergency  response  team,  CERT-UA,  has  received  international 
accreditations and is taking steps within overall framework of the EU-Ukraine cyber dialogue 
towards closer institutional cooperation with EU counterparts, including the European Union 
Agency  for  Cybersecurity  and  CERT-EU.  Ukraine  adopted  the  regulations  to  exchange  on 
cyber incidents as of 9 February 2023 with the objective to move towards alignment with the 
requirements  established  at  the  EU  level  by  the  framework  for  high  common  level  of 
cybersecurity across the EU (NIS 2 framework). Ukraine still has no 5G mobile network and 
does not seem for the moment to have plans to implement the EU toolbox for 5G security.  

On audiovisual policy, Ukrainian legislation is broadly in line with the Audiovisual Media 
Services Directive (AVMSD). On 13 December 2022, Ukraine adopted the Law on media and 
on 30 of May 2023 amendments to the Law on advertising, which broadly align the national 
rules with the new provisions of the revised AVMSD (Directive (EU) 2018/1808). The law 
entered into force on 31 March 2023 and seeks to ensure the independence of media regulator. 
It also includes mechanisms to ensure the transparency of media ownership and freedom of 
reception  and  retransmission  for  both  TV  and  radio  broadcasting  if  their  content  meets  the 
requirements of the European Convention on Transfrontier Television and of Ukrainian law. 
The  main  regulatory  authority  for  audiovisual  media  services  is  the  National  Council  of 
Ukraine on Television and Radio Broadcasting. Restrictions are in place for the retransmission 
of television programmes, with control over the content carried out by residents of a country 
recognised as an aggressor state or an occupying power, or those that systematically violate the 
requirements of Ukrainian legislation.  

Both  laws  have  stricter  rules  on  retransmission  of  the  audiovisual  content  of  broadcasters 
established in the EU than the EU Audiovisual Media Services Directive. These are aimed at 
preventing Russian TV channels from retransmitting audovisual content and advertising from 
EU Member States to Ukraine. They are considered necessary to protect Ukraine’s information 
space in the current security climate, but will need to be addressed by the time Ukraine joins 
the EU.  

On the protection of minors, content that can be harmful to the physical, mental or moral 
development of children and young people is regulated both for television and radio. While 
there are no safety-by-design or privacy-by-design principles embedded in the policy to protect 
children, there are examples of industry- and NGO-driven initiatives to address the issue of 
harmful  content,  including  self-generated  content.  Awareness-raising  activities  are  also 
organised as part of formal education. Media literacy has been integrated as a key component 
of the education system. 

Chapter 16 - Taxation 

EU  rules  on  taxation  cover  value-added  tax  and  excise  duties  and  aspects  of  corporate 
taxation. They also cover cooperation between tax administrations, including the exchange of 
information to prevent tax evasion. 

Ukraine has some level of preparation in the area of taxation. It has ensured continuity of 
tax administration and made some progress in this policy area during the reporting period. 

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On 20 March 2023, Ukraine adopted the law introducing the OECD standard on the automatic 
exchange of information on financial accounts (Common Reporting Standard), which is due 
to start in 2024. On 3 November 2022, Ukraine joined the OECD Multilateral Competent 
Authority Agreement on the exchange of country-by-country reports.  

In 2023, Ukraine should in particular:  

→  make progress in terms of aligning legislation on VAT and excise duties;  

→  prepare the introduction of the general anti-abuse rule as part of the Anti-Tax Avoidance 

Directive; 

→  ensure  the  implementation  of  the  automatic  exchange  of  tax  information  with  EU 

Member States in line with the OECD Global Standards.  

On indirect taxation, Ukraine’s VAT law is generally aligned with the EU VAT Directive. 
The standard VAT rate is 20%, with reduced rates of 0%, 7% and 14% for specific operations. 
A preferential VAT regime is applied to transactions involving the import of goods. VAT and 
excise duties on fuel and the simplified taxation, suspended at the beginning of the war, were 
restored. The VAT refund, which had been suspended, has been restored and has been fully 
automated. No VAT refund arrears have been reported as of April 2023.  

Excise taxation is partially aligned with EU law. Alcohol and alcoholic beverages are classified 
and taxed based on EU rules, except for beer and beer mixes. Excise duties on energy products 
have a narrower scope and lower rates compared to  the EU Directive.  Further alignment is 
needed on VAT and excise duty on goods imported by individuals from third countries.  

Ukraine has a tax warehousing system for alcohol, tobacco and energy products, but it does not 
comply  with  the  EU  duty  suspension  system.  The  system  includes  premises  within  the 
country’s  customs  territory  and  mobile  excise  warehouses  for  fuel  or  ethyl  alcohol  on  the 
customs  territory  of  Ukraine  under  duty  suspension.  Excise  tax  is  immediately  due  once 
excisable  goods  have  been  produced  or  imported,  with  the  excise  suspension  regime  not 
applied. The country needs to bring its excise warehousing system in line with the EU acquis. 
The  system  of  electronic  administration  of  the  sale  of  fuel  and  ethyl  alcohol  monitors  and 
controls the movement of taxed products within the territory of Ukraine. 

In terms of direct taxation, residents are taxed on worldwide income, whereas non-residents 
are  taxed  only  on  their  Ukrainian-sourced  income.  The  standard  tax  rate  of  18%  applies  to 
various  types  of  income,  including  earnings  (salary),  benefits,  foreign  income  and  passive 
income, with  a few exceptions. However, corporate income tax is  not  fully  in  line with  the 
Merger Directive, Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the Interest and Royalties Directive. The 
cross-border transfer of assets within the same company may be subject to corporate profit tax. 
Exit taxation rules similar to those in Council Directive EU 2016/1164 and in the general anti-
abuse rule as part of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive have not been implemented. 

On  administrative  cooperation  and  mutual  assistance,  Ukraine  has  double  taxation 
avoidance agreements with all EU Member States. It has also signed the Convention on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (OECD/Council of Europe). Parliament adopted the 
Law  on  automatic  exchange  of  information  on  financial  accounts,  aligned  with  the  EU 
Directive  on  Administrative  Cooperation  (DAC  2),  on  20  March  2023.  The  first  automatic 
exchange of information is scheduled for 2024, covering the period from mid-2023. Ukraine’s 
legislation on base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) implements the OECD BEPS Action 13 
on Multinational Enterprises Groups Country-by-Country Reporting, largely aligning with the 

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EU DAC 4 Directive. Ukraine intends to use the OECD Common Transmission System for 
automatic exchange of information based on the common reporting standards and country-by-
country  standards.  However,  there  is  no  central  communication  office  for  information 
exchange with EU Member States yet.  

On  operational  capacity  and  computerisation,  95%  of  State  Tax  Service  personnel  are 
operational  despite  the  ongoing  war,  with  some  working  remotely.  As  of  3  April  2023,  63 
taxpayer centres had temporarily stopped their activities, with taxpayers offered extraterritorial 
services. Thanks to EU support, the IT centre of the State Tax Service has been able to continue 
operating. Before the war, State Tax Service staff were recruited under the Law on civil service. 
However, there is a need to assess training needs and base the annual training programme on 
this assessment.  

IT  reforms  in  tax  are  guided  by  the  IT  reform  strategy  for  the  public  finance  management 
system, adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers in November 2021. A dedicated IT reform strategy 
for the State Tax Service is currently being finalised. The State Tax Service currently operates 
electronic tax administration systems as well as VAT tax invoices (ERPN) and excise invoice 
(ERAN) registration systems. Ukraine needs to establish connections to EU IT systems such 
as the Excise Movement Control System, the VAT Information Exchange System based on the 
Mutual Assistance Directives and the Recovery Directive. 

Chapter 17 – Economic and monetary policy  

EU rules require the independence of central banks and prohibit them from directly financing 
the public sector. Member States coordinate their economic policies and are subject to fiscal, 
economic and financial surveillance. 

Ukraine  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of  economic  and  monetary  policy.  As  the 
Russian full scale invasion demanded extraordinary economic policy measures, no progress 
could  be  made  in  the  policy  areas.  The  Ukrainian  authorities    have  taken  comprehensive 
measures  aimed  at  maintaining  macroeconomic  and  financial  stability  in  wartime,  which  
required  to deviate from standard practices. The policy approached has delivered stability.  

In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular: 

→ prepare to return to inflation targeting and the flexible exchange rate regime; 

→ limit monetary financing of the state budget;  

→ prepare to return to medium-term budgetary planning from 2024. 

In terms of monetary policy, the strategic goal of the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) against 
the backdrop of the war is to maintain macroeconomic and financial stability. The NBU has 
been pursuing policies aimed at maintaining price and financial stability, by maintaining an 
adequate level of foreign currency reserves. In the face of high uncertainty and less effective 
conventional  market  instruments,  the  NBU  continued  to  implement  a  fixed  exchange  rate 
regime  coupled  with  capital  controls  under  martial  law  as  the  main  anchor  for  stabilising 
expectations and ensuring price and financial stability.  

Martial law allows the NBU to take several temporary policy measures. These include allowing 
monetary financing and state budget support by purchasing securities issued by the government 
on the primary market as well as imposing limits on deposit withdrawals and restrictions on 
the repatriation of non-resident funds, given the need to provide an adequate response to the 
war and ensure the uninterrupted funding of the budget.  From 16 June 2023, the NBU eased 
some  of  the  restrictions  to  transfer  funds  abroad,  if  guaranteed  by  International  Financial 

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Institutions and foreign export credit agencies, and from 21 June 2023 to service and repay new 
loans to non-residents. The NBU has ceased  monetary financing since the start of 2023 and 
committed  to  abstaining  from  monetary  financing  going  forward.  The  NBU  also  adopted  a 
strategy on gradual easing of foreign currency restrictions, transition to greater flexibility of 
the exchange rate and return to inflation targeting. 

Overall, the legislative framework ensures the functional, institutional, personal and financial 
independence of the NBU and it prohibits direct and indirect monetary financing of the public 
sector.  In  2021,  legislation  was  adopted  that  further  strengthened  the  Central  Bank 
independence,  notably  the  operational  independence  of  its  different  functions  (e.g. 
supervision). The law contains a provision that the NBU must perform its tasks, operate and 
use its instruments without any external and public interference. However, it still provides for 
some level of engagement with the authorities by allowing mutual consultations between the 
NBU  and  the    government.  The  legislative  framework  also  allows  either  the  President  of 
Ukraine or the Rada to unilaterally remove a member of the governing body without judicial 
review, which weakens the protective measures against arbitrary dismissals. Furthermore, there 
is  still  scope  to  further  streamline  the  eligibility  criteria  and  experience  requirements  for 
appointments at the Council and Executive Board. 

On economic policy, medium-term budget planning has become difficult due to the war. This 
includes  setting  key  priorities  for  financing,  establishing  spending  ceilings  and  outlining 
possible fiscal risks. Furthermore, transparency has been negatively affected, with much less 
comprehensive  budgetary  information  being  published.  Ukraine  has  continued  to  forecast 
economic and social developments, although it became very challenging in view of the many 
uncertainties.  Forecasting  capacities  remain  rather  weak,  and  there  is  no  independent  fiscal 
institution  to  evaluate  the  forecasts,  scrutinise  the  budgetary  assumptions  or  evaluate  how 
previous forecasts performed. The government announced a return to medium-term budgetary 
planning  as  of  the  2024  budget,  and  there  have  been  some  tentative  steps  to  reform  the 
accounting framework. 

The main strategic document on economic policy is the Economic Security Strategy of Ukraine 
for the period up to 2025, which was approved by Presidential decree in August 2021. As part 
of its implementation, a transparent system of continuous monitoring of economic stability has 
been implemented, based on 34 indicators on the state of economic security with their critical 
limits  and  target  benchmarks.  These  indicators  are  similar  to  those  defined  in  the  EU  legal 
framework and are used for determining the presence of macroeconomic imbalances.  

Ukraine does not report general government sector data in line with ESA 2010, as they base 
on the IMF’s GFS Manual 2014, which differ substantially. At this stage, GFS or excessive 
deficit procedure statistics are not transmitted to Eurostat. The underlying statistical framework 
is therefore not aligned with ESA 2010 requirements and definitions, and accounting rules and 
procedures are not consistently applied across general government subsectors. In addition, the 
publication of statistical information has been largely disrupted while martial law is imposed. 

Chapter 19 – Social policy and employment 

EU rules in the social field include minimum standards for labour law, equality, health and 
safety  at  work  and  non-discrimination.  They  also  promote  social  inclusion  and  social 
protection, and social dialogue at EU level. 

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Ukraine remains at an early stage of preparation in social policy and employment. Over the 
reporting period, it made limited progress.  

In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular: 

→  adopt new framework legislation in the field of labour relations and occupational health 
and  safety  to  bring  it  in  line  with  applicable  EU  directives  and  ensure  an  enabling 
environment for bipartite and tripartite social dialogue and strengthen the capacities of 
social partners; 

→  develop and adopt a comprehensive de-institutionalisation reform of childcare and launch 

its implementation, considering the situation of displaced children; 

→  address  shortcomings  and  further  align  with  EU  legislation  on  non-discrimination  in 

employment. 

On  labour  legislation,  new  laws  were  adopted  in  2022  that  govern  labour  relations  and 
employee rights; they contain derogations (exemptions) applicable for the duration of martial 
law. Pending reforms, labour relations are still guided in general by an overarching labour code 
from 1971 that needs to be modernised and aligned with EU legislation.  

Undeclared work is widespread, with almost one in five of all employed working in informal 
employment in 2021.  

Enforcement of legislation by the State Labour Service, Ukraine’s labour inspectorate, remains 
constrained  by  legislative  restrictions  to  the  powers  of  labour  inspectors,  which  are  not 
consistent with ILO Conventions 81 and 129 on labour inspections. The State Labour Service 
is being reformed but remains underfunded and has a high staff turnover. Under martial law, 
the powers of labour inspectors are mostly limited to information and advice, as inspections 
have been suspended.  

While alignment with EU acquis on health and safety at work remains limited, steps have 
been taken during the reporting period. In 2023, the Ministry of Economy approved minimum 
requirements for safety and health signs at work and for the health and safety of workers in 
explosive environments. A resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of January 2023 established 
a list of hazardous chemicals prohibited for production and use at work and the Ministry of 
Health  approved  minimum  requirements  for  health  and  safety  of  workers  exposed  to 
electromagnetic fields and the limit and working levels of industrial vibration and the procedure 
for assessing the level of danger of the impact of vibration on the employee. Since 2020, the 
State Labour Service has reviewed occupational safety at companies in all regions of Ukraine 
to identify the most risk-prone sectors, developed regional occupational safety profiles and set 
up preventive work plans. There are no reliable statistics on workplace accidents, which remain 
severely underreported.  
On social dialogue, a law on collective agreements was adopted in February 2023 and will 
enter  into  force  six  months  after  the  cessation  or  cancellation  of  martial  law.  The  National 
Tripartite Social and Economic Council suffers from high staff turnover, understaffing and a 
lack of clear duties and responsibilities. Since September 2022, its rotating presidency has not 
been  renewed,  creating  a  period  of  major  inactivity.  The  government  continues  to  hold 
consultations with trade unions and employers’ organisations through their joint representative 
bodies. Capacity of social partners remains to be strengthened. 

Ukraine’s  employment  policy  has  yet  to  be  harmonised  with  the  relevant  EU  acquis,  in 
particular  with  the  relevant  guidelines  issued  for  the  EU  Member  States.  Ukraine  has  no 
separate strategy on employment. However, the strategy on economic development of Ukraine, 

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which runs until 2030, includes the strategic objective of increasing employment. There is no 
information available to assess its implementation, considering the big severe labour market 
distortion caused by the war. 

The  State  Employment  Service  implements  the  national  policy  on  employment,  labour 
migration and social protection against unemployment. It administers unemployment benefits 
and supports jobseekers and employers alike. The service is being reformed to make it more 
responsive to jobseekers’ and employers’ needs. Active labour market measures include the 
introduction of a state programme to provide micro-grants to individuals so they can create or 
develop their own business. 

Employment  statistics  are  collected  in  accordance  with  International  Labour  Organization 
(ILO) standards but not provided to Eurostat. The invasion has had a massive impact on the 
labour market, with vast numbers of persons being internally displaced or having fled to other 
countries.  The  employment  rate  (20-64)  stood  at  64.8%  in  2021.  For  women  the  rate  was 
59.3%. with a low and decreasing rate of participation among women. Youth unemployment 
(15-24 years) was 19.1% in 2021. Informal employment was estimated at 20% of all employed 
in 2021. Ukraine adopted a strategy and an action plan to reduce undeclared work, but it has 
stopped collecting data on it since the war.  

On  social  protection  and  inclusion,  there  has  been  some  progress  in  administering  social 
insurance  benefits  and  extending  their  coverage,  while  weak  targeting  and  the  low  level  of 
support  has  undermined  the  effectiveness  of  Ukraine’s  social  protection  expenditure  in 
reducing poverty and inequality. In view of the considerable number of internally displaced 
following the outbreak of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, a strategy on internal 
displacement covering evacuation, integration and reintegration has been put in place. There 
are no developments on social inclusion, access to social housing and social service provision. 

In 2022, Ukraine continued to strengthen the social protection of the most vulnerable segments 
of the population. The continuity of several types of social payments was ensured through a 
special system of centralised accrual during martial law. This allowed people who live in the 
territory  of  military  operations  and  under  occupation  to  accrue  payments  that  could  not  be 
made. In addition, benefits received in the past were automatically extended for the period of 
martial law. Assistance schemes for internally displaced persons have also been introduced.  

In  January  2023,  Ukraine  started  developing  a  unified  information  system  for  the 
administration  of  all  social  payments.  In  a  first  stage,  individuals  will  be  able  to  apply  for 
housing subsidies and social security benefits centrally and online.  

On childcare, there has been no progress on the de-institutionalisation of the childcare system, 
while the impact of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine added more urgency to a 
fundamental  reform  of  the  existing  system,  as  the  reform  adopted  in  2017  has  not  led  to 
substantial progress.  

The government has adopted legal changes to non-discrimination in employment and social 
policy. They oblige employers to ensure equal opportunities for employees to conclude long-
term agreements and inform them about suitable vacancies. Ukrainian law now prohibits any 
discrimination  in  employment  that  breaches  equal  opportunities  or  restricts  any  employee's 
rights,  among  others  on  grounds  of  race,  skin  colour,  sex  and  gender  identity,  sexual 
orientation,  age,  health,  disability,  marital  status  or  language.  In  August  2022,  Ukraine 
approved  rules  of  procedure  on  penalties  for  non-compliance  with  anti-discrimination 
legislation. The  Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights (ombudsperson), as 
the main body for combating discrimination, remains under-resourced, with limited capacity 
to enforce its mandate in employment and social policies. 

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No official statistics exist on court cases dedicated to discrimination at work. An overview of 
court cases demonstrates, however, that discrimination is usually not among the main reasons 
for disputes (which mostly focus instead on returning to work or the payment of wage arrears). 
Specialised  civil  society  organisations  estimate  that  the  level  of  rejected  appeals  against 
discrimination  is  high.  Ukraine  is  still  to  adopt  legislation  obliging  employers  to  prove  the 
legality of their decision, action or inaction in discrimination-related court cases, as provided 
for in the national human rights strategy for 2021-2023. 

On equality between women and men in employment and social policy, legislation does not 
create any barriers or impediments for men or women to occupy any position in any profession 
in the labour market, neither in the public or private sector. Already in 2017, legislation that 
prohibited women from practising some 450 professions was abolished, with some exceptions 
(such as ILO Convention 45, which forbids underground work in mines). In September 2020, 
Ukraine  acceded  to  the  Biarritz  Partnership  for  Gender  Equality.  Changes  to  the  Law  on 
advertising adopted in May 2023 banned also discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation 
in advertising as well as gender stereotyping, sexism in job listings and advertising, introducing 
penalties for employers. In February 2022, all jobs in the Ukrainian armed forces, including 
combat roles, were opened to women. However, existing legislation on female employment 
does  not  address  existing  imbalances  and  female  underrepresentation  in  certain  economic 
areas.   Legislation obliges employers to take measures in order to prevent and protect against 
sexual  harassment  and  other  forms  of  gender-based  violence,  but  there  is  a  lack  of  direct 
requirements or procedures for prevention and protection. 

The consistent differences in wages between men and women are largely due to occupational 
segregation, i.e. differences in employment preferences, with more women working in sectors 
with relatively high educational requirements but lower wages, primarily in the public sector. 
Since a substantial part of the economy is informal, official wage statistics do not accurately 
reflect wage differences between men and women. Ukraine has no tax-benefit system in place 
to create similar financial incentives to work for both parents, while unpaid care and domestic 
work still fall mainly on women. 

In August 2022, Ukraine adopted a state strategy to ensure equal rights and opportunities for 
men and women for the period up to 2030. In line with the operational plan for 2022-2024, the 
country has committed to prepare for the ratification of ILO Convention 190 concerning the 
elimination of violence and harassment in the world of work. Certain parts dealing with sexual 
harassment and gender-based violence are included in other legislation, but are not specifically 
dedicated to labour relationships. 

According to the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, the gender pay gap before the fully-fledged 
Russian invasion in Ukraine stands at 18,6%. . In May 2022, Ukraine presented the National 
Strategy  and  Action  Plan  to  reduce  the  gender  pay  gap,  address  occupational  separation, 
gender-based discrimination and harassment at work and close legal loopholes preventing the 
full application of the equal pay for equal work principle.   

Chapter 20 – Enterprise and industrial policy  

EU industrial policy strengthens competitiveness, facilitates structural change and encourages 
a business-friendly environment that stimulates small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 

Ukraine has some level of preparation in the area of enterprise and industrial policy, with 
limited progress made on alignment with the EU acquis during the reporting period.  

In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular:  

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→  develop mid-term priorities for SME development and take measures for improving the 

business environment and investment climate; 

→  adopt  necessary  legislation  to  align  with  Directive  2011/7/EU  on  combating  late 

payment in commercial transactions. 

On  enterprise  and  industrial  policy  principles,  in  2021  Ukraine  adopted  an  overarching 
National Economic Strategy until 2030. It outlined long-term priorities for the development of 
Ukraine’s  economy  and  strategic  measures  in  main  sectors,  including  industry  and 
entrepreneurship. Following the outbreak of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, 
the  2030  strategy  has  been  largely  overtaken  by  the  National  Recovery  Plan  (NRP),  which 
specifies  the  urgent  measures  and  investments  needed  to  support  the  country’s  wartime 
economy and society. The NRP is a strategic document that sets out the recovery/development 
goals of Ukraine until 2032, focusing on stimulating resilience, recovery, modernisation and 
growth.  It  stresses  the  need  to  align  Ukraine's  recovery  and  modernisation  with  the  EU 
principles  of  green  transition  and  digital  transformation,  prioritising  private  investment  and 
nationwide entrepreneurship and SMEs as an important pillar of the new economic model.  

The reconstruction of industry will have to be accompanied with measures directed towards 
improving the business environment, reducing the informal sector, and rolling back the state 
presence in the economy. 

While  Ukraine’s  SME  Strategy  and  Action  Plan  expired  in  2020,  it  included  the  strategic 
framework for SMEs in  alignment with the Small Business Act principles.  In the OECD’s 
SME Policy Index 2020, Ukraine registered significant progress since measurements started in 
2016. The next assessment is scheduled for 2024. As per the 2020 Index recommendations, 
Ukraine should ensure the sustainability of its institutional and regulatory framework for SME 
policy, step up deregulation efforts and ensure the creation of a level playing field for SMEs. 
In addition, streamlining support for SME greening and internationalisation and providing a 
range of business development services will help improve the competitiveness of the Ukrainian 
industry.  

A number of SME digitalisation and deregulation measures have been initiated to improve the 
regulatory  and  operational  environment  for  SMEs.  Regulatory  impact  assessments  are 
regularly conducted and include an SME test. The Unified State Electronic System of Permit 
Documents  (eLicense)  is  being  created  to  digitalise  administrative  services  in  the  field  of 
licensing, and the ePermit system is also set to be developed by the end of 2023. 

Ukraine has used the same definition for SMEs as the EU since 2012. It is enshrined in the 
Commercial Code of Ukraine and widely applied in regulating economic activity. 

On enterprise and industry policy instruments, the Ukrainian legislation is not aligned with 
EU legislation on the rules of Directive on combating late payment in commercial transactions. 
There is no dedicated legal basis to combat late payment in commercial transactions. 

Due to the absence of a current stand-alone SME strategy, the government agencies have been 
operating on an ad hoc, reactive and short-term basis during both the COVID-19 pandemic and 
the  war.  Ukraine  has  implemented  separate  programmes  to  support  SMEs  during  the  war. 
These cover aspects such as business relocation, financing and simplification of taxation. On 
entrepreneurship education and business support, the national Diia.Business support activities, 
including  the  national  multidimensional  portal  and  a  network  of  offline  centres,  have  been 
increasingly important. The Diia.Business portal contains free educational courses on various 
aspects  of starting and  managing  business.  It  also contains  online services  such as business 

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registration, choosing a taxation system, obtaining licences in the sphere of economic activity 
and public procurement. Digital competence is included as a key competence in the national 
education curricula. Female entrepreneurship is supported by several tools and women-specific 
programmes promoted on Diia.Business. 

Ukraine signed  an association agreements for participation in the EU’s Horizon Europe and 
Creative  Europe  programmes  and  signed  an  affiliation  agreement  for  the  Single  Market 
Programme  on  3  February  2023,  which  has  meanwhile  been  ratified.  Ukraine’s  business 
matchmaking  and  integration  into  EU  and  global  value  chains  are  supported  by  eight 
organisation  members  of  the  Enterprise  Europe  Network  consortium  in  Ukraine,  five 
organisations that administer the Erasmus for Young Entrepreneurs programme and about 40 
clusters  that  participate  in  the  Ukrainian  Cluster  Alliance  and  have  access  to  the  European 
Cluster Collaboration Platform instruments. 

As regards sector policies, the updated Partnership Roadmap for 2023–2024 in the area of raw 
materials  was  endorsed  on  19  May  2023.Good  progress  of  implementation  of  the  initial 
Partnership Roadmap 2021-22 was reported despite the war conditions. 

Chapter 25 – Science and research  

The  EU  provides  significant  support  for  research  and  innovation.  All  Member  States  can 
participate in the EU’s research and innovation programmes and benefit from them, especially 
where there is scientific excellence and solid investment in research and innovation.   

Ukraine is moderately prepared in the area of science and research. It participates in the 
EU  research  and  innovation  (R&I)  programmes  and  seeks  greater  integration  into  the 
European  Research  Area  and  the  New  European  Innovation  Agenda.  Overall,  limited 
progress was made towards alignment with the EU acquis during the reporting period. 

In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular: 

→  intensify effort to integrate into Horizon Europe, by taking steps to establish an office in 
Ukraine, appointing national contact points and taking part in the relevant governance 
structures; 

→  adopt the strategy for scientific and technological development; 

→  develop regional smart specialisation strategies. 

Ukraine has taken steps to modernise its  R&I policy following the recommendations of the 
Horizon 2020 Policy Support Facility. The country has set up two national advisory councils 
(for  science  and  technology  development  and  for  innovation)  and  the  National  Research 
Foundation. 

Russia’s  war  of  aggression  against  Ukraine  is  aggravating  the  long-term  trend  of  under-
investment  in  R&I  by  destroying  infrastructure  and  human  capital.  35%  of  research 
infrastructure  had  been  damaged  or  destroyed  by  March  2023  and  25%  of  the  scientific 
workforce had left the country. In addition, public investment in science and innovation has 
been cut to a minimum. As of 2020, Ukraine’s research spending shrunk to less than half of its 
2003 level. In 2021, Ukraine’s research spending as a share of GDP stood at 0.29% of GDP, 
which is less than half of its 2003 level. 

The Ukraine Start-up Fund was set up to strengthen Ukraine’s innovation capacity and business 
collaboration. There is currently no national technology transfer roadmap. According to the 
European  Innovation  Scoreboard  2022,  Ukraine  is  regarded  as  an  emerging  innovator, 

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performing  at  31%  of  the  EU  average.  On  innovation  the  performance  gap  with  the  EU  is 
increasing.  

The country has a legal basis for the design of smart specialisation strategies and their inclusion 
in  overarching  regional  development  strategies  has  been  obligatory  since  2021.  While  the 
actual development of strategies has been interrupted by the war, several  Ukrainian regions 
expressed interest in restarting the process in 2023. 

On cooperation with the EU, Ukraine is revising the roadmap for integration into the European 
Research Area and has been making progress on some of its priorities such as gender equality, 
open science (the National Open Science Plan was adopted in October 2022) and reforming 
the research assessment system. However, Ukraine’s participation in European Research Area 
governance  structures  is  still  limited.  In  relation  to  the  New  European  Innovation  Agenda, 
Ukraine has developed a strategy for the development of the innovation sector and has been 
invited  to  join  the  European  Innovation  Council  Forum  and  the  Coalition  of  the  Willing  to 
exchange on innovation policies and initiatives.  

Horizon Europe and Euratom remain the cornerstones of support for Ukraine’s R&I sector. By 
August  2023,  79  grants  had  been  signed  totalling  EUR  22.3  million.  In  addition,  Ukraine 
benefits from dedicated initiatives under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions programme, the 
European Innovation Council, the EU Cities Mission and in the areas of research infrastructure. 
The opening of the Horizon Europe office in Kyiv will help make the most of the available 
opportunities. Ukraine should also swiftly appoint the Horizon Europe national contact points 
(NCPs) to strengthen participation in the programme. 

Ukraine has 39 intergovernmental agreements for R&I cooperation with 35 countries. In 2022, 
Ukraine cooperated with eight partner countries via 79 joint international research projects. 

Chapter 26 – Education and culture  

The EU supports cooperation in education and culture through funding programmes and the 
coordination of Member State policy through the ‘open method of coordination’. The EU and 
the Member States must also prevent discrimination and ensure quality education for children 
of migrant workers, including those from disadvantaged backgrounds. 

Ukraine has some level of preparation in the area of education and culture. The education 
system and youth policy are broadly aligned with EU objectives. Ukraine’s cultural policy 
reflects the general priorities of the New European Agenda for Culture. Ukraine has a good 
level of cooperation with its European partners on sport. The country is broadly aligned with 
EU policy on training and qualifications. Some progress has been achieved in all these areas. 

In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular: 

→  develop a plan for a relevant statistical data collection, analysis and sharing mechanism 

for education and training; 

→  start implementing a plan to optimise the network of education institutions; 

→  adopt legislation to modernise and regulate professional education (vocational education 

and training). 

Education and training statistics are not widely available, and data is collected and published 
with  a considerable time lag. According to  World Bank data, public spending  on education 
amounted to 5.4% in 2020 (the EU MS average was 5% of GDP). 

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The network of education institutions, including higher education institutions, needs to be 
optimised  to  respond  to  the  demographic  changes  in  Ukraine  and  improve  the  quality  of 
education.  The  Russian  war  of  aggression  poses  major  challenges,  including  large-scale 
destruction of education facilities. This severely hampers access to education in the affected 
areas. Digital learning centres have allowed some students to resume their studies, but learning 
outcomes and the psychological state of students and teachers have suffered greatly.  

Ukraine has adopted a set of laws and policies to provide education principles and standards in 
accordance with EU standards. The New Ukrainian School reform aims at introducing content 
education  based  on  key  competencies,  including  green  and  digital.  The  new  standards  in 
primary and basic secondary education define 11 key competencies that correspond to the EU 
key competencies for lifelong learning. The  New Ukrainian School is being rolled out  with 
some delays in terms of teacher training and the printing of new textbooks.  

The Law on education establishes the structure of the education system and gives a significant 
role to the Ukrainian National Qualifications Framework, lifelong learning and education based 
on key competencies. In February 2023, the Commission published a report on the comparison 
between the European Qualifications Framework and the Ukrainian qualifications framework. 
The report demonstrates how Ukrainian qualifications compare with the European ones and 
support  the  recognition  of  Ukrainian  qualifications  and  can  help  further  studies  and 
employment. Ukraine became a member of the Advisory Group of the European Qualifications 
Framework  and  can  start  preparing  for  the  referencing  to  the  European  Qualifications 
Framework. 

An Arrangement  for  Cooperation  on  Education  between  the  European  Commission  and  the 
Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine was signed in June 2023. Both parties agreed to 
strengthen and further develop cooperation and dialogue in this field. The Commission has also 
opened up participation in the Eurydice Network to the Ministry of Education and Science of 
Ukraine to get a deeper understanding of the respective education systems and their cooperation 
in education. 

Regarding  the  issue  of  national  minorities  in  education,  where  Ukraine  needs  to  fully 
implement  the  recommendation  of  the  Council  of  Europe’s  Venice  Commission  on  the 
education  law,  implement  those  on  the  State  language  law  and    address  the  remaining 
recommendations of the Venice Commission Opinion of June 2023 and the follow-up Opinion 
of October 2023, this  will continue to  be monitored as part of Chapter 23 on judiciary  and 
fundamental rights.  

The  VET  system  still  operates  under  a  law  from  1998  that  needs  modernisation  to  among 
others merge VET and pre-tertiary levels of education into one joint professional education 
system. Meanwhile, the development of the VET sector is guided by a dedicated strategy and 
concept with the aim of making VET more attractive and relevant. Work-based learning plays 
a significant role (70%) in dual VET programmes. However, the involvement of businesses 
remains low, and the quality of training, materials and technical equipment of VET institutions 
does not fully meet the requirements of employers and students.  

Validation  of  non-formal  and  informal  learning  is  well  established  and  implemented.  The 
National  Agency  for  Qualifications  accredits  qualification  centres  that  assess  professional 
qualifications independently, including the validation of non-formal and informal learning.  

On higher education, Ukraine is a member of the Bologna Process and has ratified the Lisbon 
Recognition Convention. It has made progress on the key European Higher Education Area 
commitments,  effectively  engaging  in  EU  higher  education  policy  and  transnational 
cooperation.  At  the  same  time,  the  implementation  of  the  Strategy  for  the  Development  of 
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Higher Education in Ukraine for 2021-2031 has been slow due to the disruption and lack of 
resources caused by the war. In May 2023, it made some progress in improving the mechanism 
of quality assurance of higher education. Ukraine participates in the international dimension of 
the Erasmus+ programme. Around 30 higher education institutions from Ukraine have joined 
European Universities Alliances in 2023, as associated partners. 

In July 2023, Ukraine nominated its representatives to the European Education Area Working 
Groups 2021-2025. It is also in the process of joining the Eurydice Network. 

Youth policy is governed by the law on basic principles of youth policy, the strategy on the 
development of youth policy in Ukraine until 2030 and the state-targeted social programme 
Youth of Ukraine for 2021-2025. The Ukrainian Volunteer Service has established an effective 
national  volunteer  platform.  However,  activities  on  youth  employment  partnerships,  youth 
participation, skills development of disadvantaged young people and youth entrepreneurship 
for the digital and green economy need to be implemented in a more visible way.  

Ukraine’s  approach  to  cultural  policy  broadly  reflects  the  general  priorities  of  the  New 
European Agenda for Culture. At the strategic level, Ukrainian cultural policy focuses on three 
strands: (1) the creation of conditions for the active involvement of Ukrainian actors into pan-
European cultural processes, (2) the promotion of European values, and (3) the strengthening 
of culture ties with the EU Member States. Its strategy for the development of culture is due 
for revision in 2025. The law on culture has been amended to include rules on the digitalisation 
of  cultural  heritage  assets’  registers.  The  strategic  elements  are  further  translated  into  three 
concrete policy priorities: (1) designing and implementing a new approach for a public model 
of  cultural  infrastructure,  (2)  safeguarding  cultural  heritage,  and  (3)  fostering  networking 
among the internationalisation of Ukrainian cultural and creative sectors, which includes the 
association to Creative Europe. The European Capital of Culture is an additional priority. 

On  sport,  Ukraine  has  continued  to  cooperate  with  European  partners,  including  in  the 
European Week of Sport Beyond Borders and in the Council of Europe’s sport partnership.  

Chapter 29 – Customs union  

All EU Member States are part of the EU customs union and follow the same customs rules 
and procedures. This requires legislative alignment as well as adequate implementation and 
enforcement capacity, and access to the common computerised customs systems. 

Ukraine has a good level of preparation in the area of the customs union. Despite the ongoing 
military  aggression,  Ukraine  has  made  good  progress  in  the  customs  union  area  in  the 
reporting period, especially in terms of alignment with the EU acquis. Ukraine is connected to 
the EU customs information system and is using the new computerised transit system (NCTS). 
Ukraine has been a contracting party of the Convention on a Common Transit Procedure, which 
is 100% based on the Union transit system, since 1 October 2022.  
In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular:  
→  make progress in areas related to customs procedures, customs debt and the application of 
guarantees as well as simplification of customs formalities, and with the development of a 
new Customs Code; 

→  ensure the timely implementation of NCTS Phase 5 and expand the use of the common 

transit procedure as well as the authorised economic operator (AEO) framework;  

→  adopt  legislation  criminalising  large-scale  smuggling  of  all  goods  and  build  up 

administrative capacity to implement this. 

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Ukraine’s  Customs  Code,  adopted  in  2012,  largely  aligns  with  the  Union  Customs  Code, 
including amendments to transit, AEOs and intellectual property rights. In 2022, the Customs 
Code was amended twice to  simplify customs formalities, decision-making procedures, and 
enable accession to the common transit system. The government adopted  and implemented a 
law  aligning  the  classification  of  goods  with  the  harmonised  system  and  combined  EU 
nomenclature in October 2022 .  

Further efforts are needed to raise the usage of the national AEO programme and finalise the 
related IT system for mutual recognition with the EU AEO programme.  

Further alignment of the Customs Code with the Union Customs Code is needed, particularly 
in  the  areas  of  customs  procedures,  simplification  of  customs  formalities,  pre-departure 
information and the enforcement of intellectual property rights.  

The IT system for registering traders’ liabilities needs to be updated.  

The pre-war simplifications for customs clearance, extended until November 2023, should be 
lifted to promote the use of NCTS and grant benefits to compliant AEOs, while strengthening 
risk-based customs controls and improving inland controls. Returning operative intelligence 
rights to the State Customs Service (SCS) is necessary to improve its effectiveness.  

Ukraine became a contracting party of the Convention on a Common Transit Procedure and 
the Convention on the Simplification of Formalities in Trade in Goods on 1 October 2022, but 
the number of common transit movements remains modest.  

Despite the ongoing war and suspension of operations at several regional customs offices and 
border  crossing  points  along  the  eastern  border,  the  SCS  has  largely  maintained  its 
operational and administrative capacity. However, a comprehensive reform is necessary to 
transform it into a modern, efficient, transparent and corruption-free institution. This includes 
recruiting  stable  and  full-fledged  leadership  through  transparent  and  merit-based  selection. 
Improving human resources management with an appropriate training framework is crucial, 
alongside strengthening integrity and anti-corruption measures.  

The  SCS  IT  infrastructure  needs  a  significant  upgrade  as  existing  systems  for  customs 
clearance and risk management are outdated and non-compliant with security requirements. 
While  a  strategic  plan  for  digitalisation  of  the  SCS  was  adopted  in  2022  and  is  being 
implemented, the ongoing war limits financial resources and makes IT reform dependent on 
external funding. A long-term national strategic plan for digital development of SCS until 2026, 
based on the multi-annual EU customs strategic plan, should be finalised and adopted. A plan 
for the implementation of EU-related IT systems needs to be developed.  

Criminalisation  of  large-scale  smuggling  and  accession  to  the  Protocol  to  Eliminate  Illicit 
Trade in Tobacco Products, along with empowering the SCS to investigate cases of smuggling, 
are needed. Strengthening intellectual property rights will require the government to establish 
a  legal  framework  and  develop  necessary  IT  tools.  Developing  risk  management  for  post-
clearance control and customs audit, as well as introducing risk-based customs valuation, needs 
to be addressed.  

CLUSTER 4: THE GREEN AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE CONNECTIVITY 

This  cluster  covers:  transport  policy  (Chapter  14);  energy  (Chapter  15);  trans-European 
networks (Chapter 21); and environment and climate change (Chapter 27).  

Ukraine has a good level of preparation on energy and some level of preparation in the areas 
of transport, trans-European networks and  overall in the chapter on environment and climate 
change.   

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During the reporting period, the country has made some progress on energy. Good progress 
has been made on environment and climate, with more progress on the environment than on 
climate  change.  Limited  progress  was  recorded  on  transport  and  some  on  Trans-European 
networks. Ukraine signed a road transport agreement in June 2022 with the EU to liberalise 
bilateral  and  transit  road  transport.  However,  overall  legislative  alignment  and  institutional 
reforms in the transport sector remain slow. In the energy sector, Ukraine adopted important 
legislation  including  its  long-pending  law  on  wholesale  energy  market  integrity  and 
transparency. Measures taken under martial law, which led to a decrease in transparency and 
independence  of  energy  stakeholders,  will  need  to  be  reversed.  Regarding  Trans-European 
networks,  energy  and  transport  institutions  continue  to  show  extraordinary  resilience  and 
capability for emergency repairs to the damaged networks. In chapter environment and climate 
change,  Ukraine’s  legislative  alignment  with  EU  acquis  and  strategic  planning  increased, 
including through a framework law on waste management, flood risk management plans and a 
water strategy until 2050. Ukraine’s weak administrative capacity in the field of environment 
and  climate  is  a  key  bottleneck,  also  for  the  implementation  and  enforcement  of  rules  on 
environmental impact assessments. This cluster and the related reforms are intricately linked 
to Ukraine’s reconstruction during and after the war.  

Chapter 14 – Transport  

The EU has common rules on technical and safety standards, security, social standards, State 
aid  and  market  liberalisation  in  road  transport,  railways,  inland  waterways,  combined 
transport, aviation and maritime transport.  

Ukraine has some level of preparation in the area of transport policy, with limited progress 
achieved during the reporting period. Progress was severely hampered by Russia’s continuing 
military aggression against Ukraine. 

In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular: 

→  further  align  and  effectively  implement  of  the  EU  rail  and  road  acquis  and  set  up  the 
appropriate administrative structures for rail transport, in particular the regulatory body; 

→  strengthen  its  administrative  capacity  to  enforce  measures  on  road  safety  and  establish 

inspection and investigation bodies for rail and inland waterways transport. 

In the area of transport, Ukraine is implementing the EU acquis priority transport rules under 
the  Association  Agreement.  These  aim  to  facilitate  the  restructuring  and  modernisation  of 
Ukraine’s  transport  sector  and  gradual  approximation  with  operating  EU  and  international 
standards  and  policies.  In  this  context,  Ukraine’s  transport  sector  should  gradually  become 
more sustainable, safe  and efficient.  Despite progress  in  some areas, the  speed of legal  and 
institutional  adjustments and reforms  remains very slow, being  further  affected by Russia’s 
military aggression. The implementation of the National Transport Strategy 2030, which serves 
as a framework for the modernisation of the transport sector, and its dedicated action plan for 
2021-2024 should be resumed as soon as possible. 

The level of alignment of the Ukrainian public services legislation on rail and road transport 
with the EU acquis is low and must be prioritised. In rail and waterborne transport, independent 
accident investigation bodies have not been established.  

In 2022, Ukraine was granted observer status in the Transport Community Treaty as a robust 
basis for further transport market integration with the EU and is cooperating pro-actively with 
the treaty's structures. Closer association with the Transport Community can support Ukraine 
on  its  European  path,  as  the  Transport  Community  plays  an  important  role  supporting  the 
enlargement process through the implementation of the relevant EU transport acquis. 

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In the area of road transport, Ukraine has partially implemented the rules on tachographs. 
Rules on access to the international road transport market and on passenger transport are in 
place. On the European Electronic Toll Service/Eurovignette, there are no tolls in Ukraine and 
road charges are not collected. On social aspects, national rules are aligned with EU rules on 
driving and rest times, but a number of other rules on rest periods have not been implemented. 
Ukrainian  legislation  on  testing  the  roadworthiness  of  vehicles  is  partially  aligned  with  EU 
rules.  

No  progress  has  been  made  in  completing  important  regulatory  reforms  and  adopting 
legislation during the reporting period. This includes regulation of the road transport market on 
wheeled  transport  safety  and  social  aspects  of  road  transport.  The  road  safety  situation  in 
Ukraine has worsened since Russia’s full scale invasion. The road safety strategy up to 2024 
should be implemented as far as possible.  

A  road  transport  agreement  was  signed  in  June  2022  to  liberalise  bilateral  and  transit  road 
transport between the EU and Ukraine for an initial period of 1 year, extended up to 2024. The 
agreement also provides for the recognition of Ukrainian driving licences and certificates of 
professional competence. Ukraine has also signed the Interbus Protocol on international regular 
and special regular carriage of passengers by coach and bus. However, Ukraine has yet to ratify 
this protocol.  

The implementation of rail transport reform was suspended with the introduction of martial 
law in February 2022. The war has resulted in changes to logistics routes following the full and 
then partial closure of Ukrainian Black Sea ports. It has demonstrated the importance of reliable 
and resilient land connections with  the EU and the vital  role that rail transport plays in  the 
current context. The draft railway law has not yet been adopted.  

Ukrainian Railways (JSC Ukrzaliznytsia) remains the sole integrated railway undertaking that 
manages infrastructure and provides rail transport services, with no financial and organisational 
separation between infrastructure management and operations. The Law on natural monopolies 
aims  to  regulate  access  to  infrastructure.  In  practice,  however,  tariffs  and  conditions  for 
accessing  the  infrastructure  are  not  regulated.  The  State  Service  of  Ukraine  for  Transport 
Safety,  supervised  by  the  Ministry  for  Communities,  Territories  and  Infrastructure,  issues 
licences to wagon operators that transport passengers or dangerous goods. However, it does 
not issue safety certificates.   

On maritime transport, no progress has been made during the reporting period in adopting 
legislation that aligns with the EU acquis. The legislative framework is not aligned with the 
acquis  on  a  Community  vessel  traffic  monitoring  and  information  system.  It  is  currently 
impossible to implement the technical framework as the country does not exercise full control 
over its coastline due to the war. Ukraine has not ratified the 2006 Maritime Labour Convention 
from  the  International  Labour  Organization.  Its  legislation  is  not  fully  aligned  with  the  EU 
Directive on working time and the EU Directive on working time enforcement. A maritime 
administration has been created and the body is operational. However, its capacities have to be 
significantly  strengthened  in  order  to  enforce  the  reforms  and  carry  out  international 
obligations  incumbent  on  a  port  or  coastal  state.  On  digital  freight  transport,  the  scope  of 
Ukraine’s  legislation  partially  aligns  with  EU  legislation.  Ukraine  still  needs  to  implement 
legislation that aligns with the EU Port Services Regulation. It should, as a flag state, make 
continued efforts and take necessary measures to improve the quality of its fleet. Ukraine also 
participates in the Black and Caspian Sea (BCSEA II) technical assistance project implemented 
by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). 

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The 2020 Law on inland waterways transport establishes a legal, regulatory and institutional 
set-up to ensure the safety of navigation. Further legislation on the functioning of the market, 
access  to  the  profession,  river  information  systems  and  dangerous  goods  still  needs  to  be 
adopted and implemented. The government has taken steps to establish a dedicated executive 
body  (‘Administration  of  Navigation’)  for  inland  waterways  transport  matters.  Ukraine  is  a 
member of the EU Strategy for the Danube Region and an active Member State of the Danube 
Commission. Furthermore, it has bilateral agreements with several Danube riparian states on 
the mutual recognition of documents. Still, Ukraine should continue to work on fulfilling the 
preconditions  for  recognition  of  crew  navigation  certificates  in  the  EU,  in  accordance  with 
Directive (EU) 2017/2397. 

Ukraine  airspace is  closed for civil  aviation  due to  the war, which makes  it impossible for 
Ukrainian and foreign airlines to operate and has led to the suspension of air navigation services 
by  the  Ukrainian  State  Air  Traffic  Services  Enterprise.  However,  the  State  Aviation 
Administration  of  Ukraine  has  so  far  maintained  an  appropriate  level  of  oversight  over  the 
safety of air carriers registered in Ukraine. Ukraine has made significant progress in aligning 
with  EU  rules  on  aviation  since  2017  and  signed  the  EU-Ukraine  Common  Aviation  Area 
Agreement in October 2021. An action plan on the implementation of the Common Aviation 
Area Agreement was approved in July 2022.  

Ukraine  has  started  to  develop  its  policy,  legal  and  regulatory  framework  on  intermodal 
transport.  However,  progress  has  been  hampered  by  the  war.  The  Law  on  multimodal 
transport  clarifies  and  simplifies  the  procedures  and  responsibilities  for  the  use  of  several 
modes of transport. It does so by approximating Ukrainian legislation with the Directive on the 
establishment  of  common  rules  for  certain  types  of  combined  transport  of  goods  between 
Member States.  

More progress is needed to fully align Ukraine’s legislation with EU rules on passenger rights 
in all modes of transport, in particular for bus and coach passengers and the rights of people 
with reduced mobility. EU legislation on passenger rights in rail transport has been partially 
implemented.  

Chapter 15 – Energy 

EU energy policy covers energy supply, infrastructure, the internal energy market, consumers, 
renewable energy, energy efficiency, nuclear energy, nuclear safety, radiation protection and 
nuclear safeguards. 

Ukraine  has  a  good  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  energy.  Ukraine  achieved  some 
progress during the reporting period, despite the fact  that the energy sector operated under 
emergency conditions due to Russian attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Legislative 
alignment  continued  including  on  wholesale  energy  market  integrity  and  transparency, 
renewables, gas transmission system operator and gas storage certification. However, measures 
taken under martial law led to a decrease in transparency and independence of stakeholders in 
the energy sector.  

In the coming period, Ukraine should in particular:  

→  advance  green  energy  transition  and  green  reconstruction:  adopt  an  ambitious  national 
energy  and  climate  plan  (NECP)  in  line  with  the  2030  Energy  Community  energy  and 
climate  targets;  adopt  and  implement  the  electricity  integration  package;  continue 
improving energy efficiency including in the residential sector through regulatory measures 
and via the Energy Efficiency Fund; implement policy measures to encourage investments 

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in renewable energy production; launch reform of the district heating sector, and introduce 
mandatory energy efficiency criteria for public procurement; 

→  take steps to achieve cost reflective energy pricing, in particular by gradually phasing out 
public service obligations and replacing them with targeted support for vulnerable energy 
consumers; 

→  improve the independent and effective functioning of the energy regulator, resulting in a 
track  record  of  fair  and  transparent  decision-making  to  enable  the  energy  markets  to 
function properly. 

In April 2023, Ukraine adopted a new energy strategy until 2050. The document has not been 
made available as it remains classified by the Ukrainian government. Ukraine’s recovery plan 
from July 2022 sets out the government’s intentions to increase the share of renewable energy 
both  in  gas  and  electricity  in  the  generation  mix  and  develop  the  green  hydrogen  industry. 
Before Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine had developed a draft NECP. The new document 
will  have  to  be  drafted  taking  into  account  the  impact  of  the  war  on  Ukraine’s  energy 
infrastructure and overall consequences for its energy system, which needs to become more 
resilient, decentralised, efficient, and based on renewables. The NECP should set out concrete 
policy and measures and become a guiding document for post-war reconstruction in line with 
Energy  Community  2030  targets,  taking  due  account  of  recommendations  from  the  Energy 
Community Secretariat.  

On security of supply, Ukraine relies mostly on domestic production and limited imports from 
the EU as regards natural gas. As for electricity, the capacity for electricity imports has been 
steadily increased, reaching 1 200 MW in June 2023 for the Ukraine/Moldova control block.  

Ukraine  is  not  yet  implementing  the  Oil  Stocks  Directive.  The  deadline  under  the  Energy 
Community  Treaty  for  alignment  passed  on  1  January  2023.  In  December  2022,  Ukraine 
adopted a gas storage certification law, and in April 2023 the gas storage operator Ukrtransgaz 
was certified in a compliant manner. 

Ukraine’s  gas  and  electricity  transmission  system  operators  (TSOs)  have  observer  status  in 
ENTSO-E and ENTSOG, the European associations for the cooperation of TSOs. Ukrenergo, 
Ukraine’s electricity TSO, is implementing measures to achieve full ENTSO-E membership. 
On gas supplies, Ukraine participates in Aggregate EU, the EU’s joint gas purchase platform. 
The  country  has  agreements  with  Hungary,  Poland  and  Slovakia  on  firm  capacity  for  gas 
imports to Ukraine.  

On the internal energy market, Ukraine’s primary legislation is compliant with the third EU 
energy package. Ukraine has yet to align with and implement the new electricity integration 
package adopted in the Energy Community in December 2022. For electricity, a day-ahead and 
intraday market is operational under price caps. Ukraine has not yet designated a nominated 
electricity  market  operator.  The  electricity  and  gas  TSOs  and  the  gas  storage  operator  are 
unbundled  and  certified.  The  electricity  and  gas  distribution  system  operators  are  also 
unbundled. However, interventions by authorities and companies in the cooperate governance 
of TSOs and in the market continue, which constitute a challenge. The corporate governance 
of the gas TSO LLC Gas TSO of Ukraine proved non-functional.  The governance reform of 
the gas TSO started with legislation adopted in August 2023. 

The  independence  of  the  National  Energy  and  Utilities  Regulatory  Commission,  Ukraine’s 
national energy regulator, and trust in the institution has yet to be fully established, in line with 
Ukraine’s obligations under the Energy Community. This is critical for private investment and 
reconstruction in the energy sector. During the reporting period, NEURC largely focused on 

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maintaining low and stable energy prices for the population during the war. To this end, public 
service  obligations  were  extended  by  Cabinet  of  Ministers’  resolutions  to  ensure  the  social 
protection of household consumers of gas and electricity. As a result, the financial position of 
the state-owned energy companies that implement public service obligations  – Naftogaz for 
gas, Energoatom, Guaranteed Buyer and Ukrhydroenergo for electricity – has suffered greatly 
as  household  tariffs  were  far  below  the  cost  recovery  level.  These  tailored  public  service 
obligations need to be gradually phased out and replaced by more sustainable solutions that 
address energy poverty and the vulnerability of end consumers. In May 2023, NEURC slightly 
increased household electricity tariffs.  

After the Ukrainian and  Moldovan electricity grids  were synchronised with  the Continental 
European  Network  in  March  2022  as  an  emergency  measure,  Ukraine  started  exporting 
electricity to the EU market. Exports stopped after massive Russian air attacks on electricity 
infrastructure from October 2022 onwards. To limit the extent of scheduled blackouts caused 
by  military  attacks,  Ukraine  imported  electricity  from  the  EU  during  the  winter  months, 
resuming limited exports in April 2023. The volume of the electricity market fell significantly 
as many industrial consumers had to stop production because of the war. 

In  May  2023,  parliament  adopted  legislation  on  wholesale  energy  market  integrity  and 
transparency  (REMIT  Regulation),  in  line  with  Ukraine's  obligations  under  the  Energy 
Community.  The  REMIT  law  also  introduced  amendments  regarding  cross-border  capacity 
allocation. Agreements with EU neighbouring countries on cross-border capacity allocation are 
still pending. So far, a 50:50 split of congestion rent was agreed with Slovakia. Joint auctions 
for cross-border trading in electricity by Ukrenergo on the borders with Romania and Moldova 
and via JAO, the Joint Allocation Office, on the borders with Poland, the Slovakia and Hungary 
have yet to take place. 

In the area of hydrocarbons, parliament adopted a law to simplify permitting procedures for 
subsoil projects in December 2022.  

On renewable energy, much of Ukraine’s installed capacity – which amounted to 9.6 GW in 
2021  –  has  suffered  from  damage  or  is  in  regions  with  armed  conflict.  Implementing  a 
functional market-based support scheme for renewable energy sources (RES) in accordance 
with  Directive 2018/2001 remains a key priority for Ukraine, including  for attracting much 
needed private investment. Ukraine’s current target for 2030 is a 27% share of RES in gross 
final energy consumption. In its NECP, Ukraine should set new ambitious annual targets for 
RES until 2030.  

In July 2023, parliament adopted legislative amendments, allowing renewable producers to sell 
electricity directly on the day-ahead, intraday, bilateral and balancing markets. Prosumers can 
install RES facilities of up to 30 kW solar and wind and up to 50 kW for combined wind/solar 
systems. It offers two compensation options for prosumers: a feed-in tariff and net billing based 
on  hourly  wholesale  market  price.  In  June  2023,  Ukraine  adopted  legislation  setting  the 
framework for  guarantees of origin; a functioning national electronic registry has yet to be 
established.  

On energy efficiency, Ukraine’s energy efficiency law is largely aligned with the EU Energy 
Efficiency  Directive.  Rules  on  local  energy  planning  and  the  deployment  of  energy 
management systems by state and municipal authorities consider good practices from the EU. 
Energy audits are mandatory for large companies. However, they are not yet supplemented by 
penalties  for  breaches,  which  may  hinder  their  enforcement,  or  by  incentives.  Measures  in 
Ukraine’s 2030 national energy efficiency action plan, adopted in 2021, need to be updated, 
and  its  long-term  strategy  for  the  renovation  of  buildings  adopted.  Priority  investments  in 

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energy  efficiency  for  the  transmission  and  distribution  of  electricity  and  gas  need  to  be 
identified. 

Despite  Russia’s  war  of  aggression,  Ukraine  continues  to  align  with  EU  energy  efficiency 
legislation.  During  the  reporting  period,  Ukraine  adopted  four  out  of  26  legal  acts  that 
implement its framework law on energy efficiency. In March 2023, it signed a law on high 
efficiency cogeneration, although still without any support mechanism for combined heat and 
power based on useful heat demand to incentivise investments. Additional policy and support 
measures  are  needed  to  promote  efficient  heating  and  cooling,  including  the  reform  and 
modernisation of municipal district heating systems, wider use of renewable energy sources as 
well as waste heat from industry. 

Ukraine’s law on the energy efficiency of buildings is largely aligned with the EU acquis. A 
few  remaining  compliance  issues  require  further  attention.  These  include  inspections  of 
engineering  systems,  differentiation  between  buildings  certification  and  energy  audits  for 
buildings and introducing requirements on certifying buildings when sold or rented out. In July 
2022,  Ukraine  adopted  a  new  law  to  create  conditions  for  the  comprehensive  thermal 
modernisation  of  buildings.  The  law  on  commercial  metering  of  thermal  energy  and  water 
supply is to a large extent aligned with the acquis on heat metering, and Ukraine has equipped 
83% of buildings connected to district heating with accurate heat meters. However, individual 
metering  and  consumption-based  billing  is  still  uncommon.  Ukraine  has  a  high  level  of 
alignment with  the EU regulations and Directive on Energy Labelling  and the Directive on 
Eco-design. At the beginning of 2023, Ukraine adopted 29 technical regulations on eco-design 
and  16  on  energy  labelling.  To  ensure  effective  implementation,  the  organisational  and 
technical  capacity  of  the  state  market  surveillance  body  needs  be  strengthened.  Mandatory 
energy efficiency criteria for public procurement still need to be introduced.  

In 2018, Ukraine set up the Energy Efficiency Fund with transparent corporate governance and 
monitoring/verification systems to support renovations of residential buildings. So far, it has 
been  the  only  policy  measure  that  applies  compliant  measuring  and  verification  of  energy 
savings to end-user consumption. In 2022, the fund introduced a new restoration programme 
to support the rehabilitation of residential buildings non-structurally damaged by war.  

On  nuclear  energy,  nuclear  safety  and  radiation  protection,  Ukraine  is  party  to  all 
international  conventions  concluded  under  the  auspices  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency,  including  the  Convention  on  Early  Notification  of  a  Nuclear  Accident,  and  the 
Convention  on  Nuclear  Safety.  Commitments  and  obligations  resulting  from  international 
treaties, conventions and other agreements that fall under the responsibility of the State Nuclear 
Regulatory  Inspectorate  of  Ukraine  (SNRIU)  are  implemented  and  enforced  to  the  extent 
possible taking into account the ongoing Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the 
forceful illegal seizure by Russian forces of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant.  

The nuclear safety regulator’s capacity for independent licensing and inspection is considered 
sufficient  in  principle.  With  assistance  from  the  State  Scientific  and  Technical  Centre  on 
Nuclear and Radiation Safety, SNRIU can fulfil its responsibilities. However, its decisions are 
de  facto  not  applied  at  the  illegally  seized  Zaporizhzhia  NPP.  Further  capacity  building  at 
SNRIU  is  ongoing  with  international  support.  The  regulator  cooperates  actively  with  the 
European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group.  

In  February 2023, parliament adopted a law on the reorganisation  of its  state enterprise for 
nuclear energy. It provides for turning Energoatom into a joint stock company of the public 
sector and includes the appointment of an independent supervisory board between December 
2023 and March 2024, in line with Council Directive 204/87/Euratom. Energoatom operates 

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15 nuclear units  at  four  sites with  a total  capacity of 13.83 MW. The Zaporizhzhia nuclear 
power plant, the largest one in Europe, has been illegally seized by Russia in March 2022. This 
is  posing  numerous  safety  threats  and  leaves  Ukraine  with  6  GW  less  base  load  electricity 
production.  Memoranda  of  understanding  have  been  signed  with  Westinghouse,  with  the 
construction of nine new nuclear power units envisaged in Ukraine using AP1000 technology 
(pressurised water reactor with two cooling loops). 

Ukraine has a certain level of alignment with Euratom nuclear safety legislation. Gaps exist in 
the  field  of  radiation  protection  of  personnel,  the  population  and  the  environment  and  on 
radioactive  waste  and  spent  fuel  management.  Ukraine’s  approximation  process  is 
experiencing  delays,  partly  due  to  the  ongoing  Russian  aggression  and  is  fragmented. 
Alignment  of  Ukrainian  legislation  with  Council  Directive  2014/87/Euratom  and  Council 
Directive 2013/59/Euratom and Ukraine’s institutional framework needs to be completed.  

Ukraine has a regulatory framework on radioactive waste that requires further development. 
The country still lacks several planning documents in the areas of radioactive waste and spent 
nuclear fuel management as well as a law on the management of uranium legacy sites. The 
State  Agency  of  Ukraine  for  Exclusion  Zone  Management  is  the  central  executive  body 
responsible  for  building  and  managing  radioactive  waste  management  infrastructure.  It 
manages the Radioactive Waste Management Fund. Its resources are insufficient to finance all 
necessary infrastructure projects in this area.  

On  nuclear  safeguards,  Ukraine  would  need  to  start  adapting  the  existing  systems  of 
accountancy  and  control  of  nuclear  materials  in  order  to  accommodate  for  the  safeguards 
provisions (Chapter 7) of the Euratom Treaty. 

Chapter 21 – Trans-European networks 

transport, 
The  EU  promotes  Trans-European  networks  (TENs) 
telecommunications and energy to strengthen the internal market and contribute to growth and 
employment. 

the  areas  of 

in 

Ukraine has some level of preparation in the area of Trans-European Networks (TENs), with 
some progress achieved during the reporting period. The development of new infrastructure 
and networks was substantially slowed down by the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. 

In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular: 
→  carry out emergency repairs and plan upgrades on critical infrastructure; taking into account 
the need for reconstruction in areas badly affected by the war, and ensure better connections 
with EU Member States, in particular through more efficient TEN-T rail and road border 
crossing points as well as electricity interconnections; 

→  further align with and implement the EU TEN-T and TEN-E related regulatory framework. 
→  Develop administrative capacities and scale up project preparation in order to ensure that 
transport and energy infrastructure projects can be implemented in line with EU standards. 

On the Trans-European transport network (TEN-T), there are currently two TEN-T core 
network corridors that reach the Ukrainian border in Chop: The Mediterranean corridor and the 
Rhine-Danube corridor. In June 2022, the EU and Ukraine signed a High-Level Understanding 
on the indicative TEN-T maps, making important adaptations to the indicative TEN-T network 
in Ukraine, namely the inclusion of the inland waterways of the Dnipro River and Southern 
Buh and adjustments to the rail and road network.  

Ukraine has been associated to the Connecting Europe Facility in June 2023.  

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The Indicative TEN-T Investment Action Plan identified 39 priority projects in Ukraine that 
cover all transport modes: road, rail, aviation, ports and inland waterways. When the Russian 
war  of  aggression  against  Ukraine  started,  less  than  10%  of  the  projects  identified  had 
feasibility studies and only a few of these were in a more advanced stage of preparation or 
implementation. The limited capacity to prioritise, prepare and implement projects and limited 
fiscal space remain critical bottlenecks in Ukraine.  

During the reporting period, Ukrainian efforts were mostly focused on emergency repairs to 
the damaged transport network, restoration of lifeline connections and the implementation of 
quick-win solutions to improve connections with Danube ports and EU Member States as part 
of the ‘Solidarity Lanes’ initiative. While Ukraine’s fiscal and institutional capacities remain 
severely constrained by the war, transport institutions continue to show remarkable resilience 
and capability to undertake rapid emergency repairs to the damaged transport network.  

There is an urgent need to develop administrative capacities and scale up project preparation 
for  rebuilding  and  developing  transport  networks.  Project  implementation  units  within 
government services and local government bodies should be strengthened. Investments in the 
transport network need to be designed and implemented in line with environmental and social 
standards  and  based  on  cost-benefit  analysis  following  EU  best  practices.  Ukraine’s  own 
domestic  standards  need  amendments  to  align  with  the  EU  acquis,  thus  fostering 
interoperability with the transport network in the EU and contributing to the improvement of 
road safety. 

Ukraine  has  yet  to  fully  align  with  and  implement  the  EU  TEN-T  acquis,  in  particular  on 
technical  standards  needed  to  ensure  the  safety  and  interoperability  of  networks. 
Decarbonisation and digitalisation of the transport sector remain challenging tasks, especially 
in the current circumstances. Further alignment and improvement of the public procurement 
and environmental assessment standards and alignment with State aid rules is necessary.  

Ukraine  is  including  the  Trans-European  energy  network  (TEN-E)  guidelines  in  its 
legislative framework, with technical assistance funded by the EU. Ukraine’s alignment with 
Regulation (EU) 347/2013 and designation of a national authority are still pending. A large 
part  of  Ukraine’s  internal  electricity  transmission  infrastructure  had  been  damaged  since 
February 2022; repairs are taking place constantly. Ukraine identified some priority projects to 
strengthen  its  electricity  and  gas  grids  and  build  new  interconnectors,  for  example  the 
rehabilitation of the 400 kV Mukacheve  (Ukraine)  – V.Kapusany (Slovakia) line.  In spring 
2023, reconstruction works started on the Bar compressor station.  

Chapter 27 – Environment and climate change 

The  EU  promotes  strong  climate  action,  sustainable  development  and  protection  of  the 
environment. EU rules contain provisions addressing climate change, water and air quality, 
waste  management,  nature  protection,  industrial  pollution,  chemicals,  noise  and  civil 
protection. 

Ukraine has some level of preparation in the area of the environment and climate change. 
Good  progress  was  made  in  this  chapter,  despite  Russia's  war  of  aggression.  On  the 
environment, legislation was adopted aiming at further alignment on horizontal issues, water 
quality,  waste  management,  chemicals  and  noise.  On  climate,  where  progress  was  limited, 
Ukraine continues its work on a national climate law and a National Energy and Climate Plan.  

In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular:  

→  Ensure  cross-sectoral  mainstreaming  of  environment  and  climate  action  in  the 
reconstruction plans of the country, identify green reconstruction strategy for key sectors 

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and  prioritise  relevant  EU  legislation  and  standards  in  its  National  Programme  for  the 
Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA);  

→  Adopt  primary  and  secondary  legislation  to  continue  the  reforms  initiated  in  water  and 
waste  management  acquis.  Adopt  the  law  on  environmental  control  and  the  legislation 
harmonising with the industrial emissions acquis; 

→  Adopt  a  climate  law  and  initiate  the  update  of  its  long-term  low  emissions  strategy 

consistent with the EU 2030 framework.  

Environment  

Ukraine has taken several notable steps to align with EU horizontal legislation on environment 
despite the difficulties posed by the ongoing Russian war of aggression. Taken in this context, 
the steps undertaken by Ukraine are all the more significant, especially in view of the massive 
environmental destruction suffered by Ukraine, and their relevance for the country’s post-war 
recovery which will, ultimately, depend on the implementation and enforcement track record 
after the war. Ukraine. Ukraine ratified two amendments to the Espoo Convention in July 2022 
and  signed  a  bilateral  agreement  with  Romania  on  implementation  of  this  Convention  in 
November 2022. During the reporting period, Ukraine adopted laws on the national pollutant 
release  and  transfer  register  (September  2022)  and  on  the  state  environmental  monitoring 
system. 

The  capacity  of  public  administration  to  deliver  on  cross-sectoral  mainstreaming  of 
environment  and  climate  action  in  relation  to  reconstruction  of  the  country  as  well  as  on 
implementation  and  enforcement  of  already  adopted  EU  acquis,  needs  to  be  strengthened. 
Ukraine  needs  to  significantly  strengthen  administrative  and  inspection  capacities  in  the 
environment  and  climate  sector.  The  implementation  and  enforcement  of  EIA  and  SEA 
legislation deteriorated due to martial law. SEAs and EIAs must be carried out in line with the 
Espoo  Convention  and  the  adopted  EU  acquis  including  for  hydropower  development 
programmes  and  projects.  Access  by  civil  society  to  environmental  information  and 
participation  in  decision-making  needs  to  be  ensured.  Ukrainian  legislation  addresses 
disciplinary,  civil,  administrative  and  criminal  liability  for  environmental  offences,  but  full 
alignment with and implementation of the relevant EU acquis is yet to be achieved.  

On air quality, work on further alignment with two ambient air quality directives continues. 
In August 2022, procedures were adopted for the development of action plans to improve air 
quality, followed by the adoption of methodological recommendations in April 2023 on their 
content  and  procedures.  Under  the  United  Nations  Economic  Commission  for  Europe 
(UNECE) Air Convention, Ukraine submitted the Nomenclature for Reporting and Informative 
Inventory  Reports  in  2022  and  2023.  In  March  2023,  legislative  amendments  to  the  state 
monitoring  system,  including  on  air  quality,  were  adopted.  Further  work  is  needed  on  air 
quality information collection, processing, reporting and dissemination procedures as well as 
monitoring and control. Relevant investments should be planned for this purpose. On sulphur 
in  fuels,  systemic  compliance  monitoring  of  the  products  concerned  is  required.  Alignment 
with the Directive on the control of volatile organic compound emissions resulting from the 
storage of petrol and petrol vapour recovery has yet to be fully achieved.  

On waste management, a framework law was adopted in 2022, which enters into force in July 
2023. On sewage sludge, general issues related to water drainage and sewage treatment were 
addressed with a new law in January 2023, but full compliance with the directive is yet to be 
achieved. A law on limiting the use of plastic bags was adopted in 2021, but additional efforts 
are needed on enforcement and information dissemination to the general public. 

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On water quality, river basin management plans are being developed as well as standards to 
assess the ecological status of rivers, lakes, transitional waters and coastal waters using four 
out of five biological quality parameters of the Water Framework Directive. In October 2022, 
the government approved flood risk management plans to implement the transposed Floods 
Directive. A water strategy to address water use and the protection and reproduction of water 
resources  until  2050  was  approved  in  December  2022.  Its  action  plan  also  includes  the 
designation of nitrate vulnerable zones by December 2023 and several indicators on wastewater 
discharges for the Directive on urban wastewater treatment. In January 2023 a Law on water 
drainage and sewage treatment addressed some of its elements. The regular national annual 
report  on  the  quality  of  drinking  water  and  state  of  drinking  water  supply  for  2021  was 
published at the end of 2022. Drinking water quality is addressed in Ukrainian legislation and 
in  its  water  strategy,  but  compliance  with  EU  requirements  needs  to  be  further  assessed. 
Implementation  of  the  Directive  on  technical  specifications  for  chemical  analysis  and 
monitoring of water status continues. Administrative capacity in the water sector is insufficient, 
also due to lack of funding.  

On  nature  protection,  a  law  on  the  protection  of  forests  was  adopted  in  June  2022.  The 
government approved changes in forest reproduction rules, prohibiting the use of invasive alien 
species, in December 2022. It also approved the list of invasive tree species in May 2023. An 
action plan on the implementation of a strategy on biosafety and biological protection for 2022-
2025, which also covers measures on invasive alien species, was adopted in July 2022. Ukraine 
is a party to the Nagoya Protocol on access to genetic resources since May 2022. Further action 
is needed to protect biodiversity, including on the acquis on wild birds, habitats, zoos, leg hold 
traps, access to genetic resources and seals. A strategy on biodiversity protection and an action 
plan  on  its  implementation  need  to  be  developed  also  taking  into  account  the  Kunming 
Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework. Capacities for setting up and managing Natura 2000 
sites need to be set up, and already adopted legislation needs to be implemented. Ukrainian 
legislation is partially aligned with the EU Regulation on timber and with the EU Regulation 
on  forest  law  enforcement  governance  and  trade.  However,  there  is  a  high  risk  of  non-
compliance. The independence and capacity for monitoring and control of licences, felling and 
the  sale  of  forest  products  need  to  be  strengthened.  The  Parliament  of  Ukraine  ratified  the 
Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to 
the Convention on Biological Diversity on 10 June 2023. 

Ukraine has some level of preparation on industrial pollution and risk management. A legal 
framework covering these areas exists in Ukraine, but efforts are needed to further align with 
the EU acquis, including by adopting missing primary legislation. In May 2023, the Parliament 
adopted in first reading a draft law on integrated environmental permitting and best available 
techniques. The existing  national  limits  for the  emission of pollutants and discharge do not 
meet  emission  levels  associated  with  best  available  techniques  set  out  in  the  Industrial 
Emissions Directive, including for around 220 large combustion plants. Mandatory automated 
pollutant  emission  control  system  procedures  were  introduced  in  March  2023  for  new 
equipment. However, they exclude the most polluting equipment from the Soviet era, and the 
rules will only enter into force several years after the end of martial law. Ukraine reported its 
emissions data for 2021 to the European Environment Agency in accordance with the Large 
Combustion Plants Directive. On industrial accidents, Ukraine joined the UNECE Convention 
on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents in 2022. Ukraine’s legislation will now 
need to be updated to meet the Convention’s requirements and the EU acquis. In August 2022, 
legal amendments were adopted to align with the Seveso III Directive dealing with onshore 
major  accident  hazards.  In  September  2022,  the  government  adopted  a  resolution  on  the 

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identification  of  high-risk  facilities  based  on  the  principles  of  the  Directive.  Reporting 
procedures on safety measures for high-risk entities were drawn up in February 2023.  

Ukraine  is  encouraged  to  start  administrative  preparations  for  alignment  with  the  new  EU 
environmental  acquis  stemming  from  the  European  Green  Deal  in  the  areas  of  circular 
economy, biodiversity protection and zero pollution. Further work and administrative measures 
are  needed  to  implement  the  EU  Eco-Management  and  Audit  Scheme  and  EU  Ecolabel 
Regulations as well as adapt environmental standards and promote green public procurement.  

In the area of chemicals, Ukraine adopted a law in December 2022 to address import and export 
issues. More efforts are needed to bring the legal framework in compliance with the EU acquis. 
Ukraine adopted the law on joining the Minamata Convention on Mercury in May 2023. In 
September 2022, a law on the public health system was adopted, prohibiting the production 
and use of asbestos. In July 2022, the government postponed the entry into force of the technical 
regulation  to  ban cosmetics testing  on animals  by one year. No progress has been made on 
biocides.  

On noise pollution, a law on the public health system, adopted in September 2022, partially 
addresses the requirements of Directive 2002/49/EC. Full transposition is pending.  

On  civil  protection,  on  20  April  2023,  Ukraine  and  the  EU  signed  an  agreement  on  the 
participation  of  Ukraine  in  the  Union  Civil  Protection  Mechanism  (UCPM).  Ukraine  will 
become a Participating State in the UCPM retroactively from 1 January 2023, once it informs 
the  Commission  of  the  conclusion  of  its  ratification  procedure.  As  a  Participating  State, 
Ukraine will be able to  not only receive but  also to offer assistance via the UCPM to other 
countries affected by disasters. Ukraine will have access to more funding and will benefit from 
the full range of tools under the UCPM for structured cooperation in civil protection prevention 
and preparedness with the EU. Ukraine has already shown strong solidarity with other countries 
affected  by  disasters.  Ukraine  provided  bilateral  assistance  to  Türkiye  in  response  to  the 
earthquakes in February 2023 and to Slovenia in response to the floods in August 2023. 

Ukraine has a well-structured civil protection system at national, regional and local level. The 
State Emergency Service of Ukraine coordinates response efforts. Since the beginning of the 
war in 2022, it has effectively coordinated, together with a wide range of stakeholders across 
the Ukrainian government, the delivery of unprecedented in-kind assistance to Ukraine through 
the UCPM. The country has a 24/7 operational duty service, which cooperates closely with the 
European Commission’s Emergency Response Coordination Centre. To facilitate cooperation, 
the  number  of  English-speaking  staff  could  be  further  increased.  Roles  and  responsibilities 
within the civil protection system would benefit from further clarification. The Ukrainian civil 
protection system has a well-documented history of disaster risk management, based on robust 
tactical capacities and a solid legal and institutional framework. It could be further improved 
by  strengthening  disaster  prevention  and  preparedness  measures.  A  national  disaster  risk 
assessment  is  updated  periodically  but  is  not  based  on  a  nationally  approved  methodology. 
Ukraine has not been fully mapped for specific hazards; its Early Warning System could be 
further strengthened. Increased synergies and cooperation should be established between the 
State Emergency Service of Ukraine and the authorities in charge with industrial pollution, risk 
management, industrial accidents, onshore major accident hazards covered under the Seveso 
III Directive to put forward cross-sectorial preventive measures as part of the national disaster 
risk management assessments.   

Climate change  

On climate change, Ukraine has continued work on a framework climate law to make climate 
commitments legally binding and to establish a climate governance architecture.  

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Ukraine  updated  its  nationally  determined  contribution  (NDC)  in  July  2021,  including  a 
commitment  to  reduce  greenhouse  gas  emissions  by  65%  by  2030  compared  to  1990.  The 
commitment to reach net-zero emissions by 2060, which is included in the updated NDC, has 
not translated into a long-term low-emission development strategy yet. A strategy and action 
plan  to  implement  its  NDC  is  not  yet  in  place,  and  an  updated  long-term  low  emission 
development strategy is needed. A national adaptation strategy was adopted in 2021 as well as 
an operational plan for its implementation covering 2022-2024. 

A  Contracting  Party  to  the  Energy  Community,  Ukraine  has  obligations  connected  to  the 
Decarbonisation  Roadmap.  Connected  to  this,  the  country  is  currently  preparing  a  National 
Energy and Climate Plan with support provided through the Energy Community; the NECP is 
expected to articulate Ukraine’s medium-term vision for decarbonisation and resilience with 
needs and opportunities for rebuilding areas affected by Russia’s war of aggression in a greener 
way. 

Also  related  to  the  Energy  Community’s  Decarbonisation  Roadmap,  a  law  on  monitoring, 
reporting and verification of greenhouse gas emissions was adopted in 2019 and entered into 
force in  2020, as  a first  step towards  emission trading,  followed by  a number of secondary 
legislation acts. As the martial law is in place, the monitoring, reporting and verification system 
is  not  fully  operational.  Ukraine  needs  to  urgently  step  up  on  implementing  the  Energy 
Community’s Decarbonisation Roadmap and in particular prepare for the Emissions Trading 
System (ETS). 

Ukraine has a law on ozone-depleting substances and fluorinated gases adopted in 2019. 

Administrative  capacity  remains  weak  in  terms  of  both  human  and  financial  resources  and 
needs  to  be  urgently  enhanced.  Lack  of  administrative  capacity  hinders  the  alignment  and 
implementation  of  EU  legislation,  including  at  local  level.  Ukraine  needs  to  do  more  to 
consistently mainstream climate considerations in all dimensions of public policy in a whole-
of-government approach. 

 It will need to align the future national climate strategy and climate law with the EU 2030 
framework for climate and energy policies, notably certain pieces of legislation under the Fit 
for 55 package adopted during the reporting period.  

CLUSTER 5: RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE AND COHESION  

This cluster covers agriculture and rural development (Chapter 11); food safety, veterinary and 
phytosanitary policy (Chapter 12); fisheries and aquaculture (Chapter 13); regional policy and 
coordination  of  structural  instruments  (Chapter  22);  and  financial  and  budgetary  provisions 
(Chapter 33).  

Ukraine is moderately prepared as regards food safety and veterinary (SPS) and phytosanitary 
policy, has some level of preparation as regards regional policy and coordination of structural 
instruments  and  in  fisheries  and  aquaculture  and  is  at  an  early  stage  in  the  other  areas  - 
agriculture and rural development and financial and budgetary provisions. Ukraine has made 
some progress in four areas, namely agriculture and rural development, SPS and phytosanitary 
policy,  fisheries  and  aquaculture  and  financial  and  budgetary  provisions,  primarily  through 
legislative and policy alignment and through launching a national agrarian register. Progress 
was limited in regional policy and coordination of structural instruments.  

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Chapter 11 – Agriculture and rural development 

The EU’s common agricultural policy supports farmers and ensures Europe’s food security. 
It  helps  tackle  climate  change  and  the  sustainable  management  of  national  resources; 
maintains rural areas and landscapes across the EU; and keeps the rural economy alive by 
promoting jobs in farming, agri-food industries and associated sectors. This requires strong 
management and control systems. There are also common EU rules for marketing standards, 
quality policy and organic farming.  

Ukraine  remains  at  an  early  stage  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  agriculture  and  rural 
development. Some progress was made, notably in the adoption of legislation aligning with 
the EU acquis and the launch of the State Agrarian Registry aimed at registering farms. The 
implementation  of  other  horizontal  CAP  issues  and  the  improvement  of  administrative 
capacity was limited. 

In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular: 

→  finalise  its  national  strategy  for  agriculture  and  rural  development  for  2023-2030 

complementing the sector recovery action plan, and start implementing it; 

→  continue aligning its legislation with the EU acquis on agriculture and rural development 
focusing on the requirements stemming from the Association Agreement and strengthen 
the administrative capacity for evidence-based policy development;  

→  monitor  and  extend  the  registration  of  farms  in  the  State  Agrarian  Registry  and 
systematically  use  it  for  all  financial  support  programmes,  take  preparatory  steps  for 
establishing an EU-compliant paying agency and farm accountancy data network. 

On  horizontal  issues,  the  Ministry  of  Agrarian  Policy  and  Food  (MAPF)  is  in  charge  of 
agriculture and rural development. The government has yet to appoint a body responsible for 
the  management  and  control  of  government  expenditure  on  agriculture,  separate  from  the 
managing  authority  for  programming.  The  establishment  of  the  administrative  and  control 
system  required by the EU  acquis should be accelerated. An integrated administration and 
control system (IACS) should be set up. In August 2022, Ukraine established a State Agrarian 
Registry,  an  automated  information  system  for  collecting,  processing  and  providing 
information  about  producers  of  agricultural  products  and  their  agricultural  activities.  The 
Ukrainian State Fund for Farm Support supports farms including through interest-free loans 
and  payments  per  hectare  and  heads  of  livestock.  However,  it  is  not  yet  an  EU-compliant 
paying  agency.  Improved  integration  and  data  quality  of  registries,  in  particular  the  Land 
Parcel  Identification  System  (LPIS)  is  necessary.  Ukraine  is  encouraged  to  bring  support 
measures  in  line  with  EU  acquis.  A  farm  accountancy  data  network  (FADN)  needs  to  be 
established.  Non-state  advisory  services  of  various  legal  forms  are  allowed  in  Ukraine. 
Government support was provided before the war to registered advisers. Ukraine has started 
to establish an Agricultural Knowledge and Innovation System. 

On common market organisation the Ukrainian legal framework has yet to be aligned with 
the EU acquis. Work has focused on legal acts that regulate marketing standards for certain 
products, and standards for further products are being developed. The law on the association 
of agricultural producers is pending parliamentary adoption and aligns only partially with the 
EU acquis. 

In the wine sector, Ukraine started to establish a vineyard register and new viticulture zoning 
of wine growing areas in line with EU acquis. Common market organisation for wine shall be 
regulated through the Law on grapes and viticulture, which remains to be adopted. 

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On rural development, Ukraine’s draft national strategy for agriculture and rural development 
for 2023-2030 remains to be finalised, including environmental standards, climate resilience 
and bioenergy. It aims to complement the sector recovery action plan. Rural development is 
implemented on the basis of assistance to support small and medium-sized businesses in rural 
areas. A partial credit guarantee fund for small farmers was set up as a nonbanking financial 
institution  and  its  management  board  was  established  in  May  2023.  It  remains  to  become 
operational. A scheme launched in February 2023 supports investments by small farms and 
their integration into functional agricultural value chains.  

On quality policy, the 2020 law on the protection of geographical indications (GIs) makes it 
possible to register GIs in line with the EU system. Two laws were adopted in September and 
December 2022, which further regulate this sector. Protected GIs are registered in a publicly 
available  state  register.  Ukraine  will  have  to  build  its  administrative  capacity  to  ensure  the 
protection and control of GIs. 

In the area of organic farming preparations are underway for alignment with the EU acquis. 
Certification of organic production is mainly carried out by international certification bodies 
with Ukraine having launched the accreditation process of two Ukrainian certification bodies. 
Actions to enhance monitoring and control are important. Ukraine’s policy objective is to reach 
3% of total agricultural land certified as organic by 2030. 

Chapter 12 – Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy 

EU hygiene rules for foodstuff production ensure a high level of food safety. Animal health 
and welfare and the safety of food of animal origin are safeguarded together with the quality 
of  seeds,  plant  protection  material,  the  protection  against  harmful  organisms  and  animal 
nutrition. 

Ukraine  remains  moderately  prepared  on  this  chapter.  Some  progress  was  made,  in 
particular in the adoption of legislation aligned with the EU acquis in all sectors covered by 
the  chapter.  Implementation  of  the  legislation  should  be  carefully  monitored  and 
administrative capacities and disease surveillance stepped up. 

In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular: 

→  continue to implement and update the strategy for aligning with and implementing the 
EU acquis to meet the requirements of the Association agreement, with a focus on the 
animal health and phytosanitary measures; 

→  accelerate EU market integration through a project to pilot the  EU’s trade control and 

expert system (TRACES) and subsequently extend its use to the whole country; 

→  enhance food safety through the reform of food safety bodies (State Service of Ukraine 
on Food Safety and Consumer Protection, State Agency for Animal Identification and 
Registration,  authorised 
laboratories),  strengthening  food  safety  controls  and 
implementing robust disease surveillance and vaccination. 

With 242 EU legal acts to be approximated, the sanitary (food safety and animal health) and 
phytosanitary (plant health) sector is the single most comprehensive area in the EU-Ukraine 
Association Agreement. In June 2023, Ukraine informed to have concluded the alignment with 
81 EU acts, while work on another 75 was ongoing. Phytosanitary primary legislation is still 
lacking. 

On general food safety, the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food and the Ministry of Health 
have competence in the area of food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy. The Ministry 
of Economy is also involved in parts related to its competences. A single body, the State Service 
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of Ukraine on Food Safety and Consumer Protection (SSUFSCP), is responsible for national 
food safety control. It is also responsible for risk-based national controls through a network of 
sub-national  bodies  at  regional  (Oblast)  and  sub-regional  level.  As  a  result  of  an  in-depth 
functional review, the SSUFSCP’s central office revised its structure in December 2022. Its 
functionality  should  further  improve  by  assuming  all  obligatory  sanitary  and  phytosanitary 
duties. 

The Law on the public health system adopted in October 2022 and to be implemented from 
October  2023  introduces  a  comprehensive  ‘One  Health’  approach,  which  also  provides  for 
information exchange on infectious diseases common to animals and humans. The government 
prepared  a  general  strategy  and  joint  action  plan  for  cooperation  between  the  food  safety, 
animal and human health authorities in March 2023. 

On veterinary policy, legislative alignment with the EU acquis advanced. The government 
adopted  legislation  including  on  animal  welfare,  veterinary  medicinal  products  and  disease 
surveillance. Regionalisation and zoning procedures for certain notifiable diseases have been 
considered satisfactory in audits by the European Commission. Ukraine is invited to implement 
zoning  decisions  taken  within  the  EU.  The  systems  for  animal  disease  notification  and 
management  of  information  on  outbreaks  need  to  be  upgraded  to  become  fully  functional. 
Preparations started to use the EU’s trade control and export control system (TRACES) within 
one year. The animal movement control and registration system was extended to sheep, goats, 
pigs  and  equines  to  provide  for  more  effective  animal  health  measures.  Official  controls  to 
enforce  animal  registration  and  identification,  including  controls  of  markets,  are  yet  to  be 
improved and aligned with EU legislation.  

As for the placing of food, feed and animal by-products on the market, Ukraine’s official 
food and feed control system saw the adoption of further legislation. Structural and institutional 
reforms based on EU standards took place through the creation of a risk assessment unit in the 
SSUFSCP and standard operational procedures were agreed. The multiannual national control 
plan 2022-2026 was approved. A risk analysis, assessment and management system is in place, 
with  food  production  facilities  participating  in  it.  On  export,  as  of  23  March  2023,  427 
Ukrainian  businesses  had  obtained  the  right  to  export  their  products  to  the  EU.  Ukraine 
regularly  updated  its  food  safety  monitoring  plan.  Food  safety  databases  are  to  be  further 
integrated and administrative capacities need to be strengthened at all levels. The control of 
goods during the import process also follows a risk-based approach. Ukraine fully participates 
in the Commission’s rapid alert system for food and feed (RASFF), but is not a member of the 
network. Official controls of imports and the handling of animal by-products not intended for 
human consumption remain to be fully aligned with the EU acquis. 

On  food  safety  rules  and  specific  rules  for  feed,  legislative  changes  provided  for  the 
establishment  of  a  national  institution  for  the  registration  of  veterinary  medicines  and  feed 
additives and for the implementation of the hazard analysis and critical control points system 
in feed and feed additive production facilities. Risk-oriented feed control was introduced. 

Some  progress  was  made  on  phytosanitary  policy.  Ukraine  established  a  comprehensive 
system for the regulation and monitoring of plant protection products, pesticide use, and the 
quality and certification of seeds through the Law on plant protection products (January 2023) 
and the Law on seeds and planting material (December 2022). Relevant producers, importers, 
exporters and distributors are registered in a single register. Adoption of the draft framework 
Law on state regulation in the field of plant protection remains to be concluded. Substantial 
work  is  still  needed  to  implement  integrated  pest  management  principles  in  a  harmonised 
manner as well as increase the number of inspectors and their administrative capacity.  

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Authorised  laboratories  perform  official  laboratory  testing  for  veterinary,  sanitary  and 
phytosanitary controls. Most of these are accredited to ISO/IEC 17025. Laboratory capacity, 
including  staffing,  equipment  and  accredited  methods,  is  generally  satisfactory,  while  their 
organisation  and  the  structure  of  the  laboratory  network  is  to  be  adjusted  to  EU  standards. 
National  reference  laboratories  remain  to  be  designated  and  provide  to  improve  testing 
methods, train  staff, participate in  proficiency testing programmes and provide contingency 
capacity. 

On  genetically  modified  organisms  (GMOs),  the  relevant  authority’s  control  powers  are 
limited.  A  legal  framework  for  the  regulation  of  genetic  engineering  activities,  GMO 
registration and a system of government control of GMOs and penalties based on the nine EU 
legal acts that establish the legal framework is yet to be adopted.  

Chapter 13 – Fisheries and aquaculture 

The  common  fisheries  policy  lays  down  rules  on  fisheries  management,  protects  living 
resources of the sea and limits the environmental impact of fisheries. This includes setting 
catch quotas, managing fleet capacity, rules on control and inspection, rules on markets and 
aquaculture  and  support  for  fisheries  and  coastal  communities.  Further,  it  promotes  a 
sustainable aquaculture. 

Ukraine  has    some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  fisheries  and  aquaculture.  Some 
progress was made, including through the adoption of legislation aligned with the EU acquis 
and  by  adopting  a  national  sector  strategy.  Development  of  the  legislation  should  be 
accelerated,  and  administrative  capacities  substantially  strengthened,  notably  to  enforce 
controls and inspection. Ukraine continues to be a reliable partner in international fora. 

In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular: 

→  implement  the  national  strategy  for  the  fisheries  and  aquaculture  sectors  development 
until 2030 according to its action plan, including the alignment of the national legislation 
with  the EU  acquis and  adopt  EU  common fisheries  policy objectives  and principles, 
including  for  resource  management,    inspections  and  controls,  and  to  fight  illegal, 
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing; 

→  develop  administrative  and  institutional  capacity  for  the  management  and  control  of 
fishing activities and launch the establishment of an independent fisheries control agency 
based on EU Member States’ best practices; 

→  become  a  fully-fledged  member  of  the  General  Fisheries  Commission  for  the 

Mediterranean (GFCM). 

Ukraine’s new strategy for fisheries and aquaculture development until 2030 was adopted in 
May  2023.  The  Strategy  outlines  the  development  of  the  sectors  till  2030  in  line  with  the 
Common Fisheries Policy general rules and principles linked to the sustainable exploitation of 
fishery resources. Based on an assessment of the state of implementation of EU legal acts in 
April 2023, Ukraine prepared a national plan for full approximation with the EU acquis in the 
fisheries  sector.  The  Ministry  of  Agrarian  Policy  and  Food  is  responsible  for  establishing 
fisheries policy and drafting legislation, while the State Agency of Melioration and Fisheries 
is responsible for policy implementation.  

On resource management, Ukraine amended its legislation in March 2023 for the governance 
of fisheries, conservation and rational use of aquatic biological resources and aquaculture, with 
certain parts of the fisheries management system adapted to the EU acquis. Ukraine will need 
to develop necessary administrative and scientific capacity to systematically collect data on 

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fisheries  and  adopt  mechanisms  to  achieve  a  balance  between  fishing  capacity  and  fishing 
opportunities as  well as to  take measures to  assess  and reduce the environmental  impact  of 
fishing activities. 

On fleet management, the country has no separate fleet register for fishing vessels. Fishing is 
based on a permit issued to businesses through open auctions and vessels are registered either 
in  the  state  shipping  register  of  Ukraine  or  the  ship  book  of  Ukraine.  Ukraine  needs  to 
harmonise its fleet registers with the EU fishing fleet register.  

Inspection  and  control  activities  are  limited,  and  catch  from  illegal,  unreported  and 
unregulated  (IUU)  fishing  reportedly  enters  the  fish  market.  The  current  lack  of  effective 
inspection and control hampers Ukraine’s capacity to efficiently tackle IUU fishing. Work on 
the legislation aligned with the EU acquis to step up the fight against IUU fishing is however 
underway. A new law, adopted in March and that entered into force in July 2023 includes 
improved controls of fishing activities and of the origin of aquatic biological resources and 
for  the  implementation  of  a  unified  electronic  management  system  for  fishery  products, 
similar  to  the  rules  in  the  EU  common  fisheries  policy.  Legislation  is  being  developed  to 
ensure  the  traceability  of  aquatic  bioresources  for  the  sustainable  management  of  aquatic 
biological  resources,  to  prevent  IUU  fishing  and  promote  conservation  of  fish  stocks.    A 
dedicated  public  body  for  fisheries  control  will  need  to  be  created  in  line  with  best  EU 
practices. Improvements will be needed around control data, as well as in standards, strategies 
and risk assessment for inspection. Electronic monitoring capacity of the fishing fleet should 
be improved, including on fishing in the high seas. The overall sanctioning system should be 
dissuasive, proportionate and effective. 

Ukraine has no specific structural measures for fisheries and aquaculture. A planned reform 
aims to resolve conflicts on water use, property and tax policies. Ukraine has the largest inland 
water basin in Europe. This creates favourable conditions for inland fisheries and aquaculture 
development. The development of marine aquaculture is still at an experimental stage, while 
organic  aquaculture  has  not  been  addressed  yet.  The  State  strategy  until  2030  places  high 
priority  on  developing  it.  Ukraine  needs  to  improve  the  implementation  of  its  legislation 
specific to aquaculture in line with the EU acquis and implement it. There are some State aid 
measures applicable to fisheries or for the development of aquaculture, including for the partial 
reimbursement of constructing production facilities or equipment costs.  

On  market  policy,  there  are  standards  that  aim  to  align  with  the  EU  acquis  on  veterinary 
requirements, hygiene and consumer information for food of animal origin. Specific market 
rules, similar to the ones provided in the EU common market organisation regulation for fishery 
and aquaculture products, are to be developed. No specialised legal acts regulate the creation 
of registered fisheries producer associations.  

On international agreements, EU-Ukraine cooperation on fisheries and aquaculture is set out 
in the Association Agreement, including the management and conservation of fishery resources 
and cooperation with regional fisheries management organisations. Due to the ongoing war of 
aggression, the agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on issues of fishing in 
the  Sea  of  Azov  was  terminated  in  October  2022,  and  the  exchange  of  information  was 
suspended.  As  for  the  regional  cooperation  on  conservation  and  management  of  fisheries 
resources, Ukraine is a cooperating non-contracting party to the General Fisheries Commission 
for the Mediterranean (GFCM), being the regional fisheries management organisation working 
to  ensure  the  conservation  and  the  sustainable  use  of  living  marine  resources  in  the 
Mediterranean and in the Black Sea. Ukraine is committed to becoming a fully-fledged member 
of GFCM: Ukraine participates as a founding member in the Common Maritime Agenda for 
the Black Sea, and actively cooperates under the auspices of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 
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Organization,  the  Central  Asian  and  Caucasus  Regional  Fisheries  and  Aquaculture 
Commission and the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources. 
Ukraine is very active under the Common Maritime Agenda, the EU sea-basin strategy for the 
development of a sustainable blue economy in the Black Sea.  

Chapter 22 – Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments 

Regional  policy  is  the  EU’s  main  tool  for  reducing  regional  disparities  and  investing  in 
sustainable  and  inclusive  socio-economic  growth.  It  is  operating  through  “shared 
management”  between  the  Commission  and  EU  Member  States.  The  implementation  of 
cohesion policy programmes requires appropriate administrative capacity on programme and 
project level, the establishment of systems of sound financial management and control and also 
the  fulfilment  of  other  EU  acquis  elements  such  as  environmental  or  public  procurement 
legislation.   

Ukraine  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  regional  policy  and  coordination  of 
structural  instruments.  Overall,  limited  progress  was  made  over  the  reporting  period,  with 
more  notable  progress  in  implementing  territorial  cooperation  programmes  with  Member 
States.  

In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular: 

→  update  the  State  Strategy  of  Regional  Development  and  modernise  the  State  Fund  for 
Regional  Development  to  align  them  with  the  recovery  and  reconstruction  process, 
principles of multi-level governance and a territorially based regional policy.  

→  adopt necessary measures to bring into practice the law on principles of regional policy, in 
particular given the varying impact of the war on Ukrainian regions;  and strengthen the 
capacity of regional and local administrations to prepare related development projects;  

→  strengthen  the  coordination  framework  within  regional  policy  to  ensure  systematic  and 
inclusive  engagement  of  regional  and  local  stakeholders,  a  coordinating  role  for  the  
Ministry for Restoration, and an adequate regional angle for the Agency of Restoration. 

While a general framework for state regional policy and increased public funding for regional 
development  were  put  in  place  alongside  decentralisation  reform,  Russia’s  invasion  has 
affected all regions, albeit with significant differences. The territorial disparities, which existed 
before 2022, have therefore widened considerably. 

In  terms  of  the  legislative  framework,  the  law  on  principles  of  state  regional  policy  was 
amended to establish a framework for the recovery of war-affected regions, including a three-
level strategic planning system (national, regional and local development strategies). The law 
defines four functional types of territory: (i) recovery territories; (ii) regional growth poles; (3) 
territories  with  special  conditions  for  development;  and  (iv) territories  of  sustainable 
development. This framework should now be implemented by first developing the qualification 
criteria and a list of territories. Similarly, various local strategic documents that are required 
(such as a local development strategy, recovery and development plan, comprehensive spatial 
development plan) should be clarified, interconnected and linked with adequate financing lines. 
While  the  law  currently  focuses  on  Ukraine’s  regional  development,  it  will  need  to  be 
progressively  aligned  with  EU  regional  policy,  including  on  NUTS  (Nomenclature  of 
Territorial Units for Statistics) territorial classification. 

Overall,  a  robust  conceptual  framework  of  organisation  for  the  regional  policy  in  Ukraine 
should be developed and aligned with the recovery and reconstruction process. Accordingly, 
Ukraine  should  update,  in  consultation  with  relevant  stakeholders,  the  State  Strategy  of 

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Regional  Development  2021-2027,  taking  into  account  the  different  regional  development 
needs due to the impact of the war. 

In  terms  of  the  institutional  framework  at  central  level,  the  Ministry  for  Restoration  of 
Ukraine was established by merging the Ministry of Communities and Territories Development 
with the Ministry of Infrastructure, which resulted in high staff turnover. Ukraine should build 
capacity in the new Ministry, ensuring adequate staffing for regional development and strong 
coordination with other key ministries, in particular the Ministry of Finance.  

The  Secretariat  of  the  Cabinet  of  Ministers  of  Ukraine  performs  the  tasks  of  the  national 
authority  of  Ukraine  for  Interreg  programmes.  It  should  continue  its  efforts  to  disseminate 
information  about  Interreg  programmes  in  Ukraine,  especially  among  local  and  regional 
authorities to support developing projects with possible new beneficiaries from Ukraine. 

The  State  Agency  for  Restoration  and  Infrastructure  Development  was  set  up,  also  with 
regional offices, to enable implementation of the rapid recovery and post-war reconstruction 
projects.  

At regional level, the key role in developing regional programmes lies with regional (oblast) 
administrations,  a  number  of  which  were  turned  into  military  administrations.  This  risks 
excluding local stakeholders from decision-making. Ukraine has been gradually restoring civil 
administrations once the security situation in the liberated territories permits it. The delineation 
of  competences  between  central,  regional  and  local  tiers  of  government,  especially  in  the 
domains relevant for recovery, should also be clarified.  

Regional development agencies aim to support the socio-economic development of regions and 
communities  and  attract  investments  in  22  regions.  The  capacity  to  perform  their  mission 
remains limited due to an unclear mandate, high staff rotation and poor funding. 

On administrative capacity, a formal coordination framework involving authorities at central 
and  sub-national  level  needs  to  be  set  up  to  prepare  for  the  effective  programming  and 
management  of  EU  funds.  Regional  and  local  stakeholders  should  be  engaged  in  a  more 
systematic way in designing, implementing and monitoring these processes.  

On digitalisation, the Digital Restoration Ecosystem for Accountable Management  was 
set up to provide a single digital pipeline for all reconstruction projects, including at local level. 
The system allows anyone to monitor project performance and use this information to create 
reports. 

Regional  development  is  funded  by  the  State  Fund  for  Regional  Development  (UAH 4.5 
billion,  down  50%  in  2023  compared  with  the  pre-war  amount  in  2021).  The  Fund  for  the 
Liquidation of the Consequences of Armed Aggression (UAH 35.5 billion) may also be used 
for  regional  and  local  projects.  Programming  based  on  these  funds  should  be  based  on 
priorities,  adequate  quality  of  project  proposals,  cost-benefit  analysis  and  close  alignment 
between the strategic planning of public investment and the budget. To this end, capacities of 
sub-state administrations  should be increased, and the availability of statistics at  local  level 
improved to enable evidence-based decisions to be taken. 

Ukraine entered into five Interreg programmes with EU neighbours and held the Presidency 
of the EU Strategy for the Danube Region in 2022. This helped it gain experience in European 
territorial  cooperation  and  shared  management,  including  programming,  sound  financial 
management, project selection and contracting for instance. 

On financial management and control systems, the country needs to establish medium-term 
budget  planning.  The  link  between  policy  and  budget  at  national  and  local  level  should  be 

136 

 
 
strengthened.  The  legal  basis  for  the  system  of  monitoring  and  evaluation  of  regional 
development is complex and fragmented.  

The internal and external audit functions are in place thanks to the Accounting Chamber of 
Ukraine and the State Audit Service and it is important to strengthen their capacities. However, 
the Chamber has no mandate to audit local budgets, other than resources transferred from the 
national budget. This poses also a risk to the audit of Ukrainian beneficiaries receiving support 
from Interreg programmes which are implemented under shared management in a similar way 
to  the  EU  cohesion  policy.  Internal  audits  of  local  authorities  and  ex  ante  procurement 
verification are missing. 

The participation of Ukrainian regions in peer-to-peer recovery initiatives with EU counterparts 
may facilitate further integration of Ukrainian sub-national authorities into EU networks.  

Chapter 33 – Financial and budgetary provisions 

This chapter covers the rules governing the funding of the EU budget (‘own resources’). These 
resources  mainly  consist  of:  (i)  contributions  based  on  the  gross  national  income  of  each 
Member State; (ii) customs duties; (iii) the non-recycled plastic resource and (iv) a resource 
based on value added tax. Member States must have the appropriate administrative capacity 
to adequately coordinate and ensure the correct calculation, collection, payment and control 
of own resources. 

Preparations under this chapter are at an early stage. There was limited progress in the areas 
covered by the chapter. 

In the coming year, Ukraine should:  

→  further  strengthen  the  administrative  capacity  and  coordination  mechanism  among  key 

stakeholders in the own resource system. 

On traditional own resources, Ukraine has implemented most of the fundamental principles 
in the policy areas that affect the own resources system. The 2019 Customs Code aligns with 
the  Union  Customs  Code  in  most  of  its  rules,  in  particular  on  transit,  authorised  economic 
operators  and  intellectual  property  rights.  However,  customs  legislation  is  not  fully  aligned 
with the EU acquis, while administrative capacity in the IT sector is under strength.  

Ukraine applies a single VAT system that is largely, but not fully aligned with the European 
system. VAT is levied on imports and enforced, where necessary, as outlined in the Tax Code.  

Ukraine currently lacks a mid-term revenue strategy, which is to be developed under the IMF 
programme by the end of 2023.  

Mechanisms  to  prevent  and  combat  tax  and  customs  fraud  are  generally  in  place.  The 
Bureau of Economic Security is responsible for investigating and prosecuting financial crime, 
including tax and customs fraud. However, its performance has been unsatisfactory so far. The 
State Audit Service functions and the anti-fraud focal point for the European Anti-Fraud Office, 
and reports on cases of fraud.  

National  accounts and  gross  national  income  (GNI) data in  Ukraine partially comply with 
European System of Accounts 2010 standards, and include an estimation of the non-observed 
economy (17.7% of GNI for 2020). However, Ukraine does not submit the data to Eurostat.  

On administrative infrastructure, the current level of human and administrative resources is 
insufficient to ensure the full and accurate application of EU rules on payments into the EU 
budget upon membership.  

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CLUSTER 6: EXTERNAL RELATIONS  

This cluster covers: external relations (Chapter 30); and foreign, security and defence policy 
(Chapter 31).  

Regarding external relations, Ukraine has a good level or preparation. It made limited progress 
on trade policy in the reporting period. It stepped up its engagement with global partners and 
African Union partners in 2022 and extended humanitarian assistance to  Türkiye following 
2023  earthquake.  Ukraine  is  invited  to  remain  compliant  with  the  WTO  and  Association 
Agreement rules and assess the need for new bilateral agreements in the context of its candidate 
status and forthcoming accession.  

As regards chapter 31, Ukraine  has made good progress, ensuring a high level of alignment 
with relevant EU decisions and declarations of the EU’s common foreign and security policy 
(93%  in  2022,  89  %  alignment  between  January  and  August  2023).  Ukraine  enhanced  the 
cooperation with EU on the security and defence policy issues and jointly worked on combating 
hybrid  threats.    Ukraine  has  not  yet  ratified  the  Rome  Statute  of  the  International  Criminal 
Court.  

Chapter 30 – External relations 

The EU has a common commercial policy towards third countries, based on multilateral and 
bilateral agreements and autonomous measures. There are also EU rules on humanitarian aid 
and development policy. 

Ukraine has a good level of preparation in the area of external relations showing a significant 
convergence with the EU. Ukraine has  matured in its capacity of WTO Member since 2008. 
Limited progress was made during the reporting period.  

In the coming year, Ukraine should in particular: 

→  ensure that its trade policy is in compliance with World Trade Organization (WTO) and 

Association Agreement rules;  

→  before any new bilateral trade agreement, asses its impact, in light of candidate status and 

forthcoming accession. 

On common commercial policy, Ukraine has been a member of the WTO since 2008. Since 
2016,  trade  relations  with  the  EU  have  been  regulated  by  the  EU-Ukraine  Association 
Agreement, which established the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area.  

Ukraine has notified to the WTO preferential bilateral trade agreements with 17 countries, 
eight of which do not have a preferential trade agreement with the EU. It signed a preferential 
trade  agreement  with  Türkiye  in  2022,  with  ratification  pending,  and  is  negotiating  and 
discussing preferential trade agreements with several partners (in particular the United Arab 
Emirates). In relation to this, Ukraine should continue to coordinate closely with the EU on 
international  trade  negotiations,  in  particular  to  ensure  that,  when  it  joins  the  EU,  its 
commitments are compatible with those of the EU. 

Ukraine has 66 bilateral investment treaties in force, 21 of which are with EU Member States. 
It  has  also  signed  seven  treaties  that  have  not  yet  entered  into  force.  Ukraine  continued 
benefiting  from  a  generalised  system  of  preferences  (tariff  system)  granted  by  several 
countries, including the United States. 

Ukraine has had a solid legal framework in place on export controls of goods and technologies, 
including on dual use, since 2003. It adopted and maintained a consolidated list of dual-use 
goods  and  technologies  based  on  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  428/2009.  Applications  for 
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obtaining  export permits for dual-use goods and technologies  are subject  to  expert reviews, 
with the modalities set up by the law.  

Ukraine has a legal framework in place to provide humanitarian aid to other countries and 
relies on the state budget reserve fund to provide this aid. It provided considerable humanitarian 
and civil protection support (through the State Emergency Service) to Türkiye following the 
Türkiye-Syria earthquake in February 2023.  

On  development  policy,  Ukraine  stepped  up  engagement  with  global  partners  and  African 
Union  partners  in  2022.  This  followed  the  appointment  of  a  Special  Representative  for  the 
Middle East and Africa in 2021. In November 2022, in connection with the UN and Türkiye-
brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative, which allows for commercial food and fertiliser exports 
from  key  Ukrainian  ports  in  the  Black  Sea,  President  Zelenskyy  launched  the  Grain  from 
Ukraine programme at an international summit on food security in Kyiv. The initiative seeks 
to  address  global  food  insecurity  through  (donated  or  internationally  funded)  deliveries  of 
Ukrainian grain and foodstuffs to developing countries. Under the initiative, 625 000 tonnes of 
wheat have been delivered to African countries since December 2022.  

Chapter 31 – Foreign, security & defence policy  

Member  States  must  be  able  to  conduct  political  dialogue  under  EU  foreign,  security  and 
defence policy, align with EU statements, take part in EU actions, and apply agreed sanctions 
and restrictive measures.  

Ukraine has a good level of preparation in the area of foreign, security and defence policy.  
Good progress is demonstrated by continued unprecedented political dialogue with the EU at 
all  levels  and  significantly  enhanced  security  and  military  cooperation  with  the  EU  and  its 
Member  States.  Ukraine  has  also  demonstrated  progress  in  the  overall  alignment  with 
Statements  by  the  High  Representative  on  behalf  of  the  EU  and  Council  Decisions.  In  the 
coming year, Ukraine should in particular: 

→  work towards the ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 

and its related instruments, 

→  further maximise alignment with Statements by the High Representative on behalf of the 
EU and EU sanctions (Official EU Council positions and actions in the area of CFSP); 

→  pursue and further enhance political dialogue on foreign and security policy with the EU. 

Against  the  backdrop  of  Russia’s  unprovoked  and  unjustified  war  of  aggression  against 
Ukraine,  the  country  continued  to  take  steps  to  further  integrate  into  the  EU  in  the  area  of 
foreign and security policy. Ukraine continued  political dialogue at an unprecedented level 
and frequency with the EU and the EU Member States. 

The  institutional  framework  enables  Ukraine’s  participation  in  the  common  foreign  and 
security  policy  (CFSP)  and  common  security  and  defence  policy  (CSDP).  The  CFSP-
related issues fall under the competences of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has good 
capacity to handle EU affairs. Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a position of 
‘political director’. 

Ukraine has a good record of alignment with CFSP (statements by the High Representative 
on behalf of the EU and Council Decisions). For the calendar year 2022 Ukraine reached 93% 
alignment  and  89  %  alignment  between  January  and  August  2023.  This  represents  a  clear 
political intention to align with CFSP.  

139 

 
 
On  restrictive  measures,  Ukraine  aligns  with  EU  restrictive  measures  against  Russia. 
Regarding EU restrictive measures not related to Russia’s war of aggression, Ukraine has not 
aligned with a number of measures, e.g., related to the political and security situation in the 
Eastern  Mediterranean,  Africa,  Middle  East  and  Asia  Ukraine  has  mechanisms  in  place  to 
ensure  effective  implementation  of  EU  sanctions.  Authorities  should  strengthen  the  related 
national  legislation  and  continue  to  improve  their  capacity  to  implement  and  enforce  the 
sanctions. 

Ukraine  intensified  its  diplomatic  engagement  with  global  partners  through  food  security-
oriented agreements as well as high level political engagement and dialogue. This approach is 
in line with the EU’s own outreach to global partners aimed at addressing global consequences 
of Russia’s aggression, countering Russian disinformation narratives, and supporting President 
Zelenskyy’s Peace Formula.  

Ukraine’s cooperation with international organisations is strong and constructive, including 
with the UN, the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the Organisation for Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation. Accession to NATO is reflected in the Ukrainian Constitution as a central goal 
and the main foreign policy objective. Ukraine formally applied for NATO membership on 30 
September 2022. Ukraine stepped-up collaboration and coordination at all levels with both the 
EU and NATO in the framework of EU-NATO cooperation in the field of capacity building 
for partners. 

Ukraine has not yet ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and its 
related  instruments,  although  it  has  already  accepted  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  twice, 
including  through  legislative  acts  adopted  in  2022  in  the  context  of  evident  war  crimes 
committed as part of Russia’s war of aggression.  

On  non-proliferation,  Ukraine  is  party  to  and  has  ratified  the  main  non-proliferation 
agreements.  Ukraine  complied  with  its  international  obligations  under  international  export 
control  regimes  throughout  the  reporting  period.  Ukraine  participates  in  the  Wassenaar, 
Missile  Technology  Control  Regime,  Nuclear  Suppliers  Group  and  Australia  Group)  and 
Zangger Committee. Ukraine continued to submit reports on international transfers of certain 
categories of military goods to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, the OSCE as well as 
the Wassenaar Arrangement. 

Ukraine signed the Arms Trade Treaty in 2014 and continues procedural preparations for its 
ratification. Ukraine has put in place additional preventive measures in this regard, and it is 
setting up a unified firearms registry. Ukraine’s legislation provides for multiple measures to 
counter illegal arms trafficking and ensure arms control. 

In  July  2022  the  Parliament  established  the  Temporary  Special  Commission  to  monitor  the 
receipt  and  use  of  international  equipment  and  technical  assistance  (in  particular,  weapons) 
during martial law. EU and Ukraine established the internal security dialogue. 

As  regards  security  measures  (classified  information),  the  EU  and  Ukraine  have  an 
arrangement to exchange classified information.  

On common security and defence policy, Ukraine has continued to seek its involvement in 
EU  defence  initiatives  and  civil  and  military  crisis  management,  including  Permanent 
Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF). Given the context, 
military  and  security  cooperation  between  Ukraine  and  the  EU  and  its  Member  States  was 
significantly enhanced in particular within the framework of the European Peace Facility (EPF) 
and through the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine)  

140 

 
 
The EU and Ukraine continue to cooperate in the area of countering disinformation and cyber 
threats.  The  establishment  of  a  dedicated  cybersecurity  dialogue  in  2021  and  its  second 
iteration in 2022 were key to enhance the EU-Ukraine cyber cooperation with the aim to bolster 
cyber resilience and advance responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. Both sides also built 
up  a  unique  cooperation  aimed  at  tackling  disinformation.  Ukraine  has  been  a  contributing 
country  to  the  NATO  Cooperative  Cyber  Defence  Centre  of  Excellence  since  March  2022. 

141 

 
 
 
ANNEX 1 - RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND UKRAINE 

After  the  start  of  Russia’s  war  of  aggression  against  Ukraine,  Ukraine  applied  for  EU 
membership  on  28  February  2022  and  was  granted  European  perspective  and  candidate 
country  status  in  June  2022.  The  European  Council  granted  European  perspective  and 
candidate status to Ukraine in June 2022, on the understanding that seven steps identified in 
the Commission's opinion on the membership application, are taken. 

The  EU  and  Ukraine  signed  an  Association  Agreement  (AA),  including  a  Deep  and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) in 2014, which fully entered into force in 2017. 
The  AA  /  DCFTA  is  the  key  legal  instrument  serving  as  the  basis  of  EU-Ukraine  bilateral 
relations  and  provides  the  foundations  for  political  association  and  economic  integration 
between the European Union and Ukraine. Overall, Ukraine continued to broadly implement 
its obligations under the Association Agreement. Under the DCFTA Ukraine has committed to 
align its legislation to EU single market rules. While important progress has been achieved, 
Ukraine  is  behind  schedule  in  some  of  these  commitments.  In  some  areas,  effective 
enforcement  by  independent  and  transparent  institutions  remains  challenging.  The  DCFTA 
comes with a commitment to comply with its provisions, as well as those under WTO such as 
ruling of a bilateral arbitration panel of December 2020, in respect of which Ukraine has still 
to comply with Article 35 of the Agreement and eliminate the wood export ban introduced in 
2015. 

Regular political and economic dialogue between the EU and Ukraine has continued through 
the AA/DCFTA structures. Regular subcommittee meetings were held throughout the period. 
The Association Committee did, however, not meet during the reporting period whereas the 7th 
EU-Ukraine Association Committee in Trade Configuration took place on 25-26 October 2022; 
the Assocation Council was held on 5 September 2022 in Brussels and  the 24th EU-Ukraine 
Summit took place on 3 February 2023, in Kyiv.  

Trade relations with  the EU intensified after the entry into force of the DCFTA.  With the 
application of autonomous trade measures since June 2022, the EU has unilaterally removed 
all outstanding tariffs under the DCFTA. Such measure was renewed for another year in May 
2023.  

In light of Ukraine’s candidate country status, the EU and Ukraine agreed a Priority Action 
Plan in February 2023. Once fully implemented, Ukraine will see increased its access to the 
EU internal market, paving the way towards full accession in the future.  

The EU has been living up to its commitment to support the implementation of the Solidarity 
Lanes  initiative  with  new  logistics  corridors  between  Ukraine  and  the  EU  now  firmly 
established trough rail, road and inland waterways covering trade both directions. Solidarity 
lanes have become the lifeline for Ukraine. 

Citizens  of  Ukraine  enjoy  visa-free  travel  to  the  Schengen  area  as  of  11  June  2017.  An 
agreement on readmission between the European Union and Ukraine is in force since 2007. 

Regarding bilateral financial assistance, since the Russian invasion, the EU, Member States 
and the European Financial Institutions, stepped up their support in a Team Europe approach, 
mobilising EUR 59 billion for Ukraine’s overall economic, social and financial resilience in 
the form of emergency macro-financial assistance, budget support, emergency assistance, crisis 
response and humanitarian aid. This includes EUR 2.3 billion in grants from the NDICI Global 
Europe  instrument  (2022  and  2023),  EUR  25.2  billion  of  macro-financial  assistance 
(concessional  loans)  as  well  as  military  assistance  of  EUR  25.2  billion,  including  EUR  5.6 
billion  under  the  European  Peace  Facility  and  bilateral  EU  Member  States  contributions. 

142 

 
 
Together  with  the  resources  made  available  to  help  Member  States  cater  for  needs  of 
Ukrainians  fleeing  the  war  in  the  EU  (EUR  17  billion),  the  overall  support  to  Ukraine  and 
Ukrainians amounts to EUR 82.6 billion. This includes, amongst other, around 100 000 tons 
of in-kind assistance under the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM), turning this into 
the  largest  and  most  complex  UCPM  operation  to  date.  The  EU  has  provided  support  for 
medical  evacuations  of,  to  date,  more  than  2770  severely  ill  Ukrainian  patients  as  well  as 
mental health and psychosocial support to Ukrainians via the International Federation of the 
Red Cross, funded by the EU4Health Programme. 

Ukraine has been participating in the Eastern Partnership (EaP) since its launch in 2009. This 
overarching framework has further boosted regional relations with the EU. Ukraine benefits 
from regional programmes financed from NDICI-Global Europe. Ukraine also benefits from 
investments  through  the  Neighbourhood  Investment  Platform  (NIP).  Before  and  during 
Russia’s  war  of  aggression,  the  EU  has  worked  hand  in  hand  with  financial  institutions  to 
support Ukraine. The Economic Investment Plan, which was set up already before the war, 
will serve as an important vehicle of the reconstruction of Ukraine. The plan will continue to 
mobilise investments in grants, loans and guarantees and leverage additional public and private 
investments for Ukraine in sectors covered by the flagship initiatives such as support to SMEs, 
economic  transition  for  rural  areas,  improving  connectivity  by  upgrading  border  crossing 
points, digital transition and sustainable energy. 

Ukraine participates in several Union programmes: Horizon Europe, EURATOM Research 
and  Training  Programme,  Digital  Europe,  Fiscalis,  Customs,  Creative  Europe,  EU4Health, 
LIFE, Single Market Programme, Union Civil Protection Mechanism, and Connecting Europe 
Facility. Organisations and individuals from Ukraine can also benefit from certain actions of 
the Erasmus+ and European Solidarity Corps programmes. Ukraine is participating in several 
Interreg  programmes  and  is  a  member  of  the  EU  macro-regional  Strategy  for  the  Danube 
region. 

In 2014, the European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine 
(EUAM Ukraine) was created. Following the Russian aggression, the EU established the EU 
Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM Ukraine) on EU soil in support of Ukraine in October 
2022. 

143 

 
 
 
 
STATISTICAL DATA (as of 31/08/2023) 
Ukraine 

Basic data 
Population (thousand) 
Total area of the country (km²) 

National accounts 
Gross domestic product (GDP) (million national currency) 
Gross domestic product (GDP) (million euro) 
GDP (euro per capita) 
GDP per capita (in purchasing power standards (PPS)) 
GDP per capita (in PPS), relative to the EU average (EU-27 = 100) 
Real GDP growth rate: change on previous year of GDP volume (%) 
Employment growth (national accounts data), relative to the previous year (%) 
Labour productivity growth: growth in GDP (in volume) per person employed, relative to 
the previous year (%) 
Unit labour cost growth, relative to the previous year (%) 
**3 year change (T/T-3) in the nominal unit labour cost growth index (2015 = 100) 
Labour productivity per person employed: GDP (in PPS) per person employed relative to 
EU average (EU-27 = 100) 
Gross value added by main sectors 
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 
Industry (%) 
Construction (%) 
Services (%) 
Final consumption expenditure, as a share of GDP (%) 
Gross fixed capital formation, as a share of GDP (%) 
Changes in inventories, as a share of GDP (%) 
Exports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 
Imports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 
Gross fixed capital formation by the general government sector, as a percentage of GDP 
(%) 

Note 

1) 2) 

Note 

3) 
3) 
3) 

3) 
4) 
3) 

3) 
3) 
3) 
3) 
3) 
3) 
3) 
3) 
3) 

2010 
45 783 s 
603 548 w 

2017 
42 415 s 
603 549 w 

2018 
42 217 s 
603 549 w 

2019 
41 984 s 
603 549 w 

2020 
41 733 s 
603 549 w 

2021 
41 419 s 
603 549 w 

2010 
1 120 585 w 
106 389 w 
2 319 w 
: 
: 
4.1 w 
0 sw 
4 w 

2017 
2 981 227 w 
99 361 w 
2 339 w 
: 
: 
2.4 w 
-  1 sw 
3 w 

2018 
3 560 302 w 
110 765 w 
2 620 w 
: 
: 
3.5 w 
1 sw 
2 w 

2019 
3 977 198 w 
137 373 w 
3 269 w 
: 
: 
3.2 w 
1 sw 
2 w 

2020 
4 222 026 w 
137 133 w 
3 285 w 
: 
: 
-  3.8 w 
-  4 sw 
0 w 

2021 
5 450 849 w 
168 710 w 
4 077 w 
: 
: 
3.4 w 
-  2 sw 
6 w 

: 
: 
: 

8.4 w 
25.3 w 
3.7 w 
62.6 w 
84.4 w 
18.1 w 
0.3 w 
46.5 w 
49.3 w 
: 

: 
: 
: 

12.1 w 
25.0 w 
2.6 w 
60.3 w 
87.8 w 
15.8 w 
4.2 w 
48.1 w 
55.9 w 
: 

: 
: 
: 

12.0 w 
24.8 w 
2.7 w 
60.5 w 
90.2 w 
17.7 w 
0.9 w 
45.2 w 
54.0 w 
: 

: 
: 
: 

10.4 w 
23.2 w 
3.1 w 
63.3 w 
93.2 w 
17.6 w 
-  2.7 w 
41.2 w 
49.3 w 
: 

: 
: 
: 

10.8 w 
20.9 w 
3.3 w 
65.0 w 
92.6 w 
13.4 w 
-  4.5 w 
38.8 w 
40.3 w 
: 

: 
: 
: 

12.7 w 
23.8 w 
3.2 w 
60.3 w 
86.8 w 
13.2 w 
1.2 w 
40.7 w 
41.9 w 
: 

Business 
Industrial production volume index (2015 = 100) 
Number of active enterprises (number) 
Birth rate: number of enterprise births in the reference period (t) divided by the number of 
enterprises active in t (%) 

Note 
5) 6) 7) 
8) 

2010 
125.1 w 
: 
: 

2017 
105.4 w 
1 598 025 w 
: 

2018 
108.7 w 
1 618 543 w 
: 

2019 
108.0 w 
1 706 428 w 
: 

2020 
102.7 w 
1 729 058 w 
: 

2021 
105.0 w 
1 719 536 w 
: 

144 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Death rate: number of enterprise deaths in the reference period (t) divided by the number 
of enterprises active in t (%) 
People employed in SMEs as a share of all persons employed (within the non-financial 
business economy) (%) 
Value added by SMEs (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) 
Total value added (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) 

8) 

: 

: 

: 
: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

61.6 sw 

63.0 sw 

63.9 sw 

64.0 sw 

64.3 sw 

31 486 sw 
66 678 w 

33 936 sw 
68 917 w 

47 334 sw 
90 454 w 

48 221 sw 
86 283 w 

Inflation rate and house prices 
Consumer price index (CPI), change relative to the previous year (%) 
**Annual change in the deflated house price index (2015 = 100) 

Balance of payments 
Balance of payments: current account total (million euro) 
Balance of payments current account: trade balance (million euro) 
Balance of payments current account: net services (million euro) 
Balance of payments current account: net balance for primary income (million euro) 
Balance of payments current account: net balance for secondary income (million euro) 
Net balance for primary and secondary income: of which government transfers (million 
euro) 
**3 year backward moving average of the current account balance relative to GDP (%) 
**Five year change in share of world exports of goods and services (%) 
Net balance (inward - outward) of foreign direct investment (FDI) (million euro) 

Foreign direct investment (FDI) abroad (million euro) 
of which FDI of the reporting economy in the EU-27 countries (million euro) 

Foreign direct investment (FDI) in the reporting economy (million euro) 

of which FDI of the EU-27 countries in the reporting economy (million euro) 

**Net international investment position, relative to GDP (%) 
Year on year rate of change in gross inflow of remittances (in national currency) from 
migrant workers (%) 

Public finance 
General government deficit / surplus, relative to GDP (%) 
General government gross debt relative to GDP (%) 
Total  government revenues, as a percentage of GDP (%) 
Total government expenditure, as a percentage of GDP (%) 

Note 
9) 10) 

Note 

11) 12) 
13) 
11) 13) 
14) 11) 
13) 
11) 12) 
13) 
14) 11) 
12) 13) 
12) 15) 
16) 

Note 
17) 18) 
19) 18) 
17) 18) 
17) 18) 

2010 
9.4 w 
: 

2017 
14.4 w 
: 

2018 
10.9 w 
: 

2019 
7.9 w 
: 

2020 
2.7 w 
: 

2010 
- 2 272.3 w 
- 7 230.5 w 
4 230.4 w 
- 1 513.6 w 
2 241.4 w 
: 

2017 
- 3 046.9 w 
- 8 465.8 w 
804.6 w 
1 404.2 w 
3 210.1 w 
: 

2018 
- 5 464.2 w 
- 10 848.4 w 
1 143.0 w 
1 148.7 w 
3 092.5 w 
: 

2019 
- 3 696.3 w 
- 12 770.8 w 
1 567.6 w 
1 710.2 w 
5 796.7 w 
: 

2020 
4 735.0 w 
- 5 867.8 w 
3 845.7 w 
3 174.1 w 
3 583.0 w 
: 

: 
: 
4 338.9 w 

: 
: 
3 054.6 w 

: 
: 
4 111.9 w 

: 
: 
4 619.8 w 

554.5 w 
527.1 w 

249.1 w 
25.7 w 

-  107.5 w 
-  133.1 w 

751.7 w 
485.2 w 

: 
: 
-  50.8 w 

19.3 w 
-  39.4 w 

: 
: 

2021 
9.4 w 
: 

2021 
- 2 815.8 w 
- 5 689.0 w 
3 368.9 w 
- 4 407.1 w 
3 911.4 w 
: 

: 
: 
6 351.5 w 

-  167.3 w 
-  149.5 w 

4 893.4 w 

3 303.7 w 

4 004.4 w 

5 371.4 w 

-  31.5 w 

6 184.2 w 

3 948.2 w 

1 745.4 w 

2 727.4 w 

4 149.3 w 

-  731.1 w 

4 599.3 w 

-  24.8 w 
1.1 sw 

-  29.5 w 
0.9 sw 

-  20.2 w 
0.7 sw 

-  17.9 w 
0.6 sw 

-  14.1 w 
0.7 sw 

-  12.0 w 
1.0 sw 

2010 
-  6.3 w 
38.6 w 
40.2 w 
46.5 w 

2017 
-  1.2 w 
71.8 w 
40.3 w 
41.5 w 

2018 
-  1.9 w 
60.9 w 
39.5 w 
41.5 w 

2019 
-  1.9 pw 
50.2 w 
39.4 w 
41.2 w 

2020 
-  5.4 w 
60.4 w 
39.6 w 
45.0 w 

2021 
-  3.3 w 
49.0 w 
37.0 w 
40.3 w 

Financial indicators 

Note 

2010 

2017 

2018 

2019 

2020 

2021 

145 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to GDP (%) 
Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to total exports (%) 
Money supply: M1 (banknotes, coins, overnight deposits, million euro) 
Money supply: M2 (M1 plus deposits with maturity up to two years, million euro) 
Money supply: M3 (M2 plus marketable instruments, million euro) 
Total credit by monetary financial institutions to residents (consolidated) (million euro) 
**Annual change in financial sector liabilities (%) 
**Private credit flow, consolidated, relative to GDP (%) 
**Private debt, consolidated, relative to GDP (%) 
Interest rates: day-to-day money rate, per annum (%) 
Lending interest rate (one year), per annum (%) 
Deposit interest rate (one year), per annum (%) 
Euro exchange rates: average of period (1 euro = … national currency) 
Trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries (2015 = 100) 
**3 year change (T/T-3) in the trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries 
(2015 = 100) 
Value of reserve assets (including gold) (million euro) 

20) 21) 
20) 11) 
22) 23) 
22) 24) 
22) 25) 

26) 
27) 

28) 
28) 

83.1 sw 
178.7 w 
27 417.9 w 
56 448.8 w 
56 546.3 w 
: 
: 
: 
: 
1.72 w 
11.62 w 
3.20 w 
10.533 w 
135.4 w 
- 0.3 sw 

97.4 sw 
202.5 w 
17 961.6 w 
36 081.3 w 
36 090.3 w 
: 
: 
: 
: 
11.60 w 
15.90 w 
12.13 w 
30.004 w 
86.5 w 
- 0.2 sw 

90.4 sw 
199.6 w 
21 166.7 w 
40 164.2 w 
40 286.0 w 
: 
: 
: 
: 
16.30 w 
19.20 w 
15.64 w 
32.143 w 
85.4 w 
- 0.1 sw 

79.4 sw 
192.2 w 
29 144.0 w 
54 319.2 w 
54 436.1 w 
: 
: 
: 
: 
15.00 w 
18.35 w 
15.18 w 
28.952 w 
94.6 w 
0.0 sw 

74.6 sw 
192.4 w 
30 226.3 w 
53 177.5 w 
53 253.6 w 
: 
: 
: 
: 
7.10 w 
7.89 w 
7.22 w 
30.790 w 
93.2 w 
0.1 sw 

67.8 sw 
165.6 w 
41 433.7 w 
66 928.6 w 
66 985.2 w 
: 
: 
: 
: 
6.78 w 
7.67 w 
6.95 w 
32.310 w 
91.5 w 
0.1 sw 

20) 11) 

26 036.1 w 

15 760.9 w 

18 177.1 w 

22 682.2 w 

23 711.1 w 

27 294.4 w 

External trade in goods 
Value of imports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 
Value of exports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 
Trade balance: all goods, all partners (million euro) 
Terms of trade (export price index / import price index * 100) (number) 
Share of exports to EU-27 countries in value of total exports (%) 
Share of imports from EU-27 countries in value of total imports (%) 

Demography 
Crude rate of natural change of population (natural growth rate): number of births minus 
deaths (per thousand inhabitants) 
Infant mortality rate deaths of children under one year of age (per thousand live births) 
Life expectancy at birth: male (years) 
Life expectancy at birth: female (years) 

Note 

29) 
30) 

Note 

2010 
45 525 sw 
38 277 sw 
- 7 247 sw 
106.7 sw 
: 
: 

2017 
43 912 sw 
38 298 sw 
- 5 614 sw 
101.7 sw 
: 
: 

2018 
48 423 sw 
40 080 sw 
- 8 343 sw 
99.6 sw 
: 
: 

2019 
54 310 sw 
44 712 sw 
- 9 599 sw 
99.9 sw 
: 
: 

2020 
47 490 w 
43 053 w 
- 4 438 sw 
105.0 sw 
: 
: 

2010 
-  4.4 

9.2 
65.2 
75.3 

2017 
-  5.0 

7.7 
68.3 
78.0 

2018 
-  6.0 

7.1 
68.1 
78.0 

2019 
-  6.5 

7.1 
68.4 
78.3 

2020 
-  7.8 

6.8 
: 
: 

2021 
72 843 w 
68 072 w 
: 
118.9 sw 
: 
: 

2021 
-  10.7 e 

7.2 
: 
: 

Labour market 
Economic activity rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 
that is economically active (%) 
*Employment rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that 
are in employment (%) 
Male employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 
Female employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 

Note 
3) 31) 

2010 
72.2 w 

2017 
70.9 w 

2018 
71.8 w 

2019 
72.9 w 

2020 
72.0 w 

2021 
71.9 w 

3) 

3) 
3) 

66.4 w 

64.2 w 

65.6 w 

66.9 w 

65.2 w 

64.8 w 

71.1 w 
62.1 w 

69.4 w 
59.4 w 

70.5 w 
61.0 w 

72.7 w 
61.6 w 

70.8 w 
60.0 w 

70.8 w 
59.3 w 

146 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Employment rate for persons aged 55–64: proportion of the population aged 55–64 that 
are in employment (%) 
Employment by main sectors 
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 
Industry (%) 
Construction (%) 
Services (%) 
People employed in the public sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–
64 (%) 
People employed in the private sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–
64 (%) 
Unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that is unemployed (%) 

Male unemployment rate (%) 

Female unemployment rate (%) 

Youth unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force aged 15–24 that is unemployed 
(%) 
Long-term unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that has been unemployed 
for 12 months or more (%) 
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed at most lower secondary 
education (ISCED levels 0-2) (%) 
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed tertiary education 
(ISCED levels 5-8) (%) 

3) 

40.4 w 

38.2 w 

39.5 w 

41.9 w 

42.1 w 

41.1 w 

32) 3) 
32) 3) 
32) 3) 

32) 3) 

20.2 w 
19.1 w 
6.4 w 
54.3 w 
: 

15.4 w 
17.7 w 
6.6 w 
60.3 w 
: 

14.9 w 
17.8 w 
6.5 w 
60.8 w 
: 

13.9 w 
17.8 w 
7.1 w 
61.2 w 
: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

8.1 w 

9.5 w 

8.8 w 

8.2 w 

9.3 w 

11.1 w 

10.0 w 

8.5 w 

14.1 w 
17.8 w 
7.0 w 
61.1 w 
: 

: 

9.5 w 

9.8 w 

14.1 w 
18.2 w 
7.0 w 
60.7 w 
: 

: 

9.8 w 

9.5 w 

6.8 w 

7.7 w 

7.4 w 

7.9 w 

9.1 w 

10.1 w 

17.4 w 

18.9 w 

17.9 w 

15.4 w 

19.3 w 

19.1 w 

1.8 w 

2.5 w 

1.9 w 

1.0 w 

2.0 w 

2.4 w 

8.4 w 

12.8 w 

14.2 w 

13.9 w 

16.3 w 

15.3 w 

3) 

6.0 w 

7.5 w 

7.2 w 

6.5 w 

7.4 w 

8.5 w 

32) 3) 
33) 
32) 3) 
33) 
32) 3) 
33) 
3) 

32) 3) 
33) 
3) 

Social cohesion 
Average nominal monthly wages and salaries (national currency) 
Index of real wages and salaries (index of nominal wages and salaries divided by the 
inflation index) (2016 = 100) 
GINI coefficient 

Note 
34) 3) 

2010 
2 239 bw 
: 

2017 
7 104 w 
119 w 

2018 
8 865 w 
134 w 

2019 
10 497 w 
147 w 

2020 
11 591 w 
158 w 

2021 
14 014 w 
175 w 

35) 36) 
3) 

25 w 

23 w 

24 w 

25 w 

25 w 

24 w 

Poverty gap 
*Early leavers from education and training: proportion of the population aged 18–24 with 
at most lower secondary education who are not in further education or training (%) 

: 
: 

: 
: 

: 
: 

Standard of living 
Number of passenger cars relative to population size (number per thousand population) 
Number of mobile phone subscriptions relative to population size (number per thousand 
population) 
Mobile broadband penetration (per 100 inhabitants) 
Fixed broadband penetration (per 100 inhabitants) 

Note 

3) 37) 

3) 37) 
3) 37) 

2010 
147.9 sw 
1 182.5 w 

2017 
: 
1 314.4 w 

2018 
: 
1 279.5 w 

: 
7 w 

41.3 w 
12 w 

47.5 w 
13 w 

: 
: 

2019 
: 
 w 

 w 
 w 

: 
: 

2020 
: 
 w 

 w 
 w 

: 
: 

2021 
: 
 w 

 w 
 w 

147 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Infrastructure 
Density of railway network (lines in operation per thousand km²) 

Length of motorways (kilometres) 

Note 
1) 38) 

2010 
35.9 sw 

39) 

15 w 

Innovation and research 
Public expenditure on education relative to GDP (%) 
*Gross domestic expenditure on R&D relative to GDP (%) 
Government budget appropriations or outlays on R&D (GBAORD), as a percentage of 
GDP (%) 
Percentage of households who have internet access at home (%) 

Environment 
*Index of greenhouse gas emissions,  CO2 equivalent (1990 = 100) 
Energy intensity of the economy (kg of oil equivalent per 1 000 euro GDP at 2015 
constant prices) 
Electricity generated from renewable sources relative to gross electricity consumption (%) 
Road share of inland freight transport (based on tonne-km) (%) 

Energy 
Primary production of all energy products (thousand TOE) 
Primary production of crude oil (thousand TOE) 
Primary production of solid fuels (thousand TOE) 
Primary production of gas (thousand TOE) 
Net imports of all energy products (thousand TOE) 
Gross inland energy consumption (thousand TOE) 
Gross electricity generation (GWh) 

Note 

3) 
3) 40) 
3) 41) 

36) 42) 
39) 

Note 

43) 

2010 
6.6 sw 
0.80 sw 
0.30 w 

2010 
43.7 ew 
: 

3) 
39) 44) 

7.2 ew 
29.8 w 

Note 

3) 

2010 
77 526 
3 590 
32 142 
15 436 
41 906 s 
132 795 
188 828 

2017 
32.8 sw 

15 w 

2017 
5.4 sw 
0.45 sw 
0.20 w 

2018 
32.7 sw 

15 w 

2018 
5.3 sw 
0.47 sw 
0.20 w 

2019 
32.8 sw 

15 w 

2019 
5.4 sw 
0.43 sw 
0.20 w 

2020 
32.8 sw 

15 w 

2020 
5.4 sw 
0.40 sw 
0.20 w 

2021 
32.7 sw 

15 w 

2021 
: 
0.29 sw 
0.10 w 

20.2 w 

59.8 w 

61.5 w 

65.8 w 

79.2 w 

82.7 w 

2017 
37.1 ew 
: 

9.2 sw 
38.1 w 

2017 
58 890 
2 208 
13 517 
15 471 
33 167 s 
89 768 
155 990 

2018 
40.3 ew 
: 

10.3 w 
42.7 w 

2018 
60 886 
2 341 
14 338 
16 487 
32 347 s 
93 851 
159 796 

2019 
39.4 ew 
: 

9.4 w 
41.4 w 

2019 
60 355 
2 478 
14 186 
16 261 
32 976 s 
89 641 
154 012 

2020 
34.7 ew 
: 

11.5 w 
42.3 w 

2020 
57 121 
2 476 
12 690 
15 856 
29 487 s 
86 583 
148 264 

2021 
 w 
: 

10.6 w 
 w 

2021 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
150 042 w 

Agriculture 
Agricultural production volume index of goods and services (at producer prices) (2010 = 
100) 
Utilised agricultural area (thousand hectares) 
Livestock numbers: live bovine animals (thousand heads, end of period) 
Livestock numbers: live swine (thousand heads, end of period) 
Livestock numbers: live sheep and live goats (thousand heads, end of period) 
Raw milk available on farms (thousand tonnes) 
Harvested crop production: cereals (including rice) (thousand tonnes) 
Harvested crop production: sugar beet (thousand tonnes) 
Harvested crop production: vegetables (thousand tonnes) 

Note 

6) 

2010 
100.0 w 

2017 
132.7 w 

2018 
143.6 w 

2019 
145.7 w 

2020 
130.9 w 

2021 
152.4 w 

41 275.6 w 
4 494.4 w 
7 960.4 w 
1 731.7 sw 
11 248.5 w 
38 678.6 sw 
13 749.2 w 
8 246.7 w 

41 274.3 w 
3 530.8 w 
6 109.9 w 
1 309.3 sw 
10 280.5 w 
60 677.8 sw 
14 881.6 w 
9 369.4 w 

41 259.9 w 
3 332.9 w 
6 025.3 w 
1 268.6 sw 
10 064.0 w 
69 101.9 sw 
13 967.7 w 
9 543.0 w 

41 138.4 w 
3 092.0 w 
5 727.4 w 
1 204.5 sw 
9 663.2 w 
74 425.2 sw 
10 204.5 w 
9 801.9 w 

41 144.2 w 
2 874.0 w 
5 876.2 w 
1 140.4 sw 
9 263.6 w 
64 333.4 sw 
9 150.2 w 
9 747.5 w 

41 144.2 w 
2 644.0 w 
5 608.8 w 
: 
8 713.9 w 
: 
10 853.9 w 
10 038.3 w 

3) 

3) 

148 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat and/or the statistical authorities in Ukraine 

: = not available 
  b =  break in series 
  e = estimated value 
  p = provisional 

s = Eurostat estimate 

  w= data supplied by and under the responsibility of the national statistical authority and published on an "as is" basis and without any assurance as regards their quality 

and adherence to EU statistical methodology 
* = Europe 2020 indicator 
** = Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) indicator 

 Footnotes: 

1) Data of the State Service on Geodesy, Cartography and Cadastre of Ukraine. 
2) Data are given according to the new Classification of Land Types. 
3) Data for 2014-2021 exclude the temporarily occupied territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and the parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions which are 

temporarily occupied.  

4) Data for 2014-2021 exclude the temporarily occupied territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and the parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions which are 

temporarily occupied.  
Persons aged 15-70 years. 

5) Adjustment for the effect of calendar days of the dynamic series of indices to the average monthly value of the base. (2016) year is carried out using the DEMETRA+ program, using the 

TRAMO/SEATS method activity. 

6) Data for 2014-2021 exclude the temporarily occupied territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and the parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions which are 

temporarily occupied. 

7) Data for 2014-2021 exclude the temporarily occupied territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and the parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions which are 

temporarily occupied. 

8) The information for 2021 include of data reports of enterprises, which were submitted on initiative. 
9) Consumer price inflation 

10) Data for 2014-2021 exclude the temporarily occupied territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and the parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions which are 

temporarily occupied. 

11) Data for 2014-2021 exclude the temporarily occupied territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and the parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions which are 

temporarily occupied.  

12) Since year 2020 the National bank of Ukraine have improved the foreign direct investment compilation, in context of which non-financial corporations' reinvested earnings have  been 

incorporated in FDI flows and stocks data. Therefore, BoP, IIP, FDI data for 2015- 2019 were revised. 

13) Since year 2021 the National bank of Ukraine have improved the foreign direct investment compilation, in context of which loans between fellow enterprises have been incorporated in FDI 

flows and stocks data. Therefore, BoP, IIP, FDI data for 2015- 2020 were revised. 

14) FDI Data were recalculated taking into account EU-27 Member States, excluding the United Kingdom. 
15) Data were recalculated taking into account GDP revised 
16) Data for 2014-2021 exclude the temporarily occupied territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and the parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions which are 

temporarily occupied.  

17) Modified cash data (Government finance statistics manual 2014). 
18) Data for 2014-2021 exclude the temporarily occupied territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and the parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions which are 

temporarily occupied.  

19) State and state guaranteed debt. 
20) Assets and debt converted from US dollars to euro using cross rates at the end of the reporting year. 

149 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21) Assets and debt converted from US dollars to euro using cross rates at the end of the reporting year. 

Data for 2014-2021 exclude the temporarily occupied territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and the parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions which are 
temporarily occupied.  

22) Converted into euro using the annual exchange rates at the end of period. 
23) Monetary aggregate M1 includes: certain liabilities of resident deposit-taking corporations vis-a-vis resident sectors of the economy except general government and other deposit-taking 

corporations; currency in circulation outside the deposit-taking corporations; and transferable deposits in national currency. 

24) M2 comprises M1 and transferable deposits in foreign currency and other deposits. 
25) M3 comprises M2 and securities other than shares. 
26) Average weighted interest rate on all instruments of National bank's refinancing. 
27) Distribution of deposit certificates of the National Bank of Ukraine. 
28) Nominal effective exchange rate index of the hryvnia (2015=100), 39 countries. 
29) Data for 2014-2021 exclude the temporarily occupied territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and the parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions which are 

temporarily occupied.  

30) Index based on the previous year 
31) Fixing from 2019 economically active population - labour force. 
32) Persons aged 15-70 years. 
33) Persons aged 15 years and over. 
34) Data refer to enterprises and their independent divisions with 10 or more employees. Data from before 2010 should not be compared with data from 2010 onwards. 

35) Since 2011 the calculation of indicators of population and households analysed by level of material well-being uses an equivalence scale: a coefficient of 1 is assigned to the first member of 

the household and 0.7 to all others. Basic indicators back to 2007 have been recalculated taking into account this equivalence scale. 

36) Data for 2014-2021 exclude the temporarily occupied territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and the parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions which are 

temporarily occupied. 

37) The State Statistics Service of Ukraine does not have this information. This information is collected by the National Commission on the State Regulation in the sphere of Communications and 

Informatization. 

38) Data for 2014-2021 exclude the temporarily occupied territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and the parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions which are 

temporarily occupied.  
Data of the State Service on Geodesy, Cartography and Cadastre of Ukraine. 
Data are given according to the new Classification of Land Types. 

39) Data for 2014-2021 exclude the temporarily occupied territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and the parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions which are 

temporarily occupied. 

40) Data for 2014-2021 exclude the temporarily occupied territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and the parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions which are 

temporarily occupied. The information for 2021 is formed on the basis of data reports of enterprises, which were submitted on initiative. 

41) The information for 2021 is formed on the basis of data reports of enterprises, which were submitted on initiative. 
42) Share of persons who used the internet at home. 
43) Data for 2021 disseminate in 25.04.2023. 
44) Data are not available - according to subitem 1 of item 1 of Ukraine's law on protection of interests of entities that submit reporting and other documents during the period of martial law or 

state of war, dated on March 03, 2022 by ¿ 2115 - IX 

150 

 
 
151