COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Türkiye 2023 Report Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2023 Communication on EU Enlargement policy
Date: 2023-11-08
Institutions: Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, European Commission
Subjects: Türkiye, accession criteria, accession negotiations, pre-accession strategy, regional cooperation

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 8.11.2023  SWD(2023) 696 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Türkiye 2023 Report Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2023 Communication on EU Enlargement policy                   {COM(2023) 690 final} - {SWD(2023) 690 final} - {SWD(2023) 691 final} - {SWD(2023) 692 final} - {SWD(2023) 693 final} - {SWD(2023) 694 final} - {SWD(2023) 695 final} - {SWD(2023) 697 final} - {SWD(2023) 698 final} - {SWD(2023) 699 final}  
 
 
Table of Contents 

1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 3 

1.1 Context ................................................................................................................................................ 3 

1.2. Summary of the report  ...................................................................................................................... 4 

2. Cluster 1: The fundamentals of the accession process ........................................................................... 12 

2.1. Functioning of democratic institutions and Public Administration Reform .................................... 12 

2.1.1  Democracy .............................................................................................................................. 12 

2.1.2. Public administration reform .................................................................................................... 21 

2.2. Rule of law and fundamental rights ................................................................................................. 23 

Chapter 23: judiciary and fundamental rights .................................................................................... 23 

Chapter 24: justice, freedom and security .......................................................................................... 44 

2.3. Economic criteria ............................................................................................................................. 60 

2.3.1. The existence of a functioning market economy ...................................................................... 60 

2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union ........... 68 

2.4. Public procurement, statistics, financial control ............................................................................. 71 

Chapter 5: Public procurement ........................................................................................................... 71 

Chapter 18: Statistics .......................................................................................................................... 73 

Chapter 32: Financial control .............................................................................................................. 75 

3. Good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation ........................................................................... 78 

4.Ability to assume the obligations of membership …………………………………………………………………….81 

Cluster 2: Internal Market ....................................................................................................................... 81 

Chapter 1: Free movement of goods .................................................................................................. 82 

Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers .................................................................................. 84 

Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services ................................................. 85 

Chapter 4: Free movement of capital ................................................................................................. 86 

Chapter 6: Company law ..................................................................................................................... 87 

Chapter 7: Intellectual property law ................................................................................................... 88 

Chapter 8: Competition policy ............................................................................................................ 90 

Chapter 9: Financial services ............................................................................................................... 91 

Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection .................................................................................... 93 

Cluster 3: Competitiveness and inclusive growth ................................................................................... 95 

Chapter 10: Digital transformation and media ................................................................................... 95 

Chapter 16: Taxation ........................................................................................................................... 97 

Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy ....................................................................................... 99 

Chapter 19: Social policy and employment ...................................................................................... 100 

1 

 
 
Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy .................................................................................... 103 

Chapter 25: Science and research ..................................................................................................... 104 

Chapter 26: Education and culture ................................................................................................... 105 

Chapter 29: Customs Union .............................................................................................................. 108 

Cluster 4: The Green agenda and sustainable connectivity .................................................................. 109 

Chapter 14: Transport policy ............................................................................................................ 110 

Chapter 15: Energy ............................................................................................................................ 111 

Chapter 21: Trans-European networks ............................................................................................. 113 

Chapter 27: Environment and climate change ................................................................................. 114 

Cluster 5: Resources, agriculture and cohesion .................................................................................... 117 

Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development ............................................................................... 117 

Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy ......................................................... 118 

Chapter 13: Fisheries and aquaculture ............................................................................................. 119 

Chapter 22: Regional policy and the coordination of structural instruments .................................. 120 

Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions .............................................................................. 122 

Cluster 6: External relations .................................................................................................................. 123 

Chapter 30: External relations .......................................................................................................... 123 

Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy ............................................................................ 125 

Annex I – Relations between the EU and Türkiye ................................................................................. 131 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 

1.1 CONTEXT 
Türkiye1 remains a key partner for the European Union and a candidate country. Türkiye has 
been  linked  to  the  EU  by  an  association  agreement  since  1964  and  a  Customs  Union  was 
established in 1995. The European Council granted Türkiye the status of candidate country in 
December  1999  and  accession  negotiations  were  opened  in  October  2005.  Within  the 
framework  of  accession  negotiations,  16  chapters  have  been  opened  and  one  has  been 
provisionally closed. Accession negotiations with Türkiye, however, remain at a standstill, in 
line with the Council Conclusions of June 2018 as reiterated by the Council Conclusions of 
December  2022.  Türkiye  continued  to  move  away  from  the  EU  and  did  not  reverse  the 
negative  trend  in  relation  to  reform,  despite  its  repeated  statements  of  commitment  to  EU 
accession. The EU’s serious concerns on the continued deterioration of democratic standards, 
the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and respect for fundamental rights were not 
addressed.  

Presidential  and  parliamentary  elections  were  held  in  Türkiye  in  May  2023.  The  ruling 
coalition retained its majority in the parliament and the incumbent  President was re-elected. 
The  priorities  of  the  new  government  include  post-earthquake  relief  and  reconstruction, 
financial stability and a constitutional overhaul. 

In  February  2023,  two  powerful  earthquakes  and  multiple  aftershocks  struck  south-eastern 
Türkiye.  The  devastating  earthquakes  caused  the  death  of  tens  of  thousands  of  people  and 
resulted in widespread destruction of public and private infrastructure, including schools and 
healthcare facilities. The EU’s reaction was immediate and substantial emergency assistance 
was provided both through humanitarian funding and the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. In 
March 2023, the European Commission and the Swedish Presidency of the Council of the EU 
hosted,  in  coordination  with  the  Turkish  authorities,  an  international  donors’  conference  to 
mobilise  funds  from  the  international  community  to  support  the  early  recovery,  relief  and 
reconstruction  of  the  affected  areas.  This  conference  raised  more  than  EUR  6  billion.  The 
implementation of the assistance pledged by the European Commission has begun. 

The  EU  has  a  strategic  interest  in  a  stable  and  secure  environment  in  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship 
with  Türkiye. The European Council in  June 2022 reconfirmed its expectation that Türkiye 
fully respects international law, contributes to the de-escalation of tensions in the interest of 
regional stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and promotes good-neighbourly relations in a 
sustainable way. The European Council in June 2023 invited the High Representative and the 
Commission to submit a report to the European Council on the state of play of EU-Türkiye 
relations,  building  on  the  instruments  and  options  identified  by  the  European  Council  and 
with  a  view  to  proceeding  in  a  strategic  and  forward-looking  manner.  The  Foreign  Affairs 
Council discussed Türkiye in July 2023. 

During the reporting period, Türkiye did not engage in any unauthorised drilling activities in 
the  Eastern  Mediterranean.  It  continued  to  refuse  to  recognise  the  Republic  of  Cyprus  and 
repeatedly  advocated  a  two-state  solution  in  Cyprus,  contrary  to  relevant  UN  Security 
Council Resolutions. 

1  In  line  with  the  request  of  the  Republic  of  Türkiye  regarding  the  use  of  the  country's  new  official  name  in 
English, this document uses the name “Türkiye” instead of “Turkey” in English. This administrative change is 
limited  to  the  nomenclature  used  in  EU  documents,  does  not  have  a  retroactive  effect,  and  entails  no  legal 
consequences. This approach is without prejudice to the nomenclature used by Member States. 

3 

 
 
 
The 2016 EU-Turkey Statement continued to yield results and remained the key framework 
for  cooperation  on  migration.  Türkiye  sustained  its  remarkable  efforts  to  host  3.6  million 
refugees  from  Syria  and  other  countries.  The  EU  has  mobilised  close  to  EUR  10  billion  to 
support refugees and host communities since 2012. The Commission continued to implement 
the  additional  package  of  EUR 3 billion  covering  2021-2023,  providing  assistance  in  areas 
such  as  basic  needs,  border  management,  education,  healthcare,  protection  and  socio-
economic support.  
1.2. SUMMARY OF THE REPORT 2 

There  are  serious  deficiencies  in  the  functioning  of  Türkiye’s  democratic  institutions. 
Democratic backsliding continued during the reporting period. Structural deficiencies in the 
presidential system remained in place.  

Presidential and parliamentary elections took place on 14 May 2023. A second round of the 
presidential  election  was  held  on  28  May.  The  elections  were  held  under  the  new  electoral 
law adopted in March 2022. The elections offered voters a choice between genuine political 
alternatives and voter participation remained high, but biased media coverage and the lack of 
a level playing field gave an unjustified advantage to the incumbent. 

The constitutional architecture kept powers centralised at the level of the Presidency and does 
not ensure a sound and effective separation of powers between the executive, the legislature 
and the judiciary. The ineffective checks-and-balances mechanism means that the executive 
branch is democratically accountable only through elections.  

Political  pluralism  continued  to  be  undermined  by  the  targeting  of  opposition  parties  and 
individual  members  of  parliament.  The  government’s  pressure  on  mayors  from  opposition 
parties  continued  to  weaken  local  democracy.  Most  regulatory  authorities  remain  directly 
linked  to  the  Presidency.  The  recommendations  by  the  Council  of  Europe’s  Venice 
Commission on the presidential system remain unaddressed. 

The situation in the south-east region remained a cause for concern, particularly  after the 
earthquakes  in  February  2023.  The  Turkish  government  conducted  security  and  military 
operations in  Iraq and Syria. Border areas  faced  a security risk with  terrorist attacks by the 
Kurdistan  Workers’  Party  (PKK),  which  is  listed  as  a  terrorist  group  by  the  EU.  The 
government has a legitimate right and a responsibility to fight terrorism, but it is essential that 
it  does  so  in  full  compliance  with  the  principles  of  the  rule  of  law,  human  rights  and 
fundamental freedoms. Anti-terror measures need to be proportionate. There was no progress 
in  resuming  a  credible  political  peace  process  to  resolve  the  Kurdish  issue.  Following  the 
earthquakes, the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) declared a period of unilateral truce, 
during  the  run-up  to  the  May  elections,  which  was  terminated  in  June.  Turkish  officials 
linked  the  PKK-affiliated  People’s  Protection  Units  (YPG)  to  an  attack  in  Istanbul  in 
November  2022,  but  the  PKK  denied  involvement.  The  EU  unambiguously  condemned  the 
PKK’s  attacks  and  expressed  solidarity  with  the  families  of  the  victims.  Türkiye  continued  to 
carry out airstrikes against the PKK and affiliated groups in northern Syria and Iraq. 

2  This  report  covers  the  period  from  June  2022  to  June  2023.  It  is  based  on  input  from  a  variety  of  sources, 
including contributions from the government of Türkiye, the EU Member States, European Parliament reports 
and information from various international and non-governmental organisations.  It also includes the results of 
comparative assessments and indices produced by other stakeholders, in particular in the area of rule of law. 
The  report  uses  the  following  assessment  scale  to  describe  the  state  of  play:  early  stage,  some  level  of 
preparation,  moderately  prepared,  good  level  of  preparation  and  well  advanced.  To  describe  progress  made 
during  the  reporting  period,  it  uses  the  following  scale:  backsliding,  no  progress,  limited  progress,  some 
progress, good progress and very good progress. Where appropriate, interim steps have also been used. 

4 

 
 
 
Serious backsliding regarding civil society issues continued. Civil society organisations faced 
increased  pressure  and  shrinking  space  to  operate  ,  limiting  their  freedoms  of  expression, 
association  and  assembly.  The  implementation  of  the  Law  on  preventing  financing  of 
proliferation  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction  placed  further  restrictions  on  civil  society 
organisations.  However,  despite  increasing  pressure  from  the  authorities,  civil  society 
continued to be vocal and to participate actively in civic life, including by providing support 
to the people affected by the February 2023 earthquakes. 

Civilian  oversight  of  the  security  forces  was  not  consolidated.  The  executive  branch 
maintained  significant  control  over  the  security  forces.  The  civilian  component  of  the 
Supreme  Military  Council  (YAŞ)  remained  unchanged.  The  military  judicial  system’s 
authority  was  curbed,  with  civilian  higher  courts  reviewing  appeals  against  military  court 
decisions.  However,  effective  civilian  oversight  of  the  security  forces  remained  incomplete 
and lacking in effective accountability mechanisms. Strengthening parliamentary oversight of 
security institutions is necessary. 

Türkiye  is  in  between  some  and  moderate  level  of  preparation  in  the  field  of  public 
administration reform. It made no progress in this area over the reporting period. There is 
still  a  lack  of  political  will  to  reform  the  public  administration  and  public  financial 
management.  The  restructuring  of  the  executive  branch  and  the  overhaul  of  the  public 
administration  in  line  with  the  presidential  system  introduced  in  2018  resulted  in  highly 
centralised  policymaking  system.  The  level  of  accountability  of  the  administration  remains 
insufficient. Its human resources management system needs to be reformed. Politicisation of 
the public administration has continued. The share of women in managerial posts in the civil 
service is still low.  

Türkiye remains at an early stage of preparation in the area of judiciary. Serious backsliding 
continued  and,  despite  several  judicial  reform  packages  in  recent  years,  the  structural 
deficiencies in the judicial system remained unaddressed. The continued refusal to implement 
certain rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) remains a matter of concern. 
There  was  no  progress  in  eliminating  undue  influence  and  pressure  by  the  executive  on 
judges  and  prosecutors,  which  negatively  affects  the  independence,  impartiality  and  quality 
of  the  judiciary.  Implementation  of  the  2021  Human  Rights  Action  Plan  (HRAP)  and  the 
2019  Judicial  Reform  Strategy  (JRS)  continued,  but  the  activities  foreseen  in  these 
documents  fell  short  of  addressing  the  structural  problems  and  issues  identified  in  the 
previous  reports  of  the  European  Commission.  The  lack  of  objective,  merit-based,  uniform 
and  pre-established  criteria  for  recruiting  and  promoting  judges  and  prosecutors  remains  a 
source of concern.  

Türkiye  is  at  an  early  stage  in  the  fight  against  corruption.  There  was  no  progress  in  the 
reporting period. Outstanding deficiencies in key areas of the fight against corruption over the 
last years remained unaddressed. A fully-fledged corruption prevention policy still remains to 
be developed, including the relevant institutions, contrary to the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption, to which Türkiye is party. Legislative gaps still remain in several fields of 
the  fight  against  corruption.  The  limitations  of  the  legal  framework  and  the  institutional 
architecture  allowed  undue  influence  on  the  investigation  and  prosecution  phases  of 
corruption  cases.  The  accountability  and  transparency  of  public  institutions  need  to  be 
improved.  The  absence  of  an  anti-corruption  strategy  and  action  plan  indicates  the  lack  of 
will to fight decisively against corruption. The Council of Europe’s Group of States against 
Corruption  (GRECO)  recommendations  remained  unimplemented.  Overall,  corruption 
remains a problem.  

5 

 
 
Türkiye has  some level  of preparation in  the fight against organised  crime and there was 
some  progress  at  operational  level  through  participation  in  an  increasing  number  of  joint 
operations with EU Member States and neighbouring countries. Nevertheless, it is important 
for  Türkiye  to  further  increase  its  operational  willingness  to  cooperate  and  exchange 
information  with  EU  law  enforcement  partners.  The  legal  framework  for  the  fight  against 
organised  crime  and  police  cooperation  is  only  partially  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis.  The 
completion  of  an  international  agreement  between  the  EU  and  Türkiye  on  the  exchange  of 
personal  data  between  Europol  and  the  Turkish  authorities  responsible  for  fighting  serious 
crime  and  terrorism  is  still  pending,  considering  also  that  the  Turkish  data  protection 
legislation is still not aligned with the EU  acquis. The legal framework regulating the fight 
against  money  laundering  and  terrorist  financing  needs  to  be  improved  in  line  with  the 
recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Venice Commission on 
the Law on preventing financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 

The  deterioration  of  human  and  fundamental  rights  continued.  The  Turkish  legal 
framework includes general guarantees of respect for human and fundamental rights, but the 
legislation and its implementation need to be brought into line with the European Convention 
on  Human  Rights  (ECHR)  and  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  (ECtHR)  case  law.  No 
legislative amendments were adopted to eliminate the remaining elements of the 2016 state of 
emergency laws. 

Türkiye’s  refusal  to  implement  certain  ECtHR  rulings  is  a  source  of  concern  regarding  the 
judiciary’s adherence to international and European standards. Türkiye has not implemented 
the July 2022 ruling of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, which 
was  issued  in  the  framework  of  the  infringement  procedure  launched  by  the  Committee  of 
Ministers against Türkiye, that points to a drifting away from the standards of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms that it has subscribed to as a member of the Council of Europe. 

The implementation of the human rights action plan adopted in 2021 continued. However, it 
did not address critical issues. The overall human rights situation did not improve.  

On  freedom  of  expression,  the  serious  backsliding  continued.  Broad  restrictions  on  the 
activities  of  journalists,  writers,  lawyers,  academics,  human  rights  defenders  and  critical 
voices  continued  to  have  a  negative  effect  on  the  exercise  of  their  freedoms.  The 
implementation of the criminal laws relating to national security and anti-terrorism continued 
to contravene the ECHR and to diverge from ECtHR case law.  

The  May  2023  election  campaign    witnessed  restrictions  on  freedom  of  expression,  both 
private  and  public  media  did  not  ensure  editorial  independence  and  impartiality  in  their 
coverage of the campaign, detracting from the ability of voters to make an informed choice.  

There was no progress in the area of freedom of assembly and association, where legislation 
and its implementation are not in line with the Turkish  Constitution, European standards or 
the  international  conventions  that  Türkiye  is  party  to.  There  were  recurrent  bans, 
disproportionate  use  of 
interventions  around  peaceful  demonstrations. 
Demonstrators were subject to investigations, court cases and administrative fines on charges 
of terrorism-related activities or of violating the Law on demonstrations and marches. 

force  and 

The rights of the most disadvantaged groups and people belonging to minorities need better 
protection. Roma3 people are still largely excluded from formal employment and their living 
conditions  deteriorated  severely.  In  January  2023,  Türkiye  adopted  a  new  Roma  strategy 

3  In  line  with  the  terminology  of  European  institutions  the  umbrella  term  ‘Roma’  is  used  here  to  refer  to  a 
number of different groups, without denying the specificities of these groups. 

6 

 
 
 
covering  the  period  2023-2030  and  an  action  plan  covering  the  period  2023-2025.  The 
February  2023  earthquakes  affected  the  Roma  population  disproportionately,  and  increased 
the difficulties they faced in the affected areas in terms of living conditions, livelihood and 
basic  needs  and  health,  especially  for  women  and  children.  Gender-based  violence, 
discrimination  and  hate  speech  against  minorities  and  against  lesbian,  gay,  bisexual, 
transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) persons are still a matter of serious concern.  

On migration and asylum policy, Türkiye made some progress. The EU-Turkey Statement 
remained the main framework for cooperation between the EU and Türkiye. Some progress 
was  made  in  further  strengthening  the  capacity  for  surveillance  and  protection  of  the  land 
borders  with  Iran  and  Iraq.  The  Commission  expects  Türkiye  to  uphold  its  commitments 
under  the  EU-Turkey  statement,  in  line  with  the  European  Council  conclusions  of  October 
2021,  including  prevention  of  irregular  migration  from  land  and  sea  routes,  and  resuming 
returns.  The  return  of  irregular  migrants  from  the  Greek  islands  under  the  EU-Turkey 
Statement  remained  suspended.  The  full  and  effective  implementation  of  the  EU-Turkey 
readmission  agreement  towards  all  EU  Member  States  is  pending.  Political  and  technical 
dialogue is ongoing on migration and security. The next EU-Türkiye high level dialogue on 
migration  is  scheduled  to  take  place  on  23  November  2023.  Overall,  the  number  of  illegal 
border crossings between Türkiye and Greece remained significantly lower than it was prior 
to  the  adoption  of  the  EU-Turkey  Statement.  In  2022,  the  number  of  irregular  migrants 
arriving  increased  on  most  routes  by  comparison  with  2021.  In  the  first  half  of  2023,  the 
number of irregular arrivals from Türkiye into the EU was lower than in the same period in 
2022.  Arrivals  in  Greece  increased  by  62%,  while  the  sea  route  to  Italy  saw  a  substantial 
decrease (down by 52%) and the number of arrivals in Cyprus via the Green Line went down 
significantly  by  42%.  Türkiye  has  still  not  implemented  the  provisions  relating  to  third-
country  nationals  in  the  EU-Turkey  readmission  agreement,  which  entered  into  force  in 
October 2017.  

Türkiye continued to make significant efforts to host and meet the needs of one of the largest 
refugee  communities  in  the  world.  Out  of  the  almost  EUR  10  billion  in  EU  support  to 
refugees allocated since 2011, some EUR 7 billion had been disbursed by September 2023. 
Efficient  integration  measures  are  needed  to  address  the  prolonged  presence  of  refugees  in 
the  country.  Access  to  public  health  for  migrants  and  refugees  should  be  improved.  No 
outstanding  benchmarks  under  the  visa  liberalisation  roadmap  were  fulfilled.  Türkiye  still 
needs to further align its legislation with the EU acquis on visa policy. 

Türkiye is an active and significant actor in the area of foreign policy, which constitutes an 
important  element  in  the  context  of  the  EU-Türkiye  relationship.  Nevertheless,  Türkiye’s 
unilateral foreign policy remained at odds with the EU’s priorities under the common foreign 
and security policy (CFSP). Türkiye maintained a very low alignment rate  of 10% with the 
EU stance on foreign and security policy (as of August 2023), compared to  8% in 2022. Its 
rhetoric in support to terrorist group Hamas following its attacks against Israel on 7 October 
2023 is in complete disagreement with the EU approach. 

Following  Russia’s  war  of  aggression  against  Ukraine,  Türkiye  condemned  the  Russian 
military  aggression,  including  at  the  UN  General  Assembly,  and  engaged  politically  and 
diplomatically,  including  by  facilitating  the  export  of  Ukrainian  grain  and  the  exchange  of 
prisoners.  The  UN-  and  Türkiye-brokered  Black  Sea  Grain  Initiative  was  terminated  by 
Russia in July 2023. Türkiye also sought to facilitate talks between Ukraine and Russia and to 
work on de-escalation and bringing about a cease-fire. Nevertheless, Türkiye refrained from 
aligning itself with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia. As of March 2023, Türkiye 
has implemented a ban on exporting to Russia sanctioned goods originating from the EU, the 

7 

 
 
United  States  and  the  United  Kingdom.  This  ban  specifically  targeted  goods  that  were  in 
transit, stored in warehouses or located within free zones in Türkiye. However, the potential 
transportation  of  dual-use  and  sensitive  technology  goods,  as  well  as  the  unrestricted 
movement  of  sanctioned  goods  from  Türkiye  to  Russia  still  need  to  be  addressed.  Overall, 
Türkiye  significantly  intensified  its  trade  and  economic  ties  with  Russia,  and  the  Turkish 
economy became more dependent on Russia in crucial sectors, particularly in energy. 

Türkiye intensified its ‘regional normalisation’ policy with the Arab states, with Armenia and 
with  Israel.  Following  the  Hamas  terrorist  group’s  attacks  against  Israel  in  October  2023, 
Türkiye refrained from condemning and qualifying them as terrorism and strongly criticised 
Israel’s  response.  Türkiye  strongly  condemned  the  loss  of  civilian  lives  on  both  sides  and 
proposed to act  as a mediator between Israel and Hamas. Türkiye is  currently re-evaluating 
its ties with Israel. On the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), Türkiye’s position aligns with 
the EU’s position supporting the two-state solution. Türkiye's rapprochement with the Syrian 
regime, brokered by Russia, occurred in spite of the lack of a political resolution to the Syrian 
conflict and is at odds with the EU’s policy. At the same time, Türkiye shared a common goal 
with  the  EU  to  achieve  a  stable  and  prosperous  Syria,  primarily  by  implementing  UNSCR 
2254. Türkiye has a growing presence and geopolitical ambition in the South Caucasus and 
Central Asia. It also continued its efforts to extend its relations with African, Latin American 
and Asian countries. Türkiye’s pragmatic engagement on Afghanistan and its vocal position 
on the developments in Sudan underscored its ambition to be a key player in the context of 
major international crises. 

Türkiye continued to seek involvement in the common security and defence policy (CSDP) 
and  EU  defence  initiatives  while  persisting  in  its  exclusion  of  a  Member  State  from  all 
possible  cooperation  with  NATO.  Türkiye  remained  actively  involved  in  EU  crisis 
management missions and operations within the framework of the CSDP. In March 2023, the 
Turkish  National  Assembly  approved  Finland’s  NATO  accession  and  during  the  NATO 
summit in July 2023, the Turkish President pledged to promptly submit Sweden’s accession 
protocol  to  the  Turkish  parliament  for  ratification.  The  president  submitted  the  bill  for 
ratification to the Parliament on 23 October 2023. 

Regarding  good  neighbourly  relations  and  regional  cooperation,  Türkiye  continued  to 
refuse to recognise the Republic of Cyprus and repeatedly advocated a two-state solution in 
Cyprus,  contrary  to  relevant  UN  Security  Council  Resolutions.  The  EU  remains  fully 
committed to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework, 
in  accordance with  the relevant  UNSC resolutions,  in  line with  the principles on which the 
EU  is  founded  and  the  acquis.  The  EU  has  called,  most  recently  in  the  European  Council 
conclusions  of  June  2023,  for  the  speedy  resumption  of  negotiations  and  expressed  its 
readiness  to  play  an  active  role  in  supporting  all  stages  of  the  UN-led  process  with  all 
appropriate means at its disposal. There were no unauthorised drilling activities by Türkiye in 
the Eastern Mediterranean during the reporting period. 

Relations between Türkiye and Greece deteriorated until early 2023. However, following the 
devastating earthquakes in Türkiye in February 2023, there was a marked improvement in the 
relations.  As  of  February  2023,  violations  of  Greek  airspace  diminished  drastically,  and  no 
flights over Greek inhabited areas were reported.  

Pursuing dialogue in good faith and abstaining from unilateral actions which run counter to 
the EU interests and violate international law and the sovereign rights of EU Member States 
is  an  essential  requirement  to  ensure  stable  and  secure  environment  in  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean  and    the  development  of  a  cooperative  and  mutually  beneficial  relationship 
between  the  EU  and  Türkiye.  Türkiye  is  expected  to  unequivocally  commit  itself  to  good 
8 

 
 
neighbourly  relations,  international  agreements  and  the  peaceful  settlement  of  disputes,  in 
accordance  with  the  United  Nations  Charter,  having  recourse,  if  necessary,  to  the 
International Court of Justice.  

Regarding  the  economic  criteria,  the  Turkish  economy  is  well  advanced  but  made  no 
progress  over  the  reporting  period.  Serious  concerns  persist  over  the  proper  functioning  of 
Türkiye’s  market  economy.  There  was  backsliding  on  important  elements,  such  as  the 
conduct  of  monetary  policy  and  the  institutional  and  regulatory  environments  over  most  of 
the reporting period. Since the May parliamentary and presidential elections, the authorities 
have taken some steps to revert to more stability oriented macroeconomic policies. Although 
economic  growth  remained  robust  in  2022,  Türkiye  moved  further  away  from  market-
oriented  policies,  which  weakened  its  economic  fundamentals  and  increased  vulnerabilities 
and  risks.  Inflation  decreased  somewhat  but  remained  very  high  as  monetary  policy 
prioritised  exceptionally  low  interest  rates,  which  remain  deeply  negative  in  real  terms  and 
are  sustained  by  a  web  of  regulatory  and  prudential  measures.  After  the  presidential  and 
parliamentary elections in spring 2023, monetary policy has started to tighten, also signalling 
a  gradual  simplification  of  the  macroprudential  framework.  The  current  account  deficit 
increased  to  5.4%  of  GDP  in  2022,  driven  by  a  negative  terms-of-trade  shock  and  large 
imports of non-monetary gold. The relatively good budget performance in recent years masks 
an underlying trend of growing fiscal risks. The authorities’ commitment to fiscal discipline 
wavered, as the fiscal stance turned pro-cyclical in 2023, with earthquake-related expenditure 
pressure adding to pre-electoral budgetary largesse. However, the fiscal stance was tightened 
after the elections and a revised budget, including sizeable tax increases, was adopted in July. 

The  institutional  and  regulatory  environment  lacks  predictability  and  transparency,  and 
complicates the post-electoral economic policy normalisation. Market exit remains costly and 
slow. However, Türkiye has made progress in digitalising government services to businesses. 
Although  the size of the informal economy  has fallen  in  recent  years, it still accounts for a 
significant share of economic activity. State intervention in price-setting mechanisms persists. 
The provision of State aid lacks proper implementation rules, enforcement and transparency. 
The banking sector remained broadly stable but is facing financial stability challenges due to 
the  numerous  overly  complex  and  far-reaching  macroprudential  and  regulatory  measures. 
The labour market strengthened further, although structural challenges remain significant, in 
particular for youth and female employment. Regional labour market disparities declined and 
reached one of the lowest levels in years. The recent net minimum wage increases were pro-
cyclical. 

Türkiye has a good level of preparation and made limited progress in achieving the capacity 
to  cope  with  competitive  pressure  and  market  forces  within  the  EU.  Despite  improved 
vocational  training,  the  mismatch  between  the  education  system  and  labour  market  needs 
remains a concern. Expenditure on research and development continued to increase, albeit at 
a  very  slow  pace,  and  is  still  below  the  government’s  target.  Investment  was  relatively 
subdued in 2022. There was progress in the diversification of energy supplies and the share of 
energy generated from renewable sources increased significantly. However, the local content 
requirement  in  the  renewable  energy  generation  sector  is  a  discriminatory  practice  and  a 
cause for concern. Trade openness  increased further, but  integration with  the EU continued 
falling, although remaining high. Deviations from Türkiye’s obligations under the EU-Turkey 
Customs Union continue to hinder bilateral trade. 

Türkiye  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of  public  procurement,  with  significant  gaps 
remaining  to  align  with  the  EU  acquis.  There  was  backsliding  in  the  reporting  period  as 
Türkiye increased the use of the negotiated procedure and of discriminatory domestic price 

9 

 
 
advantage  practices,  and  continued  to  allow  offsets  that  favour  local  content.  Türkiye  is 
moderately  prepared  on  statistics  and  made  some  progress,  with  work  continuing  to 
harmonise  its  statistical  methodology  with  EU  standards.  The  Turkish  Statistical  Institute 
(TurkStat)  improved  its  compliance  with  the  timeframes  for  publishing  annual  national 
accounts  and  excessive  deficit  procedure  notifications.  It  took  further  steps  to  improve 
cooperation  with  other  main  data  providers.  However,  Türkiye  needs  to  increase  the 
credibility  of  TurkStat  and  public  trust  in  official  statistics.  Türkiye  has  a  good  level  of 
preparation on financial control. It made no progress over the reporting period. The public 
internal  financial  control  policy  paper  was  not  updated.  The  purpose,  authority  and 
responsibility  of  internal  audit  are  undermined  by  the  lack  of  a  legal  requirement  to  have 
internal audit units in ministries. 

Regarding  its  ability  to  assume  the  obligations  of  membership,  Türkiye  has  pursued 
alignment with the EU acquis on a rather ad hoc basis and to a limited degree. 

The  internal  market  cluster  is  key  to  the  good  functioning  of  the  EU-Turkey  Customs 
Union and to integrating Türkiye into the EU’s internal market. Türkiye has achieved a good 
level of preparation for the free movement of goods. However, technical barriers to trade and 
requirements discriminating against EU products remained in place. Preparations in the areas 
of  freedom  of  movement  for  workers,  the  right  of  establishment  and  freedom  to  provide 
services  are  at  an  early  stage,  and  substantial  efforts  are  still  required  to  align  with  the 
acquis. Türkiye is moderately prepared on free movement of capital, as limitations remain on 
foreign  ownership  and  on  capital  movement.  Türkiye  needs  to  continue  to  address 
outstanding  issues  in  its  framework  regulating  the  fight  against  money  laundering  and 
terrorist financing.  

Türkiye is well advanced in the area of company law but needs to make further progress in 
aligning  with  the  EU  acquis.  Türkiye  has  a  good  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of 
intellectual property law, notably in terms of legislative alignment, but it needs to improve 
implementation  and  enforcement.  Türkiye  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of 
competition  policy. Backsliding  was observed as serious concerns persist  in  relation  to  the 
legislative  framework,  enforcement  capacity  and  transparency  in  the  field  of  State  aid. 
Türkiye  has  a  good  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  financial  services,  however  the 
banking  sector  faced  a  challenging  operating  environment  in  the  reporting  period.  Türkiye 
has  a  good  level  of  preparation  on  consumer  and  health  protection,  with  limited  progress 
made,  notably  on  strengthening  its  surveillance  system  for  health  (security)  services.  The 
capacity of the healthcare system was seriously affected by the February 2023 earthquakes in  
south-east Türkiye. 

Within  the  cluster  on  competitiveness  and  inclusive  growth,  Türkiye  has  some  level    of 
preparation  in  the  area  of  digital  transformation  and  media.  Türkiye’s  preparations  in  the 
area of science and research are well advanced and Türkiye made good progress during the 
reporting period, notably as a result of joining Horizon Europe and continued efforts to raise 
awareness of, and capacity for the programme. Türkiye is moderately prepared on education 
and  culture,  and  continued  to  make  some  progress,  notably  through  the  continued 
implementation of the national qualifications system and the increased participation in some 
EU  programmes.  Access  to  education  in  south-east  Türkiye  was  significantly  impacted  by 
the February 2023 earthquakes. 

On the economy-related chapters, backsliding continued on economic and monetary policy, 
where  Türkiye  has  some  level  of  preparation.  The  Central  Bank  continued  to  loosen  its 
unorthodox monetary policy stance, which triggered multi-year high inflation and unhinged 
inflation  expectations.  Until  the  parliamentary  and  presidential  elections  in  May  2023,  the 
10 

 
 
Central  Bank  was  subject  to  significant  political  pressure  to  keep  real  interest  rates  deeply 
negative.  Far-reaching  prudential  and  regulatory  measures  disrupted  the  functioning  of 
financial  markets  and  increased  risks.  After  the  elections,  the  Central  Bank  has  started  to 
tighten monetary policy  and the  new government  took  measures  to  limit  the bulging fiscal 
deficit.  Türkiye  is  moderately  prepared  and  made  limited  progress  on  enterprise  and 
industrial policy. Major challenges in relation to measures  incompatible with EU industrial 
policy principles remain unaddressed. Türkiye has some level  of preparation in  the area of 
social  policy  and  employment.  The  labour  market  situation  improved  but  concerns  remain 
over trade union rights and effective social dialogue, persistent levels of informal economic 
activity  and  the  gender  gap  in  employment.  The  February  2023  earthquakes  had  a  major 
impact on the labour market in the affected regions. 

Türkiye is moderately prepared on taxation. It made no progress during the reporting period 
and  still  needs  to  enable  tax  information  exchange  with  all  EU  Member  States.  Türkiye 
maintains a good level of preparation for the customs union but made limited progress over 
the  reporting  period.  However,  Türkiye’s  deviations  from  its  obligations  under  the  EU-
Turkey Customs Union continued, contributing to a number of trade irritants. 

Regarding  the  cluster  on  the  Green  Agenda  and  sustainable  connectivity,  Türkiye  is 
moderately prepared in transport policy. It made limited progress during the reporting period, 
mainly  linked  to  the  update  of  the  nationally  determined  contribution  under  the  Paris 
Agreement  with  a  specific  chapter  on  transport  mitigation  policies.  Türkiye  is  moderately 
prepared  in  the  area  of  energy,  and  made  limited  progress  overall.  Efforts  continued  on 
renewable energy deployment, reforms in the natural gas sector and legislative alignment on 
nuclear safety. Türkiye continues to be an important transit country for the EU, but remains 
reliant  on  Russia  for  fossil  fuel  imports  and  nuclear  energy.  Türkiye  is  well  advanced  on 
trans-European  networks  and  made  no  progress.  The  trans-Anatolian  pipeline  continues  to 
operate smoothly and transmit gas to the European section of the Southern Gas Corridor. The 
construction  of  the  flagship  Halkali-Kapikule  railway  line  connecting  the  EU  border  to 
Istanbul continued. 

Türkiye  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  environment  and  climate  change,  and 
made  limited  progress  over  the  reporting  period.  On  climate  change,  Türkiye  submitted  its 
updated  nationally  determined  contribution  under  the  Paris  Agreement.  It  faces  critical 
environmental  and  climate  challenges,  and  needs  more  ambitious  and  better  coordinated 
environment  and  climate  policies,  strategic  planning,  substantial  investment  and  stronger 
administrative capacity. 

On the cluster covering resources, agriculture and cohesion, Türkiye reached some level 
of preparation in the area of agriculture and rural development. Backsliding continued during 
the reporting period, as its agricultural policy keeps moving away from the main principles 
of  the  EU  common  agricultural  policy  and  as  Türkiye  continued  to  restrict  imports  of 
agricultural  products  from  the EU. Türkiye is a major exporter of food products  to  the EU 
and  made  limited  progress  in  the  area  of  food  safety,  veterinary  and  phytosanitary  policy, 
where it reached some level of preparation. Full implementation of the EU acquis in this area 
requires significant further work. Türkiye is moderately prepared in the area of fisheries and 
aquaculture, and made some progress on fisheries governance, inspection and control. 

Türkiye  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of  regional  policy  and  the  coordination  of 
structural  instruments,  and continued to  make some progress  in  accelerating  the absorption 
of  IPA  II  funds  and  setting  up  the  structures  for  IPA  III  funds.  Türkiye  has  some  level  of 
preparation in the area of financial and budgetary provisions but made no progress during the 
reporting period. 

11 

 
 
In  the  external  relations  cluster,  Türkiye  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of  external 
relations  and  made  no  progress  over  the  reporting  period.  Türkiye  has  some  level  of 
preparation in the area of foreign, security and defence policy, and made no progress overall 
in  the  reporting  period.  Türkiye  is  a  significant  actor  in  the  area  of  foreign  policy,  which 
constitutes an important element in the context of the EU-Türkiye relationship. Stepping up 
efforts  to  ensure  alignment  with  the  EU's  common  foreign  and  security  policy  would  be  a 
significant signal of Türkiye's commitment to the EU in the new geopolitical context. 

2. CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS 

2.1. FUNCTIONING OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM 

Democracy 

The functioning of Türkiye’s democratic institutions continued to be severely hampered. The 
structural  shortcomings  of  the  presidential  system  remained.  Democratic  backsliding  and 
political polarisation increased in the run-up to the presidential and parliamentary elections. 
Following  the  earthquakes,  which  hit  11  provinces  in  February  2023,  a  state  of  emergency 
was introduced in the affected provinces and expired in May 2023. Furthermore, even though 
the  nationwide  state  of  emergency  was  lifted  in  July  2018,  a  number  of  legal  provisions 
granting  extraordinary  powers  to  government  officials  and  maintaining  a  number  of  the 
emergency’s  restrictive  elements  remain  in  effect.  Some  of  these  provisions  have  been 
extended  for  another  2 years,  but  most  of  the  provisions  related  to  the  2018  state  of 
emergency expired in July 2022. 

The State of Emergency Inquiry Commission ruled on all the applications within the scope of 
the  2018  Law  on  the  establishment  of  the  Inquiry  Commission  on  the  State  of  Emergency 
Measures  and  completed  its  work  in  January  2023.  Of  the  total  number  of  applications 
submitted  to  the  Inquiry  Commission  (127 292),  the  Inquiry  Commission  accepted  17 960 
cases and rejected 109 332. 

Elections 

Presidential  and  parliamentary  elections  took  place  on  14  May  2023.  A  second  round  to 
determine  the  new  President  of  the  Republic  was  held  on  28  May.  According  to  the 
preliminary conclusions of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(the ODIHR), which deployed an election observation mission, voters had a choice between 
genuine  political  alternatives  and  voter  participation  was  high.  However,  the  incumbent-
biased media coverage and the lack of a level playing field gave an unjustified advantage to 
the incumbent. 

Parliamentary elections  were held in Türkiye on 14 May 2023 to elect the 600 members of 
the Grand National  Assembly. The governing Justice and Development  Party (AKP) of the 
incumbent President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, led the People’s Alliance, which also included 
the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the Great Union Party (BBP) and the New Welfare 
Party (YRP). The People’s Alliance retained its majority in the parliament with 322 members 
of  parliament.  During  the  second  round  of  the  presidential  elections  on  28  May,  President 
Erdoğan  was  re-elected  with  52.18%  of  the  vote  (the  Republic  People’s  Party  CHP 
opposition  candidate  Kemal  Kılıçdaroğlu  received  47.82%).  The  elections  took  place  in  a 
deeply  polarised  environment.  The  elections  offered  voters  a  choice  between  genuine 
political alternatives and voter participation remained high, however, biased media coverage 
and the lack of a level  playing  field  gave an unjustified advantage to  the incumbent. In the 

12 

 
 
 
subdued  yet  competitive  campaign,  candidates  were  able  to  campaign  freely.  However, 
harsher  rhetoric, inflammatory and discriminatory language by both contestants,  along  with 
the  continued  intimidation  and  harassment  of  supporters  of  some  opposition  parties 
undermined the process. Election days were generally calm and well-administered. However, 
instances  of  deficient  implementation  of  certain  procedures,  particularly  during  the  vote 
count, were noted. The electoral campaign was held during the state of emergency in the 11 
provinces  affected  by  the  earthquakes,  where  voting  difficulties  were  widely  reported. 
OSCE/ODIHR deployed an election observation mission (EOM) with 28 long-term and 350 
short-term observers, with additional embedded observers from the Parliamentary Assembly 
of  the  Council  of  Europe  (PACE).  Local  NGOs  and  the  political  parties  also  deployed 
thousands  of  volunteers  to  monitor  the  elections.  The  elections  were  held  under  the  new 
electoral law adopted in March 2022. The new law introduced significant changes, such as a 
revised seat allocation system, changes to eligibility criteria for political parties and changes 
to the method of appointing mid-level electoral councils. It positively addressed an ODIHR 
recommendation to lower the parliamentary threshold from 10% to 7%. Most other ODIHR 
recommendations  (including  those  related  to  seat  distribution,  voter  and  candidate  rights, 
campaign  financing  and  election  dispute  resolution)  remain  unaddressed.  The  Venice 
Commission  criticised  several  aspects  of  the  amended  law,  such  as  the  new  system  for 
selecting the chairpersons and members of provincial and district election appeal boards with 
a lottery rather than taking experience into account. 

Any  further  amendments  that  Türkiye  makes  to  its  electoral  framework,  including  its 
legislation  on  political  parties,  need  to  be  made  in  line  with  international  standards,  after 
thorough consultation. 

The  48  mayors  displaced  by  government-appointed  trustees  following  the  2019  local 
elections  in  the  south-east  have  not  been  reinstated  and  no  action  was  taken  to  address  the 
relevant Venice Commission’s June 2020 opinion. This remains a source of serious concern 
as it undermines local democracy and denies voters their preferred representation. 

Parliament 

The  presidential  system  has  largely  weakened  the  national  parliament’s  legislative  and 
oversight  functions.  The  President’s  extensive  powers  allow  him  to  take  decisions  across  a 
broad  spectrum  of  policy  areas,  thereby  limiting  the  parliament’s  legislative  function.  The 
parliament  lacks  the  tools  needed  to  hold  the  government  to  account.  Targeting  of  the 
political  opposition continued. The closure case  of the People’s Democratic Party (HDP) is 
still ongoing. 

During  the  reporting  period,  the  legislative  function  of  the  parliament  was  curtailed  by  the 
extensive use of presidential decrees and presidential decisions. From January to December 
2022,  the  parliament  adopted  80  of  the  749  proposed  laws.  By  contrast,  during  the  same 
period,  273  presidential  decrees  issued  under  the  state  of  emergency  on  a  variety  of  policy 
issues (including socioeconomic issues) were brought before parliamentary committees. 

The parliament’s legislative and agenda-setting duties remained mainly under the control of 
the ruling AKP-MHP alliance, which has a parliamentary majority. Opposition parties had a 
very limited ability to influence parliamentary debates. 

The  fourth  GRECO  evaluation  report  of  2022  highlighted  the  points  that  the  asset 
declarations  made  by  members  of  parliament  are  not  verified  for  their  accuracy,  and  that 
there are no effective sanctions for violations of rules in this area. Moreover, the content of 

13 

 
 
these  declarations  is  not  made  publicly  available  promptly  after  their  submission  to  the 
parliament. 

Parliamentary  oversight  of  the  executive  remained  very  weak.  The  parliament  lacks  the 
necessary  means  to  hold  the  government  accountable.  Members  of  parliament  can  submit 
written  questions  to  the Vice-President  and  ministers,  but  it  is  not  foreseen  by  the  law  that 
they  can  submit  formal  questions  to  the  President.  Ordinary  presidential  decrees  are  not 
subject  to  parliamentary  review.  However,  presidential  decrees  issued  under  the  state  of 
emergency  must  be  submitted  to  the  parliament  for  approval.  The  supervision  of  public 
expenditure by the parliament must be substantially strengthened. 

Political  pluralism  continued  to  be  undermined  by  the  judiciary’s  targeting  of  opposition 
parties and of individual members of parliament (particularly from the People's Democratic 
Party (the HDP)) for alleged terrorism offenses.  The system of parliamentary immunity did 
not provide sufficient legal protection for opposition parliamentarians to express their views 
within  the  limits  of  free  speech.  Approximately  5 000  HDP  members  and  officials  are 
currently imprisoned. One of the detained defendants in the Gezi trial was elected as a deputy 
from the Workers’ Party of Türkiye (the TIP) in the May 2023 elections but was not released 
from prison and was therefore not allowed to be sworn in as a member of parliament. By the 
end  of  the  27th  legislative  term  (2018-2023),  the  total  number  of  members  of  parliament 
subject to the legislative immunity resolution and a request for the lifting of their immunity 
was 206 (180 of them belonged to the parliamentary opposition). During the reporting period, 
no deputies had their immunity revoked or were detained on terrorism-related charges. Two 
former  HDP  co-chairs  and  several  former  HDP  legislators  are  still  in  prison  despite  a 
European Court of Human Rights ruling in their favour. 

The HDP’s closure case on terrorism charges, including the banning from political life of 451 
HDP  members,  remain  pending  before  the  Constitutional  Court.  In  April  2023,  the  HDP 
waived  its  right  to  oral  defence,  arguing  that  the  case  was  politically  motivated  and  that  it 
should be postponed until after the May 2023 elections. The General Assembly of the Court 
recorded  the  party’s  decision  and  sent  the  file  to  the  Rapporteur.  In  January  2023,  the 
Constitutional  Court  suspended  State  funding  for  the  HDP  but  reinstated  it  in  March 
following an appeal. In June 2023, the Constitutional Court ruled that the Treasury aid paid to 
the HDP could not be legally blocked. 

Despite  the  March  2022  lowering  of  the  electoral  threshold  from  10%  to  7%,  the  legal 
framework  for  elections  and  political  parties  remains  problematic.  Türkiye  has  yet  to 
implement  the  outstanding  recommendations  of  the  OSCE’s  Office  for  Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights and of the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission. The level 
of  participation  of  women  in  decision-making,  politics  and  employment  remained  low  by 
international  standards.  Following the May 2023 elections, the percentage of women in  the 
parliament increased from 17.1% during the previous term to 20.1% (from 104 to 121 out of 
600). This is the highest ever ratio of women’s representation in the parliament but women 
are still under-represented. 

Governance 

The  presidential  system  continues  to  be  characterised  by  a  lack  of  checks  and  balances,  as 
well  as  the  politicisation  of  the  public  administration.  Most  regulatory  authorities  remain 
directly linked to the Presidency. The recommendations by the Council of Europe’s Venice 
Commission on the presidential system still need to be addressed. The government’s pressure 
on mayors from opposition parties continued to weaken local democracy. 

14 

 
 
As  highlighted  by  the  Venice  Commission's  2017  opinion  and  the  European  Commission's 
previous country reports, the presidential system still lacks the necessary checks and balances 
to  prevent  an  undue  concentration  of  power  and  to  safeguard  the  independence  of  the 
judiciary.  The  highly  centralised  presidential  system  continues  to  impair  the  legislative 
branch of government, the judicial branch and the public administration. 

The use of traditional instruments of oversight of the executive by the parliament, such as 
a vote of confidence and the ability to ask the executive oral questions, has not been allowed 
since the entry into force of the presidential system in 2018. The absence of effective checks 
and balances and the parliament’s inability to effectively supervise the office of the President 
mean  that  the  latter’s  political  accountability  is  limited  to  election  time.  The  public 
administration, courts and security forces are under the heavy influence of the executive. The 
Presidency  exercises  direct  authority  over  all  key  institutions  and  regulatory  bodies.  The 
public sector remained politicised, especially at senior management level. 

The  legal  framework  allowed  regulatory  authorities  to  be  subject  to  excessive  political 
influence. The President has the authority to appoint the chiefs and board members of the vast 
majority  of  the  regulatory  agencies.  These  regulatory  bodies,  notably  in  the  media  sector, 
issued decisions that disproportionately target (including with heavy pecuniary fines) media 
that are critical of the government. 

The  Ombudsman’s  caseload  continued  to  increase  during  the  reporting  period  and  a  high 
number  of  cases  was  adjudicated.  However,  the  Ombudsman  did  not  address  politically 
sensitive issues concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms. 

As  regards  local  self-governance,  the  government  maintained  its  pressure  on  opposition 
mayors, including through administrative and judicial investigations. In December 2022, the 
metropolitan mayor of Istanbul was sentenced to a suspended prison sentence on charges of 
insulting members of the Supreme Electoral Council. The mayor is also under administrative 
investigation  by  the  Ministry  of  Interior  for  allegedly  ‘employing  terrorists’  in  the 
municipality.  In  June  2023,  a  new  case  was  opened  against  the  mayor  for  alleged 
involvement in rigging a public works tender in 2015. In May, during a rally in Erzurum, the 
mayor  was  among  those  physically  attacked,  with  the  violence  being  condoned  rather  than 
condemned by senior AKP officials. 

In the south-east, local democracy remained severely constrained. Since the 2019 municipal 
elections, 48 HDP mayors have been removed from office on terrorism-related accusations. 
Governors continued to serve as trustees in place of the deposed mayors. Hundreds of elected 
municipal  officials  have  been  detained  on  suspicion  for  ties  to  terrorism.  These  actions 
violate citizens’ right to be governed by their elected representatives. 

The  legal  framework  governing  the  tutelary  powers  of  the  Ministry  of  Interior  over  locally 
elected  officials  was  not  revised  in  accordance  with  Türkiye’s  commitments  under  the 
European Charter of Local Self-Government. 

The municipal law provides for the engagement of local administrations with the public and 
with  civil  society.  Citizens’  assemblies,  which  seek  to  bring  together  professional  and  civil 
society organisations and other local stakeholders, remained inactive in most provinces. 

Civil society 

Serious  backsliding  regarding  the  civil  society  environment  continued.  Civil  society  faced 
continuous  pressure  from  the  authorities.  Human  rights  organisations,  which  were  closed 
under the state of emergency, were not offered any legal remedy in relation to confiscations. 
Human  rights  defender  Osman  Kavala  and  his  co-defendants  in  the  Gezi  trial  remained  in 
15 

 
 
prison without parole, despite a ruling by the ECtHR. 

The implementation of the Law on preventing financing of proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction added further restrictions and pressure on civil society. 

Despite all these negative developments, civil society continued to be vocal and to participate 
actively in civic life, including by providing support to the people affected by the February 
2023  earthquakes.  Systematic  and  inclusive  mechanisms  for  the  effective  consultation  of 
independent  civil  society  organisations  on  new  legislation  and  policies  need  to  be  put  in 
place. 

A free, empowered and diverse civil society is a key component of any democratic system. 
Civil society organisations in Türkiye continued to make crucial contributions in areas, such 
as  education,  women’s  rights,  rights  for  LGBTIQ  persons,  rights  of  persons  belonging  to 
minorities, rights of persons with disabilities, freedom of religion and belief, the environment, 
anti-discrimination and support for refugees. 

In  the  immediate  aftermath  of  the  February  2023  earthquakes,  civil  society  faced  pressure 
from the authorities when delivering aid on the ground and was prevented from reporting on 
the situation in the affected regions. 

Human  rights  organisations  and  human  rights  defenders  faced  judicial  and  administrative 
pressure, partly due to Türkiye’s broad definition of terrorism. In some cases, however, the 
judiciary  issued  positive  decisions,  acquitting  and  releasing  a  number  of  human  rights 
defenders from prison. As regards the infringement procedure launched by the Committee of 
Ministers  of  the  Council  of  Europe  in  February  2022,  the  ECtHR  ruled  in  July  2022  that 
Türkiye had failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 46 (1) of the Convention. Türkiye’s 
refusal to implement the ECtHR’s ruling in the Kavala case contravenes its obligations as a 
long-standing member of the Council of Europe. The seven co-defendants of Osman Kavala 
in  the  Gezi  case,  who  were  each  sentenced  in  April  2022  to  18  years  of  imprisonment, 
remained  in  prison.  In  the  Büyükada  case,  the  Court  of  Cassation  annulled  the  terrorism-
related convictions of all the defendants in October 2022, ruling that they had been made with 
‘inadequate investigation’. The case was referred back to the local court, which acquitted the 
four human rights defenders in June 2023. 

Some media outlets close to the government continued to portray human rights defenders as 
terrorists and criminals, notably for accepting funds from international donors, including the 
EU.  The  defamatory  rhetoric  used  by  high-level  public  officials  to  comment  on  court 
proceedings of human rights defenders is a matter of serious concern and casts doubt on the 
integrity of judicial proceedings and on the right to a fair trial. 

Women’s organisations faced pressure in  the form  of defamation,  detentions, investigations 
and arrests. Women activists also faced detentions and police violence while exercising their 
right  to  freedom  of  assembly.  The  closure  case  against  the  Tarlabaşı  Community  Centre  in 
Istanbul continued. The court cases against the executives of the Rosa Women’s Association 
based in Diyarbakır continued. Concerning the closure case against ‘We Will Stop Femicides 
Platform’  on  the  grounds  of  ‘conducting  activities  contrary  to  law  and  morality’,  in 
September 2023, the first instance court decided to reject it. 

Stigmatisation,  hate  speech  and  discriminatory  discourse  targeting  LGBTIQ  civil  society 
organisations  and  persons 
strong.  Anti-LGBTIQ  discourse  was 
instrumentalised  by  the  governing  coalition  during  the  electoral  campaign.  Anti-LGBTIQ 
rallies  took  place  in  a  number  of  cities  during  the  autumn  of  2022,  whereas  pride  marches 
were banned and heavily repressed by the police. 

remained  very 

16 

 
 
The  legal  framework  regulating  the  work  of  civil  society  organisations  lacks  clarity  and 
carries  the  risk  of  arbitrariness  during  implementation.  It  remained  compulsory  for  all 
associations to register their members in the Ministry of Interior’s information system. This 
legal  obligation  is  not  in  line  with  the  OSCE/Council  of  Europe  guidelines  on  freedom  of 
association. 

The Law on preventing financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continued 
to  be  used  by  the  authorities  to  disproportionally  target  independent  rights-based 
organisations,  despite  the  Venice  Commission’s  and  the  UN  Special  Rapporteurs’ 
recommendations  that  the  government  should  reconsider  certain  aspects  of  the  legislation. 
The Law should  not  be used to  hinder civil  society’s freedom  of association and assembly, 
including their fundraising activities. 

The Law on collection of aid continued to impose burdensome requirements for permits that 
discourage fundraising activities by civil society organisations and de facto limit civil society 
activities.  The  distribution  of  public  funds  to  civil  society  organisations  remained 
untransparent. Heavy taxation hampered the functioning and development of foundations and 
associations.  The  status  of  ‘public  benefit’  for  associations  and  ‘tax  exemption’  for 
foundations are vaguely defined and are arbitrarily granted by the President. Foreign donors 
providing financial support to civil society in Türkiye were often slandered and beneficiary 
NGOs ran the risk of having  their activities criminalised because they had received foreign 
funds. 

In  August  2022,  the  Ministry  of  Interior’s  Directorate  General  for  Relations  with  Civil 
Society published the draft civil society strategy document and action plan (2023-2027) for 
consultation.  Despite  public  consultations,  strategy  development  lacked  transparency  and 
clarity. 

Open and transparent participatory and consultation mechanisms are needed for cooperation 
between  the  authorities  and  civil  society,  for  policymaking  and  for  amending  the  legal 
framework.  Overall,  the  legal,  financial  and  administrative  environment  needs  to  be  more 
conducive to developing civil society in Türkiye. 

Civilian oversight of the security forces 

In the reporting period, the executive branch continued to hold extensive authority over the 
security  forces.  The  civilian  component  of  the  Supreme  Military  Council  (YAŞ),  which  is 
responsible  for  setting  the  military  agenda  and  making  such  decisions  as  appointments, 
promotions and dismissals of high-ranking military personnel, did not change. The scope of 
the military judicial system  was curbed. Civilian higher  courts  continued to  review  appeals 
against  the  decisions  of  military  courts.  However,  civilian  oversight  of  the  security  forces 
remained incomplete due to  the lack of  effective accountability  mechanisms.  Parliamentary 
oversight  of  the  security  institutions  needs  to  be  strengthened.  The  legal  framework  for 
overseeing military expenditure was not improved. 

The  culture  of  impunity  continued  to  prevail  within  the  security  sector,  where  security 
personnel  benefited  from  de  facto  judicial  and  administrative  protection  in  cases  involving 
alleged human rights violations and the disproportionate use of force. Military personnel and 
high-ranking  command  officials  still  have  special  legal  privileges  when  prosecuted. 
Moreover,  the  investigation  of  alleged  offences  committed  by  security  personnel  requires 
prior authorisation by either military or civilian superiors. 

Situation in the east and south-east 

17 

 
 
The situation in the south-east remained worrying and was exacerbated by the earthquakes in 
February 2023, which also affected part of the region. The Turkish government continued its 
domestic and cross-border security and military operations in Iraq and Syria, including after 
the  earthquakes.  The  security  situation  remained  precarious  in  border  areas  with  terrorist 
attacks led by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which remains on the EU list of persons, 
groups and entities involved in acts of terrorism. The government retains a legitimate right to 
fight terrorism, however, related activities should be in line with the rule of law, fundamental 
rights  and  freedoms.  There  was  no  progress  towards  the  resumption  of  a  credible  political 
peace  process  to  achieve  a  sustainable  solution  to  the  Kurdish  issue.  The  Kurdistan 
Communities  Union  (KCK)  declared  a  unilateral  truce  in  Türkiye  after  the  earthquakes  in 
February and extended it  until the Turkish  presidential  and parliamentary elections in  May. 
The truce was terminated in June 2023. 

In the aftermath of the November 2022 attack in Istanbul, which left 6 dead and 81 wounded, 
Turkish  officials  rapidly  arrested  a  Syrian  national,  as  the  alleged  main  perpetrator  of  the 
attack,  and  attributed  the  attack  to  the  PKK-linked  People’s  Protection  Units  (YPG),  even 
though  the PKK denied  its involvement. Türkiye launched a series of airstrikes in  northern 
Syria and Iraq against the PKK and affiliated groups. 

In  March  2023,  the  Council  of  Europe’s  Committee  for  the  Prevention  of  Torture  and 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) published a report on its visit to the 
high-security prison on the island of Imralı, where the PKK’s leader Öcalan and three other 
inmates are being held. The report stated that detention conditions had significantly improved 
for  Mr  Öcalan  and  remained  satisfactory  for  the  three  other  inmates.  However,  the  CPT 
expressed serious concern that the prisoners’ contact with the outside world had been further 
limited.  During  the  reporting  period,  Mr  Öcalan  was  not  allowed  to  receive  visits  from  his 
family or his lawyers. 

In Diyarbakir’s Sur municipality, after the state took possession of land from its owners for 
public  use,  several  court  cases  were  launched  by  owners  challenging  the  assessed  value  of 
their expropriated property. The principle of participation by the local residents was ignored 
in  the  planning  of  the  area’s  reconstruction.  Serious  violations  of  human  rights  by  security 
forces  (including  alleged  instances  of  torture,  ill-treatment,  arbitrary  arrests  and  procedural 
rights  violations)  continued  to  be  reported.  There  have  also  been  reports  of  severe  acts  of 
violence  and  other  abuses  committed  by  the  security  forces  in  the  aftermath  of  the 
earthquakes and during the state of emergency. 

Eastern  and  south-eastern  provincial  governors  often  imposed  blanket  bans  on  meetings, 
demonstrations and events in their provinces. The longest of these has been in force in Van 
since  2016.  The  broad  interpretation  of  terrorism,  judicial  and  administrative  pressure 
imposed  on  journalists,  political  opponents,  bar  associations  and  human  rights  defenders 
working on the Kurdish issue raised repeated concerns. Many associations, Kurdish-language 
media outlets and cultural rights institutions remained closed. 

The 15 Kurdish journalists and one media worker, who were detained in Diyarbakır in June 
2022, were released in July 2023 under judicial control condition and the next trial session is 
due  in  November.  Over  100  people  (including  several  journalists,  lawyers,  members  of 
political  parties,  artists  and  members  of  civil  society)  were  detained  in  April  2023  in  a 
coordinated operation across 21 Turkish provinces on the grounds of alleged ‘membership in 
a  terrorist  organisation’.  Some  lawyers  and  journalists  were  released,  but  a  court  case  was 
launched against 11 Kurdish journalists. The 2021 Constitutional Court judgment annulling a 
provision  of  the  emergency  decree  regarding  the  closure  in  2016  of  media  outlets  on  the 
grounds  of  ‘posing  a  threat  to  national  security’  and  annulling  a  provision  that  allowed  the 
18 

 
 
seizure  of  properties  of  closed  media  outlets  was  not  implemented.  In  January  2023,  the 
Diyarbakir  Regional  Court  of  Appeals  upheld  the  prison  sentence  against  journalist 
Abdurrahman  Gök  for  photographing  the  killing  by  the  police  of  university  student  Kemal 
Kurkut  during  the  2017  Newroz  celebrations  in  Diyarbakır.  The  local  court  had  sentenced 
Gök  in  June  2022  to  more  than  one  year  in  prison  on  the  grounds  of  propagandising  for  a 
terrorist organisation while acquitting him of ‘being a member of an illegal organisation’. 

Hate crimes and hate speech against Kurds continued. The court case in relation to the hate 
killing of HDP staff member Deniz Poyraz in Izmir was concluded in December 2022 and the 
court sentenced the perpetrator to aggravated life imprisonment (i.e. the most severe penalty 
under  Turkish  law)  on  the  charge  of  ‘intentional  killing’  as  well  as  other  minor  offences. 
Several  attacks  against  HDP  buildings  and  election  offices  have  been  reported,  including 
during the electoral campaign period. 

In January 2023, an investigation was launched against the presidents of 12 bar associations 
over their joint statement against Turkish military operations in northern Syria and Iraq and 
calling for peace, on the grounds of ‘insulting the Turkish Nation, the State of the Republic of 
Türkiye and its institutions’. 

The March 2023 Kurdish Newroz celebrations took place amid a heavy police presence. The 
Diyarbakir  Bar  association  reported  that  law  enforcement  forces  used  excessive  and 
disproportionate force during the celebrations. The police detained 350 people, most of whom 
were shortly released. 

The  Kobane  trial  of  108  members  and  executives  of  the  HDP  continued.  During  the  April 
2023 session the prosecutor of the case issued his final opinion and demanded aggravated life 
sentences for 36 HDP executives (including the party’s former co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş) 
and the re-arrest of 12 released defendants. The trial was adjourned to July 2023 and is still 
ongoing.  There  were  numerous  new  detentions  and  arrests  of  HDP  members  and  mayors, 
municipal council members and municipal executives on terrorism-related charges in the east 
and  south-east  of  Türkiye.  Requests  by  the  prosecution  to  the  parliament  to  remove  the 
immunity  of  almost  all  HDP  lawmakers  are  pending.  The  closure  case  against  the  HDP 
continued in the Constitutional Court (see above under ‘the parliament’). 

Former  HDP  co-chair  Selahattin  Demirtaş  remained  in  prison  despite  two  final  ECtHR 
judgments  ruling  in  favour  of  his  immediate  release.  In  March  2023,  the  Committee  of 
Ministers  of  the  Council  of  Europe  urged  Türkiye  to  release  Mr  Demirtaş,  in  line  with  the 
ECtHR  judgments.  The  Constitutional  Court’s  ruling  of  June  2020  on  the  violation  of 
Mr Demirtaş’  right  to  liberty  and  security  was  not  implemented.  Former  HDP  MP  and  co-
chair  Aysel  Tuğluk,  who  was  reportedly  seriously  ill,  was  released  from  prison  in  October 
2022. 

In  October  2022,  the  ECtHR,  in  its  ruling  on  the  case  of  13  imprisoned  former  HDP  MPs, 
found  that  several  articles  of  the  ECHR  had  been  violated  and  stated  that  the  arrests  were 
politically motivated. In July 2022, the Constitutional Court ruled that the Turkish State had 
violated  the  rights  of  former  HDP  co-chair  Figen  Yüksekdağ  to  freedom  of  thought  and 
expression by stripping her of her parliamentary immunity in 2016, and ordered the State to 
pay Yüksekdağ TRY 30 000 for non-pecuniary losses. 

In June 2023, out  of the 65 municipalities won  by the HDP in  the 2019 local  elections, 48 
remained ruled by State-appointed trustees and another 6 by AK party mayors. Since the first 
trustee appointment in June 2019, 83 co-mayors have been detained, 39 mayors arrested and 
6  HDP  co-mayors  remain  in  prison.  The  March  2022  Recommendations  on  Türkiye  of  the 

19 

 
 
Congress  of  Local  and  Regional  Authorities  of  the  Council  of  Europe  need  to  be 
implemented. 

Court  cases  continued  regarding  government-funded  construction  projects  on  cultural, 
historical and religious heritage sites, which were damaged in the 2015 and 2016 operations. 
There  were  renewed  tensions  around  several  new  mining  projects,  including  in  the  Tunceli 
Mountains, which is part of a national park and a sacred site for Alevis. 

There  was  no  comprehensive  and  consistent  approach  in  place  for  missing  persons,  the 
exhumation  of  mass  graves  or  the  independent  investigation  of  all  alleged  cases  of 
extrajudicial killing by security and law enforcement officers. Most of the investigations of 
cases  of  enforced  disappearance  from  the  1990s  have  passed  the  20-year  statute  of 
limitations. Out of more than 1 400 cases of missing persons since then, only 16 court cases 
have  been  launched  and  14  of  these  ended  in  the  acquittal  of  the  alleged  perpetrators. 
Concerns remained about the continued justification of extraterritorial abductions and forced 
returns under the pretext of combating terrorism and protecting national security. The village 
guard  system,  a  paramilitary  force  supporting  the  Turkish  security  forces,  was  maintained. 
Some village guards were linked to widespread human rights violations and excessive use of 
force, particularly against the Kurdish population. The village guard system is hindering the 
return of displaced villagers and continues to impede progress towards a political resolution 
of the Kurdish issue. 

Refugees and internally displaced persons 

Türkiye continues to host one of the largest refugee populations in the world. In August 2023, 
according  to  official  data,  Türkiye  was  hosting  3 298  817  Syrian  refugees  with  temporary 
protection status, and some 91 711 Syrians with residence status. Around 1.7 million of these 
were being hosted in the 11 provinces affected by the earthquakes.  

According  to  official  sources,  223 881  Syrians  had  been  granted  Turkish  citizenship  in 
December  2022.  561 758  Syrian  refugees  had  voluntarily  returned  to  Syria  from  Türkiye 
according  to  government  data.  In  May  2023,  according  to  the  Presidency  for  Migration 
Management,  in  addition  to  the  Syrian  refugees,  Türkiye  hosted  300 720  asylum-seekers 
from  other  countries.  In  December  2022,  1 345 488  foreign  nationals  holding  residence 
permits were present in Türkiye, including humanitarian residence permit holders. The return 
of irregular migrants from the Greek islands, which Türkiye unilaterally suspended on public 
health grounds in March 2020, has not resumed. The EU has repeatedly called on Türkiye to 
resume  return  operations  in  line  with  the  commitments  made  under  the  EU-Turkey 
Statement. Resettlement of Syrian refugees from Türkiye to EU Member States continued in 
the  reporting  period  totalling  39 648  by  September  2023.  Recurrent  allegations  of  human 
rights violations in the field of migration, particularly in removal centres, remain a concern. 
Over  the  last  year,  media  and  civil  society  continued  to  report  on  policies  and  practices  in 
breach of human rights  standards and Turkish legislation. Türkiye needs to further align its 
practice in removal centres with European standards, in particular with regard to protection of 
human  rights  (including  access  to  legal  counselling  and  interpreters)  and  protection  of 
vulnerable groups (in particular, children staying with their families) (see Chapter 24). 

Public  discontent  with  the  presence  of  Syrian  refugees  increased,  and  became  an  important 
electoral  topic  and  a  matter  of  constant  debate.  A  large  majority  of  refugees  and  asylum 
seekers do not have effective access to the labour market, in particular to formal employment, 
due to low employability (lower levels of education and skills), language barriers and limited 
access to information and services.  

20 

 
 
Türkiye  made  sustained  significant  efforts  to  support  refugees  and  ensure  wider  access  to 
healthcare  and  schooling,  although  restrictions  to  registration  hampered  access  to  these 
services.  By  February  2023,  over  846 000  refugee  children  had  been  enrolled  in  formal 
education in Türkiye, which was about 104 000 more than the previous academic year. Over 
720 000  of  these  were  of  Syrian  origin.  However,  more  than  400 000  school-aged  refugee 
children  were  still  out  of  school  and  did  not  have  any  access  to  education  opportunities. 
Refugees  (mainly  Syrians  under  temporary  protection)  continued  to  benefit  from  free-of-
charge healthcare services provided in 190 migrant health centres funded by the EU through 
its  Facility  for  Refugees  in  Turkey  and  in  Turkish  hospitals.  The  EU  supported  the 
employment  of  almost  4 000  healthcare  workers  to  ensure  that  refugees  and  people  under 
subsidiary protection have access to healthcare services. Over 7 million primary health care 
consultations  were  conducted  in  EU-supported  primary  level  healthcare  facilities  in  2022. 
The  capacity  of  mental  health  and  psychosocial  support  services,  reproductive  health 
services,  mobile  health  services  and  health  literacy  for  the  refugees  have  also  improved. 
Furthermore,  the  health  infrastructure  was  also  improved  by  the  completion  of  the 
construction of two new state hospitals in Dörtyol Hatay and Kilis, which were fully financed 
by the EU and inaugurated during the reporting period. 

There  was  no  progress  on  the  situation  of  internally  displaced  persons  resulting  from  the 
violence in the south-east in the 1990s and in more recent years. 

After  the  February  2023  earthquakes,  which  affected  an  estimated  15  million  people  in  11 
provinces,  there  were  massive  population  relocations,  both  within  the  provinces  and  away 
from them. An estimated 2.9 million people have moved away from the affected provinces. 

Public administration reform 

Türkiye  is  in  between  some  and  moderate  level  of  preparation  in  the  field  of  public 
administration reform. It made no progress over the reporting period. The country still lacks 
the political  will to  reform  the public administration and public financial  management. The 
restructuring  of the executive branch  and overhaul  of the public administration in  line with 
the presidential system introduced in 2017 resulted in very high levels of centralisation of the 
policymaking system. The level of accountability of the administration remains insufficient. 
Its  human  resources  management  system  remains  outdated  and  needs  to  be  reformed.  The 
politicisation  of  all  branches  of  the  administration  has  continued.  The  share  of  women  in 
managerial  posts  in  the  civil  service  is  still  low.  The  public  administration  does  not  use 
evidence-based methods or participatory mechanisms in policymaking.  

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid. 
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  prepare and adopt an interinstitutional public administration reform document in line with 

EU principles and values, and with the necessary political ownership and support; 

→  introduce  merit-based  recruitments,  appointments  and  promotions,  notably  to  the  senior 

positions; 

→  review  the  policymaking  process  to  achieve  inclusive  and  evidence-based  methods  of 

preparing policy planning documents and legislative proposals. 

Strategic framework for public administration reform 

Türkiye still lacks both a comprehensive strategy for public administration reform and the 
political will to reform. In 2022, the administration produced numerous policy planning and 
sectoral  policy documents  on multiple aspects  of public administration.  In the absence of  a 
comprehensive  strategy,  these  documents  lack  a  sound  budget  forecast  and  a  coherent 
21 

 
 
approach.  An  administrative  unit  with  the  legal  mandate  to  design,  coordinate  and  monitor 
public administration reform and public policy documents has yet to be established. The unit 
would  need  to  coordinate  with  the  Ministry  of  Finance  and  Treasury  to  ensure  strategic 
planning  is  consistent  with  fiscal  planning  and  to  efficiently  tackle  the  issue  of  managerial 
accountability.  

Policy development and coordination  

Türkiye continued the strong trend to centralise policymaking under the presidential system, 
further  preventing  an  inclusive,  participatory  and  evidence-based  policymaking  process. 
Policy  coordination,  policy  planning  and  inter-agency  cooperation  among  government 
institutions needs to be improved. In the absence of well-functioning administrative controls 
and  parliamentary  scrutiny,  policy  planning,  monitoring  and  reporting  of  government 
performance  remains  inadequate.  The  administration  does  not  carry  out  regulatory  impact 
assessments or public consultations systematically.  

Public financial management  

Türkiye  still  lacks  an  overarching  public  financial  management  reform  programme. 
Parliamentary engagement and oversight over the budget remain weak. Numerous exceptions 
introduced  in  the  public  procurement  Law  limit  the  transparency  of  tenders  and  public 
expenditure.  (see also Chapter 5 – Public procurement). Türkiye does not have in place an 
independent oversight body to ensuring fiscal discipline. Given the lack of adequate ex post 
monitoring and reporting, major public investment programmes lack transparency.  

On external audit, the Turkish Court of Accounts (TCA) continued to carry out a range of ex 
post  controls.  The  TCA’s  audit  reports  continued  to  provide  substantive  information  for 
parliamentary  oversight  and  public  scrutiny.  However,  shortcomings  remain  in  the  legal 
framework  of  the  Law  on  the  Court  of  Accounts  and  in  the  associated  process  of 
parliamentary scrutiny. There needs to be greater parliamentary and judicial follow-up to the 
TCA’s audit reports.  

There  is  limited  parliamentary  oversight  of  the  budget,  which  resulted  in  a  low  degree  of 
budget  transparency.  The  Turkish  State  Wealth  Fund  (TWF)  lacks  accountability  and 
transparency. The 2022 audit report was not published on the TWF website, which contains 
limited information overall (see Chapter 32 - Financial control). 

Following  the  February  earthquakes,  the  parliament  adopted  a  law  creating  a  Disaster 
Reconstruction Fund, governing the allocation of resources to restore infrastructure in areas 
affected  by  various  natural  disasters  such  as  earthquakes,  floods,  fires  and  landslides  in 
regions classified as 'disaster zones'. However, the law lacked details on the decision-making 
process,  and  on  the  transparency  rules  for  managing  the  Fund,  apart  from  an  obligation  to 
report financial data to the public on a quarterly basis. 

Public service and human resources management  

The  1965  legal  framework  governing  human  resources  management  in  the  civil  service  is 
outdated. The civil service legal framework fails to ensure the political neutrality of the civil 
service.  There  is  growing  concern  about  the  lack  of  merit-based  recruitment  and 
appointments  in  the  civil  service.  The  appointment  procedure  for  senior  civil  service  posts 
lacks  competitive  objective  criteria,  leaving  appointments  open  to  nepotism  and  political 
interference.  There  is  a  set  of  uniform  criteria  for  demotion,  dismissals  and  disciplinary 
measures, but there is a general lack of transparency in implementing the criteria. The civil 
service remuneration system is not standardised across the institutions. The ethics committees 
were ineffective against allegations of corruption and wrongdoings.  

22 

 
 
Accountability of the administration  

Under the presidential system, accountability is centralised and held by the President. Given 
that  internal  control  and  audit  do  not  function  effectively,  the  level  of  accountability  of 
agencies is weak and insufficient to protect citizens’ right to good administration. 

Citizens’  right  to  access  public  information  is  regulated  by  the  Law  on  the  right  to 
information, which does not require proactive disclosure and provides broad exemptions. A 
simplified  online  access  system  received  millions  of  requests  to  access  information.  The 
Board of Review of Access to Information is responsible for assessing appeals filed against a 
refusal  to  provide  access  to  public  information.  The  backlog  of  cases  continues  to  hamper 
citizens’ rights to administrative justice and their right to seek compensation. 

Strong concerns remain on the quality of the work of the Inquiry Commission on the State of 
Emergency  Measures,  even  though  it  has  completed  the  examination  of  all  cases.  Strong 
concerns  remain  as  to  whether  cases  were  examined  individually,  whether  the  rights  of 
defence  were  upheld  and  whether  the  assessment  procedure  was  in  line  with  international 
standards.  

Service delivery to citizens and businesses  

A  thorough  process  is  needed  to  simplify  administrative  procedures.  However,  in  the 
continuous absence of a law on general administrative procedures, which is necessary to give 
citizens and businesses greater legal certainty, simplifying administrative procedures remains 
problematic. 

The  government  continued  to  develop  user-focused  administration  at  central  and  local 
government level and expanded access to e-government services. Several public services are 
accessible through e-government tools. A monitoring system needs to be set up to reduce the 
barriers to access services for persons with disabilities. 

2.2. RULE OF LAW AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 

2.2.1.  Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights 

The EU’s founding values include the rule of law and respect for human rights. An effective 
(independent,  high-quality  and  efficient)  judicial  system  and  an  effective  fight  against 
corruption are of paramount importance, as is respect for fundamental rights in law and in 
practice.  

Türkiye remains at an early stage of applying the EU acquis and European standards in the 
area  of  rule  of  law  and  fundamental  rights.  There  was  backsliding  during  the  reporting 
period. 

Major issues identified in previous reports, such as the systemic lack of independence of the 
judiciary and the urgent need to improve the human rights situation, remain unaddressed. The 
2019  judicial  reform  strategy  (JRS)  and  the  2021  human  rights  action  plan  (HRAP)  tackle 
some of the areas where reforms are needed but did not include concrete steps to remedy the 
most acute problems.  

Functioning of the judiciary 

Türkiye remains at an early stage in this area. Serious backsliding continued and despite the 
several  judicial  reform  packages  in  recent  years,  the  structural  deficiencies  in  the  judicial 
system  remained  unaddressed.  The  continued  refusal  to  implement  certain  rulings  of  the 

23 

 
 
 
ECtHR remains a matter of serious concern. Undue pressure by the authorities on judges and 
prosecutors  continued  to  have  a  negative  effect  on  the  independence  and  quality  of  the 
judiciary. Implementation of the 2019 JRS and the 2021 HRAP continued, but the activities 
foreseen  in  these  documents  fell  short  of  addressing  the  structural  problems  and  the  issues 
identified in the previous reports of the European Commission. The lack of objective, merit-
based,  uniform  and  pre-established  criteria  for  recruiting  and  promoting  judges  and 
prosecutors  remains  a  source  of  concern.  Several  politically  motivated  cases  against 
opposition politicians were initiated during the reporting period.  

The  Commission’s  recommendations  from  last  year  were  not  addressed.  Türkiye  needs  to 
adopt  and  implement  measures  to  significantly  improve  the  overall  functioning  of  the 
country’s judicial system. 

In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  create a political  and legal  environment  in  line with European standards that  allows the 
judiciary  to  carry  out  its  duties  independently  and  impartially;  strengthen  judicial 
responsibilities,  with  the  executive  and  legislature  fully  respecting  the  separation  of 
powers;  and  ensure  that  lower  courts  respect  judgments  by  the  Constitutional  Court, 
whose decisions should abide by ECtHR jurisprudence; 

→  amend the structure and process of selecting the members of the Council of Judges and 
Prosecutors (HSK) so that the role and influence of the executive is limited; and introduce 
safeguards  against  any  interference  by  the  HSK  or  high-level  officials  in  judicial 
proceedings; 

→  provide effective guarantees against transfers of judges without their consent; 

→  in  accordance  with  the  guarantee  of  judicial  independence  under  the  Constitution,  limit 
any suspension of judges from office to cases where there are well-founded suspicions of 
serious misbehaviour; and take measures to remedy the damage caused by dismissals that 
have taken place in breach of procedural rights; 

→  revise the system of disciplinary proceedings so that it is based on objective criteria and 

without any undue influence from the executive; 

→  in  relation  to  the  administrative  and  judicial  measures  taken  against  individuals,  ensure 
that  any  allegation  of  wrongdoing  or  crime  is  subject  to  due  process  and  based  on 
concrete  evidence,  and  follows  fully  transparent  procedures  under  the  authority  of  an 
independent judiciary; 

→  ensure  that  all  judicial  proceedings  respect  fundamental  rights  (including  procedural 
rights),  in  particular  the  presumption  of  innocence,  individual  criminal  responsibility, 
legal certainty, the right to defence, the right to a fair trial, equality of arms and the right 
to an effective appeal. 

Strategic documents 

Implementation  of  the  2021  HRAP  and  the  2019-2023  JRS  continued.  A  new  (seventh) 
judicial reform package was adopted in April 2023. The government’s implementation report 
for the JRS stated that, as of May 2023, 70% of the activities had been completed. However, 
the  actions  included  in  the  HRAP  do  not  address  Türkiye’s  fundamental  human  rights 
shortcomings.  The  7th  judicial  reform  package  failed  to  address  many  structural  issues  of 
concern related to the judicial system indicated in the previous annual reports of the European 
Commission. However, it did provide some positive steps regarding the increased sentences 

24 

 
 
for  smuggling  and  the  possibility  of  postponing  the  execution  of  a  sentence  for  convicted 
women due to a child’s sickness. 

Management bodies 

Concerns  remain  around  the  structure  of  the  Council  of  Judges  and  Prosecutors  (HSK),  its 
lack  of  independence  from  the  executive  and  the  appointment  process  for  its  members.  In 
accordance  with  the  Constitution,  the  President  appoints  4  out  of  13  members  and  the 
parliament elects 7 by qualified majority. The remaining 2 seats are allocated ex officio to the 
Minister of Justice and the Deputy Minister. None of the members are elected by their peers. 
Due  to  its  lack  of  independence,  the  HSK  has  been  suspended  from  participating  in  the 
European Network of Councils for the Judiciary since December 2016. 

The budget allocated to the HSK increased to TRY 312 551 000 in 2023 (TRY 193 657 975 
in 2022). 

Independence and impartiality 

Although the principle of separation of powers and judicial independence is enshrined in the 
Constitution  and  other  legislative  provisions,  there  are  strong  concerns  regarding  political 
influence on the judiciary. The HRAP included some actions to improve the independence of 
the judiciary, but these actions have not been implemented. 

High-level officials and representatives of the executive (including the President) continued 
to  comment  publicly  on  ongoing  judicial  cases,  thus  undermining  judicial  independence. 
They also publicly criticised the ECtHR and Constitutional Court case law.  Lower courts at 
times  ignored  or  significantly  delayed  implementation  of  decisions  reached  by  the 
Constitutional Court. The non-implementation of the administrative courts’ decisions by the 
administration also remains an issue of concern. 

Individual applications to the Constitutional Court had limited effect, especially with regard 
to politically motivated trials. 

Accountability 

The  obligation  for  judges  and  prosecutors  to  declare  their  assets  every  5  years  is  still 
applicable.  No  information  is  available  on  the  sanctions  imposed  if  this  procedure  was  not 
followed.  A  credible  and  functioning  verification  system  needs  to  be  developed,  including 
appropriate follow-up for late or incorrect declarations of assets. 

Professionalism and competence 

The  selection  and  recruitment  of  judges  and  prosecutors  is  conducted  in  a  non-transparent 
manner.  The  Ministry  of  Justice  supervised  the  selection  boards  for  new  judges  and 
prosecutors,  while  the  HSK  had  no  role  in  the  selection  boards.  The  annual  appraisal  of 
judges and prosecutors was done by the HSK. There was limited progress in setting objective, 
merit-based, standardised and pre-established criteria for recruiting and promoting judges and 
prosecutors. 

Quality of justice 

As of September 2023, Türkiye had 16 225 full-time judges (19.13 per 100 000 inhabitants) 
and  7 601  full-time  prosecutors  (8.96  per  100 000  inhabitants).  Out  of  23  826  judges  and 
prosecutors,  8  871  are  women.  The  final  budget  for  the  entire  justice  system  increased  to 
TRY 51.2 billion in  2022 (while  TRY 34.37 billion  was initially approved) compared with 
almost TRY 24 billion in 2021. 

25 

 
 
Pre-service training for candidate judges and prosecutors and in-service training continued to 
be  delivered  by  the  Justice  Academy.  The  Academy  has  scientific,  administrative  and 
financial autonomy by law, but there are still concerns related to its independence because its 
management is left to its president, who is appointed by the President of the Republic. The 
Academy’s  lack  of  independence  affects  its  capacity  to  provide  training  programmes  that 
meet  the  requirements  of  openness,  competence  and  impartiality.  The  European  Judicial 
Training  Network  (EJTN)  therefore  maintained  the  suspension  of  the  Academy’s  observer 
status that was originally decided in 2017. 

The quality of judicial decisions and indictments remains insufficient due to the lack of legal 
reasoning  and  sufficient  factual  evidence  to  lead  to  convictions  that  often  relate  to  alleged 
offences  supporting  terrorism.  The  defence  lawyers’  access  to  case  files  for  a  specific 
catalogue of crimes is sometimes restricted until the indictment is issued. In some politically 
sensitive cases, the indictments took months to be finalised. 

Pre-trial detention continues to be frequently imposed, despite the fact that this is a measure 
of  last  resort  by  European  standards.  Defendants  were  increasingly  held  in  prisons  or 
detention centres far from the location of the alleged crime, appearing at their hearing via an 
audiovisual  system  rather  than  in  person.  Frequent  transfers  of  judges  and  prosecutors 
continued to impair the quality of justice, as did the appointment of newly recruited and less 
experienced judges and prosecutors to criminal courts. 

Trial-monitoring organisations and lawyers reported that in politically sensitive cases judges 
frequently barred journalists and observers and sometimes even the defendants’ lawyers from 
the  courtroom.  In  terrorism-related  cases,  the  practice  of  providing  evidence  extracted 
coercively  from  secret  witnesses  who  cannot  be  cross-examined  or  from  a  single  witness 
without supporting evidence remained a major concern. Frequent use of the confidentiality of 
decisions in political cases should be revised because it is often used to limit lawyers’ access 
to their clients’ files, thus violating the right of defence. 

In October 2022, the Council of State ruled in favour of the reinstatement of 178 judges and 
prosecutors dismissed under the 2016 state of emergency decrees on the basis of alleged ties 
to  the  Gülen  movement,  arguing  that  the  acts  attributed  to  them  were  insufficient  to  prove 
their links to the movement. The Council of State also ordered the State to pay compensation 
and damages to the judges and prosecutors.  As of March 2023, 3 683 of the dismissals had 
been  finalised  and  3  cases  were  ongoing.  845  dismissed/suspended  judges  and  prosecutors 
had  been  reinstated.  As  of  March  2023,  343  judges  and  prosecutors  who  had  filed  a 
complaint with  the Council of State on the issue of their removal had been reinstated. This 
decision followed an ECtHR ruling that the government had violated the ECHR by detaining 
167 judges and prosecutors after the attempted coup in 2016. 

Efficiency 

The backlog of cases remained a problem. Large parts of the judiciary continued to be under 
severe pressure to handle cases quickly. Delays in criminal cases, which are often postponed 
for months, and delays in cases where the defendants were arrested pending trial violate the 
defendants’ rights. 

Regarding the backlog of cases in the high courts, at the end of 2022, 293 207 criminal and 
64 126  administrative  cases  for  the  Court  of  Cassation  were  postponed  to  2023,  compared 
with  296 907 and 76 455 respectively  in  2021. 120 773 cases  for the Council of State were 
transferred  from  2022  compared  with  128 961  in  2021.  As  regards  the  regional  courts  of 
appeals,  in  2022,  a  total  of  809 989  cases  were  transferred  from  2021;  the  courts  received 
1 258 366 new cases and settled 1 146 065 cases. Individual applications to the Constitutional 
26 

 
 
Court  continued  to  increase.  In  2022,  109 779  applications  were  lodged  and  73 036  were 
concluded. 

Fight against corruption 

Türkiye  is  at  an  early  stage  in  the  fight  against  corruption.  There  was  no  progress  in  the 
reporting period. Türkiye has not addressed outstanding deficiencies in key areas of the fight 
against corruption in recent years. It has not taken preventive action and has not set up anti-
corruption  bodies  in  line  with  the  United  Nations  Convention  against  Corruption,  to  which 
Türkiye is party. The legal framework and institutional architecture need to be improved to 
limit undue political influence on the prosecution and adjudication of corruption cases. The 
accountability and transparency of public institutions need to be improved. The absence of an 
anti-corruption  strategy  and  action  plan  indicated  a  lack  of  political  will  to  fight  decisively 
against  corruption.  The  Council  of  Europe’s  Group  of  States  against  Corruption  (GRECO) 
recommendations remained unimplemented. Overall, corruption remains a major issue. In the 
coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  implement  its  international  obligations  in  relation  to  the  fight  against  corruption,  in 
particular the United Nations Convention against Corruption and the relevant Council of 
Europe Conventions; 

→  ensure effective follow-up of the recommendations issued by GRECO, including through 

adopting the necessary legislation; 

→  elaborate  an  anti-corruption  strategy  that  reflects  a  clear  political  will  and  vision  to 

effectively address corruption, underpinned by a credible and realistic action plan. 

Track record 

The track record of investigations, prosecutions and convictions in corruption cases remained 
poor,  particularly  in  relation  to  high-level  corruption  cases  involving  politicians  and  public 
officials. Sentences are lenient and do not have a deterrent effect. Cooperation between audit 
and  inspection  units  with  prosecution  offices  needs  to  be  improved.  Political  party  and 
election campaign financing, local administrations, land administration and management, and 
the  construction  and  transportation  industries  (especially  when  implementing  projects  via 
public-private partnerships) remained particularly prone to corruption. The increasing use and 
wide  scope  of  exemptions  in  procurement  procedures  undermined  the  integrity  of  public 
procurement.  Outstanding  GRECO  recommendations  on  political  party  financing  have  not 
been addressed. 

Institutional framework 

Prevention measures 

Türkiye continued to  lack a permanent,  functionally independent  anti-corruption prevention 
body. The level of coordination between various preventive bodies remains inadequate. The 
State  Supervisory  Council,  which  is  responsible  for  coordinating  preventive  anti-corruption 
measures,  is  not  independent.  Financial  control  of  political  parties  remained  ineffective. 
There have been no regular awareness-raising campaigns on anti-corruption. 

Law enforcement 

There  are  no  specialised  law  enforcement  authorities,  prosecution  services  and  courts 
specifically dedicated to the fight against corruption. The executive retained undue political 
influence  over  the  judicial  police.  Financial  investigations  are  not  systematically  started  in 

27 

 
 
corruption and organised crime cases. The legal framework of anti-corruption remains weak, 
including for the private sector. 

Legal framework 

Türkiye is party to all international anti-corruption conventions, including the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption. However, Türkiye needs to fully implement such provisions. 
The legislative amendments envisaged in previous anti-corruption strategies (i.e. the Law on 
general  administrative  procedure,  the  Law  on  public  procurement,  the  Code  of  Ethics  for 
Members of Parliament and the Law on whistle-blower protection) have not been adopted. 

In  November  2022,  the  OECD  Working  Group  on  Bribery  also  underlined  Türkiye’s 
continued  inaction  with  respect  to  long-standing  recommendations  on  the  liability  of  legal 
persons  in  particular  in  relation  to  foreign  bribery,  as  well  as  issues  concerning  whistle-
blower protection and prosecutorial independence, and the lack of enforcement of its foreign 
bribery laws. 

Türkiye failed to comply with the GRECO recommendations on judicial independence, and 
on  transparency  of  the  legislative  process  and  political  party  financing.  Legal  loopholes 
remain in the Criminal Code’s corruption-related provisions, which do not meet the standards 
put in place by the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. Public procurement legislation 
is  not  in  line  with  the  EU’s  acquis.  The  legal  privileges  of  public  officials  continued  to 
provide  legal  protection  for  public  officials  and  hamper  anti-corruption  criminal  and 
administrative investigations. The legal framework on  conflicts of interest as well as public 
officials’  asset  declarations  remained  inadequate.  Türkiye  has  no  legislation  governing 
lobbying. 

Strategic framework 

Previous  anti-corruption  strategies  and  action  plans  failed  to  meet  most  of  their  key 
objectives.  Outstanding  anti-corruption  measures  for  these  action  plans  have  not  been 
followed up. There is no ongoing anti-corruption strategy and action plan, and no efforts were 
made to develop new ones with the involvement of relevant institutions and civil society. 

Fundamental rights 

Human  rights  continued  to  deteriorate  and  no  progress  was  made  on  last  year’s 
recommendations.  The  Turkish  legal  framework  includes  general  guarantees  of  respect  for 
human and fundamental rights, but the legislation and its implementation need to be brought 
into line with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) case law. No legislative amendments were adopted to eliminate the 
remaining  elements  of  the  2016  state  of  emergency  laws.  The  Council  of  Europe’s 
Parliamentary Assembly continued to monitor Türkiye’s respect for human rights, democracy 
and the rule of law. Türkiye’s continued refusal to implement certain ECtHR rulings further 
increased  concerns  regarding  the  judiciary’s  adherence  to  international  and  European 
standards. The 2021 HRAP continued to be implemented but did not address critical issues or 
improve  the  overall  human  rights  situation.  Trials  and  convictions  of  journalists,  writers, 
lawyers, academics, human rights defenders and other critical voices for alleged support for 
terrorism have continued. 

In addition to addressing the shortcomings set out in this section, which have still not been 
addressed, Türkiye should in particular in the coming year: 

→  align  its  criminal  and  anti-terror  legislation,  and  its  implementation  of  European 
standards, the ECHR, ECtHR case law and the Venice Commission recommendations; 

28 

 
 
→  ensure  that  any  allegations  of  offences  are  subject  to  due  process,  based  on  concrete 
evidence  and  fully  transparent  procedures  carried  out  under  the  authority  of  an 
independent and impartial judiciary; and fully respect the right to a fair trial and relevant 
procedural  rights,  in  particular  the  presumption  of  innocence,  the  principle  of  legal 
certainty, the right to defence, equality of arms and the right to an effective remedy; 

→  improve the legislative framework and its implementation,  in  order to  effectively  tackle 
all  forms  of  violence  against  women,  including  domestic  violence,  psychological  and 
physical  abuse,  sexual  harassment,  rape,  so-called  ‘honour’  crimes,  stalking  and  forced 
marriage; 

→  improve the legislative framework and its implementation to effectively tackle all forms 
of  racism  and  discrimination,    including  against  LGBTIQ  persons  and  ensure  the 
protection of minorities. 

→  implement the ECtHR judgments as a matter of priority, including in the case of Kavala v 

Türkiye. 

Türkiye  is  a  party  to  most  international  human  rights  instruments,  but  serious  human 
rights  violations  continued. The Council of State ruled in  January 2023 that the President’s 
decision to withdraw from the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating 
violence  against  women  and  domestic  violence  (the  Istanbul  Convention)  was  lawful. 
Türkiye has not yet signed the International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from 
Enforced  Disappearance  and  the  Optional  Protocol  to  the  International  Covenant  on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
continued its full monitoring procedure. 

In  June  2023,  there  were  23 851  applications  pending  before  the  ECtHR.  The  ECtHR 
delivered judgments on 637 applications and found breaches of the European Convention on 
Human  Rights  (ECHR)  in  66  out  of  69  cases  (against  70  violations  in  2022)  that  mainly 
concerned the right to respect for private and family life, the right to a fair trial, the right to 
liberty  and  security  and  freedom  of  assembly  and  association.  During  the  reporting  period, 
there  were  13 232  new  applications  allocated  to  a  decision  body  of  the  ECtHR.  There  are 
currently  184  cases  against  Türkiye  under  enhanced  supervision  by  the  Committee  of 
Ministers. 

There  were  no  developments  with  regard  to  the  implementation  of  the  ECtHR’s  July  2022 
Grand Chamber judgment on the Kavala case as part of the ongoing infringement procedure 
launched by the Committee of Ministers of the  Council of Europe against Türkiye  (see the 
‘Judiciary’ section). 

Regarding  promotion  and  enforcement  of  human  rights,  the  March  2021  human  rights 
action plan (HRAP) continued to be implemented. The annual monitoring report, which was 
due  in  March  2023,  has  not  been  published  and  an  evidence-based  assessment  of  the 
implementation of the HRAP is missing. The HRAP does not include measures to address the 
main shortcomings in the human rights situation in Türkiye that were identified in previous 
years’ reports by the European Commission. 

The Human Rights and Equality Institution of Türkiye (HREI) and the Ombudsman are the 
main human rights institutions. The Ombudsman processes complaints against the actions of 
the  public  administration  while  the  HREI  only  accepts  cases  that  fall  outside  the 
Ombudsman’s  remit.  The  HREI  lacks  ex  officio  powers  to  initiate  investigations  and  to 
intervene  in  cases  with  legal  remedies.  The  number  of  cases  treated  by  the  two  institutions 
increased,  but  concerns  remain  regarding 
the  operational,  structural  and  financial 
independence of both institutions and the appointment of their members. The effectiveness of 

29 

 
 
both  institutions  remained  limited.  The  HREI  was  accredited  to  the  Global  Alliance  for 
National Human Rights Institutions with a B status in October 2022. 

In  2022,  the  HREI  received  2 020  applications  (1 185  in  2021),  visited  63  institutions 
(including  prisons)  and  adopted  69  reports  prepared  within  the  scope  of  visits.  The  HREI 
makes  prison  visits  in  its  role  as  the  National  Preventive  Mechanism  (NPM),  but  does  not 
have set and independent criteria for announced visits. In some visits, it only interacted with 
the administration and did not speak to the detainees. It has not visited all the prisons with the 
highest number of allegations of human rights violations, or did so with a significant delay. 
The recommendations mainly deal with minor issues and do not make concrete statements on 
serious human rights abuses. The HREI needs to improve its reputation regarding effectively 
tackling  human  rights  issues  and  engaging  in  constructive  dialogue  with  civil  society.  The 
HREI remained largely ineffective due to legislative and structural restrictions, including by 
not accepting applications filed by civil society organisations and by being overly cautious in 
tackling  cases  of  torture  and  ill  treatment.  132  of  the  3 638  applications  filed  with  the 
parliament’s Human Rights Inquiry Committee in 2022 were not processed. 

The  term  of  office  of  the  State  of  Emergency  Commission  expired  in  January  2023.  The 
Commission  found  17 960  of  the  109 332  filed  applications  to  be  admissible  but  rejected 
86% of them. 

The  space  for  civil  society  organisations  and  human  rights  defenders  continued  to  be  very 
limited due to continuous pressure through judicial and administrative investigations, threats, 
surveillance,  arbitrary  detentions  and  ill-treatment  of  human  rights  defenders.  The 
chairperson of the Turkish Medical Association was arrested after calling for an investigation 
into allegations that the Turkish armed forces had used chemical weapons in Northern Iraq. 
She was later released and the case is ongoing. Similar cases, coupled with smear campaigns 
by  some  media  outlets  close  to  the  government  and  aggressive  language  by  high-level 
officials,  had  a  chilling  effect  on  civil  society.  Intimidation  of,  and  court  cases  against, 
lawyers  who  provide  legal  assistance  to  members  of  the  civil  society  and  human  rights 
defenders continued. 

The  three  court  cases  lodged  against  the  Human  Rights  Association’s  chairperson  ended  in 
acquittal, but appeals were made against two of them and are pending before courts of appeal. 
The  court  case  continued  regarding  the  2015  killing  of  Tahir  Elçi,  a  lawyer  and  the 
chairperson  of  the  Diyarbakir  Bar  Association.  Several  female  human  rights  defenders  and 
activists  were  detained  and  faced  fines  for  participating  in  demonstrations  for  women’s 
rights. The GÖÇİZ-DER court case in which 23 human rights defenders are being tried  for 
‘using  EU  and  UN  funds  to  conduct  research  and  develop  projects  on  social  migration 
movements in line with the aims and objectives of the PKK’ continued. There were concerns 
regarding  the  recurrent  and  disproportionate  use  of  anti-terrorism  legislation  against  NGOs 
and human rights defenders. 

The  retrial  of  the  Büyükada  case  resulted  in  the  acquittal  of  four  human  rights  defenders, 
including Amnesty International Türkiye's honorary chair, who had been originally sentenced 
to over 6 years in prison on charges of ‘membership in a terrorist organisation’. 

Concerning  the  right  to  life,  urgent  measures  need  to  be  taken  by  the  authorities  to  align 
legislation with ECtHR case-law in order to ensure that credible and effective investigations 
are held into reported killings by the security services. The legislation adopted in June 2016, 
which grants judicial privileges to the security services and increases the risk of impunity, has 
remained in force. In many cases, the authorities did not grant permission to prosecute civil 
servants,  thus  seriously  limiting  accountability  and  fostering  a  climate  of  impunity  for  the 

30 

 
 
security  forces.  No  credible  investigations  were  launched  into  some  of  the  death  cases 
reported in the media. No adequate investigations have been carried out regarding the alleged 
cases  of  abductions  and  enforced  disappearances  by  the  security  services  that  have  been 
reported since the 2016 attempted coup. Alleged killings by the security forces in the south-
east,  especially  during  the  events  in  2015,  have  not  been  investigated  and  prosecuted 
effectively.  Military  or  police  officers  have  been  implicated  in  most  of  these  cases  (as  also 
underlined by the ECtHR judgments and the reports of the UN Working Group on ‘Enforced 
or  Involuntary  Disappearances  on  Turkey’)  and  investigations  have  never  been  properly 
carried out. The statute of limitations remains a major concern as regards the impunity of the 
offenders. Most of the crimes dating from the 1990s in the south-east have ended in impunity 
through  acquittal  or  due  to  the  statute  of  limitations  (for  example,  the  murder  of  the  writer 
Musa Anter in Diyarbakır in 1992). 

According  to  various  reports,  torture  and  ill-treatment  continued  to  occur  in  detention 
centres,  prisons,  informal  places  of  detention  and  transportation  vehicles,  and  on  the  street 
during demonstrations. Disproportionate use of force by security forces continued. Although 
tasked with the role of the National Preventive Mechanism (NPM), the HREI does not meet 
the key requirements under the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture and 
other  Cruel,  Inhuman  or  Degrading  Treatment  or  Punishment  (OPCAT)  and  did  not 
effectively process cases referred to it. The authorities have not authorised the publication of 
the  2016,  2018,  2021  and  2022  reports  by  the  Council  of  Europe’s  Committee  for  the 
Prevention of Torture (CPT). There have been reports documenting several cases of violence, 
torture and other abuses committed by the police and gendarmerie in the regions affected by 
the February 2023 earthquakes as well as threats against lawyers who documented a torture 
case. In some limited cases, administrative actions were taken against the accused officers. 

The UN Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture (SPT) visited Türkiye in September 2022 to 
assess how the authorities and Türkiye’s national preventive mechanism had implemented the 
SPT’s previous recommendations. Effective investigations  into allegations of torture and ill 
treatment remained limited. 

While the number of prisons continued to increase, overcrowding remains a major problem. 
As of April 2023, the prison population exceeded 350 000 (with a capacity of 290 000) and 
continued to  be the largest  in  Europe. Incidents  broke out  in  Hatay's T-Type Closed Prison 
after  the  authorities  denied  the  inmates’  requests  to  see  their  families  affected  by  the 
earthquakes.  Pilot  projects  are  being  implemented  in  several  prisons  to  improve  inmates’ 
contact  with  their  families,  notably  via  secure  video  teleconference  systems.  However, 
allegations  of  human  rights  violations  (including  arbitrary  restrictions  on  the  rights  of 
detainees, denial of access to medical care, mistreatment, limitation of open visits and solitary 
confinement)  continued  to  be  reported.  Education,  rehabilitation  and  resocialisation 
programmes  remained  limited.  The  new  S-type  security  prisons  are  assessed  as  increasing 
inmates’  isolation.  Communal  activities  remained  limited  and  arbitrary.  Transfer  to  remote 
prisons continued, sometimes without early warning. Such transfers had a negative effect on 
family visits, especially for poor families and juvenile inmates. 

There  were  allegations  of  discrimination  by  prison  authorities,  especially  against  LGBTIQ 
persons.  There  was  no  improvement  regarding  investigations  into  allegations  of  suicides, 
strip-searches  and  discriminatory  behaviour  by  prison  guards.  Concerns  related  to  the 
independence  of  the  Forensic  Medicine  Institute  persisted.  Access  to  medical  care  for  sick 
inmates continued to be uneven and at times delayed or denied, causing deaths in prison or 
soon after release. Following complaints about food quality and living conditions, the daily 
allowance for prison food was increased from TRY 20 to TRY 50 in March 2023. 

31 

 
 
The HREI, as the national preventive mechanism, is also tasked with monitoring the prison 
administration and observation boards, but this work has remained ineffective. The work of 
the boards is not transparent and not supervised by independent bodies. 

On  the  protection  of  personal  data,  the  2016  Personal  Data  Protection  Law  is  still  not 
aligned  with  the  EU  acquis,  notably  with  the  General  Data  Protection  Regulation  (GDPR) 
and  the  Law  Enforcement  Directive  (LED)  that  constitutes  a  potential  obstacle  in  several 
policy  areas,  including  with  regard  to  enhanced  operational  cooperation  with  Eurojust  and 
Europol.  The  scientific  commission  that  was  established  in  2021  to  advance  acquis 
harmonisation  continued  its  work,  but  progress  has  been  slower  than  anticipated.  The 
legislation  needs  to  be  improved,  notably  with  regard  to  the  exceptions  for  processing  of 
personal  data  by  judicial  and  law  enforcement  authorities  and  the  independence  of  the 
Personal  Data  Protection  Authority.  The  2018  Protocol  amending  the  Convention  for  the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Council of 
Europe, CETS No 223) has yet to be signed. 

On  freedom  of  thought,  conscience  and  religion,  freedom  of  worship  continued  to  be 
generally respected. The lack of legal personality for the non-Muslim and Alevi communities 
remained a serious concern, notably in relation to the lack of legal status for the patriarchates, 
the  chief  rabbinate,  synagogues,  churches  and  Cem  houses  (Alevi  places  of  worship).  The 
Venice  Commission’s  recommendations  on  the  legal  status  of  non-Muslim  religious 
communities and the right of the Greek Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul to use 
the title ‘Ecumenical’ have yet to be implemented and have continued to be challenged. 

Following the publication in June 2022 of the long-awaited Community Foundations Election 
Regulation, the vast majority of minority foundations completed their elections, albeit under 
strict control  and restricted by the state electoral  process,  and new boards of directors have 
taken  office.  However,  rules  for  the  election  of  the  board  members  in  the  foundations 
controlling  community  hospitals  have  yet  to  be  issued.  Five  articles  of  the  Election 
Regulation were improved in September 2022. Decisions in cases related to the property of 
religious  communities  still  need  to  be  implemented.  The  lack  of  legal  provisions  on 
conscientious objection to army service remained an issue for Jehovah’s Witnesses and other 
citizens  because  refusal  to  serve  in  the  military  results  in  conviction  for  desertion.  Several 
ECtHR judgments and a decision by the United Nations that found violations of the rights of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses remained unimplemented. School textbooks need to be revised in order 
to remove all discriminatory elements and hate rhetoric against all religious and faith groups. 

Further  damage  to  Hagia  Sophia  was  reported,  indicating  a  lack  of  proper  care  of  this 
historical  monument.  No  steps  were  taken  to  address  the  UNESCO  World  Heritage 
Committee’s grave concern about the potential impact of the monument’s status change into 
a mosque on the outstanding universal value of Hagia Sophia. No steps were taken to re-open 
the Halki (Heybeliada) Greek Orthodox Seminary, which has been closed since 1971. 

Attacks  continued  against  Cem  houses  and  Alevi  religious  leaders  during  the  reporting 
period. The court case concerning the July 2022 attacks in Ankara was concluded at the first 
instance  court  in  July  2023,  with  the  main  perpetrator  sentenced  to  3  years  in  prison,  for 
damaging places of worship and for deliberate injury. A presidential decree establishing the 
Alexi-Bektash Culture and Cemevi Presidency was adopted in November 2022. The Decree 
defines  the  duties  and  powers  of  this  new  state  body  attached  to  the  Presidency  of  the 
Republic.  However,  it  does  not  recognise  Cem  Houses  as  places  of  worship.  Alevi 
organisations  held  demonstrations  in  several  cities,  demanding  legal  rights  and  official 
recognition of Cem houses. 

32 

 
 
In  March  2023,  Türkiye  submitted  an  action  plan  to  the  Council  of  Europe  regarding  the 
implementation  of  four  ECtHR  judgments  filed  by  the  Alevi  community  on  compulsory 
religion  and  ethics  classes  and  the  status  of  Cem  houses.  In  June  2023,  the  Committee  of 
Ministers reviewed the cases. On the positive side, this review led to developments allowing 
the  partial  elimination  of  the  imbalance  in  religious  public  services  provided  to  the  Alevi 
community by the State. However, no measures were taken by the authorities to address the 
shortcomings identified by the Court as regards the compulsory religious culture and ethics 
classes. 

Hate speech and hate crimes against Christians, Protestants, Jews and Alevis continued (see 
the  section  on  minorities  below).  No  official  data  exists,  but  the  general  trend  is  that  those 
most targeted and subjected to hate speech and crimes are Syrians (often refugees), Greeks, 
Armenians,  Jews  and  Alevis.  The  Jewish  community  and  the  Chief  Rabbi  hold  annual 
holocaust  remembrance  ceremonies  in  İstanbul,  which  are  occasionally  attended  by 
authorities  at  local  level.  Protestants  continued  to  face  problems  in  gaining  official 
recognition  for  their  places  of  worship.  Hate  speech  and  insults  against  atheists  and  deists 
continued.  The  court  case  on  the  killing/disappearance  of  the  Chaldean  Catholic  couple  in 
Şırnak in 2020 continued. 

The Diyanet (Religious Affairs Presidency) Academy that was established with the amended 
March  2022  law  started  vocational  training  for  imams  and  Diyanet  staff.  Reports  of 
maltreatment  and  sexual  abuse  within  some  Sunni  sects  continued.  The  increased  work, 
powers and influence of the Diyanet continued in all spheres of public life. 

Acts of vandalism and destruction of minority worship places and cemeteries were reported 
during  the  period  and  need  to  be  investigated  and  prosecuted  effectively.  In  July  2022,  the 
Jewish  cemetery  in  Istanbul  was  vandalised  and  81  gravestones  were  damaged.  In  January 
2023, a fire broke out at the Surp Pırgiç Armenian Church lodgings and resulted in the death 
of  two  elderly  residents.  The  authorities  condemned  the  incidents  and  investigations  were 
launched.  Regarding  the  fight  against  antisemitism,  Türkiye  is  an  observer  country  to  the 
International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance and it has been taking actions to support and 
preserve Jewish cultural heritage.  

Two  non-Muslim  persons  were  elected  as  members  of  parliament  in  May  2023,  one 
Armenian  and  one  Syriac.  As  the  Venice  Commission  underlined  in  2010,  Türkiye  should 
continue  the  reform  process  and  introduce  legislation  to  eliminate  all  obstacles  preventing 
non-Muslim  religious  communities  from  exercising  all  their  rights  and  acquiring  legal 
personality, in accordance with European standards. 

There  are  reports  concerning  the  ill-treatment  and  detention  of  members  of  the  Ahmadi 
Religion, currently kept in the detention centre of Edirne, for attempting to seek asylum at the 
border  with  Bulgaria.  A  request  for  interim  measure  with  the  European  Court  of  Human 
Rights  for  their  release  was  rejected  on  the  grounds  that  national  measures  need  to  be 
exhausted first. 

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

Freedom of expression 

Türkiye continues to be at an early stage in this area and the serious backsliding observed in 
recent years continued. The implementation of the criminal laws relating to national security 
and anti-terrorism continued to contravene the ECHR and to diverge from ECtHR case law. 
Cases  and  convictions  of  journalists,  human  rights  defenders,  lawyers,  writers,  opposition 
politicians,  students,  artists  and  social  media  users  continued.  The  dissemination  of 

33 

 
 
opposition  voices  and  freedom  of  expression  were  impaired  by  the  increasing  pressure  and 
restrictive  measures.  Regarding  the  May  2023  elections,  the  ODIHR  identified  an 
environment  with  restrictions  on  freedom  of  expression,  both  private  and  public  media  did 
not  ensure  editorial  independence  and  impartiality  in  their  coverage  of  the  campaign,  thus 
reducing voters’ ability to make an informed choice.  

The  recommendations  from  the  European  Commission’s  last  five  annual  reports  were  not 
addressed. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→ release journalists, human rights defenders, lawyers, writers and academics being held in 
pre-trial  detention  and  ensure  that  the  criminal  cases  against  them  are  concluded  in 
accordance with the criteria set by the ECHR and the ECtHR; 

→  ensure  a  safe  and  pluralist  environment  that  enables  the  media  to  carry  out  their  work 
independently  and  without  fear  of  reprisals  and  dismissals.  This  includes  ending  the 
practice of both  state and non-state agents  of intimidating,  interfering  with,  and putting 
pressure on the media; 

→  revise  criminal  legislation,  in  particular  the  anti-terror  law,  the  Criminal  Code,  the  data 
protection law, the internet law, the new media law in relation to the definition of ‘fake 
news’, and the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) law, to ensure that they 
comply with European standards and are implemented in a proportionate manner, which 
does not curtail freedom of expression; 

→ ensure that criminal law provisions on defamation and other similar offences are not used 

as a means of putting pressure on critical voices. 

Intimidation of journalists 

Activities  of  journalists,  writers,  lawyers,  academics,  human  rights  defenders,  opposition 
politicians  and  critical  voices  continued  to  be  restricted  through  arrests,  detentions, 
prosecutions  and  convictions.  These  practices  continued  to  hinder  the  exercise  of  their 
freedoms and led to self-censorship. A few journalists covering the search and rescue efforts 
in the area of the earthquakes were reportedly blocked by the police on the basis of the three-
month  State  of  Emergency  declared  in  the  region.  Some  were  taken  into  custody  on  the 
grounds  that  they  had  taken  pictures  without  permission.  Earthquake  victims  who  spoke  to 
journalists were also threatened. 
Türkiye  is  ranked  165th  out  of  180  in  the  Reporters  without  Borders  (RSF)  2023  annual 
World Press Freedom Index (down from 149th in 2022). As of June 2023, 59 journalists and 
media employees were in prison, either awaiting trial or serving a sentence. In 2022, at least 
40  (41  in  2021)  journalists  were  taken  into  custody  and  28  (35  in  2021)  journalists  were 
sentenced to a total of 50.5 years in prison (92.5 in 2021). A large number of cases continued 
to be launched against writers and journalists. Threats and physical attacks on journalists and 
media  organisations  due  to  their  work  continued  during  the  reporting  period.  At  least  55 
opposition journalists in  Türkiye were physically assaulted by politically motivated groups. 
Prosecutions  were  initiated  against  over  700  people,  with  some  180  people  being  detained 
and  more  than  40  people  arrested,  for  their  social  media  posts  on  the  February  2023 
earthquakes. 

Legislative environment 

The current laws on anti-terrorism, the internet, intelligence services and the Criminal Code 
impede freedom of expression and run counter to European standards. Selective and arbitrary 
application of legislation continued to raise concerns as it infringes the basic principles of the 

34 

 
 
rule  of  law  and  right  to  a  fair  trial.  Despite  legislative  changes  introducing  the  need  for  a 
strong evidence base in ‘catalogue crimes’, cases relating to freedom of expression remained 
in the category of crimes that automatically requires ‘arrest pending trial’. 

No  legislative  changes  to  the  Criminal  Code  and  the  anti-terrorism  law  to  comply  with 
ECtHR case law took place in relation to the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers 2021 
resolution on a long-standing series of freedom of expression cases against Türkiye. 

The case fi to enable the concentration of resources on rescue efforts, led with the Council of 
State by the Union of Turkish Bar Associations against the circular issued by the President in 
January  2022  addressed  to  all  print,  audio  and  visual  media,  including  social  media  and 
digital  platforms,  is  ongoing.  The  circular’s  aims  include  to  ‘protect  youth,  children  and 
family  institutions  from  bad  habits  and  ignorance  and  to  protect  national  and  moral  values 
from alienation and degeneration’. 

A new Media Law was adopted by the parliament in October 2022. It raises concerns due to 
its  vague  and  ambiguous  language  with  regard  to  what  constitutes  ‘false  or  misleading 
information’, as it allows arbitrary use of the law to stifle criticism of the government. The 
Law leaves the final decision as to what is ‘fake news’ to the judiciary, which does not have 
the  tools  to  examine  complex  situations  and  does  not  provide  guarantees  of  independence 
from  the  executive  power.  Equally  worrying  is  the  provision  of  the  Law  that  stipulates 
imprisonment for the crime of disinformation. The Law also increases the punitive powers of 
the Press Advertisement Agency (BIK) and increases the sanctions to be imposed on internet 
service providers that breach provisions related to information requests from the authorities. 
On the positive side, the Law allows internet news sites to benefit from public advertisements 
and allows journalists working for internet sites to receive press cards and enjoy certain social 
security benefits. 

The new Media Law may have serious negative consequences for freedom of expression as it 
may  foster  self-censorship  and  stifle  public  debate.  Several  hundred  cases  were  launched 
against  social  media  users  on  the  basis  of  the  Law  in  relation  to  the  government’s  post-
earthquake  response.  The  opposition  Republican  People’s  Party  (CHP)  leader  was  the  first 
high-profile  public  figure  to  be  charged  with  ‘disinformation’  for  his  criticism  of  the 
government  response  to  the  earthquakes.  He  was  also  charged  with  ‘insulting  the  Turkish 
nation, the State of the Republic of Türkiye, and the institutions and organs of the State’. An 
individual  application  was  lodged  with  the  Constitutional  Court  on  behalf  of  the  first 
journalist convicted on charges of ‘openly disseminating information misleading the public’ 
in December 2022. 

The Venice Commission issued an urgent opinion in October 2022 on the draft amendments 
to the Turkish Penal Code introducing a provision on ‘false or misleading information’. This 
opinion criticised the new Media Law for its lack of proportionality and the risk of increased 
media self-censorship and violation of the right of anonymity over the internet. 

Implementation/institutions 

Selective and arbitrary application of the legislation continued to raise concerns. The quality 
of the indictments and accusations remains low as they fail to make a direct and credible link 
between the alleged offence and the act. The alleged offences are often acts which constitute 
constitutional guarantees, such as attending press conferences or trade union activities. 

Despite  the  2022  final  ECtHR  ruling  on  the  Vedat  Şorli  case,  which  pronounced  that  the 
article of the Turkish Penal Code providing a maximum sentence of 4 years for insulting the 
President is not in line with ECHR principles. This article continued to be used extensively to 

35 

 
 
prosecute persons who criticised the President. 

Following the Constitutional Court judgment of July 2019 (finding that the conviction of the 
‘Academics  for  Peace’,  who  had  been  dismissed  from  their  positions  after  signing  a 
declaration  criticising  the  government  over  human  rights  violations  in  the  2015-2016 
operation  in  the  south-east,  violated  their  freedom  of  expression),  some  courts  have  since 
ruled  in  their  favour  and  opened  the  way  for  their  reinstatement.  As  a  result,  a  number  of 
academics were reinstated in their university positions. 

The 15 Kurdish journalists and one media worker, who were detained in Diyarbakır in June 
2022,  were  released  in  July  2023  under  judicial  control  condition.  The  next  trial  session  is 
due in November. 

11 journalists were detained in April 2023 and subsequently charged with ‘membership of a 
terrorist organisation’. 

In January 2023, the Turkish Medical Association (TMA) Chair was sentenced to 2 years, 8 
months  and  15  days  in  prison  for  ‘terror  propaganda’  because  she  had  called  for  an 
investigation into the alleged use of chemical weapons by the Turkish armed forces. She was 
released from pre-trial detention and the case is being appealed. 

The Press Advertising Agency (BIK), which is responsible for placing public advertisements 
in the media, replaced its General Board Decision on the Code of Press Ethics of 1994. The 
new  Decision  now  includes  vague  wording  on  possible  violations  that  may  contribute  to 
further  media  self-censorship.  It  also  includes  ambiguous  and  generic  provisions  such  as 
‘sharing information and visuals  on terror organisations’ that are open to  interpretation  and 
can contribute to media censorship. The Constitutional Court ruled in August 2022 that the 
broad-ranging authority granted to the BIK concerning the imposition of sanctions (such as 
public advertisement bans and fines) and the way it was used violated the right to freedom of 
expression. BIK then issued a decision stating that it would not examine applications on Code 
of Press Ethics until the parliament amended the law. At the same time, the BIK continued to 
allocate public advertising in a discriminatory way that favoured pro-government media. The 
discriminatory  application  of  its  powers  risks  pushing  independent  media  into  self-
censorship. Measures therefore need to be taken to ensure that the State advertising budget is 
fairly distributed in an impartial, accountable and transparent way. 

Public Service Broadcasters 

The public service broadcaster Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) is affiliated 
with  the  Presidential  Communication  Authority,  and  the  Radio  and  Television  Supreme 
Council  (RTÜK)  is  affiliated  with  the  Ministry  of  Culture  and  Tourism.  No  changes  were 
made  to  TRT’s  editorial  policy,  which  reflects  the  government’s  official  lines.  RTÜK  has 
continued to impose fines on independent television and radio channels for their broadcasting 
content, on the vague grounds that the content is ‘contrary to the national and moral values of 
society, general morality and the principle of family protection’. Media outlets critical of the 
government were frequently fined by RTÜK on various grounds, ranging from displaying the 
imprisoned  former  HDP  co-chair  Demirtaş’  new  book  to  ‘failing  to  be  objective’  when 
reporting  on  the  government’s  response  to  the  earthquakes.  The  Industry  and  Technology 
Ministry  did  not  extend  the  operating  license  of  Deutsche  Welle’s  (DW)  Turkish  office, 
which closed at the end of March 2023. This decision meant that DW was not able to insure 
its employees who can therefore only continue practising journalism as freelancers. In August 
2023, upon the request of the RTÜK, a criminal judge of peace decided to block access to the 
Voice  of  America  Turkish  service,  for  providing  broadcasting  services  over  the  internet 
without  obtaining  a  broadcast  license.  The  concerns  relating  to  RTÜK’s  independence  and 
36 

 
 
neutrality  persisted  as  members  continue  to  be  elected  by  the  parliament  without  any 
consultation of civil society or professional media organisations. Currently, six members are 
nominees of the ruling coalition, two from the CHP party and one from the HDP party. 

Economic factors 

The  ownership  of  the  Turkish  media  outlets,  which  is  heavily  concentrated  in  a  few  large 
companies close to the government, undermined the independence of editorial policies as it 
lacked transparency. In addition, the distribution channels of printed media, which are used to 
allocate public advertising revenues and deliver newspapers to retail outlets, are owned by a 
single company close to the government. The Broadcasting Law, which does not ensure fair 
competition because it does not prevent monopolisation, was not amended. 

Internet 

The current legislation and its implementation do not guarantee an open and free internet in 
Türkiye. There were frequent website and social media bans for those who expressed views 
critical  of  the  government.  Authors  of  such  websites  faced  harassment  and  at  times 
prosecution. There are no official statistics on banned websites or the blockage of content, in 
accordance with the rulings of the criminal judges of peace. In August 2023, upon the request 
of  the  RTÜK,  a  criminal  judge  of  peace  decided  to  block  access  to  the  Voice  of  America 
Turkish  service,  for  providing  broadcasting  services  over  the  internet  without  obtaining  a 
broadcast license. 

By  March  2023,  RTÜK  had  issued  25  penalties  based  on  its  authority  to  inspect  online 
broadcasts.  In  February  2023,  the  Information  and  Communication  Technologies  Authority 
(BTK)  blocked  access  to  one  of  Türkiye’s  most  popular  social  networks,  the  online 
discussion  forum  Ekşi  Sözlük,  due  to  its  coverage  of  the  post-earthquake  response.  The 
authorities  also  reduced  Twitter’s  bandwidth  on  the  second  day  of  the  earthquakes.  Access 
was reinstated the next day after severe criticism that this had put search and rescue efforts at 
risk.  Legal  action  was  taken  against  609  persons,  150  people  were  detained  and  29  were 
arrested  for  ‘provoking  the  public  into  hatred  and  hostility’  on  social  media  platforms  in 
connection with the recent earthquakes. 

Professional organisations and working conditions 

Journalism in Türkiye remains a precarious and risky profession, with low wages, a high risk 
of  judicial  harassment  and  no  job  security.  Trade  union  rights  are  limited  and  labour 
legislation is not properly applied. According to the Journalists Union of Türkiye, only 11% 
of  journalists  are  unionised.  The  new  Media  Law  made  the  issuing  of  press  cards  and 
accreditations  highly  arbitrary,  due  to  the  composition  of  the  Press  Card  Commission,  in 
which only 1 of the 19 members comes from the journalists’ union and the others have been 
appointed by the executive branch of the government. Investigative journalism on politically 
sensitive  issues  continued  to  be  subject  to  editorial  pressure,  self-censorship  and  judicial 
harassment (see also Chapter 10 on digital transformation and media). 

The  existing  legislation  includes  vague  provisions  that  can  be  used  to  restrict  freedom  of 
artistic  expression.  A  number  of  artistic  events  and  performances  were  banned  by  the 
authorities,  and  artists  critical  of  government  policies  were  subject  to  intimidation  and 
insulting remarks by pro-government figures and RTÜK officials. 

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

There was no progress in the area of freedom of assembly and association where legislation 
and its implementation are not in line with the Turkish Constitution, European standards or 

37 

 
 
the  international  conventions  that  Türkiye  is  party  to.  Bans  on  peaceful  gatherings  were 
widely imposed and public events were often dispersed with a disproportionate use of force 
by the police. Demonstrators frequently faced investigations, court cases and administrative 
fines on charges of terrorism or of violating the Law on demonstrations and marches. Attacks 
on  opposition  gatherings  and  premises  were  often  not  investigated  or  prosecuted.  Türkiye 
needs to urgently apply the ECtHR case law and to revise relevant national laws. 

Protests and demonstrations for human rights, environmental rights, and political and socio-
economic  rights  were  banned  and  dispersed  by  the  police  on  several  occasions  (including 
demonstrations  by  dismissed  civil  servants,  on  the  occasion  of  the  International  Women’s 
Day  and  by  mothers  of  disappeared  persons).  Participants  in  public  events  were  often 
detained (including with the use of force) and later released. The legislation on meetings and 
demonstrations  allowed  authorities  to  prohibit  meetings  and  demonstrations  on  the  basis  of 
vague, discretionary and arbitrary  criteria. All  activities related to  the  “Armenian Genocide 
Commemoration Day” were banned in April 2023. All activities and gatherings to mark anti-
homophobia and Pride Month in May and June 2023 were also banned. Some activists that 
participated in the June march were detained and later released. 

In a positive development, the Constitutional Court ruled in September 2022 that the blanket 
ban  on  demonstrations  issued  by  Ankara’s  governor  between  2016  and  2018  constituted  a 
violation  of  the  Constitution.  The  Constitutional  Court  ruled  in  February  2023  that  the 
Beyoğlu  District’s  governor’s  ban  on  the  gathering  of  the  Saturday  Mothers  violated  their 
rights.  Following  the  Court’s  decision,  the  Saturday  Mothers  tried  to  meet  in  their  original 
venue,  but  they  were  repeatedly  detained  and  released  on  the  same  day.  The  court  case 
against 46 human rights defenders and the relatives of Saturday Mothers continued. 

Dozens of women and a journalist were detained for gathering to mark the International Day 
for  the  Elimination  of  Violence  against  Women  in  November  2022.  There  were  reports  of 
torture  and  ill-treatment  by  the  police  in  Cizre.  The  ‘November  25  Platform’  lodged  a 
criminal complaint about the police brutality on that day in İstanbul. 

Regarding  freedom  of  association,  many  human  rights  defenders  were  detained  or  arrested 
and  NGOs,  especially  in  the  south-east,  were  subjected  to  police  raids.  The  legal  provision 
requiring information on the identity of members of associations by the authorities remained 
in  place.  Regarding  political  associations,  the  8th  Administrative  Court  of  Ankara  found 
unlawful  the  stance  of  the  Ministry  of  Interior,  which  prevented  the  establishment  of  the 
Green Party by not providing a ‘received’ certificate for the application and decided to stay 
the execution of the process.  The Court of Appeal  has since removed the stay of execution 
decision  regarding  the  Ministry  of  Interior’s  act,  the  Green  Party  is  again  prevented  from 
being established and the case is still pending. The file for the establishment of the Humanity 
and Freedom Party is pending before the Constitutional Court. 

The Law on the prevention of financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
has continued to be implemented in a manner not compatible with international human rights 
standards and this  is  threatening freedom  of association  in  Türkiye. The Council of Europe 
Venice Commission’s July 2021 opinion on the law was not taken into account. Türkiye used 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations to categorise NGOs as medium to 
high risk for terrorism financing abuse in an arbitrary way, and to subject rights-based NGOs 
to frequent and burdensome audits. Many associations and foundations, especially recipients 
of international funds, have been subjected to repeated audits. The case against the Ministry 
of Interior’s October 2021 circular, requiring NGOs to be audited based on a risk analysis, is 
ongoing.  The  recommendations  made  in  the  2021  Venice  Commission  opinion  should  be 
implemented, including with regard to fundraising activities by NGOs. 

38 

 
 
Issues of labour and trade union rights are further covered in Chapter 19 on social policy 
and employment. 

On  property  rights,  the  Inquiry  Commission  on  the  State  of  Emergency  Measures,  whose 
term ended in January 2023, did not provide an effective domestic remedy for confiscations. 
There are ongoing court cases against the decisions of the Inquiry Commission. The case of 
the  Istanbul  Metropolitan  Municipality  against  the  Directorate-General  for  Foundations 
(DGF) on the ownership of the Taksim Gezi Park is ongoing. 

In March, the EctHR found Türkiye in  violation of property rights  in  the case of the Chief 
Rabbinate of Türkiye – İzmir Jewish Synagogue Foundation and ordered a retrial of the case. 
In December 2022, the Constitutional Court found the transfer of the Armenian Sanasaryan 
Inn  to  the  State  unlawful.  There  will  be  a  retrial  of  the  case,  which  was  launched  by  the 
Armenian Patriarchate. In January 2023, the Constitutional Court ruled that there had been a 
violation of the right to property regarding the Greek Bebek Aya Haralambos Church, Bebek 
Aya  Yani  Cemetery  Dova  Church  and  the  Cemetery  Foundation.  In  April  2023,  the  Mor 
Batlo Syriac Orthodox Church and the cemetery in Mardin/Turabdin were transferred to the 
Housing Development Administration (TOKI). Court cases regarding the 2016 expropriations 
in Diyarbakir Sur District are ongoing. 

In  the  south-east,  the  restoration  of  cultural  and  religious  heritage  and  urban  housing 
construction continued. Several important cultural and religious heritage sites were damaged 
by the February 2023 earthquakes in the region, especially in Hatay/Antakya. Regarding the 
implementation  of  the  Law  on  foundations  for  minority  communities,  many  appeals  on 
rejected claims for the restitution of property were ongoing either before a local  court or at 
the EctHR. Litigation brought forward by state institutions or municipalities against returned 
immovable property resulted in lengthy legal proceedings and uncertain property rights. The 
case  of  the  Mor  Gabriel  Monastery  Syriac  Orthodox  Church  Foundation’s  land  borders 
continued before the Constitutional Court. Other cases in relation to the ownership of the land 
of  the  Mor  Gabriel  Monastery  continued.  Other  non-Muslim  community  foundations  also 
have properties that have not yet been returned. Council of Europe Resolution 1625 of 2008 
regarding property rights on the islands of Gökçeada (Imbros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos) still 
needs to be fully implemented. There is an urgent need to revise the relevant legislation on 
the  issue  of  property  rights  for  non-Muslim  minorities  and  other  legislation  covering  all 
issues of property rights to ensure a more comprehensive framework. 

Legislation  on  non-discrimination  is  not  in  line  with  European  standards  and  not  duly 
enforced in practice. There were serious concerns regarding the implementation of the April 
2021 Law on security investigations and archive checks for people who are to be appointed to 
public posts for the first time, as this takes into consideration not only final convictions but 
also other factors (e.g. ongoing investigations, pending cases and even intelligence against a 
person).  The  law  decree  issued  under  the  State  of  Emergency  to  allow  arbitrary  dismissals 
expired  in  July  2022.  However,  dismissals  with  no  objective  criteria  of  civil  servants 
continued on the basis of the Law on civil servants. Reports on profiling and discrimination 
against  civil  servants  in  employment  on  vague  legal  grounds  continued.  Cases  of 
discrimination  and  hate  crimes  based  on  ethnic,  religious  grounds,  sexual  orientation  and 
gender  identity  continued  to  be  reported.  Diyarbakır  football  team  was  subjected  to  racist 
attacks in two different provinces during matches. The HREI, which is in charge of applying 
non-discrimination  legislation,  finalised  the  examination  of  166  applications  in  2022  but 
received  355  new  applications  during  the  year  falling  under  the  scope  of  the  task  of 
‘combating discrimination’. The finalised decisions are sent to the relevant public authorities, 
but there is no systematic follow-up of corrective actions that were taken. School textbooks 

39 

 
 
still need to be revised, especially regarding some content on minorities, secularism, religion 
and  gender  equality.  The  HREI  and  the  Ombudsman  did  not  accept  applications  on  sexual 
orientation and identity. Türkiye should urgently adopt a law on combating discrimination in 
line  with  the  EU  acquis  as  well  as  the  ECHR,  covering  discrimination  on  the  grounds  of 
sexual  orientation.  Protocol  12  of  the  ECHR,  which  provides  for  the  general  prohibition  of 
discrimination,  remained  unratified  and  the  recommendations  of  the  Council  of  Europe 
Commission  against  racism  and  intolerance  (ECRI)  were  not  implemented.  Legislation 
against hate crime, including hate speech, is still not in line with international standards and 
does  not  cover  hate  offences  on  the  basis  of  sexual  orientation,  ethnicity,  age  or  gender 
identity.  No  progress  was  made  with  the  ratification  of  the  Additional  Protocol  to  the 
Convention on Cybercrime concerning the criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenophobic 
nature committed through computer systems. 

In  the  area  of  gender  equality,  the  backsliding  on  the  rights  of  women  and  girls  remained. 
Türkiye  ranked  129th  out  of  146  countries,  as  measured  by  the  World  Economic  Forum’s 
Global Gender Gap Report 2023 (compared to 124th place in the 2022 Report). 

Widespread  promotion  of  stereotyped  gender  roles  and  definitions  continued,  including  in 
school  textbooks  and  in  the  media.  Statements  by  the  authorities  targeting  independent 
women’s organisations and women activists threatened the freedom of operation of women’s 
rights associations. State authorities increasingly came under the influence of Sunni religious 
sects  that  promote  illegal  practices,  such  as  early  marriage.  Efforts  should  be  increased  to 
prevent  school  drop-out  due  to  early  marriage  (e.g.  establishing  early  warning  systems  in 
schools,  ensuring  that  domestic  violence  is  properly  investigated  and  prosecuted,  and 
establishing a sufficient number of shelters for vulnerable individuals). 

The  Council  of  State  concluded  in  its  final  ruling  that  the  decision  to  withdraw  from  the 
Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combatting Violence against Women and 
Domestic Violence (also known as the Istanbul Convention) was in compliance with Turkish 
law.  The  Istanbul  Convention  is  an  important  international  standard,  so  this  constitutes 
serious  backsliding  in  Türkiye’s  progress.  According  to  reports,  334  women  were  killed  in 
2022  (339  in  2021)  and  245  more  women  died  in  suspicious  circumstances.  There  is  no 
comprehensive data collection system in this area. Despite the continued implementation of 
the Fourth National Action Plan for Combating Violence against Women (2021-2025), there 
are  no  effective  policies  (including  deterrent  sentences),  implementation  of  legislation  is 
weak  and  the  quality  of  available  support  services  is  low.  The  February  2023  earthquakes 
worsened  the  already  difficult  situation  of  women  and  children  in  the  region,  due  to  the 
collapse  of  women’s  shelters,  crowded  temporary  accommodation  and  a  lack  of  proper 
preventive  policies.  In  the  earthquake  areas,  priority  has  been  given  to  certain  basic  needs, 
but  the  provision  of  hygiene  products  for  women,  separate  and  protected  toilets,  and 
reproductive health facilities was neglected. 

The  protection  of  the  rights  of  the  child  remained  weak,  including  in  the  juvenile  justice 
system  and  in  relation  to  the  consequences  of  the  earthquakes.  Urgent  action  is  needed  to 
ensure protection of children in the areas affected by the February 2023 earthquakes in order 
to avoid exploitation and abuse. 

Several  human  rights  violations  were  reported  in  the  regions  affected  by  the  earthquakes, 
including  against  children  and  persons  with  disabilities.  The  Religious  Affairs  Presidency 
issued a ruling (fatwa) soon after the earthquakes, stating that there is no religious obstacle to 
a marriage between a person and their adopted child. This is cause for very serious concern. 
A  coherent  and  effective  monitoring  mechanism  by  public  institutions  for  children  in 
earthquake regions, including for unaccompanied and missing children, is urgently needed. 

40 

 
 
In  January  2023,  a  Parliamentary  Commission  for  Investigation  of  Child  Abuse  was 
established at the National Grand Assembly. A national action plan needs to be put in place 
to combat and prevent child, early and forced marriages and to raise awareness of the harmful 
impacts of child marriage. Consistent efforts are needed to eradicate child labour, especially 
among refugees. 

Türkiye  is  effectively  pursuing  a  de-institutionalisation  strategy.  However,  60%  of  the 
children living in the childcare system are in institutional care. Adequate funding should be 
ensuring  proper  de-
directed 
institutionalisation.  Particular  concern  is  caused  by  the  construction  of  new  institutions 
following the earthquakes and the wars in Syria and Ukraine. 

community-based 

reinforcing 

towards 

care 

and 

Children can benefit from free legal aid for criminal disputes, but no such scheme is in place 
for civil cases and/or other complaint mechanisms. Concerns remained about juveniles facing 
arrest  and  detention  on  charges  of  membership  of  terrorist  organisations.  Non-custodial 
measures  for  children  need  to  be  improved.  The  capacity  of  NGOs  and  bar  associations  to 
intervene, monitor and lodge strategic litigation is limited, both in law and practice. There is 
an  insufficient  number  and  geographical  coverage  of  specialised  child  courts,  child  assize 
courts and qualified staff including judges, prosecutors, lawyers and experts. Almost half of 
the children on trial are still being tried before non-specialised courts. There are currently 81 
juvenile courts and 12 juvenile high criminal courts, in accordance with the law that requires 
that there is a juvenile court in every province. However, this is not enough for the needs of 
big  cities.  Child-specific  services  (such  as  child-friendly  interview  rooms  and  child 
monitoring  centres)  were  reportedly  interrupted  in  various  cities.  A  comprehensive  training 
programme  for  all  professionals  working  with  children  in  contact  with  the  law,  with  a 
certification mechanism and incentives, needs to be developed. 

Concerning the rights of persons with disabilities, a national action plan to implement the 
‘2030  Barrier-Free  Vision  Document’  was  adopted  by  the  government  in  February  2023, 
covering  actions  until  2025.  The  action  plan  pursues  a  rights-based  approach  and  largely 
reflects  the  EU  strategy  in  this  field.  The  Monitoring  and  Evaluation  Board  on  Rights  of 
Persons with Disabilities became operational in  November 2022 and convenes twice a year 
under  the  coordination  of  the  Ministry  of  Family  and  Social  Services,  of  which  it  is 
structurally part. Türkiye has ratified the UN Convention for the Protection of the Rights of 
Persons  with  Disabilities  and  its  Optional  Protocol,  but  shortcomings  persist  in  its 
transposition  and  implementation.  There  is  insufficient  data  collection  in  the  field  of 
accessibility  of  services  and  public  infrastructure.  The  consequences  of  the  February  2023 
earthquakes  will  need  to  be  reflected  in  the  national  action  plan,  including  to  ensure  that 
public  institutions  include  persons  with  disabilities  in  their  preparedness,  evacuation  and 
post-disaster  recovery  plans.  This  will  require  a  number  of  actions,  including  a  thorough 
assessment  of  the  number  of  people  who  became  disabled  as  a  consequence  of  the 
earthquakes, along with proper rehabilitation and psychological support measures. 

Türkiye  continued  to  pursue  a  de-institutionalisation  policy  for  persons  with  disabilities, 
coupled  with  a  home-based  care  support  programme.  However,  independent-living 
mechanisms  and  opportunities  remained  very  limited.  The  human  resources  capacity  of 
services for people with chronic mental disorders and intellectual disabilities was enhanced in 
2022.  Quality  standards  developed  for  community  mental  health  centres  are  now  in  active 
use.  However,  Türkiye  has  no  mental  health  legislation  and  no  independent  monitoring 
mechanism for mental health institutions. In school education, the proportion of students with 
disabilities attending inclusive classrooms reached 75%. The remaining 25% (more than 60 
000 children) continued to attend special schools. 

41 

 
 
The  lack  of  protection  for  the  fundamental  rights  of  lesbian,  gay,  bisexual,  transgender, 
intersex  and  queer  (LGBTIQ)  persons  continued  to  raise  serious  concerns.  The  lack  of 
legal  protection  against  hate  speech  and  hate  crimes  based  on  sexual  orientation  or  gender 
identity  was  further  exacerbated  by  negative  stereotyping  in  the  media  and  discriminatory 
rhetoric from high-level  officials, including the highest political level.  Anti-LGBTIQ rallies 
were organised in various parts of the country during the reporting period and were allowed 
by  the  authorities.  LGBTIQ  associations  were  regularly  targeted  by  pro-government  media 
for being funded by foreign countries. Discrimination, intimidation and violence against the 
LGBTIQ community and especially transgender persons increased, in part due to the lack of 
effective  criminal  sanctions.  Several  court  cases  related  to  LGBTIQ  persons  who  were 
murdered  or  seriously  assaulted  continued.  Access  to  gender  reassignment  surgery  and  to 
health and social services remained cumbersome and problematic for trans persons. LGBTIQ 
prisoners suffered discrimination and solitary confinement. LGBTIQ activities, marches and 
pride parades were banned in several provinces and police intervened to disperse participants. 

The  appeal  case  against  the  Middle  East  Technical  University  (METU)  students  who  took 
part in a pride gathering on the university campus in May 2019 continued. A new court case 
was launched against METU students for their participation in the pride march of 2022. The 
court  case  against  the  former  executives  of  the  Ankara  Bar  Association  for  criticising  the 
Diyanet’s  president’s  homophobic  speech  continued.  A  court  case  against  the  Izmir  Bar 
Association’s  former  president  and  ten  board  members  started  in  April  2023  on  charges  of 
insulting  religious  values,  due  to  the  statement  they  issued  on  their  official  website  against 
the  discriminatory  Friday  sermon  of  the  president  of  religious  affairs  against  private  life, 
different  life  preferences  and  LGBTIQ  individuals.  The  Human  Rights  and  Equality 
Institution (HREI) continued to not process applications by LGBTIQ persons on the grounds 
that it does not consider discrimination against LGBTIQ to be within its remit, because the 
law  establishing  the  HREI  does  not  consider  ‘sexual  orientation  and  gender  identity-based 
discrimination’ to be a criterion for discrimination. 

On procedural rights, legislation and its implementation are not in line with the EU acquis 
or European standards, since basic minimum  procedural rights’ standards are missing. The 
2023  earthquakes  seriously  hindered  access  to  justice  in  the  affected  areas,  especially  for 
disadvantaged  groups,  women  and  children.  In  addition  to  the  loss  of  life,  many  lawyers’ 
offices and some bar associations’ premises were destroyed by the earthquakes. The Union 
of  Bar  Associations  provided  support  to  lawyers  in  the  affected  regions  but,  overall, 
problems of access to justice remained extensive. Several complaints were launched by bar 
associations concerning human rights violations, property rights and other issues. 

ECtHR  judgments  condemning  Türkiye  for  violating  the  right  to  a  fair  trial  and  the 
presumption  of  innocence  due  to  its  failure  to  respect  procedural  rules  continued  to  be 
handed down. The 2018 law issued under the state of emergency that restricted fundamental 
freedoms (including in the Code on Criminal Procedures and Anti-Terror Law) remained in 
force. 

Access to legal assistance for convicted children remained limited. Lawyers (especially those 
providing  legal  assistance  to  human  rights  defenders  and  civil  and  political  activists) 
continued  to  face  difficulties  in  performing  their  duties.  In  some  cases,  lawyers  were 
subjected to ill-treatment by law enforcement personnel. 

Protection of victims’ rights is regulated under the penal legislation. The presidential decree 
on Supporting the Victims of Crime has been in force since June 2020. Accordingly, there is 
a  specialised  Department  of  Victims’  Rights  under  the  Ministry  of  Justice.  The  ‘Judicial 
Support  and  Victim  Services  Directorates’  established  in  167  courthouses  provide 
42 

 
 
information,  orientation  and  psycho-social  support  services  to  the  victims  of  crime  during 
judicial proceedings. Currently, there are 166 forensic interview rooms in 159 courthouses in 
81 provinces, where victims can give their statements outside the courtroom with the support 
of experts and without having to face the alleged perpetrator. Compensation and redress for 
victims  remained  limited.  Steps  need  to  be  taken  to  align  national  legislation  with  the  EU 
Victims’ Rights Directive and the directive relating to compensation for crime victims. 

Hate  speech  and  hate  crime  remained  a  serious  issue  for  persons  belonging  to  ethnic  and 
national minorities. No steps were taken to revise school textbooks to remove discriminatory 
and derogatory references. Minorities continued to face difficulties, such as the lack of legal 
status for religious institutions, protection for languages, schooling support, clergy training, 
the  economic  non-viability  of  media  in  minority  languages  and  complications  in  enjoying 
property  rights  for  foundations.  The  lack  of  legal  personality  for  minority  communities’ 
churches,  synagogues,  patriarchates,  monasteries  and  chief  rabbinates  continued  to  create 
difficulties  in  exercising  their  freedom  of  association  and  religion,  and  impacted  their 
property rights. Minority schools received no public funds. Regular and substantive subsidies 
to the newspapers run by members of the Armenian, Greek, Jewish and Syriac communities 
were granted by the Press Advertising Authority, in order to ensure their viability, given their 
limited  circulation.  In  the  court  case  against  public  officials  involved  in  the  killing  of 
Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in 2007, the Court of Cassation in June 2023 upheld some of 
the convictions given by the local court and some acquittals. In April 2023, as a result of an 
on-going investigation, a new case was launched against some of the perpetrators of Dink’s 
murder  on  charges  of  ‘being  a  member  of  an  armed  organisation’,  ‘deliberate  killing’  and 
‘attempting to remove the constitutional order’. The first hearing was held in June 2023. 

The ‘Armenian Genocide Commemoration Day’ was banned by the Istanbul governorate and 
other  provinces.  During  the  reporting  period,  a  member  of  the  Armenian  community  was 
appointed as a sub-province governor (kaymakam) for the first time. The restoration studies 
continued  on  the  Büyükada  (Prinkipo  Island)  Greek  Orphanage,  a  cultural  heritage 
monument.  Mechanisms  should  be  in  place  to  support  the  participation  of  minorities  in 
decision-making  and  to  ensure  that  they  are  adequately  represented  in  the  public 
administration and in politics (see also Chapter 23 on cultural rights). 

Concerning the Roma, Dom and Abdal communities, Türkiye adopted in January 2023 a new 
Roma strategy and a related action plan covering the period until 2030. The aim is to align 
with  the  EU  Roma  Strategic  Framework,  however,  a  horizontal  objective  of  fighting 
antigypsyism and discrimination and quantitative national targets connected to indicators and 
baselines that would allow measuring progress towards the EU level headline targets remains 
to  be  defined.  The  implementation  of  the  strategy  needs  to  be  monitored  inclusively, 
including  with  the  broad  participation  of  civil  society.  Ten  municipalities  across  Türkiye 
voluntarily took part in an EU programme to promote participation in local governance using 
social mediators. Specific policy measures are needed for the inter-sectional vulnerabilities of 
Roma  women.  No  official  data  on  the  situation  and  living  conditions  of  Roma  exists  in 
Türkiye. 

The  February  2023  earthquakes  increased  the  difficulties  of  the  Roma  population  in  the 
affected areas in terms of living conditions, livelihood, basic needs and health, especially for 
women  and  children.  Dramatic  increases  in  housing  prices  particularly  hit  Roma  families, 
who often live in poor conditions  and have limited property ownership. Lack of emergency 
savings  and  high  dependence  on  informal  jobs  made  Roma  in  earthquake-affected  regions 
more vulnerable. The Roma were among the vulnerable groups who had more difficulties in 
accessing  relief  aid.  A  holistic  approach  is  needed  to  address  drug  use  disorder  among  the 

43 

 
 
Roma, taking particular account of social and economic factors. Roma children being more 
integrated  into  the  education  system  would  contribute  to  eliminate  child  labour  and  early 
marriage. Targeted support measures for Roma entrepreneurs and self-employed need to be 
introduced. The problem of incorrect diagnosis of Roma children with mental disabilities or 
learning difficulties should be effectively tackled. No EU-Türkiye Joint Roma Seminar was 
held.  Concrete  measures  should  be  taken  to  prevent  the  increase  of  antigypsyism  and  to 
combat  prejudice  and  discrimination  against  Roma.  The  capacity  of  the  National  Roma 
Contact  Point  to  programme  and  mainstream  funds  targeting  all  aspects  of  Roma  inclusion 
remained  limited.  No  members  of  parliament  in  the  new  parliamentary  term  have  an  overt 
Roma identity. 

On  cultural  rights,  there  were  no  legislative  developments  to  allow  public  services  to  be 
provided in  languages other than Turkish. Legal  restrictions on mother-tongue education in 
primary  and  secondary  schools  remained  in  place.  Optional  courses  in  Kurdish  and 
Circassian  are  provided  in  public  state  schools,  but  the  requirement  of  a  minimum  of  10 
students for these courses continued to be an impediment. The small number or complete lack 
of  teachers  for  these  courses  remained  another  limiting  factor.  University  programmes  are 
available  in  Kurdish,  Arabic,  Syriac,  Zaza  and  Circassian.  Only  a  few  political  parties 
explicitly included mother-tongue education in their election platforms.  The state-appointed 
trustee  mayors  in  the  south-east  continued  changing  the  original  names  of  streets.  The 
increased  powers  of  the  governors  and  arbitrary  censorship  continued  to  have  a  negative 
impact on arts and culture and a number of art and culture groups in Kurdish language were 
dismissed  by  the  trustees.  A  dozen  concerts,  festivals  and  cultural  events  were  banned  by 
governorates  and  municipalities  on  the  grounds  of  ‘security  and  public  order’.  Kurdish 
cultural  and  language  institutions,  media  outlets  and  numerous  art  spaces  remained  mostly 
closed,  as  they  have  been  since  the  2016  coup  attempt,  which  contributed  to  a  further 
shrinking of their cultural rights (see also Chapter 26 – Education and culture). 

2.2.2.  Chapter 24: justice, freedom and security 

The  EU  has  common  rules  for  border  control,  visas,  residence  and  work  permits,  external 
migration and asylum. Schengen cooperation entails the lifting of border controls within the 
EU. The Member States also cooperate with Türkiye in the fight against organised crime and 
terrorism, and on judicial, police and customs matters, all with the support of the EU justice 
and home affairs agencies. 

Türkiye is moderately prepared in the area of justice, freedom and security. Some progress 
was made in relation to the further strengthening of the surveillance and protection capacity 
of the land border with  Iran. Türkiye has still not  implemented the provisions pertaining to 
third-country nationals in the EU-Turkey readmission agreement, which entered into force in 
October 2017. Türkiye continued to make significant efforts to host and meet the needs of 3.6 
million refugees. Türkiye still needs to align its legislation on data protection with European 
standards. 

Most  of  last  year’s  recommendations  still  need  to  be  addressed  and  remain  valid.  In  the 
coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  fully implement  the EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016  (notably  the returns from  the 
Greek islands and the prevention of irregular routes to all Member States) and implement 
all  the  provisions  of  the  EU-Turkey  readmission  agreement  towards  all  EU  Member 
States; 

44 

 
 
→  align legislation on personal data protection with European standards, which could have a 
positive effect for the possible conclusion of an international agreement between the EU 
and Türkiye on the exchange of personal data between Europol and Türkiye; 

→  revise  legislation  and  practices  on  terrorism  in  line  with  the  European  Convention  on 
Human  Rights,  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  case  law  and  the  EU  acquis  and 
practices. The proportionality principle should be observed in practice; 

→  adopt  and implement  a strategy and  action plan  on border management  with  the aim of 

enhancing coordination between border services at national and international levels. 

Fight against organised crime 

Türkiye  has  some  level  of  preparation  to  implement  the  EU  acquis  in  this  area.  Some 
progress was made at operational level through participation in an increasing number of joint 
operations  with  EU  Member  States  and  neighbouring  countries.  A  new  strategy  and  new 
action  plan  against  organised  crime  were  adopted.  However,  Türkiye  needs  to  improve  the 
effectiveness  of  law  enforcement  in  fighting  certain  forms  of  crime,  such  as  money 
laundering and financial crimes. Coordination remains crucial for all stakeholders involved in 
fighting organised crime. 

In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  improve  the  legal  framework  and  practices  on  counterterrorism  in  line  with  the  EU 
acquis;  and  continue  addressing  the  remaining  recommendations  in  order  to  be  delisted 
from the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) ‘grey list’; 

→  conclude  an  international  agreement  with  the  European  Union  on  cooperation  with 

Eurojust; 

→  enhance efforts in the fight against the smuggling of migrants, including final convictions 

and asset confiscation; 

→  revise Law No 7262 in line with the recommendations of the Venice Commission; 

→  increase its operational willingness to cooperate and exchange information with EU law 

enforcement partners. 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

There  are  a  number  of  specialised  departments  dealing  with  various  forms  of  organised 
crime,  under  two  main  law  enforcement  agencies;  namely  the  gendarmerie  and  the  police 
under the Ministry of Interior (MoI). The Coast Guard Command also plays an important role 
in  preventing  migrant  smuggling  and  trafficking  in  human  beings.  The  Financial  Crimes 
Investigation  Board  (MASAK)  is  the  Turkish  financial  intelligence  unit  attached  to  the 
Ministry of Treasury and Finance. Cybercrime is addressed by a specialised department for 
combating cybercrime affiliated to the Turkish national police (the TNP) as well as the public 
order division of the gendarmerie at central level and the 31 provincial gendarmerie branches. 

The  TNP  comprised  a  total  of  339 563  officers  (equivalent  to  399.48  officers  per  100 000 
inhabitants).  By  comparison,  the  EU  average  is  335.3  officers  per  100 000  inhabitants 
(Eurostat,  2019-2021).  The  total  number  of  gendarmerie  staff  (excluding  conscripts)  was 
196 285  (equivalent  to  230.34  gendarmerie  personnel  per  100 000  inhabitants).  The  Coast 
Guard  Command  comprised  of  8 343  personnel  (equivalent  to  9.81  personnel  per  100 000 
inhabitants). Between April 2022 and April 2023, 1 054 personnel were dismissed from the 

45 

 
 
gendarmerie.  These  figures  include  the  personnel  dismissed  due  to  their  affiliation  to  the 
Gülen movement and the Parallel State Structure (PDY). 

The legal framework for the fight against organised crime and police cooperation is partially 
aligned with the EU acquis. 

Türkiye adopted a new national strategy (2022-2027) and an action plan (2022-2024) against 
organised  crime  in  December  2022.  The  Ministry  of  Interior’s  Department  of  Smuggling 
the 
Intelligence,  Operations  and  Data  Collection 
implementation. 

is  responsible  for  coordinating 

The legal framework pertaining to trafficking in human beings is largely in accordance with 
international  conventions  and  the  EU  acquis.  A  new  action  plan  on  trafficking  in  human 
beings requested by the Council of Europe’s Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking 
in Human Beings (GRETA) has not been adopted. Türkiye needs to fully align its definition 
of  trafficking  in  human  beings  with  the  Council  of  Europe  Convention  on  Action  against 
Trafficking in Human Beings. 

The completion of an international agreement between the EU and Türkiye on the exchange 
of personal data between Europol and the Turkish authorities with responsibility for fighting 
serious crime and terrorism is still pending considering also that the Turkish data protection 
legislation is still not aligned with the EU’s acquis. 

Türkiye is party to the Council of Europe’s ‘Budapest’ Convention on cybercrime, but it has 
yet  to  sign  its  Second  Additional  Protocol  on  enhanced  cooperation  and  disclosure  of 
electronic evidence, which was opened for signature in May 2022. 

Türkiye’s  Information  and  Communication  Technologies  Authority  has  been  a  member  of 
INHOPE  (International  Association  of  Internet  Hotlines)  since  2011  and  cooperates  with 
other  hotlines  to  fight  against  child  sexual  abuse.  Article  21  (entitled  ‘Protection  of 
Children’) of the By-law on the provision of radio, television and on-demand media services 
via  the  internet  environment  requires  media  service  providers  that  have  been  granted  an 
online  broadcasting  license  and  online  media  platform  operators  that  have  been  granted  an 
authorisation  certificate  for  the  online  transmission  of  media  services  to  take  measures  to 
ensure parental control.  It  also makes these institutions responsible for  taking the necessary 
technical measures to protect children and young audiences. In this context, examples such as 
PIN  systems,  and  child  profile  and  protective  symbol  systems  are  used  by  media  service 
providers  operating  in  Türkiye  to  protect  children  in  online  audiovisual  media  services.  In 
January  2023,  the  Turkish  parliament  set  up  a  research  commission  with  the  objective  of 
preventing  child  abuse.  The  establishment  of  this  commission  was  prompted  by  a  specific 
case  involving  the  forced  marriage  of  a  six-year-old  girl  (see  the  section  on  fundamental 
rights of the child). 

MASAK is a member of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, which facilitates 
cooperation  and  intelligence  sharing  between  national  financial  intelligence  units  to 
investigate and prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. 

Türkiye  is  party  to  the  UN  Convention  against  Transnational  Organised  Crime  and  the 
Council  of  Europe  Convention  on  Laundering,  Search,  Seizure  and  Confiscation  of  the 
Proceeds of Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (CETS No 198). 

Türkiye has a witness protection system  to  protect  witnesses  from  intimidation  and threats. 
However,  the  scope  of  the  Law  on  witness  protection  needs  to  be  expanded  to  include  all 
types of serious crimes and procedural rules need improvement. 

46 

 
 
Implementation and enforcement capacity 

In  the  reporting  period,  operational  capacity  continued  to  be  strengthened  through  new 
recruitment and training programmes. 

In  total,  6  145    operations  were  carried  out  by  the  gendarmerie  and  the  Turkish  national 
police  (the  TNP)  to  tackle  organised  crime,  cybercrime,  smuggling  of  migrants  and 
trafficking in human beings. 

Concerning firearms trafficking, 2 388  small and light weapons (SALW) were seized by the 
gendarmerie  and  4  138    by  the  TNP  during  the  reporting  period.  In  2022,  877  cases  of 
firearms trafficking (Article 12 of the Turkish Criminal Code) were brought before criminal 
courts, resulting in the conviction of 584 persons. 

Since July 2004, cooperation between Europol and Türkiye has been based on the Strategic 
Agreement on Cooperation. This does not include the possibility of sharing personal data, but 
it does facilitate cooperation in a range of areas. A Turkish liaison officer has been seconded 
to Europol since 2016. Türkiye is connected to and configured for the full use of the Secure 
Information  Exchange  Network  Application  (SIENA)  with  third  parties  and  EU  Member 
States.  The  EU  (through  Europol)  and  Türkiye  have  a  joint  interest  in  stepping  up  law 
enforcement cooperation to effectively address common challenges. 

16 EU Member States have 30 liaison officers in Türkiye and Türkiye has 10 liaison officers 
in 7 EU Member States. A cooperation agreement with the European Union Agency for Law 
Enforcement Training (CEPOL) has been in place since 2010. Its revision has been pending 
since  the  end  of  2022.  Exchange  and  training  programmes  were  carried  out  involving  the 
gendarmerie and the TNP. As well as participating in the courses held by EU Member States, 
TNP also organises joint workshops with CEPOL. 

The  track  record  on  combating  money  laundering  and  terrorist  financing  showed  a  gradual 
improvement.  Turkish  judicial  statistics  showed  a  consistent  upward  trend.  There  were  19 
files, 49 separate offences and 47 convictions in 2020, while there were 26 files, 61 separate 
offences and 61 convictions in 2021. In 2022, 39 criminal files and 118 offences resulted in 
116 convictions. 

The domestic terrorist asset freeze mechanism continued to be implemented through the joint 
decisions  issued  by  the  Ministry  of  Treasury  and  Finance  and  the  Ministry  of  Interior.  In 
2021, the assets of 1 145 real persons and 16 corporate identities were frozen through three 
interministerial decisions. In 2022, 4 interministerial decisions resulted in the assets of 64 real 
persons and 14 corporate identities being frozen. 

The country’s geographic location makes it an important player in the fight against organised 
crime groups, in particular drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, arms trafficking, intellectual 
property crime and money laundering. Türkiye is used as a financial hub between south-east 
Asian countries, the Gulf region and Europe for facilitating illicit money flows in exchange 
for irregular migrants and illicit commodities. As far as participation in the European Multi-
disciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats (EMPACT) is concerned, Türkiye was in 2022 
a participant in one operational action (in the operational action plan on intellectual property 
crime, counterfeit goods and currencies). In 2023, Türkiye is participating in 16 operational 
actions.  Regarding  cross-border  cooperation,  Türkiye  has  not  participated  in  any  EU  joint 
investigation teams (JITs) to date. 

Türkiye  continues  to  be  an  important  transit  and  destination  country  for  trafficking  in 
human  beings.  By  the  end  of  2022,  the  number  of  victims  identified  by  the  Turkish 
authorities  stood  at  345  (compared  to  2021  when  403  victims  were  identified).  Sexual  and 

47 

 
 
labour  exploitation  constitute  the  highest  number  among  the  purposes  of  trafficking.  Most 
victims are of Syrian origin. In 2022, 115 cases of trafficking in human beings (Article 80 of 
the Turkish  Criminal  Code) were brought before Türkiye’s criminal  courts.  23 cases  ended 
with convictions. 65 people accused of trafficking were convicted by the criminal courts of 
first instance. 

There are two shelters in Ankara and Kirikkale provinces run by the Presidency for Migration 
Management (PMM). Their total capacity to host victims of trafficking in human beings is 42 
persons.  There  is  an  urgent  need  to  increase  the  capacity  to  host  and  provide  services  to 
victims of human trafficking. Additional shelters are planned for the provinces of Aydin and 
Kutahya. Türkiye should bolster its collaboration with civil society organisations to enhance 
its  capacity  in  identifying  victims  and  delivering  essential  victim  support  services. 
Specialised services should be strengthened for all victims of trafficking. 

The  many  Syrian  and  other  refugees,  including  children,  are  vulnerable  to  being  exploited 
through forced labour. Reports of early marriages increased in the wake of the pandemic as a 
negative economic coping mechanism.  

There  are  insufficient  training  programmes  for  law  enforcement  agencies,  prosecutors  and 
judges  that  focus  on  a  victim-centred  approach.  Partnership  with  civil  society  should  be 
sought in order to encourage the identification of victims of trafficking and to provide them 
with  shelter  and  services.  The  reasons  why  the  crime  of  trafficking  in  human  beings  is  not 
prosecuted  should  be  identified  and  measures  should  be  taken  to  ensure  that  victims  are 
allowed  to  appear  in  court  via  video  link  when  the  circumstances  of  the  case  and  the 
vulnerability of the persons concerned require this. 

Gun  violence  in  Türkiye  has  surged  in  recent  years,  while  the  overwhelming  majority  of 
firearms  owned  by  individuals  are  unregistered  due  to  lax  enforcement  of  the  Law  on 
unregistered weapons. 

In  2022,  47  079  suspects  were  detected  in  8  252  cases  of  cybercrime  (Articles  243/1,  244, 
103 and 226 of the Turkish Criminal Code), resulting in the conviction of 123 persons. In the 
reporting period, there was no national strategy and action plan in place against cybercrime. 

The  National  Cyber  Security  Strategy  and  Action  Plan  2020-2023  covers  public 
administration systems, information systems belonging to critical infrastructures operated by 
the public and private sectors, small  and medium-sized industry, and all the components  of 
cyber space at the national level (including all private and legal persons). 

Cooperation in the field of drugs 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

The High Council for the Fight against Drugs consists of 12 ministers and is responsible for 
coordination and monitoring at national level. The national strategy and the action plan aimed 
at combating illegal drugs, which have been in effect for the period of 2018-2023, are coming 
to  an  end.  The  secretariat  for  coordinating  their  implementation  is  within  the  Ministry  of 
Health’s Directorate-General for Public Health. All ministers involved in the implementation 
of the strategy and action plan are also members of the High Council. A research committee 
conducts research into drug addiction and a scientific committee provides recommendations 
for  studies,  training  and  awareness-raising  activities  on  drug  abuse.  An  Action  Plan  on  the 
Fight Against Methamphetamine 2022-2024 has been in force since August 2022 under the 
coordination  of  the  Ministry  of  Interior.  The  Ministries  of  Justice,  Family  and  Social 
Services, Interior, Defence, Health and Trade take part in the implementation. 

48 

 
 
Türkiye  is  a  member  of  the  European  Information  Network  on  Drugs  and  Drug  Addiction 
(Reitox). 

The Turkish Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (TUBİM) continues to act as 
the  national  focal  point  of  the  European  Monitoring  Centre  for  Drugs  and  Drug  Addiction 
(EMCDDA) and is the national drug observatory. Türkiye has had a participation agreement 
in  place  with  the  EMCDDA  since  2007  and  is  a  member  of  the  Management  Board  of  the 
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA). It has a monitoring 
role at national and international level  and drafts the annual Turkish drug report. It collects 
data,  makes  risk  assessments  and  provides  recommendations  with  regard  to  the  National 
Early Warning System on new psychoactive substances. A total of 1 006 new psychoactive 
substances have been included in the national legislation and 35 of these were put on the list 
in 2022. The instant data-flow system, which uses encryption and anonymisation of personal 
data for monitoring and reporting, is operational. The responsible body for controlling drug 
precursors is the Turkish Medicine and Medical Devices Agency of the Ministry of Health, 
licences  and  permits  for  manufacture,  possession,  selling,  purchase, 
which  grants 
transportation, consumption, distribution, importation, exportation and legal use including for 
pharmaceutical and industrial purposes. 
Within  the  framework  of  the  7th  Judicial  Reform  Package  adopted  in  April  2023,  some 
penalties  have  been  increased  under  the  Turkish  Penal  Code  with  regard  to  manufacturing 
and trading certain types of drug substances, which have a higher potential to cause addiction 
and serious health problems. The minimum imprisonment penalty was increased from 10 to 
15 years. Some amendments were made in relation to treatment, rehabilitation and probation. 
Random  tests  may  be  conducted  under  probation,  and  compulsory  treatment  and 
rehabilitation can be exercised on the convict or prisoner. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

Türkiye remains a transit route for drugs between Asia and Europe, but information exchange 
and  collaboration  with  EU  law  enforcement  partners  are  to  be  enhanced,  particularly  for 
heroin. In 2022, Turkish law enforcement services conducted operations that resulted in the 
seizure of, inter alia, 71 967 kg of cannabis including skunk (2021: 64 125 kg), 2 276 kg of 
cocaine  (2021:  2  841  kg),  7  957  kg  of  heroin  (2021:  22  202  kg),  16  210  kg  of 
methamphetamine (2021: 5 528 kg), 5 050 325 ecstasy tablets (2021: 7 618 013) and 23 945 
026 captagon tablets (2021: 13 790 648). 

In  2022,  a  total  of  69  430  cases  in  relation  to  Article  188/3  of  the  Turkish  Criminal  Code 
involving 90 919 suspects were launched by the prosecution for illicit drug related offences. 
28 181 suspects were convicted. 

In the field of prevention, the Ministry of Health (MoH) operates 237 counselling centres in 
81 provinces. In 2022, 30 new centres became operational. The anti-drug counselling hotline 
received  78 152  calls  in  2022.  There  are  135  treatment  centres  for  drug  dependence  in  81 
provinces.  59  of  the  centres  focus  on  inpatient  treatment  and  20  of  those  are  specifically 
dedicated to treating children. The other 76 centres are outpatient centres and 20 of those are 
specifically  dedicated  to  children.  The  waiting  time  for  applicants  to  be  admitted  to  the 
treatment  centres  is  currently  1-3  days.  Bed  capacity  is  1 372.  Despite  improvements,  the 
rehabilitation and treatment capacity remains insufficient. 

Fight against terrorism 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

49 

 
 
Türkiye’s  continuing  efforts  to  tackle  terrorism  reduced  terrorist  activity  and  improved  the 
security  situation.  The  country  continued  to  face  threats  from  various  terrorist  groups.  The 
EU  has  condemned  all  acts  of  terrorist  violence  perpetrated  in  Türkiye.  Türkiye  has 
prioritised the fight against the PKK and the dismantling of the Gülen movement. The PKK 
remains on the EU’s list of persons, groups and entities involved in acts of terrorism. Türkiye 
has  a  legitimate  right  to  fight  terrorism.  However,  bringing  the  Turkish  anti-terrorism 
legislation in line with EU standards still remains an essential outstanding reform. 

legal 

framework 

laundering 
the 
The 
and  terrorist  financing  should  be  aligned  with  the  recommendations  provided  by  the  FATF 
and  those  outlined  by  the  Venice  Commission  on  the  Law  on  preventing  financing  of 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 

against  money 

regulating 

fight 

Türkiye has been on the list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring (the ‘grey list’) of the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) since October 2021. Türkiye's EU candidate status and 
commitment  to  address  shortcomings  identified  by  the  FATF  and  to  align  with  the  EU’s 
acquis  have  prevented  it  from  being  added  to  the  EU’s  high-risk  third  countries  list. 
Türkiye’s  response  to  the  concerns  of  the  EU  and  the  FATF  continues  to  be  closely 
monitored in the framework of the Association Agreement. Türkiye must diligently adhere to 
the outstanding FATF Action Plan items to secure its removal from the grey list. With regard 
to the outcomes of the FATF’s Mutual Evaluation Report on Türkiye and the recommended 
actions  by  the  FATF,  Türkiye  promulgated  an  overarching  national  AML/CFT  strategy 
document  in  July  2021.  The  strategy  document  was  revised  in  2022  to  comply  with  the 
outstanding recommended actions. Türkiye also updated its National Risk Assessment at the 
end  of  2022.  The  country  is  also  supported  by  the  EU’s  Global  Facility  on  Anti-Money 
Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism project. 

In 2022, Türkiye adopted regulations regarding politically exposed persons and guidance to 
the  private  sector  on  detecting  terrorist  financing.  It  also  increased  its  financial  intelligence 
agency’s proactive dissemination of financial intelligence. In July 2023, the FATF concluded 
that  Türkiye  has  taken  positive  steps  towards  improving  its  AML/CFT  regime.  Türkiye  is 
now compliant with 14 recommendations, largely compliant with 25 recommendations, with 
only one recommendation (Recommendation 15 on new technologies) remaining as partially 
compliant. 

The Law on the prevention of financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has 
not  been  revised  in  line  with  the  Venice  Commission’s  recommendations.  The  Ministry  of 
Interior  and  the  Financial  Crimes  Investigation  Board  (MASAK)  developed  a  risk-based 
methodology  for  the  audit  of  the  non-profit  organisations  (NPOs).  As  a  result  of  the  risk-
based methodology, the Ministry of Interior’s audits prioritised the humanitarian aid NPOs. 
More than 600 NPOs have been audited repeatedly in accordance with the provisions of law 
since 2021. None of the audited NPOs and their executives have been prosecuted as a result 
of  these  audits.  Civil  society  remained  concerned  about  potential  disproportionate 
implementation  of  the  law  to  further  restrict  the  legitimate  activities  of  NGOs  and  to  put 
additional pressure on critical voices. 

Türkiye is an active member of the Global Coalition against Daesh. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

Türkiye faces threats  from  various terrorist groups. Türkiye actively  engaged in  the regular 
biannual review of the EU terrorism list under Common Position 2001/931/CFSP (‘CP 931’). 
The  PKK,  IBDA-C,  DHKP/C  and  TAK  remain  on  the  EU’s  terrorism  list.  However, 
terrorism  prosecutions  often  disproportionately  targeted  legitimate  activities  of  political 
50 

 
 
opposition.  Counterterrorism  efforts  need  to  be  pursued  in  accordance  with  the  rule  of  law 
and fundamental rights and freedoms. 

In the reporting period, MASAK continued to strengthen its institutional capacity as well as 
its  cooperation  with  law  enforcement  agencies  and  judicial  authorities.  MASAK  has 
consistently  built  a  sound  track-record.  The  number  of  suspicious  transaction  reports 
submitted  decreased  from  504  995  in  2021  to  425 322  in  2022.  Systematic  inter-agency 
cooperation between the law enforcement agencies, prosecution and MASAK has improved. 
As a result of its anti-money laundering / countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) 
analysis and inspections, MASAK forwarded criminal complaints to the prosecution for 496 
persons.  

Türkiye reaffirmed its commitment to freeze the assets of persons/entities designated by the 
United  Nations  Security  Council  Sanctions  Committee.  The  government  also  continued  to 
use the domestic assets freezing instrument as a deterrent.  

Judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters 

Judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters is regulated by the Law on international 
civil  law  and  procedural  law,  circulars  and  international  conventions.  Türkiye  is  a  party  to 
most  international  conventions.  However,  it  has  not  acceded  to  relevant  international 
conventions  in  the  area  of  civil  justice,  many  of  which  were  drawn  up  by  the  Hague 
Conference  on  Private  International  Law,  including  in  particular  the  1996  Convention  on 
Jurisdiction,  Applicable  Law,  Recognition,  Enforcement  and  Co-operation  in  Respect  of 
Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children,  the 2007 Convention on 
the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance and the 
2005 Convention of Hague on Choice of Court Agreements. Türkiye has not yet ratified the 
European  Convention  on  the  Compensation  of  Victims.  In  2022,  within  the  scope  of  the 
Convention  on  Civil  Procedure,  15  judicial  legal  assistance  requests  were  made  by  EU 
Member  States  and  196  by  Türkiye.  Within  the  scope  of  the  Convention  on  the  Taking  of 
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 77 judicial legal assistance requests were 
made by EU Member States and 1 937 by Türkiye. 

The  main  legislation  governing  judicial  cooperation  in  criminal  matters  has  been  in  place 
since 2016 and Türkiye has acceded to most of the international conventions. 33 mutual legal 
assistance requests following the introduction of videoconferencing have been processed and 
2 of these have been finalised. Under the new ‘consensual extradition’ procedure, extradition 
of an offender now takes 1-2 months on average, whereas the previous extradition procedure 
lasted around a year. As for the transfer of sentenced persons, introduction of the procedure 
of  ‘exact  execution’  paved  the  way  for  the  removal  of  the  obligation  on  local  courts  to 
comply  with  domestic  legislation.  In  2022,  a  total  of  seven  convicts  were  transferred  to 
Türkiye from EU Member States under the new procedure, while one convict was transferred 
from  Türkiye  to  an  EU  Member  State.  The  independence  and  accountability  of  the  justice 
system  has  to  be  substantially  strengthened  for  a  smooth  application  of  the  principle  of 
mutual recognition of judgments and court decisions in criminal matters. 

In  2022,  EU  Member  States  accepted  18  extradition  requests  from  Türkiye,  while  29  were 
rejected,  19  requests  became  redundant  and  151  are  still  pending.  Of  the  15  extradition 
requests  from  EU  Member  States,  3  were  rejected  and  12  are  still  pending.  EU  Member 
States did not agree to any transfer of convicts to Türkiye, but Türkiye agreed to 2 transfers to 
EU Member States. Five contact points have been designated by Türkiye to coordinate and 
follow  up  judicial  cooperation  on  criminal  matters  with  Eurojust.  In  2022,  Türkiye  was 
involved in 13 Eurojust cases on terrorism, terrorism financing, cybercrime (fraud), migrant 

51 

 
 
smuggling,  attempted  murder,  money  laundering,  forgery  and  drug  smuggling  (compared 
with 15 cases in 2021). However, negotiations for an International Agreement with the EU on 
cooperation with Eurojust have not started yet.  

Cooperation arrangements should also be established with the European Public Prosecutor’s 
Office (EPPO), which started operating in June 2021. In 2022, there were four EPPO cases 
involving  Türkiye.  Until  August  2023,  Türkiye  had  not  formally  communicated  whether  it 
would cooperate with the EPPO on the basis of the declarations made by Member States to 
the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, recognising the EPPO 
as a national competent authority for the purpose of the Convention. 

Legal and irregular migration 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

The  Presidency  for  Migration  Management  (PMM)  is  in  charge  of  coordinating  migration 
policy;  ensuring  coordination  between  relevant  agencies  and  organisations;  carrying  out 
functions and actions related to foreigners’ entry into, stay in and exit from Türkiye as well as 
their  removal,  international  and  temporary  protection;  and  the  protection  of  victims  of 
trafficking in human beings. The PMM currently has 13 267 personnel. 

Following  the  December  2019  amendment  of  the  Law  on  foreigners  and  international 
protection,  which  introduced  alternatives  to  detention,  the  implementing  regulation  on 
alternative  obligations  to  administrative  detention  was  adopted  on  14  September  2022.  The 
regulation breaks down the procedures applicable for the implementation of each alternative 
to detention. In addition to alternatives to detention based on residence and notification duty 
that  were  already  implemented  (before  the  regulation  entered  into  force),  methods  such  as 
return counselling and family-based return have been rolled out. Alternatives to detention that 
require  an  electronic  infrastructure  (such  as  voice  recognition  software  and  electronic 
bracelets) have yet to be put into practice. Irregular migration bureaus are set up to monitor 
the implementation of alternatives to detention in all the Provincial Directorates of Migration 
Management  (PDMMs).  Monitoring  working  groups  were  established  in  the  İstanbul, 
Ankara, İzmir and Antalya PDMMs. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

The  EU-Turkey  Statement  remained  the  main  framework  for  cooperation  between  the  EU 
and Türkiye. 

The PMM suffered loss of personnel and infrastructure due to the devastating February 2023 
earthquakes,  which  affected  11  provinces  of  Türkiye.  The  buildings  of  the  PDMMs  in 
Malatya, Osmaniye, Hatay, Adıyaman and Gaziantep were damaged, while a large number of 
personnel from other provinces have been appointed to the affected areas to provide services 
to  foreigners.  In  the  reporting  period,  PMM  continued  to  employ  a  limited  number  of 
psychologists,  social  workers,  interpreters  and  lawyers,  some  of  whom  are  financed  by  the 
EU. 

According  to  the  International  Organization  for  Migration  (IOM),  378  migrants  lost  their 
lives in  the Eastern Mediterranean in  2022 (111  in  2021). Between January and September 
2023, 22 421 irregular migrants arrived in the EU from Türkiye (including Greece, Italy and 
Bulgaria) compared to 22 821 arrivals during the same period in 2022. The sea route to Italy 
saw a substantial  decrease (down by 55%), while arrivals  in  Greece increased  considerably 
by 123%. However, the number of arrivals in Cyprus via the Green Line went down by 42% 
between January and September 2023, in comparison with the same period in 2022.  

52 

 
 
The average number of  daily irregular arrivals  in Greece from  Türkiye  was 42 in  2022 (up 
from  20 in  2021).  In 2023, by September, the average number of daily irregular arrivals  in 
Greece from Türkiye increased to 78. Turkish irregular migrants occupied the top spot among 
those  who  arrived  in  Greece,  followed  by  Syrians  and  Afghans.  In  2022,  the  number  of 
irregular  arrivals  in  Cyprus  reached  17 365  (11 600  in  2021),  most  of  whom  crossed  the 
Green Line after arriving from Türkiye via the non-government-controlled area of Cyprus. In 
2023, by September, 6 969 irregular arrivals were recorded in the government-controlled area 
of Cyprus. 

As regards the irregular sea route from Türkiye to Italy in 2023, 4 913 irregular arrivals were 
recorded until September, compared to 10 805 in the same period in 2022. The total number 
of irregular migrants who arrived in the EU from Türkiye in 2022 stood at 33 514 (including 
15  582  in  Greece,  15  805  in  Italy,  1  884  in  Bulgaria  and  173  in  Romania),  a  substantial 
increase compared to 21 295 irregular arrivals in 2021 (7 410 in Greece, 12 916 in Italy, 936 
in Bulgaria and none in Romania). At the same time, in 2022, the number of irregular arrivals 
in Cyprus via the Green Line also increased substantially to 17 365, from 10 918 in 2021. 

280 206 irregular migrants  were apprehended in Türkiye in 2022 (162 996 in  2021).  As in 
past years, irregular migrants from Afghanistan, Syria and Pakistan were the most frequently 
apprehended nationalities. The Turkish Coast Guard (TCG) rescued 49 518 irregular migrants 
at sea in 2022 (23 676 in 2021). 

In  2023,  by  August,  the  Turkish  authorities  had  apprehended  102  746  irregular  migrants, 
around 24 405 of whom were intercepted by the TCG. Nationals of Afghanistan, Syria and 
Palestine  topped  the  list  of  nationalities.  According  to  the  government,  law  enforcement 
forces  apprehended  9 149  smugglers  in  2022  (an  increase  on  the  7 942  apprehensions  in 
2021). As regards 2023, as of August, 3 259 migrant smugglers had been apprehended. 1 720 
people and organised crime groups were convicted for migrant smuggling in 2022. 

No  progress  was  made  as  regards  the  full  implementation  of  the  EU-Turkey  Readmission 
Agreement.  Türkiye  maintained  its  position  that  it  would  not  implement  the  provisions 
concerning third-country nationals until the visa requirement for its citizens travelling to the 
Schengen Area is lifted. 

Türkiye has unilaterally suspended the return of irregular migrants from the Greek islands on 
public  health  grounds  since  March  2020.  The  European  Commission  and  Greece  have 
repeatedly called on Türkiye to resume return operations in line with the commitments made 
under  the  EU-Turkey  Statement.  The  resumption  of  returns  to  Türkiye  remains  key  to 
effectively  fighting  irregular  migration  and  migrant  smuggling  networks  in  the  region. 
Between 2016 and 2020, 2 140 persons (including 412 Syrian nationals) were readmitted to 
Türkiye  from  Greece  under  the  ‘One-for-One’  scheme.  The  bilateral  Readmission  Protocol 
between  Greece  and  Türkiye  remained  suspended.  Türkiye  did  not  readmit  third-country 
nationals  from  Bulgaria  under  either  the  bilateral  border  agreement  or  the  EU-Turkey 
Readmission Agreement. 

As  regards  resettlement  from  Türkiye  to  the  EU  under  the  ‘One-for-One’  scheme,  5  046 
Syrian  refugees  were  resettled  in  eight  EU  Member  States  in  2022.  Moreover,  the 
Resettlement  Support  Facility  run  by  the  European  Union  Agency  for  Asylum  in  Istanbul 
facilitated  the  processing  of  2 585  resettlement  candidates.  The  total  number  of  Syrian 
refugees  resettled  from  Türkiye  to  the  EU  Member  States  under  the  ‘One-for-One’  scheme 
reached  39  648  as  of  September  2023.  At  the  same  time,  561 758  Syrian  refugees  were 
voluntarily  repatriated  from  Türkiye  to  Syria  between  2016  and  2023  according  to 
government data. Out of the total number, 58 758 Syrians were repatriated in 2022.  

53 

 
 
Türkiye returned  effectively  124 441 irregular  migrants  to  their home countries in  2022, an 
increase  of  more  than  160%  on  the  2021  figure  of  46 653.  The  total  number  of  irregular 
migrants  returned  since  2018  reached  372 790.  The  total  number  of  Afghan  nationals 
returned from Türkiye in 2022 was 66 534, while 12 385 Pakistani nationals and 40 898 other 
countries’  nationals  had  been  returned  to  their  countries  as  of  22  December  2022.  None  of 
these  returns  were  carried  out  within  the  scope  of  the  readmission  agreements  that  are  in 
force  between  Türkiye  and  third  countries.  Türkiye  did  not  sign  any  new  readmission 
agreements in the reporting period. 

Türkiye continued voluntary returns of irregular migrants financed through national as well 
as  EU  funds.  737  irregular  migrants  were  returned  through  the  national  voluntary  return 
scheme while 2 259 were returned with the assistance of IOM and EU financing in 2022. 

According  to  the  government,  280 206  irregular  migrants  were  prevented  from  entering 
Turkish territory in the eastern and southern provinces in 2022 by Turkish security forces. 

Some of the 30 removal centres were heavily damaged by the February 2023 earthquakes and 
the capacity to host irregular migrants dropped from 18 000 to 15 710. The removal centre in 
Hatay was evacuated due to heavy damage and is no longer operational, whereas hosting of 
migrants  in  other  removal  centres  was  suspended  pending  reparations.  The  number  of 
temporary accommodation centres managed by the PMM increased from 7 to 9, leading to an 
increase in capacity from around 66 000 to 77 000. Temporary accommodation centres also 
started hosting earthquake victims of Turkish origin along with Syrians. 

Civil society, bar associations and various media reported incidents of alleged human rights 
violations as well as pervasive challenges relating to access to rights and services in removal 
centres,  particularly  with  regard  to  access  to  information  and  legal  aid.  In  2022,  more  than 
280  000  irregular  migrants  were  apprehended,  most  of  whom  were  subject  to  return 
procedures in removal centres. A limited number of irregular migrants (939) benefited from 
free  legal  aid  in  2022  (1 059  in  2021).  In  addition  to  the  free  legal  aid  scheme,  37 876 
migrants were able to have access to and meet their lawyers in removal centres.  

Overall, irregular migration continued to be a polarising topic in society and was heavily used 
by political parties in their electoral campaigns. 

1 345 488  foreigners  were  legal  residents  in  Türkiye  on  1  December  2022  (1 275 741  in 
2021).  Nationals  of  Iraq,  Russia,  and  Turkmenistan  were  the  most  common  holders  of 
residence  permits.  The  number  of  Russian  nationals  with  residence  permits  increased  from 
approximately 66 000 in 2021 to around 155 000 in 2023. Approximately 560 000 Ukrainians 
have arrived in Türkiye since the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine in 
February 2022. Many had already left for a third country or voluntarily returned to Ukraine 
by September 2022. Around 46 000 Ukrainians were residing in Türkiye in April 2023. 

The  legislation  on  the  acquisition  of  nationality  by  foreign  investors  remained  unchanged 
during the reporting period. Moreover, according to Articles 35 and 36 of the Land Registry 
Law,  natural  persons  who  are  the  nationals  of  countries  designated  by  the  President  of  the 
Republic  can  acquire  real  estate  in  Türkiye.  As  of  October  2022,  the  list  contained  185 
countries. The list is not publicly available because it is not published on the website of the 
General Directorate of Land Registry. Such schemes pose risks in relation to security, money 
laundering, tax evasion, terrorist financing, corruption and infiltration by organised crime. As 
a  candidate  country,  Türkiye  should  refrain  from  any  measure  that  could  jeopardise  the 
attainment of the EU’s objectives when using its prerogatives to award nationality. 

Asylum 

54 

 
 
Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

The Presidency for Migration Management (PMM) is the main institution responsible for all 
asylum-related  procedures.  The  status  determination  processes  are  carried  out  by  the 
Provincial Directorates of Migration Management (PDMMs) as well as by the International 
Protection Bureaus (decision centres) in Ankara and Istanbul (established in 2018 and 2019 
respectively), with a view of reducing case backlog. A new International Protection Bureau 
was  established  in  Samsun  in  2022.  In  addition  to  those  bureaus,  mobile  teams  were 
established in  2019. Decisions on refugee status  determination are subject  to  administrative 
and judicial appeal procedures. 

Legislation in  this area is partially aligned with  the EU  acquis. The  Law  on foreigners and 
international  protection  maintains  the  reservation  (geographical  limitation)  expressed  in  the 
New York Protocol to the 1951 Geneva Convention as a result of which the vast majority of 
persons  seeking  international  protection  in  Türkiye  cannot  apply  for  fully-fledged  refugee 
status but only for ‘conditional refugee’ status and subsidiary protection. Conditional refugee 
status  limits  the  stay  in  the  country  ‘until  the  moment  a  recognised  conditional  refugee  is 
resettled  to  a  third  country’.  By  law,  Syrian  refugees  are  granted  a  specific  refugee  status 
under  the  Temporary  Protection  Regulation.  However,  in  February  2022,  the  Ministry  of 
Interior  announced  that  newly  arriving  Syrians  who  have  not  been  registered  will  not 
automatically  receive  temporary  protection  status  in  16  provinces.  According  to  the 
announcement,  residence  permit  applications  by  foreigners  would  not  be  accepted  in  any 
neighbourhood  in  which  25%  or  more  of  the  population  consisted  of  foreigners  (this  was 
reduced to 20% in June 2022). 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

Türkiye continued to host one of the largest refugee populations in the world, with (as of 31 
August 2023) 3 298 817 Syrians under temporary protection and slightly over 300 000 non-
Syrians  (including  those  who  hold  or  who  have  applied  for  international  protection  status). 
The  number  of  asylum  seekers  slightly  increased  over  the  reporting  period.  33  246 
international  protection  applications  were  received  in  2022  (29 256  in  2021).  19 400 
applications  were  made  by  Afghans,  7 131  by  Ukrainians  and  4 083  by  Iraqis.  This  was  a 
different pattern from 2021 due to the Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. In 2022, 
Türkiye  granted  international  protection  (refugee  status,  conditional  refugee  status  or 
subsidiary protection) to 12 857 applicants, a slight decrease compared with 13 227 in 2021. 
The authorities rejected 12 030 applications (11 908 in 2021). In 2022, the cumulative total of 
pending  international  protection applications  stood at  272 336.  Despite  a slight  decrease on 
last year, this remains a significant backlog that has not been reduced over the years. There is 
no  publicly  accessible  data  on  international  protection  with  a  breakdown  by  category  of 
decisions and of pending cases at the end of the year. 

As of June 2022, Türkiye officially closed registration of temporary protection applications in 
16  provinces  in  an  attempt  to  avoid  an  increase  in  the  number  of  foreigners  where  they 
already exceed 20% of the total population. When asylum seekers are denied registration in a 
‘closed’  province,  they  are  most  often  not  officially  referred  to  another  province  with 
supporting  documentation.  Outside  the  officially  ‘closed’  provinces,  NGOs  and  lawyers 
repeatedly  referred  to  the  de  facto  closure  of  international  protection  registration  in  other 
provinces, except for highly vulnerable cases. Such barriers to registration hinder access to all 
other  essential  services  and  put  asylum  seekers  in  an  irregular  situation  if  they  are 
apprehended. 

55 

 
 
Almost half of all Syrians in Türkiye are registered in four provinces  – Istanbul, Gaziantep, 
Hatay  and  Şanlıurfa.  The  rest  reside  in  various  other  provinces  across  Türkiye.  67 548 
Syrians  are  hosted  in  seven  temporary  accommodation  centres  (50 736  in  2021).  230  998 
Syrians had been granted Turkish citizenship as of April 2023. 

The  destructive  earthquakes  of  6  February  2023  affected  a  total  of  11  provinces 
(Kahramanmaraş,  Hatay,  Gaziantep,  Malatya,  Kilis,  Osmaniye,  Diyarbakir,  Adana, 
Adıyaman, Sanliurfa) where most of the migrant and refugee population (in particular 1 738 
035 Syrians  under Temporary Protection) had been living.  According to  a statement by the 
Interior  Minister,  6  969  foreigners  (mostly  Syrians)  lost  their  lives  because  of  the 
earthquakes.  The  earthquakes  have  led  to  great  human  mobility,  including  refugees  and 
migrants, inside the country. 

In ordinary circumstances, Türkiye imposes travel restrictions on refugees, prohibiting them 
from travelling out of the provinces in which they are registered with local authorities unless 
they  have  a  permit.  On  7  February  2023,  the  authorities  lifted  these  restrictions  for  about 
1.7 million refugees under temporary and international protection in the earthquake region for 
90 days (with the exception that they could not travel to İstanbul). A second circular reduced 
this  to  60  days  and  granted  those  travelling  from  the  worst-affected  five  provinces  (Hatay, 
Malatya,  Kahramanmaraş,  Adıyaman,  and  Gaziantep)  unconditional  access  to  other 
provinces,  but  made  travel  from  the  other  five  (Kilis,  Diyarbakır,  Şanlıurfa,  Adana,  and 
Osmaniye) dependent on the applicant’s home being seriously damaged and the existence of 
medical needs that could only be met in other provinces. This circular is still in place and is 
extended  on  a  regular  basis  excluding  Istanbul.  Another  administrative  order  gave  Syrians 
under temporary protection, registered and residing in the 11 earthquake-affected provinces, 
the opportunity to return to Syria temporarily. Syrians returning temporarily can stay in Syria 
for up to 6 months. Temporary returns to Syria started in February 2023 and by June the total 
number of temporary returns was 70 086 individuals. By September 62 936 individuals had 
returned to Türkiye. The deadline for re-entry to Türkiye was 15 September 2023, after which 
the temporary protection status of Syrians who had not returned to Türkiye was cancelled. 

The earthquakes and their consequences resulted in increasing discomfort for a large portion 
of the public. In the lead-up to the general elections in May 2023, opposition politicians made 
speeches that further fuelled anti-refugee sentiment and called for Syrians to return to Syria. 

Throughout  2022,  the  PMM  continued  the  verification  of  data  of  Syrians  under  temporary 
protection,  updating  and  completing  the  information  gathered  during  their  original 
registration. 2 071 051 Syrians’ data was verified in 2022. 

Additionally,  in  the  context  of  the  20%  rule,  the  PMM  introduced  an  address-verification 
exercise for Syrians. As a result of this exercise, the temporary protection status of  Syrians 
who were found to be residing in locations other than their officially registered addresses has 
reportedly been deactivated. The PMM invited these individuals to approach their provincial 
offices  to  declare  their  current  residential  addresses  so  that  they  could  reactivate  their 
protection status. In practice, deactivation of the status means discontinued access to services 
such as education and healthcare. 

A key mechanism for identifying vulnerable asylum seekers is protection desks in PDMMs 
which  interview  and  make  referrals  based  on  their  specific  needs  assessment.  There  are 
protection desks in 50 provinces. In 2022, protection desks identified and processed referrals 
for  153  054  asylum  seekers.  In  2022,  181  unaccompanied  children  were  referred  to  the 
Ministry  of  Family  and  Social  Services  (MoFSS)  by  various  agencies.  Unaccompanied 
children  continue  to  face  protection  risks,  particularly  during  initial  identification  and  age 

56 

 
 
assessment processes, which are undertaken by different agencies (including law enforcement 
services). Children are referred to hospitals for bone x-rays, which give a broad two-year age 
range. In the absence of holistic age-assessment processes, individuals whose results indicate 
that they are aged 16-18 might be registered as adults. A multi-disciplinary approach to age 
assessment  procedures,  which  take  psychosocial  aspects  into  consideration,  is  necessary  in 
order to increase compliance with European standards. 

Applicants  for  international  protection,  conditional  refugee  status  holders  and  people  under 
temporary protection, i.e. Syrians, can apply for work permits. However, a large majority of 
refugees and asylum seekers do not have effective access to the labour market, in particular to 
formal employment, due to low employability (lower levels of education and skills), language 
barriers and limited access to information and services. Around 400 000 refugee children in 
Türkiye (especially in the 15-18 age group) do not regularly attend school. According to the 
Ministry  of  National  Education,  822 524  refugee  students  were  enrolled  at  schools  in  29 
provinces in January 2023. 

The EU has mobilised close to EUR 10 billion in support for refugees in Türkiye since 2011. 
The full operational budget of EUR 6 billion of the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey was 
committed, with  over EUR 5.1 billion disbursed by June 2023. The Facility  mobilises both 
humanitarian  and  development  assistance  for  refugees  and  host  communities  in  Türkiye  to 
meet  basic  needs,  increase  access  to  education  and  healthcare  (including  for  vulnerable 
groups,  children  and  women)  and  strengthen  border  protection  at  the  eastern  borders  with 
Iran and Iraq. 

A first top-up of EUR 535 million was allocated in 2020 and an additional EUR 3 billion was 
mobilised by the EU in June 2021 to continue support for refugees and host communities in 
Türkiye in 2021-2023. This funding is committed to continuing the provision of basic needs, 
inclusive  quality  education  for  refugees,  their  socio-economic  empowerment  in  Türkiye  as 
well  as  border  management.  Part  of  it  (EUR 350 million)  is  being  mobilised  to  support 
refugees and host communities in the regions affected by the February 2023 earthquake. 

The PMM and the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) continued their cooperation 
with  the  implementation  of  the  2022-2023  Cooperation  Roadmap,  which  offers  capacity-
building  support  and  peer-to-peer  exchanges  on  best  practices  in  the  fields  of  asylum, 
reception, resettlement and organisational change. 

NGOs and lawyers report concerns about the quality of decisions on asylum, their reasoned 
notification and challenges with the awareness of and access to legal aid for appeals. 

Visa policy 

Türkiye made no progress in meeting the six unfulfilled benchmarks of the visa liberalisation 
roadmap  (on  the  anti-terror  law,  personal  data  protection  legislation,  implementation  of  the 
EU-Turkey  Readmission Agreement, conclusion  of an international  agreement with the EU 
on  Europol,  implementation  of  the  Group  of  States  against  Corruption  (GRECO) 
recommendations on anti-corruption and judicial cooperation with all EU Member States). 

Türkiye  needs  to  further  harmonise  its  visa  policy  with  the  EU’s  visa  policy.  This  would 
include  further  aligning  Turkish  visa  requirements  with  the  EU  lists  of  visa-free  and  visa-
required countries; full phasing-out of the issuing of visas at borders (currently the citizens of 
33  countries  are  eligible  to  obtain  a  visa  on  arrival,  compared  with  24  in  2021)  and  of 
electronic visas; and ensuring that the issuing of visas at its diplomatic missions is carried out 
in line with the conditions and procedures set out in the EU Visa Code. Türkiye continues to 
apply a discriminatory visa regime against nationals of Cyprus, but it has abolished the short-

57 

 
 
stay visa requirements for the other 26 Member States. 

Türkiye has introduced the biometric collection of fingerprinting for sticker visas issued by 
its  diplomatic  missions  in  a  number  of  countries  (primarily  in  Africa)  with  a  view  to 
increasing the authorities’ capacity to tackle irregular migration. The authorities have relaxed 
the rules governing the entry and residence of Ukrainian nationals  in  Türkiye as  a result of 
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. 

Schengen and external borders 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

No new legislation for the sector was adopted during the reporting period. The coordination 
of the work of the State bodies dealing with border management matters is the responsibility 
of the Directorate-General for Provincial Administration in the Ministry of the Interior (MoI). 
The Border Management Implementation Board did not meet in the reporting period, while 
preparations for its 6th meeting since its establishment in 2016 have been underway for some 
time. Its  supervising  body, the  Integrated Border  Management Coordination Board, has  not 
yet  met.  In  addition,  relevant  interinstitutional  meetings  were  held  at  technical  level  on 
specific topics. 

The Ministry of the Interior created a new department in autumn 2021 for the coordination of 
the future work of the National Coordination and Joint Risk Analysis Centre (NACORAC). 
Several  border  management  services  within  the  Turkish  administration  assigned  staff  to 
NACORAC, which is located in Ankara. Given its responsibilities at Türkiye’s green border, 
personnel from the Land Forces Command (in the Ministry of National Defence) should be 
assigned.  The  centre  was  formally  established  in  2016  and  an  inauguration  ceremony  was 
held in November 2022 to formalise the handover of EU-financed equipment, but it is not yet 
fully operational. Staff detachments from all other relevant institutions have been completed, 
but  the  staff  assignment  process  from  the  Land  Forces  Command  is  still  ongoing. 
NACORAC  has  started  collecting  data  from  central  and  local  institutions,  albeit  at  a  basic 
level. The risk analysis process has also been initiated to a limited extent, while negotiations 
with all relevant institutions for enhanced data-sharing are ongoing. 

Following  the  establishment  in  February  2021  of  the  Institute  of  Heads  of  Civil  Border 
Administration, transfer of certain border management responsibilities from governors in 11 
border  regions  (mostly  in  eastern  Türkiye)  to  the  Directorate-General  for  Provincial 
Administration has continued. Two heads were appointed at land borders during the reporting 
period,  bringing  the  total  number  of  heads  appointed  by  the  Directorate-General  for 
Provincial  Administration  for  border  gates  to  eight  (six  at  airports,  including  Istanbul, 
Ankara,  Izmir  and  Antalya;  and  two  at  land  borders).  This  reform  seeks  to  streamline  the 
coordination of border management at central level. 

In terms of new coordination mechanisms at local level, ‘Security Commissions’ have been 
established (under the chairmanship of the Civil Border Administration with the participation 
of the representatives of the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, the Ministry of Trade, 
the Ministry of Health, the Turkish National Police and the gendarmerie) and will meet every 
month at civil airports, ports and border gates to develop, implement and evaluate measures 
with regard to security, training and inspection services. 

Similar to  last year’s  recommendations, in  order  to  bring the country’s border management 
system  in  line  with  the  EU  acquis,  Türkiye  should  further  improve  inter-service  and 
international cooperation, accelerate the adoption of an integrated border management (IBM) 
strategy and update its IBM national implementation action plan from 2006. It also needs to 

58 

 
 
take  steps  to  enact  new  legislation  to  set  up  a  non-military  border  management  body  in 
charge  of  all  aspects  of  border  management,  including  border  surveillance  at  the  green 
border, which is currently under the responsibility of the Turkish land forces. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

Türkiye continued to invest significant effort and financial resources in modernising border 
security  at  the  land  border,  especially  in  the  south  and  south-east  of  the  country.  After  the 
construction of a modular security wall and a panel/barbed-wire fence, patrol roads, lighting, 
sensors  and  thermal  cameras  along  the  Syrian  border,  the  installation  of  modern  electro-
optical  communication  and  surveillance  masts  continued  at 
Iranian  border. 
Communication and surveillance masts were also being erected on the western land border. 
The  EU  provides  substantial  support  to  Türkiye  to  modernise  its  border  surveillance 
infrastructure, including at its eastern borders with Iran and Iraq. 

the 

Relations  with  the  European  Border  and  Coast  Guard  Agency  (Frontex)  are  based  on  the 
Memorandum  of  Understanding  of  2012  and  a  three-year  cooperation  plan  covering  the 
period  2020-2022.  The  authorities  continued  to  provide  monthly  reports  on  irregular 
migration flows at the country’s western land and sea borders. Türkiye did not engage in joint 
operations in the reporting period but did participate in training sessions and conferences. 

Cooperation  with  neighbouring  Greece  and  Bulgaria  within  the  framework  of  a  trilateral 
Police  and  Customs  Co-operation  Centre  at  the  Bulgarian-Turkish  border  crossing  point  at 
Kapitan  Andreevo/Kapıkule  continued  through  data-sharing,  and  regular  ad  hoc  meetings 
between the countries’ respective authorities within the scope of existing agreements. 

Türkiye  continued  contributing  to  Interpol’s  databases,  albeit  only  on  the  basis  of  manual 
inquiries  in  case  of  need  (using  the  ‘POLNET’  website  of  the  TNP’s  Interpol  &  Europol 
Department).  Interpol’s  ‘Stolen  and  Lost  Travel  Documents’  (SLTD)  database  is  not 
integrated with  Türkiye’s local  database and there is  no access  to  other international  police 
databases. Local database connections are used by authorised officers of the Turkish National 
Police in all 81 provinces. Certain staff members in the following services have access to the 
databases:  the  Presidency  of  Migration  Management  (PMM),  the  Disaster  and  Emergency 
Presidency  (AFAD),  the  Nuclear  Regulatory  Authority,  the  Turkish  Atomic  Energy 
Authority,  the  Ministry  of  Trade  (DG  Customs  Enforcement),  the  Turkish  Coast  Guard 
Command and the General Gendarmerie Command. 

Türkiye has committed itself to removing all anti-personnel landmines by 31 December 2025 
in  order  to  fulfil its  obligations  under  the  Ottawa  Convention  (or  Anti-personnel  Mine  Ban 
Treaty). This deadline has been extended several times since  2014. So far, only a relatively 
small stretch of the total of 2 949 km of land border has been cleared entirely. Türkiye needs 
to substantially increase its national investment in removing mines not only along its borders 
with Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Armenia, but also inside Türkiye in order to fulfil its obligations 
under the Ottawa Convention. The EU is currently providing significant financial support for 
demining. 

59 

 
 
 
2.3. ECONOMIC CRITERIA 

In  line  with  the  conclusions  of  the  European  Council  in  Copenhagen  in  June  1993,  EU 
accession requires the existence of  a functioning market  economy and the capacity to  cope 
with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. 

2.3.1. The existence of a functioning market economy 

The  Turkish  economy  is  well  advanced  but  made  no  progress  over  the  reporting  period. 
Serious concerns persist over the continued proper functioning of Türkiye’s market economy. 
There  has  been  prolonged  backsliding  on  important  elements,  such  as  the  conduct  of 
monetary policy and the institutional and regulatory environment over most of the reporting 
period.  Since  the  May  parliamentary  and  presidential  elections,  the  authorities  have  taken 
some steps to revert to more stability-oriented macroeconomic policies. 

Although  economic  growth  remained  robust  in  2022,  Türkiye  moved  further  away  from 
market-oriented  policies,  which  weakened  its  economic  fundamentals  and  increased 
vulnerabilities and risks. Inflation decreased somewhat but remained very high as monetary 
policy prioritised exceptionally low interest rates, which remain deeply negative in real terms 
and are sustained by a web of regulatory and prudential measures. After the presidential and 
parliamentary elections in spring 2023, monetary policy has started to tighten, also signalling 
a  gradual  simplification  of  the  macroprudential  framework.  The  current  account  deficit 
increased  to  5.4%  of  GDP  in  2022,  driven  by  a  negative  terms-of-trade  shock  and  large 
imports of non-monetary gold. The relatively good budget performance in recent years masks 
an underlying trend of growing fiscal risks. The authorities’ commitment to fiscal discipline 
wavered, as the fiscal stance turned pro-cyclical in 2023, with earthquake-related expenditure 
pressure adding to pre-electoral budgetary largesse. However, the fiscal stance was tightened 

60 

Table 5.1: 202020212022Türkiye - Key economic figuresGDP per capita (% of EU-27 in PPS)1)65616369Real GDP growth 4.31.811.45.6Economic activity rate of the population aged 15+ (%), total52.149.351.453.1      female32.830.932.835.1      male72.068.270.371.4Unemployment rate of the population aged 15+ (%), total11.113.212.010.4      female13.815.014.713.4      male9.912.310.78.9Employment of the population aged 15+ (annual growth %)2.3-4.87.96.7Nominal wages (annual growth %)16.518.019.373.2Consumer price index (annual growth %)11.212.319.672.3Exchange rate against EUR4.28.010.417.4Current account balance (% of GDP)-2.7-4.5-0.9-5.4Net foreign direct investment, FDI (% of GDP)1.10.60.80.9General government balance (% of GDP)-2.0-2.9-2.3-1.1General government debt (% of GDP)29.039.741.831.7Notes: 1) EurostatSource: national sources2014-19 average 
 
 
 
after the elections and a revised budget, including sizeable tax increases, was adopted in July. 

The  institutional  and  regulatory  environment  lacks  predictability  and  transparency,  and 
complicates the post-electoral economic policy normalisation. Market exit remains costly and 
slow.  However,  Türkiye  made  progress  in  digitalising  government  services  to  businesses. 
Although  the size of the informal economy  has fallen  in  recent  years, it still accounts for a 
significant share of economic activity. State intervention in price-setting mechanisms persists. 
The provision of State aid lacks proper implementation rules, enforcement and transparency. 
The banking sector remained broadly stable but is facing financial stability challenges due to 
the numerous overly complex and far-reaching macroprudential and regulatory measures. The 
labour  market  strengthened  further,  although  structural  challenges  remain  significant,  in 
particular for youth and female employment. Regional labour market disparities declined and 
reached  one  of  the  lowest  levels  in  years.  The  recent  net  minimum  wage  increases  were 
pro-cyclical. 

The  Commission’s  recommendations  from  2022  were  not  fully  implemented  and  remain 
valid.  In  order  to  improve  the  functioning  of  the  market  economy,  Türkiye  should  in 
particular: 

→  restore  the  independence  of  the  central  bank  and  tighten  monetary  policy  in  order  to 

reduce inflation sustainably towards the target; 

→  develop a credible medium-term fiscal consolidation plan that underpins a gradual return 
to  primary  surpluses,  while  accommodating  transparent  reconstruction  spending  and 
addressing fiscal risks, including from contingent liabilities; 

→  further  improve  the  business  environment,  including  by  reducing  State  interference  in 
price-setting  mechanisms,  simplifying  the  macroprudential  and  regulatory  framework, 
and enhancing the transparency and control of State aid. 

Economic governance 

Türkiye  moved  further  away  from  market-oriented  policies,  weakening  economic 
fundamentals and increasing risks, but has taken some steps to reverse this course since 
the  May  elections.  Monetary  policy  prioritised  maintaining  deeply  negative  real  interest 
rates,  despite  soaring  inflation  and  tightening  global  financial  conditions.  This  necessitated 
the adoption of far-reaching macroprudential and regulatory measures that have disrupted the 
functioning of the financial markets and increased vulnerabilities. However, the central bank 
has  started  to  tighten  monetary  policy  after  the  presidential  and  parliamentary  elections  in 
spring  2023,  also  signalling  a  gradual  simplification  of  the  macroprudential  framework. 
Fiscal policy turned strongly expansionary in  the first half of 2023, with earthquake-related 
expenditure pressure adding to pre-electoral budgetary largesse. Ad hoc policy measures have 
increasingly  become  the  norm,  undermining,  in  conjunction  with  high  macroeconomic 
instability, the credibility of medium-term planning. A budget rebalancing and large tax hikes 
in  July  have  sought  to  limit  the  bulging  budget  deficit.  Subsidies  and  transfers  to  curb  the 
effects of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine increased significantly in 2022 but are 
planned to decline in 2023. Türkiye has not joined the EU restrictive measures against Russia 
and continued to benefit from its extensive and growing trade relations with it, particularly in 
energy,  tourism  and  agriculture.  The  implementation  of  the  policy  guidance  set  out  in  the 
conclusions from the Economic and Financial Dialogue of May 2022 has been limited. 

Macroeconomic stability 

61 

 
 
of 

the 

economic 

(2018-2022) 

growth 
Türkiye’s 
remained  upbeat  but  unbalanced. 
Real  GDP  grew  by  5.5%  in  2022, 
which  was  above 
five-year 
4.5%, 
average 
although,  after  a  strong  first  half  of 
the year, it decelerated in the second 
half.  It  expanded  further  in  the  first 
half  of  2023  and  growth  even 
strengthened  a  bit,  despite 
the 
devastating  February  earthquakes. 
Domestic  demand,  in  particular  very 
strong household consumption fuelled by pre-election expenditure, remained the main driver 
of  this.  Net  exports’  contribution  to  growth  turned  negative  in  the  second  half  of  2022, 
following  a  loss  in  export  momentum  and  a  pick-up  in  imports,  which  worsened  further  in 
early  2023.  Inventories  continued  to  wind  down  and  very  weak  construction  investment 
pulled down total investment growth last year. A notable expansion of technology-intensive 
and export-oriented sectors lifted industrial production to record high levels in 2022. The 6 
February earthquakes caused a tragic loss of life and significant destruction of capital assets. 
High  frequency  indicators  captured  the  first  negative  economic  effects  of  the  earthquakes 
already  in  February,  with  steep  monthly  falls  in  industrial  production  and  retails  sales,  and 
declining  economic  confidence.  However,  economic  activity  rebounded  quickly  in  the 
following months and consumer confidence increased sharply to  levels  not  seen in  5  years, 
before  steeply  falling  back  in  the  aftermath  of  the  elections.  Due  to  Türkiye’s  relatively 
strong performance during the COVID-19 crisis, income convergence with the EU resumed, 
with per capita GDP in purchasing power standards rising to 69% of the EU average in 2022 
from 59% in 2019, and above its 2015 high of 68%. 

External imbalances increased and remained a major vulnerability. The current account 
deficit swelled to 5.4% of GDP in 2022 and increased further in the first half of 2023 to more 
than double its average in 2018-2022, as the negative terms-of-trade shock and large imports 
of non-monetary gold (a traditional safe asset in times of policy uncertainty in Türkiye) drove 
the  trade  deficit  back  into  double  digits  for  the  first  time  in  a  decade.  However,  excluding 
gold and energy trade, the current account recorded a 5% surplus. The high external deficits 
remain a key macroeconomic vulnerability, aggravated by the strong reliance on short-term 
borrowing,  a  very  high  sovereign  risk  premium  and  the  low  level  of  foreign  exchange 
reserves  (with  a  large  share  in  non-
core  foreign  currencies).  The  central 
bank’s net foreign assets even turned 
negative  in  April  as  it  used  its 
reserves  to  defend  the  exchange  rate 
before 
the  elections.  Reflecting 
deteriorating  market  perception  of 
domestic  economic  policy,  the  five-
year  credit  default  swap  has  been 
high and very volatile. After peaking 
in the summer of 2022 above 900 bps 
(basis points), it declined to between 
500 bps and 600 bps by the end of the year before spiking again following the presidential 
and parliamentary elections in the spring of 2023. External debt remained moderately high at 

62 

-8-4048121620201720182019202020212022Graph 5.1: Türkiye -Real GDP growth and contributionsPriv. cons.Gov. cons.GFCFStocksNet exportsReal GDP growthSource: WiiW% y-o-y-6-30320182019202020212022Graph 5.2: Türkiye -Current account selected components and FDIGoods and services trade balance Workers' remittances balanceCurrent account balanceNet FDI% of GDPSource: IMF and Central Bank of Türkiye 
 
around 50% of GDP in early 2023, decreasing from the peak of 60% of GDP that it reached 
during the COVID-19 crisis. However, the debt stock remains sensitive to the lira’s exchange 
rate  fluctuations  and  its  structure  worsened  as  economic  agents  increased  their  reliance  on 
short-term  funding  as  a  response  to  rising  refinancing  costs.  Banks’  increased  exposure  to 
foreign currency swaps with the central bank raises economy-wide foreign currency liquidity 
concerns. The external debt roll-over ratios have been stable at close to 100% for the banking 
sector but have rapidly come down under 100% in early 2023 (albeit from high levels) in the 
non-banking  sector.  The  non-financial  sector’s  foreign  exchange  deficit  remained  broadly 
unchanged at less than 10% of GDP and its short-term position remained positive – important 
factors attenuating external vulnerability. 

Inflation  remained  high  as,  before  the  elections,  monetary  policy  prioritised  the 
maintenance  of  exceptionally  low  interest  rates  sustained  by  an  expanding  web  of 
regulatory and macroprudential measures. Inflation peaked at 85.5% in October 2022. It 
declined  steeply  in  the  following  months  on  the  back  of  sizeable  base  effects  before 
rebounding  again  since  June,  exceeding  the  5%  target  by  a  very  large  margin.  Before  the 
elections,  inflation  targeting  and  the  free-floating  exchange  rate  were  effectively  no  longer 
the  guiding  framework  of  monetary  policy.  The  monetary  policy  transmission  mechanism 
was  broken,  with  limited  responsiveness  by  key  market  interest  rates  to  the  central  bank 
policy rate. Despite very high inflation and tightening global financial conditions, the central 
bank lowered its key policy rate in the autumn of 2021 and cut it further in several steps by a 
cumulative 1 050 bps to 8.5% in February 2023 (the last 50 bps cut was delivered after the 
earthquakes). To sustain the resulting deeply negative real-interest rate and alleviate its policy 
contradictions, the authorities have introduced an increasingly complex web of regulatory and 
macroprudential  measures  to  reduce  dollarisation,  support  the  lira,  lower  inflationary 
pressures, ration and direct credit, and cap interest rates. This set of measures achieved some 
short-term  results  but  failed  to  address  the  fundamental  drivers  of  high  inflation;  namely 
deeply negative real interest rates, the absence of an effective policy anchor and the lack of 
institutional independence of the central  bank and key agencies. After depreciating  by 40% 
against  the  US  dollar  in  the  first  three  quarters  of  2022,  the  lira  remained  broadly  stable 
before  resuming  its  depreciation  trend  in  early  March  2023,  which  intensified  (along  with 
exchange rate volatility) after the May elections. Starting in June and under the guidance of a 
new central bank governor, the central bank increased the key policy rate to 25.0% in August 
and  signalled  a  gradual  further  tightening  of  monetary  conditions  and  simplification  of  the 
existing micro- and macroprudential framework. 

63 

 
 
on 

The  authorities’  commitment  to  fiscal  discipline  wavered  and  the  fiscal  stance  turned 
pro-cyclical  in  early  2023,  necessitating  the  adoption  of  a  revised  budget  in  July.  The 
budget continued to outperform expectations, ending 2022 with a central government budget 
deficit  of  0.9%  of  GDP  –  significantly  below  the  revised  budget  target  of  3.4%  and  the 
previous  year’s  deficit  of  2.8%  of 
GDP. The general government deficit 
fell to 1.1% of GDP, which was also 
far below the expected 3.2% of GDP. 
The  initial  2023  central  government 
budget  targeted  a  deficit  of  TRY 
659.4 billion (3.5% of GDP) but was 
optimistic 
based 
macroeconomic  assumption  of  5% 
real  GDP growth and 24.9% average 
inflation.  Total 
consumer  price 
revenue  was  planned  to  increase  by 
36.0%  and  expenditure  by  52.0%  in  comparison  with  the  2022  budgetary  outcome.  The 
budget  introduced  some  new  measures  but  failed  to  fully  exit  the  ‘crisis  mode’  of  ad  hoc 
decisions.  On  the  revenue  side,  the  2%  accommodation  tax  adopted  in  2021  started  to  be 
applied at the beginning of 2023. The corporate income tax rate has been lowered as planned 
to 20%. Government expenditure increased strongly in early 2023 due to the elections and the 
earthquakes.  The  government  budget  continued  underwriting  costly  and  poorly  targeted 
measures  to  support  the lira  and  cushion  the  impact  of  high  energy  prices,  although  lower-
than-expected international gas prices and financial repression measures that forced domestic 
banks  to  increase  their  holdings  of  government  bonds  led  to  some  savings.  Some  spending 
measures  with  a  large  budgetary  impact  (including  public  wage  and  pension  hikes,  and  the 
removal of the age requirement for early retirement) were finalised after budget adoption and 
were  not  fully  reflected  in  the  original  budget.  The  fiscal  stance  was  tightened  after  the 
elections. A revised budget was adopted in July, including multiple and sizeable tax increases 
(VAT, corporate income tax, special consumption tax, motor vehicle tax, etc.) and additional 
expenditure to cover earthquake reconstruction needs and pre-election spending measures. 

rather 

a 

The relatively good budget performance in recent years masks an underlying trend of 
growing fiscal risks. The government debt ratio peaked at 42.3% of GDP in early 2022 but 
came down to 31.2% of GDP in early 2023, helped by the strong denominator effect from the 
very  high  level  of  inflation.  Concerted  ‘liraisation’  efforts  increased  the  share  of  new 
domestic  borrowing  in  lira  to  90%  in  2022.  Nonetheless,  two  thirds  of  the  total  debt  stock 
remains  denominated  in  foreign  currencies,  while  the  average  time  to  maturity  of  the  debt 
stock remained unchanged at 5.4 years, as external debt maturity decreased for the fifth year 
in a row. Some measures, such as the FX-guaranteed lira deposits, had a direct and sizeable 
impact on the budget and are a significant source of (contingent) budget liabilities, even after 
they were fully transferred to the central bank in July. Successive crises and shocks triggered 
the adoption of numerous ad hoc measures with  budgetary effects  that have strained public 
finance management. The multiple and sizeable tax exemptions and reductions undermine tax 
bases and complicate planning, while successive tax amnesties have become the rule rather 
than the exception, despite official policy declarations. The planned new single consolidated 
framework  for  all  public-private  partnerships  has  yet  to  be  adopted.  Even  though  fiscal 
performance  has  been  consistently  robust  in  recent  years,  there  are  still  no  national  fiscal 
rules  or  independent  fiscal  institutions  to  monitor  fiscal  performance.  The  medium-term 
budget framework is subject to frequent changes and is not sufficiently credible and binding. 

64 

01020304050-4-202201720182019202020212022Graph 5.3: Türkiye -Fiscal developmentsPrimary balance (lhs)Interest (lhs)GG balance (lhs)Public debt (rhs)Source: Nationalsources% ofGDP 
 
The macroeconomic policy mix remained largely focused on the pursuit of growth at the 
expense of rising economic vulnerability. Fiscal policy turned expansionary in early 2023, 
despite  the  very  high  level  of  inflation  and  large  external  imbalances.  The  maintenance  of 
deeply negative real interest rates by the central bank and the complex web of regulatory and 
macroprudential  measures  to  sustain  them  created  major  vulnerabilities,  led  to  market 
fragmentation and disrupted price signals. The low level of policy credibility and institutional 
weaknesses (including the lack of central bank independence) undermine the effectiveness of 
the policy mix and hinders the post-electoral economic policy normalisation. 

Functioning of product markets 

Business environment 

The  institutional  and  regulatory  environment  is  characterised  by  weaknesses  in 
transparency,  predictability  and  rule-based  implementation.  The  government’s  highly 
interventionist  pre-election  policy  increased  uncertainty  and  volatility  on  the  product  and 
financial  markets.  Türkiye  lacks  a  mechanism  for  systematically  consulting  business 
organisations  and  social  partners  during  the  preparation  of  new  legislation.  Intellectual 
property  right  enforcement  continues  to  be  very  weak.  According  to  the  e-Government 
Benchmark report of the EU for 2022, Türkiye performed above the EU average in enabling 
regular  areas  of  business  operation  (such  as  administrative  and  tax  requirements,  human 
resources and refund of VAT) on digital platforms, except for those that require cross-border 
transactions.  However,  Türkiye's  performance  is  lower  in  online  services  for  new  business, 
which remain relatively cumbersome. Market exit remained costly and time-consuming due 
to  complicated  insolvency  procedures.  Türkiye  digitalised  some  steps  in  the  insolvency 
procedure,  such  as  liquidation,  but  it  still  takes  1 037  days  on  average  to  complete  a 
bankruptcy  process  through  the  judicial  system.  Even  though  alternative  dispute  resolution 
mechanisms have been promoted, commercial judicial processes are slow and a large backlog 
of commercial court cases remains. The number of newly established businesses increased by 
27.8% in 2022, while the number of liquidated companies went up by 26.0% and the number 
of  closed  ones  by  42.8%.  The  acquisition  and  management  of  companies  under  the 
trusteeship  of  the  Savings  Deposits  Insurance  Fund  (SDIF)  are  carried  out  in  a  non-
transparent manner. In June 2023, the trusteeship of the Fund was managing 620 companies 
based  in  35  provinces  across  Türkiye,  with  a  total  asset  value  of  TRY 128.9  billion  and 
27 213 employees. 

The informal sector’s share in the economy declined but remains structurally high and 
well above the OECD and EU averages. In 2022, the share of unregistered employment fell 
to 26.8% from 34.8% in 2019, while in the non-agricultural sector it was down to 16.8% from 
23.3%.  The  government  announced  its  new  action  plan  for  the  fight  against  the  informal 
economy (2023-2025) in December 2022. The plan includes 44 actions to measure the size of 
the informal economy; raise the level of social awareness and voluntary compliance; improve 
cooperation and interagency data sharing; adopt legal, administrative and technical measures; 
and  strengthen  audit  capacity.  However,  the  plan  lacks  performance  indicators  to  track  its 
implementation progress. 

State influence on product markets 

The State increased its intervention in the price-setting mechanism of key sectors. More 
than a quarter of the consumer basket is composed of goods whose prices are set or heavily 
influenced  by  public  authorities.  A  25%  upper  cap  on  rent  increases  was  applied  until  July 
2023.  A  month  before  the  May  elections,  the  Energy  Market  Regulatory  Authority  cut 
electricity tariffs by 15%. Households and places of worship were exempted from natural gas 

65 

 
 
payment  for  a  month  and  25  cubic  meters  have  been  provided  free  of  charge  to  citizens 
starting in June 2023 for the following 11 months. Meanwhile, the regulators have continued 
carrying out intensive price audits to investigate allegations of unfair pricing and stockpiling, 
particularly  in  essential  products.  The  VAT  exemption  period  for  new  equipment  and 
machinery deliveries to the manufacturing sector for innovation, design and R&D activities 
was extended until the end of 2024. Following the February 2023 earthquakes, the VAT rate 
applicable  to  prefabricated  buildings  and  containers  to  be  delivered  to  the  earthquake  zone 
was reduced from 18% to 1% until 31 December 2023. 

State aid transparency and control remains weak. Legislation to implement the State aid 
law has  not  been adopted. The newly established Directorate-General  for State Aid has not 
been assigned any enforcement power regarding the State aid law. The lack of implementing 
legislation and an operational institutional framework mean that this law is not enforceable. 
Türkiye has not formally set up a comprehensive state aid inventory or adopted an action plan 
to align all State aid schemes with the EU acquis. The current structure of State aid control is 
neither  independent  nor  operational  (see  Chapter  8).  The  committed  investment  for  the  64 
supported  projects  reached  TRY 491  billion  in  May  2023.  As  is  the  case  for  the  general 
incentive  scheme,  Türkiye  has  not  published  data  concerning  the  actual  support  granted  to 
these  projects.  Small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  (SMEs)  benefit  from  numerous  support 
measures  and  initiatives  in  a  fragmented  way.  The  SME  Development  Organisation  of 
Türkiye (KOSGEB) and the Ministry of Industry and Technology  conducted evaluations of 
four  more  support  programmes  in  the  reporting  period  and  published  them  on  KOSGEB’s 
website. 

Privatisation and restructuring 

The  scope  of  privatisation  remained  limited.  Privatisation  receipts  increased  from 
USD 413 million in 2021 to USD 504 million in 2022 (less than 0.1% of GDP), with 87.5% 
related  to  the  sale  of  real  assets.  The  Turkish  Wealth  Fund  (TWF)  holds  shares  in  major 
companies  in  the  financial  (including  state-owned  banks,  Borsa  Istanbul  and  consolidated 
public  insurance  companies),  telecommunications,  petrochemicals,  real  estate,  mining, 
agriculture and transport sectors. The Law on the Istanbul Financial Centre adopted in June 
2022  granted  the  TWF  the  right  to  conduct  all  business  and  management  operations  in  the 
Istanbul Financial Centre area for 20 years, with a managing company established as a joint 
stock  company.  The  involvement  of  the  TWF  through  this  company  means  that  these 
operations will be exempted from audit by the Turkish Court of Accounts (see Chapter 32). 
In addition to the numerous immunities granted to the TWF, this law provides a series of new 
tax  exemptions,  deductions  and  incentives.  The  TWF’s  total  assets  increased  to  TRY 3.2 
trillion  (44.1%  of  GDP)  at  the  end  of  2021,  up  from  TRY 2.2  trillion  (43.6%  of  GDP)  in 
2020. 

Functioning of the financial market 

Financial stability 

The  banking  sector  has  remained  broadly  stable  but  is  facing  financial  stability 
challenges. The commercial banks’ average regulatory capital ratio declined from its peak of 
20.4%  in  early  2022  to  18.7%  in  July  2023  but  stayed  significantly  above  the  required 
minimum. The decline was more pronounced in State-owned banks, whose capitalisation fell 
to  14.5%  in  early  2023  –  a  two-decade  low  –  despite  several  recapitalisation  rounds  in 
previous years, before rebounding to 16.3% in July. The fall in capitalisation was the result of 
banks’  support  for  the  authorities’  economic  and  development  agenda,  including  in  the 
aftermath  of  the  February  2023  earthquakes.  Some  of  the  macroprudential  measures  to 

66 

 
 
protect capital adequacy have been modified but remain in place (e.g., allowing the use of an 
outdated FX rate and the suspension of mark-to-market accounting rules). Credit growth, the 
extremely  negative  real  interest  rates  and  growing  collateral  valuation  brought  the  non-
performing loans ratio down to a new low (falling in July 2023 to 1.6% in the banking sector 
as a whole and to just 1.0% in the State-owned banks) while loan-loss provisioning increased 
further. The share of stage 2 loans under close monitoring also declined to below 10%. Bank 
profitability improved but remained negative in real terms. The average return on assets was 
3.7%  and  return  on  equity  was  49.9%  for  the  banking  sector  as  a  whole  in  2022,  but  were 
only  2.0%  and  29.9%  respectively  in  State-owned  banks.  FX-guaranteed  deposits  were 
around  a  quarter  of  total  deposits  in  mid-2023,  bringing  the  share  of  lira-denominated 
deposits  to  57.4%  (still  below  their  level  a  decade  ago),  while  underlying  dollarisation 
increased. 

Access to finance 

financial  sector  operates 

The 
in  an  overregulated  environment.  Far-reaching 
macroprudential  and  regulatory  measures  have  disrupted  the  functioning  of  the  financial 
markets.  Reducing  interest  rates  and  keeping  them  down  necessitated  additional  actions  to 
mitigate the fundamental contradictions of such a policy in a high-inflation environment. A 
series  of  incentives  and  restrictions  have  been  introduced  since  late  2021,  covering: 
FX-protected lira-denominated deposits; maintenance of a certain share of lira-denominated 
deposits; reserve and security requirements; collateral in swap and interbank money markets; 
tax  exemptions;  FX-surrender  requirements  for  exporters;  capital  adequacy  ratios;  risk 
weighting; and commercial loans. These measures rationed and directed credit, and replaced 
price  signals  with  quantitative  targets  or  directly  socialised  risk.  As  part  of  the  economic 
policy changes initiated after the elections, the authorities have undertaken some limited steps 
to gradually simplify the macroprudential framework. After declining in 2022, total lending 
rebounded in early 2023 (mainly driven by SME, consumer, and credit card loans) but was, at 
52.1% of GDP in June, still far below its five-year moving average. Lending to non-financial 
companies  remained  largely  subdued  –  except  for  SME  loans,  which  were  supported  by 
regulatory  measures.  The  very  high  level  of  inflation  led  to  banking-sector  assets  falling 
sharply from 127% of GDP in 2021 to 96% in 2022, while the share of foreign-owned banks 
in total banking sector assets declined from 25.9 % to 24.9%. 

Functioning of the labour market 

The  labour  market  strengthened  but  structural  challenges  remain  significant.  Job 
creation  was  very  strong  in  2022  but  slowed  down  in  early  2023.  In  the  second  quarter  of 
2023, the seasonally adjusted labour force participation and employment rates reached 53.4% 
and 48.2% respectively. The labour force moved into more productive activities. There were 
notable 
industry  and 
construction, and particularly large job 
creation  in  services,  while  agriculture 
continued shedding labour. The shift in 
employment  out  of  agriculture  also 
caused  a  decline 
the  share  of 
security 
workers  without 
registration  to  around  a  quarter  of  all 
employment 
in  early  2023.  The 
seasonally adjusted unemployment rate 
declined  to  single  digits  for  the  first 
time in 5 years. However, time-related 

job  gains 

social 

in 

in 

67 

404550556001020201720182019202020212022Graph 5.4: Türkiye -Labour market trends(15+ age group)Unemployment rate (lhs)Participation rate (rhs)Employment rate (rhs)Source: Turkstat 
 
its  strong  focus  on  supporting  entrepreneurial 

underemployment  and  the  potential  labour  force  increased  from  an  already  high  level, 
indicating labour market slack that is still structurally significant (as evidenced by the 23.5% 
labour under-utilisation). Women’s participation in the labour market continued to increase, 
although  the  gap  with  male  participation  remained  very  high  (above  35 pps).  Türkiye 
learning  and  women’s 
maintained 
entrepreneurship.  However,  job  creation  lagged  and  the  gap  between  the  male  and  female 
employment  and  unemployment  rates  widened  further.  In  the  second  quarter  of  2023,  the 
share of young people (15-24 years) not in employment, education or training (NEET) stood 
at 20.8%, falling across most educational levels. Regional labour market disparities declined 
and  reached  one  of  the  lowest  levels  in  years,  with  the  unemployment  rate  across  different 
regions ranging from 6.2% to 19.2% in 2022. Following two large increases in 2022, the net 
minimum wage was raised again by 54.6% in early 2023 and by 34.0% in July – pro-cyclical 
rises that fostered inflation and further disrupted the functioning of the labour market. 

2.3.2.  The  capacity  to  cope  with  competitive  pressure  and  market  forces  within  the 
Union 

Türkiye  has  a  good  level  of  preparation  and  made  limited  progress  in  achieving  the 
capacity  to  cope  with  competitive  pressure  and  market  forces  within  the  EU.  Despite 
improved vocational training, the mismatch between the education system and labour market 
needs  remains  a  concern.  Expenditure  on  research  and  development  has  continued  to 
increase, albeit  at  a very slow pace,  and is  still below the government’s target.  Investment 
was relatively subdued in 2022. There was progress in the diversification of energy supplies 
and the share of energy generated from renewable sources increased significantly. However, 
the local content requirement in the renewable energy generation sector is a discriminatory 
practice and a cause for concern. Trade openness increased further, but integration with the 
EU continued falling, although remaining high. Deviations from Türkiye’s obligations under 
the EU-Turkey Customs Union continue to hinder bilateral trade. 

The  Commission’s  recommendations  from  2022  were  not  fully  implemented  and  remain 
valid. In order to improve competitiveness and support long-term growth, Türkiye should in 
particular: 

→ continue increasing enrolment in education (especially pre-education), support the school-
to-work  transition  and  the  activation  of  young  people  who  are  not  in  education, 
employment  or 
labour  market 
participation; 

training  (NEET)  NEET  and 

incentivise  female 

→ take further steps to diversify energy supplies and increase the share of renewables in the 

energy mix; 

→ improve SMEs’ access to long-term finance. 

Education and innovation 

Efforts  to  improve  human  capital  continued,  but  skills  mismatch  remains  a  key 
concern. Total expenditure on education was 4.8% of GDP in 2021, representing a real year-
on-year  decrease  of  27.1%.  Government  spending  was  3.4%  of  GDP  in  2021,  decreasing 
further by 0.6 pps from 2020. In the 2021-2022 school year, net enrolment rates decreased for 
primary education (the first 4 years) but increased for lower secondary education (the second 
4  years),  upper  secondary  (the  final  4  years)  and  (marginally)  for  tertiary  education.  There 
has been a significant progress in pre-school attendance (see Chapter 26). However, Türkiye 
continues to score poorly in educational attainment in the Gender Gap Index calculated by the 

68 

 
 
World  Economic  Forum,  ranking  129th  of  146  countries  in  2023.  The  share  of  students  in 
vocational and technical secondary education has reversed its previous downward trend and 
increased by 0.6 pps to 28.0% in 2022. The share of pupils in religious education fell below 
10%  in  upper  secondary  education  for  the  first  time  in  8  years.  It  also  decreased,  albeit 
marginally  to  13.4%,  in  lower  secondary  education.  Türkiye  has  the  largest  skills  gap  for 
workers with tertiary education among  the OECD countries. There is a persistent mismatch 
between  the  skills  acquired  in  the  education  system  and  the  requirements  of  the  labour 
market, including those relevant for the digital transformation and green transition. 

Investment  in  R&D  increased  further,  albeit  at  a  slow  pace  and  lagging  the  EU’s 
performance. R&D expenditure increased gradually from 0.8% of GDP in 2013 to 1.4% in 
2021, but the gap with the EU average of 2.3% remains large. The government has intensified 
its support for business research and innovation, including through tax incentives. The private 
sector  continues  to  be  the  main  driver  of  R&D,  with  a  61.3%  share  of  R&D  expenditure. 
There  is  still  significant  room  to  enhance  cooperation  between  research  institutions  and 
economic  operators.  In  the  Global  Innovation  Index  2022,  Türkiye’s  overall  score  has 
improved so that it now ranks 37th out of 132 countries, thus entering the top 40 for the first 
time ever. However, according to the EU innovation scoreboard, Türkiye’s innovation score 
declined  from  49.2%  in  2021  to  47.7%  in  2022  and  the  performance  gap  with  the  EU  has 
widened further. The number of domestic patent applications increased by 6.8% in 2022  by 
comparison  with  2021,  but  Türkiye’s  total  international  patent  applications  declined 
significantly by 25.0% in the same period. 

Physical capital and quality of infrastructure 

Investment  activity  was  relatively  subdued  in  2022.  In  2022,  total  investment  accounted 
for 29.2% of GDP, up by 1.0 pps from its 2021 level. Construction’s share of total investment 
fell  to  a  historic  low  level  in  2022,  but  rebounded  in  the  first  half  of  2023,  with  the 
government’s  social  housing  project  and  its  reconstruction  efforts  in  the  aftermath  of  the 
February earthquakes. Machinery and equipment’s share of investment followed the opposite 
pattern, falling from its 2022 peak to 44.6% in the second quarter of 2023. Total net foreign 
direct investment (FDI) were 0.9% of GDP in 2022, close to its 5-year average. Geopolitical 
uncertainties, the build-up of macroeconomic imbalances and an unpredictable business and 
regulatory environment remain the main obstacles to attracting foreign investment. 

remains  a  necessary  precondition 

Diversification of energy supplies has improved and the use of renewables substantially 
increased.  Türkiye  has  high  ambitions  to  become  a  regional  energy  hub  and  is  investing 
heavily in the exploration of new gas fields in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, as well 
as in building new LNG terminals. However, dependence on oil and gas imports (particularly 
natural gas imports from Russia) remains high and energy demand is steadily growing despite 
energy efficiency measures. The establishment of a national emissions trading system (ETS) 
aligned with the EU ETS and with a sufficient level of ambition (notably in the overall cap on 
the  economy’s  cost-effective 
allowances) 
decarbonisation.  Türkiye  raised  the  share  of  renewable  energy  in  the  country’s  installed 
power  capacity  to  54%  in  2022.  Private  investment  continued  driving  growth  in  renewable 
installations  and  the  preferential  feed-in-tariff  was  extended  until  2030.  In  addition,  the 
National  Energy  Plan  (2023-2035)  released  in  January  2023  aims  at  further  increasing  the 
shares of renewable energy sources and of nuclear energy in installed capacity and in primary 
energy consumption by 2035. The plan was  prepared in  line with  Türkiye’s 2053 Net  Zero 
Emission Target, which implies a further increase of up to 50% of renewable energy sources 
in  primary energy consumption,  as well as  a sharp decrease in  the share  of fossil resources 
from 83.3% in 2020 to 20.8% by 2053. 

for 

69 

 
 
Competition  and  pricing  mechanism  issues  persist  in  the  energy  sector.  There  was 
limited  progress  in  liberalising  energy  markets,  as  the  unbundling  of  the  State-owned  gas 
company  BOTAȘ  was  once  again  suspended.  As  a  result,  BOTAȘ  remained  vertically 
integrated (comprising gas trade, pipeline and LNG infrastructure) and retained its dominant 
market position – thus hindering transparent, cost-reflective and non-discriminatory pricing. 
The  local  content  requirement  practices  in  the  renewable  energy  generation  sector  are 
discriminatory and a cause for concern because they impair EU companies’ competitiveness 
in  the  Turkish  energy  market.  Türkiye  continues  to  be  an  important  gas-transit  country, 
ensuring  the  smooth  operation  of  the  Trans-Anatolian  Pipeline  (TANAP)  which,  as  part  of 
the  Southern  Gas  Corridor  (SGC),  transmits  natural  gas  from  Azerbaijan  to  Europe  by 
connecting to the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) (see Chapter 15). 

The  COVID-19  pandemic  accelerated  the  economy’s  digital  transformation.  The 
telecommunication sector is subject to specific taxation and various fees that were increased 
as part of the budget consolidation efforts in July.  Although the ICT sector’s share in GDP 
remains  low  at  2.3%  in  2022,  the  number  of  broadband  internet  subscribers  reached 
90.6 million  in  2022, up from  88.2 million  in  2021.  The total number of mobile broadband 
users was 71.7 million at the end of 2022, representing a population penetration rate of 84% 
that remains significantly below the OECD average of 124.5%. Türkiye nevertheless has the 
lowest  average  download  speed  of  fixed  broadband  connection  in  the  OECD.  The  share  of 
citizens using e-government rose from 58.9% in 2021 to 68.7% in 2022. Türkiye ranks 16 out 
of 35 countries with an overall score of 72% in e-Government maturity, which is above the 
EU average (68%). Digitalisation efforts in business continued, with the share of enterprises 
involved in e-sales increasing to 19.3% in 2021, up by 6.8 pps from 2020 level (see Chapter 
10). 

Sectoral and enterprise structure 

The  economy  is  dominated  by  the  service  sector,  but  its  share  declined.  Service  sector 
employment  remained  largely  unchanged  in  the  last  5  years,  accounting  for  56.6%  of  total 
employment  in  2022.  Service  activities  surged  in  2022,  led  particularly  by  accommodation 
and food, transportation, and financial and insurance services. However, their share in GDP 
declined  to  a  multi-year  low  of  56.6%,  largely  due  to  the  expansion  of  industry.  Industry 
accounted for 21.7% of employment in 2022, up by 0.3 pps from its 2021 level. It increased 
its share of GDP from the low 20s pre-COVID-19 to above 26% of GDP in 2021 and 2022. 
The construction sector slowed down, with its share in GDP decreasing slightly from 5.1% in 
2021  to  4.9%  in  2022.  Similarly,  the  sector’s  share  in  total  employment  declined  to  6.0%, 
down  by  0.1 pps  from  its  2021  level.  By  contrast,  the  agriculture  sector’s  share  in  GDP 
increased  from  5.5%  in  2021  to  6.5%  in  2022.  However,  its  share  in  total  employment 
dropped further to 15.7% in 2022 (down by 1.5 pps from its 2021 level). 

Small and medium-sized enterprises are the backbone of the economy but face multiple 
challenges. SMEs employ around three quarters of all workers and generate more than half 
of the economy’s value added. Around 56% of SMEs in the manufacturing sector operate in 
low  technology  sectors.  Türkiye  has  continued  to  implement  various  economic  support 
schemes targeting SMEs. Targeted credit support improved SMEs access to finance and their 
share  in  total  loans  increased  to  around  28%  in  the  first  half  of  2023,  up  from  24%  in  the 
previous 5 years. However, long-term finance remains a key problem for SMEs and they are 
financed mostly through short-term loans or equity. KOSGEB provides support to companies 
on  R&D,  innovation,  product  development,  internationalisation,  entrepreneurship  and 
investment  in  high  technology  and  strategic  products.  The  Scientific  and  Technological 
Research Council of Türkiye also implements SME support schemes. 

70 

 
 
Economic integration with the EU and price competitiveness  

Economic  integration  with  the  EU  declined  further  but  remains  high.  Türkiye  is  the 
EU’s seventh largest trading partner, representing 3.3% of the EU’s total trade in goods with 
trading  partner  by  far. 
the  world 

in  2022,  while 

is  Türkiye’s 

the  EU 

largest 

The EU’s share of Turkish exports declined to 40.5% in 2022 – on a downward trend since 
2018  –  while  the  share  of  Turkish  imports  originating  in  the  EU  decreased  strongly  from 
31.5% in 2021 to 25.6% in 2022 – well below its long-term average and largely due to strong 
price  effects  and  increased  energy  imports  from  non-EU  countries  (notably  Russia).  The 
EU’s  share  of  FDI  inflows  into  Türkiye  increased  markedly  from  40%  in  2021  to  79%  in 
2022.  The  EU’s  share  in  the  overall  stock  of  FDI  rebounded  to  68%  in  2022  but  was  still 
below its long-term average of around 70%. Trade openness continued to increase steeply in 
2022, reaching 81% of GDP (up from levels  around 50% before 2017) as both exports and 
imports reached new highs. 

In  2022,  Türkiye  removed  some  of  the  additional  duties  imposed  on  products  of  non-EU 
origin  and  in  free  circulation  within  the  EU-Turkey  Customs  Union.  However,  many 
additional  duties  remain  in  force,  in  breach  of  the  rules  of  the  EU-Turkey  Customs  Union. 
Non-tariff  barriers,  such  as  import  surveillance  and  excessive  customs  checks,  continue  to 
hinder trade flows. 

2.4. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, STATISTICS, FINANCIAL CONTROL 

Chapter 5: Public procurement 

EU rules ensure that the public procurement of  goods and services in any Member State is 
transparent  and  open  to  all  EU  companies  on  the  basis  of  non-discrimination  and  equal 
treatment. 

Türkiye  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of  public  procurement,  with  significant  gaps 
remaining  to  align  with  the  EU  acquis.  There  was  backsliding  in  the  reporting  period  as 
Türkiye 
transparency),  of 
the  use  of  the  negotiated  procedure  (lacking 
discriminatory domestic price advantage practices and continued to allow offsets that favour 
local content.  

increased 

The  Commission’s  recommendations  from  last  year  were  not  implemented,  and  therefore 
remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:  

→ revise its public procurement legislation to further align it with the 2014 EU directives on 
public procurement, including utilities, concessions and public-private partnerships, and to 
increase transparency; 

→ reduce the excessive use of the negotiated procedure that distorts competition and limits 

transparency; 

71 

01020304020152016201720182019202020212022Graph 5.5a: Türkiye -Exports of goodsEUCEFTAOtherSource: WiiW% ofGDP01020304020152016201720182019202020212022Graph 5.5b: Türkiye -Imports of goodsEUCEFTAOtherSource: WiiW% ofGDP 
 
→ repeal  exemptions  that are incompatible with the EU  acquis  and  refrain  from  the use of 

discriminatory domestic price advantages and offset practices. 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

In terms of the legal framework, Türkiye's national public procurement legislation broadly 
reflects the principles of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. However, it 
includes  compulsory  domestic  price  advantages  and  offsets,  which  allow  authorities  to 
demand  compensatory  measures  if  goods  are  not  produced  domestically,  which  is 
discriminatory and contradicts the EU acquis. 

The  Public  Procurement  Law  (PPL)  is  partially  aligned  with  the  EU  Public  Procurement 
Directives  of  2014.  A  growing  list  of  exclusions  that  are  incompatible  with  the  acquis 
reduces  the  scope  of  public  procurement  rules.  In  addition,  many  sector-specific  laws  limit 
transparency. The legislation allows the mandatory procurement of goods and services from 
the State Supply Office for public institutions and organisations. In practice, this mandatory 
centralised  purchasing  system  enables  Türkiye  to  expand  the  scope  of  exclusions,  as  State 
Supply  Office  procurements  under  TRY  66.2  million  are  exempt  from  the  PPL.  The 
thresholds are also higher than those used in the EU for supplies and services. 

The  country  still  lacks  a  unified  framework  for  coordinating,  supervising  and  monitoring 
public-private partnership operations. A more consistent legal framework for concessions and 
public-private  partnerships  is  needed  to  increase  transparency  and  efficiency.  Türkiye  does 
not  publicly  disclose  information  on  public-private  partnership  contracts  in  a  transparent 
manner in order to avoid allegations of political influence on public tenders. Doing so would 
also enable a better evaluation of contingent fiscal liabilities. 

Public procurement legislation and policy papers, including Türkiye's Green Deal action plan, 
do  not  include  strategies  for  transitioning  to  green  procurement,  which  would  contribute 
significantly to sustainable consumption and production. 
Türkiye's 11th Development Plan (2019-2023) and 2023 Presidential Annual Programme aim 
to increase domestic production by using public procurement as tool to grant subsidies. For 
this  purpose,  it  makes  available  a  compulsory  domestic  price  advantage  of  up  to  15%  for 
some  ‘medium  and  high-technology  industrial  products’  and  has  put  in  place  legislation 
encouraging  offset  practices. Based on updated statistics, a high  percentage of international 
tenders apply the domestic price advantage, rising from 37% in 2017 to 43.5% in 2022. The 
overall  value  of  these  tenders  increased  from  44%  to  52.4%  of  the  total  over  the  same 
timeframe.  The  domestic  price  advantage,  distorting  competition  against  international 
tenderers, was applied in 63% of supply tenders, 38% of work tenders, 74% of consultancy 
and 18% of service tenders, corresponding to 41%, 65%, 23% and 74% of the total value of 
tenders respectively. 

The  operational  independence  of  the  Public  Procurement  Board  within  the  Public 
Procurement  Authority  is  potentially  impaired  since  the  President  of  the  Republic  is 
authorised  to  directly  appoint  the  chair  and  members  without  specific  regard  to  candidates' 
education or sector experience. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

The size of Türkiye's public procurement market increased slightly from 4.1% in 2021 to 
4.8% of GDP in 2022.  

The level of monitoring of contract awards and implementation is satisfactory. The Public 
Procurement  Authority  issues  statistics  every  six  months  to  help  measure  performance  and 

72 

 
 
improve  the  public  procurement  system.  The  capacity  of  contracting  authorities  to  manage 
public procurement processes continued to improve. Türkiye extended the mandatory use of 
electronic procurement to cover 47 659 tenders (up from 30 198 in 2021). 

Mechanisms  are  in  place  to  identify  and  tackle  corrupt  and  fraudulent  practices,  including 
rules  on  integrity  and  conflict  of  interest.  However,  the  use  of  the  negotiated  procedure 
continued to increase significantly, reaching nearly one third of all tenders (both in value and 
number).  Contracting  authorities  are  allowed  to  exercise  discretion  in  certain  unexpected 
circumstances that cannot be objectively measured. This limits competition and transparency 
regardless of any threshold when using this procedure. In 2022, it was the case in 91.34% of 
the tenders (in value) where the negotiated procedure was used. Such widespread use of this 
practice,  which  limits  transparency  and  competition,  strengthened  allegations  of  political 
influence  on  public  tenders.  It  is  important  to  develop  instruments  to  evaluate  contract 
performance  and  benchmark  the  economic  performance,  effectiveness,  and  efficiency  of 
public  procurement  procedures  and  of  contract  management  by  an  individual  contracting 
authority or entity. A risk indicator system is needed to alert on potential integrity problems 
in the procurement process. 

Efficient remedy system 

The right to a legal remedy, secured in the Constitution and the Public Procurement Law, 
creates an institutional framework and a mechanism for handling complaints. The review and 
remedies  system  ensures  that  complaints  and  penalties  are  dealt  with  and  resolved  in  an 
efficient, timely and competent manner. However, the system needs to be further aligned with 
the  EU  Remedies  Directive.  To  that  end,  creating  a  fully  independent  procurement  review 
board,  separate  from  the  Public  Procurement  Authority  and  ensuring  the  independence  of 
board members, remains pending as a priority. 

The implementation capacity of the Public Procurement Board remains stable with 341 staff. 
The Board received 1 773 complaints in 2022 (2.08% of contracts that allow for complaints), 
down  from  2 343  complaints  in  2021  (which  corresponded  to  3.25%  of  contracts).  The 
appointment  policy  and  the  Board’s  position  as  part  of  the  Public  Procurement  Authority 
remained  a  source  of  concern.  A  fully  independent  Public  Procurement  Board  would 
eliminate potential conflicts of interest and increase transparency. 

Chapter 18: Statistics 

EU  rules  require  Member  States  to  produce  statistics  based  on  professional  independence, 
impartiality, reliability, transparency, and confidentiality. Common rules are in place for the 
methodology, production and dissemination of statistical information. 

Türkiye  is  moderately  prepared  on  statistics  and  made  some  progress  in  the  reporting 
period, with work continuing to harmonise its statistical methodology with EU standards. The 
Turkish  Statistical  Institute  (TurkStat)  improved  its  compliance  with  the  timeframes  for 
publishing  annual  national  accounts  and  excessive  deficit  procedure  notifications.  It  took 
further steps to improve cooperation with other main data providers. However, Türkiye needs 
to increase the credibility of TurkStat and public trust in official statistics.  

The  Commission’s  2022  recommendations  were  only  partially  met,  and  therefore  remain 
valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  increase  the  credibility  of  TurkStat  and  public  trust  in  its  macroeconomic  statistics  by 
different measures, including setting transparent, professional criteria on the appointment 
of  the  president  of  TurkStat  and  any  grounds  for  dismissal,  which  cannot  compromise 
TurkStat’s professional or scientific independence; 

73 

 
 
→  step  up  efforts  to  fully  align  national  accounts  with  the  European  System  of  Accounts 

2010 (ESA 2010) and the requirements of the ESA 2010 transmission programme; 

→  improve  statistics  on  agriculture,  migration  and  asylum,  and  make  progress  towards  

alignment with the new requirements in short-term business statistics. 

As  regards  statistical  infrastructure,  Türkiye’s  statistics  legislation  is  based  on  the 
European Statistics Code of Practice. TurkStat is an associated institution to the Ministry of 
Treasury  and  Finance.  However,  there  are  concerns  about  the  credibility  of  TurkStat  and 
about  the  declining  public  trust  in  certain  macroeconomic  statistics.  Frequent  previous 
changes  in  management  have  significantly  undermined  the  institution’s  credibility.  The 
principles of transparency and merit-based selection processes are important for the integrity 
of the institution. The institution still lacks transparent appointment and dismissal procedures, 
including transparent, professional criteria for the appointment of the president of TurkStat. 

Preparations for the fifth strategic plan (2024-2028) are ongoing. In February 2023, TurkStat 
published  a  new  regulation  outlining  the  principles  and  procedures  for  preparing  and 
implementing  official  statistics  programmes.  Improvements  have  been  made  to  the  use  of 
public institutions' administrative records and in cooperation between TurkStat and other data 
providers. Registers in the statistical office are updated regularly. The main classifications are 
aligned with the EU acquis. 

Regarding macroeconomic statistics, Türkiye improved the level of compliance of its annual 
national  accounts  in  terms  of  timeliness,  but  there  are  still  data  gaps,  both  for  annual  and 
quarterly  national  accounts.  Gross  National  Income  (GNI)  calculations  are  not  yet  fully  in 
line  with  the  ESA  2010,  and  its  GNI  inventory  is  not  fully  aligned  with  the  latest  Eurostat 
GNI  Inventory  Guide.  Türkiye  made  some  progress  in  the  excessive  deficit  procedure 
reporting, in particular in terms of data timeliness, but further efforts are required to timely 
prepare  and  transmit  complete  excessive  deficit  procedure  notifications  and  government 
finance statistics. Türkiye produces good quality statistics on international trade in goods. It 
continued reporting quarterly balance of payments and international investment position data. 
It  provided monthly  data for the harmonised index of consumer prices. Türkiye submits all 
the data required for the calculation of purchasing power parities. 

Türkiye  continues  to  extend  the  use  of  administrative  data  to  produce  business  statistics. 
TurkStat  works  on  aligning  its  statistical  business  registers  with  the  European  Business 
Statistics Regulation requirements. Short-term business statistics are partly aligned. Research 
and development statistics have achieved a high level of compliance. The annual surveys on 
the use of information and communication technologies meet EU standards to a large extent. 
Rail,  maritime  and  regional  transport  statistics  also  have  a  high  level  of  compliance.  In 
August  2022,  a  data  transfer  agreement  was  signed  between  TurkStat  and  the  Ministry  of 
Transport  and  Infrastructure  for  road  freight  transport  statistics.  The  country  has  not  yet 
transmitted data to Eurostat on foreign affiliates statistics.  

On social statistics, Türkiye published the results of the 2021 population and housing census 
in December 2022. TurkStat conducted a survey on building and dwelling characteristics to 
provide  administrative  data  sources  on  housing  characteristics  for  the  census.  It  carries  out 
the  survey  on  income  and  living  conditions  in  line  with  EU  standards  and  sends  data  to 
Eurostat.  Social  protection  statistics  are  highly  compliant  with  EU  standards  and  labour 
market  statistics  are  fully  aligned.  TurkStat  has  yet  to  provide  Eurostat  with  Labour  Force 
Survey data in line with the new EU acquis. Türkiye regularly sends data for the labour cost 
index, though the data is not yet fully complete. It runs the structure of earnings survey every 
four  years,  in  line  with  EU  legislation.  Statistics  on  education  and  vocational  training  are 

74 

 
 
available.  Based  solely  on  administrative  registers,  Türkiye  published  indicators  on  higher 
education employment for the first time in August 2022. Public health statistics are available, 
but further progress is needed on health expenditure, non-monetary healthcare statistics and 
causes of death statistics. TurkStat also provides some data on the functioning of the justice 
system and prison statistics. Türkiye also produces statistics on immigration and emigration, 
but it does not yet collect statistics on asylum in line with EU requirements. 

On agricultural statistics, Türkiye has not carried out an agricultural census since 2001. The 
2016 farm structure survey results have not yet been sent to the Eurofarm system. TurkStat 
and  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Forestry  have  to  strengthen  their  efforts  to  improve 
administrative  registers.  Statistics  for  most  of  the  crops  and  for  most  of  the  critical  animal 
production,  milk  and  dairy  are  available  and  sent  to  Eurostat,  even  though  sometimes  with 
delay.  Cereals  and  oil  seed  crop  balances  are  also  transmitted  to  Eurostat.  The  economic 
accounts for agriculture are still not fully in line with the EU acquis. 

Energy  statistics  are  mostly  in  line  with  EU  requirements.  Monthly  and  annual  energy 
statistics are sent regularly. Data on energy prices are also sent to Eurostat regularly and are 
of good quality. Work is ongoing on energy consumption in households. TurkStat is making 
progress  in  physical  energy  flow  accounts.  On  environmental  statistics,  Türkiye  produces 
waste  and  water  statistics,  but  further  progress  is  still  needed  on  water  resources,  water 
abstraction  and  waste  generation  statistics.  Statistics  related  to  greenhouse  gas  emissions, 
environmental  taxes,  material  flow  accounts,  air  emission  accounts  and  environmental 
protection expenditure accounts are available. 

Chapter 32: Financial control 

The  EU  promotes  the  reform  of  national  governance  systems  to  improve  managerial 
accountability, sound financial management of income and expenditure, and external audit of 
public funds. The financial control rules further protect the EU’s financial interests against 
fraud in the management of EU funds and the euro against counterfeiting. 

Türkiye has a good level of preparation on financial control. It made no progress over the 
reporting  period.  The  public  internal  financial  control  policy  paper  was  not  updated.  The 
purpose, authority and responsibility of internal audit are undermined by the lack of a legal 
requirement to have internal audit units in ministries.  

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid. 
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→ organise a new round of public expenditures and financial accountability (PEFA) to assess 
the performance of the current public finance management, help prepare a comprehensive 
public  financial  management  strategy  and  update  the  public  internal  financial  control 
policy paper and the related action plan; 

→ adopt a national anti-fraud strategy; 

→  review  the  arrangements  for  including  municipalities  and  state-owned  enterprises  in  the 

treasury single account. 

Public internal financial control 

The strategic framework is partially in place. There has been no progress on the update of 
the  public  internal  financial  control  policy  paper  since  2012.  Türkiye  still  lacks  a 
comprehensive  strategic  framework  for  public  administration  reform  and  for  public  finance 
management.  Public  finance  management-related  goals  are  contained  in  different  planning 

75 

 
 
documents  and  strategies,  and  there  is  no  mechanism  to  coordinate  implementation  of 
reforms and to ensure regular monitoring and reporting. 

The Turkish  administration has a uniform  management structure that combines elements  of 
managerial accountability and delegation with a results-oriented performance management 
system.  The  Public  Financial  Management  and  Control  Law  (PFMC  Law)  applies  to  all 
public  institutions  and  specifies  the  elements  of  financial  control.  It  sets  out  the 
responsibilities of the heads of public institutions, including managerial duties and delegates 
authority  to  authorising  officers,  with  the  Ministry  of  Finance  and  Treasury  assigned  a 
coordinating  role.  Further  efforts  are  needed 
legislation,  managerial 
accountability, including reporting structures, delegating decision-making responsibilities and 
the  functioning  of  internal  control.  The  use  of  public  finance  management  diagnostic  tools 
such as PEFA could help identify and fill current gaps in implementing the public financial 
management and control Law. 

to  harmonise 

The PFMC Law regulates internal control, which functions largely in line with international 
standards.  Implementation  of  internal  control  systems  remains  undermined  by  capacity  and 
ownership  issues.  Work  needs  to  continue  to  apply  risk  management.  The  monitoring  and 
reporting  of  irregularities  also  merits  further  development.  Türkiye  has  a  treasury  single 
account,  but  the  fact  that  it  includes  in  its  scope  local  administrations  and  state-owned 
enterprises raises concerns. 

Internal  audit  practice  is  regulated  in  line  with  international  standards  in  the  PFMC  Law. 
The internal audit manual and a code of ethics prepared by the Central  Harmonisation Unit 
have not been updated since 2013. Türkiye has adopted implementing legislation on working 
procedures and principles of internal audit and took steps to increase the number of internal 
auditors  and  provide  training.  However,  there  is  still  no  legal  requirement  for  ministries  to 
have an internal audit unit, only for internal auditors. In addition, there is no formal status for 
heads  of  internal  audit  as  unit  heads.  There  is  no  entity  that  performs  the  role  of  an  audit 
committee  and  therefore  auditors  report  directly  to  their  deputy  ministers  or  to  a  senior 
manager. These reporting arrangements could compromise auditor independence. There is no 
systematic follow-up to  the implementation  of internal  audit recommendations. The lack of 
clarity  in  the  legislation  and  in  practice  between  the  internal  audit  and  inspection 
organisations compromises the effectiveness of the internal audit function. 

Two Central Harmonisation Units (CHU) are tasked with setting standards, monitoring and 
reporting  on  implementing  public  internal  financial  control.  The  CHU  for  financial 
management  and  control  sets  standards  and  the  methodology  providing  guidance,  training 
and  overall  coordination  to  public  administrations  in  this  field.  The  Internal  Audit 
Coordination Board is the CHU for internal audit, which notably monitors the internal audit 
systems  of  the  public  administrations,  develops  internal  audit  standards  and  publishes 
manuals.  The  CHU  for  financial  management  and  control  has  prepared  a  draft  guide  on 
internal  control  quality  reviews  and  completed  pilot  projects  in  three  public  administration 
bodies. The Internal Audit Coordination Board consists of seven members appointed by the 
President for four years and is  now fully attached to  the Ministry of Finance and Treasury. 
Further  action  is  needed  to  ensure  its  independence  and  boost  its  capacity,  organisational 
structure and resources to fulfil its mandate. 

External audit 

The constitutional and legal framework provides for the independence of the Turkish Court 
of  Accounts  (TCA).  There  are  concerns  regarding  the  fiscal  discipline,  transparency  and 
accountability of the Türkiye Wealth Fund (TWF), chaired by the President of the Republic 

76 

 
 
and not fully subject to direct audit by the TCA. The TWF is audited by an independent audit 
firm and by auditors appointed by the President. Not all companies in the TWF portfolio are 
audited by the TCA. The 2022 audit report was not published on the TWF website. In 2022, 
amendments  to  the  Law  on  the  establishment  of  the  Türkiye  Wealth  Fund  Management 
Company  (TWFMC)  introduced  exemptions  and  exceptions.  These  new  provisions  are 
applicable to companies, funds and their subsidiaries of which the TWF or the TWFMC is the 
controlling shareholder. Operations and management of the Istanbul Financial Centre will be 
carried out by a TWF managing company, which is not accountable to the TCA. The Disaster 
Reconstruction  Fund,  created  in  2023  to  manage  the  funds  allocated  to  disaster  recovery 
work, is excluded from the general budget and the TCA audit scope. The law establishing the 
Fund  requires  it  to  be  audited  in  line  with  international  auditing  standards,  but  it  does  not 
clearly specify the procurement principles to be used for Fund expenditure. 

Turkish Court of Accounts Law is in line with International Organisation of Supreme Audit 
Institutions  (INTOSAI)  standards.  It  provides  for  an  almost  exhaustive  audit  mandate  and 
gives the TCA full discretion in discharging its responsibilities. The TCA has both audit and 
judicial functions. In 2022, it had 1 837 staff, including 819 auditors, down from 1 920 staff 
in 2021, of which 865 were auditors. The TCA is implementing its 2019-2023 strategic plan, 
which includes running risk-based audits and strengthening its human resources capacity. It 
has  updated  its  manuals  for  public  enterprise  audit,  performance  audit,  audit  reporting  and 
local government company audit. 

The TCA has improved the quality of audit work. It submits four audit reports a year to the 
parliament  in  addition  to  a  statement  of  general  conformity.  The  TCA  reports  are  only 
evaluated by parliament during its budget deliberations. 

Regarding the impact of audit work, TCA reports are published online every year, with the 
exception  of  those  on  state-owned  economic  enterprises.  The  audited  institutions  should 
systematically and swiftly implement the TCA recommendations. A working group between 
the  TCA  and  the  Ministry  of  Treasury  and  Finance  is  operational  but  more  parliamentary 
scrutiny of TCA audit findings and recommendations is needed. There is a need to separate 
the discussion of budget and audit issues. Setting up a working group between the TCA and 
the parliament solely dedicated to discussing the performance of public institutions and their 
spending could be instrumental in this regard. 

Protection of the EU’s financial interests 

Although Türkiye has reached a good level of alignment with the EU acquis, it still needs to 
fully  align  its  legislation  with  the  EU  Directive  on  the  fight  against  fraud  to  the  EU’s 
financial interests by means of criminal law. The State Supervisory Council was designated 
as  the  anti-fraud  coordination  service  (AFCOS);  AFCOS  is  operational  and  held  its  first 
meeting  in  June  2022.  There  is  no  national  anti-fraud  strategy  for  protecting  the  EU’s 
financial interests. Türkiye reported 917 cases to the Commission via the online irregularity 
management system from 2006 to 2022, of which 127 cases were reported in 2022. Türkiye 
needs  to  continue  on  the  path  of  its  improved  track  record  of  cooperating  with  the 
European Commission during investigations. It should keep on building its track record on 
reporting of irregularities along the trends of the last years. 

Protection of the euro against counterfeiting 

Türkiye has reached a high level of alignment with the EU  acquis in this area. A dedicated 
department in the Central Bank carries out technical analysis of counterfeit money, including 
euro banknotes and coins. In addition, the Turkish State Mint carries out technical analyses of 
counterfeit coins, including euro coins. Credit institutions that do not withdraw counterfeits 
77 

 
 
from circulation are subject to financial penalties. 

3. GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND REGIONAL COOPERATION 

Cyprus 

Türkiye continued to  refuse to  recognise the Republic of Cyprus. Despite repeated  calls by 
the Council of the EU and the European Commission, Türkiye has yet to fulfil its obligations 
as  outlined  in  the  Declaration  of  the  European  Community  and  its  Member  States  of  21 
September  2005  and  in  Council  Conclusions,  including  those  of  December  2006  and 
December 2015. Türkiye did not fulfil its obligation to ensure the full and non-discriminatory 
implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement and did not remove 
all  obstacles  to  the  free  movement  of  goods,  including  restrictions  on  direct  transport  links 
with the Republic of Cyprus. Türkiye also refused to cooperate with the Republic of Cyprus 
on security-related issues, including terrorism. Türkiye continued to veto applications by the 
Republic of Cyprus to join several international organisations, including the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 

There were no unauthorised drilling activities by Türkiye in the Eastern Mediterranean during 
the reporting period. Türkiye issued several navigational telexes (NAVTEX) for conducting 
seismic  surveys  and  scientific  research  activities  but  none  in  areas  that  include  parts  of  the 
Exclusive  Economic  Zone  (EEZ)  of  Cyprus.  The  EU  remains  committed  to  defending  its 
interests  and  those  of  its  Member  States  as  well  as  to  upholding  regional  stability.  In 
November 2022, following the third annual review of the framework for restrictive measures 
in  response  to  Türkiye’s  unauthorised  drilling  activities  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean,  the 
European Council extended the regime for a further year until 12 November 2023. Currently, 
two individuals are subject to sanctions. 

Türkiye’s  military  exercises  in  the  maritime  zones  of  Cyprus  continued.  Violations  by 
Turkish  unmanned  aerial  vehicles  in  the  Nicosia  flight  information  region  and  the  national 
airspace  of  the  Republic  of  Cyprus  also  continued  unabated.  Türkiye  continued  to  increase 
the militarisation of the occupied area by upgrading the military drone base in Lefkoniko and 
the  naval  base  in  Bogazi.  The  harassment  of  Cypriot  fishing  vessels  by  Türkiye  also 
continued. 

In  the  reporting  period,  Türkiye  continued  to  criticise  the  decision  of  the  UN  Security 
Council (UNSC) to renew the mandate of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP) without the consent of the Turkish  Cypriot community.  UNFICYP’s mandated 
authority  extends  throughout  the  island  of  Cyprus  and  the  restrictions  on  its  freedom  of 
movement  can  pose  serious  risks  to  the  safety  and  security  of  United  Nations  personnel 
serving  in  peacekeeping  operations.  In  August  2023,  after  unauthorised  construction  work 
was conducted by the Turkish Cypriot side within the UN buffer zone near Pyla/Pile, Türkiye 
rejected  the  UN  Security  Council’s  statement  condemning  the  violation  of  the  status  quo, 
which  subsequently  led  to  escalating  tensions.  This  escalation  included  the  assault  on 
UNFICYP  peacekeepers  by  Turkish  Cypriot  personnel  on  18  August  2023,  an  act  strongly 
condemned  by  the  EU.  In  October  2023,  the  UN  brokered  an  understanding  between  both 
sides on the way forward regarding Pyla/Pile area, which was welcomed by Türkiye and the 
EU.  Nevertheless,  these  developments  continued  to  undermine  the  prospect  of  resuming 
negotiations and reaching a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. 

Despite international condemnations, and the inadmissibility of the settlement of any parts of 
Varosha  by  people  other  than  its  inhabitants  as  stipulated  in  UNSC  resolution  550  (1984), 

78 

 
 
 
Türkiye continued with its plan to open the entire fenced-off area of Varosha, creating a new 
fait  accompli  on  the  ground.  The  new  restrictions  imposed  in  2022  on  the  activities  of 
UNFICYP  within  the  fenced-off  area  of  Varosha  remained  in  effect  –  challenging 
UNFICYP’s ability to execute its tasks in accordance with its mandate, and violating UNSC 
Resolution 789 (1992).  

Türkiye  repeatedly  advocated  for  a  two-state  solution  in  Cyprus,  contrary  to  relevant  UN 
Security  Council  Resolutions.  In  November  2022,  the  so-called  but  not  internationally 
recognised  ‘Turkish  Republic  of  Northern  Cyprus’  was  accepted  as  an  observer  in  the 
Organization of Turkic States (OTS). This violates the principle of territorial integrity and the 
UN Charter. The EU recognises only the Republic of Cyprus as a subject of international law, 
in  accordance with  the relevant  UN Security Council Resolutions  and has stressed that any 
action  to  facilitate  or  assist  in  any  way  the  international  recognition  of  Turkish  Cypriot 
secessionist entity severely damages efforts to create an environment conducive to resuming 
settlement talks under the auspices of the United Nations. 

The EU remains fully committed to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue, within 
the  UN  framework,  in  accordance  with  the  relevant  UNSC  resolutions  and  in  line  with  the 
principles on which the EU is founded and its acquis. The EU has called, most recently in the 
European Council conclusions of June 2023, for the speedy resumption of negotiations and 
expressed its readiness to play an active role in supporting all stages of the UN-led process, 
with all the appropriate means at its disposal. 

As emphasised in the Negotiating Framework and Council declarations, Türkiye is expected 
to  actively  support  the  negotiations  on  a  fair,  comprehensive  and  viable  settlement  of  the 
Cyprus issue within the UN framework, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council 
resolutions and in line with the principles on which the EU is founded and the EU acquis. It 
is important that Türkiye reaffirms its commitment to the UN-led settlement talks on Cyprus 
in  line  with  the  relevant  UNSC  resolutions,  including  their  external  aspects.  No  unilateral 
actions should be taken that could raise tensions on the island and prevent the resumption of 
talks.  On  Varosha,  Türkiye  must  immediately  reverse  the  unilateral  actions  announced  on 
20 July 2021 and all steps taken since October 2020 that run contrary to the relevant UNSC 
resolutions.  The  EU  underlines  the  importance  of  the  status  of  Varosha  and  calls  for  full 
respect of UNSC resolutions (particularly Resolutions 550, 789 and 1251). 

Peaceful settlement of border disputes 

Relations  between  Türkiye  and  Greece  deteriorated  until  early  2023.  Hostile  rhetoric  grew 
during  this  period,  including  threatening  statements  regarding  the  sovereignty  of  Greek 
islands.  However,  the  February  2023  earthquakes  prompted  a  marked  improvement  in 
relations. Greece rapidly provided humanitarian aid and support to Türkiye, which helped de-
escalate  tensions  and  rhetoric.  This  was  followed  by  several  high-level  phone  calls  and 
meetings. The Turkish and Greek foreign ministers met in March 2023 on the margins of the 
International  Donors’  Conference  organised  by  the  European  Commission  and  the  Swedish 
Presidency of the Council of the EU. The Turkish and Greek deputy foreign ministers met in 
Ankara in March 2023 to relaunch the fourth round of the Positive Agenda talks between the 
two countries. The Greek Defence Minister visited Türkiye in April 2023. 

In  July,  the  Greek  Prime  Minister  met  with  the  Turkish  President  on  the  sidelines  of  the 
NATO  Summit  in  Vilnius.  The  meeting  took  place  in  a  good  atmosphere.  The  two  leaders 
agreed to build on the positive momentum and activate multiple channels of communication 
in  the  coming  period,  including  holding  the  next  meeting  of  the  High-Level  Cooperation 

79 

 
 
Council between Greece and Türkiye in Thessaloniki. The two leaders tasked the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs to guide the process and keep them informed on progress. 

The  possible  extension  of  Greek  territorial  waters  to  12  nautical  miles  in  the  Aegean  Sea 
under  Article  3  of  the  United  Nations  Convention  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea  (UNCLOS) 
continued to weigh on Greece-Türkiye relations. The 1995 declaration of the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly that any unilateral action by Greece to extend its territorial waters would 
be considered a casus belli, still holds. 

The Turkish violations of Greek airspace intensified in 2022 and in December 2022 Türkiye 
also  threatened  Greece  with  retaliation  if  the  latter  proceeded  with  any  expansion  of  its 
territorial  waters  in  the  Aegean.  As  of  February  2023,  violations  of  Greek  airspace 
diminished drastically, and no flights over Greek inhabited areas were reported. 

As  highlighted  by  the  Council  Conclusions  in  December  2022  and  the  European  Council’s 
Conclusions of June 2022 and stemming from obligations under the Negotiating Framework, 
Türkiye  is  expected  to  make  an  unequivocal  commitment  to  good  neighbourly  relations, 
international  agreements  and  the  peaceful  settlement  of  disputes  having  recourse,  if 
necessary, to  the International  Court of Justice. Türkiye must  avoid  threats  and actions that 
damage good neighbourly relations, normalise its relations with the Republic of Cyprus and 
respect the sovereignty of all EU Member States over their territorial sea and airspace as well 
as  all  their  sovereign  rights,  including  inter  alia  the  right  to  explore  and  exploit  natural 
resources in accordance with EU and international law, in particular the UNCLOS. 

In  October  2022,  Türkiye  and  the  Government  of  National  Unity  of  Libya  signed  a 
memorandum of understanding (MoU) for the development of bilateral scientific, technical, 
technological, legal, administrative and commercial cooperation in the field of hydrocarbons 
on land and at sea based on the 2019 MoU on the delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas 
between  Türkiye  and  the  National  Unity  Government  of  Libya.  The  MoU  infringes  on  the 
sovereign rights of third states, does not comply with UNCLOS and cannot produce any legal 
consequences  for  third  states.  Actions  that  could  undermine  regional  stability  should  be 
avoided. 

Regional cooperation 

Good  neighbourly  relations  are  an  essential  part  of  Türkiye’s  accession  process.  Bilateral 
relations with other enlargement countries were good overall but remained challenging with 
neighbouring  EU  Member  States,  particularly  Greece  and  Cyprus.  Tensions  in  the  Aegean 
and Eastern Mediterranean were markedly reduced after the February 2023 earthquakes. 

Türkiye’s  policy  in  the  Western  Balkans  is  generally  aligned  with  the  EU’s  strategic 
objectives  of  regional  stability,  Euro-Atlantic  integration  and  economic  development. 
Türkiye  portrayed  itself  as  an  EU  partner  in  the  region,  while  leveraging  its  distinctive 
cultural  and economic ties. Türkiye continued to ask for action against alleged members of 
the  Gülen  movement  in  the  region,  urging  their  extradition  and  the  closure  of  all  affiliated 
schools. This caused friction with some countries in the region. 

Türkiye’s  relations  with  Albania  have  continued  to  strengthen  with  regular  high-level 
contacts and the agreement by the two countries to bring their bilateral relations to the level 
of  strategic  partnership.  Albania  extradited,  Faruk  Fatih  Ozer,  the  founder  of  the  Turkish 
crypto-exchange  Thodex.  Türkiye  reiterated  its  readiness  to  strengthen  Albania’s  defence 
capacity. 

Türkiye  remained  close  to  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  and  President  Erdoğan  visited  the 
country in September 2022. Türkiye maintained regular contacts with all members of Bosnia 

80 

 
 
and  Herzegovina’s  tripartite  Presidency,  keeping  a  balanced  approach  and  supporting  the 
country’s  territorial  integrity  and  stability.  Türkiye  supported  the  Office  of  the  High 
Representative.  

Türkiye’s  relations  with  Serbia  are  very  good.  The  two  Presidents  maintained  frequent 
contacts. President Erdoğan visited Serbia in September 2022. President Erdoğan emphasised 
Türkiye’s  readiness  to  support  a  solution  between  Serbia  and  Kosovo .  The  two  countries 
signed a number of agreements, including on the mutual abolition of tourist visas. 
Türkiye maintained strong cultural  and economic ties with  Kosovo  and continued to  lobby 
for its international recognition. Prime Minister Kurti paid his first official visit to Türkiye in 
February  2023.  Türkiye  and  Kosovo  explored  cooperation  opportunities  in  the  economic, 
commercial, security and defence fields. 

Türkiye’s relations with Montenegro were stable. The two countries publicly stated that they 
aimed at further developing their bilateral cooperation. 

Türkiye  and  North  Macedonia  continued  to  engage  actively  in  the  economic,  educational 
and cultural sectors. The two countries celebrated 30 years of diplomatic relations. 

Türkiye  is  Georgia’s  second  largest  trading  partner  and  its  relations  with  Georgia  are  at  a 
strategic  partnership  level.  High-level  contacts  were  regular.  Türkiye  strongly  supported 
Georgia’s  territorial  integrity  and  sovereignty.  Türkiye  also  supported  Georgia’s  NATO 
integration efforts. 

Türkiye’s  relations  with  the  Republic  of  Moldova  remained  stable  and  at  the  level  of 
strategic  cooperation.  Türkiye  continued  to  support  Moldova’s  sovereignty  and  territorial 
integrity. Türkiye also welcomed the EU’s decision to grant candidate status to Moldova. 

Türkiye’s  relations  with  Ukraine  are  at  the  level  of  strategic  partnership.  Türkiye 
consistently  supported  Ukraine’s  territorial  integrity.  Türkiye  rejected  Russia’s  aggression 
against  Ukraine,  called  for  the  rights  of  Crimean  Tatars  to  be  respected,  provided 
humanitarian  aid  and  military  assistance 
to  Ukraine  and  engaged  politically  and 
diplomatically,  including  in  the  facilitation  of  the  export  of  Ukrainian  grain  and  of  the 
prisoners’ exchange, aiming at facilitating talks between Ukraine and Russia and working on 
de-escalation and bringing about a cease-fire. 

4. 

ABILITY TO ASSUME THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP  

CLUSTER 2: INTERNAL MARKET  

This cluster covers: free movement of goods (Chapter 1), freedom of movement for workers 
(Chapter  2),  right  of  establishment  and  freedom  to  provide  services  (Chapter  3),  free 
movement  of  capital  (Chapter  4),  company  law  (Chapter  6),  intellectual  property  law 
(Chapter  7),  competition  policy  (Chapter  8),  financial  services  (Chapter  9),  and  health  and 
consumer  protection  (Chapter  28).  This  cluster  is  key  to  the  good  functioning  of  the  EU-
Turkey Customs Union and to integrating Türkiye into the EU’s internal market. 

Türkiye has achieved a good level of preparation for the free movement of goods. However, 
technical barriers to trade and requirements discriminating against EU products remained in 
place.  Preparations  in  the  areas  of  freedom  of  movement  for  workers,  and  the  right  of 

 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ 
Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence. 

81 

 
 
 
 
establishment and freedom  to  provide services  are at  an early stage,  and substantial  efforts 
are still required to align with the acquis. Türkiye is moderately prepared on free movement 
of  capital,  as  limitations  remain  on  foreign  ownership  and  on  capital  movement.  Türkiye 
needs to continue to address outstanding issues in its framework regulating the fight against 
money laundering and terrorist financing, while ensuring objective implementation that does 
not restrict the legitimate rights of NGOs.  

Türkiye is well advanced in the area of company law but needs to make further progress in 
aligning  with  the  EU  acquis.  Türkiye  has  a  good  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of 
intellectual property law, notably in terms of legislative alignment, but it  needs to improve 
implementation  and  enforcement.  Türkiye  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of 
competition  policy. Backsliding  was observed as serious concerns persist  in  relation  to  the 
legislative  framework,  enforcement  capacity  and  transparency  in  the  field  of  State  aid. 
Türkiye  has  a  good  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  financial  services,  however  the 
banking  sector  faced  an  increasingly  challenging  operating  environement  in  the  reporting 
period.  Türkiye  has  a  good  level  of  preparation  on  consumer  and  health  protection,  with 
limited progress made, notably on strengthening its surveillance system for health (security) 
services. The capacity of the healthcare system was seriously affected by the February 2023 
earthquakes in the affected regions. 

Chapter 1: Free movement of goods 

The free movement of goods ensures that many products can be traded freely across the EU 
based on common rules and procedures. Where products are governed by national rules, the 
principle of the free movement of goods prevents these from creating unjustified barriers to 
trade. 

Türkiye has achieved a good level of preparation on the free movement of goods. It made 
some progress in aligning with the EU acquis, particularly under the 'old approach' and the 
'new  and  global  approach'  to  product  legislation.  The  market  access  barrier  on  agricultural 
and  forestry  tractors  was  removed  following  alignment  with  the  EU  acquis.  However, 
trade,  unjustified  checks  for  EU  products  and  requirements 
technical  barriers 
discriminating  against  EU  products  remained,  in  breach  of  Türkiye’s  obligations  under  the 
Customs Union.  

to 

The  Commission’s  recommendations  from  last  year  were  only  partially  met,  and  therefore 
remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  eliminate  the  remaining  non-tariff  barriers  to  the  free  movement  of  goods  that  are  in 
breach of Customs Union obligations, including the surveillance regimes for the import of 
certain  products,  export  restrictions,  prior  registration  requirements,  conformity 
assessments and inspections, licencing surveillance and other documentation requirements 
for imports, and non-acceptance of EU certificates of good manufacturing practices; 

→ review the remaining schemes setting local content requirements or relocating production; 

→ increase the coverage and effectiveness of market surveillance measures and ensure timely 

reporting on results for public transparency.  

General principles 

The EU framework for the free movement of goods is largely in place in Türkiye. However, 
implementation  issues  remain,  as  Türkiye  continues  to  implement  a  range  of  non-tariff 
barriers to the free movement of goods that are in breach of Customs Union obligations. In 
the  reporting  period  it  further  extended  the  scope  of  the  surveillance  regime  to  cover  the 

82 

 
 
import  of  certain  products,  such  as  photovoltaic  cells.  Export  restrictions,  prior  registration 
requirements, risk-based import control system, conformity assessments and inspections and 
other documentation requirements remained in place. Türkiye still does not accept EU good 
manufacturing  practices  certificates.  While  Türkiye  adopted  several  measures  to  adjust  the 
localisation and prioritisation schemes for pharmaceuticals, the EU’s assessment on whether 
Türkiye  has  completed  the  implementation  of  all  findings  in  the  Arbitrators’  Award  is  still 
ongoing. The local content requirements in renewable energy remain in place and new local 
content requirements were put in place for tobacco products. These schemes create de facto 
market  access  barriers  for  EU  products,  which  are  not  in  line  with  the  Customs  Union. 
Türkiye’s  product  safety  controls  on  imported  goods  processed  through  its  electronic 
TAREKS system can require the provision of additional  documentation and information on 
products coming from the EU, contrary to the Customs Union provisions. 

Non-harmonised areas 

Türkiye’s mutual recognition legislation in the non-harmonised areas is in line with the EU 
acquis.  However,  Türkiye  has  notified  only  five  product  legal  acts  in  the  non-harmonised 
areas in the reporting period. This is not sufficient, given the size of Türkiye’s economy and 
legislative  activity  and  close  ties  with  the  European  Union’s  economy  under  the  Customs 
Union. 

Harmonised areas: quality infrastructure 

Türkiye  is  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis  on  standards,  technical  regulations,  conformity 
assessment, accreditation, metrology and market surveillance. It has also aligned with the EU 
acquis  on  general  product  safety,  the  European  Conformity  mark  (CE  mark),  conformity 
assessment bodies, notified bodies and conformity assessment methods. 

The national Standards Institute is independent, adequately resourced and financed, and able 
to  implement  European  and  international  standards.  Since  2012  it  is  a  full  member  of  the 
European  Committee  for  Standardisation  (CEN)  and  the  European  Committee  for 
Electrotechnical  Standardisation  (CENELEC).  By  the  end  of  the  reporting  period,  it  had 
adopted  24  318 national  standards  aligned  with  European  standards.  The  rate  of 
harmonisation with both CEN and CENELEC standards is 99.96%. Eight Turkish economic 
operators are full members of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) 
and one is an observer. 

Türkiye has 64 notified bodies, five recognised third-party organisations, and two technical 
approval  bodies in  place. The  Turkish  Accreditation  Agency  (TÜRKAK)  is  a signatory of 
multilateral agreements as part of the European cooperation for Accreditation (EA) and takes 
part  in  the  mutual  recognition  of  data  agreement  of  the  OECD  Good  Laboratory  Practices 
Working  Group  (OECD-GLP).  The  National  Metrology  Institute  (TÜBITAK-UME)  is  a 
member  of  the  European  Association  of  National  Metrology  Institutes  (EURAMET).  The 
Ministry  of  Industry  and  Technology  participates  in  the  European  Legal  Metrology 
Organisation  (WELMEC).  TÜBİTAK-UME  chairs  a  Technical  Committee  and  participates 
in  the  Committee  of  the  European  Metrology  Programme  for  Innovation  and  Research  at 
EURAMET.  

Türkiye implements market surveillance in compliance with the EU acquis and submits its 
annual programme to the European Commission. There is a horizontal framework for market 
surveillance in place in line with the applicable EU acquis. The relevant ministries published 
separate  market  surveillance  regulations  governing  personal  protective  equipment  and 
construction products in the reporting period. According to the market surveillance report for 
2022,  a  total  of  233  644  products  were  checked  by  market  surveillance  authorities  in  2022 
83 

 
 
representing  a  11.8%  increase  as  compared  to  2021.  About  10  881  products  were  found 
uncompliant or unsafe as against 12 455 products in 2021. Access to information on market 
surveillance  activities  is  important  for  producers  and  consumers.  The  budget  allocated  to 
market  surveillance  increased  by  51%  in  2022  as  compared  to  2021,  in  a  high  inflation 
environment. Surveillance remained limited with regard to activities in e-commerce.    

Harmonised area: sectoral legislation 

On  the  ‘new  and  global  approach’  to  product  legislation,  Türkiye  adopted  legislation  to 
align with the latest acquis on medical devices and in vitro diagnostic medical devices. It also 
aligned  with  the  acquis  on  eco-design  and  on  energy  labelling  of  several  types  of  heaters, 
computers, servers, and several types of household goods.  

On the ‘old approach’ to product legislation, in January 2023, the new Turkish legislation 
on  agriculture  and  forestry  tractors  entered  into  force,  phasing  out  the  discriminatory 
treatment of EU tractors in terms of engine emission requirements, thus solving the relevant 
market  access  barrier.  It  also  adopted legislation aiming  to  align with  the  acquis on  certain 
medicinal products, good distribution practices of medicinal products for human use and on 
vaccines  and  immune  serums.  Türkiye  adopted  legislation  designed  to  align  with  the  latest 
acquis on good clinical practice and pharmacovigilance. Türkiye aligned to a large extent its 
cosmetics regulatory framework with  the  acquis by adopting a new cosmetics  regulation  in 
May  2023.  A  new  guideline  on  free  from  claims  in  cosmetics  was  published  in  June  2023 
Türkiye does not accept EU good manufacturing practice certificates on medicines for human 
use, in breach of Customs Union rules. Regarding chemicals, Türkiye has adopted two new 
regulations on the export and import of hazardous chemicals and on hazardous substances in 
electrical  and  electronic  equipment,  aligning  with  the  EU  acquis.  Türkiye  is  almost  fully 
aligned  with  the  European  Regulation  on  Registration,  Evaluation,  Authorisation  and 
Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), apart from on biocidal products. 

On  procedural  measures,  Türkiye  has  specific  licencing  and  regulation  systems  for 
economic  operators  dealing  with  drug  precursors,  with  a  strict  follow-up  and  monitoring 
system in cooperation with the police and customs. It is aligned with the EU acquis regarding 
licencing  procedures  for  firearms.  However,  it  made  no  progress  on  alignment  with  the 
acquis on cultural goods. 

Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers 

Citizens of one Member State have the right to work in another Member State and must  be 
given the same working and social conditions as other workers. 

Preparations in the area of freedom of movement for workers are at an early stage and no 
progress was made during the reporting period.  

Türkiye made no progress on access to the labour market or on the coordination of social 
security systems. The number of bilateral social security agreements with EU Member States 
remained the same, with 15 agreements concluded. Türkiye should prepare its legislation and 
administrative practices in view of joining the European Labour Authority and the European 
Employment  Services  (EURES)  network.  There  were  no  developments  on  future 
participation in the EURES network. 

Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services 

EU natural and legal persons have the right to establish themselves in any Member State and 
to provide cross-border services. For certain regulated professions, there are rules on mutual 
recognition of qualifications. EU rules on postal  services focus on improving the quality of 

84 

 
 
universal  service,  gradual  market  opening  to  competition,  and  the  establishment  of  an 
independent regulator.  

Preparations in  the area of right of establishment and freedom  to  provide services are at  an 
early stage. There was no progress in the reporting period. Right of establishment continues 
to be restricted, service providers registered in the EU still face requirements on registration, 
licencing  and  authorisation.  Postal  services  are  not  regulated  in  line  with  the  acquis. 
Continuous  and  substantial  efforts  are  needed  on  the  mutual  recognition  of  professional 
qualifications. Overall, substantial efforts are still required to achieve alignment in this area.  

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid. 
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  align  its  national  legislation  with  the  Services  Directive  and  set  up  a  point  of  single 

contact; 

→ continue aligning with the EU acquis in the area of postal services; 

→  align  its  national  legislation  with  the  EU  acquis  on  mutual  recognition  of  professional 
qualifications, including the Professional Qualifications Directive and the Proportionality 
Test Directive. 

There  was  no  progress  on  the  right  of  establishment,  which  continues  to  be  restricted  by 
several requirements in Türkiye. 

Regarding the freedom to provide cross-border services, service providers registered in the 
EU  still  face  requirements  on  registration,  licencing  and  authorisation.  The  point  of  single 
contact has not yet been created.  

No progress was made in the area of postal services. Legislation regulating postal services 
in accordance with the EU acquis has not yet been adopted. Türkiye has yet to align with the 
provisions  of  the  Postal  Services  Directive,  as  a  reserved  area  in  the  letter  mail  market  is 
maintained  for 
the  state-owned  universal  service  provider.  The  Information  and 
Communication  Technologies  Authority  (ICTA)  monitors  postal  market  development. 
National legislation still needs to be aligned with the provisions of the Regulation on  cross-
border parcel delivery services. 

On  the  mutual  recognition  of  professional  qualifications,  the  Vocational  Qualifications 
Authority  continued  to  implement  the  national  qualification  framework.  The  number  of 
occupations  that  require  compulsory  certifications  has  increased  (204  occupations  in  total). 
The  number  of  national  occupational  standards  reached  901  and  the  number  of  national 
qualifications  prepared  in  line  with  occupational  standards  reached  650.  The  Turkish 
Referencing  Report  to  the  European  Qualifications  Framework  is  still  not  updated.  Some 
regulated  professions  still  require  reciprocal  mutual  recognition.  Nationality  and  language 
requirements have not been removed. However, it is possible to make an online application 
for  the  recognition  and  equivalence  of  higher  education  qualifications.  There  is  no  specific 
regulation  or  practice  governing  the  temporary  or  occasional  provision  of  services. 
Continuous and significant steps are needed to align national legislation with the EU acquis 
in this area. 

Chapter 4: Free movement of capital 

In the EU, capital and investments must be able to move without restrictions, with common 
rules for cross-border payments. Banks and other economic operators apply certain rules to 
support the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. 

85 

 
 
Türkiye  is  moderately  prepared  on  free  movement  of  capital.  Overall,  there  was  some 
progress  in  this  area  in  the  reporting  period.  Limitations  on  foreign  ownership  persist  in 
numerous  sectors.  There  are  still  restrictions  on  capital  movements  and  foreign  exchange-
denominated  transactions.  Türkiye  has  improved  its  instant  payment  system  infrastructure. 
The country remains on the list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring ('grey list') by the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Though the FATF did not call for the use of increased 
due  diligence  measures  in  the  reporting  period,  Türkiye  needs  to  take  more  steps  to 
implement its action plan and tackle the strategic shortcomings in its anti-money laundering 
and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime. It is important for Türkiye to 
ensure an objective implementation that does not instrumentalise measures to target or restrict 
the legitimate rights of NGOs. 

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were implemented to some extent. In the 
coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  minimise limitations on foreign ownership and on capital movements; 

→  make further progress in tackling the strategic shortcomings in its AML/CFT regime, in 
line with the EU acquis and FATF recommended actions in order to be delisted from the 
FATF grey list;  

→  address  the  recommendations  of  the  Venice  Commission  regarding  the  law  on  the 

prevention of financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 

Concerning capital movements and payments, restrictions on foreign ownership are still in 
place  in  many  sectors,  including  broadcasting,  education,  transportation,  financial  services, 
the  electricity  market  and  real  estate.  Türkiye’s  legislation  on  real  estate  acquisition  by 
foreigners  remains  opaque  and  does  not  apply  to  all  EU  nationals  in  a  non-discriminatory 
way. On this point, Türkiye lags behind its commitments under the EU-Turkey Association 
Agreement. The ability for citizens of neighbouring countries in border provinces to buy real 
estate  is  still  restricted  for  national  security  reasons.  Türkiye  maintains  its  restrictions  on 
capital  movements  and  foreign  exchange-denominated  transactions.  Exporters  are  still 
required to sell 40% of their foreign-earned income to the Central Bank and Türkiye brought 
in some additional incentives to encourage exporters to convert their foreign-earned revenues 
into Turkish lira. Türkiye also imposes a range of informal measures on banks and operators 
to limit the purchase of foreign currencies. 

Türkiye has made some progress in payment systems adding to the good level of preparation 
already achieved. The Central Bank has increased the scope and coverage of the Instant and 
Continuous Transfer of Funds (FAST) system. Banks began to provide services via the Open 
Banking Gateway (GEÇİT) infrastructure. Türkiye also launched FAST Merchant Payments 
in  2023.  The  first  payment  transactions  were  made  on  the  Digital  Turkish  Lira  Network. 
Meanwhile,  the  Central  Bank  published  guidelines  on  data  sharing  services  in  payment 
services in December 2022. The Central Bank also launched the Security Overlay Service to 
facilitate  the  exchange  of  information  with  a  view  to  improving  the  detection  of  illicit 
transactions. All Turkish banks had stopped accepting the Russian MIR payment system by 
October 2022. 

Türkiye  has  made  some  progress  in  the  fight  against  money  laundering  and  terrorist 
financing. Türkiye has been on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) list of jurisdictions 
under  increased  monitoring  ('grey  list')  since  October  2021,  but  has  not  been  added  to  the 
EU’s  list  of  high-risk  third  countries.  This  is  due  to  Türkiye's  candidate  status,  high-level 
political  commitment  to  the  EU  to  tackle  the  outstanding  shortcomings  identified  by  the 
FATF and to its endeavours to reach full alignment with the EU acquis.  

86 

 
 
Türkiye revised its national  strategy document on anti-money laundering and  countering 
the  financing  of  terrorism  in  2022  to  comply  with  FATF  recommended  actions.  In  2022, 
Türkiye adopted regulations regarding politically exposed persons to comply with the FATF 
Standards and the EU acquis. Also in 2022, Türkiye issued guidance to the private sector on 
detecting  terrorist  financing  and  increased  its  financial  intelligence  agency’s  proactive 
dissemination  of  financial  intelligence.  In  July  2023,  the  FATF  concluded  that  Türkiye  has 
taken  positive  steps  towards  improving  its  AML/CFT  regime.  Consequently,  the  FATF 
upgraded the country’s ratings on five of its recommendations, including Recommendation 8 
on  the  audit  of  the  non-profit  organisations.  Türkiye  remains  partially  compliant  on  one 
recommendation. Nevertheless, the law on the prevention of financing of the proliferation of 
weapons  of  mass  destruction  has  not  been  revised  in  line  with  the  Venice  Commission’s 
recommendations. 

The  Turkish  Financial  Crimes  Investigation  Board  (MASAK)  strengthened  its  capacity  and 
the level of cooperation with law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities. The number 
of suspicious transaction reports submitted fell from 504 995 in 2021 to 425 322 in 2022. The 
number of money laundering prosecutions has been rising in recent years. 70 cases resulted in 
conviction  between 2013 and 2018. Since 2018, 225 people have been convicted in  money 
laundering cases and in 2022 alone, 4 904 people were convicted in Türkiye. 

Türkiye  reaffirmed  its  commitment  to  freeze  the  assets  of  people/entities  designated  by  the 
United  Nations  Security  Council  Sanctions  Committee.  The  government  also  continued  to 
use the domestic assets freeze instrument effectively.  

Chapter 6: Company law 

The  EU  has  common  rules  on  the  formation,  registration  and  disclosure requirements  of  a 
company,  with  complementary  rules  for  accounting  and  financial  reporting,  and  statutory 
audit. 

Türkiye is well advanced in the area of company law. Some progress was made during the 
reporting  period,  by  adopting  the  financial  reporting  standards  for  small  and  micro 
companies.  However,  there  was  no  progress  on  the  other  2022  recommendation,  which 
remains valid.   

In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  align  national  legislation  with  the  acquis  on  encouraging  long-term  shareholder 

engagement; 

→  align  national  legislation  with  the  acquis  on  cross-border  conversions,  mergers  and 

divisions and on the use of digital tools and processes in company law. 

On  company  law,  Türkiye  took  limited  legislative  action  over  the  reporting  period. 
Alignment  is  needed  on  some  outstanding  issues  in  the  context  of  cross-border  mergers, 
domestic  mergers  and  divisions,  and  takeovers.  Alignment  is  also  necessary  with  the  2019 
acquis  on  the  use  of  digital  tools  and  on  cross-border  operations  (mergers,  divisions, 
conversions) with the rules on shareholders’ rights, including on the encouragement of long-
term shareholder engagement and on gender equality on boards of directors. As regards the 
disclosure of company documents in the business register, the country still lacks provisions 
requiring all limited liability companies to publish annual accounts and on the online filing of 
company  documents.  Türkiye  also  lacks  a  fully  online  process  to  register  limited  liability 
companies.  

On  company  reporting,  a  Presidency  decision  on  the  procedures  and  principles  for 

87 

 
 
determining  the  companies  subject  to  independent  audit  was  published  in  November  2022. 
This  lowered  the  audit  exemption  thresholds.  In  January  2023,  the  Public  Oversight, 
Accounting,  and  Auditing  Standards  Authority  (POA)  published  the  financial  reporting 
standard  for  small  and  micro  enterprises.  Based  on  changes  in  the  International  Code  of 
Ethics  for  Professional  Accountants  (including  International  Independence  Standards),  the 
POA also updated the standards in the Code of Ethics for Auditors, in March 2023. There is 
still  a  lack  of  clarity  regarding  the  alignment  of  non-financial  information  and  reports  on 
payments  to  the  government.  Türkiye  will  need  to  align  with  the  2022  EU  Directive  on 
corporate  sustainability  reporting.  As  regards  transparency  requirements  for  listed 
companies,  the  Law  on  capital  markets  regulates  the  general  responsibilities  of  issuers. 
Implementing rules are published by the Capital Markets Board with the aim of aligning with 
the  EU  acquis  in  this  area.  The  Turkish  Commercial  Code  was  amended  to  increase 
transparency and provide the identity information of bearer shareholders. 

Chapter 7: Intellectual property law 

The  EU  has  harmonised  rules  for  the legal  protection  of  intellectual  property  rights  (IPR), 
copyright and related rights. Rules for the legal protection of IPR cover, for instance, patents 
and  trade marks,  designs,  biotechnological  inventions  and  pharmaceuticals.  Rules  for  the 
legal protection of copyright and related rights cover, for instance, books, films, software and 
broadcasting. 

Türkiye  has  a  good  level  of  preparation,  notably  in  terms  of  legislative  alignment.  No 
progress was made during the reporting period. Some legislative discrepancies remain, as do 
outstanding  problems  regarding  implementation  and  enforcement,  notably  in  relation  with 
judicial  procedures.  Türkiye  was  the  second  major  country  of  provenance  by  number  of 
counterfeit articles entering the EU.   

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid. 
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  improve  enforcement  measures  to  efficiently  fight  against  industrial  and  intellectual 
property  rights  infringements,  including  online  sales  of  counterfeit  and  pirated  goods, 
improve the level of specialisation in courts dealing with IPR infringements and resolve 
difficulties  in  the  judicial  procedures  to  obtain  search  and  seizure  warrants  for  criminal 
law enforcement; 

→  improve  cooperation  with  IPR  owners  for  efficient  implementation  and  effective 
enforcement  of  the  Law  on  industrial  property,  in  particular  in  cases  of  accelerated  and 
simplified destruction procedures by the judiciary and the customs authorities; 

→  ensure  the  collection  and  processing  of  accurate  statistical  data,  especially  on  effective 
judicial  enforcement  of  intellectual  and  industrial  property  rights,  with  a  view  to 
facilitating the analysis of systemic IPR shortcomings. 

Regarding copyright and related rights, Türkiye amended one specific article of the Law on 
copyright and extended legal protection against circumvention of technological measures to 
all  works,  performances,  phonograms,  productions  and  broadcasts,  in  addition  to  computer 
programmes.  The  Law  on  copyright  has  yet  to  be  fully  modernised  to  provide  sufficient 
protection,  in  line  with  technological  developments.  Systemic  issues  continue,  particularly 
regarding  collective  rights  management,  the  lack  of  autonomy  and  the  supervision  of 
collective rights management organisations (CMOs), as well as discrimination against foreign 
right  holders  in  the  management  of  CMOs.  A  number  of  issues  remained  unresolved,  in 
particular  the  lack  of  fair  distribution  of  private  copy  levies,  licencing  difficulties, 
88 

 
 
in  online  education  exceptions,  public  performance 

right  problems, 
uncertainties 
unauthorised use of  copyrighted material  via online platforms and well-known e-commerce 
websites. Türkiye is not yet aligned with the Directive on copyright and related rights in the 
Digital Single Market. 

Regarding industrial property rights, the Turkish Patent and Trademark Office continued to 
strengthen its administrative capacity and digitalise services. The lack of a precise definition 
of  bad  faith  applications  as  regards  trade  marks  has  made  the  invalidation  procedure 
ineffective. The procedures to revoke, oppose and invalidate trade marks remained expensive 
and lengthy. There are currently no legal provisions for supplementary protection certificates. 

Another  area  of  continued  concern  is  the  absence  of  an  effective  system  for  protecting 
undisclosed  test  and  other  data  generated  to  obtain  marketing  approval  for  pharmaceutical 
and  agrochemical  products.  Even  though  Türkiye  has  in  place  a  regulatory  data  protection 
regime  since  2005,  the  scope  is  limited  and  excludes  biologics  and  combination  products. 
The  length  is  also  limited  reducing  the  effective  protection  period  in  Türkiye.  Turkish  law 
links  the  length  of  the  regulatory  data  protection  with  the  duration  of  patent  protection. 
Hence,  once  a  product  is  considered  off-patent,  it  automatically  loses  its  regulatory  data 
protection.  

Concerning judicial enforcement, criminal courts rarely order deterrent fines for commercial 
scale  IP  infringements,  even  though  legal  provisions  may  provide  for  higher  penalties. 
Stakeholders continue to report complaints about inefficient litigation procedures, including 
at  courts  of  appeal.  They  report  difficulties  and  inconsistencies  in  deciding  preliminary 
injunctions  and  monetary  compensation  claims,  storage  and  destruction  problems  and 
financial  burdens  related  to  the  storage  of  counterfeit  goods,  and  the  overuse  of  expert 
witness statements. 

Despite  strong  evidence  provided  by  right  holders  about  counterfeiting,  few  search  and 
seizure  warrants  are  granted  and  very  few  counterfeit  goods  are  seized.  Public  prosecutors 
and judges require additional evidence, which is not reasonable to substantiate the claims of 
the  right  holders.  Obtaining  preliminary  injunctions  also  remains  difficult  and  the  level  of 
deterrence  of  the  penalties  ordered  by  judicial  authorities  is  reportedly  low.  Enforcement 
authorities,  in  particular  the  police  and  judges,  need  to  increase  the  efficiency  of  action 
against  IP  infringements.  The  number  of  IP  courts  has  decreased  over  the  past  years  in 
Türkiye,  which  has  a  negative  effect  on  the  quality  and  consistency  of  the  court  decisions. 
Action to combat counterfeiting at physical marketplaces remains insufficient. The Law on e-
commerce  and its  implementing regulation  introduced new provisions relating  to  the notice 
and  takedown  procedure  and  clarified  the  responsibility  of  e-commerce  intermediary  and 
direct  service  providers  in  complaints  regarding  the  infringement  of  intellectual  property 
rights.  There  has  been  an  increase  in  online  sales  of  counterfeit  goods  at  well-known  e-
commerce  marketplaces.  In  this  context,  and  with  a  view  to  stopping  IPR  infringements,  it 
will be important for Türkiye to apply notice and takedown procedures.  

The  number  of  customs  applications  for  seizures  increased  from  2 431  in  2021  to  2 637  in 
2022. However, Türkiye needs to improve customs enforcement to combat counterfeit goods, 
in particular for goods in transit and exports, which makes Türkiye the second major country 
of provenance by number of counterfeit articles entering the EU, according to the 2022 report 
on the EU enforcement of IPR. The number of articles coming from Türkiye detained at the 
EU  borders  by  customs  authorities  has  increased.  Counterfeiting  concerns  a  wide  range  of 
products from food and alcoholic beverages to vehicles, vehicles accessories and spare parts. 
The customs enforcement legislation is not fully aligned with the acquis. 

89 

 
 
There  are  only  limited  awareness  campaigns  from  public  institutions  on  the  dangers  of 
counterfeiting  and  piracy  to  public  health,  consumer  safety,  rule  of  law  and  labour  market, 
and  on  the  economic  benefits  of  IPR-intensive  sectors.  Stronger  political  commitment  is 
needed to enforce IPR and to stop the flow of counterfeit trade from Türkiye to the EU. 

Chapter 8: Competition policy 

EU rules enable free competition. They include antitrust rules against restrictive agreements 
between  companies  and  the  abuse  of  a  dominant  position,  and  also  include  rules  on 
concentrations  between  companies  which  would  significantly  impede  effective  competition. 
EU rules also set out a system of State aid control. Governments are only allowed to grant 
State aid if strict conditions are met, with a view to prevent distortion competition.  

Türkiye has some level of preparation  in the area of competition policy. Backsliding was 
noted due to serious concerns in relation to the legislative framework, enforcement capacity 
and transparency in the field of State aid. Institutional framework and the new administrative 
structure  clearly  deviate  from  the  EU  acquis.  By  repeatedly  postponing  the  creation  of  a 
functional  enforcement  structure,  Türkiye’s  legislative  framework  is,  de  facto,  ineffective. 
The  lack  of  a  transparent  State  aid  inventory  covering  all  aid  schemes  remains  a  source  of 
concern. 

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid. 
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  ensure  the  independence  and  functionality  of  the  State  aid  institutional  framework  in 

accordance with the EU acquis; 

→ implement the State aid Law by adopting implementing legislation without further delay; 

→ make available a transparent and up-to-date inventory of all aid schemes. 

Antitrust and mergers 

The legislative framework is broadly aligned with the EU acquis. The Law on the protection 
of competition broadly reflects Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European  Union  (TFEU).  Implementing  legislation  in  this  field  is  largely  in  place.  The 
relevant legislation must still be aligned in order to ensure full compliance with the Vertical 
Block Exemption Regulation.  

In  terms  of  the  institutional  framework,  the  Turkish  Competition  Authority  (TCA)  is 
responsible for enforcing the Law on the protection of competition. Its decision-making body, 
the  Competition  Board,  has  seven  members.  Despite  being  affiliated  with  the  Ministry  of 
Trade, the TCA has administrative and financial autonomy. 

The enforcement capacity of the Authority is adequate. In 2022, overall implementation was 
effective and the number of decisions in the areas of antitrust (78 compared with 74 in 2021), 
in  2021)  and 
exemption/negative  clearance  decisions 
merger/acquisition/joint  venture/privatisation  (245  compared  with  309  in  2021)  were 
comparable with those adopted in the previous year. The total amount of fines levied by the 
Authority  for  infringements  of  competition  law  (fines  related  to  substance)  remained  at 
TRY1.7  billion,  an  average  for  the  previous  five  years.  The  total  number  of  ex-officio 
investigations  and  preliminary  investigations  increased  from  15  in  2021,  to  18  in  2022.  In 
2022,  80%  of  the  139  judgements  concluded  as  a  result  of  appeals  against  the  Turkish 
Competition Authority decisions were upheld by Turkish courts.  

(19  compared  with  22 

State aid 

90 

 
 
Action taken in 2022 on the legislative framework amounted to a backslide. Türkiye’s Law 
on the monitoring and supervision of State aid is  broadly in line with Articles 107 and 108 
TFEU. However, by repeatedly postponing the creation of a functional enforcement structure, 
Türkiye has rendered its legislative framework, de facto, ineffective. 

Following the abolition of the  Directorate General  for State Aid (DGSA), in  2022,  Türkiye 
established  a  new  DGSA,  under  the  Presidency  of  Strategy  and  Budget.  However,  the  new 
DGSA does not have the same full legal mandate as its predecessor. The decree establishing 
the new DGSA gives a  different definition of State aid than the definition given in Law on 
the  monitoring  and  supervision  of  State  aid,  which  was  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis.  The 
President postponed implementation of the law and its implementing legislation indefinitely. 
As a result, not only the law is not enforceable, but the institutional framework and the new 
administrative structure  also  clearly deviate from the EU  acquis.  Accordingly, Türkiye still 
needs to make substantial efforts to align its legislation with the EU acquis. 

In 2023, the project-based investment programme – where the transfer of State resources is 
provided on a selective basis (i.e. only to certain undertakings) – included 64 projects with an 
investment  amount  of  TRY  491  billion  (incentives  granted  since  the  beginning  of  2022, 
covering 25 projects with an investment of TRY 336 billion). The breakdown of State aid for 
these  investments  was  not  disclosed,  contrary  to  the  commitments  made  under  the  EU-
Turkey  Customs  Union.  The  lack  of  a  transparent  State  aid  inventory  covering  all  aid 
schemes – including the amount or budgeted amount of the State support granted – remains a 
source of concern. 

Liberalisation 

State-owned  enterprises  are  subject  to  competition  and  State  aid  rules,  however  the  overall 
challenges in the area of State aid also apply to state-owned enterprises.  

Chapter 9: Financial services 

EU  rules  aim  to  ensure  fair  competition  among,  and  the  stability  of,  financial  institutions, 
namely  banking,  insurance,  supplementary  pensions,  investment  services  and  securities 
markets. They include rules on authorisation, operation and supervision of these institutions. 

Türkiye  has  a  good  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  financial  services.  It  made  limited 
progress in the reporting period by strengthening the insurance market and developing new 
alternative financing instruments. However, Türkiye's pre-2023 election approach to apply a 
set of unorthodox macroprudential and regulatory measures made the operating environment 
for  the  banking  sector  increasingly  challenging  during  the  reporting  period.  The  country 
should  make  further  efforts  to  align  with  the  financial  services  acquis,  focusing  on  the 
priorities identified based on the current state of play.   

The  Commission’s  recommendations  from  last  year  were  partially  implemented,  and 
therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→ gradually phase out distortive macro-prudential and regulatory measures and improve the 

transparency of asset quality review;  

→ further strengthen bank governance and supervision, crisis management and the resolution 

framework; 

→ continue to support the development of Türkiye's capital markets and their supervision. 

Regarding  banks  and  financial  conglomerates,  Türkiye  is  in  line  with  the  Basel  III 
framework (but not  taking into account  the Basel  III Finalisation of 2017) according to  the 

91 

 
 
Basel  Committee.  In  October  2022,  Türkiye  released  the  2022-2025  participation  finance 
strategy,  with  the  aim  of  building  a  legal,  administrative  and  corporate  infrastructure  for 
participation finance.  

Overall, the banking sector has remained resilient, with the indicators tracking asset quality 
improving.  The  share  of  non-performing  loan  ratios  continued  to  fall,  down  to  1.9%  in 
February  2023.  The  capital  adequacy  ratio  of  the  banking  sector  remained  above  the  legal 
thresholds,  supported  by  the  sector's  strong  profitability  performance.  Action  is  needed  to 
improve  the  transparency  and  predictability  of  the  financial  sector  regulatory  framework, 
including by carefully phasing out distortive regulatory measures and conducting transparent 
asset quality reviews.  

Türkiye made some progress on insurance and occupational pensions. In October 2022, the 
Insurance  and  Private  Pension  Regulation  and  Supervision  Agency  (SEEDK)  published  a 
new  regulation  laying  down  the  procedures  and  principles  for  the  collection,  storage  and 
sharing  of  insurance  data.  Under  a  new  regulation  on  the  state  contribution  to  the  private 
pension system,  state contributions  can be received in  the following years for contributions 
paid  above the  annual  limit.  In November 2022, SEEDK announced its roadmap for traffic 
insurance aiming at overcoming structural weaknesses in the sector. It mainly plans to switch 
to person-based insurance and to improve the arbitration process. In June 2023, a possibility 
of electronic applications was introduced for insurance arbitration system through an online 
platform. Following the  February 2023 earthquakes, SEEDK took several  measures to  ease 
the burden of insurers such as extending the maturities of all expired mandatory earthquake 
insurance policies or removing the penalty for delays to compulsory motor insurance. 

As  regards  financial  market  infrastructure,  the  Capital  Markets  Board  adopted  some 
amendments to the sale methods and distribution principles applied to initial public offering 
of shares  to  protect  investors’ rights.  It  also  amended the criteria for institutional  investors. 
Portfolio management  companies are now considered individual investors and no longer  as 
institutional  investors. To raise awareness  of sustainability  among  companies trading  in  the 
Borsa Istanbul markets, Türkiye launched futures contracts based on BIST Sustainability 25 
Index for trading on the derivatives market in January 2023. 

Regarding  securities  markets  and  investment  services,  the  Borsa  Istanbul  made  some 
amendments to the regulations on precious metals in August 2022 by expanding the scope of 
conversion  transactions  to  include  all  precious  metals.  As  part  of  the  efforts  to  develop 
alternative investment instruments, Turkish State mint gold certificates started trading on the 
commodity  market  segment  of  the  Borsa  Istanbul  Equity  Market  at  the  end  of  November 
2022. 

On sustainable and digital finance, Türkiye took a number of steps to accelerate the digital 
transformation of the banking sector over the last few years. Amendments were made to the 
remote  identification  services  of  banks,  mainly  allowing  legal  entities  to  access  these 
services, and facilitating the use of the system by persons with disabilities. The use of crypto 
currency and crypto assets directly or indirectly as an instrument of payment is still banned in 
Türkiye. In February 2022, Türkiye adopted guidelines on green debt instruments, sustainable 
debt instruments, green lease certificates and sustainable lease certificates. They are based on 
the Green Bond Principles of the International Capital Markets Association (ICMA) and aim 
to  improve  transparency  and  international  comparability  of  green  bonds,  sustainable  bonds, 
green sukuk and sustainable sukuk. 

92 

 
 
Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection 

EU rules protect consumers’ economic interests and in relation to product safety, dangerous 
imitations and liability for defective products. The EU also ensures high common standards 
for tobacco control, blood, tissues, cells and organs, and medicines for human and veterinary 
use. The EU also has rules for upholding patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare and in 
preparing  for  and  responding  to  cross-border  health  threats,  including    communicable 
diseases. 

Türkiye  has  a  good  level  of  preparation  on  consumer  and  health  protection.  Limited  
progress was achieved overall over the reporting period in this chapter. Efforts were made to 
strengthen  its  surveillance  system  for  health  (security)  services  and  to  tackle  serious  cross-
border health threats. However, implementation issues remain regarding consumer protection 
and  enforcement,  and  consumers  continue  to  face  problems  in  exercising  their  rights.  The 
capacity of the healthcare system was seriously affected by the February 2023 earthquakes in 
south-east Türkiye. 

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid. 
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  strengthen  consumer  rights  enforcement  and  further 

improve  coordination  and 
cooperation with the consumer movement and with enforcement bodies; increase raising 
awareness activities and take more measures on infringements in the digital environment 
and more measures to support vulnerable consumers; 

→  strengthen  its  primary  healthcare  services  by  providing  sufficient  resources  for  public 
health emergencies risk assessment and risk management at central and provincial levels; 

→  boost  its  workforce  and  administrative  capacity  to  ensure  effective  multi-sectoral 

preparedness and response to disasters, within and across the relevant sectors. 

Consumer protection 

While  Türkiye’s  national  legislation  remains  mostly  aligned  with  the  acquis  on  consumer 
protection  in  non-safety-related  issues,  with  further  legislative  alignment  on  consumer 
arbitration, issues remain in the application of consumer rights. Consumers face problems in 
exercising their right to choose, and consumer awareness and education remain insufficient. 
The level of cooperation and coordination between consumer organisations and enforcement 
bodies  remains  low.  The  national  consumer  information  system  (TÜBİS)  is  complex, 
preventing  its  widespread  usage.  Consumer  NGOs  lack  financial  and  professional  support 
and  are  unable  to  participate  actively  in  legal  and  public  decision-making  mechanisms. 
Consumer arbitration committee members remain insufficiently trained  and lack a  common 
understanding  of  the  legal  issues.  Of  602 613  decisions  taken  by  consumer  arbitration 
committees in 2022, 50% were in favour of consumers and 50% against them. Cooperation 
between out-of-court and court consumer systems is yet to be improved. Alignment with the 
representative actions Directive is at an early stage and significant work is still needed. 

On  safety-related  measures,  there  is  a  low  level  of  consumer  awareness  of  the  national 
unsafe products information system. Regular monitoring and more robust regulatory tools are 
required  to  combat  online  sales  of  counterfeit  goods  that  endanger  consumer  and  public 
health  (see  Chapter  7-  Intellectual  property  law).  Market  surveillance  of  e-commerce 
remained limited, although the volume of online shopping has increased (see Chapter 1-Free 
movement of goods).  

Public health 

93 

 
 
In  the  field  of  public  health,  while  Türkiye  was  recovering  from  the  impact  of  COVID-19 
pandemic,  two  earthquakes  hit  the  country  in  February  2023.  The  earthquakes  had  a  direct 
impact  on  15 million  people,  claiming  over  50 500  lives  and  injuring  over  120 000  people. 
Hospitals, family health centres and public health laboratories in the region suffered damage. 
The earthquakes interrupted the diagnostics chain from health facility to laboratory. Disease 
surveillance  was  set  up  for  infections  and  communicable  disease  outbreaks,  including 
airborne and waterborne diseases. The capacity of the health system remained insufficient to 
meet  the  healthcare  needs  in  the  earthquake-affected  areas,  especially  the  mental  health 
needs,  and  psychological  and  nutrition  needs.  The  COVID-19  pandemic  and  the  February 
2023  earthquakes  have  shown  that  inter-sectoral  linkages  and  collaboration  on  emergency 
prevention,  preparedness  and  response  are  vital  in  ensuring  public  health  safety  and 
wellbeing in the aftermath of disasters.  

Türkiye’s  health  system  faces  a  growing  burden  from  non-communicable  diseases, 
including  cardiovascular  diseases  and  cancer.  These  illnesses  have  a  significant  impact  on 
premature mortality. In 2022, Türkiye scaled up its cancer screening activities to 7.3 million 
scans across the country from 4.4 million in 2021. Of these scans, 2.8 million were for breast 
cancer, 2.7 million for cervical cancer, and 1.8 million were for colon cancer.  

Türkiye made good progress on serious cross-border health threats including communicable 
diseases,  especially  in  workforce  development  and  in  building  institutional  capacity  for 
central  and  provincial  public  health  professionals.  To  strengthen  the  capacity  to  detect  and 
counter the threats posed by outbreaks of infectious diseases, Türkiye introduced a molecular 
laboratory-based  surveillance  component  to  its  national  health  surveillance  system.  It 
prepared  acute  public  health  threats  guidelines  for  biological,  chemical,  environmental  and 
radio  nuclear  threats  at  central  level  and  distributed  the  guidelines  to  the  provincial 
authorities for implementation. 

On tobacco control,  the actions planned to  meet  the targets  set  under Türkiye's 2017-2025 
non-communicable diseases action plan to reduce tobacco and salt consumption by 30% are 
insufficient. Tobacco is consumed by 31% of the Turkish population.  

No  progress  was  made  regarding  patients’  rights  in  cross-border  healthcare,  neither  on 
drug  abuse  prevention.  On  blood,  tissues,  cells  and  organs,  Türkiye  developed  a  patient 
blood  management  software  for  ensuring  quality,  safety  and  effectiveness  of  transfusion 
applications. 

On  mental  health,  Türkiye  set  up  community  mental  health  centres  and  provided 
psychological first aid for children as part of the earthquake response., Türkiye’s capacity to 
provide mental health and psychosocial support is not sufficient to  meet the needs resulting 
from  the  crisis.  In  earthquake-impacted  regions,  20%  of  people  are  estimated  to  have 
developed  a  mental  health  disorder  due  to  earthquake-related  traumas,  and  5%  are 
experiencing severe long-term mental health problems.  

On health inequalities, vulnerable groups namely LGBTIQ persons, people living with HIV 
and  sex  workers  as  well  as  refugees  are  subject  to  discrimination  and  continue  to  face 
significant challenges to access healthcare information and services. 

CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH  

This  cluster  covers:  digital  transformation  and  media  (Chapter  10),  taxation  (Chapter  16), 
economic  and  monetary  policy  (Chapter  17),  social  policy  and  employment  (Chapter  19), 
industrial  policy  (Chapter  20),  science  and  research  (Chapter  25),  education  and  culture 
(Chapter 26), and Customs Union (Chapter 29).  

94 

 
 
Türkiye  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  digital  transformation  and  media.  It 
continued  to  backslide  as  it  did  not  address  concerns  regarding  the  lack  of  sufficient 
competition,  lack  of  transparency  of  media  funding,  concentration  of  media  ownership, 
political  influence  on  editorial  policies,  restrictions  on  the  freedom  of  expression  and  the 
lack of independence of regulatory authorities. Türkiye’s preparations in the area of science 
and research are well advanced and Türkiye made good progress during the reporting period, 
notably as a result of joining Horizon Europe and continued efforts to raise awareness of and 
capacity for the programme. Türkiye is  moderately  prepared on education and culture, and 
continued  to  make  some  progress,  notably  through  the  continued  implementation  of  the 
national  qualifications  system  and  the  increased  participation  in  some  EU  programmes. 
Access to education in south-east Türkiye was significantly impacted by the February 2023 
earthquakes.  

On the economy-related chapters, backsliding continued on economic and monetary policy, 
where  Türkiye  has  some  level  of  preparation.  The  Central  Bank  continued  to  loosen  its 
unorthodox monetary policy stance, which triggered multi-year high inflation and unhinged 
inflation  expectations.  Until  the  parliamentary  and  presidential  elections  in  May  2023,  the 
Central  Bank  was  subject  to  significant  political  pressure  to  keep  real  interest  rates  deeply 
negative.  Far-reaching  prudential  and  regulatory  measures  disrupted  the  functioning  of 
financial  markets  and  increased  risks.  After  the  elections,  the  Central  Bank  has  started  to 
tighten monetary policy  and the new  government  took  measures  to  limit  the bulging fiscal 
deficit.  Türkiye  is  moderately  prepared  and  made  limited  progress  on  enterprise  and 
industrial policy. Major challenges in relation to measures incompatible with EU industrial 
policy principles remain unaddressed. Türkiye has some level  of preparation in  the area of 
social  policy  and  employment.  The  labour  market  situation  improved  but  concerns  remain 
over trade union rights and effective social dialogue, persistent levels of informal economic 
activity  and  the  gender  gap  in  employment.  The  February  2023  earthquakes  had  a  major 
impact on the labour market in the affected regions. 

Türkiye is moderately prepared on taxation. It made no progress during the reporting period 
and  still  needs  to  enable  tax  information  exchange  with  all  EU  Member  States.  Türkiye 
maintains a good level of preparation for the customs union but made limited progress over 
the  reporting  period.  Several  longstanding  and  new  trade  barriers  still  infringe  the  basic 
provisions of the EU-Turkey Customs Union. 

Chapter 10: Digital transformation and media 

The  EU  supports 
for  electronic 
communications, electronic commerce and audiovisual services. The rules protect consumers 
and support the universal availability of modern services. 

internal  market 

functioning  of 

the  smooth 

the 

Türkiye  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  this  area.  Backsliding  continued  during  the 
reporting  period.  Concerns  persist  regarding  the  lack  of  sufficient  competition,  the  lack  of 
transparency of media funding, the concentration of media ownership, political influence on 
editorial policies, restrictions on the freedom of expression, and the lack of independence of 
regulatory authorities.  

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid. 
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→ align the universal service, authorisation arrangements, market access and rights of way in 

electronic communications with the EU acquis; 

→ strengthen the independence of the regulatory authority and its board members and amend 

95 

 
 
the Internet Law in line with the Venice Commission’s recommendations, with a view to 
ensuring media pluralism; 

→ take steps to strengthen the public broadcaster’s independence. 

On electronic communications and information technology, Türkiye made no progress in 
aligning  its  legislation  with  the  acquis  on  market  access  and  universal  service.  Concerns 
remain  regarding  the  lack  of  financial  and  administrative  independence  of  the  regulatory 
authorities. More transparency in  spending  is  needed. Further regulatory  and administrative 
steps  are 
in 
required 
telecommunications.  

to  establish  a  competitive  and  consumer-friendly  market 

Competition  on  the  market  for  fixed  voice  communications  remains  limited.  The  market 
share of alternative fixed voice operators was 12.9% in the first quarter of 2023, down from 
14.6% in the last quarter of 2022. The lack of sufficient competition on the broadband market 
remains a concern. The number of fixed broadband subscribers increased to 22.3% in March 
2023, against the OECD average of 34.7%. The total number of mobile broadband users was 
71 million, which corresponds to a penetration rate of 84.4% of the population at the end of 
2022,  against  the  OECD  average  of  128.2%.  The  number  of  LTE  subscribers  rose  to  84 
million in the first quarter of 2023 as compared to 82.9 million at the end of 2022. 

There  was  no  progress  reported  in  the  procurement  of  5G.  Türkiye  still  needs  to  allocate 
additional frequencies for the development and predictability of the sector. In 2022, 94.1% of 
households  had  access  to  the  internet,  increasing  from  92%  the  previous  year.  In  the  last 
quarter of 2022, Türkiye published a new Regulation on the  electronic  seal.  The  regulation 
covers the procedures and principles governing electronic seal certificates and the obligations 
of  electronic  seal  holders,  further  regulating  this  area.  Türkiye  has  yet  to  revise  its  Data 
Protection Law to align with the acquis. 

Regarding the recording of a new unified Cypriot plan below 700 MHz under the Geneva 06 
ITU plan, Cyprus is still facing an objection from Türkiye to such recording in International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU). It is essential that Türkiye’s objection in ITU be lifted; the 
television channels below the 700 MHz band, including those channels that have been agreed 
to be used by Turkish Cypriots, are still not registered in this ITU Plan, which deprives from 
the  necessary  regulatory  protection  against  interferences  coming  from  neighbouring 
countries, a situation where both Greek and Turkish Cypriots are affected. 

The level of enforcement of consumer rights in the telecommunication sector remained very 
weak.  The  main  focus  of  consumer  complaints  included  the  quality  of  internet  services, 
subscription services for fixed lines and cable TV services.  

Regarding  the  information  society  services,  the  number  of  services  offered  by  the  e-
Government Gateway reached 7 229. The number of integrated institutions increased to 994.  
The number of citizens using e-government increased from 57 663 331 in 2021 to 61 743 325 
in  2022, and to  63 193 741 by May  2023. In order to  ensure better services to  citizens and 
establish a governance structure to enable public administrations from all levels and sectors 
to  co-create  and  coordinate  the  exchange  of  information  across  network  and  information 
systems, Türkiye should seek alignment with both the European Interoperability Framework 
and the Interoperable Europe Act.   

The volume of e-commerce in Türkiye reached TRY 800.7 billion in 2022, increasing 109% 
compared with the previous year. Following the amendment of the e-commerce Law in July 
2022, Türkiye published an implementing regulation on e-commerce service providers and e-
commerce intermediary  service providers. Some objectives of the revised e-commerce Law 

96 

 
 
are  in  line  with  the  Digital  Markets  Act,  such  as  preventing  unfair  competition  and 
monopolisation.  

On audiovisual policy, the mainstream media remains dominated by pro-government voices. 
According to independent reporting, the government can exert power in the management of 
90%  of  the  most-watched  TV  stations  and  newspapers.  This  impedes  media  independence, 
pluralism, encourages self-censorship, and limits the scope of public debate. A large share of 
these companies’ revenue stems from state advertising and public tenders. Türkiye aimed at 
aligning  its  national  legislation  regarding  audiovisual  media  services  with  Directive 
2010/13/EU  and  efforts  are  underway  to  align  the  new  rules  introduced  by  Directive 
2018/1808  into  the  national  legislation.  Yet,  the legislation  on  the  rules of  radio,  television 
and  on-demand  media  services  lacks  clarity  in  terms  of  its  scope,  definitions,  licencing 
criteria,  and  has  controversial  rules  regarding  jurisdiction  and  restricting  access  to  online 
content. 

Between  mid-June  2022  and  March  2023,  the  Radio  and  Television  Supreme  Council 
(RTÜK),  issued  1 768  penalties  to  media  service  providers.  1 405  (nearly  80%)  of  these 
penalties  were  due  to  infringements  of  the  Law  regulating  commercial  communications.  In 
the same period, Turkish courts imposed 128 broadcasting bans on broadcasters. A pending 
application  by  the  Turkish  Bar  Association  at  the  Council  of  State  continues  to  halt  and 
cancel the execution of a presidential decree, dated January 2022, obliging media entities and 
institutions  to  eliminate  content  that  contravenes  Turkish  values  and  culture  and  to  take 
necessary  action  to  prevent  its  dissemination.  The  decree  risks  violating  basic  rights  and 
freedoms and leading to self-censorship. 

Chapter 16: Taxation 

EU rules on taxation cover value added tax, excise duties and aspects of corporate taxation. 
They  also  cover  cooperation  between  tax  administrations,  including  the  exchange  of 
information to prevent tax evasion. 

Türkiye  is  moderately  prepared  on  taxation,  with  no  progress  made  over  the  reporting 
period. In line with the tax screening process used for the purpose of drawing up the EU list 
of  non-cooperative  jurisdictions,  Türkiye  still  needs  to  activate  effective  exchange 
relationships  with  all  EU  Member  States  to  enable  the  automatic  exchange  of  financial 
account information. 

The Commission's recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid. 
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→ put arrangements in place for the automatic exchange of tax information with EU Member 

States; 

→ align the range of excisable energy products with the EU acquis; 

→  continue  to  combat  the  informal  economy  and  report  on  progress  transparently  through 

performance indicators. 

In the area of indirect taxation, Türkiye still has a wide range of products that are subject to 
a  1%  value  added  tax  (VAT),  in  breach  of  the  EU  acquis.  The  accommodation  tax, 
introduced  in  December  2019,  entered  into  force  in  2023.  The  VAT  exemption  period  for 
deliveries  of  new  machinery  and  equipment  to  the  manufacturing  industry  for  innovation, 
design and R&D activities introduced in 2018, was extended until the end of 2024. Following 
the  February  2023  earthquakes,  Türkiye  declared  a  state  of  force  majeure  in  the  affected 
provinces  until  the  end  of  June  2023.  As  a  result,  in  addition  to  the  delayed  liabilities, 

97 

 
 
taxpayers were allowed to pay their arrears in 24 instalments.  It also reduced the VAT rate 
applicable to prefabricated buildings and containers for delivery to the regions affected by the 
earthquakes from 18% to 1% until December 2023. The legislation on structure, exemptions, 
special schemes and the scope of reduced rates is not fully aligned with the EU acquis. 

Although the overall level of taxation on cigarettes is close to EU levels, Türkiye’s legislation 
on  cigarette  excise  duties  differs  from  the  EU  acquis  in  terms  of  specific  and  proportional 
elements of the tax. Excise duties on energy products are lower than the EU minimum rates 
and coal, coke and electricity are not subject to excise duties, which is not in line with the EU 
acquis. Kerosene is subject to excise duty, but it is zero rated. A 7.5% digital services tax (on 
digital advertising, content, and intermediary services) has been in force since March 2020.  

On  direct  taxation,  Türkiye  issued  a  new  amnesty  on  the  repatriation  of  foreign  and 
domestic assets in July 2022, and a new provision on tax restructuring entered into force in 
March 2023. This means that, since 2016, Türkiye has adopted five tax repatriations and six 
tax restructuring measures, extending their implementation periods repeatedly. Thus, contrary 
to  the emphasis  made in policy papers of the importance of taxpayer voluntary compliance 
and  the  priority  placed  on  increasing  the  predictability  of  the  taxation  system  declared,  tax 
restructuring  and  cash  repatriation  have  become  established  practices.  Such  uninterrupted 
periods  of  capital  repatriations  and  regular  tax  restructuring  practices  undermine  the 
effectiveness  of  the  voluntary  tax  collection  mechanism  and  distort  the  reliability  and 
predictability of the taxation system. 

Türkiye  extended  implementation  of  the  corporate  income  tax  exemption  brought  in  to 
promote the FX-protected TRY time deposit  account  scheme until  the end of 2023.  Due to 
the  high  levels  of  inflation  in  2022,  it  postponed  the  inflation  accounting  (adjustment) 
practice  to  the  end  of  2023.  In  March  2023,  it  brought  in  a  one-time  additional  tax  on 
corporate  income  taxpayers  to  compensate  for  the  tax  losses  incurred  as  a  result  of  the 
earthquakes.  

Türkiye has exempted the minimum wage from income tax since 2022, including the tax on 
all wages corresponding to the minimum wage. 

On administrative cooperation and mutual assistance, Türkiye is still listed in Annex II to 
the Council Conclusions on the EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes for 
criterion 1.1 (automatic exchange of tax information on financial accounts), as it is still not 
fully in line with the requirements. The OECD Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange 
of  Information  for  Tax  Purposes  (Global  Forum)  decision  in  November  2022  qualified 
Türkiye  as  'largely  compliant'  on  the  exchange  of  information  on  request  and  Türkiye 
fulfilled the Council Conclusions on criterion 1.2, exchange of tax information on request. In 
February 2023, the Council concluded that Türkiye should continue the technical  work and 
ensure  that  tax  information  is  exchanged  effectively  with  all  EU  Member  States  to  meet 
criterion 1.1 of the EU list.  

its  operational  capacity  and  computerisation, 

To  manage 
the  Turkish  Revenue 
Administration  uses  an  electronic  document  management  system.  The  use  of  e-tax 
statements,  which  began  in  2004,  reached  99.9%  of  taxpayers  by  2022.  Türkiye  is  in  the 
process of developing an integrated public finance management information system. In 2022, 
it unveiled a new action plan to combat the informal economy (2023-25). However, the new 
action  plan  lacks  performance  indicators  and  a  publicly  accessible  system  to  track 
implementation. 

98 

 
 
Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy 

EU rules require the independence of central banks and prohibit them from directly financing 
the public sector. Member States coordinate their economic policies and are subject to fiscal, 
economic and financial surveillance. 

Türkiye  has  some  level  of  preparation  on  economic  and  monetary  policy.  There  was 
backsliding  during  the  reporting  period,  as  the  Central  Bank  continued  to  loosen  its 
unorthodox monetary policy stance, which triggered multi-year high inflation and unhinged 
inflation  expectations.  Until  the  parliamentary  and  presidential  elections  in  May  2023,  the 
Central  Bank  was  subject  to  significant  political  pressure  to  keep  real  interest  rates  deeply 
negative.  Far-reaching  prudential  and  regulatory  measures  disrupted  the  functioning  of 
financial markets and increased risks. After the elections, the new  government has started a 
process of policy normalisation, gradually removing some of these measures and tightening 
the  monetary  and  fiscal  policy  stance.  In  2022,  Türkiye  made  efforts  in  sending  fiscal 
notifications.   

The Commission's recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid. 
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→ restore the functional independence of the Central Bank and implement an appropriately 
tight  monetary  policy  stance,  reinstalling  interest  rates  as  the  key  monetary  policy  tool, 
with a focus on price stability and re-anchoring inflation expectations; 

→ continue to gradually unwind the most disruptive regulatory measures under a transparent 

monetary policy framework, and underpinned by consistent communication; 

→  further  align  fiscal  reporting  and  notifications  under  the  excessive  deficit  procedure 
(EDP),  as  well  as  government  finance  statistics  (GFS)  reporting,  with  ESA  2010,  by 
gradually expanding data coverage and quality.  

On  monetary  policy,  over  the  last  decade  the  Central  Bank  drifted  away  from  the  official 
inflation target of 5% that it set jointly with the government. Concerns over the Central Bank 
independence  persist.  The  President  of  the  Republic  has  extensive  powers  to  appoint  and 
dismiss  the  Central  Bank  Governor  and  Board  members  and  has  made  repeated  public 
comments about the need to lower interest rates. The monetary policy framework proved to 
be inefficient in anchoring inflation expectations, strengthening the lira and restoring market 
confidence.  According  to  the  Law  on  the  Central  Bank,  monetary  financing  of  the  public 
sector  is  prohibited,  and  the  public  sector  cannot  have  privileged  access  to  financial 
institutions. 

Inflation  reached  a  peak  of  85.5%  on  an  annual  basis  in  October  2022,  before  falling 
gradually  to  38.2%  in  June  2023  on  the  back  of  a  strong  base  effect.  Inflation  rebounded 
again  in  the  following  months  driven  by  renewed  depreciation  of  the  lira  and  sizeable  tax 
increases  that  needed  to  curb  the  mounting  budget  deficit.  Reducing  interest  rates  and 
keeping them very low was the announced policy ‘anchor’ until the summer, which required 
wide-ranging  and  disruptive  macroprudential  and  regulatory  measures  to  reduce  its 
fundamental  contradictions  in  a  context  of  high  inflation.  The  Central  Bank  kept  the  real 
interest  rate  deeply  negative,  despite  soaring  inflation  and  global  tightening  of  financial 
conditions.  It  lowered  its  key  policy  rate  by  500  basis  points  from  14%  to  9%  between 
August and November 2022, and by an additional 50 basis points, down to 8.5% in February 
2023  in  the  aftermath  of  the  February  2023  earthquakes.  After  the  presidential  and 
parliamentary  elections  in  May,  and  under  a  new  governor,  the  Central  Bank  has  started  a 
policy  normalisation,  raising  its  key  rate  to  25%  in  August  and  launching  a process  of  a 

99 

 
 
gradual unwinding of some of the macroprudential and regulatory measures. The costs of the 
FX-  and  gold-protected  time  lira  deposit  scheme  has  been  fully  transferred  to  the  Central 
Bank and are not yet publicly disclosed. 

Meanwhile on economic policy, Türkiye consolidated the medium-term fiscal plan with the 
medium-term  programme  for  2023-2025  set  out  in  a  single  document.  A  more  credible 
economic plan, based on more updated assumptions and fully reflecting all fiscally relevant 
measures,  has  not  been  developed  before  September  2023.  Türkiye  could  improve  the 
credibility of its macroeconomic forecasts by providing alternative scenarios. Türkiye is still 
not  aligned  with  the  Directive  on  Requirements  for  Budgetary  Frameworks  and  lacks 
numerical fiscal rules and an independent fiscal body to monitor compliance with these rules. 
The excessive deficit procedure (EDP) notification tables for 2021 and 2022, with the latest 
one received in  April 2023, were largely  complete. However, further progress is needed on 
the coverage and quality of EDP notifications and government finance statistics reporting. 

Türkiye submitted its 2023-2025 Economic Reform Programme (ERP) on time. However, 
it did not consult external stakeholders on the document and did not publicly present it before 
adoption.  Further  efforts  are  needed  to  boost  the  institutional  capacity  needed  to  design, 
implement  and  monitor  structural  reforms.  The  ERP  included  measures  to  nurture 
competitiveness, tackle the green transition and strengthen digital transformation. However, 
the  analysis  of  structural  challenges  is  incomplete  and  some  of  the  measures  fall  short  of 
addressing the core problems in these areas. Implementation of the policy guidance set out in 
the conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue of May 2022 has been limited, with 
a lower rate of implementation than in the previous year. 

Chapter 19: Social policy and employment 

EU rules in the social field include minimum standards for labour law, equality, health and 
safety  at  work  and  non-discrimination.  They  also  promote  social  inclusion  and  social 
protection, and social dialogue at European level. 

Türkiye  has  some  level  of  preparation  on  social  policy  and  employment.  It  made  no 
progress  over  the  reporting  period.  The  labour  market  situation  improved,  but  concerns 
remain  over  trade  union  rights  and  effective  social  dialogue,  persistent  levels  of  informal 
economic activity, and the gender gap in employment. The February 2023 earthquakes had a 
major impact on the labour market in the affected regions. 

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were met only to a very limited degree, 
and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  remove  obstacles  limiting  the  exercise  of  trade  union  rights  and  use  social  dialogue 

mechanisms effectively; 

→  tackle  emerging  challenges  in  health  and  safety  at  work,  particularly  in  relation  to  fatal 

incidents in the construction and mining sectors, as well as plastic waste recycling; 

→  increase  the  employment  rate  of  women  by  adopting  effective  active  labour  market  and 

work-life balance policies. 

Türkiye made no progress on labour law. A number of workers in agriculture, forestry and 
domestic services, as well as apprentices, remain exempt from several protective clauses of 
the  labour  law.  Although  unregistered  employment  fell  to  26.8%  in  2022,  its  high  level 
hampers worker’s access to effective minimum wage protection and other labour rights and 
social  protection.  Digital  labour  platforms  need  to  be  regulated  to  ensure  that  platform 
workers  can  fully  exercise  their  right  to  labour  law  protection.  Capacity-building  efforts  to 

100 

 
 
tackle child labour continued at national and local levels. Nevertheless, child labour practices 
that  breach  international  standards  persisted,  affecting  adolescents  and  migrant  boys  in 
particular.  Türkiye  lacks  adequate  data  on  child  labour  that  would  provide  the  evidence 
needed to tackle the root causes of the problem.  Regulatory frameworks for emerging jobs, 
such as platform workers, need to be strengthened. 

In  the  area  of  health  and  safety  at  work,  despite  some  alignment  there  are  several 
implementation  challenges,  in  particular  as  regards  to  enforcement  and  labour  inspection 
resources. The government continued workplace inspections and awareness-raising efforts to 
improve health and safety at work, in high-risk sectors in particular. Workplace inspections 
slightly increased to 26 434 in 2022 (up from 24 099 in 2021), conducted by the Directorate 
of Guidance and Inspection of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security. Yet, the number of 
fatal workplace incidents continued to rise. According to the latest available official data, in 
2021,  1 394  people  lost  their  lives  at  work,  increasing  from  1 240  the  previous  year.  The 
informal  economy  remains  a  major  risk  factor  as  many  workplace  accidents  took  place  in 
sectors where undeclared work is common. Asbestos, dust, and construction-specific risks for 
employees  need  to  be  accounted  for  in  rubble-removal  and  reconstruction  efforts  in  the 
earthquake-affected regions. Plastic recycling facilities in Istanbul and Adana pose long-term 
health threats for workers and surrounding residents. Observance to occupational safety and 
health standards should be supervised.  

There was no progress on social dialogue. Türkiye does not have a functioning economic and 
social  council,  and  the  existing  tripartite  social  dialogue  mechanisms  are  very  limited  in 
scope. The unionisation rate was 14.42% for private-sector employees and 72.63% for civil 
servants. In the private sector, serious impediments to unionisation persist, including lengthy 
legal appeal procedures suspending bargaining certification of trade unions. The government 
continued imposing de facto bans on strikes in non-essential services. Adequate protection in 
line  with  International  Labour  Organisation  conventions  needs  to  be  provided  against  anti-
union dismissals and discrimination. Türkiye has yet to recognise the right to strike for civil 
servants,  and  collective  agreements  need  to  have  wider  material  scope  beyond  social  and 
financial rights. 

On  employment  policy,  the  labour  market  situation  in  Türkiye  has  improved.  The 
employment  rate  (15+)  was  47.5%  in  2022,  compared  with  45.2%  the  previous  year.  The 
unemployment rate (15+) fell from 12% in 2021 to 10.4% in 2022. The composite measure of 
labour underutilisation fell from 24.4% in 2021 to 21.3% in 2022. Despite a 2.3 percentage 
point  increase,  the  labour  force  participation  rate  of  women  (15+)  remained  low  at  35.1%. 
The  youth  unemployment  rate  (15-24)  continued  to  fall  from  22.6%  in  2021  to  19.4%  in 
2022. Female youth unemployment fell from 28.7% to 25.2%. The rate of unemployed young 
people  aged  15-24  neither  in  employment  nor  in  education  or  training  fell  slightly  from 
24.7% in 2021 to 24.2% in 2022, yet it remained particularly high for women (32.3%). Adult 
learning (25-64) was at 5.8% in 2020.  

The number of job and vocational counsellors in the Turkish Employment Agency (ISKUR) 
remained  around  the  same  level  at  4 734,  against  4 755  in  2021.  The  number  of  people 
registered in active labour market programmes fell significantly by 65%. At the same time, 
the  number  of  vocational  training  courses  on  offer  fell  sharply  from  5 027  to  514,  and  the 
number of on-the-job training courses from 93 840 to 40 332 in 2022. The vocational training 
courses previously available for vulnerable groups were discontinued in 2022. Türkiye should 
reverse  the  trend  and  invest  in  more  re-  and  upskilling  of  its  labour  force  through  targeted 
active  labour  market  policies.  The  number  of  people,  not  in  employment,  education  or 

101 

 
 
training, under the new counselling model initiated by ISKUR, increased to 100 150 in 2022, 
up from 80 730 in 2021.  

The informal economy continues to undermine the social security and welfare systems, and 
one of the most affected groups  are the Roma community. Efforts  to  grant  Syrian migrants 
access to the formal labour market continued. This remains low, given the large working age 
population of Syrian migrants. 

Due to loss of life, injury, workplace damage, and internal displacements, the February 2023 
earthquakes  had  a  major  impact  on  the  labour  market  in  the  affected  regions.  Türkiye 
authorised  the  swift  execution  of  payments  under  short-term  work  allowances,  and  people 
who were not entitled to this payment received wage support in cash. The government also 
declared an employee dismissal ban in the earthquake zone.  

For  the  European  Social  Fund,  Türkiye  maintained  a  good  level  of  preparation.  The 
Ministry of Labour and Social Security continued to manage an operational programme under 
IPA  II,  covering  areas  of  employment,  education  and  social  inclusion.  (Concerning  the 
effectiveness  of  management  of  IPA  funds,  refer  to  Chapter  22  -  Regional  policy  and 
coordination of structural instruments).  

On  social  inclusion  and  protection,  Türkiye  still  lacks  a  dedicated  poverty  reduction 
strategy. Sustained price increases further posed the risk of poverty  for the unemployed and 
wage labourers in precarious jobs. The poverty rate reached 14.4%, up from 13.8% in 2021. 
The  severe-material-deprivation  rate  reached  28.4%  in  2022  (2021:  27.2%).  The  child 
poverty  rate  for  2022  was  particularly  high  at  41.6%.  In  2022,  social  assistance  payments 
amounted to TRY 151.9 billion, or 1.01% of GDP. Türkiye has fragmented benefits at local 
and  national  level,  and  it  still  lacks  a  general  minimum  income  scheme.  It  has  adopted  a 
national  strategy  on  Roma  (2023-2030),  including  measures  on  employment  and  social 
protection. 

Türkiye  needs  to  step  up  efforts  to  de-institutionalise  care  and  move  towards  community 
and family-based care services.  

Türkiye lacks a strategy for non-discrimination in employment and social policy. There is 
still  no  ban  under  Turkish  law  on  discrimination  on  the  grounds  of  sexual  orientation.  The 
effectiveness of the Human Rights and Equality Institution and the Ombudsman in combating 
workplace  discrimination  is  limited.  Clear  rules  of  conduct  are  needed  for  public-sector 
recruitment,  as  are  appropriate  remedies  for  victims  of  discrimination.  The  adopted  2023-
2025  action  plan  on  the  rights  of  persons  with  disabilities  includes  measures  on  non-
discrimination,  such  as  legal  sanctions  and  soft  measures  as  the  revision  of  the  legal 
framework. When accessing employment however, legislation and practices that discriminate 
against persons with disabilities persist. This includes the law on judges and prosecutors that 
prohibits  the  appointment  of  physically  disabled  candidates.  The  principle  of  reasonable 
accommodation should be promoted among employers by providing both financial and non-
financial incentives.  

On  equality  between  women  and  men  in  employment  and  social  policy,  the  gender  gap 
remained very high, despite improvements on the labour market. Legislative work is needed 
to achieve full alignment with the EU Directive on work-life balance for parents and carers. 
Beyond  big  urban  centres,  access  to  quality  and  affordable  formal  care  services  and  early 
childhood education is rudimental in Türkiye (see Chapter 26 – Education and culture). The 
barriers that women still face in accessing employment include the lack of childcare facilities, 
gender bias in caring responsibilities, and discriminatory stereotypes. Further action is needed 
to prevent harassment and violence at work, including data collection and awareness raising. 
102 

 
 
The  share  of  women  in  decision-making  positions  remained  very  limited  (see  Chapter  23  - 
Judiciary  and  fundamental  rights).  Despite  the  increase  from  17.3%  in  2022,  following  the 
2023  elections,  the  representation  of  women  in  parliament  remains  low  at  20.1%;  600 
members of parliament comprise of 481 men and 121 women.  

Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy 

industrial  policy  strengthens  competitiveness, 

EU 
facilitates  structural  change  and 
encourages  a  business-friendly  environment  that  stimulates  small  and  medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). 

Türkiye  is  moderately  prepared  on  enterprise  and  industrial  policy.  It  made  limited 
progress  over  the  reporting  period  with  phasing  out  of  discriminatory  treatment  of  certain 
EU  products.  However,  concerns  persist  that  the  public  procurement  practices  are 
incompatible with  EU industrial policy principles. There are  also  concerns over the lack of 
transparency  in  State  aid  for  large  investments,  the  large  informal  economy,  the  long-term 
financing  needs  of  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  (SMEs),  and  the  insufficient  legal 
framework for microfinance.  

The  Commission's  recommendations  from  last  year  were  only  partially  implemented,  and 
therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  remove  schemes,  such  as  local  content  requirements  and  public  procurement  price 
premiums that are incompatible with industrial policy principles and substitute them with 
measures that encourage innovation effectively; 

→ publish the results of implementation of the industry strategy from 2019 to 2021 as well as 

the amounts distributed under the industry support programme; 

→  continue  conducting  assessments  on  the  impact  of  the  SME  support  framework  and 

identify any gaps and overlaps. 

On enterprise and industrial policy principles,  Türkiye maintained the scope of the  15% 
domestic  price  advantage  in  public  procurement  and  made  it  compulsory  for  medium  and 
high-tech  industrial  products.  In  2022,  the  percentage  of  international  tenders  using  the 
domestic price advantage increased to  43% (see  Chapter 5 –  Public procurement). Türkiye 
adopted  a  national  technology  entrepreneurship  strategy  (2022-2025)  in  October  2022, 
aiming  to  stimulate  competitive  technology  entrepreneurship  and  to  strengthen  the 
ecosystem. A policy tool under the strategy allows the use of public procurement to develop 
techno-entrepreneurship,  including  models  enabling  direct  procurement.  While  Türkiye 
adopted  several  measures  to  adjust  the  localisation  and  prioritisation  schemes  for 
pharmaceuticals, the EU’s assessment on whether Türkiye has completed the implementation 
of  all  findings  in  the  Arbitrators’  Award  is  ongoing.  In  January  2023,  the  new  Turkish 
legislation entered into force, phasing out the discriminatory treatment of EU agricultural and 
forestry tractors in terms of engine emission requirements. 

Türkiye  has  yet  to  publish  the  results  of  performance  indicators  tracking  the  industrial 
strategy adopted in 2019. In December 2022, Türkiye adopted a new action plan and strategy 
to  combat  the  informal  economy  (2023-2025).  As  in  previous  versions,  this  new  strategy 
lacks  performance  indicators.  In  July  2022,  Türkiye  established  a  Coordination  Board  on 
Sustainable  Development  to  monitor  and  coordinate  the  work  on  aligning  with  the  UN 
sustainable  development  goals.  Türkiye  continued  to  successfully  implement  the  Small 
Business Act framework.  

On  enterprise  and  industrial  policy  instruments,  Turkish  legislation  is  still  not  fully 

103 

 
 
harmonised  with  the  Late  Payment  Directive.  Türkiye  continued  to  implement  various 
schemes  supporting  companies,  particularly  small  and  medium-sized.  It  granted  incentives, 
subsidies,  and  amnesties  on  public  liabilities  to  companies  in  earthquake-affected  regions. 
However,  support  for  innovation  eco-systems  is  fragmented  across  numerous  programmes. 
Smart  specialisation  strategies  were  formulated  in  some  regions,  but  limited  information  is 
available on how these strategies will be implemented. 

The SME support administration (KOSGEB) continued to run a range of technical assistance 
and financing schemes. In total, nine evaluation reports are publicly available on KOSGEB’s 
website.  As  of  March  2023,  98  technology  development  zones  were  in  place;  82  were 
operational.  1 627  patents  were  obtained  from  51 085  completed  projects  in  these  zones 
(compared with 1 511 patents obtained from 47 456 completed projects in 2021).  

On policy instrument, Türkiye signed the Single Market Programme Association Agreement 
in March 2023, and completed the national ratification procedures necessary for the entry into 
force. Türkiye is participating in the SME pillar of this programme.  There were no sectoral 
policy  changes  adopted.  Türkiye's  11th  development  plan,  along  with  the  complementary 
industry and technology strategy, focus on technological transformation  of manufacturing at 
all  levels,  and  follow  a  sectoral  prioritisation  approach.  Under  the  technology-focused 
industrial movement programme and under the project-based investment support programme, 
Türkiye  intends  to  support  investments  in  strategically  chosen  sectors  such  as  machinery, 
computers, electronics, optics, electrical hardware, pharmaceuticals, chemistry, and transport 
vehicles.  In  2023,  a  total  of  64  projects  received  support  with  an  investment  of  TRY  491 
billion under the project-based investment support programme (see Chapter 8 – Competition 
policy). The breakdown of State aid for these investments was not disclosed, contrary to the 
commitments  made  under  the  EU-Turkey  Customs  Union.  For  the  last  three  tenders,  the 
overall financial amounts were not disclosed on the relevant Ministry’s website. 

Chapter 25: Science and research 

The  EU  provides  significant  support  for  research  and  innovation.  All  Member  States  can 
benefit  from  the  EU’s  research  and  innovation  programmes  and  benefit  from  them, 
especially  where  there  is  scientific  excellence  and  solid  investment  in  research  and 
innovation.  

Overall, Türkiye’s preparation in the area of science and research is well advanced. It made 
good  progress  during  the  reporting  period,  notably  linked  to  Türkiye’s  participation  in 
Horizon Europe and continued action to raise awareness of and capacity for the programme. 
There  is  good,  active  and  expanding  cooperation  between  the  EU  and  Türkiye  on  research 
and innovation.  

In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  continue  its  efforts  to  align  its  national  research  area  (TARAL)  with  the  new  European 

Research Area; 

→  step up efforts to increase innovation to remedy the continued fall down the rankings in 

the European Innovation Scoreboard. 

On research and innovation policy, in March 2023, the Turkish Statistical Institute revised 
the  calculation  method  for  R&D  expenditure  and  provided  updated  data  in  line  with  the 
Frascati  Manual  guidance:  the  share  of  R&D  expenditure  in  GDP  rose  slightly  to  1.4%  in 
2021 from 1.37% in 2020. The total number of full-time equivalent R&D personnel increased 
by  11%,  from  199 371  in  2020  to  221 811  in  2021,  but  the  share  of  female  personnel  in 
research remained at 32%. Türkiye came closer to the commitment made in its industry and 
104 

 
 
technology strategy to increase national R&D expenditure and personnel to 1.8% and to 300 
000  respectively  by  2023.  However,  a  wide  gap  remains  between  R&D  expenditure  in 
Türkiye and the EU-27 average (2.26% in 2021).  

According  to  the  2023  European  Innovation  Scoreboard,  Türkiye  remains  an  Emerging 
Innovator, performing at 47.6% of the EU average. Türkiye’s performance is below average 
of the Emerging Innovators (54.0%) and the performance it achieved in 2022 (47.7%). The 
gap  between  Türkiye’s  performance  and  the  EU  average  is  widening.  According  to  the 
Scoreboard, Türkiye has strengths in knowledge-intensive services, as well as in government 
support for R&D conducted by businesses. However, Türkiye does not  yet  provide data on 
some relevant indicators, such as “Venture capital expenditures” and “Air emissions by fine 
particulate  matter”.  Providing  the  full  set  of  indicators  might  help  raise  Türkiye’s  overall 
performance in the European Innovation Scoreboard. 

On  the  policy  side,  Türkiye  updated  the  study  entitled  Priority Research,  Development  and 
Innovation (RDI) Areas for 2022 and 2023. With a focus on green and digital technologies, in 
line with EU priorities, the updated study has three main pillars: RDI topics in priority and 
key  technologies,  RDI  topics  for  compliance  with  the  EU  Green  Deal  and  adaptation  to 
climate change, and strategic and needs-oriented RDI topics. 

Support  measures  focus  both  on  developing  the  innovation  ecosystem  and  on  building  the 
innovation capacity of enterprises. However, support continues to focus on regions with more 
mature  innovation  systems,  which  widens  the  gap  between  urban  hubs  and  less  developed 
regions in Türkiye. 

Türkiye’s  action plan to boost the national  research and innovation  capacity and awareness 
on  Horizon  Europe  contributes  to  the  positive  trend  of  Türkiye’s  performance  in  the 
programme. Türkiye has improved its  performance in  recent  years, practically doubling the 
average yearly amounts at the end of Horizon 2020 and doubling again over the first years of 
Horizon Europe. Cooperation on the EU Missions is promising, particularly in the context of 
climate-neutral and smart cities’ mission. Istanbul and Izmir were selected among 100 cities 
interested in becoming climate neutral by 2030. 

Türkiye is in the process of implementing the 2019 national European Research Area (ERA) 
roadmap, which needs to be updated. Türkiye has yet to actively engage in a set of European 
Research Area priorities. Türkiye’s participation in the activities of the European Institute of 
Innovation and Technology (EIT) is satisfactory. 

There  is  good  and  active  cooperation  between  the  EU  and  Türkiye  on  research  and 
innovation.    A  High-Level  Dialogue  on  Science,  Technology  and  Innovation  took  place  in 
autumn  2022.  It  underlined  the  shared  ambition  to  design  and  deploy  cutting-edge 
technologies and to transform the research and innovation outputs into green and sustainable 
industrial products. 

Chapter 26: Education and culture 

The EU supports cooperation in education and culture through funding programmes and the 
coordination of Member State policy through the ‘open method of coordination’. The EU and 
the  Member  States  must  also  prevent  discrimination  and  ensure  quality  education  for 
children of migrant workers, including those from disadvantaged backgrounds. 

Türkiye is moderately prepared on education and culture. There was  some progress in the 
reporting period, notably through the continued implementation of the national qualifications 
system and the increased participation in some EU programmes. On cultural policy, Türkiye   
took some steps to implement the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of 
105 

 
 
the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. Türkiye does not have a national youth strategy nor an 
officially  recognised  national  youth  council.  The  February  2023  earthquake  seriously 
disrupted the education system in the affected areas. 

The  Commission’s  recommendations  from  last  year  were  only  partially  met,  and  therefore 
remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  further  improve  inclusive  education,  with  a  particular  focus  on  girls  and  children  from 
disadvantaged groups and closely monitor and continue work to reduce the proportion of 
school dropouts; 

→  ensure the good functioning of the Turkish Qualifications Framework and Turkish Higher 

Education Quality Council; 

→  take  further  steps  to  implement  the  2005  UNESCO  Convention  on  the  Protection  and 

Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. 

On education, access to early childhood education (ECE) in Türkiye varies by age group and 
region.  The  net  enrolment  rate  for  preschool  education  (age  5)  increased  from  56.89%  in 
2020-2021  to  81.63%  in  2022,  and  the  combined  enrolment  rate  for  children  aged  3-5 
increased from  28.35% to  44.05%. In 2019-2020, before the COVID-19  pandemic, the rate 
for preschool education (age 5) was 71.22%, and the combined rate for children aged 3-5 was 
41.78%.  The  need  to  expand  flexible  and  community-based  ECE  models,  set  targets  and 
strategies to  include vulnerable  children, and guarantee effective  and free access  to  and the 
quality of ECE services remains a valid recommendation for Türkiye. 

The  net  enrolment  rate  in  primary  school  fell  slightly  from  93.23%  in  2021  to  93.16%  in 
2022, and increased slightly in lower secondary school from 88.85% to 89.84%. In secondary 
education,  the  net  enrolment  rate  continued  to  increase  from  87.93%  to  89.67%.  A  slight 
increase  in  the  enrolment  rates  of  higher  education  was  registered  from  44.41%  in  2021  to 
44.66% in 2022.  

Although Türkiye increased the duration of compulsory education for children to 12 years in 
2012,  the  level  of  non-attendance  at  the  upper  secondary  level  (grades  9-12)  remains 
significant, though varying from province to province.  

Regarding students in special education, the enrolment rate increased from 425 816 in 2021 
to  472 686  in  2022.  Given  public  investments  in  recent  years,  a  large  majority  of  children 
with  special  needs  (75%)  receive  inclusive  education  in  mainstream  classrooms.  However, 
nearly  50 000  children  with  special  needs  still  study  in  separate  classrooms,  and  more  than 
50 000  are  in  separate  schools.  Reliable  data  is  needed  on  the  educational  achievements  of 
boys and girls with disabilities as well as on school attendance rates. 

The  February  2023  earthquakes  seriously  disrupted  the  education  system  in  the  affected 
areas.  Türkiye  has  made  large  investments  to  improve  its  digital  learning  platform  called 
Education  Information  Network,  to  reduce  the  impact  of  emergencies  (e.g.  pandemic, 
earthquake,  refugee  crisis)  on  children’s  learning  and  to  increase  preparedness  for  future 
shocks. 

Türkiye  remains  advanced  in  its  implementation  of  the  Bologna  process,  though  notable 
disparities  remain  in  the  quality  of  Türkiye's  208  higher  education  institutions.  In  March 
2023, the European Quality Assurance Register for Higher Education (EQAR) approved the 
Turkish  Higher  Education  Quality  Council’s  registration  based  on  compliance  with  the 
Standards  and  Guidelines  for  Quality  Assurance  in  the  European  Higher  Education  Area 
(ESG). Türkiye is  also actively participating in 7 European Education Area (EEA) working 

106 

 
 
groups,  which  foster  European  collaboration  on  education  and  prepare  youth  for  the  green 
and digital transitions. 

On  technical  and  vocational  education  and  training  (TVET),  Türkiye  continues  to 
implement  the  National  Vocational  Qualifications  System  (NVQS)  by  the  Vocational 
Qualifications  Authority  (VQA).  As  of  June  2023,  the  number  of  national  occupational 
standards published in the Official Gazette reached 901 (893 in June 2022), and the number 
of qualifications approved was 648 (up from 586 in June 2022). During the reporting period, 
the number of authorised certification bodies in Türkiye increased to 277 from 272, and the 
number  of  VQA  vocational  qualification  certificates  issued  for  individuals  through  exams 
and skills tests run by the certification bodies increased to 2 507 663 from 2 253 424. 

Although  the  Turkish  Qualifications  Framework  (TQF)  is  operational  in  Türkiye,  the 
vocational  training  provided  by  vocational  education  and  training  institutions  remains 
incompatible  with  the  needs  of  national  qualification  (NQ)  candidates.  This  is  due  to 
candidates  falling  short  of  demonstrating  full  competence,  seeking  to  obtain  a  higher 
qualification,  or  moving  horizontally/vertically  between  qualifications  in  the  related 
occupation.  To  improve  the  functioning  of  the  TQF,  in  addition  to  the  existing  vocational 
education  and  training  institutions,  continuous  education  centres  of  universities  should 
prepare  modular  vocational  training  courses  for  specific  occupation  levels  that  are  in  line 
with the expected NQ learning outcomes and in cooperation with the authorised certification 
bodies. 

Since 30% of the minimum wage payment to students of the vocational training centres was 
introduced in December 2021, the number of students in centres has increased from 159 000 
in 2021 to 1 200 000 in 2022. Despite considerable progress in this area, the credibility of the 
NVQS  remains  a  serious  challenge  in  VET  implementation  in  Türkiye.  It  is  essential  to 
closely  align  the  quality  and  validity  of  vocational  education  and  training  provided  by 
companies  with  the  requirements  of  the  associated  national  qualifications  and  with  the 
occupational standards on which they are based. The accreditation of national qualifications 
education and training providers and the programmes they deliver is crucial to the successful 
functioning of the NVQS and TQF in Türkiye. 

On education, training and youth, Türkiye continues to participate in EU programmes. For 
Erasmus+  and  the  European  Solidarity  Corps,  the  number  of  contracted  projects  increased 
from 918 in 2021 to 1075 in 2022, with an overall budget of EUR 225 million. The number 
of  participants  who  carried  out  a  mobility  activity  (from  and  to  Türkiye)  within  both 
programmes,  exceeds  239  000.  Regarding  the  European  Solidarity  Corps  programme,  the 
number of awarded applications remained constant at 184 in both 2021 and 2022, with a total 
budget of over EUR 5 million. 

On culture, the freedom of cultural  expression is  still restricted in  Türkiye. The authorities 
continue  to  censor,  confiscate,  restrict  distribution,  or  reclaim  funding  for  books  and  films 
based  on  allegations  of  ‘harmful  and  obscene  contents’,  ‘terror  propaganda’,  or  ‘scenario 
change’. The ban on live music at night, imposed during the COVID-19 pandemic, remains 
in  place.  Music  events  and  festivals  are  cancelled  at  the  discretion  of  governors,  district 
governors,  or  mayors,  citing  security  and  public  morality  concerns  (see  also  political 
criteria). The February 2023 earthquakes caused damage to Türkiye's cultural heritage in the 
affected  regions.  The  Ministry  of  Culture  and  Tourism  reported  that  more  than  8 500 
registered cultural assets in 10 provinces have been affected by the disaster. Action plans to 
salvage cultural assets were prepared. The restoration and conservation of damaged cultural 
properties has commenced. 

107 

 
 
To implement the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions, Türkiye's cultural industries platform is operational. The platform, set 
up by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, is a forum to share opinions, statistics and data, 
where  civil  society  organisations,  public  or  private-sector  entities,  can  inform  users  about 
events or activities planned in support of cultural industries. The Cultural Industries Support 
and  Incentives  Guide  was  updated  in  2023,  listing  support  and  incentive  mechanisms  of 
public institutions for cultural and creativity-intensive industries.  

Türkiye’s participation in the EU’s Creative Europe programme is not yet finalised. Türkiye 
is seeking to re-join parts of the programme, having left it in 2017.  

Regarding  youth,  Türkiye  still  lacks  a  national  youth  strategy  and  an  officially  recognised 
national youth council. The number of youth centres increased from 388 in 2021 to 451 (June 
2023)  located  in  81  provinces  of  Türkiye.  More  than  850 000  higher  education  students, 
including foreign students, are living in 800 student dormitories located all over the country. 
1.5 million higher education students, including students receiving education abroad, receive 
an education credit or a state scholarship. 

There  are  64  sports  federations  in  Türkiye.  The  revenue  of  sports  federations  flows  from 
participation  shares,  registration  fees,  sponsorship,  advertisement,  donations  and  similar 
incomes. 

Chapter 29: Customs Union 

All Member States are part of the EU customs union and follow the same customs rules and 
procedures.  This  requires  legislative  alignment  as  well  as  adequate  implementation  and 
enforcement capacity, and access to the common computerised customs systems. 

Türkiye  maintains  a  good  level  of  preparation  for  the  Customs  Union.  It  made  limited 
progress in the reporting period.  

Several  longstanding  and  new  trade  barriers  still  infringe  the  basic  provisions  of  the  EU-
Turkey  Customs  Union.  Duty  relief,  free  zones  and  surveillance  measures  are  not  fully 
aligned with the EU acquis, again in clear contradiction with Türkiye’s obligations under the 
Customs Union.  

The Commission's recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid. 
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→ step up efforts to fully align new legislation with the EU Customs Code; 

→ bring risk-based controls and simplified procedures in line with the EU acquis; 

→ fully eliminate import and export restrictions as well as additional duties on goods in free 

circulation in the EU-Turkey Customs Union. 

Türkiye made limited progress on customs legislation. Türkiye lifted some additional duties 
applied on imports of a long list of products originating in third countries, which are in free 
circulation  in  the  EU  or  imported  from  third  countries.  However,  the  scope  was  not 
significantly narrowed as new additional duties were introduced in parallel.  

Turkish  customs  authorities  started  to  systematically  request  subsequent  verifications  of 
movement certificates and certificates of origin documents for textiles and materials used in 
the production of textiles and to  require financial  guarantees to  release the goods in  certain 
cases pending the result of the post-verification.  

108 

 
 
Türkiye's implementation of value-based import surveillance measures and the lack of a legal 
remedy to recover overpaid amounts are neither aligned with the EU  acquis nor compatible 
with  transparent,  objective  and  verifiable  customs  valuation  procedures.  Turkish  authorities 
are continuing to implement export tax measures on hides, skins and wet-blue leathers and an 
export  licencing  regime  on  copper  scrap.  New  export  registrations  were  put  in  place  on  a 
number of products, in particular feldspar and clays and were often applied in an opaque and 
discretionary manner.  

Turkish  Customs  Law  needs  to  be  fully  harmonised  with  the  EU  Customs  Code,  including 
implementation of risk-based controls and simplified procedures to facilitate legitimate trade 
while  ensuring  security  and  safety.  The  designation  of  specialised  customs  offices  is  not 
compatible with the provisions of the Customs Union. Rules on free zones and duty relief are 
yet to be aligned with the EU acquis.  

On  administrative  and  operational  capacity,  efforts  continued  to  strengthen  customs 
enforcement capacity for border controls. Yet, more work is needed to align the Law on the 
customs enforcement of intellectual property rights and in particular on export and in-transit 
operations. Risk-based controls to enforce safety and security measures need to be improved 
and  brought  in  line  with  Customs  Union  provisions.  Türkiye  implements  the  computerised 
transit system as part of its membership in the Convention on a Common Transit Procedure. 
However, it has not yet put in place tariff IT systems. It needs to implement the IT strategy in 
line with business initiatives and update the documented customs business processes in line 
with the legal basis. 

CLUSTER 4: THE GREEN AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE CONNECTIVITY  

This  cluster  covers:  transport  policy  (Chapter  14),  energy  (Chapter  15),  trans-European 
networks (Chapter 21) and environment and climate change (Chapter 27).  

Türkiye  is  moderately  prepared  in  transport  policy.  It  made  limited  progress  during  the 
reporting period, mainly linked to the update of the nationally determined contribution under 
the  Paris  Agreement  with  a  specific  chapter  on  transport  mitigation  policies.  Türkiye  is 
moderately prepared in the area of energy, and made limited progress overall. It increased its 
energy dependence on Russia. Progress continued on renewable energy deployment, reforms 
in  the  natural  gas  sector  and  legislative  alignment  on  nuclear  safety.  Türkiye  is  well 
advanced  on  trans-European  networks  and  made  no  progress.  The  trans-Anatolian  pipeline 
continues to operate smoothly and transmit gas to the European section of the Southern Gas 
Corridor. The construction of the flagship Halkali-Kapikule railway line connecting the EU 
border to Istanbul continued.  

Türkiye  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  environment  and  climate  change  and 
made  limited  progress  over  the  reporting  period.  Türkiye  submitted  its  updated  nationally 
determined  contribution  under  the  Paris  Agreement.  It  faces  critical  environmental  and 
climate  challenges,  and  needs  more  ambitious  and  better  coordinated  environment  and 
climate  policies,  strategic  planning,  substantial  investment  and  stronger  administrative 
capacity.   

Chapter 14: Transport policy 

The  EU  has  common  rules  for  technical  and  safety  standards,  security,  social  standards, 
State aid and market liberalisation in road transport, railways, inland waterways, combined 
transport, aviation and maritime transport. 

109 

 
 
Türkiye  is  moderately  prepared  in  transport  policy.  It  made  limited  progress  in  the 
reporting  period.  Türkiye  published  its  first  updated  Nationally  Determined  Contribution 
(NDC),  under  the  Paris  Agreement  with  a  specific  chapter  on  transport  mitigation  policies. 
The number of cities implementing sustainable urban mobility plans (SUMPs) increased. The 
new  railway  framework  law  has  not  yet  been  adopted  and  the  reform  of  the  incumbent 
railway operator has not progressed.  

The  Commission’s  recommendations  from  last  year  were  only  partially  met,  and  therefore 
remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  consider  charting  project-led  pathways  to  achieve  its  net-zero  targets  for  the 

decarbonisation of the transport sector;  

→ prioritise disaster resilience of urban mobility in Turkish cities and include disaster aspects         

as a part of the evolving SUMPs; 

→ improve policy dialogue and increase institutional coordination between local and central 

authorities on sustainable urban mobility. 

Regarding  general  transport,  Türkiye  published  its  first  updated  nationally  determined 
contribution  (NDC),  under  the  Partis  Agreement  with  a  specific  chapter  on  transport 
mitigation  policies.  The  number  of  cities  implementing  sustainable  urban  mobility  plans 
(SUMPs) increased. The preparation of Türkiye’s online electronic legislation inventory tool, 
which  will  digitally  track  Türkiye's  transport  legislation  in  English  to  create  a  continuous 
monitoring system with the EU acquis, reached its final stage. Regarding sustainable urban 
mobility,  policy  guidance  and  better  institutional  coordination  between  local  and  central 
bodies still need to be improved.  

On road transport, the legal framework has a good level of alignment with the EU acquis. 
Limited progress was made during the reporting period. Turksat, the communications satellite 
operator of Türkiye, advanced work to create a user portal to provide access to best practices 
on the intelligent transport services, which is compatible with the EU. The Director General 
for  Communications  was  appointed  as  the  national  access  point  for  Intelligent  Transport 
Systems  (ITS)  issues.  Institutional  capacity  remains  insufficient  to  meet  Türkiye’s  national 
ITS targets. No progress was made on the smart tachographs transition for road transport. The 
implementing  legislation  on  the  transport  of  dangerous  goods  by  road  entered  into  force  in 
June 2022. In the area of road safety, the number of road fatalities remains well above the EU 
average and continuous efforts are needed in the implementation of the road safety strategy. 

Türkiye is  moderately prepared in  the field  of  rail transport  and  made no further progress 
during the reporting period. The comprehensive railway framework Law was not adopted and 
Türkiye is not aligned with the EU’s fourth railway package. A draft law aiming to align with  
the  Directive  on  Railway  Interoperability  reached  its  final  stage  of  preparation.  The 
independence  of  the  National  Safety  Authority,  currently  assigned  to  the  DG  for  Railway 
Transport Services, has yet to be achieved. The subsidies to the incumbent railway operator 
and the financial independence of transport operator from the infrastructure manager remain 
major issues. 

Türkiye achieved a good level of preparation in aligning with the EU  acquis in the field of 
maritime transport. Some progress was made during the reporting period. Türkiye issued a 
new regulation to support the shifting of freight from road to maritime services. According to 
a new regulation adopted in August 2022, Türkiye will provide USD 2 per nautical mile to 
roll-on/roll-off operators to  open new ro-ro lines. To this  end, a new line was opened from 
Izmir  to  Sète.  Türkiye’s  efforts  on  maritime  decarbonisation  and  green  shipping  continued 

110 

 
 
through  the  renewal  of  the  maritime  fleet  with  energy-efficient  and  more  environmentally 
friendly  ships.  The  switch  to  alternative  fuels  like  green  hydrogen  and  green  methanol  is 
planned under the scope of government  incentives. A national  legislation implementing the 
EU Port Services Regulation is yet to be developed. 

Türkiye's legislation on inland waterways is not yet aligned with the EU acquis. Türkiye has 
limited  inland  waterways  and  it  has  not  signed  the  main  international  agreements  on  this 
issue. 

Türkiye  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  field  of  aviation.  It  made  some  progress  during  the 
reporting  period.  Discussions  started  on  the  renewal  of  the  working  arrangements  between 
Türkiye  and  the  European  Union  Aviation  Safety  Agency.  The  regulations  on  training 
organisations,  continuous  air  worthiness  management  and  maintenance  personnel  licencing 
were updated to further align with the EU acquis. Türkiye adopted the regulation on CORSIA 
requirements  for  carbon  off-setting  and  implementation.  The  regulation  on  accreditation  of 
institutions carrying out monitoring, reporting and verification services entered into force. 

The  lack  of  adequate  communication  between  air  traffic  control  centres  in  Türkiye  and 
Cyprus continued to compromise air safety in the Nicosia flight information region, requiring 
an  operational  solution.  Türkiye  continues  to  refuse  to  accept  the  principle  of  EU  carrier 
designation in its air services agreements with Member States, which is a cornerstone of the 
EU internal market in aviation. 

There  was  limited  progress  on  combined  transport.  The  by-law  on  combined  freight 
transport was published in May 2022. 

Regarding EU passenger rights, further efforts are needed to align in all modes of transport.   

As long as restrictions remain in place on vessels and aircrafts registered in Cyprus, related to 
Cyprus,  or  whose  last  port  of  call  was  Cyprus,  Türkiye  will  not  be  in  a  position  to  fully 
implement the EU acquis relating to this chapter. 

Chapter 15: Energy  

EU  energy  policy  covers  energy  supply,  infrastructure,  the  internal  energy  market, 
consumers,  renewable  energy,  energy  efficiency,  nuclear  energy,  nuclear  safety,  radiation 
protection and nuclear safeguards. 

Türkiye  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of  energy.  Limited  progress  was  achieved 
during  the  reporting  period.  Overall,  energy  dependency  on  Russia  has  increased;  Türkiye 
reduced gas imports from  Russia but  it  increased imports in  oil and coal  and inaugurated a 
new nuclear power plant built and operated by Russia. While the rollout of renewable energy 
continued at good pace, local content requirement practices in the sector remained in place. 
Türkiye made some legislative changes related to the natural gas market, but the reformative 
effect of these changes is contradictory. Türkiye made efforts in the legislative alignment of 
nuclear safety regulations. 

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid. 
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  deepen natural gas market reform by setting up a legally binding plan and a timetable for 
unbundling  activities  and  by  updating  the  natural  gas  market  Law  to  ensure  it  is 
compatible with the EU's third energy package; 

→  complete  the  legislative  alignment  on  nuclear  safety  and  stress  tests  on  the  Akkuyu 

nuclear power plant; 

111 

 
 
→  discontinue  local  content  requirement  practices  in  the  renewable  energy  sector,  as  such 

practices contradict WTO and EU-Turkey Customs Union rules. 

On  security  of  supply,  Türkiye  remains  an  important  transit  country,  ensuring  the  smooth 
operation  of  the  Trans-Anatolian  Pipeline  (TANAP),  which  transmits  Azeri  natural  gas  to 
Europe  by  connecting  to  the  Trans-Adriatic  Pipeline.  Natural  gas  also  continued  to  flow  to 
Europe,  which  also  includes  Russian  gas  via  the  TurkStream  pipeline.  Türkiye  actively 
expanded  its  import  capacity  for  liquefied  natural  gas  (LNG)  as  well  as  its  gas  storage 
capacity. The country now has five LNG import facilities, three of which are floating storage 
regasification units. The latest new facility started operations in early 2023. The  largest gas 
storage facility at Tuz Gölü has a capacity of 5.4 bcm and the second gas storage facility at 
Silivri has a capacity of 4.6 bcm since December 2022.  

Although  significant  amounts  of  natural  gas  have  been  discovered  in  the  Black  Sea  by  the 
Turkish  Petroleum  Corporation  (TPAO),  Türkiye  remains  dependent  on  energy  imports. 
Russia provides more than one third of the country’s natural gas imports and a quarter of the 
country’s  oil  imports  and  is  building,  operating  and  owns  the  first  nuclear  power  plant  in 
Türkiye, launched in April 2023. Faced with rising energy prices, Türkiye took measures to 
satisfy  consumer  demand  while  providing  support  to  cushion  high  energy  prices.  Türkiye 
continued  to  invest  in  becoming  a  natural  gas  hub  thanks  to  the  country’s  existing 
infrastructure  of  pipelines,  LNG  terminals,  gas  storage  facilities,  gas  exchange  and  a 
balancing system.  

On  the  internal  energy  market,  Türkiye  made  only  limited  progress  on  the  natural  gas 
market  reforms.  It  suspended  yet  again  the  unbundling  of  the  state-owned  gas  company 
BOTAȘ  and has  not  set  a date to  achieve it. Amendments to  the Natural  Gas Market  Law, 
adopted in April 2023, lifted the restrictions on long-term gas imports, simplified the export 
scheme  and  abolished  the  strict  limitations  and  time-based  obligations  aimed  to  reduce  the 
market  share  of  BOTAȘ.  The  entry  of  new  long-term  importers  and  exporters  to  the  gas 
market  depends  on  the  Ministry  of  Energy.  The  Energy  Market  Regulatory  Authority 
(EMRA) was authorised to draft regulations for determining quantities, terms, and procedures 
for spot pipe gas imports in line with the opinion of the Ministry of Energy. The new law also 
changed the approach to transmission tariffs and paved the way for setting exclusive tariffs 
for  gas  exports  that  will  be  based  on  a  separate  methodology.  These  changes  will  not  help 
transparent, cost-reflective and non-discriminatory pricing. 

Türkiye  has  modernised  its  wholesale  electricity  market  and  it  follows  developed  market 
practices.  The  eligibility  limit  in  the  electricity  market  was  reduced  to  1  000  kWh  by  an 
EMRA Board decision in December 2022. Türkiye brought in the concept of 'aggregator' as a 
separate  market  operation  in  the  electricity  market  by  amending  the  Law  on  the  electricity 
market  of  December  2022.  The  implementing  regulation  for  licencing  was  amended  in 
November 2022 but additional work is needed to address the missing issues.  

On  hydrocarbons,  Türkiye  is  at  an  advanced  stage  of  alignment  with  the  EU  acquis. 
However,  alignment  with  the  Directive  on  the  safety  of  offshore  oil  and  gas  operations 
remains  insufficient,  also  regarding  the  transit  of  hydrocarbons.  Amid  growing  concerns 
about energy price inflation, Türkiye has accelerated action to produce gas domestically from 
its  recently  discovered  Sakarya  field  in  the  Black  Sea,  with  an  estimated  potential  of  710 
billion cubic meters.  

On  renewable  energy,  Türkiye  announced  ambitious  goals  when  it  published  its  latest 
national energy plan (2023-2035) in January 2023. The plan envisages maximising solar and 
wind energy to achieve the country’s greenhouse gas emission targets. The declared goal is to 

112 

 
 
increase the share of renewable energy in primary energy consumption from 16.7% currently 
to  23.7%  in  2035,  and  the  share  of  nuclear  energy  from  zero  to  5.9%  in  2035.  With  the 
integration  of  intermittent  renewable  resources,  the  need  for  flexibility  in  the  system  will 
increase.  

At  the  beginning  of  2023,  Türkiye  published  a  new  hydrogen  technologies  strategy  and 
roadmap strategic document, highlighting that green hydrogen will be an important element 
for  the  country  to  achieve  its  net-zero  emission  targets.  The  local  content  requirement 
practices in Türkiye  continue to raise concerns as they contradict WTO and the  EU-Turkey 
Customs  Union  rules  and  undermine  the  competitiveness  of  the  EU  and  other  international 
companies on the Turkish energy market. 

As  regards  energy  efficiency,  in  the  context  of  Türkiye’s  2053  climate  targets,  energy 
efficiency  and  renewable  energy  standards  in  buildings  are  being  tightened,  electrical 
vehicles  are  promoted  and  the  use  of  different  modes  of  transport  is  prioritised.  In  the 
buildings and transport sectors, Türkiye plans to achieve an energy savings potential of 50% 
to reach its climate targets. 

On  nuclear  energy,  nuclear  safety  and  radiation  protection,  Türkiye’s  latest  national 
energy plan estimated that the total installed nuclear power capacity in the system will reach 
7.2 GW by 2035. The first reactor in the Akkuyu power plant (built with a 99.2% investment 
by Russia’s Rosatom) became operational in April 2023. Türkiye continued work to build 11 
more large-scale reactors across the country. 

Following  Türkiye’s  voluntary  commitment  to  conduct  stress  tests  on  the  Akkuyu  power 
plant  using  the  EU  model,  an  agreement  between  the  Commission  and  the  Turkish  nuclear 
regulatory  authority  has  been  reached  to  move  from  the  previously  envisaged  two-phase 
approach  to  a  more  streamlined  single-phase  approach.  In  July  2022,  Türkiye  ratified  the 
Joint Convention on the safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive 
Waste Management.  

Chapter 21: Trans-European networks 

The  EU  promotes 
transport, 
telecommunications  and  energy  to  strengthen  the  internal  market  and  contribute  to  growth 
and employment. 

trans-European  networks 

the  areas  of 

(TENs) 

in 

Türkiye  is  well  advanced  on  trans-European  networks.  It  made  no  progress  during  the 
reporting  period.  Concerning  energy  networks,  smooth  operation  of  the  Trans-Anatolian 
Pipeline  (TANAP)  continues  to  transmit  gas  to  the  European  section  of  the  Southern  Gas 
Corridor.  On  transport  networks,  construction  of  the  flagship  Halkali-Kapikule  railway  line 
connecting the EU border to Istanbul continued, despite significant difficulties.  

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid. 
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  establish  a  transparent,  cost-reflective  and  non-discriminatory  gas  transit  regime  in  line 

with the EU acquis; 

→  take concrete steps to prepare the Yavuz Sultan Selim bridge railway connections; 

→  accelerate action to align with key pieces of the EU acquis to facilitate alignment in the 

TEN-T networks. 

Concerning the transport networks, Türkiye continued to progress in the construction of the 
new  Halkali-Kapikule  high  speed  railway  line  connecting  the  Asian  part  of  Türkiye  and 

113 

 
 
Europe. The progress rate on the main line reached 64%. The contracts under the Ispartakule-
Cerkezkoy  (Stage  II)  and  Ispartakule-Halkali  (Stage  III)  sections  were  signed,  but 
implementation remains at a very early stage.  

There has been no progress on the preparatory work for the railway connection between the 
new railway line and the Yavuz Sultan Selim  bridge to  allow rail traffic  towards the Asian 
side of the straits. Due to high congestion, services and infrastructure at the border crossing 
points between the EU and Türkiye should be strengthened in view of the expected increase 
over the long term in transport flows.  

Türkiye made no progress  on  energy networks. The operation of the TANAP  transmitting 
gas  to  the  European  section  of  the  Southern  Gas  Corridor  continues.  Türkiye  is  actively 
expanding its import capacity for liquefied natural gas as well as its gas storage capacity. In 
October 2022, Türkiye and Russia agreed to explore the scope for Türkiye to become a major 
gas hub, by expanding the current TurkStream pipeline and creating a gas distribution centre 
on the borders to Greece and Bulgaria. In January 2023, an agreement of cooperation for 13 
years was signed between Türkiye’s National Petroleum Corporation BOTAȘ and Bulgargaz, 
for a volume of up to 1.5 billion cubic meters per year. The first transit via Marmara Ereglisi 
LNG  Terminal  took  place  in  April  2023.  Regarding  gas  networks  and  transmission  system 
operator cooperation, BOTAȘ applied for observer membership at the European Network of 
Gas  Transmission  System  Operators  (ENTSO-G).  The  state-owned  BOTAȘ  remains 
vertically  integrated  and  dominates  the  market  with  its  trading  and  grid  operator  functions, 
which  stifles  market  competition.  Amendments  to  the  natural  gas  market  Law  adopted  in 
April  2023  changed  the  gas  import  and  export  rationale  of  Türkiye  (see  Chapter  15  – 
Energy).  BOTAȘ  completed  the  Saros  Floating  Storage  Regasification  Unit  (FRSU) 
Terminal in February 2023, as a result of which Türkiye now has five LNG import facilities.  

Concerning  electricity  networks,  Türkiye  renewed  the  Turkish  Electricity  Transmission 
System  Operator's  observer  membership  of  the  European  Network  of  Transmission  System 
Operators  for  Electricity  (ENTSO-E)  as  of  January  2023  for  a  3-year  duration.  The  safe 
integration of increased amounts of intermittent renewable energy remains a major challenge 
in modernising the electricity network.  

Chapter 27: Environment and climate change 

The  EU  promotes  strong  climate  action,  sustainable  development  and  protection  of  the 
environment. EU rules contain provisions addressing climate change, water and air quality, 
waste  management,  nature  protection,  industrial  pollution,  chemicals,  noise  and  civil 
protection. 

Türkiye has some level of preparation and made limited progress over the reporting period 
in  this  area.  On  climate  change,  Türkiye  submitted  its  updated  Nationally  Determined 
Contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement with a slightly increased, albeit still critically 
insufficient,  mitigation  goal.  It  still  lacks  a  long-term  strategy  for  decarbonisation 
substantiating its net-zero-emission goal. The main strategic documents on climate policy still 
have  a  time  horizon  to  2023  and  need  to  be  thoroughly  updated.  Enforcement  and 
implementation remain weak. Türkiye has yet to set and then implement more ambitious and 
better  coordinated  environment  and  climate  policies.  The  level  of  strategic  planning, 
including  quantified  objectives  and  milestones,  substantial  investment  and  stronger 
administrative capacity, which are key prerequisites to increase preparedness, remains low. 

The Commission's recommendations from last year were only partially met, therefore remain 
valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

114 

 
 
→ ensure that environmental standards are met when building back better in the earthquake-
affected  areas,  notably  through  full  implementation  of  the  Environmental  Impact 
Assessment  Directive  and  other  horizontal  environmental  legislation,  and  ensure  that 
protection from exposure to asbestos in these areas is duly implemented; 

→ complete alignment with the directives on industrial pollution, water and waste as well as 

on nature protection and air quality; 

→ complete its alignment with  the EU  acquis on climate action, notably but  not  limited to 
emission  trading,  and  finalise  the  pending  contributions  required  under  the  Paris 
Agreement on climate change. 

Environment 

Türkiye has achieved some level of preparation in the area of horizontal legislation, but no 
progress was made over the reporting period. Turkish legislation is aligned with the Strategic 
Environmental  Assessment  Directive  and  mostly  aligned  with  the  Environmental  Impact 
Assessment (EIA) Directive. However, Türkiye is still not party to the Espoo Convention and 
thus,  non-alignment  with  EIA  procedures  in  transboundary  contexts  persists.  Moreover, 
Türkiye  is  not  yet  party  to  the  Aarhus  Convention  on  access  to  information,  public 
participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters. The level of 
alignment on Environmental Liability Directive remains limited. The National Environment 
Agency, set up in 2020, became operational in 2022. 

On  air  quality,  Türkiye  has  yet  to  adopt  national  legislation  in  line  with  EU  directives  on 
ambient air quality and national emission ceilings. It reports on severe air pollution in some 
cities  on  an  annual  basis.  It  has  a  national  strategy  for  air  quality  monitoring  and  all  eight 
planned regional networks are established and operational with 360 monitoring stations. 

The legal framework on waste management is partially aligned with the EU acquis. Türkiye 
continued  to  implement  the  legislation  on  zero  waste  adopted  in  2019.  In  2023,  Türkiye’s 
recycling  rate  increased  to  27%.  Preparations  continued  for  the  introduction  of  the  Deposit 
Management  System,  designed  to  recycle  disposable  beverage  packages.  On  medical  waste 
treatment, alignment and capacity building for sorting and recycling continued. The level of 
implementation of waste management plans at local and regional level is insufficient. Türkiye 
has  not  adopted  legislation  on  ship  recycling  to  mirror  the  requirements  of  the  EU  Ship 
Recycling  Regulation  and  concerns  persist  regarding  safety,  sound  waste  management  and 
environmental hazards in some of these facilities. Two Turkish shipyards were removed from 
the EU list of ship recycling facilities, but three more Turkish shipyards were added to it. On 
textiles,  the  Turkish  apparel  sector  published  in  January  2023  a  sustainability  strategy  and 
action  plan  to  transform  the  sector  by  aligning  it  with  the  EU  acquis.  The  February  2023 
earthquakes had a major impact on the waste management systems of affected municipalities, 
impacting  the  existing  infrastructure  and  equipment.  In  addition,  the  management  of 
construction  debris  remains  a  major  environmental  problem  in  terms  of  polluting  the 
ecosystems into which the debris is dumped, including due to the release of asbestos.  

In  the  area  of  water  quality,  the  legislative  alignment  is  advanced,  but  the  level  of 
implementation  and  enforcement  remain  low.  Türkiye  has  started  preparing  river  basin 
management plans in line with the Water Framework Directive and has already adopted 8 out 
of  25  basins  plans.  Preparations  of  all  25  flood  risk  management  plans  are  close  to 
completion, but the preparation of drought management plans and groundwater management 
plans  is  at  an  early  stage.  Türkiye  has  not  yet  aligned  its  provisions  with  the  revised  EU 
Directive  on  drinking  water  and  transboundary  consultations  on  water  issues  have  not 
advanced. Wastewater treatment capacity has increased as a result of continuous investments 
115 

 
 
and  with  the  construction  of  1 176  wastewater  treatment  plants  (WWTPs)  in  the  country, 
reaching a coverage of 89% of the municipal population. Türkiye aimed to reach 100% by the 
end of 2023, but the February 2023 earthquakes, which damaged much urban infrastructure 
in the affected area, including drinking water, sewerage networks and stormwater collection 
systems and the WWTPs, hampers the progress on this. The preliminary estimated cost of the 
damage is USD 3 billion. Alignment with the EU marine strategy remains pending. 

Türkiye  has  some  level  of  preparation  on  nature  protection.  Türkiye  committed  to  setting 
national  targets to  implement  the  Kunming-Montreal  Global  Biodiversity  Framework, 
adopted  at  the  15th  Conference  of  Parties  to  the  UN  Convention  on  Biological  Diversity 
(COP15), in December 2022. However, nature protection remains a challenge in Türkiye. It 
made no progress on adopting the framework legislation, the national biodiversity strategy or 
an action plan. Planning and construction in wetlands, forests and natural sites are still not in 
line with the EU acquis. In December 2022, Türkiye amended the mining regulation to allow 
mining in agricultural areas, protected areas, national parks and coastal areas, which caused 
concern among NGOs and the general public.  

In industrial pollution and risk management, alignment with the EU acquis is at an early 
stage. Türkiye  ratified the Minamata Convention  on mercury management in  October 2022 
and committed to phasing out existing mercury mines and the use of mercury in product and 
processes. Türkiye made no progress on aligning the Industrial Emissions Directive, the eco-
management  and  audit  scheme  or  the  Directive  on  the  limitation  of  emissions  of  volatile 
organic compounds.  

On chemicals, Türkiye has achieved an advanced level of legislative alignment overall, but 
the level of implementation and enforcement remains weak. Türkiye is almost fully aligned 
with  the European Regulation  on Registration, Evaluation,  Authorisation  and Restriction  of 
Chemicals (REACH). The transitional period of enforcement finishes at the end of 2023.  

Alignment  with  legislation  on  noise  is  well  advanced  but  the  level  of  implementation  and 
enforcement remains weak. The noise legislation was amended to extend its scope in 2022. 

On civil protection, Türkiye is a participating state of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism 
(UCPM). In the wake of the February 2023 earthquakes, Türkiye activated the Mechanism. 
Subsequently, all member and participating states offered major collaborative support via the 
Emergency  Response  Coordination  Centre  (ERCC)  of  the  European  Commission.  Türkiye 
has  not  yet  installed  the  Secure  Trans-European  Services  for  Telematics  between 
Administrators  system 
the  Common  Emergency 
to  connect 
to  be  able 
Communication and Information System (CECIS) with the ERCC.  

through 

Climate change 

Türkiye has achieved some level of preparation in this area and made limited progress over 
the reporting period. It is in the process of revising the current  climate change strategy and 
action  plan  (2011-2023)  and  has  adopted  an  implementing  legislation  on  fluorinated 
greenhouse gases (F-gases). Türkiye submitted an updated nationally determined contribution 
(NDC) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in April 2023. The 
overall  objective  is  slightly  higher  than  in  the  previous  NDC  and  it  contains  an  economy-
wide goal. However, the emission reduction target remains critically insufficient, as it means 
that  emissions  could  rise  by  over  30%  by  2030.  This  is  neither  in  line  with  the  EU’s 
collective objective to cut emissions by at least 55% by 2030 compared with 1990, nor with 
the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report. It remains crucial to step up the 
level  of  ambition  in  line  with  science.  It  is  also  necessary  to  adopt  a  long-term  strategy  on 
decarbonisation  that  reconciles  the  new  NDC  and  Türkiye's  objective  to  reach  net-zero 
116 

 
 
emissions  by  2053.  Türkiye  has  not  published  a  national  adaptation  plan  nor  an  adaptation 
communication under the Paris Agreement.  

Regarding its other commitments under the UNFCCC, Türkiye submitted the latest national 
inventory on greenhouse gases in April 2023. It has yet to adopt a climate law and provisions 
for the establishment of a domestic emission trading system. Similarly, on climate adaptation, 
Türkiye has yet to adopt a new national adaptation strategy beyond 2023. Türkiye still does 
not fully implement the Fuel Quality Directive, nor does it align with EU emissions standards 
for new light  and heavy-duty  vehicles. Türkiye needs  to  draw up an alignment plan for the 
Carbon Capture and Storage Directive and for the certain pieces of legislation under the Fit 
for 55 package adopted during the reporting period. 

CLUSTER 5: RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE AND COHESION  

This cluster covers: agriculture and rural development (Chapter 11), food safety, veterinary 
and  phytosanitary  policy  (Chapter  12),  fisheries  and  aquaculture  (Chapter  13),  regional 
policy and coordination of structural instruments (Chapter 22), and financial and budgetary 
provisions (Chapter 33).  

Türkiye reached some level of preparation in the area of agriculture and rural development. 
Backsliding  continued  during  the  reporting  period,  as  its  agricultural  policy  keeps  moving 
away  from  the  main  principles  of  the  EU  common  agricultural  policy  and  as  Türkiye 
continued  to  restrict  imports  of  agricultural  products  from  the  EU.  Türkiye  is  a  major 
exporter of food products  to  the EU, and made limited progress  in  the area of food safety, 
veterinary  and  phytosanitary  policy,  where  it  reached  some  level  of  preparation.  Full 
implementation  of  the  EU  acquis  in  this  area  requires  significant  further  work.  Türkiye  is 
moderately prepared in  the area of fisheries and  acquaculture, and made  some progress  on 
fisheries governance, inspection and control.  

Türkiye  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of  regional  policy  and  the  coordination  of 
structural  instruments,  and continued to  make some progress  in  accelerating  the absorption 
of  IPA  II  funds  and  setting  up  the  structures  for  IPA  III  funds.  Türkiye  has  some  level  of 
preparation in the area of financial and budgetary provisions but made no progress during the 
reporting period. 

Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development 

The EU’s common agricultural policy supports farmers and ensures Europe’s food security. 
It  helps  tackle  climate  change  and  the  sustainable  management  of  national  resources; 
maintains rural areas and landscapes across the EU; and keeps the rural economy alive by 
promoting jobs in farming, agri-food industries and associated sectors. This requires strong 
management and control systems. There are also common EU rules for marketing standards, 
quality policy and organic farming.  

Türkiye  achieved  some  level  of  preparation  on  agriculture  and  rural  development. 
Backsliding continued, however, as Türkiye’s agricultural support policy moved away from 
the  principles  under  the  EU  common  agricultural  policy  and  the  country  still  continues  to 
restrict  imports  of  agricultural  products  from  the  EU.  It  still  lacks  a  strategy  for  producing 
agricultural statistics and has not yet implemented a functioning integrated administration and 
control system (IACS).  

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid. 
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  adopt  and  start  implementing  a  strategy  for  producing  agricultural  statistics  and 
117 

 
 
implement IACS; 

→  develop and start implementing a strategy to align its agricultural support policy with the 

EU acquis; 

→  ensure the smooth implementation of the EU instrument for pre-accession assistance for 
rural  development  (IPARD  III),  including  the entrustment  of new measures  and smooth 
extension of IPARD III to the whole country. 

On horizontal issues, Türkiye took no significant steps to advance on sustainable agriculture 
under  the  Turkish  Green  Deal  action  plan.  Türkiye  continued  to  move  away  from  the 
principles governing agricultural direct support under the EU’s common agricultural policy. 
In particular, it increased support coupled to production and continued to shift to a region- or 
basin-based  management  model.  Türkiye  has  not  started  implementing  the  integrated 
administration  and  control  system  (IACS).  It  revised  the  province-based  application  of  the 
farm accountancy data network (FADN) and, as of 2022, procedures are carried out country-
wide  based  on  NUTS-1  level,  consisting  of  12  regions.  It  has  not  yet  completed  the 
agricultural  census  and  adoption  of  the  strategy  for  agricultural  statistics  remains  pending. 
Further  alignment  requires  agriculture  support  measures  to  be  brought  in  line  with  EU 
policies. 

Limited progress  has been observed on  common market organisation,  mainly in  terms of 
implementation  of  the  related  strategy.  Türkiye  has  yet  to  fully  implement  its  obligations 
under the trade agreement with the EU for agricultural products by opening quotas for beef 
and  live  animals  on  a  lasting  basis.  Türkiye  needs  to  implement  a  transparent  system  to 
manage import quotas.  

On  rural  development,  Türkiye  has  adopted  a  sectoral  agreement  underpinning  the  EU 
instrument  for  pre-accession  assistance  for  rural  development  (IPARD  III).  Meanwhile, 
implementation  of  the  IPARD  II  continued  steadily,  although  it  has  been  affected  by  the 
consequences of the earthquakes. 

On  quality  policy,  Türkiye  continued  to  implement  legislation  on  the  protection  of 
geographical indications, which is largely aligned with the EU acquis. 

On organic farming, further alignment with the EU acquis is needed. There is potential to 
further develop the sector and to use the support opportunities available under the IPARD III 
programme.  

Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy 

EU hygiene rules for foodstuff production ensure a high level of food safety. Animal health 
and welfare and the safety of food of animal origin are safeguarded together with the quality 
of  seeds,  plant  protection  material,  the  protection  against  harmful  organisms  and  animal 
nutrition. 

Türkiye  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  food  safety,  veterinary  and 
phytosanitary  policy.  Overall,  it  achieved  limited  progress  in  this  area  over  the  reporting 
period,  particularly  on  animal  identification  and  registration.  On  food  safety,  it  has  yet  to 
upgrade food establishments to meet EU standards. Full implementation of the EU acquis in 
this area requires significant further work.  

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid. 
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  upgrade food establishments to meet EU standards, notably for raw milk; 

118 

 
 
→  meet  EU  maximum  limits  for  pesticide  residues,  and  effectively  address  recurrent 

shortcomings; 

→  make further progress in addressing zoonoses. 

Türkiye  made  limited  progress  in  implementing  the  acquis  on  general  food  safety.  The 
number  of  notifications  to  the  rapid  alert  system  for  food  and  feed  on  pesticide  residues  in 
fruits  and  vegetables  imported  from  Türkiye  into  the  EU  remained  high,  a  trend  observed 
since 2020. 

Türkiye continued its work to fully align its veterinary policy with the EU acquis. On animal 
diseases, Türkiye increased cooperation with neighbouring countries in controlling infectious 
and  transboundary  diseases  in  the  veterinary  field  by  running  vaccination  campaigns  and 
increased  the  work  on  animal  identification  and  registration.  Further  structural  and 
administrative  work  is  still  necessary  to  fully  implement  the  acquis  on  animal  welfare. 
Türkiye made limited progress on controlling zoonoses. 

Türkiye continued to run training, inspection and monitoring programmes on the placing of 
food, feed and animal by-products on the market, which resulted in better administrative 
capacity  for  official  controls.  It  made  no  progress  on  developing  the  national  plan  for 
upgrading  agri-food  establishments.  Significant  work  is  still  needed  to  apply  new  rules  on 
registering  and  approving  food  establishments.  Substantial  work  is  also  required  on  animal 
by-products, notably to prepare a strategy on raw milk and on the entry into force of general 
rules to be implemented by raw milk producers. It has yet to adopt specifications of raw milk 
and rules on the use of milk that does not meet the somatic cell criteria. Türkiye’s provisions 
on funding inspections are not yet aligned with the EU system. 

Türkiye made progress on the alignment of its food safety rules with the EU acquis on issues 
such as labelling. However, progress on specific rules for feed and on phytosanitary policy 
remained limited. Interinstitutional collaboration on food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary 
policies  is  too  low  to  properly  integrate  the  EU’s  One  Health  Approach  into  its  policies. 
Türkiye has yet to align its legislation on novel food and on genetically modified organisms. 

Chapter 13: Fisheries and aquaculture 

The  common  fisheries  policy  lays  down  rules  on  fisheries  management,  protects  living 
resources  of  the  sea  and  limits  the  environmental  impact  of  fisheries.  This  includes  setting 
catch  quotas,  managing  fleet  capacity,  rules  on  markets  and  aquaculture  and  support  for 
fisheries and coastal communities. Further, it promotes a sustainable aquaculture.   

Türkiye  is  moderately  prepared  in  this  area.  It  made  some  progress  on  fisheries 
governance,  on  inspections  and  control,  namely  by  improving  and  extending  the  scope  of 
legislation and strengthening institutional capacity and infrastructure.  

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially met, and therefore remain 
valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→ step up efforts to align fisheries management with EU law, including data collection and 

data sharing for scientific stock assessments; 

→  step  up  efforts  to  align  its  market  policy  with  EU  rules,  in  particular  on  the  criteria 

governing the recognition and roles of professional organisations; 

→ improve fisheries control and inspection at sea in view of improving  compliance at both 
the  Mediterranean  and  Black  Seas,  and  of  effectively  fighting  illegal,  unreported  and 
unregulated fishing activities (IUU), including catch documentation schemes. 

119 

 
 
Türkiye  made  some  progress  on  resources  and  fleet  management.  It  amended  its 
commercial fisheries regulation to further protect aquatic biodiversity. It closed the anchovy 
fishing  season  in  the  Marmara  Sea  earlier  to  protect  and  ensure  sustainable  fishing  of  the 
stocks. It improved the institutional capacity and infrastructure for data collection and stock 
assessment.  The  information  systems  established  to  manage  fisheries  and  fishing  fleet 
became functional and contributed to monitoring, control and surveillance. The country needs 
to reduce the by-catch of sensitive species, in line with the General Fisheries Commission for 
the  Mediterranean’s  (GFCM)  recommendations  and  promote  the  use  of  selective  gear.  A 
Fisheries  and  Aquaculture  Scientific  and  Technical  Advisory  Council  was  established  in 
August 2022, with a first meeting in December, to provide scientific opinion for fisheries and 
aquaculture management. Türkiye ran support programmes for the exploitation of pufferfish, 
an invasive species, to protect marine biodiversity.   

The  amended  Fisheries  Law  also  provided  for  some  structural  action,  such  as  a  stronger 
conservation regime. Structural measures are in place to support traditional coastal fisheries. 

On  inspections  and  control,  Türkiye  continued  to  make  progress  on  legislative  alignment 
and  on  implementing  the  recommendations  for  control  measures  by  the  International 
Commission  for  the  Conservation  of  Atlantic  Tunas  (ICCAT)  and  the  GFCM.  In  line  with 
ICCAT  rules,  Türkiye  has  implemented  the  circular  that  regulates  Bluefin  tuna  (BFT) 
fisheries and has identified the BFT fishing vessels for the 2023-2025 period. The number of 
inspections increased, and 169 fisheries vessels were confiscated in 2022 due to IUU fishing. 
New technologies such as drones are used in fisheries inspections. 

On  market  policy,  Türkiye  developed  IT  tools  for  the  collection  of  data  from  producer 
organisations and for disseminating market  intelligence. These tools were set  up to  support 
the  development  and  control  of  professional  organisations  in  line  with  EU  market  policy. 
Türkiye provides State aid for aquaculture and to improve data quality on marine and inland 
artisanal fishing vessels for sustainable management of fisheries. 

Regarding international agreements, Türkiye continued cooperating with the EU in regional 
and  international  platforms.  As  the  EU  implements  the  provisions  of  the  United  Nations 
Convention  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea,  including  in  the  common  fisheries  policy,  Türkiye’s 
ratification  of  the  Convention  would  improve  cooperation  with  the  EU  on  fisheries  and 
maritime policy. Türkiye participated with an active and supportive stance in the works of the 
GFCM.  

Chapter 22: Regional policy and the coordination of structural instruments 

Regional  policy  is  the  EU’s  main  tool  for  reducing  regional  disparities  and  investing  in 
sustainable  and  inclusive  socio-economic  growth.  It  is  operating  through  “shared 
management”  between  the  Commission  and  EU  Member  States.  The  implementation  of 
cohesion  policy  programmes  requires  appropriate  administrative  capacity  on  programme 
and  project  level,  the  establishment  of  systems  of  sound  financial  management  and  control 
and  also  the  fulfilment  of  other  EU  acquis  elements  such  as  environmental  or  public 
procurement legislation.   

Türkiye  is  moderately  prepared  on  regional  policy  and  on  coordinating  structural 
instruments.  Overall, it made  some progress in accelerating the absorption of  IPA  II funds 
and setting up the structure for IPA III funds.  

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid.  
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  address structural weaknesses in implementing regional policy; 

120 

 
 
→  accelerate  implementation  of  ongoing  operations  under  IPA  II  to  deliver  high  quality 

results by the set deadlines and avoid de-commitments; 

→  ensure the proper functioning of local democracy. 

Regarding the legislative framework,  Türkiye  made no progress  in  the reporting period.  It 
has  yet  to  set  up  mechanisms  for  evidence-based  policymaking,  policy  and  programme 
evaluations, and impact assessments. 

A  general  framework  is  needed  to  put  in  place  appropriate  statistical  tools  to  monitor  and 
evaluate  performance  of  the  National  Strategy  for  Regional  Development  (NSRD)  and 
Regional Development Agencies (RDAs). The limited impact of implementing the NSRD on 
national policymaking persists, and regional level considerations continue to be inadequately 
reflected at central level. Türkiye has put in place key tools for implementation, namely the 
growth  poles  support  programme,  social  development  support  programme,  producing  cities 
programme,  institutional  transformation  and  sustainability  support  programme,  the  working 
and  producing  youth  programme,  Regional  Development  Fund,  and  the  RDAs  project 
support,  but  the  tools’  functionality  can  be  improved.  Türkiye  started  preparations  on  the 
twelfth development plan (2024-2028).  

Concerns remain regarding state overregulation and interventionism in the planning decisions 
taken  by  local  authorities,  as  well  as  the  lack  of  consultations  with  local  authorities.  The 
financial  autonomy  of  local  authorities  remains  restricted  by  their  limited  capacity  to 
calculate the  rate of local  taxes, and the fact  that a large proportion of local  revenue (more 
than half) still comes from the State budget.  

Türkiye  has  achieved  no  progress  to  remedy  the  situation  faced  by  locally  elected 
representatives. The government continues to open criminal investigations against mayors on 
the  grounds  of  a  broad  definition  of  ‘terrorism’  in  Türkiye’s  anti-terror  legislation.  It 
suspends  the  representatives  targeted  and  replaces  them  with  unelected  officials,  a  practice 
that seriously undermines the democratic choice of Turkish citizens and impedes the proper 
functioning of local democracy in Türkiye. 

On the institutional framework, the functioning of the Indirect Management by Beneficiary 
Countries  (IMBC)  authorities  remains  monitored  by  the  National  IPA  Coordinator  office 
(NIPAC)  in  coordination  with  the  National  Authorising  Officer  (NAO)  and  with  regular 
oversight  by  the  Presidential  Office.  The  Financial  Cooperation  Committee,  gathering  all 
IMBC authorities, met on a regular basis. There is a continuous need to strengthen the role of 
the NIPAC to coordinate effectively amongst ministries, to prioritise interventions under IPA 
III, and monitor their impact.  Türkiye made good progress regarding the institutional set-up 
and the system  for managing IPA funds in  IMBC, which still needs some adaptation to the 
IPA  III  requirements  and  alignment  with  the  Financial  Framework  Partnership  Agreement 
between Türkiye and the Commission. 

Türkiye  made  some  progress  in  administrative  capacity  of  the  IPA  structures. 
Implementation  of  the  action  plan  drawn  up  by  the  NIPAC  and  NAO  continued  to  deliver 
some  results.  However,  the  capacity  of  IMBC  structures  require  strengthening  to  ensure 
efficient and timely contracting and implementation of IPA programmes, improved capacities 
for  programming,  monitoring  and  evaluation  activities,  as  well  as  strengthened  Audit 
Authority. There is no clear staff retention policy and strategy. The action taken to re-focus 
the  IMBC  on  specific  sectors  together  with  the  political  instability  have  not  aided  staff 
motivation in some structures. Most Operating Structures  have reduced their ex-ante control 
rejection rates to below 10%.  

121 

 
 
Türkiye made some progress on programming, in line with the coordination framework set 
up  under  IPA  III.  The  NIPAC  coordinates  the  programming  process,  ensuring  overall 
monitoring and evaluation of the implementation.  For this purpose, the  NIPAC coordinates 
the work to implement the evaluation plans, which are presented to the Commission annually. 
However,  as  there  is  no  clear  EU  alignment  strategy,  the  programming  lacks  a  national 
anchor strategy. 

On monitoring and evaluation, all but one Operating Structures (the Ministry of Transport) 
have set up and operationalised their monitoring systems, including Management Information 
Systems (MISs). The main weaknesses are observed in the systems operated by the NIPAC 
and  the  NAO.  To  overcome  these  weaknesses,  work  is  ongoing  to  revise  the  existing  MIS 
used by the NIPAC, namely NIPAC online. The process aims to ensure the system meets the 
requirements  for  IPA  III  procedures.  A  specific  electronic  system  to  manage  the  follow-up 
and  implementation  of  Results  Oriented  Monitoring  (ROM)  and  procedures  is  also  fully 
functional. 

Concerning financial management, control and audit, the Operating Structures have built 
capacity  for  programming,  implementation  and  absorption.  Over-programming  has  become 
an issue in the context of very low de-commitment rates. Management and control systems 
have improved, including controls on tender files. Türkiye has made progress on the rate of 
ex-ante tender approvals and on the number of monitoring activities. It has also improved the 
approach taken to project management. The principle of single audit is duly reflected in the 
work of the Audit Authority for audits and supervision of the NAO. A monitoring framework 
protocol  was  developed  by  NIPAC-NAO  in  the  IPA  I  period,  and  since  then  the  NAO 
supervises execution of the protocol. The Audit Authority drafts audit strategies and specific 
manuals  and  submits  them  to  the  Commission  for  review.  In  addition,  there  is  a  general 
circular issued by the President and specific provisions for EU project audits, as set out in the 
regulation of the Audit Authority (see Chapter 32 – Financial control). 

Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions 

This  chapter  covers  the  rules  governing  the  funding  of  the  EU  budget  (‘own  resources’). 
These  resources  mainly  consist  of:  (i)  contributions  based  on  the  gross  national  income  of 
each  Member  State;  (ii)  customs  duties;  (iii)  the  non-recycled  plastic  resource  and  (iv)  a 
resource based on value added tax. Member States must have the appropriate administrative 
capacity  to  adequately  coordinate  and  ensure  the  correct  calculation,  collection,  payment 
and control of own resources. 

Türkiye has some level of preparation in the area of financial and budgetary provisions. It 
made no progress over the reporting period. The country needs to set up solid coordination 
structures,  build  administrative  capacity  and  adopt  implementing  rules  for  the  correct 
application of the own resources system. 

The Commission’s recommendation from last year was not met, and therefore remains valid. 
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

further  align  the  gross  national  income  inventory  with  Eurostat’s  GNI  Inventory 

→ 
Guide. 

Türkiye has already put in place the basic principles and institutions in the underlying policy 
areas linked to the application of the own resources system (see Chapters 16 - Taxation, 18 - 
Statistics, 29 - Customs union and 32 - Financial control). The Customs Union with the EU 
on  processed  agricultural  goods  and  industrial  goods  (with  the  exception  of  coal  and  steel 
products)  continues  to  ensure  considerable  alignment  of  Türkiye’s  customs  legislation  with 
122 

 
 
the acquis on customs. Türkiye has yet to adopt a draft customs law aligned with the Union 
Customs Code. This will facilitate preparation in traditional own resources (mainly customs 
duties). 

For the value added tax-based resource, systems are not yet in place to correctly calculate 
the VAT base and the weighted average rate. VAT and customs duties fraud remains an issue 
as  does  the  size  of  the  informal  economy.  Legislation  on  structure,  exemptions,  special 
schemes and the scope of reduced rates is not fully aligned with the EU acquis. 

Concerning  the  gross  national  income-based  resource,  Türkiye  has  undertaken  efforts  to 
bring  its  national  accounts  and  GNI  calculations  fully  in  line  with  the  European  system  of 
accounts (ESA 2010). It also needs to improve the exhaustiveness of the estimates to ensure 
that they take account of the non-observed economy.  The GNI inventory is not fully aligned 
with  Eurostat’s  Inventory  Guide  and  the  transmission  of  data  does  not  always  occur  in  a 
timely manner. 

In  terms  of  the  administrative  infrastructure,  Türkiye  needs  to  set  up  a  fully  operational 
coordination  structure,  with  sufficient  administrative  capacity  and  the  implementing  rules 
needed  to  ensure  that  it  can  correctly  calculate,  forecast,  account  for,  collect,  pay,  monitor 
and report own resources to the EU in line with the EU acquis. 

CLUSTER 6: EXTERNAL RELATIONS  

There are two chapters in this cluster: external relations (Chapter 30), and foreign, security 
and  defence  policy  (Chapter  31).  Türkiye  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of  external 
relations and made no progress over the reporting period. Large deviation from the Common 
Customs  Tariff  was  still  in  place.  Divergence  from  the  EU  Generalised  Scheme  of 
Preferences  persisted,  in  violation  of  the  EU-Turkey  Customs  Union.  Türkiye’s  official 
development  assistance  was  largely  directed  towards  humanitarian  support  for  the  Syria-
related activities on Türkiye’s own territory. 

Türkiye has some level of preparation in the area of foreign, security and defence policy, and 
made  no  progress  overall  in  the  reporting  period.  Türkiye’s  unilateral  foreign  policy 
remained at odds with the EU priorities under the common foreign and security policy.  

Chapter 30: External relations 

The  EU  has  a  common  trade  and  commercial  policy  towards  third  countries,  based  on 
multilateral  and  bilateral  agreements,  and  autonomous  measures.  There  are  also  EU  rules 
on humanitarian aid and development policy. 

Türkiye  is  moderately  prepared  on  external  relations.  It  made  no  progress  over  the 
reporting period. Türkiye removed some additional customs duties but also introduced other 
duties,  thus  resulting  in  a  very  limited  re-alignment.  Türkiye  is  still  not  in  line  with  the 
Common Customs Tariff as a wide scope of additional customs duties remained in place, as 
were  a  number  of  trade  agreements  with  the  third  countries  where  the  EU  has  no  such 
agreements.  The  divergence  from  the  EU  Generalised  Scheme  of  Preferences  persisted,  in 
breach  of  the  EU-Turkey  Customs  Union.  Türkiye’s  official  development  assistance  was 
0.79%, above  the 0.7% target enshrined in Sustainable Development Goal 17. A large share 
of its official development assistance comprised humanitarian support for projects related to 
Syria but carried out in Türkiye. 

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid. 
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

123 

 
 
→ re-align the customs tariff completely with the Common Customs Tariff; 

→  complete  the  alignment  with  the  EU’s  Generalised  Scheme  of  Preferences  and  dual-use 

export control regime. 

Türkiye  made  no  progress  on  the  common  commercial  policy.  It  lifted  some  of  the 
additional duties but it brought in other duties. It has yet to tackle a major deviation from the 
Common  Customs  Tariff,  which  has  fundamentally  distorted  the  once  good  level  of 
alignment with the EU common commercial policy, by eliminating the remaining additional 
duties. Türkiye also needs to align fully with the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences in 
terms of countries and products. Türkiye did not initiate any new safeguard investigations but 
it  continues  to  run  review  investigation  of  two  safeguard  measures  to  extend  them.  The 
initiation of anti-circumvention investigations based on weak evidence is a cause of concern. 
There is a need for closer coordination between the EU and Türkiye within the World Trade 
Organisation, in particular on the Doha Development Agenda, in the OECD and in the G-20. 

The  1998  Agreement  on  agricultural  products,  and  the  1996  Agreement  on  coal  and  steel 
products covered by the European Coal and Steel Community need to be aligned with current 
rules  of  the  Pan-euro-Mediterranean  (PEM)  Convention  on  rules  of  origin.  Discussions 
between  EU  and  Türkiye  continue  on  the  (revised)  PEM  Convention  transitional  rules  of 
origin  aiming  for  a  complete  agreement,  including  issues  of  full  cumulation  and  duty 
drawback. 

Türkiye has 82 bilateral investment treaties in force, 23 of which are with EU Member States. 
On export controls of dual-use goods, Türkiye did not align with the EU position on certain 
multilateral  export  control  arrangements,  such  as  the  Wassenaar  Arrangement  on  Export 
Controls  for  Conventional  Arms  and  Dual-Use  Goods  and  Technologies,  and  the  Missile 
Technology Control Regime. Türkiye’s non-alignment with EU restrictive measures against 
Russia  and  its  intensified  trade  and  economic  ties  with  Russia  increase  the  potential 
transportation of dual-use goods. Türkiye has an export credit agency and is a Participant in 
the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits since 2019.  

Regarding  bilateral  agreements  with  third  countries,  Türkiye  continued  to  implement  its 
free trade agreement with Malaysia and Venezuela, diverging from the common commercial 
policy  under  the  EU-Turkey  Customs  Union  as  the  EU  has  no  such  agreements  with  those 
countries.  Moreover,  a  free  trade  agreement  that  Türkiye  signed  with  the  United  Arab 
Emirates  entered  into  force.  In  addition,  Türkiye  signed  preferential  trade  agreements  with 
Uzbekistan and Pakistan and implemented the agreement with Pakistan. Türkiye continued to 
implement  the  agreement  with  Azerbaijan  and  extended  its  current  scope  to  include  some 
additional agricultural and industrial products. 

As  for  development  policy  and  humanitarian  aid,  Türkiye  granted  official  development 
assistance  in  2022  of  EUR  7  billion,  which  is  equivalent  to  0.79%  of  its  gross  national 
income  (GNI).  It  increased  in  real  terms  in  volume  compared  with  previous  years  and 
remained  above  the  0.7%  target  enshrined  in  the  Sustainable  Development  Goal  17.  The 
assistance was largely directed towards humanitarian support for projects related to Syria but 
carried out in Türkiye. 

Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy  

Member  States  must  be  able  to  conduct  political  dialogue  under  EU  foreign,  security  and 
defence  policy,  align  with  EU  statements,  take  part  in  EU  actions,  and  apply  agreed 
sanctions and restrictive measures.  

124 

 
 
Türkiye has  some level  of preparation  in  the area of foreign,  security  and defence policy, 
and  made  no  progress  overall  in  the  reporting  period.  Türkiye  is  an  active  and  significant 
actor in the area of foreign policy, which constitutes an important element in the context of 
the EU-Türkiye relationship. However, Türkiye’s unilateral foreign policy remained at odds 
with the EU’s priorities under the common foreign and security policy (CFSP).  

Following  Russia’s  war  of  aggression  against  Ukraine,  Türkiye  condemned  the  Russian 
military aggression, and  engaged politically and  diplomatically, including  in  the facilitation 
of  the  export  of  Ukrainian  grain  and  the  prisoners’  exchange.  Türkiye  worked  towards 
facilitating  talks  between  Ukraine  and  Russia  and  on  de-escalation  and  bringing  about  a 
cease-fire.  Nevertheless,  Türkiye  refrained  from  aligning  with  EU  restrictive  measures 
against  Russia,  and  has  significantly  intensified  trade  and  economic  ties  with  Russia  in 
several sectors (energy, tourism, transport, etc).  

Türkiye  also  intensified  its  “regional  normalisation”  policy  with  the  Arab  states,  with 
Armenia,  and  Israel.  Its  rhetoric  in  support  to  terrorist  group  Hamas  following  its  attacks 
against  Israel  on  7  October  2023  is  in  complete  disagreement  with  the  EU  approach.  The 
rapprochement  with  the  Syrian  regime,  facilitated  by  Russia,  in  the  absence  of  a  political 
solution  to  the  Syrian  conflict,  is  at  odds  with  the  EU’s  policy.  Türkiye  has  a  growing 
presence  and  geopolitical  ambition  in  the  South  Caucasus  and  Central  Asia,  and  continued 
the efforts to  extend relations with  African, Latin American and Asian  countries. Türkiye’s 
pragmatic  engagement  on  Afghanistan,  and  vocal  position  on  the  developments  in  Sudan, 
underscored its ambition to be a key player in the context of major international crises.  

The  Commission’s  recommendations  from  last  year  were  only  partially  met,  and  therefore 
remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:  

→  take  decisive  steps  to  significantly  improve  alignment  with  High  Representative 

statements on behalf of the EU and relevant Council decisions on CFSP;  

→  step up cooperation on preventing and detecting circumvention of restrictive measures, in 
particular regarding advanced technology items that can be diverted for military purposes; 

→  further enhance the political dialogue on foreign and security policy with the EU and seek 

collaboration on convergent interests while working on reducing divergences.  

The  political  dialogue  between  the  EU  and  Türkiye  on  foreign  and  security  policy  issues 
continued, through contacts at senior officials’ level. There were regular contacts between the 
High Representative/Vice-President of the European Commission and the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Türkiye, who also met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York 
in  September  2023.  In  June  2023,  the  President  of  the  European  Commission  and  the 
President of the European Council held  a telephone call with  the President  of Türkiye,  and 
both  Presidents  met  with  the  Turkish  President  in  the  margins  of  the  NATO  summit  in 
Vilnius in July 2023. The President of the European Council also met the Turkish President 
on  the  margins  of  the  G20  meeting  in  September  2023.  Türkiye  attended  the  Brussels  VII 
Syria Conference organised in June 2023 by the EU. 

The  institutional  framework  enabling  Türkiye’s  participation  in  the  EU  common  foreign 
and  security  policy  (CFSP)  and,  respectively,  the  common  security  and  defence  policy 
(CSDP)  remained  in  place,  at  both  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  the  Ministry  of 
Defence,  but  Türkiye  maintained  a  very  low  alignment  rate  of  10%  with  relevant  High 
Representative statements on behalf of the EU and relevant Council decisions (as of August 
2023), compared to 8% in 2022. 

125 

 
 
As  a  general  policy,  Türkiye  consistently  refrained  from  aligning  with  EU  restrictive 
measures  against  Russia  and  maintained  its  position  of  not  supporting  sanctions  adopted 
outside  the  UN  framework.  Türkiye  continued  to  operate  flights  to  Russia.  The  EU’s 
International Special Envoy for the implementation of EU sanctions visited Türkiye in March 
and July 2023 to underline the importance of taking concrete steps and cooperating to fight 
against the circumvention of EU restrictive measures against Russia in a joint and systemic 
manner. While Turkish  customs authorities highlighted the good technical cooperation with 
EU Member States on a case-by-case basis, Türkiye should continue to find ways to prevent 
the re-export of sensitive items that can be used for military purposes by Russia. 

As regards the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Türkiye is a party to most 
international  treaties  and  conventions  and  participates  in  export  control  regimes  and  other 
politically binding arrangements, complying with its legally-binding obligations and political 
commitments. However, it continued to prevent the participation of the Republic of Cyprus in 
the Conference on Disarmament, its  membership in  the Wassenaar Arrangement and in  the 
Zangger Committee. While Türkiye aligns with a number of EU positions in multilateral non-
proliferation and disarmament fora, its alignment record has further worsened since February 
2022. It is still to ratify the Arms Trade Treaty.  

Türkiye  continued  to  seek  involvement  in  CSDP  and  EU  defence  initiatives,  whilst  at  the 
same time continuing to exclude a Member State from all possible cooperation with NATO. 
Türkiye’s narrow interpretation of the EU-NATO cooperation framework continued to pose 
an  obstacle  to  building  a  genuine  organisation-to-organisation  relationship,  in  particular  by 
limiting the exchange of information and blocking the inclusive participation of all Member 
States  in  joint  activities  of  the  two  organisations.  After  protracted  negotiations,  Türkiye’s 
National Assembly ratified Finland’s NATO accession bid in March 2023. On the sidelines 
of the NATO summit in Vilnius in July 2023, the Turkish President committed to forward the 
accession protocol for Sweden to the Turkish  parliament as soon as possible. The president 
submitted the bill for ratification to the Parliament on 23 October 2023. 

Türkiye actively engaged with international organisations, while continuing to obstruct the 
accession of EU Member States. At the UN General Assembly, in September 2022, Türkiye 
reiterated  its  support  for  the  reform  of  the  UN  Security  Council,  making  a  plea  for 
multilateralism. Türkiye participated in the G20 Bali Summit in November 2022 and the 29th 
OSCE  Ministerial  Council  in  December  2022.  Türkiye  attended  the  4th  Summit  of  the 
Council of Europe in May 2023, but it did not join the 37 Member States + Canada, Japan, 
the US  and the EU that  created a register of damage for Ukraine as a  first  step towards  an 
international  compensation  mechanism  for  the  victims  of  the  Russian  aggression.  In 
September  2022,  Türkiye  was  invited  as  a  guest  to  the  22nd  Summit  of  the  Shanghai 
Cooperation  Organisation  (SCO)  and  reiterated  its  wish  to  become  a  full  member.  In 
February 2023, Türkiye attended the G20 meeting in New Delhi and hosted the 23rd meeting 
of  the  foreign  ministers  of  MIKTA  (Mexico,  Indonesia,  Republic  of  Korea,  Türkiye,  and 
Australia) on the sidelines of G20. In many international organisations, Türkiye continued to 
oppose  the  participation  of  international  and  European  Non-Governmental  Organisations, 
accusing them, without providing evidence, of supporting terrorist organisations. Türkiye is 
not a State Party to The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 

In terms of security measures, in the reporting period there was no Security of Information 
Agreement (SIA) for the exchanges of EU classified information (EUCI) with Türkiye. Since 
2006,  a  framework  participation  agreement  allows  Türkiye’s  participation,  including 
reception of EUCI, in the context of CSDP missions. 

In the framework of the EU crisis management missions and operations under the CSDP, 
126 

 
 
Türkiye continued to participate in Operation EUFOR ALTHEA as the biggest non-EU troop 
contributor. 

Regarding  hybrid  threats,  in  the  context  of  international  conflicts  and  crises,  foreign 
information manipulation and interference (FIMI) activities, including the circulation of false 
information  and  propaganda  on  social  and  mainstream  media,  was  observed  in  Türkiye's 
information  environment.  Türkiye did  not  restrict the operations of Russian state-controlled 
media outlets in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. 

Türkiye  continued  to  progressively  expand  its  global  diplomatic  network  and  pursued  the 
development of intense relations and strategic partnerships with countries worldwide, while 
enhancing regional normalisation efforts.  

In 2022, Türkiye recognised Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine as a state of war 
and rejected the Russian military aggression. During the reporting period, Türkiye maintained 
a position it describes as a 'balanced’ one between the warring parties. Turkish high officials 
have  had  regular  contacts  with  both  Russian  and  Ukrainian  counterparts.  The  UN-  and 
Türkiye-brokered  Black  Sea  Grain  Initiative  was  terminated  by  Russia  in  July.  Türkiye 
continued  to  refrain  from  aligning  with  the  EU  packages  of  restrictive  measures  against 
Russia.  As  of  March  2023,  Türkiye  implemented  a  ban  on  exporting  sanctioned  goods, 
originating  from  the  EU,  the  United  States,  and  the  United  Kingdom,  to  Russia.  This  ban 
specifically targeted goods that were in transit, stored in warehouses, or located within free 
zones in Türkiye. However, the potential transportation of dual-use and sensitive technology 
goods, as well as the unrestricted movement of sanctioned goods from Türkiye to Russia still 
need  to  be  addressed.  Türkiye  also  significantly  increased  its  trade  and  economic  relations 
with  Russia.  Frequent  high-level  Turkish-Russian  contacts  took  place  in  the  run-up  to  the 
opening of the Akkuyu nuclear facility, financed and operated by Russia’s Rosatom, attended 
online by the Russian President. 

Türkiye, a NATO ally, remained both an important and a challenging partner for the United 
States.  Türkiye  and  the  US  engaged  on  regional  issues,  including  Ukraine,  Afghanistan, 
humanitarian access to Syria, and counter-terrorism activities. Key points of friction included 
the  Russian  made  S-400  air  defence  missile  system  owned  by  Türkiye,  the  participation  of 
Türkiye  in  the  F-35  programme,  Turkish  criticism  of  US  support  for  the  YPG  forces  in 
northern Syria, tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea, and the respect of 
human  rights  in  Türkiye.  A  number  of  high-level  meetings  took  place  between  the  two 
countries  including  a  meeting  of  the  two  Presidents  in  the  margins  of  the  G20  summit  in 
November 2022 and at the NATO summit in July 2023, and two meetings of the US-Türkiye 
Strategic  Mechanism.  Türkiye  and  Canada,  as  NATO  allies,  maintain  open  channels  of 
communication at high level, reiterating and reaffirming their commitment for strong bilateral 
cooperation. Canada acted quickly to mobilise support following the earthquakes. 

Türkiye’s  efforts  for  rapprochement  in  the  Gulf  region  continued  and  intensified  in  the 
reporting  period.  Türkiye  and  the  United  Arab  Emirates  (UAE)  held  high  level  meetings 
and signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement in March 2023. In July 2023, 
during the Turkish President’s visit to the UAE, 13 agreements on investments estimated to 
be worth USD 50.7 billion were signed. Relations with Bahrain remained stable, while ties 
with  Saudi  Arabia  continued  to  strengthen.  In  March  2023,  the  two  countries  signed  an 
agreement,  for  a  USD  5  billion  swap  deposit  to  the  Turkish  Central  Bank.  Additionally,  in 
July 2023 they sealed a substantial defence export deal, involving the sale of Turkish drones 
to Saudi Arabia. Türkiye and Oman held in November 2022 the Joint Economic Commission 
and  signed  a  cooperation  agreement  to  boost  bilateral  trade  and  investments.  Türkiye 
enhanced its relations with Kuwait in the defence industry sector, signing a contract for the 
127 

 
 
purchase of Turkish-made Bayraktar drones in January 2023. Türkiye and Qatar continued 
their  cooperation  in  various  fields  and  maintained  close  coordination  on  regional  and 
international issues. Turkish-Egyptian normalisation efforts picked up pace in the first half 
of  2023,  and  both  countries  agreed  to  exchange  ambassadors.  After  an  initial  encounter  at 
Presidential level in 2022, contacts continued at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and 
culminated  in  the  meeting  between  the  Presidents  on  the  sidelines  of  the  G20  meeting  in 
September 2023.  

Türkiye’s relations with Israel were re-launched in 2022. In August 2022, the two countries 
decided to  restore full diplomatic relations, including  the exchange of ambassadors, and, in 
September 2022, the Turkish President held talks with the Israeli Prime Minister. Despite the 
rapprochement,  Türkiye  continues  to  criticise  Israel’s  actions  in  the  occupied  Palestinian 
territory, in particular related to the respect of the status quo of the Holy sites in Jerusalem. 
Following  the  Hamas  terrorist  group’s  attacks  against  Israel  in  October  2023,  Türkiye 
refrained from condemning and qualifying them as terrorism  and strongly criticised Israel’s 
response. Türkiye strongly condemned the loss of civilian lives in both sides and proposed to 
act  as  mediator  between  Israel  and  Hamas.  Türkiye  is  currently  re-evaluating  its  ties  with 
Israel. On the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), Türkiye’s position aligns with the EU’s 
position supporting the two-state solution. 

Türkiye remained critically important  actor in the Syrian  crisis  and shares with  the  EU the 
objective  of  achieving  a  stable  and  prosperous  Syria,  in  the  first  place  through  the 
implementation of UNSCR 2254. While in the past Turkish approach was more similar to the 
EU’s  position,  that  of  exercising  and  maintaining  pressure  on  Damascus,  since  December 
2022  Türkiye  has  become  involved  in  a  series  of  meetings,  encouraged  and  facilitated  by 
Russia, with the Syrian regime. These culminated in a quadripartite meeting of the Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Türkiye, Iran and the Syrian regime in Moscow in May 2023. 
Türkiye still maintains a military presence in parts of northern Syria and resumed significant 
military  cross-border  operations  into  northern  Syria  in  November  2022.  Following  the 
February  earthquakes,  two  additional  crossing  points  on  the  Turkish  border  temporarily 
opened to allow humanitarian aid into the quake-stricken northwest of Syria. 

Regarding relations with Libya, Türkiye advocated for an agreement in the framework of the 
Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process and supported the efforts of the new UNSG 
Special Representative to hold national elections in 2023. Based on the 2019 Turkish-Libyan 
maritime  delimitation  agreement,  in  October  2022,  Türkiye  signed  a  Memorandum  of 
Understanding with the Libyan Government of National Unity to develop bilateral scientific, 
technical,  technological,  legal,  administrative,  and  commercial  cooperation  in  the  field  of 
hydrocarbons on land and at sea. The EU considers the Turkish-Libyan maritime agreement 
an infringement upon the sovereign rights of third states, non-compliant with the Law of the 
Sea and having no legal consequences for third states. Ankara continued to claim that the UN 
embargo  provisions,  the  articles  on  the  withdrawal  of  all  mercenaries,  foreign  fighters  and 
foreign forces from the Libyan territory, and the suspension of military training in the cease-
fire  agreement  had  no  bearing  on  the  legitimate government.  Türkiye’s  lack  of  cooperation 
continued  to  hamper  the  EU’s  efforts  to  implement  the  UN  embargo  effectively.  In  March 
2023, Türkiye, as a flag state, withheld its consent to Operation IRINI’s request to inspect a 
vessel, the tenth such incident since Operation IRINI started.  

Türkiye continued its anti-terrorism operations against PKK groups and affiliates in Iraq and 
in the semiautonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The last operation, launched in November 
2022, was strongly condemned by the Iraqi government. In August 2023, on a visit to Iraq, 
the Turkish Foreign Minister asked Iraq to designate PKK as a terrorist organisation. Türkiye 

128 

 
 
maintained  a  high-level  dialogue  with  Iran  although  some  tensions  were  noticeable  in  the 
contexts of the Syrian and north-Iraqi theatres. 

Türkiye-Armenia  normalisation  process  continued  with  regular  contacts  between  the  two 
special envoys,  although Türkiye links progress  with  developments  in  Armenia-Azerbaijan 
relations. The  Turkish  and Armenian  leaders met  for the first  time in  October 2022, in  the 
margins of the European Political Community summit and in June 2023 the Armenian Prime 
Minister  participated  in  the  inauguration  ceremony  of  the  Turkish  President.  After  three 
decades,  in  February  2023,  the  Türkiye-Armenia  border  reopened  temporarily  to  facilitate 
the  passage  of  Armenian  humanitarian  aid  transports  to  the  quake-struck  Turkish  region, 
followed  by  a  visit  of  the  Armenian  Foreign  Minister  to  Türkiye.  Direct  cargo  flights 
between the two countries started in January 2023 but were interrupted a few months later. 
As regards the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, while voicing support to the peace 
negotiations,  Türkiye  expressed  full  support  to  the  military  actions  undertaken  by 
Azerbaijan both in September 2022 and in September 2023. Türkiye continued maintaining 
a  very  close  relationship  with  Azerbaijan,  ensuring  a  strong  collaboration  and  continuous 
consultation on the normalisation process with Armenia. The two countries had regular high-
level visits and consultations, and held joint military exercises. Türkiye extended by one year 
the deployment  of a small military contingent  to Azerbaijan, in  the framework of the joint 
Russian-Turkish  monitoring  centre  established  in  Aghdman  after  the  November  2020 
Tripartite Statement signed by Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia to monitor the  ceasefire in 
the  Nagorno-Karabakh  conflict  zone.  Türkiye  supports  the  construction  of  a  transport 
corridor  to  Azerbaijan  via  Armenia  and  emphasises  energy  and  trade  cooperation,  vocally 
supporting prospects for connectivity as means to ensure peace and prosperity of the region. 
Türkiye, Azerbaijan and Georgia also cooperate through a trilateral platform, the last edition 
of which was held in February 2023 in the format of Defence Ministers.  

In Central Asia, EU and Türkiye policies converged to some extent. Türkiye attached great 
importance  to  connectivity  and  maintained  close  relations  with  the  countries  in  the  region. 
Türkiye and Kazakhstan further developed their cooperation in the defence industry sector. 
Türkiye  and  Turkmenistan  focused  on  the  possible  transportation  of  Turkmen  gas  to 
Western  markets.  At  the  invitation  of  Uzbekistan,  Türkiye  participated  as  a  guest  in  the 
Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation regional security group 
summit  in  September  2022.  The  Turkish  President  attended  the  9th  Summit  of  the 
Organisation  of  the  Turkic  States  (OTS)  in  Samarkand  in  November  2022,  and  held  an 
Extraordinary Summit of the Heads of State of OTS in Ankara in March 2023.  

Türkiye’s  relations  with  Pakistan  remained  strong,  with  regular  high-level  exchanges.  In 
August 2022, Türkiye and Pakistan signed a preferential trade agreement offering each other 
concessions  on  tariff  lines.  Türkiye  increasingly  became  an  important  source  of  military 
equipment,  notably  for  the  Pakistani  marine.  Türkiye  maintained  a  pragmatic  approach  on 
Afghanistan,  holding  regular  talks  with  the  Taliban  de  facto  authorities,  hosting  Afghan 
political  opponents  without  facilitating  the  formation  of  a  joint  opposition  or  armed 
resistance, and increasing trade. Türkiye continued sending humanitarian aid to Afghanistan 
and kept operating the Maarif schools.  

Türkiye systematically focused on development opportunities in Asia through its Asia Anew 
Initiative and becoming the axis connecting Asia to Europe. Türkiye is part of the multilateral 
Middle  Corridor  Initiative,  which  aims  to  develop  connections  with  China  via  Türkiye,  the 
Caucasus  and  Central  Asia,  in  synergy  with  the  Chinese  Belt  and  Road  Initiative.  On  the       
sidelines  of  the  Shanghai  Cooperation  Organisation  regional  security  group  Summit  in 
September  2022,  the  Turkish  President  met  with  his  Chinese  counterpart  and  agreed  to 

129 

 
 
elevate their strategic cooperation to a higher level. Türkiye continued to strengthen its trade 
ties  with  China,  its  second  biggest  trading  partner.  Türkiye  continued  to  voice  its  views 
regarding the treatment of the Uyghurs, a Turkic ethnic group in China, but in a less visible 
manner than before. Türkiye and Indonesia agreed to further enhance their bilateral relations 
and announced the formation of a High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council during the visit 
of the Turkish President in the margins of the G-20 Summit in November 2022. The Turkish 
President and the Prime Minister of India met in September 2022 and September 2023 and 
discussed ways to deepen the bilateral cooperation.  

Türkiye maintained its diplomatic engagement with countries of  Latin America, aiming  to 
expand  and  strengthen  the  political  relations.  Türkiye  pursued  its  active  policies  in  Africa, 
maintaining strong ties in particular with Somalia in the Horn of Africa. Türkiye maintained 
a balanced position between the warring parties in the Sudanese conflict.  

130 

 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX I – RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND TÜRKIYE  

Within the framework of accession negotiations, 16 chapters have been opened so far and one 
of  these  was  provisionally  closed.  In  December  2022,  the  Council  of  the  European  Union 
reiterated  its  position  of  June  2018  that  Türkiye  continues  to  move  further  away  from  the 
European Union and that accession negotiations with the country are therefore at a standstill 
and no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing.  

The European Council has repeated that the EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure 
environment  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  and  in  the  development  of  a  cooperative  and 
mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye. The EU is ready to engage with Türkiye in a 
phased, proportionate and reversible manner to enhance cooperation in a number of areas of 
common  interest,  subject  to  the  established  conditionalities  set  out  in  European  Council 
conclusions. In case of renewed unilateral actions or provocations in breach of international 
law,  the  EU  will  use  all  the  instruments  and  the  options  at  its  disposal,  including  in 
accordance with Article 29 TEU and Article 215 TFEU, in order to defend its interests and 
those of its Member States. The European Council in June 2022 also recalled that it expects 
Türkiye  to  fully  respect  international  law,  to  de-escalate  tensions  in  the  interest  of  regional 
stability  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean,  and  to  promote  good-neighbourly  relations  in  a 
sustainable  way.  With  its  June  2023  conclusions,  the  European  Council  reconfirmed  its 
commitment  to  a  comprehensive  settlement  of  the  Cyprus  problem,  within  the  UN 
framework, in accordance with the relevant UNSC resolutions and in line with the principles 
on  which  the  EU  is  founded  and  the  acquis.  It  also  called  for  the  speedy  resumption  of 
negotiations and stated that the EU is ready to play an active role in supporting all stages of 
the UN-led process, with all appropriate means at its disposal. The European Council in June 
2023 invited the High Representative and the Commission to submit a report to the European 
Council on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations, building on the instruments and options 
identified by the European Council and with a view to proceeding in a strategic and forward-
looking manner. 

The  Council  adopted  conclusions  in  July  2019,  as  a  response  to  Türkiye’s  unauthorised 
drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. In November 2022, following the third annual 
review  of  the  framework  for  restrictive  measures  in  response  to  Türkiye’s  unauthorised 
drilling  activities  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean,  the  European  Council  extended  the  regime 
for  a  further  year,  until  12  November  2023.  Currently,  two  individuals  are  subject  to 
sanctions.   

Reforms and developments in Türkiye continued to be monitored by the bodies set up under 
the  Association  Agreement,  with  subcommittees  kept  being  held  throughout  the  reporting 
period. High-level engagement continued in areas of joint interest in the second half of 2022.  

Türkiye  is  the  EU’s  seventh  largest  trading  partner,  while  the  EU  is  Türkiye’s  largest, 
representing  more  than  one  third  of  Turkish  trade  and  its  main  source  of  investment. 
Türkiye’s exports to the EU amounted to EUR 98.68 billion in 2022 and imports from the EU 
amounted to EUR 99.65 billion.  

In  May  2023,  Türkiye  participated  in  the  annual  economic  policy  dialogue  between  the 
representatives  of  the  EU  Member  States,  the  Western  Balkans  and  Türkiye,  the  European 
Commission and the European Central Bank, as well as representatives of the central banks 
of the Western Balkans and Türkiye. The dialogue aims to prepare the future participation in 
the  European  Semester  of  the  Western  Balkans  and  Türkiye.  The  EU  and  Türkiye  also 
continue to coordinate in the framework of the G-20.  

131 

 
 
Regarding  the  Customs  Union,  the  Commission  recommended  opening  negotiations  with 
Türkiye on the modernisation of the Customs Union in December 2016. In March 2021, the 
EU  Leaders  invited  the  Commission  to  intensify  talks  with  Türkiye  to  address  current 
difficulties in the implementation of the Customs Union, ensuring its effective application to 
all  Member  States,  and  invited  in  parallel  the  Council  to  work  on  a  mandate  for  the 
modernisation of the Customs Union. Such a mandate may be adopted by the Council subject 
to  additional  guidance  by  the  European  Council.  The  Commission  continued  intensified 
engagement with Türkiye to discuss issues hampering the smooth functioning of the Customs 
Union. The European Commission and Türkiye continue their engagement on the EU Green 
Deal.  

In  the  area  of  visa,  migration  and  asylum,  the  implementation  of  the  March  2016  EU-
Turkey  Statement  has  continued  to  deliver  concrete  results  in  reducing  irregular  and 
dangerous crossings on the Eastern Mediterranean route to Europe and in saving lives at sea. 
Türkiye  sustained  its  considerable  efforts  to  provide  significant  support  to    3.6  million 
refugees,  of  which  3.3  million  Syrians  (as  of  September  2023).  In  the  context  of  the  EU-
Türkiye  visa  liberalisation  dialogue,  no  outstanding  visa  liberalisation  benchmarks  were 
fulfilled. An international agreement on the exchange of personal data between Europol and 
the  Turkish  authorities  competent  for  fighting  serious  crime  and  terrorism  is  yet  to  be 
concluded. The Council of December 2022 recalled that the full and effective implementation 
of the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement and cooperation in the area of justice and home 
affairs with all EU Member States remain essential.  

Türkiye and the EU continued to have fruitful cooperation for supporting refugees in Türkiye. 
Out  of  the  almost  EUR  10  billion  in  EU  support  to  refugees  allocated  since  2011,  EUR 
6 billion  were  provided  under  the  Facility  for  Refugees  in  Turkey.  The  full  operational 
budget  of  the  Facility  was  contracted  by  the  end  of  2020.  Facility  funding  continued  to 
support  projects  focused  on  humanitarian  assistance,  education,  migration  management, 
health,  municipal  infrastructure,  and  socio-economic  support.  Over  2  million  refugees, 
including those most vulnerable, continue to receive basic needs support and close to 774 390 
refugee  children  are  enrolled  in  school  with  Facility  and  post-Facility  support.  Other 
achievements of the Facility include the construction of 160 new schools (out of a target of 
348) and delivering over 30.3 million primary health care consultations. After bridge funding 
of  EUR  535  million  in  2020,  the  Commission  continued  implementation  of  an  additional 
package  of  EUR  3  billion  covering  the  2021-2023  period  requested  by  the  Council.  This 
additional funding continues providing support, in particular in key areas such as basic needs, 
health care and education, border management, and protection and socio-economic support. 
Overall, some EUR 7 billion has been disbursed by September 2023. 

Regarding bilateral  financial assistance, projects under the Instrument for Pre-accession 
Assistance (IPA) for Türkiye continued to be implemented, in compliance with the political 
guidance of the EU Budgetary Authority. Financial assistance under the IPA III focuses on 
priorities linked to the fundamental pillars of the enlargement strategy and sectors of common 
strategic interest, mainly related to the green, connectivity and digitalisation agendas, as well 
as on building more resilient and more sustainable economies and societies.  

Following  the  February  2023  earthquakes,  the  Commission  rapidly  deployed  humanitarian 
and  relief  support  to  Türkiye.  It  also  hosted,  together  with  the  Swedish  Presidency  of  the 
Council of the EU, an International Donors' Conference for the people in Türkiye and Syria 
on 20 March, where it pledged EUR 1 billion for the people in Türkiye. Beyond immediate 
relief  and  humanitarian  assistance,  the  EU  will  also  provide  longer  term  reconstruction 
assistance. Assistance will be mobilised for the benefit of the population in Türkiye affected 

132 

 
 
by  the  earthquakes,  including  refugees  and  their  host  communities,  covering  the  areas  of 
health,  education,  socioeconomic  support, 
job  creation  and  recovery  of  municipal 
infrastructure, notably water and sanitation.  

Türkiye has expressed interest to participate in a number of  EU programmes in the period 
2021-2027 and has signed association agreements for its participation in Erasmus+, Horizon 
Europe,  the  European  Solidarity  Corps  programme,  the  Customs  programme,  the  Single 
Market  Programme  (small  and  medium  size  enterprises  (SME)  component)  and  the  Digital 
Europe  Programme.  Negotiations  on  association  agreements  for  the  participation  in  other 
programmes  continue.  Türkiye  participates  in  the  European  Environmental  Agency,  the 
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction and the Union Civil Protection 
Mechanism. The Turkey Investment Platform (TIP) under the European Fund for Sustainable 
Development  Plus  Instrument  (EFSD+)  will  enable  stronger  EU  support  to  investments 
through guarantee programmes in  the three overarching  policy priorities, namely the Green 
Deal,  global  gateways  as  well  as  jobs  and  growth.  To  facilitate  progress  on  sustainable 
development  in  the country, Türkiye is  participating  as an observer in  a  pilot  project  under 
the Technical Support Instrument. 

133 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STATISTICAL DATA (as of 31/08/2023) 
Türkiye 

Basic data 
Population (thousand) 
Total area of the country (km²) 

National accounts 
Gross domestic product (GDP) (million national currency) 
Gross domestic product (GDP) (million euro) 
GDP (euro per capita) 
GDP per capita (in purchasing power standards (PPS)) 
GDP per capita (in PPS), relative to the EU average (EU-27 = 100) 
Real GDP growth rate: change on previous year of GDP volume (%) 
Employment growth (national accounts data), relative to the previous year (%) 
Labour productivity growth: growth in GDP (in volume) per person employed, relative to the 
previous year (%) 
Unit labour cost growth, relative to the previous year (%) 
**3 year change (T/T-3) in the nominal unit labour cost growth index (2015 = 100) 
Labour productivity per person employed: GDP (in PPS) per person employed relative to EU 
average (EU-27 = 100) 
Gross value added by main sectors 
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 
Industry (%) 
Construction (%) 
Services (%) 
Final consumption expenditure, as a share of GDP (%) 
Gross fixed capital formation, as a share of GDP (%) 
Changes in inventories, as a share of GDP (%) 
Exports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 
Imports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 
Gross fixed capital formation by the general government sector, as a percentage of GDP (%) 

Note 

1) 

Note 

2010 
72 561 s 
785 347 w 

2017 
79 815 s 
780 270 sw 

2018 
80 811 s 
779 972 w 

2019 
82 004 bs 
779 972 w 

2020 
83 155 s 
779 972 w 

2021 
83 614 s 
779 972 w 

2010 
1 167 665 
584 856 
8 000 
13 127 
52.7 
8.4 
: 
: 

2017 
3 133 704 
760 497 
9 470 
19 363 
66.0 
7.5 
: 
: 

2018 
3 758 774 
658 544 
8 090 
19 177 
63.3 
3.0 
: 
: 

2019 
4 311 733 
678 180 
8 210 
18 481 
59.0 
0.8 
: 
: 

2020 
5 048 220 
626 742 
7 520 
18 325 
61.0 
1.9 
: 
: 

2021 
7 248 789 
689 547 
8 190 
20 337 
62.7 
11.4 
: 
: 

: 
: 
: 

10.2 
21.0 
6.9 
62.0 s 
77.6 
24.6 
2.1 
21.2 
25.5 
: 

: 
: 
: 

6.8 
23.3 
9.6 
60.3 s 
73.0 
29.9 
0.8 
26.0 
29.7 
: 

: 
: 
: 

6.4 
24.9 
7.9 
60.7 s 
70.9 
29.7 
-  0.3 
31.2 
31.4 
: 

: 
: 
: 

7.1 
24.3 
6.0 
62.7 s 
72.4 
25.9 
-  0.7 
32.5 
30.2 
: 

: 
: 
: 

7.5 
25.6 
5.9 
61.0 s 
71.9 
27.4 
4.1 
28.7 
32.2 
: 

: 
: 
: 

6.2 
29.1 
5.7 
59.1 s 
68.4 
28.1 
3.7 
35.3 
35.5 
: 

Business 
Industrial production volume index (2015 = 100) 
Number of active enterprises (number) 
Birth rate: number of enterprise births in the reference period (t) divided by the number of 
enterprises active in t (%) 
Death rate: number of enterprise deaths in the reference period (t) divided by the number of 
enterprises active in t (%) 

Note 

2010 
69.8 
2 678 787 w 
: 

2017 
112.7 
3 100 412 w 
14.1 

2018 
114.2 
3 160 371 w 
13.3 

2019 
113.6 
3 228 421 w 
12.9 

2020 
115.4 
3 304 088 w 
14.7 

2021 
135.6 
3 578 931 w 
: 

12.8 

12.1 

11.5 

: 

: 

: 

134 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
People employed in SMEs as a share of all persons employed (within the non-financial 
business economy) (%) 
Value added by SMEs (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) 
Total value added (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) 

77.6 sw 

74.2 sw 

74.4 sw 

73.8 sw 

73.9 sw 

74.0 sw 

2) 
2) 

84 181 sw 
153 453 w 

127 683 sw 
236 088 w 

106 199 sw 
202 005 w 

110 591 sw 
208 171 w 

95 660 sw 
181 250 sw 

88 925 psw 
178 072 psw 

Inflation rate and house prices 
Consumer price index (CPI), change relative to the previous year (%) 
**Annual change in the deflated house price index (2015 = 100) 

Balance of payments 
Balance of payments: current account total (million euro) 
Balance of payments current account: trade balance (million euro) 
Balance of payments current account: net services (million euro) 
Balance of payments current account: net balance for primary income (million euro) 
Balance of payments current account: net balance for secondary income (million euro) 
Net balance for primary and secondary income: of which government transfers (million euro) 
**3 year backward moving average of the current account balance relative to GDP (%) 
**Five year change in share of world exports of goods and services (%) 
Net balance (inward - outward) of foreign direct investment (FDI) (million euro) 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) abroad (million euro) 
of which FDI of the reporting economy in the EU-27 countries (million euro) 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in the reporting economy (million euro) 
of which FDI of the EU-27 countries in the reporting economy (million euro) 
**Net international investment position, relative to GDP (%) 
Year on year rate of change in gross inflow of remittances (in national currency) from migrant 
workers (%) 

Public finance 
General government deficit / surplus, relative to GDP (%) 
General government gross debt relative to GDP (%) 
Total  government revenues, as a percentage of GDP (%) 
Total government expenditure, as a percentage of GDP (%) 

Financial indicators 
Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to GDP (%) 
Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to total exports (%) 
Money supply: M1 (banknotes, coins, overnight deposits, million euro) 
Money supply: M2 (M1 plus deposits with maturity up to two years, million euro) 
Money supply: M3 (M2 plus marketable instruments, million euro) 

Note 

Note 

3) 4) 
3) 4) 
3) 4) 
3) 4) 
3) 4) 

5) 

Note 

Note 
3) 

2010 
8.6 d 
: 

2017 
11.1 d 
: 

2018 
16.3 d 
: 

2019 
15.2 d 
: 

2020 
12.3 d 
: 

2021 
19.6 d 
: 

2010 
- 34 121.9 
- 42 605.3 
12 688.0 
- 5 436.3 
1 231.7 
425.9 
: 
: 
5 745.6 w 
1 117.9 w 
430.1 w 
6 863.5 w 
3 878.8 w 
-  46.7 w 
0.2 sw 

2010 
-  2.8 w 
: 
32.6 w 
35.3 w 

2017 
- 35 995.3 
- 51 370.2 
22 968.3 
- 9 811.8 
2 218.4 
1 644.7 
-  3.8 
6.8 
7 444.8 s 
2 321.7 
713.8 
9 766.5 
2 555.0 
-  51.5 w 
0.1 sw 

2017 
-  2.8 w 
28.0 w 
31.2 w 
34.0 w 

2018 
- 17 585.8 
- 33 861.9 
25 774.4 
- 10 144.2 
651.9 
223.5 
-  3.5 
5.6 
7 805.3 s 
3 049.7 
1 716.7 
10 855.0 
3 094.7 
-  42.2 w 
0.1 sw 

2018 
-  2.9 w 
30.2 w 
31.8 w 
34.7 w 

2019 
9 696.1 
- 15 027.1 
34 541.0 
- 10 590.5 
781.2 
547.5 
-  2.0 
8.8 
5 978.0 s 
2 653.2 
1 266.9 
8 631.2 
1 174.7 
-  40.7 w 
0.0 sw 

2019 
-  4.4 w 
32.7 w 
31.0 w 
35.4 w 

2020 
- 28 125.9 
- 33 199.4 
12 476.9 
- 7 560.4 
149.4 
90.9 
-  1.9 
-  2.0 
3 942.6 s 
2 829.2 
1 065.9 
6 771.8 
1 206.5 
-  53.9 w 
0.0 sw 

2020 
-  4.7 w 
39.8 w 
31.2 w 
35.9 w 

2021 
- 5 958.1 
- 24 845.2 
27 103.6 
- 9 012.0 
792.9 
355.2 
-  1.3 
7.4 
5 832.2 s 
4 204.1 
1 748.6 
10 036.3 
2 349.1 
-  31.7 w 
0.0 sw 

2021 
: 
: 
: 
: 

2010 
39.7 sw 
196.1 w 
65 975.6 w 
286 594.7 w 
300 181.9 w 

2017 
52.5 sw 
202.0 w 
99 086.3 w 
357 980.4 w 
370 715.7 w 

2018 
54.8 sw 
179.0 w 
84 551.5 w 
321 665.4 w 
330 910.9 w 

2019 
54.7 sw 
166.6 w 
108 083.1 w 
367 703.3 w 
384 079.8 w 

2020 
60.4 sw 
209.3 w 
135 348.7 w 
369 288.3 w 
379 878.0 w 

2021 
54.3 sw 
154.7 w 
143 842.8 w 
347 910.9 w 
354 818.1 w 

135 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total credit by monetary financial institutions to residents (consolidated) (million euro) 
**Annual change in financial sector liabilities (%) 
**Private credit flow, consolidated, relative to GDP (%) 
**Private debt, consolidated, relative to GDP (%) 
Interest rates: day-to-day money rate, per annum (%) 
Lending interest rate (one year), per annum (%) 
Deposit interest rate (one year), per annum (%) 
Euro exchange rates: average of period (1 euro = … national currency) 
Trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries (2015 = 100) 
**3 year change (T/T-3) in the trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries 
(2015 = 100) 
Value of reserve assets (including gold) (million euro) 

6) 7) 

7) 
8) 

282 814.2 
: 
12.3 w 
56 
6.59 
12.56 w 
8.97 w 
1.997 
153.2 
0.0 sw 

377 583.0 
31.4 
15.0 w 
84 
11.58 
18.12 w 
13.53 w 
4.121 
75.9 
- 0.3 sw 

349 848.6 
18.2 
-  2.9 w 
82 
17.76 
28.96 w 
22.31 w 
5.708 
55.7 
- 0.4 sw 

409 716.3 
11.8 
4.2 w 
80 
20.52 
15.86 w 
14.56 w 
6.358 
49.7 
- 0.5 sw 

408 386.7 
38.9 
13.0 w 
89 
10.85 
16.25 w 
13.51 w 
8.055 
40.2 
- 0.5 sw 

397 220.1 
50.1 
7.6 w 
89 
17.87 
22.79 w 
17.85 w 
10.512 
30.6 
- 0.5 sw 

3) 

64 847.2 w 

95 361.6 w 

78 770.5 w 

94 413.6 w 

81 937.5 w 

94 006.1 w 

External trade in goods 
Value of imports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 
Value of exports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 
Trade balance: all goods, all partners (million euro) 
Terms of trade (export price index / import price index * 100) (number) 
Share of exports to EU-27 countries in value of total exports (%) 
Share of imports from EU-27 countries in value of total imports (%) 

Demography 
Crude rate of natural change of population (natural growth rate): number of births minus 
deaths (per thousand inhabitants) 
Infant mortality rate deaths of children under one year of age (per thousand live births) 
Life expectancy at birth: male (years) 
Life expectancy at birth: female (years) 

Labour market 
Economic activity rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that 
is economically active (%) 
*Employment rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that are 
in employment (%) 
Male employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 

Female employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 

Employment rate for persons aged 55–64: proportion of the population aged 55–64 that are 
in employment (%) 
Employment by main sectors 

Note 

9) 

Note 

Note 
10) 
11) 
10) 
11) 
10) 
11) 
10) 
11) 

10) 
11) 

2010 
138 720 
85 298 
- 53 422 
: 
40.0 s 
36.5 s 

2017 
207 000 
139 229 
- 67 771 
98.1 sw 
40.9 s 
33.6 s 

2010 
11.8 

12.0 
74.2 
79.4 

2010 
55.9 

50.0 

72.7 

28.0 

29.6 

2017 
10.8 

9.2 
75.7 
81.3 

2017 
61.9 

55.3 

76.1 

34.5 

34.4 

2018 
188 337 
142 290 
- 46 047 
94.4 sw 
43.3 s 
32.9 s 

2018 
10.1 be 

9.3 
76.2 
81.6 

2018 
62.3 

55.6 

76.0 

35.2 

35.3 

2019 
181 038 
153 201 
- 27 836 
94.5 sw 
42.2 s 
31.6 s 

2019 
9.1 be 

9.1 
76.4 
81.8 

2019 
62.2 

53.8 

73.2 

34.4 

33.6 

2020 
182 328 
140 035 
- 42 293 
98.5 sw 
41.1 s 
33.1 s 

2020 
: 

: 
: 
: 

2020 
58.7 

51.0 

70.1 

32.0 

31.1 

2021 
219 224 
180 299 
- 38 925 
85.9 sw 
41.1 s 
31.1 s 

2021 
: 

: 
: 
: 

2021 
61.2 bw 

53.9 bw 

73.6 bw 

34.1 bw 

33.4 bw 

136 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 

Industry (%) 

Construction (%) 

Services (%) 

People employed in the public sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–64 
(%) 
People employed in the private sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–64 
(%) 
Unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that is unemployed (%) 

Male unemployment rate (%) 

Female unemployment rate (%) 

Youth unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force aged 15–24 that is unemployed (%) 

Long-term unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that has been unemployed for 
12 months or more (%) 
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed at most lower secondary 
education (ISCED levels 0-2) (%) 
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed tertiary education (ISCED 
levels 5-8) (%) 

Social cohesion 
Average nominal monthly wages and salaries (national currency) 
Index of real wages and salaries (index of nominal wages and salaries divided by the 
inflation index) (2016 = 100) 
GINI coefficient 
Poverty gap 
*Early leavers from education and training: proportion of the population aged 18–24 with at 
most lower secondary education who are not in further education or training (%) 

Standard of living 
Number of passenger cars relative to population size (number per thousand population) 
Number of mobile phone subscriptions relative to population size (number per thousand 
population) 
Mobile broadband penetration (per 100 inhabitants) 
Fixed broadband penetration (per 100 inhabitants) 

137 

10) 
11) 
10) 
11) 
10) 
11) 

10) 
11) 
11) 
10) 
11) 
10) 
10) 
11) 
10) 
11) 
10) 
11) 
10) 
11) 
10) 
11) 
10) 
11) 
10) 
11) 

Note 
12) 

11) 
10) 

Note 

23.7 s 

19.4 s 

18.4 s 

18.1 s 

17.6 s 

17.2 bw 

19.9 s 

19.1 s 

19.7 s 

19.8 s 

20.5 s 

21.3 bw 

6.3 s 

7.4 s 

6.9 s 

5.5 s 

5.7 s 

6.2 bw 

50.1 s 

54.1 s 

54.9 s 

56.6 s 

56.2 s 

55.3 bw 

13.5 w 

13.3 w 

15.4 w 

16.8 w 

17.7 w 

16.9 bw 

86.5 w 

86.7 w 

84.6 w 

83.2 w 

82.3 w 

83.1 bw 

10.7 

10.4 

11.4 

19.7 

2.8 

9.2 

7.0 

2010 
1 142 w 
: 

44 
32.3 
43.1 

2010 
102.0 
837.0 w 

9.8 w 
10 w 

10.9 

9.4 

13.9 

20.5 

2.4 

8.9 

9.4 

2017 
2 287 w 
: 

43 
26.4 
32.5 

2017 
149.0 
964.0 w 

70.5 w 
15 w 

10.9 

9.6 

13.8 

20.2 

2.4 

9.1 

9.8 

2018 
2 509 w 
: 

43 
25.8 
31.0 

2018 
151.0 
977.0 w 

74.5 w 
16 w 

13.7 

12.4 

16.5 

25.2 

3.2 

12.3 

10.6 

2019 
2 857 w 
: 

42 
27.4 
28.7 

2019 
150.0 
972.0 w 

75.0 w 
17 w 

13.2 

12.4 

14.9 

25.1 

3.3 

11.8 

10.0 

2020 
3 501 w 
: 

43 
27.5 
26.7 

2020 
157.0 
982.0 w 

78.5 w 
20 w 

12.0 bw 

10.7 bw 

14.8 bw 

22.6 bw 

3.7 bw 

10.4 bw 

10.0 bw 

2021 
3 904 w 
: 

43 
27.5 
23.0 bw 

2021 
163.0 
1 019.0 w 

82.7 w 
21 w 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Infrastructure 
Density of railway network (lines in operation per thousand km²) 

Length of motorways (kilometres) 

Innovation and research 
Public expenditure on education relative to GDP (%) 
*Gross domestic expenditure on R&D relative to GDP (%) 
Government budget appropriations or outlays on R&D (GBAORD), as a percentage of GDP 
(%) 
Percentage of households who have internet access at home (%) 

Environment 
*Index of greenhouse gas emissions,  CO2 equivalent (1990 = 100) 
Energy intensity of the economy (kg of oil equivalent per 1 000 euro GDP at 2015 constant 
prices) 
Electricity generated from renewable sources relative to gross electricity consumption (%) 
Road share of inland freight transport (based on tonne-km) (%) 

Energy 
Primary production of all energy products (thousand TOE) 
Primary production of crude oil (thousand TOE) 
Primary production of solid fuels (thousand TOE) 
Primary production of gas (thousand TOE) 
Net imports of all energy products (thousand TOE) 
Gross inland energy consumption (thousand TOE) 
Gross electricity generation (GWh) 

Agriculture 
Agricultural production volume index of goods and services (at producer prices) (2010 = 100) 
Utilised agricultural area (thousand hectares) 
Livestock numbers: live bovine animals (thousand heads, end of period) 
Livestock numbers: live swine (thousand heads, end of period) 
Livestock numbers: live sheep and live goats (thousand heads, end of period) 
Raw milk available on farms (thousand tonnes) 
Harvested crop production: cereals (including rice) (thousand tonnes) 
Harvested crop production: sugar beet (thousand tonnes) 
Harvested crop production: vegetables (thousand tonnes) 

Source: Eurostat and/or the statistical authorities in Türkiye 

138 

Note 
13) 
14) 

Note 

Note 

Note 

Note 

2010 
12.2 sw 

2017 
13.1 s 

2018 
13.2 s 

2019 
13.3 s 

2020 
13.3 sw 

2021 
13.5 sw 

2 080 

2 657 

2 842 

3 060 

3 523 

3 532 

2010 
: 
0.79 
0.36 

41.6 

2010 
181.4 w 
191.5 

26.5 w 
94.3 w 

2010 
31 412 
2 478 
16 741 
562 
74 712 s 
105 375 
211 097 

2010 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
32 773.0 
17 942.0 
: 

2017 
4.4 
0.95 
0.34 

80.7 

2017 
240.4 w 
175.3 

29.4 w 
95.4 w 

2017 
36 466 
2 695 
15 682 
292 
116 755 s 
150 445 
296 429 

2017 
: 
38 120.0 
16 105.0 p 
: 
44 312.3 s 
: 
36 598.8 
21 149.0 
30 826.0 

2018 
4.3 
1.03 
0.35 

83.8 

2018 
238.5 w 
167.7 

32.2 w 
94.8 w 

2018 
39 909 
3 010 
16 547 
351 
109 980 s 
148 120 
303 852 

2018 
: 
38 239.0 
17 220.9 p 
: 
46 117.4 s 
: 
34 705.8 
18 900.0 
29 987.0 

2019 
4.4 
1.06 
0.35 

88.3 

2019 
231.2 w 
168.6 

43.6 w 
94.8 w 

2019 
45 134 
3 102 
17 429 
390 
105 649 s 
150 123 
302 796 

2019 
: 
37 712.0 
17 872.3 
: 
48 481.5 s 
: 
35 202.1 
18 055.0 
31 041.0 

2020 
4.0 
1.09 
0.28 

90.7 

2020 
238.4 w 
162.7 

41.9 w 
94.6 w 

2020 
43 636 
3 274 
15 006 
363 
104 983 s 
148 064 
305 426 

2020 
: 
37 747.0 
18 158.0 
: 
54 112.6 s 
: 
38 050.8 
23 026.0 
31 120.0 

2021 
3.5 sw 
1.13 
0.28 

92.0 

2021 
: 
159.7 

35.6 w 
95.6 w 

2021 
46 208 
3 518 
17 151 
324 
115 096 s 
161 774 
333 412 

2021 
: 
38 038.0 
18 036.1 
: 
57 519.2 s 
: 
32 602.0 
18 250.0 
31 691.0 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
: = not available 
  b = break in series 
  d =  definition differs 
  e = estimated value 
  p = provisional 

s = Eurostat estimate 

  w= data supplied by and under the responsibility of the national statistical authority and published on an "as is" basis and without any assurance as regards their quality 

and adherence to EU statistical methodology 
* = Europe 2020 indicator 
** = Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) indicator 

 Footnotes: 

1) Area values are calculated by reference to corine classifications and adapted to LUCAS. Corine data production period is 6 years. 

2) Data converted in EUR by Eurostat 
3) Average of year exchange rate used to convert to euros. 
4) Based on BPM6. 
5) Average of year exchange rate used to convert to Turkish Lira. 
6) Data cover debt securities and loans. 
7) Updated values. 
8) Average of monthly data. Overnight deposit facility. 
9) With the January 2021 press release, foreign trade statistics according to the general trade system were used in the calculation of the indices and the base year was updated as 

2015=100. Data are given as of January 2013. Since the indices based on 2015=100 are not withdrawn annually, the requested data cannot be provided. 
Indices are calculated with Fisher index formula and 2015=100. 

10) *In HLFS, the series is not comparable to previous years due to the adjustments in the definition, scope and design  of the survey with the year 2021. 

11) Annual LFS results. 
12) Source: Income and Living Conditions Survey. 
13) Main lines only. 
14) Main lines only. 

Area values are calculated by reference to corine classifications and adapted to LUCAS. Corine data production period is 6 years. 

139 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
140