Opinion of the European Central Bank of 20 October 2023 on the establishment of a macroprudential committee (CON/2023/32)
Date: 2023-10-20
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: banking supervision, financial stability, institutional activity, legal basis

EN 

ECB-PUBLIC 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 20 October 2023  

on the establishment of a macroprudential committee 

(CON/2023/32) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On 22 September 2023 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Italian Ministry of 

Economy  and  Finance  for  an  opinion  on  a  draft  legislative  decree  implementing  Recommendation 

ESRB/2011/3 on the macroprudential mandate of national authorities and implementing Articles 23-ter (7) 

and  28(2)  of  Regulation  (EU)  2016/1011,  as  amended  by  Regulation  (EU)  2021/1681  (hereinafter  the 

‘draft decree’).  

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 

Functioning  of  the  European  Union  and  the  third  and  sixth  indents  of  Article 2(1)  of  Council  Decision 

98/415/EC2, as the draft decree relates to the Banca d’Italia and rules applicable to financial institutions 

insofar  as  they materially influence the  stability of financial institutions and  markets. In accordance with 

the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing 

Council has adopted this opinion. 

1. 

Purpose of the draft decree 

1.1  The  draft  decree  establishes  a  Macroprudential  Policy  Committee  (hereinafter  the  ‘Committee’). 

The  Committee  is  without  legal  personality  and  is  established  as  an  independent  authority 

designated  under  Recommendation  ESRB/2011/3  of  the  European  Systemic  Risk  Board3.  In 

pursuing its objectives, the Committee acts independently. 

1.2  The Committee is to be comprised of the Governor of the Banca d’Italia, who chairs the Committee, 

the  President  of  the  Commissione  Nazionale  per  le  Società  e  la  Borsa  (CONSOB,  National 

Companies  and  Stock  Exchange  Commission),  the  President  of  the  Istituto  per  la  vigilanza  sulle 

assicurazioni (IVASS, Institute for Insurance Supervision) and the President of the Commissione di 

vigilanza  sui  fondi  pensione  (COVIP,  Commission  for  the  Supervision  of  Pension  Funds), 

representing  the  respective  authorities.  The  Director-General  of  the  Treasury  participates  in  the 

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Schema di decreto legislativo per il recepimento della raccomandazione CERS/2011/3 del Comitato europeo per il 
rischio  sistemico,  del  22  dicembre  2011,  relativa  al  mandato  macroprudenziale  delle  autorità  nazionali,  e  per 
l’attuazione degli articoli 23-ter, paragrafo 7, e 28, paragrafo 2, del regolamento (UE) n. 2016/1011, come modificato 
dal regolamento (UE) n. 2021/168. 
Council  Decision  98/415/EC  of  29 June  1998  on  the  consultation  of  the  European  Central  Bank  by  national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 
Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk Board of 22 December 2011 on the macroprudential mandate of 
national authorities (ESRB/2011/3) (OJ C 41, 14.2.2012, p.1). 

 
 
 
 
 
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Committee’s meetings, without the right to vote. The Committee Chair, also on a proposal from the 

other participants, may invite third parties to attend meetings for advisory purposes, with regard to 

specific items on the agenda.  

1.3  The Banca d’Italia acts as the secretariat of the Committee.  

1.4  The Committee meets at least twice a year. The Chair convenes the Committee, sets its agenda 

and proposes its activities and tasks. The decisions and minutes of the Committee are to be made 

public unless the Committee considers that this entails risks to financial stability. 

1.5  Recommendations,  and  opinions  and  reports  issued  on  the  Committee’s  own  initiative  are 

approved  with  the  consent  or  abstention  of  the  authority  to  which  the  recommendation  is 

addressed, or of the authority which has specific competence in the area which is the main subject 

of the report or opinion.  

1.6  The Committee may inter alia identify, analyse, classify, monitor and assess risks to the stability of 

the financial system as a whole; share with the authorities the data and information necessary for 

the  exercise  of  their  tasks;  define  indicators  for  monitoring  systemic  risk  and  for  using 

macroprudential  tools;  define  and  pursue  intermediate  strategies  and  objectives  in  relation  to 

events threatening financial stability, as well as the prevention of systemic risks, thereby promoting 

a sustainable contribution from the financial sector to economic growth; issue warnings in relation 

to  systemic  risk  which  are  to  be  made  public;  address  recommendations  to  the  Banca  d’Italia, 

CONSOB,  IVASS  and  COVIP,  each  of  which  is  required  to  explain  when  and  why  these 

recommendations have not been implemented; issue reports to the Parliament, Government, other 

authorities,  public  bodies  and  State  bodies  whose  purpose  is  to  adopt  measures,  including 

legislation, and express opinions, where requested or on its own initiative, on draft legislative acts 

relevant to its objectives; develop methodologies and procedures to identify systemically important 

financial  institutions,  without  prejudice  to  the  relevant  powers  of  the  individual  authorities 

participating in the Committee under their respective sectoral regulations. 

1.7  The  Committee  has  the  power  to  request  all  necessary  data  and  information  from  private  and 

public entities carrying out, individually or together, economic activities relevant to financial stability. 

1.8  The  draft  decree  stipulates  that  entities  supervised  by  the  Banca  d’Italia,  CONSOB,  IVASS  and 

COVIP  that  fail  to  comply  with  the  obligation  to  provide  information,  and  in  accordance  with  the 

respective  sector-based  legislation,  will  be  subject  to  financial  administrative  penalties4.  For  non-

supervised  entities  that  fail  to  comply  with  the  obligation  to  provide  the  information  required5,  the 

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These penalties are laid down in Article 144(1) of Legislative Decree No 385 of 1 September 1993 (hereinafter the 
‘Consolidated  Banking  Law’,  Testo  unico  delle  leggi  in  materia  bancaria  e  creditizia  di  cui  al  decreto  legislativo  1 
settembre  1993,  n.  385);  in  Article  190(1)  of  the  Consolidated  Law  on  Financial  Intermediation  laid  down  in 
Legislative  Decree  No  58  of  24  February  1998  (Testo  unico  delle  disposizioni  in  materia  di  intermediazione 
finanziaria di cui al decreto legislativo 24 febbraio 1998, n. 58); in Article 310(1) of the Private Insurance Code laid 
down  in  Legislative  Decree  No  209  of  7  September  2005  (Codice  delle  assicurazioni  private  di  cui  al  decreto 
legislativo  7  settembre  2005,  n.  209);  and  in  Article  19-quater(2)(a)  of  Legislative  Decree  No  252  of  5  December 
2005  regulating  supplementary  pension  schemes  (Disciplina  delle  forme  pensionistiche  complementari,  decreto 
legislativo 5 dicembre 2005, n. 252). 
Pursuant to Article 1(5), third sentence, of the draft decree. 

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Banca  d’Italia  will  apply  a  financial  administrative  penalty  ranging  from  EUR  5,000  to  EUR  5 

million6.  

1.9  The  Committee  cooperates  with  the  European  Systemic  Risk  Board  (ESRB)  and  the  ECB  in 

exercising  its  macroprudential  tasks  and  with  macroprudential  authorities  from  other  EU  Member 

States, including through the exchange of information, to facilitate their respective tasks. 

1.10  Data and information acquired by the Committee are to be covered by the obligation of professional 

secrecy.  Professional  secrecy,  however,  does  not  prevent  the  sharing  of  data  and  information 

among the Committee and its participants. 

1.11  The Committee must submit to the Government and the Chambers an annual report on its activities 

by 31 March of the year following the reference year.  

1.12  Article  2  of  the  draft  decree  provides  that  IVASS  may  exercise  its  supervisory  powers  for 

macroprudential purposes on the basis of recommendations issued by the Committee. 

2. 

General observations 

2.1  The  ECB  welcomes  that  the  draft  decree  establishes  a  national  macroprudential  Committee  in 

which  all  the  relevant  authorities  and  institutions  involved  in  macroprudential  policy  are 

represented,  and  that  it  defines  the  Committee’s  objectives,  mission  and  powers  in  line  with  the 

guiding  principles  expressed 

in  Recommendation  ESRB/2011/3  and  Recommendation 

ESRB/2013/1 of the European Systemic Risk Board 7. 

2.2  The  ECB  notes  that  the  legal  basis  for  the  draft  decree  is  Law  No  127  of  4  August  2022  on 

European  Delegation  (hereinafter 

the 

‘Law  on  European  Delegation’)8,  empowering 

the 

Government to implement Recommendation ESRB/2011/3, on which the ECB was not consulted. 

2.3  The Law on European Delegation contains principles and criteria on the Government’s exercise of 

the legislative power – such as on the Committee’s tasks and the leading role of the Banca d'Italia 

– together with more detailed rules, such as on how the Committee is to function.  

2.4  On  the  basis  of  the  Law  on  European  Delegation,  the  draft  decree  completes  the  institutional 

framework to allow the oversight of systemic risk at national level, especially in respect of financial 

markets  and  pension  funds,  since  CONSOB  and  COVIP  do  not  currently  have  substantive 

macroprudential powers. 

3. 

Role of the Banca d’Italia as macroprudential authority  

3.1  Central  banks  should  play  a  leading  role  in  macroprudential  oversight,  given  their  expertise  and 

existing responsibilities in the area of financial stability9. This is particularly true in the case of the 

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Breaches  of  requests  for  information  from  the  Banca  d’Italia  will  be  subject  to  Article  144-quater,  Article  145  and 
Article 145-quater of the Consolidated Banking Law, in accordance with the implementing provisions adopted by the 
Banca d’Italia. 
Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk Board of 4 April 2013 on intermediate objectives and instruments 
of macroprudential policy (ESRB/2013/1) (OJ C 170, 15.6.2013, p. 1). 

Legge 4 agosto 2022, n. 127: Delega al Governo per il recepimento delle direttive europee e l'attuazione di altri atti 
normativi dell'Unione europea - Legge di delegazione europea 2021 pubblicata nella Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 199 del 26 
Agosto 2022. 

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Banca  d’Italia,  which  has  the  power  to  use  macroprudential  tools  as  provided  for  in  the 

Consolidated Banking Law. The ECB therefore welcomes the role envisaged for the Banca d’Italia, 

although some rules of the draft decree raise concerns in that respect, as detailed in the following 

paragraphs.  

3.2  The ECB understands that the Banca d’Italia will continue to be the concerned authority in Italy for 

the  purposes  of  notification  to  the  ECB  by  the  national  competent  or  designated  authorities  of 

requirements  for  capital  buffers  to  be  held  by  credit  institutions  in  addition  to  own  funds 

requirements  and  any  other  measures  aimed  at  addressing  systemic  or  macroprudential  risks, 

pursuant to Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/201310. 

3.3  However, the leading role of the Banca d’Italia is likely to be undermined by the provisions of the 

draft decree assigning a (de facto) veto power to each Committee member over the Committee’s 

recommendations,  reports  and  opinions11  (see  paragraph  4).  The  ECB  also  notes  that  the  draft 

decree  does  not  provide  for  the  President  of  the  Committee  having  a  double  (casting)  vote,  as 

envisaged by the Law on European Delegation12. 

4. 

Voting arrangements  

Under  the  draft  decree,  the  Committee’s  decisions  are  to  be  voted  by  the  majority  of  the 

participants at the meeting. However, any recommendation to the Banca d’Italia, CONSOB, IVASS 

and  COVIP  and  any  report  or  opinion  issued  to  the  Parliament,  Government,  other  authorities, 

public bodies and State organisations on the advisability of adopting measures are to be approved 

with the consent or abstention of the authority to which the recommendation is addressed or of the 

authority  which  has  specific  competence  in  the  area  which  is  the  main  subject  of  the  report  or 

opinion13. The current wording of Article 1(3) of the draft decree may be understood as giving each 

member  of  the  Committee  a  (de  facto)  veto  power.  This  could  cause  a  risk  of  paralysis  in 

macroprudential policy14, especially in the areas supervised by CONSOB, COVIP and IVASS since 

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This is in line with recital 24 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
November 2010 on European Union macroprudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European 
Systemic Risk Board (OJ L 331, 15.12.21010, p. 1). This is also reflected, for example, in the fact that under Article 
6(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010, the members of the General Board of the ESRB with voting rights include the 
President  and  the  Vice-President  of  the  ECB  and  the  Governors  of  the  national  central  banks  of  the  European 
System of Central Banks (ESCB). As previously noted by the ECB, given their central role in macroprudential policy, 
the General Board should include representatives from all ESCB central banks. See paragraph 2.1 of ECB Opinion 
CON/2015/4. Recommendation ESRB/2011/3 envisages that the national macroprudential authority can be either a 
single institution or a board of authorities, but also recommends that Member States ensure that central banks play a 
leading  role  in  macroprudential  policy.  See  ESRB  Recommendation  on  the  macroprudential  mandate  of  national 
authorities  (ESRB/2011/3): Follow-up  Report –  Overall  assessment,  June  2014,  available  on  the ESRB website  at 
https://www.esrb.europa.eu; see also paragraph 4 of Opinion CON/2005/39; paragraph 2 of Opinion CON/2013/56; 
paragraph  2.1  of  Opinion  CON/2013/66;  paragraph  2.1  of  Opinion  CON/2013/54;  paragraph  2.1  of  Opinion 
CON/2013/45;  paragraph  2.1  of  Opinion  CON/2013/30;  paragraph  5.2  of  Opinion  CON/2014/46;  paragraph  2.3  of 
Opinion CON/2014/21; paragraph 3.1 of Opinion CON/2019/10; and paragraph 2.14.2 of Opinion CON/2019/19. All 
ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex. 
See  Article  5  of  Council  Regulation  (EU)  No  1024/2013  of  15  October  2013  conferring  specific  tasks  on  the 
European  Central  Bank  concerning  policies  relating  to  the  prudential  supervision  of  credit  institutions  (OJ  L  287, 
29.10.2013, p. 63). 
See Article 6(2)(d)(3) of the Law on European Delegation and Article 1(3) of the draft decree. It is understood that, 
when the act is addressed to an authority which is not a member of the Committee, the veto power may be exercised 
by the member authority which has competence in the area. 
See Article 6(2)(d)(2) of the Law on European Delegation. 
Article 1(3) of the draft decree.  
See paragraph 7 of Opinion CON/2014/46.  

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they  would  not  be  granted  their  own  autonomous  macroprudential  powers15.  As  already 

recommended by the ESRB, a central bank’s leading role should be ensured by the fact that the 

central bank accounts for the majority of representatives with voting power on the macroprudential 

authority’s board when decisions are taken on a majority basis, or that no veto power is conferred 

on other board members, as is the case when decisions are taken by consensus16. In the light of 

the  above,  the  ECB  strongly  recommends  that  the  Italian  legislator  revisits  the  draft  decree’s 

provisions concerning the Committee’s voting arrangements consistent with the guiding principles 

expressed  in  the  ESRB’s  follow-up  report  on  Recommendation  ESRB/2011/317.  Furthermore,  the 

ECB also suggests that the Italian Government revisits the draft decree’s provisions concerning the 

Committee’s voting arrangements to ensure that, in the event of a tie, the President has a double 

(casting) vote, consistent with the provisions of the Law on European Delegation. 

This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.  

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 20 October 2023. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Christine LAGARDE 

15 

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CONSOB and COVIP do not currently have substantive own macroprudential powers. The issue would also concern 
IVASS  according  to  Article  188(3-ter)  of  Legislative  Decree  No  205  of  2009,  as  amended  by  Article  2  of  the  draft 
decree. 
See  ESRB  Recommendation  on  the  macroprudential  mandate  of  national  authorities  (ESRB/2011/3):  Follow-up 
Report  –  Overall  assessment,  June  2014,  p.  28:  a  central  bank’s  leading  role  is  ensured  by  the  fact  that:  (i)  the 
central bank is the macroprudential authority; (ii) the central bank accounts for the majority of representatives with 
voting power on the board when decisions are taken on a majority basis; or (iii) no veto power is conferred on other 
board  members,  as  is  the  case  when  decisions  are  taken  by  consensus;  (iv)  the  central  bank  conducts 
macroprudential analysis; (v) the central bank prepares  the main documents to be discussed by the board; and/or 
(vi) the central bank is responsible for providing the board’s secretariat; and/or (vii) the central bank governor chairs 
the board and has a casting vote. See also paragraph 2.14.2 of Opinion CON/2019/19.  
See paragraph 10.1 of Opinion CON/2014/46 and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2012/55.  

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