Identifying future critical technologies for space, defence and related civil industries : a technology foresight exercise to support further EU policy developments.
Date: 2023-10-20
Institutions: Joint Research Centre
Subjects: advanced technology industry, common security and defence policy, critical infrastructure security, foresight, industrial development, industry-research relations, innovation, new technology, research and development, research report, space research, space technology

ISSN 1831-9424 

JRC SCIENCE FOR POLICY REPORT 

Identifying future critical technologies for 
space, defence and related civil industries  
A technology foresight exercise to support further EU policy developments 

Farinha, J., Vesnic-Alujevic, L., Hristova, M. 

2023 

EUR 31688 EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
and knowledge service. 
It  aims  to  provide  evidence-based  scientific  support  to  the  European  policymaking  process.  The  contents  of  this  publication  do  not 
necessarily reflect the position or opinion of the European Commission. Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf 
of the Commission is responsible for the use that might be made of this publication. This report is based on research of the JRC. It does 
neither include any information or data collected in the context of the EU Observatory of Critical Technologies, nor does it prejudge the 
future work of the Observatory. For information on the methodology and quality underlying the data used in this publication for which the 
source is neither Eurostat nor other Commission services, users should contact the referenced source. The designations employed and the 
presentation of material on the maps do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the European Union concerning 
the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. 

Contact information 
João FARINHA 
Unit S.1 EU Policy Lab: Foresight, Design and Behavioural Insights 
Joint Research Centre, European Commission, Brussels, Belgium 
joao.farinha@ec.europa.eu 

EU Science Hub 
https://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu 

JRC 134926 

EUR 31688 EN 

PDF  

ISBN 978-92-68-08221-8 

ISSN 1831-9424 

doi:10.2760/005929         KJ-NA-31-688-EN-N 

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2023 

© European Union, 2023 

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How to cite this report: Farinha, J., Vesnic-Alujevic, L., Hristova, M., Identifying future critical technologies for space, defence and related civil 
industries  -  A  technology  foresight  exercise  to  support  further  EU  policy  developments,  Publications  Office  of  the  European  Union, 
Luxembourg, 2023, doi:10.2760/005929, JRC134926.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of contents 

Abstract .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 1 

Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 2 

Executive summary ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3 

1  Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 4 

2  Emerging and disruptive technologies relevant to space, defence and related civil industries ......... 6 

2.1 

Drivers, enabling conditions, opportunities and challenges ................................................................................... 9 

3  Potentially critical technologies in 5+ years ................................................................................................................................ 11 

3.1 

3.2 

Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................................................. 11 

Quantum communications and cryptography, including post-quantum cryptography................ 12 

3.2.1  Assessment .................................................................................................................................................................................. 12 

3.2.2  Risks, challenges and future dependencies ...................................................................................................... 14 

3.2.3  Actions .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 16 

3.3 

Nuclear micro-reactors ...................................................................................................................................................................... 17 

3.3.1  Assessment .................................................................................................................................................................................. 17 

3.3.2  Risks, challenges and future dependencies ...................................................................................................... 18 

3.3.3  Actions .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 20 

3.4 

Integrated photonics ............................................................................................................................................................................ 21 

3.4.1  Assessment .................................................................................................................................................................................. 22 

3.4.2  Risk, challenges and future dependencies ......................................................................................................... 23 

3.4.3  Actions .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 25 

3.5 

Space platform   providing critical in-orbit services and operations ......................................................... 26 

3.5.1  Assessment .................................................................................................................................................................................. 27 

3.5.2  Risks, challenges and future dependencies ...................................................................................................... 29 

3.5.3  Actions .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 31 

4  Conclusions and recommendations .................................................................................................................................................... 33 

Annex 1   Description of the foresight methodology applied and intermediary results ................................ 36 

Bibliography .................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 52 

List of figures................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 55 

List of tables ................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 56 

i 

 
 
 
 
Abstract 

The  report  presents  the  findings  of  a  participatory  technology  foresight  exercise  that  listed  46 

emerging and disruptive technologies relevant for space, defence, and related civil industries, which 

are of strategic importance for the European Union (EU). 

Throughout  the  process,  participants  focused  on  four  future  critical  technologies  that  deserve 

particular attention: (i) quantum communications and cryptography; (ii) space platform; (iii) integrated 

photonics;  and  (iv)  nuclear  micro-reactors.  These  future  critical  technologies  bear  a  high  level  of 

impact and a high probability of future EU dependency on others. For each one, the report includes a 

series of recommendations to address risks, challenges and future dependencies. 

Beyond the listing and analysis of key technologies, the authors summarised 10 clusters of topics 

related to technology development and adoption: (i) geopolitics; (ii) cooperation; (iii) investment; (iv) 

market; (v) skills and knowledge; (vi) ethical issues; (vii) regulations and standards; (viii) development 

of  technology  building  blocks;  (ix)  twin  transition  and  security  of  assets;  and  (x)  data  and 

communications. 

These insights can support further research and policy developments. The report concludes with a 

detailed explanation of the methodology applied and the results of intermediary phases. 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgments 

The authors of this report would like to thank all experts that participated in the surveys, workshops 

and  interviews  held  throughout  this  process.  The  time  they  dedicated  to  the  process  and  the 

intellectual generosity  they  showed  through  their  active  and insightful  contributions  is  very  much 

appreciated. 

The  authors  acknowledge  and  thank  in  particular  Gert  Runde,  on  his  role  as  an  external  expert 

throughout the process, for the valuable guidance and support provided. 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
Executive summary 

The  report  presents  the  findings  from  a  participatory  technology  foresight  exercise  that  was 

conducted between September and December 2022. It built on the participation of approximately 20 

experts, coming from inside and outside of the European institutions, and representing several types 

of  stakeholders.  The  foresight  process  used  in  this  exercise  was  the  result  of  a  tailor  made 

combination  of  several  known  methods,  namely  desk  research,  horizon  scanning,  sense  making 

workshops, surveys and interviews.  

The purpose of this exercise was two-fold: (i) to identify cross-cutting (relevant for space, defence, 

civil) emerging technologies that could be of strategic importance for the EU in the future; and (ii)_to 

identify priority areas that could reduce or avoid the development or emergence of existing or new 

dependencies. 

 The report assesses four potential future critical technologies:  

—  quantum communications and cryptography (including post-quantum cryptography);  

—  space platform (providing critical in-orbit services and operations);  

—  integrated photonics; 

—  nuclear micro-reactors.  

The experts participating in the foresight exercise perceived these technologies as critical in the next 

5+ years for the EU, meaning that they could have a high impact in space, defence and related civil 

industries. They could also present a potential risk of the EU's over-dependency on other countries.  

Beyond identifying these future critical technologies, the foresight process also highlighted the risks 

and  challenges  associated  with  these  technologies.  For  example,  access  to  raw  materials  and 

components, access to a skilled workforce, regulatory and standardisation environment. Proposals 

for  action  were  also  harvested  during  the  exercise  that  aim  to  mitigate  those  issues  and  bring 

opportunities further for the EU. These include: supporting start-ups; strengthening manufacturing 

capacities; promoting education and training; and retaining and attracting talent. 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
1 

Introduction 

Foresight is a discipline which aims at anticipating future developments by exploring trends, emerging 

issues  and  the  potential  challenges  and  opportunities  accompanying  them.  Through  the  use  of 

participatory  methods  and  collective  intelligence,  it  draws  useful  insights  for  strategic  planning, 

policymaking  and  preparedness  (European  Commission,  2020).  Its  sub-discipline,  technology 

foresight,  covers  a  broad  range  of  technologies  and  analyses  the  applications  and  diffusion  of 

technologies including the societal context of technology applications (Rader & Porter, 2008).  

Figure 1 - The European Union Flag 

Source:  Alexey Larionov on Unsplash 

The Joint Research Centre (JRC) EU Policy Lab conducted a technology foresight process consisting 

of a series of foresight exercises. These exercises were  carried out in the second  half of 2022 in 

collaboration with the JRC Unit on Strategic Autonomy for Space and Security. Through exploratory, 

future-oriented and participatory exercises, foresight helped to identify:  

—  cross-sectoral  (relevant  for  space,  defence,  civil)  emerging  technologies,  which  could  be  of  a 

strategic importance for the EU in the future; and  

4 

 
 
 
 
 
 
—  priority  areas  that  could  reduce  or  avoid  the  development  or  emergence  of  existing  or  new 

dependencies.  

The Competence Centre on Foresight, an integral part of the EU Policy Lab, supports EU policy-making 

by  providing  strategic  and  future-oriented  input,  developing  an  anticipatory  culture  inside  the 

European Commission, continuously experimenting and developing different methods and tools to 

make foresight practically useful for decision-making processes.(1) 

The  process  comprised  a  combination  of  several  known  methods,  namely  desk  research,  horizon 

scanning (2), two sense making workshops (each one lasting two half-days), two small scale targeted 

surveys and interviews with JRC experts. This participatory process involved a wide range of experts 

coming  from  both  inside  and  outside  the  European  institutions,  representing  diverse  policy  and 

business domains and technology fields of expertise (see Annex for detailed description of the applied 

methodology).  It  aimed  at  highlighting  the  emerging  technologies,  which  could  have  significant 

impact on the space, defence and civil industries (see Section 2), key drivers and enabling conditions, 

opportunities and challenges related to their development and adoption (see Section 2.1) and future 

critical technologies for the EU in a time span of 5+ years (see Section 3). The results could serve as 

useful insights for further detailed analysis over the next few years given the growing importance of 

establishing synergies between space, defence and civil industries in the EU, as foreseen in the action 

plan set up for that aim (European Commission, 2021). 

It  is  important  to  recall  that  the  nature  of  this  foresight  exercise  is  qualitative  and  participatory. 

Consequently, the outcomes described in the report do not present a (deterministic) forecast based 

on quantitative or statistical analysis, but rather identify and explore future developments and issues 

perceived as important for the future by this specific set of participants. Therefore it is the first step 

that should both support and be enriched by further research. It is also important to acknowledge 

that the work developed for this report does not capture all policy initiatives that are underway, inside 

and outside of the EU. In the same way, as the desk research and the participatory workshops took 

place in 2022, recent developments on both the technological and policy making side, might have 

been not considered, or can be already addressing some of the issues touched by the participants. 

Finally,  the  authors  consider  that  the methodology,  developed  for  this  specific  work,  is  in  itself  a 

contribution for further analogous foresight exercises. 

https://policy-lab.ec.europa.eu/index_en 
Horizon scanning is a foresight method aimed at the early discovery of developments whose 

(1) 
(2) 
potential may not yet be widely recognized by most experts, decision-makers, or the general public. This 
method focuses on monitoring the margins of current thinking, research and innovation for novelties and 
phenomena that may offer distinct opportunities or challenges in the medium- or long-term time horizon. 
(Amanatidou, et al., 2012) 

5 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
2  Emerging and disruptive technologies relevant to space, defence 

and related civil industries 

The first phase of the foresight exercise consisted of desk research (see Annex 1 on methodology 

and intermediary outputs) of emerging and disruptive technologies in space, defence and related civil 

industries,  and  a  horizon  scanning  that  consisted  of  a  collection  of  signals  and  a  participatory 

workshop. Participants prioritised a number of emerging technologies that are relevant for at least 

two out of three domains (space, defence and related civil industries). Emerging technologies were 

perceived as having a significant impact in the future. Discussion and prioritisation were organised 

around four main groups of technologies. The results are set out in Table 1.  

Figure 2   2022 State of the European Union (SOTEU) speech delivered by the President of the European Commission Ursula 
von der Leyen. 

Source: European Parliament on Flickr 

Some  of  the  groups  focused  on  capabilities  because  participants  saw  them  as  being  equally 

important. Given the current fast pace of innovation, which is defined by increasing combinations of 

different technologies and innovative applications of already existing technologies, prioritising and 

clustering  technologies  is  a  hard  task.  In  view  of  this,  we  mainly  focused  on  exploring  which 

technologies - and their innovative combinations 

 could generate future added value for defence, 

space and related civil industries, taking into account the underlying concepts of dual-use and cross-

fertilisation between those sectors. 

6 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 - Preliminary prioritisation of technologies and capabilities within four clusters 

—  Novel components and materials, manufacturing and energy 

●  Nuclear micro-reactors  

●  3D/4D printing in combination with AI and big data and advanced analytics  

●  New materials and/or innovations in energy storage and transport, including novel battery 

chemistries  

●  Recycling/substitution of critical raw materials / devices  

● 

Integrated photonics  

●  Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASIC) / Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) / 

embedded FPGA design  

●  Gallium nitride (GaN) power electronics including packaging  

—  Digital and connectivity 

●  Cognitive computing continuum for better resource management  

●  Quantum communications and cryptography, including post-quantum cryptography  

●  Dependable AI   technically robust and respecting laws, standards and regulations  

●  Cloud-fog-edge computing continuum  

●  Edge AI, including cyber security of edge AI devices  

●  Cognitive digital twin  

●  Quantum sensing, including assured precision, navigation and timing  

●  Broadband connectivity in 6G  

●  Frugal (low-cost and easy deployable) AI  

●  Underwater real time communications  

●  Cognitive computing continuum for better resource management  

●  Quantum communications and cryptography, including post-quantum cryptography  

●  Dependable AI   technically robust and respecting laws, standards and regulations  

●  Cloud-fog-edge computing continuum  

●  Edge AI, including cyber security of edge AI devices  

●  Cognitive digital twin  

●  Quantum sensing, including assured precision, navigation and timing  

●  Broadband connectivity in 6G  

●  Frugal (low-cost and easy deployable) AI  

●  Underwater real time communications  

7 

 
 
 
 
 
—  Mobility, autonomous systems and human performance enhancement  

●  Xenobots, neurobots, and other bio-hybrid molecular and nano-bots  

● 

Exoskeletons and protective skin  

●  Directed energy (DE) technology  

●  Hypersonic vehicles  

● 

Internet of the body things (IoBT)  

●  Multidomain swarming (Space, Air, Water, Ground)  

●  Brain-computer interfaces (BCI) and Augmented / Virtual reality (AR/VR)  

●  Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV)  

●  Bio-sensors and bio-informatics  

●  Miniaturised communications and sensor systems  

● 

Electromagnetic shielding 

—  Space 

●  Reusable vehicles and components, including plug and play architectures  

●  Manufacturing SpaceVerse and In-space assembly manufacturing (ISAM)  

● 

In-orbit servicing (IOS) platforms, Active debris removal (ADR) and End of life (EOL) services  

●  Space surveillance  

●  Space based solar power and power networks  

● 

Lightweight radiation resistant materials for deep space human exploration  

●  Scaled-up, low-cost manufacturing of nano-systems and materials for space  

●  New designs for heat shields, sensors and other sub-systems  

● 

Low temperature electronics and semiconductor technologies for 'natural' in-space operation and 
quantum computers  

●  Radiation hardened electronics  

● 

Frequency hopping or Direct sequence code division multiple access (CDMA)  

●  Satellite security   protection from cyberattacks, high-powered lasers, and electronic warfare  

● 

Emerging high-precision geodesy  

●  On board AI-based data processing  

●  Nuclear thermal-propulsion  

●  Satellite swarms  

● 

Internet of space things (IoST)  

●  Sustainable fuels and launch cycles 

Source: Authors, based on workshop discussion 

8 

 
 
 
 
 
2.1  Drivers, enabling conditions, opportunities and challenges 

This  first  phase  of  the  foresight  exercise  helped  to  identify  not  only  the  emerging  and  critical 

technologies  relevant  to  space,  defence  and  civil  sectors,  but  also  the  key  drivers  and  enabling 

conditions, opportunities and challenges related to their development and adoption. The result is a 

set of common and cross-cutting topics, relevant to almost all emerging and disruptive technologies. 

This overarching approach is particularly useful to gain a global contextual snapshot, identify trends 

and trace potential stepping-stones for future policies and strategies. The 10 most pressing groups 

of topics, highlighted by the participants, are the following:  

—  Geopolitics:  the  EU's  overdependence  on  other  countries  (especially  non-democratic  and  not 

like-minded countries) in innovation, components and supply of raw materials will continue to be 

an issue that drives the need for further policies and mechanisms to support the development of 

an autonomous EU industry. The EU  goal should be to develop an open strategic autonomy on 

key capabilities, reinforce cooperation with other countries where possible and build independent 

supply chains to protect public goods and critical knowhow from systemic rivals.  

—  Cooperation: cooperation is needed not only with like-minded countries and organisations, but 

also within the EU and across sectors (public, private and academia). There are areas where more 

—  Investment: further coordination between public funding instruments is needed, both at the EU 

Member State and at the EU level. Investment in defence-related technologies needs to adopt a 

more  risk-taking  approach,  following  the  mind-set  of  venture  capital  and  dynamic  startup 

innovation.  

—  Market:  cross-fertilisation  between  sectors  of  key  dual-use  technologies  represent  an 

opportunity for funding, considering multiple business and research opportunities, and increasing 

the application domains of those technologies. To develop critical technologies, it is important to 

obtain  further  funding  for  applied  research,  where industry  determines  mostly  the  needs  and 

priorities.  

—  Skills  and  knowledge:  the  lack  of  highly  qualified  experts  in  innovative  technologies  could 

become critical at a worldwide level. There is increasing competition between countries (including 

between  EU  Member  States)  and  it  is  vital  for  the  EU  to  train,  retain  and  attract,  technology 

specialists, researchers and other profiles related to innovation and legal experts specialised in 

technology.  

—  Ethical  issues:  the  EU  applies  a  distinct  human-centric  approach  to technology  development 

and adoption. Some technologies, including dual-use ones such as AI, autonomous systems and 

biotechnology, raise ethical issues. R&I activities and  their applications need to be in line with 

European values and principles.  

9 

 
 
 
 
 
  
—  Regulations  and  standards:  interoperable  solutions  and  the  development  of  common 

standards  bring  confidence  and  contribute  to  R&I  and  market  efficiency.  The  EU  needs  to 

anticipate and identify  technologies for future standardisation, which will be important for its 

strategic positioning.    

—  Development of technology building blocks: technologies such as Edge AI are key building 

blocks for the future development of many other larger technologies and capabilities. The number 

of patent applications by European organisations systematically lags behind those of China and 

the US. This challenges 

—  Twin  transition:  the  rising  demand  for  energy  and  raw  materials  will  continue  to  drive  the 

development  of  new  green  and  digital  technologies  and  innovations  and  the  use  of  fewer 

resources.  

—  Security: security of assets, data and communications will be crucial to ensuring the EU's and 

its Member States' sovereignty and key intellectual property rights.  

Figure 3 
opportunities and challenges across a set of emerging and disruptive technologies 

 Virtual board representing  the results of the brainstorming exercise on common drivers, enabling conditions, 

Source: Authors based on workshop discussion. Visualisation: Miro online whiteboard, RealTimeBoard Inc., www.miro.com 

10 

 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
3  Potentially critical technologies in 5+ years 

3.1 

Introduction 

The second phase of the foresight exercise consisted in prioritising the initial list of emerging and 

disruptive technologies, presented in Section 2, in terms of future risks and challenges that could lead 

to  EU  over  dependency  in  the  future.  The  process  included  a  participatory  workshop,  targeted 

interviews  with  JRC  experts  and  a  follow  up  survey,  giving  the  opportunity  to  all  participants  to 

anonymously express their opinion after the workshop, but also to gather additional insights. 

To define what a critical technology is, we referred to the definition provided in the action plan on 

synergies between civil, defence and space industries. The action plan states that: 

'Critical technologies are technologies that are relevant across the defence, space and related civil 

ependence 

on others for things we need the most.' (European Commission, 2021). 

Subsequently,  we  asked  participants  about  their  thoughts  on  technologies  and  their  applications 

which in 5+ years: i) could have a high impact on at least two domains among the space, defence 

and  related civil industries and ii)  for which the EU may be  at risk  of overdependence. The terms 

 were often used interchangeably given that in the context of 

open strategic autonomy, the EU will be open to trade and multilateral cooperation while promoting 

stable rules in order to be strong economically and have geopolitical influence. Here we define open 

strategic autonomy as reducing one-sided dependencies in critical areas as well as strengthen its 

capacity  to  set  and  implement  its  own  priorities  (Cagnin,  Muench,  Scapolo,  Stoermer,  &  Vesnic 

Alujevic, 2021). 

The outcome of the participatory process suggested four future critical technologies:  

—  Quantum communications and cryptography, including post-quantum cryptography.  

—  Nuclear micro-reactors.  

—  Integrated photonics. 

—  Space Platform   providing critical in-orbit services and operations. 

Each  of  these  technologies  need  to  undergo  more  detailed  and  profound  analysis  in  the  future. 

Nevertheless, useful insights and indications for further actions are given in this section. For each of 

: i) the main technology elements; ii) 

future evolution and application in the space, defence and civil sectors: iii) the risks, challenges and 

dependencies the EU may face in the future; and iv) the actions that could mitigate them. 

11 

 
 
 
 
 
3.2  Quantum  communications  and  cryptography, 

including  post-quantum 

cryptography 

Quantum  technologies  are  based  on  quantum  physics  and  the  interaction  of  molecules,  atoms, 

photons and electrons. Technologies that we are currently using, such as MRI scanners for medical 

imaging, lasers, solar cells, electron microscopes, atomic clocks used for GPS and many others, are 

already relying on quantum effects, which however need limited control (3). Achieving full control over 

individual  quantum systems would allow new capabilities for computation, digital communication, 

cryptography,  sensing  and  imaging  and  others.  Quantum  communication,  in  particular,  includes 

technologies  and  applications  that  aim  to  provide  the  most  secure  and  trusted  communication 

impossible to intercept without detection (4). 

Figure 4 - A wafer of the latest D-Wave quantum computers 

Source: Steve Jurvetson on Wikimedia Commons 

3.2.1  Assessment 

Participants highlighted the following core elements:  

(3)  
(4)  

https://uwaterloo.ca/institute-for-quantum-computing/quantum-101/quantum-applications-today 
https://qt.eu/discover-quantum/introduction-to-quantum-physics/ 

12 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
—  Quantum key distribution, a method that allows securely exchanging a private encryption key 

between two parties. Any attempt at eavesdropping during the exchange of key will leave a trace 

that could be detected. Also, the extent to which the key was compromised could be measured 

(Lewis & Travagnin, 2018).   

—  Randomness  is  essential  for  quantum  key  distribution  and  quantum  random  number 

generator  can  produce  random  numbers  that  are  unpredictable  because  of  the  inherently 

indeterministic quantum processes (5).   

—  Due to the intrinsic security of quantum information, it cannot be amplified through conventional 

repeaters. Quantum repeaters are being investigated to extend the range along which quantum 

information can be transmitted (Lewis & Travagnin, 2022). The building blocks are a quantum 

processor and a quantum interface to convert the information into photons (6).  

—  Single-photon detectors are used in quantum communication applications as many quantum 

cryptography protocols require single photons travelling over a channel.   

—  Photonic  integrated  circuits  are  very  important  for  quantum  technologies  as  they  make 

devices and systems more robust, compact and cheaper (7).   

—  Quantum software and quantum optimised algorithms.   

—  Platforms and modular systems.  

—  Laser technology: quantum signals are transmitted by lasers in optical fibres.   

—  Laser  communication  in  space:  using  laser  communication  in  open  space allows  obtaining 

lower level of losses than in fibre communication and therefore an increased range to reach. As 

a consequence, satellites would have a major role in quantum communication infrastructures (8).   

Secure communication that are difficult to intercept, trusted interactions and information exchange 

are of particular importance for critical infrastructures, but also for defence and military application. 

In  addition,  quantum  technologies  would  significantly  improve  data  collection,  processing  and 

exploitation  capabilities,  through  networking  together  of  quantum  sensors  and  computers.  Other 

areas that would benefit from these technology advancements include self-driving vehicles, financial 

transactions, cloud services, banking, health records and AI.  

There is progress in enhancing system performance by developing more efficient quantum devices, 

such as single photon emitters, single photon detectors, low-noise detectors, modulators, sources of 

(5)  
(6)  
(7)  
(8)  

https://qrange.eu/faq/what-are-qrng 
https://qt.eu/discover-quantum/quantum-technologies-in-a-nutshell/ 
https://qt.eu/discover-quantum/applications-of-qt/quantum-communication/ 
http://www.qtspace.eu/?q=whitepaper 

13 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
entangled photons, quantum random number generators, and quantum repeaters (9).  

Another  important  development  is  satellite  relayed  quantum  communication.  This  is  a  domain  in 

which China is very active and has already launched two quantum-encrypting satellites, representing 

a major step towards a fully secured global communication network (10).   

-term  vision  is  the  development  of  the  Quantum  Internet  all  over  Europe:  quantum 

computers,  simulators  and  sensors  interconnected  via  quantum  networks  distributing  information 

and quantum resources (11)

'Quantum  Flagship'  envisages  (12):  in  3  years,  development  and  certification  of  devices,  systems 

protocols  for  quantum  random  number  generators,  quantum  key  distribution,  quantum  repeaters, 

quantum  memories  and  long  distance  communication;  in  6  years,  cost-effective  and  scalable 

devices  and  systems  for  inter-city  and  intra-city  networks  as  well  as  demonstration  of  scalable 

solutions for quantum networks connecting devices and systems, e.g. quantum sensors or processors; 

in 10 years, development of autonomous metro-area, long distance (> 1000km) and entanglement-

based  networks,  a  'quantum  Internet',  as  well  as  protocols  exploiting  the  novel  properties  that 

quantum  communication  offers.  The  European  Quantum  Communication  Infrastructure  (EuroQCI) 

Initiative  will  make  use  of  the  quantum  communication  technologies  developed  by  the  Quantum 

Flagship. The European Commission, the European Space Agency and the EU-27 aim to build a secure 

quantum communication infrastructure that will span the whole EU, including its overseas territories, 

by 2027.  

3.2.2  Risks, challenges and future dependencies  

The main issues perceived as  risks, challenges and dependencies  that the EU may  face in a time 

horizon of 5+ years are presented in 9 pre-defined groups.  

Table 2 - Risks, challenges and future dependencies for quantum communication and cryptography 

—  Materials  

●  Materials for production of entangled photons and in particular:  

●  Nitrogen-vacancy (NV) centre in diamond  

●  Quantum dot materials    

—  Education, talent and skilled workforce  

(9)  
(10)  
(11)  
research 
(12)  

https://qt.eu/discover-quantum/quantum-technologies-in-a-nutshell/ 
https://spectrum.ieee.org/satellite-qkd-china 
https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/quantum-flagship-major-boost-european-quantum-

https://qt.eu/discover-quantum/quantum-technologies-in-a-nutshell/ 

14 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
●  Very high interest in quantum technologies would create shortage of experts.   

—  Components  

●  Single photon detectors  

● 

Integrated photonics    

●  Safe algorithms    

—  Patents  

●  Low share of EU patents in worldwide patenting  

—  Logistics 

●  No particular issues were raised regarding logistics 

—   Investment  

●  Risk of uncoordinated EU investment initiatives   

● 

Insufficient venture capital investment in the EU, particularly in comparison with the US  

—  Research, development & innovation  

●  Risk of lack of cooperation with non-EU European countries, such as Switzerland and the UK, 

which are strong in quantum technologies 

—  Regulation and standardisation  

●  Risk for EU losing influence in the international standard setting. Interoperability 

considerations would be critical for the successful application of quantum enabled devices 
and systems 

—  Other  

●  Challenge with respect to the decision whether to include quantum communications 

technologies in the EU export control list  

Source: Authors, based on workshop discussion and interviews 

The main risks and challenges for the future relate to the lack of talent and skilled workforce as well 

as low venture capital in the EU, particularly compared to the US. Low EU share in worldwide patenting 

and the EU's weaker position in international standard setting are also perceived, though to a lesser 

extent, as issues that could pose future risks for the EU.  

Some  further  observations  about  factors  influencing  the  future  development  and  application  of 

quantum  communication  technologies  were  made  in  the  responses  to  the  survey.  These  were: 

insufficient  private  investment  for  the  development  of  quantum  internet,  the  need  to  adapt  the 

technology currently developed for NV centres to different platforms, lack of an agreed interoperable 

quantum network architecture and topology across all EU Member States, risk of technology hype 

cycle and inflated expectations, lack of adoption of quantum key distribution by relevant end users, 

public and private (including in industrial protocols).  

15 

 
 
 
 
 
3.2.3  Actions  

Participants  suggested  the  following  actions  in  order  to  address  the  risks,  challenges  and 

dependencies highlighted above. Actions are organised around eight groups of issues and can address 

more than one challenge.   

Table 3 - Mitigation actions proposed for quantum communication and cryptography 

—  Materials  

● 

Improve EU capacity for processing while assuring high quality and purity, of highly 
specialised materials needed for quantum communication technologies   

—  Education, talent and skilled workforce  

●  Strengthen quantum technology education and training in the EU. Continue efforts done via 

the Quantum Flagship (13)   

—  Components  

●  Secure supply chain for single photon detectors based on avalanche photo diodes, for which 

EU system integrators depend on US and Japanese producers 

—  Patents  

● 

Improve EU patent activity  

—  Investment  

●  Promote synergies between EU investment initiatives   

●  Support EU start-ups  

—  Research, development & innovation  

●  Seek cooperation with European countries, such as Switzerland and the UK   

—  Regulation and standardisation  

●  Strengthen EU role in international standardisation  

Source: Authors, based on workshop discussion and interviews 

Further  comments  gathered  through  the  survey  suggested  several  mitigation  actions:  i)  explore 

alternatives  of  NV-centers  ii)  target  investment  on  quantum  communication  among  the  various 

quantum  technologies  iii)  agree  on  a  EU-wide  interoperable  quantum  network  architecture  and 

topology iv) work towards an EU masterplan covering quantum technology (i.e. QKD devices) but also 

operations and networking v) build up network operator capabilities and skills vi) work towards an 

easy integration with traditional cybersecurity mechanisms vii) inform about advantages offered by 

the application of quantum key distribution and clarify any uncertainties. 

(13)  

https://qt.eu/ 

16 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
 
3.3  Nuclear micro-reactors 

Nuclear micro-reactors are a subset of small modular reactors (SMRs) with a capacity below 10 MWe. 

Distinctive features are continuous operation and refuelling cycle between 10 to 30 years, capacity 

to operate autonomously, even when recovering from a malfunction and designed to be transported 

by road, rail,  barge or air. They  are principally intended for off-grid operation in remote locations 

(OECD NEA, 2023). 

Figure 5 - Computer generated images of the Westinghouse eVinci nuclear micro-reactor representing the installation on a 
remote site and the easy transportable modular elements 

Source: Westinghouse Electric Company 

3.3.1  Assessment 

Important elements highlighted by participants were:  

—  Generation IV nuclear reactor designs offering improved sustainability, safety, reliability and 

cost; 

—  Alternative nuclear fuels: high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU), Thorium, Triso; 

—  New materials resistant to corrosion and high temperature; 

—  Improved thermal-hydraulic modelling;  

—  Autonomous operation;    

—  For space applications, materials  capable of  resisting  space  radiation for long period of 

time;    

—  Nuclear fuel recycling and reprocessing;    

17 

 
 
 
 
 
    
    
 
—  Advanced additive manufacturing for producing components.    

The ability of micro reactors to operate independently from the electric grid makes them particularly 

attractive for key assets and critical infrastructures, such as military and governmental installations, 

data  centres  or  hospitals. The  urgent  deployment  of  electricity  is  also  particularly  relevant during 

natural  disasters, civil emergencies or in war zones. They could be  used for space exploration, as 

lunar surface power systems, nuclear propulsion systems (thermal and electric) or powering human 

settlements in space. For maritime transport, micro reactors could provide alternative propulsion to 

conventional engines, which could reduce CO2 emissions but also allow emergency electricity supply 

in coastal regions. For industrial processes, micro reactors could provide electricity and process heat 

in continuous operation during 20 years.  

3.3.2  Risks, challenges and future dependencies  

The main issues perceived as risks, challenges and dependencies that the EU may face in a time 

horizon of five or more years are presented in 8 predefined groups. 

Table 4 - Risks, challenges and future dependencies for nuclear micro-reactors 

—  Materials  

●  Availability of suitable neutron poisons - Er and Gd    

●  Processing of raw materials    

●  Enrichment of Uranium: currently, high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) fuel is not 

produced at a commercial scale in Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) member countries and the 
material is downblended from American or Russian high enriched uranium (HEU) stocks. 
However, according to the United States Department of Energy, HEU stocks could be 
completely exhausted by 2030-2040 (18)  

—  Education, talent and skilled workforce  

●  There would be a strong need for nuclear engineers and scientists but also for skilled 

workforce with technical profiles such as maintenance, welding and others    

●  There would be a need for human resources with appropriate legal background and 

expertise within nuclear safety regulations 

—  Components  

●  A completely new supply chain need to be set-up, ensuring relevant factory-fabrication 

methods, capabilities and fuel production capacities  

—  Patents  

●  Risk of dependencies on foreign patents due to current lack of incentives for patenting   

—  Logistics  

●  Spent nuclear fuel management    

18 

 
 
 
 
 
●  New container designs for interim storage of used fuel  

●  New packaging and transport solutions   

—  Investment  

●  The US Department of Defence, US Department of Energy as well as NASA are already 

investing in the development of small modular reactors and micro-reactors   

●  Lack of cost sharing mechanisms between public and private investment in the EU  

● 

In 2021, the US government committed investing in Romania for engineering and design of 
small modular reactors (SMR) (14)   

●  Currently, there is no market interest in the EU and diverging interests, which could 

potentially lead to dependencies on US products already established on the European 
market 

—  Research, development & innovation  

●  Strong innovation activity in the US, academic but also many start-ups 

●  Need for experimental units and appropriate research infrastructure   

—  Regulation and standardisation  

●  Certification of new transport containers  

●  Harmonisation of codes and standards  

●  Future commercial deployment will depend on resolving issues, such as the types of micro 
reactors within the meaning of 'nuclear power plant', the interpretation and application of 
international and regional safety and liability conventions   

●  Long, expensive and heavy regulatory process in the EU    

Source: Authors, based on workshop discussion and interviews 

The main future risk and challenges emerging concern the availability of key experimental facilities 

(for example, hot cells, laboratories, test reactors), the lack of nuclear engineers and scientists, the 

comparatively  higher  public  and  private  investment  in  the  US  than  in  the  EU  and  the  heavy  EU 

regulatory process, particularly compared to the US.   

Some  additional  observations  were  made  about  factors  affecting  the  adoption  of  nuclear  micro 

reactors in the EU in the future. Risk of technology hype effects leading to unrealistic expectations. It 

is  perceived  that  there  is  no  EU  market  for  such  technology  and  consequently  there  are  limited 

number  of  available  sites  for  its  deployment.  As  an  alternative,  small  modular  reactors  could  be 

considered. Also, there is a lack of appropriate regulatory experience especially in countries that only 

recently  have  started  operating  nuclear  power  plants.  And  the  current  regulatory  process  is  not 

adapted to the new business models implied by the technology. Finally, there is a lack of sufficient 

(14)  
technology-in-europe/ 

https://www.state.gov/united-states-takes-next-step-in-supporting-innovative-clean-nuclear-

19 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
data to show the business case for adopting the technology. 

3.3.3  Actions  

Participants  suggested  the  following  actions  in  order  to  address  the  risks,  challenges  and 

dependencies listed above. Actions are organised around the pre-defined groups of issues and can 

address more than one challenge. As the workshop methodology included the use of wild cards, some 

actions address both the need to mitigate specific risks that arise from highly impactful and highly 

improbable events or to develop systemic resilience to handle a diverse set of risks.   

Table 5 - Mitigation actions proposed for nuclear micro-reactors 

—  Materials  

●  Diversify the supply    

●  Extract uranium from seawater    

●  Consolidate agreements with like-minded partners, for example, Canada and Australia    

●  Address the issues related to the use of nuclear fuel in space such as its potential long-term 

storage outside Earth    

—  Education, talent and skilled workforce   

●  Attract experts and skilled workforce by providing career opportunities and attractive 

employment conditions  

● 

domains  

—  Research, development & innovation  

●  Support EU start-ups by long term power purchase agreements, cost-sharing mechanisms 

or by providing access to experimental units and needed research infrastructure  

—  Regulation and standardisation  

●  Reinforce the agile and innovative tools and capacities of European nuclear regulators    

●  Provide the right resources and tools for regulators to tackle nuclear innovation    

●  Update current regulations to take account of developments in nuclear micro-reactor 

technology    

—  Other  

●  Have a clear long-term EU strategy and policy 

●  Develop shared EU nuclear fuel recycling and reprocessing capabilities    

Source: Authors, based on workshop discussion and interviews 

Additional comments provided through the survey proposed to strengthen EU collaboration within the 

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in this area and to strengthen the 

EU  presence  and  influence  in  international  organisations  such  as  the  International  Atomic  Energy 

20 

 
 
 
 
 
Agency (IAEA).  

3.4 

Integrated photonics 

Integrated photonics is an emerging field of technology where photonics is used instead of electronics 

(15) and multiple photonic functions are integrated on a photonic integrated circuit. It is defined as 'an 

emerging  branch  of  photonics  in  which  waveguides  and  devices  are  fabricated  as  an  integrated 

structure  onto  the  surface  of  a  flat  substrate,  or  flat  surface.  As  a  result  of  integration,  complex 

photonic  circuits  can  now  process  and  transmit  light  in  similar  ways  to  how  electronic  integrated 

circuits process and transmit electronic signals' (16). 

Figure 6 - Silicon nitride photonic integrated circuit production 

Source: LioniX International 

Integrated  photonics  is  considered  to  have  a  considerable  future  application  potential  in  multiple 

fields  (17).  Its  application  spans  from  telecommunication  (e.g.  5G  network),  medicine  (use  of 

(15)  
(16)  
(17)  

https://www.wevolver.com/article/an-introduction-to-integrated-photonics 
https://www.aimphotonics.com/what-is-integrated-photonics 
https://www.wevolver.com/article/an-introduction-to-integrated-photonics 

21 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
biosensors in diagnosis) and automotive industry (use of LiDAR for detecting objects and distances 

as an important part of autonomous vehicles development) (18,19) to sensing (for example, optical gas 

sensing  (Hansel  &  Heck,  2020)).  Another  important  potential  application  is  for  'spectro-temporal 

transformations  of  quantum  light  pulses,  which  might  lead  to  the  future  large-scale  quantum 

network' (Zhu, Chen, Yu, & al., 2022). This was confirmed through the survey we conducted, stating 

that 'integrated photonics is one of the key enabling technologies not only for optical communications, 

but also for quantum computing, sensing and communication.' 

3.4.1 

 Assessment 

The participants of our workshop highlighted the following:  

—  Heterogeneous integration of materials: the workshop participants agreed that heterogeneous 

integration  of  materials  on  silicon  is  needed  to  further  develop  integrated  photonics. 

Integrated nanoelectronics-photonics chips (including high-speed photonics interconnects) will be 

needed  to  reach  full potential. Low-cost  manufacturing  processes  would  contribute  to  further 

development  together  with  advanced  cost-effective  nanolithography  and  nanofabrication 

technologies in general.    

—  Potential applications: there are a number of potential applications for integrated photonics. 

For  example,  miniaturised  sensing,  high-efficient  sensors  for  space  environment  monitoring 

(support  for  astronauts),  quantum  computing,  neuromorphic  computing  (brain-electronic 

interfaces), quantum cryptography, broadband optical communications , (space) communication, 

secure communication, high-speed optical links.   

—  Strong R&D position: the EU currently has a strong R&D position and there is a need to stay on 

that path for the future. There are R&D efforts towards achieving large scale integration as well 

as  towards  integrated  single-photon  detectors  and  sources  and  CMOS-compatible  electronic-

photonic integration. However, while hybrid integration is well developed, monolithic integration 

needs further significant R&D efforts.  

—  High-performance  communication:  integrated  photonics  will  be  a  critical  technology  for 

future high-performance communication. Therefore, it needs to remain as one of the EU's 

priorities.  The  lead  in  research  needs  to  be  capitalised  industrially  towards  large-scale  cost-

effective manufacturing and new business models (for example, fab (20)-less models).   

—  Space  and  Earth  observation:  one  of  the  most  promising  future  dual-use  applications  of 

integrated  photonics  is  in  space  technologies  and  Earth  observation,  which  will  be 

https://www.wevolver.com/article/an-introduction-to-integrated-photonics 
https://www.imec-int.com/en/expertise/integrated-photonics/stay-ahead-imecs-latest-developments-

(18)  
(19)  
integrated-photonics 
(20)  

22 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
 
increasingly used by the defence sector. Also, integrated photonics can support high-speed and 

very secure (encrypted) communication important for security and military applications. It could 

also increase data collection and processing for command, control, communications, computers, 

intelligence and surveillance. It will also affect server farms architecture due to the application 

of high-speed optical interconnects (replacing copper cable interconnects).   

—  Information  availability:  the  strong  impact  on  broadband  communication  could  have  positive 

influence on cheaper information availability, contributing to lower existing inequalities. 

3.4.2  Risk, challenges and future dependencies  

The main issues perceived as risks, challenges and dependencies that the EU may face in a time 

horizon of 5+ years are presented in 9 predefined groups. 

Table 6 - Risks, challenges and future dependencies for integrated photonics 

—  Materials  

●  Raw material

 dependencies are similar to those for semiconductors. There are many 

materials used for their production and each needs to be analysed separately to determine 
possible existence of dependencies.  

●  Silicon, for example, is not critical for the moment but it is uncertain how this will develop in 
the future. The supply related to silicon might become critical if silicon photonics and hybrid 
integration (SoI and III-V compound semiconductors) become prevalent in manufacturing 
and the integrated photonics market.  

●  Due to long-term contracts in place for large industrial players, the availability of 

semiconductor materials in large quantities for start-ups might cause problems. While big 
industries have contracts for 50-100 years, start-ups, which might have patents, cannot 
enter the market because of problems in acquiring raw materials. 

●  Environmental issues might cause some shifts in the market and the increased price of raw 
materials in the future (e.g. gold). This could cause shifts in R&D priorities. According to the 
participants, for mining lithium, the EU needs to be a strong participant and governments 
need to invest more, also through assessing and securing environmental impacts despite 
the possible raise of costs. In this context, collateral industries might become important to 
create a circular economy in order to commercialise recycled materials.  

—  Education, talent and skilled workforce  

●  Education in photonics is not homogeneous across the EU though some European 

universities have good programmes in photonics. However, some experts fear that the EU 
might face lack of talent (e.g. engineers) and/or difficulties in keeping them in the EU (USA 
and Canada might become more attractive) to keep innovation at high level in this area.  

—  Components  

●  The EU has a big dependency in terms of manufacturing and packaging. In addition, in space 

and defence, component volume is small which could pose a problem in access to 
manufacturing. Packaging cost is very high and there might be strong dependencies from 
Far East foundries. This might become an issue especially if fabless models are 
implemented. Therefore, setting up manufacturing within the EU should be a priority. 

23 

 
 
 
 
 
—  Patents  

●  The current patent situation in this area is not assessed as negative, while future situation 

will depend on availability of talent and R&D funding. Patenting will become more important 
for quantum and space applications, especially protecting the intellectual property (IP) in the 
manufacturing and design processes of the integrated circuit. Manufacturing capabilities 
have strong dependencies on the availability of very sophisticated manufacturing tools. 
Many leaders in this field are in the USA and Japan and developed a strong IP portfolio. 
When China will be able to manufacture those tools, this can become a game changer. Also, 
in some Asian countries trade secrets are used more than IP protection (e.g. patents) or 
publications, so monitoring IP and prior art might be complex.  

—  Logistics  

●  The supply chain in integrated photonics is very complex and involves many countries. A full 
EU supply chain would be ideal, or together with the 'trusted' partners. How to know/define 
which partners can be trusted is a more general question. If large-scale manufacturing is 
reached by the support of foundries in the Far East, logistics will become even more 
strategic. Problem with export control regimes might also emerge.  

—  Investment  

●  Working together with countries like China is likely to disappear. This could lead to 

decreased funding. Also, cheap production in non-EU countries could discourage investment 
in EU-based manufacturing. In the EU, there is no big foundry for photonic integrated circuit.  

●  Where to invest money is an important issue and especially how to encourage investment in 
environmentally friendly technologies that could potentially increase production costs.   

—  Research, development & innovation  

●  R&D depends largely on EU and other funding. Venture capital is required to stimulate SME 
creation. In this regard, there are many EU SMEs but they have difficulties to scale up.   

●  The bibliometric analysis shows that there is a growing number of publications in China and 
also Japan in this area. Furthermore, Japan has a strong first-mover innovation culture.   

—  Regulation and standardisation  

●  The production outside of the EU often lacks regulation. This could impact work conditions, 
environment, and fundamental rights. But, also, it could affect the reliability of photonic 
integrated circuit if manufacturing is done in non-EU foundries and there would be less 
control on this factor.  

●  When electronics-photonics integration reaches a very large scale, AI embedded at chip level 
and not recognised by the user might become a regulatory issue. Therefore, photonics 
integrated circuit for AI or other industries (led, automotive, etc.) will require regulation.  

●  Setting standards will be important for achieving technological sovereignty.  

—  Other  

●  Cheap manufacturing capabilities exist outside the EU. Paired with very high governmental 

incentives in China, this means that the EU will have difficulties to compete.  

● 

Internalisation of external costs is another potential issue (but it applies to many other 
sectors too).  

●  High cost for sustaining the business operation could be also a challenge for the EU.   

24 

 
 
 
 
 
●  Geopolitical evolution might also affect future dependencies. 

Source: Authors, based on workshop discussion and interviews 

3.4.3  Actions  

The following actions have been proposed by the participants in order to address the challenges and 

bring opportunities for the EU:  

Table 7 - Mitigation actions proposed for integrated photonics 

—  Materials  

●  Conduct technology foresight processes to assess better potential criticalities, including all 
materials in use, understanding levels of dependency and identifying how they can be 
mitigated    

●  Diversify sources in terms of supply    

●  Explore alternatives of the critical raw materials with diverse producers or manufacturing 

processes    

—  Education, talent and skilled workforce   

● 

Incentivise the training of young researchers in integrated photonics through EU funded 
initiatives    

●  Continue promoting education in this domain equally across the EU    

● 

Invest in training for young graduates    

●  Offer attractive career opportunities for the talents    

●  Train young researchers with a very pragmatic hands-on approach in research laboratories 

and manufacturing facilities    

—  Components  

●  Create advanced business models for component manufacturing, including a strategic EU 

vision in this area   

—  Patents  

●  Have more EU funded projects in integrated photonics   

● 

Incentivise the projects to protect the IP through patents    

●  Assess what are priority vs other patents (where innovation originated and others for 

market and manufacturing reasons)    

—  Logistics  

●  Dismantle any obstacles for inward movement of talent (work visa, etc.) 

—  Investment  

●  Carefully govern investments from foreign financial operators through impact assessments. 
When big semiconductor manufacturing facilities (fabrication plants) proposed in certain 

25 

 
 
 
 
 
geographical areas, before granting authorisation, impact assessments are needed on 
economy, market, societal factors    

● 

Invest and improve EU packaging (final circuit assembly) capacity   

●  Further invest into integration of photonics and electronics is needed  

—  Research, development & innovation  

●  Retain the expertise in the EU  

●  Maintain the EU funding in this area  

●  Support academic and industrial R&D, especially for costly equipment 

—  Regulation and standardisation  

●  Govern investments and conduct impact assessment of investment    

●  Deal with the takeovers of successful start-ups through regulation and IP management   

●  Create a strong IP portfolio: financial operations involving the acquisition of strong IP 

portfolios in integrated photonics should be carefully considered with a specific regulatory 
framework, as it affects the IP sovereignty and strategic EU independence    

Source: Authors, based on workshop discussion and interviews 

In the survey, an additional action was mentioned on the need to establish mutual relationships with 

suppliers/producers  and  develop  new  EU  regulations  or  update  current  regulations  to  guarantee 

stability of these relationships. 

3.5  Space platform   providing critical in-orbit services and operations 

Workshop participants selected the deployment of a space platform (SP) as an enabling infrastructure 

to deliver in-orbit servicing (IOS) and operations, and as a critical capability to be developed by the 

EU.  

IOS includes maintaining, repairing and decommissioning operations for space assets, and even if it 

is  not  a  novel  capability,  its  importance  has  been  rising  in  recent  years,  due  to  the  increasing 

deployment of satellites and constellations.  

Space assets result from significant volumes of investment, and can continue to be useful after some 

critical resource have been exhausted or even if some key component or inherent technology has 

become obsolete (NASA, 2010). The concept of circularity applied to Space has gained attention over 

the  last  years.  Beyond  the  critical  function  of  reducing  collision  events,  and  extending  life-time, 

studies have also pointed to the financially viability of In-orbit services due to the economic value of 

waste  management  and  recycling  (Leonard  &  Williams,  2023)  (Saleh,  Lamassoure,  Hastings,  & 

Newmand, 2003). 

Therefore, it will be of significant importance to identify, develop and integrate the comprehensive 

26 

 
 
 
 
 
set  of  technologies  that  the  SP  will  require,  in  order  to  reduce  the  current  (or  risk  of  future)  EU 

overdependence on others in this field.  

3.5.1  Assessment   

The following capabilities and technologies are key for the development of IOS and include some low 

technology readiness levels (TRL) items that could represent future critical technologies (FCT):  

—  Robotic arms and other solutions that enable manipulation capabilities needed in 'rendezvous', 

such as docking and grabbing.  

—  High-precision  navigation,  sensing  and  visualisation  that  are  key  to  real  time  space 

surveillance and awareness (SSA) and again for the 'rendezvous' between two assets. Quantum 

sensing and imaging are FCT on this domain.  

—  AI  can  play  several  roles:  1)  to  support  the  operation  of  distributed  space  systems,  such  as 

swarms,  that  would  be  otherwise  impossible  to  control  (using  humans  only);  2)  to  provide 

autonomous operation capability, reducing the current high level of human intervention; and 3) 

for on-board processing (edge computing) that allows for a reduction in communications between 

the in-orbit and Earth.  

—  Satellite-to-satellite  communications  is  crucial  for  servicing  operations.  In  the  future, 

quantum encryption will be a mainstream technology used in this context.  

—  The  provision  of  materials  that  are  resistant  in  space  conditions,  namely  low-temperature 

electronics, radiation hardened electronics, thermal protection and radiation shielding 

for long-time permanence of humans in space (for which there is not yet a solution).  

—  Space propulsion, for which there is a current EU dependency, and re-entry systems.  

—  In-space manufacturing of components and fuel will take IOS to a next stage, by allowing 

maintenance  and  refuelling  operations  to  becoming  increasingly  autonomous  from  Earth 

provisions.  

IOS comprises a wide set of capabilities and applications. The SP will be a space asset that interacts 

with other objects in space, either through communication, monitoring, manoeuvring, docking (when 

necessary), protection from other space infrastructures or debris, but essentially intervening on other 

assets in operations such as: repairing, refuelling, de-commission (either by forcing re-entry or by 

recycling components), supporting construction (for instance for Earth-to-Moon missions). The SP is 

therefore important throughout the life cycle of those other assets.   

Considering the underlying technologies, IOS can play  a role  in counter-space operations, such as 

time, particularly relevant for state-to-state situations, but with the growing commercial exploration 

has been for a long 

27 

 
 
 
 
 
of space, the private sector will also play a critical role on delivering and on commissioning these 

services. On the other hand, dependence of states on private actors to deliver counter-space services 

is an issue that needs to be further discussed.   

Beyond  supporting  communication  and  imaging  satellites,  the  SP  will  be  a  key  asset  for  several 

commercial  business  models  and  applications  related  with  the  exploration  of  space.  In-space 

transportation (for Moon and Mars missions), exploration of space resources (such as asteroid mining) 

and energy generation and transportation will be dependent of a reliable and wide IOS infrastructure.  

Despite the clear need for IOS and the critical role that the SP could play in supporting commercial 

uses of space (such as the very promising and profitable asteroid mining), participants agreed that 

there is still some lack of clarity on how IOS in itself could generate profit in the short to medium 

term. They foresee that in the next 10 years, there will be a need for a significant public investment, 

supported  by  EU  and  MS  policies  that  will  address  the  market  gaps  until  businesses  are  fully 

sustainable.  

Figure 7 - A space satellite hovering above the coastline 

Source: SpaceX on Unsplash  

Participants highlighted other development trends, related technologies and drivers:  

28 

 
 
 
 
 
 
—  More autonomous operation, namely for servicing large fleets that will imply that humans will 

be less on the loop.  

—  Diversification of applications, connecting mechanisms, tools and technologies used.  

—  Possible consolidation of actors dependent on the success of business models, growth and 

dimensions  achieved  by  those  actors,  and  their  funding  source.  We  could  see  large  actors 

acquiring smaller ones in order to integrate technology solutions and building blocks. 

—  Standardisation is key to facilitate interoperability between space assets, and we can expect 

advances in this field.  

IOS is a dual use capability by nature considering that infrastructures such as the SP can service both 

civil  and  defence  related  assets.  Beyond  the  commercial  servicing,  and  as  already  mentioned, 

counter-space operations could be developed by the SP, namely surveillance of other objects but also 

neutralising and bringing down satellites. With its kinetic in orbit capability, the SP could also be easily 

weaponised, namely because it can put an object in collision route with others.  

3.5.2  Risks, challenges and future dependencies   

During the second workshop, participants identified 24 risks, challenges and dependencies among 9 

predefined groups of issues. The follow up survey gave an indication which ones could contribute 

more for the future criticality of In-orbit servicing. The following list summarises the main insights 

gathered through this process:  

Table 8 - Risks, challenges and future dependencies for space platform providing critical in-orbit services and operations 

—  Materials  

●  The two materials highlighted as critical in the future were:   

 

 

Lithium  

Titanium  

●  Other materials identified as baring risks were:   

  Carbon fibre composites  

 

Thermoset resins  

  High strength aluminium alloys  

—  Education, talent and a skilled workforce  

●  Human resources with interdisciplinary profiles such as cybersecurity, robotics, artificial 

intelligence, machine learning, additive manufacturing or quantum technologies, and also 
legal advisors 

29 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
—  Components & technologies  

●  The most risky issue among the 24 is a critical component for space assets and operations: 
reliable electronics able to operate in space environment (resistance to low temperature, 
radiations, vacuum, etc.)  

● 

●  Other issues raised by participants, include:  

  Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components  

 

 

 

Precision manipulators  

Sensors for computer vision  

Integrated photonics  

  On-board AI and data processing  

  Access to quantum-based technologies. (e.g., sensing, communications and 

cryptography) 

—  Patents  

●  This was not considered as a potential problem for in-orbit servicing 

—  Logistics  

● 

In this domain, two challenges were highlighted as the second more risky issue among the 
24, namely:   

  Access to space  

 

In-space propulsion  

—  Investment  

●  EU companies relocating to the US will pose a challenge for further advancing European 

autonomy and economic relevance in space 

—  Research, development & innovation  

●  R&D&I is an area that participants highlighted as of high importance for In-orbit servicing, 
and where the EU should invest today to build and reinforce its technological sovereignty 

●  There is also a high entry barrier for SMEs due to lack of national and EU funding for 

developing industrial R&D&I lab and prototyping/manufacturing infrastructure related to up-
stream space 

●  Participants also pointed to the 'lack of partnerships between academia and industry' as a 

medium impact challenge 

—  Regulation and standardisation  

●  This cluster of issues does not include those that are significantly high risk. Nevertheless, 

some topics were pointed out during the process:  

 

Ethical and regulatory frameworks impeding innovation  

30 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Standards and guidelines (dependence on and influence from the US)  

  Outdated global regulatory framework for conduct in outer space and liability  

—  Other  

●  Limited choice of non-EU collaboration partners due to geopolitical tensions (for example, 

Russia)  

●  The need to develop 'space situational awareness' capabilities  

Source: Authors, based on workshop discussion and interviews 

To sum up, we should point out that the biggest risk and challenge for the future on In-orbit servicing 

is connected with the development of specific electronic components, suitable for operations in space 

(either the current on-Earth production of such components, but also in the future, their production 

in space). The need for more experts, as for other critical technologies, poses challenges to the EU in 

the domain of Space. Although it is an issue shared by other geographies, it could limit EU

from R&I to operations. The supply of critical raw materials such as Lithium and Titanium was also 

highlighted, as was the access to space for the deployment of assets, a domain where the EU is, 

already today, over-dependent on others. On the more business and economic dimension, the EU risks 

seeing its businesses move to the US, where private venture capital investment is more abundant. 

The need for more private investment in the space industry was also raised by some participants.  

3.5.3  Actions  

The  following  actions  were  proposed  by  participants  to  address  the  risks,  challenges  and 

dependencies mentioned before, and develop a stronger EU strategic autonomy on In-orbit services.   

Actions are organised through 9 clusters of issues. They can address more than one challenge. As the 

workshop  methodology  included  the  use  of  wild  cards  (highly  impactful  and  highly  improbable 

events), some actions address the need to mitigate specific risks that arise from  such events, but 

also aim to develop systemic resilience to handle a diverse set of risks.  

Table 9 - Mitigation actions proposed for space platform providing critical in-orbit services and operations 

—  Materials 

●  Establish EU bodies or organisations to monitor this issue, namely supply chain challenges 

●  Look for alternative technologies to avoid dependency on some raw materials 

—  Education, talent and a skilled workforce   

●  Attract qualified workers from other sectors, namely from the automotive industry, where a 
large existing work force could be converted and trained to work in the space industry 

●  Develop more innovation-led education, namely higher engagement of students with industry  

31 

 
 
 
 
 
●  Create a professional association that recognises workers in Space, increasing this sectors 

brand value, the feeling of belonging and its overall attractiveness 

—  Components & technologies  

● 

Increase the number of EU Member States with manufacturing capacity for electronics 
capable of operating in space 

—  Patents  

●  Reduce the costs on intellectual property protection 

—  Logistics  

●  Develop technologies for faster and easier access to space 

—  Investment  

●  Encourage more risk taking when investing in space technologies and capabilities 

● 

Increase the engagement between public sector (at EU and Member State level) and private 
sector (industries) in order to align strategic directions in terms of private and public 
investment 

—  Research, development & innovation  

●  Encourage the cross-fertilisation of outputs for EU-funded projects to other initiatives 

●  Develop more links across sectors and application domains 

● 

-education and research organisations 

●  Develop funding programmes to boost excellence in research and innovation in space 

research, through programmes, such as the Marie Curie Actions (European Research Executive 
Agency) 

—  Regulation and standardisation  

● 

—  Other  

●  Establish and develop good international relations across the geopolitical dimension, to 

increase or reinforce partnerships  

Source: Authors, based on workshop discussion and interviews 

32 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4  Conclusions and recommendations 

The outcome of the participatory foresight exercise suggested 46 emerging technologies, which could 

have a disruptive impact for the space, defence and civil domain.  

Among those, the following four were perceived by participants as potentially critical in the future:  

—  quantum communications and cryptography, including post-quantum cryptography;  

—  nuclear micro-reactors;  

—  integrated photonics; and 

—  space platform as an enabling infrastructure for the delivery of In-orbit servicing.  

These  4  technology  domains,  represent  different  levels  of  granularity,  in  both  the  level  of  detail 

covered by this report and the use case applications that are foreseen. This is a result of, among 

other factors, the limitations of the methodology and the maturity level of these technologies. 

There are several issues common across the four technologies, which were perceived as future risks 

and challenges that the EU may face. Those four challenges were assessed in more detail and relate 

to the lack of talent and skilled workforce, risk of a brain drain, the need to support EU start-ups and 

the importance for the EU to have an active role in standardisation.  

It  is  also  interesting  to  note  the  interconnection  among  these  four  technologies  from  both  the 

perspective of their development and interdependency as well as the common risks and challenges 

they face. For example, integrated photonics will play a significant role for quantum communication 

technologies  and the  two of  them  will be  needed  for  the  development  of in-orbit  space  services. 

Small nuclear devices are also explored for providing power for extended space exploration missions. 

(21) Consequently, acting upon the future risks of one of these technologies would have a beneficial 

effect on one or several of them. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  dual  use,  all  these  technologies  appear  to  have  both  civil  and  military 

related applications, which - as raised in the desk research and the workshops - is an opportunity to 

create synergies in terms of research and investment. But at the same, may subject them to EU rules 

on export control (22). 

In  terms  of  funding  mechanisms,  the  EU  already  covers  in  some  degree  these  four  technology 

domains.  Initiatives  such  as  Horizon  Europe  (23),  including  its  programmes  like  the  European 

Tanarro Colodron, J. and Freis, D., Nuclear power in space, Simola, K., Goulart De Medeiros, M. and 

(21) 
Konings, R. editor(s), European Commission - Joint Research Centre, Petten, 2022, JRC131078  
(22)  
a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use 
items. 
(23)  

Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up 

Horizon Europe (europa.eu) 

33 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Innovation Council (24), the European Partnerships (25), the Space Programme (26) and the Flagships 

(27), address funding needs across several technology readiness levels, and aim to bridge early-stage 

research  to  market  and  scaling-up.  Nevertheless,  the  pace  of  technological  breakthroughs,  and 

development of novel applications and solutions of already known technologies, demand a systematic 

exercise of selection and priorisation of funding topics. And most especially a detailed analysis of 

funding  needs  and  gaps  that  if  addressed,  could  support  researchers,  businesses  and  industrial 

clusters to consolidate the European space and defence industrial ecosystems. 

Figure 8   An integrated circuit 

Source: Manuel on Unsplash 

Further detailed analysis is recommended to assess the full scope of the opportunities and challenges 

that this set of technologies bear. As well as the synergies that need to be explored between the 

space, defence and related civil industries, and identify what policies still need to be put in place to 

encourage  the  right  R&I  and  business  environment. This  analysis includes (among  others):  supply 

chain  analysis,  technology  roadmaps  (when  still  needed)  and  risk  assessments.  As  well  as 

sustainability analysis, considering the global challenges related with the sourcing of raw materials 

and  the  lifecycle  of  equipment  and  infrastructures. Even  if  some  cross-cutting  issues  are  already 

(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
(27) 

European Innovation Council (europa.eu) 
European Partnerships in Horizon Europe (europa.eu) 
Space Programme (europa.eu) 

34 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
 
highlighted in this conclusion, the authors consider that further steps should  focus on deepen the 

knowledge on these cross-cutting issues and include a multi-criteria analysis. 

It is important to note that this foresight exercise does not present a deterministic forecast, but is 

based  on  a  qualitative  and  participatory  process,  which  helps  identifying  and  exploring  possible 

upcoming developments and issues perceived as important for the future.  

35 

 
 
 
 
 
Annex 1 

Description of the foresight methodology applied and intermediary 
results 

1 

Introduction 

This  document  describes  the  specific  foresight  methodology  applied  for  the  development  of  the 

technology  foresight  activity.  Technology  foresight  (TF)  covers  a  broad  range of  technologies  and 

analyses the applications and diffusion of technology including the societal context of technology 

applications (Rader & Porter, 2008). 

This exercise aimed to highlight what are the future critical technologies for EU in a time span of 5+ 

years. By future critical technologies in this context we mean, technologies and their applications that 

bear simultaneously a) a future risk of overdependence of the EU on others and b) a high impact on 

the fields of space, defence and related civil industries. These emergent and potentially disruptive 

technologies are crucial to keep the role of the EU as a world leader in several economic sectors.  

The  TF  process  developed  and  applied  specifically  for  this  exercise  comprises  a  combination  of 

several  known  methodologies,  namely  desk  research,  horizon  scanning,  sense  making  workshops, 

small scale targeted surveys and interviews with experts. This participatory process involved experts 

coming  from  both  inside  and  outside  the  European  institutions,  representing  several  policy  and 

business domains and technology fields of expertise.  

Through the literature review and the workshops, we tried to cover space, defence and related civil 

industries  from  different  perspectives, 

including  the  military  and  security  side  and  the 

commercialisation and industrialisation of space, as well as the issue of dual use technologies (for 

example, technologies that may be applied both in civil and military domains). 

The outputs of this TF process present a low to medium level of granularity on what concerns the 

definition of technologies and the drivers and enabling conditions that encourage their development. 

The  objective  of  this  TF  process  was  not  to  provide  a  comprehensive  assessment  of  what  these 

technologies are and could be, but to raise the emergent opportunities and challenges they carry, 

some of them probably below the radar of most policy makers, so they could be later on researched 

and assessed in detail. It is, therefore, an exploratory work developed to support technology foresight 

activities,  namely  by  highlighting  some  of  the  technologies  that  should  be  the  focus  of  further 

detailed analysis during the upcoming years. 

36 

 
 
 
 
 
  
 
2  Process 

The  foresight  process  applied  in  this  case  was  a  combination  of  several  foresight  methods  that 

complemented  each  other.  The  aim  was  to  capture  different  sources  and  perspectives  and  to 

triangulate and validate the outputs produced by the different methods. 

The process, including 7 stages, is summarised in Figure 9 and described in more detail in sections 3 

to 9 of this annex. 

Figure 9 - Foresight process developed and applied for technology foresight activities in 2022 

1

2

3

4

5

6

Desk 
research.

Horizon 
scanning

Workshop 
1

Survey     

1

Workshop 
2

Additional 
interviews      

7

Survey    
2

Source: Authors 

3  Desk research 

Objectives 

The objectives of the desk research were: 

—  Identify  drivers,  enabling  conditions,  opportunities  and  challenges  related  with  technology 

development & adoption in the areas of space, defence and related civil industries; 

—  Identify key disruptive and emergent technologies;  

—  Group technologies into clusters that could be used along the process. 

Description 

The first step was to identify what the relevant sources for this brief literature review should be. The 

selected sources focus on the military, security and space applications of technologies. 

other organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the European Defence 

 Corporation and the Royal United 

Services Institute (RUSI) from the United Kingdom. The authors can provide the research report and 

the complete list of sources upon request. 

The research was divided in two mains steps and outputs. The first was to identify drivers, enabling 

conditions, opportunities and challenges related with technology development & adoption. A STEEP - 

Social, Technological, Economical, Environmental and (Geo) Political   framework was used to identify 

and group these issues. It is often difficult to classify drivers in a single dimension of STEEP and when 

37 

 
 
 
 
 
 
approaching issues related with technology we mostly see strong connections between that driver 

and  the  others.  Social,  Economic,  Environmental  and  (Geo)  Political  aspects,  drive  technology 

development strongly and the majority of the topics actually play in two or more of these dimensions. 

For  that  reason,  an  alternative  grouping  of  drivers  was  used,  using  combinations  of  the  STEEP 

dimensions.  

Table 10 - Six combinations of the STEEP dimensions and 30 topics identified for the foresight exercise  

—  Social and technological 

●  Regulatory and ethical frameworks of emergent and disruptive technologies (EDA, 2021) (Moro, 

Vetere Arellano, Farulli, Hristova, & Krzysztofowicz, 2021) (Eulaerts, Joanny, & Fragkiskos, 2022) (Blumenthal, Hottes, Foran, & Lee, 
2021) 

●  Organisational challenges resulting from the use of unmanned platforms in the battlefield 

(EDA, 2021) 

●  Human capital and the skills of the 21st century soldier (Moro, Vetere Arellano, Farulli, Hristova, & 

Krzysztofowicz, 2021) (NATO, 2020) 

●  Citizens expectations with digital inclusion and privacy protection (NATO, 2020) 

—  Social and environmental 

●  Evolving concept of security, extending beyond the military realm (EDA, 2021) (Moro, Vetere Arellano, 

Farulli, Hristova, & Krzysztofowicz, 2021) 

●  New roles for the military, including emergency and disaster management and dealing with 

non-controllable movements of the population (EDA, 2021) 

—  Social and (geo)political 

●  Support for common defence and security from EU citizens (European Commission, 2022) 

●  Changing nature of warfare, including increased mobility, indirect means and private actors 

(Kaushal, 2019) (EDA, 2021) (Moro, Vetere Arellano, Farulli, Hristova, & Krzysztofowicz, 2021)  

●  Citizens as intelligence providers and misinformation in an increasing hybridisation of 

conflicts (EDA, 2021) 

—  Technological and economic 

● 

● 

● 

nvestment in R&I behind China and the US (Eulaerts, Joanny, & Fragkiskos, 2022) 

Increasing 
Commission, 2021) 

awareness and support for the development of critical technologies (European 

Increasing costs of defence and technology advantage (Barnes, 2019) (Moro, Vetere Arellano, Farulli, Hristova, 
& Krzysztofowicz, 2021) 

●  Public perception of defence and security funding (NATO, 2020) 

●  Data as an economic resource as important as water, food, energy and raw materials (NATO, 

2020) 

● 

Innovation networks and ecosystems joining industry, government and academia (NATO, 2020) 

●  Space becomes a contested, complex and democratised landscape with more state and 

private actors and new threats (Moro, Vetere Arellano, Farulli, Hristova, & Krzysztofowicz, 2021) (Black, Slapakova, & 
Martin, 2022)  (EDA, 2021) (NATO, 2020) (Stickings, 2019) 

38 

 
 
 
 
 
●  Wide range of space use cases connected with terrestrial and hybrid economic activities (Black, 

Slapakova, & Martin, 2022) 

—  Technological and (geo)political 

●  Future conflict operating environment shaped by several issues, such as situational 

awareness, electromagnetic spectrum and less command-and control architectures (Moro, Vetere 
Arellano, Farulli, Hristova, & Krzysztofowicz, 2021) (Bronk, 2019) 

●  Cyberspace consolidated as a battleground with the emergence of electronic warfare and the 

growing power of private actors (EDA, 2021) 

●  Technologies such as data science and automated decision-making have not delivered the 

expected or assumed decisive edge, showing the current limitations on the use of technology 
(Roberts, 2019) 

●  Russian investment in biotechnology sector with a key role from the private sector (Blumenthal, 

Hottes, Foran, & Lee, 2021) 

●  China access to health data causing security risks (Blumenthal, Hottes, Foran, & Lee, 2021) 

●  USA and China as q

 (Parker, 2021) 

●  European technological sovereignty in the defence sector depending on further industrial 

development and integration (Moro, Vetere Arellano, Farulli, Hristova, & Krzysztofowicz, 2021) 

●  Control of space as the high ground, leads to the control of land and sea (Stickings, 2019) 

—  Economic and (geo)political 

●  Awareness about the importance of geopolitical cohesion and a common European defence 

policy (Moro, Vetere Arellano, Farulli, Hristova, & Krzysztofowicz, 2021) 

●  Cooperation is key to address funding challenges, through better institutional coordination 

and connecting the different financial sources and mechanisms (NATO, 2020) 

●  Synergies between civil security, defence and space industries are fundamental to reach 

critical mass (European Commission, 2021) (Moro, Vetere Arellano, Farulli, Hristova, & Krzysztofowicz, 2021)  

●  Disruption of international supply chains in the defence sector and emergency of new actors 

(Moro, Vetere Arellano, Farulli, Hristova, & Krzysztofowicz, 2021) 

●  New energy sources, critical resources and other economic drivers will lead to new domains of 

potential confrontation and types of conflict (EDA, 2021) 

Source: Selection and clustering done by Authors using findings in the bibliographic references  

The second step was to identify trends, strong and weak signals related to emerging, disruptive and 

critical  technologies  and innovations,  in  the  context  of  space,  defence  and  related  civil  industries. 

These concepts (emerging, disruptive and critical) were not used as interchangeable, but as part of 

the wide range of relevant classifications for this work. In the same sense, the range was extended 

to  include  both  technologies  (including  enabling  technologies  and  materials)  and  innovations  (as 

products  of  an  innovative  combination  or  applications  of  technologies  that  might  not  be  new 

themselves).  These  technologies  manifest  themselves  through  trends  and  signals  that  present 

several grades of manifestation, consolidation and novelty. All of these were considered.  

The insights were clustered in six main groups, and a series of sub-groups as shown in Table 11. 

39 

 
 
 
 
 
Table 11 - Main groups and sub-groups for clustering desk research insights  

—  Digital & connectivity  

●  Cybersecurity 

●  Advanced computing 

●  Quantum enabled technologies 

●  Artificial intelligence 

●  Disinformation & misinformation 

●  Data 

●  Connectivity 

●  Systems 

—  Mobility & weapons 

●  General trends 

●  Unmanned military systems 

●  New types of weapons 

—  Space 

●  General trends 

●  Emerging technologies 

●  Defence 

●  Operations and energy 

—  Human performance enhancement 

●  General trends 

●  Bio and gene engineering 

● 

Internet of the body (IoB), prosthetics and exoskeletons 

—  Novel components and materials & manufacturing 

●  Components and devices 

●  Novel materials and manufacturing 

●  Semiconductors and microelectronics 

—  Energy 

●  General trends 

●  Energy storage 

Source: Clustering done by Authors using findings in the following bibliographic references: (NATO, 2020) (Moro, Vetere Arellano, Farulli, 
Hristova, & Krzysztofowicz, 2021) (Eulaerts, Joanny, & Fragkiskos, 2022) (Blumenthal, Hottes, Foran, & Lee, 2021) (Parker, 2021) (EDA, 
2021) (Black, Slapakova, & Martin, 2022) (National Science and Technology Council, 2022) (NATO Science & Technology Organization, 
2020) (Roberts et al., 2019). 

40 

 
 
 
 
 
The number of signals in each one of these groups is different, due to the fact that some domains 

are emergent and still do not bear a significant number of use cases. Nevertheless, it was important 

to highlight the main fields where we can foresee future developments in research, innovation and 

technology adoption. 

Outputs 

A report containing a summary of the insights collected through the desk research, was produced and 

shared  in  advance  with  the  participants  of  Workshop  1  (step  3  of  the  foresight  process),  as  a 

complementary source of signals. The authors can provide the research report and the complete list 

of sources upon request. 

This  report  also  helped  the  foresight  team  to  build  a  basic  understanding  on  what  are  the  most 

pressing issues and the most relevant technologies in the scope of the space, defence and related 

civil industries. This was important to design and run the workshops with experts, as it allowed the 

team to better facilitate the discussions. 

4  Horizon scanning 

Objectives 

Scan for signals and trends on emerging and disruptive technologies and innovations. 

Description: 

Horizon scanning is a foresight methodology aimed at the early discovery of developments or events 

not yet on the radar of most experts, decision-makers, or the general public. It is not a predictive tool, 

but rather a qualitative exploration of possible future novelties still at the margins of mainstream 

knowledge, and it helps to think about the directions of such novelties, their current uncertainties, 

potential  configurations,  plausible  impacts,  and  more.  It  can  reveal  blind  spots  in  the  collective 

knowledge and expose us to what to expect from what we do not know that we do not know, our 

unknown u

assessment of specific signals.  

When applied in technology foresight, it aims to identify signals related with emerging and disruptive 

technologies, innovations and connected issues, such as drivers, enabling conditions, opportunities 

and challenges. And, in the context of this exercise, signals related specifically with the use of dual 

use technologies in space, defence and related civil industries. 

For the participation in the horizon scanning, the 2 workshops and the 2 surveys of this project, the 

authors launched an invitation for participation to experts, coming from inside and outside of the 

European  Institutions.  The  final  group  of  about  20  participants,  contained  multiple  profiles  (from 

41 

 
 
 
 
 
policy makers, business

 representatives, associations  representatives, researchers from research 

and technology organisations, academia and consultants), all coming from relevant policy, scientific, 

technological or industrial domains. 

Participants in Workshop 1 (see next point) were invited to submit such signals through a specifically 

designed  webpage  at  the  European  Commission

  (28).  With  this  request,  a 

document with detailed information was sent, namely containing the definition of 'horizon scanning' 

and 'signal', and instructions about what each submission should include: a title, a brief description, 

a justification of the relevance and its source.  

Outputs 

About 60 signals were received and analysed. Signals that were found duplicated, incomplete or that 

did not relate with the purpose of the exercise were removed.  

A total of 50 signals were then selected, compiled in a report and shared back with all the participants. 

The authors can provide the full list of horizon scanning items upon request.  

Together with the desk research findings, signals were used to prepare Workshop 1 (see Point 5). 

5  Workshop 1  

Objectives  

The  first  technology  foresight  workshop  focused  on  emerging  and  disruptive  technologies,  main 

drivers,  enabling  conditions,  opportunities  and  challenges  in  the  research,  development  and 

application of technologies in the defence, space and related civil industries. It took place online on 

26 and 27 September 2022.  

This  participatory  workshop  was  part  of  the  horizon  scanning  process.  This  sense-making  session 

built on the desk research, the horizon scanning process and the expertise of the participants. Ahead 

of  the  workshops,  participants  were  invited  to  submit,  through  an  online  tool,  signals  related  to 

emerging and disruptive technologies for the horizon scanning process, as described in the previous 

point.  

Process  

Participants received 50 signals ahead of the workshop. These signals were clustered in four groups 

(see  below).  Considering  the  asymmetric  number  of  signals  in  each  of  the  six  technology  groups 

defined during the desk research, some of them were merged and renamed, as follows: 

Launched in 2013, EUSurvey is the European Commission's official survey management tool. Its 

(28) 
main purpose is to create official surveys of public opinion and forms for internal communication and staff 
management. https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/ 

42 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
—  Digital and connectivity; 

—  Mobility, autonomous systems, weapons and human performance enhancement; 

—  Space; and 

—  Novel components and materials, and energy. 

During  the  workshop,  participants  were  asked  to  select  and  prioritise  the  most  relevant  signals 

through collaborative work and discuss challenges and opportunities. Day 1 focused on prioritising 

the  50  signals  and  adding  new  ones  if  needed.  Day  2  focused  on  discussing  challenges  and 

opportunities for users, policymakers and businesses for selected technologies. 

Outputs 

As mentioned above, the discussion and prioritisation were organised around four main groups of 

technologies  and  results  are  presented  in  table  12.  Some  of  the  output  relates  to  capabilities  as 

participants perceived them as equally important.  

Table 12 - Prioritised list of emerging and disruptive technologies 

—  Digital & connectivity 

●  Cognitive computing continuum for better resource management 

●  Quantum communications and cryptography, including post-quantum cryptography, precision 

navigation and timing 

●  Dependable AI   technically robust and respecting laws, standards and regulations 

●  Cloud-fog-edge computing continuum 

●  Edge AI, including cyber security of edge AI devices 

●  Cognitive digital twin 

●  Quantum sensing, including assured precision, navigation and timing 

●  Broadband connectivity in 6G 

●  Frugal (low-cost and easy deployable) AI 

●  Underwater real time communications 

—  Novel components and materials, manufacturing and energy 

●  Nuclear micro-reactors 

●  3D/4D printing in combination with AI and big data and advanced analytics 

●  New materials and/or innovations in energy storage and transport, including novel battery 

chemistries 

●  Recycling / substitution of critical raw materials / devices 

● 

Integrated photonics 

43 

 
 
 
 
 
●  Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASIC) / Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) / 

embedded FPGA design 

●  Gallium nitride (GaN) power electronics, including packaging 

—  Mobility, autonomous systems and human performance enhancement 

●  Xenobots, neurobots, and other bio-hybrid molecular and nano-bots 

●  Exoskeletons and protective skin 

●  Directed Energy (DE) technology 

●  Hypersonic vehicles 

● 

Internet of the body things (IoBT) 

●  Multidomain swarming (Space, Air, Water, Ground) 

●  Brain-computer interfaces (BCI) and Augmented / Virtual reality (AR/VR) 

●  Unmanned ground vehicles (UGV) 

●  Bio-sensors and bio-informatics 

●  Miniaturised communications and sensor systems 

●  Electromagnetic shielding 

—  Space 

●  Reusable vehicles and components, including plug and play architectures 

●  Manufacturing SpaceVerse and In-space assembly manufacturing (ISAM) 

● 

In-orbit servicing (IOS) platforms, Active debris removal (ADR) and End-of-life (EOL) services 

●  Space surveillance 

●  Space based solar power and power networks 

●  Lightweight radiation resistant materials for deep space human exploration 

●  Scaled-up, low-cost manufacturing of nano-systems and materials for space 

●  New designs for heat shields, sensors and other sub-systems 

●  Low temperature electronics and semiconductor technologies for 'natural' in-space operation 

and quantum computers 

●  Radiation hardened electronics 

●  Frequency hopping or Direct sequence code division multiple access (CDMA) 

●  Satellite security   protection from cyberattacks, high-powered lasers, and electronic warfare 

●  Emerging high-precision geodesy 

●  On-board AI-based data processing 

●  Nuclear thermal-propulsion 

44 

 
 
 
 
 
●  Satellite swarms 

● 

Internet of space things (IoST) 

●  Sustainable fuels and launch cycles 

Source: Authors. 

6  Survey 1 

Objectives 

The objective of the first survey was to assess the emerging and disruptive technologies identified 

during Workshop 1 in terms of their future impact and risk of future EU overdependence on others. 

The purpose was to produce a shortlist of future critical technologies, assess which of them should 

be further analysed in Workshop 2 and in which domains there could be a higher criticality. 

Description 

The survey was developed to provide additional insights for Workshop 2 (next step 5 in the foresight 

process), based on the results of workshop 1 (previous step 3 of the process). Considering the scope 

of the overall foresight exercise and the number of respondents (low and limited to only some of the 

participants)  the  results  cannot  be  considered  fully  representative,  and  the  findings  should  be 

analysed carefully. Nevertheless, 

be considered as part of the qualitative method of the sense making workshops. 

Beside the initial questions on the profile of participants, there were four sections of questions, one 

for each of the four technology fields used in Workshop 1, namely:  

—  Digital and connectivity; 

—  Mobility, autonomous systems, weapons and human performance enhancement; 

—  Space; and 

—  Novel components and materials, and energy. 

In each section, participants graded the listed capabilities, technologies and innovations according to 

their: 

—  level of future impact in space, defence and related civil Industries, in a time horizon of 5+ years, 

through a scale of 1 (low impact) to 5 (high impact); 

—  risk of future EU overdependence on others in a time horizon of 5+ years, through a scale of 1 

(low risk) to 5 (high risk). 

In each section participants also: 

—  selected one of the capabilities, technologies and innovations that was top graded in the previous 

answer on dependency, to be assessed in more detail. 

45 

 
 
 
 
 
—  Having the previous answer in mind, assessed the level of future EU dependency, through a scale 

of 1 (low dependency) to 5 (high dependency), in the following domains: 

●  Critical raw materials supply; 

●  Education, talent and skilled workforce; 

●  Components; 

●  Patents; 

●  Logistics; 

● 

Investment; 

●  Research, development & innovation; and 

●  Regulation and standardisation. 

Outputs 

As mentioned before, these survey results have to be analysed carefully. Even if they confirmed some 

of the insights gathered during the conversations held in Workshop 1 and were later validated by 

experts during Workshop 2, the low number of responses limits their representativeness. 

Capabilities,  technologies  and  innovations  were  ordered  through  a  rating  formula  that  took  into 

account the average level of future impact, the average risk of future EU overdependence and the 

number of votes. The formula is the following: 

rating 

The list of top voted items is the following: 

—  Quantum communications and cryptography, including post-quantum cryptography; 

—  Nuclear micro-reactors; 

—  Multidomain swarming (Space, Air, Water, Ground); 

—  Miniaturised communications and sensor systems; 

—  Integrated photonics; 

—  New  materials  and/or  innovations  in  energy  storage  and  transport,  including  novel  battery 

chemistries; 

—  Space surveillance; 

—  Quantum sensing, including assured precision, navigation and timing; 

—  Radiation hardened electronics; 

—  In-orbit servicing (IOS) platforms, Active debris removal (ADR) and End-of-life (EOL) services; and  

—  Broadband connectivity in 6G. 

From these items, participants were invited to select which critical technologies should be assessed 

46 

 
 
 
 
 
 
in more detail during Workshop 2 and later be mentioned in the final report, as explained in the next 

step. 

7  Workshop 2 

The second workshop tool place online on 25 and 26 October 2022.  

The objectives were to explore future critical technologies and use results of survey 1 (previous step 

in the foresight process) to go more in-depth into particular technologies and explore the potential 

future dependencies, risks, challenges and opportunities. 

The results from the previous Workshop 1, as well as from the survey were used as starting point. 

Participants were asked to look at the results and agree on the technology they consider the most 

critical for the future. Four technologies were identified as the most critical for the future of the EU: 

—  Quantum computing; 

—  Integrated photonics; 

—  Nuclear micro-reactors; and 

—  Space platform for in-orbit servicing. 

The results of this workshop are described in more detail in Section 3 of the main report. 

8  Additional interviews 

Based on the output of Workshop 2, additional interviews were conducted to refine and validate the 

results of the workshop with in-house experts from the European Commission Joint Research Centre 

and other Directorates-General. They were asked to assess and elaborate on the same issues that 

were discussed in the workshop. These interviews helped us  better  understand the topic and  dive 

deeper into certain areas of dependencies, risks and challenges related to four technologies discussed 

above. The results of the interviews have been merged with the overall results of the workshop and 

survey. 

9  Survey 2 

Objectives 

The objectives of the survey was to evaluate and quantify risks highlighted in the previous workshop 

and to collect additional proposals of actions to address risks. 

Description 

As for the previous one, Survey 2 was developed to provide additional insights following Workshop 2 

and was carried out through EUSurvey with all responses being anonymous. 

Considering the scope of the overall foresight exercise and the relatively low number of respondents, 

47 

 
 
 
 
 
despite their expertise in these fields, the findings should be analysed with caution. Nevertheless, it 

was a useful step to highlight and validate some of the insights that participants produced during 

Workshop 2. 

Beside the initial questions regarding the participants

, there were four sections of questions 

addressing each one of the four critical technologies that were selected and assessed by participants 

in Workshop 2: 

—  Quantum communications and cryptography; 

—  Nuclear micro-reactors; 

—  Integrated photonic; and 

—  In-orbit servicing. 

Inside each section participants: 

—  Selected, from a previous list, the group of issues in which the EU should invest today to build 

and reinforce its technological sovereignty. The groups, previously used in Survey 1 and Workshop 

2 are as follows: 

●  Critical raw materials supply; 

●  Education, talent and skilled workforce; 

●  Components; 

●  Patents; 

●  Logistics; 

● 

Investment; 

●  Research, development & innovation; and 

●  Regulation and standardisation. 

—  Graded a list of future risks and challenges the EU may face in a time horizon of 5+ years. This 

list was developed in Workshop 2 and is specific for each one of the four technologies. Risks were 

rated from 1 (low impact) to 5 (high impact). 

—  Provided additional risks and challenges not envisaged in the previous list. 

—  Suggested actions the EU should put in place to address one or more of risks mentioned in the 

previous answers. 

Outputs 

The outputs of the survey are not sufficiently representative due to the low number of responses 

received.  Nevertheless,  they  provide  important  hints  on  which  risks  and  challenges  should  be  the 

focus of closer attention, and therefore some of the insights were included. 

48 

 
 
 
 
 
10 Final remarks and lessons-learned 

As descried in this annex, this was an iterative process, where each step produced outputs that feed 

into subsequent phases. The knowledge management and the intermediate results are summarise in 

figure 10. 

Figure 10 - Summary of the knowledge management and intermediate outputs of the process. 

Source: Authors. 

The technology foresight methodology applied in this exercise was decisive to reach the proposed 

objectives. Through a multi-stakeholder and participatory process, it delivered a short list of future 

critical technologies across different fields of applications within the scope of the space, defence and 

related civil industries. It has also supported a high-level assessment of eventual risks, challenges 

and  dependencies  surrounding  those  critical  technologies  and  raised  potential  actions  to  address 

them.  The  applied  foresight  approach  started  with  the  identification  of  a  significant  amount  of 

information  on  signals  and  trends  surrounding  technologies  in  space,  defence  and  related  civil 

industries, and throughout the consecutive steps of sense making, clustering and prioritisation, ended 

up in a summarised list of critical technologies and related issues.  

These findings are therefore a product of the collective intelligence created through a participatory 

process with a particular group of experts and should be complemented by other sources. It provides 

a high-level analysis of technologies that are still emergent and not completely well known. They 

bear a certain level of uncertainty and their detailed features and future developments should be 

assessed and monitored further on. As stated in the introduction, the main objective of this foresight 

process was to support ongoing and future policy making processes and open up the discussion about 

different possible future developments and not to forecast how exactly the future will look like. 

49 

 
 
 
 
 
 
In terms of lessons-learned, several opportunities for improvements were identified throughout this 

foresight process. These are an important considerations to take into account for similar technology 

foresight exercises: 

—  Scope 

●  Scoping, defining the objectives and the expected outputs and outcomes of a foresight exercise, 
especially in the context of a larger assessment work, is of crucial importance. Technology 
foresight enables a better understanding of the complexity and the possibilities of future 
technology developments and applications. Therefore, it does not aim to produce deterministic 
conclusions, but rather to scan the horizon, make sense of information and raise possible 
developments, in order to anticipate better and shape future policies. It is a distinct exercise 
from assessing current technologies, namely their applications, manufacturing and supply chain 
issues.  

●  Having this in mind, there is a margin to explore and improve how these two functions connect 

and complement each other, namely how foresight outputs could inspire further future-oriented 
technology assessments.  

● 

It is also important to understand how foresight could further support eventual policy initiatives 
that arise in the context of the action plan on synergies between civil, defence and space 
industries.  This would help to further shape the process and its outputs in order to better meet 
the needs of policymakers. 

—  Experts 

●  The efficiency of participatory methods is linked with the level of engagement that is 

established with participants, ways of harvesting their knowledge and what they perceive to gain 
from participating.  

● 

In technology, foresight processes there is an additional challenge regarding the need to engage 
highly qualified experts, usually over a wide scope of technology fields and representing 
different types of stakeholders. Therefore, there is a limited number of potential participants 
that meet these criteria, and the ones that do so, often have limited time to engage with such 
exercises. 

●  On the other hand, the networking dimension, the opportunity to contribute individually to high 

level policy making processes and keeping up with the latest developments on their field, are 
some of the key motivational dimensions that stakeholders value, when engaging in such 
processes. 

●  The establishment of expert panels and/or communities organised according to technology 
groups and/or domains of application could be a solution to improve expert engagement. 
Participants could interact periodically in these forums, and when needed, they could be quickly 
invited to provide insights for the foresight process, namely through horizon scanning, 
workshops, surveys and interviews. 

—  Workshops 

●  Technologies, such as video-conferencing and collaborative digital canvas provide us today, 
especially since the COVID-19 pandemic, with valuable tools to support online collaborative 
processes, that otherwise would be challenging in terms of logistics, time and cost. 

●  Organising online collaborative workshops, where experts meet virtually to discuss pressing 

topics following a predefined method, has become the most common option. This allowed 
organisations, such as the European Commission, to continue to engage internally and externally 

50 

 
 
 
 
 
even with travelling and meeting restrictions, and to do so in a quick and easy way, and 
participants to spend less time travelling and organising their trips. 

●  Nevertheless, the use of online tools and processes, even if bearing some level of efficiency, 
does not replace completely in-person sessions. Empirical experience shows us that in offline 
sessions participants get more committed to the process, and the quality and number of insights 
generated in such sessions is higher when compared with online ones. Therefore, in future 
exercises it would be advisable to mix both formats. 

51 

 
 
 
 
 
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List of figures 

Figure 1 - The European Union Flag ........................................................................................................................................... 4 

Figure 2   2022 State of the European Union (SOTEU) speech delivered by the President of the 
European Commission Ursula von der Leyen. ....................................................................................................................... 6 

Figure 3   Virtual board representing the results of the brainstorming exercise on common drivers, 
enabling conditions, opportunities and challenges across a set of emerging and disruptive 
technologies .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 10 

Figure 4 - A wafer of the latest D-Wave quantum computers ................................................................................ 12 

Figure 5 - Computer generated images of the Westinghouse eVinci nuclear micro-reactor 
representing the installation on a remote site and the easy transportable modular elements ........... 17 

Figure 6 - Silicon nitride photonic integrated circuit production ............................................................................. 21 

Figure 7 - A space satellite hovering above the coastline .......................................................................................... 28 

Figure 8   An integrated circuit .................................................................................................................................................. 34 

Figure 9 - Foresight process developed and applied for technology foresight activities in 2022 ...... 37 

Figure 10 - Summary of the knowledge management and intermediate outputs of the process...... 49 

55 

 
 
 
 
 
 
List of tables 

Table 1 - Preliminary prioritisation of technologies and capabilities within four clusters .......................... 7 

Table 2 - Risks, challenges and future dependencies for quantum communication and cryptography
 ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 14 

Table 3 - Mitigation actions proposed for quantum communication and cryptography ........................... 16 

Table 4 - Risks, challenges and future dependencies for nuclear micro-reactors ........................................ 18 

Table 5 - Mitigation actions proposed for nuclear micro-reactors ........................................................................ 20 

Table 6 - Risks, challenges and future dependencies for integrated photonics ............................................. 23 

Table 7 - Mitigation actions proposed for integrated photonics ............................................................................. 25 

Table 8 - Risks, challenges and future dependencies for space platform providing critical in-orbit 
services and operations .................................................................................................................................................................. 29 

Table 9 - Mitigation actions proposed for space platform providing critical in-orbit services and 
operations ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 31 

Table 10 - Six combinations of the STEEP dimensions and 30 topics identified for the foresight 
exercise .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 38 

Table 11 - Main groups and sub-groups for clustering desk research insights ............................................. 40 

Table 12 - Prioritised list of emerging and disruptive technologies ..................................................................... 43 

56 

 
 
 
 
 
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