COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Screening of FDI into the Union and its Member States Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Third Annual Report on the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union
Date: 2023-10-19
Institutions: Directorate-General for Trade and Economic Security, European Commission
Subjects: EU Member State, activity report, direct investment, financial control, foreign capital, foreign investment, investment policy, third country

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 19.10.2023  SWD(2023) 329 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Screening of FDI into the Union and its Member States      Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Third Annual Report on the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union                 {COM(2023) 590 final}  
 
 
Contents 

1. 

Foreign Direct Investments into the EU – 2022 overview .................................................................... 3 

A)  Main findings ........................................................................................................................................ 3 

B)  Stable global FDI, but weak flows in the EU27 ..................................................................................... 3 

C) 

Slowdown in dealmaking with -15.5% new acquisitions and -1% new greenfield investments .......... 5 

D)  The US and UK dominated foreign transactions in acquisitions equity stakes and greenfield projects

10 

E)  Public shareholding in foreign investors, 2022 ................................................................................... 15 

F)  Russian shareholding in Europe (EU27) .............................................................................................. 17 

G)  Semiconductors .................................................................................................................................. 19 

2.  Methodology and sources .................................................................................................................. 21 

3. 

EU Member States – legislative developments .................................................................................. 23 

Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 23 

Austria ..................................................................................................................................................... 24 

Belgium ................................................................................................................................................... 24 

Bulgaria ................................................................................................................................................... 25 

Croatia ..................................................................................................................................................... 25 

Cyprus ..................................................................................................................................................... 25 

Czechia .................................................................................................................................................... 26 

Denmark .................................................................................................................................................. 26 

Estonia ..................................................................................................................................................... 26 

Finland ..................................................................................................................................................... 27 

France...................................................................................................................................................... 27 

Germany .................................................................................................................................................. 28 

Greece ..................................................................................................................................................... 28 

Hungary ................................................................................................................................................... 29 

Ireland ..................................................................................................................................................... 29 

Italy ......................................................................................................................................................... 29 

Latvia ....................................................................................................................................................... 30 

Lithuania ................................................................................................................................................. 31 

Luxembourg ............................................................................................................................................ 31 

Malta ....................................................................................................................................................... 32 

1 

 
 
 
 
Netherlands............................................................................................................................................. 32 

Poland ..................................................................................................................................................... 33 

Portugal ................................................................................................................................................... 33 

Romania .................................................................................................................................................. 34 

Slovakia ................................................................................................................................................... 34 

Slovenia ................................................................................................................................................... 35 

Spain ........................................................................................................................................................ 36 

Sweden .................................................................................................................................................... 37 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
1. Foreign Direct Investments into the EU – 2022 overview 

A)  Main findings 

➢  Global Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows totaled EUR 1.2 trillion in 2022, -14.3% 
below  values  in  2021.  The  EU  contributed  to  the  reduction  of  global  flows  with 
EUR -140 billion.  

➢  A total of 4 500 new acquisitions of equity stakes and greenfield projects were recorded 
in the EU27 in 2022, a figure -7.2% lower than 2021 levels. The decrease was explained 
by a contraction in M&As and minority investments, with a -15.5% combined decline 
compared to 2021. 

➢  The US was the main foreign investor in the EU27, grouping 32.2% of all acquisitions 

of equity stakes and 46.5% of all greenfield investments. 

➢  In 2022, foreign companies used their EU27 subsidiaries for 23% of their investments1. 
➢  Almost  60%  of  the  investments  in  the  EU27  targeted  the  Information  and 

Communication Technology (ICT), Retail, and Manufacturing sectors. 

➢  In 2022,  acquisitions in high tech manufacturing grouped 59% of the total number of 
foreign deals, and 67% of the total greenfield investments, in the Manufacturing sector. 

B)  Stable global FDI, but weak flows in the EU27 

Net Global FDI inflows experienced a year-on-year reduction in 2022, totalling EUR 1.2 trillion, 
down by -14.3% compared to the values in 2021, but 34% above 2020 levels. OECD data for 2022 
indicates that the EU27 experienced a noticeable decrease in FDI inflows compared to the previous 
year,  and  also  to  20202.  This  drop  in  2022  FDI  inflows  is  however  largely  due  to  sizeable 
disinvestments that took place in Luxembourg in 20223. Excluding Luxembourg, 2022 FDI flows 
into the EU27 increased by 22%4 compared to 2021.  

1 By using an established EU company – which carries out an economic activity in a Member State – to invest into 
another  EU  company,  the  investment  becomes  an  “intra-EU”  one  and  hence  falls  outside  the  scope  of  the  FDI 
Screening Regulation.  
2 See figures in the Annual Report 2023. 
3 OECD, FDI IN FIGURES, April 2023 – https://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/statistics.htm. Although largely due 
to disinvestments in Luxembourg, global FDI flows still declined in the EU in 2022 compared to 2021. Besides, other 
major FDI recipients, such as China and the US, also recorded less FDI inflows in 2022. 
4 https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/FDI-in-Figures-April-2023.pdf  

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. FDI inflow in EU27 with breakdown by instrument (billion EUR)  

Source: OECD data, extracted on 03/05/2023. Data refers to inward FDI flows. The details by instrument does not include inflows into Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Malta, and Romania whose value is grouped under Rest. FDI values exclude investments from resident special purpose entities. 
“Debt flows” stands for “Intercompany debt flows”. 

The breakdown of FDI inflows by instrument5 (Figure 1) suggests that in 2022, reinvestment of 
earnings accounted for most of the flows into the EU27, reaching EUR 260 billion, a figure above 
the record value of EUR 219 billion observed in 2021. This evidence points to the fact that high 
profits of multinational enterprises in the post-COVID period are an important factor in explaining 
the rebound in FDI activity. The decline in FDI inflows at the EU27 level was mainly driven by 
the  level  of  intercompany  debt  and  equity  flows,  which  accounted  for  EUR  -115  billion  and 
EUR -288 billion, respectively.   

Looking at the number of foreign transactions6, acquisitions of equity stakes decreased in 2022 
compared to 2021, while the number of greenfield projects remained stable. Foreign M&As and 
greenfield investments have also slowed down significantly in the first quarter of 2023, both in 
terms of numbers and values, compared to the same quarter the previous year. The prospects for 
the EU economy in 2023 remain uncertain. 

5  Financial  flows  consist  of  three  main  components:  equity  capital,  reinvestment  of  earnings  of  foreign  parents’ 
affiliates, and intracompany debt. 
6  We  use  the  term  foreign  investor  to  identify  non-EU  entities  (companies  or  persons)  acquiring  equity  stakes  or 
initiating  greenfield  investment  projects  in  the  EU  (in  short  ‘greenfields’  or  ‘greenfield  investments’).  The  terms 
foreign and non-EU are used interchangeably. Throughout the text, the term acquisitions will identify the acquisitions 
of  equity  stakes  in  EU  companies,  be  it  M&A  or  stakes  below  50%  but  above  10%  of  the  capital,  and  the  term 
transactions will be referred to the sum of acquisitions and greenfield investments. Portfolio investments are excluded. 
For additional information see the section on methodology and sources. 

4 

 
 
 
 
 
 
C)  Slowdown in dealmaking with -15.5% new acquisitions and -1% new greenfield 

investments 

Investments by foreign companies in the EU27 lost momentum in 2022: There was a total of 4 500 
new acquisitions of equity stakes and greenfield projects, which is 7.2% lower than 2021 levels. 
The decrease is explained by a contraction in M&As and minority investments7, with a -15.5% 
decline compared to 2021. The war of aggression in Ukraine and the worsening of macroeconomic 
conditions significantly impacted EU27 M&A in 2022. Increasing inflation driven by skyrocketing 
energy  and  commodity  prices  prompted  higher  interest  rates  and  an  increased  cost  of  capital, 
discouraging investors8. The number of greenfield investments remained virtually constant, with 
a -0.9% reduction. Despite the slowdown, both acquisitions of equity stakes and greenfield projects 
remained above 2020 levels with increases of +18.3% and +22.5%, respectively9. 

The US was the main foreign investor in the EU27, with 32.2% of all acquisitions of equity stakes 
and 46.5% of  all greenfield  investments  (Table  1). The decrease in deal  making from the  US, 
by -14.2% year-on-year, was offset by a growth in the number of greenfield projects (+13.7%) in 
2022 compared to 2021. India is the only investor in the top-ten registering year-on-year growth 
rates  for  both  acquisitions  and  greenfield  investments  in  2022,  with  +107%  and  +9.1%, 
respectively.  Acquisitions  of  equity  stakes  from  Japan  increased  significantly  (+23.9%),  while 
robust growth in greenfield projects originating in Offshore Financial Centres10 (OFCs), Norway 
and  South  Africa  was  observed  (by  +8.5%,  +6.9%  and  +119%  year-on-year,  respectively).  In 
contrast,  investments  from  Russia11  collapsed,  with  a  -68.8%  decline  for  acquisitions  and 
an -82.3% decline for greenfield projects year-on-year12. 

7 We define minority investment as the acquisition of equity stakes for more than 10% (but less than 50%) of the 
capital of the target company.  
8 In 2022, the cost of borrowing for corporations in the  euro area increased by 30 basis points to 3.41% in December 
2022 (ECB, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/stats/mfi/html/ecb.mir2212~4e7d08f6a5.en.html) 
9 See figures in the Annual Report 2023. 
10  The  main  Offshore  Financial  Centres  by  number  of  M&As  or  greenfields  are  (in  alphabetical  order)  Bermuda, 
British  Virgins  Islands,  Cayman  Islands,  Mauritius  and  the  United  Kingdom  Channel  Islands.  For  the  full  list  of 
Offshore  Financial  Centres,  see  e.g.  Commission  Staff  Working  Document  -  Following  up  on  the  Commission 
Communication “Welcoming Foreign Direct Investment while Protecting Essential Interests” – SWD(2019) 108 final 
– 13 March 2019. 
11 For more details, see below the section entitled “Russian shareholding in Europe”. 
12 Only 10 investments in equity stakes in EU companies and 11 greenfield projects originated from Russia in 2022. 

5 

 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Number of foreign acquisitions and greenfield investments: share over total for 2022 
and percentage change with respect to 2021 and 2020. Detail by jurisdiction of the ultimate 
investor (for top-ten jurisdictions) 

Acquisitions of equity 
stakes 

US 

UK 

Switzerland 

OFCs 

Norway 

Canada 

Japan 

China 

India 

Australia 

RoW 

Share 
(%) 

2022 

32.2 

25.1 

8.9 

5.4 

4.3 

4.1 

3.2 

2.3 

1.6 

1.6 

11.3 

Year-on-year (% change) 

Greenfields 

21/22 

20/22 

-14.2 

-17.1 

-4.2 

-43.2 

-22.2 

-41.6 

23.9 

-2.4 

107.1 

-6.7 

-3.8 

27.9 

8.2 

25.2 

-12.7 

37.5 

15.9 

-10.9 

-14.6 

16.0 

64.7 

49.6 

US 

UK 

OFCs 

Switzerland 

China 

Japan 

Norway 

Canada 

India 

South Africa 

RoW 

Share 
(%) 

2022 

46.5 

19.0 

5.6 

4.8 

3.9 

3.3 

2.3 

1.7 

1.3 

1.3 

10.4 

Year-on-year (% change) 

21/22 

20/22 

13.7 

-8.9 

8.5 

-15.5 

-34.1 

-11.8 

6.9 

-2.0 

9.1 

118.8 

-20.3 

38.1 

10.1 

44.3 

-12.1 

-36.1 

-1.1 

40.9 

17.1 

9.1 

150.0 

44.2 

Source:  JRC  elaboration  based  on  Bureau  van  Dijk  data,  extracted  on  06/02/2023  for  equity  stakes  (Zephyr  dataset)  and  on  02/02/2023  for 
greenfields (Orbis Crossborder Investment dataset). OFCs: Offshore Financial Centres. RoW: Rest of the World. China includes Hong Kong. 

Investors, especially large conglomerates with multiple activities, often use subsidiaries registered 
in other countries (e.g., the group’s financial branch) to conduct investments13. In 2022, foreign 
non-EU  investors  performed  investments  using  their  EU  subsidiaries  in  23%  of  transactions 
recorded this year, on average (Figure 2). Looking at the geographical breakdown on the origin 
jurisdiction of the investor, the use of EU subsidiaries ranges from 14% of transactions by investors 
originating in the US to 44% by investors originating in Norway. A high share of transactions by 
investors  originating  in  OFCs14  and  Japan  (approximately  42%)  also  took  place  through  EU 
subsidiaries.  

13  These  are  fully  operating  companies,  not  special  financial  vehicles  set  in  place  for  the  purpose  of  a  specific 
investment. 
14 In many instances these are funds with offices in the EU that acquire minority stakes in EU companies. 

6 

 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Location of the direct investor. Detail by origin of the controlling parent and type 
of investment (acquisition of equity stakes and greenfield investments)  

Equity stakes

Greenfields

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

US UK

CH NO CA OFCs

JP

CN RoW

US UK OFCs CH CN JP

ZA NO RoW

Outside EU, 2022

EU, 2022

Outside EU, 2022

EU, 2022

Source:  JRC  elaboration  based  on  Bureau  van  Dijk  data,  extracted  on  06/02/2023  for  equity  stakes  (Zephyr  dataset)  and  on  02/02/2023  for 
greenfields (Orbis Crossborder Investment dataset). OFCs: Offshore Financial Centres. RoW: Rest of the World. China includes Hong Kong. Equity 
stake refers both to M&As and the acquisition of non-controlling stakes in EU companies. 

Almost 60% of the investments in the EU targeted three sectors: Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT), Retail and Manufacturing. With more than 1 000 investments in 2022, ICT was 
the top sector by foreign acquisitions of equity stakes (28%), and ranked second for greenfield 
projects (19.4%), after Retail (29.9%). The two digits year-on-year decrease in ICT acquisitions (-
18.6%) contrasted with a robust growth of greenfield investments (+17.6%) in this sector (Table 
2). 

A  large  share  of  ICT  related  foreign  greenfield  projects  in  2022  (over  80%)  were  related  to 
computer programming (mainly opening of new software development and R&D centres) and data 
processing  and  hosting  activities  (such  as  opening  of  new  data  centres  and  sales  offices). 
Acquisitions of equity stakes in the ICT sector involved micro and small target companies in more 
than 70% of the cases (Table 3). 

Manufacturing  accounted  for  24.7%  of  all  new  foreign  acquisitions  and  10.4%  of  greenfield 
investments in 2022 (Table 2). Despite the decline observed in both acquisitions (-17.9%) and 
greenfield projects (-13.1%) in 2022 compared to 2021, transactions in Manufacturing were still 
above  2020  levels  for  both  types  of  FDI.  Acquired  manufacturing  companies  were  larger  than 
targets in the ICT sector, with a share of medium and large companies above 55% (Table 3). 

In  2022,  Manufacturing  greenfield  projects  focused  mainly  on  openings  (or  expansions)  of 
manufacturing  plants  for  different  types  of  pharmaceutical  products  (10.3%  share),  electronic 
components (6.7% share), motor vehicles (5% share, mostly related to electric vehicle production) 
or batteries and accumulators (4.6% share). 

Investments  in  equity  stakes  grew  substantially  in  the  Transport  (+24%)  and  Administrative 
support (+18.6%) sectors in 2022. These two sectors experienced a very positive trend in the post-
Covid period, with an increase of 40.9% and 82.1% in 2022 compared to 2020, respectively. For 
greenfield investments, a strong performance was observed in the Finance (+33.2%), Professional 
and Scientific (+26.6%) and Health (+200%) sectors. Finance and the Professional and Scientific 
sectors accounted for more than 10% of greenfield projects each in 2022 (Table 2). 

7 

 
 
 
 
Table 2. Number of foreign acquisitions and greenfield investments: share over total for 2022 
and percentage change with respect to 2021 and 2020. Detail by target sector (NACE Rev. 2) 

Equity stakes 

Share (%) 

Year-on-year (% 
change) 

Greenfield  

Share (%) 

Year-on-year (% 
change) 

ICT 

Manufacturing 

PST 

Financ. Insur. 

Retail 

Electricity 

Transport 

Admin. support  

Construction 

Real estate 

Accommodation 

Health 

Arts. Entert. 

Mining 

Education 

Agriculture 

Remaining sections 

2022 

28.0 

24.7 

8.9 

7.3 

7.0 

4.3 

3.5 

2.9 

2.5 

2.4 

2.1 

1.9 

1.5 

1.0 

0.8 

0.7 

0.6 

21/22 

-18.6 

-17.9 

-7.6 

-5.8 

-15.1 

-10.5 

24.0 

18.6 

-32.3 

-34.8 

-24.5 

-17.1 

-6.9 

-21.7 

-17.6 

-25.0 

-38.9 

20/22 

13.4 

18.6 

33.6 

10.2 

-0.8 

8.5 

40.9 

82.1 

83.3 

13.2 

164.3 

-22.7 

22.7 

20.0 

7.7 

20.0 

10.0 

2022 

21/22 

20/22 

Retail  

ICT 

Financ. Insur. 

PST 

Manufacturing 

Accommodation 

Transport 

Admin. support  

Real estate 

Electricity 

Arts. Entert. 

Water supply 

Health 

Education 

Construction 

Other services 

Remaining sections 

29.9 

19.4 

10.8 

10.5 

10.4 

6.5 

5.1 

2.7 

1.2 

0.9 

0.7 

0.7 

0.4 

0.3 

0.3 

0.1 

0.1 

2.0 

17.6 

33.2 

26.6 

-13.1 

-29.4 

-44.0 

5.8 

-10.8 

-33.3 

-35.5 

0.0 

200.0 

0.0 

-46.2 

-33.3 

-57.1 

26.3 

53.9 

56.3 

35.5 

4.0 

-11.8 

-26.2 

43.1 

0.0 

50.0 

66.7 

125.0 

300.0 

-42.9 

-63.2 

-42.9 

-75.0 

Source:  JRC  elaboration  based  on  Bureau  van  Dijk  data,  extracted  on  06/02/2023  for  equity  stakes  (Zephyr  dataset)  and  on  02/02/2023  for 
greenfields (Orbis Crossborder Investment dataset). PST = Professional, Scientific and Technical activities (section M of NACE Rev. 2 sector 
classification). ICT stands for Information and Communication (NACE Rev. 2, section J). Due to the rounding up of numbers to the first decimal, 
the total of some percentages might reach 100,1%. 

8 

 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 3. Shares of foreign acquisitions in each target firm size category (over sector specific 
total acquisitions), 2022. Detail by NACE Rev. 2 sectors 

Sectors 

ICT 
Manufacturing 
PST 
Financ. Insur. 
Retail 
Electricity 
Transport 
Admin. support 
Construction 
Other sectors 
Average all sectors 

Shares, by sector, 2022 
Small  Medium 
42.7 
29.2 
37.0 
28.7 
35.4 
22.7 
31.6 
17.6 
27.6 
27.4 
30.0 

21.2 
35.0 
26.1 
28.7 
16.5 
22.7 
21.1 
26.5 
24.1 
32.3 
25.4 

Micro 
28.1 
15.6 
31.1 
25.7 
38.0 
22.7 
21.1 
32.4 
27.6 
22.6 
26.5 

Large 
8.0 
20.3 
5.9 
16.8 
10.1 
31.8 
26.3 
23.5 
20.7 
17.7 
18.1 

Source: JRC calculations based on Bureau van Dijk Orbis-Global data extracted in September 2022 and Zephyr data extracted on 06/02/2023. The 
first four columns are based on detailed balance sheet data, available only for 73% of the acquisitions of equity stakes observed. Each row sums to 
100. Micro: enterprises with less than 10 persons employed; Small: enterprises with 10-49 persons employed; Medium: enterprises with 50-249 
persons employed; Large: enterprises with 250 or more persons employed. PST = Professional, Scientific and Technical activities (section M of 
NACE Rev. 2 sector classification). ICT stands for Information and Communication (NACE Rev. 2, section J). Due to the rounding up of numbers 
to the first decimal, the total of some percentages might reach 99.9% or 100,1%. 

Following  the  Eurostat  definition,  foreign  transactions  in  the  manufacturing  sector  were 
reclassified by technological intensity in two categories, high- and low-tech manufacturing15. 

In 2022, foreign deals in high tech manufacturing grouped 59% of the total number of deals related 
to the manufacturing sector. Conversely, 67% of the total foreign greenfield investments in the 
manufacturing sector corresponded to high tech manufacturing activities (Table 4)16. The shares 
in  2021  were  50%  and  65%,  respectively.  For  some  jurisdictions  there  was  a  shift  towards 
investments in high technology sectors. This is the case of the US, whose share of investments in 
high  tech  manufacturing  increased  by  almost  15  percentage  points  for  acquisitions  and  4 
percentage points for greenfield projects between 2020 and 2022. On the other hand, the share of 
investments  in  low  tech  manufacturing  from  Switzerland  and  China  increased  over  the  same 
period. 

15 High tech includes high tech and medium-high tech firms, and low tech includes medium-low and low tech ones 
classification: 
(NACE-Rev.2, 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/Annexes/htec_esms_an3.pdf.  
16 The percentages displayed indicate the share of high (low) technology acquisitions and greenfield projects over total 
annual acquisitions and projects for each investor origin jurisdiction (rows sum up to 100%). 

Eurostat 

details, 

digits). 

further 

For 

see 

2 

9 

 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table  4.  Technological  content  of  foreign  investments  in  manufacturing,  high  vs  low 
technology (by origin jurisdiction) 

Origin 

Year 

Acquisitions 

Origin  Year 

Greenfield  

US  2020 

2021 

2022 

UK  2020 

2021 

2022 

Switzerland  2020 

2021 

2022 

China  2020 

2021 

2022 

OFCs  2020 

2021 

2022 

Japan  2020 

2021 

2022 

RoW  2020 

2021 

2022 

High tech. 
(%) 
51.72 

Low tech. 
(%) 
48.28 

56.25 

66.23 

52.38 

40.38 

48.19 

43.24 

49.09 

38.89 

80.00 

58.33 

60.00 

59.26 

53.66 

41.67 

78.95 

50.00 

78.26 

52.38 

43.27 

60.71 

43.75 

33.77 

47.62 

59.62 

51.81 

56.76 

50.91 

61.11 

20.00 

41.67 

40.00 

40.74 

46.34 

58.33 

21.05 

50.00 

21.74 

47.62 

56.73 

39.29 

US 

2020 

2021 

2022 

UK 

2020 

2021 

2022 

Switzerland 

2020 

2021 

2022 

China 

2020 

2021 

2022 

Japan 

2020 

2021 

2022 

OFCs 

2020 

2021 

2022 

RoW 

2020 

2021 

2022 

High tech. 
(%) 
61.5 

Low tech. 
(%) 
38.5 

63.2 

65.5 

50.0 

54.5 

56.8 

60.7 

61.3 

52.6 

90.0 

93.9 

89.3 

62.5 

78.1 

70.0 

50.0 

42.9 

81.8 

63.9 

56.4 

68.0 

36.8 

34.5 

50.0 

45.5 

43.2 

39.3 

38.7 

47.4 

10.0 

6.1 

10.7 

37.5 

21.9 

30.0 

50.0 

57.1 

18.2 

36.1 

43.6 

32.0 

Source:  JRC  elaboration  based  on  Bureau  van  Dijk  data,  extracted  on  06/02/2023  for  equity  stakes  (Zephyr  dataset)  and  on  02/02/2023  for 
greenfields (Orbis Crossborder Investment dataset). RoW: Rest of the world, OFCs: Offshore Financial Centres. China includes Hong Kong.  

D)  The  US  and  UK  dominated  foreign  transactions  in  acquisitions  equity  stakes  and 

greenfield projects 

In 2022, new foreign acquisitions of equity stakes and greenfield investments in the EU originated 
primarily  in  the  US,  in  line  with  previous  years.  Just  over  570  acquisition  deals  and  1  280 
greenfield projects originated in the US. This represented a decline compared to 2021 numbers for 
acquisitions,  but  an  improvement  for  greenfields.  Overall,  US  FDI  transactions  were  mostly 
concentrated in three Member States: Germany, Spain and France. Acquisitions of equity stakes 
in German target companies by US investors represented almost 20% of the total US acquisitions 
into the EU in 2022 (Table 5a), while new greenfield investments into Germany represented 16% 
of total US greenfield projects in 2022 (Table 5b).  

10 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The contraction in acquisitions of equity stakes by US investors in 2022 compared to 2021 affected 
all  destination  Member  States,  but  not  evenly  (Tables  5a,5b).  The  decline  affected  France  (-
27.8%), the Netherlands (-23.4%) and Spain (-19.8%) the most. For the case of US greenfields 
into the EU, Germany saw the largest year-on-year increase in the number of new US projects in 
2022 compared to 2021 (+50.7%), followed by Poland (+26.3%). Only Romania, the Netherlands 
and Italy received less US greenfield investments in 2022 compared to the previous year.  

Focusing on the sectoral breakdown, US acquisitions in 2022 mostly targeted ICT firms, with this 
sector grouping a 33.2% share of all US acquisitions into the EU (Table 6a). However, the number 
of US acquisitions in this sector declined by 21.5% compared to 2021. ICT also grouped 21.2% of 
US greenfield projects into the EU (the second largest share after Retail), and in contrast with the 
evolution of acquisitions of equity stakes, they increased by 14.8% year-on-year (Table 6b). 

The UK was the second most important foreign investor in the EU in 2022, with about 440 and 
520  acquisitions  of  equity  stakes  and  greenfield  projects,  respectively.  In  contrast  with  US 
investments,  UK  transactions  contracted  in  2022  compared  to  2021  for  both  types  of  FDI. 
Acquisitions of equity stakes by investors originating in the UK primarily targeted firms in Spain, 
with  a  14.3%  share  out  of  al  UK  acquisitions  in  the  EU  in  2022.  In  terms  of  year-on-year 
comparisons between 2021 and 2022 acquisitions originating in UK declined for all destination 
Member  States,  except  Sweden.  Greenfield  investment  originating  from  the  UK  were  more 
geographically concentrated than acquisitions, and also had Spain as main destination (18% share), 
followed by Ireland (16.1% share). UK greenfields into Ireland also experienced the highest year-
on-year increase (+82.6%). In 2022, UK acquisitions of equity stakes mainly targeted ICT and 
Manufacturing firms, with these two sectors grouping 22.8% and 18.6% of all UK acquisitions, 
respectively  (Table  6a).  Retail  grouped  31%  of  greenfield  investments  originating  in  the  UK 
(Table  6b).  Greenfields  originating  in  the  UK  are  less  concentrated  when  compared  to 
acquisitions, with ICT, Professional and Scientific services and Finance grouping similar shares 
(14.8%, 14.4% and 10.9%, respectively). 

11 

 
 
 
 
Table 5. Foreign investments (number of deals and projects) by origin of the investor and 
destination country (top investors and receivers), share 2022 and percentage change in the 
number of transactions with respect to 2021 

Table 5a. Acquisitions of equity stakes (M&As and minority) 

Destination 

Origin 

DE 

US 

2022 

19.0 

ES 

14.8 

IT 

9.6 

FR 

9.9 

NL 

10.3 

IE 

9.8 

DK 

4.4 

SE 

3.1 

BE 

5.2 

RoEU27 

13.8 

y/y 

-6.0% 

-19.8% 

-14.1% 

-27.8% 

-23.4% 

-1.8% 

0.0% 

0.0% 

-6.3% 

-16.0% 

UK 

2022 

13.6 

14.3 

12.8 

11.0 

7.4 

11.0 

5.1 

4.9 

2.5 

17.4 

y/y 

-29.9% 

-7.2% 

29.5% 

-15.5% 

-26.7% 

-2.0% 

-32.4% 

46.7% 

-56.0% 

-30.4% 

Switzerland 

2022 

24.5 

10.1 

10.7 

15.1 

10.7 

1.3 

2.5 

1.3 

3.1 

20.8 

y/y 

34.5% 

0.0% 

-46.9% 

84.6% 

0.0% 

0.0% 

-20.0% 

-33.3% 

-28.6% 

-21.4% 

OFCs 

2022 

11.5 

12.5 

16.7 

8.3 

4.2 

7.3 

6.3 

5.2 

1.0 

27.1 

y/y 

-57.7% 

-53.8% 

-36.0% 

-11.1% 

-66.7% 

-30.0% 

-25.0% 

-37.5% 

-66.7% 

-38.1% 

Norway 

2022 

9.1 

5.2 

1.3 

1.3 

15.6 

0.0 

23.4 

20.8 

6.5 

16.9 

y/y 

-41.7% 

-33.3% 

-80.0% 

0.0% 

-7.7% 

-100.0% 

28.6% 

-27.3% 

25.0% 

-38.1% 

RoW 

2022 

18.4 

13.7 

10.0 

10.0 

12.6 

3.3 

3.3 

3.3 

3.7 

21.9 

y/y 

2.6% 

-13.2% 

10.3% 

-17.3% 

10.2% 

-12.5% 

100.0% 

40.0% 

14.3% 

-30.4% 

Origin 

Table 5b. Greenfield investments  

Destination 

DE 

US 

2022 

16.0 

ES 

16.3 

FR 

14.3 

NL 

5.5 

IE 

9.7 

PL 

7.5 

IT 

5.9 

SE 

3.7 

RO 

2.1 

RoEU27 

19.0 

y/y 

50.7% 

6.1% 

12.3% 

-6.7% 

0.8% 

26.3% 

-2.6% 

14.6% 

-27.0% 

21.5% 

UK 

2022 

10.9 

18.0 

10.0 

6.5 

16.1 

11.1 

4.8 

1.7 

2.1 

18.8 

y/y 

21.3% 

-41.6% 

-22.4% 

-34.6% 

82.6% 

7.4% 

13.6% 

-30.8% 

37.5% 

-4.9% 

Switzerland 

2022 

14.5 

14.5 

8.4 

5.3 

6.9 

9.2 

3.1 

9.2 

3.8 

25.2 

y/y 

-32.1% 

-34.5% 

-15.4% 

0.0% 

800.0% 

140.0% 

-63.6% 

20.0% 

-28.6% 

-25.0% 

China 

2022 

13.0 

18.5 

11.1 

5.6 

2.8 

2.8 

9.3 

14.8 

1.9 

20.4 

y/y 

-46.2% 

-41.2% 

-33.3% 

-14.3% 

50.0% 

-57.1% 

-16.7% 

45.5% 

-66.7% 

-46.3% 

Japan 

2022 

11.1 

14.4 

4.4 

11.1 

7.8 

7.8 

4.4 

1.1 

1.1 

36.7 

y/y 

-44.4% 

0.0% 

-73.3% 

-23.1% 

40.0% 

75.0% 

100.0% 

-50.0% 

-66.7% 

22.2% 

OFCs 

2022 

15.0 

17.0 

5.9 

6.5 

2.6 

3.3 

5.9 

2.0 

3.3 

38.6 

y/y 

475.0% 

-31.6% 

12.5% 

-23.1% 

0.0% 

150.0% 

-43.8% 

-40.0% 

25.0% 

25.5% 

RoW 

2022 

12.0 

19.9 

9.2 

7.7 

4.1 

11.5 

5.1 

3.4 

3.4 

23.7 

y/y 

-6.7% 

19.2% 

-17.3% 

-5.3% 

0.0% 

38.5% 

9.1% 

-44.8% 

-33.3% 

-28.4% 

Source:  JRC  elaboration  based  on  Bureau  van  Dijk  data,  extracted  on  06/02/2023  for  equity  stakes  (Zephyr  dataset)  and  on  02/02/2023  for 
greenfields (Orbis Crossborder Investment dataset). BE: Belgium, DE: Germany, DK: Denmark, ES: Spain, FR: France, IE: Ireland, IT: Italy, 
NL: Netherlands, PL: Poland, SE: Sweden, RO: Romania, RoW: Rest of the world, OFCs stands for Offshore Financial Centres, RoEU27: Rest of 
EU27. China includes Hong Kong. y/y stands for year-on-year and is the percentage change of the number of transactions between 2022 and 2021.  

12 

 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
    
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
Acquisitions  of  equity  stakes  from  investors  originating  in  the  OFCs  experienced  generalised 
declines in 2022, compared to 2021, in all destination Member States, with year-on-year reductions 
in number of acquisitions ranging from -66.7% in the Netherlands and Belgium to -11% in France 
(Table 5a). Italy was the main destination of OFCs acquisitions in 2022. For the case of greenfield 
investments,  projects  originating  in  OFCs  mainly  targeted  Spain,  and  a  more  mixed  pattern  of 
year-on-year evolution is observed (Table 5b).   

Over one third of acquisitions of equity stakes originating in OFCs in 2022 targeted EU27 firms 
operating  in  the  ICT  sector  (Table  6a).  While  acquisitions  by  OFCs  investors  in  this  sector 
experienced a small year-on-year decline (-2.7%), acquisitions in the Manufacturing sector (which 
grouped a 12.5% share) declined by -70.7% in 2022 compared to 2021. Greenfield investments 
originating  in  OFCs  targeted  mostly  the  Retail  (38.6%  share)  and  also  the  ICT  (20.3%  share) 
sectors (Table 6b). Greenfields with OFCs origin targeting the latter sector experienced a large 
increase (+82.4%) in 2022 compared to 2021. 

Chinese FDI into the EU27 predominantly took the form of greenfield investments in 2022 (Table 
5b). Chinese greenfield projects are rather concentrated, with Germany, Spain, Sweden and France 
receiving all shares above 10% of total Chinese projects in 2022. However, with the exception of 
Sweden, these top-four destinations of Chinese greenfields experienced year-on-year declines in 
2022, particularly Germany (-46.2%). Two sectors, Retail and Manufacturing, concentrated more 
than 60% of Chinese greenfield projects into the EU27 in 2022 (Table 6b). Despite the importance 
of  these  sectors,  both  Retail  (-52.3%)  and  Manufacturing  (-15.2%)  experienced  year-on-year 
declines in the number of Chinese projects in 2022. The top-five greenfield projects in terms of 
capital expenditure (in EUR) originating in China in 2022 in the Manufacturing sector were all 
related to high tech manufacturing activities (defined using the same classification as in Table 4).  
The  two  largest  projects  were  related  to  battery  manufacturing  (with  a  combined  capital 
expenditure of EUR 9.3 billion), while the other three projects in the top-five related to production 
of electric vehicles or batteries for these (with a combined expenditure of EUR 3.1 billon). 

13 

 
 
 
 
Table 6. Foreign investments (number of deals and projects) by origin of the investor and 
target sector (top investors and sectors), share 2022 and percentage change in the number of 
transactions with respect to 2021. 

Table 6a. Acquisitions of equity stakes (M&As and minority) 

Origin 

US 

UK 

Switzerland 

OFCs 

Norway 

RoW 

Origin 

US 

UK 

Switzerland 

China 

Japan 

OFCs 

RoW 

2022 

y/y 

2022 

y/y 

2022 

y/y 

2022 

y/y 

2022 

y/y 

2022 

y/y 

2022 

y/y 

2022 

y/y 

2022 

y/y 

2022 

y/y 

2022 

y/y 

2022 

y/y 

2022 

y/y 

ICT 

33.2 

-21.5% 

22.8 

-33.8% 

17.6 

-17.6% 

37.5 

-2.7% 

54.5 

-16.0% 

23.5 

5.2% 

Manufacturing 

26.9 

-19.8% 

18.6 

-20.2% 

22.6 

-34.5% 

12.5 

-70.7% 

26.0 

53.8% 

31.4 

3.1% 

17.8 

-8.9% 

30.4 

-2.9% 

30.8 

Finance 

Retail 

Others 

NACE target sector 

PST 

9.9 

9.6% 

9.2 

6.8 

5.4% 

9.8 

5.4 

-6.1% 

9.2 

-26.8% 

37.5% 

-22.6% 

11.3 

4.4 

13.2 

100.0% 

-22.2% 

40.0% 

11.4% 

3.1 

11.5 

5.2 

30.2 

-72.7% 

-57.7% 

-37.5% 

-37.0% 

2.6 

2.6 

5.2 

9.1 

-83.3% 

-33.3% 

-33.3% 

-53.3% 

8.8 

6.3 

5.1 

24.9 

18.8% 

-12.9% 

-29.0% 

-26.7% 

Table 6b. Greenfield investments  

NACE sector 

Retail 

29.6 

38.8% 

31.8 

-7.3% 

40.5 

12.8% 

38.0 

-52.3% 

6.7 

-66.7% 

38.6 

-15.7% 

25.2 

-11.3% 

Manufacturing 

8.6 

-3.5% 

7.1 

12.1% 

14.5 

-38.7% 

25.9 

-15.2% 

33.3 

-6.3% 

7.2 

57.1% 

10.7 

-35.9% 

ICT 

21.2 

14.8% 

14.8 

1.3% 

16.8 

PST 

10.1 

24.0% 

14.4 

44.2% 

8.4 

Finance 

Others 

10.3 

18.9% 

10.9 

26.7% 

9.9 

20.2 

-10.1% 

21.1 

-41.5% 

9.9 

-26.7% 

-15.4% 

30.0% 

-45.8% 

11.1 

13.0 

5.6 

6.5 

500.0% 

250.0% 

-45.5% 

-75.0% 

24.4 

69.2% 

20.3 

82.4% 

21.2 

23.8% 

7.8 

14.4 

13.3 

-36.4% 

225.0% 

-50.0% 

2.6 

11.8 

-33.3% 

125.0% 

10.7 

28.2% 

12.4 

70.6% 

19.6 

-9.1% 

19.9 

-38.8% 

Source:  JRC  elaboration  based  on  Bureau  van  Dijk  data,  extracted  on  06/02/2023  for  equity  stakes  (Zephyr  dataset)  and  on  02/02/2023  for 
greenfields (Orbis Crossborder Investment dataset). RoW: Rest of the world, OFCs: Offshore Financial Centres. China includes Hong Kong. PST 
stands for Professional, Scientific and Technical services (NACE Rev. 2, section M), it contains among other things R&D facilities. ICT stands for 
Information and Communication (NACE Rev. 2, section J). “Others” category aggregates the remaining NACE sections. y/y stands for year-on-
year and is the percentage change of the number of transactions between 2022 and 2021.  

14 

 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
E)  Public shareholding in foreign investors, 2022 

This  box  analyses  public  shareholding  in  EU  foreign  investment  transactions  in  2022, 
considering  both  acquisitions  of  equity  stakes  and  greenfield  projects.  Public  shareholding17 
occurs whenever a state-controlled body or company holds stakes (either control or minority) in 
a foreign investor. We investigate public shareholding coming from the main foreign investors 
into the EU, namely Switzerland, China, Japan, South Korea, Russia, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. 

In  2022,  13.9%  of  the  foreign  acquisitions  (13.7%  in  2021)  recorded  presence  of  public 
shareholding from the selected jurisdictions.  For greenfield investments, the percentage were 
slightly lower, where 12.3% of cases (10.7% in 2021) presented public holdings. 

In most cases, public shareholding is expressed through minority stakes, with an overall average 
in 2022 of 4.3%, more specifically 4.5% for acquisitions and 4.1% for greenfield investments. 
This implies that looking merely at control stakes would give a very limited picture of public 
shareholdings (Figure E.1).  

Figure E.1. Foreign acquisitions and greenfield investments with public participation: share by 
amount of participation and country. 

Source: JRC calculations on Bureau van Dijk data extracted in November 2022. Russia is removed from the discussion relating to the 2022 
data, as information was only based on one data point.  

The  pattern  of  public  shareholding  varied  widely  across  the  selected  foreign  jurisdictions  in 
2022, with the largest proportion of cases (47%) being from the US. This country conveys public 
shareholding mainly through federal and local funds controlled by  public bodies, which hold 
usually small stakes (on average below 1.5%) in US and foreign entities investing in the EU. 
The second largest group of cases comes from South Korea (25%), with average stakes of around 
1.5%. Similarly, all other countries present very small average public shares, except China with 
about 38%18. 

Public  shareholding  tends  to  be  more  substantial  in  foreign  investors  active  in  specific 
industries. The manufacturing sector alone accounted for 49% of the cases, although the amount 
of public stakes is rather limited in this group (on average 2.3%). The second-largest industry 
affected by public shareholding is the ICT sector (12% of cases), with an average stake of 5%.  

15 

 
 
 
 
 
Other  industries  had  smaller  presence  of  public  shareholding,  but  with  higher  stakes.  For 
example, 11% of cases were in the Financial sector, with an average public stake of 16% (the 
highest public average share was recorded in 2022). Wholesale and retail trade grouped a similar 
11.5% of cases and on average a 0.6% stake. 

Although overall over half of the analysed transactions entail domestic public shareholding in 
2022,  i.e.,  public  owners  holding  stakes  in  an  investor  registered  in  their  same  country,  the 
selected  jurisdictions  show  rather  different  preferences.  For  example,  China  reported  no 
domestic cases, as their public stakes were detected only in investors registered outside China. 
On the opposite side, the UK held public shares almost exclusively (96% of cases) in British 
companies investing in the EU. The US and Switzerland, finally, showed roughly 80% and 67% 
of domestic cases of public shareholding, respectively.  

17 This encompasses the so-called SOEs, i.e., State Owned Enterprises. 
18 The data on State influence depends on the reconstruction of ownership links among subsidiaries, sometimes very 
difficult for Chinese companies. Those companies often use offshore subsidiaries to enter the EU, with little or no 
information on the links with mainland China, or have complex nested structures not fully captured by Bureau van 
Dijk raw data. 

16 

 
 
 
 
F)  Russian shareholding in Europe (EU27) 

This box reports on Russian investments in EU firms as of 202119 (investment stock). We detail 
both  controlling  and  non-controlling  (influence)  stakes  held  by  investors  from  Russia  (RU). 
Companies with multiple Russian shareholders, each holding a stake below 50%, but all of them 
summing  up  to  more  than  50%  of  the  capital  of  the  EU  business,  are  considered  as  cases  of 
potential control(*). 

As stated in the previous report, 
Russia  exerts 
influence  or 
control 
in  almost  30  000 
companies in the EU (0.11% of 
the EU companies20). It controls 
about 17 000 EU companies, has 
potentially  controlling  stakes  in 
other  roughly  7  000  companies 
and  minority  stakes  in  4  000 
companies.  We  observe  an 
additional 2 000 companies with 
non-controlling 
a 
Russian  shareholder,  for  which 
the  amount  of  stake 
is  not 
known.  The  breakdown  for  top 
Member  States  is  reported  in 
Figure F.1. 

reported 

The top-five  EU  Member States  by number of Russian-controlled companies are Czechia 
(with 28% of the total number of EU companies controlled by RU; it was 24.7% in the previous 
report), Latvia (14.1%; it was 18% in the previous report), Germany (12.2%; it was 12.3% in the 
previous report), Bulgaria (8.3%, same as in previous report) and Cyprus (7.1%; it was 10.3% in 
the  previous  report).  Czechia,  Germany,  and  Latvia  are  also  the  top  countries  by  number  of 
companies  with  Russian  influence  (31.7%,  12.7%  and  11.1%  respectively;  32.6%,  12%  and 
13.1%  in  the  previous  report),  followed  by  Italy  (7.7%;  previously  7.8%)  and  Bulgaria  (6%; 
previously  5.5%).  Ireland  (it  was  Latvia  in  the  previous  report)  and  Cyprus  have  the  highest 
percentage  of  controlled  companies  with  respect  to  their  size  (measured  by  the  number  of 
companies). 

19 It covers the stock of companies as of 2021 as it is based on balance sheet information, which is available only up 
to 2021. 2022 balance sheets are still incomplete at the time of drafting this document. 
20 EU companies are approximately 26 million (latest available year 2020, Eurostat business demography). 

17 

 
 
 
 
 
In  58.2%  of  the  EU  companies  under  Russian 
control  or  influence,  assets  are  held  by  a  natural 
person (it was 57.7% in the previous report), in 8.9% 
by a company and in 1.4% by a public authority/State 
(it  was  9.7%  and  1.1%  previously).  The  Russian 
government controls assets mainly in Cyprus (18.18% 
of the cases; down from 34.2% in the previous report), 
Ireland  (13.5%,  down  from  16.5%  in  the  previous 
report) and the Netherlands (11.06%, down from 16.5% 
previously)  (see  Table  F.1).  These  assets  are  in 
companies  for  89.2%  of  the  cases  (it  was  79.9% 
previously), and in banks or other financial institutions 
for the remaining cases. 

The sectors with the largest presence of Russian investors remain the same as in the previous 
report: Wholesale (with 4 316 and 3 499 companies under control and influence, respectively), 
Real Estate (2 775 and 2 309), Professional Scientific and Technical activities (1 654 and 1 245). 
Russia  also  controls  1  195  companies  in  Finance  and  Insurance  and  exerts  influence  on  910 
Manufacturing firms. 

Russia directly controls 38 EU companies in the Oil & Gas sector (it was 36 in the previous 
report) and 36 in Electricity (it was 33 in the previous report). Nine of the controlled Oil & Gas 
firms are in Germany, while minority stakes are found in six Oil & Gas companies mainly in 
Eastern and Nordic Europe. As for Electricity, six controlled companies are in Germany and five 
in Latvia, while large minority stakes are present in firms mainly in Latvia, Italy, Croatia and 
Hungary.  

Source: JRC calculations on Bureau van Dijk data extracted in November 2022. (*) Potential control refers to direct shareholding only. 

18 

 
 
 
 
 
 
G)  Semiconductors 
Semiconductors are not just related to computers and smart phones. They are embedded in our 
cars, industrial machineries, home appliances, as well as satellites and advanced military devices. 
Hence, chips are currently present everywhere in our lives, and will be even more necessary to 
feed  the  green  and  digital  transition  in  the  coming  years.  In  2022,  global  semiconductor  sales 
reached USD 574.1 billion, about double the value as compared to 10 years prior, in 2012, when 
sales totaled USD 291.6 billion. This fast-growing market is expected to reach USD 1 trillion in 
early 2030s21. In the EU, the combined turnover of EU companies involved in the semiconductor 
supply chain reached EUR 240 billion in 2021, about 1.7% of European GDP22. 

“The fate of nations has turned on their ability to harness computer power” says the economic 
historian Chris Miller23. Security of supply chains has therefore become a national security matter 
when core technologies key for critical sectors and infrastructures are involved. In this context, 
geopolitical  considerations  also  play  a  key  role.  It  is  hence  important  to  monitor  non-EU 
investments in this industry. 

In 2022, we observed 51 foreign investment transactions involving EU target firms active in the 
semiconductor sector, 46% more than in 2021, worth a total amount of USD 6.6 billion of capital 
invested.  The recovery in transactions is mostly due to an increased number of M&As (+100% as 
compared to 2021), representing almost half of all investment transactions and 96% of the capital 
invested in 2022 (Figure G.1)24.  

21 Worldwide semiconductor sales calculations from the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA). 
22 JRC calculations based on balance sheet data (from Orbis-global) for a set of over 1100 EU companies pertaining 
to the EU semiconductors value chain.  
23 Miller (2022), author of the best-seller book “Chip War: The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technology”, 
Scribner, 2022. 
24 Raw data on investments relating to semiconductor activities comes from the Pitchbook dataset. The companies are 
classified in the semiconductors sector if Pitchbook reports them as part of the semiconductors industry or if their 
description contains the keyword semiconductor. Pitchbook also collects data on a wide range of investments from 
early stage (e.g. seed rounds and venture capital) to M&As. The data reported includes foreign investment transactions 
targeting EU27 firms in the semiconductor industry, both completed (more than 98%) and in progress or announced 

19 

 
 
 
 
 
Observed venture capital (VC) investment deals were 24 in 2022 (a 14% higher as compared to 
2021), implying USD 262 million investment. In 2022, later stage VC financing, typically used to 
bring products to the market, represented over 54% of all VC deals (up from a share of 29% in 
2021), and 71% of the total amount of VC invested. Early stage or seed financing grouped 11 deals 
(and USD 77 million investments) in 2022 and displayed a downward trend (-27%) with respect 
to the number of early-stage financing deals observed the year before.  

A further look into the Primary Industry Code of the target company (Figure G.2) shows that in 
2022, most of the foreign  investment  deals (with a 19.6% share) were addressed to  EU targets 
operating  in  specific  semiconductor  activities  (such  as  wafer  or  sensors  production).  General-
purpose semiconductors, and electronics and equipment related activities grouped the second and 
third  largest  share  of  foreign  transactions  (these  include  for  example,  manufacturing  or 
development of integrated circuits, chips and lasers).  

The US was the main foreign investor in the EU27 in 2022 with 32 transactions and USD 6 billion25 
invested (Figure G.3), followed by the UK. The US was the main source of both VC investment 
and M&As. Investments originating in Developed Asian countries (i.e., Japan, Taiwan, and South 
Korea) grouped just over 13% of transactions in 2022 (worth USD 212 million), while China alone 
was the source of nearly 6% of foreign investment deals in the sector. 

(less than 2%), in the period between January and December 2022. Figures include only foreign (non-EU27) investors, 
classified according to the HQ location of the direct investor (except when the parent company of the direct investor 
is available, then this location is assigned, in around 20% of cases). The figures below report shares based on number 
of transactions. Transaction values are only available for a fraction of the investments (63%). 
25  The  acquisition  of  the  German  company  Atotech  Deutschland  by  the  US-based  firm  Mks  Instruments  is  alone 
responsible for USD 5.5 billion. 

20 

 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Methodology and sources 

Raw data on acquisitions of equity stakes and greenfield projects comes from Bureau van Dijk 
datasets (Zephyr and Orbis Crossborder, respectively). Data has been retrieved in February 2023 
(06/02/2023 for the Zephyr data, and 02/02/2023 for Orbis Crossborder data); and has been further 
elaborated by the Joint Research Centre (JRC).  

The term “foreign investor” is used whenever the investor is ultimately controlled by a non-EU 
entity (either a company or an individual). When the ultimate owner cannot be established, the 
location  of  the  investor  applies.  This  definition  differs  from  the  one  of  the  FDI  Screening 
Regulation26. Throughout the text the term acquisition will identify the acquisition of equity stakes 
in EU companies, be it M&As or stakes below 50% but above 10% of the capital, and the term 
transactions  will  be  referred  to  the  sum  of  acquisitions  and  greenfield  investments.  Raw  data 
(including old deals and projects) are regularly updated by the data provider, but data extraction 
for the same time window, done at different points in time, could lead to different figures due to 
update lags.  

The section only reports the deals’ number of transactions. Values are only available for a fraction 
of  the  acquisitions  since  companies  are  not  obliged  to  report  the  deals’  financial  details.  For 
greenfield investment projects, the expected investment and the job creation is always available 
but not reported in the text for consistency reasons. National account data at the start of the section, 
although based on the first counterpart location principle, should help in tracking FDI trends.  

All types of greenfield projects are accounted for in this document, including the construction of 
new sites, the relocation of a foreign presence, and the expansion of existing sites. All tables and 
figures are based on announced and completed transactions but report them with their announced 
date. Rumours and postponed deals/projects are excluded. A multi-deal, i.e., a deal where there 
are multiple targets and/or multiple investors is considered a sum of multiple deals. For example, 
if a foreign investor acquires two companies, this is recorded as two deals. Conversely, if a foreign 
investor acquires a company with multiple subsidiaries (in different countries), the deal remains 
unique and is attributed to the parent company’s country. Deals with multiple targets and multiple 
investors (a negligible amount) are disregarded, as it is very difficult to devise a general rule to 
attribute the transaction. This classification rule is also applied to greenfield investments in case 
of multi-purpose projects in which several sites are built and/or the projects with multiple investors 
are announced.  

In the analysis of public shareholding, for each investor, the ownership information available at 
the time of the deal/project is used. Where not available for 2022, the ownership information used 
is that of 2021, the latest information available. Data on the size of EU target companies acquired 
by a foreign investor is based on raw data from Bureau van Dijk Orbis-Global. Where not available 
for 2022, the information on balance sheet used is that of 2021. 

Note  that  very  small  firms  (and  to  some  extent  small  companies)  are  poorly  covered  in  this 
database (see OECD, 202027 for additional insights). 

26 See Article 2(2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/452 (the FDI Regulation). 
27 See: https://www.oecd.org/economy/coverage-and-representativeness-of-orbis-data-c7bdaa03-en.htm  

21 

 
 
 
Finally,  the  classification  of  companies  working  in  high  tech  manufacturing  can  be  found  in 
Eurostat webpage. Under high-tech we grouped companies falling under Eurostat sections high 
tech and medium-high tech firms. All the remaining companies are grouped under low-tech. 

22 

 
 
 
 
 
 
3. EU Member States – legislative developments  

Introduction 

This part of the Staff Working Document reflects the information provided by the EU Member 
States, pursuant to their annual reporting obligation set out in Article 5 of the EU FDI Screening 
Regulation. 

The section reflects for each Member State whether: 

-  The relevant Member State had a national investment screening mechanism in place as of 

31 December 2022; 

-  Developments  occurred  in  the  field  of  FDI  screening  during  the  reporting  period 
(01/01/2022  –  31/12/2022),  e.g.,  amendments  to  an  existing  screening  mechanism 
occurred, or ongoing initiative expected to result in the introduction of a national screening 
mechanism; 

-  The  relevant  Member  State  publishes,  or  intends  to  publish,  a  national  report  on  FDI 

screening. 

23 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Austria 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2022): Yes. 

Austria amended its existing mechanism on foreign direct investment (FDI) screening in 2022. It 
extended - until 31 December 2023 - the 10% screening threshold for FDI in the area of research 
and  development  in  pharmaceuticals,  vaccines,  medical  devices  and  personal  protective 
equipment. The amendment (BGBl. I Nr 231/2022) became effective as of 30 December 2022.  

REPORT:  Yes.  The  Austrian  government  publishes  an  annual  report  in  German.  The  latest 
version is not yet available at the date of writing this document but will be found on the following 
website: https://www.bmaw.gv.at/Themen/Investitionskontrolle.html  

Belgium 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: No. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2022): Yes. 

As  of  31  December  2022,  Belgium  had  not  established  a  national  FDI  screening  mechanism. 
However, a Cooperation Agreement establishing a mechanism for the screening of foreign direct 
investments  in  Belgium  was concluded between  the Federal  State and the competent federated 
entities on 30 November 2022. The Belgian FDI screening mechanism became operational on 1 
July 2023. 

The Federal Public Service Economy operates as the national contact point for the implementation 
of the Regulation (EU) 2019/452 and for the participation in the EU cooperation mechanism. 

Link: 
https://www.dekamer.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=flwb&language=fr&cfm=/site/wwwcfm/f
lwb/flwbn.cfm?dossierID=3079&legislat=55&inst=K 

REPORT: No. 

24 

 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
Bulgaria 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: No. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2022): Yes. 

As  of  31  December  2022,  Bulgaria  had  not  established  a  national  FDI  screening  mechanism. 
However, Bulgaria initiated first steps to start the process of establishment of an FDI screening 
mechanism  in  the  fourth  quarter  of  2022:  an  Intergovernmental  Working  Group  on  the 
establishment of an FDI screening mechanism was set up on 6 October 2022. Besides, this group 
met for the first time in November 2022. It analysed the experience of five EU Member States and 
discussed appropriate models for an FDI screening mechanism in Bulgaria. 

REPORT: No. 

Croatia 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: No 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2022): Yes.  

As  of  31  December  2022,  Croatia  had  not  established  a  national  FDI  screening  mechanism. 
However, Croatia is undergoing a technical support instrument project with the OECD. One of the 
activities of the project will result in recommendations for an investment screening mechanism 
that would enable Croatia to benefit from incoming FDI while simultaneously managing security 
risks that may be associated with individual transactions and create a more effective and efficient 
participation in the EU cooperation mechanism. It is expected to be concluded by the end of the 
summer of 2023. 

REPORT: No. 

Cyprus 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: No 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2022): Yes. 

As  of  31  December  2022,  Cyprus  had  not  established  a  national  FDI  screening  mechanism. 
However, in 2022, Cyprus drafted a new law for the establishment of a national FDI screening 
framework. The draft law has been released for public consultation. Following the approval of the 
Council  of  Minister  in  September  2022,  the  draft  law  was  submitted  to  the  Cypriot  House  of 
Representatives. 

Link: https://tinyurl.com/ymky9nre  

REPORT: No. 

25 

 
 
  
  
  
 
Czechia 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2022): No. 

REPORT: Yes. The Czech annual report for 2022 should be released during the autumn 2023. 

Denmark 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2022): No. 

On  2  June  2023,  an  amendment  to  the  existing  FDI  screening  mechanism  was  adopted  by  the 
Danish Parliament. The aim of the amendment is to tighten control over who constructs, owns, 
and operates the future Energy Island in the North Sea. The amendment also introduces a new case 
handling process with a phase 1 and phase 2. The amendment entered into force on 1 July 2023 
and has been notified to the European Commission. 

More information under: https://businessindenmark.virk.dk/topics/Economy/Investments/ 

REPORT: No. 

Estonia 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: No. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2022): Yes. 

In 2022, Estonia was in the process of finalising a draft law and preparing the necessary legislation 
to implement a national FDI screening mechanism: The Government of the Republic approved the 
draft of the Foreign Investment Reliability Assessment Act in May 2022. The legislative procedure 
started in the Parliament in June 2022. The Parliament adopted the law on 25 January 2023 and 
the national FDI screening mechanism is to enter into force on 1st September 2023. 

The mechanism will define the transactions that are considered as foreign investments and should 
undergo screening, the concept of foreign investor and the range of target undertakings for which 
the impact of foreign investments on security and public order is assessed (including, for example, 
critical service providers, state-owned enterprises, manufacturers and suppliers of military or dual-
use goods, owners of defence sites, certain media companies and owners and operators of transport 
infrastructure). 

26 

 
 
  
 
  
 
  
It  will  also  set  out  the  relevant  aspects  of  consideration  throughout  the  investment  assessment 
process. Foreign investment is going to require an authorisation issued by the Consumer Protection 
and Technical Regulatory Authority. 

Such authorisation shall be based on prior mandatory approval on the admissibility, or prohibition, 
of the foreign investment under screening from the national Commission, which is going to consist 
of representatives of the Ministries, security authorities and law enforcement agencies. It will also 
establish national rules on the cooperation mechanism, as provided for in the EU FDI Screening 
Regulation. 

Links: https://mkm.ee/uudised/riik-hakkab-hindama-valisinvesteeringute-usaldusvaarsust  

https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/504042023002/consolide (English translation) 

REPORT: No. 

Finland 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2022): No. 

REPORT: The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment has prepared the Annual Report 
of 2022 which is publicly available on the Ministry’s website:  

https://tem.fi/acquisitions (in Finnish, Swedish and English). 

https://tem.fi/documents/1410877/0/VN0083008_YKA+vuosiraportti+2022+FINAL_EN.pdf/14
dee38b-67e1-a3d7-74ce-
230c9bdeb07a/VN0083008_YKA+vuosiraportti+2022+FINAL_EN.pdf?t=1689147367692 
English) 

(in 

France 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2022): Yes. 

On 23 December 2022, France prolonged - for a year - the obligation for foreign investors to notify 
investments when acquiring at least 10% of the voting rights of listed companies (Décret n° 2021-
1758). It is the second time France prolonged this obligation since its first implementation in July 
2020, when the French government lowered the threshold from 25% to 10% of voting rights for 
listed companies. This measure was taken in a context of economic uncertainties, notably related 
to the energy crisis. 

Link: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000046792223 

27 

 
 
 
  
 
  
overview 
annually 
REPORT:  Yes. 
https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Articles/5ed9606f-f37e-4517-ae5d-
445dab7ecad0/files/68cd8466-0b98-44d2-9182-777b8768cee0 

publishes 

France 

an 

of 

its 

activities: 

Germany 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2022): No. 

REPORT:  No.  However,  Germany  published  in  2022  key  facts  and  figures  on  investment 
under: 
screening 
https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/EN/Publikationen/Aussenwirtschaft/investment-screening-in-
germany-facts-figures.pdf 

Germany, 

available 

German 

English 

and 

in 

in 

Greece 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: No. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2022): Yes. 

In 2022 Greece was working on the draft legislation aiming at the establishment of the national 
FDI  screening  mechanism.  After  an  initial  consultation  with  Commission  experts,  the  Greek 
government revised the drafted legislation. In addition, Greece actively sought conversations with 
other EU Member States to exchange on best practices. 

During  the  reporting  period,  the  competent  Departments  of  the  Hellenic  Ministry  of  Foreign 
Affairs-MFA were working on the draft legislation aiming at the establishment of the national FDI 
screening mechanism on the grounds of public order and security, by consulting with the European 
Commission and exchanging practices with other Member States that already have or are in the 
process of developing a national FDI screening mechanism. 

Two major amendments were introduced to the initial draft during the reporting period. Firstly, 
the extension of the deadline regarding the FDI screening procedure from 40 to 60 days, pursuant 
to the FDI Screening Regulation. The establishment of a more elaborated cooperation mechanism 
between MFA’s screening Authority and other competent Ministries/entities.  

Also incorporated in the new version of the national draft legislation, are modifications related to 
the strengthening of the investigation procedure by giving access to any necessary information or 
data deriving from any legal or natural person and the designation of the competent Authority for 
the  monitoring  of  the  mitigation  measures’  implementation.  Furthermore,  specific  fines  and 
penalties were introduced. As soon as the respective draft legislation is approved, it will follow a 
consultation process with other competent Ministries and entities. 

REPORT: No. 

28 

 
 
  
 
  
Hungary 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2022): Yes. 

On 5 January 2022, the amendment of Government Decree 246/2018 on the implementation of 
Act LVII of 2018 on the Control of Foreign Investments Affecting Hungary's Security Interests 
entered into force, by the Government Decree 802/2021 (XII. 28.). The purpose of the legislation 
was to harmonise national screening laws with the EU FDI Screening Regulation: The annex to 
the decree had to be updated due to changes in the legislation to which it refers. 

Link: 
https://magyarkozlony.hu/dokumentumok/29d2e1f29792faf30a1ae2978d6374e111c42e25/megte
kintes 

REPORT: No. 

Ireland 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: No. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2022): Yes.  

The Screening of Third Country Transactions Bill was published in August 2022 and is currently 
being  considered by Parliament.  It  is  expected that  the national  FDI screening  mechanism will 
come into force in Ireland in Q4 2023 or early Q1 2024. 

This new law defines the nature, scale and type of investments that should undergo investment 
screening. It also sets out the relevant points of considerations throughout the Screening process. 
It ultimately empowers the Minister to assess, investigate, authorise, condition, or prohibit foreign 
investments based on a range of security and public order criteria. The screening mechanism will 
be established in line with the principles outlined in the EU FDI Screening Regulation, and will 
better assist Ireland to fulfil its obligations under the Regulation’s cooperation mechanism.  

Link: https://enterprise.gov.ie/en/legislation/screening-of-third-country-transactions-bill.html  

REPORT: No. However, there will be one, once the mechanism will be in place. 

Italy 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2022): Yes. 

In 2022, with the Law Decree No. 21/2022 dated 21 March 2022 (converted, with amendments, 
into Law 51/2022), Italy introduced urgent measures to react to the economic and humanitarian 

29 

 
 
  
  
 
  
effects of the Ukrainian crisis (cybersecurity, raw materials, agricultural goods, etc.). Besides, a 
Decree  of  the  President  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  No.  133  of  1  August  2022  introduced 
simplification measures, such as the pre-filing mechanism and the settlement of proceedings when 
no mitigation measures  are  adopted.  In addition, the Decree of the President  of the Council of 
Ministers No. 189 of 1 September 2022 introduced mechanisms between FDI screening and tender 
procedures. 

Articles  24-28  of  the  Decree-Law  No.  21/2022  of  21  March  2022  amends  Law  Decree  No. 
21/2012,  providing  the  overcoming  of  the  transitory  regime  related  to  the  epidemiological 
emergency Covid-19 (provided by Article 4 of Decree-Law No. 56 of 30 April 2021). In addition, 
they define the knowledge and participation for the target company and extend the applicability of 
the Law Decree No. 21/2012 to greenfield investments. There are also procedural developments 
concerning simplification of measures and the strengthening of the enforcement within the FDI 
screening procedure. 

Links: https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2022/03/21/22G00032/SG 

https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2022/09/09/22G00138/sg  

https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2022/12/06/22G00196/sg  

REPORT:  Yes.  The  report  on  national  FDI  screening  activities  has  been  transmitted  by  the 
Presidency of the Council of Ministers to the Parliament on 30 June 2023. It is available under: 
https://www.senato.it/leg/19/BGT/Schede/docnonleg/47144.htm 

Latvia 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes.  

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2022): Yes. 

Latvia  amended  its  national  screening  mechanism.  The  amendments  stipulate  that  the  Russian 
Federation  or  the  Republic  of  Belarus,  its  citizens  or  legal  persons  registered  in  the  Russian 
Federation or the Republic of Belarus, may not obtain a qualifying holding or decisive influence 
in  a  company  of  significance  to  national  security,  or  become  a  member  of  a  partnership  of 
significance  to  national  security,  and  also  the  beneficial  owner  of  a  commercial  company  of 
significance to national security. These amendments were published on 16 June 2022 and entered 
into force on 23 June 2022. 

The National Security Law of Latvia was amended on 20 October 2022. The amendments entered 
into force on 14 November 2022. The range of subjects to which the National Security Law applies 
has  been  significantly  expanded.  The  amendments  set  that  not  only  commercial  companies 
registered  in  the  Republic  of  Latvia  can  have  significance  for  the  national  security,  but  also 
associations and foundations. 

Additional criteria were included to identify commercial company, associations and foundations 
as  commercial  company,  associations  and  foundations  of  significance  to  national  security.  For 
example, this applies if it is owning or holding critical infrastructures; or if it has in its ownership 

30 

 
 
 
  
a liquefied natural gas facility connected to a transmission system or a distribution system; or if it 
has access to voter data; or if it is a manufacturer, developer, or exporter of dual-use goods. 

REPORT:  Yes.  A  report  on  national  FDI  screening  activities  is  in  the making.  It  will  present 
general information about the Latvian national legislation acts and provide statistic information 
about notifications received and comments submitted. 

Links: https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/14011-national-security-law 

https://likumi.lv/ta/id/333449-grozijumi-nacionalas-drosibas-likuma 

https://likumi.lv/ta/id/336845-grozijumi-nacionalas-drosibas-likuma  

Lithuania 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2022): Yes. 

Minor amendments to the Law have been adopted: Articles No. 12, 13 and 19 of the Law on the 
Protection of Objects of Importance to Ensuring National Security of the Republic of Lithuania 
were amended in March 2022. The main changes were related to procurement provisions and radio 
frequencies (channels) of electronic communications networks and/or electronic communications 
services provisions, not to the investment screening regulation. Also, minor updates were made to 
the list of enterprises and strategic infrastructure important to national security. 

Lithuania  will  set  up  a working  group  in  spring  2022.  Its  purpose  will  be  to  take  into  account 
previous  experience  from  the  application  of  the  Law  and  submit  proposals  to  ensure  the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the national FDI screening procedure. 

Link: https://www.e-tar.lt/portal/lt/legalAct/TAR.57E0E8B29108/asr 

REPORT: No. 

Luxembourg 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: No. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2022): Yes. 

Following the opinion of professional chambers and institutions the 2021 approved government 
initiative to create an FDI screening mechanism was reviewed for opinion by the Council of State 
in 2022 and amended accordingly. On 27 January 2023, the Government Council approved these 
governmental amendments to the bill of law aiming at establishing a national screening mechanism 
for FDI likely to impact security or public order. On 14 February 2023, an additional opinion of 

31 

 
 
 
 
 
 
the Council of State was released. The next step will be to present the draft law to the relevant 
Parliamentary Commission before it will be discussed in the Chamber of Deputies. 

Links: 
https://chd.lu/wps/portal/public/Accueil/TravailALaChambre/Recherche/RoleDesAffaires?action
=doDocpaDetails&id=7885 

https://www.chd.lu/fr/dossier/7885 

REPORT: No. 

Malta 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2022): No. 

REPORT: Yes. The Maltese authorities are currently working on a report which would cover the 
3-year journey of the National Foreign Direct  Investment Screening Office. This report will be 
public and made available on the Office’s website: https://www.nfdismalta.com/ 

Netherlands 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2022): Yes.  

On 19 April 2022, the Dutch House of Representatives adopted the VIFO (“Wet Veiligheidstoets 
Investeringen,  Fusies  en  Overnames”,  i.e.,  Investments,  Mergers  and  Acquisitions  Security 
Screening Act), thereby paving the ground for a general national FDI screening mechanism. 

Prior to 2021, the Dutch FDI Screening mechanism was limited to the “Telecommunications Act”, 
“Electricity  Act”  and  “Gas  Act”.  On  30  June  2021,  the  VIFO  was  submitted  to  the  Dutch 
Parliament. The bill passed the lower house on 19 April 2022 and the upper house on 17 May 
2022. The VIFO has been finalised. It entered into force on 1st June 2023 as the necessary statutory 
instruments were ready to enter into force alongside the Act. The statutory instruments will exempt 
certain dual-use goods and add other technologies/sectors defined as ‘highly sensitive’: quantum, 
photonics, semiconductors and high assurance products. 

As with  the sectoral  mechanisms, extra-EU  as well as intra-EU and domestic investors will be 
subject  to  screening.  In  contrast  to  the  existing  mechanisms,  the  VIFO  contains  a  two-phase 
approach.  

Besides, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy are 
currently  drafting  a  bill  for  an  investment  screening  procedure  for  transactions  relating  to  the 
defence industry. 

32 

 
 
 
 
 
2022, 
Staatsblad 
Links: 
(officielebekendmakingen.nl) 

215 

|  Overheid.nl 

>  Officiële 

bekendmakingen 

https://www.bureautoetsinginvesteringen.nl/ 

https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2022-
215.html__;!!DOxrgLBm!Co1IvgJNitqX0lffqzJFWj2YZi3Tpw_MdRC7-
TADSWUnbwUOVrzeXOuo7lvrKiVZO22a-YZr0fDDMoafEm9NlNsROT0YXbA$ 

REPORT: The Minister of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy sends an annual letter to the 
Dutch  Parliament  reporting  on  her/his  use  of  the  authority  to  ban  transactions  under  the 
Telecommunications  Act.  This  letter  includes  statistics  and  reporting  on  general  investment 
screening  activities.  The  most 
(in  Dutch): 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2022/11/03/rapportage-toepassing-wet-
ongewenste-zeggenschap-telecommunicatie 

letter  can  be  accessed  here 

recent 

Poland 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2022): Yes.  

On 12 May 2022 Poland amended the VAT Act  and certain other Acts.  In addition, temporary 
regulations which existed in the Act on the Control of Certain Investments have been prolonged 
up to June 2025. 

Link:https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/PL/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:72019L1995POL_202104681&from=EN  

REPORT: No. 

Portugal 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2022): No. 

REPORT: No. 

Romania 

33 

 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: No  

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2022): Yes. 

Romania published the Emergency Ordinance of the Romanian Government No. 46/2022 on FDI 
screening in the Official Gazette of Romania on 18 April 2022. 

The legal act established a formal national screening mechanism for FDI and for new or greenfield 
investments made by foreign investors for transactions falling in the scope of the Supreme Council 
of National Defence’s Decision No. 73/2012. It sets a deadline of 60 calendar days for drafting 
secondary legislation for its application. 

In  addition,  it  mandates  the  Romanian  government  to  set  up  an  Inter-agency  Screening 
Commission in charge of decision-making, chaired by an appointee of the Prime Minister. The 
Romanian Competition Council (RCC) will ensure secretarial affairs, including the coordination 
of the expert groups responsible for screening. If the Screening Commission delivers a positive 
opinion,  the  RCC  will  also  be  responsible  for  formal  decisions  on  screening  cases  (even  with 
mitigating conditions). If the Screening Commission delivers a negative opinion, the Romanian 
Government  will  take  the  final  decision.  Finally,  Romania  drafted  and  approved  the  relevant 
secondary legislation. 

Link: https://monitoruloficial.ro/Monitorul-Oficial--PI--379--2022.htmlc   

REPORT: Yes. Starting in 2022, the Romanian Competition Council will release an annual report 
on the application of the FDI screening legislation, highlighting and commenting key takeaways. 

Slovakia 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2022): Yes.  

Slovakia’s national Parliament adopted the FDI screening act on 29 November 2022. It was then 
published  in  the  Collection  of  Laws  on  23  December  2022.  It  is  the  basis  of  a  comprehensive 
legislation on the screening of FDI in Slovakia, which replaced the partial legislation previously 
incorporated in the Act No. 45/2011 Coll., i.e., a partial scheme covering the elements of critical 
infrastructure within the sectors of energy and industry. 

The Regulation of the Government of the Slovak Republic No. 61/2023 is laying down the critical 
foreign  investments  and  the  Decree  of  the  Ministry  of  Economy  of  the  Slovak  Republic  No. 
64/2023 is laying down the application for the screening of FDI, the form for screening FDI, the 
request for the modification of a decision on conditional authorisation of an FDI, the report on the 
execution of a FDI and the monitoring report. 

The Act established a complex mechanism for the screening of FDI from third countries on ground 
of the protection of security and public order in the Slovak Republic and other EU Member States. 
It establishes the competencies of the Ministry of Economy, other state administration bodies and 
security forces which participate in the screening of FDI. The Act also laid down the screening 

34 

 
 
 
 
procedure, the obligations and rights of the foreign investor before, during and after the screening 
procedure; also the obligations of the target; the monitoring of their compliance with obligations 
established  by  the  Act  or  the  screening  decision,  as  well  as  related  offences  and  penalties; 
cooperation  at  national  level  as  a  precondition  for  a  comprehensive  cooperation  of  the  Slovak 
Republic with other EU Member States and the European Commission under the FDI Screening 
Regulation. The new legislation does not apply to foreign investments completed before its entry 
into force. The Act, together with the implementing legislation entered into force in March 2023. 

Links:  Zákon  č.  497/2022  Z.  z.  o  preverovaní  zahraničných  investícií  a  o  zmene  a  doplnení 
niektorých zákonov 

The Act No. 497/2022 Coll. the screening of foreign investments and on amendments to certain 
acts  

REPORT:  Yes.  A  report  on  national  FDI  screening  activities  is  included  in  the  new 
comprehensive Act on the screening of FDI. The first report will be published in 2024. According 
to the legislation, the Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic will be obliged to publish a 
summary  information  on  the  application  of  the  law  during  the  previous  calendar  year.  Such 
summary will be published on the website of the Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic. 
The summary information will not contain any specific information about concrete FDI, as well 
as foreign investors and target entities. There will be exclusively aggregated data for a given year 
in the form of anonymous statistical data. 

Slovenia 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes.  

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2022): Yes.  

Slovenia’s mechanism for the screening of FDI within the Intervention Measures to Mitigate and 
Eliminate the Consequences of the COVID-19 Epidemic Act (Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Slovenia, No. 80/20, hereinafter referred to as: ZIUOOPE) entered into force on 31 May 2020 and 
was in force until 30 June 2023. 

The mechanism was permanently included in the Investment Promotion Act (Official Gazette of 
the  Republic  of  Slovenia,  No.  13/18,  hereinafter  referred  to  as:  ZSInv)  and  regulated  in  the 
framework of the regular legislative procedure. In the second half of 2022, Slovenia entered the 
preparatory  phase  of  amending  the  ZSInv  for  the  purpose  of  FDI  screening.  The  legislative 
procedure was completed on 9 June 2023. The new FDI regime entered into force on 1 July 2023. 

Links: Act determining the intervention measures to mitigate and remedy the consequences of the 
COVID-19 epidemic (ZIUOOPE): Unofficial English translation. 

https://www.gov.si/teme/tuje-neposredne-investicije/ 

REPORT: No. 

35 

 
 
 
 
 
Spain 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes.  

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2022): Yes.  

Royal Decree-Law 20/2022, of 27 December 2022, on measures in response to the economic and 
social consequences of the war in Ukraine stated the following: 

•  Article  61:  Article  7bis  1  of  Law  19/2003  of  4  July  2003  is  amended  to  include  in  the 
definition of foreign investment transactions in which control of all or parts of a Spanish 
company is acquired. 

•  Article 62: The temporary regime for the suspension of the liberalisation of certain FDI 
made by residents of EU and EFTA countries is prolonged until 31 December 2024. 

Besides, Spain prepared a new FDI screening regulation which was expected to enter into force in 
the  course  of  2022  but  will  be  passed  during  2023.  Its  main  objectives  were  to:  (i)  update  the 
specific administrative procedure for FDI screening, that dates back from 1999 (RD 664/99), and 
(ii)  give  a  more  specific  definition  of  what  is  meant  by  critical  technologies,  essential  input, 
sensitive  data,  etc.  Therefore,  while  Article  7  bis  of  Law  19/2003  would  remain  in  force,  this 
legislation would represent a significant development. 

On  27  January  2023,  the  Council  of  State  issued  an  opinion  on  the  draft,  concluding  that  the 
consulted norm deserves an overall favourable judgement. 

Links:  BOE-A-2022-22685  Real  Decreto-ley  20/2022,  de  27  de  diciembre,  de  medidas  de 
respuesta  a  las  consecuencias  económicas  y  sociales  de  la  Guerra  de  Ucrania  y  de  apoyo  a  la 
reconstrucción de la isla de La Palma y a otras situaciones de vulnerabilidad. 

Ministerio de Industria, Comercio y Turismo - Detalle Participación Pública 

REPORT: Yes.  

The report identifies the total number of operations subjected to FDI screening, the total number 
of authorisations and conditional authorisations, the ultimate Investor´s country of origin and the 
reasons for subjecting the investment. The report on 2021 and 2022 can be found under: 

2021: https://comercio.gob.es/InversionesExteriores/Documents/2021%20EN%20CIFRAS.pdf 

2022: https://comercio.gob.es/InversionesExteriores/Documents/2022%20EN%20CIFRAS.pdf  

Sweden 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: No.  

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2022): Yes. 

36 

 
 
 
 
 
On 16 March 2023, the Swedish Government adopted a draft bill setting up a mechanism for the 
screening of FDI. On the same date, the draft bill was sent to the Legislative Council. After the 
Legislative  Council's  comments,  the  government  would  return  with  its  bill  for  parliamentary 
consideration. The bill is expected to enter into force on 1 December 2023. 

According  to  the  draft  bill,  the  screening  authority  will  have  the  possibility  to  review  FDI  in 
Swedish companies that conduct protected activities, such as essential services, security-sensitive 
activities (according to the Protective Security Act), sensitive personal or location data, critical 
raw  materials  and  other  metals  and  minerals,  military  equipment,  dual-use  products,  emerging 
technologies and other strategic protected technologies. 

Notification  will  be  mandatory  in  all  seven  sectors.  Furthermore,  the  obligation  to  notify  an 
investment falls on the investor (regardless of nationality or domicile) provided that the investment 
results in a certain amount of influence in the target undertaking, for example if the investor would 
command 10 percent or  more of the total  number of votes. The target  undertaking  will have  a 
disclosure obligation towards investors. The assessment must take place before the transaction is 
carried out. 

The assessment will be carried out in two stages. In the first stage, within the 25 working days of 
a complete notification, the screening authority decides to either take no further action or launch 
an in-depth investigation. Once the investigation has been launched the screening authority must 
take a final decision within three months of the decision to initiate an examination. The screening 
authority, when reviewing the investment, shall be obliged to consult a number of other Swedish 
authorities. In addition, it is proposed that the screening authority will have the right to initiate 
investigations on its own, issue sanctions fees, approve investments subject to conditions as well 
as the right to prohibit transactions. 

Links: 

https://www.government.se/press-releases/2023/03/new-act-will-stop-investments-in-companies-
by-foreign-actors-that-could-harm-sweden/  

https://www.lagradet.se/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Ett-granskningssystem-for-utlandska-
direktinvesteringar.pdf  

REPORT: No. 

37