REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT reviewing the application of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938
Date: 2023-10-05
Institutions: Directorate-General for Energy, European Commission
Subjects: EU Member State, action programme, energy efficiency, gas, gas industry, gas pipeline, gas supply, security of supply, self-sufficiency in energy, third country

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 5.10.2023  COM(2023) 572 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT reviewing the application of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 {SWD(2023) 323 final}  
 
 
Report on the Gas Security of Supply Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 

1.  Introduction 

Regulation  (EU)  2017/1938  on  measures  to  safeguard  the  security  of  gas  supply  (“the  Gas 
Security  of  Supply  Regulation”)  aims  to  prevent,  and  respond  to,  potential  gas  supply 
disruptions.  It  lays  down  the  framework  for  EU  emergency  preparedness  and  resilience  to  gas 
disruptions.  

Article 17 of the Gas Security of Supply  Regulation tasks the Commission, on the basis of the 
assessments  of  the  Member  States  preventive  action  plans  and  emergency  plans,  with  drawing 
conclusions as to possible means to enhance security of gas supply at Union level and to submit 
by 1 September 2023 a report to the European Parliament and Council on the application of this 
Regulation, and where necessary, legislative proposals to amend this Regulation.  

Over  the  past  six  years,  since  the  adoption  of  the  Gas  Security  of  Supply  Regulation,  the  gas 
security  of  supply  landscape  has  undergone  profound  changes,  most  notably  in  2022  after  the 
Russian  invasion  of  Ukraine  -  in  response  to  which,  the  European  Commission  adopted  the 
REPowerEU Plan1, aiming to save energy, accelerate the clean energy transition and diversify 
the energy supply for the EU to fully mitigate its dependence on Russian gas as soon as possible.  

As  a  result,  Russian  gas  imports  have  been  to  a  large  extent  replaced  by  supplies  from 
alternative suppliers in the form of additional pipeline import from trusted partners and, above all, 
a  considerable  increase  in  LNG  imports  (50  bcm,  or  a  73%  increase  in  2022  year-on-year). 
Whereas Russian imports amounted to around 50% of the EU’s pipeline imports before the war, 
they represent now less than 10%, showcasing the unprecedented shift the EU’s gas system has 
undergone in the past year. 

As part of the REPowerEU Plan, the EU also adopted the  revised Regulation (EU) 2023/435, 
allowing  Member  States  to  finance  in  their  respective  REPowerEU  chapters,  under  strict 
conditions, gas infrastructure investments aiming at diversifying from Russian gas and meeting 
immediate security of gas supply.  

In addition to the REPowerEU plan, the EU adopted a set of regulations such as the Gas Storage 
Regulation  (EU)  2022/1032  setting  a  90%  storage  filling  target,  the  temporary  Demand 
Reduction Regulation (EU) 2022/1369 and its prolongation (Regulation (EU) 2023/706) setting 
a 15% gas demand reduction target and the temporary Solidarity Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, 
which among others provided the legal basis for joint purchasing of gas as well as reinforced the 
solidarity rules in case of an emergency. These regulations were adopted to ensure security of gas 
supply, complementing the existing Gas Security of Supply Regulation. 

1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2022%3A230%3AFIN&qid=1653033742483  

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The  EU’s  phase  out  of  Russian  gas  requires  a  strong  emphasis  on  a  continued  supply 
diversification. This will mean a growing importance of LNG and thereby also a larger reliance 
on the global LNG market for the years to come.  

Furthermore, in  the longer-term,  gas  demand is  expected to  decrease at  a different  pace across 
sectors and Member States, which could result in a changing demand profile in the EU. Indeed, 
the future security of supply architecture must consider, and support, the ongoing decarbonisation 
efforts with continued electrification and the growing importance of biomethane and hydrogen. 
This  requires  an  integrated  strategy  for  the  future  decommissioning  and  repurposing  of 
infrastructure  to  ensure  an  orderly  transition  that  guarantees  security  of  supply  of  natural  gas, 
biomethane and hydrogen.  

The EU’s security of supply architecture will therefore need to continue to adapt according to the 
changes of the upcoming years and decades. 

The  adoption  of  this  report  aims  at  fulfilling  the  legal  requirements  of  Article  17  of  the  Gas 
Security of Supply Regulation. Its timing has been slightly adapted to align it with ongoing work 
on related areas – taking into account in particular that Article 30 of the Solidarity Regulation 
foresees  the  review  by  1  October  2023,  by  the  European  Commission,  of  the  Solidarity 
Regulation2.  

Furthermore, several security of supply-related provisions are currently being discussed by the co-
legislators in the framework of the Hydrogen and decarbonised gas market package3. 

2.  Commission assessment of Member States’ Preventive Action Plans and Emergency 

Plans 

Article 17 of the Gas Security of Supply Regulation requires the Commission to submit a report, 
based  on  the  Commission’s  assessments  of  the  updated  Preventive  Action  Plans  (PAPs)  and 
Emergency Plans (EPs). 

In  2019,  Member  States  submitted  their  PAPs  and  EPs  to  the  Commission,  after  which  the 
Commission assessed the plans and issued a series of opinions4 with specific recommendations 
and points where the plans should be improved. The same process should take place in 2023 due 
to a regular 4-yearly update of the plans required by Articles 9(11) and 10(2) of the Gas Security 
of  Supply  Regulation,  with  Member  States  required  to  submit  updated  plans  by  March  2023. 

2  Chapter  IV  of  the  Solidarity  Regulation  concerns  temporary  measures  applicable  in  case  of  a  gas  emergency.  It 
complements the Gas Security of Supply Regulation. 

3https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/markets-and-consumers/market-legislation/hydrogen-and-decarbonised-gas-
market-package_en. For more details, see section 3.7 

4

  https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/energy-security/commissions-opinions-preventive-action-plans-and-emergency-
plans_en  

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However, at the time of writing, the Commission has received both plans only from seven Member 
States, the majority of which were received in June-July 20235. Consequently, the Commission’s 
assessment will be based on the PAPs and EPs submitted in 2019, as well as on the lessons learnt 
from the past year(s); also, given that the updated plans were largely missing, the Commission 
circulated a questionnaire to consult members of the Gas Coordination Group on the provisions of 
the Gas Security of Supply Regulation.  

A more elaborate explanation of the context and substance of the provisions, as well as more details 
of the Commission’s review of the provisions of the Gas Security of Supply Regulation can be 
found in the Staff Working Document SWD(2023)323. 

3.  Review of the Gas Security of Supply Regulation and possible means to enhance 

security of gas supply and lessons learnt from the gas crisis 

3.1. Gas Coordination Group 

The Gas Coordination Group (GCG) derives its legal basis from Article 4 of the Gas Security of 
Supply Regulation, which stipulates that the GCG is chaired by the Commission and is composed 
of  representatives  of  Member  States,  ACER,  ENTSOG  and  bodies  representing  industries  and 
consumers. The Commission can, in consultation with Member States, decide on the composition 
of the GCG, to ensure it is fully representative.  

In 2022, the GCG was convened a record number of 24 times. In particular, the GCG discussed 
latest  developments  regarding  security  of  gas  supply  in  the  context  of  the  Russian  invasion  of 
Ukraine and subsequent  gas supply disruptions. In addition, exchanges were facilitated on best 
practices on national preventive and emergency measures, as well as on next steps for EU-wide 
measures to enhance preparedness, which played a key role in informing the Commission to make 
new legislative proposals.  

Representatives  of  the  GCG  indicated  in  their  responses  to  a  questionnaire  circulated  by  the 
Commission in May 2023 that they appreciated the functioning of the group, primarily praising 
its adaptable and flexible format. 

In addition, the Commission extended ad hoc invitations to third countries for a GCG meeting 
to  exchange  views  on  security  of  gas  supply.  Several  Member  States  expressed  their  positive 
opinion to continue inviting supplier or transit countries with greater frequency. 

3.2. The infrastructure standard 

Article 5 of the Gas Security of Supply Regulation provides that Member States shall ensure that 
in  case  of  a  disruption  of  the  single  largest  infrastructure  (N-1),  the  total  gas  demand  can  be 

5 EU Pilots were sent in early June 2023 to Member States whose Preventive Action Plans, Emergency Plans and Risk 
Assessments are missing. For further details, see sections 3.4.1 and 3.5 of the accompanying Staff Working Document. 

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satisfied during a day of exceptionally high  gas  demand. This  includes  an obligation to  enable 
permanent physical bi-directional capacity on interconnectors between Member States unless an 
exemption is granted. 

Respondents to the questionnaire circulated to the GCG indicated that the infrastructure standard 
was  a  good  incentive  to  have  adequate  infrastructure  capacities,  in  particular  to  facilitate  the 
reversed  West  to  East  flows  observed  in  2022  after  the  Russian  invasion  of  Ukraine.  Others 
stressed  the  need  to  complement  this  infrastructure-based  approach  with  a  larger  focus  on  the 
supply side, e.g. by having complementary diversification standards. Additional provisions can be 
considered  to  prevent  future  vulnerabilities to  a  single  supplier. This  could  be done via  further 
information exchange under Article 14 or an additional S-1 standard, while balancing security 
benefits with potential costs or inefficiencies.  

Respondents  to  the  questionnaire  indicated  that  while  stricter  standards  may  help  to  improve 
security of supply, avoiding the risk of creating stranded assets should be of primary concern.  

3.3. Supply standard and protected customers 

Article 6 of the Gas Security of Supply Regulation sets out the supply standard, which provides 
that Member States require gas undertakings to take measures to ensure the gas supply to protected 
customers under a set of pre-defined circumstances.  

Protected  customers  as  defined  under  Article  2(5)  include  households.  Furthermore,  Member 
States may under certain conditions include (1) SMEs, (2) essential social services and (3) district 
heating. However, during the energy crisis of 2022, the role of voluntary demand reduction of all 
sectors  became  of  increasing  importance.  Therefore,  the  Solidarity  Regulation  introduced  the 
possibility  for  Member  States  to  take  measures  that  reduce  the  non-essential  consumption  of 
protected customers. 

Many Member States indicated that they are not experiencing major challenges implementing the 
supply standard. Regarding protected customers, some Member States pointed towards difficulties 
estimating  the  protected  customers’  demand.  Some  respondents  considered  it  useful  to  have  a 
further harmonisation of the protected customers’ definition on EU level, although national 
specificities need to be considered.  

Several respondents indicated that they consider that the limitation of non-essential consumption 
of  protected  customers  (currently  foreseen  in  the  Solidarity  Regulation)  should  be  made 
permanent, as it provides additional flexibility in order to meet security of supply objectives.  

Given that household gas demand may in some Member States be phased out sooner than in other 
sectors, a reconsideration of the protected customers definition may in the future be required to 
adjust to a changing demand profile, while ensuring that residential needs are met, in particular as 
regards the gas consumption of vulnerable consumers. 

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3.4. Risk assessments and regional risk groups 

To  be  prepared  for  possible  security  of  supply  risks,  the  Gas  Security  of  Supply  Regulation 
establishes an architecture of risk assessments and regional risk groups, laid out in Article 7 and 
Annexes I, IV and V of the Regulation. 

This architecture starts with an EU-wide simulation of gas supply and infrastructure disruptions 
conducted by ENTSOG, after which Member States make a national risk assessment and common 
risk assessment in dedicated regional risk groups, corresponding to the main supply corridors.  

The  first  common  and  national  risk  assessments  have  been  conducted  in  2018  and  should  be 
updated every four years. Due to the challenges faced during the energy crisis in 2022, several 
Member  States  indicated  that  they  lacked  administrative  capacity  to  lead  the  risk  groups  or 
conduct the risk assessments on time. 

Yet, these risk assessments and the related PAPs and EPs are of utmost importance for the EU’s 
risk preparedness for the next winter and subsequent years. 

The Commission had initially not pursued infringement procedures due to the exceptional crisis 
of 2022. However, due to a lack of progress and the importance of being prepared for the winter 
2023-24, the Commission decided to launch 26 EU Pilots in mid-June 2023, to ensure that Member 
States prepare and notify the risk assessments and the PAPs and EPs. 

From the experience of updating the risk assessments and the functioning of the risk groups, as 
well as via feedback received from GCG members, a number of questions arose beyond the lack 
of administrative capacity in Member States: 

•  The current  regional approach to  the  risk groups  seems  no longer  be fit for purpose, 
given the changed geopolitical landscape, the risen prominence of LNG and the reduced 
role of some of the pipeline supply corridors.  

•  An EU-wide approach is suggested by a number of respondents, possibly with regional 
sensitivity analyses, with a reinforced role of the Commission’s Joint Research Centre.  

3.5. Preventive Action Plans and Emergency Plans 

The PAPs aim to prevent crises from materialising and are based on the national and common risk 
assessments, while EPs indicate the procedures, responsibilities, and measures to be taken during 
a crisis. 

Beyond  the  elements  outlined  in  section  2,  the  Commission  considers  that  further  reflection  is 
needed  for  the  following  points  that  are  not  currently  required  by  the  Gas  Security  of  Supply 
Regulation: 

•  The progress made in the phase out of Russian gas and a description and projection of 
diversification efforts as part of the description of the national gas system. Alternatively, 
this could be facilitated via a reinforced information exchange based on Article 14. 

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•  An estimate of the changing breakdown of gas consumption. 
•  Apart  from  the  role  of  domestic  production  (including  biomethane),  further  reflection 
should be given on whether national hydrogen strategies should be included. This is of 
particular importance, if it impacts security of gas supply or the replacement of gas demand 
in the context of developing a secure European hydrogen market. 

While the EPs received since the entry into force of the Regulation can generally be improved, in 
line  with  the  recommendations  in  the  Commission’s  opinions,  the  solidarity  test  (‘dry  run’ 
exercise) performed jointly by the Commission, Member States and ENTSOG in December 2022 
confirmed the important role of the EPs to ensure a quick and efficient response to an emergency 
situation. Member States confirmed that it was imperative for the Commission to check the EPs 
for measures that could have cross-border impacts, such as those restricting cross-border flows or 
capacities. 

As is further detailed in the accompanying Staff Working Document SWD(2023)323, the most 
important points missing in the PAPs were:  

(1) details on the stakeholder consultation.  
(2) information on the (enforcement of) the supply standard and lack of information on the 

infrastructure standard. 

(3) inaccurate information on (solidarity) protected customers. 
(4) details on the regional and national gas systems. 
(5) insufficient assessments of the impact of preventive measures on the economy, the internal 

market, consumers and the environment.  

For the Eps on the other hand, the main issue was an incomplete regional chapter including the 
lack of solidarity arrangements, and a lack of quantification of measures’ impact. The Commission 
considers that Member States should improve the points listed, as already stressed in the opinions 
issued in 2019. 

3.6. Responsibilities in different crisis levels 

One  of  the  core  provisions  of  the  Gas  Security  of  Supply  Regulation  is  the  establishment  of 
different  national  and  EU-wide  crisis  levels  in  Article  11,  which  defines  the  following  three 
national crisis levels: (1) early warning, (2) alert and (3) emergency.  

In  addition,  the  Commission  can  declare  a  regional  or  EU-wide  emergency,  during  which  the 
Commission  has  a  coordinating  responsibility.  The  Demand  Reduction  Regulation  (EU) 
2022/1369 also temporarily established an EU alert level.  

During  the  energy  crisis  of  2022,  and  in  particular  during  the  solidarity  ‘dry  run’  exercise 
performed in December 2022, it was considered that the EU emergency level should be further 
defined and the criteria for when a regional or when an EU-wide emergency should be declared 
are unclear. Some Member States provided feedback via the questionnaire submitted to the GCG 

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that the establishment of an EU emergency plan may be useful, in particular to clarify the roles 
and responsibilities of different EU bodies and national authorities in an emergency. 

Furthermore, the Demand Reduction Regulation (EU) 2022/1369 established the EU alert level as 
a response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which would commit Member States to a mandatory 
15% gas demand reduction. As this Regulation will expire at the end of March 2024, it should be 
reflected on whether the EU alert is useful for the long-term. The GCG provided feedback via a 
questionnaire, indicating openness to keeping this mechanism, albeit dependent on the measures 
that it would trigger. Some respondents indicated that both the triggering, as well as the subsequent 
measures, could be related to storage filling. Others mentioned that the measures tied to the EU 
alert should, like it was in 2022, be a percentile of demand reduction, with the percentage to be 
tailored to the crisis at hand.  

In addition, while Article 12(5)a of the Gas Security of Supply Regulation stipulates that Member 
States  cannot  unduly  restrict cross-border  flows  of gas, the procedure that would follow in  the 
midst of a crisis may take up to a week to be concluded. Therefore, Article 25 of the Solidarity 
Regulation  introduced  additional  safeguards  to  ensure  cross-border  flows,  allowing  the 
Commission to oblige the Member State in question to modify its actions with immediate effect. 
Most  respondents  to  the  GCG  questionnaire  consider  safeguards  for  cross-border  flows  useful 
beyond the expiration of the temporary Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, due to either appreciation of 
the  new  provisions  of  Article  25  or  by  considering  those  of  Article  12(5)  should  already  be 
respected at all times. 

3.7. Solidarity 

Article 13 of the Gas Security of Supply Regulation lays down the requirements of the solidarity 
mechanism, which is  a last  resort mechanism in  a severe gas  emergency  where the demand of 
‘solidarity  protected  customers’  is  endangered  and  where  the  market  can  no  longer  supply  the 
necessary volumes. 

As required by Article 13(10), Member States must bilaterally agree on solidarity agreements by 
1  December  2018,  which  include  the  technical,  legal  and  financial  arrangements  to  ensure  the 
functioning  of  solidarity  in  practice.  These  solidarity  agreements  operationalise  solidarity  in 
practice, but their absence does not change the legal obligation. To facilitate the bilateral solidarity 
agreements,  the  Commission  issued  Recommendation  (EU)  2018/177  in  which  it  outlined  a 
recommendation  on  the  technical,  legal  and  financial  elements  to  be  included  in  the  bilateral 
solidarity agreements. 

At the time of writing, only 8 out of 40 solidarity agreements have been signed, namely between 
Austria and Germany, Denmark and Germany, Estonia and Latvia, Latvia and Lithuania, Italy and 
Slovenia, Estonia and Finland, Denmark and Sweden, and Slovenia and Croatia.  

As  indicated  by  several  Member  States,  the  reasons  for  the  lack  of  progress  are  the  technical 
complexity, the lack of expertise allocated by national administrations and political difficulties in 
reaching an agreement, in particular regarding financial compensation. 

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Given the insufficient progress, in May 2020, the Commission sent a Letter of Formal Notice to 
25  Member  States  for  the  failure  to  comply  with  the  solidarity  provisions.  The  Commission  is 
carrying  out  infringement  package  meetings  with  Member  States,  where  the  solidarity 
infringements  are  discussed.  In  addition,  the  Commission  has  offered  support  to  facilitate 
discussions between interested Member States to overcome existing difficulties. 

Legislative developments 

To ensure that the solidarity arrangements are effective and operational and to cover for the lack 
of bilateral agreements, the Commission proposed in December 2021 to amend the Gas Security 
of  Supply  Regulation  via  the  Hydrogen  and  decarbonised  gas  market  package  to  introduce 
common solidarity rules applicable in absence of bilateral agreements.  

Since the interinstitutional negotiation on this package was not near its conclusion during the 2022 
crisis, on 19 December 2022, EU Ministers adopted the emergency Solidarity Regulation setting 
default  solidarity  rules  applicable  in  absence  of  bilateral  agreements  with  a  limitation  of  the 
maximum  compensation  to  be  paid  for  solidarity.  The  Solidarity  Regulation  also  temporarily 
extended  the  solidarity  protection  to  critical  gas  volumes  for  electricity  security  of  supply  and 
temporarily extended the solidarity obligation to Member States with LNG facilities. 

The Solidarity Regulation was adopted under Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), making it a temporary emergency measure that expires at the end of 
2023. Should the Hydrogen and decarbonised gas market package not be adopted before that date, 
the situation in this respect will revert to the one before the crisis, as described above.  

Solidarity test (dry run exercise) 

To  test  the  solidarity  provisions  of  the  Gas  Security  of  Supply  Regulation  and  the  Solidarity 
Regulation,  the  Commission  conducted  a  joint  ‘dry  run’  exercise  with  Member  States  and 
ENTSOG in December 2022. 

A number of points where follow-up is required were identified:  

• 

• 

• 

• 

Most participants agreed that LNG can provide additional flexibility in a crisis situation. 
However,  LNG  solidarity  would  require  market  mechanisms  and  intervention  of  the 
Competent  Authority,  provided  that  all  market-based  measures  have  been  exhausted, 
which should be further clarified.  
It  was  identified  that  there  is  no  legal  basis  for  requesting  solidarity  via  pipeline  to  a 
neighbouring Member State not directly connected.  
In  case  a  Member  State  receives  two  solidarity  requests,  the  procedure  was  considered 
unclear.  
Participants expressed the wish that a 24-hour period would be applicable for solidarity 
provided through pipelines, while 72 hours could still be relevant for solidarity via LNG. 

Further details on the solidarity test can be found in SWD(2023)323. 

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4.  Conclusion 

Security  of  gas  supply  in  Europe  has  improved  since  last  year  thanks  to  the  successful 
implementation of additional measures by the EU and its Member States in all key areas of energy 
policy. In light of Russia’s use of energy as a political and economic weapon, the EU has acted 
together, in a spirit of solidarity, to reduce the EU’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels while 
continuing to address the climate crisis, accelerating its efforts to increase the resilience of the 
EU’s critical infrastructure and critical entities. The scaling-up and rolling-out of renewable 
energy  made  in  Europe  has  been  greatly  accelerated.  The  EU  has  reinforced  ties  with 
international  partners  to  diversify  energy  supplies,  and  taken  coordinated  action  to  increase 
preparedness, inter alia with action regarding to gas storage or demand reduction.  

Nonetheless, there are still risks for security of gas supply to the Union, such as, for example a 
complete  stop  of  Russian  imports,  infrastructure  incidents,  unfavourable  weather  conditions, 
increasing gas demand in Europe or tightness for LNG cargoes supply.  

In addition, the energy system is undergoing a transition towards decarbonisation through an 
increasing integration of renewable and low carbon gases as well as an increasing electrification. 
This transformation of the energy system improves the security of gas supply by decreasing the 
reliance  of  the  EU  on  fossil  fuels  and  particularly  on  natural  gas.  The  security  of  gas  supply 
architecture of the future will need  to be adapted to integrate renewable and low carbon 
gases,  including  biomethane  and  hydrogen,  as  well  as  further  electrification  and  sectoral 
integration of the energy system.   

The new framework should build on, and support, the Hydrogen and decarbonised gas market 
package once adopted. The increasing development of renewable and low carbon gas, including 
biomethane  and  hydrogen,  as  well  as  the  increasing  electrification  of  the  energy  system  are 
essential elements that will need to be taken into account in any future development of the security 
of supply legal framework to ensure the security of gas supply and to support the decarbonisation 
objectives of the EU. 

This  report  points  to  a  number  of  potential  improvements  to  the  EU’s  security  of  gas  supply 
architecture. In particular, as stipulated by Article 17 of the Gas Security of Supply Regulation, 
the  report  forms  the  basis  for  further  reflections  in  view  of  a  potential  future  proposal  by  the 
Commission to amend this Regulation. 

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