European Parliament resolution of 5 October 2023 on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh after Azerbaijan’s attack and the continuing threats against Armenia (2023/2879(RSP))
Date: 2023-10-05
Institutions: European Parliament
Subjects: Armenia, Azerbaijan, EU restrictive measure, heritage protection, human rights, humanitarian aid, settlement of disputes, territorial dispute, war, war victim








C_202401188EN.000101.fmx.xml












Official Journal of the European Union


EN
Series C













C/2024/1188


23.2.2024






P9_TA(2023)0356
Situation in Nagorno-Karabakh after Azerbaijan’s attack and the continuing threats against Armenia
European Parliament resolution of 5 October 2023 on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh after Azerbaijan’s attack and the continuing threats against Armenia (2023/2879(RSP))
(C/2024/1188)



The European Parliament,






—


having regard to its recent resolutions on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan and Armenia, in particular those of 19 January 2023 on the humanitarian consequences of the blockade in Nagorno-Karabakh (1), of 10 March 2022 on the destruction of cultural heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh (2), and of 20 May 2021 on prisoners of war in the aftermath of the most recent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan (3),










—


having regard to the relevant documents and international agreements, including but not limited to the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act of 1 August 1975 and the Alma-Ata Declaration of 21 December 1991,










—


having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Geneva Conventions and the subsequent protocols thereto, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the European Convention on Human Rights, the UNESCO Convention concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage of 16 November 1972, and the UNESCO Declaration concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage of 17 October 2003,










—


having regard to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group’s 2009 Basic Principles,










—


having regard to the trilateral statement of 9 November 2020 signed by the leaders of Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan,










—


having regard to the joint statement of 19 September 2023 on Azerbaijan’s attack on Nagorno-Karabakh by the Chair of its Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Chair of its Delegation for relations with the South Caucasus, and its Standing Rapporteurs on Armenia and Azerbaijan,










—


having regard to the statements by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 September 2023 on Azerbaijan’s military escalation and of 21 September 2023 on developments in Nagorno-Karabakh and to the address by the High Representative of 21 September 2023 to the UN Security Council on Nagorno-Karabakh,










—


having regard to the statement by the European External Action Service (EEAS) Spokesperson of 29 September 2023 on the displacement of people from Nagorno-Karabakh,










—


having regard to the call of UN Secretary-General António Guterres of 19 September 2023 for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the comment by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk of 26 September 2023,










—


having regard to the orders of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of 22 February 2023 and 6 July 2023 on the request for the indication of provisional measures for the application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Armenia v Azerbaijan),










—


having regard to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, to which Armenia and Azerbaijan are parties, to the first protocol thereto, as applicable to occupied territories, and to the second protocol thereto, on the enhanced protection of cultural property,










—


having regard to the statement of 11 November 2021 by the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group reiterating the importance of protecting historic and cultural sites in the region,










—


having regard to the UN Security Council final report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992),










—


having regard to the report of 29 March 2023 by the Council of Europe’s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Azerbaijan and to the memorandum of 21 October 2021 by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights on the humanitarian and human rights consequences following the 2020 outbreak of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh,










—


having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,










A.


whereas the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has various historical and geopolitical complexities; whereas on 19 September 2023 Azerbaijan launched a pre-planned, unjustified military attack against Nagorno-Karabakh, leading to significant loss of life; whereas a ceasefire was agreed on 20 September 2023, but the security situation of civilians remaining in Nagorno-Karabakh is not guaranteed; whereas there are reports that hundreds of Armenian civilians were killed and wounded during Azerbaijan’s military operation against Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas there are reports that people are missing; whereas in the ceasefire agreement with Azerbaijan, the de facto authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh agreed to dismantle their civilian institutions as well as to disarm the self-defence forces, surrender all weapons and withdraw from all combat positions and military posts; whereas there have, however, been repeated reports about violations of the ceasefire;










B.


whereas this attack represents a gross violation of human rights and international law, and a clear infringement of the trilateral ceasefire statement of 9 November 2020 and of the commitments that Azerbaijan made in the negotiations mediated by the EU; whereas on 22 May 2023 Nikol Pashinyan, the Prime Minister of Armenia, expressed his country’s readiness to recognise the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, including Nagorno-Karabakh, in return for security guarantees for the Armenian population of the region, as part of the peace process between the two countries;










C.


whereas over 100 000 Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh have been forced to flee to Armenia since the Azerbaijani offensive on 19 September 2023; whereas as a result, Nagorno-Karabakh has been almost entirely deprived of its Armenian population, who have been living there for centuries; whereas the Azerbaijani Government stated that it would guarantee the rights of the civilian population, including educational, cultural, religious, and municipal electoral rights; whereas Azerbaijan’s promises to respect the rights of the local population were not considered credible by Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian inhabitants, who fear reprisals or the loss of the freedom to use their language and practise their religion and customs; whereas there have been credible reports of looting, destruction, violence and arrests committed by Azerbaijani troops since the beginning of the offensive; whereas several officials and former officials from Nagorno-Karabakh have been arrested by Azerbaijan since 19 September 2023;










D.


whereas ethnic cleansing is described by the UN Security Council as rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove from a given area persons of another ethnic or religious group and is contrary to international law; whereas there is a pressing need to stop and reverse the ongoing forced exodus of the local Armenian population, which amounts to ethnic cleansing, and to ensure the conditions for their safe return to Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians have the right to live in their homes in dignity and security; whereas the Azerbaijani authorities have announced the registration of all Armenian residents of Nagorno-Karabakh;










E.


whereas both Azerbaijan and Armenia are bound by international humanitarian law; whereas the Third Geneva Convention protects prisoners of war from all forms of torture and cruel treatment; whereas such acts perpetrated during an armed conflict amount to war crimes; whereas the Fourth Geneva Convention protects civilians in international armed conflicts and establishes that the unlawful confinement, wilful killing and inhuman and degrading treatment of a protected person constitute war crimes;










F.


whereas this military aggression was preceded by Azerbaijan’s nine-month blockade, in place since 12 December 2022, of the Lachin corridor, the only land corridor linking the mostly Armenian-populated Nagorno-Karabakh region with Armenia, depriving more than 100 000 Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians of freedom of movement and access to food, medication, hygiene products and other goods, as well as by the establishment of a check point on the same corridor in April 2023 in violation of the November 2020 trilateral statement, by a military build-up around Nagorno-Karabakh and along the border with Armenia, and by aggressive and inflammatory rhetoric by Azerbaijan’s leadership;










G.


whereas on the basis of the trilateral statement of 9 November 2020, which brought an end to the 44-day war, the Lachin corridor was to remain under the control of Russian peacekeeping forces, while Azerbaijan was to guarantee the security of persons, vehicles and cargo moving along the Lachin corridor in both directions; whereas the Russian so-called peacekeeping forces have not acted according to their mandate, taking no action against Azerbaijan’s blockade of the Lachin corridor, or upon its establishment of a check point, or against Azerbaijan’s most recent military aggression; whereas by sustaining the blockade of the Lachin corridor, Azerbaijan breached its international obligations under the November 2020 trilateral ceasefire statement;










H.


whereas these more than nine months of organised starvation and isolation have particularly affected vulnerable groups in Nagorno-Karabakh, such as children, elderly people and people with disabilities and chronic health conditions; whereas this has led, among other things, to a rise in miscarriages and premature births due to pregnant women not having access to proper nutrition and prenatal care; whereas Azerbaijan has also cut off the region’s gas and electricity supply, significantly impacting living conditions in the region, including the functioning of medical and educational institutions; whereas, owing to the blockade, the medical institutions in Nagorno-Karabakh have had insufficient capacity to deal with the people injured by the Azerbaijani attack;










I.


whereas in its Order of 22 February 2023 in Armenia v Azerbaijan, the ICJ ordered Azerbaijan to allow free passage through the Lachin corridor and to take all measures at its disposal to ensure the unimpeded movement of persons, vehicles and cargo along the Lachin corridor in both directions;










J.


whereas on 28 September 2023 the de facto president of Nagorno-Karabakh, Samvel Shahramanyan, was forced to sign a decree dissolving all structures and institutions of the self-proclaimed republic as of 1 January 2024, with the self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh ceasing to exist;










K.


whereas the EU has provided EUR 5 million to the International Committee of the Red Cross in humanitarian aid; whereas the funds will assist people displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia and assist vulnerable people in Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas the Armenian Government has asked the EU for assistance to help deal with the influx of refugees arriving from Nagorno-Karabakh;










L.


whereas the President of the European Council established one of the three strands of peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan;










M.


whereas numerous churches, mosques, cross-stones and cemeteries are located in Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas after considerable deliberate damage was caused by Azerbaijan to Armenian cultural heritage during the 2020 war, the ICJ indicated, in its Order of 7 December 2021 (4), that Azerbaijan must ‘take all necessary measures to prevent and punish acts of vandalism and desecration affecting Armenian cultural heritage, including but not limited to churches and other places of worship, monuments, landmarks, cemeteries and artefacts’;










N.


whereas other states, such as Türkiye, have provided political, diplomatic and military support to Azerbaijan, further escalating the conflict; whereas under point 9 of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement, Armenia was to guarantee the security of transport connections between mainland Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan exclave, connections which have been promoted by Azerbaijan and Türkiye as the ‘Zangezur corridor’ and have been employed by officials of the two countries in ways that threaten Armenia’s sovereignty;










O.


whereas in recent years the Azerbaijani leadership has made irredentist statements on several occasions with reference to the sovereign territory of Armenia; whereas, on several occasions over the past two years, the Azerbaijani army has occupied various parts of the sovereign territory of Armenia and bombed civilian targets on the territory of Armenia;










P.


whereas previous warnings from Parliament regarding the situation have not led to any significant change in the EU’s policy towards Azerbaijan; whereas three decades of diplomacy and peacebuilding efforts by the OSCE, the EU and other international actors have failed to deter Azerbaijan’s use of military force;













1.


Condemns in the strongest terms the pre-planned and unjustified military attack by Azerbaijan against the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh and calls for an immediate and complete end to the violence against the people who have remained in the region; highlights that Azerbaijan was on a clear path to re-establish its control over Nagorno-Karabakh through diplomatic negotiations and that this attack contradicts Azerbaijan’s stated intentions of working towards a sustainable peace with Armenia and undermines the ongoing peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan;












2.


Stresses that this attack represents a gross violation of international law and human rights and a clear infringement of the trilateral ceasefire statement of 9 November 2020 and of the commitments that Azerbaijan made in the negotiations mediated by the EU; recalls that the attack took place in the context of a major humanitarian crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh, following Azerbaijan’s blockade of the Lachin corridor for the past nine months, in violation of Baku’s commitments and of the legally binding orders of the ICJ; reminds Azerbaijan that the use of coercive practices to remove a civilian population from a territory may amount to a crime against humanity and could fall under the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide;












3.


Deplores the loss of life and injuries resulting from the recent attack by Azerbaijan, including after an explosion at a fuel depot on 25 September 2023; expresses its solidarity with the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh who have been forced to flee their homes and ancestral lands; considers that the current situation amounts to ethnic cleansing and strongly condemns the threats and acts of violence committed by Azerbaijani troops against the population of Nagorno-Karabakh; commends the authorities of Armenia for their efforts to provide aid and shelter to the refugees; calls for the EU institutions and the Member States to immediately offer all necessary assistance to Armenia to deal with the influx of refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh and the resulting humanitarian crisis;












4.


Calls for the EU and its Member States to adopt targeted sanctions against the individuals in the Azerbaijani Government responsible for multiple ceasefire violations and violations of human rights in Nagorno-Karabakh; calls for investigations into the abuses committed by Azerbaijani forces that could constitute war crimes;












5.


Reminds Azerbaijan that it bears full responsibility for the safety and well-being of all people in Nagorno-Karabakh and must be held accountable; demands that Azerbaijan ensure the safety and security of the people in Nagorno-Karabakh, respecting the UN Charter and all relevant international conventions, the principles of international humanitarian law and human rights, its international commitments and the OSCE principles; calls on the Azerbaijani authorities to allow the safe return of the Armenian population to Nagorno-Karabakh, to offer solid guarantees regarding the protection of their rights and to refrain from any inflammatory rhetoric that could incite discrimination against Armenians; reminds the Azerbaijani authorities that the right to return to one’s home is a fundamental precept of international human rights law; calls on the Azerbaijani authorities to urgently and genuinely engage in a comprehensive and transparent dialogue with the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians to ensure respect for their rights and guarantee their security, including their right to live in their homes in dignity and safety, and their land and property rights, to maintain their distinct identity and fully enjoy their civic, cultural, social and religious rights; calls on the Azerbaijani authorities to closely consult the Council of Europe, the UN, the OSCE and other international organisations concerning best practices to guarantee the rights of ethnic Armenians, stressing that this is particularly important given Azerbaijan’s disastrous track record on human rights;












6.


Demands the immediate lifting of the blockade of the Lachin corridor in order to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid to those in need in Nagorno-Karabakh and calls for the Lachin corridor to be opened fully, as it provides a physical connection for Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians to their land, property, culture and heritage; urges the Azerbaijani authorities to make every effort to ensure that the Armenians who have left are able to access all the necessary information on how to restore their residency in Nagorno-Karabakh and avail themselves fully of all other rights to property, social benefits, education and the like, should they decide to return;












7.


Calls for the EU and its Member States to urgently work towards securing international guarantees ensuring the safety and well-being of Armenians who are continuing to live in Nagorno-Karabakh and the immediate restoration of full humanitarian access to the region; calls for the EU and its Member States to increase their presence on the ground and substantially increase humanitarian aid to people displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia or living in Nagorno-Karabakh; expresses disappointment at the way in which the first UN mission to Nagorno-Karabakh in 30 years was organised and conducted; call for the establishment of an international presence in Nagorno-Karabakh under the auspices of the United Nations, in order to monitor the situation on the ground and provide transparency, reassurance and confidence to the residents of Nagorno-Karabakh, with a focus on humanitarian needs and protection and on the preservation of cultural and historical heritage sites; calls for the urgent replacement of the Russian peacekeeping forces with a UN peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh and along the international border between Armenia and Azerbaijan in order to effectively protect the safety and security of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh;












8.


Expresses deep concern for the preservation of cultural, religious and historical heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh after the massive exodus of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians; urges Azerbaijan to refrain from further destroying, neglecting or altering the origins of cultural, religious or historical heritage in the region, bearing in mind the destruction of cultural, religious and historical heritage since the beginning of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and calls on it to instead strive to preserve, protect and promote this rich diversity in line with the ICJ Order of 7 December 2021; demands the protection of the Armenian cultural, historical and religious heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh in line with UNESCO standards and Azerbaijan’s international commitments; insists that Azerbaijan allow a UNESCO mission to Nagorno-Karabakh and give it the necessary access to heritage sites to establish a record of their current state and proceed with an inventory;












9.


Demands the safeguarding of the property of those members of the Armenian community who were forced to leave and calls on Azerbaijan to release and commit to a broad amnesty for all the inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh who have been arrested since 19 September 2023, including former officials from the region, and for all others who were arrested before and after 19 September 2023;












10.


Reiterates its condemnation of the Azerbaijani military incursions into the internationally recognised territory of Armenia; reiterates its demand for the withdrawal of Azerbaijan’s troops from the entirety of the sovereign territory of Armenia; rejects and expresses its grave concern regarding the irredentist and inflammatory statements made by the Azerbaijani President and other Azerbaijani officials threatening the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Armenia, including those in connection with the ‘Zangezur corridor’; warns Azerbaijan against any potential military adventurism against Armenia proper; condemns Türkiye’s involvement in arming Azerbaijan and its full support for Azerbaijan’s offensives in both 2020 and 2023 and calls on Türkiye to restrain its ally Azerbaijan from undertaking any such irresponsible actions; condemns the support provided during this crisis to Azerbaijan by other countries and calls for an end to this support in order to prevent further escalation; warns that Azerbaijan could be emboldened by the lack of serious deterrence efforts by the international community;












11.


Calls for a comprehensive review of the EU’s relations with Azerbaijan, taking into account recent developments and the worsening human rights situation in the country; regrets the fact that the President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, had characterised Azerbaijan as a ‘trustworthy energy supplier’; calls on the Commission to quickly reconsider the ‘strategic partnership’ with Azerbaijan in the field of energy, given Azerbaijan’s repeated violations of its international commitments, including commitments made in talks mediated by the EU and binding provisions under international law; notes that, in the light of Azerbaijan’s aggression against Armenia in September 2022 and its unjustified use of force against and forced displacement of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023, as well as the country’s alarming human rights record, developing such a ‘strategic partnership’ is incompatible with the objectives of EU foreign policy as defined in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union; states its conviction that the EU cannot morally accept negotiating a future partnership agreement with a country that blatantly violates principles of international law as well as its international obligations and is therefore neither a reliable nor a trustworthy partner; urges the High Representative and the EEAS, therefore, to suspend the negotiations for a renewed partnership agreement until Azerbaijan has demonstrated its genuine readiness to respect the rights and security concerns of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh; calls for the EU and its Member States, if Azerbaijan continues to disregard its commitments, to consider suspending the visa facilitation agreement with Azerbaijan and lowering the level of cooperation with the country in other areas; finds unacceptable any comments and threats addressed to MEPs by the Azerbaijani authorities, including the Ambassador of Azerbaijan to the EU;












12.


Calls for the EU’s dependency on gas exports from Azerbaijan to be reduced; is seriously concerned about Azerbaijan’s import of Russian gas and the notable Russian share in the production and transportation of Azerbaijani gas for the EU, which contradicts the EU’s objective of undermining Russia’s capacity to continue its war of aggression against Ukraine by cutting its revenues from oil and gas exports to the EU; urges the Commission to investigate suspicions that Azerbaijan actually exports Russian gas to the EU; calls for the suspension of all imports of oil and gas from Azerbaijan to the EU in the event of military aggression against Armenian territorial integrity or significant hybrid attacks against Armenia’s constitutional order and democratic institutions; calls, in the light of Azerbaijan’s recent invasion of Nagorno-Kabarakh, for the suspension of the Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Partnership in the Field of Energy between the European Union and Azerbaijan;












13.


Condemns the inaction of Russian ‘peacekeepers’ and the overall role played by Russia, which for decades has fuelled the conflict and used it for its own political gains;












14.


Condemns Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for exploiting the armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh to promote an imperialistic agenda and for encouraging further attacks against Armenia’s sovereignty; urges Türkiye to adopt a constructive and responsible approach regarding Armenia’s territorial integrity and to foster peace in the region;












15.


Commends Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan for his commitment to peace; reiterates the EU’s commitment to supporting Armenia’s sovereignty, democracy and territorial integrity; strongly condemns Russia’s increasing hybrid attempts to destabilise the political situation inside Armenia; welcomes Armenia’s ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; believes that the EU must seize the opportunity of a potential geopolitical vacuum, provide Armenia with an ambitious plan for cooperation by upgrading the current Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement, anchoring Armenia more strongly in the community of Western democracies and helping it unlock relations with neighbours, in particular Türkiye;












16.


Calls for the EU to respond favourably to Armenia’s request for support via the European Peace Facility should Armenia reconsider its current military alliances; calls for the EU to substantially increase its humanitarian and financial assistance to Armenia, which faces the arrival of tens of thousands of refugees; calls for the EU, in the light of the disruption to the education of thousands of ethnic Armenians, to help establish and fund scholarships for pupils and students who have been evacuated, so that they can continue their studies;












17.


Reiterates its support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Azerbaijan and Armenia; calls on Azerbaijan to reaffirm its unequivocal commitment to Armenia’s territorial integrity; believes that genuine dialogue between Azerbaijan, Armenia and representatives of the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians is the only sustainable way forward and calls for the EU and its Member States to support such efforts; supports the ongoing peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which have been seriously hampered by the recent military operation against Nagorno-Karabakh; underlines the need for a comprehensive peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which must include the mutual recognition of territorial integrity, guarantees for the rights and security of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian population and the release of prisoners; highlights that a dignified and durable regional peace that maintains sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity for both countries is a prerequisite for stability in the neighbourhood;












18.


Calls on the EU civilian mission in Armenia (EUMA) to closely monitor the evolving security situation on the ground, provide transparent reporting to Parliament and actively contribute to conflict resolution efforts; calls for the EU and its Member States to strengthen EUMA’s mandate, increase its size, extend its duration and also place monitors along the border with Türkiye; deplores the fact that Azerbaijan has never allowed EUMA to be deployed on its territory and calls on Azerbaijan to allow EUMA’s presence on its side of the border and in Nagorno-Karabakh;












19.


Expresses deep dissatisfaction at the fact that regular alerts by Parliament regarding the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and the risks of a catastrophic outcome have been disregarded by the Commission and the Council; deplores that EU action has so far not led to any positive results; demands that the EEAS reconsider its action in the South Caucasus and replace dedicated staff; regrets the slow response by the EU institutions, with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy only releasing a statement two days after Azerbaijan launched its attack against Nagorno-Karabakh;












20.


Regrets the fact that Members of the European Parliament have accepted and failed to declare trips to Azerbaijan, visits to the Nagorno-Karabakh region and luxury hotel stays that were organised and paid for by Azerbaijani officials; reiterates its call for stricter rules on trips by officials that are paid for by foreign countries and entities; regrets the fact that this commitment was not implemented through its decision of 13 September 2023 on amendments to Parliament’s Rules of Procedure with a view to strengthening integrity, independence and accountability; calls for its Committee on Constitutional Affairs to propose a revision of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure in order to introduce a ban on Members of the European Parliament accepting trips and accommodation paid for by third parties, including officials from non-EU countries and corporate interest representatives;












21.


Calls for the EU and its Member States to urgently reassess the EU’s diplomatic and security architecture and the geopolitical configurations in the wider South Caucasus region in the light of the new facts on the ground and the interests of countries like Russia, Türkiye and Iran, but also to develop a strategy in response to the growing trend of autocratic regimes pushing aside diplomatic efforts in favour of violent military force;












22.


Deplores the Hungarian Government’s decision to block a joint statement by all EU Member States condemning the military operation by Azerbaijan against the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh; urges the Council to unite in support of the EU having more active involvement in the protection of human rights and the promotion of peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia;












23.


Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Armenia, the Director-General of UNESCO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the UN and the Council of Europe.






(1)  
            OJ C 214, 16.6.2023, p. 104.

(2)  
            OJ C 347, 9.9.2022, p. 198.

(3)  
            OJ C 15, 12.1.2022, p. 156.

(4)  Order of the International Court of Justice of 7 December 2021 on the request for the indication of provisional measures for the application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Armenia v Azerbaijan).


ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/1188/oj
ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)