COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Commission assessment of the Gas Security of Supply Regulation Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT reviewing the application of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938
Date: 2023-10-05
Institutions: Directorate-General for Energy, European Commission
Subjects: EU Member State, action programme, energy efficiency, gas, gas industry, gas pipeline, gas supply, security of supply, self-sufficiency in energy, third country

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 5.10.2023  SWD(2023) 323 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Commission assessment of the Gas Security of Supply Regulation   Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT reviewing the application of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 {COM(2023) 572 final}  
 
 
Staff  Working  Document  Accompanying  the  Report  Reviewing  the  Gas 
Security of Supply Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 

1.  Introduction 

As a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent gas supply disruptions, flows 
from Russia have been almost entirely replaced by supplies from alternative suppliers in the form 
of additional pipeline import from trusted partners and, above all, a considerable increase in LNG 
import  (50  bcm  increase  in  2022  year-on-year).  Whereas  Russian  imports  amounted  to  around 
50%  of  the  EUs  imports  before  the  war,  it  represents  now  less  than  10%,  showcasing  the 
unprecedented shift the EU’s gas system has undergone in the past year. 

Figure 1: Monthly gas flow along the East corridor 2016-2023 (in bcm/month). 

Source: JRC based on ENTSOG Transparency Platform  

In the context of the EU’s phase out of Russian gas and the continued supply diversification, as 
well as the ongoing decarbonisation efforts with increased importance electrification, biomethane 
and hydrogen, the EU’s security of supply architecture will need to continue to adapt according to 
the changes we will face in the coming years and decades. While this Staff Working Document 
may primarily focus on gas security of supply, it is of utmost future importance to put the lessons 
learned in a broader energy security perspective and adopt a more holistic approach including other 
energy  carriers.  In  the  future,  this  will  include  the  further  development  of  hydrogen  and 
biomethane and its importance for energy security. 

Article 17 of the Gas Security of Supply Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 tasks the Commission with 
drawing submitting a report to  the European Parliament  and Council on the application of this 
Regulation, and where necessary, legislative proposals to amend this Regulation.  

This Staff Working Document complements the aforementioned report, by providing more details 
on  the  Commission’s  assessment  of  Member  States’  Preventive  Action  Plans  and  Emergency 
Plans,  as  well  as  by  reviewing  in  further  detail  the  provisions  of  the  Gas  Security  of  Supply 
Regulation where future action may be required. 

1 

 
 
2.  Commission assessment of Member States’ Preventive Action Plans and Emergency 

Plans 

Article  17  of  Regulation  (EU)  2017/1938  (hereafter:  ‘the  Gas  Security  of  Supply  Regulation) 
requires the Commission to submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council, based 
on the Commission’s assessments of the updated Preventive Action Plans and Emergency Plans, 
as stipulated in Article 8(7).  

In 2019, Member States submitted their plans to the Commission, after which the Commission 
made an assessment of the plans and issued a series of opinions with specific recommendations 
and points where the plans should be improved. This same process should be taking place in 2023 
due to  a regular 4-yearly update of the plans  required by Articles 9(11) and 10(2), as Member 
States had to submit updated plans by March 2023. However, thus far the Commission has only 
recently received 7 Preventive Action Plans and 7 Emergency Plans, the majority of which were 
received in June 2023 and July 20231, meaning that the Commission’s assessment will be based 
on the Preventive Action Plans and Emergency Plans submitted in 2019, as well as on the lessons 
learned from the past year(s). 

2.1. Commission assessment and opinions on Member States’ Preventive Action Plans and 
Emergency Plans 

2.1.1.  Preventive Action Plans 

Articles 8 and 9 of the Gas Security of Supply Regulation establish the Preventive Action Plans 
(PAPs) and require Member States to describe proactive measures that will be taken to reduce risks 
to prevent a gas emergency from happening. The PAPs are to be based on the results of the national 
risk  assessment  and  need  to  contain  a  regional  chapter  based  on  the  common  risk  assessment 
referred  to  in  Article  7(2).  In  particular,  Article  9(1)  stipulates  that  the  PAPs  need  to  include 
detailed information on the following elements: 

•  Results of the risk assessments. 
•  Measures needed to fulfil the infrastructure standard and supply standard. 
•  Obligations  imposed  on  gas  undertakings  and  other  relevant  bodies  that  may  impact 

security of supply. 

•  Preventive measures designed to address the risks identified in the risk assessments. 
•  Description of economic impact, effectiveness and efficiency of preventive measures. 
•  Effect of the measures on the internal market, as well as on national market functioning. 
•  The impact on the environment and on consumers. 
•  Cross-border cooperation mechanisms between Member States. 
• 
• 

Information on interconnections and infrastructures, in particular for cross-border flows. 
Information on public service obligations. 

1 The Commission has sent EU Pilots to Member States whose Preventive Action Plans, Emergency Plans and Risk Assessments 
are missing. For further details, see sections 3.4.1 and 3.5. 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
In 2019, The Commission issued a series of opinions2 on the Preventive Action Plans and on the 
Emergency Plans (discussed in the section hereafter). The opinions contained the Commission’s 
assessment of the national plans and made targeted recommendations to improve the plans.  

While the Commission opinions recognised the overall quality and completeness of the Member 
States’ plans, in particular as regards the description of the specificities of the national gas systems, 
the  Commission’s  opinions  also  identified  a  number  of  points  that  were  recommended  to  be 
improved by Member States, including: 

•  Completing missing information on  stakeholder consultation. While it was recognised 
that most likely a stakeholder consultation took place, the Commission requested several 
Member States to further elaborate on how their comments were integrated, or not. 

•  Missing details on compliance with the supply standard. Missing data on volumes and 
capacities, or a lack of a description of the monitoring system to ensure compliance were 
the most common issues. Other issues  include using  non-market  measures  designed for 
mitigating an emergency for complying with the supply standard. 

• 

•  Lack of information on the N-1 infrastructure standard, most notably a lack of details 
on  capacities.  In  some  cases,  parameters  were  inconsistent  between  the  regional  risk 
assessment and the PAP. 
In  some  cases,  there  was  a  lack  of  information  of  the  possible  impact  of  preventive 
measures on the economy, the environment, the internal market and/or on consumers. 
•  While most Member States included a satisfactory description of the national gas system, 
a few Member States failed to include a sufficient description of the national or regional 
gas  system,  for  example  where  it  concerns  main  import  sources,  storage  withdrawal 
capacities, or a breakdown of gas consumption per sector.  
In several Member States’ PAPs, there was either an inaccurate definition or insufficient 
data on protected customers. In some instances, it was not made sufficiently clear which 
‘essential  social  services’  or  district  heating  consumers  were  considered  as  protected 
customers, which made it difficult to determine whether they exceeded 20% of total annual 
gas consumption, as stipulated in Article 2(5).  

• 

•  A  few  plans  missed  information  on  the  common  or  national  risk  assessments,  or  they 
referred to information in these documents, which are not in all cases public documents. 

Despite these shortcomings, the overall quality of the  PAPs is generally satisfactory. However, 
given  that  most  plans  include  elements  that  do  not  fully  comply  with  the  Regulation,  the 
Commission requested the majority of Member States to amend their plans accordingly.  

2.1.2.  Emergency Plans 

Articles  8  and  10  of  the  Gas  Security  of  Supply  Regulation  establish  rules,  procedures  and 
substantive requirements for the Emergency Plans (EPs). All Member States (except Cyprus by 
derogation) have Emergency Plans in place. The Emergency Plans describe, among others what 

2 Commission's opinions on the preventive action plans and emergency plans (europa.eu) 

3 

 
 
 
 
needs to be done in case of gas supply disruptions, by whom it needs to be done and how this 
should be achieved, as stipulated by Article 10. 

• 

• 

• 

It defines the role and responsibilities of (a) anyone that can be potentially affected in case 
of a gas disruption (gas undertakings, industrial gas consumers, but also gas and electricity 
TSOs and producers) and (b) competent authorities. 
It describes the measures to be taken to mitigate the impact of a gas disruption, including 
predefined actions to make gas available in case of emergency and it ensures that ample 
time is given to the relevant bodies to respond to a crisis level of Article 11. These measures 
are split between the contribution of market measures and non-market measures (including 
arrangements to prevent undue consumption of non-protected customers). 
It establishes detailed procedures and protocols/information flows to be applied in case of 
emergency (this includes designating a crisis manager). It includes liaising with authorities 
of neighbouring Member States (and a description of the existing solidarity arrangements). 
In addition, an estimation of solidarity-protected customers’ demand has to be given. 

The Commission adopted opinions on each of these plans. The most frequent comments concerned 
the lack of solidarity agreements and insufficient description of the measures foreseen (both the 
market-based and non-market-based measures) and their contribution in terms of volume saved or 
supplied  to  solve  a  crisis.  The  lack  of  bilateral  solidarity  agreements  are  assessed  to  be  a 
particular  vulnerability  in  the  gas  security  of  supply  architecture  and  the  Commission  has 
repeatedly  stressed the importance of tackling this  vulnerability either through accelerating the 
bilateral work, or via common solidarity rules applicable by default.  

While the Emergency Plans generally follow the structure required by the Regulation and a certain 
degree of response flexibility  is embodied in the documents, most of the  plans do not discuss 
measures beyond their qualitative aspects. Market-based measures for coping with the situation 
at alert level and mitigating the situation at emergency level are in most instances presented. The 
contribution of non-market-based measures planned or to be implemented for the emergency level 
is  typically discussed qualitatively, while a quantitative assessment of their impact  is  generally 
lacking.  Procedures  for  their  implementation  are  not  always  properly  defined,  meaning  that 
explicit  priority  orders  for  disconnection  are  in  most  cases  not  presented.  In  some  instances 
measures  qualified  as  market-based  seem  in  fact  to  be  non-market-based  and  vice  versa.  In 
addition,  not  all  Member  States  notified  the  specific  emergency  measures  foreseen  for  the 
electricity generation and district heating sectors.  

Many  of  the  EPs  indicate  the  importance  of  interruptible  contracts.  Some  mention  measures 
where  consumers  voluntarily  reduce  their  consumptions  and  shed  loads  typically  in  the  early 
warning phase and often with some type of monetary compensation, essentially rendering them 
demand-side  market  measures.  However,  interruptible  contracts  are  usually  mentioned  in  the 
context  of  the  emergency  phase  where  enforced  curtailments  take  place  under  orders  from  the 
competent authorities, a clear example of a non-market measure. The majority of the plans do not 
attempt to quantify the impact of such curtailments, with a few exceptions.  

4 

 
The same conclusion applies to the issue of fuel switching: the majority of plans mention their 
application but quantification is usually lacking preventing a straightforward estimate of the order 
of magnitude of the impact of its implementation at EU and per Member State. Alternative fuel 
obligations are not always explicitly stated. 

In addition, the EPs generally lacked a sufficient regional dimension, in particular as regards the 
impact  of  measures  on  neighbouring  Member  States’  by  e.g.  reducing  transit  flows  in  an 
emergency. In some instances, the Commission requested Member States to adapt its EP to provide 
more info, especially to ensure that measures are in compliance with Article 11(6). The EPs also 
tended to lack regionally agreed measures in case of regional crises. Several Member States fail to 
include information on how and when the EPs were tested, as required by Article 10(3). 

2.2. Gas Coordination Group discussions 

The Gas Coordination Group (GCG), deriving its legal basis from Article 4 of the Gas Security of 
Supply Regulation, has been convened on a regular basis since 2017 to discuss, among others, the 
implementation of the aforementioned regulation.  

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the GCG was convened with a high frequency to discuss 
latest developments regarding security of gas supply, as well as the  implementation of the Gas 
Security of Supply Regulation with a particular focus on the EU’s preparedness for a possible gas 
crisis, crisis management procedures (including discussing the activation of national crisis levels) 
and the lack of solidarity arrangements.  

Discussions with Member States and stakeholders in this forum has allowed for direct feedback 
on the implementation of the Gas Security of Supply Regulation, which has featured in this report.  

2.3. Risk preparedness reports 2022 

To assess any imminent risks stemming from possible supply cuts, as well as the EU’s and Member 
States’ overall level of preparedness for such disruptions, the Commission carried out two reports 
in  Q1 and  Q2 of 2022.  The first  report  analysed the possible risks related to  potential Russian 
supply cuts, while the second report focussed more on the EU’s preparedness and corresponding 
recommendations  to  improve  the  EU’s  preparedness  to  such  supply  disruptions.  These  reports 
were shared with Member States and the main conclusions were discussed in the GCG. 

The conclusion of the first report (Q1 2022) was based on the assessment that at the time, the 
ongoing winter 2021-2022 would most likely be safe, partly due to the preparedness of Member 
States via their Emergency Plans. This assessment was based on simulations of supply disruptions 
together with e.g. cold spells and peak days in winter. Even in worst case scenarios, security of 
supply  was  for  the  winter  2021-2022  guaranteed.  Nevertheless,  this  risk  preparedness  analysis 
pointed to several risks, in particular for the refilling of storages and called for more granular data 
from Member States on the potential of demand response, interruptible contracts, fuel switching 
and the share of non-protected customers in the different seasons. 

5 

 
The second report (Q2 2022) was issued after the European Council3 had asked the Commission 
to propose a plan to ensure security of supply for next winter, ensure sufficient levels of gas storage 
and reinforce EU contingency planning for security of supply. This report gave an overview of the 
EU’s preparedness and gave recommendations on good practices for Member States. The main 
points of action at Member State level that were identified were:  

(1) All Member States should establish crisis teams, who should be in direct contact with crisis 

managers from neighbouring Member States and the Gas Coordination Group. 
(2) Full cooperation between Member States and no restrictions of transit are essential. 
(3) Maximising energy savings across sectors, via e.g. information campaigns was assessed to 
allow extra flows towards disrupted Member States and free up gas for storage filling. 
(4) Keeping low carbon power generation online was at the time assessed to delay the need for 

additional gas for power.  

(5) Engage in dialogue with industry for rescheduling production, and prepare a proper load-

shedding plan including a clear priority order in case of a severe shortage. 

(6) Accelerate  the  lease/purchase  of  Floating  Storage  and  Regasification  Units  (FSRUs)  to 

facilitate alternative supplies. 

(7) Pursue  investments  in  low carbon and renewables  gases and renewable and low carbon 

hydrogen to substitute natural gas. 

In addition, the second report identified potential EU-level actions, based on Member State input 
via a questionnaire: 

(1) Further develop the EU Energy Platform to pool demand and optimize import capacities. 
(2) Facilitate network optimisation by TSOs via coordination to ensure gas flows from West 

to East and to prioritise flows to storage. 

(3) A  guidance  on  prioritisation  criteria  to  identify  essential  customers  that  are  not  yet 

protected under the current Gas Security of Supply Regulation.  

(4) EU-wide  coordination  of  demand  reduction  with  pre-emptive  measures  on  a  voluntary 

basis in an alert phase, to avoid uncoordinated curtailments in an emergency. 

(5) The creation of an EU-wide alert level, that allows for a wider range of measures to be 

implemented before an emergency.  

(6) Providing guidance regarding state aid measures, industrial emissions directive and third 
package gas rules, to facilitate efficient use of LNG terminals, storages, production or fuel 
switching.  

The majority of these measure were followed up on by the Commission and Member States to 
complement the  architecture of  the security of  supply  policies  to  adapt  to the new geopolitical 
landscape. It was notably done by (1) continued work on the Energy Platform and AggregateEU4, 
(2) discussions in the Gas Coordination Group with the participation of ENTSOG, (3) the “Save 
Gas  for  a  Safe  Winter”  Communication5,  (4)  the  Demand  Reduction  Regulation6  and  (5) 

3 20220311-versailles-declaration-en.pdf (europa.eu) and the conclusions of the EUCO of 25 March 
4 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/energy-security/eu-energy-platform_en  
5 EUR-Lex - 52022DC0360 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu) 
6 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022R1369  

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Temporary  Crisis  and  Transition  Framework  for  state  aid  rules7  and  clarifications  on  possible 
derogations for fuel switching provided to Member States for the Industrial Emissions Directive.  

3.  Review on Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 and possible means to enhance security of gas 

supply 

Given  that  the  updated  plans  were  largely  missing  as  outlined  in  section  2,  the  Commission 
circulated a questionnaire to consult members of the Gas Coordination Group on the provisions of 
the Gas Security of Supply Regulation.   

3.1. Gas Coordination Group 

The Gas Coordination Group (GCG) derives its legal basis from Article 4 of the Gas Security of 
Supply Regulation, which stipulates that the GCG is chaired by the Commission and is composed 
of  representatives  of  Member  States,  ACER,  ENTSOG  and  bodies  representing  industries  and 
consumers. The Commission can, in consultation with Member States, decide on the composition 
of the GCG, to ensure it is fully representative.  

The GCG is to be consulted and is tasked with  assisting the Commission on matters related  to 
security of gas supply, in particular in times of crisis. The Commission may convene the GCG in 
a setting restricted to Member States’ representatives only.  

3.1.1. Functioning during the 2022 crisis 

In the course of 2022, the GCG has been convened a record number of 24 times both in unrestricted 
and restricted format, i.e. including also EU associations or only with Member States. In particular, 
the latest developments regarding security of gas supply in the context of the Russian invasion of 
Ukraine and the subsequent gas supply disruptions were discussed. In addition, exchanges were 
facilitated on best practices on preventive and emergency measures, as well as on next steps for 
EU-wide measures to enhance preparedness, which played a key role in informing the Commission 
in  order  to  propose  new  legislative  proposals,  such  as  the  Storage  Regulation8,  the  Demand 
Reduction Regulation9 and the Solidarity Regulation10. Representatives of the GCG indicated in 
their responses to a questionnaire circulated by the Commission to the GCG in May 2023 that they 
appreciated the functioning of the group, primarily praising its adaptable and flexible format. 

Despite the fact that the GCG has proven to be a well-functioning, flexible and responsive forum 
to  discuss  latest  developments  regarding  security  of  gas  supply,  there  may  be  scope  to  further 
improve its functioning. For example, a challenge is to ensure a similar level of engagement across 
all Member States and stakeholders, to guarantee that all perspectives are heard and considered.  

7 https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/temporary-crisis-and-transition-framework_en  
8 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022R1032  
9 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022R1369  
10 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022R2576  

7 

 
 
 
In  addition,  some  members  of  the  GCG  indicated  that  there  may  be  overlap  with  the  Crisis 
Management Group as defined in Article 12(4). Some GCG members indicated that they would 
prefer if these crisis management functions would be delegated to the GCG, while others argued 
that  this  Crisis  Management  Group  could  be  turned  into  a  standing  group  also  outside  of  an 
emergency, consisting of experts who have operational expertise who can be tasked with e.g. data 
sharing and processing, which in turn can inform discussions in the GCG. 

3.1.2. Future composition 

Considering  lessons  learned  in  2022,  as  well  as  the  changing  security  of  supply  landscape  in 
coming years, further considerations should be given as to whether the current composition is still 
fit for purpose. 

More  specifically,  the  GCG  should  reflect  on  the  role  of  consumer  associations,  whose 
perspectives are essential, in particular in times of crises, but who have not always participated in 
the discussions.  

In addition, the Commission extended ad hoc invitations to third countries for a GCG meeting, 
especially the United Kingdom and Switzerland as important transit countries, to exchange views 
on  security  of  gas  supply.  Several  Member  States  expressed  their  positive  opinion  to  these 
invitation  and  further  reflection  should  be  given  to  whether  these  ad  hoc  invitations  should  be 
made  with  greater  frequency.  Several  GCG  representatives  indicated  in  their  responses  to  a 
questionnaire circulated by the Commission to the GCG in May 2023, that they would consider it 
appropriate  to  further  reflect  on  whether  these  ad  hoc  invitations  can  also  be  sent  to  supplier 
countries, such as e.g. Norway, Algeria or the US.  

Key takeaways: 
•  GCG is adaptable and flexible and can guarantee all voices are heard if members engage 

equally. 

•  Further consideration should be given to inviting third countries supplying or transiting gas. 
•  Overlap with the Crisis Management Group should be addressed. 

3.2. The infrastructure standard 

Article  5  of  the  Gas  Security  of  Supply  Regulation  establishes  the  obligation  for  competent 
authorities to ensure that the necessary measures are taken, so that in case of a disruption of the 
single largest infrastructure (e.g. interconnections, production sites, storage or LNG facilities) still 
the total gas demand can be satisfied during a day of exceptionally high gas demand (1 in 20 years). 
This calculation shall be done based on the N-1 formula, as set out in Annex II. Since the N-1 
formula  is  a  purely  capacity-based  approach,  competent  authorities  should  complement  this 
formula with hydraulic modelling of the national network under the conditions of the infrastructure 
standard,  as  stipulated  by  Article  7(4a).  The  infrastructure  standard  is  also  considered  fulfilled 
when the competent authority demonstrates in the PAP appropriate demand side measures.  

8 

 
 
 
 
Given the low number of updated PAPs and EPs received by the Commission, current compliance 
with the N-1 standard cannot be accurately assessed. However, considering the figures in between 
2016 and 2019, a general level of improvement over the years can be observed, as showcased in 
Figure 2. Three Member States with small and isolated gas markets – Sweden, Luxemburg, and 
Slovenia  –  are  exempted  from  the  N-1  rule,  due  to  Article  5(9)  of  the  Gas  Security  of  Supply 
Regulation. 

Figure 2: Infrastructure standard (N-1) per Member State 

Source:  JRC  based  on  Member  States’  PAPs  and  EPs,  sorted  according  to  the  value  of  the 
standard for 2018/2019 

Respondents to the questionnaire circulated to the Gas Coordination Group indicated that the N-1 
standard was a good incentive to have adequate infrastructure capacities. However, some indicated 
that the N-1 should not be based on a single peak day demand, but rather on a longer period, given 
that disruptions may last longer than a single day. Others  stressed the need to complement this 
infrastructure-based approach with a larger focus on the supply side, e.g. by having complementary 
diversification standards, including ensuring that our LNG supply of the future remains diversified. 

A large number of Member States either find difficulties to perform the hydraulic modelling in 
support of the infrastructure standard or do not explain in a detailed manner the simulations done. 
This  makes  it difficult  to  identify the potential existence of internal  bottlenecks in  the national 
networks, particularly under the conditions of the standard. 

3.2.1 Bi-directional capacities 

An essential part of the infrastructure standard has been the obligation on TSOs to establish bi-
directional capacity on interconnections between Member States, based on Article 5(5).  

This obligation applies to all interconnections between Member States, unless (1) it is a connection 
to a production facility, LNG facility or distribution network, or (2) a specific exemption has been 
granted based on e.g. Article 5(9) or Annex III point 5(b). Annex III allows competent authorities 

9 

 
 
– which may be delegated to the National Regulatory Authority – to grant a four-year exemption 
if the cost-benefit analysis shows that reverse flow capacity would not enhance security of supply 
or if the investment costs would significantly outweigh the prospective security of supply benefits.  

Since  the  establishment  of  the  Security  of  Supply  Regulation,  there  have  been  a  number  of 
infrastructure developments that have improved bi-directional capacities between Member States.  

Figure 3 shows the improvements made in recent years to ensure bi-directional capacities, which 
are  substantial,  and  which  were  paramount  to  facilitate  reverse  flows  in  2022,  after  Russia 
disrupted flows to several Member States. 

Figure 3: physical bi-directional capacity at cross-border interconnection points in Europe 

Source: JRC 

While  several  interconnections  between  Member  States  are  exempted  from  the  bi-directional 
capacity obligation, the Commission decided via Commission Decision  C(2020)660011 that the 
following exemptions were to be reviewed: 

•  Mosonmagyarovar, between Austria and Hungary;  
•  Murfeld – Ceršak, between Austria and Slovenia;  
•  Blaregnies – Tasnières, for high calorific gas, between Belgium and France;  
•  Karksi, between Estonia and Latvia. 

11 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2020-12/c_2020_6600_f1_commission_decision_en_0.pdf  

10 

 
  
 
 
Since  this  Commission  decision  was  published,  ACER  has  issued  an  opinion  on  the 
Mosonmagyarovar12 and Murfeld - Ceršak13 interconnections. For both the Mosonmagyarovar and 
Murfeld - Ceršak interconnections, ACER adopted the opinion that the N-1 standard was in Austria 
already at an adequate level, meaning that a prolongation of the exemption was justified, given 
that reverse flows would only marginally improve the N-1 standard in Austria, while it may result 
in inefficient investments. By absence of a Commission decision, the Commission agreed to the 
exemption proposals. 

The  exemption  for  bi-directional  capacities  of  the  Karksi  interconnection  has  in  the  meantime 
become  obsolete,  as  a  result  of  the  PCI  project  aiming  to  enhance  cross-border  capacity  and 
installing a metering station in Karksi.   

3.2.2 The N-1 and S-1 concepts 

During 2022, an unprecedented crisis has started to materialise, since the permanent disruption of 
Russian gas imports, by then the largest supplier to the EU, has materialised for most supply routes. 
The total disruption of all Russian imports in the very short-term is now considered realistic. The 
N-1 standard provides a degree of security by ensuring permanent bi-directional capacity between 
Member States and it ensures that enough infrastructure is available to mitigate certain crises. This 
mechanism to ensure adequate capacities under specific challenging circumstances has certainly 
helped to mitigate the crisis experienced in 2022, and has facilitated the changing flow patterns 
that reversed and now run primarily West to East. 

Nevertheless, the N-1 standard is not tailored to mitigate a crisis of total supply disruption from 
one single supplier. Therefore, on top of the N-1 standard, further consideration could be given on 
how to develop additional or strengthened standards to prevent in the future a similar vulnerability 
to  a  certain  supplier,  such  as  an  additional  S-1  standard.  As  is  the  case  with  the  current  N-1 
standard, such considerations should weigh the benefits this may have for an additional level of 
security  of  supply  against  any  potential  costs  or  inefficiencies  that  may  arise.  This  may  be 
facilitated via a reinforced information exchange under Article 14. In particular, members of the 
Gas  Coordination  Group  stressed  the  need  to  avoid  the  risk  of  creating  stranded  assets.  The 
standards should therefore remain in line with the EU’s decarbonisation objectives. 

Key takeaways: 
•  The  infrastructure  standard  is  relevant  to  guarantee  adequate  capacities  and  facilitated 

reverse flows during the crisis in 2022. 

•  Complementary standards could cover supply diversification needs. 
•  Standards need to be balanced with the need to avoid creating stranded assets and support 

decarbonisation objectives. 

12 https://acer.europa.eu/Official_documents/Acts_of_the_Agency/Opinions/Opinions/ACER%20Opinion%2001-
2022%20on%20HU-AT%20Reverse%20Flow.pdf  
13 https://acer.europa.eu/Official_documents/Acts_of_the_Agency/Opinions/Opinions/ACER%20Opinion%2002-
2022%20on%20SI-AT%20Reverse%20Flow.pdf  

11 

 
 
 
 
 
3.3. Supply standard and protected customers 

Article 6 of the Gas Security of Supply Regulation sets out the supply standard, which obliges 
Member States to require gas undertakings to take measures to ensure the gas supply to protected 
customers under a set of pre-defined circumstances, namely:  

•  Extreme temperatures during a 7-day peak period (statistical probability of once in 20 years);  
•  A 30 day period of exceptionally high gas demand (statistical probability of once in 20 years);  
•  A 30 day period of a disruption of the single largest gas infrastructure under average winter 

conditions. 

Protected customers as defined under Article 2(5), include households and Member States may 
under certain conditions include (1) SMEs, (2) essential social services and (3) district heating. 
However,  during  the  energy  crisis  of  2022,  and  after  the  adoption  of  the  Demand  Reduction 
Regulation  (EU)  2022/1369,  the  role  of  voluntary  demand  reduction  of  all  sectors  became  of 
increasing  importance.  Therefore,  Article  24  of  the  temporary  Regulation  (EU)  2022/2576 
introduced  the  possibility  for  Member  States  to  take  measures  that  reduce  the  non-essential 
consumption of protected customers, provided that these customers do not fall under the label of 
vulnerable consumers as defined under Article 3(3) of Directive 2009/73/EC. 

To ensure compliance with the supply standard, Member States were required in 2018 to notify to 
the Commission the definition of protected customers, the annual demand of protected customers 
and the share of protected customers in total annual gas consumption. Ultimately, Member States 
are required to ensure compliance of natural gas undertakings with the supply standard. 

Member States are allowed to increase supply standards for security of supply reasons, provided 
the measure does not negatively impact other Member States to supply their protected customers, 
and it complies with Article 8(1) or Article 12(5) in case of an EU or regional emergency. 

3.3.1. Lessons learned 

The  feedback  received  from  the  Gas  Coordination  Group,  as  response  to  the  questionnaire 
circulated by the Commission, is generally positive about the current supply standard, indicating 
that it is complementary to the infrastructure standard. Many Member States indicated that they 
are not experiencing major challenges implementing the supply standard.  

However, some of the respondents indicated that the 1 in 20 years peak demand does not consider 
any future developments on the supply or demand side, e.g. due to phase out of gas demand or due 
to  climate  change.  Other  respondents  mentioned  that  there  is  a  risk  that  the  supply  standard  is 
easier to uphold by storing gas for larger companies than for smaller companies, leading to a risk 
of competition issues.  

Regarding  protected  customers,  some  Member  States  pointed  towards  difficulties  estimating 
protected  customers’  demand,  in  particular  when  it  is  not  on  annual  basis.  Particularly, 
estimating the demand in the two first cases of the supply standard is a real challenge when daily 

12 

 
metering is not available, as it is the case in many countries for small consumers like households. 
To that end, some respondents considered it useful to have further harmonisation of the protected 
customers’  definition  on  EU  level,  by  excluding  the  ‘option’  to  include  certain  non-household 
demand under protected customers, by having one clear definition across the EU. Others urged 
that  national  specificities  and  particularities  of  national  or  regional  gas  systems  need  to  be 
considered. Regarding the possibility to reduce non-essential consumption of protected customers, 
several  respondents  indicated  that  they  consider  this  a  useful  provision  to  keep  beyond  the 
expiration of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 as it provides additional flexibility. Moreover, given that 
household demand may in some Member States be phased out sooner than other sectors, this may 
require a reconsideration of the protected customers definition in some Member States to adjust to 
a changing demand profile. 

Key takeaways: 
•  No major issues reported by respondents in implementing or enforcing the supply standard. 
•  The  supply  standard  may  be  easier  to  uphold  for  larger  companies  than  for  smaller 

undertakings.  

•  Further harmonisation of the definition of protected customers on EU level may be needed. 
•  The  non-essential  consumption  of  protected  customers  clause  is  a  provision  considered 

useful. 

3.4. Risk assessments and regional risk groups 

In  order  to  be  prepared  for  possible  security  of  gas  supply  risks,  the  Gas  Security  of  Supply 
Regulation  establishes  an  architecture  of  risk  assessments  and  regional  risk  groups,  laid  out  in 
Article 7 and Annexes I, IV and V. 

This architecture starts with  an EU-wide simulation of gas supply and infrastructure disruption 
scenarios  conducted  by  ENTSOG,  after  which  Member  States  are  to  make  a  common  risk 
assessment  (CRA)  in  dedicated  regional  risk  groups,  that  are  grouped  around  import  routes  as 
stipulated  in  Annex  I.  In  addition,  Member  States  are  also  required  to  make  a  national  risk 
assessment  with  various  disruption  scenarios.  Templates  for  the  national  and  common  risk 
assessments are provided in Annexes IV and V.  

Both the common and national risk assessments need to test or consider: 

•  The infrastructure standard (N-1); 
•  The  relevant  national  and  transnational  circumstances  (e.g.  market  size,  network 
configuration, flows, bidirectional capacities, presence of production or storages sites and 
the role of gas in the energy mixes); 

•  A number of scenarios simulating exceptionally high gas demand and supply disruptions, 
including  (1)  disruption  of  relevant  infrastructure  or  (2)  supply  disruptions  from  third 
countries as well as geopolitical risks; 

•  The interaction of risks between Member States in the risk groups and Member States in 

other risk groups; 

13 

 
 
 
 
•  Risks relating to the control of infrastructure, e.g. risks of underinvestment, undermining 

diversification, misuse of infrastructure or infringement of EU law; 

•  Considering  the  maximum  interconnection  capacity  between  Member  States  and 

respective storage filling levels.  

In turn, the common and national risk assessments are part of the foundation for the Preventive 
Action Plans and Emergency Plans, which should also include a regional chapter that are to be 
developed jointly by Member States in the regional risk groups.  

3.4.1. Compliance - regional risk groups and risk assessments 

The first common and national risk assessments have been conducted in 2018, after which they 
are to be updated every four years. Due to the challenges faced during the energy crisis in 2022, 
several  Member  States  indicated  they  lacked  administrative  capacity  to  conduct  the  risk 
assessments on time.  

By mid-June 2023 the Commission has received only a few national risk assessments from PT, IE, 
ES,  DK.  At  regional  level,  the  CRAs  of  the  regional  Risk  Groups  (RGs)  were  received  of  the 
Algerian RG, the Denmark RG, the Trans-Balkan RG, the Baltic Sea RG, Belarus RG, the Ukraine 
RG and the Libyan RG. The Commission has no confirmation on planned delivery of the CRA of 
the Caspian RG, Norway-UK RG, the Low Calorific Gas RG and the North-East RG. 

Beyond the non-compliance per se, these risk assessments and the related Preventive Action Plans 
and Emergency Plans are of utmost importance for the EU’s risk preparedness for next winter and 
subsequent years.  

Several  reminders  have  been  made  during  meetings  of  the  Gas  Coordination  Group.  The 
Commission had initially not pursued EU Pilots or infringement procedures due to the exceptional 
nature  of  the  past  year  where  Member  States  were  busy  preparing  for  a  possible  emergency 
situation. However, due to a lack of progress and due to the importance of being prepared for the 
upcoming  winter,  Commission  decided  to  launch  26  EU  Pilots  in  mid-June,  to  ensure  that 
Member States prepare and notify the risk assessments and the corresponding Preventive Action 
Plans and Emergency Plans. 

3.4.2. Lessons learned 

From the experience of updating the risk assessments and the functioning of the risk groups in the 
past years, as well as via feedback received from GCG members via a questionnaire, a number of 
questions or concerns have arisen: 

•  The current regional approach to the risk groups is no longer fit for purpose, given the 
changed geopolitical landscape, the risen prominence of LNG in the EU’s supply mix and 
the reduced role of some of the pipeline supply corridors. Less infrastructure bottlenecks 
exist than in the past, reducing in most cases the regional effects.  

14 

 
•  Some  respondents  indicated  that  they  preferred  an  EU-wide  approach,  possibly  with 
regional sensitivity analyses, with a reinforced role of the Commission’s Joint Research 
Centre.  

•  Leading the risk groups and developing the Common Risk Assessment was considered a 
large administrative burden by several Member States, especially in times of crises with 
competing priorities. Some argue for reducing the number of regional risk groups. 

The Commission can amend Annex I via Delegated Act. Further discussions should be held in the 
Gas  Coordination  Group  as  to  whether  this  would  facilitate  a  process  with  less  administrative 
burden for Member States. 

Key takeaways: 
•  Risk assessments are key to the security of supply preparedness of the EU. 
•  Current composition and functioning of the regional risk groups considered no longer fit for 

purpose. 

•  Lack  of  administrative  capacity  key  issue  for  coordinating  risk  groups  and  deliver  risk 

assessments. 

•  An EU-wide approach with regional sensitivities may be more efficient. 

3.5. Preventive Action Plans and Emergency Plans 

As explained in detail in section 2.1, the Preventive Action Plans (PAPs) and Emergency Plans 
(EPs) are based on Articles 8, 9 and 10 of the Gas Security of Supply Regulation. The PAPs aim 
to prevent crises from materialising and are based on the national and common risk assessments, 
while the EPs indicate the procedures, responsibilities and measures to be taken during a crisis. 

3.5.1. Lessons learned: Commission’s assessment of the plans 

As  indicated  in  section  2.1,  the  Commission’s  assessment  shows  that  while  the  plans  contain 
relevant information and generally the quality is satisfactory, there are important elements missing. 
This can be divided into two types of missing information: 

1)  Information required by the Regulation that was not included in the plans, which has been 

in detail discussed in section 2.1. 

2)  Information that is not required by the Regulation, but based on the experience of the last 

years would improve the plans in the future. 

However, regarding the second point, further reflection may be needed for areas that are known 
from experience gained in either developing or assessing the plans, which could be important to 
include in future plans but that are not currently required by the Gas Security of Supply Regulation:  

•  The progress made in the phase out of Russian gas and a description and projection of 
diversification efforts as part of the description of the national gas system. A breakdown 
of gas import sources per country of origin is already required by Annex VI. However, this 

15 

 
 
 
 
may  not  reflect  an  accurate  picture,  in  case  a  Member  State  is  undertaking  efforts  to 
diversify  away  from  a  certain  supplier,  or  if  certain  long-term  contracts  are  expiring. 
Therefore, a description or projections of ongoing diversification efforts may be needed, 
in case this would significantly change the future supply landscape of the MS in question. 
Alternatively,  this  could  be  facilitated  via  a  reinforced  information  exchange  based  on 
Article 14. 

•  An estimate of the changing breakdown of gas consumption in light of planned phase 
out of natural gas in certain sectors. Where a Member State knows that in the period before 
the next update of the PAP natural gas will be slowly phased out, and it knows this may 
affect the composition of the breakdown of gas demand (e.g. certain sectors may phase out 
gas quicker than others), it should provide a quantitative estimate of this development. This 
may also include the impact of ongoing electrification efforts and the role that gas would 
play in the adequacy of the electricity system. 

•  Apart from the role that domestic production, including biomethane, plays in the national 
gas system, further reflection should be given on whether national hydrogen strategies 
should be included in the plans. This is of particular importance if it impacts security of 
gas supply or the replacement of gas demand in specific sectors, notably in the context of 
developing a secure European hydrogen market. 

The Commission can amend the Annexes VI and VII via  a Delegated Act. Further discussions 
should be held in the GCG as to whether this would facilitate a process with less administrative 
burden for Member States, while ensuring a higher quality of substance of the plans. 

The  Commission  had  initially  not  pursued  EU  Pilots  or  infringement  procedures  due  to  the 
exceptional  nature  of  the  past  year  where  Member  States  were  busy  preparing  for  a  possible 
emergency  situation.  However,  due  to  a  lack  of  progress  and  due  to  the  importance  of  being 
prepared for the upcoming winter, Commission decided to launch 26 EU Pilots mid-June, to ensure 
that  Member  States  prepare  and  notify  the  risk  assessments  and  the  corresponding  Preventive 
Action Plans and Emergency Plans. 

Given the late submission of the PAPs and EPs by the vast majority of Member States,  as was 
further  detailed  in  section  3.4.1.,  consideration  should  be  given  to  whether  the  Article  8(7) 
assessment of these plans should in the future continue to form the basis of the Article 17 report.  

3.5.2. Four-year test of the Emergency Plans 

Apart from the points listed in sections 2.1 and 3.2.1, particular attention should be paid to the 
obligation of Article 10(3), which requires Member States to  test the provisions at least once 
every four-years. These tests can in turn benefit the operational applicability of the emergency 
measures for the update of the EPs that is due every four years. 

While Member States indicated via their responses to the questionnaire circulated to the GCG that 
the  plans  are  regularly  tested  on  national  level,  the  EPs  often  contain  little  information  on  the 
conclusions  of  these  tests,  nor  on  the  timeline  for  when  these  tests  are  foreseen.  Beyond  the 

16 

 
information provided in the plans, Member States have in most instances also not provided the 
information through other channels, such as via Gas Coordination Group discussions.  

The Commission considers these tests to be particularly important and encourages Member States 
to test the emergency provisions as a matter of priority, which should take into account the lessons 
learned during the crisis of 2022. When not already foreseen, the Commission would like to stress 
that  Member  States  should  include  the  lessons  learned  while  performing  these  tests  into  the 
updated Emergency Plans, as per Article 10(2). 

3.5.3 Solidarity test (‘dry run’ exercise) 

While  Emergency  Plans  can  generally  be  improved,  the  solidarity  test  (‘dry  run’  exercise) 
performed jointly by the Commission, Member States and ENTSOG in December 2022 confirmed 
the important role of the EPs to ensure a quick and efficient response to an emergency situation. 
In particular, Member States confirmed during the solidarity test that it was imperative  for the 
Commission to check the EPs for measures that could have cross-border impacts, such as those 
restricting cross-border flows or capacities. 

Key takeaways: 
•  Preventive  Action  Plans  and  Emergency  Plans  are  essential  to  security  of  supply 

preparedness and solidarity mechanisms. 

•  Substance of the plans can be improved, e.g. by adding: 

o  a projection of the phase out of Russian gas and the diversification of supply; 
o  an estimate of changing gas demand composition, and; 
o  a projection of national hydrogen strategies and the impact on gas security of supply. 

3.6. Responsibilities in different crisis levels 

One  of  the  core  provisions  of  the  Gas  Security  of  Supply  Regulation  is  the  establishment  of 
different national and EU-wide crisis levels. Article 11 in particular defines the following three 
national crisis levels: 

a)  Early  warning:  when  an  event  may  occur  that  likely  will  result  in  a  significant 

deterioration of the gas supply situation.  

b)  Alert: when a gas supply disruption or exceptionally high demand occurs resulting in a 

significant deterioration but the market can still manage the situation. 

c)  Emergency: when there is a significant supply deterioration or exceptionally high demand 
and all market-based measures have been exhausted but supply is insufficient to meet the 
remaining gas demand so that non-market-based measures must be introduced. 

In addition to these national crisis levels, Article 12 allows the Commission to declare a regional 
or EU-wide emergency, during which the Commission has a coordinating responsibility and it is 
obliged  to  e.g.  ensure  (1)  information  exchange,  (2)  ensure  consistency  and  effectiveness  of 
Member  State  actions  and  (3)  coordinate  actions  vis-a-vis  third  countries.  In  addition,  the 

17 

 
 
 
Commission  can  convene  a  Crisis  Management  Group,  consisting  of  national  crisis  managers 
established under Article 10(1).  

With the establishment of the Demand Reduction Regulation (EU) 2022/1369 and its prolongation 
(EU) 2023/706, an EU alert level was created as a response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine 
and the subsequent gas supply disruptions from Russia. If this alert level is to be triggered, it would 
commit Member States to an obligatory 15% gas demand reduction. 

3.6.1. Lessons learned and feedback from the GCG 

During the energy crisis of 2022, and in particular during the solidarity test, or ‘dry run’ exercise 
performed  in  December  2022,  it  was  considered  by  participants  that  the  EU  emergency  level 
should be further defined. The criteria for when a regional or when an EU emergency should be 
declared are considered not sufficiently clear, in particular the difference between EU and regional 
emergency and the role of the Commission in an emergency. During the aforementioned dry run 
exercise, as well as via the questionnaire submitted to the Gas Coordination Group, respondents 
indicated that an EU-wide emergency would most likely be more effective, as it would include 
those Member States that may still be in a position to help those in need. However, Member States 
indicated that the declaration of an EU emergency would not necessarily result in the declaration 
of a national emergency level, which in some Member States would allow for introducing non-
market measures.  

In  addition,  some  Member  States  indicated  that  they  would  appreciate  further  guidance  or 
coordination on the triggering and de-activation of national crisis levels, as well as on the transition 
from market to non-market measures. 

In correspondence with the undefined nature of an EU emergency, the role of the Commission in 
an EU emergency is comparatively undefined and ambiguous beyond its coordinating tasks. This 
is in contrast to the role of the Commission in the newly established EU alert, where the role of 
the Commission in monitoring, coordinating and enforcing demand reduction is clearer. To that 
end, some Member States provided feedback via the questionnaire submitted to the GCG that the 
establishment  of  an  EU  emergency  plan  may  be  useful,  in  particular  to  clarify  the  roles  and 
responsibilities of different EU bodies and national authorities in an emergency.  

3.6.2. Reflection of temporary measures introduced in 2022 

The Demand Reduction Regulation (EU) 2022/1369 established in 2022 the EU alert level which 
was prolonged via Regulation (EU) 2023/706 and which will expire at the end of March 2024. 
Therefore, further reflection should be given whether this EU alert mechanism is useful for the 
long-term. The Gas Coordination Group provided feedback on this question via a questionnaire, 
indicating openness to keeping this mechanism, albeit dependent on the measures that would be 
tied to it. Some respondents indicated that both the triggering, as well as the subsequent measures, 
could be related to storage filling. Others mentioned that the measures tied to the alert should, like 
it was in 2022, be a percentile of demand reduction, with the percentage to be tailored to the crisis 
at hand. Here, as was the case in 2022, regional differences should be taken into account. 

18 

 
In addition, while the Gas Security of Supply Regulation’s Article 12(5)a already stipulates that 
Member States shall not unduly restrict cross-border flows of gas, the procedure that would follow 
may take up to a week to be concluded, meaning that in the midst of a crisis cross-border flows 
may unduly be halted. Therefore, Regulation (EU) 2022/2576’s Article 25 introduced additional 
safeguards to ensure cross-border flows, allowing the Commission to oblige the Member State 
in  question  to  modify  its  actions  with  immediate  effect.  The  feedback  received  via  the 
questionnaire circulated to the GCG sent a clear signal that most respondents consider safeguards 
for cross-border flows useful beyond the expiration of the temporary Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, 
due to either appreciation the new provisions of Article 25 or by considering those of Article 12(5) 
should already be respected at all times. 

Key takeaways: 
•  Roles  and  responsibilities  defined  in  the  plans  for  different  crisis  levels  are  generally 

adequate. 

•  EU emergency level can be further defined, e.g. difference between regional and EU-wide 

emergency. 

•  An  EU  emergency  plan  to  clarify  roles  and  responsibilities  between  different  actors  is 

considered useful. 

•  The EU alert mechanism and additional safeguards for cross-border flows are considered 

useful provisions for the longer term. 

3.7. Solidarity 

Article 13 of the Gas Security of Supply Regulation lays down the requirements of the solidarity 
mechanism, which  is a last  resort mechanism in  a severe gas  emergency  where the demand of 
‘solidarity protected customers’ is endangered. Given that solidarity is a mechanism of last resort, 
it is only applicable in situations where the market fails to supply the necessary volumes needed 
to  meet  the  demand  of  solidarity  protected  customers.  Article  2(6)  defines  solidarity  protected 
customers  as  households  connected  to  the  distribution  grid,  and  under  certain  conditions  also 
district heating installations and essential social services, such as hospitals.  

Member  States  are  required  to  free  up  volumes  necessary  to  provide  solidarity  in  case  of  a 
solidarity request from a neighbouring Member State. This may mean that the providing Member 
State must reduce supplies to all customers other than its solidarity protected customers, insofar as 
it does not create unsafe situations. 

Article 13(3) clarifies, among others, that the solidarity requesting Member State must exhaust 
first all other market-based measures, as well as all other measures provided in its emergency plan, 
before submitting a solidarity request. When all requirements are met and a solidarity request is 
submitted to neighbouring Member States and to the Commission, the solidarity must be offered 
based on fair and prompt compensation to the providing Member State, stipulated in Article 13(8). 

As required by Article 13(10), Member States must bilaterally agree on solidarity agreements by 
1  December  2018,  which  include  the  technical,  legal  and  financial  arrangements  to  ensure  the 

19 

 
 
 
functioning  of  solidarity  in  practice.  These  solidarity  agreements  are  a  tool  to  operationalise 
solidarity in practice, but their absence does not change the legal obligation. In absence of bilateral 
solidarity agreements, the provisions laid out in Article 13 are still legally binding.  

3.7.1. Commission Recommendation (EU) 2018/177 

To  facilitate  the  process  of  concluding  bilateral  solidarity  agreements,  the  Commission  issued 
Recommendation (EU) 2018/177 (hereafter ‘the Recommendation’), outlining the technical, legal 
and financial elements to be included in the bilateral solidarity agreements.  

The  Recommendation  did  not  provide  an  exhaustive  and  prescriptive  list  appropriate  for  all 
Member  States,  as  Member  States  must  have  freedom  to  choose  solutions  best  suited  to  their 
national circumstance. Instead, it recommended to use a set of necessary yet optional elements, 
describes ways of running certain solidarity measures, and offers examples and best practices.  

The  Recommendation  included  elements  on  legal  arrangements,  such  as  (1)  a  clarification  of 
which Member States are concerned by the solidarity obligation including those connected via a 
third  country,  (2)  information  to  be  included  in  the  solidarity  request,  (3)  the  start  and  end  of 
solidarity  and  (4)  clarifications  on  roles  and  responsibilities.  In  addition,  the  Recommendation 
clarified that Member States are free to find the appropriate legal form for the solidarity agreement, 
provided it creates both rights and obligations between them in case solidarity is activated (so e.g. 
a memorandum of understanding would be insufficient).  

The necessary technical arrangements were specified to enable solidarity arrangements to work in 
practice,  e.g.  via  sharing  of  information  on  infrastructure  capacities  and  theoretical  volumes 
available for solidarity. TSOs or balancing entities could be best placed to coordinate the technical 
aspects  of  solidarity.  Existing  cooperation  mechanisms  between  TSOs  could  even  form  the 
technical basis for solidarity, although a clear overarching framework still needed to be established 
to provide legal certainty. 

Lastly, specific recommendations on financial arrangements for solidarity requests were offered, 
to  ensure  that  solidarity  is  provided  against  an  appropriate  and  fair  compensation.  The 
Recommendation outlines that financial arrangements are necessary to ensure an appropriate price 
for  solidarity,  i.e.  it  reflects  the  cost  of  providing  solidarity.  A  mechanism  for  providing 
compensation for curtailment should offer market-based incentives, such as auctions and demand-
side response. However, only the cost of providing solidarity should be covered, it cannot become 
a source of profit for the providing Member State or entity.  

The Recommendation recognised the main components of compensation, which include: 

•  The price of gas, which is determined by the market price or administrative means (in case 

there is no functioning market price any longer) in the providing Member State. 

•  Transport and associated costs, e.g. regasification fees. 

20 

 
•  Costs  of  release  of  strategic  storage  or  storage  obligations  related  costs,  unless  already 

reflected in the gas price which in most instances would be the case. 

•  Compensation for curtailment of industries if national law provides an obligation to pay 

damages to industry, unless this is already reflected in the price of gas.  

•  Cost  of  judicial  proceedings  in  the  providing  Member  State,  albeit  with  necessary 
safeguards  for  the  Member  State  in  case  of  collusive  behaviour  between  a  providing 
Member State and entity against a requesting Member State.  

Despite  the  range  of  options  and  recommendations  offered,  the  progress  on  bilateral  solidarity 
agreements has been insufficient to operationalise the solidarity concept during severe gas crises. 

3.7.2. Bilateral solidarity agreements 

Since the Gas Security of Supply Regulation entered into force, the solidarity provisions have been 
discussed regularly within the GCG, which intensified during 2018 and 2019 and the following 
years.  The  GCG  discussions  included  presentations  of  proposed  draft  agreements  and  several 
workshops on specific implementation topics, e.g. a workshop on 26 September 2019. 

Ultimately,  7  out  of  40  solidarity  agreements  have  been  signed,  namely  between  Austria  and 
Germany, Denmark and Germany, Estonia and Latvia, Latvia and Lithuania, Italy and Slovenia, 
Estonia and Finland, and Denmark and Sweden.  

In January 2020, the Commission addressed the lack of progress in letters sent to Member States 
and  encouraged  them  to  step  up  efforts  to  conclude  the  arrangements.  In  May  2020,  the 
Commission sent a Letter of Formal Notice to 25 Member States for the failure to comply with the 
solidarity provisions. Furthermore, the Commission is carrying out regular infringement package 
meetings with individual Member States, where the open solidarity infringements are discussed.  

As  indicated  by  several  Member  States,  the  reasons  for  the  lack  of  progress  are  the  technical 
complexity,  the  lack  of  expertise  allocated  by  the  national  administrations  and  the  political 
difficulties in reaching an agreement, in particular as regards the financial compensation. While 
some Member States are more proactive than others in trying to conclude bilateral arrangements, 
in general the progress made by Member States is insufficient.  

3.7.3. Legislative developments in 2021 and 2022 

To ensure that solidarity arrangements are effective and operational and to cover for the lack of 
bilateral agreements, the Commission proposed in December 2021 to amend the Security of Gas 
Supply Regulation, via the Hydrogen and Decarbonised Gas Package14. In Article 67 of this 
proposal, the Commission proposed to introduce common solidarity rules that would be applicable 
in absence of a bilateral solidarity agreement, in the form of a template for solidarity arrangements 

14 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:0c903f5a-5d8b-11ec-9c6c-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF  

21 

 
 
 
in Annex II. The Hydrogen and Decarbonised Gas Package is currently subject to interinstitutional 
negotiations. 

Furthermore, to further strengthen solidarity measures in case of a severe gas supply shortage and 
to  cover  for  the  lack  of  bilateral  solidarity  agreements,  on  19  December  2022,  EU  Ministers 
adopted  the  Solidarity  Regulation  (EU)  2022/2576  on  enhancing  solidarity  during  the  current 
energy crisis. Among others, the Solidarity Regulation sets default solidarity rules applicable in 
absence of bilateral agreements with a maximum compensation consisting of:  

1.  the price of gas; 
2.  storage and transportation costs,  
3.  litigation costs due to judicial procedures for the providing Member State, and; 
4.  indirect costs not reflected in the price of gas, e.g. compensation for curtailment of industry, 

limited to 100% of the price of gas 

The default rules  also address  a gap in  the solidarity provisions of the  Gas Security of Supply 
Regulation, namely that requesting Member States do not have to prioritise offers based on market-
based  measures  first.  In  addition,  the  Solidarity  Regulation  temporarily  extended  the  solidarity 
protection to critical gas volumes for electricity security of supply and temporarily extended the 
solidarity obligation to Member States with LNG facilities. 

The Solidarity Regulation was adopted under Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) and is therefore a temporary emergency measure that will expire at the 
end  of  2023.  This  means  that  in  case  interinstitutional  negotiations  on  the  Hydrogen  and 
Decarbonised Gas Package are not concluded before 29 December 2023, the reinforced solidarity 
provisions will expire, leaving a similar vulnerability as was identified during the 2022 crisis.  

3.7.4. ‘Dry run’ exercise 

To test roles and responsibilities in an EU-wide gas emergency, as well as the solidarity provisions 
of the Gas Security of Supply Regulation and Solidarity Regulation, the Commission conducted a 
joint ‘dry run’ exercise with Member States and ENTSOG in December 2022.  

The exercise confirmed the preparedness of Member States, the Commission and ENTSOG for an 
emergency, while the provisions in the Gas Security of Supply Regulation and in the Solidarity 
Regulation  form  an  adequate  framework  for  an  emergency  response,  in  particular  in  case  of 
solidarity requests. However, a number of points where follow-up is required were identified.  

Most participants agreed that LNG can provide additional flexibility in a crisis situation. However, 
LNG solidarity would require market mechanisms and intervention of the Competent Authority, 
provided  that  all  market-based  measures  have  been  exhausted.  The  adopted  legal  basis  for 
requesting and receiving LNG solidarity requires further clarification including, but not limited to, 
the contractual issues for diverting cargos and compensation of third parties, availability of vessels, 
possible mismatch of volumes between the solidarity request and the volumes in the vessel, ways 
of guaranteeing payments, etc.  

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• 

•  Solidarity provisions were recognised during the exercise as essential for security of supply 
if established in advance. Yet only a limited number of bilateral agreements are signed so 
far.  The  complexity  of  establishing  fair  compensation  between  Member  States  was 
considered a barrier to request and provide solidarity if not established in advance. 
It  was  identified  that  there  is  no  legal  basis  for  requesting  solidarity  via  pipeline  to  a 
neighbouring  Member  State  not  directly  connected.  This  possibility  is  not  explicitly 
mentioned in the Gas Security of Supply Regulation, while it contains provisions for when 
two Member States are connected via a Third Country.  
In  case  a  Member  State  receives  two  solidarity  requests,  the  procedure  was  considered 
unclear.  If the market  does not  allow to satisfy both  requests, there are  several  options: 
using  a  pro-rata  allocation,  on  the  basis  of  the  order  of  reception  of  the  requests  (first-
served) or depending on the amount received as compensation.  

• 

•  Several  Member  States  foresaw  complications  with  the  changed  solidarity  request 
submission time to at least 72 hours before indicated delivery time, which was agreed in 
the Solidarity Regulation. Participants expressed the wish that a 24-hour period would be 
applicable  for  solidarity  through  pipelines,  while  72  hours  could  still  be  relevant  for 
solidarity via LNG. 

Key takeaways: 
•  The lack of bilateral agreements confirms the need for default solidarity rules.  
•  The extension of solidarity provisions to LNG is assessed to provide additional flexibility 

and needs further clarification. 

•  Fair compensation for solidarity remains a point where views diverge. 

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4.  Conclusion 

This Staff Working Document provided further details to the report reviewing the functioning of 
the Gas Security of Supply Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. 

While the Gas Security of Supply Regulation has proven to be a solid basis for the EU’s security 
of supply architecture, a number of points are identified where future action may be required: 

I.  The  GCG  has  proven  to  be  an  adaptable  and  flexible  forum,  and  a  similar  level  of 
engagement across members  is  recommended.  Further consideration should be given to 
inviting  third  countries  supplying  or  transiting  gas,  while  the  overlap  with  the  Crisis 
Management Group should be addressed. 

II.  The  infrastructure  standard  has  proven  to  be  a  good  incentive  to  develop  adequate 
capacities and to facilitate reverse flows during the crisis in 2022, and it should remain 
balanced  with  the  need  to  avoid  the  risk  of  creating  stranded  assets.  Complementary 
standards to cover supply diversification may be needed. 

III.  Member  States,  to  a  large  extent,  did  not  report  major  issues  implementing  the  supply 
standard, and there may be a risk that the supply standard is easier for larger companies 
to  uphold  than  for  smaller  undertakings.  Regarding  protected  customers,  further 
harmonisation  on  EU  level  may  be  needed,  while  the  provision  for  reducing  the  non-
essential consumption of protected customers is largely supported. 

IV.  The risk assessments are crucial for the EU’s preparedness, yet the current organisation 
of the regional risk groups that are tasked with creating the common risk assessments is 
no longer fit for purpose. An EU-wide approach with regional sensitivities is suggested, 
also to reduce administrative burden.  

V.  The  Commission’s  assessment  of  the  2019  plans  showed  that  the  substance  of  the 
Preventive  Action  Plans  and  Emergency  Plans  can  be  improved.  In  the  future,  (1)  a 
projection of the phase out of Russian gas and the diversification of supply, (2) an estimate 
of changing gas demand composition and (3) a projection of national hydrogen strategies 
and the impact on gas security of supply, may be useful additions.  

VI.  The roles and responsibilities in different crisis levels are generally adequate, but the EU 
emergency level may need to be better defined, e.g. via an EU emergency plan.  An EU 
alert  mechanism  and  additional  safeguards  for  cross-border  flows  introduced  in  the 
temporary Solidarity Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 are considered useful provisions for the 
longer term.  

VII.  On  solidarity,  the  lack  of  bilateral  agreements  confirms  the  need  for  default  solidarity 
provisions. The extension to LNG is considered necessary to provide additional flexibility, 
and  the  legal  framework  and  role  of  competent  authorities’  intervention  need  further 
clarification.  In  addition,  fair  compensation  for  solidarity  remains  a  point  where  views 
among Member States diverge.  

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