The situation of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in Hungary : LIBE mission to Hungary 29 September-1 October 2021.
Date: 2023-10-04
Institutions: Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union
Subjects: Hungary, Treaty on European Union, coronavirus disease, corruption, democracy, equal treatment, human rights, legal system, migration policy, rule of law

STUDY 
Requested by the LIBE committee 

The situation of 
Democracy, the 
Rule of Law and 
Fundamental Rights 

in Hungary 

LIBE mission to Hungary 
29 September - 1 October 2021 

Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs  
Directorate-General for Internal Policies 
PE 698.540 - September 2021 

EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The situation of 
Democracy, the 
Rule of Law and 
Fundamental Rights 

in Hungary 

LIBE mission to Hungary  
29 September - 1 October 2021 

Abstract 

This Study examines the situation of Democracy, the Rule of Law 
and Fundamental Rights in Hungary and how Article 2 TEU 
values are respected and implemented in the country.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This document was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs. 

AUTHOR and ADMINISTRATOR RESPONSIBLE  
Ottavio MARZOCCHI 

EDITORIAL ASSISTANT  
Sybille PECSTEEN de BUYTSWERVE 

LINGUISTIC VERSIONS 
Original: EN 

ABOUT THE EDITOR 
Policy  departments  provide  in-house  and  external  expertise  to  support  EP  committees  and  other 
parliamentary  bodies  in  shaping  legislation  and  exercising  democratic  scrutiny  over  EU  internal 
policies. 

To contact the Policy Department or to subscribe for updates, please write to:   
Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
European Parliament 
B-1047 Brussels 
Email: poldep-citizens@europarl.europa.eu   

Manuscript completed in September 2021 
© European Union, 2021 

This document is available on the internet at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/supporting-analyses 

DISCLAIMER AND COPYRIGHT 
The  opinions  expressed  in  this  document  are  the  sole  responsibility  of  the  authors  and  do  not 
necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament.  
Reproduction  and  translation  for  non-commercial  purposes  are  authorised,  provided  the  source  is 
acknowledged and the European Parliament is given prior notice and sent a copy. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The situation of Democracy, the Rule of Law  
and Fundamental Rights in Hungary 

CONTENTS 

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION 

1.1.  Article 7 TEU procedure 

1.2.  The Rule of Law conditionality regulation and the EU recovery and resilience fund 

1.3.  European Parliament follow-up of the situation in Hungary 

1.4.  The 2021 Commission Rule of Law report on Hungary 

JUSTICE 

2.1.  The President of the National Office for the Judiciary 

2.2.  The President of the Kúria 

2.3.  Bonuses 

2.4.  The organisation of the prosecution service 

2.5.  Quality and efficiency 

  ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK 

  FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND INFORMATION, MEDIA FREEDOM AND PLURALISM 

  DEMOCRACY AND CHECKS AND BALANCES 

5.1.  Elections 

5.2.  Political campaigns 

5.3. 

‘Consultations’ 

5.4.  Spying on NGOs, journalists, opposition, lawyers, businessmen 

5.5.  EU Commission concerns on checks and balances 

  EQUALITY 

6.1.  Minorities, hate speech, racism 

6.2.  Roma 

6.3.  Women’s rights 

6.4.  LGBTIQ 

6.5.  Anti-semitism 

6.6.  Rights of the Child 

6.7.  Disabilities 

  COVID-19 MEASURES 

  OTHER ISSUES 

8.1.  Academic freedom 

8.2.  Asylum and migration 

PE 698.540 

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IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs 

8.3.  Level of implementation of the GRECO 2nd Interim Compliance Report of Fourth 

Evaluation Round on Hungary 

40 

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PE 698.540 

 
 
 
 
 
The situation of Democracy, the Rule of Law  
and Fundamental Rights in Hungary 

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 

CoE 

Council of Europe 

DRFMG 

Monitoring Group on Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights  

EP 

European Parliament 

EPPO 

European Public Prosecutor 

GRECO 

Group of States against Corruption of the Council of Europe 

LIBE 

OLAF 

OSCE 

RoL 

RRF 

Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 

European Anti-Fraud Office 

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 

Rule of Law 

Recovery and resilience fund 

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IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs 

 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION 

Hungary became a Member State of the EU on 1 May 2004 (following a referendum). It is a 
representative parliamentary republic. 

It has a unicameral Parliament, the National Assembly, holding legislative power and electing the 
Prime Minister and – by a two-thirds majority – the top rank public officials of the country. It consists 
of 199 deputies elected for 4 years. Elections were held on 8 April 2018 and new elections will take 
place in spring 2022.  

The President of the Republic is elected by Parliament for five years and can be renewed only once. 
The current President is János Áder (FIDESZ). He took office on 10 May 2012 and his mandate will 
expire in 2022 (and the new President will be elected prior to the spring elections). 

The Constitutional Court is in charge of the constitutional review of laws and of judicial decisions. It 
is chaired by Mr Tamás Sulyok.  

The Supreme Court (Kúria) is the highest instance court and is tasked with guaranteeing the 
uniform application of the law. The current President is András Zs. Varga. 

The main political parties are:  

  FIDESZ (until recently affiliated to EPP, now non-affiliated): the ruling Hungarian  political 

party from 2010 until now, its President is Viktor Orban, who is also Prime Minister, 

  KNDP: electorally allied of FIDESZ, affiliated to EPP,  its president is Mr. Zsolt Semjén, also the 

deputy PM 

  Movement for a Better Hungary, Jobbik: Non-attached in the EP, (extreme-)right wing 

party, the President is Péter Jakab, 

  Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP): affiliated to PSE, its leaders are Bertalan Tóth and Ágnes 

Kunhalmi, 

  Politics can be different (LMP) - Hungary's Green Party: affiliated to the Greens, the co-

presidents are Máté Kanász-Nagy and Erzsébet Schmuck, 

 

 Democratic Coalition (DK): affiliated to PSE, the leader is former PM Ferenc Gyurcsány, 

  Momentum Movement : affiliated to ALDE/Renew, it was created in 2017, the leader is 

András Fekete-Győr, 

  Párbeszéd - Dialogue for Hungary: affiliated to the Greens, the leaders are Gergely 

Karácsony (since 2019 also Mayor of Budapest) and Tímea Szabó, 

Since 2010 national legislative elections, the government is by FIDESZ - KDNP with its leader Viktor 
Orban as Prime Minister.  

In October 2019 the opposition won local elections in various cities including Budapest, where 
Gergely Karacsony (Dialogue for Hungary, supported by the opposition) was elected.  

The next national legislative elections will take place in 2022 and six parties of the opposition  - DK, 
Jobbik, LMP, Momentum, MSZP, and Párbeszéd - will run a common list. Since 18 September 2021, 
these parties are running primaries to select the joint opposition candidates (notwithstanding 
cyberattacks reportedly originating from China). 

6 

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The situation of Democracy, the Rule of Law  
and Fundamental Rights in Hungary 

Recently, a series of demonstrations took place in Budapest: in June 2021, people manifested 
against the decision by the government to use land earlier earmarked for affordable student 
accommodation, to install the first overseas campus of the Chinese Fudan University. Following the 
participation of 10.000 people to the protests, the government conceded that a referendum will take 
place on the issue.1 In July, as many as 30 000 people took part in the Budapest Gay Pride, contesting 
the recently adopted anti-LGBTIQ law.   

The policies enacted by the government and examined in this paper have raised serious concerns at 
international, European and national level, and represent an example of ‘Rule of Law backsliding’: the 
progressive erosion of democracy, rule of law, fundamental rights and equality, through the disabling 
of democratic checks and balances, the introduction of authoritarian discourses, policies and laws 
and the targeting of critics and minorities.2  

For this reason, the relations between Hungary and the EU institutions are conflictual and tainted by 
mutual distrust. According to critics, the reasons are multifold: while the EU is a project based on the 
values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, the Treaties, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the ECHR and is 
inspired by the liberal democratic model of democracy, Orban supports what he calls ‘illiberal 
democracy’; 3at the international level, and notwithstanding its membership of NATO and of the EU, 
Hungary is progressively developing close international and economic relations with Russia and 
China, and often took a line to shield these countries at EU level;4 it blocks progress on certain files at 

1   https://www.euronews.com/2021/09/20/is-orban-s-biggest-threat-right-under-his-nose-in-budapest 

expensive and secretive projects include Chinese investments to finance a new rail link with Belgrade; Russian 
investments for a Russian-designed nuclear power plant in Paks.  

2   see, among other documents, the EP resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal calling on the Council to 
determine, pursuant  to  Art. 7(1)  of  the Treaty on  European Union, the existence of  a clear risk  of  a  serious 
breach 
founded, 
the 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2018-0340_EN.html  

Hungary 

values 

Union 

which 

the 

on 

by 

of 

is 

3   see the 2014 speech by Viktor Orban describing his political views on Hungary and the creation of an ‘Illiberal 
democracy’,  https://budapestbeacon.com/full-text-of-viktor-orbans-speech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-
26-july-2014/: he stated that the ‘Hungarian nation is not a simple sum of individuals, but a community that 
needs to be organized, strengthened and developed, and in this sense, the new state that we are building is 
an illiberal state, a non-liberal state. It does not deny foundational values of liberalism, as freedom, etc.. But it 
does not make this ideology a central element of state organization, but applies a specific, national, particular 
approach in its stead.’ He also criticised NGOs (and mentioned the Norwegian Fund) for being made of political 
activists,  funded  by  foreigners,  to  promote  foreign  interests.  He  then  mentioned  ‘another  example  that  is 
another obstacle of reorganizing the state [he mentioned to ‘reorganize our nation state instead of the liberal 
state’]. When I mention the European Union, I am not doing this because I think it is impossible to build an 
illiberal nation state within the EU. I think this is possible. Our EU membership does not rule out this option’He 
then  mentioned  other  illiberal  countries  that  are  successful,  according  to  him,  and  explained  that  what  is 
being  done  is  to  find  a  different  route  from  ‘Western  European  dogmas’:  ‘a  trending  topic  in  thinking  is 
understanding  systems  that  are  not  Western,  not  liberal,  not  liberal  democracies,  maybe  not  even 
democracies,  and  yet  making  nations  successful.  Today,  the  stars  of  international  analyses  are  Singapore, 
China, India, Turkey, Russia. And I believe that our political community rightly anticipated this challenge. And 
if we think back on what we did in the last four years, and what we are going to do in the following four years, 
then it really can be interpreted from this angle. We are searching for (and we are doing our best to find, ways of 
parting with  Western  European  dogmas, making ourselves  independent  from them)  the  form  of  organizing  a 
community, that is capable of making us competitive in this great world-race.’ 

4   https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/hungary-blocks-eu-statement-criticising-china-over-hong-

kong-diplomats-say-2021-04-16/  and  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-orban-russia-belarus-
idUSKCN26G2IU  

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IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs 

EU level, for instance in relation to gender and equality issues;5 it has pursued a policy of targeting 
those dissenting and operated to dismantle democratic checks and balances, notably the justice 
system, media, NGOs, minorities and played a ‘cat and mouse game’ with the Commission and EU 
institutions in various areas of EU law (judicial independence, media, data protection authorities, 
asylum, migration, LGBTIQ, etc),6 now also contesting the primacy of EU law;7 secret surveillance is 
used to control critics, while authorities’ representatives use inflammatory and aggressive language 
and State-sponsored propaganda launches smear campaigns against individuals, communities and 
the EU through videos, billboards and ‘national consultations’;8 changes to the electoral system 
introduced to favour those in power; media reports about cases of corruption and nepotism and 
pointing at an oligarchy with strong connections with those in power; the non-participation in the 
Istanbul Convention, in EPPO, the resistance to the Rule of law conditionality regulation; the 
departure from the biggest political family in the EU, the EPP, to join the Eurosceptic area9; the 
homophobic campaigns; all these elements contributed to a worsening in the relations between the 
Hungarian government and the EU - as epitomised by the launching of the Article 7 TEU procedure 
by the EP.10 

While rule of law backsliding in Hungary and other Member States represents an existential threat 
for the EU democratic project and has  made evident the institutional, legal and political weaknesses 
of it,11 paradoxically it has also led the EU to develop new instruments to strive to ensure that the EU 
values (as they materialise in the Copenhagen criteria, Article 2 TEU, Charter of fundamental rights, 
etc) apply in the EU, by developing for instance the Rule of Law framework and mechanism, RoL 
conditionality and CFR enabling conditions, as well as negotiations on the EU Recovery and resilience 
fund. The same happened in relation to LGBTIQ persons and rights: the legal persecution of LGBTIQ 
persons in Hungary led the EU to act resolutely to discuss and take measures to protect LGBTIQ 
persons in the EU as it had never done before, and the EP to declare the EU as a LGBTIQ freedom 
zone. The next months and years will determine which direction the EU and Hungary will take. 

5   https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/poland-hungary-block-gender-equality-from-eu-

6  

social-summit/  
‘Over and over during the past decade, the Hungarian leader has introduced measures that pushed the limits 
of what his fellow EU leaders were willing to accept, only to row back under fire to secure a partial victory. It’s 
a  strategy  that  some  of  his  critics  have  called  his  “two  steps  forward,  one  step  back”  approach.’,  see 
https://www.politico.eu/article/how-viktor-orban-broke-the-eu-and-got-away-with-it-hungary-rule-of-law/  
7   see  the  question  tabled  by  the  Hungarian  Minister  of  Justice  to  the  Constitutional  Court,  questioning  the 
law, 

primacy 
http://public.mkab.hu/dev/dontesek.nsf/0/1DAD915853CBC33AC1258709005BB1A1?OpenDocument  

EU 

of 

8   https://www.euronews.com/2020/09/29/hungary-calls-for-eu-commissioner-jourova-to-resign-over-

derogatory-comments, see also further on ‘consultations’ and the billboard campaigns against ‘Brussels’ the 
then President of the Commission Juncker. 

9   see  article  https://www.politico.eu/article/how-viktor-orban-broke-the-eu-and-got-away-with-it-hungary-

rule-of-law/  

10   which  also  include  discussions  about  ‘Huxit’,  see  https://edition.cnn.com/2021/06/24/europe/hungary-eu-
lgbt-mark-rutte-intl/index.html  and  https://www.dw.com/en/hungary-vs-eu-is-orban-striving-for-huxit/a-
58934527  

11   Politico article by Lili Bayer is entitled ‘How Orban broke the EU — and got away with it’, and illustrates how 
‘Orbán  has  capitalized  on  vulnerabilities  in  the  bloc’s  legal  and  political  systems  to  hollow  out  Hungarian 
democracy without ever facing meaningful political or economic consequences from the EU. The EU’s failure 
to  deal  with  what  it  has  branded  as  serious  democratic  backsliding  by  one  of  its  own  members  has 
implications that go beyond its relationship with Hungary. With other countries such as Poland facing similar 
accusations,  it  raises  the  question  of  whether  the  bloc  can  hold  together  as  a  community  of  values’,  see 
https://www.politico.eu/article/how-viktor-orban-broke-the-eu-and-got-away-with-it-hungary-rule-of-law/  

8 

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The situation of Democracy, the Rule of Law  
and Fundamental Rights in Hungary 

1.1.  Article 7 TEU procedure 

The Article 7 TEU procedure against Hungary was launched by the EP with its resolution of 12 
September 2018 on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Art. 7(1) of the 
Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the 
values on which the Union is founded.  

The annex contains a proposal for a Council decision listing all the concerns of the EP by area. These 
included: the functioning of the constitutional and electoral system; the independence of the 
judiciary and of other institutions and the rights of judges; corruption and conflicts of interest; privacy 
and data protection; freedom of expression; academic freedom; freedom of religion; freedom of 
association; the right to equal treatment; the rights of persons belonging to minorities, including 
Roma and Jews, and protection against hateful statements against such minorities; the fundamental 
rights of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees; and economic and social rights.12  

Hungary brought an action against Parliament’s resolution of 12 September 2018, but the CJEU has 
dismissed it, through its decision of 3 June 2021 in case C-650/18.  

In 16 September 2019, the Council held a hearing of Hungary during the meeting of the General 
Affairs Council.13 

On 10 December 2019, a second hearing took place and focused on the independence of the 
judiciary, freedom of expression and academic freedom in Hungary. 

In September 2020, the Commission updated the Council on the latest developments in the areas 
covered by the reasoned proposals in a third hearing.  

On 22 June 2021, the Council held a fourth hearing on Hungary (and Poland).14 

The Slovenian Presidency has stated that a further discussion will take place at the General Affairs 
Council before the end of the year, probably in December. 

1.2.  The Rule of Law conditionality regulation and the EU recovery and 

resilience fund 

In December 2020, the Hungarian government (together with the Polish government) threatened to 
veto the EU budget and the Recovery and resilience fund due to the proposed RoL conditionality 
regulation. It agreed to it only after the Commission promised to issue guidelines on its application 
and to wait until the delivery of a judgment by the EUCJ on the legality of the Regulation. The 
Hungarian and Polish governments tabled their appeal against the Regulation on 11 March. The CJEU 
decided to fast-track the case, with the first hearing scheduled for 11-12 October. 

Hungary has submitted its investment and reform plan to access €7.2 billion in grants (no loans to be 
repaid were requested) of the Next Generation EU pandemic recovery and resilience fund on 12 
May. The Commission asked to extend the deadline to review it until end of September. While Orban 
stated that the EU is blocking the plan due to the Hungarian LGBTIQ recent laws, the Commission 
stated that it needed more time to examine whether the fight against corruption and the 

12   Surprisingly, the Commission, while it activated the RoL Framework and Article 7 TEU for Poland, it did not 

do so for Hungary. 

13   https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12345-2019-INIT/en/pdf  
14   https://www.statewatch.org/media/2619/eu-rule-of-law-council-hungary-hearing-outcome-22-6-21-10247-

21.pdf  

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IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs 

independence of the judiciary are properly addressed. Commissioner Dombrovskis said the 
assessment of the Hungarian plan concerns ‘further safeguards for example in areas regarding anti-
corruption, transparency, and quality and predictability of lawmaking, among others’; Commissioner 
Gentiloni added that the Commission is working with Hungary on several aspects related to 
‘corruption, public access to information, judicial independence, an increase of competition, and 
oversight of public procurements’.15 NGOs analysing the plan underline that measures do not match 
fully the EU recommendations.16 In the meantime, Hungary raised €4.5 billion on the financial 
markets to finance a part of the plan. It is important to recall that Hungary is the second-largest net 
beneficiary of the EU budget, receiving more than €5 billion more than it contributes to the EU 
budget per year. In recent years, the government has strengthened its political and economic 
relations with Russia and China, in an effort to be more autonomous from the EU.    

1.3.  European Parliament follow-up of the situation in Hungary 

Since 2011, the European Parliament has incessantly expressed concerns in relation to the changes 
progressively introduced in a wide array of key areas, both in the laws and in the Constitution, by the 
Hungarian government.  

During the 2009-2014 term, the EP adopted a number of resolutions on Hungary, and notably the EP 
resolution of 10 March 2011 on the media law in Hungary; the EP resolution of 5 July 2011 on the 
Revised Hungarian Constitution; the EP resolution of 16 February 2012 on the recent political 
developments in Hungary; the EP resolution of 3 July 2013 on the situation of fundamental rights: 
standards and practices in Hungary (pursuant to the European Parliament resolution of 16 February 
2012) (rapporteur Rui Tavares, PT/Greens). Parliament repeatedly called on the Commission to 
activate Article 7 TEU against Hungary.17 

During the term 2014-2019, the EP continued to follow closely the situation in Hungary. It adopted a 
resolution on 10 June 2015 on the situation in Hungary, in which it condemned the statements by 
Prime Minister Orban instigating a debate on the reintroduction of the death penalty and the way a 
“public consultation” on migration was carried out in Hungary. Parliament called on the Commission 
to launch the first stage of the Rule of Law framework (the monitoring phase of the Member State) 
and deplored the lack of action by the Commission. The resolution also instructed LIBE to draft an 
own-initiative report on a European mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental 
rights.  

Parliament discussed in plenary an oral question by LIBE of 10 November 2015 on the follow-up to 
the European Parliament resolution of 10 June 2015. The EP asked the Commission for explanations 
on the follow-up to its request for activation of the Rule of Law Framework to monitor the situation of 
Hungary - a request turned down by the Commission in its answer.  

The plenary debate of 2 December was followed by the EP resolution of 16 December 2015 on the 
situation in Hungary. The resolution criticised the changes introduced to the law on access to 
international protection, welcomed the infringement proceedings launched by the Commission on 

15   https://euobserver.com/democracy/152803  
16   https://helsinki.hu/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2021/05/RRFassessment_May2021.pdf  

and detailed analysis by K-Monitor: 
https://k.blog.hu/2021/09/23/rrf_how_far_will_the_eu_go_to_protect_its_financial_interests_in_hungary  
17   Although Parliament is one of the institutions that can trigger Article 7.1 TEU, it lacked the political majority to do 

it, as Fidesz was affiliated to EPP. 

10 

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The situation of Democracy, the Rule of Law  
and Fundamental Rights in Hungary 

the asylum acquis, criticised the inaction of the Council, and called on the Commission again to 
activate the first stage of the Rule of Law procedure and to continue the investigations on the alleged 
misuse of EU funds in Hungary.  

In its resolution of 17 May 2017 on the situation in Hungary, Parliament criticised the new 
measures on NGOs and on the Central European University, expressed its belief that there was a clear 
risk of a serious breach of Article 2 TEU in Hungary, and instructed LIBE to draft a report with a 
reasoned proposal to activate Article 7.1 TEU.  

In the framework of the preparation of that report, LIBE held a public hearing on 7 December 2017 
on ‘The situation in Hungary’.  

The landmark European Parliament resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal calling on the 
Council to determine, pursuant to Art. 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a 
clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded represents 
the first ever formal launching of Article 7.1 TEU by the EP, as proposed by the LIBE committee 
(report by Judith Sargentini, Greens/NL).18  

On 12 November 2018, the LIBE Chair and EP rapporteur were invited to present the EP position on 
Hungary Article 7 TEU procedure during an informal preparatory meeting with Members States' 
representatives organised by the Austrian Presidency of the Council. This was followed by other 
invitations to have informal exchanges with the Romanian Presidency in the preparation of the 
meetings of the General Affairs Council where this point was on the agenda.  

On 30 January 2019, Parliament heard statements by the Commission and the Council, and debated 
in plenary the rule of law and fundamental rights in Hungary and developments since September 
2018, while on 21 of March 2019 the Commission gave the LIBE committee an update on discussions 
in the Council.19 

During the current term, the EP continued to adopt a series of resolutions related to Hungary.  

The resolution of 16 January 2020 on ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding Poland and 
Hungary20 expresses EP’s regret at the lack of progress both in the Council, as it did not issue 
recommendations to these Member States as requested by the EP, and in these two countries, as the 
situation has further deteriorated (par. 3). Parliament also criticises the discrimination it suffers as the 
Council does not allow it to present its reasoned proposal during the hearings (par. 2). 

A debate took place in plenary on 10 March 2021 on the Government attempts to silence free 
media in Poland, Hungary and Slovenia.21  

18   Hungary brought an action against Parliament’s resolution of 12 September 2018, but the CJEU has dismissed it, 

see CJEU’s decision of 3 June 2021 in case C-650/18.  
Surprisingly, the Commission, while it activated the RoL Framework and Article 7 TEU for Poland, it did not do so 
for Hungary. 

19   this  section  is  an  excerpt  from  “The  protection  of  fundamental  rights  in  the  EU:  European  Parliament 
achievements  during  the  2014-2019  legislative  term  and  challenges  for  the  future”,  Policy  Department  for 
Citizens’ 
see  
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/621911/IPOL_BRI(2019)621911_EN.pdf  

Constitutional 

Parliament, 

European 

Affairs, 

Rights 

2019, 

and 

20   https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2020-0014_EN.html  
21   https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20210304IPR99220/meps-express-concerns-over-

attacks-on-media-in-poland-hungary-and-slovenia  

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IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs 

Hungary also had a dedicated and critical paragraph in the EP resolution of 11 March 2021 on the 
declaration of the EU as an LGBTIQ Freedom Zone.22 

In the resolution of 17 April 2020 on EU coordinated action to combat the COVID-19 pandemic 
and its consequences23 the EP deemed “it totally incompatible with European values both the decision 
from the Hungarian Government to prolong the state of emergency indefinitely, to authorise the 
Government to rule by decree without time limit, and to weaken the emergency oversight of the 
Parliament” (par. 46) and “strongly rejected any attempts to backtrack on SRHR and LGBTI rights, and in 
this context condemns [...] the attack on transgender and intersex people’s rights in Hungary” (par. 48).  

Following the tabling of a question to the Commission for oral answer,24 the European Parliament 
debated on 7th of July and approved on 8 July 2021 a resolution on breaches of EU law and of the 
rights of LGBTIQ citizens in Hungary as a result of the legal changes adopted by the Hungarian 
Parliament,25 which constitutes the EP reaction to the adoption of a Russian-style anti-LGBTIQ 
“propaganda” law by the Hungarian authorities.26 

In the resolution of 24 June 2021 on the Commission’s 2020 Rule of Law Report (rapporteur Ruiz 
Devesa, SD), the EP decried ‘the political pressure applied in Hungary and Poland to prevent national 
courts from initiating preliminary ruling proceedings before the CJEU under Article 267 TFEU, which is 
intended to prevent national judges from asking the CJEU questions in relation to EU requirements 
on judicial independence;...’ (par. 16).   

Parliament also regretted ‘the fact that Hungary’s failure to implement a CJEU ruling in relation to the 
unlawful restrictions imposed on the financing of civil organisations by persons established outside 
Hungary, which in itself constitutes a serious violation of the rule of law, has served to perpetuate the 
process of shrinking space for civil society in the country; urges the Commission to refer Hungary to 
the CJEU and to request dissuasive financial sanctions under Article 260 TFEU as a matter of 
urgency...’ (par. 32) 

It finally denounced ‘the fact that EU and international legislation is not fully respected in some EU 
Member States, for example in the field of anti-discrimination or asylum, as exemplified by Hungary’s 
failure to implement several rulings of the CJEU and European Court of Human Rights in relation to 
access to the asylum procedure, including automatic and unlawful detention and the deprivation of 
food, which violates the rights of migrants and asylum seekers to apply for international protection;’ 
(par. 37).   

22   Parliament  recalled  that  ‘legal  developments  in  Hungary  have  severely  hindered  the  fundamental  rights  of 
LGBTIQ people; [...] the adoption of Article 33 of the Omnibus Bill T/9934 de facto bans legal gender recognition 
for trans and intersex persons in Hungary, exposing them to discrimination and infringing their right to privacy; ; 
[...] in December 2020, the Hungarian Parliament adopted constitutional amendments which further restrict the 
rights of LGBTIQ people, neglect the existence of transgender and non-binary persons and restrict their right to 
family 
(par. 
the 
U).https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2021-0089_EN.html  

that  will  strip  non-married  couples  of 

to  adoption;’ 

life,  and  a 

right 

law 

23   https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2020-0054_EN.html  
24   question to the Commission for oral answer of 22 June 2021 on breaches of EU law and of the rights of LGBTIQ 
citizens in Hungary as a result of the adopted legal changes in the Hungarian Parliament (O-000050/2021) 

25   https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2021-0362_EN.html 
26   The resolution is described in the section on Equality in this paper. 

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1.4.  The 2021 Commission Rule of Law report on Hungary 

The Commission 2021 Rule of Law report on the situation in the European Union27 and its country 
chapter on Hungary28 examine the situation and the progress achieved in addressing the concerns 
expressed by the Commission in the 2020 Rule of Law report29 and in other documents.   

In this section, we will examine the general report on the situation of the rule of law in the EU, while 
in the rest of the briefing we will examine the Commission country report on Hungary.  

The general report mentions Hungary repeatedly. It recalls in footnote 9 that ‘The Commission 
launches infringements to defend these rights. The most recent examples include cases against 
Hungary and Poland for violations of fundamental rights of LGBTIQ people. In the case of Hungary, 
this concerns a recently adopted law banning LGBTIQ content and a decision imposing a disclaimer 
on children’s books with LGBTIQ content. In the case of Poland, the infringements relates to the 
‘LGBT-ideology free zones'. 

In relation to justice systems, the report states that ‘In Hungary, while the independence of the 
prosecution service is enshrined in law, there has been no change as regards concerns about some 
aspects of the prosecution service with insufficient safeguards against political influence’ (pg 7). It 
adds that ‘the direction of change continues to be towards lowering previously existing safeguards. 
The justice system has been subject to new developments, for example with regard to the 
nomination of the new President of the Supreme Court (Kúria). This adds to existing concerns on 
judicial independence, which have been expressed also in the context of the Article 7(1) TEU 
procedure initiated by the European Parliament.’ (pg 8). The ‘high level of digitalisation for 
proceedings in civil/commercial and administrative cases and in criminal cases allowed the justice 
system to adapt’ to the Covid situation (pg. 10). 

In relation to the framework against corruption, it is noted that Hungary has ‘registered a significant 
deterioration in perceived corruption levels’ and that ‘the anti-corruption programme is limited to 
fostering integrity in the public service, leaving out other areas of risk’, as well as that it had 
‘introduced legislation to address foreign bribery and criminalise informal payments in healthcare’. 
(pg 11). Furthermore, ‘while the indictment rate for corruption cases is high, and some new high-level 
cases involving politicians have been opened since 2020, the track record of investigations of 
allegations concerning high-level officials and their immediate circle remains limited’ (pg 13). The 
Commission also underlines that ‘although there are extensive disclosure requirements, concerns 
remain regarding the lack of systematic checks and insufficient oversight of asset and interest 
declarations, and suspicions of unjustified increase in wealth may lead to verification by the tax 
authorities only if investigative authorities have also opened criminal enquiries’ (pg 14). 

On media freedom, the report states for Hungary that ‘Political influence in the nomination process 
or the absence of effective safeguards against political interference remain a matter of concern in 
some Member States, despite formal independence being enshrined in law’ (pg 16) and that ‘the 
allocation of state advertising continues to permit the Government to exert indirect political 
influence over the media, with the state being the largest advertiser in the country and the large 
majority of revenue going to media companies supportive of the government’ (pg 17). It also recalls 
that Hungary ‘Media Council adopted a number of decisions which had the effect of taking one of 

27   https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/communication_2021_rule_of_law_report_en.pdf  
28    https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/2021_rolr_country_chapter_hungary_en.pdf  
29   https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1602583951529&uri=CELEX%3A52020DC0580 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1602582109481&uri=CELEX%3A52020SC0301  

and 

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IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs 

Hungary’s last independent radio stations off air’ and recalled in a footnote that ‘In June 2021, the 
Commission launched an infringement procedure against Hungary following the Media Council’s 
decisions to reject Klubrádió’s application on the use of radio spectrum.’ (pg 18). ‘In Member States 
such as Hungary access to public information was tightened through emergency measures 
introduced during the pandemic, making timely access to such information harder for independent 
media outlets’, states the Commission (pf 20). 

Concerning checks and balances, the report highlights that ‘frequent and sudden changes of 
legislation continue to undermine the predictability of the regulatory environment, and in some 
cases the pace of new legislation has accelerated further’ (pg 21) and that ‘concerns have been 
expressed about the role of the Constitutional Court in reviewing final court decisions, acting as 
another level of appeal, adjudicating on the merits of the case in the same manner as ordinary 
appellate courts although it is not part of the court system, and raising questions as regards legal 
certainty.’ (pg 21-22). ‘Pressure remains on civil society organisations critical towards the government, 
and, while the law on transparency of foreign-funded civil society organisations was repealed 
following the CJEU ruling, new measures were introduced’ (pg 23). In Hungary, ‘a constitutional 
change will limit the powers of the government as regards special legal order regimes as of July 2023. 
The current constitutional emergency regime, which gives extensive powers to the Government, is 
still in place and will remain until the Government decides to terminate it’ (pg 25). 

The RoL report was harshly criticised by the Hungarian government and a resolution was adopted on 
the matter.30 

30   https://www.dw.com/en/poland-and-hungary-lash-back-against-eu-rule-of-law-report/a-58585432  

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The situation of Democracy, the Rule of Law  
and Fundamental Rights in Hungary 

 JUSTICE  

The area of justice has been one of the first fronts of debate and legal proceedings between the 
Hungarian government and the EU. In 2012 the EU launched infringement proceedings on the 
reduction of the retirement age of judges from 70 to 62, which had the effect of forcing out many 
senior judges from the magistracy. The Commission based its case on age discrimination and won its 
case at the CJEU.31 Other changes in the judicial system took place at all levels, and raised serious 
concerns, as also described in the EP 2018 resolution and the Commission Rule of Law reports.32 

Concerns on political pressures on judges are not dissipated unfortunately: recently the Hungarian 
judge Gabriella Szabó filed a complaint with the EU Commission alleging she was fired because of 
asking for a CJEU preliminary ruling on the so-called ‘Stop Soros’ law of 2018 upon a case of a Syrian 
refugee represented by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee challenging the Immigration and Asylum 
Office's decision.33  

A similar 2019 case was mentioned in the Commission 2020 RoL annual report, whereby the Kúria, 
based on a motion by the prosecutor general, declared a preliminary reference to the EUCJ unlawful. 
It considered the judge's questions - part of which referred to the independence of Hungary's 
judiciary - irrelevant and disciplinary proceedings against the judge Csaba Vasvári was launched and 
then withdrawn. The AG examining the appeal at the CJEU underlined that the decision of the Kúria 
‘undermine[s] the power of the national court to refer questions’ to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling 
and ‘therefore undermine[s] the operation of the preliminary ruling mechanism’.34 

The Commission is currently discussing with the Hungarian government issues related to judicial 
independence, as revealed by Commissioners Dombrovskis and Gentiloni, in the framework of the 
Recovery Plan, also on the basis of the issues discussed in the RoL report and indicated below.   

31   see    https://www.politico.eu/article/how-viktor-orban-broke-the-eu-and-got-away-with-it-hungary-rule-of-
law/; as the article underlines, ‘the victory was bittersweet: The judges’ positions had been filled. Some chose 
to stay in retirement, while others went back to work — but not necessarily to their original posts.’.  Notably, 
the previous President of the Supreme Court was prematurely removed after the entering into force of the 
new Constitution. Mr András Baka criticised the proposed changes to the judiciary in the summer of 2010, 
after which the Supreme Court was renamed ‘Kúria’ and his mandate was terminated. Mr. Baka brought his 
case to the ECHR and won, see: app. no. 20261/12, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre?i=001-163113. The execution 
of the judgment is still pending and the Committee of Ministers is monitoring, see https://helsinki.hu/en/the-
looming-shadow-of-the-baka-v-hungary-case-the-government-is-still-failing-to-guarantee-the-freedom-of-
expression-of-judges/ 

32   For an overview related to the criminal justice and law enforcement, see submission of the Hungarian Helsinki 
Committee  for  the  third  cycle  of  the  Universal  Periodic  Review  of  Hungary,  https://helsinki.hu/wp-
content/uploads/2021/03/HHC_UPR2021_Hungary_criminal_justice_web.pdf  and  https://helsinki.hu/wp-
content/uploads/2021/03/HHC_UPR2021_Hungary_criminal_justice_annex_matrix.pdf  

33   the  replied 

in  2020  that  parts  of  the  asylum 

law  are  effectively  contrary  to  EU  rules,  see 

https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=224585&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&m
ode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=4007758 
https://euobserver.com/democracy/152349 
meantime-a-threat-to-all-hungarian-judges/  

see 
https://helsinki.hu/en/the-forcing-out-of-a-judge-and-

judge  Gabriella  Szabó, 

case  of 

;  on 

and 

the 

34   https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2021-04/cp210060en.pdf  

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In its 2021 Rule of Law report critically notes in relation to judicial independence that perceived 
judicial independence remains average (and dropping) among the general public and low among 
companies, and expressed concerns notably on the following issues: 

2.1.  The President of the National Office for the Judiciary 

Notwithstanding a call by the Council European Semester recommendation to improve judicial 
independence, the National Judicial Council (an independent body supervising the President of the 
National Office of the Judiciary and participating in the administration of the courts, composed of 14 
members elected by their peers) is facing challenges in counter-balancing the powers of the 
President of the National Office of the Judiciary (elected by Parliament and tasked with the central 
administration of the courts) as regards the management of the courts. Due to structural limitations, 
it is prevented from exercising effective oversight regarding the actions of the NOJ President.  

The NOJ President has furthermore repeatedly filled vacancies in higher courts, without a call for 
applications, with judges performing administrative tasks in the NOJ, while his practice of annulling 
the procedures for selecting court presidents and appointing ad interim court presidents without the 
approval of the National Judicial Council continued.  

In substance, the Commission believed that the 2019 European Semester recommendation remained 
unaddressed.35 

2.2.  The President of the Kúria 

The Commission noted that the President of the Kúria, the Supreme Court, received since the 
beginning of 2021 additional powers in organising the functioning of that court. Further to the 
powers of appointing presiding judges, assigning judges and presiding judges to chambers, 
appointing heads of department, and establishing the case allocation scheme among chambers, the 
Kúria President can now set up judicial panels composed of a presiding judge and four judges for 
certain groups of cases. 

The Kúria President also has important powers as regards the role of the Kúria in ensuring the 
uniform application of law by courts while the Kúria’s judicial bodies (the judicial council or the 

35   see Council Recommendation of 9 July 2019 on the 2019 National Reform Programme of Hungary and delivering 
a  Council  opinion  on  the  2019  Convergence  Programme  of  Hungary:  ‘1.Ensure  compliance  with  the  Council 
Recommendation of 14 June 2019 with a view to correcting the significant deviation from the adjustment path 
towards the medium-term budgetary objective. 2. Continue the labour market integration of the most vulnerable 
groups,  in  particular  through  upskilling,  and  improve  the  adequacy  of  social  assistance  and  unemployment 
benefits.  Improve  education  outcomes  and  increase  the  participation  of  disadvantaged  groups,  in  particular 
Roma in quality mainstream education. Improve health outcomes by supporting preventive health measures and 
strengthening primary healthcare. 3. Focus investment-related economic policy on research and innovation, low-
carbon energy, transport infrastructure, and waste management and energy and resource efficiency, taking into 
account  regional  disparities.  Improve  competition  in  public  procurement.  4. Reinforce  the  anti-corruption 
framework,  including  by  improving  prosecutorial  efforts  and  access  to  public  information,  and  strengthen  judicial 
independence. Improve the quality and transparency of the decision-making process through effective social dialogue 
and  engagement  with  other  stakeholders  and  through  regular,  appropriate  impact  assessments.  Continue 
simplifying  the  tax  system,  while  strengthening  it  against  the  risk  of  aggressive  tax  planning.  Improve 
competition  and  regulatory  predictability 
  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.C_.2019.301.01.0101.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AC%3A2019%3A301%3ATOC. 

in  the  services  sector.  See 

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departments) have a merely consultative role and are consequently unable to counter-balance the 
extensive powers of the Kúria President. 

The appointment of the new Kúria President elected as of 1 January 2021 under the new 
special rules on judicial appointments and without involvement of a judicial body are not in 
line with European standards: the Kúria President was appointed 1) on the basis of a specific 
modification of the law allowing to “passerelle” members of the Constitutional Court (including 
persons without experience as a judge in an ordinary court) to the Kúria as judges, 2) he was then 
recommended by the President of the Republic, 3) notwithstanding the rejection of his nomination 
by the National Judicial Council 13 to 1, and was elected by the National Assembly for a period of nine 
years.36 

The Commission concludes that ‘in the light of the administrative powers of the Kúria President and 
the key role of the Kúria in the justice system, these developments raise serious concerns as regards 
judicial independence’. 

2.3.  Bonuses 

The gradual increase of salaries of judges and prosecutors continued - noted the Commission -
however concerns persist as regards the system of bonuses and the power of the authorities 
managing the courts to award bonuses to judges on a discretionary basis, without objective and 
transparent criteria. 

2.4.  The organisation of the prosecution service 

The Commission’s concerns persist also in relation to the organisation of the prosecution service, 
which is organised in a strictly hierarchical structure. GRECO recommended to review the rules for 
appointment of the Prosecutor General in order to safeguard the office from political influence. Some 
remained unaddressed, notably 1) the recommendation to remove the possibility to maintain the 
Prosecutor General in office after the expiry of his/her 9 years mandate; 2) to ensure that situations in 
which a superior prosecutor takes over a case from a subordinate prosecutor are guided by strict 
criteria and that such decisions be justified in writing; 3) to enhance accountability and transparency 
of disciplinary proceedings against prosecutors, as it is still the direct superior prosecutor who 
decides on the merits of the case, rather than an impartial body. The Commission underlined that the 
“full implementation of these recommendations would have a positive impact on the anti-corruption 
framework”. 37 

36   The UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers characterised the election as an ‘attack 
to the independence of the judiciary and as an attempt to submit the judiciary to the will of the legislative branch, 
in violation of the principle of separation of powers’.  

37   https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/-/hungary-publication-of-the-2nd-interim-compliance-report-of-fourth-

evaluation-round ; the conclusions of GRECO state that ‘In view of the foregoing, GRECO concludes that Hungary 
has still only implemented satisfactorily or dealt in a satisfactory manner five of the eighteen recommendations 
contained  in  the  Fourth  Round  Evaluation  Report.  With  the  exception  of  a  step  forward  in  respect  of  the 
implementation  recommendation  vi,  leading  to  the  conclusion  that  this  recommendation  has  been  partly 
implemented,  Hungary  remains  at  the  same  level  of  implementation  as  in  the  previous  Interim  Compliance 
Report.’  

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IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs 

2.5.  Quality and efficiency 

The Commission also noted in relation to quality that the digitalisation of the justice system is 
overall high and the operation of the courts was adapted during the COVID-19 pandemic to use 
digital technologies; very good results are remarked as regards the promotion of and incentives for 
using alternative dispute resolution methods. The Commission notes that there are concerns as 
regards the level of inclusiveness of the legal aid scheme and the fact that court fees in commercial 
cases remain high.  

Concerning efficiency, the Commission underlined that it is high in civil and administrative cases 
and that the execution of the European Court of Human Rights judgment Gazsó v. Hungary 
concerning a case of excessive length of litigation in a labour dispute (more than 6 years) is still 
ongoing and Hungary remains under enhanced supervision of the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe on this issue. On 15 June 2021, Parliament adopted a new law introducing a 
compensatory remedy limited to excessively long civil proceedings, as well as new procedural rules 
to allow expedited proceedings in cases involving civil law claims of victims of crime.  

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  ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK 

The anti-corruption framework is one of the issues being discussed between the Commission and the 
Hungarian government in the framework of the screening of national plans for the RRF.  

Enquiries done by OLAF and by journalists revealed schemes of corruption, often connected to the 
spheres of power. 38 OLAF called the EU in 2016 to ask Hungarian authorities to repay more than 280 
million euros in funding to build a metro line in Budapest due to “fraud and possible corruption”, 
while in 2018, Reuters investigated a tourism project close to Lake Balaton aiming to channel public 
funds - including EU subsidies - to persons in power and their families.39 In a document of 26 January, 
the Commission reportedly laid out specific legal changes required from Hungary, noting that 
“competition in public procurement is insufficient in practice” adding that this is linked to “systemic 
irregularities” that “led to the highest financial correction in the history of (EU) structural funds in 
2019”.40  

Hungary does not take part in the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO).  

The European Commission RoL report explains that the ‘National Protective Service (NVSZ) under 
the oversight of the Ministry of Interior coordinates anti-corruption activities in Hungary and is also 
responsible for the prevention of crime within the police, law enforcement, and other government 
agencies. The investigation and prosecution of corruption in the public sector fall under the exclusive 
competence of the Investigation Division of the Central Chief Prosecution Office of Investigation and 
its five regional offices. The prosecution service is supported by the investigative forces of the police 
and the National Protective Service. The State Audit Office has competences for the control of 
financial management of public funds and auditing of political parties.’  

It continues by underlining that the perception of public sector corruption among experts and 
business executives is that the level of corruption in the public sector remains high. In the 2020 
Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International, Hungary scores 44/100 and ranks 19th 
in the European Union and 69th globally over 180 States monitored. This perception has significantly 
decreased over the past five years.  

Some revisions were introduced to criminal law legislation to address foreign bribery (as 
recommended by the OECD) and informal payments in healthcare. The relevant anti-corruption 
offences are criminalised and the implementation of the National Anti-corruption Strategy for 2020-
2022 and related Action Plan is ongoing.  

As reported in 2020 Rule of Law Report, the scope of the anti-corruption strategic framework is 
limited to fostering integrity in public administration. The Strategy adopted in June 2020 does 
not cover relevant areas such as political party financing, asset disclosure, lobbying and ‘revolving-
doors’ and consequently shortcomings are not addressed in a coordinated manner. The Commission 
underlines that ‘Similarly, risks related to clientelism, favouritism and nepotism in high-level public 
administration or those arising from the interface between businesses and political actors remain 

38   https://balkaninsight.com/2020/12/08/how-eu-fraud-schemes-work-in-orbans-hungary/  
39   https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-eu-hungary-exclusi-idUSKBN2A8156  
40   https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/citing-systemic-fraud-commission-pushes-

hungary-to-change-procurement/  

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IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs 

unaddressed. Challenges remain as regards the investigation and prosecution of high-level 
corruption cases.’ It add that ‘prosecutors highlight challenges in detecting corruption and obtaining 
evidence in such cases” and that “As reported last year, deficient independent control mechanisms 
and close interconnections between politics and certain national businesses are conducive to 
corruption [...] the track record of investigations of allegations concerning high-level officials 
and their immediate circle remains limited, as noted in the 2020 Rule of Law Report . The full 
implementation of the GRECO recommendations as regards the effective functioning of the 
prosecution would further strengthen the anti-corruption framework’. 

The Commission notes that notwithstanding the fact that integrity tests and an asset disclosure 
system are in place, ‘concerns remain regarding the lack of systematic checks and insufficient 
oversight of asset and interest declarations. The system in place requires members of Parliament, 
government officials, and public officials to declare their assets and interests. However, concerns 
remain as regards the lack of systematic monitoring’.  While suspicions of unjustified increase in 
wealth may lead to a verification procedure conducted by the National Tax and Customs Authority, 
this can happen only if investigative authorities have also opened criminal inquiries, which restricts 
the possibility for independent verifications. MPs must now declare to the Speaker any conflict of 
interest or incompatibility, however declarations of interests and information about any follow-up are 
not publicly available.41  

The regulation of lobbying is incomplete and lacks systematic enforcement. There is no mandatory 
registration of lobbyists and disclosure of contact reports.42 Clear rules as regards revolving doors 
and cooling-off periods are lacking. Confidentiality clauses rules foreseen in the law are not 
enforced. Party financing and transparency of it in Hungary are a concern, as noted by GRECO.   

While a regulatory framework is in place for the protection of whistleblowers, further steps are 
needed to enhance protection in practice, as noted by OECD.  

The narrowing of the scope of application of public procurement rules has heightened the risk of 
corruption. The law of 27 April 2021 excluded trusts established by the state, as well as legal persons 
managed by them, from the explicit scope of application of procurement rules in respect of 
procurements financed by European Union funds. The Commission also notes that the above-
mentioned law also removes rules aimed at preventing conflict of interest, so to allow holders of 
public office to sit on the board of trustees of such trusts.  

The Commission notes that ‘A number of OLAF investigations were completed with the support of 
the Hungarian AFCOS (anti-fraud coordination service). In recent years, the number of indictments 
following OLAF’s judicial recommendations was higher in Hungary than the EU average. However, 
despite repeated requests, the Hungarian authorities have not yet communicated an authority in 
charge to provide assistance to OLAF during its on-the-spot checks if an economic operator subject 
to control refuses to cooperate. It is further noted in the field of shared management, that the 
Hungarian authorities frequently withdraw projects from EU funding when OLAF issues a 

41   The Commission notes that GRECO recommendations on effective supervision, verification and enforcement of 
rules of conduct, conflicts of interests and asset declarations for members of Parliament have been only partly 
implemented. 

42   while  GRECO  recommended  a  clear  set  of  rules  in  the  interaction  with  lobbyists  as  regards  members  of 

Parliament. 

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financial recommendation, or sometimes when the authorities become aware that an OLAF 
investigation has been opened. Furthermore, it appears that amounts due are not systematically 
recovered from the economic operator who committed the irregularity or fraud. In such cases, 
the EU subsidy is simply replaced by national funds, with a negative impact on the deterrent 
effect of an OLAF investigation and higher risks for the national budget. During the period 2016-
2020, Hungary had 32 OLAF investigations closed with a financial recommendation in the two main 
ares of shared management.’ 

No specific measures were adopted to counter the risk of corruption connected to the COVID-19 
public procurement, ‘where derogations from procurement rules and direct awards, coupled with 
deficiencies in access to information increase the risk of corruption and raised questions as regards 
the purchase of medical equipment through intermediary companies’. 

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IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs 

  FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND INFORMATION, MEDIA 

FREEDOM AND PLURALISM  

The recent Pegasus scandal brought to light, as well as to public national and international attention, 
the situation of media in Hungary, as journalists are targeted by the authorities for their work, 
including through secret surveillance. Only a few days ago it emerged once more that a 
photojournalists’ phone had been infected by Pegasus while he was doing inquiries on the high-level 
political and economic close relations and connections in the country.43 The EP repeatedly discussed 
media freedom in Hungary since 2011, criticising the progressive consolidation of government 
influence and control of the media in the country. 44   

The situation of media freedom and pluralism in Hungary is dire. Hungary ranks 92nd out of 180 
monitored countries (three places down compared to 2020) and is one of the worst placed EU 
Member State in the 2021 World Press Freedom Index of Reporters without Borders. 

The Media Pluralism Monitor for Hungary assesses the risks to media pluralism at high risk for 
Market plurality (82%) and Political independence (78%) and at medium risk for Fundamental 
protection (41%) and Social inclusiveness (64%).45  

The Commission expressed concerns in its 2021 RoL report in relation to46: 

- the lack of independence and effectiveness of the Media Council and the Media Authority, as 
all the members are nominated by the governing party and ‘certain decisions of the Media Council 
have added to the concerns regarding its effective independence’, as also confirmed by the 2021 
Media Pluralism Monitor.  

- Media pluralism has further deteriorated in Hungary as the diversity of the media market is 
negatively affected by the concentration of ownership in the hands of a few pro-government 
businesspersons and the resulting lack of editorial independence. The Media Authority has not 
examined the impact of the establishment in November 2018 of the ‘KESMA’ media conglomerate 
on the plurality and diversity of the Hungarian media market. The economic takeover of the 
independent news media site Index.hu by pro-government interests also has a negative impact; 

- the Media Council has also refused to renew the broadcasting license of the independent radio 
station Klubrádió, based on the station’s alleged failure to comply with certain administrative 

43   https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/hungarian-photo-journalist-investigating-luxury-
trips-of-government-elite-targeted-by-spyware/ and https://hungarytoday.hu/daniel-nemeth-pegasus-
hungarian-photojournalist/  

44   see https://www.politico.eu/article/how-viktor-orban-broke-the-eu-and-got-away-with-it-hungary-rule-of-

law/  

45   see 

https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/71949/hungary_results_mpm_2021_cmpf.pdf?sequence=1&i
sAllowed=y  

46   The Commission also recalls that media freedom and pluralism and the right to access public information 
are protected by the Fundamental Law and sectoral legislation (the Media Act, Freedom of the Press Act, 
Freedom of Information Act), that legislation was adopted to align Hungarian legislation with the AVMS 
Directive and that the National Media and Info-communications Authority (the Media Authority), and its 
Media Council, are in place.  

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obligations, resulting in the radio being taken off air. On 17 June 2021, the Kúria upheld the Media 
Council’s decision and on 9 June 2021, the Commission launched an infringement procedure against 
Hungary; 

- Transparency of media ownership is still not fully guaranteed, as only some ownership data is 
available from national registers, while only basic information on company ownership is freely 
accessible from the company register. 

- the lack of rules on the allocation of state advertising continues to permit the Government to 
exert indirect political influence over the media, while the state is the largest advertiser in Hungary 
spending approximately one third of the total advertising revenue of the market and increased its 
spending by 13.8%, with 85% of that revenue going to pro-government media companies.  

- Access to public information was tightened through emergency measures introduced during 
the COVID-19 pandemic, allowing public authorities to delay giving access to public documents by 
up to 90 days (and not anymore 15+15 days) in case such provision of information was seen as 
‘jeopardising the public institution’s fulfilment of its duty related to the state of emergency’. The 
deficiencies in access to public information previously reported, including as regards the charging of 
fees, continue to be an issue also for the prevention of corruption. The restrictive definition of ‘public 
funds’ introduced by the Ninth Amendment to the Fundamental Law could restrict the access to 
public information related to public companies and public-interest trusts.  

- Journalists and media outlets continued to face diverse threats in Hungary, as journalists 
working for independent media are subject to negative narratives by pro-government media and by 
government representatives. Female journalists are in a more difficult situation, with reports of 
gender-based online harassment.  

The Council of Europe’s Platform to promote the protection and the safety of journalists has 2 
alerts47 and 1 resolved with a State reply for 2021 and 9 alerts and 3 resolved for 2020.48  

Reporters Sans Frontières 2021 World Press Freedom Index discusses Hungary as the ‘EU’s 
alternative, repressive model’: ‘After seizing on the coronavirus pandemic as a handy pretext, Viktor 
Orbán’s government continued to extend its hegemony over the Hungarian media landscape and 
inspire other European countries such as Slovenia and Poland. Its coronavirus legislation, which gave 
the government almost unlimited powers to handle the crisis, threatened journalists with 
prosecution on charges of disseminating fake news and “blocking the government’s anti-pandemic 
efforts,” and imposed additional curbs on their already limited access to state-held information. This 
would-be information police state at the heart of Europe forced many journalists and their sources to 

47   one  on  Pegasus  and  one  on 

threats  of  Legal  Action  against  Cartoonist  Gábor  Pápai,  see 

https://www.coe.int/en/web/media-freedom/hungary. 

48   These  concerned,  respectively:  the  dismissal  of  the  former  editor  of  online  news  portal  Index.hu  prior  to  its 
takeover; instructions issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade for embassies in EU Member States to 
provide information with regard to professional trips undertaken by Hungarian journalists; an injunction issued 
by a civil court preventing a weekly newspaper from publishing an article on a company and its owners on data 
protection grounds; the police interrogation of two journalists who published articles about a public figure and 
the above-mentioned refusal by the Hungarian Media Council to renew Klubrádió’s radio licence. In 2021, the 
Platform published one alert concerning what the Platform called a ‘tirade of insults’ directed against an Austrian 
journalist by the Hungarian public broadcaster.  

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censor themselves, although articles critical of the government and revealing reports were often still 
published. By requiring journalists to get permission from the authorities and landowners before 
conducting a drone overflight, or risk a one-year prison sentence, the government showed a 
readiness to resort to any legislative means possible to obstruct reporting by independent media and 
to protect the oligarchs that reporters would like to investigate. Media pluralism suffered from 
political decisions taken on administrative pretexts by the Media Council, including its decision to 
strip Klubrádió of its frequency, thereby limiting it to online broadcasting, and its Antenna Hungária 
decision, effectively ending DAB+ broadcasting in Hungary. The most spectacular development in 
2020 was the government’s takeover of the Index.hu website with the help of one of the prime 
minister’s business allies. Telex.hu, launched by former Index.hu journalists, has helped to save what 
is left of pluralism in Hungary, along with Radio Free Europe’s return.’49 

The Council of Europe Commissioner on Human rights on 30 March 2021 published a 
Memorandum on freedom of expression and media freedom in Hungary noting that ‘the 
combined effects of a politically controlled media regulatory authority and distortionary state 
intervention in the media market have eroded media pluralism and freedom of expression in 
Hungary’. The memorandum ‘constitutes a reaction to the deterioration of the environment for 
media pluralism and transparency of media ownership in the country, as also observed by numerous 
international, national, governmental and non-governmental organisations working to protect and 
promote the rights enshrined in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ and 
addresses recommendations to the Hungarian authorities, after stating that ‘by repeatedly 
disregarding the judgments of national and international courts, the government has demonstrated 
that it has no intention of adhering to the rule of law, which is crucial for the functioning of 
democracy and, indeed, the unencumbered exercise of freedom of expression.’50 

49   https://rsf.org/en/hungary  
50   https://rm.coe.int/memorandum-on-freedom-of-expression-and-media-freedom-in-hungary/1680a1e67e 
and https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/commissioner-high-time-for-hungary-to-restore-journalistic-and-
media-freedoms  

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  DEMOCRACY AND CHECKS AND BALANCES 

Freedom House categorises Hungary as partly free in its report on Freedom in the World,51 due to 
‘sustained attacks on the country’s democratic institutions’ as over the past decade, Fidesz ‘has used 
its parliamentary supermajority to impose restrictions on or assert control over the opposition, the 
media, religious groups, academia, NGOs, the courts, asylum seekers, and the private sector.’ The 
“Nations in Transit” report describes Hungary as a Transitional/Hybrid Regime and underlines that it 
stands out for its unparalleled democratic deterioration over the past decade.52 The V-Dem institute 
classifies Hungary as an ‘electoral autocracy’.53 

Academics, politicians and civil society debate on how to categorise the regime in place in Hungary 
today, but most of them share the view that democracy radically decayed in the last decade, as 
systematic efforts were made to disable checks and balances by controlling independent institutions 
and bodies and hereby push through controversial legislative and constitutional changes to 
consolidate the power of one political party over the State, hereby also maximising the chances to 
stay in power.  

EU institutions criticised these transformations and the Commission already in 2011 launched 
infringement proceedings against the media law and in early 2012 against modifications made to 
diminish the independence of the Central bank and of the Data protection authority and of 
judges. Further actions were then taken to protect other counter-powers successively but inexorably 
targeted by the government, like NGOs and universities (the Central European University). Some 
areas of concern in relation to democracy are examined below. 

5.1.  Elections 

OSCE denounced that the 2018 April parliamentary elections ‘were characterized by a pervasive 
overlap between state and ruling party resources, undermining contestants’ ability to compete 
on an equal basis. Voters had a wide range of political options but intimidating and xenophobic 
rhetoric, media bias and opaque campaign financing constricted the space for genuine political 
debate, hindering voters’ ability to make a fully-informed choice.’54 

More recently, the electoral system was changed to introduce a requirement for national parties to 
present candidates in 71 constituencies. Although the declared aim is that of countering sham 
parties, this new rule has had an impact mainly on the opposition. In fact, opposition parties initially 
intended to run on two separate and coordinated lists (left and centre) without fielding candidates 
against each other, but they are now obliged to run on a single list.55 The opposition is in the process 
of selecting its candidates and primaries are underway. 

51   https://freedomhouse.org/country/hungary/freedom-world/2021  
52   https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-04/NIT_2021_final_042321.pdf  
53   https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/74/8c/748c68ad-f224-4cd7-87f9-

8794add5c60f/dr_2021_updated.pdf  

54   https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/0/0/377410.pdf  
55   https://www.euractiv.com/section/elections/news/hungarian-opposition-forces-unite-to-beat-orban-in-2022/ 

; 
this  also  reduces  the  amount  of  available  funds  and  pushed  the  opposition  party  Two-tailed  dog  to  field 
candidates in highly competitive constituencies.   

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5.2.  Political campaigns 

Following the advice of US political consultants (working for conservatives across the globe) 
Finkelstein and Birnbaum from 2008 on, who advised to use a strategy of targeting adversaries and 
building up aggressive smear campaigns to create ‘enemies’,56 in 2017 an anti-migrant billboard 
campaign with full-page media ads paied by the Hungarian government used the image of the 
Hungarian-American businessman  George Soros.57  

Similar campaigns targeted then other politicians and NGOs, at national and European level. For 
instance, Judith Sargentini (former MEP and rapporteur on Hungary) and Guy Verhofstadt, then Chair 
of the ALDE group, as well as Soros, were targeted in a video campaign against the EP report on 
Hungary.58  

In 2019 a campaign – using billboards, full-page newspaper advertisements and a letter from the 
Prime Minister addressed to all Hungarian citizens – entitled “You too have the right to know what 
Brussels is planning!” and  funded by the Hungarian government, targeted the then Commission 
President Jean-Claude Juncker and - again - George Soros stating that they pushed a migration 
policy that “threaten Hungary’s security.”59 The Commission - in an unprecedented manner - replied 
to it stating that it ‘agrees, citizens do deserve to know the truth about what the EU is doing. But we 
believe they deserve fact not fiction. The Hungarian government campaign distorts the truth and 
seeks to paint a dark picture of a secret plot to drive more migration to Europe. The truth is that there 
is no conspiracy. The Commission would therefore like to set the record straight, point by point.’60 

Also relations with other Member States’ governments are sometimes strained, as virulent language 
is used.61 

5.3. 

‘Consultations’ 

The government also uses so called ‘national consultations’ that include questions, that according to 
critics are written in a biased way to promote the government’s views and political agenda, and lack 
of transparency.62 Nine national consultations took place: in 2010, on pensions; in 2011, on the 
constitution; in 2011, on government spending; in 2012, on the economy; in 2015, 

56   see  https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/hnsgrassegger/george-soros-conspiracy-finkelstein-birnbaum-

orban-netanyahu 

57   https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-soros-idUSKBN19W0XU  ;  Soros’  spokesperson  stated  that  the 

billboard campaign was “reminiscent of Europe’s darkest hours”. 

58   https://hungarytoday.hu/in-the-wake-of-the-sargentini-report-govt-launches-new-campaign/  
59   https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-launches-campaign-targeting-jean-claude-juncker-george-soros/  
60   https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/european-commission-responds-hungarian-government-
the 

campaign_en, 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/facts_matter_hungarian_government_campaign_en.pdf; 
following international criticism: https://www.euronews.com/2019/03/13/hungary-covers-up-some-anti-eu-
posters-during-manfred-weber-s-visit  

responses 

also 

see 

the 

to 

claims 

7 

61   https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/hungarian-official-denounces-german-nazi-style-sacking-

of-football-coach/  

62   the last one of 1st of July has 14 ‘questions’ on family support, taxation, Hungary’s vaccine factory, migration, 

George Soros, the EU and its policies. 

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on immigration and terrorism; in 2017, on “Stop Brussels”63 and on the “Soros Plan”, in 2018 on the 
protection of families. The planned consultation on various issues including segregation to be 
launched in early 2020 was cancelled due to the pandemic. However, another consultation on the 
management of the pandemic was launched in 2020, as well as another one on various issues 
including the 2021 anti-LGBTQ legislation. 

5.4.  Spying on NGOs, journalists, opposition, lawyers, businessmen 

On 6 July 2018, media reported that between December 2017 and March 2018 the extremely 
controversial Israeli private intelligence firm Black Cube spied and recorded NGOs on behalf of the 
Hungarian government with the aim of discrediting them, using agents with false identities. 
Recordings were then published in Israel and Hungary and used during the electoral campaign 
before the 2018 elections.64  

On 18 July 2021, a consortium of journalists coordinated by Forbidden Stories revealed the results of 
an inquiry on a spying software called Pegasus, developed by the Israeli cyber-surveillance firm NSO, 
sold to governments across the world. The software allows to hack the phone of a person and access 
all messages, emails, photos and videos, location data, contacts, and search history, but also to turn 
on the phone’s microphone and camera, and record calls. Hungary appeared on the list of countries 
making use of the spy software - after high-level meetings between the Israeli and Hungarian 
governments in 2017 and 2018 - with more than 300 targets. 

Among those who have been allegedly attacked by the government through Pegasus are: four 
journalists; two employees of investigative outlet Direkt36, a former journalist of liberal weekly 
Hvg.hu, as well as a fourth journalist who has chosen to remain anonymous; a Hungarian 
photographer who collaborated with an American journalist covering the Russian-led International 
Investment Bank’s affairs in Budapest; Zoltán Varga, owner of Central Media Group Plc., and other 
businessmen who joined him in a dinner meeting in 2018: Attila Chikán, an economics professor and 
former Minister of the Economy in the first Orbán government; the son of former oligarch Lajos 
Simicska and a close person to him; one of Central European University’s international students, 
Adrien Beaudeuin, who was arrested in 2018 for taking part in an antigovernmental protest. Other 
targets include a prestigious lawyer and an opposition mayor.65  

According to researches, more spying softwares could also be in use in Hungary,66 which reportedly 
has a broad and weak system of legal and political authorisation (in cases related to national, 
intelligence services can order surveillance with no judicial oversight, the signature of the minister of 
justice suffices) and oversight of surveillance.67 In particular, the parliamentary National Security 
Committee does not seem to work properly due to political tensions.   

63   https://www.populismstudies.org/viktor-orban-past-to-present/  
64   https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-israeli-intelligence-firm-targeted-ngos-during-hungarys-election-

campaign-george-soros/  

65   https://hungarytoday.hu/hungarian-journalists-pegasus-software-hungary/  and  https://168.hu/itthon/fideszes-

kormanytag-is-a-pegasus-kemprogram-celkeresztjebe-kerult-208740  

66   https://citizenlab.ca/2021/07/hooking-candiru-another-mercenary-spyware-vendor-comes-into-focus/  
67   https://telex.hu/direkt36/2021/07/18/leleplezodott-egy-durva-izraeli-kemfegyver-az-orban-kormany-kritikusait-
;  https://www.theguardian.com/news/2021/sep/15/eu-poised-to-

es-magyar-ujsagirokat-is-celba-vettek-vele 
tighten-privacy-laws-after-pegasus-spyware-scandal  

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The EP held a debate on 15 September 2021 on Pegasus and Commissioner Reynders condemned 
the spying operations and announced that the Commission will examine the conclusions of the ex 
officio investigation launched by the Hungarian Data Protection Authority on 5 August 2021.  

5.5.  EU Commission concerns on checks and balances   

The 2021 Commission Rule of Law report highlights concerns in relation to: 

- the fact that frequent and sudden changes of the legislation continue to undermine the 
predictability of the regulatory environment, as the pace of legislation has accelerated even 
further and the few consultations are purely formal, raising questions as regards legal certainty and 
the quality of legislation.  

- Civil society organisations critical towards the Government remain under pressure. Following 
the Court of Justice’s ruling in the infringement action brought against Hungary by the Commission 
on the “lex NGO”, on 18 May 2021 Parliament adopted a new law repealing the Act on the 
transparency of foreign-funded civil society organisations which breached EU law. The same law 
introduced new rules requiring the State Audit Office to carry out legality checks on the accounts of 
civil society organisations with an annual balance sheet total exceeding a certain amount. 68 

- The Commission launched infringement proceeding against legislation criminalising the 
organisation of assistance offered by persons on behalf of national, international and non-
governmental organisations to people wishing to apply for asylum. Proceedings are currently 
ongoing and a judgment is expected by the end of this year. 

- concerns are expressed on the law introducing a special 25% immigration tax applicable to 
financial support to organisations carrying out ‘activities promoting immigration’.  

- The Government and pro-government media continue to use hostile rhetoric against civil society 
organisations and individuals that take a critical stance towards the Government.69 

- Civic space in Hungary is rated as ‘obstructed’.  

- According to the Government, the National Cooperation Fund and the 1% personal income tax 
donation scheme are financing tools designed to support the operation and activities of civil society 
organisations. Nonetheless, according to stakeholders, the civil society organisations continue to be 
underfinanced, in particular if they are critical towards the government.  

- ‘The Ninth Amendment to the Fundamental Law (15 December 2020) introduced a qualified 
majority in Parliament for amending the rules on public-interest trusts performing public duties. A 
new law adopted on 27 April 2021 has created a legal framework for the functioning of such trusts. 
The boards of trustees include current Ministers and State secretaries. Some stakeholders have 
expressed concerns about public assets being donated to such private entities, also taking into 

68   on this issue, see also recent FRA report on Protecting civic space in the EU  

https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2021-protecting-civic-space_en.pdf  and Franet 
report on Hungary 
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/franet_hungary_civic_space_2021.pdf  

69   see https://apnews.com/article/6fc8ca916bdf4598857f58ec4af198b2  

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account the composition of the boards of trustees. These developments take place against the 
background of the legal uncertainty noted above as regards the applicability to such trusts of rules on 
public procurement and on access to public information. The Venice Commission acknowledged that 
the new definition does not dismiss private entities managing public funds from their duties of 
accountability, but it warned against the risk of removing public funds and public tasks from 
democratic control, also taking into account the new definition of public funds.’70 

- Concerns have been expressed about the role of the Constitutional Court in reviewing final 
court decisions. Administrative authorities may challenge before the Constitutional Court a judicial 
decision that has already become final, if it violates their rights and curtails their powers under the 
Fundamental Law. Over the past year, public authorities have challenged before the Constitutional 
Court some final judgments affecting them, handed down by ordinary courts. This possibility of 
review raises questions in particular as regards legal certainty. Moreover, although it is not part of 
the court system, the Constitutional Court hearing constitutional complaints is nonetheless 
adjudicating on the merits of the case and has been characterised as ‘a court of fourth instance’, 
acting in the same manner as ordinary appellate courts . In this context, it is recalled that members of 
the Constitutional Court are elected by Parliament voting with a two-thirds majority, on the basis of 
broad eligibility criteria.  

70   see https://helsinki.hu/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2021/05/parallel_state_I_May2021.pdf  

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  EQUALITY 

The Ombudsperson/ Commissioner for Fundamental Rights is the national human rights 
institution in Hungary, nominated by the President of the Republic and elected by Parliament for 6 
years. The current commissioner is Ákos Kozma.71 

The Commission 2021 RoL report notes that the powers of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights 
were extended, while questions were raised about its independence.  

- As of January 2021, the Equal Treatment Authority was integrated into in the Office of the 
Commissioner for Fundamental Rights. On 20 November 2020, the Council of Europe 
Commissioner of Human Rights expressed concerns about the merger, recalling that doubts 
remained about the appointment process of the incumbent and the adequacy of the institution’s 
efforts to address all human rights issues and speak out in a manner that promotes and protects all 
human rights.  

- although on paper the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights is independent, stakeholders have 
expressed concerns as regards the independent and effective functioning of the Commissioner.72   

- In October 2018, the UN Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA) of the Global Alliance of NHRIs 
(GANHRI) decided to defer its decision on its re-accreditation (with ‘A’ status in October 2014). 

In its June 2021 report, SCA recommended in a report to downgrade it to B status as ‘the SCA is of 
the view that the CFR has not effectively engaged on and publicly addressed all human rights issues, 
including in relation to vulnerable groups such as ethnic minorities, LGBTI, refugees and migrants as 
well as constitutional court cases deemed political and institutional, media pluralism, civic space and 
judicial independence. The SCA is of the view that the CFR has not spoken out in a manner that 
promotes protection of all human rights. The failure to do so demonstrates a lack of sufficient 
independence. Therefore, the SCA is of the view that the CFR is operating in a way that has seriously 
compromised its compliance with the Paris Principles’. It also notes that ‘The SCA is of the view that 
the selection process currently enshrined in the existing Law is not sufficiently broad and transparent’ 
and made recommendations in this respect, as well as on improving its Interaction with the 
international human rights system and with civil society. 73 

6.1.  Minorities, hate speech, racism 

A 2018 report on hate speech in Hungary by Article 19 states that ‘During the last few years, ‘hate 
speech’ against disadvantaged groups, in particular the Roma, Jews, LGBTQI people, migrants, and 
asylum seekers, has been an issue of growing concern in Hungary. The rise of prejudice and 
intolerance in Hungarian society can be closely linked to the Hungarian government’s own policies 
and communications strategies, as well as the lack of political will to deal with instances of hate crime 
and ‘hate speech’. In recent years, the government has run public campaigns against refugees, 
migrants, and, more recently, against non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and George Soros, a 
Hungarian-American businessman and philanthropist. This has created a forum for the rise of ‘hate 

71   https://ennhri.org/our-members/hungary/ 
72   the 
take 

Commissioner 

not 

did 

any 

action 

on 

the 

Russian-style 

LGBTIQ 

law, 

see 

https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/hungarian-ombudsman-wont-review-controversial-
lgbtqi-law/ ; according to ILGA-Europe, the current Commissioner is “a loyal government supporter, who has been 
silent on LGBTI issues”, see https://www.ilga-europe.org/sites/default/files/2021/full_annual_review.pdf   

73   https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/NHRI/GANHRI/EN-SCA-Report-June-2021.pdf  

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speech’ and facilitated its legitimation in Hungarian public discourse... Public authorities are failing to 
apply the available mechanisms against ‘hate speech’ in an effective manner. As a result of law 
enforcement agencies’ inertia in this regard, the relevant criminal provisions remain effectively 
dormant, with even the most severe cases reaching the incitement threshold going unpunished’.74 

6.2.  Roma 

The Fundamental Rights Agency, in its 2021 Annual report, noted that the European Commission 
has launched infringement proceedings against Hungary concerning discrimination against Roma 
children in education, prohibited by the Race equality directive, and that the FCNM Advisory 
Committee published its fifth opinion on Hungary in 2020.75 It recalls that ‘the Curia, the Supreme 
Court of Hungary, concluded in an actio popularis lawsuit that an elementary school in Gyöngyöspata 
had segregated Roma pupils, and thus denied them access to equal education. The court awarded 
damages of nearly HUF 100,000,000 (€ 280,000) to the 63 plaintiffs. Politicians widely criticised the 
decision, including the appropriateness of financial compensation. As a result, the parliament 
amended the law on education for the future to allow compensation only “in the form of education 
and training services” and to prevent financial compensation.’ 

The FRA report notes also that ‘In 2020, the European Roma Rights Centre published two research 
studies initiated in 2016. They show that Romani women suffer from rights violations in the field of 
maternity care in Hungary and Bulgaria.  In May 2020, the Supreme Court of Hungary found that 
a Miskolc hospital engaged in a discriminatory practice by requiring individuals accompanying 
expecting mothers to purchase certain clothing for hygienic purposes. Refusing it could have resulted 
in a denial of visits, leaving mothers to give birth without support from their chosen companions. The 
court found that the practice constituted both direct (financial situation) and indirect (Roma origin) 
discrimination.’ 

6.3.  Women’s rights 

In July 2011, it emerged that EU funds were used to finance an anti-abortion campaign and the 
Commission called for the funds to be reimbursed, as the project tabled by the government was 
different.76  

Hungary systematically blocks European texts that mention ‘gender’ and ask to replace it with ‘sex’.  

In 2018, the government also prohibited the internationally recognised ‘gender studies’ at 
Universities. 

Hungary has not ratified the Istanbul Convention. The FRA 2021 Annual report recalls that “the  
Minister for Justice stated that [...] Hungary would still not ratify the Convention because it “supports 
migration and maintains that people are not born as men or women, as there are also social genders”. 
The provisions of the Istanbul Convention, however, seek to ensure that women in migration, just like 
all other women and girls irrespective of their status and irrespective of their gender identity and 
sexual orientation, receive the necessary protection and support for experiences of gender-based 
violence.” 

74   https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Hungary_responding_to_HS.pdf  
75   https://rm.coe.int/5th-op-hungary-en/16809eb484  
76   https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/eu-funds-used-for-hungarian-anti-abortion-

campaign/  

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In its Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on Hungary, 
Human Rights Watch discusses the perpetuation of Stereotyped Gender Roles and Attacks on 
Advancing Gender Equality.77 

6.4.  LGBTIQ 

Hungary has a score of 31% in the ILGA-Europe Rainbow map.78 LGBTIQ persons have been targeted 
in Hungary during this decade, and with a harsh radicalisation since 2019, through smear campaigns, 
hate speech and constitutional and legislative changes that raised grave concerns at national, 
international and European level. Critics say that LGBTIQ persons are scapegoated to deflect attention 
from scandals embarassing the high spheres of political power, including scandals of sexual nature 
raising accusations of hypocrisy, like the József Szájer scandal79 or the Gabor Kaleta scandal, that have 
attracted worldwide attention.80 

Among the various anti-LGBTIQ actions adopted since 2010 are the following: the modification of the 
Civil Code to disallow cohabiting partners to adopt each other’s children; the introduction of a ban on 
same-sex marriage in the new Constitution and a new definition of family; hate speech comparing 
paedophilia and same-sex families by the Speaker of the Parliament and always more frequent 
homophobic and transphobic statements by government representatives; the imposition of a fine on 
a company for including same-sex couples in its advertisements; the banning of gender studies in 
Universities; the withdrawal from Eurovision song contest as it was perceived as too LGBTIQ friendly. 

Furthermore, in May 2020, legal gender recognition was banned as the term ‘sex’ on civil registry 
documents (such as birth certificates) will be replaced by the term “birth sex”, with no modification of 
it possible. Parts of the bill has been found unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court and further 
cases are pending at courts and at the Constitutional Court.  

On 16 July 2000, in Rana v. Hungary (No. 40888/17), the ECtHR ruled that the lack of access to legal 
gender recognition procedures by non-Hungarian citizens legally residing in Hungary violates the 
right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 of the ECHR. 

In October 2020, Gergely Gulyás, the Minister for the Prime Minister’s Office, threatened with criminal 
proceedings against teachers who use the book Fairyland is for Everyone, published by Labrisz 
Lesbian Association for educational purposes.  

In December 2020 the Constitution was modified to state that “The mother is a woman, the father is 
a man”, that children have a right to an "identity corresponding their sex at birth" and an upbringing 
that reflects "values based on Hungary's constitutional identity and Christian culture." 

The Civil Code and Child Protection Act were also modified to restrict adoption to only married 
couples in the country, and only the minister responsible for family policy could personally grant 
exemptions. 

On 19 January 2021, the Hungarian Consumer Protection Authority obliged the publisher of the 
abovementioned book for children presenting LGBTIQ people to include a disclaimer that the book 
depicts forms of ‘behaviour deviating from traditional gender roles'.  

77   https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/12/submission-committee-elimination-discrimination-against-women-

hungary. 

78   https://www.rainbow-europe.org/#8626/0/0 ;  
79   https://www.politico.eu/article/from-orban-ally-to-orgy-scandal-downfall-of-a-fidesz-founder/  
80   https://www.dw.com/en/hungary-approves-law-banning-lgbtq-content-for-minors/a-57909844  

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In January 2021, the Media Council launched an investigation against RTL Klub for airing a video 
about rainbow families as a public service advertisement. 

On 15 June 2021, the Hungarian Parliament adopted amendments to the Anti-Paedophilia Act 
targeting LGBTIQ persons, hereby conflating paedophilia and sexual minorities, and implementing in 
Hungary the 2013 Russian propaganda law. The law bans all products, advertising and media content 
depicting homosexual or transgender people for persons under the age of 18; bans the portrayal of 
LGBTQI people in public service advertisements; bans “promoting deviation from the child’s gender 
aligning with sex at birth, gender reassignment, or homosexuality”. It also introduced a requirement 
for holding session on issues related to sexuality only by individuals that are approved by the minister 
of in charge of education..81 On the same day, 10 000 people took part in a demonstration against the 
bill.  The law came into force following the signature of the President of the Republic, on 23 June. 

The adoption of this law led to: 

- on 22 June 2021, a statement made at the margins of the General Affairs Council meeting, co-
signed by 18 Member States, regarding the adoption of the Hungarian Bill,82  

- on 23 June, the Commission President, in an unprecedented, historical move in relation to the 
defence of LGBTIQ rights in the EU, issued a strong statement “on the new Hungarian bill that 
discriminates against people based on their sexual orientation” stating that “this Hungarian bill is a 
shame. I have instructed the responsible commissioners to send a letter to express our legal concerns 
before the bill enters into force. This bill clearly discriminates against people based on their sexual 
orientation. It goes against the fundamental values of the European Union. Human dignity, equality 
and respect for human rights. We will not compromise on these principles. I have said it before: I 
believe in a European Union where you are free to be who you are and love whomever you want. I 
believe in a Europe which embraces diversity. I will use all the powers of the Commission to ensure 
that the rights of all EU citizens are guaranteed. Whoever they are and where ever they live within the 
European Union.”83 A letter was also sent by Commissioners for Justice and for the Internal Market to 
the Hungarian Minister of Justice on the non-compliance of the draft law with several EU legal 
provisions, including Article 2 TEU on respect for human rights, freedom and non-discrimination.84 

- 24 June 2021, the European Council discussed, probably for the first time in its history, LGBTIQ 
rights in a Member State.85 A letter signed by 17 heads of state or government during the European 
Council meeting, which vowed to ‘continue fighting against discrimination towards the LGBTI 
community’.86 

81   https://telex.hu/english/2021/06/23/hungary-anti-lgbt-law-sexual-minorities-portrayal-promotion-paedophilia-
https://helsinki.hu/en/wp-

viktor-orban-ursula-von-der-leyen 
content/uploads/sites/2/2021/06/unofficial_translation_LGBT_amendments.pdf 

and 

82   https://wilmes.belgium.be/en/thirteen-countries-unite-belgiums-initiative-defend-lgbtiq-rights-europe; 

also 
the  world  of  sports  showed  solidarity  with  the  LGBTIQ  community  during  the  Euro  2020  football  games  and 
Formula 1 races.    

83   https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_21_3164  
84   letter available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_21_3164 
85   among  many  other  articles  on 

the  harsh  discussions  before  and  during 

the  meeting,  see 

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/respect-lgbt-rights-or-leave-eu-hungarys-orban-told-2021-06-25/  
86   https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/20971670/lgtbi-day-euco-letter-001.pdf, the Austrian PM signed after 

the letter was released. 

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On the same day, also the Secretary General of the UN ‘No discrimination is acceptable in any 
circumstances, and any discrimination against LGBTIQ+ people is totally unacceptable in our modern 
societies’.87   

- on 8 July 2021, the EP adopted a resolution on Breaches of EU law and of the rights of LGBTIQ 
citizens in Hungary as a result of the legal changes adopted by the Hungarian Parliament”;88 

- on 15 July 2021, the Commission decided to take legal action against Hungary89 1) for banning 
access to content that portrays homosexuality for individuals under 18 and sent a letter of formal 
notice for violating EU law in a number of ways,90 and 2) for imposing on 19 January 2021 a Disclaimer 
on the children book “What a family”, due to its LGBTIQ content.91 

- on 24 July 2021, 30 000 persons took part in the Gay Pride in Budapest,92 

- the Hungarian government representatives rejected the criticism and announced a ‘national 
consultation’ on various issues including the Russian-style LGBTIQ law. A referendum was also called 
by the Prime Minister, to be held sometime late 2021-early 2022, on 5 questions related to the newly 
adopted legislation. In the meantime, the media regulator published guidelines for broadcasters to 
comply with new LGBT laws, relegating some films portraying homosexuality or gender identity 
issues to the same age group restrictions as gory horror movies.93 

6.5.  Anti-semitism 

On the occasion of the 2017 billboard campaign against migration targeting Soros, the Federation of 
Hungarian Jewish Federations (Mazsihisz) urged Orban to halt the campaign stating that “this 
campaign, while not openly anti-Semitic, clearly has the potential to ignite uncontrolled emotions, 
including anti-Semitism.”94 

Recently, an article by a Fidesz-appointed museum chair comparing Soros to Hitler and Europe to a 
gas chamber raised protests, leading the author to apologise - while keeping his post.95 

87   https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/secretary-general%E2%80%99s-press-encounter-charles-michel-president-

of-the-european-council  

88   https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2021-0362_EN.html 

;  the  EP  already  mentioned 
Hungary in the resolution of 18 December 2019 on public discrimination and hate speech against LGBTI people, 
including LGBTI-free zones : https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2019-0101_EN.html 

89   https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_3668  
90   the Audiovisual  Media  Services  Directive (AVMSD),  the e-commerce  Directive,  the  Single  Market  Transparency 
Directive, the Treaty principles of the freedom to provide services (Article 56 TFEU) and the free movement of 
goods (Article 34 TFEU), the right to data protection laid down in the GDPR and Art. 8 Charter, human dignity, 
freedom  of  expression  and  information,  the  right  to  respect  of  private  life  as  well  as  the  right  to  non-
discrimination as enshrined respectively in Articles 1, 7, 11 and 21 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; the 
values laid down in Article 2 TEU. 

91   The Commission underlined that the measure restricts the right to freedom of expression and the right to non-
discrimination as enshrined in Articles 11 and 21 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and breaches the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive. On 7 July Hungarian authorities imposed a fine of €700 on the distributor of the 
children's  book  “What  a  family”,  see  https://www.euronews.com/2021/07/07/hungary-fines-publisher-700-for-
lgbt-rainbow-families-children-s-book . 

92   https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-gay-pride-parade-2021-lgbtq-budapest-viktor-orban/  
93   https://www.openlynews.com/i/?id=3186036a-e99f-4484-bf23-b83be64d1017  
94   https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-soros-idUSKBN19W0XU  
95   https://www.dw.com/en/rising-anti-semitism-in-hungary-worries-jewish-groups/a-55978374  

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While there are few cases of violence against Jews in Hungary, a survey commissioned by the 
Federation of Hungarian Jewish Communities revealed that one in five Hungarians are strongly anti-
Semitic, while another 16% were what the survey called moderately anti-Semitic.96 

Also Pope Francis recently warned about lurking anti-Semitism while visiting Hungary. 97 

6.6.  Rights of the Child 

The FRA annual report 2021 recalls that in its concluding observations on Hungary, the United 
Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child called on the government to act, adopt a strategy, and 
provide information and support to vulnerable children, including specific measures targeting girls, 
Roma children, asylum-seeking and migrant children and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and 
intersex children. 

6.7.  Disabilities 

The FRA annual report underlines that the CRPD Committee found in its report of September 2020 
that Hungary systematically violates rights of persons with disabilities in various ways e.g. placement 
under guardianship, persistent prevalence of institutionalisation, lack of access to housing, barriers to 
access inclusive education, limited provision of health care.98 

96   https://www.euractiv.com/section/non-discrimination/news/in-hungary-pope-says-anti-semitism-fuse-must-

not-be-allowed-to-burn/  

97   https://www.politico.eu/article/pope-francis-anti-semitism-hungary-trip-viktor-orban/  
98   see 

http://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2fPPRiCAqhKb7yhsmg8z0DXeL2x2%2f
DmZ9jKJskcOPORsTebSnOJ4Cd0WGYL2TRl9Mj9TFm8%2b6vdTpXIiWRi4jazyDcI1TkNMlxua0imYcblMrwFj9gXp
UkX%2bH%2bv  

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  COVID-19 MEASURES 

Hungary has faced the Covid-19 emergency by declaring a ‘state of danger’ and a ‘state of public 
health emergency (also referred to as ‘state of medical crisis’).  

A state of danger was declared and in force between March and June 2020 and was then substituted 
by a state of public health emergency, which was renewed every 6 months and will last until 
December 2021; the state of danger was then declared again in November 2020. In February 2021, 
the government terminated the state of danger and on the same day, declared it again and is 
currently still in place. According to the Constitution, the government may issue decrees that may 
establish derogations from provisions of Acts of Parliament, that suspend or restrict the exercising of 
fundamental rights;, such decrees can remain in force only for 15 days, after which Parliament must 
give consent to extend their effect. All together three ‘authorisation acts’ were adopted parallel to 
the declaration of the state of danger in March and November 2020, as well as in February 2021, that 
automatically extended the force of these special decrees first indefinitely, then to certain lengthy 
periods of time.99 

Serious concerns were expressed by international institutions, Council of Europe bodies, EU 
institutions, NGOs and academics. The Commission states in the 2021 RoL report that ‘Concerns over 
the current rules on the ‘state of danger’ and emergency measures remain. Despite a country-specific 
recommendation in the context of the 2020 European Semester, 100 interference with business 
activities and the stability of the regulatory environment continued, and some emergency measures 
raise questions as regards their necessity and proportionality’. 

The main concerns expressed by the above actors focused on the following issues:  
1) the fact that the state of danger may only be declared and terminated by the Government, without 
Parliamentary approval  
2) the first ‘authorisation act’ extended the length of the validity of decrees adopted under the state 
of danger - which according to the Fundamental Law is 15 days, after which the Parliament has to 
agree to their extension - to a longer period and without a termination date;  
2) the same act authorised the government to go beyond the issues listed in the Disaster 
Management Act and allow the suspension of the application of any Act of Parliament, the 
derogation from the provisions of Acts and the adoption of other extraordinary measures by means 
of a decree in many other areas. 
3) Only between March-June 2020, over 150 special decrees were adopted by the government, some 
of which violated EU law according to NGOs. Furthermore, while the second authorisation act 
foresees a sunset clause of 90 days, the third authorisation act is set to be amended for the second 
time to extend the force of special decrees until the end of 2021. There is a lack of swift constitutional 
review of the emergency regime. The overlap of the two emergency regimes creates uncertainty in 
relation to the applicable constitutional standards for reviewing the specific government decrees.  

The Commission reports also that the Constitution was amended to limit the powers of future 
governments as regards the state of danger regime by increasing parliamentary oversight and 
reducing the special legal orders from six to three - but also underlines that this was done without 

99   for  a  recent  and  clear  explanation  of  the  emergency  regimes  and  measures  in  Hungary,  see    Overview  of 
Hungary’s  Emergency  regimes  introduced  due  to  the  Covid-19  pandemic,  Update  of  15  September  2021, 
https://helsinki.hu/en/wp-
content/uploads/sites/2/2021/09/HHC_Hungary_emergency_measures_overview_15092021.pdf  

100  see Council Recommendation of 20 July 2020 on the 2020 National Reform Programme of Hungary and delivering 
a Council opinion on the 2020 Convergence Programme of Hungary: “4. Ensure that any emergency measures be 
strictly proportionate, limited in time and in line with European and international standards and do not interfere with 
business activities and the stability of the regulatory environment. Ensure effective involvement of social partners and 
stakeholders in the policy-making process. Improve competition in public procurement.” 

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public consultation and that the Venice Commission expressed concerns. These changes will only 
come into effect in 2023.101 The Government has furthermore declared on 10 March 2016 a state of 
crisis due to mass immigration in accordance with Chapter IX/A of Act LXXX of 2007 on the Right of 
Asylum, which is still in force.  

101  see  footnotes  183  and  184  of  the  RoL  report  on  HU  :  ‘the  Venice  Commission  noted  with  concern  that  the 
amendments  were  adopted  during  a  state  of  emergency,  without  any  public  consultation,  and  the  explanatory 
memorandum consists of only three pages; the Venice Commission stressed that this speed and the lack of meaningful 
public  consultations  are  particularly  worrisome  when  they  concern  constitutional  amendments  and  it  recalls  its 
previous warning against an ‘instrumental attitude’ of Hungary’s governing majority towards the Fundamental Law, 
which  should  not  be  seen  as  a  political  instrument  (Opinion  on  the  constitutional  amendments  adopted  by  the 
Hungarian parliament in December 2020 (CDL(2021)028), paras. 83 and 84)’ and ‘The Venice Commission highlighted 
that the impact of several provisions is difficult to assess without knowing the legislative changes that may be adopted 
following such provisions. It concluded that the Ninth Amendment mainly leaves the specification of most details to 
Cardinal  Acts, which  could  eventually  raise  some  serious questions regarding  the scope of  the  powers  of the  State 
during  states  of  exception  (Opinion  on  the  constitutional  amendments  adopted  by  the  Hungarian  Parliament  in 
December 2020 (CDL(2021)028), recommendation f).’ 

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  OTHER ISSUES 

8.1.  Academic freedom 

On 4 April 2017 Hungary swiftly adopted a law amending a law on higher education reforming the 
licensing regime applicable to foreign higher education institutions, a modification that critics 
described as an effort to push the Central European University out of Hungary. Following an action 
by the EU Commission for violation of the GATS and the freedom of establishment, the free 
movement of services and the provisions of the Charter relating to academic freedom, the freedom to 
found higher education institutions and the freedom to conduct a business, the EUCJ effectively 
stated that the new conditions introduced by Hungary are incompatible with EU law (6 October 
2020, Judgment in Case C-66/18 Commission v Hungary).102 

On 27 April, new legislation was adopted to restructure the administration and management of 11 
primary state universities and put them under the control of foundations, together with cultural 
institutions and other state assets, hereby putting them under the control of the ruling elite.103 

After expelling the foreign university CEU, plans to install a Chinese University in Budapest emerged, 
leading the population in the streets for demonstrations and the government to allow for a 
referendum on the issue to be held. 104 

8.2.  Asylum and migration 

As illustrated by the Submission by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee and Menedék Association for 
Migrants For the third cycle of the UPR of Hungary on the rights of migrants, ‘the Government’s 
response to the refugee challenge of the summer of 2015 was a complex set of legislative and 
physical changes, coupled with a strong anti-migrant narrative’,105 that included racist, xenophobic 
and hate contents.106 

After the 2016 termination or shortening of state-funded integration support, extrajudicial collective 
expulsions of unlawfully staying third-country nationals were legalised, while the lodging of asylum 
applications was limited to the two land-border transit zones located at the Hungarian-Serbian 
border.  

From 2017, with the exception of unaccompanied children under the age of 14, all asylum-seekers 
were to be kept in the transit zones until a final decision in their asylum procedure (against which 

102  https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2020-10/cp200125en.pdf  
103  https://globalriskinsights.com/2021/08/fidesz-managed-foundations-assume-control-of-hungarys-higher-

and 
education-system/ 
controversial-model-will-be-hungarys-locomotives/  

https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/orban-universities-with-

104  for more information on academic freedom issues in Hungary, see  the Franet report on Legal environment and 
in  Hungary  January,2021, 

space  of  civil  society  organisations 
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/franet_hungary_civic_space_2021.pdf    

in  supporting 

fundamental 

rights 

105  for  an  analysis  of 

the  asylum  and  migration  policies 

content/uploads/2021/03/HHC_Menedek_UPR2021_Hungary_Migrants_web.pdf 
https://helsinki.hu/wp-
content/uploads/2021/03/HHC_Menedek_UPR2021_Hungary_Migrants_annex_matrix.pdf  
106  https://www.dw.com/en/viktor-orbans-most-controversial-migration-comments/g-42086054 

recently 
see 
https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/20220/hungarys-slow-descent-into-xenophobia-racism-and-

https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/32900/hungarys-orban-proposes-to-ban-migrants-for-two-years; 
also 
human-rights-abuses  

and 

in  Hungary,  see  https://helsinki.hu/wp-
annex 

and 

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no remedy is available) is delivered. Rejected applicants were kept indefinitely in such metal 
container camps pending their removal.  

In July 2018, providing assistance to asylum-seekers was criminalised and a criterion based on 
which almost all asylum-seekers are to be rejected was introduced.  

In April 2020, the CJEU found in cases C-715/17, C-718/17 and C-719/17, that Poland, Hungary and 
Czechia breached EU law by refusing to comply with the temporary mechanism for the relocation of 
applicants for international protection. 

In May 2020, a judgment by the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that placement in the 
transit zones under the framework introduced in 2017 qualifies as unlawful detention.107  

The transit zones were closed and in June 2020, a new asylum system was introduced whereby 
asylum applications can only be lodged after a declaration of intent is approved by the asylum 
authority. Declarations of intent can only be lodged at the Hungarian embassy in Kyiv or Belgrade.  

In October 2020, the European Commission opened infringement proceedings against Hungary due 
to this new requirement for applicants to undergo a ‘pre-procedure’. 

On 17 December 2020, the EUCJ ruled (in Judgment in Case C-808/18 Commission v Hungary) that 
‘Hungary has failed to fulfil its obligations under EU law in the area of procedures for granting 
international protection and returning illegally staying third-country nationals In particular, restricting 
access to the international protection procedure, unlawfully detaining applicants for that protection 
in transit zones and moving illegally staying third-country nationals to a border area, without 
observing the guarantees surrounding a return procedure, constitute infringements of EU law’. In 
particular, the CJEU found that the Hungarian law and practice of “escorting” apprehended migrants 
in an irregular situation back to the outer side of the border fence with Serbia, without issuing a 
return decision and respecting other safeguards, is in breach of the Return Directive (Directive 
2008/115/EC). Restricting access to asylum and unlawfully detaining applicants in transit zones 
constitute infringements of EU asylum acquis. Forcibly escorting apprehended migrants in an 
irregular situation back to the outer side of a border fence, to a strip of land devoid of any 
infrastructure, is equivalent to ‘removal’ within the meaning of the Return Directive. Such individuals 
must be subject of a return procedure that complies with the safeguards under the directive. 108 

In June 2021, the European Commission sent a letter of formal notice to Hungary, asking the country 
to implement the December 2020 Court of Justice judgment on asylum procedures. This 
judgment had, among other things, convinced Frontex to suspend its activities in Hungary. The 
Commission believed that Hungary has not taken the necessary measures to comply with the 
judgment, in particular as regards the violation of the relevant provisions of the Asylum Procedures, 
Reception Conditions and Return Directives. Between 5 July 2016 (the entry into force of the 
legalization of push-backs which was found to be in breach of EU law by the December 2020 
judgment) and 23 September 2021, over 100 000 push-backs took place according to official Police 
statistics.109 On the same day, the Commission sent another letter of formal notice and a reasoned 
opinion to the Hungarian authorities asking them to confirm that Hungary had notified the full 
transposition of the 2013 Asylum Procedures Directive. 

107  14 May 2020, FMS and Others [GC] (C-924/19 PPU and C-925/19 PPU), CJEU also reconfirms that judicial review of 
detention measures and of return decisions must always be available, in accordance with Article 47 of the Charter. 

108  https://www.statewatch.org/media/1636/eu-cjeu-com-v-hungary-migration-asylum-pr-17-12-20.pdf  
109  http://www.police.hu/hirek-es-informaciok/hatarinfo/illegalis-migracio-alakulasa  

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8.3.  Level of implementation of the GRECO 2nd Interim Compliance 

Report of Fourth Evaluation Round on Hungary 

17.11.2020 
https://rm.coe.int/fourth-evaluation-round-corruption-prevention-in-respect-of-members-
of/1680a062e9 

Corruption prevention in respect of members of parliament 
GRECO recommended:  
- (i) to ensure that all legislative proposals are processed with an adequate level of transparency and 
consultation and, (ii) that rules be introduced for members of parliament on how to interact with 
lobbyists and other third parties seeking to influence the parliamentary process; (recommendation i)  
- that a code of ethics/conduct for members of parliament be adopted, including in respect of their 
staff as appropriate – covering various situations of conflicts of interest (gifts and other advantages, 
third party contacts, lobbyists, accessory activities, post-employment situations, etc.) and that it be 
complemented by practical measures for its implementation, such as dedicated training and 
counselling; (recommendation ii)  
- that a requirement of ad hoc disclosure be introduced for members of parliament for situations of 
personal conflicts of interest which may emerge during the parliamentary proceedings and that rules 
for such situations be developed; (recommendation iii)  
- to ensure (i) that the obligation upon members of parliament to disclose outside occupations and 
activities of a non-financial character are applied in practice; and (ii) that all declarations as submitted 
follow a format, which allows for adequate public scrutiny over time, preferably by using electronic 
means; (recommendation iv)  
- that appropriate measures be taken in order to ensure that the procedures of lifting the immunity of 
parliamentarians do not hamper criminal investigations in respect of members of parliament 
suspected of having committed corruption related offences; (recommendation v) 
GRECO concludes that recommendations i-v remain not implemented. 

Recommendation vi  
GRECO recommended that appropriate measures be taken to ensure effective supervision and 
enforcement of the existing and yet to be established rules on the conduct, conflicts of interest and 
interest declarations of members of parliament and that adequate and proportionate sanctions be 
introduced to that end. 
GRECO concludes that recommendation vi has been partly implemented. 

Corruption prevention in respect of judges  
Recommendation viii  
GRECO recommended that the powers of the President of the National Judicial Office to intervene in 
the process of appointing and promoting candidates for judicial positions be reviewed in favour of a 
procedure where the National Judicial Council is given a stronger role. 
GRECO concludes that recommendation viii remains not implemented. 

Recommendation x 23. GRECO recommended that the power of the President of the National Judicial 
Office to re-assign ordinary judges without their consent be reduced to a minimum in time and only 
for precise and particular reasons of a temporary character. 
GRECO concludes that recommendation x remains not implemented.  

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Recommendation xii 29. GRECO recommended that the immunity of ordinary judges be limited to 
activities relating to their participation in the administration of justice (”functional immunity”). 
GRECO concludes that recommendation xii remains not implemented. 

Corruption prevention in respect of prosecutors  
Recommendation xiv.  
GRECO recommended that i) the possibility to re-elect the Prosecutor General be re-considered and 
ii) the possibility to maintain the Prosecutor General in office after the expiry of his/her mandate by a 
minority blocking of the election in Parliament of a successor be reviewed by the Hungarian 
authorities. 
GRECO concludes that recommendation xiv remains partly implemented. 

Recommendation xv.  
GRECO recommended that the removal of cases from subordinate prosecutors be guided by strict 
criteria and that such decisions are to be justified in writing. 
GRECO concludes that recommendation xv remains partly implemented. 

Recommendation xvi.  
GRECO recommended that the immunity of public prosecutors be limited to activities relating to their 
participation in the administration of justice (”functional immunity”) 
GRECO concludes that recommendation xvi remains not implemented.  

Recommendation xvii.  
GRECO recommended that disciplinary proceedings in respect of prosecutors be handled outside the 
immediate hierarchical structure of the Prosecution Service and in a way that provides for enhanced 
accountability and transparency. 
GRECO concludes that recommendation xvii remains partly implemented. 

‘In view of the foregoing, GRECO concludes that Hungary has still only implemented satisfactorily 
or dealt in a satisfactory manner five of the eighteen recommendations contained in the Fourth 
Round Evaluation Report. With the exception of a step forward in respect of the implementation 
recommendation vi, leading to the conclusion that this recommendation has been partly 
implemented, Hungary remains at the same level of implementation as in the previous Interim 
Compliance Report. 
... 
GRECO concludes that the overall low level of compliance with the recommendations  
remains "globally unsatisfactory" in the meaning of Rule 31 revised, paragraph 8.3  
of the Rules of Procedure. 

Pursuant to Rule 32 2. (i) of the Rules of Procedure, GRECO requests the Head of the  
Hungarian delegation to provide a report on the progress in implementing the  
pending recommendations (i.e. recommendations i to vi, viii, x, xii and xiv to xvii) as  
soon as possible, but at the latest by 30 September 2021.’ 

PE 698.540 

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IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs 

42 

PE 698.540 

 
 
 
 
 
This Study examines the situation of Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights in Hungary 
and how Article 2 TEU values are respected and implemented in the country.  

PE 698.540 
PDF 

ISBN 978-92-846-8555-4 | doi: 10.2861/940622 | QA-09-21-401-EN-N