REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL on the main findings of the review of Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 of 19 December 2022, in view of the general situation of the gas supply to the Union.
Date: 2023-09-28
Institutions: Directorate-General for Energy, European Commission
Subjects: EU energy policy, cross-border cooperation, energy cooperation, energy crisis, energy market, gas supply, natural gas, purchase, security of supply

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 28.9.2023  COM(2023) 547 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL on the main findings of the review of Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 of 19 December 2022, in view of the general situation of the gas supply to the Union.  
 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY   

Better coordination of gas purchases (Chapter II) 

Pursuant to the Regulation, the Commission designed and launched, with the assistance of 
a  service  provider,  the  joint  purchasing  mechanism,  entitled  AggregateEU  with  the 
following results as of 14 July 2023:   

Status 
Subscriptions 
(total) 
Demand aggregated  

Supply bids  
Demand matched  

First round 
April/May 2023 

Second round 
June/July 2023 

Cumulative results 

Closed 
120 

Closed 
154  

[Ongoing] 
- 

11.6 billion cubic 
metres (bcm) 
18.7 bcm 
10.9 bcm 

15.9 bcm 

27.5 bcm 

15.2 bcm 
12 bcm 

33.9 bcm 
22.9 bcm 

The Commission  also  implemented accompanying measures mandated by the Regulation 
including  on  transparency  and  information  exchange,  governance  of  the  EU  Energy 
Platform and mandatory use of AggregateEU.  

The  Commission  believes  that  the  EU  Energy  Platform  contributed  to  the  Union’s 
diversification  effort  and  storage  filling  ahead  of  the  2023-2024  heating  season. 
AggregateEU  provided  additional  opportunity  for  European  buyers  to  procure  gas  from 
reliable  suppliers  at  competitive  prices  as  well  as  market  transparency  on  demand  and 
supply, whilst contributing to decreasing volatility of markets.  

The  fact  that  the  total  volumes  aggregated  during  the  two  first  rounds  alone  doubled 
mandatory  demand  aggregation,  showed  that  market  players  considered  the  joint 
purchasing mechanism to be very useful in the crisis context.  

Measures to enhance the use of LNG facilities, gas storage facilities and pipelines 
(Chapter II – Section 3) 

The Regulation contains provisions to enhance transparency and facilitate secondary trade 
in LNG and gas storage capacities, enabling the efficient use of LNG and storage facilities 
as  well  as  pipelines  (e.g.  due  to  congestion).  Increased  transparency  provided  a  more 
comprehensive  overview  of  the  LNG  and  storage  markets  in  the  EU,  as  well  as  a  more 
efficient use of these infrastructures. 

Measures to prevent excessive gas prices and excessive intra-day volatility in energy 
derivatives markets (Chapter III) 

On  trading,  the  Regulation  includes  a  measure  to  manage  excess  volatility  in  gas  and 

EN 

1 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
electricity  derivatives  markets,  while  preserving  the  price  formation  processes.  The 
temporary  intra-day  price  spike  collar,  a  volatility  management  mechanism,  aimed  at 
avoiding  excessive  price  volatility  and  prevent  extreme  price  spikes  in  prices  on  energy 
derivative  market,  protecting  EU  energy  operators  from  large  intra-day  upward  price 
movements and helping them secure their energy supply in the medium term.  

Since its adoption, markets developments did not require its triggering to prevent extreme 
price spikes. In this context, further monitoring of energy commodity markets is needed to 
determine  whether  a  temporary  prolongation  of  the  intra-day  volatility  management 
mechanisms  (IVM)  is  needed,  given  the  existence  of  uncertainties  in  those  markets 
following an energy crisis and also in light of the tightness of global markets, as seen in the 
summer of 2023. 

Measures for the case of a gas emergency (Chapter IV)  

The Regulation temporarily complemented the Gas Security of Supply Regulation1, notably 
by  making  the  solidarity  mechanism  applicable  by  default  in  absence  of  bilateral 
agreements,  as  well  as  by  extending  the  solidarity  mechanism  to  liquified  natural  gas 
(LNG) and critical gas volumes (CGV) for electricity. In addition, a provision was added to 
facilitate  demand  reduction  by  protected  customers,  as  well  as  a  provision  to  safeguard 
cross-border flows. 

In  December  2022,  the  Commission  carried  out  a  joint  solidarity  ‘dry  run’  exercise  with 
EU  Member  States  and  the  European  Network  of  Transmission  System  Operators 
(ENTSOG),  which  tested  the  emergency  rules  and  procedures,  as  well  as  the  solidarity 
mechanism. 

The  Commission  concludes  that  the  concepts  set  out  in  this  chapter  have  proven  to  be 
useful  concepts  in  the  context  of  mitigating  gas  crisis  and  for  ongoing  or  future  demand 
reduction efforts. 

1  

Regulation  (EU)  2017/1938  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  25  October  2017 
concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 

EN 

2 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 

In response to the global energy market disruptions caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, 
the  European  Union  (EU)  adopted  the  REPowerEU  Plan  to  save  energy,  produce  clean 
energy and diversify its energy supplies with a view to increase Europe’s strategic resilience 
and make it less dependent on Russian gas imports.  

In  April  2022,  at  the  behest  of  the  European  Council,  the  Commission  launched  the  EU 
Energy Platform under the REPowerEU Plan, with three objectives: (1) demand aggregation 
and  the  joint  purchasing  of  gas,  (2)  the  most  efficient  use  of  existing  infrastructure,  (3) 
international outreach. 

Since  the  start  of  the  war,  the  situation  in  the  gas  market  has  progressively  deteriorated. 
Russia’s weaponisation of gas supply to Europe tightened the market and led to  a dramatic 
increase  in  gas  prices.  The  wholesale  price  in  2022  was  on  average  over  five  times  higher 
than  its  pre-crisis  level,  even  spiking  above  EUR  300/MWh  at  the  height  of  the  crisis  in 
summer 20222. 

This is why, on 19 December 2022, the Council adopted emergency Council Regulation (EU) 
2022/2576 to enhance solidarity through better coordination of gas purchases, reliable price 
benchmarks and exchanges of gas across borders (the Regulation). 

This Regulation provides a temporary legal basis for: 

- 
- 

- 

better coordination of gas purchases (Chapter II), 
measures  to  prevent  excessive  gas  prices  and  excessive  intra-day  volatility  in  energy 
derivatives markets (Chapter III), 
measures for the case of a gas emergency (Chapter IV). 

Article 30 of the Regulation states that ‘by 1 October 2023, the Commission shall carry out a 
review of this Regulation in view of the general situation of the gas supply to the Union and 
shall  present  a  report  on  the  main  findings  of  that  review  to  the  Council.  The  Commission 
may, based on that report, propose to prolong the validity of this Regulation.’ 

In accordance with the above, this report describes how the Commission has implemented the 
Regulation  and gives  an overview of the main findings and resulting  conclusions about  the 
Regulation’s provisions.  

2 

This holds true for both TTF (Title Transfer Facility) futures (front-month) or TTF spot (day-ahead). 

EN 

3 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF CHAPTER II (BETTER COORDINATION OF GAS PURCHASES) 

The  Commission  has  implemented  the  coordination  of  gas  purchases  (i)  by  establishing  a 
mechanism  to  report  gas  contracts  and  tenders  in  order  to  make  the  gas  markets  more 
transparent, and (ii) by organising demand aggregation, tendering, matching and establishing 
a mechanism for joint purchasing of gas (the joint purchasing mechanism). In the report, the 
Commission presents the results and data available on 14 July 2023, covering the tenders and 
contracts notified until that date as well as the results of the first two demand aggregation and 
tendering  rounds  of  the  joint  purchasing  mechanism  organised  with  the  support  of 
AggregateEU3.  

The coordination of gas demand aggregation and tendering will continue until the Regulation 
expires.  

Review of Section 1 – Coordination of gas purchases in the Union (Articles 3 and 4)  

1.  Transparency and information exchange (Article 3 of the Regulation)  

The energy crisis exposed the EU’s dependency on Russian fossil fuels  and the detrimental 
impact  of  the  lack  of  coordinated  action  by  EU  Member  States  faced  with  Russia’s 
weaponisation  of  gas  supply,  which  led  to  high  prices  and  a  security  of  supply  crisis.  To 
lower  the  EU’s  dependency  on  Russian  natural  gas  supplies  and  bring  prices  down,  better 
coordination of gas purchases from external suppliers was considered crucial. Article 3 of the 
Regulation4  therefore  aims  to  ensure  better  coordination  of  gas  purchases  in  the  EU  and 
energy  solidarity  among  EU  Member  States.  This  should  be  achieved  by  giving  the 
Commission an overview of upcoming tenders or contracts for the sale and purchase of gas. 
To  this  end,  natural  gas  companies  or  companies  that  use  gas  are  required  to  send 
notifications to the Commission of any upcoming tenders or contracts whose volume exceeds 
5 TWh/year.  

As per Article 3(2) of the Regulation, if the Commission considers that further coordination 
with regards to the tenders or the contracts is needed (for example if tenders or contracts may 
adversely affect market functioning, security of supply, or solidarity or could benefit the joint 
purchasing  mechanism),  the  Commission  may  issue  recommendations  to  such  companies 
after informing the EU Energy Platform ad hoc Steering Board.  

3  

4  

AggregateEU is the demand aggregation and joint purchasing mechanism operated by Prisma, the service 
provider under the EU Energy Platform, in accordance with Council Regulation 2022/2576. 
Article  3  provides  that:  '1.  For  the  sole  purpose  of  better  coordination,  natural  gas  undertakings  or 
undertakings consuming gas established in the Union or authorities of Member States, which intend to 
launch  a  tender  to  purchase  gas  or  open  the  negotiations  with  natural  gas  producers  or  suppliers  from 
third countries on the purchase of gas, of a volume above 5 TWh/year, shall inform the Commission and 
where  applicable  the  Member  State  in  which  those undertakings  are  established  of  the  conclusion of  a 
gas supply contract or a memorandum of understanding or the launch of a tender to purchase gas'. 

EN 

4 

  EN 

 
 
 
Statistics on Article 3 notifications and recommendations 

On 14 July 2023 

Number  

Notifications received, resulting in: 

recommendations issued 
no recommendation needed 
pending assessment  

22 
2 
20 
0 

Volume for 
deliveries in 2023 
(terawatt hours 
(TWh)) 
89.2 
11.05 
78.15 
0 

Volume for 
deliveries in 2024 
(TWh) 

Volume for 
deliveries in 2025 
(TWh) 

189.6 
25.5 
164.1 
0 

197.9 
25.5 
172.4 
0 

The Commission arranged for multiple equally acceptable and secured channels for securely 
submitting the notifications, envisaged in Article 3 of the Regulation. This allowed to address 
companies’ concerns about security and confidentiality, whilst informing EU Member States 
in compliance with confidentiality requirements.  

Main findings: Overall, the Commission considers that the implementation of Article 3 led to 
greater transparency of planned tenders and contracts for the sale and purchase of gas insofar 
as it provided the Commission with a better view of upcoming tenders.  

The only notifications that triggered recommendations under Article 3 of the Regulation were 
notifications  of  companies  planning  to  launch  a  tender.  A  number  of  challenges  were 
encountered  with  the  implementation  of  the  Regulation:  certain  commercial  arrangements 
were  notified  after  the  fact,  and  companies  were  reluctant  to  share  commercially  sensitive 
information. Parts of the industry also questioned the Regulation’s interpretation, notably on 
the timing of notifications during ongoing negotiations. 

The Commission cannot accurately assess how many notifications were not submitted despite 
falling  under  the  requirements  of  Article  3.  This  is  because  access  to  datasets  on  signed 
commercial arrangements is either restricted or incomplete. 

Conclusion:  The  principle  of  an  obligation  to  notify  tenders  or  contracts  for  the  sale  and 
purchase of gas has become a new way of increasing transparency and preventing outbidding. 
Notifications of contracts have proved more problematic because the pre-contractual stage is 
a very sensitive one for companies.  

The  provision  has  proven  easier  to  implement  for  notifications  of  tenders  in  advance  as 
opposed 
tenders, 
recommendations  issued by the Commission  appear to  be more relevant  when addressed  to 
companies planning tenders that could go through AggregateEU.  

to  contracts.  Also,  considering  AggregateEU  operates 

through 

Another lesson learned is that broader access for the Commission to a wider dataset on signed 
commercial arrangements (through aggregated and anonymised data) should, in turn, lead to 
better  enforcement  of  the  obligation  to  notify  contracts  and  tenders,  and  more  thorough 
assessment of the impact of individual tenders or contracts. 

EN 

5 

  EN 

 
 
 
2.  Ad hoc Steering Board (Article 4 of the Regulation)  

The  Commission  established  an  ad  hoc  Steering  Board  by  Commission  Decision  of  13 
January  2023  (C(2023)407  final5).  The  ad  hoc  Steering  Board  adopted  its  Rules  of 
Procedures on 16 February 2023 and had held six meetings by 14 July 2023.  

The  ad  hoc  Steering  Board  is  chaired  by  Executive  Vice-President  Maroš  Šefčovič  and  its 
members  are  high-level  representatives  appointed  by  Member  State  authorities.  The 
Secretariat  of  the  Energy  Community  participates  as  an  observer  and  Energy  Community 
Contracting Parties participate in meetings on matters of mutual concern on invitation.  

The  ad  hoc  Steering  Board  was  established  to  facilitate  the  coordination  of  the  joint 
purchasing mechanism, in  particular  demand aggregation.  The Commission is  also required 
to consult the ad hoc Steering Board on its draft recommendations pursuant to Article 3(2), 
and  to  inform  it  of  the  effect  of  the  participation  of  the  companies  in  question  in  the  joint 
purchasing mechanism. 

Main findings: The Commission considers that the ad hoc Steering Board fully performed its 
task  of  facilitating  the  coordination  of  the  joint  purchasing  mechanism  at  national  level, 
including demand aggregation. Members and observers of the ad hoc Steering Board played 
an instrumental role in maintaining strong and continued political support for the EU Energy 
Platform,  promoting  the  joint  purchasing  mechanism,  and  giving  information  to  their 
respective national institutions and the companies concerned. National roundtables organised 
by  the  members  of  the  ad  hoc  Steering  Board  were  instrumental  in  mobilising  the  demand 
side  and  coordinating  the  participation  of  gas-  and  energy-intensive  industries.  They  have 
also  actively  engaged  with  national  financial  institutions  (national  promotional  banks  and 
export credit agencies) to look into how to obtain and secure guarantees for buyers who are 
not sufficiently creditworthy. 

Members and observers of the ad hoc Steering Board regularly discussed all key aspects of 
the  EU  Energy  Platform,  shared  best  practices,  and  provided  valuable  feedback  on  matters 
related  to  the  implementation  of  the  joint  purchasing  mechanism.  EU  Member  States  also 
discussed the application of the Regulation, in particular mandatory demand aggregation.  

Ad hoc Steering Board members were also consulted on draft recommendations issued with 
regard to Article 3 of the Regulation (see previous section above for more details). However, 
the  feedback  received  was  rather  limited  and  only  applied  to  a  limited  number  of 
recommendations. 

Conclusion: The operation of the ad hoc Steering Board was instrumental for the successful 
implementation  of  the  joint  purchasing  mechanism.  It  ensured  stronger  buy-in  by  EU 
Member States and the broad participation of industry. 

5  

The  Commission  Decision  can  be  consulted  at:  EUR-Lex  -  32023D0208(02)  -  EN  -  EUR-Lex 
(europa.eu). 

EN 

6 

  EN 

 
 
 
Review of Section 2 – Demand aggregation and joint purchasing (Articles 5 to 11 of the 
Regulation) 

3.  Demand aggregation and joint purchasing (Articles 5 to 8 of the Regulation)  

i.  AggregateEU: selecting the service provider  

The Commission designed and implemented the joint purchasing mechanism with the help of 
PRISMA  European  Capacity  Platform  GmbH,  selected  as  a  service  provider  in  accordance 
with the Regulation.  

Main  findings:  The  Commission  considers  that  the  provisions  of  the  Regulation  on  the 
selection  and  contracting  of  the  service  provider  enabled  the  appointment  of  a  qualified 
service provider to design, develop, operate and maintain AggregateEU.  

Under the guidance of, and through continuous cooperation with, the Commission acting as 
contracting authority, PRISMA launched AggregateEU in time for the filling of EU storage 
in preparation for the 2023/2024 heating season.    

In  under  3  months,  PRISMA  designed,  developed  and  rolled  out  –  by  leveraging  existing 
capabilities  and  tools  for  pipeline  capacity  allocation  –  the  joint  purchasing  mechanism  in 
line with the provisions of the tender specification and the objectives of the Regulation. The 
Regulation did not explicitly indicate how to implement the joint purchasing mechanism, but 
the Commission and PRISMA took care of the following aspects so far: 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

They set up the AggregateEU mechanism based on the Commission’s design and under 
its guidance. 
They  registered  participants  on  the  PRISMA  platform  in  line  with  industry  standards 
and processed  the subscription  to  AggregateEU, in  line  with  the exclusion criteria  set 
out in Articles 8 and 9 of the Regulation. By 14 July 2023, over 150 companies were 
registered on AggregateEU. 
They  organised  rounds  of  demand  aggregation  where  companies  could  set  their 
demands  out  in  detail,  including  all  the  information  required  on  volumes,  timing  and 
delivery points - see table under point iii (AggregateEU: initial results). 
They  collected  a  supply  of  bids  from  sellers  and  matched  the  most  competitive  bids 
with  aggregated  demand,  allocating  bids  pro  rata  in  case  of  under-supply  -  see  table 
under point iii (AggregateEU: initial results). 
They  collected  information  on  the  negotiation  status  and  contracting  of  matched 
positions between buyers and sellers. 

To bring the operation of AggregateEU into line with business practices and standards, and to 
ensure  industry’s  broad  acceptance  of  it,  the  mechanism  has  been  developed  in  close 
cooperation with industry and stakeholders represented in the Industry Advisory Group. This 
informal expert group, made up of 27 EU companies and 11 observers experienced in trading 
gas on global markets, was the main forum for industry to get involved, and it proved to be 
very  useful  in  bringing  an  industrial  perspective  to  the  discussions  of  the  services  to  be 
developed under AggregateEU. 

EN 

7 

  EN 

 
PRISMA’s  involvement,  managing  one  of  Europe’s  leading  gas  capacity  trading  platforms, 
played  a  significant  part  in  ensuring  the  credibility  of  the  joint  purchasing  mechanism  and 
getting  the  trust  and  confidence  of  industrial  actors  in  the  process,  especially  regarding  the 
protection of commercial secrets.  

Conclusion:  The  service  provider’s  support  was  instrumental  for  the  Commission’s 
successful implementation of the joint purchasing mechanism in an adequate timeframe.  

However,  when  looking  at  the  implementation  of  the  service  from  the  perspective  of  the 
Regulation, it would have made more sense for its provisions on the selection criteria to have 
prioritised the description of the services over the IT tool’s technical requirements.  

ii.  Designing AggregateEU 

The main  aim of the design  of AggregateEU was to  enable the aggregation of demand, the 
organisation  of  tendering  round  vis  a  vis  international  gas  suppliers,  and  the  matching  of 
demand with suppliers’ bids.  

The  Commission  and  the  service  provider  implemented  AggregateEU  by  organising 
tendering rounds, each of which followed the steps below:  

Main  findings:  During  the  period  assessed,  larger  companies  were  generally  more  willing 
than smaller ones  to  participate in  AggregateEU. A  total  of over 150  companies of various 
sizes and from across the supply chain have subscribed to AggregateEU so far.  

Participants appreciated the degree of flexibility provided by AggregateEU and its seemingly 
non-disruptive  effect  on  market  mechanisms.  In  particular,  they  appreciated  the  types  of 
products  available  (delivery  to  national  balancing  points  or  liquefied  natural  gas  (LNG) 
terminals) and the monthly profile and delivery dates.  

The  option  to  offer  and  then  withdraw  demand,  and  the  possibility  of  engaging  in 
negotiations with matched counterparts on terms other than those submitted on AggregateEU 
were  also  appreciated  by  some  participants.  Conversely,  other  market  players  and  some 
national  authorities  requested  that  AggregateEU  enable  more  binding  demand  from  buyers 
and offers from suppliers instead of its current voluntary nature.  

EN 

8 

  EN 

 
 
After  the  first  tendering  round,  some  participants  requested  adaptations  to  better  fit  their 
consumption  patterns.  The  regulatory  framework’s  flexibility  and  design  enabled  the 
Commission  to  partially  address  these  requests  and  further  improve  the  functioning  of 
AggregateEU by modifying and updating features between tendering rounds. For example, in 
response  to  requests  from  some  energy-intensive  industry  participants,  the  latest  delivery 
dates in the second tendering round were extended to 20 months, i.e. until March 2025.   

However, the lack of a strong legal basis for the reporting of contracts by participants resulted 
in overall limited feedback about contracts being concluded.  

Finally, the geographical limitation for participation in AggregateEU on the buyer side  was 
problematic for certain  large corporate  organisations relying on subsidiaries incorporated  in 
the United Kingdom, Switzerland or the European Economic Area.  

Conclusion: Overall, as confirmed by the good level of participation of buyers and sellers in 
the  joint  purchasing  mechanism  and  the  results  of  the  first  two  rounds,  participants  were 
mostly  appreciative  of  AggregateEU’s  design,  of  the  services  it  offered  and  of  the 
Commission’s and the service provider’s responsiveness to their requests. Most EU Member 
States  also  expressed  their  appreciation  at  the  EU  Energy  Platform  ad  hoc  Steering  Board 
meeting,  as  did  industry  in  various  exchanges  (including  at  Industry  Advisory  Group 
meetings).  

Reporting by participants on the results of the negotiation and contracting stages could have 
been more detailed. This would have most likely helped to better measure the effectiveness 
and success of AggregateEU. 

iii.  AggregateEU: Initial results  

By  14  July  2023,  the  Commission  had  launched  two  tendering  rounds  with  the  following 
results:  

First round 
April/May 2023 

Second round 
June/July 2023 

Cumulative 
results 

Closed 
120 

Closed 
154  

- 
154 

Status 
Subscriptions 
(total) 

Demand aggregated   11.6 billion cubic 

15.9 bcm 

27.5 bcm 

Supply bids  
Demand matched  

metres (bcm) 
18.7 bcm 
10.9 bcm 

15.2 bcm 
12 bcm 

33.9 bcm 
22.9 bcm 

Further tendering rounds are expected to be launched by the end of 2023. 

Main findings: In accordance with Article 8 of the Regulation,  the participation in the joint 
purchasing mechanism through AggregateEU on the buyer side was available to  companies 
established  in  the  EU  and  the  Energy  Community  Contracting  Parties.  Participation  on  the 
seller side was open to all  companies. For both buyers and sellers,  companies linked to the 

EN 

9 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
Russian Federation or subject to EU restrictive measures adopted in light of Russia’s actions 
in Ukraine were excluded.  

A  total  of  154  companies  were  subscribed  to  AggregateEU  on  14  July  2023.  This  number 
includes  companies  established  in  the  EU  and  companies  established  in  the  Energy 
Community Contracting Parties, notably from Ukraine, Moldova and Serbia, which showed 
significant  interest  in  AggregateEU  and  were  active  and  well  represented  in  the  tendering 
rounds. Most companies were gas and trading companies. However, industrial end users were 
also represented.  

The results of the first two tendering rounds  alone, which aggregated 27.5 bcm of demand, 
exceeded mandatory demand aggregation laid down in the Regulation (13.5 bcm).  

Suppliers have also actively engaged with 33.9 bcm offered in the first two rounds, resulting 
in a significant oversupply. 

The joint purchasing mechanism aimed to create new market and business opportunities for 
buyers and suppliers in  Europe.  In the crisis  context, it has  provided market  players  with  a 
tool of finding and entering into contractual relations with potentially new counterparts, and 
of procuring gas on competitive conditions regardless of their size and consumption patterns. 

Feedback on the joint purchasing mechanism is still open. There are indications from some 
EU  Member  States  and  market  players  that  the  joint  purchasing  mechanism  contributed  to 
strengthening the security of supply, and that in a few instances it may have contributed to 
keeping  prices  down  and  help  reduced  market  volatility.  The  joint  purchasing  mechanism 
also  seems  to  have  contributed  to  increasing  market  transparency  (through  offer  and  price 
discovery). However, some EU Member States and market players have been more cautious 
regarding the value added of the mechanism. 

The joint purchasing mechanism was designed to particularly benefit gas-intensive industries 
and smaller end users, enabling them to secure gas supplies at competitive prices by dealing 
directly with producers and exporters operating on the wholesale and LNG markets.  

A few buyers have reported that the joint purchasing mechanism helped lower their gas prices 
under  their  existing  contracts  concluded  outside  AggregateEU.  Several  contracts  have  also 
been  concluded  as  a  result  of  the  matching  done  on  AggregateEU.  This  is  proof  that 
suppliers’ offers on  AggregateEU  were price-competitive. At the same time,  some industry 
players have indicated that price quotes received were above or equal to the market price and 
that  no  new  sources  of  supply  were  attracted  compared  to  those  already  known  to 
participants.  

Conclusion:  AggregateEU  triggered  interest  from  many  market  participants,  as  attested  by 
the aggregated and offered volumes. The first two tendering rounds were organised between 
April and July 2023, when the situation on the market stabilised compared to summer 2022. 
The  fact  that  the  total  volumes  aggregated  during  the  first  two  rounds  alone  doubled 
mandatory  demand  aggregation  showed  that  market  players  considered  the  demand 
aggregation for gas to be very useful in the crisis context. This is an indication that market 
actors may be interested in having a similar mechanism operated on a voluntary basis.  

EN 

10 

  EN 

 
4. 

Financial aspects (Article 8(3) of the Regulation) 

In  accordance  with  Article  8(3)  of  the  Regulation,  the  Commission  assessed  the  need  for 
liquidity support, including guarantees, for AggregateEU participants, and organised outreach 
activities in a bid to secure such support. The activities focused on (i) defining the needs of 
all concerned and the financial products to best serve these needs and (ii) creating a network 
of public financial institutions willing to provide such products. 

For example, guarantees in the form of a standard letter of credit, mainly serve the needs of 
smaller  gas  companies  in  enabling  them  to  address  creditworthiness  issues,  and  of  energy-
intensive  companies,  which  had  no  prior  experience  of  operating  on  the  global  gas  market 
and had no established relations with suppliers. Guarantees play an important role in ensuring 
that all companies engaging on AggregateEU, regardless of their profiles and the areas they 
operate in, can get the most out of joint purchasing mechanism.  

The  outreach  organised  at  political  and  expert  level  consisted  of  numerous  multilateral  and 
bilateral meetings and calls on specific topics organised with European financial institutions, 
national  promotional  banks  and  institutions  and  their  various  associations,  such  as  the 
European Long-Term Investors Association and the Berne Union, as well as discussions on 
specific topics at workshops and meetings of regional groups in the EU Member States. 

EU Energy Platform ad hoc Steering Board members played an important role by helping the 
Commission  to  assess  the  needs  for  guarantees  of  the  European  companies  established  on 
their  territories  that  were  active  on  AggregateEU,  and  helping  in  outreaching  to  national 
financial institutions.   

The network was composed as follows.  

On 14 July 2023 

Public financial institutions  

International financial institutions  

Number  
8 
1 

National promotional banks  

Export credit agencies  

3 

4 

Names 
- 

European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development6  
BGK (Poland) 
Finnvera (Finland)  
Instituto de Crédito Oficial (Spain) 
Eksfin (Norway) 
Exim Banca Românească (Romania) 
Exim Banca Slovakia (Slovakia) 
SACE (Italy) 

This  way,  AggregateEU  was  able  to  provide  information  about  the  financial  products 
available to the parties concerned based on the Commission’s assessment.  

Main  findings:  The  network  provided  good  geographical  coverage,  thanks  especially  to  the 
involvement of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and Eksfin able to 
provide guarantees for natural gas for companies established in many countries. Some public 
financial institutions  were unable  to  provide  guarantees on account  of their decarbonisation 

6  

The  list  of  EBRD’s  countries  of  operations  can  be  consulted  at  https://www.ebrd.com/where-we-
are.html. 

EN 

11 

  EN 

 
 
mandates, and/or suggested creating a sovereign Commission or European Investment Bank 
guarantee. Some also said there was a lack of interest from buyers.  

Conclusion:  It  would  be  worthwhile  considering  how  further  efforts  to  provide  tailored, 
affordable  financial  support7  in  the  form  of  guarantees  and  other  instruments  can  be 
envisaged. This could ensure more active participation of smaller gas companies and energy-
intensive  industry  in  the  joint  purchasing  mechanism,  as  these  should  be  the  main 
beneficiaries of the EU Energy Platform. 

5.  Natural gas supplies excluded from joint purchasing (Article 9 of the Regulation) 

The Commission implemented Article 9 of the Regulation by requiring the companies active 
on AggregateEU to sign a Declaration of Honour8 on their compliance with the exclusion of 
natural gas originating from the Russian Federation.  

Main  findings:  Participants  asked  questions  about  the  definition  of  ownership  and  control9. 
The Commission also had some technical and practical limitations in assessing the origin of 
natural  gas  matched  on  AggregateEU.  The  Commission  and  PRISMA  ensured  compliance 
through  the  Declaration  of  Honour  and  complementary  checks  when  necessary  (such  as 
checking counterparties and LNG tracking). 

Conclusion: The Commission will continue to do its utmost to check gas origins and monitor 
the exclusion of natural gas from the Russian Federation – using the Declaration of Honour 
and, when necessary, through further checks.  

6.  Mandatory use of AggregateEU (Article 10 of the Regulation)  

Based on the information  available on 14 July  2023,  19 EU  Member States are believed to 
have fulfilled their demand aggregation obligations under Article 10(2) of the Regulation. For 
many of them, the demand aggregated in the first two rounds alone exceeded by two, or even 
more, times their mandatory demand aggregation volumes.  

7  

8  

9  

at 

be 

can 

relevant 

consulted 

https://aggregateeu.prisma-

When financial support, be it in the form of guarantees or other, constitutes State aid, it will be subject to 
State aid control pursuant to articles 107 and 108 TFEU. 
template 
The 
capacity.eu/support/solutions/articles/36000429400-how-to-fill-out-the-declaration-of-honor-. 
Article 8 (Participation in the demand aggregation and joint purchasing) states that:  
'1.  Participation  in  the  demand  aggregation  and  joint  purchasing  shall  be  open  and  transparent  to  all 
natural  gas  undertakings  and  undertakings  consuming  gas  established  in  the  Union  regardless  of  the 
volume  requested.  Natural  gas  undertakings  and  undertakings  consuming  gas  shall  be  precluded  from 
participating as suppliers, producers and purchasers in demand aggregation and joint purchasing, if they 
are: 
(a)  targeted  by  Union  restrictive  measures  adopted  pursuant  to  Article  215  TFEU,  in  particular  Union 
restrictive  measures  adopted  in  view  of  Russia’s  actions  destabilising  the  situation  in  Ukraine,  or  in 
respect of actions undermining or  
threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine; 
(b) directly or indirectly owned or controlled by, or acting on behalf or at the direction of natural or legal 
persons, entities or bodies targeted by such Union restrictive measures; or 
c)  directly  or  indirectly  owned  or  controlled  by,  or  acting  on  behalf  or  at  the  direction  of  the  Russian 
Federation or its Government or by any Russian natural or legal person or entity or body established in 
Russia.' 

EN 

12 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
Main findings: Given the novelty of the joint purchasing mechanism, the demand aggregation 
obligation was a good way of mobilising demand in some EU Member States.   

Some EU Member States, not having the adequate monitoring and enforcement tools, had to 
rely exclusively on the Commission’s assessment, which could only be indicative in nature.  

Conclusion: Mandatory demand aggregation helped to mobilise demand in some EU Member 
States. In others, a strong interest in participating in AggregateEU led to the aggregation of 
significant volumes, well above mandatory levels.  

Effective enforcement of the provision may have required a clearer obligation to be placed on 
EU  Member  States  to  take  appropriate  actions,  such  as  adopting  binding  instruments  to 
ensure compliance with the required demand aggregation level while taking into account the 
need to avoid putting an unnecessary administrative burden, notably on Member States with 
limited gas consumption. 

7.  Gas purchasing consortium (Article 11 of the Regulation) 

Article 11  of  the  Regulation  provides  that  companies  may  ‘coordinate  elements  of  the 
conditions of the purchase contract’ in line with competition rules.  

No gas purchasing consortium was created, possibly because of the complexity involved and 
the  time  constraints  created  by  the  necessity  of  launching  the  joint  purchasing  mechanism 
before the start of the gas filling season.  

Instead, in consultation with national authorities and market players, the Commission decided 
to  put  forward  two  models  of  cooperation,  the  ‘agent-on-behalf10’  model  and  the  ‘central 
buyer11’ model, to facilitate the participation of European companies in the joint purchasing 
mechanism.  

These  two  models  could  be  particularly  useful  for  companies  that  cannot  reach  the  volume 
threshold when submitting their demand, do not have expertise in  negotiating gas purchase 
contracts  on  the  global  market  (e.g.  the  energy-intensive  industry),  or  do  not  have  the 
necessary liquefied natural gas (LNG) regasification or storage capacities.  

On 14 July  2023, 16 companies  interested in  providing services  as  agent-on-behalf,  and 11 
interested in providing them as central buyer, were listed on AggregateEU.  

The Regulation states that ‘the pass-through of lower prices would be an important indicator 
for the success of joint purchasing, as it is crucial for consumers’. The Commission therefore 
asked the companies offering central buyer services to charge their customers for the services 
they offer but pass on the costs of the commodity itself.  

Main  findings:  Article  11  of  the  Regulation  was  conceived  as  a  supporting  tool  during  an 
emergency  and  was  sufficient  for  the  Commission  to  facilitate  the  process  of  creating 

10   Whereby  buyers  would  get  another  company  to  act  as  an  agent  providing  services  (for  example,  the 

reservation of a slot on an LNG terminal).  

11   Whereby several buyers would ask another company to act on their behalf as a buyer and purchase gas 

for them. 

EN 

13 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
consortia (although none were created) and developing other company cooperation models in 
compliance with EU competition rules. Company cooperation can provide an opportunity for 
smaller and inexperienced companies to more effectively and to greater advantage pool their 
demands,  access  global  gas  markets,  including  suppliers  of  LNG,  and  secure  supplies  at 
competitive  prices.  This  tallies  with  the  limited  feedback  received  from  a  few  industrial 
players  suggesting  that  these  cooperation  models  could  very  well  have  increased  their 
participation on AggregateEU. 

However,  because  of  the  limited  experience  to  date  it  is  not  possible  to  draw  any  broad 
conclusions on the full application of these models.  

Conclusion: In a crisis context, the Commission believes that all existing cooperation models 
mentioned  above  could  present  viable  options.  This  has  been  supported  by  some  industrial 
actors pointing to the fact that these cooperation models could  help increase the benefits of 
the joint purchasing mechanism. However, outside the context of an emergency situation, it is 
the  normal  functioning  of  the  European  gas  market,  driven  by  competition,  which  should 
determine  whether  and  how  companies  may  want  to  cooperate  for  the  purchase  of  gas  and 
within the limits of the EU competition rules. 

EN 

14 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
 
Review of Section 3 – Measures to enhance the use of LNG facilities, gas storage 
facilities and pipelines (Articles 12 to 14 of the Regulation) 

The Regulation contains provisions to enhance transparency and facilitate secondary trade in 
LNG and gas storage capacities. The arrangements to make it more transparent are similar to 
those for transporting natural gas using pipelines and they make a significant contribution to 
optimising the use of LNG and storage capacities in the EU. 

8. 

Secondary  capacity  booking  platform  for  LNG  facility  users  and  gas  storage 
facility users (Article 12 of the Regulation) 

Main  findings:  Secondary  capacity  booking  platforms  have  been  established  by  individual 
storage and LNG operators and are now up and running. Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE) has 
a  repository  of  links  to  secondary  capacity  booking  platforms  offered  by  infrastructure 
operators.  

Secondary  booking  enables  more  effective  allocation  of  capacities  not  used  on  primary 
markets. Additional transparency in this area enables market participants to find options more 
easily for capacity use across infrastructure in the EU market, in particular if high volumes of 
LNG are being imported into the EU.  

Conclusion:  Similar  provisions  have  been  included  under  Article  10  of  the  revised  Gas 
Regulation  (Regulation  (EC)  No  2009/715)  (Hydrogen  and  Decarbonised  Gas  Markets 
Package) proposed in December 2021 by the Commission and currently under negotiation by 
the co-legislators. 

9.  Transparency platforms for LNG facilities and gas storage facilities (Article 13 of 

the Regulation) 

Main findings: GIE operates two main platforms covering all EU Member States as well as 
the  United  Kingdom  and  Ukraine:  the  Aggregated  Gas  Storage  Inventory  (AGSI)  for  gas 
storage and the Aggregated LNG Storage Inventory (ALSI) for LNG.  

Following  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Regulation,  new  components  were  added  to  these 
platforms,  including  information  on  services  offered  and  the  conditions  that  apply  to  those 
services,  contracted  and  available  storage  and  LNG  facility  capacities,  tariffs,  etc.  The 
platforms currently cover almost all EU large-scale LNG terminals (with only 5 LNG system 
operators not on the platforms) and 98% of EU storage facilities (with only 3 storage system 
operators not on the platforms).  

Greater transparency makes for a better and more comprehensive overview of the LNG and 
storage  markets  in  the  EU.  It  also  results  in  more  efficient  use  of  these  infrastructures. 
Greater  transparency  on  the  EU  LNG  market  also  creates  potential  to  attract  additional 
suppliers. 

Conclusion:  Similar  provisions  have  been  included  under  Article  31  of  the  revised  Gas 
Regulation  2009/715  (Hydrogen  and  Decarbonised  Gas  Markets  Package)  proposed  in 
December 2021 by the Commission and currently under negotiation by the co-legislators.  

EN 

15 

  EN 

 
 
10.  More effective use of transmission capacities (Article 14 of the Regulation)  

Article 14 of the Regulation aims to improve the use of transportation capacities in view of 
changes  in  the  direction  of  gas  flows  in  the  EU.  The  existing  Congestion  Management 
Procedures  Guidelines  set  out  ‘use-it-or-lose-it’  (UIOLI)  procedures.  However,  those 
procedures  apply  only  to  congested  interconnection  points  and  were  designed  for  the  very 
short term or the very long term.  

Article 14 envisages applying UIOLI procedures to all interconnection points, whether or not 
they  are  congested.  There  are  two  basic  possibilities  for  applying  Article  14:  (i)  by 
implementing a new monthly UIOLI procedure set out in the Regulation, or (ii) by extending 
existing UIOLI procedures to all interconnectors, not only congested ones.  

Main  findings:  No EU Member States opted for the new monthly  UIOLI procedure, opting 
instead for the procedures envisaged in the Congestion Management Procedures Guidelines, 
as allowed by the Regulation.  

Conclusions: The impact of the application of Article 14 to gas transmission will be assessed 
using the parameter of transmission capacities booked by means of UIOLI procedures by the 
end of 2024 at the latest. This will make it possible to determine how often UIOLI procedures 
have been implemented and how useful they have been. 

EN 

16 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF CHAPTER III (MEASURES TO PREVENT EXCESSIVE GAS PRICES 
AND EXCESSIVE INTRA-DAY VOLATILITY IN ENERGY DERIVATIVES 
MARKETS) 

Review of Section 1 – Gas solidarity for electricity supply, essential industries and 
protected customers (Articles 15 to 22) 

1.  Temporary  intra-day  tool  for  managing  excess  volatility  in  energy  derivatives 

markets (Articles 15 to 17 of the Regulation) 

Articles  15  to  17  of  the  Regulation  require  trading  venues  on  which  energy-related 
derivatives  (derivatives  whose  underlying  asset  is  gas  or  electricity)  are  traded  to  set  up 
temporary intra-day volatility management mechanisms (IVMs). This measure aims to shield 
market  participants  from  acute  levels  of  volatility  in  such  markets,  by  requiring  that  the 
mechanisms set up by the trading venues prevent high price movements within a trading day. 

To cater for the diversity of instruments traded and the various levels of liquidity of energy 
derivatives  markets,  the  Regulation  only  sets  out  basic  parameters  for  the  functioning  of 
IVMs,  and  requires  that  they  be  adapted  to  the  characteristics  of  each  contract  and  trading 
venue. The Regulation also allows IVMs to be implemented by trading venues by integrating 
them into existing circuit breakers instead of creating an additional mechanism. 

On  30  June  2023,  and  in  accordance  with  the  mandate  given  to  it  in  Article  17  of  the 
Regulation,  the  European  Securities  and  Markets  Authority  (ESMA)  published  a  report 
documenting  potential  divergences  in  the  implementation  of  IVMs  by  trading  venues  and 
evaluating the measure’s effectiveness12. 

Main  findings:  In  its  report,  ESMA  notes  that  the  IVMs  implemented  generally  seemed 
adequately calibrated, with the caveat of the assessment’s having been done at a time when 
there was no evidence of protracted volatility episodes affecting trading in energy commodity 
derivatives.  The  measures  set  out  in  Articles  15  to  17  of  the  Regulation  applied  to  17 
trading13  venues.  ESMA’s  findings  refer  to  some  diversity  in  how  trading  venues 
implemented  IVMs,  due  to  the  characteristics  of  each  trading  venue  and  contract.  The 
divergences related in particular to: 

• 

12  

13  

the choice of the ‘reference price’, the low level of liquidity of some contracts on some 
trading  venues,  with  the  result  that  they  used  prices  on  other  venues  as  a  proxy  for 
defining the reference price; 

The  report  can  be  consulted  at:  https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2023-06/ESMA70-156-
6509_Final_Report_Intra-day_Volatility_Management_Mechanism.pdf. 
Capman AD (Belgium), 42 Financial Services (Czechia), European Energy Exchange (Germany – both 
the  regulated  market  and  the organised  trading  facility),  MEFF  Power  (Spain),  CIMD  SV  SA  (Spain), 
Tradition  Espana  (Spain),  Griffin  Markets  Europe  (France),  TPICAP  EU  (France),  Tradition  Paris 
(France), Hellenic Energy Exchange (Greece), Hungarian Derivative Energy Exchange (Hungary), Marx 
Spectron  Europe  (Ireland),  Borsa  Italiana  SPA  –  IDEM  (Italy),  ICE  Endex  Markets  BV  (the 
Netherlands), Nasdaq Oslo ASA (Norway) and OMIP – Polo Portugues SGMR SA (Portugal).    

EN 

17 

  EN 

 
 
• 

• 

the frequency of renewal of the reference price and price boundaries, with low liquidity 
leading to longer intervals between such renewals;  
the breadth of the ‘price corridor’, with large boundaries ill-suited to illiquid contracts. 

Overall, ESMA’s assessment is that these divergences can be justified and that the IVM has 
been appropriately implemented by trading venues. However, ESMA also points out that the 
IVM  is  unsuited  to  illiquid  contracts,  for  which  the  difficulties  implementing  it  seem  to 
outweigh any potential benefit. ESMA reports that only one trading venue has had its IVMs 
triggered  since  their  implementation  and  that  this  was  most  likely  because  of  erroneous 
orders. Given the limited volatility of markets for energy-related derivatives over this period, 
it seems that the IVMs were adequately calibrated by trading venues.  

On  the  mechanism’s  efficiency,  ESMA  notes  that,  given  the  absence  of  evidence  of 
protracted  volatility  episodes  affecting  energy  commodity  derivatives  during  the  period  in 
question14,  it  has  ‘a  limited  basis  to  provide  an  assessment  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  IVM, 
neither on potential positive nor negative effects’. In any event, it considers that episodes of 
high volatility in 2022 were linked to stress affecting fundamentals of the gas and electricity 
market,  and  to  Russia’s  weaponisation  of  natural  gas  supplies  to  Europe,  rather  than  by  a 
form  of disorderly  trading that the  IVM  –  and circuit breakers in  general  – are designed to 
solve. 

Lastly, ESMA notes that the IVM’s compatibility with existing obligations regarding circuit 
breakers, as well as its implementation by several trading venues by adapting existing circuit 
breakers, indicate that its objective could be achieved under existing provisions of the Market 
in  Financial  Instruments  Directive  (MiFID),  and  that  the  objective  to  be  achieved  did  not 
warrant the creation of a second layer of circuit breakers. 

ESMA’s report is based on data collected for the period between February and May 2023, a 
period characterised by a decrease in gas market volatility to extremely low levels. However, 
episodes of significant intra-day volatility on financial gas markets, in particular in the Title 
Transfer  Facility,  have  been  observed  in  the  summer,  first  in  early  June  and  then  again  in 
August, often with price variations of over 10% in the same day (reaching 20% or more on a 
few occasions).  

This suggests that, while the gas balance has significantly improved since 2022 and the EU 
has  been  able  to  successfully  replace  a  large  amount  of  gas  previously  supplied  by  Russia, 
there still remain elements  of fragility in the energy markets.  Risks such as, for example,  a 
complete and sudden cessation of the remaining Russian gas imports, infrastructure incidents, 
unfavourable  weather  conditions  or  a  significant  increase  in  gas  demand  globally  may 
unsettle  markets  and  potentially  trigger  episodes  of  excessively  high  intra-day  volatility. 
Significant volatility may also emerge as a consequence of market players reacting to news 
about potential supply shortages (even when such shortages do not eventually materialise).  

14  

The underlying information was collected in two iterations between February and May 2023. 

EN 

18 

  EN 

 
 
In  the  aftermath  of  an  energy  crisis,  where  a  return  to  the  previous  status  quo  in  energy 
supply  is  not  an  immediate  possibility,  and  with  the  EU  dependent  on  LNG  supplies,  it  is 
critical to ensure the stability of the energy financial markets, by avoiding excessive volatility 
in  prices.  It  is  currently  uncertain  whether  volatility  episodes  (which  increased  during  the 
summer of 2023) will reappear in the coming months. ESMA notes that, due to the lack of 
protracted  volatility  during  the  period  under  scrutiny,  it  had  a  limited  basis  to  provide  an 
assessment  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  IVM  in  terms  of  either  its  potential  positive,  or  its 
negative, effects.  

Conclusion: The intra-day volatility mechanism may help to limit dramatic price fluctuations 
and smoothen price patterns in highly volatile markets.  It may also have an indirect market 
disciplinary effect.   

Nevertheless, ESMA did not find grounds to make the IVM a permanent feature of the EU 
legal framework, although its assessment was carried out during a period of lack of protracted 
volatility.  ESMA  considers  that  the  appropriate  implementation  and  application  of  the 
existing circuit breakers under MiFID II, considering the lessons learnt from using the IVM, 
could  achieve  the  objective  of  limiting  excessive  intra-day  price  volatility  without 
introducing  a  second  layer  of  circuit  breakers  in  the  form  of  IVMs.  The  recent  political 
agreement  on the review of MiFID/Market  in  Financial  Instruments Regulation  should also 
be  considered.  Further  monitoring  of  the  energy  commodity  markets  and  the  impact  of  the 
IVM  in  the  next  few  months  may  be  beneficial  for  Member  States  in  order  to  take  a  more 
informed view on the need for a temporary prolongation of the IVM. Going forward, as noted 
by  the  European  Securities  and  Markets  Authority15,  the  tense  situation  in  the  gas  market 
gives rise to specific risks and vulnerabilities in the markets for gas-related derivatives, which 
could 'amplify market moves' and 'price pressure on derivatives'. The analysis of these risks 
'requires further work to  address  data  gaps and data  fragmentation'. The Commission will 
keep Member States informed of the work on this topic.  

2.  LNG price assessment and benchmark (Articles 18 to 22 of the Regulation) 

Article  18  of  the  Regulation  requires  the  Agency  for  Cooperation  of  Energy  Regulators 
(ACER) to produce and publish every day: 

• 
• 

an LNG price assessment, starting no later than 13 January 2023; and 
a daily LNG benchmark as of 31 March 2023. 

The LNG price assessment and benchmark were enacted to bring much needed transparency 
to  the  market.  Indeed,  the  absence  of  a  reliable  indicator  of  the  price  at  which  the  EU 
Member  States  were  purchasing  LNG  on  international  markets  reportedly  led  to  their 
competing to secure gas supplies during last year’s crisis. This may subsequently have played 
a significant part in putting upward pressure on prices. From the start, this was intended as a 
permanent measure to be included at the earliest opportunity in the Regulation on Wholesale 

15  

European  Securities  and  Markets  Authority,  'TRV  Risk  Analysis:  EU  natural  gas  derivatives  markets: 
risks and trends', 12 May 2023. 

EN 

19 

  EN 

 
 
Energy  Market  Integrity  and  Transparency  (REMIT),  as  it  was  considered  necessary  in  the 
context of a structural change in the importance of LNG for the EU gas supply, triggered by 
the  weaponisation  of  Russian  pipeline  gas.  However,  the  2022  energy  crisis  showed  how 
urgently  was  needed  a  transparency  tool  that  would  reflect  objectively  the  price  at  which 
LNG  cargos  were  arriving  in  Europe.  In  this  context,  the  measure  was  included  in  the 
Regulation,  with  a  clear  indication  that  it  would  be  included  as  a  permanent  measure  in 
REMIT (as evidenced by Recital 57 of the Regulation). 

Main findings: Since its implementation, the LNG price assessment has provided the market 
with  greater 
transparency,  based  on  mandatory  objective  reporting  and  reflecting 
international gas prices. Since its publication, the prices of benchmarks of natural gas in the 
EU  (the  Title  Transfer  Facility)  have  progressively  fallen  into  line  with  the  LNG  price 
assessment.  To  ensure  it  remains  reliable  and  objective,  the  Regulation  has  given  ACER 
specific powers for collecting and processing the required market data. ACER now regularly 
publishes the following price assessments: 

• 
• 
• 

Northwest Europe;  
South Europe; and 
EU LNG price. 

The LNG benchmark further strengthened this transparency by providing a spread of the EU 
LNG price to the month-ahead Title Transfer Facility settlement price, the most used futures 
contract  in  the  EU  and  widely  acknowledged  as  the  most  representative  proxy  for  EU  gas 
prices. 

With the effective price at which LNG enters the EU made more transparent, market players 
in  EU  Member  States  are  better  informed  of  market  prices  and  EU  Member  States  can 
coordinate  themselves  better  in  securing  LNG  supplies  in  a  spirit  of  solidarity,  thereby 
avoiding undue pressure being put on the market. 

On  14  March  2023,  the  Commission  adopted  a  proposal  to  amend  the  Regulation  on 
Wholesale Energy Market Integrity and Transparency (REMIT). The proposal includes both 
the LNG price assessment and benchmark. However, the final adoption and entry into force 
of the revised REMIT is expected to occur after the current Regulation expires.  

Conclusion: The Commission believes it would be very important that the relevant adopted 
measures on a temporary basis are extended to maintain the increased transparency of LNG 
import pricing, and to preserve a level playing field between EU Member States in a spirit of 
solidarity, whilst also supporting Member States in ensuring a stable supply to meet the EU’s 
energy needs. This is why similar permanent measures are included in the REMIT proposal. 

EN 

20 

  EN 

 
REVIEW OF CHAPTER IV (MEASURES FOR THE CASE OF A GAS 
EMERGENCY) 

1.  Default solidarity rules (Articles 23 and 26 to 28 of the Regulation) 

To  further  strengthen  solidarity  measures16  in  case  of  a  severe  gas  supply  shortage  and  to 
remedy  the  lack  of  bilateral  solidarity  agreements  between  EU  Member  States,  the 
Regulation sets default solidarity rules applicable in the absence of bilateral agreements. The 
default  solidarity  rules  extend  the  solidarity  obligation  to  critical  gas  volumes  needed  to 
ensure the electricity system’s adequacy, thereby preventing an electricity crisis. EU Member 
States with LNG facilities would now also be required to provide solidarity. 

The  default  rules  are  based  on  the  principle  that  solidarity  should  be  provided  against  fair 
compensation, with a maximum compensation consisting of: 

1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 

the price of gas; 
storage and transportation costs;  
litigation costs of judicial procedures for the EU Member State providing the gas; and 
indirect costs not reflected in the price of gas, e.g. compensation for the curtailment of 
industry, limited to 100% of the price of gas. 

The default solidarity rules also address a gap in the solidarity provisions of the Gas Security 
of  Supply  Regulation,  namely  that  requesting  EU  Member  States  do  not  have  to  prioritise 
offers  based  on  market-based  measures  first.  The  Regulation  also  temporarily  extended 
solidarity  protection  to  critical  gas  volumes  for  the  security  of  electricity  supply,  and 
temporarily extended the solidarity obligation to EU Member States with LNG facilities. 

The  solidarity  mechanism  is  only  applied  in  a  severe  emergency,  so  it  cannot  be  tested  in 
reality. However, Chapter IV has been simulated via the ‘dry run exercise’ as outlined in the 
following section. Furthermore, a questionnaire has been circulated in May 2023 to the Gas 
Coordination Group17. 

Main findings: results from the ‘Dry run’ exercise  
To  test  roles  and  responsibilities  in  an  EU-wide  gas  emergency,  as  well  as  to  test  the 
solidarity  provisions  adopted  under  the  Gas  Security  of  Supply  Regulation  and  the 
Regulation, the Commission conducted a joint ‘dry run’ exercise with  EU Member States, 
transmission system operators and the European Network of Transmission System Operators 
for Gas (ENTSOG) in December 2022.   

Overall, the exercise confirmed the preparedness of EU Member States, the Commission and 
ENTSOG  for  a  gas  emergency,  and  the  Gas  Security  of  Supply  Regulation  and  the 

16  

17  

Initially  provided  by  Article  13  of  Regulation  (EU)  2017/1938,  setting  out  ‘solidarity’  mechanisms 
applicable  as  a  last  resort  in  a  severe  gas  emergency  and  governed  by  bilateral  solidarity  agreements 
between EU Member States.  
The Gas  Coordination  Group is  a  standing  advisory  group,  coordinating  security  of  supply  measures, 
especially  during  crises.  See:  Register  of  Commission  expert  groups  and  other  similar  entities 
(europa.eu). 

EN 

21 

  EN 

 
 
Regulation constitute an adequate framework for an emergency response, in particular in the 
case of solidarity requests. However, several points requiring follow-up were also identified:   

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Solidarity  provisions  were  recognised  during  the  exercise  as  essential  for  security  of 
supply  if  established  in  advance.  But  only  a  limited  number  of  bilateral  agreements 
have been signed so far (7 out of 40). The complexity of deciding what constitutes fair 
compensation between  EU  Member States  was  considered a barrier to  requesting and 
providing solidarity if not established in advance.  
It  was  identified  that  there  is  no  legal  basis  for  requesting  solidarity  via  pipeline  to  a 
neighbouring EU Member State not directly connected. This possibility is not explicitly 
mentioned in  the Gas  Security of Supply  Regulation,  but  that regulation  does contain 
provisions for when two EU Member States are connected via a third country.   
In  case  an  EU  Member  State  receives  two  solidarity  requests,  the  procedure  for 
allocating  and  prioritising  was  considered  unclear.  If  the  market  does  not  make  it 
possible  to  satisfy  both  requests,  there  are  several  options:  pro  rata  allocation, 
allocation on the basis of the order in which the requests were received (first come first 
served), or allocation depending on the amount received as compensation.   
Several  EU  Member  States  believed  complications  would  arise  from  the  changed 
solidarity  request  submission  time  to  at  least  72  hours  before  the  indicated  delivery 
time,  agreed  in  the  Regulation.  Participants  expressed  the  wish  that  a  24-hour  period 
would be applicable for solidarity provided by means of pipelines, while 72 hours could 
still be relevant for solidarity provided by means of LNG.  
The  legal  basis  for  requesting  and  receiving  LNG  solidarity  requires  further 
clarification, including contractual issues related to diverting cargos and compensating 
third parties, the availability of vessels, the possible mismatch of volumes between the 
solidarity request and the volumes in the vessel in question, and ways of guaranteeing 
payments.  

Conclusion: The Commission’s conclusions are the following.   

• 

• 

• 

The concept of default solidarity rules, in the absence of bilateral agreements, should be 
made permanent.  This  would make the  EU’s security of supply  architecture complete 
on  a  permanent  basis,  while  discharging  EU  Member  States  of  the  obligation  to  sign 
bilateral agreements.  
Given the new energy landscape in the EU, with LNG having become the main supply 
source of gas, the extension of solidarity to LNG is crucial for security of supply. In the 
Regulation  the  same  provisions  apply  to  pipeline  gas  and  LNG,  but  this  no  longer 
reflects reality. The provisions would therefore benefit from being adapted to take into 
consideration the specificity of the LNG market.   
Critical  gas  volumes  are  designed  to  ensure  the  adequacy  of  the  electricity  system  so 
that the gas crisis does not spread to the electricity system. Alternative ways of doing 
this to those proposed in the Regulation could be explored. 

EN 

22 

  EN 

 
 
2.  Non-essential consumption of protected customers (Article 24 of the Regulation) 

Article 2 of the Gas Security of Supply Regulation defines protected customers as household 
consumers connected to the distribution network. EU Member States may also decide to add 
the following consumers to their protected customers, provided they do not jointly represent 
more than 20% of total annual gas consumption:  
1. 
2. 
3. 

small and medium-sized enterprises connected to the distribution grid; 
essential social services;  
district heating installations.  

Member  States  are  required  to  put  stringent  measures  in  place  to  ensure  supply  to  these 
protected customers and to prevent disconnections, even during a gas emergency.  

However, during the energy crisis of 2022, and after the adoption of the Council Regulation 
(EU)  2022/1369  of  5  August  2022  on  coordinated  demand-reduction  measures  for  gas,  the 
importance of all sectors’ voluntary demand reduction increased.  

Therefore, Article 24 of  the Regulation introduced the possibility for  EU Member States to 
take  measures  to  reduce  non-essential  consumption  of  protected  customers,  provided  that 
these  customers  do  not  qualify  as  vulnerable  consumers  as  defined  in  Article  3(3)  of 
Directive 2009/73/EC on common rules for the internal market in natural gas. 

Main findings: On 12 May 2023, the Commission circulated a questionnaire to members of 
the Gas Coordination Group, asking them for feedback on, among other things, the provisions 
related to non-essential consumption of protected customers and on additional safeguards to 
ensure cross-border gas flows. The results were: 

• 

• 

several EU Member States indicated that they considered this more flexible approach to 
the concept of protected customers beneficial, as it could, for example, free up volumes 
for  critical  industries  with  relatively  little  impact  on  households  (by  slightly  reducing 
the thermostat for example); 
some EU Member States indicated that this provision was difficult to apply in practice, 
because it is challenging to monitor non-essential consumption of protected customers 
on a non-annual basis. 

Conclusion:  The  Commission  concludes  that  the  concept  of  non-essential  consumption  of 
protected customers is a useful concept in the context of ongoing or future demand reduction 
efforts.  

3.  Safeguards for cross-border gas flows (Article 25 of the Regulation) 

Article 12(5)a of the Gas Security of Supply Regulation states that EU Member States must 
not unduly restrict cross-border gas flows. However, the procedure for this may take up to a 
week to be concluded, with the result that, in the midst of a crisis, cross-border flows may be 
unduly halted.  

EN 

23 

  EN 

 
 
This  is  why  Article  25  of  the  Regulation  introduced  additional  safeguards  to  ensure  cross-
border  gas  flows,  allowing  the  Commission  to  oblige  the  EU  Member  State  in  question  to 
modify its actions with immediate effect.  

Main  findings:  An  emergency  as  defined  in  Article  12  of  Regulation  (EU)  2017/1938  has 
never  been  declared,  and  the  provision  has  therefore  not  been  tested.  In  the  questionnaire 
mentioned above, the members of the Gas Coordination Group were nevertheless invited to 
give their views on the matter. Their responses can be categorised as follows.  

Consider Article 25 
positively 
10/18 (55%) 

Article 12(5) should already 
be respected 
3/18 (17%) 

Not in favour of new 
safeguards 
5/18 (28%) 

Frequency 

Argumentation  •  Respondents 

•  Article 12(5) 

•  Concerned about the 

appreciated the added 
certainty. 

•  Solidarity is crucial 
during a crisis. 

considered to be 
already legally binding. 
•  Article 12(5) should be 
respected, even without 
additional safeguards. 

possibility of 
maintaining the 
provisions indefinitely. 

•  EU Member States 

should be able to 
defend their position. 

The answers to this questionnaire are a signal that most respondents consider safeguards for 
cross-border gas flows useful, either because they see the usefulness of the new provisions of 
Article 25 of the Regulation, or because they believe that Article 12(5) of the Gas Security of 
Supply Regulation should already be respected at all times. 

Conclusion:  The  Commission  concludes  that  it  is  important  to  seek  to  keep  safeguards  for 
cross-border gas flows, as well as a shorter procedure, to endeavour to guarantee cross-border 
flows during a crisis.  

EN 

24 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General situation of the gas supply to the Union  

CONCLUSION 

Since  the  outbreak  of  the  Russian  invasion  of  Ukraine,  Europe  has  achieved  an 
unprecedented  energy  shift.  Keeping  the  EU’s  gas  market  well  supplied  despite  the  loss  of 
large amounts of the share of flows from Russia (- 70 billion cubic metres (bcm) in 2022) has 
been possible, thanks to increased supplies of LNG (+ 50 bcm in 2022), to pipeline imports 
from  non-Russian  partners,  and  to  gas  demand  reduction  (-  58  bcm  in  2022)  which  has 
facilitated this year’s historically high storage filling, meeting the 90% requirement set by the 
Storage Regulation already in August.18  

This shift was made possible by the successful implementation of measures by the EU and its 
Member States in all key areas of energy policy, including the EU Energy Platform, storage 
filling  policy  at  EU  level,  gas  demand  reduction,  the  reduction  of  electricity  peak  demand, 
faster deployment of renewables, and targeted infrastructure upgrades (+25 bcm of new LNG 
regasification capacity).  

The  gas  balance  situation  has  improved  compared  to  2022,  when  gas  prices  rose  to 
unprecedented levels above EUR 300/MWh. However, the war is not over and gas prices still 
remain higher and more volatile than pre-summer 2021 when Russia started weaponising the 
gas  sector.  With  the  continued  positive  impact  of  2022  policy  measures  related  to  the  EU 
Energy  Platform,  demand  reduction  extended  to  March  2024  and  storage  filling  targets 
reached,  the  outlook  for  the  coming  winter  is  more  positive  overall  than  it  was  for  winter 
2022/2023. That said, significant risks for the security of gas supply to the EU remain, such 
as:  a  complete  and  sudden  cessation  of  Russian  imports,  infrastructure  incidents, 
unfavourable  weather  conditions,  increasing  gas  demand  in  Europe  or  elsewhere  creating 
rivalry  for  LNG  cargos,  greater  use  of  gas  to  generate  electricity  as  a  result  of  droughts  or 
unplanned  nuclear  outages.  These  are  all  risk  factors  that  may,  especially  if  they  were  to 
occur at the same time, tighten the markets and put pressure on prices again.  

In  addition,  the  positive  outlook  for  winter  2023/2024  is  subject  to  preserving  the  energy 
balance achieved last year thanks to the efforts of, and the policy measures put in place by, 
EU Member States. A deterioration in the gas balance, if accompanied by some of the risks 
mentioned  above,  could  undermine  the  EU’s  security  of  supply.  Continued  vigilance  and 
close monitoring of the  market  is  therefore  required. The EU also  needs  to  be prepared for 
worst-case scenarios.  

18  

Regulation (EU) 2022/1032 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 June 2022 amending 
Regulations  (EU)  2017/1938  and  (EC)  No  715/2009  with  regard  to  gas  storage  (Text  with  EEA 
relevance). 

EN 

25 

  EN 

 
 
Opinion of the Commission on prolonging the Regulation 

Based on the main findings from the first months of implementing the Regulation, as set out 
in  this report, the Commission  believes that its provisions have played an important  role in 
contributing to stabilising the gas market and ensuring an adequate supply of gas to the EU, 
and that the Regulation is an important part of the EU’s gas security of supply tool kit.  

Given  the  persisting  risks  mentioned  above,  the  market  players’  interest,  and  potential  for 
benefits  of  the  joint  purchasing  and  solidarity  mechanism,  the  Commission  is  considering 
whether to propose prolonging some or all measures of the Regulation and how some of the 
measures in it could be integrated in a more structural way.  

To this end, the revised Gas Regulation (Regulation (EC) No 2009/715) (the Hydrogen and 
Decarbonised Gas Markets Package) has been identified as a suitable legal act for integrating 
certain aspects of the joint purchasing mechanism and the solidarity mechanism (based on the 
findings  and  lessons  learned  in  applying  the  Regulation).  The  co-legislators  are  currently 
engaging on this respect.  

EN 

26 

  EN