Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘The EU Maritime Security Strategy and its Action Plan: An enhanced EU Maritime Security Strategy for evolving maritime threats’ (JOIN (2023) 8 final)
Date: 2023-09-21
Institutions: European Economic and Social Committee
Subjects: EU migration policy, EU strategy, European security, conservation of resources, critical infrastructure security, law of the sea, maritime economy, maritime safety, maritime shipping








C_202300884EN.000101.fmx.xml












Official Journal of the European Union


EN
Series C













C/2023/884


8.12.2023






Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘The EU Maritime Security Strategy and its Action Plan: An enhanced EU Maritime Security Strategy for evolving maritime threats’
         
(JOIN (2023) 8 final)
(C/2023/884)







Rapporteur:



Anastasis YIAPANIS





Co-rapporteur:



Mateusz SZYMAŃSKI











Referral


2.5.2023




Legal basis


Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union




Plenary Assembly decision


21.9.2023




Legal basis


Rule 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure




Section responsible


Section for External Relations




Adopted in section


18.7.2023




Adopted at plenary


21.9.2023




Plenary session No


581




Outcome of vote
(for/against/abstentions)


153/1/3




1.   Conclusions and Recommendations









1.1.


The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) acknowledges the alignment of the new strategy with the Strategic Compass (1) and considers that the EU Maritime Security Strategy has to preserve EU sovereignty, security and competitiveness. By prioritising the maritime domain, the EU can advance its key policy principle of multilateralism in its external actions.












1.2.


The Committee notes a lack of an executive dimension within the joint communication and calls for the concrete identification of decision-makers and responsibilities at all levels. The execution of the proposed strategy has to continuously adapt to ensure its relevance and effectiveness remain fit-for-purpose.












1.3.


The EESC emphasises the importance of matching funds to meet the expectations in the communication, since a strong EU maritime security presence necessitates increased investment by the EU Member States (MS) and a commitment to maximising naval capabilities. More extensive use of pooling and sharing among MS is needed to ensure synergies between fragmented EU military capabilities and identify priority areas for operational and joint procurement endeavours.












1.4.


The EESC recognises that Russia’s military aggression, its unpredictable behaviour, and its use of hybrid strategies pose a substantial menace to international maritime security. EU-NATO cooperation is essential and must be enhanced through better sharing of maritime situational awareness and more effective coordination in different areas of common interest, including protection of critical infrastructure.












1.5.


The EU needs to intensify engagement with international partners to collectively tackle shared concerns, including people smuggling and human trafficking. Efforts should be made to include maritime security cooperation in future EU trade agreements.












1.6.


The EESC urges the swift implementation of the EU Indo-Pacific strategy (2), salutes the recent extension of EUNAVFOR Atalanta’s mandate and supports the expansion of CMPs to the Indian Ocean region. The EEAS should make efforts to identify potential opportunities for security cooperation with the Quad in the region.












1.7.


The Committee raises concerns regarding the EU’s existing strategic reliance on China, particularly the growing presence of Chinese operations in ports across various EU nations, deeming such influence in critical EU infrastructure unacceptable. Furthermore, the EESC is concerned that several MS that have developed close ties to China have either vetoed or watered down recent EU statements on China’s actions in the South China Sea.












1.8.


To enhance their capabilities in the maritime sector and their ability to attract and retain highly skilled workers in the maritime sector, MS must prioritise the use of existing funds like the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF), and also Horizon 2020. Employing social dialogue and the promotion of collective bargaining agreements is necessary to effectively address the dimension of working conditions and achieve higher work standards.












1.9.


The Committee emphasises the utmost importance of providing seafarers with access to reskilling and upskilling programmes to acquaint themselves with automated systems and emerging technologies, while acquiring the necessary skills to combat cyber threats and address various security incidents.












1.10.


The Committee calls for the immediate development of a centralised surveillance hub at EU level capable of meeting the requirements of both civil and military actors. It also calls for the integration and coordination of existing platforms and information technology systems to facilitate EU-wide information sharing in the maritime sector, and is looking forward to the Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE) programme becoming operational in 2024. Furthermore, the EU should advocate for its vision of cyber security centred around a rules-based cyberspace and address cybersecurity threats at International Maritime Organisation (IMO) level.












1.11.


The EESC considers that continuous collaboration and constructive discussions on maritime security development must involve actively EU organised civil society and is disappointed that the role of civil society is inexistent in the joint communication. One of the basic principles of action should be cross-sectoral cooperation.




2.   Introductory Comments









2.1.


The evolving security environment has resulted in rising tensions at sea, with the maritime domain becoming increasingly subject to power politics. The EU needs to strategically address this risk by aligning its policy instruments and strategic priorities.












2.2.


The EESC acknowledges the alignment of the new strategy with the Strategic Compass and its reflection of the EU’s evolving opportunities and challenges in the maritime domain.












2.3.


As the nature and magnitude of risks and hazards continue to evolve, encompassing both natural and human-induced threats, the EU has to adjust its approach to safeguard critical infrastructure and the vital services they provide, with a focus on resilience and continual protection.




3.   Step up activities at sea









3.1.


The EESC considers that the EU Maritime Security Strategy has to preserve our sovereignty, security and competitiveness by upholding a robust strategic presence and enhancing the protection of lawful maritime commerce, as well as facilitating unrestricted movement by sea.












3.2.


The EU has to implement an efficient governance framework that identifies decision-makers and responsibilities at all levels. This is not the case with this proposal for a strategy, and the Action Plan may therefore be regarded as wishful thinking. Furthermore, the EESC notes the existing lack of political consensus between MS regarding the role of the EU in ensuring maritime security.












3.3.


In order to effectively manage risks to the EU’s civil maritime interests, it is essential to have surveillance and communication capabilities that extend beyond the EU’s maritime jurisdiction, respecting consistently the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (3).












3.4.


The EESC salutes the recent extension of EUNAVFOR Atalanta’s mandate and supports the expansion of CMPs to the Indian Ocean. It stresses the importance of a free, open, connected, and rules-based Indo-Pacific region and urges the prompt implementation of the EU Indo-Pacific strategy. Better and efficient communication in relation to the EU Indo-Pacific strategy is needed.












3.5.


The EESC expresses concern about the EU’s current strategic dependence on China, including the expansion of Chinese activities to ports in several European countries. The EESC finds the Chinese influence in such EU critical infrastructure unacceptable and supports the EP call for a future EU strategy on China (4). The risks of Chinese ownership of European ports include the potential to disrupt the flow of goods between European ports and to gain access to confidential information on the operations of European container terminals. Furthermore, several MS that have developed close ties to China have either vetoed or watered down recent EU statements on China’s actions in the South China Sea.












3.6.


The EESC was expecting more focus on consolidating international supply chains throughout this strategy, especially following the lessons learnt from the COVID-19 pandemic, when industrial and food supply chains were seriously damaged.












3.7.


A robust EU maritime security presence cannot be achieved without increased investment from MS and a pledge to leverage naval capabilities. Additionally, the EU’s investments in space-based capabilities will also augment the Union’s maritime security capacities.




4.   Cooperate with partners









4.1.


Maritime security cannot be safeguarded by any single country alone. By prioritising the maritime domain, the EU can advance its key policy principle of multilateralism in its external actions.












4.2.


As transnational crime and its impact on the EU’s maritime security are anticipated to rise, an international approach is necessary to effectively address this issue. The EESC appreciates the excellent EU results obtained in reducing the maritime piracy and armed robbery in recent years.












4.3.


The EU must address surveillance gaps and explore avenues to enhance interoperability among agencies. Closer collaboration with industrial actors on situational awareness and threat intelligence is a prerequisite for achieving improved integration of available civilian and military capabilities.












4.4.


The EESC considers beneficial to extend the geographical coverage of Operation Atalanta further into the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, it considers of paramount importance that a CMP be initiated in the South China Sea as a means of promoting stability in the region, demonstrating EU commitment to the principle of freedom of navigation, and supporting its own economic security and prosperity.












4.5.


The EEAS should endeavour to pinpoint potential avenues for security collaboration with the Quad in the Indo-Pacific region regarding shared threat perceptions, complementary capabilities, overarching objectives, and other possible means.












4.6.


Although the EU and NATO have reached tangible results in operational cooperation in maritime issues, the EESC considers that efforts must be enhanced through better sharing of maritime situational awareness and more effectively coordinate in different areas of common interest. Strong coordination of action with NATO remains essential.




5.   Lead in maritime domain awareness









5.1.


The EU’s approach to maritime security should facilitate the proactive identification of opportunities, threats, and vulnerabilities, and be agile enough to swiftly respond to changes in the maritime landscape. Additionally, it should involve all relevant stakeholders in the maritime security domain while acknowledging their respective responsibilities, drivers, priorities, and budget constraints.












5.2.


The EESC notes that on 21 February 2023, China released its Global Security Initiative, a framework through which China aims to launch various diplomatic initiatives to expand its circle of friendly nations and shape a security governance order beyond Western influence, with the potential inclusion of Russia as a key participant.












5.3.


Sharing confidential information within the EU and NATO is still a challenge due to the lack of a security agreement between Cyprus, an EU non-NATO Member State, and NATO, which hinders the cooperation and will persist as long as the Cyprus-Turkey issue remains unresolved. The EESC would like to see the EU get involved in this as soon as possible and facilitate support for Cyprus to ensure the implementation of the Ankara Agreement (5).












5.4.


Ensuring protection for seafarers during search and rescue operations at sea in relation to human trafficking and illegal migration is crucial, as agreed in the Palermo Protocol (6). MS should establish a clear legal framework to prevent charges against individuals fulfilling their duty to rescue and preserve lives at sea.












5.5.


The EU needs to intensify its current involvement with international partners to address issues that are of mutual concern, such as people smuggling and human trafficking, while taking proactive measures to manage risks as close to their origin as possible and feasible. Cooperation on maritime security should be the subject of future trade agreements between the EU and partner countries.




6.   Manage risks and threats









6.1.


The EESC considers that Russia’s military aggression, its unpredictability and its use of hybrid strategies pose a significant threat to international maritime security and a represent a continuous willingness to disregard the rules-based system.












6.2.


It is worth appreciating the emphasis placed on EU critical infrastructure. The European Commission’s (EC) decision to add internet cables and gas pipelines that are located outside national territories and run underwater to critical EU infrastructure requiring particular attention and protection is recognised and appreciated by the EESC, complementing the failure to address these in the Critical Entities Resilience Directive (7). This requires an urgent response within the EU and NATO.












6.3.


The EESC acknowledges the increased emphasis on hybrid and cyber threats in the updated strategy, as these pose a significant risk to critical maritime infrastructure and capabilities. In order to establish global standards, the EU should advocate for its vision of cyber security centred around a rules-based cyberspace and good governance frameworks and address cybersecurity threats at IMO level.












6.4.


The proposal to establish a comprehensive framework for addressing the hazards presented by unexploded ordnance, active weapons and chemical weapons at sea is extremely important and urgent. It is crucial to employ innovative technologies for monitoring and safely removing these threats while minimising the environmental impact.












6.5.


The EESC is worried that ensuring food security for EU citizens was not mentioned at all in the Action Plan and considers it paramount that specific attention be given to managing our water domains properly and putting policies in place that contribute to EU and global food security. However, the Committee appreciates the proposed actions on tackling illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU) and considers that further support is needed for sustainable fisheries management and protection of legitimate EU fishing operations.












6.6.


The EESC emphasises the importance of the maritime global strategy of the EU in order to meet the future needs of the shipping industry. It is essential that the global crewing strategy is put in place to attract and retain suitably qualified and certified seafarers. The EU should be part of this global effort. The EESC emphasises the importance of EU-flagged vessels, since employment and environmental standards in ‘open registers’ in certain cases are lower. Seafarers’ background on the command positions should also be considered.




7.   Enhance capabilities









7.1.


For the EU to operate from a position of strength in its maritime vicinity, it must consistently invest in its naval capabilities and make more extensive use of pooling and sharing among MS. The EESC notes the growing need for advanced capabilities and adaptable structures in a rapidly evolving maritime landscape and considers it vital to ensure synergies between fragmented European military capabilities and identify priority areas for operational and procurement endeavours, including an increased focus on EU produced military capabilities.












7.2.


MS have to intensify their efforts in developing their capabilities in the maritime sector by advancing on the EU Capability Development Priorities, including the collaborative prospects outlined in the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, as part of PESCO, EDF, or at national level. This should also include the implementation of the Civilian Capability Development Plan.












7.3.


The EESC considers that PESCO members can develop a naval force package that could ready itself for EU naval operations, as well as conduct joint training and exercises. This approach would complement the EU’s CMP concept and align with NATO’s standing maritime forces. Furthermore, prioritising certain projects within PESCO is essential to achieving EU strategic autonomy, particularly in light of the recent budget cuts to programs such as the EDF, military mobility, and the European Peace Facility.












7.4.


European navies currently do not possess the necessary high-end naval capabilities to conduct multiple Sea Lines of Communication operations concurrently. Developing capabilities like aircraft carriers, submarines, surface combat ships, support vessels etc. under PESCO and the EDF will contribute to enhancing EU maritime security.












7.5.


The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has underscored the significance of Black Sea security, which has far-reaching global consequences in areas like energy and food security, prosperity, and stability. The EESC recommends increased NATO coordination in military exercises in the area, and proposes that NATO devise a separate Black Sea strategy.












7.6.


The EESC observes that there is no centralised maritime surveillance hub at EU level capable of meeting the requirements of both civil and military actors working in the maritime domain. Instead, surveillance is carried out separately by Frontex (European Border and Coast Guard Agency), EMSA (European Maritime Safety Agency) and EFCA (European Fisheries Control Agency).




8.   Educate and train









8.1.


The MS should prioritise enhancing their capacity to attract and retain highly skilled workers. To achieve this objective, they can leverage existing opportunities such as PESCO and the EDF. Additionally, the EU’s research and innovation program Horizon 2020 can also support this goal by funding projects aimed at developing threat assessment, cyber modelling, and simulation capabilities, which are crucial for the efficacy of cyber operations.












8.2.


The Committee emphasises the importance of seafarer training and the role played by Maritime Education and Training Centres in this regard. It is of vital importance to ensure seafarers have access to reskilling and upskilling programs in order to be familiarised with automated systems and new technologies, as well as to develop all the appropriate skills to deal with cyberthreats and all kind of security incidents. The STCW Convention, which is currently under review and revision, should be adequately updated and create modern curricula and training programmes to develop the necessary skills for seafarers.












8.3.


Decent working and living standards for seafarers are significant factors contributing to the attraction and retention of seafarers, which should not be compromised for cost considerations. Cutting costs in working standards is not the right approach for maintaining competitiveness on a global level. The role of the Maritime Labour Convention from 2006 has been rightly recognised since it provides a level playing field in the sector. However, problems with proper implementation still exist. Low working conditions in the sector may increase the risk to EU maritime security and safety. Therefore, an inclusive discussion is needed, as well as the utilisation of all available means, such as employing social dialogue and promoting collective bargaining to address the dimension of working conditions and achieve higher working standards and fair competition.




9.   Concluding remarks









9.1.


The EESC observes that the joint communication lacks an executive dimension since it does not cover the means or a governance framework that could establish a coordinating role for the different maritime security and safety initiatives. While it provides a significant contribution, there is still much work to be done and significant agreements that need to be made in order for it not to remain just a declaration of will.












9.2.


The EESC salutes the announced report three years after the endorsement decision of the current strategy and considers that this has to start from how many of these proposals have been agreed and implemented. Furthermore, the Committee notes that the execution of the strategy has to continuously adapt to ensure its relevance and effectiveness remain fit-for-purpose.












9.3.


Surprisingly, the proposal for a strategy does not mention the role of civil society even once (not even voluntary associations who took part in search and rescue operations at sea at their own expense and risk). The EESC considers that continuous collaboration and constructive discussions must involve EU civil society, in order to ensure public support for the EC’s proposal and future planned actions, with the involvement of social partners, NGOs, think-tanks and academia.












9.4.


The EESC notes that the European Court of Auditors issued a report on EU defence, cautioning that while the EC and the European Defence Agency have learned some valuable lessons on handling collaborative research projects, the EC’s strategy lacks long-term planning and the organisation is understaffed to address its growing demands in this field (8).












9.5.


The EESC appreciates that increased emphasis should have been placed on prevention since it not only saves lives and averts destruction, but also contributes to peace, security, sustainable development, and facilitates the resolution of underlying tensions.












9.6.


The EESC considers that the strategy and action plan should have addressed in more detail the issue of competition for maritime space, which has the potential to give rise to safety hazards and even cause conflicts among different sea-based industrial sectors.












9.7.


The EESC urges for the integration and coordination of current platforms and information technology systems that enable information-sharing at EU level in the maritime sector. In this regard, the EESC is looking forward to the CISE program becoming operational in 2024 and considers it an extremely important step forward in maritime surveillance, building on real-time collaboration between different entities, while ensuring the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of maritime surveillance activities. The Committee points out that such a complex real-time system needs to have in place a strong top-level cyber-security defence system across all entities and contact points within the system.












9.8.


Finally, the EESC emphasises the importance of matching funds to meet the expectations in the joint communication, as this is completely missing from the new proposal for an EU Maritime Security Strategy.






Brussels, 21 September 2023.


The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Oliver RÖPKE
            





(1)  A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence

(2)  The EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.

(3)  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

(4)  A new EU-China strategy

(5)  Ankara Agreement

(6)  Palermo Protocol

(7)  Critical Entities Resilience Directive (CER)

(8)  ECA special report: The Preparatory action on defence research


ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/884/oj
ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)