Annual safety review 2023.
Date: 2023-08-28
Institutions: European Union Aviation Safety Agency
Subjects: European Aviation Safety Agency, activity report, air safety, air transport, aviation security, transport accident

ANNUAL
SAFETY
REVIEW

2023

2023 Annual Safety Review

2

Catalogue number

Catalogue number
TO-AA-23-001-EN-N

ISBN
978-92-9210-281-4

ISSN
2314-9272

DOI
10.2822/83672

Disclaimer:

The occurrence data presented is strictly for information purposes only. It is obtained from Agency databases 
comprised of data from ICAO, EASA Member States, Eurocontrol and the aviation industry. It reflects knowledge 
that was current at the time that the report was generated. Whilst every care has been taken in preparing the 
content of the report to avoid errors, the Agency makes no warranty as to the accuracy, completeness or currency 
of the content. The Agency shall not be liable for any kind of damages or other claims or demands incurred as a 
result of incorrect, insufficient or invalid data, or arising out of or in connection with the use, copying or display 
of the content, to the extent permitted by European and national laws. The information contained in the report 
should not be construed as legal advice. 

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to acknowledge the contribution made by the Member States to thank them for their support 
in the conduct of this work and in the preparation of this report.

Photocredits

© istock  
© European Union Aviation Safety Agency, 2023

Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.

Foreword 
by the Executive Director 

Foreword by the Executive Director 

2023 Annual Safety Review

4

Foreword by the Executive Director 

It is my privilege to present the 2023 Annual Safety Review, which looks back at the safety performance 

of the European aviation system in 2022. 

Last year, the world, and air transport, began its journey to recovery after the unprecedented challenges 
posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. As we publish this year’s safety review in the summer of 2023, traffic 
levels are at around 93% of the pre-pandemic levels seen in 2019. This remarkable resurgence is a 
testament to the resilience and adaptability of the aviation industry, and underlines that citizens still 
have a strong desire to travel by air, which remains the safest form of transport.

It brings me immense satisfaction to recognise that there have been no major accidents involving 
European operators for many years, and the safety record of aviation continues to be exemplary. 
Such performance is the result of the collective efforts of all stakeholders who have embraced safety 
leadership and upheld the highest standards of operational excellence. 

However, the absence of major accidents in Europe should not blind us to possible threats. We were 
fortunate that last summer’s difficult operating situation did not lead to safety issues.  On the global 
scale, we are regrettably still seeing around 12-13 fatal commercial air accidents per year. 

We must also recognise that the aviation landscape is ever-changing and that new challenges continue 
to emerge. Hazards such as cyber-security vulnerabilities, war at the borders of the European Union, the 
entry of new operators, as well as rapid advancements in technology all demand our focused attention. 
To that end, the Agency works closely with the European Aviation Crisis Coordination Cell and our 
other European partners. EASA continues its efforts to identify and mitigate these emerging risks to 
ensure that our industry’s excellent safety record persists in the years to come.  As one example of 
action taken, EASA has recently published the acceptable means of compliance and guidance material 
to support the Part-IS (Information Security) regulation. 

The digital revolution has ushered in new opportunities and challenges alike. In collaboration with 
Member States and Industry stakeholders, EASA is steadfast in preparing the aviation system to 
embrace digitalisation and artificial intelligence responsibly. We are committed to harnessing the 
potential of these innovations to further enhance safety, while safeguarding against any potential risks 
they may bring. 

In closing, I extend my heartfelt gratitude to all those who have contributed to the success of the 
European aviation safety system at such a challenging time in our joint history. Your dedication, 
expertise, and unwavering commitment to safety have been instrumental in shaping an aviation 
industry that we can all be proud of. As we look towards the future, I am confident that our collective 
efforts will continue to benefit aviation safety for the future. 

Safe skies and best wishes,

Patrick Ky 

Contents

2023 Annual Safety Review

Contents

5

Contents

Foreword by the Executive Director  ........3

Introduction  ...........................................13

How the safety review is produced .................... 14
Information sources ........................................ 14

European Risk Classification Scheme .............. 15

Chapter overview ................................................ 16

2.3  NCC aeroplanes ............................................ 41
Key statistics ..................................................... 41

Occurrence categories .................................... 43

Phase of flight .................................................. 43

Propulsion type ................................................ 44

2.4  Safety risks for CAT and NCC aeroplanes .... 45

2.5  SPO aeroplanes  ........................................... 47
Key statistics ..................................................... 47

Typical structure for each chapter ....................... 18

Occurrence categories .................................... 49

The link with the European Plan for Aviation 
Safety ................................................................... 20
The European SRM Process ............................. 20

Chapter 1: Safety overview   ...................22

1.1  Global airline fatal accidents ....................... 23

1.2  EASA Member States cross domain  

Phase of flight .................................................. 50

Operation type ................................................. 51

Propulsion type ................................................ 51

Safety risks for SPO aeroplanes ...................... 52

2.6  Non-commercial other than complex  

aeroplanes .................................................... 53
Key statistics ..................................................... 53

Rates of accidents ............................................ 55

safety overview ............................................ 25

Occurrence categories .................................... 57

Chapter 2: Aeroplanes   ...........................29

2.1   CAT - complex aeroplanes ............................ 31

Numbers of AOC holders and AOC  
aeroplanes ....................................................... 31

Key statistics ..................................................... 32

Occurrence categories .................................... 34

Phase of flight .................................................. 35

Operation type ................................................. 36

Propulsion type ................................................ 36

2.2  CAT - other than complex aeroplanes ......... 37
Key statistics ..................................................... 37

Occurrence categories .................................... 39

Phase of flight .................................................. 39

Operation type ................................................. 40

Propulsion type ................................................ 40

Phase of flight .................................................. 58

Operation type ................................................. 58

Safety risks for non-commercial  
other than complex aeroplanes ...................... 59

Microlights ....................................................... 59

Aeroplanes registered outside the EASA MS .. 61

Chapter 3: Helicopters   ...........................63

3.1  All helicopter operations ............................. 65
Key statistics ..................................................... 65

Rotorcraft safety roadmap SPI ......................... 67

Occurrence categories .................................... 68

Helicopter operations sub-domains ............... 69

Type of certified helicopter (CS27/CS29) ........ 70

3.2   CAT helicopters ............................................. 71
European CAT helicopter fleet ........................ 71

Key statistics ..................................................... 72

 
 
Contents

2023 Annual Safety Review

6

Contents

Occurrence categories .................................... 74

Phase of flight .................................................. 75

Operation type ................................................. 75

Chapter 6: Aerodromes and  
ground handling   .................................109
Key Statistics .................................................. 111

Propulsion type ................................................ 76

Occurrence categories .................................. 113

Helicopter certification specification  
(CS27/ CS29) ..................................................... 77

Safety risks for CAT helicopters ....................... 78

Number of EASA MS certified aerodromes .. 114

Safety risks for aerodromes and  
groundhandling ............................................. 115

3.3   SPO helicopters ............................................ 79
Key statistics ..................................................... 79

Chapter 7: ATM/ANS   ............................116
Key statistics ................................................... 118

Occurrence categories .................................. 120

Phase of flight ................................................ 121

Airborne collisions and near collisions  
involving unmanned aircraft ......................... 122

Safety risks for ATM/ANS ............................... 123

Chapter 8: Occurrence reporting  
rates   .....................................................125

8.1   Overall levels of occurrence reporting  

and levels of traffic ..................................... 127
Annual evolution over the period  
2016-2022 ...................................................... 127

Monthly variation for each year ................... 129

8.2  Volumes of reporting for the main  

type of organisations  ................................ 130
Comparison of volume of reporting   ........... 130

Chapter 9: Standardisation   .................132

Occurrence categories .................................... 81

Phase of flight .................................................. 82

Operation type ................................................. 82

Propulsion type ................................................ 83

Helicopter certification specification  
(CS27/ CS29) ..................................................... 84

Safety risks for SPO helicopters ...................... 85

3.4  Non-commercial operations helicopters ..... 86
Key statistics ..................................................... 86

Occurrence categories .................................... 88

Phase of flight .................................................. 89

Operation type ................................................. 89

Propulsion type ................................................ 90

Helicopter certification specification  
(CS27/CS29) ...................................................... 91

Safety risks for non-commercial operations 
helicopters ....................................................... 92

Chapter 4: Balloons   ...............................93
Key Statistics .................................................... 95

Occurrence categories .................................... 97

Phase of flight .................................................. 98

Operation type ................................................. 98

Safety risks for balloons .................................. 99

Chapter 5: Sailplanes   ...........................100
Key statistics ................................................... 102

Occurrence categories .................................. 105

Phase of flight ................................................ 106

Operation type ............................................... 107

Safety risks for sailplanes .............................. 108

 
 
List of Tables

2023 Annual Safety Review

List of Tables

7

List of Tables

Table 1.1 

Cross domain comparison of EASA Member States aircraft fatal accidents and fatalities .............. 25

Table 1.2 

Cross domain comparison of EASA Member States infrastructure fatal accidents and fatalities .... 26

Table 2.1 

Key statistics for CAT complex aeroplanes ......................................................................................... 32

Table 2.2 

Fatalities and serious injuries involving CAT complex aeroplanes .................................................... 32

Table 2.3 

Key statistics for CAT other than complex aeroplanes ....................................................................... 37

Table 2.4 

Fatalities and serious injuries involving CAT other than complex aeroplanes ................................. 37

Table 2.5 

Key statistics for non-commercial complex aeroplanes .................................................................... 41

Table 2.6 

Fatalities and serious injuries involving NCC aeroplanes .................................................................. 41

Table 2.7 

Key statistics for SPO aeroplanes ........................................................................................................ 47

Table 2.8 

Fatalities and serious injuries involving CAT complex aeroplanes .................................................... 47

Table 2.9 

Key statistics for non-commercial other than complex aeroplanes .................................................. 53

Table 2.10  Numbers of fatalities and serious injuries involving non-commercial other than complex 

aeroplanes............................................................................................................................................ 53

Table 3.1 

Key statistics for all helicopter operations.......................................................................................... 65

Table 3.2 

Fatalities and serious injuries involving all helicopter operations  ................................................... 65

Table 3.3 

Key Statistics for CAT helicopters ........................................................................................................ 72

Table 3.4 

Fatalities and serious injuries involving CAT helicopters  .................................................................. 72

Table 3.5 

Key statistics for SPO helicopters ........................................................................................................ 79

Table 3.6 

Fatalities and serious injuries involving SPO helicopters  ................................................................. 79

Table 3.7 

Key statistics for non-commercial operations helicopters ................................................................. 86

Table 3.8 

Fatalities and serious injuries involving non-commercial operations helicopters  .......................... 86

Table 4.1 

Key statistics for balloons .................................................................................................................... 95

Table 4.2 

Fatalities and serious injuries involving balloons .............................................................................. 95

Table 5.1 

Key statistics for sailplanes ................................................................................................................ 102

Table 5.2 

Fatalities and serious injuries involving sailplanes .......................................................................... 102

Table 6.1 

Key statistics for aerodromes and groundhandling ......................................................................... 111

Table 6.2 

Fatalities and serious injuries for aerodromes and groundhandling  ............................................ 111

Table 7.1 

Key statistics for ATM/ANS contribution accidents and serious incidents ...................................... 118

Table 7.2 

Number of fatalities and serious injuries involving ATM/ANS contribution ................................... 118

List of Figures

2023 Annual Safety Review

List of Figures

8

List of Figures

Figure 1.1 

Fatal accidents and fatalities involving large aeroplane passenger and cargo operations, 
EASA Member States and the rest of the world ................................................................................. 23

Figure 1.2 

Fatalities involving large aeroplane passenger and cargo operations worldwide........................... 24

Figure 1.3 

EASA Member States accidents and serious incidents per year for CAT and non-
commercial complex aeroplanes, CAT other than complex aeroplanes, and SPO aeroplanes ....... 27

Figure 1.4 

EASA Member States accidents and serious incidents per year for CAT helicopters and 
SPO helicopters .................................................................................................................................... 27

Figure 1.5 

EASA Member States accidents and serious incidents per year for non-commercially 
operated other than complex aeroplanes and helicopters, and all sailplane and balloon 
operations ............................................................................................................................................ 28

Figure 1.6 

EASA Member States infrastructure related accidents and serious incidents per year  .................. 28

Figure 2.1  Numbers of AOC Aeroplanes and CAT aeroplanes in EASA MS......................................................... 31

Figure 2.2  Numbers and rates of fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents per 

million departures involving CAT complex aeroplanes ..................................................................... 33

Figure 2.3 

Fatal and serious injuries per year involving CAT complex aeroplanes ............................................ 33

Figure 2.4  Numbers of occurrences by occurrence category involving commercial air transport 

complex aeroplanes ............................................................................................................................ 34

Figure 2.5  Accidents and serious incidents by phase of flight involving CAT complex aeroplanes .................. 35

Figure 2.6  Accidents and serious incidents by operation type involving CAT complex aeroplanes ................. 36

Figure 2.7  Accidents and serious incidents by propulsion type involving CAT complex aeroplanes ................ 36

Figure 2.8  Numbers and rates of fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents per 

million departures involving CAT other than complex aeroplanes ................................................... 38

Figure 2.9 

Fatal and serious injuries per year involving CAT other than complex aeroplanes ......................... 38

Figure 2.10  Numbers of occurrences by occurrence category involving CAT other than complex aeroplanes .....39

Figure 2.11  Accidents and serious incidents by phase of flight involving CAT other than complex aeroplanes ..........39

Figure 2.12  Accidents and serious incidents by operation type involving CAT other than complex aeroplanes 40

Figure 2.13  Accidents and serious incidents by propulsion type involving CAT large aeroplanes ..................... 40

Figure 2.14  Fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents per year involving NCC aeroplanes ..... 42

Figure 2.15  Fatal and serious injuries per year involving NCC aeroplanes .......................................................... 42

Figure 2.16  Numbers of occurrences by occurrence category involving NCC aeroplanes .................................. 43

Figure 2.17  Accidents and serious incidents by phase of flight involving NCC aeroplanes ................................ 43

Figure 2.18  Accidents and serious incidents by propulsion type involving NCC aeroplanes .............................. 44

2023 Annual Safety Review

9

List of Figures

Figure 2.19  KRAs by aggregated ERCS score and number of risk-scored occurrences involving CAT 

large aeroplanes and NCC aeroplanes................................................................................................ 45

Figure 2.20  Fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents per year involving SPO aeroplanes ...... 48

Figure 2.21  Fatal and serious injuries per year involving SPO aeroplanes .......................................................... 48

Figure 2.22  Numbers of occurrences by occurrence category involving SPO aeroplanes .................................. 49

Figure 2.23  Accidents and serious incidents by phase of flight involving SPO aeroplanes ................................ 50

Figure 2.24  Accidents and serious incidents by SPO type involving aeroplanes ................................................. 51

Figure 2.25  Accidents and serious incidents by propulsion type involving SPO aeroplanes .............................. 51

Figure 2.26  KRAs by aggregated ERCS score and number of risk-scored occurrences involving  

SPO aeroplanes .................................................................................................................................... 52

Figure 2.27  Fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents per year involving non-

commercial other than complex aeroplanes ..................................................................................... 54

Figure 2.28  Fatal and serious injuries per year involving non-commercial other than complex aeroplanes .... 54

Figure 2.29  Numbers and rates of accidents involving non-commercial other than complex aeroplanes ........ 55

Figure 2.30  Comparison of number of accidents involving non-commercial other than complex 

aeroplanes per month ......................................................................................................................... 56

Figure 2.31  Numbers of occurrences by occurrence category involving non-commercial other than 

complex aeroplanes ............................................................................................................................ 57

Figure 2.32  Accidents and serious incidents by phase of flight involving non-commercial other than 

complex aeroplanes ............................................................................................................................ 58

Figure 2.33  Accidents and serious incidents by operation type involving non-commercial other than 

complex aeroplanes ............................................................................................................................ 58

Figure 2.34  KRAs by aggregated ERCS score and number of risk-scored occurrences, involving non-

commercial other than complex aeroplanes ..................................................................................... 59

Figure 2.35  Numbers of fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents per year involving 

non-commercially operated microlights ............................................................................................ 60

Figure 2.36  Numbers of fatal and serious injuries per year involving non-commercially operated microlights ...60

Figure 2.37  Numbers of fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents, and serious incidents in EU/EEA MS per 

year involving non-commercially operated aircraft not registered in an EASA MS. ........................ 61

Figure 2.38  Numbers of fatal and serious injuries per year involving non-commercially operated 

aircraft not registered in the EASA MS ............................................................................................... 61

Figure 2.39  Numbers of fatal and non-fatal accidents on non-commercially operated aircraft not 

registered in the EASA MS and occurring within the EASA MS. ........................................................ 62

Figure 3.1 

Fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents per year involving all 
helicopter operations  ......................................................................................................................... 66

Figure 3.2 

Fatal and serious injuries per year involving all helicopter operations  ........................................... 66

2023 Annual Safety Review

10

List of Figures

Figure 3.3  Number of accidents with a least one fatality or serious injury for all helicopter operations  ....... 67

Figure 3.4  Numbers of occurrences by occurrence category for all helicopter operations .............................. 68

Figure 3.5  Accidents and serious incidents by helicopter operation sub-domains  .......................................... 69

Figure 3.6  Accidents and serious incidents by certification specification for all helicopter 

operations with the breakdown of aircraft certification type for the reported fleet  ...................... 70

Figure 3.7  Number of helicopter AOC holders in the EASA MS .......................................................................... 71

Figure 3.8  Number of helicopters performing CAT in the EASA MS ................................................................... 71

Figure 3.9 

Fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents per year involving CAT helicopters ...... 73

Figure 3.10  Fatal and serious injuries per year involving CAT helicopters ........................................................... 73

Figure 3.11  Numbers of occurrences by occurrence category involving CAT helicopters ................................... 74

Figure 3.12  Accidents and serious incidents by phase of flight involving CAT helicopters ................................. 75

Figure 3.13  Accidents and serious incidents by operation type involving CAT helicopters ................................ 75

Figure 3.14  Accidents and serious incidents by propulsion type involving CAT helicopters with the 

breakdown of propulsion type for the reported fleet  ...................................................................... 76

Figure 3.15  Accidents and serious incidents by certification specification (CS27/CS29) for CAT 

operations with the breakdown of aircraft certification type for the reported fleet  ...................... 77

Figure 3.16  KRAs by aggregated ERCS score and number of risk-scored occurrences, involving CAT 

helicopters ........................................................................................................................................... 78

Figure 3.17  Fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents per year involving SPO helicopters ...... 80

Figure 3.18  Fatal and serious injuries per year involving SPO helicopters .......................................................... 80

Figure 3.19  Numbers of occurrences by occurrence category involving SPO helicopters .................................. 81

Figure 3.20  Accidents and serious incidents by phase of flight involving SPO helicopters ................................ 82

Figure 3.21  Accidents and serious incidents by operation type involving SPO helicopters ................................ 82

Figure 3.22  Accidents and serious incidents by propulsion type involving SPO helicopters with the 

breakdown of propulsion type for the reported fleet ....................................................................... 83

Figure 3.23  Accidents and serious incidents by certification specification (CS27/CS29) for SPO with 

the breakdown of aircraft certification type for the reported fleet  ................................................. 84

Figure 3.24  KRAs by aggregated ERCS score and number of risk-scored occurrences, involving SPO 

helicopters ........................................................................................................................................... 85

Figure 3.25  Fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents per year involving non-

commercial operations helicopters .................................................................................................... 87

Figure 3.26  Fatal and serious injuries per year involving non-commercial operations helicopters ................... 87

Figure 3.27  Numbers of occurrences by occurrence category involving non-commercial operations 

helicopters ........................................................................................................................................... 88

2023 Annual Safety Review

11

List of Figures

Figure 3.28  Accidents and serious incidents by phase of flight involving non-commercial operations 

helicopters ........................................................................................................................................... 89

Figure 3.29  Accidents and serious incidents by operation type involving non-commercial operations 

helicopters ........................................................................................................................................... 89

Figure 3.30  Accidents and serious incidents by propulsion type involving non-commercial 

operations helicopters with the breakdown of propulsion type for the reported fleet .................. 90

Figure 3.31  Accidents and serious incidents by certification specification (CS27/CS29)  

for non-commercial operations with the breakdown of aircraft certification type for the 
reported fleet ....................................................................................................................................... 91

Figure 3.32  KRAs by aggregated ERCS score and number of risk-scored occurrences, involving non-

commercial operations helicopters .................................................................................................... 92

Figure 4.1 

Fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents per year involving balloons ................. 96

Figure 4.2 

Fatalities and serious injuries involving balloons .............................................................................. 96

Figure 4.3  Numbers of occurrences by occurrence category involving balloons .............................................. 97

Figure 4.4  Accidents and serious incidents involving balloons, by phase of flight ........................................... 98

Figure 4.5  Accidents and serious incidents involving balloons, by operation type ........................................... 98

Figure 4.6 

Key risk areas by aggregated ERCS score and number of risk-scored occurrences 
involving balloons................................................................................................................................ 99

Figure 5.1 

Fatal and non-fatal accidents and serious incidents per year involving sailplanes........................ 103

Figure 5.2 

Comparison of number of accidents involving sailplanes per month for 2020-2022 .................... 103

Figure 5.3 

Fatal and serious injuries per year involving sailplanes .................................................................. 104

Figure 5.4  Numbers of occurrences by occurrence category involving sailplanes .......................................... 105

Figure 5.5  Accidents and serious incidents by phase of flight involving sailplanes ........................................ 106

Figure 5.6  Accidents and serious incidents by operation type involving sailplanes ........................................ 107

Figure 5.7 

Key risk areas by aggregated ERCS score and number of risk-scored occurrences 
involving sailplanes ........................................................................................................................... 108

Figure 6.1  Numbers of fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents involving 

aerodromes and groundhandling, and rates per million aerodrome movements  ....................... 112

Figure 6.2 

Fatal and serious injuries per year involving aerodromes and groundhandling ........................... 112

Figure 6.3  Numbers of occurrences by occurrence category involving aerodromes and groundhandling ... 113

Figure 6.4  Aerodromes within the scope of Regulation (EU) 139/2014 (EASA ADR)  

by EASA Member State ...................................................................................................................... 114

Figure 6.5 

Key risk areas by aggregated ERCS score and number of risk-scored occurrences 
involving aerodromes and groundhandling .................................................................................... 115

2023 Annual Safety Review

12

List of Figures

Figure 7.1  Number of accidents and serious incidents per year and serious incidents and accidents 

rate per one million flights................................................................................................................ 119

Figure 7.2 

Fatalities and serious injuries per year involving ATM/ANS contribution ...................................... 119

Figure 7.3  Numbers of occurrences by occurrence categories involving ATM/ ANS contribution ................. 120

Figure 7.4  Accidents and serious incidents by phase of flight involving ATM/ ANS contribution .................. 121

Figure 7.5  Number and rate of UAS collisions with manned aircraft and near collisions rate  ...................... 122

Figure 7.6  Airborne collisions and near collisions, involving UAS and manned aircraft  ................................ 122

Figure 7.7 

Key risk areas by aggregated ERCS score and number of risk-scored ATM/ANS occurrences ....... 123

Figure 8.1  Number of reports collected in the European Central Repository (ECR) per year .......................... 127

Figure 8.2  Number of airport movements per year, for all EASA MS (except Iceland) .................................... 128

Figure 8.3 

Reporting rate (number of reports/1000 airport movements) per year ......................................... 128

Figure 8.4  Number of reports collected in the ECR per month per year .......................................................... 129

Figure 8.5  Number of airport movements per month per year, for all EASA MS (except Iceland) ................. 129

Figure 8.6  Number of reports collected in the ECR per type of reporting organisation ................................. 130

Figure 8.7 

Proportion of reports (in % of the total number of reports) per type of reporting  
organisation ....................................................................................................................................... 131

Figure 9.1  Number of findings by class and year .............................................................................................. 134

Figure 9.2  Distribution of Class C findings by Critical Element ......................................................................... 135

Figure 9.3  Distribution of Class D findings by Critical Element ........................................................................ 135

Figure 9.4 

Ratio of class C and D findings per domain in 2022 ........................................................................ 137

Introduction 

Introduction

2023 Annual Safety Review

14

Introduction

EASA would like to welcome you to the 2023 edition of the EASA Annual Safety Review (ASR)1. The analysis 
presented in this review provides the most important aviation safety statistics for Europe in 2022 and a 
comparison with the past. It is also the data-driven input that supports the European Safety Risk Management 
(SRM) process and, hence, the European Plan for Aviation Safety (EPAS).

The core document of the ASR provides both a statistical summary of aviation safety in the EASA Member States 
(MS) and identifies the most important safety challenges faced by European aviation today, outlining the safety 
risks per aviation and operational domain.

The ASR drives the identification of safety issues, which are further assessed and prioritised using the experience 
of EASA Member States and the aviation industry to connect the data with the current and future strategic 
priorities of the Agency and the safety priorities contained in the EPAS. This work is a part of the SRM and 
benefits from the valuable inputs from the Network of aviation safety Analysts (NoA) and Collaborative Analysis 
Groups (CAGs).

The safety issues that have been identified from occurrence data are provided in the ASR appendices for the 
different aviation domains presented in this edition and build upon the work of previous years. For aerodromes 
and groundhandling, the safety risk portfolio is undergoing a major review. Thus for this year, instead of 
providing the list of safety issues identified from occurrence data, the appendix for that domain shows the 
detailed distribution of the type of operational safety events.

How the safety review is produced

Information sources

The data presented in the ASR are based on the accidents and serious incidents collected up to May 2023 by 
the Agency under Regulation (EU) 996/2010 on accident and serious incident investigation and Regulation (EU) 
376/2014 on occurrence reporting, analysis, and follow-up, and complemented through the active search of 
those events from other official sources. This data collection enables the analysis of two specific data sources:

•  EASA’s occurrence database: The main source of data is the Agency’s own database, which covers 
occurrences and other safety-related information reported to the Agency in its role as competent 
authority,  and  accidents  and  serious  incidents  notified  to  the  Agency  by  Safety  Investigation 
Authorities world-wide. This is augmented by information collected by the Agency from other sources.

•  European Central Repository: The European Central Repository (ECR) is the central database of all 
occurrences and other safety-related information reported to the competent authorities of the EASA 
MS, the reporting of which is governed by Regulation (EU) 376/2014 on the reporting, analysis and 
follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation.

The figures and analyses presented in the ASR may differ from safety reports prepared by other organisations 
and regulators, which is due to differences in collection methods, in the definitions of the data collected and the 
subsequent analyses. It is important to identify and understand these differences when comparing safety reports 
and to keep in mind that each report has its own merits.

1 

Publication of the Annual Safety Review is mandated by Article 72(7) of REGULATION (EU) 2018/1139 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND OF THE COUNCIL of 4 July 2018 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Union Aviation Safety 
Agency.

2023 Annual Safety Review

15

Introduction

European Risk Classification Scheme

Regulation (EU) 376/2014 on the reporting, analysis and follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation introduced 
the requirement for a common risk classification of occurrences at the national and EASA levels. As a result, the 
European Risk Classification Scheme (ERCS) was developed to measure the risk using a 2-dimensional matrix. The 
ERCS is part of the legal framework of Regulation (EU) 376/2014, through a Commission Delegated Regulation2 
published in 2020 and later a Commission Implementing Regulation3, published in 2021. The application of the 
ERCS is mandatory as of January 1, 2023.

Within the ERCS safety risk matrix, the rows address the severity, by identifying the worst likely accident outcome 
that would have resulted if the occurrence being scored had escalated into an accident, which considers both the 
size of the aircraft involved and the most likely type of accident. Secondly, the columns measure the probability, 
by looking at how close the occurrence was to that worst likely accident outcome, based on a weighted barrier 
model.

EASA began using this risk classification scheme in 2017 and has categorised all the accidents and serious 
incidents in the ASR, including those occurring before 2017. The ERCS is useful because the classification of 
occurrences into accidents and serious incidents does not necessarily provide an accurate picture of the risk 
of those occurrences. For example, a very close near mid-air collision would be classified as a serious incident, 
while a collision between a ground handling vehicle and an aircraft leading to substantial damage to the latter 
would be classified as an accident. In terms of risk, the serious incident in this example would be of a higher 
risk category than that of the accident. In addition, the combination of probability and severity would differ 
significantly. For each domain, an analysis using ERCS-applied occurrence data provides an overview of the risks 
that were present during the analysed period; however, it does not predict the future risks, which will change 
due to changing circumstances and the remedial effects of safety mitigating actions.

2  COMMISSION  DELEGATED  REGULATION  (EU)  2020/2034  of  6  October  2020  supplementing  Regulation  (EU)  No  376/2014  of  the 

European Parliament and of the Council as regards the common European risk classification scheme

3  COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2021/2082 of 26 November 2021 laying down the arrangements for the implementation 
of Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the common European risk classification 
scheme

2023 Annual Safety Review

16

Introduction

Chapter overview

This document is split into nine chapters. Chapter 2 to Chapter 7 cover one operational domain within the 
European aviation system. The scope of each domain chapter is the EASA MS, either as the state of operator or 
the state of registry. For the Aerodromes and Ground Handling and Air Traffic Management and Air Navigation 
Services (ATM/ANS) chapters, the scope is the EASA MS as state of occurrence. Chapter 8 reviews the reporting 
rates in the ECR, and Chapter 9 provides an overview of EASA’s monitoring of the MS’s oversight capabilities.

The chapters of this ASR cover the following areas:

Chapter 1 – Safety overview

•  Review of global airline safety: This provides a review of global safety for large commercial air 

transport aeroplanes.

•  Cross-domain safety overview of EASA MS: This provides an overview of the most important 
statistics across all the different operational domains. It helps to identify which domains are likely to 
need the greatest focus in the EPAS.

Chapter 2 – Aeroplanes 

•  Commercial air transport complex aeroplanes: This covers all commercial air transport operations 
(passenger and cargo) involving aeroplanes with a maximum certificated take-off mass exceeding 
5700 kg, or aeroplanes equipped with turbofan engine(s) or more than one turboprop engine (e.g., 
airline, air taxi, air ambulance).

•  Commercial air transport other than complex aeroplanes: This covers all commercial air transport 
operations (passenger and cargo) involving aeroplanes other than complex aeroplanes (e.g., airline, 
air taxi, air ambulance, sightseeing).

•  Non-commercial operations complex aeroplanes: This covers non-commercial operations involving 
aeroplanes with a maximum certificated take-off mass exceeding 5700 kg, or aeroplanes equipped 
with turbofan engine(s) or more than one turboprop engine (e.g., business, demonstration, flight 
training/instructional, relocation).

•  Specialised operations: This covers all aerial work/Part SPO operations involving aeroplanes and 
includes a wide range of different operational activities (e.g., agriculture, aerial advertisement, or 
photography operations) conducted by EASA MS registered aeroplanes or EASA MS AOC Aeroplanes 
holders.

•  Non-commercial operations other than complex aeroplanes: The chapter covers all non-commercial 
operations involving other than complex aeroplanes and includes analysis of leisure flights as well as 
flight training and other general aviation activities. Additional information regarding microlights and 
aircraft registered in third countries has also been included.

Chapter 3 – Helicopters

•  All  helicopter  operations: This  chapter  provides  an  analysis  of  all  EASA-certified  or  validated 

helicopter operations, except for Nationally Regulated Operations (NRO).

•  Commercial air transport: This covers all commercial air transport operations involving EASA-certified 
or validated helicopters such as Helicopter Emergency Medical Service (HEMS), air taxi or sightseeing, 
as well as flights to offshore oil, gas and renewable energy installations.

2023 Annual Safety Review

17

Introduction

•  Specialised operations: This covers all aerial work/Part SPO operations involving EASA-certified or 
validated helicopters such as sling load, advertisement, or photography with an EASA MS as state of 
operator or state of registry.

•  Non-commercial operations: The section covers all non-commercial operations involving EASA-
certified or validated helicopters with an EASA MS as state of operator or state of registry. Training 
flights are included within the non-commercial operations definition.

Chapter 4 – Balloons

This chapter covers all operations involving hot air balloons.

Chapter 5 – Sailplanes

This chapter covers all operations involving sailplanes.

Chapter 6 – Aerodromes and ground handling

This chapter covers aerodrome and ground handling operations that occur within the EASA MS; 
therefore, the scope for this chapter is EASA MS as state of occurrence.

Chapter 7 – ATM/ANS

This chapter covers ATM/ANS occurrences within the EASA MS; therefore, the scope of the chapter 
is EASA MS as state of occurrence.

Chapter 8 – ECR reporting rates

This chapter reviews the reporting rates in the European Central Repository.

Chapter 9 – Standardisation

This chapter provides an overview of EASA’s standardisation activities which entail assessing the 
National Competent Authorities’ (NCAs) ability to discharge their safety oversight responsibilities 
on a continuous basis, as well as verifying the implementation of the rules. It provides a summary 
of information about the application by each Member State of the EASA Basic Regulation and of the 
delegated and implementing acts adopted on the basis thereof4.

4  Article 85, paragraph 7 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2018 on common rules 

in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Union Aviation Safety Agency.

2023 Annual Safety Review

18

Introduction

Typical structure for each chapter

Each of the domain chapters in this ASR contains specific information that is useful in understanding the analysis 
of that domain. The structures of the chapters and appendices, as described below, are as similar as possible 
across the domain chapter to afford the ability to compare information in each domain. 

Key statistics: Every chapter begins with a set of key statistics that provide information on the Tier 1 Safety 
Performance Indicators (SPIs) for that domain, which includes details on the number of fatal accidents, non-fatal 
accidents and serious incidents. The key statistics part also outlines the number of fatalities and serious injuries 
in the domain. In all cases, the figures for 2022 are followed by a comparison with the annual averages over 
the past 10 years that helps to provide a reference on how this year’s performance relates to historical trends; 
this information is also provided in a graphical format. The key statistics are then complemented with a figure 
outlining the occurrence categories5 assigned to the serious incidents and accidents in the past five years.

Domain-specific analysis: As every domain is different, a further analysis of useful domain-specific information 
is included; for example, within the areas of special operations it is useful to provide information on the type of 
operation involved in safety events, while some chapters include an analysis of the type of propulsion. 

Safety risk analysis: The next part of the analysis is the domain safety risk analysis. This section provides an 
overview of the relative risk level and frequency of each key risk area. In the context of a safety performance 
framework, the key risk areas are the Tier 2 safety performance indicators (SPIs) for the domain. The key risk 
areas are ordered based on their risk levels, determined using the ERCS. 

Domain specific appendix (new): When a safety risk portfolio is existing for the domain, the domain specific 
appendix outlines the safety issues that have been identified from occurrence data. Safety issues are safety 
deficiencies related to one or more hazards and are the manifestation of a hazard or combination of several 
hazards in a specific context. In terms of safety performance, the safety issues are the Tier 2+ SPIs and are ranked 
based on their aggregated risk contribution using ERCS. The occurrences related to the individual safety issues 
are identified by mapping event types in the ECCAIRS taxonomy to each safety issue. 

Following on from the inclusion of data relating to Human Factors (HF) and Human Performance (HP) in the 
domain specific analysis for the aeroplane and sailplane domains in 2020, this information is now included in 
all domains. The term human factors describes human characteristics, abilities and limitations. The knowledge 
of HF is used throughout the aviation industry to design systems, equipment and work in ways that support 
humans in performing at their best. HP refers to how people perform their tasks. Following safety occurrences, 
HF and HP knowledge can also be used diagnostically to better understand what went wrong, what went right 
and, more importantly, to understand how to prevent such occurrences from happening again. Within the EASA 
occurrence data, HF and HP have been identified as having contributed to accident and serious incidents, based 
on information derived from investigation reports. The same ECCAIRS taxonomy that helps us to identify our 
safety issues and key risk areas also provides us with HF and HP codes. This taxonomy groups event types at 
different levels, so that all the issues relating to personnel are grouped at the highest level into ‘personnel’. 
The personnel issues are then further subdivided into four categories: experience and knowledge events, 
physiological events, situational awareness and sensory events, and personnel task performance events. A 
further two levels of subdivision exist, providing increasing granularity on the type of HF or HP issues identified.

Following on from the development of an airworthiness safety risk portfolio in 2023, an airworthiness analysis is 
now included in the product related domains. The term airworthiness includes aircraft design, aircraft production, 
and aircraft maintenance. Within the EASA occurrence data, airworthiness is identified as having contributed to 

5 

In accordance with the ICAO Accident/Incident Data Reporting (ADREP) taxonomy. Each category has a unique name and identifier to 
permit common, a text definition, and usage notes to clarify the category and aid in coding occurrences.

2023 Annual Safety Review

19

Introduction

accident and serious incidents, based on information derived from investigation reports. The attribute ‘event 
type’ in the ECCAIRS taxonomy allows regulators and industry to code the causes and contributing factors to 
accidents and serious incidents. A first level of airworthiness analysis shows the contribution of the aircraft 
system loss and malfunction to the accidents and serious incidents, including the distribution of the main Air 
Transport Association (ATA) chapters. A second level of analysis goes a step further, showing the contribution of 
design, production, and maintenance to aircraft system loss and malfunction, i.e., highlighting the systemic root 
cause of a system or equipment failure. 

2023 Annual Safety Review

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Introduction

The link with the European Plan for Aviation Safety

The European Plan for Aviation Safety (EPAS) constitutes the Regional Aviation Safety Plan (RASP) for EASA MS 
and sets out the strategic safety priorities and objectives for the European aviation system, presents the main risk 
affecting that system and defines the necessary actions to mitigate those risks, to further improve aviation safety 
in Europe. The plan is prepared by EASA, with technical inputs from the EASA Advisory Bodies representing MS 
and industry. The EPAS looks at aviation safety in a systemic manner. The safety priorities and corresponding 
mitigating actions are determined through the European SRM process. The occurrences that are reviewed and 
analysed during the production of the ASR support the identification of safety issues (Step 1 of the European 
Safety Risk Management Process, see below) that are listed in the EPAS for further being assessed and mitigated. 
While EPAS originates with the EASA MS, it forms the basis of the RASP for all States in the ICAO EUR Region.

In addition to the safety intelligence gained through analysing occurrence data, roadmaps have been developed 
for the general aviation and the rotorcraft domains. These domain specific roadmaps, which are monitored and 
will continue to develop, augment the overall safety intelligence picture when determining the safety priorities 
contained in the EPAS.

More information on the EPAS can be found on the EASA website: https://www.easa.europa.eu/easa-and-you/
safety-management/european-plan-aviation-safety

The European SRM Process

The main safety risks and corresponding mitigation actions feeding the EPAS are developed through the 
European SRM process, which is defined in 5 specific steps as described below:

5. Safety performance 
measurement

4. Implementation 
and follow-up

3. Definition and 
programming of safety actions

1. Identification of 
safety issues

2. Assessment of 
safety issues

2023 Annual Safety Review

21

Introduction

Identification of safety issues: The identification of safety issues is the first step in the SRM process and is 
performed through the analysis of occurrence data and other safety-related information and supporting 
information by the Collaborative Analysis Groups (CAGs). These safety issues are formally captured by the Agency 
and are then subject to a preliminary safety assessment (the safety issues are listed in the Volume III of the EPAS); 
this assessment then informs the decision on whether a candidate safety issue should be included formally within 
the relevant safety risk portfolio or be subject to other actions. Advice is taken from the NoA and CAGs. The 
outputs of this step in the process are the domain safety risk portfolios. Within the portfolios, both the key risk 
areas and safety issues are prioritised.

Assessment of safety issues: The safety issues assessed as posing the highest risk to aviation safety are subject 
to a more detailed Safety Issue Assessment (SIA). The assessment process is led by EASA and is supported by the 
NoA and the CAGs; this external support is vital to achieving the best possible results. The SIA provides potential 
mitigating actions for the EPAS and is followed by an impact assessment through the best intervention strategy 
(BIS) document, defining possible mitigation actions, assessing the implications and benefits of each possible 
action, and making recommendations on the best mitigation action(s) to be implemented in the EPAS.

Definition and programming of safety actions: Using the combined SIA/BIS, formal EPAS actions proposals are 
then submitted to the EASA advisory bodies. Once discussed, agreed upon and the required resources secured, 
the actions are then included in the next version of the EPAS. Prior to publication, the EPAS is approved by the 
EASA Management Board. Actions that are low-cost or require more rapid intervention are often fast-tracked 
and appear in the next available update of the EPAS. In some cases, more immediate safety actions are needed 
that could be completed before the next EPAS is published. Naturally, these are not included within EPAS. Such 
actions could include the publication of a Safety Information Bulletin (SIB) or take the form of immediate Safety 
Promotion activities.

Implementation and follow-up: The next step in the process involves the implementation and follow-up of the 
actions that have been included within the EPAS. There are different types of actions within the EPAS, including 
research, rulemaking, Member State tasks, safety promotion, and evaluation.

Safety performance measurement: The final stage in the process is the measurement of safety performance; 
this serves two purposes.  Firstly, to monitor the changes that have resulted from the implementation of safety 
actions. Secondly, it also serves to monitor the aviation system so that new safety issues can be identified. To 
ensure that there is a systematic approach to the work in this step of the SRM process, a Safety Performance 
Framework has been developed that identifies different tiers of SPIs. Tier 1 transversally monitors all the domains 
and the overview of the performance in each domain. Tier 2 covers the key risk areas at domain level, while Tier 
2+ monitors the safety issues. The ASR is the annual review of the Safety Performance Framework and identifies 
safety trends and highlights priority domains, key risk areas and safety issues. From this step, the SRM process 
begins again.

Chapter 1
Safety overview  

Safety overview

2023 Annual Safety Review

23

Safety overview

1.1  Global airline fatal accidents

This  section  covers  large  aeroplane  passenger  and  cargo  operations  worldwide.  The  figures  show  the 
contribution of EASA MS operators to the number of global fatal accidents and fatalities. Figure 1.1 shows that 
the number of fatal accidents in recent years has stabilised since 2020 and that the number of fatal accidents in 
2022 is the third lowest in the decade. For the context of these safety figures, it is to be noted that after two years 
of severe traffic reductions in 2020 and 2021, the aviation industry in Europe experienced, a strong recovery in 
terms of traffic since summer 2022.

Despite the stabilisation in the number of accidents, the number of fatalities in 2022 has increased compared 
to 2021 and one fatal accident (a runway incursion of a motorcycle) involving an EASA MS operator led to two 
fatalities in Guinea this year after an accident-free period of 5 years for European operators. The accident of a 
Boeing 737-800 on the 21 March 2022 near Wuzhou in China has contributed in 2022 to three-quarters of the 
total number of fatalities in large aeroplane passenger and cargo operations worldwide. 

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2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  2017  2018  2019  2020

2021 2022

EASA Member States 

Rest of world 

 ´ Figure 1.1  Fatal accidents and fatalities involving large aeroplane passenger and cargo operations, EASA 

Member States and the rest of the world

The definition of an accident is set out in EU law6 and in Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil 
Aviation (Chicago Convention). Although this definition excludes unlawful acts (as stowaway, hijacking, bombs, 
shot down, etc.), such acts have often been investigated by safety investigation authorities and the management 
of safety and security risks are increasingly connected. The data presented in Figure 1.2 has been divided to show 
the fatalities related to accidents and those related to unlawful acts. Whereas accidents have reduced markedly 
since 1970 and then more slowly in recent years, fatalities related to unlawful acts have re-emerged since 2014. 

6 

Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the investigation and prevention 
of accidents and incidents in civil aviation and repealing Directive 94/56/EC

 
 
 
 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

24

Safety overview

When focussing on the last decade (2013-2022), the fatalities caused by unlawful acts represent a bit less than 
a fourth of the total number of fatalities with fortunately an improvement over the last two years since there 
have been no civil aviation accidents due to unlawful acts during this period. This observation, in conjunction 
with the current challenges associated with the developing geopolitical situations with numerous conflict 
zones worldwide, increasingly focuses concern on security matters that require an integrated risk management 
approach in order to be adequately mitigated.

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 ´ Figure 1.2  Fatalities involving large aeroplane passenger and cargo operations worldwide

The same requirements that define an aviation accident also require that these accidents must be investigated 
with a view to understanding the causes and preventing similar events in the future. Based on the information 
from accident reports and from preliminary information where the investigations are ongoing, the fatal accidents 
between 2018 and 2022 had the following characteristics:

•  The most common underlying cause to these accidents is associated to the flight crews’ management 
of challenging circumstances created by technical failures or poor weather conditions, including heavy 
rains and thunderstorms, during approach. Safety management continues to emerge as an important 
factor in preventing accidents;

•  Aircraft upset, runway excursion and terrain collision remain as the most common accident outcomes. 
The most common flight phase for fatal accidents is approach and landing, however accidents 
occurring en-route contribute to more than half of the total number of fatalities;

•  The design of safe and effective human-machine interfaces remains a challenge and although progress 
continues to be made in this area, many aircraft continue to operate with older designs that do not 
take account of lessons learned from previous accidents;

•  Cargo  accidents  continue  to  be  slightly  disproportionately  represented  in  fatal  accidents,  at 

approximately 30% of the accidents over the past five years.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

25

Safety overview

1.2  EASA Member States cross domain  

safety overview

Each domain presented in this review provides the number of fatal accidents and fatalities for 2022 as compared 
with the preceding ten years, 2012-2021. These figures are consolidated here, to provide a cross-domain safety 
overview. 

In almost all domains, the number of fatal accidents and fatalities was close to the minimum of the preceding 
decade. The exceptions to this are the commercial helicopter operations and the sailplanes operations which 
were close or equal to the maximum of the preceding decade, a identified in Table 1.1. 

 ´ Table 1.1  Cross domain comparison of EASA Member States aircraft fatal accidents and fatalities

AIRCRAFT DOMAIN

AEROPLANES 

CAT operations with complex 
aeroplanes

CAT operations with aeroplanes 
other than complex

Non-commercial operations with 
complex aeroplanes 

Specialised operations

Non-commercial operations with 
aeroplanes other than complex

HELICOPTERS 

Overall

CAT Operations

Specialised Operations

Non-commercial Operations

BALLOONS           

FATAL 
ACCIDENTS 
2022

FATAL 
ACCIDENTS 
2012 - 2021 
MIN - MAX

FATALITIES 
2022

FATALITIES 
2012-2021 
MIN - MAX

FATALITIES 
2012-2021 
MEDIAN

1

0

2

3

31

0 - 2

0 – 1 7 

0 - 2

3 - 11

28 - 55

10

5 - 11

4

1

3

2

0 - 4

0 - 5

2 - 8

0 - 3

2

0

10

5

58

24

17

1

4

1

0 - 150

0 – 4 7

0 - 10

4 - 31

58 - 90

1

0 7

0

13

82

10 - 30

24

0 - 22

0 - 11

1 - 20

0 - 4

6

2

7

2

SAILPLANES     

27

15-31  

32

15 - 32

21

7 

2014-2021, no data available before 2014 for this operational domain.

2023 Annual Safety Review

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Safety overview

A separate table is used for aerodromes and ground handling, and for ATM/ANS8. The table includes all fatal 
accidents and fatalities that happened at aerodromes or in airspace in an EASA MS. Therefore, the infrastructure 
table not only counts fatal accidents and fatalities that are already in the table for the aircraft chapters, but also 
some that involved operators or aircraft registered outside of a MS. This is identified in Table 1.2. 

 ´ Table 1.2  Cross domain comparison of EASA Member States infrastructure fatal accidents and fatalities

INFRASTRUCTURE 
DOMAIN

AERODROMES AND 
GROUND HANDLING 

AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT  
& AIR NAVIGATION SERVICES

FATAL 
ACCIDENTS 
2022

FATAL 
ACCIDENTS 
2012 - 2021 
MIN - MAX

FATALITIES 
2022

FATALITIES 
2012-2021 
MIN - MAX

FATALITIES 
2012-2021 
MEDIAN

0

0

0 - 3

0 - 0

0

0

0 - 5

0 -0

0

0

8 

For the ATM/ANS domain, the data cannot be compared with the one published in previous ASR as the scope for this domain this year 
now focuses only on accidents with an ATM/ANS contribution.

2023 Annual Safety Review

27

Safety overview

The following graphs (Figures 1.3 to 1.6) show the number of fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious 
incidents for each aircraft domain, while providing a visual comparison. Please note that the scale of the y-axis 
is not the same for each chart, although they have in some cases been adjusted to make a comparison easier.

CAT and non-commercial complex aeroplanes

CAT other than complex aeroplanes

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Fatal accidents

Non-fatal accidents

Serious incidents

 ´ Figure 1.3  EASA Member States accidents and serious incidents per year for CAT and non-commercial 

complex aeroplanes, CAT other than complex aeroplanes, and SPO aeroplanes

Commercial air transport helicopters

Specialised operations helicopters

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 ´ Figure 1.4  EASA Member States accidents and serious incidents per year for CAT helicopters and SPO 

helicopters

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

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Safety overview

Non-commercial other than complex aeroplanes

Non-commercial helicopters 

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Fatal accidents

Non-fatal accidents

Serious incidents

 ´ Figure 1.5  EASA Member States accidents and serious incidents per year for non-commercially operated 

other than complex aeroplanes and helicopters, and all sailplane and balloon operations

Aerodromes and Ground Handling

ATM/ANS

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 ´ Figure 1.6  EASA Member States infrastructure related accidents and serious incidents per year 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2
Aeroplanes  

Aeroplanes

2023 Annual Safety Review

30

Aeroplanes

This chapter covers aeroplane operations. The chapter is divided into five main sections: 

1.  Commercial air transport (CAT) passenger and cargo operations conducted by EASA Air Operators 
Certificate  (AOC)  holders  with  complex  aeroplanes  with  a  maximum  certificated  take-off  mass 
exceeding 5700 kg or equipped with (a) turbofan engine(s) or more than one turboprop engine. 
Examples include airline, air taxi, air ambulance, etc.;

2.  CAT passenger and cargo operations conducted by EASA AOC holders with non-complex aeroplanes, 
having a maximum take-off mass below 5700 kg or not equipped with (a) turbofan engine(s) or more 
than one turboprop engine. Examples include airline, air taxi, air ambulance, sightseeing, etc.;

3.  EASA Member State (MS) registered, or operated complex aeroplanes carrying out non-commercial 
complex (NCC) operation with a maximum certificated take-off mass exceeding 5700 kg or equipped 
with  (a)  turbofan  engine(s)  or  more  than  one  turboprop  engine.  Examples  include  business, 
demonstration, flight training/instructional, relocation, etc.;

4.  Specialised operations (SPO) conducted by EASA MS registered aeroplanes or EASA MS AOC holders. 

Examples include agriculture, aerial advertisement, photography, etc.;

5.  Non-commercial operations conducted by EASA MS registered non-complex aeroplanes, having a 
maximum take-off mass below 5700 kg or not equipped with (a) turbofan engine(s) or more than one 
turboprop engine, and not covered in the sections above. 

The data presented are based on the accidents and serious incidents collected by the Agency under Regulation 
(EU) 996/2010 on accident and serious incident investigation and Regulation (EU) 376/2014 on occurrence 
reporting, follow-up, and analysis, and through the active search of those events from other official sources.

For each section, the key statistics, the occurrence categories and the safety risks at the key risk area (KRA) level 
are presented in the core document. Advanced statistics are then provided per aviation domain in domain-
specific appendices, giving an overview of the contributors to the safety risks identified in the core document 
for these types of operations at the European level. The advanced statistics are solely derived from occurrence 
data from the EASA occurrence repository and the European Central Repository (ECR).

The list of fatal accidents associated with the scope of this chapter is provided in Appendix 1, as is a list of fatal 
accidents involving non-certified aeroplanes (Annex I that lists aircraft the operation of which involves low risk 
for aviation safety).

The advanced statistics associated with the scope of this chapter are provided in Appendix 2 – Advanced Statistics 
Aeroplanes.

2023 Annual Safety Review

31

Aeroplanes

2.1   CAT - complex aeroplanes

This section covers the CAT9 passenger and cargo operations conducted by EASA AOC holders with complex 
aeroplanes with a maximum certificated take-off mass exceeding 5700 kg or equipped with (a) turbofan engine(s) 
or more than one turboprop engine. Examples include airline, air taxi, air ambulance, etc.  

Numbers of AOC holders and AOC aeroplanes

Figure 2.1 shows the number of AOC holders and the number of commercial air transport aeroplanes within 
EASA MS. It shows that in 2022, the number of AOC aeroplane holders has slightly dropped in comparison to the 
previous year but exceeds the numbers of period from 2018 to 2020. The number of Commercial Air Transport 
(CAT) aeroplanes, after the drop in 2020 and 2021, in 2022 has slightly increased but has still remained below the 
numbers of the years from 2018 to 2020.

s
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m
o
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n
a

S
M
A
S
A
E
n

i

8000

7000

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0 

Aeroplanes (CAT ops)

AOC (A)

2018

6904

603

2019

7017

585

2020

6883

575

2021

6593

635

2022

6623

615

 ´ Figure 2.1  Numbers of AOC Aeroplanes and CAT aeroplanes in EASA MS

9  As per REGULATION (EU) 2018/1139 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL, ‘commercial air transport’ means an 

aircraft operation to transport passengers, cargo or mail for remuneration or other valuable consideration.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

32

Aeroplanes

Key statistics

The key statistics for this domain are depicted in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 and include a comparison of the number 
of accidents (fatal and non-fatal) and serious incidents for the last year and the 10-year period10.  It also includes 
a comparison of the fatalities and serious injuries sustained in those accidents during the same timeframe. In 
2022 there was one fatal accident involving EASA CAT AOC holder. This accident was a collision on the runway 
with a motorcycle in Guinea, with two fatalities on the ground. The numbers of non-fatal accidents and serious 
incidents were lower than the average of the previous 10-year period. 

 ´ Table 2.1  Key statistics for CAT complex aeroplanes

Total number 
of occurrences 
per occurrence class 
over 2012-2021

Number of 
occurrences per 
occurrence class 
in 2022

Comparison 
2022 vs yearly average 
of 2012-2021 
per occurrence class

Fatal accidents

Non-fatal accidents

Serious incidents

6

162

672

1

13

51







 ´ Table 2.2  Fatalities and serious injuries involving CAT complex aeroplanes

Number of fatalities

Number of serious injuries

Total number over 2012-2021

Yearly max number over 2012-2021

Yearly min number over 2012-2021

Total number in 2022

278

150

0

2

82

17

3

5

Figure 2.2 shows that the number of non-fatal accidents in 2022 has remained the same as in the previous year. 
The number of serious incidents has slightly decreased in comparison with the previous year. The air traffic in 
2022 had reached approximately 80% of the 2019 traffic level11. These figures should be considered in the context 
of the recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic and the impact of the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine. 

Figure 2.2 also shows that the rate of accidents and serious incidents has decreased in 2022. The rates are 
displayed for years 2019 onwards due to a change in exposure data (number of flights) structure by the data 
provider. The rate of accidents is now lower than in 2019 and 2021, but higher than in 2020. The rate of serious 
incidents, which at times bear a higher risk than accidents, is lower than in the three preceding years.

10  On 4 August 2018, a Junker-52 crashed in the Swiss Alps while performing a sightseeing flight resulting in 20 fatalities. Due to the type 
of aircraft involved (not certified by EASA and an “Annex I aircraft” of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139) and the specific type of operation 
being carried, this accident has not been included in the statistics of this chapter.

11  Source: EUROCONTROL

2023 Annual Safety Review

33

Aeroplanes

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b
m
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N

120

100

80

60

40

20

0 

Serious incidents

Non-fatal accidents

Fatal accidents

Serious incident rate

Accident rate

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

83

24

1

60

22

0

55

26

2

52

15

1

94

15

1

70

8

1

97

13

0

76

20

0

32

6

0

53

13

0

11.5

11.7

15.8

3.0

2.2

3.9

51

13

1

9.6

2.6

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

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o
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o
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a
R

s
e
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u
t
r
a
p
e
d
n
o

i
l
l
i

m
1
r
e
p

 ´ Figure 2.2  Numbers and rates of fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents per million 

departures involving CAT complex aeroplanes

The number of serious injuries, slightly decreased in 2022 and reached the numbers of 2018 and 2019. Injuries 
in 2022 were attributable to passengers being injured during disembarkation by falling from the stairs, and 
encounters with turbulence during flight. The number of fatalities per year relates to the operation type 
(passenger or cargo), size and occupancy of the aeroplane involved in the accident. Two fatalities were sustained 
by persons on a motorcycle after a collision on the runway in Guinea.

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j

i

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a
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a
F

180

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0 

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Serious Injuries

Fatalities

17

3

7

0

7

7

120

150

9

2

15

3

5

0

5

0

3

0

7

0

5

2

 ´ Figure 2.3  Fatal and serious injuries per year involving CAT complex aeroplanes

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

34

Aeroplanes

Occurrence categories

Figure 2.4 outlines the top 10 categories assigned to the accidents and serious incidents in the past five years. 
Occurrences are categorised using the ICAO Accident Incident Data Reporting (ADREP) taxonomy for occurrence 
categories, developed for supporting common coding of the main elements of an occurrence that should be 
investigated, recorded, and analysed. 

Categories are of different natures, for example:

•  Operational such as low altitude operations (LALT);

•  Environmental such as turbulence encounter (TURB);

•  Technical such as system/ component failure or malfunction [non-powerplant] (SCF-NP):

•  Consequential such as fire/ smoke resulting from impact (F-POST); etc. 

Multiple categories may therefore be assigned to a single occurrence. For example, if an engine failure occurred, 
and loss of control followed, the occurrence would be coded in both categories, i.e., SCF-PP: powerplant failure 
or malfunction and LOC-I: loss of control in flight. The sum of the numbers of occurrences per category may 
therefore be greater than the total number of occurrences that were realised in the period.

In the period of 2018-2022, the highest number of accidents and serious incidents were system component 
failure related, followed by mid-air collision, and system component failure - powerplant categories.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

SCF-NP

MAC

SCF-PP

F-NI

RAMP

ATM

GCOL

RE

RI

NAV

SCF-NP: System/component failure or malfunction [non-powerplant]; MAC: Airprox/ ACAS alert/ loss of separation/(near) mid-air collisions; 
SCF-PP: powerplant failure or malfunction; F-NI: Fire/ smoke (non-impact); RAMP: Ground handling; ATM: ATM/ CNS; GCOL: Ground collision; 
RE: Runway excursion; RI: Runway incursion - vehicle, aircraft or person; NAV: Navigation error

 ´ Figure 2.4  Numbers of occurrences by occurrence category involving commercial air transport complex 

aeroplanes

2023 Annual Safety Review

35

Aeroplanes

Phase of flight

The numbers for 2022 in Figure 2.5 show a distribution of accidents and serious incidents per flight phase 
with a greater number during en-route and landing, approach, and take-off. The number of accidents and 
serious incidents during landing, critical phase of flight, in 2022 was higher than the 2012-2021 average. In 
2022 accidents and serious incidents during the standing and tow phases were slightly above the average. The 
unknown/ blank flight phase corresponds to those occurrences where no data was available, and it normally 
relates to the second aircraft in some of the occurrences.

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A

30

25

20

15

10

5

0 

Average 2012-2021

2022

Standing

7.8

8

Taxi

8.2

6

Take-off

En route

Approach

Landing

Tow

15.2

10

25.2

15

15.8

13

12.7

15

0.5

1

Unknown/
Blank

0.4

0

 ´ Figure 2.5  Accidents and serious incidents by phase of flight involving CAT complex aeroplanes

 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

36

Aeroplanes

Operation type

Figure 2.6 compares the number of accidents and serious incidents per operation type (passenger and cargo), 
showing the figures for the last year compared with the previous 10-year average. In 2022, like in 2020 and 2021, 
the number of occurrences for passenger flight operations remained below the 10-year average. The number of 
accidents and serious incidents for cargo flights was lower than the 10-year average.

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A

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Average 2012-2021

2022

Passenger

75.8

60

Cargo

8.6

4

 ´ Figure 2.6  Accidents and serious incidents by operation type involving CAT complex aeroplanes

Propulsion type

Figure 2.7 shows the distribution by propulsion type for the last year compared with the previous 10-year 
average. The figure shows a similar pattern between the 2022 figures and the 2012-2021 average figure, although 
the absolute numbers are lower in 2022 compared with the 10-year average (2012-2021). The split between 
turbofan and turboprop is consistent with the aircraft fleet sizes and utilisation.

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80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Turboprop

Turbofan

Average 2012-2021

2022

16.2

10

68.8

56

 ´ Figure 2.7  Accidents and serious incidents by propulsion type involving CAT complex aeroplanes

 
 
 
 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

37

Aeroplanes

2.2  CAT - other than complex aeroplanes

This section covers the safety performance of CAT passenger and cargo operations conducted by EASA AOC 
holders with non-complex aeroplanes, having a maximum take-off mass below 5 700 kg or not equipped with 
(a) turbofan engine(s) or more than one turboprop engine. Examples include airline, air taxi, air ambulance, 
sightseeing, etc. This is a new section that was introduced in this year’s annual safety review. Due to data 
availability for this domain, it covers the period from 2014 to 2022.

Key statistics

The key statistics for this domain are in the tables below and include a comparison of the number of accidents 
(fatal and non-fatal) and serious incidents for the last year and the previous 8-year period. Also included is a 
comparison of the fatalities and serious injuries sustained in those accidents during the same timeframe.

In 2022 there was no fatal accident involving EASA CAT AOC holder operating non-complex aeroplanes. The 
numbers of non-fatal accidents and serious incidents were higher than the average of the previous 8-year period. 

 ´ Table 2.3  Key statistics for CAT other than complex aeroplanes

Total number 
of occurrences 
per occurrence class 
over 2014-2021

Number of 
occurrences per 
occurrence class 
in 2022

Comparison 
2022 vs yearly average 
of 2014-2021 
per occurrence class

Fatal accidents

Non-fatal accidents

Serious incidents

2

9

11

0

3

2







 ´ Table 2.4  Fatalities and serious injuries involving CAT other than complex aeroplanes

Number of fatalities

Number of serious injuries

Total number over 2014-2021

Yearly max number over 2014-2021

Yearly min number over 2014-2021

Total number in 2022

6

4

2

0

4

4

0

2

2023 Annual Safety Review

38

Aeroplanes

Figure 2.8 shows that the number of non-fatal accidents in 2022 has increased, when compared with the previous 
year and has reached the level of 2015. The number of serious incidents has remained the same as in 2019, 2020 
and 2021.

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6

5

4

3

2

1

0

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Serious incidents

Non-fatal accidents

Fatal accidents

0

1

1

1

3

0

0

0

0

4

0

0

0

0

0

2

2

0

2

2

1

2

1

0

2

3

0

 ´ Figure 2.8  Numbers and rates of fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents per million 

departures involving CAT other than complex aeroplanes

The number of serious injuries, increased in 2022 but was still below the level of 2014. Two serious injuries in 
2022 were attributable to persons on board being injured during the crash of a sightseeing flight.

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0 

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a
F

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Serious injuries

Fatalities

4

2

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

4

0

0

2

0

 ´ Figure 2.9  Fatal and serious injuries per year involving CAT other than complex aeroplanes

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

39

Aeroplanes

Occurrence categories

Figure 2.10 outlines the top 5 categories assigned to the serious incidents and accidents in the past five 
years. Occurrences are categorised using the ICAO ADREP taxonomy for occurrence categories, developed for 
supporting common coding of the main elements of an occurrence that should be investigated, recorded, and 
analysed. 

In the period of 2018-2022 the highest number of accidents and serious incidents were abnormal runway contact 
related.

0

1

2

3

4

ARC

SCF-PP

RE

OTHR

WSTRW

ARC: Abnormal runway contact; SCF-PP: powerplant failure or malfunction; RE: Runway excursion; OTHR: Other; WSTRW: Windshear or 
thunderstorm

 ´ Figure 2.10  Numbers of occurrences by occurrence category involving CAT other than complex aeroplanes

Phase of flight

The low numbers in this domain do not allow any comparison in terms of flight phase. However, the data are still 
presented for information in Figure 2.11.

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2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0

Average 2014-2021

2022

Standing

0.1

0

Taxi

0.3

0

Take-off

En route

Approach

Landing

Unknown

Blank

0.3

2

0.8

2

0.6

0

0.5

1

0.1

0

0.1

0

 ´ Figure 2.11  Accidents and serious incidents by phase of flight involving CAT other than complex aeroplanes

 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

40

Aeroplanes

Operation type

Figure 2.12 compares the number of accidents and serious incidents per operation type (passenger and cargo), 
showing the figures for the last year compared with the previous 8-year average. In 2022 majority of accidents 
and serious incidents occurred during the sightseeing flights.

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3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0

Air Taxi

Sightseeing

Air Ambulance

Airline

Average 2014-2021

2022

0.9

0

0.8

3

0.3

0

0

1

Blank

0.9

1

 ´ Figure 2.12  Accidents and serious incidents by operation type involving CAT other than complex 

aeroplanes

Propulsion type

The low numbers in this domain do not allow any comparison between the two main propulsion types. However, 
the data are still presented for information in Figure 2.13.

4.5

4.0

3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0

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A

Reciprocating

Turboprop

Average 2014-2021

2022

2.1

4

0.6

1

 ´ Figure 2.13  Accidents and serious incidents by propulsion type involving CAT large aeroplanes

 
 
 
 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

41

Aeroplanes

2.3  NCC aeroplanes

This section covers the safety performance of EASA MS registered, or operated complex aeroplanes operating 
NCC with a maximum certificated take-off mass exceeding 5700 kg or equipped with (a) turbofan engine(s) 
or more than one turboprop engine. Examples include business, demonstration, flight training/instructional, 
relocation, etc.

Key statistics

The key statistics for this domain are in the tables below and include a comparison of the number of accidents 
(fatal and non-fatal) and serious incidents for the last year and the previous 10-year period. Also included is a 
comparison of the fatalities and serious injuries sustained in those accidents during the same timeframe. 

 ´ Table 2.5  Key statistics for non-commercial complex aeroplanes

Total number 
of occurrences 
per occurrence class 
over 2012-2021

Number of 
occurrences per 
occurrence class 
in 2022

Comparison 
2022 vs yearly average 
of 2012-2021 
per occurrence class

Fatal accidents

Non-fatal accidents

Serious incidents

4

23

59

2

0

3

 ´ Table 2.6  Fatalities and serious injuries involving NCC aeroplanes







Number of fatalities

Number of serious injuries

Total number over 2012-2021

Yearly max number over 2012-2021

Yearly min number over 2012-2021

Total number in 2022

7

4

0

10

3

2

0

0

2023 Annual Safety Review

42

Aeroplanes

Figure 2.14 shows that during 2022, there were two fatal accidents involving an EASA MS registered NCC 
aeroplane. CESSNA – 551 crashed in the Baltic sea with four fatalities, and PIAGGIO - P180 - AVANTI II crashed in 
the sea of the coast of Costa Rica resulting in six fatalities.

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25

20

15

10

5

0

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

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m
1
r
e
p

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2

0

1

5

0

1

5

4

0

7

2

0

6

3

0

8

4

1

6

4

1

Serious incidents

Non-fatal accidents

Fatal accidents

Serious incident rate

Accident rate

16

4

0

30.8

7.7

3

1

0

7.5

2.5

1

1

0

1.8

1.8

3

0

2

5.0

3.4

 ´ Figure 2.14  Fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents per year involving NCC aeroplanes

The number of fatalities and serious injuries per year is shown in Figure 2.15. In 2022 there were 10 fatalities that 
is the highest number when compared with the previous 10-year period (2012-2021).

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

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e
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d
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a
l
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a
F

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Serious Injuries

Fatalities

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

4

2

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

10

 ´ Figure 2.15  Fatal and serious injuries per year involving NCC aeroplanes

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

43

Aeroplanes

Occurrence categories

Figure 2.16 outlines the top 5 categories assigned to the serious incidents and accidents in the past five 
years. Occurrences are categorised using the ICAO ADREP taxonomy for occurrence categories, developed for 
supporting common coding of the main elements of an occurrence that should be investigated, recorded, and 
analysed. 

In the period of 2018-2022 the highest number of accidents and serious incidents were mid-air collision 
occurrence category related, Followed by system component failure or malfunction - non-powerplant.

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

MAC

SCF-NP

RE

NAV

ARC

MAC: Airprox/ ACAS alert/ loss of separation/ (near) mid-air collisions; SCF-NP: System/component failure or malfunction [non-powerplant]; 
RE: Runway excursion; NAV: Navigation error; ARC: Abnormal runway contact

 ´ Figure 2.16  Numbers of occurrences by occurrence category involving NCC aeroplanes

Phase of flight

The low numbers in this domain do not allow any comparison in terms of flight phase. However, the data are still 
presented for information in Figure 2.17.

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A

2.5

2

1.5

1

0.5

0

Average 2012-2021

2022

Standing

1.3

0

Taxi

0.5

0

Take-off

En route

Approach

Landing

Manoeuvring

Unknown

Blank

1.3

1

2.3

2

1.5

1

2.3

0

0.2

0

0.2

1

0.1

0

 ´ Figure 2.17  Accidents and serious incidents by phase of flight involving NCC aeroplanes

 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

44

Aeroplanes

Propulsion type

The low numbers in this domain do not allow any comparison between the two main propulsion types. However, 
the data are still presented for information in Figure 2.18.

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

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Turboprop

Turbofan

Average 2012-2021

2022

1.7

2

7

3

 ´ Figure 2.18  Accidents and serious incidents by propulsion type involving NCC aeroplanes

 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

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Aeroplanes

2.4  Safety risks for CAT and NCC aeroplanes

CAT complex aeroplanes and NCC aeroplanes are covered by a single portfolio due to the similarity of the main 
risk areas for aircraft operated, as well as the small amount of data available for NCC. 

The key risk areas (KRAs) for CAT and NCC aeroplanes are shown in Figure 2.19.

KRAs and occurrence categories (refer to Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.16) have different purposes. While occurrence 
categories describe actual factors and outcomes of an occurrence, KRAs describe the potential outcome of an 
occurrence. The KRA is defined by the most likely type of accident that an occurrence could have escalated to. 
Unlike occurrence categories, where multiple categories may be assigned to a single occurrence, there can only 
be one KRA per occurrence. The KRA is one element of the European Risk Classification Scheme (ERCS). This 
scheme is applied when determining the safety risk score of an occurrence and is further detailed in the ASR 
introduction.

The risk picture by KRAs has retained the airborne collision as the highest KRA, when compared to the previous 
year. However, there are some corrections for the following KRAs, namely, collision on runway and aircraft upset 
have now higher aggregated risk score than runway excursion. This means that risks associated with aircraft 
upset have increased for the domain. The reasons for this can be explained by the moving period of included 
data set – being five-years and nature of accidents and serious incidents that occurred within this period.

Lower Risk

Higher Risk

Airborne collision

Collision on runway

Aircraft upset

Excursion - Runway excursion

Ground damage / Collision

Obstacle collision in flight

Fire, smoke and pressurisation

Other injuries

Terrain collision

Excursion - 
Taxiway/Apron excursion

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Number of risk scored occurrences

Aggregated ERCS score

 ´ Figure 2.19  KRAs by aggregated ERCS score and number of risk-scored occurrences involving CAT large 

aeroplanes and NCC aeroplanes

2023 Annual Safety Review

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Aeroplanes

As illustrated in Figure 2.19, the higher-risk KRAs are:

•  Airborne collision includes all occurrences involving actual or potential airborne collisions between 
aircraft, while both aircraft are airborne, and between aircraft and other airborne objects (excluding 
birds and wildlife). In 2022 the highest risk contributors were occurrences such as a loss of separation, 
and TCAS resolution advisories cases. This KRA is mainly managed through safety issues identified in 
the ATM/ANS safety risk portfolio.

•  Collision on runway includes occurrences involving collisions or near-collisions between an aircraft 
and another object (other aircraft, vehicles, etc.) or person that occurs on a runway of an aerodrome 
or other predesignated landing area. It does not include collisions with birds or wildlife. In 2022 the 
highest risk contributors were occurrences involving loss of separation between two airliners, one 
landing and departing one still being on the runway, runway incursion by motorcycle leading to 
collision and fatalities on ground, aircraft landing on the wrong runway, unsafe ATC clearance related, 
and runway incursion by large aeroplane while take-off is in progress. This KRA is mainly managed 
through safety issues identified in the ATM/ANS and the Aerodromes and Ground handling safety risk 
portfolios.

•  Aircraft upset includes an undesired aircraft state characterised by unintentional divergences from 
parameters normally experienced during operations, which might ultimately lead to an uncontrolled 
impact with terrain. In 2022 the highest risk contributing occurrences were aircraft operating a 
pleasure flight crashing into the sea, unstable approach and difficulties in controlling the aircraft after 
missed approach (both pilots making simultaneous inputs to the flight controls), partial electrical 
failure and control difficulties during approach, and broken aileron cable requiring abnormal control 
inputs to keep wings level.

•  Runway excursion includes all occurrences involving actual or potential situations when an aircraft 
leaves the runway or movement area of an aerodrome or landing surface of any other predesignated 
landing area, without getting airborne. In 2022 the highest risk contributors were occurrences 
involving the actual runway excursions related with unstable approaches, poor runway surface 
condition, adverse weather conditions, and hard landings.

2023 Annual Safety Review

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Aeroplanes

2.5  SPO aeroplanes 

The scope of this section covers SPO involving aeroplanes of all mass categories having an EASA MS as state of 
registry or state of operator.

Key statistics

The key statistics for this domain are in Table 2.7 and Table 2.8 and include a comparison of the number of 
accidents (fatal and non-fatal) and serious incidents for the last year and the previous 10-year period. It also 
includes a comparison of the fatalities and serious injuries sustained in those accidents during the same 
timeframe.

The cumulated number of fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents in 2022 remained below the 
average of the preceding decade for each occurrence class. From the three fatal accidents in 2022, two of them 
occurred during glider towing operations after emergency release of the glider, the other one during parachute 
operations after the skydivers exited the aeroplanes. The numbers of fatalities and serious injuries in 2022 were 
close to the minimum values of the preceding decade. 

 ´ Table 2.7  Key statistics for SPO aeroplanes

Total number 
of occurrences 
per occurrence class 
over 2012-2021

Number of 
occurrences per 
occurrence class 
in 2022

Comparison 
2022 vs yearly average 
of 2012-2021 
per occurrence class

Fatal accidents

Non-fatal accidents

Serious incidents

56

182

78

3

10

5







 ´ Table 2.8  Fatalities and serious injuries involving CAT complex aeroplanes

Number of fatalities

Number of serious injuries

Total number over 2012-2021

Yearly max number over 2012-2021

Yearly min number over 2012-2021

Total number in 2022

128

31

4

5

61

16

1

2

The number of accidents and serious incidents per year is shown in Figure 2.20.

Except 2012, where only one fatal accident was recorded, the number of fatal accidents in 2022 was equal to the 
minimum values of the preceding decade. The number of serious incidents in 2022 was close to the number in 
2021. The number of non-fatal accidents in 2022 was lower than in all years in the preceding decade. As in all 
years of the preceding decade, the number of non-fatal accidents is higher than the number of serious incidents 
and the number of fatal accidents in 2022.

2023 Annual Safety Review

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Aeroplanes

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45

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Serious incidents

Non-fatal accidents

Fatal accidents

9

23

1

3

22

7

4

23

11

5

22

8

13

12

6

13

26

4

8

16

7

7

11

5

13

16

3

3

11

4

5

10

3

 ´ Figure 2.20  Fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents per year involving SPO aeroplanes

The number of fatalities and serious injuries per year is shown in Figure 2.21.

The numbers of fatalities and serious injuries in 2022 are close to the lowest numbers of the preceding decade, 
most recently recorded in 2020 for the number of fatalities and in 2021 for the number of serious injuries. The 
number of serious injuries in 2022 is low in relation to the number of non-fatal accidents. Seven of the ten non-
fatal accidents resulted in substantial damage to the aircraft with minor or no injuries. In two other non-fatal 
accidents, the aircraft was destroyed, one accident resulting in one serious injury, the other in a minor injury. 
The last non-fatal accident resulted in runway excursion, with unknown damage to the aircraft, and no injuries.

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25

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10

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2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Serious Injuries

Fatalities

7

13

4

16

6

31

16

16

9

9

9

5

2

8

1

13

6

4

1

13

2

5

 ´ Figure 2.21  Fatal and serious injuries per year involving SPO aeroplanes

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

49

Aeroplanes

Occurrence categories

Figure 2.22 outlines the top 15 categories assigned to the serious incidents and accidents in the past five 
years. Occurrences are categorised using the ICAO ADREP taxonomy for occurrence categories, developed for 
supporting common coding of the main elements of an occurrence that should be investigated, recorded, and 
analysed. 

For the period 2018-2022, there were 122 serious incidents and accidents involving SPO aeroplanes. The 
occurrence category LOC-I: loss of control in flight was assigned to 21 serious incidents and accidents, amongst 
which ten resulted in fatalities. While being assigned to 18 serious incidents and accidents, the occurrence 
category SCF-NP: System/component failure or malfunction [non-powerplant] did not contribute to any fatal 
accident. The occurrence categories MAC: Airprox/ ACAS alert/ loss of separation/ (near) mid-air collisions and 
RE: Runway excursion were both assigned to 14 serious incidents and accidents. While the occurrence category 
MAC: Airprox/ ACAS alert/ loss of separation/ (near) mid-air collisions was involved in two fatal accidents that 
occurred during parachute operations, the occurrence category RE: Runway excursion was only involved in 
serious incidents and non-fatal accidents. Five of the 13 serious incidents and accidents, where the occurrence 
category GTOW: Glider towing related events was assigned, resulted in fatalities. No fatalities were recorded for 
the serious incidents and accidents which the occurrence category SCF-PP: powerplant failure or malfunction 
contributed to.

0

5

10

15

20

25

LOC-I

SCF-NP

MAC

RE

GTOW

SCF-PP

UNK

OTHR

GCOL

LALT

ARC

CFIT

F-POST

FUEL

LOC-G

LOC-I: Loss of control - inflight; SCF-NP: System/ component failure or malfunction [non-powerplant]; MAC: Airprox/ ACAS alert/ loss of 
separation/ (near) mid-air collisions; RE: Runway excursion; GTOW: Glider towing related events; SCF-PP: powerplant failure or malfunction; 
UNK: Unknown or undetermined; OTHR: Other; GCOL: Ground collision; LALT: Low altitude operations; ARC: Abnormal runway contact; CFIT: 
Controlled flight into or toward terrain; F-POST: Fire/smoke (post-impact); FUEL: Fuel related; LOC-G: Loss of control - ground

 ´ Figure 2.22  Numbers of occurrences by occurrence category involving SPO aeroplanes

2023 Annual Safety Review

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Aeroplanes

Phase of flight

Figure 2.23 shows the distribution of accidents and serious incidents by flight phase.

The numbers of serious incidents and accidents in 2022 were lower than the average of the preceding decade 
for all flight phases except approach. In 2021, 12 out of the 18 accidents and serious incidents occurred at take-
off, during approach or at landing.

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9

8

7

6

5

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3

2

1

0

Average 2012-2021

2022

Standing

0.3

0

Taxi

1.9

1

Take-off

En route

Manoevring

Approach

Landing

Tow

Unknown/
Blank

7.9

6

6.5

3

4.9

1

2.8

3

5.9

3

0.3

0

1.5

1

 ´ Figure 2.23  Accidents and serious incidents by phase of flight involving SPO aeroplanes

 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

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Aeroplanes

Operation type

Figure 2.24 shows the number of accidents and serious incidents by SPO.

In 2022 the number of accidents and serious incidents were equal or lower than the average of the preceding 
decade for all operation types except aerial survey, animal herding/ mustering, and calibration operations. In 
2022, 14 out of the 18 serious incidents and accidents were in parachute drop and sailplane towing operations. 
There  were  no  accidents  or  serious  incidents  in  aerial  advertising,  aerial  observation,  agricultural,  and 
photography operations.

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12

10

8

6

4

2

0

Aerial  
advertising

Aerial  
observation

Aerial 
survey

Agri-
cultural

Airshow
/race

Animal 
herding/ 
mustering

Calibration

Parachute
drop

Photo-
graphy

Sailplane 
towing

Other

Unknown
/ Blank

Average 2012-2021

2022

0.8

0

0.4

0

0

1

4.4

0

4

1

0.1

1

0.1

1

9.7

8

1.2

0

8.6

6

0.5

0

1.2

0

 ´ Figure 2.24  Accidents and serious incidents by SPO type involving aeroplanes

Propulsion type

Figure 2.25 shows the number of accidents and serious incidents by propulsion type.

The number of accidents and serious incidents in 2022 involving aircraft with reciprocating engines or turboprop 
engines were around half of the average of the preceding decade. There were no accidents or serious incidents 

involving turbofan and turbojet engines in 2022.

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30

25

20

15

10

5

0

Reciprocating

Turboprop

Turbofan

Turbojet

Average 2012-2021

2022

25.5

15

5,9

3

0.2

0

0.2

0

 ´ Figure 2.25  Accidents and serious incidents by propulsion type involving SPO aeroplanes

 
 
 
 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

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Aeroplanes

Safety risks for SPO aeroplanes

The KRAs for specialised operations involving aeroplanes are shown in Figure 2.26.

KRAs and occurrence categories (refer to Figure 2.22) have different purposes. While occurrence categories 
describe actual factors and outcomes of an occurrence, KRAs describe the potential outcome of an occurrence. 
The KRA is defined by the most likely type of accident that an occurrence could have escalated to. Unlike 
occurrence categories, where multiple categories may be assigned to a single occurrence, there can only be one 
KRA per occurrence. The KRA is one element of the ERCS. This scheme is applied when determining the safety 
risk score of an occurrence and is further detailed in the ASR introduction.

It can be stated that aircraft upset was the most likely type of accident to which accidents and serious incidents 
escalated / could have escalated for the period 2018-2022 (52 occurrences out of 122). Aircraft upset also 
presented the highest safety risk in the domain. While 27 occurrences escalated to/ could have escalated to 
excursion, the safety risk was much lower than the safety risks associated with terrain collision, airborne collision 
and obstacle collision in flight. With only 10 occurrences out of 122, terrain collision presented however the 
second highest safety risk for the domain. 

Lower Risk

Higher Risk

Aircraft upset

Terrain collision

Airborne collision

Obstacle collision in flight

Excursion

Collision on runway

Ground damage

Other injuries

Fire, smoke and pressurisation

Security

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Number of risk scored occurrences

Aggregated ERCS score

 ´ Figure 2.26  KRAs by aggregated ERCS score and number of risk-scored occurrences involving  

SPO aeroplanes

2023 Annual Safety Review

53

Aeroplanes

2.6  Non-commercial other than complex 

aeroplanes

The scope of this section covers Non-commercial operations conducted by EASA MS registered non-complex 
aeroplanes, having a maximum take-off mass below 5700 kg or not equipped with (a) turbofan engine(s) or 
more than one turboprop engine, and not covered in the sections above. This dataset includes certified small 
aeroplanes as well as Light Sport Aeroplanes (LSA) and Very Light Aeroplanes (VLA). Ultralights, microlights, and 
other aircraft not certified are excluded from this dataset but are examined further in the microlights chapter. 
These statistics are therefore not fully comparable with previous editions of the ASR due to the better filtering 
of the dataset.

This chapter uses a consolidated dataset from the ECR database and the EASA database as its main source for 
the key statistics. However, the safety issues, human factors and human performance, and airworthiness figures 
(available in the Appendix 2) use the EASA database only, which contains more relevant information for the 
evaluation of safety issues and human factors. 

Key statistics

The key statistics for this domain are in the tables below and include a comparison of the number of accidents 
(fatal and non-fatal) and serious incidents for the last year and the previous 10-year period. It also includes a 
comparison of the fatalities and serious injuries sustained in those accidents during the same timeframe.

Table 2.9 shows a decrease of fatal and non-fatal accidents in 2022. Fatal accidents decreased by 23%, non-fatal 
accidents by 13% and serious incidents increased by 44% compared to the 10-year average

 ´ Table 2.9  Key statistics for non-commercial other than complex aeroplanes

Total number 
of occurrences 
per occurrence class 
over 2012-2021

Number of 
occurrences per 
occurrence class 
in 2022

Comparison 
2022 vs yearly average 
of 2012-2021 
per occurrence class

Fatal accidents

Non-fatal accidents

Serious incidents

400

2211

741

31

193

107







Table 2.10 presents the numbers of fatalities and serious injuries last year compared to the 10-year period. The 
table shows a 24% decrease in the number of fatalities in 2022 and there was a 48% decrease in serious injuries 
compared to the 10-year average. 

 ´ Table 2.10 Numbers of fatalities and serious injuries involving non-commercial other than complex 

aeroplanes

Number of fatalities

Number of serious injuries

Total number over 2012-2021

Yearly max number over 2012-2021

Yearly min number over 2012-2021

Total number in 2022

764

88

55

58

405

48

29

21

2023 Annual Safety Review

54

Aeroplanes

Figure 2.27 shows the numbers of fatal and non-fatal accidents and serious incidents per year. The figure shows 
a drop in fatal and non-fatal accidents between 2021 and 2022. Given the fact that Regulation (EU) 376/2014 
better established occurrence reporting, it is possible that serious incidents were under-reported in the period 
before the regulation entered into force in late 2015.

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450

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

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2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Serious incidents

Non-fatal accidents

Fatal accidents

38

277

49

29

265

45

36

256

44

26

243

42

63

160

40

82

171

28

89

229

55

111

252

40

134

257

36

134

247

46

107

210

31

 ´ Figure 2.27  Fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents per year involving non-commercial 

other than complex aeroplanes

Figure 2.28 shows the total number of fatalities and serious injuries over time. The number of fatalities in 2022 
was significantly lower compared to the 10-year average. The number of serious injuries was close to half of the 
10-year average of the preceding decade.

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20

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2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Serious Injuries

Fatalities

43

81

33

82

48

88

48

83

39

82

48

70

43

90

49

66

40

66

45

90

27

58

 ´ Figure 2.28  Fatal and serious injuries per year involving non-commercial other than complex aeroplanes

 
 
 
 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

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Aeroplanes

Rates of accidents

Six years ago, EASA published accident rates for non-commercially operated small aeroplanes for the first time, 
using the results of a joint EASA/AOPA survey in 2014. These figures have been updated in recent years using 
an AOPA/GAMA survey.  The utilisation data from this year’s survey for 2022 is not available at the time of this 
writing.  However, it is EASA’s assumption that the drop in number of accidents in 2022 can be attributed to less 
flying being performed due to the increased inflation rate in Europe.   

Figure 2.29 displays the number of fatal and non-fatal accidents for the past 5 years and the accident rates per 
100000 flights.

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Non-fatal accidents

Fatal accidents

Fatal accident rate

Non-fatal accident rate

2018

229

55

0.9

3.4

2019

252

40

0.6

3.9

2020

257

36

0.6

4.3

2021

247

46

0.7

3.8

2022

210

31

 ´ Figure 2.29  Numbers and rates of accidents involving non-commercial other than complex aeroplanes

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

56

Aeroplanes

Figure 2.30 compares the number of accidents per month from 2020-2022. It can be observed that the 2020 
line is steeper than the other lines creating a peak from May to September. This is the period where COVID-19 
restrictions were lifted. The extended period of not flying due to COVID-19 restrictions may have caused a 
deterioration of the pilot-flight competences, resulting in various problems. Please note that the section on 
safety risks in Appendix 2.4 for further information. It is also worth noting the 2022 line. It coincides well with 
the key statistics and shows a more even distribution of accidents throughout the year, but now likely to be 
affected by the increased inflation in Europe due to the Russian invasion into Ukraine.

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

2020

2021

2022

 ´ Figure 2.30  Comparison of number of accidents involving non-commercial other than complex aeroplanes 

per month

EASA encourages pilots to thoroughly plan their flights and mentally prepare themselves for different scenarios 
and what decisions they will make if they come up. This enhances the pilot’s comprehension of the problems and 
improves their decision making, their clear thinking, as well as their chances of landing the aircraft with minimal 
negative consequences.

 
2023 Annual Safety Review

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Aeroplanes

Occurrence categories

Figure 2.31 outlines the top 20 categories assigned to the serious incidents and accidents in the past five years. 
Occurrences are categorised using the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST)/ ICAO Common Taxonomy Team 
(CICTT) taxonomy for occurrence categories, developed for supporting common coding of the main elements 
of an occurrence that should be investigated, recorded, and analysed. Categories are of different nature, e.g., 
operational such as low altitude operations (LALT), environmental such as turbulence encounter (TURB), technical 
such as system/ component failure or malfunction [non-powerplant] (SCF-NP), consequential such as fire/ smoke 
resulting from impact (F-POST), etc. Multiple categories may therefore be assigned to a single occurrence. For 
example, if an engine failure occurred, and loss of control followed, the occurrence would be coded in both 
categories, i.e., SCF-PP: powerplant failure or malfunction and LOC-I: loss of control in flight. The sum of the 
numbers of occurrences per category may therefore be greater that the total number of occurrences that realised 
in the period.

0

100

200

300

400

500

ARC

RE

SCF-PP

LOC-I

SCF-NP

MAC

LOC-G

UNK

CTOL

F-POST

GCOL

FUEL

OTHR

CFIT

AMAN

F-NI

LALT

NAV

USOS

RI

ARC: Abnormal runway contact; RE: Runway excursion; SCF-PP: powerplant failure or malfunction; LOC-I: Loss of control - inflight; SCF-NP: 
System/component failure or malfunction [non-powerplant]; MAC: Airprox/ACAS alert/loss of separation/(near) mid-air collisions; LOC-G: Loss 
of control - ground; UNK: Unknown or undetermined; CTOL: Collision with obstacle(s) during take-off and landing; F-POST: Fire/smoke (post-
impact); GCOL: Ground Collision; FUEL: Fuel related; OTHR: Other; CFIT: Controlled flight into or toward terrain; AMAN: Abrupt maneuvre; F-NI: 
Fire/smoke (non-impact); LALT: Low altitude operations; NAV: Navigation error; USOS: Undershoot/ overshoot; RI: Runway incursion - vehicle, 
aircraft or person

 ´ Figure 2.31  Numbers of occurrences by occurrence category involving non-commercial other than complex 

aeroplanes

2023 Annual Safety Review

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Aeroplanes

Phase of flight

The accidents in general aviation most commonly occur in the landing phase. The year 2022 was no exception 
and there was a decrease in most flight phases compared to the 10-year average. A 5% decrease is reflected in 
the flight phases of landing, and 23% fewer accidents occurred during take-off, compared to the 10-year average. 
The unknown/blank column has also increased. This is considered normal as investigations often take up to three 
years to complete and all relevant information is sometimes not immediately available.

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160

140

120

100

80

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40

20

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Average 2012-2021

2022

Standing

6.8

6

Taxi

15.7

22

Take-off

En route

Manoevring

Approach

Landing

Tow

57.2

46

58.2

57

12

8

32.2

33

127.7

139

0.3

0

Unknown/
Blank

21.3

41

 ´ Figure 2.32  Accidents and serious incidents by phase of flight involving non-commercial other than 

complex aeroplanes

Operation type

The two main operation types in non-commercial operations (NCO) are pleasure/recreational flying and training 
flights. In Figure 2.33, it can be observed when examining the data table, that the 2012 and 2013 data is vastly 
lower than the rest. The reason is the ECR data and the fact that the EASA data before 2014 has not been 
uploaded to the ECR. This skews the average, especially for the pleasure and flight training data and should be 
taken cautiously. The unknown/blank column has been manually adjusted for 2012 and 2013 to reflect this loss 
of data in the average figures. The number of accidents in pleasure flying is similar as there were in flight training 
in 2022. This is proportionally comparable to the 10-year average.

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Pleasure

Flight Training/ 
instructional

Relocation

Test flight

Demonstration

Other

Unknown/Blank

Average 2012-2021

2022

126.4

136

73.3

124

3.3

3

2.1

5

1.21

0

3.1

2

57.8

82

 ´ Figure 2.33  Accidents and serious incidents by operation type involving non-commercial other than 

complex aeroplanes

 
 
 
 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

59

Aeroplanes

Safety risks for non-commercial other than complex aeroplanes

The KRAs for SPO involving aeroplanes are shown in Figure 2.34.

KRAs and occurrence categories (refer toFigure 2.31) have different purposes. While occurrence categories 
describe actual factors and outcomes of an occurrence, KRAs describe the potential outcome of an occurrence. 
The KRA is defined by the most likely type of accident that an occurrence could have escalated to. Unlike 
occurrence categories, where multiple categories may be assigned to a single occurrence, there can only be one 
KRA per occurrence. The KRA is one element of the ERCS. This scheme is applied when determining the safety 
risk score of an occurrence and is further detailed in the ASR introduction.

The KRA with the highest risk is aircraft upset. This KRA has 469 occurrences over the period 2018-2022 and 
it produces the highest risk score and is therefore the area where the greatest need for intervention lies. To 
contrast these figures, it can be observed that the KRA runway excursion has over 650 occurrences. The risk of 
fatalities or injuries is however very low. Other KRAs worth mentioning are terrain collision, airborne collision, 
and obstacle collision in flight.

Lower Risk

Higher Risk

Aircraft upset

Terrain collision

Airborne collision

Obstacle collision in flight

Runway excursion

Fire, smoke, pressurisation

Collision on runway

Ground damage

Other injuries

0

100

200

300

400

500

Number of risk scored occurrences

Aggregated ERCS score

 ´ Figure 2.34  KRAs by aggregated ERCS score and number of risk-scored occurrences, involving non-

commercial other than complex aeroplanes

Microlights

The diversity of general aviation exceeds EASA´s regulatory remit. However, most accidents involving EASA MS 
registered microlights and ultralights also occur in Europe, with some accidents also occurring outside Europe. 
Figure 2.35 shows accidents and serious incidents on EASA MS registered microlights and ultralights from 2014 
to 2022 that have been reported into the ECR and to EASA. The dataset used is the same consolidated dataset 
as used for non-commercial other than complex aeroplanes. The data for 2012 and 2013 were excluded as 

2023 Annual Safety Review

60

Aeroplanes

ultralights do not specifically fall under EASA’s remit and was not within scope when the data was collected at the 
time. Therefore, such data were not always entered systematically into the databases. Regulation (EU) 376/2014 
entered into force in 2015, since reporting rates have increased.

Figure 2.36 provides an overview of the reported fatalities and injuries during the same period. The dataset 
used is the same consolidated dataset as used for non-commercial other than complex aeroplanes. Overall, the 
number of accidents, serious injuries and fatalities is slowly showing a downward trend over time. The number 
of fatalities and serious injuries shown Figure 2.36 largely coincides with the data on accidents and serious 
incidents shown in Figure 2.35. However, in 2022 the numbers of fatal accidents and serious incidents was similar 
to 2021, but non-fatal accidents decreased by 25% in comparison with 2021.

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Serious incidents

Non-fatal accidents

Fatal accidents

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26

18

104

37

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37

14

102

34

13

110

35

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103

30

20

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32

 ´ Figure 2.35  Numbers of fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents per year involving non-

commercially operated microlights

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Serious Injuries

Fatalities

14

38

25

67

32

32

10

55

18

49

20

47

28

49

13

40

20

40

 ´ Figure 2.36  Numbers of fatal and serious injuries per year involving non-commercially operated microlights

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

61

Aeroplanes

Aeroplanes registered outside the EASA MS

Aeroplanes registered outside the EASA MS but operated inside the union, also fall outside of EASA’s remit. Most 
of these aeroplanes are registered in the United States of America (N-registered aeroplanes), and now also in the 
United Kingdom (G-registered aircraft). To provide an overview of this sector, EASA provides figures of accidents 
and serious incidents that have been reported to or collected by EASA. 

Figure 2.37 shows 262 non-fatal and 43 fatal accidents from 2012-2022. Figure 2.38 shows that these accidents 
resulted in 62 fatalities and 44 serious injuries over the period.

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Serious incidents

Non-fatal accidents

Fatal accidents

3

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56

6

11

20

2

18

42

5

11

28

7

12

29

6

5

22

4

3

16

6

 ´ Figure 2.37  Numbers of fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents, and serious incidents in EU/EEA MS per year 

involving non-commercially operated aircraft not registered in an EASA MS.

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2020

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2022

Serious Injuries

Fatalities

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10

7

4

10

4

3

4

8

6

11

11

9

2

4

3

4

 ´ Figure 2.38  Numbers of fatal and serious injuries per year involving non-commercially operated aircraft 

not registered in the EASA MS

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

62

Aeroplanes

Figure 2.39 shows that over the 2014-2022 period that 99 N-registered aeroplanes, 81 G-registered aircraft, 12 
non-EASA Member State registered aircraft and 19 aircraft of unknown registration were involved in fatal and 
non-fatal accidents in EU/EEA MS. There were 43 fatal accidents in the period on these aeroplanes.

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N-registered

G-registered

Other

Unknown

 ´ Figure 2.39  Numbers of fatal and non-fatal accidents on non-commercially operated aircraft not registered 

in the EASA MS and occurring within the EASA MS.

 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3
Helicopters  

Helicopters

2023 Annual Safety Review

64

Helicopters

This chapter covers all operations involving EASA certified or validated helicopters. The chapter is divided in four 
main sections: 

•  All helicopter operations providing aggregated statistics on EASA certified or validated helicopters 
performing CAT, SPO or non-commercial operations, and for which an EASA MS is either state of 
operator, state of registry or state of occurrence;

•  CAT flights conducted by EASA AOC holders and using certified or validated helicopters. This section 
brings together CAT helicopter operations for both onshore flights and includes HEMS, air ambulance, 
air taxi or sightseeing, and those flights to offshore oil, gas and renewable energy installations;

•  SPO involving certified or validated helicopters, such as sling load, advertisement, and photography 

with an EASA MS as the state of operator or state of registry; 

•  Non-commercial operations involving certified or validated helicopters, with an EASA MS as the state 

of operator or state of registry. This section includes, particularly training flights.

2022 saw a welcome lifting of COVID restrictions and a return to relatively normal flying operations, albeit with 
global flight fast approaching pre-pandemic levels.

The data presented are based on the accidents and serious incidents collected by the Agency under Regulation 
(EU) 996/2010 on accident and serious incident investigation and Regulation (EU) 376/2014 on occurrence 
reporting and in order to gain a wider picture, data has been supplemented by usage data from the airframe 
manufacturers or searching for those events from other official sources. 

For each section, the key statistics, the occurrence categories and the safety risks at KRA level are presented in 
the core document. Advanced statistics are then provided per aviation domain in domain-specific appendices, 
giving an overview of the contributors to the safety risks identified in the core document for these types of 
operations at the European level. The advanced statistics are solely derived from occurrence data from the EASA 
occurrence repository and the ECR. It is important to note that the fleet size data has been extracted from the 
Cirium12 database regarding the total EASA MS fleet for the period between 2018-2022.

The list of fatal accidents associated with the scope of this chapter is provided in Appendix 1 of this document.

The advanced statistics associated with the scope of this chapter are provided in Appendix 3 of this document.

12  Source:  Cirium  Fleets  Analyzer.  Extraction  date:  13  June  2023.  Includes  all  civil  (i.e.,  non-military  and  non-state)  CS-27  and  CS-29 
rotorcraft  that  are  operated  by  EASA  MS  operators.  EASA  Type  I  rotorcraft  are  excluded.  Cirium  makes  no  warranties,  express  or 
implied, as to the accuracy, adequacy, timeliness, or completeness of its data or its fitness for any particular purpose. Cirium disclaims 
all liability relating to or fully arising out of use of its data and other content or permissible by law. The total fleet is based on data for 
all EASA MSs, excluding the United Kingdom.

2023 Annual Safety Review

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Helicopters

3.1  All helicopter operations

The scope of this section covers the key safety statistics for certified or validated helicopters performing CAT, 
SPO or non-commercial operations, and for which an EASA MS is either the state of operator, state of registry or 
state of occurrence.

Key statistics

The key statistics for this domain are in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2. It includes a comparison of the number of 
accidents (fatal and non-fatal) and serious incidents for the last year and the previous 10-year period. Similarly, 
a comparison of the fatalities and serious injuries sustained in those accidents during the same timeframe is 
also included. In absolute numbers of fatal accidents, 2022 marks an increase compared to the average of the 
preceding decade, whereas the number of non-fatal accidents was similar to this average and the number of 
serious incidents was lower than the 10-year average. 

 ´ Table 3.1  Key statistics for all helicopter operations

Total number 
of occurrences 
per occurrence class 
over 2012-2021

Number of 
occurrences per 
occurrence class 
in 2022

Comparison 
2022 vs yearly average 
of 2012-2021 
per occurrence class

Fatal accidents

Non-fatal accidents

Serious incidents

83

374

145

10

37

13



=



 ´ Table 3.2  Fatalities and serious injuries involving all helicopter operations 

Number of fatalities

Number of serious injuries

Total number over 2012-2021

Yearly max number over 2012-2021

Yearly min number over 2012-2021

Total number in 2022

200

30

10

24

110

19

6

11

The number of accidents and serious incidents per year are shown in Figure 3.1. In absolute numbers, the total 
number of fatal accidents and non-fatal accidents have increased during 2022, but it has decreased for the 
number of serious incidents.

The number of fatalities in 2022 was higher than the preceding decade’s average, and the number of serious 
injuries in 2022 was similar to this average.

In the last 5-year period (2018-2022) covered by this analysis, there were 93 fatalities in the identified accidents. 
Considering all accidents (fatal and non-fatal) gives a mean fatality rate of 0.43 fatalities per accident. Considering 
only fatal accidents, the mean fatality rate becomes 2.1 fatalities per accident.

2023 Annual Safety Review

66

Helicopters

Since these figures are not normalised with traffic data, the number of occurrences should be interpreted 
cautiously, as the exact variation of helicopter flying activity at the European level over the past two years is 
difficult to assess. The Agency is currently taking action to address the recurrent challenge of evaluating the 
level of helicopter flying activity in Europe by engaging with the industry and National Competent Authorities 
(NCA) to collect and consolidate helicopter exposure data. For this, EASA through the Network of aviation safety 
Analysts (NoA) has made a step forward to include the digitalisation and centralised collection from the NCAs of 
the Airworthiness Review Certificate (ARC) Forms, as part of the repository of information under the EASA Basic 
Regulation Article 72 Information gathering, exchange and analysis. This project will enable the collection of 
helicopter flight hours, to improve the estimation of helicopter flying activity in Europe.

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Serious incidents

Non-fatal accidents

Fatal accidents

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10

 ´ Figure 3.1  Fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents per year involving all helicopter 

operations 

The number of fatalities and serious injuries per year is shown in Figure 3.2.  Considering that the air traffic 
recovery is fast approaching pre-pandemic levels, we saw also that the overall trend is increasing. The absolute 
number of fatalities in 2022 has almost doubled compared to the year before, whereas the figures for serious 
injuries were similar.

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Serious Injuries

Fatalities

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 ´ Figure 3.2  Fatal and serious injuries per year involving all helicopter operations 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

67

Helicopters

Rotorcraft safety roadmap SPI

The number of accidents that have caused at least one fatality or serious injury is the SPI used to monitor the 
effectiveness of the EASA Rotorcraft Safety RoadMap which was launched in 2018. This indicator is shown in 
Figure 3.3. In absolute numbers, there were more accidents with at least one fatality or serious injury in 2022 as 
compared to the previous year and is the third highest observed number since 2012.

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Roadmap SPI

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 ´ Figure 3.3  Number of accidents with a least one fatality or serious injury for all helicopter operations 

r
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©

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

68

Helicopters

Occurrence categories

Figure 3.4 outlines the top 13 categories assigned to the serious incidents and accidents in the past five 
years. Occurrences are categorised using the ICAO ADREP taxonomy for occurrence categories, developed 
for supporting common coding of the main elements of an occurrence that should be investigated, recorded, 
and analysed. Categories are of different natures, e.g., operational such as low altitude operations (LALT), 
environmental such as turbulence encounter (TURB), technical such as system/ component failure or malfunction 
[non-powerplant] (SCF-NP), consequential such as fire/ smoke resulting from impact (F-POST), etc. Multiple 
categories may therefore be assigned to a single occurrence. For example, if an engine failure occurred, and loss 
of control (LOC) followed, the occurrence would be coded in both categories, i.e., SCF-PP: powerplant failure or 
malfunction and LOC-I: loss of control in flight. The sum of the number of occurrences per category may therefore 
be greater than the total number of occurrences that were realised in the period.

When it comes to the high-risk accident occurrence categories, the occurrence category LOC-I: loss of control 
inflight has been one of the most significant causes of fatal accidents over the 5-year period. Inland helicopter 
pilots primarily fly based on visual references to the terrain, according to visual flight rules (VFR). In marginal 
visibility, this could lead to LOC.

The occurrence category UNK: unknown is one of the three high-risk accident occurrence categories which 
appears in the figure. As the aviation industry continues its recovery from Covid-19 and flights significantly rise, 
good quality of reporting safety occurrences has never been more important. As well as helping to raise direct 
issues it also helps to see emerging trends and act before they develop into a more serious issue.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

LOC-I

UNK

MAC

SCF-PP

ARC

EXTL

CTOL

LALT

F-POST

CFIT

LOC-G

SCF-NP

OTHR

LOC-I: Loss of control – inflight; UNK: Unknown or undetermined; MAC: Airprox/ACAS alert/loss of separation/(near) midair collisions; SCF-PP: 
powerplant failure or malfunction; ARC: Abnormal runway contact; EXTL: External load related occurrences; CTOL: Collision with obstacle(s) 
during take-off and landing; LALT: Low altitude operations; F-POST: Fire/smoke (post-impact); CFIT: Controlled flight into or toward terrain; 
LOC-G: Loss of control – ground;  SCF-NP: System/component failure or malfunction [non-powerplant]; OTHR: Other

 ´ Figure 3.4  Numbers of occurrences by occurrence category for all helicopter operations

2023 Annual Safety Review

69

Helicopters

Helicopter operations sub-domains

Figure 3.5 shows the numbers of accidents and serious incidents for the 4 main sub-domains of operations 
involving certified and validated helicopters. Over the decade 2012-2021, the proportions of each domain are 
the following:

•  52% of all accidents and serious incidents involved certified and validated helicopters performing non-
commercial operations and for which an EASA MS was either the state of operator or state of registry;

•  24% of all accidents and serious incidents involved certified and validated helicopters performing SPO 

and for which an EASA MS was either the state of operator or state of registry;

•  21% of all accidents and serious incidents involved certified and validated helicopters performing CAT 

conducted by EASA MS AOC holders;

•  2% of all accidents and serious incidents involved certified helicopters whose state of operator and 

state of registry were a third country but for which the state of occurrence was an EASA MS. 

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CAT-EASA MS
AoC holder

SPO-EASA MS
operated or registered

Non commercial
- EASA MS operated or 
registered

Average 2012-2021

2022

11.4

13

14.6

11

31.7

30

Third country
registered

1.6

2

 ´ Figure 3.5  Accidents and serious incidents by helicopter operation sub-domains 

 
 
 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

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Helicopters

Type of certified helicopter (CS27/CS29)

Figure 3.6 shows the distribution over the 5-year period of the EASA MS rotorcraft fleets in total by type of 
certification  specification,  Certification  Specifications  for  Small  Rotorcraft  (CS-27)  and  the  Certification 
Specifications for Large Rotorcraft (CS-29), with a trendline of accidents and serious incidents in the given period. 
The total fleet in service is shown in the primary vertical axis of the graph, whereas the total number of accidents 
and serious incidents in each period is shown in the secondary vertical axis.

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CS 29 Total In Service

CS 27 Accidents and Serious incidents

CS 29 Accidents and Serious incidents

2018

4012

736

60

7

2019

4063

741

61

11

2020

4076

731

39

10

2021

4136

731

47

4

2022

4121

724

49

8

 ´ Figure 3.6  Accidents and serious incidents by certification specification for all helicopter operations with 

the breakdown of aircraft certification type for the reported fleet 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

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Helicopters

3.2 CAT helicopters

The scope of this section covers the key safety statistics for EASA certified or validated helicopters performing CAT 
and operated by an EASA MS AOC holder. This includes offshore flights, as well as onshore HEMS, air ambulance, 
sightseeing tours, air taxis or any other operation to transport passengers, cargo or mail for remuneration or 
other valuable consideration.

European CAT helicopter fleet

Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8 show the size of the helicopter CAT sector in the EASA MS and its evolution over the 
period 2018-2022.

The number of helicopter AOC holders had a small increase in 2022 compared to the preceding year. An increase 
was observed in the number of helicopters performing CAT. The average number of helicopters per AOC holders 
in 2022 was between 8 and 9.

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300

250

200

150

100

50

0

Helicopter AOCs

2018

248

2019

246

2020

237

2021

251

2022

258

 ´ Figure 3.7  Number of helicopter AOC holders in the EASA MS

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CAT Helicopters 

2018

1991

2019

2002

2020

2031

2021

1850

2022

1948

 ´ Figure 3.8  Number of helicopters performing CAT in the EASA MS

 
 
 
 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

72

Helicopters

Key statistics

The key statistics for this domain are in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4, which include a comparison of the number 
of accidents (fatal and non-fatal) and serious incidents for the last year and the previous 10-year period. It 
also includes a comparison of the fatalities and serious injuries sustained in those accidents during the same 
timeframe. 

The number of accidents, fatalities, and serious injuries in 2022 are on an increasing trend compared to the 
average of the previous decade.

 ´ Table 3.3  Key Statistics for CAT helicopters

Total number 
of occurrences 
per occurrence class 
over 2012-2021

Number of 
occurrences per 
occurrence class 
in 2022

Comparison 
2022 vs yearly average 
of 2012-2021 
per occurrence class

Fatal accidents

Non-fatal accidents

Serious incidents

16

48

50

4

6

3







 ´ Table 3.4  Fatalities and serious injuries involving CAT helicopters 

Number of fatalities

Number of serious injuries

Total number over 2012-2021

Yearly max number over 2012-2021

Yearly min number over 2012-2021

Total number in 2022

69

22

0

17

24

7

0

2

2023 Annual Safety Review

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Helicopters

The numbers of accidents and serious incidents per year are shown in Figure 3.9. 

Whereas the number of serious incidents in 2022 has dropped to a minimum over the previous 10-year period, 
the number of fatal and non-fatal accidents in 2022 has increased to the maximum level observed since 2012. 

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Fatal accident

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2

3

5

4

6

4

1

8

8

2

7

3

4

8

2

1

7

2

1

3

6

4

 ´ Figure 3.9  Fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents per year involving CAT helicopters

The numbers of fatalities and serious injuries per year are shown in Figure 3.10. With two serious injuries, but a 
significant increase of fatalities, the 2022 is the third highest over the last decade.

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30

25

20

15

10

5

0

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Serious Injuries

Fatalities

4

6

2

0

1

2

7

7

4

22

2

6

0

6

1

19

2

1

1

1

2

17

 ´ Figure 3.10  Fatal and serious injuries per year involving CAT helicopters

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Helicopters

2023 Annual Safety Review

74

Helicopters

Occurrence categories

Figure 3.11 outlines the top 15 categories assigned to the serious incidents and accidents in the past five 
years. Occurrences are categorised using the ICAO ADREP taxonomy for occurrence categories, developed for 
supporting common coding of the main elements of an occurrence that should be investigated, recorded, and 
analysed. 

Based on this analysis, the most frequent occurrence category associated with all accidents and serious incidents 
is MAC: Airprox/ACAS alert/loss of separation/(near) midair collisions, followed by CTOL: collision with obstacle(s) 
during take-off and landing, whereas the occurrence category remains UNK: unknow for seven occurrences.

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

MAC

CTOL

UNK

LOC-I

ARC

LALT

OTHR

CFIT

F-POST

SCF-NP

SCF-PP

BIRD

F-NI

LOC-G

MED

MAC: Airprox/ACAS alert/loss of separation/(near) midair collisions; CTOL: Collision with obstacle(s) during take-off and landing; UNK: 
Unknown or undetermined; LOC-I: Loss of control – inflight; ARC: Abnormal runway contact; LALT: Low altitude operations; OTHR: Other; CFIT: 
Controlled flight into or toward terrain; F-POST: Fire/smoke (post-impact); SCF-NP: System/component failure or malfunction [non-powerplant]; 
SCF-PP: powerplant failure or malfunction; BIRD: Birdstrike; F-NI: Fire/smoke (non-impact); LOC-G: Loss of control – ground; MED: Medical

 ´ Figure 3.11  Numbers of occurrences by occurrence category involving CAT helicopters

2023 Annual Safety Review

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Helicopters

Phase of flight

Figure 3.12 shows the distribution of accidents and serious incidents by flight phase. Over the decade 2012-2021, 
the en-route phase and landing phase are the most involved in accidents. The same applies in 2022, where ten 
occurrences out of 14 have their flight phase being en-route and landing.

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8

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0

Average 2012-2021

2022

Standing

0.5

1

Taxi

0.2

1

Take-off

En route

Approach

Landing

Tow

1.5

0

3.2

3

1.5

0

2.3

7

1.2

0

Unknown/
blank

1.1

2

 ´ Figure 3.12  Accidents and serious incidents by phase of flight involving CAT helicopters

Operation type

Figure 3.13 shows the numbers of accidents and serious incidents per type of operation. All four occurrences 
in 2022 involving air taxi operations have been fatal accidents, which is significantly above the average figures 
of the preceding decade for this type of operation. With seven occurrences (four accidents and three serious 
incidents) in 2022, the figures involving HEMS operations are still above the average figures of the preceding 
decade for this type of operation. HEMS is followed by air taxi, whereas the exact type of CAT operation is still 
unknow for two occurrences in 2022.

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7

6

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4

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2

1

0

HEMS

Air Taxi

Offshore

Sightseeing

Average 2012-2021

2022

5.9

7

1.8

4

0.8

0

1.4

0

Air
Ambulance

0.3

0

Airline

0.1

0

Other/
unknown

1.2

2

 ´ Figure 3.13  Accidents and serious incidents by operation type involving CAT helicopters

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

76

Helicopters

Propulsion type

Figure 3.14 shows the distribution over the 5-year period of the EASA MS rotorcraft fleets in total by type of 
propulsion and with a trendline of accidents and serious incidents in the given period. The total fleet in service 
is shown in the primary vertical axis of the graph, whereas total number of accidents and serious incidents in 
each period is shown in the secondary vertical axis.

In 2022 one accident involved reciprocating engine helicopter and the rest of accidents and serious incidents in 
CAT helicopters operations involved turboshaft helicopters.

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2000

1800

1600

1400

1200

1000

800

600

400

200

0

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20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

Turboshaft Total In Service

Reciprocating Total In Service

Turboshaft Accidents and Serious incidents

Reciprocating Accidents and Serious incidents

2018

1912

452

18

0

2019

1938

449

15

0

2020

1951

429

11

0

2021

1949

416

9

0

2022

1949

409

13

1

 ´ Figure 3.14  Accidents and serious incidents by propulsion type involving CAT helicopters with the 

breakdown of propulsion type for the reported fleet

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

77

Helicopters

Helicopter certification specification (CS27/ CS29)

Figure 3.15 shows the distribution over the 5-year period of the EASA MS rotorcraft fleets in total by type of 
certification specification and with a trendline of accidents and serious incidents in the given period. The total 
fleet in service is shown in the primary vertical axis of the graph, whereas total number of accidents and serious 
incidents in each period is shown in the secondary vertical axis. 

The relationship between certification and CAT operation requirements for transport category rotorcraft is 
known to be convoluted, of difficult interpretation. Based on this analysis, it can be observed that the CS 29 is 
more exposed than the CS 27 fleet.

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3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

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25

20

15

10

5

0

CS 27 Total In Service

CS 29 Total In Service

CS 27 Accidents and Serious incidents

CS 29 Accidents and Serious incidents

2018

1929

534

16

2

2019

1954

537

10

4

2020

1957

538

6

5

2021

1942

542

6

3

2022

1945

536

6

5

 ´ Figure 3.15  Accidents and serious incidents by certification specification (CS27/CS29) for CAT operations 

with the breakdown of aircraft certification type for the reported fleet 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

78

Helicopters

Safety risks for CAT helicopters

The safety risks for CAT helicopters are derived from accident and serious incident data from the EASA occurrence 
repository and the ECR, covering the period 2018-2022 (67 occurrences).

The relative comparison between KRAs for this domain is highlighted in Figure 3.16. KRAs and occurrence 
categories (refer to Figure 3.11) have different purposes. While occurrence categories describe actual factors 
and outcomes of an occurrence, KRAs describe the potential outcome of an occurrence. The KRA is defined by 
the most likely type of accident that an occurrence could have escalated to. Unlike occurrence categories, where 
multiple categories may be assigned to a single occurrence, there can only be one KRA per occurrence. The KRA 
is one element of the ERCS. This scheme is applied when determining the safety risk score of an occurrence and 
is further detailed in the ASR introduction.

The absolute numbers show that airborne collision is the top key risk area in terms of aggregated risk, whereas 
obstacle collision in flight shows similar risk, both in terms of the numbers of occurrences and aggregated risk. 
This statistic is a strong reminder of the dangers of airborne collision, highlighting the importance of taking 
the necessary precautions to avoid such a catastrophic event. It serves as a warning to pilots and other aircraft 
operators to be extra vigilant when flying in the vicinity of other aircraft. Furthermore, it emphasizes the need 
for improved safety protocols and regulations to reduce the risk of aircraft collisions.

In 2022 a total of three occurrences were attributed to the KRA airborne collision, of which one was a fatal 
accident, and two were serious incidents of which one involved a large drone and a HEMS helicopter, and a 
conflict with a small aeroplane performing non-commercial operations.

Terrain collision and aircraft upset form the other main KRAs of the CAT helicopters domain. Due to the nature 
of their activity and the conditions they get flown in, such as flying at low altitudes and in challenging weather 
conditions, in order to reach patients in remote or inaccessible areas, CAT helicopters are exposed to operational 
and environmental threats.

The KRA other injuries includes the occurrence scenarios that do not fit into other KRAs, but which can still cause 
actual or potential injury. That KRA includes injuries due to turbulence encounters, hoist operations, and ground 
operators’ injuries, particularly persons being injured on the ground from falling loads, or from any part falling 
from an aircraft in flight.

Lower Risk

Higher Risk

Airborne collision

Obstacle collision in flight

Terrain collision

Aircraft upset

Other injuries

Runway excursion

0

5

10

15

20

Number of risk scored occurrences

Aggregated ERCS score

 ´ Figure 3.16  KRAs by aggregated ERCS score and number of risk-scored occurrences, involving CAT 

helicopters

2023 Annual Safety Review

79

Helicopters

3.3 SPO helicopters

This section covers the main safety statistics for EASA certified or validated helicopters performing SPO with an 
EASA MS as state of operator or state of registry. SPO are defined as any operation other than CAT where the 
aircraft is used for specialised activities such as: agriculture, construction, photography, surveying, observation 
and patrol, aerial advertisement.

Key statistics

The key statistics for this domain are in Table 3.5 and Table 3.6, which include a comparison of the number 
of fatal and non-fatal accidents and serious incidents for the last year and the previous 10-year period . It 
also includes a comparison of the fatalities and serious injuries sustained in those accidents during the same 
timeframe. 

The number of accidents in 2022 was lower than the average of the preceding 10-year period, whereas the 
number of serious incidents slightly increased compared to the average for the same period. The numbers of 
fatalities and serious injuries are also below the average figures of the preceding decade. 

 ´ Table 3.5  Key statistics for SPO helicopters

Total number 
of occurrences 
per occurrence class 
over 2012-2021

Number of 
occurrences per 
occurrence class 
in 2022

Comparison 
2022 vs yearly average 
of 2012-2021 
per occurrence class

Fatal accidents

Non-fatal accidents

Serious incidents

18

98

30

1

5

5







 ´ Table 3.6  Fatalities and serious injuries involving SPO helicopters 

Number of fatalities

Number of serious injuries

Total number over 2012-2021

Yearly max number over 2012-2021

Yearly min number over 2012-2021

Total number in 2022

29

11

0

1

38

8

1

4

2023 Annual Safety Review

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Helicopters

The numbers of accidents and serious incidents per year is shown in Figure 3.17. The total number of occurrences 
in 2022 had a slight upward trend in comparison to 2021, but still below the average for the same period. 
However, one fatal accident still occurred in 2022, as for the three preceding years. The fatal accident occurred 
during a sling load lifting operation when the main rotor hit the lower cable of a high voltage power line. 

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12

10

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6

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2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Serious incident

Non-fatal accident

Fatal accident

1

9

5

2

11

4

3

12

0

0

7

2

3

13

1

4

11

2

7

10

1

4

12

1

3

9

1

3

4

1

5

5

1

 ´ Figure 3.17  Fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents per year involving SPO helicopters

The numbers of fatalities and serious injuries per year are shown in Figure 3.18. With one fatality and four 
serious injuries, the figures for 2022 are below the average observed since 2012.

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6

4

2

0

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Serious Injuries

Fatalities

3

8

8

11

5

0

5

2

4

1

6

2

3

1

2

1

1

2

1

1

4

1

 ´ Figure 3.18  Fatal and serious injuries per year involving SPO helicopters

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

81

Helicopters

Occurrence categories

Figure 3.19 outlines the top 13 categories assigned to the serious incidents and accidents in the past five 
years. Occurrences are categorised using the ICAO ADREP taxonomy for occurrence categories, developed for 
supporting common coding of the main elements of an occurrence that should be investigated, recorded, and 
analysed. 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

EXTL

LALT

LOC-I

CTOL

SCF-PP

CFIT

UNK

ARC

LOC-G

SCF-NP

MAC

RAMP

ADRM

EXTL: External load related occurrences; LALT: Low altitude operations; LOC-I: Loss of control – inflight; CTOL: Collision with obstacle(s) during 
take-off and landing; SCF-PP: powerplant failure or malfunction; CFIT: Controlled flight into or toward terrain; UNK: Unknown or undetermined; 
ARC: Abnormal runway contact; LOC-G: Loss of control – ground; MAC: Airprox/ACAS alert/loss of separation/(near) midair collisions; RAMP: 
Ground Handling; SCF-NP: System/component failure or malfunction [non-powerplant]; ADRM: Aerodrome

 ´ Figure 3.19  Numbers of occurrences by occurrence category involving SPO helicopters

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Phase of flight

Figure 3.20 shows the breakdown of accidents and serious incidents by flight phase. As with the average of 
the preceding 10-year period, the highest number of accidents and serious incidents in 2022 happened during 
manoeuvring phases which is expected for helicopters performing specialised operations, as the risk undertaken 
is the highest when performing the activities, such as long lifting devices, power line operations or constructing 
a large mast. 

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Average 2012-2021

2022

Standing

0.6

0

Taxi

0.1

0

Take-off

En route

Manoevring

Approach

Landing

Tow

Unknown/
blank

1.9

0

2.3

0

6.1

7

1.1

0

2

2

0.3

0

0.2

2

 ´ Figure 3.20  Accidents and serious incidents by phase of flight involving SPO helicopters

Operation type

Figure 3.21 shows the numbers of accidents and serious incidents per type of operation. In 2022, construction 
and sling-load operations were, once again, by far the most affected. The other identified operation types 
involved in an occurrence in 2022 were logging and agricultural operations.

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Aerial
observation

Aerial
patrol

0.5

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0.9

0

Aerial
survey

0.6

2

Average 2012-2021

2022

Agricultural

Airshow
/race

Animal 
herding/
mustering

Construction 
sling/
load 

Calibration

Logging

Photography

Towing

2

1

0.1

0

0.3

0

0.1

0

5.1

6

0.6

2

0.1

0

0.1

0

Other/
unknown

3.2

0

 ´ Figure 3.21  Accidents and serious incidents by operation type involving SPO helicopters

 
 
 
 
 
 
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2023 Annual Safety Review

83

Helicopters

Propulsion type

Figure 3.22 shows the distribution over the 5-year period of the EASA MS rotorcraft fleets in total by type of 
propulsion and with a trendline of accidents and serious incidents in the given period. The total fleet in service 
is shown in the primary vertical axis of the graph, whereas total number of accidents and serious incidents in 
each period is shown in the secondary vertical axis.

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500

450

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

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18

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6

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2018

2019

2020

Turboshaft Total In Service

Reciprocating Total In Service

Turboshaft Accidents and Serious incidents

Reciprocating Accidents and Serious incidents

438

150

13

5

452

142

16

1

455

141

11

2

2021

475

137

8

0

2022

456

132

11

0

 ´ Figure 3.22  Accidents and serious incidents by propulsion type involving SPO helicopters with the 

breakdown of propulsion type for the reported fleet

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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2023 Annual Safety Review

84

Helicopters

Helicopter certification specification (CS27/ CS29)

Figure 3.23 shows the distribution over the 5-year period of the EASA MS rotorcraft fleets in total by type 
of certification specification, Certification Specifications for Small Rotorcraft (CS-27) and the Certification 
Specifications for Large Rotorcraft (CS-29), with a trendline of accidents and serious incidents in the given period. 
The total fleet in service is shown in the primary vertical axis of the graph, whereas total number of accidents 
and serious incidents in each period is shown in the secondary vertical axis.

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300

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2018

2019

2020

CS 27 Total In Service

CS 29 Total In Service

CS 27 Accidents and Serious incidents

CS 29 Accidents and Serious incidents

490

140

15

3

495

151

15

2

497

150

10

3

2021

513

152

8

0

2022

498

150

10

1

 ´ Figure 3.23  Accidents and serious incidents by certification specification (CS27/CS29) for SPO with the 

breakdown of aircraft certification type for the reported fleet 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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2023 Annual Safety Review

85

Helicopters

Safety risks for SPO helicopters

The safety risks for SPO helicopters are derived from accident and serious incident data from the EASA occurrence 
repository and the ECR, covering the period 2018-2022 (74 occurrences).

The relative comparison between KRAs for this domain is highlighted in Figure 3.24. KRAs and occurrence 
categories (refer to Figure 3.19) have different purposes. While occurrence categories describe actual factors 
and outcomes of an occurrence, KRAs describe the potential outcome of an occurrence. The KRA is defined by 
the most likely type of accident that an occurrence could have escalated to. Unlike occurrence categories, where 
multiple categories may be assigned to a single occurrence, there can only be one KRA per occurrence. The KRA 
is one element of the ERCS. This scheme is applied when determining the safety risk score of an occurrence and 
is further detailed in the ASR introduction.

When it comes to KRA, aircraft upset or LOC in flight is most risky, both in terms of numbers of occurrences and 
aggregated risk, which is not surprising given the conditions and the common environmental factors that come 
with this type of operation. Helicopter pilots navigate the most harrowing environments known to flight, where 
recovery has no margin for delayed and untrained human reaction. Aircraft upset or LOC can occur in all phases 
of the flight. Most of the aircraft upset KRA is often caused by inadvertent entry into instrument meteorological 
conditions, such as flying into clouds/fog/degraded visual conditions. 

Over the 5-year period analysed, four out of the five fatal accidents involving SPO helicopters were aircraft upsets 
in flight. 

The KRA other injuries includes occurrences that do not fit in other KRAs, but which can still cause actual or 
potential injury. That KRA includes occurrences due to turbulence encounters, hoist operations, ground operator 
injuries, particularly persons being injured on the ground from falling loads, or from any part falling from an 
aircraft in flight.

Lower Risk

Higher Risk

Aircraft upset

Obstacle collision in flight

Other injuries

Terrain collision

Airborne collision

Ground damage

Fire, smoke, pressurisation

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Number of risk scored occurrences

Aggregated ERCS score

 ´ Figure 3.24  KRAs by aggregated ERCS score and number of risk-scored occurrences, involving SPO 

helicopters

Helicopters

2023 Annual Safety Review

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3.4  Non-commercial operations helicopters

This section covers the main safety statistics for EASA certified or validated helicopters performing non-
commercial operations with an EASA MS as state of operator or state of registry. The type of flying included in 
this section are mainly flight training, test flights, leisure flights and ferry flights.

Key statistics

The key statistics for this domain are in Table 3.7 and Table 3.8, which include a comparison of the number of fatal 
and non-fatal accidents and serious incidents for the last year and the previous 10-year period. It also includes a 
comparison of the fatalities and serious injuries sustained in those accidents during the same timeframe. 

Whereas the number of fatal accidents and serious incidents in 2022 was lower compared with the average 
of the preceding decade, the number of non-fatal accidents was similar to the 10-year period. The number of 
fatalities and serious injuries in 2022 are below the average of the preceding 10 years. 

 ´ Table 3.7  Key statistics for non-commercial operations helicopters

Total number 
of occurrences 
per occurrence class 
over 2012-2021

Number of 
occurrences per 
occurrence class 
in 2022

Comparison 
2022 vs yearly average 
of 2012-2021 
per occurrence class

Fatal accidents

Non-fatal accidents

Serious incidents

42

218

57

3

21

4



=



 ´ Table 3.8  Fatalities and serious injuries involving non-commercial operations helicopters 

Number of fatalities

Number of serious injuries

Total number over 2012-2021

Yearly max number over 2012-2021

Yearly min number over 2012-2021

Total number in 2022

90

20

1

4

46

11

0

4

Helicopters

2023 Annual Safety Review

87

Helicopters

The numbers of accidents and serious incidents per year is shown in Figure 3.25. After the year 2020 which 
resulted in the lowest figures observed since 2011, the number of accidents slightly increased in 2021 and then 
stabilised in 2022. In comparison with 2021 where we had the highest number of fatal accidents, in 2022 the 
number is below the average figures of the preceding decade. An increasing trend can be observed for non-fatal 
accidents.

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2021

2022

Serious incident

Non-fatal accident

Fatal accident

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23

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7

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18

4

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25

4

6

12

3

5

20

6

4

21

3

 ´ Figure 3.25  Fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents per year involving non-commercial 

operations helicopters

The numbers of fatalities and serious injuries per year are shown in Figure 3.26. The number of fatalities in 2022 
shows a significant drop, whereas the number of serious injuries is similar to the period 2018-2020 but not to 
2021.

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Fatalities

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 ´ Figure 3.26  Fatal and serious injuries per year involving non-commercial operations helicopters

 
 
 
 
 
 
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2023 Annual Safety Review

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Helicopters

Occurrence categories

Figure 3.27 outlines the top 15 categories assigned to the serious incidents and accidents in the past five 
years. Occurrences are categorised using the ICAO ADREP taxonomy for occurrence categories, developed for 
supporting common coding of the main elements of an occurrence that should be investigated, recorded, and 
analysed. 

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UNK

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OTHR

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SCF-NP

EXTL

F-POST

GCOL

NAV

RI

LOC-I: Loss of control – inflight; ARC: Abnormal runway contact; UNK: Unknown or undetermined; SCF-PP: powerplant failure or malfunction; 
LOC-G: Loss of control – ground; MAC: Airprox/ACAS alert/loss of separation/(near) midair collisions; CTOL: Collision with obstacle(s) during 
take-off and landing; OTHR: Other; CFIT: Controlled flight into or toward terrain; SCF-NP: System/component failure or malfunction [non-
powerplant]; EXTL: External load related occurrences; F-POST: Fire/smoke (post-impact); GCOL: Ground Collision; NAV: Navigation error; RI: 
Runway incursion - vehicle, aircraft or person

 ´ Figure 3.27  Numbers of occurrences by occurrence category involving non-commercial operations 

helicopters

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2023 Annual Safety Review

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Helicopters

Phase of flight

Figure 3.28 shows the distribution of accidents and serious incidents by flight phase. Among the occurrences in 
2022 for which the flight phase was identified, take-off and landing phases were the most frequent, which is also 
the case for the 10-year average figures. However, it should be noticed that for three occurrences of 2022, the 
flight phase could not be identified from the data collected so far.

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Landing

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Unknown/
blank

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 ´ Figure 3.28  Accidents and serious incidents by phase of flight involving non-commercial operations 

helicopters

Operation type

Figure 3.29 shows the numbers of accidents and serious incidents per type of operation. In 2022, as in the 
previous decade, the highest number of occurrences for which the type of operation was identified were in 
pleasure flights and flight training/instructional operations. This is to be expected that flight instruction is still 
one of the riskiest environments. Most of the helicopters used in this sector are small and equipped with one 
engine. It should be highlighted that the exact nature of the operation is unknown at this stage for 5 occurrences.

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Test Flight

Average 2012-2021

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4.2

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 ´ Figure 3.29  Accidents and serious incidents by operation type involving non-commercial operations 

helicopters

 
 
 
 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

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Helicopters

Propulsion type

Figure 3.30 shows the distribution over the 5-year period of the EASA MS rotorcraft fleets in total by type of 
propulsion and with a trendline of accidents and serious incidents in the given period. 

The total fleet in service is shown in the primary vertical axis of the graph, whereas total number of accidents 
and serious incidents in each period is shown in the secondary vertical axis.

In 2022, the figures for turboshaft helicopters decreased in absolute numbers, but there is an increase in 
reciprocating helicopters. 

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Turboshaft Total In Service

Reciprocating Accidents and Serious incidents

Turboshaft Accidents and Serious incidents

311

166

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374

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336

165

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343

171

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339

180

22

6

 ´ Figure 3.30  Accidents and serious incidents by propulsion type involving non-commercial operations 

helicopters with the breakdown of propulsion type for the reported fleet

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

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Helicopters

Helicopter certification specification (CS27/CS29)

Figure 3.31 shows the distribution over the 5-year period of the EASA MS rotorcraft fleets in total by type 
of certification specification, Certification Specifications for Small Rotorcraft (CS-27) and the Certification 
Specifications for Large Rotorcraft (CS-29), with a trendline of accidents and serious incidents in the given period. 
The total fleet in service is shown in the primary vertical axis of the graph, whereas total number of accidents 
and serious incidents in each period is shown in the secondary vertical axis. 

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CS 29 Total In Service

CS 27 Accidents and Serious incidents

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539

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561

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2021

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2022

581

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 ´ Figure 3.31  Accidents and serious incidents by certification specification (CS27/CS29) for non-commercial 

operations with the breakdown of aircraft certification type for the reported fleet

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

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Helicopters

Safety risks for non-commercial operations helicopters

The safety risks for non-commercial operations helicopters are derived from accident and serious incident data 
from the EASA occurrence repository and the ECR, covering the period 2018-2022 (198 occurrences).

The relative comparison between KRAs for this domain is highlighted in Figure 3.32. KRAs and occurrence 
categories (refer to Figure 3.27) have different purposes. While occurrence categories describe actual factors 
and outcomes of an occurrence, KRAs describe the potential outcome of an occurrence. The KRA is defined by 
the most likely type of accident that an occurrence could have escalated to. Unlike occurrence categories, where 
multiple categories may be assigned to a single occurrence, there can only be one KRA per occurrence. The KRA 
is one element of the ERCS. This scheme is applied when determining the safety risk score of an occurrence and 
is further detailed in the ASR introduction.

The data reviewed on the accidents and serious incidents involving non-commercial operated helicopters shows 
that aircraft upset is by far the top KRA, both in terms of numbers of occurrences and aggregated risk. This is to 
be expected considering that it is a crucial part of pilot training and learning how to recover from an upset that 
can prevent more serious LOC incidents. On top of this, the flight envelope that they are being exposed presents 
more risk as well (e.g., engine off landings, practice forced landings, advanced autorotations).

Over the 5-year period analysed, 10 out of the 20 fatal accidents involving non-commercial operations helicopters 
were aircraft upset in flight.

This KRA is followed by obstacle collision in flight and terrain collision. Due to the nature of their operations, 
helicopters tend to commonly fly at low altitudes, and this places them at high risk of striking various types of 
obstacles or high-level terrain.

Figure 3.32 below gives a visual representation of KRAs by aggregated ERCS score and absolute numbers.

Lower Risk

Higher Risk

Aircraft upset

Obstacle collision in flight

Terrain collision

Airborne collision

Runway collision

Other injuries

Ground damage

0

20

40

60

80

100

Number of risk scored occurrences

Aggregated ERCS score

 ´ Figure 3.32  KRAs by aggregated ERCS score and number of risk-scored occurrences, involving non-

commercial operations helicopters

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Balloons  

 
 
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2023 Annual Safety Review

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Balloons

The scope of this chapter covers hot air balloon operations where the state of registry is an EASA MS. The 
data presented is based on the accidents and serious incidents collected by the Agency under Regulation (EU) 
996/2010 on accident and serious incident investigation and Regulation (EU) 376/2014 on occurrence reporting, 
and through actively searching for those events from other official sources.

The chapter provides in the core document the key statistics, the occurrence categories, and the safety risks at 
key risk aera level for balloon operations. It is the second time the European Common Repository (ECR) will be 
used as the data source for the key statistics and occurrence categories. Advanced statistics are then provided 
per aviation domain in domain-specific appendices, giving an overview of the contributors to the safety risks 
identified in the core document for these types of operations at the European level. These advanced statistics 
are solely derived from occurrence data, and use the EASA database that contains more relevant information for 
its purpose.

The list of fatal accidents associated with the scope of this chapter is provided in Appendix 1 of this document.

The advanced statistics associated with the scope of this chapter are provided in Appendix 4 of this document.

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2023 Annual Safety Review

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Balloons

Key Statistics

The key statistics for this domain are in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 and include a comparison of the number of 
accidents (fatal and non-fatal) and serious incidents for the last year and the previous 10-year period. It also 
includes a comparison of the fatalities and serious injuries sustained in those accidents during the same 
timeframe. 

Table 4.1 shows a comparison between the 10-year average vs. 2022. This indicates that the number of fatal 
accidents and the number of serious incidents is decreasing compared to the 10-year average. Non-fatal 
accidents, however, are a bit higher than the 10-year average. 

Table 4.2 presents the number of fatalities and serious injuries for 2022 vs. the 10-year average. The number of 
fatalities has decreased in 2022 compared to the 10-year average and the number of serious injuries in 2022 is 
close to even when compared to the 10-year average.

A better understanding of the level of balloon safety in EASA Member States could be achieved if exposure data 
showing the number of flights was collected at regulatory level. EASA encourages all national authorities to 
collect, aggregate and share such data for the benefit of all. 

 ´ Table 4.1  Key statistics for balloons

Total number 
of occurrences 
per occurrence class 
over 2012-2021

Number of 
occurrences per 
occurrence class 
in 2022

Comparison 
2022 vs yearly average 
of 2012-2021 
per occurrence class

Fatal accidents

Non-fatal accidents

Serious incidents

12

155

54

1

16

3







 ´ Table 4.2  Fatalities and serious injuries involving balloons

Number of fatalities

Number of serious injuries

Total number over 2012-2021

Yearly max number over 2012-2021

Yearly min number over 2012-2021

Total number in 2022

15

4

0

1

178

24

10

17

2023 Annual Safety Review

96

Balloons

Figure 4.1 plots the number of fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents, and serious incidents from 2012 until 2022. 
Last year was overall very similar to 2021, with fewer fatal accidents. A slight downward trend in the total figures 
can also be observed since 2018. 

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 ´ Figure 4.1  Fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents per year involving balloons

Figure 4.2 shows the number of fatalities and serious injuries in a similar downward trend as Figure 4.1. Last year 
2022 can be compared to 2013 and 2015 in terms of serious injuries. 

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 ´ Figure 4.2  Fatalities and serious injuries involving balloons

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

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Balloons

Occurrence categories

Figure 4.3 outlines the top 10 categories assigned to the serious incidents and accidents in the past five years. 
Occurrences are categorised using the ICAO Accident Incident Data Reporting (ADREP) taxonomy for occurrence 
categories, developed for supporting common coding of the main elements of an occurrence that should 
be investigated, recorded, and analysed. Categories are of different nature, e.g., operational such as abrupt 
manoeuvre (AMAN), environmental such as windshear or thunderstorm (WSTRW), technical such as system/ 
component failure or malfunction [non-powerplant] (SCF-NP), consequential such as fire/ smoke resulting from 
impact (F-POST), etc. Multiple categories may therefore be assigned to a single occurrence. For example, if an 
engine failure occurred, and loss of control followed, the occurrence would be coded in both categories, i.e., SCF-
PP: powerplant failure or malfunction and LOC-I: loss of control in flight. The sum of the number of occurrences 
per category may therefore be greater than the total number of occurrences that realised in the period.

For the period 2018-2022 figures show that abnormal runway contact is the most common cause of injuries. 
This means that hard landings are causing injuries, mostly to passengers, resulting in bone fractures or torn 
ligaments. The collision with obstacle(s) during take-off or landing occurrence category includes collisions with 
powerlines, buildings or other structures. 

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30

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OTHR

CTOL

UNK

F-POST

LOC-I

GCOL

WSTRW

AMAN

F-NI

ARC: Abnormal runway contact; OTHR: Other; CTOL: Collision with obstacle(s) during take-off and landing; UNK: Unknown or undetermined; 
F-POST: Fire/ smoke (post-impact); LOC-I: Loss of control - inflight; GCOL: Ground Collision; WSTRW: Windshear or thunderstorm; AMAN: Abrupt 
maneuvre; F-NI: Fire/ smoke (non-impact)

 ´ Figure 4.3  Numbers of occurrences by occurrence category involving balloons

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Balloons

Phase of flight

Most balloon accidents and serious incidents occur during the landing phase of the flight, as shown in Figure 4.4. 
It can also be observed that the number of recorded landing accidents and serious incidents is almost at the 10-
year average. There is an increase in accidents and serious incidents during the standing flight phase, whilst for 
take-off and manoeuvring phases these numbers are decreasing. For balloons, the flight phase standing covers 
the period where the balloon is filled with hot air, but the basket is still heavy.

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 ´ Figure 4.4  Accidents and serious incidents involving balloons, by phase of flight

Unknown/
Blank

1.3

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Operation type

Most balloon accidents and serious incidents are related to passenger and pleasure flights, as shown in Figure 
4.5. Note that activities such as competitions and record flights are considered to be part of the airshow/ race 
category. Passenger accidents have slightly increased in 2022 compared with the 10-year average but there is a 
fairly stable and low number of accidents and serious incidents in all other categories. 

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 ´ Figure 4.5  Accidents and serious incidents involving balloons, by operation type

Blank/
Unknown

1.5

2

 
 
 
 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

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Balloons

Safety risks for balloons

The safety risks for balloons are derived from accident and serious incident data from the EASA occurrence 
repository and the European Central Repository, covering the period 2018-2022 (125 occurrences). 

The key risk areas for Balloons are shown in Figure 4.6. Key risk areas and occurrence categories (refer to Figure 
4.3) have different purposes. While occurrence categories describe actual factors and outcomes of an occurrence, 
key risk areas describe the potential outcome of an occurrence. The key risk area is defined by the most likely type 
of accident that an occurrence could have escalated to. Unlike occurrence categories, where multiple categories 
may be assigned to a single occurrence, there can only be one key risk area per occurrence. The key risk area is 
one element of the European Risk Classification Scheme (ERCS). This scheme is applied when determining the 
safety risk score of an occurrence and is further detailed in the ASR introduction.

The main key risk area in ballooning is obstacle collision in flight. With 21 occurrences over the last five years, the 
data shows that powerline collisions or collisions with trees and buildings are the main issues. 

The balloon landings key risk area includes hard landings causing serious injuries to the passengers but no 
damage to the basket or other components. However, the landing is firm enough to cause injuries which could be 
avoided by better preparation of the passengers for the imminent touchdown. The use of the aircraft upset key 
risk area is a bit controversial in the context of ballooning. There have been, however, some accidents where the 
pilot falls out of the basket during a hard landing due to the lack of or not used restraints, or is unable to board 
the balloon when taking off. Hence, the balloon becomes uncontrolled and therefore it can be substantiated that 
the balloon, as an aircraft, is upset. 

The other injuries key risk area is a low-risk area but one which has a significant number 31 of occurrences 
attached to it. These include injuries from the inflation of the balloon until the passengers have exited the 
balloon basket, and do not fall into any other KRA. In 2022 a fatal accident occurred when a passenger rolled 
over and was killed by a vehicle during an uncontrolled take off of a balloon.

Lower Risk

Higher Risk

Aircraft upset

Obstacle collision in flight

Terrain collision

Balloon landings

Fire and smoke

Other injuries

Airborne conflict

Ground damage

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

 ´ Figure 4.6  Key risk areas by aggregated ERCS score and number of risk-scored occurrences involving 

Number of risk scored occurrences

Aggregated ERCS score

balloons

Chapter 5
Sailplanes  

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2023 Annual Safety Review

101

Sailplanes

This chapter covers sailplane operations where the state of registry of the aircraft is an EASA Member State. The 
data presented are based on the accidents and serious incidents collected by the Agency under Regulation (EU) 
996/2010 on accident and serious incident investigation and Regulation (EU) 376/2014 on occurrence reporting, 
and through actively searching for those events from other official sources.

The chapter provides in the core document the key statistics, the occurrence categories, and the safety risks at 
key risk aera level for sailplanes. The European Common Repository (ECR) and the EASA database are used as the 
data sources for the key statistics. Advanced statistics are then provided per aviation domain in domain specific 
appendices, giving an overview of the contributors to the safety risks identified in the core document for these 
types of operations at the European level. These advanced statistics are solely derived from occurrence data and 
use the EASA occurrence database that contains more relevant information for its purpose. Updated accident 
rates for sailplanes are not available this year due to missing utilisation data.  It is therefore worth stressing the 
importance of collecting exposure data to provide a proper oversight visibility on the domain.

Sailplane operations are a unique aviation domain, largely due to how gliding is performed. Unlike other 
domains where aircraft are powered by engines, sailplane operations depend on teamwork and safe towing into 
the air, using an aircraft or a winch, for the flight to commence. This added operational complexity has fostered 
a collaborative team spirit and cohesive atmosphere for safety within the gliding community. The dataset used 
in this chapter contains both non-powered and powered sailplanes but excludes ultralight sailplanes. The gliding 
community, with the leadership of the European Gliding Union (EGU), has been actively involved in shaping the 
EU rules on Sailplane Air Operations (OPS) and Flight Crew Licensing (FCL) rules, and in providing EASA with 
valuable input and insight into sailplane operations. 

The list of fatal accidents associated with the scope of this chapter is provided in Appendix 1 of this document.

The advanced statistics associated with the scope of this chapter are provided in Appendix 5 of this document.

2023 Annual Safety Review

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Sailplanes

Key statistics

The key statistics for this domain are in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 and include a comparison of the number of 
accidents (fatal and non-fatal) and serious incidents for the last year and the previous 10-year period. It also 
includes a comparison of the fatalities and serious injuries sustained in those accidents during the same 
timeframe. Table 5.1 shows an upward trend in number of fatal accidents and serious incidents but a downward 
trend in the number of non-fatal accidents, compared to the 10-year average. Table 5.2 lays out the figures on 
number of fatalities and serious injuries. In 2022 there were 32 fatalities which is higher than the maximum value 
for the preceding 10 years. Compared to the 10-year average, the number of fatalities were increased by 66% and 
the number of serious injuries were close to 50% fewer. 

 ´ Table 5.1  Key statistics for sailplanes

Total number 
of occurrences 
per occurrence class 
over 2012-2021

Number of 
occurrences per 
occurrence class 
in 2022

Comparison 
2022 vs yearly average 
of 2012-2021 
per occurrence class

Fatal accidents

Non-fatal accidents

Serious incidents

204

1522

259

27

122

33







 ´ Table 5.2  Fatalities and serious injuries involving sailplanes

Number of fatalities

Number of serious injuries

Total number over 2012-2021

Yearly max number over 2012-2021

Yearly min number over 2012-2021

Total number in 2022

212

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Figure 5.1 provides an overview of both fatal and non-fatal accidents and serious incidents from 2012 to 2022. 
The figure shows a stable trend over the period. However, last year the number of fatal accidents increased to 
similar figure as in 2019. 

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 ´ Figure 5.1  Fatal and non-fatal accidents and serious incidents per year involving sailplanes

Figure 5.2 shows a monthly comparison between the years 2020 to 2022. The figure clearly shows a jump in the 
number of accidents in May 2020. 2021 shows more even, and a little lower spike in June and July.  In comparison 
to 2022, the number of accidents is more evenly spread between months while in 2020 the main spike is from 
May till the end of August.  

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 ´ Figure 5.2  Comparison of number of accidents involving sailplanes per month for 2020-2022

 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

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Sailplanes

Figure 5.3 shows an even trend in number of fatalities and serious injuries over the period, except for 2019 that 
was unusually high compared to other years within the period. Last year records the highest number of fatalities 
compared to the previous 10 years. There was one more fatality in 2022 compared to 2019, however, serious 
injuries in 2019 were significantly more frequent than in 2022. The figure also shows that the number of reported 
serious injuries are the lowest since 2012. 

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2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Serious Injuries

Fatalities

21

24

36

21

34

19

40

29

32

15

20

21

26

20

45

31

32

15

20

17

15

32

 ´ Figure 5.3  Fatal and serious injuries per year involving sailplanes

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2023 Annual Safety Review

105

Sailplanes

Occurrence categories

Figure 5.4 outlines the top 15 categories assigned to the serious incidents and accidents in the past five years. 
Occurrences are categorised using the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST)/ ICAO Common Taxonomy Team 
(CICTT) taxonomy for occurrence categories, developed for supporting common coding of the main elements 
of an occurrence that should be investigated, recorded, and analysed. Categories are of different nature, e.g., 
operational such as low altitude operations (LALT), environmental such as turbulence encounter (TURB), technical 
such as system/ component failure or malfunction [non-powerplant] (SCF-NP), consequential such as fire/ smoke 
resulting from impact (F-POST), etc. Multiple categories may therefore be assigned to a single occurrence. 
For example, if an engine failure occurred, and loss of control followed, the occurrence would be coded in 
both categories, i.e., SCF-PP: powerplant failure or malfunction and LOC-I: loss of control in flight. The sum of 
the numbers of occurrences per category may therefore be greater that the total number of occurrences that 
occurred in the period.

For the period 2018-2022, the main occurrence categories are abnormal runway contact – which in many cases 
leads to damage due to collision with objects in the outfield landing area, and loss of control. Loss of lifting 
conditions is often a precursor to abnormal runway contact (ARC). Such occurrences include off-field landings. 

0

50

100

150

200

250

ARC

LOC-I

UNK

LOLI

GTOW

CTOL

OTHR

MAC

SCF-NP

USOS

RE

LOC-G

GCOL

SCF-PP

CFIT

ARC: Abnormal runway contact; LOC-I: Loss of control - inflight; UNK: Unknown or undetermined; LOLI: Loss of lifting conditions en-route; 
GTOW: Glider towing related events; CTOL: Collision with obstacle(s) during take-off and landing; OTHR: Other; MAC: Airprox/ ACAS alert/ loss 
of separation/ (near) mid-air collisions; SCF-NP: System/component failure or malfunction [non-powerplant]; USOS: Undershoot/ overshoot; 
RE: Runway excursion; LOC-G: Loss of control - ground; GCOL: Ground Collision; SCF-PP: powerplant failure or malfunction; CFIT: Controlled 
flight into or toward terrain

 ´ Figure 5.4  Numbers of occurrences by occurrence category involving sailplanes

2023 Annual Safety Review

106

Sailplanes

Phase of flight

The nature of gliding creates a different set of challenges for sailplane pilots compared to flights using motorised 
aircraft. This includes both a different means of take-off and the need for the sailplane pilot to frequently plan for 
possible landing areas during the flight. Figure 5.5 provides an overview of the accidents and serious incidents 
per phase of flight.

Most sailplane accidents occur during the landing phase of the flight. The landings occur both as airfield landings 
and off-field landings. The off-field landings rely on a good eye for the landscape topography in order to select 
a landing spot that is flat and clear of obstacles for a successful landing. It is during these landings where the 
sailplanes suffer damage, but the risk of injuries is low. Airfield landing accidents are mostly caused by under and 
overshoot landings where windstrength and direction plays a big role. Most common accidents during take-off 
are due to various mishaps while using a winch. The dataset includes towing occurrences where the occurrence 
involves a glider. Sailplane towing is addressed in the SPO Aeroplanes chapter.

100

90

80

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20

10

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Average 2012-2021

2022

Standing

2.7

4

Taxi

3.2

2

Take-off

En route

Manoevring

Approach

Landing

Tow

38.4

38

31.3

17

8.5

9

16

12

91

71

1

1

 ´ Figure 5.5  Accidents and serious incidents by phase of flight involving sailplanes

Unknown/
blank

16.8

21

 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

107

Sailplanes

Operation type

Most sailplane accidents and serious incidents occurred during leisure/private flights. Accidents during flight 
training come next but in 2022 there was a significant reduction of both leisure/private flights and flight training 
accidents compared to the 10-year average. It should be noted that many of the unknown/blank phases of flight 
have not been categorised due to a lack of information as these accidents are still being investigated by the 
national safety investigation authorities. 

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Airshow/race

Average 2012-2021

2022

10.4

6

Flight 
Training/
Instructional

40.2

31

Pleasure

Towing

Test Flight

Other

126.1

109

4.2

3

0.9

0

2.8

3

Blank/
Unknown

23

38

 ´ Figure 5.6  Accidents and serious incidents by operation type involving sailplanes

 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

108

Sailplanes

Safety risks for sailplanes

The key risk areas for sailplanes are shown in Figure 5.7. Key risk areas and occurrence categories (refer to 
Figure 5.4 have different purposes. While occurrence categories describe actual factors and outcomes of an 
occurrence, key risk areas describe the potential outcome of an occurrence. The key risk area is defined by the 
most likely type of accident that an occurrence could have escalated to. Unlike occurrence categories, where 
multiple categories may be assigned to a single occurrence, there can only be one key risk area per occurrence. 
The key risk area is one element of the European Risk Classification Scheme (ERCS). This scheme is applied when 
determining the safety risk score of an occurrence and is further detailed in the ASR introduction.

It can be stated that aircraft upset was the most likely type of accident to which accidents and serious incidents 
escalated/ could have escalated for the period 2018-2022 (152 occurrences out of 342). Aircraft upset also 
presented the highest safety risk in the domain. While 79 occurrences escalated to/ could have escalated to 
excursion, the safety risk was lower than the safety risks associated with terrain collision, airborne collision, 
and obstacle collision in flight. This is due to both airfield landing occurrences as well as off-field landings that 
are resulting in structural damage to the sailplane but with minimal risk for the persons on board. With only 35 
occurrences out of 342, terrain collision presented however the second highest safety risk for the domain.

Lower Risk

Higher Risk

Aircraft upset

Terrain collision

Airborne collision

Obstacle collision in flight

Runway excursion

Collision on runway

Ground damage

Other injuries

Fire, smoke, pressurisation

0

50

100

150

200

Number of risk scored occurrences

Aggregated ERCS score

 ´ Figure 5.7  Key risk areas by aggregated ERCS score and number of risk-scored occurrences involving 

sailplanes

Chapter 6
Aerodromes and 
ground handling  

Aerodromes and ground handling

2023 Annual Safety Review

110

Aerodromes and ground handling

This chapter covers aerodrome and groundhandling operations in EASA MS. The data presented is based on 
the accidents and serious incidents collected by the Agency under Regulation (EU) 996/2010 on accident and 
serious incident investigation and Regulation (EU) 376/2014 on occurrence reporting and analysis, and through 
the active search of those events from other official sources. 

The accidents and serious incidents considered in this chapter are the following:

•  Runway excursions and runway incursions related to aerodrome operations and the aerodrome 

infrastructure;

•  Occurrences  happening  on  the  apron  and  on  the  taxiway,  including  occurrences  related  to 

groundhandling operations; 

•  Occurrences  with  the  aircraft  being  airborne,  in  the  case  where  the  aerodrome  operations, 
infrastructure or groundhandling operations may have been contributors to these occurrences. 

Accidents relating to occupational health and safety, with no element of aviation safety, are not included.

The accidents and serious incidents considered in this chapter are the ones which occurred at aerodromes that are 
located in the EASA MS. This means that the data includes not only aerodromes that fall under the scope of the 
EASA Basic Regulation due to the infrastructure provided at the aerodrome or due to the number of passengers and 
number of movements but also includes aerodromes that fall under the scope of national regulations.

The  key  statistics,  occurrence  categories  and  safety  risks  at  key  risk  area  level  for  the  aerodromes  and 
groundhandling domain are presented in this document. Advanced statistics are then provided per aviation domain 
in domain specific appendices, giving an overview of the contributors to the safety risks identified in this document 
at the European level. The advanced statistics are solely derived from occurrence data from the EASA occurrence 
repository and the European Central Repository (ECR).

The list of fatal accidents associated with the scope of this domain is provided in Appendix 1 of this document.

The advanced statistics associated with the scope of this chapter are provided in Appendix 6 of this document.

2023 Annual Safety Review

111

Aerodromes and ground handling

Key Statistics

The key statistics for this domain are shown in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2. The numbers of accidents and serious 
incidents in 2022 were lower than the average of the preceding decade. In 2022, there were no fatal accidents 
related to aerodrome and groundhandling in EASA MS. However, accidents causing serious injuries still occurred 
in 2022 with numbers close to the average of the preceding decade.

 ´ Table 6.1  Key statistics for aerodromes and groundhandling

Total number 
of occurrences 
per occurrence class 
over 2012-2021

Number of 
occurrences per 
occurrence class 
in 2022

Comparison 
2022 vs yearly average 
of 2012-2021 
per occurrence class

Fatal accidents

Non-fatal accidents

Serious incidents

3

228

100

0

14

7







 ´ Table 6.2  Fatalities and serious injuries for aerodromes and groundhandling 

Number of fatalities

Number of serious injuries

Total number over 2012-2021

Yearly max number over 2012-2021

Yearly min number over 2012-2021

Total number in 2022

5

5

0

0

21

5

0

3

2023 Annual Safety Review

112

Aerodromes and ground handling

Figure 6.1 shows the number of accidents and serious incidents per year, as well as the rate of these occurrences 
per 1 million aerodrome movements in EASA MS.  Whereas the aerodrome traffic in EASA MS significantly 
recovered in 2022 after two years of low activity, the numbers of accidents and serious incidents for that year is 
one of the lowest observed over the time scope analysed. After three years of increase with a peak in 2021, the 
rate of such occurrence has decreased in 2022 down to 2.3 accidents and serious incidents per million aerodrome 
movements. Such a trend should be interpreted for more than one year and EASA will continue to monitor the 
rate in the next years to determine whether this is a tangible trend. 

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2020

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2022

Serious incidents

Non-fatal accidents
Fatal accidents

Accident +Serious incident Rate

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4.5

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2.6

17

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4.1

6

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4.7

12

18

0

5.1

7

14

0

2.3

 ´ Figure 6.1  Numbers of fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents involving aerodromes 

and groundhandling, and rates per million aerodrome movements 

The number of fatalities and serious injuries per year is shown in Figure 6.2. There were three serious injuries 
in 2022. 

The accidents causing these serious injuries were one taxiway excursion of a helicopter injuring the pilot, and 
two falls of passengers during disembarkation of a commercial air transport flight. 

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Serious Injuries

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 ´ Figure 6.2  Fatal and serious injuries per year involving aerodromes and groundhandling

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

113

Aerodromes and ground handling

Occurrence categories

Figure 6.3 outlines the occurrence categories assigned to the serious incidents and accidents in the past five 
years. Occurrences are categorised using the ICAO Accident Incident Data Reporting (ADREP) taxonomy for 
occurrence categories, developed for supporting common coding of the main elements of an occurrence that 
should be investigated, recorded, and analysed. Categories are of different natures, e.g., operational such as 
low altitude operations (LALT), environmental such as turbulence encounter (TURB), technical such as system/ 
component failure or malfunction [non-powerplant] (SCF-NP), consequential such as fire/ smoke resulting from 
impact (F-POST), etc. Multiple categories may therefore be assigned to a single occurrence. For example, if an 
engine failure occurred, and loss of control followed, the occurrence would be coded in both categories, i.e., SCF-
PP: powerplant failure or malfunction and LOC-I: loss of control in flight. The sum of the number of occurrences 
per category may therefore be greater than the total number of occurrences that realised in the period.

For the period 2018-2022, ground collisions are by far the most frequent type of accident or serious incident, 
followed by ramp/groundhandling occurrences. A more detailed categorisation of the type of event is depicted 
in Appendix 6 of this document. 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

GCOL

RAMP

LOC-G

OTHR

ADRM

UNK

RE

ATM

CTOL

SCF-NP

WILD

NAV

RI

AMAN

BIRD

EXTL

ICE

GCOL: Ground Collision; RAMP: Ground Handling; LOC-G: Loss of control – ground; OTHR: Other; ADRM: Aerodrome; UNK: Unknown or 
undetermined; RE: Runway excursion; ATM: ATM/CNS; CTOL: Collision with obstacle(s) during take-off and landing; SCF-NP: System/component 
failure or malfunction [non-powerplant]; WILD: Collision Wildlife; NAV: Navigation error; RI: Runway incursion - vehicle, aircraft or person; 
AMAN: Abrupt maneuvre; BIRD: Birdstrike; EXTL: External load related occurrences; ICE: Icing

 ´ Figure 6.3  Numbers of occurrences by occurrence category involving aerodromes and groundhandling

2023 Annual Safety Review

114

Aerodromes and ground handling

Number of EASA MS certified aerodromes

Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 (the EASA Basic Regulation), establishes which aerodromes fall under the scope of the 
European aviation safety rules and should therefore be certified in accordance with these rules. Regulation (EU) 
139/2014, the Aerodromes Regulation (EASA ADR), lays down the detailed requirements for the certification and 
operation of those aerodromes located in the EASA Member States. 

As of 31 December 2022, 541 aerodromes are within the scope of the Basic Regulation, of which, 398 have 
been certified, 17 have not been certified yet, and 126 have been granted an exemption in accordance with 
Article 2(1)(e) and Article 2(7) of the EASA Basic Regulation, due to low traffic volumes. Figure 6.4 shows the 
number of aerodromes per EASA MS that are certified in accordance with the European aviation safety rules or 
that are exempted due to low traffic volumes 13. It should be noted that although groundhandling services are 
regulated through the EASA Basic Regulation, the delegated acts laying down the detailed rules for the operation 
and oversight of groundhandling services are yet to be adopted. These acts are being developed within EASA 
rulemaking task RMT.0728.

63

26

2

4

5

1

2

1

3

4

France

Germany

Norway

Sweden

Italy

Spain

Finland

Greece

Romania

Poland

Portugal

Denmark

Ireland

Croatia

Switzerland
Austria

Netherlands
Belgium

Czech Republic
Estonia

Slovakia

Hungary

Bulgaria

Iceland

Lithuania

Slovenia

Latvia

Cyprus

Malta
Luxembourg

54

32

44

36

35

36

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11

9

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8

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1

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80

100

120

140

Certified aerodromes

Aerodromes with traffic related exemptions

Number of aerodromes

 ´ Figure 6.4  Aerodromes within the scope of Regulation (EU) 139/2014 (EASA ADR) by EASA Member State

13  A detailed list of aerodromes falling under EU rules and those exempted or excluded can be accessed via the EASA website under the 

following link: https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/datasets/aerodromes-falling-scope-regulation-eu-20181139

2023 Annual Safety Review

115

Aerodromes and ground handling

Safety risks for aerodromes and groundhandling

The safety risks for aerodromes and groundhandling are derived from accident and serious incident data from 
the EASA occurrence repository, covering the period 2018-2022 (149 occurrences). 

The key risk areas for aerodrome and groundhandling are shown in Figure 6.5. Key risk areas and occurrence 
categories (refer to Figure 6.3) have different purposes. While occurrence categories describe actual factors 
and outcomes of an occurrence, key risk areas describe the potential outcome of an occurrence. The key risk 
area is defined by the most likely type of accident that an occurrence could have escalated to. Unlike occurrence 
categories, where multiple categories may be assigned to a single occurrence, there can only be one key risk area 
per occurrence. The key risk area is one element of the European Risk Classification Scheme (ERCS). This scheme 
is applied when determining the safety risk score of an occurrence and is further detailed in the ASR introduction.

It can be stated that ground damage was the most likely type of accident to which accidents and serious 
incidents escalated/could have escalated for the period 2018-2022 (105 occurrences out of 149). Ground damage 
also presented the highest cumulated safety risk in the domain (yellow bar). It can be noted that collision on 
runway, with only 6 occurrences which escalated to/could have escalated to such outcome, has the second 
highest cumulated safety risk. 

Lower Risk

Higher Risk

Ground damage

Collision on runway

Excursion

Aircraft upset

Other injuries

Obstacle collision in flight

Airborne collision

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Number of risk scored occurrences

Aggregated ERCS score

 ´ Figure 6.5  Key risk areas by aggregated ERCS score and number of risk-scored occurrences involving 

aerodromes and groundhandling

2023 Annual Safety Review

116

Aerodromes and ground handling

Chapter 7
ATM/ANS  

ATM/ANS

2023 Annual Safety Review

117

ATM/ANS

This chapter covers accidents and serious incidents related to the provision of Air Traffic Management or Air 
Navigation Services (ATM/ANS) in EASA MS. The data are based on the accidents and serious incidents collected 
by EASA under ICAO Annex 13 and Regulation (EU) 996/2010 on accident and serious incident investigation and 
Regulation (EU) 376/2014 on occurrence reporting, analysis and follow-up.

Accidents and serious incidents in this chapter involve at least one CAT aircraft, either fixed-wing aeroplanes 
with a maximum take-off mass of at least 2250 kg, or small (CS-27) or large (CS-29) helicopters, which occurred 
in an EASA MS.

Accidents and serious incidents reviewed in this chapter comprise occurrences where the provision of services 
by the ATM/ANS was, directly or indirectly, a contributing factor in the occurrence or played a role in aggravating 
the occurrence encountered by the aircraft. 

Additionally, a subpart of this chapter deals with occurrences where UAS were involved. This part is added in the 
ATM/ANS chapter as those occurrences concern-controlled airspace and are mainly reported by the crew of CAT 
aeroplanes or ATM/ANS operators. 

The chapter introduces the key statistics and occurrence categories on ATM/ANS occurrences and concludes with 
the safety risks at KRA level from a data perspective. Advanced statistics are then provided, per aviation domain, 
in domain-specific appendices, giving an overview of the contributors to the safety risks identified in the core 
document. The advanced statistics are solely derived from occurrence data from the EASA occurrence repository 
and the ECR. 

The list of fatal accidents associated with the scope of this chapter is provided in Appendix 1 of this document.

The advanced statistics associated with ATM/ANS are provided in Appendix 7 of this report.

A
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2023 Annual Safety Review

118

ATM/ANS

Key statistics

The key statistics for this domain are in Table 7.1. They include a comparison of the number of fatal and non-fatal 
accidents and serious incidents for the last year and the previous 10-year period. 

No fatal accidents in 2022 and the preceding period 2012-2021, where ATM/ANS was a contributing factor 
(ATM involved or ATM indirectly involved) were recorded. As in 2020 and 2021 also no non-fatal accidents were 
reported in the year 2022. In the last decade, seven non-fatal accidents with ATM contribution were recorded. 

 ´ Table 7.1  Key statistics for ATM/ANS contribution accidents and serious incidents

Total number 
of occurrences 
per occurrence class 
over 2012-2021

Number of 
occurrences per 
occurrence class 
in 2022

Comparison 
2022 vs yearly average 
of 2012-2021 
per occurrence class

Fatal accidents

Non-fatal accidents

Serious incidents

0

7

116

0

0

6

=





Table 7.2 includes a comparison of the fatalities and serious injuries sustained in those accidents during the same 
timeframe. 

As shown in Table 7.2, no fatalities with ATM/ANS contribution were recorded in 2022.  Only three serious injuries 
with ATM contribution (directly or indirectly involved) were recorded during the last decade. 

 ´ Table 7.2  Number of fatalities and serious injuries involving ATM/ANS contribution

Number of fatalities

Number of serious injuries

Total number over 2012-2021

Yearly max number over 2012-2021

Yearly min number over 2012-2021

Total number in 2022

0

0

0

0

3

2

0

0

Figure 7.1 shows the number of accidents and serious incidents for 2012 – 2022 and the number of accident 
and serious incident rates per one million flights for 2019-2022.  In the past decade, no fatal accidents with 
ATM contributions were recorded. The rate of serious incidents with ATM/ANS contribution, as seen in Figure 
7.1, decreased in 2020 and 2021 compared to 2019, however an increase from four to six serious incidents was 
recorded in 2022. During the last three years, fewer serious incidents were recorded than in the years before 
(2012-2019)

2023 Annual Safety Review

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ATM/ANS

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 ´ Figure 7.1  Number of accidents and serious incidents per year and serious incidents and accidents rate 

per one million flights

Figure 7.1 indicates the accident and serious incident rate per one million flights. The reference data chosen 
for the rate calculation are traffic data (IFR flights) without UK, therefore only 2019-2022 are considered for 
the accident and incident rate calculation.  While the absolute number of serious incidents increased in 2022 
compared to 2020 and 2021, the serious incident rate continues to decline since 2019. The accident rate has been 
on a stable decline over the last four years.

The number of fatalities and serious injuries per year are shown in Figure 7.2. The number of fatalities is highly 
dependent on the size of the aircraft involved in the accident and therefore the statistics do not follow a clear 
pattern. In 2022, there were no occurrences with ATM/ANS contributions that resulted in fatalities. In 2018 there 
was one occurrence and in 2013 there were two occurrences with serious injuries were reported. 

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 ´ Figure 7.2  Fatalities and serious injuries per year involving ATM/ANS contribution

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

120

ATM/ANS

Occurrence categories

Figure 7.3 outlines the top 10 categories assigned to the serious incidents and accidents in the past five years. 

Occurrences  are  categorised  using  the  ICAO  ADREP  taxonomy  for  occurrence  categories,  developed  for 
supporting common coding of the main elements of an occurrence that should be investigated, recorded, 
and analysed. Categories are of different natures, e.g., operational such as low altitude operations (LALT), 
environmental such as turbulence encounter (TURB), technical such as system/ component failure or malfunction 
[non-powerplant] (SCF-NP), consequential such as fire/ smoke resulting from impact (F-POST), etc. Multiple 
categories may therefore be assigned to a single occurrence. For example, if an engine failure occurred, and 
loss of control followed, the occurrence would be coded in both categories, i.e., SCF-PP: powerplant failure or 
malfunction and LOC-I: loss of control in flight.

For the period 2018-2022, there were 39 serious incidents and accidents with ATM/ANS contributions. The 
occurrence category ATM: ATM/CNS was assigned to 24 serious incidents and accidents. The occurrence 
categories MAC: Airprox/ ACAS alert/ loss of separation/ (near) mid-air collisions was assigned to 19 serious 
incidents and accidents and RI: runway incursion – vehicle, aircraft or person was assigned to six serious incidents 
and accidents. The occurrence categories ADRM: Aerodrome, GCOL: Ground collision and NAV: Navigation error 
were assigned to two occurrences each, the occurrence categories AMAN: Abrupt manoeuvre, CABIN: Cabin 
safety events and CFIT: Controlled flight into or toward terrain and RE: Runway excursion were assigned to one 
occurrence each.  

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

ATM

MAC

RI

ADRM

GCOL

NAV

AMAN

CABIN

CFIT

RE

ATM: ATM/CNS; MAC: Airprox/ACAS alert/loss of separation/(near) mid-air collisions; RI: Runway incursion – vehicle, aircraft or person; ADRM: 
Aerodrome; GCOL: Ground Collision; NAV: Navigation error; AMAN: Abrupt manoeuvre; CABIN: Cabin safety events; CFIT: Controlled flight into 
or toward terrain; RE: Runway excursion

 ´ Figure 7.3  Numbers of occurrences by occurrence categories involving ATM/ ANS contribution

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ATM/ANS

Phase of flight

The majority of accidents and serious incidents in 2022 with ATM/ANS contribution took place during the 
approach and landing phases, followed by the take-off phase, as shown in Figure 7.4. While for 2012-2021, 
looking at the average of occurrences, en-route was the most affected flight phase, no occurrences were 
recorded in 2022 for this flight phase, as opposed to the occurrences in the approach and landing flight phases.

s
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Average 2012-2021

2022

Taxi

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Take-off

En route

Approach

Landing

3.0

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4.1

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4.1

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1.4

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Tow

0.1

0

Unknown/
blank

0.3

0

 ´ Figure 7.4  Accidents and serious incidents by phase of flight involving ATM/ ANS contribution

 
 
 
 
 
 
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ATM/ANS

Airborne collisions and near collisions involving unmanned aircraft

This subchapter is added into the ATM/ANS chapter as it lists occurrences involving unmanned aircraft occurring 
in controlled airspace. 

The potential for an airborne collision between a UAS and other aircraft is an area of growing safety concern, 
due to the increasing accessibility of UAS. 

It is important to note that UAS-related reports are mainly provided by the CAT aeroplanes and ATM/ANS 
domains. As soon as reports from UAS operators become more common, the safety issues relating to this type 
of aircraft will become more apparent.

Figure 7.5 shows the number of occurrences and the occurrence rate which is calculated by taking the number 
of IFR flights in the MS area and the number of UAS occurrences into account. In this chapter, a UAS occurrence 
refers to accidents and serious incidents where at least one manned fixed-wing or rotary aircraft was involved, 
and the event resulted in an airborne collision or near airborne collision with a UAS. A slight increase from two 
to three occurrences was recorded in 2022. 

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Number of occurences

Occurence rate

2018

11

2019

2

0.20

2020

2

0.45

2021

2

0.36

2022

3

0.36

 ´ Figure 7.5  Number and rate of UAS collisions with manned aircraft and near collisions rate 

Figure 7.6 compares UAS and manned aircraft involved in airborne collisions and near collisions. Since 2018 the 
number of accidents and serious incidents involving UAS decreased and kept low in 2019, 2020, and 2021 and 
had a slight increase in 2022, while no occurrence with manned aircraft of this event type was recorded in 2022.

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Manned aircraft

UAS

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12

11

2019

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2

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1

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2021

1

2

2022

0

3

 ´ Figure 7.6  Airborne collisions and near collisions, involving UAS and manned aircraft 

 
 
 
 
 
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ATM/ANS

Safety risks for ATM/ANS

The safety risks for ATM/ANS are derived from accidents and serious incident data from the EASA occurrence 
repository and the ECR, covering the 5-year period (2018-2022).

The KRAs for ATM/ANS are shown in Figure 7.7. 

KRAs and occurrence categories (refer to Figure 7.3) have different purposes. While occurrence categories 
describe actual factors and outcomes of an occurrence, KRAs describe the potential outcome of an occurrence. 
The KRA is defined by the most likely type of accident that an occurrence could have escalated to. Unlike 
occurrence categories, where multiple categories may be assigned to a single occurrence, there can only be one 
KRA per occurrence. The KRA is one element of the ERCS. This scheme is applied when determining the safety 
risk score of an occurrence and is further detailed in the ASR introduction.

It can be stated that the occurrences with the KRA collision on runway had the highest risk score. 16 out of 39 
occurrences were reported with this KRA. The occurrences with the second highest risk score are occurrences 
with the KRA airborne collision. 18 out of 39 occurrences were reported with this KRA. One occurrence each with 
the KRAs terrain collision, ground damage, other injuries, aircraft upset and runway excursion were reported 
with a low safety risk.

Lower Risk

Higher Risk

Collision on runway

Airborne collision

Ground damage

Other injuries

Terrain collision

Aircraft upset

Runway excusion

0

5

10

15

20

Number of risk scored occurrences

Aggregated ERCS score

 ´ Figure 7.7  Key risk areas by aggregated ERCS score and number of risk-scored ATM/ANS occurrences

The top KRAs in the ATM/ANS domain are airborne collision and runway collision, reflecting the role of ATM/ANS 
in guiding and separating aircraft. 

The top KRAs the ATM/ANS domain are defined as: 

•  Collision on runway. This includes all occurrences involving actual or potential runway collisions 
between  an  aircraft  and  another  aircraft,  vehicle  or  person  that  occur  on  the  runway  of  an 
aerodrome or other designated landing area. This includes occurrences involving the incorrect 
presence of an aircraft, vehicle, or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the 
landing and take-off of aircraft. It does not include occurrences involving wildlife on the runway.  

 
2023 Annual Safety Review

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ATM/ANS

A slight majority nine out of 16 of occurrences in the ASR 2023 with the KRA collision on runway 
occurred during the take-off phase. 

•  Airborne  collision.  This  includes  occurrences  involving  actual  or  potential  airborne  collisions 
between  aircraft,  and  occurrences  involving  an  aircraft  and  other  controllable  airborne 
objects,  such  as  drones,  thereby  excluding  birds.  Therefore,  it  includes  all  separation-related 
occurrences  regardless  of  the  cause.  It  does  not  include  false  TCAS/ACAS  alerts  caused  by 
equipment  malfunctions  or  loss  of  separation  with  at  least  one  aircraft  on  the  ground,  which 
may  be  coded  as  runway  or  movement  area  collision  if  the  occurrence  meets  the  criteria. 

The occurrence with the highest ERCS score and the KRA airborne collision was an occurrence that 
happened at the transfer from one sector to the other. It has to be noted that no occurrence with the 
KRA airborne collision was reported in 2022. 

 
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ATM/ANS

Chapter 8
Occurrence 
reporting rates  

Occurrence reporting rates

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Occurrence reporting rates

This chapter intends to measure the volume of occurrence reports collected in the European Central Repository 
(ECR) under Regulation (EU) 376/2014 over the period 2016-2022 and to put the changing levels of occurrence 
reporting in perspective with changes to the level of aviation activity in Europe.

Occurrence reporting rates are important to monitor as they are an indicator of the changes to safety culture in 
Europe. A large number of reports can be regarded as a sign of a good safety culture. In this respect, whereas 
in the rest of the annual safety review a higher number of accidents and serious incidents may be viewed in as 
negative; in this chapter an increase in overall occurrence reporting, which include incidents, can be viewed as 
a positive development.

This chapter had initially been developed for the 2021 annual safety review by the safety performance indicators 
working group (SPI WG), under the Network of Aviation Safety Analysts (NoA), which is established under Article 
14 of Regulation (EU) 376/2014. 

For all figures in this chapter, the number of reports should be interpreted as the number of reports from distinct 
reporting entities. This means that for a single occurrence record, if more than one report is reported by the 
same reporting entity, as it would be the case if there were follow-up reports, the record will be counted as one. 
However, if there are reports from two different reporting entities about the same occurrence, then the record 
will be counted as two and so forth. The traffic data used in this chapter were provided by Eurocontrol. The 
extent of the data scope is 30 out of the 31 EASA MS, since Eurocontrol does not collect data for Iceland. The IFR 
traffic data used in this report includes both EU and Non-EU operators.

It  should  be  highlighted  that  the  figures  shown  in  this  chapter  are  highly  dependent  on  the  quality  and 
completeness of the coding of the occurrences collected in the ECR, in particular on the attribute ‘Reporting 
Entity’.

In order to reach more accurate figures from which more solid interpretations can be built, it is important 
that reporting organisations and competent authorities continue their effort to improve the coding quality of 
occurrence records submitted under Regulation (EU) 376/2014. 

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Occurrence reporting rates

8.1   Overall levels of occurrence reporting  

and levels of traffic

This section gives a high-level quantitative analysis of the total number of reports collected in the ECR over the 
period 2016-2022, in parallel with the evolution of the level of traffic in Europe.

Annual evolution over the period 2016-2022

The total number of reports collected in the ECR over the period 2016-2022 is shown in Figure 8.1, and the 
number of cumulated airport movements in Europe for the same time period is illustrated in Figure 8.2. 
Reporting rates were then calculated by normalising the volumes of reports with the airport movements, as 
shown in Figure 8.3.

After the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 376/2014 at the end of 2015, the number of reports in the ECR 
steadily increased from 2016 to 2019, with the figure for 2019 being 50% higher than for 2016. By contrast, 
the level of traffic in Europe increased at a slower pace, with +8% of airport movements in 2019 compared to 
2016. The overall reporting rate, therefore, increased over this period from 15.6 to 21.6 reports per 1000 airport 
movements. 

In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic caused a drastic decrease in the level of traffic, which then recovered only 
partially in 2021. The total number of reports also dropped substantially in 2020, but this drop was less 
pronounced than the drop in traffic. Also, in 2021, the number of reports increased rapidly compared to 2020, 
reaching back to the volumes reported in 2017. Consequently, the overall reporting rate continued to increase 
significantly over 2020 and 2021, reaching 33.8 reports per 1000 airport movements, which is doubled compared 
to 2016.

The volumes of reports in 2022 were the highest observed since 2016, and 20% higher than in 2019. In terms of 
activity, 2022 saw the traffic continuing its recovery to reach 81% of the level of 2019. As a result, the reporting 
rate in 2022 remained almost at the highest level observed in 2021. 

350000

300000

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150000

100000

50000

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2022

 ´ Figure 8.1  Number of reports collected in the European Central Repository (ECR) per year

 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

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Occurrence reporting rates

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6

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2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

 ´ Figure 8.2  Number of airport movements per year, for all EASA MS (except Iceland)

29.5

33.8

31.9

21.6

18.7

15.6

18.2

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2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

 ´ Figure 8.3  Reporting rate (number of reports/1000 airport movements) per year

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Occurrence reporting rates

Monthly variation for each year

Figure 8.4 shows the number of reports by month for each year over the period 2016-2022.

The steady increase in reporting levels is clearly visible from 2016 to 2019. 2020 shows a very different profile, 
with a substantial drop in the number of reports from March 2020, which coincides with the even more 
pronounced drop in traffic, as shown in Figure 8.5. In 2021, whereas the first months of the year showed a lower 
number of reports compared to the preceding years, the number of reports progressively caught up with the 
levels of 2019 and were even similar to 2019 for the last quarter of the year. This trend for reports in 2021 was 
not observed in the number of airport movements which stayed lower than the pre-pandemic levels despite a 
visible increase over the year. In 2022, the evolution of airport traffic got back to its more usual seasonal profile, 
which was still slightly below the pre-pandemic years. The number of reports all along 2022 was the highest 
observed.

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35000

30000

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Aug

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2022

Month of the Year

 ´ Figure 8.4  Number of reports collected in the ECR per month per year

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Month of the Year

 ´ Figure 8.5  Number of airport movements per month per year, for all EASA MS (except Iceland)

 
 
 
 
 
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Occurrence reporting rates

8.2  Volumes of reporting for the main type of 

organisations 

This section provides data split by the main type of reporting organisations, to better identify which organisations 
are the main contributors to safety occurrence reporting and evaluate how their relative contributions have 
evolved over the period 2016-2022. 

Comparison of volume of reporting  

In Figure 8.6, the total number of reports was split into five main categories of reporting organisations, using the 
ECR attribute ‘Reporting Entity’. These five categories are as follows:

•  Aircraft operators;

•  Air navigation service providers (ANSPs);

•  Aerodrome operators; 

•  Other types of reporting entities, such as design organisations, maintenance organisations, ground 

handling organisations, production organisations, individuals;

•  Unknown: the reports for which the ‘Reporting Entity’ value was not completed. 

For the three main types of organisations, following a progressive increase from 2016 to 2019, and lower numbers 
during 2020 and 2021, the number of reports in 2022 was the highest observed since 2016. In comparison to 
the last pre-pandemic year 2019, the number of reports in 2022 from aircraft operators is 28% higher, also 28% 
higher for ANSPs, and almost doubled (93% higher) for aerodrome operators.

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2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Aircraft operator

ANSP

Aerodrome operator

Others

Unknown

 ´ Figure 8.6  Number of reports collected in the ECR per type of reporting organisation

 
 
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Occurrence reporting rates

Figure 8.7 brings an additional perspective on the trend in occurrence reporting, by showing the relative 
proportion of reports for the five categories defined in Figure 8.6. 

The proportion of reports from aircraft operators was relatively stable around 37 % of all reports over the 
period 2016-2022, except in 2020 where it decreased to 28%. For the ANSPs, the proportion of reports slightly 
decreased since 2016 to stabilise then around 28% of the total reports over the last three years. The proportion 
of aerodrome reports had a continuous increase since 2016, starting from 9% of the total reports in 2016 to 
reach 18% of the overall reports over the last two years.

It is important to highlight that the accuracy of the figures and trends described here are affected by the 
proportion of reports for which the type of reporting entity is unknown. The number of reports in the ECR 
with no reporting entity value represents between 12% and 17% of the overall reports for each year between 
2016 and 2020. Over the last two years, this proportion was reduced to 6% of the overall reports, which is 
encouraging, but still a limiting factor in the interpretability of the ECR data.

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Aircraft operator

ANSP

Aerodrome operator

Others

Unknown

 ´ Figure 8.7  Proportion of reports (in % of the total number of reports) per type of reporting organisation

 
 
 
 
 
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Occurrence reporting rates

Chapter 9
Standardisation  

Standardisation

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Standardisation

As safety is the Agency’s core business, Standardisation14, aimed at achieving and maintaining a high and uniform 
level of safety within the EU, is one of its main tasks. EASA conducts standardisation activities to monitor the 
application by National Competent Authorities (NCAs) of the requirements of the Basic Regulation15 and its 
Implementing Rules,   as well as their uniform implementation, to enable that:

•  Passengers can fly safely to, from and within the EU;

•  The EU industry benefits from a level playing field;

•  Certificates issued by NCAs are mutually recognised and trusted; and

•  The European system is recognised by international partners.

Standardisation activities entail assessing the NCAs’ ability to discharge their safety oversight responsibilities on 
a continuous basis (Continuous Monitoring Activities, CMA), as well as conducting standardisation inspections 
as necessary to directly verify the implementation of the rules. Such inspections are prioritised, planned and 
performed using a risk-based approach, based on the Agency’s assessment of well-defined indicators.

This chapter summarises the standardisation activities conducted by EASA in 2022. After two years of partial 
shut-down of aviation and NCAs operating in ‘exemption mode’, 2022 was the first year of a strong recovery in 
terms of traffic. NCAs have been trying to catch up with the resurgence of their industry. However, retaining and 
recruiting qualified staff in competition with the also recruiting industry is a big challenge for many NCAs. This 
is also the root cause of several observations   made in Standardisation in 2022.

During 2022, the Agency performed standardisation inspections and CMA in the following domains:

1.  Systemic Enablers for Safety Management (SYS),

2.  Aerodromes (ADR),

3.  Airworthiness (Production and Maintenance) (AIR),

4.  Air Traffic Management/Air Navigation Services (ATM/ANS),

5.  Air Operations (OPS),

6.  Ramp inspections (RAMP),  

7.  Aircrew - Licensing (FCL),

8.  Aircrew - Medical (MED),

9.  Aircrew - Flight Simulation Training Devices (FSTD), and

10. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS).

The Agency continued the build-up of its standardisation activities in the UAS domain. Instead of following a 
traditional standardisation approach, focusing mainly on a cycle of on-site inspections of all MS, EASA decided to 
adopt a novel approach that is mainly based on dedicated surveys (horizontal Enhanced CMA   (ECMA) activities) 
and regular webinars with sectorial focal points. These activities were complemented by one comprehensive on-
site inspection and two implementation support  visits. In addition, a new Technical Body (TeB),   dedicated to 
the UAS domain, was established to better support the exchanges   between EASA and EASA MS. Two sessions 
of this new TeB were held in 2022.

14  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 628/2013 of 28 June 2013.

15  Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2018.

2023 Annual Safety Review

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Standardisation

In 2022 the Agency raised a total of 591 findings of non-conformity, as shown in Figure 9.1: 

700

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500

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100

0

Class G

Class D

Class C

2018

9

198

375

2019

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166

380

2020

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147

2021

6

155

318

2022

2

198

391

 ´ Figure 9.1  Number of findings by class and year

Class C findings (391 in 2022) raise mainly standardisation concerns, whereas class D findings (198 in 2022) 
also raise safety concerns, if not timely corrected, and class G findings (2 in 2022) represent immediate safety 
concerns (ISCs) requiring the concerned NCA to take immediate corrective actions. 

Comparing 2022 and 2021 figures shows that the number of findings in 2022 have increased significantly 
reflecting the increase of standardisation activities in 2022. With more onsite visits compared to the preceding 
year, the number of findings increased in the majority of the domains. The biggest increase is found in the ATM/
ANS domain mainly due to a targeted focus on Performance Based Navigation (PBN) implementation specifically 
undertaken on behalf of the European Commission and new regulatory requirements   that the NCAs and 
undertakings are still becoming fully conversant with. This demonstrates the efficiency of the ECMA approach 
that enables to better evaluate the level of implementation of recent regulatory changes. 

In terms of the ratio of findings per inspection, the average of 6.9 for 2022 indicates a need to maintain regular 
onsite inspections with an upwards trend over the last three years (6.3 in 2021 and 6.2 in 2020).

2023 Annual Safety Review

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Standardisation

Class C

CE-1; 0%

CE-8; 5%

CE-7; 25%

CE-2; 3%

CE-3; 11%

CE-4; 8%

CE-6; 30%

CE-5; 17%

 ´ Figure 9.2  Distribution of Class C findings by Critical Element

Class D

CE-1; 0%

CE-8; 6%

CE-2; 3%

CE-3; 5%

CE-4; 3%

CE-5; 4%

CE-7; 36%

CE-6; 44%

 ´ Figure 9.3  Distribution of Class D findings by Critical Element

 
2023 Annual Safety Review

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Standardisation

Figure 9.2 and Figure 9.3 illustrate the distribution of class C and D findings raised in 2022 according to the eight 
Critical Elements (CEs) of a State’s Safety Oversight System defined by the International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO) in its Doc 9734 “Safety Oversight Manual”. The ICAO CEs are essentially the main constituents of a safety 
oversight system. They encompass the whole spectrum of civil aviation oversight activities, and their effective 
implementation is an indication of a State's capability in providing safety oversight. The eight CEs are:

CE-1  

Primary aviation legislation;

CE-2  

Specific operating regulations;

CE-3  

State civil aviation system and safety oversight functions;

CE-4  

Technical personnel qualification and training;

CE-5  

Technical guidance, tools and the provision of safety-critical information;

CE-6  

Licensing, certification, authorisation and approval obligations;

CE-7  

Surveillance obligations;

CE-8  

Resolution of safety concerns.

As in previous years, most class D findings (80%) relate to CE-6 (initial certification/ approval) and CE-7 (continued 
oversight/ surveillance). This confirms the continued safety impact of the inadequacy of certification and 
oversight processes that was already observed in the previous years; it represents a standing concern, and it is a 
focus area for standardisation inspections.

For class C findings, the main areas of concern are CE-6 and CE-5, followed by CE-3 and CE-7; combined, they 
account for 83% of all class C. Besides certification and oversight, the unavailability of proper procedures and 
tools (CE-5) and technical training and qualification of personnel, remain a source of standardisation concern.

In 2022 two ISCs were identified in the OPS domain. This is a decrease compared to six ISCs in 2021. All safety 
concerns were addressed immediately by the NCAs involved.

More generally, the key outcomes of standardisation activities in 2022 can be summarised as follows:

•  Lack of effective oversight. As in previous years, most Class D findings (78%) relate to the NCAs’ 
performance of certification and oversight tasks (ICAO Critical Elements CE-6 and CE-7), showing that 
such essential functions remain the most challenging. The severity of the issue varies across technical 
domains, the most critical being Air Operations, Flight Crew Licensing and Aerodromes, as can be 
seen in Figure 9.4. The inability of several NCAs to properly discharge their certification and oversight 
responsibilities in these domains is a concern, especially due to the size, scope and complexity of the 
aviation industry that some of them oversee. 

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Standardisation

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AIR - Airworthiness; OPS - Air Operations; FCL - Aircrew Licencing; MED - Aircrew Medical; FSTD - Flight Simulation Training Devices; ANS - Air 
Traffic Management/Air Navigation Services; RAMP - Ramp inspections; SYS - Systemic Enablers for Safety Management; ADR - Aerodromes; 
UAS - Unmanned Aircraft Systems.

 ´ Figure 9.4  Ratio of class C and D findings per domain in 202216

•  A growing gap in restoring the oversight function. While the majority of NCAs have reached a 
suitable level of implementation and are able to correct their weaknesses in safety oversight, some 
MS show continued difficulties in restoring their safety oversight function. 

•  This is illustrated by safety-related findings (class D) that remain open and overdue at the end of each 
year. Among the MS experiencing the most difficulties, some have been improving over the last years, 
but others struggle to restore the situation for years now. Lastly, the ability to react in a timely manner 
to overdue findings is an issue in several MS.

•  Uneven progression of the overall maturity in States. While some MS have started their journey 
to develop their maturity level years ago, others are still struggling to initiate their State Safety 
Programme (SSP), in particular regarding the coordination of all relevant state entities. 

•  Management Systems. As in previous years, the implementation of management systems at NCAs 
continues to be an area of concern. The manpower computation, which has improved globally, reflects 
the difficulty to recruit and maintain a sufficient amount of competent personnel. The competence 
of personnel and the turnover of qualified staff remains a global concern. NCAs face difficulties to 
properly implement recent changes in the applicable regulations and in change management in 
general, notably in NCAs who established a multimodal organisation, combining different modes of 
transport in a single authority,   where the integrated management system struggles to address all the 
specificities of the aviation domain and its safety management. 

•  Principal place of Business (PPoB). The correct determination of the principal place of business has 
improved in 2022 with best practices based on a European Commission Working Paper . The handling 
of PPoB issues has matured in some NCAs by increasing awareness and developing appropriate 

16 

 Note: this ratio is not yet statistically meaningful for the UAS domain, as only two findings were raised in 2021. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2023 Annual Safety Review

138

Standardisation

assessment tools. However, the increasing number of multinational companies keeps making the 
determination more complex with the risk that some companies might engage with several NCAs to 
“select” the optimal place for their approval with, potentially, challenges for the oversight that still 
needs to cope with the size and complexity of the industry.

•  European Economic Area (EEA) agreement-specific issues. The delay in incorporating new EU 
regulations into Annex XIII to the EEA applicable to Norway and Iceland creates growing technical 
differences between the certification basis used by EU MS and non-EU EEA States which escapes 
the scope of Standardisation while benefiting from equal rights and obligations within the internal 
market.

The Agency will continue to focus its standardisation efforts by running an effective Continuous Monitoring 
Approach. The successful development of ECMA to remotely investigate areas of concern and trigger inspections, 
implementation support or even direct off-site findings has proven to be an efficient way to tailor the activities to 
the situation of each country. The maturity level assessed during the SYS inspections provides a new dimension 
related to safety management at state level.

EASA will monitor and report to the European Commission on the progress of issues mentioned above to resolve 
long-standing and overdue findings and help the MS in maintaining a robust safety oversight and the mutual 
recognition of certificates.

EUROPEAN UNION AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY
SAFETY INTELLIGENCE
DEPARTMENT

Catalogue number
TO-AA-23-001-EN-N

ISBN
978-92-9210-281-4

ISSN
2314-9272

DOI
10.2822/83672

Postal address  
Postfach 10 12 53 
50452 Cologne 
Germany

Visiting address 
European Union Aviation Safety Agency 
Konrad-Adenauer-Ufer 3, D-50668  
Köln, Germany

Tel.   +49 221 89990 - 000  
Mail   safetypromotion@easa.europa.eu
Web   www.easa.europa.eu