The EU-UK trade and cooperation agreement two years on unpacking early evidence : European implementation assessment.
Date: 2023-08-10
Institutions: Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services
Subjects: EU relations, European Union, United Kingdom, cooperation agreement, cost-benefit analysis, environmental law, risk management, social security, trade agreement

The EU-UK 
Trade and 
Cooperation 
Agreement two 
years on: 
Unpacking early 
evidence 

European 
Implementation 
Assessment 

STUDY 

EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

Author: Isabelle Ioannides 
Ex-Post Evaluation Unit PE 
747.433 – August 2023 

EN 

The EU-UK Trade and 
Cooperation Agreement 
two years on: Unpacking 
early evidence 

European Implementation Assessment 

On  14  November 2022,  the  European Parliament's Conference of Presidents approved a  joint 
request from the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and the Committee on International Trade 
(INTA) to entrust them with the drafting of an implementation report entitled: Implementation of 
the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (rapporteurs: Andreas Schieder, S&D, Austria, and 
Sean Kelly, EPP, Ireland). Another 10 committees (AGRI, CULT, ECON, EMPL, ENVI, ITRE, IMCO, LIBE, 
PECH  and TRAN) are associated to the file.  This European implementation assessment seeks to 
support the scrutiny work of the  AFET and  INTA committees on this issue and accompany the 
preparation of the aforementioned implementation report. 

This  study  analyses  the  early  outcomes,  benefits,  risks  and 
challenges linked  to the implementation of the EU-UK Trade and 
Cooperation  Agreement  (TCA),  in  provisional  application  since 
January 2021  and  in  force since  1  May  2022,  for  the  EU  and  its 
Member States. Its chief focus is on the implementation of the level-
playing-field  provisions  – 
in  particular,  those  dealing  with 
environmental and social/labour rights protection – and on trade 
flows between the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom 
(UK). 

The  study first sets the scene,  outlining the potential sources of 
tension in EU-UK relations that hinder the application of the EU-UK 
TCA. 
It  then  examines  the  EU  evaluations  of  the  TCA's 
implementation at national and regional level, while also presenting 
experts' views  on  how the  agreement has been  performing. The 
study also provides a longitudinal and visual analysis of EU-UK trade 
flows  to  explain  the  changes and  continuities observed. It  then 
analyses the European Parliament's scrutiny of the EU-UK  TCA. It 
concludes  by  charting  the  possible  paths  for  enhancing  the 
performance of the EU-UK TCA, so that it can contribute to building 
trust between the two parties. 

AUTHOR 

Dr Isabelle Ioannides, Ex-Post Evaluation Unit 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS  

The author would like to thank Ines Reinstadtler and Leonie Reicheneder, trainees in the Ex-Post Evaluation 
Unit between September 2022 and July 2023, for their research assistance on this project and for providing a 
first draft of the chapter on the European Parliament's work. The author is also grateful for support received 
from the Data Visualisation Support Office of EPRS: Gyorgyi Macsai analysed the Eurostat data and prepared 
the figures and graphs on trade, and Samy Chahri created the map in Figure 1 and Figures 11 to 15. Thanks 
also go to Yann-Sven Rittelmeyer from the Linking the Levels Unit of EPRS, who kindly contacted different 
regions across the EU and coordinated their responses, and to the two peer reviewers for their constructive 
comments. 

ABOUT THE PUBLISHER 

This paper has been drawn up by the Ex-Post Evaluation (EVAL) Unit of the Directorate for Impact Assessment 
and Foresight, within the Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services (EPRS) of the Secretariat of 
the European Parliament. 

To contact the author, please email: EPRS-ExPostEvaluation@ep.europa.eu  

LINGUISTIC VERSIONS 

Original: EN 

Manuscript completed in July 2023.  

DISCLAIMER AND COPYRIGHT 

This document  is prepared for, and addressed  to, the  Members and staff of the  European Parliament as 
background material to assist them in their parliamentary  work. The content of  the document is the sole 
responsibility of its author and any opinions expressed herein should not be taken to represent an official 
position of the Parliament. 

Reproduction  and  translation  for  non-commercial  purposes  are  authorised,  provided  the  source  is 
acknowledged and the European Parliament is given prior notice and sent a copy. 

Brussels © European Union, 2023. 

PE 747.433 
ISBN: 978-92-848-0854-0 
DOI: 10.2861/940721 
CAT: QA-03-23-272-EN-N 

eprs@ep.europa.eu  
http://www.eprs.ep.parl.union.eu (intranet) 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank (internet) 
http://epthinktank.eu (blog) 

The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

Executive summary 

The Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) between the European Union (EU) and the United 
Kingdom (UK) of  Great Britain and Northern Ireland was signed on 30  December 2020.  It  took 
provisional effect on 1 January 2021. Following the completion of the ratification processes in the 
EU and the UK, it formally entered into force on 1 May 2021. 

The EU-UK TCA resets the EU-UK relationship following the UK's departure from the EU. It provides 
for tariff and quota-free trade in all goods, as well as for comprehensive market access, while also 
setting out rules for services and investment. Preferential arrangements have been agreed in areas 
including,  but  not limited  to,  trade in  goods and services, public  procurement, aviation, road 
transport, energy and fisheries. These new cooperation arrangements are underpinned by mutual 
commitments to ensure a level  playing field for open and fair competition and to contribute to 
sustainable development. 

While considering the fact that the TCA has only been in application for two years, this EPRS study 
seeks to analyse and evaluate what the early outcomes, benefits, risks and challenges linked to the 
TCA's implementation are for the EU and its Member States. Due to time constraints, the study 
focuses on three specific areas of TCA implementation. For this purpose, it: 

examines the reports of the EU institutions and provides data collected from the regions 
of the EU Member States focusing on the initial consequences and (potential) impact of 
the EU-UK TCA on environmental and social/labour rights protection in the EU Member 
States; 
provides a visual and longitudinal analysis of EU-UK trade flows (as of 2016), while also 
taking 
into  consideration  internal  and  external  disruptive  factors,  therefore 
contextualising the data provided by the European Commission; 
analyses the European Parliament's position on the EU-UK TCA, delving into its relevant 
resolutions, oral and written questions and its activities exploring avenues for further 
EU-UK cooperation and improved TCA monitoring. 

Overall, there is little data on the impact of TCA implementation on the EU in particular. Academic 
and policy research has produced several contributions on its (potential) impact on the UK in several 
policy areas, more specifically in relation to business. The EU perspective, whether at aggregate or 
Member State level, has received less attention. This may be explained by the fact that, as argued 
by researchers and practitioners alike, there has been structural and market asymmetry between 
the EU and the UK from the outset. Moreover, on average, the TCA has had a stronger impact on the 
UK than on the EU in all areas, and its impact on the EU will be felt in the medium and long term 
rather than in the short term. 

To sum up, this study has found that, despite the TCA, trade and cooperation between the EU and 
the UK have become more complex and challenging compared to when the UK was an EU Member 
State. The  EU's goal of  establishing a stable and positive relationship with the UK  is  a work in 
progress, but there have been advances in  setting up the structures for cooperation envisaged 
under the TCA, and the bodies tasked with monitoring its implementation are now in place. These 
bodies are meeting regularly and are engaging in substantive dialogue on diverse issues ranging 
from regulatory divergence and difficulties in trading to issues purposely left outside the TCA, such 
as foreign and security policy. Some challenges remain, though. For instance, the EU continues to 
face difficulties in its broader relationship with the UK, particularly regarding the implementation of 
the Ireland/Northern Ireland Protocol and the application of the Windsor Framework, and due to 
the lack of clarity regarding the potentially disruptive effect of the 'Retained EU Law' Act. 

I 

EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

As expected, trade provisions in the TCA have caused disruption. For instance, while the TCA permits 
tariff- and quota-free movement for goods, non-tariff measures and rules-of-origin requirements 
render trade more cumbersome and costly. A number of external factors – such as the coronavirus 
pandemic and the restrictions it entailed, Russia's war against Ukraine, the energy transition and 
inflationary pressures – have  also affected  EU-UK trade. Other hindrances, whether internal or 
bilateral (EU-UK), have been the difficult adaptation to and lack of knowledge of the procedures, the 
significant bureaucracy and red tape caused by the UK's withdrawal from the EU single market, and 
the new costs (transport, packaging, mobility of workers, etc.) that have hit small and medium-sized 
businesses harder than others. In addition, the – at times – tense EU-UK political relations have lent 
an air of unpredictability and insecurity to the business climate.  

In the shorter term, bilateral trade in goods and services for both EU exports and imports recovered 
in 2022, exceeding 2019 pre-pandemic levels. Nevertheless, what also emerges from the analysis is 
that the UK's goal  of  rendering its market more autonomous from the EU single market finds 
reflection, to some extent, in a decreasing share of UK trade in goods with the EU-27 in the past 
five years. EU-UK trade in services has become more complex, and a longitudinal analysis of data 
shows that it remained rather stagnant in 2016-2022. This contrasts sharply with the EU's trade with 
its partners from the rest of the world. 

Moving forward, five lines of action have been put forward to enhance the implementation of the 
EU-UK TCA and address potential mid-term impacts: 

1 

2 

3 

Addressing unforeseen circumstances and deficiencies that have emerged in the 
Ireland/Northern Ireland Protocol and  ensuring that the  Windsor Framework is 
implemented. A number of palpable potential challenges include: reactions to the 
introduction of new border control posts; costs linked to the labelling and packaging 
of products that will only be sold in Northern Ireland; differing applications of VAT; 
and different interpretations by the EU  and the UK of  the EU State aid rules. By 
extension, tensions in the application of the Windsor Framework are likely to affect 
the implementation of the EU-UK TCA. 
Strengthening  EU-UK  political  relations  could  also  improve  goodwill  to 
implement the  EU-UK  TCA  consistently. Discussions are already taking place  at 
political and diplomatic levels even on policy areas outside the TCA, notably security 
and defence, and on the response to Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. 
These issues are also addressed in the context of the Partnership Council and the 
EU- UK Parliamentary Partnership Assembly. This demonstrates that, while the UK 
remains committed to ascertaining its autonomy and decoupling from the EU, both 
sides continue to share many global interests, be it on multilateralism, global health 
or European security. 
To counter the unpredictability that business is facing in the context of EU-UK 
trade  relations, EU stakeholders are asking for a UK economic policy that is clear, 
reliable, sustainable and well  communicated. To this end, EU  research has made 
proposals for actions in three key policy areas. Actions include: i) facilitating trade in 
goods  through  greater  mutual  recognition  of  product  rules  and  conformity 
assessments, especially for the automated and financial sectors, and for agricultural 
and medical products; ii)  facilitating trade in services through simpler and more 
transparent regulations prescribed by a  single  source; and iii)  facilitating labour 
mobility through a uniform work visa. 

II 

The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

4 

5 

Experts  have  called  on  the  EU  to  focus  more  on  the  subnational  level  and 
promote relations between EU and UK sub-state players, among them devolved 
administrations, regions and cities, civil  society, academia and think tanks. When 
bottlenecks appear at  the  national or  supranational level  and  EU-UK  relations 
become conflictual, it  is at the subnational level where building of trust can take 
place. Ideas put forward in support of this option include decentralising student 
exchange initiatives, strengthening twinning projects, and twining cities. As regards 
climate action in particular, subnational players can have an increasingly important 
role in  exerting pressure and building  transnational networks to achieve critical 
mass and exchange best practices. 
The  EU and  the  UK should  work together  on  the  climate  agenda,  which is  a 
global  agenda.  This  could  be  done  by  capitalising  on  the  two  sides'  close 
cooperation developed in  response to the  energy security challenges posed by 
Russia's invasion of Ukraine. At a time when the extent of UK regulatory divergence 
is not clear, studies have demonstrated that the potential lowering of UK levels of 
environmental protection could have a  direct  impact on  the  EU  biosphere and 
would directly undermine the EU transnational agenda. 

III 

EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

Table of contents

Executive summary  ___________________________________________________________________________I

1. Introduction ______________________________________________________________________________ 1

1.1. The four pillars of the EU-UK TCA  ____________________________________________________________ 2

1.2. State of play____________________________________________________________________________ 5

1.2.1. Windsor Framework ___________________________________________________________________ 5

1.2.2. 'Retained EU Law' Act __________________________________________________________________ 7

1.3. Context of the research ___________________________________________________________________ 9

1.4. Scope and objectives ____________________________________________________________________  10

1.5. Methodology __________________________________________________________________________  10

2. Evaluations of the EU-UK TCA with a focus on business and environment and l abour protection _____________  12

2.1. The provisions on environmental and labour protection _________________________________________  12

2.2. European Commission reports _____________________________________________________________  16

2.2.1. Institutional framework and monitoring bodies  _____________________________________________  18

2.3. Monitoring by the European Economic and Social Committee_____________________________________  19

2.3.1. EU-UK Relations Issues Tracker  __________________________________________________________  20

2.4. European Committee of the Regions ________________________________________________________  21

2.4.1. Strategies on and impact of the EU-UK TCA in several EU regions ________________________________  23

2.5. European Investment Bank  _______________________________________________________________  24

2.6. Expert community ______________________________________________________________________  24

3. Impact  of the TCA  on EU-UK trade flows ________________________________________________________  29

3.1. Trade provisions and forecast s_____________________________________________________________  29

3.1.1. Provisions __________________________________________________________________________  29

3.1.2. Forecasts  __________________________________________________________________________  31

3.2. European Commission evaluations of EU-UK trade flows _________________________________________  33

3.3. Trade flows between EU regions and the UK  __________________________________________________  34

IV 

The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

3.4. Changes and continuities in EU-UK trade in numbers  ___________________________________________  34

4. Parliament's oversight of the EU-UK TCA ________________________________________________________  43

4.1. Parliament's position ____________________________________________________________________  43

4.2. Questions put forward by Members_________________________________________________________  47

4.3. Parliament's activities at committee and plenary level ___________________________________________  53

4.3.1. Committee meetings, workshops and hearings  _____________________________________________  54

4.3.2. Committee missions and formal exchanges with UK counterparts  _______________________________  56

4.3.3. EU-UK Parliamentary P artnership Assembly and UK Cont act Group  ______________________________  57

4.3.4. Parliament's plenary __________________________________________________________________  59

5. Moving forward  __________________________________________________________________________  62

5.1. Address deep-seated disagreements decisively and transparently ___________________________________  62

5.2. Build a strong EU-UK political relationship _____________________________________________________  63

5.3. Safeguard predictability and promote clear rules_______________________________________________  64

5.4. Engage in building trust  from the bottom up__________________________________________________  65

5.5. Adapt to the new climate realities together ___________________________________________________  66

V 

EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

Table of boxes 

European Parliament warns about environmental shortcomings in the EU-UK TCA  _________ 15 

Effects of the EU-UK TCA on German business _______________________________________ 27 

Studies on the impact of the TCA on EU fisheries and aquaculture for PECH workshop_______ 55 

Table of figures 

Figure 1 – EU policy areas affected by Brexit  _________________________________________ 2 

Figure 2 – EU-UK trade in goods and services, 2010-2022 ______________________________ 35 

Figure 3 – Trends in EU-UK trade versus trade between the EU and the rest of the world (trade in 
goods and services, imports and exports)  __________________________________________ 36 

Figure 4 – UK share in EU total trade  ______________________________________________ 37 

Figure 5 – Main EU-27 and UK partners in terms of trade in goods (exports and imports) _____ 37 

Figure 6 – The UK's top 10 EU Member State partners in terms of trade in goods (imports and exports)
 ____________________________________________________________________________ 39 

Figure 7 – EU goods exports to the UK _____________________________________________ 40 

Figure 8 – EU goods imports from the UK  __________________________________________ 41 

Figure 9 – EU services exports to the UK____________________________________________ 41 

Figure 10 – EU services imports from the UK ________________________________________ 42 

Figure 11 – Political affiliation of Members having posed written questions _______________ 47 

Figure 12 – Number of Members having posed written questions by nationality  ___________ 48 

Figure 13 – Average time range between Members' questions and Commission or Council answers 
in days ______________________________________________________________________ 48 

Figure  14  –  Number  of  answers  to  Members'  written    questions according  to  the  week  of 
reception ____________________________________________________________________ 49 

Figure 15 – Number of Members' questions per horizontal and sectoral category___________ 50 

VI 

The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

List of acronyms 

AFET 

AGRI 

BUDG 

CJEU 

CoR 

CULT 

DAG 

D-UK 

EEB 

ECA 

ECON 

ECHR 

EEAS 

EMPL 

ENVI 

EPP 

EP 

EPRS  

ETUC 

ETS 

EU 

FAP 

FISC 

FTA 

GCC 

GDP 

GDPR 

GI 

European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs 

European Parliament's Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development 

European Parliament's Committee on Budgets 

Court of Justice of the European Union 

European Committee of the Regions 

European Parliament's Committee on Culture and Education 

Domestic Advisory Group under the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement 

European  Parliament's  Delegation  to  the  EU-UK  Parliamentary  Partnership 
Assembly 

European Environmental Bureau 

European Court of Auditors 

European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 

European Convention on Human Rights 

European External Action Service 

European Parliament's Committee on Employment and Social Affairs 

European Parliament's Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety 

European Peoples' Party, European Parliament 

European Parliament 

European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament 

European Trade Union Confederation 

emissions trading system 

European Union 

fishery and aquaculture products 

European Parliament's Subcommittee on Tax Matters 

free trade agreement 

Gulf Cooperation Council 

gross domestic product 

EU General Data Protection Regulation 

geographic indications 

VII 

EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

Greens/EFA 

The Greens/European Free Alliance Group, European Parliament 

HR/VP 

ICT 

ID 

ILO 

IMCO 

ING2 

INTA 

ITRE 

JURI 

LIBE 

LRAs 

MFF 

MRA 

MoU 

NFBS 

NGO 

NSEC 

OECD 

PECH 

PETI 

PNR 

PPA 

REGI 

RoP 

EU High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-
President of the European Commission 

information and communications technology 

Identity and Democracy Group, European Parliament 

International Labour Organization 

European Parliament's Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection 

European Parliament's Special Committee on foreign interference in all democratic 
processes in the European Union, including disinformation, and the strengthening 
of integrity, transparency and accountability in the European Parliament 

European Parliament's Committee on International Trade 

European Parliament's Committee on Industry, Research and Energy 

European Parliament's Committee on Legal Affairs 

European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 

local and regional authorities 

multiannual financial framework 

mutual recognition agreements 

memorandum of understanding 

enterprises in the non-financial business sector 

non-governmental organisation 

North Seas Energy Cooperation grouping 

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 

European Parliament's Committee on Fisheries 

European Parliament's Committee on Petitions 

passenger name records 

EU-UK Parliamentary Partnership Assembly 

European Parliament's Committee on Regional Development 

European Parliament's Rules of Procedure 

Renew 

Renew Europe Group, European Parliament 

Socialists & Democrats Group, European Parliament 

Schengen Information System 

small and medium-sized enterprise 

sanitary and phytosanitary 

S&D 

SIS 

SME 

SPS 

VIII 

The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

TACs 

total allowable catches 

TBT 

TCA 

TEU 

technical barriers to trade 

(EU-UK) Trade and Cooperation Agreement 

Treaties of the European Union 

TRAN 

European Parliament's Committee on Transport and Tourism 

TSD 

UK 

trade and sustainable development 

United Kingdom 

UKCG 

European Parliament's United Kingdom Contact Group 

VAT 

WA 

value added tax 

Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland 
from  the  European  Union  and  the  European  Atomic  Energy 
Community2019/C 384 I/01(referred to as the UK Withdrawal Agreement) 

WTO 

World Trade Organization 

IX 

The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

1. Introduction

The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) was signed on 30 December 2020 and started 
provisionally applying on 1 January 2021,  following  the  end  of  the  Brexit  transition period on 
31 December 2020. 1 It entered into force on 1 May 2021,  following the consent of the European 
Parliament on 27 April 2021 and its adoption by the Council of the EU on 20 May 2021. 2 It took nearly 
five years of tumultuous EU-UK negotiations to arrive at the agreement, if counted from the date of 
the  Brexit vote (23 June 2016),  and  only seven months, if counted from the  signing of  the  UK 
Withdrawal Agreement (explained by the fact that negotiations on the TCA were fast tracked). 

The EU-UK TCA, which defines and governs relations between the two parties, follows on from the 
Withdrawal Agreement (WA), which established the terms of the UK's orderly withdrawal from the 
EU, in accordance with Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The WA entered into force 
on  1 February 2020, after  having been  agreed upon  on  17 October 2019.  Importantly, the WA 
encompasses the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland (the Protocol) and the Windsor Framework, 
both  of  which  seek  to  avoid  the  establishment of  a  hard  border on  the  island  of  Ireland  by 
safeguarding the all-island economy and the Good Friday Agreement. 3 

The EU-UK TCA avoided the feared 'hard Brexit' and sought to bring back stability and predictability 
in relations between the EU, its Member States and the UK. 4 Overall, the TCA aims to safeguard the 
integrity of the EU's single market and the indivisibility of the four freedoms (free movement of 
people,  goods, services  and  capital).  Not  only  does  the  TCA  cover  trade  in  goods, services, 
investment, public procurement and intellectual property rights, but also a broad range of other key 
areas of strong EU interest, such as air and road transport, energy and sustainability, fisheries, and 
social security coordination. The rules on trade and investment are underpinned by comprehensive 
commitments to a  level playing field  and sustainable development. More specifically, the level-
playing-field  provisions  seek  to  safeguard  fair  competition  between  the  parties.  A  notable 
component in the  TCA are  the provisions on social, labour and environmental protection and 
climate change, often referred to as the 'trade and sustainable development' (TSD) chapters in other 
free trade agreements (FTAs). 

The TCA goes well beyond traditional FTAs and provides a solid basis for preserving the EU and the 
UK's longstanding friendship and cooperation. At the same time, it aims to guarantee the parties' 
autonomy and sovereignty. The TCA also contains a provision for periodic updates and for 5-yearly 
reviews of 'the implementation of this Agreement and supplementing agreements and any matters 
related'. Following these reviews, with one year's notice, either side can terminate the agreement 
(Article FINPROV.8). 5 

1

2

3

4

5

Trade  and  Cooperation  Agreement between the European  Union  and  the European  Atomic Energy Community,  of 
the one part, and  the United Kingdom  of  Great Britain and  Northern Ireland, of  the other part, OJ L  149, 30.4.2021, 
pp.  10-2539. 

European  Commission,  The EU-UK  Trade and  Cooperation Agreement, 30 April 2021. 

For  an  analysis  of  the  implementation  of  the  UK  Withdrawal  Agreement,  see  A.  Neville,  I.  Hallak  and  S.  Mazur, 
Implementation  of  the UK  Withdrawal  Agreement: Financial  provisions,  citizens' rights  and  the Northern  Ireland 
Protocol, EPRS,  European  Parliament, January  2022. 

J.J.A.M.  Korving  and  J.C.  van  der Have,  'Brexit: The  Direct and  Indirect Effect  of  the EU-UK  Trade  and  Cooperation 
Agreement', INTERTAX, 50(1), pp.  28-39; European Commission,  EU-UK  Trade and Cooperation Agreement: protecting 
European  interests, ensuring fair competition, and  continued cooperation in areas of  mutual interest, Press release, 
24 December 2020. 

ibid. 

1 

EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

At the UK's request, cooperation on foreign policy, external security and defence was excluded from 
the TCA, unlike what the non-binding Political Declaration initially envisaged. 6 In addition, the TCA 
does not cover any commitment relating to equivalence in financial services, 7 the adequacy of the 
UK's data protection regime, or the assessment of its sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) regime for 
listing it as a third country allowed to export food products to the EU. These are and will remain 
unilateral decisions of the EU and are not subject to negotiation.8 

1.1. The four pillars of the EU-UK TCA 

Figure 1 – EU policy areas affected by Brexit  

Note 1:  The  'circles' denote policy areas that  were  the most  strongly affected  by Brexit,  while the  'boxes' specify the main aspects 
affected within each policy area. 

Note 2: Items in orange are policy areas where the effects of Brexit are primarily felt at the national level, while items in blue are policy 
areas where effects  are of highest relevance for the local and regional authorities. 

Data source: EPRS, based on the report Restoring 'lost connections' between the EU and the UK as a consequence 
of Brexit through local and regional authorities, CoR, 2021, p. 4. 

The EU-UK TCA broadly encompasses four pillars: a free trade agreement (FTA) defining the EU and 
the UK's new economic and social partnership; a framework for economic, social and environmental 

Political declaration  setting  out  the framework  for  the  future relationship  between  the European  Union  and  the 
United Kingdom  (2019/C 384 I/02), OJ C 384I, 12.11.2019, pp. 178-193. 

Equivalence in financial services as  regards the UK follow the EU's  approach  to assessing  the regulatory frameworks 
of 'third' (non-EU)  countries. The TCA provides for a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on regulatory cooperation; 
such an MoU was  signed on 27 June 2023. 

European  Commission,  EU-UK  Trade and  Cooperation  Agreement: A new relationship, with big changes,  December 
2020. 

6

7

8

2 

The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

cooperation; a new partnership for EU citizens' security; and a horizontal agreement on governance. 
These are outlined in greater detail below. 

Firstly, the EU-UK TCA includes an FTA described as one 'of unprecedented ambition, which will 
provide significant benefits to both sides compared to trading under World Trade Organization 
terms'. 9 The FTA covers not only trade in goods and services but also a broad range of other key 
areas of strong EU interest, such as investment, competition, digital trade, intellectual property, 
public procurement and rules for fair competition and sustainability. It provides for zero tariffs and 
zero quotas on all goods that comply with the appropriate (bilateral) rules of origin. This is especially 
important for sensitive goods such as agricultural  and  fishery  products.  The  exceptional zero 
tariffs and zero quotas on all products are in fact unique. Nevertheless, some experts have criticised 
the fact that the final TCA opted for more of a 'WTO plus' approach rather than an 'EU minus' one.10 

The TCA also contains detailed principles on State aid to prevent either side from granting unfair, 
trade-distorting subsidies. The TCA seeks to prevent unnecessary technical barriers to trade, e.g. by 
providing for self-declaration of regulatory compliance for low-risk products and facilitations for 
other specific products of mutual interest, such as automotive, wine, organics, pharmaceuticals and 
chemicals. However, all  UK  goods entering the EU  still  have to  meet the  EU's high  regulatory 
standards,  including  on  food  safety (e.g.  SPS  standards) and product safety. Under  the  TCA, 
customs  procedures  are meant to be  simplified, as  both parties have agreed, for  instance, to 
recognise  each  other's  programmes  for  trusted  traders  (authorised  economic  operators). 
Arrangements have been made to facilitate short-term business trips and temporary secondments 
of highly skilled employees. EU service suppliers wanting to offer services in  the UK will  not be 
treated any less favourably than UK operators in areas covered by the TCA, so long as they comply 
with UK rules. 

Secondly, the EU-UK TCA provides for broad economic, social and environmental cooperation in 
areas of mutual interest. The TCA is underpinned by provisions seeking to ensure a level playing 
field, sustainable  development  and respect for fundamental rights. It therefore commits both 
parties to upholding equally high labour and social standards while also adhering to environmental 
protection, the fight against climate change, including carbon pricing, and tax transparency. To fulfil 
these commitments, the two parties will need to ensure effective domestic enforcement and apply 
a binding dispute settlement mechanism, as provided for in the TCA. The two parties are also offered 
the possibility to take remedial measures. This pillar  introduces a  new  framework for the  joint 
management of fish stocks in the respective EU and UK waters. Consequently, the UK will be able 
to develop its fishing activities further, while the activities and livelihoods of EU fishing communities 
will be safeguarded and natural resources preserved. On transport, the agreement aims to ensure 
continued and sustainable air, road, rail and maritime connectivity, even if market access is below 
what the single market can offer. Provisions seek to guarantee that competition between EU and UK 
operators is not distorted, so that passenger rights, workers' rights and transport safety are not 
undermined. On energy, the TCA provides for a new model of trading and interconnectivity, with 
guarantees  for  open  and  fair  competition,  including  on  safety  standards  for  offshore,  and 
production of renewable energy. On social security coordination, the agreement seeks to ensure a 
number of rights of EU citizens working in, travelling or moving to the UK and those of UK nationals 
working in, travelling or moving to the EU as of 1 January 2021. 11 The TCA also enables the UK's 

9

European  Commission,  op.  cit., EU-UK  Trade and  Cooperation...,  December 2020, p. 3. 

10   C. Barnard  and E. Leinarte, 'Movement of Goods  under the TCA',  Global Policy, 2022, 13 (Suppl. 2), pp.  106- 118. 
11   Benefits  covered  include old-age  and  survivors'  pensions,  healthcare  (e.g.,  European  Health  Insurance  Card)  pre-

retirement benefits, maternity/paternity benefits related to the birth of a child, or accidents at work. 

3 

EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

continued participation in  a  number of  flagship  EU  programmes  over the  2021-2027  period 
(subject to a financial contribution by the UK to the EU budget), such as Horizon Europe. 

Thirdly, the TCA also establishes a new partnership  for EU and UK citizens' security through the 
creation of a new framework for law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. It 
recognises the need  for strong cooperation between national police  and judicial  authorities, in 
particular  for  fighting  and  prosecuting  cross-border  crime  and  terrorism.  The  TCA  includes 
ambitious arrangements for reciprocal exchanges of air passenger data (passenger name records 
(PNR)),  criminal  record  information, as  well  as  DNA,  fingerprint and  vehicle  registration data 
(collectively referred to as Prüm data). It envisages new operational capabilities, such as cooperation 
between Europol, Eurojust and the relevant UK authorities, in line with the EU rules applicable to 
third  countries. Security cooperation can be  suspended in  case  of  violations by the  UK  of  its 
commitment for continued adherence to and domestic enforcement of the European Convention 
of Human Rights. 

Fourthly, to give maximum legal certainty to  businesses, consumers and citizens, the TCA also 
includes a horizontal agreement  on governance.  Structurally, the TCA resembles an association 
agreement – a type of agreement the EU has with a number of neighbouring countries. Accordingly, 
it  has a  Partnership  Council  (whose members are EU  and UK  representatives), 11  specialised 
committees, four working groups, and a consultation procedure to deal with specific elements. The 
Partnership Council oversees the implementation of the TCA and can make amendments to the TCA 
and to any supplementing agreements 'in the cases provided for' in the agreement. The Partnership 
Council meets in different configurations depending on the matter at hand and has the power to 
take binding decisions by mutual consent. It is assisted in its work by the specialised committees 
and the working groups. 

The top level of dispute settlement (Part Six, Title I) applies to the whole agreement except for 10 
specified areas that either have no procedures for settling disputes (but where any arising disputes 
can be taken to the Partnership Council) or have alternative arrangements (Article INST.10). It is 
accompanied by  credible  and  robust enforcement and  safeguard mechanisms, including  the 
possibility to suspend market access commitments, e.g. by reintroducing tariffs and/or quotas in the 
affected sector. Broadly, the TCA envisages confidential consultations between the parties, allows 
for requesting an independent arbitration procedure and a compliance review (Part 6, Title I; ANNEX 
INST-X). In the event of non-compliance, the respondent party may offer 'temporary compensation' 
(Part Six, Title I, Article INST.24.1, Temporary remedies) and/or the complaining party may notify the 
other  party  of  any  intended  suspension of  obligations (Article  INST.24.2),  subject  to  certain 
conditions. Moreover, both parties are able to cross-retaliate if the other does not comply with a 
ruling of an independent arbitration tribunal. The decisions and rulings of the arbitration tribunal 
are binding on both parties (Article INST.29). 12 Any substantial breach of obligations enshrined as 
'essential elements' of the TCA (the fight against climate change, respect for democratic values and 
fundamental rights, or non-proliferation) can trigger the suspension or termination of all or part of 
the entire EU-UK TCA. 

Binding enforcement and dispute settlement mechanisms aim to ensure that rights of businesses, 
consumers and individuals are respected. This means that businesses in the EU and the UK, which 
compete on a level playing field, cannot use their regulatory autonomy to grant unfair subsidies or 
distort competition. It also means that both parties can also engage in cross-sector retaliation in 
case of violations of the agreement; cross-sector retaliation applies to all  areas of the economic 
partnership. Some experts have argued that this may trigger a nearly endless series of negotiations 

12   E. Lydgate  et al., Taking  Stock of the UK-EU  Trade and Cooperation  Agreement: Governance, State Subsidies  and the 

Level Playing Field, Briefing Paper 54, UK Trade Policy Observatory, January  2021. 

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The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

and that the various dispute settlement procedures imply continuing uncertainty about the stability 
of  EU-UK  trade  relations. 13 In  response to  requests from  the  Member  States,  the  European 
Commission has set up a central point allowing stakeholders – businesses, NGOs, employers, trade 
unions and members of the public – to register complaints related to the implementation of the 
TCA. 

1.2. State of play 

From the EU's vantage point, two factors in EU-UK relations appear to have a potentially substantial 
impact on the implementation of the EU-UK TCA: the application of the recently concluded Windsor 
Agreement; and the uncertainties and consequences linked to the UK government's 'Retained EU 
Law' Act. 

1.2.1. Windsor Framework 
Since the very beginning, the implementation of the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland (the 
Protocol), which forms an integral part of the 2020 Withdrawal Agreement, has been marred by 
rising tensions and political challenges. Consequently, both the implementation of the EU-UK TCA 
and wider EU-UK relations have also been strained. Professor of Political Science and Law Daniel 
Kelemen had warned about the difficulties of addressing Boris Johnson's, which was also Theresa 
May's, 'Brexit dilemma'. In essence, this dilemma refers to tackling three conflicting demands at the 
same time: 

  no hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland; 
  no checks at the border between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and; 

the UK to leave the EU's customs union and single market. 14 

According to the Protocol, all goods entering Northern Ireland from outside the EU, including those 
from Great  Britain, must be  accompanied by  an  entry summary declaration for food and  live 
products, in accordance with EU law.  In  the UK, this declaration was viewed as creating a trade 
barrier within its internal market, as it potentially deterred suppliers from shipping goods from Great 
Britain to Northern Ireland. The obligation to establish border controls on goods moving between 
Great Britain and  Northern Ireland is  motivated by the  lack  of  alignment in  food and  animal 
standards – SPS rules – between the EU and the UK. The EU-UK TCA confirmed in its SPS provisions 
that parties may maintain separate SPS regimes and that the exporting party has to ensure that the 
exported products meet the importing party's SPS requirements; the importing party may carry out 
audits and verifications. 15 Thus, the complexities of the trading rules between Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland were left unresolved. 

On  27 February 2023,  the  European Commission and the  UK  government came to  a  political 
agreement on the Windsor  Framework  – a  deal aiming to address, in a definitive manner, the 
challenges concerning Northern Ireland following the UK's withdrawal from the EU. Its overarching 
goal is  to reaffirm the two parties' full commitment to the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement; to 
ensure lasting certainty and predictability for people and businesses in Northern Ireland; and to 

13  

I. Fusacchia,  L. Salvatici  and  L.A.  Winters, 'The  consequences  of  the Trade  and  Cooperation  Agreement for the UK's 
international trade', Oxford Review of Economic Policy, (38)1, spring 2022, pp.  27-49; S. Fella and P. Butchard,  'The UK-
EU  Trade  and  Cooperation  Agreement: Governance  and  Dispute  Settlement', House  of  Commons  Library  Briefing 
Paper  09139, 3  August  2021;  E.  Lydgate  et  al.,  'Taking  Stock  of  the  UK–EU  Trade  and  Cooperation  Agreement: 
Governance, State Subsidies and the Level Playing Field', UKTPO Briefing Paper 54, UK Trade Policy Observatory, 2021. 

14   R.D.  Kelemen, Great thread on the Brexit dilemma..., Twitter, 31 July 2019. 
15  

I. Hallak,  EU-UK  relations: Difficulties in implementing the Northern Ireland Protocol, EPRS, European  Parliament, July 
2021. 

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EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

preserve the integrity of the EU and the UK internal markets. 16 In practice, the Windsor Framework 
provides for: 

the establishment of a 'green lane' for trusted traders from Great Britain selling directly 
to consumers in Northern Ireland, therefore also establishing a new UK Internal Market 
Scheme for the movement of goods; 
the introduction by the UK government of a duty reimbursement scheme, which is to 
reimburse the amounts of EU  customs duties paid on  goods moved into Northern 
Ireland that were not sold or used in the EU. In effect since 30 June 2023, 17 the scheme 
applies retroactively to goods moved since 2021; 
the establishment of the Northern Ireland Retail Movement Scheme, which entails the 
creation of a 'Not for EU' labelling on agri-food goods that are moved from Great Britain 
into Northern Ireland for end consumption there. New safeguards would prevent such 
goods from entering the EU's single market. Hence, goods prohibited in the EU single 
market would still be allowed to be sold in Northern Ireland. 18 

The Windsor Framework builds on the provisional agreement reached by the Council presidency 
and the European Parliament on a regulation on autonomous measures. This regulation lays down 
the rules and procedures that would allow the EU to ensure a timely and effective exercise of its 
rights in enforcing and implementing the WA and the EU-UK TCA. The measures include: 

remedial, rebalancing and compensatory measures in a number of areas; 
the temporary suspension of the relevant preferential treatment of certain products; 
the refusal, revocation, suspension, limitation or conditioning of the authorisations or 
permissions of air carriers and their operation; 

  measures restricting trade, investment or other activities. 19 

The  implementation of the Windsor Framework will  happen in  stages through to July 2025,  to 
provide businesses with time to adapt to new arrangements. 20 On 30 May 2023, the Council of the 
EU adopted three regulations aimed at implementing the solutions agreed between the EU and 
the  UK  on  public,  animal  and  plant  health issues, medicines  and  certain steel  products, and 
facilitating the  implementation of the Windsor Agreement. The new  trading rules will  make it 
considerably easier to move a range of goods from Great Britain to Northern Ireland, if they are 
destined for consumption there. At the same time, safeguards will be put in place to protect the EU's 
single market. 21 In practice, the new rules on SPS measures, which protect animal, public and plant 
health, will make it possible to move agri-food retail products from Great Britain to Northern Ireland 
for end consumption there with minimal certification requirements and controls, once the agreed 
safeguards have been put in place. The movement of certain plants for planting, based on a special 
plant health label, will  become easier, as will the movement of agricultural machinery. The ban on 

16   European  Commission,  The  Windsor  Framework:  A  new way  forward  for the Protocol on  Ireland/Northern Ireland, 

27 February 2023. 

17   Once  the  Customs  (Northern  Ireland:  Repayment  and  Remission)  (EU  Exit)  (Amendment)  Regulations  2023  was 

enforced. 

18  

Institute of Export & International Trade, An overview of the Windsor  Framework,  Northern Ireland Customs  & Trade  
Academy,  2023. 

19   Council  of the EU,  EU-UK  relations: Council  Presidency and  European  Parliament reach provisional  agreement on a 

regulation on autonomous  measures,  Press release, 30 November 2022. 

20   Council of the EU, EU-UK  relations: EU takes further steps to implement the Windsor Framework, press release, 30 May 

2023. 

21   For an analysis  of the difficulties in implementing the Protocol and  on the provisions  of the Windsor Framework,  see 
M.  Szczepanski,  The  Windsor  Framework:  A  new  way  forward  for  the  Protocol on  Ireland/Northern  Ireland, EPRS, 
European  Parliament, April 2023. 

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The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

seed potatoes will be removed. Another set of new rules will ensure that all medicines, including 
novel ones, will be available in Northern Ireland at the same time as in the rest of the UK.22 

The Windsor Framework speaks of a growing readiness for cooperation, but how and to what extent 
it will be implemented is yet to be seen. A British-German Chamber of Commerce survey from April 
2023 among its business community revealed that overall, the respondents generally expected the 
Windsor Framework to lead  to  some improvement in EU-UK  economic and  political  relations. 
However, only 2 % of respondents expected the Windsor Framework to have any significant effect 
on their business activities in the UK. The 57 respondents came primarily from the manufacturing 
sector  (26 %),  business-to-business  services  (19 %)  and  construction  (13 %).  Other  sectors 
logistics/distribution,  wholesale, 
represented  at 
travel/hospitality, retail, health care/pharmaceuticals, and business-to-consumer services (in that 
order). 23 

substantially 

included 

lower 

levels 

1.2.2. 'Retained EU Law' Act 
Freedom to diverge from EU rules and policies, and by extension regain its autonomy, was among 
the reasons given by the United Kingdom for its withdrawal from the EU. Following its departure, 
the UK announced an extensive regulatory reform, and in January 2022, the Cabinet Office released 
a  report identifying the  guiding principles  for future regulatory policy. 24 On 29 June 2023,  the 
Retained EU Law (Revocation  and Reform) Act 2023 completed its passage through Parliament 
and was granted Royal Assent. However, its journey was not a smooth one.25 From the outset, the 
Act provoked controversy, uniting trade unions, industry bodies and employers against it over the 
uncertainty it threatened to introduce. 26 There have been concerns within the EU as well, linked to 
the UK's obligations under the WA and the TCA and to fears that the 'Retained EU Law' Bill (and now 
Act) could give rise to significant regulatory divergence.27 The UK government has insisted that the 
Act would not lead to indiscriminate regulatory divergence. At the latest EU-UK PPA, co-chair Sir 
Oliver Heald said that the UK is a place of high standards and that, while there will be divergence 
and some 'sensible deregulation', this will not lead to a lowering of standards. 28 

The  Retained  EU  Law  Bill  was  introduced  on  22 September 2022,  to  'restore  Parliamentary 
sovereignty' following the UK's departure from the EU  and to enable the government to create 
regulations 'tailor-made to the UK's needs', by ending the special status of retained EU law in the UK. 
'Retained EU Law' – essentially a snapshot of all EU and EU-derived law that was in force in the UK at 
the  end of  the transition period on 31 December 2020  –  ensures that this body of law  would 
continue to apply in UK domestic law. 29 

One red line  running through the entire 'Retained EU Law' Bill was that any new or replacement 
legislation may not increase the regulatory burden on businesses. This aspect was welcome news 

22   They  will be put  on  the market  in accordance  with UK  rules and  authorisation  procedures.  This  complements  the 
solution the EU adopted in April 2022 for the supply of generic medicines to Northern Ireland. See, Council of the EU, 
EU-UK  relations: EU  takes further steps to implement the Windsor Framework,  Press release, 30 May 2023. 
23   German-British Chamber  of Business  and Industry,  German-British Business Outlook Spring 2023, April 2023. 
24   UK government, The Benefits of Brexit: How the UK is taking advantage  of leaving the EU, January  2022. 

25   Retained EU Law  (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023, 29 June 2023. 
26  
27   European  Commission,  Minutes of  the  Second  Meeting of  the Partnership  Council  on  the Trade  and  Cooperation 

'Employment  Law and  the Retained EU Law Act 2023', Linklaters, 4 July 2023. 

Agreement, in London,  24 March 2023. 

28   European  Parliament, Press point by Nathalie Loiseau, co-chair of the EU-UK  PPA and Sir Oliver Heald MP on the third 

meeting of the EU-UK  Parliamentary Partnership Assembly,  4 July 2023. 

29   UK Parliament, Retained EU  Law (Revocation  and  Reform) Act 2023, Government Bill that originated in the House of 

Commons,  Session  2022-23 (last updated:  3 July 2023). 

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EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

to employers. Following the UK's exit from the EU on 31 January 2020, the EU and the UK sought to 
ensure that a level playing field was maintained in terms of employment law rights. Initially, the 
scope of the Bill was broad, covering more than 2 400 pieces of retained EU legislation, and much of 
the EU-derived secondary legislation applicable in the UK was anticipated to be affected. Although 
it was expected that much of the current legislation would be restated or amended, as opposed to 
entirely revoked, the fact that the Bill would automatically revoke retained legislation unless specific 
steps were taken to  preserve it indicated that significant changes to the  current landscape of 
employment law could be expected. 30 

On 10 May 2023, however, the UK government undertook a major reversal in its approach when it 
removed the key sunset provision from the Act, which  would have automatically revoked most 
retained EU  law  at  the  end  of  2023.  Having  acknowledged the  scale  of  the  task  involved in 
identifying all of the legislation that would have been affected by this move, the UK government 
replaced the sunset provision with a list of around 600 pieces of legislation, which will be repealed 
at the end of 2023. 

While the new approach provided some immediate certainty for businesses, the Act contains other 
sunset provisions, which affect the content and implementation of the 'Retained EU Law' Act and its 
rules of interpretation. From 1 January 2024, the Act will abolish directly effective rights and bring 
an end to the principle of supremacy of EU law. Furthermore, at the end of 2023, general principles 
of EU law will cease to form part of UK law. This means that courts will no longer consider questions 
of interpretation in line with EU principles, including proportionality, purposive interpretation and 
legal certainty. 

Before the Act comes into force, the UK government can use its powers under the Act to restate or 
amend secondary retained EU legislation. The  power to revoke, restate or amend applies until 
23 June 2026 may be used in respect not only of secondary but also of primary legislation, where 
retained EU law provisions were inserted by secondary legislation. It has also been argued that the 
Act removes additional parliamentary scrutiny requirements that currently apply when modifying 
some types of EU-derived domestic secondary legislation. 31 

These changes could  have far-reaching consequences for environmental, consumer protection, 
intellectual property, and employment law. The Act will  change the way that EU-derived law is 
interpreted in the UK, but it will also undermine the existing body of case law, creating doubt about 
the  scope, meaning and  application of  key  EU-derived employment rights. Consequently, this 
uncertainty will make it difficult for businesses to understand their obligations and for employees 
to understand their rights. It could even further discourage EU business, more specifically EU-27 
SMEs, from seeking opportunities in the United Kingdom. 32 However, the UK government could also 
choose to write back into domestic law the principles established in retained EU case law in order 
to avoid an unintended change in the effect of employment rights. 

According to the European Commission's latest annual report on the implementation of the EU-UK 
TCA, the UK adopted just a few of the laws it had announced in 2022 that it was planning to adopt.33 
Indeed,  replacing  EU  legislation  and  standards with  domestic  ones  is  a  challenging  task,  as 

30   V.  Buckingham,  Retained EU  Law  (Revocation  and  Reform)  Bill 2022-23: what  is  the impact  on  employment  law?, 

Dentons,  25 October 2022. 

ibid. 

31   Retained EU law, The Law  Society, 27 June 2023. 
32  
33   European  Commission,  Report  from  the  Commission  on  the  implementation  and  application  of  the  Trade  and 
Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
(1 January  – 31 December 2021), COM(2022) 126 final, 24 March 2022. 

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The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

acknowledged by the UK's National Audit Office 34 and the House of Commons' Committee of Public 
Accounts. 35 Following the examination of the long-term regulatory strategy and the operational 
capability of certain regulatory agencies, both bodies concluded that the UK's withdrawal from the 
EU had significantly affected the UK regulators, which had assumed new responsibilities previously 
carried  out  by  the  EU  institutions, while  losing  access  to  EU  data  sharing  and  cooperation 
arrangements. 36 

The Bill of Rights Bill was tabled in June 2022 37 with the objective to repeal and replace the Human 
Rights Act 1998, which incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights into UK domestic 
law. Under section 1(2), the Bill 'rebalances' the relationship between the UK courts, the European 
Court of Human Rights and the UK Parliament. Notably, the UK Supreme Court would determine the 
meaning and effect of rights under the convention for the purposes of domestic law. 

The  Data  Protection  and  Digital  Information  Bill  was  tabled  in  July 2022 38  with  the  aim  of 
reforming the  UK's  data  protection framework, on  which  the  Commission's  decisions on  the 
adequacy of  the  level  of  protection for personal data provided by the  UK  are  based. The  Bill 
introduces changes in several areas, notably the legal grounds for the processing of personal data, 
the exercising of data subject rights, the rules for the transfer of personal data to third countries and 
the setting-up and functioning of the independent data protection supervisory authority. 

1.3. Context of the research 

Against this backdrop, on 14 November 2022 the European Parliament's Conference of Presidents 
approved a joint request from the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and the Committee on 
International Trade (INTA) to draft an implementation report, entitled 'Implementation of the EU-UK 
Trade and Cooperation Agreement'. The two committees are jointly responsible for handling the 
task under Rule 58 of Parliament's Rules of Procedure (RoP). Another 10 committees (AGRI, CULT, 
ECON, EMPL, ENVI, ITRE, IMCO, LIBE, PECH and TRAN) are associated to this highly political file and 
are providing opinions under Rule 57 RoP, while BUDG and REGI are drafting their opinions under 
Rule 56 RoP. 39 

The objective of the AFET/INTA implementation report is to take due account of the availability of 
reliable facts regarding the state of implementation of the TCA. According to Parliament's RoP, AFET 
has  competence  over  the  implementation  of  the  EU's  foreign  policy  and  INTA  over  the 
implementation and monitoring of the EU's common commercial policy and external economic 
relations. The 10 associated committees either share competences with AFET/INTA or have exclusive 
competences over several aspects of the TCA. This study has been prepared to support the work of 
the jointly responsible committees and more specifically the preparation of their implementation 
report. 

34   UK National Audit Office, Report – Value for money:  Regulating after EU Exit, 18 May 2022. 

35   House  of Commons,  Regulating after EU  Exit, Nineteenth Report of Session  2022-23, Committee of Public Accounts, 

22 September 2022. 

36   European  Commission,  op.  cit., COM(2022) 126 final, 24 March 2022. 

37   https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3227  
38   UK Parliament, Data  Protection and  Digital Information  Bill, Government Bill, Originated in the House  of Commons, 

Session  2022-23 (last updated:  5 May 2023). 

39   AGRI:  Agriculture and  Rural  Development;  BUDG:  Committee  on  Budgets;  CULT:  Culture  and  Education;  ECON: 
Economic  and  Monetary Affairs;  EMPL:  Employment  and  Social  Affairs;  ENVI:  Environment,  Public Health and  Food 
Safety;  ITRE:  Industry,  Research  and  Energy;  IMCO:  Internal Market  and  Consumer  Protection; LIBE:  Civil Liberties, 
Justice and  Home Affairs;  PECH:  Fisheries; REGI: Committee on Regional Development; TRAN: Transport  and Tourism.  

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EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

1.4. Scope and objectives 

Given that the EU-UK TCA has only been in effect since January 2021, the EPRS evaluation seeks to 
provide an analysis of early outcomes, benefits, risks and challenges linked to the implementation 
of this agreement on the EU and its Member States. Due to time constraints and for reasons of 
feasibility, the scope of the research has been limited, while also keeping in mind the needs of the 
AFET and INTA committees in drafting their implementation report. Therefore, while the EU-UK TCA 
is  subdivided into  seven  parts (plus  annexes and  protocols) that deal  largely  with  economic 
activities, 40 the study sets itself the task of: 

  providing an overview of the situation, outlining the potential sources of tension in EU-

UK relations that could spill over into the implementation of the EU-UK TCA; 
examining the reports issued by the European Commission and the evaluations carried 
out by other EU institutions and experts, as well as providing data collected by and from 
the EU Member States' regions. Here the analysis focuses on the initial consequences 
and (potential) impact of the EU-UK  TCA on environmental and social/labour rights 
protection in the EU Member States; 

  providing a  visual  and  longitudinal analysis of  the  trade flows  resulting from the 
implementation of  the  EU-UK  TCA  and  a  textual  explanation of  the  changes  and 
continuities observed; 
analysing  Parliament's  position  on  the  EU-UK  TCA,  delving  into  the  relevant 
Parliamentary resolutions, oral and written questions and its activities (plenary debates, 
missions, etc.); 

  outlining the options for moving forward, for mitigating the potential mid-term effects 
of the TCA, and for building on experience where cooperation has been successful. 

1.5. Methodology 

The study aims to provide a qualitative assessment of the TCA's implementation and to focus in 
particular on how effective it has been and what outcomes it has achieved. In addition to qualitative, 
robust data, where possible,  the research is  underpinned by  quantitative data illustrating the 
benefits, challenges and risks in trade in goods and services. 

Time constraints in the preparation of the study and the short period of implementation of the EU-
UK TCA have meant that a fully-fledged ex-post evaluation against the EU Better Regulation criteria 
for ex-post evaluation – relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and EU added value – has 
been difficult to conduct. It is worth recalling that the European Commission's Better Regulation 
Guidelines recommend carrying out evaluations only when a reasonable amount of data has been 
collected over at least three years. 41 Instead, the study maps and assesses the early implementation 
outcomes, benefits, challenges and risks of the TCA. It focuses on the consequences of the TCA's 
implementation for the EU in selected areas: EU-UK trade; environmental and labour protection and 
respect for social rights; and EU-UK regulatory divergence. 

Considering the short delivery deadlines for this assignment, primarily secondary (existing) data was 
used to carry out the research. Furthermore, the author examined review work carried out by EU 

40   Trade  and  Cooperation  Agreement between the European  Union  and  the European  Atomic Energy Community,  of 
the one part, and  the United Kingdom  of  Great Britain and  Northern Ireland, of  the other part, OJ L  149, 30.4.2021, 
pp.  10-2539; see  also,  I.  Hallak,  EU-UK  Trade  and  Cooperation  Agreement: An  analytical  overview,  EPRS,  European 
Parliament, February  2021. 

41   European  Commission,  Better Regulation Guidelines, SWD(2021)  305, 3 November 2021. 

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The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

and  international institutions (e.g.  the  European Commission, the  Organisation for  Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD)), and by the EU Member States, the UK government and UK 
Parliament, think tanks, academia, civil society and stakeholders from various sectors. Data on the 
impact  of  the  EU-UK  TCA  on  the  EU,  including  EU  Member  States and  EU  regions and  local 
authorities is limited, since this agreement has only been in force for two years. Moreover, data on 
the  monitoring and assessment of  the  implementation of  the  EU-UK  TCA  is  still  uneven and 
haphazard. As a result, the study paints a partial picture of the implementation of the EU-UK TCA 
thus far. 

Academic and policy  research examines the (potential) impact of  the TCA on the UK in  several 
domains, but has largely focused on the effects of the agreement on the UK (and UK business). On 
the contrary, the EU perspective, whether on an aggregate or Member State level, has received less 
attention. In an effort to bridge this gap, the author of the study reached out to the European 
Investment Bank, the European Environment Agency, the Committee of Regions and the European 
Court of Auditors and used their reports. 

In addition, EPRS sent a general request for input to all the governmental organisations that are part 
of  the  EPRS's Linking the  Levels Unit  network. This was  done through the monthly 'The Link' 
newsletter, which is sent to 1 437  contacts. The network encompasses representatives of public 
authorities at regional, local, national and EU levels. Targeted requests for input were also sent to 
umbrella bodies of public authorities, such as the Council of European Municipalities and Regions, 
as well  as regions or provinces in Austria (Carinthia, Lower Austria, Salzburg, Styria, Tirol, Upper 
Austria, Vienna), Belgium (Flanders), France (Normandy and Hauts-de-France), Germany (Hamburg 
and Bavaria), Ireland, and the Netherlands. The working hypothesis was that the regions in some of 
the EU Member States neighbouring the UK, including France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Ireland, 
are  those where  the  strongest negative effects of  the  implementation of the  EU-UK  TCA  are 
expected.  Because  of  time  restrictions,  the  consultation  was  open  for  about  three  weeks. 
Consequently, the author did not aim to gather comparable data, but rather, to provide a snapshot 
of case studies. 

It should also be noted that the UK's withdrawal from the EU is an unprecedented event and that 
the TCA has been implemented alongside the coronavirus pandemic and Russia's war on Ukraine, 
both of which have had consequences on the supply chains and the global (and by extension the 
EU) economy. In that light, it has been difficult to clearly identify the causes of changes in EU-UK 
relations and attribute them specifically to the implementation of the EU-UK TCA. Since the TCA has 
only been implemented for two years, this study is able to only point to initial outcomes emanating 
from its implementation, with all the risks involved when assumptions are based on an analysis of 
short-term changes. 

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2. Evaluations of the EU-UK TCA with a focus on business and 
environment and labour protection 

This chapter analyses the initial and potential impact of the EU-UK TCA and addresses specifically 
the effect of the agreement (in its short two years of implementation) on environmental and labour 
protection and, by extension, on social rights, as requested by AFET. It also focuses on the effect of 
the TCA on business, as requested by INTA. The TCA's effect on trade flows between the EU/EU-27 
and the UK is examined in Chapter 3. In both cases, the study seeks to analyse how the TCA has 
affected the EU and its Member States. Considering the asymmetry between the UK market and the 
EU single market, the literature, perhaps unsurprisingly, focuses primarily on the effect of the TCA 
for the UK, where arguably most of the adaptation and regulatory change has had to take place. 

The  data available on the  effect  of the  TCA on  the EU  and  its Member States are  much more 
haphazard, based on case studies and mainly focused on the limitations of the TCA provisions rather 
than on how the deal has affected the EU. Given the limited academic literature on the issue, this 
chapter relies primarily on data from EU institutional sources and relevant stakeholders, notably the 
business sector, local authorities and regions in the EU Member States, and NGOs. In that light, the 
chapter first analyses how the provisions on environmental and labour protection are articulated in 
the  TCA  and  points  to  their limitations, and  then  examines the  evaluations by  the  European 
Commission, the European Economic and  Social  Committee, the European Committee of  the 
Regions, the European Investment Bank, and the business and expert community. Overall, while 
some information is available on labour and social protection, little concrete evidence on the effect 
of the EU-UK TCA on environmental protection is available. 

The European Court of Auditors (ECA) has not prepared a special report on the implementation of 
the EU-UK TCA. However, the ECA has scrutinised UK spending of EU budget funds in the context of 
its  audit  of  the  EU  budget. 42 Under the  WA,  the  UK  committed to  honour all  of  its  financial 
obligations under previous MFFs arising from its EU  membership. During the transition  period, 
which ended on 31 December 2020, the UK continued to contribute to and benefit from the EU 
budget as if it  were a Member State. Following the end of the transition period, further mutual 
obligations on the part of the EU and the UK gave rise to certain liabilities and receivables for the 
EU. These obligations must be reflected in the EU's annual accounts. In its 2021 annual report on the 
implementation of  the  EU  budget,  the  ECA  concluded  that  'the  estimate of  the  total  asset 
recognised in relation to the UK's withdrawal process is presented fairly in the consolidated annual 
accounts'. 43 The 2022 annual report had not yet been published at the time of writing. 

2.1. The provisions on environmental and labour protection 

Title XI of Part Two – Trade, Transport, Fisheries and other Arrangements sets out the level-playing-
field provisions, designed to safeguard open and fair competition. They touch on a range of areas, 
including labour and social standards, environment and climate, and other instruments for trade 
and sustainable development (TSD). While typical TSD provisions aim to promote convergence of 
labour  and  social  standards  and  environment  and  climate  change  policy,  the  objective  of 
establishing a level playing field in the TCA is to avoid 'significant' divergence, since the EU and the 

42   Every year, the ECA audits the revenue and expenditure sides of the EU budget and provides its opinion on the extent 

to which the annual  accounts are reliable and income and  spending comply  with the rules and regulations. 

43   ECA,  2021Annual reports on  the implementation of  the EU  budget for the 2021 financial  year and  on  the activities 

funded by  the 8th, 9th, 10th and  11th European Development Funds  (EDFs)  for the 2021 financial year, 2022, p. 17.  

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UK  were  already  sharing the  same  standards and  the  two  economies were  contiguous and 
substantially interconnected when the TCA came into (provisional) application. 44 

When it comes to labour and social rights  protection, the level-playing-field commitment (Title 
XI,  Part  II)  in  the  EU-UK  TCA)  covers several  key  areas, namely:  fundamental rights at  work; 
occupational health and safety standards; fair working conditions and employment standards; 
information and consultation rights at company level; and restructuring of undertakings. There are 
separate commitments on the road transport section of the TCA requiring both parties to comply 
with working time rules (including rest breaks and periods) for drivers transporting goods between 
the UK and the EU. 

On  environmental  protection,  the  TCA's  preamble  acknowledges  the  importance  of  global 
cooperation to address shared interests, including climate action. The TCA also explicitly identifies 
the  fight  against  climate  change  as  one  of  the  partnership's  essential  elements,  alongside 
democratic principles, the rule of  law,  human rights and non-proliferation of weapons of  mass 
destruction.  Chapter  I  (General  provisions)  explicitly  declares  the  'right  to  regulate'  and 
acknowledges the 'precautionary approach' (principle) for the environment and human health; the 
parties commit to climate neutrality by 2050. Chapter 7 of the TCA covers the environment and 
climate. Article 390 sets out the definition of 'environmental levels of protection' as 'prevention of a 
danger to human life  or health from environmental impacts' and 'climate level of protection' as 
linked to protection from emissions, removals of greenhouse gases and the phasing-out of ozone 
depleting substances. Article 397 of the TCA sets the foundations and broad objectives for trade and 
sustainable development. 

Three key provisions govern labour, social rights, environment and climate protection: 

1 

2 

The TCA prohibits the EU and the UK from weakening or reducing the level of rights 
that were in place in the WA at the end of the transition period (31 December 2020), 
in a manner affecting trade or investment between the parties. The non-regression 
principle from levels of protection  can be found in Article 387(2) for labour and 
social standards and Article 391(4) for environment and climate. It implies that there 
are limits to the overhaul the UK government can apply to its employment law (also 
in the context of the 'Retained EU Law' Act). Moreover, the TCA requires that both 
the  EU  and  the  UK  maintain  a  system for  effective  domestic  enforcement of 
employment rights, including labour inspections, the possibility for court actions 
and  consequent effective  remedies  (e.g.  interim  relief).  Nevertheless, the  TCA 
recognises that both the EU  and the UK  'retain the right to exercise reasonable 
discretion on how to allocate labour enforcement resources'.45 
Chapter 8 (Other instruments for TSD) makes general commitments and lists several 
political  declarations (e.g., Agenda 21,  the Rio  Declaration on Environment and 
Development, the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development). In Article 399, the 
parties  commit  to  promoting  and  implementing  the  core  labour  standards 
recognised in  the  International Labour  Organization's (ILO)  eight  fundamental 
conventions. These  include  freedom of  association and  the  right  to  collective 
bargaining; the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; the abolition 
of child labour; and the elimination of discrimination in employment. Equally, Article 
393  sets out the environmental  and  climate  principles  of the TCA, including a 
commitment to multilateral environmental agreements. 

44   For an analysis  on level playing field for labour and environment in the EU-UK  TCA, see I. Hallak,  The level playing field 

for labour and  environment in EU-UK  relations, EPRS,  European Parliament, November 2021, p. 2. 

45   L. Morrison, What does the Brexit trade deal with the EU  mean for UK employment law?, Dentons,  7 January  2021. 

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3 

For redress, the TCA contains a dispute settlement mechanism to address, through 
consultation, a 'matter arising' under Chapters 6-8, or the provision reaffirming the 
ambition of economy-wide climate neutrality by 2050 (Article 355(3)). A panel of 
experts will consider any dispute after a 90-day consultation period, during which 
the parties will try to resolve the matter. In addition, if the UK implements changes 
to employment law that impact trade and investment considerably, the EU will be 
able  to  implement  'rebalancing  measures',  including  tariffs  (Article  411  on 
rebalancing). 46 This should encourage the UK  to adopt  a  cautious approach to 
changes it  makes in  the domain of employment law. The  enforceability of non-
regression by allowing temporary and proportionate remedial measures to offset 
any 'material impacts on trade or investment' resulting from 'significant divergences' 
between the two parties can help prevent a race to the bottom so that standards in 
each  party  would  not  drop  (e.g.  the  Paris  Agreement's goal of  limiting  global 
warming to below 2°C). Equally, this mechanism could also discourage either side 
from raising its standards through fear of competitive disadvantage, which could 
lead to bilateral tensions. 47 

The TSD provisions in the EU-UK TCA are considered innovative, since for the first time an EU trade 
agreement includes these chapters within the scope of the level  playing field. 48 Obligations on 
labour standards are stricter than those normally contained in EU FTAs, since most of the provisions 
are hard (enforceable) obligations and parties can take 'temporary remedies' (trade remedies) when 
obligations are breached. 49 Nevertheless, experts have criticised the fact that the non-regression 
and rebalancing provisions in the TCA are conditional only on measures causing an impact on trade 
or investment, with the bar of proof for demonstrating this impact having been set very high.50 The 
rebalancing measures will rely on 'reliable evidence' and not on 'conjecture or remote possibility' 
that divergence has an impact, and therefore are likely to be used very rarely. 51 

For this reason, legal scholar Giulia Claudia Leonelli argues that, 'overall, the TCA has followed a 
lowest common denominator approach to environmental protection and climate change' and is 
therefore far from ambitious. She explains that the relevant provisions have marked a shift from the 
EU's  initial  attempts to  exercise  its  extra-territorial leverage  for  high  levels  of  transnational 
environmental protection. Similarly, law  professor  Anu  Bradford argues that, '[w]ith the United 
Kingdom leaving [the single market], both the EU's market size and its regulatory capacity will 
diminish, weakening the first two conditions sustaining the de facto Brussels effect'. The Brussels 
effect refers to the considerable and often pre-eminent global impact that EU market regulations 
can have. 52 

Instead, the TCA provisions on environment and climate change focus on the stricto sensu economic 
level playing field, on potential impacts on trade and investment between the parties.53 The narrow 

46   The European  Court of Justice does not play a role in enforcing the level-playing-field provisions. 

47  

J. Wachowiak,  EU-UK  climate cooperation post-Brexit: A case for optimism?,  European Policy Centre, Brussels, 28 June 
2021, p. 2. 

48   G.C.  Leonelli, 'Transnational  Environmental  Protection to Distortions of  Competition:  The  Level Playing  Field in the 

EU-UK  Trade and Cooperation  Agreement', Journal of Environmental Law, 2021(33), pp. 611-638. 

49   E. Ares, D. Carver, S. Fella, D. Ferguson,  I. Jozepa, A. Seely and A. Shalchi, The UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement: 

Level Playing Field, Briefing Paper Number 9190, House of Commons  Library,  20 May 2021.  

50   M. Morris, The agreement on the future relationship: first analysis, Institute for Public Policy Research, December 2020, 

p. 7. 

I. Hallak,  op. cit., November 2021, p. 10. 

51  
52   A. Bradford, The Brussels Effect:  How the European Union Rules the World, Oxford University Press, 2020. 
53   G.C.  Leonelli, op. cit., 2021, p. 636. 

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The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

economic framing of the level playing field is safeguarded for as long as regulatory divergences do 
not distort competition and do not have an impact on trade and investment between the parties. 
The provisions, as they stand, cannot guarantee high levels of protection in regulatory areas where 
reductions in UK levels of environmental protection would not directly affect the EU. These areas 
include, among others, access to environmental information, public participation and access to 
justice in  environmental matters, environmental impact assessment and strategic environmental 
assessment. These areas are no longer part of Chapter 7 on Environment and climate.54 

Environmental groups have criticised this 'trade and investment test', pointing out that the impact 
might be difficult to prove, potentially rendering the provisions ineffective.55 These provisions leave 
out  many  aspects  of  environmental  protection,  which  were  expressly  presented  in  the 
February 2020 European Parliament resolution on the proposed mandate for the EU-UK TCA. In that 
resolution, Parliament offers its own take on the inclusion of SPS standards in the level playing field, 
which can be justified from the point of view of environmental and public health protection.  

European Parliament warns about environmental shortcomings in the EU-UK TCA 

The issue of environmental protection was expressly raised for the first time in the Parliament's resolution 
of February 2020 on the proposed mandate for the EU-UK TCA. The resolution focuses on environmental 
and public health matters and reflects a very broad framing of the level playing field, in pursuit of high 
levels of transnational environmental protection. In its resolution, Parliament holds that the EU-UK TCA 
would have to adhere to the precautionary principle, to the principle that environmental damage should, 
as a priority, be rectified at source, and to the polluter pays principle. Regarding the scope of application 
of the  level playing  field, the resolution says  (in paragraph  36) it  should encompass several areas of 
environmental regulation: 

access  to  environmental  information,  public  participation  and  access  to  justice  in 
environmental matters; 
environmental impact assessment and strategic environmental assessment; 
air emissions and air quality targets and ceilings; 

  nature and biodiversity conservation; 
  waste management; 
industrial emissions; 
the protection and preservation of the aquatic environment; 
the protection and preservation of the marine environment; 
the prevention, reduction and  elimination of risks  to  human health  or  the environment 
arising  from  the  production,  use, release and  disposal  of  chemical substances  or  plant 
protection products; 
climate change and the precautionary principle. 

Furthermore, the resolution (paragraph 22) asserts the need to maintain a level playing field in the areas 
of food  safety and  SPS  measures, meaning that  these are product  standards,  and  that  they must be 
complied with in full in order to ensure access to the EU market. 

Source: European Parliament resolution of 12 February 2020 on the proposed mandate for negotiations 
for a new partnership with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (2020/2557(RSP)), 
P9_TA(2020)0033. 

54   Article 7.1(1) limits the areas of  environment and  public health protection to industrial emissions,  air emissions  and 
air quality; nature and biodiversity conservation;  waste management;  the protection and  preservation of the aquatic 
and  marine  environment;  the prevention, reduction  and  elimination of  risks  to human  health or  the environment 
arising  from  the  production,  use,  release  or  disposal  of  chemicals;  and  the  management  of  impacts  on  the 
environment from agricultural or food production, notably  through the use of antibiotics and  decontaminants. 

55   See S. Williams,  Greener UK – Written evidence (EEH0030), UK Parliament, 2021. 

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According to Leonelli, 'such broad scope of  application for  the agreement's level playing field 
provisions would have enabled the EU to exercise its extra-territorial leverage and safeguard high 
levels of transnational environmental protection'.56 It would have therefore enabled the 'Brussels 
effect'. 

In  addition, sanitary standards in  the  food  and  agricultural sectors are no  longer included  in 
Chapter 7 of the EU-UK TCA. In the field of risk governance and food safety standards, UK reductions 
in levels of protection would undermine EU efforts to uphold precautionary risk management and 
sustainability at  the  transnational  level.  Moreover,  the  very  thin  Chapter  3  on  Sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures does not refer to the precautionary principle or 'precautionary approach'.57 

2.2. European Commission reports 

The EU, in Council Decision (EU) 2021/689 of 29 April 2021 (Article 2(4)) on the conclusion of the 
UK/EU TCA, 58 committed to publishing reports on the implementation of the EU-UK TCA annually 
until 2026, after which it will  continue to publish them biennially. The European Commission has 
sent its implementation reports – two, thus far (for 2021 and 2022) – to the European Parliament 
and the Council for information. These reports cover: the TCA's institutional framework; trade in 
goods; trade in services; energy; transport; fisheries; social security coordination; law enforcement 
and judicial  cooperation; participation in Union programmes; the evolution of law in  the United 
Kingdom; a level playing field for open and fair competition and sustainable development; and trade 
flows. 

In its report  on the implementation of the TCA (covering  1 January-31 December  2021), the 
European Commission assessed that, despite there being no customs duties on originating goods, 
businesses reported widely  about  disruptions in  supply  chains.  The  difficulties  faced  by  EU 
businesses were consistent with what could  be  expected,  namely: 'increased costs because of 
having to comply with dual regulatory systems and additional formalities; delays at the border due 
to new procedural requirements; and difficulty in complying with changing import rules'.59 To rectify 
the situation, the Commission issued guidance notes on the correct application of the SPS rules, the 
rules of origin and other customs-related issues, all of which it made available on its website.60 To 
facilitate trade in goods that fall under SPS requirements, the Commission shared with all Member 
States electronic model health certificates required for exports to Great Britain. It was acknowledged 
that '[t]heir application may be challenging for EU exporters and Member States due to the logistical 
impact  of  the  new  procedures, in  particular  the  need  to  submit  required  declarations and 
supporting documents before goods are shipped from EU ports to the UK, as well as the complexity 
of the IT system put in place by the UK'. 61 Regarding labour and social standards, environment and 

56   G.C.  Leonelli, op. cit., 2021, p. 618. 
57   G.C.  Leonelli, op. cit., 2021, p. 622. 
58   Council  Decision  (EU)  2021/689 of  29  April  2021  on  the  conclusion,  on  behalf  of  the  Union,  of  the  Trade  and 
Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community,  of the one part, 
and  the United Kingdom  of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the other part, and  of the Agreement between the 
European  Union  and  the United Kingdom  of Great Britain and  Northern Ireland concerning security procedures  for 
exchanging  and protecting classified information, OJ L 149, 30.4.2021, pp.  2-9. 

59   European  Commission,  Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  on  the 
implementation and  application  of  the  Trade  and  Cooperation  Agreement between  the European  Union  and  the 
United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Northern  Ireland  1  January-31  December  2021,  COM(2022)  126  final, 
24 March 2022, pp. 6-7. 

60   European  Commission,  New import formalities to bring goods  from the EU into the UK as of 1 January  2022, Taxation 

and Customs  Union (last updated:  12 July 2022). 

61   European  Commission,  op.  cit., COM(2022) 126 final, 24 March 2022, p. 7. 

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The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

climate, and sustainable development, the report focused on: the monitoring of the UK's intention 
to  establish a  single  enforcement body for employment rights; the UK's adoption of  its  2021 
Environment Act and the subsequent setting up of  relevant offices for its application; the UK's 
compliance with TCA obligations on the chemical sector; and the UK's emissions trading scheme.62 

The most recent European Commission implementation report  on  the EU-UK TCA (covering 
1 January-31  December  2022),  concludes  that '[o]verall, the  TCA  functions well'.  The  report 
maintains that, in 2022, much progress was made in finalising the institutional arrangements and 
that, while  challenges remain, the sectoral provisions of the TCA  are  operational. Most of the 
remaining challenges were linked to the UK's persistent refusal to uphold its legal obligations under 
the WA. 63 Regarding the movement of persons, the report maintains that, between June 2021 and 
June 2022, more EU citizens left the UK than arrived in it, which led to a negative net migration of 
EU citizens of 51 000. There were fewer work visa applications by EU citizens, who were also less 
likely to study in the UK. There is currently no visa requirement for short-term visits of EU citizens to 
the UK and vice versa. However, this does not automatically entail a right of entry.64 Regarding fiscal 
aspects, national customs authorities raised concerns with regard to the correctness of operators' 
self-declarations of origin and replies provided by the UK's customs authorities concerning the 
verifications of origin. While exercising control over the correct application of the rules of origin is, 
as in all trade agreements, challenging, the balance of the horizontal and product-specific rules in 
the TCA is deemed satisfactory. In the SPS area, despite the UK's commitment to promoting the use 
of  electronic  certification  to  facilitate  trade,  there  was  only  limited  progress in  accepting  EU 
paperless certificates.65 

The European Commission's 2022/2023 European SME Performance Review puts the situation of 
EU-27 SMEs into a broader context, taking geopolitical instability and global economic activity into 
account. 66  Although  the  review  does  not  mention  the  EU-UK  TCA,  the  current  geopolitical 
circumstances must be taken into account when considering the challenges EU-27 SMEs face when 
trading with the UK, especially in the context of ongoing tensions between the two parties. The 
review concludes that, overall, EU-27 SMEs are in a perilous situation and will remain so in the near 
future. A  breakdown of the  distribution of EU-27  SMEs across enterprises in the  non-financial 
business sector (NFBS) industries shows that, in 2022, SMEs were concentrated in a few industries.67 
The biggest group – SMEs in wholesale and retail trade – accounted for 24 % of all EU-27 SMEs in 

62   European  Commission,  op.  cit., COM(2022) 126 final, 24 March 2022, pp. 15-16. 

63   European  Commission,  Report  from  the  Commission  on  the  implementation  and  application  of  the  Trade  and 
Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
(1 January-31  December 2021), COM(2022) 126 final, 24 March 2022, p. 18. 

64   European  Commission,  Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  on  the 
implementation and  application  of  the  Trade  and  Cooperation  Agreement between  the European  Union  and  the 
United Kingdom  of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 1 January-31  December 2022, COM(2023) 118 final, 15 March 
2023, pp. 17-19. 

ibid., pp.  4-5. 

65  
66   L. Di Bella, A. Katsinis and J. Lagüera-González,  Annual Report on European SMEs  2022/2023: SME Performance Review 
2022/2023, Joint Research Centre and  Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry,  Entrepreneurship and  SMEs, 
European  Commission,  2023. 

67   The  NFBS  excludes  agriculture,  forestry  and  fishing;  financial  and  insurance  activities;  public  administration  and 
defence;  compulsory  social  security;  education;  human  health  and  social  work  activities; arts,  entertainment and 
recreation;  activities  of  households  as  employers;  undifferentiated  goods-  and  service-producing  activities  of 
households  for  own  use;  and  activities of  extraterritorial organisations  and  bodies.  European  Commission,  op. cit., 
Annual Report on European  SMEs  2022/2023, 2023, p. 16. 

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the EU-27 NFBS, followed by SMEs engaged in professional, scientific and technical activities (20 %) 
and in construction (15 %). 68 

Since early 2020, due to the coronavirus pandemic, the 24 million EU-27 SMEs and, more generally 
SMEs  throughout  the  world  have  faced  unprecedented  economic  uncertainty  and  turmoil. 
Moreover, throughout a part of 2021 and 2022, SMEs faced difficulties in hiring new staff to meet an 
unexpectedly strong rebound in demand, while also having to deal with numerous new challenges. 
Inflation rates increased drastically, especially in  2022,  pushing interest rates up,  which  in  turn 
reduced access to financing. Energy and raw materials price rises have also put extra pressure on 
enterprises. Additionally, with the discontinuation of financial  aid  from governments once the 
pandemic subsided, the resilience capacity of SMEs weakened, exposing to further risk the fragile 
situation most of them were  in.  Furthermore, EU-27 SMEs  have been  affected  by  the  Russian 
invasion of Ukraine, both directly (in a limited context, though, and depending on the EU Member 
State's location), and indirectly through broader war-related developments that jeopardise their 
growth. SMEs have also had to prepare for the transition to a digital and sustainable economy. 

The study notes that there are a few exceptions to this bleak picture. Specifically, SMEs with fewer 
than 10 employees seem to have outperformed all other SME size classes but have not proven their 
resilience to the aforementioned challenges. In terms of sectors, SMEs in energy renewables, retail, 
and the knowledge-intensive sector have managed to expand their business amidst the crisis, even 
when factoring in the 2022 inflation. 69 

2.2.1. Institutional framework and monitoring bodies70 
In 2022, the TCA's institutional framework was completed and became fully operational. The parties 
met 22 times in the joint bodies established by the TCA, according to the annex in the Commission 
report, to supervise and facilitate its implementation.71 

The Partnership Council has met twice since the start of the EU-UK TCA's application: in June 2021 
and in March 2023. It did not meet in 2022. In its first meeting, the Partnership Council discussed the 
TCA's implementation as regards SPS measures, customs and trade facilitation, fisheries (particularly 
licences for access to waters of the Channel Islands), non-discrimination between Member States on 
work  visa  fees,  law  enforcement and  judicial  cooperation, and  the  UK's  participation  in  EU 
programmes. In its statement following the meeting, the European Commission highlighted the 
importance of 'continuous dialogue and transparency in the implementation of the TCA' and of 
building 'a mutually beneficial and stable relationship' and 'committed to [the TCA's] full and timely 
implementation, including its governance structures'. The Partnership Council also acknowledged 
its duties vis-a-vis the Parliamentary Partnership Assembly and the Civil Society Forum. 72 In their 
second meeting, the Partnership Council members discussed energy cooperation (including the EU 
Green  Deal  industrial  plan,  the  goals  on  climate  change,  and  decoupling  from  Russian 
hydrocarbons); regulatory cooperation (progress on signing a memorandum of understanding on 
financial services, and the UK working with the EU intellectual property offices); security cooperation 

68   L. Di Bella et al., op.  cit., 2023, p. 22. 
69   L. Di Bella et al., op.  cit., 2023. 
70   The monitoring bodies set up for parliamentary oversight are discussed  in Chapter 4. 
71   The EU  was  represented in the meetings of the joint bodies  by  the European  Commission,  whereas positions  to be 

taken on behalf  of the EU  were coordinated with the Council. 

72   European Commission,  Statement by the European Commission  following the first meeting of the Partnership Council  

under the EU-UK  Trade and Cooperation Agreement, June 2021. 

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The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

in view of Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine; and the UK's participation in EU programmes.73 Both 
meetings noted the need to address the difficulties in implementing the WA and the Protocol. 

By  2022,  all  11  specialised  committees  had  been  set up  and  started meeting regularly. The 
Specialised Committee on Fisheries has met the most (three times), followed by the ones on energy 
and transport (twice each). The Trade Specialised Committee on Level Playing Field for Open and 
Fair  Competition  and  Sustainable  Development  under  the  UK-EU  Trade  and  Cooperation 
Agreement has met twice. Discussions addressed issues related to subsidy control and competition; 
UK and EU labour market enforcement; ongoing legislative files and how the UK is diverging from 
relevant EU  regulations; the UK environmental impact assessments; wastewater  treatment; and 
climate issues. The European Commission has made the agendas and the minutes of the meetings 
publicly available on its website. 74 

2.3. Monitoring by the European Economic and Social Committee 

According to Article 13 of the TCA, both the EU and the UK are to set up a Domestic Advisory Group 
(DAG) of representatives of civil society organisations. Established in 2022, the DAGs constitute the 
civil-society monitoring pillar of the deal. The EU DAG established for the TCA is the largest EU DAG 
under an EU trade agreement. It has 34 members from EU civil society organisations and six from 
the European Economic and Social  Committee (EESC). It  includes equal numbers of employers' 
representatives and third-party groups. It is also the first DAG to monitor an entire agreement, with 
a particular focus on the level-playing-field provisions. The EU DAG is organised into three thematic 
groups of 10 members each: a business group, a workers' group and a group on other organised 
NGOs, including organisations, for example, dealing with consumers, animals or the environment.75 

Regular meetings normally take place four times a year, in addition to informal meetings with other 
EU  institutions monitoring the implementation of the  EU-UK TCA,  most notably the European 
Commission. Since its first meeting on 25 November 2021, the EU DAG under the TCA has held six 
meetings focused on different implementation issues and provisions of the TCA. 76 Following the 
meeting between the EU DAG and the UK DAG in  2022, a brief statement pointed to their joint 
commitment to the monitoring and consultation process, and to working closely with the EU-UK 
PPA. The structure for cooperation between the DAGs has been set up, but, from an EU perspective, 
improvements are needed in how the DAGs engage with the civil society forum. The EU DAG has 
called for EU-UK cooperation to move forward, especially on the regulatory front. 77 In its most recent 
meeting of 9 March 2023, the EU DAG focused on the Windsor Framework on Northern Ireland and 
discussed the technical aspects of the level-playing-field provisions. Increased interest was shown 
towards the UK's then Retained EU Bill (now Act) and the Strikes (Minimum Service Levels) Bill.78 It 

73   European  Commission,  Minutes of  the  Second  Meeting of  the Partnership  Council  on  the Trade  and  Cooperation 

Agreement, in London,  24 March 2023. 

74   European  Commission,  Meetings of the EU-UK  Partnership Council and Specialised Committees under the Trade and 

Cooperation Agreement. 

75   Presentation by  Tanja  Buzek (EESC),  Joint AFET  and  INTA  hearing  on 'The  implementation of  the EU-UK  Trade  and 

Cooperation Agreement', European  Parliament, 25 May 2023. 

76   EESC,  The EU Domestic Advisory Group under the EU-UK  TCA – Related Events,  2023.  
77   Presentation by Tanja  Buzek (EESC),  op.  cit., 25 May 2023. 

78   The  Strikes Bill, laid before Parliament on  10 January  2023, would  allow employers  to serve 'work notices'  on trade 
unions  organising  industrial action in relevant services where the government has  set minimum  service levels. The  
Bill is far  more  sweeping  than  the government  first suggested,  and  could  affect  those  working  in health,  fire and 
rescue, education,  transport,  decommissioning  of  nuclear installations  and  management  of  radioactive  waste  and 
spent fuel, and  border security. If a union does not take 'all reasonable steps' to ensure that its members identified in 
the  work  notice  comply  and  attend  work,  rather  than  participate  in  industrial  action,  it  risks  being  sued.  The  

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was recognised that 'the new reality for now is one of increasing divergence [between the EU and 
UK] that will require proper management'. During discussions, EU DAG members voiced concerns 
about these provisions relating to issues such as services and data protection, deforestation, labour 
standards and the balance between natural divergence and necessary cooperation.79 

2.3.1. EU-UK Relations Issues Tracker 
To structure the dialogue on the TCA's implementation between all parties concerned, the EU DAG 
publishes an  EU-UK  Relations Issues Tracker, its latest edition being  from January 2023. 80  This 
document covers an evolving list of sectoral issues and recommendations prepared by the EU DAG 
member organisations representing the views and priorities of EU civil  society related to sectors 
affected by the TCA and its implementation. The areas covered include customs, transport, the 
cultural and creative industries, the boating industry, the metal, engineering and technology-based 
industries, insurance regulation and financial services, agriculture, SPS measures, pharmaceuticals, 
the Lugano Convention, the European Works Councils, workers' rights, animal welfare, consumers' 
rights, EU programmes and fisheries. A number of overarching issues – the institutional framework 
and enforcement, UK trade, the Protocol and digital technology – are also assessed. The objective is 
to  contribute to  a  more  open  and  focused discussion,  while  at  the  same time  providing the 
European Commission with relevant information to use in its interactions with its UK counterparts. 

The January 2023 Issues Tracker points to the detrimental impact that customs procedures under 
the EU-TCA have on transport  and logistics. It explains that, since there are fewer logistics and 
transport companies, shipment costs are much higher. This is compounded by additional fixed costs 
for all shipments between the UK and the EU, in  both directions. The administrative burden for 
businesses has increased, due to the need for health certificates, the absence of digital certificates 
and the absence of sufficient border checkpoints. This has resulted in significant costs for agriculture 
and customs clearance, as well as increasing delivery times. 

Other costs and administrative  burdens have also increased. VAT must now be paid for goods 
subject to VAT between the UK and EU; effectively this entails a 20 % price increase for a wide range 
of goods, including those bought through e-commerce. Moreover, much uncertainty remains about 
how  to  apply  the  principle  of  bilateral cumulation  of  origin  and  what  constitutes 'sufficient 
processing' in this  regard, particularly for agri-food products. In  that context, EU  operators are 
unsure about the quantity of UK ingredients that can be included in the final product. Equally, UK 
customs have been requesting that the statement of origin indicate the specific  Member State 
from which the product originates (even though, according to the TCA, the statement should only 
mention 'the Union' as the origin). 

The  January 2023  Issues  Tracker also  raises concerns about the  UK  decision  to  set  up  seven 
(maritime)  freeports  and  free  zones  that  would  act  as  national  hubs  for  global  trade  and 
investment in their region. The main concern raised is that to attract more investment, UK freeports 
are in a position to offer more benefits to the companies established there than the EU free zones, 
as the UK has more freedom regarding the flexibilities and tax concessions it can offer their free 
zones, including tax relief, planning liberalisations and incentives for innovation. By contrast, EU free 
zones are governed by the Union Customs Code and the EU rules on State aid, which stop Member 
States from using selective tax  exemptions and financial  incentives to  distort competition. UK 
freeports could benefit from this competitive advantage, which could ultimately lead to business 

employees who  do  get identified also  face losing  unfair dismissal  protection and  will risk being fired if they do  not 
comply. 

79   See EESC,  Note on the 6th meeting of the EU DAG under the TCA, 9 March 2023.  
80   See EESC,  EU DAG under the TCA – EU-UK  relations Issues Tracker,  19 April 2023.  

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The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

moving from the EU to the UK. These plans are therefore seen as potentially being in conflict with 
the provisions on the level playing field and State aid in the TCA. 

In addition, several port stakeholders have expressed concern about the risk of cargo leakage due 
to possible stops by cargo ships at UK ports rather than EU ones, to avoid falling within the scope of 
the EU emissions trading system (ETS) as much as possible and thereby cut costs. The EESC Issues 
Tracker insists that such practices must be prevented to protect the integrity of EU climate policy 
and to avoid undermining the competitiveness and connectivity of EU markets and ports. As long 
as the UK does not introduce carbon dioxide pricing or participate in  the EU ETC Directive, the 
competitive position of EU seaports could be negatively affected.81 

Furthermore, while  the  TCA  encourages cooperation on  a  range of  topics,  'consumer  rights 
enforcement is absent'. The Issues Tracker notes that the UK government is failing to adequately 
enforce employment law in the UK (Article 388, Chapter 6 in the TCA), including legislation around 
minimum wages and health and safety for workers on its seasonal worker pilot scheme. The UK does 
not have a sufficient number of labour inspectors to enforce rules on: minimum wage, health and 
safety; licensing standards in exploitative sectors; and agency worker legalisation.82 

2.4. European Committee of the Regions 

While the UK's withdrawal from the EU was negotiated at the highest levels of national governments 
and EU authorities, it affects all levels, including the local and the regional ones. In recognition of 
this fact, the European Committee of the Regions (CoR) launched a UK Contact Group intended to 
maintain lines of communication between local and regional authorities (LRAs) in EU and UK cities, 
regions, and devolved administrations. 

A study commissioned by the CoR shows that the primary impact of the EU-UK TCA on LRAs is likely 
to be in the form of changes to the economic environment of local and regional communities, 
and less seamless cross-border processes. Similar to the findings of an OECD-commissioned study 
on the impact of the EU-UK TCA, 83 the study finds that the TCA's impact varies across sectors and, 
in this case, across regions. While regions in northern and western Europe on average are most 
affected, the extent of the TCA's impact depends heavily on a region's sectoral specialisation and 
diversification. The impact on EU Member States is likely to be highly uneven, with the strongest 
negative  effects  expected  in  the  neighbouring countries,  including  France,  the  Netherlands, 
Belgium, and Ireland. Nevertheless, while the level of cooperation between EU and UK LRAs could 
be  affected to a  certain degree, 84 'established connections are likely to be  maintained [and] be 
driven by decades of successful cooperation, developed partnerships, and established economic, 
social, and cultural links regardless of available funding'. In addition, the EU-UK TCA will likely create 
opportunities for new synergies and partnerships between LRAs. 85 

81   EESC,  op. cit., 19 April 2023, pp. 4-6. 
82   EESC,  op. cit., 19 April 2023, pp. 15, 17. 

83   F.  Van  Tongeren,  C.  Arriola, A.  Mourougane  and  S.  Benz, 'Trade  Impacts  of  the Trade  and  Cooperation  Agreement 
between  the European  Union  and  the  United  Kingdom',  Economics  Department  Working  Paper  No 1698, OECD, 
December 2021. 

84   This  may  be  the result of  the discontinuation  of  the  common  cooperation  frameworks  (i.e.  frameworks  enabling 
cooperation under funds  such  as the regional development and  cohesion funds,  agriculture and rural development 
funds,  and NextGenerationEU, among others) and a decrease in the funding dedicated to joint cross-border initiatives. 
85   M. Bergstra, J. Hagemejer and  K. Karunska,  Restoring 'lost connections' between the EU and  the UK as a consequence  
of Brexit through  local and regional authorities, study  for the Commission  for Citizenship, Governance,  Institutional 
and External Affairs, European  Committee of the Regions, 2021, p. 5. 

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The fact that the UK can no longer participate in EU programmes has affected sectors that are key 
to the LRAs the most, since the UK's non-participation risks disrupting cross-border cooperation 
and reducing the scope of  student and professional exchange. 86 The study also points out that 
effects on the labour market will mostly be felt in the bordering regions where a large number of 
people have to cross borders daily to go to work. Already in 2017, the Irish Central Border Area 
Network reported that Brexit had forced a  number of  people  and businesses in the  bordering 
regions to relocate across borders to keep the benefits associated with EU membership. A number 
of sectors that rely on migrant workers are also expected to be affected. This would also apply to the 
workers themselves, especially new migrants, who would be facing higher recruitment costs after 
Brexit. The sectors concerned are primarily the UK construction and social care sectors, which rely 
heavily on a skilled EU  labour force, and the tourism and agriculture sectors, which employ the 
majority of their seasonal workers from outside the UK. 87 The study also demonstrates that the TCA 
seems to bring about higher costs in trade and decreased EU exports to the UK, while  also and 
disproportionately affecting SMEs, which struggle to adapt to the TCA rules more than companies 
conducting international trade.88 

Similarly, another study published in 2022 by the CoR examines how regions across the EU Member 
States  have  been  affected  by  Brexit  and  what  they  have  done  to  mitigate  the  negative 
consequences. It shows that many of the problems created by Brexit persist. Firstly, the same regions 
currently affected by the TCA were also more strongly affected by Brexit. Regions in northern and 
western Europe were more exposed to Brexit than regions in southern or eastern Europe. Proximity 
to  the UK  market undoubtedly also played a role.  However, the results were not uniform. For 
example, in western Sweden, the costs and challenges of dealing with the TCA might be higher for 
local  service  companies or  SMEs  having  no  trade  experience  with  countries outside  the  EU. 
Furthermore, a municipality in  Spain  mentioned the costs for the management  of procedures, 
licences, etc. for drivers and road transport, and the loss of UK clients/importers in general, as some 
of the drawbacks of the TCA. 89 

For economic  sectors,  the study finds that, overall, Brexit has had a stronger impact on sectors 
relying on high TCA regulatory compliance, such as those for agri-food products and beverages, 
machinery, cars, and textiles. In addition, despite the fact that it has prevented the potentially larger 
disruptive effects on trade and investment flows of a no-deal scenario, the TCA entails higher costs 
for trade. These costs are especially relevant to exporters who are subject to the rules of origin and 
animal  and  plant  health  checks. Costs  related  to  rules  of  origin  affect  more  strongly sectors 
producing components and parts that are extremely complex and numerous (e.g. the automotive 
sector, which ranks first in terms of EU trade with the UK), while costs related to animal and plant 
health checks could render agri-food trade more costly. Moreover, the TCA has had a notably high 
impact on tourism and real estate sales. 

Moreover, the costs for adjusting  to the TCA have been particularly high for smaller companies 
that have not traded with third countries before, and especially for those operating in the agri-food 
sector and for e-commerce companies (where the difference before and after the TCA in terms of 
cost is greatest). The increased administrative burden (i.e. the customs checks and declarations 

86   M. Bergstra et al., op. cit., 2021, p. 29. 
87   M. Bergstra et al., op. cit., 2021, p. 8. 
88   M. Bergstra et al., op. cit., 2021, pp. 2-3. 
89   M. Alessandrini, C. Bettini, E. Iacobucci, E. Gløersen, S. Zillmer, H. Gorny, K. Hat and A. Münch, New trade and economic 
relations between EU-UK:  the impact on regions and cities, European Committee of the Regions, 2022, pp. 72-73, 77. 

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The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

required from enterprises) induced by the TCA rules could push local enterprises to redirect their 
business to markets other than the UK.90 

2.4.1. Strategies on and impact of the EU-UK TCA in several EU regions 
To complement the data in the previous section, EPRS reached out to a select number of regions in 
the Member States whose trade data ranks them as the top trading partners with the UK  from 
among EU regions. Special attention was paid to the regions that are potentially most affected by 
Brexit and  would likely  benefit from the EU-UK  TCA (i.e.  benefit from a  structured relationship 
regulating all relevant EU policies). For this purpose, EPRS contacted its wide-ranging network of 
representatives of public authorities at regional, local, national and EU levels. Targeted requests for 
input were also sent to umbrella bodies of public  authorities, such as the Council of  European 
Municipalities and Regions, as well  as regions or provinces in  Austria (Carinthia, Lower Austria, 
Salzburg, Styria, Tirol, Upper Austria, Vienna), Belgium (Flanders), France (Normandy and Hauts-de-
France), Germany (Hamburg and Bavaria), the Republic of Ireland, and the Netherlands. 

Due to the time restrictions, the consultation was open for three weeks only and did not set itself 
the goal of gathering comparable data. The consultation yielded a limited number of responses, 
probably also because the TCA has not been implemented long enough to provide a clear picture 
of its persisting effects. Hence, this section provides a snapshot of the situation in the EU regions 
that took part in the consultation and shared data on what they had done to implement the EU-UK 
TCA and what initial effects this implementation had had on them. 

Some respondents did not specifically analyse the impact of the TCA at the level of provinces. In the 
Netherlands, the respondents from the province of Gelderland suggested that attention be paid 
instead to data at the national level. In Austria, Vienna pointed out that the UK had not been an 
important trading partner for the region, while the Tyrolean region provided data only on trade 
flows  (included  in  the  next  chapter), and  stated that trade in  goods had  picked  up  after the 
pandemic, even if not at pre-pandemic levels. The Irish Regions European Office did not have any 
direct information on the effect of the TCA on regional trade to share with EPRS. 

Interestingly, the French region of Normandy has drawn up a strategy related to Brexit, presenting 
its consequences not only in relation to trade but also to identity. For Normandy, the exit of the UK 
from the EU has meant that the Channel coastal area has become a new EU border region. In 2021, 
the fishing licence  crisis, on the one hand, and the inflow of migrants to the UK from across the 
Channel, on the other, showed how difficult the geographical neighbourhood could be to manage. 
The Regional Council for Economic, Social and Environmental Affairs of Normandy, one of the rare 
structures  to specifically address the impacts of  Brexit, recommended drawing up  a  genuinely 
Norman strategy for the Channel area, in particular one targeted at incentivising engagement and 
building cooperation. According to the strategy, 'multiplying the forms of cooperation would make 
it possible to respond as accurately as possible to the needs of the territories and the expectations 
of stakeholders'. Normandy, perceiving an 'absence of an initiative at European and national levels', 
took it upon itself to develop such a strategic approach at the regional level. 91 

In  terms of  employment or GDP,  there have  been  no  conclusive negative effects  of  Brexit  in 
Normandy, and exports from Normandy to the UK have remained stable. With the automation of 
the customs declaration system, logistics traffic has become relatively fluid. The port in Cherbourg 
has experienced a surge in activity, due to a diversion of truck traffic from the UK. Only the fishing 

90   M. Alessandrini et al., op.  cit., 2021, pp. 80, 112, 121, 129, 133-134.  
91   H. Fleury, La Normandie face au Brexit: Un exercice de stratégie régionale dans un contexte d'incertitudes persistantes, 

Regional Council for Economic,  Social and Environmental Affairs,  October 2022. 

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EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

sector was  disrupted in  2021,  with  tensions around licences. Normandy's socio-cultural sector 
appears to be much more negatively affected than its economy, the most telling symbol being the 
end of Erasmus+ with the UK, which practically closes the door to the UK for EU students. In addition, 
there are no more subsidies for developing projects between France and the UK. Equally, cultural 
exchanges are hampered by red tape and the disinterest of the UK government.92 

In Germany, Bavaria made available a study on the impact of the TCA on Bavaria, commissioned by 
the Bavarian Business Association. The study concludes that the EU-UK TCA has been a 'success' from 
the point of view of the Bavarian economy, in terms of facilitating EU-UK trade in goods and to a 
lesser extent trade in  services. However, various areas are not sufficiently regulated or are too 
complicated, and new trade barriers have emerged. For example, the study notes that, when it 
comes to trade in goods, SMEs in particular suffer from the often time-consuming process of having 
to prove their compliance with the rules of origin. In addition, trade in goods is hampered by the 
lack of mutual recognition of product regulations and conformity assessments, which have been 
made more difficult; new UK certification and registration systems apply. Moreover, trade in agri-
food is subject to sanitary and phytosanitary measures, which have further slowed down control 
processes. Trade in services is hindered by the lack of clear rules and by the fact that important 
services are not covered by the TCA. In addition, limitations to the movement and settlement of 
persons have  also  affected  Bavarians' (and  by  extension  Germans' and  EU  citizens')  right  to 
employment in the UK. 93 

2.5. European Investment Bank 

While  the  European  Investment  Bank  (EIB)  has  not  prepared  any  specific  studies  on  the 
implementation of the EU-UK TCA, a recent EIB study on trade distortions provided a useful overview 
of the challenges that EU firms face when trading in the current complex geopolitical landscape. 
The  study focuses on two ways firms have  responded to the challenges: diversification across 
imported inputs and heavier reliance on domestic market alternatives. The study found that the 
majority of the firms in the EU report have experienced trade disruptions since 2021. At least a third 
of the firms perceived trade disruptions as a major obstacle to their business. Trade disruptions have 
indirectly also affected a significant share of non-trading EU firms, which have faced difficulties with 
local suppliers (in turn hit by disruptions) or their imported inputs that they acquired via wholesalers. 
As such, trade disruptions are more likely to discourage non-traders from using imported inputs 
than trading companies. For their part, more productive, innovative and digitalised firms were more 
likely to take action to mitigate the effects of trade-related obstacles. Furthermore, low productivity 
firms are more likely to choose to focus on domestic markets rather than not take action. Firms that 
are more productive and globally competitive are more likely to choose diversification as a response 
strategy and expect gains – that is, increased sales.94 

2.6. Expert community 

The literature on the initial impact of the EU-UK TCA on the EU and its Member States is limited. Most 
data focus on the potential impact, implying that, given the asymmetry between the British and EU 
markets and the fact that regulatory changes were an imperative on the UK side, the consequences 
for the  EU  will  be  felt  in  the medium to  long term. As a  result, academic and  policy research 

92   H. Fleury, op. cit., October 2023, p. 3. 
93  

J. Weiß, E.  Willer, M. Böhmer and  P. Kreuzer, Der Brexit und  die Folgen:  Die bayerische  Wirtschaft ein Jahr  nach  dem 
Brexit, Prognos and vbw  – Vereinigung der Bayerischen Wirtschaft e. V.,  2021, pp. 30-31. 

94   A. Brasili and  P. Harasztosi,  Trade disruptions  in Europe:  Evidence from the EIB Investment Survey 2022, EIB Working 

Paper 2023/02, EIB, June 2023. 

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The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

examining the impact of the EU-UK TCA has centred on the UK's adaptation to its new reality and 
how it is dealing with the consequences of its departure from the EU single market. As explained 
earlier, this is not the focus of this study. As the immediate consequences of the TCA appear to affect 
the business sector, the research carried out in preparation for this study sought to examine material 
produced by  business associations, members  of the EU  DAG, academia and the community of 
experts. Very little is available in terms of the TCA's impact on the environment and climate. 

A persisting hurdle in the implementation of the EU-UK TCA is the bureaucracy and red tape that 
the withdrawal of the UK from the EU has created in EU-UK cooperation. By regaining regulatory 
autonomy and despite the fact that no tariff or quota trade conditions were placed on UK originating 
goods, the UK has lost the right to free movement of goods and open access to the EU single market 
and customs union. 95 Trade is therefore subject to a range of costs, including border costs (customs 
procedures); technical barriers to trade and SPS measures (to verify food and sanitary regulations of 
the country they enter into are met); rules of origin (to check the genuine origin of the imports and 
prevent fraud); and costs from behind the border regulations (to check that imports meet standards 
and regulations before they are sold in the country they enter into). 96 This red tape has affected 
businesses, including businesses in the EU Member States. SMEs are more exposed to the effects 
of bureaucracy because of capacity, budgetary and human resources constraints. These make SMEs 
more vulnerable to change and to uncertainty, as the studies prepared for the CoR and the EESC's 
EU-UK relations Issues Tracker (analysed in the previous sections) have demonstrated. 

In an attempt to remedy this situation, in 2020 the Belgian province of Flanders launched a mobile 
app, Gateway2Britain, in an effort to make EU-UK trade 'as frictionless as possible' and assuage fears 
that UK investment would shift away. It allows traders to fill out just one data set online and share it 
with  supply chain  and logistics  partners. Since  2020,  more  than 100  UK  businesses seeking a 
foothold in the EU have invested in Flanders. Research carried out among UK traders found three-
quarters had considered alternative markets because of bureaucracy. Half said they would buy and 
sell more if the process were simplified. In 2022, the total value of UK exports to Flanders amounted 
to €34 billion, making the UK Flanders' fourth-biggest export market. While it is unclear what the 
real  effect  of  this  app  has  been,  Minister-President  of  Flanders  Jan  Jambon  holds  that 
Gateway2Britain has put an  end to  bureaucracy and helped set up  simplified  processes while 
meeting all the demands of the post-Brexit rules. 97 

The TCA's impact has also been analysed sectorally. One major area of interest in this regard was 
the  fisheries  sector,  for  which  the  TCA's impact  was  analysed in  three  studies for  the  PECH 
committee (see box in Chapter 4 on Parliament's oversight, Section 4.3.1). Echoing findings on the 
overall economic impact, research investigating the TCA's potential impact for both the EU and the 
UK on trade aspects related to fisheries and aquaculture shows that, overall, the TCA has had a 
negative impact on the trade, production and consumption of fish and aquaculture products (FAPs), 
but in a minor way at EU level. However, the impact varies significantly across Member States. The 
largest losses for the EU are expected in the fish processing sector. While the production of FAPs at 
EU level is expected to decline only by 2.5 %, individual Member States may be much more affected 
by the TCA: Ireland's production volume is expected to decline by 11 %, Sweden's by 6 % and the 
Netherlands' by 5 %. This trend is also reflected on the consumer side, as prices are expected to rise 
by 0.6 % at EU level, in Ireland by 5 % and in France and the Netherlands by 1.5 % each. 98 

95

96

C. Barnard  and E. Leinarte, op. cit., p. 114. 

F. Van  Tongeren et al., op.  cit., 2021, p. 5. 

97 A. Bounds,  'Appy trading', The Financial Times, 6 June 2023. 
98 H.  Martelings and  Z.  Smeets  Křístková,  Workshop  on  impacts  of  the EU-UK  Trade  and  Cooperation  Agreement on

fisheries and aquaculture in the EU, Part II: Trade aspects,  European  Parliament, 2022, pp.  7-8. 

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EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

On labour rights, a 2021 policy paper on the TCA and workers' rights published by the European 
Trade Union Institute comments on three TCA chapters that are relevant for  the protection of 
workers' rights: Chapter 6  on  Non-regression, Chapter 8  on  Multilateral  labour standards and 
Chapter 9 on the Supervisory and dispute resolution framework. It argues that overall, the TCA is 
weak on labour rights and that the few additional labour clauses it contains and the overall weak 
supervision and dispute resolution procedures form an unsatisfactory regulatory framework, one 
that is unlikely to deter future UK governments from eroding present-day standards. The paper 
notes the 'key role will [...] be played by parliamentary scrutiny by both the European and British 
Parliaments'. 99 Similarly, in his research, Institute for Public Policy Research Associate Director Marley 
Morris argues that the TCA provisions are likely to constrain UK divergence from EU labour and social 
standards only  to  some extent,  be  it  as  'active  divergence' through deregulation or 'passive 
divergence' through the UK failing  to  keep  pace  with  EU  developments. The main constraint, 
however, is that, as the level playing field does not safeguard against all forms of divergence, the 
decision on whether or not to pursue a formal complaint or enact rebalancing measures is ultimately 
in the hands of the EU. This means that, in practice, the labour provisions in the TCA will be used 
under limited circumstances. 100 

Similarly,  a  2021  study published  by  the  Irish  Government Economic  and  Evaluation Service 
examined the TCA's impact on employment in Ireland. There, too, the main argument is that the 
effect varies across sectors with respect to both imports and exports that are particularly exposed 
to any Brexit-related shock due to their dependency on trade with the UK market. The sectors that 
appear to be  most affected at  EU  level  are  food and  live  animals, financial services (including 
insurance and real estate activities) and manufactured goods (tobacco, textiles, wood). The TCA has 
had moderate effects on administrative services, ICT, professional services and transport. These 
effects further vary depending on the region within the country. Unsurprisingly, Ireland's border 
region was shown to have the highest proportion of 'severely' exposed sectors to a potential Brexit 
trade shock. 101 

The results of the surveys carried out by the German Chamber of Industry and Commerce illustrate 
the overall negative consequences of the TCA on business and trade barriers for German companies. 
These results are summed up in the box below. 

99   N.  Countouris,  K.D.  Ewing  and J.  Hendy QC,  The EU-UK  Trade and  Cooperation  Agreement and workers'  rights, ETUI  

Policy Brief no. 3/2021, European Trade Union Institute, January  2021, p. 5. 

100   M. Morris, What does the UK-EU deal mean for workers' rights?, Institute for Public Policy Research, January  2022, p. 21. 
101   J. McNaboe,  C.  Shally,  N. Condon,  D.  Coates,  J. Dwan-O'Reilly, A. Brioscú,  R. Geary and  O. Murphy,  An Examination  of 
the  Employment  Exposures  to  Brexit,  Irish  Government  Economic  and  Evaluation  Service,  October  2021;  M. 
Alessandrini et al., op. cit., 2021, pp.  21-22.  

26 

The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

Effects of the EU-UK TCA on German business 

Surveys by the German Chamber of Industry and Commerce 

The German Chamber of Industry and Commerce (DIHK) issues annual surveys targeting German businesses 
that are active in a foreign country. Conducted every year in the first half of February, the questionnaire-
based surveys ask participants to assess their current and future business prospects and trade barriers in 
the respective countries or regions where they do business. The results are released in the annual 'Going 
International' reports, two of which have been published since the start of the TCA's implementation. 

In the latest 2023 survey, of the approximately 2 400 German companies that participated, 39 % reported 
an  increase in  trade  barriers with the  UK, only  second to  Russia. Beyond  the focus on  trade barriers, 
companies were asked to rate their current business as either 'good', satisfactory' or 'poor'. Some 16 % of 
German business respondents found their current business in the UK to be good, while 45 % found it to be 
poor. Additionally, companies assessed their business outlook in the respective countries or regions where 
they do business for the coming months as either positive or negative. Based on these assessments, the 
average business outlook for German companies in the UK was pessimistic (at - 26 points), therefore the 
majority of companies expect their business in the UK to worsen in the coming months. 

Since Brexit, the  DIHK  has  also  published  a  special report  on  its  consequences alongside the Going 
International reports, informed by a similar survey to that above, but this time targeting specifically German 
companies that are active in the UK. Around 1 500 German companies took part in the latest 2022 report. 
Overall, the  report  finds  that  the  'the  trade  simplifications of  the  TCA cannot  replace the  economic 
integration depth of the internal market', which is evident in the self-assessments relating to current and 
future business in the UK. Some 43 % of businesses rate current business with the UK as 'bad',  40 % as 
'satisfactory' and only 17 % as 'good'. For the coming 12 months, 33 % of German businesses rate their 
business outlook as 'worse' than it currently is, 55 % expect no change and 12 % expect it to improve. On 
the question about the effects of Brexit on their business, a majority of 67 % of businesses reported an 
increase in bureaucracy related to customs, followed by problems related to logistics (52 %) and an increase 
in tariff barriers to trade (46 %). Compared to 2021 when 46 % of respondents cited legal uncertainty and 
the inability to plan as major barriers, in 2022 only 32 % were concerned with these issues. 

Source: Going International 2023: Experiences and prospects of German business in foreign business – 
results  of  a  company  survey,  Association  of  German  Chambers  of  Industry  and  Commerce, 2023; 
Auswirkungen  des  Brexit:  Sonderauswertung  der  Ergebnisse  der  Unternehmensumfrage  Going 
International vom Februar 2022, Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce, 2022. 

At the time of writing, there was no information specifically addressing the TCA's impact on the 
environment and climate, as  it  will  only become  evident in  the  medium term.  The  European 
Environmental Bureau (EEB), which is represented in the EU Domestic Advisory Group under the 
TCA,  where it  shares its views  on  its  implementation, sees the TCA  as  a  potential monitoring 
instrument for the enforcement of environmental standards and the SDGs.102 No EEB studies refer 
specifically to the environmental and climate impacts of the TCA. However, in a memorandum to 
the Swedish Presidency of the Council of the EU, the EEB calls for pushing forward the reform of the 
EU's  international trade policy  and  ensuring that 'the  relations with  the  UK  do  not  lead  to  a 
deterioration  of  environmental  protection  standards'.103  In  addition,  the  Irish  Environmental 
Network and the Northern Ireland Environment Link published together a report titled 'Linking the 
Irish Environment', which focuses chiefly  on the  implications of  the Protocol on  environmental 
cross-border cooperation and only points to the TCA to explain the limitations of its environmental 

102   EEB,  EU-UK  Relationship. 
103   EEB,  The EEB's  Memorandum  to the Swedish  Presidency of the EU, January-June  2023, 2022. 

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provisions, similar to what Giulia Claudia Leonelli demonstrated in her research (as described in 
Section 2.1 above). In particular, the report explains that the TCA provisions are focused on trade 
and investment (which should have an impact on the environment), that the TCA centres on the UK 
and the EU as a whole, rather than on Northern Ireland or Ireland, and that it is very challenging to 
enforce. Thus, the report considers that overall, the TCA has a partially limiting effect on divergence 
and the decline of standards. It may indeed drive up standards in principle, but whether it can be 
used in the same way for national laws is seen as questionable.104 

104   C. Brennan, F. Brereton, M. Dobbs, V. Gravey, H. Gould, A. Hough and L. Whitten, Linking the Irish Environment, Interim 

Report, Irish Environmental  Network, January  2023, p. 40. 

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The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

3. Impact of the TCA on EU-UK trade flows

At the time when it voted to leave the EU in 2016, the UK was a leading economy. It generated about 
16 % of EU GDP, and the remaining EU countries accounted for almost half of the UK's total trade.105 
At the end of the transition period, on 31 December 2020, the UK and the EU split into two separate 
customs territories and two separate markets for goods, each with its own regulatory regime, which 
inevitably created barriers to trade. This chapter analyses EU-UK trade relations closely, focusing on 
the changes in bilateral trade flows (both trade in goods and trade in services). It first examines the 
relevant provisions in the TCA, then analyses the data in the European Commission reports and data 
received by EPRS from EU regions, before turning to an analysis of trade numbers. Three years have 
been chosen to map the evolution of trends in the available Eurostat data: 

2018 (after the Brexit vote, but before the signing of the EU-UK TCA);  
2021 (end of the first year of the TCA's implementation), and; 
2022 (end of the second year of the TCA's implementation, the latest available data). 

Furthermore, this chapter analyses how the EU-UK TCA has affected (if at all) trade flows between 
the UK and its top international and EU trading partners. Equally, it examines any changes in the 
composition of the EU Member States' and the UK's partners with the coming into force of the EU-
UK TCA. Taking into account the global economic trends and the complex geopolitical landscape, 
the chapter demonstrates that the UK has managed to progressively become less dependent on EU 
trade in  goods, and that changes in EU-UK  trade in services have been less disruptive for both 
parties. Thus, similar to economics and finance professors Buigut and Kapar, this study does not find 
that the implementation of the TCA has had a significant effect on EU-UK trade flows. 106 

3.1. Trade provisions and forecasts 

Chapter 3 of the TCA lays out the general provisions for cross-border trade in services, with notable 
exceptions – financial services (for which an adequacy decision is pending) and audio-visual trade 
(which the EU always excludes from its FTAs). 

3.1.1. Provisions 
The EU-UK TCA contains clear provisions on the standards to be respected in the traded goods, the 
rules of origin, trade in services and other areas of trade. These are briefly outlined below. 

Standards 

The  TCA's Chapter 4  on  Technical  barriers to trade (TBT)  defines international standards, thus 
anchoring both parties to the international standardisation system, and identifies the relevant 
international standard-setting bodies. It seeks to ensure that domestic product standards of both 
the EU and the UK and their respective technical regulations continue to be based on the same 
international references. The TCA features provisions on several highly regulated industries, which 
should  make  it  possible  to  reduce  administrative  costs  of  compliance,  particularly  for  the 
pharmaceutical  (good  manufacturing  practice),  automotive,  chemicals,  organics  and  wine 
industries. The chapter offers a common definition of international standards and the possibility to 
self-declare conformity of low-risk products, with the aim of facilitating exports to both markets for 
producers. However, the TCA does not allow for mutual recognition of conformity assessments for 

105   S.  Buigut  and  B.  Kapar,  'How  did  Brexit impact  EU  trade?  Evidence  from  real data',  The  World  Economy,  2023, 46, 

pp.  1566-1581. 

106   ibid. 

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a vast range of products, meaning that many goods – from lipsticks to mattresses to toys – will have 
to  undergo  two  sets  of  conformity assessments rather  than  one.  Customs declarations and 
paperwork to process the movement of goods – including SPS checks for live animals and products 
of animal origin – are required since 1 January 2021 for UK exports to the EU. The UK government 
adopted a phased approach to the introduction of checks and controls on goods imported into the 
UK from the EU over 2021 and 2022, except for SPS checks for food, animal and plant products, 
which will be rolled out from the end of 2023. 107 

Rules of origin 
The TCA provides for zero tariffs and zero quotas on all goods that comply with the relevant rules of 
origin. These rules of origin, which determine where a good is considered to be 'originating', are set 
out in detailed annexes that specify how much of the value of the product must be created in the 
territory of either party to the agreement in order for the product to be eligible for tariff-free trade. 
The TCA contains a provision for 'full' bilateral cumulation of origin. This allows traders to include 
the value of components originating and processing undertaken in either the UK or the EU when 
determining origin for the purposes of the TCA. However, cumulation with products originating in 
third countries is not allowed. Mutual recognition of trusted trader programmes ensures lighter 
customs formalities and smoother flows of goods. 

Trade in services 

With the TCA, which  essentially addresses financial services only marginally, the EU and the UK 
agreed to undertake commitments on market access for services for commercial establishment and 
to  apply  internationally agreed standards in  this  sector. These  commitments seek to  prohibit 
discrimination between EU and UK citizens and remove the requirement for businesses to open a 
local subsidiary before services can be provided. The European Commission maintains that some of 
the 'ambitious outcomes' of the negotiations on the TCA include: 

a comprehensive coverage of all modes of service supply and investment, in almost all 
economic sectors; 
market access on services and investment beyond the level achieved in other trade 
agreements; 
common regulatory provisions for  a  number of  services  sectors, such  as  delivery 
services, telecommunications services, international maritime transport services and, 
for the first time, a regulatory chapter on legal services resulting in a clearer presentation 
of the EU's existing commitments; 
best practice rules on licensing and qualifications; 
a  mechanism to agree on arrangements for the  mutual recognition of  professional 
qualifications; 
rules on temporary stays of persons for business purposes, in line  with the  highest 
standards of EU services agreements.108 

Nevertheless, there are a number of exceptions to the scope of liberalisation in the TCA (namely, 
public services and services of general interest; some transport services; and audiovisual services), 

107   UK  Parliament,  Constituency  casework:  New  customs  rules  for  trade  with  the  EU,  House  of  Commons  Library, 
12 May 2023; see also,  UK Parliament, Trade in goods  between Great Britain and  the EU: European  Affairs Committee 
report, House of Lords Library,  24 January 2023. 

108   European  Commission,  Annual  Information  Sheet  on  the  Implementation  of  the  EU-UK  Trade  and  Cooperation 
Agreement,  in  Individual  information  sheets  on  implementation  of  EU  Trade  Agreements,  Accompanying  the 
document Report from the Commission  to the European  Parliament, the Council,  the European Economic  and Social  
Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions  on  Implementation  and  Enforcement  of  EU  Trade  Agreements, 
SWD(2022) 730 final, 11 October 2022 pp. 97-98. 

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The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

and the level of access for UK services firms will vary from one sector to another sector and from one 
Member State to another. Service providers from the EU and the UK must now comply with specific 
domestic requirements when offering cross-border services, which may vary between EU Member 
States. Locally established enterprises owned by nationals of the other party will be able to continue 
to provide services, but may be subject to conditions applicable to foreign direct investment, in 
accordance with the market access schedules of the TCA. Moreover, both parties retain the right to 
unilaterally adopt or maintain measures for prudential reasons ('prudential carve-out'), in order to 
preserve financial stability and  the integrity of  financial  markets. Furthermore, under the TCA, 
recognition of professional qualifications is decided respectively by the laws in the UK and each of 
the concerned EU Member States separately.109  

Movement of goods and services 

The TCA includes separate sections on digital trade, aviation, road haulage, and the movement of 
natural persons. On the movement of natural persons for business purposes (GATTS 'Mode 4'), the 
TCA includes a broad range of reciprocal commitments that allow a company located in the EU to 
transfer certain employees, as intra-corporate transferees, to work in a group company located in 
the UK – and vice versa. The TCA also allows for unlimited point-to-point traffic between EU and UK 
airports, whilst it excludes UK carriers from operating flights between EU destinations based on a 
UK-issued licence. Similarly, the road transport provisions of the TCA allow for unlimited point-to-
point access for hauliers carrying loads between the EU and the UK, while  the UK is no  longer 
allowed unlimited cabotage operations within the single market. 

Experts argue that 'a plausible response to frictions on cross-border trade will be for services firms 
to relocate (part of) their business to their destinations. This will have consequences for cross-border 
trade and tax revenues. The level  of access the  EU is  offering the UK  to its markets is roughly 
equivalent to that which it offers Canada, but with some detailed differences. Several restrictions 
that remain pertain to Member States individually, rather than the EU as a whole, increasing the 
informational burden of trading. 110 

3.1.2. Forecasts 
Studies have demonstrated that the TCA has had a significant impact on the UK economy. While the 
most important factors behind current economic problems in the UK and in the EU – especially the 
rise in energy prices – are global, the comparative weakness of both UK trade and investment over 
the past few years is at least in part the result of Brexit. The UK is the only major economy where 
output remains below pre-pandemic levels. 111 Research by Jun Du et al. attributes the UK's poor 
relative economic performance to the impact of the  EU-UK TCA. While  the TCA has kept trade 
between the EU and UK tariff- and quota-free, it has been less effective at preventing non-tariff 
measures from increasing. In addition, the decline in trade (in goods) is likely to be disproportionally 
large among small, resource-constrained UK firms that export single products or a limited range of 
products and whose exports are less intensive relative to the overall sales. At the same time, the 
authors find signs of  increased concentration of export values onto fewer  products and fewer 
exporters. The significant contraction in the UK's trading capacity in terms of the varieties of goods 

109   European  Commission,  Questions & Answers:  EU-UK  Trade and Cooperation Agreement, 20 December 2020. 
110   I. Fusacchia,  L. Salvatici  and  L.A.  Winters, 'The  consequences  of  the Trade  and  Cooperation  Agreement for the UK's 

international trade', Oxford  Review of Economic Policy, 38(1), spring 2022, pp. 27-49. 

111   See,  for  example,  A.  Menon,  Where  Next?  The  Future  of  the  UK-EU  Relationship,  UK  in  a  Changing  Europe, 

20 January  2023. 

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being exported to the EU due to the limits imposed by the TCA hints at some serious long-term 
trends in the UK's future exports and productivity.112 

The impacts of the EU-UK TCA on the EU, whether on an aggregate or Member State level, have 
received less attention. This may be explained by the fact that, on average, the TCA has affected the 
UK more strongly than the EU, as a 2021 working paper commissioned by the OECD has shown.113 
As mentioned earlier in this study, since the agreement has only been implemented for a relatively 
short time, the scope of  studies is  generally restricted to the potential  impact on trade. In  this 
context, a 2021 OECD outsourced study analyses scenarios on the medium-term (5-10 years) impact 
of the UK leaving the EU single market under the terms of the TCA, and finds that the agreement's 
impact varies across Member States and sectors. According to the simulation exercise in the study, 
the EU would experience losses as a result of the UK leaving the single market. Regarding the TCA's 
broader economic impact, the EU's real GDP loss could amount to around 0.6 % in the medium term. 
The analysis shows that even with an FTA in  place, regulatory divergence and increased border 
measures between the two parties would result in a real GDP decline of 0.4 % in the EU. 114 

While  on  the  aggregate level  the  impact of  the  TCA  on  EU  trade would  be  modest, there is 
considerable variation across Member States, with real GDP losses ranging from between 0.1 % in 
Romania to more than 2.5 % in  Ireland. 115 Not surprisingly, EU Member States with strong trade 
relations with  the  UK,  especially  in  economically important sectors, would experience  a  more 
significant decline in output and trade. Ireland, Luxembourg and Denmark, small open economies, 
are the three countries that would be most affected. Eastern EU Member States, such as Bulgaria, 
Romania and Slovakia, which are less reliant on UK trade, would be somewhat shielded from the 
effect of Brexit. 116 These findings are similar to other, now dated, Brexit studies. 117 

Furthermore, according to the scenarios presented in this study, this impact depends on a variety of 
factors, such as the Member State's current bilateral trade relations with the UK and the sector in 
which it specialises. While EU imports and exports to the UK would decline across all sectors covered 
by the TCA, the biggest decline would be felt in the export and import of professional services, most 
notably in the financial services and insurance sector, communication, and other business services, 
due to the regulatory divergence between the EU and the UK. 118 

112   J. Du,  E.  Beyza Satoglu,  and  O. Shepotylo,  'How  did Brexit affect  UK trade?',  Contemporary  Social Science 2023, 18(2), 

pp.  266–283. 

113   It should  be noted that the analysis  does  not include any  transitional costs linked to the full implementation of the 
TCA,  nor does  it take  into account  stress on  the economy  as  a  result of the coronavirus  pandemic.  Lastly,  only the 
impact  on services trade as  a  result of  regulatory restrictions on the free movement  of people has  been taken into 
account  in the analysis,  while the wider labour market  impacts  of  cross-border  movement  of  people has  been  left 
aside. See F.  Van Tongeren et al., op. cit., 2021. 

114   F. Van  Tongeren et al., op.  cit., 2021, p. 14. 
115   The impact on  Ireland will also depend  on the implementation of the Windsor  Framework  and the Northern Ireland 

Protocol. 

116   F. Van  Tongeren et al., op.  cit., 2021, pp. 17-18. 
117   T. Mayer, V.  Vicard and S.  Zignago,  The Cost of Non-Europe,  Revisited, CEPII Working  Paper 2018-06, Centre d'Etudes 
Prospectives et d'Informations  Internationales, April 2018; International Monetary Fund  (IMF),  Long-Term  Impact of 
Brexit on the EU,  in Euro Area Policies: Selected Issues, IMF Country Report 18/224, 19 July 2018. 

118   F. Van  Tongeren et al., op.  cit., 2021, p. 19-20.  

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The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

3.2. European Commission evaluations of EU-UK trade flows 

The European Commission implementation report on the EU-UK TCA for 2021 ascertained that 
it was too early to assess the full economic impact of the UK's exit from the EU single market. Data 
showed that EU-UK trade flows had partially stabilised in 2021, after an initial drop following the end 
of the transition period. However, they remained lower than in 2019 and earlier. EU imports and 
exports of goods with the rest of its partners rose sharply in 2021 compared to 2020 (+27 % and 
+14.6 % respectively) and above the 2019, pre-pandemic, levels (12.5 % for imports and 4.7 % for 
exports), while trade with the UK was still far from its pre-pandemic levels. Machinery and transport 
equipment, which represent a sizeable share of bilateral trade, were particularly affected. EU imports 
from the UK in this sector contracted by 26.2 % in 2021 compared to 2020 and by 37.9 % compared 
to 2019. EU exports contracted by 3.1 % in 2021 relative to 2020 and by 20.5 % relative to 2019. In 
absolute terms, EU imports and exports in machinery and transport equipment with the UK, in 2021, 
were more than €52 billion below the level recorded in 2019. 119  

Likewise, the long list in the TCA of EU Member States' specific market access reservations, notably 
on financial data processing services, has rendered trade in services more challenging. Businesses 
that plan to deliver  services or investors that wish  to establish themselves in the  other party's 
territory face new regulatory and administrative barriers. Data for the first three quarters of 2021 
show that trade in services had not returned to pre-pandemic levels and that the travel sector was 
the most affected. Looking at the longer term, both EU exports and imports of services with the UK 
were less dynamic in comparison with EU trade with other international partners. While in 2022, the 
EU's total trade in  services with its  international partners excluding the UK  increased by 51 % 
compared to the first three quarters of 2016, this increase was lower in the case of trade in services 
with the UK: 38 % compared to the same period of 2016. 120 

In its implementation report on the EU-UK TCA for 2022, the European Commission reiterates 
its stance that it is still too early to determine the long-term economic impact, two years after the 
end of the transition period and over six years after the referendum. It explains, however, that certain 
economic implications of  the  withdrawal have become  increasingly visible.  In  the  short term, 
following a sharp decline in early 2021, both EU exports and imports in goods made a significant 
recovery in the first three quarters of 2022, approaching the 2019  pre-pandemic levels. Bilateral 
trade in services for both EU exports and imports recovered significantly in the first three quarters 
of 2022, exceeding the 2019 pre-pandemic levels. EU exports in services to the UK in the first three 
quarters of 2022 amounted to €181 billion, representing a 25.6 % increase compared to the same 
period in 2021.  EU  imports from the UK over the same period in  2022  were worth €139 billion, 
representing a 13.1 % increase compared to the same period in 2021. However, this growth was less 
dynamic when compared to EU trade in services with other international partners, where EU exports 
increased by 27.8 % and imports by 31.3 %. Looking at the longer term, data show that imports and 
exports in services combined remained rather stagnant during the 2016-2022 period. This contrasts 
sharply with EU trade with its other global partners.121 

119   European  Commission,  op.  cit., COM(2022) 126 final, 24 March 2022, pp. 7-8. 
120   European  Commission,  op.  cit., COM(2022) 126 final, 24 March 2022, pp. 10-14. 
121   European  Commission,  op.  cit., COM(2023) 118 final, 15 March 2023, pp. 13-16. 

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3.3. Trade flows between EU regions and the UK 

A number of the EU regions from which EPRS had requested information on the consequences, 
initial outcomes and potential impact of the implementation of the EU-UK TCA provided data on 
trade. Below is an overview of this data. 

In Austria, the authorities from the region of Tyrol did not yet have any figures for Tyrol's trade with 
the UK for 2022,  but, based on figures for the 2019-2021  period, they pointed out that both the 
national and the Tyrolean trade balance for trade in goods with the UK showed a regular and stable 
surplus. The UK was the sixth most important export market in goods for Tyrol in 2019-2020, then 
fell to ninth place in 2021. Austria-wide goods exports to the UK recovered in 2022 and amounted 
to €5.1 billion (up from €4.5 billion in 2019). It is expected that this recovery will also be reflected in 
the Tyrol region's figures for 2022. 

The forecast made by the Austrian Institute for Economic Research in a January 2021 study on the 
potential impact of the EU-UK TCA on the Austrian economy had been more pessimistic: Austrian 
agricultural exports to the UK would likely fall by up to 23 %, while imports from the UK would fall 
by up to 46 %. Austria's motor vehicle exports and motor vehicle supplier exports to the UK were 
likely to fall by around 5.7 %, while UK exports to Austria in that sector would drop by around 13 %. 
Moreover, Austrian financial services exports to the UK would decrease by around 13.9 %, while 
Austrian financial services imports from the UK were likely to fall by around 8.9 %. 122 

In Germany, the study by Prognos on the impact of the TCA on the Bavarian economy shows that, 
in recent years, Bavarian-British foreign trade had already suffered from the uncertainties brought 
about by the news on Brexit. After the UK's de facto withdrawal from the EU single market at the 
end  of 2020,  trade declined  yet again, while  Bavaria's  foreign trade with  the rest of  the world 
increased significantly in 2021. Between January and September 2021, Bavarian imports from the 
UK were 19 % lower than in 2020. Exports had also fallen by 3 % in 2021 compared to 2020. At the 
same time, Bavarian trade (imports and exports) had recorded growth of 18 % and 15 % respectively 
in 2021. 123 

3.4. Changes and continuities in EU-UK trade in numbers 
The trade part of the TCA 'has, predictably, caused disruption'. 124 While the TCA permits tariff- and 
quota-free movement for goods, non-tariff measures and rules-of-origin requirements render trade 
more  cumbersome  and  costly,  as  explained  in  the  previous  section.  The  analysis  below 
contextualises the European Commission's findings in its reports, by putting the Eurostat data in a 
longer timeframe (since the 2016 Brexit vote). It furthermore tries to unpack the data to show why 
it is too early to say whether the TCA is meeting its goals. What becomes clear is that many external 
factors have affected EU-UK trade: the coronavirus pandemic and related restrictions, Russia's war 
against Ukraine, the consequences of the energy transition and inflationary pressures. Some internal 
and bilateral (EU-UK) factors have also played a detrimental role: a difficult adaptation to and lack of 
knowledge of the procedures, as well as the fact that EU-UK political relations have, at times, been 
strained. What seems to emerge, however, is that the UK's objective of rendering its market less 
dependent on the EU single market may be taking shape, at least in trade in goods. 

122   H.  Oberhofer,  M.  Pfaffermayr  and  Y.  Wolfmayr,  Die  Auswirkungen  des  Brexit auf  Österreichs Wirtschaft,  Austrian 

Institute of Economic  Research, January  2021. 

123   J. Weiß et. al., op.  cit., 2021. 
124   J. Wachowiak,  op. cit., 28 June 2021. 

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The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

Figure 2 – EU-UK trade in goods and services, 2010-2 022 

Data source: EPRS, based on data from Eurostat Comext and BOP_ITS6_DET. 

Figure 2 shows that in aggregate value in billions of euro, Brexit has not had a major effect on EU-
UK trade – whether in terms of EU exports or imports from the UK and in terms of EU-UK trade in 
goods or EU-UK trade in services. However, as the same figure illustrates, EU-UK trade started to 
plunge around 2019, reaching its lowest point in 2020 for EU exports in goods and services from the 
UK and for EU imports of services from the UK. For their part, EU imports of goods from the UK 
reached their lowest point in 2021. EU exports to and imports from the UK had dropped respectively 
by 14.3 % and 35.4 % in the first three months of 2021. 125 Nevertheless, EU-UK trade in goods and 
services did not fall below the volume of trade before the Brexit vote. 

EU-UK trade started to peak again in 2021-2022, reaching unprecedented levels. Admittedly, it is 
difficult to decouple the effects of the implementation of the EU-UK TCA from those of the pandemic 
and its consequences on the economy and global trade. The drop in EU-UK trade in early 2021 for 
several EU Member States can be attributed mainly to the lack of time for businesses to adapt to the 
new rules, given the short period between the moment of the TCA's signature and its provisional 
application, and the lack of  guidance to businesses on the new legislative requirements. 126 One 
should also note the impact of high inflation since 2021 in both the UK and the EU-27, which has yet 

125   Eurostat,  March  2021 – Euro  area international trade in goods  surplus  €15.8 billion, Euroindicators  59/2021, 18 May 

2021. 

126   M. Alessandrini et al., op.  cit., 2021, p. 129. 

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to be discounted from the raw data. Between the third quarter of 2021 and the third quarter of 2022, 
there was  a  significant  increase  in  extra -EU trade, mainly  caused by  rising commodity prices, 
particularly for imports of energy and food, as the Russian invasion of Ukraine put additional upward 
pressure on these products. 127 It is therefore not possible to attribute the changes in the volume of 
trade to the EU-UK TCA. 

While one could conclude by looking at Figure 2 that the EU-UK TCA has boosted EU imports from 
and exports to the UK of both goods and services, Figure 3 helps to put the trade activity between 
the two parties in context. As EU international trade picked up again after experiencing a significant 
drop during the pandemic, 128 the boost in EU-UK trade post-2021 is only relative.  According to 
Figure 3, the growth in EU trade in goods with the 'world' – extra-EU countries minus the UK – has 
been exponential  since  2020  (post -pandemic), with EU global  trade during 2016 -2022  having 
increased by 69.2 %. In parallel, during this same period – that is, since the Brexit vote – EU-UK trade 
in goods has only gone up by 9.9 %. The difference in trade in services is less dramatic. Figure 3 
shows that global EU trade in services (with extra-EU countries minus the UK) has risen by 50.8 % 
(2016-2022), while in the same period EU-UK trade in services has risen by 38.5 %. 

Figure  3  – Trends  in EU-UK  trade versus  trade between the EU and the rest of th e 
world (trade  in goods and services, imports and exports) 

Data source: EPRS, based on data from Eurostat Comext and BOP_ITS6_DET. 

127   European  Commission,  EU  trade balance deficit returns to almost zero, Eurostat,  24 May 2023. 
128   Looking  at the last decade of EU total trade in goods,  the export growth rate, after recording particularly high values 
(12 % in 2011 and 9 % in 2012), remained positive until 2019 before sharply  decreasing in 2020. In 2020, EU-27 trade 
was  hit hard  by  the coronavirus  pandemic,  with significant  drops  observed  for  both  exports  (-9.4 %)  and  imports 
(-11.6 %)  compared  with  2019.  European  Commission,  EU  trade  in  goods  strongly  impacted  by  the  COVID-19  
pandemic in 2020, Eurostat, 25 March 2021. 

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The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

Figure 4 provides a detailed picture of the UK share in the EU-27's total trade in goods. It shows that 
the UK share in EU trade in goods almost halved from 2007 to 2022, dropping from 16.3 % to 9.8 % 
of EU total trade. It also shows that the most substantial drop was observed during the two years 
since the EU-UK TCA has been implemented. The decline in the UK share in EU total trade in services 
over 2010-2022 was much less dramatic (2.3 percentage points), with the most recent peak in 2018. 

Figure 4 – UK share in EU total trade 

Data source: EPRS, based on data from Eurostat Comext and BOP_ITS6_DET. 

Figure 5 below depicts how the UK's and the EU's shares of total trade in goods have evolved over 
time and in comparison to the EU's top 10 trading partners in goods. It shows that, at an aggregate 
level, the UK has remained the EU-27's third largest partner as regards trade in goods, right after the 
United States and China, and that despite Brexit. 

Figure 5 – Main EU-27 and UK partners in terms of trade in goods (exports and imports) 

*Note: The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) brings together six Arab countries – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 

Data source: EPRS, based on data from Eurostat Comext and IMF. 

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EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

According to Eurostat data, in 2022 the United States was the largest destination for EU exports of 
goods, while China was the largest origin for EU imports of goods.129 In 2021, the UK was the second 
largest partner for EU exports of goods (13 %) and the fourth largest partner for EU imports of goods 
(6.9 %). 130 Yet, as Figure 4 shows, despite the easing of trade that the EU-UK TCA brought for the two 
parties, the UK share in the EU-27's trade in goods fell from 13 % of the EU-27's total trade in 2018 to 
10 % in 2021 (end of the first year of implementation of the TCA) and to 9.8 % in 2022 (end of the 
second year of implementation of the TCA). 

In terms of the EU-27's share in the UK's total trade in goods, Figure 5 shows that, at aggregate level, 
the EU-27 has solidly remained the UK's top trading partner, with a substantial difference from the 
UK's next two largest trading partners (the United States and China). However, while trade between 
the  UK  and the  United States, China and  its  other top 10  trading partners – such as  Norway, 
Switzerland, Hong Kong, India and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members – has consistently 
increased, the EU-27's share of the UK's total trade has consistently shrunk. It fell from 50.1 % of the 
UK's total trade in 2018 (after the Brexit vote, but before the UK's withdrawal from the EU) to 46.2 % 
in 2021(end of the first year of the implementation of the TCA) and to 40 % in 2022  (end of the 
second year of the implementation of the TCA). Although the UK still depends on EU trade in goods, 
the 10-percentage point contraction in the share of UK trade with the EU-27 in five years can be 
considered significant. 

Figure 6 portrays a relative stability in the UK's top 10 EU Member State partners in terms of trade in 
goods. Not only have these partners remained the same, but most of them have also retained their 
ranking. In that light, the implementation of the EU-UK TCA does not seem to have had a notable 
impact on bilateral trade in  goods between the EU-27 and the UK. The only change in ranking 
concerns Belgium, which overtook France in 2022 to become the UK's third biggest trade partner in 
goods. In addition, in 2022, while Germany remained the largest exporter of goods to the UK, the 
Netherlands and Belgium surpassed Germany in imports of goods from the UK.  An important 
element to factor into the analysis is that Rotterdam (Netherlands) and Antwerp (Belgium) are the 
EU's two  biggest ports and serve as key hubs where many goods are unloaded and reloaded 
(transhipped) for other destinations. Economists speak of the 'Rotterdam-Antwerp effect' to refer to 
errors in  the  way  trade  is  calculated  when  goods  flow  through ports on  their  way  to  final 
destinations outside the  country  or  trading block.  While  not  inflating  total  trade  flows,  the 
'Rotterdam-Antwerp effect 'will distort the breakdown between one country's trade with the EU and 
with non-EU countries, although there is no agreement on the extent of distortion'. Interest in the 
Rotterdam-Antwerp effect has increased since Brexit and particularly since the end of the transition 
period, given its relative importance to the UK's trade with the EU and non-EU countries.131 

129   European  Commission,  International trade in goods,  Eurostat,  30 March 2023. 
130   European  Commission,  United Kingdom-EU  – international trade in goods  statistics, Eurostat, 1 July 2022. 
131   As an  illustration, if an  African country  (X)  exports corn oil to the UK, the corn oil shipment  will likely pass  through 
Rotterdam on its way  to the UK. If this is recorded as a flow from country X to the EU,  and then from the EU to the UK, 
it will have the effect of over-valuing EU trade with the UK and undervaluing non-EU  trade with the UK. See N. Williams, 
Trade  Distortions  and  the EU,  CIVITAS  –  Institute for  the  Study  of  Civil  Society,  July  2011; 'The  Rotterdam  effect', 
Economics Online, 27 January  2020. 

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The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

Figure 6 – The  UK's top 10 EU Member State partners in terms of trade in goods  (imports 
and exports) 

Data source: EPRS, based on data from Eurostat Comext and BOP_ITS6_DET. 

As Figure 6 illustrates, before the UK's withdrawal from the EU, Germany was both the largest EU 
importer of goods from and largest exporter of goods to the UK in 2021 and in 2018. In 2020- 2022, 
the Netherlands became the EU's main entry point for goods from third countries (including UK 
imports), before dispatching them to destinations within the EU. Ireland was the EU Member State 
with  the largest share of  trade for both imports and exports with  third countries, which  is not 
surprising, as the UK is its top trade partner.132 In 2022, a large majority of EU countries traded more 
within the EU single market than with countries outside the EU. 133 This is corroborated by Buigut 
and Kapar, mentioned earlier in this study, according to whose estimates the TCA has contributed 
to  an  increase in  intra-EU trade by  around 4.6 %.  This  is  an  indicator that, to  avoid  incurring 
regulatory costs linked to exports to the UK, companies have started looking for substitute markets 
within the EU single market. 134 

Figure 6  also shows that Ireland continues to be the EU Member State with the largest share of 
imports in goods from the UK relative to its trade with the UK. It has also consistently been the one 
EU Member State to import more goods from the UK than it has exported, regardless of Brexit or the 
EU-UK TCA. One could extrapolate that the EU-UK TCA and the Protocol have facilitated the trading 
relationship between Ireland and the UK. However, a longer-term perspective is needed to draw 
solid conclusions. Belgium is the only other EU Member State to have imported more goods from 
the UK (€34.6 billion) than it exported (€31.3 billion) in 2022, as shown in Figure 6. 

Zooming in on EU-UK trade according to sectors, the following four figures analyse the evolution of 
EU exports and imports in goods to/from the UK, as well as the evolution of EU exports and imports 
in services to/from the UK. Once more, this evolution is studied across three chosen points in time: 

132   European  Commission,  op. cit.,  EU  trade  in  goods  strongly...,  25  March  2021;  European  Commission,  Maritime 
transport  of  goods  – quarterly  data,  Eurostat,  March  2023; E.  Jones,  European  Maritime Day  2023:  Facts  &  Stats, 
Martide, 23 May 2023. 

133   European  Commission,  International trade in goods,  Eurostat,  30 March 2023. 
134   Buigut and Kapar,  op. cit., p. 1577. 

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2018 (after the Brexit vote, but before the normalisation of EU-UK relations) and the two first years 
of implementation of the EU-UK TCA (2021 and 2022). 

Figure 7 illustrates the share of the EU's main goods exported to the UK. It shows that the two sectors 
in EU goods exports to the UK that are the most affected when comparing figures for 2018 and 2022 
are mechanical appliances and electrical equipment (with an overall loss of 1.8 percentage points) 
and vehicles and aircraft (with an overall loss of 3 percentage points). Goods from these two sectors 
have also been the most exported by the EU to the UK. The decrease has been consistent but gradual 
and, overall, limited, with the share of exports of mechanical appliances and electrical equipment 
standing at 20.6 % of total EU exports of goods to the UK, and that of vehicles and aircraft at 15.4 % 
in 2021. Regarding the majority of other goods examined in Figure 7, EU exports have remained 
stable, with  only a  marginal increase. This holds true for pharmaceutical products, plastic and 
rubber, and – to a lesser degree – for optical instruments. The two sectors where there has been a 
noticeable increase in EU exports in goods to the UK in 2018-2022 are i) agri-food and ii) oil, gas and 
coal. These changes may well be the consequence of Russia's war in Ukraine and the redistribution 
of value chains of supply. 

Figure 7 – EU goods exports to the UK 

Data source: EPRS, based on data from Eurostat Comext.

When it comes to EU imports of goods from the UK, Figure 8 shows the substantial increase in EU 
imports of oil, gas and coal when comparing 2018 to 2022, with an almost 11-percentage point 
increase in just one year – from 16.6 % in 2021 to 27.3 % in 2022. This notable change is also likely 
linked to the energy crisis in the EU resulting from Russia's war in Ukraine. This has meant that the 
oil, gas and coal sector has moved up from third to second (from 2018 to 2021) to first place (in 
2022), thus accounting for the largest share of EU imports of goods from the UK. Effectively, as of 
2022, the share of imports of mechanical appliances and electrical equipment has fallen to second 
place, losing 3.2 percentage points in only one year (from 2021 to 2022). The share of EU imports of 
vehicles and aircraft from the UK has also experienced a substantial drop by 4.6 percentage points 
between 2018 and 2022, pushing it down from second to third place among the top sectors of EU 
goods imports from the UK. The agri-food, pharmaceutical products, plastic and rubber sectors have 
suffered small losses and have maintained their significance in  EU  goods imports from the UK. 
Finally, the share of imports of pearls and gemstones experienced a loss between 2021 and 2022, 
falling from 5.3 % to 3.5 %. It should be noted, however, that this sector did not feature among the 
top eight goods imported from the UK in 2018. 

40 

The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

Figure 8 – EU goods imports from the UK 

Data source: EPRS, based on data from Eurostat Comext. 

Changes in EU trade in services with the UK have been less significant, except for the share of EU 
exports in the travel sector (personal, business, tourism, and of goods and services). As Figure 9 
illustrates, the share of travel in EU exports has more than doubled from 2021 to 2022. Equally, the 
share of transport services in EU exports has increased from 13.3 % in 2021 to 15.3 % in 2022. While 
the lifting of restrictions at the end of the pandemic likely played a role in the change in EU exports 
of travel services to the UK, these exports did not reach their pre-pandemic or pre-Brexit levels in 
terms of value in billions of euro. While travel was the second most exported service by the EU to 
the UK in 2018, it fell to fifth place in 2021 and to third place in 2022. The category 'various business 
services',  which  covers  research  and  development,  accounting,  consulting,  public  relations, 
advertising, market research, public opinion polling, architectural, scientific, waste and trade related 
services, engineering, and operating leasing, has consistently retained its first place as the EU's most 
exported service to the UK. Nevertheless, the net value of EU exports in various business services fell 
from 2021  to 2022, as it did  in information and communication technologies (ICT) and financial 
services. 

Figure 9 – EU services exports to the UK 

Data source: EPRS, based on data from Eurostat. 

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EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

Figure 10 below tells  a different story about the evolution of EU imports of services from the UK. 
Various business  services  and  financial  services  have  held  their  ranks  through out the  cris es 
(coronavirus, Russia's war in Ukraine, inflation), Brexit and the implementation of the EU-UK TCA, 
with  minor  changes. While  the  share of  EU  im ports of various business services from  the UK 
marginally decreased by less than 1 percentage point between 2021 and 2022, the  share of EU 
imports of financial services decreased by less than 2 percentage points. The shares of EU imports 
of transport and travel services to the UK both increased: transport incrementally by 1.6 percentage 
points and travel (as with EU exports in services to the UK) almost doubling (from 3.4 % to 6 %). The 
composition of the list of top eight EU service sectors imported from the UK changed over the years, 
affecting the lowest-ranking entries. Thus, as Figure 10 shows, while manufacturing was seventh in 
the list of top eight EU services imported from the UK in 2021, it fell off the list, to be replaced by 
'personal, cultural and recreational' services. In 2018, construction was in eighth place among EU 
imports of services from the UK. 

Figure 10 – EU services imports from the UK 

Data source: EPRS, based on data from Eurostat. 

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The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

4. Parliament's oversight of the EU-UK TCA

The  following  section  examines  the  recommendations  put  forward  in  European  Parliament 
resolutions on the EU-UK TCA since its provisional application and analyses Members' questions 
posed to the European Commission, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP) and the Council of the EU. 135 It 
then  looks at  Parliament's oversight and monitoring activities regarding the EU-UK  TCA  –  for 
instance, committee missions to the  UK, committee hearings and workshops on the  topic and 
debates in plenary. When assessing Parliament's level of activity in relation to the TCA, one should 
consider that Parliament has, in parallel, been equally active in relation to the WA 136 and to other 
Brexit-related  issues.  Examples  of  activities  include  questions  (yet  unanswered)  on  the 
consequences of Brexit on Ireland, the negotiation of the Windsor Framework, and the development 
of EU-UK relations on security and defence cooperation, which have remained outside the scope of 
the EU-UK TCA. 137 

4.1. Parliament's position 

So far, Parliament has outlined its position on the EU-UK TCA primarily through its resolution of 28 
April 2021 on the outcome of the EU-UK negotiations on the TCA. 138 It  has become increasingly 
common for Parliament to accompany its formal consent to the conclusion of  an international 
agreement, in accordance with Rule 105(2) of the RoP, with a separate non-legislative resolution 
'setting out the reasons why Parliament should give or refuse its consent and, where appropriate, 
making recommendations for the  implementation of the  proposed' agreement. 139 In addition, 
Parliament has addressed concerns regarding the TCA on two other occasions, one in the context 

135   This  section focuses  on Parliament's  scrutiny and  oversight  role as  of  the provisional  application  of the EU-UK  TCA  

(1 January  2021) until the time of writing (9 July 2023). 

Ireland  ('United  Kingdom') 

136   See, for example, European  Parliament resolution of  18 September 2019 on the state of play  of the UK's  withdrawal  
from the European  Union (2019/2817(RSP)), P9_TA(2019)0016; European Parliament resolution of 15 March 2023 on 
the  implementation  report  on  the  Agreement  on  the  withdrawal  of  the  UK  from  the  EU  (2020/2202(INI)), 
P9_TA(2023)0080; European Parliament legislative resolution of 13 March 2019 on the proposal for a regulation of the 
European  Parliament and  of the Council  laying  down  provisions  for  the continuation  of  ongoing  learning mobility 
activities under  the Erasmus+  programme  in the context of the withdrawal  of the United Kingdom  of  Great Britain 
and  Northern 
(COM(2019)0065  –  C8-0040/2019  – 
2019/0030(COD)), P8_TA(2019)0167; European Parliament legislative resolution of 13 March 2019 on the proposal for 
a regulation of  the European  Parliament and  of the Council amending  Regulation (EU)  No 1316/2013 with regard to 
the  withdrawal  of  the  United  Kingdom  from  the  Union  (COM(2018)0568  –  C8-0385/2018  –  2018/0299(COD)), 
P8_TA(2019)0191; European Parliament resolution of 5 April 2022 on the future of fisheries in the Channel, North Sea, 
Irish  Sea  and  Atlantic  Ocean  in  the  light of  the UK's  withdrawal  from  the EU  (2021/2016(INI)), P9_TA(2022)0103; 
European Parliament legislative resolution of 4 April 2019 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament 
and  of the Council amending  Council Regulation (EC)  No  539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals  must  
be  in  possession  of  visas  when  crossing  the  external  borders  and  those  whose  nationals  are  exempt  from  that 
requirement, as  regards  the withdrawal  of the United Kingdom  from  the Union  (COM(2018)0745 – C8-0483/2018 – 
2018/0390(COD)), P8_TA(2019)0336. 

from  the  European  Union 

137   See, for instance, European  Parliament resolution of 15 March 2023 on the implementation report on the Agreement 
on the withdrawal  of the UK from  the EU (2020/2202(INI)), P9_TA(2023)0080; European  Parliament resolution of 12 
February  2020 on the proposed  mandate  for negotiations for  a new partnership with the United Kingdom  of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland (2020/2557(RSP)), P9_TA(2020)0033; European Parliament resolution of 17 February 2022 
on  the  implementation  of  the  common  foreign  and  security  policy  –  annual  report  2021  (2021/2182(INI)), 
P9_TA(2022)0039. 

138   European  Parliament  resolution  of  28  April  2021  on  the  outcome  of  EU-UK  negotiations  (2021/2658(RSP)), 

P9_TA(2021)0141. 

139   European  Parliament,  Rule  105  on  the  Rules  of  Procedure  of  the  European  Parliament:  Consent  procedure,  9th 

parliamentary term – July 2022. 

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of requirements for the UK to protect personal data and another relation to the decision on the 
numerical strength of the EU-UK Parliamentary Partnership Assembly (PPA). 

In its 28  April 2021  resolution giving its consent to the EU-UK TCA, Parliament expresses strong 
concern over its limited scope, pointing to the fact that a range of key areas (e.g. foreign policy, the 
Erasmus+ programme, judicial  cooperation in  civil  matters and asylum) were  left  outside the 
agreement. 140 To  remedy this,  Parliament suggests 'that future cooperation and  coordination 
between the EU and UK should be governed by a systemic platform for high-level consultations and 
coordination on foreign policy issues, including challenges posed by countries such as Russia and 
China,  a  close  engagement  on  security  matters,  including  in  the  framework  of  EU-NATO 
cooperation, and a  systematic preferential cooperation as regards in  particular peacekeeping 
operations' (paragraph 22). To have the opportunity to reconsider its decision on the Erasmus+ 
programme, Parliament urges 'the UK to use the ''cooling-off'' period provided for under the Joint 
Declaration on Participation in EU Programmes to reconsider its position' (paragraph 53). 

On  judicial  cooperation  in  civil  matters,  Parliament  'emphasises the  need  to  reach  a  joint 
understanding in this area as soon as possible' (paragraph 59). It also 'regrets that the agreement 
gives no role to the Court of Justice of the European Union [CJEU], in spite of the commitment of the 
parties in the Political Declaration to ensure that the arbitration panel would refer to the CJEU for a 
binding ruling in case a dispute between them raised a question of interpretation of concepts of EU 
law' (paragraph 61). Even if  the TCA does not provide a 'detailed and meaningful solution with 
regard to matrimonial, parental responsibility and other family matters', Parliament welcomes 'the 
possibilities for enhanced cooperation, at least in key family law  issues and matters of practical 
cooperation in the areas of parental responsibility, child abduction and maintenance obligations, 
that can be offered via the participation of the UK as an observer to the meetings of the European 
Judicial Network on civil and commercial matters' (paragraph 60).  

On the missing common approach to asylum, migration and border  management,  Parliament 
'calls  for  a  relevant agreement that would replace the  Dublin  Regulation to be  agreed swiftly 
between the EU and the UK' (paragraph 36). Moreover, Parliament 'regrets the lack of ambition of 
the Agreement on mobility policies and calls for the development of safe legal migration pathways 
between the EU and UK' (paragraph 37). Furthermore, Parliament calls for thorough scrutiny 'to 
ensure that the Agreement does not contain loopholes that allow [the UK Crown Dependencies and 
UK  Overseas Territories] to be  used as  counterparts for developing new  harmful tax  schemes 
impacting the functioning of the internal market' (paragraph 44), given that these territories are 
excluded from the EU-UK TCA. 

In addition, the 28 April 2021  resolution points to several areas where  no  arrangements  were 
found  between  the  EU  and  UK in  the  context  of  the  TCA.  One example  are  geographical 
indications (GIs), with Parliament observing that it 'regrets that no arrangements regarding future 
GIs  could  be  found  contrary  to  the  commitments  taken  in  the  Political  Declaration'  and 
'acknowledges nevertheless the ''rendez-vous'' clause to extend protection in the future and urges 
both parties to activate this clause as soon as possible' (paragraph 16). Another example is taxation, 
which  'is not subject to dispute settlement provisions nor to rebalancing measures'; Parliament 
therefore 'recalls [...] the possibility to request a review of the trade heading four years after the entry 
into force of the Agreement should imbalances arise' (paragraph 18 iv). Moreover, Parliament notes 
that the material scope for  social security  and the approach to health security  remain limited, 

140   Indicatively, a study prepared at the request of the JURI committee and  that analysed  ways  of ensuring efficient EU-
UK  cooperation  in  civil law  matters,  does  not  mention  the  EU-UK  TCA  once.  See,  L.B.  Dittrich, Ensuring  Efficient 
Cooperation  with  the  UK  in  civil  law  matters:  Situation  after  Brexit  and  Options  for  Future  Cooperation,  Policy 
Department for Citizens’ Rights and  Constitutional Affairs, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, March 2023. 

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The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

adding  that  'family  benefits,  long-term  care  and  non-contributory  cash  benefits  and  the 
exportability of unemployment benefits are not included' in the TCA. This means that parties must 
'immediately provide citizens affected  by restrictions to free  movement with solid and  reliable 
information regarding their  rights to  residence,  to  work  and  to  social  security  coordination' 
(paragraph 33). Parliament also notes that cooperation in health security 'has been limited  to 
assess[ing] 'significant' public  health  risks,  and  to  coordinat[ing] the  measures that  could  be 
required to protect public health' (paragraph 46). 

The  28  April 2021  resolution furthermore points to  several  procedural  deviations  hampering 
scrutiny.  Parliament highlights the 'resulting uncertainty [from the TCA negotiations] which is 
imposing high  costs  on  citizens  and  economic  operators  and has also impacted  Parliament's 
prerogatives to scrutinise and apply democratic oversight of the final text of the Agreements ahead 
of their provisional application' (paragraph 7). In light of this, Parliament 'stresses that in no way can 
this  process constitute a  precedent  for  future trade  agreements, where  the  usual  format  of 
cooperation and access to information must be guaranteed, in line  with  Article 218(10)  TFEU, 
including  the  sharing of  all  negotiating texts, regular dialogue, and  sufficient  time  for  formal 
Parliament scrutiny and debate of agreements'. Parliament also 'underlines that agreements must 
not  be  applied  provisionally without the consent of  Parliament' (paragraph 7).  The  resolution 
stresses that  'EU  rights  to  fish  are  being  questioned with  diversionary means  through the 
impossibility to  timely  adopt  an  agreement on  TACs  and  quotas and  through unacceptable 
technical  measures, as well  as  through controversial restrictive interpretations concerning the 
conditions to acquire licences' (paragraph 29). Equally, Parliament is 'concerned that the Partnership 
Council is  allowed to amend Annexes 35,  36  and 37' and 'requests that Parliament be properly 
consulted ahead of any such change' (paragraph 28). 

To strengthen  scrutiny,  in its decision on setting up a delegation to the EU-UK PPA, Parliament 
defined  the  numerical  strength  and  established  'a  new  standing  delegation  to  the  EU-UK 
Parliamentary Partnership Assembly with 35 members' respectively, which the EU-UK TCA provides 
for.  The  EU-UK  PPA  'may request relevant information regarding the  implementation of  that 
agreement and any supplementing agreement from the EU-UK Partnership Council' and it 'shall be 
informed of the decisions and recommendations of the EU-UK Partnership Council; and may make 
recommendations to the EU-UK Partnership Council'. 141 

Parliament's resolution of  28 April 2021  also  includes  a  relatively  long,  detailed  and  assertive 
Section 6 on the implementation of the Protocol. 142 In it, Parliament takes a firm position against 
the UK's 'unilateral actions' to extend grace periods, which it considers to be in breach of the WA 
and to pose a 'serious threat to the integrity of the single market'. Parliament also calls 'strongly' on 
the UK government to act in good faith and fully implement the terms of the agreements it has 
signed, without delay, and on the basis of a credible and comprehensive timetable set jointly with 
the European Commission in accordance with the good faith obligation under the WA. In addition, 
Parliament encourages the Commission to pursue infringement proceedings against the UK 'with 
vigour',  and  notes  that  persistent non-compliance  with  the  outcome  of  dispute  settlement 
proceedings under the  WA  may  also  result  in  the  suspension of  obligations and  restrict the 
unprecedented levels of market access under the TCA. It considers the risk that the TCA may be 
suspended to serve as a potential instrument for enforcing the WA. 

141   European  Parliament decision of 5 October 2021 on setting up a delegation to the EU-UK  Parliamentary Partnership 

Assembly,  and defining its numerical strength (2021/2917(RSO)), P9_TA(2021)0398. 

142   European  Parliament  resolution  of  28  April  2021  on  the  outcome  of  EU-UK  negotiations  (2021/2658(RSP)), 

P9_TA(2021)0141. 

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As  regards interim  provisions  in  the  EU-UK TCA,  in  its  28  April  2021  resolution Parliament 
highlights the 'interim provision for transmission of personal data to the UK', reiterating its stance 
taken in its resolutions of 12 February 2020 and 18 June 2020 on the importance of data protection 
'both as a fundamental right, as well as a key enabler for the digital economy' (paragraph 34). It 
therefore urges the  European Commission  'not to  adopt a  positive  adequacy decision  if  the 
conditions set under EU law and case law are not fully respected' and 'stresses that an adequacy 
decision may not be  the object of negotiation between the UK and the EU since it refers to the 
protection of a fundamental right recognised by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 
the Charter and the EU Treaties' (paragraph 34). In its 21  May 2021  resolution on the adequate 
protection of personal data by the UK, Parliament also mentions that, importantly, the TCA provides 
a number of safeguards and conditions for exchanging relevant personal data in the context of law 
enforcement and  includes  'a  ''bridging  clause''  as  an  interim  solution,  conditional  upon  the 
commitment by the UK not to change its current data protection regime, in order to ensure the 
continuation of personal data flows between the UK and the EU until the adoption of an adequacy 
decision'. 143 

In its 28 April 2021 resolution, Parliament also 'stresses the need for greater investment in customs 
control facilities and for further coordination and exchange of information between both parties' 
to prevent trade disruptions and 'preserve the integrity of the customs union in the interest of 
consumers and businesses' (paragraph 26). Moreover, the resolution points to the need for close EU-
UK cooperation to prevent unnecessary delays and disruptions in the transport system. It also points 
to the need for financial support to certain ports to rapidly remove hurdles to physical infrastructure 
at the border crossings so as to maintain connectivity to the greatest extent possible (paragraph 49). 

On 9 May 2023, Parliament agreed on three laws to implement the Windsor Framework. One of them 
concerns certain steel products subject to tariff quotas brought from Great Britain to Northern 
Ireland, which will no longer be subject to the 25 % tariff linked to EU safeguard measures, to ensure 
these transfers are economically viable. 144 Parliament's legislative resolution on the application of 
Union tariff rate quotas and other import quotas to certain products transferred to Northern 
Ireland  also refers to these steel products subject to tariff rate quotas. The law  adopted in the 
context of the Windsor Framework clarifies the issue brought up in Parliament's aforementioned 
legislative resolution, which refers to the fact that the EU-UK TCA confers on the EU the right to 
introduce tariff rate quotas or other import quotas with regard to imports of goods originating in 
the UK under certain circumstances. In this context, the resolution points to the need to clarify 
whether goods originating in the UK and released for free circulation in Northern Ireland are eligible 
for treatment under the TCA's tariff rate quotas or other import quotas. 145  

143   European  Parliament resolution of 21 May 2021 on the adequate protection of personal data  by the United Kingdom 

(2021/2594(RSP)), P9_TA(2021)0262, p. 4, E. 

144   European  Parliament,  EU-UK  relations: Parliament  adopts  three laws  to  implement the Windsor  Framework,  Press 

release, 9 May 2023. 

145   European Parliament legislative resolution of 9 May 2023 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament 
and  of  the Council  amending  Regulation  (EU)  2020/2170 as regards  the application  of  Union  tariff rate quotas  and 
other  import  quotas  to  certain  products  transferred  to  Northern  Ireland  (COM(2023)0125  –  C9-0032/2023  – 
2023/0063(COD)), P9_TA(2023)0121. 

46 

The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

4.2. Questions put forward by Members 

Figure 11 – Political affiliation of Members havi ng posed written questions 

Data source: EPRS, based on data from the European Parliament Plenary database. 

In line with Rule 138 of Parliament's RoP, 146 the Members of the European Parliament have made 
frequent use  of  their  right  to  forward written  questions to  the  Council  of  the  EU,  European 
Commission and/or to the HR/VP. Throughout the current legislature up until July 2023, when this 
study was completed, 147 Members had posed 31 written questions on the EU-UK TCA, including its 
implementation. All but two questions were addressed to the European Commission, one to the 
HR/VP148 and another one to the Council. 149 In addition, a Member posed an oral question on behalf 
of the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI). As defined in Rule 136 of Parliament's RoP, a committee, a 
political group or a Member can also pose a question for an oral answer with a debate. 150 

Figure 11 (on the left) shows that the Members having submitted questions came from almost all 
political groups in the Parliament, with those from the EPP Group taking the lead. A total of 66 
Members from 10 Member States posed 31 written questions on the EU-UK TCA. Of these, 10 were 
put forward by groups of Members. 

146   European  Parliament, Rule 138 of  the Rules of Procedure of  the European  Parliament: Questions for written answer, 

9th parliamentary term – July 2022. 
147   The last update  took place on 9 July 2023. 
148   European  Parliament, Written question by  François Alfonsi (Greens/EFA),  E-003781/2021, 28 July 2021. 
149   European  Parliament, Written question by  Patrick Breyer (Greens/EFA), E-003397/2021, 1 July 2021. 
150   European  Parliament, Rule 136 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament: Questions for oral answer with 

debate, 9th parliamentary term – July 2022. 

47 

EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

Figure 12 – Number of Me mbers having posed written question s by nationality 

Data source: EPRS, based on data from the European Parliament Plenary database. 

Figure 12 shows that the majority of Members having posed written questions come from France, 
Spain and Germany, with French Members accounting for more than half of the authors (33). One 
third  of written  questions  (10) was  put  forward  to  the  Commission  by  groups of  Member s, 
representing different political groups. Moreover , two questions benefited from the support of 
Members other than the authors. One question was written by one Member but  received the 
support of over 24 other Members of the same group across different nationalities, 151 while another 
question  received the  support  of  another  two  French  Members . 152 Pa st  EPRS research  has 
demonstrated that grouped written questions to the European Commission tend to have a bigger 
impact than questions posed by a single Member.153 

Figure 13 – Average time range between Members' questio ns and Commission or 
Council answers in days 

Data source: EPRS, based on data from the European Parliament Plenary database. 

151   European  Parliament, Written question by  Nathalie Loiseau (Renew), P-000826/2021, 10 February 2021. 
152   European  Parliament, Written question by  France Jamet (ID),  Herve Juvin  (ID), Hélène Laporte (ID),  Julie Lechanteux 

(ID), Jean-François  Jalkh (ID), André Rougé (ID), Jean-Paul  Garraud (ID),  E-000345/2021, 20 January 2021. 

153   See I. Ioannides, EU Guidelines on Human  Rights Defenders – European Implementation Assessment,  EPRS,  European 

Parliament, 2022, pp.  51-57. 

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The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

Rule 138 of Parliament's RoP sets the maximum time within which a Member should receive an 
answer to their question from the Commission/Council at six weeks (42 days). 154 Of the 31 analysed 
questions, only one was not answered, remaining open for three months after having been filed.155 
None of the Members ' written questions were answered within the 42-day deadline. Figure 13 
shows that, on  average, the addressees, primarily the Commission, took  79 days to  answer a 
Member's question. The  Commission 's swiftest  reply came  in  43 days , 156 and  its  slowest  in 
142 days. 157 

Figure 14 – Number of answers to Members' written 
 questions according to the week of reception 

In  general,  Parliament  received  the 
answers  to 
its  written  questions 
between week 6 and week 21 after the 
question was posed. Figure 14 clusters 
questions according to the timeframe 
within which an answer was received. 
While  no  question  was  answered 
within  the  42-day  deadline,  three 
questions were answered within week 
7. The  figure  also 
illustrates  the
variation of  time taken for answering
questions,  demonstrating  that  an
answer  to  the  majority  of  questions
was received within weeks 7 and 12.

The Members' questions related to the 
EU-UK  TCA  addressed  a  number  of 
horizontal and policy issues, as shown 
in  Figure 15  below.  At  a  horizontal 
level,  Members  were  interested  in 
finding  out  about  the  governance 
framework (seven  questions) and  its 
application, and the respecting of  EU 
standards  (three questions). Most  of 
the  policy-related  questions  focused 
on fisheries, and to a lesser degree on 
social  dumping,  EU 
trade  and 
standards and justice and home affairs 
(including data protection). The fewest 
number  of  questions  were  on 
the  EU's 
education,  space  and 
humanitarian response. 

Data  source:  EPRS,  based  on  data  from  the  European 
Parliament Plenary database. 

154   European  Parliament, Rule 138 of  the Rules of Procedure of  the European  Parliament: Questions for written answer, 

9th parliamentary term – July 2022. 

155   European Parliament, Question for oral answer by Adrián Vázquez Lázara on behalf of the Committee on Legal Affairs, 

O-000022/2021, 22 June 2021. 

156   European  Parliament, Written question by  Francisco José Millán Mon (EPP), E-001224/2022, 23 March 2022. 
157   European  Parliament, Written question  by  Niklas  Nienaß  (Greens/EFA),  Ville Niinistö  (Greens/EFA),  P-000332/2022, 

26 January  2022. 

49 

EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

Figure 15 – Number of Me mbers' questions per horizontal a nd sectoral category 

Data source: EPRS based on data from the European Parliament Plenary database. 

Regarding the governance of the EU-UK TCA, Members inquired about the instruments that the 
European Commission has in place under the Withdrawal Agreement and the TCA to ensure that 
judgments handed down  by  EU  and Member State courts are enforced in  the  UK. 158 A  similar 
question by a Member on the enforcement of judgments was about the Commission's stance on 
the  UK's  possible  accession  to  the  Lugano  Convention. 159 Concerning  the  transparency and 
parliamentary approval of amendments initiated by the Partnership Council, Members were also 
interested in which cases the scrutiny process by the European Parliament would be triggered.160 In 
relation to transparency, Members queried whether the list of arbitrators composing the arbitration 
mechanism under the TCA would be made public. 161 Another related question focused on the need 
for  more  consultation,  especially  with  the  European  Parliament,  to  ensure  the  proper 
implementation of the EU-UK TCA. 162 

Yet another question addressed the uncertainty over the validity of a  notice  by the  European 
Commission regarding the EU Rules on European Works Councils in light of the UK's withdrawal 

158   European  Parliament, Written question by  Francisco José Millán Mon (EPP), E-002350/2022/rev.1, 29 June 2022. 
159   European Parliament, Question for oral answer by Adrián Vázquez Lázara on behalf of the Committee on Legal Affairs, 

O-000022/2021, 23 June 2021. 

160   European Parliament, Written question by Emmanuel Maurel (GUE/NGL),  Younous Omarjee (GUE/NGL),  Manon Aubry 
(GUE/NGL),  Manuel Bompard  (GUE/NGL),  Leila Chaibi (GUE/NGL),  Anne-Sophie  Pelletier (GUE/NGL),  E-000329/2021, 
20 January  2021. 

161   European  Parliament, Written question by  France Jamet (ID),  Herve Juvin  (ID), Hélène Laporte (ID),  Julie Lechanteux 

(ID), Jean-François  Jalkh (ID), André Rougé (ID), Jean-Paul  Garraud (ID),  E-000345/2021, 20 January 2021. 
162   European  Parliament, Written question by  Nathalie Loiseau (Renew), P-000826/2021, 10 February 2021. 

50 

The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

from the EU. The question sought to clarify whether this notice was still valid after the end of the 
transition period.163 

One Member inquired about the effect of the Union declaration on the Chagos Archipelago/British 
Indian Ocean Territory, adopted on 1 June 2021. According to the declaration, the remark on the 
territory in Article 774 of the TCA should be interpreted and implemented in line with applicable 
international law. Since the respective Article of the TCA specifies that the TCA does not apply in this 
territory, the Member asked about the effect of this declaration in practice. Additionally, the Member 
was  concerned about the specific  terminology used with regard to the  Chagos islands in  the 
agreement. While the EU-UK TCA refers to these islands as the 'British Indian Ocean Territory', it was 
argued that the denomination that complies with international law is 'Chagos Archipelago'. 164 

Members raised three questions regarding the (lack of) respect for EU standards. Firstly, Members 
asked the European Commission for action to ensure the protection of and information about EU 
citizens' rights. 165 Secondly, they questioned the proposed 'free port' arrangement on European soil, 
highlighting the need for compliance with EU standards.166 The third question emphasised the need 
for mutual recognition agreements (MRA) between the EU and the UK. While the UK already has 
several MRAs in place, European notified bodies would be disadvantaged by the absence of an MRA 
between the EU and the UK. 167 

The impact on the economy and trade-related  topics, such as dumping, have often been at the 
heart of Members' questions. Fiscal and social dumping and consequent risks for fair competition 
between the  EU  and  the  UK  economies were an  issue of  concern in  two  questions posed by 
Members. 168 In their first question, Members asked, among other things, what procedures were in 
place in the TCA to ensure fair competition in the event of major divergences between the EU and 
the UK in business taxation arrangements. In the second question, Members wanted to know how, 
given that the non-regression clauses (clauses seeking to prevent social dumping) do not include a 
list of rights that must be upheld, fair competition between the two economies would be ensured 
and how the material impact of social dumping on trade would be  identified  in  the  event  of  a 
dispute over  workers’  rights. As part of the second question, Members asked the Commission what 
means it had to fight against the development of a network of freeports by the UK.169 In yet another 
related question, Members were particularly concerned about the long-term impact of the EU-UK 
TCA on the EU and UK's GDP levels and on their bilateral exports.170 

In other questions, a Member addressed the need to give EU and UK customs officials training on 
the TCA rules, as well  as highlighting the problems in cross-border trade, such as uncertainties, 
delays, increased costs at customs, and the UK and the different EU Member States implementing 

163   European  Parliament, Written question by  Billy Kelleher (Renew), P-000494/2021, 27 January 2021. 
164   European  Parliament, Written question by  François Alfonsi (Greens/EFA),  E-003781/2021, 28 July 2021. 
165   European  Parliament, Written question by  Nicola Danti (Renew), P-002650/2021, 17 May 2021. 

166   European  Parliament, Written question by  Emmanuel Maurel (GUE/NGL),  E-001396/2021/rev.1, 11 March 2021. 
167   European  Parliament, Written question by  Marion Walsmann  (EPP), E-003503/2021, 8 July 2021. 
168   European Parliament, Written question by Emmanuel Maurel (GUE/NGL),  Younous Omarjee (GUE/NGL),  Manon Aubry 
(GUE/NGL),  Manuel Bompard  (GUE/NGL),  Leila Chaibi (GUE/NGL),  Anne-Sophie  Pelletier (GUE/NGL),  E-000326/2021, 
20 January  2021;  European  Parliament,  Written  question  by  Emmanuel  Maurel  (GUE/NGL),  Younous  Omarjee 
(GUE/NGL),  Manon  Aubry  (GUE/NGL),  Manuel  Bompard  (GUE/NGL),  Leila  Chaibi  (GUE/NGL),  Anne-Sophie  Pelletier 
(GUE/NGL),  E-000325/2021, 20 January 2021.  

169   European Parliament, Written question by Emmanuel Maurel (GUE/NGL),  Younous Omarjee (GUE/NGL),  Manon Aubry 
(GUE/NGL),  Manuel Bompard  (GUE/NGL),  Leila Chaibi (GUE/NGL),  Anne-Sophie  Pelletier (GUE/NGL),  E-000325/2021, 
20 January  2021. 

170   European  Parliament, Written question by Kathleen Van Brempt (S&D),  Paolo De Castro  (S&D),  E-000479/2021/rev.1, 

27 January  2021. 

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EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

the TCA differently. In light of this situation, they asked the Commission what it thought of the 
burden the TCA currently places on customs officials, and of the problem of streamlining customs 
procedures. 171 

Besides these horizontal issues, Members raised questions about specific policies. Fisheries, data 
protection, education, and justice and home affairs issues were of particular interest. Eight Members' 
questions concerned fisheries, mostly regarding the implementation of the EU-UK TCA in this policy 
domain. As  the agreement envisages the establishment of  different bodies,  such as  a  Special 
Committee on Fisheries or an advisory group, the questions were about the setting up and meetings 
of these bodies. 172 Since the Commission is supposed to publish an annual implementation and 
application report, a Member was interested in whether this report would also focus on fisheries 
provisions, for instance those on granting licences to EU vessels. 173 In other questions, Members 
focused on the UK's and Ireland's compliance with specific articles of the agreement, and asked the 
Commission to share its planned actions aimed at ensuring and monitoring compliance.174 

In another question, Members raised the issue about import tariffs for Patagonian squid caught in 
the  waters  around  the  Falkland  Islands.  Since  the  UK's  withdrawal  from  the  EU  has  major 
implications for the EU fleet operating in other parts of the world, such as the waters around the 
Falkland Islands, the Member asked the Commission about the additional measures it was planning 
to take to lift import tariffs on Patagonian squid caught in the waters around the Falkland Islands.175  

On another occasion, Members stressed that the UK is delaying the issuing of fishing licences to 
replacement vessels regulated by the EU-UK TCA. Hence, they inquired about how the Commission 
was planning to ensure the UK's compliance with the provisions and whether a common guideline 
had  been  developed  to  ensure  a  better application  and  joint  understanding of  replacement 
vessels. 176 Members also focused on specific EU-UK TCA provisions – for instance, those relevant to 
cuts in catches and their expected impact.177 In this same context, after pointing out the negative 
impact of the EU-UK  TCA on the Irish fishing industry, a Member asked if  the Commission was 
planning to implement a  voluntary decommissioning scheme for Irish fishing vessels and their 
owners who want to leave the Irish fishing sector. 178 

Three questions dealt with justice and home affairs matters. In light of the UK's delay in forwarding 
details regarding the convictions of EU citizens to their home countries and the fact that it concealed 
this delay from other EU Member States, the Commission was asked to provide an overview of the 
actions it had taken and the exchanges it had had with the UK authorities on this issue. As part of 
the same question, the Member asked how the Commission would strictly implement and enforce 
the TCA if the UK continued not to properly cooperate with the EU on law enforcement and judicial 
cooperation in  criminal  matters. 179 In  addition,  conscious  of  the  detrimental effect  that  the 
coronavirus pandemic was having on tourism in the EU Member States, Members pointed to a 
further negative impact on EU tourism resulting from the way the UK classifies countries and the 

171   European  Parliament, Written question by  Jörgen Warborn  (EPP), E-002325/2021/rev.1, 29 April 2021.  
172   European  Parliament,  Written  question  by  Francisco  José  Millán  Mon  (EPP),  E-002936/2021,  2 June 2021;  E-

001765/2022 12 May 2022. 

173   European  Parliament, Written question by  Francisco José Millán Mon (EPP), E-001224/2022, 23 March 2022. 
174   European  Parliament, Written question by  Grace O'Sullivan (Greens/EFA),  E-003784/2021, 28 July 2021. 

175   European  Parliament, Written question by  Francisco José Millán Mon (EPP), E-001769/2022, 12 May 2022. 
176   European  Parliament,  Written  question  by  Stéphanie  Yon-Courtin  (Renew),  Pierre Karleskind  (Renew),  Catherine 

Chabaud  (Renew), P-001635/2022, 29 April 2022. 

177   Written question by Nicolás  González Casares  (S&D),  E-000106/2021, 11 January 2021. 
178   European  Parliament, Written question by  Chris MacManus  (GUE/NGL),  E-002823/2021, 27 May 2021. 
179   European  Parliament, Written question by  Sophia in 't Veld (Renew), E-001244/2021, 3 March 2021. 

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The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

fact  that  it  makes  no  distinction  between  regions.  The  Members  posing  the  question  were 
particularly concerned about island regions, such as the Balearics and the Canary Islands in the case 
of Spain, which used to receive a large number of British tourists before the pandemic. 180  

On another occasion, a Member requested information on whether criteria had been agreed upon 
under which UK authorities may deny EU nationals entry into the UK. Additionally, the question 
sought to establish whether the EU  and the  UK exchange information on the most prominent 
reasons for UK authorities to deny entry to the UK.181 

Linked to  justice  and  home affairs, three  additional written questions addressed data  and  its 
protection.  Members expressed their concern about compliance with the high EU standards for 
data  protection,  especially  in  relation  to  passenger  name  record  (PNR)  data, 182  requested 
information about the  number of  deleted  and  non-deleted datasets in  Europol or  Schengen 
Information System (SIS) databases, 183 and brought up the issue of DNA data exchange. In this third 
question, since  DNA  and  fingerprint data  is  exchanged  across borders, a  Member  asked  for 
information about the current encryption, hash algorithms and the obligations to encrypt other 
personal data used for criminal or police matters. 184 

Certain policies seem to have attracted less attention, with only one question asked respectively for 
each of the policies mentioned below. On education,  a Member asked about the Commission's 
plans  to  establish a  new  programme that promotes cross-border academic exchanges and  is 
equivalent to the Erasmus programme, in which the UK chose not to prolong its participation.185 On 
space  policy, Members addressed the risk of a gap in the funding for the Copernicus programme 
following  the withdrawal of  the  UK  from the EU.  Specifically,  Members were  interested in the 
Commission's role in avoiding an interruption in funding, including EU instruments available in case 
the  negotiation talks with  the  UK  did  not  continue  as  expected. 186  On  the  issue  of  the  EU's 
humanitarian response capacity, Members inquired about the Commission's plans regarding the 
establishment of a formal agreement on humanitarian aid within the TCA. They asked if and how a 
new  European humanitarian response capacity was planned  and highlighted the  need  for EU 
coordination mechanisms to ensure a coherent EU approach. 187 

4.3. Parliament's activities at committee and plenary level 

As Parliament geared up  for the consent procedure on the EU-UK  TCA, it  set the  tone for the 
commitment it expected from the UK in implementing the TCA and in stabilising EU-UK relations. In 
a press conference organised on 27 April 2021, prior to the vote on the EU-UK TCA, David McAllister 
(EPP, Germany), chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), and Bernd Lange (S&D, Germany), 
chair of the Committee on International Trade (INTA) – the two lead committees – and Andreas 
Schieder (S&D, Austria) and Christophe Hansen (EPP, Luxembourg), the rapporteurs on the EU-UK 

180   European  Parliament, Written question by Francisco José Millán Mon (EPP),  Gabriel Mato (EPP), Rosa  Estaràs  Ferragut 

(EPP),  Pablo Arias Echeverría (EPP),  E-002624/2021, 13 May 2021.  

181   European  Parliament, Written question by  Vlad Gheorghe (Renew), P-000504/2022, 4 February 2022.  
182   European  Parliament,  Written question  by  Gwendoline  Delbos-Corfield  (Greens/EFA),  Patrick  Breyer (Greens/EFA), 
Saskia  Bricmont  (Greens/EFA),  Anna  Cavazzini  (Greens/EFA),  Terry  Reintke  (Greens/EFA),  Sergey  Lagodinsky 
(Greens/EFA),  Damien Carême (Greens/EFA), Philippe Lamberts  (Greens/EFA),  E-000575/2021, 29 January 2021. 

183   European  Parliament, Written question by  Cornelia Ernst (GUE/NGL),  E-000334/2021, 20 January 2021. 
184   European  Parliament, Written question by  Patrick Breyer (Greens/EFA), E-003397/2021, 1 July 2021. 
185   European  Parliament, Written question by  David McAllister (EPP), E-004666/2021, 14 October 2021. 
186   European  Parliament, Written question  by  Niklas  Nienaß  (Greens/EFA),  Ville Niinistö  (Greens/EFA),  P-000332/2022, 

26 January  2022. 

187   European  Parliament, Written question by Harald Vilimsky (ID), Georg Mayer (ID), E-005648/2021, 21 December 2021. 

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TCA, stressed Parliament's serious concerns regarding the implementation of the Protocol. They also 
declared that the Withdrawal Agreement would have to be respected and faithfully implemented, 
that  unilateral violations by  the  UK  were  unacceptable, and  that  customs duties and  a  clear 
timetable would need to be set. 188 

In  a  speech on  the EU-UK TCA, given on the  same day, Manfred Weber, chair of  the European 
People's Party (EPP) Group in the Parliament, sent a clear message to then UK Prime Minister Boris 
Johnson: 'the challenges you face  are immense and you have  a  responsibility to respect your 
commitments. Don't play with  fire!'. 189 Equally, in  a  statement also published on 27  April  2021, 
Parliament's Socialists and Democrats (S&D) Group, Iratxe García Pérez (S&D Group chair, Spain), 
Andreas Schieder (co-rapporteur on the EU-UK TCA, S&D, Austria) and Vice-President Pedro Silva 
Pereira (S&D representative on the Parliament's UK Coordination Group, Portugal), warned that they 
would not 'let their guard down' ahead of the EU-UK TCA's ratification. They also stated that they 
would remain 'extremely vigilant' and use 'all tools possible' to ensure that the TCA was properly 
implemented and respected, not least given the UK government's 'recent breaches of the WA', and 
they expected  'nothing less than full  compliance'  from the  UK  'with  the  commitments under 
international law, including the Northern Ireland Protocol'.190 

4.3.1. Committee meetings, workshops and hearings 
A number of Parliamentary committees (AFET, INTA, AGRI, ITRE, IMCO, EMPL, ENVI, ECON, TRAN, 
PECH, LIBE, CULT, FISC and ING2) have followed the negotiation and implementation of the EU-UK 
TCA closely. They have done so by engaging with different stakeholders and exchanging on issues 
relating to the consequences of the agreement for their respective policy areas. In that context, 
PECH organised a workshop and a public hearing, while IMCO and CULT organised a public hearing 
each, and AFET and INTA held a joint public hearing. 

On 26 May 2021, IMCO organised a public hearing to allow Members and stakeholders to exchange 
views on the consequences of the EU-UK TCA for the EU's internal market and customs union with 
a  specific  focus  on  customs, standardisation, health  and  safety,  services  and  recognition  of 
professional qualifications. Representatives of the European Commission's Secretariat-General were 
also present to  explain  institutional and legislative aspects relating to the  internal market and 
customs union in the context of EU-UK relations. 191 

PECH  has been  the  most active when  it  comes to  engaging with  stakeholders on the TCA  at 
committee level. On 16 March 2022, PECH  held a public hearing on the future of EU-UK fisheries 
relations  after  Brexit,  to  address  growing  discontent  among  EU  fishers  about  the  TCA's 
implementation in their sector and assess the early implementation of the TCA and its consequences 
for EU-UK fisheries relations. 192 Stakeholders from various Member States first expressed views on 
the TCA's implementation as regards access to waters, resources, ports and markets, as well  as 

188   European  Parliament, Press conference by  Andreas Schieder and  Christophe  Hansen,  rapporteurs,  David  McAllister, 
Chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and  Bernd Lange,  Chair of the Committee on International Trade,  27 April 
2021. 

189   EU-UK:  TCA  – Manfred Weber, Twitter (EPP Group),  27 April 2021. 

190   Socialists & Democrats Group,  S&Ds:  We will not let our guard  down as  next chapter of EU-UK  relations begins,  Press 

release, 27 April 2021. 

191   European  Parliament, Implementation of the EU-UK  Trade and  Cooperation Agreement: challenges for the integrity 
of  the Single  Market and  the  Customs  Union,  Programme,  Public Hearing,  Committee  on  the Internal Market and 
Consumer  Protection, 26 May 2021.  

192   European  Parliament,  Public  Hearing  on  'Future  of  EU-UK  fisheries  relations after  Brexit', Committee on  Fisheries, 

16 June 2021.  

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The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

commenting on its governance. In a  second part, different national perspectives on the EU-UK 
fisheries relations were shared and discussed. 193 

As part of its meeting of the same day, PECH held a workshop on 'Impacts of the EU-UK TCA on 
fisheries and aquaculture in the EU'. Organised by the Parliament's Policy Department for Structural 
and Cohesion Policies, the workshop was divided into three parts, focusing on legal,  trade and 
fishing opportunities aspects respectively (a study on each had been produced in advance, see box 
below). 194 Information about the second study, which investigates specifically the TCA's potential 
impact on aspects of EU and UK trade related to fisheries and aquaculture, is included in Chapter 2.6 
above. 195 

Studies on the impact of the TCA on EU fisheries and aquaculture for PECH workshop 

A study (published in December 2021) analysed legal aspects of the TCA related to fisheries, notably 
Part Two, Heading Five of the agreement. The authors recommend that the TCA's implementation in the 
fisheries domain focus on alignment with the ambitious objectives and principles on conservation and 
sustainable use of fisheries. They also suggest that the EU and the UK find a compromise on sustainable 
total  allowable catches (TACs) and come up with further measures during their annual  consultations. 
Regarding access to waters, the authors expect the UK to strive to reduce the EU's access to its waters 
throughout the annual negotiations after 2026. With a view to upholding the EU-UK partnership, the study 
calls on both parties to act with moderation and in good faith, and to show restraint in the use of dispute 
resolution instruments. The authors suggest recourse to the general dispute resolution mechanism.  

Source: Valentin Schatz and Alexander Proelss, Workshop on impacts of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation 
Agreement on fisheries and aquaculture in the EU, Part I: Legal aspects, European Parliament, 2021.  

Another  study  (published  in  February  2022)  concerned  the  TCA's  potential  impact  on  fishing 
opportunities for the EU fishing industry at two moments (2021 and 2025), with a focus on France 
and the Netherlands. The study finds that the TCA would reduce the fishing opportunities for the EU-27 
as a whole, affecting Ireland, the Netherlands, France and Denmark the most. As the exact effects of the 
TCA on fishing opportunities will depend on what TACs the EU and the UK agree upon, the study calls for 
a timely agreement on TACs. The study also  calls for clarifying the role of the advisory councils in the 
negotiations between the EU and the UK under the Specialised Committee on Fisheries. Furthermore, it 
urges the EU to sign an agreement on the operational definition of a replacement vessel and to consider 
extending the issuing of fishing authorisations for replacement vessels to waters adjacent to the Bailiwicks 
of Guernsey and Jersey. Under the TCA, EU vessels may be granted access to UK waters if operators can 
prove they have a historical record of activities in UK waters or if the same EU provider operates a new 
vessel replacing those with historical activity (the replacement vessel). However, there is uncertainty 
regarding the definition of direct replacement vessels, specifically for vessels less than 12 metres long that 
are not included in the Vessel Monitoring System and therefore lack proof of their historical activity in 
some cases. Additionally, the TCA does not include a procedure for granting access to replacement vessels 
from Jersey and Guernsey. Moreover, the study encourages more EU Member States to draw up national 
compensation plans for their fishing sectors. 

Source: Benoît  Caillart  and  Pavel  Salz,  Workshop  on  impacts  of  the  EU-UK  Trade  and  Cooperation 
Agreement on fisheries and  aquaculture  in  the  EU,  Part  III:  Fishing  opportunities  aspect, European 
Parliament, 2022.  

193   European  Parliament, Public  Hearing on  'The  Future  of  EU-UK  fisheries relations after Brexit', Programme,  16 June 

2022.  

194   European  Parliament,  Workshop  on  impacts  of  the  EU-UK  Trade  and  Cooperation  Agreement  on  fisheries  and 
aquaculture  in  the  EU,  PECH  Committee  Workshop,  Policy  Department  for  Structural  and  Cohesion  Policies, 
Directorate General for Internal Policies, 16 March 2022. 

195   H. Martelings and  Z. Smeets Křístková,  op. cit., 2022. 

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In light of the UK's decision to withdraw from the Erasmus+ programme, on 15 June 2022  CULT 
organised a hearing in  association with PETI196  to  assess the impact  of this decision  on higher 
education institutions and students. 

On 25 May 2023, AFET and INTA held a joint public hearing on the implementation of the TCA, with 
a view to supporting the drafting of a joint implementation report by the two committees, for which 
this study was prepared. The hearing was hosted by a panel of four speakers: the chair of the EU-UK 
domestic advisory group (DAG) of the EESC, a  European officer from the European Trade Union 
Confederation (ETUC), a senior fellow in trade and productivity at the Tony Blair Institute and the 
director  for  EU  and  international affairs  at  manufacturers organisation Make  UK. 197  The  EESC 
representative described how each  party had proceeded with  setting up  its DAGs,  what their 
working methods were, what progress they had made and  what challenges  they were  facing 
(Chapter 2.3 provides a more detailed analysis of the DAGs' work). 198 In a related meeting from March 
2022,  INTA  focused on the  trade-related aspects of the Protocol. Many speakers attending the 
meeting called for more direct engagement from EU institutions.199 

4.3.2. Committee missions and formal exchanges with UK counterparts 
Several Parliamentary committees organised missions to the UK, some directly linked to the TCA 
and others exploring issues related more broadly to EU-UK cooperation, including policies that were 
not included in the agreement. On 19-21 December 2022, five IMCO Members visited Dublin and 
several border counties between Ireland and Northern Ireland, to meet with the Irish government, 
representatives of business and consumers, and two private sector businesses. The mission did not 
solely focus on the effects of the TCA but also on obtaining an Irish perspective of the effects of all 
relevant agreements, namely the UK Withdrawal Agreement and TCA, the Good Friday Agreement 
and the Protocol, on the EU single market and consumers. According to the mission report, it was 
the TCA that the delegation discussed in its meetings with senior Irish Foreign Ministry officials and 
consumer organisations. It therefore featured regularly in the exchanges between the two parties 
despite the mission's broader focus.200 

On  13-14  October 2022,  a  delegation  of  seven  INTA  Members visited  Belfast  to  discuss  the 
implementation of  the  Protocol. 201 They  met  civil  society  representatives, the  Business Brexit 
Working Group, Assembly Speaker Alex Maskey, party representatives, EU officials in  Northern 
Ireland and students. While the mission focused on the implementation of the Protocol, some TCA 
provisions and their impact on Northern Ireland were also discussed. Specifically, stakeholders 
highlighted the fact that limitations in the TCA regarding arrangements for EU-UK trade in services 
are negatively affecting the island of Ireland as a whole. 202 

On 2-4 November 2022, a delegation of six LIBE Members visited the UK to discuss the UK's adequacy 
under  the  EU's  General  Data  Protection  Regulation  (GDPR)  and  the  Law  Enforcement Data 

196   European  Parliament, Public Hearing on 'The United Kingdom  and Erasmus+',  Committee on Culture and Education, 

15 June 2022. 

197   European  Parliament,  The  implementation of  the EU-UK  Trade  and  Cooperation  Agreement, Joint  AFET  and  INTA  

public hearing, draft programme,  25 May 2023. 

198   Presentation by  Tanja  Buzek (EESC),  Joint AFET  and  INTA  hearing  on 'The  implementation of  the EU-UK  Trade  and 

Cooperation Agreement', European  Parliament, 25 May 2023. 

199   European  Parliament, Parliamentary trade delegation to visit Northern Ireland, Press release, 12 October 2022. 
200   European  Parliament,  Mission  Report following  the  IMCO  mission  to  Ireland,  Dublin  and  Border  Counties,  19-21 
December 2022, PE740.654v01-00, Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer  Protection, 18 January  2023.  

201   European  Parliament, Parliamentary trade delegation to visit Northern Ireland, Press release, 12 October 2022. 
202   European Parliament, Mission Report following the INTA delegation to Belfast, Northern Ireland, the United Kingdom, 

from 13 to 14 October 2022, PE737.435v02-00, Committee on International Trade, 20 October 2022.  

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Protection Directive. The proposed Bill of Rights and the 'Retained EU Law' Act were also addressed. 
The delegation met with members from both houses of the UK Parliament, the UK government, 
representatives of the Information Commissioner, NGOs, data protection experts and academics. 
After the end of the visit, the head of the delegation, Annalisa Tardino (ID, Italy), noted that, while 
the  UK  wishes  to  follow  a  more flexible  approach on data  protection, the 'divergence of  the 
legislative proposals from the GDPR may affect the UK's adequacy status with the EU'. 203 

On 20-21 February 2023, a delegation of six ECON Members visited London to meet with legislators, 
government officials, regulatory agencies, businesses and think tanks. These exchanges provided 
'important input for our parliamentary work in the context of the implementation of the Northern 
Ireland  Protocol, among other things'. Moreover, the delegation took part in  two round table 
discussions with representatives of businesses operating in the City of London. 204 

A number of visits to the UK took place in June 2023. A delegation of the FISC subcommittee visited 
London on 19-20 June to discuss EU-UK relations in international taxation. The delegation met with 
members of several House of Commons committees, Treasury Minister Baroness Joanna Penn, and 
stakeholders from civil society, associations and academia. Beyond its focus on the implementation 
of the OECD/G20 international tax reform, the delegation also discussed post-Brexit tax policies in 
the UK and their impact on the EU, in  particular corporate taxes, tax incentives, free zones and 
compliance of the UK tax policy with the EU Code of Conduct on business taxation. Additionally, 
Members discussed EU-UK cooperation in international taxation and the implementation of the 
Windsor Framework regarding VAT and excise duties.205 

A delegation of six CULT Members visited Edinburgh on 19-21 June 206 to discuss EU-UK cooperation 
in  education, culture and  youth post-Brexit. The Members met with  representatives of Scottish 
educational institutions, students, cultural organisations, youth policy and volunteer organisations, 
and with members of the Scottish Parliament and government. The head of the delegation, Niyazi 
Kizilyürek, (GUE/NGL, Cyprus) stressed that the findings of the mission only confirmed that Brexit 
has had negative consequences for education, culture and youth in Scotland; these findings will 
inform CULT's opinion on the implementation of the TCA. 

On 26 June, a delegation of seven ING2 Members visited London to exchange experiences with UK 
legislators and  senior  officials  on  transparency, ethics  and  anticorruption. These  issues  were 
discussed with  independent enquiry  bodies,  notably the  House  of  Lords' Commissioners for 
Standards and the House of  Commons' Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards, as well  as 
relevant high-level officials in the Cabinet Office. 207 

4.3.3. EU-UK Parliamentary Partnership Assembly and UK Contact Group 
Beyond parliamentary committee visits, the EU-UK Parliamentary Partnership Assembly (PPA) as 
set up by the TCA has fostered cooperation between the EU and the UK parliaments through its 
inter-parliamentary meetings. Since its constitutive meeting on 9  December 2021,  three regular 
inter-parliamentary meetings have been held, the first of which took place in Brussels on 12-13 May 
2022. In its first session, the meeting discussed the state of play in the Partnership Council and EU-
UK cooperation in relation to the war in Ukraine. It also adopted its rules of procedure and agreed 

203   European  Parliament, MEPs  conclude data  protection-themed visit to the UK, Press release, 27 October 2022. 
204   European Parliament, Economic and Monetary Affairs MEPs conclude visit to London,  Press release, 22 February 2023.  
205   European  Parliament, FISC  mission to London,  United Kingdom,  Draft programme of the mission,  19 June 2023.  
206   European  Parliament, MEPs  in Scotland:  Brexit has  had  a  fundamental  negative  impact  on  education,  culture and 

youth, Press release, 21 June 2023.  

207   European  Parliament, ING2 mission to London,  United Kingdom,  on 26 June 2023, 26 June 2023.  

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on what type of information to seek and share with the Partnership Council. In its second session, 
the meeting focused on the impact of Withdrawal Agreement issues on the work of the Partnership 
Council,  and  on  the  significance  of  building  a  new  multi-dimensional EU-UK  relationship and 
establishing cooperation in the field of energy. Matters related to the future work of the PPA were 
also discussed. 208  

On 7-8 November 2022, the PPA held its second meeting, the first to have been held in London, at 
which it exchanged views on EU-UK energy cooperation, the future of the PPA and the future of EU-
UK relations. 209 Members met in three thematic groups to discuss touring artists, cooperation on 
defence and security, with particular reference to cyber-defence and data exchange, and citizens' 
rights. Discussions also focused on the future of Europe; the future cooperation between the PPA 
and civil society, and between the PPA and the devolved legislatures within the UK; and the future 
work of the PPA. The PPA issued a set of recommendations to the Partnership Council on EU-UK 
energy cooperation. 210 In light of  significant interconnections between the EU  and UK  gas and 
electricity markets and Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, the recommendations recalled 
the measures included in the TCA to ensure a fair energy market and non-discriminatory access to 
networks, energy trading, security of supply and environmental sustainability. The PPA encouraged 
both parties to accelerate the development and implementation of measures that would render 
electricity trading more efficient, and urged them to work together to encourage the production of 
offshore renewable energy. The PPA pointed to the North Seas Energy Cooperation (NSEC)211 as a 
possible forum for this purpose and welcomed the recent commitment of the UK, the European 
Commission and the NSEC  countries in  negotiating a draft memorandum of understanding on 
offshore renewable energy cooperation, in December 2022. 212 

The third EU-UK PPA  took place on 3-4  July 2023 in Brussels. Beyond assessing the state of play 
within the Partnership Council, a large part of the exchange of views on the first day centred on the 
future  of  foreign  and  security  policy,  including  in  the  framework of  the  European  Political 
Community. Discussions were held in three thematic breakout groups on: i) the mobility of persons 
(focusing on artists, youth and pre-settlement status); ii) climate change and energy efficiency (with 
a focus on decarbonisation, rules of origin and electric car batteries and the net-zero goal); and 
iii) twinning  and  civil  society cooperation (including the  Horizon programme). Other topics of 
discussion included the EU and the UK's shared efforts to support Ukraine, cooperation on trade and 
industrial policy, and the response to the US Inflation Reduction Act. 213 Regarding shared efforts to 
support Ukraine, the PPA issued a recommendation to the Partnership Council calling on the EU and 
the UK to continue their strong cooperation and ensure the proper implementation of sanctions 
against Russia. 214 During the press point with the PPA's co-chairs on 4 July 2023, co-chair Nathalie 
Loiseau (Renew, France) called on both partners to remain mindful of their shared commitments, 
especially  to upholding high  standards, and stressed the importance of the  level-playing-field 

208   European  Parliament, Inter-parliamentary meetings, Delegation of the European  Parliament to the UK, not dated.  
209   EU-UK  Parliamentary  Partnership  Assembly,  Agenda  of  the  Joint Meeting of  the  EU-UK  PPA,  D-UK_OJ(2022)1107-

08_01, UK Parliament, Westminster, 7-8 November 2022. 

210   EU-UK  Parliamentary  Partnership  Assembly,  Recommendation  concerning  UK-EU  energy  cooperation,  November  

2022.  

211   The members of the NSEC  are: Belgium, Denmark,  France, Germany,  Ireland, Luxembourg,  the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden and the European  Commission;  see European  Commission,  The North Seas Energy Cooperation,  not dated.   
212   European  Commission,  NSEC-UK  Memorandum  of  Understanding,  Directorate-General for  Energy,  18  December 

2022. 

213   European  Parliament  and  UK  Parliament,  Third  meeting  of  the  EU-United  Kingdom  Parliamentary  Partnership 

Assembly,  Statement by the co-chairs,  European  Parliament, 3-4 July 2023. 

214   EU-UK  Parliamentary  Partnership  Assembly,  Recommendation  on  EU-UK  common  effort  to  support  Ukraine  and 

effective cooperation on sanctions,  not dated. 

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provisions in the TCA. In  response, the PPA's co-chair, Sir Oliver Heald, recalled that the UK is 'a 
country of high standards' and is committed to upholding a high level of protection, 215 indicative of 
the UK's continued effort to decouple from the EU and reclaim its autonomy. Importantly, both the 
European Commission  and  the  European Parliament  were  represented at  the  highest  level, 
respectively by Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič and President Roberta Metsola, and expressed their 
commitment to the implementation of the EU-UK TCA. 

Parliament has also engaged on matters related to the TCA through its two main points of contact 
with the UK: the UK Contact Group (UKCG) and the European Parliament's Delegation to the 
EU-UK  Parliamentary  Partnership  Assembly  (D-UK).  Both  groups  have  recently  issued 
statements on UK  bills  that threaten certain provisions of  the TCA  and have called  on the  UK 
government to abide by its responsibilities under the TCA. In a press release of 14 June 2022, the 
UKCG called on the UK government and parliament to refrain from adopting the proposed Northern 
Ireland Protocol Bill, introduced in the House of Commons on 13 June 2022. 216 According to this bill, 
specific  aspects of the Protocol, notably those related to customs, movement and regulation of 
goods, state aid and the application of EU law, do not 'have effect in the UK'. It also grants the UK 
government the authority to decide on the effect of other provisions laid out in the Protocol.217 
According to the press release signed by the Group's co-chairs, David McAllister (EPP, Germany) 
Bernd Lange (S&D, Germany), and Nathalie Loiseau (Renew, France), the Northern Ireland Protocol 
Bill  'puts into  question the  credibility  of  the  UK  government to comply  with  its  international 
obligations under the Withdrawal Agreement and the  Trade and Cooperation Agreement'. The 
press  release  stressed that  reciprocal  compliance  with  the  'mutually  agreed,  legally  binding 
commitments' is key for EU-UK relations and recalled that the conclusion of the WA was set as a 
precondition for the negotiation of the TCA. 218 

Similarly, concerned with  upholding the two parties' mutual responsibilities under the TCA, on 
26 January 2023 the D-UK Chair Nathalie Loiseau (Renew, France) and Vice-Chairs Sean Kelly (EPP, 
Ireland) and Tsvetelina Penkova (S&D, Bulgaria) issued a statement on the then 'EU Retained Law' 
Bill, 219 now an Act. After commenting on the potential impact of the Bill on EU-UK relations, the D-
UK  Bureau Members criticised  it  for  its  potential  to  invoke  higher  costs in  EU-UK  trade  and 
investments. They concluded by saying that the Bill therefore contradicts the mutual responsibilities 
agreed-upon in Articles 387 and 391 of the TCA, in which 'both sides have committed to refraining 
from weakening their levels of social, labour and environmental protection'. 220 

4.3.4. Parliament's plenary 
The TCA has featured in five plenary debates. On 27 April 2021, Parliament held a plenary debate on 
the TCA prior to its vote on the agreement. 221 The majority of Members across party affiliations and 
nationalities stressed the importance of the agreement for businesses, companies and citizens as a 
source of  stability and increased certainty, and reaffirmed their commitment to a  broad future 

215   European  Parliament, Press point by Nathalie Loiseau, co-chair of the EU-UK  PPA and Sir Oliver Heald MP on the third 

meeting of the EU-UK  Parliamentary Partnership Assembly,  4 July 2023. 

216   European  Parliament,  Serious  breach  of  international law:  MEPs  call  on  UK  not  to  adopt  new  bill,  Press  release, 

European  Parliament's UK Contact Group,  14 June 2022. 

217   See I. Hallak, The UK's Northern Ireland Protocol Bill, EPRS,  European  Parliament, July 2022. 
218   European  Parliament,  Serious  breach  of  international law:  MEPs  call  on  UK  not  to  adopt  new  bill,  Press  release, 

European  Parliament's UK Contact Group,  14 June 2022. 

219   European  Parliament, Statement by the D-UK Bureau Members on the EU  Retained Law Bill, 26 January  2023. 
220   European  Parliament, op. cit., Statement by the D-UK  Bureau...,  26 January  2023 
221   European  Parliament, The EU-UK  Trade and  Cooperation  Agreement – The  outcome of EU-UK  negotiations,  Plenary 

debate, CRE 27/04/2021 – 4 and CRE  27/04/2021 – 6, 27 April 2021.  

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partnership under the TCA. In the light of the UK's unilateral actions in disregard of the Protocol, the 
Members also voiced their concerns over the implementation of the TCA by the UK. They repeatedly 
recalled the measures built into the TCA in support of the proper implementation of the agreement 
and encouraged the use of all  tools available under the WA and the TCA to ensure compliance. 
Overall, Parliament reaffirmed scrutiny of the agreement as its key responsibility and called for an 
active role in the monitoring and implementation of the TCA. 

Beyond the general implementation of the TCA, plenary debates have also touched on specific areas 
of the agreement. In a plenary debate of 20 May 2021 222 on the Council and Commission statements 
regarding the 'Schrems II' CJEU court case 223 and the adequate protection of personal data by the 
UK,  the  Council  of  the  EU  and  the  European Commission representatives recalled  the  data 
protection arrangements under the TCA in their opening statements. The European Commissioner 
for Justice, Didier Reynders, recalled the TCA provisions that safeguard the transfer of data under 
the legislative requirements of the transferring party. He also stressed the need for a comprehensive 
instrument for data transfers to provide for a high level of protection and ensure compliance with 
the EU's level of data protection. He summarised the two draft adequacy decisions the Commission 
had proposed, one under the General Data Protection Regulation (EU 2016/679) and another under 
the Law Enforcement Directive (EU 2016/680). 224 Once adopted, these adequacy decisions would 
deem the UK's level of data protection to be adequate for a period of four years.225 This would allow 
for continued data transfers after the conclusion of  the 'grace period' for up to  a maximum of 
six months, in line with the TCA. During this period, data transfers between the EU and the UK would 
not be considered as transfers with a third country. Ana Paula Zacarias, President-in-Office of the 
Council of the EU, reiterated the importance of the TCA's sunset clause aimed at ensuring a high 
level  of personal data protection and the prevention of divergences in this domain for the EU's 
economic activity. The ensuing debate with Members focused on the Commission's draft adequacy 
decisions regarding the transfer of personal data between the EU and the UK. 

Regarding fisheries, on 4 April 2022 Parliament held a debate on the report on the future of fisheries 
in the English Channel, North Sea, Irish Sea and Atlantic Ocean in light of the UK's withdrawal from 
the EU. 226 According to rapporteur Manuel Pizarro (S&D, Portugal), this report and debate mark the 
first time the European Parliament has investigated the implementation of the TCA in the field of 
fisheries. While  the  TCA set  out conditions and rules for both sides, certain matters, especially 
regarding the access of EU vessels to British waters, have not been clarified fully, leading to differing 
interpretations  between  parties.  Members  across  various  party  groups  and  nationalities 
commented on the negative consequences of Brexit and the TCA for EU fishers. The majority of 
contributions focused on the divergences between the EU and the UK as regards the limited access 
of EU vessels to UK waters contrary to related provisions in the TCA, difficulties in obtaining fishing 
licences  and divergences on technical  aspects of fisheries. Members encouraged the European 
Commission to ensure compliance with these provisions and called for the implementation of the 

222   European  Parliament, Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Limited, Maximillian Schrems ('Schrems II') – 
Case C-311/18 – The adequate protection of personal data by  the United Kingdom,  Plenary debate, 20 May 2021. 
223   European  Court of Justice, Judgment  of the Court  of 16 July 2020, Case  C-311/18 – Data  Protection Commissioner v 

Facebook  Ireland Ltd and Maximillian Schrems.  

224   European  Commission,  Data  protection: European  Commission  launches  process on personal data flows to UK, Press 

release, 19 February 2021.  

225   The Commission  adopted two adequacy  decisions for the United Kingdom – one under the General Data  Protection 
Regulation (GDPR)  and  the other for the Law  Enforcement  Directive – on  28 June 2021. See European  Commission, 
Data protection: Commission  adopts  adequacy  decisions for the UK, Press release, June 2021. 

226   European  Parliament, Future of fisheries in the Channel,  North Sea, Irish Sea and  Atlantic Ocean, Plenary debate, CRE 

04/04/2022 – 17, 4 April 2022.  

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TCA in good faith. Several Members voiced concerns about the fisheries policy post-2026, when the 
transition period will end, as stipulated in the TCA. 

Lastly, plenary debates on the implementation of the TCA highlighted the difficulties in applying 
the Protocol. On 6 July 2022, in a debate on the Council and Commission statements on the UK's 
unilateral introduction of the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill, 227  the Council, the Commission and 
Members of the European Parliament reaffirmed their commitment to the Protocol and the TCA. The 
AFET Chair, David McAllister (EPP, Germany), recalled that the Withdrawal Agreement, including the 
Protocol,  is  the  foundation  of  the  TCA.  Vice-President  Pedro  Silva  Pereira  (S&D,  Portugal) 
commented on the measures the Commission will be forced to take (e.g. the potential activation of 
trade sanctions), which in turn could hamper the TCA's implementation. 

In its most recent plenary debate involving the TCA, on 14 March 2023, Parliament discussed the 
implementation  report  on  the  Withdrawal  Agreement  and  the  European  Commission's 
communication on the Windsor Framework.228 Thijs Reuten (S&D, Netherlands) recalled the EU and 
the  UK's  common  economic  interests,  while  pointing  out  that  hampering  workers'  rights, 
environmental standards and social protection goes against the TCA. Rapporteur Pedro Silva Pereira 
(S&D, Portugal) recalled, in his concluding remarks, the EU and UK's common economic interests 
and urged for increasing the focus on the implementation of the TCA. 

227   European  Parliament, The UK government's  unilateral introduction of the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill and respect 

for international law, Plenary debate, 6 July 2022.  

228   European  Parliament,  Implementation  report on  the Agreement on  the withdrawal  of  the  UK  from  the  EU  – the 

Windsor Framework,  Plenary debate, CRE  14/03/2023 – 19, 14 March 2023.  

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5. Moving forward 

The EU-UK TCA started applying provisionally on 1 January 2021 and entered into force on 1 May 
2021. At the outset, the two parties faced important structural disparities – a clear power asymmetry 
in terms of market size, interdependency and experience in negotiating trade deals. This can also 
explain why, so far, the TCA's implementation has largely affected the UK and has affected the EU to 
a lesser degree. As this study has shown, there is not enough evidence to show what the TCA's 
medium- and long-term effect will be on the EU and its Member States. Early evidence analysed in 
the study has shown that the TCA's immediate effects on Member States depend, among other 
things, on their geographical proximity and the main economic sectors in which they are active. 
Inevitably, EU-UK trade has become more complex compared to when the UK was an EU Member 
State. Some of  the immediate consequences of the TCA  are linked to  the lack of  clarity in  the 
implementation of rules and  administrative processes to follow,  the  costs this creates for  the 
business sector, the obstacles to the mobility of workers and transfer of goods, and the ongoing 
political disputes between the two parties. A number of options are presented below that could 
help redress some current obstacles and which would ease the TCA's impact in the medium term.  

5.1. Address  deep-seated  disagreements  decisively  and 
transparently 

The  Windsor  Framework  aims  to  address, in  a  definitive  way,  unforeseen circumstances or 
deficiencies  that have emerged since  the adoption of  the  Protocol. It  seeks to  respond to the 
everyday issues faced by people and businesses in Northern Ireland, at the same time supporting 
and protecting the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement in all its parts. Nevertheless, while the EU party 
has pinned its hopes on the implementation of the Windsor Framework, a number of fundamental 
questions effectively remain unresolved. One of these is that the Protocol is fundamentally linked to 
the constitutional position of Northern Ireland in the UK. The fact that polling results show that the 
Northern Ireland population is increasingly convinced that the two sides of Ireland will unite has led 
to Unionists becoming the most sensitive to the Windsor Framework. This is because of fears that 
its implementation may facilitate trade on the island of Ireland while simultaneously complicating 
trade between Northern Ireland and Great Britain. A number of potential challenges are palpable. 
They include: 

firstly, the possible negative popular reactions to border crossings being put in place. 
The  Windsor Framework offers a substantial cut in customs bureaucracy for goods 
moving from Great Britain and destined to remain in Northern Ireland (and not onward 
to the EU's single market in the Republic of Ireland), through a 'green lane'. In exchange, 
the UK, as a mark of goodwill, must comply with a series of EU conditions, including 
building long-delayed border control posts and providing high-quality, real-time data 
to the European Commission; 
secondly, the costs regarding labelling and packaging products that are for sale only 
in Northern Ireland have also raised concerns. Specifically, companies in Great Britain 
shipping certain goods, such as meat and fresh milk, to Northern Ireland through the 
green lane will have to label them 'Not for EU'. Supermarket chains in Great Britain have 
argued this will create prohibitive costs by forcing them to have separate production 
runs, packaging and  segregated stock. Companies such as  Marks  &  Spencer  have 
explained that the added complexity and cost of different labelling requirements would 
remain, regardless of the Windsor Framework. Moreover, Northern Ireland's fishing 
industry is concerned that it will still be subject to EU checks on catches in the region's 
own ports, over claims that the fish from those catches has come from a third country; 

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The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

thirdly, although the Windsor Framework provides for the UK to scrap VAT on some 
goods in Northern Ireland as in the rest of the UK, this rule applies only to 'immovable 
property', such as solar panels, wind turbines and home heat pumps, because these are 
less likely to end up in the EU's single market in the Republic of Ireland. The UK can 
reduce VAT on a longer list of goods than under the Protocol if the two parties agree on 
the goods on that list and the European Commission can ensure that there is no risk of 
these goods entering the EU single market; this has not happened yet. The list will be 
reviewed every five years, and in the meantime, the UK will not be required to apply a 
special EU VAT scheme for small enterprises in Northern Ireland, which is coming into 
force in January 2025. To be exempted from the scheme, the annual turnover of a given 
firm in Northern Ireland must not exceed a set EU-wide threshold; 
fourthly, a potentially different interpretation by the EU and the UK of the EU State 
aid rules in the Protocol, following the signing of the Windsor Framework, may be the 
source of further uncertainty for business and trade between the two parties. More 
specifically, from a UK perspective, Article 10(1) of the Protocol states that EU State aid 
rules are to be applied in cases where aid provided to companies could 'affect trade' in 
goods and electricity between Northern Ireland and the EU. An EU-UK joint declaration 
on the circumstances in which subsidies could be considered to affect trade between 
Northern Ireland  and  the  EU’s  single  market, was  signed  as  part  of  the  Windsor 
Framework. The UK understanding of that joint statement is that more than 98 % of 
existing  Northern Ireland  subsidies  would  no  longer  need  to  be  referred to  the 
European Commission for approval, thus facilitating trade between Northern Ireland 
and  the  EU  single  market. By  not  responding, the Commission has  left  room  for 
ambiguity. 229 

These  tensions are  likely  to  affect  more  broadly  the  implementation of  the  EU-UK  TCA  and 
negatively affect EU-UK relations. As early as next autumn, the modalities of the implementation of 
the Windsor Framework could become clearer, since the Retail Movement Scheme for movement 
of retail agri-food will be put in place in October 2023. It will concern, more particularly, 'Not for EU' 
agri-food retail labelling, especially some dairy and pre-packed meat and box labelling. In October 
2023, border control posts built in Northern Ireland will become operational, as will the additional 
temporary product inspection facilities for SPS in four Northern Ireland ports.230 

5.2. Build a strong EU-UK political relationship 

Relations between the  EU and the  UK have faced tensions and mistrust since Brexit, hindering 
cooperation and the implementation of the EU-UK TCA. However, the atmosphere seems to have 
improved markedly since Prime Minister Rishi Sunak took the helm in the UK in October 2022231 and 
an  agreement on the Windsor Framework was reached. EU-UK cooperation on Russia's war of 
aggression against Ukraine, within the NATO framework, has also helped bring the parties closer. 

In an April 2023 report, the UK House of Lords put forward a number of recommendations to deepen 
relations, which, if taken on, could not only strengthen trust between the EU and the UK, but also 

229   C. Gallardo,  'Devil in the details: 5 potential snags  in the UK's  big EU  deal', Politico Europe, 3 March 2023. 
230   Institute of Export & International Trade, An overview of the Windsor  Framework,  Northern Ireland Customs  & Trade  

Academy,  2023. 

231   M.  Szczepanski,  The  Windsor  Framework:  A  new  way  forward  for  the  Protocol on  Ireland/Northern  Ireland, EPRS, 

European  Parliament, April 2023. 

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improve goodwill to implement the EU-UK TCA.232 On the political and diplomatic front, the report 
calls for regular EU-UK summits similar to those that the EU holds with other major international 
partners. More specifically, the report urges that greater use be made of existing structures that have 
been largely inactive in recent times, due to the dispute over the Protocol. It also praises the launch 
of the new European Political Community, which includes the UK, among others. The TCA has also 
provided for the setting-up of important structures (such as the Partnership Council, the specialised 
committees and the EU-UK  PPA)  that can  play this  role, as this  study has shown. In  2022,  the 
specialised committees established under the TCA met  22  times, considering a wide  range of 
implementation issues spanning from investment to energy cooperation. 

The  report goes  on  to  say  that, on  matters involving  foreign  policy,  defence  and  security 
cooperation, the EU and the UK have closely coordinated their response to the Russian invasion of 
Ukraine. This cooperation will be essential also in the context of  the post-war reconstruction of 
Ukraine;  closer  cooperation  is  necessary,  in  particular,  for  monitoring  and  evaluating  the 
implementation and enforcement of sanctions. In this context, the House of Lords notes the recent 
establishment of the Enforcement Coordination Mechanism by the G7.  Appropriate structured 
cooperation arrangements, as foreseen in  the  EU-UK  Political  Declaration  that was  published 
alongside the Withdrawal Agreement in October 2019, could also be developed (beyond the UK's 
participation  in  the  military  mobility  project  that  is  part  of  the  EU's  permanent  structured 
cooperation). 

While the TCA – on the UK's insistence – did not include the EU Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, aspects of it have been discussed in the context of all EU-UK PPA meetings. The first PPA 
meeting, in March 2022, included an exchange of views on EU-UK cooperation regarding Ukraine,233 
while, during the second PPA meeting, in November 2022, its members addressed cooperation on 
defence and security, with particular reference to cyber-defence and data exchange. 234 Equally, at 
the third and latest EU-UK PPA meeting, in June 2023, much attention was dedicated to support for 
Ukraine and the future of foreign and security policy, including in the framework of the European 
Political  Community, and a  number of joint  recommendations were made. 235 The most recent 
meeting of  the  EU-UK  Partnership Council also  highlighted  the  parties' broad cooperation in 
responding to Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine, which is a reminder of the parties' shared values 
and commitment to European security.236 It demonstrates that, while the UK remains committed to 
ensuring its autonomy and decoupling from the EU, both sides continue to share many global 
interests, be it on multilateralism, global health or European security. 

5.3. Safeguard predictability and promote clear rules 

The UK's withdrawal from the EU brought to an end the regulatory alignment between the EU and 
the UK. While the TCA has redefined trade relations between the EU and the UK, much uncertainty 
remains. Firstly, as already analysed, research has shown that the total costs of the TCA (on trade in 
goods, but in the medium-term potentially also on trade in services) could be more pronounced for 

232   House of Lords,  The future of UK-EU relationship, European Affairs Committee, 4th Report of Session 2022-23, 29 April 

2023. 

233   European  Parliament  and  UK  Parliament,  First  meeting  of  the  EU-United  Kingdom  Parliamentary  Partnership 

Assembly,  Statement by co-chairs,  Brussels,  12-13 May 2022. 

234   European  Parliament, Inter-parliamentary meetings, EU-UK  Parliamentary Partnership Assembly,  not dated. 
235   European  Parliament  and  UK  Parliament,  Third  meeting  of  the  EU-United  Kingdom  Parliamentary  Partnership 

Assembly,  Statement by the co-chairs,  European  Parliament, Brussels,  3-4 July 2023. 

236   European  Commission,  Minutes of  the  Second  Meeting of  the Partnership  Council  on  the Trade  and  Cooperation 

Agreement, in London,  24 March 2023. 

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The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

EU  businesses, once the costs for the services sector are added to those for the manufacturing 
sectors. Secondly, the ongoing and future legislative developments in the UK will play a key role in 
demonstrating the UK's goodwill and desire for the effective implementation of the TCA. The TCA's 
fragility, due to tensions surrounding the implementation of the Protocol, potential problems with 
the application of the Windsor Framework, and the consequences of the 'EU Retained Law' Act, as 
well as persisting elements of uncertainty (e.g. long adjustment periods for sectors such as fisheries 
and the review of the TCA after five years) create a degree of unpredictability for both enterprises 
and people. Thirdly, the impact of the TCA on migration, especially on migrant workers, is currently 
unclear, as there is  very little  information at both national and regional level  on  EU-UK people 
flows. 237 That, too, creates fear and unpredictability. 

Trade could benefit from the development of a strategy and the creation of framework conditions 
in the UK's economic policy that are clear, reliable, sustainable and well communicated. In addition, 
where the UK government wishes to use the leeway it has gained unilaterally, it would be best if it 
did so in a way that is also calculable for foreign partners. In general, EU companies – especially SMEs 
– doing business with the UK have had to shoulder high transfer/transport costs and an increased 
administrative burden. Mobility and migration of workers has also been a challenge. Companies, 
including SMEs, need to regain confidence in the legal certainty and predictability of cooperation 
with UK companies. To overcome these bottlenecks, research has put forward proposals in three 
key policy areas: trade in goods, trade in services, and labour mobility. Trade in goods would be 
facilitated by greater mutual recognition of product rules and conformity assessments, especially 
for the automated and financial sectors, but also for agricultural or medical products. Trade in 
services  would be facilitated by the simplest and most transparent regulations possible from a 
single source. Labour  mobility would be  facilitated by the adoption of a  uniform work visa. In 
addition, qualifications should be mutually recognised as widely as possible.238 

5.4. Engage in building trust from the bottom up 

While the TCA is less comprehensive than was envisioned in the Political Declaration, it reflects the 
two  parties' proximity and  interconnectedness.239 The  EU-UK  PPA  provided a  solid,  structured 
framework for cooperation between the two parties, addressing even crucial issues that are on the 
political agenda, are beyond the remit of the TCA, and require multilevel cooperation. Enhancing 
cooperation  between local and regional authorities has also been put forward as a promising 
approach, with the idea that links on these levels may help with trade and cooperation. Inviting 
regional contacts in future EU-UK PPA sessions for a broader discussion on such cooperation could 
be a way of taking this idea forward. 

Experts have called on the EU to focus more on the subnational level and promote relations between 
sub-state players on both sides of the TCA, such as devolved administrations, regions and cities, civil 
society, academia and think tanks. When bottlenecks appear at the national or supranational level 
and EU-UK relations become conflictual, the subnational level is where building of trust can take 
place.  Ideas  put  forward  include  decentralising  student  exchange  initiatives,  strengthening 
twinning projects, and twinning of cities. Especially in climate action, 'subnational actors can play 
an increasingly important role in exerting pressure and building transnational networks to increase 
their  critical  mass  and  exchange  best  practices'. 240 Indicatively,  in  the  spirit  of  strengthening 

237   M. Alessandrini et al., op.  cit, 2021, pp. 116, 132. 
238   J.  Weiß  et al.,  Der  Brexit und  die Folgen:  Die bayerische  Wirtschaft  ein Jahr  nach  dem  Brexit, Prognos  and  vbw  – 

Vereinigung der Bayerischen Wirtschaft e. V.,  2021, pp. 30-31. 

239   J. Wachowiak,  op. cit., 28 June 2021. 
240   J. Wachowiak,  op. cit., 28 June 2021, p. 4; M. Bergstra et al., op.  cit., 2021. 

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relations with the UK, the Normandy region's strategy focuses on four areas of intervention that may 
resonate with other regions bordering the UK:  

1 
2 

3 

4 

Reinvigorate socio-cultural ties by, for example, winning back British tourists. 
Rebuild partnerships  in education, higher education and  research by creating a 
service  dedicated to  international mobility, promoting exchanges between the 
region's establishments and the British business world. Maintaining and restoring 
the closest possible cooperation in higher education and research is also seen as 
beneficial for both sides, according to the German Land of Bavaria. The UK House of 
Lords study adds the importance of holding school visits and developing reciprocal 
youth mobility partnerships. 'In common with existing youth mobility arrangements 
that the UK and individual EU Member States have agreed with other jurisdictions, 
this would allow young people to apply for fixed-term visas to travel and work in the 
other partner on preferential terms'.241 
Establish a network for multi-stakeholder cooperation at regional level through 
trans-regional and cross-border cooperation in the Channel area, the North Sea, with 
other regions, the UK, Ireland, and the Channel Islands, among others.  
Restoring twinning between cities and creating platforms for fact-based debate and 
dialogue on cross-Channel migration. 

5.5. Adapt to the new climate realities together 

Researchers explain how potential reductions in UK levels of environmental protection could have 
a direct impact on the EU biosphere  and would directly undermine the EU transnational agenda. 
In view of the ambitious European Green Deal agenda, some researchers call on the EU to 'focus on 
setting self-standing and sufficiently ambitious environmental protection commitments  for the 
parties  to  comply  with,  including  relevant  targets and  timeframes. These  clauses  should  be 
mandatory, enforceable and backed up by effective remedies'.242 

On the energy security and climate change front, the UK House of Lords' study urges the EU and 
the  UK  to  capitalise  on  their close  cooperation to  effectively  respond to  the  energy security 
challenges in the aftermath of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Cooperation in this regard should be 
deepened through greater use of the TCA Specialised Committee on Energy and the establishment 
of closer ties at political level. The House of Lords has urged the UK government to closely engage 
in EU  policies and instruments – including the emissions trading system and the carbon border 
adjustment mechanism243– that would have major implications for the UK. This position could be a 
way to further develop EU-UK cooperation in the monitoring bodies provided for in the TCA. 

241   The report specifies that numbers  of youth visiting should  be capped and that participants should have no automatic 

permanent residence rights in the country that they visit. House of Lords,  op. cit., 2023, 29 April 2023, p. 82. 

242   G.C.  Leonelli, op. cit., 2021, p. 637. 
243   House of Lords,  op. cit., 29 April 2023. 

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The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

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The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence 

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Q
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2
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E
N

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N

This study analyses the early outcomes, benefits, risks 
and challenges linked to the implementation of the EU-
UK  Trade  and  Cooperation  Agreement  (TCA),  in 
provisional application since January 2021 and in force 
since 1 May 2022, for the EU and its Member States. Its 
chief  focus  is  on  the  implementation  of  the  level-
playing-field  provisions – in  particular, those dealing 
with environmental and social/labour rights protection 
– and on trade flows between the European Union (EU) 
and the United Kingdom (UK). 

The study first sets the  scene, outlining the potential 
sources of tension in  EU-UK relations that hinder the 
application of the EU-UK TCA. It then examines the EU 
evaluations of  the  TCA's  implementation  at national 
and regional level, while also presenting experts' views 
on how the agreement has been performing. The study 
also provides a longitudinal and visual analysis of EU-UK 
trade  flows  to  explain  the  changes and  continuities 
observed. It  then analyses the European Parliament's 
scrutiny of the EU-UK TCA. It concludes by charting the 
possible paths for enhancing the performance of the 
EU-UK TCA, so that it  can contribute to building trust 
between the two parties. 

This is a publication of the Ex-Post Evaluation Unit 
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 

This document is prepared for, and addressed to, the Members and staff of the European 
Parliament as background material to assist them in their parliamentary work. The content of 
the document is the sole responsibility of its author(s) and any opinions expressed herein should 
not be taken to represent an official position of the Parliament. 

ISBN: 978-92-848-0854-0 | DOI: 10.2861/940721 | QA-03-23-272-EN-N