COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Statistical evaluation of irregularities reported for 2022: own resources, agriculture, cohesion and fisheries policies, pre-accession and direct expenditure Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 34th Annual Report on the protection of the European Union's financial interests and the fight against fraud - 2022
Date: 2023-07-27
Institutions: European Anti-Fraud Office, European Commission
Subjects: EU Member State, EU budget, EU strategy, activity report, digitisation, fight against crime, financial control, fraud, fraud against the EU, innovation

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 27.7.2023  SWD(2023) 275 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Statistical evaluation of irregularities reported for 2022: own resources, agriculture, cohesion and fisheries policies, pre-accession and direct expenditure Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 34th Annual Report on the protection of the European Union's financial interests and the fight against fraud - 2022 {COM(2023) 464 final} - {SWD(2023) 272 final} - {SWD(2023) 273 final} - {SWD(2023) 274 final} - {SWD(2023) 276 final}  
 
 
EN 

  EN 

 
 
CONTENTS 

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................. 3 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................. 4 

1. 

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 10 

1.1.  Scope of the document .................................................................................... 10 
1.1.  Structure of the document ............................................................................... 10 

2.  TRADITIONAL OWN RESOURCES (TOR) ......................................................... 11 

Introduction ..................................................................................................... 11 
2.1. 
2.2.  General analysis –Trend analysis .................................................................... 11 
2.2.1.  Reporting years 2018-2022 ............................................................... 11 
2.2.2.  OWNRES data vs TOR collection .................................................... 13 
2.2.3.  Recovery Rates .................................................................................. 13 
2.3.  Specific analysis .............................................................................................. 14 
2.3.1.  Customs procedure ............................................................................ 14 
2.3.2.  Method of detection ........................................................................... 15 
2.3.3.  Type of goods, countries of origin .................................................... 16 
2.4.  Member States’ activities ................................................................................ 17 
2.5.  Commission’s monitoring ............................................................................... 17 
2.5.1.  Write-off reports ................................................................................ 17 
2.5.2.  Commission’s inspections ................................................................. 18 

3.  COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY ................................................................. 19 

Introduction ..................................................................................................... 19 
3.1. 
3.2.  General trend ................................................................................................... 19 
3.3.  Modus operandi ............................................................................................... 21 
3.4.  Use of risk analysis and information from informants and media .................. 22 
3.5.  Duration of the irregularities ........................................................................... 22 
3.6.  Detection and reporting by Member State ...................................................... 23 
3.7.  Follow-up to suspected fraud .......................................................................... 25 

4.  COHESION AND FISHERIES POLICIES .............................................................. 28 

4.1. 
Introduction ..................................................................................................... 28 
4.2.  General trend ................................................................................................... 28 
4.3.  Comparison programming periods 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 ...................... 30 
4.4.  Specific analysis – irregularities and fraud by area of the cohesion policy .... 31 
4.5.  Specific analysis – irregularities and fraud by type of violation ..................... 32 
4.6.  Risk analysis and spontaneous reporting......................................................... 33 
4.7.  Duration of irregularities ................................................................................. 34 
4.8.  Detection and reporting by Member State ...................................................... 34 
4.9.  Follow-up to suspected fraud .......................................................................... 36 
4.10.  Other internal policies ..................................................................................... 38 

 
 
 
5.  PRE-ACCESSION POLICY..................................................................................... 39 

5.1. 
5.2. 

Introduction ..................................................................................................... 39 
Instruments for Pre-accession Assistance ....................................................... 39 
5.2.1.  Before 2007: Pre-accession Assistance (PAA) ................................. 39 
2007-2013: The Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA I) .... 39 
5.2.2. 
2014 – 2020: The Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II) 40 
5.2.3. 
2021  –  2027:  The  Instrument  for  Pre-accession  Assistance  (IPA 
5.2.4. 
III) ...................................................................................................... 40 
5.3.  General trend ................................................................................................... 41 
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA I, 2007-2013) ........................ 42 
5.4. 
5.4.1.  Recent trends ..................................................................................... 42 
5.4.2.  Trends  since  the  start  of  IPA  I,  by  beneficiary  country  and 

5.5. 

component ......................................................................................... 44 
Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance II (IPA II 2014-2020) ..................... 45 
5.5.1.  Trends ................................................................................................ 45 

6.  DIRECT MANAGEMENT ....................................................................................... 48 

6.1. 
Introduction ..................................................................................................... 48 
6.2.  General analysis .............................................................................................. 49 
6.2.1.  Five year analysis 2018-2022 ............................................................ 49 
6.3.  Specific analysis .............................................................................................. 50 
6.3.1.  Recoveries according to legal entity residence ................................. 50 
6.3.2.  Method of detection ........................................................................... 50 
6.3.3.  Types of irregularity .......................................................................... 51 
6.3.4.  Recovery ............................................................................................ 51 

COUNTRY FACTSHEETS .............................................................................................. 52 

Belgium - Belgique/België ........................................................................................ 54 
Bulgaria – България ................................................................................................. 56 
Czech Republic - Česká republika ............................................................................ 57 
Denmark – Danmark ................................................................................................. 59 
Germany – Deutschland ............................................................................................ 61 
Estonia – Eesti ........................................................................................................... 63 
Ireland – Éire ............................................................................................................. 65 
Greece – Ελλάδα ....................................................................................................... 67 
Spain – España .......................................................................................................... 69 
France ........................................................................................................................ 71 
Croatia – Hrvatska ..................................................................................................... 73 
Italy – Italia ............................................................................................................... 75 
Cyprus – Κύπρος ....................................................................................................... 77 
Latvia – Latvija ......................................................................................................... 79 
Lithuania – Lietuva ................................................................................................... 81 
Luxembourg .............................................................................................................. 82 
Hungary - Magyarország ........................................................................................... 84 
Malta  ......................................................................................................................... 86 

 
 
Netherlands - Nederland ............................................................................................ 88 
Austria – Österreich .................................................................................................. 90 
Poland – Polska ......................................................................................................... 92 
Portugal ..................................................................................................................... 94 
Romania – România .................................................................................................. 96 
Slovenia – Slovenija .................................................................................................. 98 
Slovakia – Slovensko .............................................................................................. 100 
Finland – Suomi-Finland ......................................................................................... 102 
Sweden – Sverige .................................................................................................... 104 

ANNEXES ...................................................................................................................... 106 

 
 
 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 

AMIF 
CAP 
CARDS 
CBC 
CF 
DA 
EAFRD 
EAGF 
EAGGF 
EFF 
EGF 
EMFF 
ERDF 
ESF 
ESIF 
FAL 
FDR 
FEAD 
FFL 
GUID 
HRD 
IDR 
IMS 
IPA 
IPARD 
ISF 
ISPA 
MM 
PAA 
PHARE 
PP 
RD 
REGD 
SA 
SAPARD 
TAIB 
TIPAA 
TOR 
YEI 

Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund 
Common Agricultural Policy 
Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation 
Cross-Border Cooperation 
Cohesion Fund 
Direct payments to farmers 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development 
European Agricultural Guarantee Fund 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
European Fisheries Fund 
European Globalisation Adjustment Fund 
European Maritime and Fisheries Fund 
European Regional Development Fund 
European Social Fund 
European Structural and Investment Funds 
Fraud Amount Level 
Fraud Detection Rate 
Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived 
Fraud Frequency Level 
European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund – Section Guidance 
Pre-accession, Human Resources Development component 
Irregularities Detection Rate 
Irregularity Management System 
Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance 
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance for Rural Development 
Internal Security Fund 
Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession 
Market Support Measures 
Pre-Accession Assistance 2000-2006 
Pre-accession assistance programme 
Programming period 
Rural Development 
Pre-accession, Regional Development component 
Direct Support to Agriculture 
Special Accession Programme for Agricultural and Rural Development 
Transition Assistance and Institution Building 
Turkey Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance 
Traditional Own Resources 
Youth Employment Initiative 

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Revenue – Traditional Own Resources (TOR) 

In  2022,  the  number  of  fraudulent  and  non-fraudulent  irregularities  (4 661)  related  to 
TOR was 7.6% higher than the average number of irregularities reported during the past five 
years.  The  number  of  fraudulent  irregularities  declined  by  6.8%  and  the  non-fraudulent 
irregularities increased by 9.4% in comparison to the 5-year average for 2018-2022. The total 
estimated  and  established  amount  of  TOR  increased  by  47%  to  EUR 783  million,  also 
because of four big non-fraudulent irregularities reported in Belgium.  

The overall recovery rate (RR) for fraudulent and non-fraudulent cases is currently 48% for 
the  reporting  year  2022.  The  RR  for  non-fraudulent  cases  is  50%,  but  falls  to  25%  for 
fraudulent cases. Although the EU-27 recovered EUR 341 million in total, the recovery rate 
varies between the Member States.  

While smuggling remains one of the main modus operandi for fraudulent cases, most cases 
reported in 2022 relate to incorrect value and incorrect classification/misdescription of goods. 
Textiles and footwear were the most affected goods not only in terms of number of cases but 
especially in value. China remained the most important country of origin of goods affected by 
irregularities.  

Fourteen  Member  States  reported  116  cases  of  smuggled  cigarettes,  with  around 
EUR 38 million of the estimated amount of TOR involved. Compared to 2021, ten Member 
States  continue  to  have  smuggling  cases  (Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Germany,  Estonia,  Greece, 
France,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Poland,  Romania)  whereas  some  Member  States  appear  in  the 
statistics in 2022 (Spain, Croatia, Austria, Portugal). This might indicate a potential shift of 
fraud or of cigarette smuggling routes to other Member States. 

Release for free circulation remains the customs procedure most affected by fraudulent and 
non-fraudulent  irregularities  (3 799  cases  with  an  overall  amount  of  EUR  688  million). 
Compared to 2021, Germany reported in 2022 a big increase in non-fraudulent cases related 
to ‘release for free circulation’ whereas some of its neighbouring Member States reported an 
increase in ‘transit’ (e.g., Czech Republic and the Netherlands) combined with a decrease in 
‘release for free circulation’ (e.g., the Netherlands). 

Inspections  by  national  anti-fraud  services  together  with  customs  release  controls  played  a 
crucial  role  in  detecting  fraudulent  cases  in  2022.  Non-fraudulent  instances  were  primarily 
detected  by  post-release  controls,  although  other  methods  of  detection,  such  as  release 
controls and tax audit, were also on the rise.   

In  2022,  the  Commission  services  focused  their  on-the-spot  inspections  in  the  Member 
States  on  the  control  strategy  for  e-commerce  and  low  value  consignments  and  the  control 
strategy for anti-dumping and countervailing duties. Furthermore, in 2022 the Commission’s 
desk audits were oriented towards three different topics: (i) COVID-19 related goods subject 
to duty relief; (ii) Binding Origin Information (BOI) decisions and (iii) open B-account cases 
(i.e.,  cases  that  have  not  yet  been  recovered  and  for  which  either  no  security  has  been 
provided or the security has been provided but it has been challenged). 

Expenditure - Common Agricultural Policy 

During  the  period  2018-2022,  fraudulent  irregularities  reported  for  rural  development 
increased,  mainly  due  to  the  rising  detections  for  the  programming  period  2014-2020. 
However, the number of these fraudulent irregularities was lower than expected. This should 

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

be  monitored  to  ensure  focus  on  fraud  detection.  A  similar  trend  concerned  non-fraudulent 
irregularities.  It  was  less  noticeable,  but  the  gap  is  becoming  significant.  In  2022,  the 
fraudulent  irregularities  under  support  to  agriculture  increased,  compared  with  2021, 
mainly due to reporting related to direct payments by two Member States. The increase was 
partly due to the reporting of many small interconnected irregularities. The irregular financial 
amounts  involved  in  non-fraudulent  irregularities  fluctuated  strongly,  mainly  due  to  the 
reporting  in  some  years  of  cases  involving  exceptional  amounts,  for  market  measures.  It 
happened that the same irregularity cover both rural development and direct payments to 
farmers. This is more frequent for fraudulent irregularities 

Detection rates for rural development were noticeably higher than for support to agriculture. 
However,  one  part  of  support  to  agriculture,  market  measures,  accounted  for  the  highest 
detection  rates.  The  detection  of  irregularities,  especially  fraudulent,  was  concentrated  in  a 
few Member States. 

During  the  period  2018-2022,  fraudulent  irregularities  often  concerned  falsification  of  the 
request  for  aid  or  of  documentary  proof.  For  market  measures  and  rural  development,  
violations concerning the implementation of the action were also significant.  

Risks  and  violations  depend  on  the  type  of  measure.  For  example,  applicants  for  direct 
payments may request aid for plots of land they do not have the right to use on the basis of 
false lease agreements or may artificially create the conditions for receiving financial support. 
While keeping on improving checks on the entitlements related to the main direct payments, 
agricultural  practices,  including  those  beneficial  for  the  climate  and  the  environment,  may 
also deserve more attention in view of identifying intentional infringements. The same may 
apply also to payments schemes based on the number and type of animals. Violations related 
to market measures may concern, for example, the withdrawal of agricultural products from 
the  market  or  the  cost,  actual  implementation  or  use  of  investments  by  producers 
organisations  -  such  as  works  for  storage  sites  or  the  purchase  of  machinery  or  equipment. 
Several complex cases related to the promotion of agricultural products were investigated by 
OLAF.  In  rural  development,  beneficiaries  may,  for  example,  use  false  invoices, 
declarations of equipment as new while it is second-hand, manipulated bids in the context of 
procurement  and  false  information  on  compliance  with  conditions  for  receiving  aid. 
Violations  may  concern  information  the  applicant  provides  to  get  the  project  selected,  to 
receive  advance  payments,  to  fulfil  critera  for  access  to  a  support  scheme.  The  beneficiary 
may  infringe  the  rules  about  procurement,  may  request  reimbursement  for  inflated  costs  or 
even  for  inexistent  transactions  or  may  ask  for  reimbursement  for  costs  already  funded  in 
another context. The beneficiary may fail to follow the business plan, to use the investment 
for the intended purpose or to use it at all. While keeping the focus on reimbursement-based 
funding  (grants  to  projects),  area  and  animal-related  spending  may  also  deserve  more 
attention in view of identifying intentional infringements. 

During 2018-2022, risk analysis still only marginally contributed to detecting fraud in rural 
development and direct payments to farmers, while it seems to play a stronger role in market 
measures.  Also  the  share  of  fraud  detections  based  on  tips  from  informants  and  whistle 
blowers was low, being the lowest for direct payments to farmers and the highest for market 
measures. Fraud was never detected following information published in the media. 

On average, during 2014-2022, it took nearly four years from the start of the irregularity  to 
come to a suspicion that a fraudulent irregularity had been committed and nearly three years 
to  close  the  case  after  reporting  to  the  Commission.  These  durations  were  shorter  for 

5 

 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

non-fraudulent irregularities. Fraudsters may go to great lenghts to hide their behaviour and 
the duration of criminal proceedings is longer. 

The Member States are requested to detect suspected fraud …  

For 11% of the irregularities reported during 2014-2022, there is or was a suspicion of fraud 
(incidence  of  fraud).  In  11%  of  such  cases,  this  suspicion  was  not  initially  detected  or 
reported. The Member State reclassified the irregularity as fraudulent at a later stage.  

… and then follow-up suspect fraud, until the case is dismissed or fraud is established. 

For just 14% of the irregularities with a suspicion of fraud, the suspicion was then confirmed 
into  established  fraud  and  for  just  10%  the  suspicion  was  dismissed.  These  percentages  do 
not  significantly  change  year  on  year  (irregularities  are  associated  to  the  year  of  first 
reporting). They could have been expected to be higher for years that are further in the past, 
because more time was available to  finalise  the case. Most of the irregularities where there 
was  a  suspicion  of  fraud  are  still  classified  as  suspected  fraud,  even  if  several  years  from 
initial reporting have elapsed. This percentage changes year on year, but is very high also for 
years that are further in the past.  

Significant  differences  between  Member  States  can  be  noticed  in  the  above  mentioned 
percentages.  In  the  Member  States  with  low  incidence  of  fraud,  the  competent  authorities 
should  invest  in  detecting  signals  of  fraud  and,  when  discovering  irregularities,  should 
carefully address the question of intentionality. Low incidence of fraud could also be due to 
reporting  practices  delaying  the  classification  as  suspected  fraud.  These  reporting  practices 
should be reviewed or the engagement with the judicial authorities should be improved.  

In  many  Member  States,  the  percentage  of  irregularities  that  are  still  classified  as 
suspected  fraud  is  extremely  high.  This  may  suggest  that  either  the  judicial  authorities  do 
not  give  proper  follow-up  to  these  suspicions  -  including  because  they  may  not  have 
sufficient  resources  -  or  that  there  are  no  proper  communication  channels  from  judicial  to 
reporting authorities.  In  addition,  many  of these  pending  irregularities are  closed. This  may 
be due to persistent suspicions of the paying agencies, while criminal proceedings were not 
started, were prevented by the statute of limitations or did not lead to enough evidence about 
fraud. It could also be that in some Member States cases were closed because the competent 
bodies had finalised administrative actions, despite pending penal proceedings. 

Expenditure - Cohesion and Fisheries Policies 

Fraudulent  irregularities  related  to  the  programming  period  2007-2013  peaked  in  2015, 
gradually decreased in the following years and in 2018 they were overtaken by those related 
to  the  programming  period  2014-2020.  These  dynamics  are  in  line  with  known  trends  and 
patterns  linked  to  the  multi-annual  implementation  cycles.  Since  2017,  reporting  of 
non-fraudulent  irregularities  related  to  the  programming  period  2014-2020  has  been 
increasing, but less than expected. The number and financial amounts of the non-fraudulent 
irregularities  that  had  been  reported  during  the  first  nine  years  of  the  programming  period 
2007-2013 were much higher than those being reported during the programming period 
2014-2020. It concerns all funds and most of the Member States. An analysis of this trend has 
been published with the past year’s PIF Report. 

Concerning fraud, risks seem to be higher in the areas of the cohesion policy related to: (i) 
transport  and  environment  protection,  because  of  the  high  financial  amounts  involved  in 
irregularities;  (ii)  research,  technological  development  and  innovation  (RTD&I)  and 
employment,  because  of  the  frequency  of  fraudulent  irregularities.  Concerning  fraud  in 

6 

 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

relation  to  the  green  transition,  analysis  suggests  higher  risks  for  investments  in  (i)  energy 
efficiency;  (ii)  provision  of  drinking  water;  (iii)  waste  management.  Concerning  fraud  in 
relation to trasport and networks, analysis suggests higher risks  for investments in (i)  roads 
that are not part of TEN (Trans-European Network), because of the number of irregularities, 
probably linked to the higher number of projects which reach the regional or local level; (ii) 
railways and TEN roads, because of the high financial amounts involved. Concerning fraud 
in  relation  to  social  inclusion,  analysis  suggests  higher  risks  for  investments  in  active 
inclusion and in healthcare infrastructure.  

took  place,  which  often  consisted 

Concerning fraud, the most frequent  type of violations concerned supporting documents. 
High  financial  amounts  were  involved  in  fraudulent  irregularities  where  infringements  of 
incomplete  or 
contract  provisions/rules 
non-implementation of the funded action. Infringements of public procurement rules were 
the most reported non-fraudulent irregularities. They rarely led to a suspicion of fraud. This 
suggests  that  either  fraud  detection,  investigation  and  prosecution  or  the  administrative 
capability  of  contracting  authorities  should  be  improved.  Most  of  fraudulent  violations 
concerning ethics and integrity were related to conflict of interests. Ethichs and integrity is 
the  category  of  infringement  with  the  highest  frequency  of  fraud.  Corruption  was  rarely 
reported. 

in 

During  2018-2022,  risk  analysis  still  only  marginally  contributed  to  detecting  fraud,  while 
tips  from  informants,  whistle  blowers  or  information  published  in  the  media  played  a 
significant  role.  In  relation  to  non-fraudulent  irregularities,  neither  risk  analysis  nor 
information  from  civil  society  played  a  noticeable  role  in  detection.  The  low  share  of 
irregularities detected following risk analysis suggests room for improvement in this domain, 
including  through  ex-post  risk  analysis  projects  focusing  on  groups  of  past  transactions,  in 
view of targeted ex-post controls. 

With regard to the programming period 2014-2020, on average, it took about one year and a 
half to come to a suspicion that a fraudulent irregularity had been committed and more than 
two  years  to  close  the  fraudulent  case  after  reporting  to  the  Commission.  These  average 
times  are  expected  to  increase  as  the  implementation  of  the  2014-2020  operational 
programmes progresses.  

The  Fraud  Detection  Rate  for  the  programming  period  2014-2020  is  0.48%,  which  is 
similar  to  the  programming  period  2007-2013.  The  Irregularity  Detection  Rate  is  0.61%, 
which is much lower than the rate recorded for the programming period 2007-2013 (2.5%). 
Detection and reporting varies significantly between Member States. 

The Member States are requested to detect suspected fraud …  

For just 7% of the irregularities reported during 2014-2022, there is or there was a suspicion 
of fraud (incidence of fraud). For 14% of such irregularities, this suspicion was not initially 
detected  or  reported.  The  Member  State  reclassified  the  irregularity  as  fraudulent  at  a  later 
stage.  

… and then follow-up suspect fraud, until the case is dismissed or fraud is established. 

For just 11% of the irregularities with a suspicion of fraud, the suspicion was then confirmed 
into  established  fraud  and  for  just  13%  the  suspicion  was  dismissed.  These  percentages  do 
not significantly change year on year. Most of the irregularities where there was a suspicion 
of fraud are still classified as suspected fraud, even if several years from initial reporting have 

7 

 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

elapsed. This percentage changes year on year, but is very high also for years that are further 
in the past. 

Significant  differences  between  Member  States  can  be  noticed  in  the  above  mentioned 
percentages.  The  same  considerations  made  above  in  relation  to  the  Common  Agricultural 
Policy  can  be  made  here  with  reference  to  the  Cohesion  and  Fisheries  policies  for  the 
Member  States  with  low  incidence  of  fraud  or  high  percentage  of  irregularities  that  are 
still classified as suspected fraud. 

Expenditure - Pre-accession 

Irregularities  reported  during  the  period  2018-2022  in  relation  to  pre-accession  mainly 
concerned  funds  distributed  under  the  2007-2013  Instrument  for  Pre-accession  Assistance  I 
(IPA I) and the 2014-2020 IPA II. There were no irregularities reported under the 2021-2027 
IPA III yet.  

For pre-accession, there is no reporting threshold of EUR 10 000 as there is instead for the 
Common Agricultural Policy or the Cohesion and Fisheries policies. The financial amounts 
involved were below EUR 10 000 for 44% of the pre-accession irregularities reported during 
2018-2022. This percentage was higher for non-fraudulent irregularities (about 47%), while it 
was  much  lower  for  fraudulent  irregularities  (about  14%).  However,  the  financial  amounts 
involved in these ‘below-10 000’ irregularities represented just 1% of the financial amounts 
involved in all pre-accession irregularities reported during 2018-2022. 

From  2021  to  2022,  both  the  number  of  non-fraudulent  irregularities  and  the  financial 
amounts  involved  experienced  exceptional  increases.  For  the  number  of  cases,  this  was 
mainly  due  to  irregularities  related  to  the  2014-2020  IPA  II  in  relation  to  IPARD  in  North 
Macedonia and Türkiye. For most of these irregularities, the financial amounts involved were 
below  EUR  10 000.  The  increase  in  financial  amounts  was  due  to  irregularities  concerning 
IPARD in Albania.  

About  10%  of  the  irregularities  detected  during  the  past  five  years  were  reported  as 
fraudulent. This percentage changed over time, increasing significantly in 2020 (17%) and 
peaking in 2021 at 20%. 

Considering all IPA I irregularities since 2007, for 37% of these irregularities the financial 
amounts involved were below EUR 10 000. Concerning these ‘below-10 000’ irregularities: 
(i) about 53% of them were related to cross-border cooperation programmes (CBC-IPA); (ii) 
Bulgaria  (34%),  Croatia  (24%)  and  Türkiye  (21%)  reported  most  of  them.    In  general,  the 
highest  number  of  irregularities  concerned  IPARD,  mainly  due  to  reporting  by  Türkiye. 
Only two other countries, Croatia and North Macedonia, reported IPARD cases. A broader 
range  of  countries  reported  irregularities  concerning  cross-border  cooperation  programmes 
(CBC-IPA),  the  second  most  affected  component  of  IPA  I.  The  majority  of  these 
irregularities were reported by Bulgaria and were ‘below-10 000’. Besides reporting most of 
the  IPARD  irregularities,  Türkiye  also  reported  most  of  the  irregularities  related  to  the 
human  resources  development  (HRD)  programmes,  the  third  most  affected  component  of 
IPA I, in terms of number of irregularities. 

All but one irregularity concerning IPA II were reported during the past five years. For 58% 
of  these  irregularities  the  financial  amounts  involved  were  below  EUR 10 000.  Concerning 
these  ‘below-10 000’  irregularities:  (i)  about  83%  of  them  concerned  IPARD;  (ii)  Türkiye 
and North Macedonia reported 83% of them; (iii) about 58% of them were reported in 2022 
(see above about the peak in 2022). In general and by far, the highest number of IPA II cases 

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

and the highest financial amounts concerned IPARD. The IPA II irregularities were reported 
by  seven  countries,  with  Türkiye  and  North  Macedonia  as  main  contributors.  However, 
most of the financial amounts were involved in irregularities reported by Albania. 

With  specific  reference  to  fraudulent  irregularities  related  to  IPA  II,  about  62%  of  them 
were reported by Türkiye and 29% by Serbia. About 73% of them concerned IPARD. The 
number of fraudulent irregularities related to  IPA II peaked in 2021. Most of this peak was 
due to IPARD irregularities reported by Türkiye.  

Expenditure - Direct management 

For the financial year 2022, a total of EUR 81 201 million has been disbursed under direct 
management.  Over  58%  of  those  payments  were  related  to  the  Recovery  and  Resilience 
Facility  (RRF).  The  Commission  services  registered  770  recovery  items  qualified  as 
irregularities, for a total financial value EUR 61.28 million. Among these recovery items, 37 
have  been  reported  as  fraudulent,  involving  EUR  5.67  million.  By  the  end  of  2022,  no 
recovery orders concerned the RRF. 

The ratio between the financial amounts related to the ‘irregularities reported as fraudulent’ 
and  expenditure  during  2018-2022  was  stable  and  close  to  zero  (0.03%).  This  ratio  was 
higher for the ‘irregularities not reported as fraudulent’ (0.22%). 

During 2018-2022, with regard to ‘irregularities not reported as fraudulent’, 74% of the total 
number of recovery items and 70% of the related recovery amounts concerned legal entities 
that  are  resident  in  the  EU-27.  For  ‘irregularities  reported  as  fraudulent’,  these  ratios  are 
slightly lower: 73% of the total number of recovery items  and 68% of the related recovery 
amounts. 

During  2018-2022,  with  reference  to  the  ‘irregularities  reported  as  fraudulent’,  OLAF  was 
the source of detection for 88% of the recovery items, accounting for 92% of total recovery 
amounts.  About  97%  of  ‘irregularities  not  reported  as  fraudulent’  were  detected  through 
controls carried out by the Commission (ex-ante and ex-post controls). 

For the recovery orders issued between 2018 and 2022, 56% of the total irregular amounts 
have  already  been  recovered.  The  recovery  rate  for  ‘irregularities  reported  as  fraudulent’ 
(34%)  remains  well  below  the  one  calculated  for  ‘irregularities  not  reported  as  fraudulent’ 
(59%). 

9 

 
 
INTRODUCTION  

1. 

INTRODUCTION 

Scope of the document 

1.1. 
This document1 presents a statistical evaluation of the irregularities and fraud detected by the 
Member States during 2022, in the context of past  years and relevant programming periods 
(PP).  It  covers  both  the  revenue  and  expenditure  sides  of  the  EU  budget.  This  analysis  is 
based  on  the  notifications  provided  by  national  authorities  of  cases  of  irregularities  and 
suspected or established fraud. Their reporting is performed in fulfilment of a legal obligation 
enshrined  in  sectoral  European  legislation.  The  document  accompanies  the  Annual  Report 
adopted on the basis of article 325(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU),  according  to  which  “The  Commission,  in  cooperation  with  Member  States,  shall 
each year submit to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the measures 
taken for the implementation of this article”. Therefore, this document should be regarded as 
an analysis of the achievements of the Member States, in terms of detection and reporting. 

The methodology (including the definition of terms and indicators), the data sources and the 
data  capture  systems  are  explained  in  detail  in  the  Commission  Staff  Working  Document  – 
Methodology for the Statistical Evaluation of Irregularities accompanying the Annual Report 
on the Protection of the EU financial interests for the year 20152. 

1.1. 

Structure of the document 

The  present  document  is  divided  in  five  parts.  The  first  part  includes  an  analysis  of  the 
irregularities reported in the area of traditional own resources (revenue). The following parts 
of the document are dedicated to irregularities reported in the area of expenditure (i) for the 
Common  Agricultural  Policy;  (ii)  for  the  cohesion  policy,  fisheries  and  other  internal 
policies; (iii) for the pre-accession policy and (iv) under direct management. 

The  document  is  completed  by  27  country  factsheets,  which,  for  each  Member  State,  (i) 
summarise  the  main  indicators  and  information  on  the  detection  of  irregularities  and  fraud; 
(ii) provide a picture of the anti-fraud landscape. 

Several  annexes  complement  the  information  and  data,  providing  a  global  overview  of  the 
irregularities reported according to the relevant sector regulations. Annexes 1 to 12 concern 
Traditional Own Resources.  Annex 13 cover  all  the expenditure sectors  for which Member 
States and beneficiary countries have a reporting obligation. 

1 This document does not represent an official position of the Commission. 
2 SWD(2016)237final 
 http://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/sites/antifraud/files/methodology_statistical_evaluation_2015_en.pdf 

10 

 
 
                                                 
TRADITIONAL OWN RESOURCES 

2. 

TRADITIONAL OWN RESOURCES (TOR) 

2.1. 

Introduction 

The  TOR  statistics  for  the  2022  PIF  report  are  prepared  based  on  the  total  estimated  and 
established amount as reported in OWNRES3.  Figures on recovery are based only on established 
amounts.  For comparability reasons  with  previous  years, the analysis for  this  section is carried 
out  based  on  the  figures  obtained  for  the  European  Union  of  27  Member  States  (EU-27).  The 
UK’s figures can nevertheless be found in the annexes.  

The following analysis is  based on the data available on the  cut-off date  (15 March 2023) and 
aims to provide an overview of cases of fraud and irregularities reported for 2022 together with 
their financial impact. 

2.2. 

General analysis –Trend analysis 

2.2.1.  Reporting years 2018-2022 

The  number  of  cases  reported  via  OWNRES  for  2022  (4 661)  is  about  7.6  %  higher  than  the 
average number of cases reported for the 5-year period 2018-2022 (4 332). The total estimated 
and  established  amount  of  TOR  involved  (EUR 783 million)  is  about  47%  higher  than  the 
average estimated and established amount for years 2018-2022 (EUR 532 million)4.   

CHART TOR1: Total number of OWNRES cases and the related estimated and established amount (2018-2022) 

In  2022,  the  total  amount  was  significantly  affected  by  four  big  cases5  of  non-fraudulent 
irregularities  that  were  reported  in  Belgium  (EUR 305 million).  Three  big  cases  were  also 
reported in the Netherlands and Poland (altogether EUR 41 million). To compare, nine big cases 
for a total  amount of EUR 143 million  affected the total estimated and  established amount for 
2021. 

2.2.1.1.  Irregularities reported as fraudulent 

The  number  of  cases  reported  as  fraudulent  (454)  is  currently  6.8%  lower  than  the  average 
number of cases reported for the 5-year period 2018-2022 (487). Similarly, there is a decrease of 
21%  in  the  total  established  and  estimated  amount  of  TOR  in  2022  (EUR  103  million) 

3 The OWNRES application allows Member States to report cases of fraud or irregularity involving traditional own 
resources of more than EUR 10 000, as required by Article 5(1) of Regulation No 2021/768. 
4 See Annex 1. 
5 Cases with an amount of TOR exceeding EUR 10 million.   

11 

 
 
                                                 
TRADITIONAL OWN RESOURCES 

compared to the average amount for years 2018-2022 (EUR 131 million)6.  However, this might 
be linked to the delayed effects of COVID-19 crisis that are now being phased out. 

CHART TOR2: OWNRES cases reported as fraudulent and the related estimated and established amount (2018-2022) 

For  2022,  the  Czech  Republic,  Ireland,  Luxembourg,  Malta,  Slovenia,  and  Sweden  did  not 
communicate any fraudulent case exceeding EUR 10 000.  

On  the  cut-off  date  (15  March  2023),  9.7%  of  all  cases  detected  in  2022  were  classified  as 
fraudulent, which represents a slight decrease compared to a relatively stable period 2020-2021 
(both 12%). 

2.2.1.2.   Irregularities not reported as fraudulent 

On  the  other  hand,  90.3%  of  cases  were  not  reported  as  fraudulent  in  2022  (4 207)  which 
leads to around 9.4% increase compared to the average number of cases communicated for the 
2018-2022 period (3 845). 

CHART TOR3: OWNRES cases not reported as fraudulent and the related estimated and established amount (2018-2022) 

The total estimated and established amount of TOR (EUR 680 million) was about 70% higher 
than  the  average  amount  for  the  5-year  period  (EUR  401  million).  However,  without  the 
above-mentioned  exceptional  case  of  Belgium  (EUR  305  million),  the  numbers  would  remain 
rather stable compared to the average amount for the 5-year period.7  

6 See Annex 2. 
7 See Annex 3. 

12 

 
 
 
                                                 
TRADITIONAL OWN RESOURCES 

Luxembourg did not report any case of irregularity exceeding EUR 10 000 for 2022. 

2.2.2.  OWNRES data vs TOR collection  

According to OWNRES data, about EUR 783 million has been established or estimated by the 
Member States in connection with reported fraudulent or non-fraudulent cases where the amount 
exceeds  EUR  10  000.  In  2022,  the  total  established  amount  of  TOR  (gross)  was  about 
EUR 34,3 billion and nearly 98% was duly recovered and made available to the Commission via 
the A-account.8   

OWNRES  cases  represent  2.33  %  of  the  total  collected  TOR  (gross)  amount  in  2022.  This 
so-called detection rate has increased compared to 2021 when it was 2.11%.9  It seems to be an 
emerging trend – in 2020 the detection rate was only 1.95%.  

A  percentage  of  2.33%  indicates  that  out  of  every  EUR  100  of  TOR  (gross)  established  and 
collected,  an  amount  of  EUR  2.33  is  registered  as  irregular  in  OWNRES  (fraudulent  or 
non-fraudulent).  There  are  differences  among  the  Member  States;  in  Belgium,  Croatia,  and 
Latvia the percentage is above average.  

Differentiation should also be made between the financial impact of fraudulent cases where the 
average  detection  rate  is  much  lower,  i.e.,  0.31%  and  of  non-fraudulent  cases,  where  it  is 
2.03%.10     

2.2.3.  Recovery Rates 

The  fraud  and  irregularity  cases  detected  in  2022  correspond  to  an  established  amount  of 
EUR 715 million.  In total,  EUR 341 million was recovered  by EU-27.  However, the  recovery 
rate  varies  between  the  Member  States.  In  absolute  figures,  Germany  recovered  the  highest 
amount (EUR 121 million).11 

The recovery rate for all cases reported in 2022 is currently 48%. For cases reported in 2021, 
the current recovery rate is 54%, compared to 50% reported last year. Over the past five years, 
the annual recovery rate has varied between 48% and 78%. Analysis shows that recovery is often 
a lengthy process. It can be expected that the recovery rate for 2022 will go up in the future as 
well.  

8 These are provisional figures for EU-27 available as of 15 March 2023 and might be changed in the final financial 
accounts. 
9 On the cut-off date for the 2021 PIF report. 
10 See Annex 4. 
11 See Annex 5. The estimated amounts are excluded. 

13 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
TRADITIONAL OWN RESOURCES 

CHART TOR4: Annual recovery rate (2018-2022) 

Three Member States (Latvia, Malta, and Slovenia) recovered 100%, i.e., the entire established 
amount  has  already  been  recovered.  In  seven  Member  States,  the  recovery  rate  is  above  90% 
(Denmark 91%, Germany 94%, Ireland 92%, Austria 93%, Slovakia 92%, Finland 97%, Sweden 
92%).  

For non-fraudulent cases, there is an increase in  the total recovered amount (EUR 323 million) 
but a decrease in the percentage (50%) compared to the previous year’s statistics. For fraudulent 
cases,  the  tendency  is  exactly  the  opposite:  the  recovered  amount  decreased  in  2022 
(EUR   18 million) but increased in the percentage (25%).12    

2.2.3.1.   Historical recovery rate 

OWNRES data show that the recovery rate for fraudulent cases is in general much lower than for 
non-fraudulent cases. The historical recovery rate (HRR) is 84%.  

Table TOR1: Historical recovery rate (HRR) 

The HRR expresses the recovery result for both complex and easy cases. Established and closed 
cases  from  2020  onwards  are  therefore  excluded  because  these  are  predominantly  easy  cases 
(complex cases can generally not be closed within three years). 

2.3. 

Specific analysis 

2.3.1.  Customs procedure 

The customs procedure ‘release for free circulation’ remains the procedure most affected by all 
irregularities (3 799 cases with an overall amount of EUR 688 million).13 For fraudulent cases, 
release for free circulation covers 85% of the total estimated and established amount registered 
in  OWNRES for all customs  procedures.  In 2022, the number of fraudulent  cases per  customs 
procedure remains rather stable but their estimated and established amount decreased (except for 
‘inward processing’). 

Similarly  for  non-fraudulent  cases,  88%  of  their  estimated  and  established  amount  for  all 
customs  procedures  is  linked  to  ‘release  for  free  circulation’.  Compared  to  2021,  Germany 

12 See Annex 10. The estimated amounts are excluded. 
13 See Annex 6 and 7. 

14 

Irregularities HRR 1989-2019 Reported as fraudulent 66,86 % Reported as non-fraudulent 91,59 % Total 84,43 %   
 
 
                                                 
TRADITIONAL OWN RESOURCES 

reported  in  2022  a  big  increase  in  non-fraudulent  cases  related  to  ‘release  for  free  circulation’ 
whereas  some  of  its  neighbouring  Member  States  reported  an  increase  in  ‘transit’  (e.g.,  Czech 
Republic and the Netherlands) combined with a decrease in ‘release for free circulation’ (e.g. the 
Netherlands).  Customs  procedures 
‘customs  warehousing’  cover  565 
‘transit’  and 
non-fraudulent  cases  for  the  year  2022  which  is  83%  more  than  in  2021.  The  estimated  and 
established amount increased for each customs procedure apart from the category ‘other’.  

2.3.2. 

 Method of detection 

Most  fraudulent  cases  were  discovered  during  inspections  by  anti-fraud  services  (35%). 
Customs  controls  carried  out  at  the  time  of  release  of  the  goods  were  the  second  most 
successful method of detecting fraud (32%), followed by post-release controls (26%). 

CHART TOR5: Method of detection 2022 – Cases reported as fraudulent (by number of cases) 

In monetary terms, these three detection methods combined represent  nearly EUR 96.6 million 
(94%) of the estimated and established amount in fraudulent cases.14 

CHART TOR6: Method of detection 2022 – Cases reported as fraudulent (by estimated and established amount) 

Most  non-fraudulent  cases  were revealed during  post-release controls (50%). Other frequent 
methods  of  detection  for  non-fraudulent  cases  are  release  controls  (23%)  and  voluntary 
admission  (12%).  In  2022,  there  has  been  a  significant  increase  of  111%  in  the  detection  of 
non-fraudulent cases by tax audit compared to 2021, mainly resulting from 235 cases reported 
in Germany.  

14 See Annex 8 and 9.  

15 

 
 
 
                                                 
TRADITIONAL OWN RESOURCES 

CHART TOR7: Method of detection 2022 – Cases not reported as fraudulent (by number of cases) 

Regarding  the  estimated  and  established  amount  of  TOR  in  non-fraudulent  cases,  the  category 
‘other’ played a big role with almost EUR 295 million (43%).15  

CHART TOR8: Method of detection 2022 – Cases not reported as fraudulent (by estimated and established amount) 

2.3.3.  Type of goods, countries of origin 

In  2022,  the  most  vulnerable  goods  were  footwear,  textiles,  vehicles,  articles  of  iron  or/and 
steel, tobacco, electrical machinery and equipment, aluminium. The most common type of fraud 
remains  incorrect  classification/misdescription  and  incorrect  value.  In  monetary  terms, 
China, the United States and Vietnam are the three most important reported countries of origin 
of goods affected by irregularities.  

2.3.3.1.  Smuggled cigarettes 
There were 116 cases of smuggled cigarettes16 registered in OWNRES in  2022. The estimated 
amount of TOR involved is around EUR 38 million (compared to 115 cases and EUR 30 million 
in 2021). The highest number of cases was reported by Lithuania (31), followed by Greece (28) 
and  Spain  (17).  The  highest  amount  was  reported  by  Belgium  (EUR  22.6  million  in  total, 
EUR 2 million  on  average  per  case).  The  second  highest  amount  was  reported  by  Croatia 
(EUR 2.5  million  in  total).  Thirteen  Member  States  have  not  reported  any  case  of  cigarette 
smuggling.17 

15 See Annex 8 and 9. 
16 CN code 2402 2090. 
17  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Ireland,  Italy,  Cyprus,  Luxembourg,  Hungary,  Malta,  the  Netherlands,  Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Finland, Sweden.  

16 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
TRADITIONAL OWN RESOURCES 

Table TOR2: Cases of smuggled cigarettes in 2022 

Compared  to  2021,  ten  Member  States  continue  to  have  smuggling  cases  (Belgium,  Bulgaria, 
Germany, Estonia, Greece, France, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania) whereas some Member 
States appear in the statistics in 2022 (Spain, Croatia, Austria, Portugal).  This might indicate a 
potential shift of fraud or of cigarette smuggling routes to other Member States. 

2.4. 

 Member States’ activities 

In 2022, the Member States reported 454 cases as fraudulent and 4 207 as non-fraudulent out of 
4 661 cases in  total.  This indicates a  Fraud  Frequency Level (FFL)  of 9,7%. Three Member 
States  registered  more  than  50%  of  cases  as  fraudulent  (Bulgaria  64%,  Estonia  75%,  and 
Lithuania 61%). 

There  are  large  differences  between  Member  States’  classifications  of  cases  as  fraudulent 
and non-fraudulent, which may partly depend on their classification practices. This can influence 
the comparison of the amounts involved in cases reported as fraudulent and as non-fraudulent by 
Member States. Moreover, individual bigger cases detected in a specific year may affect annual 
rates significantly. Factors such as the type of traffic, type of trade, the level of compliance of the 
economic operators, the location of a Member State can influence the rates significantly. Bearing 
in mind these variable factors, the rates of incidence can also be affected by the way a Member 
State’s customs control strategy is set up to target risky imports and to detect TOR-related fraud 
and irregularities. 

2.5. 

 Commission’s monitoring  

2.5.1.  Write-off reports 

In 2022, for 19 new write-off reports submitted to the Commission by six Member States, the 
Commission considered that they satisfactorily demonstrated that TOR was lost for reasons not 
imputable to them and were not financially responsible for the loss.18 The Commission assessed 
135  cases  totalling  EUR  76.8  million  in  2022.  In  82  of  these  cases  amounting  to  almost 
EUR 39 million,  the  Commission  considered  that  the  Member  States  did  not  satisfactorily 
demonstrate  that  TOR  was  lost  for  reasons  not  imputable  to  them  and  they  were  financially 
responsible  for  the  loss.  Examination  of  write-off  cases  keeps  playing  a  very  effective 
mechanism that encourages national administrations’ activity in the field of recovery.    

18 See Annex 11. 

17 

TOR: Cases of smuggled cigarettes* in 2022 MS Cases Estimated and established amount N EUR BE 11 22,643,874 BG 1 10,450 DE 1 13,133 EE 2 103,778 EL 28 7,159,394 ES 17 2,074,472 FR 2 421,029 HR 2 2,515,851 LV 3 98,255 LT 31 1,739,559 AT 3 64,047 PL 9 533,874 PT 3 513,942 RO 3 89,332  EU-27  116 37,980,990   
 
                                                 
TRADITIONAL OWN RESOURCES 

2.5.2.  Commission’s inspections 

The Commission services focus on the Member States’ customs control strategies and controls 
during its TOR inspections. These inspections take place either as regular inspections on the spot 
in  the  Member  States  (or  remotely)  or  as  desk  audits.  In  2022,  the  Commission  focused  its 
regular  on-the-spot  inspections  in  the  Member  States  on  (i)  the  control  strategy  for 
e-commerce and low value consignments and (ii) the control strategy for anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties.  

In  2022,  the  Commission’s  desk  audits  were  oriented  towards  three  different  topics:  (i) 
COVID-19  related  goods  subject  to  duty  relief;  (ii)  Binding  Origin  Information  (BOI) 
decisions  and  (iii)  open  B-account  cases  (i.e.,  cases  that  have  not  yet  been  recovered  and  for 
which  either  no  security  has  been  provided  or  the  security  has  been  provided  but  it  has  been 
challenged).  Furthermore,  the  Commission  also  continued  its  close  monitoring  of  Member 
States’ actions and follow-up on observations made during its inspections. 

One  general  conclusion  drawn  by  the  Commission  from  its  inspections  in  Member  States  in 
recent years is that a timely and proactive approach in assessing and monitoring of risks is 
indispensable for an effective protection of the EU’ financial interests. This includes using all 
available  sources  of  information,  exchanging  information  among  services  involved  and  giving 
prompt  feedback  on  actions  taken.  Such  permanent  assessment,  exchange  of  information  and 
monitoring  of  risks,  fraud  trends  and  feedbacks  is  required  for  fine-tuning  the  measures  to  be 
taken and thus for better protection of the EU’s financial interests. 

18 

 
 
COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 

3. 

COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY  

3.1. 

Introduction 

Section 3 presents a statistical evaluation of irregularities and fraud detected by the Member 
States  in  2022  in  expenditure  under  the  common  agricultural  policy  (CAP).  It  provides 
context to these detections by looking at past years and relevant programming periods (PP). 

Over  99%  of  expenditure  under  the  common  agricultural  policy  (CAP)  is  disbursed  by 
Member States under shared management. The Member States must report irregularities and  
fraud  to  the  Commission  through  the  Irregularity  Management  System  (IMS).  When 
reference  is  made  to  fraud,  this  includes  both  suspected  and  established  fraud19. 
Non-fraudulent irregularities must be reported in IMS only when they are detected after the 
expenditure has been introduced in a statement submitted to the Commission. Both fraudulent 
and  non-fraudulent  irregularities  must  be  reported  only  when  involving  financial  amounts 
above  EUR 10 000. Several  Member  States  also  reported  some  irregularities  under  this 
threshold. 

For the purpose of communicating the following findings, CAP is split into two main parts: 
(i) support to agriculture, which includes direct aid to farmers and market measures; (ii) 
rural development. In general, the following findings refer to EU-27.20  

3.2. 

General trend 

Tables  NR1  shows  the  number  of  fraudulent  irregularities  detected  and  reported  by  the 
Member States, during the period 2018-2022, in relation to CAP. Table NR2 focuses on the 
financial  amounts  involved.  Fraudulent  irregularities  reported  for  rural  development 
increased,  mainly  due  to  rising  detections  for  the  programming  period  (PP)  2014-2020. 
However,  the  number  of  these  rural  development  fraudulent  irregularities  was  lower  than 
during the previous programming period, despite the fact that the European Court of Auditors 
considers that rural development has a higher risk of error than direct payments to farmers. 
This situation should be monitored to ensure focus on fraud detection. In 2022, the fraudulent 
irregularities  under  support  to  agriculture  increased,  compared  to  2021,  mainly  due  to 
reporting  related  to  direct  payments  by  two  Member  States,  which  had  not  reported  such 
irregularities  before,  during  the  period  2018-2021.  The  increase  was  partly  due  to  the 
reporting  of  many  irregularities  below  the  EUR  10 000,  which  were  interconnected  and 
exceeding the threshold where considered together.  

19  ‘Suspected  fraud’  means  an  irregularity  that  gives  rise  to  the  initiation  of  administrative  or  judicial 
proceedings at national level in order to establish the presence of intentional behaviour, in particular fraud, as 
referred to in Article 1(1)(a) of the Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European 
Union, on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests. Regardless of the approach adopted 
by  each  Member  State,  ratification  of  the  1995  Convention  has  equipped  every  country  with  a  basis  for 
prosecuting and possibly imposing penalties for specific conducts. If this happens, i.e. a guilty verdict is issued 
and is not appealed against, the case can be considered ‘established fraud’. More recently, the Directive (EU) 
2017/1371 (so-called PIF Directive) defines what the Member States are requested to regard as fraud affecting 
the EU’s financial interests. 
20 For the methodology to identify the irregularities related to direct payments to farmers, market measures and 
rural development, please see Annex 12 to the  ‘Statistical evaluation of  irregularities reported for 2021: own 
resources, agriculture, cohesion and fisheries policies, pre-accession and direct expenditure’, SWD(2022)307. 

19 

 
                                                 
COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 

Tables NR3 shows the number of non-fraudulent irregularities detected and reported by the 
Member States, during the period 2018-2022, in relation to CAP. Table NR4 focuses on the 
financial amounts involved. The number of rural development irregularities not reported as 
fraudulent increased over the period 2020-2022, in line with progress in the implemention of 
PP 2014-2020.  The  decrease  of  reporting  in  comparison  with  the  previous  programming 
period was less noticeable than for fraudulent irregulaties, but it is becoming significant. The 
number of support to agriculture irregularities was rather stable during the past five years.  
The irregular financial amounts fluctuated strongly, mainly due to the reporting in some years 
of cases involving exceptional amounts by one Member State for market measures. 

It happens that the same irregularity cover both rural development and direct payments to 
farmers. This is more frequent for fraudulent irregularities (see SA/RD in the tables above). 

Different  CAP  areas  cannot  be  simply  compared  on  the  basis  of  the  financial  amounts 
involved in irregularities, because this metric is influenced by the total amount of payments 
received by the Member States. For example, these payments are much higher for direct aid 
than  rural  development.  A  better  comparison  can  be  based  on  the  Fraud  (FDR)  and 
Irregularity (IDR) Detection Rates. These are ratios between the financial amounts involved 
in  the  relevant  irregularities  (fraudulent  for  FDR  and  non-fraudulent  for  IDR)  during 
2018-2022 and the relevant payments received by the Member States during the same period. 
These rates are shown in Table NR5. 

20 

20182019202020212022NNNNNNSupport to agriculture (SA)128158125104278793Rural development (RD)10596124152147624SA/RD1210109849TOTAL EU272452642592654331,466UK4895531REPORTING YEARTOTAL PERIODType of supportTable NR1 Number of irregularities reported as fraudulent by type of support - 2018-22 for the CAP20182019202020212022EUREUREUREUREUREURSupport to agriculture (SA)35,345,85113,183,8147,009,45113,095,0498,110,98176,745,146Rural development (RD)23,787,49311,912,81118,671,49516,917,50711,020,09082,309,396SA/RD1,314,9431,925,8972,600,023513,9881,723,9138,078,764TOTAL EU2760,448,28727,022,52228,280,96930,526,54420,854,984167,133,306UK67,213147,531407,66787,90031,846742,157Type of supportTable NR2: Financial amounts involved in irregularities reported as fraudulent by type of support - 2018-22 for the CAPREPORTING YEARTOTAL PERIOD20182019202020212022NNNNNNSupport to agriculture (SA)8308678631,0008434,403Rural development (RD)1,7011,5491,9792,2832,74710,259SA/RD5651263437204TOTAL EU272,5872,4672,8683,3173,62714,866UK771381349456499Table NR3: Number of irregularities not reported as fraudulent by type of support - 2018-22 for the CAPREPORTING YEARType of supportTOTAL PERIODIrregularities not reported as fraudulent in 2022Irregularities not reported as fraudulent 2018-2220182019202020212022EUREUREUREUREUREURSupport to agriculture (SA)41,226,94392,366,89760,332,886104,680,03183,851,944382,458,701Rural development (RD)92,400,32659,224,89592,385,61788,950,63398,351,062431,312,533SA/RD5,699,8925,143,3642,333,5771,745,8254,870,52219,793,180TOTAL EU27139,327,161156,735,156155,052,080195,376,489187,073,528833,564,414UK1,858,3503,175,6973,125,3292,013,1282,826,37212,998,876Table NR4: Financial amounts involved in irregularities not reported as fraudulent by type of support - 2018-22 for the CAPREPORTING YEARType of supportTOTAL PERIODAmounts of irregularities not reported as fraudulent in 2022 
 
 
 
 
COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 

Detection  rates  for  rural  development  were  noticeably  higher  than  for  support  to 
agriculture.  This  is  consistent  with  the    the  findings  of  the  European  Court  of  Auditors, 
according  to  which  payments  made  on  an  entitlement  basis  (such  as  direct  payments  to 
farmers, which represent most of expenditure for support to agriculture) is less prone to error 
than  reimbursement-based  expenditure  (such  as  rural  development).  However,  one  part  of 
support  to  agriculture,  market  measures,  accounted  for  the  highest  FDR  and  IDR.  This 
comparison is influenced by a few cases related to market measures (one fraudulent and four 
non-fraudulent) involving exceptionally high financial amounts (more than EUR 15 million 
each). However, even excluding these irregularities from  the calculation, the FDR and  IDR 
for market measures were the highest.  

3.3. 

Modus operandi 

During the period 2018-2022, for direct payments to farmers, the fraudulent irregularities 
often  concerned  falsification  of  the  request  for  aid  or  of  documentary  proof.  For  example, 
applicants  may  request  payments  for  plots  of  land  they  do  not  have  the  right  to  use,  while 
providing  evidence  through  false  lease  agreements  (with  the  signature  of  unaware 
counterparts, with dead counterparts, concerning unavailable public land) or even false verbal 
rental contracts. Applicants may also artificially create the conditions for receiving financial 
support,  for  example  through  fictitious  transfers,  artificially  splitting  holdings  to  avoid 
ceilings  or  regressive  aid  rates  linked  to  areas  or  number  of  animals,  co-ordinating  with 
entities who do not have the necessary autonomy for conducting farming activities. While for 
many of the reported irregularities the description of the modus operandi is unclear, it seems 
that fraudulent irregularities focused on agricultural practices, including those beneficial for 
the  climate  and  the  environment,  may  be  a  minority  of  the  fraudulent  irregularities 
concerning direct payments to farmers. While keeping on improving checks on entitlements 
related to the main direct payments, agricultural practices, including those beneficial for the 
climate  and  the  environment,  may  also  deserve  more  attention  in  view  of  identifying 
intentional  infringements.  The  same  may  apply  also  to  payments  schemes  based  on  the 
number and type of animals.  

Violations  related  to  the  falsification  of  documentary  proof  or  requests  were  the  most 
frequent  in  relation  to  market  measures.  Violations  concerning  the  implementation  of  the 
action were also quite frequent. For example, infringements related to market measures may 
concern  the  withdrawal  of  agricultural  products  from  the  market,  the  cost,  actual 
implementation  or  actual  use  for  the  intended  purpose  of  investments  by  producer 
organisations  -  such  as  works  for  storage  sites  or  the  purchase  of  machinery  or  equipment. 
Several cases related to  the promotion of agricultural products were investigated by OLAF, 
which  uncovered  complex  fraudulent  schemes,  mainly  based  on  conflict  of  interests, 
kickback  payments,  manipulated  procurement  procedures,  price  inflation,  incomplete 
implementation of the actions. 

For rural development, there were mainly cases of falsification of the documentary proof or 
requests for aid. Falsification may concern, for example, invoices, declarations of equipment 
as  new  while  it  is  second-hand,  bids  in  the  context  of  procurement  and  information  on 
compliance  with  conditions  for  receiving  aid.  A  significant  number  of  irregularities  were 
related to the implementation of the action. While for many of the reported irregularities the 

21 

FDR IDRDirect payments0.02%0.06%Intervention in agricultural markets0.37%2.22%Support to agriculture0.04%0.19%Rural development0.12%0.64%Total CAP0.06%0.31%Table NR5: FDR and IDR by type of CAP expenditure - EU27Type of expenditureIrregularities detected and reported 2018-2022 / Payments 2018-2022Total2.59%0.37%0.76%0.08%0.23% 
 
COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 

description  of  the  modus  operandi  is  unclear,  it  seems  that  most  of  the  fraudulent 
irregularities  concerned  grants 
focus  on  such 
reimbursement-based  funding,  area  and  animal-related  spending  may  also  deserve  more 
attention in view of identifying intentional infringements. 

to  projects.  While  keeping 

the 

Support under rural development may cover a wide range of different measures, which may 
imply different risks. For example, support may be granted to projects that are selected and 
approved  based  on  specified  criteria.  Violations  may  concern  information  the  applicant 
provides  in  view  of  this  selection  or  at  the  moment  of  the  implementation  of  the  selected 
project (about the actual fulfillment of certain criteria). As part of the approved project, the 
beneficiary  may  need  to  procure  equipment,  machinery  or  works.  The  beneficiary  may 
infringe  the  rules  about  procurement,  including  rules  that  may  require  the  beneficiary  to 
choose  the  contractor  on  the  basis  of  a  minimum  number  of  independent  offers.  In  the 
framework of the approved project,  the beneficiary may  request  reimbursement for inflated 
costs or even for costs for inexistent transactions/activities or may ask for reimbursement for 
costs already funded in another context. The beneficiary may fail to follow the business plan, 
to use the investment for the intended purpose or to use it at all. Projects are usually selected 
or  advance  payments  are  made  only  if  the  beneficiary  has  sufficient  financial  capacity  or 
provides  sufficient  guarantees.  The  applicant  may  provide  inaccurate  or  false  information 
about  that.  Access  to  a  subsidy  scheme  may  be  subject  to  respect  of  certain  requirements, 
which  may  be  disregarded  by  the  beneficiary.  Finally,  the  fraudulent  scheme  may  include 
wrongdoings by staff in the national authorities managing the funds. 

3.4. 

Use of risk analysis and information from informants and media 

In the antifraud cycle, the capability of detecting fraud and irregularities is a key feature that 
helps making the system effective and efficient in protecting the EU budget. In the 2017 PIF 
Report, to boost the capability to  detect irregularities, the Commission recommended to the 
Member  States  to  improve  risk  analysis  and  the  use  of  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential 
irregularities and strengthening the protection of whistle blowers that are also a crucial source 
for investigative journalism21. 

During 2018-2022, risk analysis still only marginally contributed to detecting fraud in rural 
development and direct payments to farmers, while it seems to play a stronger role in market 
measures.  Also  the  share  of  fraud  detections  based  on  tips  from  informants  and  whistle 
blowers was low, being the lowest for direct payments to farmers and the highest for market 
measures. Fraud was never detected following information published in the media. 

3.5. 

Duration of the irregularities 

On average, during 2014-2022, it took nearly four years from the start of the irregularity 
to come to a suspicion that a fraudulent irregularity had been or was being committed and 
nearly  three  years  to  close  the  case  after  reporting  to  the  Commission.  These  average 
durations  were  shorter  for  non-fraudulent  irregularities.  The  intentional  nature  of 
fraudulent  irregularities  may  contribute  to  explain  the  longer  duration  from  perpetration  to 
suspicion.  Fraudsters  may  go  to  great  lenghts  to  hide  their  behaviour.  The  longer  delay  in 
closing  fraudulent  cases  is  consistent  with  the  need  to  rely  on  specialised,  more  limited 
resources to investigate fraud and the longer duration of criminal proceedings. 

21 Section 4.3 of the ‘29th Annual Report on the Protection of the EU’s financial interests – Fight against fraud 
–  2017’,  COM(2018)553  final  and  ‘Statistical  evaluation  of  irregularities  reported  for  2017:  own  resources, 
agriculture, cohesion and fisheries policies, pre-accession and direct expenditure’, SWD(2018)386 final.  

22 

 
                                                 
COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 

3.6. 

 Detection and reporting by Member State 

For 2018-2022, for rural development, Table NR6 shows the fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
irregularities reported by each Member State, together with the financial amounts involved, 
the payments received during the same period and the calculation of the FDR and IDR. 

Table NR7 shows the same information for market measures. 

23 

0.010.020.030.040.050.060.070.080.090.0100.0Reporting to case closureDetection to reportingSuspicion to detectionIrregularity to suspicionGraph NR1: Average times from  irregularity to case closure 2014-2022; irregularities reported as fraudulentAvg. duration in months45months7 months9 monthsNumber of irregularities at the basis of these averagetimes From irregularityto suspicion: 2 748From suspicionto detection: 2 627From detection to reporting: 2 832From reporting to case closure: 4170.010.020.030.040.050.060.070.0Reporting to case closureDetection to reportingSuspicion to detectionIrregularity to suspicionGraph NR2: Average times from  irregularity to case closure 2014-2022; irregularities not reported as fraudulentAvg. duration in months24 months29 months6 months6 monthsNumber of irregularities at the basis of these averagetimes From irregularityto suspicion: 25 665From suspicionto detection: 26 458From detection to reporting: 27 538From reporting to case closure:9 06033 monthsPaymentsFDRIDRNEURNEUREUR%%AT164,39013755,1732,831,551,9120.000.03BE00651,523,869424,774,4770.000.36BG161,356,10690652,212,8961,402,483,8130.103.72CY0000100,747,3830.000.00CZ191,762,8032275,154,8241,850,615,4580.100.28DE15842,07722210,569,6266,677,093,6330.010.16DK606,167,459262,268,979503,450,1851.230.45EE598,226,2271385,209,738560,015,1471.470.93ES5647,27299131,258,4575,744,026,4320.010.54FI141,297612,085,3391,900,242,3170.000.11FR371,194,13358411,486,0939,578,556,1850.010.12GR001,08814,662,2503,019,541,5260.000.49HR61,028,1211645,619,7661,622,615,1570.060.35HU191,225,02861218,301,8092,690,097,6860.050.68IE005137,9621,693,043,5490.000.01IT4413,067,08553054,982,0297,213,654,2980.180.76LT331,552,09936511,951,4581,021,143,9570.151.17LU00258,48687,990,6180.000.07LV18794,788692,136,582784,546,7130.100.27MT2132,000121,044,69171,882,1700.181.45NL5196,316161,082,946587,856,8790.030.18PL402,145,2061,10031,971,2836,039,403,7550.040.53PT17844,5291,32952,602,4632,586,004,6030.032.03RO21740,220,3481,53697,826,1115,510,676,3700.731.78SE112,947251,285,8761,368,388,8060.000.09SI3145,337471,288,889606,391,3010.020.21SK6643,83012613,834,937888,287,7540.071.56TOTAL EU2762482,309,39810,259431,312,53267,365,082,0840.120.64UK (1)23432,8623709,622,380Table NR6: 2018-2022 - Rural development: number of irregularities reported, amounts involved, payments received and detection rates by Member State Member StateIrregularities reported as fraudulent(1) As of 1 February 2020, the UK is no longer part of the EU Irregularities not reported as fraudulent 
 
 
COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 

Table NR8 focuses on direct payments to farmers. 

The  detection  of  irregularities  was  concentrated  in  a  few  Member  States.  A  deeper 
analysis of concentration was included in the 2018 PIF Report.22 That analysis found that the 

22  Section  3.4.3  of  ‘Statistical  evaluation  of  irregularities  reported  for  2018:  own  resources,  agriculture, 
cohesion and fisheries policies, pre-accession and direct expenditure’, SWD(2019)365 final. 

24 

PaymentsFDRIDRNEURNEUREUR%%AT61,320,66311906,022128,331,5381.030.71BE005453,910348,813,4220.000.13BG138,738,352213,857,670129,805,1026.732.97CY000031,615,9960.000.00CZ23,953,6967200,34296,524,9894.100.21DE2573,31122608,349683,473,7430.080.09DK195,2170061,861,3240.150.00EE000011,266,8650.000.00ES2705,51845822,510,3952,946,488,5550.020.76FI00236,79844,903,6050.000.08FR17532,92636123,842,8662,856,184,4010.020.83GR12,543,01723859,338323,863,9190.790.27HR0071,486,41362,827,1280.002.37HU190,564707,378,154207,756,5000.043.55IE0000120,762,7340.000.00IT4457,86624713,689,9193,276,188,7850.010.42LT007380,77348,294,7190.000.79LU00003,083,3990.000.00LV000023,344,1550.000.00MT00001,270,7110.000.00NL0018392,326195,166,6980.000.20PL1026,531,957146190,782,846235,005,42911.2981.18PT4437,3551225,658,639528,756,1520.081.07RO71,355,0298711,639,285275,845,0040.494.22SE00140,44772,875,8140.000.06SI147,5096175,78736,966,4610.130.48SK003118,77260,245,9610.000.20TOTAL EU277147,382,9801,624285,019,05112,811,523,1090.372.22UK (1)006607,058Table NR7: 2018-2022 - Market measures: number of irregularities reported, amounts involved, payments received and detection rates by Member State Member StateIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent(1) As of 1 February 2020, the UK is no longer part of the EU PaymentsFDRIDRNEURNEUREUR%%AT00348,8273,438,036,1340.000.00BE0028626,9142,467,463,7350.000.03BG0018289,9573,983,370,2750.000.01CY0000241,131,1110.000.00CZ3417,54231553,6474,240,960,7160.010.01DE13511,4681373,595,89023,608,238,2410.000.02DK0020436,2934,070,428,4610.000.01EE0000753,429,0030.000.00ES45898,48645210,697,00325,406,465,1140.000.04FI0010313,2322,604,425,7800.000.01FR1422,384,1158230,72634,699,629,7530.010.00GR110,4404397,372,1979,929,947,2560.000.07HR00531,339,6091,549,289,6590.000.09HU0013321,0196,367,202,6570.000.01IE00005,959,012,4610.000.00IT16214,437,86197756,401,61218,024,840,8690.080.31LT477,6281282,729,1742,490,458,5750.000.11LU0000166,049,3090.000.00LV007153,0081,364,668,8150.000.01MT000025,437,7300.000.00NL24902,03942520,7813,379,812,3520.030.02PL311,419,7771095,012,68416,802,296,3150.010.03PT217,370511,202,8103,538,893,8770.000.03RO32612,213,26733919,516,5489,324,445,1190.130.21SE118,7117111,1233,416,740,1870.000.00SI00468,459667,695,6120.000.01SK142,436,476492,022,5882,133,376,2030.110.09TOTAL EU2776835,745,1802,925113,564,101190,653,745,3190.020.06UK (1)8309,2951212,744,325Table NR8: 2018-2022 - Direct payments: number of irregularities reported, amounts involved, payments received and detection rates by Member State Member StateIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent(1) As of 1 February 2020, the UK is no longer part of the EU  
 
 
                                                 
COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 

concentration  of  detections  went  beyond  what  could  be  expected  given  the  level  of 
concentration of payments. This could be due to many different factors, including different 
underlying  levels  of  irregularities  and  fraud,  differences  in  the  quality  of  the  prevention  or 
detection work or different practices concerning the stage of the procedure when potentially 
fraudulent  irregularities  are  reported.  The  concentration  of  detections  was  more 
accentuated  for  fraudulent  rather  than  for  non-fraudulent  irregularities.  This  suggests 
that different approaches to criminal investigation and prosecution could be an additional 
and  significant  factor  giving  rise  to  these  different  levels  of  detection  across  the  Member 
States. 

3.7. 

Follow-up to suspected fraud 

The  Member  States  may  report  irregularities  as  non-fraudulent  (just  administrative 
irregularities)  or  as  fraudulent  (suspected  or  established  fraud)  and  they  may  change  this 
classification during the lifetime of the irregularities. 

For 11% of the irregularities reported during 2014-2022, there is or there was a suspicion 
of fraud. This percentage does not significantly change in the different years of the timespan 
considered  in  the  analysis  (irregularities  are  associated  to  the  year  of  first  reporting).  For 
11% of the irregularities where there is or there was a suspicion of fraud, this suspicion was 
not  initially  detected  or  reported.  The  Member  State  reclassified  the  irregularity  as 
fraudulent at a later stage.  

For  just  14%  of  the  irregularities  with  a  suspicion  of  fraud,  the  suspicion  was  then 
confirmed  into  established  fraud  (see  Graph  NR3  below).  This  does  not  significantly 
change year on year. It could have been expected to be higher for years that are further in the 
past, because more time was available to finalise the case.  

For  just  10%  of  the  irregularities  with  a  suspicion  of  fraud,  the  suspicion  was  then 
dismissed  (see  Graph  NR3  below).  This  percentage  tend  to  be  higher  for  the  period 
2014-2017 than for the more recent period 2018-2022, in line with expectations. 

25 

 
COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 

Most  of  the  irregularities  where  there  was  a  suspicion  of  fraud  are  still  classified  as 
suspected fraud, even if several  years  from  initial reporting have  elapsed (see Graph NR3 
above). This percentage changes year on year, but is very high also for years that are further 
in the past. In addition, 13% of these irregularities that are still pending as suspected fraud are 
already closed, so no changes can be expected.  

Focusing  on  the  irregularities  that  were  initially  reported  during  2014-2018,  significant 
differences  between  Member  States  can  be  noticed  (see  Table  NR8).  Focusing  on  this 
period means focusing on irregularities that have been reported between four and nine years 
ago.  In  the  Member  States  with  low  incidence  of  fraud,  the  competent  authorities  should 
invest  in  detecting  signals  of  fraud  and,  when  discovering  irregularities,  should  carefully 
address the question of intentionality. Low incidence of fraud could also be due to reporting 
practices  delaying  the  classification  as  suspected  fraud.  Considering  that  the  most  recent 
irregularities  in  this  analysis  have  been  reported  four  years  ago,  these  reporting  practices 
should be reviewed or the engagement with the judicial authorities should be improved. 

In  many  Member  States,  the  percentage  of  irregularities  that  are  still  classified  as 
suspected fraud is extremely high. This may suggest that either the judicial authorities do 
not  give  proper  follow-up  to  these  suspicions  -  including  because  they  may  not  have 
sufficient  resources  -  or  that  there  are  no  proper  communication  channels  from  judicial  to 
reporting  authorities.  In  addition,  many  irregularities  that  are  still  classified  as  suspected 
fraud are closed. This may due to persistent suspicions of the paying agencies, while criminal 
proceedings were not started, were prevented by the statute of limitations or did not lead to 
enough evidence about fraud. It could also be that in some Member States cases were closed 
because  the  competent  bodies  had  finalised  administrative  actions  (for  example,  full 
recovery), even if the penal proceedings were still ongoing.  

26 

 
 
COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 

27 

N.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENAT00%0%3%00%00%3100%33%BE00%0%2%00%1100%00%NABG82%9%18%3034%67%5159%98%CY00%0%21%00%00%6100%0%CZ32%8%18%38%3588%25%100%DE31%9%9%1958%824%618%67%DK11%7%15%427%533%640%50%EE43%14%16%13%1138%1759%18%ES20%5%3%3170%00%1330%92%FR00%0%73%914%12%5384%53%FI00%NA0%00%00%00%NAGR51%28%3%00%00%18100%72%HR22%13%14%425%638%638%100%HU182%8%20%3113%157%18480%73%IE10%3%12%13%39%3189%97%IT894%35%10%3012%62%21986%88%LT10%3%5%00%00%40100%93%LU00%0%50%00%00%1100%100%LV55%16%24%26%619%2475%75%MT00%0%4%00%00%1100%100%NL20%9%5%14%730%1565%100%PL81%2%31%9825%4411%25764%75%PT101%34%2%00%310%2690%69%RO301%6%14%122%13127%34571%97%SE00%0%3%00%00%2100%100%SI00%0%12%00%18%1192%73%SK74%21%18%412%13%2985%100%EU-271991%10%11%28014%29015%1,36671%83%(3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified are fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reportedTable NR8: CAP: follow-up to suspected fraud by Member State - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018(1) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) Member StateReclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraudIncidence of fraud (3) 
 
COHESION AND FISHERIES 

4. 

COHESION AND FISHERIES POLICIES  

4.1. 

Introduction 

Section 4 presents a statistical evaluation of irregularities and fraud detected by the Member 
States  during  2022,  with  reference  to  the  cohesion  and  fishery  policies.  It  places  these 
detections in the context of past years and relevant programming periods. 

Expenditure  under  the  cohesion  and  fisheries  policies  is  disbursed  by  the  Member  States 
under shared management. The Member States must report irregularities and cases of fraud to 
the  Commission  through  the  Irregularity  Management  System  (IMS).  When  reference  is 
made  to  fraud,  this  includes  both  suspected  and  established  fraud.23  Non-fraudulent 
irregularities  must  be  reported  only  when  they  are  detected  after  the  expenditure  has  been 
introduced in a statement submitted to the Commission. Both fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
irregularities  must  be 
financial  amounts  above 
EUR 10 000. Several Member States also reported some irregularities under this threshold. 

reported  only  when 

involving 

4.2. 

General trend 

Fraudulent irregularities related to programming period (PP) 2007-2013 peaked in 2015, 
gradually decreased in the following years and in 2018 they were overtaken by those related 
to PP 2014-2020 (see Table CP1 below). These dynamics are in line with known trends and 
patterns  in  the  detection  and  reporting  of  irregularities  and  are  linked  to  the  PP  2007-2013 
and PP 2014-2020 implementation cycles. 

For  PP  2014-2020,  the  financial  amounts  experienced  two  extreme  peaks  at 
EUR 660 million, in 2018, and at EUR 540 million, in 2021 (see Table CP2 below). In 2018, 
this  was  due  to  two  ERDF  irregularities  reported  by  Slovakia,  accounting  together  for 
EUR 590  million.  In  2021,  the  peak  was  mainly  due  to  one  ERDF  irregularity  reported  by 
Romania,  accounting  for  about  EUR  280  million  and  one  CF  irregularity  reported  by 
Slovakia, accounting for about EUR 120 million.  

23 See footnote 19. 

28 

20182019202020212022NNNNNNProgramming period 2014-20161101229182175848CF2312491067ERDF9468142131100535ESF3323593855208EMFF119441038Programming period 2007-1311770465130314CF2645118ERDF9540373021223ESF2018412054EFF0614819Programming period 2000-06200013ERDF200013TOTAL EU272801712752332061,165UK3341011Table CP1: Number of irregularities reported as fraudulent between 2018 and 2022 by programming period - Cohesion and fisheries policiesFUND / PROGRAMMING PERIODREPORTING YEARTOTAL PERIOD 
 
                                                 
COHESION AND FISHERIES 

The  decrease  in  the  number  of  non-fraudulent  irregularities  and  financial  amounts 
related to PP 2007-2013 was significant (see Tables CP3 and CP4). This is in line with the 
multiannual nature of structural programmes, which were closed already in 2015. In 2020 and 
2021, the financial amounts increased, just because of single cases with very high financial 
amounts involved.  

In practice, reporting  of non-fraudulent irregularities  related to  PP 2014-2020 began in 
2016. Since then, these  detections and irregular  financial amounts have  been increasing  for 
all funds, but less than expected when compared to the previous programming period. In 
2021, the financial  amounts  involved  increased  significantly. One ESF irregularity  reported 
by Greece (accounting for EUR 108 million) contributed to this abrupt increase.     

29 

20182019202020212022EUREUREUREUREUREURProgramming period 2014-20663,631,03719,152,64385,156,929539,041,417121,292,8361,428,274,862CF17,184,3671,041,15140,870,281160,098,05933,308,454252,502,312ERDF639,269,81615,928,90735,454,378367,907,68679,258,1851,137,818,972ESF6,115,4491,819,2936,117,49210,546,0787,707,26332,305,575EMFF1,061,405363,2922,714,778489,5941,018,9345,648,003Programming period 2007-13148,534,03721,526,32844,442,61928,882,51747,422,037290,807,538CF326,6962,580,0641,902,89210,235,8943,765,66018,811,206ERDF110,780,56217,994,17438,274,56115,913,76225,033,132207,996,191ESF37,426,779293,1104,212,3881,732,086043,664,363EFF0658,98052,7781,000,77518,623,24520,335,778Programming period 2000-061,724,592000455,6752,180,267ERDF1,724,592000455,6752,180,267TOTAL EU27813,889,66640,678,971129,599,548567,923,934169,170,5481,721,262,667UK999,0241,193,812250,894002,443,730Table CP2: Financial amounts related to the irregularities reported as fraudulent between 2018-2022 by programming period - Cohesion and fisheries policiesFUND / PROGRAMMING PERIODREPORTING YEARTOTAL PERIOD20182019202020212022NNNNNNProgramming period 2014-208251,2891,9552,0992,4018,569CF96142123117195673ERDF4647631301131716185,463ESF2543484976024962,197EMFF1136346392236Programming period 2007-139223783051861011,892CF8234322519192ERDF607298222136661,329ESF2132836138298EFF20181512873Programming period 2000-0661275232ERDF51123021ESF101215GUID014016TOTAL EU271,7531,6792,2672,2902,50410,493UK142193304350271,016Table CP3: Number of irregularities not reported as fraudulent between 2018 and 2022 by Programming period - Cohesion and fisheries policiesFUND / PROGRAMMING PERIODREPORTING YEARTOTAL PERIOD 
 
 
COHESION AND FISHERIES 

4.3. 

Comparison programming periods 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 

The  programming  period  2014-2020  started  about  nine  years  ago.  To  put  the  trend 
concerning the programming period 2014-2020 into perspective, it can be compared with the 
number  and  financial  amounts  of  the  irregularities  that  were  recorded  during  the  first  nine 
years of the programming period 2007-2013.  

Until the eight  year from the start of the programming periods, the number of irregularities 
reported  as  fraudulent  was  similar  for  PP  2014-2020  and  PP  2007-2013  (see  Graph  CP1 
below).  During  the  ninth  year,  PP  2014-2020  lagged  behind.  This  is  influenced  by 
reporting from Spain for ERDF.24 However, the strongest decrease concerned the ESF, partly 
compensated  by  the  increase  related  to  Cohesion  Fund.  Excluding  outliers  (irregularities 
where more than EUR 100 million were involved) also the financial amounts involved in the 
fraudulent irregularities reported for PP 2014-2020 were lower than PP 2007-2013. 

24  During  PP  2007-2013,  at  the  end  of  2015  (see  sudden  increased  in  the  blue  curve  in  Graph  CP1)  Spain 
reported  in  IMS  about  100  fraudulent  irregularities,  for  specific  reasons.  During  PP  2014-2020,  Spain  has 
instead reported just four fraudulent irregularities related to ERDF in IMS, also because of a reporting backlog, 
which has not been solved yet. 

30 

20182019202020212022EUREUREIREUREUREURProgramming period 2014-20213,969,815276,940,251340,158,934475,552,497481,456,9381,788,078,435CF57,332,287106,269,43298,574,48746,473,915127,027,301435,677,422ERDF113,738,850122,646,777203,160,435211,916,235310,490,065961,952,362ESF42,155,59444,271,30835,627,737209,829,59836,032,854367,917,091EMFF743,0843,752,7342,796,2757,332,7497,906,71822,531,560Programming period 2007-13163,512,75681,734,643121,767,368160,594,09525,351,451552,960,313CF23,304,02313,797,87244,181,28692,396,1667,370,201181,049,548ERDF120,319,76258,585,55763,748,96463,077,86716,378,925322,111,075ESF18,881,5054,420,79110,891,6184,014,145776,60238,984,661EFF1,007,4664,930,4232,945,5001,105,917825,72310,815,029Programming period 2000-061,124,36315,716,114424,1691,209,531588,69819,062,875ERDF1,097,72315,443,614199,069178,596016,919,002ESF26,640065,8221,030,935498,7341,622,131GUID0272,500159,278089,964521,742TOTAL EU27378,606,934374,391,008462,350,471637,356,123507,397,0872,360,101,623UK954,0202,000,2659,208,68410,585,7821,567,13524,315,886Table CP4: Financial amounts related to irregularities not reported as fraudulent between 2018 and 2022 by Programming period - Cohesion and fisheries policiesREPORTING YEARTOTAL PERIODFUND / PROGRAMMING PERIOD 
 
 
                                                 
COHESION AND FISHERIES 

Focusing instead on the non-fraudulent irregularities, the fall in the number of cases and 
the financial amounts reported after nine  years from the start  of the programming period  is 
striking (see Graph CP2 below). It concerns all funds and most of the Member States. 

A specific analysis has been carried out on the strong decline in non-fraudulent irregularities. 
This analysis identified a number of potential explanations that may cover part of this strong 
decrease. These hypotheses have been mentioned in the 2021 PIF Report 25. 

4.4. 

Specific analysis – irregularities and fraud by area of the cohesion policy 

The operational programmes financed under the EU cohesion policy are implemented along 
identified intervention fields. An analysis of the irregularities by intervention field has been 
published in the 2021 PIF Report, where further details can be found.26 Below, some of the 
main findings are briefly mentioned. 

Concerning fraud, risks seem to be higher in the areas of the cohesion policy related to: 

 

transport and environment protection, because of the high financial amounts involved 
in fraudulent irregularities; 

  research,  technological  development  and  innovation  (RTD&I)  and  employment, 

because of the frequency of fraudulent irregularities. 

Concerning  fraud  in  relation  to  the  green  transition,  analysis  suggests  higher  risks  for 
investments  in  (i)  energy  efficiency  (including  renovation  of  existing  housing  stock);  (ii) 
provision  of  drinking  water;  (iii)  waste  management  (including  household  waste 
management). 

Concerning  fraud  in  relation  to  trasport  and  networks,  analysis  suggests  higher  risks  for 
investments in (i) roads that are not part of TEN (Trans-European Network), because of the 
number  of  fraudulent  irregularities,  which  is  probably  linked  to  the  higher  number  of 

25  Section  4.2.3  of  ‘Statistical  evaluation  of  irregularities  reported  for  2021:  own  resources,  agriculture, 
cohesion and fisheries policies, pre-accession and direct expenditure’, SWD(2022)307 final 
26  Section  4.3.1  of  ‘Statistical  evaluation  of  irregularities  reported  for  2021:  own  resources,  agriculture, 
cohesion and fisheries policies, pre-accession and direct expenditure’, SWD(2022)307 final 

31 

 
 
                                                 
COHESION AND FISHERIES 

projects, which reach the regional or local level; (ii) railways and TEN roads, because of the 
high financial amounts involved. 

Concerning  fraud  in  relation  to  social  inclusion,  poverty  and  discrimination,  analysis 
suggests higher risks for investments in active inclusion and in healthcare infrastructure.  

4.5. 

Specific analysis – irregularities and fraud by type of violation 

With  regard  to  fraudulent  irregularities,  the  most  frequent  violations  concerned  supporting 
documents.  One  out  of  four  infringements  and  nearly  one  out  of  two  Euro  related  to 
supporting documents were fraudulent (see FFL and FAL27 in Table CP5 below28). Most of 
the time, false or falsified documents were used.  

High  financial  amounts  were  involved  in  fraudulent  irregularities  where  infringements  of 
incomplete  or 
contract  provisions/rules 
non-implementation of the funded action. The frequency of fraud was rather low (see FFL in 
Table CP5 above).  

took  place.  Fraud  often  consisted 

in 

Infringements  of  public  procurement  rules  were  the  most  reported  non-fraudulent 
irregularities.  They  rarely  led  to  a  suspicion  of  fraud,  as  shown  by  the  very  low  FFL  (see 
Table CP5 above). Despite the fact that in only 4% of the public procurement infringements 
fraud was suspected, these cases represent 16% of the financial amounts involved.  The low 
frequency  of  fraudulent  cases  suggests  that  either  fraud  detection,  investigation  and 
prosecution  concerning  public  procurement  or  the  administrative  capability  of  contracting 
authorities  should  be  improved.    When  the  suspicion  of  fraud  was  specified,  it  was  for 
example  about  (i)  bid-rigging;  (ii)  lack  of  transparency,  lack  of  equal  treatment  or 
modification  of  a  tender  during  evaluation;  (iii)  conflict  of  interest  or;  (iv)  use  of 
discriminatory technical specification based on national, regional or local preferences.   

Most  of  fradulent  violations  concerning  ethics  and  integrity  were  related  to  conflict  of 
interests. Ethichs and integrity is the category of infringement with the highest frequency of 
fraud, also in terms of financial amounts involved. One out of two infringements and nine out 

27 FFL (Fraud Frequency  Level)  is the ratio between the  number of  fraudulent irregularities reported during a 
certain  period  and  the  total  number  of  irregularities  (fraudulent  and  non-fraudulent)  reported  during  the  same 
period. FAL (Fraud Amount Level) is a similar indicator, but based on the financial amounts involved. 
28 For further details about the content of the categories of irregularities listed in Table CP5, please see Annex 
13  to  ‘Statistical  evaluation  of  irregularities  reported  for  2021:  own  resources,  agriculture,  cohesion  and 
fisheries policies, pre-accession and direct expenditure’, SWD(2022)307 final 

32 

NEUREUR/avgFFLFALNEUREUR/avgIncorrect, missing, false or falsified supporting documents336122,074,125363,31623441,108158,187,126142,768Infringement of contract provisions/rules167659,044,1803,946,3726642,440373,720,729153,164Infringement of public procurement rules119156,640,8681,316,3104163,145813,011,032258,509Ethics and integrity10084,585,460845,85553888911,465,682128,828Eligibility / Legitimacy of expenditure/measure7446,395,829626,9711026633135,061,239213,367Infringements concerning the request51135,954,2272,665,769257115756,662,212360,906Violations/breaches by the operator4315,032,298349,588142226053,146,379204,409Incorrect, absent, falsified accounts368,331,629231,43481338856,225,333144,911Product, species and/or land306,331,867211,062162315921,464,742134,998Multiple financing138,057,235619,7874286181,333,54274,086Bankruptcy51,021,537204,307895710,970,943192,473State aid3809,763269,9213610913,140,696120,557Movement14,6124,6128112709,70759,142Other10769,283,525647,5101017932348,242,818373,651blank14299,407,70821,386,26579419919,943,014100,216Total number of irregularities EU 27 (1)8321,432,641,1491,721,9249448,5351,834,755,390214,968(1) This is not the sum of the figures above, because one irregularity can refer to more than one categoryIrregularities not reported as fraudulentTable CP5: Categories of irregularity - Cohesion policy (PP 2014-2020) Categories of irregularitiesIrregularities reported as fraudulent 
 
                                                 
COHESION AND FISHERIES 

of ten Euro concerning ethics and integrity were fraudulent (see FFL and FAL in Table CP5 
above). Corruption was rarely reported. 

4.6. 

Risk analysis and spontaneous reporting 

In  the  antifraud  cycle,  the  capacity  of  a  system  to  detect  fraud  and  irregularities  is  a  key 
feature that helps making the system effective and  efficient in protecting the EU budget.  In 
the  2017  PIF  Report,  to  boost  the  capability  to  detect  irregularities,  the  Commission 
recommended  to  the  Member  States  to  improve  risk  analysis  and  the  use  of  spontaneous 
reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and  to  strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle  blowers  that 
are also a crucial source for investigative journalism29. 

Risk analysis still only marginally contributed to detect fraud, while information from 
civil  society  played  a  significant  role.  During  the  past  five  years,  about  one  out  of  four 
irregularities  has  been  detected  following  tips  from  informant,  whistle-blowers  and 
information published in the media. During the previous five years (2013-2017) just one out 
of  ten  fraudulent  irregularities  were  detected  because  of  information  from  civil  society.  In 
relation to non-fraudulent irregularities, neither risk analysis nor information from civil 
society played a noticeable role in detection. 

The  low  share  of  irregularities  detected  following  risk  analysis  suggests  room  for 
improvement in this domain. It is true that risk analysis might have had a more important 
role in detecting irregularities before expenditure is introduced in a request for reimbursement 
to the Commission. These detections, where referring to non-fraudulent irregularities, do not 
have  to  be  reported  in  IMS.  However,  this  is  valid  only  for  non-fraudulent  irregularities. 
Fraudulent  irregularities  must  always  be  reported  in  IMS  (where  above  the  EUR  10 000 
threshold).  Detection  of  fraud  and  irregularities  could  improve  by  adding  to  existing 
preventive  checks  and  audits  of  operations  also  ex-post  thematic  risk  analysis  projects 
focusing on groups of past transactions, in view of targeted ex-post controls.  

In addition, during the programming period 2021-2027, management verifications shall 
be  risk-based  and  proportionate  to  the  risks  identified.  Until  the  programming  period 
2014-2020  included,  administrative  verifications  covered  instead  100%  of  the  payment 
applications  for  reimbursement  by  beneficiaries.  In  this  new  context,  it  is  key  that  the  new 
approach to management verifications includes an adequate policy about ex-post checks.  

4.7. 

Duration of irregularities 

With regard to PP 2014-2020, on average, it took about one year and a half from the start 
of the irregularity to come to a suspicion that a fraudulent irregularity had been committed 
(see Graph CP3). For non-fraudulent irregularities this duration was longer (see Graph CP4), 
which would not be expected, as fraudsters may go to great lenghts to hide their behaviour. 
On  average,  with  regard  to  PP  2014-2020,  it  took  more  than  two  years  to  close  the  case 
after reporting to the Commission  (see Graph CP3). This average duration is shorter for 
non-fraudulent  irregularities.  The  longer  delay  in  closing  fraudulent  cases  is  consistent 
with  the  need  to  rely  on  specialised,  more  limited  resources  to  investigate  fraud  and  the 
longer duration of criminal proceedings. These average times are expected to increase as the 
implementation of the 2014-2020 operational programmes progresses.  

29 Section 4.3 of the ‘29th Annual Report on the Protection of the EU’s financial interests – Fight against fraud 
–  2017’,  COM(2018)553  final  and  ‘Statistical  evaluation  of  irregularities  reported  for  2017:  own  resources, 
agriculture, cohesion and fisheries policies, pre-accession and direct expenditure’, SWD(2018)386 final.  

33 

 
                                                 
COHESION AND FISHERIES 

4.8. 

Detection and reporting by Member State 

Past  analysis  based  on  PP  2007-2013  suggested  that  detection  and  reporting  were 
concentrated in few Member States and this was not fully explained by the concentration of 
payments30. 

With regard to PP 2014-2020, detection and reporting still varies significantly between 
Member  States,  as  shown  by  the  fraud  detection  rate  (FDR)  and  the  Irregularity  detection 
rate (IDR) (see Tables CP6 and CP7). These rates compare the results obtained by Member 
States  in  the  fight  against  fraud  and  irregularities  (financial  amounts  involved)  with  the 
payments  they  received  (during  the  same  period  of  time).  Focus  is  on  the  whole 
PP 2014-2020.  

For  EU27,  the  FDR  is  0.48%,  which  is  similar  to  the  FDR  recorded  for  the 
PP 2007-2013  (see  Table  CP6).  However,  these  two  FDRs  cannot  be  directly  compared. 
While  PP  2007-2013  has  already  gone  through  the  whole  implementation  cycle,  data  for 
PP 2014-2020  are  expected  to  change  as  implementation  progresses.  Many  fraudulent 
irregularities are still to be detected and a significant share of payments are still to be received 
by the Member States.  

30  Section  4.4.2  of  ‘Statistical  evaluation  of  irregularities  reported  for  2018:  own  resources,  agriculture, 
cohesion and fisheries policies, pre-accession and direct expenditure’, SWD(2019)365 final 

34 

0.010.020.030.040.050.060.0Reporting to case closureDetection to reportingSuspicion to detectionIrregularity to suspicionGraph CP3: Average times from  irregularity to case closure Cohesion and Fisheries policies; PP 2014-2020; irregularities reported as fraudulentAvg. duration in months17 months4 months8 months0.05.010.015.020.025.030.035.040.045.050.0Reporting to case closureDetection to reportingSuspicion to detectionIrregularity to suspicionGraph CP4: Average times from  irregularity to case closure Cohesion and Fisheries policies; PP 2014-2020; irregularities not reported as fraudulentAvg. duration in months14 months22 months3 months6 months26 months 
 
                                                 
COHESION AND FISHERIES 

For  EU27,  the  IDR  is  0.61%,  which  is  much  lower  than  the  IDR  recorded  for  the 
PP 2007-2013 (2.5%) (see Table CP7). This could be expected, given the striking drop in the 
number of non-fraudulent irregularities reported by the Member States (see above).   

35 

ReportedAmounts involvedNEUREUR%AT588,6321,055,700,2940.01BE6133,0181,563,689,9340.01BG18714,2415,819,564,0370.01CY2363,860776,599,2850.05CZ5621,134,22619,114,893,8070.11DE446,115,91815,263,457,3440.04DK15954,983547,878,0080.17EE314,207,4313,459,071,8080.12ES5175,86526,763,390,8590.00FI1425,5251,311,941,5070.03FR1710,188,00012,030,815,9710.08GR66,592,28116,596,071,4460.04HR618,612,7125,655,412,7090.33HU15041,303,80419,820,028,5430.21IE001,001,535,8370.00IT7778,43028,955,688,0510.00LT7465,4126,270,175,0940.01LU00143,328,5290.00LV6233,213,8153,573,958,3010.93MT00592,004,2420.00NL4242,0211,001,930,9290.02PL12853,348,26170,921,153,9210.08PT3240,008,34120,593,651,0070.19RO171401,403,24217,902,249,8602.24SE103,322,6381,435,543,3940.23SI61,070,6192,813,681,1010.04SK81793,425,87610,125,076,5167.84TOTAL EU278701,438,289,151302,503,925,5220.48UK (2)101,811,0287,948,675,4900.02(2) As of 1 February 2020, the UK is no longer part of the EU(1) Net payments until 2022 from CF, ERDF, ESF, EMFF. Total includes payments related to cross border cooperationTable CP6: Number of irregularities reported as fraudulent, amounts involved and fraud detection rate by Member State - Cohesion and Fisheries policies - Programming period 2014-20Member StateIrregularities reported as fraudulent PP 2014-20Payments PP 2014-2020 (1)Fraud detection rate 2014-2020ReportedAmounts involvedNEUREUR%AT926,930,9511,055,700,2940.66BE663,792,4541,563,689,9340.24BG433114,305,3985,819,564,0371.96CY151,478,808776,599,2850.19CZ838109,334,62919,114,893,8070.57DE33731,144,09215,263,457,3440.20DK341,960,895547,878,0080.36EE32437,110,3863,459,071,8081.07ES30950,906,70226,763,390,8590.19FI451,546,4771,311,941,5070.12FR36843,867,59412,030,815,9710.36GR182208,768,37116,596,071,4461.26HR15035,405,3585,655,412,7090.63HU63499,255,34319,820,028,5430.50IE603,197,4891,001,535,8370.32IT38575,631,33428,955,688,0510.26LT36833,825,4506,270,175,0940.54LU114,259143,328,5290.01LV8514,199,5293,573,958,3010.40MT131,650,517592,004,2420.28NL351,092,0601,001,930,9290.11PL2,525396,179,01970,921,153,9210.56PT23224,919,23620,593,651,0070.12RO641123,121,31917,902,249,8600.69SE613,570,8891,435,543,3940.25SI434,629,6372,813,681,1010.16SK499429,857,34310,125,076,5164.25TOTAL EU278,7751,857,695,539302,503,925,5220.61UK (2)1,35324,700,7677,948,675,4900.31(2) As of 1 February 2020, the UK is no longer part of the EUTable CP7: Number of irregularities not reported as fraudulent, amounts involved and irregularity detection rate by Member State - Cohesion and Fisheries policies - Programming period 2014-20  (1) Net payments until 2022 from CF, ERDF, ESF, EMFF. Total includes payments related to cross border cooperation.Member StateIrregularities not reported as fraudulent PP 2014-20Payments PP 2014-2020Irregularity detection rate2014-2020 (1) 
 
 
COHESION AND FISHERIES 

4.9. 

Follow-up to suspected fraud 

The  Member  States  may  report  irregularities  as  non-fraudulent  (just  administrative 
irregularities)  or  as  fraudulent  (suspected  or  established  fraud)  and  may  change  this 
classification during the lifetime of the irregularities.  
For just 7% of the irregularities reported during 2014-202231, there is or was a suspicion of 
fraud.  This  percentage  does  not  significantly  change  between  the  years  of  the  timespan 
considered  in  the  analysis  (irregularities  are  associated  to  the  year  of  first  reporting).  For 
14% of the irregularities where there is or there was a suspicion of fraud, this suspicion was 
not  initially  detected  or  reported.  The  Member  State  reclassified  the  irregularity  as 
fraudulent at a later stage.  

For  just  11%  of  the  irregularities  with  a  suspicion  of  fraud,  the  suspicion  was  then 
confirmed  into  established  fraud  (see  Graph  CP5  below).  This  does  not  significantly 
change year on year. It could have been expected to be higher for years that are further in the 
past, because more time was available to finalise the case.  

For  just  13%  of  the  irregularities  with  a  suspicion  of  fraud,  the  suspicion  was  then  
dismissed  (see  Graph  CP5  above).  This  percentage  tends  to  be  higher  for  the  period 
2014-2017 than for the more recent period 2018-2022, in line with expectations. 

Most  of  the  irregularities  where  there  was  a  suspicion  of  fraud  are  still  classified  as 
suspected  fraud,  even  if  several  years  from  initial  reporting  have  elapsed  (see  Graph  CP5 
above). This percentage changes year on year, but is very high also for years that are further 
in the past. In addition, 13% of these irregularities that are still pending as suspected fraud are 
already closed, so no changes can be expected.  

Focusing  on  the  irregularities  that  were  initially  reported  during  2014-2018,  significant 
differences  between  Member  States  can  be  noticed  (see  Table  CP8  below).  Focusing  on 
this  period  means  focusing  on  irregularities  that  have  been  reported  between  four  and  nine 

31 Considering the programming periods 2007-2013 and 2014-2020. 

36 

 
 
                                                 
COHESION AND FISHERIES 

years  ago.  In  the  Member  States  with  low  incidence  of  fraud,  the  competent  authorities 
should  invest  in  detecting  signals  of  fraud  and,  when  discovering  irregularities,  should 
carefully address the question of intentionality. This could also be due to reporting practices 
delaying the classification as supected fraud. Considering that the most recent irregularities in 
this analysis have been reported four years ago, these reporting practices should be reviewed 
or the engagement with the judicial authorities should be improved. 

In  many  Member  States,  the  percentage  of  irregularities  that  are  still  classified  as 
suspected fraud is extremely high. This may suggest that either the judicial authorities do 
not  give  proper  follow-up  to  these  suspicions  -  including  because  they  may  not  have 
sufficient  resources  -  or  that  there  are  no  proper  communication  channels  from  judicial  to 
reporting  authorities.  In  addition,  many  irregularities  that  are  still  classified  as  suspected 
fraud are closed. This may due to persistent suspicions of the administrative authorities, while 
criminal proceedings were not started, were prevented by the statute of limitations or did not 
lead to enough evidence about fraud. It could also be that in some Member States cases were 
closed  because  the  competent  bodies  had  finalised  administrative  actions (for  example,  full 
recovery), even if the penal proceedings were still ongoing.  

4.10.  Other internal policies 

Other funds are used under shared management to finance other internal policies. Tables CP9 
and  CP10  show  the  number  of  and  financial  amounts  involved  in  fraudulent  and 
non-fraudulent irregularities concerning AMIF, FEAD, YEI, ISF and EGF.   

37 

N.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENAT00%0%1%00%00%3100%0%BE00%0%2%00%00%5100%40%BG00%0%3%646%18%646%100%CY00%0%9%00%120%480%75%CZ452%30%7%3523%4026%7751%100%DE81%5%14%5235%2416%7449%82%DK1033%71%32%00%17%1393%100%EE32%13%12%00%1042%1458%36%ES1021%74%1%2418%00%11382%5%FI00%0%6%00%00%4100%25%FR00%0%3%00%00%12100%67%GR91%18%3%612%12%4486%93%HR00%0%9%117%117%467%100%HU10%1%9%00%00%139100%99%IE00%NA0%0NA0NA0NANAIT242%48%4%1530%48%3162%81%LT31%33%3%111%333%556%40%LU0NANANA0NA0NA0NANALV41%10%10%923%923%2154%33%MT00%0%3%00%00%2100%100%NL10%7%5%00%321%1179%64%PL401%13%9%5919%3812%22169%95%PT10%2%5%00%00%48100%31%RO111%5%12%5926%52%16172%99%SE00%0%5%120%00%480%25%SI00%0%11%635%318%847%100%SK111%7%13%1610%2315%11875%100%EU-272731%17%6%29018%16710%1,14271%80%(1) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reportedTable CP8: Cohesion and Fisheries policies (programming periods 2007-2013 and 2014-2020) Follow-up to suspected fraud by Member State - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018Member StateReclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraudNEURNEURNEURNEURNEURNEURAMIF000000142,4553254,3404296,795FEAD0034,701,01933,166,046248,1600087,915,225YEI143,55800472,77100005116,329TOTAL EU27143,55834,701,01973,238,817390,6153254,340178,328,349Table CP9: Number of irregularities and financial amounts reported as fraudulent by the Member States -  AMIF, FEAD, EGF, ISF and YEIFUNDTOTAL20172018201920202022REPORTING YEAR 
 
 
COHESION AND FISHERIES 

38 

NEURNEURNEURNEURNEURNEURNEURNEURAMIF00111,951221,676,99019536,449321,069,7196183,76112302,846923,781,716EGF00000000147,1240000147,124FEAD3463,9215813,20510797,8604873,764141,269,110251,901,646183,186,477799,305,983ISF1178,812003419,0001223,018381,1828462,535288,377181,452,924YEI0031,045,22493,559,27883,153,2286403,50171,748,41500339,909,646TOTAL EU274642,73291,870,380446,453,129324,786,459562,870,636464,296,357323,577,69922324,497,3922021Table CP10: Number of irregularities and financial amounts not reported as fraudulent by the Member States -  AMIF, FEAD, EGF, ISF and YEITOTAL2019FUND20162017201820202022REPORTING YEAR 
 
PRE-ACCESSION 

5. 

PRE-ACCESSION POLICY  

5.1. 

Introduction 

Section  5  presents  a  statistical  evaluation  of  irregularities  and  fraud  detected  by  the 
beneficiary countries during 2022 with reference to the pre-accession policy. It places these 
detections in the context of past years and relevant programming periods. 

The  beneficiary  countries  must  report  fraudulent  and  non-fraudulent  irregularities  to  the 
Commission through the Irregularity Management System (IMS). When reference is made 
to fraud or fraudulent, this includes both suspected and established fraud 32. Differently from 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the Cohesion and Fisheries policies, there are no 
exceptions to reporting in IMS. Irregularities must always be reported in IMS, (i) also when 
they are detected and corrected before the expenditure is introduced in a statement submitted 
to the Commission; (ii) also when the financial amounts are below EUR 10 000.  

The EU provides pre-accession assistance to candidate countries and potential candidates for 
EU  membership  to  support  them  in  meeting  the  accession  criteria  and  to  bring  their 
institutions  and  standards  in  line  with  the  EU  acquis 33.  Before  2022,  candidate  countries 
were Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and  Türkiye; potential candidate were 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Kosovo 34.  During  2022,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Moldova  and 
Ukraine  have  been  granted  the  status  of  candidate  countries  and  Georgia  has  been  given  a 
European perspective. 

5.2. 

Instruments for Pre-accession Assistance  

5.2.1.  Before 2007: Pre-accession Assistance (PAA)  

Before  2007,  the  EU  has  been  providing  pre-accession  assistance  to  candidate  countries 
through  a  number  of  separate  instruments.  The  PHARE  programme  provided  support  for 
institution-building  measures  and  associated  investment,  as  well  as  funding  measures  to 
promote economic and social cohesion and cross border cooperation. The ISPA programme 
dealt  with  large-scale  environmental  and  transport  infrastructure  projects,  while  the 
SAPARD  programme  supported  agricultural  and  rural  development.  For  the  programme 
years  2002-2006,  Türkiye  received  assistance  under  the  specific  pre-accession-oriented 
framework  of  the  Pre-accession  Financial  Assistance  for  Türkiye  (TIPAA).  The  CARDS 
programme  was  the  main  financial  instrument  to  promote  stability  in  the  Western  Balkans 
and facilitate the region’s closer association with the EU. The countries that joined the EU in 
2004 35  received  a  Transition  Facility  (TF)  in  2004-2006,  as  did  Bulgaria  and  Romania  in 
2007-2010. All pre-2007 programmes and projects have been completed. 

5.2.2. 

2007-2013: The Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA I) 

For the period 2007-2013, the EU supported reforms in the ‘enlargement countries’ (i.e., the 
candidate  countries  Albania,  Montenegro,  North  Macedonia,  Serbia,  and  Türkiye  and 
potential candidates Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo), providing financial and technical 

32 See footnote 19. 
33 Source: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/preaccession-assistance_en 
34 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ 
Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.  
35 Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 

39 

 
                                                 
PRE-ACCESSION 

help via the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA I) 36. IPA I had a budget of about 
EUR 11.5 billion and consisted of five components 37.  

The five components of IPA I were: (i) transition assistance and institution building (TAIB); 
(ii) cross border cooperation (CBC); (iii) regional  development  (transport, environment  and 
economic  development)  (REGD);  (iv)  human  resource  development  (strengthening  human 
capital  and  combatting  exclusion)  (HRD);  and  (v)  rural  development  (IPARD).  Candidate 
countries were eligible for all five components; potential candidates were eligible only for the 
first two. 

5.2.3. 

2014 – 2020: The Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II)  

For  the  period  2014-2020,  IPA  II  built  on  the  results  achieved  under  IPA  I  and  set  a  new 
framework for providing pre-accession assistance. The primary innovation of IPA II was its 
strategic  focus  on  specific  objectives.  The  multiannual  financial  framework  for  2014-2020 
allocated EUR 12.8 billion for the instrument 38.  

The  IPA  II  Regulation  limits  financial  assistance  to  five  policy  areas:  (i)  reforms  in 
preparation  for  EU  membership  and  related 
institution-and  capacity-building;  (ii) 
socio-economic  and  regional  development;  (iii)  employment,  social  policies,  education, 
promotion  of  gender  equality,  and  human  resources  development;  (iv) agriculture  and  rural 
development; and (v) regional and territorial cooperation. 

The  bulk  of  IPA  II  assistance  is  channelled  through  the  country  action  programmes. 
Additionally,  IPA  II  funded  multi-country  action  programmes  to  enhance  regional 
cooperation,  particularly  in  the  Western  Balkans.  Financial  assistance  is  also  provided  via 
cross  border  cooperation  programmes  to  encourage  territorial  cooperation  between  IPA  II 
beneficiaries and via rural development programmes for the development of rural areas. 

In  accordance  with  the  Financial  Regulation,  IPA  II-funded  activities  are  managed  either 
directly (meaning that the Commission implements them directly until the relevant national 
authorities are accredited to  manage the funds) or indirectly (meaning that the Commission 
delegates the management of certain actions to external entities, while still retaining overall 
final responsibility for the general budget execution). Cross border cooperation programmes 
with Member States are administered via shared management, meaning that implementation 
tasks are delegated to the Member States. 

5.2.4. 

2021 – 2027: The Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA III)  

The general objective of the new IPA III instrument is to support the beneficiaries in adopting 
and  implementing  the  political,  institutional,  legal,  administrative,  social  and  economic 
reforms  required  by  those  beneficiaries  to  comply  with  Union  values  and  to  progressively 
align to Union rules, standards, policies and practices with a view to Union membership. 

The new programming  framework 2021-2027  reflects  the specific objectives  of the  IPA  III 
Regulation  and  focuses  on  the  priorities  of  the  enlargement  process  according  to  five 
thematic  windows,  which  mirror  the  clusters  of  negotiating  chapters  as  per  the  revised 

36 See Council Regulation (EC) 1085/2006 of 17 July 2006, OJ L 210, 31.7.2006, p. 82-93. 
37 Source: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/instruments/overview_en. 
38 See Regulation (EU) 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing 
an Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II), OJ L 77, 15.3.2014, p. 11–26 and  
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/instruments/overview_en.  

40 

 
                                                 
PRE-ACCESSION 

enlargement methodology. For the new multiannual financial framework period 2021-27, the 
IPA III budgetary envelope is EUR 14.2 billion 39. 

5.3. 

General trend 

Table PA1 (and the related graph) shows all the fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities 
detected  and  reported  by  the  beneficiary  countries  during  the  past  five  years  under 
pre-accession  programmes  40.  These  irregularities  occurred  in  connection  with  funds 
distributed under the 2000-2006 PAA (to a limited extent 41) and under IPA I and IPA II 42. 
There were no irregularities reported under IPA III yet. 

For 44% of these irregularities the financial amounts involved were below EUR 10 000. 
This  percentage  is  higher  for  non-fraudulent  irregularities  (about  47%),  while  it  is  much 
lower for fraudulent irregularities (about 14%) 43. However, the financial amounts involved in 
these ‘below-10 000’ irregularities represented just 1% of the financial amounts involved in 
all pre-accession irregularities reported during 2018-2022. Concerning these ‘below-10 000’ 
irregularities:  (i)  about  69%  of  them  concerned  IPARD.  The  second  ranking  fund,  TAIB, 
accounted for much less (12%); (ii) Türkiye and North Macedonia reported 74% of them; (iii) 
about  45%  of  them  were  reported  in  2022,  contributing  to  the  exceptional  increase  in 
non-fraudulent irregularities (see below).   

From 2021 to 2022, both the number of non-fraudulent irregularities and the financial 
amounts involved experienced exceptional increases (see Table PA1). For the number of 
cases, this was due to irregularities related to the 2014-2020 IPA II in relation to IPARD in 
North  Macedonia  and  Türkiye.  As  mentioned,  for  most  of  these  irregularities,  the  financial 
amounts  involved  were  below  EUR  10 000.  The  increase  in  financial  amounts  was  due  to 
irregularities concerning IPARD in Albania. 

About 10% of the irregularities were reported as fraudulent. This percentage (the fraud 
frequency  level  –  FFL)  changed  over  time,  increasing  significantly  in  2020  (17%)  and 
peaking in 2021 at 20%. 

39 https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/instruments/overview_en   
40 Data for this analysis has been download from IMS on 6/3/2023.   
41  Just  12  irregularities  (with  less  than  EUR  3  million  involved)  were  related  to  the  2000-2006  PAA  (3 
fraudulent and 9 non-fraudulent) and concerned ISPA, TIPAA, PHARE and SAPARD 
42  To  provide  the  complete  picture,  four  additional  irregularities  must  be  mentioned.  These  irregularities, 
reported  as  fraudulent  by  Romania  in  2020  and  2021,  and  as  non-fraudulent  by  Estonia  in  2021  and  2022, 
concern  cross-border  cooperation  under  the  European  Neighbourhood  Instrument.  These  irregularities  are  not 
included  in  the  following  analysis,  as  they  do  not  relate  to  pre-accession.  As  part  of  EU  policy  towards  its 
neighbours, cross-border cooperation supports sustainable development along the EU’s external borders, helps 
reduce differences in living standards and addresses common challenges across these borders.  
43 Considering irregularities were the financial amounts were below EUR 10 000 and were the financial amounts 
are  still  zero  and  the  irregularity  was  already  closed.  The  open  irregularities  where  the  financial  amounts 
involved were still zero are not included. It these irregularities were included in the calculation, the percentage 
of  ‘below-10 000’  irregularities  would  increase  to  47%  (50%  for  non-fraudulent  and  23%  for  fraudulent 
irregularities).  

41 

 
                                                 
PRE-ACCESSION 

As the irregularities reported during the past five years mostly refer to IPA I and IPA II, this 
is separately analysed in the following sections.  

5.4. 

Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA I, 2007-2013) 

5.4.1.  Recent trends 

Table PA2 (and the related graph) shows all the fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities 
detected and reported by the beneficiary countries during the past five years under IPA I. The 
number  of  these  irregularities  and  the  financial  amounts  involved  fell  markedly  in  the  past 
three  years, as  the programmes were  closed  years  ago.  The  FFL was  9% during the past 
five years, although in 2019 it peaked at 13%.  

Tables  PA3  and  PA4  show  that  the  345  irregularities  related  to  IPA  I  during  the  past  five 
years:  (i)  concerned  five  components  (by  far,  the  highest  number  of  cases  and  the  highest 
financial  amounts  concerned  IPARD);  (ii)  were  reported  by  eight  countries  (the  leading 
contributor to detection was Türkiye, which reported about 75% of irregularities and 84% of 
the financial amounts). 

42 

NEURNEURNEUR2018172,016,26213110,350,22814812,366,4902019171,756,90019410,241,52221111,998,4222020173,244,466855,386,8911028,631,3572021231,271,227944,583,9331175,855,16020229854,01824539,999,63825440,853,656TOTAL839,142,87374970,562,21283279,705,085YearIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentTOTALTable PA1 - Reported irregularities, pre-accession 2018-2022 
 
 
 
PRE-ACCESSION 

5.4.2.  Trends since the start of IPA I, by beneficiary country and component 

Table PA5 and related graph show the number of irregularities and related financial amounts 
concerning IPA I since 2007, by beneficiary country and component. 

43 

NEURNEURNEUR2018121,446,6751159,842,97912711,289,6542019111,406,3561167,814,6601279,221,016202072,736,376463,933,326536,669,7022021283,651312,399,210332,482,8612022005182,4925182,492TOTAL325,673,05831324,172,66734529,845,725YearIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentTOTALTable PA2 - Reported irregularities (IPA I), 2018-2022NEURNEURNEURNEURNEUR201815181,994421,219,279577,413,172134,000122,441,20920190026205,119817,557,9521047,194101,410,751202000151,346433,904,1200092,714,23520210000181,644,1580015838,70420220000181,139004101,353TOTAL15181,994691,475,74420020,600,5411181,194507,506,252Table PA3 - Reported irregularities (IPA I) by component, 2018-2022YearCBC-IPAHRDIPARDREGDTAIBNEURNEURNEURNEURNEURNEURNEURNEUR201800923,4052148,3647103,600536,647102295,00010110,682,638201910000029,0812770,418126,18381,153,297887,962,03620201871,4920000000061,848,260345,829433,904,1202021000000163,19600666,429117,276252,335,96120220000000000336,816002145,676TOTAL2871,492923,4052148,36410175,87732107,065171,977,688141,511,40225925,030,431Table PA4 - Reported irregularities (IPA I) by country, 2018-2022YearALBGGRHRMEMKRSTR 
 
 
 
 
 
PRE-ACCESSION 

In 37% of these irregularities the financial amounts involved were below EUR 10 000. 44 
However,  the  financial  amounts  involved  in  these  ‘below-10 000’  irregularities  represented 
just  1%  of  the  financial  amounts  involved  in  all  pre-accession  irregularities  reported  for 
IPA I.  Concerning  these  ‘below-10 000’  irregularities:  (i)  about  53%  of  them  concerned 
cross-border  cooperation  programmes  (CBC-IPA).  The  second  ranking  fund,  IPARD, 
accounted for 21%; (ii) Bulgaria (34%), Croatia (24%) and Türkiye (21%) reported most of 
them.   

Since 2007, ten beneficiary countries reported 865 irregularities related to five components. 
The  highest  number  of  irregularities  concerned  IPARD.  About  87%  of  the  irregularities 
related to IPARD were detected by Türkiye. Only two other countries, Croatia and North 
Macedonia,  reported  IPARD  cases.  A  broader  range  of  countries  reported  irregularities 
concerning  cross-border  cooperation  programmes  (CBC-IPA),  the  second  most  affected 
component of IPA I. The majority of these irregularities were reported by Bulgaria (see also 
above, about the frequency of ‘below-10 000’ irregularities). The only non-Member State that 
reported  irregularities  relating  to  CBC  was  Serbia  (apart  from  one  irregularity  reported  by 
Türkiye). Besides reporting most of the IPARD irregularities, Türkiye also reported 76% of 
the irregularities related to the human resources development (HRD) programmes, the third 
most affected component of IPA I (see Table PA5 and related graph). 

44 Considering irregularities were the financial amounts were below EUR 10 000 and were the financial amounts 
are still zero and the irregularity was already closed. 

44 

NEURNEURNEURNEURNEURAL000000003871,492BG114426,49200000000GR3190,04500000000HR51228,97211423,444311,872,5035503,09391,061,787IT3553,93500000000ME002125,871002081,19400MK003267,13915215,05500181,928,108RO4720,83200000000RS21169,326000000141,511,402TR112,5331115,618,81431641,281,168185,968,4247310,480,506TOTAL1972,302,1351466,335,26836243,368,726436,552,71111715,853,295Table PA5 - Total  irregularities reported under IPA I componentsCBC-IPAHRDIPARDREGDTAIB 
 
                                                 
PRE-ACCESSION 

5.5. 

Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance II (IPA II 2014-2020) 

5.5.1.  Trends 

Table PA6 (and the related graph) shows all the fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities 
detected  and  reported  by  the  beneficiary  countries  during  the  past  five  years  under 
IPA II. The  reporting  started  in  2017,  with  one  fraudulent  irregularity 45.  The  number  of 
irregularities  fell  markedly  in  2020,  to  bounce  back  in  2021  and  skyrocket  in  2022,  also 
because the high number of ‘below-10 000’ irregularities.  

irregularities,  the  financial  amounts 

involved  were  below 
In  58%  of  these 
EUR 10 000 46.  However, 
these  ‘below-10 000’ 
irregularities  represented  just  1.5%  of  the  financial  amounts  involved  in  all  pre-accession 
irregularities  reported  for  IPA  II.  Concerning  these  ‘below-10 000’  irregularities:  (i)  about 
83%  of  them  concerned  IPARD;  (ii)  Türkiye  and  North  Macedonia  reported  83%  of  them; 
(iii) about 58% of them were reported in 2022 (see above about the reporting peak in 2022).   

the  financial  amounts 

involved 

in 

During the past five years, the fraud frequency level was 10%, close to the FFL for IPA I. 
However, it was very high in 2020-2021 (20% and 25%) and very low in 2022 (4%), also 
because the strong increase of non-fraudulent irregularities in this year, due also to sustained 
‘below-10 000’ reporting.  

45  Concerning  IPARD,  reported  by  Türkiye,  with  no  financial  amounts  involved  yet  (the  irregularity  is  still 
open).  Apart  from  this  irregularity,  data  concerning  the  past  five  years  coincide  with  data  for  the  whole 
programming period. For this reason the section on the whole programming period is not presented for IPA II. 
46 Considering irregularities were the financial amounts were below EUR 10 000 and were the financial amounts 
are still zero and the irregularity was already closed.  

45 

 
 
                                                 
PRE-ACCESSION 

About  80%  of  the  non-fraudulent  irregularities  reported  during  2022  concerned  IPARD. 
About 90% of this IPARD irregularities were reported by Türkiye and North Macedonia and 
most  of  the  rest  by  Albania.  While  being  less  numerous,  the  IPARD  non-fraudulent 
irregularities  reported  by  Albania  accounted  for  most  of  the  financial  amounts  involved 
(EUR 33  out  of  EUR  39  million).  This  was  mainly  due  to  four  irregularities  accounting 
together  for  about  EUR  31  million,  while  all  the  other  irregularities  reported  by  Albania, 
Türkiye and North Macedonia involved much lower amounts, mostly below EUR 100 000, if 
not below EUR 10 000 (see above about ‘below-10 000’ reporting). 

The  number  of  fraudulent  irregularities  peaked  in  2021.  Most  of  this  peak  was  due  to 
IPARD  irregularities  reported  by  Türkiye.  Considering  fraudulent  irregularities  during  the 
past  five  years  (i)  62%  were  reported  by  Türkiye  and  29%  by  Serbia;  (ii)  73%  concerned 
IPARD. 

Table PA7 shows that the 475 irregularities related to IPA II concerned five components. By 
far, the highest number of cases and the highest financial amounts concerned IPARD. Table 
PA8  shows  that  irregularities  related  to  IPA  II  were  reported  by  seven  countries.  The  two 
main contributors to detection were Türkiye and North Macedonia, which together reported 
about 76% of irregularities. However, 73% of the irregularities reported by North Macedonia 

46 

NEURNEURNEUR20182015498,50417498,50420196350,54473787,049791,137,593202010508,090391,453,565491,961,6552021211,187,576621,727,822832,915,39820229854,01823839,745,63724740,599,654TOTAL482,900,22842744,212,57747547,112,804YearIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentTOTALTable PA6 - Reported irregularities (IPA II), 2018-2022 
 
 
PRE-ACCESSION 

and 56% of those reported by  Türkiye  were ‘below-10 000’. Most  of the financial amounts 
were involved in irregularities reported by Albania (see above).  

47 

NEURNEURNEURNEURNEUR2018851,409008447,09500102019266,18600721,071,407302020200020391,245,561206716,094202113454,93100562,198,84568,9988252,623202210324,1941255,00019839,768,6941028,52628223,241TOTAL33896,7203255,00037344,731,6022137,524451,191,958Table PA7 - Reported irregularities (IPA II) by component, 2018-2022TAIBYearCBC-IPAHRDIPARDREGDNEURNEURNEURNEURNEURNEURNEUR201800551,409101000307447,095201920266,1860049323,459001025747,9482020353,57900650,98410112,06800126,242291,718,782202178,784388,7846324,5481338,468163,90212601,986411,788,92620224233,472,566386,0585324,838822,732,297123,3558783,0901063,177,451TOTAL5433,534,92913292,43718700,3701553,206,292287,257251,411,3182087,880,202Table PA8 - Reported irregularities (IPA II) by country, 2018-2022RSTRYearALBGMEMKRO 
 
 
 
DIRECT MANAGEMENT 

6. 

DIRECT MANAGEMENT 

6.1. 

Introduction 

Section  6  contains  a  descriptive  analysis  of  the  data  on  recovery  orders  issued  by 
Commission services in relation to expenditures managed under ‘direct management’ mode, 
which is  one of the three implementation  modes the Commission  can use to  implement the 
budget. 

According  to  the  Financial  Regulation,  the  Commission  implements  the  budget  directly 
(‘direct management’) as set out in Articles 125 to 153, through its departments, including its 
staff in the Union delegations under the authority of their respective Head of delegation, in 
accordance with Article 60(2), or through executive agencies as referred to in Article 6947. 
For  the  financial  year  2022,  a  total  of  EUR  81 201  million48  has  been  disbursed  under 
‘direct  management’  mode,  including  payments  in  Recovery  and  Resilience  policy  area.  
Table  DM1  presents  the  actual  payments  by  policy  areas  (excluding  Recovery  and 
Resilience)  and  Table  DM2  presents  payments  for  Recovery  and  Resilience.  Compared  to 
previous years, payments are higher. 

Table DM1 – Payments made in financial year 2022 by policy area 

Table DM2 – Payments made in financial year 2022 for Recovery and Resilience 

In  2022,  RRF  accounted  for  EUR  47 223  million,  representing  alone  the  biggest  part  of 
direct management. By the end of 2022, no recovery orders concerned the RRF. 

47 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the 
financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) 
No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 
223/2014,  (EU)  No  283/2014,  and  Decision  No  541/2014/EU  and  repealing  Regulation  (EU,  Euratom)  No 
966/2012PE/13/2018/REV/1, OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1–222 
48 Own calculation based on ABAC data. 

48 

Policy area Payments 2022 EUR million % Agriculture and Maritime Policy            418  1.3 Border Management            271  0.8 Defence            558  1.7 Environment and Climate Action            518  1.6 European Schools and Pensions            236  0.7 European Strategic Investments         5,437  16.5 External Action         6,546  19.9 Investing in People, Social Cohesion and Values         1,511  4.6 Migration            398  1.2 Pre-accession Assistance            669  2.0 Regional Development and Cohesion         2,031  6.2 Research and innovation        11,847  36.0 Security              91  0.3 Single Market            705  2.1 Space              44  0.1 Other Policies         1,612  4.9 Total (without Recovery and Resilience)       32,892  100.0  Policy area: Recovery and Resilience Payments 2022 EUR million % Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) and Technical Support Instrument        47,223  97.8 Other budget chapters         1,086  2.2 Total       48,309  100.0   
 
 
                                                 
DIRECT MANAGEMENT 

General analysis 

6.2. 
For  the  financial  year  2022,  the  Commission  services  registered  770  recovery  items49  in 
ABAC  that  were  qualified  as  irregularities,  for  a  total  financial  value  of  EUR  61.28 
million50.  Among  these  recovery  items,  37  have  been  reported  as  fraudulent,  involving 
EUR 5.67 million. 

However, qualifications attributed to recovery items may change over the years: irregularities 
may be turned into  suspicions  of fraud or the other way round, suspicions of fraud  may be 
reclassified as non-fraudulent irregularities, following an OLAF investigation. 

6.2.1.  Five year analysis 2018-2022 

The following analysis gives an overview of recovery data recorded in the ABAC system in 
the last five years (see Table DM3 below). From 2018 to 2022, on average, there were 42.6 
recovery items  per year  qualified as ‘irregularities reported as fraudulent’51. The ratio 
between  the  financial  amounts  related  to  these  irregularities  and  expenditure  during 
2018-2022 is close to zero (0.03%). This  ratio is quite stable across  years (see Table DM3 
below).  

Table DM3 – Irregularities reported as fraudulent and related amounts, financial years 2018-2022 

With regard to ‘irregularities not reported as fraudulent’, from 2018 to 2022, on average, 
1 240 recovery items are recorded per year (see Table DM4 below). Since 2020, there is a 
noticeable decline in the number of cases. 

Table DM4 – Irregularities not reported as fraudulent and related amounts, financial years 2018-2022 

From  2018  to  2022,  in  total,  there  were  6 200  registered  recovery  items  qualified  as 
‘irregularities  not  reported  as  fraudulent’,  with  an  aggregate  recovery  amount  of 
EUR 267 million.  The  ratio  between  these  aggregate  irregular  amounts  involved  in  the 
recovery  items  and  expenditure  during  2018-2022  is  around  0.22%  (see  Table  DM4).  This 

49 Recovery items  mean ‘recovery context’ elements in  ABAC. There can be more recovery context elements 
associated to one recovery order issued. 
50 Tables DM3 and DM4: sums for 2022. 
51  ‘Irregularities  reported  as  fraudulent’  are  cases  of  recovery  items  qualified  in  the  ABAC  system  as  ‘OLAF 
notified’. 

49 

Year Payments Irregularities  reported as fraudulent Irregular amounts/ Payments EUR million N EUR million % 2018 20,816 44 6.17 0.03 2019 20,630 37 10.57 0.05 2020 26,579 41 9.15 0.03 2021 21,711 54 7.04 0.03 2022 32,892 37 5.67 0.02 Total 122,628 213 38.60 0.03  Year Payments Irregularities not reported as fraudulent Irregular amounts/ Payments EUR million N EUR million % 2018 20,816 1,579 66.97 0.32 2019 20,630 1,778 55.35 0.27 2020 26,579 1,285 53.22 0.20 2021 21,711 825 35.85 0.17 2022 32,892 733 55.61 0.17 Total 122,628 6200 267.00 0.22   
 
 
                                                 
DIRECT MANAGEMENT 

ratio has been steadily declining for many years now from the zone of 0,5-0,6% (seven years 
ago). 

6.3. 

Specific analysis 

6.3.1.  Recoveries according to legal entity residence 

Table DM5 above shows the total recoveries made during the past five years by country of 
residence of the legal entity to which the payment was unduly made. 

During 2018-2022, with regard to ‘irregularities not reported as fraudulent’, 74% of the total 
number of recovery items and 70% of the related recovery amounts concerned legal entities 
that  are  resident  of  the  EU-2752.  For  ‘irregularities  reported  as  fraudulent’,  these  ratios  are 
slightly lower: 73% of the total number of recovery items  and 68% of the related recovery 
amounts.  

Table DM5 – Recoveries per country of residence of the legal entity, 2018-2022

6.3.2.  Method of detection 

For  each  recovery  item,  the  Commission  service  issuing  the  recovery  order  has  to  indicate 
how  the  irregularity  has  been  detected.  Six  different  categories  are  pre-defined  for  this 
purpose, two of which fall under the direct responsibility of the European Commission: ‘Ex-
ante controls’ and ‘Ex-post controls’. Table DM6 provides a breakdown of the recoveries by 
source of detection and by qualification. 

52 The residence of the legal entity and the residence of the beneficiary are not necessarily the same. 

50 

LE Country name Irregularities not reported as fraudulent Irregularities reported as fraudulent N EUR million N EUR million Austria 137 9.12 0 0.00 Belgium 347 11.69 11 6.89 Bulgaria 30 1.00 0 0.00 Croatia 33 1.95 0 0.00 Cyprus 43 0.36 9 0.24 Czech Republic 33 4.10 2 0.05 Denmark 187 7.42 0 0.00 Estonia 16 1.01 7 0.67 Finland 68 8.96 3 0.66 France 574 18.69 23 4.24 Germany 537 27.46 9 2.35 Greece 139 4.29 5 0.43 Hungary 33 1.83 0 0.00 Ireland 99 3.27 1 0.09 Italy 389 21.04 32 4.41 Latvia 13 0.19 0 0.00 Lithuania 26 0.41 1 0.11 Luxembourg 17 0.35 0 0.00 Malta 45 0.67 0 0.00 Netherlands 398 17.04 7 1.54 Poland 90 1.74 3 0.17 Portugal 87 2.90 20 2.97 Romania 53 4.52 2 0.04 Slovakia 15 4.27 0 0.00 Slovenia 116 1.81 1 0.04 Spain 872 24.78 20 1.20 Sweden 159 6.38 0 0.00 Total EU 27 4556 187.22 156 26.09 United Kingdom 713 32.50 23 5.74           Total other countries 931 47.27 34 6.77 Grand Total 6200 267.00 213 38.60   
 
 
                                                 
DIRECT MANAGEMENT 

Table DM6 – Irregularities reported by source of detection and by qualification, 2018-2022 

With reference to the ‘irregularities reported as fraudulent’, OLAF has been mentioned as 
the source of detection in relation to 88% of recovery items, corresponding to 92% of 
total  recovery  amounts.  ‘Ex-post  controls’  were  the  source  of  detection  of  another  5%  of 
this type of recovery items, corresponding to 4% of the recovery amounts. ‘Ex-ante controls’ 
recorded similar percentage: 5% and 3% respectively. 

About  97%  of  ‘irregularities  not  reported  as  fraudulent’  were  detected  through 
Commission controls (ex-ante and ex-post controls). The share of ex-ante controls has been 
steadily declining from 30% (seven years ago) to 8% in 2022.  

6.3.3.  Types of irregularity 

In the recovery context, the Commission services have to  specify the type of irregularity in 
relation  to  each  recovery  item.  Several  types  can  be  attributed  to  one  recovery  item.  Table 
DM7 provides the full picture regarding the frequency of each type during the past five years. 

Table DM7 – Types of irregularity, 2018-2022 

For ‘irregularities reported as fraudulent’, ‘amount ineligible’ was the most frequent type 
during  the  past  five  years.  In  relation  to  ‘irregularities  not  reported  as  fraudulent’, 
‘amount  ineligible’  remains  the  most  frequent  irregularity  type,  followed  by  ‘documents 
missing’ and then by ‘under-performance/non-performance’.  

6.3.4.  Recovery 

Once a recovery order is issued, the beneficiary is requested to pay back the amount unduly 
received or the amount is offset from remaining payments for the same beneficiary. 

For the recovery orders issued between 2018 and 2022, 56% of the total irregular amounts 
have  already  been  recovered.  The  recovery  rate  for  ‘irregularities  reported  as  fraudulent’ 
(34%)  remains  well  below  the  one  calculated  for  ‘irregularities  not  reported  as  fraudulent’ 
(59%). 

51 

Source of detection  2018-2022 Irregularities not reported as fraudulent Irregularities reported as fraudulent N EUR million N EUR million Ex-ante controls  499 66.79 11 1.28 Ex-post controls  5,522 180.33 11 1.56 Other controls (ECA) 43 12.80 1 0.09 Other controls (Member States) 12 0.26 2 0.12 Other controls (OLAF) 19 1.29 188 35.55 Other controls (To identify) and n. a. 105 5.53 0 0.00 Total 6200 267.00 213 38.60  Type of irregularity 2018-2022 Irregularities not reported as fraudulent (frequency %) Irregularities reported as fraudulent (frequency %) Number Amount Number Amount Amount ineligible 87.3 67.1 76.1 64.7 Beneficiary 1.4 1.5 1.4 14.4 Calculation Error 3.4 3.8 0.0 0.0 Documents missing 7.0 9.1 10.8 15.6 Double funding 0.7 2.7 6.1 1.8 Ethics and Integrity 0.2 1.2 8.0 12.1 Profit 0.4 0.8 3.3 3.9 Public procurement rules not respected 0.8 3.5 4.7 5.9 Under-performance / non-performance 4.7 20.7 5.2 2.2 (blank) 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0   
 
 
COUNTRY FACTSHEETS 

Introduction and disclaimer 

The following factsheets include a quantitative part and a list of authorities. 

Quantitative part 

For TOR, the factsheet shows the number of (and the estimated and established amounts involved in) 
fraudulent and not fraudulent irregularities reported in relation to 2022. The estimated and established 
amounts  are compared  with  the amount  of  gross TOR  collected in relation  to  2022  (‘estimated  and 
established amounts’ / ‘gross TOR’). 

For the Common Agricultural Policy, the factsheet shows the number of (and the financial amounts 
involved in) fraudulent and not fraudulent irregularities reported in relation to 2022 and the past five 
years.  Data  is  separately  shown  for  support  to  agriculture  (direct  payments  to  farmers  and  market 
measures)  and rural  development.  The  financial amounts involved  are  compared  with the  payments 
received, through the indicators FDR and IDR. 

For the Cohesion and Fisheries Policies, the factsheet shows the number of (and the financial amounts 
involved  in)  fraudulent  and  not  fraudulent  irregularities  reported  in  relation  to  the  programming 
period 2014-2020 (in relation to 2022 and cumulative since the start of the programming period). The 
financial amounts involved are compared with the payments received, through the indicators FDR and 
IDR. 

Finally,  the  factsheet  includes  data  and  indicators  on  the  follow-up  the  Member  States  give  to 
suspected fraud. For an explanation of these data and indicators, please make reference to the relevant 
sections in this Statistical Evaluation attached to the 2022 PIF Report. 

List of authorities  

The following factsheets include lists of bodies, which are ‘external’ to the standard management and 
control system for EU funds, but that can play a (significant) role in detecting or investigating fraud or 
irregularities affecting the EU’s financial interests. 

These lists of authorities are based on the following: 

 Initial replies received from the Member States in the framework of the PIF Questionnaire 2022;  

 Based on these initial replies, OLAF formulated more detailed instructions (see below), for a second 
round  of  consultations  through  the  experts  representing  the  Member  States  in  the  Advisory 
Committee for the Coordination of Fraud Prevention (COCOLAF) Subgroup on the ‘Reporting and 
analysis of fraudulent and other irregularities’. 

Legal systems and organisational set-ups are different and have different levels of complexity in the 
different Member States. Further consultation with the competent authorities in the Member States is 
needed to ensure the completeness, accuracy and consistency among Member States of the content of 
these  factsheets.  However,  these  initial  lists  can  be  the  starting  point  for  an  exploration  of  the 
differences in the anti-fraud landscape among the Member States.  

These lists of authorities do not cover the revenue side of EU budget. 

52 

 
53 

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FILLING IN THE FACTSHEETS The management and control system for EU funds is the same in each Member State, basically based on Managing Authorities and Audit Authorities (for ESIF) and Paying Agencies and Certification Bodies (for expenditure in agriculture). These factsheets concern instead bodies that (i) are external and additional to this ‘standard’ management and control system and (ii) are (also) competent for the detection or investigation of fraud or irregularities affecting the EU’s financial interests. These factsheets focus on irregularities and fraud in expenditure. 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes In each Member State, there are law enforcement agencies with a general competence in detecting and investigating crimes (usually, the Police, but in some Member States there may be (also) other law enforcement agencies, such as ‘Carabinieri’ in Italy or ‘Guardia Civil’ in Spain). Please reply YES in case in your Country these law enforcement agencies are also competent for detecting and investigating crimes related to the EU financial interests (see PIF Directive). If the answer is YES, please (i) report the name of the agency; (ii) specify whether there is a specific Department/Unit specialised in detecting and investigating these crimes (see also 2) and 4)) 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes In some Member States, there may be a specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence in detecting and investigating economic and financial crimes, which include crimes related to the EU financial interests (see PIF Directive). For example, this is the case for Italy, where ‘Guardia di Finanza’ has such a competence. Please reply YES in case in your Country there is such a specialised law enforcement agency (and report the name of the agency).  In case in your Country detection and investigation of economic and financial crimes is entrusted to a special Department/Unit within a law enforcement agency with general competence, please reply YES to 1) and specify it there.   3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS) Please reply YES, only if the AFCOS is entrusted with detecting or empowered to investigating irregularities or fraud to the detriment of the EU’s financial interests.   4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency In some Member States, there may be a specialised agency with general competence in detecting or investigating corruption. As corruption may be instrumental to commit fraud to the detriment of the EU’s financial interests, this agency strengthens the architecture protecting the EU budget. Please reply YES in case in your Country there is such a specialised agency (and report the name of the agency). In case in your Country detection or investigation of corruption are entrusted to a special Department/Unit within a law enforcement agency with general competence, please reply YES to 1) and specify it there (diffused competence in many Departments/Units is not enough to reply YES under to 1)). Under 1), please reply NO if this special Department/Unit is competent for corruption just within a specific organisation (for example, an anti-corruption Department of the Police, with specific competent only over employees of the Ministry of Interior).      5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency In some Member States, there may be a specialised agency with specific competence in detecting and investigating organised crime. This is the case in Italy, where the ‘Direzione Investigativa Anti-mafia’ (DIA – Anti-mafia Investigative Directorate) has such competence. As organised crime may be involved in committing fraud to the detriment of the EU’s financial interests, this agency strengthens the architecture protecting the EU budget. Please reply YES in case in your Country there is such a specialised agency, which is separate from the law enforcement agencies with a general competence in detecting and investigating crimes. Please reply NO in case these is a Department/Unit with such a competence within a law enforcement agency with a general competence in detecting and investigating crimes. If the answer is YES, please report the name of the agency. 6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency In some Member States, there may be an agency that is in charge of detecting or investigating irregularities to the detriment of the public budget. The activities of such an agency may lead to detect irregularities that have (also) an impact on the EU budget, so such an agency strengthens the architecture protecting the EU budget. Where the irregularity is not just administrative, but there is a suspicion of crime, such an agency may have the power to investigate also the crime or may be requested to forward the information to another agency (e.g. see points 1 and 2). This is the case in Italy, where ‘Guardia di Finanza’ has such a competence in detecting and investigating administrative irregularities and has also the power to investigate suspicions of fraud. If the answer is YES; please (i) report the name of the agency (also a significant Department embedded in an agency with a broader competence may be relevant); (ii) specify whether this agency can also investigate a suspicion of fraud or it is requested to hand it over to other bodies (please specify which ones, with specific reference to suspicions concerning EU’s financial interests). In case such an agency is qualified as an audit authority, please reply NO in this point and report this agency under 10) 7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures In some Member States, there may be an agency that is specifically in charge of detecting or investigating irregularities in relation to public procurement. If the answer is YES, please report the name of the agency (also a significant Department embedded in an agency with a broader competence may be relevant). Please reply NO in case this specific competence is with an agency mentioned under other points and specify there that that agency is competent also for ex-post checks of public procurement procedures. 8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest In some Member States, there may be an agency that is specifically in charge of detecting or investigating conflict of interests. If the answer is YES, please report the name of the agency (also a significant Department embedded in an agency with a broader competence may be relevant). Please reply NO in case this competence is with an agency mentioned under other points (for example, point 4) and specify there that that agency has a general competence in relation to conflict of interests. 9) Competition authority In each Member State, there is a national competition authority. Violations of the competition law may be related to irregularities and fraud to the detriment of the EU’s financial interests, for example because of the impact on public procurement procedures. Please reply YES only if (i) the competition authority is competent to detect or investigate specific cases; (ii) there are agreements/arrangements so that the findings of the competition authority are systematically considered for their impact on the EU funding. If the answer is YES, please report the name of the agency.   10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) In some Member States, there may be an audit authority with general competence over public budgets. Please reply YES in case this authority exists in your Country and it has the competence to detect or investigate specific irregularities to the detriment of public budgets. These activities may lead to detect irregularities that have (also) an impact on the EU budget, so such an authority strengthens the architecture protecting the EU budget.  11) National security agency/Intelligence Body In each Member State, there are security/intelligence services. Their activities may lead to detect irregularities that have (also) an impact on the EU budget, so such agencies strengthen the architecture protecting the EU budget. Please reply YES in case (i) these services are also in charge of collecting information on financial/economic criminal activities, including to the detriment of the EU budget; (ii) there are agreements/arrangements about their potential role in detecting crimes to the detriment of the public budget (for example, participation in relevant networks, committees, flows of information, etc.).    In each Member State, there is a Financial Intelligence Unit for anti-money laundering purposes. Please reply YES in case there are agreements/arrangements about their potential role in detecting crimes to the detriment of the public budget.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Belgium - Belgique/België 

54 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated10949,701,316316322,835,9939.22%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2022Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)007401,1130.000.07Rural Development (RD)0011197,6940.000.19SA/RD00110,482TOTAL0019609,2890.000.09FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)00301,031,4970.000.04Rural Development (RD)00651,523,8690.000.36SA/RD00349,326TOTAL00982,604,6920.000.08Irregularities reported 2018-2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities reported in 20222. Natural ResourcesIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRYear 20220010363,624ERDF009331,624ESF00132,000Cumulative from start of the programming period 6133,018663,792,4540.010.24ERDF239,111472,214,1380.010.32ESF493,907191,578,3160.010.193. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities not reported as fraudulentIrregularities reported as fraudulentN.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENBE00%0%2%00%1100%00%NAN.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENBE00%0%2%00%00%5100%40%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 2022(3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud(1) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) 4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
55 

BELGIUM 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes National Police 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes  3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS)  4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency  5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency  7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures  8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority Belgian Competition Authority 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Belgian Court of Audit 11) National security agency/National intelligence service    
 
 
 
Bulgaria – България 

56 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated72,584,3294126,0571.22%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2022Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)00111,294,7280.000.16Rural Development (RD)4525,8081308,411,4710.233.65SA/RD00444,642TOTAL4525,8081459,750,8410.050.92FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)138,738,352374,247,0980.210.10Rural Development (RD)161,356,10690652,212,8960.103.72SA/RD00444,642TOTAL2910,094,45894756,504,6360.181.02Irregularities reported in 2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent2. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported 2018-2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 20226170,14220860,205,566CF004439,792,424ERDF0014718,675,534ESF5138,56971,243,898EMFF131,57310493,710Cumulative from start of the programming period 18714,241433114,305,3980.011.96CF006162,957,6890.004.94ERDF0030945,892,6830.001.53ESF17682,668443,143,9670.050.21EMFF131,573192,311,0590.075.15Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent3. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020N.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENBG82%9%18%3034%67%5159%98%N.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENBG00%0%3%646%18%646%100%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 2022(1) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Czech Republic - Česká republika 

57 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated00847,716,0961.47%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2022Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)3417,5425106,5400.050.01Rural Development (RD)4407,25246967,3520.110.26TOTAL7824,794511,073,8920.070.09FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)54,371,23838753,9890.100.02Rural Development (RD)191,762,8032275,154,8240.100.28TOTAL246,134,0412655,908,8130.100.10Irregularities reported in 2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent2. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported 2018-2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 20222816,541,01532029,893,594CF00231,450,485ERDF2416,352,56524427,000,152ESF4188,450501,402,857EMFF00340,100Cumulative from start of the programming period 5621,134,226838109,334,6290.110.57CF1515,67911447,103,1390.010.86ERDF3319,959,37954955,969,0120.190.54ESF22659,1681595,429,1830.020.17EMFF0016833,2950.003.483. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENCZ32%8%18%38%3588%25%100%N.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENCZ452%30%7%3523%4026%7751%100%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 2022(1) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58 

CZECHIA 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Policie České republiky (Police of the Czech Republic) Policie České republiky, Národní centrála proti organizovanému zločinu (Police of the Czech Republic, National Organized Crime Agency) 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes  3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS)  4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency  5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency Finanční správa České republiky (Financial Administration of the Czech Republic) 7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures  8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority Úřad pro ochranu hospodářské soutěže (Office for the Protection of Competition) (competent also for ex-post checks of public procurement procedures) 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Nejvyšší kontrolní úřad (Supreme Audit Office) 11) National security agency/National intelligence service Finanční analytický úřad (Financial Analytical Office)   
 
 
Denmark – Danmark 

59 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated3114,100973,721,3840.62%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2022Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)00228,3370.000.00Rural Development (RD)221,481,2209308,6291.480.31TOTAL221,481,22011336,9660.160.04FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)195,21720436,2930.000.01Rural Development (RD)606,167,459262,268,9791.230.45TOTAL616,262,676462,705,2720.140.06FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentIrregularities reported 2018-20222. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported in 2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 2022384,794201,098,905ERDF280,339116,804ESF14,4551145,942EMFF0018936,159Cumulative from start of the programming period 15954,983341,960,8950.170.36ERDF4245,6559406,3060.120.21ESF14,4554493,4610.000.25EMFF10704,873211,061,1280.470.703. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENDK11%7%15%427%533%640%50%N.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENDK1033%71%32%00%17%1393%100%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 2022(1) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60 

DENMARK 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Politiet i Danmark – National enhed for Særlig Kriminalitet (Danish Police - Special Crime Unit with specific competence over economic/financial crimes (department of the Danish Police) 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes  3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS)  4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency  5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency  7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures  8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority Konkurrence- og Forbrugerstyrelsen (Danish Competition and Consumer Authority) 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Rigsrevisionen (Danish National Audit Office) 11) National security agency/National intelligence service    
 
 
 
Germany – Deutschland 

61 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated444,487,9691,632124,721,9531.98%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2022Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)7334,57630733,2680.010.02Rural Development (RD)3130,723431,492,9300.010.09TOTAL10465,299732,226,1980.010.03FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)151,084,7781483,219,5220.000.01Rural Development (RD)15842,07722210,569,6260.010.16SA/RD0011984,717TOTAL301,926,85538114,773,8650.010.05FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentIrregularities reported 2018-20222. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported in 2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 2022192,050,788997,601,611ERDF3221,635785,712,002ESF161,829,153191,864,919EMFF00224,690Cumulative from start of the programming period 446,115,91733731,144,0930.040.20ERDF16978,93523724,845,1280.010.30ESF285,136,982956,161,7180.080.09EMFF005137,2470.000.093. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENDE31%9%9%1958%824%618%67%N.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENDE81%5%14%5235%2416%7449%82%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 2022(1) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62 

GERMANY In principle there are police, audit authorities and country supreme audit institutions in all Länder. You can find examples below in the factsheet. 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Polizei (Federal States of North Rhine-Westphalia, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia, Berlin) 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes Spezialisierte Strafverfolgungsbehörde (Federal States of Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia, Berlin) 3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS)  4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency  5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency  7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures  8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority  10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Nationale Prüfbehörden (Federal States of North Rhine-Westphalia, Saxony,  Thuringia, Berlin) Landesrechnungshof (Federal State of Rhine-Palatinate) 11) National security agency/National intelligence service    
 
 
 
Estonia – Eesti 

63 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated3267,805146,4470.36%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2022Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Rural Development (RD)201,001,03816475,7751.000.48TOTAL201,001,03816475,7750.340.16FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Rural Development (RD)598,226,2271385,209,7381.470.93TOTAL598,226,2271385,209,7380.620.39Irregularities reported in 2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent2. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported 2018-2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 20227121,91610810,359,312CF00242,758,904ERDF228,556737,105,333ESF009425,306EMFF593,360269,769Cumulative from start of the programming period 314,207,43132437,110,3870.121.07CF1590,1996812,373,7810.061.25ERDF183,048,67322421,595,1110.161.17ESF274,970303,071,7260.010.57EMFF10493,589269,7690.610.093. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENEE43%14%16%13%1138%1759%18%N.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENEE32%13%12%00%1042%1458%36%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 2022(1) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
64 

ESTONIA 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Estonian Police and Border Guard (regional prefectures and different departments)  2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes Keskkriminaalpolitsei (National Criminal Police, Economic Crime Bureau) 3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS)  4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency Keskkriminaalpolitsei (National Criminal Police, Corruption Crime Bureau) 5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency Keskkriminaalpolitsei (National Criminal Police, Organised Crime Bureau) 6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency  7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures Ministry of Finance (Public Procurement and State Aid Department) (only administrative investigations) 8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority Estonian Competition Authority 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) National Audit Office of Estonia 11) National security agency/National intelligence service Internal Security Service (corruption crimes and conflict of interest of high officials)   
 
 
Ireland – Éire 

65 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated00222,445,6360.38%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2022Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)10000.000.00Rural Development (RD)005137,9620.000.01TOTAL105137,9620.000.00Irregularities reported 2018-2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 2022008800,692ESF008800,692Cumulative from start of the programming period 00603,197,4890.000.32ERDF00153945430.000.08ESF004528029460.000.653. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENIE10%3%12%13%39%3189%97%N.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENIE00%NA0%0NA0NA0NANAFor further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 2022(1) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
66 

IRELAND 1) Law enforcement agency (police force, Ministry of Interior) with general competence on crimes An Garda Síochána : - Garda National Economic Crime Bureau - Garda National Economic Crime Bureau – Anti-Corruption Unit 2) Specialised law enforcement agency (police force) with specific competence on economic/financial crimes  3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS)  4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency  5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency  7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures  8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority  10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General 11) National security agency/National intelligence service An Garda Síochána - Garda National Crime & Security Intelligence Service – Interpol National Central Bureau and Europol National Unit   
 
 
Greece – Ελλάδα 

67 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated378,031,1258780,6780.96%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2022Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)008213,0270.000.01Rural Development (RD)005066,643,3180.000.77TOTAL005146,856,3450.000.24FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)22,553,4574628,231,5350.020.08Rural Development (RD)001,08814,662,2500.000.49TOTAL22,553,4571,55022,893,7850.020.17FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentIrregularities reported 2018-20222. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported in 2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 2022141,4006835,462,853CF0053,271,166ERDF002327,753,287ESF141,400364,163,977EMFF004274,423Cumulative from start of the programming period 66,592,282182208,768,3710.041.26CF36,117,7031815,594,8650.300.76ERDF2433,1796748,552,5920.000.46ESF141,40092144,146,6350.003.83EMFF005474,2790.000.213. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENGR51%28%3%00%00%18100%72%N.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENGR91%18%3%612%12%4486%93%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 2022(1) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
68 

GREECE 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Ελληνική Αστυνομία (Hellenic Police) - Διεύθυνση Οικονομικής Αστυνομίας (Financial Police Directorate) (with competence on economic/financial crime) Γενική Διεύθυνση Σώματος Δίωξης Οικονομικού Εγκλήματος (General Directorate of Financial Crime Unit) 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes  3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS) Εθνική Αρχή Διαφάνειας (National Transparency Authority) (The Inspections & Audits Unit of NTA/AFCOS is competent for detecting irregularities, fraud and corruption)  4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency Εθνική Αρχή Διαφάνειας (National Transparency Authority)  5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency Επιτροπή Δημοσιονομικού Ελέγχου (Financial Audit Committee) (also checks on conflict of interest) 7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures Ενιαία Ανεξάρτητη Αρχή Δημοσίων Συμβάσεων (Hellenic Single Public Procurement Authority) (with also competence on conflict of interest) 8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority Επιτροπή Ανταγωνισμού (Hellenic Competition Commission) 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Ελεγκτικό Συνέδριο (Hellenic Court Of Audit) 11) National security agency/National intelligence service Εθνική Υπηρεσία Πληροφοριών (National Intelligence Service)   
 
 
Spain – España 

69 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated252,864,02050640,284,1611.59%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2022Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)461,587,02828211,464,2410.030.20Rural Development (RD)2467,5112386,051,1090.040.46TOTAL482,054,53952017,515,3500.030.25FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)482,702,36091033,244,0950.010.12Rural Development (RD)5647,27299131,258,4570.010.54SA/RD00111,111TOTAL533,349,6321,90264,513,6630.010.19Irregularities reported in 2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent2. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported 2018-2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 202200484,120,166ERDF00303,473,280ESF0016524,867EMFF002122,019Cumulative from start of the programming period 5175,86530950,906,7010.000.19ERDF4129,41017634,405,1850.000.18ESF146,45512414,742,0560.000.21EMFF0091,759,4600.000.283. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENES20%5%3%3170%00%1330%92%N.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENES1021%74%1%2418%00%11382%5%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 2022(1) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
70 

SPAIN 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Jefatura de Policía Judicial de la Guardia Civil (Guardia Civil Judicial Police Headquarters )/ Departamento de Delincuencia Económica y Anticorrupción de la Unidad Central Operativa de la Guardia Civil (Department of Economic Crime and Anti-Corruption of the Central Operational Unit of the Guardia Civil) Comisaría General de Policía Judicial de la Policía Nacional (General Commissariat of Judicial Police of the National Police)/ Unidad Central de Delincuencia Económica y Fiscal de la Policía judicial (Policía Nacional) Central Economic and Fiscal Crime Unit of the Judicial Police (National Police) Policía autonómica del País Vaco ( Ertzaintza), de Catalunya ( Mossos d'Esquadra) y de otras Comunidades Autónomas (Autonomous Police of the Basque Country (Ertzaintza), of Catalonia (Mossos d'Esquadra) and of other police forces of Autonomous Communities) 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes  3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS) National Anti-fraud Co-ordination Service, General Intervention of the State Administration, Ministry of Finance and Public Function 4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency Oficina Antifraude de Cataluña (Anti-Fraud Office of Catalonia) Agencia de Prevención y Lucha contra el Fraude y la Corrupción de la Comunidad Valenciana (Agency for the Prevention and Fight against Fraud and Corruption of the Autonomous Community of Valencia) Oficina de Prevención y Lucha contra la Corrupción en las Islas Baleares (Office for the Prevention and Fight against Corruption of the Balearic Islands) Oficina Andaluza de Lucha contra el fraude (Anti-Fraud Office of Andalusia) Oficina de Buenas Prácticas y Anticorrupción de la Comunidad Foral de Navarra (Office of Good Practices and Anti-Corruption of the Autonomous Community of Navarre). 5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency Centro de Inteligencia contra el Terrorismo y el Crimen Organizado - CITCO (Intelligence Center against Terrorism and Organised Crime) 6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency Autoridad Independiente de Responsabilidad Fiscal (Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility) (AIReF) Intervención General de la Administración del Estado (General Intervention of the State Administration) (IGAE) (independent department of a body with broader competences) Intervenciones Generales de las Comunidades Autónomas (General Interventions of the Autonomous Communities) (independent departments of bodies with broader regional competences) 7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures Oficina Independiente de Regulación y Supervisión de la Contratación (The Independent Office of Regulation and Supervision of Contracting) (Oirescon) (independent department of a body with broader competences) 8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest Oficina de Conflictos de Intereses (Conflict of Interest Office) (independent department of agency with broader competences) 9) Competition authority Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (National Markets and Competition Commission) 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Tribunal de Cuentas (Spanish Court of Audit) Órganos de control externo de las Comunidades Autónomas (Autonomous Regions' external control bodies) 11) National security agency/National intelligence service Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (National Intelligence Centre (CNI)   
 
France 

71 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated8213,080,59729923,370,8851.21%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2022Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)1452,473,8421088,065,4520.030.11Rural Development (RD)26359,0571643,293,5780.020.17TOTAL1712,832,89927211,359,0300.030.12FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)1592,917,04137025,634,7030.010.07Rural Development (RD)371,194,13358411,486,0930.010.12TOTAL1964,111,17495437,120,7960.010.08FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentIrregularities reported 2018-20222. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported in 2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 20222172,093366,277,643ERDF2172,093295,736,393ESF004199,901EMFF003341,349Cumulative from start of the programming period 1710,188,00036843,867,5940.080.36ERDF149,933,55124232,695,5960.140.47ESF2198,1991069,027,4510.000.19EMFF156,250202,144,5470.010.543. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENFR00%0%73%914%12%5384%53%N.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENFR00%0%3%00%00%12100%67%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 2022(1) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
72 

FRANCE 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Specialised investigation services of the Police Nationale and of the Gendarmerie Nationale (such as the Office central de lutte contre la corruption et les infractions financières ou fiscales) 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes Service d'Enquêtes Judiciaires des Finances (SEJF) (specialised service in common with Direction Générale des Douanes et Droits Indirects – DGDDI and Direction générale des finances publiques - DGFIP) 3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS)  4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency Agence française anti-corruption (AFA) Haute Autoritè pour la transparence de la vie publique (HATVP) (competent also for conflict of interests)  5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency  7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures  8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest Haute Autoritè pour la transparence de la vie publique (HATVP) (see also 4)) 9) Competition authority Autorité de la Concurrence  Direction Générale de la Concurrence, de la Consommation et de la Répression des Fraudes (DGCCRF) 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system)  11) National security agency/National intelligence service Direction Nationale du Renseignement et des Enquêtes Douanières (DNRED) Service du Traitement du Renseignement et Action contre les Circuits Financiers Clandestins (TRACFIN)   
 
 
 
Croatia – Hrvatska 

73 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated113,521,01613339,5334.63%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2022Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)00226,0540.000.01Rural Development (RD)4986,825451,719,2250.260.46TOTAL4986,825471,745,2790.130.23FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)00602,826,0220.000.18Rural Development (RD)61,028,1211645,619,7660.060.35TOTAL61,028,1212248,445,7880.030.26Irregularities reported in 2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent2. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported 2018-2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 2022217,042,171252,983,351CF116,984,35621,578,022ERDF157,8154614,339ESF0013573,255EMFF006217,735Cumulative from start of the programming period 618,612,71215035,405,3570.330.63CF116,984,356239,252,6811.570.86ERDF51,628,3565713,993,7520.050.42ESF00439,837,6980.000.91EMFF00272,321,2260.001.753. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENHR22%13%14%425%638%638%100%N.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENHR00%0%9%117%117%467%100%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 2022(1) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
74 

CROATIA 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova: Ravnateljstvo policije - Uprava kriminalističke policije (Ministry of Interior - The General Police Directorate - the Criminal Police Directorate) Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova: Ravnateljstvo policije - Uprava kriminalističke policije - Policijski nacionalni ured za suzbijanje korupcije i organiziranog kriminaliteta - Služba gospodarskog kriminaliteta i korupcije (Ministry of Interior: The General Police Directorate - the Criminal Police Directorate - Police National Office for Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime – Service for Economic Crime and Corruption) 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes  3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS)  4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency  5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency Ministarstvo financija: Sektor za financijski i proračunski nadzor (Ministry of Finance: Sector for Financial and Budget Supervision) 7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures Ministarstvo gospodarstva i održivog razvoja: Uprava za trgovinu i politiku javne nabave – Sektor za politiku javne nabave (Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development: Directorate for Trade and Public Procurement Policy - Sector for Public Procurement Policy) 8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority Agencija za zaštitu tržišnog natjecanja (The Agency for the Protection of Market Competition) 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Državni ured za reviziju (State Audit Office) 11) National security agency/National intelligence service Ministarstvo financija: Ured za sprječavanje pranja novca (Ministry of Finance: Anti-Money Laundering Office)    
 
 
 
Italy – Italia 

75 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated286,821,2526814,881,1110.58%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2022Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)6511,99215812,656,6110.010.30Rural Development (RD)81,952,8251046,275,4550.110.36SA/RD6499,125254,415,344TOTAL202,963,94228723,347,4100.050.39FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)1279,741,0541,08753,863,9830.050.25Rural Development (RD)4413,067,08553054,982,0290.180.76SA/RD384,978,38814116,682,255TOTAL20927,786,5271,758125,528,2670.100.44FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentIrregularities reported 2018-20222. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported in 2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 20220010222,762,399ERDF008821,331,251ESF00131,393,012EMFF00138,136Cumulative from start of the programming period 7778,43038575,631,3340.000.26ERDF7778,43030365,611,4740.000.35ESF00819,981,7240.000.10EMFF00138,1360.000.013. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENIT894%35%10%3012%62%21986%88%N.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENIT242%48%4%1530%48%3162%81%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 2022Pending suspected fraudPending suspected fraud(1) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraud4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
76 

ITALY 1) Law enforcement agency  with general competence on crimes Carabinieri Polizia di Stato Guardia di Finanza 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes Guardia di Finanza 3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS)  4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency Autorità Nazionale Anti-Corruzione ANAC (National Anti-Corruption Authority) (It is also responsible for ex-post controls of procurement procedures) 5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency Direzione Investigativa Anti-mafia (Anti-mafia Investigative Directorate) 6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency Guardia di Finanza 7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures  8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato AGCM (Italian Competition Authority) (It is also responsible for controls on conflict of interest) 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Corte dei Conti (general/overall control with judicial functions) Ragioneria Generale dello Stato (RGS) – Ispettorato Generale Vigilanza e Controllo di Finanza Pubblica- (State General Accounting) 11) National security agency/National intelligence service    
 
 
 
Cyprus – Κύπρος 

77 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated2112,602348,0600.31%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2022Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 20221237,6003713,769CF001189,374ERDF1237,6001311,773EMFF001212,622Cumulative from start of the programming period 2363,860151,478,8090.050.19CF004531,5310.000.23ERDF2363,8605395,3640.120.13ESF005339,2920.000.16EMFF001212,6220.000.813. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENCY00%0%21%00%00%6100%0%N.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENCY00%0%9%00%120%480%75%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 2022(1) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
78 

CYPRUS 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Αστυνομία Κύπρου (Cyprus Police) Υποδιεύθυνση Δίωξης Οικονομικού Εγκλήματος, Αστυνομία Κύπρου (Economic Crime Investigation Sub directorate, Cyprus Police) 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes  3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS) YES 4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency Ανεξάρτητη Αρχή κατά της Διαφθοράς (Independent Authority against Corruption) (this agency is competent also for checks on conflict of interests) 5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency  7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures Αρμόδια Αρχή Δημόσιων Συμβάσεων- Γενικό Λογιστήριο της Δημοκρατίας (Public procurement Directorate-Treasury of the Republic of Cyprus) 8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest Διεύθυνση Επαληθεύσεων και Πιστοποίησης-Γενικό Λογιστήριο της Δημοκρατίας (Verifications and certification directorate-Treasury of the Republic of Cyprus)  9) Competition authority Επιτροπή Προστασίας του Ανταγωνισμού (Commission for the protection of competition). However, there are no agreements/arrangements so that the findings of the Commission for the protection of competition are considered systematically for their impact on the EU funding  10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Ελεγκτική Υπηρεσία της Δημοκρατίας (Audit office of the Republic of Cyprus) (competent also for ex-post checks of public procurement procedures) 11) National security agency/National intelligence service Κυπριακή Υπηρεσία πληροφοριών (Cyprus Intelligence Service) The financial intelligence Unit is the Unit for combating money laundering (MOKAS)   
 
 
 
Latvia – Latvija 

79 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated398,255363,763,5194.39%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2022Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)00111,4210.000.00Rural Development (RD)7292,38816500,5930.260.45TOTAL7292,38817512,0140.070.12FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)007153,0080.000.01Rural Development (RD)18794,788692,136,5820.100.27TOTAL18794,788762,289,5900.040.11FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentIrregularities reported 2018-20222. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported in 2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 20222115,612,954158,830,560CF2200,56914,405,900ERDF1612,916,110104,367,959ESF32,496,275226,714EMFF00229,987Cumulative from start of the programming period 6233,213,8148514,199,5290.930.40CF31,241,720125,611,1560.150.66ERDF4728,549,404567,955,1071.350.38ESF82,807,64710504,2920.540.10EMFF4615,0437128,9740.670.143. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENLV55%16%24%26%619%2475%75%N.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENLV41%10%10%923%923%2154%33%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 2022(1) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
80 

LATVIA 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Valsts policijas Ekonomisko noziegumu apkarošanas pārvalde (Administration for Combating Economic Crimes -part of the State Police) 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes  3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS)  4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency Korupcijas novēršanas un apkarošanas birojs (Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau) (body competent also for checks on conflict of interests) 5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency  7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures Iepirkumu uzraudzības birojs (Procurement Monitoring Bureau) 8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority Latvijas Republikas Konkurences padome (Competition Council of the Republic of Latvia) 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Latvijas Republikas Valsts kontrole (The State Audit Office of the Republic of Latvia) 11) National security agency/National intelligence service    
 
 
 
Lithuania – Lietuva 

81 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated332,812,29421790,3951.78%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2022Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)225,42428686,1370.000.12Rural Development (RD)17668,275882,348,2070.270.97TOTAL19693,6991163,034,3440.080.37FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)477,6281513,414,4590.000.13Rural Development (RD)331,552,09936511,951,4580.151.17TOTAL371,629,72751615,365,9170.050.43Irregularities reported 2018-2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent2. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported in 2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 202200857,911,361CF00152,993,188ERDF00643,894,662ESF0061,023,511Cumulative from start of the programming period 7465,41236833,825,4490.010.54CF00738,216,4750.000.44ERDF0027424,018,4730.000.74ESF6430,849211,590,5010.040.14EMFF134,563000.080.003. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported Irregularities not reported N.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENLT10%3%5%00%00%40100%93%N.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENLT31%33%3%111%333%556%40%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 2022(1) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Luxembourg 

82 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated00000.00%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2022Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Rural Development (RD)00119,2200.000.07TOTAL00119,2200.000.03FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Rural Development (RD)00258,4860.000.07TOTAL00258,4860.000.02Irregularities reported 2018-2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentIrregularities reported in 20222. Natural ResourcesFundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 2022Cumulative from start of the programming period 00114,2590.000.01ERDF00114,2590.000.03Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent3. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020N.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENLU00%0%50%00%00%1100%100%N.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENLU0NANANA0NA0NA0NANAFor further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 2022(1) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
83 

LUXEMBOURG 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Police Judiciaire/Département criminalité économique et financière (Judiciary Police/Economic and Financial Crimes Unit) 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes  3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS)  4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency  5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency Direction du Contrôle financier (Ministère des Finances) (Directorate of Financial Control (Ministry of Finance)) 7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures Direction des Marchés publics (Ministère de la Mobilité et des Travaux publics) (Directorate of Public Procurement (Ministry of Mobility and Public Works)) 8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority Autorité de la concurrence (Competition Authority) 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Cour des comptes du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg (Court of Auditors of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg) 11) National security agency/National intelligence service Cellule de renseignement financier (Financial Intelligence Unit)   
 
 
 
Hungary - Magyarország 

84 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated4196,164196,853,6661.44%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2022Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)190,564181,287,6520.010.10Rural Development (RD)002265,806,2330.000.89TOTAL190,5642447,093,8850.000.36FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)190,564837,699,1730.000.12Rural Development (RD)191,225,02861218,301,8090.050.68TOTAL201,315,59269526,000,9820.010.28Irregularities reported in 2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent2. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported 2018-2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 2022126,571,43618721,592,003CF0061,281,708ERDF126,571,43615015,698,666ESF00283,238,490EMFF0031,373,139Cumulative from start of the programming period 15041,303,80463499,255,3440.210.50CF003512,795,5150.000.24ERDF14540,239,79645260,928,8530.400.61ESF51,064,00813823,988,6320.020.53EMFF0091,542,3440.006.323. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENHU182%8%20%3113%157%18480%73%N.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENHU10%1%9%00%00%139100%99%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 2022(1) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
85 

HUNGARY 1) Law enforcement agency (police force, Ministry of Interior) with general competence on crimes Rendőrség (Police) 2) Specialised law enforcement agency (police force) with specific competence on economic/financial crimes Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Bűnügyi Főigazgatósága (Directorate-General for Criminal Matters of the National Tax and Customs Agency) 3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS)  4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency Nemzeti Védelmi Szolgálat (National Defence Service, department of a body with a broader competence) Integritás Hatóság (Integrity Authority) (corruption, conflict of Interests, public procurement) 5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency Kormányzati Ellenőrzési Hivatal (Government Control Office) Állami Számvevőszék (State Audit Office) 7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures Közbeszerzési Hatóság (Public Procurement Authority) Integritás Hatóság (Integrity Authority) (corruption, conflict of Interests, public procurement) 8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest Integritás Hatóság (Integrity Authority) (corruption, conflict of Interests, public procurement) Miniszterelnökség Belső Ellenőrzési és Integritási Igazgatósága (Directorate for Internal Audit and Integrity of the Prime Minister’s Office (audit of conflicts of Interests))  9) Competition authority Gazdasági Versenyhivatal (Competition Authority) 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system)  11) National security agency/National intelligence service Alkotmányvédelmi Hivatal (Constitution Protection Bureau) Nemzetbiztonsági Szakszolgálat (Special Service for National Security)   
 
Malta 

86 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated00244,4380.16%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2022Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Rural Development (RD)190,0006188,2720.901.87TOTAL190,0006188,2720.591.24FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Rural Development (RD)2132,000121,044,6910.181.45TOTAL2132,000121,044,6910.131.06FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentIrregularities reported 2018-20222. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported in 2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 202200124,819ERDF00124,819Cumulative from start of the programming period 00131,650,5170.000.28CF002913,5180.000.60ERDF006176,8580.000.07ESF003516,9790.000.32EMFF00243,1620.000.273. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as Irregularities not reported N.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENMT00%0%4%00%00%1100%100%N.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENMT00%0%3%00%00%2100%100%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 20224: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud(1) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
87 

MALTA 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Malta Police Force Financial Crimes Investigations Department within the Malta Police Force 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes  3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS) Internal Audit and Investigations Department 4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency Permanent Commission Against Corruption in respect of cases falling within their remit in terms of Cap. 326 of the Laws of Malta 5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency Financial Investigations Directorate within Internal Audit and Investigations Department   7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures Internal Audit and Investigations Department (this Department has a general competence also we reference to conflict of interests)  8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority  10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) National Audit Office 11) National security agency/National intelligence service Financial Intelligence Analysis Unit Malta Security Service   
 
 
 
 
 
Netherlands - Nederland 

88 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated2295,84659978,193,4471.59%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2022Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)428,8548112,9210.000.02Rural Development (RD)00249,7940.000.04TOTAL428,85410162,7150.000.02FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)24902,03960913,1070.030.03Rural Development (RD)5196,316161,082,9460.030.18TOTAL291,098,355761,996,0530.030.05FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentIrregularities reported 2018-20222. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported in 2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 2022111,94612317,008CF00142,275ERDF0010261,926ESF111,94600EMFF00112,807Cumulative from start of the programming period 4242,021351,092,0590.020.11CF00142,275ERDF0030831,1680.000.18ESF3233,0212187,1900.050.04EMFF19,000231,4260.010.053. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENNL20%9%5%14%730%1565%100%N.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENNL10%7%5%00%321%1179%64%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 20224: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud(1) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
89 

THE NETHERLANDS 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Politie 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes FIOD (Fiscale inlichtingen- en opsporingsdienst (part of the Ministry of Finance) (it works also as anti-corruption agency) 3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS) Organisational Unit of the Ministry of Finance 4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency Rijksrecherche (it is competent for investigating criminal offences that affect the integrity of public administration, including corruption) 5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency Several bodies have the task of checking the legal and regular use of public funds. Rijksdienst voor Ondernemend (RVO) (part of the Ministery of  Economic Affairs & Climate) 7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures Committee of procurement experts established by the Minister for Economic Affairs 8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority Authority for Consumers & Markets (ACM) 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Auditdienst Rijk (National audit authority) 11) National security agency/National intelligence service Financial Intelligence Unit   
 
 
 
Austria – Österreich 

90 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated475,391723,608,8450.96%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2022Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)00238,0750.000.01Rural Development (RD)00128,6080.000.00TOTAL00366,6830.000.00FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)61,320,66314954,8490.040.03Rural Development (RD)164,39013755,1730.000.03TOTAL71,385,053271,710,0220.020.03FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentIrregularities reported 2018-20222. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported in 2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 202200423,061,065ERDF00362,430,815ESF006630,250Cumulative from start of the programming period 588,632926,930,9510.010.66ERDF00756,055,0130.001.01ESF588,63216793,9950.020.18EMFF00181,9430.001.243. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENAT00%0%3%00%00%3100%33%N.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENAT00%0%1%00%00%3100%0%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 20224: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud(1) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
91 

AUSTRIA 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Bundesministerium für Inneres, Bundeskriminalamt (Federal Ministry of Interior, Criminal Intelligence Service Austria) Bundesministerium für Inneres, Bundeskriminalamt, Abteilung 7 Wirtschaftskriminalität (Federal Ministry of Interior, Criminal Intelligence Service Austria, Department 7 Economic crime) 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes  3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS)  4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency Bundesministerium für Inneres, Bundesamt für Korruptionsprävention und Korruptionsbekämpfung (Federal Ministry of Interior, Federal Bureau of Anti Corruption) 5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency  7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures  8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde (BWB) (Federal Competition Authority) 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system)  11) National security agency/National intelligence service    
 
 
 
Poland – Polska 

92 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated394,434,0439528,394,5321.82%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2022Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)7346,1874434,846,1930.011.02Rural Development (RD)15930,5253376,870,8270.070.50SA/RD001157,360TOTAL221,276,71238241,874,3800.030.87FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)4127,983,769256196,008,9090.161.15Rural Development (RD)402,145,2061,10031,971,2830.040.53SA/RD145,6031157,360TOTAL8230,174,5781,357228,137,5520.130.99Irregularities reported 2018-2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentIrregularities reported in 2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent2. Natural ResourcesPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 2022195,437,326651106,581,222CF1444,009337,580,629ERDF104,173,49144386,546,936ESF7525,96417312,328,477EMFF1293,8622125,180Cumulative from start of the programming period 12853,348,2622,525396,179,0190.080.56CF64,029,63312725,052,5150.020.12ERDF5736,852,9891,629310,125,3000.100.81ESF6211,755,82276160,390,6060.110.55EMFF3709,8188610,5980.200.183. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENPL81%2%31%9825%4411%25764%75%N.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENPL401%13%9%5919%3812%22169%95%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 20224: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud(1) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93 

POLAND There could be other Authorities in Poland that could fit into this factsheet. The factsheet will be updated on the basis of further consultation.  1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Policja 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes Centralne Biuro Śledcze Policji (Central Bureau of Investigation of the Police) 3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS)  4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency Centralne Biuro Antykorupcyjne (Central Anti-corruption Bureau) 5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency  7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures  8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority  10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Najwyższa Izba Kontroli (Supreme Chamber of Control) 11) National security agency/National intelligence service Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego (Internal Security Agency)   
 
 
Portugal 

94 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated111,379,03120994,7770.54%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2022Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)00281,118,5520.000.13Rural Development (RD)18,3412109,015,0700.001.56TOTAL18,34123810,133,6220.000.70FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)6454,7251807,031,4700.010.17Rural Development (RD)17844,5291,32952,602,4630.032.03TOTAL231,299,2541,50959,633,9330.020.90Irregularities reported 2018-20222. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported in 2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 20221139,230413,167,869CF00283,586ERDF1139,230141,590,197ESF0014541,464EMFF0011952,622Cumulative from start of the programming period 3240,008,34123224,919,2360.190.12CF00142,129,8980.000.09ERDF1336,632,4649712,650,5600.320.11ESF173,246,429765,526,9440.050.08EMFF2129,448454,611,8340.041.543. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENPT101%34%2%00%310%2690%69%N.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENPT10%2%5%00%00%48100%31%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 20224: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud(1) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
95 

PORTUGAL 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Polícia Judiciária (Judicial Police) 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes UIF – Unidade de Informação Financeira (Judicial Police) 3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS)  4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency Mecanismo Nacional anticorrupção (National anti-corruption mechanism) 5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency   7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures  8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest Entidade para a Transparência (Authority for Transparency) 9) Competition authority Autoridade da Concorrência (Competition Authority) 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Tribunal de Contas (this body is competent also for ex-post checks of public procurement procedures) Inspeção-Geral de Finanças  - Autoridade de Auditoria - IGF (this body is competent also for ex-post checks on public procurement procedures) 11) National security agency/National intelligence service Serviço de Informações de Segurança (Informaiton Security Service) (for financial/economic criminal activities) Sistema de Informações da República Portuguesa (Information Service of the Republic of Portugal) (for financial/economic criminal activities) Grupo do Ação Financeira (GAFI), do Banco de Portugal (Financial Action Group of the Bank of Portugal) (for anti-money laundering purposes) Agência de Gestão da Tesouraria e da Dívida Pública (Agency for Treasury Management and Public Debt) (for anti-money laundering purposes)   
 
 
 
Romania – România 

96 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated52,089,725361,928,5761.02%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2022Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)562,276,2628510,259,6320.120.52Rural Development (RD)111,223,15846528,116,2480.122.73TOTAL673,499,42055038,375,8800.121.28FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)33313,568,29642931,272,6940.140.33Rural Development (RD)21740,220,3481,53697,826,1110.731.78SA/RD1696,04300TOTAL55154,484,6871965129,098,8050.360.85Irregularities reported in 2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent2. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported 2018-2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 20223117,707,78316326,913,724CF314,248,803125,667,660ERDF151,161,9116515,999,305ESF132,297,069743,091,490EMFF00122,155,269Cumulative from start of the programming period 171401,403,242641123,121,3202.240.69CF2189,983,8515011,369,2531.680.21ERDF133308,903,25031194,060,8643.521.07ESF172,516,14125815,054,5970.070.41EMFF00222,636,6060.002.90Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent3. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020N.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENRO301%6%14%122%13127%34571%97%N.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENRO111%5%12%5926%52%16172%99%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 20224: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud(1) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
97 

ROMANIA 1) Law enforcement agency (police force, Ministry of Interior) with general competence on crimes Poliția Română (Romanian Police) Poliția Română - Direcţia de Investigare a Criminalității Economice (Romanian Police - Economic Crimes Investigation Directorate) 2) Specialised law enforcement agency (police force) with specific competence on economic/financial crimes  3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS) Departamentul pentru lupta antifraudă – DLAF (Fight against Fraud Department) 4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency  5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency  7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures  8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest Agenția Națională de Integritate (National Integrity Agency) 9) Competition authority Consiliul Concurenței (Competition Council) 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Curtea de conturi a României (Romanian Court of Accounts) 11) National security agency/National intelligence service Oficiul Naţional de Prevenire și Combatere a Spălării Banilor (National Office for Prevention and Control of Money Laundering)   
 
 
Slovenia – Slovenija 

98 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated0018465,1590.16%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2022Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)00398,7240.000.07Rural Development (RD)00250,4000.000.04TOTAL005149,1240.000.06FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)147,50910244,2460.010.03Rural Development (RD)3145,337471,288,8890.020.21TOTAL4192,846571,533,1350.010.12Irregularities reported in 2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent2. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported 2018-2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 20221252,535142,148,640CF0011,245,611ERDF1252,53510735,208ESF003167,821Cumulative from start of the programming period 61,070,620434,629,6380.040.16CF0041,867,6640.000.25ERDF2370,665262,115,5010.030.15ESF4699,95513646,4730.100.093. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENSI00%0%12%00%18%1192%73%N.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENSI00%0%11%635%318%847%100%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 20224: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud(1) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
99 

SLOVENIA 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Generalna policijska uprava (General Police Directorate) Uprava kriminalistične policije (Criminal Police Directorate): Sektor za gospodarsko kriminaliteto (Oddelek za poslovni in javni sektor, Oddelek za korupcijo) (Economic Crime Division (Business and Public Sector Section, Corruption Section)) and Nacionalni preiskovalni urad (National Bureau of Investigation) In eight regional Police Directorates (Celje, Koper, Kranj, Ljubljana,  Maribor,  Murska Sobota, Nova Gorica, Novo mesto) there is a Criminal Police Division with an Economic Crime Section 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes  3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS) Urad Republike Slovenije za nadzor proračuna (Budget Supervision Office of the Republic of Slovenia (body within the Ministry of Finance)) 4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency V  Upravi kriminalistične policije je Sektor za gospodarsko kriminaliteto, v katerem je Oddelek za korupcijo (within the Criminal Police Directorate, Economic Crime Division, there is the Corruption Section) Komisija za preprečevanje korupcije (Commission for the Prevention of Corruption) (competent also for conflict of interests) 5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency Finančna uprava Republike Slovenije (Financial Administration of the Republic of Slovenia)  Sektor proračunske inšpekcije v Uradu RS za nadzor proračuna (the Budget Inspection) (an inspection body within Budget Supervision Office of the Republic of Slovenia) 7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures Državna revizijska komisija za revizijo postopkov oddaje javnih naročil (National Review Commission for Reviewing Public Procurement Award Procedures) 8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority Javna agencija Republike Slovenije za varstvo konkurence (Slovenian Competition Protection Agency) 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Računsko sodišče Republike Slovenije (Court of Audit of the Republic of Slovenia) 11) National security agency/National intelligence service Slovenska obveščevalno-varnostna agencija (Slovene Intelligence and Security Agency)   
 
 
 
 
Slovakia – Slovensko 

100 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated136,2415399,5010.28%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2022Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)00246,0610.000.01Rural Development (RD)2495,145498,313,5870.345.69SA/RD21,224,7885228,541TOTAL41,719,933568,588,1890.301.49FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)577,74612325,8870.000.01Rural Development (RD)6643,83012613,834,9370.071.56SA/RD92,358,730401,815,473TOTAL203,080,30617815,976,2970.100.52FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentIrregularities reported 2018-20222. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported in 2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 20221438,363,983111117,426,815CF31,430,7172554,686,369ERDF1036,892,8697560,567,344ESF140,39792,075,839EMFF00297,263Cumulative from start of the programming period 81793,425,875499429,857,3437.844.25CF32133,629,371106229,823,4674.217.23ERDF35654,393,670316148,494,33415.043.41ESF145,402,8347251,280,8890.211.98EMFF005258,6530.007.333. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENSK74%21%18%412%13%2985%100%N.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENSK111%7%13%1610%2315%11875%100%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 20224: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud(1) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
101 

SLOVAKIA 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Národná kriminálna agentúra – Prezídium Policajného zboru Slovenskej republiky (National Crime Agency – Police Presidium of the Slovak Republic 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes  3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS) YES 4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency  5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency  7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures Úrad pre verejné obstarávanie (Public Procurement Office) 8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority Protimonopolný úrad Slovenskej republiky (Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic) 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Najvyšší kontrolný úrad Slovenskej republiky (Supreme Audit Office of the Slovak Republic) 11) National security agency/National intelligence service Slovenská informačná služba (Slovak Information Service) Finančná spravodajská jednotka – Prezídium Policajného zboru Slovenskej republiky – Ministerstvo vnútra Slovenskej republiky (Financial Intelligence Unit – Police Presidium of the Slovak Republic – Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic)   
 
 
Finland – Suomi-Finland 

102 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated186,187313,113,5811.08%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2022Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)0010316,7600.000.06Rural Development (RD)0022949,9480.000.20SA/RD00114,154TOTAL00331,280,8620.000.13FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)0032822,7950.000.03Rural Development (RD)141,297612,085,3390.000.11SA/RD00226,092TOTAL141,297952,934,2260.000.06Irregularities reported in 2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent2. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported 2018-2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 20220011360,819ERDF008216415ESF002119815EMFF00124589Cumulative from start of the programming period 1425,525451,546,4760.030.12ERDF1425,52527974,2730.060.13ESF0012303,0130.000.06EMFF006269,1900.000.393. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENFI00%NA0%00%00%00%NAN.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENFI00%0%6%00%00%4100%25%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 20224: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud(1) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
103 

FINLAND 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Poliisi / keskusrikospoliisi (Finnish Police / National Bureau of Investigation) 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes  3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS)  4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency  5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency  7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures  8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority  10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Valtiontalouden tarkastusvirasto (National Audit Office of Finland) 11) National security agency/National intelligence service    
 
 
 
Sweden – Sverige 

104 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated002009,961,6401.16%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2022Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)118,711140,4470.000.01Rural Development (RD)0010257,5190.000.09TOTAL118,71111297,9660.000.03FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)118,7117129,3670.000.00Rural Development (RD)112,947251,285,8760.000.09SA/RD00122,203TOTAL231,658331,437,4460.000.032. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported in 2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities reported 2018-2022FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 20226733,72213477,5470.040.03ERDF00594,039ESF3133,584218,358EMFF3600,1386365,150Cumulative from start of the programming period 103,322,638613,570,8880.230.25ERDF121,65923900,3480.000.12ESF4437,134311,307,8890.080.23EMFF52,863,84571,362,6513.771.793. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENSE00%0%3%00%00%2100%100%N.%N.%N.%N.%of which OPENSE00%0%5%120%00%480%25%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 20224: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud(1) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
105 

SWEDEN 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Swedish Police Authority (Polismyndigheten) Nationella Anti-korruptionsgruppen NKG (National Anti-Corruption Police Unit NACPU) 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes Ekobrottsmyndigheten (Swedish Economic Crime Authority) 3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS) Ekobrottsmyndigheten (Swedish Economic Crime Authority) 4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency  5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency Swedish National Financial Management Authority 7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures  8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority Swedish Competition Authority (this body is competent of for ex-post checks of public procurement procedures) 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Swedish National Audit Office 11) National security agency/National intelligence service Ekobrottsmyndigheten (Swedish Economic Crime Authority) Säkerhetspolisen (Swedish Security Service)   
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEXES 

106 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 1 

107 

NEURNEURNEURNEURNEURBE264             22,933,612   391             48,112,872   434             61,602,035   552             91,730,528   425             372,537,308 BG16               3,464,979     2                 653,686        7                 4,600,189     29               2,797,777     11               2,710,387     CZ94               5,059,643     51               4,624,633     60               5,217,898     65               3,185,536     84               7,716,096     DK54               7,320,993     66               3,394,892     68               5,374,077     102             4,375,750     100             3,835,483     DE1,745          126,790,397 1,792          135,534,807 1,698          167,530,727 1,569          84,621,853   1,676          129,209,922 EE9                 642,408        7                 605,861        8                 1,120,169     9                 1,053,524     4                 314,252        IE36               3,514,983     22               1,459,809     20               2,917,657     27               1,446,990     22               2,445,636     EL42               7,953,756     62               4,476,066     85               7,691,408     36               13,588,892   45               8,811,803     ES335             32,771,492   321             23,934,120   379             45,958,112   491             63,481,732   531             43,148,181   FR296             95,735,911   308             26,463,585   252             41,600,386   359             55,200,915   381             36,451,482   HR16               1,087,327     8                 516,117        23               1,698,077     8                 944,363        24               3,860,549     IT95               9,671,733     158             12,556,276   87               7,651,892     85               18,366,673   96               21,702,363   CY4                 70,088          1                 10,463          1                 13,590          5                 160,662        LV20               1,396,206     25               1,018,410     28               1,494,637     44               3,858,643     39               3,861,774     LT44               4,890,322     27               3,426,512     66               5,145,936     68               5,150,828     54               3,602,689     LU1                 111,376        1                 15,690          1                 43,171          HU11               1,031,116     56               3,076,173     72               11,168,752   29               1,917,668     23               7,049,830     MT1                 27,024          2                 328,525        2                 44,438          NL503             128,987,352 408             75,820,261   432             31,081,577   494             170,608,090 601             78,489,293   AT48               2,199,340     47               4,943,359     47               1,977,807     61               6,642,690     76               3,684,236     PL157             6,768,853     144             10,243,138   127             11,134,443   125             9,191,813     134             32,828,575   PT37               9,398,614     36               2,026,480     14               469,667        24               2,962,603     31               2,373,808     RO25               1,149,731     57               3,536,671     45               3,062,137     45               2,848,180     41               4,018,301     SI16               1,036,714     10               442,197        28               5,730,470     13               1,135,392     18               465,159        SK11               544,606        7                 423,202        9                 165,408        8                 884,116        6                 435,742        FI32               2,944,982     57               5,033,812     42               3,742,922     49               12,725,577   32               3,199,768     SE155             7,259,851     176             10,649,297   169             11,008,224   194             9,800,141     200             9,961,640     EU-274,065484,625,0094,240383,094,0754,202439,187,3224,490568,905,5624,661782,919,377UK822125,477,846 90897,243,724   71190,685,862   42146,175,599   32740,310,350   Total4,887610,102,8555,148480,337,7994,913529,873,1854,911615,081,1614,988823,229,728* Cut-off date 15/03/2023** Amounts are roundedTOR: Total number of fraudulent and non-fraudulent cases with the related estimated and established amount2018 - 2022                                                                      MS20182019202020212022 
 
 
Annex 2 

108 

NEURNEURNEURNEURNEURBE4116,062,45212234,339,64111649,869,309 17377,614,90610949,701,316BG153,405,7592653,68674,600,189   272,628,20472,584,329CZ117,056DK2167,7002146,5194137,220      6351,1053114,100DE10920,905,7588327,689,6801009,837,467   604,295,590444,487,969EE4568,1025505,28461,032,346   81,033,8103267,805IE101,497,1546333,0315360,328      1100,366EL326,662,449152,379,288303,732,163   1311,052,888378,031,125ES486,059,817302,561,6073714,234,371 3719,109,996252,864,020FR6280,351,669536,431,5214525,892,624 8427,798,7258213,080,597HR121,013,8302389,444131,216,726   228,514113,521,016IT385,763,881302,371,961162,533,390   1512,788,237286,821,252CY112,878113,5902112,602LV91,103,97215735,10112773,635      91,043,536398,255LT201,683,684172,458,400414,275,529   463,837,216332,812,294LUHU1642,280123,6036164,347      1130,3194196,164MTNL182,365,80172,500,60891,333,377   514,406,9432295,846AT4147,35661,049,2333139,133      44,203,383475,391PL422,072,875272,490,231332,411,061   241,335,663394,434,043PT41,643,05461,065,7653120,502      41,065,612111,379,031RO348,5325311,9489236,469      10612,30652,089,725SI8405,956264,99471,358,807   1565,821SK5115,016115,500340,680        337,131136,241FI5267,5714226,2603153,380      186,187SE132,382173,5462101,010      EU-27494152,999,93044288,816,852510124,554,064535184,070,917454103,089,308UK28931,65029944,142715,523,85624,406,349Total522153,931,57947189,760,994517140,077,920537188,477,266454103,089,308* Cut-off date 15/03/2023** Amounts are roundedTOR: Total number of fraudulent cases with the related estimated and established amount2018 - 2022                                                                      MS20182019202020212022 
 
 
Annex 3 

109 

NEURNEURNEURNEURNEURBE2236,871,16026913,773,23131811,732,72537914,115,622316322,835,993BG159,2202169,5734126,057CZ945,059,643514,624,633605,217,898643,168,479847,716,096DK527,153,293643,248,373645,236,856964,024,645973,721,384DE1,636105,884,6391,709107,845,1261,598157,693,2601,50980,326,2631,632124,721,953EE574,3062100,577287,823119,714146,447IE262,017,829161,126,778152,557,329261,346,624222,445,636EL101,291,307472,096,779553,959,245232,536,0048780,678ES28726,711,67529121,372,51334231,723,74145444,371,73650640,284,161FR23415,384,24225520,032,06420715,707,76227527,402,19029923,370,885HR473,4976126,67310481,3516915,85013339,533IT573,907,85212810,184,315715,118,503705,578,4366814,881,111CY357,210110,463348,060LV11292,23510283,30916721,002352,815,108363,763,519LT243,206,63810968,11225870,407221,313,61221790,395LU1111,376115,690143,171HU10388,837553,052,5706611,004,405281,787,349196,853,666MT127,0242328,525244,438NL485126,621,55140173,319,65342329,748,200489156,201,14759978,193,447AT442,051,983413,894,126441,838,674572,439,307723,608,845PL1154,695,9781177,752,907948,723,3821017,856,1509528,394,532PT337,755,56030960,71611349,165201,896,99120994,777RO221,101,199523,224,723362,825,668352,235,875361,928,576SI8630,7578377,203214,371,66312569,57118465,159SK6429,5906407,7026124,7295846,9855399,501FI272,677,410534,807,552393,589,5424912,725,577313,113,581SE1547,227,46917510,575,75116710,907,2141949,800,1412009,961,640EU-273,571331,625,0803,798294,277,2233,692314,633,2593,955384,834,6454,207679,830,069UK794124,546,196   87996,299,58270475,162,006 41941,769,249 32740,310,350Total4,365456,171,2754,677390,576,8054,396389,795,2644,374426,603,8944,534720,140,420* Cut-off date 15/03/2023** Amounts are roundedTOR: Total number of non-fraudulent cases with the related estimated and established amount2018 - 2022                                                MS20182019202020212022 
 
 
Annex 4 

110 

OWNRES established and estimated amountOWNRES established and estimated amount as a % in amount gross TOR collectedOWNRES established and estimated amountOWNRES established and estimated amount as a % in amount gross TOR collectedOWNRES established and estimated amountOWNRES established and estimated amount as a % in amount gross TOR collectedEUR%EUR%EUR%BE372,537,308            9.22%49,701,3161.23%322,835,9937.99%BG2,710,387                1.22%2,584,3291.17%126,0570.06%CZ7,716,096                1.47%0.00%7,716,0961.47%DK3,835,483                0.62%114,1000.02%3,721,3840.60%DE129,209,922            1.98%4,487,9690.07%124,721,9531.91%EE314,252                   0.36%267,8050.30%46,4470.05%IE2,445,636                0.38%0.00%2,445,6360.38%EL8,811,803                0.96%8,031,1250.87%780,6780.08%ES43,148,181              1.59%2,864,0200.11%40,284,1611.48%FR36,451,482              1.21%13,080,5970.43%23,370,8850.78%HR3,860,549                4.63%3,521,0164.22%339,5330.41%IT21,702,363              0.58%6,821,2520.18%14,881,1110.40%CY160,662                   0.31%112,6020.22%48,0600.09%LV3,861,774                4.39%98,2550.11%3,763,5194.27%LT3,602,689                1.78%2,812,2941.39%790,3950.39%LU0.00%0.00%0.00%HU7,049,830                1.44%196,1640.04%6,853,6661.40%MT44,438                     0.16%0.00%44,4380.16%NL78,489,293              1.59%295,8460.01%78,193,4471.58%AT3,684,236                0.96%75,3910.02%3,608,8450.94%PL32,828,575              1.82%4,434,0430.25%28,394,5321.58%PT2,373,808                0.54%1,379,0310.31%994,7770.22%RO4,018,301                1.02%2,089,7250.53%1,928,5760.49%SI465,159                   0.16%0.00%465,1590.16%SK435,742                   0.28%36,2410.02%399,5010.26%FI3,199,768                1.08%86,1870.03%3,113,5811.05%SE9,961,640                1.16%0.00%9,961,6401.16%EU-27782,919,3772.33%103,089,3080.31%679,830,0692.03%UK40,310,3504.45%0.00%40,310,3504.45%Total823,229,7282.39%103,089,3080.30%720,140,4202.09%* Cut-off date 15/03/2023** Amounts are rounded    TOR: Percentage of the financial impact of OWNRES cases to the collected and made available TOR (gross) in 2022 per Member StateMSAllFraudulentNon-fraudulent 
 
 
Annex 5 

111 

Established amountRecovered amountRREstablished amountRecovered amountRREUREUR%EUREUR%123=2/1123=2/1BE82,604,19621,985,02627%347,379,74990,362,93226%BG2,786,183111,4574%2,699,93712,4230%CZ3,185,5363,180,880100%7,716,0966,866,48789%DK4,375,7504,335,44399%3,835,4833,489,77691%DE84,592,82081,928,22997%129,209,922121,382,43794%EE19,71419,714100%210,474164,13778%IE1,346,624943,66170%2,445,6362,240,07192%EL3,575,646692,39019%1,543,605346,12022%ES62,415,80748,845,05278%41,073,70934,795,61185%FR53,442,53327,894,63152%35,965,84116,329,12045%HR944,363944,363100%633,722506,50580%IT10,137,4163,958,35939%20,878,0295,785,33728%CY13,59013,590100%160,66265,48641%LV3,018,1942,872,50095%3,779,4973,779,497100%LT1,313,612770,79659%1,863,130736,52340%LU43,17143,171100%HU1,917,668490,17726%7,049,8301,069,51015%MT328,525328,525100%44,43844,438100%NL170,195,57650,497,92830%60,955,27728,341,17546%AT6,642,6903,884,15058%3,661,6363,393,32493%PL6,328,0765,641,59489%23,502,4694,484,83419%PT2,962,6031,798,61761%1,859,8651,627,65788%RO2,848,1802,523,82389%4,018,3012,309,37757%SI1,135,392526,57446%465,159463,743100%SK846,985846,985100%435,742399,50192%FI12,725,57712,685,441100%3,199,7683,103,25797%SE9,800,1419,325,16395%9,961,6409,179,18892%EU-27529,546,568 287,088,241 54%714,549,619 341,278,465 48%UK46,175,59935,353,73677%40,310,35012,955,66732%Total575,722,167 322,441,977 56%754,859,970 354,234,133 47%* Cut-off date 15/03/2023** Amounts are roundedTOR: Recovery rates (RR) per cut-off date MS20212022 
 
 
 
Annex 6 

112 

Release for free circulationTransitCustoms warehousingInward processingOtherRelease for free circulationTransitCustoms warehousingInward processingOtherBE49,363,140338,176317,794,6193,865,669     352,021617,993205,691BG2,573,87910,450126,057CZ7,174,250522,189        19,657DK114,1003,453,81198,850123,48945,234DE4,411,18176,789          113,387,774554,452        6,426,0463,722,821630,861EE164,027103,778        46,447IE2,382,36163,275EL2,338,708109,97884,6525,497,787     780,678ES789,5482,074,472     30,856,935432,338        988,6698,006,219FR11,987,462239,501853,634        18,278,151156,933        3,758,253593,568583,980HR594,8042,515,851410,362        339,533IT6,767,95553,297          14,742,12624,319114,666CY112,60248,060LV82,27715,9783,666,80161,717          35,000LT1,072,7351,739,559727,72262,673          LUHU113,19682,9686,853,666MT44,438NL295,84651,981,6286,250,385     1,840,36117,879,960241,113AT75,3913,541,40430,026          22,36215,053PL3,458,243630,372345,4288,155,7141,881,316     18,357,501PT1,379,031976,99217,785          RO2,089,7251,709,773218,802SI465,159SK36,241399,501FI86,1872,626,599439,43847,544SE9,804,198121,997        18,88116,564EU-2787,610,4313,844,3272,268,586295,8469,070,119600,364,39913,957,48031,840,58231,731,9021,935,706UK38,760,64627,5771,522,127Total87,610,4313,844,3272,268,586295,8469,070,119639,125,04613,985,05731,840,58233,254,0291,935,706* Cut-off date 15/03/2023** Amounts are roundedTOR: Estimated and established amount per customs procedure per Member State 2022MSFraudulentNon-fraudulent 
 
 
Annex 7 

113 

Release for free circulationTransitCustoms warehousingInward processingOtherRelease for free circulationTransitCustoms warehousingInward processingOtherBE10621170132833                   BG614CZ8211DK391321                   DE4131,49436662214                 EE121IE202EL2012148ES8174666727FR5612527274106                   HR82113IT2716413                   CY23LV213141                   LT231174LUHU31181MT2NL226424132593                   AT468112                   PL201369032PT11191RO5333SI18SK15FI12632                   SE193511                   EU-2732720412643,47244112413436UK299919Total32720412643,77145012415336* Cut-off date 15/03/2023TOR: Customs procedure by number of cases per Member State 2022MSFraudulentNon-fraudulent 
 
 
Annex 8 

114 

AllRelease controlsPost-release controlsInspections by anti-fraud servicesTax auditVoluntary admissionOtherAllRelease controlsPost-release controlsInspections by anti-fraud servicesTax auditVoluntary admissionOtherBE4251093641302316150148711BG1171644CZ848455623DK100321974820227DE1,67644187161111,63211510271523521327EE432111IE222242844EL4537132616817ES5312522125061811296141454FR38182392419299126925922HR2411641133712IT96282916168252518CY52113111LV3933361323LT54331322121LU0HU23431192143MT222NL6012259927927149AT76413724437144PL13439181531295147911PT311122720767RO41514361332SI18181107SK6115311FI32113113162SE20020011186417EU-274,66145414612015733254,2079752,11416538449376UK327327129630Total4,98845414612015733254,5349762,41016538452376* Cut-off date 15/03/2023TOR: Method of detection by number of cases per Member State 2022MSNFraudulentNon-fraudulent 
 
 
 
Annex 9 

115 

AllRelease controlsPost-release controlsInspections by anti-fraud servicesTax auditVoluntary admissionOtherAllRelease controlsPost-release controlsInspections by anti-fraud servicesTax auditVoluntary admissionOtherBE372,537,30849,701,3161,675,514   21,839,039 25,974,120 212,642      322,835,9936,294,55111,372,15813,293,150291,876,134BG2,710,3872,584,32910,450        2,573,879   126,057126,057CZ7,716,0967,716,096200,5386,483,0211,032,537DK3,835,483114,10078,783        35,317        3,721,3841,868,408892,379699,906260,691DE129,209,9224,487,9691,863,169   440,836      2,033,216   11,933        101,597      37,218        124,721,9535,824,99949,978,9631,203,21351,259,44714,985,7051,469,626EE314,252267,805103,778      164,027      46,44746,447IE2,445,6362,445,636289,361647,203374,256819,595315,221EL8,811,8038,031,1253,729,329   167,983      970,131      3,163,684   780,67820,512760,166ES43,148,1812,864,020298,129      2,490,741   75,150        40,284,1619,301,8987,053,1001,341,64317,772,6684,594,682220,170FR36,451,48213,080,5971,384,506   874,941      10,821,150 23,370,8854,954,9178,217,8089,500,669697,491HR3,860,5493,521,016855,137      167,616      2,498,263   339,533116,383176,16211,74835,241IT21,702,3636,821,252359,325      1,082,159   5,326,470   53,297        14,881,1111,045,8377,477,0576,358,217CY160,662112,60217,426        95,176        48,06026,29310,53211,234LV3,861,77498,25598,255        3,763,5191,390,4902,373,028LT3,602,6892,812,29435,813        2,776,481   790,395790,395LUHU7,049,830196,164113,196      82,968        6,853,666364,105978,5755,510,986MT44,43844,43844,438NL78,489,293295,846295,846      78,193,4478,078,15367,196,8982,918,396AT3,684,23675,39111,344        64,047        3,608,845203,9782,576,779274,995427,945125,146PL32,828,5754,434,043879,914      3,318,916   105,478      15,241        114,493      28,394,53220,458,5937,887,25313,36335,324PT2,373,8081,379,031161,626      426,401      791,004      994,777146,352161,833686,592RO4,018,3012,089,7251,980,083   109,641      1,928,57619,91251,0621,857,602SI465,159465,15918,533254,058192,568SK435,74236,24136,241        399,50162,737321,21615,548FI3,199,76886,18786,187        3,113,5812,449,828630,62333,130SE9,961,6409,961,64042,1016,864,4812,651,373403,686EU-27782,919,377103,089,30811,595,44733,534,40351,462,48087,083199,8056,210,090679,830,06961,389,086181,048,94241,459,54669,406,37131,828,668294,697,456UK40,310,350 40,310,350 38,424,934 1,885,417   Total823,229,728103,089,30811,595,44733,534,40351,462,48087,083199,8056,210,090720,140,42061,389,086219,473,87641,459,54669,406,37133,714,085294,697,456* Cut-off date 15/03/2023** Amounts are roundedTOR: Method of detection by established and estimated amounts per Member State 2022MSTotalFraudulentNon-fraudulent 
 
 
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Established amount, EURRecovered amount, EURRR, %Established amount, EURRecovered amount, EURRR, %123=2/1456=5/4BE38,377,8623,716,46910%309,001,88686,646,46428%BG2,573,8793600%126,05712,06310%CZ7,716,0966,866,48789%DK114,10078,78369%3,721,3843,410,99392%DE4,487,9693,473,90077%124,721,953117,908,53795%EE164,027164,027100%46,4471100%IE2,445,6362,240,07192%EL762,928167,98322%780,678178,13723%ES789,548761,44096%40,284,16134,034,17184%FR12,608,4382,236,02318%23,357,40314,093,09860%HR294,190166,97257%339,533339,533100%IT6,211,8383,774,33961%14,666,1912,010,99714%CY112,60217,42615%48,06048,060100%LV15,97815,978100%3,763,5193,763,519100%LT1,072,73535,8133%790,395700,71089%LUHU196,164114,24658%6,853,666955,26514%MT44,43844,438100%NL295,846295,846100%60,659,43128,045,32946%AT75,39111,34415%3,586,2453,381,98094%PL2,329,5191,922,39583%21,172,9512,562,43912%PT865,088690,14580%994,777937,51194%RO2,089,725557,71327%1,928,5761,751,66591%SI465,159463,743100%SK36,241399,501399,501100%FI86,18723,30027%3,113,5813,079,95799%SE9,961,6409,179,18892%EU-2773,560,25518,224,50225%640,989,364323,053,96350%UK40,310,35012,955,66732%Total73,560,25518,224,50225%681,299,714336,009,63149%* Cut-off date 15/03/2023** Amounts are roundedTOR: Recovery rates (RR) per Member State 2022MSFraudulentNon-fraudulent 
 
 
 
Annex 11 

Annex 12 

117 

Total cases** Cases assessed twice (AI)  Total (amounts not counted twice) N*EURNEURNEURNEURNNEURCZ12               913,405      16               1,157,672    28               2,071,077     DE2                 168,992      28               4,394,247    30               3                 4,563,239     ES 7                 3,438,623   2                 274,476      9                 3,713,100     FR  1                 121,265      1                 121,265        HR 1                 203,428       1                 203,428        IT 10               12,027,845 4                 3,487,299   14               1                 15,515,144   LV  1                 128,350      1                 128,350        LT 1                 210,101      1                 1,172,149   2                 1                 1,382,251     HU2,254          5                 5,030,093    5                 2                 5,032,346     NL1                 11,526,107 3                 1,140,836   3                 13,152,068 7                 3                 25,819,011   AT1                 2,484,269   8                 10,273,486 5                 3,828,292   14               6                 16,586,047   PL 1                 752,908       1                 752,908        PT 1                 123,541       1                 123,541        RO2                 421,809      1                 124,812      1                 143,037      4                 689,658        SE1                 103,724        1                 103,724        EU-2719                 15,620,560                 82   38,877,593                 18   22,306,936               119                 16    76,805,089 UK8                 10,487,076 13               44,163,981 21               54,651,057   Total                19   15,620,560                 90   49,364,669                 31   66,470,917               140                 16  131,456,146 * Number of cases** Cases assessed twice are not includedTOR: Examination of write-off cases in 2022MS Acceptance  Reference to Article 13.2 considered not justified  Additional information request (AI)  Not appropriate CasesEstimated and established amountNEURBE1122,643,874BG110,450DE113,133EE2103,778EL287,159,394ES172,074,472FR2421,029HR22,515,851LV398,255LT311,739,559AT364,047PL9533,874PT3513,942RO389,332EU-2711637,980,990* CN code 2402 2090* Cut-off date 15/03/2023TOR: Cases of smuggled cigarettes* in 2022MS 
 
ANNEX 13 

List of abbreviations 

SA: Support to Agriculture 

RD: Rural Development 

SA/RD: Support to Agriculture/ Rural Development 

GUID: European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund – Section Guidance 

EFF: European Fisheries Fund 

EMFF: European Maritime and Fisheries Fund 

CF: Cohesion Fund 

ERDF: European Regional and Development Fund 

ESF: European Social Fund 

AMIF: Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund 

FEAD: Fund for European Aid to the most Deprived 

ISF: Internal Security Fund 

CBC: pre-accession, Cross-Border Cooperation component 

IPA: Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance 

HRD: pre-accession, Human Resources Development component 

IPARD: Instrument for Pre-Accession for Rural Development 

REGD: pre-accession, Regional Development component 

TAIB: Transition Assistance and Institution Building 

ENI: European Neighbourhood Instrument 

TIPAA: Turkey Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance 

118 

 
 
119 

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ased on data in the Irregularity Management System(IMS) as of 6/3/2023Annex to the Statistical Evaluation -Irregularities reported as fraudulent by Member States and Beneficiary Countries in 2022 (1)The number of irregularities reported measures the results of Member States’ work to counter fraud and other illegal activities affecting the EU’s financial interests. Therefore, the figures should not be interpreted as indicating the level of fraud in the Countries’ territories.FUNDS/TYPE OF EXPENDITURE 
 
 
120 

COUNTRIESSARDSA/RDGUIDEFFEMFFCFERDFESFAMIFFEADISFCBC-IPAHRDIPARDREGDTAIBCBC-ENITIPAAAT0000000000000000000BE000000000120,149000000000BG0525,80800031,57300138,5690000000000CY0000000237,60000000000000CZ417,542407,25200003,765,66027,118,413188,4500000000000DE334,576130,72300000221,6351,829,153134,191000000000DK01,481,2200000080,3394,4550000000000EE01,001,03800093,360028,55600000000000ES1,587,028467,51100000000000000000FI0000000000000000000FR2,473,842359,05700000172,09300000000000GR0000000041,4000000000000HR0986,825000016,984,35657,81500000000000HU90,5640000006,571,43600000000000IE0000000000000000000IT511,9921,952,825499,1250100,00000000000000000LT25,424668,27500000000000000000LU0000000000000000000LV0292,3880000200,56913,371,7852,496,2750000000000MT090,00000000000000000000NL28,854000000011,9460000000000PL346,187930,5250018,523,245293,862444,0095,127,883525,9640000000000PT08,34100000139,23000000000000RO2,276,2621,223,158000014,248,8031,806,7562,297,0690000000000SE18,7110000600,13800133,5840000000000SI0000000252,53500000000000SK0495,1451,224,7880001,430,71749,560,91640,3970000000000UK031,84600000000000000000AL0000000000000000000ME0000000000000000000MK0000000000000000000RS00000000000086,8450580,9980000TR00000000000000186,1750000TOTAL8,110,98111,051,9361,723,913018,623,2451,018,93337,074,114104,746,9927,707,262254,3400086,8450767,1730000Annex to the Statistical Evaluation - Irregular amounts related to irregularities reported as fraudulent by Member States and Beneficiary Countries in 2022 (1)FUNDS/TYPE OF EXPENDITURE(1) Based on data in the Irregularity Management System(IMS) as of 6/3/2023 
 
 
 
 
121 

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ased on data in the Management System(IMS) as of 6/3/2023Annex to the Statistical Evaluation -Irregularities not reported as fraudulent by Member States and Beneficiary Countries in 2022  (1)The number of irregularities reported measures the results of Member States’ work to counter fraud and other illegal activities affecting the EU’s financial interests. Therefore, the figures should not be interpreted as indicating the level of fraud in the Countries’ territories.FUNDS/TYPE OF EXPENDITURE 
 
 
 
 
122 

COUNTRIESSARDSA/RDGUIDEFFEMFFCFERDFESFAMIFFEADISFCBC-IPAHRDIPARDREGDTAIBCBC-ENITIPAAAT38,07528,608000002,430,815630,2500000000000BE401,113197,69410,4820000331,62432,0000000000000BG1,294,7288,411,47144,64200493,71039,792,42418,944,3021,322,56000086,058000000CY00000212,622189,374311,773023,812000000000CZ106,540967,35200040,1001,953,28329,696,3601,412,90235,802000000000DE733,2681,492,93000024,69005,722,3631,864,919243,231180,75200000000DK28,337308,629000936,159016,804145,9420000000000EE0475,77500069,7692,758,9047,105,333425,3060073,4580000018,6470ES11,464,2416,051,109000122,01903,473,280524,8670000000000FI316,760949,94814,1540024,5890216,415119,8150014,9190000000FR8,065,4523,293,578000341,34905,736,393199,9010748,00000000000GR213,0276,643,318000274,4233,271,16627,770,1964,163,9770996,99600000000HR26,0541,719,225000217,7351,578,022614,339573,2550000000000HU1,287,6525,806,2330001,373,1391,281,70815,934,5033,238,4900457,20300000000IE00000000800,6920000000000IT12,656,6116,275,4554,415,344052,75038,136021,663,7081,891,7460000000000LT686,1372,348,20700002,993,1883,974,4641,023,5110000000000LU019,22000000000000000000LV11,421500,59300443,65229,9874,405,9004,367,95926,7140000000000MT0188,2720000024,81900000000000NL112,92149,79400012,80742,275261,92600000000000PL34,846,1936,870,827157,36089,964123,654125,1807,580,62994,371,97412,425,5920745,39500000000PT1,118,5529,015,070000952,62283,5861,590,197541,4640000000000RO10,259,63228,116,24800205,6672,155,2696,431,37616,534,8233,579,633058,132023,355000000SE40,447257,519000365,150094,03918,3580000000000SI98,72450,40000001,245,611735,208167,8210000000000SK46,0618,313,587228,5410097,26360,790,05564,945,3722,178,4760000000000UK02,826,37200000637,311929,8240000000000AL00000000000032,256033,250,4210189,88900ME00000000000012,151255,00057,6880000MK000000000000002,732,297036,81600RS00000000000083,530031,7170000TR000000000000003,010,53628,52697,890071,509TOTAL83,851,946101,177,4344,870,52389,964825,7237,906,718134,397,501327,506,30038,238,015302,8453,186,47888,377237,350255,00039,082,65928,526324,59518,64771,509Annex to the Statistical Evaluation - Irregular amounts related to irregularities not reported as fraudulent by Member States and Beneficiary Countries in 2022  (1)FUNDS/TYPE OF EXPENDITURE(1) Based on data in the Irregularity Management System(IMS) as of 6/3/2023