COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Follow-up by Member States to the recommendations of the PIF Report 2021 Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 34th Annual Report on the protection of the European Union's financial interests and the fight against fraud - 2022
Date: 2023-07-27
Institutions: European Anti-Fraud Office, European Commission
Subjects: EU Member State, EU budget, EU strategy, activity report, digitisation, fight against crime, financial control, fraud, fraud against the EU, innovation

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 27.7.2023  SWD(2023) 273 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Follow-up by Member States to the recommendations of the PIF Report 2021 Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 34th Annual Report on the protection of the European Union's financial interests and the fight against fraud - 2022 {COM(2023) 464 final} - {SWD(2023) 272 final} - {SWD(2023) 274 final} - {SWD(2023) 275 final} - {SWD(2023) 276 final}  
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1.  Overview of Member States’ Replies ............................................................................................. 7 

1.1. 

1.2. 

PIF Directive Transposition .................................................................................................... 7 

EPPO Participation ................................................................................................................. 7 

1.3.  Digitilising the Fight against Fraud ........................................................................................ 7 

1.4. 

Strengthening Fraud Risk Analysis ......................................................................................... 8 

2.  Follow-Up by Recommendation ..................................................................................................... 9 

2.1.  Cross-Cutting Measures .......................................................................................................... 9 

2.1.1. 

PIF Directive Transposition ............................................................................................ 9 

2.1.2. 

EPPO Participation ....................................................................................................... 10 

2.2. 

Transparency, Fraud Risk Management, and Digitilising the Fight against Fraud ............... 11 

2.2.1. 

Digitilising the Fight against Fraud .............................................................................. 11 

2.2.2. 

Strengthening Fraud Risk Analysis ............................................................................... 12 

3.  Member States’ Replies ................................................................................................................ 18 

3.1.  Austria (AT) .......................................................................................................................... 18 

3.1.1. 

Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive ................................................................... 18 

3.1.2. 

Participation in the EPPO ............................................................................................. 19 

3.1.3. 

Digitalising the fight against fraud ................................................................................ 19 

3.1.4. 

Strengthen fraud risk analysis ....................................................................................... 19 

3.2.  Belgium (BE) ........................................................................................................................ 21 

3.2.1. 

Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive ................................................................... 21 

3.2.2. 

Participation in the EPPO ............................................................................................. 21 

3.2.3. 

Digitilising the fight against fraud ................................................................................ 21 

3.2.4. 

Strengthen fraud risk analysis ....................................................................................... 22 

3.3.  Bulgaria (BG) ........................................................................................................................ 24 

3.3.1. 

Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive ................................................................... 24 

3.3.2. 

Participation in the EPPO ............................................................................................. 24 

3.3.3. 

Digitilising the fight against fraud ................................................................................ 24 

3.3.4. 

Strengthen fraud risk analysis ....................................................................................... 25 

3.4.  Cyprus (CY) .......................................................................................................................... 28 

3.4.1. 

Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive ................................................................... 28 

3.4.2. 

Participation in the EPPO ............................................................................................. 28 

3.4.3. 

Digitilising the fight against fraud ................................................................................ 28 

3.4.4. 

Strengthen fraud risk analysis ....................................................................................... 28 

3.5.  Czechia (CZ) ......................................................................................................................... 30 

3.5.1. 

Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive ................................................................... 30 

3.5.2. 

Participation in the EPPO ............................................................................................. 30 

 
 
3.5.3. 

Digitilising the fight against fraud ................................................................................ 30 

3.6.  Germany (DE) ....................................................................................................................... 31 

3.6.1. 

Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive ................................................................... 31 

3.6.2. 

Participation in the EPPO ............................................................................................. 31 

3.6.3. 

Digitilising the fight against fraud ................................................................................ 31 

3.6.4. 

Strengthen fraud risk analysis ....................................................................................... 32 

3.7.  Denmark (DK) ...................................................................................................................... 33 

3.7.1. 

Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive ................................................................... 33 

3.7.2. 

Participation in the EPPO ............................................................................................. 33 

3.7.3. 

Digitilising the fight against fraud ................................................................................ 33 

3.7.4. 

Strengthen fraud risk analysis ....................................................................................... 33 

3.8. 

Estonia (EE) .......................................................................................................................... 35 

3.8.1. 

Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive ................................................................... 35 

3.8.2. 

Participation in the EPPO ............................................................................................. 35 

3.8.3. 

Digitilising the fight against fraud ................................................................................ 35 

3.8.4. 

Strengthen fraud risk analysis ....................................................................................... 35 

3.9. 

Spain (ES) ............................................................................................................................. 37 

3.9.1. 

Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive ................................................................... 37 

3.9.2. 

Participation in the EPPO ............................................................................................. 37 

3.9.3. 

Digitilising the fight against fraud ................................................................................ 37 

3.9.4. 

Strengthen fraud risk analysis ....................................................................................... 38 

3.10. 

Finland (FI) ....................................................................................................................... 40 

3.10.1.  Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive ................................................................... 40 

3.10.2.  Participation in the EPPO ............................................................................................. 40 

3.10.3.  Digitilising the fight against fraud ................................................................................ 40 

3.10.4.  Strengthen fraud risk analysis ....................................................................................... 40 

3.11. 

France (FR) ....................................................................................................................... 42 

3.11.1.  Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive ................................................................... 42 

3.11.2.  Participation in the EPPO ............................................................................................. 42 

3.11.3.  Digitilising the fight against fraud ................................................................................ 42 

3.11.4.  Strengthen fraud risk analysis ....................................................................................... 43 

3.12. 

Greece (GR) ...................................................................................................................... 44 

3.12.1.  Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive ................................................................... 44 

3.12.2.  Participation in the EPPO ............................................................................................. 44 

3.12.3.  Digitilising the fight against fraud ................................................................................ 44 

3.12.4.  Strengthen fraud risk analysis ....................................................................................... 44 

3.13. 

Croatia (HR) ...................................................................................................................... 46 

2 

 
 
3.13.1.  Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive ................................................................... 46 

3.13.2.  Participation in the EPPO ............................................................................................. 46 

3.13.3.  Digitilising the fight against fraud ................................................................................ 46 

3.13.4.  Strengthen fraud risk analysis ....................................................................................... 48 

3.14. 

Hungary (HU) ................................................................................................................... 52 

3.14.1.  Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive ................................................................... 52 

3.14.2.  Participation in the EPPO ............................................................................................. 52 

3.14.3.  Digitilising the fight against fraud ................................................................................ 52 

3.14.4.  Strengthen fraud risk analysis ....................................................................................... 53 

3.15. 

Ireland (IE) ........................................................................................................................ 54 

3.15.1.  Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive ................................................................... 54 

3.15.2.  Participation in the EPPO ............................................................................................. 54 

3.15.3.  Digitilising the fight against fraud ................................................................................ 54 

3.16. 

Italy (IT) ............................................................................................................................ 55 

3.16.1.  Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive ................................................................... 55 

3.16.2.  Participation in the EPPO ............................................................................................. 55 

3.16.3.  Digitilising the fight against fraud ................................................................................ 55 

3.16.4.  Strengthen fraud risk analysis ....................................................................................... 56 

3.17. 

Lithuania (LT) ................................................................................................................... 59 

3.17.1.  Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive ................................................................... 59 

3.17.2.  Participation in the EPPO ............................................................................................. 59 

3.17.3.  Digitilising the fight against fraud ................................................................................ 59 

3.17.4.  Strengthen fraud risk analysis ....................................................................................... 59 

3.18. 

Luxemburg (LU) ............................................................................................................... 61 

3.18.1.  Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive ................................................................... 61 

3.18.2.  Participation in the EPPO ............................................................................................. 61 

3.18.3.  Digitilising the fight against fraud ................................................................................ 61 

3.18.4.  Strengthen fraud risk analysis ....................................................................................... 61 

3.19. 

Latvia (LV) ....................................................................................................................... 63 

3.19.1.  Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive ................................................................... 63 

3.19.2.  Participation in the EPPO ............................................................................................. 63 

3.19.3.  Digitilising the fight against fraud ................................................................................ 63 

3.19.4.  Strengthen fraud risk analysis ....................................................................................... 64 

3.20.  Malta (MT) ........................................................................................................................ 65 

3.20.1.  Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive ................................................................... 65 

3.20.2.  Participation in the EPPO ............................................................................................. 65 

3.20.3.  Digitilising the fight against fraud ................................................................................ 65 

3 

 
 
3.20.4.  Strengthen fraud risk analysis ....................................................................................... 66 

3.21. 

Netherlands (NL) .............................................................................................................. 67 

3.21.1.  Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive ................................................................... 67 

3.21.2.  Participation in the EPPO ............................................................................................. 67 

3.21.3.  Digitilising the fight against fraud ................................................................................ 67 

3.21.4.  Strengthen fraud risk analysis ....................................................................................... 68 

3.22. 

Poland (PL) ....................................................................................................................... 69 

3.22.1.  Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive ................................................................... 69 

3.22.2.  Participation in the EPPO ............................................................................................. 69 

3.22.3.  Digitilising the fight against fraud ................................................................................ 69 

3.22.4.  Strengthen fraud risk analysis ....................................................................................... 70 

3.23. 

Portugal (PT) ..................................................................................................................... 72 

3.23.1.  Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive ................................................................... 72 

3.23.2.  Participation in the EPPO ............................................................................................. 72 

3.23.3.  Digitilising the fight against fraud ................................................................................ 72 

3.23.4.  Strengthen fraud risk analysis ....................................................................................... 72 

3.24. 

Romania (RO) ................................................................................................................... 74 

3.24.1.  Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive ................................................................... 74 

3.24.2.  Participation in the EPPO ............................................................................................. 74 

3.24.3.  Digitilising the fight against fraud ................................................................................ 74 

3.24.4.  Strengthen fraud risk analysis ....................................................................................... 75 

3.25. 

Sweden (SE) ...................................................................................................................... 79 

3.25.1.  Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive ................................................................... 79 

3.25.2.  Participation in the EPPO ............................................................................................. 79 

3.25.3.  Digitilising the fight against fraud ................................................................................ 79 

3.25.4.  Strengthen fraud risk analysis ....................................................................................... 80 

3.26. 

Slovenia (SI) ..................................................................................................................... 81 

3.26.1.  Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive ................................................................... 81 

3.26.2.  Participation in the EPPO ............................................................................................. 81 

3.26.3.  Digitilising the fight against fraud ................................................................................ 81 

3.26.4.  Strengthen fraud risk analysis ....................................................................................... 82 

3.27. 

Slovakia (SK) .................................................................................................................... 85 

3.27.1.  Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive ................................................................... 85 

3.27.2.  Participation in the EPPO ............................................................................................. 85 

3.27.3.  Digitilising the fight against fraud ................................................................................ 85 

3.27.4.  Strengthen fraud risk analysis ....................................................................................... 86 

4 

 
 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 

AFCOS 

Anti-Fraud Coordination Service 

AFIS 

CAP 

CF 

Anti-Fraud Information System 

Common Agricultural Policy 

Cohesion Fund 

CRMS  

Customs Risk Management System 

EAGF   

European Agricultural Guarantee Fund 

EDES   

Early Detection and Exclusion System 

EPPO   

European Public Prosecutors’ Office 

ERDF   

European Regional Development Fund  

ESIF 

ESF 

EU 

FRC 

IMS 

IT 

MAS 

MFF 

European Structural Investment Funds 

European Social Fund  

European Union  

Financial Risks Criteria and Standards Implementing Decision  

Irregularity Management System 

Information Technology  

Mutual Assistance System  

Multiannual Financial Framework 

NAFS   

National Anti-Fraud Strategy 

NRA 

National Risk Assessment  

OLAF   

European Anti-Fraud Office 

PIF 

RRF 

RRP 

Protection of the EU’s Financial Interests 

Recovery and Resilience Facility  

Recovery and Resilience Plan  

5 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.  OVERVIEW OF MEMBER STATES’ REPLIES 

1.1. 

PIF Directive Transposition  

On 5 July 2017, Directive (EU) 2017/1371 on the fight against fraud against the European Union’s (EU) 
financial interest by means of criminal law (PIF Directive) came into effect. While the deadline for 
transposing the Directive into domestic law expired on 9 July 2019, the 2021 report on the protection 
of  the  EU’s  financial  interests  (PIF  Report)  affirmed  that  further  action  was  needed  to  address 
outstanding compliance issues. 

By  the  end  of  20221,  an  infringement  procedures  for  incorrect  transposition  of  the  Directive  was 
launched against 18 Member States. 

Alongside  Czechia,  whose  infringement  procedure  was  closed  in  2022,  many  of  these  countries 
expected to be in full compliance with the PIF Directive in the coming months. 

1.2.  EPPO Participation  

Given the EU’s unparalleled recovery plan in the aftermath of the coronavirus health crisis, the 2021 
PIF Report highlighted the importance of joining the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) for 
investigating and prosecuting fraud against these funds.  

In 2022, 22 Member States already participated in the EPPO, with the same five countries as in 2021 
abstaining. Again, Denmark and Ireland, which may opt out of freedom, security, and justice policy, as 
well as Hungary and Poland indicated that they had no intention to join the EPPO. Sweden was still 
amending its domestic legislation to accommodate membership in the future.  

1.3.  Digitilising the Fight against Fraud 

For the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and NextGenerationEU, the Commission 
has additionally put forth specific proposals that are to boost data quality and the interoperability of 
fund managing information technology (IT) systems, where the budget is implemented under shared 
management and the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). 

As the revision of the Financial Regulation, which would, for instance, oblige Member States to use a 
single integrated IT system for data-mining and risk-scoring, was ongoing in 2021, the Commission, in 
2022,  advised  Member  States  to  fully  exploit  the  tools  at  their  disposal  and  develop  interoperable 
solutions with their domestic systems.  

Following up on this recommendation revealed that at least one IT system underpins every Member 
State’s anti-fraud efforts. ARACHNE was by far most widely spread, with 21 Member States actively 
using it, frequently in support of cohesion funds (CF) and RRF. Many used their own dedicated anti-
fraud IT tools, often jointly with EU tools, although these tools were rarely interoperable. 

Reflecting the Commission’s advice, most Member States integrated any of these IT tools into their 
fight against fraud to enrich data and refine red flags, risk indicators and scores.  

1   As  of  10  June  2023,  the  Commission  opened  infringement  proceedings  against  20  Member  States  for 
incorrect transposition of the Directive. Of these 20 proceedings, two have been opened in 2023 (Bulgaria 
and Poland), one has been closed (Czechia) and, in another case (Finland), the Commission decided to send 
a  reasoned  opinion.  For  the  remaining  16  (Belgium,  Cyprus,  Estonia,  Greece,  Spain,  Croatia,  Hungary, 
Luxembourg,  Latvia,  Malta,  The  Netherlands,  Portugal,  Romania,  Sweden,  Slovenia  and  Slovakia),  the 
Commission is in the process of assessing the replies to the letters of formal notice it has received from the 
Member States. 

6 

 
 
                                                           
Overall, they assessed the impact of this digitisation as boosting fraud prevention and detection, as well 
as  simplifying  administrative  procedures.  Markedly  countries  like  Finland,  which  relied  on  non-EU 
tools, reported that the potential burden of adjusting domestic data protection law to accommodate the 
use of, for example, ARACHNE was keeping them from doing so.   

1.4. 

Strengthening Fraud Risk Analysis  

Under  the  2021-2027  MFF  and  NextGenerationEU,  the  2021  PIF  Report  more  broadly,  too, 
recommended to proactively approach the protection of the EU’s financial interests. Such an approach 
would encompass using data from all available sources, analysing the data and exchanging information, 
including with law enforcement authorities and the Commission to specify emerging risks and fraud 
trends  timely.  Member  States  should  further  act  on  information  provided  by  the  Commission  and 
feedback promptly on the actions taken in response.  

In  2022,  14  Member  States  considered  that  they  had  implemented  this  recommendation  in  full, 
reiterated  their  proactive  approach  to  combatting  fraud  against  the  EU  budget  and  presented  recent 
initiatives.  On  the  revenue  side,  these  Member  States  highlighted  the  Financial  Risks  Criteria  and 
Standards  (FRC)  Implementing  Decision,  supporting  national  and  EU  level  IT  Tools  such  as  the 
Customs Risk Management System (CRMS)2 and the Anti-Fraud Information System (AFIS), which 
helped tax and customs authorities to mine and enrich data from a variety of sources and to exchange 
data  among  Member  States  and  with  the  EU  institutions.  On  the  expenditure  side,  Member  States 
highlighted certain context-specific fraud risk management systems developed by EU fund managing 
authorities, as well as top-level coordination, IT tools like ARACHNE, and dedicated trainings.  

Member States that indicated only partial compliance (12) with the advice to strengthen their fraud risk 
analyses  reported  similar  measures,  but  had,  to  date,  not  implemented  these  for  revenue  and 
expenditure. Sometimes, as was the case for Germany, the extent to which this recommendation was 
implemented varied by governance level and amongst states due to the Member State’s competence 
distribution.  

Only Sweden is still to implement this recommendation, while Ireland and Czechia did not report on it.  

In  this  context,  it  is  also  noteworthy  that  Member  States  such  as  Finland,  which  had  only  partially 
implemented the Commission recommendation, pointed to a high burden stemming from administering 
and legislatively accommodating tools such as ARACHNE into its domestic data protection framework.  

2  

CRMS is a European electronic system for customs, financed by the EU Customs Programme. CRMS2, 
the new release of the system, started to operate on 1 January 2022 

7 

 
 
 
                                                           
2.  FOLLOW-UP BY RECOMMENDATION  

2.1.  Cross-Cutting Measures  

2.1.1.  PIF Directive Transposition 

On the correct transposition of the PIF Directive, the Commission asked Member States the following 
questions:  

Q.1.  Has  the  Commission  initiated  infringement  procedures  against  you  for  the  incorrect 
transposition of the PIF Directive?  

If YES, have you taken remedial action to modify national legislation?  

If  YES,  by  when  do  you  expect  to  complete  the  modification  of  national  legislation  to  transpose 
correctly the PIF Directive?  

By the end of 20223, an infringement procedures for incorrect transposition of the Directive was 
launched against 18 Member States.  

Alongside  Czechia,  whose  infringement  procedure  was  closed  in  2022,  many  of  these  countries 
expected to be in full compliance with the PIF Directive in the coming months. 

After sufficient adjustments, the procedure concerning Austria closed in 2022. On November 6, 2019, 
the  Austrian  Federal  Ministries  of  Justice  and  Finance  first  contended  September’s  formal  notice, 
stating  that  domestic  law  mostly  complied  with  EU  requirements.  On  November  19,  Austria  then 
referred to an ongoing government proposal to amend accordingly its criminal law. The Member State 
finally provided additional comments on December 30, 2021, when said Act had been adopted, asking 
the Commission to end the procedure, which was indeed closed on May 19, 2022.  

In 2022, the infringement procedure against Cyprus for failing to transpose the PIF Directive was still 
ongoing. Back then, the draft law that is to remedy all launched infringements was going to be legally 
scrutinised and submitted for adoption when the House of Representatives reconvened after Cypriot 
presidential election on February 5 and 12, 2023.  

On January 24, 2022, Spain responded to the European Commission’s letter of formal notice, which 
objected to the Member State’s failure to transpose the PIF Directive. In that, the Ministry of Justice’s 
Technical  Secretary  General  justified  the  transposition  of  all  articles  concerned,  namely,  Articles 
4(2)(a), 4(2)b, 7(1), and 7(3). Spain, however, has not yet received an answer.  

Following  the  opening  of  infringement  procedure,  Greece  reported  that  it  had  responded  to  the 
Commission.  

Throughout 2021 and 2022, Latvia modified its domestic law to remedy all infringements to which the 
European  Commission  had  objected  on  December  2,  2021.  After  reporting  that  all  violations  in  its 
Criminal Law, Law on Administrative Penalties for Offences in Administration, Public Order, and Use 

3   As  of  10  June  2023,  the  Commission  opened  infringement  proceedings  against  20  Member  States  for 
incorrect transposition of the Directive. Of these 20 proceedings, two have been opened in 2023 (Bulgaria 
and Poland), one has been closed (Czechia) and, in another case (Finland), the Commission decided to send 
a  reasoned  opinion.  For  the  remaining  16  (Belgium,  Cyprus,  Estonia,  Greece,  Spain,  Croatia,  Hungary, 
Luxembourg,  Latvia,  Malta,  The  Netherlands,  Portugal,  Romania,  Sweden,  Slovenia  and  Slovakia),  the 
Commission is in the process of assessing the replies to the letters of formal notice it has received from the 
Member States. 

8 

 
 
                                                           
of the Official Language, and the Taxes and Fees Law had been corrected, Latvia had not received an 
answer yet.  

Malta,  too,  reported  that it  had  taken  remedial action  that  addressed  all  launched  infringements.  In 
2022, these changes were tabled in parliament and expected to close swiftly, whereafter Malta would 
report to the Commission.  

Sweden,  in  parallel,  appointed  an  Inquiry  Commission  to  evaluate  its  alleged  failure  to  correctly 
incorporate the PIF Directive (Articles 3(2)(d)(iii), 5(2)) into domestic law. By August 31, 2023, this 
Commission  will  report  on  possible  relief  actions  targeting  Articles  3(2)(d)(i)  and  3(2)(d)(iii).  To 
remedy infringements of Article 5(2), the Swedish government has proposed that any attempt to commit 
subsidy abuse or gross subsidy abuse be criminalised. These amendments will like enter into force on 
June 1, 2023.  

When  reporting,  Slovenia  had  taken  action  to  remedy  only  part  of  the  PIF  Directive  infringements 
objected  to  by  the  European  Commission.  Effective  in  February  2023,  the  Member  State  amended 
solely  its  Criminal  Code,  more  specifically,  the  definition  of  official  persons.  It  contended  the 
Commission’s  remaining  comments  in  a  reply  to  the  letter  of  formal  notice,  arguing  that  Slovenia 
believed  its  regulation  was  fit  for  purpose  and  further  changes  were  unnecessary.  The  Commission 
response was still pending.  

Finally, Slovakia fully complied with the Commission’s formal notice, aligning domestic law with the 
PIF Directive effectively by January 1, 2024.  

2.1.2.  EPPO Participation 

Regarding Member States’ participation in the EPPO, the Commission reiterated its call for those that 
have not yet joined it to do so. It further advised Member States that already participate in the EPPO to 
ensure that the prosecutor is able to exercise all powers bestowed upon it by its founding Regulation.  

The Commission probed for progress with the following questions:  

Q.1. Are you already participating in the EPPO?  

If NO, are there plans to join the EPPO in the short-medium term?  

If YES, when do you expect to finalise the procedure?  

Table 2: Overview of present and planned EPPO participation across Member States. 

YES 
NO, with plan 
NO, without plan 

In 2022, 22 Member States already participated in the EPPO. Of the five Member States that did not 
participate, Denmark and Ireland, both of which may opt out of freedom, security, and justice policy, 
as  well  as  Hungary  and  Poland  reported  no  intention  to  join.  Sweden,  by  contrast,  argued  that  its 
government is currently working on a legislative proposal that would allow the country to join the EPPO 
as soon as possible, assuming that the Parliament endorses it.  

9 

 
 
 
 
  
  
  
2.2.  Transparency,  Fraud  Risk  Management,  and  Digitilising  the  Fight  against 

Fraud 

2.2.1.  Digitilising the Fight against Fraud  

As the Financial Regulation’s revision is ongoing, the Commission invited Member States to make full 
use of the tools at their disposal (ARACHNE, EDES, and IMS). It also encouraged the development of 
interoperable solutions with national systems to fully realise their potential. 

On Digitilising the fight against fraud, the Commission followed-up with the following questions:  

Q.1.  Are  you  using  any  of  the  following  IT  systems  in  your  fight  against  fraud,  including 
ARACHNE, EDES, IMS, others, or national dedicated anti-fraud IT tools? 

Q.2. Has any interoperability been developed between EU IT tools and national IT tools?  

If YES, with which tool? 

Q.4. To what end?  

Q.5. How is digitalisation influencing the fight against fraud?  

For any impact selected, can you provide any quantification?  

Table  3:  Overview  of  IT  systems  used  by  Member  States  in  their  fight  against  fraud  and  their 
interoperability (int.).  

ARACHNE     
 EDES 
 IMS 
Other  

National 
NO 

Markedly, every Member State reported that at least one IT system underpinned their anti-fraud efforts. 
ARACHNE was by far most widely spread, with 21 Member States actively using it, except Austria, 
Germany, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden. It most frequently supported cohesion funds (13), 6 
times all programmes4 and 7 times a limited number5. Otherwise, ARACHNE was used on 10 accounts 
in  administering  the  RRF6.  Estonia,  Croatia,  and  Romania  used  ARACHNE  for  rural  development 
funds.  In  Czechia,  Bulgaria,  and  Italy,  this  tool  aided  anti-fraud  action  across  all  EU  funds  and 
programmes.  

EDES was only used by 6 Member States, while IMS and other tools were reportedly common amongst 
12 and 13 Member States respectively. 14 Member States used their own dedicated anti-fraud IT tools, 
often jointly with EU counterparts, although they were only interoperable in 6 instances.  

4   Croatia, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Romania, Slovenia 
5   Belgium, Estonia, France, Latvia, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain 
6   Belgium, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal 

10 

 
 
 
 
  
  
                                                           
 
 
Overall, 10 Member States confirmed this system quality. Italy and Slovakia were outliers in this regard. 
Italy used all EU tools and a national tool, which were interoperable with ARACHNE, IMS, EDES, and 
other systems. Slovakia noted that it ran all EU, a national, and other anti-fraud tools compatibly with 
IMS, ARACHNE, and others.  

In contrast to Austria, Sweden and Finland relied exclusively on national dedicated anti-fraud IT tools, 
which were also not interoperable with EU tools. 

The reason for integrating any of the above IT tools into the fight against fraud was most frequently 
data  enrichment  (12)7,  followed  by  the  refinement  of  red  flags,  risk  indicators  and  scores  (6)8,  the 
introduction of red flags, risk indicators (5)9, and, finally, streamlining and automation of irregularities 
reporting (1)10. Notably, only 12 Member States provided insights to their motivation.  

All Member States but Greece, Ireland, and Sweden revealed how this digitisation impacted their anti-
fraud  efforts.  All  Member  States  (23),  except  Cyprus,  indicated  that  using  IT  tools  fostered  fraud 
prevention  as  opposed  to  decreasing  (1)  it.  Slovenia  reported  both.  Increased  (19)11  rather  than 
decreased  fraud  detection  (2)12  and  reducing  or  simplifying  administrative  procedures  (18)13  were 
similarly  common.  Few  Member  States  (8)14  reported  that  these  tools  bore  a  higher  administrative 
burden. 

2.2.2.  Strengthening Fraud Risk Analysis  

To identify and address emerging risks and fraud trends, the Commission urged Member States to use 
data from all available sources, analyse the data, and exchange information on them, including with 
enforcement  authorities  and  the  Commission.  It  also  reminded  Member  States  to  act  upon  the 
information provided by the Commission in this and other strategic analyses as well as targeted reports 
and promptly feedback on the actions they take to help monitor fraud risks and trends.  

This recommendation, the Commission followed-up with this question:  

Q.1. Have you implemented the recommendation?  

If  YES  fully,  then  please  describe  the  process,  share  any  specific  findings  if  possible,  and  make  a 
distinction between revenue and expenditure areas.  

If  YES  partially,  then  please  explain  why  you  think  it  was  a  partial implementation  and  why  a  full 
implementation was not possible. Here, too, please distinguish between revenue and expenditure areas.  

If NO, please explain why.  

Table 4: Overview of response to the advice to strengthen fraud risk analysis by Member States.  

7   Austria,  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Czechia,  Italy,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Malta,  Romania,  Slovenia, 

Slovakia 

8   Austria, Czechia, Italy, Malta, Romania, Slovakia 
9   Austria, Czechia, Italy, Malta, Slovenia 
10   Slovakia 
11   Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 

Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain  

12   Romania, Slovenia 
13   Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,  Croatia, Cyprus,  Czechia, Estonia, Germany, Italy,  Latvia,  Lithuania, Malta, 

Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain 

14   Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain 

11 

 
 
 
                                                           
YES, fully 
YES, partially 
NO 

   NA 

Most Member States implemented the Commission’s advice to bulk up their fraud risk analyses. 14 did 
so  fully  and  12  in  part.  Only  Sweden  did  not  follow  this  recommendation  at  all,  while  Ireland  and 
Czechia did not report on it.  

Austria focused on revenue from customs, where the Finance Ministry’s anti-fraud department defines 
risk  areas,  develops  countermeasures,  and  draws  up  control  strategies,  in  line  with  the  EU  risk 
management rules.  

Belgium, too, has committed fully to this recommendation across, especially on the expenditure side, 
including European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and RRF funds in Wallonia, and ERDF funds 
in Flanders as well as the Flemish government’s department for agriculture and fisheries. In Flanders, 
the General Regulation imposes upon the ERDF funds proportionate anti-fraud measures, which the 
Audit Authority assesses at the implementation stage. This system has been rated as functional. Within 
the new programming period, beginning on January 1, 2023, the Flemish Department of Agriculture 
and  Fisheries  re-examined  fraud  risks,  which  it  then  integrated  into  all  related  grant  measures  and 
processes.  

In Bulgaria, numerous bodies protecting the EU budget’s revenue and expenditure strengthened their 
fraud risk analyses, following the Commission’s advice. The Customs Agency drew on a variety of data 
sources.  As  the  certifying  authority,  the  National  Fund  Directorate,  which  oversees  managing 
authorities’  procedural  conduct and  control activities,  for  example,  now  widely  uses  ARACHNE  to 
perform  its  checks.  The  Bulgarian  Audit  of  EU  Funds  Agency,  throughout  its  auditing  activities, 
reportedly  carried  out  checks  to  identity  fraud  indicators,  analysed  and  presents  cases  in  its  annual 
control  report  for  each  programme,  notified  competent  authorities,  and  regularly  reviewed  related 
Commission  guidelines.  The  Public  Procurement  Agency  reviewed  and  analysed  data  from  various 
sources like the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the World Bank, assigning risk weights used 
in  the  random  selection  of  control  procedures.  And,  finally,  Bulgaria’s  State  Agency  for  National 
Security, the Ministry of Innovation and Growth, and the Ministry of the Interior, signed an agreement 
to facilitate information and data exchanges on emerging fraud risks.  

Cyprus equally followed through on the fourth 2021 PIF Report recommendation. On revenue focused 
fraud risk analyses, especially customs and excise duties, Cyprus reported that it adhered to Commission 
advice. Accordingly, it processed all information received through the CRSM2 and AFIS, as well as 
acted  on  it.  Financial  risks,  in  particular,  were  examined  closely,  using  the  common  criteria  for 
combatting  fraud.  Accounting  for  both  measures,  risk  information  forms,  and  OLAF  statistics  the 
Cypriot Post Control and Audit Department then planned post-control audit, clearly following a risk 
based approach.  

The Member State further reported five steps toward wholly strengthening its fraud risk analysis in the 
expenditure  of  EU  RRF funds.  Firstly,  concerning  its  Recovery  and  Resilience Plan (RRP),  Cyprus 
began to use the Commission’s fraud risk assessment tool. The tool covers an array of data on basic 
procedures like application selection, quantifying fraud risks, and weighing existing controls and the 
value of possible additions. To support this process, Cyprus, secondly, relied on the ARACHNE tool, 
which is risk focused. Since successful, the country considers applying this approach also for cohesion 
policy.  Thirdly,  Cyprus  established  an  independent  anti-corruption  authority,  which  will  coordinate 
anti-corruption actions across public services, the public and private sector. In that, it could also improve 
the  coherence  of  fraud  risk  analyses  through,  for  example,  information  exchanges.  Fourthly,  the 

12 

 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Member State now follows guidelines that align domestic and EU public procurement, prevention and 
detection,  corruption  and  conflict  of  interest  policy.  And,  fifthly,  Cyprus  amended  two  regulatory 
administrative  acts  to  grant  all  domestic  and  EU  control  bodies  access  to  beneficial  ownership 
databases.  

To  strengthen  fraud  risk  analysis,  in  particular  France’s  Agency  for  Territorial  Cohesion  regularly 
hosted  a  working  group  that  brings  together  EU  fund  managing  authorities,  harmonising  existing 
arrangements for the prevention, detection, and reporting of fraud. Using various databases alongside 
or instead of ARACHNE, these authorities exchanged information in this channel to prevent double 
funding.  It  has  further  distributed  Commission  information  notes  and  practical  guides  on  red  flags 
amongst  its  members.  And,  lastly,  the  working  group  has  issued  a  risk  analysis  focused  training 
catalogue, in some of which the EPPO participates to illustrate its support functions.  

Greece enhanced fraud risk analyses of customs and excise duties as well as  European Agricultural 
Guarantee  Fund  (EAGF)  and  RRF  spending,  affirming  a  proactive  approach  to  protect  the  EU’s 
financial  interests.  Greece  emphasised  that  its  customs  controls  followed  Article  46  of  the  Union 
Customs Code, used all available information, especially from OLAF’s mutual assistance messages and 
RIFs,  and  created  corresponding  risk  profiles.  Further,  in  the  Member  State,  the  Ministry  for  Rural 
Development and Division for Financial Control and Audit and Cooperative Affairs controls direct and 
indirect beneficiaries and debtors of the EAGF ex post. These controls’ fraud risk sensitivity has been 
improved  by  integrating  specific  risks  and  risk  values,  all  relevant  data,  and  information  from  the 
Commission throughout the selection of undertakings, their control plan and scrutiny. To protect better 
the RRF from fraud, Greece has further adopted two legislative measures. Decision 129397/13-09-2022 
was made by the RRF Agency’s Governor. It set up a fraud risk assessment team and designated an 
officer at the agency as responsible for fraud issues. With Decision 135896/21-09-2022, the agency’s 
governor  also  approved  a  new  risk  assessment  methodology  for  the  ex-ante  check  for  conflicts  of 
interest when awarding public contracts.  

With contributions from its anti-fraud coordination service (AFCOS), Agency for Territorial Cohesion, 
Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Education, Italy has fully executed the present advice with a 
focus on expenditure. The Italian AFCOS’ fraud risk analyses are reportedly underpinned by IT tools 
that run on a large volume of data from various sources, such as the Anti-Fraud Platform. It further 
coordinates and implements the country’s national anti-fraud strategy (NAFS), including though a new 
network of anti-fraud contact points. These contact points coordinate specifically fraud risk, conflict of 
interests and double funding assessments of Italy’s RRP. The Agency for Territorial Cohesion, on the 
other  hand,  relies  on  ARACHNE  for  on-the-spot  checks  and  to  disseminate  information  on  audit 
findings. It also issued new guidelines on using ARACHNE throughout the management and control of 
programmes under the ERDF. The Ministry of Justice has adjusted legislation to fully accommodate 
the EPPO in the fight against fraud. And the Ministry of Education uses all tools available to monitor 
fraud risks to its national school operational programme.  

Lithuania’s effort to strengthen fraud risk analysis has been trifold and horizontal. Competence-based 
cooperation  with  the  EPPO,  the  comprehensive  use  of  ARACHNE,  and  developing  an  evaluation 
methodology for criminal threats to the financial system, the Member State ensures that fraud risks and 
trends are accounted for.  

Latvia, too, generally bulked up its analysis of fraud risks to EU budget inflows and outflows. EU funds 
managing authorities and bodies now carry out regular risk assessments, using all available data, IT 
tools and information, including that provided by the Commission, to take timely preventative actions 
against  fraud  and  corruption.  Aiming  at  revenues  in  addition  to  expenditure,  the  Latvian  AFCOS 
disseminated all information from the Commission to its network through a dedicated platform, and has 
developed an IT tool that helps monitor risks and trends.  

13 

 
 
Luxembourg  reiterated  its  proactive  approach  to  fraud  risk  detection  across  EU  revenue  and 
expenditure streams, which evolved around information sharing and trainings in 2022.  

Poland,  too,  reaffirmed  its  proactive  approach  to  protecting 
the  EU’s  financial  interests 
comprehensively. On the revenue side, Poland has focused facilitating information exchanges with the 
Commission  and  Member  States  via  CRMS2  and  AFIS,  which  anchor  the  analysis  of  risks,  their 
identification, and feedback on actions taken based on the information received. Generally, analyses of 
fraud risks to budget outflows are supported by an array of tools, mechanisms, cooperation agreements, 
and reporting measures. The Signal system, for example, facilitates an information exchange on risky 
entities amongst CF managing authorities, alongside newly digitised auditing processes, ARACHNE, 
and the SL2014 application. An agreement between Poland’s public prosecutor and the minister for 
regional development enables regular exchanges of beneficiaries’ data. Annual reports on fraud risks to 
agricultural funds, which identify risks, assess and introduce new control mechanisms, prevent that they 
are compromised.  

Romania reaffirmed its full commitment the fourth recommendation on the revenue and expenditure 
side. In 2022, the Romanian customs authority was subordinated to its ministry of finance, adding layers 
to fraud risk analysis of inflows. The agency incorporated the FRC Decision into its risk management 
system,  which  is  supported  by  CRMS  and  AFIS,  as  well  as  a  national  IT  application  for  specific 
activities. At the central government level, Romania reported further a mutual assistance coordinating 
body,  and  regular  exchanges  with  Romanian  law  enforcement.  On  part  of  expenditures,  Romania 
pointed  to  the  contribution  of  the  competitiveness,  large  infrastructure,  and  technical  assistance 
operating programmes’ managing authorities as well as an RRF specific fraud risk analysis structure. 
Accordingly,  the  Directorate  General  for  Smart  Growth  and  Digitalisation  carried  out  a  fraud  risk 
assessment in 2022. Romania further closely monitors irregularities until they are resolved, has created 
several level of checks, including internal operational procedures, and actively uses ARACHNE in this 
domain, too. The Directorate-General for Sustainable Development, at the same time, has also carried 
out a fraud risk assessments, while the technical assistance managing team used the ARACHNE tool to 
complement its risk analysis activities. The RRF, finally, had its own administrative, organisation, and 
operational measures such as a dedicated IT system that runs on several national institutions’ databases 
on beneficiaries, an prevention, monitoring, and recovery oriented procedures.  

Slovenia similarly reaffirmed its commitment to protecting EU budget revenue and expenditure stream 
through thorough risk analyses. The Member State emphasised the proactive role of customs and VAT 
relevant  authorities.  Accordingly,  fraud  risk  data  exchanges  took  place  at  EU  level,  as  they  were 
facilitated by systems such as CRMS and AFIS to create risk profiles, apply checks preceding release 
into free circulation, ex-post checks, and inspections. This information was also forwarded internally. 
AFIS  made reportedly the biggest difference by underpinning several databases and tools, used, for 
example,  to  create  risk  profiles  for  undervalued  goods,  tracking  container  ships,  and  checking  the 
legitimacy of declaring companies. Slovenia also highlighted information exchanges with OLAF and 
mutual assistance amongst Member States using a Eurifisc tool.  On part of cohesion policy and the 
RRF, Slovenia pointed to the use of ARACHNE, national databases, regular reporting, on the one hand, 
and strategic foresight, cooperation with the EPPO, and trainings, on the other hand.  

Finally, Slovakia illustrated its proactive approach to thoroughly protecting the EU’s financial interests. 
On the revenue side, the Member State highlighted data analyses using various sources to identify trends 
in  the  circumvention  of  customs  regulations,  as  well  as  information  exchanges  internally  and  with 
OLAF. For expenditure fraud risk analyses, it pointed to the contributions of various EU fund managing 
authorities. Its government, for example, had an OLAF dedicated department that ensured top level 
coordination of various anti-fraud efforts and distributed information on emerging risks and trainings 
in  to  the  AFCOS  network,  ensuring  also  that  national  authorities  use  EU  and  national  databases, 

14 

 
 
exchange  information  and  provide  mutual  assistance.  Otherwise,  Slovakia  was  keen  to  follow  EU 
recommendations, measures, and action plans, and developed internal fraud prevention guidelines.  

In  Germany,  whether  expenditure  fraud  risk  analyses  had  been  strengthened  varied  by  level  of 
governance and amongst states. The Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs exploits all available 
resources to fight fraud, by encouraging European Social Fund (ESF) managing authorities to self-asses 
and  exchange  information.  In  Rhineland-Palatinate,  North-Rhine  Westphalia,  and  Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern,  the  ERDF  managing  authorities  only  partially  followed  this  recommendation,  due  to 
limited  resources.  For  example,  limited  resources  restrict  Rhineland-Palatinate’s  capacity  to  using 
reports  from  the  Regional  Court  of  Auditors,  the  European  Court  of  Auditors  and  the  ERDF  audit 
authority to identify fraud risks. Other ministries, like the Federal Ministry for Food and Agriculture, 
and  states,  such  as  Bavaria,  did  not  take  action  after  the  Commission’s  advice  to  boost  fraud  risk 
analysis, since they already had established procedures that ensure the timely detection of fraud risks 
and trends.  

Denmark,  too, implemented  the fourth  2021  PIF  Report  recommendation  only  in  part,  focusing  on 
customs  and  agricultural,  cohesion,  and  fisheries  funds.  Accordingly,  Denmark  reported  that  its 
Customs Agency used data from all available resources, which it analysed, and acted upon, even if not 
in every instance. At the Danish Agricultural Agency, on the other hand, a statutory risk assessment 
will be integrated into the accreditation conditions for authorities that disburse funds under the Common 
Agricultural  Policy.  The  Danish  Business  Authority  currently  investigates  how  ARACHNE  could 
complement  existing  controls.  And,  finally,  fisheries  funds  managing  authorities  use  IMS  to  report 
irregularities to the Commission.  

Estonia has comprehensively boosted fraud risk analyses in EU budget revenue streams, and partially 
in expenditure. The Estonian Customs Agency has created an IT tool that enables its use of Theseus 
across commodities more broadly, exploiting fully available sources and data to better protect the EU’s 
financial interests. On the expenditure side, the possibility of using ARACHNE for risk assessments 
across the 2021  – 2027  European Structural Investment Funds (ESIF) programming period is being 
assessed for deployment in 2023; in agriculture, ARACHNE is used as an additional source for risk 
assessment.  

Similarly to Estonia, Spain, in 2022, implemented this final recommendation fully on the revenue and 
partially on the expenditure side. Its State Tax Administration Agency, which governs Spain’s tax and 
customs system, runs its risk analyses on a consolidated database, using all available sources, including 
internal data bases, open source information, and data from OLAF, and exchanging information with 
law enforcement authorities and other Member States. In ETC, ESF, and the RRF, such a system is not 
yet  fully  in  place,  due  to  unclearly  distributed  competences  and  resource  and  IT  tool  differences. 
However,  Spain insisted  that the  recommendation’s adoption is  progressing.  In  the  ETC,  the  use  of 
shared databases is already wide spread, and in managing the ESF and RRF authorities have drawn up 
corresponding plans and made organisational changes.   

Finland, too, has thoroughly improved its fraud risk analyses of EU budget inflows, but incompletely 
altered procedures surrounding spending. In 2022, Finnish Customs developed and fully automated data 
processing  for  risk  detection,  using  official  sources  like  CRM2,  AFIS,  and  the  Mutual  Assistance 
System  (MAS).  On  part  of  expenditure,  especially  the  RRF,  data  analysis  has  been  improved  by 
completing data bases, obliging the managing authorities to update them regularly, making this data 
available to control and inspection authorities, controlling and auditing the data, and recording these 
activities’  results.  Using  ARACHNE  to  support  this  process  remains,  however,  undecided  upon  as 
resource constraints limit Finland’s ability to accommodate the tool into its data protection framework 
and administration.   

15 

 
 
In  Croatia,  progress  was  made  exclusively  on  improving  fraud  risk  analyses  of  expenditures,  with 
contributions from  the  Ministry  of  Regional  Development,  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture,  and  the  EU 
Programmes  Implementation  System  Audit  Agency.  The  Ministry  of  Regional  Development  has 
implemented the Commission’s recommendation most comprehensively. Regular staff trainings, the 
obligation to forward acquired knowledge, workshops for analysts, monitoring and the dissemination 
of relevant data and documents, and ARACHNE allow fraud risk assessments of European Structural 
Investment funds to be followed up with appropriate measures, also through cooperation with OLAF 
and the EU’s judicial bodies. Croatia’s audit authority has similarly comprehensively improved fraud 
risk  analyses  related  to  all  EU  funds,  but  the  RRF  in  particular.  Actions  revolved  mostly  around 
awareness  raising  amongst  and  training  staff,  as  well  strengthening  Croatia’s  AFCOS  network  and 
system.  Efforts  by  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture,  by  contrast,  remain  incomplete, with data types  and 
sources being varied, collection and processing being supported by the Integrated Administration and 
Control  System,  the  Area Monitoring  System,  and  ARACHNE,  and  information  exchanges running 
smoothly,  but  information  management  IT  systems  for  Common  Agricultural  Policy  (CAP)  funds 
needing to be updated.  

Hungary primarily enhanced fraud risk analyses of EU revenue and expenditure streams by realising 
the Commission’s FRC Decision and Guidance and continuing to develop its domestic IT system, both 
of which were incomplete processes. Following the Commission’s advice, Hungary, in 2022, already 
made analysis and profiling more confident, and, using the National Tax and Customs Administration’s 
risk management system, conducted real time risk analyses and timely interventions. Hungary’s FAIR 
system, which supports risk analyses of expenditure streams, was given fraud prevention functions, its 
sources were broadened, credibility improved and the administrative burden on beneficiaries reduced.  

Malta’s Internal Audits and Investigations Department, for the first time, published a comprehensive 
National Risk Assessment (NRA) on Fraud and Corruption linked to public funds, which covers also 
funds that Malta is required to manage under its international obligations. The NRA therefore marks an 
important step towards improving the Member State’s fraud risk response, including with respect to EU 
funds. As it was collaboratively produced, involving all members of the co-ordinating committee, the 
report facilitated information exchanges, in particular.  

In  2022,  the  Netherlands  used  ARACHNE  to  gain  an  overview  of  fraud  risks  that  permeate 
expenditure, and progressively improved their approach to their anticipation in EU budget revenue. To 
the  latter  end,  the  Dutch  internal  audit  offered  an  opinion  on  fraud  risks,  which  found  them  to  be 
adequately  managed  by  ministries,  and  initiated  the  formation  of  a  Security  and  Integrity  Office 
dedicated to fraud risks and necessary follow-up measures.  

Portugal reported that it had thoroughly strengthened its analytical approach to fraud risks to tax and 
customs duties, but recently revised its overarching NAFS, including a five-year action plan that sets 
out concrete fraud risk analysis measures in the expenditure domain. Only after 2022, would the latter 
measures be realised.  

While Ireland and Czechia abstained from following-up on their risk analyses, Sweden is the Member 
State that indicated that it had not realised the Commission’s recommendation to bulk up this capacity. 
Its  response  suggests  that  although  Sweden  proactively  protects  the  EU’s  financial  interests,  for 
instance,  by  monitoring  OLAF  advice  and  reports,  domestic  legislation  prevents  the  use  of  fraud 
relevant data outside the judicial system. In December, 2021, Sweden did, however, report that it had 
initiated an inquiry into how it could more effectively, efficiently, and legally secure its management 
of EU funds.  

16 

 
 
 
 
3.  MEMBER STATES’ REPLIES 

3.1.  Austria (AT)  

3.1.1.  Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive  

Q.1.  Has  the  Commission  initiated  infringement  procedures  against  you  for  the  incorrect 
transposition of the PIF Directive? 

☒ YES 

On 19 September 2019, the European Commission sent a letter of formal notice to Austria, objecting to 
the failure to transpose Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law (the 
‘PIF  Directive’;  infringement  case  No 2019/0258).  On  6 November  2019,  the  Austrian  Federal 
Ministry of Justice (BMJ) issued a partial notification, stating that the vast majority of the requirements 
contained in the PIF Directive had been complied with by provisions in place and set out in the Austrian 
Criminal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Act on the Criminal Liability of Associations. 
According  to  the  information  available  to  the  BMJ,  a  separate  notification  was  also  issued  by  the 
Federal Ministry of Finance (concerning implementing legislation regarding the Austrian Financial 
Offences Act). 

In addition, on 19 November 2021, Austria submitted a series of observations referring to the existing 
government proposal for a Federal Act amending the Criminal Code, the Act on the Federal Office for 
the  Prevention  of  Corruption  and  the  Fight  against  Corruption  and  the  1975  Code  of  Criminal 
Procedure to implement the Directive on the fight against fraud to the Union's financial interests by 
means of criminal law. Austria also provided additional comments on 30 December 2021, in which 
reference was made to the notification of the Act adopted in the meantime and which came into force 
on 28 December 2019 (Federal Law Gazette I No 111/2019). The Commission was asked to close the 
infringement case. 

Following  a  decision  by  the  Commission  on  19 May  2022,  infringement  proceedings  in  case  No 
2019/0258 for failing to transpose the PIF Directive were closed. 

It should be noted that the infringement proceedings in question were based on the failure to transpose, 
whereas  the  questions  contained  in  the  questionnaire  sent  under  point  2.1.2  refer  to  ‘incorrect 
transposition’.  It  is  unclear  to  the  BMJ  whether  infringement  case  No 2010/0258  is  actually 
addressed by the questions raised under point 2.1. If so, the answers to Question 2.1.2 would be as 
follows: 

Q1: YES 

Q2: YES, for all launched infringements 

Q 3: Infringement proceedings were closed on 19 May 2022. 

It  should  also  be  noted  that  the  BMJ  was  also  contacted  by  the  Commission  on  substantive  issues 
relating to the implementation of the PIF Directive. To date, that exchange has been exclusively via e-
mail.  We  have  yet  to  receive  a  response  from  the  Commission  to  our  e-mail  of  19 October  2022. 
Therefore,  as  we  understand  it,  no  infringement  proceedings  are  currently  open  against  Austria  in 
connection with the PIF Directive. 

17 

 
 
Q.2.  For  the  Member  States  having  replied  yes.  Have  you  taken  remedial  action  to  modify 
national legislation? 

☒ YES, for all launched infringements  

Q.3.  For  the  Member  States  having  replied  yes.  By  when  do  you  expect  to  complete  the 
modification of national legislation to correctly transpose the PIF Directive? 

Infringement proceedings were closed on 19 May 2022. 

3.1.2.   Participation in the EPPO  

Q.1. Are you already participating in the EPPO? 

☒ YES 

3.1.3.   Digitalising the fight against fraud  

Q.1. Are you using any of the following IT systems in your fight against fraud? 

☒ National dedicated anti-fraud IT tools  (In the field of customs revenue) 

Q.2. Has any interoperability been developed between EU IT tools and national IT tools? 

☒ YES 

Q.3. If yes, with which tool? 

☒ other (specify) 

EU systems ICS (Import Control System) CRMS. 

Q.4. To what end? 

☒ Data enrichment 

☒ Introduce new red flags/risk indicators 

☒ Fine tune/refine red flags/risk indicators/risk scoring 

Q.5. How is digitalisation influencing the fight against fraud? 

☒ Increasing prevention 

☒ Reducing/simplifying administrative procedures 

Q.6. For any impact selected, can you provide any quantification? 

No, but the purpose of digitalisation is to ensure targeted controls based on electronic data analysis in 
order to avoid ‘false hits’. 

3.1.4.  Strengthen fraud risk analysis 

Q.1. Have you implemented the recommendation? 

☒ YES, fully  

If you implemented fully the recommendation, can you please describe how you have done it? 
Can you share any specific findings? Please make a distinction between revenue and expenditure 
areas. 

18 

 
 
In the field of customs revenue: 

In the area of customs, the EU risk management rules developed jointly by the European Commission 
and Member States are implemented nationally based on the EU Risk Management Strategy and Action 
Plan. The customs administrations in Member States are required by EU law to transpose measures 
identified as recommendations into national law. In Austria, the anti-fraud department of the Ministry 
of  Finance  defines  the  risk  areas,  develops  countermeasures  and  draws  up  appropriate  control 
strategies for individual risk areas. 

19 

 
 
 
 
3.2.  Belgium (BE)  

3.2.1.  Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive  

Q.1.  Has  the  Commission  initiated  infringement  procedures  against  you  for  the  incorrect 
transposition of the PIF Directive? 

☒ YES FPS Finances (General Administration of Customs and Excise) and FPS Justice 

Q.2.  For  the  Member  States  having  replied  yes.  Have  you  taken  remedial  action  to  modify 
national legislation? 

☒ NO FPS Finances (General Administration of Customs and Excise) and FPS Justice 

3.2.2.  Participation in the EPPO  

Q.1. Are you already participating in the EPPO? 

☒ YES ERDF and RRF Wallonia, Department of Agriculture and Fisheries, FPS Finances (General 
Administration of Customs and Excise) and FPS Justice 

3.2.3.  Digitilising the fight against fraud  

Q.1. Are you using any of the following IT systems in your fight against fraud? 

☒ ARACHNE  ERDF and RRF Wallonia, ERDF and RRF Brussels, ERDF Flanders 
☒ Cohesion (not all programmes) ERDF and RRF Wallonia, ERDF and RRF Brussels 
☒ Recovery and Resilience Facility ERDF and RRF Wallonia 
☒ other (specify) ERDF and RRF Wallonia 

Q.2. Has any interoperability been developed between EU IT tools and national IT tools? 

☒ NO  ERDF and RRF Wallonia, ERDF and RRF Brussels, Department of Agriculture and Fisheries, 
ERDF Flanders 

Q.4. To what end? 

☒ Data enrichment ERDF and RRF Brussels 
☐ Introduce new red flags/risk indicators ERDF and RRF Brussels 

Q.5. How is digitalisation influencing the fight against fraud? 

☒  Increasing  prevention    ERDF  and  RRF  Wallonia,  ERDF  and  RRF  Brussels,  Department  of 
Agriculture and Fisheries 
☒ Increasing detection ERDF and RRF Wallonia,  ERDF and RRF Brussels, Department of Agriculture 
and Fisheries 
☒ Increasing administrative burden  ERDF and RRF Wallonia, ERDF and RRF Brussels 
☒ Reducing/simplifying administrative procedures ERDF and RRF Wallonia 

Q.6. For any impact selected, can you provide any quantification? 

ERDF and RRF Wallonia: In terms of prevention: However it is impossible to quantify the impact of 
that measure, letting know from the start to all potential beneficiaries that the competent authorities 

20 

 
 
 
 
 
will make use of IT tools dedicated to the fight against fraud (such as EDES or ARACHNE) can have a 
deterrent effect on potential fraudsters.  

In terms of reducing administrative burden and simplifying procedures, digitalisation of processes at 
the level of managing authorities reduces administrative burden for all stakeholders. It allows to gather 
data and documents on operations in a single IT tool that performs automated checks and cross-checks, 
that  should  have  otherwise  been  performed  by  members  of  personnel  (for  example,  thousands  of 
invoices are uploaded into the IT tool that performs cross-checks between invoices of expenses declared 
in all projects and both ERDF and RFF funds in order to detect potential multiple declaration of same 
expenditures). Although, at EU level, the multiplicity of databases to consult in order to get a full picture 
(ARACHNE,  EDES,  Transparency  System)  sometimes  constitutes  an  obstacle  to  reducing  the 
administrative burden in the fight against fraud.  

In terms of detection and administrative burden related to the use of ARACHNE : Since Wallonia started 
using ARACHNE (mid 2018) for ERDF, 432 risk (related to 25 different risks indicators) have been 
analysed. Following these analysis only one case led up to the uncovering of an irregularity that could 
have been a suspected fraud. It was however quickly established, in the course of the analysis, that there 
was no intention on the part of the beneficiary and the irregularity was consequently not qualified as 
suspected fraud and not communicated to OLAF (under the threshold of 10.000€ EU).  

3.2.4.  Strengthen fraud risk analysis  

Q.1 Have you implemented the recommendation? 

☒ YES, fully ERDF and RRF Wallonia, ERDF Flanders, Department of Agriculture and Fisheries 

If you implemented fully the recommendation, can you please describe how you  have done it? 
Can you share any specific findings? Please make a distinction between revenue and expenditure 
areas. 

ERDF  and  RRF  Wallonia  :  Wallonia  is  making  use  of  informations  and  tools  provided  by  the 
Commission in the area of fight against fraud.  

Indeed,  members  of  the  personnel  of  the  Managing  authority  take  part  in  workshops  and  seminars 
provided  by  the  Commission  on  the  subject  matter  and  meetings  of  working  groups  such  as 
COCOLAF’s working groups.  

The  knowledge  basis  acquired  in  shared  management  regarding  fraud,  corruption  and  conflict  of 
interests is used and transposed, where possible, to RFF as the body in charge of PIF with regards to 
RFF is the same as for ERDF. 

Wallonia feeds the ARACHNE tool with data from both ERDF program and RRF on a quarterly basis 
and communicates irregularities to OLAF for both funds, through IMS.  

As foreseen in the Financial Regulation recast, Wallonia will make use of the EDES database in share 
management (ERDF), as well as for RRF. 

Information  is  exchanged  between  relevant  stakeholders  implementing,  controlling  and  auditing  (at 
Wallonia’s  level)  ERDF  and  RRF  funds,  through  multiple  channels  (workings  groups,  monitoring 
committees,  managing  authority’s  website,  …)  and  all  relevant  data  on  expenditures,  public 
procurement,  detected  irregularities  and  controls  are  accessible  for  these  stakeholders,  through 
specific and secured access, in the Managing authority’s IT system.  

21 

 
 
 
ERDF Flanders: 

In  het  kader  van  de  Structuurfondsen 
legt  de  Algemene  Verordening  proportionele 
fraudebestrijdingsmaatregelen  op.  Bij  de  uitvoering  van  het  EFRO-programma  worden  deze 
fraudemaatregelen beoordeeld door de Auditautoriteit. Het EFRO Vlaanderen programma behaalt hier 
een score 1 ‘het systeem werkt’. 

Department of Agriculture and Fisheries: 
Reeds  langer  wordt  een  proactieve  aanpak  aangehouden  binnen  het  Departement  Landbouw  en 
Visserij. Specifiek in de context van de nieuwe programmaperiode die inging op 1/01/2023 wordt het 
risicobeheer verscherpt en herbekeken om een grotere focus te leggen op frauderisico’s, waarbij alle 
subsidiemaatregelen en processen bekeken zullen worden om frauderisico’s in kaart te brengen. 

22 

 
 
 
 
3.3.  Bulgaria (BG)  

3.3.1.  Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive  

Q.1.  Has  the  Commission  initiated  infringement  procedures  against  you  for  the  incorrect 
transposition of the PIF Directive? 

☒ NO 

3.3.2.  Participation in the EPPO  

Q.1. Are you already participating in the EPPO? 

☒ YES 

The Prosecutor’s office of the Republic of Bulgaria, according to its functions and competence, works 
in close interaction with all national law enforcement officials. By order of the General Prosecutor in 
2021, in parallel with the start of the work of the EPPO, Department 08 “Crimes against the EU’s 
financial interests and interaction with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office” within the Supreme 
Cassation Prosecutor’s Office was established in order to organize and ensure the interaction between 
the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Bulgaria and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, as 
well as optimizing the work of the Bulgarian prosecutors on files and pre-trial proceedings for crimes 
against the financial interests of the EU. 

The  fore-mentioned  department,  during  the  short  period  of  its  work  by  now,  became  contact  point 
between PORB and OLAF, managed to achieve very high results in various directions of countering 
the crimes associated with European funds, as well as in increasing the efficiency in cooperation with 
all  national  and  international  partners  in  the  field.  The  indisputable  professional  experience  and 
capacity  of  the  magistrates  in  this  specialized  national  unit  strengthened  the  authority  of  the 
Prosecutor's  Office  in  interaction  with  the  EPPO.  Its  representatives  actively  participate  in  all 
international events and forums in that area, participate as speakers/lecturers, not only by invitation of 
various institutions and organizations, but also initiate training modules for magistrates around the 
country,  support  the  activities  of  working  groups  on  amendments  of  the  national  legislation  and 
transposition  of  European  legislation,  etc.  All  strategic  analysis  and  targeted  reports  from  the 
Commission, OLAF, EPPO, etc. are received, analyzed, taken into account and practically implemented 
according to the competences of the Prosecutor's Office. 

3.3.3.  Digitilising the fight against fraud  

Q.1. Are you using any of the following IT systems in your fight against fraud? 

☒ ARACHNE  
☒ All EU funds and programmes (Cohesion, Rural Development, Recovery and Resilience Facility) 
☒  IMS  (do  not  select  if  IMS  is  used  only  for  reporting  irregularities  and  fraud,  as  this  is  a  legal 
obligation. Select if irregularities and fraud reported via IMS are used to perform risk analysis or other 
anti-fraud related activities) 
☒ National dedicated anti-fraud IT tools 

Q.2. Has any interoperability been developed between EU IT tools and national IT tools? 

☒ YES 

Q.3. If yes, with which tool? 

23 

 
 
☒ ARACHNE 

Q.4. To what end? 

☒ Data enrichment 

Q.5. How is digitalisation influencing the fight against fraud? 

☒ Increasing prevention 
☒ Increasing detection 
☒ Reducing/simplifying administrative procedures 

Q.6. For any impact selected, can you provide any quantification? 

UMIS2020  is  entirely  web-based.  The  system  is  also  designed  to  operate  on  mobile  devices.  The 
digitalisation of UMIS processes is our main tool for combating fraud. UMIS2020 is linked to several 
national systems, such as RegiX, Monitorstat and SAP. Given that each UMIS process is carried out in 
an  electronic  environment,  we  are  able  to  collect  lots  of  data  in  a  structured  form,  which  are  then 
further processed and analysed. Alongside the internal system with its double funding functionalities 
and the system’s e-service modules, the public module increases transparency as the public can monitor 
the entire grant award, implementation and reporting process through it, which increases the possibility 
of identifying and assessing projects with a high risk of fraud and irregularities at an early stage. 

3.3.4.  Strengthen fraud risk analysis  

Q.1 Have you implemented the recommendation? 

☒ YES, fully  

If you implemented fully the recommendation, can you please describe how you have done it? 
Can you share any specific findings? Please make a distinction between revenue and expenditure 
areas. 

The ARACHNE tool is used to perform checks when implementing the main assessment and negotiation 
processes before signing contracts with applicants (to check the absence/existence of double funding 
and to verify the absence/existence of a conflict of interest); when monitoring and verifying expenditure 
(checking that payments are made to a company registered in an area on a list of countries with offshore 
jurisdictions); before payment is made, to make sure that the beneficiary does not present a high risk 
of bankruptcy and/or insolvency and that it is not blacklisted. when examining and checking reported 
expenditure under a contract concluded with a contractor. 

The  ‘Central  Coordination  Unit’  Directorate  at  the  Administration  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  has 
increased  the  number  of users for the ongoing  use  of  ARACHNE  in  the  management  of  funds from 
ESIF/the Recovery and Resilience Plan as a tool for preventing irregularities and combating fraud. 
Increasing  the  number  of  users  enables  projects  with  a  high  risk  of  fraud,  conflicts  of  interest  and 
irregularities to be identified and assessed at the earliest possible stage. 

When  carrying  out  the  fraud  risk  assessment,  the  competent  authorities  in  Bulgaria  also  take  into 
account the European Commission’s Note Ref. Ares (2021) 3171797 – 12/05/2021 on the need to update 
fraud risk assessments and adapt anti-fraud measures. 

The  ‘National  Fund’  Directorate,  which  performs  the  functions  of  the  Certifying  Authority  and  the 
Accounting Authority, falls under the Ministry of Finance. 

24 

 
 
Within the framework of its control functions as Certifying Authority, the National Fund Directorate is 
empowered to carry out checks where necessary and use the information contained in the European 
Commission’s system for measuring the risk of fraud and irregularities (ARACHNE). In addition, when 
carrying  out  checks  on  compliance  with  the  procedures  and  control  activities  of  the  managing 
authorities,  the  Certifying  Authority’s  experts  monitor  the  presence  of  ‘red  flags’  referred  to  in 
documents issued by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the European Commission indicating 
fraud under the ERDF, ESF and CF and listed in detail in the checklists for the inspection of accounting 
documentation or the procedure for selecting contractors. 

In relation to the Recovery and Resilience Facility, the National Fund Directorate within the Ministry 
of Finance acts as a coordinating unit at national level. The management and control system of the 
Recovery  and  Resilience  Plan  (RRP)  incorporates  checks  in  the  ARACHNE  tool,  covering  ex-post 
controls  of  public  procurement  procedures  and  verification  of  reported  financial  and  technical 
information in connection with the performance of on-the-spot checks. This is part of the fraud risk 
assessment carried out by the National Fund Directorate, as a result of which checks on the information 
contained in the ARACHNE tool and checks using fraud indicators – red flags – have been introduced 
as controls that should have an impact on the identified risks.  

In  the  RRP  management  and  control  system,  the  actions  to  be  carried  out  in  connection  with  the 
verification of conflicts of interest/related parties (ARACHNE system, Commercial Register, etc.) and 
the verification of double funding, including in the Financial Transparency System, are in place. 

 The management and control system also contains the procedure for reporting fraud, corruption and 
conflicts of interest from internal and external sources. 

In connection with the implementation of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan, the UMIS 2020 
information  system  provides  the  possibility  of  entering  and  storing  the  data  referred  to  in  Article 
22(2)(d) of Regulation (EU) 2021/241, which is the responsibility of the final recipients and which is 
checked  by the  management  and  control authorities of the  NRRP.  The  system also  has  modules for 
reporting and following up reports and incidents relating to irregularities. 

The  Executive  Agency  ‘Audit  of  EU  Funds’, as the  body  responsible  for  carrying  out  specific  audit 
activities  on  European  Union  funds  and  programmes,  fully  implements  the  recommendation  for 
enhanced fraud risk analysis. During the course of auditing work, checks are carried out to identify 
fraud  indicators,  cases  are  analysed  and  presented  in  the  annual  control  reports  for  each 
programme/financial instrument, and the competent authorities are also notified. The purpose of this 
analysis  is  to  verify  the  proper  functioning  of  the  managing  authorities’  management  and  control 
systems.  

In  accordance  with  the  Commission’s  Guidelines  on  fraud  risk  assessment  and  effective  and 
proportionate anti-fraud measures, which we apply (EGESIF_14-0021 – 0016/06/2014), the handbook 
‘The  role  of  Member  States’  auditors  in  fraud  prevention  and  Detection  for  EU  Structural  and 
Investment  Funds:  experience  and  practice  in  the  Member  States’,  the  Information  Note  on  Fraud 
Indicators in relation to the ERDF, ESF and CF (COCOF 09/0003/00 – 18/2/2009), OLAF’s Guidelines 
for identifying conflicts of interests in public procurement procedures for structural actions and the 
results of the audit carried out in 2022, the Executive Agency has notified the European Prosecutor's 
Office  and  the  authorities  of  the  Prosecutor's  Office  of  the  Republic  of  Bulgaria  of  3  cases  where 
suspicions  of  fraud  and  suspicions  of  agreements  between  undertakings/concerted  practices  have 
arisen. 

The  Public  Procurement  Agency reviewed and  analysed  information  and  data in  the field  of  public 
procurement from reports and other documents issued by the Commission, the European Anti-Fraud 
Office, the Ministry of the Interior’s AFCOS Directorate, the State Financial Inspection Agency, the 
Court  of  Auditors,  the  Commission  for  the  Protection  of  Competition,  the  Managing  Authorities  of 
operational programmes, the Executive Agency ‘Audit of EU Funds’, the World Bank, the Organisation 

25 

 
 
 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, etc. In addition, the weightings of the risk factors for the 
methodology for the random selection of control procedures (in force since 1.1.2022) and the control 
opinion models have been updated. 

The Customs Agency strives to use data from all available sources, both European and national. All 
the risk criteria under the Implementing Decision laying down measures for the uniform application of 
customs  controls  by  establishing  common  financial  risk  criteria  and  standards  have  also  been 
implemented. The information received is analysed and risk profiles are introduced on that basis. Where 
suspicion arises that a risk may occur in other Member States, the information is transmitted through 
CRMS, AFIS mail or national systems. 

In June 2022, an Interaction and Cooperation Agreement was concluded between the State Agency for 
National Security, the Ministry of Innovation and Growth and the Ministry of the Interior. The aim of 
the agreement is to enhance and facilitate the exchange of information as well as the use of data from 
different sources to ensure better analysis in identifying and addressing emerging fraud risks and trends 
in a timely manner.use As a result, coordination and interaction took place in 2022 with the Ministry 
of the Interior’s AFCOS Directorate and the Ministry of Innovation and Growth, on cases concerning 
the possible existence of organised criminal schemes for the unlawful diversion and absorption of funds 
from EU financial programmes for the 2014 – 2020 programming period. 

26 

 
 
 
 
3.4.  Cyprus (CY)  

3.4.1.  Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive  

Q.1.  Has  the  Commission  initiated  infringement  procedures  against  you  for  the  incorrect 
transposition of the PIF Directive? 

☒ YES 

Q.2.  For  the  Member  States  having  replied  yes.  Have  you  taken  remedial  action  to  modify 
national legislation? 

☒ YES, for all launched infringements 

Q.3.  For  the  Member  States  having  replied  yes.  By  when  do  you  expect  to  complete  the 
modification of national legislation to correctly transpose the PIF Directive? 

The draft law has been subjected to legal scrutiny and will be submitted for adoption once the House 
of Representatives reconvenes after the presidential elections taking place on 5 and 12 February 2023. 

3.4.2.  Participation in the EPPO  

Q.1. Are you already participating in the EPPO? 

☒ YES 

3.4.3.  Digitilising the fight against fraud  

Q.1. Are you using any of the following IT systems in your fight against fraud? 

☒ ARACHNE  
☒ Recovery and Resilience Facility 

Q.2. Has any interoperability been developed between EU IT tools and national IT tools? 

☒ NO 

Q.5. How is digitalisation influencing the fight against fraud? 

☒ Increasing detection 
☒ Reducing/simplifying administrative procedures 

Q.6. For any impact selected, can you provide any quantification? 

3.4.4.  Strengthen fraud risk analysis  

Q.1 Have you implemented the recommendation? 

☒ YES, fully  

If you implemented fully the recommendation, can you please describe  how you have done it? 
Can you share any specific findings? Please make a distinction between revenue and expenditure 
areas. 

The following were implemented during 2022: 

27 

 
 
 
 
Targeted fraud risk assessment for the recovery and resilience plan (RPP). The Commission’s fraud 
risk assessment tool was used for this exercise. The tool covered the likelihood and impact of specific 
and commonly identified fraud risks related in particular to basic procedures: selection of applicants, 
implementation and verification, milestones and targets, and certification and payments. There were 
five steps to the methodology: quantifying the likelihood and impact of a specific fraud risk (gross risk); 
assessing the effectiveness of existing controls in mitigating gross risk; evaluating gross risk taking into 
account the impact and effectiveness of current controls (residual risk); assessing the impact of planned 
additional controls on the gross (residual) risk; and defining the target risk. 

ARACHNE was used to complement the fraud risk assessment process, promoting use of an approach 
based on risk detection and scoring. This approach can increase the effectiveness of project selection, 
verifications and checking, and can further strengthen identification, prevention and detection of fraud, 
especially in cases of corruption. ARACHNE is used for the RPP, to prevent double funding and conflict 
of interests. There are also plans for it to be used for the cohesion policy funds for programming period 
2021-2027. 

Establishment of the Independent Anti-Corruption Authority The Authority is the designated competent 
authority for coordinating the actions of public sector services, the wider public sector and the private 
sector to prevent and combat corruption at national level. The Authority’s responsibilities are laid down 
in Article 7 of Law 19(I)/2022 on the establishment and operation of the Independent Anti-Corruption 
Authority. 

Guidelines  approved  by  the  Council  of  Ministers  have  been  issued  on  procedures  to  ensure 
compatibility  with  national  and  EU  public  procurement  policy,  and  for  prevention,  detection  and 
correction of fraud, corruption and conflict of interests in the context of the RPP. 

Two  Regulatory  Administrative  Acts  have  been  amended,  implementing  the  national  anti-money 
laundering  law  (Law 188  (I)/2007),  in  order to  allow  all  national  and  EU  control  bodies  access  to 
beneficial  ownership  databases.  RAA  116/2022  and  RAA  180/2022  grant  access  to  the  relevant 
beneficial ownership databases with the Treasury of the Republic of Cyprus, Directorate-General for 
Development,  Internal  Audit  Service,  Auditor  General,  European  Commission,  Court  of  Auditors, 
OLAF and EPPO having the same rights as the competent national anti-money laundering authorities. 

In addition, the Cyprus Agricultural Payments Organisation has carried out a fraud risk analysis of the 
projects/measures that it funds. Procedures for using the ARACHNE Risk Scoring Tool have also been 
introduced. 

For  revenues,  and  especially  in  relation  to  the  Customs  and  Excise  Department,  all  information 
received  from  the  Commission  and  other  Member  States  through  CRMS2  and  the  AFIS  portal  is 
processed and analysed. Appropriate measures are then taken, mainly in the form of risk profiling, and 
alerts are sent to frontline officers. 

 With regards to financial risks, the Customs and Excise Department has applied the common criteria 
for financial risk for combating fraud in the following areas: undervaluation, misclassification, anti-
dumping,  preferential  origin,  quotas,  suspensions,  customs  procedure  4200/6300,  as  well  as  risks 
related to specific economic operators and the nature of the goods. 

The Post Control and Audit Department takes into account the above, and risk information forms (RIF), 
OLAF and statistics from own resources etc, when planning  post-control audits, especially in cases 
where there is a reasonable suspicion of undervaluation, wrong tariff classification and failure to apply 
EU regulations on anti-dumping measures. 

28 

 
 
 
 
3.5.  Czechia (CZ) 

3.5.1.  Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive  

Q.1.  Has  the  Commission  initiated  infringement  procedures  against  you  for  the  incorrect 
transposition of the PIF Directive? 

☒ NO 

3.5.2.  Participation in the EPPO  

Q.1. Are you already participating in the EPPO? 

☒ YES 

3.5.3.  Digitilising the fight against fraud  

Q.1. Are you using any of the following IT systems in your fight against fraud? 

☒ ARACHNE  
☒ All EU funds and programmes (Cohesion, Rural Development, Recovery and Resilience Facility) 
☒ Recovery and Resilience Facility – access to ARACHNE ensured, but for controls and verification 
of applicants rather the CRIBIS database is used. 
☒ other (specify) 
 Register of beneficial owners (Ministry of Justice database) 
CRIBIS (commercial database of commercial information) 
DATLAB (sophisticated database of procurements) 

Q.2. Has any interoperability been developed between EU IT tools and national IT tools? 

☒ YES 

Q.3. If yes, with which tool? 

☒ ARACHNE 

Q.4. To what end? 

☒ Data enrichment 
☒ Introduce new red flags/risk indicators 
☒ Fine tune/refine red flags/risk indicators/risk scoring 

Q.5. How is digitalisation influencing the fight against fraud? 

☒ Increasing prevention 
☒ Increasing detection 
☒ Reducing/simplifying administrative procedures 

Q.6. For any impact selected, can you provide any quantification? 

Not available. 

29 

 
 
 
 
3.6.  Germany (DE) 

3.6.1.  Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive  

Q.1.  Has  the  Commission  initiated  infringement  procedures  against  you  for  the  incorrect 
transposition of the PIF Directive? 

☒ NO 

3.6.2.  Participation in the EPPO  

Q.1. Are you already participating in the EPPO? 

☒ YES 

3.6.3.  Digitilising the fight against fraud  

Q.1. Are you using any of the following IT systems in your fight against fraud? 

In  general,  we  would  like  to  refer  to  the  ongoing  negotiations  on  the  revision  of  the  EU  Financial 
Regulation. In this context, Germany has already sent the European Commission detailed questions on 
the  proposed  use  of  a  data  analysis  and  risk  assessment  tool  (based  on  ARACHNE)  and  the  Early 
Detection and Exclusion System (EDES).  

We  would  also  refer  to  Germany’s  replies  to  the  Commission’s  2022  ARACHNE  user  survey.  The 
replies reflect the feedback received from all bodies responsible for managing and overseeing EU funds 
in Germany.  

The issues and reservations raised now need to be clarified in detail during the negotiations. 

No - Rhineland-Palatinate ERDF managing authorities 

☒ EDES Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania ERDF managing authority 
☒  IMS  (do  not  select  if  IMS  is  used  only  for  reporting  irregularities  and  fraud,  as  this  is  a  legal 
obligation. Select if irregularities and fraud reported via IMS are used to perform risk analysis or other 
anti-fraud  related  activities)  North  Rhine-Westphalia  and  Mecklenburg-Western  Pomerania  ERDF 
managing authorities 
☒ other (specify) Bavaria ERDF managing authority: There is an established procedure for detecting, 
reporting and monitoring the relevant data in general, and data on irregularities in particular. There 
is a database system for reporting and monitoring in the ERDF, IGJ Objective, Bavaria 2014-2020 
(FIPS2014), which is also used for programme management.   

Q.2. Has any interoperability been developed between EU IT tools and national IT tools? 

☒  NO  Brandenburg,  Schleswig-Holstein,  North  Rhine-Westphalia,  Bavaria,  Saxony-Anhalt,  and 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania ERDF managing authorities; Federal Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs 

Q.5. How is digitalisation influencing the fight against fraud? 

☒ Increasing prevention Bavaria ERDF managing authority 
☒  Increasing  administrative  burden  Mecklenburg-Western  Pomerania  ERDF  managing  authorities; 
Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 

30 

 
 
☒  Reducing/simplifying  administrative  procedures  Brandenburg  and  Bavaria  ERDF  managing 
authorities 

Q.6. For any impact selected, can you provide any quantification? 

Bavaria ERDF managing authority: Evaluation and follow-up are being facilitated. Federal Ministry 
of Labour and Social Affairs No 

3.6.4.  Strengthen fraud risk analysis  

Q.1 Have you implemented the recommendation? 

☒ YES, partly Rhineland-Palatinate, North Rhine-Westphalia. and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern ERDF 
managing authorities, Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 

☒ NO Brandenburg, Schleswig-Holstein, Bavaria, and Saxony-Anhalt ERDF managing authorities 

If you implemented partially the recommendation, could you please explain why you think it was 
a  partial  implementation  and  why  a  full  implementation  was  not  possible?  Please  make  a 
distinction between revenue and expenditure areas. 

In  Rhineland-Palatinate  (ERDF  managing  authority),  the  annual  reports  of  the  Regional  Court  of 
Auditors,  the  European  Court  of  Auditors  and  the  ERDF  audit  authority  are  being  analysed  and 
evaluated in terms of their relevance for the ERDF. If new risks are identified, they are integrated into 
the Rhineland-Palatinate fraud prevention tool. Because of staffing capacity we are unable to do more.  

Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania ERDF managing authority: Data from various available sources are 
used and analysed and information is shared, including with law enforcement authorities. This ensures 
adequate prevention, detection and follow-up of fraud, while respecting the principle of proportionality. 
Not all available databases are being used. 

Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs As part of the support for the Federal Programme for 
the European Social Fund (ESF), all available resources are being used to fight fraud in order to ensure 
exchanges between the relevant stakeholders. This includes, in particular, regular self-assessment of 
the managing authority’s strategic approach to preventing and combating fraud and corruption. This 
self-assessment includes all available information on combating fraud (for example, also up-to-date 
PIF reports) and exchanges between the relevant stakeholders, for example, on current cases of fraud 
and suspected fraud involving the ESF and the main identified risk areas, in order to investigate and 
address emerging risks and fraud trends in a timely manner. 

If you did not implement the recommendation, could you please explain why? 

Bavaria ERDF managing authority: There is already an established procedure for detecting, reporting 
and monitoring the relevant data in general, and data on irregularities in particular. Checklists are 
developed (for example, on conflicts of interest) on an ongoing basis, meaning that improvements are 
implemented in a timely manner. Audit priorities are dealt with using specially developed checklists 
that include fraud-related questions. Data storage and data exchange must comply with data protection 
requirements.    

Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture on the questions under 2.3 and 2.4: The questions cannot be 
answered in the requested format. ARACHNE and EDES are not used for agriculture and fisheries. In 
these areas, fraud prevention takes the form of regular analysis of specific fraud risks. This, along with 
appropriate  training  measures,  is  suitably  provided  for  in  the  fraud  prevention  procedures  of  the 
Länder and the Federal Government. For this purpose, use is also made of IMS data and Commission 
recommendations (such as PIF reports). 

31 

 
 
 
3.7.  Denmark (DK)  

3.7.1.  Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive  

Q.1.  Has  the  Commission  initiated  infringement  procedures  against  you  for  the  incorrect 
transposition of the PIF Directive? 

☒ NO 

3.7.2.  Participation in the EPPO  

Q.1. Are you already participating in the EPPO? 

☒ NO 

Q.2. For the Member States not participating yet. Are there plans to join the EPPO in the short-
medium term? 

☒ NO 

3.7.3.  Digitilising the fight against fraud  

Q.1. Are you using any of the following IT systems in your fight against fraud? 

☒  IMS  (do  not  select  if  IMS  is  used  only  for  reporting  irregularities  and  fraud,  as  this  is  a  legal 
obligation. Select if irregularities and fraud reported via IMS are used to perform risk analysis or other 
anti-fraud related activities) 
☒ other (specify) (For cohesion: Project reporting data is linked with data from the business regiter 
and the income register) 
☒ National dedicated anti-fraud IT tools 

Q.2. Has any interoperability been developed between EU IT tools and national IT tools? 

☒ NO 

Q.5. How is digitalisation influencing the fight against fraud? 

☒ Increasing prevention 
☒ Increasing detection 
☒ Increasing administrative burden 

Q.6. For any impact selected, can you provide any quantification? 

3.7.4.  Strengthen fraud risk analysis  

Q.1 Have you implemented the recommendation? 

☒ YES, partly  

If you implemented partially the recommendation, could you please explain why you think it was 
a  partial  implementation  and  why  a  full  implementation  was  not  possible?  Please  make  a 
distinction between revenue and expenditure areas. 

32 

 
 
For customs (revenue), the Danish Customs Agency uses data from all available sources, analyses and 
exchanges  information  including  with  Commission,  and  acts  on  specific  analyses  and  reports.  The 
Customs Agency does not necessarily act on all analyses and reports.  

For agriculture (expenditure), the Danish Agricultural Agency has had a sectoral approach and has 
developed the use of national databases. From 2023, the efforts will be strengthened as a statutory risk 
assessment  will  be  part  of  the  accreditation  conditions  for  authorities  disbursing  funds  under  the 
Common Agricultural Policy.  

For  cohesion  (expenditure),  the  Danish  Business  Authority  conducts  data  driven  controls  based  on 
internal data linked with data from the business register and the income register. On the basis on the 
linked  data,  a  risk  assessment  is  carried  out,  but  the  data  is  not  linked  with  other  databases  as  in 
ARACHNE. The Danish Business Authority currently investigates the possibilities for supplementing 
the existing controls with ARACHNE.   

For fisheries (expenditure), IMS is used to report irregularities to the Commission. Suspicion of fraud 
is reported directly to the appropriate authorities.  

33 

 
 
 
 
3.8.  Estonia (EE) 

3.8.1.  Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive  

Q.1.  Has  the  Commission  initiated  infringement  procedures  against  you  for  the  incorrect 
transposition of the PIF Directive? 

☒ YES 

Q.2.  For  the  Member  States  having  replied  yes.  Have  you  taken  remedial  action  to  modify 
national legislation? 

☒ NO 

3.8.2.  Participation in the EPPO  

Q.1. Are you already participating in the EPPO? 

☒ YES 

3.8.3.  Digitilising the fight against fraud  

Q.1. Are you using any of the following IT systems in your fight against fraud? 

☒ ARACHNE  
☒ Cohesion (not all programmes) 
☒ Rural Development 
☒ other (specify) - Estonian Tax and Customs Board is using different AFIS applications. 
☒ National dedicated anti-fraud IT tools – We use national information systems for the implementation 
of support and these systems are connected to several national registers (Commercia Register, Public 
Procurement Register etc) 

Q.2. Has any interoperability been developed between EU IT tools and national IT tools? 

☒ NO 

Q.5. How is digitalisation influencing the fight against fraud? 

☒ Increasing prevention 
☒ Increasing detection 
☒ Reducing/simplifying administrative procedures 

3.8.4.  Strengthen fraud risk analysis  

Q.1 Have you implemented the recommendation? 

☒ YES, fully (REVENUE) 
☒ YES, partly (EXPENDITURE) 
If you implemented fully the recommendation, can you please describe how you have done it? 
Can you share any specific findings? Please make a distinction between revenue and expenditure 
areas. 

34 

 
 
Estonian Tax and Customs Board is constantly and proactively using all available sources and data to 
better protect the EU´s financial interests. The data is being shared with all relevant law enforcement 
authorities including the Commission. One of the measures indicated in PIF questionnaire 2022 was: 

To  better  protect  the  EU´s  financial  interests,  the  Estonian  Customs  has  created  an  IT  tool,  which 
automatically checks the declared prices against prices provided by the EU´s database Theseus. This 
new  approach  has  allowed  Customs  to  extrapolate  the  use  of  Theseus  to  the  broader  scope  of 
commodities, not being limited only by textiles or footwear. The new tool detects and identifies customs 
declarations with a risk of undervaluation, which need to be checked 

If you implemented partially the recommendation, could you please explain why you think it was 
a  partial  implementation  and  why  a  full  implementation  was  not  possible?  Please  make  a 
distinction between revenue and expenditure areas. 

Estonian Managing Authority for ESIF programs has started again with the analysis of  ARACHNE 
deployment. In 2022 we did the analysis of the data fields and the first testing. In 2023, the goal is to 
decide to what extent we will use ARACHNE and carry out the necessary training. 

In addition, they have developed risk-based controls for the implementation of the period 2021-2027 
and set the obligation to carry out a risk assessment (including fraud risks) already at the stage of 
developing support measures  

Estonian Agricultural Register and Information Board uses ARACHNE as an additional source for a 
risk assessment. 

35 

 
 
 
 
3.9. 

Spain (ES)  

3.9.1.  Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive  

Q.1.  Has  the  Commission  initiated  infringement  procedures  against  you  for  the  incorrect 
transposition of the PIF Directive? 

☒ YES 

Q.2.  For  the  Member  States  having  replied  yes.  Have  you  taken  remedial  action  to  modify 
national legislation? 

☒ YES, but not  for all launched infringements 

Q.3.  For  the  Member  States  having  replied  yes.  By  when  do  you  expect  to  complete  the 
modification of national legislation to correctly transpose the PIF Directive? 

By Letter of Formal Notice of 2 December 2021 (INFR 2021/2235) the European Commission notified 
the  Kingdom  of  Spain  of  the  non-compliance  of  Spanish  legislation  with  Directive  (EU)  2017/1371 
(Directive on the fight against fraud to the Union's financial interests by means of criminal law) for 
failure to transpose correctly into national law: 

 - Article 4(2)(a) of the Directive  

- Article 4(2)(b) of the Directive  

- Article 7(1) in conjunction with Article 3(2)(a) and (b) of the Directive; and 

 - Article 7(3) in conjunction with Article 4(2)(b) of the Directive.  

By means of a report and annex of case law from the Technical Secretary General of the Ministry of 
Justice, dated 24 January 2022, a response to this letter was given with an assessment of each and 
every one of the articles allegedly not transposed correctly, justifying their transposition.  

Since the date of the report, no response has been received from the European Commission 

3.9.2.  Participation in the EPPO  

Q.1. Are you already participating in the EPPO? 

☒ YES 
☐ NO 

3.9.3.  Digitilising the fight against fraud  

Q.1. Are you using any of the following IT systems in your fight against fraud? 

☒ ARACHNE  
☒ Cohesion (not all programmes) 
☒  other  (specify)  National  Grants  Database,  Public  Sector  Procurement  Platform,  Commercial 
Register, E-informa, Axesor, Infocif. 
☒ National dedicated anti-fraud IT tools 

Q.2. Has any interoperability been developed between EU IT tools and national IT tools? 

☒ YES 

36 

 
 
Q.3. If yes, with which tool? 

☒ other (specify) SFC (System for Fund Management in the European Union) 

As a general rule, interoperability between EU IT tools and national IT tools has not been developed.  

However, according to the reply provided by the managing authority of the Asylum, Migration and 
Integration Fund (AMIF), they are working on the interoperability between the AMIF fund management 
application in Spain and the SFC application in order to carry out a more efficient and agile reporting 
of the management of the programme. 

Q.4. To what end? 

☒ Other (specify) Management of the AMIF National Programme 

Q.5. How is digitalisation influencing the fight against fraud? 

☒ Increasing prevention 
☒ Increasing detection 
☒ Increasing administrative burden 
☒ Reducing/simplifying administrative procedures 

The digitisation of the fight against fraud mostly involves an increase in fraud prevention and detection, 
as well as a simplification of administrative procedures. In some cases, it has also been suggested that 
it increases the administrative burden. 

Q.6. For any impact selected, can you provide any quantification? 

According to the information received, it is not possible to provide any quantification. 

3.9.4.  Strengthen fraud risk analysis  

Q.1 Have you implemented the recommendation? 

☒ YES, fully  
☒ YES, partly  

If you implemented fully the recommendation, can you please describe how you have done it? 
Can you share any specific findings? Please make a distinction between revenue and expenditure 
areas. 

If you implemented partially the recommendation, could you please explain why you think it was 
a  partial  implementation  and  why  a  full  implementation  was  not  possible?  Please  make  a 
distinction between revenue and expenditure areas. 

Once the different authorities involved have been consulted, the conclusion that can be drawn based on 
their responses is that the measure has been partially implemented on the expenditure side and fully 
implemented on the revenue side.  

Some of the reasons for this partial implementation on the expenditure side are as follows: they are in 
the  process  of  implementing  national  tools,  or  they  plan  to  implement  them  later  depending  on  the 
technical requirements and/or necessary resources, or they do not consider that the recommendation 
has been fully implemented as they do not use the IT tools recommended by the Commission. 

37 

 
 
 
In some cases, it has been indicated that it is difficult to obtain all the information on the cases given 
the  distribution  of  competences  between  the  different  bodies  involved.  In  general,  the  good 
collaboration of all the authorities managing European funds with AFCOS and OLAF in the collection 
and forwarding of the information requested in their investigations is highlighted.  

We highlight below some of the responses to the recommendations adopted. 

In the area of expenditure: 

In  the  case  of  European  Territorial  Cooperation,  the  database  is  common  for  all  cooperation 
programmes in which Spain participates, which allows taking into account the common information on 
risks and warning flags of the different programmes. 

The European Social Fund (ESF) authorities report that work is underway to strengthen anti-fraud 
mechanisms in the management of this fund, considering that the development and implementation of 
the National Anti-Fraud Strategy will serve to improve its procedures. 

Anti-Fraud  Action  Plans have  been  developed for the  management  of funds  from  the  Recovery  and 
Resilience Mechanism, and Anti-Fraud Units or Committees have been set up. 

On  the  revenue  side,  the  implementation  of  the  recommendation  has  been  full.  The  State  Tax 
Administration Agency, which is responsible for the management of the state tax and customs system, 
has a Consolidated Database that allows the implementation of risk analysis systems based on Data 
Analytics. It also applies a risk analysis system in which it uses all available sources of information, 
whether internal databases, open source information, complaints received or data from OLAF or other 
Community bodies. 

In particular, the Tax Agency maintains a very active position in the EUROFISC15 group to combat 
organised intra-Community VAT fraud, and maintains a very fluid relationship with the other Member 
States  for  the  exchange  of  sensitive  information,  both  on  specific  cases  of  non-compliance  and  on 
evasion procedures or techniques. 

The exchange of information with law enforcement authorities is possible, although it is restricted to 
the legal framework of protecting the confidentiality and secrecy of information of a tax nature. 

15   EUROFISC is a network of VAT antifraud experts, established and funded by the EU Fiscalis programme. 

38 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
3.10.  Finland (FI)  

3.10.1. Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive  

Q.1.  Has  the  Commission  initiated  infringement  procedures  against  you  for  the  incorrect 
transposition of the PIF Directive? 

☒ YES 

Q.2.  For  the  Member  States  having  replied  yes.  Have  you  taken  remedial  action  to  modify 
national legislation? 

☒ NO 

Q.3.  For  the  Member  States  having  replied  yes.  By  when  do  you  expect  to  complete  the 
modification of national legislation to correctly transpose the PIF Directive? 

The  Finnish  Government  has  replied  to  the  Commission’s  letter  of  formal  notice  in  case 
INFR(2021)2234. We consider that the Directive has been adequately and correctly implemented in 
Finland. 

3.10.2. Participation in the EPPO  

Q.1. Are you already participating in the EPPO? 

☒ YES 

3.10.3. Digitilising the fight against fraud  

Q.1. Are you using any of the following IT systems in your fight against fraud? 

☒ other (specify) National programme information systems and business data (the Asiakastieto service) 

Q.2. Has any interoperability been developed between EU IT tools and national IT tools? 

☒ NO 

Q.5. How is digitalisation influencing the fight against fraud? 

☒ Increasing prevention 
☒ Increasing administrative burden 

3.10.4. Strengthen fraud risk analysis  

Q.1 Have you implemented the recommendation? 

☒ YES, partly  

If you implemented partially the recommendation, could you please explain why you think it was 
a  partial  implementation  and  why  a  full  implementation  was  not  possible?  Please  make  a 
distinction between revenue and expenditure areas. 

For  revenue,  Finnish  Customs  has  developed  and  automated  the  processing  of  data  from  official 
sources (e.g. CRM2, AFIS/MAS) to detect risks. This will enable Customs to address the risks in a timely 
manner. 

39 

 
 
For expenditure, steps have been taken in the area of data analysis, in particular the implementation of 
the RRF. A joint government project portfolio and RRP system have been put in place to monitor aid 
granted  under  the  RRF.  Information  on  granting  and  paying  aid,  beneficial  owners  and  DNSH 
assessments  has  been  entered  into  the  systems.  The  various  aid  authorities  must  enter  up-to-date 
information in the systems every month. This information is also available to the RRP’s control and 
inspection authorities. These systems will help meet the needs for data availability and coverage. Data 
quality  is  ensured  by  control  and  audit  activities.  Information  on  the  findings  of  control  and  audit 
measures carried out by the aid authorities will also be recorded in the systems. 

The  option  of  using  the  Commission’s  data  management  and  extraction  tool  (ARACHNE)  has  been 
explored as part of preparations for implementing the RRF. So far, no decision to introduce the tool 
has been taken for the RRF or for other EU programmes. The main problems with access to different 
Commission  information  systems  and  data  tools  relate  to  limited  resources,  i.e.  increased 
administrative burden, and legislation, in particular as regards the transmission of personal data and 
data protection. 

Other actions have also been taken at the paying agency responsible for agricultural funds, where anti-
fraud activities have been reorganised. This means that information from different sources will be taken 
into account in the identification of fraud risks and in the design of anti-fraud measures to a greater 
extent than previously. 

Preventive anti-fraud measures in the Home Affairs Funds are also implemented through training and 
guidance and risk-based control and audit activities. 

40 

 
 
 
 
3.11.  France (FR) 

3.11.1. Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive  

Q.1.  Has  the  Commission  initiated  infringement  procedures  against  you  for  the  incorrect 
transposition of the PIF Directive? 

☒ NO 

3.11.2. Participation in the EPPO  

Q.1. Are you already participating in the EPPO? 

☒ YES 

3.11.3. Digitilising the fight against fraud  

Q.1. Are you using any of the following IT systems in your fight against fraud? 

☒ ARACHNE  
☒ Cohesion (not all programmes) 
☒  other  (specify)  The  managing  authorities  use  various  databases  for  management  verifications 
(Manageo, Fiben, Societe.com, Infogreffe, Diane, etc.). 

☒ National dedicated anti-fraud IT tools 

Q.2. Has any interoperability been developed between EU IT tools and national IT tools? 

Automated data exchange between information systems has not been implemented. At present, in order 
to use ARACHNE and IMS, data has to be exported from the Synergie information system (the tool for 
managing and monitoring European programmes in France) by means of a file. The ANCT [National 
Agency for Territorial Cohesion], which is responsible for Synergie, is investigating the possibility of 
automating data exchange between Synergie and the ARACHNE and IMS information systems. 

Q.5. How is digitalisation influencing the fight against fraud? 

☒ Increasing prevention 
☒ Increasing administrative burden 

Q.6. For any impact selected, can you provide any quantification? 

While the ARACHNE system does enhance the prevention of fraud relating to EU funds, it also increases 
the administrative burden for staff responsible for management verifications. ARACHNE contains an 
array  of  information  that  makes  it  difficult  to  understand,  with  risk  indicators  that  are  difficult  to 
interpret. 

However,  the  authorities  managing  EU  funds  also  use  various  databases  which  can  be  consulted 
instead  of  or  as  well  as  ARACHNE  (Manageo,  Fiben,  Societe.com,  Infogreffe,  Diane,  etc.).  The 
consultation of digital tools or information systems for data on beneficiaries of EU funds is integrated 
into managing authorities’ management verification procedures and anti-fraud measures. 

41 

 
 
 
 
3.11.4. Strengthen fraud risk analysis  

Q.1 Have you implemented the recommendation? 

☒ YES, fully  
If you implemented fully the recommendation, can you please describe how you have done it? Can you 
share any specific findings? Please make a distinction between revenue and expenditure areas. 

MICAF [the Inter-Ministerial Anti-Fraud Coordination Mission] has drawn up a new national strategy 
to combat fraud affecting the EU budget. The aim is to prevent fraud through better risk management, 
to detect fraud by strengthening data collection, sharing and processing, and to prosecute and punish 
fraud by improving administrative and judicial coordination. 

In this context, the ANCT leads working groups involving all the managing authorities for EU funds, 
with the aim of consolidating and harmonising the existing arrangements for the prevention, detection 
and reporting of fraud. 

The managing authorities for EU funds use various databases which can be consulted instead of or as 
well  as  ARACHNE  with  regard  to  fraud  prevention.  The  managing  authorities  also  exchange 
information relating to operational data in order to avoid any risk of double funding from EU funds. 

Moreover,  with  regard  to  fraud  prevention  and  identifying  fraud  risks,  the  information  notes  and 
practical  guides  drawn  up  by  the  Commission  on  fraud  warning  signs  have  been  distributed  to  the 
authorities managing EU funds. The European Public Prosecutor’s Office has attended a number of 
meetings organised by the ANCT with the managing, certification and audit authorities to explain its 
role  in  supporting  managing  authorities  in  the  fight  against  fraud  affecting  EU  funds  and  the 
practicalities of working and exchanging information with the Office. These meetings were attended by 
technicians and decision-makers from the managing authorities. 

In this context, the MICAF had the opportunity to present its tasks and its procedure for cooperation 
between managing authorities and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. 

Finally, the MICAF has opened up its training catalogue to all those involved in the management of 
EU funds in order to provide them with access to training delivered by anti-fraud professionals. The 
ANCT relays the information through its collaborative platform, and managing authority staff have 
already attended various training sessions. 

42 

 
 
 
 
3.12.  Greece (GR) 

3.12.1. Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive  

Q.1.  Has  the  Commission  initiated  infringement  procedures  against  you  for  the  incorrect 
transposition of the PIF Directive? 

☒ YES 

Q.2.  For  the  Member  States  having  replied  yes.  Have  you  taken  remedial  action  to  modify 
national legislation? 

☒ YES 

Q.3.  For  the  Member  States  having  replied  yes.  By  when  do  you  expect  to  complete  the 
modification of national legislation to correctly transpose the PIF Directive? 

3.12.2. Participation in the EPPO  

Q.1. Are you already participating in the EPPO? 

☒ YES 

3.12.3. Digitilising the fight against fraud  

Q.1. Are you using any of the following IT systems in your fight against fraud? 

☒ ARACHNE  
☒ Recovery and Resilience Facility 
☒ other (specify) RRF Management Information System 

Q.2. Has any interoperability been developed between EU IT tools and national IT tools? 

☒ NO 

3.12.4. Strengthen fraud risk analysis  

Q.1 Have you implemented the recommendation? 

☒ YES, fully  

If you implemented fully the  recommendation, can you please describe how you have done it? 
Can you share any specific findings? Please make a distinction between revenue and expenditure 
areas. 

Division for Financial Control and Audit and Cooperative Affairs of the Ministry of Rural Development 
and Food: 

The Division for Financial Control and Audit and Cooperative Affairs (Department for the Control of 
EAGF Expenditure), in application of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council, carries out ex post controls on beneficiaries or debtors directly or indirectly related to 
the  financing  system  under  the  European  Agricultural  Guarantee  Fund  (EAGF)  or  their 
representatives. 

The aim of these ex post controls is to scrutinise the commercial documents of those entities which are 
beneficiaries or debtors and which relate directly or indirectly to the financing system under the EAGF 

43 

 
 
or  their  representatives  (‘undertakings’),  in  order to ascertain  whether  EAGF  transactions forming 
part  of  the  financing  system  have  actually  been  carried  out  and  whether  they  have  been  executed 
correctly, based on the risk presented by the beneficiary, the risk of the measure under scrutiny, by 
means of specific control procedures and evidence, and the recovery of amounts wrongly paid. 

The directorate carries out systematic scrutiny of the commercial documents of undertakings, taking 
account of the nature of the transactions to be scrutinised. The selection of undertakings for the annual 
control plan gives the best possible assurance of the effectiveness of the measures for preventing and 
detecting irregularities 

A risk analysis methodology is therefore used, not only during the selection of undertakings for the 
control plan but also during the actual scrutiny of these undertakings. The risk analysis includes specific 
risks and risk values, all of the data relating to the scrutiny, and information from the Commission, in 
order to address any emerging risks 

The selection takes into account, inter alia, the financial importance of the undertakings in that system 
and of other risk factors. 

The accuracy of primary data under scrutiny is verified by a number of cross-checks, including, where 
necessary, the commercial documents of third parties, appropriate to the degree of risk presented, such 
as: 

a) comparisons with the commercial documents of suppliers, customers, carriers or other third parties; 

b) physical checks, where appropriate, on the quantity and nature of stocks; 

c)  comparisons  with  the  records  of  financial  flows  preceding  or  following  the  EAGF  transactions 
carried out within the financing system, and 

d) checks, in relation to bookkeeping or records of financial movements showing, at the time of the 
scrutiny, that the documents held by the paying agency by way of justification for the payment of aid to 
the beneficiary are accurate. 

Recovery and Resilience Facility Agency: 

the  agency  was  designated  as  responsible 

In  accordance  with  Decision 129397/13-09-2022  of  the  Governor  of  the  Recovery  and  Resilience 
Facility Agency (online publication No ΨΜ5ΚΗ-ΑΞΘ), a fraud risk assessment team was set up and an 
issues.  Furthermore,  by 
officer  at 
Decision 135896/21-09-2022  of  the  Governor,  the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  Agency’s  risk 
assessment methodology for the ex ante check for conflicts of interest when awarding public contracts 
was approved, in order to prevent, and enforce measures to assess and address, risks that may affect 
the  smooth  implementation  and  achievement  of  the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  Agency’s 
objectives. 

fraud 

for 

Directorate-General for Customs and Excise of the Independent Authority for Public Revenue: 

Customs controls are carried out based on risk analysis in accordance with Article 46 of the Union 
Customs  Code.  The  analysis  makes  use  of  all  available  information,  particularly  information  from 
OLAF’s mutual assistance messages and RIFs, and creates the corresponding risk profiles. Feedback 
on the measures taken is systematic and the monitoring of fraud risks and trends is ongoing. 

44 

 
 
 
 
3.13.  Croatia (HR)  

3.13.1. Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive  

Q.1.  Has  the  Commission  initiated  infringement  procedures  against  you  for  the  incorrect 
transposition of the PIF Directive? 

☒ YES 

Q.2.  For  the  Member  States  having  replied  yes.  Have  you  taken  remedial  action  to  modify 
national legislation? 

☒ NO 

Contribution of the Ministry of Justice and Public Administration: 

The Republic of Croatia submitted in January 2022 a reply to the European Commission in relation to 
the letter of official notification on the transposition of the PIF  Directive into the national criminal 
legislation. 

3.13.2. Participation in the EPPO  

Q.1. Are you already participating in the EPPO? 

☒ YES 

3.13.3. Digitilising the fight against fraud  

Q.1. Are you using any of the following IT systems in your fight against fraud? 

☒ ARACHNE  
☒ Cohesion (all programmes) (Ministry of Regional Development and EU Funds, Agency for the Audit 
of European Union Programmes Implementation System) 
☒ Rural Development (Ministry of Agriculture) 
☒  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  (Agency  for  the  Audit  of  European  Union  Programmes 
Implementation System) 
☒  IMS  (do  not  select  if  IMS  is  used  only  for  reporting  irregularities  and  fraud,  as  this  is  a  legal 
obligation. Select if irregularities and fraud reported via IMS are used to perform risk analysis or other 
anti-fraud related activities) (Ministry of Agriculture) 
☒ National dedicated anti-fraud IT tools (e.g. web data bases, Companies register, Poslovna.hr, etc. - 
Agency for the Audit of European Union Programmes Implementation System) 

Q.2. Has any interoperability been developed between EU IT tools and national IT tools? 

☒ NO 

Q.5. How is digitalisation influencing the fight against fraud? 

☒  Increasing  prevention  (Agency  for  the  Audit  of  European  Union  Programmes  Implementation 
System, Ministry of Agriculture) 
☒  Increasing  detection  (Agency  for  the  Audit  of  European  Union  Programmes  Implementation 
System) 
☒  Reducing/simplifying  administrative  procedures  (Agency  for  the  Audit  of  European  Union 
Programmes Implementation System, Ministry of Agriculture) 
☒ Other (specify) (Ministry of Regional Development and EU Funds)  

45 

 
 
Contribution of the Ministry of Regional Development and EU Funds:  

ARACHNE  -  The  ARACHNE  Risk  Scoring  Tool  will  alert  the  Managing  Authority  in  identifying 
projects,  contracts,  contractors  and  beneficiaries  with  highest  risk,  and  help  to  focus  on  their 
administrative  capacity  for  verifications.  Where  the  analysis  by  the  Managing  Authority  leads  to 
recurring risks being identified, the management and control systems should be reinforced in order to 
prevent the risk from occurring in future.  

ARACHNE is used while evaluating projects applying for funds in European structural and investment 
fund: Operational Program Competitiveness and Cohesion 2014-2020. It is also planned to use it for 
evaluation  of  projects  in  the  Multiannual  Financial  Framework  2021-2027:  Competitiveness  and 
Cohesion Program 2021-2027.  

In  the  feedback  from  the  national  implementing  and  intermediary  bodies  that  use  the  relevant  tool 
ARACHNE in their work within Operational Program Competitiveness and Cohesion 2014-2020, we 
received interesting observations and suggestions for improvement. Some of them are listed below: 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

The data in ARACHNE should be updated more frequently. The tool should have more financial 
data to make a quality risk assessment and search filter should include "search by a unique 
identifier  number"  dependant  on  the  state.  They  use  the  tool  in  evaluation  of  project 
applications as well as in verification of procurement procedures (ex-post verification) and to 
detect conflict of interest. However, its usefulness might be improved. The data is often outdated 
and incomplete; it takes a lot of time to use it without significant impact (no conflicts of interest 
that we are aware of was detected through ARACHNE). There are much more effective means 
of detecting real and serious conflicts of interest and they are not at the disposal of Managing 
Authority  or  delegated  intermediate  bodies.  For  example  tracking  payments  between  legal 
entities and natural persons, gathering correspondence, conducting investigations, and these 
are  not  and  cannot  be  at  our  disposal  having  in  mind  we  are  not  formal  investigative  or 
prosecution bodies or financial authorities. Even if we were to file reports about suspicious 
behaviour or possible conflicts of interest, there would have to be a reasonable doubt before 
that,  and  with  our  current  competences,  we  cannot  achieve  that  goal.  Therefore,  use  of 
ARACHNE is not useful. 

ARACHNE, as it is stipulated by the Managing Authority in the Common National Rules, does 
not serve for risk scoring, it serves to detect possible conflict of interest. To be used as a risk 
scoring tool, it should be used by the bodies in charge of programming and drafting/publishing 
calls for proposals, sectoral bodies, not bodies in charge of verification of funds and overseeing 
project implementation. 

The data should be valid, recent and complete. 

By clear communication from the European Commission level about the purpose of the system, 
perhaps focusing on lesser number of areas covered by the system, but make it more efficient. 

The  three-month  regular  updates  on  companies  publicly  available  information  provided  by 
ARACHNE is a too long period for the purpose of effective risk analysis. We have national and 
private databases with paid membership that provide this data on a more regular basis. 

Considering that we primarily use  ARACHNE to check conflicts of interest, we believe that 
more data on companies and persons should be transferred to ARACHNE from court registers, 
trade registers and other relevant registers of member countries in order to have more data 
and  a  more  accurate  checks  (official  relevant  internal  pages:  Poslovna.hr,  InfoBiz,  Tax 
Administration, official court registry, beneficial ownership register, trade register). 

ARACHNE tool can be used to strengthen the capacity to detect, report and follow-up on irregularities. 
Further improvements of IT systems and staff’s competences are needed. 

46 

 
 
Q.6. For any impact selected, can you provide any quantification? 

Contribution of the Ministry of Agriculture: 

The usage of IT systems for the purpose of internal controls reduces administrative burden especially 
when compared with results it can provide. 

At this moment, we do not have data to quantify the effect of digitization on increased prevention of 
possible fraud and/or reduction of administrative burden when conducting controls.  

Contribution  of  the  Agency  for  the  Audit  of  European  Union  Programmes  Implementation  System 
(Audit Authority): 

Digitalisation is indeed accelerating and facilitating the whole process. In other words, the information 
is much more accessible, transparent and reachable. Its processing is also easier and more available. 
During audit tests and checks, auditors check how the bodies in the management and control systems 
undertake anti-fraud measures and how they in practice protect the financial interests of the EU, also 
by using respective IT tool. The procedures at national level for all EU funds utilised and managed 
envisage and define roles, responsibilities and functions in respect of protection of EU funds as well. 
Tools, methods, instructions, guidelines are provided for all EU funds.  

What  should  be  improved is  making  the  use  of these tools  and  methods  faster  and  getting/using  all 
benefits that the tools provide. For this purpose, trainings should be organised at levels of all bodies 
(within management and control systems, at the level of coordinating bodies, audit authority, etc.) to 
train the staff on using all tools in the most effective, useful and productive way. One of the crucial 
things  is  then  to  upload  and  update  the  information  in  the  digitalised  systems  as  databases  and  to 
provide up-to-date, reliable and verifiable source of information.  

3.13.4. Strengthen fraud risk analysis  

Q.1 Have you implemented the recommendation? 

☒ YES, fully (Ministry of Regional Development and EU Funds, Agency for the Audit of European 
Union Programmes Implementation System) 
☒ YES, partly (Ministry of Agriculture) 

If you implemented fully the recommendation, can you please describe how you have done it? Can you 
share any specific findings? Please make a distinction between revenue and expenditure areas. 

If you implemented partially the recommendation, could you please explain why you think it was a 
partial  implementation  and  why  a  full  implementation  was  not  possible?  Please  make  a  distinction 
between revenue and expenditure areas. 

Contribution of the Ministry of Regional Development and EU Funds:  

In relation to the risk assessment in the Operational Program Competitiveness and Cohesion 2014-
2020,  all  bodies  in  the  system  of  management  and  control  of  ESI  funds  since  the  beginning  of  the 
implementation  of  the  Program,  regardless  of  whether  a  risk  assessment  has  been  carried  out, 
implement fundamental measures to combat fraud as follows: 

conducting  appropriate  trainings  and  educations  for  employees  of  bodies  in  the  system  and  the 
obligation to spread the acquired knowledge and obtained materials within the body (by delivering 
them to the internal organizational unit/person in charge of education issues/coordinator for training, 
who then forwards them to all other organizational units);  

47 

 
 
at  workshops  intended  for  users:  informing  users  about  the  measures  taken  for  the  purpose  of 
prevention, detection and ways of dealing with established fraud (special attention is paid to (public) 
procurement issues) and the consequences to which they are exposed in cases of fraudulent behaviour 
(criminal prosecution, obligation to return 100% of the funds received), while referring the user to a 
website and/or e-mail address where suspected fraud can be reported anonymously;  

regular  monitoring  of  the  OLAF  website  and  the  publication  of  reports  by  the  European  Court  of 
Auditors  dealing  with the subject  of  irregularities, fraud  and  corruption to the detriment  of the  EU 
budget  is  the  responsibility  of  the  Risk  Management  Person  or  the  Coordinator  for  Anti-Fraud 
Measures, who at least twice a year delivers a summary of the relevant data and documents published 
on  the  specified  page  to  the  heads  of  organizational  units  within  their  body  and  other  risk  owners 
(strategies, reports, presentations, brochures, a description of the cases that have been dealt with, etc.), 
who then pass them on to officials within their services/departments;  

in  relation  to  public  procurement  procedures,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  Risk  Management  Person  or  the 
Coordinator  for  Anti-Fraud  Measures  to  encourage  project  managers  to  regularly  monitor  the 
Electronic Public Procurement Bulletin (EOJN), the websites of the State Commission for the Control 
of Public Procurement Procedures (DKOM) and other national relevant websites and search engines 
(such  as  www.strukturnifondovi.hr,  www.poslovna.hr,  https://sudreg.pravosudje.hr)  and  to  use  the 
ARACHNE  tool;  verify  the  user  and/or  the  person  authorized  to  represent  the  user  through  the 
ARACHNE system and through some of the available Internet browsers regarding the prevention of 
conflicts of interest.  

After performing the risk assessment, if necessary, additional, appropriate measures are taken, which 
are defined in relation to the identified risks and their reach. 

Through cooperation with the Service for Coordination of the Anti-Fraud Coordination System related 
to EU funds (AFCOS-Service) as an organizational unit of the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of 
Croatia which performs a coordinating role within the AFCOS-system and acts as the main contact 
point for the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) the task of protecting the financial interests of the 
EU is enhanced. 

Cooperation with judicial bodies and services of the European Commission is stipulated in the Common 
National Rules for the Operational Program Competitiveness and Cohesion 2014-2020. In cases where 
it is considered that a specific, established irregularity contains elements of a criminal offense or fraud, 
the intermediary body that made the Decision on irregularity, along with all relevant documentation, 
shall without delay submit it to the State Attorney's Office of the Republic of Croatia. On the day of 
becoming aware of the fact that the committed criminal offense has been established by a final court 
decision, the intermediary body draws up an official note on the aforementioned, which it records in 
the  Register  of  Irregularities  and  stores  it  in  the  eFondovi  system  and/or  ESIF  MIS.  Also,  the 
intermediary body informs the Ministry of Finance about suspected fraud through the IMS system in 
case  of  established  irregularities  with  suspected  fraud,  if  there  is  evidence  based  on  which  further 
payments within the project would not be justified and reasonable in the context of the obligation to 
protect national financial interests and financial interests of the European Union, and in this context a 
criminal  complaint  has  been  filed  or  is  intended  to  be  filed  with  the  State  Attorney's  Office  of  the 
Republic of Croatia.  

Contribution of the Ministry of Agriculture: 

Data sources and data types which Croatian authorities already use or expect to collect and use (in 
period of new CAP 2023.—2027.) to monitor implementation (or evaluation) of agricultural policy are, 
among others, as follows: 

- 

administrative IT resources (reports, etc.) 

48 

 
 
- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

publicly available information (i.e. internet sites and other public data)  

remote sensors   

Earth  observation  technology  and  space/satellite  technology    (satellite  data  collection, 
program Copernicus Sentinel) 

mobile applications 

Geospatial data (data with geographical or location component-GSA). 

For  the  purpose  of  monitoring  and  evaluating  measures  within  Common  Agricultural  policy,  the 
analytical processing of large amounts of data is continuously used.  

Croatian Paying Agency, also collects and processes data relevant to analyses of agricultural policy 
which are obtained through the system of IACS (Integrated Administrative and control system) as it is 
stipulated by relevant EU legislation.  

Currently, the Croatian Paying Agency is in process of further developing and setting up of wider usage 
of Area Monitoring System (AMS) what includes the use of satellite data for the purpose of controls and 
analyses. 

Beside this,  ARACHNE system is used in Croatia as a basis for indication of the need to carry out 
additional controls in some doubtful projects.     

In our understanding, it is crucial to improve and upgrade collecting of data so that they can be used, 
among other purposes, also for analyses related to fraudulent irregularities and fraud risks. Collected 
data and their quality are the basis for the quality risk analysis.  

Additionally, Croatian authorities (Ministry of Agriculture and Croatian Paying Agency) continuously 
work  on  the  quality  of  flow  of  information  between  organisational  units  dealing  with  controls  and 
analyses.  

National control system set up to implement for reforms and investments within the scope of Recovery 
and  Resilience  Facility  also  includes  the  use  of  ARACHNE.  Ministry  of  Agriculture  is  responsible 
authority for the subcomponent C1.5. “Improving the use of natural resources and strengthening the 
supply chain” of National recovery and resilience plan and Ministry of Regional Development and EU 
Funds provides employees with access to the ARACHNE system and does the work of collecting and 
entering data into the ARACHNE system. This will strengthen capacity to detect, report and follow-up 
on  irregularities,  especially  those  on  conflict  of  interest  and  will  also  serve  as  a  basis  for  the  risk 
analyses.  

However, we consider this recommendation has been partially implemented as further improvements 
of Croatian Paying Agency’s IT systems and upgrade of managing information on the level of Managing 
Authority and Croatian Paying Agency for the purpose of risk analyses are needed.  

Contribution  of  the  Agency  for  the  Audit  of  European  Union  Programmes  Implementation  System 
(Audit Authority): 

For example, the Audit Authority for the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) in Croatia has issued 
a finding related to strengthening anti-fraud measures, with particular emphasis on performing of risk 
analyses. The auditees – all bodies encompassed by the audit, have prepared their risk analyses, based 
on  the  procedures  outlining  the  methodology,  the  approach,  providing  templates,  etc.  The  Audit 
Authority is within their audits closely following the risk and irregularity management policies and 
processes. The Audit Authority is also highlighting that awareness should be continuously and regularly 

49 

 
 
raised in the institutions falling under the management and control systems, with respect to fraud risk 
analyses; and trainings should be provided to all the staff dealing with EU funds/RRF.  

The  Audit  Authority  also  provided  inputs  and  contributed  to  the  Questionnaire  developed  for  the 
analysis  of  the  system  for  combatting  irregularities  and  fraud  by  the  AFCOS  Service.  The  analysis 
serves  perfectly  to  evaluate  the  current  state  of  play  as  regards  the  AFCOS  network  and  system  in 
Croatia. The Audit Authority expressed the viewpoints that staff in the management and control systems 
should  be  trained  on  all  steps/processes  in  respect  of  prevention,  detection,  processing,  reporting, 
follow-up of irregularities/fraud + applying of financial corrections; additionally, awareness should be 
raised on the bodies involved in the AFCOS network and their role in fraud management.  

50 

 
 
 
 
3.14.  Hungary (HU)  

3.14.1. Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive  

Q.1.  Has  the  Commission  initiated  infringement  procedures  against  you  for  the  incorrect 
transposition of the PIF Directive? 

☒ YES 

Q.2.  For  the  Member  States  having  replied  yes.  Have  you  taken  remedial  action  to  modify 
national legislation? 

☒ NO 

Q.3.  For  the  Member  States  having  replied  yes.  By  when  do  you  expect  to  complete  the 
modification of national legislation to correctly transpose the PIF Directive? 

Judit Varga, Minister for Justice, wrote to the Commission on 19 July 2022 setting  out the relevant 
Hungarian  law  and  practice  and  referring  to  the  relevant  international  legal  obligations  and,  for 
example, the GRECO findings. The Minister informed the Commission that the Hungarian Government 
considered the Hungarian legislation to be in line with the Directive. 

3.14.2. Participation in the EPPO  

Q.1. Are you already participating in the EPPO? 

☒ NO 

Q.2. For the Member States not participating yet. Are there plans to join the EPPO in the short-
medium term? 

☒ NO 

3.14.3. Digitilising the fight against fraud  

Q.1. Are you using any of the following IT systems in your fight against fraud? 

☒ ARACHNE  
☒ Cohesion (all programmes) 
☒ Recovery and Resilience Facility 
☒ EDES 

Q.2. Has any interoperability been developed between EU IT tools and national IT tools? 

☒ NO 

Q.5. How is digitalisation influencing the fight against fraud? 

☒ Increasing prevention 
☒ Increasing detection 

51 

 
 
3.14.4. Strengthen fraud risk analysis  

Q.1 Have you implemented the recommendation? 

☒ YES, partly  

If you implemented partially the recommendation, could you please explain why you think it was a 
partial  implementation  and  why  a  full  implementation  was  not  possible?  Please  make  a  distinction 
between revenue and expenditure areas. 

Revenue area 

To  support  the  uniform  protection  of  the  EU’s  financial  interests,  the  Commission  has  adopted  a 
Decision on Financial Risk Criteria (Implementing Decision C(2018) 3293 final establishing common 
financial risk criteria and standards, ‘the FRC Decision’) and Guidance on the implementation of the 
FRC Decision (TAXUD A3/057/2019). 

The decision and the guidance will help to ensure a consistent approach to and consistent analysis and 
profiling (i.e. defining and flagging) of financial risks and uniform recording of abuses detected (with 
a two-digit FRC code clearly assigned to each financial risk and displayed next to the risk flag in the 
risk management system built into the process). The built-in risk management system developed by the 
National Tax and Customs Administration (NAV) enables real-time collection and evaluation of risk 
information and, where necessary, immediate intervention in the areas of both customs and tax. 

The  Commission  regularly  monitors  the  implementation  of  the  Decision  by  means  of  a  specific 
questionnaire and, on that basis, evaluates the related activities and makes recommendations to the 
Member States. FRC risks identified are shared between national customs authorities, including the 
NAV, and with the Commission. 

The  risks  identified  are  managed  according  to  their  importance  and  are  forwarded  as  a  matter  of 
priority to the competent specialists for further action, for example in the area of tax or criminal law. 

It  is  also  important  to  mention  the  integrated  practice  of  the  NAV,  developed  to  protect  the  EU’s 
financial  interests,  in  which,  following  the  customs  procedure,  our  authority  creates  incentives  for 
compliance for companies with mainly tax debts which show a low willingness to pay and are difficult 
to contact (after the release of customs goods, action may be taken by the authorities as long as the 
goods are available). 

Expenditure area 

FAIR,  the information  system  for  managing and  recording  Hungary’s  support  from  the  operational 
programmes, is continually being developed, including building in fraud prevention functions. FAIR 
receives information from several domestic public databases, thus increasing the credibility of the data 
and reducing the administrative burden for beneficiaries. In addition, warnings drawing attention to 
potential risks have been built into the system. 

The anti-fraud and anti-corruption strategy for European Union funds adopted by Government Decree 
No 1540/2022  of  15 November  2022  is  also  a  significant  step  forward  in the  implementation  of  the 
recommendation. The strategy’s action plan also proposes a number of further measures in line with 
the recommendation. 

52 

 
 
 
 
3.15.  Ireland (IE)  

3.15.1. Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive  

Q.1.  Has  the  Commission  initiated  infringement  procedures  against  you  for  the  incorrect 
transposition of the PIF Directive? 

☒ NO 

3.15.2. Participation in the EPPO  

Q.1. Are you already participating in the EPPO? 

☒ NO 

Q.2. For the Member States not participating yet. Are there plans to join the EPPO in the short-
medium term? 

☒ NO 

3.15.3. Digitilising the fight against fraud  

Q.1. Are you using any of the following IT systems in your fight against fraud? 

☒  IMS  (do  not  select  if  IMS  is  used  only  for  reporting  irregularities  and  fraud,  as  this  is  a  legal 
obligation. Select if irregularities and fraud reported via IMS are used to perform risk analysis or other 
anti-fraud related activities) 

53 

 
 
 
 
3.16.  Italy (IT)  

3.16.1. Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive  

Q.1.  Has  the  Commission  initiated  infringement  procedures  against  you  for  the  incorrect 
transposition of the PIF Directive? 

☒ NO 

3.16.2. Participation in the EPPO  

Q.1. Are you already participating in the EPPO? 

☒ YES 

3.16.3. Digitilising the fight against fraud  

Q.1. Are you using any of the following IT systems in your fight against fraud? 

☒ ARACHNE  
☒ All EU funds and programmes (Cohesion, Rural Development, Recovery and Resilience Facility) 
☒ EDES 
☒  IMS  (do  not  select  if  IMS  is  used  only  for  reporting  irregularities  and  fraud,  as  this  is  a  legal 
obligation. Select if irregularities and fraud reported via IMS are used to perform risk analysis or other 
anti-fraud related activities) 
☒ National dedicated anti-fraud IT tools 

Contribution  by  the  General  Inspectorate  for  Financial  Relations  of  the  State  General  Accounting 
Department – MEF 

In 2022, the first trials started with the Integrated Anti-Fraud Platform PIAF, which interacts with and 
collects data from heterogeneous and certified external sources at national and European level. The 
objective  of  the  platform  is  to  consolidate  and  strengthen  the  fight  against  fraud  and  other  illegal 
activities to the detriment of the EU budget through technical and operational support for national and 
transnational investigations. 

The platform collects data from the following sources and databases: 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

Agenzia delle Entrate (Revenue Agency (Tax Register)) 

Infocamere (official Chamber of Commerce site) (Chamber of Commerce Register) 

Court of Auditors (online consultation tool - GIUDICO; Irregularities and Fraud Information 
System – SIDIF) 

Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance, General Inspectorate for Financial Relations with 
the European Union (MEF-IGRUE) (Single Database – BDU) 

European Commission (IMS; FTS) 

The PIAF-IT system has been the subject of very recent developments which have made it possible, as 
of November 2022, to enrich the reference information resources through consultation of the following 
databases: 

54 

 
 
 
- 

- 

- 

- 

National State Aid Register (RNA); 

Public Administration Database (BDAP); 

ReGiS management system for the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP); 

Bureau Van Dijk – ORBIS database. 

Q.2. Has any interoperability been developed between EU IT tools and national IT tools? 

☒ YES 

Q.3. If yes, with which tool? 

☒ ARACHNE 
☒ EDES 
☒ IMS 
☒ other (specify) 

Q.4. To what end? 

☒ Data enrichment 
☒ Fine tune/refine red flags/risk indicators/risk scoring 
☒ Other (specify) 

Using and standardising the data available to the national and EU authorities;  

Facilitating  the  exchange  of  information  between  all  national  and  European  actors  for  effective 
cooperation in the fight against fraud against the EU budget.  

Q.5. How is digitalisation influencing the fight against fraud? 

☒ Increasing prevention 
☒ Increasing detection 
☒ Reducing/simplifying administrative procedures 
☒ Other (specify) 

It ensures the traceability of information flows. 

It makes it possible to ‘reconstruct’ the ‘infringement’ process, which is useful for strengthening the 
fight against fraud and to ensure ongoing monitoring of fraud risks and trends. 

It allows an accurate risk analysis to be conducted. 

3.16.4. Strengthen fraud risk analysis  

Q.1 Have you implemented the recommendation? 

☒ YES, fully  

55 

 
 
If you implemented fully the recommendation, can you please describe how you have done it? 
Can you share any specific findings? Please make a distinction between revenue and expenditure 
areas. 

Contribution from AFCOS IT 

In Italy, there is a well-established proactive approach to the issue of protecting the EU’s financial 
interests through: 

coordination and implementation of the national anti-fraud strategy. 

Based on flexibility and dynamism, so as to adapt to the rapidly changing external environment, the 
national  strategy  relies  on  a  highly  structured  system  of  institutions,  judicial  and  administrative 
authorities, police forces, agencies, and management and control authorities  – each responsible for 
specific sectors and/or individual phases of the anti-fraud cycle  – which continually carry out joint 
analysis and hold discussions under the guidance and coordination of AFCOS, which is made up of 
members  of  all  the  national  organisations  concerned  and  is  chaired  by  the  Minister  for  European 
Affairs, the South, Cohesion Policies and the NRRP. Precisely because of these developments and in 
addition to the well-known qualities of the AFCOS, we would highlight the creation of the ‘Network of 
Anti-fraud contact points of the NRRP’, which, as part of the implementation of the National Recovery 
and Resilience Plan, is responsible for coordinating actions aimed at ensuring regular assessment of 
the  risk  of  fraud,  conflict  of  interest  and  double  funding  and  defining  effective  and  proportionate 
measures  and  actions.  In  order  to  support  these  objectives  operationally,  the  ‘General  Anti-Fraud 
Strategy  for  the  implementation  of  the  National  Recovery  and  Resilience  Plan’  was  published  in 
October  2022,  describing  the  basic  principles  and  general  measures  of  the  anti-fraud  strategy 
necessary to ensure – in accordance with Article 22 of Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of 12 February 2021 
–  the  correct  use  of  Next  Generation  EU  funds  allocated  to  the  NRRP.  The  document  provides 
information on the anti-fraud ‘system’ put in place at national level to prevent, detect and correct cases 
of corruption, fraud and conflict of interest when using funding provided under the NRRP. 

Analysis and assessment of fraud risks 

The analysis and assessment of fraud risks and therefore the availability of computer databases and 
applications  that  can,  by  cross-checking  and  processing  information,  news  and  various  elements, 
support  the  investigation  of  illegal  practices  and  the  selection  of  objectives  are  at  the  core  of  the 
national anti-fraud strategy. 

In  that  respect,  the  project  setting  up  the  Integrated  Anti-Fraud  Platform  (PIAF  IT),  which  was 
launched in institutional collaboration with the Inspectorate General for Information Technology and 
Technological  Innovation  (IGIT)  and  the  Inspectorate  General  for  Financial  Relations  with  the 
European Union (IGRUE) of the General Accounting Department of the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Finance has been further developed. 

This  IT  tool  fully  complies  with  specific  European  legislative  provisions  and  several  sectoral 
recommendations of the European Commission, which stress the need to “design and focus audit and 
control activities on the basis of risk analysis and the development of IT tools” able to utilise the large 
amount of data available to the local authorities. 

The  aim  of  the  platform  is  to  enable  data  from  various  different  national  and  European  sources 
(including the Irregularity Management System (IMS) and the Financial Transformation System (FTS)) 
to  be  collected  in  a  structured,  digitalised  and  secure  manner  and  organised  in  an  integrated  and 
harmonised way so as to enable all national administrations managing EU funds to have an immediate 
context for potential fraud strategies and the associated subjective and objective profiles, as well as to 
step up the exchange of information. 

56 

 
 
The platform is also intended to support the Commission’s ARACHNE system for monitoring the NRRP. 

For the sake of completeness, we would point out that all the national administrations dealing with the 
prevention and suppression of fraud, on both the revenue and expenditure side, have ad hoc databases 
and  applications  to  carry  out  analyses  and  assessments  of  fraud  risks  for  their  respective  areas  of 
competence, thus ensuring interoperability. 

Contribution of the Agency for Territorial Cohesion 

The Agency for Territorial Cohesion (ATC) regularly monitors ARACHNE to support the sampling of 
operations for on-the-spot checks and to disseminate information on audit findings, in order to focus 
the intermediate bodies’ own checks on any observations/irregularities found and recommendations 
made. 

The ATC has distributed version 1.0 of the ‘National Guidelines for the use of the EU's  ARACHNE 
Anti-Fraud  System’,  published  by  the  Ministry  of  Economic  Affairs  and  Finance,  to  the  Managing 
Authorities and all the other bodies involved in various ways in the management and control process 
for  the  national  and  regional  operational  programmes  in  the  context  of  the  ERDF  (certifying 
authorities, intermediate bodies and audit authorities). 

With regard to the Agency for Territorial Cohesion’s programmes, consideration was given to using 
the ARACHNE system and the new ex ante functionality, as suggested by the European Commission 
regarding the use of this IT system also as a tool for managing conflicts of interest during the selection 
of beneficiaries and, therefore, before funding is granted.  

As part of the activities of the Joint Committee for the State – Regions and Autonomous Provinces, the 
Agency, as the national reference authority, contributed to the fraud risk assessment exercise of the 
ETC (European Territorial Cooperation) programmes for which it is responsible.  

Contribution from the Ministry of Justice 

Article  9  of  Law  No  127  of  4  August  2022  (European  Delegation  Law  2021),  to  bring  national 
legislation  into  line  with  the  Regulation  on  the  European  Public  Prosecutor’s  Office  –  the  body 
responsible for PIF offences – delegated to the Government the task of adopting one or more legislative 
decrees  amending  the  rules  on  jurisdiction  laid  down  in  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  so  as  to 
concentrate in the district judicial offices the handling of proceedings for offences against the financial 
interests  of  the  European  Union  in  respect  of  which  the  European  Public  Prosecutor’s  Office  may 
exercise  its  competence,  irrespective of  whether  that competence is exercised, in  order to  make  the 
activities of EDPs more efficient. 

Contribution from the Ministry of Education 

The MA of the ‘National School Operational Programme’ uses, for the purpose indicated, all the tools 
available: the Risk Self-Assessment Group, a general prevention tool which, specifically, acts as a link 
on  issues  and  requirements  relating  to  corruption  prevention  and  transparency;  the  ARACHNE  IT 
system; the Quality Review procedure for assessing the conformity of controls carried out. 

57 

 
 
 
 
3.17.  Lithuania (LT) 

3.17.1. Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive  

Q.1.  Has  the  Commission  initiated  infringement  procedures  against  you  for  the  incorrect 
transposition of the PIF Directive? 

☒ NO 

3.17.2. Participation in the EPPO  

Q.1. Are you already participating in the EPPO? 

☒ YES 

3.17.3. Digitilising the fight against fraud  

Q.1. Are you using any of the following IT systems in your fight against fraud? 

☒ ARACHNE  

Q.2. Has any interoperability been developed between EU IT tools and national IT tools? 

☒ YES 

Q.3. If yes, with which tool? 

☒ ARACHNE 

Q.4. To what end? 

☒ Data enrichment 

Q.5. How is digitalisation influencing the fight against fraud? 

☒ Increasing prevention 
☒ Increasing detection 
☒ Reducing/simplifying administrative procedures 

3.17.4. Strengthen fraud risk analysis  

Q.1 Have you implemented the recommendation? 

☒ YES, fully  

If you implemented fully the recommendation, can you please describe how you have done it? 
Can you share any specific findings? Please make a distinction between revenue and expenditure 
areas. 

If you implemented fully the recommendation, can you please describe how you have done it? Can you 
share any specific findings? Please make a distinction between revenue and expenditure areas. 

- 

Competence-based cooperation ensures that the EPPO is able to exercise all of the powers 
conferred on it; 

58 

 
 
- 

- 

Comprehensive use of ‘ARACHNE’; 

By  ensuring  that  the  EU’s  financial  interests  are  protected,  fraud  risk  analysis  is  being 
improved and a methodology for evaluating criminal threats to the financial system is being 
developed. 

59 

 
 
 
 
3.18.  Luxemburg (LU)  

3.18.1. Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive  

Q.1.  Has  the  Commission  initiated  infringement  procedures  against  you  for  the  incorrect 
transposition of the PIF Directive? 

☒ NO 

3.18.2. Participation in the EPPO  

Q.1. Are you already participating in the EPPO? 

☒ YES 

3.18.3. Digitilising the fight against fraud  

Q.1. Are you using any of the following IT systems in your fight against fraud? 

☒ ARACHNE  
☒ Cohesion (all programmes) 
☒ Recovery and Resilience Facility 

Q.2. Has any interoperability been developed between EU IT tools and national IT tools? 

☒ YES 

Q.3. If yes, with which tool? 

☒ ARACHNE 

Q.4. To what end? 

☒ Data enrichment 

Q.5. How is digitalisation influencing the fight against fraud? 

☒ Increasing prevention 
☒ Increasing administrative burden 

Q.6. For any impact selected, can you provide any quantification? 

There is no quantifiable data available 

3.18.4. Strengthen fraud risk analysis  

Q.1 Have you implemented the recommendation? 

☒ YES, fully  

If you implemented fully the recommendation, can you please describe how you have done it? Can you 
share any specific findings? Please make a distinction between revenue and expenditure areas. 

60 

 
 
 
 
Luxembourg  takes  a  proactive  approach  in  the  fight  against  fraud.  Due  to  its  size  and  close 
geographical proximity of the different competent authorities, Luxembourg does permit a fast access 
and exchange of information to timely address emerging fraud risks. This includes also exchanging 
information with the Commission and other countries. To provide an example, Luxembourg customs 
informed during 2022 that it was able to uncover and seize 1.9 million cigarettes from smugglers thanks 
to information from their UK customs counterparts. A proactive approach has also been taken in the 
area of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, where an onsite meeting has been organized between the 
managing authority, AFCOS, the national audit authority and EPPO to establish a direct contact, share 
experiences and strengthen the anti-fraud cooperation. 

61 

 
 
 
 
3.19.  Latvia (LV)  

3.19.1. Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive  

Q.1.  Has  the  Commission  initiated  infringement  procedures  against  you  for  the  incorrect 
transposition of the PIF Directive? 

☒ YES 

Q.2.  For  the  Member  States  having  replied  yes.  Have  you  taken  remedial  action  to  modify 
national legislation? 

☒ YES, for all launched infringements 

Q.3.  For  the  Member  States  having  replied  yes.  By  when  do  you  expect  to  complete  the 
modification of national legislation to correctly transpose the PIF Directive? 

Latvia, in response to the EC initiated infringement procedure, indicated that during 2021 and 2022 it 
has already modified following national legislation:  

- 

- 

- 

the Criminal Law, 

the Law on Administrative Penalties for Offences in the Field of Administration, Public Order, 
and Use of the Official Language,  

the Law "On Taxes and Fees",  

thus  ensuring  that  the  violations  indicated  in  the  EC  initiated  infringement  procedure  have  been 
eliminated. Since sending the EC this information, no new objections have been received from the EC 
regarding the implementation of the PIF Directive. 

3.19.2. Participation in the EPPO  

Q.1. Are you already participating in the EPPO? 

☒ YES 

3.19.3. Digitilising the fight against fraud  

Q.1. Are you using any of the following IT systems in your fight against fraud? 

☒ ARACHNE  
☒ Cohesion (not all programmes) (ETC not using, as technical solution for data transfer purposes to 
ARACHNE is being developed) 
☒ Rural Development Development (in test mode) 
☒ EDES 
☒  IMS  (do  not  select  if  IMS  is  used  only  for  reporting  irregularities  and  fraud,  as  this  is  a  legal 
obligation. Select if irregularities and fraud reported via IMS are used to perform risk analysis or other 
anti-fraud related activities) 
☒ National dedicated anti-fraud IT tools 

Q.2. Has any interoperability been developed between EU IT tools and national IT tools? 

☒ NO 

62 

 
 
Q.3. If yes, with which tool? 

☒ other (specify) National EU Funds Management IT systems are linked with other national systems 
(e.g. Population Register of the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs; Information systems of the 
State Employment Agency for the registration of unemployed persons and registered vacancies; State 
Revenue Service’s IT systems; The Disability Information System of the State Commission of Physicians 
for Health and Work Capacity Examination; State Regional Development Agency’s IT systems; State 
Register of Addresses of the State Land Service) 

Q.4. To what end? 

☒ Data enrichment 

Q.5. How is digitalisation influencing the fight against fraud? 

☒ Increasing prevention 
☒ Increasing detection 
☒ Reducing/simplifying administrative procedures 

Q.6. For any impact selected, can you provide any quantification? 

We cannot provide any quantification. 

3.19.4. Strengthen fraud risk analysis  

Q.1 Have you implemented the recommendation? 

☒ YES, fully  
If you implemented fully the recommendation, can you please describe how you have done it? Can you 
share any specific findings? Please make a distinction between revenue and expenditure areas. 

In relation to expenditure area:  

EU Funds Managing Authorities and Intermediate Bodies carry out regular risk assessment, using all 
available data, IT tools and information, including information provided by the EC, in order to take 
timely preventive actions to reduce fraud and corruption. 

In relation to expenditure and revenue area:  

AFCOS disseminated to the AFCOS Network all the information provided by the Commission in PIF 
report  and  other  strategic  analysis  and  targeted  reports.  All  the  information  received  from  the 
Commission is constantly available in the AFCOS document platform (based on the MS SharePoint) 
and can be conveniently accessed and used by the AFCOS Network. 

AFCOS elaborated IT tool based on the Methodology on typologies of crimes that can cause damage 
to the EU's financial interests. IT tool contains up-to-date red flags and typologies of fraud (including 
VAT fraud from the revenue area) and can be used by the AFCOS Network in order to help monitor 
fraud risks and trends. 

63 

 
 
 
 
3.20.  Malta (MT)  

3.20.1. Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive  

Q.1.  Has  the  Commission  initiated  infringement  procedures  against  you  for  the  incorrect 
transposition of the PIF Directive? 

☒ YES 

Q.2.  For  the  Member  States  having  replied  yes.  Have  you  taken  remedial  action  to  modify 
national legislation? 

☒ YES, for all launched infringements 

Q.3.  For  the  Member  States  having  replied  yes.  By  when  do  you  expect  to  complete  the 
modification of national legislation to correctly transpose the PIF Directive? 

Malta’s Reply:  

The  necessary  legislative  changes  are  currently  tabled  in  Parliament.  The  legislative  process  is 
expected to be finalised shortly. 

3.20.2. Participation in the EPPO  

Q.1. Are you already participating in the EPPO? 

☒ YES 

3.20.3. Digitilising the fight against fraud  

Q.1. Are you using any of the following IT systems in your fight against fraud? 

☒ ARACHNE  
☒ Cohesion (all programmes) 
☒ Recovery and Resilience Facility 

Q.2. Has any interoperability been developed between EU IT tools and national IT tools? 

☒ YES 

Q.3. If yes, with which tool? 

☒ ARACHNE 

Q.4. To what end? 

☒ Data enrichment 
☒ Introduce new red flags/risk indicators 
☒ Fine tune/refine red flags/risk indicators/risk scoring 

Q.5. How is digitalisation influencing the fight against fraud? 

☒ Increasing prevention 
☒ Increasing detection 

64 

 
 
☒ Reducing/simplifying administrative procedures 

Q.6. For any impact selected, can you provide any quantification? 

Malta’s Reply:  

Digitalisation is considered as having a huge impact since it entails high usefulness to detect risks and 
alert stakeholders. 

3.20.4. Strengthen fraud risk analysis  

Q.1 Have you implemented the recommendation? 

☒ YES, partly  

If you implemented partially the recommendation, could you please explain why you think it was a 
partial  implementation  and  why  a  full  implementation  was  not  possible?  Please  make  a  distinction 
between revenue and expenditure areas. 

Malta’s Reply:  
In order to monitor fraud risks and trends, and address emerging risks in a timely manner, in 2022, the 
Internal  Audit  and  Investigations  Department  (IAID)  coordinated  the  drafting  and  publication  of 
Malta’s first National Risk Assessment (NRA) on Fraud and Corruption.  
The document was published in December 2022 on IAID’s website and can be accessed through the 
following link: https://iaid.gov.mt/en/Pages/Co-ordinating-committee-.aspx.  
The NRA was prudently compiled on a high level through a collaborative approach involving all the 
members  of  the  Co-ordinating  Committee,  set  up  in  terms  of  Article  23  of  the  Internal  Audit  and 
Financial Investigations Act (Cap. 461 of the Laws of Malta) in order to ‘co-ordinate the activities of, 
and to facilitate the exchange of information between, different entities charged with the protection and 
safeguarding of public funds’. The latter also include funds that Malta is required to manage under its 
international obligations. The list of the present members of the Co-ordinating Committee can be found 
on pages 9 and 10 of the NRA document. 7  

The plan is that the NRA will be reviewed and updated if the need be on a biennial basis in order to 
reflect new developments, including regulatory and institutional changes, as well as the management 
of emerging risks. 

65 

 
 
 
 
 
3.21.  Netherlands (NL)  

3.21.1. Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive  

Q.1.  Has  the  Commission  initiated  infringement  procedures  against  you  for  the  incorrect 
transposition of the PIF Directive? 

☒ NO 

3.21.2. Participation in the EPPO  

Q.1. Are you already participating in the EPPO? 

☒ YES 

3.21.3. Digitilising the fight against fraud  

Q.1. Are you using any of the following IT systems in your fight against fraud? 

☒ ARACHNE  
☒ Cohesion (not all programmes) 
☒ Recovery and Resilience Facility 
☒ National dedicated anti-fraud IT tools 

Q.2. Has any interoperability been developed between EU IT tools and national IT tools? 

☒ NO 

Q.5. How is digitalisation influencing the fight against fraud? 

☒ Increasing prevention 
☒ Increasing detection 
☒ Increasing administrative burden 

Q.6. For any impact selected, can you provide any quantification? 

Increasing prevention/ detection: 

In addition to the fact that these tools have a much larger data range and can provide insight into the 
entire population, data analysis is ideally suited to perform consistency checks on complex collections 
of related data and to identify exceptions more easily. 

Increasing administrative burden: 

We aren’t fundamentally opposed to the use of a centralised IT system at EU level (ARACHNE) if it 
contributes to safeguarding the financial interests and interests of the EU. However, we are still very 
critical of how ARACHNE works in terms of user-friendliness, data protection and privacy, and the 
currently  unclear  added  value  of  the  system  as  a  result  of  the  problems  we  experience  with  it.  In 
addition, it is found that current risk indicators identify false red flags and that ARACHNE generally 
does not meet the needs of the management authorities well and needs to undergo fundamental changes 
before it can meet expectations and needs. This results in increasing administrative burden. 

66 

 
 
3.21.4. Strengthen fraud risk analysis  

Q.1 Have you implemented the recommendation? 

☒ YES, partly  

If you implemented partially the recommendation, could you please explain why you think it was 
a  partial  implementation  and  why  a  full  implementation  was  not  possible?  Please  make  a 
distinction between revenue and expenditure areas. 

If you implemented fully the recommendation, can you please describe how you have done it? Can you 
share any specific findings? Please make a distinction between revenue and expenditure areas. 

If  you  implemented  partially  the  recommendation,  could  you  please explain  why  you think  it  was  a 
partial  implementation  and  why  a  full  implementation  was  not  possible?  Please  make  a  distinction 
between revenue and expenditure areas. 

If you did not implement the recommendation, could you please explain why? 

Fraud risks and the lawful use of funds (including EU funds) are important areas of focus within the 
Netherlands. In 2021 the Dutch internal audit paid extra attention to the mitigation of fraud risks and 
have separately included the opinion of fraud risks in the audit report accompanying the justification 
of the annual reports of the ministries. Overall, they concluded that the fraud risk management of the 
ministries is adequate.  

Despite this finding of the internal audit service, a further professionalization of the fraud risk analysis 
is currently taking place. Due to digitization, more data is available. It is important that as much data 
as possible is taken into account when drawing up the fraud risk analysis. Where possible, databases 
are linked to each other.  

Currently, not all revenue cycles work with specific fraud risks. However, risks are included with regard 
to the correctness, timeliness and completeness of the incoming cash flow, so that fraud risk is included. 
An office Security & Integrity is established to give the fraud risks and the associated measures a more 
prominent place within the already existing processes. At the moment this process is ongoing, that’s 
why we mentioned the implementation as partly.  

Finding expenditure 

For an assessment of risks concerning related parties, the surrounding view within ARACHNE provides 
insight  into  the  structure  of  the  project  partners.  This  allows  risks  to  be  identified  aimed  at 
parties/suppliers who are connected to the project partner. However, these risks can also be assessed 
through organisational structures and extracts from the Chamber of Commerce.  

67 

 
 
 
 
3.22.  Poland (PL)  

3.22.1. Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive  

Q.1.  Has  the  Commission  initiated  infringement  procedures  against  you  for  the  incorrect 
transposition of the PIF Directive? 

☒ NO 

3.22.2. Participation in the EPPO  

Q.1. Are you already participating in the EPPO? 

☒ NO 

Q.2. For the Member States not participating yet. Are there plans to join the EPPO in the short-
medium term? 

☒ NO 

3.22.3. Digitilising the fight against fraud  

Q.1. Are you using any of the following IT systems in your fight against fraud? 

☒ ARACHNE  
☒ Recovery and Resilience Facility 
☒  IMS  (do  not  select  if  IMS  is  used  only  for  reporting  irregularities  and  fraud,  as  this  is  a  legal 
obligation. Select if irregularities and fraud reported via IMS are used to perform risk analysis or other 
anti-fraud related activities) 
☒ National dedicated anti-fraud IT tools 

Q.2. Has any interoperability been developed between EU IT tools and national IT tools? 

☒ NO 

Q.5. How is digitalisation influencing the fight against fraud? 

☒ Increasing prevention 
☒ Increasing detection 
☒ Reducing/simplifying administrative procedures 

Q.6. For any impact selected, can you provide any quantification? 

In the fight against fraud, prevention involves thorough checks on entities applying for EU funds and 
implementing projects cofinanced by the  EU. Sources of information on this topic have so far been 
spread across many state registers, and using them has been a significant administrative burden. In the 
process of developing applications as part of the centralisation of recorded data on cohesion policy, an 
application  similar  to  the  economic  information  database  has  been  created,  which  streamlines  and 
speeds up the analysis process and at the same time provides the documentation necessary to ensure 
an audit trail. The application has not yet been used for long enough to provide accurate and reliable 
quantitative data. 

Also in the agricultural sector, the procedures in place ensure the collection and use of data on detected 
fraud. Suspected fraud and confirmed fraud can be recorded in dedicated databases. These databases 

68 

 
 
are operated by all relevant institutions and entities carrying out delegated tasks and involved in the 
detection  of  irregularities  and  fraud.  The  databases  are  modified  periodically  as  a  result  of  new 
requirements to the extent necessary for the reporting of irregularities and the analysis of fraud. The 
data they contain make it significantly easier to carry out analyses, investigate and prevent fraud and 
identify suspected fraud. In addition to using the IMS system to send information on irregularities and 
fraud to the Commission, the information contained therein is used in the risk analysis carried out by 
the  Managing  Authority  for  the  purpose  of  monitoring  the  proper  implementation  of  the  Rural 
Development Programme. 

3.22.4. Strengthen fraud risk analysis  

Q.1 Have you implemented the recommendation? 

☒ YES, fully  

If you implemented fully the recommendation, can you please describe how you have done it? 
Can you share any specific findings? Please make a distinction between revenue and expenditure 
areas. 

Proactive  measures  to  protect  the  European  Union’s  financial  interests  have  been  taken  and 
implemented in Poland for a number of years, notwithstanding the recommendation made in the 2021 
PIF Report. On the expenditure side of the EU budget, this protection is achieved through the use of a 
variety  of  tools  and  mechanisms.  In  the  Signals  system,  the  institutions  responsible  for  the 
implementation of cohesion policy operational programmes exchange information on potentially risky 
entities and other risks that have been identified. This mechanism is a response to the need to exchange 
information on warning signs of possible fraud. On the basis of a cooperation agreement between the 
National Public Prosecutor and the minister responsible for regional development (on the provision of 
information on ongoing and completed proceedings concerning projects carried out with cofinancing 
from European funds), there is a regular exchange of data on the beneficiaries of EU funds in respect 
of which investigations have been carried out. In addition, some bodies make use of the possibility to 
consult public prosecution service representatives if they urgently need data on ongoing proceedings. 
The cooperation agreement between the minister responsible for regional development and the Agency 
for Restructuring and Modernisation of Agriculture (ARiMR) formed the basis for cooperation in the 
implementation of cross-checks to detect and eliminate double financing of cohesion policy expenditure 
and expenditure under the 2014-2020 RDP and the 2014-2020 Fisheries OP. The agreement with the 
Central Anti-Corruption Bureau allows the information gathered in the electronic system supporting 
the implementation of operational programmes in the programming period 2014-20 to be provided to 
the  organisational  units  of  the  Central  Anti-Corruption  Bureau  by  means  of  telecommunication.  In 
addition, the Partnership Agreement Coordinating Authority organises annual conferences on controls 
and irregularities in the spending of Structural and Cohesion Funds, attended by representatives of the 
relevant institutions involved in the implementation and control of EU funds. The  ARACHNE tool is 
used for the RRF. Selected representatives of OLAF and the Commission have also been granted access 
to the SL2014 main application to enable them to independently analyse the information on applicants, 
beneficiaries, expenditure cleared and checks carried out. New national IT tools dedicated to the new 
financial perspective have also been put in place: 

e-Kontrole  (e-Controls)  –  an  application  to  computerise  controls  of  projects  under  cohesion  policy 
programmes and reforms, investments and projects under the RRF; 

SKANER (Scanner) – an application containing data on economic operators from internal databases 
and public registers, including their personal and capital links and data on projects cofinanced by EU 
funds carried out by these operators, and information on beneficial owners; 

Kontrole Krzyżowe (Cross-Checks) – a tool for grouping correlated invoices, where these can be used 
for double financing of expenditure. 

69 

 
 
In  addition,  the  institutions  at  the  level  of  each  operational  programme  are  required  to  draw  up  a 
document on how to prevent and deal with corruption and fraud, including conflicts of interest within 
the programme.  

In the agricultural sector, an analysis of the risk of fraud is carried out each year in respect of the aid 
measures being operated, with the aim of identifying areas at risk of fraud, assessing effectiveness and, 
in specific cases, introducing control mechanisms to minimise the risk of fraud in the area of financial 
aid  granted  by  the  Paying  Agency  (Agency  for  Restructuring  and  Modernisation  of  Agriculture, 
ARiMR).  As  one  of  the  elements  used  to  verify  cases  at  ARiMR,  a  list  of  signs  of  fraud  has  been 
introduced in order to raise awareness among employees of ARiMR at all stages of the administrative 
and control cycle as regards anomalies (signs) that could warrant suspicions of fraud and to increase 
the effectiveness of fraud prevention and detection. The list of signs is considered to be non-exhaustive 
and is updated on the basis of the results of fraud analysis, the results of other analytical activities 
concerning  the  fraud  cases  found,  the  results  of  audits  and  controls  carried  out  at  ARiMR  and  the 
Commission’s reports and analyses. 

The procedures in place to assess whether financial assistance is correctly granted and used ensure 
that all information (including anonymous information) is verified and that all available sources are 
used in cases of suspected fraud. In addition, ARiMR cooperates with law enforcement authorities in 
the framework of its investigations, including by carrying out inspection activities at the request of the 
public  prosecution  service.  ARiMR  also  provides  all  information  and  the  required  documents  and 
cooperates with OLAF in connection with administrative investigations carried out by the Office.  

Analytical activities for the National Revenue Administration (KAS) with regard to revenue are carried 
out by the Strategic Analysis Centre at the Katowice Regional Revenue Administration Office. These 
activities  are  implemented  by  means  of  an  exchange  of  information  with  the  Commission  and  the 
Member  States  via  the  CRMS2  or  AFIS  systems,  and  with  other  Regional  Revenue  Administration 
Offices by circulation of internal information in the National Revenue Administration. When messages 
concerning RIF or AM are received, the information they contain is analysed. Where a risk is identified, 
the information is entered in the integrated risk analysis system, with a description of the case and an 
indication  of  the  specific  risk  area.  Depending  on  the  nature  of  the  information  indicated  in  the 
messages concerning RIF and AM, analytical activities are undertaken on the basis of the National 
Revenue Administration’s operational systems and data are compiled and sent as necessary to OLAF 
and  the  Regional  Revenue  Administration  Office  (with  recommendations  for  specific  actions  to  be 
taken). There are also reservations at central level (central risk profiles) in the integrated risk analysis 
system, which provides a risk analysis service for the National Revenue Administration’s operational 
systems.  Feedback  to  the  Commission  and  the  Member  States  on  actions  taken  on  the  basis  of 
information received, the reservations introduced in the IT systems, the results of checks, recoveries, 
etc. are submitted via the CRMS2 and AFIS systems. The relevant information is also forwarded to 
other authorities, e.g. the public prosecution service. 

70 

 
 
 
 
3.23.  Portugal (PT)  

3.23.1. Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive  

Q.1.  Has  the  Commission  initiated  infringement  procedures  against  you  for  the  incorrect 
transposition of the PIF Directive? 

☒ YES 

Q.3.  For  the  Member  States  having  replied  yes.  By  when  do  you  expect  to  complete  the 
modification of national legislation to correctly transpose the PIF Directive? 

The process is under way and is expected to be concluded shortly. 

3.23.2. Participation in the EPPO  

Q.1. Are you already participating in the EPPO? 

☒ YES 

3.23.3. Digitilising the fight against fraud  

Q.1. Are you using any of the following IT systems in your fight against fraud? 

☒ ARACHNE  
☒ Cohesion (not all programmes) 
☒ Recovery and Resilience Facility 
☒ EDES 
☒  IMS  (do  not  select  if  IMS  is  used  only  for  reporting  irregularities  and  fraud,  as  this  is  a  legal 
obligation. Select if irregularities and fraud reported via IMS are used to perform risk analysis or other 
anti-fraud related activities) 
☒ other (specify) (eInforma – IFA) 

Q.2. Has any interoperability been developed between EU IT tools and national IT tools? 

☒ NO 

Q.5. How is digitalisation influencing the fight against fraud? 

☒ Increasing prevention 
☒ Increasing detection 
☒ Reducing/simplifying administrative procedures 

3.23.4. Strengthen fraud risk analysis  

Q.1 Have you implemented the recommendation? 

☒ YES, fully as regards the fight against fraud and tax and customs duty evasion 
☒ YES, partly with regard to the control of European funds 

If you implemented fully the recommendation, can you please describe how you have done it? 
Can you share any specific findings? Please make a distinction between revenue and expenditure 
areas. 

71 

 
 
The Portuguese Tax and Customs Authority uses all available information  – from both internal and 
external sources – that is relevant for checking operators and activities in order to prevent, detect and 
investigate VAT fraud (among other revenue sources). As regards VAT and combating VAT fraud, the 
use  of  the  administrative  cooperation  instruments  provided  for  in  Council  Regulation  (EU)  No 
904/2010 of 7 October 2010 is particularly important. 

If you implemented partially the recommendation, could you please explain why you think it was 
a  partial  implementation  and  why  a  full  implementation  was  not  possible?  Please  make  a 
distinction between revenue and expenditure areas. 

In the area of expenditure, the national anti-fraud strategy (NAFS) was revised. It includes a 5-year 
action plan setting out concrete fraud risk analysis measures.  

72 

 
 
 
 
3.24.  Romania (RO)  

3.24.1. Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive  

Q.1.  Has  the  Commission  initiated  infringement  procedures  against  you  for  the  incorrect 
transposition of the PIF Directive? 

☒ YES  

Q.2 For the Member States having replied yes. Have you taken remedial action to modify national 
legislation? 

☒ YES, but not for all launched infringements 16 

3.24.2. Participation in the EPPO  

Q.1. Are you already participating in the EPPO? 

☒ YES 

3.24.3. Digitilising the fight against fraud  

Q.1. Are you using any of the following IT systems in your fight against fraud? 

☒ ARACHNE  
☒ Cohesion (all programmes) 
☒ Rural Development 
☒  IMS  (do  not  select  if  IMS  is  used  only  for  reporting  irregularities  and  fraud,  as  this  is  a  legal 
obligation. Select if irregularities and fraud reported via IMS are used to perform risk analysis or other 
anti-fraud related activities) 
☒ other (specify) – IACS (integrated administration and control system), a technical tool set up for the 
management and control of single payment applications submitted by farmers 
☒ National dedicated anti-fraud IT tools 

Q.2. Has any interoperability been developed between EU IT tools and national IT tools? 

☒ YES 

Q.3. If yes, with which tool? 

☒ ARACHNE 

Q.4. To what end? 

☒ Data enrichment 
☒ Fine tune/refine red flags/risk indicators/risk scoring 

Q.5. How is digitalisation influencing the fight against fraud? 

☒ Increasing prevention 
☒ Increasing detection 
☒ Decreasing detection 

16 In 2023, Romania reportedly took action to address all launched infringements.  

73 

 
 
 
                                                           
☒ Reducing/simplifying administrative procedures 

3.24.4. Strengthen fraud risk analysis  

Q.1 Have you implemented the recommendation? 

☒ YES, fully  

If you implemented fully the  recommendation, can you please describe how you have done it? 
Can you share any specific findings? Please make a distinction between revenue and expenditure 
areas. 

On the expenditure side:  

Managing authority (MA) - ‘Competitiveness’ OP: In accordance with the legal provisions laid down 
in  Article 125  of  Regulation (EU)  No 1303/2013  (relating  to  ‘Competitiveness’  OP  2014-2020)  and 
Regulation (EU) No 1060/2021 (relating to ‘Smart Growth, Digitalisation and Financial Instruments’ 
OP):  the  managing  authority  shall  be  responsible  for  managing  the  operational  programme  in 
accordance  with  the  principle  of  sound  financial  management.  As  regards  the  management  of  the 
operational programme, the managing authority shall put in place effective and proportionate anti-
fraud measures taking into account the risks identified. As a result, the Directorate-General for Smart 
Growth and Digitalisation (DGCID) carried out the fraud risk assessment for 2022. 

Irregularities  (including  fraud)  are  closely  monitored  until  the  debts  owed  by  beneficiaries  are 
recovered. In order to correctly address this issue, in particular as regards suspicions of irregularities 
and  the  way  they  are  monitored,  the MA  has implemented several  levels  of  checks,  such  as:  use  of 
internal operational procedures (‘Irregularity Management’, ‘Major Risk Assessment’ and ‘Fraud Risk 
Assessment’). They all thoroughly describe the activities that are mandatory for the sole purpose of 
successfully identifying, sanctioning and monitoring all cases of irregularities. 

In addition to the aforementioned procedures, the MA also has access to  ARACHNE. This is a risk-
scoring  tool  developed  by  the  Commission  that  aims  to  support  the  MA’s  efforts  to  effectively  and 
efficiently  identify  the  riskiest  projects,  contractors  and  beneficiaries,  as  required  to  comply  with 
Article 125(4)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013. 

MA - ‘Large infrastructure’ OP 

Within  the  DGPDD  (Directorate-General  for  the  Sustainable  Development  Programme),  the 
Operational Procedure PO.DGPDD.30 ‘Fraud Risk Assessment’, Edition I, Revision 0 was drawn up 
on the basis of the EC’s anti-fraud guidance issued in 2014. 

At the same time, a fraud risk assessment was carried out between 14-18 November 2022. As a result, 
an INFORMATION NOTE on the results and conclusions of the internal fraud risk assessment and the 
actions and measures proposed for LIOP 2014-2020 was drawn up on 4 January 2023. 

The fraud risk assessment covers four key processes that are considered to be most exposed to the fraud 
risks identified in the implementation of LIOP 2014-2020, namely: 

- 
- 
- 
- 

selecting and evaluating projects (funding applications); 
the technical and procurement aspects of implementing and auditing operations; 
certifying/checking costs and making payments; 
establishing irregularities and preventing, detecting and reporting fraud. 

The risk assessment concluded that all fraud risks that may arise within the MA for the LIOP are already 
at an acceptable level, which allows the MA to carry out its activities. The assessment team considers 
that the existing forms of control are sufficient, that no additional checks or specific anti-fraud measures 
are  required,  and  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  draw  up  a  fraud  risk  mitigation  plan.  However,  the 
assessment team recommends close monitoring of the activities carried out within the MA for the LIOP 

74 

 
 
in order to ensure that the tolerable level of fraud risk is maintained and to identify potential new fraud 
risks. 

MA - ‘Technical Assistance’ OP  

For the purpose of the fraud risk analysis, the MA TAOP team took into account the controls/checks 
carried out in accordance with the operational procedures and the collaboration protocols concluded 
with the relevant verification institutions, also taking into account the use of the ARACHNE system, and 
analysed the impact of potential risks leading to malfunctions in the TAOP 2014-2020 management and 
control system. The analysis of the assessment result thus showed that the MA TAOP management and 
control system is functioning well and that the level of confidence in the verifications carried out by the 
managing authority can be considered as high. 

DG PECU (Directorate-General for European Human Capital Programmes) 

In order to strengthen the fraud risk analysis, DG PECU has taken a proactive approach to protecting 
the EU’s financial interests by: 

- 
- 
- 

- 

using data from all available sources, 
analysing data and exchanging information, 
cooperating with law enforcement authorities (DLAF - the Anti-Fraud Department, DNA - the 
National Anti-corruption Directorate, EPPO - the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, ANI - 
the National Integrity Authority), 
and carrying out the fraud risk assessment, which was completed when the note on the results 
of the assessment of fraud risks identified by DG PECU as concerns ‘Human Capital’ OP and 
the  action  plan  to  mitigate  fraud  risks  were  approved,  in  accordance  with  the  Fraud  Risk 
Assessment Operational Procedure. 

National recovery and resilience plans  

As regards the protection of the EU’s financial interests, Romania has taken the following measures 
linked to the RRF: 

Legislative measures: (a) implementing the National Anti-Fraud Strategy, the National Anti-Corruption 
Strategy, Law No 129/2019 on preventing and fighting money-laundering and terrorist financing; (b) 
setting up the institutional and financial framework to manage European funds allocated to Romania 
under the Recovery and Resilience Facility, and establishing the legal framework to prevent, check and 
detect irregularities or double financing, and serious irregularities in obtaining and using RRF funds, 
including  the  relationship  between  institutions  managing  RRF  funds  and  authorities  in  charge  of 
detecting serious irregularities, with GEO (Government Emergency Orders) Nos 155/2020, 124/2021 
and 70/2022. 

Administrative,  organisational  and  operational  measures:  (a)  development  by  the  Ministry  of 
Investment and European Projects (MIPE) in cooperation with the Special Telecommunications Service 
(STS) of a management and control IT system meeting the requirements laid down in Article 22(2)(d) 
of  Regulation  (EU) 2021/241.  The  IT  system  is  interconnected  with  the  databases  of  national 
institutions managing the data on the actual beneficiaries; (b) operational procedures for managing 
and preventing risks of serious irregularities, and operational procedures to track and recover debts 

In order to carry out its preventive and control tasks, the Directorate-General for Fisheries (MA for 
the Operational Programme for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs (POPAM)) cooperates with the contact 
institution for the European Anti-Fraud Office – the Anti-Fraud Department (DLAF), and with other 
national relevant institutions. 

DLAF is in constant contact with the managing authorities for EU funds in order to assess the fraud 
risk, and monitors and centralises the briefing notes drawn up by the MAs on the assessment results.  

75 

 
 
 
The results have been taken into account in the development of the National Anti-Fraud Strategy. 

On the revenue side:  

AVR (the Romanian Customs Authority) 

The  reorganisation  of  the  Romanian  customs  administration  started  at  the  end  of  2021  and  was 
implemented at the beginning of April 2022: 

- 

- 

- 

- 

since April 2022, the Romanian Customs Authority has been subordinated to the Ministry of 
Finance;  there  are  seven  regional  customs  directorates  and  91 inland  and  border  customs 
offices operating under the Authority’s aegis; a total of 3 060 posts have been approved by 
government decision;  
mobility  measures  were  taken  and  staff from  mobile teams and from inland  customs  offices 
were posted to customs offices at the border with the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, as well 
as in the Black Sea ports; 
in accordance with GEO No 103 of 30 June 2022 on measures to increase the border control 
capacity of the Romanian Customs Authority, 324 posts were added to the establishment plan 
for a fixed period - until the situation leading to the massive flow of goods and people at the 
Romanian  border  with  Ukraine  and the  Republic  of Moldova  and  in  the  Black Sea  ports is 
resolved,  but  not  more than  three  years  from  the  date  of entry into  force of the  Emergency 
Order; 
in  early  2022,  the  Minister  of  Finance  approved  a  Strategy  on  the  Romanian  Customs 
Authority’s reform for 2022-2024, with the following strategic objectives: 

facilitating legitimate trade and improving services for all parties involved; 
increasing digitalisation at local customs authority level; 
increasing the EU’s external border’ security; 

o 
o 
o 
o  strengthening the capacity to prevent and fight cross-border crime and customs and 

tax fraud; 
o 
increasing efficiency, visibility, transparency and access to the business environment; 
o  strengthening the administrative capacity of the customs authority in accordance with 

European (and international) standards. 

The  Romanian  Customs  Authority  is  responsible  for  customs  control  at  Romania’s  and  the  EU’s 
external border, for customs control of import, export and transit operations, for post-clearance checks 
and for unannounced inspections to monitor and control activities linked to the production, possession, 
movement and use of excise goods. European and international standards on tariff classification, origin 
and customs value have been implemented and are applied at national level, and there are ongoing 
projects  to  develop  customs  IT  systems  under  the  EU’s  Multi-Annual  Strategic  Plan  for  Electronic 
Customs (MASP-C).  

Since 2010, the Romanian customs administration has been using the national IT application RMF-RO 
(Risk Management Framework-RO) to carry out specific risk management and risk treatment activities 
in the area of customs in order to identify, prevent and fight customs fraud when import, export or 
transit operations are performed and when legal safety and security provisions are implemented. Risk 
profiles (a predefined combination of risk indicators that have been collected, analysed and ranked) 
are  developed  at  all  levels  of  the  customs  authority  (local,  regional  and  central).  They  are  only 
implemented in the RMF-RO system at central level. 

The RMF-RO system has incorporated the criteria and standards for financial risks adopted by the 
European Commission in 2018 (in the Financial Risks Criteria and Standards Implementing Decision 
(the ‘FRC Decision’) - Commission Implementing Decision C(2018)3293), and is using risk profiles 
based on risk indicators established at EU level. 

At  the  same  time,  all the  levels  of  the  customs  authority  (local, regional  and central)  are  using the 
customs  risk  management  system  developed  by  DG TAXUD  (CRMS2  –  Customs  Risk  Management 

76 

 
 
 
System 2), and the AFIS system developed by OLAF. The information exchanged through this system 
between  Member  States’  administrations  and  with  the  relevant  Commission  departments  is  used  by 
customs officials in charge of risk analysis to develop new risk profiles and to order specific controls 
and checks (during clearance of goods or afterwards).  

The exchange of risk information with other Romanian law enforcement authorities (the National Tax 
Administration  Agency  (ANAF),  the  police,  the  border  police,  the  public  prosecutor’s  office,  the 
Environmental Guard, sanitary-veterinary and phytosanitary authorities, etc.), based on cooperation 
protocols or memoranda of understanding, takes place through mutual access to databases and the use 
of customs officers seconded to the Centre for International Police Cooperation - National Focal Point 
or to the National Passenger Information Unit within the General Border Guard Inspectorate (IGPF). 
Moreover,  at  central  level  there  is  also  a  body  dedicated  to  coordinating  and  ensuring  mutual 
administrative  assistance  on  customs  and  excise  matters.  This  body  implements  Regulation  (EC) 
No 515/1997 on mutual assistance between the administrative  authorities of the Member States and 
cooperation  between  the  latter  and  the  Commission  so  as  to  ensure  the  correct  application  of  the 
legislation on customs and agricultural matters, as amended, Council Regulation (EU) No 389/2012 of 
2 May 2012 on administrative cooperation in the field of excise duties and repealing Regulation (EC) 
No 2073/2004,  the  SELEC  Convention  and  the  Naples  II  Convention,  as  well  as  international 
agreements, conventions and treaties to which Romania is a party (in the framework of mutual customs 
assistance arrangements with non-EU countries).  

In 2022, the Romanian customs administration continued to be actively involved in implementing the 
2022-2025  EMPACT  EU  Policy  Cycle,  and  also  participated  in  the  activities  carried  out  in  the 
framework  of  the  joint  customs  operations  (JCOs)  organised  by  OLAF,  WCO,  INTERPOL,  and 
EUROPOL. 

As  regards  the  prevention  and  fight  against  illicit  trafficking  in  cigarettes  and  tobacco  products, 
operational  cooperation  with  other  Romanian  law  enforcement  authorities  (ANAF,  the  police,  the 
border police, the public prosecutor’s office) continued. The checks carried out in close cooperation 
with  these  authorities  to  fight  tobacco  products  smuggling  resulted  in  a  significant  decrease  in  the 
estimated consumption level of illicit cigarettes in Romania, which dropped from an average of 8.7% 
of the total cigarette consumption in 2021 to an average of 7.1% in 2022, a record low level for the 
past 15 years. We would point out that with every percentage point that goes to the legal market, the 
State budget receives EUR 35-40 million. In 2022, the Romanian Customs Authority’s central and local 
customs supervision and control bodies seized over 19.4 million cigarettes and 27 tons of tobacco. 

77 

 
 
 
 
3.25.  Sweden (SE)  

3.25.1. Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive  

Q.1.  Has  the  Commission  initiated  infringement  procedures  against  you  for  the  incorrect 
transposition of the PIF Directive? 

☒ YES 

Q.2.  For  the  Member  States  having  replied  yes.  Have  you  taken  remedial  action  to  modify 
national legislation? 

☒ YES, for all launched infringements 

Q.3.  For  the  Member  States  having  replied  yes.  By  when  do  you  expect  to  complete  the 
modification of national legislation to correctly transpose the PIF Directive? 

The Commission has stated in a formal notification that Sweden has failed to correctly incorporate 
articles  3.2  d  i,  3.2  d  iii  and  article  5.2  compared  with  article  3.2  a  and  3.2  b,  into  its  national 
legislation.  

Before the Government can draw up a legislative proposal, the matter must be analysed. In June 2022, 
the Swedish Government decided to appoint a commission of inquiry to, inter alia, propose measures 
regarding the first part of the formal notice from the Commission (3.2 d i and 3.2 d iii). The inquiry will 
submit its report by 31 August 2023.  

When it comes to the second part of the formal notice (5.2 compared with article 3.2 a and 3.2 b), the 
Government  has  proposed,  in  a  proposal  referred  to  the  Council  of  Legislation,  that  attempting  to 
commit subsidy abuse or gross subsidy abuse should be criminalised. The amendments are proposed to 
enter into force on 1 June 2023. 

3.25.2. Participation in the EPPO  

Q.1. Are you already participating in the EPPO? 

☒ NO 

Q.2. For the Member States not participating yet. Are there plans to join the EPPO in the short-
medium term? 

☒ YES 

Q.3. If YES, when do you expect to finalise the procedure? 

The  Government  is  currently  working  on  a  proposal  containing  the  necessary  legislation  to  enable 
Sweden to join the EPPO as soon as possible, provided endorsement from Parliament. 

3.25.3.  Digitilising the fight against fraud  

Q.1. Are you using any of the following IT systems in your fight against fraud? 

☒ National dedicated anti-fraud IT tools 

Q.2. Has any interoperability been developed between EU IT tools and national IT tools? 

☒ NO 

78 

 
 
3.25.4. Strengthen fraud risk analysis  

Q.1 Have you implemented the recommendation? 

☒ NO 

If you did not implement the recommendation, could you please explain why? 

If you implemented fully the recommendation, can you please describe how you have done it? Can you 
share any specific findings? Please make a distinction between revenue and expenditure areas.  

If  you  implemented  partially  the  recommendation,  could  you  please explain  why  you think  it  was  a 
partial  implementation  and  why  a  full  implementation  was  not  possible?  Please  make  a  distinction 
between revenue and expenditure areas.  

If you did not implement the recommendation, could you please explain why?  

Sweden  works  proactively  to  protect  the  EU's  financial  interests,  for  example  by  closely  following 
recommendations  and  reports  produced  by  OLAF,  the  Court  of  Auditors  and  the  Commission,  etc. 
institutions and best practices in the other Member States.  

Currently, there is no national common database for Swedish authorities handling EU funds. In this 
context, it must also be held that the Swedish judiciary's databases are not open databases and that 
there is legislation that prevents such data from being used outside the judicial system.  

The Swedish government decided in December 2021 to appoint an inquiry regarding the effective and 
efficient management of EU funds in Sweden. The assignment not only concerns the management of EU 
funds,  but  the  inquiry  will  also  make  proposals  for  an  organizational  structure  and  division  of 
responsibilities that will enable a more effective, efficient and legally secure management of EU funds, 
which at the same time lives up to the requirements set by the EU. The study, called "An effective and 
efficient management of EU funds Dir 2021:109", will submit a final report in December 2023. 

79 

 
 
 
 
3.26.  Slovenia (SI)  

3.26.1. Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive  

Q.1.  Has  the  Commission  initiated  infringement  procedures  against  you  for  the  incorrect 
transposition of the PIF Directive? 

☒ YES 

Q.2.  For  the  Member  States  having  replied  yes.  Have  you  taken  remedial  action  to  modify 
national legislation? 

☒ YES, but not  for all launched infringements 

Q.3.  For  the  Member  States  having  replied  yes.  By  when  do  you  expect  to  complete  the 
modification of national legislation to correctly transpose the PIF Directive? 

The  Act  amending  the  Penal  Code  is  expected  to  be  published  in  the  official  gazette  (Uradni  List 
Republike Slovenije) in February 2023. Regarding the second and third comments: the Government of 
Slovenia explained in its reply to the letter of formal notice that it believes the regulation in Slovenia 
are fit for purpose and no further changes are necessary.  

3.26.2. Participation in the EPPO  

Q.1. Are you already participating in the EPPO? 

☒ YES 

3.26.3. Digitilising the fight against fraud  

Q.1. Are you using any of the following IT systems in your fight against fraud? 

☒ ARACHNE (Office for Cohesion Policy, Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Agricultural Markets 
and Rural Development (ARSKTRP)) 
☒ Cohesion (all programmes) 
☒ Rural Development 
☒  IMS  (do  not  select  if  IMS  is  used  only  for  reporting  irregularities  and  fraud,  as  this  is  a  legal 
obligation. Select if irregularities and fraud reported via IMS are used to perform risk analysis or other 
anti-fraud related activities) 
☒  other  (specify)GVIN,  e-Bonitete,  AJPES  (Agency  of  the  Republic  of  Slovenia  for  Public  Legal 
Records and Related Services), MFERAC (Office for Cohesion Policy), ERAR, 

Q.2. Has any interoperability been developed between EU IT tools and national IT tools? 

☒ YES 
Q.3. If yes, with which tool? 

☒ ARACHNE 

Q.4. To what end? 

☒ Data enrichment 
☐ Streamline and automatise the reporting of irregularities 

80 

 
 
 
☒ Introduce new red flags/risk indicators 
☐ Fine tune/refine red flags/risk indicators/risk scoring 
☐ Other (specify) 

Q.5. How is digitalisation influencing the fight against fraud? 

☒ Increasing prevention 
☒ Decreasing prevention 
☒ Increasing detection 
☒ Decreasing detection 
☒ Other (specify) 

Reply from URSOO: 

Improving risk management through data mining 
Improving the performance of the early detection and exclusion system 
Improving the effectiveness and quality of checks and audits 

 
 
 
  Strengthening risk analysis for fraud 

Q.6. For any impact selected, can you provide any quantification? 

3.26.4. Strengthen fraud risk analysis  

Q.1 Have you implemented the recommendation? 

☒  YES,  fully  (reply  from  FURS  (Financial  Administration  of  the  Republic  of  Slovenia)  and  the 
Government  Office  for  Development  and  European  Cohesion  Policy  (SVRK)  -  Office  for  Cohesion 
Policy,  
 Reply from URSOO)  

If you implemented fully the recommendation, can you please describe how you have done it? 
Can you share any specific findings? Please make a distinction between revenue and expenditure 
areas. 

Reply from FURS: 

The Financial Administration of Slovenia (FURS) has assumed a proactive role in protecting the EU’s 
financial interests by analysing and exchanging data and information for the purpose of managing risks 
associated  with  customs  and  VAT.  Details  on  how  FURS  protects  the  EU’s  financial  interests  are 
provided below. 

The exchange of vital data and information happens at EU level. This data includes data on risks arising 
from the systems, such as CRMS, AFIS, RAPEX, RASFF, TRACES NT, EUROFISC and TNA. FURS 
analyses these data and uses them to create risk profiles, which apply to checks preceding release into 
free circulation, ex-post checks and inspections. Risk-related information is, where required, forwarded 
to the other competent authorities (national or EU) for further processing. 

We  would  single  out  data  obtained  from  the  Anti  Fraud  Information  System  (AFIS),  which  is  most 
commonly used as a gateway to the following databases and tools: 

AMT (Automated Monitoring Tool) or Theseus (Joint Research Centre – JRC). The database in these 
applications contains cleaned average prices (CAPs) and is incorporated in FURS’ databases on a 
monthly basis. By comparing CAPs and the actual import data, the IT system calculates and identifies 

81 

 
 
suspicion of undervalued goods. Where a suspicion is established, this triggers risk profiles for release 
into circulation, which is followed up by a verification of the customs value of the goods. 

Container  Status  Messages  (CSMs),  the  JRC’s  ConTraffic  database  and  Sea  Searcher  facilitate 
container and ship tracking to combat fraud related to the provenance of goods or the avoidance of 
payment  of  anti-dumping  and  countervailing  duties.  FURS  obtains  data  from  these  applications  by 
running manual queries. 

Dun & Bradstreet – Global Reference Solution (previously Orbis) makes it possible to check whether 
a company referred to in customs papers or procedures actually exists. FURS obtains data from these 
applications by running manual queries. 

Given  the  international  dimension  of  fraud,  information  obtained  by  FURS  from  the  other  Member 
States through international exchange mechanisms and OLAF plays a vital role in protecting the EU’s 
financial interests. 

Regulation  (EC)  No 515/97  of  13 March  1997  provides  for  mutual  assistance  between  the 
administrative authorities of the Member States and cooperation between the latter and the Commission 
to  ensure  the  correct  application  of  the  law  on  customs  and  agricultural  matters  FURS  processes 
OLAF’s mutual assistance messages and mission reports on an ongoing basis and uses them to create 
systemic  measures  involving  the  creation  of  risk  profiles  for  checks  preceding  release  into  free 
circulation, and carry out ex-post checks and inspections. The findings are submitted to OLAF.  

Where  there  is  suspicion,  with  regard  to  imports  from  third  countries,  that  supplier  documents  are 
forged or unauthentic, FURS sends international letters of request to third-country customs authorities 
in  accordance  with  bilateral  or  multilateral  agreements  and  protocols  (Slovenia  vis-à-vis  a  third 
country or EU vis-à-vis a third country). 

In addition, available tax data exchanged in accordance with Council Regulation (EU) No 904/2010 of 
7 October 2010 on administrative cooperation and combating fraud in the field of value added tax are 
used for the purpose of protecting the EU’s financial interests. The main source of data is Eurofisc’s 
tool TNA. Data on individual liable entities associated with risk (Eurofisc qualification) are transferred 
into FURS’ databases and used primarily to generate risk profiles for checks preceding release into 
free circulation but also for identifying subjects of future ex-post checks and inspections. The data from 
Eurofisc are particularly important for monitoring the conduct of customs procedures Nos 46 and 63. 
A  new  form  of  Eurofisc  data  exchange called  Follow-Up  Action  is  used to  identify  (more  complex) 
misuse of customs procedures more quickly.   

FURS reports all instances of suspected crime to the police and/or the competent prosecutor’s office. 
FURS closely cooperates with law enforcement authorities; in complex cases involving an international 
component  all  the  authorities  cooperate  and  exchange  information  with  one  another  since  the  very 
beginning in the form of specialised investigation teams. Where a crime harms the financial interests 
of  the  EU,  FURS  cooperates  with  the  EPPO  by  reporting  crime  or  submitting  data  required  for 
prosecution in another Member State.  

We should like to point out that we cooperate with the Office for the Prevention of Money Laundering 
and Terrorist Financing, exchanging information on suspicious transactions, which is a major input 
for risk analysis 

Reply from the Office for Cohesion Policy: Fully implemented since, in addition to ARACHNE, we also 
use  national  databases  (GVIN,  e-Bonitete,  AJPES,  MFERAC),  which  are  authorised  for  collecting, 
processing and keeping public annual and other end-of-year reports. We use our data tools to examine 
general, accounting and other financial data on a selected entity. This guarantees the protection of the 
financial interests of the EU and Slovenia. 

82 

 
 
Reply from URSOO:  

adoption of the Strategy of the coordination body of the Recovery and Resilience Facility for fighting 
fraud and regular updates to the action plan;  

cooperation with law enforcement authorities (police, EPPO);  

training courses on integrity and combating fraud;  

organising training on the protection of the EU’s financial interests; 

informing the competent authorities on training and education activities to do with the protection of the 
EU’s financial interests. 

83 

 
 
 
 
3.27.  Slovakia (SK)  

3.27.1. Correct Transposition of the PIF Directive  

Q.1.  Has  the  Commission  initiated  infringement  procedures  against  you  for  the  incorrect 
transposition of the PIF Directive? 

☒ YES 

Q.2.  For  the  Member  States  having  replied  yes.  Have  you  taken  remedial  action  to  modify 
national legislation? 

☒ YES, for all launched infringements 

Q.3.  For  the  Member  States  having  replied  yes.  By  when  do  you  expect  to  complete  the 
modification of national legislation to correctly transpose the PIF Directive? 

The  legislative  changes  regarding  the  modification  of  the  national  legislation  are  in  the  legislative 
procedure. The modification shall enter into force by 1/1/2022. 

3.27.2. Participation in the EPPO  

Q.1. Are you already participating in the EPPO? 

☒ YES 

3.27.3. Digitilising the fight against fraud  

Q.1. Are you using any of the following IT systems in your fight against fraud? 

☒ ARACHNE  
☒ All EU funds and programmes (Cohesion, Rural Development, Recovery and Resilience Facility) 
☒ Cohesion (all programmes) 
☐ Cohesion (not all programmes) 
☒ Rural Development 
☒ Recovery and Resilience Facility 
☒ EDES 
☒  IMS  (do  not  select  if  IMS  is  used  only  for  reporting  irregularities  and  fraud,  as  this  is  a  legal 
obligation. Select if irregularities and fraud reported via IMS are used to perform risk analysis or other 
anti-fraud related activities) 
☒ other (specify)  

1.  online database Index Podnikatela (www. https://www.indexpodnikatela.sk/) that is actually a 
tool to link 26 different databases to crosscheck connections between procurement officials and 
bidders.  

2.  online database Foaf (https://foaf.sk/) that is actually a tool to provide visualization of company 

connections.  

3.  Anti-bureaucratic Portal OverSi (Portál OverSi (gov.sk))  
4.  Register of legal entities, entrepreneurs and public authorities: https://rpo.statistics.sk  
5.  Portal for registration and monitoring of state aid: https://semp.kti2dc.sk/  
6.  Insolvency Register: https://ru.justice.sk/ru-verejnost-web/  
7.  Central register of executions : www.cre.sk  
8.  List of legally convicted legal entit  

☒ National dedicated anti-fraud IT tools 

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Q.2. Has any interoperability been developed between EU IT tools and national IT tools? 

☒ YES 

Q.3. If yes, with which tool? 

☒ ARACHNE 
☒ IMS 
Note:  
ARACHNE: The transfer of data from relevant national systems to ARACHNE is not automated on a 
software level, but has been implemented as a manual and regular process.  
IMS:  there  is  a  partial  interoperability  between  IMS  and  national  IT  Monitoring  System  for  ESIF 
(ITMS2014+), but full interoperability has not been reached yet. 

Q.4. To what end? 

☒ Data enrichment 
☒ Streamline and automatise the reporting of irregularities 
☒ Fine tune/refine red flags/risk indicators/risk scoring 

Q.5. How is digitalisation influencing the fight against fraud? 

☒ Increasing prevention 
☒ Increasing detection 
☒ Reducing/simplifying administrative procedures 
Q.6. For any impact selected, can you provide any quantification? 

We do not have any data to quantify the impact of the use of selected IT tools in the fight against fraud. 

3.27.4. Strengthen fraud risk analysis  

Q.1 Have you implemented the recommendation? 

☒ YES, fully  

If you implemented fully the recommendation, can you please describe how you have done it? 
Can you share any specific findings? Please make a distinction between revenue and expenditure 
areas. 

The Office of the Government of the Slovak Republic is via its Section of Control, National Office for 
OLAF (department), responsible for ensuring and coordinating the protection of the EU´s financial 
interests  in  the  Slovak  Republic.  If  the  National  Office  for  OLAF  receives  materials,  analyses  and 
reports  from  the  Commission  (OLAF)  containing  useful  information  in  the  anti-fraud  area,  these 
documents are distributed to the AFCOS network partners in order to be considered in their fraud risk 
analysis, if relevant. The National Office for OLAF also elaborates its own materials and analyses (e.g. 
Annual Report on Irregularities), which are distributed to the relevant national authorities within the 
AFCOS network.  

In addition, the exchange of information on emerging risks and fraud trends also takes place during 
training activities in the area of the protection of the EU´s financial interests organised by the National 
Office for  OLAF,  which are  attended also  by  the  representatives of  the  law  enforcement  bodies  (as 
lectures and also as participants) and cover both expenditure and revenue side of the EU budget.  

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In order to prevent, detect and investigate fraud and other irregularities, national authorities also use 
wide range of available EU and national databases, exchange relevant information and provide mutual 
assistance.  

With respect to this questionnaire, the Office of the Government of the Slovak Republic also contacted 
AFCOS network partners (national authorities, including managing authorities, certifying authority, 
control  bodies  etc.)  in  order  to  gather  relevant  information.  Below  please  find  detailed  replies  as 
provided by some of them:  

Expenditure area:  

The Ministry of Health of the Slovak Republic, as an intermediary body, fully accepted and implemented 
the  European  Commission's  recommendation  to  deal  with  the  risks  of  fraud  based  on  the  2014 
guideline, as well as the guideline that was a response to the situation and addresses anti-corruption 
measures in the context of CRII/CRII+ and the REACT-EU program. The Ministry has drawn up tables 
based on fraud risks identified by the EC (also in connection with the pandemic situation), proposed 
measures,  action  plans  and  makes  an  annual  evaluation  of  fulfilled  measures.  According  to  the 
obligation  arising  from  the  Statute  and  Rules  of  procedure  of  the  Working  group  for  IROP  risk 
management, the governing body is informed about the activities and outputs of the working group.  

The Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic, acting as Certifying Authority (CA) has developed a 
risk  management  system  resulting  from  CA  activities  and  its  management  and  control  systems, 
including the processes of identification, analysis and assessment of risks, their solutions and measures 
taken  to  eliminate  them,  including  permanent  monitoring  and  evaluation.  This  system  is  subject  to 
regular analysis and updating as of 30.11. of the respective year. The risk analysis system also includes 
identified  risks  of  possible  corruption  and  fraud  and  "sensitive  positions",  including  measures  to 
prevent the occurrence of corruption and fraud at CA.  

The  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Rural  Development  of  the  Slovak  Republic  informed,  that  the 
Agricultural  Paying  Agency  has  adopted  internal  guidelines  for  the  prevention  of  fraud  and 
irregularities, which specify obligations and processes in relation to fraud and communication with the 
relevant authorities.  

The Ministry of Investments, Regional Development and Informatization of the Slovak Republic stated 
that the employees of the Managing Authority for Integrated Regional Operational Programme (IROP), 
as well as the intermediate bodies (IB), responsible for the administrative verification of the requests 
for  a  non-refundable  financial  contribution,  control  and  implementation  of  projects,  work  with  the 
ARACHNE and EDES information systems and use other available national registers and databases in 
order to protect the financial interests of the EU and prevent fraud. Follow-up processes related to 
identification of possible fraud, which may lead to the identification of irregularities, or to the sending 
of an initiative to other entities involved in the protection of financial interests (National Office for 
OLAF, law enforcement authorities, EPPO) are ensured in cooperation with the control department of 
IROP section, which covers further communication and exchange of information. Also, in conditions of 
the Managing Authority for IROP, the Working Group for Risk Management meets every year, which, 
among other things, deals with monitoring the risks of fraud and their occurrence within the program. 
All procedures are incorporated in the internal management documentation. 8 IB for Priority Axis (PA) 
7  of  the  Operation  Programme  Integrated  Infrastructure  (OPII)  in  accordance  with  the  European 
structural and investment funds Management System for detecting fraud risks uses a fraud risk self-
assessment tool in cooperation with Managing Authority, i.e. matrix - catalog of risks. The stated IB 
PA7  OPII  fraud  risk  analysis  is  carried  out  once  a  year  and  is  carried  out  in accordance  with  the 
guideline EGESIF_14-0021-00 16/06/2014", issued by the European Commission.  

The Managing Authority for the cross border Cooperation Interreg SK-CZ and Interreg SK-AT has 
established a Risk Management Working Group which reviews on a regular annual basis the risks and 
the effectiveness of measures to eliminate them, including supporting tools for verifying the economy 

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and eligibility of expenditures. The appropriateness and effectiveness of existing control mechanisms 
are assessed, additional risk elimination measures are proposed where necessary, and new potential 
risks  are  identified  where  appropriate.  At  the  same  time,  we  have  published  Anti-Fraud  Policies, 
established contact addresses for reporting suspected fraud, use available IT tools, provide assistance 
to law enforcement authorities and other authorized entities, etc.  

The Programme Slovakia 2021 – 2027: The programming of the Slovakia Programme was completed 
at the end of 2022. The implementation of the program did not start in 2022.  

The  Ministry  of  Environment  of  the  Slovak  Republic,  acting  as  the  managing  authority  for  the 
Operational Programme Quality of Environment 2014 – 2020 (OP QE) stated, that as part of the risk 
management  of  the  OP  QE,  recommendations  are  implemented  on  an  ongoing  basis  by  analysing 
individual fraud risks in relation to available resources/data in order to identify and address potential 
risks in a timely manner.  

The  Supreme  Audit  Office  of  the  Slovak  Republic  (SAO  SR)  has  not  yet  been  granted  access  to 
ARACHNE,  but  has  requested  authorization  for  its  access  by  the  Ministry  of  Investments,  Regional 
Development and Informatization of the Slovak Republic. Nevertheless, based on legislation and its 
own monitoring, SAO SR collects necessary information, data and documents for the purposes of risk 
analysis. Based on the set up strategic focus of its audits, SAO SR is moving forward with its so-called 
floating planning system, beginning from 2023. Thanks to it, it will be able to include action plans for 
audits in a more flexible, risk analysis based as well as in a time appropriate manner. The audit plan 
will be adjusted and expanded during the year based on significance, the results of risk analyses and 
suggestions from the office's memorandum partners or the public. The new Development Strategy for 
the years 2023-2025 describes key risks from a financial and property point of view, but also in relation 
to the obligations of the Slovak Republic towards international organizations, such as the EU or the 
UN. SAO SR closely cooperates with institutions involved in criminal proceedings (police, prosecution), 
both when it detects or suspects a crime committed, via notification of detected deficiencies and also 
carries out audits based on suggestions by the institutions.  

Public Procurement Office (PPO) informed, that officials of the Supervision Department carrying out 
review procedures, and staff of the Public 9  

Procurement  Department  work  with  public  sources  in  the  course  of  their  work  for  verification  and 
prevention in the detection of conflict of interest in public procurement. PPO has introduced in the 
internal  directive  on  public  procurement  the  obligation  of  the  staff  of  the  Public  Procurement 
Department  that  the  verifier  in  charge  of  public  procurement  is  obliged  to  use  external  sources  of 
information  in  the  review  of  possible  conflict  of  interest,  including  publicly  accessible  electronic 
databases of natural and legal persons (e. g. www.foaf.sk) and other publicly available information. 
The  Supervision  Department  implements  national  project  funded  by  the  Operational  Programme 
Effective Public Administration “Increasing efficiency in public procurement in Slovakia”, which is 
aimed at unifying decision-making practice and detecting potential conflicts of interest. The Supervision 
Department  on  the  basis  of  project  implementation  developed  the  Methodology  of  the  Supervision 
Department, which is backed by a team of six staff members and aims to answer questions from control 
officials seeking connections between procurement officials and bidders to spot red flags for conflict of 
interest. Internal methodologist of Supervision Department use access to an online licensing database 
(Index  Podnikatela),  which  provides information,  analyses  and reports  on  legal and  natural  person 
entrepreneurs  by  linking  26  different  public  databases.  In  addition  to  this  licence,  the  internal 
methodologist  of  the  Supervision  Department  also  use  publicly  available  resources  such  as  the 
following to detect potential conflict of interest, the register of end users of benefits, results of municipal 
and higher territorial unit elections, which also include elected deputies in local government bodies, 
the register of authorised civil engineers, information published in the media about potential links, the 
register of non-governmental non-profit organisations maintained by the Ministry of the Interior of the 
Slovak Republic, the database created by the third sector on major cases in order to navigate through 
the media and publicly available information (www.kauzy.sk).  

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The  Government  Office  of  the  Slovak  Republic,  acting  as  the  National  Implementation  and 
Coordination Authority for the Slovak Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP) informed that line ministries 
implementing the RRP have been instructed in order to strengthen the ability to ensure the identification 
of  possible  fraud,  conflict  of  interests  and  corruption  when  performing  checks  to  use  all  available 
verification options and data and information (e.g. publicly available registers, data in the information 
and monitoring system, ARACHNE information system, social network www.foaf.sk, etc.).  

Revenue area:  

The  responsible  departments  of  the  Financial  Directorate  of  the  Slovak  Republic  actively  analyse 
various available data sources (external/internal) also on their own initiative on the basis of the imports 
development.  They  identify  trends  of  circumvention  of  customs  regulations.  Subsequently  there  is 
communication and exchange of relevant information / findings of the respective department within 
other departments of the Financial Directorate of the Slovak Republic itself, as well as communication 
of  the  Financial  Directorate  of  the  Slovak  Republic  with  the  Criminal  Office  of  the  Financial 
Administration  but  also  with  the  European  Commission,  depending  on the  10 specific  cases.  Vice  - 
versa, the European Commission, through its anti-fraud office OLAF, communicates with the respective 
departments in charge of the Financial Administration of the Slovak Republic, in particular with the 
Criminal  Office  of  the  Financial  Administration  or  with  the  Financial  Directorate  of  the  Slovak 
Republic regarding detected fraud in order to identify and address in a timely manner emerging risks 
and trends in customs fraud and to translate them into the prevention of the occurrence of such fraud 
in a preventive manner. The issue of risk analysis was also discussed by the Financial Directorate of 
the  SR  with  representatives  of  the  European  Commission  on  7  October  2022  in  Bratislava.  In 
connection with the detection and investigation of customs fraud, the Financial Administration of the 
SR  and  the  Criminal  Office  of  the  Financial  Administration  cooperate  with  the  European  Public 
Prosecutor's Office as well.  

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