COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2023 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2023 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union
Date: 2023-07-05
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Poland, administrative transparency, corruption, democracy, independence of the judiciary, infringement of EU law, pluralism in the media, political rights, rule of law

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 5.7.2023  SWD(2023) 821 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2023 Rule of Law Report        Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2023 Rule of Law Report                           The rule of law situation in the European Union {COM(2023) 800 final} - {SWD(2023) 801 final} - {SWD(2023) 802 final} - {SWD(2023) 803 final} - {SWD(2023) 804 final} - {SWD(2023) 805 final} - {SWD(2023) 806 final} - {SWD(2023) 807 final} - {SWD(2023) 808 final} - {SWD(2023) 809 final} - {SWD(2023) 810 final} - {SWD(2023) 811 final} - {SWD(2023) 812 final} - {SWD(2023) 813 final} - {SWD(2023) 814 final} - {SWD(2023) 815 final} - {SWD(2023) 816 final} - {SWD(2023) 817 final} - {SWD(2023) 818 final} - {SWD(2023) 819 final} - {SWD(2023) 820 final} - {SWD(2023) 822 final} - {SWD(2023) 823 final} - {SWD(2023) 824 final} - {SWD(2023) 825 final} - {SWD(2023) 826 final} - {SWD(2023) 827 final}  
 
 
ABSTRACT 

Serious concerns persist related to the independence of the Polish judiciary.  Poland adopted 
legislation to raise the standard of certain aspects of judicial independence and engaged in a 
further reform of the disciplinary regime for judges. The Court of Justice and the European 
Court  of  Human  Rights  delivered  rulings  further  confirming  existing  concerns.  Serious 
concerns related to the independence of the National Council for the Judiciary remain to be 
addressed. There are also serious doubts as to the compliance of a number of Supreme Court 
judges with the requirement of a tribunal established by law. A number of judges continue to 
be subject to disciplinary investigations and proceedings and forced transfers. The Commission 
referred Poland to the Court of Justice for violations of EU law by the Constitutional Tribunal 
and  its  case  law.  Some  steps  have  been  taken  to  ensure  functional  independence  of  the 
prosecution service from the Government, while the functions of the Minister of Justice and 
the Prosecutor General are still not separate. The digitalisation of justice is progressing well.  

The 2018-2020 anti-corruption programme ended and there is currently no new programme in 
place. No further steps were taken  to  strengthen lobbying rules and to  standardise the asset 
declaration control system. There have also been no initiatives with a view to enabling a robust 
track record to address high-level corruption, as previously identified institutional and practical 
barriers in law persist. Risks also remain concerning the effective enforcement against high-
level corruption in practice, including the threat of selective application of the law and impunity 
caused  by  the  disparity  in  the  treatment  of  corruption  cases  for  political  purposes.  New 
impunity provisions were adopted, creating exemptions from criminal responsibility for public 
officials,  as  in  previous  years,  which  increase  the  risk  of  corruption.  New  measures  have 
entered into force increasing the transparency of political party finances, yet concerns remain 
regarding party donations and election campaigns.  

A set of constitutional safeguards and legislative measures provide a legal framework for the 
exercise of freedom of expression, including the protection of editorial independence. While 
legislative safeguards for the media regulator - the National Broadcasting Council - exist, some 
concerns  persist  with  regard  to  its  independence.  No  steps  have  been  taken  to  enhance  the 
independent governance and editorial independence of public service media, amid concerns as 
regards  independent  reporting  by  public  broadcasters.  No  measures  were  adopted  so  far  to 
ensure fair procedures in the granting of operating licences to media outlets. The level of media 
ownership transparency increased. Journalists continued to face difficulties in their activities 
and  may  face  challenges  with  regards  to  access  to  public  information.  The  journalistic 
community is also affected by a lack of a robust self-regulatory mechanism. 

A  law  empowering  an  administrative  committee  to  deprive  individuals  of  the  right  to  hold 
public office related to the handling of public funds for up to 10 years, raises serious concerns 
and  triggered  amendments.  The  framework  in  which  the  Ombudsperson  operates  was 
improved. No steps have been taken to ensure a more systematic follow-up to the findings of 
the Supreme Audit Office and to ensure a swift appointment of the College Members of that 
Office,  thus  putting  its  effective  functioning  at  risk.  The  practice  of  adopting  laws  through 
procedures not requiring adequate consultations persists. Stakeholders have raised concerns as 
regards  the  introduction  of  a  range  of  disproportionate  sanctions  to  the  Criminal  Code.  No 
measures have been taken to improve the framework for the civic space, while civil society 
remains vibrant. 

1 

 
 
 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 

Overall, concerning the recommendations in the 2022 Rule of Law Report, Poland has made:  

  No progress on separating the function of the Minister of Justice from that of the Prosecutor-
General  and  some  progress  on  ensuring  functional  independence  of  the  prosecution  service 
from the Government. 

  No progress on strengthening the existing integrity rules by introducing lobbying rules and a 
standardised  online  system  for  asset  declarations  of  public  officials  and  Members  of 
Parliament. 

  No progress on ensuring independent and effective investigations and prosecutions, address the 
broad scope of immunities for top executives and abstain from introducing impunity clauses in 
legislation in order to enable a robust track record of high-level corruption cases. 

  No progress on ensuring that fair, transparent and non-discriminatory procedures are adhered 

to for the granting of operating licences to media outlets. 

  No progress on strengthening the rules and mechanisms to enhance the independent governance 
and editorial independence of public service media taking into account European standards on 
public service media. 

  No progress on ensuring a more systematic follow-up to findings by the Supreme Audit Office 

and ensure a swift appointment of the College Members of the Supreme Audit Office. 

  Some progress on improving the framework in which the Ombudsperson operates, taking into 
account  European  standards  on  Ombudsinstitutions,  and  no  progress  on  improving  the 
framework  in  which  civil  society  operates,  taking  into  account  European  standards  on  civil 
society. 

On this basis, and considering other developments that took place in the period of reference, and in 
addition  to  recalling  the  need  to  address  the  remaining  serious  concerns  relating  to  judicial 
independence,  in  particular  those  set  out  in  the  Article  7  TEU  procedure  initiated  by  the 
Commission, as well as the obligation to comply with the rule of law related rulings of the ECJ and 
the rule of law related infringement procedures referred to in the country chapter, the commitments 
made under the National Recovery and Resilience Plan relating to certain aspects of the justice 
system and the checks and balances, and recalling the relevant country-specific recommendations 
under the European Semester, it is recommended to Poland to: 
  Separate  the  function  of  the  Minister  of  Justice  from  that  of  the  Prosecutor-General  and 
continue  efforts  to  ensure  functional  independence  of  the  prosecution  service  from  the 
Government. 

  Strengthen the existing integrity rules by introducing lobbying rules and a standardised online 

system for asset declarations of public officials and Members of Parliament. 

  Ensure independent and effective investigations and prosecutions, address the broad scope of 
immunities for top executives and abstain from introducing impunity clauses in legislation in 
order to enable a robust track record of high-level corruption cases. 

  Ensure that fair, transparent and non-discriminatory procedures are adhered to for the granting 

of operating licences to media outlets. 

  Strengthen  the  rules  and  mechanisms  to  enhance  the  independent  governance  and  editorial 
independence of public service media taking into account European standards on public service 
media. 

  Ensure a more systematic follow-up to findings by the Supreme Audit Office and ensure, as a 
matter of urgency, the appointment of the College Members of the Supreme Audit Office in 
order to ensure its effective functioning. 
Improve the framework in which civil society operates and continue such efforts regarding the 
society  and 
Ombudsperson, 
Ombudsinstitutions. 

into  account  European 

standards  on  civil 

taking 

 

2 

 
I. 

JUSTICE SYSTEM  

The  Polish  justice  system  is  separated  in  two  main  branches,  administrative  and  ordinary 
judiciary.  The  Supreme  Administrative  Court  and  16  administrative  courts  exercise  control 
over public administration, including the lawfulness of measures of local government bodies 
and of territorial organs of government administration. The ordinary judiciary, supervised by 
the  Supreme  Court1,  consists  of  three  levels:  11  appeal  courts,  47  regional  courts  and  318 
district  courts2.  Judges  are  appointed  by  the  President  of  the  Republic  at  the  request  of  the 
National Council for the Judiciary. The Constitutional Tribunal, which adjudicates notably on 
the  constitutionality  of  legislation,  is  composed  of  15  judges  chosen  by  the  Sejm  (lower 
chamber of the Parliament) for a term of office of nine years. The National Council for the 
Judiciary  is  tasked  by  the  Constitution  to  safeguard  judicial  independence.  A  particular 
characteristic of the prosecution system, which is not part of the independent judiciary, is that 
the  Prosecutor  General  and  the  Minister  of  Justice  are  the  same  person.  The  Constitution 
provides that advocates and legal counsellors can self-regulate their practice.  

Independence  

The level of perceived judicial independence in Poland continues to be very low among 
both the general public and companies. Overall, 23% of the general population and 17% of 
companies perceive the level of independence of courts and judges to be ‘fairly or very good’ 
in  20233.  According  to  data  in  the  2023  EU  Justice  Scoreboard,  the  perceived  judicial 
independence among both the general public and companies has consistently decreased since 
2016 (45% for the general public and 35% for companies). Both figures have decreased slightly 
in comparison with 2022 (24% for the general public and 19% for companies). The main reason 
cited by the general public and companies for the perceived lack of independence of courts and 
judges is the perception of interference or pressure from the Government and politicians4.  

The  Court  of  Justice  has  further  clarified  EU  requirements  on  judicial  independence, 
notably as regards  the disciplinary regime for judges in Poland. On 5 June 2023, in an 
infringement  procedure5,  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  EU  (Court  of  Justice)  has  held  that  all 
contested provisions of the Law adopted in December 20196 infringe EU law, in particular the 
principle of judicial independence and of effective judicial protection. The Court of Justice has 
held in particular that Poland infringed Article 19(1) TEU by conferring to the Disciplinary 
Chamber – the independence of which was not guaranteed – the power to hear the cases of all 
judges concerning the lifting of their immunity in order to start criminal proceedings and of 

1   The Supreme Court also supervises military courts. 
2   As  of  1 July  2023,  an  additional  district  court  will  be  created  in  the  city  of  Czeladź  (cf.  Ordinance  of  the 

Minister for Justice of 28 October 2022 on the creation of a district court in the city of Czeladź). 

3   Figures 49 and 51, 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard. The level of perceived judicial independence is categorised 
as follows: very low (below 30% of respondents perceive judicial independence as fairly good and very good); 
low (between 30-39%), average (between 40-59%), high (between 60-75%), very high (above 75%). 

4  Figure 51, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
5   Case C-204/21, Commission v. Republic of Poland. See 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the 
rule of law situation in Poland, p. 4; Commission press release of 31 March 2021 IP/21/1524. See 2022 Rule 
of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 7. 

6   The  law  of  20  December  2019  amending  the  Law  on  the  Ordinary  Courts  Organisation,  the  Law  on  the 

Supreme Court and certain other acts. 

3 

 
                                                           
Supreme Court judges concerning their retirement and social rights7. The Court of Justice also 
held that Poland infringed EU law8 by adopting provisions qualifying as disciplinary offence 
that judges ascertain whether they or other judges or courts meet the EU law requirements of 
an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. The Court of Justice has 
furthermore ruled that by adopting provisions prohibiting all Polish judges to verify whether 
another  judge  or  court  complies  with  these  EU  law  requirements,  Poland  infringed  Article 
19(1) TEU, Article 47 Charter and the primacy of EU law. Poland has furthermore infringed 
EU law9 and the primacy of EU law, by conferring to the Chamber of Extraordinary Control 
and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court an exclusive competence to assess whether a court or 
a judge is independent. The Court of Justice has also held that Poland infringed the fundamental 
rights on protection of personal data and private life provided by the Charter and by the General 
Data Protection Regulation by adopting and applying the legislative provisions requiring all 
judges before taking the office to disclose their membership in political parties and in other 
associations and then to publish them online. Prior to the Court of Justice’s judgment, Poland 
had failed to fully comply with the interim measures set out by the Court’s Order of 14 July 
2021 and was ordered to pay penalty payments10. On 21 April 2023, the Vice-President of the 
Court of Justice lowered the amount of penalty payments from EUR 1 million to EUR 500 000 
as of 21 April 2023 in view of notable progress11 in the implementation of the Order of 14 July 
202112. As no payments were made, the amounts due have been offset from EU funds allocated 
to Poland. Polish courts continue sending preliminary references to the Court of Justice13.  

Serious concerns remain relating to the lack of implementation of final judgments and 
interim  measures  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  regarding  judicial 
independence.  Poland  has  not  yet  taken  any  steps  to  implement  final  judgments  of  the 
European  Court  of  Human  Rights  (ECtHR)  relating  to  compliance  with  Article  6  of  the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) by three panels of Chambers of the Supreme 
Court  and  one  of  the  Constitutional  Tribunal14.  These  steps  have  not  been  taken  as  a 
consequence  of  rulings  of  the  Constitutional  Tribunal  declaring  Article  6  ECHR 

7   The Disciplinary Chamber was meanwhile dismantled by the Law of 9 June 2022 amending the law on the 

Supreme Court and certain other laws; see below p. 7. 

8   Article 19(1) TEU read together with Article 47 Charter, as well as Article 267 TFEU. 
9   Article 19(1) TEU read together with Article 47 Charter, Article 267 TFEU. 
10   On the basis of the Order, the Commission called on Poland to pay the amount of EUR 556,5 million. In line 
with  the  order  of  27  October  2021  of  the  Vice  President  of  the  Court  of  Justice  imposing  daily  penalty 
payments. 

11   Following the adoption of the law of 9 June 2022 amending the law on the Supreme Court and certain other 
acts, which has dismantled the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court (see below). See the Order of the 
Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 21 April 2023 in the case C-204/21 R paragraph 112. 

12   On  12  March  2023,  Poland  had  requested  the  Court  of  Justice  to  repeal  the  interim  measures  order  of  27 
October 2021 or, in alternative, to vary the amount of the daily penalties imposed due to the entry into force 
of the Law of 9 June 2022 partially implementing the interim measures. 

13   The  Court  of  Justice  remains  seized  of  a  number  of  preliminary  ruling  requests  concerning  judicial 
independence in Poland (cf. cases C-615/20, C-671/20, C-181/21, C-269/21, C-718/21, C-720/21, C-647/21, 
C-648/21,  C-521/21,  C-43/22,  C-255/22,  C-658/22,  C-711/22.  The  Court  of  Justice  found  a  number  of 
preliminary ruling requests concerning judicial independence as submitted by Polish courts to be inadmissible 
(see the Order of 22 December 2022 issued in joined cases from C-491/20 to C-496/20, C-509/20, and C-
511/20). 

14   See notably the final judgments of 8 November 2021, Dolińska - Ficek and Ozimek v. Poland, 49868/19; of 3 
February 2022, Advance Pharma Sp. Z O.O v. Poland, 1469/20; of 7 May 2021, Xero Flor w Polsce sp. z o.o. 
v. Poland, 4907/18. 

4 

 
                                                           
unconstitutional in certain cases15. Poland is subject to an Article 52 ECHR procedure16. In that 
respect, on 9 December 2022, the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers, recalling the 
grave breaches of the judicial appointment regime in Poland, called on the Polish authorities to 
re-establish  the  full  independence  of  its  judges  in  accordance  with  the  relevant  ECtHR 
judgments17. Poland has refused to comply with interim measures orders of the ECtHR18 aimed 
at safeguarding judicial independence of Polish judges19. The ECtHR remains seized of over 
350 different applications, which raise issues relating to various aspects of the reorganisation 
of the judicial system in Poland under laws that mostly entered into force in 2017 and 2018, in 
particular related to judicial appointments carried out at the request of the National Council for 
the Judiciary as recomposed in 201820. 

Serious concerns related to the independence of the National Council for the Judiciary 
remain  to  be  addressed21.  The  Court  of  Justice  and  the  ECtHR  confirmed  that  there  are 
legitimate doubts as to the independence of the National Council for the Judiciary (‘NCJ’)22, 

15   Rulings of 24 November 2021 and of 10 March 2022 in cases K 6/21 and K 7/21. It is recalled that, according 
to  the  Constitutional  Tribunal,  Article  6  ECHR  is  unconstitutional  to  the  extent  that  it  applies  to  the 
Constitutional Tribunal and empowers the ECtHR to assess the legality of the appointment of Constitutional 
Tribunal judges and to the extent that, among others, it empowers national courts and the ECtHR to carry out 
a specific assessment in the context of determining the compliance of other courts with the requirement of a 
‘court established by law’. See  2022 Rule of  Law Report,  Country  Chapter on the  rule  of law  situation in 
Poland, p. 8.  

16   According to Article 52 ECHR, on receipt of a request from the Secretary General of the Council of Europe 
any High Contracting Party shall furnish an explanation of the manner in which its internal law ensures the 
effective implementation of any of the provisions of the Convention. It is also noted that on 22 November 
2022, the Council of Europe Secretary General published a report on Poland’s implementation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, noting that Poland’s obligation to ensure to everyone under its jurisdiction the 
enjoyment of the right to a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law is, at this 
stage, not fulfilled in Polish law. The Secretary General expresses her concerns in view of the rising number 
of similar judgments and related applications pending before the European Court. 

17   This concerns the ECtHR judgment in Xero Flor w Polsce sp. z o.o. v. Poland and the Reczkowicz group of 
judgments, as well as the Broda and Bojara v. Poland judgments. See Council of Europe – Supervision of the 
ECtHR execution of judgments; 1451st CM-DH Meeting, (06-08 December 2022) adopted on 9 December 
2022. 

18   Since January 2022, the Court has received a total of 60 requests for interim measures from Polish judges in 
29 cases concerning the independence of the Polish judiciary. These cases can  be grouped into three main 
categories: lifting of immunity; suspension from judicial functions; transfer against the will of the judge to 
other posts. Requests in 17 of these cases have been fully or partly granted. Cf. ECtHR press release ECHR 
053(2023)  of  16  February  2023  and  the  appended  additional  press  releases.  On  14  March  2023,  the 
Ombudsperson’s Office issued a statement requesting the public authorities to provide explanations on the 
lack of the necessary follow-up to the interim measures orders of the ECtHR (press release of 16 February 
2023; two formal statements of 8 February 2023 VII.510.11.2023.JRO). 

19   ECtHR press release ECHR 053(2023) of 16 February 2023. The interim measure in these three cases indicated 
to the Government of Poland that the respondent State should suspend the effects of the decisions to transfer 
the applicants from the Criminal Division to the Labour and Social Security Division of the Warsaw Court of 
Appeal until the final determination of the applicants’ complaints by the European Court. It also indicated that 
it should ensure that no decision to transfer the applicants to another division of the Warsaw Court of Appeal 
against their will was taken in the meantime. 

20   ECtHR press release ECHR 053(2023) of 16 February 2023 and information on 34 communicated cases of 6 

March 20223 (Application No. 10374/22, Joanna Palińska against Poland). 

21   See  the  Commission’s  Reasoned  Proposal  for  a  Council  decision  on  the  determination  of  a  clear  risk  of  a 
serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law (COM/2017/0835 final - 2017/0360 (NLE)), paras 
137-145. 

22   See 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, pp. 3-4. See also the 

ECtHR judgment (final) of 6 October 2022 in case Juszczyszyn v. Poland, Application No. 35599/20. 

5 

 
                                                           
which continues to play an active role in the judicial appointment procedures by evaluating 
candidates  for  judiciary  posts  and  submitting  proposals  for  judicial  appointments  to  the 
President  of  the  Republic23.  Whereas  the  NCJ  has  criticised  measures  affecting  the 
remuneration  of  judges  and  prosecutors,  it  continued  adopting  resolutions  that  cannot  be 
reconciled with its duty of safeguarding judicial independence. In particular, these resolutions 
underlined  the  unconstitutionality  of  Article  6  ECHR  as  determined  by  the  Constitutional 
Tribunal,  as  well  as  the  unlawfulness  of  certain  interim  measures  ordered  by  the  ECtHR24. 
Also,  on  10  February  2023,  the  NCJ  requested  the  prosecution  services  to  open  a  criminal 
investigation against judges that had implemented the interim measures order of the Court of 
Justice of 14 July 202125. The NCJ also refused access to files related to judicial proceedings 
requested by courts in the context of their adjudication, if these were not publicly available26. 
On 14 March 2023, the President of the NCJ sent an open letter to the president of a second-
instance  court,  in  which  she  criticised  a  ruling  issued  in  first  instance  by  an  ordinary  court 

23   In view of the expiry of the joint term of office of the NCJ judges-members, on 12 May 2022, the Polish Sejm 
appointed  new  such  members.  Out  of  15  judges-members  appointed,  all  were  proposed  by  the  current 
governing majority in the absence of any proposals from opposition parties, amongst which 11 reappointed 
members; see 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 4. Entities 
entitled to submit a candidate for a member of the Council are a group of at least: 1) 2,000 citizens of the 
Republic of Poland who are at least 18 years old, enjoy full capacity to perform acts in law and have all public 
rights; 2) 25 judges, excluding retired judges. This means that the candidate for a member of the Council must 
obtain the support of the 25 judges or 2,000 citizens. The Sejm selects members of the Council for a common 
four-year term of office at the closest meeting of the Sejm, by a majority of 3/5 of votes cast or, if this majority 
is not obtained, by absolute majority, in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of members of the 
Sejm, by voting on the list of candidates. 

24   Resolution of 13 July 2022 concerning the applications Nos. 9988/22, 8687/22, and 8076/22 examined by the 
ECtHR (WO 41.9.2022). On 27 and 29 July 2022, the NCJ issued further resolutions in which it considered 
that the judgments of the ECtHR regarding the rule of law in Poland do not bind the Republic of Poland, and 
that any similar ruling issued by that Court will not be subject to enforcement in Poland. See Resolution of 27 
July  2022  concerning  the  application  No.  48530/21  examined  by  the  ECtHR  (WO  41.11.2022).  Similar 
statements were made in other resolutions adopted on the same day, registered under the same number, and 
pertaining to applications Nos. 54461/21, 46453/21, and 159258/22. See also the resolutions of 29 July 2022 
(WO 41.17.2022) concerning the applications Nos. 21998/21, 22918/21, 25545/21, 24398/21 examined by the 
ECtHR; (WO 41.16.2022) concerning the applications Nos 41097/20, 53778/20, 1510/22, 31053/21, 1210/22, 
42668/21,  60827/21;  (WO  41.15.2022)  concerning  the  application  No.  41097/20;  (WO  41.14.2022) 
concerning  the  application  No.  1412/21;  (WO  41.13.2022)  concerning  the  applications  Nos.  26638/21, 
50702/21,  50708/21.  See  also  the  position  of  the  National  Council  for  the  Judiciary  of  10  January  2023, 
WO.41.5.2023. 

25   This  concerns  the  former  President  of  the  Labour  Chamber  of  the  Supreme  Court  who  was  allowed  to 
adjudicate cases in view of the interim measures order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 14 July 
2021 in the case C-204/21 R (which had obliged Poland to suspend the effects of resolutions adopted by the 
Disciplinary Chamber in cases related to judicial immunities). See the press release of the NCJ of 10 February 
2023.  

26   Position of the National Council for the Judiciary of 22 December 2022 WO 41.43.2022, dot. WP 0212.6.2022. 
It is noted that judges requesting such data in view of the decision-making process are refused access thereto 
and subsequently become target of disciplinary proceedings; cf. Rzeczpospolita.pl of 5 April 2023, ‘Sędzia 
Wojciech Maczuga z Krakowa na celowniku Przemysława Radzika’. 

6 

 
                                                           
judge’27. Stakeholders have underlined that the lack of independence of the NCJ constitutes a 
core systemic concern of the rule of law in Poland28. 

There are serious doubts whether a number of Supreme Court judges, including its First 
President, comply with the requirement of a tribunal established by law. As previously 
reported, there are serious doubts whether certain judges in the Professional Liability Chamber 
and the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs, which were appointed to the 
Supreme Court29, comply with the requirements stemming from Article 19(1) TEU30. Fourteen 
out of seventeen judges of the Chamber of the Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs and 
four out of eleven judges of the Professional  Liability Chamber have been appointed to the 
Supreme  Court  in  conditions  considered  by  the  ECtHR  as  violating  the  right  to  a  court 
established by law31. These doubts also apply to the status of the First President of the Supreme 
Court itself32. Furthermore, a preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice related to  a judicial 
appointment to the Chamber of Extraordinary Control has so far not been implemented33.The 
President of the Labour Chamber of the Supreme Court raised concerns about the handling of 
case files by the First President of the Supreme Court in sensitive cases concerning judicial 
independence, alleging that the Supreme Court can no longer administer justice34. Furthermore, 

27   This letter was seriously criticised by the president of the second-instance court, as encroaching upon judicial 
independence: on 15 March 2023, this president indicated that the letter of the President of the NCJ constitutes 
an ‘absolutely unacceptable form of a comment on a judicial ruling and is inconsistent with the NCJ’s task of 
safeguarding judicial independence. See the  Letter of the  President of the Regional Court in Poznań of 20 
March 2023, ref. A-070-1/23. In the open letter, the President of the NCJ requested that the President of the 
Regional Court could consider the possibility of directing a judge to receive training in constitutional law, 
including  in  particular  the  protection  of  religious  worship.  The  President  of  the  NCJ  also  indicated  that, 
listening to the oral reasoning of the decision, she had the impression that the judge had not fulfilled her duty 
of objectivity. 

28   Written  contribution  submitted  by  Association  of  European  Administrative  Judges  (p.  13);  Consortium  of 
seven NGOs (pp. 11, 13 and 14); by MEDEL (pp. 11-12); Human Rights Watch (p. 11). Statements made 
during  the  virtual  country  visit  to  Poland  by  representatives  of  the  Ombudsman’s  Office,  of  judges’  and 
prosecutors’ associations, of the National Bar Council and of the National Chamber of Legal Councillors and 
by NGOs. The NCJ disagrees with this view. 

29   In October 2018 and in February 2019. 
30   Order of 21 April 2023 of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice in the case C-204/21 R, paragraph 89-91 

where the Commission’s position is set out. 

31   See notably the judgment of 8 November 2021 in Dolińska-Ficek and Ozimek v. Poland and of 3 February 
2022 in Advance Pharma v. Poland (above). This also concerns judges appointed to the Supreme Court in 
October 2018 on the basis of NCJ resolutions Nos. 318/2018 (giving rise to the appointments to the Criminal 
Chamber) and 330/2018 (giving rise to the appointments to the Civil Chamber). Recusals of judges based on 
the ECtHR rulings have been contested. The Supreme Court informed that from 19 until 25 November 2022, 
the  Civil  Chamber  issued  seven  rulings  asserting  that  decisions  taken  by  various  composition  of  the  Civil 
Chamber’s judges, ruling on recusal of judges, are ‘non-existent’ (see a press release of the Supreme Court of 
29 November 2022). 

32   On the contested procedures related to the appointment of the respective Presidents of the Supreme Court, see 
notably: 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, pp. 9-10 and 2020 
Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 6. 

33   This concerns the implementation of the judgment of 6 October 2021 in the case C-487/19 W.Ż. The letter 
was  published  by  ‘Iustitia’  association  of  judges  on  1  March  2023  (Iustitia.pl,  ‘Małgorzata  Manowska 
ponownie uniemożliwia wykonanie orzeczeń TSUE co do neosędziów’). According to the Polish Government, 
there were serious and objective obstacles preventing the final conclusion of the case. 

34   The concerns were expressed in two letters – dated 14 February and 28 March 2023 – addressed to, amongst 
others, the President of the Court of Justice, in which it is alleged that the First President did not return to 
judicial  panels  case  files  in  specific  cases  concerning  irregularities  in  the  appointment  of  Supreme  Court 
judges. According to the President of the Labour Chamber, the First President was directly interested in the 

7 

 
                                                           
the First President of the Supreme Court, refused to swear in 26 out of 30 lay judges of the 
Supreme  Court  following  their  appointment  by  the  Senate  on  7  October  202235.  Further 
changes in the management of the Supreme Court took place36.  

Poland  adopted  legislation  to  raise  the  standard  of  certain  aspects  of  judicial 
independence and engaged in a further reform of the disciplinary regime for judges. On 
1 June 2022, the Commission issued a positive assessment of Poland’s Recovery and Resilence 
Plan (RRP), which was approved by the Council of the European Union on 17 June 202237. It 
contains  several  commitments  from  Poland  to  improve  the  investment  climate,  including  a 
comprehensive reform of the disciplinary regime applicable to judges, aimed at strengthening 
certain aspects of the independence of the judiciary. On 15 July 2022, a new law entered into 
force38, with the aim of strengthening the independence of the judiciary in Poland. This law 
explicitly excludes disciplinary liability of judges for making a preliminary ruling request to 
the Court of Justice. It also introduced a test allowing judges to assess, under certain conditions, 
the independence of other judges and dismantled the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme 
Court39, creating in its stead a new Chamber of Professional Liability. The new Chamber issued 
a number of rulings, reviewing measures imposed on judges in the context of disciplinary and 
judicial immunity cases, and annulled all suspensions from office decided by the Disciplinary 
Chamber40. On 13 January 2023, a new law was adopted by the Polish parliament to reinforce 
the  provisions  protecting  judges  against  disciplinary  liability  based  on  the  content  of  their 
judicial decisions, including if they assess, also ex officio, compliance of other courts with the 

outcome  of  these  cases.  In  reply,  the  First  President  argued  that  the  panels  concerned  were  irregularly 
composed contrary to the applicable framework. See press release of the Supreme Court of 22 March 2023 
and Prawo.pl of 30 March 2023, ‘Ostra wymiana pism w SN: Dyscyplinarka dla Prusinowskiego i oskarżenie 
Manowskiej o instytucjonalne bezprawie’ where the contents of the letters are reproduced.  

35   See a press release of the Senate of 7 October 2022 and a press release of the Supreme Court of 7 February 
2023. On 1 June 2023, the First President eventually decided to swear in all lay judges as appointed by the 
Senate;  see  Oko.press  of  9  June  2023,  ‘Manowska  z  SN  skapitulowała.  Dopuściła  do  orzekania  ławników 
wybranych przez opozycję’. 

36   On 10 May 2023, the President of the Republic appointed a new President of the Criminal Chamber.  (see a 
press  release  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  10  May  2023).  On 27  October  2022,  the  President  of  the  Republic 
appointed the President of the Professional Liability Chamber (see a press release of the Supreme Court of 27 
October 2022). In addition, the budget for the Supreme Court and the number of vacant posts increased; see 
written contribution of the Supreme Court (p. 12): According to the Budget Act for 2022, the Supreme Court’s 
expenditure plan includes an amount of over PLN 197 million, i.e. an increase of over PLN 6 million compared 
to the plans for 2021. At the end of 2022, there were 89 judges in the Supreme Court over 125 overall posts. 
In 2022, the President of the Republic of Poland, acting on a motion of the NCJ, appointed a total of 10 new 
Supreme  Court  judges.  Moreover,  a  total of  13  Supreme  Court  judges  retired  in  2022. The  vacancy  of  36 
unfilled judicial positions contributes to the protraction of proceedings, according to the Supreme Court. 
37   Council  Implementing  Decision  of  17  July  2022  on  the  approval  of  the  assessment  of  the  recovery  and 

resilience plan for Poland (ST 9728/22; ST 9728/22 ADD 1). 

38   The Law of 9 June 2022 amending the Law on the Supreme Court and certain other acts.  
39   The Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court had been found by the Court of Justice to no longer comply 
with the requirements of an independent and impartial court within the meaning of Article 19(1) TEU; see 
judgment of 15 July 2021 in the case C-791/19, Commission v Poland. On 7 September 2021, the Commission 
issued a letter of formal notice under Article 260 TFEU regarding the implementation of this judgment. The 
ECtHR has ruled that the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court was not a lawful tribunal:  Judgment 
(final) of 6 October 2022 in case Juszczyszyn v. Poland, Application No. 35599/20, reiterating the reasoning 
already presented by the ECtHR in the judgment of 22 July 2021,  Reczkowicz v. Poland, Application  No. 
43447/19. 

40   See press releases of the Supreme Court of 19 October and 9 December 2022. However, the new Chamber has 
not restored the immunity of a judge in all cases, see e.g. case of judge I.T. II ZIZ 4/22 and a press release of 
the Supreme Court of 29 November 2022. 

8 

 
                                                           
requirements stemming from Article 19(1) TEU. On 21 February 2023, the President of the 
Republic referred the new law, prior to signing it, for review to the Constitutional Tribunal 
where  it  is  still  pending41.  The  new  law  has  therefore  not  yet  entered  into  force.  The 
Commission  will  assess  whether  the  relevant  legislation  in  force  complies  with  the 
commitments made under the RRP upon the submission by Poland of the first payment request. 
A  reform  introducing  a  new  institution  of  judges  of  peace42  continues  to  be  subject  to 
parliamentary  works  with  no  indication  as  to  when  these  would  be  finalised43.  A 
comprehensive reform of the ordinary judiciary as prepared by the Government, including a 
significant change of the judicial map, is still subject to public consultations44.  

Serious concerns persist related to the Constitutional Tribunal. On 15 February 2023, the 
Commission decided to refer Poland to the Court of Justice for violations of EU law by the 
Constitutional Tribunal and its two rulings issued in 202145. The Commission considered that 
the two rulings  of the  Constitutional  Tribunal breached the general  principles of autonomy, 
primacy, effectiveness, uniform application of Union law and the binding effect of rulings of 
the  Court  of  Justice  as  well  as  Article  19(1)  TEU,  which  guarantees  the  right  to  effective 
judicial protection; and that the Constitutional Tribunal no longer met the requirements of an 
independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. The Constitutional Tribunal 
continues to be seized in cases concerning judicial independence. In particular, on 14 March 
2023,  the  President  of  the  Republic  seized  the  Constitutional  Tribunal46,  contesting  the 
competence of the Supreme Administrative Court to  review the appointment  acts  of judges 
issued  by  the  President  of  Poland47.  On  15  December  2022,  a  bench  of  the  Chamber  of 
Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court requested the Constitutional 

41   Press release of the President of the Republic of 21 February 2023.  
42   The draft laws No. 1760 and 1761 proposed on 4 November 2021 by the President of the Republic. See 2022 

Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 6. 

43   The draft law on the judges of peace was discussed by the Sejm’s Committee for Justice and Human Rights 
on 1 March 2023, where it was concluded that a separate law (introducing this new institution) now needs to 
be revised to reflect amendments introduced to the Polish justice system meanwhile. See: Prawo.pl of 1 March 
2023, ‘Sejmowa podkomisja kończy prace nad projektem o sądach pokoju’, where statements of members of 
the Sejm’s Committee are reproduced.  

44   Draft law No. UD322, containing a draft law on the Ordinary Courts Organisation and draft law No. UD 323, 
containing a draft law implementing the former law; both published by the Government Legislation Centre on 
26 and 27 April 2022 respectively. See 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation 
in Poland, p. 5. 

45   The Commission opened the infringement procedure against Poland on 22 December 2021, by sending a letter 
of formal notice. This followed the rulings of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal of 14 July 2021 and 7 October 
2021, where it had considered Article 19 TEU and 279 TFEU as interpreted and applied by the Court of Justice 
incompatible with the Polish Constitution, expressly challenging the primacy of EU law.  

46   The Constitutional Tribunal was seized in a special procedure whereby a central body of state submits that 

another state body encroaches upon its own competences by acting or failing to act in a specific way.  

47   See  case  Kpt  1/23.  The  President  of  the  Republic  referred  in  that  respect  to  a  set  of  rulings  whereby  the 
Supreme Administrative Court annulled NCJ proposals issued in 2018 for appointments to the Supreme Court 
relying on  the preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice of 2 March 2021 in the case C-824/21 A.B. See 2022 
Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 4. The Supreme Administrative 
Court considers that no ruling can be issued by the Constitutional Tribunal as there is no dispute over authority 
in the present case (see the Supreme Administrative Court’s position in the case Kpt 1/23). In result of the 
request of the President of the Republic, the Supreme Administrative Court suspended proceedings in case II 
GSK 986/19 concerning a cassation appeal against a ruling of a regional administrative court in Warsaw of 24 
January 2019 (ref. No. VI SA/Wa 2287/18), rejecting an appeal against the decision of the President of the 
Republic on a judicial appointment. See the Supreme Administrative Court’s press release of 5 April 2023 and 
of 16 March 2023. 

9 

 
                                                           
Tribunal to assess the constitutionality of the lack of judicial review of NCJ resolutions related 
to transfers of judges carried out without their consent48. Also, following a motion of the First 
President  of  the  Supreme  Court,  the  Constitutional  Tribunal  requested  case  files  from  the 
Supreme Court in a number of cases concerning judicial independence, thereby preventing it 
from issuing rulings in those cases49. The Constitutional Tribunal also remains seized of other 
cases concerning the constitutionality of EU Treaty provisions, including as regards the power 
of the Court of Justice to impose penalty payments for non-compliance with interim measures 
orders  related  to  the  functioning  of  the  judiciary50.  Since  December  2022,  a  number  of 
Constitutional  Tribunal  members  issued  open  statements  contesting  the  legitimacy  of  the 
current President of the Constitutional Tribunal, considering that her term of office had expired. 
As  a  result,  these  judges  refuse  to  adjudicate  cases  upon  request  of  the  President  of  the 
Constitutional Tribunal51. As indicated above, the Constitutional Tribunal has also been seized 
to assess the constitutionality of the law of 13 January 2023 concerning the judiciary. 

A number of judges continue to be subject to disciplinary investigations and proceedings 
related to the content of their judicial decisions and forced transfers. In spite of the interim 
measures  order  issued  by  the  Vice-President  of  the  Court  of  Justice52,  a  number  of  judges 
continued being subject to disciplinary investigations due to the content of judicial decisions 
they  rendered,  on  the  basis  of  provisions  that  should  have  been  suspended  pursuant  to  the 
interim measures ordered by the Court of Justice53. Disciplinary proceedings were also brought 
against the former First President of the Supreme Court for a judicial decision54. Several judges 
reinstated in office were transferred without their consent to another division in their courts, 

48   The Court of Justice has held that, even  where such transfer measures  without consent  are adopted by the 
president of the court to which the judge who is the subject of those measures belongs outside the disciplinary 
regime applicable to judges, those measures may only be ordered on legitimate grounds, in particular relating 
to the distribution of available resources to ensure the proper administration of justice, and that such decisions 
may  be  legally  challenged  in  accordance  with  a  procedure  which  fully  safeguards  the  rights  enshrined  in 
Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter, in particular the rights of the defence (judgment of 6 October 2021 in the 
case C-487/19 W.Ż. paragraph 118). 

49   Case K 24/20, initiated at the request of the First President of the Supreme Court, in which the Constitutional 
Tribunal is requested to rule on the constitutionality of provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to the extent 
that  they  allow  Polish  courts  to  rule  on  the  (non)existence  of  an  employment  relationship  of  a  judge. The 
request to transfer casefiles in such cases is confirmed in a press release of the Supreme Court of 22 March 
2023. 

50   Case K 8/21. As regards other cases, see 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation 

in Poland, pp. 8-9. 

51   See e.g. an open letter reproduced by the press of 28 February 2023: doRzeczy.pl,  ‘Sędziowie TK ponownie 
piszą do Przyłębskiej. Ujawniamy treść listu’ and a statement of the press bureau of the Constitutional Tribunal 
invoked by the media: Polish Press Agency of 2 March 2023, ‘Trybunał Konstytucyjny rozstrzygnął sprawę 
kadencji Prezesa TK’; Wiadomości of 3 March 2023, ‘Koniec sporu w Trybunale Konstytucyjnym’. 

52   In the case C-204/21 R. 
53   See  the  decision  of  the  Deputy  Disciplinary  Officer  for  Ordinary  Court  Judges,  RDSP.8011  47  2022  of  8 
October 2022 where Article 107(1) item 3 of the Law on ordinary courts was invoked; two decisions of a 
deputy Disciplinary Officer at the Regional Court in Olsztyn of, respectively, 7 December 2022 (case No is 
K-0083-90/22; SD 55/22) and of 3 January 2023 (case No is K-0083-76/22; SD 44/22) where Article 107(1) 
item 2 and 3 of the Law on ordinary courts was invoked; and a decision of the Deputy Disciplinary Officer for 
Ordinary Court Judges, RDSP.8010.58.2022 of 27 March 2023, where Article 107(1) point 2, 3, and 5 and 
Article 42a(1) and (2) of the Law on ordinary courts was invoked. 

54   On  7  December  2022,  the  former  First  President  was  presented  with  disciplinary  charges  related  to  the 
convening of a joint sitting of three Chambers of the Supreme Court on 23 January 2020. See Prawo.pl of 7 
December 2022, ‘Zarzuty dla prof. Gersdorf za dopuszczenie do uchwały trzech izb SN’. 

10 

 
                                                           
upon a decision by court presidents appointed by the Minister of Justice55. Some of these judges 
sued the court presidents concerned before labour courts56. The Minister of Justice continues 
using  his  competence  ––  to  second  judges  adjudicating  in  criminal  cases  to  higher  judicial 
posts57,  despite  concerns  expressed  by  the  Court  of  Justice  on  the  legislative  provisions 
regarding these secondments58.  

Some  progress  has  been  made  to  ensure  functional  independence  of  the  prosecution 
service from the Government, while no progress has been made to separate the office of 
the  Minister  for  Justice  and  the  Prosecutor  General.  The  2022  Rule  of  Law  Report 
recommended to Poland to “[s]eparate the function of the Minister of Justice from that of the 
Prosecutor General  and ensure functional  independence of the prosecution service from the 
Government”59. On 27 October 2022, Parliament adopted an amendment to the Law on the 
Prosecution  Service,  transferring  the  competence  to  appoint  and  dismiss  persons  to 
management  positions  within  the  prosecution  service  from  the  Prosecutor  General  to  the 
National  Prosecutor  (who  can  be  dismissed  solely  with  the  consent  of  the  President  of  the 
Republic)60. The Government is working on an additional reform of the prosecution services 
that  would  further  increase  the  powers  of  the  National  Prosecutor61.  These  changes  could 

55   The practice is confirmed by a number of interim measures issued by the ECtHR (see above). See also a ruling 
of the Supreme Court of 17 November 2022 in the case II ZZ 6/22 where the Supreme Court noted that its 
decision suspending the effects of a Disciplinary Chamber’s decision to suspend a judge in office means that 
the judge ‘is to be reinstated immediately in the division of the Regional Court in W. in which he has hitherto 
adjudicated. Any attempt to transfer the judge, without his consent, to another position, including to another 
division,  will  constitute  a  defiance  of  a  Supreme  Court’s  ruling  and  should  result  in,  at  the  very  least, 
disciplinary liability of the judge so deciding. This caveat is necessary in view of repeated cases of transferring 
judges to another post when disciplinary courts issue rulings favourable to such judges, which constitutes an 
additional, intentional and unlawful ailment that may even have the character of harassment.’  

56   See  Oko.press  of  22  November  2022,  ‘Trzy  represjonowane  sędzie  z  Warszawy  pozywają  ludzi  Ziobry  za 
karną zsyłkę do innego wydziału’; one of the judges, concerned by the Court of Justice ruling of 6 October 
2021 in the case C-487/19 W.Ż., successfully opened a case against the NCJ President who is also the president 
of the court where he adjudicates and who had transferred him to another division of the court without his 
consent, Ysee Onet.pl of 15 March 2023, ‘Porażka szefowej KRS. Sędzia Żurek wygrał proces o mobbing’. 
57   The secondment decision was served after the judge subject to the secondment issued a ruling convicting a 
Polish activist for assisting a pregnant woman to obtain an emergency contraception, giving rise to concerns 
that  the  decision  was  a  form  of  reward  for  the  content  of  the  ruling.  The  Minister  for  Justice  denied  such 
allegations, indicating that the decision had been made prior to the ruling but was only served after the ruling 
had been handed down. See Prawo.pl of 16 March 2023, ‘Sędzia awansowała i od razu skazała aktywistkę 
proaborcyjną’.  

58   Judgment of 16 November 2021 in joined cases C-748/19 to C-754/19 W.B. and others, where the Court of 
Justice found that EU law precludes the regime in force in Poland which permits the Minister for Justice to 
second judges to higher criminal courts; secondments which that minister – who is also the Public Prosecutor 
General – may terminate at any time without stating reasons the secondment of a judge to higher criminal 
courts. 

59   2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 2.  
60   The  competence  applies  to  the  appointment  and  dismissal  of  the  Director  and  Deputy  Director  of  the 
Department or Office of the National Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Head of the Internal Affairs Division, 
as well as the entrustment of the performance of duties in this area. 

61   The draft law, currently examined by the Sejm (draft No. 3216), would transfer further competences from the 
Prosecutor-General  to  the  National  Prosecutor,  notably  as  regards  the  use  of  the  budget  of  the  National 
Prosecutor,  carrying  out  supervision  over  cases  conducted  by  the  National  Prosecutor’s  Office,  taking 
individual decisions on prosecutors and assistant prosecutors, including as regards the secondment without 
their consent. According to commentators, the reform would allegedly also affect the procedural position of 
parties by depriving them, under specific circumstances, of the right to lodge a subsidiary indictment.  See 
Prawo.pl of 13 April 2023, ‘Jeśli PiS przegra wybory, zostawi sobie władzę w prokuraturze’. 

11 

 
                                                           
increase  the  functional  independence  of  the  prosecution  service  from  the  Government. 
However, the separation of the office of the Prosecutor General from that of the Minister of 
Justice has not  been  carried out.  Prosecutors are  still being seconded without their consent, 
which  risks  affecting  prosecutorial  independence,  while  courts  continue  considering  such 
secondments  as  a  form  of  harassment62.  Disciplinary  proceedings  against  prosecutors  in 
sensitive cases continue63. As regards the environment for legal professions, the Constitutional 
Tribunal  remains  seized  of  a  case64  concerning  the  constitutionality  of  certain  provisions 
regarding the organisation, powers and membership of Bar associations, which triggered strong 
criticism by the Polish Bar Council and the National Chamber of Legal Councillors65. As new 
rules  were  adopted  to  increase  the  functional  independence  of  the  prosecution  service  and 
further measures are being prepared, while there is still no separation between the Minister for 
Justice and the Prosecutor General, there has been some progress on the recommendation made 
in the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

Quality  

The digitalisation of the justice system has significantly improved. As reported in previous 
years, Poland is progressing well with the digitalisation of the justice system, and ranks high 
as  regards  digital  solutions  to  initiate  and  follow  proceedings  in  civil,  commercial  and 
administrative cases66. Further improvements could be envisaged as regards the admissibility 
of  evidence  in  a  digital  format  in  criminal  cases67  and  the  increase  of  the  use  of  digital 
technology by the prosecution services68. The Supreme Administrative Court underlined that 
solutions introduced during the COVID-19 pandemic, allowing court hearings to be organised 
remotely, should be kept in place69. Poland ranks high as regards the promotion of incentives 
for  using  Alternative  Dispute  Resolutions  methods  and  ensuring  specific  arrangements  for 
access to justice of persons at risk of discrimination and of older persons70. 

62   According  to  a  statement  of  4  April  2023  the  association  of  prosecutors  ‘Lex  Super  Omnia’,  a  regional 
prosecutor was transferred to a district prosecutor’s office located within 70 km of distance from the place of 
the original employment. The secondment was made without the prosecutor’s consent and the decision, that 
cannot  be  subject  to  judicial  review,  was  not  reasoned.  On  21  March  2023,  a  district  court  ruled  that  a 
secondment of a prosecutor, which took place in 2016, was a form of discrimination at work (see: Oko.press 
of 29 March 2023, ‘Pierwszy wyrok za degradowanie prokuratorów przez Ziobrę. Prokuratura ma zapłacić 
45 tys zł.’. 

63   This concerns e.g. a prosecutor reportedly targeted with Pegasus surveillance software in 2021, who was also 
responsible for opening a criminal investigation in the matter related to the organisation of postal presidential 
elections in 2020. The prosecutor is now accused of disclosing details related to another criminal investigation 
and has been suspended in the course of the ongoing disciplinary proceedings. See written contribution by the 
Consortium of seven NGOs (p. 16). 

64   Case K 6/22. 
65   According to documents transmitted by representatives of the Polish Bar Council during the virtual country 
visit  to  Poland  (‘Executive  summary”  motion  to  the  Constitutional  Tribunal  in  Poland  contesting  certain 
provisions of the Act on the Advocates Profession and the Act on the Attorneys Profession as of September 
2022’).  According  to  the  statement,  the  motion  appears  to  be  aimed  at  partitioning  the  bar  associations, 
depriving  disciplinary  and  other  powers  from  the  bar  associations.  See  also  a  written  contribution  of  the 
Consortium of seven NGOs (p. 15-16). 
66   See Figure 45, 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
67   See Figure 41, 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
68   See Figures 42 and 44, 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
69   Information  received  during  the  virtual  country  visit  to  Poland  from  representatives  of  the  Supreme 

Administrative Court.  

70   See Figures 26 and 27, 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard. 

12 

 
                                                           
The  budgetary  law  for  2023  adversely  affected  the  remuneration  of  judges  and 
prosecutors. The law accompanying the budgetary law for the year 202371 provides for a set 
salary  base,  although  the  legislation  applicable  to  ordinary  and  administrative  court  judges 
indicates that the salary is to be determined on the basis of an average salary received in Poland 
in the second quarter of the preceding year72. This has given rise to concerns expressed notably 
by the Supreme Court73, the National  Council for  the Judiciary74, the Ombudsperson75, and 
associations of judges and prosecutors76. The President of the Supreme Administrative Court77, 
the First President of the Supreme Court78 and the National Council of the Judiciary79 requested 
the  Constitutional  Tribunal  to  declare  the  contested  provisions  unconstitutional  (the  case 
remains pending).  

Efficiency 

The  overall  performance  of  ordinary  and  administrative  courts  in  terms  of  efficiency 
remains stable. As regards ordinary courts, their overall performance continues to be average. 
The estimate time needed to resolve civil, commercial and administrative cases has remained 
stable80, while the estimated time needed to resolve litigious civil and commercial cases has 
increased81.  On  9  March  2023,  the  Polish  Parliament  adopted  amendments  to  the  civil 
procedure with the aim of simplifying the existing procedures and ensuring a reduction in the 
workload of the courts and the length of proceedings. As regards administrative courts, their 
performance  stays  above  average82,  although  the  rate  of  resolving  administrative  cases  is 
declining83.  

II. 

ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK  

Several  authorities  are  responsible  for  anti-corruption  in  Poland,  including  the  Prosecutor 
General,  who  is  also  the  Minister  of  Justice,  and  the  Minister  of  Internal  Affairs  and 
Administration who is in charge of prevention aspects, such as the lobby register for public 
officials.  The  Central  Anti-Corruption  Bureau  is  the  specialised  law  enforcement  body 

71   The law of 1 December 2022 on particular solutions aimed at the implementation of the budgetary law for 

2023. 

72   The  same  salary  basis  is  applied,  mutatis  mutandis,  to  prosecutors.  See  also  written  contribution  by  the 

Supreme Court (p. 11). 

73   Letter of the First President of the Supreme Court of 2 September 2022 addressed to the Minister for Finances 

(BSA III.021.22.2022). 

74   Statement of the NCJ of 2 September 2022 (WO 420.89.2022, UD 378). 
75   Submission of the Ombudsperson of 8 February 2023 (III.7042.2.2023.LN) lodged with the Constitutional 

Tribunal in the case K 1/23. 

76   Open letter addressed to the President of the Republic, Prime Minister and Marshals of the Sejm and the Senate 
of  4  October  2022,  signed  by  associations  of  judges  ‘Iustitia’,  ‘Themis’,  National  Association  of 
Administrative Court Judges, ‘Pro Familia’ Association of Family Court Judges, Association of Family Court 
Judges  in  Poland,  Association  of  Prosecutors  ‘Lex  Super  Omnia’,  Association  ‘Independent  Prosecutors’, 
‘Votum’ Association of Graduates of the National Magistracy School, Association ‘Lex et Iustitia’ of Court 
Referendaries.  

77   Case K 3/23 submitted on 21 December 2022. 
78   Case K 1/23 submitted on 21 December 2022. See written contribution of the Supreme Court (pp. 10-11). 
79   Case K 4/23 submitted on 22 December 2022. 
80   Figure 5, 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
81   Figure 6, 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
82   Figures 8 and 9, 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
83   Figure 12, 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard. 

13 

 
                                                           
combating  corruption  in  the  public  and  the  private  sector  alongside  the  Central  Police 
Investigation Bureau and the regular police, the Internal Security Agency and the Prosecution 
Service84. The Central Anti-Corruption Bureau combines intelligence and police functions, and 
can trigger both administrative and criminal proceedings. It has also been tasked with policy 
coordination85 and corruption prevention86, including educational awareness-raising activities 
against  corruption  and  an  e-learning  platform87.  The  Supreme  Audit  Office  (NIK)  has  a 
preventive  role  monitoring  the  public  spending  of  the  government  administration  bodies, 
including the National Bank of Poland and state legal persons88. 

The perception among experts and business executives is that the level of corruption in 
the  public  sector  remains  relatively  high.  In  the  2022  Corruption  Perceptions  Index  by 
Transparency International, Poland scores 55/100 and ranks 19th in the European Union and 
45th globally89. This perception has deteriorated over the past five years90. The 2023 Special 
Eurobarometer on Corruption shows that 61% of respondents consider corruption widespread 
in  their  country  (EU  average  70%)  and  37%  of  respondents  feel  personally  affected  by 
corruption in their daily lives (EU average 24%)91. As regards businesses, 55% of companies 
consider that corruption is widespread (EU average 65%) and 25% consider that corruption is 
a problem when doing business (EU average 35%)92. Furthermore, 37% of respondents find 
that  there  are  enough  successful  prosecutions  to  deter  people  from  corrupt  practices  (EU 
average 32%)93, while 18% of companies believe that people and businesses caught for bribing 
a senior official are appropriately punished (EU average 30%)94.  

84   Cf. Law of 9 June 2006 on the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau. The Law of 24 May 2002 on the Internal 
Security Agency and Foreign Intelligence Agency. The Law of 28 January 2016 on the Prosecution Service. 
Law of 6 April 1990 on the police. Within the police, the Police Internal Affairs Bureau is appointed to combat 
and reduce corruption  within  the police itself.  According to the Bureau’s 2019 report,  25% of accusations 
against police officers concern corruption crimes (see statistical data provided by the Internal Affairs Bureau 
of the Police). 

85   The  Central  Anti-Corruption  Bureau  replaced  the  Minister  of  Interior  and  Administration  in  the  overall 

coordination of the Governmental Anti-Corruption Programme. 

86   The  Supreme  Audit  Office  audit  flagged  concerns  as  to  the  appropriateness  of  entrusting  the  Central-
Anticorruption Bureau’s with corruption prevention policy coordination tasks, as it would neither have  the 
competence (i.e. legislative initiative) as a law enforcement body nor the resources to coordinate public policy. 
Supreme Audit Office (2022), Post-audit presentation of the audit Implementation of the Government Anti-
Corruption Programme for 2018-2020. 

87   Educational website of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, and its e-learning platform. 
88   Law of 23 December 1994 on the Supreme Audit Office. 
89   Transparency International (2022), Corruption Perceptions Index 2021. The level of perceived corruption is 
categorised as follows: low (the perception among experts and business executives of public sector corruption 
scores above 79); relatively low (scores between 79-60), relatively high (scores between 59-50), high (scores 
below 50). 

90   In 2018 the score was 60, while in 2022 the score is 55. The score significantly increases/decreases when it 
changes more than five points; improves/deteriorates (changes between 4-5 points), and is relatively stable 
(changes from 1-3 points) in the last five years.  

91 Special Eurobarometer 534 on Corruption (2023). The Eurobarometer data on citizens’ corruption perception 

and experience is updated every year. The previous data set is the Special Eurobarometer 523 (2022). 

92 Flash Eurobarometer 524 on Businesses’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU (2023). The Eurobarometer 
data  on  business  attitudes  towards  corruption  as  is  updated  every  year.  The  previous  data  set  is  the  Flash 
Eurobarometer 507 (2022). 

93  Special Eurobarometer 534 on Corruption (2023).  
94   Flash Eurobarometer 524 on Businesses’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU (2023).  

14 

 
                                                           
There has been no announcement yet to renew Poland’s anti-corruption commitments 
under a new Anti-Corruption Programme. The 2021 Report of the Central Anti-Corruption 
Bureau95 includes a reference to preparatory work on a new national anti-corruption strategy 
entitled  ‘National  Integrity  Programme’.  The  Supreme  Audit  Office  recommended  in  its 
December 2022 report96 to prepare and adopt an anti-corruption programme well in advance97 
to  allow  ministries  and  central  government  offices  sufficient  time  to  prepare  and  plan  their 
respective  tasks  under  the  new  anti-corruption  programme.  However,  no  plans  have  been 
announced  by  the  Government  so  far.  The  Council  of  Ministers’  list  of  legislative  and 
programmatic  work  for  2023  does  not  include  any  reference  to  a  new  anti-corruption  plan 
either98.  No  stakeholder  consultation  has  taken  place  yet99.  Therefore,  there  is  currently  no 
strategy, action plan or new policy initiative on anti-corruption in place in Poland that would 
address prevalent corruption risks for the years to come.100  

Poland’s criminal code was amended to increase the level of penalties for corruption. The 
Polish Criminal Code broadly criminalises corruption101. Following the President’s signature 
on 2 December 2022, the reform of the Criminal Code entered into force on 14 March 2023 
introducing stricter levels of criminal responsibility, higher sanctions and new types of offences 
to  capture  certain  aggravating  circumstances102.  According  to  the  Ministry  of  Justice,  the 

95   Information on the results of operations of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau in 2021. 
96   Supreme Audit Office, Implementation of the Government Programme Counteracting Corruption for the Years 
2018-2020 (December 2022). As previously reported in the 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country chapter on the 
rule of law situation in Poland, pp. 13-14, the Supreme Audit Office has audited the programme, identifying 
several irregularities, while highlighting that its goal was not achieved (11 out of 27), that several delays in 
implementing  key  legislative  tasks  had  taken  place  and  that  there  was  a  lack  of  monitoring  indicators,  of 
implementation  monitoring  in  practice  and  of  reporting  that  would  allow  for  the  verification  of  the 
programme’s  accomplishments,  see  for  more  information  Supreme  Audit  Office  (2022),  Post-audit 
presentation of the audit Implementation of the Government Anti-Corruption Programme for 2018-2020. 
97   For upcoming audits of the Supreme Audit Office in 2023, see Supreme Audit Workplan 2023 information of 

26 January 2023. 

98   The list of legislative and program works of the Council of Ministers.  
99   Information  received  from  Supreme  Audit  Office,  Helsinki  Foundation  for  Human  Rights,  and  Batory 

Foundation in the context of the country visit to Poland. 

100  As previously reported, the fight against corruption, including in key areas of public administration, has been 
included as a priority for the police for 2021-2023. See Priorities of the Commander-in-Chief of the Police for 
2021-2023. These tasks include the strengthening of police activity in counteracting economic crime in the 
areas of tax crime, crimes against the fundamental interests of the European Union and crimes in the area of 
public procurement; as well as increasing police effectiveness in combating corruption in key areas of public 
administration  activity.  Details  on  how  these  priorities  will  be  implemented  and  on  the  concrete  expected 
results are not published.  

101  The key offence penalised by the Criminal Code is bribery of public officials in its passive (accepting a bribe) 
and active (offering a bribe) forms. The term ‘person holding a public position’ as defined by law has a broad 
scope,  including  among  others  the  President  of  the  Republic  of  Poland,  members  of  Parliament,  judges, 
notaries, officers of a public authority, members of local authorities, etc. 

102  Amendments concern the Criminal Code  Articles 228 (passive bribery), 229 (active  bribery), 230 (passive 
paid protection), 230(a) (active paid protection), 305 (distortion in public tendering), while Article 306(b) was 
newly introduced criminalising aggravated types of offences due to the value of the property exceeding  five 
or ten times the amount the amount considered as great value property (i.e. approximately EUR 215,000). By 
introducing the concept of ‘great value’ to the criminal code as an analogy to property of great value (Article 
115(5)),  the  maximum  sanction,  for  example,  for  passive  bribery  of  significant  value  (Articles  228(5)  and 
229(4)), was increased from 12 to 15 years. For all minor cases of bribery (and other corruption crimes), the 
minimum sanction was increased from 1 to 3 month, while the daily rate of fines was increased from 10 to 
100. For previous amendments to the  Criminal Code that  entered into  force on 1 January 2022 to counter 
corruption practices, introducing among others stricter sanctions for corruption, see 2022 Rule of Law report, 

15 

 
                                                           
increase  in  corruption  sanctions  was  necessary  as  the  levels  were  lower  compared  to  other 
crimes103.  Stakeholders  criticised  the  lack  of  consultation  as  well  as  questioned  the 
proportionality  and  justification  of  the  proposed  changes104,  arguing  that  the  challenges  of 
fighting corruption are not necessarily linked to the level of sanctions but to the effectiveness 
of the proceedings  (see also pillar IV). On foreign bribery, effective enforcement in practice 
remains  poor105.  Legislative  amendments  are  under  preparation.  The  Ministry  of  Justice 
presented a new draft law on 2 September 2022 on the liability of collective entities106. The 
initiative  aims  at  removing  the  rule  according  to  which  private  companies  can  be  held 
criminally liable for foreign bribery only after the final instance court sentence convicting the 
natural person(s) involved in the foreign bribery case or after the termination of the proceedings 
for other reasons107. Work is ongoing at Government level and the draft law has not yet been 
transmitted to the Parliament (Sejm)108.  

There  have  been  no  steps  yet  to  enable  a  robust  track  record  of  addressing  high-level 
corruption, as previously identified institutional and practical barriers persist. The 2022 
Rule  of  Law  Report  recommended  to  Poland  to  “ensure  independent  and  effective 
investigations  and  prosecutions,  […]  in  order  to  enable  a  robust  track  record  of  high-level 

Country chapter on the rule of law situation, p. 14. See also Pillar IV on additional concerns related to this 
point. 

103  See the justification of the draft law of the Law on amending the Law - the Criminal Code and certain other 
Acts,  2022,  pp.  1-3,  75-76,  95-96,  making  an  analogy  with  property  crimes,  which  allow  for  more  severe 
sanctions in the aggravated circumstance that the damage is five times the value of the property, to justify 
increased sanctions also for corruption crimes where a high financial benefit is at stake. 

104  Lawyers’  associations  have  complained  about  the  procedure,  the  government  justification  and  lack  of 
consultation, as they see the problem not in the level of sanctions but in the effectiveness of the proceedings, 
and therefore issued a resolution and an open letter questioning the impact of the amendments. Information 
received  by  National  Chamber  of  Legal  Councillors/  Supreme  Bar  Council/  Free  Courts  Initiative  in  the 
context of the country visit to Poland. See in this context also the press release of the Ombudsperson of 18 
July 2022; the Opinion of the Ombudsperson of 15 July 2022 (II.510.1043.2021.PZ); resolution No. 82/2022 
of  the  National  Bar  Council  of  19  November  2022;  Prawo.pl  of  26  November  2022,  ‘Karniści  apelują  o 
zawetowanie drakońskiego prawa’ where a statement signed by over 170 experts in criminal law. Krakowski 
Instytut Prawa Karnego Fundacja, Populist amendment to the criminal law: Act of July 7, 2022 amending the 
Act  -  Penal  Code  and  some  other  acts  (Senate  Paper  No.  762)  (19  July  2022),  pp.  36-39, 
https://kipk.pl/ekspertyzy/populistyczna-nowelizacja-prawa-karnego/.  Polska  Akademia 
Instytut  Nauk 
Prawnych  Zadlad  Kryminologii,  How  neoclassical  criminology,  penal  populism  and  COVID-19  helped  to 
escalate 
(2022), 
https://czasopisma.inp.pan.pl/index.php/ak/article/view/2210. 

repressiveness 

criminal 

Poland 

case 

law 

the 

the 

of 

of 

– 

105  The OECD reports one single conviction of an individual as the only successful prosecution to date. OECD 
Anti-Bribery  Convention,  Phase  4  Report  –  Poland  (8  December  2022),  p.  4.  See  also  Transparency 
International,  Exporting  Corruption  (2022),  pp.  99-100,  reporting  little  or  no  enforcement,  with  one 
investigation having been opened in the period of 2018-2021, while no cases were commenced or concluded 
with sanctions. 

106  Draft law amending the act on liability of collective entities for acts prohibited under penalty. 
107  Ibid. For other reasons includes scenarios such as a  final judgement conditionally terminating the criminal 
proceedings against the natural person, or a ruling to grant that person the right to voluntary surrender, or a 
court ruling to terminate the proceedings against the natural person due to circumstances preventing him/her 
from being punished. In addition, the act includes changes regarding the amount and method of calculating 
penalties for private companies, which would - just like the changes of the criminal liability for companies 
rules - have the potential to address some of the long-standing OECD recommendations on foreign bribery. 
See OECD, Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, Phase 4 Report – Poland (8 December 2022), 
p. 63, urging PL to repeal the natural person conviction requirement for corporate liability and investigations 
as a matter of utmost priority. 

108  The Permanent Committee of the Council of Ministers has provided its analysis on 18 November 2022. 

16 

 
                                                           
corruption cases”. The institutional independence of the anti-corruption institutions in charge 
of  investigating  and  prosecuting  corruption  remains  an  issue.  No  developments  have  taken 
place to separate the position of the Prosecutor-General from the position of Minister of Justice, 
which remains to be held by one and the same person109. Similarly, no developments are noted 
as  regards  the  independence  of  the  Central  Anti-Corruption  Bureau,  which  remains 
subordinated  to  the  executive110.  Concerns  regarding  the  politicisation  of  the  prosecution 
service111 have also been reiterated by stakeholders, including risks of selective application of 
the law and disparity in the treatment of corruption cases for political purposes112. Reportedly, 
in  some  cases  no  investigations  are  initiated,  despite  serious  allegations113.  The  reported 
suspicion of a corruption and fraud case, including on EU funds spending, was not followed 
up. The police however questioned the reporting authorities and other stakeholders114. A further 
issue  is  that  lengthy  investigations  and  prosecutions,  due  in  some  extent  to  the  prosecution 
service’s  insufficient  human  and  technical  resources,  continue  to  present  obstacles  to  the 
effective  prosecution  of  corruption115.  Since  allegations  of  institutionalised  corruption, 

109  See in this context also pillar I, p. 14. 
110  No  changes  have  taken  place  regarding  the  conditions,  under  which  the  Central  Anti-Corruption  Bureau 
operates, including on the rules that allow for the political appointment of the Bureau's leadership. For more 
details, see 2020, 2021 and 2022 Rule of Law Reports, Country Chapters on the rule of law situation in Poland, 
p. 8 and 11 (for 2020), p. 18 (for 2021), p. 16 (for 2022); GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round – Evaluation Report, 
paragraph 78. 

111  For more details, see in this context also further above in Pillar II. 
112  Cf. 2022 Rule of Law Report, County Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 16. Contribution from 
Citizens Network Watchdog Poland/ Civil Development Forum/ Free Courts Foundation/ Institute of Public 
Affairs/ Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights/ Polish Federation of Non-governmental Organisations/ Stefan 
Batory Foundation for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 15. Journalists and media organisations emphasise the 
existence  of  political  corruption  and  the  use  of  corruption  as  a  stick  to  fight  the  opposition;  information 
received from Towarzystwo Dziennikarskie and Izba Wydawców Prasy in the context of the country visit to 
Poland.  There  are  also  allegations  of  little  interest  of  the  prosecution  service  to  follow  up  on  information 
received by the Supreme Audit Office on potential irregularities and corruption with only 2% of notices sent 
to the prosecution service ending in indictment, see Notes from Poland (NfP) of 1 February 2023, ‘State audit 
office  notifies  prosecutors  of  alleged  crimes  by  Polish  oil  giant  Orlen’.  Regarding  concerns  and 
recommendations  to  ensure  the  prosecutorial  independence  from  political  and  executive  influence  in  the 
context of foreign bribery investigations and prosecutions, see also OECD, Implementing  the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention in Poland, Phase 4 Report (December 2022), p. 64, para. 15. See also Oko.press of 14 
August 2022, ‘The defeat of the Ziobro prosecutor's office in the case of Judge Morawiec - The court did not 
believe the evidence of her alleged corruption’.  

113  For example, the investigation and prosecution of the findings of misuse of per diem allowances of a member 
of the European Parliament has so far not taken place after more than two  years  have passed. Information 
received by Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights/ Batory Foundation in the context of the country visit to 
Poland. For more details on prior EU-level investigations conducted and forwarded to the Polish prosecution 
office by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), see Politico of 3 August 2020, ‘Top Polish MEP under 
investigations  over  travel  expenses’;  Euronews  of  4  August  2020,  Ryszard  Czarnecki:  Senior  Polish  MEP 
under  investigation  over  travel  expenses.  See  in  this  context  also  Helsinki  Foundation  (2022),  A  state  of 
accusation: Polish prosecution service 2015-2022. 

114  Information received from the Supreme Audit Office and Batory Foundation in the context of the country visit 
to Poland. The police carried out several criminal investigations and interrogations of Supreme Audit Office 
representatives in connection with the activities of the Supreme Audit Office on the basis of allegations that 
controls of expenditure of state funds were not conducted in accordance with the law, while submissions on 
potential irregularities made by the Supreme Audit Office to the prosecution service were not pursued. 

115  Information received from the  National Chamber of Legal Councillors/ Supreme Bar Council/ Free Courts 
Initiative/ Supreme Audit Office in the context of the country visit to Poland. As previously reported, major 
cases are still pending also in 2022, including for example the case against the Polish Senate Speaker whose 
immunity  was  not  waived  and  statutes  of  limitation  now  bar  some  of  the  charges  brought  forward,  see 
PolskieRadio24.pl of 7 December 2022, ‘Dozens of people charged with corruption in the hospital headed by 

17 

 
                                                           
politicisation  and  the  instrumentalisation  of  corruption  investigations  and  prosecutions 
particularly in high-level corruption cases remain a serious concern116, no progress has been 
made on the implementation of the recommendation in the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

Broad immunities of top executives  who are also  members of  Parliament have not yet 
been limited. The 2022 Rule of Law Report recommended to Poland to “[…] address the broad 
scope of immunities for top executives […] in order to enable a robust track record of high-
level corruption”. Concerns regarding the broad scope of immunities of persons exercising top 
executive functions who are also members of Parliament have not yet been addressed and act 
as  obstacles  to  criminal  accountability  for  corruption  crimes,  in  as  much  as  they  relate  to 
activities  outside  the  member’s  official  duties117.  The  European  Public  Prosecutor’s  Office 
(EPPO) was recognised by Poland as a competent authority for the relevant EU instruments on 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters and the necessary amendments to the Criminal Code 
of Procedure on cooperation between the EPPO and Poland entered into force on 27 December 
2022118. As no steps have yet been taken to ensure independent and effective investigations 
and prosecutions and to address the broad scope of immunities for top executives, there is no 
progress  yet in this regard on the implementation of the recommendation made in the 2022 
Rule of Law Report. 

New impunity provisions have been adopted, jeopardising the efficient fight against high-
level corruption. The 2022 Rule of Law Report recommended to Poland to “[…] abstain from 
introducing impunity clauses in legislation in order to enable a robust track record of high-level 
corruption  cases”119.  On  22  December  2022,  a  new  act  entered  into  force  abandoning 

Grodzki’; Gazeta  Wyborcza  – Szczecin of 8 November 2022, ‘25 patients of the hospital in Zdunów were 
accused of corruption. But what does this have to do with the Speaker of the Senate?’; PolandDaily24 of 7 
January 2022, ‘Senate Speaker Tomasz Grodzki’s corruption accusation mounts’. The case against lawyer and 
former Deputy Prime Minister and former Minister of Education Roman Giertych, see Gazeta Prawna of 29 
March  2022,  ‘The  court  did  not  consent  to  the  prosecutor's  request  to  arrest  Roman  Giertych’;  and  the 
corruption case against the former Minister of Transport, see Polish Press Agency of 14 April 2022, ‘Former 
head of GROM convicted of corruption in the case related to Sławomir Nowak’.  

116  Cf. 2022 and 2021 Rule of Law Report, County Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 16 (for 2022) 

and p. 17 (for 2021).  

117  GRECO  Fifth  Evaluation  Round  –  Compliance  Report,  paragraphs  54-63;  and  GRECO  Fifth  Evaluation 
Round  –  Evaluation  Report,  paragraphs  82-91,  reiterating  its  recommendation  that  in  respect  of  persons 
exercising top executive functions, an in-depth reform of the system of immunities be carried out with a view 
to facilitating the prosecution of corruption offences by excluding these from the scope of immunities and by 
ensuring that the procedure for the lifting of the immunity is transparent and based on objective and fair criteria 
used effectively in practice (see paragraph 87). See also 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the 
rule of law situation in Poland, p. 17. 

118  Law  of  27  October  2022  amending  the  Act  -  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  and  the  Act  -  Law  on  Public 
Prosecution).  See  in  this  context  also  European  Public  Prosecutor’s  Office,  Letter  sent  to  European 
Commission  regarding  Poland’s  refusal  to  cooperate  with  the  EPPO  (16  February  2022),  indicating  that 
cooperation  was  conditioned  on  a  prior  approval  of  an  amendment  of  the  Polish  Criminal  procedure. 
According  to  the  European  Public  Prosecutor’s  Office,  Annual  Report  2022,  the  EPPO  received  in  2022 
seventeen private parties’ reports originating from the non-participating Member States Poland (p. 77), while 
Poland was involved in 31 EPPO cases in 2022 (p. 96). The working arrangement for the cooperation, finalised 
at technical level, has not yet been signed. Poland abstains from joining the EPPO as a full member and remains 
a  non-participating  state.  The  working  arrangement  facilitates  the  cooperation  in  investigations  and 
prosecutions relating to criminal offences within their respective competences, with respect to the exchange 
of strategic and operational information and evidence, extradition and other forms of cooperation, as with other 
third, non-EU countries. 

119  2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 2. 

18 

 
                                                           
prosecution for crimes committed in the context of the organisation of the 2020 presidential 
elections120.  The  draft  law  had  been  introduced  following  lower-level  courts’  decisions121., 
which had argued that the COVID-19 pandemic could not justify that public administrative 
bodies were authorised to act in an extra-legal manner without a legal provision in place122. 
The  new  act  presents  an  amnesty  law  for  local  government  officials.  It  stipulates  that  no 
proceedings  shall  be  initiated,  and  those  already  initiated  shall  be  discontinued,  for  any  act 
relating to the provision of voters’ lists for the 2020 presidential elections to postal operators, 
committed  during  the  state  of  the  pandemic123.  Furthermore,  existing  convictions  shall  be 
removed from the National Register of Criminal Records124. In addition, previously introduced 
impunity  clauses  remain  unchanged  and  in  force125.  Such  exemptions  from  criminal 
responsibility  increase  the  risk  of  corruption  and  may  foster  the  abuse  of  political  and 
administrative power, given the lack of deterrence and the perception of impunity. Therefore, 
no progress has been made on the implementation of the recommendation made in the 2022 
Rule of Law Report. 

120  The Law of 1 December 2022 on the abandonment of prosecution for certain acts related to the organisation 
of the elections for the office of President of the Republic of Poland, ordered for 10 May 2020, was adopted 
by the Parliament - rejecting the veto of the Senate pointing out its unconstitutionality - on 15 December 2022 
and signed by the President on 18 December 2022.  

121  The courts had  had found that the decision of the Prime  Minister ordering the state-owned Polish national 
postal service to prepare and deliver the postal ballot for the 2020 presidential elections was invalid, see Ruling 
of the Provincial Administrative Court in Warsaw of 15 September 2020 in the case no VII SA/Wa 992/20. 
On 3 April 2020, the head of the postal service was removed and replaced by the Deputy Defense Minister, 
who initiated preparations for the elections to meet the electoral deadline before an enabling draft law had 
entered into force. See Notes from Poland of 27 May 2020, ‘70 million zloty bill for Poland’s abandoned 
presidential election’ of 27 May 2020. See justification of the draft law indicating that “the need and purpose 
of adopting the proposed solutions results from the formation of lines of jurisprudence, which are based on a 
reductive and formalistic interpretation made by provincial administrative courts and some common courts. 
These courts, without a clear legal basis for doing so, have ruled on the overstepping of powers by mayors 
who transferred the register of voters […]”. 

122  Ibid. At the time of the Prime Minister’s decision instructing the Post Office to conduct preparations for the 
elections (16 April 2020), Article 99 of the Covid Act (stipulating that the Post Offices as a designated operator 
has the right to request from all public entities access to any registers and directories of personal data) was not 
yet in force. At a later stage, it was declared illegal by the Administrative Court in Warsaw. See Prawo.pl of 
7 June 2022, ‘WSA: Sharing data for postal elections violated GDPR’. Local municipalities had been requested 
by  the  postal  service  to  deliver  voters’  names,  addresses  and  identification  numbers.  Some  had  refused  to 
submit such personal data without legal grounding, see Notes from Poland of 27 May 2020, ‘70 million zloty 
bill for Poland’s abandoned presidential election’. Others submitted voters’ lists and, as a consequence, some 
Mayors were prosecuted and convicted, see Prawo.pl of 22 December 2022, ‘The law is already in force – 
there will be no penalties for mayors who have handed over voter lists to the Postal Office’. Reportedly, the 
Civic Network Watchdog filed notifications to the prosecutor’s office of 200 cases against mayors that had 
submitted voters’ lists, most of which are still pending. Batory Foundation of 9 December 2022, ‘Corrupt gifts 
on the occasion of December 9’. 

123  Art.  1  of  the  Act  of  1  December  2022  on  the  abandonment  of  prosecution  for  certain  acts  related  to  the 
organisation of the elections for the office of President of the Republic of Poland, ordered for 10 May 2020. 

124  Art. 2(1) ibid. 
125  In April 2022, amendments to Art. 483(1) of the Commercial Company Code Act were introduced abolishing 
liability of management and supervisory boards for actions to the detriment of the company, see Polish News 
of  17  January  2023,  ‘”Lex  Obajtek”,  changes  in  the  Code  of  Commercial  Companies  –  Comments  of 
politicians’; Gazeta Wyborcza of 17 January 2023, ‘Another ‘impunity law’ pushed through by PiS: They call 
it ‘lex Lotos’, ‘lex Obajtek’’. For more information on state-owned enterprises, see further above in this text. 
On impunity clauses in public procurement rules, first introduced during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, 
and proposals introduced for the draft law on aid for Ukrainian refugees in 2022, see 2022 Rule of Law Report, 
Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, pp. 19-20. 

19 

 
                                                           
There has been no progress yet to strengthen Poland’s lobbying rules. The 2022 Rule of 
Law Report recommended to Poland to “strengthen the existing integrity rules by introducing 
lobbying rules […]”126. The 2018-2020 anti-corruption programme127 had included the revision 
of the lobbying regulation, dating back to 2005128. This has, however, not materialised so far. 
Poland  does  not  have  lobbying  rules  in  place  obliging  persons  exercising  top  executive 
functions  to  disclose  their  contacts  with  interest  representatives129.  This  lack  of  rules  was 
highlighted  in  public  debates  in  December  2022,  when  the  Government  was  extensively 
lobbied  by  the  pharmaceutical  industry  during  the  negotiations  of  amendments  to  the 
Reimbursement  Act130.  Concerns  also  persist  as  to  the  effectiveness  of  the  registers  for 
lobbyists  currently  in  place131.  Therefore,  there  has  been  no  further  progress  on  the 
recommendation made in the 2022 Rule of Law Report.  

There  have  been  no  steps  yet  to  standardise  Poland’s  asset  declarations  and  control 
system.  The  2022  Rule  of  Law  Report  recommended  to  Poland  to  “strengthen  the  existing 
integrity rules by introducing […] a standardised online system for asset declarations of public 
officials  and  Members  of  Parliament.”  This  was  foreseen  in  the  2018-2020  anti-corruption 
programme132, but has not materialised so far133. As a result, a uniform, centralised submission 
and  monitoring  system  is  still  lacking,  and  the  level  of  digitalisation  of  politicians’  asset 

126  2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 2. 
127  The resolution No. 207 of 19 December 2017 of the Council of Ministers – the Governmental Anti-Corruption 
Programme  for  years  2018-2020,  (M.P.  z  2018  r.  item  12).  See  also  above  in  the  paragraph  on  the  Anti-
Corruption Programme. 

128  Law of 7 July 2005 on Lobbying. The applicable law defines lobbying, establishes a public register as well as 
determines  obligations  and  sanctions  for  unregistered  lobbyists.  While  most  of  the  objectives  to  provide 
educational  material  and  trainings  have  been  met,  the  implementation  of  important  legislative  initiatives 
specified in the programme has not been completed. These include, in particular, the draft law on Liability of 
Collective Entities, the reform of the asset declaration system, and the revision of the lobbying legislation, as 
previously reported in the 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, 
p. 14.  

129  GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round  - Compliance Report, paragraphs 32-36. In practice, there are three lobby 
registers in place, one for the Government (based on the lobbying regulation), one for the lower chamber of 
Parliament  (Sejm),  and  one  covering  its  higher  chamber  (Senate).  For  lobbying  activities  towards  the 
government,  the  Minister  of  Internal  Affairs  and  Administration  is  the  supervisory  body  maintaining  the 
register. For members of Parliament, the two chambers have supervisory tasks over lobbying activities. 
130  For more details, see, for instance, GazetaPrawna of 27 December 2022, ‘A story of one amendment. The 
secret  services  suspect  the  pharmaceutical  industry  of  lobbying’  (27  December  2022);  see  also 
BakerMcKenzie of 13 October 2022, Poland: Amendment to the new Reimbursement Act. 

131  Registration rates are declining and the oversight is not systematic and no information is available on whether 
sanctions have been applied to unregistered lobbyists, as previously reported in 2022  Rule of Law Report, 
Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 17. 

132  The  programme  was  based  on  resolution  No.  207  of  19  December  2017  of  the  Council  of  Minister  –  the 
Governmental Anti-Corruption Programme for the years 2018-2020, (M.P. z 2018 r. item 12). The Programme 
was accompanied by an  Action Plan, Governmental  Anti-Corruption Programme  for the  years 2018-2020. 
While most of the objectives to provide educational material and trainings have been met, the implementation 
of  important  legislative  initiatives  specified  in  the  programme  has  not  been  completed.  These  include,  in 
particular, the draft law on Liability of Collective Entities, the reform of the asset declaration system, and the 
revision of the lobbying legislation, as previously reported in the 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter 
on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 14.  

133  As previously reported, the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau had prepared a draft regulation, however, it has 
not been made public, while the technical work towards a more standardised, electronic system was suspended 
until appropriate legislative steps were to be taken. Access to document requests by stakeholders regarding the 
regulation were declined, see 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, 
p. 18. 

20 

 
                                                           
declaration continues to be low134. Most declarations are still filled out by hand and in a variety 
of formats135. Therefore, there has been no progress on the recommendation made in the 2022 
Rule of Law Report.  

The dedicated legislation to protect whistleblowers continues to be under preparation. 
Following  the  deliberations  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  in  early  March  2022,  the  draft  law 
transposing the relevant EU directive was not yet forwarded to the Parliament (Sejm) and no 
timeline  is  available,  according  to  the  Ministry  of  European  Affairs136.  The  draft  law, 
representing a political priority for the Government, shifts the competence as the administrative 
authority137 and reporting channel for whistleblower disclosures from the Ombudsman Office, 
as  originally  planned,  to  the  National  Labour  Inspectorate138.  Stakeholders  have  flagged 
concerns  regarding  this  envisaged  change  for  institutional,  legal  and  practical  reasons 
surrounding  the  National  Labour  Inspectorate139.  Until  amendments  are  introduced  to  the 
current whistleblower framework, whistleblowers’ protection is provided for in different legal 
provisions140. 

New  measures  have  entered  into  force  increasing  the  transparency  of  political  party 
finance, yet concerns remain regarding party donations and election campaigns. On 1 July 
2022, legislation entered into force requiring political parties to publish up-to-date information 
of  the  register  of  donations141  and  the  register  of  contracts142  of  political  parties  in  a  party 

134  GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round – Evaluation Report, recommendations x and xi, paragraphs 72 and 78.  
135  Ibid. 2022 and 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 18 (for 
2022) and p. 19 (for 2021), where it was reported that, at least, 16 different forms are in use. Provisions on 
asset declarations are scattered among several legislative acts.  

136  Due to the transposition delay since 17 December 2021, the Commission decided to refer Poland to the Court 
of Justice for failure to transpose the Directive on time, see Press release, The European Commission decides 
to refer 8 Member States to the Court of Justice of the European Union over the protection of whistleblowers 
(IP 23/703 of 15 February 2023). For more information on the steps taken by Poland to transpose the directive, 
see https://www.whistleblowingmonitor.eu/?country=poland. 

137  Article 1 and 57 of the draft law of 22 July 2022 of the act on protection of persons who report breaches of 

law. 

138  According to information received from the Ombudsman Office in the context of the country visit to Poland, 
the Ombudsman Office welcomes this change due to its more limited mandate to infringements caused by 
organs, not by individuals.  

139  The Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights and the Batory Foundation raised stakeholder concerns regarding 
the effectiveness of whistleblower protection, if the National Labour Inspectorate were to become the authority 
to receive whistleblower disclosures due to the lack of resources and competence and risks of politicisation 
due  its  political  appointments,  pursuant  to  information  received  from  the  Helsinki  Foundation  for  Human 
Rights and the Batory Foundation in the context of the country visit to Poland.  

140  Poland reported that whistleblowers are benefiting from protection on the basis of general principles of labour 
law and provisions protecting whistleblowers from retaliation, such as anti-discrimination provisions and the 
provisions that prohibit mobbing in the place of employment, while reviews found that the effectiveness of 
the  labour  code  provisions  in  practice  is  low  and  only  covering  part  of  the  working  population.  See  UN 
Conference  of  the  State  Parties  to  the  UN  Convention  against  Corruption  (2015),  Implementation  Review 
Group – Poland, p. 5, and OECD (2015), Poland: Follow up to the Phase 3 Report and Recommendations 
(2015), pp. 5 and 29. 

141  New Article 25(6)-(13) of the Political Parties Act. The register of donations is in electronic form, searchable 
and made available in a public information bulletin operated by the political parties, including information 
only on those donations exceeding the amount of approximately EUR 2,500 (i.e. PLN 10,000) of a person in 
a  single  year,  excluding  membership  fees.  In  case  of  failure  of  compliance  with  the  new  obligation,  an 
administrative monetary sanction is applied (equal to 50% of the amount of payments made). 

142  New  Articles 27(a)-(c) of the Political Parties Act;  Article 4 of the  Law amending the  Criminal  Code and 
certain  other  acts  (14  October  2021). The  register  of  contracts  is  in  electronic  form  and  made  public.  The 

21 

 
                                                           
information bulletin available to the public143. Stakeholders consider the public availability of 
this information as a significant step toward more transparency in political party finance, noting 
however that the reliability of the published data still needs to be tested144. Publication practice 
still  varies145.  Stakeholders  highlighted  the  practice  of  simultaneous  donations  by  a  large 
number  of  individuals  of  the  same  state-owned  enterprise  to  individual  politicians  as  a 
concern146. Since these donations are just below the annual ceiling for donations from natural 
persons,  they  raise  questions  as  to  conflicts  of  interest  and  the  effectiveness  of  the  ban  of 
donation from legal entities to political parties and of political campaign finance transparency 
in practice147. In this context, some stakeholders flag systemic challenges relating to clientelist 
networks  around  state-owned  enterprises  and  an  increasing  institutionalisation  and  scale  of 
such practice that contributes to inequality in the election process148. The Supreme Audit Office 
was not granted the possibility to audit whether such donations of State Treasury companies 
were in  accordance  with  the applicable rules,  on grounds of  a lack of a legal  basis to  audit 
companies,  despite  a  state  ownership  of  more  than  50%149.  In  view  of  the  parliamentary 
elections planned in autumn 2023, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 

register includes information on the contract number, data and place of the contract signature, contract period, 
parties to the contract and their representatives, the subject, value and mode of the contract. In case of failure 
of compliance with the new obligation, the same administrative monetary sanctions apply as for the register 
of donations, see footnote above. 

143  As previously reported, the registers were introduced by Act amending the Criminal Code and certain other 
acts (14 October 2021), see also 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in 
Poland, p. 18. 

144  See also 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 19. 
145  The information is published on the party’s website partly in downloadable pdf-format (see website of the 
Civic  Platform  party  at  http://bip.platforma.org/rejestr_umow_i_wplat/  or  the  Left  Together  party  at 
https://partiarazem.pl/informacje/bip ); partly as embedded tables (see websites of the Law and Justice party, 
http://bip.pis.org.pl/rejestr-wpat, and the New Left party at https://bip.lewica.org.pl/rejestr-wplat); while some 
parties have  not  yet  made the relevant registers available at all (see the  website of the  New Hope  party at 
https://wolnosc.pl/). 

146  Information received from Helsinki Foundation and Batory Foundation in the context of the country visit. In 
2022, journalists uncovered that on the same day in 2019 a total of 22 managers of the state-owned petrol 
company Orlen transferred donations in support of election campaigns of two politicians amounting to equal 
shares of each approximately EUR 16.000. See in this context TVN24 of 31 October 2022, ‘Together with PiS 
–  Paracampaign’,  and  TVN24  of  5  August  2022,  ‘Money  flows  to  the  party.  Payments  from  MEPs  and 
members of supervisory boards of State Treasury companies’, raising allegations of quid-for-pro, i.e. whoever 
was given a good job in a state-owned company by the authorities should repay according to party custom. 
Notably, the list of donors for the year 2019 is not published, but it is accessible on the website of the National 
Electoral Commission (https://wybory.gov.pl). See also on election campaign support for a former Minister 
of  Energy  from  employees  of  a  state-owned  mining  company  that  his  ministry  supervised,  TVN24  of  7 
November 2022, ‘”Chris is my colleague, I paid for his position”. Who else paid for the position and paid 
money for PiS campaign?’. See also Business Insider of 21 December 2022, ‘The authorities of state-owned 
companies  generously  subsidies  PiS’.  TVN24  of  27  February  2023,  ‘Payments  to  the  PiS  account  from 
managers of state-owned companies. “Pre-established pumping station for the party fund’. 
Art. 25 of the Act of 27 June 1997 on political parties prohibits the acceptance of donations from legal entities. 
148  Contribution from Citizens Network Watchdog Poland, Civil Development Forum, Free Courts Foundation, 
Institute of Public Affairs, Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, Polish Federation of Non-governmental 
Organisations, Stefan Batory Foundation for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 18. 

149  Reportedly, the prosecution service has refused to initiate proceedings in five cases brought by the Supreme 
Audit Office, upon  which the Supreme Audit Office  has filed complaints to the Warsaw district court, see 
Notes from Poland of 1 February 2023, ‘State audit office notifies prosecutors of alleged crime by Polish oil 
giant Orlen’, and Euractiv of 19 December 2022, ‘Polish opposition notifies prosecution of irregularities in 
state  fuel  merger’.  See  also  Polityka  of  11  February  2023,  ‘The  PiS  machine  to  siphon  millions  out  of 
companies. NIK Controllers are left without any attention’. 

22 

 
                                                           
Rights (ODIHR) recommended not to introduce amendments to fundamental elements of the 
electoral  legal  framework  this  year  ahead  of  the  parliamentary  elections  and  to  consult  the 
public150, while some stakeholders fear corruption to become a more prominent feature in the 
run up to the elections151.  

Concerns of corruption risks exist in public procurement. In October 2022, the government 
enacted amendments (commonly referred to as the ‘Legal Shield’) simplifying and accelerating 
administrative  procedures  that  apply  also  to  contracts  concluded  under  public  procurement 
law152.  The  law  now  permits  the  modification  of  public  procurement  contracts  due  to 
significant,  unforeseeable  cost  changes  that  the  contracting  authority  could  not  have 
envisaged153. Suspicion of irregularities in a call for proposals issued by the National Centre 
for  Research  and  Development  raised  the  public’s  awareness.  While  investigations  were 
initiated by the Anti-Corruption Bureau relating to EU structural funds that were procured in 
fast-track  procedures  in  this  case154,  stakeholders  flagged  concerns  of  increasing  political 
corruption  in  the  allocation  of  funds  to  specific  entities  just  before  the  elections155.  Among 
others, these concerns were triggered by the significant  increase of the investigated  call for 
proposals’  budget  during  the  proposal  assessment  phase156,  and  the  awards  of  grants  to 
companies  that  were  established  shortly  before  the  call  or  did  not  provide  for  sufficient 

150  The Draft Law of 26 January 2023 amending the Election Code and certain other acts combines several draft 
laws introduced to the lower chamber of Parliament on 22 December 2022, many of which were adopted in 
the second and third, final reading on the same day of 26 January 2023. The Law would introduce extensive 
amendments to the 2011 Election Code, and some changes to selected provisions of the 1997 Act on Political 
Parties,  the  1997  Law  on  Restrictions  on  Conduct  of  Business  Activities  by  Persons  Performing  Public 
Functions, the 2000 Law on the National Criminal Register, the 2000 Law on Local Referendum, the 2003 
Law on Nationwide Referendums, and several other legislative acts. See OSCE/ODIHR, Opinion on the Draft 
Act amending the Election Code and certain other Acts (Senate paper No. 911) – Poland (20 February 2023), 
p. 2. The draft Act would introduce extensive amendments to the 2011 Election Code and some changes to 
selected provisions of the 1997 Act on Political Parties, the 1997 Act on Restrictions on Conduct of Business 
Activities by Persons Performing Public Functions, the 2000 Act on the National Criminal Register, the 2000 
Act on Local Referendum, the 2003 Act on Nationwide Referendums and several other legislative acts. 
151  Information  received  from  media  and  journalists  organisations/  journalists  (Towarzystwo  Dziennikarskie; 
Stowarzyszenie  Polskie  Telewizje  Lokalne  i  Regionalne;  Fundacja  Bona  Notitia;  Izba  Wydawców  Prasy; 
Stowarzyszenie Polskich Mediów) in the context of the country visit to Poland.  

152  See Arts. 44 and 48 of the Act of 7 October 2022 on Amending Certain Laws to Simplify  Administrative 
Procedures for Citizens and Businesses. See in this context also European Semester report for Poland (2023), 
p. 11, emphasising that, in 2022, approximately half of public tenders had only one bidder participating, which 
was the highest percentage among all EU countries. The Flash Eurobarometer on Businesses’ attitudes towards 
corruption in the EU shows that 22% of companies in Poland (EU average 26%) think that corruption has 
prevented them from  winning a public tender or a public procurement contract in practice in the last three 
years. Flash Eurobarometer 524 on Businesses’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU (2023).  

153  Ibid, Article 48 of the Act. 
154  See  Anti-Corruption Bureau, CBA control at the National Centre for Research and Development (2023). See 
also  Research  Professional  News  of  23  February  2023,  ‘Polish  research  funder  probed  by  anti-corruption 
bureau’. The respective call for proposals financed with EU structural funds was launched in October 2022 
for research projects in cybersecurity, digitisation of industry, and digital creative technologies. 

155  Information received from journalists and media associations (Towarzystwo Dziennikarskie; Stowarzyszenie 
Polskie  Telewizje  Lokalne  i  Regionalne;  Fundacja  Bona  Notitia;  Izba  Wydawców  Prasy;  Stowarzyszenie 
Polskich Mediów) and Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, Batory Foundation, and Associations of Judges 
and Prosecutors in the context of the country visit to Poland, linking the indicated awards and changes in the 
call on EU structural funds to political corruption and the upcoming elections in autumn 2023.  

156  Ibid. The budget saw an increase from EUR 138 million to EUR 178 million, see Oko.press - Rule of Law, 
‘What  is  the  NCR&D  scandal  about?  Huge  grants  for  suspicious  firms’  (28  February  2023), 
https://ruleoflaw.pl/what-is-the-ncrd-scandal-about-huge-grants-for-suspicious-firms/. 

23 

 
                                                           
evidence of their financial stability157. Members of Parliament have filed a request for a control 
by the Supreme Audit Office of this EU structural funds-related case158. 

III.  MEDIA PLURALISM AND MEDIA FREEDOM 

In  Poland  freedom  of  the  press  and  other  means  of  social  communication  and  freedom  of 
expression are constitutionally protected. The Constitution stipulates that the public interest in 
radio  broadcasting  and  television  shall  be  safeguarded  by  the  media  regulator,  the  National 
Broadcasting Council (KRRiT), whose members are appointed by the Sejm (lower chamber of 
the Parliament), the Senate and the President of the Republic. The Law on Broadcasting, and 
the Press  Law are  key instruments which establish, respectively, a detailed legal  framework 
regulating the media regulator and safeguards for the exercise of the journalistic profession, 
including the relevant rules governing the access to public information159.  

In spite of positive changes introduced in 2021, some concerns have been raised on the 
functional independence of the media regulator. The 2021 amendments to the Broadcasting 
Act modified the procedure for the rejection of the annual report of the KRRiT by the Sejm and 
the  Senate,  which  results  in  the  automatic  expiry  of  the  mandate  of  the  KRRiT’s  members, 
primarily by introducing additional formal requirements in the rejection procedure. In spite of 
this legal change, the full independence of the new Board of the media regulator is called into 
question160.  The  2023  Media  Pluralism  Monitor  reports  medium  risks  in  relation  to  the 
independence and effectiveness of the media regulator161. In August 2022, the Senate elected 
one  member  of  the  KRRiT.  Subsequently,  in  September  2022,  the  Sejm  appointed  two 
members, and in October 2022, the President of Poland appointed two members of the KRRiT. 
Stakeholders  consider  that  the  current  composition  of  the  KRRiT  may  further  increase  its 
politicisation162. Representatives of the media community and NGOs pointed out divergences 
in KRRiT’s approach when exercising its oversight powers163 over public service media on the 
one hand and private broadcasters on the other164. Certain stakeholders have also questioned 

157  Ibid. Reportedly, one grant award-winning company had made financial losses since its establishment in 2020, 
while the other had been established as virtual entity 10 days before the extended deadline with a small capital 
of approximately EUR 1,000, while scoring just above the minimum score and still being granted 20% of the 
call’s budget. Other concerns related to the extension of the deadline for submissions just before the closing 
of the deadline. See also Polish News, ‘The scandal at the National Center for Research and Development. 
National  Center  for  Research  and  Development,  “Fast  track”  competition.  New  arrangements,  conflict  of 
interest (23 February 2023). 

158  See Science Business of 8 March 2023, ‘Police in Poland launch investigation into fast-track grants disbursed 

by national research funding agency’. 

159  Poland ranks 57 in the 2023 Reporters without Borders World Press Freedom Index (compared to 66th in the 

previous year). 

160  Contribution from the Consortium of seven NGOs for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 28; Contribution from 
the Polskie Towarzystwo Dziennikarskie for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p.16. See also the 2022 Rule of 
Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 21. 

161 2023 Media Pluralism Monitor, p. 11. 
162  Liberties 2023 Rule of Law Report – Poland p. 17. 
163  Article 18 of the Broadcasting  Act authorizes KRRiT to investigate  and sanction the promotion of actions 
contrary to law and Poland’s raison d’Etat, and attitudes and views contrary to morality and social good. 
164 In 2023 the Council of Europe Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists alerted 
about the proceedings launched against the radio stations  TOK FM and Radio  Zet. On  28 April 2023, the 
KRRiT imposed a financial penalty of PLN 80,7 thousand on the TOK FM radio station, submitting that 
TOK FM progremmes promoted illegal activities,  views and attitudes contrary  to  morality and social 
good. See: Press.pl of 28 April 2023, “Przewodniczący KRRiT Maciej Świrski nakłada 80 tys. zł kary 
dla nadawcy Tok FM”Also, in December 2022 KRRiT launched proceedings in relation to a documentary 

24 

 
                                                           
whether the legal framework provides for an effective appeal mechanism against the KRRiT 
chairman’s decisions165. 

There has been no further progress to ensure fair, transparent and non-discriminatory 
procedures for the granting of operating licences to media outlets. The 2022 Rule of Law 
Report  recommended  to  Poland  to  “ensure  that  fair,  transparent  and  non-discriminatory 
procedures  are  adhered  to  for  the  granting  of  operating  licences  to  media  outlets”.  While, 
following the Presidential veto of 27 December 2021,a legislation that would have entailed a 
possibility not to grant broadcasting concessions to operators directly or indirectly controlled 
by persons registered outside the European Economic Area was effectively blocked there were 
no  notable  actions  to  address  the  2022  Rule  of  Law  Recommendation.  Some  stakeholders 
reported that the exercising of KRRiT oversight powers could be seen as an attempt to create 
legal uncertainty around the licences granted to certain media166. Therefore, there has been no 
further progress on the implementation of the recommendation made in the 2022 Rule of Law 
Report. 

The  level  of  media  ownership  transparency  increased.  The  entry  into  force  of  the  2021 
amendment  of  the  Law  on  Broadcasting,  adopted  in  the  context  of  the  transposition  of  the 
revised  Audiovisual  Media  Services  Directive,  introduced  further  requirements  regarding 
media ownership transparency. The new rules require from broadcasters, video-on-demand and 
providers of video-sharing platforms to make available information on partners, shareholders 
and beneficial owners of their companies to the Central Register of Beneficial Owners and on 
their websites. Moreover, these providers are also obliged to disclose information on all media 
services offered by them or belonging to the same company, such as newspapers, magazines 
or  video-sharing  platforms.  Consequently,  due  to  this  legislative  change,  the  2023  Media 
Pluralism Monitor reported an improvement as regards media ownership transparency167. 

While legal safeguards for editorial independence are in place, there are claims of political 
influence over the media in practice. The Polish legal order includes a set of provisions related 
to  editorial  independence  enshrined  in  the  Press  Law  and  the  Law  on  Broadcasting. 
Nonetheless,  stakeholders  have  highlighted  several  allegedly  politically-inspired  cases  of 
interference  in  editorial  decisions  of  media  outlets168.  Examples  include  the  deletion  of  an 

broadcast by the TVN24 channel. See: Contribution from the Consortium of seven NGOs for the 2023 Rule 
of Law Report, p. 27; Contribution from the Reporters Without Borders for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, 
p.15; Liberties 2023 Rule of Law Report – Poland p. 15. 

165  Stakeholders’ concerns are related to the fact that an appeal would in last instance be examined by the Chamber 
of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs; see in this  respect page 6 above. Liberties 2023 Rule of Law 
Report – Poland p. 15. 

166  For instance, in December 2022 KRRiT initiated proceedings in relation to a documentary broadcast by the 
TVN24  channel.  As  reported by  Liberties,  “the  broadcaster  risks  a  fine  of  up  to  PLN  986,010.  Moreover, 
should the examination lead KRRiT to a conclusion that the broadcaster is ‘in flagrant breach’ of the conditions 
set out in the Broadcasting Act or in the terms of the licence, KRRiT would be legally obliged to withdraw the 
broadcaster’s  licence’.  Liberties  2023  Rule  of  Law  Report  –  Poland  p.  17.  Similarly,  the  TOK  FM 
representatives consider that the penalty imposed by the KRRiT on 28 April 2023 may be seen as a sign 
of the potential reluctance from the side of the KRRiT to extend the TOK FM licence,  which will expire 
on 3 November 2023.  See: press.pl of 8 May 2023, “"Biała księga"  - korespondencja nadawcy Radia 
Tok FM z przewodniczącym KRRiT w sprawie kary nałożonej za "podręcznik dla Hitlerjugend"” . 

167  2023 Media Pluralism Monitor, p. 9. 
168  Contribution from the Consortium of seven NGOs for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 30. In that respect, see 
also an open letter of 14 November 2022 of the Ombudsperson addressed to the Prime Minister, calling for 

25 

 
                                                           
interview critical towards the governmental tax reforms from the online website of a regional 
media  outlet  owned  by  Polska  Press,  bought  by  state-owned  oil  giant  PKN  Orlen,  and  the 
blocking,  by  the  management  board,  of  a  piece  of  investigative  journalism  in  the  local 
newspaper “Dziennik Wschodni”169. The 2023 Media Pluralism Monitor reports high risks in 
relation to editorial independence from commercial and owners influence, pointing to the lack 
of  explicit  regulatory  or  self-regulatory  measures  enabling  to  disclose  actual  or  potential 
conflicts of interests of media owners170. 

There  has  been  no  progress  to  enhance  the  independent  governance  and  editorial 
independence of public service media, amid ongoing concerns related to the independent 
reporting by public broadcasters. The 2022 Rule of Law Report recommended to Poland to: 
“strengthen  the  rules  and  mechanisms  to  enhance  the  independent  governance  and  editorial 
independence of public service media taking into account European Standards on public service 
media”. The National Media Council remains competent for the appointment and removal of 
the  management  and  supervisory  boards  of  the  Polish  Television,  the  Polish  Radio  and  the 
Polish  Press  Agency.  KRRiT  has  powers  related  to  the  charters  of  duties  of  public  service 
media,  and  to  their  yearly  programming  and  financial  plans.  It  also  assesses  yearly  reports 
regarding the performance of their public service remit. The 2023 Media Pluralism Monitor 
highlights high risks in relation to the independence of public service media, underlining that 
in  practice,  the  appointments  and  dismissals  of  the  public  service  media  management  and 
supervisory  boards  are  guided  by  political  choice  and  that  KRRiT  does  not  systematically 
monitor  the  performance  of  public  service  media171.  Similarly,  stakeholders  report  about 
KRRIT’s inaction with regard to multiple cases of biased reporting by public service media172, 
in particular on opposition leaders and minorities173 and selective and unbalanced reporting174. 
No  further  measure  has  been  taken  to  strengthen  the  rules  and  mechanisms  to  enhance  the 
independence  of  public  service  media.  Therefore,  there  has  been  no  progress  on  the 
implementation of the recommendation made in the 2022 Rule of Law Report.  

State  controlled  entities  allocated  advertising  mainly  to  pro-government  media.  While 
there were no new legislative developments concerning the framework on the allocation of state 
advertising,  stakeholders  reiterate  challenges  related  to  fairness  in  distribution  of  such 
advertising175. According to one recent study, Government-friendly media are reported to be 
the  main  beneficiaries  of  advertising  coming  from  state-owned  companies176.  The  study 
concludes  that  the  distribution  of  state  advertising  can  be  seen  as  an  instrument  of  political 

measures to protect the freedom and plurality of media, following the acquisition of Polska Press by PKN 
Orlen. 

169 Liberties 2023 Rule of Law Report – Poland p. 20. 
170 2023 Media Pluralism Monitor p.16. 
171 2023 Media Pluralism Monitor, p. 19. 
172  Contribution from the Consortium of seven NGOs for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 27. 
173  Contribution from the ILGA for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 19. 
174  Contribution from the International Press Institute for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 19, Contribution from 

the Consortium of seven NGOs for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 27. 

175  Contribution from the Reporters Without Borders p.18. See also a report on the public funds expenditure on 
advertising of 30 March 2022, presented by Wirtualne Media and a report advertising spending by state owned 
companies, presented by Notes from Poland. 

176  See: money.pl of 3 March 2022, ‘1,23 mld zł wydały Spółki Skarbu Państwa na reklamę. Pieniądze szły do 
"przyjaznych"  mediów”’,  Rzeczpospolita.pl  of  28  February  2023,  ”Kampanie  informacyjne  rządu  warte 
miliony. Opozycja łączy je z nadchodzącymi wyborami”. 

26 

 
                                                           
manipulation, serving to further polarise attitudes in society. Civil society also points out to the 
lack of the regular monitoring of state advertising spending177.  

Challenges are reported with regard to the right of access to information by journalists. 
The International Press Institute reports cases of denying access to public information without 
any  justification,  or  routinely  refusing  communication  or  interviews  with  certain  media  by 
public officials connected to the ruling parties178.  Similarly, the 2023 Media Pluralism Monitor 
reports  medium  risks  in  relation  to  the  protection  of  the  right  to  information  and  refers  to 
frequent  and  various  forms  of  denial  of  access  to  public  information  for  journalists179. 
Stakeholders also point out to delays in judicial procedures relevant for protecting the right to 
information. Consequently, due to the length of such procedures many journalists do not make 
use fully of their rights under the Law on the Access to Public Information180. 

Journalists have continued to encounter difficulties in their activities. A freelance journalist 
was arrested in February 2022 by the Polish Security Services and accused of conducting illegal 
espionage on behalf of the Russian state181. Press freedom organisations have raised concerns 
about  the  lack  of  evidence  for  arresting  the  journalist182  who  still  remains  in  pre-trial 
detention183.  Associations  of  journalists  highlight  the  long-lasting  criticism  of  the  Criminal 
Code provision on offences for insulting State symbols, senior public officials and religion184. 
They  consider  that  it  potentially  affects  the  framework  for  journalists’  protection  given  that 
defamation could be sufficiently tackled on the basis of the civil liability framework185. In 2023, 
the Council of Europe Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists 
registered four alerts concerning Poland with two considered as defamation proceedings against 
journalists186. In addition, the journalistic community is affected by a lack of  self-regulatory 
measures that could contribute to the strengthening of the status of journalists187. The incentives 
for fostering such self-regulation appear to be weakened by the increased polarisation of the 
journalistic community188.  

177  Contribution from the Consortium of seven NGOs for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 29, Liberties 2023 

Rule of Law Report – Poland p. 17. 

178  Contribution from the International Press Institute for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 19. 
179 2023 Media Pluralism Monitor, p. 11.  
180  Under Article 3a of the Press Law; see Contribution from the Consortium of seven NGOs for the 2023 Rule 

of Law Report, p. 32. 

181  The freelance journalist Pablo González was arrested in February 2022 in the city of Rzeszów by the Polish 
Security Services, where he was reporting on the refugee crisis caused by Russia’s war of aggression against 
Ukraine. He was accused of conducting illegal espionage on behalf of Russia. 
182  Contribution from Human Rights Watch for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 18. 
183  On 28 February 2023, it was reported that a district court prolonged the detention  until 24 May 2023; see 
Euractiv  of  28  February  2023,  ‘Sąd  w  Lublinie  przedłużył  areszt  hiszpańskiego  dziennikarza.  Jest 
podejrzewany o szpiegostwo’; as also confirmed by the Council of Europe Platform to promote the protection 
of journalism and safety of journalists. 

184  Contribution from the Reporters Without Borders for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p.15. 
185 The Resolution 1577 (2007) of Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe of 4 October 2007 on towards 
decriminalisation of defamation, encouraged Member States to favour the use of administrative or civil law to 
deal with defamation cases.  

186  For instance, in October 2022, an investigative  journalist  Tomasz Piątek  was convicted by the Warszawa-
Śródmieście District Court in Warsaw of criminal defamation (Article 212 of the Polish Criminal Code) and 
sentenced to eight months of community service. However, the judicial proceeding was criticised due to the 
fact that Tomasz Piątek did not attend any hearings as he was not duly informed about them. 

187  Contribution from the Reporters Without Borders for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p.15. 
188  Contribution from the Polskie Towarzystwo Dziennikarskie for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p.16. 

27 

 
                                                           
IV.  OTHER INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO CHECKS AND BALANCES 

Poland is a representative democratic republic with a directly elected President, a bicameral 
Parliament (Sejm and Senate) and a Constitutional Tribunal in charge of constitutional review 
of laws. The Sejm has the final decision-making power when adopting laws. The President of 
the Republic, the Senate, a group of 15 Members of the Sejm, the Council of Ministers and a 
group of at least 100 000 citizens have the right to propose new legislation. The independent 
Ombudsperson  is  tasked  with  safeguarding  the  freedoms  and  rights  of  persons  and  citizens 
specified in the Constitution and other normative acts. The Supreme Audit Office is the chief 
organ  of  state  audit,  subordinate  to  the  Sejm,  acting  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of 
collegiality. 

The  practice  of  adopting  laws  through  procedures  not  providing  for  adequate 
consultations persists. Stakeholders189 have reiterated concerns about the pace of the adoption 
of laws and the fact that laws are often submitted as proposals of members of Parliament instead 
of Government proposals190, an approach which means public consultation is not required191. 
Under the RRP, Poland has committed to amend the Rules of Procedure of the Sejm, the Senate 
and the Council of Ministers to enhance the use of public consultations and impact assessments 
in the law-making process192. The reform would also limit the use of fast-track procedures to 
well-specified and exceptional cases. No legislative steps have been taken so far. The only part 
of the legislative procedure that allows for a reflection on opinions related to draft laws is in 
the  Senate193.  The  quality  of  law-making  and  the  frequent  changes  in  legislation  remain  a 
significant  cause  for  concern  about  the  effectiveness  of  investment  protection  among 
companies in Poland194. 

On 1 January 2023, Poland had 46 leading judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights pending implementation, an increase of eight compared to the previous year195. At 
that time, Poland’s rate of leading judgments from the past 10 years that remained pending was 
at 56% (compared to 48% in 2022), and the average time that the judgments had been pending 

189  Written contribution provided by Consortium of seven NGOs p. 34 and MEDEL p. 23. 
190  Ombudsperson’s annual activity report for 2021 as presented by the Ombudsperson on 30 November 2022. 
Also  NGOs  signalise  that  the  dialogue  between  the  Government  and  CSOs  has  been  subject  to  a  gradual 
reduction  in  recent  years,  while  now  NGOs  are  either  not  invited  or  given  a  very  short  time  to  provide 
comments on draft legislation (see written contribution provided by Consortium of seven NGOs (p. 41). 
191  It is noted that throughout 2022 out of 277 draft laws brought  to the Sejm a  formal urgent procedure  was 
adopted as regards 14 drafts (mostly concerning issues of energy and aid to Ukraine; cf. written contribution 
provided by the Supreme Court (p. 19)). At the same time, 18% of draft laws coming from the Government 
were subject to a formal urgent procedure (cf. written contribution provided by Consortium of seven NGOs, 
p. 35). 

192  Milestone F2.1, set out in the Annex to the Council Implementing Decision of 14 June 2022 on the approval 

of the assessment of the recovery and resilience plan for Poland (9728/22). 

193  Information received from representatives of the Ombudsperson’s Bureau during the virtual country visit to 

Poland.  

194  Figure 54, 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
195 The  adoption  of  necessary  execution  measures  for  a judgment  by  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  is 
supervised by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. It is the Committee’s practice to group 
cases against a State requiring similar execution measures, particularly general measures, and examine them 
jointly. The first case in the group is designated as the leading case as regards the supervision of the general 
measures and repetitive cases within the group can be closed when it is assessed that all possible individual 
measures needed to provide redress to the applicant have been taken. 

28 

 
                                                           
implementation was 5 years and 6 months (compared to 5 years and 10 months in 2022)196. 
The  oldest  leading  judgment,  pending  implementation  for  17  years,  concerns  the  excessive 
length  of  proceedings  before  administrative  bodies  and  courts  and  absence  of  an  effective 
remedy197. On 15 June 2023, the number of leading judgments pending implementation has 
increased to 49198. 

There has been no progress as regards the appointment of members of the College of the 
Supreme  Audit  Office,  putting  at  risk  its  effective  functioning.  The  2022  Rule  of  Law 
Report recommended to Poland to “[e]nsure a more systematic follow-up to findings by the 
Supreme Audit Office and ensure a swift appointment of the Members of the College of the 
Supreme Audit Office”199. The Marshal of the Sejm has however still not appointed any new 
member of the College, which now consists of nine out of 19 members200. The Supreme Audit 
Office reported that this puts it at risk of losing the capacity to carry out  its functions as of 
September 2023, including on the sound and independent audit of public funds’ expenditure201. 
A  Director  General  of  the  Supreme  Audit  Office  was  still  not  appointed,  and  the  Office’s 
budget was not increased202, which may further impact its proper functioning203. Auditors face 
severe obstacles when carrying out audits in state-owned companies, being denied access to 
the necessary documentation204. The public prosecution does not follow up on the Supreme 
Audit Office’s requests205, while auditors themselves are subject to criminal investigations206. 
Given that there have been no further appointments of College Members of the Supreme Audit 
Office, and that no more systematic follow-up has been noted to its findings, there has been no 
progress on the implementation of the recommendation made in the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

196 All figures are calculated by the European Implementation Network and are based on the number of cases that 
are considered pending at the annual cut-off date of 1 January 2023. See the Contribution from the European 
Implementation Network for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 6. 

197  Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 1 February 2005, Beller v. Poland, 51837/99. 
198  Data according to the online database of the Council of Europe (HUDOC). 
199  See the 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 2. 
200  According 

information  provided  by  the  Supreme  Audit  Office  on  its  official  website: 
https://www.nik.gov.pl/o-nik/kolegium-nik/. According to the written submission of the Supreme Audit Office 
made in the context of the virtual country visit to Poland, the President of the Supreme Audit Office has so far 
made 34 requests for appointment of College members of which seven have been accepted. 

the 

to 

201  According to the information provided by representatives of the Supreme Audit Office. 
202  According to the written submission of the Supreme Audit Office made in the context of the virtual country 
visit to Poland. The submission explains that without the requested increase of the annual budget, the Supreme 
Audit Office is no longer in position to notably ensure an increase of salaries to align them with salaries offered 
for similar positions in other state institutions.  

203  According to the written submission of the Supreme Audit Office made in the context of the virtual country 
visit to Poland. The Marshal of the Sejm, without legal basis, requested from the Sejm’s Committee for State 
Audit an opinion on the candidate-Director-General proposed by the President of the Supreme Audit Office. 
According to the  written submission, one  of the  main consequences of the refusal to appoint the Director-
General ‘is the institutional paralysis of the NIK [Supreme Audit Office] and the disruption of its activities 
not only in terms of audit (obstruction of audit activities) but also organizational (lack of Director General), 
which in a democratic state of law cannot take place’. 

204  According to a letter of the President of the Supreme Audit Office of 29 December 2022 addressed to the 

Marshal of the Sejm (KPK-KPP.011.104.2022). 

205  Written input provided by the representatives of the Supreme Audit Office. On that point, see the 2022 Rule 

of Law Report, Country chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 28. 

206  According to a letter of the President of the Supreme Audit Office of 29 December 2022 addressed to the 

Marshal of the Sejm (KPK-KPP.011.104.2022). 

29 

 
                                                           
A law empowering an administrative committee to assess and decide whether individuals 
should be deprived of the right to hold public office related to the handling of public funds 
for up to 10 years, raises serious concerns and triggered amendments. The new law207 sets 
up  a  special  state  committee,  as  part  of  the  public  administration,  tasked  with  conducting 
inquiries  determining  whether  senior  public  officials  and  senior  management  members  in 
companies  with  State  Treasury’s  shares  acted  in  the  period  of  2007-2022  under  Russian 
influence  to  the  detriment  of  the  public  interest.  The  Committee  will  be  composed  of  nine 
members,  all  appointed  by  the  Sejm208.  It  will  be  empowered  to,  amongst  others,  obtain 
classified information, change or repeal administrative decisions considered as adopted under 
Russian influence to the detriment of Polish State’s interests and deprive individuals, by means 
of an administrative decision, of the right to hold public office related to the handling of public 
funds for up to 10 years (so-called remedial measure)209. Such remedial measure would become 
immediately applicable210, and could be subject only to a limited review by the administrative 
judiciary211. According to stakeholders, the new law gives rise to serious concerns related to 
the principle of division of powers, as it would grant de facto judicial competences to impose 
sanctions of criminal nature to a body of a strictly administrative character212. The Commission 
issued a statement that it is very concerned by the adoption of the law, as it raises concerns that 
it could be used to affect the possibility of individuals to run for public office213. On 2 June 
2023,  the  President  of  the  Republic  tabled  amendments  to  the  law214.  On  8  June  2023,  the 
Commission decided to open an infringement procedure as regards the law, by sending a letter 
of formal notice to Poland215. On 30 June 2023, the Polish authorities sent a reply to the letter 
of formal notice, which is being assessed by the Commission. 

207  Law of 14 April 2023 on the State Committee to examine Russian influence on the internal security of the 

Republic of Poland in years 2007-2022. It entered into force on 31 May 2023. 

208  The Prime Minister will appoint the President of the Committee from among its members; cf. Article 9(1) and 

Article 11(1) of the Law. 

209  Cf. Article 16, Article 36(1) item 2 and Article 37(1), of the Law. 
210  According to Article 15(4) of the Law,  ‘administrative decisions, orders and resolutions of the Committee 

shall be final.’ 

211  The judicial review of the administrative courts is limited to the requirement of respect of the law interpreted 
in a narrow  way and  would  not extend to the review of  the correctness of the assessment of  facts and the 
weighing of evidence. 

212  See the opinion of the Ombudsperson of 28 December 2022 (II.510.1126.2022.MT); opinion of the Polish 
Cities’ Association of 3 January 2023; opinion of the Association of the Regions of the Republic of Poland of 
1 December 2022. The Law also includes shortcomings related to the criminal procedural law – see in that 
respect the opinion of the National Prosecutor of 12 December 2022 (1001-1.0280.326.202). Views have also 
been  expressed  by  Members  of  Parliament  that  the  committee  could  be  used  to  unduly  target  political 
opponents ahead of the parliamentary elections scheduled for October 2023. Cf. Wp.pl of 11 January 2023, 
‘Prezydent duda znów postawi się PiS? Komisja ds. wpływów rosyjskich może nie powstać’ and Polish Press 
Agency of 11 January 2023, ‘Opozycja o komisji ds. badania wpływów rosyjskich: bubel prawny. PiS: trzeba 
pokazać prawdę o złym postępowaniu poprzednich rządów’. 

213  Statement of the European Commission of 30 May 2023 on the Polish law establishing a State Committee for 

the Examination of Russian Impacts on internal Security. 

214  On 16 June 2023, the Sejm adopted the amendments which were subsequently transmitted to the Senate, where 
they remain pending. If adopted with final effect, the amendments would i.a. introduce judicial review of the 
Committee’s decisions by ordinary courts instead of by the administrative judiciary suspending automatically 
the effects of the contested Committee’s decisions, remove the Committee’s competence to deprive individuals 
from the right to hold public office, and change the composition of the Committee which would consist of 
experts instead of Members of the Sejm. Cf. press release of the President of the Republic of 2 June 2023. 
215 The Commission considers that the new law violates: (i) the principle of democracy (Articles 2 and 10 TEU); 
(ii) the principles of legality and non-retroactivity of sanctions (Article 49 Charter) and general principles of 

30 

 
                                                           
Amendments  have  been  adopted  to  the  Criminal  Code,  which  stakeholders  consider 
incompatible with national and international law. On 2 December 2022, the President of 
the  Republic  signed  a  law  bringing  substantive  changes  to  the  Criminal  Code216.  Certain 
amendments  are  considered  by  stakeholders  as  introducing  disproportionate  sanctions, 
incompatible  with  requirements  of  the  ECHR,  for  instance  life  imprisonment  without  a 
possibility of parole. The Ombudsperson, the National Bar Council and an important number 
of specialists of criminal law criticised the amendments, considering them to be in violation 
with national and international law217.  

Some progress has been made to improve the framework in which the Ombudsperson 
operates in relation to funding. The 2022 Rule of Law Report recommended to Poland to 
improve  the  framework  in  which  […]  the  Ombudsperson  operate[s],  taking  into  account 
European  standards  on  Ombudsinstitutions218.  On  7  December  2022,  the  Ombudsperson 
dismissed one of its deputies whose activities had focused on the situation related to migration 
at  the  Polish-Belarussian  border,  generating  criticism  from  civil  society  organisations219.  A 
new case of the use of Pegasus software was detected, and the Ombudsperson, in addition to 
the  President  of  the  Supreme  Audit  Office,  raised  concerns  in  that  respect220.  The  budget 
allocated to the Ombudsperson’s office was increased in 2023, but remains insufficient221. In 
the  light  of  this  increase,  there  has  been  some  progress  on  the  implementation  of  the 
recommendation made in the 2022 Rule of Law Report. The Ombudsperson was reaccredited 

legal certainty and res judicata; (iii) the rights to effective judicial protection (Article 47 Charter), ne bis in 
idem and the protection of professional secrecy (Article 7 Charter); (iv) the requirements of EU law relating 
to data protection (GDPR and Article 8 Charter). See press release IP/23/3134. 
216  The law of 7 July 2022 amending the law – Criminal Code and certain other laws. 
217  The amendments would, among others, also prolong or abolish altogether the statute of limitations for specific 
criminal offences; lower from 15 to 14 years the threshold for bearing responsibility for murder on the basis 
of the Criminal Code; increase punishments for several criminal offences such as rape, causing serious bodily 
injury,  robbery,  directing  a  terrorist  group.  Amongst  others  the  Ombudsman  and  the  Supreme  Court  have 
underlined that the criminal sanctions introduced are disproportionate and are not warranted in view of the 
available data related to criminality. See the press release of the Ombudsperson of 18 July 2022. See also the 
Opinion of the Ombudsperson of 15 July 2022 (II.510.1043.2021.PZ); resolution No. 82/2022 of the National 
Bar  Council  of  19  November  2022;  Prawo.pl  of  26  November  2022,  ‘Karniści  apelują  o  zawetowanie 
drakońskiego prawa’ where a statement signed by over 170 experts in criminal law.  
218  2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 2. 
219  See  an  open  letter  of  8  December  2022  signed  by  90  NGOs,  as  published  by  the  Batory  Foundation 

(Batory.org.pl of 8 December 2022).  

220  The  Pegasus  software  was  reportedly  used  against  a  mayor  of  a  city  who,  at  the  time  was  engaged  in  the 
preparation  of  the  political  campaign  of  one  of  the  opposition  parties  ahead  of  the  2019  parliamentary 
elections.  See  Rzeczpospolita.pl  of  3  March  2023,  ‘Prezydent  Sopotu  inwigilowany  Pegasusem  przed 
wyborami  w  2019  r.’  The  Ombudsperson  addressed  an  open  letter  to  the  Minister  for  Interior  and 
Administration, indicating that the Polish law does not permit the use of software such as Pegasus in view of 
its interference  with the rights of individuals. The President of  the  Supreme  Audit Office shared the same 
concerns: see Ombudsperson’s press releases of 10 January 2023 and of 2 May 2023. See also the 2022 Rule 
of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 17 and 24. 

221  Notably as regards the need to ensure that the salary of the Ombudsperson’s employees match the raise of the 
inflation rate. Also the budget does not allow to fully cover expenses related to the aid necessary to deal with 
individual cases of persons from Ukraine. Information received from representatives of the Ombudsperson’s 
Office  in  the  context  of  the  virtual  country  visit.  See  also  a  report  of  November  2022  by  the  Helsinki 
Foundation of Human Rights ‘Ratownicy. Biuro Rzecznika Praw Obywatelskich w latach 2015-2022’, p. 53. 
See also written contribution from ENNHRI for the 2023 Rule of Law Report (p. 10). 

31 

 
                                                           
with  ‘A’  status  in  March  2023  by  the  UN  Global  Alliance  of  National  Human  Rights 
Institutions (GANHRI)222.  

There  has  been  no  progress  to  improve  the  framework  for  the  civic  space,  while  civil 
society remains vibrant. The 2022 Rule of Law Report recommended to Poland to “[i]mprove 
the framework in which civil society […] operate[s], taking into account European standards 
on civil society […]”223. Poland continues to have a broad and vibrant civil society, consisting 
of more than 120 000 NGOs. According to CIVICUS, the civic space continues to be rated as 
obstructed224.  On  9  June  2022,  the  Polish  authorities  increased  the  amount  of  tax  which 
taxpayers  may  assign  to  public  benefit  organisations225.  A  draft  law  aimed  at  ensuring 
‘transparency  of  non-governmental  organisations’  and  a  draft  law  amending  the  offence  of 
religious  beliefs  have  not  been  withdrawn  despite  criticism  expressed  by  stakeholders226. 
Stakeholders raised concerns about continued attacks on NGOs by representatives of public 
authorities,  notably  on  organisations  involved  in  providing  humanitarian  aid  at  the  Polish-
Belarussian border227, abortion activists228, and representatives of the LGBTIQ community229 

222  Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI), Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA), 

Accreditation Status as of 26 April 2023.  

223  See the 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 2.  
224  Rating  given  by  CIVICUS.  Ratings  are  on  a  five-category  scale  defined  as:  open,  narrowed,  obstructed, 
repressed and closed. In 2020 and 2021, civic space was considered as ‘narrowed’. According to CIVICUS, 
Poland has not implemented the recommendations relating to the civic space addressed to Poland under the 
UN universal periodic review. See the CIVICUS press release of 28 March 2023 and the CIVICUS ‘People 
Power under Attack’ 2022 report, p. 43. 

225  Law  of  9  June  2022  amending  the  Law  on  Personal  Income  Tax  (Official  Journal  of  2022  item  1265). 
According to the amendments, since 1 January 2023, taxpayers may decide to transmit 1,5% of their Personal 
Income Tax to public benefit organisations, instead of 1% which applied prior to the amendment. 

226  They  remain  pending,  while  no  significant  development  occurred  since  July  2022;  see  2022  Rule  of  Law 
Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 29; see also written contribution provided 
by Client Earth – Prawnicy dla Ziemi (pp. 21-22) and by the Consortium of seven NGOs pp. 38-39. 

227  This reportedly concerns activists and journalists  who report on allegedly illegal  “push-backs” of refugees 
from Syria, Iraq or Afghanistan by the public authorities. See written contribution provided by Consortium of 
seven NGOs (p. 39) and a report of the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights of June 2022, ‘Where law does 
not reach – 11 months of humanitarian crisis at Polish-Belarussian border’. 

228  On 14 March 2023, an activist who aided a woman to obtain an emergency contraception was convicted to 
eight months of limitation of liberty. Cf. Prawo.pl of 14 March 2023, ‘Pomoc w aborcji ukarana - aktywistka 
skazana na prace społeczne’. Concerns have also been raised as regards the possibility for women fleeing the 
war in Ukraine to have a safe access to legal abortion in Poland (see written contribution by Human Rights 
Watchdog (p. 20)) as well as over the misuse of the ‘conscience clause’ which allows doctors to refuse to carry 
out  an  abortion  if  this  is  against  their  religious  belief  (see  Wyborcza.pl  of  10  February  2023,  ‘Ciotka 
zgwałconej 24-latki, której odmówiono aborcji: Niedzielski i rzecznik praw pacjenta kłamią!’; DW of 2 May 
2023,  ‘Outcry  in  Poland  over  abortion  law’).  In  June  2022,  the  Minister  for  Health  issued  a  regulation 
extending  the  dataset  mandatorily  recorded  by  Polish  doctors  in  a  national  register,  including  a  record  of 
pregnancy. Women’s and reproductive rights groups have raised concerns that such sensitive health data could 
be  misused  by  authorities  to  intimidate  or  prosecute  women  who,  for  instance,  experience  spontaneous 
miscarriages. 

229  Cases  continued  against  the  creators  of  ‘Hate  atlas’  (a  platform  containing  an  online  map  tracking 
municipalities that adopted the so-called ‘anti-LGBT ideology’ resolutions). Overall seven court cases were 
started  before  courts  by  local  authorities  in  that  respect.  In  October 2022,  one  charge  was  dropped  and  in 
December 2022, two district courts dismissed the lawsuits in favour of the ‘Hate atlas’ creators. See written 
contributions provided by Consortium of seven NGOs (p. 39-40) and by ILGA-Europe - the European Region 
of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, and Intersex Association (p. 20). The latter contribution 
(pp. 22-23) also refers to unfavourable statements of public officials against LGBTIQ initiatives, including by 
incentivising the police to carry out background checks on members of LGBTIQ NGOs. On 23 November 
2022, an LGBTIQ activist was arrested for organising a protest against allegedly transphobic policies of his 

32 

 
                                                           
and – more broadly – about shortcomings in the financing of NGOs in Poland230. As in 2022, 
civil society is playing a crucial role in providing help to refugees from Ukraine231, following 
the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine232. The President of the Republic vetoed for the 
second time a law seeking to substantially increase the control over schools’ functioning by 
central government’s representatives who would be in position to decide, amongst others, on 
admitting  or  refusing  access  of  individual  NGOs  to  extracurricular  activities  of  schools233. 
Overall,  there has  been no progress  on the implementation  of recommendation made in  the 
2022 Rule of Law Report. 

university  (the  activist  was  convicted  by  a  summary  judgment,  i.e.  without  trial).  In  September  2022,  the 
Prosecutor-General requested the Supreme Court to rule that a transsexual person ought to take to court, in 
addition  to  parents,  also  the  non-divorced  spouse  and  children  in  any  case  related  to  the  gender  legal 
recognition. This would constitute an additional obstacle in such cases for transsexual persons, according to 
i.e. the NGO ‘Campaign against Homophobia’ in Poland (cf. Prawo.pl of 5 April 2023, ‘W oczekiwaniu na 
decyzję SN: Uzgodnienie płci wymaga pozywania dzieci i małżonka?’). 

230  The  concerns  related  to  a  reported  continued  practice  of  public  authorities  to  allocate  a  significant  part  of 
NGOs’ funds to entities ideologically close to the governing majority (see written contributions provided by 
Consortium  of  seven  NGOs,p.  40).  According  to  the  Government,  the  Public  Benefit  Activity  and 
Volunteering  Act  of  24  April  2003  lays  down  the  following  principles  for  cooperation  between  public 
administrations and NGOs: subsidiarity, sovereignty, partnership, efficiency, fair competition and openness. 
231  Financial  support  for  the  initiative  aimed  at  helping  refugees  from  Ukraine  came,  among  others,  from 
government programs supporting the development of civil society in Poland, and from the Commission (see 
press release of 28 October 2022). 

232  See the 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 28. 
233  The  veto  took  place  on  15  December  2022;  as  regards  the  law  concerned,  see  2022  Rule  of  Law  Report, 

Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 29. 

33 

 
 
 
                                                           
Annex I: List of sources in alphabetical order* 

* The list of contributions received in the context of the consultation for the 2023 Rule of Law report 
can 
https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2023-rule-law-report-targeted-
found 
stakeholder-consultation_en.  

be 

at 

Association of European Administrative Judges (AEAJ) (2023), Written contribution received in the 
context of the 2023 Rule of Law Report preparation.  

Associations of judges and prosecutors (2022), Open letter addressed to the President of the Republic, 
Prime Minister and Marshals of the Sejm and the Senate, 4 October 2022. 

Baker  McKenzie  (2022),  Poland:  Amendment  to  the  new  Reimbursement  Act,  27  September  2022 
https://insightplus.bakermckenzie.com/bm/healthcare-life-sciences/poland-amendment-to-the-new-
reimbursement-act.  

Batory Foundation (2022), Corruption gifts on 9 December (Korupcyjne prezenty z okazji 9 grudnia), 
9 December 2022 https://www.batory.org.pl/blog_wpis/korupcyjne-prezenty-z-okazji-9-grudnia/.  

Batory  Foundation 
https://www.batory.org.pl/oswiadczenie/list-do-rpo-w-sprawie-odwolania-dr-hanny-machinskiej/.  

letter  of  8  December  2022  signed  by  90  NGOs 

(2022),  Open 

Business Insider (2022), The authorities of state-owned companies generously subsidies PiS (Władze 
2022 
spółek 
https://businessinsider.com.pl/biznes/wladze-spolek-skarbu-panstwa-hojnie-dotuja-pis/n5qqk3f  

December 

Państwa 

Skarbu 

dotują 

hojnie 

PiS), 

21 

Central  Anti-Corruption  Bureau  (2023),  CBA  control  at  the  National  Centre  for  Research  and 
https://www.cba.gov.pl/en/news/1019,CBA-control-at-the-National-Centre-for-
Development, 
Research-and-Development.html.  

Central  Anti-Corruption  Bureau  (2021),  Information  on  activities  of  the  Central  Anti-Corruption 
Bureau in 2021 https://cba.gov.pl/ftp/dokumenty_pdf/Informacja_2021.pdf.  

CIVICUS (2023), People Power under Attack 2022 report 

 https://monitor.civicus.org/.  

CIVICUS  (2023),  press  release  of  28  March  2023  https://www.civicus.org/index.php/media-
resources/news/united-nations/geneva/6336-poland-complete-failure-in-implementing-civic-space-
recommendations.  

ClientEarth – Prawnicy dla Ziemii, Written contribution received in the context of the 2023 Rule of Law 
Report preparation. 

Committee to Protect Journalists, Written contribution received in the context of the 2023 Rule of Law 
Report preparation. 

Consortium of 7 NGOs (Citizens Network Watchdog Poland; Civil Development Forum; Free Courts 
Foundation; Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights; Institute of Public Affairs; National Federation of 
Polish NGOs; Stefan Batory Foundation), Written contribution received in the context of the 2023 Rule 
of Law Report preparation. 

34 

 
Council of Europe – Parliamentary Assembly, Monitor for Poland statement on the mission to Poland 
https://pace.coe.int/en/news/9015/poland-pace-monitor-urges-all-political-parties-to-set-aside-narrow-
party-interest-and-address-the-rule-of-law-crisis.  

Council  of  Europe  -  Parliamentary  Assembly,  Resolution  1577(2007)  of  4  October  2007  Towards 
decriminalisation 
https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-
en.asp?fileid=17588&lang=en  

defamation. 

of 

Council  of  Europe  –  Platform  to  promote  the  protection  of  journalism  and  safety  of  journalist 
https://fom.coe.int/en/alerte/detail/107637244.  

Council  of  Europe  –  Secretary  General,  Poland’s  implementation  of  the  European  Convention  on 
Human  Rights:  Secretary  General’s  Report:  https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/poland-s-
implementation-of-the-european-convention-on-human-rights-secretary-general-s-report.  

Council of Ministers (2017) – the Governmental Anti-Corruption Programme for years 2018-2020, 19 
December 2017. 

Court of Justice, orders of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 14 July 2021, of 27 October 
2021, of 21 April 2023 in the case C-204/21 R, Commission v. Poland. 

Disciplinary Officers for ordinary Court judges: decisions of 8 October 2022 (RDSP.8011 47 2022); of 
7  December  2022  (K-0083-90/22;  SD  55/22),  of  3  January  2023  (K-0083-76/22;  SD  44/22);  of  27 
March 2023 (RDSP.8010.58.2022 of 27 March 2023). 

doRzecz.pl (2023), CT judges write again to Przyłębska. We disclose contents of the letter (Sędziowie 
TK  ponownie  piszą  do  Przyłębskiej.  Ujawniamy 
listu),  28  February  2023 
https://dorzeczy.pl/kraj/410773/sedziowie-tk-ponownie-pisza-do-przylebskiej-mamy-tresc-listu.html.  

treść 

DW.pl (2023), Outcry in Poland over abortion law, 2 May 2023 https://www.dw.com/en/poland-outcry-
over-abortion-law/a-
64586531#:~:text=%22The%20doctors%20invoked%20the%20%27conscience%20clause%27%20as
%20justification,beliefs.%20This%20was%20what%20happened%20in%20this%20case.  

Dziennik  Gazeta  Prawna  (2022),  A  story  of  one  amendment.  The  secret  services  suspect  the 
pharmaceutical industry of lobbying (Historia jednej poprawki. Służby specjalne podejrzewają lobbing 
branży farmaceutycznej), 27 December 2022 
https://www.gazetaprawna.pl/wiadomosci/kraj/artykuly/8618091,ustawa-refundacyjna-leki-farmacja-
sluzby-specjalne.html.  

Dziennik Gazeta Prawna (2022), The court did not consent to the prosecutor’s request to arrest Roman 
Giertych (Sąd nie przychylił się do wniosku prokuratury o aresztowanie Romana Giertycha), 29 March 
https://www.gazetaprawna.pl/wiadomosci/kraj/artykuly/8390149,aresztowanie-romana-
2022 
giertycha-sad-prokuratura.html.  

EU Whistleblowing Monitor, Status of transposition of the Directive on the Protection of Persons Who 
Report Breaches of Union Law https://www.whistleblowingmonitor.eu/?country=poland.  

Euractiv (2023), A court in Lublin has prolonged the arrest of the Spanish journalist. He is suspected 
of  espionage  (Sąd  w  Lublinie  przedłużył  areszt  hiszpańskiego  dziennikarza.  Jest  podejrzewany  o 
szpiegostwo), 28 February 2023 https://www.euractiv.pl/section/bezpieczenstwo-i-obrona/news/sad-w-
lublinie-przedluzyl-areszt-hiszpanskiego-dziennikarza-jest-podejrzewany-o-szpiegostwo/.  

35 

 
 
Euractiv  (2022),  Polish  opposition  notifies  prosecution  of  irregularities  in  state  fuel  merger,  19 
December 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/polish-opposition-notifies-
prosecution-of-irregularities-in-state-fuel-merger/.  

2022 

Euronews (2022), Ryszard Czarnecki: Senior Polish MEP under investigation over travel expenses, 4 
August  2022  https://www.euronews.com/2020/08/04/ryszard-czarnecki-senior-polish-mep-under-
investigation-over-travel-expenses.  

European  Commission  (2023),  Press  release  IP/23/842,  The  European  Commission  decides  to  refer 
POLAND to the Court of Justice of the European Union for violations of EU law by its Constitutional 
Tribunal https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_842.  

European Commission, Reasoned Proposal for a Council decision on the determination of a clear risk 
of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law (COM/2017/0835 final - 2017/0360 
(NLE)). 

European  Court  of  Human  Rights,  judgment  of  15  March  2022,  Grzęda  v.  Poland,  43572/18. 
European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 3 February 2022, Advance Pharma Sp. Z O.O v. Poland, 
1469/20. 

European  Court  of  Human  Rights,  judgment  of  22  July  2021,  Reczkowicz  v.  Poland,  43447/19. 
European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 8 November 2021, Dolińska  – Ficek and Ozimek v. 
Poland, 49868/19. 

European  Court  of  Human  Rights  (2023),  Communicated  cases  information  of  7  March  2023 
(Application  no.  10374/22,  Joanna  PALIŃSKA  against  Poland,  and  33  other  applications  
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22respondent%22:[%22POL%22],%22documentcollectionid2%22:
[%22COMMUNICATEDCASES%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-223549%22]}.  

European  Court  of  Human  Rights’  press  release  ECHR  053(2023)  of  16  February  2023  
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=003-7573075-
10409301&filename=Non-
compliance%20with%20interim%20measure%20in%20Polish%20judiciary%20cases.pdf.  

European  Network  of  National  Human  Rights  Institutions,  State  of the rule  of law  in  the  European 
Union  (2023)  –  written  contribution  submitted  in  the  context  of  the  2023  Rule  of  Law  Report 
preparation 

2022 
Office, 
European 
https://www.eppo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2023-02/EPPO_2022_Annual_Report_EN_WEB.pdf.  

Prosecutor’s 

Annual 

Report 

Public 

of 

European Public Prosecutor’s Office (2022), Letter sent to European Commission regarding Poland’s 
refusal to cooperate with the EPPO, 16 February 2022 https://www.eppo.europa.eu/en/news/letter-sent-
european-commission-regarding-polands-refusal-cooperate-eppo.  

Gazeta Wyborcza (2022), 25 patients of the hospital in Zdunów were accused of corruption. But what 
does this have to do with the Speaker of the Senate? (25 pacjentom szpitala w Zdunowie zarzucono 
korupcję.  Ale 
z  marszałkiem  Senatu?),  8  November  2022 
https://szczecin.wyborcza.pl/szczecin/7,34939,29117598,25-pacjentom-szpitala-w-zdunowie-
zarzucono-korupcje-ale-co.html.  

to  ma  wspólnego 

co 

36 

 
Gazeta Wyborcza (2023), Another ‘impunity law’ pushed through by PiS: They 37al lit ‘lex Lotos’, 
‘lex  Obajtek’  (Kolejna  „ustawa  bezkarnościowa”.  Mówią  o  niej  „lex  Lotos”,  „lex  Obajtek”),  17 
January 2023 https://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,29363816,kolejna-ustawa-pod-obajtka.html#S.embed_link-
K.C-B.1-L.1.zw.  

Gazeta Wyborcza (2023), The aunt of the raped 24-years old who was denied abortion: Niedzielksi and 
the Ombudsperson for patient’s rights are lying (Ciotka zgwałconej 24-latki, której odmówiono aborcji: 
Niedzielski i rzecznik praw pacjenta kłamią!), 10 February 2023  
https://bialystok.wyborcza.pl/bialystok/7,35241,29451365,tylko-w-wyborczej-ciotka-zgwalconej-24-
latki-niedzielski.html?disableRedirects=true.  

GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round – Evaluation Report. 

Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, A state of accusation. Polish prosecution service 2016-2022 – 
a new report of the Helsinki Foundation, 14 March 2022 https://hfhr.pl/en/news/a-state-of-accusation-
polish-prosecution-service-2016-2022--a-new-report-of-the-helsinki.  

Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (2022), Where law does not reach – 11 months of humanitarian 
crisis at Polish-Belarussian border – Report, June 2022 https://hfhr.pl/publikacje/raport-gdzie-prawo-
nie-siega-11-miesiecy-kryzysu-humanitarnego-na-polsko-bialoruskim.  

https://bialystok.wyborcza.pl/bialystok/7,35241,29451365,tylko-w-wyborczej-ciotka-zgwalconej-24-
latki-niedzielski.html?disableRedirects=true.  

Human  Rights  Watch,  Written  contribution  received in the context  of the  2023 Rule of  Law  Report 
preparation. 

ILGA-Europe - the European Region of the international Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, and Intersex 
Association, Written contribution received in the context of the 2023 Rule of Law Report preparation. 

International Press Institute, Written contribution received in the context of the 2023 Rule of Law Report 
preparation. 

Iustitia – association of judges (2023), letter of 1 March 2023, Małgorzata Manowska again makes it 
impossible to implement rulings of the CJEU as regards neojudges (Małgorzata Manowska ponownie 
uniemożliwia  wykonanie  orzeczeń  TSUE 
co  do  neosędziów)  https://www.iustitia.pl/79-
informacje/4642-pani-malgorzata-manowska-ponownie-uniemozliwia-wykonanie-orzeczen-tsue-co-
do-neosedziow.  

Lex  Super  Omnia  –  association  of  prosecutors  (2023),  A  masked  cuckoo  in  the  nest  for  festivities 
(Zamaskowane kukułcze jajo na święta), 5 April 2023 https://lexso.org.pl/2023/04/05/zamaskowane-
kukulcze-jajo-na-swieta/.  

Lex  Super  Omnia  –  association  of  prosecutors 
https://lexso.org.pl/2023/04/05/stanowisko-zarzadu-stowarzyszenia-prokuratorow-lex-super-omnia-z-
4-kwietnia-2022-r-w-sprawie-nierownego-traktowania-i-dyskryminacji-prokuratora-pawla-
burzynskiego/.  

(2023),  Statement  of  4  April  2023 

Magistrats Europeens pour la Democratie et les Libertes (MEDEL), Written contribution received in 
the context of the 2023 Rule of Law Report preparation. 

37 

 
Money.pl (2022), PLN 1,23 billion spent by State Tresury Companies on advertisement. The money 
went to “friendly” media outlets (1,23 mld zł wydały Spółki Skarbu Państwa na reklamę. Pieniądze szły 
do „przyjaznych” mediów), 30 March 2022,  https://www.money.pl/gospodarka/1-23-mld-zl-wydaly-
spolki-skarbu-panstwa-na-reklame-pieniadze-poszly-do-przyjaznych-mediow-
6752761664883232a.html.  

National Bar Council (2022), resolution No. 82/2022 of 19 November 2022. 

National Council for the Judiciary (2022), Position of 22 December 2022 WO 41.43.2022. 

National Council for the Judiciary (2023), Position of 10 January 2023, WO.41.5.2023. 

National Council for the Judiciary (2023), Press release of 10 February 2023, WO.41.5.2023. 

National  Council  for  the  Judiciary,  resolutions  of  13  July  2022  concerning  the  applications  Nos. 
9988/22, 8687/22, and 8076/22 examined by the ECtHR (WO 41.9.2022); of resolutions of 27 July 
2022 concerning the application No. 48530/21 examined by the ECtHR (WO 41.11.2022); concerning 
the  applications  Nos.  54461/21,  46453/21,  and  159258/22;  resolutions  of  29  July  2022  (WO 
41.17.2022) concerning the applications Nos. 21998/21, 22918/21, 25545/21, 24398/21 examined by 
the  ECtHR;  (WO  41.16.2022)  concerning  the  applications  Nos  41097/20,  53778/20,  1510/22, 
31053/21, 1210/22, 42668/21, 60827/21; (WO 41.15.2022) concerning the application No. 41097/20; 
(WO  41.14.2022)  concerning  the  application  No.  1412/21;  (WO  41.13.2022)  concerning  the 
applications Nos. 26638/21, 50702/21, 50708/21. 

National Council for the Judiciary, statement of 2 September 2022, WO 420.89.2022, UD 378. 

Notes from Poland (2020), 70 million zloty bill for Poland’s abandoned presidential election, 27 May 
https://notesfrompoland.com/2020/05/27/70-million-zloty-bill-for-polands-abandoned-
2020 
presidential-election/.  

Notes from Poland (2022), Polish state firms direct advertising cash to government-friendly media, data 
show,  1  April  2022  https://notesfrompoland.com/2022/04/01/polish-state-firms-direct-advertising-
cash-to-government-friendly-media-data-show/.  

Notes from Poland (2023), State audit office notifies prosecutors of alleged crimes by Polish oil giant 
Orlen, 
https://notesfrompoland.com/2023/02/01/state-audit-office-notifies-
2023 
prosecutors-of-alleged-crimes-by-polish-oil-giant-orlen/.  

1  February 

Oko.press (2022), The defeat of the Ziobro prosecutor’s office in the case of Judge Morawiec – The 
court  did  not  believe  the  evidence  of  her  alleged  corruption  (Klęska  prokuratury  Ziobry  ws.  Sędzi 
Morawiec. Sąd nie uwierzył w dowody jej rzekomej korupcji), 14 August 2022 https://oko.press/kleska-
prokuratury-ziobry-ws-sedzi-morawiec.  

Oko.press (2022), Three repressed judges from Warsaw are suing Ziobro’s people for their punitive 
remanding to another division (Trzy represjonowane sędzie z Warszawy pozywają ludzi Ziobry za karną 
zsyłkę do innego wydziału), 22 November 2022 https://oko.press/sedzie-z-warszawy-pozywaja-ludzi-
ziobry-za-karna-zsylke-do-innego-wydzialu.  

Oko.press (2023), A first ruling for degrading prosecutors by Ziobro (Pierwszy wyrok za degradowanie 
prokuratorów  przez  Ziobrę.  Prokuratura  ma 
zł.),  29  March  2023 
https://oko.press/pierwszy-wyrok-za-degradacje-prokuratorow.  

zapłacić  45 

tys 

38 

 
Oko.press (2023), Manowska from Supreme Court has given up. She allowed to adjudicate lay judges 
appointed  by  the  opposition  (Manowska  z  SN  skapitulowała.  Dopuściła  do  orzekania  ławników 
wybranych przez opozycję), 9 June 2023 https://oko.press/manowska-lawnicy-zaprzysiezenie 

Ombudsperson, 
https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/kategoria-prawna-i-organizacyjna/informacja-roczna.  

Activity 

Report, 

Annual 

(2021) 

30 

November 

2022 

Ombudsperson  (2022),  Open  letter  addressed  to  the  Prime  Minister  of  14  November  2022 
https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-ochrona-konkurencji-koncentracja-wolnosc-mediow-premier.  

Ombudsperson (2022), Opinion of 15 July 2022 (II.510.1043.2021.PZ). 

Ombudsperson (2023), Press release of 10 January 2023 https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-mswia-
inwigilacja-pegasus.  

Ombudsperson 
2023https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/sites/default/files/2023-
02/Do_Prezesa_SA_Warszawa_zabezpiecenie_ETPCz_8.2.2023.pdf.  

(2023),Formal 

statement 

of 

8 

February 

Ombudsperson (2023), Press release of 16 February 2023 
https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/content/niewykonanie-zabezpieczen-etpc-sad-apelacyjny-warszawa-msz-
odpowiedz.  

Ombudsperson (2023)Press release of 19 April 2023 https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-akta-spraw-
izby-pracy-tsue-sn-pierwsza-prezes.  

Ombudsperson  (2023)  Press  release  of  2  May  2023  https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-sluzby-
inwigilacja-standardy-mswia-nik.  

Ombudsperson (2023), Submission to the Constitutional Tribunal of 8 February 2023 in the case K 
1/23, III.7042.2.2023.LN. 

Onet.pl  (2023),  The  defeat  of  the  head  of  the  NCJ.  Judge  Żurek  won  the  case  related  to  mobbing 
(Porażka  szefowej  KRS.  Sędzia  Żurek  wygrał  proces  o  mobbing),  15  March  2023 
https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/krakow/porazka-szefowej-krs-sedzia-zurek-wygral-proces-o-
mobbing/gr3cp1w.  

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Implementing the OECD Anti-
Bribery  Convention  –  Phase  4  Report:  Poland  https://www.oecd.org/corruption/anti-bribery/poland-
phase-4-report.pdf.  

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Poland: Follow up to the Phase 3 
Report and Recommendations (2015). 

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)/ Office for Democratic Institutions 
and Human Rights (ODIHR), Opinion on the Draft Act amending the Election Code and certain other 
https://legislationline.org/sites/default/files/2023-
acts 
03/FINAL%20ODIHR%20Opinion%20on%20the%20Draft%20Act%20of%20Poland%20Amending
%20the%20Election%20Code%20and%20Certain%20Other%20Acts_20Feb2023_ENGLISH.pdf. 

February 

Poland, 

2023 

20 

– 

Personal Data Protection Office (2022), Opinion of the President of the Office of 30 December 2022 
(DOL.401.593.2022.WL.NP). 

39 

 
 
PolandDaily24  (2020),  Senate  Speaker  Tomasz  Grodzki’s  corruption  accusation  mounts,  7  January 
2020 
https://polanddaily24.com/801-senate-speaker-tomasz-grodzki39s-corruption-accusation-
mounts/politics/1752.  

Polish  Press  Agency  (2022),  Former  head  of  GROM  convicted  of  corruption  in  the  case  related  to 
Sławomir  Nowak  (Były  szef  GROM  skazany  za  korupcję  w  sprawie  związanej  ze  Sławomirem 
Nowakiem),  14  April  2022  https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news%2C1157287%2Cbyly-szef-grom-
skazany-za-korupcje-w-sprawie-zwiazanej-ze-slawomirem.  

Polish Press Agency (2023), Opposition on the Committee tasked with analysing the Russian influence: 
it is a legal junk. PiS: it is necessary to show the truth on the nefarious conduct of former governments 
(Opozycja o komisji ds. Badania wpływów rosyjskich: bubel prawny. PiS: trzeba pokazać prawdę o 
2023 
złym 
https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news%2C1520311%2Copozycja-o-komisji-ds-badania-wplywow-
rosyjskich-bubel-prawny-pis-trzeba.  

postępowaniu 

poprzednich 

rządów), 

January 

11 

Polish Press Agency (2023), The Constitutional Tribunal has settled the case of the term of office of 
the CT President (Trybunał Konstytucyjny rozstrzygnął sprawę kadencji Prezesa TK), 2 March 2023 
https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news,1543511,trybunal-konstytucyjny-rozstrzygnal-sprawe-kadencji-
prezesa-tk.html.  

PolishNews (2023), ‘”Lex Obajtek”, changes in the Code of Commercial Companies – Comments of 
politicians’, 
https://polishnews.co.uk/lex-obajtek-changes-in-the-code-of-
January 
commercial-companies-comments-of-politicians/.  

2023 

17 

Polish  News  (2023),  ‘The  scandal  at  the  National  Center  for  Research  and  Development.  National 
Center  for  Research  and  Development,  “Fast  track”  competition.  New  arrangements,  conflict  of 
interest (23 February 2023), https://polishnews.co.uk/the-scandal-at-the-national-center-for-research-
and-development-national-center-for-research-and-development-fast-track-competition-new-
arrangements-conflict-of-interest./ 

Polityka.pl (2023), The PiS machine to siphon millions out of companies. The Surpeme Audit Office 
Controllers  are  left  without  any  attention  (Machina  PiS  do  wyprowadzania  milionów  ze  spółek. 
Kontrolerzy  NIK  całują  klamkę)  https://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/kraj/2200726,1,machina-
pis-do-wyprowadzania-milionow-ze-spolek-kontrolerzy-nik-caluja-klamke.read.  

PolskieRadio24.pl (2022), Dozens of people charged with corruption in the hospital headed by Grodzki 
(Kilkadziesiąt osób z zarzutami ws. Korupcji w szpitalu, którym kierował Grodzki), 7 December 2022 
https://polskieradio24.pl/5/1222/artykul/3083226,kilkadziesiat-osob-z-zarzutami-ws-korupcji-w-
szpitalu-ktorym-kierowal-grodzki.  

Prawo.pl (2023), A heated exchange of letters in the Supreme Court: a disciplinary case for Prusinowski 
and  accusation  of  Manowska  for  an  institutional  unlawfulness  (Ostra  wymiana  pism  w  SN: 
Dyscyplinarka dla Prusinowskiego i oskarżenie Manowskiej o instytucjonalne bezprawie), 30 March 
2023  https://www.prawo.pl/prawnicy-sady/dyscyplinarka-dla-prezesa-prusinowskiego-i-oskarzenie-
prof,520559.html.  

Prawo.pl  (2023),  A  judge  was  promoted  and  immediately  convicted  a  pro-abortion  activist  (Sędzia 
awansowała 
2023 
16  March 
https://www.prawo.pl/prawnicy-sady/awans-sedzi-rozstrzygajacej-w-procesie-proaborcyjnej-
aktywistki,520340.html.  

proaborcyjną), 

aktywistkę 

skazała 

razu 

od 

i 

40 

 
Prawo.pl (2023), Aiding in abortion has been punished – an activist convicted to social labour (Pomoc 
w  aborcji  ukarana 
społeczne),  14  March  2023 
https://www.prawo.pl/prawo/pomoc-w-aborcji-ukarana,520302.html.  

skazana  na  prace 

-  aktywistka 

Prawo.pl (2022), Charges against prof. Gersdorf for allowing the resolution of the three Supreme Court 
Chambers  to  happen  (Zarzuty  dla  prof.  Gersdorf  za  dopuszczenie  do  uchwały  trzech  izb  SN),  7 
December 2022 https://www.prawo.pl/prawnicy-sady/prof-gersdorf-ma-wyjasnic-dlaczego-dopuscila-
do-uchwaly-z-2020-r,518047.html.  

Prawo.pl (2022), Criminal law specialists calling for vetoing the Draconian law (Karniści apelują o 
zawetowanie drakońskiego prawa), 26 November 2022 https://www.prawo.pl/prawnicy-sady/zmiany-
w-kodeksie-karnym-apel-o-weto,518493.html.  

Prawo.pl  (2023),  If  PiS  loses  elections  it  will  keep  control  over  the  prosecution  service  (Jeśli  PiS 
przegra wybory, zostawi sobie władzę w prokuraturze), 13 April 2023 https://www.prawo.pl/prawnicy-
sady/gdy-pis-przegra-wybory-zostawi-sobie-wladze-w-prokuraturze,520753.html.  

Prawo.pl (2023), Sejm’s committee is finalising its works on the draft law on courts of peace, of 1 
March  2023 
sądach  pokoju) 
https://www.prawo.pl/prawnicy-sady/sady-pokoju-sejmowa-podkomisja-pracuje,517264.html.  

(Sejmowa  podkomisja  kończy  prace  nad  projektem  o 

Prawo.pl (2022), The law is already in force – there will be no penalties for mayors who have handed 
over voter lists to the Polish Postal Office (Ustawa już obowiązuje – nie będzie kar dla wójtów, którzy 
2022 
Poczcie 
przekazali 
https://www.prawo.pl/samorzad/wybory-kopertowe-abolicja-dla-samorzadowcow,517938.html.  

wyborców 

December 

Polskiej), 

spisy 

22 

President of the Regional Court in Poznań of 20 March 2023 ref. A-070-1/23. 

of 

President 
(2023), 
https://www.prezydent.pl/prawo/wnioski-do-tk/wniosek-prezydenta-rp-do-trybunalu-
konstytucyjnego,64960.  

Republic 

release 

Press 

the 

21 

of 

February 

2023 

Press.pl (2023), „The White book” – correspondence between Radio Tok FM broadcaster and the 
President  of  the  KRRiT  on  the  penalty  imposed  for  „a  handbook  for  Hitlerjugend”  (“”Biała 
księga”  –  korespondencja  nadawcy  Radia  Tok  FM  z  przewodniczącym  KRRiT  w  sprawie  kary 
nałożonej za “podręcznik dla Hitlerjugend””), 8 May 2023,  
https://www.press.pl/tresc/76450,_biala-ksiega_---korespondencja-nadawcy-radia-tok-fm-z-
przewodniczacym-krrit-w-sprawie-kary-nalozonej-za-_podrecznik-dla-hitlerjugend._  

Press.pl (2023), President of the KRRiT Maciej Świrski imposes an 80 thousand PLN penalty on the 
Tok.fm broadcaster (Przewodniczący KRRiT Maciej Świrski nakłada 80 tys. zł kary dla nadawcy Tok 
FM), 28 April 2023, https://www.press.pl/tresc/76349,krrit_-80-tys_-zl-kary-dla-nadawcy-tok-fm.  

Reporters Without Borders, Written contribution received in the context of the 2023 Rule of Law Report 
preparation. 

ResearchProfessional  News  (2023),  Polish  research  funder  probed  by  anti-corruption  bureau,  23 
February  2023  https://www.researchprofessionalnews.com/rr-news-europe-other-nations-2023-2-
polish-research-funder-probed-by-anti-corruption-bureau/.  

Rzeczpospolita.pl (2023), Information campaigns of the government are worth millions. The opposition 
links  them  with  the  forthcoming  elections  (Kampanie  informacyjne  rządu  warte  miliony.  Opozycja 

41 

 
łączy  je  z  nadchodzącymi  wyborami),  28  February  2023  https://www.rp.pl/polityka/art38033601-
kampanie-informacyjne-rzadu-warte-miliony-opozycja-laczy-je-z-nadchodzacymi-wyborami.  

Rzeczpospolita.pl, Judge Wojciech Maczuga from Cracow is targeted by Przemysław Radzik (Sędzia 
Wojciech  Maczuga  z  Krakowa  na  celowniku  Przemysława  Radzika’)  https://www.rp.pl/sady-i-
trybunaly/art38274421-sedzia-wojciech-maczuga-z-krakowa-na-celowniku-przemyslawa-radzika.  

Rzeczpospolita.pl  (2023),  Mayor  of  Sopot  invigilated  by  Pegasus  ahead  of  the  2019  elections 
(Prezydent  Sopotu  inwigilowany  Pegasusem  przed  wyborami  w  2019  r.),  3  March  2023 
https://www.rp.pl/polityka/art38061531-prezydent-sopotu-inwigilowany-pegasusem-przed-
wyborami-w-2019-r.  

Science  Business  (2023),  Police  in  Poland  launch  investigation  into  fast-track  grants  disbursed  by 
national research funding agency, 8 March 2023 https://sciencebusiness.net/widening/news/Cohesion-
policy/police-poland-launch-investigation-fast-track-grants-disbursed-national-research.  

Sejm’s Bureau of Analysis (2022), opinion of 2 December 2022 (BAS-WAPEiM-2328/22). 

Senate of the Republic of Poland (2022), Press release of 7 October 2022 
https://www.senat.gov.pl/aktualnoscilista/inne/art,15048,senat-wybral-lawnikow-sadu-
najwyzszego.html.  

Supreme Administrative Court (2023), Press release of 16 March 2023   
https://www.nsa.gov.pl/komunikaty/komunikat-w-sprawie-sporu-kompetencyjnego-pomiedzy-
prezydentem-rp-a-naczelnym-sadem-administracyjnym,news,4,940.php.  

Supreme Administrative Court (2023), Press release of 5 April 2023 
https://www.nsa.gov.pl/komunikaty/stanowisko-nsa-w-sprawie-wniosku-o-rozstrzygniecie-sporu-
kompetencyjnego-pomiedzy-prezydentem-rp-a-naczelnym-sadem-administracyjnym,news,4,950.php.  

Supreme  Audit  Office 
https://www.nik.gov.pl/en/news/finance-education-health-environment-safety-what-are-we-going-to-
audit-in-2023.html.  

(2023),  Audit  Workplan  2023 

Information,  26  January  2023 

Supreme Audit Office, Post-audit presentation of the audit Implementation of the Government Anti-
Corruption Programme for 2018-2020 (Realizacja Rządowego PRogramu Przeciwdziałania Korupcji 
na lata 2018-2020), KAP.430.002.2022 https://www.nik.gov.pl/plik/id,27014,vp,29814.pdf.  

Supreme Audit Office, President of the Supreme Audit Office letter of 29 December 2022 addressed to 
the Marshal of the Sejm, KPK-KPP.011.104.2022. 

Supreme Court, Letter of the First President of 2 September 2022 addressed to the Minister for Finances 
(BSA III.021.22.2022). 

Supreme Court (2022), Press release of 19 October 2022 
http://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SitePages/Komunikaty_o_sprawach.aspx?ItemSID=525-b6b3e804-
2752-4c7d-bcb4-7586782a1315&ListName=Komunikaty_o_sprawach&rok=2022.  

Supreme Court (2022), Press release of 27 October 2022 
http://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SitePages/Wydarzenia.aspx?ItemSID=880-0dc69815-3ade-42fa-bbb8-
549c3c6969c5&ListName=Wydarzenia.  

42 

 
 
 
 
 
Supreme Court (2022), Press release of 9 December 2022 
http://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SitePages/Komunikaty_o_sprawach.aspx?ItemSID=542-b6b3e804-
2752-4c7d-bcb4-7586782a1315&ListName=Komunikaty_o_sprawach&rok=2022.  

Supreme Court (2023), Press release of 10 May 2023 
http://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SitePages/Wydarzenia.aspx?ItemSID=904-0dc69815-3ade-42fa-bbb8-
549c3c6969c5&ListName=Wydarzenia.  

Supreme Court (2023), Press release of 22 March 2023  
http://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SitePages/Wydarzenia.aspx?ItemSID=899-0dc69815-3ade-42fa-bbb8-
549c3c6969c5&ListName=Wydarzenia.  

Supreme Court (2023), Press release of 7 February 2023 
http://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SitePages/Wydarzenia.aspx?ItemSID=896-0dc69815-3ade-42fa-bbb8-
549c3c6969c5&ListName=Wydarzenia.  

Supreme  Court,  Written  contribution  submitted  in  the  context  of  the  2022  Rule  of  Law  Report 
preparation. 

Towarzystwo Dziennikarskie (Society of Journalists), Written contribution received in the context of 
the 2023 Rule of Law Report preparation. 

Transparency International (2022), Corruption Perceptions Index 2021   
https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021.  

Transparency International (2022), Exporting Corruption 
https://www.transparency.org/en/publications/exporting-corruption-2022.  

TVN24 (2022), Together with PiS. Para-campaign (Do spółki z PiS. Parakampania), 31 October 2022 
https://tvn24.pl/go/programy,7/czarno-na-bialym-do-spolki-z-pis-odcinki,900735/odcinek-
2,S00E02,900739.  

TVN24 (2022), Chris is my colleague, I paid for his position”. Who else paid for the position and paid 
money for PiS campaign? (Krzysiu jest moim kolegą, dałem go na stanowisko". Kto jeszcze dostał stołek 
i  wpłacił  na  kampanię  PiS?),  7  Novmeber  2022  https://tvn24.pl/premium/darowizny-dla-grzegorza-
tobiszowskiego-europosla-pis-kto-wplacal-6193789.  

TVN24 (2022), Money flows to the party. Payments from MEPs and members of supervisory boards 
of  State  Treasury  companies  (Pieniądze  płyną  do  partii.  Wpłaty  od  europosłów  i  członków  rad 
nadzorczych w spółkach Skarbu Państwa), 5 August 2022 https://tvn24.pl/polska/wplaty-na-partie-od-
europoslow-i-czlonkow-rad-nadzorczych-w-spolkach-skarbu-panstwa-6057685.  

TVN24  (2023),  Payments  to  the  PiS  account  from  managers  of  state-owned  companies.  “Pre-
established pumping station for the party fund”  (Wpłaty na konto PiS od menedżerów państwowych 
spółek.  „Ustalona  wcześniej  przepompownia  na 
fundusz  partii”),  27  February  2023 
https://tvn24.pl/polska/wplaty-nakonto-pis-odmenedzerow-panstwowych-spolek-komentarze-
politykow-6780218.  

Wiadomości  TVP  (2022),  The  end  of  a  dispute  in  the  Constitutional  Tribunal  (‘Koniec  sporu  w 
Trybunale  Konstytucyjnym’),  3  March  2023  https://wiadomosci.tvp.pl/67693655/koniec-sporu-w-
trybunale-konstytucyjnym.  

43 

 
 
 
 
 
Wirtualna Polska (2023), Will President Duda stand again against PiS? The Committee for the Russian 
influence  may  not  be  created  (Prezydent  duda  znów  postawi  się  PiS?  Komisja  może.  wpływów 
rosyjskich  może  nie  powstać),  11  January  2023  https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/prezydent-duda-znow-
postawi-sie-pis-komisja-ds-wplywow-rosyjskich-moze-nie-powstac-6854464779201088a.  

Wirtualne Media (2023), Last year, state-treasury companies spent PLN 1,23 billion on advertisement. 
Hundred of thousand of PLN flow to “Sieci”, “Gazeta Polska Codziennie” i “Do Rzeczy” (Spółki skarbu 
państwa wydały na reklamy w ubiegłym roku 1,23 mld zł. Setki tys. zł płyną do "Sieci", "Gazety Polskiej 
Codziennie"  i  „Do  Rzeczy”),  30  March  2023  https://www.wirtualnemedia.pl/artykul/spolki-skarbu-
panstwa-rzad-ile-wydaja-na-reklamy-w-2021-roku.  

44 

 
 
 
 
 
Annex II: Country visit to Poland234 

The Commission services held virtual meetings in March 2023 with: 

  Amnesty International 
  Association of Judges ‘Iustitia’ (Stowarzyszenie Sędziów Polskich Iustitia) 
  Association of Judges ‘Themis’ (Stowarzyszenie Sędziów Polskich Themis) 
  Association  of  Prosecutors  ‘Lex  Super  Omnia’  (Stowarzyszenie  Prorkuratorów  Lex  Super 

Omnia); 

  Batory Foundation (Fundacja Batorego) 
  Civic Development Forum (Forum Obywatelskiego Rozwoju) 
  Free Courts (Wolne Sądy) 
  Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (Helsinska Fundacja Praw Człowieka) 
  Chamber of Press Publishers (Izba Wydawców Prasy) 
  National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council (Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji) 
  Ministry of Culture (Minsiterstwo Kultury) 
  National Council for the Judiciary (Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa) 
  National Chamber of Legal Councillors (Krajowa Izba Radców Prawnych) 
  Ombudsperson’s Office (Biuro Rzecznika Praw Obywatelskich) 
  Ordo Iuris 
  National Media Council (Rada Mediów Narodowych) 
  Polish Media Association (Stowarzyszenie Polskich Mediów) 
  Supreme Administrative Court (Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny) 
  Supreme Audit Office (Najwyższa Izba Kontroli) 
  Supreme Bar Council (Naczelna Rada Adwokacka) 
  Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) 
  Society of Journalists (Towarzystwo Dziennikarskie) 
  Society of Polish Journalists (Towarzystwo Dziennikarzy Polskich) 
  Watchdog Polska 

* The Commission also met the following organisations in a number of horizontal meetings:  

 ALDA (European Association for Local Democracy) 

 
  Amnesty International  
  Civil Liberties Union for Europe  
  Civil Society Europe 
  Culture Action Europe  
  European Centre for Press and Media Freedom  
  European Civic Forum  
  European Federation of Journalists  
  European Partnership for Democracy  
  European Youth Forum  
  Free Press Unlimited 
  Front Line Defenders 

234  The Polish government did not provide written input and decided not to participate in relevant meetings of the 

country visit. 

45 

 
 
                                                           
ILGA Europe  
International Commission of Jurists 
International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)  
International Planned Parenthood Federation European Network 
International Press Institute  
JEF Europe  

 
 
 
 
 
 
  Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso Transeuropa 
  Philea  
  Reporters Without Borders  
  SOLIDAR 
  Transparency International EU 

46