COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2023 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2023 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union
Date: 2023-07-05
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Hungary, administrative transparency, corruption, democracy, independence of the judiciary, infringement of EU law, pluralism in the media, political rights, rule of law

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 5.7.2023  SWD(2023) 817 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2023 Rule of Law Report       Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2023 Rule of Law Report                        The rule of law situation in the European Union {COM(2023) 800 final} - {SWD(2023) 801 final} - {SWD(2023) 802 final} - {SWD(2023) 803 final} - {SWD(2023) 804 final} - {SWD(2023) 805 final} - {SWD(2023) 806 final} - {SWD(2023) 807 final} - {SWD(2023) 808 final} - {SWD(2023) 809 final} - {SWD(2023) 810 final} - {SWD(2023) 811 final} - {SWD(2023) 812 final} - {SWD(2023) 813 final} - {SWD(2023) 814 final} - {SWD(2023) 815 final} - {SWD(2023) 816 final} - {SWD(2023) 818 final} - {SWD(2023) 819 final} - {SWD(2023) 820 final} - {SWD(2023) 821 final} - {SWD(2023) 822 final} - {SWD(2023) 823 final} - {SWD(2023) 824 final} - {SWD(2023) 825 final} - {SWD(2023) 826 final} - {SWD(2023) 827 final}  
 
 
ABSTRACT 

the 

reforms  have  been  adopted,  aimed  at  addressing 

Legislative 
justice-related 
recommendations  of  the  2022  Rule  of  Law  Report,  the  relevant  country-specific 
recommendation  issued  by  the  Council  under  the  European  Semester  and  the  related 
commitments in Hungary’s Recovery and Resilience Plan, and some of the concerns expressed 
under the Article 7(1) TEU procedure initiated by the European Parliament. A strengthened 
role  for  the  National  Judicial  Council  will  allow  it  to  counter-balance  the  powers  of  the 
President of the National Office for the Judiciary, also as regards the career of judges. The new 
rules  on  the  Supreme  Court  will  contribute  to  the  transparency  of  its  functioning  and  will 
decrease the possibility of political interference. The Supreme Court will no longer be able to 
review the necessity of preliminary references in criminal proceedings, in line with EU law 
requirements. However, as regards lower courts, the lack of transparency of case allocations is 
a source of concern. The justice system performs very well as regards the length of proceedings 
and has an overall high level of digitalisation.  

Hungary is  introducing  a number of  relevant  anti-corruption reforms  in  response to  the EU 
conditionality procedure, including the preparation of a new National Anti-Corruption Strategy 
for 2023-2025 and the establishing of the new Integrity Authority to enhance oversight over 
the spending of EU funds. Prosecutorial decisions not to investigate or prosecute corruption 
can now be reviewed by court decisions, although such decisions are still not binding. Although 
some high-level cases reached the indictment and conviction stage, the lack of a robust track 
record  of  investigations  of  corruption  allegations  concerning  high-level  officials  and  their 
immediate circle remains a serious concern. Only some progress was made relating to asset 
declarations due to legislative amendments reducing public official’s declaration obligations 
and  the  lack  of  systematic  monitoring.  No  amendments  have  been  introduced  to  reform 
lobbying and revolving doors, and shortcomings remain regarding political party and campaign 
finance. The Council has temporarily suspended budgetary commitments from EU funds under 
several programmes and has prohibited entering into new legal commitments with Hungarian 
public interest trusts and entities maintained by them, until further anti-corruption reforms are 
introduced and enforced.  

There  have  been  no  developments  to  address  the  various  challenges  to  media  pluralism 
highlighted in past Rule of Law Reports. Concerns persist with regard to both the functional 
independence of the media authority, as  well as  the editorial  and financial  independence of 
public  service  media.  No  measures  have  been  adopted  or  are  planned  to  regulate  the 
channelling of state advertising to media outlets. While there have not been any physical attacks 
on journalists, smear campaigns have been registered and the deployment of spyware targeting 
certain investigative journalists and media professionals remains an issue of serious concern. 
As part of the commitments undertaken in the Recovery and Resilience Plan, a new reform 
aims to facilitate access to public information and rendered the charging of fees for releasing 
public information and documents exceptional. 

Legal  certainty  has  been  undermined  by  the  unpredictable  regulatory  environment  and  the 
extensive and prolonged use of the Government’s emergency powers, also interfering with the 
operation of businesses in the single market. The practical impact of new rules on formal public 
consultations remains to be assessed. The Constitutional Court, composed of members elected 
by  Parliament  without  the  involvement  of  the  judiciary,  can  no  longer  be  seized  by  public 
authorities,  but  can  still  review  final  decisions  of  the  ordinary  courts.  The  ineffective 
implementation by state authorities of the judgments of European courts remains a source of 
concern. No steps have been taken to remove obstacles affecting civil society organisations, 
which remain under pressure. 

1 

 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS  
Overall, concerning the recommendations in the 2022 Rule of Law Report, Hungary has 
(made):  
  Fully  implemented  the  recommendation  to  strengthen  the  role  of  the  National  Judicial 
Council, while safeguarding its independence, to effectively counter-balance the powers of 
the President of the National Office for the Judiciary. 

  Fully implemented the recommendation to adapt the rules related to the Kúria to remove 
judicial appointments outside the normal procedure, to strengthen eligibility criteria for the 
Kúria  President,  and  to  strengthen  control  by  judicial  bodies  over  the  Kúria  President, 
taking  into  account  European  standards,  and  to  remove  the  possibility  of  reviewing  the 
necessity of preliminary references, in line with EU law requirements. 

  No  progress  on  adopting  comprehensive  reforms  on  lobbying  and  revolving  doors,  and 
some progress on strengthening the system of asset declarations, providing for effective 
oversight and enforcement. 

  No progress yet on establishing a robust track record of investigations, prosecutions and 

final judgments for high-level corruption cases. 

  No  progress  on  introducing  mechanisms  to  enhance  the  functional  independence  of  the 
media  regulator  taking  into  account  European  standards  on  the  independence  of  media 
regulators. 

  No  progress  on  strengthening  the  rules  and  mechanisms  to  enhance  the  independent 
governance  and  editorial  independence  of  public  service  media  taking  into  account 
European standards on public service media. 

  No progress on adopting legislation to ensure fair and transparent distribution of advertising 

expenditure by the state and state-owned companies. 

  No progress on removing obstacles affecting civil society organisations. 
On this basis, and considering other developments that took place in the period of reference, in 
addition to recalling the obligation to comply with the rule of law-related rulings of the ECJ 
and  the  rule  of  law-related  infringement  procedures  referred  to  in  the  country  chapter,  the 
concerns raised under the conditionality regulation, the relevant concerns raised in the Article 
7  TEU  procedure  initiated  by  the  European  Parliament,  the  commitments  made  under  the 
national Recovery and Resilience Plan relating to certain aspects of the justice system, the anti-
corruption framework and the checks and balances, and recalling the relevant country-specific 
recommendations under the European Semester, it is recommended to Hungary to: 
 

Improve the transparency of case allocation systems in lower-instance courts, taking into 
account European standards on case allocation.  

  Adopt comprehensive reforms on lobbying and revolving doors, and further improve the 

system of asset declarations, providing for effective oversight and enforcement. 

  Establish a robust track record of investigations, prosecutions and final judgments for high-

 

level corruption cases. 
Introduce  mechanisms  to  enhance  the  functional  independence  of  the  media  regulator 
taking into account European standards on the independence of media regulators. 

  Strengthen the rules and mechanisms to enhance the independent governance and editorial 
independence of public service media taking into account European standards on public 
service media. 

  Adopt legislation to ensure fair and transparent distribution of advertising expenditure by 

the state and state-owned companies.  

  Foster  a  safe  and  enabling  civic  space  and  remove  obstacles  affecting  civil  society 
organisations, including by repealing legislation that hampers their capacity of working, in 
particular the immigration tax.  

2 

 
 
I. 

JUSTICE SYSTEM  

Hungary has a four-tier ordinary court system. 114 district courts operate at first instance, while 
20 regional courts hear appeals against district court decisions and decide on certain cases at 
first instance. Five regional appeal courts decide on appeals against decisions of the regional 
courts.  Administrative  cases  are  dealt  with  by  the  ordinary  courts  (the  Budapest  Regional 
Appeal Court hears appeals against first-instance decisions of the eight regional courts with an 
administrative department). The main role of the Supreme Court (Kúria) is to guarantee the 
uniform application of the law. The Fundamental Law tasks the President of the National Office 
for the Judiciary (NOJ), elected by Parliament, with the central administration of the courts. 
The National  Judicial Council is  an independent  body, which, under the Fundamental  Law, 
supervises the NOJ President and participates in the administration of the courts. Since June 
2023, it has been vested with legal capacity and budgetary autonomy. Judges are appointed by 
the President of the Republic following a recommendation of the NOJ President based on a 
ranking of candidates established by the local judicial councils (composed of judges elected by 
their peers). The NOJ President cannot deviate from this ranking without the prior consent of 
the National Judicial Council. In the case of Kúria judges, the recommendation is made by the 
Kúria  President.  The  Constitutional  Court  is  not  part  of  the  ordinary  court  system.  The 
prosecution  service  is  an  independent  institution  vested  with  powers  to  investigate  and 
prosecute  crime.  The  Hungarian  Bar  Association  and  the  regional  bar  associations  are 
autonomous self-governing public bodies. 

Independence  

The level of perceived judicial independence in Hungary has decreased among the general 
public and continues to be low among companies. Overall, 35% of the general population 
and 32% of companies perceive the level of independence of courts and judges to be ‘fairly or 
very good’ in 20231. According to data in the 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard, no clear trend can 
be  identified  in  the  evolution  of  the  perceived  level  of  independence  in  the  last  years. 
Nevertheless, the perceived judicial independence among the general public has decreased in 
comparison with 2022 (43%) as well as with 2016 (49%). The perceived judicial independence 
among companies has slightly increased compared to 2022 (34%), as well as to 2016 (33%). 

A new law fully implements the 2022 recommendation, by strengthening the role of the 
National Judicial Council allowing it to effectively counter-balance the powers of the NOJ 
President2. The 2022 Rule of Law Report recommended to Hungary to ‘[s]trengthen the role 
of the National Judicial Council, while safeguarding its independence, to effectively counter-
balance the powers of the President of the National Office for the Judiciary’3. In its Recovery 

1   Figures 49 and 51, 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard. The level of perceived judicial independence is categorised 
as follows: very low (below 30% of respondents perceive judicial independence as fairly good and very good); 
low (between 30-39%), average (between 40-59%), high (between 60-75%), very high (above 75%). 

2   The assessments included in this country chapter do not prejudge any future assessment under Article 24 of 
Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021  establishing 
the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  or  under  Article  15  of  Regulation  (EU)  2021/1060  of  the  European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional 
Development  Fund,  the  European  Social  Fund  Plus,  the  Cohesion  Fund,  the  Just  Transition  Fund  and  the 
European  Maritime,  Fisheries  and  Aquaculture  Fund  and  financial  rules  for  those  and  for  the  Asylum, 
Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border 
Management and Visa Policy. 

3   2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 2. 

3 

 
                                                           
and  Resilience  Plan4  Hungary  commmitted  to  a  legislative  reform  of  the  National  Judicial 
Council5. Hungary adopted a legislative reform6 which establishes as of 1 June 2023 stronger 
powers for the National Judicial Council and ensures that the Council gives a binding opinion 
on a number of important matters related to the administration of the justice system as regards 
both individual decisions and general regulations issued by the NOJ President. According to 
the new law, the National Judicial Council will have access to all documents, information and 
data related to the administration of courts. It will need to be consulted on legislative proposals 
affecting  the  justice  system  and  will  be  able  to  propose  to  the  Government  to  initiate  new 
legislation on the same matters. The reform also aims at ensuring that the  National Judicial 
Council has adequate resources, including staff and offices, to carry out its tasks in an effective 
manner7.  It  will  have  legal  capacity  and  autonomy  in  disbursement  of  its  budget.  Finally, 
according to the new law, it will be able to seize the competent court and the Constitutional 
Court to defend its prerogatives and enforce its rights. Therefore, the recommendation made in 
the 2022 Rule of Law Report has been fully implemented.  

The  new  law  aims  at  limiting  the  risk  of  arbitrary  decisions  as  regards  the  career  of 
judges. The 2022 Rule of Law Report noted that the absence of effective control over the NOJ 
President increases the possibility of arbitrary decisions as regards the career of judges8. In its 
Recovery  and  Resilience  Plan9  Hungary  commmitted  to  strengthen  the  role  of  the  National 
Judicial Council. In 2022, the National Judicial Council found that the Kúria President and the 
NOJ President had not respected applicable rules when appointing several judges to the bench 
in 202110. Moreover, stakeholders reported that the point system applicable to the evaluation 
of  applications  for  judicial  posts  favours  candidates  from  the  public  administration  to  the 

4   RRP milestone 213.  
5   The National Judicial Council is composed of the Kúria President ex officio and 14 judges-members (and 14 
substitute  members) elected by their peers for a period of six  years. Judges-members (one  court of appeal 
judge, six regional court judges and seven district court judges) are elected by a conference of delegates from 
among delegate judges. The full court of the Kúria and the plenary sessions of each of the five regional appeal 
courts and the 20 regional courts elect 2 to 20 delegates (the number of delegates is proportionate to the number 
of judicial posts at the given court). The next election of delegates is due in Autumn 2023. 

6   Act X of 2023 amending, with regard to the Hungarian Recovery and Resilience Plan, certain Acts governing 

justice was adopted on 3 May 2023. 

7   The budget of the National Judicial Council for the year 2022 was HUF 34.5 million (HUF 29.5 million in 
2021) (input from Hungary for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 1).  For the year 2023, HUF 300 million is 
committed.  For  a  period  of  nine  months,  the  NOJ  will  provide  administrative  and  financial  management 
support. 

8   2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 4. 
9   RRP milestone 213. 
10   Decisions 50/2022 of 6 July 2022 and 70/2022 of 5 October 2022. The Kúria President and the NOJ President 
decided on the outcome of  several appointment procedures in a  single batch and removed from the list of 
ranked candidates those who had already been appointed in other (parallel) appointment procedures but had 
not withdrawn their applications. In five cases out of the 11 vacancies announced in 2021, the Kúria President 
did not initiate the appointment (or transfer) of the first-ranked judge, nor did he reach out to the National 
Judicial Council in order to obtain its consent to deviate from the ranking of candidates. In the case of one 
position, he declared the fourth-ranked applicant as successful, which is not allowed under the law even with 
the National Judicial Council’s consent (see contribution from the National Judicial Council for the 2023 Rule 
of Law Report, p. 10). Stakeholders note that, as a result, a former state secretary without any prior judicial 
experience became a Kúria judge (contribution from Amnesty International Hungary for the 2023 Rule of Law 
Report,  p.  11).  The  Kúria  President  followed  the  same  practice  in  the  evaluation  of  the  2021  calls  for 
applications as it had always been done in the previous decade (contribution from the Kúria for the 2023 Rule 
of Law Report, p. 2). 

4 

 
                                                           
disadvantage of candidates with experience on the bench11. The new law will ensure that in the 
future, the National Judicial Council gives a binding opinion on the regulation laying down the 
point system for the evaluation of applications for judicial posts and on a series of individual 
decisions  of  the  NOJ  President.  Such  decisions  include  (i)  the  annulment  of  appointment 
procedures  for  judicial  and  court  executive  positions12  where  there  is  at  least  one  eligible 
candidate who has been supported by the judges of the given court; (ii) the transfer of judges, 
including secondments, to another court13;  (iii) the removal of judges without  their consent 
from  the  pool  of  judges  that  hear  special  cases,  including  administrative  cases.  A  binding 
opinion  of  the  National  Judicial  Council  is  also  introduced  as  regards  the  suitability14  of 
candidates for the post of President and Vice-President of the NOJ, who can be proposed by 
the  President  of  the  Republic  or  the  President  of  the  NOJ,  respectively.  A  draft  legislative 
proposal  has  also  been  prepared  by  the  NOJ  President  to  amend  the  rules  related  to  the 
assessment of the suitability  for judicial tenure of judges appointed for an initial  three-year 
period.  However,  it  does  not  include  provisions  preventing  the  interruption  of  the  judicial 
career during the review of the evaluation, raising some concerns as regards effective judicial 
protection of the judges concerned.  

Case  allocation  in  the  Kúria  is  expected  to  be  more  transparent  following  a  legislative 
reform. In its Recovery and Resilience Plan15 Hungary committed to amend the rules on the 
case allocation scheme of the Kúria. Electronically filed cases will be given a case number 
without human intervention. Cases will be allocated to  chambers  following pre-established, 
objective  criteria.  The  bench  hearing  the  case  will  be  composed  following  an  algorithm 
prescribed in advance. The parties to the proceedings will be able to verify on the basis of the 
case file whether the rules on case allocation have been duly applied. The judicial council of 
the Kúria and the departments of judges (‘kollégium’) concerned will give a binding opinion 

11   Contribution from the Hungarian Association of Judges for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 11. 
12   The NOJ President appoints the presidents, vice-presidents and heads of department (‘kollégium’) of the 20 
regional courts and of the five regional appeal courts. Stakeholders point out that most court executives are 
appointed by the presidents of regional appeal courts and of regional courts (contribution from Alapjogokért 
Központ for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 12). The new rules do not apply to the appointment of deputy 
heads of department and presiding judges in the regional appeal courts, to the appointment of deputy heads of 
department and presiding judges in the regional courts, and to the appointment of presidents, vice-presidents 
and  (deputy)  heads  of  groups  in  the  114  district  courts.  Judicial  bodies  (e.g.  the  department)  vote  on  the 
candidates for court executive posts by secret ballot; the voting results are not binding. 

13   See Sections 27, 27/A, 31 and 32 of Act CLXII of 2011 on the status and remuneration of judges. The National 
Judicial Council’s consent is not required for secondments to the NOJ. The National Judicial Council does not 
give a binding opinion on transfers and secondments between the district courts in the area of jurisdiction of 
the  same  regional  court  and  between  the  regional  court  and  district  courts  in  the  area  of  its  jurisdiction. 
Stakeholders note that such transfers and secondments, ordered by the regional court presidents, may have a 
significant  impact  on  the  living  conditions,  workload  and  remuneration  of  judges  (Contribution  from  the 
Hungarian Association of Judges for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 12). 

14   The suitability criteria, including independence, impartiality, probity and integrity, are determined by the law. 
The legislative amendments ensure that the candidates found unsuitable by the National Judicial Council have 
access to an accelerated judicial review before the Budapest Regional Court. 

15   RRP milestone 214.  

5 

 
                                                           
on the case allocation scheme16. The implementing law also fixes the number of judges sitting 
on the uniformity complaint panels17.  

Concerns have been raised regarding the lack of transparency of case allocation in lower 
courts. The case allocation schemes in the five regional appeal courts, the 20 regional courts 
and the 114 district courts are established by the court presidents18. The law provides for a wide 
range  of  exceptions  to  the  rules  without  establishing  guarantees  against  their  inappropriate 
application19.  European  standards  require  that  the  allocation  of  cases  within  a  court  follow 
objective pre-established criteria in order to safeguard the right to an independent and impartial 
judge20. Stakeholders note that case allocation schemes can be modified at any point of time; 
according to  stakeholders, such modifications are carried out on a  regular basis, sometimes 
even from  one day to  another21. Also, parties to  court proceedings cannot  verify the proper 
application of the scheme or whether there was a derogation from it22. The data of the most 
recent survey of the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary suggests that one out of 
five  Hungarian  judges  considers  that  during  the  last  three  years,  not  all  cases  have  been 
allocated  in  accordance  with  established  rules  in  order  to  influence  the  outcome  of  the 
particular case23.  

A new law fully implements the 2022 recommendation by addressing several  concerns 
related  to  the  functioning  of  the  Kúria.  The  2022  Rule  of  Law  Report  recommended  to 
Hungary  to  ‘[a]dapt  the  rules  related  to  the  Kúria  to  end  judicial  appointments  outside  the 
normal procedure, to strengthen eligibility criteria for the Kúria President, and to strengthen 
control by judicial bodies over the Kúria President, taking into account European standards’24. 

16   As of 1 January 2023, the Kúria President, with the support of the Kúria’s judicial bodies, amended the case 
allocation scheme to increase from three to five the number of judges on the bench hearing civil and criminal 
cases (input from Hungary for the 2023 Rule of Law report, pp. 2-3). This measure is not related to the RRP. 
17   Parties to the proceedings may lodge a uniformity complaint against a final decision of the Kúria if it deviates 
from the Kúria’s published case law. Also, the uniformity complaint panel decides on the preliminary reference 
in the interest of uniformity of law. The ‘preliminary reference procedure in the interest of uniformity of law’ 
can be applied in two scenarios: (i) when a Kúria chamber wishes to deviate from the Kúria’s published case 
law, it must stay the proceedings and request a uniformity decision; (ii) the Kúria (vice) President, the heads 
of Kúria departments and the Prosecutor General may request a uniformity decision if it is necessary to ensure 
the  uniform  interpretation  of  the  law,  or  to  alter  or  annul  a  previous  uniformity  decision.  The  Kúria’s 
uniformity decisions are binding on courts (Article 25(3) of the Fundamental Law). In 2022, the Kúria heard 
41 uniformity complaints (23 of them were dealt with on their merits) and delivered 12 uniformity decisions 
(input from Hungary for the 2023 Rule of Law report, p. 8). 

18   In the case of district courts, the case allocation scheme is established by the president of the regional court. 
The judicial council of each court gives a non-binding opinion (contribution from Alapjogokért Központ for 
the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 13). 

19   Contribution from Amnesty International Hungary for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 14; contribution from 
Eötvös  Károly  Policy  Institute  for  the  2023  Rule  of  Law  Report,  p.  14;  contribution  from  the  Hungarian 
Helsinki Committee for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 14. The basis rules of case allocation are set in Section 
10 of Act CLXI of 2011 on the organisation and administration of courts. The method for case allocation is 
regulated by Section 31 of Decree 14/2002 of 1 August 2002 of the Minister of Justice on the rules of the case 
management in courts. 

20   Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12, para. 24. 
21   Contribution from Amnesty International Hungary for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 14; contribution from 
Eötvös  Károly  Policy  Institute  for  the  2023  Rule  of  Law  Report,  p.  14;  contribution  from  the  Hungarian 
Helsinki Committee for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 14. 

22   Ibid. 
23   ENCJ Survey on the Independence of Judges 2022, p. 27. 
24   2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 2. 

6 

 
                                                           
In its Recovery and Resilience Plan25 Hungary committed to amend the rules on the election 
of the Kúria President; the rules on the case allocation scheme of the Kúria; and the rules on 
the functioning of the Kúria to (i) establish stronger powers for the judicial council of the Kúria 
and the departments of judges (‘kollégium’) concerned, (ii) remove the possibility for members 
of  the  Constitutional  Court  to  become  judges  and  then  be  appointed  to  the  Kúria  without 
following the normal application procedure, and (iii) ensure that the National Judicial Council 
gives  a  binding  opinion  on  the  suitability  of  candidates  for  the  posts  of President  and  Vice 
President of the Kúria26. The reform will equally ensure that the strengthened powers of the 
National  Judicial  Council  also  apply  in  relation  to  the  Kúria  President  when  acting  as 
appointing authority. Therefore, the recommendation made in the 2022 Rule of Law Report 
has been fully implemented. These reforms address several long-standing concerns regarding 
the  Kúria.  As  flagged  by  the  Council  of  Europe,  the  lack  of  an  effective  oversight  by  an 
independent judicial body regarding Parliament’s competence to remove the Kúria President 
from office27 remains a concern. Also, the possibility to maintain the Kúria President in office 
after the expiry of his/her mandate could expose him/her to undue political influence28. 

Smear campaigns continue to exert undue pressure on judges, affecting their freedom of 
expression. Stakeholders report that in autumn 2022, pro-government media launched smear 
campaigns  against  two  judges-members  of  the  National  Judicial  Council29.  The  National 
Judicial Council issued a public statement in defence of its members30. On 15 July 2022, the 

25   RRP milestone 214. 
26   The suitability criteria, including independence, impartiality, probity and integrity, are determined by the law. 
The candidates found unsuitable by the National Judicial Council have access to an accelerated judicial review 
before the Budapest Regional Court. 

27   Decision  of 

the  Committee  of  Ministers  of 

the  Council  of  Europe  of  9  March  2023 
(CM/Del/Dec(2023)1459/H46-11). In the context of the supervision of the execution of the judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights, the Committee of Ministers recalled that the Court had found violations of 
the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  on  account  of  the  undue  and  premature  termination  of  the 
applicants’  mandates  as  President  (Baka)  and  Vice-President  (Erményi)  of  the  former  Hungarian  Supreme 
Court through ad hominem legislative measures: in the Baka case through legislative acts of constitutional 
rank  and  therefore  beyond  judicial  control;  in  the  Erményi  case  through  an  ordinary  legislative  act, 
unsuccessfully challenged before the Constitutional Court, found by the European Court of Human Rights not 
to pursue any legitimate aim. 

28   The Kúria President is elected by Parliament voting with a two-thirds majority, for a period of nine years (see 
Article 26(3) of the Fundamental Law). Section 115(4) of Act CLXI of 2011 provides that if the mandate of 
the Kúria President ceased upon expiry of the term of office and Parliament had not elected a new president 
before the mandate terminated, the Kúria President shall remain in office until the new president is elected. A 
blocking minority in Parliament can prevent the election of a new president, thereby keeping the incumbent 
in  office  for  an  undetermined  period  of  time.  The  Kúria  President  can  stay  in  office  beyond  the  statutory 
retirement age for judges (see Article 26(2) of the Fundamental Law). In a letter sent to the Commission on 
16 June 2023, the European Associaton of Judges expressed concerns regarding the possibility that the current 
Kúria President continues in his position after the end of his term of office until a successor has been elected.  
29   Contribution from Eötvös Károly Policy Institute for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 19; contribution from 
Liberties for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 4. In August 2022, in a statement published by The Guardian, 
the spokesperson of the National Judicial Council voiced his concerns over government overreach aimed at 
swaying  courts;  his  statements  triggered  severe  and  defamatory  attacks  against  him  from  pro-government 
media. In October 2022, further attacks were launched by pro-government media and government  officials 
against the National Judicial Council’s spokesperson and its member responsible for international relations. 
Their independence was questioned for meeting the US ambassador in their capacity as representatives of the 
Council, to discuss the situation of judicial independence in Hungary. 

30   The  Hungarian  Association  of  Judges  (MABIE),  the  European  Association  of  Judges  (EAJ)  and  the 
representatives  of  the  European  Network  of  Councils  for  the  Judiciary  (ENCJ)  publicly  expressed  their 
solidarity. 

7 

 
                                                           
Code  of  Ethics  for  Judges,  adopted  by  the  National  Judicial  Council31,  came  into  force.  It 
includes  provisions  on  judges’  freedom  of  expression  when  voicing  their  opinion  on  the 
functioning  of  the  justice  system.  The  Kúria  President  challenged  the  Code  before  the 
Constitutional Court32. On 9 March 2023, the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers33 
called on the Hungarian authorities to implement the Baka34 judgment from the European Court 
of Human Rights, and reiterated the paramount importance, stressed by the Court in its case 
law, including the Baka judgment, of effective and adequate safeguards against abuse when it 
comes to restrictions on judges’ freedom of expression. 

A new law fully implements the 2022 recommendation by removing the Kúria’s possibility 
of reviewing the necessity of preliminary references in criminal proceedings, in line with 
EU law requirements. The 2022 Rule of Law Report recommended to Hungary to ‘remove 
the  possibility  of  reviewing  the  necessity  of  preliminary  references,  in  line  with  EU  law 
requirements’35. In its Recovery and Resilience Plan36 Hungary committed to remove obstacles 
for courts to independently refer cases for preliminary rulings to the Court of Justice, thereby 
ensuring compliance with its case law37. Therefore, the recommendation made in the 2022 Rule 
of Law Report has been fully implemented.  

A  new  law  introduced  the  possibility  for  judicial  review  of  prosecutorial  decisions  in 
corruption  cases,  reducing  the  risk  of  arbitrary  decisions.  Concerns  as  regards  the 
discretionary powers of the prosecution service to decide on the investigation and prosecution 
of cases had been raised in previous reports38. To address them, as of 1 January 2023, a new 
law provides for judicial review of decisions of the prosecution service not to open or to close 
an investigation in corruption-related cases. This new judicial review possibility could mitigate 
the  persistent  risk  of  top  prosecutors  influencing  the  work  of  subordinate  prosecutors  and 
interfering in individual cases, which is facilitated by the strictly hierarchical architecture of 
the  prosecution  service  and  a  lack  of  internal  checks  and  balances  within  the  prosecution 
service39. Also, the continued possibility to maintain the Prosecutor General in office after the 
expiry of his/her mandate could expose him/her to undue political influence40. 

31   Decision 16/2022 of 2 March 2022. 
32   Case II/01285/2022, pending. The Kúria President questioned the National Judicial Council competence to 

issue a Code of Ethics and pointed to the absence of a reference in its text to the Fundamental Law. 

33   CM/Del/Dec(2023)1459/H46-11. 
34   Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 23 June 2016, Baka v. Hungary, 20261/12. The Court 
found that the impugned measures had a ‘chilling effect’, discouraging not only the applicant, but also ‘other 
judges  and  court  presidents  […]  from  participating  in  public  debate  on  […]  issues  concerning  the 
independence of the judiciary’ (§ 173). 

35   2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 2. 
36   RRP milestone 215. 
37   Judgment of the Court of Justice of 23 November 2021, IS, C-564/19.  
38   2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 9. 
39   See 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 9. However, see 
also the findings of the Council on limitations to the effectiveness of such procedure, as expressed in recital 
46 of Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 on measures for the protection 
of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary. 

40   GRECO Fourth Evaluation Round – Third Interim Compliance Report (8 September 2022), p. 6, para. 34. See 
2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 9; 2021 Rule of Law 
Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 8; 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country 
Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 7. The Prosecutor General can stay in office beyond the 
statutory retirement age for prosecutors (see Article 29(3) of the Fundamental Law). 

8 

 
                                                           
Quality  

The digitalisation of the justice system continues to be overall high. Hungary ranks very 
high when it comes to digital solutions to conduct and follow court proceedings in criminal 
cases and online access to published judgments by the general public41. It also ranks high as 
regards the use of electronic communication tools by courts and the prosecution service, and 
the existence of digital  solutions  to  initiate and follow proceedings in civil/commercial and 
administrative cases42. Moreover, Hungary has good results as regards the promotion of and 
incentives for using alternative dispute resolution methods43.  

Access to justice for vulnerable groups could be improved. There are concerns as regards 
the level  of inclusiveness of the legal  aid  scheme44. Further specific arrangements  could  be 
introduced for access to justice of persons at risk of discrimination and elderly persons and for 
victims of violence against women/domestic violence45. Training in communication for judges 
is scarce46. 

The  impact  of  earlier  salary  increases  of  judges  and  prosecutors  has  been  adversely 
affected  by  high  inflation.  The  three-year  salary-increase  programme  ended  in  2022  with 
judges  and  prosecutors  receiving  an  average  increase  of  12%47.  At  the  same  time,  in  2022, 
inflation exceeded 15%48 in Hungary, significantly impacting the real value of judges’ salaries. 
The  financial  situation  of  judges  and  court  staff  has  deteriorated,  also  compared  to  the 
significant wage increases in other segments of society49. Stakeholders report that due to low 
salaries, courts have difficulties with recruiting and retaining non-judicial staff50.  

Efficiency 

The efficiency in civil and administrative cases remains high51. Hungary performs very well 
as regards the estimated time needed to resolve litigious civil and commercial cases at all court 

41   See Figures 46 and 47, 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
42   See Figures 43, 44 and 45, 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard.  
43  See Figure 26, 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
44   See Figure 24, 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard. The threshold for legal aid is so low that a person with an income 

below the poverty threshold may not be eligible for legal aid.  

45   See Figures 27 and 28, 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard. For instance, information on the rights of persons at risk 
of  discrimination  is  not  available.  Judges  cannot  follow  training  on  gender-sensitive  practices  in  judicial 
proceedings. Judges cannot follow training on protection measures, in particular in cases of violence against 
women. Victims are not informed, at least in cases where the victims and their family might be in danger, 
when the perpetrator escapes or is released temporarily or definitively. There is no specific website to provide 
information about support and protection services to victims of domestic violence.  

46   See  Figure  38,  2023  EU  Justice  Scoreboard.  No  training  available  on  the  use  of  social  media  and/or 
communication with the media, on dealing with disinformation campaigns in new media (social media), on 
communication with LGBTIQ people, on communication with persons of different cultural, religious, racial, 
ethnic or linguistic background. 

47   Input from Hungary for the 2023 Rule of Law report, p. 4. 
48   Inflation is expected to remain above 15% in 2023. 
49   Contribution from the Hungarian Association of Judges for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 15. The salary 
base of both judges and prosecutors has been raised from gross HUF 507 730 – for the year 2021 – to HUF 
566 660 – for the year 2022 – but remained at this level (HUF 566 660) for the year 2023. 

50   Information received during the country  visit  from Hungarian  Association of Judges and National Judicial 

Council. 

51   See 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 9. 

9 

 
                                                           
instances,  as  well  as  administrative  cases  at  all  court  instances52.  On  21  March  2023,  the 
European Court of Human Rights confirmed that the 2021 Act on pecuniary compensation for 
delay in civil proceedings guarantees in principle genuine redress for Convention violations53. 
A compensation scheme for protracted administrative and criminal proceedings remains to be 
set up. In January 2023, the Ministry of Justice established a new working group in order to 
shorten the length  of proceedings in  those exceptional cases, which  are significantly longer 
than the average54. 

II. 

ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK  

The Ministry of Interior is responsible for the overall coordination of the anti-corruption policy 
and  oversight  over  the  National  Protective  Service55.  As  a  law  enforcement  agency,  the 
National  Protective  Service  is  still  in  charge  of  crime  detection,  lifestyle  monitoring  and 
integrity testing for staff subordinated to the Ministry of Interior56. However, since May 2022, 
the Constitution Protection Office as an internal security intelligence agency overseen by the 
Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office is empowered to carry out integrity tests for all other public 
officials57. In 2022, Hungary set up an Integrity Authority as a new, independent authority to 
enhance oversight over the public spending with a focus on EU funds58. A new Anti-Corruption 
Task Force was set up as a consultative body with the aim of examining existing anti-corruption 
policies  and  elaborate  new  proposals59.  The  State  Audit  Office  contributes  to  corruption 
prevention with its competences for the audit of the financial management of public funds, the 
monitoring of state-owned companies’ compliance with statutory public disclosure obligations, 
as  well  as  political  party  finance  and  campaign  finance  audits.  As  to  the  repression  of 
corruption, the police can investigate private sector corruption and corruption-related economic 
crimes.  The  investigation  and  prosecution  of  corruption  in  the  public  sector  fall  under  the 

52   See Figures 7 and 9, 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
53   Decision of the European Court of Human Rights, 21 March 2023, Szaxon v. Hungary, 54421/21. 
54   Contribution from Alapjogokért Központ for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 17. 
55   A smaller division of the National Protection Service is entrusted with corruption prevention tasks, including 
intra-governmental  cooperation  and  evaluation  of  the  2020-2022  anti-corruption  strategy  and  action  plans. 
Since  May  2022,  the  Service  has  been  in  charge  of  corruption  prevention  in  the  health  care  and  public 
education sectors. 

56   Following the April 2022 elections, the competence of the National Protection Service was reduced, for more 

information see further below in this text on integrity tests. 

57   Act IV of 2022 amending certain Acts related to Act II of 2022 on the list of Ministries of Hungary. Since 25 
May 2022, corruption prevention in the National Tax and Customs Administration are under the competence 
of the Constitution Protection Office, a national security agency (input from Hungary for the 2023 Rule of 
Law Report, p. 19).  

58   This  reform  (RRP  milestone  160)  was  proposed  as  a  remedial  measure  under  the  budget  conditionality 
procedure. In this context, a new internal audit directorate has also been set up within the government body 
coordinating EU funds to strengthen internal controls to prevent the misuse of EU funds (RRP milestone 224). 
The Directorate-General for Auditing European Funds has been transformed in an autonomous body from the 
Ministry of Finance (RRP milestone 225). 

59   The  Task  Force  is  mandated  to  examine  existing  anti-corruption  measures  and  to  elaborate  proposals  to 
enhance  the  detection,  investigation,  prosecution  and  sanctioning  of  corrupt  practices.  It  includes  an  even 
number of government and non-governmental members. Delegate members who participate in the Task Force 
meetings, but do not have a voting right, include the State Audit Office, the Competition Authority, the Public 
Procurement Authority, the Authority for the Supervision of Regulated Activities, the National Office for the 
Judiciary  and  the  prosecution  service.  Other  relevant  actors,  such  as  the  Government  Control  Office,  the 
National  Authority  for  Data  Protection  and  Freedom  of  Information,  the  Commissioner  for  Fundamental 
Rights, and the Central Bank of Hungary, are so far not participating in the work of the Task Force. See in this 
context also the reforms agreed under the RRP milestone 166. 

10 

 
                                                           
exclusive competence of the Investigation Division of the Central Chief Prosecution Office of 
Investigation and its five regional offices. The prosecution service oversees investigations and 
is supported by the investigative forces of the police and the National Protective Service. 

The perception of public sector corruption among experts and the business executives is 
that  the  level  of  corruption  in  the  public  sector  remains  high.  In  the  2022  Corruption 
Perceptions Index by Transparency International, Hungary scores 42/100 and ranks 27th in the 
European Union and 77th globally60. This perception has been relatively stable over the past 
five years61. The 2023 Special Eurobarometer on Corruption shows that in Hungary, 88% of 
respondents consider corruption widespread in their country (EU average 70%) and 22% of 
respondents feel personally affected by corruption in their daily lives (EU average 24%)62. As 
regards businesses, 77% of companies in Hungary consider that corruption is widespread (EU 
average 65%) and 45% consider that corruption is a problem when doing business (EU average 
35%)63. Furthermore, 34% of respondents find that there are enough successful prosecutions 
to deter people from corrupt practices (EU average 32%)64, while 22% of companies believe 
that people and businesses caught for bribing a senior official are appropriately punished (EU 
average 30%)65.  

Hungary  is  introducing  a  number  of  anti-corruption  reforms  in  response  to  the  EU 
conditionality procedure66. To protect the EU budget against corruption and systemic rule of 
law  issues,  the  Council  temporarily  suspended  EU  funding  under  certain  instruments  or 
towards certain entities under Hungarian law67. To remedy the identified breaches in the area 

60   Transparency International (2023), Corruption Perceptions Index 2022. The level of perceived corruption is 
categorised as follows: low (the perception among experts and business executives of public sector corruption 
scores above 79); relatively low (scores between 79-60), relatively high (scores between 59-50), high (scores 
below 50).  

61   In 2018, the score was 46, while, in 2022, the score is 42. The score significantly increases/decreases when it 
changes more than five points; improves/deteriorates (changes between 4-5 points), and is relatively stable 
(changes from 1-3 points) in the last five years. 

62   Special Eurobarometer 534 on Corruption (2023). The Eurobarometer data on citizens’ corruption perception 

and experience is updated every year. The previous data set is the Special Eurobarometer 523 (2022). 

63   Flash Eurobarometer 524 on Businesses’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU (2023). The Eurobarometer 
data  on  business  attitudes  towards  corruption  as  is  updated  every  year.  The  previous  data  set  is  the  Flash 
Eurobarometer 507 (2022). 

64  Special Eurobarometer 534 on Corruption (2023).  
65   Flash Eurobarometer 524 on Businesses’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU (2023).  
66   Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 
on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget. Council Implementing Decision 
(EU) 2022/2506.  

67   On  15  December  2022,  following  a  proposal  by  the  Commission,  the  Council  adopted  measures  for  the 
protection  of  the  Union  budget  against  breaches  of  the  principles  of  the  rule  of  law  in  Hungary  under  the 
Conditionality Regulation. See, in particular, Article 2(1) of Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 
of 15 December 2022 on measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of 
the  rule  of  law  in  Hungary.  As  of  2019,  Hungary  initiated  a  change  of  the  governance  model  of  higher 
education  institutions  (’model  change’)  promoting  the  transformation  of  public  universities  into  publicly 
funded private  universities that are  maintained by newly established trusts  managed by  boards of trustees. 
With this model change, organisational and operational competences were transferred to the boards of trustees 
(whose members are appointed by the government for life with subsequent appointments occurring through 
co-optation, and which do not appear to be accountable to or supervised by any external organ, including the 
State). To implement the Council Implementing Decision, national agencies implementing Erasmus+ and the 
European Solidarity Corps are to ensure that they do not enter into any new legal commitment with public 
interest  trusts.  Similarly,  under  Horizon  Europe,  the  Commission,  the  Executive  Agencies  and  Joint 
Undertakings refrain from entering into new legal commitments with any public interest trust or any entity 

11 

 
                                                           
of anti-corruption, Hungary is finalising a draft National Anti-Corruption Strategy, established 
an  Anti-Corruption  Task  Force  as  well  as  an  Integrity  Authority  to  provide  oversight  over 
public procurements that affect the EU’s financial interests. It also adopted legislative reforms 
on  asset  declarations  and  introduced  the  possibility  for  the  judicial  review  of  prosecutorial 
decisions. In order to address the remaining concerns identified in this area68, Hungary can at 
any  time  notify  remedial  measures  it  has  taken  under  the  conditionality  procedure  to 
demonstrate that the relevant breaches of the principles of the rule of law and/or their effects 
or risks for the Union budget and the Union’s financial interests have been removed pursuant 
to the procedure set by the Conditionality Regulation69. Furthermore, no disbursement of funds 
under the Recovery and Resilience Plan can be made to Hungary until  all audit and control 
milestones,  including  those  related  to  the  key  implementation  steps  of  the  conditionality 
procedure are fully and correctly implemented. 

Hungary  is  finalising  a  new  National  Anti-Corruption  Strategy  and  Action  Plan  until 
202570.  Hungary  committed  under  the  conditionality  procedure  and  its  Recovery  and 
Resilience Plan to strengthen its anti-corruption framework71. The draft strategy  covers the 
period from 1 July 2023 to 31 December 202572. It is intended to be more ambitious than the 
previous  strategy73,  as  the  Government  committed  to  include  tasks,  such  as  new  ethical 
standards  for  high-level  officials  and  a  sanctioning  regime  for  non-compliance  with  asset 
declaration  rules.  However,  the  draft  strategy  does  not  include  a  comprehensive,  strategic 
approach to corruption. Strategic policy coordination in relevant anti-corruption areas, such as 
a  comprehensive  lobbying  legislation  or  political  party  and  campaign  financing,  as  well  as 
measures  against  high-level  corruption  are  missing  from  the  draft  strategy74.  Stakeholders 

maintained by them. In March 2023, six Hungarian universities brought actions for annulment against Article 
2(2) of the Council Implementing Decision (Cases T-115/23, T-132/23, T-133/23, T-138/23, T-139/23, and 
T-140/23, pending). 

68   See Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022, in particular recitals 56 and 57. 
69   Article  7  of  the  Conditionality  Regulation  provides  for  a  specific  procedure  to  adapt  or  lift  the  measures 
adopted by the Council if the Member State remedies the  situation  - in part or in full  - that had  led to the 
adoption of Council measures.  

70   Apart from the new National Anti-Corruption Plan for 2023-2025, a separate Anti-Fraud and Anti-Corruption 
Strategy specifically for the protection of EU funds has also entered into force in 2022, which the Government 
committed to coordinate. See RRP milestones 178-179. 

71   These include tasks 1-4, 6a-6b, 7a-7b, 10, 12-18 of Government Decision 1328/2020 of 19 June 2020 on the 
Mid-term  National  Anti-Corruption  Strategy  for  2020-2022  and  the  accompanying  action  plan,  see  RRP 
milestone  177.  While  the  National  Protection  Service  was  tasked  with  the  overall  coordination  of  the 
implementation of the 2020-2022 strategy, most of the strategy tasks were delegated to the Ministry of Interior, 
see 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 11. 

72   The draft strategy was prepared by the National Protective Service under the Minister of Interior. For the new 
National  Anti-Corruption  Strategy  and  Action  Plan,  the  newly  established  Task  Force  shall  evaluate  the 
progress in the implementation of the Action Plan, see input from Hungary for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, 
p.  18.  An  assessment  report  of  the  level  of  implementation  prepared  by  the  Ministry  of  Interior  for  the 
government is planned one year after the end of its implementation period (Q1 2026), see RRP milestone 179. 

73   2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, pp. 11-12. 
74   The OECD is also preparing an assessment of the draft National Anti-Corruption Strategy. See also 2022 Rule 
of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 12; 2021 Rule of Law Report, 
Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 11, and 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter 
on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 11. Notably, the government committed to including in the new 
Action Plan 2023-2025 the adoption of a non-binding Code of Conduct for persons with executive functions, 
including contacts with lobbyists and post-employment restrictions, and to strengthen administrative control 
procedures (including the verification, control and sanctioning mechanism) related to asset declarations, see 

12 

 
                                                           
pointed  to  some  shortcomings,  such  as  the  lack  of  an  evidence-based  approach  in  the 
development  of  the  strategy75  and  the  lack  of  a  dedicated  budget.  The  low  level  of  public 
information and visibility of the actions implemented under the previous strategy has reduced 
the possibilities for public monitoring and oversight76. This should be taken into account for 
the implementation of the new strategy.  

Amendments  to  Hungary’s  criminal  procedural  law  were  introduced  to  strengthen 
prosecutorial  efforts  to  investigate  corruption  cases,  although  the  court  decision 
overturning the prosecutorial decision not to prosecute is still not binding. In November 
2022, an amendment77 to the Criminal Procedure Code introduced the possibility for a judge 
to  review  prosecutorial  and  investigative  authorities’  decisions  not  to  investigate  reported 
corruption suspicions or to terminate ongoing corruption investigations without indictment78. 
Anyone, irrespective of whether it is a natural or a legal person79, can request a review and 
trigger the oversight procedure for any corruption-related cases dismissed or terminated after 
1 January 202380. The objective of this new procedure81 is to enhance the effective prosecution 
of corruption by addressing the concerns raised in the past as regards the accountability of the 
prosecution  service82.  However,  shortcomings  remain,  in  particular  as  regards  the  temporal 
scope of the new measure83 and the lack of the binding nature of court decisions quashing the 

RRP milestone 178. For more details on lobbying, post-employment rules and asset declarations, see further 
below in this text. 

75   Hungary’s National Institute of Criminology operating in the framework of the Prosecutor-General’s Office 
conducts analyses and research on trends in different crime areas, which could be used to inform and provide 
an evidence base for the government’s anti-corruption policy. According to the information received from the 
Prosecution Service in the context of the country visit to Hungary, so far the research is primarily used for 
trainings.  

76   Information received from K-Monitor and Transparency International Hungary in the context of the country 
visit to Hungary. See also 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, 
p. 11, including footnote 77.  

77   Act XLIV of 2022 on the Directorate-General for Audit of European Funds and amending certain acts adopted 
at the request of the European Commission to ensure the successful conclusion of the conditionality procedure. 
78   The  offences  concerned  relate  to  the  exercise  of  public  authority  or  the  management  of  public  property, 
including, all corruption offences of Chapter XXVII of the Criminal Code except lenient cases of bribery; 
abuse  of  office;  serious  cases  of  embezzlement  and  fraud;  misappropriation;  budget  fraud;  and  money 
laundering among others. For more details, see also footnote 109 below. 

79   Notably, the new Integrity Authority, any other public authority and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office 

have no standing in the procedure. 

80   The  Prosecutor  General  has  published  guidelines,  including  instructions  how  to  file  a  review  request,  see 
http://ugyeszseg.hu/altalanos-benyujtasi-informaciok/, which stakeholders, such as K-Monitor, have found to 
be user-friendly; information received in the context of the country visit to Hungary. If the prosecution service 
does not grant the request, the judge can decide that an investigation should take place and send the case back 
for investigation to the prosecution service. If the prosecution service does not act, the judge informs the person 
who has requested the review that an indictment can be lodged with the court by him as a ‘private prosecutor’, 
see pillar I above, p. 10.  

81   The  introduction  of  the  procedure  stems  from  Council  Implementing  Decision  (EU)  2022/2506  of  15 
December 2022 on measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the 
rule of law in Hungary, and a commitment of Hungary under its Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP milestone 
169). 

82   See 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 9, 15-16. 
83   The new law does not clarify the scope of application in time of the new rules and, in particular, fails to clarify 
that the  new procedure  will also apply to (non-time-barred) criminal offences committed before 1 January 
2023.  See  Council  Implementing  Decision  (EU)  2022/2506  of  15  December  2022  on  measures  for  the 
protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary, recital 46. 

13 

 
                                                           
prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute84. A government assessment report on the functioning 
of the judicial review is planned for the fourth quarter of 2023.  

Integrity tests and ‘lifestyle monitoring’ continue to be the primary tool for the detection 
of corruption in the public sector. Since 25 May 2022, the competence to conduct integrity 
tests85 and ‘lifestyle monitoring’86 of public officials has been divided between the Ministry of 
Interior and the Constitution Protection Office, which is a national security service87. With the 
exception  of  police  and  staff  in  the  public  education  and  public  healthcare  sectors  that  are 
subordinated  to  the  Ministry  of  Interior,  all  public  officials  are  now  under  the  remit  of  the 
Constitution  Protection  Office  that  is  overseen  by  the  Prime  Minister.  The  Government 
maintains that these changes are without prejudice to the applicable law on integrity tests and 
‘lifestyle monitoring’. However, there is a risk that the transparency of such proceedings can 
be affected, as the potential detection of corruption by the secret service may fall under national 
secrecy  rules  and  a  decision  not  to  further  pursue  a  corruption  investigation  is  de  facto 
impossible  to  contest.  For  2022,  the  prosecution  service  considers  the  National  Protective 
Service  still  to  be  the  main  and  indispensable  source  for  evidence-gathering  to  initiate 
corruption investigations and prosecutions88, in particular of petty corruption, such as gratitude 
payments  in  healthcare89.  Other  detection  tools,  including  asset  declarations,  whistleblower 
disclosures and registries, continue to play a relatively minor role in corruption investigations90. 
Since 1 July 2022, the central register for beneficial ownership information managed by the 

84   See Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 on measures for the protection of 

the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary, recital 46. 

85   The  possibility  of  conducting  covert  surveillance  of  public  officials  through  ‘integrity  tests’  to  establish 
whether they commit corruption has to be approved by the public prosecutor and, in case a suspected crime is 
detected,  reported  to  the  competent  agency.  The  individual  concerned  by  the  surveillance  shall  only  be 
informed once evidence of corruption is detected and this resulted in criminal proceedings. 

86   The lifestyle monitoring takes into account whether or not the public official’s way of living is beyond his/her 
salary. In order to conduct the lifestyle monitoring, the curriculum vita and a completed consent declarations 
have  to  be  submitted  by  the  concerned  person  and  those  living  in  the  same  household.  The  ‘lifestyle 
monitoring’ is conducted at the request of the responsible head of the public institution and related findings 
can be a ground for dismissal of the public official. 

87   See Act CXXV of 1995 on the national security services, which was modified in 2022, providing in Section 
8(k)  that  the  civilian  national  security  services  can  perform  internal  crime  prevention  activities,  lifestyle 
monitoring and integrity testing. With regard to corruption, the Constitution Protection Office is now mandated 
to detect crimes until a criminal investigation is opened. according to input from Hungary for the 2023 Rule 
of Law Report, p. 13. 

88   Information received from the Prosecution Service in the context of the country visit to Hungary. As reported 
last  year,  criminal  proceedings  for  corruption  offenses  are  mainly  initiated  on  the  basis  of  the  criminal 
investigation activities of the investigating authorities. The majority of the investigated cases are detected by 
the National Protective Service, see 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in 
Hungary, p. 13. To what extent the newly tasked Office for the Protection of the Constitution will cooperate 
with the prosecution service and contribute to the detection of corruption remains to be seen. 

89   Gratuity payments in the health care sector are reported to be the most serious challenges that the National 
Protective Service is in charge of, with a total of 120 cases of corruption and other criminal offences in the 
health sector having been reported or investigations been initiated in the course of January 2023, according to 
input from Hungary for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 20. In its Recovery and Resilience Plan, Hungary 
committed to implement an awareness-raising campaign against gratuity payments (RRP milestones 182-183 
and target 184). 

90   Information received from the Prosecution Service in the context of the country visit to Hungary. See also 
contribution  from  K-Monitor for the 2022 Rule of  Law  Report,  p. 18; 2021 Rule of Law  Report,  Country 
Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 12. 

14 

 
                                                           
Tax and Customs Authority is publicly accessible to those who have a legitimate interest in a 
manner determined by the registry and against payment of an access fee91. 

Hungary’s  oversight  system  was  extended  through  the  creation  of  the  new  Integrity 
Authority.  On  18  November  2022,  the  newly  established  Integrity  Authority  took  up  its 
operations with the powers to intervene in all cases where in its view the competent national 
authorities have not taken the necessary steps to prevent, detect and correct corruption, fraud, 
conflicts of interest and other illegalities and irregularities focusing on the implementation of 
EU financial support in Hungary92. The procedure for the appointment of its president and vice-
presidents  is  based on  eligibility criteria93.  In respect  of other state bodies with  supervisory 
functions,  political  appointments  raise  questions  about  their  impartiality  in  detecting 
corruption94. As previously reported, deficient independent  oversight mechanisms and close 
interconnections between politics and certain national businesses are conducive to corruption95.  

There has been no progress yet regarding the establishment of a robust track record of 
repressing high-level corruption. The 2022 Rule of Law Report recommended to Hungary to 
‘[e]stablish a robust track record of investigations, prosecutions and final judgments for high-
level corruption cases’96. As in previous years, the prosecution service considers the level of 
cooperation  between  the  relevant  anti-corruption  entities97,  as  well  as  human  and  financial 

91   Stakeholders raised concerns that excessive fees and too strict accessibility criteria set by the Authority would 
deter ordinary citizens from using the central database, see for example, Transparency International, Exporting 
Corruption (2022), p. 52, also recommending increased transparency of private equity funds, which play a role 
in hiding ill-gotten gains from corruption. The EU legislation on anti-money laundering and counter terrorist 
financing imposes obligations on all Member States, including Hungary, to identify the ultimate beneficial 
owner.  Beneficial  owners  are  individuals  who  benefit  from  a  company  even  though  they  are  not  formally 
named as the owner of the business. 

92   The Integrity Authority was created as part of the remedial measures proposed by Hungary in the context of 
the  conditionality  procedure.  See,  in  this  respect,  the  findings  of  the  Council  of  the  EU  regarding  certain 
weaknesses, risks and shortcomings in Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022, 
recital 36. The creation and functioning of the Integrity Authority is also the subject of RRP milestone 160. 

93   See Section 36 of Act XXVII of 2022 on the control of the use of European Union budget funds. 
94   Appointments have been sought for unusually long periods for a mandate, such as in the State Audit Office, 
for which the President was elected in July 2022 for a period of twelve years. The President of the State Audit 
Office (just like the Prosecutor General) is accountable to Parliament and can be the addressee of questions 
raised  by  members  of  Parliament.  However,  the  President  of  the  SAO  has  no  right  to  reply.  This  has  the 
practical consequence that accountability cannot be fully exercised. Similarly, for the Supervisory Authority 
of Regulated Activities overseeing concessions, the President was appointed in October 2021 for a period of 
nine years, while grounds for the termination of the mandate are limited. See also Freedom House (2022), 
Freedom in the World – Hungary Country Report, emphasising the Government’s broad control over auditing 
and investigative bodies; and the 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in 
Hungary, p. 14. 

95   2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 14. See also OECD 

(2021), Economic Survey Hungary, p. 57. 

96   2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 2.  
97   Information received from the Prosecution Service in the context of the country visit to Hungary. According 
to  information  received  from  Nézőpont,  Alapjogokért  Központ,  Mathias  Corvinus  Collegium,  Danube 
Institute and Századvég in the context of the country visit to Hungary, ongoing proceedings against public 
officials support this view.  

15 

 
                                                           
resources, and of specialisation98 adequate to carry out their tasks99. To facilitate more effective 
investigations, including in corruption cases, a new IT system  for the prosecution service is 
planned  to  address  the  persisting  challenges  in  evidence-gathering  and  sharing,  particularly 
with  regard  to  obtaining  relevant  financial  data  from  the  currently  numerous  separate  state 
registries100. The indictment rates for corruption are reported to be overall high101. In 2022, the 
prosecution  service  reported  that  326  persons  had  been  convicted  on  a  final  instance  for 
corruption related crimes102. The prosecution service reports filing indictments in a number of 
corruption cases involving senior officials and the start of investigations in other cases since 
July  2022  and  that  investigations  from  previous  years  are  ongoing  in  several  other  cases. 
Convictions  in  a  high-level  corruption  cases  continue  to  be  rare.  In  the  reporting  period, 
judgments were handed down in two high-level corruption cases103. Stakeholders report that in 
2022, investigations were either grounded to  stall  for a long time or, rather to  the contrary, 
proceedings  were  quickly  closed  ‘in  the  absence  of  a  crime’,  or  no  investigations  were 
launched104. Serious concerns remain therefore regarding the absence of a robust track record 
of investigations of corruption allegations concerning high-level officials and their immediate 

98   Special  trainings  for  prosecutors  are  provided  to  cover  new  and  emerging  crime  areas  and  investigative 
techniques, including on encrypted communication and crypto currency, according to information received 
from the Prosecutor General’s Office in the context of the country visit.  

99   Information received from the Prosecutor General’s Office in the context of the country visit to Hungary. See 

also 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 14. 

100  The  IT  database  would  offer  the  possibilities  to  interconnect  prosecutors  and  investigate  criminal  cases, 
including through artificial intelligence and an open-source element, according to information received from 
the Prosecution Service in the context of the country visit to Hungary. See also 2022 Rule of Law Report, 
Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 14. The IT system for the handling of sensitive 
files  is  to  be  fully  functional  and  operational  by  Q2  2024,  see  RRP  milestone  180.  In  addition,  a  case 
management IT system is planned to be fully functional and in operation by the end of 2025, see RRP milestone 
181. 

101  83.1% of registered corruption offences under prosecutorial investigations led to indictments in 2022 (i.e. a 
total of 1 224 offences) (information received from the Prosecution Service in the context of the country visit 
to Hungary). See also 2022 Rule of Law report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 
15. See also the OLAF (2023), 2022 Annual Report, for the latest data on judicial follow-up by Member States, 
indicating an indictment rate  in Hungary  

102  Input from Hungary for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 22. The number of proceedings initiated for public 
sector corruption has remained essentially unchanged from 173 proceedings (in 2021) to 176 (in 2022).  
103 Both were handed down by military chambers. One case concerned a former leader of the National Security 
Office who was sentenced by the Kaposvár Regional Court, confirmed by the military chamber of the Budapest 
Regional Appeal Court in September 2022. The other case concerned the Head of Division in the Budapest 
Police  Headquarters  and two leaders of the National Bureau of Investigations,  who  were sentenced by  the 
military chamber of the Budapest Regional Court in February 2023 (information received from the Prosecution 
Service on 28 April 2023). 

104  Information received from the Hungarian Association of Judges and Hungarian Bar Association in the context 
of  the  country  visit  to  Hungary,  stating  that  criminal  proceedings  are  extremely  and  unacceptably  long, 
especially  in  more  sophisticated  and  complex  cases  that  require  expertise  in  other  areas,  such  as  financial 
regulation, that investigators and prosecutors do not have, resulting in a lack of knowledge to investigate such 
cases. As a recent example of a case against a former Member of Parliament of the governing party, see 24.hu 
(2022), ‘The investigation into Florian Farkas’ scandalous Roma programme was quietly terminated, relating 
to a procedure in the case of the Bridge to the World of Work programme’. Notably, the Integrity Authority 
announced to request access to the documents from the prosecutor’s office, see Telex, The Integrity Authority 
appeals to the public prosecutor’s office over the terminated investigation into the case of Florian Farkas. For 
an overview of cases, see also Átlátszó (2021), Botched investigations: 20 important cases that got stuck with 
prosecutors. Notably, even where cases are dismissed at an early stage in the detection phase on lower levels 
of the police or the National Tax Authority, the prosecution service has the right to take on the investigation 
and  instruct  the  police  forces  to  act  accordingly.  See  also  Civitas  Institute  and  Transparency  International 
Hungary (2021), Black Book II – Corruption and State Capture in Hungary. 

16 

 
                                                           
circle105. For cases dismissed or terminated after 1 January 2023, citizens and public interest 
organisations  can  now  request  a  review  of  the  prosecutorial  decisions,  or  of  those  of 
investigating  authorities,  not  to  investigate  reported  corruption  suspicions  or  to  terminate 
ongoing corruption investigations without indictment106. It remains to be seen to what extent 
this  newly  introduced  procedure  will  be  used  and  thus  contribute  to  a  more  effective 
prosecution  in  practice107.  Stakeholders  also  continued  to  raise  concerns  about  clientelism, 
favouritism and nepotism in high-level public administration108 and about the risk of impunity 
caused  by  a  disparity  in  the  treatment  of  corruption  cases  for  political  purposes109,  which 
potentially  breaches  the  principle  of  equality  before  the  law110.  Overall,  given  these 
developments  coupled  with  the  politicisation  of  the  prosecution  service  and  a  too  close 
relationship between politics and business111, no progress was therefore made on establishing 

105  See contribution from K-Monitor for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 25 and from Transparency International, 
pp. 22-23. See 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, pp. 15-16 
with references to previous reports of 2021 and 2020. See also Bertelsmann Stiftung (2022), Transformation 
Index: Hungary Country Report, highlighting that the prosecution of corruption is limited to those cases, which 
can be considered political petty corruption, happening outside of the negotiated rules of the power pyramid. 
106  The  offences  concerned  relate  to  the  exercise  of  public  authority  or  the  management  of  public  property, 
including  all  corruption  offences  of  Chapter  XXVII  of  the  Criminal  Code  except  lenient  cases  of  bribery; 
abuse  of  office;  serious  cases  of  embezzlement  and  fraud;  misappropriation;  budget  fraud;  and  money 
laundering  among  others  (Section  817/A(1)).  A  request  for  judicial  review  can  be  filed  for  criminal 
proceedings initiated on or after 1 January 2023. Relevant terminated corruption cases are published on the 
publicly  available  websites  of  the  police  (https://ugyintezes.police.hu/web/guest/anonimizalt-hatarozatok/), 
the  National  Tax  Authority  (https://nav.gov.hu/anonimizalt-hatarozatok)  and  the  Prosecution  Service 
(http://ugyeszseg.hu/anonimizalt-hatarozatok/).  The  legislation  if  one  of  the  seventeen  commitments  the 
government made under the conditionality procedure to protect EU money from breaches of the rule of law, 
including  weak  anti-corruption  safeguards,  see  Council  Implementing  Decision  (EU)  2022/2506  of  15 
December 2022 on measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the 
rule of law in Hungary, recital (e) and paras. 44-46. 

107  Notably,  several  recommended  reforms  of  the  prosecution  service  in  Hungary  remain,  however,  partly 
implemented or not implemented at all (such as to limit the broad immunities of prosecutors to functional 
immunity  only),  see  GRECO  Fourth  Evaluation  Round  -  Third  Interim  Compliance  Report  (8  September 
2022), p. 7, paras. 41-45. 

108  Corruption  Research  Center  Budapest  (2023),  Fourteen  Graphs  and  Two  Tables  on  the  New  Trends  of 
Corruption  in  the  Hungarian  Public  Procurement  2005-2022.  Information  received  from  Transparency 
International  Hungary,  K-Monitor,  Corruption  Research  Center  Budapest,  Átlátszó,  Hungarian  Bar 
Association, Hungarian Association of Judges in the context of the country visit to Hungary. Highly centralised 
political  corruption  became  the  main  modus  operandi  of  Hungarian  politics,  with  political  corruption  and 
informal  power  networks  as  key  pillars  of  party-state  capture,  according  to  Bertelsmann  Stiftung  (2022), 
Transformation Index: Hungary Country Report, stressing that the prosecution of corruption is limited to those 
cases,  which can be considered political petty corruption,  happening outside of the  negotiated rules of the 
power pyramid.  

109  Information  received  from  Transparency  International  Hungary,  K-Monitor,  Corruption  Research  Center 
Budapest, Átlátszó, Hungarian Bar Association, Hungarian Association of Judges in the context of the country 
visit to Hungary. 

110  The  full  implementation  of  the  GRECO  recommendations  as  regards  the  effective  functioning  of  the 
prosecution would further strengthen the anti-corruption framework. See GRECO Fourth Evaluation Round – 
Third Interim Compliance Report (8 September 2022), p. 6, paras. 31-35. See also pillar I and 2022 Rule of 
Law report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 16. This concerns in particular the 
limitation of prosecutors’ immunity to functional immunity but also the procedures to lift parliamentarians’ 
immunity,  which  risk  hampering  the  timely  evidence-gathering  in  corruption  investigations  against 
parliamentarians, see also GRECO Fourth Evaluation Round – Third Interim Compliance Report (8 September 
2022), p. 7, paras. 41-45, and recommendation v, paras. 8-10. See also above in pillar I. 

111  See above in this pillar II on oversight and control mechanisms, p. 16. 

17 

 
                                                           
a robust track record to fight high-level corruption, as recommended in the 2022 Rule of Law 
Report. 

The  lack  of  enforcement  against  foreign  bribery  continues.  No  new  investigations  into 
foreign bribery have been initiated112. International recommendations to design a strategy to 
proactively detect and investigate foreign bribery cases and to provide for more time in the 
application  of  investigation  measures  in  highly  complex  multi-jurisdictional  cases  remain 
among other recommendations unfulfilled since 2012113.  

Some legislative steps have been taken to facilitate on-the-spot checks conducted by the 
EU Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) for investigations involving EU funds. On 4 October 2022, 
Hungary  designated  by  law  the  National  Tax  and  Customs  Administration  as  the  relevant 
authority to assist OLAF when carrying out on-the-spot checks and inspections in Hungary, 
including when an economic operator that is subject to such checks refuses to cooperate114. The 
amendments also introduced the possibility to involve, upon OLAF’s request, a finance guard 
in the checks as well as to impose a financial sanction in case an economic operator refuses to 
cooperate with OLAF during its checks and investigations. Regarding the allegations reported 
last year of a corruption ring in management authorities linked to national and EU funds that 
raised  concerns  as  to  the  lack  of  systemic  oversight115,  more  than  30  suspects  of  bribery 
involving the Ministry of Finance and the Prime Minister’s Office have in the meantime been 
identified116. 

112  Transparency  International  (2022),  Exporting  Corruption,  p.  51,  reporting  about  little  to  no  enforcement 
referencing  that  in  the  period  of  2018-2021,  Hungary  opened  one  investigation,  commenced  no  cases  and 
concluded no cases. See also OECD, Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, Phase 4 Two-Year 
Follow-Up Report: Hungary (2021), p. 3, para. 3 and p. 6 on recommendation 4.a, reporting that only one 
small-scale foreign bribery case has been concluded, resulting in the conviction of 26 natural persons between 
2008  and  2011,  since  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Convention  in  Hungary.  Some  stakeholders  indicate  that 
foreign financial influence from third countries poses an additional threat, information received from Mathias 
Corvinus Collegium in the context of the country visit to Hungary.  

113  See  OECD  Working  Group  on  Bribery  (2023),  Hungary  should  urgently  implement  long-standing  OECD 
Anti-Bribery recommendations, enforce its foreign bribery laws and improve its engagement with the Working 
Group on Bribery. See also OECD (2021), Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, Phase 4 Two-
Year  Follow-Up  Report:  Hungary,  following  up  on  the  OECD  recommendation  of  the  Phase  4  Report  – 
Hungary  (2019),  p.  54,  aspects  of  which  are  planned  to  be  included  in  Hungary’s  new  National  Anti-
Corruption Strategy and Action Plan. 

114  Act XXIX of 2022 on the control of the use of European Union budget funds, which entered into force on 11 
October 2022. See in this context also Communication on the remedial measures notified by Hungary under 
Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 for the  protection of the  Union budget,  COM(2022) 687 final of 30 
November  2022,  paras.  12,  134,  137-138  and  Council  Implementing  Decision  (EU)  2022/2506  of  15 
December 2022, recital (53), concluding that Hungary fulfilled the relevant remedial measure set under the 
conditionality procedure for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule 
of law in Hungary. Notably, the refusal of economic operators to cooperate with OLAF had been in focus in 
the previous report, as were concerns regarding the frequent practice of the Hungarian authorities to withdraw 
EU-funded projects in case of financial recommendations issued or investigations opened by OLAF, while 
amounts due are not systematically recovered from the economic operator who committed the irregularity or 
fraud, see 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 14. In RRP 
milestone  226,  Hungary  committed  to  reforms  to  strengthen  the  cooperation  with  OLAF  to  reinforce  the 
detection of fraud related to the implementation of Union support. 

115  See 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 14. 
116  Telex (2023), There are already 34 suspects  in the  bribery case involving the Ministry  of Finance and the 

Prime Minister’s Office. 

18 

 
                                                           
There has been no progress so far to reform lobbying rules. The 2022 Rule of Law Report 
recommended to Hungary to ‘[a]dopt comprehensive reforms on lobbying […] providing for 
effective  oversight  and  enforcement’117.  Although  new  lobbying  guidance  is  planned,  the 
measures  are  not  sufficient  to  address  the  identified  systemic  weaknesses  in  Hungary’s 
lobbying  framework.  The  Government  committed  to  including  in  the  new  National  Anti-
Corruption  Strategy  Action  Plan  the  adoption  of  a  code  of  conduct  for  persons  with  top 
executive functions providing guidance on contacts with lobbyists118. The non-binding code of 
conduct alone is a step forward, but alone it does not adequately address the previously raised 
concerns in the area of lobbying. These are that Hungary does not have a comprehensive lobby 
regulation,  transparency  register  or  legislative  footprint  in  place  to  disclose  contacts  with 
interest representatives119. There is no obligation to make the encounters or the content public, 
nor are there any sanctions provided in the relevant Decree120 in case of failure to comply. No 
steps  have  been  taken  to  establish  a  clear  set  of  rules  for  contacts  between  members  of 
Parliament  and  lobbyists  to  address  concerns  regarding  the  level  of  transparency  in  the 
decision-making  process121.  The  lobbying  rules  therefore  remain  incomplete,  with  no 
systematic follow-up ensured in case of non-compliance. The envisaged actions can therefore 
not be considered a comprehensive reform on lobbying, as recommended in the previous report. 
Therefore, there has been no progress  so  far on  the implementation  of the recommendation 
made in the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

The government plans to provide new guidance on post-employment restrictions, while 
reforms of the revolving door rules in place are not yet envisaged. The 2022 Rule of Law 
Report recommended to Hungary to ‘[a]dopt comprehensive reforms on […] revolving doors 
[…] providing for effective oversight and enforcement’122. There are plans to provide further 
guidance on post-employment restrictions, and the Government committed to including such 
guidance in the new Anti-corruption Strategy Action Plan123. Post-employment restrictions and 
cooling-off  periods  remain  largely  fragmented  and  apply  only  to  a  small  group  of  public 

117  2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 2.  
118  Input from Hungary for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 10. See also RRP milestone 178. There are no specific 
plans to go beyond the implementation of the commitments made under the conditionality procedure and the 
RRP with regard to lobbying, according to information received from the Ministry of Interior in the context 
of the country visit. 

119  According  to  Government  Decree  50/2013 of  25  February  2013,  employees  of  state  administration  bodies 
need to document meetings and may only meet interest representatives in relation to their work after informing 
their superiors, who may prohibit the meeting. See 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of 
law situation in Hungary, p. 17; 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in 
Hungary, p. 13. Comprehensive lobbying rules would be of particular importance with regard to the increasing 
number of ‘investments of strategic importance for the national economy’, as they are exempted from regular 
requirements and safeguards in order to simplify and accelerate investment procedures.  

120  Government  Decree  50/2013  of  25  February  2013  on  the  integrity  management  system  of  public 

administration bodies and the procedure for receiving lobbyists. 

121  See GRECO Fourth Evaluation Round – Third Interim Compliance Report (8 September 2022), paras. 9-10. 
According to information received from the National Assembly’s Immunity Committee in the context of the 
country  visit to Hungary, parliamentary rules are clear and interest representatives have the opportunity to 
express their opinions. 

122  2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 2. 
123  Input from Hungary for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 10. There are no specific plans to go beyond the 
implementation of the commitments made under the conditionality procedure and the RRP (milestones 177-
179) with regard to revolving doors, according to information received from the Ministry of Interior in the 
context of the country visit. 

19 

 
                                                           
officials124  and  a  limited  set  of  public  institutions,  such  as  the  State  Audit  Office  and  the 
National Media and Infocommunications Authority125. In practice, however, these rules are not 
effectively  enforced,  as  the  Government  is  still  to  specify  the  sectors  and  public  officials’ 
positions to which cooling-off time restriction  will apply with  regard to  business  careers of 
public officials in the area, in which they were active beforehand126. A code of conduct for 
members of Parliament that would include post-employment guidelines is neither in place nor 
planned127. Therefore, while the guidance would be a good initial step if adopted, the envisaged 
actions cannot be considered a comprehensive reform on post-employment rules. Therefore, 
there has been no progress on the implementation of on the recommendation made in the 2022 
Rule of Law Report.  

Some progress has been made to strengthen the system of asset declarations and a newly 
established  oversight  structure  has  started  operating.  The  2022  Rule  of  Law  Report 
recommended  to  Hungary  to  ‘[s]trengthen  the  system  of  asset  declarations,  providing  for 
effective  oversight  and  enforcement’128.  Until  July  2022,  Hungary  had  an  extensive  asset 
disclosure  system  in  place  that  required  members  of  Parliament,  Government  officials  and 
public officials to declare their assets and interests129. The system lacked effective oversight 
and  enforcement  in  practice.  In  2022,  after  several  amendments  to  the  Act  on  the  National 
Assembly130  which  first  abolished  the  obligation  to  report  on  assets  in  exchange  for  an 
exclusive focus on income131, the previous asset declaration system was largely reinstated132. 

124  See 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, pp. 17-18. 
125  Confidentiality clauses exist in the Labour Code (Section 8(4) of Act I of 2012), as well as in some specific 
legislation applicable to public officials (Section 93(1)(g) of Act CXXV of 2018). Such clauses stipulate that 
a Government official shall retain classified information and, in addition, not disclose to any unauthorised 
person or entity any fact which came to his knowledge in the course of his activities and the disclosure of 
which would have adverse or beneficial consequences for the State, a governmental authority, an employee or 
a citizen. 

126  The  term  of  the  restriction  specified  by  law  is  the  equivalent  of  the  time  spent  on  the  job  subject  to  the 
restriction, with a maximum of two years (Section 117(2) of Act CXXV of 2018). Section 117(1) provides 
that  the  Government  must  determine  the  sectors  and  positions  where  a  government  official  may  not  be 
employed after the termination of his/her public service. That provision remains to be implemented. 

127  According to Section 85 of Act XXXVI on the National Assembly, restrictions apply for a period of two years 
after the termination of the mandate to members of Parliament to prevent economic conflicts of interest in that 
they  are  restricted  to  conclude  a  purchase  agreement  to  acquire  shareholdings  of  a  business  organisation 
operating  with  influence  over  the  Hungarian  or  foreign  State,  a  local  government,  the  association  of  local 
governments, a foreign municipality, a political party, or a domestic or foreign religious community. GRECO 
has repeatedly called for the introduction of a code of ethics/ conduct for members of Parliament to be adopted, 
covering,  among  others,  post-employment  rules,  and  complementary,  practical  measures  for  their 
implementation, see GRECO Fourth Evaluation Round – Third Interim Compliance Report, pp. 3-4, paras. 8-
11, with reference to the Fourth Evaluation Report, p. 17. 

128  2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 2.  
129  See 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 16; 2021 Rule of 
Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 12, flagging concerns with regard to 
the lack of effective oversight and enforcement in practice, not the system established in law. 

130  The  scope  of  the  Act  also  extends  to  senior  government  officials,  as  their  system  is  based  on  the  rules 
applicable  to  members  of  Parliament.  Asset  declaration  rules  for  lower-level  public  officials  and  local 
government leaders remained unchanged in 2022. 

131  See 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 16, stressing that 
the government proposal introducing amendments to the asset declarations rules for members of Parliament 
with  a  timeline  for  adoption  on  27  July  2022  does  not  aim  to  address  these  calls  to  strengthen  the  data 
verification, oversight or sanctions in case of failure to comply with the rules. 

132  As before, members of Parliament, their spouses and partners living in the same household are required to 
submit asset declarations each year after taking up their mandate and at the end of their mandate. While the 

20 

 
                                                           
Concerns  have  been  raised  regarding  some  remaining  loopholes133,  as  well  as  effective 
monitoring  and  verification.  In  2022,  out  of  the  605  declarations  submitted,  one  procedure 
against a member of Parliament was initiated but rejected by the Committee of Immunity as 
manifestly unfounded134. There is still no obligation for regular monitoring for the respective 
entities  in  the  parliament  or  the  Tax  and  Customs  Authority  to  check  the  correctness  and 
completeness of the declarations made135. Asset declarations are generally verified only upon 
notification of suspicions, and potential follow-up is left to the discretion of the public official’s 
employer  or,  in  case  of  members  of  Parliament  and  other  high-ranking  officials,  to  the 
Committee of Immunity136. However, neither declarations of interests nor information about 
any follow-up are publicly available. To address some of the long-standing calls to make the 
supervision,  verification  and  enforcement  of  rules  of  conduct,  conflict  of  interest  and  asset 
declarations for members of Parliament more effective, the Integrity Authority was created in 
November  2022  and  tasked  to  increase  oversight  over  asset  declarations137.  The  overall 
effectiveness of the Integrity Authority’s oversight role will considerably depend in practice 
on the collaboration of other relevant state bodies and entities138.  While the Integrity Authority 
has no enforcement or sanctioning powers of its own, it can provide evidence to the competent 
law  enforcement  authorities.  Against  this  background,  some  progress  can  be  seen  in  the 
establishment of this new oversight structure for the asset declarations of certain categories of 
officials. Future reports will continue to monitor its effectiveness in practice. Therefore, some 
progress has been made towards implementing the recommendation made in the 2022 Rule of 
Law Report. 

asset declaration of the member of Parliament remains to be public as before, the names of family members 
are no longer published and their declarations are not public but only accessible to the National Assembly’s 
Immunity Committee, which is not obliged to automatically initiate a verification procedure upon complaint. 
Instead, complaints need to be substantiated with evidence indicating the missing or false elements in family 
members’ declarations, which in practice is impossible, if the declarations remain non-accessible to the public. 
133  Under the new rules, the property serving for the exclusive use of the member of Parliament and his/her family 
living in the same household does no longer have to be declared, unlike the previous system, in which all real 
estate owned had to be included in the declaration, even though only the district in which the real estate is 
located must be mentioned. The new rules introduced also income bands instead of exact incomes and require 
members  of  Parliament  to  share  information  only  when  they  considered  it  justified,  instead  of  annual 
declarations. 

134  Written contribution from the National Assembly’s Committee of Immunity in the context of the country visit 

in Hungary, p. 3. 

135  See also K-Monitor (2023), Hungarian MPs Assets: Less Declared and Still Not Monitored. 
136  The Committee rejected almost all notifications as unsubstantiated in the years between 2017-2021 (15 out of 
16),  while  in  the  remaining  case  the  procedure  was  not  initiated  due  to  the  subsequent  correction  of  the 
declarations, see 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 16. 
Any incompatibility of conflicts of interest of members of Parliament must be declared to the Speaker, i.e. the 
President of Parliament, following which, they are subject to certain restrictions pending the resolution of the 
situation. Act XXXVI of 2012, amended in December 2019. 

137  Act XXVII of 2022 on the control on the implementation of EU Funds establishing the Integrity Authority. 
The Integrity Authority has the exclusive power to verify asset declarations of political government leaders, 
including  the  Prime  Minister  and  other  high-level  executives.  For  all  other  high-risk  officials,  including 
members of Parliament, the Authority has a supervisory role and as such the right to request the respective 
competent authorities to initiate a verification procedure upon suspicion, complaint or ex officio. This latter 
element  is  considered  a  weakness  or  a  shortcoming  by  the  Council  of  the  EU  under  the  conditionality 
procedure. See the Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 on measures for 
the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary, recital 36. 
138  In law, they  have an obligation to collaborate,  while the Integrity  Authority can act  in  court for  failure  of 

compliance with this obligation. 

21 

 
                                                           
Hungary committed to addressing conflict of interest risks, including for public interest 
trusts139. Rules on conflicts of interest for public officials, judges and prosecutors exist and are 
regulated in the respective sectoral laws as well as in codes of ethics. The national integrity 
measures target low and mid-level officials in the public administration, while for senior public 
officials the national framework remains weak140. There are also no general conflict of interest 
rules in place for political advisors and ministerial or government commissioners141. Notably, 
the Government committed to including in the Action Plan to the  National Anti-Corruption 
Strategy 2023-2025 the adoption of a Code of Conduct for persons with executive functions142. 
It remains to be seen to what extent the Code would cover also new rules on conflicts of interest, 
on gifts and similar benefits for parliamentarians, as planned by the Government and reported 
last year143. Until these commitments are implemented in practice, there are no codes of ethics 
for  members  of  the  Government,  state  secretaries,  or  members  of  Parliament.  Furthermore, 
verification  procedures  by  the  National  Tax  and  Customs  Authority  upon  suspicions  of 
unjustified wealth can only be initiated if investigative authorities have also opened criminal 
inquiries, thus significantly limiting the possibility for such verifications144. At the same time, 
the  newly  established  Integrity  Authority  will  be  able  to  request  the  investigation  of  such 
suspicions when there is a link with public funds with a focus on EU funds. To ensure more 
transparency of the use of EU funds, the scope of the conflict of interest rules were enlarged to 
cover also public interest trusts145. However, top-level public officials, including but not limited 
to  members of Parliament and former public officials  can receive a second income through 

139  Public  interest  trusts  receive  significant  public  funding,  including  EU  funding,  and  have  been  found  to  be 

managed by board members close to the Government. 

140  Act CXXV of 2018 on central government administration provides only for a limited concept of conflicts of 
interest,  as  it  does  not  define  conflicts  of  interest  as  such,  but  instead  lists  only  certain  activities  that  are 
incompatible  with  the  position  of  senior  political  executive  (Section  182).  The  law  does  not  sufficiently 
regulate specific situations, in which private interests are in contradiction with public interests, or financial 
interests with decision-making. This seen in context, the integrity tests described above prove to contribute 
rather to curbing petty corruption in the public administration at the same time. For the implementation of EU 
funds, as a consequence of the Conditionality procedure, Government Decrees 373 and 374 were adopted in 
2022 to include rules on compliance with Article 61 of the Financial Regulation. 

141  To implement Hungary’s Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP milestones 217-220 and 224), the guidelines 
and conflict of interest rules applicable to staff involved in any way in the implementation of EU funds were 
updated,  while  a  dedicated  body  (the  Directorate  for  Internal  Audit  and  Integrity,  DIAI)  set  up,  which  is 
empowered to regularly check the veracity of those declarations. Furthermore, while the rules on the use of 
EU funds were updated on conflicts of interest, ministers do not need to sign conflict of interest declarations, 
even if they are involved in the implementation of EU funds. These apply only from state secretary level and 
below. 

142  RRP milestone 178. 
143  See 2022, Rule of Law  Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 17, which was 
based on information received from the Government in the context of the draft 2022 report consultation. 
144  2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 17; 2021 Rule of Law 

Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary p. 13. 

145  Act XXIX of 2022. However, the regulatory framework still does not prevent top-level officials, including 
senior political executives from the  National Assembly and Hungary’s autonomous bodies, from sitting on 
boards of public interest trusts, as repeatedly requested by the Commission. Moreover, Hungary reintroduced 
(by means of an exception from the general prohibition), as of 1 November 2022, the possibility for senior 
political executives to have second remunerated employment, including in boards of public interest trusts. On 
15 December 2022, the Council adopted budgetary measures to protect the Union budget from breaches of the 
principles of  the rule of law in Hungary,  under the  Conditionality Regulation. In this context,  the  Council 
prohibited to enter into any new legal commitments with public interest trusts and entities maintained by such 
trusts when implementing the Union budget in direct or indirect management. The regulation on public interest 
trusts was codified in April 2021, see Act IX of 2021.  

22 

 
                                                           
their board membership side-job. This situation presents a personal financial benefit that may 
bring personal and professional interests in conflict146. Board members are currently appointed 
for  life,  while  no  cooling-off  periods  exist  for  former  high-level  officials  to  become  board 
members.  

Parliament  adopted  the  update  of  the  whistleblower  protection  legislative  framework. 
Upon the political veto of the President on 21 April 2023, Parliament passed a revised law to 
transpose  the  EU  Directive147  on  23  May  2023148.  Various  state  agencies  operate  online 
reporting  channels,  including  the  National  Protective  Service149,  the  Commissioner  for 
Fundamental  Rights150,  the  Hungarian  Competition  Authority151,  the  Public  Procurement 
Authority152 and the Prime Minister’s Office153. The latter can receive disclosures related to 

146  Top-level officials,  who  may  take decisions on the implementation of Union funding, can sit on boards of 
public interest asset management trusts, which might benefit from such funding. In addition, the Government 
has  reintroduced  as  of  1  November  2022  the  possibility  (by  means  of  an  exception  from  the  general 
prohibition)  for  senior  political  executives  to  have  other  remunerated  employment,  including  on  boards  of 
public  interest  asset  management  foundations,  see  Council  Implementing  Decision  (EU)  2022/2506  of  15 
December 2022 on measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the 
rule of law in Hungary, recital 43. Public interest trusts receive significant public funding, entailing increased 
risks of corruption. Since such trusts may receive funding not only from the Hungarian State but also from the 
private sector and foreign States, the trustees may engage in fundraising and lobbying activities. The legal 
framework has been challenged before the Constitutional Court (case II/02280/2021, pending) due to concerns 
regarding the separation of powers, as trustees are not prevented from holding high ranking positions, such as 
Minister and member of Parliament, at the same time. 

147  The  deadline  for  transposition  of  the  Directive  (EU)  2019/1937  on  the  protection  of  persons  who  report 
breaches  of  Union  law  was  17  December  2021.  Pursuing  the  infringement  proceedings  launched  against 
Hungary for failure to transpose the Directive, on 15 February 2023, the Commission decided to refer Hungary 
to the Court of Justice (case C-155/23, pending). The OECD recognised the positive aspects of the existing 
regulatory framework, but raised concerns as regards the effectiveness of the protection of whistleblowers, see 
OECD  (2021),  Implementing  the  OECD  Anti-Bribery  Convention,  Phase  4  Two-Year  Follow-Up  Report: 
Hungary.  

148  Act XXV of 2023 on complaints, public interest disclosures and rules related to whistleblowing. On 21 April 
2023, the President of the Republic vetoed the earlier version of the Bill (T/3089), adopted on 11 April 2023, 
but not promulgated by the President, that would have added provisions stigmatising LGBTIQ people to the 
law transposing the EU’s Whistleblower Directive. The new law no longer contains provisions that could have 
resulted in reporting on sensitive data, such as same-sex couples raising children.  

149  Since 2011, the National Protective Service has had a toll-free hotline where anyone can report anonymously, 

according to input from Hungary for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 19. 

150  The Commissioner acts as a  reporting channel and operates the electronic platform but  has limited formal 
competence as regards whistleblower complaints on corruption, including primarily the forwarding of reports 
to competent authorities. In 2022, the Commissioner has not received any petition relating to corruption despite 
its awareness-raising activities to promote whistleblower reporting, including on corruption and EU subsidies, 
according to information received from the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights in the context of the country 
visit to Hungary. See also 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, 
p. 18. 

151  Hungarian  Competition  Authority,  General 

information 

about 

how  Cartel 

chat  works, 

https://www.gvh.hu/kartellchat/kcfaq/faqentry_568311.html. 

152  Public  Procurement  Authority,  Public  Procurement  Anonymous  Chat 

(KAC) 

launched, 

https://www.kozbeszerzes.hu/hirek/elindult-kozbeszerzesi-anonim-chat-kac/. 

153  The  reporting  channel  has  been  complemented  by  a  conflict  of  interest  reporting  interface,  see  conflict  of 
interest reporter at https://www.palyazat.gov.hu/osszeferhetetlenseg, which is a new commitment of Hungary 
under its Recovery and Resilience Plan milestone 224 on the setting up of the DIAI to report anonymously 
any conflict of interest suspicions on conflicts of interest in relation to persons involved in the implementation 
and control of Union support in Hungary. 

23 

 
                                                           
the misuse of EU funds154. In practice, reporting on these channels continued to be scarce in 
2022, while reported cases are frequently dismissed155. The anonymous, secure whistleblower 
hotline  of  the  new  Integrity  Authority156  is  currently  under  development  and  not  yet 
operational157. No steps have been taken yet to address the major operational deficiencies in 
the whistleblower regime, including the limited protection against retaliation and the risks of 
disclosure of the whistleblowers’ identity158. 

Challenges  persist  with  regard  to  political  party  and  campaign  financing  rules,  which 
have a narrow scope of application159. Campaign activities that are conducted outside the 
official campaign period of 50 days before the general elections do not fall under the law. In 
practice,  however,  parties  had  extensively  campaigned  long  before  the  start  of  the  official 
campaign for the recent elections in 2022160. The State Audit Office, which is responsible to 
oversee  the  use  of  public  funds  and  to  control  the  legality  of  political  parties’  financial 
management,  indicated  that  significant  foreign  sources  appeared  in  campaign  financing  in 
2022, which raised suspicions of the possibility of illegal financing161. An audit control in this 
regard on party and campaign financing is being carried out in the course of 2023. Stakeholders 
have  raised  concerns  to  the  Supreme  Audit  Office  on  systemic  overspending  in  2022  on 
outdoor billboard advertising during the 2022 elections, possibly violating spending caps162. 
Also, political advertising on the social media platform Facebook, financed by third parties163, 
is not considered to fall within the legal definition of political advertising under the Electoral 
Procedure  Act.  Consequently,  it  is  not  audited  by  the  State  Audit  Office164,  even  if  recent 

154  See the Magyarorszag.hu portal, Public interest announcements, www.anti-lop.hu. 
155  See the list of public interest announcements on the website of Magyarorszag.hu for the orderly and transparent 
use  of  funds  from  the  European  Union,  https://www.anti-lop.hu/.  According  to  information  received  from 
Transparency  International  Hungary  in  the  context  of  the  country  visit  to  Hungary,  some  whistleblowers 
refrained from reporting corruption cases due to concerns of political affiliates being involved in the reporting 
channels with the consequence that the whistleblower systems do not fulfil their objective in practice. 

156  See Section 4 of Act XXVII of 2022 on the control of the use of EU budget resources. 
157  Information received from the Integrity Authority in the context of the country visit to Hungary. 
158  Including the limited protection against retaliation and the risks of disclosure of the whistleblowers’ identity. 
See OECD (2021), Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, Phase 4 Two-Year Follow-Up Report: 
Hungary, p. 3.  

159  See 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 18; 2020 Rule of 

Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 12. 

160  Information received by Transparency International in the  context of the country visit to Hungary.  On the 
elections more generally, see OSCE, Hungary, Parliamentary Elections and Referendum  - ODIHR Election 
Observation Mission Final Report (2022) and Freedom House, Nations in Transit Report 2023, indicating a 
decline in the electoral process rating. 

161  Written contribution from the State Audit Office in the context of the country visit to Hungary, p. 8. 
162  K-Monitor  (2022),  Outnumbered  eight  to  one  by  the  government’s  poster  campaign,  they  have  already 
exceeded the legal requirements. See contribution from Transparency International for the 2023 Rule of Law 
Report, p. 16. See also K-Monitor, Political Capital and Transparency International Hungary (2022), Orban’s 
Fidesz to overspend in Hungary’s election campaign; and K-Monitor (2022), Hungary’s State of Corruption 
heading towards elections. 

163  This can include proxies, such as GONGOs, companies, informal grouping of people or individuals that are 
involved in campaigning activities as special purpose vehicles to promote political parties or candidates, the 
related spending of which would not appear in party accounts. See also Hungary Today (2022), Pro-Fidesz 
Megafon’s Facebook Ad Spending Exceeds HUF 1 Billion. 

164  Information received from Transparency International Hungary and the State Audit Office in the context of 
the country visit to Hungary. Act XXXVI of 2013 on electoral procedure covers media content or audiovisual 
content published in a press product promoting or encouraging a candidate organisation or an independent 
candidate, while political advertising content on Facebook is considered not to be from a media promotion 
provider. Thus, its social media content does not qualify as press product within the meaning of Section 146(b) 

24 

 
                                                           
elections have shown that most of the political party campaigning takes place on this social 
media tool165. While some measures have been taken to ensure that political party financial 
registries  are  transparent  and  up-to-date,  which  allows  clarifying  party  income  sources, 
campaign periods and ensuring a more in-depth monitoring, overall concerns remain as regards 
the transparency of party financing despite OSCE ODIHR recommendations166. 

Several  amendments  to  the  public  procurement  rules  were  introduced  for  a  more 
transparent  use  of  funds,  including  for  public  interest  trusts.  Public  interest  trusts 
established by the State, as well as legal persons established or maintained by them are now 
explicitly designated to fall within the scope of application of procurement rules in respect of 
procurements financed by the European Union funds167. Since 19 November 2022, the newly 
established Integrity Authority can intervene upon request, complaint or ex officio in cases of 
suspected  fraud,  conflicts  of  interest,  corruption  and  any  other  irregularities  and  inform  the 
national  prosecution  service  and  the  European  Anti-Fraud  Office168.  Furthermore,  the 
Government  undertook to reduce the percentage  of contracts  awarded to  single-bidders, for 

of  the  Media  Act.  See  also  State  Audit  Office  (2021),  Elections:  Handbook  prepared  to  support  election 
regularity. 

165  BIRN  (2022),  Hungary  Election:  Virtual  Smear  Tactics  Alive  and  Well  on  Facebook.  According  to 
information received from K-Monitor, Transparency International and Corruption Research Center Budapest 
in the context of the country visit to Hungary, the amounts spent on Facebook being by far the largest. See 
also  Hungary  Today  (2022),  Political  Parties  Spent  HUF  3  Billion  during  Campaign  Period  on  Facebook 
Alone; BIRN (2022), Hungary Election: Virtual Smear Tactics Alive and Well on Facebook; Euractiv (2022), 
Orban’s influencers shower cash, become largest social media spenders. 

166  OSCE ODIHR and Venice Commission Guidelines on Political Party Regulation para. 194. OSCE, Hungary, 
Parliamentary Elections and Referendum - ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report (2022), p. 22. 
Also, the State Audit Office (SAO) has limited competence to control the expenditure of political parties, and 
only parties that have gained at least one percent on the ballot from the party list can be monitored. Corruption 
risks therefore exist for public funds, for example, if parties below this threshold are founded to obtain access 
to state subsidies, terminating their operations right after the elections. SAO audit findings that can result in 
the  withdrawal  of  state  funds  and  cannot  be  challenged  before  an  administrative  court.  See  also  GRECO 
(2019),  Third  Evaluation  Round  –  Second  Addendum  to  the  Second  Compliance  Report  on  Hungary  on 
incriminations and transparency of party funding, para. 24. 

167  Act XXIX of 2022 introduced a new point f) to Section 5(1) of Act CXLIII of 2015 on public procurement 
stipulating  that  public  interest  asset  management  foundations  performing  public  duty  and  legal  persons 
established  or  controlled  by  them  were  subject  to  the  obligation  to  conduct  procurement  procedures  in 
accordance with the Act on public procurement.  As reported previously, Act VIII of 2021 repealed Section 
5(3) of the public procurement law, thereby removing trusts and legal persons  managed by them  from the 
scope of application of procurement rules, see 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law 
situation in Hungary, p. 20. See also pillar IV. 

168  As  a  horizontal  measure,  the  Government  has  established  the  new  Integrity  Authority,  which  aims  at 
remedying  systematic  breaches  of  the  rule  of  law  concerning  public  procurement  affecting  the  Union’s 
financial interests and to reinforce the prevention, detection and correction of fraud, conflicts of interest and 
corruption,  as  well  as  other  illegalities  and  irregularities.  Hungary  adopted  on  4  October  2022  the  Act 
establishing the Integrity Authority by Act XXVII of 2022 on the control of the use of European Union budget 
funds, which entered into force on 11 October 2022. Further amendments were introduced to the Act as part 
of the two draft bills composing the ‘service package’ submitted to the National Assembly on 15 November 
2022. See in this context, Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 on measures 
for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary, para. 
34. The Integrity Authority is provided access to all available information relevant for its task and has the right 
to instruct other competent national authorities, including giving instructions to exercise their supervisory or 
control  functions  or  to  carry  out  administrative  investigative  acts  on  behalf  of  the  Integrity  Authority.  In 
addition,  the  Integrity  Authority  can  conduct  investigative  procedures  on  their  behalf  in  order  to  identify 
relevant circumstances. 

25 

 
                                                           
both  tender  procedures  financed  from  European  Union  as  well  as  from  national  funds169. 
Transparency in public procurement has improved, though specific data on beneficiaries and 
overall amounts on exempted, pandemic-related procurements remain unpublished170. Further 
measures to increase the level of competition in public procurement are included in a dedicated 
action plan for the period 2023-2026171. To address its findings on the inadequate system of 
control, monitoring, accountability and sanctions, the Integrity Authority’s report recommends 
furthermore  to  establish  a  single  audit  and  control  system  that  addresses  the  whole  public 
procurement process in a holistic way172. According to the Public Procurement Authority, the 
trend  continues  in  2022  that  fewer  investments  have  been  procured  in  2022,  however  with 
larger amounts, even larger than already in 2021173. Businesses’ attitudes towards corruption 
in the EU show that 27% of companies in Hungary (EU average 26%) think that corruption has 
prevented them from winning a public tender or a public procurement contract in practice in 
the  last  three  years174.  Stakeholders  also  report  about  selective  awarding  to  political 
affiliates175,  which  would  carry  the  potential  to  increase  corruption  risks  in  a  procurement 
market that is already vulnerable to corruption176.  

169  The share of single bids for tender procedures is to be reduced below 15%, while measures will be taken in 
case they exceed this limit.  See RRP  milestones and targets 185-212 and Communication on the  remedial 
measures notified by Hungary 2020/2092 for the protection of the Union budget, 100-105. Previously in 2022, 
Government Decree 63/2022 of 28 February 2022, which entered into force on 15 March 2022, had introduced 
measures to reduce this high share of single bids targeting, however, only public procurements above the EU 
public procurement thresholds, thus relating only to a limited number of procurements. See also Corruption 
Research Center Budapest (2021), Two tendencies in the Hungarian public procurement, pp. 3-4, including an 
analysis of more than 250 000 public contracts awarded between 2005 and 2021 in general, stating that the 
contracts awarded to single-bidders in 2021 rose to 34.6% in 2021 (from 32.1% in 2020). According to the 
single bid indicator of the 2022 Single Market Scoreboard, until 2021, the proportion of contracts awarded in 
procedures where there was just one bidder had stagnated around 40% between 2018-2021, which was among 
the highest in the EU. However, there is a downward trend since 2022. 

170  See Átlátszó (2020), The Government has abused the pandemic multiple times according  to K-Monitor and 
HCLU. See in this context also Integrity Authority, Integrity Risk Assessment Report (2023), finding that the 
application and use of the legal framework on public procurement, which is generally in line with international 
standards and guidelines, is dysfunctional, as it leads to higher costs of taxpayers and does not achieve the 
objectives of the transparent use of public funds. 

171  Government Decision No 1118/2023 (of 31 March 2023) on the action plan (2023 to 2026) to increase the 

level of competition in public procurements. 

172  Integrity Authority, Integrity Risk Assessment Report (2023). 
173  Public  Procurement  Authority  (2022),  Flash  Report:  Hungarian  Public  Procurement  in  Numbers,  p.  3, 
reporting only for the first half of 2022 that the  final total value of the procedures shows a 73,3% increase 
compared to the same period in 2021. See also Public Procurement Authority (2021), Flash Report: Hungarian 
Public  Procurement  in  Numbers,  p.  3,  reporting  a  23%  increase  of  the  total  value  compared  to  2020  and 
considerably above the level of the total value calculated in the years prior to the coronavirus pandemic. 
174  Flash Eurobarometer 524 on Businesses’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU (2023). This is one percentage 

point above the EU average. 

175  See, Corruption Research Center Budapest (2023), Fourteen Graphs and Two Tables on the New Trends of 
Corruption  Risk  in  the  Hungarian  Public  Procurement  2005-2022;  as  well  as  the  six  case  studies  of  the 
Corruption  Research Center  Budapest (2023), White Elephants in Hungary  –  Lessons  of some EU  funded 
projects. See also Átlátszó (2023), We identified the companies that have won hundreds of public contracts in 
a single city. 

176  See European Semester (2022), p. 11. This is also supported by the Integrity Authority’s public procurement 

risk assessment exercise report.  

26 

 
                                                           
III.  MEDIA PLURALISM AND MEDIA FREEDOM 

Hungary’s  Fundamental  Law  and  sectoral  legislation  provide  the  legal  framework  for  the 
protection  of  media  freedom  and  pluralism.  The  Media  Act  regulates,  in  detail,  both  the 
Hungarian  media  regulator  as  well  as  the  governance  of  public  service  media.  Legislative 
amendments adopted in 2022 have modified certain aspects of the right to access information 
held by public authorities, thereby facilitating the exercise of that right177.  

There  has  been  no  progress  in  strengthening  the  functional  independence  of  the 
Hungarian  media  regulator.  The  2022  Rule  of  Law  Report  recommended  to  Hungary  to 
‘[i]ntroduce  mechanisms  to  enhance  the  functional  independence  of  the  media  regulatory 
authority taking into account European standards on the independence of media regulators’178. 
While the Media Act179 regulates the establishment and operation of the Media Authority, the 
Authority’s functional independence needs to be strengthened180. The decision-making body 
of  the  Authority,  the  Media  Council,  remains  composed  of  members  all  nominated  by 
Parliament, which is controlled by the governing party. By virtue of a recent amendment to the 
Media Act as part of the revision of the asset disclosure system (see also Pillar II), members of 
the Media Council are now obliged to make a declaration of assets181. On 15 July 2022, the 
Commission decided to refer Hungary to the Court of Justice182 in the infringement procedure 
which  considers  incompatible  with  EU  law  the  Media  Council’s  refusal  to  renew  the 
broadcasting license of independent radio station Klubrádió, which resulted in the radio being 
taken off air183. Following the April 2022 rejection of renewal of Tilos Rádió’s licence184, the 
Media  Council  eventually  opened  a  fresh  tendering  process  under  which  the  independent 
station obtained a new licence in September 2022. . Given the ongoing issue with regard to the 
authority’s composition, the 2023 Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM) has changed its previous 
assessment of the independence and effectiveness of the Media Authority from medium to high 
risk185, also referring to the authority’s ‘openly discriminatory’ decision making. Given that no 
measures  have  been  adopted  or  are  planned  so  far  to  strengthen  the  regulator’s  functional 
independence, there has thus been no progress in the implementation of this recommendation.  

There has been no progress to increase transparency and fairness in the distribution of 
state  advertising.  The  2022  Rule  of  Law  Report  recommended  to  Hungary  to  ‘adopt 
legislation to ensure fair and transparent distribution of advertising expenditure by the state and 

177  Hungary ranks 72nd in the 2023 Reporters without Borders World Press Freedom Index compared to 85th the 

previous year. 

178  2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 2. 
179  Act CLXXXV of 2010 on media services and on mass media. 
180  See 2020, 2021 and 2022 Rule of Law Reports, Country Chapters on the rule of law situation in Hungary. 
181  The amendment to Section 218/E of the Media Act in relation to asset declarations is in line with Act LVI of 
2022  amending  certain  Acts  requested  by  the  European  Commission  for  the  successful  conclusion  of  the 
conditionality procedure. 

182  Case C-92/23, pending. 
183  The  Commission  considers  that  the  Media  Council’s  decisions  to  reject  Klubrádió’s  application  were 
disproportionate and non-transparent and that Hungarian media law has been applied in a discriminatory way 
in breach of EU telecoms rules, set out in Directive (EU)  2018/1972 establishing the European Electronic 
Communications  Code  (Recast).  On  17  June  2021,  the  Kúria  upheld  the  Media  Council’s  decision.  On  8 
February 2022, the Constitutional Court dismissed Klubrádió’s constitutional complaint (Decision 3064/2022. 
(II. 25.) AB). 

184  2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 21. 
185  Media Pluralism Monitor 2023, country report on Hungary, pp. 17-19. 

27 

 
                                                           
state-owned  companies’186.  No  legislative  or  other  measures  have  been  announced  to  that 
effect.  The  channelling  of  significant  state  resources  to  pro-government  media  continues  to 
prevent a level playing field in the Hungarian media landscape. While according to the Mérték 
Media  Monitor  ‘the  primary  instrument  of  distorting  the  media  market  in  Hungary  is  state 
advertising spending’ and this remains the case today187, the 2023 MPM has this year adjusted 
its risk score from high to medium risk with regard to state advertising in the country188. Given 
that no legislative or other measures have been adopted or announced, there has been no further 
progress in the implementation of this recommendation.  

There  are  no  detailed  rules  on  transparency  in  the  ownership  structure  of  media 
companies. Registers maintained by the media authority only contain limited information on 
media  service  providers  though  direct  ownership  information  is  available  via  the  business 
register. This leads the 2023 MPM to consider this a high-risk area although it points out that 
‘in practice […] the public is often aware of the ultimate beneficial owners behind a particular 
outlet’ due to the attention which journalists and researchers have given to this matter189. The 
Hungarian system of review of market concentration in the media market continues to operate 
under the conditions described in detail in previous reports190.  

There has been no progress with regard to enhancing the independence of public service 
media. The 2022 Rule of Law Report recommended to Hungary to ‘[s]trengthen the rules and 
mechanisms  to  enhance  the  independent  governance  and  editorial  independence  of  public 
service  media  taking  into  account  European  standards  on  public  service  media’191.  No 
significant  legislative  or  policy  changes  have  been  adopted  or  are  planned  in  terms  of  the 
governance and funding of public service media, amid concerns in relation to its financial and 
editorial independence192. The 2023 MPM maintains its high risk score for this area holding 
that: ‘Hungarian public service media is financially dependent on the governing majority in 
Parliament,  is  controlled  by  political  interests  and  is  seen  as  extremely  biased  in  its 
reporting’193. Section 87 of the Media Act, which establishes rules related to the election of the 
members  of  the  board  of  trustees  of  the  Public  Service  Foundation  was  amended194.  The 
amendment stipulates that in case of termination of a member’s mandate before the end of his 
or her term and an intervening change of Government it shall be up to the Committee on Culture 
of the National Assembly to propose a replacement member. There has thus been no progress 
in the implementation of this recommendation195. 

A new reform aims to facilitate access to public information and rendered the charging 
of fees exceptional. As part of the commitments undertaken in the Recovery and Resilience 

186  2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 2. 
187  Mérték (2021), State advertising spending – complaint update.  
188  Media Pluralism Monitor 2023, country report on Hungary, pp. 30-31. 
189  Media Pluralism Monitor 2023, country report on Hungary, pp. 21-22. 
190  See 2020, 2021 and 2022 Rule of Law Reports, Country Chapters on the rule of law situation in Hungary. 
191  2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 2. 
192  See  details  as  to  the  legislative  framework  regulating  public  service  media  in  2022  Rule  of  Law  Report, 

Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, pp. 22-23. 

193  Media Pluralism Monitor 2023, country report on Hungary, p. 31. 
194  Act CLXXXV of 2010 on media services and on mass media, amended by Section 4 of Act XVIII of 2022.  
195  According  to  the  European  Parliament’s  Flash  Eurobarometer:  News  &  Media  Survey  2022,  22%  of 
respondents in Hungary stated that they trust public TV and radio stations, below the EU average of 49%. 

28 

 
                                                           
Plan196, a new Chapter 21/A was added to the Freedom of Information Act197, which aims to 
accelerate litigation in connection with data of public interest by applying the rules of litigation 
on press rectification198. The legislative provisions entered into force on 31 December 2022 
and apply to  data requests  filed after that date. The provisions are expected to  significantly 
speed  up  litigation,  thanks  to  the  very  tight  deadlines199.  In  addition,  in  October  2022,  the 
Government  had  amended  other  relevant  provisions200  thus  establishing  an  over-arching 
principle that public information shall be provided free of charge and that fees for access to 
such  public  information  may  only  be  charged  under  exceptional  and  clearly  defined 
circumstances and that such fees should be capped. This reform is expected to address some 
long-standing issues regarding access to public information. Stakeholders point out that certain 
legal obstacles to freedom of information remain, and that proactive data publication on the 
new transparency portal is not mandatory for all entities performing a public duty201. The 2023 
MPM considers that the 2022 amendments are positive but considers that the current regime is 
still more restrictive than that existing prior to 2015 and consequently maintains its high risk 
score for this area202.  

Journalists  and  other  media  professionals  have  been  targeted  by  spyware  and  smear 
campaigns.  Following  allegations  related  to  the  use  of  Pegasus  and  equivalent  spyware 
surveillance software against journalists203, (see also pillar IV), the 2023 MPM highlights the 
fact  that,  in  Hungary,  ‘Pegasus  spyware  has  been  used  by  national  authorities  against 
journalists and media owners’204 adding that independent media outlets which have expressed 
critical positions towards the Government have been targeted by seemingly coordinated smear 
campaigns205,  amplified  by  coverage 
the  KESMA  media 

in  outlets  belonging 

to 

196  RRP milestones 229 and 230. 
197  Act  XL  of  2022  amending  Act  CXII  of  2011  on  the  right  to  informational  self-determination  and  on  the 

freedom of information in order to reach an agreement with the European Commission. 

198  It applies the provisions of Act CXXX of 2016 on the Code of Civil Procedure in an analogous manner. 
199  The amendment also included a rule with a slowing effect: holders of trade secrets may now intervene in a 
lawsuit, supporting the data controller (contribution from Liberties for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 6). 
Legislative changes do not affect the execution of court decisions where challenges remain (see pillar IV and 
contribution from ILGA-Europe for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 19). 

200  Government Decree 301/2016 of 30 September 2016 on the  amount of the reimbursement of costs  for the 
execution of a request for data of public interest. The new rules (a) abolished the possibility to charge labour 
costs associated with the fulfilment of access to public information requests; (b) defined publicly available 
unit costs related to the costs of copying and the delivery of the information requested; (c) established the rule 
that fees charged shall not exceed the actual cost incurred by the holder of the public information requested 
when fulfilling that information request related to the cost categories under point (b) and only if those costs 
exceed HUF 10 000; and (d) defined a reasonably low overall ceiling of maximum HUF 190 000 for associated 
cost that can be taken into account by a public body when fulfilling an individual access to public information 
request. 

201  Contribution from Transparency International Hungary for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 26. According to 
stakeholders, state entities frequently reject requests claiming that they are not in possession of the information, 
then  grant  access  during  the  court  proceedings.  Also,  stakeholders  refer  to  case-law  confirming  that  data 
related  to  subcontractors’  participation  in  projects  financed  by  EU  funds  do  not  need  to  be  disclosed 
(contribution from Hungarian Civil Liberties Union for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 24). 

202  Media Pluralism Monitor 2023, country report on Hungary, pp. 13-15. 
203  2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 26. 
204  On 31 January 2022, following an ex officio procedure, the Hungarian National Authority for Data Protection 
and Freedom of Information (NAIH) concluded that the investigation regarding the use of Pegasus software 
did  not  reveal  any  illegality.  Subsequently,  on  15  June  2022,  the  Central  Chief  Prosecution  Office  of 
Investigation terminated its investigation into the matter, concluding that no crime had been committed.  

205  Media Pluralism Monitor 2023, country report on Hungary, p. 16.  

29 

 
                                                           
conglomerate206.  For  these  reasons,  the  2023  MPM  considers  this  to  be  an area  of  medium 
risk207. The Council of Europe’s Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety 
of journalists registered three new alerts relating to, respectively, an opposition party politician 
who spoke about the hypothetical hanging of a journalist208, a far-right website which hosted 
content suggesting that all journalists working for a particular media outlet should be beaten to 
death209 and denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks suffered by 12 media outlets in a short period of 
time210.  

IV.  OTHER INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO CHECKS AND BALANCES 

Hungary  is  a  parliamentary  republic  with  a  unicameral  Parliament  (National  Assembly). 
Parliament, among other functions, adopts and amends211 the Fundamental Law of Hungary, 
legislates, including cardinal laws212, elects the Prime Minister, and elects – by a two-thirds 
majority – the top rank public officials of the country. The President of the Republic is elected 
by Parliament. There are a number of institutions tasked with counter-balancing the powers of 
the  legislature  and  the  executive  and  entrusted  with  guaranteeing  the  respect  of  the 
constitutional  order,  including  the  Constitutional  Court,  the  State  Audit  Office  and  the 
Ombudsperson (‘Commissioner for Fundamental Rights’). The Constitutional Court reviews 
the constitutionality of laws and judicial decisions. In addition to the Government, the President 
of the Republic, every parliamentary committee and any member of Parliament may table a 
bill. 

Amendments to the rules on public consultations are expected to improve the legislative 
process, yet their practical impact remains to be assessed. The quality of law-making and 
frequent changes in legislation remains a significant reason for concern about the effectiveness 
of investment protection among companies in Hungary213. The 2022 Rule of Law report noted 
that the lack of public consultation coupled with an accelerated legislative process had further 
weakened the quality of the regulatory environment214. From among the 81 Acts of Parliament 
promulgated in 2022, five were adopted in an exceptional procedure, and eight were adopted 
via urgent procedure. Hungary’s Recovery and Resilience Plan includes dedicated milestones 
and targets215 to ensure that at least 90% of all legislation, including decrees, initiated by the 
Government will be subject to public consultation for a minimum period of eight days. Any 
exceptions  would  need  to  be  duly  justified  and  in  all  cases  impact  assessments  should  be 
prepared  in  line  with  an  agreed  methodology  and  the  summaries  of  these  should  be  made 

206  See Rule of law reports on Hungary 2020, 2021 and 2022 for details on KESMA.  
207  Media Pluralism Monitor 2023, country report on Hungary, pp. 15-17. 
208  The government replied to this alert, distancing itself from the statement made by this politician. 
209  The Government replied to this alert, stating that the offending content had been taken down. 
210  Council of Europe, Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists. 
211  A two-thirds majority of all the members is required to adopt or amend the Fundamental Law. 
212  The  Fundamental  Law  provides  for  the  adoption  of  33  cardinal  laws  implementing  its  provisions  and 
containing detailed rules on the functioning of key institutions or on the exercise of certain fundamental rights. 
They may be adopted or amended by a two-thirds majority of the members of Parliament present. The Venice 
Commission criticised Hungary for using cardinal acts beyond what is strictly necessary, and even in respect 
of detailed legislation, which has been considered questionable from a democratic perspective as it makes it 
difficult to introduce reforms in the future (CDL-AD(2012)009, para. 47). 

213  Figure  54,  2023  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  indicates  that  ‘Frequent  changes  in  legislation  or  concerns  about 

quality of the law-making process’ are of concern to 29% of companies in Hungary. 
214  2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 24. 
215  RRP milestones and targets 235 to 240. 

30 

 
                                                           
publicly available for all legislation. As of 26 October 2022, the law on public participation in 
the drafting of legislation216 was amended. The practical impact of these changes on the quality 
of legislation is  yet  to  be seen. For instance, on  28 February  2023, in  response to  criticism 
regarding  a planned health-care reform,  Parliament  passed a law217 stripping the Hungarian 
Chamber of Medical Doctors of its regulatory role, less than 28 hours following the tabling of 
the Government’s legislative proposal, prepared without any public consultation218. 

The Government continues to use its emergency powers extensively, which undermines 
legal certainty and affects the operation of businesses in the single market. Hungary has 
been under a special legal regime for prolonged periods of time219. In response to the COVID-
19 pandemic, the Government maintained a ‘state of danger’ between 11 March 2020 and 18 
June 2020 and then between 1 January 2021 and 1 June 2022. On 25 May 2022, a ‘state of 
danger’  was  declared  by  the  Government  ‘in  view  of  the  armed  conflict  and  humanitarian 
catastrophe in Ukraine and with a view to averting their impact on Hungary’, which is still in 
force220. In 2022, out of the 637 government decrees, 267 (41.9%) were adopted as emergency 
decrees,  either  with  a  reference  to  the  pandemic  or  the  war.  82  of  these  were  issued  in 
November-December  2022,  including  a  decree  restructuring  the  state  budget.  Despite  a 
country-specific  recommendation  in  the  context  of  the  2020  European  Semester221, 
interference with business activities and the stability of the regulatory environment continued, 
and some emergency measures raise questions as regards their necessity and proportionality222. 

216  Act CXXXI of 2010. Draft laws and draft government decrees are published online for a period of at least 
eight days; anyone can send comments. According to the Government, as from the entry into force of the new 
rules, 92% of draft legislation was subjected to public consultation in 2022. 

217  Act I of 2023 amending Act XCVII of 2006 on professional associations in the health sector and Act CLIV of 

1997 on healthcare. 

218  www.parlament.hu. Earlier, the Government’s Bill (T/583) on repealing a lump-sum tax for entrepreneurs, 
prepared with no public consultation and tabled on 11 July 2022, was passed into law in less than 28 hours. 
Also, in an open letter to the European Commission, stakeholders  (Amnesty International Hungary, Eötvös 
Károly  Policy  Institute  and  Hungarian  Helsinki  Committee)  complain  that  Parliament  breached  its  own 
procedural rules  when on 3 May 2023 it adopted the omnibus legislation introducing a justice reform (see 
pillar I) based on an amendment tabled by members from the governing parties, changing the entire content 
of  a  Bill  (T/3131)  in  the  final  stage  of  the  legislative  process,  without  any  debate.  According  to  the 
Government,  appropriate  consultations  were  conducted  in  accordance  with  legal  requirements  and 
commitments in the RRP. 

219  2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 25; 2021 Rule of Law 
Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, pp. 21-22; 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country 
Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, pp. 17-18. 

220  In  order  to  formally  comply  with  the  revised  Article  51  of  the  Fundamental  Law,  Government  Decree 
424/2022  of  28  October 2022  reintroduced  the  ‘state  of  danger’  for  30 days  as  of  1  November  2022. The 
Government  needs  an  authorisation  from  Parliament  to  extend  the  ‘state  of  danger’  after  an  initial  30-day 
period. This authorisation can be given for a maximum of 180 days per occasion but can be repeated without 
limitation. On 22 November 2022, Parliament authorised the Government, through Section 2(1) of Act XLII 
of 2022, as amended on 3 May 2023, to extend the ‘state of danger’ until 25 November 2023.  

221  Council  Recommendation  of  20  July  2020  on  the  2020  National  Reform  Programme  of  Hungary  and 

delivering a Council opinion on the 2020 Convergence Programme of Hungary, recommendation 4. 

222  Government Decree 197/2022 of 4 June 2022 on extra profit tax targets banks and other financial institutions, 
oil  refineries,  producers  of  renewable  energy,  telecom  companies,  air  carriers,  insurance  companies  and 
retailers. It has been amended more than 10 times without any stakeholder consultation. Government Decree 
404/2021 of 8 July 2021 on supplementary mining royalty payable with a view to relaunching the economy 
obliges the producers of building raw  material to pay a  special tax; it forces cement producers to realise a 
negative profit margin. Government Decrees are norms that can only be reviewed by the Constitutional Court. 
The  Constitutional  Court  has  no  power  to  hear  cases  related  to  taxation.  The  Constitutional  Court  has 
developed  a  specific  test  for  reviewing  emergency  measures:  it  examines  whether  (i)  there  has  been  an 

31 

 
                                                           
The  Government  continues  to  use  its  emergency  powers  also  to  interfere  with  the 
administration  of  justice223  as  well  as  to  limit  the  freedom  of  the  press224  and  the  right  to 
strike225. Parliament has no ex ante control over individual emergency measures226.  

The Government’s practice of granting exemptions from regulatory oversight for selected 
transactions  and  projects  undermines  legal  certainty  and  equality  before  the  law.  The 
Government  may  declare  certain  mergers  and  acquisitions  of  companies  of  ‘strategic 
importance for the national economy’, thereby exempting them from control by the competition 
authority227.  In  the  context  of  the  European  Semester,  the  Commission  noted  that,  as  a 
consequence,  the  impact  of  such  transactions  on  the  economy,  competition  and  the  single 
market is not being assessed228. Also, the Government may declare certain investment projects 
to be of ‘strategic importance for the national economy’ merely through a Decree229, thereby 
exempting these type of projects from public oversight and control230. The criteria for these 

interference with the given fundamental right, (ii) the restriction of fundamental rights does have a legitimate 
goal, (iii) the fundamental right restriction is suitable for achieving the legitimate goal, and (iv) taking into 
account Article 53(3) of the Fundamental Law, the legislator was convinced at intervals of the justification of 
maintaining  or  extending  the  restriction  (3128/2022.  (IV.  1.)  AB  Decision,  para.  163).  The  Constitutional 
Court has not found any emergency measure unconstitutional so far. 

223  Government Decree 356/2022 of 19 September 2022 made inaccessible – retroactively – documents related 
to the operation and functioning of the COVID-19 Task Force and its working groups. The emergency measure 
specifies that such documents cannot be filed in court proceedings and can only be inspected on the premises. 
This emergency measure came in the context of ongoing court proceedings initiated by journalists against the 
COVID-19  Task  Force,  after  the  judge  hearing  the  case  ordered  the  defendant  to  submit  to  the  court  the 
documents sought. 

224  Government Decree 210/2022 of 14 June 2022 on the rules of dissemination of printed media during the state 
of  danger  provides  that  no  permission  is  needed  for  newsstands  that  only  sell  newspapers  and  magazines 
containing state advertising related to the war in Ukraine. Since only pro-government media has access to state 
advertising, newsstands are disincentivised to sell independent newspapers. 

225  Government Decree 36/2022 of 11 February 2022 limited teachers’ right to strike by establishing rules on 
minimum service. On 24 May 2022, Parliament codified the provisions of the emergency measure in Sections 
14  and  15  of  Act  V  of  2022  on  regulatory  issues  in  the  context  of  the  termination  of  the  state  of  danger. 
Subsequently, the Constitutional Court dismissed an application challenging the relevant provisions of this 
law  (Decision  1/2023.  (I.  4.)  AB).  In  response  to  the  ensuing  civil  disobedience  movement  of  teachers, 
Government  Decree  4/2023  of  12  January  2023  on  emergency  rules  related  to  the  functioning  of  public 
education  institutions,  allows  the  extraordinary  dismissal  of  teachers  with  immediate  effect  and  without 
severance payment any time up to 1 August in the academic year, instead of the generally applicable 15-day 
deadline. Stakeholders note that the Government relies on the special legal regime introduced because of the 
war to put pressure on protesting teachers by extending their insecurity as regards the application of sanctions 
(contribution from Liberties for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, pp. 23-24.). 

226  Under Article 53 of the Fundamental Law, the Government reports regularly to the National Assembly about 
its measures introduced; the National Assembly may repeal a decree adopted by the Government during the 
state of danger. In this case, the Government, as a rule, cannot adopt again a repealed decree with identical 
content. 

227  Section 24/A of Act LVII of 1996 on the prohibition of unfair trading practices and unfair competition. 
228  2023 European Semester Country Report for Hungary. See 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the 
rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 13. More recently, Government Decree 139/2022 of 7 April 2022 exempted 
the acquisition of E.ON’s Hungarian subsidiary and Government Decree 2/2023 of 9 January 2023 exempted 
the acquisition of Vodafone’s Hungarian subsidiary. 

229  Government Decrees are norms that can only be reviewed by the Constitutional Court in very limited cases. 
230  The  Government  has  issued  Decrees  under  Act  LIII  of  2006  on  the  acceleration  and  simplification  of  the 
implementation of investments of strategic importance for the national economy. For example, Government 
Decree  1/2023  of  4  January  2023  (industrial  park),  Government  Decree  44/2023  of  20  February  2023 
(development of an industrial park) Government Decree 45/2023 of 20 February 2023 (renovation of a school 
building), Government Decree 66/2023 of 6 March 2023 (water management), Government Decree 77/2023 

32 

 
                                                           
exemptions are not clearly laid out, they are applied arbitrarily, and there is no formal procedure 
to contest their application. There are several instances where the Government granted such 
exemptions, giving rise to criticism by stakeholders231. 

Concerns regarding the independence and effective functioning of the Commissioner for 
Fundamental Rights persist. The 2022 Rule of Law Report noted that concerns as regards 
the independence of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights had been aggravated by the 
Commissioner taking over the responsibilities of the Equal Treatment Authority232. The UN 
Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA) of the Global Alliance of NHRIs (GANHRI) has not 
revised  its  earlier  recommendation  that  the  Hungarian  national  human  rights  institution  be 
downgraded to B-status233. Stakeholders reported that the Office of the Commissioner’s Equal 
Treatment Directorate has discontinued the practice of the former Equal Treatment Authority 
by  repeatedly  refusing  to  provide  protection  for  the  rights  of  LGBTIQ  people234.  As  of  1 
January  2023,  the  Commissioner  has  also  assumed  the  responsibilities  of  the  independent 
mechanism defined in the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities235. 

Further concerns have been raised due to the absence of effective oversight as regards the 
use  of  secret  surveillance  measures  outside  criminal  proceedings.  Stakeholders  reported 
that the rules of secret information gathering allow for any citizen to become a surveillance 
target as the Minister of Justice has discretion in allowing secret surveillance for reasons of 
national security, without any meaningful control by courts or the data protection authority236. 

of  10  March 2023  (building  of  a  poultry  slaughterhouse),  Government  Decree  86/2023 of  21  March 2023 
(building of a logistic warehouse), Government Decree 102/2023 of 29 March 2023 (extraction of natural gas). 
Also, an emergency measure allows to dispense with public hearings in administrative procedures related to 
urban planning, thus further limiting public oversight and the effective involvement of stakeholders (Section 
3 of Government Decree 146/2023 of 27 April 2023). According to the Government, during implementation, 
the same official control rules apply as for other investment projects which were not declared to be of ‘strategic 
importance for the national economy’. 

231  Joint contribution from Amnesty International Hungary and eight other CSOs for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, 
p. 27; contribution from K-Monitor for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, pp. 9 and 19; contribution from Ökotárs 
for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 19.  

232  2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 27. 
233  The SCA found that the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights ‘has not effectively engaged on […] all human 
rights  issues,  including  in  relation  to  vulnerable  groups  such  as  ethnic  minorities,  LGBTI,  refugees  and 
migrants as well as constitutional court cases deemed political and institutional, media pluralism, civic space 
and judicial independence (2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, 
p. 27). 

234  Contribution  from Háttér Society  for the 2023 Rule of  Law  Report,  p. 21.  While the law requires that  the 
equal-opportunity-related tasks be carried out by a separate Equal Treatment Directorate within the Office of 
the Commissioner, no director has so far been appointed (contribution from ILGA-Europe for the 2023 Rule 
of Law Report, p. 21). According to the Government, the Equal Treatment Directorate operates smoothly in 
an uninterrupted manner, the duties of the director are carried out by the Commissioner, and the Commissioner 
follows the practice of the Equal Treatment Authority in cases concerning LGBTIQ people. 

235  Section 33(2) of the Convention. Contribution from the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights for the 2023 
Rule of Law Report, p. 18. The Commissioner for Fundamental Rights operates the electronic system serving 
for filing and registering public interest disclosures, aimed at protecting whistleblowers (see also pillar II). 
Since 2015, the Commissioner has been tasked  with the role of National Preventive Mechanism  under the 
Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (OPCAT). In 2020, the Commissioner took over the responsibilities of the Independent Police 
Complaints Board. 

236  The European Court of Human Rights referred to the limited power conferred on Hungary’s data protection 
authority and the resulting absence of an external, independent scrutiny in such matters. In its investigation, 
the data protection authority is bound by the restrictions on access to certain types of data, including those 

33 

 
                                                           
In  the  context  of  its  call  to  implement  the  Szabó  and  Vissy237  judgment  from  the  European 
Court of Human Rights, on 10 March 2023 the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers238 
‘exhorted’ the Hungarian authorities to adopt without further delay the measures required to 
bring  domestic  legislation  on  secret  surveillance  for  national  security  purposes  fully  and 
effectively in line with the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights.  

Legal certainty has been improved as final judicial decisions can no longer be challenged 
by  public  authorities  before  the  Constitutional  Court.  In  the  context  of  the  European 
Semester, the Council of the European Union noted that questions had been raised regarding 
the role of the Constitutional Court, composed of members elected by Parliament without the 
involvement of the judiciary, in reviewing judgments of the ordinary courts239. The 2022 Rule 
of Law Report noted that the possibility for the Constitutional Court to review final judicial 
decisions  upon  request  of  public  authorities  raises  questions  in  particular  as  regards  legal 
certainty240.  In  its  Recovery  and  Resilience  Plan,  Hungary  committed  to  remove  this 
possibility241 introduced in 2019. The Constitutional Court, composed of members elected by 
Parliament without the involvement of the judiciary, can still review such final rulings in other 
cases242.  

On 1 January 2023, Hungary had 43 leading judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights  pending  implementation,  a  decrease  of  four  compared  to  the  previous  year243. 
Hungary’s  rate  of  leading  judgments  from  the  past  10  years  that  remain  pending  is  at  76% 
(compared  to  71%  in  2022)  and  the  average  time  that  the  judgments  have  been  pending 

processed by the defence force, national security services,  police, tax authority and the public prosecutor’s 
office. The data protection authority cannot therefore have direct access to such data. In case of data categories 
statutorily  exempt  from  independent  supervision,  the  data  protection  authority  can  enquire  only  via  the 
overseeing minister and would only be informed of the result of the latter’s own enquiry. Judgment of the 
European Court of Human Rights of 29 September 2022, Hüttl v Hungary, 58032/16, paras. 16 and 18. See 
also pillar III. 

237  Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 12 January 2016, Szabó and Vissy v Hungary, 37138/14. 
238  An Interim Resolution is a form of decision adopted by the Committee of Ministers aimed at overcoming more 
complex situations requiring  special attention. The Committee recalled that the European Court of Human 
Rights had found violations of the applicants’ right to respect for their private and family life  and for their 
correspondence on account of the Hungarian legislation on secret surveillance  measures. This  was  namely 
within the framework of intelligence gathering for national security, which did not provide for ‘safeguards 
sufficiently precise, effective and comprehensive on the ordering, execution and potential redressing of such 
measures’. 

239  Council  Recommendation  of  12  July  2022  on  the  2022  National  Reform  Programme  of  Hungary  and 

delivering a Council opinion on the 2022 Convergence Programme of Hungary, recital 27. 
240  2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 27. 
241  Section 27 of Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court. See RRP milestone 216. 
242  Although it is not part of the court system, the Constitutional Court adjudicating on the merits of the case has 
been characterised as  ‘a court of fourth instance’  when hearing constitutional complaints challenging final 
judicial decisions (see 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, pp. 
27-28). Stakeholders note that the Constitutional Court does not have a case-allocation scheme and cases are 
assigned to judges-rapporteurs under non-transparent rules (contribution from Amnesty International Hungary 
for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 14) and it is not bound by procedural deadlines when hearing constitutional 
complaint cases (contribution from ILGA-Europe for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 14). 

243  The  adoption of necessary execution  measures  for a  judgment by the  European  Court of Human  Rights is 
supervised by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. It is the Committee’s practice to group 
cases against a State requiring similar execution measures, particularly general measures, and examine them 
jointly. The first case in the group is designated as the leading case as regards the supervision of the general 
measures and repetitive cases within the group can be closed when it is assessed that all possible individual 
measures needed to provide redress to the applicant have been taken. 

34 

 
                                                           
implementation  is  over  6  years  and  8  months  (compared  to  over  6  years  and  3  months  in 
2022)244. The oldest leading judgment, pending implementation for almost 14 years, concerns 
the violation of the right to freedom of assembly245. On 15 June 2023, the number of leading 
judgments pending implementation has decreased to 42246. Stakeholders report that there is still 
no separate national structure to bring together various actors to coordinate the implementation 
of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights; meaningful parliamentary oversight is 
lacking247.  According  to  stakeholders,  some  public  authorities  fail  to  execute  final  court 
decisions  related  to  access  to  documents248.  The  number  of  decisions  in  which  the 
Constitutional  Court  declared  that  a  legislative  omission  resulted  in  the  violation  of  the 
Fundamental Law, but Parliament has failed to remedy the situation to date, is 13. The court-
set deadline for implementing these decisions has expired in 10 cases, the oldest one in 2013. 

There  has  been  no  progress  to  remove  obstacles  affecting  civil  society  organisations, 
which remain under pressure. The 2022 Rule of Law Report recommended to Hungary to 
‘[r]emove obstacles affecting civil society organisations’249. Independent domestic civil society 
organisations (CSOs) continue to be attacked by the Government and the governing parties. 
The space for civil society continues to be rated as ‘obstructed’250, while legislation on freedom 
of association generally conforms with relevant international standards and did not change in 
the past year251. According to stakeholders, attempts to stifle CSOs include extensive smear 
campaigns  and  rhetorical  attempts  of  intimidation,  launching  ill-founded  legal  procedures 
against  civil  society,  and  otherwise  hindering  their  work252.  Stakeholders  report  that  most 
authorities refuse to cooperate with stigmatised CSOs and reject invitations to workshops and 
participation in research253. Stakeholders also note that while various consultative bodies with 
civil society representatives do exist254, they are rarely convened, and their functions are often 
merely formal,  and traditional channels  of  advocacy and consultation  with  state institutions 
ceased  to  work  years  ago255.  The  Government  regularly  avails  itself  of  ‘national 

244  All figures are calculated by the European Implementation Network and are based on the number of cases that 
are considered pending at the annual cut-off date of 1 January 2023. See the contribution from the European 
Implementation Network for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 4. 

245  Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 7 October 2008, Patyi and Others v. Hungary, 5529/05, 

pending implementation since 2009. 

246  Data according to the online database of the Council of Europe (HUDOC). 
247  Contribution from the Hungarian Helsinki Committee for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 37. The Minister 
of Justice submits a yearly report to the relevant parliamentary committee on the judgments delivered by the 
European Court of Human Rights and the actions taken as a result thereof. 

248  Contribution from Amnesty International Hungary for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 36; contribution from 
Hungarian Civil Liberties Union for the 2023 Rule of Law Report,  p. 24; contribution from the Hungarian 
Helsinki Committee for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 37. 

249  2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 2. 
250  Rating by CIVICUS; ratings are on a five-category scale defined as: open, narrowed, obstructed,  repressed 

and closed. 

251  Contribution from the European Civil Forum on Hungary for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 5. 
252  Contribution from the Hungarian Helsinki Committee for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 26; contribution 

from Ökotárs for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 19. 

253  Contribution from Fair Trials for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, pp. 7-8. 
254  For instance, National Council on Sustainable Development, Human Rights Roundtable, National Economic 

and Social Council of Hungary. 

255  Contribution from the European Civil Forum on Hungary for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 11; contribution 

from the Hungarian Helsinki Committee for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 41. 

35 

 
                                                           
consultations’256, replacing other forms of dialogue and civic participation. Furthermore, the 
implementation of the law257 adopted in 2021 to repeal the Transparency Act258, found to be 
contrary to EU law by the Court of Justice259, is putting additional pressure260. The so-called 
‘child-protection  law’261,  amending  various  laws  including  the  law  on  national  public 
education262,  authorises  the  responsible  minister  to  regulate  by  decree  the  conditions  of 
registration for CSOs that may give sex education classes in public education institutions. No 
such decree has been issued ever since, thereby limiting the activity of the CSOs concerned263. 
As of 1 January 2023, in response to a judgment of the Court of Justice264, Hungary amended 
its  legislation  which  criminalised  the  organisation  of  activities  carried  out  with  a  view  to 
assisting the initiation of applications for international protection that do not fulfil the national 
criteria for granting that protection. Another law265 introducing a special 25% immigration tax 
applicable  to  financial  support  received  by  organisations  carrying  out  ‘activities  facilitating 
immigration’, which also raised concerns, continues to apply266. Therefore, there has been no 
progress on the implementation of the recommendation made in the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

256  Contribution from Amnesty International Hungary for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, pp. 39-40. The ‘national 
consultation’  is  a  tool  consisting  of  letters  sent  directly  to  every  Hungarian  household  ‘on  behalf  of  the 
Government of Hungary’, accompanied by questionnaires allowing the citizens to submit answers to sets of 
questions formulated by the Government and supported by a countrywide billboard and media campaign. The 
‘national consultation’ organised between October and December 2022, focused on the presumed economic 
impact of the sanctions imposed on Russia because of the war of aggression against Ukraine and adopted by 
unanimous decisions of the Council of the European Union. 

257  Act XLIX of 2021 on the transparency of organisations carrying out activities capable of influencing public 
life;  an  application  seeking  the  review  of  the  law  is  pending  before  the  Constitutional  Court  (Case 
IV/05049/2021). According to the Government,  the law is  aimed at increasing the transparency of support 
granted to and the operation of non-governmental organisations. 

258  Act LXXVI of 2017 on the transparency of organisations which receive support from abroad. 
259  Judgment of the Court of Justice of 18 June 2020, Commission v Hungary, C-78/18.  
260  Stakeholders report that the procedures to comply with the new reporting requirements impacted the capacity 
of CSOs to carry out their activities, including because of several technical difficulties and due to the lack of 
feedback to the audited CSOs (contribution from the European Civil Forum on Hungary for the 2023 Rule of 
Law Report, p. 8; contribution from the Hungarian Helsinki Committee for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 
39). Under the new rules, in May 2022, the State Audit Office carried out legality checks on all accounts of 
CSOs  with  an  annual  balance  sheet  exceeding  a  certain  amount  and,  therefore,  considered  capable  of 
influencing  public  life.  The  Summary  Report  published  by  the  State  Audit  Office  on  2  December  2022 
announced that the rules governing both the selection criteria and the methodology for the assessment would 
be  reviewed  but  did  not  provide  detailed  information  (https://www.asz.hu/dokumentumok/22062.pdf).  No 
information is available on the continuation of the legality check process. 

261  Act LXXIX of 2021 on stricter action against paedophile offenders and amending certain acts for the protection 
of children lays down a number of restrictive and discriminatory measures; in particular, it prohibits or limits 
access to content that propagates or portrays the so-called ‘divergence from self-identity corresponding to sex 
at birth, sex change or homosexuality’ for individuals under the age of 18. The Commission considered that 
the law violates the internal market rules, the fundamental rights of individuals (in particular LGBTIQ people) 
as well as - with regard to those fundamental rights - the EU values; on 15 July 2022, the Commission decided 
to refer Hungary to the Court of Justice (case C-769/22 is pending). 

262  Act CXC of 2011 on national public education. 
263  Contribution from Háttér Society for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 23; contribution from ILGA-Europe for 

the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 23. 

264  The Court of Justice has held that Section 353/A of Act C of 2012, introduced by Section 11(1) of Act VI of 
2018 (part of the so-called ‘Stop Soros’ legislative package) breached Union law (judgment of the Court of 
Justice of 16 November 2021, Commission v Hungary, C-821/19). 

265  Section 253 of Act XLI of 2018 amending certain tax laws and other related laws and on the immigration tax. 
266  2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary, p. 19, which reported on 

criticism voiced in the Venice Commission and OSCE ODIHR Joint Opinion (CDL-AD(2018)035). 

36 

 
                                                           
Concerns related to the State’s role in financing civil society persist. Almost 47% of civil 
society’s  resources  come  from  public  funding267.  Stakeholders  report  that  this  income  is 
distributed unevenly268, that the operation of state funding269 for CSOs is non-transparent and 
that  about  half  of  the  largest  beneficiaries  are  organisations  directly  controlled  by  local 
governing party politicians or their affiliates270. Also in this respect, no progress has been made 
on the implementation of the 2022 recommendation to remove obstacles affecting CSOs.  

267  The total income of associations and foundations in 2021 was HUF 1 070 billion, a little more than the year 
before (HUF 900 billion). Of this, some 47% comes from public funding, 22% from private sources, with the 
rest originating from generated own income and a variety of other sources. The Government did not provide 
any additional funding or relief to CSOs in response to the effects of the pandemic on the sector and lagged 
behind civil society in treating the refugee crisis stemming from the war in Ukraine. Domestic institutional 
philanthropy  remains  very  underdeveloped,  with  just  a  handful  of  relatively  small  actors.  There  are  no 
dedicated national public funding sources specifically supporting CSOs engaged in the areas of democracy, 
rule of law and fundamental rights. Independent CSOs remain dependent on international philanthropic and 
institutional donors (contribution from Ökotárs for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 21). 

268  35% of the CSOs work with an annual budget of not more than HUF 500 000 and 70.5% below HUF 5 million, 

with the average per organisation being around HUF 21 million. 

269  The central state support instrument to CSOs, the National Cooperation Fund provides grants annually to some 
4 000 organisations with a total budget of HUF 11 billion in 2022. Additionally, the Village and Town Civil 
Funds (for CSOs operating in settlements under and over 5 000 inhabitants, respectively) each distributed HUF 
5  billion.  A  large  part  of  the  Hungarian  civil  society  sector  is  not  eligible  for  funding  by  the  National 
Cooperation  Fund  which  actively  promotes  government  agendas  (European  Commission:  Civil  Society 
Landscape in the European Union - Research in support of the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) 
Programme, p. 19). According to the Government,  in 2022,  11 023 organisations received grants from the 
National Cooperation Fund. In addition, taxpayers can donate 1% of their personal income tax to any CSO. 
According  to  the  Government,  in  2022,  HUF  11 247 679 837  was  distributed  among  28 822  organisations 
under this scheme, based on the declarations of 1 491 469 taxpayers. 

270  Contribution from the Hungarian Helsinki Committee for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 29; contribution 

from Ökotárs for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, p. 18. 

37 

 
                                                           
Annex I: List of sources in alphabetical order* 

* The list of contributions received in the context of the consultation for the 2023 Rule of Law report 
can 
https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2023-rule-law-report-targeted-
stakeholder-consultation_en. 

found 

be 

at 

24.hu  (2022),  The  investigation  into  Florian  Farkas’  scandalous  Roma  programme  was  quietly 
terminated  (Szép  csendben  megszüntették  a  nyomozást  Farkas  Flórián  botrányos  roma  programja 
ügyében)  https://24.hu/kozelet/2022/12/12/orszagos-roma-onkormanyzat-farkas-florian-fidesz-hid-a-
munka-vilagaba-nyomozas-megszuntetes-nav-ugyeszseg/.  

Alapjogokért  Központ  (2023),  Contribution  from  Alapjogokért  Központ  for  the  2023  Rule  of  Law 
Report. 

Amnesty International Hungary, Eötvös Károly Policy  Institute (EKINT), Hungarian Civil Liberties 
Union  (TASZ),  Hungarian  Environmental  Partnership  Foundation  (Ökotárs),  Hungarian  Helsinki 
Committee, K-Monitor, Mertek Media Monitor, Political Capital, Transparency International Hungary 
(2022), Contribution for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

Amnesty International Hungary (2023), Contribution from Amnesty International Hungary for the 2023 
Rule of Law Report. 

Amnesty  International  Hungary,  Eötvös  Károly  Policy  Institute  and  Hungarian  Helsinki  Committee 
https://helsinki.hu/en/wp-
European 
the 
(2023), 
content/uploads/sites/2/2023/05/joint_letter_EC_judicial_reform_20230502.pdf. 

Commission 

Open 

letter 

to 

Átlátszó (2020), The Government has abused the pandemic multiple times according to K-Monitor and 
HCLU  (A  K-Monitor  és  a  TASZ  szerint  többszörösen  visszaélt  a  kormány  a  vírushelyzettel) 
https://atlatszo.hu/kozugy/2020/10/28/a-k-monitor-es-a-tasz-szerint-tobbszorosen-visszaelt-a-
kormany-a-virushelyzettel/.  

Átlátszó (2021), Botched investigations: 20 important cases that got stuck with prosecutors (Elszabotált 
ügyészségen) 
nyomozások: 
https://atlatszo.hu/kozpenz/2021/09/16/elszabotalt-nyomozasok-20-fontos-ugy-ami-megakadt-az-
ugyeszsegen/.  

megakadt 

fontos 

ügy, 

ami 

20 

az 

Átlátszó (2023), We identified the companies that have won hundreds of public contracts in a single 
city  https://english.atlatszo.hu/2023/02/16/we-identified-the-companies-that-have-won-hundreds-of-
public-contracts-in-a-single-city/.  

Bertelsmann  Stiftung  (2022),  Transformation  Index:  Hungary  Country  Report  https://bti-
project.org/en/reports/country-report/HUN. 

BIRN  (2022),  Hungary  Election:  Virtual  Smear  Tactics  Alive  and  Well  on  Facebook 
https://balkaninsight.com/2022/03/30/hungary-election-virtual-smear-tactics-alive-and-well-on-
facebook/.  

Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (2023), Media Pluralism Monitor 2023, country report 
on Hungary. 

CIVICUS, Monitor tracking civic space – Hungary https://monitor.civicus.org/country/hungary/. 

Civitas Institute and Transparency International Hungary (2021), Black Book II – Corruption and State 
Capture in Hungary https://en.civitasintezet.hu/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Black_Book_II.pdf.  

Commissioner for Fundamental Rights (2023), Contribution from the Commissioner for Fundamental 
Rights for the 2023 Rule of Law Report. 

Corruption  Research  Center  Budapest  (2021),  Political  Favoritism  in  Public  Tenders  in  Hungary: 
Analysis of the odds of winning https://www.crcb.eu/?p=2925.  

38 

 
Corruption Research Center Budapest (2022), Corruption Risks and the Crony System in Hungary: a 
brief  analysis  of  EU 
in  Hungarian  public  procurement  2005-2021 
https://www.crcb.eu/?p=3095.  

funded  contracts 

Corruption  Research  Center  Budapest  (2023),  White  Elephants  in  Hungary  –  Lessons  of  some  EU 
funded 
https://www.crcb.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2023/01/2023_research_notes_01_230129_01.pdf.  

projects 

Corruption Research Center Budapest (2023), Fourteen Graphs and Two Tables on the New Trends of 
Corruption 
the  Hungarian  Public  Procurement  2005-2022  https://www.crcb.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2023/02/2023_crcb_statistical_quick_report_230207_01.pdf.  

in 

Council  of  Europe:  Committee  of  Ministers  (2010),  Recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)12  of  the 
Committee of Ministers to member states on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities. 

Council  of  Europe:  Venice  Commission  (2012),  Opinion  on  Act  CLI  of  2011  on  the  Constitutional 
Court of Hungary (CDL-AD(2012)009). 

Council of Europe: Venice Commission and OSCE ODIHR (2018), Joint Opinion on Section 253 on 
the special immigration tax of Act XLI of 20 July 2018 amending certain tax laws and other related 
laws and on the immigration tax (CDL-AD(2018)035). 

Council of Europe: Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists.Court of 
Justice  of  the  European  Union,  judgment  of  18  June  2020,  Commission  v  Hungary,  C-78/18, 
ECLI:EU:C:2020:476. 

Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 16 November 2021, Commission v Hungary, C-
821/19, ECLI:EU:C:2021:930. 

Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union,  judgment  of  23  November  2021,  IS,  C-564/19, 
ECLI:EU:C:2021:949. 

Court of Justice of the European Union, Case C-92/23, Commission v Hungary, pending.  

Eötvös Károly Policy Institute (2023), Contribution from Eötvös Károly Policy Institute for the 2023 
Rule of Law Report. 

Euractiv  (2022),  Orban’s  influencers  shower  cash,  become  largest  social  media  spenders 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/orbans-influencers-shower-cash-become-
largest-social-media-spenders/. 

(2022),  Burnt  Hungarian 

election 
Euractiv 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/burnt-hungarian-election-ballots-in-romania-
cause-uproar/  

in  Romania 

ballots 

cause 

uproar 

European  Anti-Fraud  Office  (OLAF)  (2023),  Annual  Report  2022,  https://ec.europa.eu/olaf-
report/2022/index_en.html. 

European Civil Forum (2023), Contribution from the European Civil Forum on Hungary for the 2023 
Rule of Law Report. 

European Commission (2020), 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation 
in Hungary. 

European Commission (2021), 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation 
in Hungary. 

39 

 
European Commission (2022), 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation 
in Hungary. 

European Commission (2023), Civil Society Landscape in the European Union - Research in support 
of the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) Programme https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-
detail/-/publication/5eb1a213-c14f-11ed-8912-01aa75ed71a1/language-en.  

European Commission (2023), 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard. 

European Commission (2023), 2023 European Semester, Country Report on Hungary. 

European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 12 January 2016, Szabó and Vissy v Hungary, 37138/14. 

European  Court  of  Human  Rights,  judgment  of  12  January  2016,  Miracle  Europe  Kft  v  Hungary, 
57774/13. 

European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 23 June 2016, Baka v Hungary, 20261/12. 

European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 29 September 2022, Hüttl v Hungary, 58032/16. 

European Court of Human Rights, decision of 21 March 2023, Szaxon v Hungary, 54421/21. 

European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (2022), ENCJ Survey on the Independence of Judges 
2022 
https://pgwrk-websitemedia.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/production/pwk-web-encj2017-
p/GA%2022/Report%20ENCJ%20Survey%202022.pdf.  

European Parliament: Flash Eurobarometer: News & Media Survey 2022. 

European 
2022 
https://www.eppo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2023-02/EPPO_2022_Annual_Report_EN_WEB.pdf.  

Prosecutor’s 

(2023), 

Annual 

Report 

Public 

Office 

Fair Trials (2023), Contribution from Fair Trials for the 2023 Rule of Law Report. 

Freedom  House 
the  World 
https://freedomhouse.org/country/hungary/freedom-world/2022. 

Freedom 

(2022), 

in 

–  Hungary  Country  Report 

Freedom  House,  Nations  in  Transit  (2023),  https://freedomhouse.org/country/hungary/nations-
transit/2023. 

GRECO (2019), Third Evaluation Round – Second Addendum to the Second Compliance Report on 
Hungary on incriminations and transparency of party funding. 

GRECO  (2022),  Fourth  Evaluation  Round  –  Third  Interim  Compliance  Report  on  Hungary  on 
corruption prevention in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors. 

Háttér Society (2023), Contribution from Háttér Society for the 2023 Rule of Law Report. 

Hungarian Association of Judges (MABIE) (2023), Contribution from the Hungarian Association of 
Judges for the 2023 Rule of Law Report. 

Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (TASZ) (2023), Contribution from Hungarian Civil Liberties Union 
for the 2023 Rule of Law Report. 

Hungarian Helsinki Committee (2023), Contribution from the Hungarian Helsinki Committee for the 
2023 Rule of Law Report. 

Hungary  Today  (2022),  Pro-Fidesz  Megafon’s  Facebook  Ad  Spending  Exceeds  HUF  1  Billion  (31 
March 2022), https://hungarytoday.hu/pro-fidesz-megafon-social-media-facebook-ad-spending-huf-1-
billion/. 

Hungary Today (2022), Political Parties Spent HUF 3 Billion during Campaign Period on Facebook 
Alone 
https://hungarytoday.hu/political-parties-campaign-facebook-opposition-fidesz-dominance-
election/.  

ILGA-Europe (2023), Contribution from ILGA-Europe for the 2023 Rule of Law Report. 

40 

 
Authority 

Integrity 
https://eutaf.kormany.hu/download/d/25/13000/Integritas_Hatosag_Integritaskockazat_ertekeles_202
3_m%C3%A1rcius.pdf. 

Assessment 

Integrity 

(2023), 

Risk 

Report 

K-Monitor (2022), Contribution from K-Monitor for the 2022 Rule of Law Report. 

K-Monitor 
towards 
https://k.blog.hu/2022/02/21/hungary_s_state_of_corruption_heading_towards_elections.  

(2022),  Hungary’s 

of  Corruption 

heading 

State 

elections 

K-Monitor (2022), Outnumbered eight to one by the government’s poster campaign, they have already 
exceeded  the  legal  requirements  (Nyolcszoros  túlerőben  a  kormányoldal  plakátkampánya,  már 
túlköltötték 
előírásokat) 
https://k.blog.hu/2022/03/30/nyolcszoros_tuleroben_a_kormanyoldal_plakatkampanya.  

törvényi 

a 

K-Monitor,  Political  Capital  and  Transparency  International  Hungary  (2022),  Orban’s  Fidesz  to 
overspend 
https://transparency.hu/wp-
content/uploads/2022/03/KMon_PC_TI_Hu_public_billboards_EN.pdf.  

Hungary’s 

campaign. 

election 

in 

K-Monitor 
(2023),  Hungarian  MPs  Assets:  Less  Declared  and  Still  Not  Monitored 
https://k.blog.hu/2023/02/15/hungarian_mp_s_assets_less_declared_and_still_not_monitored?layout=
5.  

Kúria (2023), Contribution from the Kúria for the 2023 Rule of Law Report. 

Liberties (2023), Contribution from Liberties for the 2023 Rule of Law Report. 

Mérték 
content/uploads/2021/03/State-advertising-Hungary.pdf.  

(2021),  State  advertising 

spending  –  complaint  update.  https://mertek.eu/wp-

Napi.hu  (2022),  NVB  explained  why  burnt  mail  ballots  are  not  being  investigated  (Az  NVB 
megindokolta,  miért  nem  vizsgálják  az  elégetett  levélszavazatokat)  https://www.napi.hu/magyar-
gazdasag/valasztas-nbv-levelszavazat-tuz-egetes.749597.html.  

National Judicial Council (2023), Contribution from the National Judicial Council for the 2023 Rule of 
Law Report. 

OECD  (2021),  Implementing  the  OECD  Anti-Bribery  Convention,  Phase  4  Two-Year  Follow-Up 
Report: Hungary.  

OECD  (2021),  Economic  Survey  Hungary  https://www.oecd.org/economy/surveys/Hungary-2021-
OECD-economic-survey-overview.pdf. 

OECD Working Group on Bribery (2023), Hungary should urgently implement long-standing OECD 
Anti-Bribery recommendations, enforce its foreign bribery laws and improve its engagement with the 
Working  Group  on  Bribery  https://www.oecd.org/corruption/anti-bribery/hungary-should-urgently-
implement-long-standing-oecd-anti-bribery-recommendations-enforce-its-foreign-bribery-laws-and-
improve-engagement-with-working-group-on-bribery.htm.  

Ökotárs (2023), Contribution from Ökotárs for the 2023 Rule of Law Report. 

OSCE  (2022),  Hungary,  Parliamentary  Elections  and  Referendum  -  ODIHR  Election  Observation 
Mission Final Report, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/6/523568.pdf.  

Prosecutor  General (2021),  Extract  of  the  Parliamentary  report  on  the  activities  of  the  Prosecution 
Service in 2020 http://ugyeszseg.hu/en/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/ogy_beszamolo_2020.pdf. 

Prosecutor  General (2022),  Extract  of  the  Parliamentary  report  on  the  activities  of  the  Prosecution 
Service in 2021. http://ugyeszseg.hu/en/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/ogy_beszamolo_2021.pdf.  

Public  Procurement  Authority  (2021),  Flash  Report:  Hungarian  Public  Procurement  in  Numbers 
https://kozbeszerzes.hu/media/documents/FLASH_REPORT-2021.pdf. 

Public Procurement Authority (2022), Flash Report: Hungarian Public Procurement in Numbers.  

41 

 
Reporters  Without  Borders  (2023),  2023  World  Press  Freedom  Index.State  Audit  Office  (2021), 
Elections:  Handbook  prepared  to  support  election  regularity  (Választások:  Kézikönyv  készült  a 
választások 
érdekében) 
https://www.asz.hu/hu/sajtokozlemenyek/valasztasok-kezikonyv-keszult-a-valasztasok-
szabalyszerusegenek-tamogatasa-erdekeben.  

szabályszerűségének 

támogatása 

Telex  (2022),  The  Integrity  Authority  appeals  to  the  public  prosecutor’s  office  over  the  terminated 
investigation into the case of Florian Farkas (Az ügyészséghez fordul az Integritás Hatóság a Farkas 
Flórián ügyében megszüntetett nyomozás miatt) https://telex.hu/belfold/2022/12/15/az-ugyeszseghez-
fordul-az-integritas-hatosag-a-farkas-florian-ugyeben-megszuntetett-nyomozas-
miatt?utm_source=ground.news&utm_medium=referral.  

Telex (2023), There are already 34 suspects in the bribery case involving the Ministry of Finance and 
the  Prime  Minister’s  Office  (Már  34  gyanúsítottja  van  a  Pénzügyminisztériumot  és  a 
Miniszterelnökséget  is  érintő  vesztegetési  ügynek)  https://telex.hu/belfold/2023/03/03/vesztegetes-
miniszterelnokseg-ugyeszseg-palyazat-penzugyminiszterium-korrupcio-buncselekmeny-nyomozas. 

Transparency International (2022), Exporting Corruption. 

Transparency International (2023), Corruption Perceptions Index 2022. 

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for the 2023 Rule of Law Report. 

42 

 
Annex II: Country visit to Hungary 

The Commission services held virtual meetings in February 2023 with: 

  Alapjogokért Központ 
  Amnesty International Hungary 
  Átlátszó 
  Budapest Institute for Policy Analysis (Budapest Szakpolitikai Elemző Intézet) 
  Corruption Research Center Budapest 
  Danube Institute 
  Editors-in-Chief’s Forum (Főszerkesztők Fóruma) 
  ELTE Media Department 
  Hungarian Association of Judges (MABIE) 
  Hungarian Bar Association 
  Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (TASZ) 
  Hungarian Economic Association (Magyar Közgazdasági Társaság) 
  Hungarian Helsinki Committee 
 
  K-Monitor 
  Kúria (the Supreme Court) 
  Mathias Corvinus Collegium 
  Media Service Support and Asset Management Fund (MTVA) 
  Mérték Media Monitor 
  Ministry of Interior 
  Ministry of Justice 
  National Assembly (Országgyűlés) 
  National  Association  of  Public  Procurement  Advisors  (Közbeszerzési  Tanácsadók 

Integrity Authority 

Országos Szövetsége) 

  National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information 
  National Judicial Council 
  National Media and Infocommunications Authority 
  National Office for the Judiciary 
  Nézőpont 
  Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights 
  Prosecution Service of Hungary 
  Public Procurement Authority 
  State Audit Office (Állami Számvevőszék) 
  Századvég 
  Transparency International Hungary 

* The Commission also met the following organisations in a number of horizontal meetings:  

  ALDA (European Association for Local Democracy) 
  Amnesty International  
  Civil Liberties Union for Europe  

43 

 
 
  Civil Society Europe 
  Culture Action Europe  
  European Centre for Press and Media Freedom  
  European Civic Forum  
  European Federation of Journalists  
  European Partnership for Democracy  
  European Youth Forum  
  Free Press Unlimited 
  Front Line Defenders 
 
 
 
 
 
  JEF Europe  
  Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso Transeuropa 
  Philea  
  Reporters Without Borders  
  SOLIDAR 
  Transparency International EU 

ILGA Europe  
International Commission of Jurists 
International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)  
International Planned Parenthood Federation European Network 
International Press Institute  

44