JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL A new outlook on the climate and security nexus: Addressing the impact of climate change and environmental degradation on peace, security and defence
Date: 2023-06-28
Institutions: European Commission, European External Action Service
Subjects: armed forces, climate change policy, defence policy, degradation of the environment, energy transition, environmental impact, international cooperation, international security, peace, research policy

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY Brussels, 28.6.2023  JOIN(2023) 19 final  JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL A new outlook on the climate and security nexus:  Addressing the impact of climate change and environmental degradation on peace, security and defence  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 

Climate change and environmental degradation pose increasing risks to international peace and 
security.  Extreme  weather  events,  rising  temperatures  and  sea  levels,  desertification,  water 
scarcity,  threats  to  biodiversity,  environmental  pollution  and  contamination  and  loss  of 
livelihoods threaten the  health and  well-being of humanity,  and  can  create the potential for 
greater  migratory  movements  and  displacement,  pandemics,  social  unrest,  instability  and 
insecurity.  Of  the  20 countries  that  are  the  most  vulnerable  and  least  prepared  for  climate 
change, 12 were in conflict in 20201. 

The EU has been at the forefront in addressing climate change as a threat-multiplier since 20082 
and its links to EU crisis management and European defence since 20203. However, the need 
to include the impact of environmental degradation in the debate as well as current realities and 
future  projections  regarding  the  scale  of  climate  change  and  the  impact  of  environmental 
degradation, in the context of intensifying strategic competition and complex security threats, 
require a new outlook on the climate and security nexus. The term climate and security nexus 
as  used  in  this  document,  refers  to  the  impacts  of  both  climate  change  and  environmental 
degradation, including biodiversity loss and pollution, on peace, security and defence.  

-  Climate  change  and  environmental  degradation  are  intrinsically  interlinked  and 
exacerbating each other, and are already affecting food security, reducing the yield of major 
crops such as maize, rice and wheat, and increasing the risk of simultaneous harvest failures 
in major producing countries. At the same time, unsustainable food production also drives 
environmental degradation and water scarcity. By 2050, it is estimated that more than one 
billion people will have insufficient access to water, that soil degradation could rise to 90%, 
while demand for food could increase by 60%4. 

-  Climate  and  environmentally  induced  instability  and  resource  scarcity  can  be  actively 
instrumentalised by armed groups and organised crime networks, corrupt or authoritarian 
regimes,  and  by  other  parties,  including  through  environmental  crime.  The  latter  has 
already become the fourth largest and growing global crime sector further accelerating the 
environmental crisis including through the unsustainable exploitation of natural resources5.  

-  The  United  Nations  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees  (UNHCR)  estimates  that,  since 
2008, an annual average of 21.5 million people have been forcibly displaced by weather-
related events, such as floods and heatwaves. These numbers are expected to increase in 

Progress Report of the United Nations Climate Security Mechanism, May 2021. See also Annex 1. 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY - Paper from the High Representative 

1 
2 
and the European Commission to the European Council (S113/08, 14 March 2008). 
3 
In particular through the Climate Change and Defence Roadmap (Doc. 12741/20, 9 November 2020) 
and Concept for Integrated Approach on Climate Change and Security (Doc. 12537/21, 5 October 2021). The 
joint progress report sets out the progress made in their implementation (Doc. WK 15770/2022 INIT, 
16 November 2022). 
4 
from the World Bank (2021). 
5 

See: SIPRI, Environment of Risk: Security in a New Era of Risk (2022) and the Groundswell Report 

See: Eurojust: Report on Eurojust’s Casework on Environmental Crime (2021). 

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the  coming  decades6, exacerbating  demographic  change  and  putting  stress  on  cities  and 
urban  areas  where  the  demand  for  housing,  food,  energy  and  jobs  may  rise,  thus 
contributing to increasing social impacts of climate change. In addition, natural disasters or 
extreme  weather  can  also  cause  physical  damage  to  critical  infrastructure,  thereby 
disrupting access to and flows of essential and emergency services. Moreover, vulnerable 
populations in distress are at risk of being targeted by smugglers and other organised crime 
organisations, while armed  groups  can and do exploit  an increased vulnerabilities when 
recruiting child soldiers and combatants.  

-  Climate change and environmental degradation negatively impact health in multiple ways.7 
They  are  also  undermining  many  of  the  social  determinants  for  good  health,  such  as 
livelihoods, access to healthcare and social support. These impacts can lead to instability 
and threaten security. 

is 

-  Climate change is the most comprehensive threat to the Arctic regions with temperature 
increasing 3 to 4 times faster than the global average. External interest in resources in Arctic 
increasing  with  multifaceted  social,  environmental  and  economic 
locations 
consequences. The thawing of the Arctic Sea ice also opens potential shipping routes and 
access  to  natural  resources  which  can lead to increased security tensions  in  the region.8 
Climate  change  has  a  growing  geopolitical  impact  in  the  global  maritime  domain,  both 
around Europe (e.g. in Baltic and the Black Sea) as well as in the Indo-Pacific. 

-  Adverse  impacts  of  climate  change  on  the  ocean  include  a  shift  in  composition  and 
distribution of fish stocks that can destabilise fisheries agreements and increase the risk of 
international  disputes.  Sea-level  rise  also  presents  a  security  risk  due  to  the  scale  of 
potential displacement and migration of people9, while it will also affect the measurement 
of maritime boundaries that determine different economic entitlements, which in turn can 
raise instability and conflicts. 

-  Resources and technologies that are essential for the energy transition and the phase out of 
fossil fuel  have become  the subject  of  growing strategic  competition,  which has  further 
accelerated since Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine. 

-  Member  States’  security  and  defence  forces  are  confronted  with  a  changing  and 
increasingly  challenging  security  environment  in  Europe  and  beyond,  including  more 

The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) estimates that 1.2 billion people could be displaced 

Including through death and illness from extreme weather events, more frequent vector-, food- and 

6 
globally by 2050 due to climate change and natural disasters. 
7  
water-borne and zoonotic diseases, and emergence of viruses due to permafrost melting. 
8  
(JOIN(2021) 27 final, 13.10.2021). 
9  
continue to rise to around 0.3 metre by 2050 and 2 metres by 2100 under the very high greenhouse gas 
emissions scenario – risking forced human displacement – up to 340 million people by 2050 and 630 million 
people by 2100. 

Joint Communication on a stronger EU engagement for a peaceful, sustainable and prosperous Arctic 

IPCC, 2019: IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate: sea level will 

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severe  climatic  operational  conditions.  At  the  same  time,  they  need  to  reduce  their 
greenhouse gas emissions and fossil fuel dependency, without affecting their operational 
effectiveness. 

The green energy transition is the only way to simultaneously ensure sustainable, secure, and 
affordable energy worldwide. To be successful, that transition must be socially just and fair, 
leaving no-one behind. It means not only phasing out fossil fuels and outdated practices, but 
phasing  in  green  energy,  innovative  technology,  better  markets,  and  circular  economy.  It 
requires tackling already now the potential future risks and dependencies. 

It  is  therefore  critically  important  to  continue  investing  in  both  climate  adaptation  and 
mitigation and in protecting and restoring the environment. Nevertheless, and while a lot is 
being done to advance green transition and manage its challenges, there is an increased risk of 
instability, insecurity and even conflict. We should prepare ourselves for increased spill over 
effects  on  the  European  Union.  These  can  arise  through  increased  demand  for  aid,  the 
disruption of supply chains or with people fleeing from uninhabitable areas or severe adverse 
conditions  at  home,  with  the  potential  of  internal  displacement  and  increased  irregular 
migration  but  also  through  organised  crime,  terrorist  organisations  and  the  proliferation  of 
weapons. 

The security and defence implications of climate change and environmental degradation have 
thus become more urgent, challenging and multifaceted. This is also consistently highlighted 
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)10 and multiple other reports and 
studies. Partner organisations, such as the United Nations and NATO, and bilateral partners are 
integrating  these  risks  in  their  policy  planning.  As  reflected  in  the  March  2023  Council 
conclusions on Climate and Energy Diplomacy11, the EU needs to better integrate the climate, 
peace and security nexus in the EU’s external policy, including Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP) and international cooperation and partnerships. The role of Member States is 
essential in taking this work forward. 

Defining and implementing this new outlook on the climate and security nexus is critical, in 
line with the objectives set out in the external dimension of the European Green Deal12 and the 
Strategic  Compass  on  Security  and  Defence13.  It  is  essential  to  better  connect  the  different 
policy strands and ensure that external action, policies and capabilities are fit for the future. 
The  EU  needs  to  adopt  a  more  proactive  and  comprehensive  response  to  the  multifaceted 
challenges. As these are global challenges, the EU will seek further close cooperation with its 
international partners and stakeholders to promote multilateral solutions. 

IPCC Sixth Assessment Report, August 2021. 
Doc. 7248/23, 9 March 2023. 
Doc. COM(2019) 640, 11 December 2019. 
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/strategic_compass_en3_web.pdf. 

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11 
12 
13 

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This  Joint  Communication  establishes  an  enhanced  framework  and  puts  forward  concrete 
measures in line with the EU’s Integrated Approach to External Conflicts and Crises14 with the 
aim to:  

  strengthen  climate  and  environment  informed  planning,  decision-making  and 

implementation, through enhanced evidence-based analysis and foresight; 

  operationalise  the  climate  and  security  nexus  in  EU  external  action  from  policy  to 

implementation; 

  enhance climate adaptation and mitigation measures for the development of Member 

 

States’ civilian and military capabilities, and related infrastructure; and 
reinforce  international  partnerships  and  the  EU’s  work  within  multilateral  fora, 
consistent with the EU’s wider multilateral climate change and environment agenda. 

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1.  Evidence-based analysis and foresight as an enabler for action: supporting climate 

and environment informed planning, decision-making and implementation 

The  EU’s  responses  to  the  security  implications  of  climate  change  and  environmental 
degradation  will  continue  to  rely  on  evidence-based  policies  and  actions,  including  new 
information  and  developing  insights,  highlighting  the  importance  of  reliable  and  accessible 
analytics for all parties involved. 

1.1.Data and analytics on climate- and environment-driven security risks 

EU  data  initiatives  and  analytical  frameworks  already  include  a  number  of  climate  and 
environmental  factors.  For  instance,  the  methodologies  for  early  warning  and  conflict 
analysis  include  a  focus  on  climate,  environment  and  natural  resources,  leading,  where 
relevant,  to  recommendations  for  preventive  action,  and  for  conflict-sensitive  programming 
and external actions. This will be further strengthened in future analyses.  

In addition, improving the dissemination and accessibility of joint, shared analysis is a key 
factor in ensuring it can be fully exploited and integrated. Raising awareness of climate and 
environmental risks at large, and on the analytical products, is part of this endeavour. 

To  enhance  the  availability  of  EU  data  and  analysis  for  all  relevant  planning  and 
implementation  processes,  the  European  Union  Satellite  Centre  (SatCen)  will  explore  the 
development of an integrated knowledge hub. The Climate and Environment Security Data 
and  Analysis  Hub,  to  be  created  within  SatCen,  will  build  on  existing  experience  and 
initiatives and offer a resource for climate-related security risk assessments. The Commission 
will  also  continue  to  enhance  access  to  data  and  analytics  relevant  to  climate  change, 
environmental degradation and its impact on security and defence through existing platforms 
such as the Science for Peace portal15. 

To  facilitate  the  inclusion  of  the  climate  and  security  nexus  into  discussions  and  decision-
making  at  political  and  strategic  levels,  the  Commission  services  and  the  EEAS  will  start 
conducting  an  annual  comprehensive  trend  analysis  covering,  among  other  things,  the 
impacts  of  climate  change  and  environmental  degradation  on  conflicts,  displacement  and 
migratory  movements  and  natural  resource  competition.  The  Climate  and  Environment 
Security Data and Analysis Hub will feed into the trend analysis, and close cooperation with 
different  services,  such  as  the  Emergency  Response  Coordination  Centre,  and  use  of 
Copernicus, the EU Earth Observation programme, will be ensured.  

The Global Conflict Risk Index16, developed by the JRC as a quantitative input to the EU’s 
early warning and conflict analysis methodologies, will be broadened to look beyond droughts 
to assess, for example, impacts related to amplified migration and displacement, to examine 
indirect  effects  of  climate  change  and  environmental  degradation,  for  instance  on  prices  of 

https://science4peace.jrc.ec.europa.eu/. 
https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/initiatives-services/global-conflict-risk-index#documents/1059/list. 

15 
16  

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commodities  such  as  food,  gas  and  oil  prices,  and  to  examine  the  geopolitical  and  security 
implications of decreasing dependence on fossil fuels.  

Furthermore, a dynamic, short-term and sub-national conflict risk model, paying particular 
attention to environment and climate-related variables, will be developed to improve the EU’s 
early warning and anticipation capacity.  

Further examples of EU initiatives for data  and analysis on climate  and environment-
related risks: 

  Copernicus’  Emergency  Management  Service  supports  early-warning  capacity  with 
components  covering  droughts17,  wildfires  and  flood  risks18  and  Copernicus  Land 
Monitoring Service19 provides geospatial information on land cover and its changes, land 
use, vegetation state, water cycle and Earth's surface energy variables20. 

  INFORM,  a  multi-stakeholder  forum  for  analysis  related  to  humanitarian  crises  and 
disasters. INFORM Climate Change21 (released in November 2022) presents quantitative 
estimations of the impacts of climate change on the future risk of humanitarian crises. 
  European Marine Observation and Data Network (EMODnet)22 consists of more than 
120 organisations working together to observe the sea and process the data in accordance 
with international standards, to provide interoperable data layers and data products. 

  Destination Earth initiative23, which aims to develop a highly accurate digital model of 
the  Earth  on  a  global  scale,  is  expected  to  produce  forecasts  and  simulations  of  natural 
phenomena and extremes. 

Close  cooperation  with  Member  States,  partner  countries,  including  their  early-warning 
systems  and  local  knowledge  hubs,  and  international  organisations  will  lead  to  greater 
understanding of the climate and security nexus. 24 The EU also promotes the development of 
analytical capabilities in other regions to forecast and rapidly address emerging and evolving 
risks related to climate change and environmental degradation. For instance, as a member of 
the intergovernmental Group  on Earth Observations, the EU supports  global  initiatives  for 
evidence-based decision-making related to climate change and environmental degradation, 
and through the Global Network Against Food Crises, evidence-based analysis on global food 
security. 

https://edo.jrc.ec.europa.eu/edov2/php/index.php?id=1000.  
https://www.efas.eu/en. 
https://land.copernicus.eu/. 
In addition the Copernicus Security Services addresses climate security with new geospatial products 

17 
18 
19  
20  
and the Copernicus Climate Change Service provides information and tools to enable climate change mitigation 
and adaptation. 
21 
22 
23 
24  
climate, environment, and security partnership, provide a good example of such cooperation. 

https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/inform-index/INFORM-Climate-Change/Methodology. 
https://emodnet.ec.europa.eu/en. 
https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/destination-earth. 
Data dialogues envisaged on an annual basis in regional settings, in the framework of the EU-UNEP 

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1.2.Defence data gathering and analysis 

The European Defence Agency (EDA) has already engaged Member States to gather data on 
the  energy  consumption  and  greenhouse  gas  emissions  of  their  armed  forces25  and  is  now 
working to establish a structured methodology, the Defence Energy Suite, for collecting and 
monitoring defence energy data of Member States. Together with the Commission, the EDA is 
also conducting studies and research into the resilience of defence energy infrastructure26. Such 
data  gathering  and  analytics  is  needed  to  improve  climate-informed  defence  planning  and 
investment decisions within the Member States. 

1.3.Leveraging research and innovation 

For both  security  and defence purposes, research and studies on climate  and environmental 
risks  are  essential  for 
informing  and  guiding  policy  development,  planning  and 
implementation.  

Research projects on the climate and security nexus 

EU research and innovation framework programmes, such as Horizon 2020 (2014-2020) and 
the current Horizon Europe (2021-2027), play an important role in bridging knowledge gaps 
on climate change and environmental degradation as a basis for developing effective  policy 
responses that are anchored in best available scientific evidence27. Overall, 35% of Horizon 
Europe is earmarked to fund climate-related activities28. In addition, 7.5% of Horizon Europe 
in 2024-25, and 10% as of 2026 onwards is earmarked to fund biodiversity-related activities29. 
Further examples of relevant research studies include the joint EDA and JRC research study 
assessing climate change impacts on defence-related critical energy infrastructure and military 
capabilities. 

[insert reference to the EDA defence energy data]. 
Tavares da Costa, R., Krausmann, E., Hadjisavvas, C., Impacts of climate change on defence-related 

25 
26 
critical energy infrastructure, 2023, doi:10.2760/03454. 
27  
EU Missions in Horizon Europe) 
28 
Examples  of  EU-funded  projects  that  are  highly  relevant  in  the  climate  and  security  nexus  include: 
HABITABLE  (Linking  Climate  Change,  Habitability  and  Social  Tipping  Points:  Scenarios  for  Climate 
Migration);  CASCADES  (CAScading  Climate  risks:  towards  ADaptive  and  resilient  European  Societies); 
RECEIPT (REmote Climate  Effects and their Impact on European sustainability, Policy and Trade);  CoCliCo 
(Coastal  Climate  Core  Service);  CLIMAAX  (CLIMAte  risk  and  vulnerability  Assessment  framework  and 
toolboX);  ESPREssO  (Enhancing  Synergies  for  disaster  PRevention  in  the  EurOpean  Union);  CaseXtreme 
(ChAnges  in  the  Statistics  of  EXTremes  Events  in  climate);  MIRACA  (Multi-hazard  Infrastructure  Risk 
Assessment  for  Climate  Adaptation);  ARCOS  (Artic  Observatory  for  Copernicus  SEA  Security  Service); 
CENTAUR (Copernicus Enhanced Tools for Anticipative Response  to Climate  Change in the Emergency and 
Security Domain); EGSIEM (European Gravity Service for Improved Emergency Management); GPP (GEOSS 
Platform Plus); PLACARD (PLAtform for Climate Adaptation and Risk reduction); AD4GD (All Data 4 Green 
Deal) BIOSEC (Biodiversity and Security: understanding environmental crime, illegal wildlife trade and threat 
finance)  and  ConFooBio  (Resolving  conflicts  between  food  security  and  biodiversity  conservation  under 
uncertainty).  
29  
open-calls/horizon-europe/cluster-6-food-bioeconomy-natural-resources-agriculture-and-environment_en 

https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-

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Key actions at EU level: 

  The  EU  Satellite  Centre  will,  with  all  relevant  actors  and  initiatives,  explore  the 
establishment of a Climate and Environment Security Data and Analysis Hub within 
its facilities, in order to increase access to, and availability of, data and analytics on 
climate and security. 

  Relevant  Commission  services  and  the  EEAS  will  provide  an  annual  climate  and 
security  trend  analysis  to  support  political  and  strategic-level  discussions  and 
decision-making. 

  The Commission will further develop the inclusion of relevant and evidence-based 
environment and climate-related indicators in the Global Conflict Risk Index to better 
inform the selection of priorities for conflict prevention.  

  Relevant  Commission  services  in  consultation  with  the  EEAS  will  develop  a 
dynamic,  short-term  and  sub-national  conflict  risk  model,  which  will  include 
strengthened consideration of environment and climate-related variables to improve 
the EU’s early warning and anticipation capacity.  

2.  Operationalising the climate and security nexus in EU external action 

The climate and security nexus needs to be operationalised coherently in all EU external action 
from policy formulation and decision-making to implementation. The various EU initiatives, 
ranging  from  climate  action  and  adaptation  to  conflict  prevention,  crisis  management  and 
humanitarian action, are most effective when synergies and complementarities are maximised 
in line with the EU’s Integrated Approach. The aim is also to optimise the resources of the 
EU and its Member States, including by promoting Team Europe action30. 

In  line  with  the  NDICI-Global  Europe  regulation31,  which  requires  a  conflict  analysis  for 
countries and regions in situations of crisis, post-crisis or fragility and vulnerability, relevant  
Commission  services  and  the  EEAS,  including  the  EU  Delegations,  will  strengthen 
climate/environment peace and security nexus analysis of its relevant policies and actions, 
especially in geographical areas vulnerable to these impacts, such as, at regional level, Sahel 
or Horn of Africa, or Small Island Developing States (SIDS). This analysis will help shape its 
approaches in these situations and inform future programming, where appropriate. This will 

Team Europe consists of the European Union, its Member States, the European Investment Bank (EIB) 

30 
and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 
31  
the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe. 

Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing 

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be part of the guidelines to EU Delegations in the context of the mid-term review of NDICI-
Global Europe. 

In recognition of the differentiated impacts of climate change and environmental degradation 
on women, children and vulnerable groups, the application of a human rights-based approach, 
and integration of a gender-responsive perspective and a child protection and youth dimension, 
is essential when operationalising the climate and security nexus. This goes hand in hand with 
supporting context-sensitivity, local ownership and do-no-harm approaches. 

2.1.Investments in climate and environment as investments in peace and security 

As a global leader in the fight against climate change, pollution and biodiversity loss, the EU 
is  at  the  forefront  of  collective  efforts  to  scale  up  climate  and  biodiversity  finance.  This 
translates  to  building  resilience  of  low-income  and  vulnerable  countries  and  communities, 
including food security, while promoting long-term sustainable approaches to the management 
of  key  natural  resources.  By  developing  alternative  livelihoods  and  supporting  good 
governance, in a gender-responsive manner, these efforts also contribute to conflict prevention 
and peace. 

The Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument  - Global 
Europe (NDICI-Global Europe) plays a key role in this regard. It includes a 30% spending 
target  for  climate  action  focusing  on  climate  change  mitigation  and  adaptation  measures, 
increased  by  an  additional  EUR 4  billion  as  announced  by  Commission  President  von  der 
Leyen in September 2021. It will also contribute to the EU objective of achieving a spending 
target  for  biodiversity  of  7.5%  in  2024  and  of  10%  in  2026  and  2027.  The  President  also 
announced a doubling of the Commission’s international funding for biodiversity, especially 
for the most vulnerable countries, to EUR 7 billion for the period 2021-2027. 

These funds address some of the links between climate change, environmental degradation and 
insecurity, while indirectly helping to manage climate displacement and migration. Likewise, 
through NDICI-Global Europe, and the humanitarian aid budget, the EU also funds actions that 
are instrumental in strengthening disaster risk reduction, preparedness and anticipatory action. 
This  contributes  positively  to  the  climate  and  security  nexus  by  building  resilience.  As 
knowledge and experience regarding this nexus grows, the EU and its Member States should 
plan engagements accordingly through the Team Europe approach.  

The Global Gateway strategy, the EU’s positive offer to partners to tackle the most pressing 
global  challenges,  will  contribute  to  the  EU’s  efforts  towards  peace  and  stability.  It  will 
promote projects that support partner countries’ efforts to pursue the green and digital transition 
and human development while narrowing the global investment gap. 

For example, as part of the EU-Africa Global Gateway investment package, the Team Europe 
Initiative on Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience in Africa was introduced to strengthen 
the resilience of the most vulnerable populations against climate and natural hazard risks by 
bringing together programmes from the EU and EU MS of more than EUR 1 billion. In Central 
Asia,  the  Team  Europe  Initiative  on  Water,  Energy  and  Climate  Change  contributes  to 

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managing water and energy resources sustainably while addressing environmental challenges 
and  tackling  climate  change,  with  an  initial  contribution  of  EUR  700  million  from  Team 
Europe.  In  Latin  America,  climate  change  and  deforestation  aspects  are  addressed  through 
Team Europe Initiatives in the Amazon Basin, including a TEI on Tropical Forests in Brazil 
with an indicative amount of EUR 430 million. 

Particular focus should be put on community-level resilience and the resilience of cities and 
urban areas as they are often the focal point of migration and displacement. This is especially 
important when it comes to offering resilient, low-carbon, affordable, and accessible homes 
especially  for  those  in  most  vulnerable  situations,  in  precarious  accommodation,  many  of 
whom are women or children. While EU funded actions to this end are on-going, the EU will 
explore how to engage even closer with the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy 
who are contributing to global campaigns in this area. 

Furthermore, economic and investment plans, developed together with EU partners for the 
Western Balkans, and the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods, can contribute to creating or 
maintaining  stability  by  increasing  resilience  to  the  impacts  of  climate  change  and 
environmental degradation, and tackle some of the root causes of migration and displacement. 

2.2.Addressing the climate and security nexus in conflict and crisis situations 

The EU must make further progress in addressing the linkages throughout the whole conflict 
cycle between the climate and environmental crises, peace and security, in line with the EU’s 
Integrated Approach. This challenge is twofold: climate and environment-related policies and 
practices should be seen to be increasingly conflict-sensitive, and at the same time climate and 
environmental  considerations  should  continue  to  be  mainstreamed  into  EU  peacebuilding, 
stabilisation, crisis management and post-conflict recovery. 

2.2.1.  Peacebuilding and stabilisation 

Lack of natural resource management and governance can aggravate existing tensions within 
and between countries. This is addressed, in particular, through EU peacebuilding initiatives in 
fragile situations and regions. For instance, EU stabilisation actions32 can serve to mitigate 
certain climate and environment-related security risks, by addressing the needs of internally 
displaced  persons,  especially  women  and  girls,  and  persons  with  disabilities,  often 
disproportionally impacted by climate and environmental aspects, and their host communities. 
Therefore,  future  EU  stabilisation  assessments  will  incorporate  climate  and  environmental 
considerations in their response options in an inclusive, gender and conflict sensitive approach. 

Access to natural resources and other environmental topics can also provide new opportunities 
for cooperation and reconciliation, for instance through inclusive governance structures, and 

See EU Stabilisation Concept, Doc. WK 13776/2022 INIT, 12 October 2022. 

32 

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can serve as entry points for mediation and dialogue33. Transboundary cooperation on water34, 
for example, can act as a driver for conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The EU will continue 
to invest in the training of a pool of mediators while aiming to support capacity development 
of  local  mediators  to  engage  on  peace  and  security  impacts  of  climate  change  and 
environmental challenges. 

2.2.2.  Humanitarian action, disaster preparedness and response 

Climate  and  environmental  considerations  are  increasingly  integrated  in  all  humanitarian 
interventions  in  recognition  of  how  conflict,  and  climate  change  and  environmental 
degradation, exacerbate humanitarian needs and vulnerabilities35. 

EU humanitarian aid and the Union Civil Protection Mechanism are at the forefront of the EU’s 
response  to  extreme  weather  events  and  their  humanitarian  consequences36.  Through  the 
Disaster  Preparedness  Budget  Line  (EUR  78  million),  the  EU  is  supporting  targeted 
preparedness  interventions,  including  anticipatory  actions  to  prepare  for  and  mitigate  acute 
humanitarian  impacts  before  they  fully  unfold.  The  EU  is  also  committed  to  reducing  the 
environmental footprint of EU-funded humanitarian operations and supports and encourages 
the efforts of its partners in this regard, especially in relation to more sustainable supply chains. 

As a result of more frequent and severe weather events, Member States’ security and defence 
capabilities  are  likely  to  be  called  upon  more  often  to  support  disaster  management  and 
humanitarian  relief  efforts,  both  within  the  EU  and  beyond  its  external  borders.  Further 
strengthening  civil-military  coordination  and  preparedness  at  EU  and  national  level  in 
accordance with the framework for the use of EU military assets in support of humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief37 is critical to ensure a timely and effective response compatible 
with the principled approach of EU Humanitarian assistance, and requires further acceleration. 

2.2.3.  Crisis management 

The EU’s 13 civilian and 9 military missions and operations under the EU Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP) are often deployed in countries that are particularly vulnerable to 
climate  and  environment  related  security  risks.  The  EU  will  progressively  mainstream  and 
address climate and environmental aspects in the planning, implementation and review of their 

The EU launched Team Europe Initiative on Transboundary Water Management in Africa in the UN 

As  recognised  in  the    Concept  and  in  the  subsequent  Council  Conclusions  on  EU  Peace  Mediation 

33 
(7 December 2020), and in the EEAS Peace Mediation Guidelines. 
34  
Water Conference in March 2023 
35 
The EU’s humanitarian aid and the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) are at the forefront of 
the EU’s response to extreme weather events and their humanitarian consequences. Part of the EU’s humanitarian 
budget (EUR 1.7 billion for 2023) is dedicated to respond to the humanitarian needs arising from climate-induced 
disasters, whose frequency, duration and scale are increasing as a result of climate change. 
36 
 Part  of  the  EU’s  humanitarian  budget  (EUR  1.7  billion  for  2023)  is  dedicated  to  respond  to  the 
humanitarian needs arising from climate-induced disasters, whose frequency, duration and scale are increasing as 
a result of climate change. The European Humanitarian Response Capacity was created in 2022 to support the EU 
response to crisis, including climate-induced disasters.  
37 
Assistance and Disaster Relief. 

As  outlined  in  the  EU  Concept  on  Effective  CIVMIL  Coordination  in  Support  of  Humanitarian 

11 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
mandates. The Strategic Compass set the objective for all military and civilian missions and 
operations to have an environmental adviser, and to report on their environmental footprint, 
by 2025. In the Civilian CSDP Compact38, Member States committed to mainstream efforts, 
in  external  mission  activities,  to  address  security  challenges  linked  to  climate  change  and 
environmental degradation and exploitation. 

To enable the CSDP  missions and operations to effectively deliver on these climate-related 
objectives, a set of measures needs to be developed and implemented together with Member 
States.  Such  a  new  CSDP-Climate  Package  will  provide  a  coherent  basis  for  different 
interlinked activities, ensuring that resources are used in the most efficient manner, as follows. 

  Different profiles for environmental advisors will need to be identified and reflected in 
training and recruitment needs39, considering the scope of CSDP missions and operations40 
and possible future developments. 

  The decision-making process regarding CSDP mandates should take account of the new 
annual climate, environment and security trend analyses41 and other analytical sources 
for the planning and periodic review of mission mandates, while promoting the integration 
of lessons learnt throughout the different work streams. Lessons learnt from our partners 
operating in the same theatre, most notably the UN42, should be reflected on, also with a 
view to identifying possible areas of closer cooperation. 

  A reporting mechanism on the environmental footprint will be rolled out in all missions 
and  operations,  building  on  lessons  from  pilot  projects,  while  ensuring  synergies  and 
exchange of best practice on these issues with other domains of EU external action, such 
as humanitarian engagements. An appropriate link to the European Peace Facility with a 
view  to  optimisation  of  climate  and  environmental  performances43  should  also  be 
established. 

Finally,  it  may  also  be  pertinent  to  reflect  on  the  integration  of  climate  and  environmental 
factors  into  the  scenarios  supporting  the  operationalisation  of  the  EU  Rapid  Deployment 
Capacity. 

2.2.4.  Impact of armed conflict on the environment and post-conflict recovery 

The impact of armed  conflicts on the environment is a major element to  address within the 
climate and security nexus. Even though international humanitarian law (IHL) provides for the 
protection of the natural environment in armed conflicts, violations of IHL are widespread and 
cause  extensive  and  long-term  damage.  In  post-conflict  situations,  water,  soil  and  land 

ST 9588 2023 INIT, 22 May 2023. 
See also link to the EU Climate and Security Training Platform set out as a new action in Chapter 3 of 

38 
39 
this Joint Communication. 
40 
The  mandates  of  the  CSDP  cover  conflict  prevention  and  peacekeeping,  crisis  management,  joint 
disarmament operations, and  military advice  and assistance tasks, and also  humanitarian and rescue and post-
conflict stabilisation tasks. 
41 
See Chapter 1 of this Joint Communication. 
42 
For example, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) is currently looking into the 
protection of water resources through peacekeepers to ensure access to emergency and sustainable water supplies 
and avoid that the terrorist organisation Al-Shabaab gains control. 
43 
performance as a criterion for procurement procedures under its assistance measures. 

The implementation rules of the European Peace Facility include climate and environmental 

12 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
contamination  from  explosive  remnants  is  particularly  common,  from  the  destruction  of 
ecosystems to pollution and waste management, due to bombings, landmines and oil and gas 
leaks. In addition to ongoing EU initiatives on environmental protection, pollution and waste 
management in this context, including promotion of IHL compliance, complementary targeted 
actions will be considered on post-conflict environmental assessments, including in the context 
of the Incubation Forum for Circular Economy in European Defence. 

Examples of EU action on the climate and security nexus in various policy dimensions: 

  Displacement and migration: The EU addresses displacement and migration related to 
through 
disasters,  climate  change  and  environmental  degradation, 
humanitarian, development and peace actions.44 The EU is also launching a new global 
EU  action  (EUR 8  million)  with  the  Internal  Displacement  Monitoring  Centre  to 
deepen knowledge on the drivers, vulnerabilities and risks that lead to internal displacement 
and to improve capacities for affected partner countries to address these risks. 

in  particular 

  Environmental  crime:  Environmental  crime  is  one  of  the  10  priorities  within  the 
European  Multidisciplinary  Platform  against  Criminal  Threats  (EMPACT)  which 
enables EU law enforcement cooperation with relevant authorities from third countries on 
operational actions to tackle environmental crimes. CSDP missions can also contribute to 
helping national authorities fight environmental crime45. 

  Maritime security: The recently updated EU maritime security strategy46 highlights the 
significant  impacts  of  climate  change  and  environmental  degradation  on  the  marine 
environment  and  maritime security,  and  it proposes various actions. Other work strands 
aim  at  facilitating  coexistence  of  offshore  renewable  energy  with  defence  operations 
and systems47. 

  Space:  The  EU  Space  Programme  supports  the  protection  of  the  environment,  helps  to 
monitor and mitigate the effects  of climate change and ensures safety  and civil  security 
across Europe. 

Key actions at EU level: 

  Relevant  Commission services and the  EEAS, including the EU Delegations, will 
strengthen  climate/environment  peace  and  security  nexus  analysis  of  relevant 
policies  and  actions,  especially  in  geographical  areas  vulnerable  to  these  impacts, 
such as, at regional level, Sahel or Horn of Africa, or Small Island Developing States 
(SIDS). 

  The EEAS, in cooperation with relevant Commission services, will ensure that future 
incorporate  climate  and  environmental 

EU  stabilisation  assessments  will 

See also Commission Staff Working Document addressing displacement and migration related to 

44  
disasters, climate change and environmental degradation. 
45 
host State’s internal security forces’ environmental footprint, EEAS(2022) 2086, December 2022. 
46 
47 

Doc. JOIN/2023/8, 10 March 2023. 
https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/eu-policies/symbiosis. 

See Mini-concept on possible civilian CSDP support to fight environmental crime and to reduce the 

13 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
considerations  with  respect  to  the  local  populations’  livelihoods  when  examining 
response options. 

  The EEAS will train and equip the EU pool of mediators and other EU mediation 
actors, to engage on peace and security impacts of climate change and environmental 
challenges. 

  Relevant Commission services and the EEAS, including the EU Military Staff, will 
continue to strengthen and improve civil-military coordination in the context of EU 
humanitarian  assistance  and  disaster  relief  efforts,  building  on  previous  steps  and 
lessons learnt. 

  The  High  Representative  in  coordination  with  Member  States  will  ensure  the 
comprehensive  implementation  of  the  new  CSDP-Climate  Package,  including  the 
swift development of clear profiles for environmental advisers. 

  The EEAS will reflect climate change and environmental degradation considerations 
in operational scenarios as appropriate to support the operationalisation of the Rapid 
Deployment  Capacity  by  strengthening  preparedness  and  to  provide  realistic 
frameworks of employment. 

  Relevant  Commission  services  and  the  EDA  will  explore  the  development  of 
collaborative projects for post-conflict environmental assessment and restoration in 
the context of the Incubation Forum for Circular Economy in European Defence. 

3.  Ensuring a sustainable and climate-resilient European security and defence 

Climate  change  and  environmental  degradation  will  transform  the  way  actors  involved  in 
peace,  security  and  defence  will  plan,  invest  and  operate.  The  EU  should  scale  up  its 
engagement  to  facilitate  and  support  Member  States  to  address  the  growing  magnitude, 
complexity and urgency of the challenges involved, in line with the objectives of the European 
Green Deal and the Strategic Compass. 

3.1.Develop climate and environmental expertise and raise awareness 

There is an urgent need to further raise awareness and develop the necessary specialised skills 
to facilitate the implementation of climate adaptation and mitigation measures in security and 
defence.  This  applies  to  all  relevant  EU  actors,  including  EU  Delegations  and  CSDP 
missions/operations  as  well as, at  the national  level,  different  ministries in the EU Member 
States. 

To  bring  together  different  training  providers  and  address  the  needs  of  different  training 
audiences in a systematic manner, an EU Climate Security and Defence Training Platform 
will be established in the framework of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC). 

14 

 
 
 
 
 
Its objective will be to develop the required expertise at EU and national level, including for 
example environmental law and crime experts, environmental engineers, and climate-related 
security risk analysts. This will also enable the EU to gradually develop a pool of (certified) 
experts that Member States could make available to CSDP missions/operations in addition to 
their work in national ministries. Once established, the platform could support coordination 
with other international parties. 

The  EU  multilayer  crisis  management  exercises  provide  another  opportunity  to  raise 
awareness  and  test  and  validate  how  EU  crisis  management  mechanisms  can  respond  to 
climate-related security concerns. The EDA and relevant Commission services are organising 
tabletop exercises to examine the dependencies in relation to defence-related critical energy 
infrastructure when compromised or rendered inoperable due to hybrid threats, as part of their 
joint study on these issues. 

3.2.Military capabilities and infrastructure 

The energy intensive nature of Member States’ armed forces48, who are also the largest public 
owner of free land and infrastructures in the EU, offers opportunities to become more efficient 
and generate climate and biodiversity benefits at scale. A coherent and smart approach to 
the  climate  adaptation  and  mitigation  efforts  of  the  military  must  preserve,  and  where 
possible enhance, operational effectiveness. Improved energy efficiency and sustainability not 
only  reduces  the  carbon  footprint,  it  reduces  costs49,  decreases  the  logistical  burden  and 
advances self-sustainability in the operational context – thus adding to the safety and freedom 
of movement of the armed forces. It must also take into account that the armed forces operate 
specialised  equipment  that  usually  has  a  very  long  life-cycle,  whereas  developing  next 
generation capabilities can take years if not decades.  

An assessment of the manifold impacts and risks generated by climate change needs to inform 
short to long-term defence planning and investments. For instance, to ensure that equipment 
can operate under challenging climate conditions, to train and equip the armed forces for more 
frequent military assistance to civilian authorities in response to natural disasters, or to improve 
the resilience of infrastructure used by the military and ensure that military capabilities can be 
deployed in a reliable and sustainable manner across land, air and sea. As Member States are 
increasing their defence  budgets50, such measures  need to  be an integral  part of developing 
climate-proof armed forces. It is equally important to ensure that other horizontal policies, such 
as  initiatives  on  sustainable  finance,  remain  consistent  with  the  European  Union  efforts  to 
facilitate the European defence industry’s sufficient access to finance and investment. 

48 https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-factsheets/2019-06-07-factsheet-energy-defence (new data to be 
published in the coming days). 
49 Forthcoming EDA data show efficiency gains of approximately 33% over the period 2016-2020.  
50 See also Joint Communication on Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward, JOIN(2022)24 final, 
18.05.2022.  

15 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
There is already a lot of work ongoing to address these climate and energy challenges among 
the armed forces, including through different expert formats at the EDA, partly funded by the 
European Commission  (see box below). Moreover, Member States are currently addressing 
many of these issues by developing and implementing national strategies to prepare the armed 
forces  for  climate  change,  as  called  for  in  the  Strategic  Compass.  The  EU  Climate  and 
Defence Network of experts from Member States’ defence ministries, which was formed as a 
follow-up to the Strategic Compass at the initiative of the EEAS and the EDA, has proven to 
be a useful format to foster cooperation, coordination and the exchange of best practices in this 
regard51.  

With  the  momentum  generated  through  these  national  strategies,  it  becomes  critical  to 
substantially  enhance  cooperation  between  Member  States  in  the  EU  framework.  This  will 
lower the risk of fragmentation and ensure interoperability among the EU’s armed forces while 
creating  economies  of  scale.  These  objectives  can  only  be  achieved  through  a  well-aligned 
whole-of-government  approach  at  national  and  EU  level.  For  example,  the  development  of 
standards  for  sustainable  fuels  would  ensure  the  interchangeability  of  such  fuels  between 
Member States’ Armed Forces.  

Against this backdrop, the Commission and the High Representative will explore possibilities 
to  support  Member  States,  both  individually  and  through  accelerated  civilian-military 
cooperation, in line with the objectives of the Strategic Compass and the European Green Deal. 
To  this  end,  a  new  Climate  and  Defence  Support  Mechanism  will  be  set  up  between 
relevant  Commission  services,  the  EEAS  and  the  EDA  to  work  with  Member  States  to 
identify gaps and collaborative opportunities in areas such as the development of skills, sharing 
or  conducting  research  and  studies,  developing  green  standards,  data  gathering,  developing 
methodologies  or  technical  concepts,  enhancing  incentives  and  promoting  collaborative 
projects.  In  this  context,  as  part  of  a  phased  approach,  the  Commission  and  High 
Representative,  in  close  consultation  with  the  EDA,  will  consider  the  establishment  of  a 
dedicated EU-led Competence Centre on Climate Change, Security and Defence to enhance 
the  climate  adaptation  and  mitigation  effort  among  the  Member  States’  armed  forces, 
including, where relevant, through the European Investment Bank.  

Relevant EU instruments, policies and tools that provide a strong foundation for further 
work: 

  Three  projects  were  launched  in  2021  under  the  European  Defence  Fund  (EDF)  for 
defence-oriented  solutions  dedicated  to  support  research  and  development  of  defence 
technologies and products on climate, energy management and efficiency with a budget of. 
EUR 84 million. 

  The Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.052 integrated sustainability and energy efficiency 
as  key  objectives  in  the  development  of  future  dual-use  transport  infrastructure  and 

51 The Network, which is co-chaired by the EEAS and EDA, developed and agreed an indicative template to be 
used by Member States for their development of national strategies to prepare the armed forces for climate change. 
52 

Doc. JOIN(2022) 48 final, 10 November 2022. 

16 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
capabilities, including the fuel supply chain for the large-scale movement of military forces 
and their equipment53. 

  Member States are addressing energy efficiency, circularity and energy resilience in the 
defence sector through Commission-funded activities under the umbrella of the European 
Defence  Agency,  including  the  Consultation  Forum  for  Sustainable  Energy  in  the 
Defence  and  Security  Sector  (CF  SEDSS)54,  the  Incubation  Forum  for  Circular 
Economy  in  European  Defence  (IF  CEED)55  as  well  as  the  Symbiosis  initiative 
(offshore renewable energy for defence)56. Moreover, the EDA Energy and Environment 
Capability Technology Group (EnE CapTech) identifies technological gaps and proposes 
collaborative projects57. 

  Collaborative  projects  in  the  framework  of  the  Permanent  Structured  Cooperation 
(PESCO)  address  challenges  related  to  climate  and  environmental  degradation,  most 
notably the Energy Operational Function project58 and Helicopter Hot and High Training. 
  The JRC has launched a project to identify, assess and tackle climate risks to EU defence, 
with  the aim of providing  scientific  and technical  support to  Member States in  order to 
make defence more climate-resilient. 

Key actions at EU level: 

  The ESDC will establish an EU Climate, Security and Defence Training Platform 
supported  by  the  EEAS,  relevant  Commission  services,  the  EDA  and  SatCen,  to 
ensure that the EU has the expertise needed, including by supporting our partners. 

  Relevant Commission services, the EEAS and the EDA will set up a Climate and 
Defence  Support  Mechanism  to  work  with  Member  States  to  identify  gaps  and 
collaborative  opportunities,  in  order  to  promote  concrete  climate  adaptation  and 
mitigation  action  among  the  armed  forces.  A  first  report  on  its  findings  will  be 
presented to Member States in the second half of 2024. 

  As  part  of  a  phased  approach,  the  Commission  and  the  High  Representative,  in 
consultation  with  EDA,  will  consider  the  establishment  of  a  dedicated  EU-led 

This is in line with the TEN-T policy, which aims to reduce the carbon footprint of the transport sector 

Tavares da Costa, R., Krausmann, E., Hadjisavvas, C., Impacts of climate  change on  defence-related 

53 
and the effects of climate change, while the new Regulation for the deployment of alternative fuels 
infrastructure sets mandatory deployment targets for electric recharging and hydrogen refuelling infrastructure. 
54 
critical energy infrastructure, 2023, doi:10.2760/03454. 
55 
Commission-funded  initiative  run  by  the  EDA,  which  pursues  project  ideas  based  on  circularity 
principles in the fields of critical raw materials, additive manufacturing, materials for textiles, ecodesign, green 
procurement, SCIP database under the Waste Framework Directive, data, EMAS uptake in military ranges, and 
spare parts management. A dedicated project circle addresses relevant critical raw materials for EU defence, such 
as titanium, tungsten, antimony, including to foster their circularity in different sections of the supply chain. 
56 
https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/eu-policies/symbiosis. 
57 
This includes a new E+ZERO project that aims to propose and demonstrate a rapidly deployable modular 
camp  with  positive  energy  balance,  advanced  water  management  and  purification  technologies  and  with  no 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
58 

https://www.pesco.europa.eu/project/energy-operational-function/. 

17 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
Competence Centre on Climate Change, Security and Defence in support of Member 
States.  

  Relevant Commission services, the EEAS and the EDA will continue to explore the 
challenges  and  potential  opportunities  for  green  public  procurement  for  defence 
needs. 

  The EEAS will incorporate climate change-related aspects in the 2024 EU Integrated 

Resolve exercise. 

  Relevant  Commission  services  and  the  EDA  will  conduct  further  studies  to  help 
manage  climate  and  environment  risk  systematically  and  comprehensively  in  EU 
military installations and minimise damage, loss and disruption due to climate and 
weather hazards. 

  Relevant  Commission  services,  the  EEAS  and  the  EDA  will  continue  to  work 
together  with  Member  States  on  the  energy  transition  of  dual-use  transport 
infrastructure  and  capabilities,  including  fuel  supply  chains,  in  follow-up  to  the 
Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0. 

  Relevant Commission services and the EDA will continue to analyse the impact of 
revised  energy-related  directives  and  a  revised  policy  framework  on  military 
infrastructure,  and  also  explore  the  project  ideas  and  studies  developed  in  the  CF 
SEDSS context, e.g., on improving energy efficiency and buildings performance in 
defence. 

  The  EEAS  and  the  EDA  will  consult  with  Member  States  on  the  permanent 
establishment  of  the  Climate  and  Defence  Network  to  monitor  and  support  the 
implementation of national strategies and explore collaborative opportunities. 

  Relevant  Commission  services,  the  EEAS  and  the  EDA,  together  with  Member 
States,  will  continue  promoting  consistent  approaches  in  the  various  ongoing 
collaborative projects  in  the area of climate and  defence in  PESCO  and the EDF, 
making  best  use  of  the  Coordinated  Annual  Review  on  Defence  framework  to 
identify new possible projects. 

4.  International cooperation 

Climate  change  and  environmental  degradation  are  global  challenges  that  require  an  active 
consolidated  multilateral  agenda.  The  EU  will  further  increase  its  engagement  with 
international and regional organisations and third countries, at both political and operational 
levels.  

18 

 
 
 
 
 
4.1. Setting an ambitious global agenda 

The EU will continue to set an ambitious global agenda with regard to the climate and security 
nexus. Many initiatives led or supported by the EU, most notably on water, ocean, food 
security,  energy  transition  and  raw  materials  value  chains,  have  a  strong  partnership 
component, such as the EU Energy Platform59, which is highly relevant for the climate and 
security  nexus.  Furthermore,  the  EU  will  encourage  international  initiatives  with  a 
transboundary  dimension  to  address  the  climate  and  security  nexus  and  to  enhance  global 
action on energy efficiency and renewable energy in a conflict sensitive manner60. 

Examples of EU-led or supported initiatives: 

  Water  security  and  droughts:  Together  with  partners,  the  EU  will  champion  global 
implementation  of  integrated  water  resources  management,  an  increased  focus  on  the 
water-energy-food-ecosystem nexus, and a stronger water governance at all levels61. The 
EU also promotes proactive drought management in relevant international fora, such as the 
UN  Convention  on  Combating  Desertification  and  the  International  Drought  Resilience 
Alliance.  

  Ocean  governance:  The  EU  and  its  Member  States  will  champion  the  universal 
ratification, entry into force and effective implementation of the UN High Seas Treaty to 
ensure better protection of the ocean. 

  Energy transition: The EU and its Member States  will also continue, together with G7 
partners,  to  engage  in  a  new  model  of  long-term  partnerships  called  Just  Energy 
Transition  Partnerships  with  fast-growing  developing  countries,  providing  financial 
support to enable a shift to clean energy sources and an ambitious nationally determined 
contribution, with a central emphasis on a socially just transition. 

  Critical raw materials (CRMs): As part of the external dimension of the EU’s Critical 
Raw  Materials  package,  the  EU  will  strengthen  its  global  engagement  to  develop  and 
diversify  investment,  production,  and  trade  with  reliable  partners  and  will  deploy  new 
diplomatic  initiatives,  such  as  the  Critical  Raw  Materials  Club,  bringing  together 
consuming  and  resource-rich  countries  to  promote  the  secure  and  sustainable  supply  of 
CRMs.  These  partnerships  will  support  emerging  and  developing  countries  to  develop 
sustainable raw materials value chains, add local value and diversify their economies, while 
respecting environmental and social standards. 

The  EU  and  its  Member  States,  as  board  members  of  multilateral  development  banks 
(MDBs)  and  international  financial  institutions  (IFIs),  will  continue  to  champion  and 

The EU’s external energy engagement in a changing world (JOIN(2022) 23), which was published 

The EU opened its EU Energy Platform to those neighbours that are most affected by Russia’s war of 

59 
aggression against Ukraine to address jointly their energy security concerns. 
60 
alongside the REPowerEU Plan on 18 May 2022, aims to reduce the world’s overall energy demand, boost the 
international development of renewables and ensure a fair competition for resources more globally. 
61 See conclusions of European Council of 23 March 2023: “The European Council welcomes the UN 2023 Water 
Conference and its Water Action Agenda. It acknowledges the need for enhanced EU and global action on water 
and underlines the importance of a strategic EU approach to water security.” 

19 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
support  ambitious  and  innovative  proposals  to  further  align  MDB  and  IFI  strategies  and 
financial  flows  with  the  Paris  Agreement  goals,  and  to  strengthen  their  capacity  to  address 
climate change, biodiversity loss, pollution and fragility, while maintaining their strong focus 
on poverty reduction. Such support from MDBs and IFIs also contributes to stability, peace 
and security 

In  the  context  of  accelerated  global  warming,  deliberate  large-scale  intervention  in  the 
Earth’s  natural  systems  (referred  to  as  “geoengineering”),  such  as  solar  radiation 
modification, is  attracting  more  attention. However,  the  risks,  impacts  and  unintended 
consequences  that  these  technologies  pose  are  poorly  understood,  and  necessary  rules, 
procedures and institutions have not been developed62. These technologies introduce new risks 
to people and ecosystems, while they could also increase power imbalances between nations, 
spark conflicts and raises a myriad of ethical, legal, governance and political issues. Guided by 
the precautionary principle, the EU will support international efforts to assess comprehensively 
the risks and uncertainties of climate interventions, including solar radiation modification and 
promote  discussions  on  a  potential  international  framework  for  its  governance,  including 
research related aspects. 

4.2.Addressing the climate and security nexus together with partners 

The EU will continue its efforts in all relevant UN fora, including the UN Security Council 
and the Peacebuilding Commission, and its cooperation with different UN agencies on climate 
and environmental risks to peace and security through established dialogues and partnerships. 
The implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is also important in this 
context. 

The priorities for the EU-UN strategic partnership on peace operations and crisis management 
for  2022-2024  already  reflect  and  mainstream  the  climate  and  security  nexus.  The  EU  will 
support  UN  efforts  under  the  ‘New  Agenda  for  Peace’  and  continue  enhancing  effective 
operational  cooperation  on  the  ground,  including  through  EU  delegations  and  between  UN 
peace operations and EU CSDP missions and operations. The engagement of the EU and UN 
in Somalia63 serves as a good starting point for closer engagement, such as in the area of joint 
training to local coastguards. The EU’s progressive deployment of environmental advisers to 
all CSDP missions and operations will enable the development of synergies, such as joint local 
capacity-building effort, data sharing, and management of the environmental footprint. The EU 
will also deepen its exchange with the UN Climate Security Mechanism to enhance sharing 
of lessons learnt, coordination and cooperation on policy and programming approaches, and 
training. 

The EU remains committed to the previously agreed international position under the Convention of 

62  
Biological Diversity decision X/30 
63 
building mission (EUCAP Somalia), and the UN conducts an assistant mission (UNSOM). 

The EU is conducting a military training mission (EUTM Somalia) and a civilian maritime capacity 

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Example of EU-UNEP partnership on climate change and security 

The first phase of the EU-UNEP partnership on climate change and security developed tools 
and capacities to enhance environment- and climate-security analysis and preventive action to 
address conflict and fragility risks in two pilot countries, Nepal and Sudan. Moving from its 
pilot phase to scaling up at the regional level, the partnership  will aim to address emerging 
climate and environment-related risks in three priority regions: the Horn of Africa, the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA), and West Africa and the Sahel. 

The EU will use all channels and existing dialogues at bilateral level64 and with international 
organisations, such as NATO, the African Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 
the Arctic Council, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, the League of 
Arab States, OSCE, as  well as with G7 and G20, to address  climate change, environmental 
degradation and security. 

Example of African Union-EU partnership: Innovation Agenda 

The African Union and the EU have agreed to develop an ambitious agenda to foster scientific 
cooperation between researchers to develop knowledge together, as well as sharing technology 
and  expertise.65  This  includes  most  notably  joining  forces  to  advance  climate  resilience, 
mitigation and adaptation, taking the security-related impacts of climate change into account. 

The Joint Declaration on EU-NATO cooperation66 of January 2023 stressed the need to jointly 
address the security implications of climate change. Both organisations have made substantive 
progress  in  supporting  the  adaptation  of  the  armed  forces  of  their  members  to  the  adverse 
effects of climate change and environmental degradation and in reducing the negative impact 
through mitigation measures. Therefore, there is hence a need for closer coordination and an 
opportunity for concrete cooperation on selected work strands, such as on Data analysis and 
early warning, training and awareness-raising, resilience building, and capability development 
(including  with  regard  to  energy  efficiency  and  the  energy  transition)  provide  concrete 
opportunities for cooperation. The High Representative and the Commission will consult with 
NATO the possibility of setting up an EU-NATO structured dialogue on these issues. Synergies 
with other EU-NATO dialogues on related areas will explored as appropriate, e.g., EU-NATO 
Structured Dialogue on Resilience and the EU-NATO Taskforce on the resilience of critical 
infrastructure.  

64 
The EU organises climate and environment dialogues and regional and bilateral cooperation activities, 
including high-level dialogues on climate change and environment with Canada, India, Japan, South Korea, the 
US  and  others,  and  seeks  green  alliances  with  partners  who  have  demonstrated  commitment  to  the  highest 
ambition.  The  EU  also  organises  political  and  security  dialogues  with  bilateral  partners  and  will  continue  to 
integrate climate change and environmental considerations in these discussions, building on good experiences of 
such dialogues with the US, Canada, the UK and Rwanda. 
65  
66 
january-2023/. 

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/54412/final_declaration-en.pdf.  
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/01/10/eu-nato-joint-declaration-10-

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The  EU  will  also  convene  regional  climate,  environment  and  security  dialogues  permitting 
wider engagement with partners, both in regions acutely vulnerable to climate change, and 
those  that  may  currently  receive  less  attention  in  the  field  of  climate  and  security.  These 
dialogues  will  also  support  coordination  between  various  parties  both  within  and  between 
regions. 

In addition to EU’s efforts to address the climate and security nexus through close partnerships 
at multilateral, regional and bilateral levels, cooperation with civil society as a whole, including 
local actors, research bodies, and think tanks will also be enhanced. 

Key actions at EU level: 

  The  High  Representative  and  the  Commission,  with  EU  Member  States  and 
international partners, will champion and support ambitious and innovative proposals 
to further align MDB and IFI strategies and financial flows with the Paris Agreement 
goals. 

international  efforts 

  Guided by the precautionary principle, the Commission and the High Representative 
will support 
the  risks  and 
uncertainties  of climate  interventions,  including  solar  radiation  modification  and 
its 
promote  discussions  on 
governance, including research related aspects. 

to  assess  comprehensively 

a  potential 

international 

framework 

for 

  The EEAS will seek closer cooperation between EU and UN experts on the ground 
with  the  aim  of  creating  greater  synergies  between  their  respective  activities  and 
further exploring joint initiatives, e.g., in training and capability development.  

  The EEAS and relevant Commission services will further integrate climate change 
and environmental considerations in dialogues with bilateral  partners and regional 
organisations, and various civil society organisations where relevant. 

  The High Representative and the Commission will consult with NATO the setting up 
a  structured  dialogue  to  address  the  manifold  linkages  related  to  climate  change, 
environmental degradation, security and defence, with a view to exploring synergies 
between both organisations and identifying possible cooperation in areas of mutual 
benefit. This should take place within the framework of an envisaged comprehensive 
implementation document on EU-NATO cooperation. 

  The  EEAS  and  relevant  Commission  services  will  explore  the  possibility  for 
exchanges with  the NATO Climate Change  and Security Centre of Excellence on 
lessons learnt and best practices. 

  The relevant Commission services and EEAS will convene climate, environment and 
security dialogues in priority regions of concern to support spaces for discussion of 
specific challenges and to foster cooperation. 

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5.  Way forward 

The Commission and the High Representative invite the European Parliament and the Council 
to  welcome  the  Joint  Communication  and  to  support  the  new  outlook  on  the  climate  and 
security nexus. The Commission and the High Representative will report on the progress made 
on the implementation of the Joint Communication to Member States. 

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Annex 1 

Source: https://erccportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ECHO-Products/Maps#/maps/4526 

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