The European political community : a forum in search of a role.
Date: 2023-06-21
Institutions: European University Institute
Subjects: EU policy, European security, accession to the European Union, cooperation policy, crisis management, governance, summit meeting, the EU's international role

POLICY BRIEFTHE EUROPEAN POLITICAL COMMUNITY: A FORUM IN SEARCH OF A ROLESTG Policy PapersISSUE 2023/11MAY 2023Author:Teona GiuashviliSchool of Transnational GovernanceSCHOOL OFTRANSNATIONALGOVERNANCEEXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has spurred an intense debate on the 
future  of  the  European  security  order  and  on  the  EU’s  eastward 
enlargement.  Following  President  Macron’s  proposal  to  launch 
a  new  format  for  political  and  security  cooperation  in  Europe  in 
May  2022,  the  first  Summit  of  the  EPC  took  place  in  Prague  in 
October and sent a strong message of European unity in the face 
of  Russia’s  aggression.  However,  as  the  47  European  leaders  of 
the  EPC  prepare  to  gather  for  the  second  Summit  in  Moldova 
on  1  June  2023,  the  format  still  lacks  a  clear  sense  of  purpose. 
This  policy  brief  argues  that  the  EPC  could  fulfil  multiple  roles, 
depending  on  convergence  among  its  member  states  and 
on  the  scope  for  delivering  added  value  compared  to  other 
European organisations. First, while clearly separate from the EU 
enlargement process, the EPC could complement it by fostering 
political engagement with EU aspirant members. Second, the EPC 
could evolve into an inclusive forum for security dialogue, building 
confidence among its members and helping prevent or manage 
crises.  Third,  the  EPC  could  perform  as  a  hub  for  differentiated 
cooperation, with groups of member states working together on 
security issues as well as on a broader agenda, such as education 
and connectivity. Flexibility is and should remain a strength of this 
format, but the sustainability of the EPC will depend on what it is 
able to deliver.

Author:Teona Giuashvili | Visiting Fellow, School of Transnational Governance, EUIViews expressed in this publication reflect the opinion of individual authors and not those of the European University Institute.SCHOOL OFTRANSNATIONALGOVERNANCE1. INTRODUCTION

The upcoming summit of the European Political 
Community (EPC) in Chisinau, on 1 June, takes 
place one year after President Macron outlined 
his  idea  to  establish  the  new  pan-European 
forum in front of the European Parliament, on 
9 May 2022. Less than five months on, the first 
EPC  Summit  was  held  in  Prague  in  October 
2022,  gathering  44  European  countries. 
Established  to  embody  a  firm,  common 
response  to  Russia’s  aggression  of  Ukraine 
and to help re-think the European political and 
security  architecture,  the  very  creation  of  the 
EPC  forum  marked  a  significant  innovation. 
However,  as  the  47  European  leaders  of  the 
EPC  prepare  to  gather  in  Moldova  in  a  few 
weeks’ time, the format still lacks a clear sense 
of purpose.

This  policy  brief  reviews  the  evolution  of  the 
EPC  and  explores  its  prospects  at  a  time  of 
turmoil in European geopolitics. The purpose 
is  to  assess  what  role  the  EPC  could  play  to 
advance  dialogue,  political  convergence, 
security  and  concrete  policy  initiatives  across 
the continent. Furthermore, the paper considers 
the challenges that the new EPC format faces. 
The principal question is whether and in what 
ways  the  EPC  can  deliver  added  value  to  its 
members  and  contribute  to  cooperation  and 
stability  across  Europe.  This  brief  builds  on  a 
number  of  interviews  conducted  with  officials 
and  experts  from  France,  Germany,  Poland, 
and Moldova.1 

2.  THE  EARLY  STEPS:  AN  INITIATIVE 
WITH FEW BACKERS

the 

The creation of the EPC prompted contrasting 
reactions.  Some  welcomed 
initiative 
by  President  Macron  as  an  opportunity  to 
strengthen  the  alignment  of  all  the  European 
countries  that  oppose  Russia’s  invasion  of 
Ukraine.  Others  were  sceptical,  suspecting 
France  of  promoting  a  generic  agenda  of 
pan-continental  dialogue  that  would  side-
line  prospects 
(EU) 
enlargement in Eastern Europe.

for  European  Union 

2.1  Responding  to  the  new  geopolitical 
reality: the French initiative

The  war  in  Ukraine  and  the  consequent  re-
opening of the debate on EU enlargement set 
the  stage  for  President  Macron’s  proposal  in 
May 2022 to “organise Europe from a political 
perspective  and  with  a  broader  scope  than 
that  of  the  European  Union”,  by  establishing 
the  European  Political  Community.  Russia’s 
invasion  of  Ukraine  brought  large-scale  war 
back  to  Europe  and  shattered  the  European 
security  architecture.  The  war  raised  the 
question of how Europe could re-structure its 
continental  order.  Within  two  weeks  from  the 
outbreak  of  the  war,  Ukraine,  Moldova,  and 
Georgia applied for EU membership, opening 
a  new  chapter  in  the  prolonged  and  often 
controversial  debate  on  the  EU’s  eastward 
expansion.  Their 
compounded 
pressure  to  define  a  strategic  approach  to 
enlargement  and  to  provide  strong  political 
support  to  Ukraine  and  the  other  Eastern 
neighbours.

requests 

President  Macron’s 
initiative  matched  a 
broader  pattern  of  ‘voluntarist’  leadership 
efforts  that  France  has  often  performed  on 
the European stage. Paris would launch broad 
strategic  ideas  with  scarce  details  on  their 
implementation  and  specific  end  goals,  while 
pragmatically  adjusting  these  initiatives  to 
evolving circumstances2. This ‘experimentalist’ 
approach  can  help  break  new  ground,  but  it 
can also generate hesitancy or even opposition 
from EU partners suspicious of France dressing 
its own national priorities in European clothes.

The  aim  to  forge  a  framework  for  European 
cooperation  that  extends  beyond  the  EU  has 
deep  roots  in  French  strategic  thinking.  In 
sketching out his proposal for a new European 
forum,  Emmanuel  Macron  explicitly  referred 
to François Mitterrand’s 1989 idea to pursue a 
‘European  Confederation’.  Part  of  the  French 
establishment still views Mitterrand’s proposal 
as  “a  missed  opportunity  to  pacify  the 
European  continent”3  following  the  collapse 
of  the  Soviet  Union,  by  integrating  Russia  in 
shared  structures  of  governance.  However, 

These interviews were conducted by the author between February and April 2023. For privacy reasons, the interviewees will remain anonymous. The 

1 
author is grateful to the officials and experts who have generously shared their views and experience over the course of the preparation of this policy brief.
2 
3 

Interview with an expert from a German think tank, 13 February 2023.
Interview with a researcher from a French institute, 6 February 2023.

3

STG | Policy Papers Issue | 2023/11 | May 2023at  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  Central  and 
Eastern  European  states  felt  that  Mitterrand’s 
idea  risked  charting  an  alternative  course  to 
that  of  EU  and  NATO  enlargement,  and  as 
a  result,  rejected  it.  Dispelling  concerns  that 
Macron’s EPC proposal aimed to side-line EU 
enlargement was therefore essential for France 
to prevent its EU partners from dismissing the 
proposal outright.

2.2  The  many 
surrounding the EPC

shades  of 

scepticism 

The  EPC  got  off  to  a  difficult  start.  Macron’s 
initiative  took  most  European  capitals  by 
surprise.  Lack  of  prior  consultations  on  the 
proposal,  including  with  Berlin,  did  not  help 
win  support.  As  a  result,  French  diplomacy 
engaged  in  course  correction,  reaching  out 
to  partners  to  gather  political  feedback  on 
the  proposal  and  to  ensure  that  they  would 
endorse the initiative.

German officials wondered how the envisaged 
forum  would  fit  the  existing  multilateral 
architecture 
in  Europe.  Berlin  needed 
reassurance  that  the  resources  that  Germany 
would  put  into  the  new  framework  would 
be  commensurate  to  its  added  value.4  In 
addition  to  taking  a  cautious  and  pragmatic 
approach to the creation of additional formats 
in Europe, some in Germany also questioned 
how  the  French  initiative  would  relate  to  the 
EU’s  enlargement  process.  At  the  same  time, 
the  German  government  took  over  three 
months  to  openly  back  Ukraine’s  candidate 
status  request,  which  only  happened  when 
Chancellor  Scholz  visited  Kyiv  just  before  the 
June  European  Council,  alongside  President 
Macron,  then  Italian  Prime  Minister  Draghi, 
and  Romanian  President  Iohannis.  Ultimately, 
Germany  viewed  the  EPC  as  a  French  idea 
and  did  not  feel  it  had  ownership  over  the 
proposal.5  However,  Berlin  calculated  that 
it  could  not  afford  to  ignore  the  initiative,  as 
that would put additional strain on the already 
complicated 
two 
countries.6 

relations  between 

the 

4 
5 
6 
7 

Interview with a German government official, 2 March 2023.
Interview with an expert from a German think tank, 3 March 2023.
Interview with an expert from a French think tank, 16 February 2023.
Interview with an expert from a Polish think tank, 21 February 2023.

Poland  did  not  embrace  the  idea  with  great 
enthusiasm  either.  Warsaw  was  concerned 
with the potential implications of the proposal 
for  Eastern  Europe  and  for  the  enlargement 
agenda  of  the  EU.  More  importantly,  facing 
the  need  to  counter  Russia’s  aggression  and 
support  Ukraine,  Poland  was  uncomfortable 
with  the  prospect  of  creating  a  forum  that 
would not include the US and Canada.7 Various 
EU members from Central and Eastern Europe 
shared these concerns. The same reservations 
informed  Ukraine’s  wary  initial  reaction  to  the 
EPC proposal, with Kyiv focused on achieving 
EU candidate status.

the  historic  decision  of 

However, 
the 
European  Council  in  June  2022  to  grant  EU 
candidate  status  to  Ukraine  and  Moldova 
and,  in  perspective,  to  Georgia,  marked  a 
breakthrough,  assuaging  fears  that  the  EPC 
could challenge or delay EU enlargement and 
unlocking  political  support  for  the  initiative. 
The  decision  of  the  United  Kingdom  to  join 
the  EPC  was  another  important  factor  that 
added  political  momentum  to  the  proposal. 
Many capitals could see the added value of a 
format that included London after the trauma 
of Brexit, at a time when the whole of Europe 
was confronting the threat of war. A window of 
opportunity  therefore  opened  in  the  summer 
of 2022 to move speedily towards the launch 
of  the  EPC  at  the  Prague  Summit  in  October 
2022.

3. WHAT IS THE EPC FOR?

The  very  fact  that  the  first  EPC  Summit 
gathered 44 European countries was a success. 
However,  the  Prague  Summit  did  not  deliver 
a  clear  sense  of  purpose  for  the  new  format. 
Eight  months  on,  the  role  that  the  EPC  is  to 
play  remains  subject  to  debate.  In  European 
capitals, views diverge on how the EPC relates 
to  the  EU’s  enlargement  process,  on  how  it 
can  contribute  to  strengthening  European 
security,  and  on  whether  it  can  pave  the  way 
to some form of differentiated cooperation in 
Europe. At the same time, the search for a core 
mission  may  not  be  the  most  useful  way  to 

4

STG | Policy Papers Issue | 2023/11 | May 2023define the role of the platform. The EPC could 
fulfil  multiple  roles  at  once,  depending  on 
convergence among its member states and on 
its scope for delivering added value compared 
to other European organisations.

3.1  The  EPC  and  the  EU  enlargement 
process: parallel tracks, a steppingstone, or 
a safety net?

The  June  2022  European  Council  decision  to 
grant  candidate  status  to  Eastern  European 
applicants  reassured  sceptics  that  the  EPC 
would  not  become  a  substitute  for  the  EU 
enlargement process.8 There is now consensus 
among  European  countries  that  the  EPC  and 
EU  enlargement  follow  separate  tracks,  each 
driven  by  distinct  goals  and  each  based  on 
different  parameters.  However,  this  is  not 
the only way to look at the links between the 
EPC  and  EU  enlargement.  The  fact  that  the 
two  processes  follow  parallel  tracks  does  not 
necessarily mean that they are disconnected.

While  being  neither  a  competitor  nor  a 
prelude  to  EU  enlargement,  the  EPC  can 
assist  and  complement  this  process.  It  can 
play a significant role in strengthening mutual 
understanding between the EU member states 
and  the  European  states  beyond  the  EU, 
enabling socialisation and community building, 
including  at  the  level  of  heads  of  state  and 
government.  Moreover,  the  EPC  can  deepen 
political dialogue and advance sectoral policy 
cooperation  between  its  members.  Thus,  the 
EPC could better equip candidate countries to 
participate in certain EU policies. This would be 
consistent with the prospect of reforming the 
enlargement  process  and  introducing  a  form 
of staged accession for candidate countries.

Even if detached from the enlargement policy 
by  design,  the  EPC  could  also  perform  as  a 
safety  net,  and  provide  a  space  for  dialogue 
and cooperation in case the accession process 
ran  into  complications.  Despite  the  European 
Council’s  unanimous  decision  in  June  2022, 
differences  among  national  capitals  persist 

on the timeframe for EU enlargement, on the 
capacity  of  candidate  countries  to  adopt  the 
required  reforms,  and  on  the  capacity  of  the 
EU to absorb new member states. Experience, 
including the drawn-out and contested process 
of  EU  enlargement  to  the  Western  Balkans, 
shows  that  mutual  pledges  are  not  sufficient. 
Besides,  Russia’s  aggression  has  made  the 
integration  of  Ukraine  and  of  the  entire 
region into the EU even more urgent, but also 
more  challenging.9  The  prospect  of  fast-track 
accession,  while  legally  possible,  is  all  but 
certain  to  run  into  political  obstacles  within 
both the EU and the candidate countries.10 The 
significant  difficulties  that  the  next  phase  of 
EU  enlargement  may  encounter  suggest  that 
the EPC could be instrumental as an additional 
layer of political fabric connecting EU member 
states and candidate countries.11 

3.2 The EPC and the future of the European 
security order

The  EPC  was  initially  conceived  of  as  a 
community  of  democracies;  it  aimed  to  bring 
together European states that shared common 
values  on  an  equal  footing.12  Nevertheless, 
as  Russia’s  aggression  directly  or  indirectly 
threatened all countries in Europe, geopolitical 
considerations  prevailed,  resulting 
in  the 
involvement of as wide a range of countries as 
possible.  The  success  of  the  Prague  meeting 
largely  rested  on  its  symbolic  value,  sending 
a strong message of unity in condemnation of 
Russia’s war in Ukraine. The political aim of the 
EPC was clearly to isolate Russia and Belarus, 
the  aggressor  and  its  aide.  For  that  reason, 
no European leader could afford to be absent 
from the summit.13 

Eight  months  on,  the  potential  role  of  the 
EPC  in  strengthening  security  and  stability  in 
Europe can be framed in three main ways. First, 
the  format  can  continue  to  offer  a  platform 
for  pan-European  consultation  on  dealing 
with Russia’s aggression, and for the eventual 
aftermath of the Ukraine war. The EPC would 
help to preserve a common front, address (and 

8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 

Interviews with French government officials, 29 March 2023 and 3 March 2023.
Interview with an expert from a French think tank, 16 February 2023.
Interview with a French government official, 3 March 2023.
Interview with an expert from a Polish think tank, 27 February 2023.
Interviews with a French government official, 3 March 2023, and an expert from a French think tank, 6 March 2023.
Interviews with an expert from a French think tank, 17 February 2023, and a German government official, 2 March 2023.

5

STG | Policy Papers Issue | 2023/11 | May 2023paper  over)  political  differences,  and  shape  a 
common  European  narrative  against  Russia’s 
war.

tangible  deliverables  will  be  one  of  the 
principal criteria in assessing the added value 
of the EPC and in determining its sustainability.

Second, the EPC could be seen as a venue for 
strategic  dialogue  on  Europe’s  political  and 
security agenda beyond the current war. In this 
capacity,  the  EPC  would  promote  exchanges 
but  not  deliver  binding  decisions.  Some  in 
France  maintain  that,  over  the  long-term,  the 
EPC could also be instrumental to structuring 
relations  with  a  post-war  and  post-imperialist 
Russia.14  This  perspective  would  open  the 
issue  of  the  interconnection  of  the  EPC  with 
the Organisation for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE), especially considering that 
this  organisation  is  largely  gridlocked  due  to 
Russia’s destructive actions. 

Third,  the  forum  could  play  a  useful  role  in 
discussions  over  contentious  security  matters 
and  in  promoting  de-confliction  among  its 
members.  An  early  test  was  the  quadrilateral 
meeting that took place at the margins of the 
Prague  Summit  involving  the  Prime  Minister 
of  Armenia  and  the  President  of  Azerbaijan, 
together  with  the  French  President  and  the 
President  of  the  European  Council,  which 
helped  to  create  the  necessary  conditions  to 
deploy a civilian EU mission in Armenia on the 
border  with  Azerbaijan.  An  informal  meeting 
between  the  leaders  of  Armenia  and  Turkey 
in  Prague  provided  further  evidence  of  the 
potential of the EPC as a venue for discreet top-
level encounters that contribute to confidence 
building. Given its wide membership, the EPC 
has the potential to achieve political progress 
on  sensitive  issues  by  convening  the  right 
actors in small formats.15

3.3 The EPC as a platform for differentiated 
cooperation

Besides  contributing  to  strategic  dialogue 
among European leaders, the EPC might play 
a useful role in fostering sectoral cooperation 
between  EU  and  non-EU  countries.  Providing 

14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 

Interview with a French government official, 9 March 2023.
Interview with a German government official, 2 March 2023.
Interview with an expert from a Moldovan think tank, 28 March 2023.
Interview with a French government official, 3 March 2023.
Interview with a French government official, 29 March 2023.
Interview with an expert from a Polish think tank, 27 February 2023.
Interview with a German government official, 2 March 2023.

The  EPC  is  of  course  not  the  only  framework 
takes  place 
through  which  cooperation 
between EU member states and their partners 
in Europe. However, due to its pan-European 
scope,  it  can  provide  a  suitable  venue  for 
undertaking  various  initiatives  in  areas  of 
shared interest, bridging different sub-regional 
projects.16 In defining the areas and modalities 
of  cooperation,  one  of  the  main  questions  is 
whether  these  initiatives  would  necessarily 
involve  all  members,  or  whether  priority 
would  be  given  to  so-called  differentiated 
cooperation  among  sub-sets  of  members.17 
Preliminary  exchanges  among  EPC  members 
suggest that cooperation will likely take place 
within groups or coalitions of states at variable 
geometry.

the  EPC 

As  to  the  concrete  policy  areas  where 
some 
cooperation  could  be  advanced, 
observers and officials consider the security field 
a priority, while respecting the prerogatives of 
NATO. Cyber security could be an area where 
joint efforts would deliver added value, such as 
by  organising  joint  exercises.18  Some  believe 
that  cooperation  could  also  be  fostered  in 
the  defence  industrial  sector.19  Others  deem 
the  security  field  to  be  too  sensitive  to  spur 
cooperation  under 
framework, 
and  point  to  the  potential  for  joint  work  in 
the  fields  of  energy,  connectivity,  climate 
change, the digital and green transitions, and 
telecommunication  networks 
the 
abolition  of  roaming  charges).20  Infrastructure 
development  projects  and  strengthening 
the  security  of  critical  infrastructure  could  be 
suitable  priorities  for  cooperative  action  too. 
Whatever the policy focus, the implementation 
of common projects would depend on funding, 
management, and expertise, all of which points 
to the question of the institutional capacity of 
the EPC.

(namely, 

6

STG | Policy Papers Issue | 2023/11 | May 20234. OPEN QUESTIONS AND POTENTIAL 
CHALLENGES

Ultimately, ‘the EPC will be what it will deliver’.21  
At present, there is no masterplan guiding the 
evolution  of  the  EPC,  with  a  fair  amount  of 
brinkmanship  having  shaped  developments 
so  far.  22  The  key  question  is  whether  the 
EPC  will  remain  a  platform  for  exchange  and 
deliberation,  or  whether  it  should  acquire  a 
policy role and deliver concrete results.

4.1 Flexibility as a strength?

The EPC is today an informal intergovernmental 
forum, which puts its participants on an equal 
footing  irrespective  of  their  membership  to 
the  EU  and  NATO.  All  the  participants  seem 
to  appreciate  the  opportunity  to  meet  face 
to  face,  organise  bilateral  meetings  on  the 
margins,  and  engage  in  strategic  exchanges 
on issues of common concern.

no 

and 

The  EPC  has  no  secretariat,  no  institutional 
decision-making 
framework, 
mechanism.  EPC  summits  do  not  produce 
political  declarations  or  conclusions.  The 
presidency  rotates  among  member  countries, 
alternating  between  EU  members  and  non-
members  alike.  The  country  holding  the 
presidency  proposes  the  agenda  of  the 
summits.  Nothing  is  set  in  stone,  neither 
membership 
(with  current  discussions  on 
potentially  expanding  membership  to  non-
European  EU  neighbours),  nor  the  pace  of 
the  meetings  (which,  some  argue,  should  be 
reduced from two to one per year)23. Flexibility 
is  what  distinguishes  the  EPC  from  other 
formats  and,  according  to  many  participants, 
this feature should be safeguarded.24 In short, 
the EPC would replicate some of the working 
methods of other informal gatherings such as 
the G7 and the G20.25

While  highly  valued  by  participants,  however, 
is  doubtful  that  flexible  agendas  and 
it 
informal  proceedings  offer  a  viable  basis  to 
generate  concrete  deliverables.26  Priorities 

on  the  agenda  for  the  forthcoming  Chisinau 
Summit  include  the  need  to  strengthen  the 
fight  against  cyber  threats,  and  expanding 
education  programmes.  However,  if  the  EPC 
truly hopes to have any impact on these issues, 
then it needs to develop the capacity for policy 
coordination and implementation.

4.2 What role, if any, is there for the EU and 
its institutions?

The  EU  is  one  of  the  parties  involved  in  the 
EPC but does not play a leading role therein. 
Part  of  the  attraction  of  the  project  for  non-
EU  countries,  such  as  the  UK,  Switzerland, 
and  Turkey,  stems  precisely  from  the  fact 
that  EU  institutions  are  present  but  are  not 
central.27 At a technical level, however, if and 
when  participating  countries  decide  that  the 
EPC  should  undertake  policy  initiatives,  the 
engagement,  resources,  and  expertise  of  EU 
institutions would be of great help. 

Mobilising  funding  from  European  financial 
institutions,  such  as  the  European  Bank  for 
Reconstruction  and  Development  (EBRD)  and 
the European Investment Bank (EIB), to support 
projects is one of the options currently being 
discussed by EPC members.28 An alternative or 
complementary  option  could  be  the  creation 
of ad hoc intergovernmental funds. Extending 
the  application  of  EU  programmes,  such  as 
Erasmus, to non-EU members of the EPC, would 
of  course  require  EU  institutions  and  funding 
to  play  a  leading  role.  Another  case  in  point 
would  be  the  contribution  that  the  European 
Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) could 
bring to joint cybersecurity exercises under the 
EPC framework.

4.3 Challenges to EPC sustainability

Looking  ahead,  the  central  challenge  for  the 
EPC  is  sustainability.  The  political  context 
of  European  unity  in  the  face  of  Russia’s 
aggression  in  Ukraine  was  central  to  the 
success  of  the  Prague  Summit.  That  said,  the 
legitimacy of the EPC cannot flow indefinitely 

21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 

Interview with an expert from a French think tank, 6 March 2023.
Interview with a German government official, 2 March 2023.
Interview with a German government official, 31 March 2023.
Interviews with an expert from a Moldovan think tank, 28 March 2023, and a German government official, 31 March 2023.
Interview with a German government official, 31 March 2023.
Interview with an expert from a French think tank, 6 March 2023.
Interview with an expert from a French think tank, 17 February 2023.
Interviews with a researcher from a French institute, 6 February 2023, and a French government official, 29 March 2023.

7

STG | Policy Papers Issue | 2023/11 | May 2023from the circumstances created by the war. The EPC will need to find roles that it can fulfil in 
ways that meet the interests of its members. Demonstrating and sustaining the added value of 
the format, however, requires tackling various challenges. First, the diversity of members makes 
it harder to identify common priorities.29 Lack of leadership is another risk that could affect the 
EPC. France has sought to relinquish the leading role that it played in 2022 as Paris does not 
want the EPC to be perceived as a French product. Nevertheless, most of the other participants 
are less invested in the future of the EPC and seem comfortable to simply re-enact the Prague 
Summit.30  Finally,  the  articulation  of  the  EPC’s  mandate  with  that  of  existing  organisations  in 
Europe, such as the EU, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and NATO needs to be defined to 
foster possible cooperation with these bodies, while excluding duplication.

5. CONCLUSIONS: THE WAY TO CHISINAU

Like the first Summit in Prague, the forthcoming meeting in Chisinau bears considerable political 
and  symbolic  significance.  The  meeting  of  47  leaders  will  once  again  display  European  unity 
in the face of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and will send a strong message of solidarity 
to Moldova - a country vulnerable to the threats stemming from Russia. However, the Chisinau 
Summit also sets a demanding test for the EPC. The format cannot thrive if it does not deliver 
added value to its members. The challenge is to define a clear sense of purpose for the EPC so 
that the forum can find its proper place in the European institutional landscape and contribute to 
the construction of a new, pan-European cooperative and security architecture.

The  EPC  can  grow  in  two  non-mutually  exclusive  directions.  Primarily  established  in  response 
to the pressing need to cope with war in Europe, the EPC may continue to evolve as a venue 
for strategic dialogue and political crisis management, contributing to convergence among its 
members, and strengthening stability in Europe. The EPC would thereby play a role in creating 
a  more  coordinated  Europe,  reinforcing  the  continent’s  resilience  against  Russia’s  attempts  to 
divide  it.  From  this  perspective,  the  EPC  would  focus  on  cooperation  in  the  field  of  energy 
security, the fight against cybercrime, and the protection of critical infrastructure. On the second 
path, these activities could contribute to the evolution of the EPC into a platform for differentiated 
cooperation among its member states, which may work together in fields beyond the security 
dimension, such as in education, mobility, connectivity, and innovation.

29 
30 

Interview with a German government official, 2 March 2023.
Interviews with a French expert, 23 February 2023, and an expert from a German think tank, 3 March 2023.

8

STG | Policy Papers Issue | 2023/11 | May 2023FURTHER READING

•  Bozo, Frédéric (2008), “The Failure of a Grand Design: Mitterrand’s European Confederation, 

1989-1991”, Contemporary European History, Vol.17, No 3, August, pp. 391-412.

•  Chopin,  Thierry,  Macek,  Lukáš  and  Maillard  Sébastien  (2022),  “The  European  Political 
Community. A new anchoring to the European Union”, Brief, Paris: Jacques Delors Institute, 
31  May.  Available  at:  https://institutdelors.eu/en/publications/la-communaute-politique-
europeenne/

•  Emerson, Michael and Blockmans, Steven (2022), “The New Agenda for the EU’s Enlargement 
and  Neighbourhood  Policies”,  Policy  Insight  No  2022-20,  CEPS,  9  June.  Available  at: 
https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/the-new-agenda-for-the-eus-enlargement-and-
neighbourhood-policies/

•  Grant, Charles (2022), “Macron is serious about the ‘European Political community’”, Insight, 
Centre  for  European  Reform,  1  August.  Available  at:  https://www.cer.eu/insights/macron-
serious-about-european-political-community

•  Kozioł, Aleksandra and Maslanka, Łukasz (2022), “European Political Community Meets for 
the First Time”, The Polish Institute of International Affairs, 7 October. Available at: https://
www.pism.pl/publications/european-political-community-meets-for-the-first-time

•  Letta,  Enrico  (2022),  “Europe  of  the  Seven  Unions”,  Working  Paper,  Groupes  d’Etudes 
Géopolitiques, May. Available at: https://geopolitique.eu/en/2022/05/09/the-europe-of-the-
seven-unions/

•  Lippert, Barbara (2022), “European Summit in Prague Sets agenda and Isolates Moscow”, 
Point of View, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 17 October. Available at: https://www.swp-
berlin.org/publikation/european-summit-in-prague-sets-agenda-and-isolates-moscow

•  Mayer, C. Franz, Pisani-Ferry, Jean, Schwarzer, Daniela and Vallee, Shahin (2022), “Enlarging 
and deepening: giving substance to the European Political Community”, Policy Contribution 
15/2022,  Bruegel.  Available  at:  https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/russias-war-
ukraine-rethinking-eus-eastern-enlargement-and-neighborhood

•  Meister,  Stefan,  Nič,  Milan,  Kirova,  Iskra  and  Blockmans,  Steven  (2023),  “Russia’s  War  in 
Ukraine: Rethinking the EU’s Eastern Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy”, DGAP Report 
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rethinking-eus-eastern-enlargement-and-neighborhood

•  Pierini,  Marc  (2022),  “Five  Takeaways  From  the  European  Political  Community  Summit”, 
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•  Parkes, Roderick and Nič, Milan (2022), “Analysis of the European Political Community Misses 
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•  Parmentier, Florent and Marciacq, Florent (2022), “Quelle ‘Communauté politique européenne’ 
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•  Youngs,  Richard  (2022),  “Ukraine’s  EU  Membership  and  the  Geostrategy  of  Democratic 
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pub-86771

9

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