REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Long-term forecast of future inflows and outflows of the EU budget (2024-2028)
Date: 2023-06-20
Institutions: Directorate-General for Budget, European Commission
Subjects: EU budget, EU expenditure, Member States' contribution, budget policy, budgetary resources, long-term forecast, multiannual financial framework, own resources

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 20.6.2023  COM(2023) 390 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Long-term forecast of future inflows and outflows of the EU budget (2024-2028) {SWD(2023) 218 final}  
 
 
Table of Contents 

TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................................................................................... 1 
Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 2 

1. 

2. 

Forecast of outflows of the EU budget 2024-2028............................................................................................................ 2 

2.1. 

2.2. 

2.3. 

2.4. 

2.5. 

3. 

4. 

Payments in relation to the commitments of the 2021-2027 MFF .......................................................................... 4 

Payments for the completion of pre-2021 commitments ............................................................................................... 6 

Decommitments .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 7 

NextGenerationEU ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 8 

Evolution of the level of outstanding commitments ............................................................................................................ 9 

Forecast of inflows of the EU budget 2024-2027 ............................................................................................................ 10 

Conclusions ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 12 

Annex II – Results of the forecast ............................................................................................................................................................... 13 

Table 1.1 – Long-term forecast of future outflows over 2024-2028 for the MFF .......................................................................... 13 

Table 1.2 – Payments in relation to the commitments of the 2021-2027 MFF............................................................................... 14 

Table 1.3 – Payments for the completion of pre-2021 commitments ............................................................................... 15 

Table 2 – Forecast decommitments 2024-2027 .............................................................................................................................. 16 

Table 3 – Long-term forecast of outflows for NextGenerationEU ......................................................................................... 17 

Table 4 – Change in the total outstanding commitments from 2024 to 2027 ............................................................ 18 

Table 5 – Long-term forecast of future inflows of the EU budget over 2024-2027 ................................................ 19 

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1.  Introduction 

This  report  projects  the  inflows  and  outflows  of  the  EU  budget  for  the  next  five  years  in  accordance  with  Article 
247(1)(c) of the Financial Regulationi.  This thirdii edition forecast the revenue and expenditure  iii stemming from the 
Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021-2027 and NextGenerationEUiv over the period 2024-2028v.  

Payments from the EU budget follow commitments. The estimates for payments presented in this report are based 
on the commitment appropriations included in the financial programming accompanying the Draft Budget 2024 (DB 
2024)vi, which incorporates the programme-specific adjustments under Article 5 of the MFF Regulationvii as well as 
re-use  of  decommitments  under  Article  15(3)viii  of  the  Financial  Regulation.  As  regards  revenue,  the  forecast  is 
based on the revenue system of the Own Resources Decisionix. The revenue projections also consider the Agreement 
on the withdrawal of the  United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European  Union and the 
European Atomic Energy Communityx (‘Withdrawal Agreement’). 

Together with the MFF estimates, this forecast projects payments on all programmes under NextGenerationEU. This 
expenditure, additional to the spending under the MFF, is financed by  revenue proceeds from borrowing operations 
on the capital markets. 

This forecast estimates the outstanding payments resulting from commitments made in programmes from the MFF 
2021-2027  and  earlier,  while  payments  related  to  post-2027  MFF  programmes  are  outside  of  the  scope  of  this 
forecast.  The  report  does  not  project  scenarios  for  the  financing  costs  of  NextGenerationEU  and  considers  the 
amounts as per financial programming. 

2.   Forecast of outflows of the EU budget 

2024-2028 

Over the period 2024-2028, payments are estimated at EUR 1 042 billion, including EUR 824 billion under the MFF 
payment ceiling and EUR 216 billion from NextGenerationEU non-repayable support.  

The forecast includes the future programme-specific adjustments based on Article 5 of the MFF Regulation and the 
re-use of decommitments under Article 15(3) of the Financial Regulation for the years 2025-2027. The programme-
specific  adjustments  are  expected  to  result  in  an  automatic  upward  adjustment  of  the  MFF  ceilings  for 
commitments and payments of EUR 12.6 billion in the period 2022-2027xi. The exact annual adjustment will depend 
on the revenue from competition fines in the previous year for an overall amount of EUR 11 billion (in 2018 prices) 
by 2027. 

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Chart 1 - Payments forecast by category 

Payments from the EU budget are not uniformly distributed across the period 2024-2028. The forecast depends on 
the evolution of: 1) the payments from spending programmes financed by the MFF 2021-2027 (75% of the total 
payments),  2) the disbursements from NextGenerationEU (21% of the  payments), and 3) the  payments  stemming 
from  outstanding  commitments  of  the  MFF  2014-2020  and  earlier  (4%  of  the  payments).  The  estimated  annual 
average of the outflows of the EU budget is EUR 208 billion, with EUR 43 billion financed by borrowing on the capital 
markets  for  NextGenerationEU  programmes.  The  forecast  for  2028  correspond  to  the  outstanding  payments 
resulting from commitments made in programmes from the MFF 2021-2027 and earlier, while payments related to 
post-2027 MFF programmes are outside of the scope of this forecast. 

Overall payments are expected to decline in 2025 and to increase in 2026. The projections for the payments from 
MFF  2021-2027  show  a  gradual  increase  in  years  2025-2026  and  smaller  in  the  next  one,  whereas 
NextGenerationEU payments are expected to decline in 2025 and 2026 compared to 2024. With the finalisation of 
NextGenerationEU implementation in 2026, the bulk of payments in the last two forecast years correspond to the 
2021-2027 MFF programmes. 

In  relation  to  the  expenditure  under  the  MFF  2021-2027  and  its  predecessors,  the  annual  average  payments 
forecast is EUR 165 billion, with years 2024, 2025 and 2028 below this figure and years 2026 and 2027 above this 
figure. Albeit more accentuated given more important implementation delays, this pattern was observed in previous 
MFFs due to the progressive reduction of payments and closure of the previous programming period and the phase-
in of new programmes reaching their cruising speed only in the second half of the MFF. 

The forecast margin for 2024-2027 defined as the difference between the forecast payments under the MFF ceiling 
and the payment ceiling set in the technical annual adjustment for 2024 (TAJU 2024) is estimated at EUR 11 billion. 
In 2024 and 2025, the annual margin is projected at EUR 31 billion and EUR 9 billion respectively, while the forecast 
margins  for  2026  and  2027  are  negative,  with  the  payments  exceeding  the  ceiling  by  an  estimated  amount  of 
EUR 16  billion  and  EUR  12  billion.  The  existence  of  positive  or  negative  margins  are  the  consequence  of  a  stable 
payment ceiling in real terms and the variable path of the programmes under the EU budget, mainly driven by the 
implementation  of  cohesion  policy.  Pursuant  to  the  automatic  adjustment  mechanism  of  the  Single  Margin 
Instrument  under  Article  11(1)(b)  of  the  MFF  Regulation,  as of  2022  the  unspent  amounts  in  a  year increase  the 
future annual ceilings. Therefore, the positive margins prior to 2024 increase the ceilings in 2025-2027 within the 

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limits set by Article 11(3) of the MFF Regulation. Considering these adjustments as well as the future programme-
specific  adjustment  of  Article 5  of  the  MFF  Regulation  (which  will  increase  the  payment  ceilings  by  an  additional 
EUR 7.7 billion), the MFF 2021-2027 payment ceiling is expected to cater for the total expected payments. However, 
in 2026 the maximum payment ceiling could be exceeded by EUR 0.8 billion, which would need to be paid under the 
payment ceiling of 2027. This is  mostly driven  by the forecast payments pattern for  cohesion  programmes  which 
will accelerate in that year and the peak reached in the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) 
due  to  the  overlap  between  the  finalisation  of  the  programmes  from  2014-2022  and  the  cruising  speed  of  the 
current MFF. An acceleration in payments of cohesion programmes beyond the central forecast scenario assumed in 
this report could lead to a larger breach of the maximum payment ceiling in that year (see sections 2.1 and 2.3).  

Chart 2 - Payments forecast vs. MFF payment ceiling for the period 2024-2027 

2.1.  Payments in relation to the commitments of the 2021-2027 MFF 

Cohesion and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) represent more than half of  the projected payments stemming 
from the 2021-2027 MFF. The implementation of these two policies largely drives the estimates of the long-term 
payment forecast. 

Heading 2a - Cohesion policy 

After  the  approval  of  all  the  programmes  by  the  end  of  2022,  the  implementation  of  the  2021-2027  cohesion 
programmes  started  last  year  with  the  disbursement  of  the  pre-financing  for  2021  and  2022,  as  well  as  the 
additional pre-financing for FAST-CARE. In 2023 and 2024, further pre-financing and first interim payments will be 
disbursed, though at slower pace than in the previous programming period, which is explained mainly by the delayed 
programming as well as national authorities’ efforts to finalise the  2014-2020 programmes and to speed  up the 
implementation  of  NextGenerationEU.  Compared  to  the  previous  programming  period,  the  accumulation  of  delays 
represents a one-year implementation gap. 

As in the previous report, this forecast proposes three scenarios for the implementation of cohesion programmes. 
Taking into account the latest information available on implementation, it is assumed that Member States will speed 
up implementation in 2025 and 2026, although to a different extent, to catch-up the accumulated delays and thus 

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mitigate  the  risk  of  decommitments.  The  central  scenario  assumes  that  Member  States  will  accelerate 
implementation in 2025, reaching the implementation pace of the MFF 2014-2020 in the years 2026 and 2027 and 
the full cruising speed from 2028 onwards. The upside scenario projects the implementation in 2025 and 2026 as 
in the MFF 2014-2020 and the full cruising speed in the following years.  The  downside scenario assumes that 
Member States do not manage to close the one-year delay during the forecast period. 

These  three  scenarios  assume  that  Member  States  will  use  all  the  available  possibilities  to  avoid 
decommitments  given  the  higher  risks  compared  to  last  year’s  report.  The  forecast  projects  that  from  2025 
onwards, the  deadline  for  the  2022  commitments,  Member States will  submit  substantial  payment  claims  by  the 
end of the year to be processed in the following one. This submission of payment claims would reduce the amount 
of decommitments in this same year and as a result only 20% of the expected decommitments materialises. The 
remaining 80% is assumed to be recovered as internal assigned revenue in equal amounts in the next two years. 

The forecast  payments for the 2021-2027  cohesion policy programmes  under the  central scenario amount to 
EUR 220 billion for the period 2024-2028, while last year’s forecast for the period 2023-2027 was EUR 177 billion. 
If this central scenario is projected for the years 2023-2027 to provide an equivalent comparison with last year’s 
forecast, payments would amount to EUR 165 billion, confirming delayed implementation. The year 2026 shows the 
impact of the late submission of payment claims.  

Despite  these  assumptions,  the  three  forecast  scenarios  show  that  substantial  decommitments  could  occur  as  of 
2025  unless  Member  States  undertake  additional  efforts  to  catch  up  with  the  one-year  implementation  gap  [see 
section  2.3  on  decommitments].  To  avoid  this  risk,  Member  States  would  need  to  further  increase  efforts  to 
implement in the next years at a much faster pace than in the period 2014-2020.  

Chart 3 - Payments forecast for Heading 2a (2021-2027 MFF commitments), and upside and downside 
scenarios 

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Heading 3 - Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Just Transition Fund  

The payments forecast for the Pillar I of the CAP, market-related expenditure and direct payments, amounts to EUR 
163 billion over 2024-2027, reflecting the most recent financial programming. 

Following  the  submission  and  approval  of  all  the  CAP  Strategic  Plans,  the  implementation  of  Pillar  II  under  the 
2023-2027  CAP  the  EAFRD  -  started  on  time.  The  transitional  provisions  extending  the  2014-2020  programmes 
allowed the continuation of the implementation in 2021 and 2022.  

The  forecast  of  payments  stemming  from  the  MFF  2021-2027  includes  the  payments  from  the  2023-2027  CAP 
Plans  as  well  as  those  linked  to  the  extension  to  2021  and  2022  (see  Point  2.2.  Payments  on  pre-2021 
commitments)  that  will  be  completed  by  2026.  This  forecast  also  considers  the  transfers  between  pillars  of  the 
Common Agricultural Policy communicated by Member Statesxii, which resulted in a net transfer of EUR 4.8  billion 
from Pillar I (EAGF) to Pillar II (EAFRD) for the years 2024-2027. 

With  the  2014-2022  EAFRD  programmes  continuing  their  course  and  the  implementation  of  the  new  CAP  plans 
timely starting, the payments are projected to run steadily in the coming years, peaking in 2026. This is due to the 
overlap of outstanding payments from the programmes 2014-2020 and the transitional period years 2021-2022, 
both working under N+3 decommitment rule, together with the phasing-in of the 2023-2027 CAP Plans which follow 
a N+2 decommitment rule.  

No payments under the MFF ceilings are planned for the Just Transition Fund in the budget 2023 and in the Draft 
Budget 2024 as priority is given to the use of NextGenerationEU funding available until 2026. The assumption under 
this forecast is that payments will start in 2025 to avoid decommitments from 2022 commitments.   

Other programmes and headings 

The  payment  forecast  is  increased  compared  to  last  year,  notably  in  Heading  1  –  Single  Market,  Innovation  and 
Digital –, Heading 5  – Security and Defence  –, and Heading 6  – Neighbourhood and the World. This is due to the 
improved  implementation  forecast,  even  though  the  speed  of  implementation  has  slightly  decreased.  Catch-up  is 
expected in 2026. 

2.2.  Payments for the completion of pre-2021 commitments 

The  payments  of  pre-2021  commitments  (RAL  for  reste  à  liquider)  is  forecast  at  EUR  47.8  billion  for  the  period 
2024-2028. 

Heading 2a – Cohesion policy 

Most payments on pre-2021 commitments (37%) relate to the cohesion policy programmes, which are running at 
cruising  speed.  The  payment  projections  are  based  on  the  latest  Member  States’  forecast  (January  2023)  and 
information  on  the  implementation  on  the  ground.  With  the  Cohesion’s  Action  for  Refugees in  Europe  (CARE),  and 
SAFExiii, Member States are expected to speed up implementation of the funds under the 2014-2020 period.  

The  last  accounting  year  for  the  European  Structural  and  Investment  (ESI)  funds  ends  in  June  2024,  with  most 
payments  projected  by  end-2023.  Limited  payments  are  expected  after  2024,  considering  the  retention  rate  and 
pre-financing clearance.  

6 

 
Heading 3 - Common Agricultural Policy  

As in the previous forecast, the completion of the 2014-2022 operational rural development programmes is 
expected for 2026, with most of the interim payments to be paid in 2025. 

Other programmes and headings 

Most  of  the  outstanding  payments  for  the  rest  of  the  budget  are  equally  divided  by  Heading  1  –  Single  Market, 
Innovation and Digital – and Heading 6 – Neighbourhood and the World. While completion under Heading 1 is now 
expected earlier than in previous estimations, the projects under Heading 6 are now expected to be more backloaded 
towards 2025-2027. 

2.3.  Decommitments 

The  de-commitments’  forecast  stemming  from  the  programmes  of  the  current  and  prior  MFFs  over  2024-2027 
stands  at  EUR  8.1  billion,  increasing  compared  to  last  year’s  forecast  projections  for  the  years  2023-2027  and 
showing substantial changes in the composition. The increase is mostly driven by the cohesion programmes under 
the current MFF.  

Heading 2a – Cohesion policy 

The amounts at risk of de-commitments for the completion of the programmes 2014-2020 is reduced compared to 
the  previous  forecast  due  to  the  substantial  flexibilities  facilitating  the  full  absorption  of  Cohesion  Funds  and 
minimising the risk of decommitments at closure of the programmes. 

By contrast, cohesion programmes for the period 2021-2027 are forecast to face important risks from 2025 when 
the  decommitment  targets  for  the  commitments  made  in  2022  and  2023  apply.  It  is  estimated  that  the  rate  of 
submission  of  payment  claims  will  trail  behind  that  of  2014-2020  due  to  the  delay  in  the  approval  of  the 
programmes and the low uptake in the budget 2023 and the Draft Budget 2024. The de-commitment risk could only 
decrease if implementation accelerates in 2025 and 2026 beyond the central scenario. However, if this acceleration 
does not materialise and the implementation pattern remains close to the downside scenario, the amounts at risk of 
decommitment would be substantially larger.  Under this scenario, in which Member States are unable to catch-up 
with the one-year delay, an important share of the re-programmed 2021 commitments could be lost. Furthermore, 
if decommitments were not  reduced as described in  point 2.1 and assumed  for the three scenarios, the  projected 
amount of decommitments for Cohesion policy programmes would multiply by 5 [see Table 2].     

Heading 3 - Common Agricultural Policy and Just Transition Fund  

The forecast for decommitments of the programmes 2014-2022 of the EAFRD is in line with the results of last year. 
They are expected at closure of the programmes in 2026, improving the 2007-2013 outcome significantly. If any, 
decommitments  for  the  2023-2027  CAP  Strategic  Plans  would  be  assumed  at  closure  (i.e.,  towards  2029-2030), 
which are outside the scope of this report.  

As in the case of the Cohesion Funds, the delay in the approval of the relevant legal acts and programmes of the 
Just  Transition  Fund  together  with  the  deferral  in  the  implementation  put  important  amounts  at  risk  of 
decommitments as of 2025 due to the time limit for the commitments made in years 2022 and 2023. Following the 

7 

 
same assumptions as for the other Cohesion programmes described in point 2.1 Member States need to speed up 
the implementation in 2025 and 2026 to avoid decommitments that could occur as of 2025.  

Other programmes and headings 

For the programmes directly managed by the Commission, the decommitments’ forecast is built on the most recent 
project-level information. As in the previous report, the projections for the decommitments related to the MFF 2021-
2027  programmes  are  based  on  the  decommitment  rates  of  the  predecessor  programmes.  The  exact  year  of 
decommitment  would  depend  on  the  closure  of  individual  projects  and  actions  that  cannot  be  forecast  with 
precision. 

2.4.    NextGenerationEU 

NextGenerationEU is a temporary emergency instrument for crisis response, recovery, and resilience measures. The 
non-repayable  part  of  NextGenerationEU  constitutes  external  assigned  revenue  and  is  used  to  speedily  support 
reform  and  investment  priorities  –  in  particular  through  the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  (RRF)–  and  to 
reinforce  a  number  of  key  programmes  for  the  recovery.  To  present  the  impact  of  NextGenerationEU  in  a 
transparent  manner,  the  estimates  of  the  expected  implementation  of  the  external  assigned  revenue  are  drawn 
separately  for  each  programme  (see  Table 3).  The  forecast  is  established  based  on  the  annual  commitment 
instalments provided in the financial programming accompanying the Draft Budget 2024. 

The  centrepiece  of  NextGenerationEU  is  the  RRF,  which  accounts  for  80%  of  the  non-repayable  allocationsxiv 
NextGenerationEU outflows are largely determined by the pace of disbursements for the RRF. The Facility entered 
the  implementation  phase,  progressing  according  to  the  timeline  of  reforms  and  investments  set  by  the  Member 
States in their plans. 

As  of  May  2023,  all  27  Member  States  have  adopted  national  Recovery  and  Resilience  Plans  (RRPs).  Twenty-two 
RRPs  were  adopted  in  2021,  triggering  pre-financing  payments  and  the  signature  of  the  financing  and  loan 
agreements, and the remaining five in 2022. Some plans were amended in 2023 to take the updated allocation into 
account  (in  accordance  with  Article  11  of  the  RRF  Regulation).  In  total,  EUR 153.4 billion  was  disbursed 
(EUR 106.3 billion  in  non-repayable  support  and  EUR 47.1 billion  in  repayable  support  from  loans)  out  of  around 
EUR 500 billion in committed RRF grants and loans. This includes EUR 56.5 billion in pre-financing. Depending on the 
progress in implementation of the national RRPs, RRF annual grant disbursements are expected to reach a level of 
EUR 96 billion  in  2024,  after  which  it  is  forecast  to  decline  to  EUR 39 billion  in  2025  before  increasing  again  to 
around  EUR 47 billion  in  2026.  Compared  to  last  year’s  forecast,  the  profile  for  disbursements  is  a  bit  less 
frontloaded  as  some  implementation  delays  occurred  related  to  complex  investments  and  reforms.  There  are  no 
decommitments estimated in this forecast. 

As stipulated in the RRF Regulation, the national RRPs will be modified over the course of 2023 to take the updated 
maximum  financial  contribution  into  account.  The  update  of  the  plans  will  also  include  the  dedicated  REPowerEU 
chapters, with the objective to become more energy independent from Russia and hence foster the energy transition 
towards sustainable renewable energy sources. 

Member  States  by  far  and  large  prioritised  the  RRPs  on  using  non-repayable  support  to  finance  investments  and 
reforms.  Taking  the  level  and  speed  of  loan  commitments  into  account,  this  implies  that  EUR 225 billion  of  loan 
support is available for Member States for commitment in 2023. 10 Member States have expressed an interest in 
(additional) RRF loans for a total of around EUR 145 billion, in line with Article 14(6) of the amended RRF Regulation. 
Member States have until 31 august 2023 to request such loan support. xv 

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REACT-EU is the second largest instrument of NextGenerationEU, representing 12% of the non-repayable support 
and distributing additional resources in 2021 and 2022 through some of the existing cohesion policy funds (ERDF 
and ESF).  REACT-EU  commitments took  place  over  2021-2022.  Interim and  final  payments  are  concentrated  over 
2022-2024,  in  line  with  REACT-EU  objectives  to  speed  up  the  delivery  by  using  already  existing  programmes  and 
providing  full  flexibility  of  the  implementation  rules.  Compared  to  last  year’s  forecast,  REACT-EU  payments  under 
ESF are advanced to 2023 to cater for the increased payment needs following additional resources transferred from 
ERDF  to  ESF  in  2022  but  also  in  line  with  the  short-term  nature  of  the  ESF  measures.  The  REACT-EU  payments 
under ERDF are expected to increase in 2024 compared to last year’s forecast as due to the impact of higher energy 
costs and raw materials shortages. 

Member States can use funding under REACT-EU to address refugee flows following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. 
To alleviate the pressure on  national budgets and allow faster and easier implementation of measures related to 
the  integration  of  third  country  nationals,  the  Commission  proposed  increased  pre-financing  and  simplified  cost 
options in 2022xvi. Some limited closure payments under both the ESF and ERDF are expected by the end of 2025. 

The other five  programmes  supported through  NextGenerationEU take  up the remaining  8% of the non-repayable 
allocation. The forecast of payments considers the experience with predecessor programmes, taking into account the 
shorter cycle of commitments and the focus on immediate recovery needs. The  Just  Transition Fund  (JTF)  has 
been affected by the delays in the adoption of the MFF and the programme-specific legislation. By end of 2022, all 
JTF submitted programmes were adopted (all Member States, except for Bulgaria, which has not yet submitted its 
JTF  programme).  The  implementation  phase  started  directly  after  the  adoption  of  the  programmes,  with  all 
disbursements projected over 2023-2026. For InvestEU, the forecast reflects the expected provisioning schedule of 
the budgetary guarantee, expenditure for the advisory hub and support expenses. 

2.5.    Evolution of the level of outstanding commitments 

The total RAL from the 2021-2027 and previous MFFs is expected to increase gradually over the period 2024-2027, 
from  EUR  274  billion  to  EUR  322  billion.  With  Cohesion  accounting  for  a  large  share,  the  implementation  of  this 
policy  under  the  N+3  decommitment  rule  will  determine  the  overall  evolution  in  the  stock  of  outstanding 
commitments,    with  the  backload  of  payments  towards  the  end  of  the  MFF  and  after  (see  point  2.1).  As  for 
NextGenerationEU, the RAL will be progressively settled until the end of 2026 when all the payments will need to be 
completed. 

The  forecast  for  the  evolution  of  RAL  stemming  from  the  2021-2027  and  previous  MFFs  (excluding 
NextGenerationEU) as a share of the EU-27 GNI would decline from 1.8% to 1.6% in 2027, which is explained by the 
increase in the RAL that it is compensated by the growth of the EU-27 GNI. The projections for the year 2028 are 
not considered since this forecast does not project new commitments post-2027.  

9 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart  4  –  Evolution  of  the  level  of  outstanding  commitments  (RAL)  over  2024-2027,  measured  in 
percentage of the Union’s Gross National Income 

3.  Forecast of inflows of the EU budget 2024-

2027 

The EU budget is financed by own resources and other revenue. In addition, the Union is empowered to borrow funds 
to  finance  NextGenerationEU.  The  Commission  mobilises  the  funds  through  operations  on  international  capital 
markets, in line with the financing needs of NextGenerationEU’s spending programmes (see point 2.4). To this end, 
the  Commission  follows  a  diversified  funding  strategyxvii  and, as  part  of  this  strategy,  publishes annual  borrowing 
decisions  and  six-monthly  funding  plans.  The  present  forecast  focuses  on  the  revenue  necessary  to  finance  the 
budget expenditure within the MFF. 

The own resources needed to finance the budget is determined by total expenditure less ‘other revenue’. Accordingly, 
the forecast of the EU budget revenue for 2024-2027 is based on the principle that expenditure must be matched 
by revenue; therefore, total revenue equals total expenditure. 

Since  2021,  in  line  with  the  Withdrawal  Agreement  (part  V),  the  United  Kingdom  contributes  to  the  EU  budget  in 
relation to outstanding commitments of previous financial frameworks. This includes the RAL at the end of 2020, as 
well  as  pensions  and  other  liabilities  laid  down  in  the  financial  settlement.  The  United  Kingdom’s  contribution 
constitutes ‘other revenue’ of the EU budget and is not part of the Union’s own resources. It will progressively phase-
out as the outstanding commitments will be settled. 

Other  miscellaneous  revenue  not  forming  part  of  the  Union’s  own  resources  are  assumed  to  remain  nominally 
constant at the level of the 2024 Draft Budget. 

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Own  resources  –  national  contributions  and  customs duties  –  account  for  most  of  the  revenue  needed  to  finance 
budget expenditure. The projections are based on the Own Resources Decision in forcexviii. They do not consider the 
Commission’s  proposals on new own  resources of 20 June 2023.  On average for the  period 2024-2027, national 
contributions  are  projected  at  EUR 144 billion  per  year  or  0.76%  of  the  EU’s  Gross  National  Income.  Mainly  the 
spending  cycle  and  to  a  lesser  extent  the  phasing  out  of  the  United  Kingdom  contribution  determine  the 
development  of  national  contributions  over  the  forecast  period.  Due  to  the  delayed  implementation  of  important 
spending  programmes, national contributions  remain at a comparatively low level in 2024.  Increasing expenditure 
from accelerated programme implementation and the United Kingdom’s declining contribution to the RAL will lead to 
increasing national contributions in 2025 and 2026. The contributions are forecast to remain largely stable in 2027. 

Chart 5 - Revenue forecast for financing the MFF 2024-2027 

In any given year, the total own resources collected by the Union may not exceed the own resources ceiling set in 
the  Own  Resources  Decision  of  1.40%  of  Gross  National  Income  of  the  EU  Member  States,  with  an  additional 
temporary  increase  of  0.6%  of  EU  GNI  for  covering  all  liabilities  of  the  Union  from  the  borrowing  on  the  capital 
markets to fund NextGenerationEU. While own resources are projected to grow in 2025 and 2026, to then stabilise 
in 2027, the available margin under the own resources celling (so-called headroom) is expected to remain largely 
stable  as  the  Union’s  Gross  National  Income  is  expected  to  increase  gradually  over  the  reference  periodxix.  The 
headroom  stands  on  average  at  EUR  207  billion  over  the  period,  of  which  EUR 113  billion  for  the  increase  of 
NextGenerationEU.  

The  EU  budget  provides  for  the  payments  of  interests  on  the  funds  borrowed  and  allocated  to  non-repayable 
support  under  NextGenerationEU  since  borrowing  started  in  2021.  The  own  resources  necessary  to  finance  those 
costs are counted within the temporary increase of 0.6% of EU GNI of the own resources ceiling. The planned costs 
follow a backloaded profile to reflect the progressive rollout of borrowing. At the same time, there are uncertainties 
related to the financing cost of NGEU in light of the rapid and substantial increase of interest rates on the financial 
markets since December 2021. 

11 

 
 
4.  Conclusions 

The present forecast is drawn up in a context of high uncertainty due to the geopolitical and economic 
instability resulting from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The initiatives put forward to support 
Member States, third countries and specific sectors accelerated payments for the outstanding and new programmes, 
while external financing instruments are  making  more  funding available for  Ukraine and the neighbouring partner 
countries.  

The delayed implementation of 2021-2027 Cohesion Policy programmes and the Just Transition Fund 
increases  the  risks  of  decommitments.  The  national  authorities’  focus  on  finalising  programmes  from  the 
previous MFF and NextGenerationEU, given their shorter timeframes, might also contribute to these delays, together 
with  the  late  approval  of  the  relevant  legal  bases  and  programmes.  Member  States  will  need  to  substantially 
accelerate the implementation in 2025 and 2026 to avoid the loss of funds due to decommitments rules. For other 
funds, especially under Headings 1 and 6, the risks are reduced, reflecting the pressure on these programmes.  

The MFF payment ceiling remains sufficient to cover the projected payments except in 2026 where the 
forecast points to an over-run. Payments are expected to run well below the MFF payment ceiling in 2024 and 
2025, allowing to transfer  unused amounts within certain limits towards the end of the period when credit needs 
will  be  higher.  Overall,  the  net  margin  over  2024-2027  including  adjustments  is  estimated  at  EUR  18.5  billion, 
comprising  the  increase  from  the  Single  Margin  Instrument  as  well  as  the  automatic  adjustment  of  the  ceiling 
following the top-ups based on Article 5 MFFR amounting to EUR 7.7 billion between 2025-2027, as included in the 
TAJU 2024. Under the  current assumptions, the estimated payment needs will exceed  the MFF payment  ceiling in 
2026 and 2027. In 2026, even taking into account the maximum cap of EUR 13 billion (in 2018 prices) under the 
Single Margin Instrument 11(1)(b) and 11(3)xx, payments would exceed the maximum payment ceiling. This is very 
much  driven  by  the  forecast  evolution  of  cohesion  policy  payments  and  the  underlying  assumptions,  which  are 
subject  to  important  uncertainties.  While  the  risk  appears  smaller  in  2027,  the  difference  between  the  estimated 
payments level and the maximum payments ceiling remains tight. Importantly, due to the capping mechanism, it will 
not be possible to use in the second half of the MFF the estimated margin under the payment ceiling for 2024 and 
2025 fully, which comes close to EUR 40 billion. Part of the margin might remain unused.  

NextGenerationEU’s  targeting  investments  and  reforms  continue  supporting  the  EU  economy  and  the 
implement 
transition  to  clean,  green  energy.  For  the  years  ahead,  Member  States  will  need  to 
NextGenerationEU  funds  prior  to  the  deadline  for  disbursements  scheduled  for  2026  and  at  the  same  time 
accelerate the implementation of cohesion policy funds.  

The forecast RAL is in line with the expected evolution of the economic growth. While the RAL nominally 
increases at the end of the  MFF compared to  2023,  when measured as a  share of the EU Gross  National Income 
(GNI) the RAL is reduced, which shows that the nominal growth of the EU economy outweights the accumulation of 
outstanding commitments from the EU budget. NextGenerationEU produces a temporary effect on the level of the 
EU  outstanding  commitments,  which  will  peak  at  the  end  of  2023  and  then  gradually  will  return  to  levels 
comparable with the start of the MFF period by the end of 2027.  

The own resources necessary to finance the budget will grow in line with the MFF expenditure. Yet, the 
size of the available margin under the Own Resources ceiling will remain relatively stable as the increasing revenue 
needs match the projected nominal growth of the EU economy. 

12 

 
 Annex II – Results of the forecast 

All values are in billions of EUR, current prices, unless otherwise specified. Some totals may not tally due to rounding. 

Table 1.1 – Long-term forecast of future outflows over 2024-2028 for the MFF 

Year 

2024 

2025 

2026 

2027 

2028 

Total 

Commitment Ceiling 

186.0 

187.9 

179.7 

185.4 

Payment Ceiling 

170.5 

173.7 

177.1 

180.7 

In addition, adjustment for MFFR 
Article 5 (estimate for future years) 

1.7 

1.8 

4.2 

Commitments (programmed)* 

189.4 

192.4 

183.2 

191.1 

738.9 

702.0 

7.7 

756.2 

Forecast Payments* 

143.1 

166.3 

193.6 

193.0 

130.5 

826.4 

Of which Special Instruments** 

3.2 

1.4 

0.1 

4.7 

13 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.2 – Payments in relation to the commitments of the 2021-2027 MFF 

MFF Heading 

2024 

2025 

2026 

2027 

2028 

Total 

1 Single Market, Innovation 
and Digital 

2 Cohesion, Resilience and 
Values 

2.1 Economic, Social and 
territorial cohesion 

17.2 

21.3 

23.3 

23.1 

16.8 

101.7 

20.1 

44.6 

64.1 

71.7 

64.9 

265.5 

10.3 

35.1 

53.3 

58.7 

62.0 

219.5 

2.2 Resilience and Values 

9.8 

9.5 

10.8 

13.1 

2.9 

46.0 

3 Natural Resources and 
Environment 

3.1 Market related expenditure 
and direct payments 

3.2 Other programmes of 
Natural Resources and 
Environment 

4 Migration and Border 
Management 

5 Security and Defence 

6 Neighbourhood and the 
World 

7 European Public 
Administration 

46.1 

57.3 

62.2 

55.4 

31.4 

252.3 

40.5 

40.7 

40.7 

40.7 

162.5 

5.6 

16.6 

21.5 

14.7 

31.4 

89.8 

2.8 

1.8 

3.7 

2.5 

4.7 

2.9 

4.8 

2.6 

3.3 

19.2 

2 

11.8 

12.7 

15.9 

17.4 

18.1 

10.8 

74.9 

11.9 

12.5 

12.9 

13.2 

50.5 

2.5 

Special Instruments 

1.4 

1.1 

Total 

114.1 

158.8 

187.6 

188.9 

129.2 

778.6 

14 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.3 – Payments for the completion of pre-2021 commitments 

MFF Heading 

2024 

2025 

2026 

2027 

2028 

Total 

1 Single Market, Innovation and 
Digital 

3.7 

3.1 

2.0 

1.1 

0.8 

10.7 

2 Cohesion, Resilience and Values 

14.1 

1.2 

1.4 

0.9 

2.1 Economic, Social and territorial 
cohesion 

13.9 

1.1 

1.4 

0.8 

2.2 Resilience and Values 

0.2 

0.1 

0.1 

3 Natural Resources and 
Environment 

8.2 

0.2 

0.1 

0.1 

0.1 

3.1 Market related expenditure and direct 
payments 

0.1 

3.2 Other programmes of Natural 
Resources and Environment 

4 Migration and Border Management 

5 Security and Defence 

6 Neighbourhood and the World 

8.1 

0.2 

0.1 

0.1 

0.1 

0.4 

0.2 

2.4 

0.1 

0.2 

2.6 

0.1 

2.4 

0.1 

1.9 

0.3 

1.3 

Total 

29.0 

7.5 

6.1 

4.0 

17.5 

17.1 

0.4 

8.8 

0.1 

8.7 

1.6 

0.5 

9.7 

47.8 

* The total commitments and estimated payments include appropriation stemming from Article 5 of the MFF Regulation and 
Article 15(3) of the Financial Regulation. Unallocated margins are not included.  

** The amounts for special instruments cover the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve, the European Globalisation Adjustment 
Fund, the Brexit Adjustment Reserve and the Flexibility Instrument. In the subsequent tables, the payments related to the 
mobilisations of the Flexibility Instrument are included within the respective headings.  

15 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 – Forecast decommitments 2024-2027 

MFF Heading 

Completion 

MFF 

Total 

1 Single Market, Innovation and Digital 

2 Cohesion, Resilience and Values 

2.1 Economic, Social and territorial cohesion 

2.2 Resilience and Values 

3 Natural Resources and Environment 

3.2 Other programmes of Natural Resources 
and Environment 

4 Migration and Border Management 

5 Security and Defence 

6 Neighbourhood and the World 

Total 

0.8 

0.4 

0.2 

0.2 

1.3 

1.3 

0.5 

0.1 

0.1 

3.2 

1.1 

2.7 

2.2 

0.5 

0.6 

0.6 

0.3 

0.0 

0.2 

4.9 

2.0 

3.1 

2.3 

0.7 

1.9 

1.9 

0.8 

0.1 

0.3 

8.1 

16 

 
 
 
Table 3 – Long-term forecast of outflows for NextGenerationEU 

Programme 

2024 

2025 

2026 

2027 

Total 

Horizon Europe 

InvestEU  

European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF) 

European Social Fund (ESF) 

1.5 

1.3 

6.3 

4.4 

0.6 

1.0 

0.7 

0.0 

0.4 

1.2 

0.0 

0.0 

European Recovery and Resilience Facility  96.0 

39.1 

47.4 

Union Civil Protection Mechanism 
(RescEU) 

0.4 

0.3 

0.3 

European Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development (EAFRD) 

Just Transition Fund 

1.8 

1.2 

2.3 

5.5 

0.6 

3.6 

Total 

112.9 

49.6 

53.5 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0. 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

2.5 

3.5 

7.0 

4.4 

182.5 

1.0 

4.7 

10.4 

216.0 

17 

 
Table 4 – Change in the total outstanding commitments from 2024 to 
2027 

Source 

RAL start-
2024 
(estimate)* 

Commitments 
2024-2027 

Payments 
2024-2027 

Decommitments 
2024-2027 

RAL end-2027 

MFF  

NGEU  

Total 

273.7 

216.8 

490.6 

756.5 

0.1 

756.6 

695.9 

216.0 

911.9 

8.1 

321.9 

0.9 

8.1 

322.9 

* The RAL at the start of 2023 includes EUR 3.4 billion generated from third-country contributions to specific 
programmes of the 2014-2020 MFF, which is not included in the table. 

18 

 
 
 
 
Table 5 – Long-term forecast of future inflows of the EU budget over 
2024-2027 

INFLOWS 

Own Resources ceiling in % of EU 
Gross National Income 

      of which temporary increase 
for NGEU 

Own Resources ceiling expressed 
in EUR billion* 

     of which temporary increase 
for NGEU 

Net amount of traditional own 
resources** 

National contributions*** 

a 

a’ 

b 

c 

2024 

2025 

2026 

2027 

Total  

2,00% 

2,00% 

2,00% 

2,00% 

n/a 

0,60% 

0,60% 

0,60% 

0,60% 

353,9 

369,1 

383,9 

398,5 

n/a 

n/a 

106,2 

110,7 

115,2 

119,6 

n/a 

24,6 

25,7 

26,8 

27,8 

104,9 

112,4 

136,3 

163,6 

162,1 

574,5 

Total own resources 

d =b+c 

137,1 

162,0 

190,4 

189,9 

679,3 

     of which own resources to 
finance NGEU liabilities 

Other revenue (incl. provisional UK 
contribution) 

TOTAL REVENUE 

d’ 

e 

d+e 

3,9 

6,0 

2,7 

4,3 

3,8 

3,2 

5,0 

15,4 

3,0 

16,6 

143,1 

166,3 

193,6 

193,0 

695,9 

Available margin under the Own 
Resources ceiling  

a-d 

216,9 

207,1 

193,5 

208,6 

n/a 

     of which margin under the 
temporary increase for NGEU 

a’-d’ 

102,3 

108,0 

111,4 

114,6 

n/a 

* Own Resources ceiling - calculated on the basis of the Spring 2023 economic forecast for the Gross National Income of the 
EU27 for 2023-2027 

** Traditional own resources are estimated on the basis of 25% retention rate for collection costs.  

*** National contributions include the Gross National Income-based own resource, the reformed Value Added Tax-based own 
resource and the new own resource based on non-recycled plastic packaging waste. 

19 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i. 

Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the 
financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) 
No  1301/2013,  (EU)  No  1303/2013,  (EU)  No  1304/2013,  (EU)  No  1309/2013,  (EU)  No  1316/2013,  (EU)  No 
223/2014,  (EU)  No  283/2014,  and  Decision  No  541/2014/EU  and  repealing  Regulation  (EU,  Euratom)  No 
966/2012, OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1. 

ii. 

COM(2021)343, 30.6.2021. 

iii.  Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual  financial framework for the years 

2021 to 2027, OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 11. 

iv.  Council  Regulation  (EU)  2020/2094  establishing  a  European  Union  Recovery  Instrument  to  support  the 

recovery in the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis, OJ L 433I , 22.12.2020, p. 23 (‘NextGenerationEU’). 

v.  Unless otherwise specified, all amounts in the report are expressed in current prices. 

vi.  Draft Budget 2024, Statement of estimates SEC (2023) 250 - June 2023. 

vii.  Article  5  of  the  MFF  Regulation  provides  for  the  additional  allocation  in  commitment  and  payment 

appropriations for a pre-defined list of programmes, for an amount equivalent to certain types of fines. 

viii.  Article  15(3)  of  the  Financial  Regulation  provides  that  commitment  appropriations  corresponding  to  the 

amount of de-commitments made in relation to research projects may be made available again. 

ix.  Council  Decision  (EU,  Euratom)  2020/2053  of  14  December  2020  on  the  system  of  own  resources  of  the 

European Union and repealing Decision 2014/335/EU, Euratom, OJ L 424, 15.12.2020, p. 1. 

x.  OJ C66 I, 19.2.2019, p.1. 

xi.  COM(2021)365, 7.6.2021, COM(2022)2093, 7.6.2022 and COM (2023) 320 6.62023). 

xii.  Member States decided to transfer funds between direct payments and rural development. The result was set 

out in Commission Delegated Regulation 2023/813 of 8 February 2023. 

xiii.  Regulation  (EU)  2022/562  amending  Regulations  (EU)  No  1303/2013  and  (EU)  No  223/2014  as  regards 
Cohesion’s Action for Refugees in Europe (CARE), Regulation (EU) 2022/613 of the European Parliament and of 
the  Council  of  12  April  2022  amending  Regulations  (EU)  No  1303/2013  and  (EU)  No  223/2014  as  regards 

20 

 
 
                                                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
increased  pre-financing  from  REACT-EU  resources  and the  establishment  of  a  unit  cost  and Regulation  (EU) 
2022/2039 amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) 2021/1060 as regards additional flexibility to 
address the consequences of the military aggression of the Russian Federation FAST (Flexible Assistance for 
Territories). 

xiv Given its demand-driven delivery mechanism, no forecast is available for the loan component of the Recovery 
and Resilience Facility (similarly to other loan-based instruments implemented outside the budget). 

xv Overview of Member States' intentions to request RRF loan support.pdf (europa.eu) 

xvi COM(2022) 145 final, 23.3.2022. 

xvii COM(2021) 250 final, 14.4.2021. 

xviii Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December 2020, OJ L 424/1, 15.12.2020 

xix European Commission, European Economic Forecast Spring 2023. 

xx The Single Margin Instrument 11(1)(b) leads directly to an adjustment of the MFF payment ceiling, which is 
carried out annually by the Commission in the technical adjustment, with the unused payment margin, subject 
to regulatory caps in 2025-2027 

21