Opinion on democracy in the digital age.
Date: 2023-06-20
Institutions: Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies
Subjects: EU action, democracy, digital literacy, digital technology, disinformation, election, political communication, political propaganda, populism, report, risk management, social media

#EthicsGroup_EU

DEMOCRACY
in the digital age

European Group  
on Ethics in Science and
New Technologies

Research and 
Innovation 

European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies  
Democracy in the Digital Age

European Commission
Directorate-General for Research and Innovation
Unit 02 

Contact 
Email 

Jim DRATWA
 EC-ETHICS-GROUP@ec.europa.eu  
 RTD-PUBLICATIONS@ec.europa.eu

European Commission
B-1049 Brussels

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This is an EGE Opinion, written and adopted by the members of the EGE: Nikola Biller-Andorno, Maria do Céu Patrão Neves (Vice-Chair), Migle 
Laukyte, Paweł Łuków, Pierre Mallia, Fruzsina Molnár-Gábor, Thérèse Murphy, Herman Nys, Laura Palazzani, Barbara Prainsack (Chair), Nils-Eric 
Sahlin (Vice-Chair), Tamar Sharon, Jeroen van den Hoven, Renata Veselská, Takis Vidalis.

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EUROPEAN COMMISSION

European Group on Ethics  
in Science and New Technologies

Opinion on 

Democracy  
in the digital age

Opinion no. 33 
Brussels, 20 June 2023

2023

Directorate-General for Research and Innovation

Democracy in the digital age 

Table of contents 

SUMMARY ................................................................................................... 4 

PREAMBLE ................................................................................................ 5 

1.  INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS A ‘THICK’ CONCEPTION OF DEMOCRACY IN 
THE DIGITAL AGE ..................................................................................... 7 

1.1.  Democracy: Thick v. thin conceptions ............................................... 7 
1.2.  Threats to democracy and the involvement of digital practices ............. 9 
1.3.  The role of ethics ............................................................................ 10 

2.  THE KNOWN RISKS FOR DEMOCRACY AND THE EU MEASURES THAT SEEK 
TO ADDRESS THEM ................................................................................... 11 

2.1.  What are the known risks? ............................................................... 12 
12 
2.1.1. Harmful information, polarisation and lack of transparency 
2.1.2. Unintended effects of an unduly narrow understanding of privacy 14 
15 
2.1.3. Surveillance and discrimination by algorithm 
16 
2.2.  What is being done to protect and strengthen democracies in the EU .... 18 
18 
23 
24 

2.2.3. Technology for democracy and value-sensitive design 

2.1.4. Foreign interference 

2.2.2. Beyond legal efforts 

2.2.1. Legal efforts 

3. NOVEL RISKS AND CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACIES IN THE EU ............ 27 

3.1.  The expansion of Big Tech into new sectors ....................................... 27 
3.1.1. Privacy harms related to sphere transgressions: The tip of the 
iceberg 

28 
29 
30 
31 
3.2.  Regulatory gaps, unintended overlaps, and contradictions in new laws .. 33 

3.1.2. Non-equitable returns for the public sector 

3.1.3. Agenda-setting for commercial interests 

3.1.4. Deepening dependencies on Big Tech 

4. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE TO PROTECT AND STRENGTHEN DEMOCRACIES 
IN THE EU? ............................................................................................... 38 

4.1.  Citizenship in digital democracies ..................................................... 38 
4.2.  Public education ............................................................................. 40 
4.3.  Ethics frameworks for interventions to counter infodemics ................... 41 
4.4.  Publicly funded research and its results ............................................. 42 
4.5.  Regulation: What steps to take? ....................................................... 43 
43 
43 

4.5.2. Public private partnerships (PPPs) 

4.5.1. Knowledge generation 

4.5.3. Technology as a means of fostering fundamental rights protection

4.5.4. Cooperation and enforcement 

4.5.5. The EU as an international actor 

44 
44 
44 

2 European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies  

 
 
Democracy in the digital age 

RECOMMENDATIONS................................................................................. 46 

1. Thinking of democracy differently – A wider understanding of democracy ... 46 
2. A more inclusive democracy .................................................................. 47 
2.1. Public participation, civic education and critical digital literacy must be 
47 
promoted and supported 
47 

2.2. Digital citizenship requires social inclusion 

2.3. More coherent regulation is needed to make digital practices serve 
people and communities 

47 
3.  Recognising  the  importance  of,  and  strengthening,  civil  society  organisations

48 

4. Protecting and empowering journalists and other media professionals ........ 48 
5. Designing and regulating technologies for democracy  –  Democracy in and  by 
design .................................................................................................... 49 

5.1. Policies to ensure that technology development adheres to 
fundamental values 

5.2. Policies to realise and safeguard privacy in a wider sense 

49 
49 

5.3. Value-sensitive technology design can complement the protection of 
fundamental values 

50 
6. Democracy, technologies and the common good...................................... 50 

6.1. Wider measures need to be taken to make sure that publicly funded 
innovation benefits the public 

6.2. Safeguarding basic needs from market rationales 

50 
50 

6.3. Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) as Public Private People 
Partnerships (PPPPs) should be designed to strengthen fundamental values
51 
7. Extending diplomacy: Valuing democracy, for people and planet ............... 51 

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................ 52 

THE MEMBERS OF THE EGE ........................................................................... 63 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................... 64 

THE EGE TEAM ............................................................................................ 65 

European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PROTECTING DEMOCRACY  
IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
REQUIRES MORE THAN 
FIGHTING ELECTION 
MEDDLING, AND MORE 
THAN A NARROW FOCUS  
ON TECHNOLOGIES. 

A WIDE AND DEEP 
UNDERSTANDING OF 
DEMOCRACY

Democracy is the form of 
government that is best suited to 
realise fundamental rights and 
values. It is itself a set of values 
that enables people to live and 
thrive together in solidarity. 

CHALLENGES

RECOMMENDATIONS

Algorithms and social 
media provide powerful 
means for manipulating 
opinion and public 
debate in the digital 
space.

The increasing reliance 
on tech corporations 
for the provision of public 
services limits spaces of  
democratic control.

Socio-technical 
developments are too 
often driven by the 
interest in profit of  
a few, and not by  
the interest of society  
in the common good.

Icons: © SkyLine, #550096463; ©Jane Kelly, #226276278; 2023; 
© Yurii, #302175964; © spiral media, #123852944; 2020. Source: 
stock.adobe.com. 

Stronger support for public 
participation, civic education, 
critical digital literacy and 
inclusive digital citizenship.

Coherent, impactful regulation 
for digital practices that serve 
all. Technology design for 
values and democracy.

Better support for civil society 
organisations & media 
professionals.

Publicly funded innovation 
to benefit the public – and 
basic needs safeguarded from 
market rationales.

EU diplomacy for protecting 
democracy and voicing civil 
society’s calls for people and 
planet.

An understanding of privacy 
that does not treat it merely 
as a negative right but also 
as an individual and collective 
right to develop and express 
ourselves without being 
continuously watched and 
judged.

Democracy in the digital age 

PREAMBLE 

Democracy  is  in  peril.  Recent  years  have  seen  profound  challenges  to  it,  including 
the  spread  of  misinformation,  disinformation  and  otherwise  misleading  information 
(all  of  which  we  subsume  under  the  label  ‘harmful’  information1).  Together  with 
other  injustices,  they  increase  political  polarisation  and  populism2  and  they  widen 
inequalities,  thus 
jeopardising  democracy.  Certain  configurations  of  digital 
technologies contribute to these challenges, even if they are not their sole cause. At 
the  same  time,  other  ways  of  using  digital  technologies  may  help  us  to  address 
some  of  these  problems.3  For  example,  digital  voting,  while  making  it  easier  for 
some people to vote, can also produce formal or informal barriers for those who are 
less digitally literate, or who have limited digital resources.  

A  democratic  system  can  become  an  empty  shell  if  it  is  not  underpinned  by 
fundamental rights and the values it seeks to protect and promote, such as justice, 
equality  and  solidarity.  Because  the  challenges  to  fundamental  rights  and  values 
have significantly changed since the paper age, the digital era requires new ways to 
understand and  protect  them. For example, it is now more than ever necessary to 
understand  privacy  not  just  as  a  negative  right  to  be  free  from  unwarranted 
interference  in  one’s  life,  but  also  as  a  positive  right,  possessed  by  each  of  us,  to 
develop and express our personality without being datafied or watched.  

To protect democracy in the digital age, we need not a thin, but a ‘thick’ conception 
of it. This demands that democracy be understood from an ethical perspective. It is 
not  just  a  political  regime  but  also  comprises  a  set  of  values  that  shape  human 
behaviour  and  form  the  foundation  of  society.  Respecting  democracy  in  the  digital 
age,  then,  requires  much  more  than  fighting  election  meddling,  and  more  than  a 
narrow focus on technologies. It requires ways of seeing, and standing up to, other 
digital harms. It also requires that, as a political union of 27 Member States with 24 
official  languages,  the  European  Union harnesses  the  best  that  digital  technologies 
have  to  offer  in  order  to  protect  and  strengthen  the  rule  of  the  people  in  a  deep 
sense, and to create mutual trust among all people living in the European Union, a 
true community of values and civic engagement. 

It  is  against  this  backdrop,  at  the  request  of  the  President  of  the  European 
Commission,  that  the  European  Group  on  Ethics  in  Science  and  New  Technologies 

1 There is currently no agreed upon typology of harmful information; see Lesher et al. 2022. 
2  We  understand populism  as politics  that pits  the supposedly  ‘pure  people’  against  a  corrupt 
elite (see Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017). It undermines the core idea of representative democracy 
by  waging  attacks  against  democratically  elected  representatives  of  the  people,  which 
populists lump together with governments and other political elites that supposedly serve only 
particularistic interests. 
3  For  the  domain  of  health,  the  Lancet  &  Financial  Times  Commission  on  Governing  Health 
Futures  introduced  the  notion  of  digital  determinants  of  health.  This  notion  conveys  not  only 
that the use of digital tools, data and information shapes how people can protect, learn about 
and act upon their own health, but also that the digital practices of some people can affect the 
rights  and  interests  of  others  (e.g.  Kickbusch  et  al.  2021).  Analogous  to  this,  the  notion  of 
digital  determinants  of democracy  could  be  used  to  highlight  that  digital  practices  affect  how 
people  understand  themselves  and  how  they  act,  but  also  that  the  digital  practices  of  one 
group can have bearing on the interests and rights of others. 

European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 5 

 
 
Democracy in the digital age 

(EGE) 4  developed  this  Opinion  on  Democracy  in  the  Digital  Age.  While  it  comes  in 
the  context  of  the  European  Commission  revising  the  European  Democracy  Action 
Plan  and  preparing  a  Defence  of  Democracy  package,  this  EGE  Opinion  also 
explicitly  looks  beyond  these  parameters.  It  is  also  set  in  the  wake  of  the  EGE’s 
democracy statement of June 2021, Values for the Future, issued in the context of 
the  Conference  on  the  Future  of  Europe  and  delivered  to  the  President  on  9  June 
2021.  

The  present  Opinion  addresses  the  safeguarding  of  democracy  in  a  digital  age, 
including, but not restricted to, free and fair elections. It looks at the role of online 
platforms, politics, media, civil society organisations, universities and other actors in 
opinion-shaping,  including  where  malign  foreign  interference  is  involved.  It 
discusses the relationship between policy measures that regulate civic spaces (e.g. 
to  curb  the  spreading  of  harmful  information),  on  the  one  hand,  and  fundamental 
rights safeguards on the other. Taking stock and looking towards the future, it also 
explores the role that digital technologies can play in developing better civic spaces 
and  enhancing  participation.  In  doing  so,  it  emphasises  the  role  of  the  European 
Union  and  everyone  therein  in  protecting  democracies.  Last  but  not  least,  it 
addresses  the problem  of  democratic governments losing their  grip on basic public 
functions  and  the  provision  of  public  goods  as  these  tasks  are  diversely  and 
increasingly left to private actors.  

This  Opinion  is  organised  in  four  main  sections.  The  first  introduces  notions  of 
democracy  and  examines  the  interplay  between  democracy  and  technology.  The 
second  examines  known  risks  for  democracy  as  well  as  what  the  EU  has  done  to 
date  to  protect  democracies  in  the  digital  age.  The  third  section  discusses  new 
challenges,  and  the  fourth  looks  at  what  could  be  done  to  address  them.  The 
Opinion concludes with a set of recommendations.  

4  The  EGE  is  the  independent  multidisciplinary  body  appointed  by  the  President  of  the 
European Commission that advises on all aspects of Commission policies and legislation where 
ethical, societal and fundamental rights dimensions intersect with the development of science 
and  new  technologies.  The  EGE’s  most  recent  outputs  include  its  Statement  on  “Values  in 
Times  of  Crisis”  (November  2022)  and  its  “Statement  in  support  of  Ukraine”  (March  2022). 
Over  the  past  years,  it  has  also  worked  on  matters  such  as  artificial  intelligence,  the 
coronavirus  pandemic,  the  future  of  work,  genome  editing,  agriculture,  energy,  synthetic 
biology, security and surveillance, and the role of values in policy making. 

6    European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Democracy in the digital age 

1.  INTRODUCTION:  TOWARDS  A  ‘THICK’  CONCEPTION 

OF DEMOCRACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE 

1.1.  Democracy: Thick v. thin conceptions 

‘Democracy’  refers  to  a  form  of  government  in  which  power  lies  with  the  people.5 
Beyond this minimal definition, there are many conceptions of democracy, signalled 
by  qualifiers  and  adverbial  prefixes:  democracies  can  be  representative,  direct, 
parliamentary,  associative,  liquid,  guided,  socialist,  deliberative,  contestatory  or 
agonistic, to give just a few examples (Alonso 2011, Reilli 2018, Strøm et al. 2003, 
Hirst 1996, Bader 2001, Blum & Zuber 2016, Brown 2001, Muldoon & Booth 2022, 
Mouffe  2000,  Landemore  2017,  Shapiro  &  Macedo  2000,  Paxton  2019).6  Most  of 
these  definitions  share  certain  features.  They  contain,  under  different  labels,  the 
following  elements:  franchise,  scope  and  authenticity  (Dryzek  1996);  a  political 
system  for  choosing  and  replacing  the  parliament  (and  government)  by  means  of 
free  and  fair  elections;  the  participation of  citizens in  all  aspects  of  social,  political 
and  economic  life;  human  rights  protection,  the  rule  of  law  and  safeguards  and 
guarantees  of  the  equitable  and  fair  application  of  laws  and  procedures  to  all 
citizens.7 

The EGE subscribes to a ‘thick’ conception of democracy. Democracy is the form of 
government underpinned by, and best suited to protect, fundamental rights as well 
as  the  values  that  these  defend  and  promote,  such  as  justice,  equality  and 
solidarity. Such a rich understanding of democracy helps to prevent democracy from 
turning into a kind of “phantom democracy” (Boggs 2011, Keane 2017) that has the 
outer form of a democratic system but does not substantively incorporate the rule of 
the people and the protection of their interests.  

Our  ‘thick’  conception  implies  that  majority  rule  is  not  an  end  in  itself.  Instead,  it 
serves  the  purpose  of  ensuring  that  as  few  people  as  possible  live  under  a 
government that they have not elected (Kelsen 1920). Thus, the majority principle 
serves  to  realise  and  protect  other  substantive  values  and  it  is  incomplete  without 
the protection of minority rights. 

A  thick  conception  of  democracy  also  entails  a  civic  consciousness  of  engagement 
and the recognition of social, political and economic equality in society. It entails an 
understanding,  on  the  part  of  everyone,  that  ‘we  are  in  this  society  together’  –  a 
sense  of  community  and  solidarity.  Thick  democracy  thus  requires  more  than  the 
mere  acceptance  that  others  may  end  up  benefitting  more  from  widely  shared 
principles  of  distributive  justice.  It  requires  civic  solidarity  and  reciprocity  that 
support just outcomes.  

5 The etymology is dēmos (the people) and kratia (power, rule). 
6 Recent additions include Norton’s (2023) “wild democracy”. 
7  Narrow  definitions  of  citizenship  can  of  course  restrict  the  range  of  ‘the  people’  to  a  much 
smaller  group  than  those  who  permanently  reside,  and  have  a  stake,  in  a  country.  For  an 
understanding of “deep” democracy, see e.g. Walby (2009). 

European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 7 

 
 
 
Democracy in the digital age 

The digital transformations of recent decades have in some ways made it easier, but 
in other ways harder, to protect democracies. Digital technologies have created new 
arenas  for  exchange  and  democratic  participation,  but  they  have  also  altered  the 
distribution  of  power,  both  globally  and  within  countries.8  Foreign  governments, 
private  enterprises,  and  even  rich  individuals  can  interfere  with  elections  more 
easily, manipulate  public opinion,9  or spread  harmful  information across the globe. 
The latter has been found to have a direct effect on  fundamental rights (European 
Parliament  2021a).  This  is  not,  of  course,  a  linear  process  in  which  technologies 
cause the problems that then, in turn, require better technologies to fix them. The 
risks and benefits of  digital technologies are  shaped by the way they are  designed 
and  regulated,  and  by  the  ways  in  which  we  use  them.  In  this  way,  they  are 
influenced also by dominant values shared in a given society. 

We  shall  argue  in  this  Opinion  that the  strengthening  of  democracies  in  the  digital 
age requires three things. First, digital technologies need to be regulated in such a 
way that they serve people and communities, instead of merely benefitting a small 
political and corporate elite at the cost of most others (see Sections 2 and 3). 

Second, it is necessary to reconsider how we can best protect the ethical values that 
underpin  democracies,  including  autonomy,  justice,  solidarity,  equality  and  non-
discrimination.  For  example,  in  the  era  of  grave  power  asymmetries  between 
individuals on the one hand  and companies and other corporate  data users on  the 
other,  ‘consent’  to  data  use  is  often  a  precondition  for  access  to  (sometimes  even 
public)  goods  and  services.  In  this  context,  we  cannot  assume  that  people  ‘freely’ 
agree to their data being used by others (see Section 2).  

Third,  autonomy  and  the  self-determination  of  individual  people  and  of  entire 
populations  are  compromised  by  the  fact  that  democratic  governments  are  losing 
their  grip  on  basic  public  functions  and  the  provision  of  public  goods  as  these  are 
increasingly  left,  wholly  or  in  part,  to  private  entities.  This  needs  to  change  (see 
Section 3). 

In  all  this,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  online  world  is  structurally  different 
from  the  offline  world,  in terms  of  network  size  and  topology,  and  in  terms  of  the 
quality  of  connections  between  people,  and  between  users  and  providers.  In  the 
online  world,  weak  ties  between  people  typically  dominate  over  strong  ties. Often, 
there  are  no  cues indicating  epistemic  quality  of information.  Democratic  corrosion 
is  exacerbated  by  key  features  of  the  attention  and  platform  economy,  with  its 
reinforcement  architectures, 
techniques  of  personalisation  and  audience 
segmentation,  manipulative  targeting,  and  ubiquitous  choice  architectures  with 
built-in nudges and dark patterns.10 The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence 

8 Many low-income countries are placed at a disadvantage by the fact that corporations carry 
out  business  on  their  territories  but  pay  taxes  in  the  high-income  countries  where  they  are 
headquartered.  Moreover,  as  noted  by  Törnberg  (2023:  5),  digital  “platforms’  disruptive 
strategies have proven particularly efficacious in countries in the Global South”, where poorly 
resourced  public 
laissez-faire 
platformization.  Labor  platforms  such  as  Uber  feed  on  neoliberal  conditions  not  only  to  lax 
regulation, but also as they depend on a pool of desperate workers” (see also Chueri 2022). 
9 An example is the use of bots to create the illusion of public support; e.g. Savaget 2019.  
10  Dark  patterns,  also  known  as  deceptive  design  patterns,  are  different  interface  design 
choices that push users to behave in ways that are detrimental to their interests.  

institutions  have  provided  “conditions 

favourable 

to 

8    European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 

 
 
Democracy in the digital age 

(AI) is already altering production and distribution of information with, so far, little 
knowledge  about  the  consequences  of  large-scale  use  of  AI.  Many  agents  seek  to 
benefit  personally  from  this  situation.  Some  try  to  present  fake  or  problematic 
evidence as ‘science’, or use science in manipulative ways. Influencers and meddlers 
compromise  independent  journalism  with  fake  news,  propaganda  and  hyper-
partisan  narratives.  Lobbyists  have  undermined  trust  in  politics.  Profit  maximising 
and managing elites have obliterated trust in the financial sector and the corporate 
world,  and  “conspiracy  entrepreneurs”  (Rosenblum  &  Muirhead  2019)  crowd  out 
serious attempts to understand the world.  

At  the  time  of  writing,  for  example,  ChatGPT  and  other  Large  Language  Models 
seem  to  be  taking  society  by  storm.  As  educators,  journalists,  coders  and  other 
professionals scramble to develop guidelines on how to integrate this technology in 
their  work  practices,  we  are  confronted  with  a  social  experiment  of  extraordinary 
scale,  which  includes  risks  to  democracy.  AI  bots  can  produce  abundant  new 
sources  of  misinformation,  reproduce  harmful  and  biased  content,  lead  to  privacy 
infringements,  and  cause  important  environmental  costs  (Bender  et  al.  2021; 
Marcus  2022).  We  can  question  how  prepared  our  societies  are  to  deal  with  a 
technology  which  convincingly  passes  off  as  a  speaker  of  truths,  while  it  has  no 
intentionality,  agency,  meaning-making  capacity,  or  ability  to  be  held  accountable 
(Bender 2020; Weil 2023). A wide societal deliberation is needed to ascertain if and 
which such sociotechnical arrangements are desirable; if so, they must be designed 
with commonly agreed values.11  

1.2.  Threats  to  democracy  and  the  involvement  of 

digital practices 

Democracy and the fundamental rights, that both support it and are supported by it, 
are  under  serious  threat.  Foa  and  Mounk  (2017),  for  example,  speak  of  a  “de-
consolidation”  of  the  entrenched  democratic  order  in  the  western  world  that  is 
taking  place  at  the  beginning  of  the  twenty-first  century.  Autocracies,  oligarchies 
and other non-democratic regimes are on the rise. Some are evolving as a result of 
decline  in  existing  democracies,  as  happens  when  populism  is  growing.  Such 
regimes  incorporate  democratic  elements  into  what  are,  in  effect,  hybrid  political 
systems. They lack free and fair elections, universal suffrage, judicial independence, 
a free press and other human rights protections (e.g. Heckelei, 2016; Brown 2001), 
yet they are sold by their leaders as the ‘true’ will of the people. Populists celebrate 
such autocratic systems as a ‘purer’ form of democracy, pitting ‘the people’ against 
‘the  elites’  (Mudde  &  Kaltwasser  2017).  In  How  Democracies  Die  (2018),  Levitsky 
and Ziblatt argue that the “tragic paradox of the electoral route to authoritarianism 
is  that  democracy’s  assassins  use  the  very  institutions  of  democracy  –  gradually, 
subtly, and even legally  –  to kill it” (p. 8).  One  of  the  biggest risks in  the twenty-
first  century  is  that  we  continue  to  trust  democracies  when  they  have  stopped 
functioning as such (Runciman 2018). 

11  See  the  EGE  Statement on Artificial  Intelligence, Robotics  and  ‘Autonomous’ Systems (EGE 
2018).  

European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 9 

 
 
 
Democracy in the digital age 

The  features  of  the  democratic  state  that  have  declined  most  rapidly  across  the 
globe in recent  years are  ‘trustworthy independent  media’,  ‘freedom  of expression’ 
and  ‘access  to  alternative  sources  of  information’  (e.g.  Gorokhovskaia  et  al. 2023; 
Reporters Without Borders 2022; IPSOS 2019; Hanitzsch et al. 2018). In each case, 
the decline is, in part,  a consequence  of the growing influence of digital media. To 
give  just  one  example,  they  make  it  hard  for  independent,  professional  journalism 
to obtain sufficient funding, and therefore shift power to those who own and control 
online  media  and  platforms.12  Against  this  backdrop,  there  is  an  urgent  need  to 
examine what democracy means, and what we want it to mean. It is not enough to 
hold onto an empty shell. 

1.3.  The role of ethics 

Ethics  as  a  systematic  and  critical  description,  analysis  and  justification  of  moral 
claims  and  moral  considerations  helps  us  to  shape  institutions,  policy,  technology, 
laws  and  governance  in  a  digital  age.  Taking  democratic  values  seriously  in  the 
European Union requires that we recognise ethics as a source of legislative choices 
that can help to critically evaluate them – but which is not an alternative to them.  

The EGE has described its views on the role and the future of moral values in more 
detail  in  its  Statement  “Values  for  the  Future:  The  role  of  ethics  in  European  and 
global  governance”  of  June  2021  (EGE,  2021).  In  this  context,  the  pitting  of 
regulation  against  self-regulation  and  ethics  (something  currently  being  seen  in 
connection with AI ethics, for example), is a dangerous development (Van Dijk et al. 
2021; Yeung et al. 2020). In the recent past, attempts have been made to relegate 
ethics  to  self-regulation,  to  give  it  a  bad  name  as  an  obstacle  to  innovation,  and 
defund  research  in  the  social  sciences  and  humanities  (e.g.  Wagner  2018;  Sides 
2015; Pinker 2015; Gibbons 2020; Taylor 2009). At the same time, it has become 
very  clear  that  we  cannot  make  the  fundamental  ethical  problems  and  hard 
questions of advanced digital societies go away by obfuscation and avoidance. They 
are  questions  about  how  we  (want  to)  live  and  what  society  we  (want  to)  live  in. 
The  answers  we  give  to  them  will  determine  what  kind  of  society  our  children  will 
live in.  

EU  institutions  are  known  for  the  attention  given  to  ethics  across,  for  example, 
innovation,  foreign  policy,  finance  and  health.  Indeed,  we  need  to  make 
fundamental  values  the  basis  for  and  justification  of  choices  that  societies  as  a 
whole  make  in  order  to  prosper,  live  in  peace  and  freedom,  and  ensure  that  even 
the most vulnerable in our communities are treated with respect and consideration. 
The  design  of  novel  forms  of  (digital)  democracy  is  one  of  the  main  routes  to 
achieve a Europe that reaches the moral ideal it projects internationally and defends 
with vigour.  

12 At the same time, it should be noted that some studies found a positive association between 
digital  media  use  and  participation  in  civic  and  political  life  (Boulianne  2020),  especially  in 
emerging democracies and autocracies (Lorenz-Spreen 2022). 

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2.  THE  KNOWN  RISKS  FOR  DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EU 

MEASURES THAT SEEK TO ADDRESS THEM 

The  EU’s  commitment  to  democracy  has  a  long  history.  Schuman’s  definition  of 
democracy  considers  Europe  “the  embodiment  of  a  generalised  democracy  [and] 
what characterises a democratic state are the objectives that it sets and the means 
it  deploys  to  attain  them.  Democracy  is  at  the  service  of  the  people  and  works  in 
agreement  with  it”  (Schuman  1964).  Article  2  of  the  Treaty  on  European  Union 
(TEU) identifies the values that constitute the essence of a system of freedoms and 
a  community  of  values,  i.e.,  a  democratic  society,  and  declares  them  to  be  the 
starting  point  of  the  EU  (see  also  European  Declaration  on  Digital  Rights  and 
Principles  for  the  Digital  Decade,  2022).  These  values  include  justice,  equality  and 
solidarity,  as  well  as  respect  for  the  fundamental  rights  that  enforce  them.  The 
integration, legitimation, material content and functioning of the EU are conditioned 
and  determined  by  these  values.  The  EU  has  made  these  values  Europe’s  raison 
d’être  –  a  purpose  that  all  Member  States  are  also  expected  to  continuously 
contribute to building, supporting and strengthening.  

Values  that  guide  decision-making  as  benchmarks  require  concretisation  in  rules. 
The EU has powerfully advanced such concretisation in recent years with regard to 
the  EU-specific  concept  of  democracy,  which  at  the  same  time  rests  on  the 
obligations of the Member States under international law (cf. only Art. 3 of the 1st 
Additional  Protocol  to  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  (ECHR)).  These 
democratic  values  are  explicitly  mentioned  in  legal  instruments  such  as  the  TEU, 
and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFREU). They appear regularly, also, in 
secondary law, and are binding for EU organs, Member States and citizens. In that 
sense, they form the basis for any legitimate interest, public or private, in the EU. 
Any individual right or obligation, and any institutional competence, must ultimately 
be grounded in them. 

European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 11 

 
  
 
 
 
Democracy in the digital age 

2.1.  What are the known risks? 

2.1.1. Harmful information, polarisation and lack of transparency 

The  EGE  agrees  with  those  who  have  publicly  expressed  concern  about  the 
unfavourable  knowledge  conditions  and  power  relations  of  the  digital  age  (e.g. 
Kickbusch  et  al.  2021).  If  the  public  sphere,  and  the  basic  standards  of  public 
reason,  are  not  meaningfully  oriented  towards  appropriate  epistemic  values  and 
intellectual  virtues,  this  shared  public  sphere  and  its  robust  conceptions  of 
community  and  solidarity  will  suffer  in  various  ways.  In  the  words  of  Shoshanna 
Zuboff:  

On  the  strength  of  their  surveillance  capabilities  and  for  the  sake  of  their 
surveillance  profits,  the  new  empires  engineered  a  fundamentally  anti-
democratic  epistemic  coup  marked  by  unprecedented  concentrations  of 
knowledge  about  us  and  the  unaccountable  power  that  accrues  to  such 
knowledge. (Zuboff 2021)  

This  is  reminiscent  of  the  observation  that  “a  people  that  no  longer  can  believe 
anything cannot make up its mind. It is deprived not only of its capacity to act but 
also of its capacity to think and to judge. And with such a people you can then do 
what you please” (Arendt, 1974).  

Dialogue  and  deliberation  are  essential  in  a  robust  democracy.13  Jürgen  Habermas 
famously referred to the ‘public sphere’ as the place where public opinion is formed 
(Habermas  1989;  2022;  Thiel  2023).  That  sphere  has  several  key  characteristics. 
First,  it  is  a  place  where  people  come  together  as  citizens,  and  not  as 
representatives  of  particularistic  or  corporate  interests.  Second,  there  is  no  power 
behind  these  exchanges  between  citizens  that  intimidates  them,  or  otherwise 
coerces  the  deliberation in  a  specific  direction.  The  deliberation  taking  place  in  the 
public  sphere,  according  to  Habermas,  has  an  important  democratic  function  as  a 
corrective  to,  and  controller  of,  the  everyday  functioning  of  the  state.  Cafés  – 
insofar  as  they  do  not  exclude  anyone,  such  as  women,  economically  deprived 
groups, or minorities – have been considered archetypal places of the public sphere: 
places  for  social  interaction  and  deliberation  between  the  private  sphere  and  the 
sphere of public authority (Calhoun 2012; Steiner 2015). 

Habermas’  ideal  of  the  public  sphere  has  been  criticised  (e.g.  Fraser  1992)  as 
unrealistic,  and  more  importantly  as  an  ideal  that  ignores  the  realities  of  life  for 
marginalised groups. Still, even as a flawed ideal, Habermas’ portrayal of the public 
sphere  helps  us  to  pinpoint  particular  challenges  that  have  emerged  in  the  digital 
age. Today, when much of the public sphere is online, for example on social media 
platforms,  the  owners of  most  of  these  platforms  benefit  from  hate  and  division.14 

13  The  Committee  for  Bioethics  of  the  Council  of  Europe  (DH-BIO  at  the  time,  now  CDBIO) 
issued an important ‘Guide on public debate on human rights and bioethics’ (2019). 
14 In his more recent work, Habermas (2022) considers platforms the main organisational form 
of  digital  communication.  He  draws  upon  Zuboff’s  (2019)  depiction  of  surveillance  capitalism 
and  emphasises  that  algorithmic  personalisation  is  detrimental  to  an  inclusive  public  sphere. 

12    European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 

 
 
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The wilder the lies, the more outrageous the defamations and the more compelling 
the  conspiratorial  tales,  the  longer  many  people  seem  to  stay  on  the  platforms,15 
driving  up  revenue.16  As  recent  scandals  over  voter  manipulation17  and  incitement 
to racialised and sexualised violence illustrate, the platforms – although they portray 
themselves  as  neutral  ‘infrastructures’  that  cannot  be  held  responsible  for  the 
content  shared  –  can  be  paid  to  serve  the  interests  of  powerful  political  and 
economic actors (e.g. Leetaru 2018; Kofman & Tobin 2020; Sapiezynski 2022; Tech 
Transparency Project 2023; Ali et al. 2019; Chandwaney 2020; Hinds et al. 2020). 
The  more  private  corporations  take  over  public  functions,  the  more  public  spaces 
become opaque, unequal and at times outright dangerous. 

There  are  also  risks  stemming  from  how  people  use  platforms  as  a  news  source. 
When fewer people obtain their news from independent quality-controlled media and 
more  do  so  from  social  media  platforms,  a  people’s  shared  information  reality  is 
narrowed.  It  is  split  into ever  smaller  and  more  fragmented  groups  of  like-minded 
individuals as the platforms’ algorithms identify groups of people who display similar 
behavioural  patterns  (e.g.  ‘likes’  on  websites  and  social  media,  or  purchase  data) 
and target them with tailored information that may be ‘relevant’ and ‘interesting’ for 
them  (e.g.  Cinelli  et  al.  2021).  The  consequences  may  be  that  people  are  less 
exposed  to  information  about  realities  that  are  different  from  theirs,  making  it 
harder  for  them  to  relate  to  diversity  as  such;  and  that  they  may  end  up  with  a 
skewed understanding of reality and assume that others think and act like them. We 
are  witnessing  a  structural  power  shift  from  transparent,  non-monopolistic  public 
spaces to unaccountable, profit-driven spaces that can be  changed,  closed or used 
for  idiosyncratic  purposes  at  the  will  of  a  few  powerful  actors  (see  also  Section 
2.2.3.).18 

In  this  light  it  is  urgent  to  ensure  the  protection,  safety  and  empowerment  of 
journalists and other media professionals,19 and to acknowledge the important role 
of  think  tanks  and  other  civil  society  organisations  in  promoting  reflective  and 

The  plebiscitary  public  sphere  of  social  media  platforms  inflates  “a  sphere  of  communication 
that had previously been reserved for private correspondence” (2022: p. 166). 
15  There  have  been  manifold  studies  in  this  regard.  Some  studies  suggest,  for  example,  that 
conservative  and  right-wing  audiences  are  more  vulnerable  to  harmful  information  (e.g. 
Baptista & Gradim 2022, Freelon et al. 2020, Frischlich et al. 2021, Zhuravskaya et al. 2020). 
Other research found that people over 65 are seven times more likely to share fake news than 
younger individuals do (European Parliament 2019). 
16 The European Parliament, in its Resolution on online platforms and the Digital Single Market 
(2016/2276(INI)),  adopted  in  June  2017,  called  upon  the  Commission  to  analyse  the  latest 
developments  and  legal  framework  as  regards  fake  news,  and  the  possibility  to  introduce 
legislation  to  counter  the  dissemination  of  this  content.  The  European  Council  addressed  the 
matter once again in March 2018 (European Council meeting of 22 March 2018 – Conclusions) 
to  highlight  the  responsibility  held by  social  media  networks  and  digital  platforms  in securing 
transparent practices and the full protection of citizens’ privacy and personal data. 
17 E.g. European Parliament (2021b) on a “next generation repression toolkit” which refers to 
practices and technologies that are very difficult to detect. 
18  European  Parliament, 2019, Disinformation  and propaganda  –  impact  on  the  functioning of 
the rule of law in the EU and its Member States. 
19  Commission  Recommendation  (EU)  2021/1534  of  16  September  2021  on  ensuring  the 
protection,  safety  and  empowerment  of  journalists  and  other  media  professionals  in  the 
European Union. 

European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 13 

 
 
Democracy in the digital age 

informed political debate. Strengthening media and improving journalism standards 
includes  the  making  available  of  sufficient  public  funding,  support  programmes  for 
investigative  journalism  and  for  improving  fact-checking  services  and  credibility 
indices.20, 21 

2.1.2. Unintended  effects  of  an  unduly  narrow  understanding  of 

privacy 

It has been argued that the increasing datafication of people’s lives and bodies – i.e. 
the growing  capture  of  specifically  human  practices  and  characteristics  in  the form 
of  digital  data  of  various  kinds  –  has  changed  the  way  people  understand  privacy 
(Surden  2007,  Friedewald  et  al.  2017).  This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  people 
care less about privacy. Privacy remains important, but some have become resigned 
to  the  fact  that  they  must  surrender  certain  privacy  rights  to  obtain  access  to 
services  and tools they need  in daily life (Turow et al. 2015). Many have given up 
the  hope  that  their  privacy  can  be  fully  and  effectively  protected  in  today’s  world. 
Moreover,  we  cannot  ignore  the  fact  that  the  information  describing  what  one  is 
consenting  to  when  one  ‘accepts’  a  website’s  privacy  policy  is  unduly  long  and 
technical, and incomprehensible to many people. From this perspective, it could be 
said that the current consent system functions more as a waiver of responsibility for 
those who obtain data than as a reinforcement of the right to privacy.  

Many  of  the  larger  technology  companies  are  notorious  for  their  questionable 
privacy policies and data sharing practices. TikTok, for instance, was banned by EU 
institutions and prohibited for use by public sector employees in the course of their 
work in different countries (Xu et al. 2023). And Google continues paying fines for 
privacy  infringements  in  the  EU.22  While  the  sharing  or  re-selling  of  personal  data 

20  European  Parliament, 2019, Disinformation  and propaganda  –  impact  on  the  functioning of 
the rule of law in the EU and its Member States. 
21  In  this  respect,  the  EU  is  funding  research  projects  under  Horizon  Europe  (under  the  calls 
Media for democracy,  democratic  media  and  Politics  and  the  impact of  online social  networks 
and new media). 
22 E.g. in France (https://www.cnil.fr/en/cookies-google-fined-150-million-euros, 
https://www.cnil.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/cnil_-_42e_rapport_annuel_-_2021.pdf,  

https://www.cnil.fr/en/cookies-equally-easily-accepted-or-refused-cnil-orders-20-
organisations-comply, https://www.cnil.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/cnil_-
_41e_rapport_annuel_-_2020.pdf,  

https://www.cnil.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/cnil-40e_rapport_annuel_2019.pdf,  

https://edpb.europa.eu/news/national-news/2019/cnils-restricted-committee-imposes-
financial-penalty-50-million-euros_en, https://www.cnil.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/cnil_-
_41e_rapport_annuel_-_2020.pdf,  

https://www.cnil.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/cnil-40e_rapport_annuel_2019.pdf), in 
Sweden (https://edpb.europa.eu/news/national-news/2020/swedish-data-protection-
authority-imposes-administrative-fine-google_en, 
https://www.imy.se/globalassets/dokument/beslut/2020-03-11-beslut-google.pdf, in Belgium: 

https://edpb.europa.eu/news/national-news/2020/belgian-dpa-imposes-eu600000-fine-
google-belgium-not-respecting-right-be_en, in Spain: https://www.aepd.es/en/prensa-y-
comunicacion/notas-de-prensa/the-aepd-has-imposed-sanction-on-google-llc-for-transferring-
personal-data-to-third-parties, https://www.aepd.es/es/documento/ps-00140-2020.pdf). 

14    European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 

 
 
 
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may  be  made  legal  by  the  terms  and  conditions  of  the  digital  services  that  users 
agree  to,  it  remains  ethically  dubious,  and  constitutes  a  breach  of  what  Helen 
Nissenbaum (2011) calls “contextual privacy”. For example, when we share personal 
information on social media, or use our supermarket loyalty card, we do not expect 
the data to be used by, for example, the government. This runs counter to people’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy. 

In the digital era effective privacy protection needs to go beyond the protections set 
up in the paper age. It is no longer enough to ensure that individuals are asked for 
their  consent  before  their  data  is  used.  ‘Consenting’  to  data  use  has  become  a 
precondition for obtaining access to essential services, such as communication and 
news  platforms,  and  sometimes  even  healthcare.  This  may  be  efficient  for 
companies,  but  it  is  not  effective  as  an  informed  choice,  as  assessing  and 
communicating the risks of data processing is fraught with challenges. Privacy in the 
digital era must be understood as more than merely an individual’s right to freedom 
from  undue  interference.  It  is,  in  addition,  a  positive  right  to  have  the  space  to 
develop and express oneself. In the words of Julie Cohen:  

Privacy  shelters  dynamic,  emergent  subjectivity  from  the  efforts  of 
commercial  and  government  actors  to  render  individuals  and  communities 
fixed,  transparent,  and  predictable.  It  protects  the  situated  practices  of 
boundary  management  through  which  the  capacity  for  self-determination 
develops. (Cohen 2013: p. 1905) 

In summary, privacy is not only valuable because personal data in the wrong hands 
can  be used in  ways  that negatively  impact  a person’s  life  chances  –  as  when,  for 
example,  a  health  insurer  raises  your  premium  when  they  find  out  how  much  of 
your  weekly  supermarket  budget  is  spent  on  potato  chips,  or  a  future  employer 
decides against hiring you in light of your tweets about how you cope with a mental 
health problem. Privacy is the “breathing room we need to engage in the process of 
self-development” (Cohen 2013: p. 1906). It is a buffer that gives us the space to 
develop an identity that is separate from the judgement of others. It is crucial for us 
to  manage  these  pressures,  and  to  form  an  identity  that  is  not  dictated  solely  by 
social conditions.  

2.1.3. Surveillance and discrimination by algorithm 

Social  and  political  theorists  have  been  studying  the  chilling  effects  of  surveillance 
technologies  for  decades.  An  awareness  that  one  is  being  watched,  they  argue, 
changes  people’s  behaviour  (Friedewald  et  al.  2017).  The  gaze  of  the  ‘watcher’  is 
internalised by us, the people, and comes to shape what we do, how we think and 
is 
ultimately  who  we  are.  Surveillance  curtails  our  autonomy.  Today, 
decentralised,  enabled  by  self-tracking  devices,  the  internet  of  things  and  social 
media. It  is no  longer  happening merely ‘from  above’, but also horizontally, as we 
share information with others and monitor ourselves. It is also ubiquitous, in that it 
is not confined to the walls of the prison, or school, or hospital, but appears in many 
spheres of social life and all the time. The breathing room that privacy constitutes is 

it 

European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 15 

 
 
Democracy in the digital age 

essential for democratic citizenship.23 Privacy and related values are currently under 
threat  by  the  constant  data  collection,  profiling,  nudging  and  prediction-based 
coaching that characterises the digital age. 

A  related  problem  is  that  algorithms  and  automated  decision-making  systems  are 
increasingly being implemented in areas that are vital to the functioning of healthy 
democracies,  including  public  administration  (Van  Bekkum  &  Borgesius  2021),  law 
enforcement  (FRA  2022),  education  (Bedingfield  2020),  healthcare  (Ledford  2019) 
and hiring procedures (Whittaker et al. 2019). While these systems are intended to 
improve efficiency and increase the ‘objectivity’ of decision-making procedures, they 
are trained on data which themselves include biases and prejudices that exist in our 
societies, and they thus inevitably introduce or  reproduce  these  biases. Experience 
has  shown  that  the  decisions  and  recommendations  that  these  systems  produce 
often  lead  to  discriminatory  outcomes,  typically  towards  already  vulnerable  groups 
in  society,  such  as  ethnic  minorities,  women  and  economically  deprived  groups 
(Eubanks  2018;  Maki  2011;  Boulambwini  &  Gebru  2018).  Moreover,  and  as  these 
systems  become  increasingly  integrated  in  public  sectors,  people  do  not  always 
have  a  possibility  to  opt  out  or  seek  redress  for  decisions  that  are  made  in  highly 
untransparent, ‘black-boxed’ ways (Pasquale 2016).  

In  2019,  Philip  Alston,  the  UN  Rapporteur  for  extreme  poverty  and  human  rights, 
warned  that  there  is  a  “grave  risk  of  stumbling  zombie-like  into  a  digital  welfare 
dystopia”  (UN  Rapporteur  on  extreme  poverty  and  human  rights  2019).  A  telling 
example  of  this  is  the  recent  childcare  benefits  scandal  in  the  Netherlands,  which 
revealed  that  algorithmic  decision-making  for  fraud  detection  wrongly  singled  out 
parents  with  dual  nationalities,  often  with  migrant  backgrounds  (Amnesty 
International 2021). Asked  to  immediately pay back large sums of allowances that 
they had received, this has caused severe financial difficulties to a number of these 
families, including losing their homes and children being given into care facilities. To 
avoid  such  injustices,  we  must  ensure  that  AI  systems  are  not  used  in  ways  that 
undermine  democracy,  are  discriminatory,  or  otherwise  violate  fundamental  rights 
(see Section 2.2.3.).  

2.1.4. Foreign interference 

Another problem with digital surveillance is the opportunity it potentially affords for 
interference  by private or  state actors with  interests  in  a foreign country (see also 
European  Parliament  2019).  An  example  is  the  development  of  malicious  software 
deployed  by  private  companies  for  the  purpose  of  industrial  espionage  (see  also 
European Commission 2019a). 

It  is  crucial  to  consider  measures  to  strengthen  the  resilience  of  democracies  at  a 
global  and  international  level.  Espionage,  for  example,  is  best  addressed  through 

23  We  use  the  term  citizenship  to  refer  to  a  person’s  identity  and  roles  as  part  of  a  political 
community.  Holding  citizenship  status  in  the  formal  sense can  be  part of  a person’s role  in a 
political community (as it determines their entitlements and obligations towards the state), but 
it  is  not  a  requirement  for  a  person  being  a  citizen  in  a  wider  sense.  In  the  widest  sense, 
citizenship requires that a person has a stake in the political community that they are part of. 

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public international law, by  reference  to the norms regulating the relation between 
states  and  state  actors  conduct  –  such  as  the  principle  of  non-interference  (Kunig 
2008: recitals 1-6, recitals 22 et seq.), or the framework provided by diplomatic law 
–  and human  rights.  In  case  of  interference  in  foreign  elections,  in  contrast, these 
frameworks  are  less  immediately  helpful,  because  such  interference  does  not 
typically  meet  the  legal  requirements  to  be  considered  an  intervention  contrary  to 
international  law  (Steiger  2021).  This  would  only  be  the  case  if  an  election  result 
was  directly  changed,  election  infrastructure  was  attacked,  or  violent  unrest  was 
provoked  with  the  help  of  false  news  (cf.  Kunig  2008).  Other,  equally  harmful 
inferences do not fall under the non-intervention principle.  

When a political group, party, or a government pays a social media platform to show 
certain  types  of  information  to  a  specific  group  of  people  in  order  to  steer  their 
election  behaviour,  for  example,  this  can  represent  a  violation  of  the  political 
independence  of  a  state  as  part  of  its  sovereignty  (e.g.  Federal  Government  of 
Germany  2021,  UN  Working  Group  on  developments  in  ICT  in  the  context  of 
international  security  2021;  UN  Office  for  Disarmament  Affairs24).  Some  countries 
consider state sovereignty in cyberspace to be a rule of international law that can be 
deemed  violated  in  its  own  right.  Internally,  sovereignty  allows  states  to  regulate 
matters  relating  to  cyberspace  independently.  Externally,  it  guarantees  both  the 
territorial integrity of states and their political independence. Political independence, 
as part of sovereignty, would then be independently violable. The preconditions for 
a violation are often disputed. In particular, it is currently unclear whether it would 
be necessary to exceed a materiality threshold, as in the area of territorial integrity, 
in order to violate political independence (Schmidt 2021).  

Regulating foreign interference will come with the challenge of integrating openness 
and  international  cooperation  together  with  the  protection  of  democratic  systems 
and  fundamental  rights.  As  was  reported  by  those  developing  the  European 
Commission’s  Defence  of  Democracy  package,  identifying  covert  malign  action 
might  require  efforts  towards  increased  transparency  and  accountability  in  many 
areas, from social media platforms to news production as well as research and other 
organisations.  Yet  this  must  not  come  at  the  cost  of  weakening  these  institutions 
and people’s freedoms and rights, many of them central to a thriving democracy, as 
civil  society  organisations  have  stressed  (e.g.  Civil  Society  Europe  &  Philea  2023; 
Wheaton  &  Goujard  2023).  Regulatory  efforts  against  malign  foreign  interference, 
and their enforcement, should not undermine the fabric of trust and togetherness in 
societies; they should seek to uphold and safeguard our values and the institutions 
built  on  the  basis  of  these  values.  Particular  attention  is  required  in  relation  to 
unintended  consequences  of  measures,  and  to  measures  which  would  risk  being 
instrumentalised  and  abused  –  a  form  of  ‘dual  use’  –  to  stifle  democratic  life. 
Constructive  proposals  that  have  been  made  include  the  establishment  of  a 
protection  mechanism  for  the  reporting  of  attacks  and  increased  support  for 
organisations  to  better  monitor  the  use  of  EU  funds  (Civil  Society  Europe  &  Philea 
2023).  Such  measures  would,  for  example,  empower  civil  society  in  protecting  its 
organisations.  

24 https://www.un.org/disarmament/ict-security/  

European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 17 

 
 
Democracy in the digital age 

2.2.  What  is  being  done  to  protect  and  strengthen 

democracies in the EU  

2.2.1. Legal efforts 

A “new push for European democracy” 

The  European  Commission  has  already  taken  firm  action  to  promote  robust 
democratic  processes  within  the  EU.  It  has  introduced  extensive  regulation  and 
policies in support of democracy, the rule of law, fundamental rights and core ethical 
principles.  

Securing free and fair elections and protecting democratic processes has been at the 
heart  of  the  European  project.  The  European  Commission  has  reinforced  these 
efforts with its electoral package of 2018,25 giving them priority status.26 They were 
integrated, as part of President von der Leyen’s ‘new push’ for European democracy, 
into  the  initiatives  announced  in  the  2020  European  Democracy  Action  Plan 
(EDAP).27  The  EDAP  has  the  aim  to  “empower  citizens  and  build  more  resilient 
democracies  across  the  EU  by  (a)  promoting  free  and  fair  elections,  (b) 
strengthening media freedom, and (c) countering disinformation”.28  

In  2021  the  Commission  adopted  a  package  of  measures  to  reinforce  democracy 
and  protect  the  integrity  of  elections.  This  included  a  Communication,  a  legislative 
proposal  on  transparency  and  targeting  of  political  advertising,  two  legislative 
proposals  on  the  right  of  EU  citizens  residing  in  a  different  Member  State  to  vote 
and  stand  as  candidates  in  elections  to  the  European  Parliament  and  municipal 
elections, and a legislative proposal to update EU rules on the funding of European 
political  parties  and  foundations.  It  also  issued  the  European  Media  Freedom  Act29 
and  several  actions  to  support  the  strengthening  of  the  rights  and  safety  of 
journalists.30  The  proposals  for  a  regulation  on  the  transparency  and  targeting  of 
political  advertising  and  the  regulation  on  the  statute  and  funding  of  European 
political parties are currently under negotiation among the European co-legislators. 

25 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0637&from=EN 
26 The implementation of the electoral package was reported on in the Commission’s report on 
the 2019 European parliamentary elections: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0252 
27 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e0f68623-24f9-45ce-a784-
62ad2e786db1_en?filename=edap_factsheet8.pdf 
28 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/new-push-
european-democracy/european-democracy-action-plan_en  
29 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_22_5505  
30 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/fs_22_2653, https://digital-
strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/recommendation-protection-safety-and-empowerment-
journalists-factsheet 

18    European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 

 
 
 
 
Democracy in the digital age 

Other measures that have been taken forward include the work in the framework of 
the regular meetings of the European cooperation network on elections,31 such as a 
Joint  mechanism  for  electoral  resilience  organised  and  coordinated  through  said 
network  in  cooperation  with  the  Network  and  Information  Systems  (NIS) 
Cooperation Group and the EU’s Rapid Alert System. Having started its operations in 
2022, this mechanism’s primary operational focus has been to support deployment 
of  joint  expert  teams  and  expert  exchanges  with  the  aim  of  building  resilient 
electoral processes, in particular in the area of online  forensics, disinformation and 
cybersecurity of elections, providing direct support to national entities.  

In  her  2022  State  of  the  Union  address,  President  von  der  Leyen  announced  an 
initiative to defend democracy from malign foreign influence. At the time of writing, 
this Defence of Democracy package is  due to complement actions already taken at 
EU level under the EDAP, with a focus on transparency measures to prevent covert 
foreign  interference.  It  is  also  meant  to  include  specific  measures  on  electoral 
matters ahead of the elections to the European Parliament, and measures to foster 
an  enabling  civic  space  and  promote  inclusive  and  effective  engagement  by  public 
authorities with civil society organisations and citizens.  Further,  it is also  supposed 
to  take  into  account  several  democracy-related  proposals  made  by  the  Conference 
on the Future of Europe as regards citizen engagement in policy making. It has been 
communicated that it will be consistent with the Rule of Law report,32 the upcoming 
anti-corruption package and other measures to further increase transparency. 

A European regulatory “digital strategy”  

By closely linking EU values to fundamental rights, democracy within the Union also 
affects the way the EU institutions represent the interests of people living in the EU. 
The protection of privacy and personal data is an example of the EU’s commitment 
to  the  prioritisation  of  people’s  interests:  Whether  and  how  personal  data  may  be 
processed,  whether  by  private  companies  or  by  public  authorities,  depends  on  the 
balancing of  the  processing  interests  with  the  interests  in  protecting  the  data.  The 
EU  General  Data  Protection  Regulation  (GDPR),  which  entered  into  force  in  May 
2016, aims to secure a high level, general and uniform protection for personal data 
in  all  Member  States  through  its  direct  applicability.  The  EU  has  given  individuals 
considerable control over the way their data is used by granting them differentiated 
rights vis-à-vis those who control the data, in relation to different categories of data 
and  processing  situations.  The  intent  is  to  avoid  various  forms  of  harm  caused  by 
the  processing  that  limit  the  negative  freedom  of  individuals  (absence  of  external 
constraints),  prevent  them  from  presenting  themselves  freely  to  others,  and 
exacerbate  asymmetries  of  information  and  power  between  individuals  and  data 
controllers  (Molnár-Gábor  2016).  Unlike  many  other  jurisdictions,  the  EU  has 
regulated data protection both in a standardised manner, so that public and private 

31 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-
rights/eu-citizenship/democracy-and-electoral-rights_en#european-cooperation-network-on-
elections 
32 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2022-rule-law-report-communication-and-
country-chapters_en  

European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 19 

 
 
 
 
Democracy in the digital age 

actors are generally covered by the same legislation, and cross-sectorally, meaning 
that  a  set  of  general  rules  applies  to  personal  data  regardless  of  the  processing 
context (healthcare, finance, marketing, etc.) in which it is used. Some contexts are 
subject to specific provisions or further legislation. 

By  seeking  the  enactment  of  legislation  which  cannot  be  circumvented  by  private 
agreements  as  a  result  of  its  fundamental  rights  character,  the  EU  has  eschewed 
private  law  solutions  to  the  problem  of  data  protection  (European  Commission 
1998). Remedies for harms emerging from data use are limited to cases where the 
breaking  of  a  law  resulted  in  the  harm  –  leaving  without  adequate  support  people 
who  were  negatively  affected  by  legal,  yet  harmful  practices  (e.g.  McMahon  et  al. 
2020). Moreover, legal concepts such as public interest and trade-offs (e.g. related 
to the research privilege) have not been suitably addressed in their implementation 
and interpretation at EU level or in the Member States. While a margin can ensure 
fair and just application of the law in individual cases, efforts to harmonise the data 
processing  rules  can  easily  come  to  naught.  Intermediate-level  standardisation  for 
sector-specific  data  processing  (specific  rules  concretising  GDPR  rules  in  a  sector-
specific manner) through, for example, codes of conduct, have  so  far remained an 
unused  option  in  many  data  processing  contexts.  Last  but  not  least,  the  GDPR's 
mechanisms  for  international  data  transfers  ensure  that  the  obligations  applicable 
under EU data protection law continue to apply after the transfer of data outside the 
EU  and  the  European  Economic  Area,  including  the  obligation  on  proportional 
balancing  of  benefits  and  harms.  Concerns  about  fundamental  rights  in  a  third 
country,  for  example  in  the  context  of  surveillance  activities  by  public  authorities, 
influences the assessment of the level of protection in that country, and lead to its 
rules  being  considered  disproportionate,  or  even  contrary  to  the  essence  of  the 
fundamental  rights  concerned  (CJEU  C-362/14  2015;  CJEU  C-311/18  2020).  If  a 
European Commission assessment for a third country is not yet available, potential 
data  transmitters  must  examine  the  entire  legal  system  of  third  countries  with 
regard  to  fundamental  rights  protection  before  making  international  data  transfers 
to that country. This increases the complexity and compliance costs associated with 
conducting outbound data transfers from the EU and the European Economic Area to 
third countries. 

In  recent  years,  the  European  Commission  has  taken  an  active  interest  in  digital 
transformation,  drafting  legislation  in  response  to  this  rapidly  changing  field.  In 
particular,  the  proposed  AI  Act  (COM/2021/206  final),  the  Regulation  on  the  High 
Performance Computing Joint Undertaking (COM/2020/569 final), the Cybersecurity 
Act (Regulation (EU) 2019/881), as well as the Directive on the European Electronic 
Communications  Code  (Directive  (EU)  2018/1972)  all  respond  to  new  technologies 
in the digital space. 

The Digital Services Act (Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, DSA) and Digital Markets Act 
(Regulation  (EU)  2022/1925),  and  the  Data  Governance  Act  (Regulation  (EU) 
2022/868, DGA) and its sectoral concretisations in, among other things, the health 
sector  through  the  draft  European  Health  Data  Space  Regulation  (COM/2022/197 
final),  together  with  the  Open  Data  Directive  (Directive  (EU)  2019/1024)  and  the 
proposed Regulation known as the Data Act (COM/2022/68 final), complete the EU 
digital policy scaffold. The last of these will form part of a cross-sectoral governance 
framework  for  access  to,  and  use  of,  data.  It  will  establish  harmonised  rules  on 
matters  affecting  the  relationships  between  actors  in  the  data  economy,  including 
access to, and use of, data generated by the use of a product or linked service. In 
addition,  it  aims  to  facilitate  switching  between  data-processing  services  and  to 

20    European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 

 
Democracy in the digital age 

improve data-sharing services and mechanisms, and data interoperability in the EU 
(COM(2022)  68  final:  recital  5  and  7  of  the  explanatory  memorandum  and  Article 
1(1) of the proposal).  

It is expected that further legislation will be presented in the near future, including a 
revision of the Database Directive (Directive 96/9/EC), the proposed Regulation on 
Privacy  and  Electronic  Communications  (COM/2017/010  final  -  2017/03  (COD), 
revision  of  the  ePrivacy  Directive)  and  the  upcoming  Cyber  Resilience  Act 
(COM(2022)  454  final).  A  legislative  proposal  to  build  an  EU  space-based  global 
secure communications system has also been announced (COM/2022/57 final). The 
revised Database Directive will have a focus on facilitating the trading and sharing of 
machine-generated data, and data generated as part of the rollout of the internet of 
things.33 

In  summary,  these  legislative  initiatives  aim  to  improve  fundamental  rights 
protection in relation to digital practices. The goal is to inhibit encroachments on the 
rights  of  data  subjects  by  preventing  manipulative  and  exploitative  practices 
associated  with  digital  technologies  as  well  as  misuse.  The  regulations  will  seek  to 
define  an  appropriate  balance  between  the  rights  and  interests  of  data  protection 
and the goals of data processing more broadly, and to implement the results of this 
balance at a technical level through the realisation of principles of privacy-by-design 
and privacy-by-default (Regulation (EU) 2019/881, Art. 1(1) and recitals 1, 16, 41) 
–  which means, in essence, that  privacy-protecting solutions are  designed into the 
hardware and the software. In order to develop  and  apply digital technologies in a 
way  that  respects  and  further  promotes  fundamental  rights,  the  right  to  access 
data, including secondarily generated data, must be balanced with data protection, 
and  the  reuse  of  data  (including  public  sector  data) must  be  enabled  in  a  privacy-
preserving  manner.  The  prevention  of  misuse  and  a  strengthening  of  the 
proportionality of trade-offs are both based on risk assessment. They are therefore 
linked  to  the  best  possible  preservation  of  the  affected  but  competing  values. 
Overall,  digital  technologies  should  serve  enhanced  fundamental  rights  protection, 
with due consideration of the additional vulnerability they create. 

The  regulations  also  promote  the  creation  of  a  cross-sectoral  framework  for  data 
governance.  Ideally  the  framework  will  reduce  fragmentation  between  data 
processing and the corresponding rules for actors, between different forms of access 
and  use,  and  across  regulatory  areas.  Harmonisation  within  the  EU  will  be  further 
supported  by  strengthening  EU  agencies  like  the  Cybersecurity  Agency  (Regulation 
(EU)  2019/881)  and  promoting  common  data  spaces  in  order  to  reduce  regulatory 
fragmentation  between  Member  States  and  promote  technical  and  normative 
interoperability and competition between enhanced digital services while respecting 
fundamental  rights.  Establishing  new  digital  market  players  such  as  data 
intermediaries  (COM/2020/825  final:  Art.  1  and  recital  153)  promotes  rule 
implementation  and  enforcement  within  the  EU  and  enables  connectivity  to  EU-
external data spaces.  Harmonised rules for liability  and due diligence  could further 
promote  standardised  enforcement.  Improved  security  and  information  assurance 
should  promote  privacy  protection  against  spoofing  and  eavesdropping  by  third 
parties (COM/2022/57 final, Explanatory Memorandum: p. 9) and strengthen the EU 
as a data actor on a global scale. 

33 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/protection-databases  

European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 21 

 
 
Rules against discrimination 

Democracy in the digital age 

The obligation to respect the principle of non-discrimination is enshrined in Art. 2 of 
the Treaty on European Union (TEU), Art. 10 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European  Union  (TFEU)  (requiring  the  EU  to  combat  discrimination  arising  on 
various  grounds),  and  Art.  20  and  21  of  the  EU  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights 
(CFREU) (equality before the law and non-discrimination based on a non-exhaustive 
list  of  grounds).  In  secondary  law,  the  Equal  Treatment  Directive  (Directive 
2006/54/EC), 
2000/43/EC;  Directive 
2000/78/EC;  Directive  2006/54/EC;  Directive  2004/113/EC;  Directive  Proposal 
COM(2008)462)  and  data  protection  laws  are  among  the  legislative  instruments 
operationalising  non-discrimination  requirements.  In  Member  States,  ‘equality 
bodies’ implement and enforce the EU value of equality and defend the right to non-
discrimination.  These  public  organisations  assist  victims  of  discrimination  and 
monitor and report on discrimination issues arising from legal obligations defined by 
the grounds of discrimination set out in EU law.34 

non-discrimination 

(Directive 

laws 

Digital  technologies,  and  in  particular  also  machine  learning  and  other  practices 
commonly subsumed under the label of artificial intelligence (AI), can exacerbate or 
cause new instances of discrimination. This can be rooted in biased training data, or 
in  the  ways  in  which  organisations  define  target  variables  and  class  labels  (e.g. 
Zuiderveen Borgesius 2018). The most important rules operationalising the handling 
of  AI  in  the  EU  based  on  fundamental  rights  and  ethical  values  are  set  out  in  the 
proposed  AI  Act  (AIA,  COM/2021/206  final).  In  draft  form,  this  Act  contains 
obligations on such matters as data control, human supervision and a guarantee of 
the  comprehensibility  of  AI  decisions  that  are  based  on  the  risk  of  discrimination. 
The  European  Commission  has  already  presented  the  draft  of  an  AI  Liability 
Directive,  but  this  is  limited  to  claims  based  on  injury  to  life,  health,  physical 
integrity and property (COM/2022/496 final). 

Where data is concerned, the obligations are limited to certain types of AI systems 
that  are  classified  as  high-risk  applications  (COM/2021/206  final:  Art.  16  et  seq.). 
For  other,  non-high-risk,  AI  systems  only  a  low  level  of  obligation  applies.  Even  if 
the GDPR is fully applicable, the rights of data subjects reach their limits due to the 
technical  nature  of  machine  learning  systems  and  the  way  in  which  they  draw 
conclusions (Müller 2022).  Accordingly, there is a need for improved protection for 
the  rights  of  data  subjects,  especially  regarding  transparency  obligations  (Art.  52 
AIA) and rights corresponding to user obligations in general (Art. 29 AIA) (Ebers et 
al.  2021).  Clear  definitions  (e.g.  of  the  concept  of  bias,  the  distinction  between 
interpretability and explainability, and the level of transparency required) should be 
established. Until this happens the standardisation of AI systems – which is not only 
a technical but  also an ethical-legal issue –  will be left to  private  regulatory actors 
such  as  standardisation  organisations  (Ebers  et  al.  2021).  The  standardisation  will 
not be discussed by society as a whole, and the corresponding decisions will not be 
made through democratic processes. A lack of democratic legitimacy and the limited 
influence of relevant interest groups on standardised rules weaken decision-making 
processes  relying  on  them.  This  not  only  manifests  the  absence  of  essential 
regulations that the legislator should provide for with regard to compliance but leads 
to a weakening of supervision. 

34 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-
rights/combatting-discrimination/tackling-discrimination/equality-bodies_en  

22    European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 

 
 
Democracy in the digital age 

Particularly problematic (because, at least under the laws of many Member States, 
no  protection  is  afforded  by  anti-discrimination  law)  are  cases  of  discrimination  in 
which  no  specific  person  is  discriminated  against,  but  an  entire  group  of  people  is 
disadvantaged (e.g. Tobler 2005; Ellis & Watson 2012). This can lead, for example, 
to  certain  job  advertisements  not  being  taken  up  at  all  by  members  of  a  specific 
group,  or  to  its  members  having  to  pay  a  higher  price  for  certain  services.  In  the 
EU,  Member  States  have  an  obligation  to  prevent  discrimination,  and  to  sanction 
violations  of  the  provisions  prohibiting  discrimination,  by  applying  effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive measures, regardless of whether any specific person is 
disadvantaged by the violation and can claim legal protection as an individual (CJEU 
Case  C-54/07).  Equally,  however,  problems  also  arise  in  cases  where  an  effective 
remedy is not available exclusively at the individual level. In such cases, it must be 
shown that an apparently neutral rule, practice or decision disproportionately affects 
a  protected  group  and  is  thus  prima  facie  discriminatory  (Zuiderveen  Borgesius 
2018). Effective protection against such discrimination would require, first, that it be 
recognised.  The  GDPR  does  not  provide  for  an  obligation  to  inform,  especially  in 
areas where AI is used only as an assistant (Sesing & Tschech, 2022). 

Recently,  some  of  these  regulations  have  been  translated  into  impact  assessment 
tools  to  identify,  assess  and  address  adverse  effects  on  rights,  for  example  in  the 
form  of  Data  Protection  Impact  Assessments  and  Human  Rights  Impact 
Assessments.  Besides  helping  companies  to  assess  risks,  these  tools  can  require 
that  a  company  or  organisation  modifies  their  products  or  procedures  to  improve 
their effects on data protection or human rights.35 

2.2.2. Beyond legal efforts 

The European Commission has also taken new  directions in  research on the use  of 
digital technologies. Nearly 300 research projects  dealing with different dimensions 
of  democracy  and  its  contemporary  challenges,  including  digital  technologies, 
received  more  than  EUR  700  million  under  the  Horizon  2020  research  funding 
programme  (2014-2020).  The  projects  addressed  a  wide  range  of  themes: 
democratic participation, trust and governance, the rule of law, Europeanisation, the 
challenges  presented  by  harmful  information,  media  literacy,  civic  education  and 
global  governance,  the  future  of  democracy,  deliberative  democracy,  countering 
violent  extremism  and  populism,  transforming  public  services  into  citizen-centric 
and innovative services, and many more issues (EGE hearing  of  DG  RTD.D4,  2022 
on the European Commission’s research and  innovation funding for democracy and 
governance36).  Horizon  2020  also 
funded  experimentation  with  democratic 
innovations,  in  particular  deliberative  and  participatory  democracy  approaches.37 

35  The  Dutch  government, for  example,  is  increasingly  making  use  of  these  to  analyse  and 
assess risks of using digital platforms, for example the use of Facebook pages. An example is: 
https://www.privacycompany.eu/blogpost-en/human-rights-impact-assessment-of-facebook-
pages  
36 See also https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/research-area/social-sciences-and-
humanities/research-and-innovation-funding-democracy-and-governance_en  
37 See this report on Horizon 2020 research on deliberative and participatory practices in the 
EU: https://op.europa.eu/s/yMM6  

European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 23 

 
 
 
Democracy in the digital age 

Horizon  2020  also  supported,  as  part  of  the  Green  Deal,  a  participatory  action  on 
the green  transition involving  800 citizens from  all Member  States and resulting in 
roadmaps  for  sustainable  food  systems,  smart  and  efficient  mobility,  and  energy-
efficient buildings.38  

In addition, research on democracy and governance is specifically funded under the 
Horizon Europe research funding programme (2021-2027). With a dedicated budget 
of  EUR  264  million  over  its  first  four  years,  it  is  the  most  substantial  allocation  of 
resources yet for research topics pertaining to social sciences and humanities. Some 
of  the  challenges  identified  in  this  Opinion  are  also  being  addressed  in  funded 
projects.  For  example,  some  projects  are  specifically  addressing  the  impact  of  AI 
and big data on democracy39; some are dedicated to understanding and countering 
foreign  interference.  Other  research  themes  include  the  impact  of  inequalities  on 
democracy,  the  future  of  democracy  and  civic  participation  and  how  they  can  be 
supported (or threatened) by digital technologies, how to improve the inclusiveness 
of  public  spaces  online  and  offline,  and  the  threats  posed  by  disinformation, 
polarisation and extremist narratives on online media.  

2.2.3. Technology for democracy and value-sensitive design  

As noted, for democracies to become or remain strong, several conditions must be 
met:  rule  of  law,  transparency  and  accountability,  participation,  legitimacy  of 
institutions,  adequate  and  functioning  regulatory  and  institutional  mechanisms  to 
protect  fundamental  rights  and  the  ethical  values  they  protect  and  promote,  an 
economic  system  that  is  accountable  to  all  people  living  in  the  society,  and  an 
independent  judicial  system  –  to  name  but  a  few  of  the  more  important  ones. 
Whatever we value in our democratic and digital practices – equality of opportunity, 
fairness,  tolerance  and  respect  in  the  public  sphere,  or  solidarity  –  these  values 
need to be supported and facilitated by digital design. And vice versa, if we do not 
strengthen fundamental values in the fabric of our democratic societies, we cannot 
expect  digital  infrastructures,  models  and  algorithms,  platforms,  social  media  and 
communication  systems  to  miraculously  –  as  if  by  an  invisible  digital  hand  –  be 
aligned with these values. 

In  the  last  two  decades,  experiments  in  the  digital  mediation  of  democracy  have 
been carried out across Europe. Examples range from crowdsourcing constitutions in 
Iceland  to  petitioning  platforms  in  the  UK,  and  from  deliberative  assemblies  in 
Ireland,  open  government  data  in  Estonia,  online  deliberation  platforms  for  city 
planning  in  Barcelona,  to  G1000  citizen  councils  in  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands. 
Ideas  about  inclusion,  participation,  voice,  deliberation  and  public  debate  have 

38 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/news/all-research-and-innovation-news/final-
report-our-citizen-voices-eu-climate-transition-project-out-2023-05-03_en    
39  Some  examples:  ORBIS  elaborates  new  participatory  democracy  models  by  employing  AI- 
and  Big  Data-based  technologies;  KT4D  creates  models  to  foster  more  inclusive  civic 
participation,  with  strong  involvement  of  CSOs;  ITHACA  improves  the  understanding  of  how 
AI-based solutions can be used in the field of civic participation, in full respect of fundamental 
rights,  and  in  light  of  moral  and  ethical  reflections;  AI4Gov  develops  evidence-based 
innovations and policies to improve public participation with the use of AI- and Big Data-based 
technologies, while complying with fundamental rights and values. 

24    European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 

 
 
 
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found expression in these and many other socio-technical experiments.  It is in this 
spirit  that  the  Conference  on  the  Future  of  Europe  was  convened,  in  2021-2022, 
involving  notably  an  interactive  digital  platform  and  citizens’  panels.  Among  its 
results was a series of proposals on how citizen participation and youth involvement 
may be strengthened at EU level.40  

Such exercises and initiatives need to be supported and scaled up by the European 
Commission. Examples of this are  the Citizens,  Equality,  Rights and Values (CERV) 
programme41  and  the  Competence  Centre  on  Participatory  and  Deliberative 
Democracy.42  In  fact,  Naeem  (2019:  p.  41)  points  out  that  the  benefits  of  open 
government43  can  include  lower  levels  of  corruption,  higher  levels  of  public 
awareness  and  education,  higher  level  of  transparency,  more  democratic  control, 
and improved efficiency and effectiveness of public services.44  

What applies to safety, privacy and security is true for other values as well: besides 
strengthening  these  values  through  policies  shaping  social,  economic  and  political 
practices,  we  also  need  to  realise  them  through  design.  ‘Design  for  values’  thus 
refers  to  the  explicit  transposition  of  ethical  values  into  context-dependent  design 
requirements.  It  provides  a  framework  for  stakeholders  to  translate  moral 
consideration  (e.g.  those  pertaining  to  fundamental  rights)  into  context-dependent 
design  requirements  through  a  structured,  inclusive,  transparent  process.  The 
European  Commission  has  been  championing  such  an  ethics-by-design  approach 
(e.g. in the GDPR  and the proposed AI  Act),  and  now  many are  following Europe’s 
lead.  It  is  time  for  the  EU  to  expand  the  ethics-by-design  approach  to  democracy 
itself.  

Digital (social) media have not only created echo chambers and filter bubbles,45 and 
isolated,  segregated  and  polarised  our  societies,  but  also  led  people  astray  and 
pitted them against each other in terms of ‘likes’ and ‘followers’. If people no longer 
cherish democratic values, all our policies and best laid schemes will fall upon deaf 
ears.  At  the  same  time,  with  the  right  design,  online  platforms  can  support  civic 
engagement  and  encourage  inclusive  discourse  –  if  they  are  not,  as  is  currently 
often  the  case,  designed  to  hold  the  user’s  attention  for  as  long  as  possible  to 
generate advertising revenues. Initiatives in value-sensitive technology design have 
recently  sprung  up  partly  within  university  research  projects,  offering  public 
alternatives  to  profit  driven  platforms.46  In  addition,  legal  and  financial  incentives 

40 See https://futureu.europa.eu/en/  
41 https://commission.europa.eu/about-european-commission/departments-and-executive-
agencies/justice-and-consumers/justice-and-consumers-funding-tenders/funding-
programmes/citizens-equality-rights-and-values-programme_en  
42 See https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/participatory-democracy/about_en  
43  Open  Government  refers  to the  idea  that  the  actions  of  government  should be  transparent 
and accountable (e.g. Meijer et al 2012; OECD, Open Government).  
44 On the notion of openness, and that it should never be treated as an end in itself (see, e.g. 
Hartley et al. 2018; for the field of open science, see Leonelli 2023). 
45 A seeming paradox is that some studies suggest that being confronted with political opinions 
that differ from one’s own can lower political interest and engagement (EPRS 2018), yet echo 
chambers are generally regarded as problematic. 
46 For example, PubHubs is a non-commercial community network developed by academics at 
Dutch  universities,  which  offers  an  online  environment  made  up  of  ‘hubs’  –  or  communities, 

European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 25 

 
 
Democracy in the digital age 

should  be  created  encouraging  for-profit  companies  to  invest  in  measures  that 
strengthen  public  deliberation  and  pluralistic  dialogue  even  when  these  do  not 
translate into commercial profit.  

such  as  sports clubs, patient organisations,  museums or  municipalities  –  in which people  can 
safely  and  securely  communicate.  The  network  focuses  on  reliable  information,  protected,  if 
necessary, with digital signatures, and on trusted communication, if necessary with guarantees 
of the identity of participants. Importantly, it is not driven by a business model which requires 
collecting personal data. Such non-commercial alternatives should receive more support from 
national and/or supranational public bodies (see also, e.g. von Thadden 2023; Staab 2019). 

26    European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 

 
 
 
 
Democracy in the digital age 

3.  NOVEL  RISKS  AND  CHALLENGES  TO  DEMOCRACIES  IN 

THE EU  

3.1.  The expansion of Big Tech into new sectors 

Adding to the risks mentioned above (Section 2), we now identify a number of novel 
risks that digital technologies present to democracy, specifically to the richer, ‘thick’ 
conception of it.  

In the past decade, vast technology companies such as Alibaba, Alphabet, Amazon, 
Apple, Baidu, Meta, Microsoft, Tencent and Xiaomi have come to dominate the world 
of  computational  hardware  and  software,  and  to  manage  most  of  our  internet 
searches and social media.47  In the process  they  have  expanded well beyond their 
original  spheres  of  activity  into  other  areas  and  markets,  including  health  and 
medical  research,  education,  transport,  news  provision,  public  administration, 
agriculture,  finance,  law,  humanitarian  aid,  and  so  on.48  Drawing  on  the  political 
philosopher  Michael  Walzer’s  (1983)  theory  of  justice  and  complex  notion  of 
equality, we can understand this expansionism as a series of ’sphere transgressions’ 
that  pose  novel  risks  to  democracies  (see  also  Sharon  2021a,  2021b;  Van  den 
Hoven 1997; Nagenborg 2009).  

According  to  Walzer,  society  is  made  up  of  spheres  of  practice  distinguished  by  a 
defining good or cluster of goods – e.g. the economic sphere, the sphere of politics, 
the  sphere  of  welfare,  family  life,  education,  and  so  on.  In  liberal  democracies, 
Walzer argues, we can accept some inequality within spheres: some people may be 
richer than others (successful entrepreneurs), some people may have more political 
power than others (political leaders) and some people may receive more healthcare 
(the chronically ill). But it is particularly problematic if these inequalities are carried 
over  from  one  sphere  to  another.  The  fact  that  some  people  have  more  access  to 
money and other resources than others should not entitle them to better healthcare 
or  enable  them  to  buy  votes.  Nor  should  the  fact  that  someone  has  more  political 
power  than  others  mean  that  they  receive  better  education  for  their  children  or 
privileged  access  to  the  market.  Such  translations  of  advantage  between  spheres 
disrupt  complex  equality  and  can  lead  to  the  domination  of  some  members  of 
society by others (Walzer 1983).  

Big Tech corporations have gained an advantage in their original sphere of activity – 
because they are good at what they do, or they have had pockets deep enough to 
buy  out  potential  competitors.  As  a  result,  they  hold  quasi  monopolies  in  certain 
capabilities,  such  as  the  development  of  data  collection,  storage  or  analytical 
products and services. Through sphere transgressions, they convert their position in 
one  sphere  of  activity  into  advantages  in  new  spheres.  These  conversions  can  be 

47  Several  seminal  works  have  described  this,  including  Zuboff’s  The  Age  of  Surveillance 
Capitalism (2019) and Cohen’s Between Truth and Power (2019). 
48  For  an  overview  of  tech  corporation  initiatives  in  various  sectors  see  https://www.sphere-
transgression-watch.org/. 

European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 27 

 
 
 
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seen as problematic encroachments into new spheres, insofar as these corporations 
do  not  have  the  domain  expertise  required  by  their  new  level  of  influence  in  new 
spheres such as health or education, and insofar as they are not accountable in the 
way  that  public  sector  actors  are.  Indeed,  they  function  outside  of  the  legal  and 
normative checks and balances of democratic systems. 

In  the  political  economies  in  which  digital  practices  are  embedded,  such  sphere 
transgressions  pose  a  number  of  risks  to  democracy.  These  include:  (1)  privacy 
harms, (2) non-equitable returns for the public sector in its collaborations with tech 
actors,  (3)  the  reshaping  of  critical  public  sectors  according  to  the  interests  and 
values of commercial entities (agenda-setting), and (4) deepening dependencies on 
Big Tech for the provision of basic goods or services. 

3.1.1. Privacy harms related to sphere transgressions: The tip of the 

iceberg 

As  noted,  many  of  the  tech  giants  are  notorious  for  their  questionable  privacy 
policies  and  data  sharing  practices  within  their  original  spheres  of  activity.  Such 
privacy concerns may become even more serious when these companies move into 
new critical sectors and spheres, especially if particularly sensitive kinds of personal 
data, such as health and medical data, or data collected on children in schools, are 
in  question.  Privacy  breaches  in  the  new  sectors  into  which  technology  companies 
are  making  inroads  can  be  very  consequential  –  for  example,  if  they  are  used  to 
help determine future decisions about which patient gets a certain treatment, which 
school a pupil can go to, or which parent receives a welfare benefit.  

In  one  sector  into  which  Big  Tech  companies  are  aggressively  expanding,  health, 
there  have  already  been  several  incidents  involving  privacy  breaches.  In  2016, 
DeepMind,  Google’s  AI  offshoot  in  London,  was  at  the  centre  of  a  data  protection 
controversy  when  it  was  revealed  that  a  data  sharing  partnership  with  three  NHS 
hospitals allowed it to access identifiable health data on 1.6 million patients without 
their explicit consent (Powles & Hodson 2017, 2018). An investigation conducted by 
the  UK’s  Information  Commissioner’s  Office  (ICO)  ruled  that  the  data  agreement 
breached  data  protection  law  (ICO,  2017).  Then,  in  2019,  Google  came  under 
scrutiny  when  its  partnership  with  Ascension,  the  second  largest  health  system  in 
the  United  States,  granted  the  company  access  to  over  50  million  medical  records 
(Copeland  2019).  Here  too,  the  data  was  not  anonymised,  nor  were  patients  or 
doctors  notified,  or  asked  to  provide  proper  consent.  More  recently,  in  2022,  Meta 
has been criticised for accessing medical data on millions of people and using it for 
targeted advertising via a data tracking tool called Meta Pixel. The latter is installed 
on dozens of hospital  websites in the  US, granting the  company access to data on 
patient appointments, prescriptions and health status (Delouya 2022). 

European  rules  and  regulations  protecting  personal  data  drafted  over  the  past 
decade – from the GDPR to the DGA and the more recently proposed Data Act – aim 
to address this type of risk. They do so by reaching an appropriate balance between 
competing  rights  and  interests,  such  as  between  data  protection  and  data 
processing  interests.  In  addition,  privacy-  and  data-protection-by-design  methods 

28    European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 

 
 
Democracy in the digital age 

(see Section 2.2.) can be developed and applied by tech actors in collaboration with 
public institutions.49  

Privacy harms, however, are only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the novel 
risks  to  democracy  posed  by  Big  Tech  expansion  into  new  sectors  (Sharon  2022). 
This  is  because  the  business  models  that  drive  the  expansionism  are  not  primarily 
about  selling  personal  data  to  third  parties  –  be  these  advertisers,  insurers,  or 
anyone else.  The  latter is  a  business  model that  we  know  a  fair  bit  about  from  its 
operation  in  internet  search  engines  and  social  media,  and  for  which  regulatory 
instruments such as the GDPR and  privacy-by-design techniques (Aizenberg &  Van 
den Hoven 2020) are quite well-equipped. But where many initiatives in new sectors 
are concerned, the tech corporations are not collecting data to resell it, and revenue 
will  not  be  generated  through  data  collection  and  processing.  For  example,  the 
ResearchKit software  –  one of Apple’s most  ambitious health initiatives that allows 
clinicians  to  carry  out  studies  using  the  iPhone  to  collect  health  data  –  does  not 
require data to flow to, or through, Apple. Instead, the business model rests on the 
software  and  the  iPhone being  used  by  more  and  more  clinicians  for  decentralised 
and remote studies – a form of research which is on the rise.  

Moreover,  some  technology  companies  effectively  instrumentalise  privacy  as  a 
means  of  extending  their  reach  into  new  sectors.  They  take  advantage  of  the 
heightened focus on privacy and data protection, in other words,  to move into new 
sectors  with  privacy-friendly  products  and  services.  A  good  example  of  this  is  the 
application  programming  interface  (API)  for  digital  contact  tracing  that  Apple  and 
Google  jointly  developed  at  the  outbreak  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic.  This  was 
explicitly  built  in  a  way  that  would  conform  to  stringent  privacy-protecting  criteria 
defined  by  leading  European  privacy  experts,  in  particular,  decentralised  data 
storage (Troncoso et al. 2020; 2020/2616(RSP)). The protocol developed by Google 
and  Apple  complied  with  these  criteria  and  was  applauded  by  privacy  experts  and 
data  protection  bodies  alike  for  its  privacy-friendliness  (Whittaker  2020).  This  API 
was subsequently adopted by numerous countries around the world – some of which 
redesigned  the  contact  tracing  apps  they  were  already  working  on  to  comply  with 
the  criteria  of  the  Google  Apple  API.  In  this  way,  the  reach  and  influence  of  these 
companies  into  pandemic  containment  strategy  and  public  health  extended  even 
further.  Privacy-friendly  technology  can,  therefore,  unwittingly  facilitate  the 
increased involvement of tech corporations in the public sector. It is important that 
policy makers and regulators do not get “blind-sided by privacy” (Sharon 2021b), at 
the cost of ignoring structural issues relating to the distribution of power and agency 
in  digital  societies.  They  must  remain  vigilant  to  the  broader  risks  that  Big  Tech 
expansionism in new sectors raises beyond mere privacy and data protection. 

3.1.2. Non-equitable returns for the public sector 

A  rather  different,  and  important,  risk  presented  by  Big  Tech  expansionism  is  that 
the  public  sector  is  not  securing  a  fair  share  of  the  gains  resulting  from 

49  See  e.g.  the  PEP  framework  (Verheul  and  Jacobs  2017),  developed  and  implemented  in  a 
research  collaboration  between  a  university  medical  centre  in  the  Netherlands  and  Verily, 
which uses polymorphic encryption and pseudonymisation to ensure data protection. 

European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 29 

 
 
 
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collaborations  between  the  public  sector  and  tech  corporations  (Mazzucato  2021; 
Bradley  et  al.  2022;  Prainsack  et  al.  2022).  This  is  particularly  important  in 
situations  where  data  is  being  used  primarily  in  the  creation  of  commercial  profit. 
One  of  the  business  models  known  to  be  driving  Big  Tech  expansionism  in  new 
sectors  involves  access  to  domain-specific  datasets.  An  example  is  medical  data 
collected  and  collated  in  hospitals,  which  is  needed  to  train  machine  learning  to 
develop applications and algorithms. These algorithms are typically proprietary and 
can  be  monetised.  Often,  tech  companies  give  collaborators  in  the  public  sector 
access to the algorithms at no cost. But this is typically for a pre-determined period, 
after  which  access  comes  with  a  steep  price  tag.  In  the  DeepMind-NHS 
collaboration, for example, DeepMind was using patient data from several hospitals 
to  develop  an  app  to  help  professionals  identify  patients  at  risk  of  acute  kidney 
disease.  Initial  contracts  of  five  years  meant  the  hospitals  involved  could  use  the 
app at no cost, but after that DeepMind was free to set a price for use and access. 
Other partnerships between British hospitals and DeepMind for different kinds of AI 
research  followed  the  same  pattern.  The  development  of  proprietary  algorithms 
trained  on  publicly  funded  datasets  can  be  likened  to  drug  innovation,  where 
pharmaceutical companies create patents developed through research carried out in 
part using public financing. 

During  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  which  saw  numerous  collaborations  between  tech 
firms and public sector institutions for data analytics and other purposes, awareness 
of this risk increased. In the UK, for example, the NHS entered into agreements with 
Google, Amazon, Microsoft, Palantir and Faculty (a  British AI start-up) in  a project 
that  sought  to  create  a  ’data  store’  collating  data  from  across  the  NHS  capable  of 
providing  a  dashboard  of  information  to  support  pandemic  decision-making  (Gould 
et al. 2020). A freedom  of information request led by the civil society organisation 
Foxglove  revealed  that  the  companies  were  originally  granted  intellectual  property 
rights and allowed to train their models and profit from access to NHS data, raising 
concerns  not  just  about  privacy,  but  about  whether  the  public  was  getting  “fair 
value  for  [their]  NHS  data  assets”  (Fitzgerald  and  Crider  2020).  The  terms  of  this 
deal were amended following this revelation. 

This  dynamic  is  present  not  just  in  the  healthcare  sector  but  all  sectors  in  which 
underfinanced public institutions are lured into partnerships with tech companies via 
incentives  of  seemingly  no-strings-attached  private  investment.  Policymakers  and 
sectoral  actors  need  to  become  more  alert  to  the  fact  that,  in  the  long  run,  the 
public sector is losing out in these partnerships. To counter this, and to ensure more 
equitable allocation of value creation, more robust contracts with suitable terms and 
conditions need to be attached to these partnerships.  

3.1.3. Agenda-setting for commercial interests 

The  more  involved  in  public  sectors  tech  corporations  become,  the  greater  their 
influence  also  on  what  research  is  carried  out.  When  tech-affiliated  philanthropists 
become  major  funders  of  disease  research  as  well  as  research  in  other  fields,  a 
gradual  reshaping  of  sectors  in  line  with  the  values  and  interests  of  shareholders 
and top executives at tech corporations can occur (Prainsack 2020; McGoey 2015).  

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One  example  of  this  is  Alphabet’s  now  long-standing  interest  and  investment  in 
Parkinson’s  disease  research,  which  includes  the  development  of  a  ’wearable’  for 
clinical  and  diagnostic  research,  investment  in  smart  utensils  for  people  with 
Parkinson’s,  and  over  US$1  billion  in  funding  for  Parkinson’s  research  channelled 
through  a  philanthropic  foundation  set  up  by  Sergey  Brin,  a  co-founder  of  Google. 
Parkinson’s  is  a  currently  incurable  neurodegenerative  disease  afflicting  some  10 
million  people  worldwide  which  deserves  the  substantial  attention  it  receives.  But 
the investments in research into treatments for it associated with Alphabet are also 
rooted  in  Brin’s  personal  interest  in  finding  a  cure  for  the  disease,  as  he  is  the 
carrier of a gene linked to Parkinson’s – something he has been publicly open about 
(Dolan  2022).  Furthermore,  while  Brin’s  philanthropy  is,  in  this  case,  of  apparent 
value to global health, it is known that a number of founders and executives at tech 
corporations, including those at Amazon, Palantir and Alphabet are actively investing 
in areas which may be of reduced importance in terms of global health, such as life 
extension and anti-ageing (Gebru; Sample 2022).  

In  strong  democratic  societies,  research  agenda  setting  has  to  be  the  outcome  of 
some form of public deliberation wherein the interests of  all  and the vulnerabilities 
of the weakest are taken into consideration. Moreover, public bodies must be able to 
audit  the  ensuing  studies  and  ensure  that  the  data  and  outputs  are  used  for  the 
public good. The influence of private actors and philanthropists with vested interests 
of their own on research priorities should remain limited.  

3.1.4. Deepening dependencies on Big Tech 

One  of  the  greatest  risks  for  democracy  raised  by  the  spectre  of  Big  Tech 
expansionism is the deepening of existing dependencies, and the emergence of new 
ones,  in  which  the  public  sector  eventually  becomes  a  ‘junior  partner’  to  private 
actors  –  in  this  case  a  handful  of  non-European  private  actors  who  are  neither 
transparent nor accountable in the way expected  of public sector actors, or indeed 
private contractors working in the public sector (Taylor 2021). An important avenue 
through  which  this  can  occur  is  through  the  growth  of  these  firms’  infrastructural 
power. Gürses and Dobbe (2020) distinguish between “common infrastructure” (i.e., 
the  familiar  traditional  infrastructure  of,  for  example,  water,  sewage,  road  and 
railway systems) and “computational infrastructure”, which they define as the global 
network of data centres, network infrastructure, and mobile devices and platforms. 
The  latter  is  becoming  essential  for  the  provision  of  digital  services.  Yet  the 
components of the computational infrastructure are owned and run by the largest of 
the tech  corporations:  Microsoft  (e.g.  Microsoft  365),  Amazon  (Azure),  Google  and 
Apple  (iOS).  Also  here,  the  problem  created  by  a  deepening  of  dependencies  does 
not  emerge  only  from  the  risk  of  data  being  misused.  It  arises  from  a  growing 
dependency  of  the  public  sector  on  these  infrastructures.  The  result  is  often  the 
divestment of public funding and a decline of public expertise. 

In  their  infrastructural  role,  the  products  and  services  offered  by  technology  firms 
need to be seen as elements of a ‘suite’, or ecosystem, which cannot be bought into 
without taking on the whole series of hardware, software, apps, cloud and operating 
system,  which  individual  products  (inter)operate  with.  Threats  to  democratic  and 
other  values  are  not  created  by  digital  technologies  as  such.  They  come  from  the 
ways  in  which  technologies  are  used,  what  they  replace,  and  whether  they  make 

European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 31 

 
 
Democracy in the digital age 

powerful actors even more powerful while disempowering others. Gürses and Dobbe 
(2020)  speak  of  a  deployment  of  computational  infrastructures  onto  common 
infrastructures  in  this  context.  While  our  public  infrastructures  have  not  yet  been 
infrastructure,  we  do 
completely  digitised  or  subsumed  by  computational 
increasingly  rely  on  computational  infrastructures  for  the  proper  functioning  of 
important  areas  of  society.  That  is,  our  public  infrastructures  are  increasingly 
becoming  computational  infrastructures  (think  of  electronic  health  care  records  or 
digital banking systems). This development can lead to a dangerous dependence of 
public  sectors  on  Big  Tech  firms  in  carrying  out  their  main  task,  the  provision  of 
public  services  and  goods,  and  to  the  undermining  of  the  “publicness”  of  public 
sectors (STOA 202250). 

The digital contact tracing API referred to above illustrates just how entangled and 
dependent our daily lives have become with, and on, computational infrastructures, 
and  how  this  can  affect  a  sector  such  as  public  health.  Google  and  Apple’s  almost 
complete monopoly of smartphone operating systems meant that the very attempt 
to  automate  contact  tracing  with  smartphone  applications  put  public  health 
authorities  and  governments  at  their  mercy  (Veale  2020).  If  interoperability  is 
sought – as was the case with contact-tracing apps – it would make little sense to 
develop apps that cannot run on Google or Apple’s operating systems.  

Another  example  is  the  extent  to  which  education  has  become  increasingly 
dependent  on  digital  platforms  and  infrastructure,  especially  during  the  pandemic 
and the rise of remote lectures and lessons (Fiebig et al., 2021; Kerssens  and van 
Dijck,  2021,  2022).  While  the  depth  of  these  dependencies  varies  from  country  to 
country, and from institution to institution, the authors of the papers just cited point 
out  that  one  of  the  main  issues  created  by  the  migration  of  universities  to  public 
clouds,  and  the  use  of  edtech  in  primary  and  secondary  schools,  is  autonomy:  be 
that  in  the  form  of  academic  independence  or  the  institutional  pedagogical 
autonomy of schools. 

Public  health  and  education  are  two  of  the  basic  goods  that  democratic  societies 
should  provide.  Increased  dependence  on  private  actors  in  the  provision  of  these 
goods  –  actors  who  are  not  regulated  in  the  same  way  that  public  actors  are,  are 
not held accountable for serving the public interest in the way that public actors are. 
Neither are they subject to public scrutiny in ways that enable redress  – is a threat 
to  democracy  that  requires  urgent  attention  in  European  policy  making  and 
regulation. 

All  of  these  risks  raised  by  Big  Tech  expansionism  point  to  the  need  for  broader 
issues, and specifically the public-private trade-offs, to be taken into account when 
the public sector considers collaborating with tech corporations. Indeed, while there 
is much value to reap from these collaborations given the technical capabilities the 
tech sector has to offer, the risks, including the gradual reshaping of public sectors 
immediate  nor 
and  the  entrenchment  of  new  dependencies,  are  neither 
straightforward. We need to develop policy and regulation that captures this broader 
societal  view  and  takes  into  account  the  longer-term  future  so  that  all  people  in 

50 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2022/729533/EPRS_STU(2022)72953
3_EN.pdf  

32    European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 

 
 
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Europe  can  benefit  from  the  collaborations  in  ways  that  protect  the  primacy  of 
democracy. 

3.2.  Regulatory  gaps,  unintended  overlaps,  and 

contradictions in new laws 

As noted in Section 2, the European Commission has been very busy over the past 
few  years  developing  new  legislation  to  address  potential  digital  harms  and 
improving  its  governance  of  digital  innovation.  In  the  process  it  has  sought,  in 
various ways, to mitigate the risks posed by the increased digitisation of society and 
to ensure that digital transformations take place in line with fundamental rights and 
values in Europe  –  and indeed to strengthen  our  democracies. Existing regulations 
primarily  affect  vertical  relations  between  state  actors  and  citizens.  However,  they 
also  affect  private  actors’  obligations  to  citizens  in  digital  policy,  and  they 
complement  one  another,  aiming  at  providing  comprehensive  protection.  The 
regulations impose several implementation obligations on EU institutions as well as 
Member  State  administrations:  for  example,  to  create  accountable  administrative 
bodies  and  infrastructures,  to  assign  new  tasks  to  existing  bodies  and  institutions, 
and  to  put  in  place  measures  that  implement,  operationalise  and  enforce  data 
subjects'  rights.  However,  several  regulatory  gaps  and  unintended  overlaps, 
duplications  and  contradictions  between  the  provisions  laid  down  in  legal 
instruments have been identified and still need to be solved (e.g. Bertuzzi 2023).  

When  it  comes  to  the  type  of  regulation  required  to  address  the  scope  and 
modalities  of  digital  technologies on the basis  of  values  and  ethical  principles,  it  is 
often difficult for legislators to define substantive rules from scratch. This can be the 
case,  for  example,  when  the  ethical  and  societal  evaluation  of  the  technology  in 
question is still pending. For example, the DSA tries to hold commercial actors such 
as  large  online  platforms  to  account  by,  among  other  things,  mandating  stricter 
rules on the removal of illegal content (Regulation (EU) 2022/2065: Art. 16 et seq.). 
Concretisation  of  what  is  to  be  considered  problematic  content  is,  as  the  term 
“illegal  content”  suggests,  limited  to  an  assessment  of  compliance  with  EU  and 
Member  State  law.  The  restriction  of  the  regulation  to  illegal  content,  however,  is 
too  narrow.  Other  types  of  harmful  information,  such  as  ‘simply’  false  news  and 
conspiracy  narratives,  can  be  just  as harmful,  but often  they  do  not  fall under  the 
umbrella  of  illegal  content.  A  further  hindrance  here  is  the  possibility  that  neither 
service  providers  nor  public  authorities  can  generate,  or  acquire,  the  necessary 
knowledge to assess and evaluate the relevant risks within a short period of time. 

Two  important  regulatory  principles  in  this  respect  are  the  risk  principle,  which 
requires  scientific  evidence  of  the  potential  risks  of  a  technology  and  adjusts 
regulation  accordingly,  and  the  precautionary  principle,  which  allows  the  use  of  a 
technology that threatens to cause serious and irreversible harm to humans and/or 
the environment to be restricted even in the absence of reliable scientific evidence. 
However,  these  principles  do  not  provide  specific  guidance  clarifying,  for  example, 
the necessary trade-offs between competing interest positions condensed into legal 
positions.  The  various  ways  in  which  the  principles  are  applied,  together  with  the 
paucity  of  case  law  illustrating  their  regulatory  implementation,  also  make  their 
uniform and context-specific application difficult where trade-offs are concerned. 

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Democracy in the digital age 

The actions of public administration often involve factual investigation of whether an 
intervention is necessary and then consideration of what legal measures, if any, are 
required. This two-stage examination is in many cases characterised by a margin of 
judgement at the factual level and a margin of discretion at the legal consequence 
level.  However,  if  the  legislature,  which  must  regulate  a  large  number  of  different 
practical  scenarios,  lacks  the  knowledge  necessary  for  determining  exactly  what 
decisions the administration should make in the relevant context, administrators are 
required  to  ‘close’  the  legal  knowledge  gaps,  and  to  determine  the  legal 
consequences.  With  the  increasing  freedom  being  given  to  administrative  bodies, 
there is the risk that the application of the law will depart from the intentions of the 
legislature  or  fail  to  be  as  consistent  as  it  should  be,  leading  to  variability  in  the 
preservation  and  implementation  of  values.  This  situation  is  further  complicated 
when administrators themselves lack expertise in the digital domain. That puts them 
at  a  disadvantage  vis-à-vis  private  actors,  who  have  extensive  technological 
knowledge  and  expertise.  It  also  limits  the  administration’s  ability  to  monitor  and 
exercise oversight. 

It is also true that, at present, we have an insufficient number of measures in place 
that put the digital expertise of private actors at the service of public interest (and 
sometimes  even  public  administration)  –  for  example  in  the  form  of  public  private 
partnerships  (PPPs)  that  involve  contractually  regulated  cooperation  between  a 
public  body  and  a  private  company  within  the  framework  of  a  special  purpose 
vehicle.  In  many  cases,  PPPs  introduce  a  division  of  labour  in  which  the  private 
partner  takes  responsibility  for  the  efficient  delivery  of  services,  while  the  public 
body ensures that the objectives, defined by public interest, are achieved, and that 
the  necessary  funding  is  provided.  Sometimes,  PPPs  are  motivated  by  problematic 
assumptions,  such  as  the  belief  that  privately  owned  social  media  platforms  are 
unique sites of pluralism and participation, or the opinion that technologies can only 
advance thanks to private sector investments, and the public sector must take what 
it  is  given.  Moreover,  PPPs  can  be  detrimental  to  democracy  if  they  contribute  to 
further  sphere  transgressions  (see  Section  3.1.),  and  to  a  greater  withdrawal  of 
public  actors  from  technology  development.  Another  problem  is  the  excessive 
influence  of  tech  corporations  on  the  exercise  of  fundamental  rights,  such  as 
freedom of speech and the right to information. 

In addition to regulatory gaps at the legislative level and knowledge gaps in public 
administration,  nuanced  specific  provisions  within  different  legal  instruments  can 
contribute  to  fragmentation.  This  happens,  for  example,  when  different  legal 
instruments apply to similar, or even identical, contexts and facts. Fragmentation, in 
turn, can undermine the very objectives that regulatory measures were designed to 
achieve  –  for  example  the  protection  of  fundamental  rights.  They  can  create 
confusion  among  those  who  apply  the  law,  since  neither  the  bearers  of  the 
obligations  nor  those  to  whom  those  obligations  are  owed  know  what  rights  and 
obligations the legal framework defines. 

As an illustration of these  issues, we can take the  rules on  data processing. These 
are broadly scattered across a multitude of new and recent EU legal instruments on 
digitalisation. In their substantive scope, the rules overlap – for example in terms of 
the data, the parties (including data processors), and the technologies to which they 
apply. 

A  more  specific  example,  at  EU  level,  is  the  following.  The  parallel,  simultaneous 
application of the GDPR, the AI Act and the DGA would oblige companies to take on 

34    European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 

 
Democracy in the digital age 

different  roles:  under  data  protection  law,  as  ’controllers’,  ‘joint  controllers’  with 
other entities, or ‘processors’; a ‘data holder’ role under the DGA; and a ‘developer’ 
role  under  the  AI  Regulation.  These  roles  are  not  harmonised  in  a  coherent  and 
clear  assignment  of  bundled  obligations  of  the  kind  that  would  be  vital  for  the 
addressees of the relevant laws and associated monitoring and oversight bodies. As 
a result, the actors who are assigned the duties by law are regularly unclear about 
what duties, exactly, are being assigned to them, and in which role. Overlapping or 
conflicting allocations of duty remain unresolved at the regulatory level and are not 
addressed  through  appropriate  governance  measures.  Other  specific  examples  of 
laws  in  conflict  include  the  duplication  of  protective  measures  (e.g.  applying  data 
protection  rules  to  anonymised  data  based  on  a  vague  definition  of  when  data  is 
legally  considered  anonymised)  and  the  inappropriate  shifts  in  the  trade-offs 
between conflicting interests that result from this. They also include the dissolution 
of safeguards by rules that effectively cancel each other out  – e.g. when the same 
actors have conflicting obligations to fulfil. 

The  monitoring  and  enforcement  of  conflicting  and  non-harmonised  regulations  is 
often  ineffective  because  it  is  exercised  by  different  bodies.  The  regulatory 
discordance  leads  to  scattered  audit  and  oversight  structures  to  be  created, 
resulting  in  a  patchwork  of  competencies  among  different  bodies,  and  in 
overcomplicated  administrative  oversight  and  enforcement  structures  overall. 
Additionally, even when the obligations are clearly defined – as is the case, for very 
large  online  platforms,  for  example,  in  the  DSA  –  they  follow  principles  of  private 
law enforcement and self-responsibility by the service providers. For example, they 
leave  it  up  to the  provider  to  decide  on  the  legality  of  the  content  it  hosts  and  its 
removal  or  its  blocking.  Even  where  official  orders  against  illegal  content  are 
available under EU or national law, in enforcing and complying with applicable law, 
providers  are  primarily  encouraged  to  self-regulate  –  for  example  by  adapting 
General  Terms  and  Conditions,  and  defining  community  standards,  content 
moderation, risk mitigation, or codes of conduct. It remains to be seen whether, and 
to  what  extent,  providers  will  be  willing  to  comply  with  these  self-regulatory 
obligations  and  adapt  their  systems  accordingly.  The  proposed  countermeasures  – 
fully implemented – would in some cases seriously shake up the providers' business 
models  (Kuhlmann  &  Trute  2022).  It  is  also  questionable  whether  the  supervisory 
authorities and courts can prosecute violations of the applicable law effectively given 
the sheer volume of new content. 

The fragmentation of specific regulations in the digital domain can be observed not 
only between EU secondary law measures, but also within individual secondary law 
instruments.  It  also  arises  at  different  regulatory  levels  –  for  example  between 
international law and EU law, EU law and the law of third countries, and EU law and 
the law of the Member States.  Where the interaction between EU  law and Member 
State  law  is  concerned,  the  main  challenge  is  the  mutual  influence  of  sectoral 
regulations. The various impacts that the regulation of one sector or area has, often 
unintentionally, on other sectors and areas, particularly on the enforcement of their 
rules,  can  lead  to  an  undesirable  fragmentation  of  laws  with  the  same,  or  similar, 
substantive  scope.  For  example,  many  non-EU  social  media  companies  are 
registered  in  EU  countries  to  benefit  from  low  tax  rates.  The  fact  that  the 
responsibility  for  data  protection  monitoring  and  oversight  is  generally  assigned  to 
the supervisory authorities of the countries in  which  the  companies are  registered, 
and that they are often not well equipped to handle a large number of complaints in 
a  timely  manner,  has  created  a  bottleneck  in  the  handling  of  data  protection 

European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 35 

 
Democracy in the digital age 

complaints by these authorities in connection with international data transfers. This 
bottleneck has recently been resolved by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU Case 
C-645/19).  The  Court  has  extended  the  responsibilities  of  the  data  protection 
supervisory  authorities  of  Member  States,  clarifying  their  mutual  obligations  to 
exchange  information  and  creating  new  possibilities  for  filing  complaints  in 
connection  with  the  consistency  and  cooperation  procedure  between  supervisory 
authorities set out in the GDPR.51 

While it is true that interaction between EU law and national law related to various 
legal  regimes  and  sectors  must  fit  into  the  complex  system  of  division  of  the 
competences  between  Member  States  and  the  EU,  the  interpretation  of  EU  law  by 
the CJEU could nevertheless benefit from this interaction. However, the introduction 
of  such  interpretation  through  case  law  is  only  possible  if  relevant  facts  are 
presented to the courts, and the ensuing proceedings take a long time. 

The objective of the GDPR is to ensure both the  protection  of data subjects' rights 
and the free movement of data. In determining the proportionate balance of these 
objectives, risks to the rights and freedoms of natural persons that may be affected 
by  a  particular  data  processing  operation  must  be  taken  into  account,  with 
consideration  being  given  to  all  of  the  affected  fundamental  rights  and  freedoms 
under CFREU as well as rights guaranteed by secondary legislation. The principle of 
proportionality  also  applies  to  international  data  transfers.  Since  the  level  of 
protection  provided  for  in  EU  law  must  ‘travel’  with  the  data  wherever  it  goes, 
conflicts  between  the  GDPR  and  third  country  data  protection  rules  are  bound  to 
arise in cases where both can be applied if third country data protection rules differ 
from those of the GDPR, and there are no mechanisms to resolve such a situation. 

At  the  same  time,  new  legislative  proposals  appear  to  double  down  on  data 
protection  by,  for  example,  treating  access  to  personal  and  sensitive  data  in  a 
secure data space as an international data transfer when actors outside the EU/EEA 
request access. Access to data in an EU infrastructure follows technical specifications 
that comply with the standards of EU data protection law. If data cannot leave the 
secure data system and can only be processed within the infrastructure according to 
EU standards, no further, and different, obligations should be imposed on European 
and international  actors as users  of the data, i.e., stricter access conditions should 
not be defined for international actors. 

To  protect  the  rights  of  data  subjects  and  to  comply  with  the  principles  of  data 
minimisation  and  purpose  limitation,  sensitive  data  is  usually  made  available  in 
anonymised form for secondary use, for example for scientific research. This is the 
case  for  electronic  health  data  in  the  European  Health  Data  Space  (EHDS),  to  the 
extent  that  the  anonymised  data  is  sufficient  to  achieve the processing purpose  of 
the data user. At the same time, data processing by users is limited to the technical 
infrastructure  of  the  EHDS  and  does  not  allow  users  to  download  or  otherwise 
reproduce the data in question. However, making data available in anonymised form 

51  The  CJEU  clarifies  the powers  of  national  supervisory  authorities  under  the  GDPR  in  that  it 
empowers a supervisory authority of a Member State, under certain conditions, to exercise its 
power  to  bring  an  alleged  breach  of  the  GDPR  before  a  court  of  that  state.  The  supervisory 
authority  can  initiate  or  conduct  judicial  proceedings  in  relation  to  cross-border  data 
processing,  even  if  that  authority  is  not  the  lead  supervisory  authority  in  relation  to  that 
processing.  

36    European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 

 
 
Democracy in the digital age 

would  exclude  their  processing  from  the  scope  of  the  GDPR,  so  no  further 
safeguards  may  be  needed  to  maintain  protection  if  the  nature  of  the  processing 
does not remove anonymisation. On the other hand, if safeguards are put in place, 
processing data in a non-anonymous format could still comply with applicable data 
protection  rules.  In  addition,  processing  data  in  a  non-anonymised  format  would 
avoid losing the analytical value of the data for research (Molnár-Gábor et al. 2022). 
By  mandating  anonymised  processing  as  the  main  rule  in  an  otherwise  secure 
technical infrastructure such as the EHDS, the safeguards for data processing seem 
to be ‘duplicated’ and no longer reflect the proportionality that should be established 
between  the  interests  of  the  processor  and  the  interests  of  data  protection.  This 
proportionality or balance must also consider the data subjects' interest in the data 
processing,  as  well  as  the  societal  perspective  that  the  data  is  being  processed  to 
ensure that public benefits are derived from the research results. In other words: By 
mandating  protection  within  a  data  space  designed  according  to  applicable  data 
protection  standards  and  making  anonymisation  the  main  rule,  the  principle  of 
proportionality seems to be disregarded. 

European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 37 

 
 
 
Democracy in the digital age 

4.  WHAT  SHOULD  BE  DONE  TO  PROTECT  AND 

STRENGTHEN DEMOCRACIES IN THE EU? 

As  argued  in  this  Opinion,  strengthening  democracy  –  as  the  form  of  government 
best suited to realise fundamental rights and core values of the EU such as justice, 
equality  and  solidarity  –  is  an  ethical  necessity.  Digital  technologies  can  support 
democratic processes and structures in many ways: they can, for instance, facilitate 
voting and participation,52 or foster access to information, education and healthcare. 
At the same time, there are substantial grounds for concerns regarding novel harms 
to  democracy  in  the  digital  era.  The  opportunity  to  rapidly53  spread  false  or 
manipulative  information  can  have  detrimental  effects  on  public  debate  and 
democratic  elections,  and  it  can  increase  polarisation  in  societies  (European 
Parliament 2021a). Privacy harms and ubiquitous surveillance can lead to pernicious 
uses of personal data and a contraction of the ‘breathing room’ that people need to 
act  as  autonomous,  critical  individuals  (Cohen  2013:  p.  1906).  Other  problems 
include  the  potential  for  new  forms  of  discrimination  resulting  from  algorithmic 
decision-making,  non-equitable  returns  for  the  public  sector  from  the  commercial 
profits of digital  businesses, agenda setting by commercial entities, and deepening 
dependencies  on  private  technology  corporations  for  the  provision  of  basic  public 
goods. All these developments threaten the values that a democratic system aims to 
protect. 

Safeguarding  values  and  fundamental  rights  cannot  be  achieved  by  governments 
alone:  it  requires  the  active  participation  of  all  people.  However,  it  cannot  be 
assumed  that  all  are  similarly  interested  in  engaging  or  enabled  to  engage.  In  the 
following section, we outline the preconditions for active citizenship and democratic 
participation in the digital era. We call for efforts to promote people’s digital literacy 
(including  its  technological  and  legal  aspects,  and  critical  thinking  skills)  and  we 
argue  for  the  need  for  an  ethical  framework  governing  interventions  aimed  at 
reducing  harmful  information  and  other  problematic  developments  in  the  digital 
space.  Finally,  we  address  the  importance  of  publicly  funded  research  and  of 
focussing on regulatory gaps.  

4.1.  Citizenship54 in digital democracies 

As  noted,  democracy  –  and  in  turn,  citizenship  –  means  more  than  mere 
participation  in  elections.  The  kind  of  citizenship  that  corresponds  with  the  ’thick’ 

52  Some  expect  that  digital  practices  will  change  the  nature  of  political  representation  in 
profound  ways;  digital  technologies  also  provide  opportunities  for  more  forms  of  direct 
democracy – see, e.g. European Parliamentary Research Service (2020). 
53  Research  found  that  false  stories  spread  faster,  farther  and  deeper  than  other  types  of 
information; see JRC 2019. 
54 Also here, we emphasise that our use of the term citizenship is broader than merely formal 
legal citizenship. It denotes people’s roles and identities in the political communities they are 
part of. 

38    European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 

 
 
  
 
Democracy in the digital age 

conception  of  democracy  that  we  promote  in  this  Opinion  requires  people  living  in 
the EU to be willing, and to be given opportunities, to participate in political, social 
and economic life.  

Participation of this kind requires several things. It requires that people trust the EU 
and its institutions, and that they are willing to engage actively in public life, based 
on a shared vision, and that they are confident that such engagement can have an 
impact.  At  least  three  preconditions  can  support  this.  First,  transparent,  fair  and 
consistent  policies  and  governance  by  EU  institutions  are  a  requirement  for  trust. 
Here,  digital  technologies  and  interfaces  can  be  helpful  in  creating  access  to 
information and  documentation that shows how  and  why decisions were reached  – 
for example also by clarifying the values upon which decisions are based.  

A  second  precondition  concerns  peoples’  conception  of  themselves  as  political 
actors,  and  indeed  as  sovereign,  rather  than  as  mere  private  individuals  and 
consumers. While democratic values do not necessarily clash with market logic, the 
latter  hollow  out  the  former  when  they  take  over  all  spheres  of  society  (Soron  & 
Laxer  2012).  When  people’s  wealth  determines  their  access  to  healthcare  and 
housing, and what schools their children attend, this increases inequalities and limits 
the spaces in which people from all walks of life and all social strata come together. 
Democracies require deliberation and other exchanges to take place in these spaces, 
and  the  commercialisation  of  public  space  limits  these  vital  exchanges  (Sandel 
2020). The overarching power of market logic also explains why the EU’s imperative 
to  harmonise  markets  (here:  digital  markets)  is  often  in  tension  with  fundamental 
values such as justice, equality and solidarity. When markets become the reference 
point for all other values, ’fairness’ is reduced to ‘fair competition’ and ‘domination’ 
comes to mean ‘market domination’. In the focus on markets, moreover, individuals 
are  reconfigured as consumers only, and  companies are  mere market competitors. 
Strengthening  democracies  in  the  digital  era,  by  contrast,  requires  understanding 
fairness in its broad sense, involving equality and justice in and across all domains, 
not just the economic sphere, and ensuring that people’s basic needs do not have to 
be  met  on  market  terms.  Public  services  should  insulate  key  values  and  needs  – 
education,  healthcare,  housing  –  from  market  rationales  and  dynamics.  And,  more 
broadly, issues pertaining to the economy need to be included in the range of issues 
that  people  have  a  say  in  (see  also  Warren  1992).  The  notion  of  economic 
democracy  (Sen  2009)  emphasises  that  citizens  also  need  to  have  agency  over 
economic issues. The organisation  of economies shapes how people work and live, 
what  they  learn  in  school,  how  much  they  earn,  and  many  other  things.  It  is  too 
important to be left solely ‘to the experts’ or ‘to the market’. 

Third,  encouraging  democratic  participation  also  requires  providing  opportunities 
and an infrastructure that allows citizens to engage with EU policies and institutions. 
The  European  Commission’s  “Have  your  say”  platform55  and  the  digital  platform 
used  for  the  Conference  on  the  Future  of  Europe  are  good  starting  points  for  this. 
Again, digital technologies provide a range of means to facilitate these processes  – 
for  example  through  civic  engagement  platforms,  e-voting  or  other  e-democracy 
applications  –  nurturing  a  culture  in  which  participation  is  perceived  as  an  integral 

55 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives_en  

European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 39 

 
 
Democracy in the digital age 

part  of  everyday  life  and  is  facilitated  (CDDG  2021;  European  Digital  Competence 
Framework for Citizens56).57 

4.2.  Public education 

In digital societies, the ability of people to participate in different aspects of political, 
social  and  economic  life  also  depends  on  their  digital  skills,  digital  literacy  and 
related abilities. These capacities are needed if people are to be able to manoeuvre 
through  digital  interfaces,  be  it  simply  to  access  information,  to  cast  a  vote,  or  to 
engage  in  a  deliberative  process.  A  more  demanding  aspect  of  digital  literacy 
concerns  the  confusing  intermingling  of  reliable  and  harmful  information  in  the 
digital sphere. AI-generated content that is indistinguishable from human-generated 
content,  often  based  on  undeclared  sources  (Spitale  et  al.  2023),  and  the 
algorithmic creation of echo chambers, make it even harder for people to critically, 
and  fruitfully,  assess  and  use  the  information  that  is  digitally  available  to  them. 
Beyond  technical  and  epistemic  issues,  citizens  need  to  be  informed  about  the 
potential  benefits  and  harms  of  information  sources,  communication  channels  and 
engagement platforms in the digital space so that they can make informed decisions 
about whom to trust and which services to use. As not everyone is equally prepared 
or enabled to participate in public discourse, interventions fostering critical thinking, 
moral  reasoning  and  effective  and  constructive  communication  can  facilitate  the 
participation  of  all  social  groups,  together  with  interventions  that  foster  the 
appreciation of public engagement itself. Legal literacy training can help citizens to 
harness the benefits and  to challenge the negative power of digital technologies in 
the EU.  

Interventions, for example training courses, of such kind can help us, as a society, 
to overcome digital divides, ensuring that everyone has the tools and capabilities to 
use digital technologies to participate fully in society, and that no one is left behind 
(e.g.  the  EU’s  Digital  Education  Action  Plan58,  or  Mimikama,  an  Austrian  fact-
checking  site59).  In  a  time  when  (often  inexpensive)  mobile  devices  have  become 
the  primary  means  of  online  access  for  many  people  around  the  world,  digital 
divides  go  beyond  the  separation  between  users  and  non-users  of  digital 
technologies (see Prainsack 2017: p. 36). One divide is between those who use the 
internet  mostly  in  a  passive  and  basic  way,  and  those  who  have  the  skills  and 
means to use it in more creative and deeper ways – although the former may spend 
just as many, or even more hours online (e.g. Wei 2012; van Deursen and van Dijk 
2014; Robinson et al. 2015). Lack of access is not the only reason for internet non-
use.  Some  people  choose  to  remain  offline  due  to  what  media  and  technology 
expert  David  Brake  calls  “motivational”  access  barriers  (Brake  2014),  referring  to 
people who feel that the internet does not have anything worthwhile to offer, or who 
are concerned about privacy (see also Morrison & Gomez 2014). Alternative access 

56 https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=15688&langId=en  
57  In  a  non-paper,  the  EU  Digital  Citizenship  Working  Group  set  out,  in  2022,  five  pillars  of 
digital  citizenship,  recommending  policy  actions  in  areas  including  technology,  social 
engagement, human rights and democratic participation (Killeen 2022). 
58 https://education.ec.europa.eu/focus-topics/digital-education/action-plan  
59 https://www.mimikama.org/  

40    European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 

 
 
 
Democracy in the digital age 

to services, in particular in healthcare, must be guaranteed to people who prefer not 
to enter the digital sphere.  

4.3.  Ethics  frameworks  for  interventions  to  counter 

infodemics  

Those using digital interfaces need to be able to recognise reliable information. They 
require  tools  that  enable  them  to  autonomously  judge  and  critically  evaluate  the 
quality  of  the  information  they  receive.60  On  the  other  hand,  information  provided 
by  public  authorities  including  the  EU  institutions  must  be  inclusive  as  well  as 
tailored to the intended user groups, notably to those who are not ‘digital natives’. 
Tools  that  encourage  users  to  participate  in  digital  initiatives  can  offer  new 
opportunities  for  sharing  knowledge  and  information,  especially  when  these  are 
aimed at groups who are  at risk of marginalisation  in  digital societies, such as  the 
elderly.  Such  tools  could  also  help  to  broaden  public  debates  that  are  otherwise 
restricted to the digitally literate or other elite groups. 

The task of judging the quality of information cannot, however, be left to individual 
people  alone.  This  is  why,  in  response  to  fake  news  and  other  manipulative 
strategies that threaten democracies today, institutions are increasingly considering 
the use of social listening, social marketing and even social engineering strategies. 
See for example the work of the WHO on “an ethical framework and tools for social 
listening and infodemic management”.61  

Toxic  content  –  including  racist,  sexist,  homophobic,  xenophobic  and  otherwise 
hateful forms of speech  – circulating widely on the internet is now also reproduced 
by  chat  bots.  One  means  of  addressing  this  is  content  moderation,  but  it  is  by  no 
means  a  silver  bullet.  First,  because  the  contextual  nature  of  language  makes 
automating this task extremely difficult, if not too dangerous or even impossible.62 
Second,  because  content  moderation  –  certainly  in  the  form  of  the  monitoring  of 
hateful speech and horrendous images – is arduous, tedious and traumatising work 
for humans to carry out. Most tech corporations outsource this “ghost work” (Gray & 
Sury  2019).  The  result  is  that  precarious  workers  in  Africa  and  Southeast  Asia, 
working 
for  this  task,  thereby 
exacerbating  unequal  labour  relations  between  the  Global  North  and  the  Global 
South.  These  difficulties  will  only  grow  with  the  integration  of  large  language 

in  problematic  conditions,  are  responsible 

60  The  ERC  project  BOTFIND  developed  a  ‘junk  news  aggregator’,  a  publicly  available  set  of 
tools  to  evaluate  news  quality  online.  Similarly,  the  ERC  project  FARE_AUDIT  is  currently 
designing  a  tool  to  audit  search  engines  with  the  aim  to  detect  disinformation  in  real  time 
(these and the other European Research Council projects referenced here were brought to the 
attention  of  the  EGE  by  the  Feedback  to  Policy  team  of  the  ERC  Executive  Agency).  At  the 
EGE’s public round table on Democracy in the Digital Age, reference was made to  GPTZero, a 
platform developed in response to ChatGPT, that can be used to detect AI-generated content.  
61 https://www.who.int/news/item/10-02-2023-who-kicks-off-deliberations-on-ethical-
framework-and-tools-for-social-listening-and-infodemic-management  
62  Yet,  there  have  been  many  attempts  to  develop  automated  solutions,  for  example  in  the 
context of the ERC project AI4Dignity.  

European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 41 

 
 
 
Democracy in the digital age 

models, such as ChatGPT and Bard, into search engines and their widespread use by 
citizens. 

Going far beyond matters of content moderation, AI-based predictive  analytics can 
be used to nudge and affect the behaviour of internet users in a targeted way. Such 
strategies may lead to a ‘digital arms race’ to influence public opinion rather than to 
participatory  democratic  discourse.  Understanding  knowledge  gaps,  emotional 
reactions  and  behavioural  dispositions  can  be  used  for  providing  targeted 
information  to  people  (Spitale  et  al.  2021).  The  Cambridge  Analytica  and  Team 
Jorge scandals provide shocking examples of this63 and solutions must be found for 
ensuring that those employing these services (political parties, individual politicians, 
or other actors), and those providing them can be held accountable. 

The points above lead to one last crucial consideration. Particularly when important 
societal goods such as public health are at stake, there is a risk that core features of 
democracy  will  be  undermined  by  well-intended  but  problematic  efforts  to  silence 
dissenting  and  potentially  harmful  voices.64  Action  might  be  warranted  in 
circumstances where a crisis threatens, but it would need to be guided by an ethics 
framework  based  on  the  principles  of  openness,  transparency, 
inclusivity, 
intelligibility  and  privacy,  that  help  to  shape  the  key  elements  of  risk  and  crisis 
communication  (evidence,  initiator,  channel,  publics,  message  and  feedback) 
(Spitale et al. 2022). It is also important to ensure that urgent decisions made in a 
crisis  do  not  flout  democratic  legitimation  and  that  they  remain  open  to  public 
scrutiny (EGE 2022). 

4.4.  Publicly funded research and its results 

An  important  concern  which  became  especially  apparent  during  the  COVID-19 
pandemic, relates to publicly funded research and its results. On the one hand, the 
EU  has  invested  millions  of  euros  in  research  carried  out  at  public  and  private 
institutions and corporations. On the other, the private sector remains the only point 
of  reference  when  it  comes  to  the  use  of  digital  technologies,  such  as  AI,  in  the 
public  sector.  When  governments  and  public  administrations  seek  to  use 
technological  applications  to  deliver  public  services,  they  tend  to  turn  to  private 
companies  rather  than  publicly  accountable  institutions,  such  as  universities  (see 
also  Larkin  2013).65  However,  privately  owned  companies  often  treat  data  and 

63 See e.g. The Guardian’s continuous reporting on this, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/series/disinfo-black-ops   
64 E.g. as discussed at the EUI’s conference on Surveillance, Democracy, and the Rule of Law, 
https://www.eui.eu/events?id=544559  
65 Hecht (2009: p. 15) uses the term “technopolitics” to refer to the “strategic practice of [...] 
using  technology  to  constitute,  embody, or  enact political goals”.  Törnberg  (2023: p.  9)  sees 
the attempt to “compete with  - and even supplant  - the regulatory role of public institutions” 
as a characteristic of platform capitalism, and argues that the owners of large digital platforms 
pursue  the  strategy  to  “unnest  their  proprietary  markets  from  the  larger  public  market  of 
which  it  is part,  making  participants  subject only  to  the  taxation  and  governance  imposed  by 
the platforms themselves” (Törnberg 2023: p. 6). See also York (2022). 

42    European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 

 
 
 
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research  findings  as  proprietary  instead  of  developing  prototypes  and  models  that 
are made available to the rest of society.  

This  means  that  there  is  a  strong  misalignment  between  research  funding  and 
knowledge that leads to tangible benefits for the  public: the  openness of research, 
data, and science is obviously not enough  to  ensure that society benefits from  the 
studies paid for with its taxes. It is necessary to ensure that innovation funded with 
public money in the EU remains in the public sphere. The development of AI-based 
translation software that includes minority languages is not a minor example. 

4.5.  Regulation: What steps to take? 

4.5.1. Knowledge generation 

Beyond supporting science through projects and policy programmes such as Horizon 
Europe, the EU should ensure that findings from scientific research are transformed 
into actionable knowledge  for  society, including  for policy making. EU and Member 
State  authorities  should  be  able  to  draw  on  extensive  empirical  knowledge  within 
the  scope  of  their  discretionary  powers  when  implementing  EU  law  principles  and 
applying  indeterminate  legal  concepts  such  as  public  interest.  To  this  end,  EU 
agencies  could  further  streamline  information  gathering  and  provide  assistance  to 
prevent the spread of false and other forms of harmful information. This applies in 
particular to risk information.  

4.5.2. Public private partnerships (PPPs) 

Possible forms of cooperation between the public sector and private companies and 
the  role  played  by  the  EU  in  establishing  PPPs  require  more  regulatory  attention, 
especially  as  regards  the  design  of  such  relationships  in  line  with  the  CFREU.  This 
could  help  to  counteract  the  potential  issues  listed  in  Section  3,  which  include  the 
crowding out of public expertise and control by the increasing expansion of power of 
large tech corporations. Conditions that could be written into PPPs might include, for 
example,  an  insistence  on  open-source  software  or  the  implementation  of  Human 
Rights Impact Assessments prior to a PPP being agreed on. 

For PPPs to serve innovation and to strengthen democratic and other values at the 
same  time,  access  to  data  needs  to  prevent  a  ‘Matthew  effect’,  in  which  powerful 
corporations  benefit  disproportionately  compared  to  smaller  and  medium  sized 
enterprises and public actors. Moreover, the commercial benefits from any data use 
should be shared with the public sphere (Prainsack et al. 2022).   

Fundamental  rights  do  not  only  apply  to  the  relationship  between  individuals  and 
the  state,  but  they  also  influence  the  legal  relationships  between  individuals,  and 
generally  between  private  actors.  Committing  private  actors  to  the  protection  of 
fundamental rights is and remains of key importance. In  addition to the horizontal 
force  of  fundamental  rights,  which  generally  affects  relations  between  individuals 
and private actors, PPPs can directly bind private actors to the obligation to respect 
fundamental  rights  when they  must  act  in  the  performance  of  a  public  duty.  In  all 

European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 43 

 
 
Democracy in the digital age 

PPPs, it should be carefully considered whether the private companies involved pose 
a risk to democratic and other values (e.g. via partnerships with other companies in 
autocratic countries, or via ownership or influence by non-democratic governments). 

4.5.3. Technology  as  a  means  of  fostering  fundamental  rights 

protection  

Technological  measures  can  help  to  minimise  risks  to  the  rights  and  freedoms  of 
individuals. They can do so by helping to define the context of data processing that 
takes  place.  Technical  design,  such  as  secure  data  infrastructures,  can  also 
contribute to the implementation of the principle of proportionality and can help to 
ensure the protection of the rights and freedoms of data subjects.  

In  addition,  the  creation  of  a  favourable  technical  framework  for  digitisation  can 
serve  as  a  basis  for  using  data  in  the  public  interest  while  complying  with  clearly 
defined legal requirements. The technical environment will, in this way, become part 
of the governance. 

4.5.4. Cooperation and enforcement 

The  rules  in  data-related  legal  acts  must  be  coherent  and  consistent  to  be 
applicable.  Given  the  current  inconsistencies,  there  is  a  great  need  to  guide 
implementation  towards  actionability  of  the  new  legal  frameworks  in  compliance 
with  the  principle  of  subsidiarity  in  the  EU,  and  to  avoid  regulatory  gaps,  also 
influencing  effective  enforcement.  Where  regulations  already  provide  for  the 
possibility  of  further  specifying  EU  rules  on  particular  topics  in  compliance  with  EU 
competences,  this  should  be  pursued  (e.g.  tertiary  legal  acts,  e.g.  Art.  40  GDPR 
codes of conduct for sectoral data processing). 

In  addition,  different  legal  regimes  can  be  mutually  reinforcing  in  implementation 
and  enforcement.  An  example  of  this  are  measures  developed  under  antitrust  law 
that can  prevent the concentration of power related to data collection, culmination 
and aggregation, alongside data protection regulations and consumer protection.  

4.5.5. The EU as an international actor 

In the international field, protection obligations could also be implemented through 
technical  solutions  that  are  a  translation  of  legal  trade-offs  and  values,  especially 
when  not  only  individual  data  and  information  but  information  systems  and 
infrastructures  are  affected  on  a  cross-border  level.  In  addition,  the  shifting of  the 
protection  of  fundamental  values  to  operators  of  networks  and  platforms  needs  to 
be accompanied  by  appropriate  regulatory  measures  on  EU  and  international  level 
instead  of leaving  the  development, implementation  and monitoring of rules to  the 
self-regulatory efforts of private actors (see criticisms of the DSA in Section 3.2.). 

While  strengthening  human  rights  protections  regarding  transnational  information 
flows  is  helpful  in  combating  the  effects  of  foreign  interference  on  privacy,  the  EU 
could  also  play  a  more  important  role  in  unifying  the  rules  that  define  these 
protections  across  countries  in  instances  of  different  regulatory  systems  applying 
different data protection and privacy rules. 

44    European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 

 
Democracy in the digital age 

In this context, rules for solving conflicting data processing provisions between the 
EU and third countries with different constitutional traditions could more vigorously 
prescribe  data  processing  rules  in  business-to-business  (B2B)  and  business-to-
government  (B2G)  contexts.  For  future  specific  rules  on  an  international  level,  the 
Council  of  Europe’s  amended  treaty  on  data  protection  law66  could  be  a  good 
starting point.  

66  Council  of  Europe,  Protocol  amending  the  Convention  for  the  Protection  of  Individuals  with 
regard  to  Automatic  Processing  of  Personal  Data  (CETS  No.  223).  Council  of  Europe, 
Convention  for  the  Protection  of  Individuals  with  regard  to  Automatic  Processing  of  Personal 
Data (CETS No. 108). 

European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 45 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Democracy in the digital age 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

Since the end of World War II, Europe, European countries and peoples, as well as 
the  nascent  European  institutions,  have  been  at  the  forefront  of  democratic 
development. But democracy is a living and breathing ideal that must continually be 
strived  for,  that  must  be  nurtured  and  defended.  It  is  not  just  a  political  regime, 
upheld  by  elections.  It  is  also  a  set  of  fundamental  values,  including  respect  for 
human  rights  and  ethical  values  such  as  justice,  solidarity  and  freedom.  These 
values  shape  human  behaviour  and  form  the  foundation  of  societies.  Such  an 
understanding  of  democracy  implies  a  civic  consciousness  of  engagement  and  the 
recognition  of  the  importance  of  social,  political  and  economic  equality  in  society. 
Recent years have seen profound challenges to democracy understood not only as a 
political regime, but also to democracy understood in this ‘thick’ sense. Democracy 
is in peril. 

Without  being  its  sole  cause,  digital  technologies  have  played  an  important  role  in 
this  development.  They  have,  in  various  ways,  contributed  to  the  spread  of  mis-, 
dis-  and  other  problematic 
information,  manipulation,  polarisation  and 
discrimination.  Via  the  expansion  of  powerful  technology  corporations,  digital 
practices  have  facilitated  the  spread  of  market  logics  into  public  sectors  which  are 
responsible 
for  providing  basic  goods  such  as  well-functioning  democratic 
institutions, health and education to all. However, when the important set of values 
that  underpin  democracies  are  considered  in  their  design  and  regulation,  digital 
technologies can also contribute to safeguarding and furthering democracy. 

To  protect  and  to  foster  democracy,  the  European  Union  should  adopt  purposeful 
policies – which ought to be pursued by: 

1. Thinking  of  democracy  differently  –  A  wider 

understanding of democracy 

Democracy is, too often, problematically reduced to elections alongside very limited 
mechanisms  that  enable  civic  participation  and  the  rule  of  law  –  without 
substantively  accounting  for  the  rule  of  the  people  and  the  protection  of  their 
interests. Democratic values and principles, such as equality, freedom, participation 
and  accountability,  mean  little  unless  they  are  specifically  and  concretely  enacted 
through democratic practices and institutions.  

The  EGE  calls  for  a  wider  understanding  of  democracy  as  the  evolving  form  of 
organisation that is underpinned by – and best suited to protect – shared values and 
fundamental rights, and that is driven by the search for – and best suited to attain – 
the  continuing  realisation  of  the  common  good.  Such  a  conception  of  democracy 
also  entails  a  civic  consciousness  of  engagement  and  the  recognition  of  the 
importance  of  social,  political  and  economic  equality  in  society.  It  requires  civic 
solidarity  and  reciprocity  that  support  just  outcomes.  It  is,  indeed,  to  be  seen  not 
only  as  a  political  system,  but  as  a  wider  social  system  that  also  protects  its  own 
societal preconditions, including health care, education and housing for all. 

46    European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 

 
 
 
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The  EGE  calls  upon  all  to strive  towards  and  make  real  such  a  democracy;  it  calls 
upon  civil  society  to  demand  it  and  make  use  of  all  democratic  means  and 
institutions  in  that  regard;  it  calls  upon  those  in positions of  power to nurture  and 
expand such institutions; and it calls upon all those who hold claims to expertise to 
explore how this can be furthered. What democracy means and how it works has to 
be  continuously  developed,  and  this  very  (democratic)  process  of  becoming  and 
envisioning needs to be safeguarded.  

2. A more inclusive democracy 

2.1. Public  participation,  civic  education  and  critical  digital  literacy 

must be promoted and supported 

Member States, EU institutions, and other public authorities need to provide digital 
education to all people in Europe in order to ensure digital democratic participation 
and  engagement,  enhancing  access  to  information  and  strengthening  public 
deliberation  and  pluralistic  dialogue.  Skills  required  for  participating  in  public 
discourse should be purposely fostered in education, such as critical thinking, ethical 
reasoning and effective communication. Literacy training (in terms of digital, ethical 
and  legal  literacy)  will  help  us  all  to  both  harness  the  benefits  and  challenge  the 
negative  power  of  digital  technologies  in  the  EU.  In  addition,  public  investment 
should  foster  the  creation  of  platforms  and  other  digital  media,  in  some  cases 
publicly owned, that support a public sphere that does not feed on polarisation and 
the  spread  of  harmful  information,  but  that  instead  facilitates  participation, 
deliberation  and  dialogue.  In  this  context,  appropriate  measures  must  be  taken  to 
ensure that digital divides are bridged, not only in terms of access to infrastructure 
and digital technologies, but also in terms of how people can use digital technologies 
and make their voice heard.  

2.2. Digital citizenship requires social inclusion  

Digital citizenship, understood as the ability to use (engage with and steer clear of) 
digital  technologies  in  critical,  collaborative  and  creative  ways,  also  requires  that 
people are able to recognise reliable information, having the tools that enable them 
to  autonomously  judge  and  critically  evaluate  the  quality  of  the  information  they 
receive. It further requires that such tools be attuned also to groups who are at risk 
of  marginalisation  in  digital  societies,  such  as  the  elderly,  disabled  persons  and 
persons  living  in  poverty,  and  that  research  on  inclusive  digital  technologies  be 
encouraged. 

2.3. More  coherent  regulation  is  needed  to  make  digital  practices 

serve people and communities 

Digital technologies need to be regulated in such a way that they serve people and 
communities, instead of merely benefitting a small elite at the cost of most others, 

European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 47 

 
 
Democracy in the digital age 

becoming more transparent and accountable. The  European Commission has taken 
an  active  interest  in  digital  transformation,  drafting  legislation  in  response  to  this 
rapidly  changing  field,  aiming  to  improve  fundamental  rights  protection.  But  more 
must be done to address the risks that digital technologies create such as new forms 
of  discrimination  resulting 
the  use  of  algorithmic  decision-making. 
Standardisation  and  alignment  of  regulation  across  the  European  Union  to  foster 
coherence  and  consistency  needs  to  be  further  supported,  also  through  mid-level 
sectoral  rules,  such  as  Codes  of  Conduct,  by  strengthening  knowledge  generation 
and  by  promoting  technological  solutions  such  as  shared  data  spaces.  This  should 
help to reduce regulatory fragmentation between Member States and promote both 
technical  and  normative  interoperability  between  enhanced  digital  services,  while 
preserving fundamental rights. 

from 

3. Recognising  the  importance  of,  and  strengthening, 

civil society organisations 

Civil society organisations (CSOs) can be important actors endorsing and promoting 
core values such as democracy, the rule of law and solidarity, across the European 
Union. They can be part of wider coalitions of engagement in the context of human 
rights and new digital technologies, at times also providing a bridge between human 
rights experts, policy makers and technology experts. Civil society organisations can 
also  facilitate  online  interaction  between  citizens  and  decision-makers  to  enhance 
the  connection  between  the  civic  input  and  the  political  arena.  Member  States 
should implement measures to strengthen public awareness of the important role of 
CSOs, support CSOs and protect their role in the public sphere.  

4. Protecting  and  empowering  journalists  and  other 

media professionals  

Today,  fewer  people  obtain  their  news  from  independent  quality-controlled  media 
and more so from social media platforms. This, in turn, gives rise to echo chambers 
and filter bubbles, and to the isolation and polarisation of people. The shared reality 
in  which  we  live  is  narrowed,  and  we  are  split  into  ever  smaller  and  more 
fragmented groups of like-minded individuals. 

Independent and trustworthy journalism remains of key importance for democracies 
in  the  digital  era.  We  call  upon  governments  to  ensure  the  protection,  safety, 
independence  and empowerment  of journalists  and other media professionals, also 
acknowledging the important role of think tanks and other civil society organisations 
in  promoting  a  reflective  and  informed  political  debate  and  in  opinion-shaping. 
Strengthening media and improving journalism standards includes making available 
sufficient  public  funding  and  supporting  programmes  for  quality  fact-checking 
services and credibility indices. 

We also endorse Civil Society Europe’s recommendation to set up an early warning 
mechanism  that  enables  journalists  and  other  civil  society  actors  to  submit 

48    European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 

 
 
 
Democracy in the digital age 

complaints  in  a  simple  and  non-bureaucratic  manner  on  developments  relevant  to 
democracy, rule of law and civic space.67 

5. Designing  and 

regulating 

technologies 

for 

democracy – Democracy in and by design 

5.1. Policies  to  ensure  that  technology  development  adheres  to 

fundamental values  

Digital  technologies  can  and  should  be  instruments  for  strengthening  democracy, 
widening the public space, acting as a vehicle for direct and inclusive participation in 
public  life,  as  well  as  bringing  people  together  and  fostering  social  cohesion.  Their 
development  should  comply  with  core  ethical  values  which  include  respect  for  the 
rule of law and for fundamental rights, with due regard to dignity, equality, welfare 
and  freedom.  Policy  intervention  is  required  to  ensure  through  binding  norms,  as 
well  as  incentives  and  other  measures,  that  technology  development  and 
deployment in the public and private sector adheres to fundamental values.  

5.2. Policies to realise and safeguard privacy in a wider sense 

One of the major concerns in the digital age is the protection of personal data and 
privacy, which must be understood as something broader than merely an individual 
right to freedom  from undue interference. Privacy is also a right of people to have 
the  space  and  opportunity  to  freely  develop  and  express  themselves.  This  places 
obligations on policy makers at all levels to secure that such space and opportunity 
exists, e.g. by issuing legislation to ensure that data about our lives and bodies are 
not collected without our knowledge and used to control and harm us, or legislation 
discouraging  opt-out  practices  in  personal  data  processing,  as  they  do  not  leave 
sufficient space of free  choice  to data subjects compared to the opt-in standard  of 
informed  consent.  This,  in  turn,  requires  that  citizens  –  both  individually  and 
collectively – have a say in how data is used, for whose benefit and at whose cost. 
Simple compliance with informed consent, which places a high level of responsibility 
on the data subject with regard to the assessment of risks of data processing and its 
justification, is no longer sufficient to simultaneously promote access and guarantee 
privacy,  nor  functional  in  the  light  of  novel  ways  to  extract  personal  data  (i.e. 
biometric tracking). Those who opt out of being datafied must not be disadvantaged 
in  their  ability  to  satisfy  their  basic  needs.  In  addition,  a  right  to  non-datafication 
should  be  considered.  In  this  regard  we  recommend  that  public  funding  is  made 
available for public education and debate.  

67 Civil Society Europe, Preliminary Proposals from Civil Society, October 2022 

European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 49 

 
 
 
Democracy in the digital age 

5.3. Value-sensitive 

technology  design  can  complement 

the 

protection of fundamental values 

In  addition  to  strengthening  fundamental  values  by  law  and  policy  measures, 
respect  for  fundamental  values  can  also  be  realised  by  value-by-design  initiatives, 
which  seek  to  protect  various  values,  such  as  privacy,  fairness  or  inclusivity.  This 
means  that  privacy-protecting  solutions  should  be  designed  into  the  hardware  and 
the  software  of  new  (and  revisited  existing)  technologies,  adopting  an  ethics-by-
design approach. Such a solution can also help to integrate legal and ethical trade-
offs  into  technical  infrastructures,  and  thus  also  provide  a  normative  governance 
framework for data processing. 

6. Democracy, technologies and the common good 

6.1. Wider  measures  need  to  be  taken  to  make  sure  that  publicly 

funded innovation benefits the public 

There  is  a  strong  misalignment  between  research  and  innovation  funding  and 
knowledge  transfer  into  tangible  benefits  for  the  public:  the  openness  of  research, 
data and science has not been enough to ensure that society benefits from data use 
that  was  made  possible  through  the  activities  of 
individuals  and  public 
infrastructures.  We  recommend  that  more  measures  are  taken  to  ensure  that 
innovation  funded  with  public  money  in  the  European  Union  remains  in  the  public 
sphere,  and  that  commercial  companies  are  given  incentives  to  invest  in  the 
strengthening  of  the  public  sphere  even  if  that  does  not  offer  them  immediate 
commercial profits.  

6.2. Safeguarding basic needs from market rationales  

Digital  technologies  are  strongly  controlled  by  Big  Tech  corporations.  Their 
expansionism  from  their  original  sphere  of  activity  to  new  sectors  threatens  public 
control  and  citizens’  sovereignty,  deepening  dependencies  on  private  technology 
corporations  for  the  provision  of  basic  public  goods.  Democratic  governments  are 
losing  their  grip  on  basic public  functions.  The  provision  of  public  goods  –  such  as 
healthcare, social security and public administrative  services  in general, education, 
employment,  but  indeed  importantly  also  everything  needed  for  a  functioning 
democracy – should be kept away from market rationales and dynamics, remaining 
widely  available  and  accessible  to  all  independent  of  their  ability  to  pay.  This  is  a 
shared responsibility of all countries in the European Union. 

The  focus  on  markets  turns  individuals  into  consumers  and  reduces  companies  to 
mere market competitors. Strengthening democracies in the digital era, by contrast, 
requires  understanding  fairness  not  just  as  market  fairness  but  as  fairness  in  and 
across all domains, and ensuring that people’s basic needs do not need to be met on 
market terms. 

50    European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 

 
 
Democracy in the digital age 

6.3. Public  Private  Partnerships  (PPPs)  as  Public  Private  People 
Partnerships  (PPPPs)  should  be  designed  to  strengthen 
fundamental values 

Collaborations  between  the  public  sector  and  technology  corporations  providing 
digital  services  should  be  established  with  care.  Currently,  profits  generated  by 
collaborations  with  tech  corporations  do  not  flow  back  to  the  public  sector  in 
equitable  ways.  Conditions  that  ensure  a  fair  distribution  of  profits  (monetary  or 
other) should be predefined. Additional conditions for collaboration should take into 
account impacts that can be incremental and evident only at a later stage, such as 
the  gradual  reshaping  of  sectors  and  growing  dependencies  on  private 
computational infrastructure.  

7. Extending  diplomacy:  Valuing  democracy,  for  people 

and planet 

Digital technologies have been used for repression and control in third countries as 
well. Digital authoritarianism must be acknowledged as a geopolitical issue, eroding 
democracy as well as fundamental rights and the values and principles upon which 
these are based. 

The  European  Union  should  make  the  fight  against  anti-democratic  developments 
and  repression  a  more  central  part  of  its  high-level  diplomacy  and  geopolitical 
strategies,  developing  a  toolbox  for  dealing  with  the  specific  challenges  also  of 
digital repression, incorporating them fully into foreign policy instruments. 

In this context, it should seize the opportunity and take seriously the responsibility 
to work towards a common international awareness of shared values and goals – as 
well  as  vulnerabilities.  Europe’s  democracies  support  and  sustain  this  awareness, 
and have been calling for increased efforts to take into account present and future 
generations, to care for the environment and the diversity of forms of life on Earth, 
to act upon climate change, and to realise sustainable ways of inhabiting the planet. 
Democracy should be valued as the best mean  to identify common challenges  and 
goals and to work towards achieving those goals together, also crucially beyond the 
EU’s borders. 

European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 51 

 
 
 
 
 
Democracy in the digital age 

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62    European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 

 
 
 
Democracy in the digital age 

THE MEMBERS OF THE EGE 

Barbara Prainsack 
Chair of the EGE 

Maria do Céu Patrão Neves 
Vice-Chair of the EGE 

Nils-Eric Sahlin 
Vice-Chair of the EGE 

Nikola Biller-Andorno 

Migle Laukyte 

Paweł Łuków 

Pierre Mallia  

 Fruzsina Molnár-Gábor 

Thérèse Murphy 

Herman Nys 

Laura Palazzani 

Tamar Sharon 

Marcel Jeroen van den Hoven 

Renata Veselská 

Takis Vidalis 

European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 63 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Democracy in the digital age 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

The  President  of  the  European  Commission,  Ursula  von  der  Leyen,  addressed  the 
EGE by letter in February 2023 to request this Opinion.  

The  development  of  the  present  Opinion  involved  several  relevant  services  of  the 
European  Commission  and,  beyond,  a  wide  range  of  stakeholders  and  experts, 
many of whom presented their perspectives to the EGE on the occasion of dedicated 
hearings. A central part of this, pursuant to Commission Decision 2021/156, was the 
Open Round Table, which was held on 29 March 2023. The event gathered an array 
of perspectives, from academia through to international organisations, industry and 
civil  society  organisations,  to  discuss  the  questions  raised  by  recent  technological 
advances  as  well  as  by  longstanding  tensions  at  the  very  heart  of  democracy.  It 
provided a forum for dialogue, and an opportunity to gather inputs from experts and 
the  EGE’s 
the 
interested  participants, 
recommendations. 

reflection  and 

further 

refine 

to 

All  of  the  people  who  participated  in  the  different  phases  of  this  process,  be  it 
physically  or  online  or  in  writing,  are  appreciatively  recognised.  Notably:  Julien 
Mousnier, Maria-Luisa Cabral, Toma Sutic, Roua Abbas, Martina del Ministro, Harry 
Panagopulos,  Michalina  Zięba,  Susana  Nascimento,  Katja  Reppel,  Francisco  de  la 
Torre  Francia,  Julie  Baleriaux,  Laura  Smillie,  Laurent  Bontoux,  Andrea  Accardo, 
David Kaye, Diego Naranjo, Michael Saward, Carlotta Besozzi, Paolo Benanti, Louise 
Edwards,  Alison  Weightman,  Frederico  Rocha,  Rafael  Carrascosa  Marzo,  Ole 
Petersen, and Elias Weiss.  

The  close  and  fruitful  cooperation  with  the  teams  in  the  sister  international 
organisations  tasked  with  the  ethics  and  governance  of  emerging  technologies 
(notably:  UNESCO,  WHO,  FAO,  ILO,  OHCHR,  WTO,  WIPO,  UNEP,  ICGEB  as  well  as 
Council  of  Europe  and  OECD)  is  gratefully  acknowledged,  as  is  the  crucial  role  in 
that regard of the UN Inter-Agency Committee on Bioethics, in which the European 
Commission  is  represented  by  Jim  Dratwa.  Appreciation  is  extended  to  the  Chairs, 
Secretaries-General, and representatives of the National  Ethics Councils emanating 
from the Member States of the EU. The exchanges with them in the context of the 
development of the Opinion have undoubtedly helped to refine the thinking therein. 
Similarly,  appreciation  is  extended  to  the  members  of  the  European  Commission’s 
Interservice Group on Ethics and EU Policy.  

64    European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 

 
 
 
 
Democracy in the digital age 

THE EGE TEAM 

Jim DRATWA 
Head of the EGE Team 

Barbara GIOVANELLI 
Policy Officer 

Marta JASINSKA 
Policy Assistant 

Contact: ec-ethics-group@ec.europa.eu 

European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 65 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU

In person
All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct centres. You can find the address of the 
centre nearest you online (european-union.europa.eu/contact-eu/meet-us_en).

On the phone or in writing
Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European Union.  
You can contact this service: 

– by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls), 
– at the following standard number: +32 22999696, 
– via the following form: european-union.europa.eu/contact-eu/write-us_en.

FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU

Online
Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the Europa  
website (european-union.europa.eu).

EU Publications
You can view or order EU publications at op.europa.eu/en/publications. Multiple copies of free publications 
can be obtained by contacting Europe Direct or your local documentation centre (european-union.europa.eu/
contact-eu/meet-us_en).

EU law and related documents
For access to legal information from the EU, including all EU law since 1951 in all the official language 
versions, go to EUR-Lex (eur-lex.europa.eu).

EU open data
The portal data.europa.eu provides access to open datasets from the EU institutions, bodies and agencies. 
These can be downloaded and reused for free, for both commercial and non-commercial purposes. The portal 
also provides access to a wealth of datasets from European countries.

Recent  years  have  seen  profound  challenges  to  democracy,  including 
alarming  populist  and  autocratic  shifts.  Democracy  can  quickly  become  
an empty shell if it is not underpinned by fundamental rights and the values 
it seeks to protect and promote. In this context, the EGE examines how certain 
configurations  of  digital  technologies  can  contribute  to  a  weakening  of 
democratic institutions, even if they may not be its sole cause. Among these 
are the spread of harmful information, an unduly narrow understanding of 
privacy,  algorithmic  surveillance,  manipulation  and  discrimination,  foreign 
interference, and the expansion of Big Tech into public sectors. 

Against  this  background,  the  EGE  conceptualises  a  ‘thick’  understanding 
of democracy, that considers it, beyond a political system, a wider social 
system that protects its own societal preconditions. The EGE also formulates 
a series of recommendations that may help to develop pathways for how 
this  vision  can,  collectively  and  democratically,  be  further  translated  into 
reality. It stresses that strengthening democracy means safeguarding this 
very process.

Research and Innovation policy