JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL ON “EUROPEAN ECONOMIC SECURITY STRATEGY”
Date: 2023-06-20
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: EU industrial policy, EU strategy, competitiveness, critical infrastructure security, economic coercion, economic cooperation, economic independence, economic policy, risk management, supply chain, technology

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY Brussels, 20.6.2023  JOIN(2023) 20 final  JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL ON “EUROPEAN ECONOMIC SECURITY STRATEGY”   
 
 
1. A Strategy to enhance European Economic Security 

The global pandemic, Russia’s illegal and unprovoked war in Ukraine, hostile economic actions, 
cyber and infrastructure attacks, foreign interference and disinformation and a global increase in 
geopolitical  tensions  have  exposed  risks  and  vulnerabilities  in  our  societies,  economies  and 
companies that did not exist only a few shorts year ago.  

Over the last years the EU has been successful  both in moving forward to deliver on our priorities 
and  at  the  same  time  in  addressing  vulnerabilities,  whether  on  energy  security,  pandemic 
preparedness,  or  the  resilience  of  our  economies,  supply  chains  and  key  technologies  more 
generally.  

However this experience has also revealed that Europe was in some cases insufficiently prepared  
for new and emerging risks that have arisen in the more challenging geopolitical context that we 
find  ourselves  in.  The  COVID-19  pandemic  exposed  the  risks  that  highly  concentrated  supply 
chains can pose to the functioning of the European economy. Russia’s war of aggression against 
Ukraine  showed  how  an  overreliance  on  a  single  country,  especially  one  with  systemically 
divergent values, models and interests, reduces Europe’s strategic options and puts our economies 
and citizens at risk. Member States and businesses have also had to shoulder the cost of economic 
coercion, including bans of European exports and boycotts of European brands, designed to force 
them to comply and conform with the political priorities of another country. All these trends pose 
a direct risk to the functioning of our societies, economies and of global trade – as well as a direct 
challenge to the EU’s strategic interests and ability to act.  

With geopolitical tensions rising and global economic integration deeper than ever before, 
certain economic flows and activities can present a risk to our security. More than ever, our 
security is deeply intertwined with our ability to make ourselves more resilient and reduce the risks 
arising from economic linkages that in past decades we viewed as benign. Profound technological 
shifts  are  adding  to  the  intensity  of  this  competition  and  making  the  economic  and  security 
challenges more complex. 

New geopolitical and technological realities requires us to adapt our  approach, preserving 
the vast majority of  Europe’s highly  valuable economic links  to the world while  ensuring 
that the new risks we face, which are narrow but critical, are effectively tackled.  

The  EU  is  not  alone  in  this  process:  countries  all  over  the  world  have  started  addressing 
challenges  to  their  economic  security.  Some  advanced  economies  have  already  adopted 
dedicated  strategies  and  are  now  implementing  them.  Developing  economies  are  also  taking 
action,  diversifying  their  economic  ties  to  reduce  harmful  dependencies  and  increasing  local 
production. This trend reflects the fact that only by completing traditional approaches to national 
security  with  new  measures  to  safeguard  our  economic  security  can  we  ensure  our  prosperity, 
sovereignty  and  safety  in  the  current  age.  Working  together  with  our  allies,  partners,  and  the 
business  sector  to  articulate  and  execute  a  vision  of  economic  security  will  serve  as  a  force 
multiplier. 

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While the European Union has done a lot to respond to specific challenges in recent years, it 
now  needs  a  comprehensive  strategic  approach  to  economic  security,  de-risking  and 
promoting its technological edge in critical sectors. The aim is to provide a framework for  a 
robust assessment and  management of risks to  economic security  at  EU,  national  and business 
level while preserving and increasing our economic dynamism. This is all the more important to 
put in place at a time when these risks are both evolving rapidly and merging with national security 
concerns. A prime example of this is the speed with which critical new technologies are emerging 
and blurring the boundaries between the civil and military sectors. 

The starting point for this strategy is taking a clear-eyed look at the risks and acknowledging 
the inherent tensions that exist between bolstering our economic security, and ensuring that the 
European Union continues to benefit from an open economy. 

The EU is one of the most attractive destinations for global companies and for investment. Our 
economies  thrive  on  open  and  rules-based  trade  and  investment,  on  secure  cross-border 
connectivity and collaboration on research and innovation. These elements will remain critical 
drivers  of  European  competitiveness  and  resilience  as  we  speed  up  the  twin  green  and  digital 
transitions. We need to rely on trade and on the Single Market to spur competition and ensure that 
we have access to the raw materials, technologies, and other inputs which are crucial for boosting 
our  competitiveness,  resilience  and  for  sustaining  current  and  future  employment  and  growth. 
Similarly,  we  want  our  partners  around  the  world  to  continue  to  benefit  from  access  to  the 
European markets, capital and technologies for their transition to a clean and resilient economy. 

Getting  this  balance  right  is  essential  and  can  ensure  that  our  economic  and  security  interests 
reinforce each other. Achieving this will depend on the following three priorities: (1) promoting 
our  own  competitiveness;  (2)  protecting  ourselves  from  economic  security  risks;  and  (3) 
partnering with the broadest possible range of countries who share our concerns or interests 
on economic security.  

The priorities of an EU Economic Security Strategy 

-  Promoting our own competitiveness by making our economy and supply chains more resilient  
bolstering  innovation  and industrial  capacity, while preserving our social market  economy. 
This can be achieved by deepening the Single Market, investing in the economy of the future 
through sound macroeconomic and cohesion policies, NextGenerationEU, investing in human 
capital including by upskilling the European workforce. It will require diversifying sources of 
supply and export markets, or fostering the research and industrial base in strategic areas such 
as advanced semi-conductors, quantum computing, biotechnology, net-zero industries, clean 
energy or critical raw materials.  

-  Protecting ourselves from commonly identified economic security risks, by better deploying 
the tools we already have in place, such as on trade defence, foreign subsidies, 5G/6G security, 
Foreign  Direct  Investment  screening  and  export  controls,  as  well  as  the  new  instrument  to 

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counter economic coercion. In parallel, we need to assess the effectiveness of the EU toolkit 
and expand it where necessary to tackle some of the new risks that we face, for instance linked 
to exports or outward investments in a narrow set of key enabling technologies with military 
applications (e.g. in the areas of Quantum, Advanced Semiconductors, Artificial Intelligence). 

-  Partnering with countries who share our concerns on economic security as well as those who 
have common interests and are willing to cooperate with us to achieve the transition to a more 
resilient  and  secure  economy.  In  practice  this  means  working  together  with  the  broadest 
possible range of partners to reinforce economic security, foster resilient and sustainable value 
chains,  and  strengthen  the  international  rules-based  economic  order  and  multilateral 
institutions. It also means partnering with countries on similar de-risking paths, furthering and 
finalising free trade agreements, and  investing in  sustainable  development  and secure links 
throughout the world through Global Gateway.     

The fundamental principles for any measures on economic security flowing from this strategy will 
be: proportionality to ensure that our tools are in line with the level of the risk and limit any negative 
unintended spill-over effects on the European and global economy, and precision to define exactly 
which goods, sectors or core industries are targeted and ensure that measures respond to the risks 
themselves. 

This  strategy builds on the work already started at  European level, taking a critical  look  at  the 
Union resilience and vulnerabilities in order to make the European economy and industry more 
competitive and resilient  and strengthen our  open  strategic autonomy. This  ranges from  bigger 
investment in the green and digital transitions through NextGenerationEU and the crowding-in of 
more  private  investments  to  the  pillars  of  the  EU  industrial  policy  such  as  the  Acts  on  Chips, 
Critical Raw Materials and Net Zero Industry. This was reaffirmed by the Versailles Declaration, 
in which Leaders agreed on the need to strengthen European resilience and sovereignty in areas 
like  energy,  health  and  pharmaceutical  products,  food  security  and  defense  capabilities.  This 
strategy also responds to the concerns of citizens as expressed in the context of the Conference on 
the Future of Europe.  

Implementing this strategy will require joined-up action across internal and external policies. It 
will also require buy-in beyond policy makers at European and national level. The private sector 
will  be  an  essential  partner  and  is  already  advanced  in  its  work  on  de-risking.  Global  asset 
managers  have  radically  changed  their  allocations  of  capital  in  response  to  growing  and 
increasingly  complex  risks  that  exist  within  the  global  economy.  Seeking  resilient,  diversified 
supply chains that enhance economic security will be a core part of a long-term business strategy 
that protects not only shareholders’ interests but also the general interest. Identifying the main risks 
and designing  policy  responses should tap into the knowledge of European companies  that  are 
already working to mitigate many of these threats.  

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This Communication lays the groundwork for a discussion on economic security  with Member 
States and the European Parliament with a view to creating a common framework to de-risk and 
protect the Union’s economic security. This Communication will help to define the strategy that 
should guide the common assessment of risks, the use of existing tools and the identification of 
possible  gaps  in  the  EU’s  economic  security  arsenal  for  which  we  will  develop  a  common 
response.   

2. Identifying the risks to European economic security 

The aim of this strategy is to protect the EU’s economic security and reinforce the resilience of 
our economy, while working to ensure that we maintain and grow our technological edge. This 
means investing in EU competitiveness, diversifying supply chains, and responding to practices 
such as economic coercion. It aims to prevent the leakage of sensitive emerging technologies, as 
well as other dual-use items, to destinations of concern that operate civil-military fusion strategies. 

To reach these objectives, we need a clear-eyed view of the risks and their evolution over time. 
That is why the Commission and Member States will deepen their analysis of critical supply 
chains, stress test them and establish the level of risk. 

The  Commission  and  the  High  Representative  have  identified  the  following  broad  and  non-
exhaustive categories of risks to economic security namely risks related to: (1) resilience of supply 
chains;  (2)  physical  and  cyber  security  of  critical  infrastructure;  (3)  technology  security  and 
technology  leakage;  and  (4)  weaponisation  of  economic  dependencies  or  economic  coercion. 
These risks can occur along the entire value chain, from knowledge creation and basic research to 
commercialisation and manufacturing at scale. 

The types of risks that European economies face  

Risks to the resilience of supply chains, including energy security – Risks of price surges, the 
unavailability or scarcity of critical products, or inputs in the EU, including but not limited to 
those linked to the Green Transition, those needed for a stable and diversified energy supply and 
pharmaceuticals.  

Risks  to  the  physical  and  cyber-security  of  critical  infrastructure  –  Risk  of  disruptions  or 
sabotage  of  critical  infrastructures,  such  as  pipelines,  undersea  cables,  power  generation, 
transportation,  electronic  communication  networks,  that  undermine  the  secure  and  reliable 
provision of goods and services or data security in the EU.  

Risks related to technology security and technology leakage – Risk to the EU’s technological 
advancements, technological competitiveness, and access to leading-edge technology, including 
through malicious practices in the digital sphere such as espionage or illicit knowledge leakage 
In some cases, technology leakage  risks strengthening the military/intelligence capabilities of 

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those that could use them to undermine peace and security, especially for dual-use technologies 
such  as  Quantum,  Advanced  Semiconductors  or  Artificial  Intelligence,  and  therefore  require 
specific risk mitigation measures. 

Risk  of  weaponization  of  economic  dependencies  or  economic  coercion  –  Risk  of  third 
countries  targeting  the  EU,  its  Member  States  and  EU  businesses  through  measures  affecting 
trade  or  investment  to  bring  about  a  change  of  policy  falling  within  legitimate  policymaking 
space. 

Finally, it is important to bear in mind that  certain risks listed above could also go so far as to 
threaten national security in certain circumstances. This could be the case, most notably, with 
dual use technology leakage, foreign direct investment threatening security and public order; dual 
use exports or outbound investment in a narrow set of advanced technologies that could enhance 
military  and  intelligence  capacities  of  actors  who  may  use  these  capabilities  to  threaten 
international peace and security; and the secure treatment of sensitive information  

On this basis, the Commission proposes to identify and assess, collectively with EU Member 
States and with inputs from private stakeholders, risks to the EU’s economic security that 
threaten  its  key  interests  within  clearly  defined  parameters,  taking  into  account  the  evolving 
geopolitical context and, where appropriate, stakeholders’ views. This should be a dynamic and 
continuous process.  

For this purpose, the Commission proposes the following process, to be carried out with Member 
States and, where appropriate, in coordination with the High Representative: 

  Risks to the resilience of supply chains, to be assessed by the Commission, by deepening 
the EU’s strategic dependencies analysis, with a particular focus on dependencies that are 
more likely to be weaponised for geopolitical purposes. 

  Risks to the physical and cyber security of critical infrastructure, to continue to be assessed 

in line with the Council Recommendation of 8 December 2022. 

  Risks related to technology security and technology leakage, to be assessed on the basis of 
a  list  of  strategic  technologies  critical  for  economic  security.  With  regard  to  the  most 
sensitive  risks,  the  Commission  will  propose  a  list  of  dual-use  technologies  for  risk 
assessment that could be adopted by the Council by September 2023. The list will be based 
on narrowly defined and forward-looking criteria such as the enabling and transformative 
nature of a technology, the risk of civil military fusion, and the risk of their misuse for 
human  rights  violations.  The  priority  technologies  should  be  assessed  collectively  with 
Member States by the end of 2023, with a view to identifying the relevant protection and 
promotion measures.  

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  Risks of weaponisation of economic dependencies or economic coercion, to be assessed 

including in the context of the recently agreed upon EU anti-coercion instrument. 

With a view to maintaining a coherent, targeted, and up-to-date approach to economic security, 
the Council should review, based on input from the Commission and, where appropriate, the High 
Representative, the overall progress on risk assessment in these four areas every six months, and 
report yearly to the European Council.  

Moreover,  the  High  Representative,  together  with  the  Member  States,  will  enhance  the Single 
Intelligence Analysis Capability (SIAC) in order to increase its ability to detect threats to the EU 
economic security.  

3. Putting the economic security strategy into action  

To mitigate these risks, the EU Economic Security Strategy is based on: 

1)  Promoting  the  EU’s  competitiveness  and  growth,  strengthening  the  Single  Market, 
supporting a strong and resilient economy, and fostering the EU’s research, technological 
and industrial base. 

2)  Protecting economic security through a range of policies and tools, including targeted new 

instruments where needed. 

3)  Partnering and further strengthening cooperation with countries worldwide.  

3.1 Promoting the EU’s economic base, competitiveness and growth 

The Single Market is the EU’s best asset to keep its economy prosperous, innovative, and 
resilient. It is most often associated with economies of scale for cooperating across borders 
within the EU and a level playing field. At the same time, through its trade, Global Gateway 
investment  and  other  policies,  the  EU  is  leveraging  the  Single  Market  to  keep  global  supply 
chains open and shape standards, which further contributes to strengthening EU competitiveness 
and security of supply. Implementation of the NextGenerationEU and of the Cohesion Funds 
are  triggering  major  reforms  and  investments  across  a  wide  range  of  sectors,  including  critical 
infrastructures,  and  is  already  contributing  to  EU’s  economic  growth,  competitiveness  and 
resilience.  

In recent years, the Commission has adopted several concrete proposals to increase resilience 
and  strengthen  supply  chains.  The  EU  Industrial  Strategy  identified  several  measures  to 
enhance the resilience of the Single Market, such as industrial alliances to accelerate activities in 
clean tech, raw materials, processors and semiconductors, data, edge and cloud; important projects 
of  common  European  interest  to  pool  resources  for  breakthrough  innovations;  promoting  the 
circular  economy;  enhancing  green  and  digital  skills;  and  a  new  strategy  to  secure  the  EU’s 
leadership in  global standard-setting.  Likewise, the energy transition  in  line with  the European 
Green Deal and RepowerEU objectives is key to strengthen the EU’s energy security of supply. 

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Significant progress has been already achieved in this area but further necessary efforts will be 
identified in the upcoming State of the Energy Union report.  

The proposal for the Critical Raw Materials Act aims at facilitating the extraction, processing 
and  recycling  of  critical  raw  materials  in  the  EU,  reducing  dependencies  and  increasing 
preparedness. The European Chips Act will ensure a secure supply of semiconductors, while the 
proposed Net-Zero Industry Act will help scale up manufacturing of net-zero technology in the 
EU.  The  initiatives  include  effective  governance  mechanisms  allowing  timely  cooperation  and 
exchange of information among the Commission, the Council and Member States. 
These initiatives have also a direct impact on further securing supply chains and access to resources 
(increasingly  challenged  by  strategic  competitors,  as  highlighted  by  the  Strategic  Compass  for 
Security  and  Defence)  which  is  vital  for  an  innovative,  competitive  and  resilient  European 
Defence  Technological  and  Industrial  Base.  Their  timely  adoption  is  therefore  of  vital 
importance for Europe’s economic security. 

The Single Market Emergency Instrument aims at ensuring the availability and free circulation 
of  critical  products  in  case  of  future  emergencies.  In  the  future,  the  Single  Market  Emergency 
Instrument will allow monitoring strategic products and services, including disruptions of supply 
chains and related shortages, and react fast and collectively once needed.  

More investments are urgently needed both to ensure EU’s leadership and competitiveness in the 
research  and  development  of  strategic  emerging  technologies.  In  order  to  crowd-in  private 
investments, the Commission continues to develop the Capital Market Union. The Commission 
is  also  proposing  a  new  Regulation  to  establish  a  Strategic  Technologies  for  Europe  Platform 
(‘STEP’).  This  Platform  will  support  the  development,  manufacturing  or  strengthening  of  the 
respective  value  chains  in  the  Union  of  deep  and  digital  technologies,  clean  technologies,  and 
biotechnologies to meet the objectives of the green and digital transitions. This will enable the 
Union to reduce or prevent strategic dependencies.  

The Commission will also report by the end of 2023 on options to ensure adequate, strategically 
targeted  support  for  dual-use  technology  development,  after  reviewing  the  scope  of  existing 
instruments. 

3.2 Protecting against economic security risks 
The EU has already put in place specific de-risking tools and measures to protect against economic 
security risks.  As the risks keep evolving, we need to assess the effectiveness of these tools in 
addressing them and consider upgrades or new tools that may be needed. 

Addressing weaponization of economic dependencies and economic coercion  

Strategic dependencies, which may give rise to economic security risks, can be exacerbated by 
non-market policies and practices used by third countries that tilt the playing field. The 
Commission will make rigorous use of Trade Defence Instruments to address such unfair 

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policies and practices and is ready to deploy the Foreign Subsidies Regulation to ensure a level 
playing field with the Single Market. 

As a response to the EU and its Member States being the target of deliberate economic pressure 
in recent years, the EU has adopted the EU Anti-coercion Instrument. The instrument’s 
objective is first and foremost to deter countries from restricting or threatening to restrict trade or 
investment to bring about a change of legitimate policy in the EU, but also foresees the 
possibility for the EU to take countermeasures as a last resort. The EU will also cooperate with 
partner countries to monitor instances of coercion and assess and identify the scope for 
coordinated responses. 

Inbound investments affecting security and public order 

The  Foreign  Direct  Investment  (FDI)  Screening  regulation  has  created  a  cooperation 
mechanism for Member States and the Commission to exchange information, raise security-related 
concerns and identify solutions related to specific FDIs with a view to ensuring the protection of 
security and public order. Since October 2020, the Commission and Member States have reviewed 
more than 1,000 FDI transactions. The Commission is also in the process of evaluating the current 
framework and will propose its revision before the end of 2023. Member States who have not yet 
implemented national FDI screening mechanisms should do so without further delay. 

Technology security and technology leakage 

Being able to develop, and keep up with, new technologies is key for the EU’s economic security, 
as it reduces strategic dependencies and enables us to protect or create a technological advantage.  

Openness  and  international  cooperation  are  at  the  heart  of  European  research  and 
innovation (R&I). In order to help prevent EU-funded technology leakage, the Commission can 
for example, in duly justified cases exclude certain third country entities or EU entities controlled 
by  certain  third  countries  from  participating  in  research  and  innovation  and  digital  capacities 
deployment projects to protect the Union’s strategic assets, interests, autonomy, or security. It can 
also assess the impact of the transfer of results of Horizon Europe (including intellectual property) 
generated by EU funded research to non-associated third countries and object to such transfers.  

The Commission has also developed a Toolkit on Tackling Foreign R&I Interference, which 
helps  to  raise  awareness  and  build  resilience  in  the  R&I  sector  across  Europe  at  national  and 
sectoral levels to bolster research security more broadly.  

For technologies deemed to be critical for economic security (identified as per section 2 above), 
the Commission will, after assessment, propose measures to improve research security ensuring a 
systematic and rigorous enforcement of the above-mentioned tools and identifying and addressing 
any remaining gaps. It will do so while preserving the openness of our system, which is the bedrock 
for our innovative economies. 

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Standardization  is  important  as  part  of  the  ‘soft  power’  influence  over  the  shape  of  tech 
developments and has therefore an indirect bearing on the EU’s economic security (including by 
allowing it to limit possibilities of abusive use of technologies that could threaten  its economic 
security).  As  set  out  in  the  EU  standardisation  strategy,  the  EU  needs  to  be  able  to  shape 
international standards in line with its values and interests – and with its legal acquis. With respect 
to the future artificial intelligence, data or cyber resilience acts, the EU will work on European 
standards and towards congruent international standards together with partners. In the same vein, 
effective  enforcement  of  intellectual  property  rights,  especially  patents,  will  also  contribute  to 
prevent technology leakage 

Under  its  2020  Cybersecurity  Strategy,  the  EU  is  deploying  measures  to  counter  malicious 
practices in the digital sphere to protect from illegitimate influence, industrial espionage and illicit 
knowledge leakage. The proposed Cyber Resilience Act will improve the cybersecurity, for the 
public and private sector, of hardware and software sold in the Union.  The EU will continue to 
address cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including by using its EU Hybrid and Cyber 
Diplomacy Toolboxes, to respond to such malicious activities.  

Protecting economic security by protecting infrastructure 

The  EU  has  adopted  the  Directive  on  the  Resilience  of  Critical  Entities  and  the  Revised 
Directive on the security of network and information system (NIS2 Directive). They provide 
an  updated  and  comprehensive  legal  framework  to  strengthen  both  the  physical  and  digital 
resilience of critical infrastructure (including energy, transport, health, digital infrastructure, water 
and food). Further to the Council Recommendation of December 2022, targeted actions are already 
being carried out to ensure a common EU response to incidents.  

To  increase  the  security  and  resilience  of  5G  networks,  the  5G  Toolbox  establishes  a  set  of 
measures to be applied by all Member States, including measures to restrict or exclude high-risk 
suppliers. On 15 June 2023, the Commission urged Member States that have not yet fully applied 
these measures to high-risk suppliers to do so without delay.  

The proposed Cyber Resilience Act will also play an important role in securing the supply chain 
for the EU’s critical infrastructure. Cyber risk assessments and scenarios are also being developed 
specifically for the electronic communication infrastructure and energy sectors and will serve to 
guide actions supported under the proposed Cyber Solidarity Act, notably the coordinated testing 
of critical entities. 

Better EU coordination on export controls of dual-use items 

Some  strategic  technologies  are  of  dual  use  nature  and  require  specific  attention.  Under 
section 2 above, the EU will identify a list of technologies critical to economic security and assess 
their  risks  collectively.  While  subject  to  a  multilateral  and  EU  framework,  decisions  on  the 

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implementation and enforcement of export controls of dual use items are mainly in the hands of 
the Member States.  

The established dual-use export control architecture – with the multilateral export control regimes 
as standard-setters – has in recent decades addressed the Union’s security policy objectives, while 
at the same time nurturing openness and a conducive climate for research and innovation and non-
proliferation  at  large.  The  EU  will  strengthen  its  support  for  the  work  of  multilateral  regimes, 
although its effectiveness is hindered by the fact that it is only a member of one of the existing 
Multilateral Control Regimes, and an observer in a second. 

However, in light of the new challenges related to the increased military potential of a range of 
strategic technologies, Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, heightened geopolitical 
tensions and risks to national security, some EU Member States and third countries have stepped 
up national controls to limit the export of critical technologies outside, or in some cases building 
on,  the  processes  established  in  the  multilateral  export  control  regimes  such  as  manufacturing 
equipment for advanced semiconductor chips or equipment related to quantum computing. Recent 
development have also shown the need for greater flexibility in the regime, to respond to current 
and fast changing events. 

The EU’s Regulation on dual-use export controls was revised in 2021 to better address risks 
associated with the rapidly evolving security, technology, and trade environment, with a particular 
focus  on  the  exports  of  sensitive,  emerging  technologies.  It  includes  provisions  that  allow  one 
Member  State  to  introduce  export  controls  based  on  another  Member  State’s  legislation, 
amounting to a coordinated and cross-border effect, among EU Member States and supported by 
the  Commission,  of  export  controls  whose  implementation  is  a  national  prerogative.    These 
provisions are currently being tested.  

The need for more rapid and coordinated action at EU level in the area of export controls 
has become pressing  as  an uncoordinated  proliferation  of national  controls  by Member States 
would create loopholes and undermine the effectiveness of export controls and the integrity of the 
Single Market. As more technologies are developed that are key to national security and subject 
to national controls, possible divergences between Member States would weaken the economic 
security of the EU as a whole. To prevent this from happening, the current Regulation should be 
fully  implemented.  At  the  same  time,  a  reflection  should  begin  on  building  on  the  existing 
framework  to  develop  a  more  coordinated  European  approach  that  goes  beyond  the  current 
obligation of ensuring transparency among Member States.  

The Commission will therefore table a proposal at the latest by the end of this year to improve 
the effectiveness and efficiency of the current framework. It should make it fit for purpose in 
the rapidly changing technology and security environment, reinforcing the capacity of the EU to 
play fully its role as a global actor in a context where the multilateral export control regimes are 
under pressure, in full respect of the EU’s and Members States’ respective competences.    

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Outbound investment 

The  EU  and  Member  States  also  have  a  common  interest  in  preventing  the  narrow  set  of 
technological advances that  are assessed to be core to enhancing military and intelligence 
capabilities of actors who may use them to undermine international peace and security from 
being fuelled by our companies’ capital, expertise and knowledge.   

Strategic trade and investment controls require a holistic approach to enable us to protect 
our essential security interests.  This raises the question on the need to subject not only exported 
goods, but also certain outbound investment to controls to counter the risk of technology and know-
how leaking as part of that investment.   

Moreover,  increased  cooperation  is  required  to  prevent  the  leakage  of  sensitive  emerging 
technologies, as well as other dual-use items, to destinations of concern that operate civil-military 
fusion strategies, and to avoid the backfilling of any controlled exports and investments. 

The  Commission  will  examine  what  security  risks  can  result  from  outbound  investments,  in 
liaison with Member States. It will set up a new dedicated group of Member States’ experts, to 
assist  in  these  tasks,  building  a  new  structured,  confidential  cooperation  mechanism.  The 
Commission, with input from this new expert group, will also conduct outreach and consultations 
activities with business and other stakeholders, and partner countries, as appropriate. 

On  this  basis,  the  Commission  will  examine  possible  measures  to  address  security  risks 
related to outbound investments, with a view to proposing an initiative by the end of the year.  
. 

In sum, we need the unity at EU level for a bolder and faster use of existing EU instruments 
when  they  are  required  and  a  more  assertive  approach  to  enforcement.  The  EU  and  its 
Member  States  should  ensure  that  these  are  used  to  their  full  potential  to  bolster  economic 
resilience and protect essential security interests, bearing in mind also the impacts outside the EU. 
EU businesses should also be encouraged to integrate economic security risks in their due diligence 
and risk management processes. Moreover, in some areas this Communication identifies the need 
to strengthen or develop new tools to match today’s risks.  

3.3 Partnering on economic security  

The  EU  cannot  achieve  economic  security  on  its  own.  Neither  can  its  policy  response  be 
unilateral.  The  global  economy  will  remain  integrated  and  interconnected,  and  effective  EU 
action depends on cooperation and coordination with others. Transparency and cooperation are 
essential to ensuring that economic security policies do not have unwanted consequences on third 
countries,  particularly  on  the  most  vulnerable  ones.  De-risking  supply  chains  and  mitigating 
disturbances involves diversification of supply and access to a diverse set of import and export 
markets. Moreover, the EU’s vulnerabilities linked to critical dependencies in strategic sectors are 

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very similar to those of many other global actors, including its closest partners, while all countries 
are potentially vulnerable to various forms of economic coercion.  

This makes a strong argument for cooperation with the broadest possible range of partners, 
including long-standing like-minded partners, such as the members of the G7, as well as others 
with whom we share common interests and who are willing to cooperate with us. 

This cooperation will be flexible, and will vary in form, scope and types of participants in 
function of shared interests and common dependencies and depending on the specific policy area 
or the risks identified.  

Bilateral and plurilateral cooperation  

The  EU  is  vastly  expanding  its  bilateral  and  plurilateral  cooperation  instruments  to  be  a 
nimbler actor where this is necessary for greater economic security. This is a core element of 
the  Union’s  policy  response,  implementing  the  notion  of  security  through  diversification  of 
partners. Intensive cooperation on economic security is already taking place with various partners 
including the US and India as part of the respective Trade and Technology Councils (TTC). 
The  EU  –  Japan  High  Level  Economic  Dialogue  will  incorporate  a  dedicated  workstream  on 
economic security issues. 

The  G7  provides  an  important  avenue  for  cooperation  on  economic  security.  The  May  2023 
Hiroshima  Summit  statement  on  economic  resilience  and  economic  security  confirms  the  G7 
Leaders’  commitment  to  work  together  and  with  partners  beyond  the  G7  to  enhance  global 
economic  resilience  and  economic  security,  by  building  resilient  supply  chains  and  critical 
infrastructure,  responding  to  harmful  practices  such  as  non-market  policies  and  economic 
coercion, and preventing leakage of critical and emerging technologies.   

Having as large a geo-economic toolbox as possible – from Free Trade Agreements to Digital 
Partnerships,  Green  Alliances  and  Partnerships,  Raw  Materials  Partnerships,  and  the  Raw 
Materials Club and strengthened cooperation with countries in the EU neighbourhood – allows us 
to respond to a broad range of economic security related challenges with the appropriate tool for 
greatest possible coordination and effect. We will continue to use these instruments and adapt them 
to better contribute to supply chain resilience and EU economic security.  

We will continue to make the most of the EU’s vast network of Free Trade Agreements through 
full  implementation  while  also  working  to  expand  it.  These  agreements  facilitate  business  de-
risking, diversification and reduction of dependencies by opening new markets, help build mutual 
beneficial economic ties  especially in  regions  where the  EU would otherwise leave a void  that 
third countries would fill, as well as support social and environmental sustainability.  

A key dimension of economic security is the readiness of the EU to reinforce its  partnerships 
with developing countries that could play a bigger role in global value chains. EU financial and 
technical support to low- and middle-income countries for industrialisation, the green transition 

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and bridging the digital divide is not only valuable on its own and creates positive effects for the 
local communities, but also contributes to our economic resilience by promoting a more diversified 
global economy.  

In this respect, the Global Gateway and the Partnership for Global Infrastructure Investments 
will be key in contributing to the economic security of their beneficiaries tighten economic links 
and integration with global economies. These initiatives will help the EU and its partners to tackle 
major  challenges  together,  including  fighting  climate  change,  deploying  secure  digital 
infrastructures,  improving  health  systems,  and  achieving  the  Sustainable  Development  Goals, 
while offering partners sustainable alternatives to investment practices that would make them more 
vulnerable to economic coercion by their creditors. They also contribute to the EU’s economic 
security, notably by helping to diversify supply chains and integrate value chains with partners in 
key sectors. 

The EU will continue to build-up other forms of cooperation with various partners on issues of 
interest, for example on critical raw materials within a Critical Raw Materials Club. 

Multilateral cooperation 

At global level, multilateral cooperation and the rules-based framework provide the foundation for 
the  economic  security  of  the  EU  and  all  members  of  the  international  community.  Even  in  an 
environment  of  strategic  rivalry  and  economic  competition,  there  is  scope  for  international 
cooperation on common challenges and a need for clear rules guaranteeing fair and open trade, 
thus  putting  guardrails  on  the  trend  towards  “might  is  right”,  economic  fragmentation  or 
protectionism. 

The EU’s interest therefore is to strengthen multilateral cooperation through international 
fora and organisations such as the G20, the UN or the Multilateral Development Banks. In the 
trade realm, the EU will continue efforts to reform the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
restore its dispute settlement function, given the critical role an effective WTO plays in minimising 
the risk of arbitrary behaviour and narrowing the scope of possible trade restrictions.   

Next steps  

The Commission and the High Representative, within their respective competences, will: 

  develop  with  Member  States  a  framework  for  assessing  risks  affecting  the  EU’s 
economic security; this includes establishing a list of technologies which are critical 
to  economic  security  and  assess  their  risks  with  a  view  to  devising  appropriate 
mitigating measures. 

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  engage  in  a  structured  dialogue  with  the  private  sector  to  develop  a  collective 
understanding of economic security and encourage them to conduct due diligence and 
risk management in light of economic security concerns.  

  further  support  EU  technological  sovereignty  and  resilience  of  EU  value  chains, 

including by developing critical technologies through STEP. 
  review the Foreign Direct Investment Screening Regulation. 
  explore options to ensure adequate targeted support for research and development of 

dual-use technologies. 

  fully implement the EU’s export control regulation on dual use and make a proposal 

to ensure its effectiveness and efficiency. 

  propose an initiative to address security risks related to outbound investments. 
  propose  measures  to  improve  research  security  ensuring  a  systematic  and  rigorous 

enforcement of the existing tools and identifying any remaining gaps.  

  explore  the  targeted  use  of  CFSP  instruments  to  enhance  EU  economic  security 
including Hybrid and Cyber Diplomacy toolboxes and foreign information manipulation 
and interference (FIMI) toolbox. 

  instruct the EU Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC) to work specifically on 

the detection of possible threats to EU economic security. 

  ensure that the protection and promotion of EU economic security is fully integrated in 
European Union’s external action and intensify the cooperation with third countries 
on economic security issues. 

Conclusion 

In an interconnected world, no country can act alone to ensure its economic security. In today’s 
world, Member States’ economic and national security interests, vulnerabilities and responses can 
rarely be seen or identified in isolation from those of other Member States or those of the Union 
as a whole. Individual Member State’s interests are inextricably linked to the proper functioning 
of the internal market, the integrity of the EU trade policy and the security interests of the EU as a 
whole.  

The alternative to an EU approach to economic security is that our partners will pick and choose 
alliances,  while  less  well-intentioned  players  will  seek  to  divide  and  conquer.  Therefore,  a 
common and coordinated EU action across policies, through cooperation between the EU and the 
Member States, is essential for the Union’s economic security. The key to success will be to act in 
unity. 

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