COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Subsidiarity Grid Accompanying the document Proposal for a Council Directive on Faster and Safer Relief of Excess Withholding Taxes
Date: 2023-06-19
Institutions: Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union, European Commission
Subjects: European tax cooperation, digital single market, investment abroad, securities, tax collection, tax law, tax on investment income, tax relief, taxpayer

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 19.6.2023  SWD(2023) 215 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Subsidiarity Grid Accompanying the document Proposal for a Council Directive on Faster and Safer Relief of Excess Withholding Taxes {COM(2023) 324 final} - {SEC(2023) 243 final} - {SWD(2023) 216 final} - {SWD(2023) 217 final}  
 
 
Subsidiarity Grid 

1.  Can the Union act? What is the legal basis and competence of the Unions’ intended action? 

1.1 Which article(s) of the Treaty are used to support the legislative proposal or policy initiative? 

Article 115 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) constitutes the legal base 
for  legislative  initiatives  in  the  field  of taxation.  Although  no  explicit  reference  to  direct  taxation  is 
made,  Article  115  refers  to  issuing  directives  for  the  approximation  of  national  laws  as  those  that 
directly affect the establishment or functioning of the internal market. It follows that, under Article 
115 TFEU, directives are the appropriate legal instrument for the Union in this field. Based on Article 
288 TFEU, directives shall be binding as to the result to be achieved upon Member States but leave 
the choice of form and methods to the national authorities. 

1.2 Is the Union competence represented by this Treaty article exclusive, shared or supporting in 
nature? 

In the case of direct taxation as far as the proposal relates to the establishment or functioning of the 
internal market, the Union’s competence is shared. 

2.  Subsidiarity Principle: Why should the EU act? 

2.1 Does the proposal fulfil the procedural requirements of Protocol No. 21: 

-  Has there been a wide consultation before proposing the act? 
- 

Is  there  a  detailed  statement  with  qualitative  and,  where  possible,  quantitative  indicators 
allowing an appraisal of whether the action can best be achieved at Union level? 

There  has  been  an  extensive  consultation  process  while  preparing  the  current  proposal.  The 
stakeholder consultation’s strategy consisted of both public and targeted consultations.  

- 

- 

- 

- 

The  Inception  Impact  Assessment  was  published  on  28  September  with  one  month  of 
consultation  period,  followed  by  the  public  consultation  that  ran  between  April  and  June 
2022 leading to 1682 responses.  
Targeted consultations were conducted with Member States, one Working Party IV and one 
High  Level  Working  Party  on  Taxation  (HLWP),  bilateral  meetings  and  two  meetings  at  the 
TADEUS Forum.  
Targeted consultations took place as well with the private sector via topic-related calls and 
onsite sessions to discuss technical elements.  
In addition, the Commission has consulted widely and has received input from various other 
sources during all the stages for the drafting of the proposal. Among others, the Commission 
has relied on publicly available information such as ESMA, ECB, FISCO Group, Giovannini and 
OECD reports and on studies done by the JRC and financial market´s agents. 

All of the above-mentioned insights received from stakeholders have been considered and have led 
to  introducing  measures  in this proposal  that strike the  balance  between the two main objectives, 
making Withholding Tax procedures more efficient and preventing tax fraud. 
Furthermore, the Commission prepared an impact assessment and an explanatory memorandum to 
support this proposal whereby the principle of subsidiarity was duly justified as explained in question 
2.2 below.  

2.2 Does  the  explanatory  memorandum  (and  any 

impact  assessment)  accompanying  the 
Commission’s  proposal  contain  an  adequate  justification  regarding  the  conformity  with  the 

1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12016E/PRO/02&from=EN  

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principle of subsidiarity? 

This  proposal  complies  with  the  principle  of  subsidiarity  as  set  out  in  Article  5  of  the  Treaty  on 
European Union (TEU). The cross-border nature of the problem at stake requires a common initiative 
across the internal market.  

The  source  of  the  current  complications  lies  mainly  in  the  fact  that  there  are  currently  different 
systems  and  different  application  of  these  systems  across  the  Union  regarding  the  relief  of 
withholding taxes. Among those Member States that levy withholding taxes on dividend or interest 
payments, different systems are being applied to provide for relief of double taxation in cross-border 
situations.  The  following  reclaim  systems  are  being  used  with  different  thresholds  or  different 
requirements;  relief  at  source  system,  quick  refund  system,  the  standard  refund  system  or  a 
combination thereof. 

Keeping an increasingly fragmented framework of withholding tax procedures in the EU would lead 
to higher compliance costs for investors and financial intermediaries involved. The prevailing cross-
border  nature  of  the  issue  at  stake  determines  the  necessity  of  EU  action  in  order  to  simplify 
administrative  procedures  and  reduce  compliance  costs.  Otherwise,  the  fragmentation  of  national 
rules on WHT procedures in the EU would make the effective functioning of reclaim procedures more 
difficult  to  achieve  for  cross-border  operations,  hindering  the  proper  functioning  of  the  internal 
market.  Therefore,  an  EU  action  is  required  to  level  the  playing  field  for  national  and  foreign 
investors and for domestic and non-resident intermediaries alike.  

The initiative also aims to respond to the recommendations provided by ESMA which were presented 
in  the  ‘Final  report  On  Cum/Ex,  Cum/Cum  and  withholding  tax  reclaim  schemes’  which  concluded 
that specific action at EU level in the field of taxation should be provided in order to effectively fight 
abuse.  

A  legislative  approach  is  therefore  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of  subsidiarity,  as  set  out  in 
Article 5 of the Treaty on the European Union.  

2.3 Based  on  the  answers  to  the  questions  below,  can  the  objectives  of  the  proposed  action  be 

achieved sufficiently by the Member States acting alone (necessity for EU action)? 

The objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States acting 
alone  for  the  reasons  stated  below.  The  necessity  for  EU  action  was  supported  by  94%  of 
respondents during the public consultation. 

(a)  Are  there  significant/appreciable  transnational/cross-border  aspects  to  the  problems  being 

tackled? Have these been quantified? 

One of the main problems which needs to be addressed is the inefficient withholding tax procedures. 
Current  procedures  are  cumbersome  and  costly  for  investors,  financial  intermediaries  and  tax 
administrations due to a variety of factors, such as: 

-  Uneven  digitalization:  the  lack  of  a  standardised  and  digitalised  system  prevents  tax 
administrations from creating cost efficiencies and automating certain processes. Nowadays 
a  majority  of  Member  States  is  still  fully  or  partially  relying  on  paper-based  WHT  refund 
procedures.  This 
issue  was  confirmed  by  most  tax  administrations  during  targeted 
consultations. 
Fragmentated  rules  across  Member  States:  In  particular,  there  are  highly  divergent  WHT 
procedures applied in each Member State with more than 450 different forms to be filled in 

- 

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by  investors  according  to  information  provided  by  the  industry.  In  addition,  most  of  these 
forms  are  only  available  in  national  languages.  This  results  in  high  administrative  and 
financial compliance costs and in long and heavy processes for both taxpayers and financial 
intermediaries in charge of providing reclaim services to their clients. 
Lack  of  transparency  in  the  financial  chain:  In  a  cross-border  context,  chains  of  financial 
intermediaries are generally longer than in a domestic scenario, which makes it difficult for 
issuers to know the identity of the ultimate investor – while they know instead the financial 
identity.  Similarly,  tax  administrations  struggle  to  gather  sufficient 
intermediary’s 
information on the ultimate investor to be able to properly apply the benefits granted under 
the DTTs. 

In January 2016, the overall cost of WHT refund procedures within the EU was estimated at EUR 8.4 
billion  per  year by  the  Joint  Research  Centre  (JRC).  The  estimate  has  been  updated  in  2022 
amounting to EUR 6.62 billion per year. 
The other problem aiming to address under the current initiative is that WHT procedures are prone 
to  risk  of  abuse.  Some  Member  States  have  experienced  large-scale  tax  abuse  schemes  known  as 
‘Cum/Ex’ and ‘Cum/Cum’. 

- 

- 

‘Cum/Ex’  schemes  work  as  fraudulent  multiple  reclaim  schemes  when  entitled  to  a  single 
reclaim. Short selling practice around the distribution day creates a confusion between the 
economic and legal owner of the securities, which enables both parties to claim tax refunds 
that exceed the amount that was initially withheld by the WHT agent. An estimation made by 
the  journalist  network  Correctiv,  working  together  with  the  University  of  Mannheim, 
estimated the losses from Cum/Ex at EUR 9.1 billion for the years 2000-2020. 
‘Cum/Cum’ schemes are dividend arbitrage patterns aimed to minimise or avoid paying taxes 
on dividends. Those strategies are often structured in a way that an investor lends or sells its 
shares to a borrower/buyer domiciled in a country that has a lower dividend tax rate, so as to 
minimise  the  taxes  paid  on  such  dividend.  The  borrower/buyer  receives  the  dividend  paid 
out by the issuer of the share and then returns it to the lender/seller, minus the dividend tax 
and  a  percentage  –  or  ‘cut’  –  negotiated  between  the  two  counterparties.  The  cost  for 
Member  States  of  Cum/Cum  trading  has,  according  to  the  same  sources  of  Correctiv  and 
University of Mannheim, been estimated at EUR 141 billion for the years 2000-2020. 

(b)  Would national action or the absence of the EU level action conflict with core objectives of 

the Treaty2 or significantly damage the interests of other Member States? 

National  actions would  not  be  sufficient  to  address  the  problem  in  its  entirety as  the cross-border 
nature of the problem requires a common action from the EU as a whole. In order to act at EU level 
the legislative  proposal introduces a common digital tax  residence  certificate, a common reporting 
standard  to  tackle  the  lack  of  transparency  within  the  financial  chain  and  common  streamlined 
withholding tax procedures to avoid fragmentation across the EU to.  

(c)  To  what  extent  do  Member  States  have  the  ability  or  possibility  to  enact  appropriate 

measures? 

Member  States  can  individually  impose  domestic  measures  and  indeed  lately Member  States  have 
had  a  tendency  to  impose  them  unilaterally.  As  shown  in  the  targeted  consultation  of  Member 
States,  some  of  them  have  introduced  provisions  attempting,  in  different  ways  and  by  different 
means, to address the problems of withholding tax procedures. For instance, Finland has introduced 
in  2021  a  TRACE-like  system  for  dividend  payments  from  listed  companies.  It  relies  on  a  relief  at 

2 https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-in-brief_en  

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source  system  as  a  primary  system.  Other  countries  like  Germany  have  approved  a  tax  reform  on 
withholding tax procedures for non-residents that relies on a standard refund procedure with several 
extensive conditions to be fulfilled in terms of documentation.  

(d)  How  does  the  problem  and  its  causes  (e.g.  negative  externalities,  spill-over  effects)  vary 

across the national, regional and local levels of the EU? 

Feedback  given  by  Member  States demonstrates  that  withholding  tax  collection  and  relief/refund 
procedures vary considerably among them. The main differences in such procedures for cross-border 
withholding tax procedures are: 

-  Different  forms  and  procedures  in  place:  As  explained  above  each  relevant  Member  State 
tries to tackle the problems drivers with different procedures. It entails that an investor with 
a diversified portfolio needs to deal with several forms in different languages depending on 
which Member States the investments are done. 

-  Reporting obligations  associated with  withholding tax  collection: in several Member States, 
domestic  reporting  obligations  must  be  met  in  connection  with  taxable  income  payments. 
Differences  exist  in  terms  of  (i)  the  content  of  reporting,  (ii)  the  entity  required  to  comply 
with the reporting obligations, (iii) the person to whom the reports must be issued to, and 
(iv)  the  frequency  and  format  of  reporting.  In  most  cases,  the  information  to  be  reported 
relates  to  the  gross  income,  the  tax  withheld,  the  net  income,  and  the  recipient  of  the 
income.  Although  DAC2 has  streamlined  the  procedures  to  report  information  for  cross-
border passive income, it does not encompass all reporting items needed under withholding 
tax procedures. 

- 

-  Documentation  requirements  for  obtaining  tax  treaty  benefits  (reduced  withholding  tax 
rates): generally beneficial owners must provide evidence to prove that they are entitled to 
WHT relief/refund under domestic law or DTTs. The type of documentation to be provided 
differs  from  one  Member  State  to  another.  At  one  end  of  the  spectrum,  benefits  can  be 
provided on the basis of free-format information about the beneficial owners or on the basis 
of documentation held by the  intermediary  under Know  Your Customer rules (KYC). At the 
other end of the spectrum, reduced rate can be granted only on the basis of official forms or 
certificates stamped by the local authorities of the investor’s country of residence or by the 
local tax authorities of the country of investment. 
Format and covered period of tax residence certificates: tax residence certificates are issued 
with  different  content  and  formats  across  Member  States.  In  addition,  in  some  countries, 
new forms must be used for each claim, while in others, certificates remain valid for one year 
or until they are revoked.  
Time limitations to refund claims: the period within which withholding tax refunds must be 
claimed varies among Member States and even within the same Member State, depending 
on the treaty under which the refund is claimed. 
Tax authority arrangements for processing refund claims: in some countries, the processing 
of all refund claims is centralised in one office of the tax authorities, while in other Member 
States, refund claims must be filed with the local tax office responsible for the  withholding 
tax agent. 

- 

- 

-  Due  diligence  procedures:  Although  financial  intermediaries  would  already  need  to  check 
customer  information  under  AML/KYC  and  DAC2  rules,  current  reclaim  procedures  do  not 
adequately leverage these rules as there are divergent customer due diligence procedures in 
place in the EU for withholding tax procedure purposes.  

(e)  Is the problem widespread across the EU or limited to a few Member States? 

Uneven state of digitalization, fragmentation of rules regarding withholding tax procedures and lack 

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of  transparency  within  the  financial  chain  are  problems  widespread  across  the  EU,  which  hamper 
non-resident investors access to the reduced rates they are entitled to when investing cross-border 
and,  therefore,  discourage  cross-border  investment.  The  problems  of  withholding  tax  procedures 
that  are  inefficient  and  prone  to  abuse  arise  in  those  Member  States  where  there  is  a  difference 
between the statutory national rate and the rates provided under tax treaties or lower rates granted 
to  specific  taxpayers  under  domestic  legislation.  At  the  moment,  23  Member  States  levy  a 
withholding  tax  on  dividends  and  around  15  Member  States  levy  a  withholding  tax  on  interest. 
Furthermore, investors from all EU Member State can face issues once they invest cross-border.    

(f)  Are Member States overstretched in achieving the objectives of the planned measure? 

As the proposed legislation seeks to ensure fair taxation and reinforce the Capital Market Union by 
setting common rules in the withholding tax procedures field, it is expected that Member States will 
implement  the  proposed  measures  by  replacing  their  current  systems  by  the  common  ones  or 
adjusting  them  to  be  fully  compliant  with  the  standards  set  by  the  Directive.  Therefore,  Member 
States´ systems will become more efficient and  more secure by re-allocating their resources to the 
high-risk cases. 

(g)  How  do  the  views/preferred  courses  of  action  of  national,  regional  and  local  authorities 

differ across the EU? 

Overall, Member States have expressed support to the initiative.  

- Member States support introducing a common EU-wide digital tax residence certificate. 

- Regarding the reporting obligation and the common procedures:  

(A) there are Member States where the domestic rate for non-resident investors is lower or the same 
as the tax treaty rate: these Member States therefore might not need and might not have refund 
procedures.  While the  impact  for these Member States might be limited, some of these  Member 
States have expressed support for European Union action due to their own investor base. 

(B) those Member States where internal withholding tax rate is higher than the applicable tax treaty 
rate:  overall,  they  agree  on  enhancing  transparency  and  standardizing  procedures,  stressing  the 
importance of striking a balance between making withholding tax procedures efficient and keeping 
the control over processes to prevent tax abuses. 

2.4 Based  on  the  answer  to  the  questions  below,  can  the  objectives  of  the  proposed  action  be 
better achieved at Union level by reason of scale or effects of that action (EU added value)? 

The objectives of the proposal can be better achieved at Union level. The added value of EU action is 
broadly confirmed in the public consultation where the vast majority of respondents (close to 94 %) 
stated that the same withholding tax procedures system should be set up throughout the EU. 

(a)  Are there clear benefits from EU level action?  

An action at  the  level of the  EU will bring an added value,  compared to individual Member States’ 
initiatives in the field. Firstly, it will ensure a consistent application of the eTRC both for the Member 
State of the investor and the Member States of the investment. Furthermore, the current reporting 
obligations could be replaced by the standardized rules set, leading to reductions in compliance costs 
for  any  stakeholder  involved  and  enabling  Member  States  to  obtain  a  comprehensive  set  of 
information  to  make  a  safe  and  swift  decision.  Finally,  it  entails  common  rules  for  efficient 
withholding  tax  procedures  that  will  benefit 
intermediaries  and  tax 
it  will  avoid  a  patchwork  of  refunding  requirements,  unilaterally 
administrations  alike  as 

investors, 

financial 

5 

 
 
implemented by some or all Member States using different procedures. 

(b)  Are there economies of scale? Can the objectives be met more efficiently at EU level (larger 

benefits per unit cost)? Will the functioning of the internal market be improved? 

The initiative aims to achieve fair taxation – by ensuring that taxpayers do not pay more than they 
should and that taxes which are due are paid - and to improve the capital market union.  
Inefficient  withholding  tax  procedures  by  using  different  reporting  and  procedural  requirements 
imposed by Member States at national level may distort the European financial market and lead to 
non-well-functioning Capital Market Union. 
The objective of fighting against tax abuse is better achieved at EU level as it is the only way to gather 
the information needed to make an accurate decision on refunds and detect potential Cum/Ex and 
Cum/Cum schemes. 

(c)  What  are  the  benefits  in  replacing  different  national  policies  and  rules  with  a  more 

homogenous policy approach? 

The  measures  under  the  proposal  will  facilitate  cross-border  investment.  A  fully  functioning  and 
integrated market for capital with no barriers will allow the EU’s economy to grow in a sustainable 
way and be more competitive. An economically stronger Europe will better serve its citizens and help 
the EU play a stronger role on the global stage. 
On the other hand, it will prevent tax abuse. Providing Member States´ tax administrations with the 
proper tools to address the current lack of transparency and would make fraudulent behaviour more 
difficult.  Therefore,  this  initiative  aims  to  contribute  to  safeguarding  the  tax  revenues  of  Member 
States, making tax systems fairer and ensuring a level playing field among all involved. 

(d)  Do  the  benefits  of  EU-level  action outweigh  the  loss of  competence  of  the  Member  States 
and  the  local and  regional  authorities  (beyond  the  costs  and  benefits of  acting  at  national, 
regional and local levels)? 

The benefit of EU-level action will outweigh the loss of competence of the Member States. From the 
tax  administrations’  perspective,  less  resources  might  be  required  on  average  to  deal  with 
withholding tax reclaim procedures and more resources could therefore be re-allocated to deal with 
higher  risk  cases.  The  main  benefit  for  tax  administrations  is  the  availability  of  the  appropriate 
information  to  achieve  swifter  withholding  tax  procedures  and  to  fight  tax  abuse.  In  relation  to 
macro-economic  effects,  tax  revenues  would  marginally  decrease  as  there  will  be  less  cases  of 
foregone tax revenues (as taxpayers will have their excess WHT refunded), but this could be balanced 
by the prevention of fraud. 

(e)  Will there be improved legal clarity for those having to implement the legislation? 

There will be improved legal clarity as this initiative would digitalise and harmonise key features of 
withholding  tax  procedures  resulting  in  a  lower  administrative  burden  and  hence  time  and  costs 
savings  for  tax  administrations, 
intermediaries  and  companies.  Making 
withholding tax procedures more efficient and fighting against fraud are objectives that can be met 
more effectively and efficiently at EU level. 

investors,  financial 

3.  Proportionality: How the EU should act 

3.1  Does  the  explanatory  memorandum  (and  any  impact  assessment)  accompanying  the 
Commission’s proposal contain an adequate justification regarding the proportionality of the 
proposal  and  a  statement  allowing  appraisal  of  the  compliance  of  the  proposal  with  the 
principle of proportionality? 

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The envisaged measures do not go beyond ensuring the minimum necessary level of protection for 
the internal market. The  proposal  does not therefore  prescribe  full harmonization but only  creates 
common  features  that  would  enhance  the  Member  States'  WHT  systems  and  strengthen  them 
against abuse.  

The implementation of a digital tax residence certificate benefits investors, financial intermediaries 
and  tax  administrations.  The  current  fragmented  system  with  partly  paper-based  documents  is 
replaced by a completely digital system. It will increase the digitalisation of administrative processes 
by  Member  States  and  achieve  efficiency  gains,  also  enabling  the  intermediaries  to  improve  their 
processes. This is one step forward to achieve more efficient withholding tax procedures.  

The  implementation  of  additional  reporting  obligations  for  financial  intermediaries  imposes 
additional  administrative  burden  and  costs  as  the  reporting  of  information  must  be  extended  to 
include  more  granular data. These costs  are,  nonetheless, outweighed by  (i) the standardisation of 
the  reporting  obligation  in  the  EU,  which  will  reduce  compliance  costs  for  financial  intermediaries 
operating  cross-border,  and  (ii)  the  positive  impact  the  information  received  by  tax  administration 
has on the improvement of withholding tax procedures in terms of security and effectiveness. 

justified 

As 
proportionality principle 

in  the 

Impact  Assessment  accompanying  this  proposal, 

it 

is  compliant  with 

3.2 Based  on  the  answers  to  the  questions  below  and  information  available  from  any  impact 
assessment,  the  explanatory  memorandum  or  other  sources,  is  the  proposed  action  an 
appropriate way to achieve the intended objectives? 

The  proposed  action  is  an  appropriate  way  to  achieve  the  intended  objectives  as  it  is  does  not  go 
beyond what is needed to make withholding tax procedures more efficient and bring down the risk 
of tax abuse. 

(a)  Is the initiative limited to those aspects that Member States cannot achieve satisfactorily on 

their own, and where the Union can do better? 

By  creating  common  features  such  as  a  common  tax  residence  certificate  and  common  reporting 
and common procedures across the European Union, investors wishing to invest cross-border will no 
longer be faced with different processes to obtain relief of double taxation in the Member State that 
levies the withholding tax. These commonalities can only be set at an EU level. 

(b)  Is  the  form  of  Union  action  (choice  of  instrument)  justified,  as  simple  as  possible,  and 
coherent with the satisfactory achievement of, and ensuring compliance with the objectives 
pursued  (e.g.  choice  between  regulation,  (framework)  directive,  recommendation,  or 
alternative regulatory methods such as co-legislation, etc.)? 

In  order  to  reach  common  features  and  procedures  within  the  EU,  the  choice  of  a  directive  is 
justified. 

Non-legally binding actions were  taken in the past  but  did not resolve the issues.  In particular, the 
most recent soft law measure was the implementation of a Code of Conduct in 2017.  Although the 
implementation  of  the  Code  of  Conduct  helped  in  raising  awareness  on  the  need  to  simplify 
withholding tax procedures, it was not in itself sufficient to tackle the existing problems. Therefore, 
further  EU  action  is  needed  at  legislative  level,  as  neither  national  measures  nor  multilateral  soft 
measures have been effective so far.  

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(c)  Does the Union action leave as much scope for national decision as possible while achieving 
satisfactorily the objectives set? (e.g. is it possible to limit the European action to minimum 
standards or use a less stringent policy instrument of approach?) 

The scope of the proposal does not set the rate nor the tax base, it limits itself in providing the tools 
for the Member States to ensure compliance and to streamline procedures.  

(d)  Does  the 

initiative  create  financial  or  administrative  cost  for  the  Union,  national 
governments,  regional or local authorities, economic operators or citizens? Are these costs 
commensurate with the objective to be achieved? 

For  investors,  the  proposal  is  not  expected  to  lead  to  an  increase  in  costs  (but  actually  to  costs 
savings  estimated  at  EUR  5.17  billion  annually,  thanks  to  less  foregone  withholding  tax  refunds, 
fewer administrative costs and reduced opportunity costs for investors). 
Financial  intermediaries  are  estimated  to  face  a  one-off  increase  in  costs  of  EUR  75.9  million 
(implementing costs) and EUR 13.5 million in recurring costs. For Member States, at the level of the 
tax administrations, costs will stem from the development of implementing the common digital tax 
residency certificate  and  the  recurrent  costs  associated  with  the  new  reporting  systems to  receive 
information from financial intermediaries.  
In relation to macro-economic effects, tax revenues would marginally decrease as there will  be less 
cases of foregone tax revenues (as taxpayers will have their excess WHT refunded), but this could be 
counterbalanced by the prevention of fraud. 
These  costs  need  to  be  incurred  to  achieve  the  benefits  of  efficiency  and  robustness  related  to 
withholding tax procedures. 

(e)  While  respecting  the  Union  law,  have  special  circumstances  applying  in  individual  Member 

States been taken into account? 

Not applicable. 

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