COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard
Date: 2023-06-08
Institutions: Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, European Commission
Subjects: EU Member State, EU statistics, access to the courts, application of EU law, digitisation, electronic government, independence of the judiciary, judicial proceedings, judicial reform, rule of law

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 8.6.2023  COM(2023) 309 final  COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard  
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION  

Effective  justice  systems  are  essential  for  the  application  and  enforcement  of  EU  law  and 
upholding the rule of law and other values the EU is founded on and which are common to the 
Member States. National courts act as EU courts when applying EU law. It is national courts in 
the first place that ensure that the rights and obligations  set in EU law are enforced effectively 
(Article 19 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)). 

In  addition,  effective  justice  systems  are  also  essential  for  mutual  trust  and  for  improving  the 
investment  climate  and  the  sustainability  of  long-term  growth.  This  is  why  improving  the 
efficiency, quality and independence of national justice systems features among the priorities of 
the European Semester – the EU’s annual cycle of economic policy coordination. The 2023 annual 
sustainable growth survey (1), which sets out the economic and employment policy priorities for 
the  EU,  confirms  the  link  between  effective  justice  systems  and  Member  States’  business 
environment,  and  an  economy  that  works  for  people.  Well-functioning  and  fully  independent 
justice systems can have a positive impact on investment and are key for investment protection, 
and therefore contribute to productivity and competitiveness. They are also important for ensuring 
the  effective  cross-border  enforcement  of  contracts,  administrative  decisions  and  dispute 
resolution, essential for the functioning of the single market (2). 

In this context, the EU Justice Scoreboard gives an annual overview of indicators focusing on the 
essential parameters of effective justice systems:  

efficiency;  

- 
-  quality;  
- 

independence.  

The  2023  Scoreboard  further  develops  the  indicators  for  all  three  aspects,  including  on 
accessibility to justice for persons at risk of discrimination and  older persons, and again on the 
digitalisation of justice, which has played a crucial role in keeping the courts functioning during 
the COVID-19 pandemic and supporting their recovery in its aftermath, as well as more generally, 
to  promote  efficient  and  accessible  justice  systems  (3).  This  edition  of  the  Justice  Scoreboard 
strengthens the business dimension on all three aspects by including new data on efficiency in the 
area  of  the  fight  against  corruption  (4),  an  updated  chart  on  the  legal  safeguards  in  relation  to 
administrative  decisions  and  continues  to  present  the  data  on  the  confidence  in  investment 
protection. Finally, the 2023 Scoreboard presents how the justice systems started their recovery 
from the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the efficiency of these systems. 





1   COM(2022) 780 final. 
2   See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Identifying and addressing barriers to the Single Market, 
COM(2020)93, and accompanying SWD(2020)54.  

3   See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Digitalisation of justice in the European Union: A toolbox 
of opportunities, COM(2020)710, and accompanying SWD(2020)540. 

4   On  3  May  2023,  the  European  Commission  adopted  an  Anti-Corruption  Package,  including  a  proposal  for  a 
Directive  on  combating  corruption  by  criminal  law.  Proposal  for  a  Directive  on  combatting  corruption  COM 
(2023) 234 and Joint Communication on the fight against corruption JOIN(2023) 12 final. 

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 The Annual Rule of Law Cycle – 

As announced in President von der Leyen’s political guidelines, the Commission has established 
a comprehensive Annual Rule of Law Cycle to deepen its monitoring of the situation in Member 
States. The Rule of Law Cycle acts as a preventive tool, deepening dialogue and joint awareness 
of rule of law issues. At the centre of the new  cycle is  the annual  Rule  of  Law Report, which 
provides a synthesis  of significant  developments  – both  positive and negative  – in  all Member 
States  and  the  Union  as  a  whole.  The  Reports,  including  its  2022  edition,  published  on 
13 July 2022, draw on a variety of sources, including the EU Justice Scoreboard (5). Moreover, as 
announced by President von der Leyen in her 2021 State of the Union Speech, the 2022 Rule of 
Law Report includes recommendations to Member States. The 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard has 
also been further developed to reflect the need for additional comparative information identified 
during the preparation of the 2022 Rule of Law Report, so as to support forthcoming Rule of Law 
Reports, including in the area of the fight against corruption.  

What is the EU Justice Scoreboard?  

The EU Justice Scoreboard is an annual comparative information tool. Its purpose is to assist the EU and 
Member States improve the effectiveness of their national justice systems by providing objective, reliable 
and comparable data on a number of indicators relevant for the assessment of the (i) efficiency, (ii) quality 
and (iii) independence of justice systems in all Member States. It does not present an overall single ranking. 
Rather, it gives an overview of how all Member States’ justice systems function, based on indicators that 
are of common interest and relevance for all Member States. 
The Scoreboard does not promote any particular type of justice system and treats all Member States on an 
equal footing.  
Efficiency, quality and independence are essential parameters of an effective justice system, whatever the 
model  of  the  national  justice  system  or  the  legal  tradition  on  which  it  is  based.  Figures  for  these  three 
parameters should be read together, as all three are often interlinked (initiatives aimed at improving one 
may affect another).  
The Scoreboard mainly presents indicators concerning civil, commercial and administrative cases, as well 
as, subject to availability of data, certain criminal cases (i.e. cases concerning money laundering at first 
instance courts), in order to assist Member States in their efforts to create an environment which is more 
efficient, better for investments as well as business and citizen-friendly. The Scoreboard is a comparative 
tool  which  evolves  in  the  course  of  dialogue  with  Member  States  and  the  European  Parliament  (6).  Its 
objective is to identify the essential parameters of an effective justice system and to provide relevant annual 
data. 

What is the methodology of the EU Justice Scoreboard? 

The Scoreboard uses a range of information sources. The Council of Europe’s European Commission for 
the  Efficiency  of Justice  (CEPEJ),  with  which  the  Commission  has  concluded a  contract  to  carry  out a 
specific annual study, provides much of the quantitative data. The data cover 2012-2021, and have been 
provided by Member States in accordance with the CEPEJ’s methodology. The study also provides detailed 
comments and country-specific factsheets that give more context. They should be read together with the 
figures (7). 

5   https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2022-rule-law-report-communication-and-country-chapters_en  
6   E.g. European Parliament resolution of 29 May 2018 on the 2017 EU Justice Scoreboard (P8_TA(2018)0216). 
7   https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/eu-

justice-scoreboard_en  

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Data on the length of proceedings collected by the CEPEJ show the ‘disposition time’ – a calculated length 
of  court  proceedings  (based  on  a  ratio  between  pending  and  resolved  cases).  Data  on  courts’  and 
administrative  authorities’  efficiency  in  applying  EU  law  in  specific  areas  show  the  average  length  of 
proceedings derived from the actual length of court cases. Note that the length of court proceedings may 
vary  substantially  between  areas  in  a  Member  State,  particularly  in  urban  centres  where  commercial 
activities may lead to a higher caseload. 
Other data sources, covering the period from 2012 to 2022, are: the group of contact persons on national 
justice systems (8), the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ) (9), the Network of the 
Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU (NPSJC) (10), the Association of the Councils of State 
and  Supreme  Administrative  Jurisdictions  of  the  EU  (ACA-Europe)  (11),  the  Council  of  Bar  and  Law 
Societies  in  Europe  (CCBE)  (12),  the  European  Competition  Network  (ECN)  (13),  the  Communications 
Committee (COCOM)(14), the European Observatory on infringements of intellectual property rights(15), 
the Consumer Protection Cooperation Network (CPC) (16), the Expert Group on Money Laundering and 

8   To  help  prepare  the  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  and  promote  the  exchange  of  best  practice  on  the  effectiveness  of 
justice systems, the Commission asked Member States to designate two contact  persons, one from the judiciary 
and one from the ministry of justice. This informal group meets regularly. 

9   The  ENCJ  brings  together  Member  States’  national  institutions  that  are  independent  of  the  executive  and 
legislature,  and  are  responsible  for  supporting  the  judiciary  in  the  independent  delivery  of  justice: 
https://www.encj.eu/ 

10   The NPSJC provides a forum that gives European institutions the opportunity to request the opinions of supreme 
courts, and brings them closer by encouraging discussion and the exchange of ideas: http://network-presidents.eu/ 
11   ACA-Europe is composed of the Court of Justice of the EU and the Councils of State or the Supreme administrative 

jurisdictions of each EU Member State: http://www.juradmin.eu/index.php/en/ 

12   CCBE  represents  European  bars  and  law  societies  in  their  common  interests  before  European  and  other 
international  institutions.  It  regularly  acts  as  a  liaison  between  its  members  and  the  European  institutions, 
international organisations, and other legal organisations around the world: https://www.ccbe.eu/  

13   The  ECN  has  been  established  as  a  forum  for  discussion  and  cooperation  between  European  competition 
authorities in cases where Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) are applied. 
The ECN is the framework for the close cooperation mechanisms of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 . Through 
the ECN, the Commission and the national competition authorities in all EU Member States cooperate with each 
other: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/index_en.html 

14   The COCOM is composed of EU Member State representatives. Its main role is to provide an opinion on the draft 
measures  that  the  Commission  intends  to  adopt  on  digital  market  issues:  https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/communications-committee 

15   The European Observatory on Infringements of Intellectual Property Rights is a network of experts and specialist 
stakeholders. It is composed of public and private sector representatives, who collaborate in active working groups: 
https://euipo.europa.eu/ohimportal/en/web/observatory/home  

16   The CPC is a network of national authorities responsible for enforcing EU consumer protection laws in EU and 
countries: 
EEA 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/performance_by_governance_tool/consumer_protection_cooperat
ion_network/index_en.htm  

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Terrorist Financing (EGMLTF) (17), Eurostat (18), and the European Judicial Training Network (EJTN) (19), 
and the national contact points in the fight against corruption (20). 
Over the years, the Scoreboard methodology has been further developed and refined in close cooperation 
with  the  group  of  Member  States’  contact  persons  on  national  justice  systems,  particularly  through  a 
questionnaire  (updated  annually)  and  by  collecting  data  on  certain  aspects  of  the  functioning  of  justice 
systems. 
The  availability  of  data,  in  particular  for  indicators  on  the  efficiency  of  justice  systems,  continues  to 
improve. This is because many Member States have invested in their capacity to produce better judicial 
statistics. Where difficulties in gathering or providing data persist, this is either due to insufficient statistical 
capacity, or because the national categories for which data are collected do not correspond exactly to the 
ones used for the Scoreboard. Only in very few cases is the data gap due to a lack of contributions from 
national authorities. The Commission continues to encourage Member States to further reduce this data 
gap. 

How  does  the  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  feed  into  the  European  Semester  and  how  is  it  related  to  the 
Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)? 

The Scoreboard provides elements for assessing the efficiency, quality and independence of national justice 
systems. In doing so, it aims to help Member States make their national justice systems more effective. By 
comparing information on Member States’ justice systems, the Scoreboard makes it easier to identify best 
practice and shortcomings and to keep track of challenges and progress made. In the context of the European 
Semester,  country-specific  assessments  are  carried  out  through  a  bilateral  dialogue  with  the  national 
authorities  and  the  stakeholders  concerned.  Where  the  shortcomings  identified  have  macroeconomic 
significance, the European Semester analysis may lead to the Commission proposing to the Council to adopt 
country-specific recommendations to improve the national justice systems in individual Member States (21). 
The RRF has made available more than EUR 737 billion in loans and non-repayable financial support, of 
which each Member State would need to allocate a minimum of 20% to the digital transition and a minimum 
of 37% to measures contributing to climate objectives. So far, the reforms and investments proposed by 
Member  States  have  exceeded  these  targets,  with  an  estimated  digital  expenditure  at  26%  and  climate 
expenditure at about 40%. The RRF offers an opportunity to address country-specific recommendations 
related to national justice systems and to accelerate national efforts to complete the digital transformation 
of justice systems. Payments to Member States under the performance-based RRF are contingent on the 
fulfilment of milestones and targets. So far, 6,000 milestones and targets were introduced, of which about 
two-thirds  are  investments  and  one  third  are  reforms.  In  this  context,  the  Commission  therefore  had  to 
assess  whether  the  Member  States’  recovery  and  resilience  plans  (RRPs)  are  expected  to  contribute  to 

17   The EGMLTF meets regularly to share views and help the Commission define policy and draft new anti-money 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/financial-

counter-terrorist 

legislation: 

financing 

laundering 
crime/index_en.htm 

and 

18   Eurostat is the statistical office of the EU: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/about/overview 
19   The EJTN is the principal platform and promoter for the training and exchange of knowledge of the European 

judiciary: https://www.ejtn.eu/en/  

20   The Commission maintains an informal group of contact persons dealing  with the fight against corruption. See 
https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/internal-security/corruption/how-eu-helps-member-states-fight-

also 
corruption_en. 

21   In  the  context  of  the  European  Semester,  the  Council,  on  the  basis  of  the  Commission’s  proposal,  addressed 
country-specific recommendations on their justice systems to seven Member States in 2019 (HR, IT, CY, HU, MT, 
PT and SK) and eight Member States in 2020 (HR, IT, CY, HU, MT, PL,  PT and SK). The Commission also 
monitors  judicial  reforms  in  BG  and  RO  under  the  Cooperation  and  Verification  Mechanism.  There  were  no 
country-specific recommendations in 2021 due to the ongoing RRF processes. In 2022, there were two Member 
States (PL and HU) with country specific recommendations related to judicial independence.  

4 

 
 
                                                           
effectively addressing all or a significant number of challenges identified in the relevant country-specific 
recommendations or challenges identified in other relevant Commission documents adopted in the context 
of the European Semester (22). Following payment requests by the Member States and positive assessments 
by the Commission on the satisfactory fulfilment of the respective milestones and targets, a total of EUR 
144.08 billion in RRF grants and loans have been disbursed to the Member States in the last years. However, 
to this date, the fulfilment of 92% of milestones and targets has not yet been assessed by the Commission.  
Why are effective justice systems important for an investment- friendly business environment? 
Effective justice systems that uphold the rule of law have a positive economic impact, which is particularly 
relevant in the context of the European Semester and the RRF. Where and when judicial systems guarantee 
the  enforcement  of  rights, creditors  are  more  likely  to  lend,  businesses  have  higher  confidence  and  are 
dissuaded from opportunistic behaviour, transaction costs are reduced and innovative businesses are more 
likely to invest. In fact, an effective justice system is vital for sustained economic growth. It can improve 
the business climate, foster innovation, attract foreign direct investment, secure tax revenues and support 
economic growth. The benefits of well-functioning national justice systems for the economy are confirmed 
by a wide range of studies and academic literature, including from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
(23), the European Central Bank (ECB) (24), the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (25), the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (26), the World Economic Forum (27), 
and the World Bank (28). 
A study has found a strong correlation between a reduction in the length of court proceedings (measured in 
disposition time (29)) and the growth rate of the number of companies (30), and that a higher percentage – 
by 1% – of companies perceiving the justice system as independent correlates with higher firms’ turnover 
and greater productivity growth (31).  

22   Article 19(3)(b) and Article 24(3) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the 

Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility, OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17. 

23   IMF,  Regional  Economic  Outlook,  November  2017,  Europe:  Europe  Hitting  its  Stride,  p.  xviii,  pp.  40,  70: 

https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/REO/EUR/2017/November/eur-booked-print.ashx?la=en  

24   ECB, ‘Structural policies in the euro area’, June 2018, ECB Occasional Paper Series No 210: 

https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecb.op210.en.pdf?3db9355b1d1599799aa0e475e5624651  

25   European Network of Councils for the Judiciary and the Montaigne Centre for the Rule of Law and Administration 
of Justice of Utrecht University, ‘Economic value of the judiciary – A pilot study for five countries on volume, 
value  and  duration  of 
large  commercial  cases’,  June  2021:  https://pgwrk-websitemedia.s3.eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/production/pwk-web-encj2017-p/Reports/Economic%20value%20of%20te%20judiciary%20-
%20pilot%20study.pdf  

26   See e.g. ‘What makes civil justice effective?’ OECD Economics Department Policy Notes, No. 18, June 2013 and 
‘The Economics of Civil Justice: New Cross-Country Data and Empirics’, OECD Economics Department Working 
Papers, No. 1060. 

27   World 

Economic 

Forum, 

‘The  Global  Competitiveness  Report 

2019’,  October 

2019: 

https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-competitiveness-report-2019  

28   World Bank, ‘World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law, Chapter 3: The role of law’, pp.  83, 

140: http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2017  

29   The ‘disposition time’ indicator is the number of unresolved cases divided by the number of resolved cases at the 
end of a year multiplied by 365 (days). It is a standard indicator developed by the Council of Europe’s European 
(CEPEJ): 
Efficiency 
Commission 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/default_en.asp 

Justice 

the 

for 

of 

30   Vincenzo Bove and Leandro Elia, ‘The judicial system and economic development across EU Member States’, 
the  EU,  Luxembourg,  2017: 

JRC  Technical  Report,  EUR 28440  EN,  Publications  Office  of 
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC104594/jrc104594__2017_the_judicial_system_and
_economic_development_across_eu_member_states.pdf 

31   Idem. 

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Several surveys have also highlighted the importance of the effectiveness of national justice systems for 
companies.  For  example,  in  one  survey,  93%  of  large  companies  replied  that  they  systematically  and 
continuously review the rule of law conditions (including court independence) in the countries they invest 
in (32). In another survey, over half of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) replied that the cost and 
excessive  length  of  judicial  proceedings,  respectively,  were  the  main  reasons  for  not  starting  court 
proceedings  over  the  infringement  of  intellectual  property  rights  (IPR)  (33).  The  Commission’s 
Communications on  Identifying and  addressing barriers to the single market (34) and the Single market 
enforcement action plan (35) also provide insights into the importance of effective justice systems for the 
functioning of the single market, in particular for businesses.  

How  does  the  Commission  support  the  implementation  of  good  justice  reforms  through  technical 
support? 

Member States can draw on the Commission’s technical support available through the Directorate-General 
for Structural Reform Support (DG REFORM) under the Technical Support Instrument (TSI) (36), with a 
total  budget  of  EUR  864.4  million for  2021 to  2027.  Since 2021,  the TSI  has been supporting  projects 
directly linked to the effectiveness of justice, such as the digitalisation of justice, reforms of judicial maps 
or  better  access  to  justice.  The  TSI  also  complements  other  instruments,  namely  the  RRF,  since  it  can 
support Member States in the implementation of their recovery and resilience plans. The RRPs include 
actions, among others, related to making justice more effective: digitalising justice, reducing backlogs, and 
improving the management of courts and cases. 

How does the Justice programme support the effectiveness of justice systems? 

With a total budget of around EUR 305 million for the period 2021-2027, the Justice programme supports 
the further development of the European area of Justice based on the rule of law including the independence, 
quality and efficiency of the justice system, based on mutual recognition and mutual trust, and on judicial 
cooperation. In 2022, around EUR 42.5 million were provided to fund projects and other activities under 
the three specific objectives of the programme: 

  EUR 11.4 million were provided to promote judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters and to 
contribute to the effective and coherent application and enforcement of EU instruments as well as to 
support to Member States for their connection to the ECRIS-TCN system, 

32   The  Economist  Intelligence  Unit,  ‘Risk  and  Return  –  Foreign  Direct  Investment  and  the  Rule  of  Law’,  2015 

http://www.biicl.org/documents/625_d4_fdi_main_report.pdf, p. 22. 

33   EU 

Intellectual  Property  Office 

(EUIPO), 

Intellectual  Property 

(IP)  SME  Scoreboard  2016: 

https://euipo.europa.eu/tunnel-
web/secure/webdav/guest/document_library/observatory/documents/sme_scoreboard_study_2016/Executive-
summary_en.pdf 

34   COM(2020)93 and SWD(2020)54.  
35   Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European  Economic  and 
Social  Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions,  Long  term  action  plan  for  better  implementation  and 
enforcement of single market rules, COM(2020)94, in particular actions 4, 6 and 18.  

36   https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes/overview-funding-

programmes/structural-reform-support-programme-srsp_en  
The TSI regulation was adopted in March 2021. According to its Article 5 the aim is to support: “….institutional 
reform and efficient and service-oriented functioning of public administration and e-government, simplification of 
rules  and  procedures,  auditing,  enhancing  capacity  to  absorb  Union  funds,  promotion  of  administrative 
cooperation, effective rule of law, reform of the justice systems, capacity building of competition and antitrust 
authorities,  strengthening  of  financial  supervision  and  reinforcement  of  the  fight  against  fraud,  corruption  and 
money laundering” (emphasis added). 

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  EUR 16.6 million were provided in support to training of justice professionals on EU civil, criminal 

and fundamental rights law, legal systems of the Member States and the rule of law, 

  EUR 14.5 million were provided to promote access to justice (including e-Justice), victims’ rights and 
the rights of persons suspected or accused of crime as well as to support the development and use of 
digital tools and the maintenance and extension of the e-Justice portal (in complementarity with the 
Digital Europe Programme). 

Why does the Commission monitor the digitalisation of national justice systems? 

Digitalisation of justice is the key to increasing the effectiveness of justice systems and a highly efficient 
tool for enhancing and facilitating access to justice. The COVID-19 pandemic has brought to the forefront 
the need for Member States to accelerate modernisation reforms in this area. 
Since 2013, the EU Justice Scoreboard has included certain comparative information on the digitalisation 
of justice across the Member States, for example in the areas of online access to judgments or online claim 
submission and follow-up. 
The  Commission’s  Communication  on  Digitalisation  of  justice  in  the  European  Union  –  A  toolbox  of 
opportunities (37), adopted in December 2020, presents a strategy aimed at improving access to justice and 
the  effectiveness  of  justice  systems  using  technology.  As  outlined  in  the  Communication,  a  number  of 
additional  indicators  were  included  in  the  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  as  of  2021.  The  purpose  is  to  ensure 
comprehensive and timely in-depth monitoring of progress areas and challenges encountered by Member 
States in their efforts towards the digitalisation of their justice systems. 

2. 

CONTEXT: DEVELOPMENTS IN JUSTICE REFORMS IN 2022 

In  2022,  a  large  number  of  Member  States  continued  their  efforts  to  further  improve  the 
effectiveness  of  their  justice  systems.  Figure  1  presents  an  updated  overview  of  adopted  and 
planned measures across several areas of justice systems in Member States engaged in reforming 
their justice systems. 

Figure  1:  Legislative  and  regulatory  activity  concerning  justice  systems  in  2022  (adopted 
measures/initiatives under negotiation in each Member State) (source: European Commission (38)) 

37   COM(2020) 710 final. 
38   This information has been collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems 
for 26 Member States. DE explained that a number of judicial reforms were under way, but that the scope and 
scale of the reform process can vary within the 16 federal states. 

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In 2022, procedural law continued to be an area of particular focus in many Member States, with 
a significant amount of ongoing or planned legislative activity. Reforms concerning the status of 
judges, the rules for legal professionals, as well as rules for public prosecution service, also saw 
significant activity. Following the process of introducing legislation for the use of information and 
communication technologies (ICT) in a number of Member States in 2021, a large number of the 
proposed legislation has been adopted in 2022. The momentum from preceding years for measures 
concerning the administration of courts continued in 2022. Four Member States are planning to 
use artificial intelligence in their justice systems, however, no legislation was adopted  in 2022. 
The overview confirms the observation that justice reforms require time – sometimes several years 
– from their announcement, until the adoption of the legislative and regulatory measures and their 
implementation on the ground. 

8 

 
 
 
 
 
 
3. 

KEY FINDINGS OF THE 2023 EU JUSTICE SCOREBOARD 

Efficiency, quality and independence are the main parameters of an effective justice system, for 
all three of which the Scoreboard presents indicators. 

3.1. Efficiency of justice systems 

The Scoreboard presents indicators for the efficiency of proceedings in the broad areas of civil, 
commercial and administrative cases  and in specific areas where administrative authorities and 
courts apply EU law (39).  

The efficiency related indicators in 2021, in particular the number of incoming cases, clearance 
rate  and  disposition  time,  show  the  first  signs  of  recovery  from  the  impact  of  the  COVID-19 
pandemic, which affected Member States in different ways (e.g. in terms of timing or severity) 
(40). 

3.1.1. Developments in caseload 

The caseload of national justice systems decreased notable in three Member States, compared to 
the previous year, while increasing in four or remaining stable in 14. Overall, it continues to vary 
considerably between Member States (Figure 2). This is testament to how important it is to remain 
attentive to caseload developments to ensure the effectiveness of justice systems. 

Figure 2: Number of incoming civil, commercial, administrative and other cases in 2012, 2019 
– 2021 (*) (1st instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study (41)) 

39   The enforcement of court decisions is also important for the efficiency of a justice system. However, comparable 

data are not widely available. 

40   In  IT,  the  temporary  slowdown  of  judicial  activity  due  to  strict  restrictive  measures  to  address  the  COVID-19 
pandemic affected the disposition time. More details on the individual Member States’ situation are presented in 
2021 study on the functioning of judicial systems in the EU Member States – country profiles, carried out by the 
CEPEJ 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/justice-and-fundamental-
rights/effective-justice/eu-justice-scoreboard_en.  

the  Commission: 

Secretariat 

for 

41   2021 study on the functioning of judicial systems in the EU Member States, carried out by the CEPEJ Secretariat 
for the Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/justice-and-fundamental-rights/effective-justice/eu-justice-
scoreboard_en 

9 

 
 
 
                                                           
(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious cases, 
non-litigious land and business registry cases, other registry cases, other non-litigious cases, administrative law cases 
and other non-criminal cases.  

Figure 3: Number of incoming civil and commercial litigious cases in 2012, 2019 – 2021 (*) 
(1st instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, litigious civil/commercial cases concern disputes between parties, e.g. disputes 
about  contracts.  Non-litigious  civil/commercial  cases  concern  uncontested  proceedings,  e.g.  uncontested  payment 
orders. Methodology changes in EL and SK. Data for NL include non-litigious cases. 

Figure 4: Number of incoming administrative cases in 2012, 2019 – 2021 (*) (1st instance/per 
100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study)  

(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, administrative law cases concern disputes between individuals and local, regional 
or national authorities. DK and IE do not record administrative cases separately. Removal from judicial procedure 
of some administrative procedures occurred in RO in 2018. Methodology changes in EL, SK and SE. In SE, migration 
cases have been included under administrative cases (retroactively applied for 2017). 

10 

 
 
 
 
  
 
3.1.2. General data on efficiency 

The  indicators  on  the  efficiency  of  proceedings  in  the  broad  areas  of  civil,  commercial  and 
administrative cases are: (i) estimated length of proceedings (disposition time), (ii) clearance rate, 
and (iii) number of pending cases. 

 Estimated length of proceedings – 

The length of proceedings indicates the estimated time (in days) needed to resolve a case in court, 
meaning the time taken by the court to reach a decision at first instance. The ‘disposition time’ 
indicator is the number of unresolved cases divided by the number of resolved cases at the end of 
a year multiplied by 365 (days) (42). It is a calculated quantity that indicates the estimated minimum 
time that a court would need to resolve a case while maintaining the current working conditions. 
The higher the value, the higher is the probability that it takes the court longer to reach a decision. 
Figures mostly concern proceedings at first instance courts and compare, where available, data for 
2012, 2019, 2020 and 2021 (43). Figures 7 and 9 show the disposition time in 2021 in civil and 
commercial litigious cases, and administrative cases at all court instances. 

Figure 5: Estimated time needed to resolve civil, commercial, administrative and other cases 
in 2012, 2019 – 2021 (*) (1st instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious cases, 
non-litigious land and business registry cases, other registry cases, other non-litigious cases, administrative law cases 
and other non-criminal cases. Methodology changes in SK. Pending cases include all instances in CZ and, until 2016, 
in  SK. LV: the sharp decrease is due to court system reform, error checks and data clean-ups of the information 
system. 

42   Length of proceedings, clearance rate and number of pending cases are standard indicators defined by CEPEJ: 

http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/default_en.asp 

43   The  years  were chosen  to keep the eight-year perspective  with 2012 as a  baseline,  while at the  same  time  not 
overcrowding the figures. Data for 2010, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 are available in the CEPEJ report. 

11 

 
 
 
                                                           
Figure  6:  Estimated  time  needed  to  resolve  litigious  civil  and  commercial  cases  at  first 
instance in 2012, 2019 – 2021 (*) (1st instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, litigious civil/commercial cases concern disputes between parties, e.g. disputes 
about  contracts.  Non-litigious  civil/commercial  cases  concern  uncontested  proceedings,  e.g.  uncontested  payment 
orders. Methodology changes in EL and SK. Pending cases include all instances in CZ and, up to 2016, in SK. IT: 
the temporary slowdown of judicial activity due to  strict restrictive  measures to address the COVID-19 pandemic 
affected the disposition time. Data for NL include non-litigious cases. 

Figure 7: Estimated time needed to resolve litigious civil and commercial cases at all court 
instances in 2021 (*) (1st, 2nd and 3rd instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) The order is determined by the court instance with the longest proceedings in each Member State. No data are 
available for first and second instance courts in BE and BG, for second instance courts in NL, for second and third 
instance courts in AT or for third instance courts in DE and HR. There is no third instance court in DE and MT. IT: 
The temporary slowdown of judicial activity due to  strict restrictive measures to address the COVID-19 pandemic 
affected the disposition time. Access to a third instance court may be limited in some Member States.  

12 

 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Estimated time needed to resolve administrative cases at first instance in 2012, 2019 
– 2021 (*) (1st instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Administrative law cases concern disputes between individuals and local, regional or national authorities, under 
the CEPEJ methodology. Methodology changes in EL and SK. Pending cases include courts of all instances in CZ 
and, until 2016, in SK. DK and IE do not record administrative cases separately. CY: in 2018, the number of resolved 
cases increased because cases were tried together, 2 724 consolidated cases were withdrawn and an administrative 
court was set up in 2015. 

Figure 9: Estimated time needed to resolve administrative cases at all court instances in 2021 
(*) (1st and, where applicable, 2nd and 3rd instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*)  The  order  is  determined  by  the  court  instance  with  the  longest  proceedings  in  each  Member  State.  No  data 
available for second instance courts in BE, CZ, HU, MT, AT, RO, SI, SK and FI, for third instance courts in CY, 
LT, LU, MT and PL. The supreme, or other highest court, is the only appeal instance in CZ, IT, CY, AT, SI and FI. 
There is no third instance court for these types of cases in LT, LU and MT. The highest Administrative Court is the 
first and only instance for certain cases in BE. Access to third instance courts may be limited in some Member States. 
DK and IE do not record administrative cases separately.



13 

 
 
 
 
 Clearance rate – 

The clearance rate is the ratio of the number of resolved cases over the number of incoming cases. 
It measures whether a court is keeping up with its incoming caseload. When the clearance rate is 
around 100% or higher, it means the judicial system is able to resolve at least as many cases as 
come in. When the clearance rate is below 100%, it means that the courts are resolving fewer cases 
than the number of incoming cases. 

Figure 10: Rate of resolving civil, commercial, administrative and other cases in 2012, 2019 
– 2021 (*) (1st instance/in % — values higher than 100% indicate that more cases are resolved 
than  come  in,  while  values  below  100%  indicate  that  fewer  cases  are  resolved  than  come  in) 
(source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious cases, 
non-litigious land and business registry cases, other registry cases, other non-litigious cases, administrative law cases 
and  other  non-criminal  cases.  Methodology  changes  in  SK.  IE:  the  number  of  resolved  cases  is  expected  to  be 
underreported due to the methodology. IT: different classification of civil cases introduced in 2013. 

14 

 
 
 
Figure 11: Rate of resolving litigious civil and commercial cases in 2012, 2019 – 2021 (*) (1st 
instance/in %) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Methodology changes in EL and SK. IE: the number of resolved cases is expected to be underreported due to the 
methodology. IT: different classification of civil cases introduced in 2013. Data for NL include non-litigious cases. 

Figure 12: Rate of resolving administrative cases in 2012, 2019 – 2021 (*) (1st instance/in %) 
(source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Past values for some Member States have been reduced for presentation purposes (CY in 2018 = 219%; IT in 
2012=279.8%); Methodology changes in EL and SK. DK and IE do not record administrative cases separately. In 
CY, the number of resolved cases has increased because cases were tried together, 2 724 consolidated cases were 
withdrawn and an administrative court was set up in 2015. 




15 

 
 
 
 
 Pending cases – 

The number of pending cases expresses the number of cases that remains to be dealt with at the 
end of the year in question. It also affects disposition time. 

Figure 13: Number of pending civil, commercial and administrative and other cases in 2012, 
2019 – 2021 (*) (1st instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious cases, 
non-litigious land and business registry cases, other registry cases, other non-litigious cases, administrative law cases 
and other non-criminal cases. Methodology changes in SK. Pending cases include cases before courts of all instances 
in CZ and, until 2016, in SK. IT: different classification of civil cases introduced in 2013. 

Figure 14: Number of pending litigious civil and commercial cases in 2012, 2019 – 2021 (*) 
(1st instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Methodology changes in EL and SK. Pending cases include cases before courts of all instances in CZ and, until 
2016, in SK. IT: different classification of civil cases introduced in 2013. Data for NL include non-litigious cases. 

16 

 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Number of pending administrative cases in 2012, 2019 – 2021 (*) (1st instance/per 
100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Past values for some Member States have been reduced for presentation purposes (EL in 2012 = 3.5). Methodology 
changes in EL and SK. Pending cases include cases before courts of all instances in CZ and, until 2016, in SK. DK 
and IE do not record administrative cases separately. 

3.1.3. Efficiency in specific areas of EU law 

This section complements the general data on the efficiency of justice systems and presents the 
average length of proceedings (44) in specific areas of EU law. The 2023 Scoreboard builds on 
previous data for competition, electronic communications, the EU trademark, consumer law and 
anti-money laundering. A sixth area is added, to include data on anti-corruption proceedings, in 
light of the recent proposal on this topic (45). The now six areas have been selected because of their 
relevance  for  the  single  market  and  the  business  environment.  This  edition  continues  with  the 
overview  of  efficiency  of  administrative  authorities  with  updated  figures  on  the  areas  of 
competition  and  consumer  protection.  In  general,  long  delays  in  judicial  and  administrative 
proceedings may have negative impacts on rights stemming from EU law e.g. when appropriate 
remedies are no longer available or serious financial damages become irrecoverable. For business 
in particular, administrative delays and uncertainty in some cases can lead to significant costs and 
undermine planned or existing investments (46).  

44   The  length of proceedings in  specific areas is calculated in calendar days, counting  from the day on  which an 
action or appeal was lodged before the court (or the indictment became final) until the day on which the court 
adopted  its  decision  (Figures  16-23).  Values  are  ranked  based  on  a  weighted  average  of  data  for  2013  and 
2019-2021 for Figures 16, 18, 19 and 20, for 2013 and 2019-2021 for Figure 20, for 2014 and 2019-2021 for 
Figure 21. For Figure 17, data cover 2020 and 2021. For Figure 23, the data cover only 2021. Where data were not 
available for all years, the average reflects the available data presented in the chart, calculated based on all cases, 
a sample of cases or, in very few countries, estimations. 

45   Proposal for a Directive on combatting corruption COM (2023) 234 and Joint Communication on the fight against 

corruption JOIN(2023) 12 final. 

46   Figure 18 of the Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment, Political Risk and Policy Responses, 2019 

the World Bank Group. 

17 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
– Competition – 

The effective enforcement of competition law is essential for an attractive business environment 
as it ensures a level playing field for businesses. It encourages enterprise and efficiency, creates a 
wider choice for consumers and helps reduce prices and improve quality. Figure 17 presents the 
average length of cases against the decisions of national competition authorities applying Articles 
101  and  102  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  (TFEU)  (47).  Figure  18 
presents  the  average  length  of  proceedings  before  the  national  competition  authorities  when 
applying Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU. 

Figure  16:  Competition:  average  length  of  judicial  review  in  2013,  2019  –  2021  (*)  (1st 
instance/in days) (source: European Commission with the European Competition Network) 

(*) IE and AT: the scenario is not applicable as the authorities do not have powers to take respective decisions. AT: 
data include cases decided by the Cartel Court involving an infringement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, but not based 
on appeals against the national competition authority. An estimation of length was used for IT. An empty column can 
indicate that the Member State reported no cases for the year in question. The number of cases is low (below five a 
year) in many Member States. This can make the annual data dependent on one exceptionally long or short case (e.g. 
MT were there was only one case).  

47   See Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1–25, in particular 
Articles 3 and 5.  

18 

 
 
                                                           
Figure  17:  Competition:  average  length  of  proceedings  before  the  national  competition 
authorities  in  2020-2021  (*)  (in  days)  (source:  European  Commission  with  the  European 
Competition Network) 

(*) In 10 Member States the number of cases is limited. It must be taken into account that some Member States count 
the days for the length of proceedings from different starting points. With a few exceptions below, most Member States 
consider a case open when the investigation is open. In the NL, the case is considered open when the Statement of 
Objection is sent, while in CZ and SK a case is considered open when the administrative proceedings open. In the 
latter case, this is an intermediate phase between the opening of the investigation and the sending of the Statement of 
Objection.  There  are  also  a  number  of  factors  that  may  impact  the  length  of  proceedings  before  the  national 
competition authorities. These include the nature and complexity of the case, the time it takes to collect the economic 
data and the conclusion of the economic analysis, the deadline extensions at the requests of the parties, the repetition 
of hearings and court actions. The COVID-19 pandemic also had an impact on the length of proceedings. 

– Electronic communications – 

The objective of EU electronic communications legislation is to raise competition, to contribute to 
the  development  of  the  single  market  and  to  generate  investment,  innovation  and  growth.  The 
positive effects for consumers can be achieved through effective enforcement of this legislation 
which can lead to lower prices for end users and better quality services. Figure 18 presents the 
average  length  of  judicial  review  cases  against  the  decisions  of  national  regulatory  authorities 
applying EU law on electronic communications (48). It covers a broad range of cases, ranging from 
more complex ‘market analysis’ reviews to more straightforward consumer-focused issues.  

48   The  calculation  has  been  made  based  on  the  length  of  cases  of  appeal  against  national  regulatory  authority 
decisions  applying  national  laws  that  implement  the  EU  regulatory  framework  for  electronic  communications 
(Directives  2002/19/EC  (Access  Directive),  Directive  2002/20/EC  (Authorisation  Directive),  Directive 
2002/21/EC (Framework Directive), Directive 2002/22/EC (Universal Service Directive), as well as other relevant 
EU law such as the radio spectrum policy programme and Commission spectrum decisions, excluding Directive 
2002/58/EC on privacy and electronic communications. 

19 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 18: Electronic communications: average length of judicial review in 2013, 2019 – 2021 
(*) (1st instance/in days) (source: European Commission with the Communications Committee) 

(*) The number of cases varies from one Member State to another. An empty column indicates that the Member State reported no 
cases for the year (except PT for 2019-20, and RO no data). In some instances, the limited number of relevant cases (BG, CY, MT, 
NL, SK, FI, SE) can make the annual data dependent on one exceptionally long or short case and result in wide variations from 
one year to the next. DK: quasi-judicial body in charge of 1st instance appeals. EE: The average length of judicial review cases 
in 2013 was 18 days. ES, AT, and PL: different courts in charge depending on the subject matter.  

– EU trademark – 

Effective  enforcement  of  intellectual  property  rights  is  essential  to  stimulate  investment  in 
innovation.  EU  legislation  on EU trademarks (49) gives the national  courts a significant  role to 
play, in acting as EU courts and taking decisions that affect the single market. Figure 19 shows the 
average length of EU trademark infringement cases in litigation between private parties. 

Figure 19: EU trademark: average length of EU trademark infringement cases in 2013, 2019 
– 2021 (*) (1st instance/in days) (source: European Commission with the European Observatory 
on infringements of intellectual property rights) 

49   Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union 

trademark (OJ L 154, 16.62017, p. 1-99). 

20 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
(*) FR, IT, LT, LU: a sample of cases used for data for certain years. DK: data from all trademark cases (not only 
EU) in Commercial and Maritime High Courts; for 2018 and 2019, no data on average length due to changes in data 
collection system. EL: data based on weighted average length from two courts. ES: cases concerning other EU IP 
titles are included in the calculation of average length.  

– Consumer protection – 

Effective enforcement of consumer law ensures that consumers benefit from their rights and that 
companies  infringing  consumer  laws  do  not  gain  an  unfair  advantage.  Consumer  protection 
authorities and courts play a key role in enforcing EU consumer law (50) within the various national 
enforcement  systems.  Figure  20  illustrates  the  average  length  of  judicial  review  cases  against 
decisions of consumer protection authorities applying EU law.  

For consumers or companies, effective enforcement can involve a chain of actors, not only courts 
but also administrative authorities. To shed more light on this enforcement chain, the length of 
proceedings by consumer authorities is presented. Figure 21 shows the average length of time it 
took for administrative decisions by national consumer protection authorities in 2014, 2019-2021 
from  the  moment  a  case  is  opened.  Relevant  decisions  include  declaring  infringements  of 
substantive rules, interim measures, cease and desist orders, initiation of court proceedings or case 
closure. 

Figure 20: Consumer protection: average length of judicial review in 2013, 2019 – 2021 (*) 
(1st instance/in days) (source: European Commission with the Consumer Protection Cooperation 
Network) 

(*) DE, LU, AT: scenario is not applicable as consumer authorities are not empowered to decide on infringements of 
relevant consumer rules. The number of relevant cases for 2020 is low (fewer than five) in IE and FI. An estimate of 
average length was provided by EL and RO for certain years.  

50   Figures 20 and 21 relate to the enforcement of the Unfair Terms Directive (93/13/EEC), the Consumer Sales and 
Guarantees Directive (1999/44/EC), the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (2005/29/EC) and the Consumer 
Rights Directive (2011/83/EC), and their national implementing provisions. 

21 

 
 
 
                                                           
Figure  21:  Consumer  protection:  average  length  of  administrative  decisions  by  consumer 
protection  authorities  in  2014,  2019  –  2021  (*)  (1st  instance/in  days)  (source:  European 
Commission with the Consumer Protection Cooperation Network) 

(*) DE, LU, AT: scenario is not applicable as consumer authorities are not empowered to decide on infringements of 
relevant consumer rules. An estimate of average length was provided by DK, EL, FR, RO and FI for certain years.  

– Money laundering – 

In addition to depriving criminals of resources for perpetrating their illicit acts, the fight against 
money  laundering  is  crucial  for  the  soundness,  integrity  and  stability  of  the  financial  sector, 
confidence in the financial system and fair competition in the single market (51). Money laundering 
can  discourage  foreign  investment,  distort  international  capital  flows  and  negatively  affect  a 
country’s  macroeconomic  performance,  resulting  in  welfare  losses,  thereby  draining  resources 
from  more  productive  economic  activities  (52).  The  Anti-money  laundering  Directive  requires 
Member  States  to  maintain  statistics  on  the  effectiveness  of  their  systems  to  combat  money 
laundering or terrorist financing (53). In cooperation with Member States, an updated questionnaire 
was used to collect data on the judicial stages in national anti-money laundering regimes. Figure 
22 shows the average length of first instance court cases dealing with money laundering criminal 
offences.  

51   Recital  2  of  Directive  (EU)  2015/849  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  20 May  2015  on  the 

prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing. 

52   IMF factsheet, March 8, 2018: https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/31/Fight-Against-

Money-Laundering-the-Financing-of-Terrorism  

53   Article 44(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/849. See also revised Article 44 of Directive (EU) 2018/843, which entered 

into force in June 2018 and had to be implemented by Member States by January 2020.  

22 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure  22:  Money  laundering:  average  length  of  court  cases  in  2014,  2019  –  2021(*)  (1st 
instance/in days) (source: European Commission with the Expert Group on Money Laundering 
and Financing of Terrorism) 

(*) No data for 2021: BE, DE, FR, HR, IT and RO. BG: The average length of the cases is calculated from the day of opening the 
court case to the day of the court decision in months. PT: the database was filtered, for each and every judicial county, by the 
relevant criteria to reach the information related to money laundering files; regarding the average number of days, the dates of 
infraction and the date of final decision or closure were considered. CY: Serious cases, before the Assize Court, are on average 
tried within a year. Less serious offences, before the District Courts, take longer to be tried. SK*: data correspond to average 
length of the whole proceedings, including at appeal court. 

– Anti-corruption – 

Corruption is an impediment to sustainable economic growth, diverting resources from productive 
outcomes,  undermining  the  efficiency  of  public  spending  and  deepening  social  inequalities.  It 
hampers the effective and smooth functioning of the single market, creates uncertainties in doing 
business  and  holds  back  investment.  Corruption  is  particularly  complex  to  tackle  since,  unlike 
most crimes, both parties involved in a corruption case are interested in maintaining secrecy about 
it, contributing to a general difficulty to quantify the magnitude of corruption cases in any country. 
Corruption is a particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension addressed in Article 83(1) 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union that can only be effectively tackled by 
common minimum rules across the European Union. On 3 May 2023, the Commission adopted a 
proposal for a Directive on combating corruption by criminal law and a joint communication on 
the fight against corruption (54). The proposal for a directive updates and harmonises EU rules on 
the definitions of and penalties for corruption offences, to ensure high standards against the full 
range of corruption offences (i.e. bribery, but also misappropriation, trading in influence, abuse of 
functions, as well as obstruction of justice and the illicit enrichment related to corruption offence) 
to better prevent corruption and to improve enforcement. In cooperation with Member States, a 

54   Proposal for a Directive on combatting corruption COM (2023) 234 and Joint Communication on the fight against 

corruption JOIN(2023) 12 final. 

23 

 
 
 
                                                           
new questionnaire was developed to collect data on the length of court proceedings before first 
instance courts in bribery cases, which is presented in Figure 23 below (55).  

Figure 23: Corruption (bribery): average length of court cases in 2021 (*) (1st instance/in days) 
(source: European Commission with the National Contact Points for Anti-corruption) 

(*) No reply on this question from MT and CY. For BE, EE, DE, IE, EL, ES and IT the exact number of days is not available. 
NL: The average processing time for the 27 cases is 443 days. However, the indictment/subpoena at this starting point is not yet 
final, and often the case is not yet ready for trial, so it takes some time before it is placed in a hearing. If the starting point is the 
first hearing and the endpoint is the date of the final verdict (by a first instance judge), then the average processing time for the 
abovementioned cases is 100 days. 

55   This first data collection has focussed on the criminal courts of first instance, which usually contribute the most to 

the overall length of criminal proceedings until the judgment becomes final. 

24 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
3.1.4. Summary on the efficiency of justice systems 

An efficient justice system manages its caseload and backlog of cases, and delivers its decisions 
without undue delay. The main indicators used by the EU Justice Scoreboard to monitor the 
efficiency of justice systems are therefore the length of proceedings (estimated or average time 
in days needed to resolve a case), the clearance rate (the ratio of the number of resolved cases 
to the number of incoming cases) and the number of pending cases (that remain to be dealt with 
at the end of the year). 

General data on efficiency 

The 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard contains data on efficiency spanning 10 years (2012-2021). 
This time-span makes it possible to identify certain trends and takes into account that it often 
takes time for the effect of justice reforms to be felt. 

The data from 2012 to 2021 in civil, commercial and administrative cases reveals positive trends 
in  most  cases.  After  the  dip  in  efficiency  observed  in  2020,  possibly  due  to  the  COVID-19 
pandemic, in 2021 we see a return to the efficiency levels of 2019. This shows the effect of the 
measures  taken  by  Member  States  to  introduce  different  types  of  hybrid  or  online  working 
arrangements, in order to keep the courts functioning despite the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic 
in 2021. 

Some positive developments can be observed in the Member States that have been considered, 
in the context of the European Semester, to be facing specific challenges (56). 

  From  2012,  based  on  the  existing  data  for  these  Member  States,  and  despite  the 
COVID-19  pandemic,  in  12 Member  States,  the  length  of  first  instance  court 
proceedings  in  the  broad  ‘all  cases’  category  (Figure 5)  and  the  ‘litigious  civil  and 
commercial cases’ category (Figure 6) continued to decrease or remained stable. Figures 
5 and 6 show a decrease in the length of proceedings for 10 Member States, in some 
cases to below 2019 levels. In administrative cases (Figure 8), the length of proceedings 
since 2012 has decreased or remained stable in about 7 of these Member States. Overall, 
15 the Member States saw a decrease in the length of proceedings in administrative cases 
in 2021. 

  The Scoreboard presents data on the length of proceedings in all court instances for 
litigious civil and commercial cases (Figure 7) and administrative cases (Figure 9). Data 
show that in 5 of the Member States identified as facing challenges with the length of 
proceedings  in  first  instance  courts,  higher  instance  courts  perform  more  efficiently. 
However,  for  5 other  Member  States  facing  challenges,  the  average  length  of 
proceedings in higher instance courts is even longer than in first instance courts. 

56   HR, IT, CY, HU, MT, PL, PT and SK which received 2020 European Semester country-specific recommendations, 
and BE, BG, IE, EL, ES, RO, and SI, where challenges were reflected in the recitals of their 2020 country-specific 
recommendations and country reports.  
Differences in the results over the 10 years analysed may be explained by contextual factors (differences of more 
than  10%  in  the  number  of  incoming  cases  are  not  unusual)  or  systemic  deficiencies  (lack  of  flexibility  and 
responsiveness or inconsistencies in the reform process).  

25 

 
 
                                                           
 

In the broad ‘all cases’ and the litigious civil and commercial cases’ categories (Figures 
10 and 11), the overall number of Member States whose clearance rate is over 100% 
increased  since  last  year,  improving  significantly  since  2020.  In  2021,  21 Member 
States,  including  those  facing  challenges,  reported  a  high  clearance  rate  (more  than 
97%). This means that courts are generally able to deal with the incoming cases in these 
categories.  In  administrative  cases  (Figure 12),  in  2021,  in  10  Member  States  the 
clearance rate remained broadly the same as in 2020. While the administrative clearance 
rate is generally lower than for other categories of cases, 5 Member States continue to 
make good progress. In particular, 7 of the Member States facing challenges report an 
increase in clearance rate in administrative cases since 2012. 

  Since 2012, the situation has remained stable or continued to improve in 5 of the Member 
States  facing  the  most  substantial  challenges  with  their  backlogs,  regardless  of  the 
category  of  cases.  In  2021,  despite  the  increase  in  the  number  of  pending  cases,  in 
Member  States  the  number  of  pending  cases  remained  stable  in  litigious  civil  and 
commercial  cases  (Figure 14)  and  in  administrative  cases  (Figure 15).  However, 
significant differences remain between Member States with comparatively few pending 
cases and those with a high number of pending cases. 

Efficiency in specific areas of EU law 

Data on the average length of proceedings in specific areas of EU law (Figures 16-23) provide 
an insight into the functioning of justice systems in concrete types of business-related disputes. 

Data on efficiency in specific areas of EU law are collected based on narrowly defined scenarios, 
so the number of relevant cases may be low. However, compared to the calculated length of 
proceedings  presented  in  the  general  data  on  efficiency,  these  figures  provide  for  an  actual 
average length of all relevant cases in specific areas in a year. It is worth noting that Member 
States  that  do  not  appear  to  be  facing  challenges  based  on  general  data  on  efficiency  report 
significantly  longer  average  case  lengths  in  specific  areas  of  EU  law.  At  the  same  time,  the 
length of proceedings in different specific areas may also vary considerably in the same Member 
State. 

Another figure introduced this year focuses on the length of criminal proceedings, particularly 
those involving bribery, revealing the level of efficiency in that area of EU law.  

Finally,  the  2023  Scoreboard  builds  on  the  efficiency  of  the  overall  enforcement  chain.  For 
example, in competition law cases, there is a chart focusing on the length of proceedings before 
the National Competition Authority and of the judicial review of the decisions of this authority. 
This  is  important  for  a  positive  business  and  investment  environment,  by  ensuring  timely 
resolution of cases and enforcement of rights 

The figures for specific areas of EU law show the following trends. 

  For judicial review of competition cases (Figure 16), as the overall caseload faced by 
courts  across  the  EU  increased,  the  length  of  judicial  review  decreased  or  remained 
stable in 4 Member States, while it increased in 7. Despite the moderately positive trend, 
6 Member  States  reported  an  average  length  exceeding  1 000  days  in  2021.  For 
proceedings before the national competition authorities, 7 Member States reported 
that  proceedings  took  less  than  1 000  days.  Among  the  Member  States  cited  as 

26 

 
 
experiencing  issues  with  efficiency  in  the  judicial  review  of  competition  cases,  3 are 
among the more efficient when it comes to proceedings before the national competition 
authorities. 

  For  electronic  communications  (Figure 18),  the  caseload  faced  by  courts  decreased 
compared to previous years, continuing the positive trend regarding decreased length of 
proceedings observed in 2020. In 2021, 13 Member States registered a decrease in the 
average lengths of proceedings or figures remained stable, compared to 2020, with only 
2 showing an increase. 

  For  EU  trademark  infringement  cases  (Figure 19),  in  2021  the  overall  caseload 
continued to decrease. However, while 9 Member States managed to cope better with 
their  caseload,  registering  decreased  or  stable  lengths  of  proceedings,  2 saw  a  clear 
increase in the average length of proceedings. 

 

In the area of EU consumer law, the possible combined effect of the enforcement chain 
consisting  of  both  administrative  and  judicial  review  proceedings  can  be  seen 
(Figures 20 and 21). In 2021, 5 Member States reported that their consumer protection 
authorities took on average less than 3 months to issue a decision in a case covered by 
EU consumer law, while in 9 other Member States they took more than 6 months. Where 
the decisions of the consumer protection authorities were challenged in court, in 2021 
trends in the length of the judicial review of an administrative decision diverged, with 
increases in 7 Member States, and decreases in 6, compared to 2020. In 2 Member States 
the average length of a judicial review is still over 1 000 days. 

  Effective measures to combat money laundering are crucial for protecting the financial 
system,  ensuring  fair  competition  and  preventing  negative  economic  consequences. 
Over-lengthy  court  proceedings  may  hamper  the  EU’s  ability  to  fight  against  money 
laundering/reduce the effectiveness of efforts in this field. Figure 22 presents updated 
data on the length of judicial proceedings dealing with money laundering offences. It 
shows that, while in 15 Member States first instance court proceedings take up to a year 
on average, they take up to 2 years on average in 7 Member States, and in 2 Member 
States they take up to 3.5 years on average (57). 

  Corruption is a particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension. It has negative 
economic consequences and can only be effectively tackled by common minimum rules 
across the EU. This year’s Scoreboard presents the first set of figures on the length of 
judicial proceedings dealing with bribery cases. Figure 23 shows varying levels of data 
availability among Member States, and differences in the average length of proceedings 
before  first-instance  criminal  courts.  In  12  Member  States,  the  proceedings  are 
concluded within about a year, while in the remaining 5 where data are available, the 
proceedings could last up to about 4 years. Overall, the complexity of prosecuting and 
adjudicating  bribery  offences  reflects  the  serious  nature  of  the  crime,  which  is  also 
reflected in the length of proceedings. 

57   Directive (EU) 2018/1673 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on combating money 
laundering by criminal law will eliminate legal obstacles that may delay prosecution, such as a rule that prosecution 
for  money  laundering  can  only  start  when  the  proceedings  for  the  underlying  predicate  offence  have  been 
concluded. Member States were meant to transpose the Directive by 8 December 2020. 

27 

 
 
 
                                                           
3.2. Quality of justice systems 

There  is  no  single  way  of  measuring  the  quality  of  justice  systems.  The  2023  EU  Justice 
Scoreboard continues to examine factors that are generally accepted as relevant for improving the 
quality of justice. They fall into four categories: 

1) accessibility of justice for citizens and businesses; 

2) adequate financial and human resources; 

3) putting in place of assessment tools; 

4) digitalisation. 

3.2.1. Accessibility 

Accessibility is required throughout the whole justice chain to enable people to obtain relevant 
information  –  about  the  justice  system,  about  how  to  initiate  a  claim  and  the  related  financial 
aspects,  about  the state  of play of proceedings up until  their end  – and to  access  the judgment 
online.  

– Legal aid, court fees and legal fees – 

The  cost  of  litigation  is  a  key  factor  that  determines  access  to  justice.  High  litigation  costs, 
including court fees (58) and legal fees (59), may hinder access to justice. Litigation costs in civil 
and commercial matters are not harmonised at EU level. Governed by national legislation, they 
vary from one Member State to another.  

Access to legal aid is a fundamental right enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU (60). It allows access to justice to people who would not otherwise be able to bear or advance 
the costs of litigation. Most Member States grant legal aid based on the applicant’s income (61). 

Figure 24 shows the availability of full or partial legal aid in a specific consumer case involving a 
claim  of  EUR  6 000.  It  compares  the  income  thresholds  for  granting  legal  aid,  expressed  as  a 
percentage  of  the  Eurostat  poverty  threshold  for  each  Member  State  (62).  For  example,  if  the 
threshold for legal aid appears to be at 20%, it means that an applicant with an income 20% higher 
than  the  Eurostat  poverty  threshold  for  their  Member  State  will  still  be  eligible  for  legal  aid. 

58   Court fees are understood as an amount to be paid to initiate non-criminal legal proceedings in a court or tribunal. 
59   Legal fees are the bill for services provided by lawyers to their clients. 
60   Article 47(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. 
61   Member  States  use  different  methods  to  establish  the  eligibility  threshold,  e.g.  different  reference  periods 
(monthly/annual income). In 14 Member States also have a threshold tied to the applicant’s personal capital. This 
is not taken into account for this figure. In BE, BG, IE, ES, FR, HR, HU, LT, LU, NL and PT, certain groups of 
people  (e.g.  individuals  who  receive  certain  benefits)  are  automatically  entitled  to  receive  legal  aid  in 
civil/commercial disputes. Additional criteria that Member States may use, such as the merit of the case, are not 
reflected in this figure. Although not directly related to the figure, in several Member States (AT, CZ, DE, DK, IT, 
NL, PL, SI) legal aid is not limited to natural persons. 

62   To collect comparable data, each Member  State’s Eurostat  poverty threshold  has been converted to a  monthly 
income.  The  at-risk-of-poverty  (AROP)  threshold  is  set  at  60%  of  the  national  median  equivalised  disposable 
household 
ilc_li01, 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/ilc_li01/default/table?lang=en 

Income  and  Living  Conditions,  Eurostat 

income.  European  Survey  on 

table 

28 

 
 
                                                           
However, if the threshold for legal aid appears to be below 0, this means that a person with an 
income below the poverty threshold may not be eligible for legal aid. 

Nine Member States operate a legal aid system that provides for 100% coverage of the costs linked 
to litigation (full legal aid), complemented by a system covering partial costs (partial legal aid), 
the latter applying eligibility criteria different from that of the former. Ten Member States operate 
only a full or partial legal aid system. In three Member States, the courts have a discretion over 
granting legal aid. 

Figure 24: Income threshold for legal aid in a specific consumer case, 2022 (*) (differences in 
% from Eurostat poverty threshold) (source: European Commission with the Council of Bar and 
Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) (63))  

(*) Calculations are based on 2021 at-risk-of-poverty (AROP) threshold values. BE, DE, ES, FR, HR, IE, IT, LT, 
LU, NL, SI, SK, FI: legal aid has to also take into account the applicant’s disposable assets. EE: decision to grant 
legal aid is not based on the level of the applicant’s financial resources. EL: Beneficiary of legal aid is the person 
whose  capital  annual  income  does  not  exceed  the  2/3  of  the  lowest  annual  salaries  as  provided  by  the  existing 
legislation. 

63   The 2022 data is collected using replies from Council of Bar and Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) members to a 
questionnaire based on the following specific scenario: a dispute  of a consumer with a company (two different 
claim  values  indicated:  EUR  6 000  and  the  Eurostat  AROP  threshold  for  each  Member  State).  Given  that 
conditions for legal aid depend on the applicant’s situation, the following scenario was used: a single 35-year-old 
employed  applicant  without  any  dependant  or  legal  expenses  insurance,  with  a  regular  income  and  a  rented 
apartment. 

29 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
21 Member States require parties to pay a court fee when starting judicial proceedings. Recipients 
of legal aid are often exempt from paying court fees. Only in six Member States (Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland and Slovenia) are recipients of legal aid not automatically exempt 
from paying court fees. In Czechia, the court decides on a case-by-case basis whether or not to 
exempt a legal aid recipient from paying court fees. In Luxembourg, litigants who benefit from 
legal aid do not have to pay bailiff fees. Figure 25 compares, for two scenarios, the amount of the 
court fee presented as a proportion of the value of the claim. If, for example, in the figure below 
the court fee is 10% of a EUR 6 000 claim, the consumer will have to pay a EUR 600 court fee to 
start judicial proceedings. The low value claim is based on the Eurostat at-risk-of-poverty (AROP) 
threshold for each Member State. 

Figure  25:  Court  fee  to  start  judicial  proceedings  in  a  specific  consumer  case,  2022  (*) 
(amount of court fee as a proportion of the value of the claim) (source: European Commission 
with the Council of Bar and Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) (64)) 

(*)  Calculations  are  based  on  2021  at-risk-of-poverty  (AROP)  threshold  values.  ‘Low  value  claim’  is  a  claim 
corresponding  to  the  Eurostat  poverty  threshold  for  a  single  person  in  each  Member  State,  converted  to  monthly 
income (e.g. in 2021, this value ranged from EUR 242 in RO to EUR 2124 in LU).EE, PT: No data on the court fee 
for a low value claim. NL: Court fees values correspond to a litigant with less than EUR 29400 annual income.  

64   The data, referring to income thresholds valid in 2022, have been collected using replies from Council of Bar and 
Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) members to a questionnaire based on the following scenario: a consumer dispute 
between an individual and a company (two different claim values indicated: EUR 6 000 and the Eurostat AROP 
threshold for each Member State). 

30 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
– Accessing alternative dispute resolution methods – 

Figure  26  shows  Member  States’  efforts  to  promote  the  voluntary  use  of  alternative  dispute 
resolution (ADR) methods with specific incentives. These may vary depending on the area of law 
(65).  

Figure 26: Promotion of and incentives for using ADR methods, 2022 (*) (source: European 
Commission (66)) 

(*)  Maximum  possible:  68  points.  Aggregated  indicators  based  on  the  following  indicators:  1)  website  providing 
information on ADR; 2) media publicity campaigns; 3) brochures for the general public; 4) provision by the court of 
specific  information  sessions  on  ADR  upon  request;  5)  court  ADR/mediation  coordinator;  6)  publication  of 
evaluations on the use of ADR; 7) publication of statistics on the use of ADR; 8) partial or full coverage by legal aid 
of costs ADR incurred; 9) full or partial refund of court fees, including stamp duties, if ADR is successful; 10) no 
requirement for a lawyer for ADR procedures; 11) judge can act as a mediator; 12) agreement reached by the parties 
becomes enforceable by the court; 13) possibility to initiate proceedings/file a claim and submit documentary evidence 
online; 14) parties can be informed of the initiation and different steps of procedures electronically; 15) possibility of 
online payment of applicable fees; 16) use of technology (artificial intelligence applications, chat bots) to facilitate 
the  submission  and  resolution  of  disputes;  and  17)  other  means.  For  each  of  these  17  indicators,  one  point  was 
awarded for each area of law. IE: administrative cases fall into the category of civil and commercial cases. EL: ADR 
exists in public procurement procedures before administrative courts of appeal. ES: ADR is mandatory in labour law 
cases. PT: for civil/commercial disputes, court fees are refunded only in the case of justices for peace. SK: the Slovak 
legal order does not support the use of ADR for administrative purposes. FI: consumer and labour disputes are also 
considered to be civil cases. SE: judges have procedural discretion on ADR. Seeking an amicable dispute settlement 
is a mandatory task for the judge unless it is inappropriate due to the nature of the case.  

– Specific arrangements for access to justice – 

The 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard presented a dedicated figure on specific arrangements to facilitate 
equal access to justice of persons with disabilities. This edition continues a deeper exploration of 

65   The methods for promoting and incentivising the use of ADR do not cover compulsory requirements to use ADR 
before going to court. Such requirements may raise concerns about their compatibility with the right to an effective 
remedy before a tribunal enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. 

66   2022 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

31 

 
 
                                                           
selected  specific  arrangements  that  facilitate  equal  access  to  justice  to  persons  at  risk  of 
discrimination  overall  and  two  specific  groups:  older  persons  and  victims  of  violence  against 
women and domestic violence.  

The two figures below show what steps each Member State undertook to facilitate the access to 
justice for the respective groups. Figure 27 displays selected specific arrangements with regard to 
persons who are at risk of discrimination, as well as older persons. These are, among others, the 
availability of information in accessible formats, ensuring physical access to court buildings and 
court rooms, or enabling participation of non-governmental organisations and equality bodies in 
judicial proceedings on behalf or in support of the victim(s).  

Figure 27: Specific arrangements for access to justice of persons at risk of discrimination 
and older persons, 2022  (source: European Commission (67)) 

67   2022 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems and the European 

Judicial Training Network. 

32 

 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 28 shows the effort of Member States to protect and support victims of violence against 
women/domestic  violence68  and  facilitate  their  access  to  justice.  Access  to  justice  plays  an 
important role in combating violence against women and domestic violence. A coordinated and 
integrated justice response contributes to the safety and well-being of victims and to preventing 
re-victimisation.  

Figure 28: Specific arrangements for victims of violence against women/domestic violence, 
2022 (*) (source: European Commission (69)) 

68   Violence against women means gender-based violence, that is directed against a woman or a girl because she is a 
woman or a girl or that affects women or girls disproportionately, including all acts of such violence that result in, 
or are likely to result in, physical, sexual, psychological or economic harm or suffering, including threats of such 
acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life. Domestic violence 
means all acts of violence that result in, or are likely to result in, physical, sexual, psychological or economic harm 
or suffering, that occur within the family or domestic unit, irrespective of biological or legal family ties, or between 
former or current spouses or partners, whether or not the offender shares or has shared a residence with the victim. 
69   2022 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems and the European 

Judicial Training Network. 

33 

 
 
 
                                                           
- Selected powers of equality bodies to help victims of discrimination to access justice -  

For  the  first  time,  the  2023  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  provides  an  overview  of  selected  specific 
powers of equality bodies to assist victims of discrimination to access justice. Figure 29 below 
shows which powers the equality body(ies) – or in certain cases other specific bodies – hold in 
each Member State to resolve cases of discrimination. These are, among others, offering the parties 
the  possibility  to  seek  an  alternative  resolution  to  their  dispute  (for  example  mediation  or 
conciliation procedures), issuing binding decisions in discrimination cases, acting in court in cases 
of discrimination either on behalf of victims or in its own name, or submitting observations to the 
court as amicus curiae or expert in cases of discrimination. The exercise of those powers in practice 
varies depending on the Member State. 

Figure  29:  Selected  powers  of  equality  bodies  to  help  victims  of  discrimination  to  access 
justice,  2022  (*)  (source:  information  compiled  based  on  data  collected  from  Equinet  (the 
European network of equality bodies), national equality bodies and the European Network of legal 
experts) 

(*) A dot reflects that at least one equality body in the Member State has the relevant power. In some Member States, 
the powers studied are exercised by another entity than the equality body, in which case the table does not contain a 
dot. BG: According to Act 15/2022, adopted on 12 July 2022.CZ: The Public Defender of Rights is empowered to act 
as amicus curiae only before constitutional court. It is not formaly empowered to submit observation before courts 
deciding on discrimination cases. ES: According to Ley 15/2022, adopted on 12 Julio 2022, but not fully implemented 
yet.  

– Judicial control over public administration in business-related scenarios – 

The  2023  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  further  develops  the  overview  of  selected  legal  safeguards 
regarding acts or omissions of administrative authorities in business-related scenarios70, started in 

70   In  the  first  scenario,  during  the  court  proceedings  related  to  the  expropriation,  the  authorities  order  a  mining 
company to cease  mining  with immediate  effect; they rely  on earlier complaints  made by  house owners in the 
neighbouring village, already settled by the mining company. The company would incur a daily profit loss of EUR 
8 000 if it complied with the administrative decision. The company challenges the administrative decision in court, 
which eventually overturns the decision as ill-founded. In the second scenario, a company established in Member 
State ‘B’ files with the competent authority in Member State ‘A’ a request for permission to build an 800 square 
meters  retail  store  in  the  capital  city  of  Member  State  ‘A’.  The  company  does  not  receive  any  reply  from  the 
authority  in  question  within  the  statutory  time  limit/within  what  seems  a  reasonable  time  to  reply  (period  of 
administrative silence). Finally, the figure examines whether the company can seek financial compensation for the 
losses  it  incurred  because  of  the  delay  (the  period  of  administrative  silence)  in  granting  the  building  permit 
(assuming that the building permit is finally granted) from the competent authority. 

34 

 
 
 
                                                           
the 2022 edition of the Scoreboard. Relevant safeguards include the court review of administrative 
decisions  and  interim  measures,  or  possibility  for  financial  compensation  in  the  case  of 
administrative silence or an ill-founded decision. All of these contribute to the quality of the justice 
system, of particular relevance for the business and investment environment and the functioning 
of the single market.  

Figure  30: Legal  safeguards regarding decisions  or inaction of administrative authorities, 
2022 (*) (source: European Commission (71)) 

(*) ‘●’: The specific form of state liability is recognised under the legal regime of the Member State and it was applied 
in practice in at least one court case in the past ten years; ‘○’: The specific form of state liability is recognised under 
the legal regime of the Member State but it has not been applied in practice in at least one court case in the past ten 
years. A blank cell should not be understood as a statement related to the existence of requirements under EU law. 
FR: While in general, administrative silence means tacit approval, in certain exceptional cases listed by law, it means 
tacit refusal. SK: Court may stay the enforcement of an administrative decision upon proposal in most cases. National 
references to cases establishing state liability in case of EU law infringement by a decision of the court adjudicating 
in the last instance (Köbler): CZ: Cases establishing such liability of the state might exist. In several cases concerning 
such liability of the state, the Supreme Court refered the  case back to the first instance for a new hearing but the 
results of the new proceeding are not publicly available (see, for example, judgment of the Supreme Court of 26 July 
2019,  No.  30  Cdo  3856/2017,  ECLI:CZ:NS:2019:30.CDO.3856.2017.1);  DK:  The  legal  basis  for  financial 
compensation claims would have to be found in normal Danish legal principles, - namely on the ‘culpa’ principle - 
requiring for the company to inter alia provide proof of liability.  In certain exceptional cases of administrative silence  
where the failure to act is deemed to be an illegal omission, an authority within the State Administration may order 

71   2021 and 2022 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems.  

35 

 
 
 
                                                           
judgment 

municipalities to act.  EE: Supreme Court of Estonia (20.05.2022) judgment of the Administrative Chamber of the 
Supreme Court in administrative case no 3-20-1684; EL: Council of State decisions of the plenary 799-803/2021; 
ES:  Judgment  of  the  National  Audience  415/2009  -  Sentencia  de  la  Audiencia  Nacional  AN  415/2009  - 
ECLI:ES:AN:2009:415,  Audiencia  Nacional.  Sala  de 
lo  Contencioso.  Sección:3  10/02/2009,  Nº  de 
Recurso:553/2007;  FR:  Tribunal  administratif  de  Paris,  21  April  2021,  n°  1823994 ;  HU :  Kúria,  Pfv.  III. 
22.112/2012/13.  (doctrine confirmed, claim rejected) Kúria, Pfv.III.21.591/2013/5 ; NL: ECLI:NL:HR:2018:2396, 
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2021:15447,  ECLI:NL:HR:2018:2396;  FI :  KKO2013:58 ;  State  liability  in  case  of  EU  law 
infringement by legislative or administrative acts (Brasserie du Pêcheur): BE: Civ. Fr. Brussels (4ème ch.) 17 June 
2021. Decision of 09.03.2021 of the Brussels Court of Appeal (Fernand Ullens de Schooten v Belgian State); BG: 
Judgment No. 16 of 2.03.2021 of the SCC in Case No. 1914/2020; CZ: Cases establishing such liability of the state 
might exist. For example, in several cases concerning such liability of the state, the Supreme Court refered the case 
back to the first instance for a new hearing but the results of the new proceeding are not publicly available (see, for 
1945/2016, 
of 
example, 
ECLI:CZ:NS:2018:30.CDO.1945.2016.1).; EE: Tallinn Circuit Court 31.10.2017 judgment in an administrative case 
no 3-13-366; IE: Ogieriakhi v MJE and others (Case C-244/13); EL: Council of State decisions 607/2016, 4403/2015; 
ES:  Supreme  Court,  Administrative  Section,  judgment 26 May  2021,  application  nº  352/2019,  ECLI:ES:TS:2021: 
2143; Supreme Court, Administrative Section, judgment 29 October 2021, application nº 3409/2016, ECLI:ES:TS: 
2021:4019;  FR: TA Rouen, 28 June 2022, n°2001360; TA Clermont-Ferrand, 14 December, 2021, n°2000090 (5 
different cases) ; TA Poitiers, 26 November 2020, n° 1901176 ; CAA Versailles, 24 November 2020, IP Celimo SAS, 
n° 15VE02812); IT: Italian Supreme Court (Cassation Court), Section III, 24.11.2020 n. 26757 and Cassation Court, 
29.9. 2021 n. 26302; Cassation Court, United Sections, 23.6.2022, n. 20278; Cassation Court, Section III, 13.5.2020 
n. 8889, Cassation Court, Section I, 30.10.2018, n. 27690; Cassation Court, III Section, 16.10.2020 n. 22631; HU: 
Fővárosi  Ítélőtábla,  3.  Pf.  20.182/2014/2.  Fővárosi  Ítélőtábla,  5.Pf.21.081/2016/6.  Fővárosi  Ítélőtábla  Pf. 
21.340/2017/5.3.  Fővárosi  Ítélőtábla  Pf.20.602/2017/5/II;  MT:  Daniel  James  Cassar  vs.  Direttur  tas-Sahha 
en 
Istituzzjonali 
ECLI:NL:HR:2015:2723);  ECLI:NL:RVS:2020:898, ECLI:NL:RVS:2020:899, ECLI:NL:RVS:2020:900 and ECLI: 
NL:RVS:2020:901; ECLI:NL:HR:2018:1973; ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2013:3791.  

ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2013:3791 

ECLI:NL:HR:2015:2722 

Supreme  Court 

(cassatieberoep: 

2018,  No. 

25  April 

et;  NL: 

30  Cdo 

the 

of 

36 

 
 
 
 
– Child-friendly justice –  

The 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard continues the analysis of child friendly-justice. Figure 31 looks 
at specific arrangements available when a child is involved as a victim or as a suspect/accused 
person. 

Figure 31: Specific arrangements for child-friendly proceedings with children involved as 
victims or suspects or as accused persons, 2022 (*) (source: European Commission (72)) 

(*) Children: persons under 18 years of age. 

72   2022 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems.  

37 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
3.2.2. Resources 

Sufficient resources, including the necessary investments in physical and technical infrastructure, 
and  well  qualified,  trained  and  adequately  paid  staff  of  all  kinds,  are  necessary  for  the  justice 
system to work properly. Without adequate facilities, tools or staff with the required qualifications, 
skills and access to continuous training, the quality of proceedings and decisions is undermined. 

– Financial resources – 

The figures below show the actual government expenditure on the operation of the justice system 
(excluding prisons), both per inhabitant (Figure 32) and as a proportion of gross domestic product 
(GDP) (Figure 33). 

Figure 32: General government total expenditure on law courts in EUR per inhabitant, 2012, 
2019 – 2021 (*) (source: Eurostat)  

(*) Member States are ordered according to their expenditure in 2021 (from highest to lowest). While a significant 
effort was undertaken to harmonise the recording of government measures to mitigate the economic and social impact 
of the COVID-19 pandemic, a full harmonisation of data for the reference years 2020 and 2021 was not yet achieved. 
The  likelihood  of  future  revisions  is  thus  higher  than  usual  and  EU  and  euro  area  data  is  provisional  for  2021.  
Further, data for other years is provisional for DE, ES, FR and PT.   

38 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure  33:  General  government  total  expenditure  on  law  courts  as  a  percentage  of  GDP, 
2012, 2019 – 2021 (*) (source: Eurostat)  

(*) Member States are ordered according to their expenditure in 2020 (from highest to lowest). While a significant 
effort was undertaken to harmonise the recording of government measures to mitigate the economic and social impact 
of the COVID-19 pandemic, a full harmonisation of data for the reference years 2020 and 2021 was not yet achieved. 
The likelihood of future revisions is thus higher than usual and EU and euro area data is provisional for 2021. Further, 
data for other years is provisional for DE, ES, FR and PT.  

Figure 34 presents the ratio of annual salaries of judges and prosecutors compared to the average 
annual salary in the country. For each country, the first two columns present the salaries of judges 
and prosecutors at the beginning of their respective careers, and at their peak. By virtue of Article 
19(1) TEU, Member States have to  ensure that both  their courts as a whole and the individual 
judges  are  independent  in  the  fields  covered  by  Union  law.  While  temporary  reduction  in 
remuneration  in  the  context  of  austerity  measures  has  not  been  considered  in  violation  of  this 
provision, the European Court of Justice has stated that the receipt by members of the judiciary of 
a level of remuneration conmensurate with the importance of the functions carried out constitutes 
an essential guarantee of judicial independence (73). 

73   Case C‑64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, para. 45, “ Like the protection against removal from 
office  of  the  members  of  the  body  concerned  (see,  in  particular,  judgment  of  19 September  2006, Wilson, 
C-506/04, EU:C:2006:587, paragraph 51), the receipt by those members of a level of remuneration commensurate 
with the importance of the functions they carry out constitutes a guarantee essential to judicial independence.”  

39 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure  34:  Ratio  of  annual  salaries  of  judges  and  prosecutors  with  annual  average  gross 
salary  in  the  country  in  2021  (*)  (per  100  000  inhabitants)  (source:  Council  of  Europe’s 
European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) study) 

– Human resources – 

Adequate  human  resources  are  essential  for  the  quality  of  a  justice  system.  Diversity  among 
judges,  including  gender  balance,  adds  complementary  knowledge,  skills  and  experience  and 
reflects the reality of society. 

Figure 35: Number of judges, 2012, 2019 – 2021 (*) (per 100 000 inhabitants) (source: Council 
of Europe’s European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) study) 

(*) This category consists of judges working full-time, in accordance with the CEPEJ methodology. It does not include 
the Rechtspfleger/court clerks that exist in some Member States. AT: data on administrative justice have been part of 
the data since 2016. EL: since 2016, data on the number of professional judges include all the ranks for criminal and 
civil justice as well as administrative judges.  IT: Regional audit commissions, local tax commissions and military 
courts are not taken into consideration. Administrative justice has been taken into account since 2018.  

40 

 
 
 
 
Figure 36: Proportion of female professional Supreme Court judges 2020 – 2022 (*) (source: 
European Commission (74)) 

(*) The data are sorted by 2022 values, from the highest to the lowest. MT: No women on the highest court 2020. 

Figure 37: Number of lawyers, 2012, 2019 – 2021 (*) (per 100 000 inhabitants) (source: Council 
of Europe’s European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) study) 

(*) In accordance with the  CEPEJ methodology, a lawyer is a person qualified and authorised  by national law to 
plead and act on behalf of their clients; to engage in the practice of law; to appear before the courts or advise and 
represent their clients in legal matters (Recommendation Rec (2000)21 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe on the freedom of exercise of the profession of lawyer). DE: no distinction is made between different groups 
of lawyers  in Germany, such as between solicitors  or barristers.  FI:  since 2015,  the number of lawyers provided 
includes both the number of lawyers working in the private sector and the number of lawyers working in the public 
sector.  

74   European 

Institute 

for  Gender  Equality,  Gender  Statistics  Database:  https://eige.europa.eu/gender-

statistics/dgs/indicator/wmidm_jud_natcrt__wmid_natcrt_supcrt/datatable  

41 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
– Training – 

Judicial training makes an important contribution to the quality of judicial decisions and the justice 
service delivered to citizens. The data set out below cover judicial training on communication with 
parties and on social media.  

Figure 38: Availability of training in communication for judges, 2022 (*) (source: European 
Commission (75)) 

(*) Maximum possible: 12 points. Member States were given 1 point if they have initial training and 1 point if they 
have continuing training (maximum of 2 points for each type of training) on the topics displayed above.  

75   2022 data collected in cooperation with the European Judicial Training Network.  

42 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
3.2.3. Assessment tools 

Regular  evaluation  could  make  the  justice  system  more  responsive  to  current  and  future 
challenges,  thereby  improving  its  quality.  Surveys  (Figure  39)  are  essential  for  assessing  how 
justice systems operate from the perspective of legal professionals and court users.  

Figure 39: Topics of surveys conducted among court users or legal professionals, 2021 (*) 
(source: European Commission (76)) 

(*) Member States were given one point per survey topic indicated regardless of whether the survey was conducted 
at national, regional or court level. ‘Other topics’ included the impact of Covid-19, how to minimise disruptions to 
the court and the expansion of video-links as a solution (IE), satisfaction of victims of criminal offenses who use the 
victim assistance offices of the judicial courts (FR), main issues that should be addressed in order to make  justice 
more accessible to victims of domestic violence (MT), the use of alternative sanctions and their effectiveness , and 
trust in the system of preventing domestic violence, including intervention (PL), general aspects of the courts; access 
to  information  on  the  courts;  court  facilities;  functioning of  the  courts;  judge  responsible  for  the  case;  resources 
available;  and  loyalty  (PT).  In  (SE),  the  Swedish  National  Courts  Administration  (SNCA)  has  created  a  digital 
questionnaire with a series of different types of questions, which the courts can use when performing their own surveys. 
In addition to the above-mentioned questions, the template also includes questions if the courthouse building and the 
courtrooms within the courthouse are easy to find. Another set of questions refers to the court users ‘perception of 
their personal safety and security both inside and outside the courtroom and outside the immediate premises of the 
court building. 

3.2.4. Digitalisation 

The use of information and communication technologies (ICT) can strengthen the Member States’ 
justice systems and make them more accessible, efficient, resilient and ready to face current and 
future challenges. The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted a number of challenges affecting the 
functioning of the judiciary and showed the need for the national justice systems to further improve 
their digitalisation.  

76   2021 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

43 

 
 
 
                                                           
Earlier editions of the EU Justice Scoreboard provided comparative data on certain aspects of the 
ICT in justice systems. As announced in the Commission’s Communication on the digitalisation 
of justice in the EU of 2 December 2020 (77), the Scoreboard has been substantially augmented 
with  further  data  on  digitalisation  in  the  Member  States.  This  should  allow  for  more  in-depth 
monitoring of progress areas and outstanding challenges. 

Citizen-friendly justice requires that information about national judicial systems is not only easily 
accessible but is also tailored to specific groups of society that would otherwise have difficulties 
in accessing the information. Figure 41 shows the availability of online information and specific 
public services that can help people access justice.  

Figure 40: Availability of online information about the judicial system for the general public, 
2022 (*) (source: European Commission (78)) 

77   Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European  Economic  and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions ‘Digitalisation of justice in the European Union: A toolbox 
of opportunities’ COM(2020)710 and accompanying SWD(2020)540.  

78   2022 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

44 

 
 
 
                                                           
(*) DE: Each federal state as well as the federal level decide individually which information to provide online. 

45 

 
 
 
– Digital-ready rules – 

The use of digital solutions in civil/commercial, administrative and criminal cases often requires 
appropriate regulation in national procedural rules. Figure 41 illustrates the possibilities set out by 
law for various actors to use distance communication technology (such as videoconferencing) for 
court and court related procedures, and reflects the current situation on the admissibility of digital 
evidence.  

Figure  41:  Procedural  rules  allowing  digital  technology  in  courts  in  civil/commercial, 
administrative and criminal cases, 2022 (*) (source: European Commission (79)) 

(*) For each Member State, the first column presents procedural rules for civil/commercial cases, the second column 
for administrative cases and the third column for criminal cases. Maximum possible: 12 points. For each criterion, 
two points were given if the possibility exists in all civil/commercial, administrative and criminal cases, respectively 
(in criminal cases, the possibility of hearing the parties was split to cover both defendants and victims). The points 
are divided by two when the possibility does not exist in all cases. For those Member States that do not distinguish 
between civil/commercial and administrative cases, the same number of points has been given for both areas CY, LU: 
none for administrative cases. 

79   2022 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

46 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
– Use of digital tools – 

Beyond digital-ready procedural rules, courts and prosecution services need to have appropriate 
tools  and  infrastructure  in  place  for  distance  communication  and  secure  remote  access  to  the 
workplace (Figure 42). Adequate infrastructure and equipment is also needed for secure electronic 
communication  between  courts/prosecution  services  and  legal  professionals  and  institutions 
(Figures 43 and 44). 

ICT, including innovative technology, plays an important role in supporting the work of judicial 
authorities. It therefore contributes significantly to the quality of justice systems. The availability 
of various digital tools at the disposal of judges, prosecutors and judicial staff can streamline work 
processes, ensure fair workload allocation and lead to a significant time reduction. 

Figure  42:  Use  of  digital  technology  by  courts  and  prosecution  services,  2022  (*)  (source: 
European Commission (80)) 

80   2022 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

47 

 
 
 
                                                           
(*)  Maximum  possible:  7  points.  For  each  criterion,  one  point  was  given  if  courts  and  prosecution  services, 
respectively, use a given technology and 0.5 point was awarded when the technology is not always used by them. 

Secure electronic communication can contribute to improving the quality of justice systems. The 
possibility  for  courts  to  communicate  electronically  between  themselves,  as  well  as  with  legal 
professionals and other institutions, can streamline processes and reduce the need for paper-based 
communication and physical presence, which would lead to a reduction in the length of pre-trial 
activities and court proceedings. 

Figure 43: Courts: electronic communication tools, 2022 (*) (source: European Commission 
(81))

(*)  Maximum  possible:  5  points.  For  each  criterion,  one  point  was  given  if  secure  electronic  communication  is 
available for courts. 0.5 was awarded when the possibility does not exists in all cases. FI: the tasks of notaries do not 
relate to courts. Therefore, there is no reason to provide them with secure connection. 

Prosecution  services  are  essential  for  the  functioning  of  the  criminal  justice  system.  They  also 
stand  to  benefit  from  access  to  a  secure  electronic  channel  of  communication,  which  could 
facilitate their work and thus improve the quality of court proceedings. The possibility for secure 
electronic  communication  between  prosecution  services  and  investigating  authorities,  defence 
lawyers and courts would enable a more expedient and efficient preparation of the proceedings 
before the court. 

81   2022 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

48 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 44: Prosecution service: electronic communication tools,  2022(*) (source: European 
Commission (82)) 

(*)  Maximum  possible:  5  points.  For  each  criterion,  one  point  was  given  if  secure  electronic  communication  is 
available for prosecution services. 0.5 was awarded when the possibility does not  exist in all cases. Availability of 
electronic  communication  tools  within  prosecution  service  includes  communication  with  lawyers  employed  by  the 
prosecution service. 

82   2022 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

49 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
– Online access to courts – 

The ability to carry out specific steps in a judicial procedure electronically is an important aspect 
of the quality of justice systems. The electronic submission of claims, the possibility to monitor 
and advance a proceeding online or serve documents electronically can tangibly facilitate access 
to justice for citizens and businesses (or their legal representatives) and reduce delays and costs. 
The availability of such digital public services would help bring courts one step closer to citizens 
and businesses, and by extension increase public trust in the justice system. 

Figure  45:  Digital  solutions  to  initiate  and  follow  proceedings  in  civil/commercial  and 
(83))
administrative 

Commission 

European 

(source: 

cases, 

2022(*) 

(*) Maximum possible: 9 points. For each criterion, one point was given if the possibility exists in all civil/commercial 
and administrative cases, respectively. 0.5 point was awarded when the possibility does not exist in all cases. For 
those Member States that do not distinguish civil/commercial and administrative cases, the same number of points 
has been given for both areas.  

83   2022 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

50 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
The use of digital tools for conducting and following court proceedings in criminal cases can also 
help  guarantee  the  rights  of  victims  and  defendants.  For  example,  digital  solutions  can  enable 
confidential  remote  communication  between  defendants  and  their  lawyers,  allow  defendants  in 
detention to prepare for their hearing and help victims of crime avoid secondary victimisation. 

Figure  46:  Digital  solutions  to  conduct  and  follow  court  proceedings  in  criminal  cases, 
2022(*) (source: European Commission (84)) 

(*) Maximum possible: 6 points. For each criterion, one point was given if the possibility exists in all criminal cases. 
0.5 point was awarded when the possibility does not exists in all cases. 

– Access to judgments – 

Ensuring online access to judgments increases the transparency of justice systems, helps citizens 
and businesses understand their rights and can contribute to consistency in case-law. Appropriate 
arrangements for publishing judicial decisions online are essential for creating user-friendly search 
facilities (85) that make case-law more  accessible to legal  professionals  and the  general public. 
Seamless  access  to  and  easy  reuse  of  case-law  makes  the  justice  system  algorithm-friendly, 
enabling innovative ‘legal tech’ applications that support practitioners.  

The  online  publication  of  court  decisions  requires  balancing  a  variety  of  interests,  within  the 
boundaries set by legal and policy frameworks. The General Data Protection Regulation (86) fully 
applies to the processing of personal data by courts. When assessing what data to make public, a 
fair balance has to be struck between the right to data protection and the obligation to publicise 

84   2022 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 
85   See  Best  practice  guide  for  managing  Supreme  Courts,  under  the  project  Supreme  Courts  as  guarantee  for 

effectiveness of judicial systems, p. 29. 

86   Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1). 

51 

 
 
 
                                                           
court decisions to ensure the transparency of the justice system. This is particularly true when there 
is a prevailing public interest that justifies the disclosure of those data. In many countries, the law 
or  practice  requires  the  anonymisation  or  pseudonymisation  (87)  of  judicial  decisions  before 
publication,  either  systematically  or  upon  request.  Data  produced  by  the  judiciary  are  also 
governed by EU legislation on open data and the reuse of public sector information (88). 
The availability of judicial decisions in a machine-readable format (89), as displayed in Figure 49, 
facilitates an algorithm-friendly justice system (90). 

Figure  47:  Online  access  to  published  judgments  by  the  general  public,  2022  (*) 
(civil/commercial,  administrative  and  criminal  cases,  all  instances)  (source:  European 
Commission (91)) 

(*) Maximum possible: 9 points. For each court instance, one point was given if all judgments are available for civil/commercial 
and administrative and criminal cases respectively, 0.75 points when most judgments (more than 50% are available) and 0.5 points 

87   Anonymisation/pseudonymisation is more efficient if  assisted by an algorithm. However, human supervision is 

needed, since the algorithms do not understand context. 

88   Directive 2003/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 November 2003 on the re-use of public 
sector information (OJ L 345, 31.12.2003, p. 90) and Directive (EU) 2019/1024 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 20 June 2019 on open data and the re-use of public sector information (OJ L 172, 26.6.2019, p. 
56). 

89   Judgments modelled according to standards (e.g. Akoma Ntoso) and their associated metadata are downloadable 
free of charge in the form of a database or by other automated means (e.g. Application Programming Interface). 
90   See also Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – A European strategy for data, COM(2020) 66 final, 
Commission White Paper on Artificial Intelligence – A European approach to excellence and trust, COM(2020) 
65 final, and Conclusions of the Council and the representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting 
within the Council on Best Practices regarding the Online Publication of Court Decisions (OJ C 362, 8.10.2018, 
p. 2). 

91   2022 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

52 

 
 
 
                                                           
when some judgments (less than 50%) are available. For Member States with only two court instances, points have been given for 
three court instances by mirroring the respective higher instance court of the non-existing instance. For those Member States that 
do not distinguish the two areas of law (civil/commercial and administrative), the same number of points has been given for both 
areas. BE: for civil and criminal cases, each court is in charge of deciding on the publication of its own judgments.  DE: each 
federal state decides on online availability of first instance judgments.  AT: for first and second instance, judges decide which 
judgments are published. Decisions of the Supreme Court that reject an appeal without substantial reasoning are not published. 
Decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court taken by a single judge are published if the judge concerned decides to publish 
them.  Furthermore,  decisions  only  containing  legal  issues  where  there  already  is  continuous  jurisprudence  of  the  Supreme 
Administrative  Court and  non-complicated decisions  concerning discontinuance  of proceedings  are  not  published.  NL:  courts 
decide on publication according to published criteria. PT: a commission within the court decides on the publication. SI: procedural 
decisions with little or no significance for the case-law are not published; from decisions in cases, which are identical in substance 
(e.g. bulk cases), only the leading decision is published (together with the list of case files with the same content). Individual higher 
courts decide which judgments can be published. SK: decisions on several types of civil cases, such as in inheritance matters or 
determining of paternity are not published. FI: courts decide which judgments are published. 

Figure  48:  Arrangements  for  producing  machine-readable  judicial  decisions,  2022  (*) 
(civil/commercial,  administrative  and  criminal  cases,  all  instances)  (source:  European 
Commission (92)) 

(*) Maximum possible: 24 points per type of case. For each of the three instances (first, second, final) one point can 
be given if all judicial decisions are covered. If only some judicial decisions are covered at a given instance, only half 
a point is awarded. Where a Member State has only two instances, points have been given for three instances by 
mirroring the respective higher instance as the non-existing instance. For those Member States that do not distinguish 
between administrative and civil/commercial cases, the same points have been allocated for both areas of law.  ES: 
The use of the General Council for the Judiciary (CGPJ) database for commercial purposes, or the massive download 
of information is not allowed. The reuse of this information for developing databases or for commercial purposes 
must follow the procedure and conditions established by the CGPJ through its Judicial Documentation Centre.  IE: 
anonymisation of judgments is done in family law, child care and other areas where statute requires or a judge directs 
the identities of parties or persons not to be disclosed. 

92   2022 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

53 

 
 
 
                                                           
54 

 
 
 
 
3.2.5. Summary on the quality of justice systems 

Easy access, sufficient resources, effective assessment tools and digitalisation all contribute to a 
high-quality  justice  system.  The  public  and  businesses  expect  high-quality  decisions  from  an 
effective justice system. The 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard makes a comparative analysis of these 
factors. 

Accessibility 

The 2023 Scoreboard looks again at a number of elements that contribute to a people-friendly 
justice system: 

1)  The availability of legal aid and the level of court fees have a major impact on access to 
justice, in particular for people living in poverty or at risk of poverty. Figure 24 shows that in 
5 Member States, people whose income is below the Eurostat poverty threshold would not 
receive legal aid. The level of court fees (Figure 25) has remained largely stable since 2016, 
although in 5 Member States court fees were lower than in 2021, in particular for low-value 
claims. The burden of court fees continues to be proportionally higher for low-value claims. 
Difficulties in claiming legal aid combined with high court fees in 4 Member States could 
deter people living in poverty from attempting to access justice. 

2)  The  2023  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  continues  to  analyse  the  ways  in  which  Member  States 
promote  voluntary  use  of  alternative  dispute  resolution  methods  (ADR)  (Figure 26), 
including the possibility of using digital technologies. The overall picture is unchanged from 
2021,  with  3 Member  States  improving  their  efforts,  but  also  3  reducing  the  number  of 
promotion measures. In general, the number of ways used to promote ADR methods tends to 
be  lower  for  administrative  disputes  than  for  civil  and  commercial,  labour  or  consumer 
disputes. 

3)  For the first time, the 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard takes stock of specific arrangements to 
support persons at risk of discrimination and older persons in accessing justice. Figure 27 
shows  that  17  Member  States  provide  information  on  the  rights  of  persons  at  risk  of 
discrimination  and  22  provide  easy  physical  access  to  court  buildings.  14  enable  non-
governmental organisations to initiate or participate in proceedings on behalf or in support of 
persons at risk of discrimination, as well as making it easier for older people to participate in 
court  proceedings.  Additionally,  one  third  of  Member  States  took  steps  to  make  legal  aid 
more  accessible  for  older  people,  while  only  4 Member  States  asked  about  the  needs  and 
satisfaction levels of persons at risk of discrimination in surveys of court users in 2021. 

4)  Figure 29 shows that Member States have also given equality bodies powers to help victims 
access justice. This year’s Scoreboard gives an overview of this for the first time. Equality 
bodies  in  a  third  of  Member  States  can  take  binding  decisions  in  discrimination  cases.  In 
22 Member  States,  they  can  offer  parties  the  option  of  seeking  an  ADR  (for  example 
mediation or conciliation procedures). In 18 Member States, equality bodies can act in court 
in cases of discrimination either on behalf of victims or in their own name, and in 16 Member 
States they can submit observations to the court as an expert or amicus curiae (non-party but 
who  is  permitted  to  assist  a  court  by  offering  information,  expertise,  or  insight  that  has  a 

55 

 
 
 
bearing on the issues in the case). 

5)  Also for the first time, a mapping is given of selected specific arrangements for victims of 
violence  against  women  and  domestic  violence.  Figure 28  shows  how  many  of  the 
examined safeguards are in place in each Member State. In 12 Member States, all safeguards 
are  in  place,  e.g.  providing  special  protection  for  victims,  or  online  access  to  specific 
information.  However, nearly a quarter of Member States do not  provide online access  to 
specific  information  on  domestic  violence  prevention,  support  and  protection  services,  or 
legal information about violence against women/domestic violence and victims’ rights. 

6)  The 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard extends the mapping of certain aspects of judicial control 
over  acts  and  omissions  of  public  administrations  based  on  specific  business  scenarios 
(Figure 30). The figure presents the recognition and application of the specific forms of state 
liability  under  legal  regimes  of  the  Member  States  when  state  conduct  infringing  EU  law 
causes  damage  or  when  the  infringement  of  EU  law  stems  from  a  decision  of  the  court 
adjudicating at last instance. This was already applied in concrete cases before national courts 
in  5 Member  States  for  state  conduct  causing  damage  and  in  10 for  decisions  of  courts 
adjudicating at last instance.  Apart from these specific safeguards, other, more general, forms 
of  state  liability  may  exist.  In  24  Member  States  companies  may  receive  financial 
compensation for damage caused by administrative decisions or by administrative silence and 
courts may stay the enforcement of administrative decisions. These may have an impact on 
investor confidence, the business environment and the functioning of the single market, and 
require closer monitoring. 

7)  The 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard provides an overview of selected measures Member States 
have  in  place  to  ensure  a  child-friendly  justice  system.  Figure 31  looks  at  specific 
arrangements available when a child is involved as a victim or as a suspect/accused person. 
Overall, the situation appears to have improved compared to 2021. In total, 17 Member States 
are  now  reported  to:  provide  the  possibility  of  audio-visual  recording  of  questioning  of 
children;  ensure  child-friendly  settings  and  effective  participation  of  children  in  hearings; 
provide information in a child-friendly way; and arrange for assistance by a lawyer. Despite 
these reported improvements, especially with regards to legal assistance for children, there 
are still fewer specific safeguards available for children involved in proceedings as suspects 
or accused persons than for those who are involved as victims. 

Resources 

High-quality  justice  systems  in  Member  States  depend  on  sufficient  financial  and  human 
resources. This  requires appropriate investment  in  physical  and technical  infrastructure,  initial 
and  continuing  training,  and  diversity  among  judges,  including  gender  balance.  The  2023  EU 
Justice Scoreboard shows the following. 

8)  In terms of financial resources, overall, in 2021, general government spending on law courts 
remained stable in most Member States, but with persistent significant differences between 
Member States in spending levels of both per inhabitant and as a percentage of GDP (Figures 
32 and 33). There are 21 Member States that increased their expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP  in  2021  (an  increase  compared  to  2020)  and  3 also  increased  their  expenditure  per 
capita.  

56 

 
 
9)  For the first time, this year’s Scoreboard presents the ratio of annual salaries of judges and 

prosecutors compared to the average annual salary in the country (Figure 34). 

10) Women  still  account  for  fewer  than  50%  of  judges  at  supreme  court  level  in  20 Member 
States  (Figure 36),  while  in  7  Member  States  half  or  more  judges  at  supreme  courts  are 
female. Figures for the three-year period from 2020 to 2022 show diverging levels and trends 
between Member States. 

11) To improve communication with vulnerable groups (Figure 38), all Member States provide 
training on communicating with asylum seekers and/or with people from different cultural, 
religious, ethnic or linguistic backgrounds. Furthermore, 15 Member States provide training 
on the use of social media and communication with the media, and 15 raise awareness and 
provide training on dealing with disinformation. 

Assessment tools 

12) The use of surveys among court users and legal professionals (Figure 39) was higher in 2021 
than in the preceding years, with only 10 Member States not conducting any surveys (15 in 
2020). Accessibility, customer service, court hearings and overall trust in the justice system 
are recurring topics for surveys, but only 8 Member States inquired about the satisfaction of 
groups with special needs or about individuals’ awareness of their rights. 

Digitalisation 

Since 2021, the EU Justice Scoreboard has included a large, detailed section on aspects related 
to the digitalisation of justice. Although Member States already use digital solutions in different 
contexts and to varying degrees, there is significant room for improvement. 

13) 26 Member States provide some online information about their judicial system, including 
websites with clear information on accessing legal aid, on court fees and on eligibility criteria 
for  reduced  fees  (Figure 40).  The  situation  has  improved  compared  to  last  year  but  some 
differences still exist between Member States in the level of information and the degree to 
which it responds to people’s needs. For example, 14 Member States provide an interactive 
online simulation where people can find out whether they are eligible for legal aid, or provide 
education on legal rights through online interactive learning tools. 24 Member States provide 
a website with understandable information on procedural rights, including online forms for 
companies and individuals, and information for non-native speakers. 

14) 8 Member  States  have  digital-ready  procedural  rules  (Figure 41),  which  allow  fully  or 
mostly for the use of distance communication and for the admissibility of evidence in digital 
format only.  In 19 Member States,  this  is  possible only in  a limited number of situations. 
Nonetheless, there has been steady overall progress in this regard since 2020. 

15) Figure 42 reveals the use of digital technology by courts and prosecution services. It shows 
that,  with  two  exceptions,  Member  States  do  not  fully  use  the  potential  allowed  by  their 
procedural rules (cf. Figure 41). Member States’ courts, prosecutors and court staff already 
have  various  digital 
their  disposal,  such  as  case-management  systems, 
videoconferencing systems and teleworking arrangements. However, further progress could 
still be achieved in electronic case allocation systems, with automatic distribution based on 
objective criteria. 

tools  at 

57 

 
 
16) Courts in all Member States have some secure electronic tools for communication at their 
disposal. These tools are available for communication among courts and between courts and 
lawyers. However, 10 Member States still lack tools for digital communication with notaries, 
detention facilities or bailiffs/judicial officers (Figure 43). All Member States now provide 
for  secure  electronic  communication  within  the  prosecution  services,  as  well  as  between 
prosecution  services  and  courts,  which  represents  an  improvement  compared  to  2021 
(Figure 44).  Nevertheless,  a  third  of  Member  States  still  lack  tools  for  electronic 
communication between the prosecution services and defence lawyers. 

17) In  civil/commercial  and  administrative  cases,  21 Member  States  provide  individuals  and 
businesses (or their legal representatives) with online access to their ongoing or closed cases 
(Figure 45),  albeit  to  varying  degrees.  In  25 Member  States  it  is  now  possible  to  initiate 
proceedings or to file a claim online, which marks a significant improvement compared to 
2021. However, in criminal cases (Figure 46) in 21 Member States, defendants and victims 
have only limited possibilities for following or pursuing part of their case electronically, with 
a third of the Member States providing no or very few digital solutions in criminal cases. 

18) Online access to court judgments (Figure 47) has slightly improved overall compared to 
2021, especially regarding the publication of first- and second-instance court decisions. When 
it comes to the highest instance, online access to judgments has generally remained stable. 

19) As in previous years, the 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard analyses arrangements for producing 
machine-readable  judicial  decisions  (Figure 48).  All  Member  States  have  at  least  some 
arrangements in place for civil/commercial, administrative and criminal cases although there 
is  considerable  variation  between  them.  In  general,  there  is  a  tendency  to  introduce  more 
arrangements, particularly for downloading the judgments free of charge (databases and other 
automated  solutions),  for  modelling  judgments  to  make  them  machine-readable,  or  for 
anonymising/pseudonymising  judgments  using  algorithms.  In  2022,  8 Member  States 
reported improvement compared to the previous year, while the situation in 10 Member States 
remained  stable.  Justice  systems  with  arrangements  for  modelling  judgments  in  line  with 
standards to make them machine-readable seem to have the potential to achieve better results 
in the future. 

58 

 
 
 
 
 
3.3. Independence 

Judicial  independence,  which  is  integral  to  the  task  of  judicial  decision-making,  is  an  EU  law 
requirement stemming from the principle of effective judicial protection referred to in Article 19 
TEU, and from the right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal enshrined in Article 47 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (93). That requirement presumes:  

(a)  external  independence,  when  the  body  concerned  exercises  its  functions  autonomously, 
without being subject to any hierarchical constraint or subordinated to any other body and without 
taking orders or instructions from any source whatsoever, thus being protected against external 
interventions or pressure liable to impair the independent judgment of its members and to influence 
their decisions; and  

(b)  internal  independence  and  impartiality,  when  an  equal  distance  is  maintained  from  the 
parties to the proceedings and their respective interests with regard to the subject matter of those 
proceedings (94), and when individual judges are protected from undue internal pressue within the 
judiciary (95).  

Judicial independence guarantees that all the rights that individuals derive from EU law will be 
protected and that the values common to the Member States set out in Article 2 TEU, in particular 
the value of the rule of law, will be safeguarded (96). Preserving the EU legal order is fundamental 
for all citizens and business whose rights and freedoms are protected under EU law.  

A high perceived independence of the judiciary is paramount for the trust which justice in a society 
governed by the rule of law must inspire in individuals, and is contributing to a growth-friendly 
business environment, as a perceived lack of independence can deter investments. The Scoreboard 
includes indicators for the judiciary’s independence concerning the  effectiveness  of investment 
protection. In addition to indicators on perceived judicial independence from various sources, the 

93   See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT&from=EN 
94   Court of Justice, judgment of 16 November 2021, Criminal proceedings against WB and Others, Joined Cases C-
748/19 to C-754/19, judgment of 6 October 2021, W. Ż., C-487/19, judgment of 15 July 2021, , Commission v. 
Poland, C-791/13, judgment of 2 March 2021, AB, C-824/18, judgment of 19 November 2019, A. K. and Others, 
C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:982, paras. 121 and 122; judgment of 5 November 2019, 
Commission  v  Poland,  C-192/18, 
judgment  of  24  June  2019,  Commission  v.  Poland,  C-619/18, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:531  paras.  73  and  74;  judgment  of  27  February  2018,  Associação  Sindical  dos  Juízes 
Portugueses, C‑64/16, EU:C:2018:117, para.  44; judgment of 25 July 2018,  Minister for Justice and Equality, 
C‑216/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:586, para. 65.  

95   Supreme Courts, as final instance courts, and higher/appeal courts in general, are essential to secure the uniform 
application of the law in Member States. Nevertheless, hierarchical  judicial organisation should not undermine 
individual  independence  (Recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)12,  para.  22).  Superior  courts  should  not  address 
instructions to judges about the way they should decide individual cases, except in national preliminary rulings or 
when  deciding  on  legal  remedies  according  to  the  law  (Recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)12,  para.  23).  A 
hierarchical  organisation  of  the  judiciary  in  the  sense  of  a  subordination  of  judges  to  higher  instances  in  their 
judicial decision-making activity would be a clear violation of the principle of internal independence, according 
to the Venice Commission (Venice Commission, Report on the independence of the judicial system, Part I: the 
independence of courts, Study No. 494/2008, 16 March 2010, CDL-AD(2010)004, paras. 68 - 72). Any procedure 
for the unification of case-law must comply with fundamental principles of separation of powers, and even after 
such  a  decision  of  a  higher/Supreme  Court,  all  courts  and  judges  must  remain  competent  to  assess  their  cases 
independently  and  impartially,  and  to  distinguish  new  cases  from  the  interpretation  previously  unified  by  a 
higher/Supreme Court (2022 EU Justice Scoreboard, p. 45). 

96   Court of Justice, judgment of 24 June 2019, Commission v. Poland, C-619/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:531 para. 44.  

59 

 
 
                                                           
Scoreboard presents a number of indicators on how justice systems are organised to protect judicial 
independence in certain types of situations where independence could be at risk (97). Reflecting 
the input from the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ), the Network of the 
Presidents  of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Courts  of  the  EU  (NPSJC),  the  Expert  Group  on  Money 
Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EGMLTF), and from the National contact points in the 
fight against corruption, this edition of the Scoreboard shows indicators on powers of the Councils 
for the Judiciary, the  authorities involved  in the appointment of Supreme Court Presidents and 
Prosecutors  General,  and  the  a  first  overview  regarding  bodies  involved  in  prevention  and 
prosecution of corruption and their various degrees of specialisation.  

3.3.1. Perceived judicial independence and effectiveness of investment protection 

Figure  49:  How  the  general  public  perceives  the  independence  of  courts  and  judges  (*) 
(source: Eurobarometer (98) - light colours: 2016, 2021 and 2022, dark colours: 2023) 

(*) Member States are ordered first by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and 
judges is very good or fairly good (total good); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, then 
they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is fairly bad 
or very bad (total bad); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good and total bad, then they are 
ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very good; if some 
Member States have  the same  percentage of total good, total bad and of very good, then they are ordered by the 
percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very bad. 
Figure 50 shows the main reasons given by respondents for the perceived lack of independence of 
courts  and  judges.  Respondents  among  the  general  public,  who  rated  the  independence  of  the 

97   Since 2020, the World Economic Forum has not published the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) rankings. 
98   Eurobarometer survey FL519, conducted between 16 and 24 January 2023. Replies to the question: ‘From what 
you know, how would you rate the justice system in (your country) in terms of the independence of courts and 
see: 
fairly  bad  or  very  bad?’, 
judges?  Would  you 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/justice-and-fundamental-rights/effective-justice/eu-justice-scoreboard_en 
FL 
503 
the  Eurobarometer  website: 
(2021),  FL  435 
https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/screen/home. 

(2016),  also  available  on 

(2022),  FL  489 

is  very  good, 

fairly  good, 

say 

it 

60 

 
 
 
                                                           
justice system as being ‘fairly bad’ or ‘very bad,’ could choose between three reasons to explain 
their rating. The Member States are listed in the same order as in Figure 49. 

Figure 50: Main reasons among the general public for the perceived lack of independence 
(share of all respondents - higher value means more influence) (source: Eurobarometer (99)) 

Figure  51:  How  companies  perceive  the  independence  of  courts  and  judges  (*)  (source: 
Eurobarometer (100) - light colours: 2016, 2021 and 2022, dark colours: 2023) 

99   Eurobarometer survey FL519, replies to the question: ‘Could you tell me to what extent each of the following 
reasons explains your rating of the independence of the justice system in (our country): very much, somewhat, not 
really, not at all?’ if reply to Q1 is 'fairly bad' or 'very bad'. 

100  Eurobarometer survey FL520, conducted between 16 and 30 January 2023, replies to the question: ‘From what 
you know,  how  would  you rate  the justice system in (our country) in terms of the  independence of courts and 
judges?  Would  you 
see: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/justice-and-fundamental-rights/effective-justice/eu-justice-scoreboard_en; from 

fairly  bad  or  very  bad?’, 

is  very  good, 

fairly  good, 

say 

it 

61 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
(*) Member States are ordered first by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and 
judges is very good or fairly good (total good); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, then 
they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is fairly bad 
or very bad (total bad); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good and total bad, then they are 
ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very good; if some 
Member States have the same  percentage  of total good, total bad and of very good, then they are ordered by  the 
percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very bad.  

Figure 52 shows the main reasons given by respondents for the perceived lack of independence of 
courts  and  judges.  Respondents  among  companies,  who  rated  the  independence  of  the  justice 
system as being ‘fairly bad’ or ‘very bad,’ could choose between three reasons to explain their 
rating. The Member States are listed in the same order as in Figure 51. 

Figure 52: Main reasons among companies for the perceived lack of independence (rate of 
all respondents - higher value means more influence) (source: Eurobarometer (101)) 

2021, the sample size of companies surveyed was enlarged to 500 for all Member States except for MT, CY and 
LU, where the sample was 250. In previous years the sample size was 200 for all Member States except for DE, 
ES, FR, PL and IT, where the sample was 400. FL 504 (2022), FL 490 (2021), FL 436 (2016) are also available 
on the Eurobarometer website. Eurobarometer – Public opinion in the European Union (europa.eu) 

101  Eurobarometer survey  FL520; replies to the question: ‘Could you tell me to what extent each of the following 
reasons explains your rating of the independence of the justice system in (your country): very much, somewhat, 
not really, not at all?’ if the response to Q1 was 'fairly bad' or 'very bad'. 

62 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
 
Figure 53 shows, for the second time, the indicator on how companies perceive the effectiveness 
of investment protection by the law and courts as regards, in their view, unjustified decisions or 
inaction by the State. 

Figure 53: How companies perceive the effectiveness of investment protection by the law and 
courts (*) (source: Eurobarometer (102) - light colours: 2022, dark colours: 2023) 

(*) Member States are ordered first by the combined percentage of respondents who stated that they are very or fairly 
confident in investment protection by the law and courts (total confident).  

102  Eurobarometer survey FL520; replies to the question: 'To what extent are you confident that your investments are 
protected  by  the  law  and  courts  in  (your  country)  if  something  goes  wrong?'  For  the  purpose  of  the  survey, 
investment was defined as including any kind of asset that a company owns or controls and that is characterised 
by the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit or the assumption of risk. 

63 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 54 shows the main reasons given by respondents for the perceived lack of effectiveness of 
investment  protection.  Respondents  among  companies,  who  rated  their  level  of  confidence  as 
'fairly unconfident' or 'very unconfident', could choose four reasons to explain their rating (and 
some indicated “other”). The Member States are listed in the same order as in Figure 53. 

Figure  54:  Main  reasons  among  companies  for  their  perceived  lack  of  effectiveness  of 
investment  protection  (rate  of  all  respondents  -  higher  value  means  more  influence)  (source: 
Eurobarometer (103)) 

103  Eurobarometer  survey  FL520;  replies  to  the  question:  'What  are  your  main  reasons  for  concern  about  the 

effectiveness of investment protection?' if the response to Q3 was 'fairly unconfident' or 'very unconfident'. 

64 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
3.3.2. Structural independence 

The  guarantees of structural  independence  require rules, particularly on the composition  of the 
court and the appointment, length of service and grounds for abstention, rejection and dismissal of 
its  members.  These  rules  dispel  any  reasonable  doubt  in  the  minds  of  individuals  as  to  the 
imperviousness of the court to external factors and its neutrality with respect to the interests before 
it (104). They must, in particular, be such as to preclude not only any direct influence, in the form 
of instructions,  but also types of influence that are more indirect  and that are liable to  have an 
effect on the decisions of the judges concerned (105). 

European standards have been developed, particularly by the Council of Europe, for example in 
the  2010  Council  of  Europe  Recommendation  on  judges:  independence,  efficiency  and 
responsibilities  (106).  The  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  presents  certain  indicators  on  issues  that  are 
relevant when assessing how justice systems are organised to safeguard judicial independence. 

This  edition  of  the  Scoreboard  contains  new  indicators  on:  (i)  authorities  involved  in  the 
appointment of Supreme Court Presidents (Figures 56 and 57) (107); (ii) certain bodies involved in 
the prevention of corruption, with regard to some of their key powers (Figure 58) and authorities 
involved  in  their  appointment  (Figure  59);  (iii)  the  specialisation  of  authorities  involved  in  the 
repression of corruption (Figure 60); (iv) authorities involved in the appointment of the heads of 

104 
   See Court of Justice, judgment of 16 November 2021, Criminal proceedings against WB and Others, Joined Cases 
C-748/19 to C-754/19, para. 67; judgment of 6 October 2021,  W.Ż., C-487/19, para. 109; judgment of 15 July 
2021, Commission v. Poland, C-791/19, para. 59; judgment of 2 March 2021, A.B., C-824/18, para.117; judgment 
of 19 November 2019, A. K. and Others (Independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court), C-
585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18,EU:C:2019:982, paras. 121 and 122; judgment of 24 June 2019, Commission v. 
Poland,  C-619/18,  EU:C:2019:531  paras.  73  and  74;  judgment  of  25  July  2018,  LM,  C-216/18  PPU, 
EU:C:2018:586, para. 66; judgment of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, C‑64/16, 
EU:C:2018:117,  para.  44.  See  also  paragraphs  46  and  47  of  the  Recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)12  Judges: 
Independence, Efficiency and Responsibility (adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 
17 November 2010) and the explanatory memorandum. These provide that the authority taking decisions on the 
selection  and  career  of  judges  should  be  independent  of  the  executive  and  legislative  powers.  With  a  view  to 
guaranteeing its independence, at least half of the members of the authority should be judges chosen by their peers. 
However, where the constitutional or other legal provisions prescribe that the head of state, the government or the 
legislative  power  take  decisions  concerning  the  selection  and  career  of  judges,  an  independent  and  competent 
authority drawn in substantial part from the judiciary (without prejudice to the rules applicable to councils for the 
judiciary contained in Chapter IV) should be authorised to make recommendations or express opinions which the 
relevant appointing authority follows in practice.  

105  See Court of Justice, judgment of 2 March 2021, A.B., C-824/18, para. 119; judgment of 19 November 2019, A. 
K. and Others (Independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court), C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-
625/18, EU:C:2019:982, para. 123; judgment of 24 June 2019, Commission v. Poland, C-619/18, EU:C:2019:531 
para. 112. 

106  See  Recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)12  Judges:  Independence,  Efficiency  and  Responsibility,  adopted  by  the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 17 November 2010 and the explanatory memorandum (‘the 
Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12’). 

107  The  figures  are  based  on  the  responses  to  an  updated  questionnaire  drawn  up  by  the  Commission  in  close 
association with the ENCJ. Responses to the updated questionnaire from Member States that have no Councils for 
the Judiciary or that are not ENCJ members (CZ, DE, EE, CY, LU, AT, and PL) were obtained  in cooperation 
with the Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU. 

65 

 
 
                                                           
prosecutor’s  offices  specialised  for  dealing  with  corruption  (Figure  61)  (108);  (v)  authorities 
involved in the appointment of prosecutors general (Figure 62) (109); and (vi) a first overview of 
the different solutions adopted in Member States to ensure the protection of constitutional rights 
at highest instance and the bodies’ selected powers (Figures 63 and 64) (110). It also presents an 
updated overview of some of the key powers of the councils for the judiciary (Figure 55) (111) and 
updated figures on the independence of bars and lawyers (Figure 65) (112). The figures present the 
national frameworks as they were in December 2022. 

The figures presented in the Scoreboard do not provide an assessment or present quantitative data 
on the effectiveness of the safeguards. They are not intended to reflect the complexity and details 
of the procedures and accompanying safeguards. Implementing policies and practices to promote 
integrity  and  prevent  corruption  within  the  judiciary  are  also  essential  to  guarantee  judicial 
independence. Ultimately, the effective protection of judicial independence also requires, beyond 
whatever  necessary  norms,  a  culture  of  integrity  and  impartiality  shared  by  magistrates  and 
respected by the wider society. 

– Powers of the Councils for the Judiciary – 

Figure 55 shows an updated overview, first presented in the 2016 EU Justice Scoreboard, of some 
of the key powers of the Councils for the Judiciary (members of the ENCJ), such as the powers 
over the appointment of judges and powers affecting their careers. It has been expanded to include 
the powers to evaluate the functioning of the courts (e.g. quality, efficiency), process complaints 
from court users, and decide on the number of judicial posts in each court. 

108  Figures 58-61 are based on the responses to a questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association with 

the national contact points in the fight against corruption. 

109  Figure 62 is based on responses to an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close cooperation 

with the Expert Group on Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism. 

110 Figures 63 and 64 have been drawn by the Commission. 
111  Figure 55 is based on the responses to an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association 
with the ENCJ. Responses to the updated questionnaire from Member States that are not ENCJ members (PL) 
were obtained in cooperation with the Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU.  
112 Figure 65 is based on the responses to an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association 

with the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE). 

66 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 55: Powers of Councils for the Judiciary (source: European Network of Councils for the 
Judiciary and Network of Presidents of Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU (113)) 

(*) The figure presents only certain powers and is not exhaustive. The Councils for the Judiciary have further powers 
not mentioned here. For DK, IE, HU, and PT, data are from the 2021 judicial independence questionnaire, and there 
is no information on these Councils’ potential powers of evaluation of the functioning of the courts,  of processing 
complaints from court users, and of deciding on number of judicial posts in each court. EL: column shows powers for 
both  councils,  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council  of  Civil  and  Criminal  Justice  and  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council  for 
Administrative Justice; the Supreme Judicial Council for Administrative Justice has an additional power to decide on 
implementation and use of ICT in courts. IT: column shows powers for both councils, the council for civil and criminal 
courts (CSM) and the council for administrative courts (CPGA); CPGA has an additional power to allocate budget 
to particular courts; LV: other self-governing judicial bodies exercise certain powers, e.g. over discipline and ethics. 

– Appointment of Supreme Court Presidents – 

Supreme Courts, as final instance courts, are essential to ensure the uniform application of the law 
in  Member  States.  Presidents  of  Supreme  Courts  exercise  an  important  role  as  they  are  often 
assigned  powers  to  manage  the  Supreme  Court.  It  is  for  the  Member  States  to  organise the 
procedure  of  appointment  of  Supreme  Court  judges  and  Presidents  in  such  a  way  that  their 
independence and impartiality is ensured. In that respect, EU law requires Member States to ensure 
that, once appointed, judges are free from influence or pressure from the appointing authority when 
carrying  out  their  role  (114).  It  is  also  necessary  to  ensure  that  the  substantive  conditions  and 

113  Data collected through an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association with the ENCJ. 

For PL, data collected through the NPSC. 

114  Since 2019, the Court of Justice issued a number of rulings on judicial appointments and requirements of EU law 
in  that  respect  (see  judgment  of  20  April  2021  in  case  C-896/19,  Repubblika  and  Il-Prim  Ministru,  para.  56; 
judgment of 2 March 2021 in case C-824/18, AB, para. 122; judgment of 19 November 2019 in joined cases C-
585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, AK et al, para. 133). 

67 

 
 
 
                                                           
detailed  procedural  rules  governing  the  adoption  of  appointment  decisions  are  such  that  they 
cannot give rise to reasonable doubts, in the minds of individuals, as to the imperviousness of the 
judges concerned to external factors and as to their neutrality with respect to the interests before 
them (115). Participation of independent bodies, such as Councils for the Judiciary, in the process 
of judicial appointment process may, in principle, be such as to contribute to making that process 
more objective, provided that such a body is itself sufficiently independent of the legislature and 
the executive and the authority to which it is required to submit an opinion (116).  

Figure  56  shows  an  overview  of  the  bodies  and  authorities  which  propose  candidates  for  their 
appointment  as  Supreme  Court  Presidents  and the  authorities  that  appoint  them,  as  well  as the 
authorities that are consulted (e.g. Supreme Court judges, Councils for the Judiciary).  

Figure 56: Appointment of Supreme Court Presidents: proposing and appointing authorities 
(*)  (source:  European  Network  of  Councils  for  the  Judiciary  and  Network  of  Presidents  of 
Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU (117))  

(*) BE: proposal: Council for the Judiciary on mandatory advice from the Supreme Court; appointment: the Head of 
State (King). BG: Preliminary proposals for candidates are made by at least three members of the Judges Chamber 
of the Council for the Judiciary, the Minister of Justice and the Plenaries of the Supreme Cassation Court and the 
Supreme Administrative Court. The Plenary of the Council for the Judiciary, after a selection procedure, sends the 
official proposal of one candidate to the President of the Republic who then appoints the President of the Supreme 
Cassation Court or Supreme Administrative Court. CZ: The President of the Supreme Court is appointed from among 
the other judges of the Supreme Court by the President of the Republic. The President of the Republic appoints one of 
the  judges  of  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court  as  the  President  of  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court  with  the 
countersignature of the Prime Minister. DK: The President of the Supreme Court is elected by the other judges in the 
Supreme  Court.  IE:  proposal:  the  Judicial  Appointments  Advisory  Board  selects  candidates  who  are  not  already 

115  Judgment of 20 April 2021 in case C-896/19, Repubblika and Il-Prim Ministru, para. 57, ECLI:EU:C:2021:311; 
judgment of 2 March 2021 in case C-824/18, AB, para. 123, ECLI:EU:C:2021:153; judgment of 19 November 
2019 in joined cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, AK et al., paras. 134 and 135, ECLI:EU:C:2019:982.  
116  Judgment of 20 April 2021 in case C-896/19, Repubblika and Il-Prim Ministru para. 66; judgment of 2 March 
2021 in case C-824/18, AB, paras. 66, 124 and 125; judgment of 19 November 2019 in joined cases C-585/18, C-
624/18 and C-625/18, AK et al, paras. 137 and 138. 

117  Data collected through an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association with the ENCJ. 
Responses to the updated questionnaire from Member States that have no Councils for the Judiciary are not ENCJ 
members, were obtained through cooperation with the NPSC. 

68 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
holding judicial office and recommends them to the government as being suitable for appointment to judicial office. 
The government may select serving judges for appointment to higher judicial office; appointment: the President on 
the advice of the government. AT: proposal: Minister of Justice based on a proposal from a ‘staff panel’ consisting 
of judges; appointment: Federal President. LU: proposal and appointment: Cour supérieure de justice. DE: proposal: 
Minister of Justice; appointment: the whole Federal Government following consultative advice from the Präsidialrat 
(the Presidential Council of the Supreme Court, consisting of its president and judges elected by all the judges of the 
court, provides a reasoned opinion on the personal and professional aptitude of each candidate) and with mandatory 
consent from Richterwahlausschuss (Judges Election Committee, consisting of the ministers of justice of the 16 federal 
states  and  16  members  elected  by  the  federal  parliament  (Bundestag));  formal  appointment  by  the  President. 
Appointment as President of the Supreme Federal Court also requires election as a judge of that federal court. In this 
respect, there are no special features for the election of a federal judge.  EE: proposal: President of the Republic; 
appointment: Parliament. EL: The presidents of the three highest courts (Council of State, Supreme Court, Court of 
Audit) are appointed according to the same procedure; proposal: the government, based on a proposal by the Minister 
of Justice and an opinion of a parliamentary body; appointment: President of the Republic by a presidential decree. 
NL: proposal: Supreme Court; appointment: government. PL: The President of the Supreme Court is appointed by 
the President of the Republic of Poland, after the opinion of the First President of the Supreme Court, for a 3-year 
term of office from among three candidates selected by the assembly of the judges of a chamber of the Supreme Court. 
PT: The President of the Supreme Court is elected by the other judges in the Supreme Court. RO: The President, Vice-
Presidents  and  Presidents  of  Sections  of  the  High  Court  of  Justice  and  Cassation  are  appointed  by  the  Superior 
Council of Magistracy (Section for Judges), following an interview consisting of presenting the managerial plan, the 
verification of the managerial and communication skills, focusing essentially on the organisational capacity, speed in 
decision-making, resilience to stress, self-improvement, capacity for analysis, synthesis, forecasting, short-, medium- 
and long-term strategy and planning, initiative, rapid adaptability, networking and communication capacity, as well 
as verification of the specific knowledge of the role/position the candidate has applied for. CY: President appoints on 
advice of the Advisory Judicial Council (Law on the Administration of Justice No 145(I)/2022). ES: The President of 
the Supreme Court is appointed by the King by royal decree countersigned by the President of the Government on 
advice of the Council for the Judiciary. The candidate takes an oath or promise before the King and takes office before 
the Plenary of the High Court. Upon the President’s appointment, if they have a judicial career, they are declared in 
a special service situation (Articles 351.a and 593 of the Organic Law of the Judiciary). The duration of the term of 
office coincides with that of the Council that elected them, and they may only be re-elected and appointed once for a 
new term of office (Article 587 of the Organic Law of the Judiciary). LT: The chart reflects the process for the Supreme 
Court  President;  proposal:  President  of  the  Republic  (the  candidates  are  selected  by  the  Selection  Commission); 
appointment: Parliament. The Chairperson of the Supreme Administrative Court is appointed by the President of the 
Republic.  LV:  proposal:  Plenary  session  of  the  Supreme  Court  on  mandatory  advice  from  the  Judicial  Council; 
appointment: Parliament.  LU: proposal and appointment: Cour supérieure  de  justice.  The  procedure will change 
from 1 July 2023 when the Council for the Judiciary  will  start operating.  IT: proposal: the Supreme Council for 
Magistracy (CSM) or the Council for the judiciary for administrative judges (CPGA); appointment: President of the 
Republic.  FR:  proposal:  Higher  Council  for  the  Judiciary (CSM);  appointment:  President  of  the  Republic.  The 
Council issues a ‘call for candidates’, and all judges can propose their candidature. The president of the Supreme 
administrative court (Conseil d’Etat) is appointed by the President of the Republic.  HR: proposal: President of the 
Republic  after  receiving  the  list  of  eligible  candidates  who  applied  to  the  vacancy;  The  General  Assembly  of  the 
Supreme Court and the competent parliamentary committee give their opinions on the candidates either before or 
after the President proposes the candidate. As clarified by the Constitutional Court (U-I-1039/2021), these opinions, 
which have to be given on all candidates, are not binding on the President of the Republic. appointment: Parliament. 
HU: proposal: President of the Republic based on a list of suitable candidates drawn up by the OBT (National Judicial 
Council).  The  parliamentary  committee  for  justice  interviews  the  candidate;  appointment:  Parliament  elects  the 
candidate  with  a  two-thirds  majority  of  votes  for  9  years.  Re-election  is  not  possible.  MT:  The  Chief  Justice  is 
appointed by the President acting in accordance with a resolution of Parliament supported by the votes of not less 
than two-thirds of all the members. SI: proposal: Minister of Justice after receiving an opinion of the Judicial Council. 
The Judicial Council interviews candidates who applied to the vacancy and requests a plenary session of the Supreme 
Court for an opinion. The Minister for Justice may also be present at the interview and has the right to ask questions; 
appointment: Parliament.  SK: proposal: Judicial Council; appointment: President.  FI: proposal: Supreme Court; 
appointment: President of the Republic. SE: proposal: Judges Proposals Board; appointment: government. 

69 

 
 
Figure 57 presents the competence of the executive power and parliament in appointing candidates 
as Supreme Court Presidents upon submission from the proposing authorities (e.g. Council for the 
Judiciary  or  Supreme  Court).  The  height  of  the  column  depends  on  whether  the  executive  or 
parliament have the possibility to reject a candidate for the Supreme Court President, whether it 
can choose only among the proposed candidates, or whether it can choose and appoint any other 
candidate, even if they are not proposed by the competent authority. If a candidate is not appointed, 
an important safeguard is the obligation to provide reasons (118) and the possibility for a judicial 
review of the decision (119). The figure is a factual presentation of the legal system and does not 
make a qualitative assessment of the effectiveness of the safeguards. For example, in 13 Member 
States.  the  executive  or  parliament  has  the  power  to  reject  a  candidate  for  the  Supreme  Court 
President. However, that power has never been exercised or has not been exercised in the last 5 
years (2018-2022) (i.e. in BE, BG, DE, EE, LV, LU, MT, NL, AT, PL, SK, FI, and SE), or it has 
been exercised in isolated cases (i.e. in EL, HR, SI, and LT). 

Figure  57:  Appointment  of  Supreme  Court  Presidents:  competence  of  the  executive  and 
parliament  (*)  (source:  European  Network  of  Councils  for  the  Judiciary  and  Network  of 
Presidents of Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU (120)) 

(*) BG: The President of the Republic has the right to veto the proposed candidate. Then the Plenary of the Council 
for the Judiciary has to vote again for the candidates that were proposed to them. If the Plenary re-elects the same 
candidate, the President is obliged to appoint them. IE: The figure reflects the competence of the government. Under 
Article 13.9 of the Constitution (i.e. a constitutional requirement rather than a practice), the President’s power of 
appointment  is  only  exercisable  on  the  advice  of  the  government.  Where  the  government  proposes  to  advise  the 
President on an appointment to the office of Chief Justice, it must first have regard to the qualifications and suitability 
of those who are already serving as judges. EL: Supreme Court (dealing with civil and commercial cases) and Council 
of  State  (dealing  with administrative  cases):  selection  from  among  the  Vice-Presidents  of  the  Supreme  Court  and 
Supreme Court Judges (with at least 4 years of service in this position) or selection among the members of the Council 
of State (Vice-Presidents and Councillors). For Supreme Court and Council of State President: Complete discretional 
power of the government (Cabinet). No reasoning required. For the President and Vice-Presidents of the Supreme 
Court, an appeal/review under provision of the law is not allowed. For the post of Vice-President or President of the 
Council of State, the judicial review is very limited. ES: The Head of State (the King) as appointing authority must 
mandatorily follow the proposal of the Council for the Judiciary concerning judicial appointments and promotions. 

118 Judgment of 20 April 2021 in case C-896/19, Repubblika and Il-Prim Ministru, para. 71. 
119 Judgment of 19 November 2019 in joined cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, AK et al., para. 145. 
120  Data collected through an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association with the ENCJ. 
Responses to the updated questionnaire from Member States that have no Councils for the Judiciary are not ENCJ 
members, were obtained through cooperation with the NPSC. 

70 

 
 
 
                                                           
The King has, therefore, no discretion and no obligation to provide reasons. The decision of the King has the form 
of a Royal Decree, is published in the Official Gazette and may not be challenged as such. It is the previous decision 
by the Council to propose a candidate for judicial appointment or promotion that can be appealed, initially through 
an administrative appeal (decided by the Plenary of the Council) and subsequently through a judicial review before 
the Administrative Division of the Supreme Court. IT: On the proposal by the Supreme Council for Magistracy (CSM) 
or  the  Council  for  the  judiciary  for  administrative  judges  (CPGA),  which  are  in  practice  binding  proposals,  the 
President of the Republic issues a decree on the appointment of the President of the Supreme Court or the President 
of the Council of State, respectively, having no discretion in this regard.  CY: The President of the Republic, when 
appointing the President of the Supreme Court, has no constitutional or legal obligation to follow the advisory opinion, 
but as a rule follows it. The senior member of the Supreme Court has been appointed as President of the Supreme 
Court to date. MT: The authority presented is the Parliament. The Chief Justice is appointed by the President acting 
in accordance with a resolution of Parliament supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds of all the members. 
NL: proposal: Supreme Court; appointment: the government upon the nomination by the Minister of Justice. AT: The 
Federal President may reject the candidate proposed by the Minister of Justice, but may not appoint a person who 
has not been proposed. LT: The candidate can request a special judicial review of the selection procedure before the 
Supreme Court only on a procedural basis on the opinion of the Selection Commission (this opinion is not binding on 
the President of the Republic). LU: There is no binding text on this subject, but so far, the appointing authority has 
never refused the nomination of a candidate proposed by the Court. HR: The Constitutional Court, in a decision of 
23  March  2021  (U-I-1039/2021,)  clarified  that  the  President  of  the  Republic  can  only  choose  from  among  the 
candidates  who  have  applied  to  the  vacancy;  however,  the  President  can  also  decide  not  to  propose  any  of  the 
candidates  who  applied  and  inform  the  Parliament.  An  unsuccessful  candidate  can  request  a  review  of  the 
Parliament’s decision before the Constitutional Court. PL: The President of the Republic is not obliged by law to 
provide reasons for not appointing the President of the Supreme Court. A candidate for the President of the Supreme 
Court  and  a  candidate  for  the  president  of  a  chamber  of  the  Supreme  Court  cannot appeal.  The  President  of  the 
Republic cannot refuse to appoint the First President of the Supreme Court or a president of a chamber from among 
the candidates selected by the General Assembly of Supreme Court judges. SI: Neither the Minister of Justice nor the 
Parliament  are  required  to  give  reasons  for  not  proposing/appointing  the  candidate.  The  Judicial  Council  is  not 
required to give reasons for its opinion on the candidates. There is no judicial review of decisions or opinions in the 
procedure. SK: Although it has never happened, if a candidate for a Supreme Court President is not appointed, the 
appointing  authority/body  would  be  required  to  provide  them  the  reasons  for  the  decision,  and  there  would  be  a 
possibility  of  a  review  before  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court.  FI:  The  President  would  give  reasons  for  the 
decision, although this is not mentioned in the law. SE: The government can decide not to appoint a candidate for the 
Supreme Court President and can choose any other candidate, even if the proposing authority did not submit their 
name. However, the chosen candidate’s application must be one of the applications for the position processed by the 
Judges Proposals Board.  

– Anti-corruption – 

Corruption is a multi-faceted phenomenon, present both in the public and private sector.  It has 
negative impacts on prosperity and economic growth, social cohesion, as well as on sustainable 
development. The national anti-corruption frameworks are being monitored by the Commission  
under the annual Rule of Law Report and also under the European Semester and the Recovery and 
Resilience Plans. On 3 May 2023, the Commission presented a Communication on the fight against 
corruption, as well as a proposal for a Directive on combating corruption by criminal law (121).  
For the first time, the 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard is presenting data on the bodies specialised in 
the prevention of corruption, giving an overview of the type of powers of such bodies (Figure 58) 
and of the rules on the appointment of these same bodies (Figure 59). Most Member States have 
one or more bodies that play a role in the prevention of corruption. Nine Member States did not 
report on the existence of a specialised preventive body but rather on authorities that, apart from 
their other tasks, also deal with prevention of corruption. Apart from the powers of the specialised 

121  Proposal for a Directive on combatting corruption COM (2023) 234 and Joint Communication on the fight against 

corruption JOIN(2023) 12 final. 

71 

 
 
                                                           
bodies presented in the figure, other national authorities (may) have other powers in the field of 
prevention of corruption. 

Figure 58: Powers of specialised bodies dealing with the prevention of corruption (*) (Source: 
European Commission with the National Contact Points for Anti-corruption (122)) 

(*) Member States have one or several bodies that have at least some role in preventing corruption. For clarity and 
comparability, the chart only presents the powers of one authority for each Member State, which is specialised in 
preventing corruption. The authorities whose powers are represented are listed hereafter. Some Member States do 
not have such authorities, while  others have several, with different competences. BE: Unit for Integrity within the 
Federal Public Service for Policy and Support (FOD BOSA/FPS BOSA). BG: Commission on Combating Corruption 
and Forfeiture of Illegally Acquired Property (CCCFIAP). CZ: Conflict of Interests and Anti-corruption Department, 
(Ministry of Justice). IE: Standards in Public Office Commission. Garda National Economic Crime Bureau also has 
a role to play in the prevention of corruption. EL: National Transparency Authority. ES: Office on the Conflict of 
Interests. FR: There are two anti-corruption bodies - L’Agence française anticorruption (AFA) and la Haute Autorité 
pour la transparence de la vie publique (HATVP). Тhey have complementary functions in relation to the prevention 
of corruption. The chart presents the powers of the AFA. HR: Commission for the Resolution of Conflicts of Interest. 
IT: National Anti-corruption Authority. CY: Independent Authority Against Corruption. LV: Corruption Prevention 
and  Combating  Bureau.  LT:  There  are  two  authorities  dealing  with  the  prevention  of  corruption  –  Special 
Investigation Service (STT), which is presented in the chart, and the Chief Official Ethic Commission (COEC). HU: 
Integrity Authority. The competence to verify asset declarations of senior political executives was transferred to the 
Integrity  Authority  in  2022.  The  procedure  under  the  Conditionality  Regulation  and  Hungary’s  Recovery  and 
Resilience Plan include, in addition, reforms to extend the Integrity Authority’s powers to directly verify public asset 
declarations  of  all  high-risk  officials  whose  assets  declarations  are  publicly  available,  and,  for  non-public  asset 

122 Data collected through a questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association with the National contact 

points in the fight against corruption. 

72 

 
 
 
                                                           
declarations, to request the competent bodies to carry out the verification and to obtain the verification results. There 
are two other authorities that play a role in terms of prevention of corruption – the National Protective Service and 
the Constitution Protection Office. AT: Federal Bureau of Anti-corruption (BAK). PL: The Central Anti-corruption 
Bureau.  PT:  National  Anti-corruption  Mechanism  RO:  The  National  Integrity  Agency.  SI:  Commission  for  the 
Prevention of Corruption. SE: There is a decentralised approach in the prevention of corruption and SE has entrusted 
this task to many different agencies and bodies.  

Figure 59: Appointment of specialised bodies dealing with the prevention of corruption (*) 
(Source: European Commission with the National Contact Points for Anti-corruption (123)) 

(*)  Member  States  have  one  or  more  bodies  that  play  some  role  in  preventing  corruption.  For  clarity  and 
comparability, the chart only presents the powers of one authority for each Member State, which is specialised in 
preventing corruption. The authorities whose powers are represented are listed hereafter. Some Member States do 
not have such authorities, while others have several.  BE: Unit for Integrity within the Federal Public Service  for 
Policy and Support (FOD BOSA/FPS BOSA). BG: Commission on Combating Corruption and Forfeiture of Illegally 
Acquired Property (CCCFIAP). CZ: Conflict of Interests and Anti-corruption Department, (Ministry of Justice). IE: 
Standards  in  Public  Office  Commission.  Garda  National  Economic  Crime  Bureau  also  has  a  role  to  play  in  the 
prevention of corruption. EL: National Transparency Authority. ES: Office on the Conflicts on Interests. FR: There 
are two anti-corruption bodies -.L’Agence française anticorruption and la Haute Autorité pour la transparence de la 
vie  publique  (HATVP).  Тhey have  complementary  functions  in  relation  to  the  prevention  of  corruption.  The  chart 
presents the appointment of the AFA. HR: Commission for the Resolution of Conflicts of Interest. IT: National Anti-
corruption  Authority.  CY:  Independent  Authority  Against Corruption.  LV:  Corruption Prevention  and  Combating 
Bureau. LT: There are two authorities dealing with the prevention of corruption – Special Investigation Service (STT), 
which  is  presented  in  the  chart,  and  the  Chief  Official  Ethic  Commission  (COEC).  HU:  Integrity  Authority.  The 
President and the Vice-Presidents of the Integrity Authority are appointed by the President of the Republic for a term 
of six years, on a proposal from the President of the State Audit Office. AT: Federal Bureau of Anti-corruption (BAK). 
PL:  The  Central  Anti-corruption  Bureau.  PT:  National  Anti-corruption  Mechanism  RO:  The  National  Integrity 
Agency. SI: Commission for the prevention of corruption. SE: There is a decentralised approach in the prevention of 
corruption and SE has entrusted this task to many different agencies and bodies. 

Public  prosecution  plays  a  major  role  in  the  criminal  justice  system  as  well  as  in  cooperation 
between Member States in criminal matters. The proper functioning of the national prosecution 

123 Data collected through a questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association with the National contact 

points in the fight against corruption. 

73 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
service is  crucial  for the effective fight  against crime, including economic and financial crime, 
such  as  money  laundering,  and  corruption.  According  to  the  case-law  of  the  Court  of  Justice 
relating to the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision (124), the public prosecutor’s office 
can be considered a Member State judicial authority for the purposes of issuing and executing a 
European arrest warrant whenever it can act independently, without being exposed to the risk of 
being  subject,  directly  or  indirectly,  to  directions  or  instructions  in  a  specific  case  from  the 
executive, such as a Minister for Justice (125). The organisation of national prosecution services 
varies across the EU and there is no uniform model for all Member States. However, the Council 
of Europe has noted a widespread tendency to have a more independent prosecutor’s office, rather 
than one subordinated or linked to the executive (126). According to the Consultative Council of 
European Prosecutors, an effective and autonomous prosecution service committed to upholding 
the rule of law and human rights in the administration of justice is one of the pillars of a democratic 
state (127).  

124  Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between 

Member States (OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 1). 

125  Court  of  Justice,  judgment  of  27  May  2019,  OG and  PI  (Public  Prosecutor’s  Office  of  Lübeck and  Zwickau), 
Joined Cases C-508/18 and C-82/19 PPU, paras 73, 74 and 88, ECLI:EU:C:2019:456; judgment of 27 May 2019, 
C‑509/18, para 52, ECLI:EU:C:2019:457; see also judgments of 12 December 2019, Parquet général du Grand-
Duché  de  Luxembourg and  Openbaar  Ministerie  (Public  Prosecutors  of  Lyon  and  Tours),  in  Joined  Cases  C-
566/19 PPU  and  C-626/19,  ECLI:EU:C:2019:1077;  Openbaar  Ministerie  (Swedish  Prosecution  Authority),  C-
625/19 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1078, and Openbaar Ministerie (Public Prosecutor in Brussels), C-627/19 PPU, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:1079; judgment of 24 November 2020, AZ, C-510/19, para 54, ECLI:EU:C:2020:953. See also 
judgment  of  10  November  2016,  Kovalkovas,  C-477/16  PPU,  paras  34  and  36,  ECLI:EU:C:2016:861,  and 
judgment of 10 November 2016, Poltorak, C-452/16 PPU, para 35, ECLI:EU:C:2016:858, on the term ‘judiciary’, 
‘which must […] be distinguished, in accordance with the principle of the separation of powers which characterises 
the operation of the rule of law, from the executive’. See also Opinion No. 13(2018) Independence, accountability 
and ethics of prosecutors, adopted by the Consultative Council of European Prosecutors (CCPE), recommendation 
xii. 

126  CDL-AD(2010)040-e Report on European Standards as regards the Independence of the Judicial System: Part II - 
the  Prosecution  Service  -  Adopted  by  the  Venice  Commission  -  at  its  85th  plenary  session  (Venice,  17-
18 December 2010), para. 26. 

127  Moreover, in a democratic society, both courts and the investigative authorities must remain free from political 
pressure. The concept of independence means that prosecutors are free from unlawful interference in the exercise 
of their duties so as to ensure full respect for and application of the law and the principle of the rule of law and 
that they are not subjected to any political pressure or unlawful influence of any kind. Independence applies not 
only to the prosecution service as a whole, but also to its particular bodies and to individual prosecutors. Whatever 
the model of the national justice system or the legal tradition in which it is anchored, European standards require 
that Member States take effective measures to guarantee that public prosecutors are able to fulfil their professional 
duties and responsibilities under adequate legal and organisational conditions and without unjustified interference. 
See Consultative Council of European Prosecutors (CCPE) Opinion No. 15 (2020) on the role of prosecutors in 
emergency situations, in particular when facing a pandemic; Opinion No. 16 (2021) on the Implications of the 
decisions of international courts and treaty bodies as regards the practical independence of prosecutors, para. 13. 
See also Recommendation Rec(2000)19 on the role of public prosecution in the criminal justice system, adopted 
by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 6 October 2000 (the 2000 Recommendation), paras. 
4,  11  and  13.  Opinion  No.  13(2018)  Independence,  accountability  and  ethics  of  prosecutors,  adopted  by  the 
Consultative  Council  of  European  Prosecutors  (CCPE),  recommendations  i  and  iii;  Group  of  States  against 
corruption  (GRECO),  fourth  evaluation  round  'Corruption  prevention  -  Members  of  Parliament,  Judges  and 
Prosecutors', a vast number of recommendations ask for the introduction of arrangements to shield the prosecution 
service from undue influence and interference in the investigation of criminal cases. 

74 

 
 
                                                           
Corruption  is  often  a  complex  crime  and  its  investigation  and  prosecution  and  could  require 
specialisation. This is also recognised in the Commission’s proposal for a Directive on combating 
corruption  through  criminal  law  and  the  UN  Convention  against  Corruption  (128).  Figure  60 
presents a mapping of the bodies specialised in the investigation and prosecution of corruption. 
Whereas  all  Member  States  allow  regular  police  and  prosecutorial  bodies  to  investigate  and 
prosecute some forms of corruption, all but two Member States also have in place some form of a 
specialised police to investigate specific corruption cases, for instance when they are more serious, 
complex or relating to a certain category of suspects. When it comes to prosecution of corruption, 
all but 7 Member States have specialised prosecutors to deal with such corruption cases.  

Figure 60: Authorities involved in the investigation and prosecution of corruption - overview 
(*) (Source: European Commission with the National Contact Points for Anti-corruption (129)) 

(*) ES: There are two law enforcement authorities specialised in the investigation of corruption - National Police: 
Economic and Fiscal Crime Unit (UDEF) - Cuerpo Nacional de Policía, Unidad Central de Delincuencia Económica 
y Fiscal (UDEF) and Civil Guard: Central Operating Unit (UCO) - Guardia civil, Unidad Central Operativa (UCO). 
IT: There are no Public prosecutor offices specialised only in investigating and prosecuting corruption. However, 
some of them have working groups specialising in crimes against the public administration, which could include also 
corruption. 

Figure 61 presents the appointment procedures for the heads of prosecutor’s offices specialised in 
dealing  with  corruption  (where  they  exist).  In  12  Member  States,  there  is  no  specialised 
prosecutor’s office or if there is one, the appointment of its head is conducted through the normal 
appointment procedure for appointment of heads or prosecutor’s offices.  

128  Art. 36 of the UNCAC "Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system, 
ensure the existence of a body or bodies or persons specialized in combating corruption through law enforcement. 
Such body or bodies or persons shall be granted the necessary independence, in accordance with the fundamental 
principles of the legal system of the State Party, to be able to carry out their functions effectively and without any 
undue influence. Such persons or staff of such body or bodies should have the appropriate training and resources 
to carry out their tasks. 

129 Data collected through a questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association with the National contact 

points in the fight against corruption. 

75 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure  61:  Appointment  procedures  for  the  heads  of  prosecutor’s  offices  specialised  for 
dealing with corruption (*) (Source: European Commission with the National Contact Points for 
Anti-corruption (130)) 

(*)  The  figure  focuses  only  on  the  Member  States  that  have  a  specialised  prosecutor’s  office  dealing  with  the 
repression of corruption regardless of the degree of specialisation. It presents different information than the mapping 
in the previous figure, which gives a more general overview of the specialisation. CZ: High Prosecutor’s Offices. DK: 
The National Special Crime Unit. IE: Anti-Bribery & Corruption unit, Garda National Economic Crime Bureau. EL: 
Financial Prosecutor’s Office. ES: Special Public Prosecutor’s Office against Corruption and Organised Crime. HR: 
State Attorney’s Office, Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised crime (USKOK). Minister of Justice 
and Public Administration and Council in State Attorney's Office of the Republic of Croatia provide their opinion in 
procedure of appointment. FR: Parquet national financier (PNF). CY: Anti-corruption taskforce established under 
the competence of the Attorney General office, with specialised officers from relevant institutions. LV: Divisions for 
Coordination  of  the  Corruption  Combating  of  the  Prosecutor  General's  Office  and  Prosecution  Office  for 
Investigation of Public Office Holders' Misconduct Offences. NL: The public prosecutors associated with the Anti-
Corruption Team of the Public Prosecution Service work independently at the operational and functional level. All 
public  prosecutors  are  selected  (and  proposed)  by  the  Prosecutor’s  office.  They  are  appointed  by  royal  decree, 
however that is a formality (the king has no interference with the selection procedure for public prosecutors). AT: 
Central Public Prosecutor's Office for Combating Economic Crimes and Corruption (WKStA). PL: The Department 
for Organised Crime and Corruption of the National Prosecutor's Office. PT: Public Prosecution Service – Central 
Department for Criminal Investigation and Prosecution (DCIAP). RO: The National Anti-corruption Directorate SI: 
Specialised  State  Prosecutor's  Office  of  the  Republic  of  Slovenia.  SK:  Specialised  Prosecutor’s  Office.  SE:  The 
National Anti-corruption Unit (NACU) (Riksenheten mot korruption). 

130 Data collected through a questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association with the National contact 

points in the fight against corruption. 

76 

 
 
 
                                                           
Figure  62  presents  an  overview  of  the  bodies  and  authorities  that  propose  candidates  for  their 
appointment as prosecutors general, the authorities that appoint them, and the authorities that are 
consulted. 

Figure  62:  Proposal  and  appointment  of  the  Prosecutor  General  (*)  (Source:  European 
Commission with the Expert Group on Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (131)) 

(*) BG: Preliminary proposals for candidates are made by at least three members of the Prosecutors Chamber of the 
Council for the Judiciary and the Minister of Justice. The Plenary of the Council for the Judiciary, after a selection 
procedure,  sends  the  official  proposal  of  one  candidate  to  the  President  of  the  Republic  who  then  appoints  the 
Prosecutor General. The President has the right to veto the proposed candidate. Then the Plenary of the Council for 
the Judiciary has to vote again for the list of candidates that was proposed to them. If they re-elect the same candidate, 
the President is obliged to appoint them. CZ: The Minister/Ministry of Justice proposes the Prosecutor General, and 
the  government  appoints  them.  DK:  The  Minister/Ministry  of  Justice  proposes  the  Prosecutor  General,  and  the 
government's  Hiring  Committee  appoints  them.  DE:  The  Federal  Public  Prosecutor  General  is  appointed  by  the 
President of Germany on the proposal of the Federal Minister of Justice, which requires the approval of the Federal 
Council.  EE:  The  Government  of  the  Republic  appoints  the  Prosecutor  General  to  office  on  the  proposal  of  the 
minister responsible for the area after considering the opinion of the Legal Affairs Committee of the Riigikogu. IE: A 
committee comprising the Chief Justice, the Chair of the Bar Council, the President of the Law Society, the Secretary 
General  to  the  government  and  the  Director  General  of  the  Attorney  General’s  Office  selects  candidates  for 
appointment  following  an  open  competition  and  interview.  EL:  The  Minister/Ministry  of  Justice  proposes  the 
Prosecutor General, and the Council for the Judiciary appoints them, followed by a presidential decree. FR: Proposal 
for appointment: the Minister of Justice decides with a prior non-binding opinion of the Council for the Judiciary. 
HR:  proposal:  the  government;  appointment:  Parliament  based  on  an  opinion  of  the  competent  parliamentary 
committee. IT: Decision for appointment: after the proposal of the Council, the Minister of Justice issues a ministerial 
decree, without any discretion not to appoint the proposed candidate prosecutor. CY: The Head of State proposes and 
appoints  the  Prosecutor  General.  LV:  Proposal  for  appointment:  Judicial  Council.  Decision  for  appointment: 
Parliament.  LT:  Proposal  for  appointment:  the  Prosecution  Selection  Commission  (composed  of  two  prosecutors 
nominated  by  the  Collegiate  Council,  two  prosecutors  nominated  by  the  Prosecutor  General,  and  three  other 
members, who are each nominated by the President of the Republic, the Speaker of the Seimas and the Prime Minister 
respectively). LU: Minister/Ministry of Justice proposes the Prosecutor General, and the Grand Duke appoints them. 
The procedure will change from 1 July 2023 when the Council for the Judiciary will start functioning. NL: Decision 

131  Data collected through an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close cooperation with the Expert 

Group on Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism. 

77 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
for appointment is taken by royal decree (with an obligation to follow the proposal to appoint the candidate for the 
post of prosecutor). Decision for the dismissal is taken by royal decree. AT: Proposal for appointment: independent 
personnel body. Decision for appointment: Federal President delegates the decision to the Minister of Justice.  PL: 
The  Minister of Justice is also the  Prosecutor General.  They are appointed and dismissed by the President of the 
Republic  of  Poland  on  the  proposal  of  the  Prime  Minister.  RO:  The  Minister/Ministry  of  Justice  proposes  the 
Prosecutor General, and the Head of State appoints them. SI: Proposal: State Prosecutorial Council; appointment: 
Parliament, after receiving an opinion from the government. SK: One proposal for the election of the candidate for 
the Prosecutor General can be submitted to the National Council by a member of Parliament, the Minister of Justice, 
the Public Defender of Rights, the Council of Prosecutors of the Slovak Republic, the professional organisation of 
lawyers, the faculty of law of a university based in the Slovak Republic and the Institute of State and Law of the Slovak 
Academy of Sciences. SE: There is no proposing authority involved.  

– Constitutional jurisdictions – 

Constitutional justice is a key component of checks and balances in a constitutional democracy. 
Constitutional  courts  play  a  crucial  role  in  the  effective  application  of  EU  law,  ensuring  the 
integrity of the EU legal order, and determining the fundamental principles that constitute the rule 
of law. As early as 1970, the Court of Justice recognised the constitutional traditions common to 
Member States as the basis of European protection of fundamental rights (132). More recently, the 
Court of Justice pointed out that the principles of the rule of law, as developed in the case law of 
the  Court  on  the  basis  of  the  EU  treaties,  have  their  source  in  common  values  that  are  also 
recognised and applied by Member States in their own legal systems (133).  

The  organisation  of  justice,  including  the  establishment,  composition  and  functioning  of  a 
constitutional court falls within the competence of Member States (134). In addition, constitutional 
courts, when they exist, may or may not be part of the judiciary. However, as pointed out by the 
Court of Justice, when exercising that competence, Member States are required to comply with 
their  obligations  deriving  from  EU  law  and,  in  particular,  with  the  values  on  which  the  EU  is 
founded  (135).  The  Venice  Commission  has  also  noted  that  there  is  no  general  requirement  to 
establish a constitutional court (136). Figure 63 presents a first overview of the different solutions 
adopted in Member States to ensure the protection of constitutional rights at highest instance.  

132  CJEU, judgment of 17 December 1970, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 11/70, EU:C:1970:114. 
133  CJEU, judgments of 16 February 2022, Hungary v Parliament and Council, C-156/21, EU:C:2022:97, para. 237, 

and of 16 February 2022, Poland v Parliament and Council, C-157/21, EU:C:2022:98, para. 291. 

134  CJEU, judgment of 20 April 2021, Repubblika, C‑896/19, EU:C:2021:31. 
135  CJEU,  judgment  of  22 February  2022,  RS  (Effect  of  the  decisions  of  a  constitutional  court),  C-430/21, 

EU:C:2022:99, para. 38. 

136  Venice Commission, Compilation of Venice Commission opinions, reports and studies on constitutional justice, 

p. 6. 

78 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure  63:  Highest  instance  exercising  constitutional  jurisdiction  (*)  (source:  European 
Commission) 

(*) The jurisdictions considered for the purposes of this chart are: BE: Cour Constitutionnelle, Grondwettelijk Hof 
(Constitutional  Court  of  Belgium).  BG:  Конституционен  съд  на  Република  България  (Constitutional  Court  of 
Republic  of  Bulgaria).  CZ:  Ústavní  soud  (Constitutional  Court  of  Czechia).  DK:  Højesteret  (Supreme  Court  of 
Denmark).  DE:  Bundesverfassungsgericht  (Federal  Constitutional  Court).  All  courts  are  competent  to  review  the 
constitutionality of legislation. The review consists of whether an act is adopted in accordance with the procedure 
laid down in the Constitution and the Standing Orders of the Parliament and if the content of the act complies with 
the Constitution. EE: Riigihokus (The Constitutional Review Chamber of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court 
en banc). IE: Cúirt Uachtarach na hÉireann (Supreme Court of Ireland).  EL: Areios Pagos (Supreme Court) and 
Symvoulio Tis Epikrateias (Council of State). There is no constitutional court. Each judge has the power to control 
the  constitutionality  of  the  law  (Article  87,  paragraph  2  of  the  Constitution:  ‘judges  shall  be  subject  only  to  the 
Constitution and the laws; in no case whatsoever shall they be obliged to comply with provisions enacted in violation 
of  the  Constitution’).  ES:  Tribunal  Constitucional  de  España  (Constitutional  Court  of  Spain).  FR:  Conseil 
Constitutionnel (Constitutional Council). HR: Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske (Contitutional Court of the Republic 
of Croatia). IT: Corte Costituzionale (Constitutional Court). CY: Ανώτατο Δικαστήριο (Supreme Court of the Republic 
of Cyprus). LV: Latvijas Republikas Satversmes tiesa (Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia). LT: Lietuvos 
Respublikos Konstitucinis Teismas (Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania). LU: Cour constitutionnelle de 
Luxembourg (Constitutional Court of Luxembourg). HU: Alkotmánybíróság (Constitutional Court of Hungary). All 
courts  can  carry  out  a  decentralised  form  of  ‘constitutional’  review  against  directly  effective  treaties.  MT: 
Constitutional Court.  NL: Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Supreme Court of the  Netherlands) -The Dutch Supreme 
Court functions as a court of cassation in civil, criminal and tax cases. AT: Verfassungsgerichtshof (Constitutional 
Court  of  Austria).  PL:  Trybunał  Konstytucyjny  (Constitutional  Tribunal  of  Poland).  PT:  Tribunal  Constitucional 
(Constitutional  Court).  RO:  Curtea  Constituțională  (Constitutional  Court  of  Romania).  SI:  Ustavno  sodišče 
Republike  Slovenije  (Constitutional  Court  of  the  Republic  of  Slovenia).  SK:  Ústavný  súd  Slovenskej  republiky 
(Constitutional  Court  of  Slovakia).  FI:  Korkein  oikeus  ja  Korkein  hallinto-oikeus  (Supreme  Court  and  Supreme 
Administrative  Court  of  Finland).  There  is  no  constitutional  court  in  FI.  All  courts  can  carry  out  ex  post 
constitutionality  reviews  in  concrete  cases,  with  the  Supreme  Court  and  Supreme  Administrative  Court  being  the 
highest instance in each branch of the judiciary. SE: Högsta Domstolen Högsta och Förvaltningsdomstolen (Supreme 
Court  and  Supreme  Administrative  Court  of  Sweden).  All  courts  can  review  the  compatibility  of  laws  with  the 
Constitution  or  with  superior  statutes  when  adjudicating  concrete  cases  and  must  disapply  any  incompatible 
provisions. 

79 

 
 
 
 
 
The competences assigned to these constitutional jurisdictions also vary, and there are no European 
standards applicable in this regard. The practice shows that the main role of Constitutional Courts 
in reviewing legislation and norms is accompanied in some Member States by a role in reviewing 
draft  legislation  (137).  In  some  cases,  national  law  also  allows  individuals  and  legal  entities  to 
appeal  to  the  constitutional  jurisdictions;  this  right  may  be  limited  to  cases  of  alleged 
unconstitutionality of generally applicable legislation, whereas in other cases it may also cover the 
right to challenge individual acts. Figure 64 presents an overview of the different  competences 
exercised by the highest constitutional jurisdictions of Member States, focusing on a selected set 
of competences commonly attributed to these jurisdictions. 

Figure 64: Selected competences of the highest instance exercising constitutional jurisdiction 
(*) (source: European Commission) 

(*) CZ: Ex ante review by the Constitutional Court occurs only when assessing the conformity of an international 
treaty  with  the  Constitution  and  constitutional  laws.  An  individual  may  challenge  a  general  norm  before  the 
Constitutional Court only under limited circumstances. DK: All courts can review the constitutionality of legislation. 
The review consists of whether an act is adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Constitution and 
the Standing Orders of the Parliament and if the content of the act complies with the Constitution. IE: Article 26 of 
the Constitution provides that the President of Ireland can refer draft legislation to the Supreme Court for an opinion 
on its constitutional validity. EL: There is no constitutional court. Each judge has the right and the duty to control 
the constitutionality of laws (decentralised constitutional control). A court can only declare the law under scrutiny as 
‘inapplicable’  for  the  case  at  hand.  ES:  The  Constitutional  Court  can  exercise  preliminary  appeals  of 
unconstitutionality in relation to proposals for reforms of statutes of autonomy. IT: Every ordinary and administrative 
judge can raise a question of constitutional validity of the norms that they have to apply to the case before it. State 
and regional governments can directly refer issues of constitutionality to the Court, claiming that its constitutionally 
guaranteed competences have been encroached. LU: A constitutionality check can be initiated when a party raises a 
question relating to the conformity of a law with the Constitution before ordinary or administrative courts. CY: Cyprus 
will have a constitutional court (Ανώτατο Συνταγματικό Δικαστήριο) as of July 2023. The legislation provides for a 
system of referral to the Constitutional Court by ordinary courts of questions relating to the constitutionality of a law. 
The Constitutional Court cannot review individual complaints. HU: Ex ante review of draft laws may be requested by 
Parliament or the President of the Republic. Ex post review of laws can be initiated by the government, a quarter of 
the members of Parliament, the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights (ombudsperson), the president of the Kúria 

137  Venice  Commission, CDL-AD(2011)001 Hungary  - Opinion on three legal questions arising in  the process of 

drafting the New Constitution, paragraph 37. 

80 

 
 
 
                                                           
(Supreme  Court)  and  the  Prosecutor  General.  NL:  Ordinary  courts  can  carry  out  a  decentralised  form  of 
constitutional  review  in  the  absence  of  a  centralised  Constitutional  Court.  While  acts  of  Parliament  may  not  be 
reviewed against the Constitution, review is possible against directly effective treaties. The Advisory Division of the 
Council  of  State  provides  independent  advice  on  draft  legislation,  including  as  regards  its  compatibility  with  the 
Constitution. PT: Ex post review includes a constitutional check of the omission to adopt the necessary legislative 
measures to execute constitutional norms. SI: On a proposal from the President of the Republic, the government or 
one third of the members of the National Assembly, the Constitutional Court issues an opinion on an international’s 
treaty conformity with the Constitution, during the treaty’s ratification process. The National Assembly is bound by 
the opinion of the Constitutional Court.  

– Independence of bars and lawyers in the EU – 

Lawyers and their professional associations play a fundamental role in ensuring the protection of 
fundamental rights and the strengthening of the rule of law (138). A fair system of administering 
justice requires that lawyers be free to pursue their activities of advising and representing their 
clients.  Lawyers’  membership  of  a  liberal  profession  and  the  authority  deriving  from  that 
membership helps maintain independence, and bar associations play an important role in helping 
guarantee  lawyers’  independence.  European  standards  require,  among  others,  the  freedom  of 
exercise of the profession of a lawyer and the independence of bar associations. These standards 
also lay down the basic principles for disciplinary proceedings against lawyers (139).  

138  ‘Lawyers  play  an  important  role  in  protecting  the  rule  of  law  and  judicial  independence,  while  respecting  the 
separation of powers and fundamental rights.’, ‘Access to a lawyer and rule of law’, Presidency discussion paper 
for 
Justice  and  Home  Affairs  Council  on  3  and  4  March  2022: 
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6319-2022-INIT/en/pdf.  

the  meeting  of 

the 

139  Recommendation No. R(2000)21 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. 

81 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 65: Independence of Bars and lawyers, 2022 (*) (source: European Commission with 
the CCBE (140)) 

(*) Based on the survey results, Member States could score a maximum of 9 points. The survey was conducted at the beginning of 
2023.  For  the  question  on  guarantees  for  confidentiality  of  the  lawyer/client  relationship,  0.5  points  were  awarded  for  each 
scenario fully covered (search and seizure of e-data held by the lawyer, search the lawyer’s premises, interception of lawyer/client 
communication, surveillance of the lawyer or their premises, tax audit of the law firm and other administrative checks). For all 
other criteria fully met, 1 point was awarded. No points were awarded if the criterion was not met. MT: 2020 replies, adapted to 
the new methodology. EE: The Ministry of Justice has broad supervisory powers over the organisation of the legal aid system. LT: 
According to the Law on the Bar, disciplinary action against lawyers can be taken by the Bar Council. However, it also lays down 
that the Minister of Justice also has such a right. If the Minister of Justice decides to initiate disciplinary action against a lawyer, 
the Bar has no say in such proceedings, and the case goes directly to the Disciplinary Court. Furthermore, the Disciplinary Court 
consists of five lawyers, who are members of the Bar. Three of the five are elected by the General Assembly of the Bar, and another 
two are appointed by the Minister of Justice.  PL: The Ministry of Justice has a supervisory role over the Bar, organising bar 
examinations and controlling the scheme on minimal legal fees. SI: Disciplinary proceedings are conducted exclusively within the 
Bar  Association  itself.  An appeal  is  possible  against  the  decision of  the  Disciplinary  Committee  of  the  first  instance,  which  is 
considered by the Disciplinary Committee of the second instance. There is no possibility of appeal against the decisions of the 
Disciplinary  Committee  of  the  second  instance.  This  is  determined  in  Article  65  of  the  Attorneys  Act:  ‘The  decisions  of  the 
disciplinary bodies of the Bar Association shall be enforceable.’; SK: Primarily, it is the independent Supervision Committee of 
the  Slovak  Bar  Association  that  files  a  petition  based  on  the  complaint.  However,  the  Minister  of  Justice  may  also  initiate  a 
disciplinary proceeding if ‘a lawyer performed an action which might be viewed as a professional misconduct under the legal rules 
which were in force so far, the Chair of the Supervision Committee or the Minister of Justice (acting in their capacity of a petitioner) 
may submit an application for the commencement of the disciplinary proceeding under this Act to the appropriate Bar´s governing 
body within the time limit which applied to commencement of the disciplinary proceeding under the legal rule which was in force 
so far.’ 

140  2022 data collected through replies by CCBE members to a questionnaire. 

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3.3.3. Summary on judicial independence 

Judicial  independence  is  a  fundamental  element  of  an  effective  justice  system.  It  is  vital  for 
upholding  the  rule  of  law,  the  fairness  of  judicial  proceedings  and  the  trust  of  citizens  and 
businesses in the legal system. For this reason, any justice reform should uphold the rule of law 
and  comply  with  European  standards  on  judicial  independence.  The  2023  Scoreboard  shows 
trends in the general public's and companies' perceptions of judicial independence. This edition 
also presents some new indicators on appointment of Supreme Court Presidents and Prosecutors 
General, on bodies involved in prevention and repression of corruption, and on highest instances 
exercising constitutional jurisdictions. The structural indicators do not in themselves allow for 
conclusions  to  be  drawn  about  the  independence  of  the  judiciaries  of  the  Member  States,  but 
represent possible elements which may be taken as a starting point for such an analysis.  

a)  The  2023  Scoreboard  presents  the  developments  in  perceived  independence  from 
surveys  of  the  general  public  (Eurobarometer  FL519)  and  companies  (Eurobarometer 
FL520): 

o  The eight Eurobarometer survey among the general public (Figure 49) shows that 
the  perception  of  independence  has  improved  in  15  Member  States  when 
compared to 2016. The general public’s perception of independence has improved 
in 8 of the Members States facing specific challenges when compared to 2016. 
Compared to last year, the general public’s perception of independence improved 
in 12 Member States as well as 8 of the Members States facing specific challenges, 
although  in  two  Member  States,  the  level  of  perceived  independence  remains 
particularly low.  

o  The eight Eurobarometer survey among the companies (Figure 51) shows that the 
perception of independence has improved in 12 Member States compared to 2016. 
However,  compared  to  last  year,  the  companies’  perception  of  independence 
decreased  in  13  Member  States  and  in  9  Members  States  facing  specific 
challenges. In two Member States, the level of perceived independence remains 
particularly low.  

o  Among the reasons for the perceived lack of independence of courts and judges, 
the interference or pressure from government and politicians was the most stated 
reason,  followed  by  the  pressure  from  economic  or  other  specific  interests. 
Compared  to  previous  years,  both  reasons  remain  notable  for  the  two  Member 
States where perceived independence is very low (Figures 50 and 52). 

o  Among  the  reasons  for  good  perception  of  independence  of  courts  and  judges, 
nearly four fifths of companies and of the general public (equivalent to 38% and 
42% of all respondents, respectively) named the guarantees provided by the status 
and position of judges. 

b)  Since 2022, the EU Justice Scoreboard presents the results of a Eurobarometer survey on 
how  companies  perceive  the  effectiveness  of  investment  protection  by  the  law  and 
courts as regards, in their view, unjustified decisions or inaction by the State (Figure 53).  
Administrative  conduct,  stability  and  quality  of  the  law-making  process,  as  well  as 
effectiveness  of  courts  and  property  protection  still  remain  key  factors  of  comparable 
significance for confidence in investment protection (Figure 54). Compared to last year, 
confidence in investment protection improved in 16 Member States.   

83 

 
 
c)  Figure 55 presents an updated overview of the main powers of Councils for the Judiciary 

in countries where such bodies exist.  

d)  Figures  56  to  57  present  the  situation  regarding  the  appointment  of  Supreme  Court 
Presidents in all Member States. Figure 56 shows the authorities proposing candidates for 
their  appointment  as  Supreme  Court  Presidents  and  the  authorities  that  appoint  them. 
Figure 57 presents the competence of the executive power and parliament in appointing 
Supreme Court Presidents upon submission from the proposing authorities.  

e)  For  the  first  time,  the  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  presents  a  series  of  indicators  dedicated 
specifically to anti-corruption. Figures 58 and 59 show a comparative view of the powers 
and  appointment  of  the  specialised  bodies  dealing  with  the  prevention  of  corruption. 
Figures 60 and 61 present a first overview of bodies regarding their specialisation in the 
repression of corruption  and the appointment procedures for the heads of prosecutor’s 
offices specialised in dealing with corruption. 

f)  Figure  62  presents,  for  the  first  time,  the  authorities  involved  in  the  appointment  of 

Prosecutors General. 

g)  Figures 63 and 64, as a novelty of this edition of the Scoreboard, present a first overview 
of  the  different  solutions  adopted  in  Member  States  to  ensure  the  protection  of 
constitutional rights at highest instance and their selected competences. 

h)  Figure  65  shows  that  although  in  nine  Member  States  the  executive  plays  some 
supervisory role as regards the Bar, the independence of lawyers is generally guaranteed, 
allowing lawyers to be free in pursuing their activities of advising and representing their 
clients.  

4. 

CONCLUSIONS 

The 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard presents a diverse picture of the effectiveness of justice systems 
in the Member States. It shows that efforts to improve the efficiency, quality and independence of 
the justice systems are underway in many jurisdictions. However, challenges remain to ensure full 
trust  of  citizens  in  the  legal  systems  of  all  Member  States.  The  information  in  the  EU  Justice 
Scoreboard contributes to the monitoring carried out in the framework of the European Rule of 
Law Mechanism and feeds into the Commission’s annual Rule of Law report.  

84