COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL ON THE REVISED LESSER DUTY RULE IN ANTI-DUMPING AND ANTI-SUBSIDY INVESTIGATIONS IN THE EU A review and evaluation of the application of Articles 7(2a), 8(1) and 9(4) of REGULATION (EU) 2016/1036 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 8 June 2016 and of the third and fourth subparagraphs of Article 12(1), the third and fourth subparagraphs of Article 13(1), and of the third and fourth subparagraphs of Article 15(1) of REGULATION (EU) 2016/1037 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 8 June 2016
Date: 2023-06-07
Institutions: Directorate-General for Trade and Economic Security, European Commission
Subjects: anti-dumping legislation, anti-subsidy proceeding, countervailing charge, dumping, import (EU), originating product, third country

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 7.6.2023  COM(2023) 294 final  COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL ON THE REVISED LESSER DUTY RULE IN ANTI-DUMPING AND ANTI-SUBSIDY INVESTIGATIONS IN THE EU A review and evaluation of the application of Articles 7(2a), 8(1) and 9(4) of REGULATION (EU) 2016/1036 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 8 June 2016 and  of  the third and fourth subparagraphs of Article 12(1), the third and fourth subparagraphs of Article 13(1), and of the third and fourth subparagraphs of Article 15(1) of REGULATION (EU) 2016/1037 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 8 June 2016       
 
 
EN 

  EN 

 
 
 
REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF THE APPLICATION OF THE LESSER DUTY RULE IN ANTI-
DUMPING AND ANTI- SUBSIDY INVESTIGATIONS 

1. 

INTRODUCTION 

On 8 June 2018, new anti-dumping and anti-subsidy rules entered into force to modernise and 
strengthen the EU’s trade defence instruments1.  One of the main changes concerned how the 
EU applies a rule known as the ‘lesser duty rule’ (LDR). The new Article 23(4) of the basic 
Anti-Dumping  Regulation2  (“BADR”)  and  Article  32a(2)  of  the  basic  Anti-Subsidy 
Regulation3  (“BASR”)  require  the  Commission  to  submit  a  review  and  evaluation  of  the 
application of the new provisions on the lesser duty rule by 9 June 2023 and accompany, if 
appropriate, with a legislative proposal. This review covers cases initiated after 9 June 2018 
and concluded by the end of March 2023. It outlines how the new provisions were applied and 
the impact, if any, on the level of measures.    

Background 

Under WTO rules, the level of an anti-dumping or anti-subsidy duty cannot be higher than the 
amount of dumping or subsidisation, but it is desirable that the duty is lower if that level would 
be sufficient to remove the injury to the domestic industry. This rate is calculated by comparing 
import prices with the cost of production of the EU industry and a reasonable profit margin 
(the “underselling margin”).   

Prior  to  June  2018,  the  EU  always  applied  the  LDR  in  anti-dumping  and  anti-subsidy 
investigations. However, with a view to strengthening the trade defence instruments, the co-
legislators  considered  that  some  types  of  distortions  are  particularly  harmful  and  that,  as  a 
result, a duty based on the existing LDR disciplines would not capture the full extent of the 
injury caused by them. This concerns subsidisation practices, on the one hand, and certain types 
of  measures  distorting  the  price  of  any  raw  material  (whether  unprocessed  or  processed, 
including  energy)  which  create  an  undue  advantage  for  the  companies  in  the  market  of  the 
country concerned.  

In line with that new legislation, in anti-subsidy investigations, it is no longer possible to apply 
the  LDR.    The  amount  of  the  countervailing  duty  is  set  at  the  level  of  the  countervailable 
subsidies established..The LDR only applies when it can be clearly concluded that it is not in 
the Union interest to determine the measures on the basis of the subsidy amount. This means 
that anti-subsidy measures will, by default, fully offset the subsidies that an exporter receives 
thereby allowing the EU to address the distortive and damaging effects of subsidised imports 
more rigorously.   

In anti-dumping investigations, the application of the LDR was also modified. While the LDR 
still  applies  in  such  cases,  in  certain  special  circumstances  (i.e.  presence  of  significant  raw 

1  

2  

3  

Regulation (EU) 2018/825 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 
on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union and Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European 
Union, OJ L 143, 7.6.2018, p. 1. 
Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council on protection against dumped imports from countries 
not members of the European Union – Codified Version, OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21. 
Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 of the European Parliament and of the Council on protection against subsidised imports from countries 
not members of the European Union – Codified Version OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p.55. 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
material distortions) the Commission may impose measures at the level of the full dumping 
margin and not at the level of the potentially lower underselling margin, because it is deemed 
necessary  to  remove  the  additional  injury  suffered  by  the  industry  stemming  from  the  raw 
materials distortions. The relevant cumulative conditions are:  

o  Significant  raw  material  distortions  must  exist.  They  consist  of:  dual  pricing  schemes, 
export taxes, export surtax, export quota, export prohibition, fiscal tax on exports, licensing 
requirements,  minimum  export  price,  value  added  tax  (VAT)  refund,  reduction  or 
withdrawal, restriction on customs clearance point for exporters, qualified exporters list, 
domestic market obligation, captive mining if the price of a raw material is significantly 
lower as compared to prices in the representative international markets. This list can be 
amended if the OECD ‘Inventory on export restrictions on industrial raw materials’, or 
any OECD database, which replaces this inventory, identifies other types of measures. 
o  These distortions must concern at least one raw material that accounts, individually, for 
more  than  17%  of  the  cost  of  production  of  the  product  concerned,  in  the  exporting 
country; 

o  The  price  of  the  distorted  raw  material  needs  to  be  significantly  lower  than  prices  in 

representative international markets; 

o  The Commission must establish that a higher level of measures is in line with the interest 
of  the  Union  by  examining  all  pertinent  information  such  as  spare  capacities  in  the 
exporting country, competition for raw materials and the effect on supply chains for Union 
companies.   

2.  THE  LESSER  DUTY  RULE  IN  ANTI-DUMPING  INVESTIGATIONS - ARTICLE  7(2A)  OF 

BADR 

2.1.  The procedure 

For the Commission to examine how the LDR should apply, it must have sufficient evidence 
of  ‘significant  raw  material  distortions’  meeting  the  aforementioned  conditions.  These 
distortions are examined in the investigation only after the Commission has established that 
the dumping margins are higher than the underselling margins. Under overarching WTO and 
EU rules, the duty level imposed cannot be higher that the dumping margin found, and therefore 
analysing the existence of distortions and of the legal conditions would become moot in these 
circumstances.  

2.2.  The investigations 

The Commission imposed definitive anti-dumping duties in 34 cases initiated covered by this 
review. A list of the cases is contained in Annex 1. 

Of those 34 investigations, the issue of significant raw material distortions was raised in 13 
cases.  

2.2.1.  DUMPING  MARGINS  LOWER  THAN  UNDERSELLING  MARGINS  - 

SIGNIFICANT DISTORTIONS NOT EXAMINED 

In four investigations (Aluminium extrusions from China (2021); Hot rolled flat products of 
iron/steel from Türkiye (2021); Stainless steel cold-rolled flat products from Indonesia (2021) 
and Graphite electrodes from China (2022)) the dumping margins found were lower than the 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
underselling margins. Therefore, the Commission did not examine the raw material distortions 
since measures could only be imposed at the level of the dumping margins. 

2.2.2.  UNDERSELLING  MARGINS  LOWER  THAN  DUMPING  MARGIN  – 

SIGNIFICANT DISTORTIONS EXAMINED  

For the remaining nine  cases,  dumping margins  were higher,  for some companies, than the 
underselling margins. Hence, the Commission examined if the conditions under Article 7(2a) 
of the BADR were met. 

In three out of these nine cases (Calcium Silicon (2022), Aluminium flat rolled products (2021) 
and  Aluminium  converter  foil  (2021)  –  all  from  China),  the  raw  materials  individually 
accounted for more than 17% of the costs of production of the product concerned. However, in 
Calcium silicon, the Commission found no evidence to support the allegations that the price of 
electricity in the Northern provinces of the People’s Republic of China was distorted by a dual 
pricing scheme and, furthermore, no cooperating exporting producer was located in that region. 
One producer also provided evidence that the electricity rates were higher in its region than in 
those identified in  the complaint.  As to the two cases  on aluminium  products,  the domestic 
prices of the aluminium ingots, for which distortions were claimed, were not significantly lower 
than  prices  in  representative  international  markets.  In  aluminium  converter  foil,  the  prices 
fluctuated  above  and  below  the  international  benchmark  prices.  As  a  result,  in  these  three 
investigations, the conditions under Article 7(2a) of the BADR were not met and the measures 
were imposed at the level of the underselling margin.  

In  Stainless  steel  cold-rolled  flat  products  from  India  (2021),  the  distortions  related  to 
chromium  that  accounted  for  more  than  17%  of  the  costs  of  production.  The  underselling 
margin  for  one  Indian  exporting  producer,  Chromeni,  was  lower  than  the  dumping  margin. 
However, Chromeni did not in fact use the raw material subject to the distortions and therefore 
further analysis as to the application of Article 7(2a) and 7(2b) of the BADR was not required.  

In two further investigations (Certain hot rolled stainless steel sheets and coils from Indonesia 
and China (2020)), the issue of raw material distortions was as follows. Regarding Indonesia, 
distortions existed on nickel ore which accounted for more than 17% of costs of production.  
These distortions included an export ban, an export tax, a licensing requirement and a de facto 
export quota. The price paid for nickel ore was significantly lower (by more than 30%) than 
the  price  in  the  representative  international  market  (Philippines).  For  China,  significant 
distortions  were  found  including  an  export  tax  or  a  licensing  requirement  on  some  raw 
materials (stainless steel scrap, ferrosilicon, nickel pig iron and ferrochromium, vanadium and 
ferronickel).  At  least  one  of  them  was  found  to  represent  more  than  17%  of  the  cost  of 
production of the product under investigation. The prices for these main raw materials were 
significantly  lower  than  prices  in  the  representative  international  markets  and  thus  the 
conditions under Article 7(2a) of the BADR existed. However, the Union interest test under 
Article 7 (2b) of the BADR found that the impact of measures on imports from the PRC and 
Indonesia, at the level of the dumping margin, would be disproportionate given the anticipated 
strong negative effects on supply chains and on the financial viability of one significant user 
which accounted for 30% to 40% of EU consumption.  On the impact on supply chains, the 
Commission  noted  that  other  Union  producers  of  the  product  concerned,  although  having 
significant spare capacities, had hardly supplied the user in question. Furthermore, potential 
import  volumes  from  other  exporting  countries  were  limited.  Moreover,  the  affected  user 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
would already need to reorganise value chains to fend off the impact of measures based on the 
lower  underselling  margin  given  the  likely  impact  on  profitability  of  these  measures.  The 
Commission observed that the user’s ability to pass on large cost increases to its customers was 
questionable as  the user’s main competitors  on the downstream  market  were the very  same 
Union producers of SSHR. As a result, it was not in the Union interest to apply a higher rate of 
duty  and  so  the  measures  were  imposed  at  the  lower  rate  to  eliminate  the  injury  to  the  EU 
industry.   

In the remaining three cases, the LDR was modulated for some or all exporters. 

The first anti-dumping case in the EU where the LDR was modulated was Urea ammonium 
nitrate (‘UAN’) from Russia (2019). Distortions were found regarding natural gas, the main 
raw  material  inputs  for  UAN,  i.e.  export  tax,  licencing  requirements  and  dual  pricing.  The 
prices  of  natural  gas  were  significantly  lower  than  the  Waidhaus  price  (price  of  exported 
Russian gas at the German/Czech border). For all the cooperating  exporting companies, the 
dumping  margins  were  higher  than  the  underselling  margins.  In  the  Union  interest  test,  the 
Commission concluded that measures at the higher dumping level would not negatively affect 
the supply  chain in  the  EU  and that any impact  would be limited and not  disproportionate. 
Thus, the Commission found that fertilizers overall accounted at the time for 1% of farming 
costs. For specialized farms relying more on UAN, it could account for up to 10% of production 
costs and an increase in duties, even at the highest level proposed, would have an impact of 
around  3%  on  costs.    Given  that  Union  producers  were  not  only  harmed  by  dumping,  but 
suffered  from  additional  distortions  of  trade  compared  to  Russia’s  exporting  producers,  the 
Commission concluded that a duty lower than the margin of dumping would not be sufficient 
to remove injury to the Union industry. As a result, the measures based on the dumping margins 
ranged from 20% to 31,9% as compared to underselling margins ranging from 13,7% to 16,3% 
which would have applied in the absence of raw materials distortions.  

In two other investigations (Electrolytic chromium coated steel (ECCS) from China (2022) and 
Fatty Acid from Indonesia (2023)) the LDR was modulated for one cooperating exporter and 
for ‘All others’ in each of the cases.    

In  the  ECCS  investigation  concerning  China,  the  Commission  examined  the  existence  of 
significant distortions in respect of one company only (Handan Jintai), given that its dumping 
margin  was  higher  than  the  underselling  margin.  The  investigation  revealed  there  were 
significant distortions in the form of VAT refunds on hot rolled coils and that the prices for 
that raw material observed in an undistorted representative market were between 30% - 50% 
higher than those paid by Handan Jintai. There was significant spare capacity in China with the 
potential  to  increase  global  supply,  depress  prices  and  undermine  the  effectiveness  of  the 
measure if not set at the level of dumping.  Also, users would have access to ECCS from the 
Union industry or other third countries, even if imports from China decreased due to the higher 
duty. The Commission therefore concluded it was in the Union interest to impose higher duties 
for  that  company  (53,9%  instead  of  23,9%).  The  countrywide  duty  for  non-cooperating 
exporting producers was based on the higher dumping margin found for Handan Jintai.  For 
reasons  of  Union  interest  under  Article  21  of  the  BADR,  the  Commission  decided  that  the 
measures should take the form of a fixed amount per tonne.   

In the Fatty Acid investigation, the dumping margin for one cooperating exporters, P.T. Musim 
Mas  was  higher  than  the  underselling  margin.  For  that  company,  the  investigation  found 
significant distortions in the form of an export tax related to crude palm oil and crude palm 

4 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
kernel oil. These raw materials in question accounted for over 40% and 50% respectively of 
the cost of production while the prices were found to be significantly lower than the prices 
prevailing on the international market. When applying the Union interest test under 7(2b) of 
the BADR, the Commission found that there was significant spare capacity in Indonesia which 
could increase global supply, depress prices and undermine the effectiveness of the measure if 
not set at the level of dumping. The Commission also concluded that Union producers or other 
third countries could supply users, even if imports from Indonesia decreased.  Therefore, it was 
appropriate to impose measures at the higher level (46,4% versus 30,5%) for P.T. Musim Mas. 

2.3.  Evaluation  

In line with the revised and strengthened Trade Defence Instruments ('TDI')  legislation, the 
EU considered it necessary to tackle significant raw material distortions in exporting countries 
which give some exporting producers a considerable unfair advantage in their costs of major 
inputs. These practices compound the damage caused by dumped imports to EU industry.  The 
changes  introduced  as  part  of  the  modernisation  package  guarantee  that  the  revised  LDR 
disciplines  offer  sufficient  protection  against  such  detrimental  distortive  practices  in  the 
country of export. It is important that the anti-dumping instrument is adequately equipped to 
address the additional damage arising from unfair and artificial advantages which benefit some 
exporters and distort level playing field.  

The  implementation  of  the  new  rules  shows  that  they  are  practical,  workable  and  have  an 
impact where the conditions are met. At the same time, the rules were designed to ensure that 
the application of the LDR, a cornerstone of the EU’s anti-dumping rules, can only be set aside 
in very particular circumstances, where warranted.   

The analysis of the cases concerned has shown that:  
  The rules are sufficiently detailed and nuanced to deal with the many different scenarios 

which can arise in this context.  

  The  investigations  under  review  have  not  revealed  that  the  17%  threshold  (i.e.,  the  raw 
materials must account individually for more than 17% of costs of production) would no 
longer be adequate. Indeed, this threshold enabled the industry to invoke the provisions at 
complaint stage in 38% of anti-dumping cases initiated in the review period.  Furthermore, 
all investigations confirmed that the allegations contained in the complaint on the threshold 
being met were correct. 

  The analysis, while targeted, has a sufficiently wide scope and addresses all raw materials 
distortions  which  have  a  concrete  impact  on  the  costs  of  production,  thus  allowing 
Commission to act where justified. At the same time, it does not penalise companies not 
benefitting from raw material distortions e.g. where exporting companies do not use the 
raw material in question.  

  The Union interest test under Article 7(2b) is a crucial additional safeguard to ensure that 
higher measures will not be imposed where it would have a negative impact, for example, 
on users or value chain. An examination of the two cases where measures were not imposed 
at  a  higher  dumping  level  owing  to  Union  interest  considerations  (Certain  hot  rolled 
stainless steel sheets and coils from Indonesia and China) showed that the lower level of 
measures had a material impact on import volumes, while at the same time, they permitted 
a major user, and significant employer in the Union, to continue importing while not being 
adversely affected by a higher level of duties.  

  The rules are non-discriminatory, as demonstrated by the fact that the modulation of the 

lesser duty rule was applied in cases concerning Russia, China and Indonesia. 

5 

 
 
 
 
 
 
3.  THE LESSER DUTY RULE IN ANTI-SUBSIDY INVESTIGATIONS - ARTICLES 12(1) AND 

15(1) OF THE BASR 

3.1.  The procedure 

The  changes  introduced  in  June  2018  in  Articles  12(1)  and  15(1)  of  the  BASR  effectively 
reduced the application of the LDR to cases where the Commission finds that it is not in the 
Union's interest to set the amount of measures at the level of countervailable subsidies found. 
When the Union interest test taking into account all the various interests involved, including 
those of the Union industry, importers and users, shows that it is in the interest of the Union to 
apply anti-subsidy measures, the Commission imposes countervailing duties at that (higher) 
level.    

3.2.  The investigations  

The Commission  has imposed countervailing measures in  eight  cases initiated since 8 June 
2018.  In six of these cases, the Commission conducted separate anti-dumping investigations 
concerning the same products from the same origins.  A list of the cases is contained in Annex 
2. 

In all cases, pursuant to the Union interest test in Article 15(1), the Commission concluded that 
there were no compelling reasons to conclude that it was not in the Union interest to impose 
countervailing measures at the level of the total amount of the countervailable subsidies. In two 
of those cases, (Biodiesel from Indonesia (2019) and Continuous filament glass fibre products 
from Egypt (2020)), that conclusion had already been reached at provisional stage under Article 
12(1).     

Looking  at  the  two  anti-subsidy  cases  where  there  were  no  separate  anti-dumping 
investigations  on  the  same  products  from  the  same  origins,  the  Commission  found  that  the 
amount of subsidisation was lower than the underselling margins found – hence the full subsidy 
amount would have been imposed also under pre-modernisation rules.  

The  situation  in  the  six  investigations  where  there  were  separate  anti-dumping  and 
countervailing investigations shows different results. 

Prior  to  revision/strengthening  of  the  TDI,  the  LDR  applicable  in  anti-dumping  and  anti-
subsidy  investigations  meant  that  that  there  was  only  one  injury  elimination  level  for  both 
proceedings  as  they  covered  the  same  imports.  Therefore,  the  combined  anti-dumping  and 
countervailing  measures  were  capped  by  the  injury  elimination  level.  Since  the  changes 
introduced in June 2018, the situation is different.  In general, excepting cases where Union 
interest  considerations  dictate  otherwise,  the  countervailing  measures  now  imposed  are  in 
addition  to  any  separate  anti-dumping  duties,  which  already  cover  the  full  injury  margin 
established in those cases. 

This is demonstrated in the AD and AS investigations concerning aluminium foil from China.   
Anti-dumping  measures  were  imposed  at  the  levels  of  the  underselling  margins  ranging 
between 23,6% and 28,5%. Prior to modernisation, the full level of measures imposed for both 
AD and AS would have been capped at that injury elimination level. However, under current 

6 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
rules, the Commission imposed anti-subsidy measures  at  the full  levels  of the  subsidisation 
found without reducing the separate anti-dumping measures accordingly4, as it was not against 
the Union interest to do so. This resulted in additional protection ranging between 0,7% and 
18,2%.   

In the separate AD and AS investigations concerning Stainless steel cold rolled flat (SSCR) 
from India (2022) and the glass fibre fabrics (GFF) from China (2020), there was also an impact 
on the level of measures. The legislative  changes resulted in  a higher level of measures for 
some exporters than would have been the case under the previous rules. In SSCR, the final 
level of measures for Chromeni Steels Private Ltd. included the full amount of the subsidisation 
of 7,5% and an anti-dumping duty rate of 35,3% already covering the injury margin. Similarly 
in the GFF case, the full subsidy amount of 17% was imposed on the Yuntianhua Group and a 
dumping duty rate of 37,6% also covering the full injury margin. In both these instances, prior 
to the changes, the overall final level of the measures would have been capped at the injury 
elimination levels. 

On the other hand, in the AD and AS investigations concerning Optical fibre cables from China 
(2022), the combined AD and CVD measures imposed were based on the dumping and subsidy 
amounts and, while significant (ranging between 19,7% and 44%), these were below the injury 
margin. Hence, the new rules could have no impact as the level of measure corresponded to the 
maximum level of protection allowed under WTO rules.     

3.3.  Evaluation  

Subsidisation by third countries is an increasing concern and it is important to show that where 
such  practices  cause  harm  to  Union  producers,  they  are  tackled  robustly.  By  imposing 
countervailing measures at a level that fully reflects the amounts of subsidisation, the EU shows 
that it addresses the serious damaging effects of this unfair trade practice rigorously, and also 
ensures adequate protection of the EU industry and level playing field.  

This is especially evident where there are separate AD and AS measures imposed on the same 
products  from  the  same  origins.  As  shown  in  Section  1.5.4,  this  provision  has  made  a 
significant difference in a number of separate AD and AS investigations on the same products 
from the same origins, notably in Aluminium converter foil, SSCR and GFF by increasing the 
combined level of protection for the EU industry. This means that there is now a clear benefit 
for industry to bring an anti-subsidy complaint in addition to anti-dumping complaints, because 
it may lead to additional but at the same time adequate protection.  

Furthermore,  it  is  clear  that,  since  modernisation,  the  anti-subsidy  investigations  have 
identified  increasingly  complex  ways  how  subsidies  are  granted,  including  through  cross-
border  financial  support.  Given  the  evolution  of  these  particularly  damaging  practices,  the 
Commission considers it imperative that it continues to apply countervailing measures to offset 
the full amounts of subsidies found, where justified. At the same time, the Union interest test 
maintains a crucial balance and flexibility in the system allowing the Commission to take into 
account the interest of all the economic operators.       

4 Except for one company, Daching Group, the final dumping margin was reduced to ensure that the final level of measures did not exceed 
the margin of dumping found.  

7 

 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
4.  THE  LESSER  DUTY  RULE  IN  UNDERTAKINGS  -  ARTICLE  8(1)  OF  THE  BADR  AND 

ARTICLE 13(1) OF THE BASR  

The  Commission  did  not  accept  any  new  price  undertakings  in  the  anti-dumping  and  anti-
subsidy investigations initiated since the entry into force of the modernisation package.  

5.  REVIEW OF THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 9(4) OF THE BADR – PRE-DISCLOSURE 

PERIOD 

The changes under modernisation introduced an obligation on the Commission to inform all 
interested parties three weeks before (changed to four weeks in June 2020 following a review5) 
if it intends to impose provisional anti-dumping measures or not (pre-disclosure)6. During this 
period the Commission can register imports to avoid stockpiling which could undermine the 
remedial effect of the duties, allowing for the retroactive collection of duties for that period, if 
necessary.  

Article  9(4)  of  the  BADR  was  also  amended  to  allow  the  Commission  to  analyse,  in  cases 
where imports were not registered, if there was a substantial rise in imports during the period 
of  pre-disclosure  causing  additional  injury.  If  the  analysis  showed  this  was  the  case,  the 
Commission could reflect that additional injury by adjusting upwards the injury margin.  

The  Commission  imposed  definitive  anti-dumping  duties  in  34  cases  initiated  after  8  June 
2018.  The  Commission  imposed  provisional  measures  in  22  of  those  and  did  not  register 
imports in 11 cases. The final column in Annex 1 gives details of the cases.  

The analysis of the 11 cases revealed the following:  

o  In  the  investigations  on  Aluminium  converter  foil  (2021)  and  Calcium  silicon 
(2022) - both from China, imports in the pre-disclosure dropped by 47% and 36% 
on average respectively. In the investigation on Mono-ethylene glycol from Saudi 
Arabia (2021) imports were 15,3% lower in the period.  

o  In the investigations concerning Steel road wheels (2020) and Aluminium flat rolled 
products (2021) – both  from China, there was no increase of imports in the pre-
disclosure period. 

o  In  the  investigation  on  Graphite  Electrode  systems  from  China  (2022),  while 
imports in the pre-disclosure period increased by 5,5% this was not substantial.  
o  In  the  remaining  five  investigations  (Certain  heavyweight  thermal  paper  from 
Korea (2020); Mono-ethylene glycol from USA (2021); Birch plywood from Russia 
(2021); Electrolytic chromium coated steel (ECCS) from China and Brazil (2022)) 
the Commission found imports increased substantially in the pre-disclosure period.  
The increases ranged from 39% for Mono-ethylene glycol to almost 99% for Birch 
plywood. To address the additional injury caused by these substantially increased 
imports,  the  Commission  made  appropriate  adjustments  to  increase  the  injury 
elimination levels. Except for the measures on ECCS from China and Brazil, the 
measures  in  the other  cases were based on the dumping margin.  As a  result, the 
adjustment to the injury elimination level did not impact the level of the measures 
imposed, as the duties were capped by the respective dumping margins, which is 

5  

6  

Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/1173 of 4 June 2020 amending Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 on protection against 
dumped  imports  from  countries  not  members  of  the  European  Union  and  Regulation  (EU)  2016/1037  on  protection  against 
subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Union as regards the duration of the period of pre-disclosure 
This information is made available on DG Trade’s webpage. 

8 

 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
the maximum protection allowed under the WTO and EU law. In the ECCS cases, 
the adjustment of 4,1% to address the additional injury in the pre-disclosure period 
had an impact on level of the final measures.    

6.  CONCLUSION 

The  review  and  evaluation  of  the  relevant  modernised  provisions  as  regards  the  revised 
application  of  the  LDR  show  that  they  have  fully  achieved  their  intended  objectives  of 
providing sufficient remedies against dumping and subsidisation. 

The legislative changes at hand were carefully drafted to afford more robust protection against 
particularly  harmful  types  of  significant  raw  material  distortions  and  overall  subsidisation 
practices. In as much as 38% of the anti-dumping cases initiated in the review period, the EU 
industry  raised  significant  raw  material  distortions  as  defined  under  the  new  legislation.  In 
some of those cases, the Commission could adopt a measure at a higher level than would have 
been imposed prior to the respective legislative changes. A review of the practice shows that 
the  current  scope  and  thresholds  are  sufficient  and  adequate  to  ensure  proper  and  balanced 
protection against raw material distortions. Likewise, the removal of the LDR in anti-subsidy 
practice provided higher protection to EU producers exposed to subsidised imports. 

The Union interest test ensured that the strengthened trade defence practice remains targeted 
and balanced. 

On this basis, the Commission did not consider it appropriate to prepare a legislative proposal 
to accompany the current review and evaluation, as envisaged by Article 23(4) of the BADR 
and  Article  32a(2)  of  the  BASR.As  mandated  by  the  aforementioned  provisions,  the 
Commission will continue to closely monitor the situation taking into account evolving policy 
priorities and the ever-challenging geopolitical context. 

9 

 
 
 
 
 
Annex 1 

ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES 

PRODUCT 

COUNTRY 

PROVISIONAL 
MEASURES 

DEFINITIV
E  
MEASURE
S 

RAW 
MATERIAL 
DISTORTIONS 
CLAIMED 

Mixtures of 
urea and 
ammonium 
nitrate 

Russia, 
Trinidad and 
Tobago  
USA 

Provisional 
Regulation  

Definitive 
regulation  

Russia: YES 

Trinidad and 
Tobago/ USA: NO 

RAW 
MATERIAL 
DISTORTIO
NS 
EXAMINED 
IF DUMPING 
MARGIN 
>THAN 
INJURY 
YES 

RAW 
MATERIAL 
DISTORTIONS 
/ UNION 
INTEREST  

CONDITIONS 
MET 

ARTICLE 9(4) 
– IMPORTS 
REGISTERED  
YES/NO 

Natural gas  
>50% COP 

Price 
significantly 
lower than 
benchmark 

Union interest - 
YES 

- 

- 

- 

 YES 

YES 

- 

- 

- 

NO 

No increase in 
imports 
- 

- 

Steel road 
wheels 

Certain woven 
and/or stitched 
glass fibre 
fabrics 
Certain 
polyvinyl 
alcohols 
Certain hot 
rolled stainless 

China 

Egypt 
China 

China 

Indonesia  
China 
 Taiwan 

Provisional 
Regulation  

Definitive 
regulation  

- 

_ 

Definitive 
regulation  

Definitive 
regulation  

NO 

NO  

NO 

-  

- 

- 

Provisional 
Regulation 

Definitive 
regulation  

Indonesia & 
China: YES 

Indonesia & 
China: YES 

China:  Main  raw 
materials  >  17  % 
COP 

NO 

YES 

10 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
steel sheets and 
coils 

Certain 
heavyweight 
thermal paper 

Aluminium 
extrusions 

Hot rolled flat 
products of 
iron, non-alloy 
or other alloy 
steel  
Aluminium flat 
rolled 

Optical fibre 
cables 

Stainless steel 
cold-rolled flat 
products 
Mono-ethylene 
glycol 

Taiwan: NO 

Korea 

Provisional 
regulation 

Definitive 
regulation  

NO 

- 

China 

Türkiye 

Provisional 
regulation  

Provisional 
regulation  

Definitive 
regulation  

Definitive 
regulation 

YES 

YES 

NO 

NO 

China 

Provisional 
regulation  

Definitive 
regulation 

YES 

YES 

Price  lower  than 
benchmark.  
Indonesia:  Nickel 
Ore > 17% COP 
Price  lower  than 
benchmark. 
Union 
NO 

interest: 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

NO  
71% increase in 
imports.    
Injury margin 
increased from 
16,9% to 17,6% 
YES 

YES 

NO 

NO 

not 

 No increase in 
imports 

Aluminium 
ingots > 17 % 
COP 
Price 
significantly 
lower 
benchmark 

than 

China 

- 

Definitive 
Regulation 

NO 

- 

- 

India 
Indonesia 

Provisional 
regulation  

Definitive 
Regulation  

YES 

INDIA: YES 

Saudi Arabia 
USA 

Provisional 
regulation  

Definitive 
regulation 

NO 

- 

India: Exporter 
not using raw 
material  
- 

- 

NO 

- 

NA 

YES 

NO 

11 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Birch plywood 

Russia 

Provisional 
Regulation 

Definitive 
Regulation 

NO 

- 

- 

- 

Aluminium 
converter foil 

China 

Provisional 
regulation  

Definitive 
Regulation  

YES 

YES 

Steel Wind 
Towers 
Iron or steel 
fasteners 
Calcium Silicon 

China 

China 

China 

- 

- 

Provisional 
regulations  

Definitive 
Regulation  
Definitive 
Regulation  
Definitive 
regulation  

Graphite 
Electrode 
Systems 
Super absorbent 
polymers 

China 

Provisional 
Regulation  

Definitive 
regulation  

Republic of 
Korea 

- 

Definitive 
Regulation  

- 

- 

YES 

NO 

- 

NO 

NO 

YES 

YES 

NO 

12 

Aluminium 
ingots 
> 17 % COP 

Prices not 
significantly 
lower than 
benchmark. 
- 

- 

Electricity = 20% 
of COP - No 
evidence of dual 
pricing 

- 

- 

NO 

- 

- 

NO 

- 

- 

USA: 39 % 
increase in 
imports  
Adjusted injury 
margin Saudi 
Arabia: No 
increase in 
imports 
NO 

  98,6 % increase 
in Imports  -  
Adjusted injury 
margin by factor 
of 1,02  
NO 

47% drop in 
imports  

NA 

NA 

NO 

36% drop in 
imports   

NO 
  5,5% increase 
in imports  
NA 

 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corrosion 
resistant steel   
Electrolytic 
chromium 
coated steel  

Russia 
Türkiye 
China 
Brazil 

- 

Provisional 
regulation   

Definitive 
Regulation  
Definitive 
regulation  

China : YES  

YES 

Brazil : NO  

NO 

- 

-  

Ceramic Tiles 

Aluminium 
road wheels 

India 
Türkiye 
Morocco 

- 

Provisional 
Regulation  

Fatty Acid 

Indonesia 

- 

Definitive 
Regulation  
Definitive 
regulation  

Definitive 
regulation  

NO 

NO 

- 

- 

YES 

YES 

13 

- 

YES  

NA 

NO 

58% increase in 
imports– injury 
margin adjusted 
by 4,1%  

- 

- 

NA 

YES 

YES  

NA 

Hot rolled coils 
(HRC) >17% of 
COP. 

Prices 
significantly 
lower than 
benchmarks. 

Union interest : 
YES 
- 

- 

Raw materials 
CPO >40% and 
CPKO>50% of 
COP. 

Prices 
significantly 
lower than 
benchmarks. 

Union interest: 
YES 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 2 

COUNTERVAILING MEASURES 

Product 

Country 

Biodiesel  

 Indonesia 

Glass fibre fabrics 
(certain woven and/or 
stitched) 
Continuous filament 
glass fibre products 

Aluminium converter 
foil 

China 
Egypt 

Egypt 

China 

Optical fibre cables 

China 

Stainless steel cold-
rolled flat products 

India 
Indonesia 

Provisional  
Article 12(1)  

Definitive  
Article 15(1) 

Provisional 
regulation 
biodiesel 

Definitive 
regulation 
biodiesel 

Measures 
imposed full 
AS amount 
YES 

Separate AD 
Case 

- 

- 

Definitive 
regulation GFF 

YES 

AD653 

Provisional 
regulation GFR 

Definitive 
regulation GFR 

YES 

- 

- 

- 

- 

Definitive 
regulation ACF 

Definitive 
regulation OFC 

Definitive 
regulation 
SSCR 

YES 

AD673 

YES 

AD669 

YES 

AD670 

14