REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE EMPLOYMENT COMMITTEE Report on the European instrument for Temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE) following the COVID-19 outbreak pursuant to Article 14 of Council Regulation (EU) 2020/672 SURE after its sunset: final bi-annual report
Date: 2023-06-02
Institutions: Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: EU aid, EU financial instrument, coronavirus disease, economic consequence, emergency aid, employment aid, epidemic, fight against unemployment, self-employed person, social impact

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 2.6.2023  COM(2023) 291 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE EMPLOYMENT COMMITTEE Report on the European instrument for Temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE) following the COVID-19 outbreak pursuant to Article 14 of Council Regulation (EU) 2020/672             SURE after its sunset: final bi-annual report  
 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

This  report  is  the  fifth  and  final  bi-annual  report  on  the  European  instrument  for 
temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE). It confirms 
the  findings  outlined  in  the  previous  reports,  presents  the  operations  and  use  of  the  instrument 
and reviews its socio-economic impacts. SURE was a crisis instrument, with a size of EUR 100 
billion,  created  by  the  European  Union  (EU)  to  help  Member  States  protect  jobs  and  workers’ 
incomes  in  the  context  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic.  SURE  ended  on  31  December  2022,  but 
monitoring  of  its  implementation  continued  beyond  this  date,  encapsulated  in  this  report.  The 
monitoring ends with the publication of this report. 

This report addresses some of the additional observations made by the European Court of 
Auditors  in  its  Special  Report  on  SURE,  published  in  December  2022.  Importantly,  this 
report  includes  further  analysis  of  national  control  and  audit  systems,  additional  evidence 
confirming  the  reliability  of  the  number  of  people  and  firms  covered  by  SURE,  and  further 
analysis of the health-related measures covered by SURE. 

A new instrument put in place quickly to respond to the socioeconomic impact of the pandemic  

The  implementation  of  the  instrument  was  swift  and  smooth.  As  part  of  the  EU’s  initial 
response to the pandemic, the Commission proposed the SURE Regulation on 2 April 2020, and 
the Regulation was adopted by the Council on 19 May 2020. SURE was a strong expression of 
solidarity across Member States through the EU: all Member States agreed to provide bilateral 
guarantees  to  the  EU  so  that  the  Union  could  borrow  from  the  markets  at  very  favourable 
conditions to finance SURE loans. The financial envelope of EUR 100 billion became available 
on 22 September 2020, after all Member States signed guarantee agreements. The Commission 
speeded up the implementation of the instrument, working closely with the Member States and 
granting  financial  assistance  to  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Cyprus,  Czechia,  Estonia,  Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia 
and  Spain.  Over  90%  of  the  granted  financial  assistance  was  disbursed  in  just  seven  months, 
from  October  2020  to  May  2021.  Further  disbursements  took  place  in  2022,  to  accommodate 
Member States who preferred to receive funds later or requested additional financial assistance. 

In  autumn  2022,  eight  Member  States  were  granted  additional  financial  assistance.  This 
top-up support was for additional expenditure incurred in 2021 – and in some cases up to early 
2022 – on the emergency support measures already supported by SURE. SURE support could be 
requested for eligible COVID-related spending, based either on planned expenditure or incurred 
expenditure,  with  the  latter  not  subject  to  any  absorption  risk  by  definition.  An  amending 
Council Implementing Decision was also adopted for Poland to address its absorption gap.  

The  EU  issued  social  bonds  for  the  first  time  to  finance  SURE  financial  assistance  to 
Member States. On top of the requirements of the SURE Regulation, this report also provides 
the relevant reporting under the EU SURE Social Bond Framework and re-confirms that SURE 
spending has been well aligned with the UN Sustainable Development Goals. 

The  Commission  successfully  issued  EUR  6.5  billion  of  SURE  social  bonds  in  December 
2022, which almost exhausted the entire SURE envelope. This was the final transaction of a 
successful  issuance  campaign  that  attracted  strong  investor  interest  and  favourable  pricing 
1 

 
 
conditions. Overall, a total of EUR 98.4 billion of SURE financial assistance was disbursed to 19 
Member  States,  close  to  the  maximum  amount  of  EUR  100  billion.  The  remaining  EUR  1.6 
billion cannot be requested for future use as the instrument has ended.  

The continued use of SURE by beneficiary Member States  

This  report  confirms  the  earlier  estimate  that  SURE  covered  around  31½  million  people 
and over 2½ million firms in 2020, when the pandemic first took hold. This represents almost 
one  third  of  total  employment  and  over  a  quarter  of  total  firms  in  beneficiary  Member  States. 
The  high  reliability  of  these  coverage  figures,  which  are  primarily  based  on  Member  States’ 
administrative  data  following  Commission  guidance,  has  been  confirmed.  SMEs  were  the 
primary  recipients  of  SURE  financial  assistance.  The  most  supported  sectors  were  contact-
intensive  services  (accommodation  and  food  services,  wholesale  and  retail  trade)  and 
manufacturing.  

In  2021,  particularly  in  the  first  half  of  the  year  when  the  pandemic  continued  to  wreak 
havoc,  SURE  supported  an  estimated  9  million  people  and  over  900 000  firms.  Economic 
support measures were still required in the first half of 2021 but were subsequently phased out as 
both  the  economic  and  health  impact  of  the  pandemic  weakened.  This  gradual  unwinding 
occurred  when  vaccinations  were  rolled  out  and  the  EU  economies  further  adapted  to  the 
pandemic.  

In 2022, SURE is estimated to have supported almost 350 000 people and over 40 000 firms, 
in  line  with  the  decrease  in  SURE-related  expenditure.  Most  of  the  SURE  beneficiary 
Member States  had phased out  their emergency job-retention  measures by  the middle of 2022. 
Only four Member States used SURE to fund measures in 2022, spending just EUR 5 billion as 
the pandemic’s impact continued to ease. 

All of the total planned public expenditure under SURE has now been executed.  The total 
public expenditure on SURE-eligible measures reached EUR 122 billion in beneficiary Member 
States.  This  is  well  in  excess  of  the  total  financial  assistance  granted  (EUR  98  billion),  since 
several  Member  States  supplemented  SURE  financing  of  eligible  measures  with  national 
funding, showing the relevance of the measures supported by SURE.  

Almost half of total public expenditure on SURE-eligible measures was allocated to short-
time work schemes. Almost one third was allocated to similar measures for the self-employed. 
The remainder of the public expenditure was allocated to wage subsidy measures – akin to short-
time  work  schemes  albeit  not  based  on  hours  worked  –  and  health-related  measures.  The 
participation of women and youth in short-time work also increased during the COVID-19 crisis. 

The  ancillary  nature  of  the  health-related  expenditure  was  confirmed,  only  covering  two 
fifths  of  the  SURE  beneficiary  Member  States  and  representing  just  5%  of  total 
expenditure. 8 out of 19 Member States used SURE to finance health-related measures. Of this, 
22% concerned measures taken in the workplace to ensure a safe return to work. 

Moreover, SURE was used to effectively finance different types of health-related measures. 
These  measures  were  distributed  almost  evenly  across  i)  preventive  measures  against  COVID-
19,  ii)  additional  labour  costs  to  recruit  and  support  healthcare  workers  and  iii)  purchase  of 
healthcare  equipment  and  medication,  including  vaccines.  These  measures  either  facilitated  a 
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faster  return  to  work  or  provided  welcome  emergency  support  to  the  healthcare  sector  in  the 
eight Member States that used SURE to support health-related expenditure. 

Importantly,  all  SURE  financial  assistance  has  now  been  absorbed  in  all  Member  States. 
The absorption issue in two Member States (Romania and Poland), which was monitored closely 
and reported in detail in the fourth bi-annual report has now been entirely resolved. In Romania, 
the absorption gap has been fully closed thanks to the reduction of the total amount granted and 
the  introduction  of  additional  eligible  measures  in  July  2022.  This  was  confirmed  with  final 
budgetary  execution  data.  In  Poland,  the  moderate  absorption  gap  compared  with  the  amount 
granted  was  resolved  with  the  inclusion  of  two  new  SURE-eligible  measures  in  an  amending 
Council Implementing Decision adopted in November 2022.  

An updated assessment of the impact of SURE 

The policy response to the COVID-19 crisis effectively prevented around 1½ million people 
from  becoming  unemployed  in  2020  and  SURE-funded  schemes  may  have  contributed  to 
the  bulk  of  this.  The  rise  in  unemployment  in  2020  in  beneficiary  Member  States  was  very 
moderate,  despite  the  large  fall  in  economic  output,  and  significantly  lower  than  expected  by 
historical standards. This was achieved by retaining employees in their firms and maintaining the 
activity of the self-employed. Additional illustrative simulations conducted by the Commission 
using  the  Global  Multi-country  model  suggest  that  the  short-time  work  schemes  and  similar 
measures  directly  funded  by  SURE  could  have  saved  up  to  1  million  jobs  in  2020  in  the  euro 
area alone (representing 14  of 19 SURE beneficiaries).  This  suggests that SURE-funded  short-
time work schemes likely accounted for the bulk of the total estimated 1½ million jobs saved by 
the overall policy response to COVID-19 across the 19 SURE beneficiaries.  

SURE  may also  have contributed to preventing a rise in labour  market inequality across 
the  EU.  This  is  in  contrast  to  developments  that  took  place  in  the  aftermath  of  the  global 
financial  crisis.  In  the  period  2020-2022,  the  dispersion  of  unemployment  rates  was  reduced 
between SURE beneficiaries and the other Member States as well as across SURE beneficiaries.  

SURE  specifically  added  value  by  fostering  confidence  in  the  economy  and  effectively 
encouraging  Member  States  to  set  up  wide-ranging  and  ambitious  short-time  work 
schemes  at  national  level.  Survey-based  evidence  provided  in  earlier  reports  confirms  the 
specific impact of SURE. Firstly, SURE – one of the first EU financial instruments put in place 
in response to COVID-19 – helped improve general economic confidence by showing the EU’s 
ability to  respond  rapidly  and  effectively to  an unprecedented crisis.  Secondly, through SURE, 
the EU supported and encouraged the extensive use of short-time work schemes (the setting up 
of new schemes or extension of existing schemes). Thirdly, SURE underpinned Member States’ 
confidence  to  undertake  larger  borrowing  and  spending  for  job-retention  measures  than  they 
otherwise would have. Research by the Centre for European Policy Studies affirms that the take 
up of short-time work schemes increased significantly during the pandemic due in large part to 
the large increase in government financing of these measures. 

The  protection  of  employment  in  the  first  two  years  of  the  pandemic  also  led  to  a  more 
rapid recovery in 2021 than in previous crises. Survey data shows that in 2021, SURE support 
focused  on  the  sectors  still  badly  affected  by  the  pandemic.  SURE  expenditure  was  also 

3 

 
 
concentrated in the first half of the year, when containment measures were stricter. This suggests 
that SURE targeted the most pressing needs by supporting the worst-hit sectors.  

Very concretely, Member States are now estimated to have saved a total of EUR 9.0 billion 
in  interest  payments  by  receiving  financial  assistance  through  SURE.  This  figure  is 
explained by the very favourable financing conditions enjoyed by the EU and the long average 
duration of the loans granted to Member States. The estimated interest savings rose with the 9th 
and final SURE transaction in December 2022.  

The control and audit systems put in place by Member States 

In  line  with  their  legal  obligations,  all  Member  States  reported  to  have  verified  the 
implementation  of  measures  supported  by  SURE,  either  through  ex-ante  controls  or  ex-
post controls including audit (or both). Almost all Member States reported to have controlled 
all SURE-supported measures ex ante (before the funds were released to the final beneficiaries). 
More than half of the  Member States  reported to  have controlled all or most measures  ex post 
(after the funds were released). A further five Member States reported to have controlled either 
the largest measure or the measure at the highest risk of fraud and irregularity ex post. In order to 
ensure  the  proper  use  of  public  funds,  the  measures  that  were  not  controlled  ex  ante  were 
controlled ex post. 

No Member State considers SURE-supported measures to be at a high risk of irregularities 
or fraud. This is often explained by legally and clearly-defined eligibility conditions which were 
set out and controlled ex ante.  

In the case of confirmed irregularities or fraud, all Member States recovered or are in the 
process  of  recovering  improperly  used  funds.  Specifically,  the  incidence  of  irregularities  or 
fraud  for  the  largest  SURE-supported  measure  in  each  Member  State  has  been  in  most  cases 
below 2% of total expenditure. The majority of Member States have recovered more than 75% of 
the total amount due until now. In addition, in cases of fraud, all Member States took measures 
beyond  recovering  improperly  used  funds,  such  as  notifying  the  relevant  investigation  bodies. 
Some  Member  States  reported  to  have  taken  preventive  action  as  a  response  to  fraud  or 
irregularities. 

The sunset of the SURE instrument at the end of 2022 

The  sunset  clause  of  the  SURE  instrument  took  effect  on  1  January  2023.  The  SURE 
Regulation contained a ‘sunset clause’ specifying that the Instrument would end on 31 December 
2022, unless the Council decided to extend it, on a proposal from the Commission. The fourth bi-
annual report in September 2022 was not accompanied by a proposal to extend the Instrument. 
COVID-19 emergency measures were almost entirely phased out by the end of summer 2022 and 
the  epidemiological  and  economic  impact  of  COVID-19  has  continued  to  trend  downward 
throughout 2022. On 5 May 2023, the World Health Organisation re-classified COVID-19 as an 
established  and  ongoing  health  issue  rather  than  a  public  health  emergency  of  international 
concern. This confirms the Commission’s assessment that the exceptional occurrences justifying 
SURE no longer exist. Careful monitoring has continued in the first months of 2023 to ensure the 
absorption of all SURE financial assistance, which is now confirmed. The monitoring of the use 
of SURE financial assistance ends with this report. 

4 

 
 
INTRODUCTION 

This  report  is  the  fifth  and  final  bi-annual  report  on  the  European  instrument  for 
temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE). SURE was 
established by the European Union (EU) in  May 2020 to help Member States protect workers’ 
jobs  and  income  during  the  COVID-19  pandemic.1  It  provided  requesting  Member  States  with 
Union  financial  assistance  (up  to  EUR  100  billion)  in  the  form  of  loans  with  favourable 
conditions. The aim of the loans was to help finance Member States’ short-time work schemes or 
similar  measures  aimed  at  protecting  employees  and  the  self-employed  and,  as  an  ancillary, 
health-related measures, in particular in the workplace. 

The SURE instrument ended on 31 December 2022. The sunset clause for the availability of 
financial support under the SURE instrument specified that it would end on 31 December 2022 
unless the Council, on a proposal by the Commission, decided to extend it on the basis  that the 
exceptional occurrences that necessitated SURE (i.e. the severe economic disturbance caused by 
the COVID-19 pandemic) continued to  exist. The Commission  assessed that these occurrences 
no longer existed, thus the sunset clause came into effect. No Council Implementing Decisions 
(CIDs) granting SURE financial assistance to Member States could therefore be adopted since 1 
January  2023.  However,  monitoring  has  continued  in  the  first  months  of  2023  to  ensure  the 
absorption of all SURE financial assistance granted, which is now confirmed. The monitoring of 
the use of SURE financial assistance ends with this report.  

This  bi-annual  report  is  a  legal  obligation.  It  is  adopted  by  the  European  Commission 
(hereafter the Commission) in accordance with Article 14 of Council Regulation (EU) 2020/672 
(SURE  Regulation)2  to  deliver  on  its  obligation  to  report  to  the  European  Parliament,  the 
Council,  the  Economic  and  Financial  Committee  (EFC)  and  the  Employment  Committee 
(EMCO).3  As  all  of  the  financial  assistance  granted  has  now  been  disbursed  and  spent  and  no 
further financial assistance can be granted, this is the final bi-annual monitoring report on SURE. 
Financial  monitoring  of  the  repayment  of  the  loans  will  continue  by  the  Commission’s 
Directorate General for Budget until all of the outstanding loans have been  repaid. The cut-off 
date for including information in this report was 3 March 2023 for Member States’ reporting, 17 
March  2023  for  control  and  audit  information  and  15  May  2023  for  economic  and 
epidemiological data.4  

1  SURE  follows  from  the  Commission’s  2019-2024  Political  Guidelines,  which  proposed  a  European 
Unemployment Benefit Reinsurance Scheme to protect European citizens and reduce the pressure on public finances 
during external shocks. Following the outbreak of the COVID-19 virus in Europe, it was set up on the basis of the 
Commission’s proposal of 2 April 2020. 
2 Council Regulation (EU) 2020/672 of 19 May 2020 on the establishment of a European instrument for temporary 
support  to  mitigate  unemployment  risks  in  an  emergency  (SURE)  following  the  COVID-19  outbreak,  OJ  L  159, 
20.5.2020, p. 1 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32020R0672&from=en).   
3  Under  Article  14  of  the  Regulation,  the  Commission  shall  report  on  the  use  of  financial  assistance,  including 
outstanding amounts and the applicable repayment schedule under SURE, and on the continuation of the exceptional 
occurrences that justify the application of the SURE Regulation (the COVID-19 pandemic).  
4  All  reporting  tables  and  questionnaires  on  control  and  audit  were  initially  submitted  by  3  March  2023  and  17 
March, respectively (except for Malta, who submitted the reporting table on 27 March 2023 and the questionnaire on 
17 April 2023). In addition, some clarifications of data were provided after this date.  

5 

 
 
                                                           
This  report  presents  new  or  updated  data  confirming,  as  of  February  2023,  the  positive 
assessments of SURE presented in the previous bi-annual reports. Its key findings can be 
summarised as follows: 

-  Approximately  31½  million  people  and  2½  million  firms  are  estimated  to  have  been 

covered by SURE in 2020 in 19 Member States. 

-  9 million people and over 900 000 firms were covered by SURE in 2021 in 15 Member 
States,  with  a  clear  phasing  out  in  2022  when  350 000  people  and  40 000  firms  were 
covered in four Member States. 

-  The  policy  support  measures  adopted  effectively  prevented  an  estimated  1½  million 
people  from  becoming  unemployed  at  the  height  of  the  pandemic  in  2020.  Additional 
illustrative  simulations  suggest  that  SURE-funded  short-time  work  schemes  likely 
accounted for the bulk of this estimated impact. 

-  This policy action also contributed to decreasing labour market inequality by reducing the 

dispersion of unemployment rates, especially across SURE beneficiaries.   

-  19 Member States have been granted financial assistance under SURE, of whom 11 have 

been granted additional top-up support.5 

-  Over EUR 98 billion – close to the maximum amount of EUR 100 billion – was allocated 
and  disbursed,  including  EUR  6.5  billion  disbursed  to  9  Member  States  in  December 
2022.  

-  The  sunset  clause  applied  as  of  1  January  2023,  meaning  that  no  further  financial 
assistance  can  be  granted  to  Member  States.  Epidemiological  data  confirms  the 
Commission’s assessment that the exceptional circumstances justifying the use of SURE 
no longer exist.  

-  All  of  the  SURE  financial  assistance  has  now  been  absorbed  in  all  19  beneficiary 

Member States. 

-  Beyond  the  positive  effects  on  social  and  employment  outcomes,  Member  States  are 

estimated to have saved EUR 9.0 billion in interest payments. 

-  Almost half of the financial assistance under SURE has been allocated by Member States 
to support short-time work schemes, while one third was allocated for similar measures 
for the self-employed.  

-  5% was allocated to health-related measures, which are ‘ancillary’ in accordance with the 
SURE  Regulation.  These  include  preventive  measures  against  COVID-19,  healthcare 
equipment  and  additional  labour  costs  to  recruit  and  support  healthcare  workers,  with 
around one fifth of the amount concerning measures taken in the workplace. 

-  All Member States reported to have controlled SURE-supported measures either ex ante 
or  ex  post  (or  both).  No  Member  State  considers  SURE-supported  measures  to  be  at  a 
high risk of irregularities or fraud.  

-  All  Member  States took remedial  measures  as a response to  irregularities or fraud. The 
majority  of  Member  States  have  recovered  more  than  75%  of  the  total  amount  to  be 
recovered until now. 

5 The 19 Member States comprise Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain.  

6 

 
 
 
                                                           
This  report  updates  the  information  contained  in  the  first  four  bi-annual  SURE  reports 
and  provides  some  additional  analysis.  It  covers  institutional  developments  since  the  fourth 
report’s cut-off date in August 2022, including top-up financial assistance granted to 8 Member 
States,  the  amendment  of  the  Council  Implementing  Decision  for  Poland  to  address  the 
absorption gap and the disbursement of funds related to the top ups and to Poland. An in-depth 
look  at  control  and  audit  systems,  ensuring  that  the  obligations  of  the  Loan  Agreement  are 
respected,  is  conducted,  following  on  from  the  ad-hoc  questionnaire  reported  on  in  the  3rd  bi-
annual report. The analysis contained in the previous reports is updated, in particular regarding 
the  public  expenditure  by  Member  States  covered  by  SURE  –  based  on  bi-annual  reporting 
provided by Member States in February 2023 – and on the estimated impact of SURE – based on 
the latest macroeconomic figures. This report also includes a number of new elements: additional 
analysis of the number of jobs saved by SURE based on a Commission macroeconomic model, a 
more  detailed  analysis  of  health-related  measures  funded  by  SURE  and  their  importance, 
information on the reliability of the data on the number of people and firms covered by SURE, 
the aforementioned detailed examination of national control and audit systems, and a discussion 
of the lessons learned from SURE. 

This  report  also  reflects  suggestions  by  the  European  Court  of  Auditors.  The  European 
Court of Auditors (ECA) published its Special Report 28/2022 on SURE on 14 December 2022, 
after  the  fourth  bi-annual  report  was  published,  containing  a  number  of  observations  on  the 
Instrument.6  The  ECA  report  is  overall  very  positive  on  the  instrument,  recognising  the  quick 
and  efficient  reaction  by  the  Commission  to  the  challenge  of  helping  Member  States  preserve 
employment  as  a  response  to  the  COVID-19  pandemic.  The  report  makes  only  one 
recommendation:  to  evaluate  SURE.  The  Commission  accepted  this  recommendation  and  will 
carry out an evaluation study of SURE by the third quarter of 2024, which will complement the 
analysis provided in the bi-annual reports.  

The report is  structured  into seven  sections. Section  I  covers the institutional  use of SURE: 
the financial assistance granted and disbursed to Member States with their repayment schedule. 
Section  II  outlines  the  policy  use  of  SURE,  summarising  Member  States’  total  public 
expenditure  on  national  measures  supported  by  SURE.7  Section  III  updates  and  extends  the 
assessment  of  the  impact  of  SURE  provided  in  the  previous  reports.  Section  IV  examines 
information on national ex-ante and ex-post control systems, including audit. Section V discusses 
and confirms that the exceptional occurrences that justified the continuation of SURE no longer 
exist.  Section  VI  provides  the  relevant  reporting  committed  to  under  Section  2.4  of  the  EU 

6 The ECA observed e.g. that  (i) the lack of comprehensive Member State data limits the Commission’s ability to 
assess the number of people and businesses supported by SURE (ii) there is little monitoring data on health-related 
measures (iii) the design of the instrument does not make it possible to identify separately the impact of SURE, in 
terms  of  outputs  and  results,  within  the  national  schemes  (iv)  there  was  no  Commission  check  on  whether  the 
national measures supported by SURE were cost-effective or complemented other schemes, given that SURE was a 
crisis response instrument  where the rapid disbursement of funds  was a priority (v)  the  legal  framework does  not 
require  the  Commission  to  assess  the  robustness  of  the  Member  States’  control  systems  governing  the 
See 
implementation 
https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR22_28/SR_SURE_EN.pdf 
7  Sections  I  and  II  pertain  to  the  use  of  financial  assistance  under  SURE  as  per  Article  14(1)  of  the  SURE 
Regulation. 

supported 

measures 

national 

funds. 

EU 

the 

by 

of 

7 

 
 
                                                           
SURE  Social  Bond  Framework,  which  is  merged  into  this  report.8  Finally,  Section  VII  offers 
some conclusions on the value added of SURE. 

I.  THE  INSTITUTIONAL  USE  OF  SURE:  AMOUNTS  GRANTED  AND  DISBURSED  AND  OTHER 

FINANCIAL ASPECTS  

1.1 Overview of beneficiary Member States and amounts granted  

Over  98%  of  the  EUR  100  billion  SURE  envelope  was  granted  over  the  lifetime  of  the 
instrument.  Total  financial  assistance  of  EUR  98.4  billion  was  granted  under  SURE  to  19 
Member States: Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Malta,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania,  Slovakia,  Slovenia  and  Spain.  The 
vast  majority  of  financial  assistance  was  granted  in  2020  (Graph  1),  beginning  in  September 
2020 when SURE became available. The final amounts were granted in November 2022.  

Top-up  financial  assistance  was  granted  to  eight  Member  States  between  September  and 
November  2022.  Since  the  previous  bi-annual  report  in  September  2022,  additional  financial 
assistance of EUR 5.05 billion was granted by the Council to eight Member States on top of the 
initial  financial  assistance  they  were  granted  in  2020:  Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Czechia,  Greece, 
Croatia,  Lithuania,  Latvia  and  Portugal.  The  financial  assistance  was  granted  for  incurred 
expenditure, primarily in 2020 and 2021, on extensions of measures that had already been funded 
by SURE.  In the case of Cyprus,  Greece and Croatia, this represented a second top up to their 
initial loan. In total, 11 of the 19 Member States that used SURE were ultimately granted top-up 
financial  assistance.  This  reflects  the  fact  that  SURE  support  could  be  requested  for  eligible 
COVID-related spending, based either on planned expenditure or incurred expenditure, with the 
latter not subject to any absorption risk by definition. 

Graph 1: Amount granted and disbursed by year 

Source: European Commission. 

8 https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/eu-budget/eu-borrower/eu-borrowing-activities/eu-sure-social-bond-
framework_en  

8 

0102030405060708090100202020212022EUR billionAmount grantedAmount disbursed 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Table 1: Overview of support granted under SURE (EUR) 

Member State 

Total Amount 
Granted* 

Of Which Top-Up 

Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Cyprus 
Czechia 
Greece 
Spain 
Croatia 
Italy 
Lithuania 
Latvia 
Malta 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Slovenia 
Slovakia 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Estonia 
Total 

8 197 530 000 
971 170 000 
632 970 000 
4 500 000 000 
6 165 000 000 
21 324 820 449 
1 570 600 000 
27 438 486 464 
1 099 060 000 
472 807 000 
420 817 000 
11 236 693 087 
6 234 462 488 
3 000 000 000 
1 113 670 000 
630 883 600 
651 470 000 
2 473 887 900 
230 000 000 
98 364 327 988 

394 150 000 
460 170 000 
153 900 000 
2 500 000 000 
3 437 000 000 
0 
550 000 000 
0 
496 750 000 
280 107 000 
177 185 000 
0 
300 000 000 
0 
0 
0 
147 140 000 
0 
0 
8 896 402 000 

Amount 
Disbursed* 

8 197 530 000 
971 170 000 
632 970 000 
4 500 000 000 
6 165 000 000 
21 324 820 449 
1 570 600 000 
27 438 486 464 
1 099 060 000 
472 807 000 
420 817 000 
11 236 693 087 
6 234 462 488 
3 000 000 000 
1 113 670 000 
630 883 600 
651 470 000 
2 473 887 900 
230 000 000 
98 364 327 988 

Amount Outstanding 

0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 

*In  the  implementation  of  the  disbursements,  the  amounts  granted  were  rounded  down  for  operational  purposes. 
Source: European Commission. 

1.2 Disbursements and applicable repayment schedule  

The Commission successfully issued a final EUR 6.5 billion of SURE social bonds on behalf 
of the EU.  On 7 December 2022,  the EU's  9th and final  issuance under the SURE programme 
took  place.  The  15-year  bond  had  an  order  book  of  EUR  25.4  billion,  making  it  four  times 
oversubscribed  during  this  end-of-year  funding  window.  The  EUR 6.548  billion  was  disbursed 
on  14  December:  EUR  460  million  to  Bulgaria,  EUR  29  million  to  Cyprus,  EUR  2  billion  to 
Czechia,  EUR  900  million  to  Greece,  EUR  550  million  to  Croatia,  EUR  142  million  to 
Lithuania,  EUR  167  million  to  Latvia,  EUR  1.5  billion  to  Poland  and  EUR  300  million  to 
Portugal.  The  amount  disbursed  to  Poland  had  been  delayed  until  its  issue  of  absorption  was 
resolved  (see  Section  2.1.2),  while  the  other  amounts  represented  top  ups  granted  to  the  eight 
Member States in autumn 2022.  

The SURE issuance programme was highly successful  overall, marked by strong investor 
demand  and  favourable  pricing.  Prior  to  the  pandemic,  the  Commission’s  borrowing  on 
European capital markets was limited, but SURE, quickly followed by NextGeneration EU, led 
to  the  Commission  becoming  a  significant  player  in  sovereign  debt  issuance.  All  of  the 
transactions were multiple times oversubscribed and achieved favourable pricing, with a number 
of  the  earlier  bonds  issued  at  negative  interest  rates  (see  Table  A2).  The  success  illustrated 
investor confidence both in the EU’s financing capacity and in the SURE programme.  

By December 2022, all of the EUR 98.4 billion of financial assistance granted under SURE 
had been disbursed (Table 1).  Further details on the SURE transactions and disbursements to 
Member States are reported in Tables A1 and A2 in the Annex. 

9 

 
 
The  average  maturity  of  disbursements  to  Member  States  remains  at  14.5  years.  This  is 
close to the maximum of 15 years provided by the respective CIDs. Reporting on the repayment 
schedule for principal and interest payments is presented in Table 2.  

Table 2: Repayment Schedule of EU’s SURE outstanding loans 

Calendar year 
2023 
2024 
2025 
2026 
2027 
2028 
2029 
2030 
2031 
2032 
2033 
2034 
2035 
2036 
2037 
2038 
2039 
2040 
2041 
2042 
2043 
2044 
2045 
2046 
2047 
2048 
2049 
2050 
Total 

Principal 

 8 000 000 000  
 8 000 000 000  

 10 000 000 000  
 8 137 000 000  
 10 000 000 000  

 8 500 000 000  
 9 000 000 000  
 8 718 000 000  

 7 000 000 000  

 5 000 000 000  
 6 000 000 000  

 10 000 000 000  
98 355 000 000 

Interest 
 326 563 400  
 326 982 500  
 326 982 500  
 326 982 500  
 326 982 500  
 326 982 500  
 326 982 500  
 326 982 500  
 326 982 500  
 326 982 500  
 326 982 500  
 326 982 500  
 326 982 500  
 326 982 500  
 308 982 500  
 104 500 000  
 104 500 000  
 104 500 000  
 97 500 000  
 97 500 000  
 97 500 000  
 97 500 000  
 97 500 000  
 97 500 000  
 75 000 000  
 30 000 000  
 30 000 000  
 30 000 000  
5 949 818 400 

SURE Total 
 326 563 400  
 326 982 500  
 8 326 982 500  
 8 326 982 500  
 326 982 500  
 10 326 982 500  
 8 463 982 500  
 10 326 982 500  
 326 982 500  
 326 982 500  
 326 982 500  
 326 982 500  
 8 826 982 500  
 9 326 982 500  
 9 026 982 500  
 104 500 000  
 104 500 000  
 7 104 500 000  
 97 500 000  
 97 500 000  
 97 500 000  
 97 500 000  
 97 500 000  
 5 097 500 000  
 6 075 000 000  
 30 000 000  
 30 000 000  
 10 030 000 000  
104 304 818 400 

II.  THE POLICY USE OF SURE: PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND NATIONAL MEASURES COVERED 

BY SURE 

This  section  focuses  on  the  policy  use  of  the  SURE  instrument.  Section  2.1  summarises  the 
public expenditure by Member States covered by or eligible for SURE, including the absorption 
of  funds.  Section  2.2  provides  detail  on  the  short-time  work  schemes  and  similar  measures 
supported  by  SURE,  while  Section  2.3  examines  the  nature  of  the  supported  health-related 
measures.  Section  2.4  presents  the  number  of  employees  and  firms  that  benefitted  from  the 
measures supported by SURE.  

2.1 Actual and planned public expenditure supported by SURE 

2.1.1 Monitoring of public expenditure on eligible measures 

Bi-annual  reporting  by  beneficiary  Member  States  is  used  to  monitor  the  planned  and 
actual use of the financial assistance granted under SURE.  The required reporting includes 
public expenditure for measures covered by SURE (and the employee and firm coverage of those 
measures, as reported in  Section  3.3). There have been  five series of this reporting thus  far: in 
August  2020  (“initial  reporting”),  in  January-February  2021  (“first  report”),  in  June  2021 
(“second report”), January 2022 (“third report”), June 2022 (“fourth report”) and February 2023 
10 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(“latest reporting”). It is intended that the latest reporting will be the last, as all of the financial 
assistance  granted  has  now  been  spent  and  there  is  no  longer  planned  expenditure  for  which 
execution should be monitored. The information is presented as reported by Member States on 
measures that are eligible for SURE. Some Member States have spent more than the amount of 
SURE financial assistance received, having supplemented SURE support with national financing 
and/or EU structural funds, so that total expenditure can exceed the amount supported by SURE. 
The  reporting  allows  for  measuring  the  absorption  of  the  financial  assistance  under  SURE,  by 
comparing it with the amount granted by the Council.9  

All of the total planned public expenditure under SURE has now been executed. The SURE 
Regulation allowed for financial assistance to be used for both incurred and planned increases in 
public expenditure on measures covered by SURE.10 At the outset of SURE, when COVID-19-
related  restrictions  were  acute,  the  instrument  funded  a  large  amount  of  planned  expenditure, 
amounting to 64% of total expenditure in June 2020. The share of planned expenditure decreased 
to 12% in June 2021 and was less than 4% by the end of 2021. All spending on SURE-eligible 
measures  was  complete  by  December  2022,  however,  the  SURE  financing  of  measures  was 
exhausted by all Member States by June 2022, with only national financing beyond this.11 

Graph 2: Reported public expenditure 

Graph 3: Monthly evolution of incurred 
public expenditure under SURE 

Source: Member States’ reporting (February 2023). 
Note: Estonia is included from June 2021 as it applied 
for SURE later. H1 and H2 correspond to the first and 
second halves of 2021. 

Source: Member States’ reporting (February 2023). 

9 An absorption gap can occur because the expenditure incurred or planned by the Member State on SURE-eligible 
measures is less than the amount granted by the Council. Part of the absorption can be due to the Member State not 
managing  to  spend  the  amount  already  disbursed,  which  may  become  problematic  if  this  gap  remains  when  the 
planned expenditure has been implemented. 
10  Ireland  and  Estonia  applied  for  SURE  for  incurred  public  expenditure  only.  As  such,  the  reported  expenditure 
remains  unchanged  since  March  2021.  The  reporting  on  public  expenditure  for  2020  and  2021  also  remained 
unchanged for Hungary and Lithuania since the previous report.  
11 Eligible measures are those described in Article 3(2) of the SURE Regulation: national short-time work schemes 
or similar measures, and as an ancillary, health-related measures.  

11 

464545434444443434343434418292929303710910113449899116119119122020406080100120140EUR BnFeb-Jun 2020Jul-Dec 2020H1 2021H2 20212022020406080100120140024681012141618 Jan 2020 Jan 2021 Jan 2022EUR BnMonthly expenditure (LHS)Cumulated expenditure (RHS) 
 
 
 
                                                           
Total public expenditure on SURE-eligible measures was EUR 122 billion, in excess of the 
total  financial  assistance  granted  under  SURE.  This  amount  rose  slightly  compared  to  the 
fourth  report  (Graph  2)  as  some  Member  States  extended  measures  in  2022,  albeit  with  more 
limited  expenditure.  Overall,  13  Member  States  reported  expenditure  in  2022.  Expenditure  on 
the  fewer  schemes  that  continued  in  2022  rose  slightly  from  the  EUR 3.7  billion  that  was 
planned to EUR 4.5 billion that was ultimately executed. The total spending (EUR 122 billion) is 
greater  than  the  total  amount  granted  under  SURE  (EUR 98.4  billion)  because  most  Member 
States  spent  more  on  eligible  measures  than  the  financial  assistance  they  requested  and  were 
granted.12 This highlights the continued relevance of the scope of SURE to Member States after 
they first applied for it in 2020.  

The  easing  of  the  pandemic’s  impact  in  2022  saw  monthly  expenditure  on  SURE-eligible 
measures fall to negligible amounts. Graph 3 shows that expenditure for 2022 peaked (at a low 
level) in January before decreasing rapidly. The early 2022 expenditure was focused on measures 
such  as  the  prolongation  of  some  short-time  work  schemes,  quarantine-related  measures, 
COVID-19  testing  and  special  compensation  for  healthcare  workers.13  In  the  second  half  of 
2022, average monthly expenditure was just EUR 83 million across all reporting Member States. 

 2.1.2 Absorption of funds  

All SURE financial assistance has now been absorbed in all Member States. With all public 
expenditure financed by SURE now executed, i.e. no remaining planned expenditure, the EUR 
98.4  billion  of  financial  assistance  granted  has  been  fully  absorbed.  The  absorption  issues 
previously  identified  in  two  Member  States  that  were  discussed  in  the  fourth  bi-annual  report 
have  now  been  resolved.  Of  the  19  Member  States,  17  in  fact  spent  more  than  the  amount 
granted, including by financing the remainder nationally (see Graph 4).  

In Romania, the absorption gap has been fully closed and confirmed with final budgetary 
execution  data.  To  recall,  in  early  2022  Romania  had  an  absorption  gap  of  close  to  EUR  3 
billion.  The  amended  CID  adopted  in  July  2022  reduced  the  amount  granted  from  EUR  4.1 
billion to EUR 3 billion and included 21 additional measures eligible under SURE, following a 
request  by  the  Romanian  authorities.  The  close  dialogue  between  the  Commission  and  the 
Romanian  authorities  helped  identify  further  eligible  expenditure  in  the  form  of  a  reduction  of 
indirect  labour  costs  linked  to  firms  that  are  participating  in  short-time  work  schemes.14  The 
estimated remaining gap of EUR 350 million as recorded in September 2022 and indicated in the 
fourth report, has now been fully closed. There is now even an excess margin comfortably above 
the EUR 3 billion granted to Romania. Final budgetary execution for 2022 on all the measures in 
the  amended  CID  dispelled  uncertainty  such  that,  by  December  2022,  the  total  incurred 
expenditure  was  above  EUR  3  billion  and  the  health-related  expenditure  remained  ancillary 
(amounting to less than 46% of total expenditure).  

12  For  Spain  and  Italy,  this  is  also  due  to  the  concentration  limit  (of  60%  of  the  maximum  amount  of  EUR  100 
billion) that applies to the three largest beneficiary Member States. 
13 Some expenditure in 2022 also related to the backloading of payments related to earlier time periods by Member 
States to beneficiary workers and firms.  
14 Full or partial exemptions for social security contributions are eligible under SURE as long as they are linked to 
preserving employment. Short-time work schemes can include such exemptions and they have been financed under 
SURE for Member States when requested (see for example in Slovenia, Greece, Spain and Portugal).   

12 

 
 
                                                           
Graph 4: Excess of public expenditure on eligible measures over loan amount (% of loan 
amount)  

Source: Member States’ reporting (February 2023). 
Note:  Public  expenditure  refers  to  measures  reported  as  covered  in  the  CIDs,  net  of  European  Structural  and 
Investment Funds (ESIF). Some Member States (Estonia, Slovenia) have discontinued reporting on SURE-eligible 
measures  beyond  2020  as  they  are  no  longer  using  SURE  financial  assistance  to  fund  those  measures,  having 
already exceeded the amount granted.  

In Poland, the moderate absorption gap compared with the amount granted was resolved 
with the inclusion of two new SURE-eligible measures. In early 2022, Poland reported lower 
total expenditure on measures covered in their CID (EUR 9.9 billion) than the amount granted 
(EUR 11.2 billion). As a result of a technical dialogue between the Commission and the Polish 
authorities,  the  Council  amended  Poland’s  original  CID  in  November  2022,  based  on  a 
Commission  proposal,  to  include  two  additional  health-related  measures  eligible  under 
SURE. They consist of a bonus for healthcare workers and PCR testing services for COVID-19. 
The  amount  of  eligible  health-related  expenditure increased  from  0%  to  15%  of  total 
expenditure,  remaining  ancillary.  The  remaining  disbursement  of  funds  (EUR  1.5  billion), 
initially postponed until the absorption issue was resolved, was executed in December 2022. 

2.2 National measures: short-time work schemes or similar measures supported by SURE  

The vast majority of total public expenditure on SURE-eligible measures was allocated to 
short-time  work  schemes  and  ‘similar  measures’,  including  for  the  self-employed.  Indeed, 
almost  half  (49%)  of  total  public  expenditure  on  SURE-eligible  measures  was  spent  on  short-
time work schemes, which 16 of the 19 Member States funded using SURE. A further 31% has 
been allocated to ‘similar measures’ for the self-employed.15 9% was allocated to wage subsidy 
schemes16,  while  6%  of  total  expenditure  was  allocated  to  ‘other’  similar  measures  supporting 
job retention and workers’ incomes.17 Only 5% was spent on health-related measures, confirming 

15 This is based on Commission analysis, categorising the measures reported by Member States by type. 
16  Wage  subsidy  schemes  are  job-retention  schemes  similar  to  short-time  work,  except  that  payments  are  not 
calculated in terms of hours (not worked), but rather correspond to a lump sum or a proportion of the total wage. In 
total, measures similar to short-time work schemes account for 46% of total SURE-eligible expenditure.  
17 Other similar measures include, for example, sick-leave benefits, parental leave and vocational training linked to 
short-time work. 

13 

-100-50050100150200EstoniaIrelandCyprusGreecePolandLithuaniaCroatiaItalyBulgariaCzechiaPortugalLatviaSloveniaHungaryRomaniaBelgiumSpainMaltaSlovakia 
 
 
                                                           
their  ancillary  nature.  11  Member  States  only  used  SURE  financial  assistance  for  short-time 
work schemes and similar measures (Graph 5).  

Graph 5: Public expenditure on SURE-eligible measures by type of expenditure 

Source: Member States’ reporting (February 2023). 
Note: See March 2021 report for details on Hungary’s health expenditure. 

The participation of women and youth in short-time work increased during the COVID-19 
crisis.  This  primarily reflects  the change in  the sectoral  composition  of the support away from 
manufacturing and construction towards services and retail, i.e.  sectors with a relatively higher 
share of women and youth in employment (Graph 6).18 

In  autumn  2022,  eight  Member  States  were  granted  additional  financial  assistance  for  a 
variety of measures. This top-up support was for the additional expenditure incurred in 2021 – 
and in some cases up to early 2022 – on the emergency support measures already supported by 
SURE. Specifically, the top ups covered:  

-  Bulgaria:  the  prolongation  until  June  2022  of  a  short-time  work  scheme  provided  to 
companies that have endured a revenue reduction of at least 30% due to the pandemic and 
which  restricted  their  activities  between  13  March  2020  and  31  December  2020  while 
retaining their employees. 

-  Cyprus:  the  additional  expenditure  linked  to  the  prolongation  (until  the  third  quarter  of 
2021) of the wage subsidy scheme supporting companies that had to (partially) suspend 
operations,  the  special  schemes  for  the  accommodation  and  tourism  sectors,  a  subsidy 
scheme for the self-employed, as well as the sickness benefit scheme for COVID-19;  

-  Czechia:  the prolongation in  2021 of the  emergency short-time work scheme (so-called 

‘Antivirus programme’), and of the emergency support for the self-employed; 

18 European Commission (2020): Labour Market and Wage Developments in 2020, Chapter 3, Policy developments. 
https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=23268&langId=en.  In  Italy  and  Belgium,  on  average,  the  share  of 
women involved in the schemes doubled after March 2020, while the share of young worker beneficiaries increased 
from 1.6% to 5.7% in Italy and from 6.7% to 7.6% in Belgium. The share of women and young workers involved in 
short-time work was also high in Latvia, Romania, Portugal and Estonia. 

14 

0102030405060708090100BulgariaSlovakiaCroatiaIrelandGreeceMaltaEstoniaCyprusSloveniaLithuaniaLatviaSpainSURE-19PolandPortugalItalyCzechiaBelgiumRomaniaHungary% total expenditure Short-time-work schemesWage subsidy measuresSelf-employed measuresHealth-related measuresOther measures 
 
 
                                                           
-  Greece:  the  prolongation  of  the  emergency  job  retention  scheme  (an  allowance  for 
private sector employees whose contract had been suspended) in  2021 and 2022 and of 
the associated subsidy covering the corresponding social security contributions; 

-  Croatia: the prolongation of the two existing support measures, namely a wage  subsidy 
scheme for businesses negatively affected by the pandemic (until June 2022), and a short-
time work scheme providing support for the temporary reduction of working time (until 
December 2022); 

-  Lithuania:  the prolongation until  June 2021 of the job  retention  scheme subsidising the 
salary  costs  of  employees  during  periods  of  work  suspension,  and  subsidy  schemes  for 
the self-employed; 

-  Latvia: the reinstatement of the emergency support measures (compensation for idle time 
for workers, wage subsidies for affected companies and Covid-related sickness benefits) 
in the period from November 2020 to June 2021, as well as some additional expenditure 
on the extension of health-related measures; 

-  Portugal:  the  prolongation  of  an  existing  set  of  labour  market  and  health-related 
measures  (which  had  been  expanded  with  an  amending  CID  in  January  2022)  until  the 
end of 2021 and March 2022 respectively (the latter including the prophylactic isolation 
allowance and the exceptional support for the resumption of business activities). 

Graph 6: Average share of women and young (15-24) beneficiaries across short-time work 
schemes (2020/2021) 

- 

Source: Labour market policy (LMP) database 2020, European Commission, Directorate General for Employment, 
Social Affairs and Inclusion; EMCO data collection 2020 and 2021. 
Note: Data is not available for all countries covered by SURE.  

In  most  Member  States,  the  recourse  to  short-time  work  support  continued  throughout 
2021 but at a declining rate. In the majority of Member States, after the first peak during the 
first wave of the pandemic in March-April 2020, the recourse to short-time work and similar job-
retention measures stabilised in the second half of 2020. The use of the schemes then gradually 
declined in the course of 2021, in line with the economic recovery and the successful rollout of 
the  vaccination  campaigns.  Some  countries  experienced  a  second  peak  at  the  end  of  2020  / 
beginning of 2021. 

15 

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%% of women% of youngITSICYBEESBGEEPTROLV 
 
 
 
Graph 7. Proportion of jobs benefiting from job-retention measures (aggregate and by 
Member State) 

Source: Eurostat, Member States’ reporting (February 2023). 
Note: Data not available for Czechia and Romania. The decline in the share of jobs covered in the second half of 
2021 is partly due to data unavailability for a number of countries.   

Most  of  the  SURE  beneficiary  Member  States  had  phased  out  their  emergency  job-
retention  measures  by  the  middle  of  2022.  While  a  few  countries  (Estonia,  Slovenia)  had 

16 

0246810121416180%5%10%15%20%25%janfebmaraprmayjunjulaugsepoctnovdecjanfebmaraprmayjunjulaugsepoctnovdec20202021STW coverage (LHS)SURE expenditure (EUR bn, RHS) 
 
 
 
 
BE 

BG 

CZ 

EE 

IE 

EL 

ES 

HR 

IT 

CY 

LV 

LT 

HU 

MT 

PL 

PT 

RO 

SI 

withdrawn  their  emergency  job-retention  measures  already  in  the  second  half  of  2020,  most 
extended their emergency support into 2021 and, in some cases, until the first half of 2022. Only 
in two countries (Portugal, Croatia) did emergency support remain available until late 2022. 

Table 3. Main emergency job-retention measures and their duration 

Member State 

Type 

Permanent / Temporary  

Permanent, with temporary 
modifications 

Temporary 

Temporary 

Temporary 

Temporary 

Temporary 

Reduction of 
working time 

Emergency 
support 
provided until 

0-100% 

June 2022 

50% or 100% 

June 2022 

0-100% 

February 2022 

0-100% 

June 2020 

- 

August 2020 

50% or 100% 

January 2022 

Permanent, with temporary 
modifications 

0-100% 

March 2022 

Temporary 

0-100% 

December 2022 

Permanent, with temporary 
modifications 

Temporary 

Temporary 

Temporary 

- 

Temporary 

0-100% 

December 2021 

0-100% 

August 2021 

0-100% 

June 2021 

0-100% 

- 

- 

June 2021/ 
September 2021 
- 

May 2022 

Temporary 

20-100% 

September 2021 

STW 

STW 

STW 

STW 

Wage subsidy 

STW 

STW 

Wage subsidy + 
STW 

STW 

STW 

STW 

Wage subsidy + 
STW 
- 

Wage subsidy 

Wage subsidy + 
STW 

STW 

STW 

STW 

Permanent, with temporary 
modifications 

Temporary 

Temporary 

0-100% 

September 2022 

0-100% 

50-100% 

May 2022 

December 2020 

SK 

STW 

Temporary 
Note:  This  table  only  focuses  on  the  main  schemes.  Hungary  did  have  an  emergency  short-time  work  scheme  in 
place during the pandemic, which was financed with European structural funds. Hence, it did not receive financial 
assistance  for  it  under  SURE.  Ireland  replaced  its  wage  subsidy  scheme  with  a  similar  modified  scheme  that  run 
until May 2022, but did not fund it with SURE. 

March 2022 

0-100% 

2.3 National measures: health-related measures supported by SURE  

The  ancillary  nature  of  the  health-related  expenditure  is  confirmed.  Only  5%  of  total 
expenditure was spent on health-related measures. Only 8 Member States out of 19 used SURE 

17 

 
 
support to finance health-related measures. The SURE Regulation allows for the financing of any 
COVID-19-related  health  measure,  but  highlights  in  particular  those  taken  in  the  workplace, 
which  represents  22%  of  all  health-related  spending  (Graph  8).19  Measures  taken  in  the 
workplace are considered to be primarily those that facilitate a safe return to work by reducing 
occupational hazards, including for healthcare workers.  

Graph 8: Share of health-related 
expenditure in the workplace 

Health in the workplace
Health outside the workplace

Graph 9: Decomposition of types of health-
related measures (number of Member States 
concerned)  

e
r
u
t
i
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n
e
p
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e
h
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l
a
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h

l

a
t
o
t

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%

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

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t
I

i

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9
1
-
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Source: Member States’ reporting (February 2023). 

Source: Member States’ reporting (February 2023). 
Note:  Portugal  and  Romania  are  counted  twice  as  they 
have  respectively  preventive  measures  and  healthcare 
equipment  and  medication  measures  both  inside  and 
outside the workplace. 

SURE  was  used  to  finance  several  types  of  health-related  measures,  providing  welcome 
emergency  support  to  the  healthcare  sector  and  facilitating  a  faster  return  to  activity  in 
several  Member  States.  On  a  suggestion  by  ECA,  the  Commission  services  have  further 
examined  the  effects  of  the  health-related  measures  financed  by  SURE.  The  supported  health-
related  measures  can  be  broadly  divided  into  three  categories:  i)  preventive  measures  against 
COVID-19, ii) additional labour costs to recruit and support healthcare workers operating in very 
difficult  conditions  and  iii)  healthcare  equipment  and  medication.  Graph  9  shows  that  the 
popularity  of  each  category  of  measures  was  broadly  similar  across  the  Member  States.  These 
measures, detailed below, occur both inside and outside the workplace.  

  Preventive measures: These measures  aim  to reduce occupational hazards and  ensure a 
safe  return  to  work  (other  than  personal  protective  equipment).  Examples  in  the 
workplace  are  hygiene  training  (Belgium),  testing  workers  in  nursing  homes  and 
childcare  facilities  (Portugal)  as  well  as  tax  credits  for  small  businesses  and  non-profit 

19 See Article 1 of Council Regulation (EU) 2020/672 of 19 May 2020.  This condition is also further explained in 
recital  5:  “In  order  to  maintain  the  strong  focus  of  the  instrument  provided  for  in  this  Regulation  and  thereby  its 
effectiveness,  health-related  measures  for  the  purpose  of  that  instrument  may  consist  of  those  aiming  at  reducing 
occupational hazards and ensuring the protection of workers and the self‐employed in the workplace, and, where 
appropriate, some other health‐related measures.” 

18 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
 
 
 
 
organisations to sanitising workplaces (Italy). Preventive measures outside the workplace 
mostly  concern  the  financing  of  expenditure  related  to  population-wide  COVID-19 
testing. Scaling up laboratory capacity for testing during the pandemic was also critical to 
maintaining clinical operations and lifting lockdowns and social distancing measures. In 
the EU, genomic sequencing saw a 15-fold increase in 2021 compared to 2020, leading 
the  percentage  of  sequenced  positive  tests  to  increase  from  less  than  1%  in  2020  to  an 
average of 7% in 2021.20  

  Additional labour costs to recruit and support healthcare workers: Of all  the measures 
taken  outside  the  workplace,  additional  healthcare  worker  labour  costs  (primarily 
bonuses)  were  the  most  popular  type.  For  example,  Estonia,  Hungary,  Latvia,  Poland, 
Portugal  and  Romania  used  funds  available  under  SURE  to  provide  bonuses  to  health 
personnel and/or hire additional staff. During the pandemic, scaling up of intensive care 
capacity  which  is  labour  intensive  was  of  primary  importance,  as  higher  occupancy  of 
intensive care has been associated with increasing mortality.21  

  Healthcare  equipment  and  medication:  SURE  funds  were  also  used  for  personal 
protective  equipment  and  disinfection  equipment  in  workplaces  and  hospitals  (Estonia, 
Latvia, Hungary and Portugal) and vaccine rollout (Romania), which was key to limiting 
the death toll and returning to normalcy.  

2.4. SURE coverage in terms of employment and firms 

The  Commission  has  confirmed  the  high  quality  of  the  coverage  figures  reported  by 
Member  States.  Guidance  was  given  by  the  Commission  and  efforts  were  made  by  Member 
States to improve the quality of the reported coverage for 2020, 2021 and 2022 through the five 
series of reporting.22 9 out of 19 Member States have now confirmed that the information is fully 
based on administrative data and in  line with  the guidance provided by the Commission.23 For 
eight additional Member States, it is considered to be mostly based on administrative data. Only 
two  Member  States  noted  that  their  reported  data  could  only  be  considered  as  best  estimates, 
until  full  information  is  known.  This  gives  substantial  confidence  to  the  coverage  estimates 
reported here and addresses one of the comments by ECA on reliance on estimates rather than 
final data. 

In  2020,  SURE  is  estimated  to  have  supported  31½  million  people  and  over  2½  million 
firms. This represents almost one third of total employment and over one quarter firms in the 19 
beneficiary  Member  States.24  The  employment  estimate  is  comprised  of  approximately  22¼ 

20 See OECD (2022), Health at a glance. 
21 See for example Bravata et al. (2021), “Impact of ICU transfers on the mortality rate of patients with COVID-19: 
insights from comprehensive national database in France” 
22  By  construction,  the  information  on  the  number  of  workers  and  firms  required  Member  States  to  track  each 
beneficiary  of  each  measure  supported  by  SURE  in  the  administrative  databases  on  social  security  system  and 
collected also through the public employment agencies. This process involved the gathering of a massive amount of 
information  and  time  to  carry  verifications  to  avoid  double  counting:  for  example,  when  the  same  individual 
receives two types of measures supported by SURE, or submits an application for a support measure several times in 
a same year in a discontinued way.  
23 The accounting of self-employed and of the employees working for those self-employed was not fully harmonised 
through Member States with different statistical and legal system.  
24  The  figures  correspond  to  people  and  firms  who  were,  at  some  point,  covered  by  short-time  work  schemes  or 
similar  measures  supported  by  SURE.  The  denominators  are  based  on  the  reporting  tables  submitted  by  Member 

19 

 
 
                                                           
 
million  employees  and  9¼  million  self-employed  workers.  Graphs  10  and  11  present  a 
breakdown  of  SURE  coverage  by  Member  State.  These  estimates  do  not  include  people 
supported  only  by  health-related  measures  under  SURE  and  could  therefore  be  considered 
conservative.25 

Graph 10: Workers covered by SURE in 2020 
(% of total employment) 

Graph 11: Firms covered by SURE in 
2020 by size (% of total firms) 

Source: Member States’ reporting (February 2023). 
Note:  The  coverage  and  total  employment  figures  are 
those reported by Member States.  

Source: Member States’ reporting (February 2023). 
Note:  Total  firms  excludes  zero-employee  firms.    
SMEs  are  those  with  less  than  250  employees  and 
large those with over 250 employees.  

SMEs  were  the  primary  beneficiaries  of  SURE  support.  The  pandemic  caused  a  shift  from 
the use of short-time work schemes by primarily large firms pre-Covid to also include small and 
medium-sized firms, which represent most of the firms covered by SURE (Graph  11).26 SURE 
provided  support  to  29%  of  SMEs  across  beneficiary  Member  States,  on  average  (Graph  12). 
Short-time work schemes were mostly taken up by the services and retail sectors. Manufacturing 
nevertheless  still  received  14%  of  SURE  expenditure.  The  sectors  with  the  largest  share  of 
expenditure  according  to  the  latest  reporting  were:  (i)  accommodation  and  food  services,  (ii) 
wholesale  and  retail  trade,  and  (iii)  manufacturing  (Graph  13).  Many  Member  States  also 
provided  support  to  further  sectors,  such  as  the  cultural  sector,  with  targeted  measures  in  their 
respective CIDs. 

States.  The  total  number  of  firms  comprises  firms  with  at  least  one  employee.  The  share  of  firms  covered  has 
reduced compared to the fourth report primarily due to the provision of final administrative data by Poland.  
25  In  addition,  in  some  Member  States,  there  was  significant  overlap  between  the  recipients  of  support  across 
different measures, for which appropriate adjustment could not be made. In such cases, Member States were asked 
to report only the coverage of the largest measure(s) to avoid double counting. As such, the true coverage may be 
even higher. 
26 European Commission (2020): Labour Market and Wage Developments in 2020, Chapter 3, Policy developments. 
https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=23268&langId=en.  Further  discussion  is  available  in  the  second 
SURE report.  

20 

01020304050607080SloveniaItalyCyprusGreeceCroatiaMaltaSURE-19CzechiaSlovakiaSpainPolandBelgiumPortugalLithuaniaIrelandEstoniaRomaniaBulgariaHungaryLatvia% total employmentEmployeesSelf-employed0102030405060708090SloveniaItalyGreeceBelgiumMaltaIrelandSpainCroatiaSlovakiaPortugalRomaniaLithuaniaSURE-19CyprusEstoniaPolandCzechiaLatviaBulgariaHungary% total firmsSMEslarge firms 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
 
 
Graph 12: SMEs covered by SURE in 2020 
(% of total SMEs) 

Graph 13: Sectoral coverage of SURE 

Source: Member States’ reporting (February 2023) 
Note:  Poland  did  not  report  on  firm  size,  while 
Belgium and Czechia did not provide data on the total 
number  of  SMEs.  SMEs  are  those  with  less  than  250 
employees.  

Source: Member States’ reporting (February 2023) 
Note: This graph reports the average share of expenditure 
in  the  three  sectors  benefitting  most  from  SURE  in  each 
Member  States.  When  a  sector  is  not  mentioned,  we 
assume  it  gets  a  share  of  the  residual  spending  that  is 
proportional to the sector’s total wage bill in the economy. 
This is  also  the case  for  Portugal  who did not report any 
sectoral coverage. In addition, four Member States do not 
report  the  shares  of  expenditure  going  to  the  top  three 
sectors:  we  assume  that  the  largest  sector  gets  50%,  the 
second largest gets 25% and the third largest 15% of total 
expenditure.  These  figures  correspond  to  the  averages  in 
Member States that reported the shares of expenditure. 

In  2021,  particularly  in  the  first  half  of  the  year  when  the  pandemic  continued  to  wreak 
havoc, SURE supported an estimated 9 million people and over 900 000 firms. This includes 
almost  6¾  million  employees  and  2¼  million  self-employed,  corresponding  to  around  15%  of 
total  employment  and  of  firms  in  the  15  beneficiary  Member  States  who  continued  to  use  the 
instrument in 2021 (Graphs 14 and 15).27 This figure has risen since the last report as, after the 
top ups that were granted in autumn 2022, Czechia and Croatia used SURE to fund expenditure 
in 2021, having previously exhausted their loan in 2020. The uneven recovery in 2021 meant that 
economic support measures were still required at various stages throughout the year. As seen in 
Graph 1, these were focused in the first half of 2021 and eased as both the economic and health 
impact  of  the  pandemic  lessened  later  in  the  year  due  to  vaccinations  and  other  economic 
adaptations.  

27  Member  States  that  spent  all  of  their  SURE  financial  assistance  in  2020  are  not  included  here:  Estonia,  Spain, 
Ireland  and  Slovenia.  However,  many  of  these  Member  States  continued  or  adapted  their  relevant  measures  and 
financed them through other sources.  

21 

0102030405060708090SloveniaItalyGreeceMaltaIrelandSpainSURE-19CroatiaSlovakiaPortugalLithuaniaCyprusRomaniaEstoniaPolandLatviaBulgariaHungary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Graph 14: Workers covered by SURE in 2021 
and 2022 (% of total employment) 

Graph 15: Firms covered by SURE in 
2021 and 2022 (% of total firms) 

Source: Member States’ reporting (February 2023) 
Note: Member States  who spent  all their SURE  financial 
assistance  in  2020  are  not  shown.  Member  States  who 
spent  the  SURE  assistance  by  the  end  of  2021  are  not 
included  in  2022.  Not  applicable  (n/a)  refers  to  Member 
States that did not report coverage for that year. 

Source: Member States’ reporting (February 2023) 
Note: Total firms excludes zero-employee firms.  Not 
applicable (n/a) refers to Member States that did not 
report coverage for 2021 or 2022. 

In 2022, SURE is estimated to have supported almost 350 000 people and over 40 000 firms, 
in  line with  the  decrease  in  SURE-related  expenditure.  This  is  comprised  of  approximately 
220 000 employees and  130  000 self-employed.  The figure has  risen since the fourth  report as 
due to their top ups in autumn 2022, Bulgaria, Portugal, Greece and Croatia used SURE financial 
assistance in 2022 and thus have increased the 2022 coverage figures (Graph 14). However, the 
majority of Member States were no longer using SURE in 2022. Only four Member States used 
SURE  to  fund  measures  in  2022,  with  a  further  nine  Member  States  funding  SURE-eligible 
measures through other sources. 

III.  ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF SURE 

This section provides an updated assessment of SURE’s impact on unemployment, the real 
economy and interest payments in beneficiary Member States. The purpose of SURE was to 
help  Member  States  preserve  the  employment  of  workers  and  the  self-employed  during  the 
COVID-19 pandemic, thus also protecting labour incomes. This in turn was intended to facilitate 
a rapid economic recovery once the pandemic restrictions were lifted. This section assesses these 
impacts,  updating  and  extending  the  analysis  presented  in  the  previous  bi-annual  reports.  The 
results from a Commission macroeconomic model, which support the earlier findings, are added. 
Overall, the results are informative and suggest that SURE had a positive impact.  

3.1. Estimating the impact of SURE in 2020: mitigating the effect of the pandemic upon impact  

The  substantial  role  of  SURE  in  2020,  not  least  in  avoiding  a  surge  in  unemployment,  is 
clearly  supported  by  evidence.  While  methodological  issues  affect  precise  quantitative 
estimates, the various pieces of evidence shown below, using different methodologies, all point 

22 

01020304050607080MaltaCyprusItalyLithuaniaCzechiaGreecePortugalSURE-15CroatiaSlovakiaLatviaBelgiumBulgariaHungaryRomaniaPolandBulgariaCroatiaSURE-4GreecePortugal20212022% total employmentEmployeesSelf-employedTotal employment (2020)n/a0102030405060MaltaGreeceLithuaniaItalyBelgiumPortugalSURE-15CroatiaSlovakiaLatviaCyprusCzechiaRomaniaBulgariaHungaryPolandBulgariaCroatiaSURE-4GreecePortugal2021% total firms2021-202220202022n/a 
 
 
 
in the same direction. 28 Firstly, the national schemes supported by SURE had a material impact 
in terms of lower unemployment at the height of the pandemic. Secondly, SURE encouraged the 
setting of generous national schemes to retain jobs. 

3.1.1 SURE facilitated job retention preventing a strong rise in unemployment and inequality 

The rise in unemployment in 2020 in beneficiary Member States was significantly less than 
expected. Historically, a fall in GDP would typically lead to a significant rise in unemployment. 
However, the swift and sizeable policy measures taken in 2020 to address the COVID-19 crisis, 
including  SURE,  mitigated  the  impact  of  the  fall  in  output  on  unemployment.  The  increase  in 
unemployment was therefore, in most countries, lower than expected (Graphs 16 and 17).29  

Graph  16:  Actual  vs.  expected  changes  in 
SURE-19  unemployment  rate  in  2019  vs. 
2020 

Graph  17:  Actual  vs.  expected  changes  in 
unemployment  rates  by  beneficiary  Member 
State in 2020 

Source: Ameco and own calculations. 
Note:  y-axis:  The  expected  change  in  unemployment  rates  corresponds  to  the  predictions  stemming  from  a  panel 
regression model for beneficiary Member States (Graph 16) and a country-specific regression model (Graph 17) for 
the period 1999 to 2019. The analysis is based on an Okun’s law approach, where the dependent variable stands for 
the change in unemployment rate and the independent variable refers to the real GDP growth rate. The specification 
controls  for  (non-time  varying)  country-specific  features  of  the  labour  market  via  country-fixed  effects  and  for 
sample-common  factors  via  time  fixed  effects.  The  results  appear  robust  to  the  use  of  additional  independent 
variables,  such  as  employment  protection  legislation  and  the  change  in  the  labour  force  participation  rate.  The 
specification  controls  for  the  endogeneity  of  output  by  using  a  first-difference  GMM  estimator.  Croatia  is  not 
included for data availability reasons. 

28 Firstly, it is difficult to design a ‘counterfactual’ scenario of labour market performance in the absence of SURE: 
as  SURE  provided  only  a  second  line  of  defence  against  unemployment  by  financing  national  measures,  it  is 
difficult  to  disentangle  the  impact  of  SURE  itself  from  that  of  the  national  measures  Secondly,  the  output-
employment relationship is impacted by a wide range of factors, including SURE. Other factors included that people 
were unable to, or were discouraged from, actively seeking employment due to the shutdown of large parts of the 
economy. The box on model simulations also mentions further caveats. 
29 The responsiveness of changes in economic growth to unemployment is often referred in the economic literature 
as “Okun’s Law”. For further details see European Commission (2021), Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, Section 
III, Vol. 20, No 2. 

23 

-1.0-0.50.00.51.01.52.020192020ActualExpected 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
The policy support measures adopted, including SURE, effectively prevented an estimated 
1½  million  people  from  becoming  unemployed.  The  widespread  use  of  short-time  work 
schemes  and  other  similar  measures  partially  explain  the  muted  increase  in  unemployment 
compared  to  the  fall  in  output.  This  prevention  of  unemployment  allowed  an  estimated  1½ 
million  people  to  retain  their  jobs  in  2020  in  SURE  beneficiary  Member  States.30  Graph  18 
shows  a  breakdown  of  the  estimated  jobs  saved  per  Member  State.  Additional  illustrative 
simulations conducted by the Commission (see Box 2) suggest that the national short-time work 
schemes funded by SURE in the euro area  alone saved up to 1 million jobs. This suggests that 
these SURE-supported schemes likely accounted for a significant portion of the total 1½ million 
jobs saved across the 19 SURE beneficiaries. The positive impact of SURE is further supported 
by the fact that the higher the amount each Member State received through SURE in 2020, the 
more moderate the rise in unemployment compared with historical standards (Graph 19). At the 
same  time,  some  non-beneficiary  Member  States  (e.g.  France,  Netherlands)  were  able  to  use 
their  favourable  financial  position  and  funding  conditions  to  run  equally  large  job-retention 
schemes.  

Graph 18: Estimated jobs saved per Member 
State in 2020 (thousands) 

Graph 19: Relationship between the change 
in the unemployment rate and disbursed 
SURE funding in 2020 

Source: Ameco and own calculations. 
Note:  The  estimate  of  jobs  saved  is  derived  from  the 
difference  between  the  actual  and  expected  change  in  the 
unemployment  rate,  multiplied  by  the  2020  labour  force.  It 
assumes that the actual and expected labour force is the same. 
For some countries, the estimate is zero, as the actual change 
in  the  unemployment  rate  was  higher  than  predicted  by  the 
model.  The  expected  change 
rates 
corresponds  to  the  prediction  stemming  from  the  country-
specific regression model shown in Graph 17.  

in  unemployment 

Source: Ameco and own calculations.  
Note:  y-axis:  The  expected  change  in  unemployment 
rates stems  from the country-specific regression  model 
explained in the note to Graph 17.  

301½  million  is  the  midpoint  of  the  results  derived  from  the  methodologies  used  in  Graph  16  and  17.  The  panel 
regression shown in Graph 16 and country-specific regression in Graph 17 result in estimates of 1.35 million and 1.9 
million jobs saved, respectively.  

24 

 - 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800SpainItalyPolandGreecePortugalBulgariaCzechiaBelgiumHungarySlovakiaCyprusSloveniaLatviaEstoniaLithuaniaRomaniaMaltaIrelandMTELPTCYSIPLLTESROBEITLVCZBGSKIEHUFRNLDKATDESEFILUEE-5-4-3-2-1010.00.51.01.5Actual minus expected change in unemployment 2020Disbursed SURE funding 2020 (% of GDP)R2=0.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
SURE  also  contributed  to  preventing  a  rise  in  labour  market  inequality  across  Member 
States. SURE appears to have prevented a strong rise in unemployment in the countries who had 
suffered more labour market scarring during the global financial crisis. First, the increase in the 
average unemployment rate in SURE beneficiaries tracked very closely that in non beneficiaries 
following the COVID-19 crisis. This is in contrast to the aftermath of the global financial crisis 
when  average  unemployment  among  SURE  beneficiaries  increased  substantially  compared  to 
non-beneficiaries  (Graph  20).  Second,  the  dispersion  of  unemployment  rates  across  SURE 
beneficiaries  has  decreased  markedly  since  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  converging  gradually  to 
the lower dispersion experienced by the non-SURE beneficiaries (Graph 21). Also notable is that 
although  the  improvement  in  the  average  unemployment  rate  is  expected  to  stop  in  2023,  its 
dispersion  across  SURE  beneficiaries  is  expected  to  continue  to  fall.  This  reduction  in 
unemployment inequality is the opposite image of what was experienced in the global financial 
crisis. This result also suggests that SURE beneficiaries were those Member States whose labour 
markets needed the instrument the most. 

Graph  20:  Evolution  of 
the  average 
unemployment  rate  between  SURE  and 
non-SURE Member States 

Graph  21:  Historical  dispersion  of 
unemployment  rates  in  SURE  and  non-
SURE Member States 

Source: Ameco (spring 2023 forecast). 
Note:  “SURE-19”  refers  to  the  19  EU  Member  States 
that were granted SURE support. “Non-SURE” refers to 
the remaining 8 EU Member States. 

 Source: Ameco (spring 2023 forecast). 
Note: Dispersion refers to the standard deviation of the 
unemployment 
rate  of  SURE  and  non-SURE 
beneficiary  Member  States,  which  is  calculated  for 
each year. 

The  success  of  short-time  work  schemes  during  the  pandemic  has  also  been  affirmed  by 
external  research.  Research  carried  out  by  CEPS  on  the  take  up  of  job  retention  schemes 
showed  a  substantial  increase  in  take  up  compared  with  the  Great  Recession31.  Government 
financing of the entire scheme has the most positive impact on take up. Having a scheme in place 

31 See Corti, F., Ounnas, A, & Ruiz de la Ossa, T (2023). Job retention schemes between the Great Recession and 
the COVID-19 crises - Does the institutional design affect the take up? An EU-27 cross-country comparison. CEPS 
in-depth  analysis.  January  2023  –  02.  This  research  received  funding  from  the  EU  Horizon  2020  research  and 
innovation programme.  

25 

024681012142005200620072008200920102011201220132014201520162017201820192020202120222023SURE-19Non-SUREGlobal financial crisisCOVID-190.01.02.03.04.05.06.02005200620072008200920102011201220132014201520162017201820192020202120222023SURE-19Non-SUREGlobal financial crisisCOVID-19 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
prior  to  the  crisis  also  significantly  increased  the  use  of  schemes.  They  also  showed  that  the 
higher the wage paid and the coverage (e.g. to non-standard workers), the higher the take up. The 
findings provide further evidence to support that short-time work schemes funded by SURE were 
effective in mitigating the impact of COVID-19. Box 1 details some further examples of national 
research on the effectiveness of Member States schemes.  

Box 1: Existing evidence on the effectiveness of national schemes supported by SURE 

Existing evidence on the effectiveness of emergency support measures taken by Member States in response to the 
COVID-19 crisis is still quite limited. A recent study conducted by the Centre for European Policy Studies has 
shown  that  understanding  cross-national  differences  in  the  implementation  of  job  retention  policies  may  be 
important for their effectiveness. It shows that the expansion and increasing use of job retention policies is related 
to the design of these policies. Broader coverage, higher wage replacement rates, and more generous government 
funding are positively related to take-up rates.32 This box provides a brief summary of available data on national 
schemes in some Member States that have benefited from SURE support. 

In  Slovenia,  there  were  two  main  national  programmes  aimed  at  preventing  unemployment:  a  ‘part-time 
allowance’ covering part of the wage costs of employees whose workweek was reduced; and a furlough scheme 
paying wage compensation as well as training costs for workers whose contract had been temporarily suspended. 
During  the  period  covered  by  the  measure,  just  3%  of  the  total  of  1 850  employers  supported  went  out  of 
business.  Employment  registry  data  from  June  2021  indicate  that  7.3%  of  workers  in  the  supported  companies 
had lost their jobs after the measures ended, while 92.7% kept their jobs.33  

In  Greece,  several  measures  were  introduced  to  mitigate  the  pandemic  employment  shock,  including  a  ban  on 
layoffs in  the  most affected industries and conditioning income  support on employment retention. The analysis 
(based on a differences-in-differences estimation) of the employment effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and of 
the  associated  government  policy  response  shows  that  unemployment  did  not  increase  substantially,  mainly 
thanks to the job-retention measures. At the same time, seasonal work (mainly in tourism) decreased significantly 
due to the lockdown compared to the trends in previous years. This led to a limited increase in unemployment, 
which could be attributed to disrupted seasonal dynamics, as the lockdown coincided with the peak of seasonal 
hiring. Hiring trends did not return to pre-pandemic levels until the first quarter of 2021.34 

A comparison of the employment effects of the pandemic shock and government intervention in the Baltic states 
sheds light on the heterogeneous implementation and efficiency of the various measures.  Job retention measures 
have  significantly  reduced  the  rise  in  unemployment.  However,  there  is  evidence  that  the  various  types  of  job 
retention programmes (short-time work schemes, furlough schemes, and wage subsidies) may have had varying 
degrees of effectiveness across Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Foresight Centre, 2020).35 

3.1.2 SURE supported the labour market through several channels 

SURE added value by fostering confidence in the economy and encouraging Member States 
to set up wide-ranging and ambitious short-time work schemes at national level. Assessing 
the ‘additional impact’ of SURE compared with national measures is somewhat challenging. The 
survey-based evidence provided in earlier reports confirms the specific impact of SURE, namely 

32 Ibid.  
33  Ministrstvo  za  delo,  druzino,  socialne  zadeve  in  enake  moznosti  Republike  Slovenije,  S.  za  analize  in  razvoj. 
(2022). Analiticna podlaga za potrebe vzpostavitve stalne sheme skrajsanega delovnega casa v Sloveniji. 
34 Betcherman, G., Giannakopoulos, N., Laliotis, I., Pantelaiou, I., Testaverde, M., & Tzimas, G. (2023). The short-
in  Greece.  Empirical  Economics. 
the  2020  pandemic 
term 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-023-02381-2 
35  Foresight  Centre.  (2020).  A  comparative  review  of  socio-economic  implications  of  the  coronavirus  pandemic 
(COVID-19) in the Baltic States. 

lockdown  on  employment 

impact  of 

26 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
improving  confidence  across  the  EU,  the  EU’s  support  for  and  encouragement  of  the  use  of 
short-time work schemes in the specific context of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the enabling of 
Member  States  to  spend  more  than  otherwise  on  employment  support  in  response  to  the 
pandemic lockdowns and other restrictions on economic activity.  

Firstly, SURE helped improve general confidence in the EU’s ability to respond effectively 
to an unprecedented crisis. The EU policy response to COVID-19 was threefold: i) a relaxation 
of  the  regulatory  framework  including  the  Coronavirus  Response  Investment  Initiatives  (CRII 
and  CRII+),  the  state  aid  framework  and  the  activation  of  the  general  escape  clause  for  fiscal 
policy;  ii)  a  financial  backstop  (SURE  and  the  Pan-European  Guarantee  Fund  for  businesses); 
and iii) the announcement of the Next Generation EU instrument.36 This response complemented 
the  support  provided  through  the  European  structural  and  investment  funds,  notably  the 
European Social Fund. SURE required Member States to agree very quickly on establishing the 
instrument  and  to  voluntarily  provide  budgetary  guarantees,  which  sent  a  strong  signal  on  the 
EU’s ability to respond effectively and swiftly to a crisis. This collective capacity to respond to 
the crisis with adequately tailored instruments likely contributed to supporting the confidence of 
economic  agents  in  the  EU,  its  Member  States  and  the  quality  of  the  specific  policy  response. 
This  effect  was  illustrated  by  the  results  of  the  December  2021  Eurobarometer  survey,  which 
showed that 82% of euro area citizens, in both beneficiary and guarantor countries, thought that 
the  SURE  loans  were  a  good  idea  (Graph  22).37  This  confidence  is  understood  to  have 
contributed  to  reducing  the  interest  rate  spread  for  Member  States’  sovereign  borrowing  and 
improving the EU’s growth outlook. SURE helped mobilise fiscal policy in an effective manner, 
thanks  also  to  its  design,  tailored  to  the  type  of  shock  caused  by  COVID-19.  This  supportive 
fiscal stance worked in tandem with the accommodative monetary policy to safeguard economic 
activity during the pandemic. 

Secondly,  through  SURE,  the  EU  supported  and  encouraged  the  use  of  job-retention 
measures.  By  providing  financial  assistance  to  finance  short-time  work  schemes  and  similar 
measures, SURE encouraged Member States to pursue these types of policies, also in line with 
the  2020  Employment  Guidelines.  The  Commission  conducted  an  ad-hoc  survey  of  SURE 
beneficiary  Member  States  to  better  understand  how  well  this  channel  worked.38  The  survey 
found that SURE enabled Member States to be more ambitious in the policies they introduced.  

  A  majority  of  beneficiary  Member  States  indicated  that  SURE  played  a  role  in  their 
decision to adopt a new short-time work scheme or to modify an existing  scheme. Nine 
Member  States  set  up  a  new  short-time  work  scheme  in  response  to  the  COVID-19 

36 See also European Commission (2021), Report on Public Finances in EMU 2020 for further information on the 
EU policy response to COVID-19. 
37 Specifically, respondents were asked: “What are your thoughts about the most recent EU financial support for EU 
Member States to overcome the COVID-19 crisis? Do you think it was good or not good to provide… loans to help 
interested Member States keep people in employment?” See: https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2289  
38  To  better  understand  the  role  played  by  SURE  in  the  creation  and  use  of  short-time  work  schemes  and  similar 
measures at national level during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Commission directly solicited the views of Member 
State authorities through a questionnaire submitted to the Employment Committee (EMCO). Out of the 19 Member 
States that applied for support under SURE, 15 provided answers to the questionnaire. 

27 

 
 
                                                           
crisis39  and  four  Member  States  modified  an  existing  short-time  work  scheme.40  The 
majority of these schemes had been introduced or modified in March 2020, shortly before 
the  Commission  proposed  the  SURE  instrument.  After  SURE  was  proposed,  new 
schemes were introduced in Hungary, Greece, Romania and Slovenia, while pre-existing 
schemes were further modified by Italy and Spain. 

  SURE  also  enabled  some  Member  States  to  be  more  ambitious  on  measures  similar  to 
short-time work schemes. 17 Member States also requested SURE financial assistance for 
schemes similar to short-time work. Some Member States had introduced these measures 
before  SURE  was  proposed,  and  some  after.41  A  majority  of  Member  States  surveyed 
introduced  new  schemes  similar  to  short-time  work  in  response  to  the  potential 
availability of financing from SURE. Moreover, in three Member States, the availability 
of SURE financing contributed to an increase in the budget allocated for these schemes.  

Graph 22: EU citizens’ views on whether SURE loans were a good idea (% of total 
responses) 

Source:  Eurobarometer  survey  December  2021  publication,  conducted  in  euro  area  countries  in  October  and 
November 2021. See footnote 37.  

Thirdly, SURE underpinned Member States confidence to undertake larger borrowing and 
spending on related measures than they otherwise would have. This was particularly true as 
the financing was available at very low rates and a long maturity, as SURE was, and because it 
provided  an  early  element  of  the  EU  policy  response  when  uncertainty  remained  high.  A 
majority  of  beneficiary  Member  States  indicated  that  SURE  support  had  a  role  in  temporarily 
increasing  the  coverage  and  generosity  of  short-time  work  schemes  and  similar  measures,  and 
the  overall  funding  of  the  policies  to  address  the  COVID-19  crisis.42  Six  Member  States 
indicated  that  the  budget  of  their  respective  short-time  work  schemes  had  been  increased  after 

39  Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Greece,  Croatia,  Hungary,  Lithuania,  Latvia,  Romania  and  Slovenia.  Hungary  decided  to 
finance its new short-time scheme using European Structural and Investment Funds rather than SURE.  
40 Belgium, Spain, Ireland and Italy.  
41 These ‘similar’ schemes were legislated before 2 April (in Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Poland and Slovenia), after 2 
April  (in  Spain,  Hungary  and  Czechia),  or  at  various  moments  as  the  crisis  progressed,  between  March  and  July 
2020 (in Belgium, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta and Romania). 
42 According to the EMCO survey.   

28 

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%ESITFREuroAreaBEDELTSKELSICYEEPTATNLFIMTLULVIEGoodNot goodCan't decideDon't know / n/a 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
the Commission proposed the creation of SURE. In two of these cases, SURE was considered to 
have had a high degree of influence on the decision. 

Box 2: Illustrative model simulations on the impact of short-time work schemes financed by SURE 

This box uses the Commission’s Global Multi-country (GM) model to simulate the impact of SURE-financed short-
time work (STW) schemes during the COVID-19 pandemic.43  

(i) 

Methodology 

The  GM  model  is  an  open-economy  model  used  by  the  Commission  to  analyse  business  cycle  fluctuations  and 
macroeconomic  stabilisation  policies.  Its  behavioural  parameters  are  estimated  with  Bayesian  techniques,  and  the 
model is regularly used to contribute to the Commission’s European Economic Forecasts.  

The GM model is used here to study the impact of the STW schemes financed by SURE, which also include wage 
subsidies  and  similar  support  to  the  self-employed  (excluding  other  measures  such  as  health-related  ones).  As  the 
model is split in two regions, the euro area (20 Member States) and the rest of the world, the simulations only examine 
the impact of SURE funds disbursed to the 14 beneficiary Member States of the currency union, totalling around EUR 
72 billion (73% of total SURE support). The largest amount was spent in the second quarter of 2020, reaching about 
1% of (quarterly) euro area GDP. 

(ii) 

Channels of impact 

To  better  capture  the  impact  of  STW  schemes,  the  standard  GM  model  is  augmented  with  a  more  comprehensive 
labour  market structure.  Specifically, it allows distinguishing between the extensive  margin  (number of employees) 
and  the  intensive  margin  (hours  per  employee),  as  well  as  contractual  hours  paid  and  effective  hours  worked.  By 
subsidising  hours  not  worked  during  temporary  negative  shocks,  STW  schemes  result  in  job  retention  in  terms  of 
headcount.  In  other  words,  STW  schemes  can  encourage  firms  to  adjust  labour  through  reduced  hours  instead  of 
through layoffs. 

Besides  preventing  layoffs,  STW  accelerates  economic  recovery.  By  retaining  their  staff  thanks  to  STW  schemes, 
employers  also  avoid  the  costly  separation,  re-hiring,  and  training  processes  during  the  eventual  economic  upturns. 
This  cost-saving  channel  is  particularly  significant  during  deep  recessions  when  liquidity  constraints  and  weaker 
balance sheets impair the firms’ ability to avoid layoffs.  

Additionally, by mitigating unemployment, STW help  stabilise workers’ income and consumption demand. Overall, 
STW  schemes  can  mitigate  the  negative  impact  of  adverse  shocks  in  the  labour  market  and  contribute  to  a  more 
resilient economy. 

(iii) 

Simulation and results 

In  this  modelling  exercise,  STW  schemes  financed  by  SURE  are  considered  as  a  discretionary  government 
intervention  to  subsidise  non-worked  hours.  This  government  intervention,  scaled  to  the  size  of  SURE,  allows 
estimating the prevented job losses in a stylised manner. 

43 The GM model is a structural  macroeconomic model in the New Keynesian tradition. It is developed jointly by 
Directorate-General  for  Economic  and  Financial  Affairs  and  the  Joint  Research  Centre  of  the  European 
Commission. For a detailed description of the core GM model, see A. Albonico, L. Calès, R. Cardani, O. Croitorov, 
F. Di Dio, F. Ferroni, M. Giovannini, S. Hohberger, B. Pataracchia, F. Pericoli, P. Pfeiffer, R. Raciborski, M. Ratto, 
W. Roeger &  L.  Vogel (2019).  The Global Multi-Country  Model (GM): an Estimated DSGE  Model for the Euro 
Area Countries. ECFIN Discussion Paper No. 102. European Commission. 

29 

 
 
 
                                                           
Based on the channels described above, “standard” model simulations suggest that STW schemes financed by SURE 
have had a substantial positive impact on employment, preventing around ¾ million job losses in the euro area. 

However,  these  “standard”  simulation  results  may  underestimate  the  potential  impact  of  job  losses  during  a  deep 
recession, such as the one caused by COVID-19 pandemic. In particular, research suggests that wage rigidity and firm 
liquidity  constraints  can  significantly  amplify  employment  fluctuations.44  This  is  also  consistent  with  empirical 
evidence  showing  that  the  unemployment  rate  rises  faster  during  recessions  than  it  falls  during  expansions. 45  To 
capture this feature, a “deep recession” scenario considers a higher employment to output elasticity. 46 Accounting for 
these dynamics of the unemployment rate, the estimated number of jobs saved would be close to 1 million for the euro 
area. Put differently, without STW schemes financed by SURE, the euro area unemployment rate would have reached 
8.6% in 2020 (instead of the observed 8.0%).  

Overall, these stylised simulations suggest substantial job savings, in the same order of magnitude as the Okun’s law 
estimates presented on p.23. Unlike the Okun’s Law analysis presented in Graph 16, this simulation focuses only on 
the effects of STW schemes financed by SURE, rather than the overall policy response to COVID-19. 

(iv) 

Caveats 

The simulations show the strong impact of SURE on employment thanks to STW schemes. However, some caveats 
need to be considered when interpreting the results, in particular, the following upside and downside effects: 

 

 

 

 

(+)  In  principle,  STW  can  mitigate  further  demand  shortfalls  associated  with  unemployment  fears.  The 
modelling  does  not  include  these  additional  stabilisation  benefits  arising  from  reduced  precautionary 
savings.47  Moreover,  the  benefits  from  STW  schemes  as  automatic  stabilisers  could  exceed  those  of  the 
discretionary government intervention financed by SURE.48 
(+) By maintaining jobs and employment, STW schemes can prevent scarring effects from  unemployment, 
such as skill losses or discouragement from participating in the labour market. 
(-)  On  the  downside,  however,  the  model  simulations  exclude  possible  adverse  reallocation  effects  in  the 
labour  market,  as  STW  could  discourage  workers  from  moving  to  more  productive  firms  or  sectors. 
Nevertheless, the very strong rebound of the euro area economy in 2021 and the temporary nature of SURE   
suggested that this effect was of second order.  
(-)  Additionally,  the  model  does  not  account  for  potential  moral  hazard  problems,  such  as  firms  being 
incentivised to reduce hours more than necessary under STW. Nonetheless, empirical evidence suggests that 
this issue remains relatively contained.49 

3.2. Estimating the impact of SURE in 2021 and beyond: facilitating the economic recovery 

The  protection  of  employment  in  the  first  two  years  of  the  pandemic  supported  a  more 
rapid  economic  recovery  in  2021  than  in  previous  crises.  Firstly,  GDP  and  unemployment 

44 See, e.g., Giroud, X., & Mueller, H.  (2017). Firm Leverage, Consumer Demand, and Employment Losses During 
the Great Recession. Quarterly Journal of Economics 132 (1), 271–316. 
45 On business cycle asymmetries in the OECD, see, for example, Abbritti, M., & Fahr, S. (2013). Downward wage 
rigidity and business cycle asymmetries. Journal of Monetary Economics, 60(7), 871-886. 
46  To  capture  this  feature,  the  model’s  employment  adjustment  cost  parameter  is  halved.  While  stylised,  this 
parametrisation  is  broadly  in  line  with  Gehrke  and  Hochmuth,  who  show  that  the  effect  on  employment  after  a 
discretionary STW shock can double in a deeper recession. See Gehrke, B. & Hochmuth, B., (2021), Counteracting 
Unemployment in Crises: Non‐Linear Effects of Short‐Time Work Policy, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 123, 
issue 1, p. 144-183. 
47 Dengler and Gehrke estimate that accounting for precautionary savings can increase the stabilisation potential of 
STW by up to 55%. See, Dengler, T. & Gehrke, B. (2021). Short-time work and precautionary savings, IZA DP No. 
14329. 
48  See,  e.g.,  Balleer,  A.,  Gehrke,  B.,  Lechthaler,  W.,  &  Merkl,  C.  (2016).  Does  short-time  work  save  jobs?  A 
business cycle analysis. European Economic Review, 84, 99-122. 
49  See  Giupponi  G.  &  Landais  C.,  Subsidizing  Labour  Hoarding  in  Recessions:  The  Employment  and  Welfare 
Effects of Short-time Work, The Review of Economic Studies, (2022); and Giupponi G, Landais, C. & Lapeyre, A. 
(2022). Should We Insure Workers or Jobs during Recessions? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 36 (2): 29-54. 

30 

 
 
 
                                                           
reverted to their pre-crisis levels in SURE beneficiary Member States much faster than after the 
global financial crisis and euro area debt crisis (Graph 23). This occurred despite the subsequent 
waves  of  the  pandemic  that  necessitated  the  reintroduction  of  restrictions  during  202150. 
Secondly, despite the Russian invasion of Ukraine and resulting humanitarian and energy crisis, 
economic growth continued in 2022 and, based on the spring 2023 Commission forecast, should 
continue in 2023, albeit at a slower rate.51 Even so, it is still outperforming the recovery seen at 
the same stage after the global financial crisis and the euro area debt crisis, as the EU economy 
returned  to  its  pre-pandemic  output  level  in  2021,  while  it  remained  well  below  its  pre-crisis 
level  at  the  same  stage  in  the  two  previous  crises.  This  suggests  that  keeping  the  available 
workforce connected with firms via short-time work schemes and similar measures in the context 
of  the  COVID-19  pandemic  helped  support  the  swift  recovery,  despite  the  challenging 
epidemiological situation in 2021.52  

Graph 23: Historical comparison of the recovery in GDP and unemployment after a crisis 

Source: Ameco (Commission Spring 2023 forecast), Eurostat  
Note: Aggregate GDP and average unemployment rate for SURE beneficiary Member States shown. Time period t-
1 refers to the year prior to the respective crises. t=2009 for global financial crisis (GFC); t=2012 for euro area (EA) 
debt crisis; t=2020 for the Covid crisis. t+3 for the Covid crisis refers to 2023. 

Survey data shows that SURE supported the activity of the economic sectors most affected 
by  the  pandemic  in  2021.  The  EU  Business  and  Consumer  Survey  showed  that  the  services 
sectors most affected by COVID-19 in SURE beneficiary Member States (accommodation, food 
and beverage, travel  agencies, sports  activities and other personal  services) continued to  suffer 
from weak demand and confidence in the first half of 2021 in particular (Graph 24). In contrast, 

50 It should be noted nevertheless that the nature of the global financial crisis, specifically, the abrupt deleveraging 
that  it  forced  in  the  private  sector,  created  particularly  severe  consequences  for  activity  and  employment, 
irrespective of the employment support measures that could have been adopted. 
51  European  Commission  Directorate-General  for  Economic  and  Financial  Affairs  (2023).  European  Economic 
Forecast: Spring 2023.  
52  For  further  details  see  European  Commission  (2022),  Quarterly  Report  on  the  Euro  Area,  Section  III,  Vol.  21, 
No.2. The article shows that SURE did not impair labour mobility, which is relevant for an efficient reallocation of 
resources following the pandemic outbreak and its structural effects on the EU economy.  

31 

GFC (2009)EA debt crisis (2012)Covid (2020)90%92%94%96%98%100%102%104%106%108%GDPGFC (2009)EA debt crisis (2012)Covid (2020)80%100%120%140%160%180%200%Unemployment Rate 
 
 
 
                                                           
manufacturing was less affected by the restrictions in early 2021 and performed better. As shown 
in  Graph  12,  the  sectors  accounting  for  the  largest  share  of  SURE  expenditure  were 
accommodation  and  food  services  and  wholesale  and  retail  trade,  suggesting  that  SURE  has 
addressed the most pressing needs by supporting the worst-hit sectors.53  

 Graph 24: Services sectoral demand and SURE expenditure 

Source: EU Business and Consumer Survey Programme March 2023; Member States’ reporting (February 2023) 
Note: For services, average index shown for accommodation, food and beverage, travel agencies, sports activities 
and other personal services.  

3.3. The direct financial effect: interest savings  

Member States are estimated to have saved a total of EUR 9 billion on interest payments by 
receiving  financial  assistance  through  SURE.  This  amount  is  based  on  all  nine  issuances  of 
SURE, up to the disbursement of 14 December 2022 (Table 4).54 These savings were generated 
as  SURE  loans  offered  Member  States  lower  interest  rates  than  those  they  would  have  paid  if 
they had issued sovereign debt themselves, and this over an average period of close to 15 years.55 
This is due to the EU’s strong credit rating and the liquidity of the  SURE bonds.56 The largest 
savings were recorded by Member States with lower credit ratings. 

53 This seems to suggest that SURE primarily provided necessary support. See also footnote 52.  
54 Further detail on the methodology can be found in Section III of the Quarterly Report on the Euro Area Vol. 20, 
No 2 (2021). 
55  These  estimates  exclude  any  possible  additional  confidence  effects  that  new  emergency  instruments,  including 
SURE,  may  have  had  on  the  confidence  of  economic  agents  and  the  interest  rate  spread  for  Member  States’ 
sovereign borrowing. Furthermore, Member States could reduce the volume of their own sovereign issuance in those 
funding periods, which likely improved the conditions they could achieve with that issuance.  
56  The  EU  has  an  AAA  rating  from  Fitch,  Moody’s,  DBRS  and  Scope  and  an  AA+  (outlook  stable)  rating  from 
Standard and Poor’s.  

32 

-100-80-60-40-20020051015 Jan 20 Mar 20 May 20 Jul 20 Sep 20 Nov 20 Jan 21 Mar 21 May 21 Jul 21 Sep 21 Nov 21 Jan 22 Mar 22 May 22 Jul 22 Sep 22 Nov 22EUR BnMonthly SURE expenditure (LHS)Service demand expectations (next 3 months) (RHS)Retail orders expectations (next 3 months) (RHS)Manufact. product. expectations (months ahead) (RHS) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Table 4: Interest Rate Savings by Member State 

Member 
State 

Belgium 
Cyprus 
Greece 
Spain 
Croatia 
Hungary* 
Italy 
Lithuania 
Latvia 
Malta 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Slovenia 
Slovakia 
Bulgaria 
Ireland 
Czechia** 
Estonia*** 
Total 

Amount 
disbursed 
(EUR bn) 
8.2 
0.6 
6.2 
21.3 
1.6 
0.7 
27.4 
1.1 
0.5 
0.4 
11.2 
6.2 
3.0 
1.1 
0.6 
1.0 
2.5 
4.5 
0.2 
98.4 

Average 
spread 

Average 
maturity 

Interest savings 
(EUR bn) 

0.06 
0.64 
0.84 
0.44 
1.03 
1.80 
0.96 
0.13 
0.34 
0.56 
0.55 
0.46 
2.27 
0.23 
0.09 
1.76 
0.11 
0.23 
0.00 
0.67 

14.7 
14.7 
14.6 
14.7 
14.5 
14.8 
14.8 
14.8 
14.8 
14.6 
13.6 
14.7 
14.6 
14.8 
14.9 
15.0 
14.7 
10.1 
15.0 
14.5 

0.14 
0.06 
0.65 
1.58 
0.21 
0.15 
3.76 
0.02 
0.02 
0.04 
0.80 
0.42 
0.85 
0.05 
0.01 
0.18 
0.05 
0.04 
0.00 
9.03 

Interest Savings 
(% amount 
disbursed) 
1.7 
9.7 
10.6 
7.4 
13.4 
22.5 
13.7 
1.5 
4.1 
8.4 
7.2 
6.8 
28.4 
4.3 
1.3 
18.3 
2.1 
1.9 
0.0 
9.42 

Note: Interest savings are computed bond by bond, and summed across issue dates and maturities.  
* Hungary has issued only two 10-year and 30-year euro-denominated bonds since 2020, both in November 2020. 
Using these two bonds, the spread between the yield curve in national currency and in euro was extrapolated at 
other maturities and other issue dates.  
** Data on euro-denominated bond issuances in Czechia in 2022 were not available. Czechia’s interest savings are 
based on the first disbursement of EUR 2 billion to Czechia in 2021 only. 
*** Estonia has issued only one outstanding 10-year bond, no data was available for other maturities. The spread 
with the EU SURE social bond at these other maturities is assumed to be close to zero. 

IV. 

INFORMATION ON NATIONAL CONTROL AND AUDIT SYSTEMS 

4.1. A second questionnaire on national systems of ex ante and ex post controls including audits  

The Commission carried out the first questionnaire on national control and audit in early 
2022  to  understand  how  Member  States  respect  their  obligations  under  the  Loan 
Agreement.  These  results  were  reported  in  the  third  bi-annual  report  on  SURE.57  The  main 
findings were that in almost all Member States the institutions performing control and audit of 
the  measures  supported  by  SURE  were  already  in  place  before  the  COVID-19  pandemic.  All 
Member  States  ran  controls  on  measures  supported  under  SURE  and  checked  that  eligibility 
criteria  were  fulfilled.  In  all  Member  States  but  one,  controls  and  audits  detected  instances  of 
irregularities  or  fraud.  In  all  such  cases,  investigations  took  place.  In  the  case  of  confirmed 

57 In the third bi-annual report, the Commission also recalled the reporting obligations on control and audit of the 
Commission as lender and the Member State, as borrower. 

33 

 
 
                                                           
irregularities or fraud, all Member States recovered or are in the process  to recover improperly 
used funds either with or without legal action. 

The  purpose  of  the  follow-up  questionnaire  was  to  receive  further  information  on  how 
Member  States  fulfil  their  minimum  legal  obligations,  in  particular  on  ex  post  controls 
including  audit.  The  first  questionnaire  showed  that  further  explanation  was  needed  from 
Member States on the existence and the scope of ex-post controls, including audit. For the sake 
of  clarity,  the  follow-up  questionnaire  conducted  in  early  2023  distinguishes  between  ex-ante 
controls  (before  the  funds  are  released)  and  ex-post  controls  including  audits  (after  funds  are 
released).58  Its  aim  was  to  update  the  information  on  ex-ante  controls  and  bring  further 
explanation on the existence and the scope of ex post controls including audits. 

An additional goal was to collect information which will help the Commission to implement 
the European Court of Auditors’ recommendation. In 2022, the European Court of Auditors 
audited  the  performance  of  SURE  and  issued  one  recommendation,  including  on  audit  and 
control.59 The follow-up questionnaire is a first step towards implementing the recommendation. 
It  collects  information  on:  (i)  the  risk  of  irregularities  or  fraud  of  SURE-supported  measures 
based  on  perception  or  assessment  by  Member  States;  (ii)  the  scope  of  ex-ante  and  ex-post 
controls  for  measures  assessed  to  be  at  the  highest  risk  of  irregularities  or  fraud;  and  (iii)  the 
incidence of irregularities or fraud. 

The  results  of  the  first  and  the  follow-up  questionnaire  are  consistent  and  confirm  that 
Member  States  respected  their  legal  obligations  under  their  loan  agreements.60  The 
consolidated  findings  of  both  questionnaires  carried  out  in  early  2022  and  2023  show  that  all 
Member States reported to have controlled all SURE-supported measures, including those at the 
highest risk of irregularities or fraud, either ex-ante or ex-post (or both), in line with their legal 
obligations. In the case of confirmed irregularities or fraud, all Member States recovered or are 
in  the  process  of  recovering  improperly  used  funds  either  with  or  without  legal  action.  In 
addition,  in  case  of  fraud,  all  Member  States  took  measures  in  addition  to  those  to  recover 
improperly used funds such as launching criminal investigations.  

A summary of the results as reported by Member States in the follow-up questionnaire is 
provided in this section. Specifically, Section 4.2 reports on the risk of fraud or irregularities for 

58 Ex-ante controls are those carried out before funds are released. They are usually performed by the implementing 
bodies, e.g. bodies providing the funds to the final recipients. Ex-post controls, including audits are those carried out 
after funds are released. They can include controls and audits performed by departments that are not subordinated to 
the  implementing  departments  within  the  implementing  bodies  (e.g.  internal  audit  within  the  ministries),  but  also 
audits carried out by an independent body to the implementing bodies (e.g. audit body or Supreme Audit institution).  
59  The  European  Court  of  Auditors  recommends  the  Commission  to  evaluate  the  experience  of  SURE,  including 
whether the SURE framework was effective in minimising the risk of irregularities or fraud, given the cases reported 
by  Member  States.  See  Special  report  28/2022  on  Support  to  mitigate  Unemployment  Risks  in  an  Emergency 
(SURE). 
60  As  per  Article  13(1)  of  the  SURE  Regulation  and  Article  220(5)  of  the  Financial  Regulation  and  specifically, 
under  the  Loan  Agreement,  each  Member  State  benefiting  from  SURE  should  regularly  check  that  amounts 
borrowed under the Facility are used in accordance  with the SURE Regulation, the CID and the Loan Agreement 
and ensure that appropriate measures to prevent irregularities or fraud are in place. In case of irregular or improper 
use  of  the  amounts  borrowed,  the  Member  State  should  take  legal  actions  to  recover  such  amounts.  This  is 
complemented by the obligation on the Member State to investigate and treat cases of fraud, corruption or any other 
illegal activity detrimental to the EU’s financial interests, in relation to the management of the loan. 

34 

 
 
                                                           
SURE-supported measures, including its drivers. Section 4.3 covers the scope of ex-ante and ex-
post  controls  and  provides  examples  of  controls.  Section  4.4  focuses  on  SURE-supported 
measures  at  the  highest  risk  of  fraud  or  irregularities  and  reports  on  their  controls.  Finally, 
Section 4.5 provides information on incidence of irregularities or fraud, recovery rates and other 
measures taken as a response to irregularities or fraud. 

4.2. Riskiness of SURE-supported measures in terms of irregularities or fraud  

No Member State considers SURE-supported measures to be at a high risk of irregularities 
or fraud (Graph 25). Twelve Member States consider all SURE-supported measures to be at a 
low  risk  and  four  Member  States  at  a  medium  risk  while  three  Member  States  consider  some 
measures to  be at  a low  risk and the others at  a  medium  risk. Several  Member States reported 
that their ex-post controls, including audit, have not found a significant scale of irregularities or 
fraud. This has been also confirmed by an empirical study on the Italian short-time work scheme 
(Cassa Integrazione Guadagni - CIG) in the largest beneficiary Member State.  

Graph 25: The risk assessment of SURE-supported measures (number of Member States) 

Source: Member States’ questionnaires 

Low risk of irregularities or fraud – as reported by a large majority of Member States – is 
often explained by legally  and clearly  defined eligibility conditions which were controlled 
ex-ante.  Several  Member  States  reported  that  implementation  of  automatic  ex-ante  controls, 
such as cross-checking the consistency between the data declared by the applicants and the data 
in various administrative or social security registers, helped to avoid payments of undue benefits, 
thus reducing risks of irregularities or fraud. Some Member States considered SURE-supported 
measures to be at low risk of irregularities or fraud by design because the support was calculated 
using  the  information  already  available  in  administrative  databases,  including  before  the 
COVID-19 pandemic. In case of health-related measures, clear procurement criteria are reported 
to explain low-risk of irregularities or fraud.  

Medium risk of irregularities or fraud is reported in a few Member States where ex-ante 
controls  were  limited.  This  was  the  case  especially  at  the  onset  of  the  pandemic  when  the 
number of applicants surged in a short period of time while there was need to provide support to 
them as soon as possible. In addition, in some cases eligibility criteria could not be verified ex-
ante  as  the  data  (e.g.  the  size  of  the  fall  in  revenue)  was  not  yet  available.  In  those  cases, 
disbursements  were  based  on  the  declaration  of  honour  provided  by  applicants  in  which  they 
35 

 
 
 
 
claimed to meet all eligibility conditions. Member States put in place ex-post controls to verify 
the  correctness  of  the  applicants’  self-assessment  and  gradually  –  after  the  initial  wave  of 
applications – also strengthened their ex-ante controls. 

4.3. The scope and the type of ex-ante controls and ex-post controls including audits  

Almost  all  Member  States  reported  to  have  controlled  ex-ante  all  SURE-supported 
measures (Graph 26). Three beneficiary Member States reported that they did not control some 
of  their  measures  ex-ante  for  various  reasons  such  as  a  very  high  number  of  applicants  and  a 
limited  institutional  capacity  to  process  applications  in  a  short  period  of  time.  It  was  also 
reported that in some cases ex-ante controls were not needed as the benefits were calculated by 
the authorities themselves based on  past  data of beneficiaries. Member States compensated  the 
lack of ex-ante controls with ex-post controls.  

Examples of ex-ante controls include:61  

  Checking administrative/social security registers to verify the employer’s status (whether 
the  employer  operates  within  an  eligible  economic  activity,  date  of  registration  of  the 
activity, information on turnover), the person’s status (such as whether the person is an 
employee or not,  whether the labour  contract  is  suspended or not,  whether the  working 
hours  is  reduced  or  not,  whether  the  person  is  receiving  other  benefits  or  not),  the 
amounts requested, the age of the child (in case of parental leave benefits), whether tax 
liabilities have been settled.  
In case of sick leave, it was reported that a certificate of incapacity to work issued by GP 
was required before the benefits were paid out.  
In  case  of  health-related  measures,  it  was  reported  that  the  management  board  and  the 
health insurance provider had to approve the terms and conditions of covering the extra 
hours and higher salary for the medical personnel. 

 

 

61 Institutions in charge of ex-ante controls under SURE are explained in the third bi-annual report on SURE.  

36 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Graph  26:  Existence  of  ex-ante 
controls  for  all  SURE-supported 
measures 
(number  of  Member 
States) 

Graph  27:  The  scope  of  ex-post  controls,  including 
audit (number of Member States) 

Source: Member States’ questionnaires 

Source: Member States’ questionnaires 

More than a half of Member States reported to have controlled ex-post all or most SURE-
supported  measures  and  mostly  do  not  plan  additional  ex-post  controls  (Graph  27(i)). 
Additional  five  Member  States  reported  to  have  controlled  either  the  largest  measure,  or  the 
measure at the highest risk of fraud and irregularity, or both, while still planning further ex-post 
controls  (Graph  27(ii-iv)).  Two  Member  States  have  controlled  at  least  one  SURE-supported 
measure  ex-post  and  they  plan  additional  ex-post  controls,  including  audit,  in  2023.  The 
remaining  one  Member  State  plans  to  audit  all  SURE-supported  measures  in  the  first  half  of 
2023 (Graph 27(v)).  

Examples of ex-post controls include:62  

  Audit of expenditure on SURE-supported measures by an independent audit body as part 
of  the  budget  execution.  For  example,  an  independent  audit  body  checked  whether  the 
statutory benefits were correctly assigned and paid to the beneficiaries.  

  Financial  checks  on  the  beneficiaries’  turnover/revenue  to  assess  eligibility  and  the 
correct  amount  of  payments,  controls  that  employers  paid  the  full  amount  of  wages  to 
employees  and  did  not  terminate  their  employment  (for  example  during  the  period  for 
which compensation is  paid), controls to  prevent  that the beneficiaries received support 
from other incompatible sources (e.g. unemployment benefits), controls by ministries that 
spending of local labour offices was correct.  

  For health-related measures, it was reported that public procurement was audited as well 
as the health insurance fund which provided support to hospitals to cover the costs of an 
additional need for staff.  

Ex-post  controls  were  often  based  on  risk  and  performed  on  a  sample  of  beneficiaries. 
Specifically,  ex-post  controls  focused  on  beneficiaries  for  which  the  greatest  risk  of  misuse  of 

62  Institutions  in  charge  of  ex-post  controls  under  SURE  are  explained  in  the  third  bi-annual  report  on  SURE. 
Coordination  between  different  institutions  (e.g.  central,  regional  and  peripheral  offices)  was  reported  to  be 
important to identify cases of suspected or confirmed irregularities.  

37 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
the provided funds had been identified. For example, it was reported that ex-post controls would 
focus on companies that e.g. (i) hired new people or had a high percentage of people with tasks 
suitable for teleworking while making use of benefits under short time work schemes or similar 
measures (ii) were either re-activated or newly set up and then ceased to operate once the support 
was  discontinued  (iii)  adapted  their  legal  status  or  the  employment  contract  of  employees  to 
become  eligible  for  support  (iv)  were  already  subject  to  irregularities  or  fraud  in  the  past.  In 
some cases, risk was assessed based on the outcome from ex-post controls of similar expenditure 
(e.g. funded by the European Social Funds). It was also reported that ex-post controls were either 
random  or  they  involved  all  beneficiaries,  however  only  over  a  selected  period  of  time  (e.g.  a 
couple of months).   

All  Member  States  reported  to  have  controlled  SURE-supported  measures  either  ex-ante 
or ex-post (or both). The measures which were not controlled ex-ante were controlled ex-post to 
ensure the proper use of SURE-supported measures.63  

4.4. Controls of measures at the highest risk of irregularities or fraud 

The majority of Member States could not identify SURE-supported measures at the highest 
risk of irregularities or fraud (Graph 28). The main reason is that SURE-supported measures 
are considered to be at the low risk of irregularities or fraud. Four Member States identified the 
measures that provided support to the self-employed to be at the highest risk of irregularities or 
fraud  either  because  of  limited  ex-ante  controls  (in  an  effort  to  provide  the  support  as  soon  as 
possible) or because of irregularities which were found ex-post. 

Graph 28: SURE-supported measures at the 
fraud 
highest  risk  of 
(number of Member States) 

irregularities  or 

Graph  29:  Action  taken  or  planned  for 
SURE-supported  measures  at  the  highest 
risk  of  irregularities  or  fraud,  which  were 
not  ex-post  controlled  (number  of  Member 
States) 

Source: Member States’ questionnaires 

Source: Member States’ questionnaires 

Those  Member  States  that  identified  SURE-supported  measures  at  the  highest  risk  of 
irregularities  and  fraud  took  action  to  ensure  proper  use  of  funds.  Specifically,  all  (nine) 

63 One Member State provided information on control and audit for labour market measures only.   

38 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Member States that identified SURE-supported measures at the highest risk of irregularities and 
fraud controlled ex-ante such measures.64 In addition, five Member States also reported that they 
ex-post  controlled  them  (Graph  28).  The  four  Member  States  that  have  not  ex-post  controlled 
such measures reported that they either still plan ex-post controls or that ex-ante controls offer a 
high degree of reliance that the expenditure was properly used (Graph 29).  

4.5. Incidence of irregularities or fraud and remedial measures    

The amounts to be recovered – as a proxy for the incidence of irregularities or fraud – for 
the  largest  SURE-supported  measure  have  been  in  most  cases  below  2%  of  total 
expenditure  (Graph  30).  However,  this  data  is  only  indicative  and  not  comparable  across 
countries due to heterogenous measures.65 Some Member States informed that the amounts to be 
recovered include fines imposed because of fraud. 

Eleven out of fifteen Member States have recovered until now more than 75% of the total 
amount  due  (Graph  31).  In  some  Member  States,  the  recovery  rate  would  be  higher  if,  for 
example,  out-of-court  settlements  allowing  for  repayment  in  (future)  instalments  were  also 
considered.  

While all Member States detected irregularities, about two thirds of Member States have 
also detected fraud.  In case of fraud, all Member States took measures in addition to those to 
recover improperly used funds such as  notifying the relevant  investigation bodies and carrying 
out  the  relevant  law  enforcement  procedures.  Some  Member  States  reported  to  have  taken  a 
preventive  action  as  a  response  to  fraud  or  irregularities  such  as  building  a  new  Business 
Intelligence system to predict risks of fraud and optimize preventive detection or creating a list 
of the entities which did not fulfil the eligibility conditions to prevent them from (successfully) 
applying again.  

64 Two Member States identified the SURE-supported measure at the highest risk of irregularities and fraud based 
on its size and not risk.  
65  For  example,  Slovenia  reported  that  in  case  of  their  largest  measure  (“waiting  for  work”,  which  is  a  short  time 
work scheme), the support was granted in 2020 on the basis of the applicant’s subjective assessment of the expected 
fall  in  revenue  in  2020.  Given  uncertainty  in  the  economy  it  was  difficult  to  predict  the  exact  fall  in  revenue, 
therefore, the majority of irregularities for this measure was related to the (non)fulfilment of this eligibility condition 
ex-post. This also explains a relatively high incidence of irregularities or fraud (10% in Graph 30).  

39 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Graph  30:  Incidence  of  irregularities  or 
fraud  for  the  largest  SURE-supported 
measure (as % of total expenditure) 

Graph  31:  Recovery  rates  for  the  largest 
(recovered 
SURE-supported 
amounts  as  %  of  total  amount  to  be 
recovered) 

measure 

Source: Member States’ questionnaires 
Note: The recovery rate is reported for all measures in the 
case  of  Croatia  and  Cyprus  and  for  the  second  largest 
measure  in  the  case  of  Czechia.  Bulgaria,  Greece  and 
Poland did not provide the recovery rates.  

the 

the 

total  expenditure  for 

Source:  Member  States’  questionnaires  and  own 
calculations 
Note:  The  incidence  of  irregularities  or  fraud  is 
calculated as the amount to be recovered  with respect 
to 
largest  SURE-
supported measure in each Member State. The data is 
only  indicative  and  not  comparable  across  countries 
due  to  heterogenous  measures  (see  footnote  64).  The 
incidence  is  reported  for  all  measures  in  the  case  of 
Croatia and Cyprus and for the second largest measure 
in the case of Czechia. In those cases, the incidence is 
calculated  with respect to the total expenditure  for all 
or  the  second  largest  measure,  as  applicable.  For 
Bulgaria,  the  incidence  is  calculated  based  on  the 
amount recovered and not the amount to be recovered. 
Greece,  Poland  and  Portugal  did  not  provide  info 
either  on  the  amount  to  be  recovered  or  the  amount 
recovered.  

V.  THE  CONTINUATION  OF  THE  EXCEPTIONAL  OCCURRENCES  THAT  JUSTIFY  THE 

APPLICATION OF THE SURE REGULATION 

The sunset clause of the SURE instrument took effect on 1 January 2023. The Commission 
was  required  to  report  on  the  continuation  of  the  exceptional  occurrences  that  justified  the 
application  of  the  SURE  Regulation  while  the  Instrument  was  active.66  The  fourth  bi-annual 
report  in  September  2022  was  not  accompanied  by  a  proposal  to  extend  the  Instrument:  it 
recognised that most COVID-19-related restrictions had been phased out as the epidemiological 
threat  of  the  virus  waned.  As  those  exceptional  occurrences  no  longer  existed,  financial 

66 Article 14(1) of the SURE Regulation. According to Art 12(3) of the SURE Regulation, the period of availability 
of  the  Instrument  during  which  a  CID  can  be  adopted  shall  end  on  31  December  2022.  According  to  Art.  12(4), 
where the Commission concludes in  its implementation report that the severe economic disturbance caused by the 
COVID-19 outbreak affecting the financing of eligible measures continues to exist, the Council, on a proposal from 
the  Commission,  may  decide  to  extend  the  period  of  availability  of  the  Instrument,  each  time  for  an  additional 
period of six months.  

40 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
assistance  under  the  Instrument  ceased  to  be  available  on  31  December  2022.  This  section 
examines whether that assessment remains valid.  

COVID-19  emergency  measures  were  almost  entirely  phased  out  by  the  end  of  summer 
2022.  Although  the  Omicron  variant  has  seen  periodic  waves  of  infection  peaking  every  2-3 
months,  the  epidemiological  and  economic  impact  of  COVID-19  has  continued  to  decline 
overall.  According  to  the  European  Centre  for  Disease  Control,  there  has  been  a  general 
downward  trend  in  the  height  of  the  peaks  in  reported  cases,  hospitalisations,  ICU  admissions 
and deaths over the last 12 months.67 Member States have not needed to reintroduce containment 
or economic support measures, allowing COVID-19 related expenditure to continue to be phased 
out. As of 7 May 2023, all EU/EEA COVID-19 indicators were either decreasing or stable, and 
in  the  few  Member  States  in  which  some  indicators  increased,  the  values  remained  relatively 
low.68  The  World  Health  Organisation  re-classified  COVID-19  as  an  established  and  ongoing 
health issue rather than a public health emergency of international concern on 5 May 2023.  

This  confirms  the  Commission’s  earlier  assessment  that  the  exceptional  occurrences 
justifying  SURE  no  longer  exist.  The  stable  epidemiological  situation  is  also  reflected  in 
Member  States’  expenditure  on  SURE-eligible  measures,  which  amounted  to  just  EUR  66 
million in total by December 2022, compared to EUR 1.3 billion in January 2022. SURE was a 
temporary  emergency  instrument,  and  with  the  emergency  phase  of  the  pandemic  over,  it  has 
also come to an end.  

VI.  REPORTING OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE EU SURE SOCIAL BOND FRAMEWORK 

This  report  goes beyond the  reporting  obligation  of  the SURE regulation, also  complying 
with the reporting requirement under the EU SURE Social Bond Framework.69 The latter 
requires reporting on the allocation of SURE proceeds, type of expenditure and impact of SURE.  

The  breakdown  of  SURE  proceeds  by  beneficiary  Member  State  and  by  type  of  Eligible 
Social Expenditure is provided in Sections 1.1 and 3.2, respectively. By December 2022, all 
of  the  EUR  98.4  billion  allocated  had  been  disbursed  to  19  Member  States  and  all  of  this 
financial assistance had been spent by Member States.  

SURE  public  expenditure  continues  to  be  well-aligned  with  the  UN  Sustainable 
Development  Goals  (SDGs).  A  breakdown  of  SURE-financed  public  expenditure  by  eligible 
social  expenditure,  as  outlined  in  the  Social  Bond  Framework,  shows  that  95%  is  spent  on 
reducing the risk of unemployment and loss of income. As illustrated in Graph 32, this supports 
SDG  8  (Decent  Work  and  Economic  Growth).  The  remaining  5%  is  spent  on  health-related 
measures, which supports SDG 3 (Good Health and Well-being).  

67 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/covid-19/country-overviews  
68 Ibid. 
69 The EU SURE Social Bond Framework defines a standard, which provides investors with assurances that the EU 
bonds issued within this framework relate to projects serving a true social purpose. The framework is therefore in 
line  with the ICMA Social Bond Principles, namely (i) the use of proceeds; (ii) the process for project evaluation 
and  selection; 
further  details,  please  see: 
eu_sure_social_bond_framework.pdf (europa.eu) 

(iii)  management  of  proceeds  and 

reporting.  For 

(iv) 

41 

 
 
                                                           
The impact of SURE is reported on in Section 2.4 and Section 3. Estimates are provided of 
the  number  of  people  and  firms  supported  by  SURE  for  each  of  2020,  2021  and  2022.  SURE 
contributed  to  protecting  an  estimated  1½  million  jobs  that  were  saved  in  2020,  as  shown  in 
Section  3.1.  SURE  was  shown  to  have  supported  the  growth  rebound  in  2021  and  2022,  as 
shown in Section 3.2. Member States are now estimated to have saved EUR 9 billion in interest 
payments, as shown in Section 3.3. 

Graph 32: Social Bond Framework and SDG mapping 

SDG 3: Good 
Health and 
Well-being 

SDG 8: 
Decent 
Work and 
Economic 
Growth 

Source: Member States’ reporting (February 2023). 

VII.  FINAL  CONSIDERATIONS  ON  THE  VALUE  ADDED  OF  SURE  WITH  THE  BENEFIT  OF 

HINDSIGHT 

This  section  discusses  three  broad  policy  lessons  that  can  be  drawn  from  the  success  of 
SURE.  The  preliminary  assessment  in  this  report  shows  that  SURE  has  been  an  overall 
success.70  Furthermore,  in  June  2021,  SURE  won  the  European  Ombudsman  2021  Award  for 
Good  Administration  in  the  category  citizen-focussed  service  delivery.  Three  key  lessons  that 
can be  learned  from  SURE are discussed here but  will be further assessed in  the evaluation  of 
SURE that the Commission has announced it will publish by Q3 2024.  

Firstly, SURE responded to a specific emergency need that arose in the pandemic context 
and  was  both  social  and  economic  in  nature.  Amid  the  uncertainty  at  the  outset  of  the 
pandemic, it was crucial for policymakers to  take concrete steps to  avoid long-term social  and 
economic  scarring  due  to  a  shock  that  had  strong  reasons  to  be  assumed  to  be  (correctly,  as  it 
turned  out)  of  temporary  nature.  To  that  end,  SURE  served  a  clear  and  well-defined  purpose, 
responding  to  a  specific  and  pressing  need  identified  by  both  Member  States  and  the 
Commission.  This  purpose  was  to  retain  workers  in  employment  to  protect  their  incomes  and 
mitigate  the  negative  economic  and  social  consequences  of  the  pandemic.  It  responded  in 
particular to the halt to  economic activities linked to the lockdowns and containment  measures 

70 The considerations discussed in this section are drawn from  European Commission (2022), Quarterly Report on 
the Euro Area, Section III, Vol. 21, No.2. 

42 

Expenditure to reduce the risk of unemployment and loss of income95%Expenditure on health-related measures, in particular in the workplace5% 
 
 
                                                           
 
that  were  introduced  across  the  EU  to  tame  the  severe  epidemiological  situation,  reduce  the 
speed of contagion and protect lives. The social nature of this goal was emphasised by the EU’s 
issuance of social bonds for the first time, which has also proven popular with investors.  

The  scope  of  SURE  was  particularly  effective  as  it  was  not  based  on  a  rigid  institutional 
definition, but was purpose-based, i.e. supporting job retention. SURE was not limited to a 
narrow type of instrument that was only a means to an end. Its headline focus was on short-time 
work schemes (and similar measures for the self-employed) as the most efficient type of labour 
market  measure  to  implement  during  a  regulated  closure  of  the  economy  (i.e.  COVID-19 
lockdown).71 This also gave Member States a clear policy direction during the crisis. At the same 
time,  a  key  purpose  of  SURE  was  to  provide  Member  States  with  operational  leeway  to  tailor 
their  labour  market  response  to  their  needs  in  the  face  of  unprecedented  and  dramatic 
circumstances. For this reason, SURE covered an array of measures fulfilling the same purpose 
as short-time work schemes, namely to retain jobs in firms, while providing income protection to 
workers during the pandemic. These measures included support for self-employed workers and 
wage subsidy schemes (where support is not granted on the basis of hours not worked, but rather 
as  a  lump  sum  or  a  share  of  the  wage  bill).  Other  measures  included  various  reductions  in 
indirect  labour  costs  (related  to  job  retention),  sick  leave  and  special  leave  benefits,  and  other 
specific  measures  to  extend  the  activity  of  atypical  workers  (such  as  intermittent  or  seasonal 
workers).  

Secondly,  in  terms  of  governance,  SURE  showed  the  merit  of  the  EU  method,  combined 
with  policy-based  conditionality  and  flexible  national  implementation.  SURE  was  initiated 
by  the  Commission  following  the  EU  Community  method,  rather  than  the  intergovernmental 
approach. This  ensured  accountability and solidarity  among Member States, while contributing 
to  avoiding  any  possible  stigma.  The  Commission  proposed  only  policy-based  conditionality 
under SURE: the only condition to access the scheme was that Member States had faced a severe 
and  sudden  increase  in  spending  on  short-time  work  schemes  and  similar  measures  due  to  the 
pandemic,  and  to  use  the  SURE  funds  for  their  intended  purpose.  This  form  of  conditionality 
allowed  Member  States  to  retain  ownership  of  the  measures  implemented  nationally,  while 
benefitting from the financial support and policy orientations provided under SURE.  

Thirdly, the SURE instrument was underpinned by a robust financial construction.  SURE 
came  into  existence  based  on  a  guarantee  system  provided  by  Member  States.  All  Member 
States, including the eight that did not benefit from SURE, provided a total of EUR 25 billion of 
guarantees. These guarantees were provided voluntarily, and, once granted, became irrevocable, 
unconditional  and  on-call.  This  guarantee  system  is  financially  robust  (while  also  a  clear 
expression of solidarity through the EU budget). This system made SURE bonds highly credible 
to  markets  and  credit  rating  agencies,  paving  the  way  for  the  strong  investor  demand  that 
materialised  for  each  issuance.  The  popularity  of  SURE,  amongst  both  Member  States  and 
investors,  also  reduced  the  risk  of  stigma  attached  to  the  use  of  financial  assistance  by  any 
particular Member State.  

71 There  was also recognition  of the  particular effectiveness of short-time  work schemes  by academia  at the early 
stages of the pandemic, e.g. Laudais and Giupponi in VoxEU, April 2020: https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/building-
effective-short-time-work-schemes-covid-19-crisis.  

43 

 
 
                                                           
ANNEX: Further detail on SURE transactions and disbursements 

Table A1:  Disbursements to Member States under SURE (in EUR billion) 

1st EU SURE 
issuance 
Transaction: 
20.10.2020 
Disbursement: 
27.10.2020 

2nd EU SURE 
issuance 
Transaction: 
10.11.2020 
Disbursement: 
17.11.2020 

3rd EU SURE 
issuance 
Transaction: 
24.11.2020 
Disbursement: 
01.12.2020 

4th EU SURE 
issuance 
Transaction: 
26.01.2021 
Disbursement: 
02.02.2021 

Total 
loan 
amoun
t 

Country 

10y  20y Total  5y  30y  Total 

15y 

2.0 

7y  30y  Total 

1.3  0.7  2.0 

5th EU 
SURE 
issuance 
Transaction: 
09.03.2021 
Disburseme
nt: 
16.03.2021 
15y 

0.5 

6th EU SURE 
issuance 
Transaction: 
23.03.2021 
Disbursement: 
30.03.2021 

7th EU SURE 
issuance 
Transaction: 
18.05.2021 
Disbursement: 
25.05.2021 

8th EU 
SURE 
issuance 
Transaction: 
22.03.2022 
Disbursemen
t: 
29.03.2022 

9th EU 
SURE 
issuance 
Transaction: 
07.12.2022 
Disbursemen
t: 
14.12.2022 

Total 
Disburse
d 
(100% of 
loan 
amount) 

Avg. 
maturi
ty 

5y  25y  Total  8y  25.6y  Total 

15y 

15y 

1.3  0.9 

2.2  1.1  0.9 

0.3  0.2 

2.0 

0.5 

0.3  0.2  0.5 

0.2  0.1  0.3 

0.2  0.1  0.2 

0.1  0.0 

0.1 

1.0 

1.0 

1.0 

Belgium  8.2 

Bulgaria  1.0 

Croatia 

Cyprus 

Czechia 

Estonia 

Greece 

1.6 

0.6 

4.5 

0.2 

6.2 

Hungary  0.7 

Ireland 

2.5 

1.0  1.0  2.0 

0.7 

0.7 

0.2 

0.2  0.1  0.3 

Italy 

27.4  5.5  4.5  10.0  3.1  3.4  6.5 

4.5 

4.5 

3.9 

Latvia 

0.5 

Lithuania  1.1 

Malta 

0.4 

0.1  0.0  0.1 

0.2  0.1  0.3 

0.1  0.0  0.1 

0.0  0.0  0.1 

0.3 

0.1 

Portugal 

6.2 

Romania  3.0 

Slovakia  0.6 

Slovenia  1.1 

3.0 

3.0 

0.3 

0.2  0.0  0.2 

Spain 

21.3  3.5  2.5  6.0  2.9  1.2  4.0 

0.5  0.4  0.9 

1.0  1.0 

Total 

98.4  10.0  7.0  17.0  8.0  6.0  14.0 

8.5 

10.0  4.0  14.0 

0.3 

2.9 

9.0 

44 

0.5 

0.6 

0.0 

2.5 

0.9 

0.2 

0.1 

1.5 

0.3 

8.2 

1.0 

1.6 

0.6 

4.5 

0.2 

6.2 

0.7 

2.5 

27.4 

0.5 

1.1 

0.4 

11.2 

6.2 

3.0 

0.6 

1.1 

21.3 

98.4 

14.7 

15.0 

14.5 

14.7 

12.8 

15.0 

14.6 

14.8 

14.7 

14.8 

14.7 

14.8 

14.6 

13.6 

14.7 

14.6 

14.9 

14.8 

14.7 

14.5 

0.1  0.1 

1.6  0.9 

0.2 

2.5 

1.3  1.2 

0.7  1.2 

2.5 

1.9 

0.8 

0.1  0.0 

0.2  0.2 

0.1  0.1 

1.5  0.9 

0.1 

1.5 

0.5 

0.8 

0.1 

0.4 

0.2 

1.6 

2.4 

2.4  1.7 

4.1  1.9  1.4 

3.4 

8.0  5.0 

13.0  8.1  6.0 

14.1 

2.2 

6.5 

Poland 

11.2  1.0  0.0  1.0 

2.6  1.7  4.3 

1.4 

1.4  1.1  0.5 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2: Key Statistics of the EU’s SURE Borrowing Transactions (EUR) 

SURE #1 

SURE #2 

SURE #3 

SURE #4 

SURE #5 

SURE #6 

SURE #7 

SURE #8  SURE #9 

Tranche 

10 year 

20 year 

5 year 

30 year 

15 year 

7 year 

30 year 
(tap) 

15 year 

5 year 

25 year 

8 year 

25 year 

15 year 

15 year 

Size of bond  10 bn 

7 bn 

8 bn 

6 bn 

8.5 bn 

10 bn 

4 bn 

9 bn 

8 bn 

5 bn 

8.137 bn 

6 bn 

2.17 bn 

6.548 bn 

Yield 

-0.238%  0.131% 

-0.509%  0.317% 

-0.102%  -0.497%  0.134% 

0.228% 

-0.488%  0.476%  0.019%  0.757% 

1.199% 

2.767% 

Spread 

MS+3 
bps 

MS +14 
bps 

MS-9 
bps 

MS+21 
bps 

MS-5bps 

MS-16 
bp 

MS+5 bp  MS-4 bps 

MS-14 
bps 

MS+1 
bps 

MS-2 
bps 

MS+17 
bps 

MS – 
8bps 

MS+21bps 

Spread to 
Bund (bps) 

Spread to 
OAT (bps) 

New Issue 
Concession 

Total 
investor 
demand 

36.7 

52.1 

18.5 

36.4 

26.9 

20 

25.2 

33.4 

20 

34.4 

31.5 

40.6 

55.9 

86.8 

9.2 

3.2 

7.7 

-9.9 

0.5 

-1 

-23.1 

-2.6 

3.1 

-11 

-1.2 

-21 

4.9 

24 

+1 bp 

+2 bps  +1.5 bps  +2.5 bps 

+1 bp 

1 bps 

1 bps 

2 

1.5 bps 

1.5 bps 

2 bps 

2.5 bps 

1 bps 

4 bps 

145 bn 

88 bn 

105 bn 

70 bn 

114 bn 

83 bn 

49 bn 

86 bn 

46.5 bn 

40 bn 

51.2 bn 

37.5 bn 

35 bn 

25 bn 

Note: These statistics refer to the Commission’s borrowings on behalf of the Union. New issue concession refers to the premium paid to investors purchasing a new-issue 
bond over the spread at which corresponding bonds would be expected to trade in the secondary market.  

45