COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2009/18/EC establishing the fundamental principles governing the investigation of accidents in the maritime transport sector
Date: 2023-06-01
Institutions: Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport, European Commission
Subjects: environmental protection, marine environment, maritime safety, maritime transport, transport accident

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 1.6.2023  SWD(2023) 145 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT  Accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council  amending Directive 2009/18/EC establishing the fundamental principles governing the investigation of accidents in the maritime transport sector {COM(2023) 270 final} - {SEC(2023) 201 final} - {SWD(2023) 146 final}  
 
 
Table of Contents 

1. 

2. 

INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT ............................................................... 1 

PROBLEM DEFINITION .................................................................................................................. 10 

2.1.  What are the problems? ................................................................................... 11 
2.2.  What are the problem drivers? ........................................................................ 13 
2.3.  How likely are the problems to persist? .......................................................... 19 

3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? ........................................................................................................ 20 

3.1.  Legal basis ....................................................................................................... 20 
3.2.  Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action ............................................................... 20 
3.3.  Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action .......................................................... 21 

4.  OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? ............................................................................... 21 

4.1.  General objectives ........................................................................................... 21 
4.2.  Specific objectives ........................................................................................... 21 

5.  WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? .................................................................... 23 

5.1.  What is the baseline from which options are assessed? .................................. 23 
5.2.  Policy measures and policy options ................................................................ 25 
Discarded policy measures ........................................................ 25 

5.2.1. 

5.2.2. 

Retained policy measures ......................................................... 25 

5.3.  Description of the policy options .................................................................... 25 
Policy option A .......................................................................... 27 

5.3.1. 

5.3.2. 

5.3.3. 

Policy option B........................................................................... 27 

Policy option C ........................................................................... 28 

6.  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? ........................................................... 29 

6.1.  Economic impacts ........................................................................................... 30 
Impacts on Accident Investigation Bodies ................................ 30 

6.1.1. 

6.1.2. 

6.1.3. 

6.1.4. 

6.1.5. 

6.1.6. 

Impacts on the ship operators .................................................. 33 

Impact on EMSA ........................................................................ 35 

Impacts on SMEs ....................................................................... 37 

Functioning of the internal market and competition ............... 38 

Impacts on competitiveness ..................................................... 39 

6.2.  Social impacts .................................................................................................. 39 
Maritime safety ......................................................................... 39 

6.2.1. 

6.2.2. 

6.2.3. 

Impacts on working conditions and skills ................................. 40 

Impacts on fundamental rights ................................................. 40 

I 

 
 
 
6.3.  Environmental impacts .................................................................................... 41 

7.  HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? ............................................................................................ 43 

7.1.  Effectiveness .................................................................................................... 43 
7.2.  Efficiency ........................................................................................................ 45 
7.3.  Coherence ........................................................................................................ 47 
7.4.  Subsidiarity and proportionality ...................................................................... 47 

8. 

PREFERRED POLICY OPTION ....................................................................................................... 48 

Identification of the preferred policy option and stakeholders views ............. 48 
8.1. 
8.2.  REFIT .............................................................................................................. 49 
8.3.  Application of the ‘one in, one out’ approach ................................................. 49 

9.  HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? .................................. 50 

ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ............................................................................................ 51 

1. 

LEAD DG, DECIDE PLANNING/CWP REFERENCES .................................................................. 51 

2.  ORGANISATION AND TIMING ...................................................................................................... 51 

3. 

4. 

CONSULTATION OF THE RSB....................................................................................................... 51 

EVIDENCE, SOURCES AND QUALITY ......................................................................................... 52 

ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION (SYNOPSIS REPORT) ................................................ 54 

ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW? .......................................................................................... 60 

1. 

2. 

3. 

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE INITIATIVE..................................................................... 60 

SUMMARY OF COSTS AND BENEFITS ....................................................................................... 62 

RELEVANT SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS ............................................................... 63 

ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL METHODS ..................................................................................................... 65 

ANNEX 5: EU/EEA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BODIES FALLING WITHIN THE SCOPE 

OF DIRECTIVE 2009/18/EC  BY TYPE AND YEAR OF ESTABLISHMENT .............................. 80 

ANNEX 6: IMO SUPERSEDED OR OUT OF DATE REFERENCES ...................................................... 81 

ANNEX 7: DISCARDED PROBLEM DRIVERS AND POLICY MEASURES ........................................ 83 

ANNEX 8: RETAINED POLICY MEASURES .......................................................................................... 87 

ANNEX 9: EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DIFFERENT POLICY OPTIONS .............................................. 91 

II 

 
 
 
 
Glossary 

Term or acronym 

Meaning or definition 

AIB 

AID 

EC 

EMCIP 

EMSA 

EU 

FTE 

GDPR 

GISIS 

IA 

IMO 

LBP 

LNG 

LOA 

PCF 

PM 

PO 

MARPOL 

SME 

SOLAS 

UNCLOS 

VSMC 

Accident Investigation Body 

Accident Investigation Directive (Directive 2009/18/EC) 

European Commission  

European Maritime Casualty Information Platform  

European Maritime Safety Agency 

European Union 

Full-time equivalent 

General Data Protection Regulation (Regulation 2016/679) 

(IMO) Global Integrated Shipping Information System  

Impact assessment  

International Maritime Organisation  

Length Between Perpendiculars 

Liquid Natural Gas 

Length Overall 

Permanent Cooperation Framework of EU/EEA Accident 
Investigation bodies 

Policy measure 

Policy option 

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 

Small or Medium-sized Enterprise 

International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 

Very Serious Marine Casualty  

III 

 
1. 

INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT 

This  Impact  Assessment  accompanies  a  legislative  proposal  for  a  revision  of  Directive 
2009/18/EC  establishing  the  fundamental  principles  governing  the  investigation  of 
accidents  in  the  maritime  transport  sector  (hereinafter  “the  AI  Directive”  or  “the 
Directive”)1. 

The  AI  Directive  establishes  the  fundamental  principles  governing  the  investigation  of 
accidents in the maritime transport sector. Under the Directive, maritime accidents falling 
within  the  scope  of  the  Directive  are  investigated  by  independent  national  accident 
investigation  bodies  determine  the  cause  of  the  accident  so  as  to  improve  maritime 
safety, as well to protect the marine environment, by learning lessons from accidents to 
prevent their reoccurrence. These inquiries are called safety investigations.  

Maritime  transport  is  a  key  sector  for  the  EU  economy  as  it  embodies  the  main 
transport  mode  for  European  imports  and  exports  to  the  rest  of  the  world.  Maritime 
transport  is  estimated2  to  represent  around  80%  of  worldwide  goods  transported  and 
around 30% of intra-EU  transport activity.  In  2019, 1.9  billion tonnes were transported 
by  short  sea  shipping3  to/from  the  main  EU  ports.  In  addition,  418  million  passengers 
aboard ferries and cruise vessels embarked and disembarked in EU ports in 2019.  

At  the  same  time,  an  average  of  2,239  marine  accidents  were  reported  on  average  per 
year between 2014 and 2020 for EU Member States, of which 33% were categorised as 
very serious  or serious  casualties.  In addition,  370 cases of marine  pollution have been 
reported in total during 2014-20204.    

The  revision  of  the  AI  Directive  has  to  be  seen  in  the  context  of  the  Commission’s 
Communication on a Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy (SSMS) which sets out 
the  EU  vision  for  the  transport  system  of  the  future.  The  strategy  announced  that  the 
Commission  is  planning  to  initiate  a  major  review  of  existing  legislation  on  flag  State 
responsibilities,  port  State  control  and  accident  investigation  in  2021.  According  to 
the  SSMS,  the  overall  objective  of  this  review  should  be  to  enable  safe,  secure  and 
efficient maritime transport and further stresses that “safety and security of the transport 
system  is  paramount  and  should  never  be  compromised  and  the  EU  should  remain  a 
world  leader  in  this  field.  Continuous  efforts  with  international,  national  and  local 
authorities, stakeholders, and citizens is key […]5.” The strategy sets as one of the goals 
that by 2050, the death toll for all modes of transport in the EU to be close to zero. The 
objective of the EU and its Member States to ensure a high and uniform level of maritime 

1 EUR-Lex - 32009L0018 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu) 
2 European Commission (2021), The EU Blue Economy Report 2021. 
3 Short  sea shipping is the  maritime transport of  goods over relatively short distances, as opposed to the 
intercontinental cross-ocean deep sea shipping. 
4  http://www.emsa.europa.eu/newsroom/latest-news/item/4266-annual-overview-of-marine-casualties-and-
incidents-2020.html  
5 COM(2020) 789 final  - Sustainable and Smart Mobility  Strategy  – putting European transport on track 
for  the  future;  FLAGSHIP  10  –  ENHANCING  TRANSPORT  SAFETY  AND  SECURITY  point  98  and 
101. 

1 

 
 
                                                           
safety  and  environmental  protection  has  also  been  underlined  in  several  Council 
conclusions and in particular those from 20176 and 20207.   

In  the  context  of  the  AI  Directive,  maritime  accidents  are  investigated  to  improve 
maritime  safety,  as  well  to  protect  the  marine  environment,  by  learning  lessons  from 
accidents  to  prevent  their  reoccurrence.  Safety  investigations  of  this  type  are  separate 
from and independent of administrative and/or criminal investigations and do not seek to 
determine or assign any civil or criminal liability8. 

In  relation  to  the  protection  of  the  environment  from  pollution  caused  by  accidents,  the 
initiative should deliver the zero pollution ambitions of the European Green Deal (EGD)9 
and the SSMS. The initiative contributes towards Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 3 
(“Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages”) and SDG 14 (“Conserve 
and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development”). 

International context 

Due  to  its  history  and  international  nature,  maritime  transport  has  developed  a  specific 
regulatory  structure.  At  the  global  level  maritime  safety  and  protection  of  the 
environment  are  promoted  through  an  international  legal  framework  adopted  under  the 
auspices  of  the  United  Nations’  specialised  agency  responsible  for  regulating  shipping, 
the International Maritime Organisation (IMO)10. 

The obligation to investigate marine casualties or navigation incidents finds its origin in 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea11 (UNCLOS) which imposes an 
obligation  on  the  flag  State12  to  conduct  an  investigation.  However,  the  scope  of  this 
obligation is limited to a small set of requirements: (i) accidents happening on the high 
seas13, (ii) accidents which result in loss of life or serious injury to nationals of another 
State and/or (iii) accidents involving a ship or installation of another State14.  

The  IMO,  which  plays  a  role  in  the  implementation  of  UNCLOS,  subsequently 
developed its Casualty Investigation Code15. The Code requires a safety investigation16 to 
be  conducted  into  casualties  involving  the  total  loss  of  the  ship  or  a  death  or  severe 

6 "Priorities for the EU's maritime transport policy until 2020: Competitiveness, Decarbonisation, 
Digitalisation to ensure global connectivity, an efficient internal market and a world-class maritime cluster" 
7 "EU Waterborne Transport Sector – Future outlook: Towards a carbon-neutral, zero accidents, automated 
and competitive EU Waterborne Transport Sector" 
8    As  a  consequence  maritime  safety  investigations  do  not  typically  deal  with  deliberate  acts  which  are 
investigated by other authorities.   
9 https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en#documents 
10 International Maritime Organization (imo.org) is a United Nations specialised agency; all  EU Member 
States are  IMO  members. The European Union cannot be  a  member but the Commission holds observer 
status as an Intergovernmental Organisation. 
11 https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm 
12 The flag State of a vessel is the jurisdiction under whose laws the vessel is registered, the flag State is the 
“nationality” of the vessel. 
13 The high seas or international waters are those part of the sea which do not belong to any state's 
jurisdiction. 
14 Article 94 UNCLOS 
15  Code  of  International  Standards  and  Recommended  Practices  for  a  Safety  Investigation  into  a  Marine 
Casualty or Marine Incident (Casualty Investigation Code) 
16  A  safety  investigation  is  carried  out  to  determine  the  cause(s)  of  an  accident  and  is  independent  of 
criminal or other parallel investigations held to determine liability or apportion blame 

2 

 
 
                                                           
damage  to  the  environment.  It  also  recommends  that  investigations  be  carried  out  into 
other  marine  casualties  and  incidents,  by  the  flag  State  of  a  ship  involved,  if  it  is 
considered likely that it would provide information that could be used to prevent future 
accidents. In addition, the  IMO is progressing work under the  International Convention 
for  the  Prevention  of  Pollution  from  Ships  (MARPOL)  including  the  Action  Plan  to 
address marine plastic litter from ships, including as a result of an accident. 

EU context 

EU  action  in  the  field  of  maritime  safety  both  complements  and  implements  the 
international framework as defined within IMO. The transposition of IMO rules into the 
EU legal system makes these provisions actionable before the European Court of Justice 
thereby ensuring their uniform enforcement across the Union.  

The  bulk  of  today’s  EU  maritime  safety  policy  was  developed  in  the  early  1990s,  and 
was further worked upon between 2000-2009, in the wake of major maritime accidents 
causing  substantial  oil  spills17  and  loss  of  life18.  The  overall  objective  of  the  EU  has 
therefore  been  –  and  continues  to  be  –  a  Union  policy  on  safe  seas19,  and  continuous 
work to improve safety and thereby reduce accidents and pollution into the sea. 

Although  the  colloquial  term  accident  is  used  to  describe  these  unplanned,  undesired 
events,  both  the  IMO  Code  and  the  AI  Directive  refer  to  the  more  precise  legal  terms 
“marine casualties”20 and “incidents”21.   

The  AI  Directive  goes  further  than  the  IMO  Casualty  Code.  First,  it  obliges  Member 
States to establish independent accident investigation bodies (“AIBs”) and to provide in 
their  legal  order  that  these  AIBs  are  notified  of  marine  casualties  and  incidents22.  The 
AIBs  should  investigate  accidents  depending  upon  their  severity.  For  “very  serious 
marine casualties”23 (VSMC) the Directive, as does the IMO Casualty Code, provide that 

17 E.g. Aegean Sea in 1992, ES (74,000 tonnes of oil), Braer accident in 1993, UK (85,000 tonnes), etc. 
18 E.g. Estonia 1994, Baltic Sea claiming 852 lives 
19 Communication from the Commission COM (93) 66 ‘A common policy on safe seas’  
20 As defined by the IMO “A marine casualty is an event, or a sequence of events, that has occurred directly in 
connection  with  the  operations  of  a  ship  and  which  has  resulted  in  any  of  the  following:  the  death  of,  or 
serious injury to, a person, the loss of a person from a ship; the loss, presumed loss or abandonment of a ship, 
material damage to a ship, the stranding or disabling of a  ship, or the involvement of a ship in a collision, 
material  damage  to  marine  infrastructure  external  to  a  ship,  that  could  seriously  endanger  the  safety  of  the 
ship, another ship or an individual; or severe damage to the environment, or the potential for severe damage to 
the environment. A marine casualty does not include a deliberate act or omission, with the intention to cause 
harm to the safety of a ship, an individual or the environment (Article 2(a) of the AI Directive). 
21 As defined by the IMO “A marine incident means an event, or sequence of events,  other than a marine 
casualty, which has occurred directly in connection with the operations of a ship that endangered, or, if not 
corrected, would endanger the safety of  the ship, its occupants or any other person or the environment”. 
Marine incidents are less serious than casualties and can include less serious injuries, minor damage to a 
ship or near misses (Article 2(c) of the AI Directive). 
22 This obligation covers casualties and incidents that involve ships flying the flag of one of the Member 
States;  or  occur  within  Member  States'  territorial  seas  and  internal  waters;  or  involve  other  substantial 
interests of the Member States. The territorial sea, is a belt of coastal waters extending at most 12 nautical 
miles (22 km) from the baseline (usually the mean low-water mark) of a coastal state. Internal waters are 
those waters on the landward side of the baseline of a nation's territorial waters. Internal waters can include 
rivers and canals as well as ports and harbours.(Article 6 of the AI Directive)  
23  As defined by the IMO Code for the Investigation of Marine Casualties and Incidents – in effect loss of 
a ship, death or severe damage to environment - referred to in Article 3(2)(b) of the AI Directive . 

3 

 
                                                           
there must always be an investigation, so there is no discretion as to whether this accident 
type has to be investigated. The Directive also extends this obligation in fishing vessels 
of 15 metres in length and over.  

For “serious casualties”24 a preliminary assessment in order to decide whether or not to 
undertake  a  safety  investigation  should  take  place.  For  less  serious  casualties  and 
incidents,  it  is  for  the  AIB  to  decide  to  investigate  when  it  considers  that  lessons  to 
improve safety at sea can be learnt. Independence in the organisation, legal structure and 
decision-making means that the AIB can investigate and address safety recommendations 
without  any  appearance  of  bias  or  conflict  of  interest.  Second,  the  types  of  vessels 
covered by the AI Directive is also different. The IMO rules mainly apply to commercial 
passenger or cargo craft while the AI Directive, is broader including fishing vessels of 15 
metres in length and over and also includes pleasure yachts and pleasure crafts which can 
carry more than 12 passengers for commercial purposes.  

the  basis  of 

Procedures  on  how  to  conduct  investigations  in  the  EU  are  laid  down  in  a  so-called 
“Common  Methodology”.25  AIBs  should  publish  reports  on 
the 
investigations  carried  out  and  they  should  also  notify  the  Commission  of  marine 
casualties  and  incidents  via  a  database  (the  European  Marine  Casualty  Information 
Platform  –  EMCIP),  established  and  maintained  by  the  European  Maritime  Safety 
Agency26 (EMSA) for this purpose. The Directive allows for the collection, collation and 
sharing  of  safety  data  through  EMCIP.  This  facilitates  national  administrations  in 
responding  to  accidents,  allowing  for  digitally  sharing  information  both  regarding  the 
circumstances of occurrences and the safety reports resulting from the investigations. The 
use of digital tools optimises processes and means that the Directive is digital-ready. The 
carrying out of harmonised investigations and the electronic sharing of information and 
lessons  learnt  allows  for  the  development  of  more  targeted,  evidence-based  policy 
responses  at  international,  EU  and  Member  State  level  to  accidents  and  incidents,  and 
thereby it is part of continuous improvement.  

Safety investigation reports set out the facts of the incident outlining the particulars of the 
ship  and  its  voyage,  its  crew,  the  circumstances  of  the  casualty  and  the  sequence  of 
events  setting  out  the  consequences  in  terms  of  impact  on  persons,  vessels  and  the 
environment.  The  investigation  must  analyse  the  key  events  in  the  build  up  to  the 
casualty  and  its  aftermath  to  discover  contributing  factors  and  ultimately  safety  issues. 
The investigation then identifies findings, contributing factors and safety issues so as to 
be  able  to  make  safety  recommendations.  The  Directive  provides  that  Member  States 
shall ensure that safety recommendations made by the investigative bodies are duly taken 
into account by the addressees and, where appropriate, are given an adequate follow-up 
in  accordance  with  Union  and  international  law.  Furthermore,  where  appropriate,  an 
investigative body or the Commission shall make safety recommendations on the basis of 

24    In  accordance  with  the  updated  definition  contained  in  Circular  MSC-MEPC.3/Circ.3  of  the  IMO 
Maritime  Safety Committee and Marine Environment Protection Committee of 18 December 2008;   – in 
effect a fire, explosion, collision, grounding, contact, heavy weather damage, ice damage, hull cracking, or 
suspected hull defect, etc. referred to in Article 3(3) of the AI Directive 
25 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1286/2011 adopting a common methodology for investigating marine 
casualties  and  incidents  developed  pursuant  to  Article  5(4)  of  Directive  2009/18/EC  (OJ  L  328, 
10.12.2011, p. 36) 
26 www.emsa.europa.eu 

4 

 
                                                           
results of multiple investigations (so-called “abstract data analysis” according to Article 
15(2) of the AI Directive) and of the overall results of safety investigations carried out.  

The  safety  recommendations  are  addressed  to  ship  owners/operators,  to  national 
authorities,  to  the  Union  or  to  international  bodies  such  as  the  IMO.  While  the  safety 
recommendations  are  recommendations  and  are  therefore  not  legally  enforceable,  the 
status  of  a  recommendation  made  by  an  independent  AIB  and  addressed  to  ship 
operators,  to  national  authorities  or  for  example  to  the  IMO  means  that  these 
recommendations  have  considerable  persuasive  authority  based  as  they  are  on  a  safety 
investigation.  EMSA  collates  accident  data  and  publishes  an  Annual  Overview27  and  a 
Maritime Transport Environmental Report28.  

Since  June  2011  when  the  Directive  entered  into  effect  some  2000  individual  Safety 
Recommendations  have  been  issued  following  safety  investigations.  67%  of  them  have 
been  accepted,  meaning  that  actions  have  been  taken  to  improve  safety  of  ships  and 
pollution  prevention.  These  are  usually  focused  on  a  specific  accident,  as  under  the 
Directive and the IMO Casualty Code all very serious have to be investigated  but there 
can  be  some  repetitions  (as  accidents  can  inevitably  resemble  each  other)  but  the 
recommendations and addressees remain different. 

legitimate  expectations, 

to  provide  predictability  and 

It is important to note that improvements in safety and the measurable perception thereof 
takes time. Changes to legislation or regulation are slow and the reason for this as there is 
a  need 
the 
implementation and application.  When changes to international conventions are involved 
it  typically  takes  time  for  the  international  community  (and  in  maritime  this  involves 
global action) and industry to  recognise that there is  a problem and to  identify the root 
cause,  to  agree  on  the  measures  to  be  taken  to  address  the  problem;  and  for 
improvements  to  be  observed  in  terms  of  reduced  number  of  accidents.  Changes 
involving  the  so-called  “human  element”  where  the  safety  recommendations  are 
addressed  to  individual  companies,  to  sectors  or  to  administrations  and  which  involve 
changes to  practices,  procedures, manning or training can however be quicker.  This  all 
forms part of continuous improvement in maritime safety. 

in  view  of 

Safety  recommendations  can  result  in  the  better  enforcement  of  already  existing  IMO 
legislation. An example relates to  the grounding of Hoegh Osaka which led to better and 
enhanced  enforcement  of  the  IMO  Resolution  A.582(14)  related  to  the  maximum 
securing load of  lashings to be used when securing road vehicles on cargo decks. They 
can also lead to the improvement of EU legislation: the safety investigation into the fire 
on the MSC Flaminia concluded that the EU implementation related to Places of Refuge 
should  be  improved  by  virtue  of  further  guidelines  to  better  assist  EU  Member  States. 
The same investigation also led to better implementation of IMO Resolution A.950(23) 
at  the  EU  Member  State  level  regarding  the  establishment  and  operation  of  maritime 
assistance services. 

The  conclusions  of  several  safety  investigations,  as  these  relate  to  similar  or  repeated 
accidents, can also bring to light safety issues that might be individually disregarded, for 
example, the highest number of fire on-board ships is in the Engine Room. Most of these 

27 http://www.emsa.europa.eu/publications/item/4266-annual-overview-of-marine-casualties-and-incidents-
2020.html 
28 European Maritime Transport Environmental Report 2021, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2800/650762 

5 

 
                                                           
do not result in serious damages and unless they are catastrophic would not be regarded 
as very serious marine casualties (VSMCs) but such fires represent a regular threat to the 
ship.  In  that  sense  and  drawing  on  accident  investigations  reports  the  International 
Association of Classification Societies29  revised its unified interpretation related to hot 
surfaces in engine room in order to reduce the number of fires, whatever the ship type. 

The  Directive  also  provides  that  the  Member  States  shall,  in  close  cooperation  with  the 
Commission,  establish a  permanent cooperation  framework  (PCF)30  to  enable the  AIBs to 
cooperate among themselves to the extent necessary to attain the objectives of the Directive. 

Synergies with other EU policy instruments  

The  responsibility  for  maritime  safety  involves  three  overlapping  lines  of  State 
intervention both internationally and at the EU level (see Figure 1). States have differing 
but complementary responsibilities either as a vessel’s state of registration, a state which 
is  being  visited  by  a  foreign  flagged  vessel  or  as  a  coastal  state  by  which  a  vessel  is 
travelling  without  calling.  The  first  “line  of  defence”  is  provided  by  the  flag  State. 
However, as flag State rules only applies to vessels that fly that flag, many of the IMO's 
most important technical conventions contain provisions for ships to be inspected when 
the  vessels  visit  foreign  ports  to  ensure  that  they  meet  the  international  requirements. 
This control by port States is regarded as the second line of defence.  

Although both the flag State control and the port State control have  worked to improve 
maritime safety and improve the marine environment, accidents can still occur. Once this 
happens, it is important to investigate what went wrong and how a similar accident can 
be  avoided  in  the  future.  To  achieve  this  the  third  line  of  defence  of  accident 
investigation was created. 

This impact assessment has been initiated in parallel to the related impact assessments of 
the  Port  State  control  Directive  (Directive  2009/16/EC31)  and  the  Flag  State  Directive 
(Directive 2009/21/EC32). All three EU maritime safety Directives are based on the rules 
and  standards  established  by  the  IMO  at  the  international  level  and  while  they  each 
reflect  the  differing  responsibilities  of  the  EU  Member  States  in  their  various  roles  as 
flag, port and coastal states they have to be coherent with each other and any proposed 
change  to  one  has  to  take  the  other  two  Directives  and  the  broader  international 
regulatory environment into account.    

The  Directives  work  together  to  contribute  to  a  higher  level  of  maritime  safety  and 
maritime transport efficiency  as well as a stronger level  playing field  between Member 
States.  The  counter  factual  situation  would  be  international  obligations  transposed  into 
national legislation with no means for supervision at Union level or to cooperate with the 
support of EMSA. This would lead to less protection for EU citizens. 

29 The International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) is a technically based non-governmental 
organization that currently consists of twelve member marine classification societies. More than 90% of the 
world's cargo-carrying ships’ tonnage is covered by the classification standards set by member societies of 
IACS. 
30  The  rules  of  procedure  and  organisational  arrangements  of  the  PCF  are  set  out  in  Commission 
Implementing Regulation (EU) No 651/2011 (OJ L177 of 6.7.2011, p.18) 
31 OJ L 131, 28.5.2009, p.57 
32 OJ L 131, 28.5.2009, p.132 

6 

 
                                                           
Figure 1: The flag State, port State and accident investigation responsibilities of EU Member States 

The impact  assessment of the port State control  Directive (PSC) looks at extending the 
scope of port State control to fishing vessels, which are currently not covered by PSC. It 
also  seeks  to  update  the  Directive  to  take  account  of  changes  to  the  international  legal 
and regulatory framework since 2009. It seeks to address issues related to the targeting of 
vessels for inspection, including the use of electronic data and certificates and seeking to 
make PSC more environmentally focused. It also looks at issue encountered by Member 
States’ authorities in their implementation of the PSC regime.  

The impact assessment of the Flag State Directive looks at updating and aligning the EU 
acquis  with  international  rules  maintaining  the  IMO-Audit  provision  and  follow-up,  to 
clarify and strengthen the flag States to perform their obligations, including monitoring 
of  EU  Recognised  Organisations  (otherwise  known  as  Classification  Societies).  It  also 
looks  at  digitalising  the  Flag  registers,  to  revising  the  flag  State  performance 
measurement and rewarding good quality. 

These  three  Directives  are  also  part  of  and  have  significant  interaction  with  the  larger 
maritime safety acquis which includes elements such as the EU vessel traffic monitoring 
and  information  system  (SafeSeaNet)33,  the  EMSA  founding  Regulation34,  the  fishing 
vessel  safety  Directive35,  the  EU  legilslation  relating  to  Recognised  Organisations36and 
other EU environmental legislation37.   

The  interaction  of  the  AI  Directive  with  the  EMSA  oil  pollution  response  capacity,  is 
however  limited  as  the  AI  Directive  is  designed  to  protect  the  marine  environment  by 
preventing  accidents  by  finding  out  their  root  causes  while  the  EMSA  oil  pollution 

33 Directive 2002/59/EC establishing a Community vessel traffic monitoring and information system (OJ L 
208, 5.8.2002, p. 10) 
34 (OJ L 208, 5.8.2002, p. 1) which is under possible revision see  https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-
regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13049-European-Maritime-Safety-Agency-review-of-mandate_en 
35 (OJ L 34, 9.2.1998, p. 1) which is under evaluation see https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-
regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12522-Fisheries-Fishing-Vessel-Safety-Directive-evaluation-_en 
36 Regulation (EC) No 391/2009 on common rules and standards for ship inspection and survey 
organisations (OJ L 131, 28.5.2009, p.11) and Directive 2009/15/EC on common rules and standards for 
ship inspection and survey organisations and for the relevant activities of maritime administrations (OJ 
L131, 28.5.2009, p.47) 
37 Such as Directive 92/43/EEC (the “Habitats Directive”), Directive 2009/147/EC (the “EU Birds 
Directive”), Directive (EU) 2019/904 (Single use Plastics Directive)  

7 

 
 
                                                           
response is a damage clean up and mitigation measure.  EMSA had a role in oil pollution 
response  since  2006  and  this  was  expanded  to  cover  fixed  spills  from  oil  and  gas 
installations in 2013.  

In this regard, EMSA provides different services to ensure that EU coastal states respond 
quickly  and  effectively  to  marine  pollution  from  vessels,  oil  and  gas  facilities.  This 
includes  a    network  of  stand-by  oil  spill  response  vessels,  a  satellite-based  oil  spill 
monitoring service known as “CleanSeaNet”. 

In addition  to  the oil spill response vessels  EMSA has pre-positioned oil spill  response 
“Dispersant Stockpiles”  in the Member States for fast response  and this  combined with 
the “Dispersant Usage Evaluation Tool ” an e-dimensional numeric model to simulate oil 
spills with dispersant applications, which provides a quantitative comparison of response 
options  according  different  levels  of  effectiveness  depending  on  the  dispersant  and 
timing of its application can mitigate the damage cause by oil spills.  

EMSA also provides other services to the Member States within the scope of emergency 
response  to  chemical  spill  into  the  sea,  namely,  (MAR-ICE)  a  network  of  chemical 
experts to  strengthen information transfer on  chemical  substances involved in  maritime 
pollution  emergencies  in  EU  waters  and  the  “Marine  Intervention  in  Chemical 
Emergencies  Network  (MAR-CIS)  “Marine  Chemical  Information  Sheets”  which 
provide  in  a  concise  way  substance-specific  and  maritime  relevant  information  on 
chemicals  aiming  to  assist  the  competent  authorities  during  the  initial  stage  of  the 
response to maritime incidents involving such substances.  

The  linkage  between  the  AI  Directive  and  the  Marine  Strategy  Framework  Directive 
(MSFD)38  is  also  limited  as  the  latter  provides  for  a  framework  within  which  Member 
States  must  take  the  necessary  measures  to  achieve  or  maintain  good  environmental 
status in the marine environment by the year 2020 at the latest. By virtue of the MSFD, 
EU Member  States are  required to  implement  strategies aimed at  (i) the  protection and 
preservation  of  the  marine  environment,  the  prevention  of  its  deterioration  or,  where 
practicable, the restoration of marine ecosystems in areas where they have been adversely 
affected; (ii) the prevention and reduction of inputs in the marine environment, in order 
to ensure that there are no significant impacts on or risks to marine biodiversity, marine 
ecosystems,  human  health  or  legitimate  uses  of  the  sea.  This  means  that  the  MSFD  is 
proactive in that it obliges Member States to have a plan in place to achieve good marine 
environmental status. Therefore and while the AI Directive has a role in  environmental 
protection  by  seeking  to  prevent  pollution  and  environmental  damage  by  preventing 
accidents,  it  does  not  put  any  responsibilities  on  the  MS  to  address  marine  damage  or 
mitigate such damage nor does it require that damaged environments are restored. The AI 
Directive  does  not  have  the  same  overarching  environmental  objectives  as  the  Marine 
Strategy Framework, the two pieces of legislation are parallel but separate in their scope 
of mechanism of action. 

Linkage with the Green Deal  

The  Green  Deal  and  more  specifically  the  FuelEU  maritime  initiative  will  result  in 
significantly higher uptake of renewable and low-carbon fuels and low and zero-emission 
propulsion systems over time. The change of type of fuels used can affect the reliability 

38 OJ L 164, 25.6.2008, p. 19 

8 

 
                                                           
and performance of engines, calibrated for certain types of fuels, and the issue with this is 
the risk of loss of propulsion which is an obvious safety risk. Another risk relates to fire 
and explosion. At this stage however, in the context of no significant uptake of renewable 
and  low-carbon  fuels  and  low  and  zero-emission  propulsion  systems  in  the  maritime 
sector  it  is  difficult  to  predict  what  type  of  accidents  may  likely  occur  in  the  future. 
Nevertheless, a higher uptake of electric vessels in the long term is expected to result in 
lower pollution due to fuel lost. 

Ex-post evaluation of the Directive and the Maritime Transport Fitness Check 

The 2018 REFIT ex-post evaluation39 and Maritime Transport Fitness Check40 concluded 
that in the absence of the AI Directive, it is likely that the 16 AIBs established since 2009 
would  not  have  been  put  in  place.  The  majority  of  the  States  without  an  AIB  prior  to 
2009 primarily conducted investigations for criminal prosecution purposes if they did so 
at  all.  The  creation  of  AIBs  has  given  a  boost  to  accident  investigations  for  safety 
reasons,  with  an  emphasis  on 
the  development  of  safety 
recommendations for accident prevention purposes. In addition, the evaluation concluded 
that  the  Directive  provides  a  consistent  framework  for  conducting  maritime  accident 
investigations  and  thus  ensures  that  accident  investigations  are  conducted  in  a  uniform 
and harmonised way throughout the EU. 

independence  and 

While  the  IMO  had  developed  its  Investigation  Code,  the  obligatory  nature  of  the  AI 
Directive has led to a harmonised reporting of accidents and incidents, as a standard set 
of  requirements  has  to  be  met.  The  overall  conclusion  of  the  evaluation  based  on  the 
assessment  of  relevance,  effectiveness,  efficiency,  coherence  and  EU  added-value  was 
that AI Directive has largely met expectations, achieving EU-wide benefits.  

However,  shortcomings  of  the  current  policy  framework    with  issues  of  resources, 
staffing  and  expertise  widely  reported  as  problematic.  Resource  constraints  limit  some 
Member State AIBs in discharging their responsibilities in a correct and timely manner. 
This  is  particularly  the  case  for  those  Member  States  with  small  fleets  and  limited 
maritime transport activity where the establishment of a permanent dedicated AIB is seen 
as  a  disproportionate  burden.  In  similar  vein  the  Maritime  Transport  Fitness  Check  
concluded that the capacity of Member States to fulfil their international obligations as a 
flag, port or coastal State in relation to the various Directives is under strain. Resources, 
staffing and expertise issues were widely reported as problematic for AIBs. The Fitness 
Check made a number of recommendations  relevant  to  accident investigation including 
the better use of  resources at  national  and EU level,  including the  pooling of  resources 
building on the role and support provided by EMSA and exploiting the efficiency gains 
offered  by  digitalisation  and  information  sharing.  The  results  of  the  ex-post  evaluation 
are reflected in this impact assessment as summarised in Table 1. 

Table 1: Links between conclusions of the ex-post evaluation and the impact assessment 

Main ex post evaluation conclusions 

Impact Assessment 

Conclusions on relevance 
The Directive provides consistency in the regulatory 
framework across Member States and the effective and 
enforceable application of international obligations in a more 
uniform and harmonised way.  
Conclusions on effectiveness 

Policy measures are defined to keep the 
Directive up to date with developments 
at international and EU level. 

39 SWD(2018) 232 final 
40 SWD(2018) 228 final 

9 

 
                                                           
Main ex post evaluation conclusions 
The AI Directive has been effective in achieving its intended 
objectives, although its contribution generally needs to be 
appreciated in light of the broader maritime safety framework 
that is developed by Member States, the EU and IMO.  
The Directive has been effective in requiring the creation of 
independent AIBs with, in most cases, defined budgets 
covering operational needs. However AIBs report constraints 
mostly in relation to lack of financial means and human 
resources availability while lack of appropriate skills and 
infrastructure are also identified. Consequently gaps in 
coverage can occur. 
Conclusions on efficiency  
Member States agree that EMCIP offers a harmonised system 
for accident investigations, facilitating cooperation between 
them. However, they also find that it represents an additional 
workload.  
Conclusions on coherence  
The Directive is internally coherent and is coherent with the 
other pieces of the maritime safety acquis.  

Impact Assessment 
Policy measures are defined to keep the 
Directive up to date with developments 
at international and EU level.  

Policy measures are defined to support 
AIBs in discharging their reporting and 
investigative responsibilities.   

Policy measures are defined to support 
AIBs in discharging their reporting and 
investigative responsibilities.   

The IA identifies smaller fishing vessels 
as being an area with significant impact 
on safety, not currently covered by the 
Directive, which may need to be 
addressed.  

Conclusions on EU added value  
EU level intervention has brought benefits which would not 
have been possible at national level or at IMO level alone. 

EU action continues to be needed to 
deliver on the policy objectives. 

2.  PROBLEM DEFINITION 

Significant  accidents  involving  certain  categories  of  vessels  are  currently  not  reported 
and  investigated  across  the  Union  in  a  coordinated  and  harmonised  manner  and  the 
necessary safety improvements to prevent loss of life and protect the marine environment 
are  unlikely  to  be  made.  The  investigation  level  also  varies  greatly  between  Member 
States.  Moreover,  some  of  the  definitions  necessary  for  the  correct  functioning  of  the 
Directive are either not provided or are not specific enough while others essential to keep 
the  Directive  aligned  with  the  relevant  international  legal  framework  have  become 
outdated.  At  present,  many  AIBs  lack  sufficient  resources  to  be  able  to  carry  out  the 
responsibilities of reporting on investigating marine casualties and incidents in a timely 
and  effective  manner.  This  impacts  on  the  proper  functioning  of  the  Directive  and  the 
harmonised  safety  level  it  was  designed  to  underpin.  The  underlying  drivers,  problems 
and implications that are relevant for this revision are presented in Figure 2. 

10 

 
Figure 2: Problem tree  

2.1.  What are the problems? 

Problem 1 – Accidents involving some categories of vessels are not investigated or are 
not investigated in a harmonised manner  

During 2014-2020, an average of 2,239 marine casualties and incidents were reported on 
average per year showing a relatively stable evolution over time (see Figure 3). VSMCs 
represented 3.1% of the total while serious casualties an additional 30.2%, resulting in an 
average  of  69  fatalities.  Crew  is  the  most  affected  category  of  victims,  representing 
around 89% of fatalities. Furthermore, a total of 145 ships were lost over the 2014-2020 
period (21 per year on average) 41.  

A total of 370 cases of marine pollution have been reported during 2014-2020, showing a 
decreasing trend over time. Marine pollution in the form of ship bunkers (fuel) and other 
pollutants (e.g. cargo residues, lubricating or hydraulic oils) represented 68%  and 18%, 
respectively, of the total number of cases of pollution (Figure 4)42. 

However, not  all maritime accidents in  European waters or involving European vessels 
with severe consequences such as loss of life or loss of the ship are currently within the 
scope of the Directive. Several ships types are excluded from the scope of the Directive, 
namely: a) ships of war and troop ships and other ships owned or operated by a Member 
State  and  used  only  on  government  non-commercial  service;  b)  ships  not  propelled  by 
mechanical  means,  wooden  ships  of  primitive  build,  pleasure  yachts  and  pleasure  craft 
not  engaged  in  trade,  unless  they  are  or  will  be  crewed  and  carrying  more  than  12 
passengers  for  commercial  purposes;  c)  inland  waterway  vessels  operating  in  inland 
waterways;  d)  fishing  vessels  with  a  length  of  less  than  15  metres;  e)  fixed  offshore 
drilling units. The reasons  why these vessel types  were excluded from  the scope of the 
Directive are various43. 

41 European Maritime Safety Agency (2021), Annual overview of marine casualties and incidents 2021. 
42 European Maritime Safety Agency (2021), Annual overview of marine casualties and incidents 2021. 
43 As regards (a) it is because these vessels enjoy state immunity and due to the fact that the international 
conventions do not apply to them. For (b) it is because the international conventions do not apply, but also 
because they are certified and operated differently to maritime transport vessels and because these vessels 

11 

 PROBLEM DRIVERSPROBLEMSIMPLICATIONSFINAL CONSEQUENCEAccidents involvingsome categories of vessels are not investigated orare not investigated in a harmonised mannerThe Directive does not apply tocertain vessels (PD1)Smaller fishing vessels, theircrews and theenvironment are not protectedSome accidents are not investigatedas Accident Investigation Bodies lackclarity regarding the circumstances in which and how they must actSome definitions are notprovided in the Directive orare notspecific enough (PD2)The Directive contains references to outdatedinternational rules (PD3)Some AccidentInvestigation Bodieslack sufficient resources or expertise to be able to effectively and consistently report and investigatemarine casualties (PD4)Some accidents thatshould be investigated are notor are not being investigatedin a harmonized mannerAccidents are not being reported and investigated in a timely, expert and independentmannerRisk for maritime safety (casualties and pollution)Some Accident Investigation Bodies are not able to effectively and consistently report andinvestigate marine casualties 
 
                                                           
 
Figure  3:  Number  of  reported  marine  casualties  and  incidents  by  type  (left  side)  and  number  of 
fatalities (right side) 

Source: European Maritime Safety Agency (2021) 

Figure 4: Cases of marine pollution by type  

Source: European Maritime Safety Agency (2021) 

During  2014-2020,  810  investigations  were  finalised  (116  investigations  per  year  on 
average), 48% of these being related to VSMCs and 42% to serious casualties44.  

The  need  to  further  assess  the  inclusion  of  fishing  vessels  with  a  length  of  less  than  15 
metres  in  the  scope  of  the  Directive  has  been  identified  based  on  the  feedback  to  the 
inception impact assessment and the targeted stakeholders’ consultations. These maritime 
accidents  are  neither  reported  nor  investigated  in  a  systematic  or  harmonised  manner, 
despite the fact that they represent around 90% of the EU fishing fleet45. There is therefore 
a gap in safety and the possibilities of learning from these accidents and preventing such 
accidents  in  the  future  are  not  being  followed  up,  with  negative  consequences  on  their 
crews and the environment46. No issues resulting from the exclusion from the scope of the 
Directive were identified by stakeholders for the other categories of vessels.  

Problem  2  –  Some  accidents  are  not  investigated  as  AIBs  lack  clarity  regarding  the 
circumstances in which they must act and how they must act 

The  Directive  contains  a  number  of  definitions  which  have  given  rise  to  questions  of 
interpretation and to differences of approach between AIBs. This has also created a lack 
of legal certainty and an absence of harmonisation. 

are  not  operated  commercially/professionally.  With  regard  to  (c)  and  (e)  the  international  maritime 
conventions  generally  do  not  apply  to  these  vessels  which  are  constructed,  certified  and  operated 
differently to maritime transport vessels. 
44 Source: European Maritime Safety Agency 
45 DG MARE fleet register database (https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/fleet-europa/search_en) and Eurostat 
(https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/fish_fleet_alt/default/table?lang=en) 
46 In this regard the IMO is also looking into possible measures to address accidentally lost fishing gear 
which is a very significant element of marine litter.  

12 

 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
In  2015,  PCF  members  were  asked  to  list  issues  related  to  the  implementation  of  the 
Directive  and  the  lessons  learned  thus  far.  During  the  course  of  this  exercise  several 
Member States reported that a number of definitions (i.e. definition of length of fishing 
vessel,  definition  of  pleasure  yachts  and  pleasure  craft,  definition  of  ‘directly  in 
connection  with  the  operations  of  a  ship’,  definition  of  a  deadline  for  fatal/non-fatal 
injuries,  conditions  for  a  simplified  investigation  report)  should  be  further  clarified  as 
there  are  different  interpretations  between  Member  States  and  between  Member  States 
and EMSA, when entering data in the EMCIP database. 

While not all AIBs agree that all of the definitions mentioned above are problematic, the 
lack of a common understanding about these topics can have an impact on the day-to-day 
activities of the AIBs in the case of a joint investigation, and may affect the quality of the 
reports submitted to EMCIP.  

In addition, the AI Directive refers to IMO definitions as well as other EU law. Since the 
adoption of the Directive, the IMO legislation impacting on the Directive has changed (see 
Annex 6). As a result, the Directive does not always refer to the up-to-date legislation. This 
creates a lack of legal certainty and harmonisation. This prevents cooperation with AIBs in 
third countries (which follow the more up to date IMO provisions).  

It  has  not  proved  possible  to  estimate  the  extent  to  which  less  clear,  ambiguous  or 
outdated  definitions  have  impacted  on  the  number  of  investigations  that  have  been 
carried  out.  This  is  because  there  is  no  information  available  on  the  number  of 
investigations  that  have  not  been  carried  out  due  to  definitions  being  unclear  or  un-
harmonised or which do not correspond to the IMO standard. That being said, the issue 
of problematic and outdated definitions has been extensively discussed within the PCF. 
While agreement on some was reached (for example accidents involving the operations 
of a ship – while in port) these agreed interpretations have not been incorporated into a 
legislative text and are therefore not mandatory or enforceable. 

Problem  3  –  Some  accident  investigation  bodies  are  not  able  to  effectively  and 
consistently report and investigate marine casualties 

This problem was highlighted in the 2018 Maritime Transport Fitness Check. There are 
multiple reasons for this: it can be an internal resource issue if the number of employed 
investigators  is  limited,  the  AIBs  may  also  not  have  sufficient  budget  available  to  hire 
external  experts, even when additional personnel or  technical  or scientific  expertise are 
required.  Resource  constraints  can  also  be  the  result  of  unexpected  events,  such  as 
multiple accidents occurring during a short period, or for example during the COVID-19 
pandemic  when  investigators  possibilities  to  travel  to  the  scene  of  accidents  were 
restricted. The evidence collected from the stakeholders, particularly the AIBs, indicates 
that  the  severity  of  the  problem  differs  between  Member  States  with  the  shortage  of 
human and/or financial resources being a bigger issue for some AIBs than others.   

2.2.  What are the problem drivers? 

Problem Driver 1: The Directive does not apply to certain vessels  

This  problem  driver  links  to  Problem  1.  Fishing  vessels  in  general  show  a  relatively  high 
incidence  of  serious  casualties  and  VSMCs.  For  2014-2020,  data  reported  to  EMCIP  for 
fishing vessels of more than 15 metres in length show a share of VSMCs in total number of 
marine casualties of 6.8% and of serious casualties of 59%, well above the average for other 

13 

 
ship types (2.6% and 24.3%, respectively). In terms of share in the number of VSMCs and 
serious casualties they come second after cargo ships, with 32% and 31% respectively (see 
Figure 5). In addition, fishing vessel crews constitute 34% of all fatalities47.  

Figure 5: Distribution of severity per ship type for 2014-2020 (cumulative number of accidents – left 
side; share in the total number of accidents – right side) 

Source: European Maritime Safety Agency (2022) 

The  occurrence  indicators,  calculated  by  EMSA  as  the  ratio  between  the  number  of 
reported accidents for a given ship type and the corresponding fleet size, also shows that 
safety level related to fishing vessels has negatively evolved during the past years. While 
the  overall  average  occurrence  indicator  has  decreased  over  time,  the  one  for  fishing 
vessels has continuously increased between 2014 and 2020. In addition,  fishing vessels 
represented  61%  of  the  total  number  of  ships  lost  during  the  2014-2020  period  (13 
fishing  vessels  of  the  21  total  ships  lost  per  year  on  average)48.  In  contrast  to  larger 
vessels,  EU-wide  data  is  not  systematically  collected  on  accidents  involving  fishing 
vessels smaller than 15 metres. The data reported to EMCIP relating to fishing vessels in 
this category either relates to information voluntarily reported by the AIBs or because the 
accident in question also involves a vessel falling within the scope of the Directive.  

Eleven AIBs stated that accidents involving fishing vessels below 15 metres in length are 
already investigated in their respective countries under national law. This activity generally 
only  covers  fatalities  and/or  serious  accidents.  Data  concerning  2012-2019  from  EMCIP 
validated  through  interviews  with  AIBs,  shows  that  Denmark,  France,  Portugal,  Sweden 
and Spain have uploaded accident reports concerning VSMCs with fishing vessels that are 
smaller than 15 meters (these Member States investigate these accidents based on national 
legislation  even  though  there  is  no  obligation  to  do  so  under  EU  law).  Other  AIBs 
(Germany, Greece, Malta, and Poland) have only uploaded accident reports for some years. 
While some other AIBs (e.g. Norway) have indicated that they also investigate these cases, 
but the reports are not uploaded in EMCIP. 

As small fishing vessels are outside the scope of the Directive, EMSA does not follow up 
on this work and therefore it is not clear if these investigations are carried out in a systemic 
or  harmonised  manner.  Furthermore,  there  is  no  broad  or  systematic  dissemination  of 
information  on the  results of  these investigations  –  there is therefore no indication if the 
sporadic and uncoordinated non-harmonised investigation of these smaller fishing vessels 
accidents has a positive impact on safety in those Member States in which they are carried 
out. In addition, AIBs cannot benefit of lessons learned through investigations carried out 
and safety recommendations made in other Member States. 

47 European Maritime Safety Agency (2021), Annual overview of marine casualties and incidents 2021. 
48 European Maritime Safety Agency (2021), Annual overview of marine casualties and incidents 2021. 

14 

 
                                                           
The Eurostat European Safety and Work data relating to accidents involving sea fisheries 
was  also  looked  into.  However,  the  Eurostat  statistics  only  cover  eight  Member  States 
and  some  of  the  Member  States  reporting  to  EMCIP  do  not  appear  in  the  Eurostat 
statistics,  while  some  of  the  Member  States  who  do  report  to  EMCIP  and  appear  in 
Eurostat  statistics  show  conflicting  numbers.  Therefore,  as  these  statistics  cannot  be 
reconciled, it has been decided to rely on the  EMCIP data. The issue of fishing vessels 
safety  has  also  been  the  subject  of  discussion  by  the  Committee  on  Safe  Seas  and  the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships49 where Member States agreed that there was a need 
to do more on this matter at EU level, including for smaller fishing vessels. 

All  stakeholders  generally  acknowledge  the  inherent  risks  involved  in  the  operation  of 
smaller  fishing  vessels.  The  AIBs  interviewed  noted  that  small  fishing  vessels  are 
particularly  prone  to  capsizing;  falls  overboard  are  also  relatively  common.  It  was  also 
highlighted by multiple AIBs that often the operations of small fishing vessels are rather 
informal, with possibly only one (often elderly/retired) operator fishing alone, without an 
affiliation  with  a  larger  company.  Consequently,  there  may  be  a  lack  of  awareness, 
attention, or safety equipment at play, and in some cases, alcohol may be involved.  

The  exclusion  of  the  mentioned  category  of  vessels  reduces  the  effectiveness  of  the 
Directive,  as  there  is  no  obligation  at  the  EU  level  for  the  AIBs  to  conduct  a  safety 
investigation. This  in  turn means that no  harmonised  EU-wide safety recommendations 
can be adopted to improve the safety of the  EU fishing fleet. Consequently, the overall 
safety  performance  of  smaller  fishing  vessels  in  the  European  fishing  fleet  cannot  be 
improved on the basis of harmonised accident data. It appears however that the challenge 
with fishing vessels below 15 metres is that the incidents are often difficult to investigate 
particularly  due  to  lack  of  witnesses,  evidence  (especially  in  the  case  of  loss  of  one-
person crew and/or vessel), and the causes of incidents are often difficult to address by 
recommendations. A balance is therefore needed between resources spent on and safety 
benefits expected from the investigation. 

Problem Driver 2: Some definitions are not provided in the Directive or are not specific 
enough 

This problem driver links to Problems 1 and 2. Three problematic definitions have been 
identified in this context. 

Definition of length of fishing vessel. Marine casualties and incidents that involve only 
fishing vessels with a length of less than 15 metres are outside the scope of the Directive. 
There  are  a  number  of  different  methods  by  which  the  length  of  a  vessel  can  be 
established  with  the  two  most  common  methods  used  globally  being  ‘length  overall’ 
(LOA)50 and ‘length between perpendiculars’ (LBP). This means that depending on the 
method used the same ship can have different lengths and could be within or outside the 
scope  of  the  Directive.  This  ambiguity  can  create  confusion  and  a  non-harmonised 
approach between Member States regarding investigations involving this vessel type.  

49 COSS 46 meeting of November 2019. The committee established by Regulation (EC) No 2099/2002 to 
assist and advise the Commission on all matters of maritime safety and prevention or reduction of pollution 
of the environment by shipping activities. 
50 See Regulation (EU) 2017/1130 defining characteristics for fishing vessels (OJ L 169, 30.6.2017, p. 1) 

15 

 
                                                           
A relevant consideration in this regard is why the threshold of 15 metres for fishing vessels 
in the Directive was chosen. This was linked with a requirement in Directive 2002/59/EC 
as  amended  by  Directive  2009/17/EC  on  vessel  traffic  monitoring  which  was  adopted  at 
the same time as the AI Directive. This amendment provides that any fishing vessel flying 
the flag of a Member State, or operating in EU waters, or landing its catch in the port of a 
Member  State  and  with  a  length  of  15  metres  LOA  had  to  be  fitted  with  an  Automatic 
Identification of Ships - Class A automatic tracking system. It is therefore clear that LOA 
was the intention of the co-legislators at the time the AI Directive was drafted.  

Definition of ‘directly in connection with the operations of a ship’. For the purposes of 
the Directive, the terms “marine casualties” and “marine incidents” shall be understood 
in  accordance  with  the  IMO Casualty Code providing that these  events  have  “occurred 
directly in connection with the operations of a ship”. There is significant divergence of 
approach as regards what constitutes the “operations of a ship” and these differences in 
approach can have a considerable operational impact, particularly as regards what could 
be a joint investigation and as regards the gathering of meaningful accident and incident 
data. The question whether the accident or incident is directly connected to the operation 
of a ship is pivotal for assessing if the occurrence should be considered, or not, under the 
scope of the Directive and therefore has to be investigated. This is a particular issue with 
regard to accidents on board ships in ports involving stevedores/dock workers.  

The matter has been extensively discussed between Member States AIBs in the context 
of PCF and there is agreement that the issue of what constitutes the operations of a ship 
particularly when that ship is in a port needs to be clarified.  

Definition of a deadline for fatal/non-fatal injuries. The IMO Casualty Code defines a 
VSMC  as  “involving  the  total  loss  of  the  ship  or  a  death  or  severe  damage  to  the 
environment”.  This  means  a  fatality  will  count  as  a  VSMC  triggering  an  obligation  on 
the  AIB  to  carry  out  an  investigation.  However,  neither  the  relevant  IMO  nor  the 
Directive  provide  any  guidance  on  the  time  within  which  a  death  has  to  take  place 
following the incident for it to qualify as a fatal incident.  

A similar problem was encountered in the past in the aviation sector, but EU legislation51 
now  provides,  a  clear  time  frame  for  a  fatal  injury.  The  absence  of  a  unified  single 
definition  of  fatal  injury  in  the  AI  Directive  may  mean  that  maritime  incidents  which 
result in death are not being investigated as there is no harmonised approach to the time-
frame within which death must occur for a fatality to be counted as a VSMC across the 
Union. The matter has been extensively discussed in the context of the PCF and there is 
agreement that a clarification is needed. 

Problem Driver 3: References to outdated international and EU rules 

This problem driver links to Problem 2. The Directive refers to a number of IMO legal 
texts  which  have  been  abrogated,  amended  or  revised  since  the  entry  into  force  of  the 
Directive  (see  Annex  6).  As  the  Directive  is  built  upon  the  IMO  texts  and  as  it  is 
necessary  that  Member  States  fulfil  both  their  international  obligations  as  well  as  their 
EU  obligations,  it  is  important  that  the  Directive  be  kept  aligned  with  the  relevant 
international instruments and that there is no contradiction in their obligations.  

51  Regulation  (EU)  No  996/2010  on  the  investigation  and  prevention  of  accidents  and  incidents  in  civil 
aviation (OJ L 295, 12.11.2010, p. 35) 

16 

 
                                                           
The  Directive  refers  to  the  “IMO  Code  for  the  Investigation  of  Marine  Casualties  and 
Incidents52”  adopted in  1997.  In May 2008  IMO adopted another text53 to  “incorporate 
and  build  upon”  the  1997  IMO  Code  referred  to  in  the  Directive.  However,  in  2013  a 
further  resolution  was  adopted54  which  revoked  the  1997  IMO  text.  The  Directive  also 
refers  to  Circular  MSC/MEPC.  3/Circ.355  of  2008  which  provides  the  definition  of  a 
“serious  casualty”;  this  IMO  text  was  superseded  by  another  IMO  Circular  in  201456 
which no longer refers to “serious casualty”.   

If the Directive is not updated to take account of alignment with the international legal 
requirements, the Member States may face different obligations leading to confusion and 
extra  effort  for  the  AIBs,  leading  to  an  inefficient  accident  investigation  process. 
Alignment  between  the  EU  acquis  and  the  IMO  regulatory  environment  is  particularly 
important having regard to joint investigations carried out with third countries. This has 
not  yet  been done,  as it  requires that  the Directive is  updated.  It  is  important  to  ensure 
that the Member States do not have contradictory obligations as regards the EU and IMO 
regulatory requirements. 

Problem  Driver  4  –  Some  AIBs  lack  sufficient  resources  and/or  expertise  to  be  able to 
effectively and consistently report on and investigate marine casualties  

This problem driver links to Problem 3. A number of Member States already had an AIB 
before the adoption of the AI  Directive and therefore the various  AIBs have developed 
differently depending on their national context. The AI Directive is not prescriptive as to 
the  form  or  structure  the  AIB  had  to  take  other  than  as  to  its  independence.  All  27 
Member  States  now  have  AIBs  with  fifteen  having  established  maritime-only  AIBs, 
while twelve have multi-modal AIBs. Comparing the size and structure of different AIBs 
in different Member States is not useful as it ignores the fact that different Member States 
have different sized fleets, the flagged fleets are different in terms of composition, they 
vary  as  to  the  number  and  size  of  ports  in  their  territory  as  well  as  their  length  of 
coastline. Moreover, some AIBs are multi-modal.  

Accidents  by  their  nature  are  not  predictable  and  the  issue  of  resource  constraints 
becomes  particularly  pressing  when  there  is  a  period  with  several  VSMCs  or  serious 
marine  casualties  to  investigate.  Both  the  2018  ex-post  evaluation  and  the  Maritime 
Transport  Fitness  Check  showed  that  resource  availability,  either  as  regards  available 
staff or with regard to external staff engaged to carry out a particular investigation can be 
critical considerations in deciding whether or not to perform an investigation into a less 
serious accident. Budget and personnel constraints might also influence the preliminary 
assessment in case of a serious accident. If an investigation is delayed due to insufficient 
resources,  it  may  not  be  conducted  in  the  most  effective  way,  as  due  to  time  passed 

52 IMO Resolution A.849(20) of 27 November 1997 
53  Adoption  of  the  Code  of  the  International  Standards  and  Recommended  practices  for  a  Safety 
Investigation  into  a  Marine  Casualty  or  Marine  Incident  (Casualty  Investigation  Code)  Resolution  MSC 
255(84) of 16 May 2008.  
54  Resolution  A.1075(28)  Guidelines  to  Assist  Investigators  in  the  Implementation  of  the  Casualty 
Investigation Code  MSC.255(84)) Adopted on 4 December 2013 
55  Circular  MSC/MEPC.  3/Circ.3    of  the  IMO  Maritime  Safety  Committee  and  Marine  Environment 
Protection Committee of 18 December 2008; 
56  Circular  MSC-MEPC.  3/circ.4/rev.1  Reports  on  Marine  Casualties  and  Incidents  Revised  Harmonized 
Reporting Procedures of 18 November 2014 

17 

 
                                                           
between  the  accident  and  the  start  of  the  investigation  evidence  might  be  lost,  or  the 
memories of the witnesses may be affected. 

Seven  of  the  17  AIBs  who  were  involved  in  the  targeted  consultation  stated  that  they 
suffer from lack of resources, or that they would carry out more investigations if they had 
more  staff  available.  The  AIBs  reported  that  in  principle  they  have  the  option  to 
subcontract  experts,  particularly  when  specific  knowledge  is  required,  but  many  noted 
that  budget  and/or  administrative  complications  make  this  impractical  or  impossible. 
Only  four  AIBs  explicitly  stated  that  resource  availability  is  not  currently  an  issue  for 
them, however one of the four indicated that  the obligations to notify marine casualties 
and incidents to EMCIP place a significant additional stress on their resources as the AIB 
does not deal with statistical data otherwise. 

Issues relating to the obligation of the AI Directive to report accident and incidents to the 
EMCIP  database  had  been  identified  in  the  ex-post  evaluation.  Underreporting  of 
casualties  and  incidents  is  a  significant  issue  –  the  difficulty  being  that  it  is  hard  to 
estimate  what  is  not  known.  Nevertheless,  EMSA  has  carried  out  an  estimation  of  the 
size of the underreporting issue comparing reported accident data with publicly available 
information. On the basis of its research, EMSA concluded that the underreporting rate 
may be as high as 50%. This analysis is based on work carried out by EMSA as well as 
on  academic  theories  of  industrial  accident  prevention57  whereby  there  is  a  numerical 
relationship between the number of accidents resulting in serious injuries, minor injuries 
or no injuries with the number of each increasing as their severity decreases.   

On this basis the underreported accidents seem to relate more particularly to less serious 
incidents which are not always reported to AIBs by the shipping companies and therefore 
are not recorded in the EMCIP database. These are typically cuts, slips and trips usually 
involving  crew  members  which  do  not  result  in  lost  days  of  work.  Because  of  this, 
underreporting is not further considered in the assessment of impacts. At the same time, a 
number  of  AIBs  see  the  reporting  obligation  as  burdensome  and  a  resource-intense 
obligation  which  could  be  better  discharged  by  other  competent  authorities,  allowing 
them to concentrate on investigation. The issue is also problematic because it means that 
there is no truly accurate picture of the accident situation.  

Another  aspect  of  this  problem  is  the  question  of  suitably  trained  staff  with  sufficient 
expertise  in  accident  investigation  and  maritime  transport.  EMSA  currently  provides 
extensive  training  to  AIB  staff  but  it  is  the  AIBs  which  have  the  responsibility  for  the 
recruitment and training of appropriately qualified investigators. The EGD and in particular 
the  “Fit  for  55”  package  will  require  boosting  multimodal  transport  and  ramping  up  the 
deployment  of  sustainable  alternative  transport  fuels  (for  example  through  the  “FuelEU 
maritime”  initiative).  This  shift  to  renewable  and  low  carbon  fuels  as  well  as  to  new 
technologies is expected to lead to a radical change in the maritime transport sector over the 
coming decades and will inevitably have an impact on the types of accidents that occur as 
well as impacting on the investigation thereof. This will present new challenges for the AIBs. 

Other potential drivers considered in the impact assessment and discarded 

57 In the theory of industrial accident prevention, the accident triangle is known as Heinrich triangle or 
Birds triangle. The triangle first introduced by H.W Heinrich in 1931 and later expanded by Frank E. Bird 
(1969); it shows the relationships between Major, Minor and near miss.  

18 

 
                                                           
A  number  of  possible  problem  drivers  (in  relation  to  Member  State  acting  as 
Substantially  Interested  State  (SIS),  the  definition  of  pleasure  yachts  and  pleasure  craft 
and the COVID-19 pandemic) were considered during the impact assessment process but 
were  discarded  either  because  the  identified  problem  driver  was  not  validated  by  the 
stakeholders consulted, because the problem was not susceptible to a solution by means 
of EU legislation or because proposing an action to address the issue at EU level will not 
yield additional results. Further details on the discarded problem drivers and the reasons 
are set out in Annex 7. 

2.3.  How likely are the problems to persist? 

Problem 1  -  Accidents  involving  some  categories of  vessels are not  investigated or are 
not  investigated  in  a  harmonised  manner.  As  long  as  smaller  fishing  vessels  are  not 
included  in  the  scope  of  the  Directive,  those  Member  States  who  do  not  currently 
investigate these accidents under national law will not do so. Those Member States that 
do  investigate  (under  national  law)  smaller  fishing  vessels  accidents  do  so  in  an 
uncoordinated way, and are not obliged to upload their reports and recommendations to 
EMCIP. Consequently, no lessons will be learnt with regards to safety on fishing vessels 
and no standardised EU wide data on this subject will be collected. There is no evidence 
to suggest that the situation will change in the future without EU level intervention. The 
lack  of  accident  investigation  reports,  safety  recommendations  and  lessons  learnt  could 
lead to a decline in safety in the fishing sector operating with ships below 15 meters in 
length.  Without  reminders  and  information  about  risks  to  avoid  and  safe  practices  to 
follow, safety standards may decline. The small size of the businesses in question would 
make  it  highly  unlikely  that  they  would  promulgate  such  lessons  within  the  industry 
themselves.  As  explained  in  section  2.2,  the  accident  occurrence  indicator58  for  fishing 
vessels has continuously increased between 2014 and 2020 showing that the safety level 
related to fishing vessels has negatively evolved during the past years59.  

Problem  2  –  Some  accidents  are  not  investigated  as  AIBs  lack  clarity  regarding  the 
circumstances in which and how they must act. Without further EU level intervention, the 
unclear,  ambiguous,  or  outdated  definitions  of  the  AI  Directive  will  persist.  This  means 
that that AIBs will continue to lack clarity regarding the circumstances in which they must 
act  (i.e.  in  relation  to  the  length  of  fishing  vessel  within  the  scope,  of  the  definition  of 
‘directly in connection with the operations of a ship’, and of the definition of a deadline for 
fatal/non-fatal injuries) and how they must act (i.e. in relation to conditions for a simplified 
investigation report). AIBs will be placed in the situation where they have to find ad hoc 
workable solutions not coordinated or harmonised across the EU.  

Problem 3 – Some AIBs lack sufficient resources and/or expertise to be able to effectively 
and consistently report on and investigate marine casualties. As explained in section 2.2, 
some  AIBs  already  lack  sufficient  human  and  financial  resources  and/or  expertise  to 
effectively and consistently report on and investigate marine casualties. Maritime traffic 
and ship calls are projected to increase over time. This in turn is expected to lead to an 
increase in the number of maritime accident investigations and put additional pressure on 
resources,  despite  the  fact  that  improved  technology  may  offer  better  means  for 
investigators  to  investigate  accidents.  For  example,  most  (larger)  vessels  that  are  built 

58 Calculated as the ratio between the number of reported accidents and the corresponding fleet size. 
59 European Maritime Safety Agency (2021), Annual overview of marine casualties and incidents 2021. 

19 

 
                                                           
after 200260 are equipped with Voyage Data Recorders (VDR)61 which should make the 
work  of  the  investigators  easier.  On  the  other  hand,  the  uptake  of  renewable  and  low 
carbon fuels in the maritime sector, in line with the “Fit for 55” package and in particular 
the “FuelEU maritime” initiative, will require resources to continuously update the staff 
skills.  Problem  3  is  thus  expected  to  persist  over  time  without  further  EU  level 
intervention, although technological innovations are expected to facilitate to some extent 
the work of investigators. At the same time, an upgrade of staff skills  is expected to be 
needed in the future.  

3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? 

3.1.  Legal basis 

Title VI (Articles 90-100) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) establishes 
the EU’s prerogative to make provisions for the Common Transport Policy. Pursuant to 
Article 100(2) TFEU, the Union legislator may lay down appropriate provisions for sea 
transport.  Article  91(1)(c)  of  the  TFEU  provides  that  the  Union  has  competence  in  the 
field of transport to lay down measures to improve transport safety.    

Within  this  legal  framework,  the  EU  provides  for  a  coordinated  and  harmonised  safety 
standard, protecting life and the marine environment  across the Union, instead of relying 
on  the  uncoordinated  action  of  individual  Member  States  only.  Travellers,  workers  and 
citizens  in  general  can  be  reassured  that  accidents  will  be  investigated  to  the  same  high 
standard  across  the  Union  and  that  the  lessons  learned  from  such  accidents  can  be 
disseminated, allowing for better evidence based policy responses at national and EU level.   

3.2. 

Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action 

Under  the  principle  of  subsidiarity,  in  areas  which  do  not  fall  within  its  exclusive 
competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot  be  sufficiently  achieved  by  the  Member  States.  To  the  extent  that  international 
instruments  in  the  field  of  Accidents  Investigation  in  the  maritime  transport  sector  are  an 
exclusive Union competence pursuant to Article 3(2) TFEU, the subsidiarity principle does 
not apply, either to those instruments or to Union rules implementing those agreements. 

In  any  case,  in  the  absence  of  the  AI  Directive,  16  of  the  Member  States’  AIBs  are 
unlikely to have been established. Furthermore, the majority of the States which did not 
have  an  AIB  prior  to  2009  used  to  conduct  investigations  primarily  for  criminal 
prosecution purposes. The Directive has therefore addressed a safety need.  

In the absence of EU action, EU Member States would work in an uncoordinated and non-
harmonised way. Given the international nature of maritime transport, there is therefore a 
“Union  relevance”  of  improving  the  Directive  to  address  the  identified  problems.  It  is 
essential that all Member States investigate similar accidents in the same way to ensure an 
appropriate safety net across the Union to protect life and the marine environment. 

60 The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea - SOLAS, Regulation 20 of Chapter V. 
61 A voyage data recorder (VDR) is a data recording system designed for vessels required to comply with 
the  IMO's  International  Convention  SOLAS  Requirements  (IMO  Res.A.861(20))  to  collect  data  from 
various sensors on board the vessel. The information is then digitized, compressed and stored, it performs a 
similar function to the “black box” recording device installed on commercial airliners. 

20 

 
 
                                                           
The  identified  problems  apply  across  the  entire  Union  and  have  the  same  underlying 
causes.  Only  the  issue  of  inadequate  resources  to  discharge  the  Directive’s  obligations 
varies  between  Member  States  as  some  AIBs  have  sufficient  human,  financial  and 
technical resources to be able to report or investigate all casualties that they would like to 
and others do not. Nevertheless, the fact that some AIBs have sufficient resources should 
not prevent those who do not from receiving the necessary assistance.  

3.3. 

Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action 

Shipping is an international sector, operating in different EU and international waters and 
regulated  at  the  global  as  well  as  regional  and  national  instances.  Therefore,  it  has  by 
nature a strong  cross-border dimension.  The  2018 ex-post evaluation  of the  AI  Directive 
and  the  Maritime  Fitness  Check  also  underlined  its  EU  added  value  in  terms  of  its 
effectiveness,  efficiency  and  synergies  that  it  brings.  The  evaluation  found  that  the 
obligation to create an independent AIB  was regarded by the majority of stakeholders as 
the main added value of the Directive. This was done to avoid the situation that an AI body 
which is part of the maritime administration would in effect be investigating itself with the 
attendant  risk  of  conflict  of  interest.  Given  the  role  and  responsibilities  of  maritime 
administrations as regards certification of vessels, of equipment, of seafarer training as well 
as the control exercised over vessel traffic monitoring as well as of coast guards and other 
bodies, the EU co-legislators felt that it was important that the AIB was separated from the 
maritime  administration.  The  Commission  has  been  obliged  to  take  a  number  of 
infringement actions in this regard62. The Directive also brings EU legislation in line with 
IMO regulation. EU action ensures a level playing field for shipowners, ports and between 
Member States. Harmonisation of investigations at EU level is essential in this respect. 

Given the international nature of maritime transport and the need for a coordinated and 
harmonised approach to maritime safety, a multiplicity of Member State responses to the 
extent  allowed,  issues  identified  is  not  appropriate,  therefore  the  issues  previously 
identified are only susceptible to EU-wide solutions. Failure to adapt the Directive would 
remove the synergistic benefits gained through its implementation.   

4.  OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? 

4.1.  General objectives 

In view of the problems identified in section 2.1, the review of the AI Directive should 
improve maritime safety and improve the protection of the marine environment. It should 
thus  also  contribute  towards  Sustainable  Development  Goal  (SDG)  3  (“Ensure  healthy 
lives and promote well-being for all at all ages”) and SDG 14 (“Conserve and sustainably 
use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development”). 

4.2. 

Specific objectives 

This initiative is designed to effectively address the identified problems that hamper the 
coordinated and harmonised investigation of maritime accidents in the European Union. 
The  specific  objectives  (SOs)  and  their  correspondence  with  the  problem  drivers  are 
presented in Figure 6. 

62 See in particular the Judgment of 9 July 2020 – European Commission v Ireland (C-257/19) 

21 

 
 
                                                           
SO1: Protect fishing vessels, their crew and the environment. VSMCs of smaller fishing 
vessels  of  less  than  15  meters  in  length  including  fatalities  and  loss  of  vessels  are  not 
investigated in a systematic and harmonised way across the European Union.  Including 
VSMCs involving this vessel type within the Directive would require reporting and allow 
for  more  investigations  and  a  better  understanding  of  the  safety  problems  that  this 
segment  faces.  Systematic  safety  investigations  of  these  accidents  would  lead  to  safety 
recommendations  to  the  vessel  operators,  the  sector,  national  administrations  and  other 
interested  parties  which  should  improve  the  safety  picture.  The  conduct  of  systematic 
safety  investigations  will  also  provide  policy  makers  at  national  and  EU  level  with  the 
information to prepare well-developed and evidence-based policy responses.  

Figure 6: Correspondence between the specific objectives and the problem drivers  

SO2:  Member  States  accident  investigation  bodies  to  have  clarity  and  precision 
regarding  definitions  to  ensure  that  all  accidents  that  need  to  be  investigated  are 
investigated in a timely and harmonised manner. AIBs need clarity on the circumstances 
in which they should carry out investigations. An absence of adequate harmonisation and 
a  common  understanding  of  definitions  relating  to  the  legislation  means  that  similar 
accident  are  subject  to  different  treatment  as  to  whether  they  are  investigated  or  not  in 
different  Member  States.  The  Directive  should  also  be  aligned  with  the  relevant 
international  instruments  so  as  to  ensure  better  consistency  between  Member  States 
obligations under the Directive and their international obligations – this is particularly an 
issue having regard to joint investigations with third countries.  

SO3: Enhance the capacity of AIBs to conduct (and report on) accident investigations in 
a  timely,  expert  and  independent  manner  -  including  as  regards  renewable  and  low 
carbon  fuels  and  technologies.  Member  States  AIBs  should  be  able  to  respond  in  a 
timely  manner,  report  to  EMCIP  and  to  carry  out  appropriate  safety  investigations. 
Adequate  resources  are  relevant  in  this  context  – if the AIBs need  specialised training, 
operational or technical assistance there should be a mechanism within the Directive that 
provides  for  such  a  possibility.  The  uptake  of  renewable  and  low  carbon  fuels  in  the 
maritime  sector,  in  line  with  the  “Fit  for  55”  package  and  in  particular  the  “FuelEU 
maritime” initiative, will require resources to continuously update the staff skills.   

22 

PROBLEM DRIVERSSPECIFIC OBJECTIVESProtectfishing vessels, their crewand the environmentThe Directive does not apply tocertain vessels (PD1)Accident Investigation Bodies haveclarity and precision regarding definitions to ensure that all accidents that need to be investigated are investigated in a timely and harmonized mannerSome definitions are notprovided in the Directive orare notspecific enough (PD2)The Directive contains references to outdatedinternational rules (PD3)Some AccidentInvestigation Bodieslack sufficient resources or expertise to be able to effectively and consistently report and investigate marine casualties (PD4)Enhance the capacity of Accident Investigation Bodies to conduct and report on investigations in a timely, expert and independent manner (including as regards renewable and low-carbon fuels and technologies) 
 
5.  WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? 

5.1.  What is the baseline from which options are assessed? 

The EU Reference scenario 2020 (REF2020) is the starting point for the impact assessment 
of this initiative. The REF2020 takes into account the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic 
that had a significant impact on the transport sector. More detailed information about the 
preparation  process,  assumptions  and  results  are  included  in  the  Reference  scenario 
publication63. Building on REF2020, the baseline scenario for this impact assessment has 
been  designed  to  include  the  initiatives  of  the  ‘Fit  for  55’  package  proposed  by  the 
Commission  on  14  July  2021.  A  common  baseline  was  developed  for  this  impact 
assessment,  as  well  as  for  the  Flag  State  and  Port  State  control  impact  assessments,  to 
ensure consistency. More details on the baseline scenario are provided in Annex 4.  

The  baseline  scenario  assumes  no  further  EU  level  intervention  beyond  the  current  AI 
Directive  and  the  continuation  of  the  application  of  the  IMO  Casualty  Code  as  it  is. 
Smaller  fishing  vessels  would  continue  to  be  outside  the  scope  of  the  Directive  and 
therefore Member States would adopt different approaches to similar accidents. Member 
States with inadequate financial, technical or operational resources to be able to report on 
and investigate accidents in a timely and efficient manner would have to make choices as 
to what accident to investigate and how. As previously stated, the role of EMSA in the 
implementation  of  the  Directive  is  central.  EMSA  operates  the  EMCIP  database, 
provides training to investigators on the request of AIBs and assists in the management 
of the PCF. The Commission has launched an impact assessment on the possible review 
of  EMSA  founding  Regulation.64  However,  the  outcome  of  this  impact  assessment 
cannot be prejudged and thus the baseline scenario does not account for changes in the 
EMSA founding Regulation. 

The  COVID-19  pandemic  had  a  major  impact  on  global  shipping,  affecting  all  its 
segments  from  passenger  ships  to  container  ships  and  oil  tankers.65  In  the  baseline 
scenario,  international  maritime  freight  transport  activity  (intra  and  extra-EU)  is 
projected  to  be  21%  lower  in  2020  relative  to  2015.  From  2021  onwards  however  it  is 
projected to start recovering and grow strongly by 2025 and beyond (i.e. 19% growth for 
2015-2030 and 48% for 2015-2050), due to the rising demand for primary resources and 
container  shipping.  Relative  to  2019,  this  is  equivalent  to  8%  increase  in  transport 
activity by 2030 and 33% growth by 2050. 

The number of port calls for 2025-2050 is projected to grow at lower rate than transport 
activity, following similar evolution over the historical period66. This reflects the fact that 
transport activity is also driven by other factors such as the increase in the size of vessels 
over time, and of the distance travelled. In the baseline scenario the number of port calls 
is projected to go up by 14% by 2030 relative to 2015 and by 36% by 2050 (equivalent to 

63 EU Reference Scenario 2020 | Energy (europa.eu) 
64 Regulation (EC) No 1406/2002/EC, the inception impact assessment at  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13049-European-Maritime-Safety-
Agency-review-of-mandate_en 
65 COVID-19 did not however have a long term effects on the activities of the accident investigation 
bodies, as it can be seen in Annex 7. 
66  The  same  ratio  between  the  growth  in  the  number  of  port  calls  and  the  transport  activity  as  for  the 
historical period (2014-2019) has been assumed for the projection period.  

23 

 
                                                           
6% growth by 2030 relative to 2019 and 26% increase by 2050), following the recovery 
from the COVID-19 pandemic. 

Driven by the increase in the transport activity and the number of vessels, the number of 
marine casualties is projected to increase over time in the baseline scenario. Considering 
only  the  scope  of  the  AI  Directive  (i.e.  excluding  fishing  vessels  below  15  meters)  the 
number  of  casualties  is  projected  to  increase  by  14%  by  2030  relative  to  2019  and  by 
45% by 2050 without further EU level action. At the same time, the degree of severity of 
marine casualties is projected to decrease, leading to a decrease in the number of vessels 
lost (by 5% for 2019-2030 and for 2019-2050) and a relative stabilisation of the number 
of fatalities by 2050 (11% decrease for 2019-2030 and 3% increase for 2019-2050).  

Accounting also for the fishing vessels below 15 meters, which are currently outside the 
scope of AI Directive, the number of marine casualties is projected to increase by 9% by 
2030 relative to 2019 and by 27% by 2050 in the baseline scenario. The lower growth in 
the number of marine casualties for fishing vessels below 15 meters (6% for 2019-2030 
and 15% for 2019-2050) is explained however by the projected reduction in the number 
of  fishing  vessels  by  2050,  while  the  marine  casualties’  rate  would  still  increase  over 
time.  The  degree  of  severity  of  marine  casualties  including  fishing  vessels  below  15 
meters is projected to decrease over time but 210 fatalities are still projected in 2030 and 
203 in 2050 in the baseline scenario, while 141 vessels are projected to be lost in 2030 
and  129  in  2050.  By  2050,  the  number  of  fatalities  involving  fishing  vessels  below  15 
meters would represent 67% of the total number of fatalities while the vessels lost 85% 
of  the  total.  In  addition,  the  estimated  number  of  fatalities  and  injuries  where  "other 
persons  are  involved"  is  projected  to  remain  stable  up  to  2030  relative  to  2019  but 
increase by 25% and 23%, respectively, up to 2050 (15 fatalities and 103 injuries). This 
is  particularly  relevant  with  regard  to  accidents  on  board  ships  in  ports  involving 
stevedores/dock  workers.  This  is  still  far  from  the  goal  of  the  Sustainable  and  Smart 
Mobility Strategy of close to zero death toll for all modes of transport in the EU. 

The  tonnes  of  bunker  fuel  lost  at  sea  due  to  VSMCs  involving  all  vessels,  excluding 
fishing vessels below 15 meters, is estimated to go up from around 650 tonnes in 2019 to 
740 tonnes in 2030 and 890 tonnes in 2050. When also considering fishing vessels below 
15 meters the bunker fuels lost at sea is estimated to increase from 1,178 tonnes in 2019 
to 1,301 tonnes in 2030 and 1,497 tonnes in 205067.  

Driven by the projected number of marine casualties, the number of safety investigations 
in the scope of the AI Directive is projected to increase from 95 in 2019 to 111 in 2030 
and 138 in  2050  in  the  baseline scenario.  The baseline projections  also  account  for the 
impact of Brexit68, which is likely to be felt more significantly by some Member States 

67 An average level of 30 tonnes of bunker fuels lost per vessel (excluding fishing vessels) has been used 
for  the  estimations  in  the  context  of  the  impact  assessment  support  study.  For  fishing  vessels  above  15 
meters an average level of 22 tonnes of bunker fuels lost per vessel has been assumed, based on data from 
EMSA. Finally, for fishing vessels below 15 meters, 21% of the bunker fuels lost per fishing vessels above 
15 meters has been assumed (i.e. 6.6 tonnes), drawing on information  from the  Scientific, Technical and 
Economic  Committee  for  Fisheries  (STECF),  database  of  the  2021  Annual  Economic  Report  on  the  EU 
Fishing Fleet, available at https://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/reports/economic. 
68  From  the  entry  into  force  of  the  AI  Directive  till  the  end  of  2020,  the  UK  has  conducted  187  safety 
investigations out of 1,482 investigations in total. Amongst them, 53 included an EU interest. As a result of 
Brexit, and assuming no agreement with the UK AIB, these would now have to be done by EU AIBs. On 

24 

 
                                                           
 
(e.g.  Ireland,  France,  Belgium,  Cyprus  or  the  Netherlands)  due  to  their  links,  either 
geographical or commercial, with the UK. The impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine 
on maritime traffic, on maritime trade flows or safety and thereby indirectly on maritime 
accident investigation has not as yet been possible to quantify.   

As explained, safety investigations for  fishing vessels below 15 are not  in the scope of 
the  AI  Directive  and  Member  States  that  perform  them  do  so  in  line  with  national 
legislation.  In  the  baseline  scenario,  the  number  of  safety  investigations  for  VSMCs 
involving fishing vessels below 15 meters is projected to go up from a range between 53 
and  156  investigations  in  2019  to  58  to  171  investigations  in  2030  and  63  to  186 
investigations in 2050. These projections also take into account the effect of Brexit.  

The costs for all EU AIBs for conducting investigations according to AI Directive (including 
administrative tasks) are projected to increase from a range between EUR 1.0 and 6.2 million 
in  2019  to  EUR  1.2  to  7.2  million  in  2030  and  EUR  1.5  to  8.9  million  in  2050.  The 
investigations of VSMCs involving fishing vessels below 15 meters, performed by EU AIBs 
in line with the requirements of national law may add between EUR 0.6 to 10.1 million in 
2019, to EUR 0.6 and 11.1 million in 2030 and to EUR 0.7 to 12.1 million in 2050.  

5.2. 

Policy measures and policy options 

As  a  first  step,  a  comprehensive  list  of  possible  policy  measures  was  established  after 
extensive consultations with stakeholders, expert meetings, independent research and the 
Commission’s  own  analysis.  This  list  was  subsequently  screened  based  on  the  likely 
effectiveness, efficiency and proportionality of the proposed measures in relation to the 
given objectives, as well as their legal, political and technical feasibility. 

5.2.1.  Discarded policy measures 

A number of possible problem  drivers and  policy  measures  were considered during the 
impact  assessment  process  but  were  discarded  either  because  the  identified  problem 
driver  was  not  validated  by  the  stakeholders  consulted,  because  the  problem  was  not 
susceptible  to  a  solution  by  means  of  EU  legislation  or  because  proposing  an  action  to 
address  the  issue  at  EU  level  will  not  yield  additional  results.  Further  details  on  the 
discarded problem drivers and policy measures and the reasons are set out in Annex 7. 

5.2.2.  Retained policy measures  

The retained policy measures to address the problems identified in section 2 are provided 
in Table 2. A more detailed description of the policy measures is included in Annex 8.  

5.3.  Description of the policy options  

The retained policy measures have been grouped in 3 policy options: policy option A (PO 
A), policy option B (PO B) and policy option C (PO C). Table 2 presents the links of policy 
measures included in the policy options with the problem drivers and specific objectives. 

this basis, the number of investigations for all EU AIBs is estimated to increase by 3.5% each year relative 
to developments excluding Brexit. 

25 

 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Policy measure 

Table 2: Overview of policy measures and policy options 
Policy driver 
and specific 
objective 
PD1 
SO1 

PM 1a – Member States will be encouraged to report all very serious 
marine  casualties  (crew  fatalities  or  loss  of  vessel)  involving  fishing 
vessels of less than 15 metres in EMCIP 
PM 1b – Member States will be obliged to report very serious marine 
casualties (crew fatalities or loss of vessel) involving fishing vessels of 
less than 15 metres in EMCIP 
PM  2  –  Member  States  will  be  obliged  to  carry  out  a  preliminary 
assessment of very serious marine casualties involving fishing vessels 
of  less  than  15  metres  to  determine  whether  they  will  open  a  safety 
investigation 
PM 3 - Length of fishing vessels to be defined as Length overall (LOA) 
PM 4a – The  phrase  “directly in connection  with the  operations of a 
ship”  will  be  clarified  in  interpretive  guidelines  (non-regulatory 
measure) as regards accidents which take place in ports  
PM  4b – The  phrase  ‘directly  in  connection  with  the  operations  of  a 
ship’  will  be  explicitly  defined  in  the  Directive  as  regards  accidents 
which take place in ports  
PM 5a – Interpretive guidelines will provide elements to support the 
AIB  to  decide  when  an  accident  classifies  as  fatal  in  case  a  person 
does not die immediately 
PM 5b – An explicit deadline will be included in the Directive stating 
when  an  accident  classifies  as  fatal  in  case  a  person  does  not  die 
immediately 
PM 6 - The Directive will refer to the most up-to-date versions of the 
Code  for  the  Investigation  of  Marine  Casualties  and  Incidents 
(Casualty Investigation Code) 
PM 7 - EMSA could provide highly specialised analytical support 
during an individual investigation (soft skills) 
PM 8 - EMSA could provide analytical tools and equipment during 
an individual investigation (hardware) 
PM  9  -  EMSA  could  share  knowledge  or  organise  training  on 
specific techniques/tools on new developments and technologies which 
may be relevant for accident investigation in the future, including but 
not limited to renewable and low carbon fuels,  which are particularly 
relevant in view of the “Fit for 55” package, and automation, as well as 
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) rules  
PM  10  -  Introduce  the  obligation  that  each  Member  State  establishes  a 
quality management system (QMS) for the accident investigation body  
PM 11 - The list of authorities that can input / add accident data to the 
EMCIP database is modified, so that AIBs must report VSMCs but 
all  other  occurrences  can  be  reported  by  other  nominated  competent 
national authorities, the Commission and EMSA 

PO 
A 

PO 
B 

PO 
C 

√ 

√ 
√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

√ 

PD2 
SO2 

PD3 
SO2 

PD4 
SO3 

All three policy options contain four common policy measures, namely:  PM3 to clarify 
the length of fishing vessels, PM6 to align the Directive with the most up to date version 
of  the  IMO  Casualty  Code  to  avoid  the  situation  where  Member  States  have  divergent 
responsibilities  to  the  EU  and  IMO,  PM9  on  EMSA  providing  training  on  new 
developments  and technologies  as well as on the GDPR rules  and PM10 requiring that 
EU AI bodies to have a quality management system. 

26 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3.1.  Policy option A  

This policy option proposes a number of changes to the Directive to better deliver on the 
goal of improving maritime safety and pollution prevention. Policy option A will leave 
the scope of the Directive as it is and the AIBs would continue to have the flexibility they 
currently have. The changes envisaged would add little in terms of new requirements in 
the AI Directive while EMSA assistance would offer some benefits.  

On  Specific  Objective  1  “Protect  fishing  vessels,  their  crew  and  the  environment”  -  a 
non-regulatory  measure  is  proposed  where  Member  States  will  be  recommended  to 
report on VSMCs (crew fatalities or loss of vessel) and in so doing should provide more 
insight into the number of accidents as well as some of the reasons behind them (PM 1a).  

With regard to Specific Objective 2 “Member States AIBs to have clarity and precision 
regarding definitions to ensure that all accidents that need to be are being investigated in 
a harmonised manner” the amendments are focused both on aligning the Directive with 
new references in IMO legislation (PM 6) and on providing more guidance on how the 
effectiveness  of  accident  investigation  can  be  improved  to  ultimately  positively  impact 
maritime safety. Problems with definitions will be clarified by legislation (PM 3) or by 
using non-regulatory measures such as interpretative guidelines (PM 4a and PM 5a). 

In relation to Specific Objective 3 “Enhance the capacity of AIBs to conduct (and report on) 
accident investigations in a timely, expert and independent manner  -  including as regards 
renewable  and  low  carbon  fuels  and  technologies”  the  policy  option  requires  a  quality 
management system (QMS) be put in place to assure each AIBs’ effective management of 
resources and of inspection reports (PM 10). On the issue of resources, an enhanced role is 
provided  for  EMSA  in  support  of  the  Member  States  by  providing  highly  specialised 
analytical  support  (soft  skills)  during  an  investigation  (PM  7),  the  supply  of  tools  and 
equipment (hardware) to AIBs (PM 8) and the sharing of knowledge or the organisation of 
training on specific techniques/tools on issues such as renewable and low carbon fuels which 
are expected to have significant impacts on the way in which maritime transport operates and 
which will be relevant for accident investigation in the future as well as on issues relating to 
the General Data Protection Regulation  “GDPR” (PM 9) and the sharing of information with 
third country authorities.  

5.3.2.  Policy option B  

This  policy  option  seeks  to  balance  enhanced  harmonisation  by  means  of  more  clearly 
stated definitions with a limited additional requirement as regards smaller fishing vessels. 
In  this  policy  option,  flexibility  for  the  AIBs  is  limited  while  harmonisation  is 
highlighted as much as possible.  

On  Specific  Objective  1  “Protect  fishing  vessels,  their  crew  and  the  environment”  the 
Directive  would  be  amended  so  that  Member  States  would  be  required  to  report  all 
fatalities and vessel losses involving fishing vessels of less than 15 metres to the EMCIP 
(PM  1b).  This  should  provide  the  Commission  and  Member  States  with  empirical  data 
for future policy making in this area.  

With regard to Specific Objective 2 “Member States AIBs to have clarity and precision 
regarding definitions to ensure that all accidents that need to be are being investigated in 
a harmonised manner”, the same alignment as in PO A on IMO (PM 6) is provided for.  

27 

 
On  the  possibly  ambiguous  terms  and  definitions  which  leave  room  for  interpretation 
specifically  how  to  measure  the  length  of  fishing  vessels,  how  the  phrase  ‘directly  in 
connection with the operations of a ship’ should be defined and the fixing of a time limit 
for  situations  when  person  does  not  die  immediately  after  the  accident  are  explicitly 
defined  in  the  Directive  to  harmonise  accident  investigation  further  (PM3,  PM  4b  and 
PM  5b).  Limiting  the  flexibility  of  AIBs  as  regards  definitions  will  ensure  a  more 
harmonised approach to  investigations and more coherent inspection results in terms of 
reports and safety recommendations. 

In relation to Specific Objective 3 “Enhance the capacity of AIBs to conduct (and report 
on)  accident  investigations  in  a  timely,  expert  and  independent  manner  -  including  as 
regards  renewable  and  low  carbon  fuels  and  technologies”  there  continues  to  be  the 
requirement  for  a  QMS  (PM  10)  like  in  PO  A.  The  role  of  EMSA  in  support  of  the 
Member  States  is  slightly  enlarged  beyond  what  is  currently  provided  for  in  existing 
legislation  by  sharing  of  knowledge  or  the  organisation  of  training  on  specific 
techniques/tools on issues such as renewable and low carbon fuels which are expected to 
have significant impacts on the way in which maritime transport operates and which will 
be  relevant  for  accident  investigation  in  the  future  as  well  as  on  issues  relating  to  the 
General Data Protection Regulation  “GDPR” (PM 9). However, the responsibility of AIBs 
to  report  accident  information  to  EMCIP  is  reduced  by  broadening  the  scope  of 
authorities who can input such data to include any competent authorities nominated by the 
Member  States  as  well  as  the  Commission  and  EMSA  (PM  11).  The  EMCIP  reporting 
burden  on  AIBs  is  somewhat  lessened  by  broadening  the  range  of  competent  authorities 
that can report to the database.     

5.3.3.  Policy option C  

This  policy option  revises the Directive, increasing the  level  of policy intervention and 
focuses  on  the  harmonisation.  This  policy  option  is  the  most  ambitious  in  terms  of 
increased administrative and investigatory requirements for the AIBs.   

With  respect  to  Specific  Objective  1  “Protect  fishing  vessels,  their  crew  and  the 
environment” this option will oblige AIBs not only to report on fatalities and vessels losses 
of smaller fishing vessels (PM 1b), but also to carry out at least a preliminary assessment 
to determine if lessons can be learned and if a full investigation needs to be carried out (PM 
2).  At  the  moment,  AIBs  are  not  required  to  provide  information  on  the  safety  record  if 
smaller  fishing  vessels  or  their  susceptibility  to  accidents  at  EU  level.  However,  smaller 
fishing vessels are  generally older,  not typically  appropriately  invested in  or operated by 
their  owners  and  are  frequently  crewed  by  only  one  or  two  crewmembers.  Therefore,  if 
they are involved in a fatal incident there may not be any crew to interview. This does not 
mean however that there will be no evidence and that the lessons learned cannot be shared. 
Moreover,  as  they  fall  outside  the  scope  of  the  Directive,  accidents  are  not  reported  and 
therefore, there are no statistics that allow monitoring the evolution of accidents (even if 
they are not investigated).  

All  stakeholders  generally  acknowledged  the  inherent  risks  involved  in  the  operation  of 
smaller  fishing  vessels.  The  AIBs  interviewed  noted  that  small  fishing  vessels  are 
particularly prone to capsizing; falls overboard are also relatively common.  

However, there is mixed opinion among AIBs as to whether the scope should be extended. 
AIBs  already  investigating  casualties  involving  smaller  fishing  vessels  are  in  favour  of 

28 

 
extending the scope. AIBs not yet investigating casualties involving smaller fishing vessels 
have  mixed  opinions.  Some  of  them,  especially  the  small  ones,  are  against  a  scope 
extension  as  they  fear  that  it  will  increase  their  workload  substantially.  The  larger  AIBs 
seem to be more in favour as they see advantages of investigating the accidents as in the 
long run it could improve safety. Social partners in the sea fisheries sector (employers and 
employees)  on  the  other  hand  have  expressed  support  for  this  measure,  underlining  the 
importance of gathering solid, detailed information on the causes of accidents. 

At  the  same  time,  IMO  has  removed  the  reference  to  serious  casualty  and  as  part  of 
alignment  the  Directive  will  be  amended  to  abolish  the  requirement  that  a  preliminary 
assessment  is  carried  out  in  respect  of  all  serious  casualties.  This  means  that  apart  from 
VSMCs (which currently make up 48% of European AIBs completed safety investigations 
and  following  the extension to smaller fishing vessels  proposed in this  revision  whereby 
the  AIB  will  only  be  obliged  to  carry  out  a  preliminary  assessment)  all  other  safety 
investigations (currently just more than half of all investigations) will be at the discretion of 
the  AI  bodies.  In  other  words,  besides  investigating  VSMCs,  AIBs  already  focus  their 
work  on  the  accidents  where  they  consider  that,  a  priori,  some  safety  lessons  can  be 
learned.   

With regard to Specific Objective 2 “Member States AIBs to have clarity and precision 
regarding definitions to ensure that all accidents that need to be are being investigated in 
a  harmonised  manner”  the  same  alignment  as  in  PO  A  and  B  on  IMO  (PM  6)  is 
provided for. Potentially problematic definitions will be laid down in the Directive and 
clearly  addressed.  The  effect  of  this  policy  option  is  that  AIBs  will  still  have  some 
flexibility  in  some  areas,  while  in  other  areas  the  room  for  interpretation  is  limited,  to 
improve harmonisation in the EU (PM3, PM 4b and PM 5b). 

On  the  resource  issue  set  out  in  Specific  Objective  3  “Enhance  the  capacity  of  AIBs  to 
conduct  (and  report  on)  accident  investigations  in  a  timely,  expert  and  independent 
manner - including as regards renewable and low carbon fuels and technologies” the role 
of  EMSA in support of the Member States is enhanced by providing highly specialised 
analytical  support  (soft  skills)  during  an  investigation  (PM  7),  the  supply  of  tools  and 
equipment (hardware) to AIBs (PM 8) and the sharing of knowledge or the organisation of 
training  on  specific  techniques/tools  and  new  developments  (in  particular  renewable  and 
low carbon fuels following the “Fit for 55” package, automation etc.), as well as assistance 
on  EU  GDPR  which  will  be  relevant  for  accident  investigation  in  the  future  (PM  9). 
EMSA’s  assistance  both  in  terms  of  soft  skills  and  hardware  will  partially  mitigate  the 
additional  workload.  The  authorities  which  can  report  data  to  EMCIP  will  also  be 
expanded  (PM  11).  The  requirement  for  a  QMS  (PM10)  is  also  contained  within  this 
option.  

6.  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? 

This section summarizes the main expected economic, social and environmental impacts 
of each PO69. The proposed measures which involve the amendment of the Directive are 
assumed  to  be  implemented  from  2025  onwards,  so  that  the  assessment  has  been 
undertaken  for  the  2025-2050  period  and  refers  to  EU27.  Costs  and  benefits  are 

69  The  analysis  in  this  section  is  based  on  the  Ecorys  et  al.  (2022),  Impact  assessment  support  study 
concerning possible revision of Directive 2009/18/EC, and on the analysis of stakeholders' feedback. 

29 

 
                                                           
expressed as present value over the 2022-2050 period, using a 3% discount rate. Further 
details on the methodological approach are provided in Annex 4. 

The  revision  aims  at  improving  how  accident  investigations  are  undertaken  in  the  EU. 
Some measures aim at increasing efficiency and harmonisation through better definitions, 
to share resources (i.e. through EMSA) and alignment with other pieces of legislation70. 
Better  investigation  is  expected  to  ultimately  lead  to  enhanced  safety  and  better 
protecting the environment. 

6.1.  Economic impacts 

This  section  provides  the  economic  impacts  of  the  policy  options  on  the  AIBs,  ship 
operators  and  EMSA.  It  also  provides  an  assessment  of  impacts  on  SMEs,  the 
functioning of the internal market and competition, and on competitiveness.   

6.1.1.  Impacts on Accident Investigation Bodies 

Impact  on  the  number  of  investigations.  The  inclusion  of  the  very  serious  casualties 
involving  a  fishing  vessel  below  15  meters  in  PO  C  is  projected  to  result  in  37  to  110 
additional  investigations  relative  to  the  baseline  in  2030  and  40  to  119  additional 
investigations in 2050 (Table 3) at  EU level. It should be noted that for fishing vessels 
below 15 meters, as explained in section 5.1, the investigations in the baseline scenario 
are conducted in line with the requirements of national legislation in 11 Member States.  

The  clarification  of  the  length  of  fishing  vessels  definition,  defined  as  Length  overall 
(LOA)  in  all  three  policy  options,  is  projected  to  result  in  a  limited  increase  in  the 
number  of  investigations  that  are  currently  under  the  scope  of  the  AI  Directive  (6 
additional investigations in all three options relative to the baseline in 2030 and 2050).  

As regards the definition  of “directly in  connection with the operations of  a ship”  and 
how this is interpreted having regard to port workers, the impact of a clearer definition 
explicitly  extending  the  scope  of  the  Directive  to  situations  where  there  are  casualties 
involving port workers which take place on board a ship in a port is expected to give rise 
to a limited number of additional investigations per year in PO B and PO C (8 additional 
investigations  relative  to  the  baseline  in  2030  and  9  in  2050).  The  impact  would  be 
smaller  in  PO  A  whereas  only  interpretative  guidelines  are  foreseen  (4  additional 
investigations relative to the baseline in 2030 and 5 in 2050).  

A  number  of  policy  measures  further  seek  to  specify  or  clarify  definitions  in  the 
Directive.  It  was  not  possible  to  quantify  their  impact  on  the  additional  number  of 
investigations, although their impact is expected to be limited.   

On the establishment of a time limit for fatal accidents, this is expected to give rise to a 
very limited increase in the number of investigations per year in PO B and PO C. The 16 
AIBs  that  responded  to  the  AIB  survey  indicated  that  accidents  with  “delayed”  loss  of 
life  only  occur  once  a  year  or  less.  In  many  cases,  such  accidents  are  investigated 
anyway. All the AIBs responding to the survey mentioned that it never happened that a 
fatal accident was not investigated because the death occurred only after the decision not 
to undertake the investigation. However, several AIBs mentioned that it would be helpful 

70 For example the GDPR 

30 

 
                                                           
to have an alignment with international standards or guidelines, to facilitate cooperation 
with non-EU countries.   

The alignment with the up to date IMO provisions in PO A, PO B and PO C means that 
the concept of a serious casualty is removed from the Directive along with the obligation 
on AIBs to carry out a preliminary assessment of such casualties to determine if a safety 
investigation has to be carried out. While this alignment with the IMO provision will not 
necessarily reduce the number of non-mandatory safety investigations carried out it will 
mean that AIBs are not obliged to carry out preliminary assessments which may lead to a 
reduction of the costs. Given that all occurrences are subject to some sort of assessment 
to establish whether it falls within the scope of the Directive and should be investigated, 
it is not possible to quantify the possible reduction in costs.  

Overall, PO A would lead to 10 additional investigations at EU level in 2030 and 11 in 
2050  relative  to  the  baseline.  PO  B  is  projected  to  result  in  slightly  higher  number  of 
additional  investigations  than  PO  A  (14  in  2030  and  15  in  2050),  while  PO  C  would 
result  in  51  to  124  additional  investigations  in  2030  and  55  to  134  additional 
investigations  in  2050  (Table  3).  As  explained  above,  the  number  of  additional 
investigations may be slightly higher, in particular in PO B and PO C, which additionally 
establish a time limit for fatal accidents.  

Table 3: Projected number of investigations (EU27) 

Baseline 

PO A 

Difference to the baseline 
PO B 

PO C 

2030 
111 

2050 
138 

2030 
10 

Number of investigations 
excluding fishing vessels below 
15 meters 
Number of investigations for 
fishing vessels below 15 meters 
Total number of investigations  169 - 282  201 - 324 
10 
Source: Ecorys (2022), Impact assessment support study 

63 - 186 

58 - 171 

0 

2050 
11 

2030 
14 

2050 
15 

2030 
14 

2050 
15 

0 

11 

0 

14 

0 

37 - 110  40 - 119 

15 

51 - 124  55 - 134 

Impact on the reporting requirements. All policy options include requirements regarding 
the  reporting  of  very  serious  marine  casualties  (VSMC)  involving  fishing  vessels  below  15 
meters. However, while in PO A Member States are encouraged to report VSMCs involving 
these vessels (on a voluntary basis), in PO B and PO C Member States are obliged to report 
them. In 2019, only Denmark, France, Malta, Portugal and Poland reported in total 21 VSMCs 
in EMCIP, which represent around 5% of the total number of VSMCs estimated for that year71. 
In the baseline scenario, the share of VSMCs involving fishing vessels below 15 meters that 
are reported in EMCIP is assumed to remain constant over time relative to 2019. In PO A the 
share is assumed to increase to 50% of the VSMCs involving fishing vessels below 15 meters, 
which however represents an upper bound and thus leads to conservative cost estimates. In PO 
B and PO C all the VSMCs would be reported in EMCIP, following the reporting obligation. 
Thus, PO A would  result in 218 additional VSMCs reported in EMCIP in 2030 and 237 in 
2050 relative to the baseline, while PO B and PO C would result in 436 additional VSMCs 
reported in EMCIP in 2030 and 474 in 2050 (Table 4).      

71 The shares are similar for 2014-2019. 

31 

 
  
                                                           
Table 4: Projected number of VSMCs reported in EMCIP  

Baseline 

PO A 

Difference to the baseline 
PO B 

PO C 

Number of VSMCs involving 
fishing vessels below 15 meters  
Source: Ecorys (2022), Impact assessment support study 

2030 
22 

2050 
24 

2030 
218 

2050 
237 

2030 
436 

2050 
474 

2030 
436 

2050 
474 

Impacts  on  costs  for  AIBs.  The  increase  in  the  costs  for  AIBs  in  the  policy  options 
relative to the baseline originate from: 1) an increase in the number of investigations; 2) 
an increase in the reporting requirements; and 3) from the requirement of establishing a 
quality management system (QMS) for the AIBs.  

The  costs  related  to  the  additional  number  of  investigations  (i.e.  adjustment  costs)  are 
estimated  on  the  basis  of  the  time  needed  to  complete  an  investigation.  Drawing  on 
stakeholders’ consultations, the time spent on an investigation is assumed to be between 
250  and  1,500  hours72.  It  should  be  noted  that  PO  C  only  requires  a  preliminary 
assessment  of  VSMCs  involving  fishing  vessels  below  15  meters,  which  may  result  in 
lower number of hours and lower workload for AIBs if a full investigation is not pursued. 
It  is  however not  possible to  estimate how many of the preliminary  assessments  would 
result  in  full  investigations.  For  this  reason,  a  conservative  assumption  is  used,  namely 
that all preliminary investigations result in full investigations, which represents the upper 
bound in terms of costs. PO A is projected to result in additional costs of between EUR 
0.2 and 0.8 million in 2030 and EUR 0.3 to 0.8 million in 2050 relative to the baseline, 
while PO B would result in somewhat higher costs of EUR 0.3 to 1 million in 2030 and 
EUR  0.3  to  1.1  million  in  2050.  PO  C  shows  the  highest  additional  costs,  estimated  at 
EUR 0.7 to 8.2 million in 2030 relative to the baseline and at EUR 0.7 to 8.8 million in 
2050.  The  much  higher  cost  of  PO  C,  relative  to  PO  A  and  PO  B,  is  related  to  the 
inclusion of the VSMCs involving fishing vessels below 15 meters in the scope of the AI 
Directive (Table 5). 

The time for reporting is estimated by EMSA as being in the order of 15 minutes work 
per  casualty.  In  any  event,  AIBs  are  notified  on  all  casualties  and  have  to  sort  through 
them to establish whether or not they will investigate. Any additional costs for AIBs will 
be  small  particularly  as  the  possibility  to  upload  data  to  EMCIP  is  broadened  to  allow 
this to be done by competent national authorities other than the AIBs in PO B and PO C. 
The additional costs related to reporting of VSMCs (i.e. the administrative costs) in PO 
A  are  estimated  at  EUR  1.6  thousand  in  2030  relative  to  the  baseline  and  EUR  1.8 
thousand in 2050. For PO B and PO C the costs would be higher, due to the obligation of 
reporting  all  VSMCs  involving  fishing  vessels  below  15  meters  (EUR  3.3  thousand  in 
2030 and EUR 3.6 thousand in 2050 relative to the baseline).  

In addition, under all three POs Member States shall develop, implement and maintain a 
quality  management  system  (QMS)  for  their  AIBs73.  This  QMS  shall  be  certified  in 

72 The tariffs per hour draw on Eurostat Structure of earnings survey, Labour Force Survey data for Non-
Wage Labour Costs. 
73 The quality management system (QMS) will allow for more efficient investigations, better management 
of resources and systems and would also allow to identify problems before these become serious. The need 
for such a QMS is to allow for better management of often scarce resources to identify system problems 
and to allow these to be addressed either by seeking help from EMSA or by making the case for additional 
resources at the national level. A key part of improvements in efficiency is to establish control  conditions 
and a  QMS supports this as it is supposed to indicate  with  more precision  where there is a ‘problem’ or 

32 

 
  
                                                           
 
accordance with the applicable international quality standards (ISO 9000 series). The QMS 
is required for all AIBs to identify and address system problems they may encounter and to 
thereby  improve  the  quality  of  their  work  and  in  particular  of  their  investigations. 
According to desk research in the context of the impact assessment support study, the one-
off costs for putting in place such a QMS (ISO 9000) ranges between EUR 5,000 and EUR 
15,000 per AIB, depending on the size and the system already in place. Annual auditing 
costs (i.e. ongoing costs) are assessed at EUR 5,000 per annum.  

According to the impact assessment support study, only one AIB (i.e. in France) holds an 
ISO certified system while six other AIBs have indicated that they have a QMS in place, 
but not ISO certified. On that basis, no one-off costs are assumed for the MS with an ISO 
certified standard, EUR 5,000 one-off costs are assumed for each of the 6 MS that have 
an (uncertified) QMS in place and EUR 15,000 one-off costs for each of the 20 MS that 
have no QMS in place. Ongoing costs of EUR 5,000 per year are assumed for all MS that 
have an uncertified QMS in place or that do not have any QMS in place. Thus, total one-
off  costs  for  all  EU  MS  are  estimated  at  EUR  330,000  in  2025  while  ongoing  costs  at 
EUR 130,000 per year from 2026 onwards.   

The  total  costs  for  AIBs  are  provided  in  Table  5.  In  PO  A,  they  are  estimated  at  an 
additional  EUR  0.2  to  0.8  million  in  2030  relative  to  the  baseline  and  EUR  0.3  to  0.8 
million  in  2050.  PO  B  shows  very  slightly  higher  costs  relative  to  PO  A  due  to  the 
reporting  requirements  for  VSMCs  and  the  requirements  related  to  the  definition  of 
“directly in  connection  with the operations of  a ship” in  the Directive,  estimated at  an 
additional EUR 0.3 to 1 million in 2030 and EUR 0.3 to 1.1 million in 2050 relative to 
the  baseline.  Finally,  PO  C  shows  the  highest  additional  costs  for  AIBs  relative  to  the 
baseline  due  to  the  extension  of  the  scope  of  the  AI  Directive  to  VSMCs  involving 
fishing  vessels  below  15  meters  (EUR  0.7  to  8.2  million  in  2030  and  EUR  0.7  to  8.8 
million in 2050 relative to the baseline).    

Table 5: Costs for AIBs (in thousand EUR, 2020 prices) 

Reporting costs (administrative  
costs) 
Investigation costs (adjustment  
costs) 

Total costs 

Baseline 

PO A 

Difference to the baseline 
PO B 

PO C 

2030 
21.7 

2050 
27.6 

2030 
1.6 

2050 
1.8 

2030 
3.3 

2050 
3.6 

2030 
3.3 

2050 
3.6 

1199.2 - 
7195 
1220.9 - 
7216.7 

1490.9 - 
8945.1 
1518.5 - 
8972.8 

238 - 
778.2 
239.7 - 
779.8 

248.8 - 
843 
250.6 - 
844.8 

281.2 - 
1037.5 
284.5 - 
1040.8 

292 - 
1102.3 
295.6 - 
1105.9 

681 - 
8167.6 
684.3 - 
8170.9 

724.2 - 
8815.8 
727.8 - 
8819.4 

Source: Ecorys (2022), Impact assessment support study 

EMSA operational assistance to AIBs, included in PO A and PO C would not have any cost 
implication for AIBs. Rather it should ease their resource burden and allow them to either do 
all  of  the  activities  they  would  like  to  but  have  been  unable  to  do  because  of  resource 
limitations, or allow them to do their work better or in a more efficient and timely manner. 

6.1.2.  Impacts on the ship operators 

In relation to the reporting requirements for small fishing vessel VSMCs, included in PO 
A as a non-regulatory action and in PO B and PO C as an obligation, it should be noted 

systematic  ‘fault’  so  that  the  administration  can  take  action  where  there  is  an  identified  need.  It  is  to  be 
noted that this includes availability of sufficient and adequate (technical) resources. 

33 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
that the operators of fishing vessels below 15 meters are already obliged under national 
law  to  notify  the  maritime  authorities  of  a  loss  of  the  vessel  or  of  a  fatality  on-board 
detailing the circumstances. Therefore, such measure  would not  add  any  administrative 
costs for ship operators relative to the baseline in any of the options. The administrative 
costs to be considered under the ‘One-in One-out’ are thus zero.   

During investigations, investigators have to interview vessel crew or need to temporarily 
immobilise a vessel (for example to obtain information from on-board equipment). If the 
number of investigations of AIBs increases, the frequency that production processes are 
temporarily  stopped  (due  to  unavailability  of  the  vessel  and/or  its  crew)  increases, 
resulting  in  higher  enforcement  costs  for  ship  operators  relative  to  the  baseline.  The 
policy  measures  included  in  the  policy  options  that  have  such  an  impact  are  those 
involving fishing vessels and clarification of definitions.  

The nature of investigations differs however case-by-case. For example, some AIBs have 
indicated during the consultation that it is  not  uncommon that, in  a  VSMC involving a 
small fishing vessel, the vessel has sunk and there are no witnesses. In these situations, 
the associated costs of cooperating with the investigation are considered to be zero, as the 
vessel is no longer operational and the persons on board are deceased.  

Overall, as explained in section 6.1.1 the inclusion of the length of fishing vessels in the 
Directive as Length overall (LOA) in all three policy options, the definition of “directly in 
connection with the operations of a ship” and the extension of the scope of the directive to 
VSMCs  involving  fishing  vessels  below  15  meters  in  PO  C  would  lead  to  additional 
investigations relative to the baseline, the highest number being estimated for PO C. Other 
measures  clarifying  definitions  in  the  AI  Directive  (as  regards  delayed  fatalities)  are 
expected  to  have  an  impact  on  all  shipowners  as  the  number  of  safety  investigations  is 
expected to increase but their impact on costs for shipowners is expected to be small.  

For the assessment of additional enforcement costs, a ‘cooperation effort’ of 8 hours per 
investigation is assumed. Such an investigation will be triggered by either the sinking of 
the vessel or a fatality. If the vessel has sunk the issue of the vessel being tied up and not 
able to operate does not arise. In the case of a fatality it is likely that such a case would 
have  to  be  investigated  by  other  competent  authorities  such  as  the  police  or  judicial 
authorities under national law so the vessel will be immobilised for some period in any 
event.  While  safety  investigations  are  separate  to  and  distinct  from  other  types  of 
investigations,  it  should  be  possible  for  AIBs  to  avail  of  this  window  of  opportunity 
when  the  vessel  is  not  working,  thereby  limiting  the  negative  economic  impact  on  the 
enterprise.  In  2018  (the  latest  year  for  which  complete  information  is  available), 
information  from  the Commission’s Scientific, Technical  and Economic  Committee for 
Fisheries  indicates  that  the  (gross)  value  of  landings  was  EUR  7,994  million  in  the 
fishing sector of EU27. The total number of hours worked by vessel crew is estimated at 
EUR 194 million in 2018. Thus, the gross value of landings per hour worked is estimated 
at EUR 41. The enforcement costs per investigation are estimated at EUR 328. The total 
enforcement  costs  for  ship  operators  in  PO  A  are  estimated  at  EUR  3.3  thousand  in 
2030 and EUR 3.6 thousand in 2050 relative to the baseline, linked to the higher number 
of investigations due to the inclusion of the length of fishing vessels in the Directive as 
Length  overall (LOA) and the interpretative guidelines  on the  definition  of “directly in 
connection with the operations of a ship”. In PO B they are slightly higher than in PO A, 
estimated at EUR 4.6 thousand in 2030 relative to the baseline and EUR 4.9 thousand in 
2050 due to the inclusion of the definition of “directly in connection with the operations 

34 

 
of  a  ship”  in  the  Directive.  In  PO  C  enforcement  costs  are  the  highest,  due  to  the 
inclusion  of  the  VSMCs  involving  fishing  vessels  below  15  meters  in  the  scope  of  the 
Directive,  and  estimated  at  EUR  16.7  to  40.7  thousand  in  2030  and  EUR  18  to  44 
thousand in 2050 relative to the baseline at EU level. 

On  the  basis  of  information  from  EMCIP,  it  is  estimated  that  67%  of  completed 
investigations give rise to at least one safety recommendation or define actions to prevent 
similar accidents from occurring in the future74. For PO A and PO B the costs savings for 
ship operators in terms of avoided vessels lost are estimated at EUR 0.9 million relative 
to the baseline, expressed as present value over 2022-2050. For PO C the costs savings 
are estimated at EUR 5.7 to 9.4 million relative to the baseline (corresponding to 18 to 31 
vessels lost avoided). It should be noted however that there is high uncertainty regarding 
these  estimates75.  This  is  because  the  impacts  of  AI  Directive  on  safety  are  indirect, 
through  the  safety  recommendations  and  their  follow-up.  For  this  reason,  a  sensitivity 
analysis  has  been  performed,  assuming  10%  and  20%  lower  value  in  absolute  terms  of  the 
elasticity used to derive the impacts. Table 6 shows that even with lower value of the elasticity 
PO A, PO B and PO C are projected to result in costs savings for ship operators in terms of 
avoided vessels lost, although the positive impacts on safety would be more limited. 

Table 6: Results of the sensitivity analysis on the costs savings for ship operators in terms of avoided 
vessels lost, expressed as present value over 2022-2050 (in million EUR) relative to the baseline 

Cost savings for fishing vessels 
operators (in million EUR) 

Elasticity - central case 

Elasticity - 10% lower 

Elasticity - 20% lower 

Difference to the baseline 

PO A 

PO B 

PO C 

0.92 

0.83 

0.74 

0.92 

0.83 

0.74 

5.68 - 9.41 

5.11 - 8.47 

4.55 - 7.52 

6.1.3.  Impact on EMSA 

The changes to the Directive related to reporting of VSMCs for fishing vessels below 15 
meters and definitions are not expected to give rise to additional costs for EMSA.   

Cost  increases  would  however  result  from  measures  that  increase  the  role  of  EMSA  to 
facilitate the investigation of casualties in PO A and PO C (i.e. provide highly specialised 
analytical  support  during  an  individual  investigation,  provide  analytical  tools  and 
equipment  during  an  individual  investigation  and  share  knowledge  or  organise  training 
on  specific  techniques/tools  and  new  developments)  including  GDPR  in  all  policy 
options. Although many AIBs mentioned during the stakeholders’ consultation that they 
do  not  have  sufficient  resources  to  adequately  conduct  accident  investigations,  it  often 

74  In  the  context  of  the  impact  assessment  support  study  a  log-log  relationship  between  the  number  of 
investigations conducted in year t and the number of marine casualties in year t+2 has been estimated. The 
elasticity has been estimated at -0.0239 meaning that “a 1% increase in investigations in year t reduces the 
number of marine casualties in year 2 by 0.0239%”. More details are provided in Annex 4. 
75 An average cost of EUR 2.1 million per vessel (in 2020 prices) has been considered for all vessels, except for 
small fishing vessels for which an average cost of EUR 0.5 million has been assumed drawing on information 
from the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF), database of the 2021 Annual 
Economic Report on the EU Fishing Fleet, available at https://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/reports/economic.  

35 

 
  
  
  
  
 
                                                           
remains  unclear  what  could  be  done  on  the  EU  level  to  address  this  issue.  Many  AIBs 
simply indicate that they would like to see their staff increased. As the AI Directive has 
no means to do so, policy measures are defined to increase assistance from EMSA in the 
conduct  of  investigations,  while  of  course  respecting  the  independence  of  AIBs.  In 
practice, this would mean that any assistance provided by EMSA should be requested by 
the  AIBs.  The  benefit  of  EMSA  assistance  would  be  that  it  could  allow  AIBs  to 
investigate all the occurrences they would like to do so in a timely and efficient manner.  

EMSA  has  considerable  experience  in  providing  operational  support  to  national 
authorities  in  a  number  of  areas.  A  pilot  project  involving  remotely  operated  vehicles 
(remotely  operated  submersibles)  began  in  2020.  Discussions  with  AIBs  led  to  an 
expected  need  of  10  to  12  operations  per  year  as  well  as  the  drawing  up  of  business 
cases, draft rules of procedures, etc. With regard to the operational support from EMSA it 
is likely that the support will grow over time with 10-12 support actions in the first year 
growing to 30 actions per year over the successive years. The number of cases of support 
will  also  depend  on  demand  by  the  AI  bodies.  This  can  be  reviewed  in  function  of 
demand. 

The highly specialised analytical support during an individual investigation by EMSA 
in  PO  A  and  PO  C  is  foreseen  in  terms  of  participation  to  VSMC  investigations  of 
‘standard’  experts  and  ‘high  level’  experts  from  EMSA.  For  ‘standard’  experts,  5 
working days are assumed per VSMC at a rate of 1,500 EUR per day. ‘Standard’ experts 
would participate in around 10% of the VSMCs per year in PO A and PO C. For ‘high 
level’ experts, 4 working days are assumed per VSMC at a rate of 3,000 EUR per day. 
‘High level’ experts would participate in around 2% of the VSMCs per year in PO A and 
PO C. In PO A the number of VSMCs are projected at 82 in 2030 and 97 in 2050. In PO 
C, due to the assumed extension of the AI Directive to VSMCs involving fishing vessels 
below 15 meters, the number of VSMCs are projected at 540 in 2030 and 595 in 2050. 
As  a  result,  the  additional  costs  for  EMSA  in  PO  A  are  estimated  at  around  EUR  81 
thousand in 2030 and EUR 96 thousand in 2050, equivalent to 0.7 full time equivalents 
(FTE) in 2030 and 0.8 FTEs in 2050 relative to the baseline.. In PO C the additional costs 
are  estimated  at  around  EUR  535  thousand  in  2030  and  EUR  589  thousand  in  2050 
equivalent to 4.5 full time equivalents (FTE) in 2030 and 5 full time equivalents in 2050 
relative to the baseline. .  

The  analytical  tools  and  equipment  to  be  provided  by  EMSA  during  an  individual 
investigation (hardware) can take various forms like for example:  

  On scene tools such as ROV (remotely operator submersible), RPAS (aerial drones), 

Robots (e.g. small ones to access damaged areas, enclosed spaces, etc.);  

  Specialised tools such as: VDR facilities, software such as MADAS (Marine Accident 
Data Analysis Suite)76; ad-hoc resources (scientific laboratories, tank testing); ad-hoc 
services (3D simulation for fire, loss of containers, etc.). 

This support will build upon the existing services provided by EMSA in different  areas 
(as seen above aerial drones, submersible drones, satellite imagery training etc.) and will 
be  provided  on  a  first  come,  first  served  basis.  In  the  longer  term,  and  depending  on 
experience in implementation, the EMSA resources would be adapted accordingly.   

76 https://www.avenca.co.uk/marine-data-analysis/systems-software/madas/ (for example) 

36 

 
                                                           
The  additional  cost  estimates  per  year  from  2025  onwards  for  analytical  tools  and 
equipment to be provided by EMSA in PO A and PO C are provided in Annex 4. They 
are estimated at EUR 1.1 million per year relative to the baseline for all years (EUR 0.9 
million for on scene tools and EUR 0.2 million for specialised tools).   

In relation to knowledge sharing and organising training on specific techniques/tools and 
new  developments,  EMSA  currently  organises  training  courses  on  core  skills  for  accident 
investigators,  advance  courses for accident investigators  and on use  of  electronic evidence 
(VDR/ECDIS).  Additional  training  could  be  foreseen  in  all  policy  options  in  particular  in 
relation  to  renewable  and  low  carbon  fuels  (risks,  use  on  board,  ship  protections,  etc.),  in 
support  of  the  initiatives  part  of  the  “Fit  for  55”  package,  but  also    on:  human  element, 
conduct  of  an  automated  ship,  safety  analysis  (to  encourage  Member  States  to  better  use 
casualty  data),  forensic  (photos,  sampling,  etc.),  occurrences  (fire,  navigational  accidents, 
damage to equipment, occupational activities, etc.) and GDPR rules. In all policy options, 6 
additional training courses are foreseen at around EUR 36,000 each (EUR 6,000 estimated 
for the trainer and EUR 30,000 on average for reimbursement of participants). Thus, the total 
costs in all policy options are estimated at EUR 216,000 per year starting from 2025.  

Total additional costs for EMSA are estimated at around EUR 1.42 million in 2030 and 
EUR 1.44 million in 2050 in PO A, and at around EUR 1.88 million in 2030 and EUR 
1.93 million in 2050 in PO C. In PO B only the training costs to knowledge sharing and 
organising  training  are  foreseen,  estimated  at  EUR  216,000  per  year  (Table  7).  These 
additional costs expected for EMSA are not covered by existing budgetary commitments. 
Part of the costs in PO A and PO C are projected for highly specialised analytical support 
provided by EMSA during individual investigations (for PO A, equivalent to 0.7 FTE in 
2030  and  0.8  FTEs  in  2050  relative  to  the  baseline;  for  PO  C,  4.5  FTE  in  2030  and  5 
FTEs in 2050 relative to the baseline).  77 

Table 7: Total additional cost estimates for EMSA relative to the baseline (in thousand EUR, 2020 prices) 

Costs for EMSA 
Source: EMSA 

PO A 

PO B 

PO C 

2030 
1,423.2 

2050 
1,438.0 

2030 
216.0 

2050 
216.0 

2030 
1,876.6 

2050 
1,931.1 

6.1.4.  Impacts on SMEs  

The extension of the AI Directive to VSMCs involving fishing vessels below 15 meters 
in  PO  C  is  ‘relevant’  for  SMEs.  Due  to  the  non-consolidated  nature  of  this  particular 
segment,  it  can  be  assumed  that  all  fishing  vessels  below  15  meters  would  qualify  as 
small enterprises or even as micro-businesses78. This may be also the case for operators 
of  fishing  vessels  above  15  meters,  for  which  the  length  of  fishing  vessels  is  to  be 
defined in the Directive in all policy options. Fishermen’s groups have been contacted, as 
part of the consultation process, and are in favour of the extension of scope.  

The analysis in section 6.1.2 has shown that in PO A the additional enforcement costs for 
fishing  vessels  operators  are  estimated  at  around  EUR  3,280  at  EU  level  in  2030  and 
EUR 3,608 in 2050 relative to the baseline. PO B shows slightly higher costs than PO A 
(EUR 4,592 in 2030 and EUR 4,920 in 2050). For PO C the additional enforcement costs 

77 From those FTEs, 2 will be employed by EMSA.  
78 Small companies have less than 50 employees and either a net turnover or balance sheet of €10 million, 
while micros have less than 10 employees and either a net turnover or balance sheet of €2 million. 

37 

 
 
                                                           
are  estimated  at  EUR  16.7  to  40.7  thousand  in  2030  and  at  EUR  18  to  44  thousand  in 
2050. Considering the projected number of fishing vessels in 2030 and 2050 at EU level, 
the  additional  enforcement  costs  relative  to  the  baseline  in  all  policy  options  are 
estimated at below 1 EUR per vessel79.     

In addition, the analysis in section 6.1.2 has shown that no additional administrative costs 
are expected in relation to the reporting requirements for VSMCs, included in PO A as a 
non-regulatory action and in PO B and PO C as an obligation. This is because operators 
of fishing vessels  below 15 meters are already obliged under national  law to  notify the 
maritime  authorities  of  a  loss  of  the  vessel  or  of  a  fatality  on-board  detailing  the 
circumstances.  Therefore,  no  area  was  identified  in  the  analysis,  where  significant  and 
disproportionate costs for SMEs, in comparison to all enterprises, would result from the 
changes under the three policy options.  

On the other hand, all policy options will improve safety to different degrees, what will 
generally  benefit  all  ship  operators  and  in  particular  fishing  vessels  operators.  PO  C  in 
particular  will  have  positive  impacts  in  terms  of  safety  for  operators  of  fishing  vessels 
below  15  meters,  which  are  mainly  small  enterprises  or  even  micro-businesses.  As 
explained  in  section  6.1.2,  the  costs  savings  for  ship  operators  in  terms  of  avoided 
vessels lost are estimated at EUR 0.9 million relative to the baseline in PO A and PO B, 
expressed as present value over 2022-2050, and at EUR 5.7 to 9.4 million relative to the 
baseline in  PO C. These represent  benefits  for the fishing vessels operators that clearly 
outweigh the costs in all three policy options, with the highest impact expected in PO C. 

6.1.5.  Functioning of the internal market and competition 

All  policy  options  are  expected  to  have  a  positive  impact  on  the  functioning  of  the 
internal  market,  both  by  improving  overall  maritime  safety  for  the  benefit  of  freight 
customers  and  passengers  throughout  the  Union  as  well  as  by  ensuring  that  the  same 
safety level applies throughout the Union. The positive impacts of PO C are expected to 
be higher than those of PO A and PO B, because  the VSMCs involving fishing vessels 
below  15  would  be  included  in  the  scope  of  the  AI  Directive  resulting  into  a  higher 
degree of harmonisation between Member States. This is particularly the case as only 11 
Member States currently investigate VSMCs involving fishing vessels below 15 metres.    

All options provide for a level playing field as all policy options improve safety and the 
performance of AIBs in the performance of their functions.  

79 The estimation of the enforcement costs for the owners/operators of smaller fishing vessels is based on 
EMSA experience of the time necessary to establish the  facts in case of fishing  vessels above 15 metres 
and  the  gross  value  of  landings  per  hour  worked  (i.e.  drawing  on  information  from  the  Commission’s 
Scientific,  Technical  and  Economic  Committee  for  Fisheries),  as  explained  in  section  6.1.2. It  should  be 
noted  that  such  an  investigation  will  be  triggered  by  either  the  sinking  of  the  vessel  or  a  fatality.  If  the 
vessel has sunk the issue of the vessel being tied up does not arise. In the case of a fatality it is likely that 
such  a  case  would  have  to  be  investigated  by  other  competent  authorities  such  as  the  police  or  judicial 
authorities under national law so the vessel will be immobilised for some period in any event. While safety 
investigations are separate  to and distinct from other types of investigations, it should be possible for AI 
bodies to avail of this window of opportunity when the vessel is not working. 

38 

 
                                                           
6.1.6.  Impacts on competitiveness 

As explained in section 6.1.2 and in section 6.1.4, the additional enforcement costs for ship 
operators  (i.e. fishing vessels  operators)  are expected to be very limited in  all three policy 
options and estimated at below 1 EUR per vessel in 2030 and 2050 relative to the baseline. 
No other additional costs are expected for the industry (i.e. ship operators) in the three policy 
options. On the other hand all policy options are expected to lead to costs savings for ship 
operators, in particular fishing vessels operators, in terms of avoided vessels lost. Therefore, 
it  can  be  concluded  that  all  three  policy  options  may  improve  the  competitiveness  of  the 
fishing vessels operators, the impact being higher in PO C relative to PO A and PO B.   

6.2. 

Social impacts 

Social impacts are mainly assessed in terms of impacts of the policy options on maritime 
safety (in terms of lives saved and injuries avoided), working conditions and fundamental 
rights.  Costs  impacts  for  consumers  from  any  of  the  policy  options  have  not  proved 
possible to be quantified but are expected to be negligible.  

6.2.1.  Maritime safety  

As explained in section 6.1.2, not all investigations have an impact on the number of marine 
casualties.  To  estimate  the  benefits,  a  relationship  between  the  number  of  finalised 
investigations and the number of marine casualties has been estimated, according to Annex 
480. The reduction in the number of casualties is subsequently translated into a reduction in 
the number of fatalities and injuries by using the ratios between the number of fatalities and 
injuries and the number of marine casualties projected in the baseline scenario.   For PO A 
and PO B the impact on the number of lives saved and injuries avoided is expected to be 
limited by 2050 (2 lives saved and 10 injuries avoided relative to the baseline in PO A and 2 
lives saved and 14 injuries avoided in PO B). However, PO C would result in higher number 
of lives saved (28 to 48) and injuries avoided (219 to 379)81 for 2025-2050 relative to the 
baseline, mainly due to the assumed extension of the scope of AI Directive to the VSMCs 
involving  fishing  vessels  below  15  meters.  Thus,  all  policy  options  contribute  towards 
Sustainable Development Goal 3 (“Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all 
ages”), although the positive impact of PO C is the highest.  

All policy options are estimated to result in a reduction in the external costs of accidents 
relative  to  the  baseline  (Table  8)  although  the  impact  would  be  highest  in  PO  C  (EUR 
132.6  to  229.3  million,  expressed  as  present  value  over  2022-2050)  relative  to  PO  A 
(EUR 6.6 million) and PO B (EUR 9 million)82.  

80  In  the  context  of  the  impact  assessment  support  study  a  log-log  relationship  between  the  number  of 
safety  investigations  conducted  in  year  t  and  the  number  of  marine  casualties  in  year  t+2  has  been 
estimated. The elasticity has been estimated at -0.0239 meaning that “a 1% increase in inspections in year t 
reduces the number of marine casualties in year 2 by 0.0239%”. More explanations are provided in Annex 
4. 
81 The possible impact of the policy measures on the number of fatality and injury avoided may be higher. 
A  cautious  approach  is  taken  here  due  to  the  indirect  nature  of  the  impact  of  safety  investigations  on 
maritime safety. 
82 The 2019 Handbook on the external costs of transport has been used to monetise the costs. According to 
the  Handbook, the external costs of a fatality in 2020 prices is estimated at around EUR 3.5 million and 
that of an injury at around EUR 0.5 million. 

39 

 
                                                           
Table 8: Reduction in the external costs of accidents, present value over 2022-2050 (in million EUR) 

Baseline 

Fatalities 
Injuries 
Total fatalities and injuries 
Source: Ecorys (2022), Impact assessment support study  

14,549 
17,827 
32,376 

Difference to the baseline 
PO B 
4.4 
4.7 
9.0 

PO C 
60.1 - 103.7 
72.5 - 125.6 
132.6 - 229.3 

PO A 
3.2 
3.4 
6.6 

It should be noted however that there is high uncertainty regarding these estimates. This 
is  because  the  impacts  of  AI  Directive  on  safety  are  indirect,  through  the  safety 
recommendations  and  their  follow-up.  For  this  reason,  a  sensitivity  analysis  has  been 
performed,  assuming  10%  and  20%  lower  value  in  absolute  terms  of  the  elasticity  used  to 
derive the impacts. Table 9 shows that even with lower value of the elasticity PO A, PO B and 
PO C are projected to result in lives saved and injuries avoided, although the positive impacts 
on safety would be more limited. 

Table  9:  Results  of  the  sensitivity  analysis  on  the  reduction  in  the  external  costs  of  accidents, 
expressed as present value over 2022-2050 (in million EUR) relative to the baseline 

Reduction in external costs of accidents 
(in million EUR) 

Elasticity - central case 

Elasticity - 10% lower 

Elasticity - 20% lower 

Difference to the baseline 

PO A 

PO B 

PO C 

6.6 

5.9 

5.3 

9.0 

8.1 

7.2 

132.6 - 229.3 

119.3 - 206.3 

106.1 - 183.4 

It  is  important  to  note  that  while  it  is  possible  that  police,  judicial  or  administrative 
investigations might have dissuasive or deterrent effect as regards future accidents, this is 
not  the  primary  function  of  such  investigations.  As  these  national  investigations  are 
carried out under a multiplicity of national procedures, neither they nor their results can 
easily be compared. Furthermore, the results of the investigations are not communicated 
or shared between Member States, to enable lessons to be learned. For these reasons, it is 
not  possible  to  estimate  their  impact  on  maritime  safety,  although  the  impact  on  ship 
operators or AI bodies of Member States other than the investigating State is expected to 
be very limited.    

6.2.2.  Impacts on working conditions and skills 

The impact of the policy options on working conditions is expected to be positive, although 
it  has  not  been  possible  to  quantify  them.  By  improving  safety,  the  policy  options  will 
result in saved lives (of passengers but in particular of crew), avoid injuries and improve 
the attractiveness of employment in the sector. The impact is expected to be higher in PO 
C, relative to PO A and PO B, resulting in the highest number of lives saved and injuries 
avoided. In addition, the knowledge sharing and training organised by EMSA included in 
PO  A  and  PO  C  will  improve  the  skills  of  investigators  in  light  of  new  developments 
which may be relevant for accident investigation in the future, including but not limited to 
renewable and low carbon fuels, automation and autonomous shipping.  

6.2.3.  Impacts on fundamental rights  

Given  the  global  nature  of  the  shipping  industry  and  the  different  jurisdictions  with 
which they may be brought into contact, seafarers need special protection, especially in 

40 

 
  
  
  
  
  
relation  to  contacts  with  public  authorities,  in  line  with  the  human  rights  protection 
standards  enshrined  in  EU  primary  law.  Therefore  and  in  the  interests  of  increased 
maritime  safety,  seafarers  should  be  able  to  rely  on  fair  treatment  in  the  event  of  a 
maritime accident. The human rights and dignity of seafarers should be preserved at all 
times and all safety investigations should be conducted in a fair and expeditious manner. 

The policy options were assessed to determine if they have an impact on the fundamental 
rights and/or equal treatment of EU citizens. The starting point of the assessment of the 
fundamental  rights  is  the Charter of Fundamental Rights  of the  European Union83. The 
assessment  identified  two  potentially  relevant  fundamental  rights  being  Article  8  – 
Protection of personal data and Article 20 – Equality before the law. 

Safety  investigations  and  the  reports  emanating  therefrom  are  not  supposed  to  contain 
personal data so the question of protection thereof and the implications of the GDPR are 
somewhat limited. However, the majority of the AIBs noted that GDPR rules do play an 
important  role  that  should  be  expressly  mentioned  in  the  Directive  to  guarantee  the 
respect of the seafarers’ rights. Several AIBs have raised the issue of when the AIB has 
to co-operate with an AIB in a third country when conducting a joint investigation as the 
GDPR forbids the transfer of the personal data of EU data subjects to non EEA countries 
—  unless  appropriate  safeguards  are  imposed,  or  the  third  country's  data  protection 
regulations are formally considered adequate by the Commission. The EMSA training on 
GDPR, will address this issue in all policy options.  

As  regards  “equality  before  the  law”,  safety  investigations  are  carried  out  to  determine 
the cause of the accident and are not supposed to attribute blame or responsibility; they 
are  separate  from  and  distinct  to  police  or  judicial  investigations.  Similarly,  safety 
investigation reports are not supposed to be written, in terms of content and style, with 
the  intention  of  it  being  used  in  legal  proceedings.  All  three  of  the  POs  were  assessed 
having  regard  to  the  relevant  EU  instrument  and  the  applicable  IMO  text84  and  it  was 
concluded  that  they  maintain  full  respect  for  human  and  fundamental  rights  referred  to 
previously and none will have any negative impact thereon. 

6.3.  Environmental impacts 

The impact of the policy options on the environment is also an indirect one, as it depends 
on  the  safety  recommendations  and  their  follow-up  as  explained  in  section  6.2.1.  The 
environmental impact of maritime casualties derives from ships sinking, cargoes lost and 
oil spills (either as cargo or from bunkers - ship fuels). While there has not been a single 
significant oil spill similar to that of the Erika (1999) or Prestige (2002) oil spills in EU 
waters for almost 20 years, the possibility of such an incident is nonetheless present and 
has to be prepared for and mitigated against. Similarly and in the context of the European 
Green  Deal  and  the  “Fit  for  55”  package,  it  is  likely  that  there  will  be  a  significant 
change  in  the  way  vessels  are  powered  in  the  coming  decades.  This  will  have 
implications for the entire shipping and fishing industries including for the safety profile 
thereof and can be expected to have an impact on AIBs and the cases they investigate. 

83 OJ C 326 of 26.10.2012 p.2 
84  Resolution  LEG.3(91)  of  27  April  2009  Adoption  of  Guidelines  on  Fair  Treatment  of  seafarers  in  the 
Event of a maritime Accident.  

41 

 
                                                           
It  is  important  to  note  the  significance  of  the  safety  recommendations.  A  more  recent 
example is the maritime safety issue related to containers lost overboard (falling off large 
containerships).  Such  an  accident  happened  in  2019,  where  a  large  container  vessel 
(MSC Zoe) lost a total of 342 containers whilst sailing in bad weather on the North Sea, 
in  the  Terschelling-German  Bight  Traffic  Separation  Scheme.  This  resulted  in  severe 
pollution of the Wadden Sea area and its islands (NL). The Wadden Sea is designated as 
a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area and is on the UNESCO World Heritage List. 

The investigations by the flag State (Panama), together with affected States (NL and DE), 
identified  safety  issues  related  to  various  IMO  instruments  and  requirements.  Safety 
recommendations  were  made 
regarding  carriage 
requirements, such as, use of the improved use of the VDR to record such information for 
the  purpose  of  safety  investigations.  The  administrations  involved  have  submitted 
proposals to the IMO various Maritime Safety Committees addressing recommendations 
included in the report for actions to be taken. 

investigation 

reports 

the 

in 

This  case  was  also  raised  and  discussed  at  the  Transport,  Telecommunications  and 
Energy  Council  in  summer  2021,  under  the  Slovenian  Presidency;  where  Ministers 
agreed to  address the issue of containership safety, including containers lost at sea, fire 
safety  etc.,  in  a  holistic  manner  following  a  root  cause  analysis.  This  work  is  ongoing, 
and a first Union submission to IMO has been agreed regarding the issue of container lost 
at  sea  and  setting  up  an  international  mandatory  reporting  system,  based  on  the  legal 
requirements  applicable  in  EU  law  already,  requiring  changes  to  the  conventions 
(SOLAS and MARPOL). 

Furthermore,  23  cases  of  pollution  due  to  bunker  fuel  lost  were  recorded  in  2019  for  all 
vessels excluding fishing vessels below 15 meters. Assuming the same ratio of pollution to 
VSMCs for fishing vessels below 15 meters as for those above 15 meters, the overall number 
of  pollution  cases due to  bunker  fuel lost including for  fishing vessels below 15 meters is 
estimated  at  103  for  2019.  The  level  of  pollution  per  very  serious  accident  (resulting  in 
pollution) has been  estimated  as involving the  loss of 30 tonnes  of  bunker fuel.  For small 
fishing  vessels,  the  level  of  pollution  per  very  serious  accident  (resulting  in  pollution) 
implied the loss of 6.6 tonnes of bunker fuel while for larger fishing vessels a loss into the 
sea of 22 tonnes of bunker fuel was indicated. 

In the baseline scenario the cumulative number of tonnes of bunker fuels lost between 2025 
and 2050 is estimated at around 35.4 thousand. PO A and PO B would result in 7 tonnes of 
bunker fuel lost avoided during 2025-2050 relative to the baseline, while PO C is estimated 
to have a more significant impact (101 to 176 tonnes of bunker fuel lost avoided) due to the 
inclusion  of  the  VSMCs  involving  fishing  vessels  below  15  meters  in  the  scope  of  the 
Directive (see Table 10). This is expected to have a positive impact on the quality of marine 
water  and  biodiversity.  It  was  not  possible  to  quantify  the  environmental  impact  from 
avoided ships sinking and cargoes lost, but this is expected to be positive in all three policy 
options with the highest impact in PO C85.  

85  In  the  context  of  the  impact  assessment  support  study  a  log-log  relationship  between  the  number  of 
safety  investigations  conducted  in  year  t  and  the  number  of  marine  casualties  in  year  t+2  has  been 
estimated. The elasticity has been estimated at -0.0239 meaning that “a 1% increase in inspections in year t 
reduces the number of marine casualties in year 2 by 0.0239%”. The reduction in the number of casualties 
is subsequently translated into a reduction in the number of tonnes of bunker fuel lost at sea by using the 

42 

 
                                                           
 
Table 10: Bunker fuel lost cumulative for 2025-2050 (in tonnes) 

Baseline 

Difference to the baseline 

Bunker fuels lost  

35,411 

Source: Ecorys (2022), Impact assessment support study 

PO A 
7 

PO B 
7 

PO C 
101 - 176 

It should be noted however that there is high uncertainty regarding these estimates. This 
is  because  the  impacts  of  AI  Directive  on  safety  are  indirect,  through  the  safety 
recommendations  and  their  follow-up.  For  this  reason,  a  sensitivity  analysis  has  been 
performed,  assuming  10%  and  20%  lower  value  in  absolute  terms  of  the  elasticity  used  to 
derive the impacts. Table 11 shows that even with lower value of the elasticity PO A, PO B 
and  PO  C  are  projected  to  result  in  bunker  fuel  lost  at  sea  avoided,  although  the  positive 
impacts would be more limited. 

Table 11: Results of the sensitivity analysis on the bunker fuel lost at sea, cumulative for 2025-2050 
(in tonnes) relative to the baseline 

Bunker fuel lost at sea (in tonnes) 

Elasticity - central case 

Elasticity - 10% lower 

Elasticity - 20% lower 

Difference to the baseline 

PO A 

PO B 

PO C 

7 

6 

5 

7 

6 

5 

101 - 176 

91 - 158 

81 - 140 

All policy options contribute towards Sustainable Development Goal 14 (“Conserve and 
sustainably  use  the  oceans,  seas  and  marine  resources  for  sustainable  development”), 
although the positive impact of PO C is the highest. 

No significant harm is expected on the environment in any of the three policy options, 
in particular in the area of sustainable use and protection of water and marine resources 
to which the initiative relates. On the contrary, as explain above, all three policy options 
are  expected  to  have  small  positive  impacts  on  the  quality  of  water  and  biodiversity  – 
with the highest impact among the three projected in PO C.   

7.  HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? 

7.1.  Effectiveness 

The  assessment  of  effectiveness  looks  at  the  extent  to  which  the  general  and  specific 
objectives (SO) of the intervention, as previously described, are met. Table 12 provides 
the link between policy objectives and assessment criteria. 

Table 12: Link between objectives and assessment criteria 
General objective 
Improve maritime safety 
and improve the 
protection of the marine 
environment 

Specific objective 
SO1 - Protect fishing vessels, their 
crew and the environment. 

Assessment criteria  

Change in the number of very serious marine 
casualties reported and/or investigated  
Changes in the number of fatalities and injuries, 
and avoided vessels lost 
Changes in the number of tonnes of bunker fuel 
lost at sea 

ratio between the number of tonnes of bunker fuel lost at sea and the number of marine casualties projected 
in the baseline scenario. More explanations are provided in Annex 4. 

43 

 
  
  
  
  
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
General objective 

Assessment criteria  

Expected improvement in clarity and functioning 
of the internal market 
Change in the number of investigations conducted 

Change in quality of the investigation conducted 

Specific objective 
SO2 - Member States AIBs to have 
clarity and precision regarding 
definitions to ensure that all 
accidents that need to be 
investigated are investigated in a 
timely and harmonised manner. 
SO3 - Enhance the capacity of 
AIBs to conduct (and report on) 
accident investigations in a timely, 
expert and independent manner- 
including as regards renewable and 
low carbon fuels and technologies 

Concerning SO1, PO A and PO B should allow for more information to be gathered and 
thereby  allow  the  AIBs,  the  Commission  and  EMSA  to  get  a  better  appreciation  and 
understanding of the safety picture of fishing vessels  below 15 meters  and the types  of 
marine  casualties  they  are  affected  by.  However,  neither  PO  A  nor  PO  B  requires 
investigations to be carried out for this type of fishing vessels. PO C aims to extend the 
scope of the Directive to all fishing vessels  irrespective of their length  in case they  are 
involved in a VSMC. PO C is fully effective in addressing SO1 in that it requires both 
the  reporting  of  and  the  investigation  of  VSMC  involving  fishing  vessels  below  15 
meters, with positive effects on safety and protection of marine environment. PO A and 
PO B address SO1 to a more limited extent by requiring that the reporting of VSMCs is 
applied in different ways to the smaller fishing vessel segment.    

Concerning SO2, as highlighted in the problem definition, some of the definitions used in 
the Directive are currently not always clear for the AIBs. As a result, AIBs do not always 
know  whether  or  not  an  investigation  should  be  started,  which  may  also  have  negative 
impacts  on  the  functioning  of  the  internal  market  due  to  the  different  approaches  by 
Member States. By making those definitions clearer, AIBs will better understand whether 
to  investigate  or  not.  Measures  aiming  to  improve  (some  of)  the  definitions  used  are 
included in all three policy options.  In PO A two elements are clarified,  namely, how to 
measure the length of a fishing vessel and how to define the phrase ‘in direct connection 
with  the  operations  of  the  ship’,  by  providing  interpretive  guidelines.  As  such,  PO  A 
contributes to some extent to achieve SO2. PO B and PO C, in addition to the clarification 
of how to measure the length of a fishing vessel, go further by including the definition of 
‘directly in connection with the operations of a ship’ in the Directive and by including a 
specific deadline for accidents resulting in a fatality that does not directly occur after the 
accident took place. Therefore, PO B and PO C are more effective than PO A in achieving 
SO2.  All  three  options  include  references  to  the  most  up-to-date  versions  of  the  IMO 
Casualty  Code.  Thus,  it  can  be  concluded  that  in  relation  to  SO2,  PO  B  and  PO  C  are 
equally effective and more effective than PO A. All policy options contribute to improving 
the functioning of the internal market. In this respect, PO C is most effective, due to the 
inclusion of the VSMCs involving fishing vessels below 15 meters within the scope.    

With  regard  to  SO3,  the  problem  definition  highlighted  that  AIBs  sometimes  lack 
adequate  resources  (either  in  the  number  of  staff  or  available  budgets)  to  effectively 
conduct all investigations needed. To tackle this problem, several policy measures have 
been  defined.  PO  B  includes  several  specific  policy  measures.  On  the  one  hand,  this 
option contains  a measure on introducing a QMS system  that ensures harmonisation  of 
the  investigation  procedures  throughout  the  EU.  A  key  part  of  improvements  in 
efficiency is to establish control conditions and a QMS supports this as it is supposed to 
indicate with more precision where there is a ‘problem’ or systematic ‘fault’ so that the 

44 

 
 
 
administration  can  take  action.  The  better  management  of  often  scarce  resources  will 
identify  system  problems  and  allow  these  to  be  addressed  either  by  seeking  help  from 
EMSA  or  by  making  the  case  for  additional  resources  at  the  national  level.  It  is  to  be 
noted that this includes availability of sufficient and adequate (technical) resources. If the 
AI function had not been separated from flag State administrations the EU AI bodies as 
part  of  the  flag  State  administrations  would  have  already  been  covered  by  the  QMS 
requirement in Directive 2009/21/EC86 and consequently would be audited in accordance 
with the III-code.   

Since the IMO Code on the Implementation of International Instruments (the “III-code”) 
became mandatory in 2017, it is acknowledged that a QMS ensures better adherence with 
the  III-code  requirements.  Therefore,  it  is  appropriate  for  the  reasons  previously 
explained as well as to ensure coherence between the different parts of the MS maritime 
administrations  that  this  requirement  is  extended  to  the  MS  AI  and  port  State  control 
functions, and it is thus included in all policy options. On the other hand, PO B consists 
of  a  measure  that  broadens  the  group  of  competent  authorities  that  could  include 
information in EMCIP. At the same time, the role of EMSA is slightly enhanced by only 
providing  sharing  knowledge  and  organising  training.  By  having  these  dedicated 
measures, PO B is somewhat effective in achieving SO3. PO A has a different approach 
in  addressing  SO3  and  includes  several  measures  on  support  from  EMSA  to  the  AIBs. 
This  could  either  relate  to  soft  skills  (such  as  specific  technical  support)  or  hardware 
(such as specific analytical tools). In addition, EMSA could provide additional training. 
Besides  support  from  EMSA,  PO  A  also  introduces  a  QMS.  By  the  wider  range  of 
support offered, PO A is more effective in achieving SO3 than PO B. PO C is a mix of 
PO A and PO B and includes all measures proposed. More concretely, not only a QMS is 
introduced but  both  the  support from  EMSA  as  well as  the broadening of the  group of 
competent authorities are included. Thus, PO C and PO A are more effective than PO B 
in addressing SO3.  

All policy options contribute to the general  objective of improving maritime safety and 
the  protection  of  the  marine  environment.  PO  C  is  however  more  effective  than  PO  A 
and  PO  B  due  to  the  higher  positive  impact  estimated  in  terms  of  lives  saved,  injuries 
avoided and pollution due to bunker fuels lost avoided. Annex 9 provides a more detailed 
overview on the effectiveness of the policy options in relation to the specific objectives.  

7.2.  Efficiency 

Efficiency concerns "the extent to which objectives can be achieved for a given level of 
resource/at  least  cost".  The  combined  measures  under  the  three  POs  have  economic, 
social and environmental impacts. The major costs of the policy options come in the form 
of investigation costs for AIBs and costs for EMSA related to soft skills (such as specific 
technical support) or hardware (such as specific analytical tools) and additional training. 
They are summarised in Table 13. 

86 Directive 2009/21/EC on flag State requirements (Article 8) imposes that EU Member State flag State 
administrations have a QMS.  

45 

 
                                                           
Table 13: Summary of costs and benefits of policy options – present value for 2022-2050 compared to 
the baseline (in million EUR) 

PO A 

PO B 

PO C 

Costs for AIBs 

Reporting costs 
Investigation costs 

0.03 
4.3 - 13.96 
24.03 

0.06 
5.03 - 18.33 
3.64 

0.06 
11.97 - 141.53 
31.88 

Costs for EMSA 
Costs for small fishing vessels operators (enforcement 
costs) 
Total costs 
Cost savings for vessels operators 
Reduction in external costs of accidents 
Total benefits 
Net costs/benefits 
Benefits to costs ratio 
Source: Ecorys (2022), Impact assessment support study; Note: for the net costs/benefits, negative values 
indicated net costs and positive values net benefits. 

0.06 
28.42 - 38.08 
0.92 
6.60 
7.52 
(-30.55) - (-20.9) 
0.2 - 0.3 

0.08 
8.81-22.11 
0.92 
9.04 
9.97 
(-12.14) – 1.15 
0.5 - 1.1 

0.29 - 0.7 
44.2 - 174.17 
5.68 - 9.41 
132.6 - 229.28 
138.28 - 238.68 
64.51 - 94.09 
1.4 - 3.1 

PO C leads to the highest total costs among the three policy options, estimated at EUR 
44.2 to 174.17 million in addition to the baseline costs, expressed as present value over 
2022-2050.  The  highest  total  costs  in  PO C  are  linked  to  the  assumed  extension  of  the 
scope of the AI Directive to VSMCs involving fishing vessels below 15 meters and thus 
the increased number of investigations. PO A shows lower costs than PO C, estimated at 
EUR 28.42 to 38.08 million in addition to the baseline costs, expressed as present value 
over 2022-2050. The highest cost category in PO A is related to costs for EMSA for soft 
skills (such as specific technical support) or hardware (such as specific analytical tools) 
and  additional  training.  Finally,  PO  B  shows  the  lower  total  costs  among  the  POs, 
estimated at EUR 8.81 – 22.11 million in addition to the baseline costs.  

In  terms  of  total  benefits,  PO  C  shows  the  highest  benefits  among  the  three  policy 
options due to the reduction in the external costs of accidents and the avoided vessels lost 
linked to  the extension  of the scope to  fishing vessels below 15 meters.  These benefits 
are  estimated  at  EUR  138.28  to  238.68  million  relative  to  the  baseline,  expressed  as 
present value over 2022-2050. PO A and PO B show much lower total benefits of EUR 
7.52 million and EUR 9.97 million, respectively. The impact of the avoided pollution due 
to the tonnes of bunker fuel lost was not possible to be monetised but also in this case the 
highest benefits are projected in PO C, as shown in section 6.2.1.  

Overall, PO A results in net costs relative to the baseline, expressed as present value over 
2022-2050,  while  PO  C  shows  net  benefits.  For  PO  B,  the  range  provided  shows  that  it 
could result either in net costs or net benefits although the possible net costs are lower than 
in PO A.  The net benefits are largest in PO C,  estimated  at  EUR 64.51 to 94.09 million 
relative  to  the  baseline,  expressed  as  present  value  over  2022-2050.  PO  C  also  shows 
higher benefits to costs ratio (1.4 to 3.1) relative to PO B and PO A (see Table 13). 

Considering  the  sensitivity  analysis  on  the  impacts  of  the  policy  options  on  the  costs 
savings  for  ship  operators  in  terms  of  avoided  vessels  lost  and  on  the  external  costs  of 
accidents,  provided  in  sections  6.1.2  and  6.2.1  respectively,  the  net  benefits  and  the 
benefits to costs ratios have been calculated for each case and are provided in Table 14. 
The table shows that even with lower values of the elasticity, PO C would result in the 
highest benefit to cost ratio.  

46 

 
 
  
  
  
Table 14: Results of the sensitivity analysis on net benefits and benefit to cost ratio of policy options  

Difference to the Baseline 

PO A 

PO B 

PO C 

Net benefits (in million 
EUR)  

Elasticity - central case 

(-30.55) - (-20.9) 

Elasticity - 10% lower 

(-31.31) - (-21.65) 

(-12.14) - 1.15 

(-13.14) - 0.16 

Elasticity - 20% lower 

(-32.06) - (-22.4) 

(-14.14) - (-0.84) 

Benefit to cost ratio 

Elasticity - central case 

Elasticity - 10% lower 

Elasticity - 20% lower 

7.3.  Coherence 

0.2 - 0.26 

0.18 - 0.24 

0.16 - 0.21 

0.45 - 1.13 

0.41 - 1.02 

0.36 - 0.9 

64.51 - 94.09 

40.64 - 80.26 

16.78 - 66.43 

1.37 - 3.13 

1.23 - 2.82 

1.1 - 2.5 

Internal coherence. The internal coherence concentrates on how the different elements 
within the Directive itself work together to achieve the objectives. It should be noted that 
this  does  not  only  concern  the  Directive  itself,  but  also  its  accompanying  secondary 
legislation  (delegated  and/or  implementing  acts)  and  rules  as  well  as  interpretative 
guidelines.  Although  all  three  POs  address  the  identified  problems,  they  do  so  in 
different  ways.  PO  A  addresses  the  problems  in  such  a  way  that  room  for  flexibility 
remains,  meaning  that  the  majority  of  guidance  would  be  laid  down  in  interpretative 
guidelines,  which  are  a  supporting  tool  for  AIBs.  In  addition,  AIBs  are  encouraged  to 
undertake  certain  activities,  however, 
to  do  so.  This 
notwithstanding, while  coherence  exists  there is  still room for  improvement. PO  B  and 
PO  C  propose  amendments  to  the  Directive  itself  for  all  aspects  that  require  further 
harmonisation and thus ensure a higher degree of internal coherence than PO A.  

is  no  obligation 

there 

External  coherence.  The  external  coherence  concentrates  on  the  compliance  of  the 
Directive  with  key  EU  policy  objectives  and  international  legislation.  Revising  the 
Directive  and  deleting  the  references  to  outdated  international  law  will  ensure  that  the 
Directive  and  IMO  legislation  will  be  aligned.  As  such,  both  legal  regimes  will  be 
consistent. As PO A, PO B and PO C all seek  alignment  with  the current  international 
legal regime, external coherence will be guaranteed in all three policy options.  

7.4. 

Subsidiarity and proportionality 

As  highlighted  in  section  2  there  is  a  clear  need  for  EU  action  on  all  three  problems 
identified,  and  their  drivers.  The  current  Directive  does  not  apply  to  all  vessel  types 
involved  in  VSMCs,  contains  unclear  definitions  and  refers  to  outdated  legislation.  In 
addition, AIBs are not able to effectively and consistently report and investigate marine 
casualties. Member States individually are not able to tackle all the problems identified. 
While  it  is  possible  to  adopt  national  legislation  to  tackle  some  of  the  problems 
highlighted,  if  27  Member  States  would  do  this  and  adapt  their  own  legislation  and/or 
rules  this  would  lead  to  fragmentation  of  legislation  and  potential  distortion  of  the 
internal  market.  To  avoid  such  a  fragmented  legal  framework,  there  is  a  need  for  EU 
action.  As  such,  there  is  a  right  for  the  EU  to  act.  As  all  policy  options  ensure 
harmonisation  of  the  legal  framework,  the  subsidiarity  requirement  is  fulfilled.  In  any 
event, as stated in Section 3.2, the principle of subsidiarity does not apply to areas subject 
to EU exclusive competence pursuant to Article 3(2) TFEU. 

47 

 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
In  relation  to  proportionality,  the  proposed  revision  aims  to  improve  maritime  safety. 
This objective is achieved by investigating casualties and learning from them, to prevent 
similar  accidents  from  happening  in  the  future.  PO  A  contributes  to  this  objective  by 
strongly focusing on improving the ability of AIBs to investigate accidents. Focus is put 
on providing more support through soft skills and hardware as well as knowledge sharing 
and training by EMSA. The additional support offered is considered proportional. PO B 
contributes to the objective by strongly focusing on clarifying several of the definitions 
used.  As  the  Member  States  cannot  easily  tackle  unclear  definitions  themselves  it  is 
important that it is done on an EU-level. During the stakeholder consultation, it became 
clear that clarifying the definitions is one of the most important aspects for AIBs in the 
revision of the Directive. The measures proposed under PO B are therefore considered to 
be  proportionate.  PO  C  combines  elements  of  PO  A  and  PO  B  and  adds  the  scope 
extension  to  fishing  vessels  below  15  meters.  The  scope  extension  is  considered  to  be 
proportionate. The additional costs necessary for  AIBs to investigate VSMCs involving 
fishing  vessels  below  15  meters  seem  to  be  limited,  especially,  when  compared  to  the 
potential positive safety impacts it can yield.  

8.  PREFERRED POLICY OPTION 

8.1. 

Identification of the preferred policy option and stakeholders views  

Although  each  of  the  options  addresses  the  problems  identified,  their  drivers  and  the 
specific objectives, some options are more effective in achieving the specific and general 
objectives.  Based  on  the  assessment  done,  PO  C  is  regarded  as  the  most  effective 
policy option. With respect to efficiency, PO C has the highest additional costs, followed 
by PO A. However, when linking costs to benefits, PO C also yields the highest impact 
in  terms  of  improving  maritime  safety  and  thus  monetised  benefits.  As  the  additional 
benefits  outweigh  the  additional  costs,  PO  C  is  seen  as  the  most  efficient  option 
proposed. Both the net benefits and the benefits to costs ratio are higher in PO C relative 
to PO B (when considering net benefits for PO B out of the range provided), while PO A 
results  in  net  costs.  Concerning  external  coherence,  the  policy  options  score  more  or 
less the same. PO C is slightly more coherent than PO A and PO B as besides coherence 
with international legislation, PO C also improves coherence by extending the scope of 
the Directive to fishing vessels below 15 meters. Concerning internal coherence, PO C is 
also  the  most  coherent  option.  In  terms  of  subsidiarity,  all  options  fulfil  this  principle 
and there are no real differences among them. The three options are also proportionate. 
None of the options leads to excessive costs in achieving the objectives set even if PO A 
results in net costs relative to PO B and PO C.  

Based on the analysis above it can be concluded that PO C is the preferred policy 
option. There is mixed opinion among AIBs as to whether the scope should be extended. 
AIBs  already  investigating  casualties  involving  smaller  fishing  vessels  are  in  favour  of 
extending  the  scope.  AIBs  not  yet  investigating  casualties  involving  smaller  fishing 
vessels held mixed opinions. Some of them, especially the small ones, are against a scope 
extension as they fear that it will increase their workload substantially. The larger AIBs 
seem to be more in favour as they see advantages of investigating the accidents as in the 
long  run  it  could  improve  safety.  The  sea-fisheries  social  partners  (employers  and 
employees  representatives)  have  expressed  support  for  this  measure,  underlining  the 
importance of gathering solid, detailed information on the causes of accidents. 

48 

 
8.2.  REFIT 

This initiative is part of the Commission Work Programme 2021 under Annex II (REFIT 
initiatives), under the heading Promoting our European Way of Life87.  

The  initiative  has  an  important  REFIT  dimension  in  terms  of  alignment  and 
simplification  of  safety  legislation,  of  improving  the  safety  profile  in  particular  of  the 
small  fishing  vessel  segment  and  of  assisting  Member  State  AIBs  to  better  discharge 
their  reporting  and  investigative  functions.  Partially  extending  the  Directive  to  the 
smaller  fishing  fleet  while  increasing  the  overall  policy  ambition,  the  review  also 
includes  some  important  simplification  aspects.  AIBs  will  face  higher  costs  due  to  the 
scope  extension  as  they  will  have  to  carry  out  at  least  a  preliminary  assessment  of 
VSMCs  involving  smaller  fishing  vessels  but  this  has  to  be  seen  against  the 
simplification brought about by the removal of the requirement to mandatorily carry out 
such a preliminary assessment in the case of all serious casualties. It is however difficult 
to identify any cost savings stemming from this simplification as all casualties are subject 
to some form of assessment to establish the circumstances, to determine their seriousness 
and whether they need to be investigated.  

In addition, the preferred policy option includes elements of simplification:  

  It will increase the efficiency of the national AIBs by providing clarity on when they 

need to carry out investigations.  

  The  provision  by  EMSA  of  top-up  assistance  to  those  AIBs  that  request  operational 
support in the form of analytical tools, hi-tech hardware such as drones or facilities to 
deal with VDRs will improve the quality and quantity of investigations carried out as 
well as increasing their harmonisation and standardisation across the EU.  

  EMSA training to AIB staff on technological and regulatory developments as well as 
on safety issues arising from renewable and low carbon fuels and other developments 
arising from the European Green Deal as well as issues around autonomous shipping 
should  also  provide  a  boost  to  AIBs  in  tackling  the  significant  coming  changes  in 
maritime transport. 

  EU AIBs are, under the relevant IMO instruments (as is the case for all IMO States) 
obliged  to  report  accident  information  data  to  the  IMO  Global  Integrated  Shipping 
Information System (GISIS)88, however once the accident data is reported to EMCIP 
the possibility is included in EMCIP for this data to be transferred onwards to GISIS. 
Similarly if a Member State AIB wishes to make EMCIP its national database, EMSA 
as database manager can customise EMCIP with the required functionalities such that 
the  AIB  can  report  one  time  to  EMCIP,  thereby  obviating  the  need  for  a  national 
reporting as well as EU reporting. As such, the AI Directive already uses interoperable 
digital solutions and could be considered digital-ready.   

8.3.  Application of the ‘one in, one out’ approach  

As  explained  in  sections  6.1.2  and  6.2,  the  preferred  policy  option  is  not  expected  to 
result in additional administrative costs or adjustments costs for the private sector, or for 
the citizens. Additional enforcement costs for the private sector (i.e. ship operators) are 
estimated at EUR 0.29 to 0.7 million relative to the baseline, expressed as present value 

87 COM(2020) 690 final  
88 http://gisis.imo.org/Members 

49 

 
                                                           
over  2022-2050.  They  would  however  be  largely  overcompensated  by  the  benefits  in 
terms of vessels lost avoided, which are estimated at EUR 5.68 to 9.41 million relative to 
the baseline, expressed as present value over 2022-2050.  

9.  HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? 

The  Commission  services  will  monitor  the  implementation  and  effectiveness  of  this 
initiative  through  a  number  of  actions  and  a  set  of  core  indicators  that  will  measure 
progress  towards  achieving  the  operational  objectives.  Five  years  after  the  end  of  the 
implementation  date  of  the  legislation,  the  Commission  services  should  carry  out  an 
evaluation to verify to what extent the objectives of the initiative have been reached. 

Actions foreseen for verifying implementation include: 

-  Commission/EMSA  monitoring  of  EMCIP  database  to  verify  that  investigations  are 
being carried out in a timely and effective manner and that the reports are uploaded to 
the database, including for fishing vessels below 15 meters for which data and safety 
gaps  are  identified.  The  indicators  that  will  be  specifically  monitored  drawing  on 
EMCIP database will be the number of fatalities and very serious injuries, the number 
of  vessels  lost  and  the  number  of  cases  of  pollution  at  sea,  and  their  evolution  over 
time. All these indicators will be monitored by type of vessel involved. The number of 
safety recommendations published as a result of the investigations and their follow up 
will also be monitored. 

-  Visits  to  Member States to  verify operations on the ground,  these are  carried out  by 
EMSA  on  behalf  of  the  Commission  as  part  of  EMSA’s  support  role  to  the 
Commission89. To be translated into  visits  reports and  if shortcomings are  identified 
they  are  addressed  either  by  means  of  EMSA  training  or  through  the  EU  pilot  and 
infringement procedure. 

-  Member States will have to have a QMS to certify its organisation, policies, processes, 
resources and documentation are appropriate to achieve its objectives. This will have 
to be certified and subsequently subject to annual audit. AIBs will have to share with 
Commission/EMSA the results of the annual audits carried out by the accredited body 
such that the AIB can retain its QMS certification.  

-  Horizontal analysis required90 to be carried out by EMSA (giving an indication of how 
the  legislation  is  functioning  and  identifying  gaps  and  what  can  be  done  to  address 
them) and reported to the Commission and Member States (discussed in workshops). 

89 EMSA carries out such visits under Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 1406/2002 establishing a European 
Maritime Safety Agency as part of its core tasks, as such no additional costs are expected to arise. 
90 Article 3(5) Regulation (EC) No 1406/2002 establishing a European Maritime Safety Agency 

50 

 
                                                           
ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION 

1.  LEAD DG, DECIDE PLANNING/CWP REFERENCES 

The lead DG is DG MOVE, Unit D2: Maritime Safety 

DECIDE reference number: PLAN/2019/5433 

Item 35 in Annex II to Commission Work Programme 2021  

2.  ORGANISATION AND TIMING 

The  impact  assessment  follows  the  ex-post  evaluation  of  the  maritime  accident 
investigation Directive performed as part of the overall maritime transport policy fitness 
check in 2018. 

The impact assessment started in 2020, with inception impact assessment published on 9 
October 202091.  

The impact assessment on a possible review of the Accident Investigation Directive was 
coordinated  by  an  Inter-Service  Steering  Group  (ISSG).  The  Commission  Services 
participating  in  the  ISG  were:  Secretariat-General,  DG  Maritime  Affairs  and  Fisheries, 
DG  Climate  Action,  DG  Migration  and  Home  Affairs,  DG  for  Employment,  Social 
Affairs and Inclusion, DG Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, DG Environment, DG 
Health and Food Safety and the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). 

The  Inter-Service  Steering  Group  met  4  times:  on  22  January  2021,  3  March  2021,  15 
October 2021 and 24 March 2022. It was consulted throughout the different steps of the 
impact  assessment  process:  notably  on  all  stakeholder  consultation  materials  and 
deliverables from the external contractor and on the draft Staff Working Document.  

3.  CONSULTATION OF THE RSB 

The  draft  report  was  discussed  by  the  Regulatory  Scrutiny  Board  on  27  April  2022, 
which issued a positive opinion. The Board also made several main recommendations for 
improvement which were addressed in the final impact assessment report as follows:  

RSB recommendations 

Modification of the IA report 

(1)  The  report  should  better  explain  the 
effectiveness  of  the  instrument  and  to  what 
extent  and 
through  which  mechanisms 
investigations  lead  to  avoided  accidents  and 
pollution.  It  should  discuss  whether  it  is 
possible 
scarcity  of 
investigative  resources  by  better  focussing 
investigations,  instead  of  increasing  their 

counter 

the 

to 

In Sections 1 and 6.4 the description of how the Directive 
currently  works  has  been  improved;  the  linkage  between 
safety investigations the safety recommendations that they 
give  rise  to  and  changes  to  international  instruments, 
national  laws  and  the  operations  of  shipping  companies 
are  explained.  With  regard  to  very  serious  marine 
casualties Member States do not have discretion under the 
IMO  instrument  as  to  whether  they  will  investigatre  as 

91 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12642-Maritime-Accident-
Investigation_en 

51 

 
 
                                                           
number. 

they are obliged to do so.  

(2) The report should clarify  how it  grouped 
the  measures into options. It should consider 
whether  combining  different 
levels  of 
ambitions  for  the  various  objectives  could 
lead  to  a  better  outcome.  The  report  should 
clarify  how  measures  on  GDPR  and  the 
introduction of a quality management system 
link  to  problems  that  the  initiative  aims  to 
tackle. 

(3)  The  report  should  include  more  detailed 
explanations  on  how  the  estimates  were 
calculated,  including  any  sensitivity  analysis 
carried  out.  The  report  should  be  explicit 
about  the  reasons  for  the  limited  quantified 
costs  for  SMEs.  It  should  also  underline 
uncertainties  related  to  the  benefits  and 
acknowledge  the  risk  that  the  benefits  may 
not  materialise as expected. It should  further 
explain  how  efficiency  in  investigations  is 
understood and used in the analysis. 

(4)  The  report  needs  to  justify  better  the 
proportionality  of  including  smaller  fishing 
vessels  in  the  scope  of  the  initiative.  The 
report  should  clarify  how  this  will  work  in 
the context of national authorities having the 
choice  as  to  when  to  investigate  beyond  the 
very  serious  accidents.  It  should  also  set  out 
how  maritime  accident  investigations  could 
be  coordinated  with  police  and  other 
investigations  in  the  most  serious  cases  to 
minimise  the  potential  loss  of  earnings  for 
SME operators. It should clarify  whether the 
additional  costs  expected  for  the  European 
Maritime  Safety  Agency  are  covered  by 
existing budgetary commitments. 

(5) The report needs to be explicit about how 
success  will  be  measured  and  which 
indicators will be monitored to this end. 

Section 5.3 has been reinforced to better explain and 
present the reasons for the groupings of measures into the 
three policy options. The linkage between the options and 
the problem descriptions has been better explained. The 
issue of training for GDPR and the misgiving of some 
Member states authorities about sharing of information 
with third country authorities is better explained.  In 
section 6.1.1. the need for and expected benefits of the 
introduction of a quality management system for the 
Member States’ accident investigation authorities is 
reinforced.  
More detailed explanations were added in sections 6.1.2, 
6.2.1 and 6.3. In addition, a sensitivity analysis has been 
performed; its results are reported in sections 6.1.2, 6.2.1, 
6.3 and 7.2. More explanations on the limited costs for 
SMEs have been added in section 6.1.4. The uncertainty of 
the benefits has been highlighted, together with the 
presentation of the results of the sensitivity analysis. More 
explanations on the quality management system and the 
link with the efficiency in investigations have been added 
in section 6.1.1. 

In section 6.1.1 and 6.1.2. the proportionality of the partial 
extension of the scope of the Directive to cover fatalities 
and loss of the vessel in cases of fishing vessels of below 
15 metres in length is better explained. The Directive is 
not being fully extended but rather Member States will be 
obliged to record and report the accident and to carry out a 
preliminary assessment to evaluate whether an 
investigation should take place.  The current obligations of 
operators of fishing vessels below 15 meters to notify the 
maritime authorities of a loss of the vessel or of a fatality 
on-board detailing the circumstances is also noted.  
In section 6.1.4 the enforcement costs for a vessel operator 
of coopering with an investigation as well as the linkages 
between a safety investigation and other inquiries ( police 
or administrative) is further developed.  
The impact on EMSA’s budget and the additional 
resources that will be required as setr out in section 6.1.3.  
Section 9 on monitoring reporting and evaluation of the 
results of the proposed policy measures and which 
indicators will be evaluated has been reinforced. 

The draft report was submitted to the RSB on 30 March 2022 and was discussed by the 
Board on 27 April 2022.  

4.  EVIDENCE, SOURCES AND QUALITY 

The  impact  assessment  is  based  on  several  sources,  using  both  quantitative  and 
qualitative data. This includes: 

•  Ex-post evaluation of the maritime accident investigation Directive 

•  Maritime Fitness Check 2018  

•  Stakeholder consultation activities (see Annex 2) 

52 

 
 
•  External support study carried out by an independent consortium (lead by Ecorys)  

•  Commission experience in monitoring and implementing the Directive  

•  Various databases managed by EMSA. 

53 

 
 
ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION (SYNOPSIS REPORT) 

This annex provides a summary of the outcomes of the consultation activities which have 
been carried out for the review of the Accident Investigation Directive, including in the 
context  of  the  external  support  study.  It  notes  the  range  of  stakeholders  consulted, 
describes the main consultation activities and provides a succinct analysis of their views 
and the main issues they raised.   

The  objective  of  the  consultation  activities  were  to  collect  information  and  opinions  of 
stakeholders  on  the  key  problems  and  associated  drivers,  definition  of  relevant  policy 
objectives linked to those problem areas and the identification, definition and screening 
of  policy  measures  that  could  eventually  be  incorporated  into  policy  options  for  this 
Impact Assessment, as well as gather information and opinions on their likely impacts.  

1.   Overview of consultation activities 

A  consultation  strategy,  covering  the  stakeholder  consultation  activities  carried  out, 
including as part of the support study, has been developed from the start and further fine-
tuned  throughout  the  different  phases  of  the  impact  assessment.  The  consultation 
activities  were  aimed  at  a  range  of  relevant  stakeholders  representing  accident 
investigation bodies in  EU and  industry representatives (including relevant  associations 
of shipowners, fishermen,  port operators, recognised organisations  seafarers and social 
partners).  

Consultation  activities  have  taken  place  since  the  publication  of  the  Inception  Impact 
Assessment  in  October  2020  and  continued  until  early  2022,  with  the  bulk  of 
consultations taking place in 2021. 

As  part  of  the  initial  feedback  mechanism,  stakeholders  had  the  opportunity  to  provide 
feedback  on  the  Inception  Impact  Assessment92  via  the  relevant  website.  The 
Commission received 5 responses, during 09 October to 20 November 2020. There was 
one  response  provided  by  one  EU  Member  State,  one  from  an  EEA  country  and  3 
provided  by  business  associations,  actors  from  shipping  industry,  including  a  trade 
association  of  seafarers  and  an  NGO.  A  further  response  was  received  from  a  Member 
State which did not use the relevant website. 

Afterwards, the following main consultation activities were carried out: 

-  Considering  the  highly  technical  nature  of  the  file,  it  was  agreed  with  the 
Secretariat  General  that  there  is  no  added  value  in  running  an  Open  Public 
Consultation.  However,  the  general  public  was  offered  the  opportunity  to 
provide  any  views  on  this  initiative,  via  an  announcement  on  DG  MOVE  web 
page93 and a dedicated functional mailbox. One contribution was received from a 

92 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12642-Maritime-Accident-
Investigation_en 
93 https://transport.ec.europa.eu/news/maritime-safety-three-directives-under-review-2021-09-08_en 

54 

 
 
                                                           
 
shipowner  association  relating  to  accident  investigation  which  welcomed  the 
administrative burden reduction and possible support to AIBs from EMSA.  

-  Three  rounds  of  interviews  with  EU  level  representatives  of  key  stakeholders 
organised  by  the  consultant  in  charge  of  the  external  support  study,  running 
intermittently from February 2021 to November 2021, to fill specific information 
requests,  particularly  to  support  and  refine  the  overall  problem  definition  and 
possible policy options.  

-  Targeted  stakeholder  surveys  organised  by  the  consultant  in  charge  of  the 
external support study, running from June to November 2021, to gather specific 
information, particularly to support the refinement of the problem definition, the 
baseline  and  where  possible  the  assessment  of  impacts  of  possible  policy 
measures. 

-  Additional consultation activities organised by DG MOVE and the consultant in 
charge  of  the  external  support  study  in  order  to  consult  the  Member  States  and 
key  stakeholders  by  providing  their  views  on  the  different  policy  measures  but 
also to validate the emerging and final results of the support study to the Impact 
Assessment  in  terms  of  the  quantification  of  the  impacts.  These  activities  took 
place in the context of  meetings of the EU Sectoral Social Dialogue Committee 
on  maritime  transport  (16  April  2021,  23  September  2021  and  16  December 
2021),    the  EU  Sectoral  Social  Dialogue  Committee  on    Sea  Fisheries  (29 
January  2021,  8  March  2021  and  16  November  2021),  the  EU  Sector  Social 
Dialogue Committee on  ports (19 November 2021), meetings of the Permanent 
Cooperation  Framework  of  AIBs  (10  March  2021,  18  June  2021,  29  August 
2021,  22  September  2021  and  7  October  2021),  an  informal  meeting  of  the 
EU/EEA Maritime Transport Directors (30 November 2021), meetings of the of 
the EU Committee on Safe Seas and the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (17 
May 2021 and 11 November 2021). A final validation workshop to validate the 
conclusions  of  the  support  study  attended  by  Member  State  and  industry 
representatives was also organised (20 January 2022). 

The  information  collected  from  stakeholders  was  key  in  allowing  the  Commission  to 
refine  the  design  of  the  policy  options  as  well  as  to  assess  their  economic,  social  and 
environmental  impacts,  compare  them  and  determine  which  policy  option  is  likely  to 
maximize the benefits/costs ratio for the society and fully contribute to achieving a more 
effective  and  efficient  mechanism  to  investigate  the  maritime  accidents  across  the  EU. 
Findings from those processes complemented the desk research carried out in the context 
of the external support study.  

Methods  have  been  adapted  to  take  account  of  the  development  of  the  COVID-19 
pandemic. For this reason, interviews and meetings have been held by videoconference.  

Table 15:  Overview of responses to different stakeholder consultation activities 

Number of 

Number of 

Impact Assessment elements 

invitees 

responses 

Exploratory interviews 

Targeted interviews 1st round 

Targeted interviews 2nd round 

5 

35 

5 

5 

25 

4 

Problem assessment 

Problem assessment / possible measures 

Policy measures / options / impacts 

55 

 
 
Number of 

Number of 

Impact Assessment elements 

invitees 

responses 

Targeted AIB survey 

Targeted survey fisheries 

Additional AIB survey 

28 

305 

28 

16 
7194 

16 

Problem assessment /size of the problem / baseline 

Problem assessment /size of the problem / baseline 

Data gaps /problem assessment 

The  full  list  of  stakeholders  who  participated  in  the  various  consultation  activities  is 
included in the external support study.   

2.   Limitations of the Stakeholder consultation 

Not all stakeholders were very responsive to the various targeted consultation activities, 
in  particular  fishermen  representatives  (slow  responses  or  incomplete  answers). 
However, since all relevant stakeholder groups have provided their views and positions 
to the various targeted consultations, a meaningful comparison and analysis of opinions 
gathered from all consultation activities was nevertheless possible.  

It was particularly difficult to gather input from stakeholders on possible expected costs 
of implementing proposed measures, as well as estimations on the number of accidents 
because  of  the  scarcity  and  incompleteness  of  existing  data.  In  certain  instances,  the 
responses  of  the  accident  investigation  bodies  were  not  very  consistent,  which  may  be 
explained  by  their  differing  histories  and  stage  of  development  (pre-2009  or  post), 
structures (maritime only or multi-modal), size and resources, differing appreciations of 
issues such as definitions and whether there are problems with resources, concerns over 
additional, increased workload in the future, while ensuring that their full independence 
and responsibility in deciding the accidents they think are worth being investigating and 
the conduct of the investigations themselves. 

3.   Analysis of the key results of the stakeholder consultation  

The  remainder  of  the  annex  presents  key  findings  from  the  analysis  of  stakeholder 
contributions to the consultation process. They are structured around the main elements 
of  the  intervention  logic,  including  the  problem  areas  and  their  drivers,  the  policy 
objectives  as  well  as  the  key  aspects  of  the  design  of  possible  policy  measures.  The 
technical support study for this Impact Assessment contains the detailed presentation of 
findings from the targeted consultation activities.  

3.1. Problem areas and policy objectives 

While AI Bodies are overall of the opinion that the fact that the fishing vessels below 15 
meters  are  not  covered  by  the  Directive  is  not  an  issue  per  se,  some  rather  pointing  to 
difficulties  in  interpreting  a  number  of  the  definitions  provided  in  the  Directive,  they 
nevertheless acknowledge the high risks of accidents in this particular sector: 

94  The  survey  was  distributed  via  the  Commission’s  fisheries  network  and  targeted  a  mix  of  individual 
fishermen, fishing companies (more than 1 employee), seafarer’s and fisheries’ organisations and ‘other’. 
For each of the groups responses were received. 71 respondents started the survey. However, the majority 
of them did not complete the survey. Only 12 respondents filled answers to all questions asked.  

56 

 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 7: Are there certain types of fishing vessels that are more accident prone? (n = 12) 

no
No data available
Small vessels

3

2

7

0

2

4

6

8

Number of respondents

Almost  half  (seven  out  of  eighteen)  of  the  AIBs  who  participated  in  the  consultation 
activities  do  not  have  information  on  the  number  of  accidents  involving  small  fishing 
vessels  in  their  country.  Of  the  eleven  which  have  data  available,  three  report  no 
accident, three report a single-digit number of accidents and four report between 10 and 
50 yearly accidents. One AIB reported a significantly higher number of yearly accidents 
involving  small  fishing  vessels,  namely  218,  of  which  four  were  investigated.  Out  of 
these eighteen AIBs, five have stated that less than 10 such accidents are investigated on 
a yearly basis, and one AIB claiming to investigate between 10 and 20. According to the 
same AIBs, accidents are investigated if they lead to fatalities or a loss of ship. 

On the issue of the lack of some definitions in the Directive, ten AIBs agree and strongly 
agree  that  unclear  definitions  in  the  Directive  may  be  the  source  of  several  problems. 
Four  AIBs  disagree  with  this  claim,  while  three  neither  agree  nor  disagree.  Ten  AIBs 
consider  that  the  problems  are  likely  to  stay  the  same,  should  no  remedial  action  be 
taken, while three AIBs consider that these problems would increase in the future. 

Figure 8: Do you agree that unclear definitions in the Directive are an issue? (n = 18) 

I do not know
Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree

0

1

2

3

4

8

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Number of respondents

Finally,  regarding  the  question  of  adequate  human  or  financial  resources  the  AIBs 
provided the below replies. Out of the four AIBs stating that resource availability is not 
an issue, one indicated nevertheless that tasks linked to filling in the EMCIP database add 
stress on their resources. 

Figure 9: Do you agree that a lack of resources available to AIBs is an issue? (n = 17) 

I do not know
Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree

0

1

2

2
2

10

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Number of respondents

57 

 
 
 
 
 
With one exception, the average yearly number of investigations into maritime accidents 
did not fluctuate strongly across 2016 – 2020 period, in 16 Member States for which data 
was collected during this exercise. For nine AIBs, this number has been less than 10. For 
six AIBs, this number has been between 10 and mid-30. One AIB stands out in terms of 
both  the  absolute  number  of  yearly  investigations,  as  well  as  its  sharp  increase  since 
2018. 

3.2. Potential policy measures 

Scope of the Directive  

On the policy measures regarding the investigation of accidents involving fishing vessels 
of less than 15 meters in  length,  there  was no common view amongst  the twenty AIBs 
who participated in the consultation. Sixteen AIBs have provided more detailed views, as 
presented in the figure below: 

Figure 10: AIB survey - In your expert opinion, what grounds should justify the inclusion of smaller 
fishing vessels (under 15m) in the scope of the Directive? (multiple answers possible) (N=16) 

Fourteen out of the sixteen AIBs who replied, believe that the inclusion of small fishing 
vessels in the scope of the Directive would require a higher number of staff. Ten AIBs 
consider  that  such  an  inclusion  may  lead  to  a  reprioritisation  of  investigations  and 
consequently  to  a  higher  number  of  accidents  not  being  investigated.  Six  AIBs  believe 
that new knowledge and skills would be required. 

Fishermen  representatives  took  the  view  that  overall  the  benefits  of  investigating  very 
serious accidents  involving fishing vessels  –  irrespective of their size  – are higher than 
the possible additional costs. 

References to outdated legislation  

The majority of the twenty AIBs expressing views, was of the opinion that the proposed 
measure,  the  Directive  referring  to  the  most  up-to-date  versions  of  the  Code  for  the 
Investigation  of  Marine  Casualties  and  Incidents  and  Code  Casualty  Investigation,  is 
effective  in  addressing  the  identified  problem.  Also,  the  majority  of  them  are  of  the 
opinion  that  the  replacement  of  reference  to  Directive  95/46/EC  by  a  reference  to 
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 is at least to some extent effective, but they do not favour the 
Commission supporting the AIBs in order to comply with the new GDPR rules. This will 
contribute  to  a  better  protection  of  personal  data  of  crew  members,  for  example 
considering  the  processing  of  data  after  an  interview  with  vessel  crew  is  conducted  by 
investigators. 

58 

 
 
EMSA providing highly specialised analytical support to AIBs  

There is no common view amongst the AIBs regarding the effectiveness of this measure, 
with 9 out of 21 believing that there will be no change while 7 were of the opinion that it 
would  be  easier  to  do  a  high  quality  investigation.  On  the  contrary  the  majority  of  the 
AIBs, 9 out of 20 replies, were of the opinion that EMSA providing analytical tools and 
equipment  to  AIBs  would  help  them  to  do  a  high  quality  investigation  against  7  who 
thought there will be no change while 1 respondent thought it would deteriorate the work 
of AIBs and 1 didn’t know. The AIBs have also supported the added value that EMSA 
trainings and better dissemination of specialised information could bring. They were also 
supportive  of  the  measure  that  the  PCF  could  be  given  an  advisory  role  to  the  EMSA 
with regard to the AID: 

Figure 11: If the PCF is given an advisory role to EMSA with regard to the Directive, how will this 
affect your AIB’s work on a daily basis? (n = 21) 

Introduce an obligation on Member States having a quality management system (QMS) for the 
accident investigation 

The vast majority of the AIBs were not supportive of this measure, 13 out of 21, because 
of the cost increase. 

Broaden the group  to other competent authorities, EMSA and the Commission who can add 
accident data to the EMCIP database 

Only 2 out of the 20 AIBs who provided views on this measure, considered that it would 
lead to increased workload for them. 

Figure 12: How will this solution affect the workload of your AIB? (n = 20) 

59 

 
 
 
ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW? 

1.  PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE INITIATIVE 

Summary of the preferred policy option implementation 

The  revision  of  the  Maritime  Accident  Investigation  Directive  aims  at  maintaining  and 
improving the level of maritime safety of EU registered ships operating worldwide and of 
ships operating in EU waters. The impacts of the preferred policy option are expected to 
fall  on  different  stakeholder  groups:  national  accident  investigation  bodies,  EMSA, 
industry (i.e. ship owners/operators), crews of the vessels, port workers and passengers of 
maritime vessels. 

Ensuring a high level of safety is important for the users of transport transporting goods 
as well as for passengers. It is also important for vessel crews as these persons make up 
the largest number of persons killed and/or injured in maritime accidents. It is important 
for  consumer  protection  as  well  as  for  the  integrity  of  the  internal  market  that 
occurrences are systematically investigated in a coherent and harmonised manner across 
the European Union. There can be no gaps in the maritime safety net. Any and all lessons 
that can be learned should be taken advantage of to avoid future reoccurrence.  

It  is  also  important  for  the  environment  that  accidents  are  avoided  and  when  these  do 
unfortunately occur that their effects are mitigated to the extent possible, this is why it is 
essential  that  accidents  are  investigated  and  that  the  results  of  the  investigations  are 
disseminated to the widest extent possible throughout the Union in a systemic manner.    

The  preferred  policy  option  identified  in  the  context  of  this  Impact  Assessment,  policy 
option C, provides for a minimum requirement that any very serious marine casualty (in 
essence a fatality or the loss of a vessel) involving a fishing vessel of below 15 metres in 
length  overall  is  subject  to  a  preliminary  assessment  to  determine  if  a  full  safety 
investigation should be carried out.  

The  preferred  policy  option  also  clarifies  on  a  number  of  problematic  or  ambiguous 
definitions  by  amending  the  Directive.  It  aligns  the  Directive  with  the  most  up  to  date 
IMO provisions and also requires that AIBs have a certified quality management system 
in place to assure their operations.  

Finally the preferred policy option envisages  assistance to  those AIBs that  request  it in 
terms of training  as well as operational support whereby EMSA can assist AIBs to better 
discharge their obligations under the Directive.  

Implications on consumers, market actors and public authorities 

The following key target groups of this initiative have been identified: 

  Accident investigation bodies in EU Member States 
  European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) 
  Owners/operators of fishing vessels of below 15 metres length overall 

60 

 
 
  Owners/operators of fishing vessels of above 15 metres length overall 
  Owners/operators of maritime transport vessels 
  Crews of the above-mentioned categories of vessel 
  Port workers 
  Passengers of maritime vessels 

AIBs  will  be  affected  in  three  ways:  firstly  the  partial  extension  of  scope  to  smaller 
fishing  vessels  means  that  as  a  minimum  they  will  have  to  carry  out  a  preliminary 
assessment of very serious marine casualties involving these vessels. This is expected to 
increase  the  amount  of  work  they  have  to  do.  AIBs  will  also  face  a  slightly  increased 
number  of  investigations  because  of  changes  and  increased  clarity  in  definitions.  The 
increase is somewhat mitigated by the fact that the AI body can decide not to carry out a 
full investigation if it feels  that there are no lessons to  be learned. These investigations 
are expected to result in new findings as fishing vessels below 15 meters are currently not 
in the scope of the AI Directive.  

AIBs will benefit from the technical and operational support that they will receive from 
EMSA which should allow them to better discharge their obligations in an efficient and 
timely fashion particularly when confronted  with  multiple investigations  which have to 
be carried out at the same time.  

The  third  aspect  is  that  AIBs  will  have  to  put  in  place  a  quality  management  system 
(QMS). The AIBs internal systems will have to be certified and then the AIB will have to 
be audited  each  year to  retain its certification.  This  implies  one-off  costs for putting in 
place the system and ongoing costs for the yearly audit. 

EMSA  will  be  impacted  in  that  it  will  have  to  provide  different  forms  of  operational 
support  as  well  as  training  to  AIBs.  This  will  take  the  form  of  support  to  the  AIBs  to 
carry out investigations either in terms of soft skills in the form of expertise or hardware 
such as drones or laboratory assistance to deal with technical aspects. 

In  fisheries,  the  owners/operators  and  crews  of  fishing  vessels  of  below  15  metres  in 
length overall are the stakeholder category mostly impacted by the proposed intervention. 
The extension of the scope of the Directive to this category of vessel should lead to an 
improvement in the safety profile of this vessel segment and at the very least to a better 
understanding  of  the  safety  problems  faced  by  vessels  within  this  category.  Additional 
costs for the sector of participating in accident investigations (i.e. enforcement costs) are  
however limited.  

Maritime transport operators and the owners /operators of fishing vessels of above 
15  metres  (both  of  which  are  currently  within  the  scope  of  the  Directive)  will  be 
impacted  in  that  a  limited  number  of  additional  investigations  will  be  carried  out  as  a 
result of increased clarity as regards definitions of when an investigation has to be carried 
out.  The  additional  costs  for  the  sector  of  participating  in  accident  investigations  (i.e. 
enforcement costs) are however limited.  

On  the  other  hand,  benefits  are  expected  in  terms  of  avoided  vessels  lost,  due  to 
improved  safety.  These  benefits  overcompensate  the  costs  for  the  industry  (i.e. 
shipowners/operators).  

61 

 
 
Given  that  crews  are  systematically  the  most  impacted  category  of  people  as  regards 
injuries and death in maritime transport any improvement to safety will impact on them 
positively.  Positive  impacts  in  terms  of  safety  improvements  are  also  expected  for  the 
port workers and the passengers of maritime vessels. 

2.  SUMMARY OF COSTS AND BENEFITS 

I. Overview of Benefits (total for all provisions) – Preferred Option (Policy option C) 

Amount 

Direct benefits 

Comments 

Description 

Improvement in the 
functioning of the internal 
market  

Reduction of external costs 
related to accidents relative 
to the baseline (i.e. present 
value over 2022-2050) 

Indirect benefits 

EUR 132.6 to 229.28 million 

Cost savings for vessels 
operators relative to the 
baseline (i.e. present value 
over 2022-2050) 

Reduction in the bunker fuel 
lost at sea, relative to the 
baseline over 2025-2050 (in 
tonnes) 

EUR 5.68 to 9.41 million 

101 to 176 tonnes 

The initiative will ensure that Accident 
Investigation Bodies investigate similar 
accidents in the same way, to improve the 
functioning of the internal market and to 
ensure an appropriate safety net across the 
Union to protect life and the marine 
environment. EU action ensures a level 
playing field for shipowners, ports and 
between Member States. 

ships’  crews, 

Indirect  benefit 
in 
to 
particular  those  of  small  fishing  vessels, 
port  workers  and  passengers  of  maritime 
vessels,  and  to  society  at  large,  due  to  the 
lives  saved  and  injuries  avoided.  Part  of 
to 
completed 
rise 
investigations  give 
recommendations  or  define  actions 
to 
prevent similar accidents from occurring in 
the  future.  These  are  projected  to  result  in 
28 to 48 lives saved and 219 to 379 injuries 
avoided  over  2025-2050  relative  to  the 
baseline.  The  reduction  of  external  costs 
related  to  accidents,  due  to  the  lives  saved 
and  injuries  avoided,  is  estimated  at  EUR 
132.6  to  229.28  million  relative  to  the 
baseline  (i.e.  present  value  over  2022-
2050). 

impacts 

Indirect 
for  vessels’  owners/ 
operators,  in  particular  for  small  fishing 
vessels.  Cost  savings  in  terms  of  avoided 
vessels  lost  are  estimated  at  EUR  5.68  to 
9.41 million relative to the baseline (18-31 
avoided vessels lost).  

Indirect benefit to society at large. 
Preventing similar accidents from occurring 
in the future is projected to avoid  
101 to 176 tonnes of bunker fuel lost at sea 
relative to the baseline. This is expected to 
have a positive impact on the quality of 
marine water and biodiversity. 

Administrative cost savings related to the ‘one in, one out’ approach 

No costs savings related to  
the ‘one in, one out’ 

- 

62 

- 

 
 
 
approach have been 
identified 

II. Overview of costs – Preferred option (Policy option C) 

Citizens/Consumers 

Businesses 

Administrations 

One-off 

Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

For AIBs: 
EUR 11.66 to 
141.23 
million, of 
which EUR 
9.59 to 
139.16 
million 
additional 
investigation 
costs and 
EUR 2.07 
million  for 
QMS 

For EMSA: 
EUR 31.88 
million 

EUR 0.06 
million 

- 

Direct adjustment costs for 
Accident Investigation Bodies 
(AIBs) and EMSA, relative to 
the baseline (i.e. present value 
over 2022-2050) 

- 

- 

- 

- 

For AIBs: 
one-off costs 
of EUR 0.3 
million for 
setting up 
the quality 
management 
system 
(QMS)  

Direct administrative costs for 
Accident Investigation Bodies 
(AIBs), relative to the 
baseline (i.e. present value 
over 2022-2050) 

Direct enforcement costs for 
ship owners/operators, 
relative to the baseline (i.e. 
present value over 2022-
2050) 

Indirect costs 

Direct adjustment 
costs  

Total   

Indirect 
adjustment costs 

Administrative 
costs (for 
offsetting) 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

EUR 0.29 to 
0.7 million 

- 

- 

Costs related to the ‘one in, one out’ approach 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

3.  RELEVANT SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS 

III. Overview of relevant Sustainable Development Goals – Preferred Option(s) 
Relevant SDG 

Expected progress towards the Goal 

Comments 

63 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SDG 3 “Ensure healthy lives and 
promote well-being for all at all ages”  

Changes to the Directive are expected to contribute 
to health and well-being benefits from the increased 
number of lessons learned which may prevent future 
injuries or fatalities.  

SDG 14 “Conserve and sustainably use 
the oceans, seas and marine resources 
for sustainable development” 

Changes to the Directive are expected to contribute 
to preventing future damage to the marine 
environment through accidents of a similar nature.  

 The preferred policy option is 
projected to result in 28 to 48 
lives saved and 219 to 379 
injuries avoided over 2025-
2050 relative to the baseline. 

 Preventing similar accidents 
from occurring in the future is 
projected to result in  
101 to 176 tonnes of bunker 
fuel lost avoided relative to 
the baseline. This is expected 
to have a positive impact on 
the quality of marine water 
and biodiversity. 

64 

 
 
 
ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL METHODS 

1.  Description of the analytical methods used  

The  main  model  used  for  developing  the  baseline  scenario  for  this  initiative  is  the 
PRIMES-Maritime  transport  model  by  E3Modelling,  a  specific  sub-module  of  the 
PRIMES and PRIMES-TREMOVE models. The model has a successful record of use in 
the Commission's energy, transport and climate policy assessments.  In particular, it has 
been used for the impact assessments underpinning the “Fit for 55” package95, the impact 
assessments  accompanying  the  2030  Climate  Target  Plan96  and  the  Staff  Working 
Document  accompanying 
the 
Commission’s  proposal  for  a  Long  Term  Strategy98  as  well  as  for  the  2020  and  2030 
EU’s climate and energy policy framework.  

the  Sustainable  and  Smart  Mobility  Strategy97, 

For  the  assessment  of  the  impacts  of  the  policy  options  an  excel-based  tool  has  been 
developed  by  Ecorys  in  the  context  of  the  impact  assessment  support  study99.  The  tool 
draws on the Standard Cost Model for the assessment of the administrative costs and also 
includes an assessment of the impacts on the maritime safety. The excel-based tool builds 
extensively on data from EMCIP, provided by EMSA, and the analysis of stakeholders' 
feedback.  The  proposed  measures  which  involve  the  amendment  of  the  Directive  are 
assumed  to  be  implemented  from  2025  onwards,  so  that  the  assessment  has  been 
undertaken  for  the  2025-2050  period  and  refers  to  EU27.  Costs  and  benefits  are 
expressed as present value over the 2022-2050 period, using a 3% discount rate. 

PRIMES-Maritime model 

The  PRIMES-Maritime  transport  model  is  a  specific  sub-module  of  the  PRIMES  and 
PRIMES-TREMOVE  models  and  aims  to  enhance  the  representation  of  the  maritime 
sector within the energy-economy-environment modelling nexus. The model, which can 
run  in  stand-alone  and/  or  linked  mode  with  PRIMES  and  PRIMES-TREMOVE, 
produces  long-term  transport  activity,  energy  and  emission  projections,  until  2070, 
separately for each EU Member State. The coverage of the model includes the European 
intra-EU maritime sector as well as the extra-EU maritime shipping. The model covers 
both  freight  and  passenger  international  maritime.  PRIMES-Maritime  focuses  only  on 
the EU Member State, therefore trade activity between non-EU countries is  outside the 
scope of the model. The model considers the transactions (bilateral trade by product type) 
of  the  EU-Member  States  with  non-EU  countries  and  aggregates  these  countries  in 
regions. Several types and sizes of vessels are considered. 

PRIMES-Maritime  features  a  modular  approach  based  on  the  demand  and  the  supply 
modules. The demand module projects maritime activity for each EU Member State by 

95 Delivering the European Green Deal | European Commission (europa.eu) 
96 SWD(2020)176 final. 
97 EUR-Lex - 52020SC0331 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu)  
98 Source: 2050 long-term strategy (europa.eu)   
99 Ecorys et al. (2022), Impact assessment support study concerning possible revision of Directive 
2009/18/EC. 

65 

 
 
                                                           
type of cargo and by corresponding partner. Econometric functions correlate demand for 
maritime  transport  services  with  economic  indicators  considered  as  demand  drivers, 
including  GDP,  trade  of  energy  commodities  (oil,  coal,  LNG),  trade  of  non-energy 
commodities, international fuel prices, etc. The supply module simulates a representative 
operator  controlling the  EU fleet,  who offers the requested maritime transport services. 
The  operator  of  the  fleet  decides  the  allocation  of  the  vessels  activity  to  the  various 
markets  (representing  the  different  EU  MS)  where  different  regulatory  regimes  may 
apply  (e.g.  environmental  zones).  The  fleet  of  vessels  is  disaggregated  into  several 
categories. PRIMES-Maritime utilises a stock-flow relationship to simulate the evolution 
of the fleet of vessels throughout the projection period and the purchasing of new vessels. 

PRIMES-Maritime  solves  a  virtual  market  equilibrium  problem,  where  demand  and 
supply interact dynamically in  each consecutive time period, influenced by a variety of 
exogenous  policy  variables,  notably  fuel  standards,  pricing  signals  (e.g.  Emission 
Trading  Scheme),  environmental  and  efficiency/operational  regulations  and  others.  The 
PRIMES-Maritime model projects energy consumption by fuel type and purpose as well 
as CO2, methane and N2O and other pollutant emissions. The model includes projections 
of costs, such as capital, fuel, operation costs, projections of investment expenditures in 
new vessels and negative externalities from air pollution. 

The model serves  to  quantify policy scenarios supporting the transition  towards carbon 
neutrality.  It  considers  the  handling  of  a  variety  of  fuels  such  as  fossil  fuels,  biofuels 
(bioheavy100,  biodiesel,  bio-LNG),  synthetic  fuels  (synthetic  diesel,  fuel  oil  and  gas,  e-
ammonia and e-methanol) produced from renewable electricity, hydrogen produced from 
renewable  electricity  (for  direct  use  and  for  use  in  fuel  cell  vessels)  and  electricity  for 
electric  vessels.  Well-To-Wake  emissions  are  calculated  thanks  to  the  linkage  with  the 
PRIMES energy systems model which derives ways of producing such fuels. The model 
also  allows  to  explore  synergies  with  Onshore  Power  Supply  systems.  Environmental 
regulation,  fuel  blending  mandates,  greenhouse  gas emissions reduction targets,  pricing 
signals  and  policies  increasing  the  availability  of  fuel  supply  and  supporting  the 
alternative  fuel  infrastructure  are  identified  as  drivers,  along  fuel  costs,  for  the 
penetration of new fuels. As the model is  dynamic and handles vessel  vintages, capital 
turnover is explicit in the model, influencing the pace of fuel and vessel substitution. 

Data inputs 

The  main  data  sources  for  inputs  to  the  PRIMES-Maritime  model,  such  as  for  activity 
and  energy  consumption,  comes  from  EUROSTAT  database  and  from  the  Statistical 
Pocketbook "EU transport in figures”101. Other data comes from different sources such as 
research  projects  (e.g.  TRACCS  project)  and  reports.  PRIMES-Maritime  being  part  of 
the  overall  PRIMES  and  PRIMES-TREMOVE  transport  model  is  calibrated  to  the 
EUROSTAT energy balances and transport activity; hence the associated CO2 emissions 
are assumed to derive from the combustion of these fuel quantities. The model has been 
adapted to reflect allocation of CO2 emissions into intra-EU, extra-EU and berth, in line 
with  data  from  the  MRV  database102.  For  air  pollutants,  the  model  draws  on  the  EEA 
database.  In  the  context  of  this  exercise,  the  PRIMES-Maritime  model  is  calibrated  to 
2005, 2010 and 2015 historical data. 

100 Bioheavy refers to bio heavy fuel oil. 
101 Publications (europa.eu) 
102 THETIS-MRV (europa.eu) 

66 

 
                                                           
2.  Baseline scenario 

to  reflect 

the  fundamental  socio-economic, 

transport  and  GHG  emissions.  The  socio-economic  and 

technological  and  policy 
In  order 
developments,  the  Commission  prepares  periodically  an  EU  Reference  Scenario  on 
energy, 
technological 
developments used for developing the baseline scenario for this impact assessment build 
on the latest  “EU Reference 2020 scenario” (REF2020)103. The same assumptions have 
been used in the policy scenarios underpinning the impact assessments accompanying the 
“Fit for 55” package104.   

Main assumptions of the Baseline scenario 

The main assumptions related to economic development, international energy prices and 
technologies are described below. 

Economic assumptions  

The  modelling  work  is  based  on  socio-economic  assumptions  describing  the  expected 
evolution  of  the  European  society.  Long-term  projections  on  population  dynamics  and 
economic activity form part of the input to the model and are used to estimate transport 
activity, particularly relevant for this impact assessment.  

Population  projections  from  Eurostat105  are  used  to  estimate  the  evolution  of  the 
European  population,  which  is  expected  to  change  little  in  total  number  in  the  coming 
decades.  The  GDP  growth  projections  are  from  the  Ageing  Report  2021106  by  the 
Directorate  General  for  Economic  and  Financial  Affairs,  which  are  based  on  the  same 
population growth assumptions. 

Table 16: Projected population and GDP growth per Member State 

Population 

GDP growth 

EU27 

Austria 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Croatia 

Cyprus 

Czechia 

Denmark 

Estonia 

Finland 

France 

Germany 

Greece 

2020 
447.7 

8.90 

11.51 

6.95 

4.06 

0.89 

2025 
449.3 

9.03 

11.66 

6.69 

3.94 

0.93 

2030 
449.1 

9.15 

11.76 

6.45 

3.83 

0.96 

10.69 

10.79 

10.76 

5.81 

1.33 

5.53 

67.20 

83.14 

10.70 

5.88 

1.32 

5.54 

68.04 

83.48 

10.51 

5.96 

1.31 

5.52 

68.75 

83.45 

10.30 

2020-‘25 
0.9% 

2026-‘30 
1.1% 

0.9% 

0.8% 

0.7% 

0.2% 

0.7% 

1.6% 

2.0% 

2.2% 

0.6% 

0.7% 

0.8% 

0.7% 

1.2% 

0.8% 

1.3% 

0.6% 

1.7% 

2.0% 

1.7% 

2.6% 

1.2% 

1.0% 

0.7% 

0.6% 

103 EU Reference Scenario 2020 (europa.eu) 
104 Policy scenarios for delivering the European Green Deal (europa.eu) 
105 EUROPOP2019 population projections: Eurostat - Data Explorer (europa.eu)   
106 The 2021 Ageing Report : Underlying assumptions and projection methodologies The 2021 Ageing 
Report: Underlying Assumptions and Projection Methodologies | European Commission (europa.eu)   

67 

 
 
  
                                                           
Hungary 

Ireland 

Italy 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Luxembourg 

Malta 

Netherlands 

Poland 

Portugal 

Romania 

Slovakia 

Slovenia 

Spain 

Sweden 

Population 

GDP growth 

2020 
9.77 

4.97 

60.29 

1.91 

2.79 

0.63 

0.51 

17.40 

37.94 

10.29 

19.28 

5.46 

2.10 

47.32 

10.32 

2025 
9.70 

5.27 

60.09 

1.82 

2.71 

0.66 

0.56 

17.75 

37.57 

10.22 

18.51 

5.47 

2.11 

48.31 

10.75 

2030 
9.62 

5.50 

59.94 

1.71 

2.58 

0.69 

0.59 

17.97 

37.02 

10.09 

17.81 

5.44 

2.11 

48.75 

11.10 

2020-‘25 
1.8% 

2026-‘30 
2.6% 

2.0% 

0.3% 

1.4% 

1.7% 

1.7% 

2.7% 

0.7% 

2.1% 

0.8% 

2.7% 

1.1% 

2.1% 

0.9% 

1.4% 

1.7% 

0.3% 

1.9% 

1.5% 

2.0% 

4.1% 

0.7% 

2.4% 

0.8% 

3.0% 

1.7% 

2.4% 

1.6% 

2.2% 

Beyond  the  update  of  the  population  and  growth  assumptions,  an  update  of  the 
projections on the sectoral composition of GDP was also carried out using the GEM-E3 
computable general equilibrium model. These projections take into account the potential 
medium- to long-term impacts of the COVID-19 crisis on the structure of the economy, 
even  though  there  are  inherent  uncertainties  related  to  its  eventual  impacts.  Overall, 
conservative  assumptions  were  made  regarding  the  medium-term  impacts  of  the 
pandemic on the re-localisation of global value chains, teleworking and teleconferencing 
and global tourism. 

International energy prices assumptions  

Alongside  socio-economic  projections,  transport  modelling  requires  projections  of 
international fuel prices. The projections of the POLES-JRC model – elaborated by the 
Joint  Research  Centre  and  derived  from  the  Global  Energy  and  Climate  Outlook 
(GECO107) – are used to obtain long-term estimates of the international fuel prices. The 
table below shows the  oil prices  assumptions of  the baseline and policy  options  of this 
impact assessment.  

Table 17: Oil prices assumptions  

in $'15 per boe 
Oil 

2015 
52.3 

2020 
39.8 

2030 
80.1 

2040 
97.4 

in €'15 per boe 
Oil 
Source: Derived from JRC, POLES-JRC model, Global Energy and Climate Outlook (GECO) 

2020 
35.8 

2030 
72.2 

2040 
87.8 

2015 
47.2 

2050 
117.9 

2050 
106.3 

Technology assumptions 

Modelling  scenarios  is  highly  dependent  on  the  assumptions  on  the  development  of 
technologies  -  both  in  terms  of  performance  and  costs.  For  the  purpose  of  the  impact 

107 https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/geco  

68 

 
 
  
                                                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
assessments  related  to  the  “Climate  Target  Plan”  and  the  “Fit  for  55”  policy  package, 
these assumptions have been updated based on a rigorous literature review carried out by 
external consultants in collaboration with the JRC108. Continuing the approach adopted in 
the long-term strategy in 2018, the Commission consulted on the technology assumption 
with  stakeholders  in  2019.  In  particular,  the  technology  database  of  the  PRIMES  and 
PRIMES-TREMOVE models (together with GAINS, GLOBIOM, and CAPRI) benefited 
from a dedicated consultation workshop held on 11th November 2019. EU Member States 
representatives  also  had  the  opportunity  to  comment  on  the  costs  elements  during  a 
workshop  held  on  25th  November  2019.  The  updated  technology  assumptions  are 
published together with the EU Reference Scenario 2020109. The same assumptions have 
been used in the context of this impact assessment. 

Policies in the Baseline scenario  

Building  on  the  EU  Reference  scenario  2020,  the  baseline  scenario  for  this  impact 
assessment has been designed to include the initiatives of the ‘Fit for 55’ package110.  

The  baseline  scenario  assumes  no  further  EU  level  intervention  beyond  the  current  AI 
Directive  and  the  continuation  of  the  application  of  the  IMO  Casualty  Code  as  it  is. 
Smaller  fishing  vessels  would  continue  to  be  outside  the  scope  of  the  Directive  and 
therefore Member States would adopt different approaches to similar accidents. Member 
States with inadequate financial, technical or operational resources to be able to report on 
and investigate accidents in a timely and efficient manner would have to make choices as 
to what accident to investigate and how.  

As previously stated, the role of EMSA in the implementation of the Directive is central. 
EMSA operates the EMCIP database, provides training to investigators on the request of 
AIBs  and  assists  in  the  management  of  the  PCF.  The  Commission  has  launched  an 
impact  assessment  on  the  possible  review  of  EMSA  founding  Regulation.111  However, 
the outcome of this impact assessment cannot be prejudged and thus the baseline scenario 
does not account for changes in the EMSA founding Regulation. 

Baseline scenario results 

The  COVID-19  pandemic  had  a  major  impact  on  global  shipping,  affecting  all  its 
segments  from  passenger  ships  to  container  ships  and  oil  tankers.  In  the  baseline 
scenario,  international  maritime  freight  transport  activity  (intra  and  extra-EU)  is 
projected  to  be  21%  lower  in  2020  relative  to  2015.  From  2021  onwards  however  it  is 
projected to start recovering and grow strongly by 2025 and beyond (i.e. 19% growth for 
2015-2030 and 48% for 2015-2050), due to the rising demand for primary resources and 
container  shipping.  Relative  to  2019,  this  is  equivalent  to  8%  increase  in  transport 
activity by 2030 and 33% growth by 2050. 

108 JRC118275  
109 EU Reference Scenario 2020 (europa.eu) 
110 Delivering the European Green Deal | European Commission (europa.eu) 
111 Regulation (EC) No 1406/2002/EC, the inception impact assessment at  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13049-European-Maritime-Safety-
Agency-review-of-mandate_en 

69 

 
                                                           
The number of port calls for 2025-2050 is projected to grow at a lower rate than transport 
activity,  following  similar  evolution  over  the  historical  period112.  This  reflects  the  fact 
that  transport  activity  is  also  driven  by  other  factors  such  as  the  increase  in  the  size  of 
vessels  over  time,  and  of  the  distance  travelled.  In  the  baseline  scenario  the  number  of 
port  calls  is  projected  to  go  up  by  14%  by  2030  relative  to  2015  and  by  36%  by  2050 
(equivalent to 6% growth by 2030 relative to 2019 and 26% increase by 2050), following 
the recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. 

Driven by the increase in the transport activity and the number of vessels, the number of 
marine casualties is projected to increase over time in the baseline scenario. Considering 
only  the  scope  of  the  AI  Directive  (i.e.  excluding  fishing  vessels  below  15  meters)  the 
number  of  casualties  is  projected  to  increase  by  14%  by  2030  relative  to  2019  and  by 
45% by 2050 without further EU level action. At the same time, the degree of severity of 
marine casualties is projected to decrease, leading to a decrease in the number of vessels 
lost (by 5% for 2019-2030 and for 2019-2050) and a relative stabilisation of the number 
of fatalities by 2050 (11% decrease for 2019-2030 and 3% increase for 2019-2050).  

Table 18: Projected number of marine casualties, vessels lost, fatalities and injuries in the baseline 
scenario in EU27 

2019 (levels) 

Cumulative growth rates 

'19-'30 

'19-'40 

'19-'50 

9% 
-6% 
-7% 
0% 

6,303 
150 
226 
1,667 

Total including fishing vessels below 15 meters 
Marine casualties 
Vessels lost 
Fatalities 
Injuries 
Total excluding fishing vessels below 15 meters (current scope of the AI Directive) 
Marine casualties 
Vessels lost 
Fatalities 
Injuries 
Fatalities and injuries where "other persons are involved" 
Total including estimated non reported fatalities and injuries 
Fatalities 
Injuries 
Source: Ecorys (2022), Impact assessment support study 

2,502 
20 
66 
540 

14% 
-5% 
-11% 
10% 

0% 
2% 

12 
84 

16% 
-11% 
-9% 
-1% 

25% 
-10% 
-6% 
17% 

17% 
14% 

27% 
-14% 
-10% 
1% 

45% 
-5% 
3% 
34% 

25% 
23% 

Accounting also for the fishing vessels below 15 meters, which are currently outside the 
scope of AI Directive, the number of marine casualties is projected to increase by 9% by 
2030 relative to 2019 and by 27% by 2050 in the baseline scenario.  

The  projected  numbers  of  marine  casualties,  vessels  lost,  fatalities  and  injuries  in  the 
baseline scenario, by vessel type, are provided in Table 19. They are derived based on the 
projected growth in the number of vessels and the occurrence ratios. For all vessels types, 
except for fishing vessels, the occurrence ratios113 are assumed to remain constant over 
time at their 2019 levels, drawing on information for the historical period from EMCIP. 
This is also the case for the ratios between vessels lost, fatalities, injuries and the vessel 
fleet. 

112  The  same  ratio  between  the  growth  in  the  number  of  port  calls  and  the  transport  activity  as  for  the 
historical period (2014-2019) has been assumed for the projection period.  
113 Ratio between the number of marine casualties and the number of vessels.  

70 

 
 
                                                           
For fishing vessels the occurrence ratio is projected to slightly increase over time (from 
5.6% in  2019 to  6.2% in 2030 and 7.5% in  2050),  drawing on historical developments 
but assuming a slower pace than in the past. At the same time, the ratios between vessels 
lost, fatalities, injuries and the vessel fleet are assumed to remain constant over time, at 
their 2019 levels. This is acknowledging the past trends observed, showing that while the 
number of marine casualties involving fishing vessels is increasing over time the degree 
of  severity  of  the  casualties  has  been  slightly  decreasing114.  The  number  of  fishing 
vessels  is  projected  to  reduce  over  time  (by  6%  between  2019  and  2030  and  by  16% 
during 2019-2050), in  line with  historical  developments115  and also  taking into account 
the moderate increase in the number of catches projected in the future (0.4% per year)116. 
This is the reason why the number of vessels lost, fatalities and injuries involving fishing 
vessels is projected to decrease over time.  

Thus, the lower growth in the number of marine casualties for fishing vessels below 15 
meters (6% for 2019-2030 and 15% for 2019-2050) relative to other types of vessels is 
explained by the projected reduction in the number of fishing vessels by 2050, while the 
marine casualties’ rate  would still increase over time. The degree of severity of marine 
casualties  including  fishing  vessels  below  15  meters  is  projected  to  decrease  over  time 
but  210  fatalities  are  still  projected  in  2030  and  203  in  2050  in  the  baseline  scenario, 
while 141 vessels are projected to be lost in 2030 and 129 in 2050. By 2050, the number 
of  fatalities  involving  fishing  vessels  below  15  meters  would  be  135  out  of  total  203, 
representing 67% of the total number of fatalities while the vessels lost 85% of the total 
(110 lost fishing vessels below 15 meters out of 129 total). 

Table 19: Projected numbers of marine casualties, vessels lost, fatalities and injuries in the baseline 
scenario by vessel type (EU27) 

Cargo vessels 
Marine casualties 
Vessels lost 
Fatalities 
Injuries 
Fishing vessels above 15 meters 
Marine casualties 
Vessels lost 
Fatalities 
Injuries 
Fishing vessels below 15 meters 
Marine casualties 
Vessels lost 
Fatalities 
Injuries 
Passenger vessels 
Marine casualties 
Vessels lost 

2019 

2030 

2040 

2050 

Levels 

1,233 
1 
24 
204 

381 
13 
16 
113 

3,801 
130 
160 
1,127 

616 
1 

1,452 
1 
28 
240 

386 
12 
14 
102 

4,011 
122 
151 
1,064 

733 
1 

1,623 
1 
32 
268 

388 
11 
13 
93 

4,204 
116 
143 
1,009 

821 
1 

1,969 
2 
38 
326 

386 
10 
12 
85 

4,366 
110 
135 
957 

994 
2 

114  For  fishing  vessels  below  15  meters,  the  same  occurrence  rate  as  well  as  ratios  between  vessels  lost, 
fatalities, injuries and the  vessel fleet have  been assumed  as for  fishing  vessels above 15  meters. This is 
due to the lack of information in EMCIP, where only some Member States report the number of casualties, 
vessels lost, fatalities and injuries, on voluntary basis.    
115 European Commission (2020). Fishing fleet. Derived from: https://ec.europa.eu/oceans-and-
fisheries/facts-and-figures/facts-and-figures-common-fisheries-policy/fishing-fleet_en 
116 OECD/FAO (2020), OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2020-2029 

71 

 
 
                                                           
Levels 

2019 
3 
145 

2030 
4 
173 

201 
2 
6 
41 

193 
2 
16 
39 

Fatalities 
Injuries 
Service vessels 
Marine casualties 
Vessels lost 
Fatalities 
Injuries 
Other vessels 
Marine casualties 
Vessels lost 
Fatalities 
Injuries 
Total including fishing vessels below 15 meters 
Marine casualties 
Vessels lost 
Fatalities 
Injuries 
Total excluding fishing vessels below 15 meters (current scope of the AI Directive) 
Marine casualties 
Vessels lost 
Fatalities 
Injuries 
Source: Ecorys (2022), Impact assessment support study 

6,862 
141 
210 
1,659 

6,303 
150 
226 
1,667 

2,851 
19 
59 
595 

2,502 
20 
66 
540 

79 
3 
7 
39 

79 
3 
7 
39 

2040 
4 
193 

204 
2 
6 
41 

79 
3 
7 
39 

7,319 
134 
205 
1,643 

3,115 
18 
62 
634 

2050 
5 
234 

206 
2 
6 
42 

79 
3 
7 
39 

8,000 
129 
203 
1,683 

3,634 
19 
68 
726 

In  addition,  18  Member  States117  currently  report  in  EMCIP  casualties  where  "other 
persons  are  involved".  This  is  particularly  relevant  with  regard  to  accidents  on  board 
ships  in  ports  involving  stevedores/dock  workers.  As  explained  in  section  2.2  there  is 
significant divergence of approach as regards what constitutes the “operations of a ship” 
and  these  differences  in  approach  can  have  a  considerable  operational  impact, 
particularly as regards what could be a joint investigation and as regards the gathering of 
meaningful  accident  and  incident  data.  The  matter  has  been  extensively  discussed 
between Member States AI Bodies in the context of PCF and there is agreement that the 
issue of what constitutes the operations of a ship particularly when that ship is in a port 
needs to be clarified. 

During  2014-2019,  a  total  number  of  87  casualties  where  "other  persons  are  involved" 
has been reported in EMCIP. For 2019, 11 casualties have been reported at EU27 level. 
Considering  the  significant  divergence  of  approach  as  regards  what  constitutes  the 
“operations of a ship” and the ratio between the number of casualties and the number of 
port calls118 between Member States (ranging between 175 casualties per million of port 
calls for 2014-2019 in Slovenia and 132 in Portugal to 3 in the Netherlands and Spain), it 
is likely that the reporting in EMCIP under the AI Directive underestimates the number 
of  casualties.  It  is  possible  that  these  casualties  are  reported  to  other  authorities  in  the 
Member States that show lower ratios, but no information is available in relation to this 
and the investigations conducted. Assuming that the average ratio of the top 4 Member 
States (Slovenia, Portugal, Bulgaria and Malta) that report already in EMCIP applies to 

117 These Member States are: BG, DK, EE, FI, FR, DE, EL, IE, IT, LV, LT, MT, NL, PL, PT, SI, ES, SE.  
118  The  number  of  port  calls  is  considered  to  be  more  relevant  for  casualties  where  "other  persons  are 
involved",  which  is  particularly  relevant  with  regard  to  accidents  on  board  ships  in  ports  involving 
stevedores/dock workers. 

72 

 
 
                                                           
the other Member States, 87 casualties where "other persons are involved" are estimated 
at EU level for 2019 (compared to a total of 11 casualties reported in EMCIP).  

Table  20:  Projected  numbers  of  casualties  where  "other  persons  are  involved"  in  the  baseline 
scenario (EU27) 

BG 
DK 
EE 
FI 
FR 
DE 
EL 
IE 
IT 
LV 
LT 
MT 
NL 
PL 
PT 
SI 
ES 
SE 
BE 
CY 
HR 
RO 
Estimated total 
Source: Ecorys (2022), Impact assessment support study 

2019 
0 
3 
1 
4 
7 
7 
11 
2 
9 
1 
1 
1 
6 
2 
2 
0 
19 
6 
3 
0 
1 
1 
87 

2030 
0 
3 
1 
5 
6 
6 
12 
2 
12 
1 
1 
2 
6 
3 
2 
0 
17 
5 
3 
0 
1 
1 
89 

2040 
1 
3 
2 
5 
6 
7 
13 
2 
13 
1 
1 
2 
6 
4 
2 
1 
19 
5 
4 
0 
1 
1 
99 

2050 
1 
4 
2 
5 
6 
8 
14 
2 
14 
1 
1 
2 
7 
4 
2 
1 
20 
6 
4 
1 
1 
1 
107 

In  addition,  the  estimated  number  of  fatalities  and  injuries  where  "other  persons  are 
involved" (Table 20) is projected to remain stable up to 2030 relative to 2019 at EU level 
but  increase by 25% and 23%, respectively, up to 2050 (15 fatalities and 103 injuries). 
As explained, this is particularly relevant with regard to accidents on board ships in ports 
involving stevedores/dock workers.  

The projected developments in the number of fatalities in the baseline, presented above, 
are still far from the goal of the Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy of close to zero 
death toll for all modes of transport in the EU. 

The tonnes of bunker fuel lost at sea due to very serious marine casualties involving all 
vessels, excluding fishing vessels below 15 meters, are estimated to go up from around 
650 tonnes in 2019 to 740 tonnes in 2030 and 890 tonnes in 2050. When also considering 
fishing vessels below 15 meters the bunker fuels lost at sea are estimated to increase from 
1,178 tonnes in 2019 to 1,301 tonnes in 2030 and 1,497 tonnes in 2050119.  

119 An average level of 30 tonnes of bunker fuels lost per vessel (excluding fishing vessels) has been used 
for  the  estimations  in  the  context  of  the  impact  assessment  support  study.  For  fishing  vessels  above  15 
meters an average level of 22 tonnes of bunker fuels lost per vessel has been assumed, based on data from 
EMSA. Finally, for fishing vessels below 15 meters 21% of the bunker fuels lost per fishing vessels above 
15 meters has been assumed (i.e. 6.6 tonnes), drawing on information  from the  Scientific, Technical and 
Economic  Committee  for  Fisheries  (STECF),  database  of  the  2021  Annual  Economic  Report  on  the  EU 
Fishing Fleet, available at https://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/reports/economic. 

73 

 
 
                                                           
Driven by the projected number of marine casualties, the number of safety investigations 
in the scope of the AI Directive is projected to increase from 95 in 2019 to 111 in 2030 
and 138 in  2050 in  the  baseline scenario. The baseline projections also  account  for the 
impact of Brexit120, which is likely to be felt more significantly by some Member States 
(e.g.  Ireland,  France,  Belgium,  Cyprus  or  the  Netherlands)  due  to  their  links,  either 
geographical or commercial, with the UK. The impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine 
on maritime traffic, on maritime trade flows or safety and thereby indirectly on maritime 
accident investigation has not as yet been possible to quantify.  

Table 21: Projected number of safety investigations finalised in the baseline scenario (EU27)  

Levels 
2030 

2019 

2050 
Number of investigations excluding fishing vessels below 15 meters but including investigations where "other 
persons are involved"  
Very serious 
Serious 
Less serious  
Marine incident 
Total 
Of which, number of investigations where "other persons are involved"  
Very serious 
2 
Serious 
0 
2 
Total 
Range for the number of safety investigations for very serious casualties finalised for fishing vessels below 15 
meters (outside the scope of AI Directive) 
Low 
High 
 Source: Ecorys (2022), Impact assessment support study 

54 
48 
9 
0 
111 

63 
63 
12 
0 
138 

46 
42 
7 
0 
95 

53 
156 

58 
171 

63 
186 

1 
0 
1 

0 
0 
0 

As  explained,  safety  investigations  for  fishing  vessels  below  15  meters  are  not  in  the 
scope  of  the  AI  Directive  and  Member  States  that  perform  them  do  so  in  line  with 
national  legislation.  Based  on  data  reported  for  2014-2020  in  EMCIP  and  stakeholders 
consultation,  11  Member  States  are  currently  conducting  safety  investigations  for  very 
serious casualties involving fishing vessels below 15 meters, but they are not necessarily 
conducted by the AIBs or in accordance with the EU Common Methodology or the IMO 
Casualty  Code.  These  11  Member  States  represented  around  61%  of  fishing  vessels 
below 15 meters in 2019 (41,579 of the total 68,272 fishing vessels below 15 meters)121. 

However, there is high uncertainty regarding the total number of very serious casualties 
investigated for fishing vessels below 15 meters because there is no obligation to report 
them122.  Therefore,  projections  are  presented  in  a  range.  Assuming  the  same  ratio  of 
investigations to very serious occurrences as for larger fishing vessels provides the upper 
bound  of  the  range  (high  number  of  investigations)  and  the  ratio  of  investigation  as 
reported  by  France  in  EMCIP  would  provide  the  lower  bound  (low  number  of 

120  From  the  entry  into  force  of  the  AI  Directive  till  the  end  of  2020,  the  UK  has  conducted  187  safety 
investigations out of 1,482 investigations in total. Amongst them, 53 included an EU interest. As a result of 
Brexit, and assuming no agreement with the UK AIB, these would now have to be done by EU AIBs. On 
this basis, the number of investigations for all EU AIBs is estimated to increase by 3.5% each year relative 
to developments excluding Brexit. 
121 DE, DK, ES, FR, EL, HR, LT, MT, PL, PT, SE. 
122  The  reporting  in  EMCIP  is  done  on  voluntary  basis.  Only  7  finalised  investigations  for  very  serious 
casualties  have  been  reported  in  EMCIP  for  2019  by  Denmark,  France,  Malta,  Poland  and  Portugal  and 
even for these Member States it is not clear if all the investigations have been reported. 

74 

 
 
                                                           
investigations)123.  France  was  chosen  for  determining  the  lower  bound  because  of  the 
more  complete  time  series  reported  in  EMCIP.  On  these  grounds,  in  the  baseline 
scenario, the number of safety investigations for very serious casualties involving fishing 
vessels  below  15  meters  is  projected  to  go  up  from  a  range  between  53  and  156 
investigations in 2019 to 58 to 171 investigations in 2030 and 63 to 186 investigations in 
2050. These projections also take into account the effect of Brexit.  

Given  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  a  standard  investigation,  the  estimated  costs  per 
investigation  differ  substantially  per  AIB.  Furthermore,  a  non-negligible  share  of  the 
work of AIBs is spent on administrative activities. One AIB has indicated that it spends 
approximately  30%  of  its  time  and  resources  on  administrative  tasks.  AIBs  may  also 
perform other activities (based on national law), that go beyond the requirements of the 
AI Directive. In order to separate the costs for AIBs investigations conducted according 
to  AI  Directive  from  other  activities  (based  on  national  law),  the  time  spent  per 
investigation  has  been  used  for  projecting  the  AIBs  costs  in  the  baseline  scenario. 
Drawing on stakeholders’ consultations, a range between 250 and 1,500 hours has been 
considered  for  an  investigation124.  The  costs  for  all  EU  AIBs  for  conducting 
investigations (including administrative tasks) are thus projected to increase from a range 
between EUR 1.0 and 6.2 million in 2019 to EUR 1.2 to 7.2 million in 2030 and EUR 1.5 
to 8.9 million in 2050 (Table 22). 

Table 22: Projected costs for AIBs excluding fishing vessels below 15 meters in the baseline scenario 
(EU27) 
Costs for AIBs excluding fishing vessels below 15 meters in the baseline 
scenario (in million EUR) 

2019 

2030 

2050 

Costs of investigations  
Total costs, including administrative tasks  
Source: Ecorys (2022), Impact assessment support study 

0.7 - 4.3 
1.0 - 6.2 

0.8 - 5.0 
1.2 - 7.2 

1.0 - 6.3 
1.5 - 8.9 

The investigations of very serious casualties involving fishing vessels below 15 meters, 
performed by EU AIBs in line with the requirements of national law may add between 
EUR 0.6 to 10.1 million in 2019, to EUR 0.6 and 11.1 million in 2030 and to EUR 0.7 to 
12.1 million in 2050. 

3.  Other assumptions used for quantifying the impacts of the policy options 

Impacts on the number of investigations 

As  explained  in  section  6.1.1,  the  inclusion  of  the  very  serious  casualties  involving  a 
fishing  vessel  below  15  meters  in  PO  C  is  projected  to  result  in  37  to  110  additional 
investigations relative to the baseline in 2030 and 40 to 119 additional investigations in 
2050 at EU level.  

It should be noted that for fishing vessels below 15 meters, as explained in section 5.1, 
the investigations in the baseline scenario are conducted in line with the requirements of 
national  legislation  in  11  Member  States.  These  11  Member  States  represented  around 

123  As  explained  in  Section  2.2,  many  AIBs  report  significant  challenges  for  investigating  accidents 
involving small fishing vessels (e.g. lack of witnesses for one-man vessels), this is why it was assumed that 
ratio  of  investigations  to  occurrence  should  be  at  most  equal  to  the  one  for  larger  fishing  vessels.  For 
further details, see also Annex 4. 
124 The tariffs per hour draw on Eurostat Structure of earnings survey, Labour Force Survey data for Non-
Wage Labour Costs. 

75 

 
                                                           
61%  of  fishing  vessels  below  15  meters  in  2019  (41,579  of  the  total  68,272  fishing 
vessels below 15 meters)125. 

To calculate the additional number of investigations in PO C, first the number of marine 
casualties that are currently not subject to investigations has been derived, drawing on the 
share  of  fishing  vessels  below  15  meters  in  the  Member  States  that  do  not  conduct 
investigations  based  on  requirements  of  national  legislation  (i.e.  39%).  In  the  second 
step,  the  share  of  very  serious  casualties  in  the  total  number  of  marine  casualties 
involving  a  fishing  vessel  below  15  meters  in  the  Member  States  that  currently  report 
such data has been used to estimate the very serious casualties involving a fishing vessel 
below 15 meters that are not reported. In the third step, to account for the high degree of 
uncertainty  regarding  the  number  of  very  serious  casualties  not  investigated  for  fishing 
vessels  below  15  meters  the  same  assumptions  as  in  the  baseline  scenario  have  been 
used. Assuming the same ratio of investigations to very serious marine casualties as for 
larger  fishing  vessels  provides  the  upper  bound  of  the  range  for  the  non  investigated 
VSMCs  (high  number  of  investigations)  and  the  ratio  of  investigation  as  reported  by 
France in EMCIP would provide the lower bound (low number of investigations)126. As 
previously explained, France was chosen for determining the lower bound because of the 
more  complete  time  series  reported  in  EMCIP.  Finally,  the  additional  number  of 
investigations relative to the baseline is derived.  

The  clarification  of  the  length  of  fishing  vessels  definition,  defined  as  Length  overall 
(LOA)  in  all  three  policy  options,  is  projected  to  result  in  a  limited  increase  in  the 
number  of  investigations  that  are  currently  under  the  scope  of  the  AI  Directive  (6 
additional investigations in all three options relative to the baseline in 2030 and 2050).  

For  estimating  these  additional  number  of  investigations,  the  Fishing  Fleet  Register127 
has been used to compare the number of fishing vessels that would fall into the scope of 
the  Directive  when  the  ‘length  between  perpendiculars’  (LBP)  would  be  used  as 
indicator.  The  LBP  of  fishing  vessels  is  not  always  registered128.  By  only  considering 
vessels for which both the LBP and LOA are registered, it is found that there are 4,321 
fishing vessels with both the LOA and the LBP being larger than 15 meters. At the same 
time, there are 1,141 vessels for which the LOA is larger than 15 meters, but the LBP is 
smaller than 15 meters. Hence, by requiring the length of fishing vessels to be measured 
as LOA, the number of vessels included under the scope of the Directive would increase 
by  26%.  Assuming  the  same  occurrence  ratio  and  the  same  ratio  of  investigations  to 
marine  casualties  as  in  the  baseline  scenario,  6  additional  investigations  are  estimated 
relative to the baseline in all three policy options.  

As regards the definition of “directly in connection with the operations of a ship” and 
how this is interpreted having regard to port workers, the impact of a clearer definition 
explicitly  extending  the  scope  of  the  Directive  to  situations  where  there  are  casualties 
involving port workers which take place on board a ship in a port is expected to give rise 

125 DE, DK, ES, FR, EL, HR, LT, MT, PL, PT, SE. 
126  As  explained  in  Section  2.2,  many  AIBs  report  significant  challenges  for  investigating  accidents 
involving small fishing vessels (e.g. lack of witnesses for one-man vessels), this is why it was assumed that 
ratio of investigations to occurrence should be at most equal to the one for larger fishing vessels.  
127 Fleet Register European Commission, consulted March 2022. Filters: “Present in the fleet on 
31/12/2019” 
128 For 1,444 vessels with a LOA smaller than 15 meter, the LBP is not registered. 

76 

 
                                                           
to a limited number of additional investigations per year in PO B and PO C (8 additional 
investigations  relative  to  the  baseline  in  2030  and  9  in  2050).  The  impact  would  be 
smaller  in  PO  A  whereas  only  interpretative  guidelines  are  foreseen  (4  additional 
investigations relative to the baseline in 2030 and 5 in 2050).  

The  approach  of  estimating  the  total  number  of  casualties  where  "other  persons  are 
involved"  (including  those  not  reported  or  possibly  reported  to  other  authorities  in  the 
Member States) in the baseline scenario is explained in section 2 of Annex 4 (Table 20). 
The split of the number of casualties by severity type is performed based on the average 
shares by severity type for 2014-2019 from EMCIP. In the next step the average ratio of 
investigations to very serious and serious casualties for 2014-2019 from EMCIP is used 
to derive the total number of investigations where "other persons are involved". Finally, 
the additional number of investigations is derived in relation to the baseline projections.   

Overall, PO A would lead to 10 additional investigations at EU level in 2030 and 11 in 
2050  relative  to  the  baseline.  PO  B  is  projected  to  result  in  slightly  higher  number  of 
additional  investigations  than  PO  A  (14  in  2030  and  15  in  2050),  while  PO  C  would 
result  in  51  to  124  additional  investigations  in  2030  and  55  to  134  additional 
investigations  in  2050.  As  explained  in  section  6.1.1,  the  number  of  additional 
investigations may be slightly higher, in particular in PO B and PO C, which additionally 
establish  a  time  limit  for  fatal  accidents.  However,  due  to  the  lack  of  data  is  was  not 
possible to quantify this.  

Detailed costs for EMSA for providing analytical tools and equipment during an 
individual investigation (hardware) 

The  analytical  tools  and  equipment  to  be  provided  by  EMSA  during  an  individual 
investigation (hardware) can take various forms like for example:  

  On scene tools such as ROV (remotely operator submersible), RPAS (aerial drones), 

Robots (e.g. small ones to access damaged areas, enclosed spaces, etc.);  

  Specialised tools such as: VDR (Voyage Data Recorders) facilities, software such as 
MADAS  (Marine  Accident  Data  Analysis  Suite)129;  ad-hoc  resources  (scientific 
laboratories, tank testing); ad-hoc services (3D simulation for fire, loss of containers, 
etc.). 

The  additional  costs  estimates  per  year  from  2025  onwards  for  analytical  tools  and 
equipment to be provided by EMSA in PO A and PO C are estimated at EUR 1.1 million 
per  year  relative  to  the  baseline  for  all  years  (EUR  0.9  million  for  on  scene  tools  and 
EUR  0.2  million  for  specialised  tools).  The  breakdown  of  the  costs  is  provided  in  the 
table below.   

Table  23:  Additional  cost  estimates  per  year  for  analytical  tools  and  equipment  to  be  provided  by 
EMSA in PO A and PO C relative to the baseline (in EUR) 

On scene tools 

Remotely operated submersible (ROV) 
Cost per 'normal' operation in EUR 

Estimated cost and operations 
per year 

25,000 

129 https://www.avenca.co.uk/marine-data-analysis/systems-software/madas/ (for example) 

77 

 
  
  
  
                                                           
Number of 'normal' operations per year 
Standby-by fees in EUR 
Total cost per year for 'normal' operations in EUR 
Cost per operation outside “coastal waters” 
Number of operations outside “coastal waters” per year 
Standby-by fees in EUR 
Total cost per year for operations outside “coastal waters” in EUR 
Total costs for ROV in EUR 

Remotely piloted aircraft - aerial drone (RPA) 

Cost per operation in EUR 
Number of operations per year 
Total costs for RPA in EUR 

Specialised tools (laboratories, testing, simulations) 

Average cost per operation in EUR 

laboratories 
simulations 
tank testing 

Number of operations per year 
Total costs for specialised tools in EUR 

Total costs for on scene and specialised tools (in EUR) 
Source: EMSA 

Estimated cost and operations 
per year 

12 
50,000 
350,000 
150,000 
3 
50,000 
500,000 
850,000 

3,000 
12 
36,000 

20,000 
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
12 
240,000 
1,126,000 

Benefits in terms of avoided number of fatalities, injuries, vessels lost and tonnes of 
bunker fuel lost at sea 

To  estimate  the  benefits,  a  relationship  between  the  number  of  finalised  investigations 
and safety indicators has been estimated in the context of the impact assessment support 
study,  by  establishing  an  autoregressive  log-log  model.  The  effect  of  a  safety 
investigation  conducted  in  year  0  is  estimated  on  the  safety  level  2  years  later,  as  one 
might expect some delay between an accident occurring, the investigation being carried 
out and the safety recommendations being implemented. The hypothesis is thus that the 
safety  impacts  take  two  years  to  materialize;  many  investigation  reports  are  only 
published one year after the accident having occurred. 

A relationship between the (natural logarithm) of safety investigations conducted in the 
period 2012-2017 on the number of marine casualties in the period 2014-2019 has been 
estimated. It indicates that the negative effect of the number of safety investigations on 
the  number  of  marine  casualties  two  years  later  is  statistically  different  from  0. 
Furthermore, the error term, indicated by the R2 (at 0.74) is  fairly low, which suggests 
that  much  of  the  changes  in  year  t+2  can  be  explained  by  changes  in  year  t.  The 
regression  analysis  is  to  be  interpreted  as  “a  1%  increase  in  investigations  in  year  t 
reduces  the  number  of  marine  casualties  in  year  2  by  0.102%”.  However,  to  provide  a 
conservative estimate on the safety impacts, accounting for the high level of uncertainty, 
this elasticity is not used directly. Instead, a confidence interval is derived, indicating a 
95%  level  of  significance.  The  95%  confidence  is  calculated  as:  -0.102130  +  2.571131 × 
0.030132. The confidence interval is calculated at -0.0239, which is used in the analysis. 
Thus,  in  the  analysis  “a  1%  increase  in  investigations  in  year  t  reduces  the  number  of 
marine casualties in year 2 by 0.0239%”.  

130 Estimated coefficient. 
131 Which corresponds to the t-value for a significance level of 95%, using 5 degrees of freedom. 
132 The standard error.  

78 

 
  
  
  
                                                           
The reduction in the number of casualties is subsequently translated into a reduction in 
the  number  of  fatalities,  injuries,  vessels  lost  and  tonnes  of  bunker  fuel  lost  at  sea  by 
using  the  ratios  between  the  number  of  fatalities,  injuries,  vessels  lost  and  tonnes  of 
bunker  fuel  lost  at  sea  and  the  number  of  marine  casualties  projected  in  the  baseline 
scenario.  

79 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 5: EU/EEA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BODIES FALLING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF DIRECTIVE 2009/18/EC  
BY TYPE AND YEAR OF ESTABLISHMENT 

80 

 
 
 
ANNEX 6: IMO SUPERSEDED OR OUT OF DATE REFERENCES  

Original instrument 
IMO code of International Standards and 
Recommended Practices for a Safety 
Investigation into a Marine Casualty or Marine 
Incident (Casualty Investigation Code) 
(Resolution A.849(20) of 27 November 1997 
incorporated in Resolution MSC 255(84) of the 
IMO Maritime Safety Committee of 16 May 
2008) 
Circular MSC-MEPCS.3/Circ.3 

IMO resolution MSC A.861(20) of the IMO 

Assembly of 27 November 1997 shipborne 
voyage data recorders (VDRs). 

Resolution MSC.163(78) of the IMO Maritime 
Safety Committee on performance standards 
for VDRs 

Recital 7 of the Directive refers to Code for the 
Implementation of Mandatory IMO Instruments 
annexed to Resolution A.996(25) of the IMO 
Assembly of 29 November 2007” recalling the 
obligation of flag States to ensure that marine 
safety investigations are conducted by suitably 
qualified investigators 

Reference in AI Directive and date of change 
Article 3(1) of the Directive 
Revoked in December 2013 

Replacement/amendment 
Guidelines to Assist Investigators in the 
Implementation of the Casualty Investigation 
Code (Resolution A.1075(28)) 

Article 3(3) of the Directive 
Amended in November 2014, however, not yet 
implemented 
Article 3(6) of the Directive  

MSC-MEPC.3/Circ.4/Rev.1 

Resolution MSC 214(81) (as adopted 12 May 

2006),  

Revised in May 2006 and again revised in May 
2012 

Revised through Resolution MSC (333 (90) as 

adopted on 22 May 2012.) 

Recital 7 of the Directive 
Revoked in November 2011 

Resolution A.1054(27)  

81 

 
 
 
 
Original instrument 
Resolution A.1054(27) 

Reference in AI Directive and date of change 
Recital 7 of the Directive 
Revoked in December 2013 

Replacement/amendment 
Resolution A.1070(28) 

82 

 
 
ANNEX 7: DISCARDED PROBLEM DRIVERS AND POLICY MEASURES  

A number of possible problem drivers and policy measures were considered during the impact assessment process but were discarded either because the 
identified  problem  driver  was  not  validated  by  the  stakeholders  consulted,  because  the  problem  was  not  susceptible  to  a  solution  by  means  of  EU 
legislation or because proposing an action to address the issue at EU level will not yield additional results.  

Discarded problem drivers 

The Member State acting as Substantially Interested State (SIS): the Directive obliges Member States to investigate VSMCs, including on a Member 
State  which  is  neither  the  flag  State  nor  the  coastal  State  but  whose  substantial  involvement  has  been  established  in  the  casualty.  The  purpose  of  the 
obligation is to guarantee that the investigation is conducted also when the coastal State and the flag State refuse to do so.  

During  2014-2020,  20,899  ships  flagged  under  an  EU/EEA  Member  State  have  been  involved  in  a  marine  casualty  or  incident.  Considering  the  total 
number of marine casualties and incidents, a State different from the flag or the coastal State was involved in 23.3% of marine casualties and incidents 
during the same period. 28 EU/EEA Member States were involved as SIS 2,596 times, while the Czech Republic and Slovakia were not involved at all133.  

During the interviews with AIBs, it was observed that there is no problem with the comprehension and application of the aforementioned obligation. The 
provision  is  regarded  as  suitably  open  and  clear  both  in  IMO  and  EU  law,  adequately  providing  the  standards  for  the  launch  of  a  procedure  of 
investigations in collaboration with third countries.  

Definition of pleasure yachts and pleasure craft. The Directive refers to “pleasure yachts and pleasure craft not engaged in trade, unless they are or will 
be crewed  and carrying  more than 12 passengers for commercial purposes.” However, the Directive does not  define either "pleasure  yacht" "pleasure 
craft"  “commercial  purposes”  or  “engaged  in  trade”.  Furthermore,  the  exception  "unless  they  are  or  will  be  crewed  and  carrying  more  than  12 
passengers” is not defined. While there is some uncertainty, there is no agreement among the AIBs as to whether this is a problem, if it is what the size of 
the problem is and whether it is a problem which is susceptible to solution at EU level.  

133 European Maritime Safety Agency (2021), Annual overview of marine casualties and incidents 2021. 

83 

 
 
                                                           
The COVID-19 pandemic impacted the work of investigators for a significant time and the question arose whether the procedures under the AI Directive 
offer sufficient flexibility for the AIBs to conduct their work in drastically changed circumstances. However, following discussions with the AIBs, it was 
concluded that nothing in the Directive contributed to the difficulties and that neither the COVID-19 pandemic nor emergencies in general could be 
considered as a sufficient problem or a driver to impede the correct functioning of the Directive. 

Discarded policy measures 

During the Impact Assessment process, a number of possible policy measures have been discussed with the key stakeholders and finally discarded, as 
explained below. 

Policy measure 

Formulate a definition of “serious casualty“ 
in  the  Directive  and  thereby  continue  to 
oblige  AIBs 
to  conduct  a  preliminary 
assessment to determine if the investigation 
can lead to safety recommendations. 

Relevant 
Driver 
PD2 

Short description 

Reason for discarding 

As the term ‘serious casualty’ no longer exists in 
the  IMO  Casualty  Code,  the  obligation  to 
perform  an  assessment  has  no  legal  basis  in 
international law. The aim of this policy measure 
would  be  to  assess  whether  an  investigation 
could lead to safety requirements.  

The  AIBs  consulted  during  the  IA  stated  that  that  for  each  accident 
occurring  AIBs  already  perform  a  preliminary  assessment.  Such  an 
assessment  is  needed  in  order  to  assess  the  extent  of  the  accident 
investigation.  
Introducing  an  explicit  obligation  to  do  so  will  not  yield  any 
additional results.  

In  relation  to  pleasure  yachts  and  pleasure 
craft, the phrases ‘for commercial purposes’ 
and  ‘will  be  crewed  and  carrying’  will  be 
interpretive  guidelines  or 
clarified 
explicitly defined in the Directive 

in 

PD2 

During the IA process, a certain ambiguity and a 
risk  of  non-harmonised  approach  as  to  whether 
accidents involving  this ship  type are or have  to 
be investigated was perceived. 

Ten of the AIBs who participated in the stakeholder consultation find 
the definitions  clear and unproblematic,  while six  other  AIBs are of 
the view that this should be better elaborated. The European Boating 
Association  further  explained  that  accidents  involving  fatalities  are 
investigated by AIBs if lessons can be drawn, and they do not see the 
need of additional clarifications. 

84 

 
 
Policy measure 

Provide  either  in  interpretative  Guidelines 
or  in  detailed  provisions  in  the  Directive 
how  the  Member  State  should  act  as    a 
Substantially Interested State 

Relevant 
Driver 
PD2 

Provide the possibility to produce a concise 
report for all accidents that are less complex 

PD2 

Short description 

Reason for discarding 

as 

the  Member 

In  cases  where  the  Member  State  is  neither  the 
flag  State  or  the  coastal  State  it  can  have 
problems  when  it  is  obliged  to  investigate  as  a 
Substantially  Interested  State.  This  can  be 
problematic 
lacks 
jurisdiction but also when the member State AIB 
becomes aware of the accident long after it took 
place.   
In  this  policy  measure,  the  simplified  report  is 
replaced  by  a  concise  report.  The  phrase  ‘less 
complex’ will be clearly defined in the Directive.  
Concise  reports  shall  be  produced  irrespective 
whether a safety recommendation can be issued.  

state 

The  AIBs  consulted  during  the  IA  state  that  they  do  not  have 
particular  problems  with  this  obligation,  cooperation  between  EU 
Member States is excellent and any changes to the Directive will not 
address problems with third countries. Any changes to the Directive 
or  interpretative  guidelines  in  this  regard  are  unlikely  to  yield  any 
additional results. 

Defining whether an investigation is less complex is difficult. Neither 
international  nor  EU  law  define  this  concept.  It  seems  extremely 
challenging to define less complex. In addition, it is also questionable 
whether an attempt to define less complex will ease the investigation 
procedures.   

Ensure  that  EMSA  provide  open  access  to 
its  data  in  order  to  increase  the  knowledge 
base of the AIB staff 

Further  ensure  confidentiality  of  witness 
statements  and  the  status  of  the  safety 
investigation  as 
regards  other  public 
bodies/judicial authorities in the Directive 

PD4 

PD4 

EMCIP information based on open data is shared 
in  order  to  disseminate  findings  on  safety 
recommendations  to  a  larger  extent  than  is 
currently the case. 

AIBs  believe  that  other  proposed  measures  already  sufficiently 
ensured  increasing  the  knowledge  base  of  AIB  staff.  This  measure 
has no added value.  

The  goal  of  this  policy  measure  is  to  further 
strengthen  the  independence  of  the  investigation 
authorities  and  to  better  define  the  role  and 
responsibilities  of  AIBs  particularly  as  regards 
their  relations  with  judicial  and  prosecutorial 
authorities.  

Safeguards  to  ensure  the  confidentiality  of  witness  statements  in 
national court cases need to be provided for in national law. The role 
and  responsibilities  of  the  AIBs  as  regards  the  status  of  safety 
investigations  are  already  defined  it  the  Directive  which  must  be 
implemented  having  regards  to  the  internal  legal  order  in  each 
Member State. No benefit of an additional EU measure in this regard 
were identified. 

85 

 
Policy measure 

To support AIBs in meeting their objectives 
EC  could  stimulate  the  use  of  peer  reviews 
on accident reports, in order to improve the 
quality  of  the  written  reports  and  PCF 
members could provide technical support to 
one another 

Relevant 
Driver 
PD4 

Short description 

Reason for discarding 

In  order  to  improve  the  quality  and  therefore 
usability of the reports, a quality review could be 
introduced. The review could be done via a peer 
review  system  (similar  to  aviation)  where  AIBs 
review each other’s reports. In addition, the PCF 
could  organise  that  staff  is  exchanged  between 
AIBS if needed and possible. 

AIBs  believed  that  introducing  the  QMS  itself  will  be  sufficient  to 
improve the quality of the accident investigation reports. In addition, 
EMSA  could  provide  a  quality  assurance  role.  The  added  value  of 
introducing  peer  reviews  seems  limited  and  it  would  increase  the 
workload of AIBs without yielding clear benefits.   

PCF  to  be  given  an  advisory  role  to  the 
EC/EMSA with regard to the AID 

PD4 

The  Directive 
to  provide 
additional flexibility for AIBs in emergency 
situations such as the COVID-19 pandemic 

is  amended 

PD4 

Safety 

If  the  PCF  has  an  advisory  role  towards  the 
EC/EMSA,  like  the  European  Network  of  Civil 
Aviation 
Investigation  Authorities 
(ENCASIA)  also  has  towards  EC  and  European 
Union  Aviation  Safety  Agency  (EASA),  it  is 
the  PCF. 
that 
expected 
Leading 
and 
to 
participation.  
AIBs  found 
their 
investigative  functions  during  the  COVID-19 
pandemic,  in  particular  they  found  travelling  to 
the  site  of  accidents  difficult  because  of  travel 
restrictions 

this  will  empower 
improved 

to  carry  out 

cooperation 

it  difficult 

Political support for this measure seems to be missing, especially as 
the  distinction  between  the  Member  States  and  their  AI  Bodies  will 
become  less  clear  once  this  measure  is  introduced.  Instead  of  being 
fully independent the AIBs will move more to policy making, which 
is not their role.  

AIBs  stated  that  there  was  nothing  intrinsically  within  the  Directive 
that  could  be  addressed  by  amending  the  directive  to  address  this 
issue.  

86 

 
 
ANNEX 8: RETAINED POLICY MEASURES  

Policy measure 
PM 1a – MSs will be encouraged to report all 
very serious marine casualties (crew fatalities or 
loss of vessel) involving fishing vessels of less 
than 15 metres in EMCIP 
PM 1b – MSs will be obliged to report all very 
serious marine casualties (crew fatalities or loss 
of vessel) involving fishing vessels of less than 
15 metres in EMCIP 
PM 2 - Member States will be obliged to carry 
out a preliminary assessment of very serious 
marine casualties involving fishing vessels of less 
than 15 metres to determine whether they will 
open a safety investigation 
PM 3 – Length of fishing vessels to be defined as 
Length overall (LOA) 

Driver 
PD 1: The Directive 
does not apply to 
certain vessels 

PD2: Some 
definitions are not 
provided in the 
Directive or are not 
specific enough 

Short description 
This measure aims to obtain more insight into the number of fatalities 
and/or vessel losses involving fishing vessels of less than 15 metres.  

Link to a specific objective 
SO1: Protect fishing vessels, 
their crew  
and the environment 

This measure aims to obtain more insight into the number of fatalities 
and/or vessel losses involving fishing vessels of less than 15 metres.  

This measure requires AIBs to investigate (at least in the form of a 
preliminary assessment) accidents for small fishing vessels if the 
accident involved a loss of the vessel and/or a fatality. The measure 
applies to all fishing vessels of less than 15 metres LOA falling within 
the definition of Article 4(1)(4) of Regulation 1380/2013. 
The Directive will specify that the length overall (LOA) of a fishing 
vessel shall be used to determine the length. By defining that the length 
of a vessel is measured in LOA, the AID Directive will be in line with 
the length measures requirements laid down in Article 6a of Directive 
2002/59. 

SO2: Member States AIBs to 
have clarity and precision 
regarding  definitions to ensure 
that all accidents that need to be 
are being investigated in a 
harmonised manner 

PM 4a - The phrase “directly in connection with 
the operations of a ship” will be clarified in 
interpretive guidelines (non-regulatory measure) 

In order to be considered as falling within the scope of the Directive, the 
casualty has to be ‘directly in connection with the operations of a ship’. 
The main issue seems to relate to the treatment of accidents involving 

87 

 
 
Link to a specific objective 

Driver 

Policy measure 
as regards accidents which take place in ports 

PM 4b – The phrase ‘directly in connection with 
the operations of a ship’ will be explicitly 
defined in the Directive as regards accidents 
which take place in ports 

PM 5a – Interpretive guidelines will provide 
elements to support the AIB to decide when an 
accident classifies as fatal in case a person does 
not die immediately 

PM 5b - An explicit deadline will be included in 
the Directive stating when an accident classifies 
as fatal in case a person does not die immediately 

PD3: The Directive 
contains references 
to outdated 

PM 6 - The Directive will refer to the most up-to-
date versions of the Code for the Investigation of 
Marine Casualties and Incidents (Casualty 

Short description 
vessels in ports and involving port workers. There are differences in 
approach between Member States’ AIBs and this measures will 
establish a common interpretation. Interpretative guidelines on what 
factors to take into consideration will provide AIBs with some practical 
guidance in understanding the Directive's provisions. Practical examples 
could be used for the sake of clarity. 
In order to be considered as falling within the scope of the Directive, the 
casualty has to be ‘directly in connection with the operations of a ship’. 
The main issue seems to relate to the treatment of accidents involving 
vessels in ports and involving port workers. There are differences in 
approach between Member States’ AIBs and it is important to use a 
common definition on the phrase. In the Directive, an explicit definition 
will be included.  
This relates to situations where a person suffers serious injuries but does 
not die immediately. There are differences in approach between 
Member States’ AIBs as to how a fatality which occurs some time after 
the incident is treated and a common interpretation must be established. 
Interpretative guidelines on what factors to take into consideration and 
how to decide if a fatality is linked to a specific incident and therefore 
has to be investigated. Practical examples could be used for the sake of 
clarity. 
This measure addresses the problem that a non-fatal injury can become 
a fatal injury some time after the marine occurrence which caused it. To 
provide clear guidance until when an investigation should be started, the 
Directive will include a clear deadline (i.e. 30 days after the accident 
occurred, as in other transport modes). 
In this policy measure, all references to specific IMO legislation and 
guidance, which might be outdated, will be deleted. Instead, the 
Directive will be re-phrased more openly by referring to the most up-to-

88 

 
Link to a specific objective 

SO3: Enhance the capacity of 
AIBs to conduct (and report on) 
accident investigations in a 
timely, expert and independent 
manner - including as regards 
renewable and low carbon fuels 
and technologies. 

Driver 
international rules 

Policy measure 
Investigation Code) 

PD4: Some AIBs 
lack sufficient 
resources or 
expertise to be able 
effectively and 
consistently report 
and investigate 
marine casualties 

PM 7 - EMSA could provide highly specialised 
analytical support during an individual 
investigation (soft skills) 

PM 8 - EMSA could provide analytical tools 
and equipment during an individual 
investigation (hardware) 

PM 9 - EMSA could share knowledge or 
organise training on specific techniques/tools on 
new developments and technologies which may 
be relevant for accident investigation in the future 
including but not limited to renewable and low 
carbon fuels, which are particularly relevant in 
view of the “Fit for 55” package, and automation, 
, as well as the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) rules   

PM 10 - Introduce the obligation that each 

Short description 
date version of the relevant IMO legislation and guidance. This is done 
with one reservation: that the latest version should be of the same clarity 
and protection as the previous version (non-regression clause meaning 
that it remains as good as it is now).  
Many AIBs indicated that they do not have enough budget to have an 
expert on every specialised discipline. Therefore, it would be helpful if 
EMSA would provide a pool of experts of different disciplines who 
could be of service to any requesting AIB. A frequently given example 
is the need for a VDR expert. 
Specialised equipment can be very expensive and most AIBs do not 
have the budget to purchase such equipment. EMSA could provide 
specialised tools and equipment, which can be lent or provided to the 
AIBs. This way, the equipment only needs to be purchased once or 
twice instead of every AIB having to purchase it. Examples include a 
specialised data analysis programme in which all data can be combined 
and analysed at once or the use of RPAS (aerial drones) or ROVs 
(underwater vehicles). 
EMSA could take a role in raising awareness of developments, 
disseminating information, and organising discussions and training 
courses on renewable and low carbon fuels, new digital technologies 
and relevant developments at the IMO level. In addition, EMSA could 
provide dedicated training on the use of investigative technologies, 
equipment and on new technologies relating to the developments in 
maritime transport. All of this would allow the AIBs to conduct their 
duties more effectively. The Commission and EMSA will provide 
guidance in the form of training and workshops on how AIBs can or 
have to deal with different aspects of the GDPR to ensure that during 
investigations the AIBs will comply with the GDPR legislation. 
This measure is introduced to improve the quality of the accident 

89 

 
Driver 

Policy measure 
Member State establishes a quality management 
system (QMS) for the accident investigation 
body 
PM 11 – The list of authorities that can input / 
add accident data to the EMCIP database is 
modified, so that AIBs must report VSMCs but 
all other occurrences can be reported by other 
nominated competent national authorities, the 
Commission and EMSA 

Link to a specific objective 

Short description 
investigations, the management of available resources having regard to 
the workload and especially the reports written. A similar system as 
under Article 8(1) of Directive 2009/21/EC could be adopted. 
Currently, Article 17(3) of the Directive specifies that: "The 
investigative bodies of the Member States shall notify the Commission 
on marine casualties and incidents in accordance with the format in 
Annex II". Some of the AIBs consider that this should not be 
specifically their responsibility, as they do not handle this kind of data 
management, and the relevant statistics are collected, used and managed 
by other Member State authorities. Art. 17(3) will therefore be changed 
to "The investigative bodies of the Member States shall notify the 
Commission on very serious marine casualties. All other marine 
casualties and incidents can be notified by a duly designated competent 
authority of a Member State. Data is notified in accordance with the 
format in Annex II.” In addition, EMSA and the Commission should be 
able to input data to the EMCIP database. 

90 

 
 
 
ANNEX 9: EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DIFFERENT POLICY OPTIONS 

Key: Impacts expected 

 

 

O 

   

 

Strongly negative 

Negative 

No or negligible impact 

Positive 

Strongly positive 

Specific policy objective 1: Protect fishing vessels, their crew and the environment 

PO A 

PO B 

Unclear 

PO C 

Change in the number of very 
serious marine casualties 
(VSMCs) reported and/or 
investigated   

casualties 

Positive  effect  on  the  number  of  very 
serious  marine 
(VSMCs) 
involving  fishing  vessels  below  15  meters 
reported in EMCIP: 218 additional VSMCs 
in 2030 and 237 additional VSMCs in 2050 
relative to the baseline. The increase in the 
amount of information available to national 
and  EU  authorities  should  help  in  the 
development of policy responses.  

Positive  effect  on  the  number  of  very 
serious marine casualties involving fishing 
vessels  below  15  meters  reported 
in 
EMCIP:  436  additional  VSMCs  in  2030 
and  474  additional  VSMCs 
in  2050 
relative to the baseline. This will lead to an 
accurate picture of the safety issues in this 
the  fishing  vessel  sector 
segment  of 
leading 
evidenced  policy 
responses at national and EU level.  

to  better 

Positive  effect  on  the  number  of  very 
serious marine casualties involving fishing 
vessels  below  15  meters  reported 
in 
EMCIP:  436  additional  VSMCs  in  2030 
and  474  additional  VSMCs 
in  2050 
relative  to  the  baseline.  This  will  lead  to 
an  accurate  picture of the safety  issues  in 
this  segment  of  the  fishing  vessel  sector 
leading 
evidenced  policy 
responses at national and EU level. 

to  better 

In addition, 37 to 110 additional 
investigations of VSMCs involving 
fishing vessels below 15 meters are 
expected to be carried out in 2030 and 40 
to 119 in 2050 relative to the baseline. The 
carrying out of systematic harmonised 
safety investigations leading to safety 

91 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Key: Impacts expected 

 

 

O 

   

 

Strongly negative 

Negative 

No or negligible impact 

Positive 

Strongly positive 

PO A 

PO B 

Changes in the number of 
fatalities and injuries and 
avoided vessels lost 

Changes in the number of 
tonnes of bunker fuel lost at 
sea 

92 

Unclear 

PO C 

recommendations addressed to industry 
and authorities should improve the safety 
profile of this segment.  

Positive impact on the number of lives 
saved (28 to 48) and injuries avoided (219 
to 379)  for 2025-2050 relative to the 
baseline, mainly due to the assumed 
extension of the scope of the Directive to 
the VSMCs involving fishing vessels 
below 15 meters. 

Positive impact on ship operators in terms 
of  avoided  vessels  lost  estimated  at  EUR 
5.7  to  9.4  million  relative  to  the  baseline 
(corresponding  to  18  to  31  fewer  vessels 
lost), mainly due to the assumed extension 
of  the  scope  of  the  Directive  to  the 
VSMCs  involving  fishing  vessels  below 
15 meters. 

Positive  impact  on  the  environment:  101 
to  176  tonnes  of  bunker  fuel  lost  at  sea 
avoided  during  2025-2050,  mostly  due  to 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key: Impacts expected 

 

 

O 

   

 

Strongly negative 

Negative 

No or negligible impact 

Positive 

Strongly positive 

PO A 

PO B 

Unclear 

PO C 

the  inclusion  of  the  VSMCs  involving 
fishing  vessels  below  15  meters  in  the 
scope of the Directive. This is expected to 
have  a  positive  impact  on  the  quality  of 
marine water and biodiversity. 

Specific policy objective 2 - Member States accident investigation bodies to have clarity and precision regarding definitions to ensure that all accidents that need to be 
investigated are investigated in a timely and harmonised manner 

Expected improvement in 
clarity and functioning of the 
internal market 

Positive  effect  in  removing  any  ambiguity 
for  AIBs  regarding  the  length  of  fishing 
vessels  falling  within  the  scope  of  the 
Directive. 
for  AIBs 
Improved  clarity 
regarding the accidents which take place in 
ports,  through  guidelines  on  ‘directly  in 
connection  with  the  operations  of  a  ship’. 
Improved  clarity  for  AIBs  regarding  the 
decision  on  when  an  accident  classifies  as 
fatal 
in  case  a  person  does  not  die 
immediately.  Positive  effect  by  aligning 
the responsibilities of AIBs as regards their 
IMO responsibilities. This will remove any 
incoherence  or  difficulties  due  to  different 

approach 

for  AIBs 

Positive effect in removing any ambiguity 
for  AIBs  regarding  the  length  of  fishing 
vessels  falling  within  the  scope  of  the 
Directive.  Positive  effect,  providing  a 
to 
harmonised 
accidents which take place in ports, though 
the inclusion of a definition of ‘directly in 
connection  with  the  operations  of  a  ship’ 
in the Directive. Positive effect, providing 
a harmonised approach for AIBs on when 
an  accident  classifies  as  fatal  in  case  a 
person  does  not  die  immediately.  Positive 
effect  by  aligning  the  responsibilities  of 
AIBs as regards their IMO responsibilities. 

93 

approach 

for  AIBs 

take  place 

Positive effect in removing any ambiguity 
for  AIBs  regarding  the  length  of  fishing 
vessels  falling  within  the  scope  of  the 
Directive.  Positive  effect,  providing  a 
to 
harmonised 
accidents  which 
in  ports, 
though  the  inclusion  of  a  definition  of 
‘directly in connection with the operations 
of a ship’ in the Directive. Positive effect, 
providing  a  harmonised  approach  for 
AIBs  on  when  an  accident  classifies  as 
fatal  in  case  a  person  does  not  die 
immediately.  Positive  effect  by  removing 
the  reference  to  serious  casualty  and 

 
 
 
 
 
Key: Impacts expected 

 

 

O 

   

 

Strongly negative 

Negative 

No or negligible impact 

Positive 

Strongly positive 

PO A 

PO B 

Unclear 

PO C 

or contradictory provisions. Positive  effect 
on  the  functioning  of  the  internal  market 
through improved clarity. 

Change in number of 
investigations conducted 

increase 

Small 
the  number  of 
in 
investigations  due  to  improved  clarity:  10 
additional investigations in 2030 and 11 in 
2050  relative  to  the  baseline,  with  small 
positive impacts on the number of fatalities 
and  injuries  avoided,  avoided  vessels  lost 
and number of tonnes of bunker fuel lost at 
sea.  

due 

This  will  remove  any  incoherence  or 
or 
difficulties 
contradictory provisions. Positive effect on 
the  functioning  of  the  internal  market 
through improved clarity. 

different 

to 

for 

the 

requirement 

abolishing 
a 
preliminary  assessment.  This  will  allow 
AI  bodies  to  focus  their  work  on  the 
accidents  where  they  consider  that,  a 
priori, some safety lessons can be learned. 
the 
by 
Positive 
responsibilities  of  AIBs  as  regards  their 
IMO  responsibilities.  This  will  remove 
any  incoherence  or  difficulties  due  to 
different  or  contradictory  provisions. 
Positive  effect  on  the  functioning  of  the 
internal market through improved clarity. 

aligning 

effect 

increase 

Small 
the  number  of 
in 
investigations  due  to  improved  clarity:  14 
additional investigations in 2030 and 15 in 
2050  relative  to  the  baseline,  with  small 
positive 
the  number  of 
fatalities  and  injuries  avoided,  avoided 
vessels  lost  and  number  of  tonnes  of 
bunker fuel lost at sea. 

impacts  on 

increase 

Small 
the  number  of 
in 
investigations due to improved clarity: 14 
additional investigations in 2030 and 15 in 
2050  relative  to  the  baseline,  with  small 
positive 
the  number  of 
fatalities  and  injuries  avoided,  avoided 
vessels  lost  and  number  of  tonnes  of 
bunker fuel lost at sea. 

impacts  on 

Specific policy objective 3: Enhance the capacity of AIBs to conduct (and report on) accident investigations in a timely, expert and independent manner - including as 

94 

 
 
 
 
 
Key: Impacts expected 

 

 

O 

   

 

Strongly negative 

Negative 

No or negligible impact 

Positive 

Strongly positive 

PO A 

PO B 

regards renewable and low carbon fuels and technologies  

Unclear 

PO C 

Change in quality of the 
investigation conducted 

effect  on 

Positive 
the  quality  of 
investigations  and  of  the  reports  thanks  to 
highly  specialised  analytical  support  by 
EMSA.  The  QMS  should  additionally 
ensure that each AIB can identify systemic 
problems  and  more  effectively  manage 
resources  leading  to  better  high  quality 
safety  investigations  and  reports.  Positive 
effect  through  the  better  understanding  of 
the  General  Data  Protection  Regulation 
(GDPR) rules. 

AIBs with limited resources should also 
benefit from shared technology, provided 
by EMSA. Improved awareness of 
renewable and low carbon fuels as well as 
new technologies, that are expected to lead 
to a radical change in the maritime 
transport sector over the coming decades 
and will inevitably have an impact on the 
types of accidents that occur as well as on 

Positive  effect  as  the  QMS  should  ensure 
that  each  AIB  can 
identify  systemic 
problems  and  more  effectively  manage 
resources  leading  to  better  high  quality 
safety  investigations  and  reports.  Positive 
effect  through  the  better  understanding  of 
the  General  Data  Protection  Regulation 
(GDPR) rules. 

AIBs  with  limited  resources  should  also 
benefit  from  shared  technology,  provided 
Improved  awareness  of 
by  EMSA. 
renewable and low carbon fuels as well as 
new technologies, that are expected to lead 
the  maritime 
to  a  radical  change 
transport  sector  over  the  coming  decades 
and  will inevitably  have  an  impact  on the 
types of accidents that occur as well as on 
the investigation thereof. 

in 

More flexibility with regard to the 
nominated competent national authorities 

95 

effect  on 

Positive 
the  quality  of 
investigations and of the reports thanks to 
highly  specialised  analytical  support  by 
EMSA.  The  QMS  should  additionally 
ensure 
identify 
that  each  AIB  can 
systemic  problems  and  more  effectively 
manage  resources  leading  to  better  high 
quality  safety  investigations  and  reports. 
Positive 
better 
the 
understanding  of 
the  General  Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) rules. 

through 

effect 

AIBs with limited resources should also 
benefit from shared technology, provided 
by EMSA. Improved awareness of 
renewable and low carbon fuels as well as 
new technologies, that are expected to 
lead to a radical change in the maritime 
transport sector over the coming decades 
and will inevitably have an impact on the 
types of accidents that occur as well as on 

 
 
 
 
 
Key: Impacts expected 

 

 

O 

   

 

Strongly negative 

Negative 

No or negligible impact 

Positive 

Strongly positive 

PO A 

PO B 

the investigation thereof. 

in reporting incidents to EMCIP should 
allow AIBs to concentrate on their core 
activity of casualty investigation.  

Unclear 

PO C 

the investigation thereof. 

More flexibility with regard to the 
nominated competent national authorities 
in reporting incidents to EMCIP should 
allow AIBs to concentrate on their core 
activity of casualty investigation.  

96