Recommendation for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION on the 2023 National Reform Programme of Belgium and delivering a Council opinion on the 2023 Stability Programme of Belgium
Date: 2023-05-24
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Belgium, economic policy, economic recovery, economic reform, education policy, energy policy, fiscal policy, labour market, stability pact, stability programme

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   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 24.5.2023  COM(2023) 601 final  Recommendation for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION on the 2023 National Reform Programme of Belgium and delivering a Council opinion on the 2023 Stability Programme of Belgium {SWD(2023) 600 final} - {SWD(2023) 601 final}  
 
Recommendation for a 

COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION 

on the 2023 National Reform Programme of Belgium and delivering a Council opinion 
on the 2023 Stability Programme of Belgium 

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 

Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union,  and  in  particular 
Articles 121(2) and 148(4) thereof, 

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of 
the  surveillance  of  budgetary  positions  and  the  surveillance  and  coordination  of  economic 
policies1, and in particular Article 5(2) thereof, 

Having regard to the recommendation of the European Commission, 

Having regard to the resolutions of the European Parliament, 

Having regard to the conclusions of the European Council, 

Having regard to the opinion of the Employment Committee, 

Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee, 

Having regard to the opinion of the Social Protection Committee, 

Having regard to the opinion of the Economic Policy Committee, 

Whereas: 

(1) 

Regulation  (EU)  2021/241  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council2,  which 
established  the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility,  entered  into  force  on  19  February 
2021. The Recovery and Resilience Facility provides financial support to the Member 
States  for  the  implementation  of  reforms  and  investments,  entailing  a  fiscal  impulse 
financed  by  the  EU.  In  line  with  the  European  Semester  priorities,  it  contributes  to 
economic  and  social  recovery  and  to  the  implementation  of  sustainable  reforms  and 
investments,  in  particular  to  promote  the  green  and  digital  transition  and  make  the 
Member States’ economies more resilient. It also helps strengthen public finances and 
boost  growth  and  job  creation  in  the  medium  and  long  term,  improve  territorial 
cohesion  within  the  EU  and  support  the  continued  implementation  of  the  European 
Pillar of Social Rights. The maximum financial contribution per Member State under 
the Recovery and Resilience Facility was updated on 30 June 2022, in accordance with 
Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/241.  

(2) 

On 22 November 2022, the Commission adopted the 2023 Annual Sustainable Growth 
Survey3,  marking  the  start  of  the  2023  European  Semester  for  economic  policy 
coordination. The European Council endorsed the priorities of the survey around the 

1 
2 

3 

OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1. 
Regulation  (EU)  2021/241  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  12  February  2021 
establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility (OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17). 
COM(2022) 780 final. 

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four  dimensions  of  competitive  sustainability  on  23  March  2023.  On  22  November 
2022,  on  the  basis  of  Regulation  (EU)  No  1176/2011,  the  Commission  also  adopted 
the 2023 Alert Mechanism Report, in which it did not identify Belgium as one of the 
Member States that may be affected or may be at risk of being affected by imbalances, 
and for which an in-depth review would be needed. On the same date, the Commission 
also  adopted  an  opinion  on  Belgium’s  2023  draft  budgetary  plan.  The  Commission 
also adopted a recommendation for a Council recommendation on the economic policy 
of the euro area, which the Council adopted on 16 May 2023, as well as the proposal 
for  the  2023  Joint  Employment  Report  analysing  the  implementation  of  the 
Employment  Guidelines  and  the  principles  of  the  European  Pillar  of  Social  Rights, 
which the Council adopted on 13 March 2023. 

(3)  While the EU economies are showing remarkable resilience, the  geopolitical  context 
continues  to  have  a  negative  impact.  As  the  EU  stands  firmly  with  Ukraine,  the  EU 
economic  and  social  policy  agenda  is  focused  on  reducing  the  negative  impact  of 
energy shocks on both vulnerable households and companies in the short term, and on 
keeping  up  efforts  to  deliver  on  the  green  and  digital  transition,  support  sustainable 
and inclusive growth, safeguard macroeconomic stability and increase resilience in the 
medium  term.  It  also  focuses  heavily  on  increasing  the  EU’s  competitiveness  and 
productivity. 

(4) 

(5) 

On  1  February  2023,  the  Commission  issued  the  Communication  A  Green  Deal 
Industrial  Plan  for  the  Net-Zero  Age4  to  boost  the  competitiveness  of  the  EU’s  net-
zero  industry  and  support  the  fast  transition  to  climate  neutrality.  The  plan 
complements  ongoing  efforts  under  the  European  Green  Deal  and  REPowerEU.  It 
aims to provide a more supportive environment for scaling up the EU’s manufacturing 
capacity  for  the  net-zero  technologies  and  products  required  to  meet  the  EU’s 
ambitious climate targets, as well as ensuring access to relevant critical raw materials, 
including  by  diversifying  sourcing,  properly  exploiting  geological  resources  in 
Member States and maximising the recycling  of raw materials. The plan  is  based on 
four pillars:  a predictable and simplified regulatory  environment,  speeding up access 
to finance, enhancing skills, and open trade for resilient supply chains. On 16 March 
2023,  the  Commission  also  issued  the  Communication  Long-term  competitiveness  of 
the EU: looking beyond 20305, structured along nine mutually reinforcing drivers with 
the objective to work towards a growth enhancing regulatory framework. It sets policy 
improvements,  well  focused 
priorities  aimed  at  actively  ensuring  structural 
investments and regulatory measures for the long-term competitiveness of the EU and 
its Member States. The recommendations below help address those priorities. 

In 2023, the European Semester for economic policy coordination continues to evolve 
in  line  with  the  implementation  of  the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility.  Fully 
implementing  the  recovery  and  resilience  plans  remains  essential  for  delivering  the 
policy priorities under the European Semester, as the plans address all or a significant 
subset  of  the  relevant  country-specific  recommendations  issued  in  recent  years.  The 
2019, 2020 and 2022 country-specific recommendations remain equally relevant also 
for  recovery  and  resilience  plans  revised,  updated  or  amended  in  accordance  with 
Articles 14, 18 and 21 of Regulation (EU) 2021/241.  

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COM(2023) 62 final.  
COM(2023) 168 final.  

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(6) 

(7) 

(8) 

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The REPowerEU Regulation6 adopted on 27 February 2023 aims to rapidly phase out 
the  EU’s  dependence  on  Russian  fossil  fuel  imports.  This  will  contribute  towards 
energy security and the diversification of the EU’s energy supply, while increasing the 
uptake of renewables, energy storage capacities and energy efficiency. The Regulation 
enables  Member  States  to  add  a  new  REPowerEU  chapter  to  their  national  recovery 
and  resilience  plans  in  order  to  finance  key  reforms  and  investments  that  will  help 
achieve the REPowerEU objectives. They will also help boost the competitiveness of 
the EU’s net-zero industry as outlined in the Green Deal  Industrial Plan for the Net-
Zero Age and address the energy-related country-specific recommendations issued to 
the  Member  States  in  2022  and,  where  applicable,  in  2023.  The  REPowerEU 
Regulation  introduces  a  new  category  of  non-repayable  financial  support,  made 
available  to  Member  States  to  finance  new  energy-related  reforms  and  investments 
under their recovery and resilience plans.  

On 8 March 2023, the Commission adopted a communication providing fiscal policy 
guidance for 2024. It aims to support the preparation of Member States’ stability and 
thereby  strengthen  policy  coordination7.  The 
convergence  programmes  and 
Commission recalled that the general escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact 
will be deactivated at  the end of 2023.  It  called  for fiscal  policies in  2023-2024 that 
ensure  medium-term  debt  sustainability  as  well  as  raise  potential  growth  in  a 
sustainable manner. Member States were invited to set out in their 2023 stability and 
convergence programmes how their fiscal plans will ensure that the 3% of GDP deficit 
reference value is adhered to as well as plausible and continuous debt reduction, or for 
debt  to  be  kept  at  prudent  levels  in  the  medium  term.  The  Commission  invited 
Member States to phase out national fiscal measures introduced to protect households 
and  firms  from  the  energy  price  shock,  starting  with  the  least  targeted  ones.  It 
indicated that, if support measures needed to be extended because of renewed energy 
price  pressures,  Member  States  should  target  such  measures  much  better  than  in  the 
past  towards  vulnerable  households  and  firms.  The  Commission  proposed  that  the 
fiscal  recommendations would be  quantified and differentiated  and be  formulated on 
the basis of net primary expenditure, as proposed in its Communication on orientations 
for  a  reform  of  the  EU  economic  governance  framework8.  It  recommended  that  all 
Member States should  continue to  protect  nationally  financed investment and ensure 
the  effective  use  of  the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  and  other  EU  funds,  in 
particular  in  light  of  the  green  and  digital  transition  and  resilience  objectives.  The 
Commission  indicated  that  it  will  propose  to  the  Council  to  open  deficit-based 
excessive deficit procedures in spring 2024 on the basis of the outturn data for 2023, in 
line with existing legal provisions. 

On  26  April  2023,  the  Commission  presented  legislative  proposals  to  implement  a 
comprehensive reform of the EU’s economic governance rules. The central objective 
of the proposals is to strengthen public debt sustainability and promote sustainable and 
inclusive growth in all Member States through reforms and investment. The proposals 
aim at providing Member States with more control over the design of their medium-
term plans, while putting in place a more stringent enforcement regime to ensure that 

Regulation  (EU)  2023/435  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  27  February  2023 
amending Regulation (EU) 2021/241 as regards REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans 
and  amending  Regulations  (EU)  No  1303/2013,  (EU)  2021/1060  and  (EU)  2021/1755,  and  Directive 
2003/87/EC (OJ L 63, 28.2.2023, p. 1). 
COM(2023) 141 final. 
COM(2022) 583 final. 

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(9) 

Member  States  deliver  on  the  commitments  undertaken  in  their  medium-term  fiscal-
structural plans. The objective is to conclude the legislative work in 2023. 

On 30 April 2021, Belgium submitted its national recovery and resilience plan to the 
Commission, in accordance with Article 18(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/241. Pursuant 
to  Article  19  of  Regulation  (EU)  2021/241,  the  Commission  assessed  the  relevance, 
effectiveness,  efficiency  and  coherence  of  the  recovery  and  resilience  plan,  in 
accordance with the assessment guidelines of Annex V to that Regulation. On 13 July 
2021,  the  Council  adopted  its  Decision  on  the  approval  of  the  assessment  of  the 
recovery and resilience plan for Belgium9. The release of instalments is conditional on 
a decision by the Commission,  taken in  accordance with  Article 24(5) of  Regulation 
(EU)  2021/241,  that  Belgium  has  satisfactorily  fulfilled  the  relevant  milestones  and 
targets  set  out  in  the  Council  Implementing  Decision.  Satisfactory  fulfilment 
presupposes  that  the  achievement  of  preceding  milestones  and  targets  has  not  been 
reversed. 

(10)  On 30 April 2023, Belgium submitted its 2023 National Reform Programme and, on 
30 April 2023, its 2023 Stability Programme,  in  line with  Article 4(1) of Regulation 
(EC)  No  1466/97.  To  take  account  of  their  interlinkages,  the  two  programmes  have 
been  assessed  together.  In  accordance  with  Article  27  of  Regulation  (EU)  2021/241, 
the  2023  National  Reform  Programme  also  reflects  Belgium’s  biannual  reporting  on 
the progress made in achieving its recovery and resilience plan.  

(11)  The Commission published the 2023 country report for Belgium10 on 24 May 2023. It 
assessed  Belgium’s  progress 
relevant  country-specific 
in  addressing 
recommendations  adopted by  the Council  between 2019  and  2022 and  took stock of 
Belgium’s implementation of the recovery and resilience plan. Based on this analysis, 
the  country  report  identified  gaps  with  respect  to  those  challenges  that  are  not 
addressed  or  only  partially  addressed  by  the  recovery  and  resilience  plan,  as  well  as 
new  and  emerging  challenges.  It  also  assessed  Belgium’s  progress  on  implementing 
the  European  Pillar  of  Social  Rights  and  on  achieving  the  EU  headline  targets  on 
employment, skills and poverty reduction, as well as progress in  achieving the UN’s 
Sustainable Development Goals.  

the 

(12)  Based  on  data  validated  by  Eurostat,11  Belgium’s  general  government  deficit 
decreased from 5.5% of GDP in 2021 to 3.9% in 2022, while general government debt 
fell  from  109.1%  of  GDP  at  the  end  of  2021  to  105.1%  at  the  end  of  2022.  On  [24 
May]  2023,  the  Commission  published  a  report  under  Article  126(3)  TFEU;12  the 
report discussed the budgetary situation of Belgium, as its general government deficit 
in  2022  exceeded  the  3%  of  GDP  Treaty  reference  value.  The  report  concluded  that 
the  deficit  criterion  was  not  fulfilled.  In  line  with  the  Communication  of  8  March 
2023,13 the Commission did not propose to open new excessive deficit procedures in 
spring  2023;  in  turn,  the  Commission  stated  that  it  would  propose  to  the  Council  to 
open  deficit-based  excessive  deficit  procedures  in  spring  2024,  on  the  basis  of  the 

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Council Implementing Decision of 13 July 2021 on the approval of the assessment of the recovery and 
resilience plan for Belgium (ST 10161/21; ST 10161/21 ADD 1). 
SWD(2023) 601 final. 
Eurostat-Euro Indicators, 47/2023, 21.4.2023 

COM(2023) 631 final, 24.05.2023. 

COM(2023) 141 final, 8.3.2023. 

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outturn data for 2023. Belgium should take account of this in the execution of its 2023 
budget and in preparing the Draft Budgetary Plan for 2024. 

(13)  The  general  government  balance  has  been  impacted  by  the  fiscal  policy  measures 
adopted to mitigate the economic and social impacts of the increase in energy prices. 
In  2022,  such  revenue-decreasing  measures  included  a  cut  in  excise  duties  on  petrol 
fuel  and  VAT  reductions  on  residential  electricity  and  gas  contracts;  while  such 
expenditure-increasing measures included an extended coverage of the social tariff on 
energy  products  for  vulnerable  households,  across-the-board  income  transfers  to 
households  directly  through  their  gas  and  electricity  energy  bills  (‘energy  package’), 
earmarked  lump  sum  transfers  (for  those  households  using  heating  oil,  propane, 
butane, or pellet fuel), and direct support to help companies faced with rising energy 
costs. The cost of these measures was partly offset by new taxes on windfall profits of 
energy  producers  and  suppliers,  namely  on  the  electricity  and  oil  sectors.  The 
Commission  estimates  the  net  budgetary  cost  of  these  measures  at  0.9%  of  GDP  in 
2022. The general government balance has also been impacted by the budgetary cost 
of temporary protection to displaced persons from Ukraine, which is estimated at 0.1% 
of  GDP  in  2022.  At  the  same  time,  the  estimated  cost  of  COVID-19  temporary 
emergency measures dropped to 0.5% of GDP in 2022, from 3% in 2021. 

(14)  On 18 June 2021, the Council recommended that in 2022 Belgium 14 use the Recovery 
and  Resilience  Facility  to  finance  additional  investment  in  support  of  the  recovery, 
while pursuing a prudent fiscal policy. Moreover, Belgium should preserve nationally-
financed investment. 

(15)  According to the Commission estimates, the fiscal stance15 in 2022 was supportive, at 
-2%  of  GDP.  As  recommended  by  the  Council,  Belgium  continued  to  support  the 
recovery  with  investments  to  be  financed  by  the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility. 
Expenditure financed by Recovery and Resilience Facility grants and other EU funds 
amounted  to  0.2%  of  GDP  in  2022  (0.2%  of  GDP  in  2021).  Nationally  financed 
investment  provided  a  neutral  contribution  to  the  fiscal  stance.16  Belgium  therefore 
preserved  nationally  financed  investment,  as  recommended  by  the  Council.  At  the 
same time, the growth in nationally financed primary current expenditure (net of new 
revenue measures) provided an expansionary contribution of 1.9 percentage points to 
the fiscal stance. 

This  significant  expansionary  contribution  included  the  additional  impact  of  fiscal 
policy measures to mitigate the economic and social impact of the increase in energy 
prices  (additional net  budgetary cost  of 0.8% of GDP compared to  2021), as  well as 
the  costs  to  offer  temporary  protection  to  displaced  persons  from  Ukraine  (0.1%  of 
GDP).  At  the  same  time,  rising  current  expenditure,  driven  in  particular  by  the 
automatic indexation of social benefits and public sector wages and other structurally 
increasing  current  expenditure  (notably  reflecting  demographic  ageing)  also 

14 

15 

16 

Council  Recommendation  of  18  June  2021  delivering  a  Council  opinion  on  the  2021  Stability 
Programme of Belgium, OJ C 304, 29.07.2021, p. 5.  
The  fiscal  stance  is  measured  as  the  change  in  primary  expenditure  (net  of  discretionary  revenue 
measures), excluding Covid-19 crisis-related temporary emergency measures but including expenditure 
financed  by  non-repayable  support  (grants)  from  the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  and  other  EU 
funds, 
in 
the Fiscal Statistical Tables.   
Other nationally financed capital expenditure provided a neutral contribution of 0 percentage points of 
GDP.  

growth. For  more 

to  medium-term 

see  Box 1 

potential 

relative 

details 

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contributed  to  the  growth  in  net  primary  current  expenditure.  The  significant 
expansionary  contribution  of  nationally  financed  current  expenditure  was  thus  only 
partially due to the measures to address the economic and social impact of the increase 
in energy prices, as well as the costs to offer temporary protection to displaced persons 
from  Ukraine.  Belgium  therefore  did  not  sufficiently  limit  the  growth  in  nationally 
financed current expenditure. 

(16)  The macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections  in  the Stability 
Programme  is  realistic  in  2023  and  thereafter.  The  government  projects  real  GDP  to 
grow by 1% in 2023 and 1.7% in 2024. By comparison, the Commission 2023 spring 
forecast projects a real GDP growth of 1.2 % in 2023 and 1.4% in 2024. 

(17) 

In its 2023 Stability Programme, the government expects that the general government 
deficit  ratio  will  increase  to  5.1%  of  GDP  in  2023.  The  increase  in  2023  mainly 
reflects  increasing  permanent  current  spending  (notably  due  to  the  automatic 
indexation of social benefits and public wages as well as to demographic ageing), the 
budgetary impact of a temporary decrease in firm’s social contributions during the first 
half  of  2023,  and  a  deficit  increasing  reform  of  the  taxation  of  residential  energy 
products. According to the Programme, the general  government debt-to-GDP ratio is 
expected to  increase from  105.1% at the end of  2022 to  106.7%  at  the end of 2023. 
The Commission 2023 spring forecast projects a government deficit of 5% of GDP for 
2023.  This  is  in  line  with  the  deficit  projected  in  the  Stability  Programme.  The 
Commission 2023 spring forecast  projects  a slightly lower  general  government debt-
to-GDP ratio, of 106% at the end of 2023. The difference is due to a somewhat higher 
projected nominal GDP in 2023 in the Commission 2023 spring forecast. 

(18)  The government balance in 2023 is expected to continue to be impacted by the fiscal 
measures adopted to mitigate the economic and social impact of the increase in energy 
prices.  They  consist  of  measures  extended  from  2022,  in  particular  a  cut  in  excise 
duties on petrol fuel and VAT reductions on electricity and gas residential contracts; 
an extension of the coverage of the social tariff on energy products, across-the-board 
income transfers to households through their gas and electricity energy bills (‘energy 
package’),  earmarked  lump  sum  transfers  (for  those  households  using  other  heating 
sources  than  gas  and  electricity),  and  direct  support  to  help  companies  faced  with 
rising energy costs. 

The cost of these measures continues to be partly offset by taxes on windfall profits of 
energy suppliers, namely by taxes on the electricity and oil sectors, that have been in 
place since 2022, and by a tax in 2023 on a gas international network system operator 
(Fluxys).  Taking  these  revenues  into  account,  the  net  budgetary  cost  of  the  support 
measures  is  projected  in  the  Commission  2023  spring  forecast  at  0.4%  of  GDP  in 
202317. 

Most  measures  in  2023 do  not  appear  targeted  to  the  most  vulnerable  households  or 
firms, although many of them preserve the price signal to reduce energy demand and 
increase energy efficiency. As a result, the amount of targeted support measures, to be 
taken into account in the assessment of compliance with the fiscal recommendation for 
2023, is  estimated  in the Commission  2023 spring  forecast  at  0.1% of GDP  in  2023 
(compared to  0.2% of GDP  in  2022). The budgetary  cost  of temporary protection to 
displaced  persons  from  Ukraine  is  projected  to  remain  stable  compared  to  2022. 

17 

The  figure represents the level of annual budgetary cost of those  measures, including current revenue 
and expenditure as well as – where relevant – capital expenditure measures. 

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Finally, the 2023  government balance is  expected to  benefit from  the phasing out  of 
COVID-19 temporary emergency measures of 0.5% of GDP. 

(19)  On 12 July 2022, the Council recommended18 that Belgium ensure in 2023 a prudent 
fiscal  policy,  in  particular  by  limiting  the  growth  of  nationally  financed  primary 
current expenditure below medium-term potential output growth19, taking into account 
continued temporary and targeted support to households and firms most vulnerable to 
energy price hikes and to people fleeing Ukraine. At the same time, Belgium should 
stand  ready  to  adjust  current  spending  to  the  evolving  situation.  Belgium  was  also 
recommended  to  expand  public  investment  for  the  green  and  digital  transitions,  and 
for  energy  security  taking  into  account  the  REPowerEU  initiative,  including  by 
making use of the Recovery and Resilience Facility and other Union funds. 

(20) 

In  2023,  the  fiscal  stance  is  projected  in  the  Commission  2023  spring  forecast  to  be 
expansionary  (- 1.1%  of  GDP),  in  a  context  of  high  inflation.  This  follows  an 
expansionary fiscal stance in 2022 (-2% of GDP). The growth in nationally financed 
primary  current  expenditure  (net  of  discretionary  revenue  measures)  in  2023  is 
projected to provide an expansionary contribution of 0.7% of GDP to the fiscal stance. 
This  includes  the  reduced  cost  of  the  targeted  support  measures  to  households  and 
firms most vulnerable to energy price hikes by 0.1% of GDP.  

The  growth  of  nationally  financed  primary  current  expenditure  in  excess  of  the 
medium-term  potential  output  growth  is  therefore  not  due  to  the  targeted  support  to 
households  and  firms  most  vulnerable  to  energy  price  hikes  and  to  people  fleeing 
Ukraine. The expansionary growth in nationally financed primary current expenditure 
(net of discretionary revenue measures) is also driven by permanent increases in public 
sector  wages  and  social  benefits  (due  to  the  indexation  of  public  sector  wages  and 
social benefits), to structurally rising current expenditure resulting from demographic 
ageing, to a reform of residential energy contract taxation, and to a temporary decrease 
in  firm’s  social  contributions  during  the  first  half  of  2023.  In  sum,  the  projected 
growth  of  nationally  financed  primary  current  expenditure  is  not  in  line  with  the 
Council recommendation.  

Expenditure financed by Recovery and Resilience Facility grants and other EU funds 
are projected to amount to 0.3% of GDP in 2023, while nationally financed investment 
is  projected  to  provide  an  expansionary  contribution  to  the  fiscal  stance  of  0.1 
percentage  points20.  Therefore,  Belgium  plans  to  finance  additional  investment 
through the Recovery and Resilience Facility and other EU funds, and it also plans to 
preserve nationally-financed investment.  It plans to finance public investment for the 
green  and  digital  transitions,  and  for  energy  security,  such  as  investment  projects  in 
renovation  of  buildings,  sustainable  mobility  and  the  decarbonisation  of  the  energy 
sector,  and  key  investments  to  accelerate  the  digital  transition  (including  digitalising 
the public administration, promoting digital inclusion, and reinforcing cyber security) 
which are funded by the Recovery and Resilience Facility and other EU funds.  

18 

19 

20 

Council  Recommendation  of  12  July  2022  on  the  National  Reform  Programme  of  Belgium  and 
delivering a Council opinion on the 2022 Stability Programme of Belgium OJ C 334, 1.9.2022, p. 9.  
Based  on  the  Commission  2023  spring  forecast,  the  medium-term  (10-year  average)  potential  output 
growth of Belgium is estimated at 5.4% in nominal terms.  
Other  nationally  financed  capital  expenditure  is  projected  to  provide  an  expansionary  contribution  of 
0.1 percentage points of GDP.  

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(21)  According  to  the  Stability  Programme  the  general  government  deficit  is  expected  to 
decline to 4.2% of GDP in 2024. The decrease in 2024 also reflects the withdrawal of 
temporary support measures that were adopted in the context of rising energy prices. 
The  programme  expects  the  general  government  debt-to-GDP  ratio  to  increase  to 
107.1% at the end of 2024. Based on policy measures known at the cut-off date of the 
forecast, the Commission 2023 spring forecast projects a government deficit of 4.7% 
of  GDP  in  2024.  This  is  higher  than  the  deficit  projected  in  the  programme,  mainly 
due  to  deficit-reducing  measures  not  yet  specified  in  the  Programme  amounting  to 
0.2%  of  GDP  (therefore  not  taken  into  account  in  the  Commission  2023  spring 
forecast)  and  to  a  less  favourable  projection  of  government  revenue,  in  particular  as 
regards  corporate  taxes.  The  Commission  2023  spring  forecast  projects  a  similar 
general government debt-to-GDP ratio, of 107.3% at the end of 2024.  

(22)  The  Stability  Programme  envisages  the  phasing  out  of  all  of  the  energy  support 
measures in 2024. The Commission also currently assumes full phasing out of energy 
support  measures  in  2024.  This  hinges  upon  the  assumption  of  no  renewed  energy 
price increases. 

(23)  Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 calls for an annual improvement in the structural 
budget balance toward the medium-term objective by 0.5% of GDP as a benchmark.21 
Taking  into  account  fiscal  sustainability  considerations22  and  the  need  to  reduce  the 
deficit  to  below  the  3%  of  GDP  reference  value,  an  improvement  in  the  structural 
balance  of  at  least  0.7%  of  GDP  for  2024  would  be  appropriate.  To  ensure  such  an 
improvement,  the  growth  in  net  nationally-financed  primary  expenditure23  in  2024 
should not exceed 2%, as reflected in this recommendation.  

At the same time, the remaining energy support measures (currently estimated by the 
Commission  at  0.4%  of  GDP  in  2023)  should  be  phased  out,  contingent  on  energy 
market developments and starting from the least targeted ones, and the related savings 
should be used to reduce the government deficit. 

In  addition,  according  to  the  Commission  2023  spring  forecast,  the  growth  in  net 
nationally-financed  primary  current  expenditure  in  2023  is  not  in  line  with  the 
recommendation  of  the  Council.  If  this  is  confirmed,  lower  growth  in  net  primary 
expenditure in 2024 would be appropriate. 

(24)  Assuming  unchanged  policies,  the  Commission  2023  spring  forecast  projects  the  net 
nationally financed primary expenditure to grow by 2.7% in 2024, which is above the 
recommended growth rate. 

(25)  According  to  the  programme,  government  investment  is  expected  to  increase  from 
2.9% of GDP in 2023 to 3.1% of GDP in 2024. The higher investment reflects higher 
nationally  financed  investment  and  investment  financed  by  the  EU,  namely  through 

21 

22 

23 

Cf. Article 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97, which also requires an adjustment of more than 
0.5%  of  GDP  for  Member  States  with  a  government  debt  exceeding  60%  of  GDP,  or  with  more 
pronounced debt sustainability risks. 
The  Commission  estimated  that  Belgium  would  need  an  average  annual  increase  in  the  structural 
primary  balance  as  a  share  of  GDP  of  1.0  percentage  points  to  achieve  a  plausible  debt  reduction  or 
ensure that government debt is kept at prudent levels in the medium term.  This estimate was based on 
the  Commission  autumn  2022  forecast.  The  starting  point  for  this  estimate  was  the  projected 
government  deficit  and  debt  for  2024  which  assumed  the  withdrawal  of  energy  support  measures  in 
2024.  
Net  primary  expenditure  is  defined  as  nationally  financed  expenditure  net  of  discretionary  revenues 
measures and excluding interest expenditure as well as cyclical unemployment expenditure. 

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the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility.  The  Programme  refers  to  reforms  and 
investments,  which  are  expected  to  contribute  to  fiscal  sustainability  and  sustainable 
and inclusive growth. These include a project for a fiscal reform of the tax and benefits 
system  aiming  at  boosting  employment  and  economic  activity,  thereby  fostering  the 
sustainability  of  public  finances,  and  a  pension  reform  (as  foreseen  in  the  Recovery 
and Resilience Plan) to improve the financial sustainability of the pensions system. In 
addition,  the  Plan  intends  to  step  up  efforts  to  bolster  public  investment  in  view  of 
speeding up the green and digital transitions, including through the implementation of 
the Recovery and Resilience Plan. 

(26)  The Stability Programme outlines a medium-term fiscal path until 2026. According to 
the programme, the general government deficit is expected to decline to 3.3% of GDP 
in 2025 and to 2.9% by 2026. Therefore, the general government deficit is planned to 
decrease  below  3%  of  GDP  in  2026.  According  to  the  programme,  the  general 
government debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to increase from 107.1% at the end of 2024 
to 107.8% by the end of 2026. 

(27)  Belgium faces substantial fiscal sustainability challenges. These relate to both the high 
level  of  government  debt  and  the  expected  worsening,  under  unchanged  policies,  of 
the  impact  of  ageing-related  expenditure  on  public  finances  in  the  face  of  a  rapidly 
ageing  population.  In  the  Commission’s  2021  Ageing  Report,  ageing-related 
expenditure is projected to increase by 3.6 percentage points of GDP by 2040 and by 
5.4  percentage  points  of  GDP  by  2070,  mostly  due  to  pension  and  long-term  care 
expenditure.  Pension  expenditure  is  projected  to  increase  by  3  percentage  points  of 
GDP  over  2019-2070,  compared  to  0.1  percentage  point  of  GDP  on  average  in  the 
euro  area.  In  the  case  of  Belgium,  the  bulk  of  the  projected  increase  would  already 
occur by 2040, when pension expenditure would increase by 2.7 percentage points of 
GDP  to  14.9%  of  GDP.  Belgium’s  recovery  and  resilience  plan  includes  a  pension 
reform  that  aims  to  help  address  this  challenge,  alongside  other  objectives  such  as 
improving the social sustainability of the system, incentivising people to remain active 
in  the  labour  market  after  meeting  early  retirement  conditions  and  ensuring  greater 
convergence between and within pension systems. On long-term care, public spending 
amounted to 2.2% of GDP in 2019 (EU average 1.7%), which made Belgium one of 
the countries with the highest spending on long-term care in the EU. By 2070, long-
term care expenditure is projected to increase further to 4.3% of GDP in the baseline 
scenario.  However,  those  costs  could  increase  to  6.0%  of  GDP  in  the  most  negative 
scenarios24. Evidence suggests a possible overuse of residential care and unnecessary 
or  premature  institutionalisation  of  older  people.  Available  data  suggest  that  the 
number  of  older  people  placed  unnecessarily  or  at  least  prematurely  in  a  residential 
care  facility  remains  high,  although  it  has  been  decreasing  in  recent  years.  In 
particular, the data pointed out that the share of individuals affected by this issue was 
high  in  Brussels  and  Wallonia.  Reforms  to  improve  the  cost-efficient  use  of  the 
different  care  settings,  in  particular  to  avoid  and  delay  unnecessary  or  premature 
institutionalisation, have been started by the federated entities, to which responsibility 
for long-term care has been devolved since 2019. However, they do not focus enough 
on addressing the fiscal sustainability challenge.  

(28)  Despite  recent  reforms,  the  tax  wedge  (social  security  contributions  and  taxation  of 
labour  income)  in  Belgium  remains  well  above  the  EU  average  at  all  wage  levels, 

24 

European Commission, 2021 Ageing Report. Belgium long-term care spending is projected to reach 6% 
of GDP in the cost convergence scenario and in the cost and coverage convergence scenario. 

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except  for  very  low  wage  earners  (50%  of  the  average),  which  may  create 
disincentives to work. Some measures have been introduced to increase the net income 
of  low  wage  earners,  such  as  the  job  bonus  (Flanders)  and  in-work  benefits  for  the 
long-term  unemployed  or  for  interregional  mobility  (federal).  However,  these 
measures  also  further  increase  the  high  marginal  tax  rate  for  lower  middle-income 
earners  (‘low  wage  trap’),  which  may  discourage  investments  in  lifelong  learning  as 
well as increase the number of hours worked. Unemployment benefits are unlimited in 
time and not means-tested for the long-term unemployed. Moreover, several non-cash 
social  benefits  are  linked  to  the  unemployment  status  of  beneficiaries,  which  may 
contribute to existing inactivity, unemployment and low wage traps. A broad review of 
the benefits system would improve transparency in terms of work incentives and could 
contribute to increase the effectiveness of activation policies. 

immovable  property 

(29)  The  extensive  use  of  tax  expenditure,  partly  to  counterbalance  the  high  tax  rates, 
creates inefficiencies and tends to favour certain types of remuneration and expenses. 
This  leads  to  economic,  social  and  environmental  distortions.  Special  schemes  like 
meal vouchers, commuting subsidies or withholding tax exemption for overtime, R&D 
work  and  night/shift  work  are  costly  for  the  budget  and  have  been  found  to  create 
inefficiencies.  Some  personal  income  tax  deductions  (e.g.  deduction  for  service 
vouchers) disproportionally benefit high-income earners. There are still tax incentives 
that 
for 
underestimate actual rental income, interest deductibility for secondary housing loans) 
and regional level (‘chèque-habitat’ in Wallonia). These distort resource allocation and 
potentially generate tax-induced overinvestment in certain types of assets. Tax-related 
environmentally harmful subsidies have increased. The reduction of the VAT rate on 
electricity  and  gas  for  residential  contracts,  while  providing  household  support, 
continues to favour fossil fuels in the long term and discourages further diversification 
and  energy  savings.  In  the  face  of  increasing  traffic  congestion  and  air  pollution 
issues, transport taxes and pollution taxes still seem to be underused. The broader tax 
reform, which the government plans to phase in by 2024, is expected – if adopted and 
implemented – to reduce the tax burden on labour and reduce some of the distortions. 

level  (cadastral  values 

investments  at  federal 

(30) 

In accordance with Article 19(3), point (b) and Annex V, criterion 2.2 of Regulation 
(EU) 2021/241, the recovery and resilience plan includes an extensive set of mutually 
reinforcing reforms and investments to be implemented by 2026. The implementation 
of Belgium’s recovery and resilience plan is underway, however with increasing risk 
of delays. Belgium has not yet submitted a payment request. An effective governance 
will be needed to allow for a swift and steady implementation. The plan is expected to 
be revised in 2023, to include among others a REPowerEU chapter, while taking into 
account  the  downward  revision  of  the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  maximum 
grant allocation to Belgium. The swift inclusion of the new REPowerEU chapter in the 
recovery  and  resilience  plan  will  allow  additional  reforms  and  investments  to  be 
financed  in  support  of  Belgium’s  strategic  objectives  in  the  field  of  energy  and  the 
green transition. In accordance with Article 14(6) of Regulation (EU) 2021/241, on 31 
March  2023,  Belgium  expressed  its  intention  to  request  EUR  1,024,900,000  of 
additional  loan  support  under  the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility.  The  systematic 
and effective  involvement  of local and  regional  authorities, social partners and other 
relevant  stakeholders  remains  important  for  the  successful  implementation  of  the 
recovery  and  resilience  plan,  as  well  as  other  economic  and  employment  policies 
going beyond the plan, to ensure broad ownership of the overall policy agenda. 

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(31)  The Commission approved all of Belgium’s cohesion policy programming documents 
in 2022 apart from the European Regional Development Fund for the Brussels-Capital 
Region, which was adopted in 2023. Proceeding with the swift implementation of the 
cohesion  policy  programmes  in  complementarity  and  synergy  with  the  recovery  and 
resilience plan, including the REPowerEU chapter, is key to achieving the green and 
digital  transition,  increasing  economic  and  social  resilience  as  well  as  achieving 
balanced territorial development in Belgium. 

(32)  Beyond the economic and social challenges addressed by the recovery and resilience 
plan,  Belgium  faces  a  number  of  additional  challenges  related  to  its  labour  market, 
education  system,  energy  policy  and  the  green  transition.  The  job  vacancy  rate  in 
Belgium  is  currently  one  of  the  highest  in  the  EU  and  employers  are  finding  it 
increasingly  difficult  to  hire  employees  with  the  right  skills.  Regional  disparities  in 
labour  market  participation,  however,  are  significant.  Labour  shortages  are  high  in 
both  low-  and  high-skilled  occupations  with  shortages  in  several  sectors,  including 
information  and  communication  technologies,  professional,  technical  and  scientific 
jobs,  hospitality  and  healthcare.  The  number  of  graduates,  especially  women,  in 
science,  technology,  engineering  and  mathematics  (STEM)  remains  low  and  their 
share  is  only  slowly  increasing,  despite  dedicated  STEM  action  plans.  Skills 
mismatches  are  also  explained  by  low  participation  in  adult  learning.  The  current 
incentives  for  adult  learning  may  not  reach  the  low-educated,  for  whom  upskilling 
could  offer  better  employment  opportunities.  High-quality  education  and  training 
systems  that  respond  to  changing  labour  market  needs  and  targeted  upskilling  and 
reskilling  measures  are  key  to  reducing  skills  shortages  and  promoting  labour 
inclusion and reallocation. Addressing labour shortages and skills mismatches is a key 
lever for tackling the digital transformation and enabling the green transition, as well 
as for achieving the 2030 EU headline targets on employment and skills.  

(33) 

In  addition  to  reducing  work  disincentives  from  the  tax  and  benefits  system,  more 
effective and targeted activation measures could help unlock the large untapped labour 
potential and alleviate the growing labour and skills shortages. Disadvantaged groups, 
including  people  with  low  education  attainment,  a  migrant  background  or  with 
disabilities, are less integrated in the labour market. There is a low transition rate on 
average  from  unemployment or inactivity to  employment. This  suggests that there is 
still scope to strengthen the effectiveness of active labour market policies, in particular 
with  more  systematic  evaluations  and  integrated  pathways  for  jobseekers  who  face 
multiple  barriers  to  finding  a  job.  Pursuing  policies  to  boost  the  reintegration  of 
workers on long-term sick leave, in particular due to burnout and depression (25% of 
cases), who now largely exceed the number of unemployed, will also be necessary to 
further increase the employment rate. 

(34)  On labour shortages and skills mismatches, there are concerns about the performance, 
inclusiveness and equity of the education systems, also in light of high public spending 
on  education.  The  gap  in  educational  outcomes  is  closely  linked  to  students’  socio-
economic  and  migrant  background  and  is  among  the  largest  in  the  EU,  leading  to 
inequalities in education. Increasing the labour market relevance and attractiveness of 
vocational  education  and  training  will  be  key.  Strengthening  the  teaching  profession 
by providing better teacher training and continuous professional development, and by 
developing  more  flexible  and  attractive  career  paths,  would  help  reduce  a  growing 
shortage  of  qualified  teachers,  which  risks  further  increasing  existing  educational 
inequalities.  Some  steps  have  been  recently  taken  or  are  planned  to  strengthen  the 

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teaching profession. It will be essential to continue and monitor the implementation of 
these measures and their impact. 

(35)  Around 70% of Belgium’s gross inland energy consumption is covered by fossil fuel 
imports.  In  2021,  oil  provided  45%  of  Belgium’s  energy  mix  and  natural  gas  23%. 
Belgium’s  consumption  of  natural  gas  dropped  by  15%  in  the  period  August  2022-
March 2023, compared with the average gas consumption over the same period in the 
preceding 5 years, in line with the 15% reduction target. Belgium could keep pursuing 
efforts  to  temporarily  reduce  gas  demand  until  31  March  202425.  Renewable  energy 
accounted  for  only  13%  of  final  energy  consumption  in  2021.  Belgium  will  need  to 
significantly  increase  its  renewable  energy  target  by  2030,  which  is  currently  17.5% 
and considered unambitious in the Commission’s 2020 assessment, to reflect the more 
ambitious  EU  objectives.  To  meet  the  planned  reduction  of  nuclear  energy  and 
projected rise in electricity demand, energy efficiency and the share of electricity from 
renewable  sources  will  need  to  significantly  increase.  The  development  of  onshore 
wind projects and the related expansion of the power grid are, however, still severely 
hampered  by  low  public  acceptance  and  long  delays  related  to  permit-granting 
procedures, in particular due to repetitive and lengthy appeal procedures. Further steps 
can  be  taken  to  accelerate  the  deployment  of  onshore  wind  power  and  related  grid 
reinforcement. Spatial planning and a review of the minimum distance rules of wind 
turbines  from  airports,  radars  and  military  zones  could  free  up  more  space  for  wind 
energy.  Furthermore,  permitting  could  be  made  easier  by  granting  wind  and  grid 
infrastructure  projects  the  status  of  overriding  public  interest  and  processing  appeals 
faster. The participation of municipalities and citizens in renewable energy generation 
projects could increase local acceptability. The expansion of rooftop solar power (both 
small-scale  and  large-scale  installations)  could  be  further  stimulated  by  adopting 
reforms  that  provide  for  binding  requirements  for  large  public  and  commercial 
buildings, incentives for landlords, and legal frameworks that facilitate energy sharing. 
In  addition,  self-consumption  and  demand  side  flexibility  could  be  promoted.  The 
proactive development of more integrated and consistent ten-year electricity network 
investment  plans  could  avoid  delays  in  connecting  new  wind  energy  projects  (and 
other renewable sources) as well as end users (heat pumps, charging points for electric 
cars), and should anticipate the expected surge in industrial electricity consumption.  

(36)  Further policy reforms and additional investments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
in  the  energy,  industry,  building  and  transport  sectors  would  help  reduce  Belgium’s 
high  overall  dependency  on  fossil  fuel  imports.  Energy  efficiency  gains  in  industry 
could be incentivised by improving voluntary agreements, introducing energy savings 
and  decarbonisation  plans  for  the  largest  fossil  fuel  users,  stimulating  electrification 
and  the  deployment  of  industrial  heat  pumps  and  further  embedding  circular 
production methods. Belgium risks not reaching  its renovation and energy efficiency 
targets for 2030. The challenge of reducing fossil fuel consumption in buildings is still 
considerable. The current investment efforts on energy renovations should therefore be 
stepped up and complemented with policy reforms such as a ban on fossil fuels in new 
builds,  mandatory  energy-efficient  renovations,  phasing  out  fossil  fuel-based  heating 
and shifting incentives towards low carbon heating solutions such as heat pumps and 
heat networks supplied with recovered and renewable energy. This should be matched 
by adapting education and training to the relevant emerging green technical skills and 
ensuring sufficient and appropriately skilled technicians and construction workers.  In 

25 

Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1369 and Council Regulation (EU) 2023/706 

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transport, the high share of private car use accounts for a large part of oil consumption 
in Belgium. Promoting ‘soft mobility’ (for example cycling, shared mobility) and the 
use of public transport  would help  reduce the use of private cars, together with road 
congestion  costs.  In  2022,  cycling  increased  as  a  method  of  commuting  to  work, 
particularly  in  Flanders  and  Brussels,  thanks  to  continuous  investments  in  cycling 
infrastructure,  promotion  initiatives  and  targeted  incentives.  However,  there  is  still 
scope to  further encourage this form  of soft mobility through investments in  cycling 
infrastructure  and  in  road  safety  for  cyclists.  The  use  of  public  transport  has  not  yet 
fully  recovered  after  the  COVID-19  crisis  and  could  be  further  promoted  by 
improvements  to  suburban  and  intercity  services,  investments  in  fleet  renewal  and 
higher frequency of services. 

(37)  Labour  and  skills  shortages  in  sectors  and  occupations  key  for  the  green  transition, 
including  manufacturing,  deployment  and  maintenance  of  net-zero  technologies,  are 
creating  bottlenecks  in  the  transition  to  a  net-zero  economy.  High-quality  education 
and  training  systems  that  respond  to  changing  labour  market  needs  and  targeted 
upskilling and reskilling measures are key to reducing skills shortages and promoting 
labour inclusion and reallocation.  To unlock untapped labour supply, these measures 
need  to  be  accessible,  in  particular  for  individuals  and  in  sectors  and  regions  most 
affected  by  the  green  transition.  In  2022,  labour  shortages  were  reported  for  several 
occupations that require specific green skills or knowledge, including civil engineering 
functions and power plant operators. 

(38) 

(39) 

In light of the Commission’s assessment, the Council has examined the 2023 Stability 
Programme and its opinion26 is reflected in recommendation (1) below.  

In view of the close interlinkages between the economies of euro area Member States 
and  their  collective  contribution  to  the  functioning  of  the  Economic  and  Monetary 
Union, the Council recommended that euro area Member States take action, including 
through  their  recovery  and  resilience  plans,  to  (i)  preserve  debt  sustainability  and 
refrain  from  broad-based  support  to  aggregate  demand  in  2023,  better  target  fiscal 
measures taken to mitigate the impact of high energy prices and reflect on appropriate 
ways to wind down support as energy price pressures diminish; (ii) sustain high public 
investment and promote private investment to support the green and digital transition; 
(iii)  support  wage  developments  that  mitigate  the  loss  in  purchasing  power  while 
limiting  second-round  effects  on  inflation,  further  improve  active  labour  market 
policies  and  address  skills  shortages;  (iv)  improve  the  business  environment  and 
ensure that energy support to companies is cost-effective, temporary, targeted to viable 
firms  and  that  it  maintains  incentives  for  the  green  transition;  and  (v)  preserve 
macro-financial  stability  and  monitor  risks  while  continuing  to  work  on  completing 
the Banking Union. For Belgium, recommendations (1), (2), (3) and (4) contribute to 
the implementation of the first, second and third euro area recommendations. 

HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Belgium take action in 2023 and 2024 to:  

1. 

Wind  down  the  energy  support  measures  in  force  by  the  end  of  2023,  using  the 
related  savings  to  reduce  the  government  deficit.  Should  renewed  energy  price 
increases  necessitate  support  measures,  ensure  that  these  are  targeted  at  protecting 
vulnerable  households  and  firms,  fiscally  affordable,  and  preserve  incentives  for 
energy savings.  

26 

Under Articles 5(2) and 9(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97. 

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Ensure  prudent  fiscal  policy,  in  particular  by  limiting  the  nominal  increase  in 
nationally financed net primary expenditure in 2024 to not more than 2%. 

Preserve nationally financed public investment and ensure the effective absorption of 
RRF  grants  and  other  EU  funds,  in  particular  to  foster  the  green  and  digital 
transitions.  

For  the  period  beyond  2024,  continue  to  pursue  a  medium-term  fiscal  strategy  of 
gradual  and  sustainable  consolidation,  combined  with  investments  and  reforms 
conducive  to  higher  sustainable  growth,  to  achieve  a  prudent  medium-term  fiscal 
position. 

Strengthen efforts to improve the efficiency of long-term care. Pursue the reform of 
the taxation and benefits system to reduce disincentives to work by shifting the tax 
burden away from labour and by simplifying the tax and benefits system. Review tax 
expenditures to reduce their economic, social and environmental harmful impact. 

Ensure an effective governance to allow for a swift and steady implementation of its 
recovery and resilience plan. Swiftly finalise the REPowerEU chapter with a view to 
rapidly  starting  its  implementation.  Proceed  with  the  speedy  implementation  of 
cohesion  policy  programmes,  in  close  complementarity  and  synergy  with  the 
recovery and resilience plan. 

Address  labour  shortages  and  skills  mismatches,  in  particular  by  strengthening 
activation policies to integrate disadvantaged groups into the labour market. Improve 
the  performance  and  equity  of  the  education  and  training  systems  and  continue 
reforms to strengthen the teaching profession. 

Reduce  overall  reliance  on  fossil  fuels  by  stepping  up  energy  efficiency 
improvements and the reduction of fossil fuel use in buildings, by further stimulating 
the  decarbonisation  of  industry  and  by  promoting  the  use  and  supply  of  public 
transport as well as soft mobility. Accelerate the deployment of renewable energies 
and  related  grid  infrastructure  by  further  streamlining  the  permitting  procedures, 
including  by  reducing  the  length  of  appeal  procedures,  and  by  adopting  legal 
frameworks  to  further  boost  investments  in  renewable  energy  installations  and 
facilitate  energy  sharing.  Step  up  policy  efforts  aimed  at  the  provision  and 
acquisition of the skills needed for the green transition. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

Done at Brussels, 

For the Council 
The President 

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