Iraq : Arab tribes and customary law : April 2023.
Date: 2023-04-26
Institutions: European Union Agency for Asylum
Subjects: Iraq, Islamic State, civil defence, ethnic discrimination, fundamental rights, geographical mobility, human rights, international security, judicial power, migration policy, position of women, refugee, regional security, religious discrimination, religious group, report, sexual discrimination, violence, war, woman

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Iraq: 
Arab tribes and 
customary law

 
 
 
 
Iraq: Arab tribes and customary law 

April 2023

 
Manuscript completed in April 2023 

Neither the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) nor any person acting on behalf of the 
EUAA is responsible for the use that might be made of the information contained within this 
publication. 

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2023 

PDF 

ISBN : 978-92-9400-796-4             doi: 10.2847/294289 

            BZ-03-22-158-EN-N 

© European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), 2023 

Cover photo/illustration: Mudhif in Chabayish (Nasiriya) ©Melisande Genat, 18 December 2021 

Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. For any use or reproduction 
of photos or other material that is not under the EUAA copyright, permission must be sought 
directly from the copyright holders. 

 
 
 
IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW  

Acknowledgements 

This report was drafted by the EUAA COI Sector. The chapters on women, children, and 
Christian converts were written by Finland’s Country Information Service within the Finnish 
Immigration Service. 

The following national asylum and migration departments reviewed this report: 

•  Germany, Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), Country Analysis. 

EUAA would also like to acknowledge ACCORD, the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and 
Asylum Research and Documentation, as a peer-reviewer of the report. 

Finally, the report was also reviewed by Haley Bobseine. Ms. Bobseine is a PhD Candidate at 
King's College London’s School of Security Studies. She is an Arabic-speaking researcher, 
analyst, and advisor to international organizations, with more than 12 years field experience in 
the Middle East, mostly in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria.  Her areas of expertise include tribalism, 
conflict, and security issues. 

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Contents 

Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................ 3 

Contents .......................................................................................................................................... 4 

Disclaimer ........................................................................................................................................ 6 

Glossary and abbreviations ............................................................................................................7 

Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 11 

Methodology ........................................................................................................................................ 11 

Defining the terms of reference ................................................................................. 12 

Collecting information ................................................................................................... 12 

Research challenges and limitations ........................................................................ 12 

Quality control ..................................................................................................................13 

Sources ..................................................................................................................................................13 

Structure and use of the report ...................................................................................................... 15 

Maps ............................................................................................................................................... 16 

1. 

Tribes and tribal law in Iraq .............................................................................................. 17 

1.1.  Background .................................................................................................................................. 17 

1.2.  Structure of the tribe................................................................................................................ 22 

1.3.  Tribal law in Iraq ........................................................................................................................ 24 

2. 

Causes of tribal disputes ................................................................................................. 29 

2.1.  Water and land disputes ......................................................................................................... 32 

3. 

Tribal conflict resolution mechanisms and practices ................................................... 34 

3.1.  Notification (tanbih) and ‘Tribal summoning’ (mutalaba asha’iriyah) ......................... 36 

3.2. Tribal confrontation (gouwama) and striking (degge asha’iriyah) ............................... 37 

3.3.  Tribal ‘blood truce’ (atwa) ...................................................................................................... 38 

3.4.  Exile (jalwa) ................................................................................................................................ 39 

3.5. Tribal dispute settlement (sulha, also sulh) ....................................................................... 39 

3.6. Tribal dispute compensation (fasl) ....................................................................................... 42 

3.7.  Expulsion from the tribe or banishment (bara’a) .............................................................. 43 

3.8. ‘Blood spilling’ (hadr al-dam).................................................................................................. 47 

3.9. Blood feuds (thar) ..................................................................................................................... 49 

3.10. Women as a means of tribal disputes settlement or use of women in tribal 
customs…… ……………………………………………………………………………………………………                     50 

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IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

3.11. Honour violations and honour-based violence ................................................................. 51 

3.12. Tribes’ capacity to enforce the outcome of dispute settlements .............................. 55 

4. 

Situation of certain profiles under the tribal system .................................................... 57 

4.1.  People perceived as affiliated with ISIL .............................................................................. 57 

4.1.1 Possibility of tribal aid for returnees ................................................................ 64 

4.2. Women’s tribal participation and other practices affecting women ........................... 65 

4.2.1 Women’s tribal membership and participation............................................ 65 

4.2.2. Use of women as compensation (fasliya) .................................................... 67 

4.2.3. Traditional marriage of cousins (nahwa) and kassa bi kassa (cousin 
dowry) ............................................................................................................................... 69 

4.3.  Collective liability and children ..............................................................................................70 

4.4.  Treatment of family members of a person violating ‘honour’ ........................................ 71 

4.5. Treatment of Christian converts ............................................................................................. 71 

5. 

State response and redress ............................................................................................ 74 

5.1.  The interaction between tribal and state law .................................................................... 74 

5.2. State response to persons fearing tribal retaliation, particularly honour-based 
violence

…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….79 

5.4. Relocation away from tribal threats ...................................................................................... 81 

6. 

Impact of tribal violence on the security situation and civilians ................................. 82 

6.1.  Security incidents resulting from tribal conflict ................................................................ 82 

6.2. ACLED data on tribal feuds ................................................................................................... 85 

6.3. State’s response to tribal feuds that impact security ..................................................... 88 

Annex 1: Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 94 

Annex 2: Terms of Reference ..................................................................................................... 112 

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Disclaimer 

This report was written according to the EUAA COI Report Methodology (2023). The report is 
based on carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.  

The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with 
utmost care within a limited timeframe. However, this document does not claim to be 
exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this 
does not mean that the event has not taken place or that the person or organisation does not 
exist. Any event taking place after the finalisation of this report is not included. More 
information on the reference period for this report can be found in the Introduction.  

Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particular 
application for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as 
indicative of a particular legal position.  

‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal 
sense as applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.  

Neither EUAA nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which 
may be made of the information contained in this report.  

On 19 January 2022, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) became the European 
Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA). All references to EASO, EASO products and bodies should 
be understood as references to the EUAA. 

The drafting of this report was finalised on 6 April 2023. More information on the reference 
period for this report can be found in the methodology section of the Introduction. 

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IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

Glossary and abbreviations 

Term 

Definition 

ACLED 

Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project 

Arfa  

Ashira 

Tribal customary reference, awaref in plural 

Tribal organisation comprised of a cluster of clans 

Asayish 

Intelligence services of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq 

Atwa  

Bara’a 

Bayt 

Tribal truce 

Expulsion of a member from the tribe 

House – a tribal unit 

Degge asha’iriyah 
(also degge) 

A tribal practice whereby the injured tribe sends armed men to 
the home of the perpetrator and sprays it with some number of 
bullets’ as a warning 

Dakhala  

Seeking protection of another tribe 

Diyya (also diya) 

Blood money paid to settle a dispute between tribes, especially in 
cases involving death; sometimes referred to as fasl 

EUAA 

European Union Agency for Asylum 

Fakhdh 

Clan – a tribal unit comprised of a number of bayts 

Fasl (also fasel) 

Tribal dispute compensation; sometimes used to refer to the 
process of dispute settlement or the compensation amount to be 
paid (diyya) though it is not always a monetary settlement; refers 
to the ‘solution’ or agreement that is the outcome of the sulha 
process 

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Term 

Definition 

Fasliya  

A practice of trading women/girls to settle tribal disputes 

Fidiyya 

Ransom 

Ghasl al-yar 

Shame-washing; action taken, such as honour killing, to remove 
shame 

Gouwama 

Tribal warning – a tribal practice 

Hadr al-damm  

‘Blood spilling’ 

IDP 

IOM 

IRCC 

‘ird 

ISF 

ISIL 

Jalwa 

KDP 

KH 

Internally Displaced Person 

International Organization for Migration 

Iraqi Resistance Coordination Commission 

Family honour; can be increased by male behaviour; females for 
the most part can only contribute to loss of family honour; see 
also Sharaf 

Iraqi Security Forces 

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant; also known as Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Islamic State (IS), or Daesh 

Also called Jali; A tribal practice whereby the perpetrator, and 
sometimes his close male relatives, undergo and exile for a 
certain period of time 

Kurdistan Democratic Party 

Kata’ib Hezbollah (Battalions of the Party of God); Iranian-backed 
Shia militia that is part of the Popular Mobilisation Units. KH was 
designated by the US as a terrorist organisation on 2 July 2009) 1 

1 USDOS, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, n. d., url 

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IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

Term 

Definition 

Khamsa 

Greater extended family – a tribal unit; consisting of male children 
with certain common lineage; traditional vengeance group 

Khoulasiya 

An official document obtained by the person in case of self-
banishment from the tribe 

KRG 

KRI 

Kurdistan Regional Government 

Kurdistan Region of Iraq 

Mahdar Sulh 

A dispute settlement document 

Mutalaba 
Asha’iriyah 

Nahwa 

Tribal summoning 

A tribal tradition where the cousin, uncle or other male relative of 
a girl can prohibit her marriage to a person outside of the family. 

Peshmerga 

Military forces of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq Kurdistan 

PMF 

Popular Mobilisation Forces 

Qabila 

Tribal Confederation 

Sanayin (Sawani) 

Sets of codes constituting tribal law 

Sayyid 

A surname of Muslims recognised as descendants of Muhammad 
through Ali ibn Ali Talib; in the Iraqi context related to Shia Islam; 
in the context of dispute resolution or religious context, it usually 
means that this person, in addition to having descendance as 
described, also may have religious training or be acknowledged 
as a wise person within the community who has capacity to help 
in these matters. A sayyid may also be a religious cleric, such as 
for example, Ayatollah Sistani 

Sharaf 

A male’s honour that can be won/lost based on his behaviour 

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Term 

Definition 

Sheikh 

A tribal leader or notable in the tribal community 

Sulh/sulha 

Tribal dispute settlement process meaning ‘peacemaking’ and 
aimed at restoring the honour of disputing parties 

Tabriya 

Disowning a person, e.g., in cases of affiliation with ISIL 

Tahwila 

A tribal delegation (also referred to as mashya) 

Tanazul 

Withdrawal of complaint 

Thar 

Urf 

Blood feud 

Tribal customary law; also called a’araf  or adah 

10 

 
 
IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

Introduction  

The purpose of this report is to provide relevant contextual information in view of the 
assessment of international protection status determination, including refugee status and 
subsidiary protection.  

This report is meant to provide an overview and provide background information on the tribal 
dynamics and structures in Iraq as well the major tribal practices and dispute settlement 
mechanisms applied by the Arab Muslim Iraqi tribes, mainly in western/central and southern 
areas of the country. Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) is not covered by this report. Issues in 
disputed territories between the KRI and Iraqi government are not specifically covered. 

It provides information on tribal (customary) law in Iraq, tribal practices, and tribal interaction 
with Iraqi formal law as well as the Iraqi state’s response towards tribes and tribal practices in 
Arab Muslim contexts. Furthermore, the report provides information on certain aspects of how 
women are impacted by tribal practices, and tribal responses to Christian conversion and 
perceived ISIL affiliation. Lastly, aspects of tribal violence that have a civilian and security 
dimension are addressed: causes, impact on the security situation, and the State’s ability to 
respond to tribal feuds.  

It must be noted that the tribal system in Iraq is highly complex, sensitive, extremely difficult to 
research, and variable based on a wide range of factors and specific circumstances on the 
ground. The information in this report is compiled from a selection of public sources and 
should therefore only be taken as indicative. It provides an overview of some of the tribal 
customs occurring in Arab tribal contexts in Iraq. The report should also be read in conjunction 
with other EUAA publications on Iraq, namely: 

•  EUAA COI Report Iraq – Targeting of Individuals (January 2022);  
•  EUAA COI Report Iraq – Targeting of Individuals (March 2019);  
•  EUAA COI Report: Iraq - Treatment of Iraqis with perceived affiliation to ISIL (October 

2020) 

•  Additional EUAA COI Reporting on Iraq available on the EUAA COI Portal. 

Methodology  

This report is produced in line with the EUAA COI Report Methodology (2023) 2 and the EUAA 
COI Writing and Referencing Style Guide (2023). 3 

The reference period for the report is January 2021 to 23 March 2023. It was originally from 
October 2021 to November 2022, however it was extended up to March 2023, to allow time 

2 EUAA, Country of Origin Information (COI) Report Methodology, February 2023, url 
3 EUAA, Writing and Referencing Guide for EUAA Country of Origin Information (COI) Reports, February 2023, url 

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

to address research gaps identified in the review process and enhance overall quality of the 
reporting.  

Additional information was added after the reviewing of this report in response to feedback 
received during the quality control process, until March 2023. In this quality review process, a 
review was carried out by COI specialists from Germany, ACCORD, and by country expert 
Haley Bobseine, as stated in the Acknowledgments section of this report, and internally by 
EUAA. More details are provided below. 

Defining the terms of reference 

In the course of EUAA’s work facilitating the EUAA COI Specialist Network on Iraq, the 
network indicated that information was needed on the functioning of tribal law and practices. 
The terms of reference of this report build on internal and external consultations with experts, 
with EUAA network members, and the relevant most recent literature on the topic. Terms of 
reference for this report can be found in Annex 2: Terms of Reference of this report.  

Collecting information 

This report is based on information gathered from extensive desk research using 
predominantly public, specialised paper-based, and electronic sources; as well as interviews 
with experts conducted by the EUAA and the Finnish Immigration Service for the purposes of 
the report in October-November 2022 and by the EUAA during March 2023 to supplement 
information gaps. ACLED data on security incidents and fatalities involving tribal actors 
covering the reference period of this report were also consulted and included. All these 
sources were duly referenced and described in Annex 1: Bibliography. 

Research challenges and limitations 

Researching the tribal system in Iraq is extremely challenging due to a range of limitations 
including: lack of reporting and limited published sources on the topic, lack of available 
English sources, difficulty accessing expert knowledge about the internal workings of tribes, 
sensitivity of topics and questions surrounding human rights violations and tribal practices, a 
high degree of variability within the tribal context across different tribes, regions, and peoples; 
as well as a deeply complex socio-cultural and legal context that is opaque and difficult to 
access. Taken together, these limitations should be borne in mind when considering the 
available information found in this report, which provides an indication of the complexities of 
tribal practices based on available information.  

Additionally, information on tribes available in sources can range from quite old (yet still 
relevant) to more recent and updated (and possibly unstable). Care has been taken during the 
research in validating information from older sources and reflecting possible changes due to 
the fluid situation in Iraq during the ISIL period and subsequently after ISIL’s defeat in 2017, 
however it is important to be aware of how tribal and societal dynamics in Iraq were disrupted 
by the years of ISIL conflict.  

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IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

Quality control 

To ensure that the authors respected the EUAA COI Report Methodology a quality review was 
carried out by COI specialists from the countries and organisations listed as reviewers in the 
Acknowledgements section. All comments made by the reviewers were taken into 
consideration and most of them were implemented. The quality review phase identified a 
number of research gaps and methodology points that needed to be addressed, including 
adding detail on honour-related violence and the tribal dimension of the situation of people 
with ISIL affiliation. Duly responding to the reviewer comments and aimed at increasing 
quality, additional research was conducted up to March 2023 and included in the final draft of 
this report. A quality review on the content overall from a country expert perspective was then 
provided in March 2023 by Iraq expert, Haley Bobseine. Lastly, EUAA management 
conducted a review and the report was finalised in April 2023.  

It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or 
organisations contributes to the overall quality of the report, but does not necessarily imply 
their formal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EUAA. 

Sources 

In accordance with EUAA COI methodology, a range of different published documentary 
sources have been consulted on relevant topics for this report. These include: academic 
publications, think tank reports, and specialised sources covering Iraq; information from civil 
society, NGOs, and Iraqi media. As the topic of the report is of a deep societal and cultural 
nature, information from English sources was complemented and corroborated/contrasted by 
Arabic sources to provide a better understanding of the tribal issue in Iraq. Such information 
was gathered from a variety of sources in Arabic including media articles, academic papers, 
journalist opinions, official sources, and videos shared on social media by an Iraqi tribal leader 
explaining tribal practices in Iraq. The content of the Arabic sources was checked by Arabic-
speaking/reading reviewers. 

In addition to using publicly available documentary sources, several oral sources were 
contacted and interviewed for this report. These experts are competent in the issue of tribes 
and tribal practices in Iraq and have various backgrounds. See the Bibliography for additional 
details.  

ACLED data on security incidents coded with a tribal actor 

Furthermore, and in order to provide an overview of the prevalence of tribal violence and its 
evolution in Iraq within the reference period, ACLED data was used. The use of ACLED data is 
only meant to be illustrative of the overall element of tribes as an actor. Any understanding of 
security issues in relation to tribes must also be read in relation to the EUAA reports on the 
general security situation in Iraq such as EUAA COI Report Iraq – Security Situation (January 
2022). 

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

ACLED is a project collecting, analysing and mapping information on ‘the dates, actors, 
locations, fatalities, and types of all reported political violence and protest events across 
Africa, the Middle East, Latin America & the Caribbean, East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, 
Central Asia & the Caucasus, Europe, and the United States of America’. 4 The information is 
collected in a database that is searchable and kept continuously up to date. The data primarily 
come from secondary sources such as media reports. ACLED’s methodology applied for 
coding and monitoring of the data is explained in detail in its Codebook. 5 As ACLED points 
out, the reader should, however, be aware of some limitations in the data.  

These limitations are:  

‘that most of the data is gathered based on publicly available, secondary reports. This 
means that the data is in part a reflection of the coverage and reporting priorities of 
media and international organisations. One of the effects of this is that it may under-
estimate the volume of events of non-strategic importance (for example, low-level 
communal conflict, or events in very isolated areas). We work to address this possibility 
by triangulating data sources to include humanitarian and international organisation 
reports, rather than media alone; and by conducting ground-truthing exercises in 
which we present data to local organisations and partners to assess its validity among 
people working directly in conflict-affected contexts.’ 6 

Therefore, ACLED’s figures in this report are to be considered as an estimate and indication of 
trends in violence over a given period of time.  

ACLED codes security incidents as follows:  

• 

• 

• 

• 

‘Battles’: ‘a violent interaction between two politically organized armed groups at a 
particular time and location.’ ‘Battles can occur between armed and organised state, 
nonstate, and external groups, and in any combination therein.’ Sub-events of battles 
are ‘armed clash’, ‘government regains territory’ and ‘non-state actor overtakes 
territory’. The subevent type ‘Armed clash’ occurs when ‘armed, organized groups 
engage in a battle, and no reports indicate a change in territorial control’. 
‘Violence against civilians’: ‘violent events where an organised armed group 
deliberately inflicts violence upon unarmed non-combatants’. ‘Violence against 
civilians includes attempts at inflicting harm (e.g., beating, shooting, torture, rape, 
mutilation, etc.) or forcibly disappearing (e.g., kidnapping and disappearances) civilian 
actors.’ The following sub-event types are associated with the violence against 
civilians event type: ‘Sexual violence’, ‘Attack’, and ‘Abduction/forced disappearance’.  
‘Explosions/remote violence’: ‘one-sided violent events in which the tool for engaging 
in conflict creates asymmetry by taking away the ability of the target to respond.’ They 
include: Chemical weapon’, ‘Air/drone strike’, ‘Suicide bomb’, ‘Shelling/artillery/missile 
attack’, ‘Remote explosive/landmine/IED’, and ‘Grenade’.  
‘Riots’: are a violent demonstration, often involving a spontaneous action by 
unorganised, unaffiliated members of society. They include ‘violent demonstrations’, 
‘mob violence’.  

4 ACLED, About Acled, n.d., url 
5 ACLED Codebook, n.d., url 
6 ACLED, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Guide for Media Users, January 2015, url, pp. 9-10 

14 

 
 
IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

• 

• 

‘Protests’: ‘public demonstration in which the participants do not engage in violence, 
though violence may be used against them.’ It includes ‘peaceful protests’, ‘protests 
with intervention’, ‘excessive force against protesters’.  
‘Strategic developments’: ‘contextually important information regarding the activities of 
violent groups that is not itself recorded as political violence, yet may trigger future 
events or contribute to political dynamics within and across states.’ It includes 
‘agreements’, ‘changes to group/activity’, ‘non-violent transfers of territory’, ‘arrests’. 7 

EUAA provided analytical graphs on security incidents involving tribal actors based on publicly 
available ACLED data. For the purpose of this report, only the following types of events were 
included as violent incidents in the analysis of the security aspect of tribal feuds in Iraq: 
battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians. The reference period for 
the ACLED data is from 1 October 2021 to 28 February 2023 and EUAA downloaded the 
ACLED curated data files on the Middle East, including Iraq, on 9 March 2023.  

ACLED identified in its 2019 Codebook 8 three codes for the geo-precision of events: ‘If the 
report notes a particular town, and coordinates are available for that town, the highest 
precision level “1” is recorded. If the source material notes that activity took place in a small 
part of a region, and notes a general area, a town with georeferenced coordinates to 
represent that area is chosen and the geo-precision code will note “2” for “part of region”. If 
activity occurs near a town or a city, this same precision code is employed. If a larger region is 
mentioned, the closest natural location noted in reporting (like “border area”, “forest” or “sea”, 
among others) is chosen to represent the region – or a provincial capital is used if no other 
information at all is available – and is noted with precision level “3”. No ACLED event is 
associated with the “country” as the smallest location unit available.’  

Structure and use of the report 

The report is divided into six chapters. The first chapter provides background information on 
the issue and role of tribes in the Iraqi society, the structure of the tribe, and the major tribal 
confederations in the country and an introduction to tribal law. The second chapter describes 
the main triggers of tribal disputes and conflicts. Chapter 3 describes tribal conflict resolution 
mechanisms and practices that deal with disputes, as well as the means by which tribes 
enforce settlements. Chapter 4 covers tribe-related aspects of certain profiles, such as people 
with perceived ISIL affiliation, the participation of women and impacts of certain tribal practices 
on women, the liability of children in tribal disputes, and tribal treatment of Christian converts. 
Chapter 5 deals with tribal law and its relationship with the Iraqi state law, state redress in 
cases where a person fears tribal retribution, and relocation away from such threats. Chapter 
6 provides information on tribal feuds that have a security dimension and broader civilian 
impact, their causes, prevalence, impact on the security situation in Iraq, as well as the Iraqi 
State’s ability to respond to such feuds and enforce the law. 

7 ACLED, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook, October 2017, url, pp. 7-14 
8 ACLED, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook, 2019, url, p. 29 

15 

 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Maps 

Map 1. Iraq 9  

9  Map 1: UN, Iraq - Map No. 3835 Rev.6, July 2014 

16 

 
 
IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

1. 

Tribes and tribal law in Iraq  

1.1. 

Background 

Tribes in Iraq exercise social influence across the country, 10 and social capital for Iraqis is 
‘often’ 11 or ‘primarily found in tribal, clan, and ethno-sectarian communities’. 12 A report by the 
US Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimated that 75% of Iraqis are either members of, 
or have kinship to, a tribe, 13 and ‘around 70 percent of Iraqis identify themselves as part of the 
tribal system’. 14 Recent information on the representation and organisation of tribes across 
Iraq is scarce. There are around 60 tribal confederations 15, SS and around 150 tribes (asha’ir, 
singular ashira) in Iraq, comprising around 2 000 smaller clans. Tribes and clans vary in size 
and influence with the largest tribe counting more than 1 million members and the smallest a 
few thousand. 16 Minority communities in Iraq are also composed of tribes, however, in certain 
cases those have become less prominent. 17 In Arab and Kurdish areas, ‘tribal issues remain 
prevalent’  18 and tribes are largely present in rural areas, though they are spread all over the 
country and represent Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish Iraqis. 19 

According to Iraqi scholar Renad Mansour, 20 ‘loyalties to tribal codes go beyond simple family 
bloodlines’. Arab tribes tending to be defined by genealogy, while Kurdish tribes are defined 
by territory. 21 However, Bobseine mentioned that it is important to recognise that genealogical 
aspects have limits also – as tribes are characterised by distant patrilineal ancestry which is 
‘often more claimed than real’ and that Iraqis, like other cultures ‘may manipulate their 
genealogical ancestry in search of new tribal associations.’  22 Additionally, tribal 
confederations and tribes are ‘often cross-sectarian’ and major tribes contain both Sunni and 
Shiite members, 23 such as the Jiburi and Shammar. 24 Due to the diversity of tribal structures 
and origins, geographical and sectarian divisions are not always clear-cut. Iraqi tribes have 
‘related branches’ in several Arab countries like Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia as well as in 

11 Bobseine, H., comments during external expert review of the report, 03 April 2023 
12 BTI, BTI 2022 – Iraq, 2022, url, p. 17 
13 Hassan, H. D., Iraq: Tribal Structure, Social, and Political Activities, CRS, 7 April 2008, url, p. 1 
14 Mansour, R., Tribes and Religious Institutions in Iraq, Cordoba Foundation of Geneva, September 2017, url, p. 5 
15 The Emirates Policy Center (EPC) estimated the number of tribes in Iraq at 200. EPC,  ﺎﯾﺎﺿﻘﻟا : قارﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ ةرﺻﺑﻟا رﺋﺎﺷﻋ
ﺔﯾﻧﻣﻷاو ﺔﯾﻋﺎﻣﺗﺟﻻاو ﺔﯾﺳﺎﯾﺳﻟا [Basrah tribes in Iraq: Political, social and security issues], 25 May 2022, url 
16 Hassan, H. D., Iraq: Tribal Structure, Social, and Political Activities, CRS, 7 April 2008, url, p. 1 
17 Mansour, R., Tribes and Religious Institutions in Iraq, Cordoba Foundation of Geneva, September 2017, url, p. 9 
18 Mansour, R., Tribes and Religious Institutions in Iraq, Cordoba Foundation of Geneva, September 2017, url, p. 9 
19 BTI, Iraq Country Report 2022, 2022, url  
20 Renad Mansour is a Senior Research Fellow and project director of the Iraq Initiative at Chatham House. He is 
also a senior research fellow at the American University of Iraq, Sulaimani, and a research fellow at the Cambridge 
Security Initiative based at Cambridge University. Chatham House, Renad Mansour, n. d., url  
21 Mansour, R., Tribes and Religious Institutions in Iraq, Cordoba Foundation of Geneva, September 2017, url, p. 5 
22 Bobseine, H., comments during external expert review of the report, 03 April 2023 
23 Hassan, H. D., Iraq: Tribal Structure, Social, and Political Activities, CRS, 7 April 2008, url, pp. 2-3; Mansour, R., 
Tribes and Religious Institutions in Iraq, Cordoba Foundation of Geneva, September 2017, url, p. 9 
24 Hassan, H. D., Iraq: Tribal Structure, Social, and Political Activities, CRS, 7 April 2008, url, pp. 2-3 

17 

 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Turkey. 25 In a commentary published on the foreign policy analysis platform War on the Rocks, 
Alison Pargeter, 26 stated that tribes are ‘broadly secular in orientation’, 27 and affiliation with 
the tribal system and codes supersedes religious considerations. 28 Haley Bobseine further 
stated that ‘while many tribes do not have explicit confessional orientations, often having 
Sunni and Shia members within one tribe, defining them as secular is a misnomer. Tribal 
customary law, or urf, is a dynamic amalgamation of various customs, including to a certain 
extent, interpretations of Sharia law.’ 29 Tribes ‘do not have explicitly stated confessional 
orientations’, and supporting a tribal leader is based on the latter’s actions and ability to 
defend the interests of the tribe rather than sectarian considerations. Mansour noted that the 
secular nature of tribes should not be overstated. 30   

Sources indicate that even highly educated individuals resort to their tribes, and tribal 
leadership may include highly educated individuals, 31 including in urban areas. 32 Many 
politicians, judges, and police ‘retain some degree of tribal identity’. 33 The Economist reported 
that some lawyers even advise corporate clients to use tribal councils instead of state courts, 
especially where the sheikhs involved have linkages to militia groups. 34 

‘Tribalism’ 35 is a defining characteristic of modern Iraqi society, but one that is constantly 
adapting to changing times’. 36 Years of authoritarian rule, war, and economic crises  have 
hampered ‘the creation of a unified social identity’ in Iraq, meaning tribal, ethno-sectarian and 
clan communities are of primary social importance. 37  Tribalism is ‘one of the oldest 
establishments’ in Iraq and the tribe’s leader assumes the tasks of resource administration, 
conflict management, and law enforcement in periods where the state’s governing powers 
fluctuated. 38 This was particularly the case after 2003 when the tribe played a major role in 
maintaining peace and order in the country. 39 In Iraq, tribes can be viewed as ‘social, 
economic, cultural, and at times political organizations’, 40 and have strength over the state 

25 Hassan, H. D., Iraq: Tribal Structure, Social, and Political Activities, CRS, 7 April 2008, url, pp. 2-3 
26 A Senior Research Fellow at the School of Security Studies, King's College London and a Senior Visiting Fellow 
at the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies. King’s College London, Alison Pargeter, n. d., url  
27 Pargeter, A., TRIBES, POLITICAL PARTIES, AND THE IRAQI ELECTIONS: A SHIFTING DYNAMIC, War on the 
Rocks, 28 September 2021, url 
28 Pargeter, A., TRIBES, POLITICAL PARTIES, AND THE IRAQI ELECTIONS: A SHIFTING DYNAMIC, War on the 
Rocks, 28 September 2021, url; Chokr, M. A., Tribes, Memory and Politics in Iraq, PhD Thesis, 2022, url, 192 
29 Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url 
30 Mansour, R., Tribes and Religious Institutions in Iraq, Cordoba Foundation of Geneva, September 2017, url, p. 9 
31 Al-Ibrahimi, H., email, 28 November 2022; OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023, p. 7 
32 OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023, p. 7; Al-Ibrahimi, H., email, 28 November 2022 
33 CNA, “No Security Without Us”: Tribes and Tribalism in Al Anbar Province, June 2014, url, p. 5 
34 Economist (The), With Iraqi tribes settling more disputes, sheikhs are in high demand, 30 May 2019, url 
35 The European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) defines tribalism as ‘a loyalty or preference to one’s own 
people’. ECPS, Cultural Tribalism, n. d., url 
36 Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 1 
37 BTI, Iraq Country Report 2022, 2022, url  
38 Khan, J., The Iraqi Tribal Structure: Background and Influence on Counter-Terrorism, November 2007, url, p. 3 
39 Al-Ibrahimi, H., video interview, 3 November 2022. Haidar Al-Ibrahimi is the CEO of Peace Paradigms with 
expertise on peacebuilding and tribal reconciliation. He was also the Executive Director of the Iraqi NGO Sanad for 
Peacebuilding. Peace Paradigms, Meet our core team, n. d., url; Al-Abadi, A. M.,  ﺎﮭﺗاﺮﯿﺛﺄﺗو قاﺮﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا تﺎﻋاﺰﻨﻟا
ﺔﯿﻠﺒﻘﺘﺴﻤﻟا [Tribal disputes in Iraq and their future impact], 15 April 2019, url; BBC Arabic,  ﻦﯿﻧاﻮﻘﻠﻟ ﻞﯾﺪﺑ ﻮھ ﻞھ يﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا نﻮﻧﺎﻘﻟا
؟ﺔﯿﻧﺪﻤﻟا [Tribal law: Is it and alternative to civil laws?] [Online video], 25 February 2019, url  
40 Mansour, R., Tribes and Religious Institutions in Iraq, Cordoba Foundation of Geneva, September 2017, url, p. 5 

18 

 
IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

socially, politically, and legally. 41 In areas where it is strong, tribal law ‘regulates everyday life 
and behaviour, relations between sexes, and men’s and women’s roles in society. 42 A key 
underlying concept of the tribal system in Iraq is ‘honour,’ especially where family, clan and 
tribe are strong and where state institutions are weak; it is also key to tribal systems of conflict 
resolution. 43  

The role of tribes increases when the state is weakened by partisan struggles, armed conflicts, 
or economic crises, especially as regards the issues of security and identity. This increase, 
however, does not take place in a coordinated and homogeneous way, but varies based on 
geographical, socio-economic and religious considerations. 44 In countries impacted by 
conflicts as Iraq, tribes assume ‘functions that in strong states are exclusively performed by 
the government’ such as providing security and resolving disputes. 45  Bobseine observed, 
however, that when the state is weak in enforcing justice it would put more burden on tribes 
to enforce tribal justice as well, hindering both. She added that even during the ISIL conflict 
when ISIL had geographical control over areas, tribal justice was absent as ISIL’s interpretation 
of Sharia law was the only “judicial system” operating; nevertheless, tribal importance did not 
disappear. 46 

There are hundreds of tribal codes in Iraq, and violations can trigger a reaction from tribes. 47 
Each clan, tribe, and tribal confederation has their own leader, or Sheikh. 48 Tribal codes are 
hierarchical, within and across tribes, as leaders ‘compete and amalgamate’ into broader 
confederations. At the local level, tribal leaders are ‘power-holders’ and are considered 
responsible for the protection and economic situation of their communities, serving as local 
judges and mediators for resolving disputes, including in matters of property and marriage. 49 
The tribe, however, is not currently considered by most to be responsible for the economic 
situation of their communities. 50 

In contemporary Iraq, tribalism has influence throughout the country. 51 It is particularly strong 
in the western/central areas and the south of Iraq, and particularly in rural areas. The presence 
of militias with tribal connections in both Baghdad and Basra were also mentioned; and 

41 Al-Obaidi, B., Interview with EUAA, 3 April 2023. Dr. Bushra Al-Obaidi is an Assistant Professor in international 
criminal law. She has been lobbying for women’s rights in Iraq since 1997 and is currently a member of UNAMI’s 
advisory group specialising on women in legislation and policies. She is a former member of the Iraqi High 
Commission for Human Rights. 
42 USIP, Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, 1 July 2011, url, p. 253 
43 Norway, Landinfo, Temanotat: Irak - Ære og æresrelatert vold [Thematic Note: Iraq - Honour and Honour Related 
Violence in Iraq and Kurdistan], 10 March 2022, url, para. 2.2.1 ‘Honor as a mechanism’ 
44 EPC, ﺔﯾﻧﻣﻷاو ﺔﯾﻋﺎﻣﺗﺟﻻاو ﺔﯾﺳﺎﯾﺳﻟا ﺎﯾﺎﺿﻘﻟا : قارﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ ةرﺻﺑﻟا رﺋﺎﺷﻋ [Basrah tribes in Iraq: Political, social and security issues], 25 
May 2022, url 
45 Revkin, M. R., The limits of punishment: Traditional justice and violent extremism, IFIT and UNU, May 2018, url, p. 
24 
46 Bobseine, H., comments during external expert review of the report, 03 April 2023 
47 Al-Ibrahimi, H., video interview, 3 November 2022; HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023; OWFI, Interview 
with EUAA, 13 March 2023 
48 CNA, “No Security Without Us”: Tribes and Tribalism in Al Anbar Province, Iraq, June 2014, url, p. 7 
49 Mansour, R., Tribes and Religious Institutions in Iraq, Cordoba Foundation of Geneva, September 2017, url, p. 7 
50 Bobseine, H., comments during external expert review of the report, 03 April 2023 
51 Gharizi, O., and Al-Ibrahimi, H., BAGHDAD MUST SEIZE THE CHANCE TO WORK WITH IRAQ’S TRIBES, War on 
the Rocks, 17 January 2018, url; HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023; OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 
2023 

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

individual members of tribes are involved in leading or participating in militias that can 
‘become very violent if it has disputes’. 52  

Tribalism ‘is particularly prominent among the Sunni community’, 53 especially in the 
governorates of Al-Anbar, Salah Al-Din, Kirkuk and Ninewa. 54 For example, the population of 
Al-Anbar governorate still looks ‘more toward their tribes for protection than the central 
government’ where tribal leaders play the role of mediators and advocates ‘toward other 
tribes, security forces and the government’. 55 The lack of strong political parties in the Sunni 
Arab areas also enabled tribes to represent the people and to mediate in cases of conflict.  56 
In an interview with EUAA, Nasir Al-Samaraie also observed that in Al-Anbar for example, 
especially in the Ramadi and Fallujah districts, the role of tribes is thriving due to the presence 
of high profile politicians, and that tribes in these areas seek financial benefits from those 
politicians. 57 In a 2020 research paper on tribal justice for families with perceived affiliation to 
ISIL, Melisande Genat 58 observed that given the current situation of dysfunctionality of state 
institutions and the aftermath of the ISIL-conflict, ‘Sunni tribes [in Nineveh, Salah al-Din and 
Anbar] all express a strong sense of confusion and a lack of clarity regarding the relationship 
between the adjudication function of the state and the tribes.’ 59 

The role of tribes in the Shia-majority areas in central and southern Iraq is also influential, 60 
particularly in Basra. 61 Renad Mansour observed that ‘[t]he tribes in the southern areas of Iraq 
are diverse in their origins and make-up, and varied in their stances towards state institutions 
and non-tribal actors’. 62 A case study prepared for the United Nations University 63 published 
in August 2022 found that in the city of Al-Basrah (as  well as in the city of Talafar in Anbar), 
‘[h]ighest rates of trust (in both locations) were held towards tribal authorities’. 64 Moreover, 
according to an IOM report published in 2021, 62% of the respondents to a survey, who were 

52 OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023 
53 Gharizi, O., and Al-Ibrahimi, H., BAGHDAD MUST SEIZE THE CHANCE TO WORK WITH IRAQ’S TRIBES, War on 
the Rocks, 17 January 2018, url 
54 Gharizi, O., and Al-Ibrahimi, H., BAGHDAD MUST SEIZE THE CHANCE TO WORK WITH IRAQ’S TRIBES, War on 
the Rocks, 17 January 2018, url 
55 Al-Monitor, Anbar tribes key to security, political backing ahead of Iraq's October vote, 22 April 2021, url 
56 Mansour, R., Tribes and Religious Institutions in Iraq, Cordoba Foundation of Geneva, September 2017, url, pp. 11-
12, 17 
57 Al-Samaraie, N., video Interview, 27 October 2022. Nasir Al-Samaraie is an expert on tribalism, tribal mechanisms 
and tribal law in Iraq 
58 Melisande Genat is a PhD student at Stanford University with extensive experience researching tribal justice and 
conflict resolution mechanisms in Iraq. 
59 Genat, M., Tribal Justice Mechanisms and Durable Solutions for Families with a Perceived Affiliation to ISIS, IOM, 
2020, p. 10 
60 Badawi, T., The Growing Tribal Role in Iraq’s Post-election Shia Politics, Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 17 May 2022, url;  
61 Gharizi, O., and Al-Ibrahimi, H., BAGHDAD MUST SEIZE THE CHANCE TO WORK WITH IRAQ’S TRIBES, War on 
the Rocks, 17 January 2018, url 
62 Mansour, R., Tribes and Religious Institutions in Iraq, Cordoba Foundation of Geneva, September 2017, url, p. 30 
63 The methodology used for the report is as follows: ‘This report is based on data collected from February 2022 to 
March 2022 from a total of 807 respondents in Basra and Tal Afar. Data was collected by a team of Iraqi 
enumerators who live in the relevant governorates. In both locations, male enumerators interviewed male 
respondents and female enumerators interviewed female respondents.’ Parry, J., et al, Managing Exits from Conflict 
in Iraq: A Case Study of Basra and Tal Afar, August 2022, url, p. 12 
64 Parry, J., et al, Managing Exits from Conflict in Iraq: A Case Study of Basra and Tal Afar, August 2022, url, p. 4 

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IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

residents of Al-Basrah city, expressed positive trust in tribal leaders. 65 Al-Samaraie observed 
that in southern Iraq, the potential financial gains to be made from the presence of the oil 
industry has increased the role of tribes, especially in the governorates of Al-Basrah, Thi-Qar 
and Maysan. According to him, those companies have taken large areas of land, and tribes 
tend to coerce them for financial benefits, especially through requesting the employment of 
members of tribes.66  

The focus of this EUAA report is not on tribal and honour issues in KRI, however it should be 
mentioned that tribes in the Kurdish region also have influence,67 despite that ‘[n]ationalism 
has overtaken tribalism in the Kurdish psyche’.68 The governance of the KRI is ‘split down 
tribal lines between the Barzani and Talabani clans.69 Rudaw stated that ‘tribes and religious 
denominations rule supreme [in the KRI, and particularly in Duhok] more than in any locality in 
the region’. During the 2021 Iraqi parliamentary elections, ‘almost all the 31 candidates in the 
three constituencies of Duhok, including those from the religious minorities as well as 
nationalists and political Islamists, have made sure that their candidates are identified by their 
tribal affiliation’.70 An article published by the Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM) in 
September 2018 stated that in return for their support to the political parties in the KRI, the 
tribes ‘demand for some positions in the government and within the parties’. This, according 
to the source, ‘has created such a reality which in many cases makes too hard to separate the 
tribes from the political parties and it can be assumed as a very crucial part of the parties’.71 
Kurdish tribes were able to ‘gain a huge political and militaristic power from the beginning of 
the formation of KRG even till the present time’, including in ‘administrative and institutional 
establishments’.72 They are mobilised by the ruling parties to provide votes to certain 
candidates during elections. Tribal leaders in some parts of the KRI enjoy a strong influence 
over the members of their tribes as regards voting, and this is especially the case when the 
candidate is a fellow tribesman.73 Moreover, tribalism is present in the Peshmerga across the 
KRI as the Kurdish ruling parties ‘use commanders that come from powerful tribes for their 
own political gain’. In Sulaimaniya, which is considered as the least tribal governorate of the 
KRI,74 political parties continued to engage the tribes to collect votes in the governorate.75 
Honour crimes and related violence against women is a continuing problem in the Kurdistan 
Region of Iraq.76 

65 IOM, Migration into a fragile setting: Responding to climate-induced informal urbanization and inequality in Basra, 
Iraq, 2021, url, p. 22 
66 Al-Samaraie, N., video Interview, 27 October 2022 
67 Mansour, R., Tribes and Religious Institutions in Iraq, Cordoba Foundation of Geneva, September 2017, url, p. 9 
68 Zaman, A., From Tribe to Nation: Iraqi Kurdistan on the Cusp of Statehood, Wilson Center, 2016, url, p. 6url, p. 3 
69 Kane, A., “The Reality of Intra-Kurdish Rivalry Undermines the Notion of Pan-Kurdish Nationalism”, 2017,  
70 Rudaw, Tribal affiliation and religion may determine outcome of Iraq’s election, 29 September 2021, url; Qader, S. 
S. and Hakeem H., I., The role of tribes in the political process of KRG, September 2018, url, p. 6 
71 ORSAM, The Role of Tribes in the Political Process of KRG, September 2018, url, p. 7 
72 Qader, S. S. and Hakeem H., I., The role of tribes in the political process of KRG, September 2018, url, p. 3 
73 Rudaw, Tribal affiliation and religion may determine outcome of Iraq’s election, 29 September 2021, url; Qader, S. 
S. and Hakeem H., I., The role of tribes in the political process of KRG, September 2018, url, p. 6 
74 Rudaw, Tribal affiliation and religion may determine outcome of Iraq’s election, 29 September 2021, url 
75 Rudaw, Tribal affiliation and religion may determine outcome of Iraq’s election, 29 September 2021, url; Qader, S. 
S. and Hakeem H., I., The role of tribes in the political process of KRG, September 2018, url, p. 6 
76 Al Jazeera, ‘As if she never existed’: The graveyards for murdered women, 8 March 2021, url; Canada, IRB, Iraq: 
Honour-based violence in Kurdistan, 15 February 2016 (IRQ105424.E), url; AW, Worrisome increase of “Honour” 

21 

 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

1.2. 

Structure of the tribe 

EUAA notes that sources describe tribal structures in a similar manner, however there are 
some differences especially concerning the terms (English translations) used to describe those 
tribal units such as using the word ‘clan’ or ‘tribe’ interchangeably.77 Bobseine observed that 
the ‘term ‘tribe’ is therefore a technical term, but is also used in a broad sense to include units 
of organization that operate within the tribal structure’.78 

The foundational unit in the tribal structure is the ‘greater extended family’, known as the 
Khams (or Khamsa79). It comprises ‘all male offspring who share the same great-great 
grandfather’,80 or those males ‘related through the paternal line to the fifth generation.’81 This 
tribal unit is the one obligated by tribal custom to avenge the death or injury of a family 
member82 by either killing a member of the perpetrator’s Khams or by obtaining a financial 
compensation (diyya).83 That is, ‘if a tribesman is murdered, his [male] relatives within the 
khamsah are required to avenge his death, and all members of the murderer’s khamsah are 
considered to share responsibility and thus are legitimate targets for reprisal.84 

The lowest level in the structure of the tribe is the bayt, or house,85 which comprises one 
extended family86 or a number of families (awa’il)87 whose members amount to hundreds.88 
Members of one bayt often maintain a high level of cohesion,89 which correlates with the 
degree of kinship (usually going up to five generations).90 This unit does not have ‘a political or 
military role, but […] an economic, camping, and housing’ one.91 

crimes in Iraqi Kurdistan, 21 March 2022, url; Mustafah, R., Addressing Violence Against Women in Iraqi Kurdistan, 
28 March 2022, url;  
77 EUAA observation on patterns and terminology in source information. 
78 Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 3 
79 Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 6 
80 Khan, J., The Iraqi Tribal Structure: Background and Influence on counter-Terrorism, November 2007, url, p. 4 
81 CNA, “No Security Without Us”: Tribes and Tribalism in Al Anbar Province, June 2014, url, p. 5 
82 Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 6 
83 Khan, J., The Iraqi Tribal Structure: Background and Influence on counter-Terrorism, November 2007, url, p. 4; 
UNHCR, Tribal Conflict Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, available at: url, , p. 1 
84 CNA, “No Security Without Us”: Tribes and Tribalism in Al Anbar Province, June 2014, url, p. vi 
85 Mansour, R., Tribes and Religious Institutions in Iraq, Cordoba Foundation of Geneva, September 2017, url, p. 5 
86 Hassan observed that a bayt ‘is similar to a Khams. It can resemble a single, vast extended family with hundreds 
of members’. Hassan, H. D., Iraq: Tribal Structure, Social, and Political Activities, CRS, 7 April 2008, url, p. 2 
87 Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 3 
88 Khan, J., The Iraqi Tribal Structure: Background and Influence on counter-Terrorism, November 2007, url, p. 4 
89 Mansour, R., Tribes and Religious Institutions in Iraq, Cordoba Foundation of Geneva, September 2017, url, p. 5 
90 Abd, A. M., رﺎﺒﻧﻻا  ﺔﻈﻓﺎﺤﻣ ﻲﻓ  ﻲﻠﺒﻘﻟا مﺎﻈﻨﻟا ﻦﻋ ﻲﺟﻮﻟﻮﺑوﺮﺜﻧا ﺚﺤﺑ ﺎﮭﯿﻠﻋ تأﺮط  ﻲﺘﻟا  تاﺮﯿﻐﺘﻟاو ﺔﻠﯿﺒﻘﻟا ﺔﯿﻨﺑ [The Structure of the Tribe and 
the Changes Incurred to It: Anthropological Research on the tribal system in Al-Anbar governorate] in: Al-Adab 
Journal, Issue 101, 2012, url, p. 694 
91 Mansour, R., Tribes and Religious Institutions in Iraq, Cordoba Foundation of Geneva, September 2017, url, p. 5 

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IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

A fakhdh, (translated as clan92 or sub-clan93), is comprised of a number of houses,94 and has 
‘its own chief, family name, and land that is relative to a specific village or town’.95 A fakhdh 
can be viewed as a kind of ‘sub-tribe’ whose members tend to live together or in geographic 
proximity ‘making cohesion and solidarity stronger’. The role of this unit is also economic.96 

Ashira, (translated as tribal organisation97 or clan98), is comprised of a cluster of clans or 
houses.99 The geographic proximity of the clans that comprise the ashira as well as the 
influence of the sheikhs of the houses (bayts) that make up the clan could lead the ashira to 
enjoy a high level of unity.100 Those tribal organisations ‘can widely vary in size, ranging from a 
few thousand to more than a million members’;101 play a political and military role and are led 
by sheikhs who bring ‘a sense of unity to the structure’.102 

Finally, a group of asha’ir (pl. of ashira) form a Qabila103, or a tribal confederation104 which is 
‘the largest unit within the Arab tribal structure’.105 The members of the Qabila are led by a 
‘paramount sheikh’ and ‘have a sense of common lineage or descent’106 which can be real of 
fictitious.107 While the term qabila can be used in reference to ashira, the distinction between 
the two units lies in the structure of leadership: when the sheikhs of several asha’ir are led by 
a paramount sheikh, then the unit in question is qabila.108 Tribal confederations play a political 
and military role and respond to external threats.109 Khan observed that ‘[a]lthough the qabila 
is an alliance of several tribes, it is still regarded as a tribe’.110 

92 Khan refers to fakhdh as clan: Khan, J., The Iraqi Tribal Structure: Background and Influence on counter-
Terrorism, November 2007, url, p. 4; Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 3 
93 Mansour, R., Tribes and Religious Institutions in Iraq, Cordoba Foundation of Geneva, September 2017, url, p. 5 
94 Abd, A. M., رﺎﺒﻧﻻا  ﺔﻈﻓﺎﺤﻣ ﻲﻓ  ﻲﻠﺒﻘﻟا مﺎﻈﻨﻟا ﻦﻋ ﻲﺟﻮﻟﻮﺑوﺮﺜﻧا ﺚﺤﺑ ﺎﮭﯿﻠﻋ تأﺮط  ﻲﺘﻟا  تاﺮﯿﻐﺘﻟاو ﺔﻠﯿﺒﻘﻟا ﺔﯿﻨﺑ [The Structure of the Tribe and 
the Changes Incurred to It: Anthropological Research on the tribal system in Al-Anbar governorate] in: Al-Adab 
Journal, Issue 101, 2012, url, p. 695 
95 Khan, J., The Iraqi Tribal Structure: Background and Influence on counter-Terrorism, November 2007, url, p. 4 
96 Mansour, R., Tribes and Religious Institutions in Iraq, Cordoba Foundation of Geneva, September 2017, url, p. 5; 
Bobseine stated that the economic role of the tribe has decreased now compared to the past decades. Bobseine, 
H., comments during external expert review of the report, 03 April 2023 
97 Khan, J., The Iraqi Tribal Structure: Background and Influence on counter-Terrorism, November 2007, url, p. 4 
98 Mansour, R., Tribes and Religious Institutions in Iraq, Cordoba Foundation of Geneva, September 2017, url, p. 5 
99 Abd, A. M., رﺎﺒﻧﻻا  ﺔﻈﻓﺎﺤﻣ ﻲﻓ  ﻲﻠﺒﻘﻟا مﺎﻈﻨﻟا ﻦﻋ ﻲﺟﻮﻟﻮﺑوﺮﺜﻧا ﺚﺤﺑ ﺎﮭﯿﻠﻋ تأﺮط  ﻲﺘﻟا  تاﺮﯿﻐﺘﻟاو ﺔﻠﯿﺒﻘﻟا ﺔﯿﻨﺑ [The Structure of the Tribe and 
the Changes Incurred to It: Anthropological Research on the tribal system in Al-Anbar governorate] in: Al-Adab 
Journal, Issue 101, 2012, url, p. 695 
100 Khan, J., The Iraqi Tribal Structure: Background and Influence on counter-Terrorism, November 2007, url, p. 4 
101 Hassan, H. D., Iraq: Tribal Structure, Social, and Political Activities, CRS, 7 April 2008, url, p. 2 
102 Mansour, R., Tribes and Religious Institutions in Iraq, Cordoba Foundation of Geneva, September 2017, url, p. 5 
103 Abd, A. M., رﺎﺒﻧﻻا  ﺔﻈﻓﺎﺤﻣ ﻲﻓ  ﻲﻠﺒﻘﻟا مﺎﻈﻨﻟا ﻦﻋ ﻲﺟﻮﻟﻮﺑوﺮﺜﻧا ﺚﺤﺑ ﺎﮭﯿﻠﻋ تأﺮط  ﻲﺘﻟا  تاﺮﯿﻐﺘﻟاو ﺔﻠﯿﺒﻘﻟا ﺔﯿﻨﺑ [The Structure of the Tribe and 
the Changes Incurred to It: Anthropological Research on the tribal system in Al-Anbar governorate] in: Al-Adab 
Journal, Issue 101, 2012, url, p. 696. For Bobseine’s description of the structure, see: Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a 
Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url 
104 Hassan, H. D., Iraq: Tribal Structure, Social, and Political Activities, CRS, 7 April 2008, url, p. 2; Mansour, R., Tribes 
and Religious Institutions in Iraq, Cordoba Foundation of Geneva, September 2017, url, p. 5 
105 Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 3 
106 Mansour, R., Tribes and Religious Institutions in Iraq, Cordoba Foundation of Geneva, September 2017, url, p. 5 
107 CNA, “No Security Without Us”: Tribes and Tribalism in Al Anbar Province, Iraq, June 2014, CNA, url, p. vii 
108 Abd, A. M., رﺎﺒﻧﻻا  ﺔﻈﻓﺎﺤﻣ ﻲﻓ  ﻲﻠﺒﻘﻟا مﺎﻈﻨﻟا ﻦﻋ ﻲﺟﻮﻟﻮﺑوﺮﺜﻧا ﺚﺤﺑ ﺎﮭﯿﻠﻋ تأﺮط  ﻲﺘﻟا  تاﺮﯿﻐﺘﻟاو ﺔﻠﯿﺒﻘﻟا ﺔﯿﻨﺑ [The Structure of the Tribe and 
the Changes Incurred to It: Anthropological Research on the tribal system in Al-Anbar governorate] in: Al-Adab 
Journal, Issue 101, 2012, url, p. 696 
109 Mansour, R., Tribes and Religious Institutions in Iraq, Cordoba Foundation of Geneva, September 2017, url, p. 5 
110 Khan, J., The Iraqi Tribal Structure: Background and Influence on counter-Terrorism, November 2007, url, p. 4 

23 

 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

The major Arab tribal confederations in Iraq are the following111:  

•  Shammar: counts more than 1.5 million members and extends from south of Baghdad 
to the Syrian border, while some of its tribes reside in Yemen and the United Arab 
Emirates. It includes both Sunni and Shia members. 
 Dulaym: resides mainly in Al-Anbar governorate and many of its tribe leaders played 
an important role in supporting the regime of Saddam Hussein.  

• 

•  Jibur: one of the largest tribal confederations in Iraq and includes both Sunni and Shia 

groups. 

•  Tikriti: is the tribal confederation of former senior officials in Iraq including Saddam 
Hussein. Albu Nasir tribe, Hussein’s tribe, counts more than 350 000 young men. 

•  Al-Khaza’il: are found in Baghdad area. 
•  Anizah: is believed to be ‘the largest group of nomad Arab tribes’ in terms of number 

and is considered to be the ‘hereditary foes’ of Shammar. 

•  Banu Hushaim: resides on the Euphrates and its tribes are mostly of Shammar origin.  
•  Aqrah: is also of Shammar origin and its members work in agriculture and sheep 

breeding. 

•  Zubayd: believed to have migrated from Yemen, and ‘have a wide kinship’.112 

In addition to the tribal confederations mentioned above, Khan mentioned the following ones: 
Tayy, Rubia, Ubayd, Al-Dhufair, Al-Muntafiq, Bani Rikab, Al-Soudan, Albu Mohammed, Al-
Qarraghul, Al-Hassan, Yazzid, Ka’b, Shammar Touga, Al-Ghalal, Al-Sumaida, Bani Lam, Al-
Azza, Al-Umtayr, Zoba, Midan, Al-Duriyeen, and Al-Suwarma.113 

The above information on major tribal groups provides an overview and a sampling; it is 
beyond the scope of this report to provide a comprehensive listing of all the tribes and 
confederations operating in Iraq. 

1.3. 

Tribal law in Iraq 

In the Arab world, according to Carroll, tribal law is ‘best understood as a fluid product of 
ongoing negotiation between the state and tribal actors’.114 The tribal system ‘represents a 
crucial social system’ in a country115, and exists at the local level ‘for dispute resolution, 
particularly in light of fledgling legal systems’,116 or to fill the gap left by a weak state.117 

111 For more detailed information on the presence of tribes at a provincial level, see: Mansour, R., Tribes and 
Religious Institutions in Iraq, Cordoba Foundation of Geneva, September 2017, url, pp. 17-34 
112 Hassan, H. D., Iraq: Tribal Structure, Social, and Political Activities, CRS, 7 April 2008, url, pp. 5-6  
113 Khan, J., The Iraqi Tribal Structure: Background and Influence on counter-Terrorism, November 2007, url, p. 5 
114 Carroll, K. B., Tribal law and reconciliation in the New Iraq, 2011, url, p. 11 
115 Chokr, M. A., The Persisting Past of Iraq, September 2021, url, p. 4 
116 Mansour, R., Tribes and Religious Institutions in Iraq, Cordoba Foundation of Geneva, September 2017, url, p. 17 
117 Carroll, K. B., Tribal law and reconciliation in the New Iraq, 2011, url, p. 11; Economist (The), With Iraqi tribes settling 
more disputes, sheikhs are in high demand, 30 May 2019, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-
africa/2019/05/30/with-iraqi-tribes-settling-more-disputes-sheikhs-are-in-high-demand  

24 

 
IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

Sometimes tribal laws contradict state law118 or contravene human rights;119 they have not been 
recognised by the state or codified.120  

In the tribal system, the acquiring of honour and conversely the avoidance of shame, disgrace, 
or humiliation are ‘key to the ethos of Iraqi society’ underpinning value structure in the tribal 
system. Honour of the tribe may fluctuate with male behaviour (Sharaf), while family honour 
(‘ird), mainly embodied in women, can only be lost as a result of female behaviour. The tribal 
system is also characterised by the strong sense of group identity that subordinates the 
individual's interest. There is significant pressure to conform for groups survival, but also as 
‘survival of the individual’, and in return for loyalty it provides protection. Customary tribal law 
is an expression of the collective identity that ‘regulates relations between the individual and 
the group’ and an individual who does not obey tribal customs ‘risks the loss of support of the 
tribe, thus making himself and his family vulnerable.’121 The fundamental goal of Sulh (tribal 
dispute settlement explained in chapter 3. Tribal conflict resolution mechanisms and practices) 
is to restore peace through the restoration of honour.122 According to Genat, the purpose of 
tribal justice is to ‘contain conflict’, not to prevent it, but rather to prevent it from escalating.123  

Tribal law in Iraq is comprised of sets of codes (sanayin or sawani in Arabic) which are 
adopted by tribal sheikhs to constitute the customs that guide the relations between tribe 
members124 and between tribes themselves.125 Those codes comprise tribal customs that pre-
date Sharia law126 and precede the Iraqi Constitution,127 and have materialised through tribal 
judicial precedents and tribal customs over the years.128  

According to Carroll, the legal codes of many Iraqi tribes have been printed in formal 
documents129 which may be adopted by the senior members of tribes. Those legal codes 
‘share a common body of rules, regardless of ethno-religious affiliations’ and are known as 
urf.130 However, while urf rules vary, ‘[t]here is significant overlap and little variation among 
Sunni and Shia Arab tribal customs [… and] greater [differences] among other ethnic and 
religious groups.131 According to Carroll, there ‘appears to be relatively little variation in the 
structure, specifics or processes of law’ among those codes which enables them to facilitate 

118 Al-Bayan, «تﺎﻋاﺰﻨﻟا ﺾﻔﺗ ﺔﯿﻗاﺮﻋ ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻋ ﺪﯿﻟﺎﻘﺗ ..«ﺔﯿﻧﺎﺴﻟا [Saniya: Tribal traditions in Iraq to settle disputes], 27 September 
2014, url  
119 HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023 
120 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022 
121 CNA, “No Security Without Us”: Tribes and Tribalism in Al Anbar Province, Iraq, June 2014, url, pp. 8-9 
122 Carroll, K. B., Tribal law and reconciliation in the New Iraq, 2011, url, p. 13 
123 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022 
124 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022 
125 Hassony, A. and Oda, J. G., ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا ﺔﺒﻟﺎﻄﻤﻟﺎﺑ ﻒﯾﺮﻌﺘﻟا [Definition of tribal claim], 2019, url, pp. 117-118; Genat, M., video 
interview, 4 October 2022 
126 Carroll, K. B., Tribal law and reconciliation in the New Iraq, 2011, url, p. 12 
127 Al-Bayan, «تﺎﻋاﺰﻨﻟا ﺾﻔﺗ ﺔﯿﻗاﺮﻋ ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻋ ﺪﯿﻟﺎﻘﺗ ..«ﺔﯿﻧﺎﺴﻟا [Saniya: Tribal traditions in Iraq to settle disputes], 27 September 
2014, url  
128 Hassony, A. and Oda, J. G., ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا ﺔﺒﻟﺎﻄﻤﻟﺎﺑ ﻒﯾﺮﻌﺘﻟا [Definition of tribal claim], 2019, url, pp. 117-118; 123-124 
129 Carroll, K. B., Tribal law and reconciliation in the New Iraq, 2011, url, p. 12. In an interview with EUAA, Genat 
stated that she has seen printed documents containing such codes. Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022. In 
an interview with the EUAA, Nasir Al-Samaraie stated that tribal codes are available on social media and 
occasionally in Iraqi media. Al-Samaraie, N., video interview, 27 October 2022 
130 Genat, M., Tribal Justice Mechanisms and Durable Solutions for Families with a Perceived Affiliation to ISIS, IOM, 
2020, p. 10 
131 Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 3 

25 

 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

the settlement of disputes between tribes.132 Those rules that tribes have between each other 
include rules on the sums of fasl (see 3.6 below) for different disputes.133  

However, other sources tended to agree that while some principles are overarching, there is 
variation in application at the tribal level: USIP remarked in 2011 that ‘major legal concepts and 
principles (…) are generally true for most Arab Iraqi tribes’ and that ‘compensation amounts 
and punishments may vary from tribe to tribe.134 Other sources indicated that tribal rules are 
often unwritten or are norms leaving a wide range of discretion in their application.135 Human 
Rights Watch remarked that the tribal system is very much oriented toward communal identity 
and while there are similar general concepts that apply across the board [collective 
responsibility for protection/revenge; blood money/diya, thar/revenge, threats or confrontation 
(degge), fasliya, bara’a, honour killings], customary practices and settlements of disputes can 
vary very much at the discretion of who is involved in the dispute settlement process.136 Al 
Samaraie stated that tribal codes may have difference by region, and disputes may be 
resolved differently by region, but have commonalities among them.137 Similarly, Genat stated 
that ‘while the core rules are static’ tribal rules are dynamic and considered as a fluid 
mechanism. Some of those codes are written down and vary from tribe to tribe, while the core 
principles are similar.138 

Tribal rules are dynamic139 and can be amended by tribal sheikhs in accordance with what the 
social, economic, and political circumstances dictate.140 They can also be amended by a ‘tribal 
customary reference’, arfa, as in the example cited by Genat’s IOM report when the arfa of 
Shammar tribe ‘noted that he recently amended Shammar internal law to modify the extent of 
expulsion demanded of tribal members.’141 Another example is the decision of the tribes in 
Diyala governorate to adopt new codes to counter defamation on social media. According to 
Sky Arabia, Diyala tribes agreed to set a fasl of 25 – 50 million Iraqi Dinars (16 000 – 33 000 
USD) for such cases.142  

There are two types of tribal judges. The first type are tribal leaders who act as mediators 
between the parties in most cases, and whose decisions are not binding. The other type of 
judges are called Awaref or Faradha.143 They comprise a handful of reputable senior figures 
who are turned to when there is no clarity regarding the responsible party for any given 
injury.144 These persons have inherited their positions and they “adjudicate” a case as 

 "

مﺪﻟا

 ﻲﻓ

ﺔﻧﺪھ

 " ..

ﻖﺒﺴﺗ

قاﺮﻌﻟا

نﻮﻧﺎﻘﻟا

ةﻮﻄﻌﻟا

ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا

 [Tribal atwa in Iraq. “Blood truce” precedes 

132 Carroll, K. B., Tribal law and reconciliation in the New Iraq, 2011, url, p. 12 
133 Genat, M., Tribal Justice Mechanisms and Durable Solutions for Families with a Perceived Affiliation to ISIS, IOM, 
2020, p. 11 
134 USIP, Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, 1 July 2011, url, p. 253 
135 HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023; OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023; Oral tribal laws are also 
mentioned by Al-Mayadeen, 
the law], 4 June 2022, url 
136 HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023 
137 Al Samaraie, video interview, 27 October 2022 
138 Al-ibrahimi, H., video interview, 3 November 2022 
139 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022 
140 Al-Mayadeen, نﻮﻧﺎﻘﻟا ﻖﺒﺴﺗ "مﺪﻟا ﺔﻧﺪھ" .. قاﺮﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا ةﻮﻄﻌﻟا [Tribal atwa in Iraq. “Blood truce” precedes the law], 4 
June 2022, url 
141 Genat, M., Tribal Justice Mechanisms and Durable Solutions for Families with a Perceived Affiliation to ISIS, IOM, 
2020, p. 11 
142 Sky Arabia, قاﺮﻌﻟﺎﺑ ﻞﺻاﻮﺘﻟا تﺎﻜﺒﺷ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺮﯿﮭﺸﺘﻟا ﺪﺿ "يﺮﺋﺎﺸﻋ نﻮﻧﺎﻗ" [“Tribal law” banning defamation on social media 
networks in Iraq], 4 June 2021, url 
143 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022 
144 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 236; Al-
Shabaka, ﻦﯿﻧاﻮﻘﻟا ﻦﻣ ىﻮﻗأ  فاﺮﻋأ  .. يﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا ﻞﺼﻔﻟا [Tribal fasl. Customs which are stronger than the law], 17 April 2018, url  

26 

 
 
 
 
 
IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

opposed to tribal leaders who mediate between the parties.145 The process is ‘quite formal 
and relatively swift, usually taking no more than a day or two in the most’.146 When the 
disputing parties agree to have their case adjudicated through the second path, they pledge 
to accept the rulings of the tribal judge and make an oath on the Quran to abide by them.147 In 
Hamoudi’s paper on Shia tribalism, he stated that in cases where there is no evidence to 
support a claim, ‘what is resorted to is known as taking an oath of the tomb of Abbas’, a 
revered figure in Shia Islam, where ‘a victim can be taken to Kerbala at the insistence of the 
offending party and be made to swear on the tomb’ of Abbas that the claim is true. Once the 
oath is undertaken, ‘a party’s honor, referred to among the tribes using the colloquial term 
bakht, is invoked, and to involve one’s bakht is a serious matter’.148 

The challenges faced by the government to protect the Iraqi society has led to the 
consolidation of the role of tribal customs and traditions in parallel to the rule of law, as 
acknowledged by the Supreme Judicial Council of Iraq.149 As a result, sources indicated that 
many Iraqis prefer to use the tribal system to resolve disputes,150 even for major crimes,151 as 
well as minor disputes,152 or interpersonal, intercommunal issues,153 of family disputes.154 This 
is mainly due to problems of corruption and distrust in the formal courts,155 lack of access to 
such courts,156 lack of trust in the government,157 and because tribal courts are less costly and 
seen as faster than state courts.158  

Additionally, tribal resolution is seen as ‘more flexible’ compared to the state authorities for 
some types of disputes,159 as the tribal systems are perceived as maintaining social 
relationships among community members.160 However, sources also indicate that sometimes 
disputes may also be resolved through a mixed approach, or by resorting to the formal system 
in serious cases, such as murder.161 

145 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022 
146 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 236; 
Bobseine observed that the process can in some cases take much longer. Bobseine, H., comments during external 
expert review of the report, 03 April 2023 
147 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022 
148 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 236 
149 The Supreme Judicial Council of Iraq acknowledges that the weakness of the Iraqi State’s institution since 2003 
has led to an increased role of the tribes in providing protection to their members and to the prevalence of the 
tribal practice of degge. Iraq, Supreme Judicial Council, ﺔﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا  ﺔﻣاوﻛﻟا [Tribal gouwama], 14 June 2021, url 
150 Freedom House, Freedom in the world 2022: Iraq, 2022, url; HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023; 
National (The), In post-ISIS Iraq, tribal justice grows in shadow of Baghdad mistrust, 26 June 2018, url 
151 Freedom House, Freedom in the world 2022: Iraq, 2022, url; 
152 Kao. K., Legal Pluralism and Fragmented Sovereignty in Iraq, 9 June 2022, url, p. 18 
153 HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023 
154 Kao. K., Legal Pluralism and Fragmented Sovereignty in Iraq, 9 June 2022, url, p. 2 
155 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2022: Iraq, 2022, url; Al-Samaraie, N., video interview, 27 October 2022; 
Kao. K., Legal Pluralism and Fragmented Sovereignty in Iraq, 9 June 2022, url, p. 18 
156 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2022: Iraq, 2022, url; 
157 National (The), In post-ISIS Iraq, tribal justice grows in shadow of Baghdad mistrust, 26 June 2018, url 
158 Revkin, M., The Limits of Punishment, May 2018, url, p. 24 
159 HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023 
160 Kao. K., Legal Pluralism and Fragmented Sovereignty in Iraq, 9 June 2022, url, p. 2 
161 Kao. K., Legal Pluralism and Fragmented Sovereignty in Iraq, 9 June 2022, url, p. 41; HRW, Interview with EUAA, 
13 March 2023 

27 

 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Al-Samaraie observed that all kinds of complaints can be brought to tribal justice.162 These 
include cases involving murder, traffic accidents, and individual disputes, as well as land feuds 
and disputes based on irrigation rights and historical feuds.163 Tribal arbitration is ‘increasingly 
becoming the norm in handling criminal, family, and commercial disputes’ such as marital 
issues, personal disputes, car accidents, as well as professional problems ‘such as teachers 
failing students or medical mistakes by doctors’. Even state employees ‘resort to tribal courts 
to resolve disputes instead of by-laws and disciplinary tribunals’.164 Further, according to an 
Iraqi tribal leader, tribal sheikhs are being involved in minor disputes such as ones arising from 
debt, interpersonal differences, and marital quarrels.165 For honour issues, see Sections 3.10 
Women as a means of tribal disputes settlement or use of women in tribal customs, 3.11 
Honour violations and honour-based violence and 4.2 Women’s tribal participation and other 
practices affecting women. 

162 Al-Samaraie, N., video interview, 27 October 2022 
163 Shafaqna – Iraq, ﺎﮭﻋاوﻧأ لﻛﺑ مﺋارﺟو لﻛﺎﺷﻣ  ﺞﻟﺎﻌﺗ ”ﺔﻣاوﻛﻟا “ وأ ﺔﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا لوﺻﻔﻟا  ..قارﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ [In Iraq. Tribal fasl or gouwama deals 
with all sorts of crimes and problems], 27 August 2022, url 
164 Al-Ahram Online, How Iraq’s judiciary got into a political mess, 5 April 2022, url 
165 Independent Arabia, ﺎﮭﯿﻓ ﻦﯿﻠﻣﺎﻌﻟا و ﺎﮭﺗﺎﻧﺎﯿﻛ دﺪﮭﺗ و قاﺮﻌﻟا  ﻲﻓ ﺔﻟوﺪﻟا ﻢﻜﺤﺗ ةﺮﯿﺸﻌﻟا [The clan dominates the state in Iraq and 
threatens its entities and public servants], 13 September 2021, url 

28 

 
IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

2.  Causes of tribal disputes 

Tribal conflicts or disputes may be triggered by a range of different issues including: 

Intentional or unintentional killing;166 
Infliction of injuries; 167 

• 
• 
•  Loss of ‘honour’ and honour violations, especially by women168 (also including ‘black 
crime’ (as-souda) such as rape, homosexual acts, kidnapping a woman, or stealing 
from a kinsman or host;’169 being LGBTIQ;170  

•  Theft;171 
•  Verbal or other insults or offenses against a man’s honour;172 
•  Unpaid debts;173 financial problems;174 
•  Unresolved land disputes;175  
•  Access to water, property, or resources;176 
•  Car accidents;177 
•  Revenge;178 
• 
•  Competition between tribes over power or authorities in a city, village, or 

Interpersonal, family, or intercommunal issues;179 

neighbourhood;180 

•  Medical errors or deaths blamed on doctors and medical professionals;181 
•  Moreover, tribal violence can also be triggered for minor reasons182 such as fights 

between children183 and social media posts,184 insulting a religious figure venerated by 

166 UNHCR, Tribal Conflict Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, url  
167 UNHCR, Tribal Conflict Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, url  
168 See Section 3.11 Honour violations and honour-based violence of this report on honour violations and associated 
punishments. 
169 USIP, Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, 1 July 2011, url, p. 264; UNHCR, Tribal 
Conflict Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, url  
170 HRW, “Everyone Wants Me Dead”, 2022, url, p. 72 
171 UNHCR, Tribal Conflict Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, url; USIP, Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in 
War-Torn Societies, 1 July 2011, url, p. 254 
172 USIP, Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, 1 July 2011, url, p. 254 
173 UNHCR, Tribal Conflict Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, url; for additional examples, see:  
174 Al-Hadath, قارﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ ﺔﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا تﺎﻋازﻧﻟا نوﻧﺟ ..قﻼطﻟا  وأ ﺦﯾطﺑﻟا رﻌﺳ [Melon price or divorce . the insanity of tribal clashes in 
Iraq], 12 May 2022, url 
175 UNHCR, Tribal Conflict Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, url; for additional examples, see:  
176 UNHCR, Tribal Conflict Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, url; for additional examples, see:  
177 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 259; Al-
Samaraie, N., video interview, 27 October 2022 
178 New Arab (The), تﻠﻔﺗﻣﻟا حﻼﺳﻠﻟ ﺔﯾﻠﺋﺎﺻﻔﻟاو ﺔﯾﺳﺎﯾﺳﻟا ﺔﯾﺎﻣﺣﻟﺎﺑ ءاوﻘﺗﺳا :قارﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ رﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا تﺎﻛﺎﺑﺗﺷا [Clashes of tribes in Iraq: Drawing 
strength from politics and militias to protect incontrollable weapons], 22 April 2022, url 
179 HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023 
180 OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023 
181 Irfaasawtak, ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا ﺔﻣاﻮﻜﻟا" ﺔﻠﺋﺎط ﺖﺤﺗ ءﺎﺒطأ", [Doctors under tribal threats] 29 May 2019, url  
182 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022; Al-Samaraie, N., video interview, 27 October 2022; Al-Ibrahimi, H., 
video interview, 3 November 2022; Independent Arabia, 
dominates the state in Iraq and threatens its entities and public servants], 13 September 2021, url 
183 Independent Arabia, ﺎﮭﯿﻓ ﻦﯿﻠﻣﺎﻌﻟا و ﺎﮭﺗﺎﻧﺎﯿﻛ دﺪﮭﺗ و قاﺮﻌﻟا  ﻲﻓ ﺔﻟوﺪﻟا ﻢﻜﺤﺗ ةﺮﯿﺸﻌﻟا [The clan dominates the state in Iraq and 
threatens its entities and public servants], 13 September 2021, url 
184 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022; Ultra Iraq, ﺔﯾرﺎﻧﻟا ﺔﺣﻠﺳﻷﺎﺑ ﺔﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻋ ﺔﻛرﻌﻣ  :"كوﺑﺳﯾﻓ" ﻰﻠﻋ تاروﺷﻧﻣ بﺑﺳﺑ [Because 
of a post on Facebook: a tribal battle with fire arms], 27 September 2019, url; Al-Hadath,  نوﻧﺟ  ..قﻼطﻟا وأ ﺦﯾطﺑﻟا رﻌﺳ

 [The clan 

ﻦﯿﻠﻣﺎﻌﻟا

ةﺮﯿﺸﻌﻟا

ﺎﮭﺗﺎﻧﺎﯿﻛ

قاﺮﻌﻟا

ﺔﻟوﺪﻟا

ﻢﻜﺤﺗ

دﺪﮭﺗ

ﺎﮭﯿﻓ

 ﻲﻓ

 و 

 و 

29 

 
 
 
  
 
 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

the members of another tribe or the children of two competing tribes fighting.185 
Bobseine stated that it is important to note that minor disputes and a broad range of 
daily issues can escalate into tribal issues.186 

Sources indicate these can arise in both rural areas and in cities,187 including in Baghdad.188 
The representative of OWFI indicated that in rural settings tribes are more free to escalate and 
use violence where there is less police control.189 The prevalence of heavy weapons and lack 
of security forces intervention for fear of being targeted themselves were cited reasons for 
escalations of tribal violence.190 

Al-Ibrahimi observed that there are hundreds of tribal customs, and any violation of any of 
these is set to trigger a reaction from the tribe.191 An IOM report published in 2021 maintained 
that ‘[t]ribal conflicts emerge mainly when disputes between individuals or families are not 
resolved through peaceful means (either through formal or customary processes), and parties 
in conflict rely on specific customary practices […] that involve violence’.192 In a follow-up email 
on 28 November 2022, Al-Ibrahimi stated that people who do not have contact or 
engagement with the tribal system (which is mostly the case in urban settings), are not 
obligated by any code or tribal measure. However, if for any reason they become subject to a 
tribal disciplinary code, they have to attend the tribal dispute settlement meeting (fasl) and 
abide by the outcome or otherwise they will face consequences, which could take the form of 
aggressive reaction from the tribe.193 The reaction follows two steps. The tribes of the 
aggrieved and the perpetrator establish a conversation, a session where they discuss the 
issue and agree on the penalty. If the perpetrator (and his tribe) is compliant with the penalty, 
the issue is solved. If not, the aggrieved party (and his tribe) has the right to escalate, and 
escalation means violence.194 A person who is not affiliated with a tribe, e.g., an urban 
professional or a non-Iraqi Arab can be called to a tribal dispute settlement meeting (fasl) if 
involved in a dispute with a member of a tribe, e.g., in the case of car accident. Such a 
situation is unfortunate because the person will not be able ‘to turn to anyone to represent his 
interests in this closed and insular system’.195 

 [Football causes deaths and injuries following a tribal feud 

 ﺮﺛإ

 ﻲﻓ

 عاﺰﻧ

 ﻰﻠﺘﻗ

طﻮﻘﺴﺑ

 ﺐﺒﺴﺘﺗ

 يذ رﺎﻗ

ﻰﺣﺮﺟو

يﺮﺋﺎﺸﻋ

قارﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ ﺔﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا  تﺎﻋازﻧﻟا [Melon price or divorce, the insanity of tribal clashes in Iraq], 12 May 2022, url; Al-Falluja 
ةﺮﻛ مﺪﻗ
Channel, 
in Thi-Qar] {Online video], 19 October 2021, url  
185 Inquirer (The), Tribal Iraq: where petty squabbles turn lethal, AFP, 27 June 2021, url 
186 Bobseine, H., comments during external expert review of the report, 03 April 2023 
187 OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023; Al-Ibrahimi, H., video interview, 3 November 2022 
188 OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023; Al-Obaidi, B., Interview with EUAA, 3 April 2023 
189 OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023 
190 Al-Obaidi, B., Interview with EUAA, 3 April 2023 
191 Al-Ibrahimi, H., video interview, 3 November 2022; Al-Hadath, قارﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ ﺔﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا  تﺎﻋازﻧﻟا نوﻧﺟ ..قﻼطﻟا وأ ﺦﯾطﺑﻟا رﻌﺳ 
[Melon price or divorce . the insanity of tribal clashes in Iraq], 12 May 2022, url 
192 IOM, Migration into a fragile setting: Responding to climate-induced informal urbanization and inequality in 
Basra, Iraq, 2021, url, p. 18 
193 Al-Ibrahimi, H., email, 28 November 2022. 
194 Al-Ibrahimi, H., video interview, 3 November 2022 
195 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 259 

30 

 
 
 
 
 
 
IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

There were reports that government employees and public servants, police, doctors,196 
judges197 and school teachers have been summoned to tribal fasl by tribes,198 murdered, or be 
subject to revenge.199 According to Bobseine, their tribe may represent them.200 According to 
the head of the teachers’ trade-union cited in the article, targeting teachers by tribes has been 
increasing, especially in southern and central Iraq, with around 85 incidents registered in the 
governorate of Thi-Qar alone in 2022.201 Tribes have threaten medical professionals/doctors 
for perceived medical errors or claims of wrongful death;202 assault and threaten doctors at 
work,203 and extort doctors through fabricated tribal penalties,204 that can reach 300 million 
Iraqi Dinars (approximately 211 700 EUR205),206 including in Baghdad,207 and causing doctors to 
change professions or leave the country.208  Tribal practices in Iraq ‘are becoming so common 
that people now often turn to the tribal courts even to solve professional problems’ and are 
affecting education and medical institutions.209  

Further relevant information could not be found within the time constraints of this report. 

A sociologist cited in Independent Arabia observed that the reason behind tribal disputes is 
when a person or a group suffer from injustice and resort to their tribe, rather than the state, to 
address it.210 However, Bobseine observed that state law may also be weak in resolving 
disputes, and that tribal and state law are very much overlapping.211 According to Genat, 
frustration caused by the deteriorating political and economic situation leads to escalation of 
violence. This phenomenon has been ongoing since the beginning of the civil war in 2004. 
Many feuds start with two individuals fighting, and later escalate when the two tribes get 

196 Iraq, Supreme Judicial Council, مﻗر رارﻘﻟا مﺎﻛﺣا ءوﺿ ﻲﻓ ﺔﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا ﺔﺑﻟﺎطﻣﻟا نﻣ ﻲﻧوﻧﺎﻘﻟا فﻗوﻣﻟا (24) [Legal position regarding 
tribal summons in light of Decision No. 24], 23 May 2012, url; see also: Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report 
Iraq, 16 January 2023, url, pp. 8-9 
197 Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report Iraq, 16 January 2023, url, pp. 8-9; Al-Obaidi, B., Interview with 
EUAA, 3 April 2023 
198 Raseef22, ﻚﺗﺮﯾﺪﻣ  سأرو ﻚﺳأر  ﺮﺴﻛأو ﺔﺳرﺪﻤﻟا  ﻖﻠﻏﺄﺳ" ...قاﺮﻌﻟا ﻲﻤّﻠﻌﻣ ﺮﮭظ ﻲﻓ ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻋ ﺔﯿﻗﺪﻨﺑ" [The rifle of tribes at the back of Iraq’s 
teachers… “I will close the school and step on your and your principal’s bigwig toe”], 14 December 2022, url. 
Raseef22 is an ‘independent media platform that includes decision makers from all denominations, socio-economic 
backgrounds, educational levels and with equal distance from all political parties’. Raseef22, Who We Are, n. d., url; 
Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report Iraq, 16 January 2023, url, pp. 8-9 
199 Al-Obaidi, B., Interview with EUAA, 3 April 2023 
200 Bobseine, H., comments during external expert review of the report, 03 April 2023 
201 Raseef22, ﻚﺗﺮﯾﺪﻣ  سأرو ﻚﺳأر  ﺮﺴﻛأو ﺔﺳرﺪﻤﻟا  ﻖﻠﻏﺄﺳ" ...قاﺮﻌﻟا ﻲﻤّﻠﻌﻣ ﺮﮭظ ﻲﻓ ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻋ ﺔﯿﻗﺪﻨﺑ" [The rifle of tribes at the back of Iraq’s 
teachers… “I will close the school and step on your and your principal’s bigwig toe”], 14 December 2022, url  
202 Irfaasawtak, ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا ﺔﻣاﻮﻜﻟا" ﺔﻠﺋﺎط ﺖﺤﺗ ءﺎﺒطأ", [Doctors under tribal threats] 29 May 2019, url; AP, Doctors still working 
in Iraq face violence, tribal justice, 15 December 2015, url  
203 Context, Iraq War 20 years on: Doctor’s dreams shattered by tribal clan, 13 March 2023, Guardian (The), ‘The 
family will kill you if the patient dies’: the doctors facing attack in Iraq’s hospitals, 9 August 2022, url; Arab Weekly 
(The), Medical doctors, a disappearing profession in Iraq, 31 March 2019, url; Australia, DFAT, Country Information 
Report Iraq, 16 January 2023, url, pp. 8-9 
204 Guardian (The), ‘The family will kill you if the patient dies’: the doctors facing attack in Iraq’s hospitals, 9 August 
2022, url  
205 Exchange rates from European Commission, Exchange rate (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed 2 November 2022 
206 Guardian (The), ‘The family will kill you if the patient dies’: the doctors facing attack in Iraq’s hospitals, 9 August 
2022, url 
207 Riyadh, L., Violence against doctors in Iraq during the time of COVID-19, 2021, PlosOne, url 
208 Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report Iraq, 16 January 2023, url, pp. 8-9 
209 Al-Ahram Online, How Iraq’s judiciary got into a political mess, 5 April 2022, url 
210 Independent Arabia, ﺎﮭﯿﻓ ﻦﯿﻠﻣﺎﻌﻟا و ﺎﮭﺗﺎﻧﺎﯿﻛ دﺪﮭﺗ و قاﺮﻌﻟا  ﻲﻓ ﺔﻟوﺪﻟا ﻢﻜﺤﺗ ةﺮﯿﺸﻌﻟا [The clan dominates the state in Iraq and 
threatens its entities and public servants], 13 September 2021, url 
211 Bobseine, H., comments during external expert review of the report, 03 April 2023 

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

involved. Consequently, tribal mechanisms are activated to contain the conflict and prevent it 
from escalating.212  

2.1.  Water and land disputes 

Water and land disputes are frequently linked to tribal conflict impacting security issues as 
discussed in chapter 6. Impact of tribal violence on the security situation and civilians. 

Bobseine observed that tribal disputes in the south are mainly due to the absence of the rule 
of law, political fragmentation, the poor economic situation, and political-social deterioration, 
with some disputes occuring over rent-seeking behaviour.213 Bobseine observed that water 
and environmental degradation are a ‘conflict multiplier’ in the southern region rather than a 
main factor causing violence.214 Several sources also reported that scarcity of water resources 
constitutes a factor in tribal disputes in southern Iraq,215 particularly due to severe droughts’ 
which are caused by ‘an increase in the demand for water, radical environmental changes, 
and poor water management’.216 Sources indicate that incidents of tribal violence due to water 
issues have been increasing in recent years.217 For example, in Thi-Qar where ‘water scarcity 
has contributed to the recent eruption of 20 clan clashes, which the government was unable 
to address, especially given that most tribes control the flow of water in southern Iraq’.218 In an 
article published in June 2022, the National stated that ‘heated disputes over land and water 
rights’ take place in southern Iraq, and have led to clashes causing civilian casualties.219 The 
Iraqi government ‘has been unwilling or unable to intervene, and tribal groups sometimes use 
violence directly against government authorities over water issues’.220 

Tribal disputes over land in the south arise due to tribes imposing control, demands for 
payment, or threats on companies operating in their areas.221 The presence of oil fields can 
also be a source of tribal disputes in southern Iraq as tribes demand access to resources, 
employment for their members,222 or threaten and blackmail the companies operating in the 
fields’.223 The New Arab article further highlighted that 85% of tribal feuds in Al-Basrah take 
place in Al-Hartha, Al-Qurna and Al-Midaina districts due to their proximity to oilfields. 

212 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022 
213 Bobseine, H., comments during external expert review of the report, 03 April 2023 
214 Bobseine, H., comments during external expert review of the report, 03 April 2023 
215 Nussaibah Younis, Early warning: How Iraq can adapt to climate change, ECFR, 19 July 2022, url; Planetary 
Security Initiative, Drought ignites tribal conflicts in Southern Iraq, 17 August 2020, url; Water, Peace and Security, 
Water challenges and conflict dynamics in Southern Iraq: An in-depth analysis of an under-researched crisis, 17 
February 2022, url; National News (The), Nine killed in Iraq tribal violence, 22 June 2022, url 
216 Planetary Security Initiative, Drought ignites tribal conflicts in Southern Iraq, 17 August 2020, url 
217 Nussaibah Younis, Early warning: How Iraq can adapt to climate change, ECFR, 19 July 2022, url; Planetary 
Security Initiative, Drought ignites tribal conflicts in Southern Iraq, 17 August 2020, url 
218 Water, Peace and Security, Water challenges and conflict dynamics in Southern Iraq: An in-depth analysis of an 
under-researched crisis, 17 February 2022, url 
219 National News (The), Nine killed in Iraq tribal violence, 22 June 2022, url 
220 Nussaibah Younis, Early warning: How Iraq can adapt to climate change, ECFR, 19 July 2022, url 
221 Saadoon, M., Tribal disputes cripple Iraq's oil-rich Basra, Amwaj, 27 March 2021, url 
222 Saadoon, M., Tribal disputes cripple Iraq's oil-rich Basra, Amwaj, 27 March 2021, url; Rudaw, Iraqi tribe protests in 
front of Dhi Qar oil field, 27 February 2022, url 
223 Nasrallah, M., Clan violence in Iraq: Oil companies targeted as poverty reigns, the New Arab, 13 September 
2021, url 

32 

 
IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

According to the source, tribes ‘demanded financial compensation in exchange for access to 
the land which had previously belonged to them.’ The source gave an example where an oil 
company was demanded to pay a fasl and to grant a two-month paid leave to one of its 
members in the wake of a fight that involved him and a company employee.224  

In an interview with EUAA on 3 November 2022, Al-Ibrahimi noted that land feuds are 
prevalent in all the disputed territories (between the central government and the Kurdish 
Regional Government), including Kirkuk, Ninewa, Salah Al-Din and Diyala.225  

Al-Ibrahimi observed that in the so-called liberated areas where ISIL was in control the nature 
of some tribal disputes and dynamics may differ from other areas of the country. In the liberated 
areas, there is tribal competition with regard to international reconstruction funds, and there are 
problems on the basis of marginalization and exclusion on the basis of why certain tribes are 
supported instead of others. This affects a lot of tribes from different religious backgrounds.226  

Tribal feuds over these resources can escalate and influence the security situation, as detailed 
in chapter 6. Impact of tribal violence on the security situation and civilians. 

224 Nasrallah, M., Clan violence in Iraq: Oil companies targeted as poverty reigns, the New Arab, 13 September 
2021, url 
225 Al-Ibrahimi, H., video interview, 3 November 2022 
226 Al-Ibrahimi, H., video interview, 3 November 2022 

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

3. 

Tribal conflict resolution mechanisms 
and practices 

A briefing on tribal law practices in Iraq drafted by the not-for-profit CNA Corporation 
explained that  

‘Tribes in Iraq practice several distinct ritualized processes of restorative justice. 
Procedurally, conflict resolution mechanisms most resemble mediation and arbitration 
and include peacemaking rituals such as sulha and fasl. Petty cases are disposed of 
daily by the sheikh of the section or tribe, while more important matters are reserved 
for the special decision of a superior or third-party sheikh or a committee of arbitrators. 
Procedures take place within a communal framework and involve a process of 
acknowledgment, apology, compensation, forgiveness, and reconciliation. In addition, 
customary juridical procedures employ calming mechanisms such as exile, sanctuary, 
truces, and the use of intermediaries or brokers. (…) Standardized rituals understood 
by all tribes are designed to prevent the escalation of conflict before, during, and after 
dispute resolution.’227 

UNHCR stated that ‘tribal practices, procedures and remedies, including the amount of 
compensation, are subject to negotiation and can reportedly be influenced by various factors, 
including the nature of the crime and the extent of injury sustained, the social status of the 
tribes involved, the degree of influence of the tribal leader (“sheikh”), the sex and social status 
of the perpetrator and the victim, and the history of feuding between the tribes involved, 
among others.’.228 Human Rights Watch similarly explained that there is a wide range of 
discretion in how compensation can be sought, depending on the situation and who is 
involved in the mediation; such that customary practices can vary from tribe to tribe, despite 
common concepts. Furthermore, the lines around who is affected by tribal reconciliation 
processes depends and varies extensively depending on the crime, the individual 
circumstances of the tribe, and the situation at hand.229  

Sources indicated that inter-sect tribal disputes between Sunni and Shia are handled in a 
similar fashion230 or there are no specific mechanisms for those situations.231 Further 

227 CNA, “No Security Without Us”: Tribes and Tribalism in Al Anbar Province, June 2014, url, p. 12; See also: USIP, 
Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, 1 July 2011, url, pp. 256-264 
228 UNHCR, Tribal Conflict Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, url; Similarly the USIP provides an extensive list of 
determining factors that may contribute to determining the remedy including: the nature of the crime, extent of the 
injury and type, degree of shame induced, intentions of the injuring party; relationships/genealogy of the 
disputants; relationship of the victim to the sheikh; personal or community liability; tribal affiliations; history of feuds 
between parties; status of the victim within the tribe; gender of the victim; financial status of the accused; 
admissions of guilt. USIP, Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, 1 July 2011, url, p. 262 
229 HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023 
230 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 233; USIP, 
Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, 1 July 2011, url 
231 Mansour, R., Tribes and Religious Institutions in Iraq, Cordoba Foundation of Geneva, September 2017, url, p. 10 

34 

 
IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

information on differences between Shia and Sunni tribal mechanisms could not be found 
within time constraints. 

Severity of offences 

Sources indicate that serious offences likely to incur the most harsh responses from the tribe 
are those that deal with honour232 (which can lead to honour killings, especially of women),233 
preservation of the family bloodlines and relationships;234 also, serious disputes result from 
any transgression involving killing or wrongful death, such as killings of sons,235 homicide, 
injury, or intertribal warfare, or those that have potential to cause further violence or long-term 
feuds.236 USIP noted that in cases of homicide, there is distinction made between 
‘premeditated and unintentional killing, as well as honorable and dishonorable killing’ which 
require different compensation amount and punishments, triggering ‘different obligations 
between victim and killer and between the tribes.’237 

Without providing details, Genat also stated that the types of violations of tribal codes that 
incur harsh practices such as banishment from the tribe are ‘mainly terrorism and honour-
related offences’.238 USIP described ‘black crimes’ (as-souda) as a trigger for capital 
punishment, 239 while Al-Ibrahimi observed that there are four main categories of ’serious 
violations’ of tribal codes that are not tolerated: these are killing, rape, sexual harassment of 
any kind and a threat to security, including those acts linked to extremist groups such as Al 
Qaida or ISIL; describing the punishments as such that 'this crime won’t occur again’.240 

In field research conducted among the Shia tribes of southern Iraq in 2013, Hamoudi et al. 
observed that ‘Iraqi tribes tend to rely on reputational sanctions in their early phases’ before 
resorting ‘to escalating self-help remedies that are used with some level of restraint to avoid 
the negative consequences and threats to public order that can attend as remedies grow’. 241 
Similarly, Al-Samaraie noted that in general, a party to a dispute would try to settle the dispute 
in a direct manner initially. If the person is armed and/or is supported by a militia, they might 
opt for violence to resolve the issue. These methods are independent of tribal mechanisms 
and there are regional and geographic differences that influence the way to approach a 
conflict. When the direct approach to resolve a dispute fails, tribal mechanisms are initiated.242 
CNA explained the process as follows: ‘For homicide and other serious crimes, customary 
obligations and rules amounting to sanctuary, temporary truces, ceasefire agreements, and 
temporary exile are used to prevent blood feuds and the spread of violence’ and adversaries 

232 OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023; CNA, “No Security Without Us”: Tribes and Tribalism in Al Anbar 
Province, June 2014, url, pp. v, 14 
233 OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023; HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023 
234 OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023;  
235 HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023 
236 CNA, “No Security Without Us”: Tribes and Tribalism in Al Anbar Province, June 2014, url, pp. v, 14 
237 USIP, Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, 1 July 2011, url, p. 253 
238 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022.  
239 USIP, Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, 1 July 2011, url, p. 264 
240 Al-Ibrahimi, H., video interview, 3 November 2022 

242 Al-Samaraie, N., video interview, 27 October 2022 

35 

 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

can stop fighting without incurring shame associated with weakness or admission of defeat. 
Once the aggrieved parties agree to resolve the issues through peaceful means, various 
options include mediation (usually for minor cases, unintentional injury, car accidents or 
intratribal homicide), or arbitration for serious crimes or if mediation did not succeed; in 
‘grievous crimes’ like homicide or blood feud cases where there is a serious risk of violence 
escalating between tribes or families, sulha and fasl settlement may be used,243 through 
arbitration processes involving mediators, Sheikhs, and possibly judicial councils of various 
sheikhs chosen by both parties.244  

The following sections provide an overview of some procedural aspects of these tribal conflict 
resolution process and main mechanisms found within the available sources. The information 
provided is indicative only, and should not be taken as comprehensive in describing all 
aspects of the phenomena. Information on the details of such practices is scarce and difficult 
to access in English, in particular.  

3.1.  Notification (tanbih) and ‘Tribal summoning’ 

(mutalaba asha’iriyah) 

Notification (or tanbih) is the first step in tribal dispute resolution where the injured party from 
a tribe notifies the perpetrator from another tribe of an injury that was incurred, and that 
recompense is required.245 This process is based on ‘the desire to rely on reputation and 
avoid remedies that could escalate out of control and thereby garner the attention of the 
state’. For less grave injuries such as theft or unpaid debt, the involvement of prominent tribal 
leaders is not required, and usually a religious leader would transmit the notification.246 If the 
perpetrating party responds to the notification, ‘an accommodation might be reached quickly 
and with minimal reputational damage to the offending party’.247 

When a person objects to a behaviour or an action of another person from the same tribe or 
another tribe, that person can summon the opponent to a tribal dispute resolution gathering. 
This practice is called mutalaba asha’iriyah and could result in a diyya sum being paid by the 
summoned party.248  

243 CNA, “No Security Without Us”: Tribes and Tribalism in Al Anbar Province, June 2014, url, p. 12 
244 USIP, Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, 1 July 2011, url, p. 259-264 
245 BBC Arabic, ؟ﺔﯿﻧﺪﻤﻟا ﻦﯿﻧاﻮﻘﻠﻟ ﻞﯾﺪﺑ  ﻮھ ﻞھ يﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا نﻮﻧﺎﻘﻟا [Tribal law: Is it and alternative to civil laws?] [Online video], 25 
February 2019, url; Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 
2015, p. 233 
246 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 233 
247 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 234 
248 Iraq, Supreme Judicial Council, مﻗر رارﻘﻟا مﺎﻛﺣا ءوﺿ ﻲﻓ ﺔﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا ﺔﺑﻟﺎطﻣﻟا نﻣ ﻲﻧوﻧﺎﻘﻟا فﻗوﻣﻟا (24) [Legal position regarding 
tribal summons in light of Decision No. 24], 23 May 2012, url 

36 

 
IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

3.2.  Tribal confrontation (gouwama) and striking 

(degge asha’iriyah) 

When a party to a conflict fails to take part in a sulha (see 3.5 below),249 or ‘notification does 
not lead to a fruitful result,’ the next step is a warning issued to compel that party to actively 
seek tribal reconciliation. This practice of tribal warning is known as gouwama [guama], and is 
best translated as ‘confrontation’. It is where ‘reputational sanctions begin to have their 
bite’.250  

According to an explanatory video about gouwama made by an Iraqi tribal leader,251 
traditionally, it was used in cases of grave offences such as murder. However, it has become 
more common recently and is used in cases of personal disputes and trivial matters,252 as well 
as for example, threatening medical professionals/doctors for perceived medical errors.253  
This tribal practice is activated when the tribal leader of the injured party ‘authorizes a sizable 
delegation to go to the home of the perpetrator in full view of the neighborhood […] 
accompanied by a third party to act as witness as to the occurrence of the confrontation’. The 
delegation will then ‘note the injury, demand recompense, and insist on a visit from the 
perpetrator’s tribe to the victims within a set period’.254 According to Hamoudi, gouwama is 
‘not intended to be violent,’255 however, a tribal leader explained that in practice, violent acts 
such as shooting in the air at the threatened person’s house does occur during the warnings. 
In the past, tribal warnings used to take the form of firing into the air with a pistol, but since 
2003, light and heavy weapons and grenades have been deployed and houses have been set 
on fire during this practice.256 

The Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council observed that the practice of gouwama that remains a 
verbal threat that has not transformed into material action falls under the scope of Article 430 
of the Iraqi Criminal Code No. 111 of 1969 which stipulates a punishment or imprisonment for 
up to seven years for a person who threatens another.257 Bobseine observed that the practice 
is now illegal under Iraqi state law under anti-terrorism law, although the practice still happens 
sometimes.258 Information on any prosecutions or convictions by the state against those 
carrying out gouwama threats, or those that include violence beyond verbal threats, could not 
be found.  

249 Salah Dagher Al-Okabi,  يﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا ﺮﯾﺬﺤﺘﻟا وأ  ﺔﻣاﻮﻜﻟا[Gouwama or tribal warning] [Online video], 29 May 2021, url  
250 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 234 
251 Salah Dagher Al-Okabi is an Iraqi tribal leader and Sheikh active in explaining tribal practices on social media. 
Sheikh Salah Dagher Al-Okabi, [Twitter], n.d., url 
252 Salah Dagher Al-Okabi,  يﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا ﺮﯾﺬﺤﺘﻟا وأ  ﺔﻣاﻮﻜﻟا[Gouwama or tribal warning] [Online video], 29 May 2021, url  
253 Irfaasawtak, ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا ﺔﻣاﻮﻜﻟا" ﺔﻠﺋﺎط ﺖﺤﺗ ءﺎﺒطأ", [Doctors under tribal threats] 29 May 2019, url 
254 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 234 
255 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 234 
256 Salah Dagher Al-Okabi, ﺎﮭﺘﺠﻟﺎﻌﻣ و ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا  ﺔﻛﺪﻟا [Al-degge Al-Asha’iriyah and its treatment] [Online video], 22 
December 2021, url,  
257 Iraq, Supreme Judicial Council, ﺔﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا  ﺔﻣاوﻛﻟا [Tribal gouwama], 14 June 2021, url 
258 Bobseine, H., comments during external expert review of the report, 03 April 2023 

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

When a party to the conflict ignores the tribal warning, gouwama escalates to a more violent 
form known as degge asha’iriyah (degge for short).259 It refers to ‘the spraying of bullets on 
houses of wanted tribesmen during a tribal feud to force the clan of the enemy to depart from 
the area’260 or to cause ‘a serious reputational sanction to the individual and to the tribe’ of the 
perpetrator.261 According to sources, a variety of weapons are used, including medium 
weapons262 and grenades, as a way to force the other family to accept the settlement 
negotiations.263 AFP explained that tribes attempt to resolve a dispute through mediation, and 
‘[i]f one side failed to attend such a meeting, the rival clan would fire on the absentee’s home 
or that of fellow tribesmen’. With the proliferation of weapons in Iraq, this practice ‘may be 
deadlier than ever’.264 For more information on the impact of degge on the security situation in 
Iraq, see Chapter 6 below. 

3.3.  Tribal ‘blood truce’ (atwa) 

The tribal ‘blood truce’ (atwa) refers to a cooling off period between aggrieved tribes at the 
beginning of the reconciliation process, or a temporary ceasefire meaning the ‘gift of 
restraint’.265 In disputes that especially involve the death of a tribe member, the two conferring 
tribes266 ‘normally press the victim's family to accept a ceasefire’ known as atwa. It is defined 
as ‘a set period of time, generally between two weeks to sometimes months (renewable),267 in 
which the victim's family agrees not to exercise their right to retribution’.268 It is meant to ‘give 
the offending tribe an opportunity to gather its members and others for the large resolution 
that will take place’ and is considered ‘an admission of guilt’.269 According to a tribal leader, 
the atwa is obtained in cases of premeditated and accidental death as well as in cases of 
honour and can last for a period of up to one year. There is usually a printed document which 
includes details such as the date, the names of the two parties involved in the case as well as 

 ﻲﻓ

ازﻧﻟا

نوﻧﺟ

تﺎﻋ 

ﺔﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا

259 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 235; Salah 
Dagher Al-Okabi,  يﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا  ﺮﯾﺬﺤﺘﻟا وأ  ﺔﻣاﻮﻜﻟا[Gouwama or tribal warning] [Online video], 29 May 2021, url 
260 Water, Peace and Security, Water challenges and conflict dynamics in Southern Iraq: An in-depth analysis of an 
under-researched crisis, 17 February 2022, url, p. 29 
261 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 235 
262 BBC Arabic, ؟ﺔﯿﻧﺪﻤﻟا ﻦﯿﻧاﻮﻘﻠﻟ ﻞﯾﺪﺑ  ﻮھ ﻞھ يﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا نﻮﻧﺎﻘﻟا [Tribal law: Is it and alternative to civil laws?] [Online video], 25 
February 2019, url 
263 Iraq, Supreme Judicial Council, بﺎھرﻹا ﺔﺣﻓﺎﻛﻣ نوﻧﺎﻗ لﯾدﻌﺗ عورﺷﻣ حرﺗﻘﻣ) ﺔﯾﺑﺎھرﻹا مﺋارﺟﻟا قﺎطﻧ نﻣﺿ ﺔﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا ﺔﻛدﻟا رﺎﺑﺗﻋا) 
[Including the degge asha’iriah in the range of terrorist crimes (Proposal to amend the Anti-Terrorism Law)], 18 
August 2022, url; Saadoon, M., Tribal disputes cripple Iraq's oil-rich Basra, Amwaj, 27 March 2021, url; Al-Arabiya, 
قارﻌﻟا
 [Melon price or divorce . the insanity of tribal clashes in Iraq], 12 May 
2022, url; Al-Arab News, ةﺮﯿﺸﻌﻟا  ﺔﻄﻠﺴﺑ ﺔﻣﻮﻜﺤﻣ  قاﺮﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ بﺎﺒﺸﻟا ةﺎﯿﺣ [The life of Iraqi youth is controlled by the tribe’s 
authority], 2 May 2021, url 
264 AFP, In Iraq, bloody tribal custom now classed as ‘terrorism’, Arab News, 18 November 2018, url  
265 CNA, “No Security Without Us”: Tribes and Tribalism in Al Anbar Province, June 2014, url, pp. v, 13; see also: Al-
 [Tribal atwa in Iraq . “Blood truce” precedes the law], 4 June 
Mayadeen, 
2022, url 
266 Or a third party composed of notables according to Al-Mayadeen. Al-Mayadeen,   "مﺪﻟا ﺔﻧﺪھ" .. قاﺮﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا ةﻮﻄﻌﻟا
نﻮﻧﺎﻘﻟا ﻖﺒﺴﺗ [Tribal atwa in Iraq . “Blood truce” precedes the law], 4 June 2022, url 
267 According to Hamoudi et al, the period of atwa varies between a month and two months depending on the 
circumstances. Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 
238 
268 Carroll, K. B., Tribal law and reconciliation in the New Iraq, 2011, url, p. 14 
269 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 238 

ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا

 قﻼطﻟا

ةﻮﻄﻌﻟا

نﻮﻧﺎﻘﻟا

قاﺮﻌﻟا

ﺦﯾطﺑﻟا

رﻌﺳ  

 ﻖﺒﺴﺗ

 ..  "

ﺔﻧﺪھ

 وأ 

 ﻲﻓ

مﺪﻟا

 ..

 "

38 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

the name of the guarantor who would guarantee the terms of the truce. The document loses 
its value once a fasl has been achieved.270  

3.4.  Exile (jalwa) 

In some cases there is no atwa, and the perpetrator, and sometimes his close male relatives, 
must go on exile for a certain period of time.271 Jalwa [or Jali] is a customary exile that is 
intended to secure the protection of the offender’s family from revenge obligations.272 Jalwa 
occurs in offences of a serious nature until sulh takes place,273 or until the dispute is 
resolved.274  According to the CNA,  

The custom of exile away from one’s tribal homeland serves several functions. First, it 
secures immediate protection for the exile’s family within the territory of their 
protector. Second, jali saves the victim’s group from dishonor, because the killer and 
his group are not within practical reach. Throughout the period of exile, which may 
extend for months or years, members of the killer’s group are relegated to a marginal 
social political position within the tribal community offering them protection. After a 
period of time in exile, the mediation process can start.275 

According to Al-Ibrahimi, if a person kills someone on purpose, the whole family will be 
expelled from the entire area and/or neighbourhood for a certain period of time (jalwa), 
between five and 25 years, depending on the tribe and the region. There is a certain 
framework to be observed that sets, e.g., the distance that should be kept from the people 
expelled.276 

3.5.  Tribal dispute settlement (sulha, also sulh) 

The process of dispute settlement is called sulha277, and it results in a sum of money (fasl), or 
land,278 which is paid by the perpetrator ‘for the damage of honor that has been caused’.279 
Fasl, however, is not necessarily monetary, and can take the form of exile from the tribe,280 
where the perpetrating party is required to ‘leave their home and move to a location farther 
away from the home of the victim or other members of his tribe [… and if] then seen in the 
place where he had promised not to appear any longer, then, to use the tribal phrasing, “his 

270 Salah Dagher Al-Okabi, ﺔﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا ةوطﻌﻟا كﺻ [tribal atwa template] [Online video], 14 September 2022, url  
271 Carroll, K. B., Tribal law and reconciliation in the New Iraq, 2011, url, p. 14 
272 CNA, “No Security Without Us”: Tribes and Tribalism in Al Anbar Province, June 2014, url, p. 13 
273 Genat, M., Tribal Justice Mechanisms and Durable Solutions for Families with a Perceived Affiliation to ISIS, IOM, 
2020, p. 11 
274 CNA, “No Security Without Us”: Tribes and Tribalism in Al Anbar Province, June 2014, url, p. 13 
275 CNA, “No Security Without Us”: Tribes and Tribalism in Al Anbar Province, June 2014, url, p. vi 
276 Al-Ibrahimi, H., video interview, 3 November 2022 
277 Carroll, K. B., Tribal law and reconciliation in the New Iraq, 2011, url, p. 12; Chokr, M. A., The Persisting Past of 
Iraq, ETH Zurich, September 2021, url, p. 3 
278 Al-Samaraie, N., video Interview, 27 October 2022 
279 Chokr, M. A., The Persisting Past of Iraq, ETH Zurich, September 2021, url, p. 3 
280 CNA, “No Security Without Us”: Tribes and Tribalism in Al Anbar Province, Iraq, June 2014, url, p. 15; Bobseine, 
H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 6 

39 

 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

blood could be shed with impunity”’.281 Additionally, women are used as commodities and 
collateral during the resolution of conflicts,282 for example through forced marriages, exchange 
of women, child marriage,283 or providing women as compensation.284 For example, in cases 
that involve the death of a young man, ‘the expectation is that the women [being used as a 
fasl from the offending tribe] will be married to the immediate male relatives of the victim so as 
to heal the rift by making the families relatives of one another’. According to Hamoudi, writing 
in 2015, the practice was not used in cities and was decreasing.285 However, other sources 
indicated the practice has been on the rise, especially in the south and rural areas where it is 
common.286 See Section 3.10 Women as a means of tribal disputes settlement or use of 
women in tribal customs for more details. Additionally, Bobseine observed that sulha 
settlement can take other forms, such as a conciliation agreement where one party agrees to 
withdraw a court case against someone.287 

Sulha has two types: partial (in the context of a broad feud where the aim is to suspend 
hostilities) and comprehensive (which ‘wipes the slate completely clean between two 
groups’).288 Tribal dispute settlement mechanisms are ‘designed to operate when the facts are 
known’ but have an investigative aspect when necessary. If the investigation comes to a dead 
end, a judicial council, composed generally of six tribal leaders is formed, and when one of the 
parties is not satisfied with the council’s decision, they have the right to appeal to a higher 
tribal judge with the caveat that the latter’s decision is final.289  

As mentioned above, the purpose of Sulha is to avoid the escalation of feuds. A mediator 
plays an essential role in the sulha process and can be an Islamic religious leader (sayyid)290, a 
political leader, and most often a tribal leader (sheikh). When the mediator is a tribal leader, a 
hierarchy is observed following the tribal structure, whereby in cases of serious nature a 
sheikh at a tribal level is involved.291 Sulha can be regarded as a ‘communal gathering or 
diplomacy’292 usually taking place in a tribal leader’s house or the house of the victim293 as a 
sign of good will.294 The sheikhs involved in this practice mediate between the parties 
involved in the dispute in order to establish the facts of the incident, to agree on the 

281 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 239 
282 HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023; OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023; Ceasefire for Civilian 
Rights, Correspondence with EUAA, 16 March 2023 
283 Ceasefire for Civilian Rights, Correspondence with EUAA, 16 March 2023 
284 HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023; OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023 
285 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 239-240 
286 Raseef22, In Iraq, Women are Offered as Tributes to Settle Tribal Vendettas, 8 September 2016, url; Al-Monitor, 
Blood money marriage makes comeback in Iraq, 18 June 2015, url; See also: France24, In Iraq, tribal traditions rob 
women, girls of rights, 18 April 2019, france24.com/en/20190418-iraq-tribal-traditions-rob-women-girls-rights  
287 Bobseine, H., comments during external expert review of the report, 03 April 2023 
288 Carroll, K. B., Tribal law and reconciliation in the New Iraq, 2011, url, p. 17 
289 Carroll, K. B., Tribal law and reconciliation in the New Iraq, 2011, url, p. 14-15 
290 According to an Iraqi tribal leader and to Hamoudi et al. the presence of a sayyid in a reconciliation process is 
 [Important tribal terminology] [Online video], 15 September 
mandatory. Salah Dagher Al-Okabi, 
2022, url; Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 238; 
Bobseine clarified that the involvement of a sayyid happens in the Shia context. Bobseine, H., comments during 
external expert review of the report, 03 April 2023 
291 Carroll, K. B., Tribal law and reconciliation in the New Iraq, 2011, url, p. 13 
292 Chokr, M. A., The Persisting Past of Iraq, September 2021, url, p. 3 
293 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 238 
294 Chokr, M. A., The Persisting Past of Iraq, September 2021, url, p. 3; Carroll, K. B., Tribal law and reconciliation in 
the New Iraq, 2011, url, p. 15 

تﺎﺤﻠﻄﺼﻣ

ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻋ

ﺔﻤﮭﻣ

40 

 
 
 
IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

compensation (which is often referred to in Arabic as either fasl or diyya), and to launch the 
reconciliation rituals.295 According to BBC Arabic, the representatives of the perpetrator 
attempt during the sulha to convince those of the victim to withdraw the complaint lodged 
with authorities in return of the fasl sum.296 Sheikhs interviewed by Katherine Blue Carroll297 
highlighted that they do not accept payments for their role in concluding fasl but accept gifts 
given to them after a sulha is achieved,298 However, in contrast, Bobseine remarked that often 
Sheikhs do take a cut of the dispute settlements, even if this is not publicly acknowledged.299 
However, there have also been reports of a booming business where Sheikhs’ services are 
rented out for the purpose of settling disputes, requiring fee payment, and sometimes 
involving ‘imposter Sheikhs’.300 

An Iraqi tribal leader described, in a video shared on social media, the process of reaching a 
fasl in the broader context of sulha as follows: In the south, but also in the mid-Euphrates301 
and some parts of the west of Iraq, tribal leaders, spearheaded by a Muslim religious leader, 
are asked to pay a visit to the tribe of the victim in the dispute in order to start a sulha (this 
delegation is called tahwila in the south and mashya in the mid-Euphrates). The sulha starts 
with a religious sermon by the Muslim religious leader. Other tribal notables take turns in 
providing speeches until the fasl is agreed upon or forfeited. In southern Iraq, once an 
agreement is reached, the delegation would request to receive a religious symbol (the flag of 
Al-Abbas) as a sign of accepting the settlement302 and in the mid-Euphrates and the west, a 
short chapter of the Quran is recited. The sulha concludes with the payment of the fasl or the 
forfeiting of the sum if the victim has agreed to do so.303 USIP and CNA describe similar 
processes.304 

There are strong incentives that enforce the outcome of the settlement and failure to uphold 
the agreement (e.g., by carrying out revenge or not paying the agreed amount of money) is 
considered an offence to the tribal leader who negotiated it. Once a sulha is concluded, its 
terms have to be respected by all the parties involved in the dispute. The victim’s family risk 

295 Carroll, K. B., Tribal law and reconciliation in the New Iraq, 2011, url, p. 12; In an interview with the EUAA on 27 
October 2022, Nasir Al-Samaraie also observed that the reconciliation process includes the elements of mediation 
and compensation agreed between the parties to the conflict. Al-Samaraie, N., video interview, 27 October 2022 
296 BBC Arabic, ؟ﺔﯿﻧﺪﻤﻟا ﻦﯿﻧاﻮﻘﻠﻟ ﻞﯾﺪﺑ  ﻮھ ﻞھ يﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا نﻮﻧﺎﻘﻟا [Tribal law: Is it and alternative to civil laws?] [Online video], 25 
February 2019, url 
297 Katherine Blue Carroll is ‘a full-time non-tenure track assistant professor in the Department of Political Science, 
where she directs the undergraduate program in public policy studies and teaches courses on Terrorism, Political 
Islam, Middle East Politics, and The War in Iraq’. Vanderbilt University, Department of Political Science, n. d., url 
298 Carroll, K. B., Tribal law and reconciliation in the New Iraq, 2011, url, p. 16 
299 Bobseine, H., comments during external expert review of the report, 03 April 2023 
300 Economist (The), With Iraqi tribes settling more disputes, sheikhs are in high demand, 30 May 2019, 
https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2019/05/30/with-iraqi-tribes-settling-more-disputes-sheikhs-are-
in-high-demand 
301 A geographic area that comprises the governorates of Karbala, Diwaniya and Babil (Hilla). Al-Ittihad,   تاﺮﻔﻟا  ﻊﻤﺘﺠﻣ
رﺎﺠﺘﻟاو ةدﺎﺴﻟاو ﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا  :ﻂﺳوﻷا [Mid-Euphrates society: Tribes, sayyids and trade, n. d., url  
302 ‘The offending tribe representative ties a cloth to a wooden stake that the sayyid declares to be the Banner of 
Abbas—the flag that Abbas held to represent the warring party of Imam Hussein in Kerbala. The injured party then 
attaches a similar cloth, and the deal is thereby formalized, on the staff carried by Shi’a Islam’s noblest warrior in 
the most important battle in Shi’a Muslim history.’ Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and 
Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, pp. 238-239 
303 Salah Dagher Al-Okabi, يرﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا لﺻﻔﻟا [tribal fasl] [Online video], 10 September 2021, url  
304 USIP, Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, 1 July 2011, url, pp. 260-262; CNA, “No 
Security Without Us”: Tribes and Tribalism in Al Anbar Province, June 2014, url, p. 14-15 

41 

 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

becoming socially outcast and losing honour and respect if they violate the terms of the sulha, 
while the guarantor of the terms has the obligation to take revenge against them if they do 
so.305 If the two tribes fail to achieve an agreement, the case may escalate to tribal violence.306 

3.6.  Tribal dispute compensation (fasl) 

A dispute settlement process ends with fasl which is ‘the best-known part of the tribal 
proceedings throughout Iraq, and the most difficult to translate’.307 The term (fasl) has two 
different notions. It can refer to ‘a custom of compensation intended to prevent the escalation 
of conflict via payment for a wrong done where the culprit admits he was wrong’ and to ‘a 
negotiated settlement that is paid after an intentional killing’, although it is not necessarily 
financial.308 Hamoudi et al. observed that the word fasl can refer to both the ‘convening of the 
tribes to effect a final resolution, and the resolution arising therefrom’.309 Fasl is a tribal custom 
and constitutes a ‘fine’ or ‘compensation’ decided after a process of negotiation is held to 
settle a dispute within the framework of tribal law.310 It is considered as the ‘central step in 
sulha’, and the sum of fasl for specific types of wrongs is indicated in the tribal code for each 
tribe or may have been established via ‘long-term bilateral agreements between the two 
tribes’. The ‘final sum is also influenced by the reasons for the incident, the behavior of the 
perpetrator, the suffering of the victim's family, and the status of the victim’311 and can be 
reduced to honour the religious leaders or tribal notables who attended the sulha. 312 Fasl sets 
the amount and form of diyya to be provided to the injured party; traditionally diyya 
settlements consisted of ‘material goods, gold, or women, but today the payment is usually 
money or real property’. It is not seen as a punishment or as a replacement for the monetary 
value of a killed individual, but rather as the ‘price of foregoing revenge’.313 

Where the money of fasl goes depends on the internal rules of the tribe. In cases of death of a 
member of the tribe for example, the heirs of the deceased would get between one-third and 
two-thirds of the fasl money. There is always a proportion of the fasl that is paid to the 
collective fund of the tribe or distributed between the other members of the tribe. Also, the 
perpetrator would pay between a quarter and two-thirds of the fasl money with the rest of the 
sum being covered by the tribe. In cases related to honour, however, the perpetrator is 
expected to pay the entire amount of fasl.314 Hamoudi et al. stated a slightly different ratio 
where the ‘perpetrator is usually responsible for one-third of the payment, with the tribe 

305 Carroll, K. B., Tribal law and reconciliation in the New Iraq, 2011, url, p. 17 
306 BBC Arabic, ؟ﺔﯿﻧﺪﻤﻟا ﻦﯿﻧاﻮﻘﻠﻟ ﻞﯾﺪﺑ  ﻮھ ﻞھ يﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا نﻮﻧﺎﻘﻟا [Tribal law: Is it and alternative to civil laws?] [Online video], 25 
February 2019, url 
307 ’ Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 238 
308 CNA., “No Security Without Us”: Tribes and Tribalism in Al Anbar Province, Iraq, June 2014, url, p. vi 
309 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 238 
310 Salah Dagher Al-Okabi, يرﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا لﺻﻔﻟا ﻰﻧﻌﻣ [the meaning of tribal fasl] [Online video], 5 May 2022, url 
311 Carroll, K. B., Tribal law and reconciliation in the New Iraq, 2011, url, p. 15 
312 Carroll, K. B., Tribal law and reconciliation in the New Iraq, 2011, url, p. 16 
313 USIP, Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, 1 July 2011, url, p. 263 
314 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022. Melisande Genat is a PhD student at Stanford University with 
extensive experience researching tribal justice and conflict resolution mechanisms in Iraq. 

42 

 
IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

supplying the other two-thirds’, with the injured party being ‘entitled to two-thirds, with the 
tribe entitled to the final third’.315 

According to Carroll, fasl could sometimes be used for extortionary purposes where the 
‘weaker parties simply paid to avoid problems’.316 In a report published in August 2022, 
Shafaqna-Iraq, a Shia news outlet based in the UK,317 citing an Iraqi notable from southern Iraq, 
stated that tribal dispute resolution has become a lucrative business with the reconciliation 
money transforming into large royalties imposed on parties to the conflict.318 Additionally, 
Genat observed that tribes in the southern governorates have the tendency to ask for 
exaggerated diyya compensations amounting to more than 100 million Iraqi dinars (more than 
70 500 EUR)319 for cases of unpremeditated murders, while tribes in the mid-Euphrates and in 
western Iraq agreed on amounts not exceeding 25 million Iraqi dinars (approximately 17 600 
EUR)320.321 Hamoudi et al. stated that ‘the injured tribe demands compensation that is many 
multiples of the amount that they ultimately seek’, and ‘then reduce it based on those who 
happen to be present – the sayyids, notables from the other tribe, and others’.322 In her review 
of this report, Bobseine also reiterated that this is often a negotiation mechanism.323 

3.7. 

Expulsion from the tribe or banishment (bara’a) 

Another tribal practice is expulsion from the tribe. Hamoudi et al. observed that in exceptional 
situations, a tribe would resort to ‘formal expulsion announced through a document known as 
the sanad,324 or certification, which is sent to all the tribes’. In this document, the tribe clears 
its responsibility of the actions committed by the individual after the issuance of the document, 
and although denied by the tribal leaders interviewed by the authors, ‘from the sole 
perspective of the tribal law, the issuance of the sanad is the same as declaring the person’s 
blood liable to be shed, because no tribal action is possible to defend him if violence were 
directed against him’.325 UNHCR stated that such documents ‘do not follow a standard format’ 
and the perpetrator may either receive a copy of it or be informed verbally of expulsion 
through relatives or members of the tribe.326  

In an interview with EUAA on 4 October 2022, Genat distinguished between two practices 
here: Bara’a where the tribe collectively banishes a member and tabriya when relatives 

315 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 239 
316 Carroll, K. B., Tribal law and reconciliation in the New Iraq, 2011, url, p. 27 
317 Shafaqna News Association, Who We Are, n. d., url  
318 Shafaqna – Iraq, ﺎﮭﻋاوﻧأ لﻛﺑ مﺋارﺟو لﻛﺎﺷﻣ  ﺞﻟﺎﻌﺗ ”ﺔﻣاوﻛﻟا “ وأ ﺔﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا لوﺻﻔﻟا  ..قارﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ [In IraqTribal fasl or gouwama deals 
with all sorts of crimes and problems], 27 August 2022, url 
319 Exchange rates from European Commission, Exchange rate (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed 2 November 2022  
320 Exchange rates from European Commission, Exchange rate (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed 5 November 2022 
321 Genat, M., Tribal Justice Mechanisms and Durable Solutions for Families with a Perceived Affiliation to ISIS, IOM, 
2020, p. 11 
322 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 238; see 
also: Al-Shabaka, 
 [Tribal fasl. Customs which are stronger than the law], 17 April 
2018, url 
323 Bobseine, H., comments during external expert review of the report, 03 April 2023 
324 UNHCR, Tribal Conflict Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, available at: url, p. 3 
325 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 241-242 
326 UNHCR, Tribal Conflict Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, available at: url, p. 3 

يﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا

فاﺮﻋأ

ﻞﺼﻔﻟا

ﻦﯿﻧاﻮﻘ

 ﻦﻣ ﻟا

  ىﻮﻗأ

 ..

43 

 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

disown a person, e.g., in cases of ISIL affiliation.327 Before banning a person, tribes usually 
start with eviction, denouncement and repulsion in cases that involve acts considered by the 
tribe as ill-behaviour.328  

Tribal expulsion became widely discussed in the wake of the ISIL crisis as tribes started to 
consider expelling members who are affiliated with ISIL from the tribe to distance themselves 
from the terrorist group.329 This was most pronounced in the governorates of Ninewa, and 
perhaps Kirkuk,330 as well as Al-Anbar, Salah Al-Din and Diyala following the defeat of ISIL.331 
Al-Ibrahimi noted that in the context of ISIL returns, if the community disavows a household, 
this affects the household members’ economic opportunities, employment, and even the 
ability to get married. The returnees of this type have started to establish their own 
communities which are isolated from the rest.332 

According to the Iraqi journalist, Layth Natiq,333 tribes continued to expel people from their 
land if they commit a ‘shameful’ act. This practice spilled over from rural areas to the cities, 
where the sentenced people are compelled to leave their houses if the two disputing tribes 
agreed on this.334 According to Al-Ibrahimi, people are banned if they commit acts such as 
killing, rape, sexual harassment of any sort, and acts considered as a threat to security.335 
According to Sheikh Abud Al-Issawi, the former Prime Minister’s advisor on the National 
Reconciliation and Follow-up Committee cited by Carroll, in cases that involve intentional 
killing, theft within the tribe, or rape, the perpetrator ‘will be dishonored, expelled from the 
tribe, and will not be protected or assisted by his tribe with a fasel336’. He also added that even 
if the expelled person is killed in retaliation for his crime, no fasl will be requested by his tribe 
or family.337 In her review of this report Bobseine, noted however, in practice, expulsion in the 
above-mentioned cases is not as frequent as suggested.338 Genat also observed that people 
expelled collectively by a tribe can, in theory, be targeted by other actors and their tribe would 
not ask for fasl in case they were killed. She added that while banishment for cases related to 
honour can happen, it is not very common.339 The OWFI representative stated that exile or 
banishment can result from a combination of circumstances such as not paying money 
required by a tribal fine, not attending such meetings, and not respecting the patriarchs of the 
tribe.340 

Without providing details, Al-Ibrahimi said that the banishment is documented in a’ tribal 
registry.’341 Corroboration could not be found about the a ‘tribal registry’, however, Bobseine 

327 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022 
328 Al-Samaraie, N., video interview, 27 October 2022 
329 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022 
330 Bobseine, H., comments during external expert review of the report, 03 April 2023 
331 Al-Samaraie, N., video interview, 27 October 2022 
332 Al-Ibrahimi, H video interview, 3 November 2022 
333 Layth Natiq is an Iraqi journalist and news anchor at Al-Hurra media outlet. Natiq, L., [Twitter], n. d., url 
334 Natiq, L., ﺎﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻋ بوﻠطﻣ" ﮫﻠﻛ  قارﻌﻟا :ﻲﻠﺑﻘﻟا ذوﻔﻧﻟا مﺧﺿﺗ" [Inflation of the role of tribes: All of Iraq is “tribally wanted”], 
Assafir, 30 May 2019, url 
335 Al-Ibrahimi, H., video interview, 3 November 2022 
336 Otherwise written as fasl 
337 Carroll, K. B., Tribal law and reconciliation in the New Iraq, 2011, url, p. 17 
338 Bobseine, H., comments during external expert review of the report, 03 April 2023 
339 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022 
340 OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023 
341 Al-Ibrahimi, H., video interview, 3 November 2022 

44 

 
IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

observed that tribal sheikhs are increasingly writing down their ‘laws’ and decisions are often 
written and signed on paper and a copy of it is saved with the tribal sheikh.342 The tribal elites 
as well as the relatives of the banned person are informed. There are some restrictive 
measures involved: the banned person cannot receive aid from or contact the family. 
Moreover, individuals or families cannot be banned by another tribe, but only the tribe of the 
person can make such decisions.343 Further and corroborating information could not be found. 

Banishment from tribe is, according to Genat, something that is meant to be advertised, and 
depending on the tribe and the offence committed, tribes usually announce that a person was 
banned and denounce the act committed. This can take place either informally through tribal 
meetings or more formally by posting this on the internet or publishing lists containing 
names.344 Al-Ibrahimi observed, on the other hand, that the meetings in which people are 
banned from the tribe are public. However, tribes do not invite the media, and the discussions 
are not published unless people are taking photos and videos and leaking them to social 
media. This is especially the case with these types of issues which are sensitive, where tribes 
try to resolve them internally. In such cases, tribes aim to avoid a scandal and a stain to the 
reputation of the tribe.345 

The following examples of expulsion from tribes were reported by Iraqi media:  

• 

• 

• 

In April 2022, the Sarkha tribe made a public announcement in which it reiterated its 
expulsion of one of its members who was initially disowned in 1999. The tribe accused 
the expelled member of violating tribal codes and affiliation with the Baath Party.346  
In the same month, Albu Assaf clan published a document on social media expelling a 
member for the immoral behaviour of insulting one of the clan’s leaders. The 
document was signed and stamped by three of the clan’s leaders.347  
In August 2021, Al-Sharfa tribe decided to expel one of its members due to ‘immoral’ 
behaviour that could jeopardise the reputation of the tribe. It requested its members 
not to deal with the expelled person until he apologised for his behaviour. Later on, the 
expelled member apologised, and the tribe shared a post on Facebook pardoning 
him.348  

•  Tribal leaders in Maysan decided in December 2019 to expel and ‘spill the blood’ of 
any member who participates in violent acts and in targeting state authorities and 
services.349 

342 Bobseine, H., comments during external expert review of the report, 03 April 2023 
343 Al-Ibrahimi, H., video interview, 3 November 2022 
344 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022 
345 Al-Ibrahimi, H., video interview, 3 November 2022 
346 National News Center,  ﻲﺧرﺻﻟا دوﻣﺣﻣ“ وﻋدﻣﻟا نﻣ أرﺑﺗﺗ ﺔﺧرﺻ لآ رﺋﺎﺷﻋ” [Al-Sarkha clans disown the so-called “Mahmoud 
Al-Sarkhi”], 11 April 2022, url 
347 Ultra Iraq, ﻲﻧوﯾزﻔﻠﺗ ءﺎﻘﻟ بﺑﺳﺑ ﺎﮭﺧوﯾﺷ دﺣأ  درطﺗ نﺎﻣﯾﻠﺳﻟا ﻲﻠﻋ ةرﯾﺷﻋ [Ali Sulaiman’s clan expels one of its sheikhs for a 
televised interview], 28 April 2022, url 
348 NRT, مﻣﻌﻣ نﯾد لﺟر نﺄﺷﺑ وﯾدﯾﻓ ﻊطﻘﻣ رﺷﻧﺗو ﺎﻧﺎﯾﺑ ردﺻﺗ ةرﯾﺷﻋ ..هودرط نا دﻌﺑ :قارﻌﻟا [Iraq: After expelling him. A tribe issues a 
statement and publishes a video concerning a cleric], 2 August 2021, url 
349 Today News, تﺎﺳﺳؤﻣﻠﻟ  قرﺣ وأ  لﺗﻗ تﺎﯾﻠﻣﻌﺑ ﮫﻛارﺗﺷا تﺑﺛﯾ نﻣ لﻛ ”مد ردھ”ـﺑ دﮭﻌﺗﺗ نﺎﺳﯾﻣ رﺋﺎﺷﻋ [Maysan tribes pledge to spill the 
blood anyone who is proved to have participated in murder or setting fire to state institutions], 15 December 2019, 
url; Mawazeen News, صﺎﺧﻟاو مﺎﻌﻟا  لﺎﻣﻟا ﻰﻠﻋ يدﺗﻌﯾ صﺧﺷ لﻛ نﻣ  ةءارﺑﻟا ﻰﻠﻋ ﻖﻔﺗﺗ نﺎﺳﯾﻣ رﺋﺎﺷﻋ [Maysan tribes agree to disown 
anyone who targets public and private property], 15 December 2019, url 

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Iraqi media sources and social media shared examples of documents announcing bara’a from 
members of tribes for various reasons, including insulting the Prime Minister,350 vandalising 
public property and attacking security forces.351 Both examples included the reason for 
expulsion and the signatures of the tribal sheikhs who issued them.352 

At a formal level, there is a mechanism to voluntarily be expelled from a tribe. A person can go 
to the Directorate of Tribal Affairs353 and fill a specific form to obtain one’s own banishment 
from a tribe to distance themselves from the actions of the tribe and avoid collective liability. 
The person is provided with a document (called in Arabic Khoulasiyya) which testifies that the 
person has undergone the process of self-banishment.354 Within the tribal context, a tribal 
leader explained in a video that a person can opt for leaving the tribe voluntarily for personal 
reasons including the treatment by the tribe or the willingness to distance themselves from the 
acts of the tribe. There are tribal customs to be followed in such cases: first, the intention to 
leave the tribe and dissociate oneself from the collective liability has to be announced publicly 
in the tribe’s guesthouse; and second, all outstanding issues with the original tribe (fasl or 
disputes) have to be resolved beforehand. While not always the case, the person leaving a 
tribe should provide a deed of release issued by the sheikh of the original tribe to the leader 
of the host tribe.355 

According to Genat, ‘there is no agreement among tribes whether bara’a is permanent or not.’ 
In the southern governorates, banishment from the tribe is often seen as temporary and 
comes to an end once a fasl has been achieved.356 UNHCR also stated that expulsion from a 
tribe ‘can be for a specific period of time or forever’.357 

Finally, according to USIP, tribal banishment is ‘a fate tantamount to death because, without 
tribal protection, the offender is easy prey for other tribes.’358 Similarly, UNHCR observed that 
this practice ‘has serious consequences for the affected individual’s social status and every-
day life, as he loses all claims to protection by the tribe’.359 Genat stated that if the violation 
committed by the expelled person affected another member of the same tribe, then the tribe 
would actively pursue that person. However, the tribe of the expelled person would not 
encourage other actors to target that person. Such persons can make use of an old tradition 

350 Al-Hashimi, H., يدﺎﺒﻌﻟا رﺪﯿﺣ  رﻮﺘﻛﺪﻟا ﻰﻠﻋ ﺎھزوﺎﺠﺗو يوﻼﺘﻔﻟا نﺎﻨﺣ ﺐﺋﺎﻨﻟا تﺎﻓﺮﺼﺗ ﻦﻣ  ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻋ ﺔﺋﺮﺒﺗ بﺎﺘﻛ [Document of tribal tabriya 
from the behaviour of MP. Hanan al-fatlawi and her transgression against Dr. Haidar Al-Abadi] [Twitter], posted on 
30 April 2016, url  
351 Mawazeen News, ﻢﮭﻣد رﺪﮭﺗو ﻦﯿﺑﺮﺨﻤﻟا ﻦﻣ أﺮﺒﺘﺗ ةﺮﺼﺒﻟا ﺮﺋﺎﺸﻋ خﻮﯿﺷ ..ﺔﻘﯿﺛﻮﻟﺎﺑ [In a document. Al-Basrah tribal sheikhs disavow 
vandalisers and conduct hadr al-dam towards them], 2 December 2019, url 
352 Based on the EUAA drafter’s reading of the examples. 
353 The Iraqi State recognises the importance of tribes, which is ‘evident through the existence of the Directorate of 
Tribal Affairs in the Ministry of Interior that has branches in every Iraqi province and offices within the Ministry of 
Justice’. The Directorate’s role is to deal with tribal leaders and has a Committee for Tribal Conflict Resolution. 
Water, Peace and Security, Water challenges and conflict dynamics in Southern Iraq: An in-depth analysis of an 
under-researched crisis, 17 February 2022, url, p. 26 
354 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022 
355 Salah Dagher Al-Okabi, ﺪﻨﺳ نوﺪﺑ ةﺮﯿﺸﻌﻟا ﻦﻣ  جوﺮﺨﻟا [Leaving the tribe without a document] [Online video], 25 August 
2022, url  
356 Genat, M video interview, 4 October 2022 
357 UNHCR, Tribal Conflict Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, available at: 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/5a66f84f4.html, p. 3 
358 USIP, Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, 1 July 2011, url, p. 254 
359 UNHCR, Tribal Conflict Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, available at: 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/5a66f84f4.html, p. 3 

46 

 
IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

called Dakhala whereby they can seek the protection of a more powerful tribe.360 The person 
seeking the protection of a tribe must contribute to the collective fund of the that tribe361 which 
will then intervene in cases of ‘simple’ tribal disputes such as fights and car accidents.362 
Granting this protection to a person expelled from another tribe is not an obligation on the 
part of the tribal leader of the host tribe and is decided on a case by case basis.363  

Reportedly, individuals whose tribes are not strong and those who belong to minorities (e.g., 
Christians and Mandaeans) seek the protection of prominent tribes, or other strong power 
brokers such as the PMF and security forces,364 in Iraq, and this has become a trend whereby 
many youth in Baghdad have been reverting to tribes for protection.365 Bobseine observed in 
her review that it is important to note that power-brokers and protections are not just tribal, 
but also political, or security-related and that it ‘depends on the context, what they need 
protection from, and who is powerful in the area.’366 

The expelled person can also seek the protection of the police, however, how well the person 
is connected plays a role in the effectiveness of this type of protection. Genat was of the view 
that it might be safer for an expelled person who is not well connected to run away and hide 
in another part of Iraq, such as the KRI for example.367 

3.8. 

‘Blood spilling’ (hadr al-dam) 

Hadr al-dam is a ‘tradition-based form of response in tribal conflicts. This means that a person 
or an entire family is deprived of the family/tribe's protection and can possibly be liquidated 
without causing any reactions from the person's family/tribe.’368 Al-Samaraie explained that 
Hadr al-dam can be seen as a way that allows the tribe to distance itself from the act 
committed by one of its members.369 According to USIP, hadr al-dam is form of outcasting in 
extreme cases.370 

Information on hadr al-dam is scarce. In a video posted on social media, by Sheikh Al-Okabi, 
an Iraqi tribal leader, he explained that when a tribe member constantly causes troubles and 
does not abide by tribal law and customs, the tribe can collectively decide to expel him. He 
stated that hadr al-dam is resorted to in cases of murder, and a document (sanad) that 
announces hadr al-dam, signed by the sheikhs of the tribe as well the perpetrator’s father 
and/or uncle, is issued. Once a person’s blood is ‘spilled’, his tribe will not claim revenge or 

360 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022 
361 Al-Arab News, ةﺮﯿﺸﻌﻟا ﺔﻄﻠﺴﺑ ﺔﻣﻮﻜﺤﻣ قاﺮﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ بﺎﺒﺸﻟا ةﺎﯿﺣ [The life of Iraqi youth is controlled by the tribe’s authority], 2 
May 2021, url; Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022 
362 Al-Arab News, ةﺮﯿﺸﻌﻟا ﺔﻄﻠﺴﺑ ﺔﻣﻮﻜﺤﻣ قاﺮﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ بﺎﺒﺸﻟا ةﺎﯿﺣ [The life of Iraqi youth is controlled by the tribe’s authority], 2 
May 2021, url 
363 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022 
364 Bobseine, H., comments during external expert review of the report, 03 April 2023 
365 Al-Arab News, ةﺮﯿﺸﻌﻟا ﺔﻄﻠﺴﺑ ﺔﻣﻮﻜﺤﻣ قاﺮﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ بﺎﺒﺸﻟا ةﺎﯿﺣ [The life of Iraqi youth is controlled by the tribe’s authority], 2 
May 2021, url 
366 Bobseine, H., comments during external expert review of the report, 03 April 2023 
367 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022 
368 Norway, LandInfo, Irak: Klanskonflikt – hadr dam [Iraq: Tribal conflict – hadr al-dam], 31 August 2012, url, p. 1 
369 Al-Samaraie, N., video interview, 27 October 2022 
370 USIP, Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, 1 July 2011, url, p. 264 

47 

 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

call for dispute settlement (fasl) in case he was killed.371 According to USIP, hadr al-dam is 
sometimes used in cases where a man ‘habitually puts the whole tribe in jeopardy by 
behaving irresponsibly or failing to abide by a sulha settlement with another tribe,’ or in the 
case of murder.372  

Information on the types of behaviour that could lead to hadr al-dam as well as the prevalence 
of the practice is scarce. According to Al-Samaraie, the types of offences or violations that 
could lead to hadr al-dam are mainly of ‘criminal and moral nature.’373 According to OWFI, the 
cause is usually a morality punishment for situations like having sexual relations outside of 
marriage; usually against women who are the vast majority of victims; or in situations where a 
male is caught in an sexual act with another male (so-called ‘black crimes’, as-souda) or in 
cases of child rape. These are what the source stated were the ‘most extreme cases’.374  Al-
Ibrahimi stated that hadr al-dam usually results from the violation of a tribal settlement, e.g., 
when a tribal blood compensation set on the basis of a killing is not complied with.375 
According to Al-Samaraie, publicly announcing hadr al-dam implies a public declaration of 
inability to resolve a dispute and constitutes a public invitation to kill a person without fearing 
tribal consequences and is mainly used as a leverage to negotiate diyya.376 Al-Ibrahimi 
observed that hadr al-dam is ‘not a permission to kill a person, but rather a declaration that 
the tribe wants to have nothing to do with the person’ in question and no protection will be 
provided to them.377 Expulsion is not necessary in such cases, and the person can continue to 
live in their area but people from other tribes can harm the person. The person receives no aid 
from the tribe and any other person who tries to aid the person in question will be disciplined 
by the tribe.378 However, USIP states that this type of outcasting is seen in Iraqi tribal society 
as a ‘virtual death sentence’ due to the lack of protection.379  

According to Al-Ibrahimi’s knowledge this practice is ‘very rarely exercised’, however direct 
corroboration could not be found.380 However, Haley Bobseine stated that the killing of people 
who killed for ISIL ‘happened a lot immediately following the cessation of hostilities in the 
official fight against ISIL. Basically, tribes said, they do not take responsibility for actions of any 
of their tribesmen who joined ISIL and committed crimes. In essence, they are dam mahdour 
[subject to hadr al-dam]. A number of perceived ISIL fighters and affiliates were murdered 
during this time. Some of this still occasionally continues today but not nearly the numbers 
seen before. Security forces allegedly sometimes turn a blind eye to some of these killings of 
suspected ISIL fighters and do not follow up on any investigations.’381 Further information on 
prevalence could not be found. 

371 Salah Dagher Al-Okabi, يﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا  فﺮﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ مﺪﻟا  رﺪھ ﺪﻨﺳ [Sanad of hadr al-dam in tribal customs], 26 January 2023, url  
372 USIP, Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, 1 July 2011, url, p. 264 
373 Al-Samaraie, N., video interview, 27 October 2022 
374 OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023 
375 Al-Ibrahimi, H., video interview, 3 November 2022 
376 Al-Samaraie, N., video interview, 27 October 2022 
377 Al-Ibrahimi, H., video interview, 3 November 2022; Bobseine is also of the same view. Bobseine, H., comments 
during external expert review of the report, 03 April 2023 
378 Al-Ibrahimi, H., video interview, 3 November 2022 
379 USIP, Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, 1 July 2011, url, p. 264 
380 Al-Ibrahimi, H., video interview, 3 November 2022 
381 Bobseine, H., Comment made during the review of this report, 3 April 2023 

48 

 
IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

3.9.  Blood feuds (thar) 

According to the CNA, thar refers to blood feuds or revenge killing to avenge the killing of a 
tribesman. Furthermore, ‘failure to fulfill the obligation of ‘al thar’ badly damages the group’s 
reputation; it is a loss of honor that weakens the group vis-à-vis other groups’ and this can 
have implications for the tribes economic and political influence, as well as ‘potential marriage 
partners’. Thar is thus both for vengeance to rebalance tribal power but also for self-protection 
of the tribe and tribes engage in thar to make known to others to refrain from trespassing 
against them.382 In an interview with EUAA, Genat maintained that thar, although a tribal 
practice, is not considered a part of ‘tribal codes’ or a tribal conflict resolution mechanism. It 
happens precisely when tribal justice has failed.383 UNHCR also noted that blood feuds occur 
when ‘tribes fail to resolve disputes between them through peaceful means’.384 

Blood feuds and thar remain common in Iraq385 and remain a ‘major matter’ within the tribal 
system that can go on for years.386 As regards blood feuds (known in Arabic as thar), Genat 
observed the existence of this cultural practice in Iraq, even in large cities, where ‘most urban 
Iraqis report that they know at least one person in their immediate entourage who is, or has 
been, at risk of thar’.387 This practice remains ‘a common occurrence’ especially in southern 
Iraq ‘with clashes sometimes lasting for days with the use of heavy weapons’.388 

Al-Samaraie observed that in cases of ‘grave nature’ such as murder or if a party is ‘socially 
disadvantaged in various forms’, that party might not accept to go through the fasl (sulha) 
process. The affected party might announce that they would opt for revenge at the early 
stages of the dispute. Nevertheless, the tribal system continues to operate, and tribes 
continue to mediate to bring the two parties to a settlement. Once the two parties accept to 
meet, personal charms, historical relations, and religious language are used in order to reduce 
the blood money (diyya). However, when there is a revenge or counter killing, settlement 
becomes more complicated.389  

Iraqi security sources cited in a New Arab report dated 15 January 2022 stated that tribal 
disputes did not come to an end despite the arrests of members of involved tribes who still 
believe in revenge. The cited sources added that 280 persons were arrested in Thi-Qar 
against the background of tribal disputes since the beginning of 2020, but those are usually 
released due to the intervention of government and city officials.390 

382 CNA, “No Security Without Us”: Tribes and Tribalism in Al Anbar Province, June 2014, url, p. 9 
383 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022; Genat, M., Tribal Justice Mechanisms and Durable Solutions for 
Families with a Perceived Affiliation to ISIS, IOM, 2020, p. 11 
384 UNHCR, Tribal Conflict Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, available at: url, p. 3 
385 UNHCR, Tribal Conflict Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, available at: url, p. 3; OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 
March 2023 
386 OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023 
387 Genat, M., Tribal Justice Mechanisms and Durable Solutions for Families with a Perceived Affiliation to ISIS, IOM, 
2020, p. 11 
388 UNHCR, Tribal Conflict Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, available at: url, p. 3 
389 Al-Samaraie, N., video interview, 27 October 2022 
390 New Arab (The), قارﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ ﻲﻠھﻷا مﻠﺳﻟا  ﻖﻠﻘﺗ ﺔﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا تﺎﻋازﻧﻟا [Tribal disputes disturb civil peace in Iraq], 15 January 2022, 
url 

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

3.10.  Women as a means of tribal disputes settlement or 

use of women in tribal customs 

Dr. Bushra Al-Obaidi stated in an interview for this report that women are used as a tool to 
settle disputes. When a tribal dispute breaks out related to a woman, usually it is due to an 
incident of rape, harassment, or violence against her by a man from another tribe. Additionally, 
there are several tribal customs which persist and impact women, including fasliya marriages, 
kassa bi kassa, nahwa, and giving women away as gifts to prominent and important visitors to 
the tribe, or forcing women to forfeit their inheritances.391 

Hamoudi et al. observed that women are not only excluded completely from ‘participating 
meaningfully in tribal resolution’, but ‘they are treated as objects of exchange in a broader 
compensation system, even if for the most part the matter is symbolic’.392 This practice is 
called fasliya, where ‘women are married off as restitution for blood spilt between two 
tribes’393 or where a tribe gives ‘one or several girls or women for marriage to another tribe’ as 
a way to resolve inter-tribal conflict’.394 This is done ostensibly to ‘create bonds’ that prevent 
future fighting.395  

The giving of women as gifts means the important visitor is obliged under tribal customs to 
accept the gift and it may be perceived as an insult if he does not, triggering a dispute or the 
killing of the woman (whose honour would be questioned).396 

UNHCR observed that while fasliya practice is banned by Iraqi law, it ‘has reportedly seen a 
resurgence since 2014’397 especially in southern Iraq.398 In this practice, the woman has no 
right to divorce and is exposed to abuse,399 and mistreatment.400 

Detailed information on this practice and other practices impacting women can be found 
under Sections 3.11 Honour violations and honour-based violence and 4.2 Women’s tribal 
participation and other practices affecting women of this report.  

391 Al-Obaidi, B., Interview with EUAA, 3 April 2023 
392 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 259 
393 France24, In Iraq, tribal traditions rob women, girls of rights, 18 April 2019, url 
394 UNHCR, Tribal Conflict Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, available at: url, p. 2 
395 USIP, Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, 1 July 2011, url, p. 264 
396 Al-Obaidi, B., Interview with EUAA, 3 April 2023 
397 UNHCR, Tribal Conflict Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, available at: url, p. 2 
398 UNHCR, Tribal Conflict Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, available at: url, p. 2; Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a 
Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 12 
399 UNHCR, Tribal Conflict Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, available at: url, p. 2; Al-Obaidi, B., Interview with 
EUAA, 3 April 2023 
400 USIP, Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, 1 July 2011, url, p. 264; Al-Obaidi, B., 
Interview with EUAA, 3 April 2023 

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IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

3.11.  Honour violations and honour-based violence 

According to Dr. Bushra Al-Obaidi, honour violence is one of the largest problems 
encountered in Iraqi society, enabled by the Criminal Code, Article 409.401 According to 
Landinfo, honour-based violence refers to ‘violence committed with the intention of restoring 
one’s honour or the collective honour of the family, clan, or tribe.’402 Violations of honour 
(‘honour crimes’) that contravene tribal social norms and codes and that can spark honour-
based violence against a person can be due to a range of reasons, including examples such 
as these for women/girls: 

•  seeking a partner of her own choosing, or having romantic relations without prior 

• 

permission from respective male kin; 403 
refusing an arranged marriage; 404 seeking divorce against the will of the family or 
tribe;405 

•  expressed sexuality of women, including preservation of virginity and female ‘purity’;406 
•  sexual relations or male contact outside marriage; ‘fornication’; ‘adultery’;407 flirtation or 
even rumours or suspicion of an offence; ‘real or perceived unfaithfulness’;408 or if a 
girl/woman has texts/has correspondence ‘deemed inappropriate’ between her and a 
man she is not married to;409 

•  being a female victim of rape, sexual assault or kidnapping;410 
• 
‘shameful’ dress or behaviour, including on social media;411 
•  showing disobedient behaviour to male relatives, elderly female relatives, or one’s 

husband.412 

Norway’s report on honour violations noted that the situation for males is not the same, noting: 
contact with the opposite sex or a premarital relationship is not in itself considered harmful to 
the collective honour of the man or his family, but he will be affected by the desire for revenge 
from the woman’s family. Males may be considered to have damaged honour if they violate 
gender roles through dress or same-sex relationships.413 USIP also mentions ‘Black crimes’ 

401 Al-Obaidi, B., Interview with EUAA, 3 April 2023 
402 Norway, Landinfo, Temanotat: Irak - Ære og æresrelatert vold [Thematic Note: Iraq - Honour and Honour Related 
Violence in Iraq and Kurdistan], 10 March 2022, url, p. 4 
403 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 240 
404 Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report Iraq, 16 January 2023, url, p. 30 
405 Norway, Landinfo, Temanotat: Irak - Ære og æresrelatert vold [Thematic Note: Iraq - Honour and Honour Related 
Violence in Iraq and Kurdistan], 10 March 2022, url, p. 20 
406 EUAA, COI Report: Iraq – Targeting of Individuals, url, para. 3.1 
407 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 240 
408 USIP, Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, 1 July 2011, url, p. 255 
409 Bobseine, H., comments during external expert review of the report, 03 April 2023 
410 Norway, Landinfo, Temanotat: Irak - Ære og æresrelatert vold [Thematic Note: Iraq - Honour and Honour Related 
Violence in Iraq and Kurdistan], 10 March 2022, url, para. 2.3. 
411 Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report Iraq, 16 January 2023, url, p. 30 
412 Norway, Landinfo, Temanotat: Irak - Ære og æresrelatert vold [Thematic Note: Iraq - Honour and Honour Related 
Violence in Iraq and Kurdistan], 10 March 2022, url, p. 19-20 
413 Norway, Landinfo, Temanotat: Irak - Ære og æresrelatert vold [Thematic Note: Iraq - Honour and Honour Related 
Violence in Iraq and Kurdistan], 10 March 2022, url, p. 20 

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

(as-souda) such as male same-sex relations,414 rape, kidnapping a woman, or theft from a 
fellow kinsman or host.415 

Tribal resolutions to honour violations include arranged or forced marriage; 416 fasliya 
marriage;417 forced divorce;418 honour killing of women and/or the involved parties;419 non-
lethal violence, forced suicide or contrived suicide, female-genital mutilation, starving or 
poisoning; restricted freedom of movement or confinement; denial of basic rights; forced 
abortion; forced virginity testing; denial of personal autonomy; verbal abuse or 
abandonment.420 The aim of these actions is shame-washing to restore ‘honour’.421 Women 
and girls are the most frequent victims of honour killings,422 however men and boys may also 
be affected or killed, on a smaller scale. 423 Male family members who consider their honour 
damaged are usually the perpetrators; however female relatives may also be involved.424 The 
full extent of the problem, which occurs all over the country, is not known due to extreme 
underreporting.425 It remains a serious problem nationwide.426 UNAMI reported that several 
hundred women die each year from honour killings.427  In February 2023, widespread outrage 
in Iraq occurred when a young woman was killed by her father for so-called honour reasons, 
upon a return trip to Iraq. She had complained of being sexually assaulted by her brother in 
previous years, and had moved and was living abroad with her Syrian fiancé against her 
father’s wishes, and become well known for making Youtube videos.428 Several sources 
mentioned her case as exemplifying the situation of women and honour violence in Iraq.429  

414 OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023; Norway, Landinfo, Temanotat: Irak - Ære og æresrelatert vold 
[Thematic Note: Iraq - Honour and Honour Related Violence in Iraq and Kurdistan], 10 March 2022, url, p. 15-17; 
USIP, Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, 1 July 2011, url, p. 255 
415 USIP, Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, 1 July 2011, url, p. 264; UNHCR, Tribal 
Conflict Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, url  
416 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 240; 
Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report Iraq, 16 January 2023, url, p. 31; Norway, Landinfo, Temanotat: Irak - 
Ære og æresrelatert vold [Thematic Note: Iraq - Honour and Honour Related Violence in Iraq and Kurdistan], 10 
March 2022, url, para. 2.3. Forms of honour-related violence 
417 Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report Iraq, 16 January 2023, url, p. 31 
418 Norway, Landinfo, Temanotat: Irak - Ære og æresrelatert vold [Thematic Note: Iraq - Honour and Honour Related 
Violence in Iraq and Kurdistan], 10 March 2022, url, para. 2.3 
419 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 240 
420 Norway, Landinfo, Temanotat: Irak - Ære og æresrelatert vold [Thematic Note: Iraq - Honour and Honour Related 
Violence in Iraq and Kurdistan], 10 March 2022, url, para 2.3. 
421 USIP, Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, 1 July 2011, url, p. 264; UNHCR, Tribal 
Conflict Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, url; Norway, Landinfo, Temanotat: Irak - Ære og æresrelatert vold 
[Thematic Note: Iraq - Honour and Honour Related Violence in Iraq and Kurdistan], 10 March 2022, url, p. 10-11 
422 Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights, Correspondence with EUAA, 16 March 2023; OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 
March 2023; Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report Iraq, 16 January 2023, url, p. 31; See also in KRI: AW, 
Worrisome increase of “Honour” crimes in Iraqi Kurdistan, 21 March 2022, url and Mustafah, R., Addressing 
Violence Against Women in Iraqi Kurdistan, 28 March 2022, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/addressing-violence-against-women-iraqi-kurdistan  
423 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on 
her mission to Iraq, 5 June 2018, url, Para. 40; Relating to the scale of the problem: Norway, Landinfo, Temanotat: 
Irak - Ære og æresrelatert vold [Thematic Note: Iraq - Honour and Honour Related Violence in Iraq and Kurdistan], 
10 March 2022, url, 
424 Norway, Landinfo, Temanotat: Irak - Ære og æresrelatert vold [Thematic Note: Iraq - Honour and Honour Related 
Violence in Iraq and Kurdistan], 10 March 2022, url, p. 4 
425 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on 
her mission to Iraq, 5 June 2018, url, Para. 40 
426 Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report Iraq, 16 January 2023, url, p. 30 
427 Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report Iraq, 16 January 2023, url, p. 30 
428 Al-Monitor, Honor killings in Iraq rekindle efforts to criminalize domestic violence, 19 February 2023, url; 
Guardian (The), ‘Honour’ killing of YouTube star sparks outrage in Iraq, 3 February 2023, url  
429 HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023; OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023 

52 

 
IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

Honour killings of those accused of honour crimes, occur with impunity, often in secret, or 
under the guise of other reasons.430 They are also often motivated by financial (such as getting 
a woman’s inheritance) or personal motives, but they remain ‘conceal crimes’ that are not 
discussed in public.431 Some families reportedly arrange honour killings to appear as 
suicides.432  They occur more frequently in rural or poor areas.433 There are no reliable 
statistics,434 and they often remain unreported and unsolved. 435 

There is no law against domestic violence in Iraq,436 or that outlaws violence against women 
or sexual assault.437 Seeking assistance from authorities has not lead to results and the 
discussion of human rights violations such as these are very sensitive in the Iraqi context.438 
The custom of honour killing is ‘in some ways integrated, or at least indirectly sanctions, by 
statutory law’. 439 Iraqi law allows for ‘honour’ to be seen as a mitigating circumstance for 
violence and such killings are considered separately from murder.440 There is a lack of modern 
and effective mechanism to protect victims of domestic violence and honour-related 
violence.441 There are no state-run shelters for women fleeing violence.442 The representative 
of OWFI indicated that women’s shelters have been targeted by authorities who perceive 
them as ‘brothels’ or make accusations that they traffic women.443 The UN similarly reported 
that such shelters are stigmatised and targeted by various actors.444 

Dr. Bushra Al-Obaidi explained that the Iraqi state Criminal Code is strongly influenced by 
tribal codes with some legal provisions derived from tribal customs.445 Human Rights Watch 
similarly explained that much of the provisions allowing the abuse of women have underlying 
reinforcement in Iraqi tribal law and practices.446 Examples under the Criminal Code include: 

430 Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights, Correspondence with EUAA, 16 March 2023; Hamoudi, H. A et al, The 
Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, pp. 252-253; National (The), Death of Iraqi 
blogger sparks demands to end ‘honour killings’, 3 February 2023, url  
431 Al-Obaidi, B., Interview with EUAA, 3 April 2023 
432 Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report Iraq, 16 January 2023, url, p. 30 
433 Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights, Correspondence with EUAA, 16 March 2023; Hamoudi, H. A et al, The 
Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, pp. 252-253 
434 Al-Obaidi, B., Interview with EUAA, 3 April 2023 
435 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, pp. 252-253 
436 Al-Monitor, Honor killings in Iraq rekindle efforts to criminalize domestic violence, 19 February 2023, url 
437 HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023 
438 Al-Monitor, Honor killings in Iraq rekindle efforts to criminalize domestic violence, 19 February 2023, url  
439 USIP, Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, 1 July 2011, url, p. 255 
440 National (The), Death of Iraqi blogger sparks demands to end ‘honour killings’, 3 February 2023, url; Reuters, 
Buried alive by her family, Iraqi woman fears for her life as murders go unpunished, 12 July 2017, url  
441 National (The), Death of Iraqi blogger sparks demands to end ‘honour killings’, 3 February 2023, url; Guardian 
(The), ‘Honour’ killing of YouTube star sparks outrage in Iraq, 3 February 2023, url; UN Human Rights Council, 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her mission to Iraq, 5 June 
2018, url, Para. 44 
442 National (The), Death of Iraqi blogger sparks demands to end ‘honour killings’, 3 February 2023, url; Ceasefire 
for Civilian Rights, Correspondence with EUAA, 16 March 2023 
443 OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her mission to Iraq, 5 June 2018, url, Para. 43 
444 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on 
her mission to Iraq, 5 June 2018, url, Para. 43 
445 Al-Obaidi, B., Interview with EUAA, 3 April 2023 
446 HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023; See also: UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her mission to Iraq, 5 June 2018, url, Para. 41 

53 

 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

•  Article 41, for husbands to abuse their wives as discipline,447 ‘within certain limits 

described by the law or custom’ though this remains undefined other than to ‘not leave 
marks on the body’ however discipline with tools such as sticks or belts is ‘customary 
in Iraqi society’.448  

•  Article 128, 130, and 131 allow for honour motives as a mitigating circumstance and 

allow for reduced sentences.449 The ‘honourable motives’ can also include suspecting 
a behaviour that could affect honour occurred, whether or not it was actually 
witnessed.450 According to OWFI, these provisions correspond with tribal ‘shame-
washing’ (ghasl al-yar) and is used by the formal justice system to cover up for the 
killing of women for honour-related reasons. Similarly, to Dr. Obaidi, OWFI stated that 
in terms of how tribal and formal law interact, perpetrators rarely serve time and judges 
sometimes applaud the perpetrators preservation of honour. As an example, OWFI 
also mentioned the case of two young girls who had been sexually abused in their 
family home, and the judge ordered virginity tests on girls.451  

•  Article 377 on adultery being punishable by detention, which is ‘derived from 

customary law which considers certain acts shameful for women but not for men’.452  

•  Article 398 that if rapists to marry their victims [prosecution of sexual assault/rape 

ceases in the case of marriage to the victim453] they receive a lowered sentence.454 In 
such marriages, divorce cannot occur before three years, and in the tribal context, the 
victim is obliged to marry as the alternative would be death for dishonouring the tribe 
by having been a victim of rape.455 

•  Article 409, gives the right of the husband to kill his wife (or a first-degree relative to 

kill his relative) if for example, adultery occurs.456 The law allows reduced sentences for 
murders or violence with an honour motivation, including against family members,457 
and for such acts as for adultery or sex outside marriage.458 The Code limits a 
sentence for murder to a maximum of three years’ imprisonment if a man is on trial for 
killing his wife, girlfriend, or a female dependant due to suspicion that the victim had 
been committing adultery or having sex outside of marriage.459 Dr. Al-Obaidi indicated 
that usually the perpetrator is sentenced to 6 months or a year on a suspended 

447 HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023; See also: UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her mission to Iraq, 5 June 2018, url, Para. 41; Al-
Obaidi, B., Interview with EUAA, 3 April 2023 
448 Al-Obaidi, B., Interview with EUAA, 3 April 2023 
449 Norway, Landinfo, Temanotat: Irak - Ære og æresrelatert vold [Thematic Note: Iraq - Honour and Honour Related 
Violence in Iraq and Kurdistan], 10 March 2022, url, para. 4.1; Al-Obaidi, B., Interview with EUAA, 3 April 2023 
450 Al-Obaidi, B., Interview with EUAA, 3 April 2023 
451 OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023 
452 Al-Obaidi, B., Interview with EUAA, 3 April 2023 
453 Norway, Landinfo, Temanotat: Irak - Ære og æresrelatert vold [Thematic Note: Iraq - Honour and Honour Related 
Violence in Iraq and Kurdistan], 10 March 2022, url, para. 4.1 
454 HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023; Al-Obaidi, B., Interview with EUAA, 3 April 2023 
455 Al-Obaidi, B., Interview with EUAA, 3 April 2023 
456 Al-Obaidi, B., Interview with EUAA, 3 April 2023 
457 National (The), Death of Iraqi blogger sparks demands to end ‘honour killings’, 3 February 2023, url; elbarlament, 
The push to criminalise domestic violence in Iraq, 3 May 2020, url; OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023; 
Article 409 of the Criminal Code - UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary executions on her mission to Iraq, 5 June 2018, url, Para. 41 
458 OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023 
459 Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report Iraq, 16 January 2023, url, p. 30; Al-Obaidi, B., Interview with EUAA, 
3 April 2023 

54 

 
IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

sentence and ‘socially and tribally the perpetrator is considered a hero who was 
washed [away] his dishonour’.460 

Dr. Al-Obaidi stated that violence against women in Iraq is a matter of custom, which poses 
obstacles to the passing of laws to protect women from domestic violence.461 Perpetrators of 
gender-based violence are rarely prosecuted.462 While arrest warrants are sometimes issued 
for perpetrators of honour killing, many suspects flee the country or seek protection from tribal 
groups before they can be brought to trial.’463 According to OWFI, in regards to state 
responses, ‘female dignity is not respected and there is no protection for women fleeing from 
gender-based violence.’464 Norway also states that the ‘real access to official protection for 
persons exposed to honour-related violence is very low, both in KRI and Iraq in general.’465 

3.12.  Tribes’ capacity to enforce the outcome of dispute 

settlements 

Regarding the treatment of persons who fail to abide by the codes of their tribes, OWFI stated 
that the tribe would start with pressure to comply, and this may escalate to threats like writing 
on the door of their house that they must pay the fasl, or ‘putting their guns to the door’, 
threatening violence, and if the person still did not comply, ‘they would not allow him to 
continue his life if he doesn’t pay out’ and that people ‘often escape altogether from the area 
and try to live somewhere else’.466 Hamoudi et al. observed that tribes follow different steps to 
ensure a member’s compliance with those codes. First, the ‘perpetrator is required to pay one-
third of the damages in a fasl’. There is also the pressure of ‘informal reputational sanctions, 
bolstered by negative gossip respecting “shameful” […] activity’. If those do not work, the tribe 
has other mechanisms to be employed: first, ‘a sentence of individual exile from a particular 
village, neighborhood, or city’ can be included in a fasl, ‘accompanied by a written indication 
that if the perpetrator is found in that prohibited’, he/she will be subject to the practice of hadr 
al-dam.467 On 3 December 2022, Shafaq News reported that two men were killed in Thi-Qar 
due to their “violation” of a previous tribal resolution expelling them to Kerbala and banning 
them from entering the area in which they were killed.468 Second, the tribe ‘may escalate the 
matter to what is known as an internal, conditional expulsion’ whereby the perpetrator is no 
longer considered a member of the tribe and will have to ‘be responsible for all the damages’ 

460 Al-Obaidi, B., Interview with EUAA, 3 April 2023 
461 Al-Obaidi, B., Interview with EUAA, 3 April 2023 
462 HRW, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023 
463 Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report Iraq, 16 January 2023, url, p. 30 
464 OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023 
465 Norway, Landinfo, Temanotat: Irak - Ære og æresrelatert vold [Thematic Note: Iraq - Honour and Honour Related 
Violence in Iraq and Kurdistan], 10 March 2022, url, para. 5 
466 OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023 
467 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 241-242; 
Bobseine observed that the exact amount varies. Bobseine, H., comments during external expert review of the 
report, 03 April 2023 
468 Shafaq News, يﺮﺋﺎﺸﻋ راﺮﻗ  ﺮﺴﻛ  ﺐﺒﺴﺑ "ﮫﻨﺑاو ﮫﻤﻋ" ﻰﻠﻋ ﺰﮭﺠﯾ بﺎﺷ ..رﺎﻗ يذ [Thi-Qar. A man kills his “uncle and cousin” due to 
non-abidance by a tribal resolution], 3 December 2022, url  

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

that may occur by him. Finally, and exceptionally, the tribe would resort to expelling the 
person from the tribe formally.469  

Regarding capital punishment, in serious cases, which involve the killing of a tribal leader or in 
honour crimes, UNHCR stated that ‘tribes may impose capital punishment on the culprit’. The 
perpetrator can be dishonoured by his tribe, expelled, or even killed.470 Genat stated that the 
‘death penalty’ does not exist in tribal law as such, however in practice it occurs.471 USIP stated 
that ‘capital punishment is generally avoided’ since tribal mechanisms are designed to ‘foster 
reconciliation’.472 Al-Samaraie stated tribes ‘do not impose the death penalty, at least not 
publicly,’ and that ‘parties involved are aware of the consequences’ of failing to play a ‘fair and 
just role’ in the process.473 USIP stated regarding capital punishments under tribal settlement 
mechanisms that : 

‘Capital punishment is reserved for the most extreme cases, where honor cannot be 
retrieved in any other way (as in the case of female honor crimes or the murder of a 
tribal leader), if the victim’s family cannot be made whole in any other way, or if the 
offender has committed a heinous crime of individual liability. In some instances, tribes 
may kill culprits from their own tribe if they commit a black crime (as-souda) such as 
rape, homosexual acts, kidnapping a woman, or stealing from a kinsman or host.’ 474 

In practice, killing and death sentences can happen in cases of revenge when no settlement 
can be found, if an atwa is broken, or when the terms of a sulh are not observed.475 USIP also 
remarked that the loss of tribal protection in cases of banishment is ‘tantamount to death’.476 
Furthermore, in practice, tribal remedies do prescribe death as a consequence for certain 
offenses such as crimes of greed, repeat offences, honour violations,477 or in murder cases if 
the diyya is not paid within a year, allowing the ‘right to kill a notable or any other member of 
the perpetrator’s tribe’ with retaliation being unpunished.478  

Kao observed in a study conducted in 2018 in Mosul that ‘the state is most likely to use 
coercive force whereas tribal and religious institutions rely more on social sanctioning to 
enforce their decisions’. Tribal sheikhs often inherit their positions from their fathers or uncles, 
and ‘rely on their reputation and their ability to command social pressure among tribal 
members to enforce their decisions.’ The most powerful tools at the disposal of tribal leaders 
to enforce their decisions are the expulsion from the tribe and the ’ability to withdraw support 
and tarnish the reputations of his enemies’ so that the person would end up ostracised by the 
rest of the tribe.479 While most of the respondents in Kao’s study indicated that tribal sheikhs 
would avoid resorting to violence to enforce decisions, at different sections of her study she 

469 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 241-242 
470 UNHCR, Tribal Conflict Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, available at: url, p. 2 
471 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022 
472 USIP, Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, 1 July 2011, url, p. 265 
473 Al-Samaraie, N., video interview, 27 October 2022 
474 USIP, Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, 1 July 2011, url, p. 264 
475 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022; see also: USIP, Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn 
Societies, 1 July 2011, url, p. 264 
476 USIP, Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, 1 July 2011, url, p. 253 
477 USIP, Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, 1 July 2011, url, p. 253-255 
478 USIP, Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, 1 July 2011, url, p. 264 
479 Kao. K., Legal Pluralism and Fragmented Sovereignty in Iraq, 9 June 2022, url, pp. 36-37 

56 

 
IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

indicated that ‘[t]ribal leaders may have militias that are loyal to them or the ability to influence 
their community members to sanction those in their community in other ways’.480  

Genat referred to the major role social pressure plays in enforcing the outcomes of sulh, as 
tribes do not have mechanisms or procedures to enforce them. As the legitimacy of tribal 
leaders has been compromised in Iraq, tribes are struggling with enforcing decisions, and it 
could happen that a sulh agreement is broken and fighting is resumed.481  

According to Al-Ibrahimi, tribal leaders have become key players in Iraqi society with regard to 
the political landscape and the security architecture, especially in cases related to the return 
of IDPs.482 Local Peace Committees483 in Iraq have been collaborating with local stakeholders 
including tribal leaders ‘to negotiate agreements that commit tribes to comply with the state’s 
justice system, to cooperate with state security forces, to disavow extra-judicial violence’.484  

4. 

Situation of certain profiles under the 
tribal system 

4.1. 

People perceived as affiliated with ISIL 

This section focuses on the tribal aspects related to the treatment of persons with perceived 
affiliation to ISIL. For detailed information on the general treatment of persons perceived as 
affiliated with ISIL, the legal requirements for and the process of return of IDPs to the areas 
liberated from ISIL, see Chapter 1 of the EUAA report Iraq: Targeting of Individuals published in 
January 2022, as well as EUAA’s previous publications on this topic.485 

Without providing details, the Iraqi Ministry of Interior estimated that there are approximately 
250 000 people with perceived ISIL affiliation.486 In a tribal reconciliation session involving 
dozens of tribes from Al-Anbar, held in Baghdad in 2017, ‘there was broad consensus on the 
need for cooperation and coordination with the Iraqi legal system and security forces on 
matters concerning the detention and prosecution of suspected IS members’; at the same 
time, ‘some of the participating sheikhs made statements in favour the collective punishment 
and social exclusion of individuals solely on the basis of their family ties to IS.’487 According to 
an IOM report from 2019, ‘A key principle of tribal law, which is influential in Iraq, particularly in 

480 Kao. K., Legal Pluralism and Fragmented Sovereignty in Iraq, 9 June 2022, url, pp. 7-8 
481 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022 
482 Al-Ibrahimi, H., video interview, 3 November 2022 
483 Local Peace Committees have been organised by local communities in Iraq since 2017 ‘to facilitate inclusive, fair, 
and context-specific reconciliation processes in areas liberated from ISIL’. UNDP, Pathways to Reintegration: IRAQ 
Families Formerly Associated with ISIL, February 2021, url, p. 19 
484 UNDP, Pathways to Reintegration: IRAQ Families Formerly Associated with ISIL, February 2021, url, p. 21 
485 EUAA, COI Report – Iraq: Targeting of individuals, January 2022, url; EUAA, COI Report – Iraq: Targeting of 
Individuals (March 2019), url; EUAA, COI Report – Iraq: Treatment of Iraqis with perceived affiliation to ISIL, October 
2020, url 
486 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2022 – Iraq, February 2023, url, p. 40 
487 Revkin, M. R., The Limits of Punishment: Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, May 2018, url, p. 25 

57 

 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

areas where state authority is weak, is the attribution of collective guilt to the family or tribe of 
the perpetrator of a crime’. This concept ‘allows for the relatives of an ISIL member to be held 
vicariously responsible for crimes that he or she committed individually’.488  However, 
Bobseine stated that in practice, the tribal stance towards collective responsibility of ISIL 
family members is more nuanced as it is seen as an exceptional circumstance as a terrorist 
group. Some are allowed to return, and some are not and the degree of association to the ISIL 
perpetrator may also vary by area.489 

According to Ceasefire for Civilian Rights, the situation of perceived ISIL-affiliates varies from 
tribe to tribe, as some made explicit commitments to take back relatives of ISIL members, 
while others have refused to accept them.490 Following the defeat of ISIL, and to prevent 
rounds of retributive justice, there were tribal reconciliation agreements made to refer 
suspected ISIL militants to the official justice system for prosecution; however, the tribes 
involved also pledged to disown members convicted of affiliation to ISIL.491 While ISIL fighters 
are prosecuted through the state legal system,492 families with perceived ISIL affiliation are 
being dealt with through a combination of intelligence, tribal, and state justice mechanisms.493 
many ISIL families ‘are unable to return to their home villages because of the application of 
tribal law’. The different tribal mechanisms applied in the case of persons with perceived 
affiliation to ISIL, such as family members, ‘serve a punitive function, while protecting some 
families from possible reprisals.’494 Many Iraqis prefer to solve inter-personal and 
intercommunal disputes, including those related to ISIL, through the tribal justice mechanisms; 
some of those who sought redress for crimes committed against them by ISIL preferred tribal 
justice mechanisms, since state courts are overburdened and perceived as widely ‘corrupt 
and illegitimate’.495 In the context of persons with perceived affiliation to ISIL, tribal law and 
agreements ‘are being applied today on a mass scale’ and ‘have produced an excessive 
number of disputes that traditional tribal justice systems are struggling to address’, with the 
outcome of such agreements being sometimes at odds with the Iraqi formal law and 
constituting ‘a form of collective punishment that violates individual rights’.496  

According to an IOM/RWG report from 2020, ‘communities used three mechanisms from tribal 
customary justice that have been adapted to the specific context and used to regulate the 
return of those community members: disavowal, denouncement and return to a nearby 

488 IOM, WEST MOSUL: PERCEPTIONS ON RETURN AND REINTEGRATION AMONG STAYEES, IDPS AND 
RETURNEES, June 2019, url, p. 7 
489 Bobseine, H., comments during external expert review of the report, 03 April 2023 
490 Ceasefire for Civilian Rights, Correspondence with EUAA, 16 March 2023 
491 USIP, How to Foster Peace in Iraq After ISIS, 13 February 2017, url  
492 Thiefaine. C., IRAQI TRIBAL JUSTICE PUT TO THE TEST AS ISLAMIC STATE FAMILIES RETURN, 19 February 
2021, url  
493 Bobseine, H., comments during external expert review of the report, 03 April 2023 
494 Thiefaine. C., IRAQI TRIBAL JUSTICE PUT TO THE TEST AS ISLAMIC STATE FAMILIES RETURN, 19 February 
2021, url; Bobseine also mentioned the importance of state security clearance process, lack of access to 
documentation, and is due to a combination of state security and tribal measures. Bobseine, H., comments during 
external expert review of the report, 03 April 2023  
495 Revkin, M. R., The Limits of Punishment: Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, May 2018, url, p. 24 
496 Center for Civilians in Conflict, Ignoring Iraq’s most vulnerable: The plight of displaced persons, April 2021, url, 
pp. 17-18 

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IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

area’.497 Expulsion from the tribe, or bara’a,498 has also been mentioned by sources, as a form 
of disavowal.499  

Disavowal constitutes the ‘act of formally denouncing ISIL in front of the community or tribal 
leader, or the court, denying any allegiance to the group and pledging to having done no 
harm to the community’, and is used widely in the context of IDPs who stayed under ISIL but 
‘have no proven direct association with the group and no first or second-line relatives facing 
criminal charges or accusations of ISIL affiliation in core roles’.500 According to research on 
post-ISIL return agreements by the World Bank,  

The disavowal process has become common across Iraq in the post-war period as a 
means of enabling the return of families that had a first-degree relative with close ties 
to ISIL. It is practiced in two forms: one, known as tabriya, occurs in front of a tribal 
committee and does not have a basis in Iraqi law, while the second, known as ikhbar, 
is a form of ‘notification’ that takes place in front of a judge and has been recognized 
in Iraqi law for years preceding ISIL’s arrival. The core idea of both processes is similar: 
namely, that the person formally pledges that their relationship with the accused 
relative is severed.501 

The two mechanisms can influence obtaining security clearances for persons with perceived 
ISIL affiliation, which they need to return to their areas of origin: disavowal of their ISIL-
affiliated relative (tabriya, also spelled tabrea’a) and notification of offence (ikhbar).502 
According to Bobseine, ‘Tabriya is actually a tribal process but it is also used as a colloquial 
term to describe the ikhbar process, which is a process done through state courts. This can 
make research on these topics confusing. Sometimes it is required for a person with 
perceived ISIL affiliation to do tabriya with their sheikh and also to file an ikhbar claim in front 
of an investigative judge. This process may vary by area and by tribes, etc. The degree of 
relatives involved, and who is requested to do ikhbar against whom is left up to the informal 
discretion of both tribal and state/intelligence authorities who are managing returns in the 
area and managing access to documents, etc. However, according to state law, ikhbar is 
voluntary but many people are not allowed to return until they do this, so in that sense the 
extent to which it is voluntary is in question.’503  

Disavowal, IOM added, ‘is the most commonly used mechanism, often used in conjunction 
with other mechanisms, as it facilitates obtaining a sponsorship.’ However, it poses a few 
problems to persons who utilise it, including the implication of indirect admittance of past 
involvement with ISIL and the possibility of exploitation by those who would provide 

497 IOM Iraq and RWG, MANAGING RETURN IN ANBAR: Community Responses to the Return of IDPs with 
Perceived Affiliation, 2020, url, p. 12 
498 HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023 
499 HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023 
500 IOM Iraq and RWG, MANAGING RETURN IN ANBAR: Community Responses to the Return of IDPs with 
Perceived Affiliation, 2020, url, p. 12 
501 World Bank Group, Local Peace Agreements and the Return of IDPs with Perceived ISIL Affiliation in Iraq, 
January 2022, url, p. 25 
502 Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection Analysis Report: Right to identity and civil documentation, October 2021, url, 
p. 8; CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced People, April 2021, url, p. 14 
503 Bobseine, H., comments during external expert review of the report, 03 April 2023 

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

sponsorship and clearances to returnees.504 There were reports that tribal leaders ‘fabricated 
accusations of ISIL affiliation’ leading to stigmatisation of IDPs or discrimination due to family 
rivalries or for economic reasons.505 IDPs may be faced with the choice of disavowing their 
relatives or remaining in situations of displacement.506 

It is ‘most often employed if the accused relative is either deceased or missing, because the 
denouncement could potentially be used against the accused in a future trial or as a criminal 
proof against a relative who is still alive’.507  Many returnees refuse to undergo disavowal 
process ‘for fear that doing so is in effect a confession of the guilt of their family member’.508 
This practice especially impacts women as it stigmatises and endangers them, puts the 
husband at risk if he is missing or detained, undermines their ‘rights to inheritance and other 
entitlements under Iraqi law’ and  risks creating a conflict with the family of the woman’s 
husband.509 Human Rights Watch commented that the disavowals have presented problems 
where such statements by relatives have been used as secret evidence against accused ISIL 
militants, some of whom the family may believe is missing, but who are in secret detention; 
executions have also occurred as a result.510 

Another mechanism used by tribes is the return of IDPs to an area nearby the community of 
origin: ‘This mechanism has been employed generally in two situations. First, when the 
families of victims have accused one member of the displaced family of committing a crime 
that, according to tribal custom, can be avenged, and a tribal mediation process has started to 
settle the case. In these cases, and while mediation is taking place, the offender and his family 
are sent away until a settlement is agreed upon by the two families. This option offers 
protection to the accused and their family and protects the victim’s family honor.’ Although it 
can be ‘understood as an intermediary step before IDPs are allowed to return home’, there are 
numerous ‘drawbacks’ to this mechanism, including the risk of protracted displacement in 
case of inability to pay the fasl amount and isolation from the community in case of complete 
return.511  

Persons with perceived ISIL affiliation may also be blocked from returning. According to 
sources, blocking the return of persons with perceived affiliation with ISIL to their areas of 
origin constitutes collective punishment512 derived from tribal customary law,513 and can be 

504 IOM Iraq and RWG, MANAGING RETURN IN ANBAR: Community Responses to the Return of IDPs with 
Perceived Affiliation, 2020, url, p. 12 
505 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2022 – Iraq, February 2023, url, p. 40 
506 Human Rights Watch, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023 
507 IOM Iraq and RWG, MANAGING RETURN IN ANBAR: Community Responses to the Return of IDPs with 
Perceived Affiliation, 2020, url, p. 13 
508 Sanbar, S., “Barriers to post-ISIS reconciliation in Iraq: Case study of Tel Afar, Ninewa”, SciencePo Kuwait 
Program, 2020, url, pp. 9-10 
509 UNDP, Affiliated with ISIS: Challenges for the return and reintegration of women and children, October 2022, url, 
pp. 20-21; IOM Iraq and RWG, MANAGING RETURN IN ANBAR: Community Responses to the Return of IDPs with 
Perceived Affiliation, 2020, url, p. 13 
510 HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023 
511 IOM Iraq and RWG, MANAGING RETURN IN ANBAR: Community Responses to the Return of IDPs with Perceived 
Affiliation, 2020, url, pp. 13-14 
512 Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, The Century Foundation, 7 November 2019, url, p. 15; Center for 
Civilians in Conflict, Ignoring Iraq’s most vulnerable: The plight of displaced persons, April 2021, url, pp. 17-18 
513 Center for Civilians in Conflict, Ignoring Iraq’s most vulnerable: The plight of displaced persons, April 2021, url, 
pp. 17-18 

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IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

permanent or temporary.514 According to the Center for Civilians in Conflict, ‘when there is a 
“blood crime” between members of different tribes […] the leaders of both tribes negotiate a  
settlement (“fasil”)515 in order to avoid an escalation of violence and revenge killings’, and 
forced exile, or jalwa, can be a part of the dispute settlement.516 IOM observed that in some 
cases following a return of IDPs with perceived affiliation with ISIL, relatives of victims may file 
a complaint against the returnees to the security forces. The security forces then inform tribal 
leaders that ‘they cannot ensure the safety of the families with perceived affiliation and 
request that the families leave, prompting the secondary displacement of these families with 
perceived affiliation’. This type of displacement, according to the source, ‘is perceived by 
community members and community leaders as a preventative measure to avoid increased 
violence, given that the return of this population of IDPs can ignite cycles of revenge attacks 
by victims’.517 

In addition to these mechanisms, returnees are often requested to pay diyya (blood money), 
and those who fail to do so are ‘often stuck in the camps’ and ‘Even for those who can pay, 
families remain vulnerable to accusations, arrests, or physical attack.’518 In some cases, 
initiatives by ‘Provincial authorities and national institutions’ succeeded in convincing victims 
of ISIL violence to accept ‘government compensation instead of the traditional’ diyya, 
however, ‘families wishing to return are still obliged to pay 500,000 Iraqi dinars, an excessive 
economic burden to most […] despite the lack of criminal charges against them or any judicial 
decision compelling them to do so’.519  

The Protection Cluster – Iraq stated that ‘[s]ocial norms and practices, based on tribal customs, 
often takes precedence over the strict application of Iraqi law and thus can contribute to the 
denial of the right to identity and civil documentation’ in the case of IDPs with perceived 
affiliation to ISIL.520 UNDP observed that ‘In various parts of Nineveh, the procedure [of ikhbar] 
faced tribal rejection due to the concept of revenge’ while ‘In other areas, even after obtaining 
acquittal, many families accused of being associated with ISIS are ostracized, threatened and 
assaulted.’521 Moreover, some clans in Al-Anbar refused the return of ISIL families ‘even 
though they obtained legal documents that prove they disowned the members involved with 
ISIS’.522  

514 Revkin, M. R., The Limits of Punishment: Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, May 2018, url, p. 11 
515 Bobseine observed, however, that ‘Many sheikhs from Anbar and Nineveh denied negotiating fasl or accepting 
diya payments in exchange for Islamic State members being able to return to their communities, saying that tribes 
don’t pay for the group’s terrorist acts, and that individuals must bear responsibility’. Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in 
a Fragile Iraq, The Century Foundation, 7 November 2019, url, p. 14 
516 Center for Civilians in Conflict, Ignoring Iraq’s most vulnerable: The plight of displaced persons, April 2021, url, 
pp. 17-18 
517 IOM Iraq and RWG, MANAGING RETURN IN ANBAR: Community Responses to the Return of IDPs with Perceived 
Affiliation, 2020, url, p. 15 
518 Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, The Century Foundation, 7 November 2019, url, p. 18 
519 Center for Civilians in Conflict, Ignoring Iraq’s most vulnerable: The plight of displaced persons, April 2021, url, p. 
19 
520 Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection Analysis Report: Right to identity and civil documentation, October 2021, url, 
p. 8 
521 UNDP, Affiliated with ISIS: Challenges for the return and reintegration of women and children, October 2022, url, 
pp. 20-21 
522 Shafaq News, Tribes in Al-Anbar Refuses the return of displaced families with ISIS ties, local official says, 24 
November 2020, url  

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Tribal sheikhs play an important role in blocking or facilitating the return process, and their 
role is described as ‘more exploitative than constructive’.523 The return of IDPs with perceived 
affiliation to ISIL ‘is often dependent on multiple factors beyond obtaining a security 
clearance’, one of which is the verification of the tribal leader of any sponsorship agreements, 
in parallel with ‘local security, administrative and political actors’.524 In addition to resolving 
disputes, ‘tribal authorities are involved in negotiating the terms under which IDPs displaced 
by IS-related violence and individuals affiliated with IS including family members may or may 
not be allowed to return to their former communities.’525  

In some areas, according to UNHCR, ‘tribal leaders have reportedly been successful in 
containing violent retribution against suspected ISIS members and their families by barring 
collective punishment and referring suspects to the formal justice system’.526 Tribes, in some 
cases, helped to facilitate safe returns ‘either by arranging the return of small numbers of 
families to their communities without risk of retaliation or by negotiating larger tribal 
agreements or “pacts of honor.”’527 However, in other areas, ‘IDP families accused of having 
supported ISIS are reportedly prevented from returning, while others were pressured to make 
“blood money” payments to the victims of ISIS before being allowed to return’.528 Persons with 
perceived affiliation to ISIL ‘often face stigmatisation and rejection from their home 
communities, and in some cases threats or violence’ in addition to the obstacles faced by 
other IDPs when returning to their areas of origin.529 According to Bobseine, ‘Even if granted 
security clearance to return, some sheikhs and tribesmen are demanding protection fees—
sometimes euphemized as “taxes”—from returnees and those perceived to have affiliation 
with the Islamic State’. If the returnees fail to pay such fees, they would face attacks, evictions, 
or death.530  

In a report published in October 2022, UNDP observed regional differences as regards the 
obstacles that prevent the return of persons with perceived affiliation to ISIL. In Al-Hatra region 
of Ninewa, tribes ‘say that they do not believe in punishing relatives of ISIS members just 
because of family ties’. In Talafar, ‘the Popular Mobilization Forces stipulated that in return for 
allowing the families to come back, the Government would provide services to families of 
victims’.531 In the Sinsil district of Diyala, the PMF informed returnees that ‘the most capable 
man in his family should join a local armed unit, without pay, to patrol and guard the 
neighborhood’. In Kirkuk, the Sunni Arab, Turkmen and Kurdish communities ‘support the 
return of families’ and the objection to return comes from the Shiite Turkmen and the PMF. 
According to UNDP, some attempts to return IDPs to some villages in Kirkuk have failed.532 

523 Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, The Century Foundation, 7 November 2019, url, p. 16 
524 IOM Iraq and RWG, MANAGING RETURN IN ANBAR: Community Responses to the Return of IDPs with 
Perceived Affiliation, 2020, url, p. 16 
525 Revkin, M. R., The Limits of Punishment: Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, May 2018, url, p. 24 
526 UNHCR, Tribal Conflict Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, available at: url, pp. 4-5 
527 Center for Civilians in Conflict, Ignoring Iraq’s most vulnerable: The plight of displaced persons, April 2021, url, p. 
19 
528 UNHCR, Tribal Conflict Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, available at: url, pp. 4-5 
529 Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report Iraq, 16 January 2023, url, p. 25 
530 Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, The Century Foundation, 7 November 2019, url, p. 18 
531 UNDP, Affiliated with ISIS: Challenges for the return and reintegration of women and children, October 2022, url, 
p. 17 
532 UNDP, Affiliated with ISIS: Challenges for the return and reintegration of women and children, October 2022, url, 
p. 18 

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IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

Furthermore, in Salah Al-Din, the tribes and families of ISIL victims ‘still do not allow talk about 
the return of families and their integration into society’ even those who obtained judicial 
clearance, while in Diyala, ‘family returns have been halted due to legal, economic, clan-
related, social and security obstacles’. According to women interviewed by UNDP, their return 
was allowed only if ‘they abandon their male children even if the boy is only one day old’. 
Finally, in the Garma town of Al-Anbar, at least 200 ISIL families were issued ‘special pink 
identity cards’ as a method of tracing them. These families ‘are allowed to go home and can 
use the documents to travel across checkpoints […but…] will be permanently marked with pink 
cards and subjected to harassment, stigmatization and sometimes violations’.533  

Some communities in the areas liberated from ISIL established ‘local peace committees’ or 
agreements with the aim to facilitate the reintegration of this category of IDPs,534 however, 
according to a UNHCR report from 2018, ‘Under tribal agreements, those suspected of being 
ISIS members or whose relatives are alleged to have been involved with ISIS are reportedly 
subjected to forced eviction/expulsion and confiscation or destruction of their property’.535 
The Center for Civilians in Conflict also stated that in some cases ‘tribes have reached 
agreements that punish entire families for the crimes of their relatives, banish them from their 
area of origin, and even confiscate their properties’.536 Bobseine also stated that in Al-Baaj 
district of Ninewa governorate, several tribal leaders ‘maintained that they were engaging in 
redistribution of property belonging to families associated with the Islamic State not for their 
own material benefit, but rather to appease government demands—proving to the 
government that the tribes are tough on terrorism—and to hedge against future Islamic State 
threats.’537  

IDPs continue to face stigmatisation, discrimination, harassment, revenge killings, and difficulty 
obtaining security clearances and accessing reconstruction funds.538 UNHCR observed ‘An 
increase in attacks against and forced evictions of families suspected of having collaborated 
with ISIS in areas retaken from ISIS’.539 A report by the New Arab dated 3 March 2021 stated 
that persons with perceived affiliation to ISIL are subject to the tribal practice of thar (revenge) 
which incurs forms of retaliation such as exile, the blocking of return and execution, instances 
of which were reported.540 According to UNHCR, ‘Tribes have also been reported to take 
punitive action against members of their own tribe who had joined ISIS (e.g. in the 
governorates of Al-Anbar, Salah Al-Din and Ninewa), including by destroying their homes, 
ordering their expulsion, or killing them.’541 According to Revkin, in some areas of Iraq, tribes 

533 UNDP, Affiliated with ISIS: Challenges for the return and reintegration of women and children, October 2022, url, 
p. 18 
534 Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report Iraq, 16 January 2023, url, p. 25 
535 UNHCR, Tribal Conflict Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, available at: 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/5a66f84f4.html, p. 4 
536 Center for Civilians in Conflict, Ignoring Iraq’s most vulnerable: The plight of displaced persons, April 2021, url, 
pp. 17-18 
537 Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, The Century Foundation, 7 November 2019, url, p. 15 
538 HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023; Ceasefire for Civilian Rights, Correspondence with EUAA, 16 March 
2023 
539 UNHCR, Tribal Conflict Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, available at: url, p. 4 
540 New Arab (The), ﻦﯿﺣزﺎﻨﻟا ةدﺎﻋإ ﻞﯿﮭﺴﺘﻟ  ﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا ءﺎﻤﻋز ﻰﻠﻋ لﻮﻌﺗ ﺔﯿﻗاﺮﻌﻟا ﺔﻣﻮﻜﺤﻟا [Iraqi government relies on tribal leaders to 
facilitate the return of IDPs], 3 March 2021, url  
541 UNHCR, Tribal Conflict Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, available at: 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/5a66f84f4.html, pp. 4-5 

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

showed unwillingness to cooperate with the state as regards the issue of persons with 
perceived affiliation to ISIL, and ‘have insisted on enforcing their own legal doctrines including 
those requiring paying of “blood money” or banishment’ and ‘have engaged in acts of extra-
judicial violence’ including ‘executing individuals accused of joining IS, banishing them from 
the community, or destroying their homes’.542 In May 2019, a tribal leader from Al-Anbar 
warned against the arbitrary return of ISIL families as they could be killed due to the 
prevalence of weapons and the weak enforcement of law. 543 

4.1.1 Possibility of tribal aid for returnees 

Genat stated that there is no package of aid or help from tribes to returnees from internal 
displacement or abroad. She stated that ‘even for the weakest segments of the population, 
there have been complaints about the absence of help from the tribes.’ Issues like the reason 
behind displacement and the person’s connections play a role in facilitating or hindering the 
person’s return. What exists are mainly informal mechanisms whereby notables and wealthy 
people help those in need through charity, but no tribal codes exist in this regard. A sheikh 
might also use a part of the collective fund to help persons in need, but this is evaluated on a 
case-by-case basis.544 Bobseine observed that Tribal sheikhs were generally viewed as 
exploitative, and not helpful, in their role with regard to returns, but in response they claimed 
to be  ’providing a social safety net (funded by money collected from the tribal communities) to 
families without livelihoods who have been financially and psychologically destroyed by years 
of war and displacement.’545  In agreement with Genat, Bobseine also observed that tribes do 
not provide support systematically, and that sometimes there is support from collective funds 
but it is more on a case by case, charity basis. She added that this may depend on the profile 
of the returnee.546 

On the issue of formal or informal supports from tribes for returnees, Human Rights Watch 
stated that there have been cases of tribal councils working to allow returns and others that 
have not; it is not based on a tribal code and ‘it entirely depends on the individual tribal 
leadership’.547 Similarly, according to Al-Ibrahimi, the type of support provided to returnees to 
areas previously held by ISIL varies from one area to the other and depends on the profile of 
the returnee. Tribes are dealing with the returning population of the basis of their perception 
on whether the returnees supported or fought against ISIL. Those IDP’s who are accepted by 
the tribe and adhere to tribal norms receive the three basic forms of support: shelter, basic 
local economic opportunities (usually in the field of agriculture) and protection. The general 
status is that the IDP’s are either accepted or rejected by the tribe, however, there are cases 
where the returnee is neither accepted nor rejected. In these cases, the tribe deals with the 

542 Revkin, M. R., The Limits of Punishment: Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, May 2018, url, p. 24 
543 Rudaw, نﻮﻧﺎﻘﻟا بﺎﯿﻏ ﺐﺒﺴﺑ ﻞﺘﻘﻠﻟ  نﻮﺿﺮﻌﺘﯾ  ًﺎﯿﺋاﻮﺸﻋ نوﺪﺋﺎﻌﻟا ﺶﻋاد تﻼﺋﺎﻋ داﺮﻓأ :رﺎﺒﻧﻷا ﺮﺋﺎﺸﻋ ىﺪﺣإ ﺦﯿﺷ [A leader of one of Anbar’s 
tribes: Returning ISIL family members are randomly killed due to absence of law], 2 May 2019, url; Center for 
Civilians in Conflict, Ignoring Iraq’s most vulnerable: The plight of displaced persons, April 2021, url, p. 19  
544 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022 
545 Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, The Century Foundation, 7 November 2019, url, p. 19 
546 Bobseine, H., comments during external expert review of the report, 03 April 2023 
547 HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023 

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IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

returnee with caution and provides only a basic level of protection on the basis of tribal norms 
and there is no guarantee that there will be no acts of retaliation or vengeance.548 

No further information on the support tribes provide to returnees from internal displacement 
or from abroad could be found within the time constraints of this report.  

For more information on this topic, refer to EUAA COI Report – Iraq: Internal Mobility (February 
2019). 

4.2.  Women’s tribal participation and other practices 

affecting women 

This section provides a brief discussion of women’s position and agency in relation to tribal 
practices, including her membership and tribal dimensions in situations of divorce, as well as 
tribal practices that specifically impact women/girls. The general situation of women should be 
taken into account for context and more detailed information on this can be found in: EUAA 
COI Report Iraq – Targeting of Individuals (January 2022); EUAA COI Report: Iraq - Treatment 
of Iraqis with perceived affiliation to ISIL (October 2020); EUAA COI Report: Iraq - Targeting of 
individuals (March 2019). 

The violation of women’s rights are among the main human rights problems that arise due to 
tribal customary practices549 and daily incidents in Iraq show a ‘deep failure of the state’ to 
deal with the negative aspects of tribalism in Iraq, especially in relation to women’s rights.550 
Women’s agency are often not respected in tribal proceedings and are in practice used as 
collateral to resolve conflicts.551 Honour killings are among the worst violations of women’s 
rights as a result of the tribal system.552 For more information on honour crimes and related 
honour-based violence, see Section 3.11 Honour violations and honour-based violence.  

4.2.1 Women’s tribal membership and participation 

Among Arab and Kurdish tribes, membership of the tribe is by patrilineal inheritance.553 
According to Maryam Tawfiq Marwan, in her thesis in 2019 on forced marriages in tribal Iraq 
which focused on Kirkuk, Arabs, being a patriarchal society, mention only male ancestors in 
their family tree lineages, the ascending ‘chains’ (salasil) or ‘trees’ (shajarat al-nasab).554  

Sources explained that family and individual honour is held and fluctuates due to the 
behaviour of the males; while females can only decrease honour through shameful 

548 Al-Ibrahimi, H., video interview, 3 November 2022 
549 HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023 
550 Independent Arabia, ﺎﮭﯿﻓ ﻦﯿﻠﻣﺎﻌﻟا و ﺎﮭﺗﺎﻧﺎﯿﻛ دﺪﮭﺗ و قاﺮﻌﻟا  ﻲﻓ ﺔﻟوﺪﻟا ﻢﻜﺤﺗ ةﺮﯿﺸﻌﻟا [The clan dominates the state in Iraq and 
threatens its entities and public servants], 13 September 2021, url 
551 Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights, Correspondence with EUAA, 16 March 2023 
552 OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023; HRW, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023; Ceasefire for Civilian 
Rights, Correspondence with EUAA, 16 March 2023 
553 GlobalSecurity.org, Shia and Kurdish Tribes, url  
554 Tawfiq Marwan, M., Forced Marriages In Tribal Iraq: A Case Study From Kirkuk, May 2019, url, p. 16-17 

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behaviour.555 Haley Bobseine, an independent researcher and analyst based in the Middle 
East, stated that unless they use a male intermediary, women have very limited influence or 
interaction with the tribal structure.556 Human Rights Watch similarly stated that women are 
members of the tribe, but are not considered equals and have no decision-making authority.557 
Forced and child marriage are reportedly common, as well as honour killings to restore a 
man’s reputation in the eyes of the community for perceived transgressions by a woman.558 

Tribes and women’s divorce 

According to Genat, if a woman marries a man from another tribe, she is not considered a 
member of the new tribe, but rather one of their women.559 According to Al-Ibrahimi, when a 
woman gets married this does not eliminate her tribal affiliation. 560 Concerning tribal attitudes 
towards divorce, according to Genat, in cases of ‘regular divorce’, the woman’s tribe of origin 
wouldn’t normally abandon her or object to her return, although the reason behind the divorce 
might play a role, e.g., in divorces that occurred due to honour-related issues [See Section 3.11 
Honour violations and honour-based violence]. As a general rule, a woman cannot be 
expelled from a tribe, so there are no mechanisms to expel a divorced woman, but the 
husband’s tribe will not protect her either.561 According to Al-Ibrahimi, in cases of divorce, the 
general condition is that the divorced woman returns back to her original tribe. ‘A woman can 
be abandoned by her own tribe and family in rare and individual cases, for example when a 
wife kills her husband, harms her children or commits terrorist acts but not e.g. in case of 
divorce’.562 USIP similarly explained that a woman’s ties to her ‘natal agnatic group remain 
stronger in some ways than ties to her husband’ and if the woman suffers or inflicts injury, ‘it is 
generally not her husband but her guardian who will undertake any legal proceedings that 
may follow; if she is guilt , it is her agnates who will pay. If the marriage ends, a woman 
normally returns to her guardian’s home.'563 

Human Rights Watch explained that there is a hierarchy in the wali (male guardianship) 
guardianship of a woman – unmarried young women (default wali is the father), if the father is 
missing, then it is the elder brother; once the woman marries, it becomes her husband; if she 
is unmarried it remains her father or brother; if a woman marries and has no brothers, no 
father, and her husband dies but she has a son, then the son will be the male guardian, even if 
he is a child. In instances where a woman no longer has a wali (male guardian), the tribe can 
step in as a surrogate to offer some degree of male protection.564 Ceasefire for Civilian Rights 
remarked that in cases where a woman’s husband is killed or passes away, ‘she will be 

555 Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, The Century Foundation, 7 November 2019, url, p. 11; CNA, “No 
Security Without Us”: Tribes and Tribalism in Al Anbar Province, Iraq, June 2014, 
https://www.cna.org/archive/CNA_Files/pdf/cop-2014-u-007918-final.pdf, p. 10 
556 Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, The Century Foundation, 7 November 2019, url, p. 11  
557 HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023 
558 Ceasefire for Civilian Rights, Correspondence with EUAA, 16 March 2023 
559 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022 
560 Al-Ibrahimi, H., video interview, 3 November 2022 
561 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022 
562 Al-Ibrahimi, H., video interview, 3 November 2022 
563 USIP, Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, 1 July 2011, url, p. 256 
564 HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023 

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pressured to remarry one of his close relatives or another member of the tribe’.565 Further 
information on how changes to the wali occur could not be found. 

4.2.2. Use of women as compensation (fasliya) 

Fasliya refers to the tribal practices of trading women [and children/girls] as part of the tribal 
settlement of a dispute566  as compensation for injury or death’.567 To be more precise, as 
UNHCR mentions in another report, ’under this custom, an inter-tribal conflict is resolved by 
one tribe giving one or several girls or women for marriage to another’.568 For example, the 
marriage of a murderer’s sister into the victim’s family may be a solution for the conflict.569 

The forced marriage is a method of ‘building bridges’ between tribes,570 so that the two tribes’ 
problems were solved and that the two families had ‘become one’.571 Motives for fasliya also 
include protecting the tribe’s and family’s honour. In fasliya, the consent of the bride or groom 
is not asked, but they are forced to get married. Such coercion, that emanates from tribe and 
family, does not come from Sharia law. The Islamic tradition of bride-wealth (dowry) normally 
does not exist in tribal forced marriages. A wedding or engagement party are also not 
normally part of a fasliya marriage.572  

Women in fasliya marriages are often treated badly and experience abuse;573 and essentially 
are ‘enslaved’ as they are seen as the tribe’s enemy,574 or with a sense of resentment by the 
deceased person’s family towards the bride.575 According to researcher Mohamed Abdel 
Hassan, the bride may be subject to ‘the worst kinds of retaliatory humiliation and 
degradation’.576 According to Iraqi journalist Dima Yassine, bad treatment by the murdered 
man’s family ‘frequently results in the girls’ suicide or escape’.577 According to Janan Aljabiri 
and Joanne Payton at the non-profit Fair Observer media, women may be required to 
completely cut off contact with their natal families and live in a slave-like existence with ‘none 
of the status or recourses of an official wife’. The most likely people to marry off their 
daughters to achieve reconciliation are poor people, who cannot raise ‘blood money’. Due to 

565 Ceasefire for Civilian Rights, Correspondence with EUAA, 16 March 2023 
566 HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023; OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023; Ceasefire for Cilivian 
Rights, Correspondence with EUAA, 16 March 2023; Tawfiq Marwan, M., Forced Marriages In Tribal Iraq: A Case 
Study From Kirkuk, May 2019, url, p. 6-7, 18; USDOS, 2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq, March 
3, 2017, url p. 52  
567 UNHCR, Tribal Conflict Resolution in Iraq, January 15, 2018, url, p. 2; Tawfiq Marwan, M., Forced Marriages In 
Tribal Iraq: A Case Study From Kirkuk, May 2019, url, p. 6-7, 18;  
568 UNHCR, International Protection Considerations with Regard to People Fleeing the Republic of Iraq, May 2019, 
url, p. 93, footnote 568 
569 Tawfiq Marwan, M., Forced Marriages In Tribal Iraq: A Case Study From Kirkuk, A thesis proposal submitted in 
fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Oriental Languages and Cultures: Arabic and 
Islamic Studies, Universiteit Gent, May 2019, url, p. 45 
570 Ceasefire for Civilian Rights, Correspondence with EUAA, 16 March 2023 
571 Tawfiq Marwan, M., Forced Marriages In Tribal Iraq: A Case Study From Kirkuk, May 2019, url, p. 19 
572 Tawfiq Marwan, M., Forced Marriages In Tribal Iraq: A Case Study From Kirkuk, May 2019, url, p. 22, 31-32, 46, 
52-53   
573 Yassine, D., Iraqi women: Resisting oppression in an afflicted country, 16 January 2022, url; OWFI, Interview with 
EUAA, 16 March 2023; Al-Obaidi, B., Interview with EUAA, 3 April 2023 
574 OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023 
575 Tawfiq Marwan, M., Forced Marriages In Tribal Iraq: A Case Study From Kirkuk, May 2019, url, p. 22, 47;   
576 Barwari, D., Iraqi Women Victimized by Tribal Marriage Customs, Al-Monitor, September 12, 2013, url  
577 Yassine, D., Iraqi women: Resisting oppression in an afflicted country, 16 January 2022, url  

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

their situation, they also cannot help the bride in cases of abuse.578 According to OWFI, 
children of the fasliya marriages are seen as ‘less’ than other children of the tribe and the 
wives in these situations will never have the same status as those of the rest of the tribe.579     

Tribal leaders are the primary decision makers in fasliya marriages. Those who participate in 
fasliya marriages consider tribes to be above the law, but there may be official intervention if 
the conflict escalates. In some cases, fasliya marriages were arranged when the intended 
couple were children. The marriage would take place when they came of age, and only then 
would they be informed of the marriage. The tribe’s coercion towards a family can be 
considerable, and a tribal sheikh can coerce the family to have their daughter getting married. 
580  

Sources indicate that women married off in fasliya marriages cannot divorce,581 and that the 
expectation is that she will not be the last wife. There have also been cases where a woman 
has tried to escape a fasliya marriage, and where her original family has returned her to her 
husband, even telling her that they consider her as dead. Or that the husband has ordered her 
to leave, but her family has not accepted her back.582  

In Iraq, there is no law against forced marriage.583 The most widely respected Shia religious 
leader in Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has called to an end of the fasliya tradition, but the 
tradition continues particularly in areas where tribes have more influence than government 
institutions.584 Tribes have also attempted to end fasliya, as it brings tribal law into opposition 
with Sharia, causes problems within communities, forces women into an unpredictable future 
and victimizes families.585 Furthermore, Dr. Al-Obaidi stated that although fasliya marriage is a 
crime under the Personal Status Law of 1959, and punishable by 3-10 years, the provision is 
not effectively applicable because the complaint must be launched by the victim, which is 
‘impossible for the victim’ in fasliya marriages.586 Many victims commit suicide.587 

Fasliya marriages continue to exist.588 Iraqi journalist Dima Yassine mentions fasliya customs 
still occurring daily in Iraq.589 The US Department of State reports that fasliya remains a 

578 Aljabiri, J. & Payton, J., Woman-for-Blood Marriages Persist in Iraq, 29 December 2015 url  
579 OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023 
580 Tawfiq Marwan, M., Forced Marriages In Tribal Iraq: A Case Study From Kirkuk, May 2019, url, p. 46, 49-50, 52-
53 
581 Tawfiq Marwan, M., Forced Marriages In Tribal Iraq: A Case Study From Kirkuk, May 2019, url, p. 46, 49-50, 52-
53; UNHCR, Tribal Conflict Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, url, p. 2; Al-Obaidi, B., Interview with EUAA, 3 April 
2023 
582 Tawfiq Marwan, M., Forced Marriages In Tribal Iraq: A Case Study From Kirkuk, May 2019, url, p. 46, 49-50, 52-
53 
583 IICI, Supplement to the International Protocol on the Documentation and Investigation of Sexual Violence in 
Conflict: Iraq, Guidance for practitioners in Iraq, March 2018, url, p. 6; However, in the Kurdistan Region ‘forced 
marriage’ and ‘marriage in exchange for ransom (blood money)’ are criminalized in Article 2(1) of the Act of 
Combating Domestic Violence (Law 8/2011). 
584 USDOS, Iraq 2021 Human Rights Report, 31 March 31 2022, url, p. 47 
585 Tawfiq Marwan, M., Forced Marriages In Tribal Iraq: A Case Study From Kirkuk, May 2019, url, p. 37, 51-53  
586 Al-Obaidi, B., Interview with EUAA, 3 April 2023 
587 Al-Obaidi, B., Interview with EUAA, 3 April 2023 
588 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022; Yassine, D., Iraqi women: Resisting oppression in an afflicted 
country, 16 January 2022, url; OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023; Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights, 
Correspondence with EUAA, 13 March 2023; HRW, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023 
589 Yassine, D., Iraqi women: Resisting oppression in an afflicted country, 16 January 2022, url  

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problem particularly in the southern governorates.590 Dr. Bushra Al-Obaidi stated that such 
marriages are a ‘concealed phenomenon’ that are not discussed publicly.591  

4.2.3. Traditional marriage of cousins (nahwa) and kassa bi kassa (cousin 
dowry) 

The term nahwa comes from the Arabic terms naha (which means prohibit, interdict or 
prevent), and nahw (termination). Accordingly, in the nahwa tradition, the cousin, uncle or 
other male relative of a girl or woman can prohibit or end her marriage to a person outside of 
the family,592 or tribe.593 Nahwa is the practice where a male cousin is entitled to marry his 
female cousin or decide on whom she can marry,594 and enables any clan to ‘reject marriage 
proposals from men who belonged to another clan, forcing the girl to marry from her own, 
without her parents’ consent or hers’.595 The bridegroom would be threatened or killed to 
prevent the marriage if the girl or her father went against the prohibition.596 Dr. Al-Obaidi 
stated that a victim of Nahwa would be killed by the tribe if she complained to authorities.597 

The intention behind nahwa is to protect the honour and long-standing commitments of the 
family by preventing relationships outside the ethnic, cultural and religious group,598 And to 
control the sexuality of women in deciding whom they will marry, thus controlling the family 
bloodlines.599 Sources indicate that it is an old tribal tradition,600 linked to male-centric 
historical dominance in tribal systems.601 Suicides have been committed by women who have 
fallen victim to nahwa marriage.602  Honour killings of women by their own families are also 
sometimes disguised as suicides.603 

Genat provided the view that, according to her knowledge, nahwa practice was nearly non-
existent now, despite the fact that arranged marriages do exist and men often marry their 

590 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2018 - Iraq, 13 March 2019, url  
591 Al-Obaidi, B., Interview with EUAA, 3 April 2023 
592 Tawfiq Marwan, M., Forced Marriages In Tribal Iraq: A Case Study From Kirkuk, May 2019, url, p. 20; OWFI, 
Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023 
593 Australia, DFAT, Country Report – Iraq, 16 January 2023, url, p. 31 
594 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022; OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023 
595 Yassine, D., Between Yesterday’s Wars and Tomorrow’s Revolutions: Women’s Role in Iraq, December 21, 2020, 
url  
596 Tawfiq Marwan, M., Forced Marriages In Tribal Iraq: A Case Study From Kirkuk, A thesis proposal submitted in 
fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Oriental Languages and Cultures: Arabic and 
Islamic Studies, Universiteit Gent, May 2019, url, p. 20 
597 Al-Obaidi, B., Interview with EUAA, 3 April 2023 
598 Tawfiq Marwan, M., Forced Marriages In Tribal Iraq: A Case Study From Kirkuk, A thesis proposal submitted in 
fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Oriental Languages and Cultures: Arabic and 
Islamic Studies, Universiteit Gent, May 2019, url, p. 21-22 
599 OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023 
600 Tawfiq Marwan, M., Forced Marriages In Tribal Iraq: A Case Study From Kirkuk, May 2019, url, p. 21; Abdoush, R., 
“The art of marriage” or the veiled rape practiced against tribal women in Syria and Iraq, April 30, 2022, url 
601 Tawfiq Marwan, M., Forced Marriages In Tribal Iraq: A Case Study From Kirkuk, May 2019, url, p. 21 
602 Abdoush, R., “The art of marriage” or the veiled rape practiced against tribal women in Syria and Iraq, April 30, 
2022, url; Arab News, In Iraq, tribal traditions rob women, girls of rights, April 18, 2019, url   
603 Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights, Correspondence with EUAA, 16 March 2023 

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

female cousins.604 However, multiple sources stated that nahwa still continues today.605 The 
US State Department reports that despite Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s call to end the 
nahwa tradition, the tradition persists particularly in areas where tribes are more influential 
than government institutions.606 In an Al Jazeera article published in December 2021, 
researcher and activist Duaa Ghazi believed that nahwa marriages still concerned thousands 
of women, particularly in tribal areas in Southern Iraq. A tribal sheikh explained that the 
tradition was receding, but that some people continued to adhere to it.607    

The practice of kassa bi kassa occurs when a man’s sister is given as a dowry to the fiancée’s 
brother. The practice is a form of forced marriage where the victim is not allowed to object.608 
Further and corroborating information on this practice and its prevalence could not be found 
within time constraints. 

4.3.  Collective liability and children 

The scope of this section deals with whether tribes are liable for the actions of children. 

Children become members of a certain tribe by birth. They ‘belong to their father’s agnates’ 
including in cases of divorce. 609 In a book edited by Wolfgang Weissleder it is mentioned that 
‘a loyalty to the specific tribal group of which one is a member by birth’ is a characteristic of 
the Arab identity in Iraq and elsewhere.610 For example, the sheikh of the Abu Hamdan tribe in 
Iraq mentioned in an article of the Los Angeles Times in 2002 that his large tribe’s members 
were bound to the group by birth.611 Iraqi tribes have a patrilineal ancestry.612  

According to Genat, due to the concept of collective liability, which is a core principle in the 
tribal system, parents are considered liable for the behaviour of their children. This collective 
liability takes two forms: the financial aspect where the next of kin is obliged to pay two-thirds 
or the whole amount of fasl depending on the tribe and the type of offence committed. The 
other form is exile (jalwa) where 1st, 2nd, and/or 3rd degree relatives are expelled depending 
on the arrangement. An entire clan can be expelled from an area for a certain period of time. 
This liability is general and not age specific.613 Al-Ibrahimi mentions that there is no age limit 
with regard to tribal measures. Age is not taken into consideration. It is also not about an 
individual’s mental capacity or ability to make decisions. It is about the reputation of the house 

ﺪﺴﻔﺗ

حاﺮﻓأ

جاوﺰﻟﺎﺑ

تﺎﺒﻏاﺮﻟا

ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا

تﺎﯿﻗاﺮﻌﻟا

 [Criminalised by law…tribal lust spoils the joys of Iraqi women who want to 

604 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022 
605 USDOS, Iraq 2021 Human Rights Report, 31 March 2022, url, p. 47; USDOS, IRAQ 2022 HUMAN RIGHTS 
REPORT, 20 March 2023, url, p. 54; OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2022; Al Jazeera, ةﻮﮭﻨﻟا.. نﻮﻧﺎﻘﻟا ﺎﮭﻣﺮﺠﯾ 
, 27
get married], December 2021, url  
606 USDOS, Iraq 2021 Human Rights Report, 31 March 2022, url, p. 47; USDOS, IRAQ 2022 HUMAN RIGHTS 
REPORT, 20 March 2023, url, p. 54 
607 Al Jazeera, 27, جاوﺰﻟﺎﺑ تﺎﺒﻏاﺮﻟا تﺎﯿﻗاﺮﻌﻟا حاﺮﻓأ ﺪﺴﻔﺗ ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا ةﻮﮭﻨﻟا.. نﻮﻧﺎﻘﻟا ﺎﮭﻣﺮﺠﯾ December 2021, url  
608 Al-Obaidi, B., Interview with EUAA, 3 April 2023 
609 USIP, Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, 1 July 2011, url, p. 255 
610 Weissleder, W. (ed.), The Nomadic Alternative: Modes and Models of Interaction in the African-Asian Deserts and 
Steppes, Walter de Gruyter, 2011, p. 21 
611 Los Angeles Times, Iraq’s Tribes May Provide a Secret Weapon for Hussein, 14 October 2002, url  
612 Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, The Century Foundation, 7 November 2019, url, p. 3  
613 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022. 

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IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

and, by extension, of the tribe. There is no age limit after which the child is considered, in this 
manner, an independent member of the tribe.614 

According to Al-Samaraie, in general, parents, as guardians, are considered responsible for 
the actions of their children until a certain age. In legal terms, the age is 18, but in societal 
terms, the age could be less, and the type of violation committed by the child plays a role in 
determining the liability age as well. If a boy or girl, who reached puberty, commits certain 
actions, their families would not announce that publicly but would try to resolve the issue 
within the family. Parents are considered liable for the actions of their children who are below 
the age of 18.  If the boys come of age, they are considered liable for their own actions, but 
not girls.615 

4.4.  Treatment of family members of a person violating 

‘honour’ 

According to a report by the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), Iraqi tribes may agree to 
punish whole families for the crimes that their members committed. Such a family can be 
banished from its area of origin, and its property may be confiscated. CIVIC reports, for 
example, that the tribes in Heet in Al-Anbar governorate had made a covenant, according to 
which the return of families whose members were suspected of having joined or cooperated 
with ISIL to the city was barred. According to CIVIC, obstructing the return of the whole family 
and other forms of punishment against them are linked to tribal practice and customary law. 
Tribal settlements concerning the families of alleged ISIL members have been applied on a 
mass scale. Even when there is a negotiated solution for a family to return home and there are 
no criminal charges against them, the family may be expected to pay a large sum of money as 
a condition for return.616   

For detailed information on the treatment of family members perceived as violating tribal 
honour, as well as Iraqis with perceived affiliation to ISIL, see Section 4.1 People perceived as 
affiliated with ISIL. Please also refer to EUAA’s previous publications on this topic.617 

4.5.  Treatment of Christian converts 

This section is focused on tribal responses to Christian converts; however, it is important to 
note that conversion occurs in a wider social and cultural context that should be taken into 

614 Al-Ibrahimi, H., video interview, 3 November 2022 
615 Al-Samaraie, N., video interview, 27 October 2022 
616 CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced Persons, April 2021, url, p. 17-19 
617 EUAA, COI Report – Iraq: Targeting of individuals, January 2022, url; EUAA, COI Report – Iraq: Targeting of 
Individuals (March 2019), url; EUAA, COI Report – Iraq: Treatment of Iraqis with perceived affiliation to ISIL, October 
2020, url 

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

account. For information on treatment of Christian conversion in Iraq, see also EUAA’s 
previous publications relevant for this topic.618 

The law forbids conversion of Muslims to other faiths.619 Religious conversion away from the 
culturally dominant religion, Islam, to Christianity or other religions is socially taboo in Iraq, and 
ill-perceived by society.620  

Tribes are highly influential and impose their traditions on society. 621  According to Haley 
Bobseine, it is important to note that ‘because conversion is a religious issue, it is likely to be 
dealt with by religious men, although there can be overlap with tribal settlements of the 
matter.’622 Compliance with traditions often surpasses compliance with official law. Christian 
converts with a Muslim and tribal background, particularly if the person comes from an 
influential tribe, may be affected and other Christians may not support the convert in fear of 
consequences. There are areas where tribal influence surpasses that of the government. 
According to Open Doors, Christian converts with a Muslim background are mostly pressured 
by the ‘(extended) family’ and may face threats from family members, tribal leaders and the 
surrounding society. Because of this they are often secretive about their new faith.623   

According to a person working with converts to Christianity who was interviewed 
anonymously by the Finnish Immigration Service in 2021, the family of the convert decides on 
the attitude taken towards the convert, and authorities would not change a decision that the 
family or tribe makes concerning the convert.624 Ceasefire for Civilian Rights stated that the 
way that Christian converts are treated by tribes varies from tribe to tribe and place to place, 
and can depend on the extent to which the convert draws attention to themselves.625  

Publicly revealing one’s conversion from Islam to Christianity ‘would likely put a person at 
considerable risk’, according to Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights.626 Al Ibrahimi stated that 
for Arab Muslim tribes, disavowal by one’s tribe ‘provides a permission to kill since the person 
has become an infidel’.627 OWFI stated that Muslims who convert to Christianity are treated ‘in 
a terrible way’ and that she was aware of cases of converts exiled by their families; noting that 
conversion is not accepted usually accepted by tribes.’628 Open Doors reports that some tribal 
elders ‘have agreed to converts being killed’.629 Christians with a Muslim background may 
face severe pressure from relatives who want the converts to return to Islam. According to 
Open Doors, sometimes this amounts to attempts to kill the convert. Open Doors also lists 
other forms of violations: ‘physical harm and abuse, detention, being disowned and expelled 
from the family home, being ostracized from clan, family and community, forced divorce 
(especially targeting women), forced marriage with a radical Muslim (especially targeting 

618 EUAA, COI Report – Iraq: Targeting of individuals, January 2022, url; EUAA, COI Query – Security Context of 
Christians, 22 October 2020, url; EUAA, COI Query – Atheism and conversion in KRI, 15 March 2019, url; EUAA, COI 
Report – Iraq: Targeting of Individuals (March 2019), url 
619 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2022 – Iraq, February 2023, url, p. 69 
620 Al-Samaraie, N., video interview, 27 October 2022 
621 OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023; Open Doors, Iraq: Full Country Dossier, January 24, 2022, url, p. 24, 
31 
622 Bobseine, H., Comment made during the review of this report, 3 April 2023 
623 Open Doors, Iraq: Full Country Dossier, January 24, 2022, url, p. 24, 31 
624 Finland, FIS, Kristityt, ateistit ja islamista luopuneet Irakissa, May 18, 2022, url, p. 15 
625 Ceasefire for Civilian Rights, Correspondence with EUAA, 16 March 2023 
626 Ceasefire for Civilian Rights, Correspondence with EUAA, 16 March 2023 
627 Al-Ibrahimi, H. video interview, 3 November 2022 
628 OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023 
629 Open Doors, Iraq: Full Country Dossier, January 24, 2022, url, p. 27 

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IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

women) and loss of custody of children’.630 According to an Iraqi pastor who was interviewed 
anonymously by the Finnish Immigration Service in 2021, a tribe may force a male Christian 
convert to divorce his wife and renounce his children.631  

According to Nasir Al-Samaraie, conversion in general is ill-perceived by the society and not 
spoken about. This is also the case for Christian women who marry Muslim men and are 
banished by their families due to social pressure. Conversion exists but is not talked about. 
Persons would opt to hide their conversion to Christianity or any other religion and not 
publicly announce it unless there is a benefit to be obtained by the conversion. As regards 
punishment for conversion, although Islamic law condemns apostasy by death, Al-Samaraie 
has not come across a case where this punishment was applied in practice.632  

According to Al-Ibrahimi a family tries to hide the conversion of a family member because they 
know the consequences of conversion are very dire. Hiding the conversion is normally not 
successful. When that happens, the situation becomes critical for the family in question. There 
is no tribal code that says that the family should be eliminated but there is a code saying that 
they should be expelled from the territory. Al-Ibrahimi mentions that the meetings in which the 
decision to expel a family is made public are open with the date and venue made known in 
advance. Thus, basically anyone can attend them. The media are not invited, and information 
about the meetings is not published. Photos and videos may be leaked via social media 
particularly when tribes try to resolve the matter internally, trying to avoid a scandal and a 
stain to the reputation of the tribe. The meeting is documented in the tribal registry.633 

According to a person who had worked with Iraqi Christians and who was interviewed 
anonymously by the Finnish Immigration Service in 2021, the attitude taken towards a convert 
by his/her family or tribe is of crucial importance. In a case where the tribe is assumed not to 
approve of the conversion, the convert’s family and close relatives may decide on whether to 
convey information about the conversion to the tribe or not. If the family members choose not 
to convey this information to the tribe, they will take a calculated risk on the tribe’s possible 
retaliatory measures being directed at the whole family. According to the interviewee, if the 
family members choose to talk about the conversion, the tribe will organize a meeting where a 
decision is made on who is responsible for the killing of the convert. The interviewee 
mentioned that the decision does not automatically lead to the killing of the convert. It is 
possible, that such a decision is only a formality and is left ‘floating in the air’. It is also possible 
that the conversion is settled, and the decision of the tribe is annulled by the doing of favors 
and/or giving a monetary compensation to the tribe.634  

Al-Ibrahimi was not aware of a family disavowing and distancing themselves from the convert 
publicly (e.g., in a newspaper). According to him, in almost all cases the family is against the 
conversion and consider it best that the family member is expelled or punished. If the family 
hides the convert, it is only because the family is afraid for her/his well-being. They are not 

630 Open Doors, Iraq: Full Country Dossier, January 24, 2022, url, p. 27  
631 Finland, FIS, Kristityt, ateistit ja islamista luopuneet Irakissa, May 18, 2022, url 
 p. 15 
632 Al-Samaraie, N., video interview, 27 October 2022. An expert on tribalism, tribal mechanisms, and tribal law in 
Iraq 
633 Al-Ibrahimi, H., video interview, 3 November 2022. The CEO of Peace Paradigms with expertise on 
peacebuilding tribal reconciliation 
634 Finland, Kristityt, ateistit ja islamista luopuneet Irakissa, May 18, 2022, url, p. 15-16   

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against the tribal measures as such. Al-Ibrahimi tells of a famous case where a Shabaki Muslim 
man fell in love with a Christian woman, and they escaped from their families to get married in 
Al-Najaf. The case became a big issue on tribal and religious levels and there was a lot of 
media attention around it. Al-Ibrahimi claims that converting from one religion to any other is a 
red line for all tribes, be it from Islam to Christianity or Christianity to Islam. He says that ‘from 
the perspective of religion, it provides a permission to kill since the person has become an 
infidel. This is the general code among all the tribes, among all ethnicities and all religions.635 

According to a person who had worked with Iraqi Christians and who was interviewed 
anonymously by the Finnish Immigration Service in 2021, a convert with a Muslim background 
would aim to leave the country if the conversion came to light. This is because a tribal 
judgment on the matter would complicate job seeking, buying an apartment or make it difficult 
to deal with authorities such as the Kurdish security organization Asayish. According to the 
interviewee, a person who has fallen out of favor with his/her tribe is seen to be destabilizing 
society.636 According to a person working with Christian converts who was interviewed 
anonymously by the Finnish Immigration Service in 2021, losing the tribe’s support is 
meaningful in situations where the person has to deal with authorities, e.g. when getting 
married, or needs a certificate from the tribal leader for some purpose, or requires assistance 
in dispute resolution.637 According to Open Doors, violations against converts tend to occur 
more often in Arab than Kurdish areas. A ‘country expert’ mentioned in the Open Doors report 
maintains that tolerance against converts with a Muslim background is decreasing in Kurdish 
areas and that there is increased pressure on them due to the growing influence of 
conservative Islam.638 Open Doors mentions that ethnic leaders are highly likely to pressure 
converts to Christianity with a Muslim background to renounce their new faith.639 According to 
Genat, conversion to Christianity might potentially create an issue that could escalate to a 
dispute and hence trigger tribal mechanisms, but conversion or renouncing Islam is not 
common in the context of tribalism in Iraq. It is not considered a violation to tribal honour but 
falls rather within the scope of the family.640   

5. 

State response and redress  

5.1. 

The interaction between tribal and state law 

For an overview of tribal law, see Chapter 1. Tribes and tribal law in Iraq. 

Iraq has a pluralistic legal system with multiple overlapping legal systems through the formal 
Iraqi state judiciary, the Sharia law and Islamic courts, and the tribal law system.641 Additionally, 

635 Al-Ibrahimi, H., video interview, 3 November 2022 
636 Finland, FIS, Kristityt, ateistit ja islamista luopuneet Irakissa, May 18, 2022, url, p. 16, footnote 122   
637 Finland, FIS, Kristityt, ateistit ja islamista luopuneet Irakissa, May 18, 2022, url, p. 16   
638 Open Doors, Iraq: Full Country Dossier, January 24, 2022, url, p. 31  
639 Open Doors, Iraq: Full Country Dossier, January 24, 2022, url, p. 27; Finland, FIS, Kristityt, ateistit ja islamista 
luopuneet Irakissa, May 18, 2022, url, p. 16   
640 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022. PhD student at Stanford University with extensive experience 
researching tribal justice and conflict resolution mechanisms in Iraq. 
641 HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023; USIP, Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, 1 
July 2011, url, p. 269 

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IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

tribal, ethno-sectarian, and family considerations ‘significantly influenced government 
decisions at all levels and across all branches of government.’642 The plurality of legal systems 
posed challenges to a uniform application of the law for Iraqis.643  

Article 45 of the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 stipulates that: 

The State shall seek the advancement of the Iraqi clans and tribes, shall attend to their 
affairs in a manner that is consistent with religion and the law, and shall uphold their 
noble human values in a way that contributes to the development of society. The State 
shall prohibit the tribal traditions that are in contradiction with human rights.644 

According to a report published by Al-Mayadeen on 4 June 2022, Iraqi state law 
acknowledges tribal customs insofar as they do not contradict the Constitution and legal 
provisions. This is the case especially as regards crimes where tribes intervene to contain 
escalation by providing the victim’s family with the diyya (blood money) following a 
reconciliation process.645 The concept of ‘collective responsibility’ is fundamental to tribal law 
and is ‘an important guiding principle during tribal settlements’ where all sorts of fasl are to be 
paid by ‘the entire tribal branch’ of the perpetrator.646 From this perspective, ‘tribal law is 
inconsistent with the principle of “individual liability” that is integral to Iraq’s Penal Code’.647 
Police and the judiciary are not independent of tribal influence,648 state judges ‘do appreciate 
it’s place in resolving conflicts, and some admit to using tribal customary law principles, while 
others vehemently insist on the modern system; and while its role is ‘extremely limited, in 
practice ‘tribal juridical principals do indeed influence state court decisions’ and may result in 
reduced sentences, including in honour crimes.649 

In practice, tribal practices frequently undermine human rights,650 and in some cases law 
enforcement officials and courts encourage or refer cases for tribal settlement.651 Bobseine 
noted that it is not only tribal practices that are discriminatory but that State law itself also 
often undermines human rights.652  Citing a former Iraqi criminal judge, Carroll stated that 
there is ‘no official state-sanctioned right to avenge damage to honour’ via dispute settlement; 
however in practice most judicial officials she interviewed acknowledged the role of fasl in the 

642 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2022 – Iraq, February 2023, url, p. 45 
643 HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023 
644 Iraq, Iraqi Constitution, 2005, url 
645 Al-Mayadeen, نﻮﻧﺎﻘﻟا ﻖﺒﺴﺗ "مﺪﻟا ﺔﻧﺪھ" .. قاﺮﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا ةﻮﻄﻌﻟا [Tribal atwa in Iraq . “Blood truce” precedes the law], 4 
June 2022, url 
646 Genat, M., Tribal Justice Mechanisms and Durable Solutions for Families with a Perceived Affiliation to ISIS, IOM, 
2020, p. 10 
647 Revkin, M. R., The limits of punishment: Traditional justice and violent extremism, IFIT and UNU, May 2018, url, p. 
25 
648 Ceasefire for Civilian Rights, Correspondence with EUAA, 16 March 2023 
649 USIP, Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, 1 July 2011, url, p. 264 
650 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on 
her mission to Iraq, 5 June 2018, url, Para. 40-44; HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023 
651 EUAA, COI Report – Iraq: Actors of Protection, November 2018, url, Section 6.6; UNHCR, Tribal Conflict 
Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/5a66f84f4.html, p. 3 
652 Bobseine, H.  

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

justice process. A successful sulh could lead to a reduction of sentences by half or 
completely.653  

In formal proceedings, state courts do not officially take into consideration tribal laws, 654  
however, in practice, politics, social positions, and other factors influence the state’s judicial 
process.655 For example Genat stated that sometimes judges wait for a sulh to be concluded 
between the litigants in order to terminate the case.656  Human Rights Watch explained that 
there is a relationship of both competition and cooperation between the state and tribal 
systems, noting that one of the main issues encountered especially in rural areas, is the close 
relationship between tribes and courts. For instance, the local judge may also be on the tribal 
council, or related by blood to the local Sheikh. This allows negotiations on the sidelines of the 
justice system and the tendency to resort to informal mechanisms. Outcomes then become 
dependent on individual personalities and positions of authority at a given time and place.657  

As mentioned earlier, state failures have led to the increase in the role of tribal customs and 
traditions in parallel to the rule of law.658 However, Genat explained in a report authored for 
IOM in 2020 that ‘the relationship between tribes and state judicial institutions in Iraq is best 
understood as deeply embedded cooperation’ where the two spheres of justice overlap.659 
According to Genat, an examination of the penal legislation in Iraq and how it is implemented 
in the tribal areas indicates that the two systems of law coexist.660 Similarly, Bobseine stated 
that: ‘The informal Iraqi tribal justice system is often perceived by outsiders as operating in 
parallel to the formal justice system. In practice, however, the two systems frequently overlap 
and even coordinate with each other, and at other times challenge each other.’661 

Genat observed that ‘Iraqi legislation contains carefully crafted windows enabling tribal justice 
to happen outside of the court system.’662 Genat also maintained that the current Iraqi 
legislation contains a coded language that allows the state to work with the tribes without a 
direct reference to this, especially in the penal and procedures codes.663 In cases where tribal 
conciliation is achieved, ‘Iraqi laws provide for accommodation, sentence reduction, or 
outright termination of all proceedings.’664 The two judicial systems, according to Genat, 
maintain ‘a degree of functional autonomy in the areas where there is no overlap’ and there 

653 Carroll, K. B., Tribal law and reconciliation in the New Iraq, 2011, url, pp. 27-28 
654 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022 
655 Bobseine, H.,  
656 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022 
657 HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023 
658 The Supreme Judicial Council of Iraq acknowledges that the weakness of the Iraqi State’s institution since 2003 
has led to an increased role of the tribes in providing protection to their members and to the prevalence of the 
tribal practice of degge. Iraq, Supreme Judicial Council, ﺔﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا  ﺔﻣاوﻛﻟا [Tribal gouwama], 14 June 2021, url; USIP, 
Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, 1 July 2011, url; EUAA, COI Report – Iraq: Actors of 
Protection, November 2018, url, Section 6.6 
659 Genat, M., Tribal Justice Mechanisms and Durable Solutions for Families with a Perceived Affiliation to ISIS, IOM, 
2020, p. 10 
660 Genat, M., Tribal Justice and State Law in Iraq, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 53(3), August 2021, 
url, p. 507 
661 Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, The Century Foundation, November 7, 2019, url 
662 Genat, M., Tribal Justice and State Law in Iraq, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 53(3), August 2021, 
url, p. 507 
663 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022 
664 Genat, M., Tribal Justice and State Law in Iraq, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 53(3), August 2021, 
url, p. 507 

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IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

seems to be ‘a mutual understanding that each jurisdiction retains complementary yet distinct 
prerogatives’. She added that tribes acknowledge the role of the state in enforcing 
punishment in cases of grave offences whereby the exiled member of the tribe due to such an 
offense ‘is expected to surrender to the police to be incarcerated’.

665

Genat added that a sulh can be negotiated outside of the court room or in front of a judge. 
When a fasl is concluded, this normally indicates that the litigants are satisfied with the 
compensation, and a tanazul [withdrawal of the complaint] can be made. In such cases, a 
peace document (mahdar sulh) is brought to the court by the litigants to withdraw the claim 
and a significant sentence reduction can be issued by the judge. If the claim is private and 
there is no public right, the judge can terminate the case. If there is a public right, however, 
the judge cannot terminate the case and has to pass a sentence on the perpetrator. Even 
when a sentence is handed down, it can be reduced when a tribal fasl was concluded. In 
general, the judges avoid acknowledging the role of tribes in the judicial proceedings but are 
happy when a dispute is settled through tribal mechanisms in order to reduce their workload. 
Judges collaborate with the tribes in an informal way.666 

Exile 

Another area of collaboration between the state and tribes is in cases that involve exile 
(jalwa). Al-Ibrahimi observed that jalwa is labelled under the eviction code and that the return 
of the exiled should be negotiated with the local community. The state has provided the local 
community the possibility to settle the issues, but this, according to Al-Ibrahimi, raises human 
rights questions with regard to, e.g., the neutrality of the process.667 

Homicide 

According to Hamoudi, it is ‘unlikely that the tribe could keep the state away from a murder 
entirely’ hence tribes are incentivised to cooperate with the state in allowing it to ‘undertake 
whatever punitive measures the tribe seeks’. Tribes may insist the perpetrator turn himself into 
authorities and then the tribes argue the case for compensation through the court system in a 
‘symbiotic method of interaction’.668 According to Genat, in cases of homicide, most of the 
Iraqi tribes consider lodging an official complaint necessary ‘as long as no interference by 
armed para-state actors disrupts state-tribal relations’. If the death occurred accidentally, 
withdrawal of the complaint (tanazul) is expected once the blood money (diyya) is established; 
while for cases of premeditated murder, tanazul is not likely to be obtained. Further, tribes in 
the south of Iraq ‘sometimes negotiate what they call a fidiyya (lit. ransom), an additional diyya, 
to obtain tanāzul.’

 In fact, tribes bring their cases of murder, and even thar, to court 

669

665 Genat, M., Tribal Justice and State Law in Iraq, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 53(3), August 2021, 
url, p. 509 
666 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022; See also: Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, The Century 
Foundation, November 7, 2019, url 
667 Al-Ibrahimi, H., video interview, 3 November 2022 
668 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 242 
669 Genat, M., Tribal Justice and State Law in Iraq, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 53(3), August 2021, 
url, p. 508 

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

‘routinely’. The only exception are cases of honour crime.670 For information on treatment of 
honour-related killings, see Section 3.11 Honour violations and honour-based violence. 

Iraqi tribes ‘insist with some vigor that the tribe must handle certain matters on its own’ 
including ‘issues relating to stains of honor’.671 Moreover, tribes have a tendency to view the 
role of state law as complementary, in the sense that it is ‘only when they cannot [resolve an 
issue tribally] or one tribe is unwilling that the state system becomes an acceptable venue’.672 
Nevertheless, as Hamoudi et al emphasised, ‘this by no means precludes the injured tribe 
from initiating a case in the courts’ which will often be the case ‘as another means of 
pressuring the offending tribe to seek a settlement – in addition to the “striking” previously 
discussed’. Once there has been a fasl, ‘the victims stop pursuing the case’ and would ‘only 
proceed to judgment under the state system if the offending tribe refused to adhere to the 
tribal procedure’.673 On the part of the state, the authors observed that ‘if alleged victims file a 
claim and then, after pursuing it for some period of time, seem to abandon it, the case sits on 
the record books, formally active but in reality unpursued by the state authorities’.674  

As regards crimes, ‘the tribe cooperates by not seeking punitive measures, indeed by allowing 
the state to undertake whatever punitive measures the injured tribe seeks’. Thus, especially in 
cases of murder, tribes rely on the state to carry out the punishment. The tribe of the victim 
‘will insist not only that a sum of money is paid to recompense a killing, but also that the 
perpetrator turn himself into the authorities’.675 On the issue of whether a tribal claim against a 
person ends when the state court system punishes them, UNHCR stated that prosecution of 
the offender in the formal justice system ‘does not necessarily end or avoid tribal conflict.’676 
Human Rights Watch said that that can depend case-by-case. Tribes recognise the authority 
of the state is higher for some matters (such as murder or ISIL issues, but not honour crimes, 
for example). The source indicated that it is difficult to say whether the tribe’s claim on the 
person would end with formal punishment, or if it would be pursued despite a formal 
sentence, and depends on whether the victims were satisfied. It is possible the family could 
still pursue the matter even if the state punished someone, and it depends on the 
circumstances of the situation.677 

Genat observed that there were cases where tribal customary law, urf, contradicted formal 
law. She stated that the Baghdad Directorate of Tribal Affairs ‘has worked on several 

670 Genat, M., Tribal Justice Mechanisms and Durable Solutions for Families with a Perceived Affiliation to ISIS, IOM, 
2020, p. 10 
671 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq: Toward a 
Cooperative Model of Pluralism, in: M. Helfand (Ed.), Negotiating State and Non-State Law: The Challenge of 
Global and Local Legal Pluralism (ASIL Studies in International Legal Theory), Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 
244 
672 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, Cambridge 
University Press, 2015, p. 246 
673 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 247 
674 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 244 
675 Hamoudi, H. A et al, The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq, 2015, p. 248 
676 UNHCR, Tribal Conflict Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, url, p. 3 
677 Human Rights Watch, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023 

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IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

legislative proposals designed […] to discipline, or rectify’ tribal law, especially as regards 
violent practices during tribal feuds and forceful expulsion.

678

In the context of ISIL members, some Iraqis turn to tribal justice in order to seek redress for 
crimes committed by the members of the group since state courts ‘are both overburdened 
and widely perceived as corrupt and illegitimate’. While in some cases the role of tribes was 
perceived to be positive, in others ‘tribal justice has been a barrier to reconciliation’ with tribes 
in certain areas being ‘unwilling to cooperate with state authorities [… and insisting] on 
reinforcing their own legal doctrines including those requiring paying of “blood money” or 
banishment …’.679 Genat observed that Iraqi tribes have been confronted with a new situation, 
especially in the context of the ISIL conflict and the large number of cases of dispute 
settlement which is due to the dysfunctionality of the state. Iraqi tribes are attempting to 
formalise new mechanisms and find solutions to these outstanding issues.680 Al-Ibrahimi also 
referred to existing confusion when it comes to tribes dealing with cases involving ISIL. He 
stated that tribes are confused on how to deal with the issue of intentional killings by a 
terrorist group that wants to destabilise the whole country or the whole area.681  

For more information on the treatment of persons perceived to be affiliated with ISIL, see 
Section 4.1 People perceived as affiliated with ISIL of this report. 

Also refer to Chapter 1 of the EUAA Iraq Targeting of Individuals report published in January 
2022 and EUAA’s previous publications on this topic.682 

5.2.  State response to persons fearing tribal retaliation, 

particularly honour-based violence 

According to Human Rights Watch, given the tribalistic nature of Iraqi societal attitudes and 
the underlying concept of honour/shame, turning to the formal justice system in matters of 
personal or intercommunal disputes can itself be perceived as ‘shameful’ and to protect one’s 
reputation, it is preferably to go through the tribal dialogue system.683 Similarly, in the case of 
violence against women, Ceasefire for Civilian Rights also remarked that women do not report 
such violence against them because state institutions do not look positively on individuals 
(especially women), leaving their family/tribe and taking legal measures against their relatives, 
leading to underreporting.684 

678 Genat, M., Tribal Justice and State Law in Iraq, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 53(3), August 2021, 
url, p. 510 
679 Revkin, M. R., The limits of punishment: Traditional justice and violent extremism, IFIT and UNU, May 2018, url, p. 
24 
680 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022 
681 Al-Ibrahimi, H., video interview, 3 November 2022 
682 EUAA, COI Report – Iraq: Targeting of individuals, January 2022, url; EUAA, COI Report – Iraq: Targeting of 
Individuals (March 2019), url; EUAA, COI Report – Iraq: Treatment of Iraqis with perceived affiliation to ISIL, October 
2020, url 
683 HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023 
684 Ceasefire for Civilian Rights, Correspondence with EUAA, 16 March 2023 

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On 8 March 2022, an expert of the UN Human Rights Committee noted that although tribal 
courts ‘had the potential to enhance the administration of justice in the country, there were 
reports of abuses from such courts.’ The expert questioned the Iraqi State’s ability to prevent 
such abuses and to offer means of recourse ‘for individuals who had suffered harm because 
of the application of tribal justice’. The expert added that ‘there were secret prisons being 
operated by’ different non-state actors including tribal factions.685 On the question of obtaining 
protection by the state if a person is fearing tribal violence or retaliation, according to the 
representative of OWFI, the police are not effective in providing protection in cases of thar 
revenge and blood feuds.686 Human Rights Watch stated that for degge, a person would be 
more likely to be able to be protected in an urban setting, rather than in rural areas, as it is 
more difficult for tribes to carry out degge due to police presence.687 Similarly, OWFI stated 
that the tribes have more freedom to act in rural areas and outside the capital and main 
cities.688 

OWFI stated that in the more than 4 000 cases of family violence that they documented, most 
went unreported, and for the police family units that do exist, they often try to mediate the 
conflict with the family/tribe with the agreement to drop charges and return home being seen 
as a success. The same source noted that family or tribe member who caused the violence 
may agree to sign a ‘pledge’ not to cause further harm. ‘These are the dominant methods 
used by the [largely male-dominated] state institutions to deal with cases of violence, despite 
their limited actual effectiveness in preventing further harm.’689  Dr. Al-Obaidi also stated that 
the community police stations are not considered a safe accommodation for women fleeing 
from violence, and often such police would return the victim to her family after making a 
promise not to hurt her.690 

There are no shelters or laws that protect women victims of domestic violence.691 When 
women flee situations of domestic violence or need to escape the family home, tribes will 
pursue the woman, and although some civil society organisations offer shelter, government 
officials are not supportive. Other times there are some community police who will write up a 
report on behalf of the woman and bring her to a women’s organisation; however the 
government ‘doesn’t seem to care much about it as a major issue.’692 Similarly, Human Rights 
Watch stated that there is ‘no protection for anyone’ in cases where the tribal code overlaps 
with the criminal code, such as in cases of violence against women.693 According to Ceasefire 
for Civilian Rights, ‘in line with the general weakness of the rule of law in Iraq, state institutions 
have a limited capacity to provide protection or take action against the interests of powerful 
groups. For example, there are very few instances of police or courts taking action to 
prosecute members of tribes/families for ‘honour’ related killings of women, despite the 
prevalence of this practice.’ Furthermore, state courts may drop charges under tribal pressure 

685 OHCHR, Experts of the Human Rights Committee Commend Iraq for its Judicial Pursuit of Perpetrators of Sexual 
Violence, and Ask about the Civil and Political Rights of Displaced Persons, 8 March 2022, url 
686 OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023 
687 Human Rights Watch, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023 
688 OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023 
689 Ceasefire for Civilian Rights, Correspondence with EUAA, 16 March 2023 
690 Al-Obaidi, B., Interview with EUAA, 3 April 2023 
691 Al-Obaidi, B., Interview with EUAA, 3 April 2023 
692 OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023 
693 Human Rights Watch, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023 

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or refrain from further investigation if the family insists it was suicide, even in the face of clear 
evidence of their involvement in her death.694 

Further information on the state’s response to honour-motivated violence, especially against 
women, can be found in Section 3.11 Honour violations and honour-based violence. For more 
details on tribal interaction with state justice, see Secton 5.1 The interaction between tribal and 
state law. 

5.4. Relocation away from tribal threats 

Information on relocation away from tribal threats was scarce. 

According to the Australian DFAT Country Report on Iraq for 2023, ‘where a person is 
relocating to avoid violence or the threat of violence at the hands of family, tribe, or 
community as a result of harmful traditional practices, including on account of preserving 
family ‘honour’, there is clear evidence that such actors will pursue the person to the proposed 
area of relocation, including, through tribal, family or other links. The endorsement of such 
norms and practices by large segments of society and the limitations of the state to provide 
protection against such abuses all mitigate against successful relocation.’695 The OWFI 
representative stated that people relocate away from tribal issues when they have to, but that 
tribes have the capacity to locate a person due to their network connections and will ‘find a 
way to do it’ if they desire finding the person.696 

Further information on relocation could not be found within time constraints. For more 
information on this topic, refer to EUAA COI Report – Iraq: Internal Mobility (February 2019). 

694 Ceasefire for Civilian Rights, Correspondence with EUAA, 16 March 2023 
695 Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report Iraq, 16 January 2023, url, p. 40 
696 OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023 

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6. 

Impact of tribal violence on the security 
situation and civilians 

6.1. 

Security incidents resulting from tribal conflict 

Tribal violence in Iraq is frequent, especially in the southern governorates which see an 
outbreak of tribal violence very often.697 According to several sources, tribal aspects are 
present in Iraqis’ daily life,698 either through the phrase ‘wanted by the tribe’ written on houses 
or through the frequent clashes in the southern governorates.699 Tribal disputes can continue 
for months or years, and usually impact civilians in areas in which those feuds breakout.700 In 
her review of this report, Bobseine also remarked that Tribal conflicts is often a catch all term 
used and that while some conflicts can be tribal, sometimes this catch all, general term can be 
used to obscure political, security, and other dimensions of the ongoing conflict.701 

Tribal disputes, according to a New Arab article from January 2022, are on the rise in Iraq,702 
and tribal violence can be noticed across all the governorates of Iraq.703  The main security 
risk caused by tribal disputes that affect the security situation is to civilians getting caught up 
in the cross-fire as heavily armed tribes can escalate disputes very quickly.704 Bobseine stated 
that there  have been cases of heated tribal disputes where for instance an atwa has not been 
reached or is repeatedly breached and no sulha is in sight. In such situations, it can be 
dangerous for children to cross town and go to school and there have been incidents in Thi 
Qar, for example, where schools were closed temporarily due to tribal violence in the area.705 
A tribal leader from southern Iraq, cited in the New Arab article, highlighted that the 
governorates of Thi-Qar, Maysan and Al-Basrah were the ones that registered the highest 
numbers of tribal disputes which led to dozens of casualties among those involved in the 
feuds,706 but also innocent bystanders.707 Bobseine remarked in her review of this report that 
those ‘involved in feuds’ can be broad due to the definition of Khamsa level vengeance [See 

697 Al-Ibrahimi, H., video interview, 3 November 2022; Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022 
698 EPC, ﺔﯾﻧﻣﻷاو ﺔﯾﻋﺎﻣﺗﺟﻻاو ﺔﯾﺳﺎﯾﺳﻟا ﺎﯾﺎﺿﻘﻟا : قارﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ ةرﺻﺑﻟا رﺋﺎﺷﻋ [Basrah tribes in Iraq: Political, social and security issues], 
25 May 2022, url; Zalzali, A., ﺔﯿﻗاﺮﻌﻟا ﺔﻟوﺪﻟا ﺔﯿﻧﺪﻣ نودﺪﮭﯾ "ﺔﻗﺰﺗﺮﻣ خﻮﯿﺷ"و فاﺮﻋأ [Customs and “mercenary Sheikhs” 
threaten the civility of Iraqi State], Al-Hurra, 29 March 2022, url; Ceasefire for Civilian Rights, 16 March 2023; OWFI, 
Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023  
699 Zalzali, A., ﺔﯾﻗارﻌﻟا ﺔﻟودﻟا ﺔﯾﻧدﻣ نوددﮭﯾ "ﺔﻗزﺗرﻣ خوﯾﺷ"و فارﻋأ [Customs and “mercenary Sheikhs” threaten the civility of 
Iraqi State], Al-Hurra, 29 March 2022, url 
700 Rudaw, Senior Iraqi officer killed while mediating tribal dispute in Dhi Qar, 20 April 2022, url; OWFI, Interview 
with EUAA, 16 March 2023 
701 Bobseine, H., comments during external expert review of the report, 03 April 2023 
702 New Arab (The), قارﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ ﻲﻠھﻷا مﻠﺳﻟا  ﻖﻠﻘﺗ ﺔﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا تﺎﻋازﻧﻟا [Tribal disputes disturb civil peace in Iraq], 15 January 2022, 
url 
703 Independent Arabia, ﺎﮭﯿﻓ ﻦﯿﻠﻣﺎﻌﻟا و ﺎﮭﺗﺎﻧﺎﯿﻛ دﺪﮭﺗ و قاﺮﻌﻟا  ﻲﻓ ﺔﻟوﺪﻟا ﻢﻜﺤﺗ ةﺮﯿﺸﻌﻟا [The clan dominates the state in Iraq and 
threatens its entities and public servants], 13 September 2021, url 
704 HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023 
705 Bobseine, H., comments during external expert review of the report, 03 April 2023 
706 Bobseine, H., comments during external expert review of the report, 03 April 2023 
707 New Arab (The), قارﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ ﻲﻠھﻷا مﻠﺳﻟا  ﻖﻠﻘﺗ ﺔﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا تﺎﻋازﻧﻟا [Tribal disputes disturb civil peace in Iraq], 15 January 2022, 
url 

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Section 1.2 Structure of the tribe].708  Rudaw, citing sources in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), 
added Baghdad and Wassit to the list of the governorates affected by tribal violence.709 In 
such disputes, medium and heavy weapons are used, civilians are terrorised and killed, and 
main roads are blocked.710 

According to Al-Ibrahimi, in the southern region (including Al-Basrah, Thi-Qar and Diwaniya) 
the tribes are heavily polarized and supported by key armed actors and have become a key 
competitor to state’s security institutions.711 Also tribal militias have political connections, 
including in Baghdad,712 and the risk of escalation is increased due to both the armed capacity 
of tribes and the tribal affiliation of members of the security forces as well as with different 
tribal militias.713 This took place in parts of Iraq, especially the south, in the post-2003 
environment and during the ISIL crisis where Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs), which 
included tribes, ‘compete with the state apparatus in security provision’.714 The state struggles 
to have the security institutions in order since the tribes have weapons and enjoy political 
backup.715 In the context of the protests in Baghdad, Al-Basrah and Thi-Qar, for example, tribes 
‘have taken the lead in crafting protest tactics, shutting down roads, and even retaliating 
against Iranian-backed groups.’ Additionally, one prominent tribe from Southern Iraq 
threatened the Iraqi government for the release of one of its leaders who was arrested, and 
the government conceded to the tribe’s demand.716  

In the view of Al-Ibrahimi, it has become hard to control the tribes and to separate the Popular 
Mobilization Forces (PMF) and the armed actors from tribal factions since they are deeply 
connected. The more the tribes have presence in the armed groups the more they are 
empowered locally and also on the national level.717 Together with organised crime and 
political parties, the tribe is one of the categories into which the PMF fits readily.718 Badawi 
noted that elements within the PMF and tribes collaborate in security matters due to tribes’ 
capacity to deny PMF militants access to their lands during counterinsurgency operations. He 
cited the example of an alliance created by Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) which organises ‘pro-
paramilitary tribal elders and figures that routinely issue statements supportive of those 
groups and the Iran-led regional axis’.719 Moreover, a judge cited in Independent Arabia stated 
that some tribal groups receive support from the armed factions of certain political parties that 
use the degge practice as an umbrella for their activities.720 According to a security official 

708 Bobseine, H., comments during external expert review of the report, 03 April 2023 
709 Rudaw, Tensions between two Basra tribes lead to bloody fighting, 2 July 2022, url 
710 Al-Abadi, A. M., ﺔﯿﻠﺒﻘﺘﺴﻤﻟا ﺎﮭﺗاﺮﯿﺛﺄﺗو قاﺮﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ  ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا تﺎﻋاﺰﻨﻟا [Tribal disputes in Iraq and their future impact], 15 April 
2019, url 
711 Al-Ibrahimi, H., video interview, 3 November 2022 
712 HRW, Interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023; OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023 
713 HRW, Interview with EUAA< 13 March 2023 
714 KAS, Research Paper No.3: Alternative Governance – Non-State Armed groups and the Iraqi Reconstruction 
Process, June 2018, url, p. 11 
715 Al-Ibrahimi, H., video interview, 3 November 2022 
716 Smyth, P., Iran is losing Iraq’s tribes, 4 December 2019, url 
717 Al-Ibrahimi, H., video interview, 3 November 2022 
718 Haddad, F., Iraq's Popular Mobilization Units: A Hybrid Actor in a Hybrid State, in Day, A. (ed.), Hybrid Conflict, 
Hybrid Peace: How Militias and Paramilitary Groups Shape Post-conflict Transitions, New York: United Nations 
University, 2020, url, p. 51 
719 Badawi, T., The Growing Tribal Role in Iraq’s Post-election Shia Politics, Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 17 May 2022, url 
720 Independent Arabia, ﺎﮭﯿﻓ ﻦﯿﻠﻣﺎﻌﻟا و ﺎﮭﺗﺎﻧﺎﯿﻛ دﺪﮭﺗ و قاﺮﻌﻟا  ﻲﻓ ﺔﻟوﺪﻟا ﻢﻜﺤﺗ ةﺮﯿﺸﻌﻟا [The clan dominates the state in Iraq and 
threatens its entities and public servants], 13 September 2021, url 

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

cited in by the New Arab in June 2022, members of the ISF take part in some of the tribal 
clashes and use the weapons of the state to support their tribes.721 

Recent examples of tribal confrontations that include civilian casualties include: 

• 

• 

In March 2021, Rudaw reported that a family of three, including a child, were injured in 
their home in the south of Nasiriyah, in Thi-Qar governorate, as a result of a tribal 
dispute.722  
In a video shared online in September 2021, the Iraqi TV channel, Al-Falluja, reported 
on a tribal feud that broke out in Al-Shatra district of Thi-Qar where light and medium 
weapons as well as mortar shells were used by the parties to the conflict. The feud 
resulted in casualties among those involved in the feud, and caused damage to the 
health centre, the water station, and numerous houses in the district. The report 
claimed that the ISF did not intervene immediately despite calls for help.723  
In June 2022, sources reported on the death of nine people in two separate tribal 
feuds that broke out in Maysan and Wassit.724  
In July 2022, Rudaw reported on a tribal feud that lasted for more than five hours in 
the town of Garma in Al-Basrah between two tribes and led to the death of five people 
and the injury of 21 others.725 Reportedly, heavy weapons were used in the feud.726  
•  A tribal feud broke out in the district of Khabat in Erbil which also resulted in casualties 

• 

• 

among the parties to the conflict.727 

•  On 5 October 2022, fighting erupted in the al-Hai District of Wasit Province between 

• 

the al-Gharib and al-Shahman Tribes that resulted in the death of a child (Hasan Abbas 
al-Gharibawi) and injuries to two individuals. Two members of the al-Shahman Tribe 
were arrested on charges of the killing and were reportedly affiliated with the Counter 
Terrorism Service and the Special Operations Forces.’728 
‘On February 20, security sources in Diyala said that unidentified gunmen attacked 
farmers in the village of Albu-Bali, near the town of Khalis, northeast of Baquba. The 
attack killed seven people, including two women, and injured three other villagers. 
Security officials attributed the violence to an old tribal conflict involving the main tribes 
residing in the villages of Albu-Bali and al-Jayaliyah.’729 

Several drivers for displacement in Iraq include tribal issues and blood feuds. The Head of the 
Al-Sulaymaniyah Migration Department cited in the source observed a ‘reversed migration’ 
from Salah Al-Din governorate to IDP camps in Al-Sulaymaniyah. This movement is due to 

721 New Arab (The), قارﻌﻟا طﺳوو بوﻧﺟ ندﻣ ﻲﻓ نﻣﻷا ﻖھرﺗو  ﻲﻌﻣﺗﺟﻣﻟا  مﻠﺳﻟا ددﮭﺗ ﺔﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا تﺎﻋازﻧﻟا [Tribal disputes threaten societal 
peace and exhaust security in Iraq’s southern and central cities], 27 June 2022, url 
722 Rudaw, Family burned inside home in Nasiriyah armed clan conflict, 19 March 2021, url 
723 Al-Falluja Channel, ﺎﯾﺎﺣﺿ عوﻗوو ﻖﺋارﺣﺑ  نﺎﺑﺑﺳﺗﯾ لﯾﺑرأو ةرطﺷﻟا ﻲﻓ نﺎﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻋ  نﺎﻋازﻧ [Two tribal feuds in Al-Shatra and Erbil 
cause fires and casualties] [Online video], 16 September 2021, url  
724 Al-Arabiya, Nine shot dead in Iraq tribal clashes: Police, 22 June 2022, url; Arab Weekly (The), Bloody tribal 
clashes highlight fragile security in Iraq, 26 June 2022, url  
725 Rudaw, Tensions between two Basra tribes lead to bloody fighting, 2 July 2022, url 
726 Germany, BAMF, Briefing Notes Summary Group 62 – Information Centre for Asylum and Migration, 4 July 2022, 
url, p. 1 
727 Al-Falluja Channel, ﺎﯾﺎﺣﺿ عوﻗوو ﻖﺋارﺣﺑ  نﺎﺑﺑﺳﺗﯾ لﯾﺑرأو ةرطﺷﻟا ﻲﻓ نﺎﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻋ  نﺎﻋازﻧ [Two tribal feuds in Al-Shatra and Erbil 
cause fires and casualties] [Online video], 16 September 2021, url  
728 USDOS, Iraq 2022 Human Rights Report, 20 March 2023, url, p. 22 
729 EPIC, ISHM: February 16-23, 2023, 23 February 2023, url 

84 

 
IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

ongoing tribal conflicts in the areas of origin.730 In September 2021, the New Arab, citing the 
Head of the Al-Basrah Police, stated that 13 families left their homes in the city of Al-Basrah 
due to tribal violence.  The Chairman of the Reconciliation and Clans Committee in the Iraqi 
Parliament, also cited in the source, stated that ‘this type of displacement is spiralling out of 
control due to the proliferation of weapons within the tribes and the weakness of the security 
apparatus’.731  

6.2.  ACLED data on tribal feuds732 

This section provides an overview of ACLED data where coded actors involved in security 
incidents were coded as tribal actors. From the numerous actors in Iraq identified by ACLED, 
only those actors in the dataset mentioned with tribal affiliation were selected,733 with the 
exception of Tribal Mobilisation Forces, which are irrelevant to the scope of this report, as they 
constitute a part of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF)734 and their purpose is to fight 
remnants of ISIL in coordination with the state forces.735 Therefore, the incidents in this section 
should be understood as security incidents with strictly tribal actors coded and it is possible 
that there are more incidents with a tribal dimension that are not captured by the scope of this 
report. 

This section is intended only as an indication about the level of security incident activity 
involving ACLED-coded tribal actors, and should be read in conjunction with other EUAA COI 
reports on the Iraqi security situation to put these incidents in context. Given how broad 
ACLED data is, it can be challenging for researchers to determined what exactly constitutes 
‘tribal’ conflict, especially given that conflict labels may obscure other political and security 
dimensions within a given conflict.736  

For the purpose of this report, only the following types of events were included in the analysis: 
battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians.  

EUAA used the ACLED dataset for Iraq (9 March 2023) for security incidents figures, graphs 
and maps.737 According to this dataset, in all of the reference period (1 October 2021 – 28 
February 2023), there were 378 security incidents recorded in Iraq involving tribes, most of 
which were coded as battles (302). For the remainder of the incidents, 10 were recorded as 

730 New Arab (The), لزﺎﻧﻣﻟا رﺎﻣدو يرﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا رﺄﺛﻟاو تﺎﯾﺷﯾﻠﻣﻟا  بﺑﺳﺑ قارﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ رﻣﺗﺳﻣ ﻲﻠﺧادﻟا حوزﻧﻟا [Internal displacement in Iraq is 
ongoing due to militias, tribal blood feuds and destruction of houses], 22 October 2021, url 
731 New Arab (The), Clan violence in Iraq: Oil companies targeted as poverty reigns, 13 September 2021, url 
732 The dataset used to extract security events is inclusive of geo precision level 3. See the section Sources of this 
report for further information on ACLED’s codes for the geo-precision of events. 
733 Those tribal actors are: Akil Abu Ghraib Clan Militia, Al-Dhahabiyat Tribal Militia, Al-Hilali Tribal Militia, Al-
Khanafra Tribal Militia, Al-Mawajid Tribal Militia, Al-Sawaed Tribal Militia, Albu Bakhit Tribal Militia, Albu Hamoudi 
Tribal Militia, Albu Khamis Tribal Militia, Banu Tamim Tribal Militia, Jaghayfa Clan Militia, and Unidentified Tribal 
Militia. 
734 GPPI, Sunni Tribal Forces, 30 August 2017, url  
735 Shafaq, "ﺶﻋاد ةدرﺎﻄﻣ  ﻲﻓ ﺔﻌﺳاو ﺔﯿﻟوﺆﺴﻣ ﻰﻟﻮﺘﯾ يﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا ﺪﺸﺤﻟا .. ﻖطﺎﻨﻤﻟا ﺲﯾرﺎﻀﺘﺑ ﻢﮭﺘﻓﺮﻌﻤﻟ [For their knowledge of the geography 
of the region Tribal Mobilisation Forces assume an important role in chasing Daesh], 30 April 2022, url 
736 EUAA observation. 
737 EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, ACLED Data Export Tool, 1 October 2021 – 28 February 2023, 9 
March 2023, url 

85 

 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

explosions/remote violence, and 66 as violence against civilians. The vast majority of the 
incidents (363) involved unidentified tribal militias. Furthermore, most security incidents 
related to tribal violence were recorded in the governorates of Baghdad (137), Maysan (86), Al-
Basrah (47), Thi-Qar (40), and Ninewa (11). The lowest numbers of security incidents related to 
tribal violence were recorded in the governorates of Duhok, Al-Qadissiyah, and Al-
Sulaymaniyah (1 each).738 

Figure 1: Evolution of security events involving tribal actors coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence 
against civilians in the period 1 October 2021 – 28 February 2023, based on ACLED data 739 

Governorate 

Battles 

Remote 
violence 

Violence 
against civilians 

Total number of 
events 

Baghdad 

Maysan 

Al-Basrah 

Thi-Qar 

114 

65 

37 

34 

6 

1 

0 

1 

17 

20 

10 

5 

137 

86 

47 

40 

738 EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, ACLED Data Export Tool, 1 October 2021 – 28 February 2023, 9 
March 2023, url 
739 EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, ACLED Data Export Tool, 1 October 2021 – 28 February 2023, 9 
March 2023, url 

86 

 
 
 
 
IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

Al-Muthanna 

Wassit 

Al-Najaf 

9 

6 

6 

Ninewa 

10 

Al-Anbar 

Diyala 

Kirkuk 

Erbil 

Salah Al-Din 

Babil 

Kerbala 

Al-Qadissiya 

Al-
Sulaymaniyah 

Duhok 

2 

3 

2 

3 

3 

3 

2 

1 

1 

1 

0 

0 

0 

0 

1 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

1 

0 

0 

0 

0 

4 

2 

1 

2 

3 

2 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

9 

10 

8 

11 

5 

6 

4 

3 

3 

3 

3 

1 

1 

1 

Figure 2: Breakdown of security events involving tribal actors (coded battles, explosions/remote violence and 
violence against civilians) by governorate in the period 1 October 2021 – 31 October 2022, based on ACLED data 740 

During the reference period of this report (1 October 2021 – 28 February 2023), ACLED 
recorded 264 fatalities in security incidents involving tribes in Iraq, of those fatalities, 83 were 

740 EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, ACLED Data Export Tool, 1 October 2021 – 31 October 2022, 9 
November 2022, url 

87 

 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

recorded in Maysan, 60 in Baghdad, 30 in Al-Basrah, 26 in Thi-Qar, 15 in Diyala, 10 in Ninewa, 
9 in Wassit, and 7 in Al-Muthanna.741 

6.3.  State’s response to tribal feuds that impact 

security 

This section deals with how tribes are embedded in Iraqi state institutions, the state’s efforts to 
deal with tribal conflicts, and their effectiveness. 

The Ministry of Interior has publicly stated that tribes are ‘part of the social fabric and have a 
prestigious status’.742 Tribes ‘have a semi-autonomous nature and follow their own set of 
customary laws and other sub-identities’, and this results in a complex situation where 
‘political leaders and self-governed groups attempt to merge traditional and modern systems 
of governance’. Chokr stated that ‘the Iraqi government continuously attempts to ensure that 
tribal loyalties, allegiances, and their affairs are taken into consideration to maintain social 
stability’.743 The Iraqi government takes the tribal issue seriously, and several committees were 
formed to deal with tribal feuds and violence at the levels of the Council of Ministers, the 
Parliament, and the Ministries of Interior and Defence.744 

Tribes are represented in the Iraqi state institutions through the Directorate of Tribal Affairs 
which operates under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior and has branches in all the Iraqi 
governorates as well as a committee for Tribal Conflict Resolution. The latter’s directors are 
 In an attempt to establish dialogue 
both tribal leaders and senior police or army officers.
between the tribes and the state, arbitration laws were adopted in 2018 whereby a team of 
tribal arbitrators was assembled by the Ministry of Justice ‘to secure the safety and peace of 
communities across all provinces’. Moreover, the Ministry of Interior selected 47 tribal leaders 
who were tasked with resolving disputes with the aim to reduce tribal conflicts.746 

745

However, sources indicate that due to being well armed and connected with militias, the risk 
of escalation of violence by tribes is high.747 With regards to degge (striking), among the 
different tribal practices, the degge is the one that involves ‘the spraying of bullets on houses 
of wanted tribesmen during a tribal feud to force the clan of the enemy to depart from the 

741 EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, ACLED Data Export Tool, 1 October 2021 – 31 October 2022, 9 
November 2022, url. The dataset used to extract fatalities is exclusive of geo precision level 3. See the section 
Sources of this report for further information on ACLED’s codes for the geo-precision of events. 
742 Iraq, Ministry of Interior, ﺔﻗﻮﻣﺮﻤﻟا ﺔﻧﺎﻜﻤﻟا ﺎﮭﻟو ﻲﻋﺎﻤﺘﺟﻻا ﺞﯿﺴﻨﻟا  ﻦﻣ ءﺰﺟ ﺔﯿﻗاﺮﻌﻟا  ﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا نأ ﺪﻛﺆﯾ ﺔﯿﻠﺧاﺪﻟا ﺮﯾزو [Minister of Interior 
affirms that Iraqi tribes are part of the social fabric and have a high status], 12 November 2022, url 
743 Chokr, M. A., The Persisting Past of Iraq, September 2021, url, p. 3 
744 EPC, ﺔﯿﻨﻣﻷاو ﺔﯿﻋﺎﻤﺘﺟﻻاو ﺔﯿﺳﺎﯿﺴﻟا ﺎﯾﺎﻀﻘﻟا :قاﺮﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ ةﺮﺼﺒﻟا ﺮﺋﺎﺸﻋ [Basrah tribes in Iraq: Political, social and security 
issues], 25 May 2022, url 
745 Genat, M., Tribal Justice and State Law in Iraq, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 53(3), August 2021, 
url, p. 509 
746 Chokr, M. A., The Persisting Past of Iraq, September 2021, url, p. 3 
747 Al-Ibrahimi, H., video interview, 3 November 2022; OWFI, Interview with EUAA, 16 March 2023 

88 

 
 
IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

area’.748  It has affected the lives of civilians which led the Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council to 
designate it as a terrorist crime in November 2018749 and to include it under the Anti-Terrorism 
Law No. 13 of 2005.750 In December 2018, the Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council announced that 
64 people were arrested across Iraq under the Anti-Terrorism Law for their involvement in the 
degge practice.751 The Council further announced subsequent arrests and sentences handed 
down to persons involved in degge in 2019752, and 2021.753 Moreover, on 4 January 2022, 
three men involved in tribal disputes and convicted of murder in Babil were sentenced to 
death by the Babil Criminal Court.754 Noon Post observed a decrease in the number of degge 
incidents since the Iraqi judiciary has designated as a terrorist crime.755 

In addition to the measures taken by the Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council, the Iraqi Ministry of 
Interior has a directorate dedicated to tribal affairs.756 The directorate engages with Iraqi 
tribes,757 resolves tribal disputes between tribes and prepares studies about the reasons that 
lead to such disputes.758 The directorate, as cited in an article by Mawazin759 from July 2022, 
stated that the incidents of degge have decreased by 85% across Iraq.760 Reportedly, the 
Directorate of Tribal Affairs has resolved more than 450 tribal disputes between July 2020 
and June 2021761 and more than 2 400 in 2022.762 Moreover, at a governorate level, 

 ﻲﻓ

ﺔﮔدﻟ

 نادﻣ

)۱٥ (

بﺎﻛﺗرﺈﺑ

ﺔﻧﺳ ﻖﺣﺑ

ﺔﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا

748 Water, Peace and Security, Water challenges and conflict dynamics in Southern Iraq: An in-depth analysis of an 
under-researched crisis, 17 February 2022, url, p. 29 
749 Independent Arabia, ﺎﮭﯿﻓ ﻦﯿﻠﻣﺎﻌﻟا و ﺎﮭﺗﺎﻧﺎﯿﻛ دﺪﮭﺗ و قاﺮﻌﻟا  ﻲﻓ ﺔﻟوﺪﻟا ﻢﻜﺤﺗ ةﺮﯿﺸﻌﻟا [The clan dominates the state in Iraq and 
threatens its entities and public servants], 13 September 2021, url 
750 New Arab (The), قارﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ ﻲﻠھﻷا مﻠﺳﻟا  ﻖﻠﻘﺗ ﺔﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا تﺎﻋازﻧﻟا [Tribal disputes disturb civil peace in Iraq], 15 January 2022, 
url; Al-Amili, S., ﺎﮭﯿﻓ ﻦﯿﻠﻣﺎﻌﻟا و ﺎﮭﺗﺎﻧﺎﯿﻛ دﺪﮭﺗ و قاﺮﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ ﺔﻟوﺪﻟا ﻢﻜﺤﺗ ةﺮﯿﺸﻌﻟا [The clan dominates the state in Iraq and threatens its 
entities and public servants], Independent Arabia, 13 September 2021, url 
751 Iraq, Supreme Judicial council,  ﻰﻠﻋ ضﺑﻘﻟﺎﺑ ارﻣأ 20 رودﺻو "ﺔﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا ﺔﻛدﻟا"  ﺔﻣﯾرﺟﺑ ﺎﻣﮭﺗﻣ 64 فﯾﻗوﺗ تﻠﺟﺳ دﻼﺑﻟا مﻛﺎﺣﻣ :رادﻗرﯾﺑ ﻲﺿﺎﻘﻟا
نﯾﺑرﺎھ [Judge Beyrakdar: State courts registered the arrest of 64 persons accused of the crime of “degge asha’iriah” 
and the issuance of 20 arrest warrants for fugitives], 26 December 2018, url 
752 Iraq, Supreme Judicial Council, ﺔﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا  ﺔﻛد"ـﻟا ﮫﺑﺎﻛﺗرﻻ  ﺔﻧﺳ 15 نادﻣ نﺟﺳﺑ ﻲﺿﻘﺗ نﺎﺳﯾﻣ تﺎﯾﺎﻧﺟ" [Maysan Criminal Court 
sentences a convicted with 15 years imprisonment for committing “degge Asha’iriah”], 20 February 2019, url 
753 Iraq, Supreme Judicial Council, ﺔﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا ﺔﻛدﻟا ﺔﻣﯾرﺟﺑ نﯾﻣﮭﺗﻣ ﺔﺳﻣﺧ ﻖﺣﺑ ﺔﯾﻧوﻧﺎﻗ تاءارﺟا [Legal procedures against five 
persons accused of committing the crime of degge asha’iriah], 31 January 2021, url; Iraq, Supreme Judicial Council, 
نﺎﺳﯾﻣ
 [(15) years imprisonment for a convicted with degge asha’iriah in Maysan], 
 ا
12 august 2021, url 
754 Iraq, Supreme judicial Council, ﺔﯾردﻧﻛﺳﻻا ﻲﻓ يرﺋﺎﺷﻋ عازﻧو لﺗﻗ مﺋارﺟﺑ اوﺑﺑﺳﺗ نﯾﻣرﺟﻣ ﺔﺛﻼﺛﻟ مادﻋﻹا :لﺑﺎﺑ تﺎﯾﺎﻧﺟ [Babil Criminal 
Court: Death sentence for three criminals who caused murders and tribal disputes in Alexandria], 04 January 2022, 
url 
755 Noon Post, ؟رﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا ﺔﻧﺎﺳرﺗ مﺟﺣ ﺎﻣ ..قارﻌﻟا حﻼﺳ [Iraq’s weapons. What is the size of tribes’ arsenal?], 17 July 2021, url 
756 Iraq, Ministry of Interior, ﺔﻗﻮﻣﺮﻤﻟا ﺔﻧﺎﻜﻤﻟا ﺎﮭﻟو ﻲﻋﺎﻤﺘﺟﻻا ﺞﯿﺴﻨﻟا  ﻦﻣ ءﺰﺟ ﺔﯿﻗاﺮﻌﻟا  ﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا نأ ﺪﻛﺆﯾ ﺔﯿﻠﺧاﺪﻟا ﺮﯾزو [Minister of Interior 
affirms that Iraqi tribes are part of the social fabric and have a high status], 12 November 2022, url  
757 Al-Awla, ىﻮﻨﯿﻧ ﺔﻈﻓﺎﺤﻣ ﻲﻓ ﻲﻧﺎﺜﻟا يﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا  ﺎھﺮﻤﺗﺆﻣ  ﺪﻘﻌﺗ ﺔﯿﻠﺧاﺪﻟا ةرازو ﻲﻓ ﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا نوﺆﺷ ﺔﯾﺮﯾﺪﻣ [Directorate of Tribal Affairs in the 
Ministry of Interior held its second tribal conference in the governorate of Ninewa], 20 October 2020, url  
758 Yaqin News, ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا تﺎﻋاﺰﻨﻟا  بﺎﺒﺳأ دﺪﺤﺗ ﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا نوﺆﺷ ﺔﯾﺮﯾﺪﻣ ..” ﺖﻠﻔﻨﻤﻟا حﻼﺴﻟا“ ﺎھزﺮﺑأ [Mainly “unregistered weapon”. 
Directorate of Tribal Affairs specifies the reasons of tribal disputes], 10 December 2020, url  
759 Mawazin News is an independent, neutral, and pro-democratic media outlet. Mawazin News, ﻦﺤﻧ ﻦﻣ [Who we 
are], n. d., url  
760 Mawazin News, دﻼﺒﻟا مﻮﻤﻋ ﻲﻓ ﺔﺌﻤﻟﺎﺑ 85 ﺔﺒﺴﻨﺑ ﺖﻀﻔﺨﻧا ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا  ﺔﻛﺪﻟا :ﺔﯿﻠﺧاﺪﻟا [Ministry of Interior: Tribal degge has decreased 
by 85% across the country], 14 July 2022, url  
761 Al-Jazeera, ؟قاﺮﻌﻟا بﻮﻨﺟ ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا تﺎﻋاﺰﻨﻟا ﻢﻗﺎﻔﺘﺗ اذﺎﻤﻟ [Why do tribal disputes in southern Iraq keep worsening?], 16 May 
2022, url  
762 Rudaw, 2022 ﻲﻓ حﻼﺳ ﺔﻌﻄﻗ ﻒﻟا  45 ﻦﻣ ﺮﺜﻛا ﻂﺒﺿو ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻋ  تﺎﻋاﺰﻧ 2403  ّﺾﻓ ..قاﺮﻌﻟا [Iraq.Resolution of 2403 tribal disputes 
and seizure of more than 45 000 weapons in 2022], 4 January 2023, url  

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

committees to resolve tribal disputes were created in Thi-Qar763 and Basrah.764 In Maysan, a 
committee affiliated with the Ministry of Interior announced the resolution of 800 tribal 
disputes, some of which started more than 30 years ago.765 In Thi-Qar, and according to the 
Commander of the Sumer Operations of the Iraqi Army cited in Al-Mada,766 the security 
situation is stable, but there are still tribal disputes and criminal activities under control.767 

Regardless of the state’s efforts to put an end to tribal violence, sources reported that degge 
still happens in Iraq, and that including it under the Anti-Terrorism Law and the few sentences 
handed down to people accused of conducting it did not have a deterrence effect.768 A report 
published by the New Arab in April 2022 stated that the attempts of the Iraqi government to 
solve the issue of tribal violence in central and southern Iraq, which included the creation of 
official committees to settle disputes among rival tribes, failed in many cases.769 According to 
security sources cited by Noon Post in July 2021, 74 tribal disputes and 234 degge incidents 
were documented in 2020-2021, with the highest numbers registered in Al-Basrah 
governorate.770  

Additionally, a source observed that all the laws currently in place did not deter tribal 
practices, and that it remains at the discretion of judges to determine the graveness of the 
tribal degge practice on a case-by-case basis. Some sentences, therefore, were handed down 
under the Anti-Terrorism Law of 2005, while others under Article 430 and the subsequent 
Articles of the Iraqi Penal Code.771 According to Genat, the Iraqi army randomly arrested a big 
number of people on charge of a degge, but due to corruption, those arrests did not 
necessarily lead to conviction.772  

Tribes challenge the Iraqi state’s ability to maintain control over its full territory.773 The arsenals 
of weapons possessed by Iraqi tribes, especially in the southern cities and Baghdad, pose a 
‘unresolved threat to the state’s monopoly on the use of force’ and successive governments 
have failed to disarm the tribes.774 The Iraqi law permits the possession of weapons by several 
segments of the Iraqi society including tribal leaders with the endorsement of the Tribal Affairs 

 تﺎﻋاﺰﻨﻟا

763 Mawazin News, ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا  تﺎﻋاﺰﻨﻟا ﻞﺤﻟ ﺔﻨﺠﻟ  ﻞﻜﺸﺗ رﺎﻗ يذ ..ةﺮﻄﺸﻟا ثاﺪﺣا ﺪﻌﺑ [Following the incidents of Al-Shatra... Thi-Qar 
creates a committee to resolve tribal disputes], 20 April 2022, url; Earth News,    ﻞﺤﻟ ﺔﻨﺠﻟ ﻞﯿﻜﺸﺗ ﺪﻛﺆﯾ  رﺎﻗ يذ ﻆﻓﺎﺤﻣ ﺐﺋﺎﻧ
ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا
 [Deputy Thi-Qar Governor affirms the creation of a tribal dispute resolution committee], 20 April 
2022, url  
764 Iraq, Al-Basrah Governorate, ﻦﯿﻨطاﻮﻤﻟا ﻦﯿﺑ نﻮﻧﺎﻘﻟاو ﻦﻣﻷا ضﺮﻓ ﻲﻓ ﺮﯿﺒﻛ رود ﺎﮭﻟ نﻮﻜﯿﺳ ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا  تﺎﻋاﺰﻨﻟا  ﻞﺣ ﺔﻨﺠﻟ :يﺮﺋاﺰﺠﻟا [Al-
Jazaeri: The tribal dispute resolution committee will play a major role in enforcing security and law among citizens], 
24 February 2019, url  
765 K24, Iraq interior ministry announces end of 800 tribal feuds in Maysan, 17 August 2022, url  
766 An Iraqi independent newspaper. Al-Mada, ﻦﺤﻧ ﻦﻣ [Who we are], n. d., url  
767 Al-Mada Paper, ﺖﻠﻔﻨﻤﻟا  حﻼﺴﻟا  ﺔﻌﺑﺎﺘﻣ راﺮﻤﺘﺳاو ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا تﺎﻋاﺰﻨﻠﻟ ضﺎﻔﺨﻧا  :رﺎﻗ يذ [Thi-Qar: Decrease in tribal disputes and 
ongoing follow-up on unregistered weapon], 27 March 2022, url  
768 Arab Weekly (The), Tribal feuds pushing many Iraqis to leave Basra, 29 June 2019, url; Genat, M., video 
interview, 4 October 2022; Al-Arab News, 
the tribe’s authority], 2 May 2021, url 
769 New Arab (The), تﻠﻔﺗﻣﻟا حﻼﺳﻠﻟ ﺔﯾﻠﺋﺎﺻﻔﻟاو ﺔﯾﺳﺎﯾﺳﻟا ﺔﯾﺎﻣﺣﻟﺎﺑ ءاوﻘﺗﺳا :قارﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ رﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا تﺎﻛﺎﺑﺗﺷا [Clashes of tribes in Iraq: Drawing 
strength from politics and militias to protect incontrollable weapons], 22 April 2022, url 
770 Noon Post, ؟رﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا ﺔﻧﺎﺳرﺗ مﺟﺣ ﺎﻣ ..قارﻌﻟا حﻼﺳ [Iraq’s weapons. What is the size of tribes’ arsenal?], 17 July 2021, url 
771 Independent Arabia, ﺎﮭﯿﻓ ﻦﯿﻠﻣﺎﻌﻟا و ﺎﮭﺗﺎﻧﺎﯿﻛ دﺪﮭﺗ و قاﺮﻌﻟا  ﻲﻓ ﺔﻟوﺪﻟا ﻢﻜﺤﺗ ةﺮﯿﺸﻌﻟا [The clan dominates the state in Iraq and 
threatens its entities and public servants], 13 September 2021, url 
772 Genat, M., video interview, Teams, 4 October 2022 
773 BTI, BTI 2022 – Iraq, 2022, url, p. 6 
774 BTI, BTI 2022 – Iraq, 2022, url, p. 8 

 [The life of Iraqi youth is controlled by 

ﺔﻣﻮﻜﺤﻣ

ةﺮﯿﺸﻌﻟا

بﺎﺒﺸﻟا

قاﺮﻌﻟا

ﺔﻄﻠﺴﺑ

ةﺎﯿﺣ 

 ﻲﻓ

90 

 
 
 
  
 
  
IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

Directorate of the Ministry of Interior.775 Each family is allowed to possess one light weapon as 
long as it is registered with the authorities. However, due to tribal customs, Iraqis sometimes 
keep many weapons at their homes, and some tribes, according to an academic cited in the 
Independent Arabia report, possess a lot of weapons and ammunition that are used in tribal 
disputes.776 Such weapons can range from light weapons to short-range missiles.777 An Iraqi 
tribal leader cited by the New Arab stated that most of the weapons that the tribes possess 
are registered and owned by members of the ISF and the PMF,778 especially since most 
fighters of armed factions also have tribal affiliation.779  

The Iraqi government attempted to ban parties and tribes from carrying weapons and to 
control the proliferation of weapons in the country in 2020780 and conducted operations to 
seize unlicensed weapons  in the governorates of Al-Basrah, Maysan, Al-Muthanna and Thi-
Qar, as well as tribal areas in Baghdad.781 In April 2022, the Iraqi Army units carried out an 
operation in Thi-Qar governorate in the wake of tribal armed disputes in which rocket-
propelled grenades (RPG), mortar shells and grenades were used. The clashes resulted in the 
death and injury of around 20 Iraqis, including a highly ranked officer of the Iraqi Army. A 
curfew was imposed by the army in order to contain the situation. Those disputes, according 
to the source, fall in a long series of tribal disputes that highlight the state’s inability deal with 
the issue of unregistered weapons that the tribes possess.782 Moreover, according to a 
spokesperson of the Ministry of Interior cited by Rudaw, more than 45 000 weapons were 
seized in 2022.783 

However, according to BTI, ‘[a]ll seven successive cabinets have failed to disarm the clans and 
tribes’.784 According to an article by the New Arab dated April 2022, citing a security source, 
the reason behind the deterioration of the security situation in southern Iraq related to tribal 
feuds is the protection of the tribal arsenal provided by political parties and armed actors. The 
source added that the state is apprehensive of approaching the issue of tribes’ weapons 
which impacts the state’s ability to resolve the issue.785 A prominent government official from  
Al-Nasiriya, cited in the New Arab article, stated that most of those involved in ‘current and 
previous’ tribal disputes were protected by PMF factions and that the government’s attempts 

775 Iraq, Supreme Judicial Council, ةزﺎﺟإ ﻼﺑ ﮫﺗزﺎﯾﺣ تﺎﺑوﻘﻋو ..حﻼﺳﻟا  لﻣﺣﺑ ﺔﻟوﺧﻣﻟا تﺎﺋﻔﻟا نوﺿرﻌﺗﺳﯾ ةﺎﺿﻗ [Judges discuss the 
categories entitled to carry weapons. As well as the punishments of weapon possession without permit], 17 
February 2021, url 
776 Independent Arabia, ﺎﮭﯿﻓ ﻦﯿﻠﻣﺎﻌﻟا و ﺎﮭﺗﺎﻧﺎﯿﻛ دﺪﮭﺗ و قاﺮﻌﻟا  ﻲﻓ ﺔﻟوﺪﻟا ﻢﻜﺤﺗ ةﺮﯿﺸﻌﻟا [The clan dominates the state in Iraq and 
threatens its entities and public servants], 13 September 2021, url 
777 BTI, Iraq Country Report 2022, 2022, url, p. 8; Noon Post, ؟رﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا ﺔﻧﺎﺳرﺗ مﺟﺣ ﺎﻣ  ..قارﻌﻟا  حﻼﺳ [Iraq’s weapons. What is 
the size of tribes’ arsenal?], 17 July 2021, url 
778 New Arab (The), قارﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ ﻲﻠھﻷا مﻠﺳﻟا  ﻖﻠﻘﺗ ﺔﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا تﺎﻋازﻧﻟا [Tribal disputes disturb civil peace in Iraq], 15 January 2022, 
url 
779 Noon Post, ؟رﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا ﺔﻧﺎﺳرﺗ مﺟﺣ ﺎﻣ ..قارﻌﻟا حﻼﺳ [Iraq’s weapons. What is the size of tribes’ arsenal?], 17 July 2021, url 
780 AA, Iraq bans parties, tribes from carrying weapons: Arms and weapons are widespread in Iraq, especially in 
hands of Iranian-backed militant groups, 15 July 2020, url 
781 Diyaruna, Southern Iraq tribes back crackdown on unlicensed weapons, 22 September 2020, url 
782 New Arab (The), تﻠﻔﺗﻣﻟا حﻼﺳﻠﻟ ﺔﯾﻠﺋﺎﺻﻔﻟاو ﺔﯾﺳﺎﯾﺳﻟا ﺔﯾﺎﻣﺣﻟﺎﺑ ءاوﻘﺗﺳا :قارﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ رﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا تﺎﻛﺎﺑﺗﺷا [Clashes of tribes in Iraq: Drawing 
strength from politics and militias to protect incontrollable weapons], 22 April 2022, url; Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Senior 
Iraqi Intelligence Officer Killed during Tribal Dispute in Dhi Qar, 21 April 2021, url  
783 Rudaw, 2022 ﻲﻓ حﻼﺳ ﺔﻌﻄﻗ ﻒﻟا  45 ﻦﻣ ﺮﺜﻛا ﻂﺒﺿو ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻋ  تﺎﻋاﺰﻧ 2403  ّﺾﻓ ..قاﺮﻌﻟا [Iraq. Resolution of 2403 tribal disputes 
and seizure of more than 45 000 weapons in 2022], 4 January 2023, url 
784 BTI, Iraq Country Report 2022, 2022, url, p. 8 
785 New Arab (The), تﻠﻔﺗﻣﻟا حﻼﺳﻠﻟ ﺔﯾﻠﺋﺎﺻﻔﻟاو ﺔﯾﺳﺎﯾﺳﻟا ﺔﯾﺎﻣﺣﻟﺎﺑ ءاوﻘﺗﺳا :قارﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ رﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا تﺎﻛﺎﺑﺗﺷا [Clashes of tribes in Iraq: Drawing 
strength from politics and militias to protect incontrollable weapons], 22 April 2022, url 

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

to address the issue of unregistered weapons that the tribes possess by custom are 
ineffective and are done just to save face.786 

According to Genat, in the southern governorates, especially Al-Basrah, the army is the main 
interlocutor with the tribes,787 while according to Bobseine, the ISF may be the main 
interlocutor with tribes in other areas.788 Whenever an incident of tribal violence occurs, the 
army intervenes and arrests people randomly as a way to pressure the involved tribes to put 
an end to the feud.789 The Iraqi Army occasionally played a mediatory role between conflicting 
tribes to resolve a dispute.790 Tribes may communicate their promise to settle the dispute so 
that the army does not intervene. When a sulh is achieved, the army is generally satisfied with 
the outcome and does not intervene. Tribes especially in the south know how to 
instrumentalise the state justice and they file hundreds of complaints and counter-complaints 
to the courts. The more the feud escalates, the more complaints are lodged. This shows that 
the tribes do not operate outside the scope of the state, and that the two systems are 
intrinsically interconnected.791 

UNHCR observed that Iraqi law enforcement personnel, due to their affiliation with tribes, ‘are 
said to be reluctant to interfere in tribal conflicts as their involvement may risk further 
escalating the situation’.792 Law enforcement agents in Iraq are often harassed and threatened 
by tribesmen when on duty,793 and their actions can trigger the tribal practice of gouwama 
when for instance a policeman asks a person to show their identity document or ask to check 
their car.794 Moreover, AFP and Arab News cited examples of police officers who were forced 
to attend tribal sulha and to pay a fasl following decisions they took to enforce the law.795 The 
New Arab, citing the Commander of Thi-Qar Operations of the Iraqi Army, also stated that 
members of the Iraqi security forces face threats of death and attacks on their homes by 
tribesmen if they intervene in disputes. The source added that this sometimes renders the 
security forces reluctant to enforce the law.796 

Al-Ibrahimi stated that the Iraqi State lacks both the capacity and the will to resolve the issue 
of tribal feuds: The government lacks the tools, the capacity and the know-how, and at the 
same time there is also pragmatically enough evidence to suggest that there is no willingness 
to resolve the situation since there has been no resolution for the last two decades. The 
propositions by peace building organisations to resolve the issue receive no response.797 

786 New Arab (The), تﻠﻔﺗﻣﻟا حﻼﺳﻠﻟ ﺔﯾﻠﺋﺎﺻﻔﻟاو ﺔﯾﺳﺎﯾﺳﻟا ﺔﯾﺎﻣﺣﻟﺎﺑ ءاوﻘﺗﺳا :قارﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ رﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا تﺎﻛﺎﺑﺗﺷا [Clashes of tribes in Iraq: Drawing 
strength from politics and militias to protect incontrollable weapons], 22 April 2022, url 
787 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022 
788 Bobseine, H., comments during external expert review of the report, 03 April 2023 
789 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022 
790 Rudaw, Senior Iraqi officer killed while mediating tribal dispute in Dhi Qar, 20 April 2022, url 
791 Genat, M., video interview, 4 October 2022 
792 UNHCR, Tribal Conflict Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, available at: url, p. 4 
793 AFP, "قاﺮﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ ﻦﻣﻷا ضﺮﻓ ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا  تاءﺎﻤﺘﻧﻻا  ﻞﻗﺮﻌﺗ ﺎﻣﺪﻨﻋ :"ﻚﻣﺎﻤﻋ ﺮّﻀﺣ [“Prepare your uncles”: when tribal affiliation hinders 
law enforcement in Iraq], 23 September 2017, url  
794 Sky Press, "ﺔﯾﻧﻣﻻا ﺎﮭﺗزﮭﺟاو ﺔﻟودﻟا ددﮭﯾ  رطﺧ .."ﺔﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا ﺔﻣاوﻛﻟا [“Tribal Kuwama”. A danger that threatens the state and its 
security apparatus], 12 June 2017, url 
795 AFP, "قاﺮﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ ﻦﻣﻷا ضﺮﻓ ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا  تاءﺎﻤﺘﻧﻻا  ﻞﻗﺮﻌﺗ ﺎﻣﺪﻨﻋ :"ﻚﻣﺎﻤﻋ ﺮّﻀﺣ [“Prepare your uncles”: when tribal affiliation hinders 
law enforcement in Iraq], 23 September 2017, url; Al-Arab News, ةﺮﯿﺸﻌﻟا ﺔﻄﻠﺴﺑ ﺔﻣﻮﻜﺤﻣ  قاﺮﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ بﺎﺒﺸﻟا ةﺎﯿﺣ [The life of Iraqi 
youth is controlled by the tribe’s authority], 2 May 2021, url 
796 New Arab (The), قارﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ ﻲﻠھﻷا مﻠﺳﻟا  ﻖﻠﻘﺗ ﺔﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا تﺎﻋازﻧﻟا [Tribal disputes disturb civil peace in Iraq], 15 January 2022, 
url 
797 Al-Ibrahimi, H., video interview, 3 November 2022 

92 

 
IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

93 

 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Annex 1: Bibliography 

Oral sources, including anonymous sources 

Al-Ibrahimi, H., video interview with EUAA, 3 November 2022. The CEO of Peace 
Paradigms with expertise on peacebuilding tribal reconciliation. Peace Paradigms is a 
private consulting company based in Iraq that provides context-specific solutions 
related to conflict mitigation and prevention. 

Al-Obaidi, B., video interview with EUAA, 3 November 2023. Dr. Bushra Al-Obaidi is an 
Assistant Professor in international criminal law. She started working in the field of 
women’s rights in 1997 as a chair of the woman and child committee of the Iraqi 
Human Rights Association and since 2003 she has been active in lobbying for 
women’s rights in Iraq. She is currently a member of UNAMI’s advisory group 
specialising on women in legislation and policies. She is a former member of the Iraqi 
High Commission for Human Rights and of the Higher Committee for Community 
Coexistence and Peace. 

Al-Samaraie, N., video interview with EUAA, 27 October 2022. Nasir Al-Samaraie is an 
expert on tribalism, tribal mechanisms and tribal law in Iraq. 

Bobseine, H., Comments made during the review report and incorporated to fill 
information gaps. Haley Bobseine is described in the acknowledgments section. 

Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights, Correspondence with EUAA, 16 March 2023. Iraq 
researcher who conducts monitoring on violations of international humanitarian law in 
Iraq, and promotes access to remedies and mechanisms to deal with rights violations. 

Genat, M., video interview with EUAA, 4 October 2022. Melisande Genat is a PhD 
student at Stanford University with extensive experience researching tribal justice and 
conflict resolution mechanisms in Iraq. 

Human Rights Watch, interview with EUAA, 13 March 2023. Iraq researcher for Human 
Rights Watch, who conducts field research and monitors human rights developments 
in the country.  

OWFI (Organization of Women’s Freedom in Iraq), interview with EUAA, 16 March 
2023. OWFI is a women’s civil society organisation that works directly with women 
fleeing gender-based violence in Iraq and whose projects include lobbying for legal 
reform to protect women’s rights. 

Public sources 

AA, Iraq bans parties, tribes from carrying weapons: Arms and weapons are 
widespread in Iraq, especially in hands of Iranian-backed militant groups, 15 July 

94 

IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

2020, Iraq bans parties, tribes from carrying weapons (aa.com.tr), accessed 17 October 
2022 

 ﻲﻓ

رﺎﺒﻧﻻا

 ﻲﻠﺒﻘﻟا

ﺔﻈﻓﺎﺤﻣ

Abd, A. M., 
Structure of the Tribe and the Changes Incurred to It: Anthropological Research on the 
tribal system in Al-Anbar governorate] in: Al-Adab Journal, Issue 101, 2012, 
https://www.iasj.net/iasj/download/ea05ee73b6d13b1c, accessed 1 March 2023 

ﻲﺟﻮﻟﻮﺑوﺮﺜﻧا

تاﺮﯿﻐﺘﻟاو

 [The 

 تأﺮط

مﺎﻈﻨﻟا

ﺔﻠﯿﺒﻘﻟا

 ﺚﺤﺑ

ﺎﮭﯿﻠﻋ

 ﻦﻋ 

 ﻲﺘﻟا

ﺔﯿﻨﺑ

Abdoush, R., “The art of marriage” or the veiled rape practiced against tribal women in 
Syria and Iraq, April 30, 2022, https://medfeminiswiya.net/2022/04/30/the-art-of-
marriage-or-the-veiled-rape-practiced-against-tribal-women-in-syria-and-iraq/?lang=en, 
accessed 24 November 2022 

ACLED Codebook, n.d., https://www.acleddata.com/wp-
content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2017/10/ACLED_Codebook_2019FINAL_pbl.pdf, 
accessed 5 November 2022  

ACLED Data Export Tool, 1 October 2021 – 31 October 2022, 9 November 2022, 
https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Facleddata.com%
2Fdata-export-
tool%2F&data=04%7C01%7C%7C226bee20deaa4cf7d7a508d9a9c09c52%7Cd19e42
43f4804af5889971f10798d806%7C0%7C0%7C637727466975354271%7CUnknown%7
CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXV
CI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=%2F2Q7wX00cQL36p1FfoUarYuQnsZ%2F11oisu5zwT2
HpBw%3D&reserved=0, accessed 9 November 2022 

ACLED, About Acled, n.d., https://acleddata.com/about-acled/, accessed 5 November 
2022 

ACLED, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Guide for Media Users, 
January 2015, https://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/ACLED_User-
Guide-for-Media_2015.pdf, accessed 5 November 2022 

AFP, In Iraq, bloody tribal custom now classed as ‘terrorism’, Arab News, 18 November 
2018, In Iraq, bloody tribal custom now classed as ‘terrorism’ | Arab News, accessed 15 
November 2022 

 :"

 ﻲﻓ

ﻦﻣﻷا

ﺎﻣﺪﻨﻋ

ﻞﻗﺮﻌﺗ

ﺮّﻀﺣ

قاﺮﻌﻟا

 ضﺮﻓ

ﻚﻣﺎﻤﻋ

ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا

تاءﺎﻤﺘﻧﻻا

 [“Prepare your uncles”: 

AFP, "
when tribal affiliation hinders law enforcement in Iraq], 23 September 2017, 
https://www.swissinfo.ch/ara/afp/-%D8%AD%D8%B6-%D8%B1-
%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%83---
%D8%B9%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%A7-
%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B1%D9%82%D9%84-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%A1%D8%A7%D8
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نﻮﻧﺎﻘﻟا

ةﻮﮭﻨﻟا

حاﺮﻓأ

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اذﺎﻤﻟ

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؟قاﺮﻌﻟا

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ﺖﻠﻔﻨﻤﻟا

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ا تﺎﻋاﺰﻨﻟا ﻞﺣ ﺔﻨﺠﻟ :يﺮﺋاﺰﺠﻟا
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ﺔﻧﺎﻜﻤﻟا

ﺞﯿﺴﻨﻟا
Iraq, Ministry of Interior, 
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ﻲﻋﺎﻤﺘﺟﻻا

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ﺔﯿﻗاﺮﻌﻟا

ﺔﯿﻠﺧاﺪﻟا

ﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا

ﺮﯾزو

ﺎﮭﻟو 

ﺪﻛﺆﯾ

 نأ

Iraq, Supreme Judicial Council, 
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نﺎﺳﯾﻣ ﻲﻓ ﺔﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا ﺔﮔدﻟا بﺎﻛﺗرﺈﺑ نادﻣ ﻖﺣﺑ ﺔﻧﺳ (

 [(15) years 

)۱٥

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IRAQ: ARAB TRIBES AND CUSTOMARY LAW 

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ھ ﻰﻠﻋ ضﺑﻘﻟﺎﺑ ارﻣأ

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 رودﺻو "ﺔﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا

20 

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 نادﻣ نﺟﺳﺑ ﻲﺿﻘﺗ نﺎﺳﯾﻣ تﺎﯾﺎﻧﺟ

ﺔﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا ﺔﻛد"ـﻟا ﮫﺑﺎﻛﺗرﻻ ﺔﻧﺳ

15 

" 

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ءﺎﺒطأ

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 [Following the incidents 

 ..يذ رﺎﻗ

تﺎﻋاﺰﻨﻟا

ةﺮﻄﺸﻟا

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ﻞﻜﺸﺗ

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ﻲﺧرﺻﻟا دوﻣ

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ةدﺎﻋإ

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ءﺎﻤﻋز

ﻞﯿﮭﺴﺘﻟ

ﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا

ﺔﯿﻗاﺮﻌﻟا

ﺔﻣﻮﻜﺤﻟا

ﻦﯿﺣزﺎﻨﻟا

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  مﻠﺳﻟا ﻖﻠﻘﺗ ﺔﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا تﺎﻋازﻧﻟا

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of tribes in Iraq: Drawing strength from politics and militias to protect incontrollable 

105 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

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يرﺋﺎﺷﻌﻟا رﺄﺛﻟا" ءﺎطﻏ تﺣﺗ نﯾﯾﻧدﻣﻟا نﺎﻛﺳﻟا فادﮭﺗﺳا تﺎﯾﻠﻣﻋ لﺻاوﺗ ﺔﺣﻠﺳﻣ تﺎ

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ﯾﺷﯾﻠﻣ :قارﻌﻟا

" 

قارﻌﻟا طﺳوو بوﻧﺟ ندﻣ ﻲﻓ نﻣﻷا ﻖھرﺗو ﻲﻌﻣﺗﺟﻣﻟا

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ﻓ

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ﺎﺳﯾﻣ رﺋﺎﺷﻋ

ﺔﯾرﺎﻧﻟا ﺔﺣ

Ultra Iraq, 
Facebook: a tribal battle with fire arms], 27 September 2019,  ﻰﻠﻋ تارﻮﺸﻨﻣ ﺐﺒﺴﺑ"كﻮﺒﺴﯿﻓ": 
ﺔﯾرﺎﻨﻟا ﺔﺤﻠﺳﻷﺎﺑ ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻋ ﺔﻛﺮﻌﻣ (ultrasawt.com), accessed 20 October 2022 

ﻠﺳﻷﺎﺑ ﺔﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻋ ﺔﻛرﻌﻣ :"كوﺑﺳﯾﻓ" ﻰﻠﻋ تاروﺷﻧﻣ بﺑﺳﺑ

 [Because of a post on 

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Ultra Iraq, ﻲﻧوﯾزﻔﻠﺗ ءﺎﻘﻟ بﺑﺳﺑ ﺎﮭﺧوﯾﺷ دﺣأ درطﺗ نﺎﻣﯾﻠﺳﻟا ﻲﻠﻋ ةرﯾﺷﻋ [Ali Sulaiman’s clan expels one 
of its sheikhs for a televised interview], 28 April 2022,  ﺎﮭﺧﻮﯿﺷ ﺪﺣأ دﺮﻄﺗ نﺎﻤﯿﻠﺴﻟا ﻲﻠﻋ ةﺮﯿﺸﻋ
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Ultra Iraq, ادﻧﻟوھ ﻲﻓ هذﺎﺗﺳأو ﻲﻗارﻋ بﻟﺎط نﯾﺑ "ﺔﯾرﺋﺎﺷﻋ ﺔﻣاوَﻛ" ﺔﺻﻗ [the story of a tribal gouwama 
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"ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻋ ﺔﻣاﻮَﻛ" اﺪﻨﻟﻮھ ﻲﻓ هذﺎﺘﺳأو ﻲﻗاﺮﻋ ﺐﻟﺎط ﻦﯿﺑ (ultrasawt.com), accessed 30 October 2022 

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March 2023 

UNDP, Pathways to Reintegration: IRAQ Families Formerly Associated with ISIL, 
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Weissleder, W. (ed.), The Nomadic Alternative: Modes and Models of Interaction in the 
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تﺎﻋاﺰﻨﻟا

ﺔﯾﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا

Yaqin News, 
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 [Mainly 

ﺮﺋﺎﺸﻌﻟا

ﺖﻠﻔﻨﻤﻟا

 بﺎﺒﺳأ

ﺎھزﺮﺑأ

حﻼﺴﻟا

ﺔﯾﺮﯾﺪﻣ

نوﺆﺷ

دﺪﺤﺗ

”  ..

 “

110 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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Yassine, D., Iraqi women: Resisting oppression in an afflicted country, January 16, 
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threaten the civility of Iraqi State], 29 March 2022, و فاﺮﻋأ"ﺔﻗﺰﺗﺮﻣ خﻮﯿﺷ"   ﺔﻟوﺪﻟا ﺔﯿﻧﺪﻣ نودﺪﮭﯾ
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Zaman, A., From Tribe to Nation: Iraqi Kurdistan on the Cusp of Statehood, Wilson 
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ibe_to_nation_final.pdf, accessed 16 March 2023 

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Annex 2: Terms of Reference 

Tribalism in Iraq   

•  Background of tribalism in the Iraqi society; the prevalence of tribalism 

and the role of tribes in the Iraqi society; structure of tribes.  

Tribal disputes and tribal conflict resolution mechanisms and practices  

•  Causes of tribal disputes and the different tribal mechanism triggered by 
such disputes: e.g., notification, confrontation, truce, sulha, fasl, and 
blood feuds; expulsion from the tribe (the mechanism, documents 
issues, publicity of expulsion); the practice of hadr al-dam (spilling one’s 
blood); the capacity of tribes to enforce the outcome of tribal conflict 
resolution mechanisms; – the treatment of issues related to honour.  

Tribal law and Iraqi formal law  

• 

Information on tribal law in Iraq and its prevalence; types of conflicts 
resolved by tribal law; the death penalty under tribal law.   

•  The interaction between tribal and state law in Iraq  
•  Representation of tribes in the Iraqi state institution.  

Tribal disputes  

•  Prevalence of tribal violence in Iraq and the Iraqi state’s ability to 

respond to tribal feuds  

•  ACLED data on tribal violence.  

Tribes and the issue of perceived ISIL affiliation and returnees:  

•  Requirements for return of IDPs, support, if any and the nature of 

support provided by the tribes to returnees  

•  The issue of the return of persons perceived to be affiliated with ISIL; the 

role of tribes in facilitating/blocking return.   

Treatment of converts, specific aspects of children and women under tribal law and 
practices  

•  The issue of renouncing Islam under tribal law and the treatment of 

converts/apostates by the tribe.  

•  Tribal affiliation of children; liability as regards actions committed by 

children.  

•  The treatment of women under tribal law and practices: honour-related 
issues and tribal practices specific to women; tribal affiliation of women; 
treatment of divorced women; male guardianship in Iraq.  

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