European Parliament resolution of 19 April 2023 on the challenges facing the Republic of Moldova (2023/2595(RSP))
Date: 2023-04-19
Institutions: European Parliament
Subjects: Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, accession to the European Union, common foreign and security policy, military occupation, national sovereignty, political situation, self-sufficiency in energy, territorial law








C_202300447EN.000101.fmx.xml












Official Journal of the European Union


EN
Series C













C/2023/447


1.12.2023






P9_TA(2023)0112
Challenges facing the Republic of Moldova
European Parliament resolution of 19 April 2023 on the challenges facing the Republic of Moldova (2023/2595(RSP))
(C/2023/447)



The European Parliament,






—


having regard to its previous resolutions on the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Russia,










—


having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part (1), which includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area and which fully entered into force on 1 July 2016,










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having regard to the Republic of Moldova’s application for EU membership of 3 March 2022, and the European Council’s consequent granting of candidate status on 23 June 2022 based on a positive assessment by the Commission and in line with the views expressed by Parliament,










—


having regard to the Commission opinion of 17 June 2022 on the Republic of Moldova’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2022)0406), the Council conclusions of 24 June 2022 on the membership applications of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, the Commission analytical report of 1 February 2023 on Moldova’s alignment with the EU acquis (SWD(2023)0032), and the Commission Association Implementation Report on the Republic of Moldova of 6 February 2023 (SWD(2023)0041),










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having regard to the European Council conclusions of 23 March 2023,










—


having regard to the joint statement following the 7th EU-Moldova Association Council of 7 February 2023 and to the final statement of the 13th EU-Moldova Parliamentary Association Committee of 23 March 2023,










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having regard to the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe,










—


having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,










A.


whereas the Republic of Moldova has condemned Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine since the beginning and has supported the territorial integrity of Ukraine; whereas the Republic of Moldova has been disproportionally affected by the war, having had to cope with an influx of over 700 000 Ukrainian refugees — proportionately more than any other country — with over 100 000 of them still remaining in the country, while the Moldovan economy has been severely affected by lost trade, a decrease in foreign investment, and increased energy and transport prices; whereas the Russian Federation, in cooperation with domestic Russian-sponsored actors, has galvanised and utilised the resultant economic uncertainty to delegitimise and foster opposition to the Moldovan Government’s pro-European policies;










B.


whereas Russia has used its gas exports as a tool to pressure the Moldovan Government, including on its pro-European orientation, by artificially creating a gas supply crisis in 2021 and 2022; whereas Russia’s weaponisation of energy has further exposed the fragility of the Moldovan energy sector, while the country’s connections to the EU gas and electricity markets and mechanisms have helped it to overcome the crisis; whereas high energy prices led to inflation rising to 30 %, and Moldova’s economic output fell by 5,9 % year-on-year in real terms in 2022; whereas although the Republic of Moldova has diversified its natural gas supplies away from Russia, its electricity supply remains largely dependent on the Russian-owned Cuciurgan power station in the Transnistrian region;










C.


whereas in the early 1990s, Russia was a direct participant in the Transnistria War against the Moldovan state and since then has continued to sponsor the de facto occupied region of Transnistria, where to this day it illegally maintains an estimated 1 500 Russian troops; whereas on 22 June 2018, the UN General Assembly urged the Russian Federation to complete, unconditionally and without further delay, the orderly withdrawal of its forces and armaments from the territory of the Republic of Moldova; whereas the Cobasna depot, located within the Transnistrian region near the Ukraine-Moldova border, contains approximately 22 000 tonnes of Soviet-era ammunition and military equipment guarded by the Operational Group of Russian Forces; whereas, in spite of commitments made in 1999 and again in 2021, the Russian Federation has failed to ensure the full destruction of these weapons and the withdrawal of its illegally stationed troops;










D.


whereas on 21 February 2023, the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, revoked his decree of 7 May 2012 on measures to implement the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, which, among other things, committed Russia to seeking ways to resolve the separatist issue ‘based on respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and neutral status of the Republic of Moldova in determining the special status of Transnistria’;










E.


whereas the Russian Federation has been using provocation, disinformation, cyberattacks and other hybrid means to undermine the stability and sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova; whereas in recent years, the Republic of Moldova has been dealing with an increase in disinformation from Russian and pro-Russian sources and media outlets; whereas Russia’s subversive activities in the Moldovan information space also seek to undermine widespread popular support for temporarily displaced Ukrainians and for the European Union, tie down Ukrainian forces on the southern border, and foster destabilisation; whereas other active measures envisaged by Russia include establishing and promoting front organisations disguised as NGOs and ‘cultural centres’, establishing strong pro-Russian political and societal constituencies, returning the Republic of Moldova to a state of dependency on Russian hydrocarbons, and taking steps that could result in armed escalation in the occupied Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova; whereas Russian officials have repeatedly and falsely claimed that the Russian-speaking population in the Republic of Moldova is oppressed;










F.


whereas Russian missiles targeting Ukraine have flown over the Republic of Moldova’s territory on several occasions, in clear violation of Moldova’s sovereignty, and on several occasions Russian missile debris has fallen on Moldovan territory, causing damage and endangering the lives of civilians; whereas Moldova’s air surveillance and defence is in urgent need of investment and modernisation and the Moldovan Government has asked its Western partners for air-defence systems;










G.


whereas on 9 February 2023, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy informed the European Council that Ukraine had intercepted a Russian secret service plan to destroy the democratic system in the Republic of Moldova and establish control over the country; whereas this was later confirmed by the President of the Republic of Moldova, Maia Sandu, who declared that the country had received intelligence that suggested that Russia was plotting to violently overthrow the country’s pro-European leadership;










H.


whereas Russia is using internal, pro-Russian oligarchs and political forces, such as the Șor party, to destabilise the political situation in the country; whereas the Șor Party has reportedly actively recruited, arranged logistics for, and abused citizens’ vulnerable economic position by providing financial incentives to attend anti-government protests since August 2022; whereas the leader of the Șor party, Ilan Șor, fled the Republic of Moldova in 2019 after being convicted of money laundering and embezzlement in a bank fraud scandal that resulted in the equivalent of USD 1 billion being siphoned away from Moldova’s banking system; whereas on 13 April 2023 the Chisinau Court of Appeal sentenced Ilan Șor to 15 years in prison on corruption charges in the bank fraud case; whereas Moldovan prosecutors are seeking his extradition from Israel and have also prosecuted his party for receiving illegal financing;










I.


whereas the Moldovan Government has called on the EU to impose sanctions on fugitive oligarch Ilan Șor whom it accuses of helping Russia wage a hybrid war against the government in Chișinău by spreading social unrest; whereas oligarchs Ilan Șor and Vladimir Plahotniuc have been sanctioned by the United States and the United Kingdom for their involvement in the USD 1 billion bank fraud and other illicit schemes;










J.


whereas the Republic of Moldova’s democracy has demonstrated its resilience in the face of Russian disinformation and propaganda during the recent government reshuffle despite increased Russian and Russian-sponsored subversive activity; whereas despite all these attempts at destabilisation, the Moldovan people and leadership remained determined to follow the pro-European path they have chosen;










K.


whereas the Republic of Moldova submitted its application to join the EU on 3 March 2022, attesting to the determination of the Moldovan authorities and its citizens to advance Moldova’s European integration; whereas the Republic of Moldova is now a candidate country for EU membership;










L.


whereas the Government of the Republic of Moldova has embarked on an ambitious political, judicial and institutional reform process and has demonstrated its determination to fulfil the nine steps identified in the Commission opinion to meet the conditions set for the opening of accession negotiations; whereas the Moldovan Government’s implementation of existing agreements demonstrates its commitment to closer cooperation with and integration into the Union; whereas EU accession remains a merit-based process conditional upon the fulfilment of established criteria and conditions;










M.


whereas the Republic of Moldova is a close and valued partner of the EU and EU-Moldova relations have intensified over the past year, based on a mutual commitment to strengthen their political association and deepen their economic integration; whereas the Council conclusions of 13 December 2022 on the enlargement and stabilisation and association process put the emphasis on further deepening the EU’s sectoral cooperation with Moldova and its integration into the EU single market; whereas the EU and its Member States have provided significant political, economic and humanitarian support to the Republic of Moldova, and have been actively engaged in promoting the rule of law, democracy and reforms in the country; whereas the European Council conclusions of 23 March 2023 reaffirmed the EU’s determination to continue providing all relevant support to the Republic of Moldova and tasked the Commission with presenting a support package ahead of its next meeting; whereas an ambitious and comprehensive support package is essential both for countering destabilising activities by external actors and for sustaining the country’s accession path;










N.


whereas the Union has provided the Republic of Moldova with EUR 1,09 billion in loans and grants since October 2021 to strengthen its resilience, including budget support, macro-financial assistance, humanitarian aid and assistance under the Union Civil Protection Mechanism and the Moldova Support Platform; whereas the second instalment of the EUR 105 million in macro-financial assistance pledged in November 2022 has still not been disbursed; whereas the Council adopted assistance measures worth EUR 7 million in 2021 and EUR 40 million in 2022 in further non-lethal military assistance under the European Peace Facility (EPF); whereas the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) supports Moldova’s and Ukraine’s efforts to effectively manage their common border;










O.


whereas the Republic of Moldova will host the next European Political Community summit in Chișinău, demonstrating its ambitious and resolute pro-European stance;










P.


whereas the Republic of Moldova overcame the substantial logistical blockages at its border with Ukraine by deploying additional specialised border guard staff;













1.


Stands in solidarity with the people of the Republic of Moldova during this difficult period and reiterates its unwavering support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova; strongly condemns Russia’s repeated attempts to destabilise the Republic of Moldova, its government and society, which has included the use of hybrid means, the weaponisation of energy supplies, the repeated violations of its airspace, disinformation campaigns and staged protests, as well as the threat of the use of force; calls on the Russian authorities to respect the Republic of Moldova’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, to cease its provocations and attempts to destabilise the country, to withdraw its military forces from the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova, to ensure the safe evacuation or full destruction of all ammunition and equipment in the Cobasna depot under international oversight and to support a peaceful and sustainable resolution of the Transnistrian conflict, in line with the principles of international law and within the Republic of Moldova’s internationally recognised borders;












2.


Calls for the EU and its Member States to closely monitor the situation in the Republic of Moldova, and to take action to counter the Russian Federation’s use of hybrid means; calls for the EU to step up its support to the Republic of Moldova, including by providing more technical resources, financial assistance and expertise in combating disinformation, cyberattacks and other hybrid attacks; calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to improve strategic communication about the EU in the Republic of Moldova; calls on the Commission and the Member States to continue supporting the independence of the media in the Republic of Moldova, as well as the efforts to increase society-wide media literacy and critical analysis skills in order to improve the population’s ability to detect disinformation;












3.


Welcomes the leadership and political courage of President Maia Sandu, as well as the determination and responsibility with which the Moldovan authorities have managed to uncover and counteract the Russian-backed attempts to destabilise the government; calls on the Council, the Commission and the EEAS to thoroughly assess the existing support measures, taking into account the increased security risks for the Republic of Moldova and the need to strengthen the resilience of Moldova’s state institutions, armed forces and society against external attempts at destabilisation and provocation; welcomes the Swedish Presidency’s proposal to establish a civilian mission in Moldova under the common security and defence policy (EU Partnership Mission in Moldova — EUPM Moldova) to provide support on countering disinformation, cyber and hybrid threats; calls on the Member States to establish and swiftly launch an ambitious EU common security and defence policy advisory civilian mission and therefore to prioritise the mission’s launch at the Foreign Affairs Council of 22 May 2023, and to properly staff and fund this mission;












4.


Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to further strengthen cooperation with the Republic of Moldova to enhance the country’s resilience to hybrid threats, including through the joint development of a strategy to safeguard the integrity and security environment of the 2023 local elections, the 2024 presidential elections and the 2025 parliamentary elections, to support the work of journalists and civil society organisations seeking to counter disinformation; calls on the Commission and the Moldovan authorities to strengthen strategic communications with the Moldovan population, including in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova; further calls on social media platforms to develop, adapt and implement specific online content moderation measures sensitive to the context of disinformation in the Republic of Moldova;












5.


Welcomes the Moldovan authorities’ clear condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and welcomes the government’s pledge to align with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia; calls on the Commission to assist Moldova in implementing these sanctions and to provide support to mitigate any negative consequences; commends Moldova’s continued solidarity with the people fleeing Ukraine on account of Russia’s war of aggression, and the recent decision to grant them temporary protection in line with the relevant EU legislation; calls on the Commission to continue delivering humanitarian support via the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, border management support via the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) and the relocated EUBAM, and support for the transfer of persons to EU Member States in the context of the Solidarity Platform; reiterates its call on the Commission and on the Moldovan authorities to take into account the special needs of the refugee children from Ukraine currently staying in Moldova and to set up support programmes for refugee women, in particular those in need of specialised support for victims of gender-based violence, and ensure access to sexual and reproductive health services;












6.


Emphasises the Republic of Moldova’s role as a regional security provider, in particular since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine; welcomes the increase in European Peace Facility support for the Republic of Moldova in 2022 to help modernise the Moldovan Armed Forces; calls on the Member States to increase the contributions that the Republic of Moldova receives from the European Peace Facility, through longer-term and predictable annual allocations, which, among other things, would allow Moldova to improve its air surveillance and air defence, and thereby also increase the EU’s security at its borders;












7.


Endorses the continued work under the High-Level Political and Security Dialogue between the EU and the Republic of Moldova to enhance cooperation on foreign and security policy, raise relevant issues of concern for regional security and stability and discuss possibilities for close coordination and effective assistance and support measures; expresses its appreciation for the Republic of Moldova’s participation in the EU Training Mission to Mali and its intention to contribute to the EU Training Mission in Somalia and EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as to step up cooperation on countering hybrid threats;












8.


Calls for the EU and its Member States to broaden the scope of the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime to include as a punishable offence acts of corruption that undermine a country’s security, stability, constitutional order and democratic institutions; calls for the EU and its Member States to establish immediate sanctions against those that attempt to destabilise the Republic of Moldova, undermine its security, stability and constitutional order or corrupt its political and economic institutions; calls for the EU, in this context, to sanction fugitive oligarchs Ilan Șor and Vladimir Plahotniuc personally and, where appropriate, to sanction their businesses and political organisations; calls on the respective hosting states and territories to extradite Ilan Șor and Vladimir Plahotniuc to stand trial in the Republic of Moldova;












9.


Reaffirms its commitment to the Republic of Moldova’s membership of the European Union; believes that it would represent a geostrategic investment in a united and strong Europe; recognises the government’s progress in terms of reforms and level of alignment with the EU acquis and encourages it to step up work towards the full and effective implementation of the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area; encourages EU and Member State leaders to continue to invest in political dialogue with the Republic of Moldova and also to visit the country, including as a way of showing the EU’s commitment to Moldova’s European future; calls on the Commission to attach clear, measurable and consistent criteria and benchmarks to the nine steps identified for the Republic of Moldova to advance towards EU membership;












10.


Welcomes the Moldovan authorities’ considerable efforts to advance the reform agenda and their determination to fulfil the nine steps identified in the Commission opinion, despite Russia’s pressure and the crises triggered by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; encourages the Republic of Moldova to continue resolutely with its reform agenda on democracy and the rule of law; encourages the government to work with all stakeholders on achieving a profound, sustainable and comprehensive justice and anti-corruption reform, in line with EU and Venice Commission recommendations; commends the decisive steps taken by the government to improve the functioning of the judiciary, including the progress achieved in the pre-vetting procedure for new members of the Superior Council of the Magistracy (SCM) and the Superior Council of Prosecutors; encourages all relevant actors, in particular the General Assembly of Judges, to ensure that the remaining positions on the SCM are filled swiftly and in accordance with the high standards set for the integrity of its members; welcomes the measures taken in the area of anti-corruption such as the implementation of the legislation on trial in absentia and the progress of the prosecution on a number of high-profile anti-corruption cases or those relating to the USD 1 billion bank fraud; calls on the Moldovan authorities to continue and further strengthen their efforts to fight corruption, in particular by clarifying the mandates of the country’s specialised anti-corruption institutions and by strengthening the effectiveness of the National Anticorruption Center and the National Integrity Authority; recalls the importance of establishing a credible track record of prosecutions and convictions for corruption on the basis of proactive and efficient investigations as a matter of the greatest priority;












11.


Encourages Moldova’s efforts to tackle organised and serious international and transnational crime; calls on the Commission to boost assistance to Moldovan law enforcement agencies to prevent these types of crime; welcomes the Republic of Moldova’s enhanced cooperation with the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL) and Frontex, and invites the Commission and the Council to strengthen the presence of these institutions in Moldova; welcomes the close cooperation in the framework of the EU Support Hub for Internal Security and Border Management in Moldova and calls for the strengthening of the EU Support Hub, including by appointing and maintaining contact points in the relevant EU institutions and by providing additional EU financial assistance for its operational activities; calls for the EU and its Member States to increase their support to Moldova’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and to improve cooperation with the Republic of Moldova on the exchange of classified information;












12.


Welcomes the Republic of Moldova’s commitment to increase its efforts to comply with the ‘de-oligarchisation’ requirement set out in the Commission opinion; welcomes the draft law on ‘de-oligarchisation’, the legislation on media ownership and the adoption of the new strategy on the management of state property, state enterprises and entities with state capital 2022-2030; urges the authorities, however, to address the Venice Commission’s recommendations to adopt a systemic approach to strengthening the institutions and legislation relating to monopoly prevention, competition policy, political parties, elections, taxation and fighting corruption and money laundering; calls on the European Commission to clarify the ‘de-oligarchisation’ process described in the nine steps;












13.


Reiterates its call for an innovative, complementary and flexible interaction between the implementation of the Association Agreement and the accession negotiation process, allowing for the Republic of Moldova’s gradual integration into the EU single market, based on a priority action plan and relevant sectoral programmes and providing access to relevant EU funds, enabling Moldovan citizens to reap the benefits of accession throughout the process rather than only at its completion;












14.


Underlines the importance of advancing the country’s reform process in order to improve the living standards of the population, especially of the more vulnerable population groups and those in the regions, and to provide younger generations with attractive prospects for life and work in the country; also recalls the need for Moldova to uphold its commitments to enhance gender equality and fight violence against women, as noted in the nine steps identified in the Commission opinion;












15.


Looks forward to the Republic of Moldova’s fulfilment of the nine steps identified in the Commission opinion and in the Commission’s assessment as part of the 2023 enlargement package; calls, in this context, on the Commission and the European Council to start EU accession negotiations by the end of 2023, upon the fulfilment of the nine steps;












16.


Calls for the EU and its Member States to support the Republic of Moldova’s integration by incorporating the country into EU programmes, instruments and agencies such as the EU single market programme, the Digital Europe programme, the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, the European Environment Agency, the Connecting Europe Facility, the European Defence Agency, the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC), DiscoverEU, the Employment and Social Innovation programme and others, as well as enhancing the Republic of Moldova’s participation in programmes it has already joined, such as Erasmus Mundus;












17.


Calls for the EU and its Member States to continue providing political, economic and humanitarian support to the Republic of Moldova, including through the Moldova Support Platform launched in 2022, and to promote the rule of law, democracy, and reforms in the country; calls for the EU and its Member States to step up financial and technical assistance to support a speedy and effective EU integration process for the Republic of Moldova and calls for financial assistance to the Republic of Moldova to be given in the form of direct budget support, in particular; calls for political briefings to be delivered to the Republic of Moldova before and after Council meetings, in line with the current practice for the Western Balkans countries;












18.


Acknowledges the importance of the EU’s comprehensive support package, which has mobilised over EUR 1,09 billion in loans and grants since October 2021 to strengthen Moldova’s resilience; welcomes the disbursement of a EUR 10 million grant by the Commission on 5 April 2023, as part of the second instalment of the ongoing macro-financial assistance (MFA) to the Republic of Moldova, worth EUR 150 million in total, which it expects to be fully disbursed without delay; expects that the payment of a further EUR 40 million in loans will follow at the beginning of May 2023; calls on the Commission to swiftly disburse the EUR 105 million in budgetary support announced in November 2022 in order to shore up Moldova’s macroeconomic and financial stabilisation efforts; welcomes the additional EUR 145 million increase in the MFA proposed by the Commission and confirms its readiness to support this measure; calls for the rapid adoption of the proposal in order to allow the funds to be disbursed over the course of 2023;












19.


Calls on the Commission to prepare the support package for the Republic of Moldova requested by the European Council on 23 March 2023 no later than the European Council meeting of 29 June 2023, in order to strengthen the country’s resilience, security, economy and energy supplies and to support its accession path towards the EU;












20.


Stresses the importance of providing the Republic of Moldova with access to EU pre-accession financial instruments as early as possible; calls on the Commission to present a proposal to revise the IPA III Regulation (2) accordingly as soon as feasible, including a proposal to sufficiently increase the overall IPA III budget; stresses the significance of ensuring synergies between EU programmes and additional resources provided by EU and international financial institutions, Member States and other donors;












21.


Welcomes the temporary liberalisation measures to support the Republic of Moldova’s economy by granting annual duty-free tariff-rate quotas to overcome the loss of its export markets in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine; calls for the EU to take swift and significant steps towards the permanent liberalisation of its tariff-rate quotas in order to ensure predictability and increase the country’s medium-to-long-term attractiveness for investors, as requested by the Moldovan Government; notes that, as agriculture is a key economic sector for the Republic of Moldova, the aforementioned measures should also be accompanied by support for the sustainability of Moldova’s agricultural production; calls for the EU, given the structure of the Republic of Moldova’s small economy and based on positive audit assessments, to also allow the import of additional Moldovan products of animal origin and to include Moldovan farmers in the compensation mechanism for producers affected by the market disruption stemming from the war in Ukraine;












22.


Condemns Russia’s continued energy blackmail and expresses its support for the Republic of Moldova’s efforts to increase its energy security by diversifying supply sources, reducing consumption and purchasing energy on the European market, developing interconnectivity infrastructure (e.g. the Isaccea-Vulcănești and Suceava-Bălți high-voltage power lines), as well as for Moldova’s protecting its citizens through a compensation plan for the most vulnerable groups via the Energy Vulnerability Fund; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue to support the Republic of Moldova on achieving energy independence, including by increasing its generating capacity, connectivity, diversification, attracting investment in renewable energy sources and energy efficiency, while ensuring environmental sustainability and striving towards carbon neutrality, in line with Moldova’s strategic priorities; urges the EU to use emergency funding to strengthen the connection of the Republic of Moldova to the EU’s electricity network and reduce the dependency on energy produced within the Transnistrian region; underlines the critical nature of EU and partner contributions in alleviating the impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine on Moldovan energy prices and calls for the provision of further assistance as needed; encourages Moldova to make full use of the joint gas purchasing mechanism through the EU Energy Platform to ensure its security of supply and access to affordable energy; calls for the EU institutions to assist the Republic of Moldova in this effort;












23.


Calls for the EU and its institutions to support the Republic of Moldova’s efforts to modernise its payment system in order to fulfil the conditions for integration into the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) and to take the necessary steps to reach the objective of abolishing roaming charges between the Republic of Moldova and the EU, starting with the extension of the ‘roam like at home’ regime to the Republic of Moldova;












24.


Welcomes the extension of the EU-Moldova Agreement on the Liberalisation of Road Freight Transport until 30 June 2024, which will allow Moldova to make full use of alternative export routes to support its economy; welcomes Moldova’s involvement in the work of the Transport Community and encourages further cooperation in order to pave the way for Moldova’s full membership of the Transport Community Treaty as well as the establishment of a Transport Community Representative office in Chișinău; calls on the Transport Community Secretariat to support the development of an action plan for the transposition of the EU transport acquis into national legislation;












25.


Calls for the EU to further support the rehabilitation of, and upgrades to, the rail infrastructure in the Republic of Moldova, as well as the port of Giurgiulești, as part of a solution for regional and global food-security concerns and as a way of supporting the economies of the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine;












26.


Welcomes the Republic of Moldova’s accession to the EU4Health programme and calls on the Commission to offer additional support to Moldova for the programme’s launch and implementation;












27.


Encourages the organisation of bilateral parliamentary meetings between the parliaments of the Member States and the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, as well as between the Commission and the Government of the Republic of Moldova, and recommends considering ways to bring forward the moment at which observers from the Republic of Moldova could take up their seats in the European Parliament, such as by linking it to the closing of negotiations on specific clusters; expresses its willingness to contribute to supporting and strengthening parliamentary democracy in the Republic of Moldova, including through the Jean Monnet Dialogue, when appropriate to its domestic context;












28.


Recalls that consolidating the Republic of Moldova’s administrative capacity is a key requirement set out in the Commission opinion of 17 June 2022; takes note of the impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine on the Republic of Moldova’s strained budget and administrative capacities; calls on the Moldovan authorities, in this regard, to continue their efforts to increase the quality and capacity of the public administration personnel working on EU accession; encourages the Commission to second EU officials to Moldovan ministries; calls on the Commission, given the Republic of Moldova’s challenges and status as an EU candidate country, to further increase its staff capacity dealing with and supporting the accession process for the Republic of Moldova, both in Brussels and in Chișinău, and to establish a dedicated unit for the Republic of Moldova within the Commission’s Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR);












29.


Stresses that cooperation with and the participation of civil society in decision-making processes will be the foundation of any successful implementation of the necessary reforms to bring the Republic of Moldova closer to the EU; calls for the EU institutions and the Member States to increase their support to civil society in the Republic of Moldova;












30.


Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the United Nations and the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Moldova and to the Russian Federation.






(1)  
            OJ L 260, 30.8.2014, p. 4.

(2)  Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III) (OJ L 330, 20.9.2021, p. 1).


ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/447/oj
ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)