Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Directive 2014/49/EU as regards the scope of deposit protection, use of deposit guarantee schemes funds, cross-border cooperation, and transparency
Date: 2023-04-18
Institutions: Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union, European Commission
Subjects: bank deposit, credit guarantee, credit institution, cross-border cooperation, financial control, financial legislation, financial transparency, management audit

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   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Strasbourg, 18.4.2023  COM(2023) 228 final 2023/0115 (COD)  Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Directive 2014/49/EU as regards the scope of deposit protection, use of deposit guarantee schemes funds, cross-border cooperation, and transparency (Text with EEA relevance) {SWD(2023) 225-226 final} - {SEC(2023) 230 final}  
 
 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 

1. 

CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 

Reasons for and objectives of the proposal 

• 
The  proposed  amendments  to  Directive  2014/49/EU1  (the  Deposit  Guarantee  Schemes 
Directive  or  DGSD)  are  part  of  the  crisis  management  and  deposit  insurance  (CMDI) 
legislative  package  that  includes  also  amendments  to  Directive  2014/59/EU2  (the  Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive or BRRD) and Regulation (EU) No 806/20143 (the Single 
Resolution Mechanism Regulation or SRMR).  

The  EU  crisis  management  framework  is  well-established,  however,  previous  episodes  of 
bank failures have shown that there is need for improvements. The aim of the CMDI reform is 
to  build  on  the  objectives  of  the  crisis  management  framework  and  to  ensure  a  more 
consistent approach to resolution, so that any bank in crisis can exit the market in an orderly 
manner,  while  preserving  financial  stability,  taxpayer  money  and  ensuring  depositor 
confidence.  In  particular,  the  existing  resolution  framework  for  smaller  and  medium-sized 
banks  needs  to  be  strengthened  with  respect  to  its  design,  implementation  and,  most 
importantly,  incentives  for  its  application,  so  that  it  can  be  more  credibly  applied  to  those 
banks.  Moreover,  the  depositor  protection  framework  should  be  improved  to  ensure  a 
coherent  application  of  rules  and  a  better  level  playing  field,  while  protecting  financial 
stability, enhancing depositors’ confidence and preventing contagion.  

Context of the proposal 

In  the  aftermath  of  the  global  financial  and  sovereign  debt  crises,  the  EU  took  decisive 
actions, in line with international calls for reform, to create a safer financial sector for the EU 
single market. This included providing the tools and powers to handle the failure of any bank 
in  an  orderly  manner,  while  preserving  financial  stability,  public  finances  and  depositor 
protection. The Banking Union was created in 2014 and is currently made up of two pillars: a 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). However, 
the  Banking  Union  is  still  incomplete  and  is  missing  its  third  pillar:  a  European  deposit 
insurance  scheme  (EDIS)4.  The  Commission’s  proposal  adopted  on  24 November  2015  to 
establish EDIS5 is still pending. 

The Banking Union is supported by a Single Rulebook which, in what concerns the CMDI, is 
made up of three EU legal acts adopted in 2014: the BRRD, the SRMR and the DGSD. The 
BRRD  defines  the  powers,  rules  and  procedures  for  the  recovery  and  resolution  of  banks, 

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Directive  2014/49/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  16  April  2014  on  deposit 
guarantee schemes (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 149–178). 
Directive  2014/59/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  15 May  2014  establishing  a 
framework  for  the  recovery  and  resolution  of  credit  institutions  and  investment  firms  and  amending 
Council  Directive  82/891/EEC,  and  Directives  2001/24/EC,  2002/47/EC,  2004/25/EC,  2005/56/EC, 
2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) 
No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190). 
Regulation  (EU)  No  806/2014  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  15  July  2014 
establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain 
investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and 
amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ L 225, 30.7.2014, p. 1). 
Furthermore, there is still no agreement on a credible and robust mechanism for providing liquidity in 
resolution in the Banking Union, in line with the standard set by international peers. 
COM/2015/0586 final. 

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including cross-border cooperation arrangements to tackle cross-border banking failures. The 
SRMR creates the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and 
defines  powers,  rules  and  procedures  for  the  resolution  of  the  entities  established  in  the 
Banking  Union,  in  the  context  of  the  Single  Resolution  Mechanism.  The  DGSD  ensures  the 
protection of depositors and sets-out the rules for the use of DGS funds. The BRRD and the 
DGSD apply in all Member States while the SRMR applies in Member States participating in 
the Banking Union. 

The 2019 banking package, also  known as the ‘risk  reduction package’, revised the  BRRD, 
the  SRMR,  the  Capital  Requirements  Regulation  (CRR6)  and  the  Capital  Requirements 
Directive  (CRD7).  These  revisions  included  measures  delivering  on  the  EU’s  commitments 
made in international fora8 and took further steps towards completing the Banking Union by 
providing credible risk reduction measures to mitigate threats to financial stability. 

In November 2020, the Eurogroup agreed on the creation and early introduction of a common 
backstop to the SRF by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)9.  

The  crisis  management  and  deposit  insurance  (CMDI)  reform  and  the  broader 

implications for the Banking Union 

Together with the CMDI reform, a complete Banking Union, including its third pillar, EDIS, 
would  offer  a  higher  level  of  financial  protection  and  confidence  to  EU’s  households  and 
businesses, increase trust and strengthen financial stability as necessary conditions for growth, 
prosperity and resilience in the Economic and Monetary Union and in the EU more generally. 
The Capital Markets Union complements the Banking Union as both initiatives are essential 
to finance the twin transitions (digital and green), step up the international role of the euro and 
strengthen  the  EU’s  open  strategic  autonomy  and  its  competitiveness  in  a  changing  world, 
particularly considering the current challenging economic and geopolitical environment10, 11. 
In June 2022, the Eurogroup did not agree to a more comprehensive work plan to complete 
the  Banking  Union  by  including  EDIS.  Instead,  the  Eurogroup  invited  the  Commission  to 
table  more  targeted  legislative  proposals  for  reforming  the  EU  framework  for  bank  crisis 
management and national deposit insurance12.  

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Regulation  (EU)  No  575/2013  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  26  June  2013  on 
prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 
648/2012 (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1–337). 
Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the 
activity  of  credit  institutions  and  the  prudential  supervision  of  credit  institutions,  amending  Directive 
2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338–436). 
The  Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision  and  the  Financial  Stability  Board  (FSB).  Financial 
Stability  Board  (2014  updated  version),  Key  Attributes  of  effective  resolution  regimes  for  financial 
institutions  and  (2015),  Principles  on  Loss-absorbing  and  Recapitalisation  Capacity  of  Globally 
Systemically  Important  Banks  (G-SIBs)  in  Resolution,  Total  Loss-absorbing  Capacity  (TLAC)  Term 
Sheet. 
Eurogroup  (30  November  2020),  Statement  of  the  Eurogroup  in  inclusive  format  on  the  ESM  reform 
and the early introduction of the backstop to the Single Resolution Fund. The implementation will take 
place  over  2022-2024.  However,  the  Agreement  Amending  the  Treaty  Establishing  the  European 
Stability Mechanism is still pending ratification. 
European Commission (2020), Commission Work Programme 2021, section 2.3, p. 5.  
European Commission (2023), Long-term competitiveness of the EU: looking beyond 2030. 
Eurogroup (16 June 2022), Eurogroup statement on the future of the Banking Union. 

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In parallel, the European Parliament, in its 2021 annual report on  the Banking Union13, also 
stressed  the  importance  of  completing  it  with  the  establishment  of  EDIS  and  supported  the 
Commission in putting forward a legislative proposal on the CMDI review. While EDIS was 
not explicitly endorsed by the Eurogroup, it would make the CMDI reform more robust and 
would  deliver  synergies  and  efficiency  gains  for  the  industry.  Such  a  legislative  package 
would be part of the  agenda for completing the  Banking Union, as  emphasised in  President 
von  der  Leyen’s  Political  Guidelines,  which  also  recalled  the  importance  of  EDIS,  and  as 
regularly supported by leaders14. 

The objectives of the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive (DGSD) 

The DGSD harmonised the deposit protection mechanisms across the EU. Deposit protection 
is  key  to  improve  depositors’  confidence,  strengthen  the  financial  stability  of  the  banking 
system  and safeguard the functioning of the single market.  To that end, at  least  one deposit 
guarantee scheme (DGS) was set up in every Member State to ensure fast reimbursement of 
depositors in the event of bank failures (payout) and a harmonised level of protection was set 
at EUR 100 000. Importantly, DGSs also play a role in banks’ crisis management. They can 
contribute  to  resolution  or  finance  other  measures,  thus  preserving  depositors’  access  to 
covered deposits. 

Reasons for the proposal 

In  line  with  the  mandate  under  Article  19(6)  DGSD,  the  Commission  conducted  a 
comprehensive  evaluation  on  how  the  DGSD  performed.  Its  conclusion  confirmed  that  the 
DGSD’s  main  components,  particularly  the  standard  coverage  level  of  EUR  100  000  per 
depositor  per  bank,  the  minimum  target  level  for  DGS  funding,  and  the  short  timelines  for 
depositor payout, overall, generated positive benefits for depositors.  

However, practical experience in applying this framework has shown that there are areas for 
improvement.  These  areas  concern  the  scope  of  depositor  protection,  the  divergent 
interpretation of conditions for the use of DGS funds for interventions outside the payout of 
covered deposits, the operational effectiveness and efficiency in the way DGSs work, broad 
national discretions and options and a need for improved coordination between resolution and 
deposit insurance safety nets. 

As  an  integral  part  of  the  Commission’s  CMDI  legislative  review,  the  DGSD  proposal  is 
largely  based  on  the  preparatory  work  and  on  the  recommendations  developed  by  the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) in its five opinions15 on the application of the DGSD and 
takes  into  account  instances  where  its  practical  application  failed  to  achieve  some  of  its 
important objectives or achieved them only partially.  

Summary of the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive (DGSD) amendments as part of 

the crisis management and deposit insurance (CMDI) reform 

The DGSD proposal covers a range of policy aspects and constitutes a coherent response to 
the identified problems. It therefore aims to: 

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European Parliament (2022), Banking Union – annual report 2021; the European Parliament has issued 
a report on the Banking Union every year starting 2015. 
Euro Summit Meeting (24 March 2023), Statement of the Euro Summit, meeting in inclusive format.  
See the section 3 on collection and use of expertise. 

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(1) 

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(4) 

(5) 

clarify  the  scope  of  depositor  protection  by  addressing  identified  discrepancies  to 
offer EU depositors a harmonised and robust level of protection; 

harmonise the least cost test for all types of DGS interventions outside the payout of 
covered  deposits  in  insolvency,  to  improve  the  level  playing  field  and  ensure 
consistency of outcomes when managing bank failures; 

improve  the  functioning  of  DGSs  by  simplifying  administrative  procedures,  while 
improving the transparency of their financial robustness and use of funds;  

increase the convergence in DGS practices and among authorities; and 

improve  cross-border  cooperation  between  DGSs  in  reimbursing  depositors  located 
in other EU Member States, or in case of change of DGS affiliation by banks. 

• 

Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area 

The  proposal  builds  on  and  strengthens  the  existing  deposit  insurance  framework  set  out  in 
the  DGSD.  To  that  end,  many  elements  of  the  proposal  follow  the  work  undertaken  by  the 
EBA, in cooperation with national DGSs and designated authorities. It proposes amendments 
to reflect the practical experience gained from the national transposition of EU law and from 
the  application  of  some  provisions,  including  in  the  context  of  the  Banking  Union.  The 
proposal  is  initiated in  parallel  with  the  reviews  of  the  BRRD  and  the  SRMR  to  ensure  the 
overall consistency of the EU bank crisis management framework.  

• 

Consistency with other Union policies 

The proposal builds on the reforms carried out in the aftermath of the financial crisis that led 
to the creation of the Banking Union and the single rulebook for all EU banks. 

By strengthening depositor confidence and financial stability, the proposal contributes to the 
resilience of the EU banking sector and its ability to support economic recovery following the 
COVID-19  pandemic,  in  line  with  the  political  objectives  of  the  European  open  strategic 
autonomy. More specifically, the proposal also improves consumer protection by harmonising 
the level and period of protection of specific retail deposits that are short-term and contingent 
on specific life events (‘temporary high balances’) or by strengthening information disclosure 
to consumers. 

In addition, to mitigate the risk that DGSs reimburse depositors involved in money laundering 
and terrorist financing (ML/TF) activities, the amendments build on Directive (EU) 2015/849 
on anti-money laundering and take into account the direction proposed in the Commission’s 
legislative  package  on  the  EU  anti-money  laundering/countering  the  financing  of  terrorism 
(AML/CFT) regime, adopted on 20 July 2021.  

To strengthen the enforceability of the DGSD rules, the amendments refer to the supervisory 
powers  laid  down  in  Directive  2013/36/EU  (Capital  Requirements  Directive  or  CRD).  This 
approach  enshrines  the  notion  that  compliance  with  DGS  requirements  is  a  first-order 
requirement  for  all  banks  and  provides  ground  for  the  sequencing  of  events  to  discipline  a 
bank that would fail to fulfil such obligations.  

The amendments also harmonise and clarify the rules applicable to preventive and alternative 
measures  financed  by  DGS  funds.  These  rules  must  be  appreciated  in  connection  with  the 

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already  existing  requirements  on  State  aid  for  financial  establishments  set  out  in  the 
Commission’s Banking Communication16. 

The amendments also add clarity to the protection of client funds held by non-bank financial 
institutions in a bank in line with the requirements for segregating client funds as set out in the 
Payment  Services  Directive17,  the  E-money  Directive  and  Commission  Delegated  Directive 
(EU)  2017/59318.  In  view  of  rapid  developments  in  innovative  financial  services,  the 
clarification  aims  at  building  clients’  trust  in  non-bank  financial  institutions  and  in  their 
business continuity if a bank failure occurs. 

2. 

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LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY 

Legal basis 

The proposal amends an existing directive, the DGSD, in particular as regards the improved 
application of the tools that are already available in the deposit protection framework.  

Consequently,  the  legal  basis  for  the  proposal  is  the  same  as  the  legal  basis  of  the  original 
legislative act, namely Article 53(1) of the TFEU on the right of establishment, the same legal 
basis as the directive being amended. According to EU case law19, where a legislative act is 
designed merely as a supplement or a correction of another legislative act, without altering its 
original goal, the EU legislature is fully entitled to base the latter act on the legal basis of the 
first act.  

• 

Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence)  

The amendments to the DGSD comply with the subsidiarity principle. National rules cannot 
achieve a harmonised level of depositors’ protection and a uniform set of rules on funding and 
functioning of DGSs. EU action is therefore needed to ensure a level playing field across the 
EU and avoid undue competitive advantages among financial institutions linked to divergent 
rules on deposits protection. The EBA also underlined this in its opinions on the review of the 
DGSD. 

Moreover, the establishment of banks and the provision of banking services, including deposit 
taking, can be conducted cross-border. The cross-border nature of banking systems can create 
many challenges for DGSs (changes of DGS affiliation of a bank, record keeping of clients or 
cross-border cooperation), which create a need for EU intervention. 

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Communication  from  the  Commission  on  the  application,  from  1 August  2013,  of  State  aid  rules  to 
support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis (‘Banking Communication’) 
Text with EEA relevance; OJ C 216, 30.7.2013, p. 1–15. 
Directive  (EU)  2015/2366  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  25 November  2015  on 
payment  services  in  the  internal  market,  amending  Directives  2002/65/EC,  2009/110/EC  and 
2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC (Text with EEA 
relevance); OJ L 337, 23.12.2015, p. 35–127. 
Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593 of 7 April 2016 supplementing Directive 2014/65/EU 
of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to safeguarding of financial instruments and 
funds belonging to clients, product governance obligations and the rules applicable to the provision or 
reception of fees, commissions or any monetary or non-monetary benefits (Text with EEA relevance); 
OJ L 87, 31.3.2017, p. 500–517. 
See judgment of 21 June 2018, Poland v Parliament and Council, C-5/16, EU:C:2018:483, p. 49, p. 69 
and case-law cited. 

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Most of the amendments in the proposal update existing EU law, and, as such, concern areas 
where the EU has already exercised its powers. Several actions in the proposal introduce an 
additional  degree  of  harmonisation  to  consistently  achieve  the  objectives  defined  by  the 
DGSD. 

• 

Proportionality 

The  amendments  are  proportionate  to  what  is  necessary  to  achieve  the  objectives  of  the 
DGSD.  

The  amendments  establish  common  requirements  to  improve  and  harmonise  the  level  of 
depositor protection within the EU. However, the proposal does not govern the organisational 
models,  legal  structure  or  internal  governance  of  EU  DGSs.  Therefore,  the  established  EU 
deposit insurance set-up relies on, and will continue relying on, a network of national DGSs, 
organised  in  line  with  different  models  (public  DGS,  private  DGS,  institutional  protection 
schemes  (IPS))  and  types  of  relationships  between  the  DGS  designated  authority  and  the 
resolution authority (under a same umbrella entity or in distinct institutions). 

Moreover, the proposal confers considerable powers to national authorities, starting with the 
execution  of  the  least  cost  test  that  determines  the  cost-efficiency  in  the  use  of  DGS  funds. 
Most topics covered by the proposal (on common level of temporary high balances, protection 
of  client  funds,  protection  of  public  authorities)  relate  to  areas  where  EU  Member  States 
explicitly asked for an EU-wide standard in order to provide more legal certainty in protecting 
depositors.  The  mandates  for  the  EBA  provided  for  under  the  proposal  (through  guidelines 
and  standards)  are  limited  to  the  most  technical  DGSD  topics  for  which  a  more  detailed 
explanation of requirements is needed. 

The  proposal  also  maintains  existing  provisions  that  recognise  national  specificities  and 
ensure  a  proportionate  application  of  the  DGSD  rules,  e.g.  through  the  choice  of  national 
options,  the  possibility  for  certain  Member  States  to  apply  a  lower  target  level  or  for  IPS 
members to benefit from reduced contributions. 

• 

Choice of the instrument 

It is proposed that the measures be implemented by amending the DGSD through a directive. 
The proposed measures refer to or further develop already existing provisions incorporated in 
this  legal  instrument.  As  deposit  insurance  is  closely  linked  to  non-harmonised  areas  of 
national law, such as insolvency law, transposition is necessary to best integrate the proposed 
provisions into national law.  

3. 

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RESULTS 
CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS 

EVALUATIONS, 

EX POST 

OF 

STAKEHOLDER 

Ex post evaluations/fitness checks of existing legislation 

The CMDI framework was designed to avert and manage the failure of institutions of any size 
or  business  model.  It  was  developed  with  the  objectives  of  maintaining  financial  stability, 
protecting  depositors,  minimising  the  use  of  public  support,  limiting  moral  hazard,  and 
improving the internal  market  for financial services. The evaluation  concluded that, overall, 
the CMDI framework should be improved in certain respects. 

In  particular,  the  evaluation  shows  that  legal  certainty  and  predictability  in  managing  bank 
failures  remain  insufficient.  The  decision  of  public  authorities  on  whether  to  resort  to 
resolution  or  insolvency  may  differ  considerably  across  Member  States.  In  addition,  safety 

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nets  financed  by  the  industry  are  not  always  effective  and  divergent  access  conditions  to 
funding  in  resolution  and  outside  resolution  persist.  These  affect  incentives  and  create 
opportunities for arbitrage when decisions are made on what crisis management tool to use. 
Finally,  depositor  protection  remains  uneven  and  inconsistent  across  Member  States  in  a 
number of areas. 

• 

Stakeholder consultations 

The Commission conducted extensive exchanges through different consultation tools to reach 
out to all stakeholders involved, in order to better understand how the framework performed 
as well as the possible scope for improvements. 

In 2020, the Commission launched a consultation on a combined inception impact assessment 
and a roadmap aimed at providing a detailed analysis of actions to be taken at EU level and 
the potential impact of different policy options on the economy, society and the environment. 

In 2021, the Commission launched two consultations: a targeted and a public consultation to 
seek stakeholder feedback on how the CMDI framework was  applied and views on possible 
modifications.  The  targeted  consultation,  comprising  39  general  and  specific  technical 
questions,  was  available  in  English  only  and  open  from  26 January  to  20 April  2021.  The 
public consultation consisted of 10 general questions, available in  all EU languages and ran 
over  the  feedback  period  from  25 February  to  20 May  2021.  A  report  summarising  the 
feedback to this consultation was published on 07 July 202120. The consultations showed that 
most  respondents  considered  that  deposits  of  public,  including  local  authorities,  should  also 
be  protected  by  the  DGS.  Most  banks  and  DGSs  considered  that  the  current  regular 
that  no  changes  were  needed.  Digital 
information  disclosure  was  sufficient  and 
communication was often considered as the most suitable means to save costs. 

In  addition,  the  Commission  hosted  a  high-level  conference  on  18 March  2021  gathering 
representatives from all relevant stakeholders. The conference confirmed the importance of an 
effective framework but also highlighted the current weaknesses. Panellists at the conference 
noted  that  the  DGSD  framework  would  benefit  from  further  harmonisation  and  a  better 
interplay with the rules set out in the Anti-money laundering directive (AMLD), the Payment 
services directive and State aid rules. Also, consumer confidence and trust should be reflected 
in the DGSD review as well as the situation in smaller markets. 

Commission staff have also repeatedly consulted Member States on the EU implementation of 
the  CMDI  framework  and  on  possible  revisions  of  the  BRRD/SRMR  and  DGSD  in  the 
context of the Commission Expert Group on Banking, Payments and Insurance. In parallel to 
the discussions in the Expert Group, the issues addressed in this proposal were also covered in 
meetings of the Council’s preparatory bodies, namely the Council Working Party on Financial 
Services and the Banking Union and the High-Level Working Group on EDIS. 

Furthermore,  during  the  preparatory  phase  of  the  legislation,  Commission  staff  also  held 
numerous  meetings  (physical  and  virtual)  with  representatives  of  the  banking  industry  and 
with other stakeholders. 

The  results  of  all  the  above-mentioned  initiatives  have  fed  into  the  preparation  of  this 
proposal and the accompanying impact assessment. They have provided clear evidence of the 
need to update and complete the current rules to best achieve the objectives of the framework. 

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European  Commission  (2021),  Consultation  Banking  Union  –  review  of  the  bank  crisis  management 
and deposit insurance framework.  

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Annex  2  of  the  impact  assessment  provides  the  summaries  of  these  consultations  and  the 
public conference. 

• 

Collection and use of expertise 

To support its  work on the DGSD review, the Commission  issued a comprehensive  call for 
advice to the EBA21.The EBA responded by submitting five opinions. The first opinion on the 
eligibility of deposits, coverage level and cooperation between deposit guarantee schemes was 
submitted  in  August  201922.  The  second  opinion  on  deposit  guarantee  scheme  payouts  was 
submitted in October 201923. The third opinion on deposit guarantee scheme funding and uses 
of  deposit  guarantee  scheme  funds  was  submitted  in  January  202024.  The  fourth  opinion on 
the treatment of client funds was submitted in October 202125. Additionally, the Commission 
took  into  account  the  2020  EBA’s  opinion  on  the  interplay  between  the  EU  Anti-money 
laundering directive and the EU Deposit  guarantee schemes directive26 and the 2021 EBA’s 
biennial opinion on risks of money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF) affecting the 
EU's financial sector27. 

Furthermore, the Commission  contracted the Centre for European Policy  Studies (CEPS) to 
provide two reports on deposit insurance, entitled ’Harmonising insolvency laws in the Euro 
area’28  and  ’Options  and  national  discretions  under  the  DGSD’29,  that  were  published 
respectively in December 2016 and November 2019.  

In  addition  to  consulting  stakeholders,  the  Commission  participated  in  discussions  and 
exchange of views informing the work of the EBA’s task force on deposit guarantee schemes 
and the Expert Group on Banking, Payments and Insurance. 

• 

Impact assessment30 

This proposal shares its impact assessment (IA) with the proposals reviewing the BRRD and 
the SRMR, which takes into account the feedback received from stakeholders and the need to 
address various interconnected issues spanning over three different legal texts. Annex 6 of the 
IA  describes  the  issues  around  the  current  functioning  of  the  DGS,  sets  out  the  possible 
scenarios  for  its  improvement  and  justifies  the  policy  options  retained  in  the  proposed 
amendments. It concludes that the DGSD has been broadly effective in improving the level of 
depositor  protection  across  the  EU.  However,  the  application  of  the  DGSD  safeguards 
remains uneven among national DGSs, highlighting the need for harmonised rules to address 

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EBA (October 2021), Call for advice regarding funding in resolution and insolvency 
EBA (August 2019), Opinion of the EBA on the eligibility of deposits, coverage level and cooperation 
between deposit guarantee schemes 
EBA (October 2019) Opinion of the EBA on deposit guarantee scheme payouts. 
EBA  (January  2020),  Opinion  of  the  EBA  on  deposit  guarantee  scheme  funding  and  uses  of  deposit 
guarantee funds. 
EBA (October 2021), Opinion of the EBA on the treatment of client funds under the DGSD. 
EBA (December 2021), Opinion of the EBA on the interplay between the EU Anti-Money Laundering 
Directive and the EU Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive.  
EBA (March 2021), Opinion of the EBA on the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing 
affecting the EU’s financial sector. 
CEPS  (December  2016),  Harmonising  insolvency  laws  in  the  Euro  area.  https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-
publications/harmonising-insolvency-laws-euro-area-rationale-stocktaking-and-challenges/ 
CEPS (November 2019), Options and national discretions under the DGSD and their treatment in the 
context of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme.  
Please  see  references  to  SWD(2023)226  (summary  sheet  of  the  IA)  and  SEC(2023)230  (the  positive 
opinion of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board). 

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divergences that have adverse impacts on depositors. It also highlights the need to clarify the 
coverage for certain types of depositors. 

All  policy  options  take  into  account  the  EBA’s  suggestions  and  the  subsequent  feedback 
received  from  Member  States’  experts  in  the  Commission’s Expert  Group on  Banking, 
Payments and Insurance as well as, where available, other analytical evidence. 

The IA highlighted that the assessed policy options would improve the application of deposit 
insurance across Member States and enhance legal certainty and depositor confidence. They 
would adequately adapt depositor protection to the recent evolutions and vulnerabilities of the 
financial  ecosystem  through  specific  provisions  targeted  towards  cross-border  activities, 
fintech services and anti-money laundering. They would also facilitate the use of DGS funds 
outside  of  the  payout  of  covered  deposits  through  a  revised  least  cost  test  when  such 
interventions ensure the access of depositors to their deposits in a more cost effective way. 

However,  by  explicitly  including  certain  types  of  depositors  and  deposits  in  the  scope  of 
coverage  (public  authorities,  client  funds)  and  further  harmonising  some  rules  (minimum 
level of coverage for temporary high balances, removal of the possibility to deduct liabilities 
of depositors that have fallen due from the repayable amount), these amendments could have 
an impact– albeit limited – on the costs for DGSs. Likewise, the changes to the least cost test 
for the use of DGS for interventions other than for payout could also have a financial impact 
on DGSs. These costs would  be borne by the banking industry through contributions  to  the 
DGS and would not affect taxpayers in line with the principle of public money protection laid 
down in the DGSD. 

The  IA  also  confirmed  that  the  EU  DGS  framework  would  be  more  resilient  if  backed  by 
EDIS.  Pooling  funds  into  a  shared  scheme  would  strengthen  the  ability  of  the  deposit 
insurance  system  in  the  Banking  Union  to  cope  with  high-value  payouts  and  enhance 
depositor  confidence.  Although  the  policy  option  to  set  up  an  EDIS  is  technically  the  most 
robust option, it is not politically feasible at this stage. 

The  Regulatory  Scrutiny  Board  endorsed  the  impact  assessment  following  a  first  negative 
opinion. To address the comments raised by the Board in relation to the DGS functioning, the 
impact assessment has been amended to better clarify the links between the EBA advice and 
the options set out in the IA.  

• 

Regulatory fitness and simplification 

The  proposal  should  help  to  reduce  the  DGS’s  regulatory  and  administrative  burden  by 
removing  certain  national  options and discretions, applying equal  treatment  of third country 
branches  and  strengthening  arrangements  for  cross-border  cooperation  between  DGSs.  By 
streamlining required disclosures and aligning them with what is necessary for the recipients, 
the amendments will alleviate the administrative work in implementing DGS requirements.  

As regards digital readiness, the proposal builds on the technological and legal advancements 
to ensure that depositor information is easily accessible, and that the payout process is as swift 
as possible. 

In  addition,  empowerments  for  the  EBA  will  allow  further  adjustments  to  improve  and 
harmonise even further the practical implementation of the DGSD provisions. 

Costs  for  banks  and  national  authorities  would  be  very  limited.  Each  of  the  depositor 
protection  enhancements  provided  for  under  the  DGSD  proposal  (temporary  high  balances, 

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client funds, public authorities) is expected to have a very marginal impact on DGS funds. For 
instance,  in  13  Member  States,  the  amount  of  client  funds  constitutes  less  than  1%  of  all 
covered  deposits  in  that  Member  State.  The  proposal  will  therefore  preserve  the 
competitiveness  of  the  EU  banking  sector  while  boosting  the  protection  offered  to  EU 
depositors.  Moreover,  the  potential  additional  costs  –  albeit  limited  –  arising  from  these 
improvements would be largely offset by the reduced costs for DGSs in performing their daily 
activities  under  the  reviewed  Directive.  Indeed,  by  reducing  the  number  of  options, 
simplifying the mechanisms in place for cross-border cooperation and establishing at EU level 
a  common  methodology  for  least  cost  test  completion,  the  proposal  will  free  up  DGS 
administrative resources.  

Due  to  an  increased  role  of  DGSs  in  crisis  management,  the  use  of  their  financial  means, 
which are collected from the banking sector, might require more frequent replenishments of 
their funds. However, in compliance with the least cost test, these measures are allowed only 
if  they  are  considered  as  less  costly  for  the  DGS  than  a  payout  scenario.  This  approach 
safeguards its financial resources in the long term. 

• 

Fundamental rights 

The  proposal  respects  the  fundamental  rights  and  observes  the  principles  recognised  by  the 
Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the  EU,  in  particular  the  freedom  to  conduct  a  business 
(Article 16), the right to property (Article 17) and consumer protection (Article 38). 

4. 

BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS 

The  proposal  has  no  impact  on  the  EU  budget.  The  proposal  would  require  the  EBA  to 
develop  seven  technical  standards  and  six  guidelines  in  addition  to  those  already  present  in 
the DGSD. Among these six new instructions for guidelines, three solely aim at codifying in 
level one text already existing guidelines (stress testing, delineation and reporting of available 
financial means, cooperation agreements), that were established on the EBA’s own initiative. 
Therefore,  these  guidelines  would  not  require  a  significant  additional  burden  of  work.  The 
other empowerments provided for under the proposal relate to various topics, covering both 
very  targeted  mandates  (principle  of  diversification  in  low-risk  assets)  and  broader  topics 
(least cost definition). 

Considering past and current work on crisis management at the EBA, it is considered that the 
proposed tasks for the EBA will not require additional positions and can be carried out with 
current resources. 

The  delivery  of  the  technical  standards  is  due  12  months  after  the  entry  into  force  of  the 
Directive. This  deadline  should provide sufficient time for the EBA to  develop  them taking 
into account its current resources. 

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5. 

• 

OTHER ELEMENTS 

Implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements 

Through  regular  interactions  with  the  EBA  Task  Force  on  Deposit  Guarantee  Schemes,  the 
Commission  assesses the implementation  of legal  provisions31 and  contributes to  harmonise 
the level of depositor protection across the EU. 

As already set out in existing DGSD, national authorities will keep reporting to EBA on the 
amount of available financial means, alternative funding arrangements and use of DGS funds, 
which EBA should in turn disclose. The proposal also maintains the periodic and follow-up 
reviews already foreseen in the original directive, for stress testing of DGSs, criteria for risk-
based contributions and re-examination of coverage level. 

• 

Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal 

The  proposed  amendments  build  on  and  clarify  the  mandate  of  DGSs  to  better  protect 
deposits in the context of the reimbursement of depositors. They also enhance the role of the 
DGS outside of situations in which depositors are repaid by the DGS following the failure of 
a  bank  for  the  purpose  of  bank  crisis  management  with  the  view  to  maintain  depositor 
confidence  and  financial  stability.  They  finally  set  up  specific  requirements  to  simplify  the 
daily activities of DGS and deal with administratively complex situations. 

The proposal amends the following provisions of the DGSD:  

Considering the enhanced possibilities for the use of DGS for financing preventive measures, 
transfer  strategies  in  resolution  and  alternative  measures  in  insolvency,  Article  1  (‘Subject 
matter and scope’) is amended to clarify that along with the establishment and functioning of 
the DGS, the coverage and repayment of deposits, and the use of DGS funds for measures to 
maintain the access of depositors to their deposits also fall within the scope of this Directive. 
Paragraph 2, point (d) of this article is amended to  clarify that branches of credit institution 
established in third countries are covered by the Directive. 

Article  2  sets  out  terms  and  definitions  that  are  used  for  the  purpose  of  this  Directive.  It  is 
amended  to  introduce  definitions,  consistently  with  the  new  provisions  introduced  in  the 
proposal following the EBA’s recommendations in its opinions, in particular on clients’ funds 
deposits and anti-money laundering and terrorist financing.  

Paragraph 8 of Article 4 is  consolidated in  the new Article 16a on  exchange of information 
between credit institutions and DGS and reporting by authorities (see below). 

In  its  opinion,  the  EBA  pointed  at  the  divergent  implementation  of  the  definition  of  public 
authorities.  This  led  to  a  different  scope  of  protection  of  deposits  across  Member  States, 
which  in  some  cases  excluded  from  protection  public  entities  such  as  schools,  hospitals  or 
municipal  services,  which  are  not  sophisticated  depositors.  The  existing  differentiation 
between public authorities based on their budget and other characteristics creates operational 
difficulties for credit institutions and DGSs. Therefore, in Article 5, public authorities are no 
longer excluded from the scope of depositor protection with the objective of harmonising and 
enhancing their protection. The article also clarifies that deposits related to terrorist financing 
are excluded from the DGS protection. 

31 

The proposal requires Member States to transpose this Directive in their national laws within 18 months 
from the entry into force of this proposal. 

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Article 6, which regulates the coverage level of depositor protection, is amended to harmonise 
the  minimum  level  of  protection  for  temporary  high  balances,  the  related  protection  period 
and to clarify the scope of protected deposits held in view of real estate transactions. 

Considering the divergent interpretations of the existing option related to the deduction from 
the repayable amount of liabilities of depositors that have fallen due, paragraph 5 of Article 7 
is deleted to harmonise the rules for the calculation of the repayable amount. Paragraph 7 is 
amended to take into account situations where the interest rate is negative. 

A  new  Article  7a  on  the  burden  of  proof  is  introduced  to  clarify  the  procedural  aspect  of 
eligibility  or  entitlement  to  the  deposits,  leaving  the  burden  of  proof  on  depositors  and 
account  holders  to  prove  that  they  are  absolutely  entitled  to  the  deposits  in  beneficiary 
accounts or accounts with temporary high balances.  

To give more time to verify the eligibility for repayment and in line with the provision on the 
burden of proof laid down in  Article 7a, Article 8 is  amended to  allow  the  DGS to  apply  a 
longer  period  of  up  to  20  working  days  in  the  case  of  repayment  of  beneficiary  accounts, 
client funds, and temporary high balances. The cut-off date starts being counted from the date 
on  which  a  DGS  received  the  complete  documentation  allowing  the  examination  of  claims 
and verification of conditions for repayment. The amended article also allows the DGS to set 
a threshold for the repayment of dormant accounts.  

A new Article 8a is inserted to ensure that depositors, above a threshold of Euro 10 000, are 
reimbursed via credit transfers in line with the AML/CFT objectives. 

Financial institutions such as investment firms, payment or e-money institutions collect funds 
from  their  clients  and  are  required  by  the  sectoral  rules  to  safeguard  those  funds,  including 
inter alia via placing them on segregated accounts with credit institutions. A new Article 8b 
sets out rules to harmonise the scope of deposit protection for such funds deposited on behalf 
and for the account of their clients, for the purpose of segregation. The article also details the 
modalities  for  the  repayment  of  the  account  holder  or  the  client  and  mandates  the  EBA  to 
develop draft regulatory technical standards for the identification of clients in such cases.  

The  Commission’s  proposal  for  a  regulation  on  the  prevention  of  the  use  of  the  financial 
system  for  the  purposes  of  money  laundering  or  terrorist  financing32  requires  that  financial 
supervisors  cooperate  with  resolution  authorities  or  designated  authorities  and  inform  those 
authorities  of  the  outcome  of  customer  due  diligence  measures.  A  new  Article  8c  DGSD  is 
introduced  in  order  to  avoid  the  repayment  of  deposits  where  the  outcome  of  customer  due 
diligence reveals that there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing, as well 
as to ensure a smooth exchange of information between the designated authority and the DGS 
in  these  cases.  This  new  provision  also  establishes  withholding  arrangements  on  DGS 
repayments for payouts of covered deposits entailing money laundering / terrorism financing 
concerns. 

Article  9  DGSD  provides  that  where  a  DGS  makes  payments  in  the  context  of  resolution 
proceedings, the DGS should have a claim against the relevant credit institution for an amount 
equal  to  its  payments.  That  claim  should  rank  pari  passu  with  covered  deposits.  This 

32 

European Commission, (July 2021), Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or 
terrorist financing COM(2021) 420 final. 

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provision  does  not  make  a  distinction  between  DGS  contribution  to  an  open-bank  bail-in 
resolution  (where  the  bank’s  entity  is  preserved  and  continues  its  operations)  and  DGS 
contributions to the financing of a transfer strategy (sale of business or bridge institution tool 
and  liquidation  of  the  residual  entity).  The  absence  of  such  a  distinction  may  create 
uncertainty  with  respect  to  the  existence  and  the  amount  of  a  DGS  claim  in  different 
scenarios. Therefore, Article 9 is  amended to  specify  that, when DGS funds  are used in  the 
context of transfer strategies in resolution or alternative measures in insolvency proceedings, 
the  DGS  should  have  a  claim  against  the  residual  institution  or  entity  in  its  subsequent 
winding-up proceedings under national law. This is justified by the fact that the DGS funds 
are  used  in  connection  to  losses  that  would  have  otherwise  been  borne  by  depositors.  This 
claim should rank at the same level as deposits under national insolvency rules to ensure that 
the shareholders and creditors left behind in the residual institution or entity effectively absorb 
the losses  of the institution and to  improve the possibility of  DGS recoveries  in  insolvency. 
On  the  contrary,  a  DGS  contribution  to  an  open-bank  bail-in  resolution  in  lieu  of  covered 
deposits  for  the  amount  by  which  covered  deposits  would  have  been  written  down  or 
converted, had they been subject to bail-in, should not generate a claim against the institution 
under resolution, as it would eliminate the purpose of the DGS’s contribution.  

Article  9,  paragraph  3  is  amended  to  harmonise  to  five  years  the  period  during  which 
depositors can make a claim against the DGS. 

Article 10 is amended to specify the reference period for the calculation of the target level and 
the fact that only money directly contributed to the DGS or recovered by the DGS are eligible 
to fulfil the target level. This clarification is in line with the current rules applicable by virtue 
of  the  EBA’s  guidelines.  The  objective  is  to  clarify  that  money  collected  via  loans  is  not 
eligible to reach the target level.  

Paragraph  4  of  Article  10  is  deleted  as  the  option  to  raise  the  available  financial  means 
through  the  mandatory  contributions  paid  by  member  institutions  to  existing  schemes  of 
mandatory contributions established by a Member State has not been used in practice. 

In  line  with  the  EBA  opinions,  to  improve  convergence  of  practices  and  ensure  that  funds 
could be made available to meet the deadline to reimburse depositors, a new paragraph 11 is 
added  to  Article  10,  providing  for  flexibility  for  DGSs  to  use  alternative  funding 
arrangements financed through private sources before using the available financial means and 
funds  collected  through  extraordinary  contributions.  Furthermore,  such  flexibility  would 
allow DGSs to avoid having to immediately raise extraordinary contributions, where raising 
such contributions would endanger financial stability (e.g. in a systemic crisis). Full flexibility 
is also needed to enable DGSs to use their funds in the most efficient way and avoid a fire sale 
of  their  assets  (available  financial  means)  at  the  point  of  crisis.  At  the  same  time,  the 
provision ensures that funding from public sources could be used only as a last resort. 

Additionally,  the  new  paragraph  in  Article  10  clarifies  requirements  to  ensure  the  sound 
management  of  DGS  funds  and  mandates  the  EBA  to  develop  guidelines  on  the 
diversification of DGS’ investment strategy. It also provides for the possibility to place DGS 
funds in a segregated account at the national central bank or national Treasury. Furthermore, 
it mandates the EBA to develop regulatory technical standards on the delineation of available 
financial means for DGSs. 

Article 11 is amended to clarify the distinction between preventive and alternative measures. 
Preventive  measures  are  DGS  interventions  supporting  financially  a  bank  in  distress,  for 

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example in the form of guarantees, cash injections, participation in capital increase, before the 
bank  meets  the  conditions  for  failing  or  likely  to  fail  with  the  objective  to  preserve  its 
financial  soundness.  Alternative  measures  are  DGS  interventions  supporting  the  transfer  of 
deposits and assets of the failing bank to another bank (e.g., in the form of a cash contribution 
to  fill  the  gap  between  assets  and  deposits,  guarantees)  in  the  context  of  insolvency  to 
preserve the access of depositors to their money. 

Article  11a  establishes  a  set  of  safeguards  for  preventive  measures  and  allocate  the 
responsibilities  among  authorities  for  assessing  how  preventive  measures  are  applied.  This 
aims  at  ensuring  that  the  use  of  these  measures  is  timely,  cost-effective  and  applied 
consistently across Member States, as improvements to the current situation.  

Article  11b  provides  for  the  conditions  underlying  the  note  with  measures  that  a  credit 
institution  commits 
to  ensure  or  restore  compliance  with  prudential 
requirements. Such note of measures should be consulted with the competent authority.  

to  undertake 

Article 11c establishes requirements for the credit institutions which did not comply with their 
commitments or fail to repay financial support granted with preventive measures. The EBA is 
mandated  to  develop  guidelines  on  the  content  of  the  note  with  measures  needed  for  the 
efficient implementation of a preventive measure and of the remediation plan. 

When using DGS funds for the purpose of alternative measures referred to in Article 11(5), 
Article  11d  provides  for  the  conditions  for  marketing  of  the  bank’s  assets,  rights  and 
liabilities. This process should be harmonised in order to limit adverse impacts on competition 
and  to  facilitate  attracting  potential  buyers.  This  should  also  ensure  consistency  with  the 
transfer tools under the BRRD. In line with the BRRD, the procedures to wind up the residual 
entity in an orderly manner should be initiated without delay.  

A least cost test compares the cost of a DGS intervention to prevent the further deterioration 
of  a  bank’s  financial  situation  or  the  DGS  cost  for  the  transfer  of  business  to  another  bank 
with  the cost  of a hypothetical  scenario of a payout  of covered deposits  in  liquidation.  This 
requirement  has  been  implemented  differently  across  Member  States.  A  new  Article  11e 
clarifies  and  harmonises  the  approach  to  perform  the  least  cost  test,  which  determines  the 
maximum amount a DGS may contribute outside payout, to finance preventive, resolution and 
alternative  measures.  A  payout  of  covered  deposits  in  insolvency  can  generate  direct  and 
indirect costs for the DGS and its members. Direct costs correspond to the amount disbursed 
by  the  DGS  for  its  payout  minus  the  recoveries  from  the  liquidation  proceedings.  Indirect 
costs  should  take  into  account  the  replenishment  of  the  funds  spent  by  the  DGS  and  the 
additional  costs  of  funding  for  the  DGS  linked  to  the  payout.  When  the  least  cost  test  is 
performed for the purpose of preventive measures, the importance of such measures for the 
DGS statutory or contractual mandate should also be factored in the calculation of the payout 
counterfactual.  The  cost  of  interventions  outside  payout  should  take  into  account  expected 
earnings,  operational  expenses  and  potential  losses  related  to  the  intervention.  The  EBA  is 
mandated to develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the methodology for the 
least cost test calculation. 

Article 14 is amended to clarify that the protection by DGSs also covers depositors located in 
Member  States  where  their  member  credit  institutions  exercise  the  freedom  to  provide 
services.  It  sets  the  conditions  to  give  a  DGS  in  a  home  Member  State  the  possibility  to 
reimburse directly depositors of branches established in another Member State and to allow a 
DGS  in  a  host  Member  State  to  operate  as  a  point  of  contact  for  depositors  of  credit 

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institutions  that  exercise  the  freedom  to  provide  services.  The  EBA  is  mandated  to  develop 
guidelines  on  the  respective  roles  of  home  and  host  DGSs  and  on  the  circumstances  and 
conditions  under  which  a  DGS  in  a  home  Member  State  should  decide  to  reimburse 
depositors  of  branches  located  in  another  Member  State.  Furthermore,  it  specifies  the  rules 
applicable to the calculation of funds to be transferred when a member institution changes its 
DGS affiliation from one Member State to another.  

Article  15  is  amended  to  require  that  branches  of  credit  institutions  established  in  third 
countries  join  a  DGS  in  a  Member  State  if  they  want  to  provide  banking  services  and  take 
eligible deposits in the EU. According to the EBA opinion, the vast majority of third country 
branches in EU Member States are already members of an EU DGS, either because the third 
country depositor protection regime is deemed to be non-equivalent or no formal equivalence 
assessment  has  been  made.  Some  of  the  remaining  branches  were  not  required  to  join  a 
respective EU DGS notwithstanding the results of the equivalence assessment showing their 
depositor  protection  was  not  equivalent.  In  line  with  the  EBA  recommendation,  this 
amendment includes this membership requirement and ensures equal protection for depositors 
in  the  EU  branches  of  third  country  banks  and  in  EU  banks  and  their  branches  in  different 
Member States. This enhances the protection of depositors as it eliminates the risk of having 
deposits in the EU whose protection by a non-EU DGS would not be up to the EU standards 
(according  to  the  EBA  opinion,  among  the  74  non-EEA  branches  in  the  EU,  5  were  not 
members of an EU DGS). Requiring EU branches of third country banks to join an EU DGS 
is also in line with one of the main objectives of this review to facilitate the use DGS funds in 
resolution.  

In  order  to  avoid  that  DGS  funds  are  exposed  to  economic  and  financial  risks  in  third 
countries,  a  new  Article  15a  allows  DGS  coverage  of  depositors  belonging  to  branches  of 
member  institutions  located  in  third  countries  only  if  the  collected  funds  are  above  the 
minimum target level. 

Article 16 is amended to harmonise information which banks have to provide to their clients 
annually on the protection of their deposits. It also enhances the information requirements for 
depositors in case of mergers or other major reorganisations of credit institutions, changes of 
DGS affiliation and unavailability of deposits due to the critical financial situation of banks. 
Member  States  are  empowered  to  verify  the  appropriateness  of  the  information  provided  to 
depositors  and  the  EBA  is  empowered  to  develop  draft  regulatory  standards  for  the  format 
and the content of the information sheet and the procedures and the information to depositors, 
also  with  reference  to  client  funds  deposits  and  to  terrorist  financing/money  laundering 
situations. 

A new Article 16a is introduced to clarify the rules on reporting and improve the exchange of 
information  from  the  credit  institution  to  the  DGSs  and  from  the  DGSs  and  the  designated 
authorities to the EBA. It is important that the DGS receives from its affiliated institutions at 
any time and upon request information on deposits it insures. This is necessary for the DGS to 
operate as requested by this Directive in an effective way. These reporting requirements are 
derived from existing obligations by banks to ensure immediate identification of deposits or 
follow from the expansion of depositor protection and therefore, do not contradict the overall 
objective  of  reducing  the  administrative  burden  on  credit  institutions.  Furthermore,  it  is 
important  that the EBA is  appropriately informed of situations that occur and for which the 
DGS  may  intervene  in  accordance  with  this  Directive,  to  support  the  EBA  in  its  tasks  of 
overseeing the financial integrity, stability, and security of the European banking system. The 

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EBA will be empowered to develop draft implementing technical standards on the template, 
the procedures and the content of this information.  

Member States have to transpose these amendments within two years after the entry into force 
of the amending Directive. The new rules regarding the application of safeguards on the use 
of preventive measures by DGSs under Article 11a require organisational changes and 
gradual building up of operational capacities by DGSs and designated authorities which 
justify a longer implementation period. Taking into account the specificities of IPSs which are 
recognised as DGS, this implementation period may be extended further.

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2023/0115 (COD) 

Proposal for a 

DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 

amending Directive 2014/49/EU as regards the scope of deposit protection, use of deposit 
guarantee schemes funds, cross-border cooperation, and transparency 

(Text with EEA relevance) 

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 

Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union,  and  in  particular 
Article 53(1) thereof, 

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission, 

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments, 
Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee33,  
Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions34,  
Having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank35, 

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, 

Whereas: 

(1) 

(2) 

In  accordance  with  Article  19(5)  and  (6)  of  Directive  2014/49/EU  of  the  European 
Parliament and of the Council36, the Commission has reviewed the application and the 
scope of that Directive and concluded that the objective of protection of depositors in 
the Union through the establishment of deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) has mostly 
been met. However, the Commission also concluded that there is a need to address the 
remaining gaps in depositor protection and to enhance the functioning of DGSs, while 
harmonising rules for DGSs interventions other than payout proceedings. 

The failure to comply with the obligations to pay contributions to DGSs or to provide 
information  to  depositors  and  DGSs  could  undermine  the  objective  of  depositor 
protection.  DGSs,  or  where  relevant,  designated  authorities  can  apply  pecuniary 
sanctions  for  late  payment  of  contributions.  It  is  important  to  improve  coordination 
between  DGSs,  designated  and  competent  authorities  to  take  enforcement  actions 
against  a  credit  institution  that  does  not  comply  with  its  obligations.  Although  the 
application  of  supervisory  and  enforcement  measures  by  the  competent  authorities 
against credit institutions  is  regulated under national  laws  and Directive  2013/36/EU 

33 
34 
35 
36 

OJ C , , p. . 
OJ C , , p. . 
OJ C , , p. . 
Directive  2014/49/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  16 April  2014  on  deposit 
guarantee schemes (recast) (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 149). 

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of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council37,  it  is  necessary  to  ensure  that 
designated authorities inform the competent authorities in time about any infringement 
of obligations of credit institutions under deposit protection rules. 

To  support  further  convergence  of  DGSs’  practices  and  assist  DGSs  in  testing  their 
resilience,  the  European  Banking  Authority  (EBA)  should  issue  guidelines  on  the 
performing of stress tests of DGS’ systems. 

Pursuant  to  Article  5(1),  point (d),  of  Directive  2014/49/EU,  deposits  of  certain 
financial  institutions,  including  investment  firms  are  excluded  from  coverage  by  the 
DGS.  However,  the  funds  that  those  financial  institutions  receive  from  their  clients 
and that they deposit in a credit institution on behalf of their clients, in the exercise of 
the services they offer, should be protected subject to certain conditions. 

The  range  of  depositors  that  are  currently  protected  through  repayment  by  a  DGS  is 
motivated  by  the  wish  to  protect  non-professional  investors,  while  professional 
investors  are  deemed  not  to  need  such  protection.  For  that  reason,  public  authorities 
have been excluded from coverage. However, most public authorities (which in some 
Member States include schools and hospitals) cannot be considered to be professional 
investors.  It  is  therefore  necessary  to  ensure  that  deposits  of  all  non-professional 
investors,  including  public  authorities,  can  benefit  from  the  protection  offered  by  a 
DGS.  

Deposits  resulting  from  certain  events,  including  real  estate  transactions  relating  to 
private  residential  properties  or  the  payout  of  certain  insurance  benefits,  can 
temporarily  lead  to  large  deposits.  For  that  reason,  Article  6(2)  of  Directive 
2014/49/EU  currently  obliges  Member  States  to  ensure  that  deposits  resulting  from 
those events are protected above EUR 100 000 for at least 3 months, but for no longer 
than 12 months from the moment the amount has been credited or from the moment 
when such deposits become legally transferable. To harmonise depositor protection in 
the Union and to reduce the administrative complexity and legal uncertainty related to 
the scope of protection of such deposits, it is necessary to  align their protection to at 
least EUR 500 000 for a harmonised duration of 6 months, in addition to the coverage 
level of EUR 100 000.  

During a real estate transaction, the funds can transit through different accounts prior 
to  the  actual  settlement  of  the  transaction.  Therefore,  to  protect  depositors  going 
through real estate transactions in a homogenous manner, protection of temporary high 
balances should apply to the proceeds of a sale as well as to the funds deposited for a 
purchase of a private residential property in the short-term. 

To ensure timely disbursement of the amount to be repaid by a DGS, and to simplify 
the  administrative  and  calculation  rules,  the  discretion  to  take  into  account  due 
liabilities when calculating the repayable amount should be removed.  

It  is  necessary  to  optimise  the  operational  capacities  of  DGSs  and  to  reduce  their 
administrative burden. For that reason, it should be established that when it comes to 
the identification of depositors that are entitled to deposits in beneficiary accounts or 
the  assessment  of  whether  depositors  are  eligible  for  temporary  high  balances 

Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the 
activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, 
amending  Directive  2002/87/EC  and  repealing  Directives  2006/48/EC  and  2006/49/EC  (OJ  L  176, 
27.6.2013, p. 338). 

(3) 

(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

(7) 

(8) 

(9) 

37 

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safeguards,  it  remains  the  depositors’  and  account  holders’  responsibility  to 
demonstrate, by their own means, their entitlement.  

(10)  Certain  deposits  may  be  subject  to  a  longer  repayment  period  because  they  require 
DGSs to verify the claim for repayment. To harmonise the rules across the Union, the 
period  for  repayment  should  be  limited  to  20  working  days  after  the  reception  of 
relevant documentation.  

(11)  The  administrative  cost  related  to  the  repayment  of  small  amounts  on  dormant 
accounts  can  outweigh  the  benefits  for  the  depositor.  It  is  therefore  necessary  to 
specify that DGSs should not be obliged to take active steps to repay deposits held in 
such accounts below certain thresholds that should be set at national level. The right of 
depositors to claim such amount should, however, be preserved. In addition, where the 
same depositor also has other active accounts, DGSs should include that amount in the 
calculation of the amount to be reimbursed.  

(12)  DGSs  have  diverse  methods  to  repay  depositors,  ranging  from  cash  payouts  to 
electronic transfers. However, to ensure the traceability of the repayment process from 
DGSs and to stay in line with the objectives of the Union framework on the prevention 
of  the  use  of  the  financial  system  for  the  purposes  of  money  laundering  or  terrorist 
financing, depositor reimbursements via credit transfers should be the default  payout 
method when reimbursement exceeds the amount of EUR 10 000. 

(13)  Financial institutions are excluded from deposit protection. However, certain financial 
institutions, including e-money institutions, payment institutions and investment firms, 
also  deposit  the  funds  received  from  their  clients  in  bank  accounts,  often  on  a 
temporary  basis,  to  comply  with  safeguarding  obligations  in  line  with  sectorial 
legislation,  including  Directive  2009/110/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 
Council38, Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council39 
and  Directive  2014/65/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council40. 
Considering the growing role of those financial institutions, DGSs should protect such 
deposits under the condition that those clients are identified or identifiable.  

(14)  Clients  of  financial  institutions  do  not  always  know  which  credit  institution  the 
financial  institution  has  chosen  to  deposit  their  funds.  DGSs  should  therefore  not 
aggregate  such  deposits  with  a  deposit  that  the  same  clients  might  have  in  the  same 
credit  institution  where  the  financial  institution  has  placed  their  deposits.  Credit 
institutions may not know the clients entitled to the sum held in the client accounts, or 
be able to check and record individual data of those clients. Depending on the type and 
business  model  of  the  financial  institution,  there  might  be  circumstances,  where 
reimbursing  the  client  directly  could  endanger  the  account  holder.  Therefore,  DGSs 
should  be  allowed  to  reimburse  amounts  to  a  client  account  opened  by  the  account 

38 

39 

40 

Directive  2009/110/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  16  September  2009  on  the 
taking up, pursuit and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions amending 
Directives  2005/60/EC  and  2006/48/EC  and  repealing  Directive  2000/46/EC  (OJ  L  267,  10.10.2009, 
p. 7). 
Directive  (EU)  2015/2366  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  25  November  2015  on 
payment  services  in  the  internal  market,  amending  Directives  2002/65/EC,  2009/110/EC  and 
2013/36/EU  and  Regulation  (EU)  No  1093/2010,  and  repealing  Directive  2007/64/EC  (OJ  L  337, 
23.12.2015, p. 35). 
Directive  2014/65/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  15  May  2014 on  markets  in 
financial  instruments  and  amending  Directive  2002/92/EC  and  Directive  2011/61/EU  (recast)  (OJ  L 
173, 12.6.2014, p. 349). 

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holder in another credit institution for the benefit of each client when certain criteria 
are  met.  To  avoid  the  risk  of  double  payment  in  those  situations,  any  claims  clients 
have in relation to sums held on their behalf by the account holder should be reduced 
by  the  amount  reimbursed  by  the  DGS  to  those  clients  directly.  The  EBA  should 
therefore  develop  draft  regulatory  technical  standards  to  specify  the  technical  details 
related  to  the  identification  of  clients  for  the  purpose  of  repayment,  the  criteria  for 
repayment to the account holder for the benefit of each client or to the client directly, 
and the rules to avoid multiple claims for payouts to the same beneficiary. 

(15)  When reimbursing depositors, DGSs may encounter situations that give rise to money 
laundering concerns. DGS should  therefore  withhold  the  payout to  a depositor  when 
notified that a financial intelligence unit has suspended a bank or payment account in 
accordance with the applicable anti-money laundering rules. 

(16)  Article 9 of Directive 2014/49/EU provides that where a DGS makes payments in the 
context  of  resolution  proceedings,  the  DGS  should  have  a  claim  against  the  credit 
institution concerned for an amount equal to its payments and that claim should rank 
pari  passu  with  covered  deposits.  That  provision  does  not  distinguish  between  a 
DGS’s contribution when an open-bank bail-in tool is used, and DGS’s contribution to 
the financing of a transfer strategy (sale of business or bridge institution tool) followed 
by liquidation of the residual entity. To ensure clarity and legal certainty with respect 
to the existence and amount of a DGS’s claim in different scenarios, it is necessary to 
specify  that  when  the  DGS  contributes  to  support  the  application  of  the  sale  of 
business tool or of the bridge institution tool, or alternative measures, whereby a set of 
assets, rights and liabilities, including deposits, of the credit institution are transferred 
to  a  recipient,  that  DGS  should  have  a  claim  against  the  residual  entity  in  its 
subsequent  winding-up  proceedings  under  national 
the 
shareholders  and  creditors  of  the  credit  institution  left  behind  in  the  residual  entity 
effectively  absorb  the  losses  of  that  credit  institution  and  improve  the  possibility  of 
repayments in insolvency to the DGS, the DGS claim should have the same ranking as 
the  depositors’  claim.  In  case  the  open  bank  bail-in  tool  is  applied  (i.e.,  the  credit 
institution  continues  its  operations),  the  DGS  contributes  in  the  amount  by  which 
covered deposits would have been written down  or converted to absorb the losses in 
that credit institution, had covered deposits been included within the scope of bail-in. 
Therefore, the DGS’s contribution should not result in a claim against the institution 
under resolution as it would eliminate the purpose of the DGS’s contribution. 

law.  To  ensure 

that 

(17)  To  ensure  convergence  of  DGS  practices  and  legal  certainty  for  depositors  to  claim 
their  deposits,  and  to  avoid  operational  hurdles  for  DGSs,  it  is  important  to  set  an 
adequately  long  period  within  which  depositors  can  claim  the  repayment  of  their 
deposits, in those cases where the DGS has not repaid depositors within the deadlines 
laid down in Article 8 of Directive 2014/49/EU in the case of a payout. 

(18)  Pursuant to Article 10(2) of Directive 2014/49/EU, Member States are to ensure that 
by 3 July 2024, the available financial means of a DGS reach a target level of 0,8 % of 
the  amount  of  the  covered  deposits  of  its  members.  To  objectively  assess  whether 
DGSs fulfil that requirement, a clear reference  period should be set  to determine  the 
amount of covered deposits and DGSs’ available financial means. 

(19)  To  ensure  the  resilience  of  DGSs,  their  funds  should  derive  from  stable  and 
irrevocable  contributions.  Certain  sources  of  DGS  financing,  including  loans  and 
expected recoveries, are  too  contingent  to  be accounted as contributions  to reach  the 
DGS’  target  level.  To  harmonise  DGSs’  conditions  for  the  fulfilment  of  their  target 

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level and to ensure that DGSs’ available financial means are financed by contributions 
from the industry, funds that qualify to reach the target level should be distinguished 
from  funds  that  are  considered  as  complementary  sources  of  financing.  Outflows  of 
DGS  funds,  including  foreseeable  loan  repayments,  can  be  planned  and  factored  in 
regular contributions from DGS members, and should therefore not lead to a decrease 
of  the  available  financial  means  below  the  target  level.  It  is  therefore  necessary  to 
specify that, after the target level has been reached for the first time, only a shortfall in 
DGS’ available financial means caused by a DGS intervention (payout, or preventive, 
resolution or alternative measures) should trigger a six-year replenishment period. To 
ensure  consistent  application,  the  EBA  should  develop  draft  regulatory  technical 
standards  specifying  the  methodology  for  the  calculation  of  the  target  level  by  the 
DGSs. 

(20)  The available financial means of a DGS should be immediately usable to face sudden 
events of payout or other interventions. In view of various practices across the Union, 
it  is  appropriate  to  lay  down  requirements  for  DGSs’  funds  investment  strategy  to 
mitigate  any  negative  impact  on  the  ability  of  a  DGS  to  fulfil  its  mandate.  Where  a 
DGS is not competent to set the investment strategy, the authority, or body or entity in 
the Member State that is responsible for setting the investment strategy should, when 
setting  that  investment  strategy,  also  respect  the  principles  regarding  diversification 
and  investments  in  low-risk  assets.  To  preserve  full  operational  independence  and 
flexibility of the DGS in terms of access to its funds, where DGS funds are deposited 
with  the  treasury,  those  funds  should  be  earmarked  and  placed  on  a  segregated 
account.  

(21)  The  option  to  raise  the  available  financial  means  of  a  DGS  through  mandatory 
contributions  paid  by  member  institutions  to  existing  schemes  of  mandatory 
contributions established by a Member State to cover the costs related to systemic risk 
has never been used and should therefore be removed. 

(22) 

It is necessary to enhance depositor protection, while avoiding the need for a fire sale 
of  the  assets  of  a  DGS  and  limiting  possible  negative  pro-cyclical  effects  over  the 
banking industry caused by the collection of extraordinary contributions. DGSs should 
therefore  be  allowed  to  use  alternative  funding  arrangements  that  enable  them  to 
obtain at any time short-term funding from sources other than contributions, including 
before using their available financial means and funds collected through extraordinary 
contributions.  Because  credit  institutions  should  primarily  bear  the  cost  and 
responsibility for financing DGSs, alternative funding arrangements from public funds 
should only be used as a last resort. 

(23)  To ensure adequately diversified investment of DGS funds and  convergent practices, 
the EBA should issue guidelines to provide DGSs with guidance in that respect.  

(24)  While the primary role of DGSs is the repayment of covered depositors, interventions 
outside  payout  can  prove  more  cost-effective  for  DGSs  and  ensure  uninterrupted 
access  to  deposits  by  facilitating  transfer  strategies.  DGSs  may  be  required  to 
contribute to the resolution of credit institutions. In addition, in some Member States, 
DGSs  may  finance  preventive  measures  to  restore  the  long-term  viability  of  credit 
institutions,  or  alternative  measures  in  insolvency.  While  such  preventive  and 
alternative  measures  can  significantly  improve  the  protection  of  deposits,  it  is 
necessary to subject such measures to adequate safeguards, including in the form of a 
harmonised  least  cost  test,  to  ensure  a  level  playing  field  and  the  effectiveness  and 

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cost-efficiency of such measures. Such safeguards should only apply to interventions 
financed with the DGS’s available financial means regulated under this Directive. 

(25)  Measures  to  prevent  failure  of  a  credit  institution  through  sufficiently  early 
interventions can play an effective role in the continuum of crisis management tools to 
maintain depositor confidence and financial stability. Those measures can take various 
forms - capital support measures through own funds instruments (including Common 
Equity  Tier  1  instruments)  or  other  capital  instruments,  guarantees,  or  loans.  DGSs 
have had heterogeneous recourse to those measures. To ensure the continuum of crisis 
management tools and recourse to preventive measures in a manner consistent with the 
resolution framework and the state aid rules, it is necessary to specify the timing and 
conditions  for  their  application.  Preventive  measures  are  not  appropriate  for  the 
absorption of incurred losses when the credit institution is already failing or likely to 
fail and should be used early to prevent deterioration of the financial situation of the 
bank.  Designated  authorities  should  therefore  verify  whether  the  conditions  for  such 
DGS  intervention  have  been  fulfilled.  Finally,  those  conditions  for  the  use  of  DGS 
available  financial  means  should  be  without  prejudice  to  the  assessment  by  the 
competent authority of whether an IPS fulfils the criteria laid down in Article 113(7) 
of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council41.  

(26)  To ensure  that  preventive measures achieve their objective, credit institutions should 
be  required  to  prepare  a  note  outlining  the  measures  that  they  commit  to  undertake. 
The preparation of such  note should not  be too  burdensome and time-consuming for 
the credit institution to ensure the possibility for the DGS to intervene early enough. 
Therefore,  the  note  accompanying  preventive  measures  should  take  the  form  of  a 
sufficiently short explanatory document. Such note should contain all elements which 
aim  at  preventing  the  outflow  of  funds  and  strengthening  the  capital  and  liquidity 
position of the credit institution, enabling the credit institution to comply with all the 
relevant  prudential  and  other  regulatory  requirements  on  a  forward-looking  basis. 
Such  note  should  therefore  contain  capital  raising  measures,  including  rules  on  the 
issuance of rights, the voluntary conversion of subordinated debt instruments, liability 
management  exercises,  capital  generating  sales  of  assets,  the  securitisation  of 
portfolios, and earnings retention, including dividend bans and bans on the acquisition 
of  stakes  in  undertakings.  For  the  same  reason,  during  the  implementation  of  the 
measures envisaged in the note, credit institutions should also strengthen their liquidity 
positions and refrain from aggressive commercial practices, and from the repurchasing 
of own shares or call hybrid capital instruments. Such note should also contain an exit 
strategy for any support measures received. Competent authorities are best positioned 
to be consulted on the relevance and credibility of the measures envisaged in the note. 
To  ensure  that  the  designated  authorities  of  the  DGS  that  is  requested  to  finance  a 
preventive  measure  by  the  credit  institution  can  assess  that  all  the  conditions  for 
preventive measures are fulfilled, the competent authorities should cooperate with the 
designated authorities. To ensure a consistent approach to the application of preventive 
measures  across  the  Union,  the  EBA  should  issue  guidelines  to  assist  credit 
institutions to draft such a note. 

(27)  To  ensure  that  credit  institutions  receiving  support  from  DGSs  in  the  form  of 
preventive  measures  deliver  on  their  commitments,  competent  authorities  should 

41 

Regulation  (EU)  No  575/2013  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  26  June  2013  on 
prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 
648/2012 (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1). 

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request  a  remediation  plan  from  credit  institutions  that  failed  to  fulfil  their 
commitments. Where a competent authority is of the opinion that the measures in the 
remediation  plan  are  not  capable  of  achieving  the  credit  institution’s  long-term 
viability,  the  DGS  should  not  provide  any  further  preventive  support  to  the  credit 
institution. To ensure a consistent approach to the application of preventive measures 
across the Union, the EBA should issue guidelines to assist credit institutions to draft 
such a remediation plan. 

(28)  To avoid detrimental effects on competition and on the internal market, it is necessary 
to  lay  down  that  in  the  case  of  alternative  measures  in  insolvency,  relevant  bodies 
representing  a  credit  institution  in  the  context  of  national  insolvency  proceedings 
(liquidator,  receiver,  administrator  or  other)  should  make  arrangements  for  the 
marketing of the business of the credit institution or part of it in an open, transparent 
and non-discriminatory process, while aiming to maximise, as far as possible, the sale 
price.  The  credit  institution  or  any  intermediary  acting  on  behalf  of  the  credit 
institution should apply rules that are adequate for the marketing of assets, rights and 
liabilities  that  are  to  be  transferred  to  potential  purchasers.  In  any  event,  the  use  of 
State resources should remain subject to the relevant State aid rules under the Treaty, 
where applicable. 

(29)  Since  the  main  aim  of  DGSs  is  to  protect  covered  deposits,  DGSs  should  only  be 
allowed  to  finance  interventions  other  than  payouts  where  such  interventions  are 
cheaper than payouts. Experience with the application of that rule (‘least cost test’) has 
revealed  several  shortcomings  as  the  current  framework  does  not  detail  how  to 
determine  the  cost  of  those  interventions  nor  the  cost  of  the  payout.  To  ensure  a 
consistent application of the least cost test across the Union, it is necessary to specify 
the  calculation  of  those  costs.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  necessary  to  avoid  excessively 
stringent  conditions  that  would  effectively  disable  the  use  of  DGS  funds  for  other 
interventions than payout. When carrying out the least cost assessment, DGSs should 
first  verify  that  the  cost  to  finance  the  selected  measure  is  lower  than  the  cost  of 
reimbursement  of  covered  deposits.  The  methodology  for  the  least  cost  assessment 
should take into account the time value of money.  

(30)  Liquidation  can  be  a  lengthy  process  whose  efficiency  depends  on  national  judicial 
efficiency, insolvency regimes, individual bank features, and the circumstances of the 
failure.  For  DGS  interventions  as  part  of  alternative  measures,  the  least  cost  test 
should  rely  on  the  valuation  of  the  assets  and  liabilities  of  the  credit  institution,  laid 
down in Article 36(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU, and the estimate laid down in Article 
36(8) of that Directive. However, the precise evaluation of liquidation recoveries can 
be  challenging  in  the  context  of  the  least  cost  test  for  preventive  measures,  which 
supposedly  happen 
the 
counterfactual  for  the  least  cost  test  for  preventive  measures  should  be  adjusted 
accordingly, and in any case, the expected recoveries should be limited to a reasonable 
amount based on recoveries in past payout events. 

long  before  any  foreseeable 

liquidation.  Therefore, 

(31)  The  designated  authorities  should  estimate  the  cost  of  the  measure  for  the  DGS, 
including after the repayment of a loan, a capital injection or the use of a guarantee, 
net  of  expected  earnings,  operational  expenses,  and  potential  losses,  against  a 
counterfactual  based  on  a  hypothetical  final  loss  at  the  end  of  the  insolvency 
proceedings,  which  should  take  into  account  recoveries  from  the  DGS  as  part  of  a 
bank’s liquidation proceedings. To give a fair and more comprehensive picture of the 
actual  cost  of  depositors’  repayment,  the  estimation  of  the  loss  incurred  due  to  the 
reimbursement  of  covered  deposits  should  include  costs  indirectly  related  to  the 

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reimbursement of depositors. Such costs should include the  cost  of  replenishment  of 
the  DGS  and  the  cost  that  the  DGS  might  bear  due  to  the  recourse  to  alternative 
financing.  To  ensure  consistent  application  of  the  least  cost  test,  the  EBA  should 
develop draft regulatory technical standards on the methodology to calculate the cost 
of different DGS interventions. To ensure consistency of the methodology for the least 
cost assessment with the DGS statutory or contractual mandate as regards preventive 
measures,  the  EBA  should,  when  developing  those  draft  regulatory  technical 
standards, take into account the relevance of preventive measures in the methodology 
for the calculation of the payout counterfactual. 

(32)  To enhance harmonised protection of depositors and specify respective responsibilities 
across  the  Union,  the  DGS  of  the  home  Member  State  should  ensure  the  payout  to 
depositors located in Member States where the credit institutions that are a member of 
the DGS take deposits and other repayable funds by offering deposit services on cross-
border basis without establishment in the host Member State. To facilitate the payout 
operations  and  provision  of  information  to  depositors,  the  DGS  of  the  host  Member 
State  should  be  allowed  to  operate  as  a  point  of  contact  for  depositors  at  credit 
institutions that exercise the freedom to provide services. 

(33)  The  cooperation  between  DGSs  across  the  Union  is  vital  to  ensure  fast  and  cost-
efficient  depositors’  repayment  where  credit  institutions  conduct  banking  service 
through branches in other Member States. In view of technological advancements that 
promote  the  use  of  cross-border  transfers  and  remote  identification,  the  DGS  of  the 
home Member State should be allowed to make the repayments directly to depositors 
at branches located in another Member State, provided that the administrative burden 
and costs are lower than if the repayment would be carried out by the DGS of the host 
Member  State.  That  flexibility  should  complement 
the  current  cooperation 
mechanism,  requiring  the  DGS  of  the  host  Member  State  to  repay  depositors  in 
branches  on  behalf  of  the  DGS  of  the  home  Member  State.  To  preserve  depositor 
confidence  in  both  host  and  home  Member  States,  EBA  should  issue  guidelines  to 
assist the DGSs in such cooperation, inter alia by suggesting a list of conditions under 
which  a  DGS  of  the  home  Member  State  could  decide  to  reimburse  depositors  at 
branches located in the host Member State. 

(34)  Credit  institutions  may  change  affiliation  to  a  DGS  because  they  move  their 
headquarters to another Member State or convert their subsidiary into a branch or vice 
versa.  Article  14(3)  of  Directive  2014/49/EU  requires  that  the  contributions  of  that 
credit  institution  paid  during  the  12  months  preceding  the  transfer  are  transferred  to 
the other DGS in proportion to the amount of covered deposits transferred. To ensure 
that the transfer of contributions  to the receiving DGS is not dependent on divergent 
national rules regarding invoicing or actual date of payment of contributions, the DGS 
of  origin  should  calculate  the  amount  to  be  transferred  on  the  basis  of  contributions 
due rather than contributions paid.  

(35) 

It is necessary to ensure equal protection of depositors across the Union that cannot be 
fully guaranteed by an equivalence assessment regime of depositor protection in third 
countries. For that reason, branches in the Union of a credit institution that has its head 
office in a third country should join a DGS in the Member State where they  perform 
their  deposit-taking  activity.  That  requirement  would  also  ensure  consistency  with 
Directives 2013/36/EU and 2014/59/EU that aim to introduce a more robust prudential 
and resolution frameworks for third country groups providing banking services in the 
Union. Conversely, it should be avoided that DGSs are exposed to the economic and 

EN 

24 

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financial risks of third countries. Deposits in branches established in third countries by 
Union credit institutions should therefore not be protected.  

into  account 

take 
institutions 

(36)  Standardised  and  regular  information  disclosure  enhances  awareness  of  depositors 
about  deposit  protection.  To  align  disclosure  requirements  with  technological 
the  new  digital 
those  requirements  should 
developments, 
communication  channels  whereby  credit 
interact  with  depositors. 
Depositors  should  obtain  clear  and  homogeneous  information  that  explains  their 
deposit  protection,  while  limiting  the  related  administrative  burden  for  credit 
institutions  or  DGSs.  The  EBA  should  be  mandated  to  develop  draft  implementing 
technical standards to specify, on the one hand, the content and format of the depositor 
information  sheet  to  communicate  to  depositors  on  annual  basis  and,  on  the  other 
hand, the template information  that either DGSs or credit institutions  are  required to 
communicate  to  depositors  in  specific  situations,  including  mergers  of  credit 
institutions, determination that deposits are unavailable, or repayment of client funds 
deposits.  

(37)  The merger of a credit institution or the conversion of subsidiary into branch or  vice 
versa might affect the key features of depositor protection. To avoid adverse impacts 
on  depositors  that  would  have  deposits  in  both  merging  banks  and  whose  claim  to 
deposit  coverage  would  be  reduced  because  of  changes  to  DGS  affiliation,  all 
depositors  should  be  informed  about  such  changes  and  should  have  the  right  to 
withdraw  their  funds  without  incurring  a  penalty  up  to  an  amount  equal  to  the  lost 
coverage of deposits. 

(38)  To preserve financial stability, avoid contagion and enable depositors to exercise their 
rights  to  claim  deposits  when  applicable,  designated  authorities,  DGSs  and  credit 
institutions concerned should inform depositors about deposits becoming unavailable. 

(39)  To increase transparency for depositors and to promote financial robustness and trust 
among DGSs when fulfilling their mandate, the current reporting requirements should 
be  improved.  Building  on  the  current  requirements  that  enable  DGSs  to  request  all 
necessary  information  from  their  member  institutions  to  prepare  for  payout,  DGSs 
should  also  be  able  to  request  information  necessary  to  prepare  for  a  payout  in  the 
context  of  cross  border  cooperation.  Upon  the  request  from  a  DGS,  member 
institutions  should  be  required  to  provide  general  information  about  any  material 
cross-border business in other Member States. Likewise, in order to provide the EBA 
with  the  suitable  range  of  information  on  the  evolution  of  the  DGSs’  available 
financial  means  and  on  the  use  of  those  means,  Member  States  should  ensure  that 
DGSs  inform  the  EBA  on  a  yearly  basis  of  the  amount  of  covered  deposits  and 
available financial means, and notify the EBA about the circumstances that led to the 
use  of  DGS  funds  either  for  payouts  or  other  measures.  Finally,  to  reflect  the 
strengthened role of DGSs in the bank crisis management which aims to facilitate the 
use of DGS funds in resolution, DGSs should have the right to receive the summary of 
resolution  plans  of  credit  institutions  to  increase  their  general  preparedness  to  make 
the funds available.  

(40)  Technical standards in financial services should facilitate consistent harmonisation and 
adequate protection of depositors across the Union. As a body with highly specialised 
expertise,  it  would  be  efficient  and  appropriate  to  entrust  the  EBA  with  the 
development  of  draft  regulatory  and  implementing  technical  standards  which  do  not 
involve policy choices, for adoption by the Commission.  

EN 

25 

  EN 

 
(41)  The Commission should, where provided for in this Directive, adopt draft regulatory 
technical  standards  developed  by  the  EBA  by  means  of  delegated  acts  pursuant  to 
Article  290  TFEU,  in  accordance  with  Articles  10  to  14  of  Regulation  (EU)  No 
1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council42 to specify the following: 
(a) the technical details related to the identification of clients of financial institutions 
for payout of client funds deposits, the criteria for repayment to the account holder for 
the benefit of each client or to the client directly, and the rules to avoid multiple claims 
for payouts to the same beneficiary; (b) the methodology for the least cost test, and (c) 
the  methodology  for  the  calculation  of  available  financial  means  qualifying  for  the 
target level.  

(42)  The  Commission  should,  where  provided  for  in  this  Directive,  adopt  draft 
implementing technical standards developed by EBA by means of implementing acts 
pursuant to Article 291 TFEU, in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 
1093/2010  to  specify:  (a)  the  content  and  format  of  the  depositor  information  sheet, 
the  template  for  information  that  either  DGSs  or  credit  institutions  should 
communicate  to  depositors;  (b)  the  procedures  to  be  followed  when  providing 
information  by  credit  institutions  to  their  DGS,  and  by  DGSs  and  designated 
authorities to EBA, and the templates for providing that information. 

(43)  Directive 2014/49/EU should therefore be amended accordingly. 

(44)  To  allow  branches  of  credit  institutions  having  their  head  offices  outside  the  Union 
that are not members of a DGS established in the Union to  join a Union DGS, those 
branches should be given a sufficient period to take the necessary steps to comply with 
that requirement.  

(45)  Directive 2014/49/EU allows Member States to recognise an IPS as a DGS if it fulfils 
the criteria laid down in Article 113(7) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and complies 
with Directive 2014/49/EU. To take into account the specific business model of those 
IPSs, in particular the relevance of preventive measures at the core of their mandate, it 
is appropriate to provide for the possibility of Member States to allow IPSs to adapt to 
the new safeguards for the application of preventive measures within a 6-year period. 
This possibly longer compliance period takes into account the timeline for the build-up 
of a segregated fund for IPS purposes other than deposit insurance as agreed between 
the European Central Bank, the national competent authority and the relevant IPSs.  

(46)  To  allow  DGSs  and  designated  authorities  to  build  up  the  necessary  operational 
capacity to apply the new rules on the use of preventive measures, it is appropriate to 
provide for a deferred application of those new rules.  

(47)  Since  the  objectives  of  this  Directive,  namely  to  ensure  uniform  protection  of 
depositors in the Union, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States due to 
the risks that diverging national approaches might entail for the integrity of the single 
market but can rather, by amending rules that are already laid down at Union level, be 
better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the 
principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on the European Union. In 
accordance  with  the  principle  of  proportionality,  as  set  out  in  that  Article,  this 
Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives, 

42 

Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
establishing  a  European  Supervisory  Authority  (European  Banking  Authority),  amending  Decision 
No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 12). 

EN 

26 

  EN 

 
                                                 
HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: 

Article 1 

Amendments to Directive 2014/49/EU  

Directive 2014/49/EU is amended as follows: 

(1) 

Article 1 is amended as follows: 

(a) 

paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: 

‘1. This Directive lays down rules and procedures relating to the establishment 
and  the  functioning  of  deposit  guarantee  schemes  (DGSs),  the  coverage  and 
repayment  of  deposits,  and  the  use  of  DGS  funds  for  measures  that  aim  to 
ensure the access of depositors to their deposits.’; 

(b) 

in paragraph 2, point (d) is replaced by the following:  

‘(d) credit institutions, and branches of credit institutions  that have their head 
office outside the Union, that are affiliated to the schemes referred to in points 
(a), (b) or (c) of this paragraph.’; 

(2) 

in Article 2, paragraph 1 is amended as follows: 

(a) 

in point (3), the introductory wording is replaced by the following: 

‘(3)  ‘deposit’  means  a  credit  balance  which  results  from  funds  left  in  an 
temporary  situations  deriving  from  normal  banking 
account  or  from 
transactions  habitually  carried  out  by  credit  institutions  in  the  course  of  their 
business, and which a credit institution is required to repay under the legal and 
contractual conditions applicable, including a fixed-term deposit and a savings 
deposit, but excluding a credit balance where:’; 

(b) 

in point (13), the introductory wording is replaced by the following: 

‘(13)  ‘payment  commitment’  means  an  irrevocable,  fully  collateralised 
obligation of a credit institution to pay a DGS a monetary amount when called 
by that DGS, and where the collateral: 

(c) 

the following points (19) to (23) are added:  

(19) ‘resolution authority’ means a resolution authority as defined in Article 2, 
point (18) of Directive 2014/59/EU; 

(20) ‘client funds deposits’ means funds that account holders that are financial 
institutions  as  defined  in  Article  4(1),  point  (26),  of  Regulation  (EU) 
No 575/2013 deposit in the course of their business with a credit institution for 
the account of their clients; 

(21) ‘Union State aid framework’ means the framework established by Articles 
107,  108  and  109  TFEU  and  regulations  and  all  Union  acts,  including 
guidelines,  communications  and  notices,  made  or  adopted  pursuant  to  Article 
108(4) or Article 109 TFEU; 

(22) ‘money laundering’ means money laundering as defined in Article 2, point 
(1)  of  [please  insert  reference  –  proposal  for  Anti-Money  Laundering 
Regulation - COM/2021/420 final] *’; 

EN 

27 

  EN 

 
(23) ‘terrorist financing’ means terrorist financing as defined in Article 2, point 
(2) [please insert reference – proposal for Anti-Money Laundering Regulation - 
COM/2021/420 final]. **’; 

(d)  paragraph 3 is replaced by the following:  

‘3.  Shares  in  Irish  building  societies,  apart  from  those  of  a  capital  nature 
covered by Article 5(1), point (b), shall be treated as deposits.’; 

____________________________________________ 

[Please  insert  full  reference  –  proposal  for  Anti-Money  Laundering 

* 
Regulation - COM/2021/420 final]. 

[Please  insert  full  reference  –  proposal  for  Anti-Money  Laundering 

** 
Regulation - COM/2021/420 final. 

(3) 

Article 4 is amended as follows:  

(a) 

paragraph 4 is replaced by the following: 

‘4. Members States shall ensure that where a credit institution does not comply 
with its obligations as a member of a DGS, that DGS shall immediately notify 
the competent  authority  of that credit institution thereof. Member States  shall 
ensure  that  the  competent  authority,  in  cooperation  with  that  DGS,  uses  the 
supervisory powers laid down in Directive 2013/36/EU, and promptly takes all 
measures  to  ensure  that  the  credit  institution  concerned  complies  with  its 
obligations,  including  where  necessary  by  imposing  administrative  penalties 
and  other  administrative  measures  in  accordance  with  the  national  laws 
adopted in addition to the implementation of provisions of Title VII, Chapter 1, 
Section IV, of Directive 2013/36/EU.’; 

(b) 

the following paragraph 4a is inserted: 

‘4a. Members States shall ensure that where a credit institution fails to pay the 
contributions  referred to in  Article 10 and  Article 11(4) within the  timeframe 
specified  by  the  DGS,  that  DGS  shall,  for  the  period  of  the  delay,  charge 
statutory interest rate on the amount due.’; 

(c) 

paragraphs 5 and 6 are replaced by the following: 

‘5. Member States shall ensure that the DGS informs the designated authority 
where  the  measures  referred  to  in  paragraphs  4  and  4a  fail  to  restore 
compliance  by  the  credit  institution.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  the 
designated authority assesses whether the institution still fulfils the conditions 
for a continued membership of the DGS and inform the competent authority of 
the outcome of that assessment. 

6.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  where  the  competent  authority  decides  to 
withdraw  the  authorisation  in  accordance  with  Article  18  of  Directive 
2013/36/EU, the credit institution ceases to be a member of the DGS. Member 
States shall ensure that deposits held on the date on which a credit institution 
ceased to be a member of the DGS continue to be covered by that DGS.’; 

(d)  paragraph 8 is deleted; 

(e) 

the following paragraph 13 is added: 

EN 

28 

  EN 

 
‘13. By…  [OP – please  add 36 months  after entry  into  force],  the EBA shall 
develop  guidelines  on  the  scope,  contents  and  procedures  of  the  stress  tests 
referred to in paragraph 10.’; 

(4) 

Article 5 is amended as follows:  

(a) 

paragraph 1 is amended as follows: 

(i) 

the introductory wording is replaced by the following: 

‘1. The following shall be excluded from any repayment by a DGS:’ 

(ii)  point (c) is replaced by the following: 

‘(c)  deposits  arising  out  of  transactions  in  connection  with  which  there 
has  been  a  criminal  conviction  for  money  laundering  and  terrorist 
financing;’; 

(iii)  point (e) is deleted; 

(iv)  point (f) is replaced by the following: 

‘(f)  deposits  the  holder  of  which  has  never  been  identified  pursuant  to 
Article  16  of  Regulation  (EU)  ….  [please  insert  short  reference  – 
proposal for Anti-Money Laundering Regulation - COM/2021/420 final], 
where  those  deposits  have  become  unavailable,  except  where  a  holder 
requests payout and proves that the lack of identification was not caused 
by his or her action;’; 

(v)  point (j) is deleted;  

(b)  paragraph 2 is replaced by the following: 

‘2.  By  way  of  derogation  from  paragraph  1,  point  (i),  Member  States  may 
decide  that  deposits  held  by  personal  pension  schemes  and  occupational 
pension  schemes  of  small  or  medium-sized  enterprises  are  included  up  to  the 
coverage level laid down in Article 6(1).’; 

(5) 

Article 6 is amended as follows: 

(a) 

paragraph 2 is amended as follows: 

(i) 

the introductory wording is replaced by the following: 

‘In  addition  to  paragraph  1,  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  the 
following  deposits  are  protected  as  a  minimum  to  an  amount  of  EUR 
500 000  for  6  months  after  that  amount  has  been  credited  or  from  the 
moment when such deposits become legally transferable’; 

(ii)  point (a) is replaced by the following: 

‘(a)  deposits  resulting  from  real  estate  transactions  relating  to  private 
residential  properties  and  deposits  intended  for  such  transactions, 
provided  that  those  transactions  are  concluded  in  the  short  term  by  a 
natural  person,  and  provided  that  that  natural  person  can  provide 
documents proving such transaction;’; 

(b) 

the following paragraph 2a is inserted: 

‘2a.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  the  coverage  level  laid  down  in 
paragraph 2 supplements the coverage level laid down in paragraph 1.’ 

EN 

29 

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(6) 

Article 7 is amended as follows: 

(a) 

paragraph 5 is deleted; 

(b)  paragraph 7 is replaced by the following: 

‘7.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  the  DGS  reimburses  interest  on  deposits 
which  has  accrued  until,  but  has  not  been  credited  or  debited  at,  the  date  on 
which a relevant administrative authority makes a determination as referred to 
in Article 2(1), point (8)(a), or a judicial authority makes a ruling as referred to 
in Article 2(1), point (8)(b). The coverage level laid down in Article 6(1) or, in 
the  circumstances  referred  to  in  Article  6(2),  the  coverage  level  laid  down  in 
that paragraph, shall not be exceeded.’; 

(7) 

the following Article 7a is inserted: 

‘Article 7a 

Burden of proof for deposit eligibility and entitlement 

Member  States  shall  ensure  that  in  the  cases  referred  to  in  Article  6(2)  and 
Article 7(3) a depositor or, where appropriate, an account holder, proves either 
that  the  deposits  concerned  meet  the  conditions  of  Article  6(2),  or  the 
entitlement to the deposits in the circumstances referred to in Article 7(3).’; 

(8) 

Article 8 is amended as follows: 

(a) 

paragraph 3 is replaced by the following: 

‘3. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, Member States shall allow DGSs 
to apply a longer repayment period for the deposits referred to in Article 6(2), 
Article 7(3) and Article 8b, which shall not exceed 20 working days from the 
date on which those DGSs received the complete documentation they requested 
from  a  depositor  to  examine  the  claims  and  verify  that  the  conditions  for 
repayment are met.’; 

(b)  paragraph 5 is amended as follows: 

(i) 

point (c) is replaced by the following: 

‘(c) by way of derogation from paragraph 9, there has been no transaction 
relating to the deposit during the last 24 months (the account is dormant), 
except where a depositor also has deposits on another account that is not 
dormant’; 

(ii)  point (d) is deleted; 

(c) 

paragraph 8 is deleted;  

(d)  paragraph 9 is replaced by the following:  

‘9.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  where  there  has  been  no  transaction 
relating  to  the  deposit  during  the  last  24  months,  DGSs  may  set  a  threshold 
concerning  the  administrative  costs  that  would  be  incurred  by  those  DGSs  in 
making  such  a  repayment.  DGSs  shall  not  be  obliged  to  take  active  steps  to 
repay depositors below that  threshold. Member States shall ensure that DGSs 
repay depositors below that threshold where so requested by those depositors.’; 

(9) 

the following Articles 8a, 8b and 8c are inserted: 

EN 

30 

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‘Article 8a 

Repayment of deposits exceeding EUR 10 000 

Member  States  shall  ensure  that  when  amounts  to  be  reimbursed  exceed  EUR 
10 000, DGSs shall reimburse depositors via credit transfers as defined in Article 2, 
point (20), of Directive 2014/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council*. 

‘Article 8b 

Coverage of client funds deposits 

1.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  client  funds  deposits  are  covered  by  the  DGSs 
where all of the following applies: 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

such  deposits  are  placed  on  behalf  and  for  the  account  of  clients  who  are 
eligible for protection in accordance with Article 5(1); 

such  deposits  are  made  to  segregate  client  funds  in  compliance  with 
safeguarding requirements  laid down in Union law regulating the activities of 
the entities referred to in Article 5(1), point (d);  

the clients referred to in point (a) are identified or identifiable prior to the date 
on which a relevant administrative authority makes a determination as referred 
to in Article 2(1), point (8)(a) or a judicial authority makes a ruling as referred 
to in Article 2(1), point (8)(b). 

2.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  the  coverage  level  referred  to  in  Article  6(1) 
applies  to  each  of  the  clients  that  meet  the  conditions  laid  down  in  paragraph  1, 
point (c), of this Article. By way of derogation from Article 7(1), when determining 
the repayable amount for an individual client, the DGS shall not take into account the 
aggregate fund deposits placed by that client with the same credit institution.  

3. Member States shall ensure that DGSs repay covered deposits either to the account 
holder for the benefit of each client, or to the client directly. 

4. The EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify: 

(a) 

(b) 

the technical details related to the identification of clients for the repayment in 
accordance with Article 8;  

the criteria under, and the circumstances in which the repayment is to be made 
to the account holder for the benefit of each client or to the client directly; 

(c) 

the rules to avoid multiple claims for payouts to the same beneficiary. 

When  developing  those  draft  regulatory  technical  standards,  EBA  shall  take  into 
account all of the following: 

(a) 

(b) 

the  specificities  of  the  business  model  of  the  different  types  of  financial 
institutions referred to in Article 5(1), point (d); 

the specific requirements of the applicable Union law regulating the  activities 
of  the  financial  institutions  referred  to  in  Article  5(1),  point  (d),  for  the 
treatment of client funds. 

The EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission 
by … [OP – please insert the date= 12 months after the date of entry into force of this 
Directive]. 

EN 

31 

  EN 

 
Power is delegated to the Commission to supplement this Directive by adopting the 
regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph 
in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. 

Article 8c 

Suspension of repayments in case of concerns about money laundering or 
terrorist financing  

1. Member States shall ensure that the designated authority informs the DGS within 
24 hours from the moment the designated authority received the information referred 
to  in  Article  48(4)  of  [please  insert  reference  –  proposal  for  a  Anti-Money 
Laundering  Directive  repealing  Directive  (EU)  2015/849  -  COM(2021)  423  final] 
about  the  outcome  of  the  customer  due  diligence  measures  referred  to  in  Article 
15(4)  of  Regulation  (EU)  ….  [please  insert  short  reference  –  proposal  for  Anti-
Money  Laundering Regulation  - COM/2021/420 final]. Member States shall ensure 
that  the  information  exchanged  between  the  designated  authority  and  the  DGS  is 
limited to the information that is strictly necessary for the exercise of the DGS’ tasks 
and  responsibilities  under  this  Directive  and  that  such  exchange  of  information 
respects the requirements laid down in Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council**. 

2.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  DGSs  suspend  the  repayment  referred  to  in 
Article  8(1)  where  a  depositor  or  any  person  entitled  to  sums  held  in  his  or  her 
account  has  been  charged  with  an  offence  arising  out  of,  or  in  relation  to,  money 
laundering or terrorist financing, pending the judgment of the court. 

3.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  DGSs  suspend  the  repayment  referred  to  in 
Article 8(1) for the same duration as laid down in Article 20 of [please insert  short 
reference  –  proposal  for  a  Anti-Money  Laundering  Directive  repealing  Directive 
(EU)  2015/849  -  COM(2021)  423  final]  where  they  are  notified  by  the  Financial 
Intelligence Unit referred to in Article 32 of Directive (EU) [please insert reference – 
proposal for a Anti-Money Laundering Directive repealing Directive (EU) 2015/849 
-  COM(2021)  423  final]  that  that  Unit  has  decided  to  suspend  a  transaction  or  to 
withhold  consent  to  proceed  with  such  a  transaction,  or  to  suspend  a  bank  or  a 
payment  account  in  accordance  with  Article  20(1)  or  (2)  of  Directive  (EU)  [please 
insert  reference  –  proposal  for  a  Anti-Money  Laundering  Directive  repealing 
Directive (EU) 2015/849 - COM(2021) 423 final].  

4. Member States shall ensure that DGSs are not held liable for any measures taken 
in accordance with the instructions of the Financial Intelligence Unit. DGSs shall use 
any information received from the Financial Intelligence Unit for the purposes of this 
Directive only. 

* 
Directive  2014/92/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  23 
July 2014 on the comparability of fees related to payment accounts, payment account 
switching and access to payment accounts with basic features (OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, 
p. 214). 

**  Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
1996 on the legal protection of databases (OJ L 77, 27.3.1996, p. 20).’; 

(10) 

in Article 9, paragraphs 2 and 3 are replaced by the following: 

‘2.  Without  prejudice to  rights  they may have under national  law, DGSs that make 
payments  under  guarantee  within  a  national  framework  shall  have  the  right  of 

EN 

32 

  EN 

 
subrogation to  the rights of depositors in  winding up or reorganisation  proceedings 
for an amount  equal  to  the DGSs payments  made to  depositors.  DGSs that make a 
contribution in the context of the resolution tools referred to in  Article 37(3), point 
(a)  or  (b),  of  Directive  2014/59/EU,  or  in  the  context  of  measures  taken  in 
accordance  with  Article  11(5)  of  this  Directive,  shall  have  a  claim  against  the 
residual credit institution for any loss incurred as a result of any contributions made 
to resolution pursuant to Article 109 of Directive 2014/59/EU or to the transfer made 
pursuant  to  Article 11(5)  of this  Directive  in  connection to  losses which  depositors 
otherwise  would  have  borne.  That  claim  shall  rank  at  the  same  level  as  deposits 
under national law governing normal insolvency proceedings. 

3. Member States shall ensure that depositors whose deposits have not been repaid or 
acknowledged by the DGS by deadlines laid down in Article 8(1) and (3) can claim 
the repayment of their deposits within a period of 5 years.’; 

(11) 

Article 10 is amended as follows: 

(a) 

paragraph 2, is amended as follows: 

(i) 

after the first subparagraph, the following subparagraphs are inserted: 

‘For  the  calculation  of  the  target  level  referred  to  in  the  first 
subparagraph,  the  reference  period  shall  be  between  31  December 
preceding  the  date  by  which  the  target  level  is  to  be  reached  and  that 
date.  

When  determining  whether  the  DGS  has  reached  that  target  level, 
Member  States  shall  only  take  into  account  available  financial  means 
directly contributed by,  or recovered from, members to the DGS, net of 
administrative  fees  and  charges.  Those  available  financial  means  shall 
include  investment  income  derived  from  funds  contributed  by  members 
to  the  DGS,  but  shall  exclude  repayments  not  claimed  by  eligible 
depositors during payout procedures, and loans between DGSs.’; 

(ii) 

the third subparagraph is replaced by the following: 

‘Where,  after  the  target  level  referred  to  in  the  first  subparagraph  has 
been  reached  for  the  first  time  and  the  available  financial  means, 
following  a  disbursement  of  DGS’s  funds  in  accordance  with  Article 
8(1), and Article 11(2), (3), and (5), have been reduced to less than two-
thirds of the target level, DGSs shall set the regular contribution at a level 
allowing for the target level to be reached within 6 years.’; 

(b)  paragraph 3 is replaced by the following: 

‘3. The available financial means that the DGS takes into account to reach the 
target level referred to in paragraph 2 may include payment commitments. The 
total  share  of  such  payment  commitments  shall  not  exceed  30  %  of  the  total 
amount of available financial means raised in accordance with paragraph 2.  

The EBA shall issue guidelines on payment commitments laying down criteria 
for the admissibility of those commitments;’ 

(c) 

paragraph 4 is deleted;  

(d)  paragraph 7 is replaced by the following: 

EN 

33 

  EN 

 
‘7. Member State shall ensure that DGSs, designated authorities, or competent 
authorities  set  the  investment  strategy  for  the  available  financial  means  of 
DGSs,  and  that  that  investment  strategy  complies  with  the  principle  of 
diversification and investments in low-risk assets.’; 

(e) 

the following paragraph 7a is inserted: 

‘7a.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  DGSs  may  place  all  or  part  of  their 
available financial means with their national central bank or national treasury, 
provided that those available financial means are kept on a segregated account 
and  that  they  are  readily  available  for  use  by  the  DGS  in  accordance  with 
Articles 11 and 12.’; 

(f) 

paragraph 10 is deleted; 

(g) 

the following paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 are added: 

‘11. Member States shall ensure that in the context of the measures referred to 
in Article 11(1), (2), (3) and (5), DGSs may use the funds originating from the 
alternative  funding  arrangements  referred  to  in  Article  10(9)  which  are  not 
financed through public funds, before using the available financial means and 
before  collecting  the  extraordinary  contributions  referred  to  in  Article  10(8). 
Member  States  shall  ensure  that  DGSs  use  alternative  funding  arrangements 
financed through public funds only as a last resort. 

12. The EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify: 

(a) 

(b) 

the  methodology  for  the  calculation  of  available  financial  means 
qualifying  for  the  target  level  referred  to  in  paragraph  2,  including  the 
delineation of the available financial means of DGSs and the categories 
of available financial means that derive from contributed funds; 

the  details  of  the  process  to  reach  the  target  level  referred  to  in 
paragraph 2  after  a  DGS  has  used  available  financial  means  in 
accordance with Article 11. 

EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission 
by … [OP – please insert the date = 24 months after the date of entry into force 
of this Directive]. 

Power  is  delegated  to  the  Commission  to  supplement  this  Directive  by 
adopting the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph 
in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. 

13. By… [OP – please insert the date = 24 months after the date of entry into 
force of this Directive] The EBA shall develop guidelines to assists DGSs with 
the diversification of their available financial means and on how DGSs could 
invest in low-risk assets applicable to the available financial means of DGSs.’; 

(12) 

Article 11 is replaced by the following: 

‘Article 11 

Use of funds 

1. Member States shall ensure that DGSs use the available financial means referred 
to  in  Article  10  primarily  to  repay  depositors  in  accordance  with  Article  8  without 
prejudice  to  the  use  of  additional  financial  means  collected  by  DGSs  for  the 
fulfilment of mandates other than depositor protection under this Directive.  

EN 

34 

  EN 

 
2. Member States shall ensure that DGSs use the available financial means to finance 
the  resolution  of  credit  institutions  in  accordance  with  Article  109  of  Directive 
2014/59/EU.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  resolution  authorities  determine  the 
amount  that  a  DGS  is  to  contribute  to  the  financing  of  resolution  of  credit 
institutions, after those resolution authorities have consulted the DGS on the results 
of the least cost test referred to in Article 11e of this Directive. 

3.  Member  States  may  allow  DGSs  to  use  the  available  financial  means  for 
preventive measures as referred to in Article 11a for the benefit of a credit institution 
where all of the following applies: 

(a) 

(b) 

none of the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4) of Directive 2014/59/EU 
are present; 

the DGS has confirmed that the cost of the measure does not exceed the cost of 
repaying depositors as calculated in accordance with Article 11e; 

(c) 

all of the conditions laid down in Articles 11a and 11b are met.  

4. Where available financial means are used for preventive measures as referred to in 
Article 11a, the affiliated credit institutions shall immediately provide the DGS with 
the  means  used  for  such  measures,  where  necessary  in  the  form  of  extraordinary 
contributions, where any of the following applies: 

(a) 

the  need  to  repay  depositors  arises  and  the  available  financial  means  of  the 
DGS amount to less than two-thirds of the target level; 

(b) 

the available financial means of the DGS fall below 25 % of the target level. 

5. Where a credit institution is wound up in accordance with Article 32b of Directive 
2014/59/EU  in  order  to  exit  the  market  or  terminate  its  banking  activity,  Member 
States may allow DGSs to use the available financial means for alternative measures 
to preserve the access of depositors to their deposits, including the transfer of assets 
and liabilities and a deposit book transfer, provided that the  DGS confirms that the 
cost of the measure does not exceed the cost of repaying depositors as calculated in 
accordance with Article 11e of this Directive and that all the conditions laid down in 
Article 11d of this Directive are met.’; 

(13) 

the following Articles 11a to 11e are inserted: 

‘Article 11a 

Preventive measures 

1.  Where  Member  States  allow  the  use  of  DGS  funds  for  preventive  measures  as 
referred to in Article 11(3), Member States shall ensure that DGSs use the available 
financial  means  for  the  preventive  measures  referred  to  in  Article  11(3),  provided 
that all of the following conditions are met: 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

the request of a credit institution for the financing of such preventive measures 
is accompanied by a note containing measures as referred to in Article 11b; 

the  credit  institution  has  consulted  the  competent  authority  on  the  measures 
envisaged in the note referred to in Article 11b; 

the use of preventive measures by the DGS is linked to conditions imposed on 
the  supported  credit  institution,  involving  at  least  more  stringent  risk 
monitoring of the credit institution and greater verification rights for the DGS; 

EN 

35 

  EN 

 
(d) 

(e) 

(f) 

the use of the preventive measures by the DGS is conditional upon the credit 
institution’s commitments to secure access to covered deposits; 

the affiliated credit institutions  are able to pay the extraordinary contributions 
in accordance with Article 11(4); 

the credit institution complies with its obligations under this Directive and has 
fully reimbursed any previous preventive measure. 

2.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  DGSs  have  monitoring  systems  and  decision-
making  procedures  in  place  that  are  appropriate  for  selecting  and  implementing 
preventive measures and monitoring affiliated risks. 

3. Member States shall ensure that DGSs may implement preventive measures only 
where  the  designated  authority  has  confirmed  that  all  the  conditions  laid  down  in 
paragraph  1  have  been  met.  The  designated  authority  shall  notify  the  competent 
authority and the resolution authority. 

4. Member States shall ensure that the DGS which uses its available financial means 
for  capital  support  measures  transfers  its  holdings  of  shares  or  other  capital 
instruments  in  the  supported  credit  institution  to  the  private  sector  as  soon  as 
commercial and financial circumstances allow. 

‘Article 11b 

Note accompanying preventive measures 

1. Member States shall ensure that credit institutions which request a DGS to finance 
preventive  measures  in  accordance  with  Article  11(3)  present  to  the  competent 
authority for consultation a note with measures that those credit institutions commit 
to  undertake  to  ensure  or  restore  compliance  with  the  supervisory  requirements 
applicable  to  the  credit  institution  concerned  and  that  are  laid  down  in  Directive 
2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.  

2.  The  note  referred  to  in  paragraph  1  shall  set  out  actions  to  mitigate  the  risk  of 
deterioration of the financial soundness and strengthen the credit institution’s capital 
and liquidity position.  

3. Member States shall ensure that in the event of a capital support measure, the note 
referred  to  in  paragraph  1  identifies  all  capital  raising  measures  that  can  be 
implemented, including safeguards preventing outflows of funds,  a forward-looking 
capital adequacy assessment, and a subsequent determination of the capital shortfall 
that the DGS has to cover. 

4.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  in  the  event  of  a  liquidity  support  measure,  the 
note referred to  in  paragraph 1  provides for  a clearly specified  repayment  schedule 
by the credit institution of any funds received as part of the preventive measures. 

5.  Where  relevant,  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  the  measures  envisaged  in  the 
note referred to in paragraph 1 are aligned with the capital conservation plan referred 
to in Article 142 of Directive 2013/36/EU. 

6. Where the Union State aid  framework is  applicable, Member States shall ensure 
that the measures  envisaged in  the note  referred  to  in  paragraph 1  are  aligned with 
the  restructuring  plan  that  the  credit  institution  is  required  to  submit  to  the 
Commission under that framework. 

EN 

36 

  EN 

 
 
 
 ‘Article 11c 

Remediation plan 

1.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  where  the  credit  institution  fails  to  fulfil  the 
commitments outlined in the note referred to in Article 11b(1), or fails to repay the 
amount contributed under the preventive measures at maturity, the DGS informs the 
competent authority thereof without delay.  

2.  In  the  situation  referred  to  in  paragraph  1,  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  the 
competent  authority  requests  the  credit  institution  to  submit  a  remediation  plan 
describing  the  steps  the  credit  institution  will  take  to  ensure  or  restore  compliance 
with supervisory requirements, to ensure its long term viability and to repay the due 
amount contributed by the DGS to the preventive measure, as well as the associated 
timeframe.  

3. Where the competent authority is not satisfied that the remediation plan is credible 
or  feasible,  the  DGS  shall  not  grant  any  further  preventive  measures  to  that  credit 
institution. 

4. By … [OP – please insert the date = 42 months after the date of entry into force of 
this  Directive]  the  EBA  shall  issue  guidelines  setting  elements  of  the  note 
accompanying  the  preventive  measures  referred  to  in  Article  11b(1)  and  the 
remediation plan referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.  

‘Article 11d 

Transparency of marketing process in alternative measures  

1.  Where  Member  States  allow  the  use  of  DGS  funds  for  the  alternative  measures 
referred to in Article 11(5), they shall ensure that when DGSs finance such measures 
the credit institutions market, or make arrangements for the marketing of, the assets, 
rights and liabilities those credit institutions intend to transfer. Without prejudice to 
the  Union  State  aid  framework,  such  marketing  shall  comply  with  all  of  the 
following:  

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

the  marketing  is  open  and  transparent  and  does  not  misrepresent  the  assets, 
rights and liabilities that are to be transferred; 

the marketing does not favour, nor discriminate between, potential purchasers 
and does not confer any advantages on a potential purchaser; 

the marketing is free from any conflict of interest; 

the marketing takes  account  of the need to implement  a rapid  solution  taking 
into account  the  deadline laid down in  Article 3(2), second subparagraph, for 
the determination referred to in Article 2(1), point (8)(a);  

(e) 

the marketing aims at maximising, as much as possible, the sale price for the 
assets, rights and liabilities concerned. 

‘Article 11e 

Least cost test 

1.  When  considering  the  use  of  DGS  funds  for  the  measures  referred  to  in 
Article 11(2), (3) or (5), Member States shall ensure that DGSs make a comparison 
of the following: 

EN 

37 

  EN 

 
(a) 

the estimated cost for the DGS to finance the measures referred to in Article 11 
(2), (3) or (5); 

(b) 

the estimated cost of repaying depositors in accordance with Article 8(1). 

2. For the comparison referred to in paragraph 1, the following shall apply:  

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

for  the  estimation  of  the  costs  referred  to  in  paragraph  1,  point  (a),  the  DGS 
shall  take  into  account  the  expected  earnings,  operational  expenses  and 
potential losses related to the measure; 

for  the  measures  referred  to  in  Article  11(2)  and  (5),  the  DGS  shall  base  its 
estimation  of  the  cost  of  repaying  depositors,  as  referred  to  in  paragraph  1, 
point  (b),  on  the  valuation  of  the  credit  institution’s  assets  and  liabilities 
referred to in Article 36(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU and the estimate referred 
to in Article 36(8) of that Directive;  

for the measures referred to in Article 11(2), (3) and (5), when estimating the 
cost  of  repaying depositors, as  referred to  in paragraph 1, point (b), the  DGS 
shall  take  into  account  the  expected  ratio  of  recoveries,  the  cost  for  the 
replenishment  of  the  DGS  that  is  to  be  borne  by  credit  institutions  that  are 
members of the DGS, and the potential additional cost of funding for the DGS; 

for  the  measures  referred  to  in  Article  11(3),  when  estimating  the  cost  of 
repaying  depositors,  the  DGS  shall  multiply  the  estimated  ratio  of  recoveries 
calculated in accordance with the methodology referred to in paragraph 5, point 
b, by 85 %. 

3. Member States shall ensure that the amount used to finance the resolution of credit 
institutions, as referred to in Article 11(2), for the preventive measures referred to in 
Article  11(3),  or  for  the  alternative  measures  referred  to  in  Article  11(5),  does  not 
exceed the amount of covered deposits at the credit institution. 

4. Member States shall ensure that the competent and resolution authorities provide 
the DGS with all information necessary for the comparison referred to in paragraph 
1.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  the  resolution  authority  provides  the  DGS  with 
the  estimated  cost  of  the  DGS  contribution  to  resolution  of  a  credit  institution  as 
referred to in Article 11(2). 

5. The EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify:  

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

the  methodology  for  the  calculation  of  the  estimated  cost  referred  to  in 
paragraph 1, point (a), which shall take into account the specific features of the 
measure concerned; 

the  methodology  for  the  calculation  of  the  estimated  cost  of  repaying 
depositors referred to in paragraph 1, point (b), including the estimated ratio of 
recoveries referred to in paragraph 2, point (c);  

the way to account, in the methodologies referred to in points (a), (b) and (c), 
where  relevant,  for  the  change  of  value  of  money  due  to  potential  accrued 
earnings over time. 

For  the  calculation  of  the  estimated  cost  of  repaying  depositors  as  referred  to  in 
paragraph 1, point (b), in the case of preventive measures, the methodology referred 
to in point (b) shall take into account the importance of preventive measures for the 
statutory  or  contractual  mandate  of  the  DGS,  including  IPS  referred  to  in  Article 
1(2), point (c). 

EN 

38 

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The EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission 
by …[OP – please insert the date= 12 months after the date of entry into force of this 
Directive]. 

Power is delegated to the Commission to supplement this Directive by adopting the 
regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with 
Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.’; 

(14) 

Article 14 is amended as follows: 

(a) 

paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: 

‘1. Member States shall ensure that DGSs cover the depositors at branches set 
up  by  their  member  credit  institutions  in  other  Member  States  and  depositors 
located  in  Member  States  where  their  member  credit  institutions  exercise  the 
freedom  to  provide  services  as  referred  to  in  Title  V,  Chapter  3,  of  Directive 
2013/36/EU.’; 

(b) 

in paragraph 2, the following subparagraph is added: 

‘By way of derogation from the first subparagraph, Member States shall ensure 
that  a  DGS  of  the  home  Member  State  may  decide  to  repay  depositors  at 
branches directly where all of the following applies: 

(i) 

(ii) 

the  administrative  burden  and  cost  of  such  repayment  is  lower  than  the 
repayment by a DGS of the host Member State; 

the  DGS  of  the  home  Member  State  ensures  that  the  depositors  are  not 
worse off than where the reimbursement  would have been conducted in 
accordance with the first subparagraph.’; 

(c) 

the following paragraphs 2a and 2b are inserted: 

‘2a.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  a  DGS  of  a  host  Member  State  may, 
subject to an agreement with a DGS of a home Member State, act as the point 
of  contact  for  depositors  at  credit  institutions  that  exercise  the  freedom  to 
provide services as referred to in Title V, Chapter 3, of Directive 2013/36/EU, 
and shall be compensated for the costs incurred.  

2b. In the cases referred to in paragraphs 2 and 2a, Member States shall ensure 
that  the  DGS  of  the  home  Member  State  and  the  DGS  of  the  host  Member 
State  concerned  have  an  agreement  in  place  on  the  payout  terms  and 
conditions,  including  on  the  compensation  of  any  costs  incurred,  the  contact 
point for depositors, the timeline and the payment method.’; 

(d)  paragraph 3 is replaced by the following: 

‘3.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  where  a  credit  institution  ceases  to  be 
member of a DGS and joins a DGS of another Member State, or if some of the 
credit institution’s activities are transferred to a DGS of another Member State, 
the DGS of origin shall transfer to the receiving DGS the contributions due for 
the  last  12  months  preceding  the  change  of  DGS  membership,  with  the 
exception of the extraordinary contributions referred to in Article 10(8).’; 

(e) 

the following paragraph 3a is inserted: 

‘3a. For the purposes of paragraph 3, Member States shall ensure that the DGS 
of  origin  transfers  the  amount  referred  to  in  that  paragraph  within  1  month 
from the change of DGS membership.’; 

EN 

39 

  EN 

 
(f) 

the following paragraph 9 is added: 

‘9. The EBA shall issue guidelines on how the EBA sees the respective roles of 
home  and  host  DGSs  as  referred  to  in  paragraph  2,  first  subparagraph,  and 
containing  a  list  of  circumstances  and  conditions  under  which  a  DGS  of  the 
home  Member  State  should  be  able  to  decide  to  reimburse  depositors  at 
branches  located  in  another  Member  State  as  laid  down  paragraph  2,  third 
subparagraph.’; 

(15) 

Article 15 is replaced by the following: 

‘Article 15 

Branches of credit institutions that are established in third countries 

Member States shall require branches of credit institutions that have their head office 
outside  the  Union  to  join  a  DGS  within  their  territory  before  they  allow  such 
branches to take eligible deposits in those Member States.’; 

(16) 

the following Article 15a is inserted: 

‘Article 15a 

Member credit institutions that have branches in third countries 

Member States shall ensure that DGSs do not cover depositors at branches that have 
been  set  up  in  third  countries  by  their  member  credit  institutions,  except  where, 
subject to the approval of the designated authority, those DGSs raise corresponding 
contributions from the credit institutions concerned.’; 

(17) 

Article 16 is amended as follows: 

(a) 

paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: 

‘1.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  credit  institutions  provide  actual  and 
intending depositors with the information those depositors need to identify the 
DGSs of which the credit institution and its branches are members within the 
Union.  Credit  institutions  shall  provide  that  information  in  the  form  of  an 
information sheet prepared in a data extractable format as defined in Article 2, 
point  (3),  of  Regulation  (EU)  XX/XXXX  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of 
the Council [ESAP Regulation]***. 

_______________________________________________ 

*** 
Regulation  (EU)  XX/XXX  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 
Council  of  dd  mm  jj  establishing  a  European  single  access  point  providing 
centralised  access  to  publicly  available  information  of  relevance  to  financial 
services, capital markets and sustainability.’; 

(b) 

the following paragraph 1a is inserted: 

‘1a.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  the  information  sheet  referred  to  in 
paragraph 1 contains all of the following:  

(i) 

basic information about the protection of deposits; 

(ii) 

contact  details  of  the  credit  institution  as  a  first  point  of  contact  for 
information on the content of the information sheet;  

(iii)  coverage level for deposits as referred to in Article 6(1) and 6(2) in EUR 

or, where relevant, another currency; 

EN 

40 

  EN 

 
(iv)  applicable exclusions from DGS protection; 

(v) 

limit of protection in relation to joint accounts; 

(vi) 

reimbursement period in case of the credit institution’s failure;  

(vii)  currency of reimbursement; 

(viii)  identification of the DGS responsible for protecting a deposit, including a 

reference to its website.’; 

(c) 

paragraph 2 is replaced by the following: 

‘2. Member States shall ensure that credit institutions provide the information 
sheet  referred  to  in  paragraph  1  before  they  enter  into  a  contract  on  deposit-
taking and, subsequently, annually. Depositors shall acknowledge the receipt of 
that information sheet.’; 

(d) 

in paragraph 3, the first subparagraph is replaced by the following: 

‘Member States shall ensure that credit institutions confirm on their depositors’ 
statements  of  account  that  the  deposits  are  eligible  deposits,  including  a 
reference to the information sheet referred to paragraph 1.’; 

(e) 

paragraph 4 is replaced by the following:  

‘4.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  credit  institutions  make  the  information 
referred  to  in  paragraph  1  available  in  the  language  that  was  agreed  by  the 
depositor  and  the  credit  institution  when  the  account  was  opened  or  in  the 
official  language  or  languages  of  the  Member  State  in  which  the  branch  is 
established.’; 

(f) 

paragraphs 6 and 7 are replaced by the following: 

‘6.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  in  the  case  of  a  merger  of  credit 
institutions, conversion of subsidiaries  of a credit  institution  into branches, or 
similar  operations,  credit  institutions  notify  their  depositors  thereof  at  least  1 
month before that operation  takes legal  effect, unless the competent  authority 
allows for a shorter deadline on the grounds of commercial secrecy or financial 
stability.  That  notification  shall  explain  the  impact  of  the  operation  on  the 
depositor protection.  

Member States shall ensure that, where as a result of operations referred to in 
the first subparagraph, depositors with deposits in those credit institutions will 
be affected by the reduced deposit protection, the credit institutions concerned 
notify  those  depositors  that  they  may  withdraw  or  transfer  to  another  credit 
institution  their  eligible  deposits,  including  all  accrued  interest  and  benefits, 
without  incurring  any  penalty  up  to  an  amount  equal  to  the  lost  coverage  of 
their deposits within 3 months following the notification referred to in the first 
subparagraph. 

7. Member States shall ensure that credit institutions that cease to be a member 
of  a  DGS  inform  their  depositors  thereof  at  least  1  month  prior  to  such 
cession.’; 

(g) 

the following paragraph 7a is inserted: 

‘7a.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  designated  authorities,  DGSs  and  credit 
institutions  concerned  inform  depositors,  including  by  a  publication  on  their 
websites,  of  the  fact  that  a  relevant  administrative  authority  has  made  a 

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determination as referred to in Article 2(1), point (8)(a), or a judicial authority 
has made a ruling as referred to in Article 2(1), point (8)(b).’; 

(h)  paragraph 8 is replaced by the following: 

‘8.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  where  a  depositor  uses  internet  banking, 
credit  institutions  provide  the  information  they  have  to  provide  to  their 
depositors under this Directive by electronic means unless a depositor requests 
to receive that information on paper.’; 

(i) 

the following paragraph 9 is added: 

‘9. The EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to specify: 

(a) 

(b) 

the  content  and  the  format  of  the  information  sheet,  referred  to  in 
paragraph 1a; 

the procedure to be followed for the provision of, and the content of, the 
information  to  be  provided  in  the  communications  from  designated 
authorities,  DGSs  or  credit  institutions  to  depositors,  in  the  situations 
referred  to  in  Articles  8b  and  8c  and  in  paragraphs  6,  7  and  7a  of  this 
Article. 

The  EBA  shall  submit  those  draft  implementing  technical  standards  to  the 
Commission by … [OP - please insert date = 12 months after the date of entry 
into force of this Directive].  

Power  is  conferred  on  the  Commission  to  adopt  the  implementing  technical 
standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of 
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.’; 

(18) 

the following Article 16a is inserted: 

‘Article 16a 

Information exchange between credit institutions and DGS, and reporting by 
authorities 

1.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  DGSs,  at  any  time  and  upon  request,  receives 
from  their  affiliated  credit  institutions  all  information  necessary  to  prepare  for  a 
repayment of depositors, in accordance with the identification requirement laid down 
in  Article  5(4),  including  the  information  for  the  purposes  of  Article  8(5)  and 
Articles 8b and 8c.  

2. Member States shall ensure that credit institutions, upon request of a DGS, provide 
the DGS of which they are a member information about: 

(a) 

depositors at branches of those credit institutions;  

(b)  depositors  who  are  recipients  of  services  provided  by  member  institutions  on 

the basis of the freedom to provide services. 

The information referred to in points (a) and (b) shall indicate the Member States in 
which those branches or depositors are located. 

3. Member States shall ensure that, by 31 March each year, DGSs inform the EBA of 
the  amount  of  covered  deposits  in  their  Member  State  on  31  December  of  the 
preceding year. By the same date, DGSs shall also report to the EBA the amount of 
their available financial means, including the share of borrowed resources, payment 

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commitments  and  the  timeline  for  reaching  the  target  level  in  case  of  use  of  DGS 
funds.  

4. Member States shall ensure that the designated authorities notify the EBA, without 
undue delay, about all of the following: 

(a) 

the determination of unavailable deposits pursuant to circumstances referred to 
in Article 2(1), point (8); 

(b)  whether any of the measures referred to in Article 11(2), (3) and (5) have been 
applied  and  the  amount  of  funds  used  in  accordance  with  Article  8(1)  and 
Article 11(2), (3) and (5), and, where applicable and once available, the amount 
of  funds  recovered,  the  resulting  cost  for  the  DGS  and  the  duration  of  the 
recovery process; 

(c) 

(d) 

the availability and the use of alternative funding arrangements as referred to in 
Article 10(3); 

any  DGSs that have ceased to  operate or  the establishment  of any new  DGS, 
including as a result of a merger or of the fact that a DGS started operating on a 
cross-border basis. 

The  notification  referred  to  in  the  first  subparagraph  shall  contain  a  summary 
describing all of the following: 

(a) 

the initial situation of the credit institution; 

(b) 

the measures for which the DGS funds have been used; 

(c) 

the expected amount of available financial means used. 

5. The EBA shall publish the information received in accordance with paragraphs 2 
and 3 and the summary referred to in paragraph 4 without undue delay. 

6. Member States shall ensure that the resolution authorities of the credit institutions 
which are a member of a DGSs provide that DGS, upon request, with the summary 
of the key elements of the resolution plans as referred to in Article 10(7), point (a), of 
Directive 2014/59/EU, provided that such information is necessary for the DGS and 
designated authorities to exercise the obligations referred to in Article 11(2), (3) and 
(5) and in Article 11e. 

7.  The  EBA  shall  develop  draft  implementing  technical  standards  to  specify  the 
procedures to be followed when providing the information referred to in paragraphs 
1 to 4, the templates for providing that information, and to further specify the content 
of that information, taking into account the types of depositors.  

The  EBA  shall  submit  those  draft  implementing  technical  standards  to  the 
Commission by …. [OP - please insert the date = 12 months after the date of entry 
into force of this Directive]. 

Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards 
referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) 
No 1093/2010.’; 

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(19) 

Annex I is deleted. 

1. 

2. 

1. 

Article 2 

Transitional provisions 

Member  States  shall  ensure  that  branches  of  credit  institutions  that  have  their  head 
office  outside  the  Union  and  take  eligible  deposits  in  a  Member  State  on  …  [OP 
please insert the date = date of entry into force], and that are not members of a DGS 
on that date, join a DGS in operation within their territories by [OP please insert the 
date  =  3  months  after  entry  into  force].  Article 1(15)  shall  not  apply  to  those 
branches until [OP please insert the date = 3 months after entry into force]. 

By  way  of  derogation  from  Article  11(3)  of  Directive  2014/49/EU,  as  amended  by 
this Directive, and Articles 11a, 11b, 11c and 11e in relation to preventive measures, 
until [OP – please insert the date = 72 months after the date of entry into force of this 
Directive],  Member  States  may  allow  IPS  referred  to  in  Article 1(1),  point (c),  to 
comply  with  the  national  provisions  implementing  Article  11(3)  of  Directive 
2014/49/EU as applicable on [OP – please insert the date of entry into force of this 
Directive]. 

Article 3 

Transposition 

Member  States  shall  adopt  and  publish,  by  …  [OP  –  please  insert  the  date  =  24 
months  after  the  date  of  entry  into  force  of  this  Directive]  at  the  latest,  the  laws, 
regulations  and  administrative  provisions  necessary  to  comply  with  this  Directive. 
They shall forthwith communicate to the Commission the text of those provisions. 

They shall apply those provisions from … [OP – please insert the date = 24 months 
after  the  date  of  entry  into  force  of  this  Directive].  However,  they  shall  apply  the 
provisions necessary to comply with Article 11(3), as amended by this Directive, and 
Articles  11a,  11b,  11c  and  11e  in  relation  to  preventive  measures  from  …  [PO  – 
please insert the date = 48 months after the date of entry into force of this Directive]. 

When  Member  States  adopt  those  provisions,  they  shall  contain  a  reference  to  this 
Directive  or  be  accompanied  by  such  a  reference  on  the  occasion  of  their  official 
publication. Member States shall determine how such reference is to be made. 

2. 

Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the main provisions 
of national law which they adopt in the field covered by this Directive. 

Article 4 

Entry into force 

This Directive shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in 
the Official Journal of the European Union. 

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Article 5 

Addressees 

This Directive is addressed to the Member States. 

Done at Strasbourg, 

For the European Parliament 
The President 

For the Council 
The President 

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