REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 2021 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REGULATION (EC) N° 300/2008 ON COMMON RULES IN THE FIELD OF CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY
Date: 2023-04-13
Institutions: Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport, European Commission
Subjects: activity report, air safety, aviation security, carriage of goods, civil aviation, coronavirus disease, drone, epidemic, international cooperation, safety standard

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 13.4.2023  COM(2023) 186 final/2  Correction of heading and subheading numbering REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 2021 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REGULATION (EC) N° 300/2008 ON COMMON RULES IN THE FIELD OF CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY          
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION 

According  to  Article  16  of  Regulation  (EC)  No  300/20081,  the  Commission  shall 
every year present a report to the European Parliament, the Council and the Member 
States  informing  them  of  the  application  of  this  Regulation  and  of  its  impact  on 
improving aviation security.  

In  2021,  the  Commission  continued  to  strengthen  aviation  security  rules,  with  a 
particular  focus  on  addressing  the  impact  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic  on  the 
implementation  of  existing  and  new  aviation  security  rules.  In  aviation  security,  the 
objective of the Commission during the pandemic has been twofold: firstly, to ensure 
that  security  is  not  compromised,  as  a  security  incident  would  be  exceptionally 
damaging on top of a health and economic crisis. Secondly, to create a solid basis for 
the  gradual  resumption  of  operations  and  to  restore  public  confidence  in  transport, 
while ensuring that safety and security remain at the highest level.   

2. 

FOR AN ENHANCED, MORE INNOVATIVE AND MORE 
RESILIENT EU AVIATION SECURITY POLICY 

The Commission launched in 2020 a stocktaking exercise and strategic discussion on 
possible  next  steps  for  the  EU  aviation  security  system,  the  purpose  of  which  is  to 
reflect  on  a  strategic  vision  for  the  future  of  aviation  security.  While  delayed  by 
COVID-19 pandemic priorities, the work resumed in 2021. This includes input from 
various work streams in the areas of risk-based security, security culture and holistic 
approach,  innovation,  and  aviation  security  standards.  The  intention  of  the 
Commission is to finalise this work in the beginning of 2023 with proposals for a way 
forward, in terms of possible concrete actions and decisions. 

3. 

INSPECTIONS AND OTHER COMPLIANCE MONITORING 
ACTIVITIES 

3.1 

General 

Regulation  (EC)  No  300/2008  aims  at  preventing  unlawful  interference  with  civil 
aircraft in order to protect persons and goods. While this Regulation requires Member 
States  to  regularly  monitor  the  compliance  of  the  implementation  of  the  common 
basic  aviation  security  standards  by  airports,  air  carriers  and  other  entities  and  to 
ensure the swift detection and correction of failures, the role given to the Commission 

1  

Regulation  (EC)  No  300/2008  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  11  March 
2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation security and repealing Regulation (EC) No 
2320/2002 (OJ L 97, 9.4.2008, p. 72). 

1 

 
                                                           
by the legislator is to monitor the effective implementation by the EU/EEA2 Member 
States of this legal requirement. 

Article  15  of  Regulation  (EC)  No  300/2008  requires  the  Commission  to  conduct 
inspections  and,  as  appropriate,  to  make  recommendations  to  improve  aviation 
security. To fulfil this monitoring objective, the oversight system of the Commission 
covers the activities of the Member States in setting up, maintaining and applying an 
effective  national  civil  aviation  security  programme  and  an  effective  national  civil 
aviation quality control programme.  

To  this  end,  the  Commission  put  in  place  a  two-layer  system  of  compliance 
monitoring,  i.e.  its  own  inspections  complemented  by  the  assessment  of  Member 
States' annual reports on national monitoring activities.  

Since  2010,  the  compliance  rate  identified  during  Commission  inspections  has 
remained stable around 80%. However, this relatively stable figure does not mean that 
Member  States  have  not  increased  their  efforts,  as  the  requirements  in  the  field  of 
aviation  security have  also  strengthened  significantly  over the  years, in  particular in 
areas  such  as  air  cargo  security,  liquids,  aerosols  and  gels  screening,  or  the  use  of 
explosive trace detection. 

3.2 

Frequency and scope of the inspections 

The  Commission  carries  out  inspections  of  Member  States'  aviation  security 
administrations  (the  'appropriate  authorities'),  as  well  as  inspections  of  airports, 
operators and entities applying aviation security standards. 

The  number,  frequency  and  scope  of  these  inspections  are  established  in  the  DG 
MOVE strategy for monitoring the implementation of EU aviation security standards. 
It  takes  into  consideration  the  level  of  aviation  activity  in  each  Member  State,  a 
representative sample of the airport operations type, standard of implementation of the 
aviation security regulations, results of previous Commission inspections, assessments 
of  national  annual  quality  control  reports,  security  incidents  (acts  of  unlawful 
interference), threat levels and other factors and assessments. 

To  provide  the  Commission  with  adequate  assurances  on  the  compliance  level  of 
Member  States,  a  multiannual  monitoring  approach  is  used.  As  such,  evidence  is 
acquired  concerning  the  application  of  Regulation  (EC)  No  300/2008  and  its 
implementing legislation by every Member State in a cycle of two years, by means of 
either an inspection of its appropriate authority or an inspection of at least one of its 
airports.  

In  addition,  evidence  of  the  application  of  the  common  basic  standards  on  aviation 
security is obtained in a cycle of five  years by a selection of at least 15% of all EU 

2  

European  Economic  Area  countries  +  Switzerland.  EFTA  Surveillance  Authority  (ESA)  is 
responsible for the monitoring of Norway and Iceland. 

2 

 
                                                           
airports  falling  under  Regulation  (EC)  No  300/2008  including  the  largest  airport  in 
terms of passenger volumes in every Member State. The inspections carried out by the 
Commission  at  selected  airports  constitute  a  strong  indicator  of  the  overall 
compliance level in each Member State.  

3.3 

Procedures and methodology for inspections 

Commission Regulation (EU) No 72/20103 lays down the procedures for conducting 
Commission  inspections  in  the  field  of  aviation  security.  It  includes,  inter  alia, 
provisions for the qualification and powers of Commission inspectors. 

The  methodology  used  to  conduct  the  inspections  has  been  developed  in  close 
cooperation  with  Member  States’  aviation  security  authorities  and  is  based  on  the 
verification of the effective implementation of security measures.  

3.4 

Inspections carried out by the Commission 

In  2021,  the  Commission  continued  to  conduct  inspections,  despite  mobility 
restrictions  due  to  the  COVID-19  pandemic.  During  this  time  new  approaches  were 
used,  such  as  documentation-based  remote  inspections  of  appropriate  authorities. 
Physical on-site airport inspection activities were resumed in October 2021. 

To  carry  out  its  inspection  work,  the  Commission  had  a  team  of  seven  full  time 
aviation  security  inspectors,  supported  by  a  pool  of  some  80  national  auditors 
nominated by Member States who qualify for participation in Commission inspections 
through training provided by the Commission. 

In  addition,  a  significant  number  of  national  auditors  participating  in  Commission 
inspections  ensures  a  peer  review  system  and  allows  spreading  methodologies  and 
best practices across Member States and associated countries.4  

3.4.1  Inspections of national appropriate authorities 

The  inspections  of  appropriate  authorities  aim  at  verifying  whether  Member  States 
have  the  necessary  tools  –  including  a  national  quality  control  programme,  legal 
authority and appropriate resources – to be able to adequately implement EU aviation 
security legislation.  

The Commission continued its sixth cycle of appropriate authority inspections in 2021 
with  eight  inspections.  The  results  highlighted  the  need  for  additional  effort  by 
Member States, in particular in the following areas: security programmes of airports, 

3 

4  

Commission  Regulation  (EU)  No  72/2010  of  26  January  2010  laying  down  procedures  for 
conducting Commission  inspections  in the field of aviation security (OJ  L  23, 27.1.2010, p. 
1). 
See  Annex  1  for  a  chart  summarising  all  Commission  and  ESA  compliance  monitoring 
activities in 2021. 

3 

 
                                                           
operators  and  entities  that  were  still  not  fully  in  line  with  the  regulations;  the 
methodology required for inspections and the elements to be included in compliance 
monitoring  reporting;  minimum  frequencies  for  security  audits  and  inspections;  and 
where required or applicable, proper risk assessments to define security measures or 
certain  exemptions.  In  addition,  some  Member  States  did  not  monitor  with  the 
expected regularity national and/or foreign air carriers and some entities with security 
responsibilities. 

Nevertheless, most of the Member States inspected in 2021 did align national aviation 
security programmes with EU legislation, provided their appropriate authorities with 
the  necessary  enforcement  powers  for  monitoring  and  enforcing  all  requirements  of 
the Regulation and its implementing acts, ensured that a sufficient number of auditors 
were  available  for  performing  compliance  monitoring  activities,  and  implemented 
most of the requirements related to security training. 

3.4.2 Initial inspections at airports 

The  inspections  of  airports  aim  at  verifying  if  the  appropriate  authority  adequately 
monitors the effective implementation of aviation security measures and is capable of 
swiftly  detecting  and  rectifying  potential  deficiencies.  In  both  cases,  any  deficiency 
identified  by  Commission  inspectors  must  be  rectified  within  an  established 
timeframe. Inspection reports are shared amongst all Member States.  

After the 12th year of implementation of Regulation (EC) No 300/2008, the inspection 
results reflect the efforts made by appropriate authorities and the industry. Most of the 
security  requirements  were  correctly  implemented.  However,  the  three  initial 
inspections of airports conducted in 2021 highlighted difficulties encountered by the 
airport  operators  in  the  effective  implementation  of  some  measures,  for  instance 
access control and cabin baggage screening. 

3.4.3 Follow-up inspections 

In  accordance  with  Article  13  of  Regulation  (EU)  No  72/2010,  the  Commission 
routinely carries out a limited number of follow-up inspections. Such inspections are 
scheduled  when  several  serious  deficiencies  have  been  identified  during  the  initial 
inspection, but also on a random basis to verify that appropriate authorities have the 
necessary powers to require rectification of deficiencies within set timeframes. As on-
site inspections were on hold until autumn 2021, only one follow-up inspection was 
carried out this year. 

3.5 

Assessments of Member States' annual quality control report 

Point  18  of  the  Annex  to  Regulation  (EC)  No  300/2008  requires  Member  States  to 
annually  submit  a  report  to  the  Commission  on  the  measures  taken  to  fulfil  their 
obligations  under  this  Regulation  and  on  the  aviation  security  situation  at  airports 
located in their territory. 

4 

 
The assessment of these reports, in addition to its own regular inspections, provides a 
tool  for  the  Commission  to  closely  follow  the  implementation  of  robust  national 
quality  control  measures.  This,  in  turn,  allows  for  swift  detection  and  correction  of 
deficiencies in each Member State.  

The assessment includes an analysis of regular monitoring of airports, air carriers and 
other  entities  with  aviation  security  responsibilities,  as  well  as  time  spent  by  the 
auditors  in  the  field,  scope  and  frequencies  of  a  suitable  mixture  of  compliance 
monitoring activities, national compliance levels,  follow-up activities and the use of 
enforcement powers. 

The COVID-19 pandemic significantly  impacted the capability of Member States  to 
perform  their  ordinary  quality  control  activities  conducted  on-site  at  airports  and  at 
other operators’ sites during 2021. 

Therefore, the assessment for the 2021 annual reports performed by the Commission 
focused  on  the  ordinary  quality  control  tools  that  could  be  implemented  by  the 
Member  States,  combined  with  an  evaluation,  and  weighing  of  alternative  and 
additional  compliance  monitoring  activities5  that  were  conducted  during  the  most 
severe  lockdown  period.  The  Commission  noted  that  while  some  Member  States 
could  discharge  their  quality  control  obligations  in  full  using  the  ordinary 
methodology  and tools,  most  made large use of  alternative  and  additional  activities. 
This contributed to the achievement of satisfactory performance.   

The  assessment  of  the  annual  reports  acknowledged  the  outstanding  efforts  put  in 
place  by  all  Member  States  in  maintaining  their  aviation  security  regime  under 
continuous review through a combination of desktop assessments and where possible, 
targeted  on-site  activities.  No  shortcomings  or  weaknesses  for  follow-up  were 
revealed. 

The  Commission  sent  a  formal  comprehensive  evaluation  to  the  Member  States 
highlighting,  where  needed,  suggestions  on  how  to  improve  or  better  tailor  the 
national efforts.  

3.6 

Assessments of third country airports 

In  normal  circumstances,  assessments  are  conducted  in  the  context  of  One  Stop 
Security  (OSS)  arrangements  between  the  EU  and  third  countries  to  confirm  the 
implementation of certain security measures continues to be of an equivalent standard 
to  the  implementation  of  EU  aviation  security  legislation.  In  2021,  this  was  not 
possible due to the pandemic. 

5 

Consisting,  inter  alia,  in  the  assessment  and  review  of  the  national  security  programmes, 
security  programmes  of  airlines,  airport  operators  and  other  entities,  on-line  training  and 
certification  activities,  review  of  national  risk  assessments,  desktop  inspections,  analysis  of 
trends, etc. 

5 

 
                                                           
3.7 

Article 15 cases and legal proceedings 

If identified deficiencies in the implementation of security measures at an airport are 
serious  enough  as  to  have  a  significant  impact  on  the  overall  level  of  civil  aviation 
security in the Union, the Commission will activate Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 
72/2010. This means that all other appropriate authorities are alerted to the situation 
and  compensatory  measures  would  have  to  be  considered  in  respect  of  flights  from 
the airport in question. No such case was initiated in 2021. 

The  Commission  also  has  the  possibility  to  open  infringement  proceedings, 
particularly  in  cases  of  prolonged  non-rectification  or  recurrence  of  deficiencies.  In 
2021, no such proceedings were launched. 

4. 

LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK AND SUPPLEMENTARY TOOLS  

4.1 

Legislative framework 

Civil aviation remains an attractive target for hostile actors and countering this threat 
requires  the  implementation  of  proportionate,  risk  based  protective  measures.  The 
Commission  and  Member  States  are  therefore  constantly  adjusting  the  mitigation 
measures to achieve the highest level of security while minimising adverse effects on 
operations. 

Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  2015/1998  was  amended  in  February  2021  by 
Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  2021/2556.  The  latter  contains  provisions  for 
extending  the  applicability  of  alternative  and  expedited  processes  for  EU  aviation 
security  validations  of  the  Union-bound  supply  chain  operators  affected  by  the 
COVID-19  pandemic,  introduces  rules  concerning  Pre-Loading  Advance  Cargo 
Information  (PLACI),  and  provides  flexibility  for  the  process  of  installation  of 
standard 3 explosive detection systems (EDS) equipment.  

4.2 

Union database on supply chain security  

The Commission deployed a new enhanced version of the Union database7 on supply 
chain  security  in  November  2021.  It  constitutes  the  only  legal  tool  for  consultation 
when  accepting  consignments  from  another  regulated  agent  or  from  a  known 
consignor. The same database also includes a list  of approved civil aviation security 
equipment with ‘EU Stamp’ marking.   

6  

7 

Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  2021/255  of  18  February  2021  amending 
Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  2015/1998 
the 
implementation  of  the  common  basic  standards  on  aviation  security  (OJ  L  58, 19.2.2021, p. 
23). 
https://ksda.ec.europa.eu/  

laying  down  detailed  measures  for 

6 

 
                                                           
At the end of 2021, the database contained about 20 000 records of regulated agents, 
known  consignors,  independent  validators,  ACC3  airlines,  regulated  suppliers,  third 
country regulated agents and known consignors, security equipment and airports. Its 
target availability rate of 99.7% was continuously met in 2021.   

4.3 

Pre-Loading Advance Cargo Information (PLACI) 

The  first  phase  of  the  new  customs  import  system  (ICS2)  based  on  pre-loading 
advance  cargo  information  requirements  in  respect  of  postal/mail  and  express 
consignments for air cargo and mail security risk analysis purposes was launched on 
15 March 2021. 

Under PLACI requirements, details pertaining to each shipment flying to the EU from 
third  country  locations  are  to  be  electronically  submitted  to  EU  customs  by  the 
economic  operators  responsible  for  bringing  consignments  into  the  Union  customs 
territory and analysed for civil aviation security purposes by the  customs authorities 
of the first point of entry in the EU. 

The outcome of the PLACI risk analysis may require the implementation of specific 
mitigating aviation security measures. These must be applied by economic operators 
engaged in the EU in-bound supply chain before the consignment is loaded on board 
of  an  EU-bound  flight.  The  Commission  organised  in  January  2021  a  second  joint 
workshop with aviation security authorities and national customs authorities to foster 
smooth PLACI implementation.  

5. 

TRIALS, MEETINGS AND NEW INITIATIVES 

5.1 

Trials 

A 'trial' in the sense of EU aviation security legislation is conducted when a Member 
State  agrees  with  the  Commission  that  it  will  use  a  particular  means  or  method  not 
recognised under the terms of the legislation to replace one of the recognised security 
controls, for a limited period on condition that such trial does not impact  negatively 
on the overall levels of security. No trials were conducted or initiated during 2021. 

5.2 

Meetings  

The Commission organised in October 2021 a second virtual meeting of the Aviation 
Cybersecurity  Working  Group,  bringing 
together  Member  State  authorities 
responsible for aviation security and implementation of the NIS Directive8, as well as 
stakeholders. The Commission considers that implementing and further improving the 

8  

Directive  (EU)  2016/1148  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  6  July  2016 
concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems 
across the Union (OJ L 194, 19.7.2016, p. 1). 

7 

 
                                                           
complex  regulatory  environment  of  aviation  cybersecurity  can  greatly  benefit  from 
the  sharing  of  experience  and  best  practices  within  such  a  working  group.  There  is 
also a keen interest to ensure that the specificities of the aviation sector are considered 
and  to  see  how  sectorial  and  horizontal  efforts  can  complement  each  other,  while 
avoiding duplication of effort and undue burden on administrations and industry. 

With  the  aim  to  provide  Member  States  with  feedback  from  inspections,  promote 
transparency  and harmonise compliance monitoring methodologies, the  Commission 
organised  an  annual  meeting  and  training  of  the  AVSEC  national  inspectors  in 
December 2021, held virtually. 

The Commission co-organised with the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) 
a  virtual  workshop  on  the  impact  of  artificial  intelligence  on  aviation  security 
equipment  in  May  2021.  The  aim  of  this  workshop  was  to  contribute  to  a  common 
understanding  by  bringing  together  international  AI  experts,  practitioners  and  end-
users  and  prepare  further  work,  notably  in  the  area  of  automated  detection  of 
prohibited items. 

5.3 

New initiatives 

Progress was made regarding the development of new aviation security technologies. 
Work was notably undertaken to elaborate security equipment detection standards to 
tackle new threats, especially chemical substances. To this end, excellent cooperation 
is in place with the United States (US) and other international partners. However, the 
COVID-19  pandemic  impaired  this  cooperation  by  preventing  physical  meetings, 
since  this  activity  requires  the  exchange  of  classified  information  in  a  secure 
environment. 

6. 

THREAT EVENTS AND OUTLOOK 

6.1 

General 

International jihadist terrorism remains a major threat to the EU that requires careful 
monitoring9.  Despite  global  efforts  to  limit  terrorist  financing  sources,  terrorist 
organisations still have access  to  large  cash  reserves10 to  finance their activities and 
propaganda. They retain intent to attack aviation as a high-profile target as well as the 
capability to develop innovative explosive concealments. It is expected that the threats 
and  challenges  of  aviation  security  will  continue  to  evolve,  as  well  increase  in  the 
diversity  of  modus  operandi  of  attack.  Other  potential  threats  such  as  chemical, 
biological,  radiological  and  nuclear  (CBRN)  are  continually  being  assessed  by  the 
Commission and Member States. Insider threats and home-grown terrorism remain an 

9  
10  

See for example: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12315-2021-INIT/en/pdf 
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0532  

8 

 
                                                           
area of particular attention. At the same time, other threats and means of attack have 
come  into  focus.  Conflict  zones  will  continue  to  provide  terrorists  with  an 
environment  offering  the  opportunity  to  acquire  more  sophisticated  military  grade 
equipment and to exploit less stringent aviation security measures.  

The  Commission,  together  with  the  relevant  agencies,  maintained  a  continuous 
dialogue  on,  and  regular  monitoring  of,  emerging  security  threats  for  aviation, 
including  those  of  a  hybrid  nature,  with  Member  States  and  other  stakeholders,  to 
build  up  the  knowledge  and  capacity  to  react  to  those  threats,  effectively  managing 
the risk. 

6.2 

Cybersecurity 

In  the  context  of  aviation’s  growing  reliance  on  information  technology  and  digital 
operational  systems,  cybersecurity  is  becoming  ever  more  critical.  Cyber-attacks 
targeting  transport  could  potentially  have  disastrous  consequences  and  lead  to  a 
significant  economic  disruption.  This  is  of  particular  concern  when  considering  that 
different  cyber-incidents  throughout  2021  demonstrated  the  vulnerability  of  the 
sector.11  In  its  efforts  to  make  the  transport  sector  and  related  infrastructure  more 
resilient, the Commission confirmed that the EU will update and improve the existing 
security  framework,  including  the  means  to  tackle  cyber  threats,  under  the 
overarching umbrella of the existing rules governing this matter12. The cyber domain 
points  to  a  number  of  specific  challenges,  including  the  array  of  actors  and 
motivations (beyond terrorist groups). The Commission has adopted measures also in 
this domain13, in  the  face  of more malicious intentions  and increased  capabilities of 
hostile third parties. The situation in aviation underlines the need to ensure maximum 
the  Commission’s 
consistency  between  horizontal  and  sectoral  rules.  From 
perspective,  it  is  imperative  to  avoid  duplication  and  burden  on  operators  and 
administrations. 

6.3 

Drones 

The unlawful use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), better known as drones, can 
disrupt airport operations and may endanger aircraft and their occupants.14 In March 

11  

12  

13  

14  

However, observed cyber-incidents were mostly ransomware-type of attacks, with no impact 
on safety and security. 
Paragraph 102 of the Communication from the  Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council,  the  European  Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions, 
Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy – putting European transport on track for the future, 
COM(2020) 789 final, 9 December 2020. 
For  instance,  cyber  requirements  under  Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU) 
2019/1583  of  25  September  2019  entered  into  force  on  31  December  2021  and  their 
implementation is subject to the inspection programme of the Commission. 
According  to  EASA  data,  the  number  of  drone  occurrences  being  reported  has  steadily 
increased since 2014. The increase halted in 2020 (latest figures available), presumably due to 
the covid restrictions. 

9 

 
                                                           
2021, EASA – with the support of the Commission – issued guidance to help aviation 
operators  and  national  authorities  to  manage  drone  incidents  at  and  around  airports. 
On 22 April 2021, the Commission adopted a regulatory framework for the European 
unmanned traffic management concept (the U-Space)15, which will make it easier for 
authorities  to  distinguish  between  cooperative  and  non-cooperative  drones.  The 
Commission  is  also  supporting  innovative  projects  such  as  Skyfall16  or  Courageous 
for  counter-UAS  system  testing.  Increasing  system  resilience  and  counter-UAS 
capabilities  also  forms  an  integral  part  of  the  “Drone  Strategy  2.0”17,  which  the 
Commission adopted in November 2022. 

6.4 

Conflict Zones 

Under the Conflict  Zone Alerting System common risk assessments took place on a 
regular  basis,  with  some  practical  limitations  imposed  by  the  COVID-19  pandemic, 
under the lead of the integrated EU aviation security risk assessment group. The aim 
of this exercise is to share information on the assessment of risks arising from conflict 
zones in a timely manner to support risk mitigation. In case of urgency,  exceptional 
meetings are arranged.18 

In 2021, the Commission launched a review process with Member States represented 
in  the  group  and  EASA  on  how  to  further  streamline  the  conflict  zones  risk 
assessment process. It resulted in better defined rules governing the issuance of EASA 
Conflict  Zones  Information  Bulletins  (CZIBs)  and  EASA  information  notes, 
facilitation of their dissemination and special arrangements for urgencies.  

The  integrated  EU  aviation  security  risk  assessment  process  also  provides  risk 
assessment capability and supports the decision-making process (risk mitigation) for 
air cargo security and aviation security standards. 

7. 

INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE 

7.1 

General 

The  Commission  continued  its  contribution  to  the  enhancement  of  aviation  security 
worldwide.  It did so by engaging with international bodies, such as the International 
Civil  Aviation  Organisation  (ICAO),  and  key  trading  partners,  and  working  closely 
with  Member  States  to  ensure  co-ordinated  EU  positions.  Bilateral  dialogues  were 

15 

16  
17  

18  

https://transport.ec.europa.eu/news/drones-commission-adopts-new-rules-and-conditions-safe-
secure-and-green-drone-operations-2021-04-22_en  
https://www.projectskyfall.org/  
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Drone Strategy 2.0 for 
a Smart and Sustainable Unmanned Aircraft Eco-System in Europe, COM(2022) 652 final, 29 
November 2022 
For example, in August 2021 for Afghanistan. 

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also held with certain third countries, such as  the US, Canada, Australia, Singapore, 
and the United Kingdom (UK).   

7.2 

International bodies 

The  EU  actively  participated,  as  an  observer,  in  the  annual  meeting  of  the  ICAO 
Aviation Security Panel (AVSECP/32) which took place on 31 May to 4 June 2021 in 
a  virtual  setting.  The  main  deliverable  was  an  agreement  on  a  proposal  for 
Amendment-18 to Annex 17 (Security) to the Chicago Convention.  

7.3 

Third countries 

In the context of relations with the United States, the EU-US Transportation Security 
Cooperation Group (TSCG) aims at fostering co-operation in several areas of mutual 
interest.  It  ensures  the  continued  functioning  of  One  Stop  Security  (OSS) 
arrangements  and  of  the  mutual  recognition  of  respective  EU  and  US  air  cargo  and 
mail regimes. These initiatives save air transport operators’ time, cost, and operational 
complexity. Due to COVID-19 pandemic constraints, no formal TSCG meeting took 
place in 2021. However, there were continuing contacts between the EU and the TSA 
(Transportation Security Administration) throughout the year via virtual means. 

In conformity with EU law, the Commission has established agreements recognising 
security  standards  applied  in  some  third  countries,  or  airports  of  third  countries,  as 
equivalent to EU standards.19 No new OSS arrangements were concluded in 2021. In 
the case of Israel, all development projects at Tel Aviv Ben Gurion Airport, including 
investment into screening technology required for OSS,  have been postponed due to 
the  negative  financial  effects  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic.  Technical  discussions 
between the Commission and Japan on OSS are on-going.  

As from 1 January 2021, the UK is no longer part of the EU. However, the OSS from 
the UK is maintained20 with benefits for airports, airlines and passengers in the EU. 

Regarding  capacity  building,  the  “Civil  Aviation  Security  in  Africa,  Asia  and  the 
Middle  East”  project  (CASE  II),  implemented  by  ECAC,  continued  in  2021.21 
However, the delivery of project activities was severely hampered by the COVID-19 
pandemic,  which  limited  outputs  mainly  to  online  activities  including  regional 
workshops and some state-to-state training activities. The overall objective of CASE 

19  

20 

21  

EU has OSS with, among others, the US, Canada, Singapore, Montenegro, Serbia, the UK and 
Israel (only for hold baggage). 
Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  2019/413  of  14  March  2019  amending 
Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  2015/1998  as  regards  third  countries  applying  security 
standards  equivalent  to  the  common  basic  standards  on  civil  aviation  security  (OJ  L  73, 
15.3.2019, p. 98). 
The project is entirely EU-funded with a budget of EUR 8 million for four years. 

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II is to counter the threat of terrorism to civil aviation by partnering with States in the 
three regions, to strengthen their aviation security regimes.22 

8. 

CONCLUSIONS 

In  2021,  the  COVID-19  pandemic  continued  to  have  a  profound  effect  on  all  usual 
Commission  and  Member  States  activities.  Normal  on-site  inspections  could  only 
resume  in  October  2021  before  which  only  documentation-based  assessments  of 
appropriate authorities were  conducted  from  March 2020.  International  co-operation 
on aviation security was also impacted for the same reason.  

However,  the  Commission  notes  with  satisfaction  that  throughout  the  COVID-19 
pandemic the importance of maintaining effective security measures was understood, 
also as key factor in underpinning the sector’s recovery. Moreover, it was observed in 
a context of dramatic shifts in air travel demand and workforce issues.   

As  to  the  future,  the  Commission  is  continuously  reflecting  on  how  the  current 
aviation security framework could be further improved. To this end, it is considering 
ways  to  increase  its  efficiency,  sustainability,  and  flexibility,  without  compromising 
the high levels of security achieved thus far.    

22  

Partner States are selected based on objective criteria, such as the commitment/capability of a 
given  State  to  fully  benefit  from  the  capacity-building  activities  delivered  by  the  Project,  or 
the absence of possible duplication with other capacity-building initiatives, either bilateral or 
multilateral. 

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