COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules promoting the repair of goods and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2394, Directives (EU) 2019/771 and (EU) 2020/1828
Date: 2023-03-22
Institutions: Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, European Commission
Subjects: Internet, after-sales service, consumer information, consumer law, goods and services, maintenance, product life, single market, sustainable product

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 22.3.2023  SWD(2023) 59 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT  Accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council  on common rules promoting the repair of goods and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2394, Directives (EU) 2019/771 and (EU) 2020/1828 {COM(2023) 155 final} - {SEC(2023) 137 final} - {SWD(2023) 60 final}  
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT ................................................................3 

Political context ...........................................................................................................3 

Related policy initiatives and legal context .................................................................4 

2. 

PROBLEM DEFINITION .....................................................................................................................7 

Problem 1: Premature disposal of repairable consumer goods within the legal guarantee

 ............................................................................................................................7 

Problem 2: Premature disposal of repairable consumer goods beyond the legal guarantee 

 ............................................................................................................................8 

The scale of the problem ............................................................................................11 

What are the problem drivers? ...................................................................................14 

Driver 1: Choice within the legal guarantee favours replacement with new goods in case 
ofdefect 14 

Driver 2: Lack of transparency on availability and conditions of repair ......................... 15 

Driver 3: Inconvenience factors dissuade consumers from repair ................................... 16 

Driver 4: Repair is not economically attractive for consumers outside the legal 
guarantee .......................................................................................................................... 17 

Other drivers beyond the scope of this initiative ............................................................. 17 

How likely are the problems to persist? .....................................................................19 

3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? ......................................................................................................... 22 

Legal basis .................................................................................................................22 

Subsidiarity: Necessity and added value of EU action ..............................................23 

4.  OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? ................................................................................ 24 

General objective .......................................................................................................24 

Specific objectives .....................................................................................................25 

Increasing repair and reuse of viable consumer goods within the legal guarantee 
(Addressing problem 1) ................................................................................................... 25 

Increasing repair and reuse of viable consumer goods beyond the legal guarantee 
(Addressing problem 2) ................................................................................................... 25 

5.  WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? ..................................................................... 25 

What is the baseline from which options are assessed (Option 0)? ...........................25 

Description of the policy options ...............................................................................28 

CLUSTER I: Options to promote repair and reuse of goods within the legal guarantee 28 

CLUSTER II: Options to encourage repair and reuse of goods beyond the legal 
guarantee .......................................................................................................................... 31 

Options for instruments.................................................................................................... 35 

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6.  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? ............................................................ 35 

Impact of the baseline scenario ..................................................................................35 

CLUSTER I: Promoting repair and reuse within the legal guarantee .......................38 

Impacts of Option 1: Promoting repair within the SGD remedies system ...................... 38 

Impacts of Option 2: Prolonging the liability period in repair context ............................ 40 

Impacts of Option 3: Replacement with refurbished goods............................................. 43 

Impacts of Option 4: Aligning the liability period for refurbished goods ....................... 45 

CLUSTER II: Facilitating and encouraging repair and reuse beyond the legal guarantee

 ..........................................................................................................................47 

Impacts of Option 5: Information on where to repair ...................................................... 47 

Impacts of Option 6: Enhance transparency/conditions for repair .................................. 51 

Impacts of Option 7: Adding a functionality on refurbished goods in the matchmaking 
platform for repair (PO5B) .............................................................................................. 56 

7.  HOW DO OPTIONS COMPARE ....................................................................................................... 58 

8. 

PREFERRED OPTION ....................................................................................................................... 66 

9.  HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? .................................. 74 

ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ............................................................................................. 76 

ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION ....................................................................................... 84 

ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW? ......................................................................................... 100 

ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL METHODS .................................................................................................... 105 

ANNEX 5: DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE POLICY OPTIONS .................................................... 159 

ANNEX 6: DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF EFFICIENCY OF POLICY OPTIONS ............................... 174 

ANNEX 7: GLOSSARY ............................................................................................................................. 191 

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1.  Introduction: Political and legal context 

Political context  

The European Green Deal1 is one of the Commission main priorities and its contribution to the 
UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development2. It aims to transform the EU into a climate-
neutral, resource-efficient, clean and circular economy. One key element of a circular economy 
is improving the sustainable consumption of goods, thus reducing waste as well as avoiding 
the use of unnecessary resources and the production of CO2 emissions. Extending the lifespan 
of products can also decrease the dependency on global supply chains for crucial raw materials 
as well as foster European resilience and strategic autonomy.  

Promoting  repair  is  vital  to  achieve  more  sustainable  consumption  and  consumers  have  an 
essential role in accomplishing this objective. Increasing repair of consumer products instead 
of  replacing  them  figures  prominently  in  Commission  policy.  The  Green  Deal  already 
envisaged to encourage businesses to offer, and to allow consumers to choose reusable, durable 
and repairable products, as well as to analyse the need for a ‘right to repair’. Looking at the 
sustainable consumption of consumer goods, the New Circular Economy Action Plan (CEAP) 
and the New Consumer Agenda3 announced that the Commission will promote repair and work 
towards a new ‘right to repair’. Both policy documents indicated as a possible legislative tool 
changes to the Sale of Goods Directive (SGD), confirming the focus on consumer goods. Such 
focus complements horizontal initiatives to promote sustainable consumption in general, like 
the Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation (ESPR) proposal.  

To  deliver  on  the  European  Green  Deal,  the  Letter  of  Intent  of  President  von  der  Leyen 
announced a legislative proposal4, which is included in the Commission Work Programmes for 
20225  and  2023.6  The  aim  of  promoting  more  sustainable  consumption  by  consumers  is 
supported also in four resolutions of the European Parliament (EP)7 and in conclusions of the 
Council8.  

1 COM(2019)640 final, 11.12.2019.  
2 Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 
3 COM(2020) 696 final Strengthening consumer resilience for sustainable recovery, 13.11.2020, pp. 7-8.  
4 State of the Union 2021 by President von der Leyen, Letter of Intent of 15.9.2021, p. 4.  
5 COM(2021) 645 final, 19.10.2021, p. 3. It was also included in the Joint Declaration of the EU institutions’ 2022 
Legislative Priorities, p. 2.  
6 COM(2022) 548 final, 18.10.2022, p. 6. 
7 EP Resolutions of 4.7.2017 on a longer lifetime for products: benefits for consumers and companies, 4.7.2017 
(2016/2272(INI)),  25.11.2020:  Towards  a  more  sustainable  single  market  for  business  and  consumers, 
2020/2021(INI), 10.2.2021 on the New Circular Economy Action Plan, 2020/2077(INI) and 7.4.2022 on the right 
to repair (2022/2515(RSP)).  
8 Making the Recovery Circular and Green of 11.12.2020.  

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Related policy initiatives and legal context  

Production Phase: Ecodesign Directive and ESPR 

On the supply side, tackling the production phase, the Ecodesign Directive sets the framework 
for product reparability, in particular as regards product design requirements and availability 
of spare parts.  It  has led  so far to  the adoption of  ecodesign requirements for 31 individual 
energy-related product groups of which 8 are currently covered by reparability requirements 
(such  as  TVs  and  electronic  displays,  washing  machines,  dishwashers,  refrigerators).  The 
ESPR will replace the Ecodesign Directive. It extends its product scope enabling the setting of 
minimum  performance  and  information  requirements  to  be  set  for  almost  all  categories  of 
physical  goods.  Specific  requirements  on  elements  such  as  product  durability,  reusability, 
upgradability  and  reparability  will  be  introduced  in  delegated  acts.  While  the  ecodesign 
framework requires producers to make spare parts available, the Commission proposal for a 
Design Directive (recast)9 will allow the reproduction of spare parts of complex products for 
the purpose of repair, contributing to opening up the spare parts aftermarket for competition. 

Point of sale: Consumer Rights Directive (CRD) and Empowering Consumers in the Green 
Transition initiative (ECGT) 

On the demand side, the CRD sets information requirements at the point of sale. The ECGT, 
adopted on the same day as the ESPR, amends the CRD, providing pre-contractual information 
requirements on the existence and length of a producer’s commercial guarantee of durability, 
on  the  availability  of  free  software  updates  for  goods  with  digital  elements  and  on  the 
reparability  of  products.  Furthermore,  the  ECGT  addresses  greenwashing  and  early 
obsolescence practices. Thus, it enables consumers to take informed purchase decisions and 
thereby contribute to more sustainable consumption. 

After-sales/use phase: Sale of Goods Directive (SGD) 

In  the  event  that  a  product  becomes  defective  in  the  after-sales  phase,  the  SGD  provides 
consumers with remedies against sellers. Consumers have remedies for those defects that exist 
at  the time when the  goods were delivered and  which become apparent  within two  years10. 
Other defects which are e.g. due to wear and tear or consumer’s mishandling of the product, or 
which appear after the liability period, fall outside the SGD scope and do not enable consumers 
to request remedies.  

The SGD foresees a two-stage approach: Firstly, the SGD gives consumers the right to choose 
between  repair  and  replacement.  This  choice  is  however  restricted:  The  consumer  cannot 
request a specific remedy, if it is impossible or disproportionately costly compared to the other 

9 Proposal for a Directive on the legal protection of designs (recast), 28.11.22, COM(2022) 667 final. 
10 MS are free to introduce longer liability or limitation periods for the exercise of consumers’ remedies. 

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remedy.11 In addition, the seller may refuse repair and replacement if they are impossible or 
would impose disproportionate costs on the seller. In this and other cases, the consumer can 
move to the second stage of remedies: price reduction and contract termination.12 

As regards second-hand goods, the SGD allows Member States (MS) to provide that the seller 
and consumer can agree on a shorter liability (or limitation) period of at least one year. This 
means that the rules for new goods also apply to second-hand goods, while in those MS that 
allow it, a shorter period for second-hand goods can be agreed by sellers and consumers. 

Conclusions for the scope of this initiative 

The SGD precursor, the 1999 Consumer Sales and Guarantees Directive (CSD), sought mainly 
to increase consumer protection by achieving a high level of consumer remedies in case of the 
purchase  of  defective  goods.  Therefore,  the  CSD  granted  the  consumer  the  choice  between 
repair  and  replacement.  The  SGD  maintained  this  choice  and  gave  at  the  same  time  more 
emphasis to the internal market objective by achieving full harmonisation, i.e. a single set of 
rules that businesses could use for selling goods in the internal market.  

Sustainability was not the main political concern when the CSD and the SGD were discussed 
and adopted. This has changed, however. The Commission, supported by the EU institutions, 
is  now  pursuing  the  Green  Deal  objective  of  sustainable  consumption.  The  Commission  is 
following this objective in a holistic manner, by tackling different aspects on both the supply 
and demand side in various initiatives. A ‘right to repair’ will be the result of the combined 
effect of these measures.  

The  combined  effect  of  the  ESPR  and  the  ECGT  will  improve  products’  sustainability  and 
promote  sustainable  purchases.  However,  a  gap  remains  in  the  after-sales  phase  when 
consumers facing defects discard their products prematurely, because they  are not  provided 
with  incentives  to  repair  or  repair  is  not  convenient  for  them.  Here  this  initiative  adds  a 
necessary third dimension to the package of Commission proposals. It will promote the use of 
repair as a remedy within the legal guarantee scope and provide new tools promoting repair 
outside  the  legal  guarantee,  thereby  taking  advantage  of  improved  reparability  of  products 
through  ecodesign  requirements.  All  these  initiatives  provide  synergies  to  each  other  and 
together  form  a  comprehensive  approach  towards  the  common  overall  objective  of  more 
sustainable consumption.  

11 Example: A consumer has bought a refrigerator (price EUR 400) and after 6 months the door handle breaks 
(repair costs EUR 50). The consumer cannot request the seller to replace the whole refrigerator, as the costs of the 
refrigerator replacement would be disproportionately higher than the repair of the door handle. 
12 Example:  The cooling system of the refrigerator breaks down after 6  months. The seller cannot replace the 
refrigerator  due  to  a  production  stop.  Repairing  the  cooling  system  would  cost  EUR  800.  As  replacement  is 
impossible and repair causes absolute disproportionate costs, the seller can refuse both remedies. The consumer 
can e.g. request the termination of the contract with reimbursement of the price. 

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The  demand  side  for  products  includes  consumers  and  business.  This  initiative  has  a  clear 
political  mandate  (derived  from  the  CEAP  and  the  New  Consumer  Agenda)  to  focus  on 
business-to-consumer (B2C) relations and the sustainable consumption of consumer goods by 
encouraging consumers to make sustainable choices.  

The  consumer  demand  for  the  use  of  products  is  influenced,  in  addition  to  economic 
considerations, by specific-drivers (see section on problem drivers further down). Companies’ 
demand for products and the duration of their use, on the other hand, is likely to be driven by 
economic considerations which depend on the sector, the business model, production needs, 
type of market situation, taxation and accounting rules and are therefore very diverse and multi-
layered.  

Furthermore,  B2B  contract  law  rules,  especially  in  cross-border  contracts,  are  largely 
characterised by freedom of contract which translates into the freedom to choose the applicable 
law and the use by national laws of dispositive rules from which contractual parties can deviate. 
Consumer contract law is however characterised by a determined choice of the applicable law 
through  EU  law  and  by  national  mandatory  rules,  which  aim  to  redress  the  imbalance  of  a 
contractual relationship in which consumers are the party in a structural imbalance compared 
to businesses. Differences between such existing or future national mandatory rules in the B2C 
area can constitute actual or potential obstacles to the functioning of the internal market (see 
Section 3 on the legal base).  It was not possible to ascertain the existence of or differences 
between national B2B contract law rules constituting such obstacles. 

While by consequence B2B relations have been excluded from the scope of this initiative, they 
are however tackled to a certain extent by other recent Commission initiatives. The ESPR first 
and foremost will improve sustainability of all products, irrespective by whom they would be 
purchased  or  used.  The  Corporate  Sustainability  Due  Diligence  proposal13,  adopted  by  the 
Commission shortly before the ESPR and the ECGT, will help companies to better manage 
sustainability-related matters in their own operations and value chains as regards among others 
climate change and the environment. The proposal takes a broad approach and covers inter alia 
adverse environmental impacts that occur in companies’ own operations, subsidiaries, products 
and in their value chains, in particular at the level of raw material sourcing, manufacturing or 
product use, dismantling, disposal or recycling. The proposal requires companies to prevent or 
mitigate  among  others  such  adverse  environmental  impacts  in  their  established  business 
relationships.  Covering  the  use  and  end-of-life  phases,  albeit  not  including  specific 
requirements on this, can incentivise reuse and reparation of products in the B2B context. 

EU  consumer  law  is  the  appropriate  tool  to  address  sustainable  consumption  aspects  in  the 
after-sales phase of consumer use, as the question whether a defective and reparable product is 
repaired or not depends to a great extent on consumers’ behaviour and decision-making. This 
is valid both for defects covered by the legal guarantee, where the remedies to repair or replace 

13 Proposal for a Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence, 23.2.2022, COM(2022) 71 final. 

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are granted at the choice of the consumer, and for defects falling outside the legal guarantee, 
where consumers do not have rights against the seller and are left with the decision whether to 
bear the costs for having a product repaired or for buying a new product. While the reparability 
of  a  product  is  regulated  by  the  ESPR,  the  decision  to  carry  out  repair  still  lays  in  the 
consumer’s  hands.  Regulatory  tools  used  in  consumer  contract  law,  like  pre-contractual 
information,  and  improved  ways  to  pass  such  information  to  the  consumer  are  needed  to 
encourage more sustainable consumer decisions. 

2.  Problem definition 

If products become defective, consumers often do not seek to repair them, but discard them 
prematurely even though they could be repaired and used much longer. Premature disposal of 
repairable consumer goods in the after-sales context happens: 

(1) where consumers have the right of free repair under the SGD but rather choose replacement 
with a new product and 

(2) where the legal guarantee does not apply/expired and consumers face sub-optimal repair 
choices so they rather buy a new product. 

Figure 1: Problem tree 

Problem 1: Premature disposal of repairable consumer goods within the legal guarantee 

The  first  time  consumers  may  need  to  repair  a  purchased  product  is  when  a  defect  appears 
during the liability period (in most MS during the first two years after delivery). In practice, 

7 

Driver 6 (out of scope): Consumer lifestyle choicesDriver 1: Choice within legal guarantee favours replacement in case of defectsDriver2: Lack of transparency on conditions and availability of repairDriver 3: Inconvenience factors dissuade consumers from repairDriver 4: Repair is not economically attractive for consumers beyond the legal guaranteeDriver 5 (out of scope): Products are not designed to be reparableProblem 1 premature disposal of repairable consumer goods within the legal guarantee Problem 2Premature disposal of repairable consumer goods beyond the legal gaurantee For consumers:continued expenditure due to premature product replacement For manufacturers and sellers: - Manufacturers and sellers continue to benefit from unsustainable consumption patterns with little incentive to develop  sustainable business models in the long term For repairers:- Repairers experience foregone sales of repair services; underdeveloped repair marketFor the environment and society:  continued CO2 emissions due to unsustainable consumption, resource depletion, waste, damage to healthFor employment: Limited potential for development of local jobs in the repair sector For third countries: manufacturing profits from unsustainable consumption, but also  costs to human health, climate disasters      driversproblemsConsequencesFor public administration: Increased expenditure on environmental damage (e.g. air pollution, waste management)Problem tree 
 
 
the  majority  of  consumers  –  on  average  64%14  –  currently  chooses  replacement,  when  the 
purchased goods are defective and they exercise their remedies given by the SGD.  By the same 
token, sellers are incentivised to offer replacement because of the consumer demand for it and 
because they want to provide a satisfactory solution and keep them as customers. The main 
reasons  for  businesses  to  offer  replacement  are  thus  consumer  demand  and  lower  costs,  if 
replacement is cheaper than repair.15  

If  these  reasons  are  not  prevalent,  e.g.  when  the  consumer  does  not  expressly  ask  for  a 
replacement, but simply presents the seller with a defective product, sellers usually offer repair 
instead of replacement.16 However, despite the seller’s preference for repair, the consumer’s 
choice for replacement generally prevails.  

As a consequence of the consumers’ choice of replacement, defective products are returned 
and often discarded. This undesirable result originates in the free choice between repair and 
replacement in the context of the legal guarantee.  

Problem 2: Premature disposal of repairable consumer goods beyond the legal 

guarantee  

Beyond  the  legal  guarantee  the  costs  and  difficulties  in  arranging  repair  fully  shift  to 
consumers. Attempting repair in the first place mainly depends on consumer decisions. As the 
majority  of  defects  occurs  beyond  the  legal  guarantee,  a  larger  share  of  the  overall  repair 
opportunities depends on consumer choices.17  

In practice, a large number of consumers tends to replace defective goods with new ones,18 
even though these products could potentially be used twice as long.19 Of the consumers who 

14 IA Study, Section 3.3. Number of consumers choosing replacement varies among product  groups, e.g. 78% 
(shoes and clothes), 68% (smartphones), 60% (refrigerators), 56% (wooden furniture) and 45% (cars), Table 3-3. 
On average, only 32% request repair, whereas an average of 4% replied ‘I don’t know’. 
15 IA Study,  Annex 1.3, Business Survey,  Section 4, p. 95: Consumer demand (53%) followed by lower costs 
(37%).  
16 E.g. 74% of retailers selling refrigerators and phones and 67% selling shoes proposed repair, IA Study, Section 
4.2.3, Figure 5.15. Regarding e.g. phones, sellers offered repair on average 7 times more often than replacement, 
IA Study, Section 4.2.1, Figure 5.7. 
17 IA Study, Section 5.3.2: an analysis of the consumer survey data on defects suggests that the majority of defects 
consumers experienced within a year fall beyond the legal guarantee; Annex 3.4. For instance, for smartphone 
and mobile phones 5.50% of consumers experienced a defect within a year, of which 1.90% were covered by the 
legal  guarantee;  This  ratio  was  respectively  for  TVs  4.41%/2%;  for  refrigerators  4.41%/1.60%;  for  laptops 
6.26%/1.60%; for jackets 6.67/2.40%; for shoes 4.92%/2; for cars 10.36%/1/90%; for furniture 2.46%/0.90%. 
18 IA Study, Section 3.2.3. 
19 IA Study, Section 3.1, Table 3-1: For a sample of 8 popular consumer goods there is a discrepancy between the 
average consumption lifetime in practice and the absolute lifetime of products as designed: e.g. for phones it is 
1.7 years, while the absolute one is 7; for TVs this ratio is 7/22 years, refrigerators 10/20 years, laptops 4/7 years, 
jackets 1/4 years, shoes 3/5 years, cars 11.5/18 years; wooden furniture 10/22 years. 

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actually  repair  their  products,  the  majority  does  so  reluctantly.  Repair  beyond  the  legal 
guarantee happens only if there is consumer willingness to repair and to pay the price and if 
the  consumer  can  overcome  difficulties  in  the  repair  process.  In  practice,  some  effort  and 
inconvenience accompanies nearly every repair situation. Repair requires finding a competent 
repair shop, bringing the product to the repair shop or arranging a visit at home, and waiting 
for the product to be repaired, which is particularly inconvenient for goods needed on a daily 
basis. There is  also  uncertainty about  the final  price and a concern about  paying  more than 
expected if the defect proves more complex and costly upon inspection, as well as concerns 
that the defect may reappear. Thus, even where repair is technically feasible and economically 
affordable, it will only materialise if consumers decide and take action to repair in a specific 
case. 

Consumers are willing to invest different amounts of effort and money in repair. Four consumer 
segments20 can be identified based on consumer willingness to repair: 1) Enthusiastic repairers, 
who had a product repaired and show a high level of affinity to repair (13.4%); 2) Reluctant 
repairers, who had a product repaired, but show low affinity to repair (37.8%); 3) Reluctant 
replacers (9.2%), who had a defective product replaced, but show a high level of affinity to 
repair; 4) Enthusiastic replacers (39.5%), who had a defective product replaced and show a low 
affinity to repair.21 These segments help to specify the nature and scale of the problem.  

While the problem concerns all consumers, it affects particularly the three consumer segments 
that  consider  repair  as  an  option:  reluctant  replacers,  reluctant  repairers  and  enthusiastic 
repairers.  The  segment  of  ‘reluctant  replacers’  represents  most  clearly  the  market  failure, 
because these consumers not only considered repair, but tried it, were prevented from doing so 
and ended up replacing goods, despite their preference. The problem is however broader and 
includes the obstacles and frictions that make repair difficult and unattractive for many others. 
Drivers 2, 3 and 4 are the reasons why the majority of consumers who repair do so reluctantly. 
Such  obstacles  are  particularly  likely  to  dissuade  the  large  segment  of  ‘reluctant  repairers’. 
‘Reluctant repairers’ comprise consumers who repaired at least once in the past year, but may 
not be willing to put up with much hassle or inconvenience to repair on other occasions. For 
instance, they may have repaired a fridge or a laptop, but not shoes or lower value items like 
kettles, because for some goods repair is not worth the hassle for those who are reluctant to 
repair in general. Even ‘enthusiastic repairers’ may be dissuaded, for instance where the price 
of repair is too high or the repair causes excessive effort or inconvenience.22 

Some  consumers  (the  segment  of  ‘enthusiastic  replacers’)  do  not  repair  for  other  reasons, 
notably due to their personal lifestyle choices (driver 6). The problem analysis focuses on the 

20 IA Study, Annex 1.4.  
21 IA Study, Annex 1.4. 
22 ‘Behavioural Study on Consumers’ Engagement in the Circular Economy’, 2018, p. 10 et seq., 60 et seq., 70 et 
seq., https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/ec_circular_economy_final_report_0.pdf. 

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market  failure  and  obstacles  that  make  repair  an  unattractive  option  rather  than  on  lifestyle 
choices.  

Limited use of refurbished goods within and beyond the legal guarantee  

An aspect relevant to both problems is the limited reuse of products.  If products, which are 
currently  discarded  prematurely,  would  be  refurbished,  they  could  be  reused  for  years,  for 
instance by less affluent consumers who cannot afford more expensive or innovative products, 
instead of ending up in waste early on. Reuse by refurbishment is a way, along with repair, to 
prolong  the  consumption  lifetime  of  goods,  but  currently  its  potential  is  not  sufficiently 
exploited. The refurbishment of defective goods can be beneficial for the waste reduction both 
in the context of the legal guarantee, where returned or defective products are relatively new, 
as well as beyond the legal guarantee, because they are usually discarded years before reaching 
their absolute lifetime.  

Most  EU  consumers  are  unlikely  to  buy  second  hand  or  refurbished  goods.23  Many  more 
businesses discard defective products right away compared to those businesses that refurbish 
and resell them.24 The extent to which defective products are discarded depends on the product 
groups.25  From  a  consumer  perspective,  the  main  reason  for  buying  second-hand  and 
refurbished products is their price.26 The reasons for not buying them include quality concerns 
about  refurbished  products  in  general,  or  about  reduced  functionalities  of  such  products. 
Furthermore, lifestyle choices, driven by a preference for new and fashionable goods.27 Quality 
concerns are affected by the length and scope of the liability period for refurbished goods.28 
From a business perspective, the limited consumer demand and limited access to refurbished 
goods are reasons that hold back sales of refurbished products. 

SGD insufficient to tackle premature disposal 

23 Almost 70% hardly ever consider buying products that are second-hand/refurbished, IA Study, Section 3.2.3. 
with reference to further research.  For most product categories  (with the  exception of clothes)  around 85% or 
more have not bought a second-hand/ refurbished product recently.  
24 IA Study, Annex 1.3, Business Survey, Section 4, pp. 97-98. 58% of producers and 40% of retailers discard 
while only 33% of producers and 40% of retailers refurbish and resell.  
25 E.g. electronic goods and cars are refurbished more than clothing, shoes and furniture. IA Study, Sections 4.5 
and 3.3. 
26 IA Study, Section 4.4: price ranks first followed by a better price/quality ratio. 
27 At least 3 in 4 refrain from using refurbished goods due to negative perceptions about quality or hygiene. IA 
Study,  Annex 1.4, Consumer  Survey, Section 5, QE1. Between 75% concerning clothing and 90% as regards 
refrigerators had not purchased a product that had been refurbished/used before in the past year. 
28 Not being protected/having limited protection through a legal or commercial guarantee is a reason for between 
7% and 14% depending on the product not to purchase a used product). IA Study, Annex 1.4, Consumer survey, 
Section 5, p. 142, QE4.  

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The  current  SGD  is  insufficient  to  tackle  both  problems  leading  to  premature  disposal  of 
defective consumer goods. Because of its design focussing on consumer protection, the SGD 
offers the choice between repair and replacement in the event of a lack of conformity and most 
consumers choose replacement. Because of its scope limitation to non-conformity of products 
sold with the contract of sale, the majority of defects (notably defects that are due to wear and 
tear, mishandling by the consumer or appear after the lapse of the liability period) fall outside 
the SGD scope and the remedies given to the consumer. As a result, there is a large number of 
defective  products  that  could  be  repaired  but  are  instead  discarded  and  replaced  by  new 
products.  

The scale of the problem 

The problem of premature disposal of repairable consumer goods is present across the EU.29 It 
applies  to  a  wide  range  of  consumer  goods.30  Considering  only  consumers  who  made  an 
attempt  to  repair,  but  failed  (‘reluctant  replacers’),  the  scale  of  the  market  failure  already 
amounts to EUR 5.1 billion per year31, which translates into a market failure of minimum EUR 
62  billion  over  15  years.  This  is  a  conservative  estimate.  It  does  not  reflect  the  consumer 
detriment that ‘reluctant repairers’ and even ‘enthusiastic repairers’ may experience when they 
repair, but do not get their preferred choice in the market, because they could not find a repair 
service that suits their needs due to market  obstacles and frictions. It does not reflect either 
forgone  repair  in  cases  where  consumers  did  not  even  consider  or  attempt  it  for  a  specific 
product because of the same obstacles and frictions in the market,32 nor the forgone consumer 
savings from limited use of refurbished goods. The overall scale of the problem could therefore 
be considerably higher.33 

These figures do not reflect the costs of other negative consequences of the problem, notably 
for the environment (see “consequences of the problem”). When consumers do not repair their 

29 IA Study, Section 3.3, Table 3-4. 
30 IA Study, Section 5.1 (with cars and high-quality wooden furniture as the exceptions which confirm the rule).  
31 The estimate is based on the value of repairable consumer durables of EUR 792 billion at consumer prices in a 
year, discounted by the average % of defects beyond the legal guarantee which consumers have to repair at their 
own cost. This estimate is based on a narrow definition of the market failure excluding cars (as an “outlier”, i.e. 
the product consumers are most likely to repair instead of replace in case of defects (52%), cars are excluded from 
the  analysis  to  avoid  overestimates.)  and  only  considers  failed  repair  attempts  within  a  year  by  the  consumer 
segment of reluctant replacers (9.2% of consumers).  
32  The  scale  of  the  problem  as  regards  the  detriment  for  ‘reluctant  repairers’  cannot  be  estimated  in  a  robust 
manner, because data on their preferred repair choice is not available. Likewise, data is not available on the number 
of occasions an average EU consumer did not repair a product due to obstacles and frictions in the market.  
33 The estimate is the low bound of the market failure. A more realistic assumption for the consumer products 
covered (without cars) could be several times higher. Assuming that the market failure is indeed several times 
higher, i.e. within the range of EUR 5-25 billion per year, the net present value for a period of 15 years would be 
between EUR 62 billion and 307 billion.  

11 

 
 
                                                 
goods, they limit the time during which a product could potentially be used and dispose of a 
significant  number  of  products  that  could  still  be  functional  for  years.34  The  scale  of  the 
problem  also  varies among  MS, as in  some MS consumers are more  open to  repair than in 
others.35 This means in particular that consumers in one MS may be less likely to repair a given 
product, such as their smartphone, compared to consumers in another MS.36 

Product  coverage:  Both  problems  are  relevant  for  consumer  goods  in  general,  except  for 
products irreparable by nature.37 The problems concern all product groups, but the problem 
scale is likely to be bigger for product groups that consumers are less willing to repair. Such 
goods  are  discarded  without  even  attempting  repair,  even  though  repair  is  feasible  in  most 
cases.  Not  to  attempt  repair  is  particularly  likely  for  products  with  a  relatively  low  cost, 
modularity and consumption life-time. In general, consumers are less inclined to repair lower 
value items that are easily replaced38 than higher value goods. Less modular products are less 
suitable for repair, as defective parts cannot be easily replaced. 39 Consumer likelihood to repair 
products  with  a short  consumption life-time  is low, while for others, such as furniture, it  is 
relatively high.  

Consumers are less interested in repairing non-energy related/ non-electr(on)ic products40. For 
instance, there is a relatively low likelihood to repair clothes (16%) and shoes (18%). Despite 
a comparably higher consumer interest in repair of electr(on)ic products for various reasons41, 
many  consumers  still  did  not  repair  their  electronic  goods  due  to  obstacles  in  the  repair 
process.42 Only up to one in four consumers consider it more likely to repair electronic goods 
more in the future if the repair market remains the same.43  

34  PROMPT,  Product  Lifestyle  &  Product  Replacement  reasons,  Online  Survey,  https://prompt-project.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2021/07/2021_PROMPT-lifecycle-and-replacement-reasons-report.pdf:  Washing  machines 
26.3% (p. 67), smartphones 63,4% (p. 76), TVs 64,2% (p. 83), vacuum cleaners 36,5 (p. 90). 
35 IA Study, Section 3.3, Table 3-4: E.g. across three selected product categories (mobile/smartphone, refrigerator, 
car) the share of consumers who would always or probably have a product repaired is lower in Italy, Spain and 
Greece than in Hungary, the Netherlands and France.  
36 This may be due to different conditions in the respective repair markets or consumption trends. 
37 Food, non-alcoholic beverages, water, gas and other fuels, routine household maintenance products, medical 
products, personal care products, print media products were excluded from the analysis to avoid overestimates. 
38 E.g. kettles, hand mixers and toasters (IA Study, Section 3.3). If consumers decide against repair, 84% of broken 
electronic and electrical devices are disposed of (Wertgarantie, 2021). 
39 Electronic products that are in principle characterised by higher modularity are therefore more popular repair 
items for consumers. Repair Monitor, Analysis results 2019, p. 14. 
40 They may include products that have long or short consumption lifetime (furniture vs shoes); relatively higher 
or lower modularity (e.g. bicycles, knives, scissors, clocks, necklaces) and varying value. 
41 Repair Monitor, Analysis results 2019, pp. 14-15. 
42 IA Study, Annex 1.4, Consumer Survey, Section 3: Experience with defects and product repair, QC6. 
43 IA Study, Annex 1.4, Consumer Survey, QB6, Perception of the repair market with  respect to smartphones, 
TVs, refrigerators and laptops.  

12 

 
 
                                                 
Consequences of the problems 

The  current  consumption  pattern  marked  by  frequent  replacements  generates  negative 
economic  consequences.  First,  consumers  spend  money  on  replacing  products  they  could 
potentially use for years. Thus, consumers lose savings they could spend to acquire goods and 
services, which they do not have. Repair businesses miss out on potential demand, which holds 
back the development of the repair market and local jobs. This in turn prevents some consumers 
from  finding  the  repair  service  they  need.  The  manufacturing  and  trade  sectors  meet  the 
constant  demand  for  new  replacement  goods  by  increased  production  and  supply.  While 
manufacturers both in the EU and worldwide, as well as EU importers and sellers, currently 
profit from this demand, they invest in business models which are unsustainable in the long-
term.  The  manufacturing  of  billions  of  new  goods  to  replace  repairable  goods  puts  also  a 
massive strain on the environment. The global population of 8 billion is projected to grow to 9 
billion by 2030, including 3 billion new middle-class consumer, increasing demand for some 
raw materials by factor 20 by 2030.44 This strain on natural resources is unsustainable long-
term, unless more sustainable production and consumption models are adopted. 

The consequences for the environment and society include unnecessary CO2 emissions for the 
production  and  shipment  of  new  goods,  and  increasing  volumes  of  waste.45  The  consumer 
goods  lifecycle  starts  with  raw  material  extraction,  which  can  cause  loss  of  biodiversity, 
contamination  of  groundwater  and  soil  acidification.46  Premature  disposal  of  repairable 
consumer goods leads to the use of around 10.5 million tons per year of valuable resources in 
the EU.47 This includes for instance 0.3 million tons of aluminium, an amount equal to 15.5% 
of aluminium produced in the EU + the UK in 202048, 4.8 million tons of steel and iron or 2.7% 
of  the  EU  steel  output49  and  2  million  tons  of  wood  or  12.63%  of  the  EU28  wood  pellets 
production  in  2015.50  The  manufacturing  phase  involves  the  use  of  fossil  fuels,  water, 
chemicals  etc.  and  generates  GHG-emissions  linked  to  the  use  of  fossil  fuels.51  For  eight 
product groups assessed52, the premature disposal of viable consumer goods leads to around 57 
million tons of unnecessary CO2-eq emissions yearly,53 Negative environmental impacts occur 

44 VERAM, Vision of Raw materials in Europe and for Europe, Part I, p.5 and 9.  
45 In the EU and in partner countries (notably in Asia) where a large part of consumer production has been shifted 
to in the last decades. 
46 IA Study, Section 3.5.1. 
47 IA Study, Section 3.5.5, Table 3-9. 
48 In 2020, around 2 million tons of aluminium, IA Study, Section 3.5.5. 
49 The EU output is over 177 million tons of steel a year: IA Study, Section 3.5.5 
50 IA Study, Section 3.5.5, Table 3-9. 
51 IA Study, Section 3.5.2: Textiles produce the most GHG emissions per unit of material and cause 10% of the 
global GHG emissions. 
52 Mobile/smartphones, televisions, refrigerators, laptops, clothing, shoes, cars and wooden furniture, IA Study, 
Section 2.1. 
53 IA Study, Section 3.5.5., Table 3-9. 

13 

 
 
                                                 
also in the use phase, with most significant impacts for energy using products. While for a few 
products  with  high  energy  consumption  replacement  at  a  certain  age  with  a  more  energy-
efficient  model  can  offer  potential  environmental  gains,54  for  other  products  the  negative 
environmental  impacts  in  the  production  phase  can  hardly  be  compensated.55  Finally,  the 
premature disposal of viable consumer goods leads to the production of unnecessary waste of 
7.4 million tons per year in the EU.56 This corresponds to the municipal waste generation of 
around 14.5 million EU citizens. When extrapolated to the whole EU economy, these figures 
show that for all products premature disposal of viable consumer goods leads to the production 
of 261 million tons of unnecessary CO2-eq/product, the use of 30 million tons of unnecessary 
resources and the production of 35 million tons of unnecessary waste in the EU every year.57  

Finally,  public  administration  and  budgets  need  to  deal  with  the  negative  environmental 
consequences and costs. For instance, the costs for waste management are directly linked to 
the amount of discarded consumer goods in each EU MS. The overall costs including indirect 
impacts on human health and the climate that sometimes materialise in the long term are not 
quantifiable, but are likely to exceed direct costs of environmental impacts. For instance, there 
is a proven link between soil and water contamination (linked to resource extraction) 58 and air 
pollution through CO2 and damage to human health. This puts extra costs on health systems. 
CO2  emissions  are  also  of  global  relevance  for  the  climate  and  entail  costs  for  managing 
climate disasters. The overall costs for the public are therefore not limited to the EU, but also 
affect third countries (e.g. where resources are extracted or climate disasters occur).  

What are the problem drivers? 

Driver 1: Choice within the legal guarantee favours replacement with new goods in case 

of defect  

The current legal guarantee framework gives consumers a choice to have the goods repaired or 
replaced for free. This choice leads 65% of consumers to choose replacement as a remedy.59 
When asked about the reason for choosing replacement instead of repair, consumers explained 
that they prefer to have new goods instead of repaired ones. This preference may be driven by 
life-style choices,60 but also because getting a new placement good is often more convenient 

54 IA Study, Section 3.5.3, e.g. refrigerators. 
55 IA Study, Annex 2, Section 2.4 with reference to further research. . 
56 IA Study, Section 3.5.5. 
57 IA Study, Section 3.5.5 Table 3-10. 
58  The  ‘Ecological  potential  of  repair,  impacts  of  mining’,  presentation  by  Alberto  Vázquez  Ruiz,  CATAPA, 
Fixfest 2022. 
59 IA Study, Section 3.3. 
60 See driver 6 and IA Study, Annex 2, Sections 3.1.2, 3.2.2 and 3.4.2. 

14 

 
 
                                                 
than waiting for the purchased one to be repaired. A lack of trust in repaired products adds to 
this consumers’ preference.61  

The  regulatory  framework  allows  consumers  to  implement  this  preference  for  new  goods, 
which, combined with a lack of trust in repaired products, encourages the replacement with 
new  goods  instead  of  repair.  Hence,  the  current  provisions  of  the  SGD  are  insufficient  to 
encourage sustainable choices and rather enable the premature disposal of repairable consumer 
goods.  

Driver 2: Lack of transparency on availability and conditions of repair  

In situations outside the legal guarantee regime, a lack of transparency regarding availability 
and the conditions of repair can be a dissuasive factor for the decision to repair a product.62 
While under the legal guarantee consumers can turn to the seller and claim the remedies they 
are entitled to under EU law (including repair), in situations outside the legal guarantee, it is 
not obvious where and under what conditions a product can be repaired. For some products, 
for example dishwashers, EU sectorial rules ensure that consumers receive information on the 
website of the manufacturer about how to access professional repair services for those specific 
products.63 While such information requirements facilitate the search of repair services, in their 
absence, consumers bear the search costs themselves.  

When the defect occurs, the availability of information on the repair process (including time 
for repairs, possibility of getting a replacement product for the duration of repair and the repair 
process), availability of repair services and the party responsible for repair are very important 
factors for consumers’ decisions to repair.64 Furthermore, information on the price of repair is 
essential, as price is a top factor for the decision of repair. Finding out how much repair will 
cost can be difficult as it often requires the repairer to carry out a diagnostic of the problem. As 
a result, consumers need to first pay the diagnostic in order to find out whether repair is possible 
at all and how much it will cost. Evidence shows that the costs for diagnosis can vary.65 Due 
to uncertainty about these upfront costs many consumers abandon the option of repair. 

Finding information on all these elements and identifying an available repair service meeting 
the conditions that suit the consumer’s needs can be difficult. The lack of transparency on these 

61 IA Study, Section 3.2.3. 
62 IA Study, Section 3.2.1 with reference to further research.  
63 Commission Regulation (EU) 2019/2022 of 1 October 2019 laying down ecodesign requirements for household 
dishwashers, Annex II, point 6 (14). 
64 IA Study, Annex 1.4, Consumer Survey, Section 2, p. 8, QB4 (Scale 0-10): information available regarding 
price of repair, and the repair process: 8.1; availability of repair service: 8; information available regarding the 
responsible party: 7.8.  
65 Between 7% (shoes) to 22% (cars) for most common defects, IA Study, Annex 1.3, Business Survey, Section 
2, p. 38. 

15 

 
 
                                                 
aspects  contributes  to  the  search  costs,  increases  the  efforts  necessary  to  repair  and  can 
ultimately lead the consumer to abandon repair.66  

Driver 3: Inconvenience factors dissuade consumers from repair 

In situations outside the legal guarantee, a range of inconvenience factors linked to the repair 
process may dissuade consumers from repair. Even in case consumers find a suitable service 
and the price is acceptable, the repair process itself may require too much hassle. Repair takes 
time  and  that  time  is  even  longer  where  spare  parts  need  to  be  ordered.  Time  matters  to 
consumers because during repair they are deprived of the product.67 Where consumers need 
the  product  on  a  daily  basis  (e.g.  refrigerators,  phones)  and  they  do  not  get  a  replacement 
product, they feel impaired.68 Moreover, arranging repair costs efforts. For instance, for large 
items  (e.g.  TVs,  stoves)  it  can  be  difficult  to  arrange  their  transportation  if  they  cannot  be 
repaired at the consumer’s place,69 or alternatively to find a repair service that would repair it 
at the consumer’s place. An unsuccessful repair not only causes extra costs, but also more effort 
compared  to  immediately  buying  a  new  product,  as  the  repair  infrastructure  is  not  always 
convenient compared to retail shops.70   

Surveyed consumers consider all the above ‘hassle’ factors as very important for the decision 
to repair and any of these factors can, on its own, dissuade consumers from repair.71  Where 
these factors apply cumulatively, the hassle is even more dissuasive. 

Furthermore, all the above factors influence consumer trust in the repair service as a whole.  
Trust in the quality of repair is a key factor for the decision to repair, comparable to the top 
factor price.72 This trust is intrinsically linked to the key repair service characteristics, which 
ultimately determine if the service suits the consumer’s needs. As evidenced by a behavioural 

66 IA Study, Annex 1.4, Consumer Survey, Section 3, p. 21: e.g. 19% of consumers did not repair their smartphone 
because they could not find information how to get it repaired or there was no available service that could carry 
out repair.  
67 IA Study, Annex 1.4, Consumer Survey, Section 2, QB4: 7.7 on a scale of 10. 
68 IA Study, Annex 1.4, Consumer Survey, Section 2, QB4: 7.5 on a scale of 10. 
69 IA Study, Annex 1.4, Consumer Survey, Section 2, QB4: 7.5 on a scale of 10. 
70 ‘Behavioural Study on Consumers’ Engagement in the Circular Economy’, European Commission, 2018, p. 11, 
181. 
71 IA Study, Annex 1.4, Consumer Survey, Section 3, QC6: E.g. among mobile phone/smartphone owners that 
experienced a defect and did not have the product repaired, 9% said that too much effort was required to deliver 
the product to the shop or have it shipped; repair would take too long according to 14%; it was not possible to get 
the replacement product for the duration of the repair for 10%. There are variations among products: While 9% 
of responding consumers did not repair their mobile phone because it took them too much effort to take the product 
to repair, a greater share (14%) did not repair their refrigerators and TVs for this reason. 
72 IA Study, Section 3.2.3: 8.2 on a scale of 10. 

16 

 
 
                                                 
experiment73, the more consumers know about the key characteristics of a repair service, the 
more they are likely to take it up and therefore trust it. 

Driver 4: Repair is not economically attractive for consumers outside the legal guarantee  

When products become defective outside the scope of the legal guarantee, the costs of both 
repair and replacement with a new product will play a significant role. Amongst the aspects 
that influence the consumers’ decision on whether to repair a product, the price of repair74 as 
such  and  in  relation  to  the  cost  of  a  new  product  is  a  top  factor.75  Repair  may  be  the  less 
attractive  option,  as  it  can  be  relatively  expensive  compared  to  buying  an  affordable  new 
product.  The  limit  of  an  acceptable  repair  price  is  on  average  around  20%  of  the  purchase 
price.76 Consumers are more willing to repair goods if they consider that the benefits of repair77 
outweigh the costs of repair. However, many consumers believe that it is cheaper to buy a new 
product  instead  of  repairing  the  existing  one.78  Especially  as  regards  low  value  products, 
consumers are more inclined to buy new than repair.79 

The  price  of  repair  depends  on  a  number  of  factors,  including  labour  costs,  technical 
complexity and need to constantly keep up to date with new product models, access to spare 
parts, availability of repair services and competition in the market. It is not in the realm of this 
initiative to influence factors that have an effect on prices; the resulting prices will largely be 
determined by the market. However, bringing more transparency to the price and to the content 
of repair services can help consumers identify economically attractive repair offers.  

Other drivers beyond the scope of this initiative 

The drivers set out below contribute to the problems but are outside the scope of this initiative 
(driver 5) or are addressed only indirectly (driver 6).  

Driver 5: Products are not designed to be reparable  

73 IA Study, Annex 1.2, Right to Repair experiments. 
74 IA Study, Section 3.2.1, with further references to relevant research. 
75 IA Study, Annex 1.4, Consumer survey, Section 2, p. 8: 8.2 on a scale of 0 to 10. 
76 IA Study, Section 3.2.1, Figure 3.8: Acceptable price ranged between 17% and 27% depending on the product.  
77  Possibility  to  use  the  already  purchased  product  longer,  avoiding  spending  additional  money  on  buying  a 
replacement. 
78 ‘Behavioural Study on Consumers’ Engagement in the Circular Economy’, October 2018, p. 115. Between 50% 
of (dishwashers) and 25% (clothing) reported that they did not choose to repair their goods because it would have 
been too expensive, p. 85. See also references to further research in the IA Study on p. 38. 
79 IA Study, Annex 1.4, Consumer survey, Section 2, p. 9: Between 17% of the original price for a car up to 27% 
of the original price for a smartphone. Televisions, refrigerators, laptops, clothing, shoes and wooden furniture 
scored within this range. 

17 

 
 
                                                 
The problems are also driven by supply-related issues and technical constraints80, notably that 
some products are not designed to be reparable.81 While some business models focus on durable 
goods and a high sales price in exchange for a long lifetime and reparability of the product, not 
all consumers are able or willing to purchase such products.  Other business models rely on 
profits  from  sales  of  new  goods  and  depend  on  consumers  replacing  their  products  more 
frequently. This encourages producers to produce less durable but cheaper products and make 
profit from a high turnover.82 In order to keep prices affordable, companies often make savings 
on  the  manufacturing  process.83An  additional  effect  of  the  lack  of  reparability  is  that  even 
consumers who are in general willing to repair their goods are often discouraged when they 
learn that certain products cannot be repaired.84 Supply-related factors that could make repair 
technically unfeasible are beyond the scope and are tackled by related EU initiatives, notably 
ESPR  (reparability  rules)  and  ECGT  (tackling  early  obsolescence)  as  well  as  the  Design 
Directive (liberalisation of the spare parts market). 

Driver 6: Consumer life-style choices  

A significant reason for premature disposal of reparable consumer goods is linked to lifestyle 
choices.85 They are driven by behavioural and psychological considerations relating to image 
and are particularly relevant for the consumer segment of ‘enthusiastic replacers’, who may 
not even consider repair, as a result of their preference for new goods. The preference for new 
goods may be driven by the desire to keep up with fashion trends as a status symbol86 and sign 

80 There is a lack of spare parts, difficult or no access to the necessary software updates, repair tools or repair 
information or a lack of access to data (IA Study, Section 3.2.1). 
81 IA Study, Annex 1.3, Business survey, Section 2, p. 39: some business respondents indicated that one of the 
causes of irreparability of products was irreparability by design; a share of respondents to the consumer survey 
also indicated that their products could not be repaired, IA Study, Annex 1.4, Consumer survey, Section 3, p. 117. 
Key technical barriers to repair identified by the repair community include product design related causes and spare 
parts, notably “no spare parts available”, “irreparable”, “unable to open”, Repair cafe international Foundation 
2020, Top ten barriers in 2019, based on 1582 observations. 
82 Cooper, Kaner, Furmston & Cutts, Furniture lifetimes in a circular economy: a state of the art review. May, 
2021, https://hdl.handle.net/10344/10203. 
83 E.g. gluing of components, which makes it in turn difficult to disassemble and repair such products. Hernandez, 
Miranda  & Goni, Empowering Sustainable Consumption by  Giving Back to Consumers the ‘Right to Repair’, 
2020, 1–15.84  IA  Study,  Annex  2,  Section  2.2.  E.g.  25%  reported  that  they  had  to  replace  their  TV  as  it  was 
irreparable. Similar or higher numbers apply to other product categories, such as refrigerators (37%), IA Study, 
Annex 2, Section 2.3) or clothing. Around 60% of discarded items are due to a product not being durable and not 
designed to be repaired, ECOS 2021; IA Study, Annex 2, Section 2.5. 
84 IA Study, Annex 2, Section 2.2. E.g. 25% reported that they had to replace their TV as it was irreparable. Similar 
or higher numbers apply to other product categories, such as refrigerators (37%), IA Study, Annex 2, Section 2.3) 
or clothing. Around 60% of discarded items are due to a product not being durable and not designed to be repaired, 
ECOS 2021; IA Study, Annex 2, Section 2.5. 
85 IA Study, Section 3.2.3, with reference to further research.  
86 IA Study, Annex 2, Sections 3.1.2, 3.2.2 and 3.4.2. 

18 

 
 
                                                 
of wealth.87 Some consumers associate new products with better performance, even if this is 
not the case88 or value new technological developments/models, even if older products are still 
functional89.These preferences are fuelled by producers constantly developing and promoting 
new  models,90  as  the  dominant  business  model  relies  on  higher  sales  of  new  goods.91  
Consumers’ preference for new goods is relevant in most product groups.92 Life-style choices 
also  largely  influence  consumer  attitudes  to  reuse  of  goods  in  the  form  of  second-hand  or 
refurbished  goods.  This  driver  may  be  tackled  by  Member  States’  policies  on  consumer 
education  and  to  some  extent,  indirectly,  by  EU  initiatives  encouraging  more  sustainable 
consumer  choices  at  the  point  of  sale.  This  initiative  may  contribute  to  tackling  this  driver 
indirectly, as ‘enthusiastic replacers’ may be influenced by options facilitating repair, albeit to 
a small extent.93  

How likely are the problems to persist? 

The problems are likely to decrease in scale due to the positive impacts of related initiatives, 
but they will not disappear. Consumers will continue to dispose of repairable consumer goods 
due  to  drivers  that  are  not  tackled  or  only  partially  tackled  and  which  influence  consumer 
behaviour  with  respect  to  repair  (see  figure  2).  In  addition,  premature  disposal  will  also 
continue because of limited reuse of consumer goods.  

The problem of premature disposal of goods within the legal guarantee will persist, as the 
key driver behind it (driver 1 choice within the legal guarantee) will remain unaddressed in the 
absence of EU legal action. Consumer preferences for new goods as a lifestyle choice (driver 
6) will continue to favour replacement, as most consumers are unlikely to change their attitude 
on the choice between repair and a new good in the next 15 years.   

The problem of premature disposal of goods beyond the legal guarantee should decrease 
in scale, because the ESPR and the ECGT will tackle some drivers that hinder repair beyond 
the legal guarantee at least partially.  

The  one  driver  tackled  comprehensively  concerns  products  that  are  irreparable  by  design 
(driver 5). Ecodesign legislation will tackle it for the product groups for which it introduces 

87 IA Study, Section 3.2.3, (Singh & Giacosa, 2019). 
88 IA Study, Section 3.2.3, with references to further research. 
89 IA Study, Section 3.2.3. e.g. 27% did not repair their mobile phone, because they wanted a new model. 
90 Recent research (IA Study, Section 3.2.3: Bayus, 1988) revealed a significant negative correlation between the 
amount of yearly advertising and employment levels for TV service technicians, indicating a decline in demand 
for repair services. 
91 IA Study, Section 3.2.3.  
92  IA  Study,  Section  3.4.  E.g.  smartphones  and  televisions.  It  is  less  relevant  only  for  a  few  products  like 
refrigerators. 
93 IA Study, Annex 1.4. 

19 

 
 
                                                 
ecodesign  requirements  to  increase  their  reparability  and  the  ECGT  will  tackle  early 
obsolescence  practices.  Products  will  gradually  become  more  repairable  over  time  as 
reparability  requirements  under  the  Ecodesign  framework  continue  to  be  introduced  on  a 
product-by-product basis. This positive trend will reduce the scale of the problem particularly 
as regards energy related product categories, notably electric and electronic devices, which are 
in focus of ecodesign reparability requirements and that consumers are more inclined to repair 
in any case.94 Furthermore, as ecodesign requirements encourage the production of goods fit 
for reuse and refurbishment, they will improve the business case and thus the availability of 
refurbished products.95 The scale of the problem may persist to a larger extent for non-energy 
related/non-ecodesign goods, for which consumers are less inclined to attempt repair.  

The Ecodesign legislation may contribute to a decrease in repair prices (driver 4 on price) as a 
result of more repairable designs, better availability of spare parts, repair and product specific 
information. The ECGT may encourage demand for repairable products by helping consumers 
identify them at the point of sale, to which the introduction of reparability scoring under the 
Ecodesign and Energy  Labelling framework also contributes. Availability of repair services 
may improve as a result of more interest in repair (driver 2 lack of transparency). Consumers 
may  also  find  it  easier  to  repair  products  on  their  own  based  on  product  specific  repair 
information under Ecodesign legislation (driver 2 lack of transparency). 

However,  even  where  ecodesign  rules  facilitate  reparability  and  refurbishment,  five  more 
drivers  influencing  consumer  behaviour  will  continue  to  trigger  unsustainable  consumption 
choices  and  premature  disposal  of  repairable  consumer  goods.  Even  if  repair  becomes 
technically  feasible  for  many  more  products,  in  most  cases  it  will  depend  on  consumer 
decisions to repair their goods.  

Important  aspects  of  the  drivers  4  (on  price)  and  2  (lack  of  transparency)  will  persist.  In 
particular, when it comes to price, consumers will not have transparency on the price of the 
repair service and will continue to worry about the maximum price they may have to pay. They 
will have difficulties to compare offers in terms of price and content. As to availability of repair 
services (driver 2 lack of transparency), consumers will still have to find a conveniently located 
repair  shop  they  trust.  Furthermore,  they  will  have  to  identify  key  repair  conditions,  e.g. 
duration of repair, replacement goods, quality guarantees. Transparency on these conditions 
(driver  2)  will  not  be  ensured  by  the  ESPR  and  the  ECGT.  These  conditions  matter  also, 
because  they  largely  influence  the  inconvenience  of  the  repair  process  (driver  3  on 
inconvenience).  This  aspect  is  not  tackled  at  all  and  is  an  essential  factor  for  consumer 
reluctance  to  repair.  While  each  aspect  that  will  not  be  tackled  can  influence  consumer 

94 IA Study, Section 3.4 
95  For  example,  growth  of  refurbished  smartphones.  Counterpoint  Research’s Global Refurbished  Smartphone 
Tracker (available at counterpointresearch.com).  

20 

 
 
                                                 
decisions  against  repair,  the  cumulative  impact  is  even  higher.  The  emerging  consumption 
trends do not suggest that market developments will resolve the outstanding drivers on their 
own.  

On  the  one  hand,  there  are  trends  of  increased  environmental  consciousness96,  as  well  as 
increased  openness  to  refurbished  goods  by  consumers.97  Fashion  and  status  trends  that 
underpin consumers’ choices are more likely to evolve towards more sustainable behaviour, as 
already seen in the growing second-hand market for clothes. This is all the more relevant in the 
current context of inflation and the cost-of-living crisis which is expected to trigger more repair 
and purchase of refurbished goods. These trends are likely to encourage more consumers to 
repair  or  buy  refurbished  goods  for  economic  reasons  and  for  a  more  sustainable  lifestyle 
choice.98   

On  the  other  hand,  there  are  trends  pointing  to  increased  interest  in  new  models  with  new 
features. Overall, an increase in consumption of consumer goods is expected. For instance, the 
use of smartphones is supposed to increase up to 7.5 billion by 2026.99 Sale of TVs in the EU 
has  constantly  increased  over  the  last  decade  and  is  expected  to  continue  growing.100  The 
replacement rate for defective refrigerators increased from 3.5% in 2004 to 8.3% in 2013 with 
many appliances discarded before their end of life.101 In addition, more and more household 
appliances are equipped with ‘smart’ features that can incentivise consumers to replace their 
goods in order to have these new functionalities.102 Therefore, when an appliance breaks down, 
consumers may be tempted to replace it with a newer model instead of repairing it. The more 
difficult  and  unattractive  repair  looks,  the  more  consumers  will  prefer  to  replace,  as  the 
majority of consumers repairing products do so reluctantly in any case. 

This replacement trend affects the majority of consumers, i.e. the biggest consumer segments 
of enthusiastic replacers and reluctant repairers, and is therefore likely to be stronger than the 
positive  developments.  Thus,  the  problem  will  largely  persist  in  the  absence  of  specific 
measures targeting consumer repair behaviour.  

96 IA Study, Section 3.2.4 with reference to further research, Section 3.4. 
97  IA  Study,  Section  3.1,  Figure  3.7:  E.g.  48%  of  consumers  declared  their  interest  in  buying  a  second-
hand/refurbished laptops, 46% wooden furniture, 44% smartphones, 41% refrigerators and 38% televisions.   
98 IA Study, Section 3.2.3. 
99 The figures refer to smartphones worldwide. IA Study, Annex 2, Section 3.1.3 with reference to further research. 
100 IA Study, Annex 2, Sections 2.2 and 3.2.1 with reference to further research. 
101  European  Commission,  ‘Sustainable  Products  in  a  Circular  Economy  -  Towards  an  EU  Product  Policy 
Framework contributing to the Circular Economy’, 2019, p. 28. 
102 IA Study, Section 3.2.1. 

21 

 
 
                                                 
3.  Why should the EU act?  

Legal basis 

This  initiative  contributes  to  the  better  functioning  of  the  internal  market  by  amending  and 
adding to the harmonised remedies system for the sale of consumer goods, thereby supporting 
also  the  EU’s  overall  approach  to  promoting  sustainable  consumption  under  the  European 
Green Deal. The appropriate legal basis is Article 114 TFEU; according to Art. 114 (3) TFEU, 
the Commission takes as a base a high level of environmental and consumer protection.  

The SGD was adopted on the basis of Article 114 TFEU. It aims to contribute to the functioning 
of the internal market by tackling contract law-related obstacles for the cross-border sales of 
consumer goods in the EU. Problem 1 of this IA is driven by the free consumer choice between 
repair and replacement in the SGD. As several options promoting repair entail amendments to 
the fully harmonised remedies system of the SGD, it is necessary to amend the SGD. 

Outside  the  scope  of  the  SGD,  individual  MS  can  adopt  measures  promoting  sustainable 
consumption.  Some  MS  have  indeed  already  adopted  rules  promoting  repair.  For  example, 
Spain has introduced an obligation on the producer to guarantee an adequate technical service 
and the availability of spare parts related to any defect of a product during a period of 10 years 
from  the  manufacturing  of  the  good.103  Other  MS  have  introduced  measures  related  to  the 
extension  of  the  liability  period  or  explore  measures  aiming  at  more  sustainable 
consumption.104 For example, a recent French law105 provides a six-month extension period of 
the guarantee for consumers who choose to have their products repaired instead of replaced. In 
addition, in France the seller is incentivised to accept the repair requested by the consumer, 
since if the repair is refused by the seller, the replaced product is given an additional two-year 
guarantee period.  

Such  differing  national  rules  are  likely  to  constitute  actual  or  potential  obstacles  to  the 
functioning of the  internal  market. National  measures outside the scope  of the SGD are, or 
would likely be, because of their consumer protection nature, mandatory rules. For instance, 
the French or Spanish rules mentioned above are mandatory rules. Such differing mandatory 

103 General Law for the Protection of Consumers and Users and other complementary laws (Ley General para la 
Defensa de los Consumidores y Usuarios), approved by Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007 of 16.11. 2007, Article 
127a(1).  
104 In the workshop with the MS, several MS informed that they could consider regulating consumer contract law 
to  better  fit  sustainability  requirements,  but  they  are  first  waiting  for  possible  Commission  initiatives  on  this 
matter.  
105 ‘Loi n° 2020-105 du 10 février 2020 relative à la lutte contre le gaspillage et à l'économie circulaire’, amending 
article L. 217-9 du code de la consommation of the ‘code de la consommation’.  

22 

 
 
                                                 
rules are likely to create economic burdens on the economic operators acting in the internal 
market.  

The regime of the Rome I Regulation106 leads for most cross-border consumer contracts either 
to  the  application  of  the  law  of  the  consumer  in  its  entirety  or  to  the  application  of  the 
mandatory rules of the consumer’s law where their level of protection is higher than the law 
chosen by the parties. This would have the result in the example of the French rules explained 
above that sellers  from  other MS  exporting to  consumers  residing in  France would need to 
apply the French law entirely, or at least these specific mandatory rules would apply. Traders 
selling to French consumers would in this case need first of all to find out about the applicable 
national law. Subsequently, they would need to adapt their contract terms and conditions to the 
requirements of French law. Obtaining the necessary legal advice for this means information 
and transaction costs, which they would not face in their own national market, according to the 
law of which their standard contract terms have been designed. Similar scenarios would emerge 
also in the context of other comparable national measures, such as the Spanish rule mentioned 
above. Against the same background, possible measures of other MS promoting sustainability 
in the contractual context  could create potential  obstacles for the smooth functioning of the 
internal market. 

Furthermore, differing national rules and resulting differences in market practices result in low 
transparency on repair conditions, dissuading consumers from accessing repair services across 
borders as in the absence of harmonised rules complexity in cross-border transactions is even 
higher  than  in  a  national  context.  The  resulting  limited  consumer  demand  hinders  the 
development of repair services across borders. As digital technologies evolve and more goods 
include  digital  features  that  could  be  accessed  remotely,  repair  services  at  a  distance,  and 
respectively  cross-border  are  likely  to  develop  even  more  in  the  future.  It  indirectly  also 
discourages the cross-border movement of goods, such as spare parts and repair equipment that 
are necessary for repair services. 

Subsidiarity: Necessity and added value of EU action 

The problems analysed in this IA are of a cross-border nature and of European, if not global 
scale; they have the same drivers and effects across the EU.  

The SGD has already fully harmonised certain rules on the sale of consumer goods, in order to 
promote cross-border trade and the functioning of the internal market. As legislative action at 
national  level  to  tackle  the  problems  within  the  scope  of  the  SGD,  for  instance  prioritising 
repair over replacement, would be excluded by its harmonisation effect, the described problem 
could  be  remedied  only  through  legislative  action  at  EU  level.  In  the  absence  of  EU-level 
action, national initiatives outside the scope of the SGD would follow, as the above-mentioned 

106 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the  law 
applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), OJ L 177, 4.7.2008.  

23 

 
 
                                                 
examples  already  show,  in  all  likelihood  with  different  approaches  and  different  design,  in 
order to promote the goal of more sustainable consumption. While they could bring certain 
benefits to consumers and the environment at national level, they would at the same time create 
or increase fragmentation in the Single Market.  

The EU action is therefore necessary in order to achieve the overall objective of a functioning 
internal market with more sustainable consumption of consumer goods. It is only through EU 
action that the desired effect of promoting repair and reuse in the context of cross-border sales 
can be achieved consistently across the internal market.  

The  preferred  policy  options  (POs)  of  this  initiative,  while  aiming  at  more  sustainable 
consumption, will be tailored to the needs it must address and be of a targeted nature, carefully 
designed in terms of scope and intensity. Administrative burden and costs are commensurate 
with the specific and general objectives to be achieved. None of the options analysed in this IA 
goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives. The principle of proportionality will 
therefore be complied with. 

The SGD has since 1 January 2022 started to apply in MS and the review of the Directive is 
due by 12 June 2024. Considering this timeline, a Commission proposal following the review 
could be submitted to the co-legislators earliest in 2025, more likely 2026, the adoption by the 
co-legislator would not be before 2028 and the implementation by MS not before 2030. The 
European Green Deal and its objectives of promoting the green transition and more sustainable 
consumption tackle challenges and goals of the current decade. To deliver on these objectives, 
the reduction of harmful environmental impacts  concerning  consumer remedies cannot wait 
for the review of the SGD.  

4.  Objectives: What is to be achieved? 

General objective 

The general objective of the POs flows from the Treaties and the commitments taken by the 
EU to  tackle climate change.  In this  context, the initiative delivers on  the general  objective 
included in the European Green Deal, i.e. sustainable consumption by promoting the repair and 
reuse of viable consumer goods in the Single Market in the area of consumer remedies.  

Aligning  the  harmonised  consumer  remedies  to  the  objective  of  promoting  repair  of  viable 
consumer goods is conducive to more environment-friendly actions of consumers and sellers 
at the moment when products become defective. Therefore, it contributes to the longer use of 
consumer goods and prevention of viable products ending up as waste.  

The ESPR creating more sustainable product design  at the production phase and the ECGT 
promoting  more  sustainable  consumer  decisions  at  the  point  of  sale,  also  contribute  to  the 
general objective of promoting sustainable consumption. They leave it from the outset to this 
initiative to tackle consumer remedies in the after-sales phase.  

24 

 
 
By measures promoting repair and reuse of goods, this initiative also supports several targets 
of  the  Sustainable  Development  Goals,  namely  Goal  12  on  responsible  consumption  and 
production and Goal 13 on climate action. 

Specific objectives  

Increasing  repair  and  reuse  of  viable  consumer  goods  within  the  legal  guarantee 

(Addressing problem 1)  

This objective aims at an increase in repair and reuse of viable consumer goods within the legal 
guarantee. The rationale is to promote repair as a remedy and to facilitate the reuse of viable 
products during the legal guarantee. Achieving the objective will contribute to more sustainable 
consumption, as there will be less waste stemming from discarded products and less demand 
for resources, including energy, used in manufacturing and sale of new products replacing the 
ones not being repaired.  

Increasing  repair  and  reuse  of  viable  consumer  goods  beyond  the  legal  guarantee 

(Addressing problem 2) 

This objective aims at increasing repair and reuse of viable consumer goods beyond the legal 
guarantee. The rationale is to encourage consumers towards repairing their defective products 
and to incentivise demand of refurbished products, instead of buying new products. Achieving 
this objective entails a higher percentage of consumers who repair their own products after the 
legal guarantee has expired or is not applicable (e.g. because of wear and tear), as well as a 
higher use of refurbished products, thus prolonging the lifespan of products. Consequently, this 
will contribute to more sustainable consumption, as there will be less waste stemming from 
discarded products  and less  demand for  resources, including energy, used in  manufacturing 
and sale of new products replacing the ones not being repaired. 

5.  What are the available policy options? 

What is the baseline from which options are assessed (Option 0)? 

The baseline below is the benchmark for assessing the POs (option 0) over a period of 15 years.  

As  regards  problem  1  (Premature  disposal  of  repairable  consumer  goods  within  the  legal 
guarantee): The SGD will continue to allow the choice between repair and replacement within 
the two-year minimum liability period.  Consumers in those MS with longer periods will be 
able to benefit from the choice for even longer periods.107 The majority of EU consumers are 
likely to continue to choose replacement due to their preference for new products. 

107 E.g. ES, SE 3-year liability period; IE 6-year limitation period. 

25 

 
 
                                                 
As regards  problem 2 (Premature disposal  of repairable consumer goods beyond  the legal 
guarantee): Beyond the SGD remedies system, the current legal framework will not effectively 
address the drivers which dissuade consumers from repair due to inconvenience and will only 
partially  address  the  drivers  related  to  price  and  lack  of  transparency  on  availability  and 
conditions of repair services.  

The  Ecodesign  Directive  has  led  so  far  to  the  adoption  of  ecodesign  requirements  for  31 
individual energy-related product  groups. The work on the ecodesign framework will cover 
more product groups.108 For a number of the ecodesign product groups covered reparability 
requirements  exist.  Such  requirements  will  be  introduced  for  new  product  groups  (e.g. 
smartphones  and  tablets)  or  products  under  review  (i.e.  tumble  dryers  and  computers).  The 
European  Committee  for  Standardisation  and  the  European  Committee  for  Electrical 
Standardisation finalised standards for energy-related products, including on durability, ability 
to repair and reuse.109 

The ESPR will replace the Ecodesign Directive once adopted and will extend the product scope 
of the ecodesign framework beyond energy-related products to cover almost all categories of 
physical goods on the EU market (except food, feed and medicine). The ESPR establishes rules 
on product durability, reusability and reparability, which will be put into practice by delegated 
acts  for  product  groups.  Reparability  rules,  where  relevant,  will  be  further  specified  in 
delegated acts and may include requirements on spare parts, repair instructions, information on 
disassembly and reparability scoring. Product-specific reparability rules under the ESPR are 
likely  to  have  a  positive  impact  on  problem  2,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  on problem  1,  for  the 
product groups they cover. They will make repair easier by tackling the technical obstacles to 
reparability (driver 5), which should also positively affect the repair price (driver 4). However, 
the  ESPR  will  not  address  the  transparency  and  comparability  of  prices  for  repair  services 
(driver 4) nor obstacles relating to the repair process itself, which dissuades many consumers 
from repair (drivers 2 and 3). Furthermore, the extent of the ESPR impact is uncertain, because 
its  effects  will  depend  on  the  product-specific  delegated  acts  to  be  included  in  future 
Commission working plans from 2025.  

The proposal for a Design Directive (recast) will, similarly as under the ESPR, make repair 
easier by tackling technical obstacles to reparability (driver 5), which would positively affect 
repair  prices  (driver  4).  However,  it  does  not  address  the  other  relevant  drivers  that  keep 
consumers from repairing defective products relating to lack of transparency (driver 2) and the 
inconvenience factors (driver 3). 

108 Based on the Ecodesign and Energy Labelling Working Plan 2022-2024, 30 March 2022.  
109 CEN - CEN/CLC/JTC 10 (cencenelec.eu). 

26 

 
 
                                                 
Product-specific  initiatives:  The  Circular  Economy  Action  Plan  includes  other  initiatives 
promoting longer product lifetimes for priority product groups.110  

The  ECGT  proposal  will  provide  consumers  with  better  information  on  reparability  and 
durability  of  products  before  they  buy  a  product.  Consumer  will  be  able  to  choose  more 
sustainable products that last longer and can be repaired more easily. However, this proposal 
will not remedy the situation once the product is defective and the consumer needs to decide 
to repair.  

The Directive on the Common System of Value Added Tax extends the possibilities for MS 
to apply reduced VAT rates to certain repair services, which could affect the price of repairs in 
those national markets where MS decide to apply a reduced rate.  

The  Data  Act  will  facilitate  a  broader  offer  of  repair  and  maintenance  services  around 
connected products as repairers could access data generated by these products.  

The above-mentioned initiatives have a positive effect on repair. However, as they do not make 
repair  more  acceptable  and  accessible  for  consumers  in  the  after-sales  context,  they  do  not 
solve the problems handled by this initiative. Firstly, the consumer choice of a remedy within 
the legal guarantee period (problem 1) is not affected by the ESPR or the ECGT, as the majority 
of  EU  consumers,  who  currently  prefers  replacement,  is  likely  to  continue  to  choose 
replacement due to their preference for new products. The related initiatives are therefore not 
likely to diminish the scale of problem 1. As goods will be designed to be more reparable, and 
consumers become more aware of sustainability  characteristics of goods at the point of sale 
and therefore more likely end up buying these products, it is assumed that repairs outside the 
scope of the SGD  will  increase  in  the next  15  years as  a combined result of the ESPR and 
ECGT. Problem 2 should therefore diminish to a certain extent in scale, as the related initiatives 
tackle some problem drivers, including some beyond the scope of this initiative. However, with 
the  impact  of  the  ESPR  delegated  acts  being  uncertain  at  present,  reaching  the  overall 
sustainability objective and promoting repair and reuse in the after-sales context should not 
wait  for  all  the  product-specific  delegated  acts  to  be  adopted  and  applied.  In  any  case, 
regardless of the positive impacts of the related initiatives on the repair rates, the ESPR will 
not  address obstacles relating to the  repair process  itself, which dissuades many consumers 
from repair (drivers 2 and 3). Similarly, the ECGT proposal will not remedy the situation once 
the product is defective and the consumer needs to decide to repair. As the drivers tackled with 
this initiative are outside the scopes of the ESPR and ECGT, the problem of premature disposal 

110  For  instance,  the  Communication  on  an  EU  Strategy  for  Sustainable  and  Circular  Textiles  of  30.3.2022, 
COM(2022) 141 final announces support for circular business models such as reuse, renting and repair, take-back 
services  and  second-hand  retail.  The  proposal  for  a  Regulation  concerning  batteries  and  waste  batteries, 
10.12.2020,  COM(2020)  798  final,  and  the  work  of  the  Batteries  Alliance  should  result  in  a  new  regulatory 
framework for batteries. The proposal on the review of the End-of-Life Vehicles (ELV) Directive, scheduled for 
2023, will contribute to car durability.  

27 

 
 
                                                 
of viable goods by consumers within and outside the legal guarantee will not be solved without 
the policy intervention by this initiative.  

Description of the policy options 

Each cluster of POs has a different objective and scope: 

Cluster I promotes repair and reuse of goods within the legal guarantee;  
Cluster II facilitates and encourages repair and reuse outside the legal guarantee;  

The  POs  within  and  between  the  clusters  are  complementary;  the  sub-options  within  each 
option are alternatives. Annex 5 contains detailed explanations on the POs and on the discarded 
options. The problems, specific objectives and respective clusters of options addressing them 
are marked in the same colour on Figure 2 (yellow for Cluster I and blue for Cluster II). 

Figure 2: Intervention logic  

CLUSTER I: Options to promote repair and reuse of goods within the legal guarantee 

The Cluster I measures to promote repair and reuse within the SGD scope necessitate changes 
of the SGD, because they entail changes to the current remedies system which is largely fully 

28 

Choice within the legal guarantee favours replacement with new goods in case of defectLack of transparency on availability and conditions of repairInconvenience factors dissuade consumers from repairRepair is not economically attractive for consumers outside the legal gauranteeProblem 1: Premature disposal of repairable consumer goods within the legal guarantee frameworkProblem 2: Premature disposal of repairable consumer goods beyond the legal guarantee framework DriversProblemsSpecific objectivesGeneral objectivePolicy optionsSustainable consumption: promoting repair and reuse of viable consumer goods in the Single MarketIncrease repair and reuse of viable consumer goods within the  legal guarantee Increase repair and reuse of viable consumer goods beyond the legal guarantee1. Promoting repair within the remedies system of the SGD 1A: Prioritising repair whenever it is cheaper than replacement  1B: Making repair the primary remedy2. Prolonging the liability period in repair context 2A: Incentivising the consumer with a longer liability period to choose repair2B: Extending liability period for repair3. Replacement with refurbished goods3A: In the extended liability period (PO2B)3B: From the second year of the liability period5. Information on where to repair 5A: Obligation to inform where to repair5B: A matchmaking platform on available repair services at national level 5C: A matchmaking platform on available repair services at EU-level6. Enhance transparency/conditions for repair6A: A common EU   easy repair standard    6B: Obligation to issue a binding standardised repair quote on price and conditions of repair 6C: Obligation to repair  products repairable under EU law 6D: Obligation to repair all products4. Aligning the liability period for refurbished goods 7. Promoting refurbished goods on an online platfom via an additional functionality under option 5B or 5CProducts are not designed to be reparableConsumer lifestyle choicesCluster I: Encouraging repair and reuse within the legal guaranteeCluster II: Encouraging repair and reuse beyond the legal gauranteeText 
 
 
 
harmonised.  Its  provisions  are  insufficient  to  tackle  the  premature  disposal  of  repairable 
consumer goods. They should incentivise repair and reuse of goods under the legal guarantee. 
The measures only cover defects that are present at delivery and become apparent within the 
liability period.  

i.  Option 1: Prioritising repair within the remedies system of the SGD 

Sub-option 1A: Prioritising repair whenever it is cheaper than replacement 

PO1A means that consumers can only request the seller to repair and not to replace the product 
in all cases where repair is cheaper than or as costly as replacement. The consumer will be able 
to request replacement only if repair is more expensive than replacement. This is different from 
the current SGD where the consumer can request replacement even if repair is cheaper, as long 
as the difference between the costs for the remedies is not disproportionately high.  

Sub-option 1B: Making repair the primary remedy 

In PO1B, repair would be the primary remedy. The consumer could request replacement only 
if repair of the product is not possible at all or causes disproportionately high costs in absolute 
terms for the seller. As long as the costs for repair are not disproportionate in absolute terms, 
the seller would be obliged to repair the product. This is different from the current SGD, which 
allows  replacement  already  when  repair  is  disproportionately  more  costly  compared  to 
replacement.  

Both PO1A and 1B take the repair costs as the benchmark. This maintains the approach of the 
SGD legislator, chosen to balance the interests of consumers and sellers. The sub-options have 
however different effects on whether the consumer can choose replacement. PO1B has a higher 
threshold: replacement can only be chosen if repair is excessively costly. PO1A sets the hurdle 
lower: replacement can be chosen when repair is more costly, including a minor difference in 
costs. 

However for both sub-options a principle of consumer law that the parties may agree on a more 
favourable remedy for the consumer, i.e. replacement, remains unaffected.  

ii.  Option 2: Prolonging the liability period in the context of repair  

Sub-option 2A: Incentivising the consumer with a longer liability period to choose repair 

In PO2A, once a defect  (present at the time of delivery) appears and the consumer chooses 
repair,  the  liability  period  for  the  repaired  product  would  be  extended,  with  the  aim  to 
incentivise the consumer to choose repair instead of replacement. The extension of the liability 
period could be done in different ways. 

Variant 1 extends the liability period by 1 year, added to the existing liability period. In the 
additional liability period, if a defect occurs again, the consumer would be entitled to request 
only repair (if repair is impossible or too costly in absolute terms, the other remedies would not 

29 

 
 
apply). This does not prevent the parties to agree on replacement, which is likely to happen in 
cases  where  repair  is  more  expensive  than  replacement  or  businesses  want  to  keep  their 
customers. For the MS that provide for longer liability periods (e.g. 3 instead of the 2 years 
foreseen by the SGD) one year would be added to that period (e.g. an additional 4th year where 
the consumer can only request repair). 

Variant  2  prolongs  the  liability  period  by  restarting  it  again  after  the  consumer  has  chosen 
repair. The current liability period would start anew, with all available remedies, counting from 
the moment the consumer received the repaired product from the seller. Depending on when 
the lack of conformity appears, restarting the liability period could lead to a significantly longer 
liability period, which would be even longer in MS that already foresee a longer liability period. 

In both variants, the liability period would only be added/restarted once, to avoid continuous 
prolongations leading to legal uncertainty and being too burdensome for the seller. The first 
variant leads to a liability period of three years (or more, depending on MS) and is limited to 
repair.  The  second  variant  can  lead  to  a  liability  period  between  2  and  4  years  (or  more, 
depending on MS) allowing the consumer to exercise all remedies. 

Sub-option 2B: Extending the liability period for repair  

PO2B does not aim at incentivising consumers to choose repair, but extends the liability period, 
e.g. by one year, in all cases, independent from the consumer choosing repair when a defect 
occurs. However, the extension applies only to repair as a remedy, i.e. if a lack of conformity 
becomes  apparent  in  the  extended  liability  period,  the  consumer  can  only  request  repair  (if 
repair is impossible or too costly in absolute terms, the other remedies would not apply). This 
does not prevent the parties to agree on replacement, which is likely to happen in cases where 
repair is more expensive than replacement or businesses want to keep their customers.  

While both PO2A and  2B extend the liability period, the approach  is  different: PO2A only 
applies when the consumer chooses repair, aiming to incentivise consumers to choose repair 
instead of replacement by rewarding them with an additional liability period. PO2B grants an 
extension of the liability period to all consumers even if the consumer has chosen replacement 
in the first two years.  

Both PO2A and 2B could be combined with PO3A that allows replacement with refurbished 
goods in the additional liability period (see iii.). 

iii.  Option 3: Replacement with refurbished goods 

If consumers choose replacement as a remedy under the current SGD, sellers have to replace 
the defective goods with new goods. To increase the use of refurbished goods, the SGD could 
be amended to allow sellers to offer replacement with refurbished goods, where available.  

Sub-option 3A: Replacement with refurbished goods in the extended liability period 

30 

 
 
PO3A envisages a combination with the POs prolonging the liability period in context of repair 
(see  ii.  PO2A111  and  PO2B).  The  replacement  with  refurbished  goods  would  be  a  remedy 
offered  to  consumers  in  cases  where  repair  is  impossible  or  causes  excessive  costs.  PO3A 
would only apply in the additional liability period going beyond the minimum liability period 
of two years (or more depending on MS regime). This option would not apply in the first two 
years  of  the  liability  period  as  the  consumer  may  expect  as  fair  replacement  only  the 
replacement with new goods during that period. After two years, replacement with refurbished 
goods, where available, could be justified as the defective goods have already been in use for 
a considerable time. 

Sub-option  3B:  Replacement  with  refurbished  goods  from  the  second  year  of  the  liability 
period 

To promote the use of refurbished goods more, PO3B would allow sellers to offer refurbished 
goods as a replacement from the second year of the liability period. When one year has passed, 
many products are likely to show signs of wear and tear. It is thus considered as fair to grant 
the seller the additional possibility of replacing the defective product with a refurbished one, if 
available. 

iv.  Option 4: Aligning the liability period of refurbished goods with new goods 

To encourage consumers to buy refurbished goods, this measure would align the liability period 
for refurbished goods with the liability period for new goods (i.e. minimum two years). It would 
remove  MS’  current  possibility  to  allow  sellers  and  consumers  to  contractually  agree  to  a 
shorter liability for refurbished goods. For the MS having used this option this would mean that 
they  could  keep  their  current  rule  for  second-hand  goods,  but  would  need  to  exclude 
refurbished  goods.  Aligning the liability period for refurbished  goods and new goods  could 
influence consumers’ choice to buy more refurbished goods. They would not be discouraged 
by  quality  concerns  due  to  the  shorter  liability  period  and  could  rely  on  similar  quality 
assurances as for new goods.  

CLUSTER II: Options to encourage repair and reuse of goods beyond the legal guarantee 

The measures under Cluster II would not change the SGD as they are outside the scope of the 
legal  guarantee  framework.  They  encourage  and  facilitate  repair  of  defects  that  do  not 
constitute a lack of conformity pursuant to the SGD, i.e. the large majority of defects, either 
due to wear and tear or mishandling of the consumer that were not present at delivery or defects 
that appear after the liability period expired. 

v.  Option 5: Information on where to repair 

111 Replacement with refurbished goods could be an alternative remedy in both variants of PO2A.  

31 

 
 
                                                 
Sub-option 5A: Obligation to inform where to repair  

Producers should inform on their website whether they themselves provide repair services and 
to what extent, e.g. for which specific products/models. If combined with PO6C and PO6D on 
the obligation to repair, producers should also inform to what extent the obligation to repair 
applies for specific goods they produce. This information can be provided when new products 
are placed on the market and updated only where changes occur112.   

Sub-option 5B: A matchmaking platform on available repair services at national level  

PO5B entails the creation of an online platform with a search engine, matching consumers with 
repairers for consumer goods at national level. The purpose is to facilitate the search of suitable 
repair services and provide more transparency on conditions of repair in order to incentivise 
consumers to choose repair. This would be an independent comparison tool helping end-users 
to  assess  the  merits  of  different  repair  providers  by  means  of  standardised  information, 
facilitating comparison of prices and quality parameters. Where the market has already created 
such platforms which meet the criteria or a relevant national platform already exists, MS would 
not need to create a new one.  

The national platforms could be interconnected at EU level with relevant websites, such as the 
European Product Registry for Energy Labelling (EPREL)113, the Single Digital Gateway or 
Your Europe Portal. 

Sub-option 5C: A matchmaking platform on repair at EU level 

This sub-option entails the creation of a single online platform at EU level with a search engine 
matching consumers with repairers for consumer goods.  

It would add new functionalities to the EPREL portal for energy labelled products. The EPREL 
portal requires producers to include product-related information when placing a product on the 
market  to  facilitate  market  surveillance.  The  repair  information  would  cover  the  product 
categories with an energy label, which can be included in EPREL. Consumers could access the 
portal by scanning the energy label on their product (e.g. a refrigerator) and identify repairers 
nearby. The take-up is likely to increase as a result, even among consumers not yet aware of 
the  EPREL  portal.  A  platform  at  EU  level  could  also  enable  more  cross-border  repair, 
especially  in  cross-border  regions  or  for  items  that  can  be  shipped  at  acceptable  cost.  This 
would  broaden  the  choice  of  repair  for  consumers  and  promote  competition  in  the  Single 
Market.  

A detailed outline of functionalities for both options 5B and 5C is presented in Annex 5. 

112 E.g. when specific product models are no longer repairable as spare parts are not available anymore. 
113 EPREL Public website (europa.eu). 

32 

 
 
                                                 
vi.  Option 6: Enhance transparency/conditions for repair 

Sub-option 6A: Voluntary commitments to an EU common ‘easy repair standard’   

The  standard  would  be  applicable  to  all  repairers  across  the  EU  (including  independent 
repairers and producers). It would cover key ‘convenience’ factors for consumer decisions on 
repair, e.g. reasonable duration of the repair service, availability of a temporary replacement 
product,  availability  of  pick-up/transportation  and  additional  voluntary  guarantees  on  repair 
quality. The commitment would set a standardised minimum quality level on each aspect. This 
would increase consumer confidence, as they could trust that providers with this label address 
consumer concerns about repair in an effective manner.  

The standard could be either developed by a EU standardisation organisation or through self-
regulation. In the latter case, the standard could be negotiated as a code of conduct, agreed by 
representative business associations at EU level as well as consumer organisations and civil 
society representatives to take their legitimate interests into account. The Commission would 
facilitate the development of the standard and help to provide publicity. To ensure visibility 
and consumer recognition, a standardised ‘easy repair’ label could be granted to all subscribers.  

Sub-option 6B: Obligation to issue a binding repair quote on price and conditions for repair in 
a standardised form 

A binding repair quote in a standardised form should be issued, once the consumer expresses 
interest  in  obtaining  a  repair  service.  The  obligation  would  apply  to  producers,  sellers  and 
independent repair service providers to stimulate competition. PO6B draws on precedents in 
sectorial  EU  law  to  facilitate  consumer  choice  by  standardised  comparable  pre-contractual 
information. The repair quote would provide the consumer with the relevant information on 
costs and key conditions of repair such as the price or maximum price,114 duration of repair, 
any additional voluntary guarantees beyond existing legal remedies for repair contracts under 
national  law,  availability  of  a  temporary  replacement  product  during  the  time  of  repair  and 
transportation. A standardised form on a durable medium would allow the consumer to easily 
compare offers. The consumer should only be obliged to pay the costs necessary to issue the 
quote.  

Sub-option  6C:  Producer’s  obligation  to  repair  goods  that  are  subject  to  reparability 
requirements under EU law (against a price)  

114  The  CRD  obligation  to  inform  about  the  price  or  the  manner  it  is  calculated  applies  also  to  repair  service 
contracts or a service contract whose object is merely to estimate the cost of repair. The price information of PO6B 
will be complementary as it will be combined with the content of the service, bringing transparency to what the 
price includes and is likely to be given following an individual diagnostic of the defect. 

33 

 
 
                                                 
Such obligation to repair would cover defects outside the legal guarantee.115 The obligation to 
repair would apply to products for which reparability116 requirements in EU law exist or will 
be  adopted,  e.g.  in  ecodesign  implementing  regulations.  This  will  make  PO6C  possible  in 
practice. The obligation to repair would apply to producers as they are also the addressees of 
existing reparability requirements under EU law. Thus, they have the necessary spare parts, 
expertise and equipment to repair.117 Other repair actors, e.g. independent repairers and sellers, 
do  not  necessarily  have  access  to  spare  parts  or  do  not  possess  the  necessary  know-how, 
software and equipment to fulfil this obligation.  

The  product  would  be  repaired  for  a  price.  The  price  could  take  into  account  the  costs  for 
labour, spare parts, operating the repair facility (e.g. tools, rent) and a profit for the producer. 
The price would not be regulated, but  agreed in  the contract between the consumer and the 
producer, done under the competitive pressure of independent repairers, therefore benefitting 
consumers and the repair sector.118 Consumers could seek other repair opportunities in order 
to be able to compare offers. They would likely approach also local independent repairers or 
the seller before reaching out to producers which may be located at a greater distance. 

Option 6D: Producer’s obligation to repair all products (against a price)  

PO6D has the same rationale as PO6C, but a broader scope. It envisages a producer’s obligation 
to repair all products which are reparable by nature. This option would cover all defects that 
are outside the legal guarantee. Unlike  goods subject to reparability requirements under EU 
law, not all products are reparable by design. Therefore, PO6D would include an exception 
linked  to  the  actual  possibility  to  repair  the  product.  Producers  could  invoke  this  exception 
when repair is not technically feasible, notably when products are not reparable by design. The 
assessment  of  the  actual  reparability  would  largely  depend  on  the  producer.  The  choice  of 
whether  to  request  repair  will  remain  with  the  consumer.  The  price  of  repair  would  be 
determined like in PO6C.  

vii.  Option 7: Promoting refurbished goods on an online platform via a functionality 

under PO5B or PO5C 

PO7 encourages supply and demand for refurbished goods by match-making consumers with 
sellers of refurbished consumer goods and purchasers of goods for refurbishment. It facilitates 
the  search  for  refurbished  goods  as  a  sustainable  alternative  to  buying  new  products  or 
replacing  defective  products  outside  the  legal  guarantee.  It  also  facilitates  arrangements 
between  consumers  that  may  wish  to  dispose  of  defective  repairable  goods  and  service 

115 Defects not present at delivery or which appeared after the liability period had elapsed. 
116 Except where technically not feasible. 
117 APPLiA, Home Appliance Europe, ‘By the Numbers: The Home Appliance Industry in Europe’, 2020-2021: 
91% requests to repair to manufacturers resulted in successful repair in 2018.   
118 If the price were to be regulated, all the repair demand would be channelled to the producer and the independent 
repairers would be foreclosed. 

34 

 
 
                                                 
providers  that  are  looking  for  such  goods  for  refurbishment.  PO7  can  be  implemented  as  a 
functionality of the repair platform suggested under PO5B and 5C, as they work on the same 
matchmaking principle. If combined, they would be more cost efficient and produce synergies. 
When the repair possibilities identified through the platform are not available or not satisfactory 
for  the  consumers’  needs,  consumers  may  use  the  same  platform  to  identify  replacement 
products that are refurbished. The platform would function based on sellers’ and purchasers’ 
self-registration.  

Options for instruments 

The options set out above could be delivered via different legal instruments, depending on the 
nature of the option, including amendments  to  existing EU legislation, the adoption of new 
legal  instruments  or  codes  of  conduct.  In  particular,  the  options  in  cluster  I  could  entail 
amendments to the SGD or a new directive. The option for a European matchmaking platform 
(PO5C) would necessitate a regulation, a Commission decision or an amendment to relevant 
existing  legal  instruments.  The  option  concerning  voluntary  commitments  (PO6A)  can  be 
delivered  via  a  code  of  conduct  or  a  Commission  mandate  for  a  repair  standard  to 
standardisation bodies. The concrete choice of instruments will be discussed in the context of 
the preferred option.  

6.  What are the impacts of the policy options? 

Impact of the baseline scenario 

The combined impact of initiatives under the Circular Economy Action Plan will be positive 
for the environment, reducing the problem scale by promoting the production and sales of more 
sustainable products. However, despite this positive impact, those initiatives will not achieve 
the  full  potential  of  sustainable  consumption  if  there  is  no  action  to  tackle  drivers  behind 
unsustainable consumer behaviour.  

Even  if  the  majority  of  goods  are  covered  by  ecodesign  requirements  to  make  them  more 
durable and repairable, defects will still occur, because goods will still break down at some 
point over their lifetime. Even if defects can be easily fixed at a low cost, this will not happen 
if consumers do not wish and do not follow through with repair. Therefore, consumer decisions 
are  essential  for  sustainable  consumption.  However,  problems  in  the  after-sales  phase  will 
continue to discourage consumers from repair, thereby preventing the full potential of having 
more repairable products through ecodesign requirements to materialise, and thereby limiting 
the impact of those initiatives. 

On the supply side: Based on the initiatives under the Circular Economy Action Plan, mainly 
the ESPR (and the Ecodesign Directive until ESPR enters into force), more consumer goods 
will become technically reparable. This should result in a continuous increase in the percentage 

35 

 
 
of products that are fixable and fixed in the next 15 years.119 Repair rates growth will mainly 
be driven by more successful repair outcomes, because the technical obstacles to repair will 
decrease in the next 15 years. More products fixed means longer consumption lifetime, less 
prematurely discarded products and potentially 1.5 billion avoided new product purchases by 
2037. Better reparability is therefore expected to contribute to a decrease in the scale of the 
problem.  

Manufacturers and sellers: EU initiatives encouraging more sustainable consumption on the 
supply  and  demand  side  will  lead  to  manufacturing  more  sustainable  products.  European 
producers, subject to relevant ecodesign requirements, will increasingly invest in more durable 
and  reparable  products.  The  importance  of  reparability  is  likely  to  grow  as  more  product-
specific  reparability  rules  will  be  adopted.  Market  practices  may  also  evolve  towards  more 
reparability, based on standards. This expected shift towards sustainable product design will 
diminish the importance of supply-related drivers that hinder repair which are beyond the scope 
of this initiative. This is also likely to encourage businesses to refurbish more goods, which 
could be beneficial for parts of the repair sector. However, as long as consumers prematurely 
dispose of their goods and need new replacement goods, manufacturers and sellers will still 
respond to consumer demand as a result of discarding repairable goods before their lifetime is 
achieved.  

Most  repair  businesses  (mainly  SMEs120)  will  depend  on  consumers’  decisions  whether  to 
repair their product or replace/buy a new one. Even if more repairable products are placed on 
the  market  and  more  consumers  buy  them,  defects  in  these  products  will  still  occur.  These 
include non-conformity defects existing at delivery (covered by the legal guarantee), as well as 
defects  due  to  consumer’s  use  or  wear  and  tear  (beyond  the  legal  guarantee).  As  long  as 
consumers replace defective products (falling under the legal guarantee) or dispose of defective 
products prematurely without repairing them (beyond the legal guarantee), repairers will miss 
out  on  forgone repair services (as subcontractors in  the scenario of problem  1 and in direct 
consumer repair service contracts in the scenario of problem 2). Repair actors, such as repair 
cafés, will not be able to cover consumer demand, despite the fact they are well placed to fix 
defects, especially for non-electronic products121, and thus improve competition in the sector. 

119 At least 58% of products consumers brought to repairers were fixed in 2021 and this share may increase by 
4.57% by 2037Sharepair Project (Yoko Dams): An average annual growth increase of 0.28% can be assumed 
based  on  historic  data  of  increase  in  products  that  could  be  fixed  between  2014  and  2021.  The  0.28%  is  the 
assumed annual average increase rate of repair based on successful repair rates between 2014 (54.74%) and 2021 
(57.72%). The data covers 40 popular consumer goods including electr(on)ic and non-electr(on)ic products, It is 
reasonable to assume that repair rates will continue to grow in the next 15 years given the expanding scope of 
ecodesign legislation and reparability rules under EU law.  
120 82% of repair services employees in the EU work for SMEs. 
121 The average success rate of repair of a wide range of electr(on)ic and non-electr(on)ic products in repair cafés 
was 63%,  while the repair rate for non-electronic products was 85%. M. Postma, S.  Boer, C. Zeeland: Repair 

36 

 
 
                                                 
On  the  demand  side,  the  ECGT  will  encourage  consumers  towards  more  sustainable 
consumption by helping them to buy more durable and reparable products. Having bought such 
products, consumers could subsequently be more willing to repair them. However, most after-
sales  drivers  that  influence  consumer  behaviour  and  dis-incentivise  repair  will  still  persist, 
because  they  are  not  tackled  by  initiatives  under  the  Circular  Economy  Action  Plan.  Many 
consumers are likely still be put off by the hassle or the inconveniences of the repair process 
or uncertainty about repair price and conditions. These consumers will continue to dispose of 
repairable goods prematurely, contributing to the problem over the long term. 

Consumer attitudes towards repair: As a trend, consumers will still prefer replacement to repair 
for most consumer goods in the next years.122 Repair could increase in the future due to a more 
environmental-conscious  attitude  and  therefore  a  willingness  to  repair  among  younger 
generations, but the trend to buy new goods to keep in step with fashion or update and upgrade 
to new technological features is likely to be stronger.  

Consumer confidence in the repair market also remains rather low: less than 30% of consumers 
considers it more likely to repair a defective product rather than replace it. If the market for 
repair  services  continues  as  today,  the  trend  over  the  next  years  is  unlikely  to  change 
significantly.123  Even  with  some  positive  development  in  the  repair  market  thanks  to  other 
related EU initiatives, the consumer-related drivers under this initiative will largely persist.  

Consumer attitudes towards refurbished goods: Positive trends are emerging for some product 
categories  such  as  clothing124,  smartphones125  and  laptops.126  However,  consumers  are  still 
likely  to  be  held  back  by  low  trust  in  second-hand  and  refurbished  goods;  thus  the  low 
willingness127 of consumers to purchase them is likely to continue.128 Most consumers are also 
likely to throw away goods they no longer need, instead of bringing them to refurbishment in 
the absence of take-back arrangements.  

Employment  in  the  repair  market  in  the  EU  will  remain  underdeveloped,  due  to  limited 
consumer demand for repair, thereby limiting the potential for local jobs. Jobs in manufacturing 

Monitor  Analysis  2019,  May  2020,  p.  17.  Available  at:  RepairMonitor_analysis_2019_05052020_ENGLISH-
1.pdf (repaircafe.org).  
122 IA Study, Section 3.4, Table 3-7: In a representative sample of consumer goods, the majority of consumers are 
likely to prefer replacing their products to repair in the next 10 years for all sample products, except cars. 
123 IA Study, Section 3.4. 
124 IA Study, Section 3.4, Figures 3.12 Perception of the repair market among consumers. 
125Counterpoint 
Global 
(https://www.counterpointresearch.com/global-refurbished-smartphone-market-2021/):  Global 
sales 
refurbished smartphones have increased between 2020 and 2021 by 15% globally and by 10% for Europe.  
126 IA Study, Annex 2, Section 2.5 and Section 4.3. 
127  IA  Study,  Section  3.3:  11-20%  do  not  trust  second-hand/refurbished  goods  (depending  on  the  product 
category). 
128 IA Study, Section 3.3. 

Tracker 
in 

Refurbished 

Smartphone 

Research’s 

37 

 
 
                                                 
and  retail  would  remain  unaffected  to  the  extent  that  current  sales  of  new  goods  can  be 
maintained.  

Environment: ESPR and ECGT will contribute to an increase in reparability, durability and 
increased consumption lifetime of a range of consumer goods and thus positively impact the 
environment. Increased repair will also contribute to the production of spare parts within the 
EU. Assuming that following the ESPR and ECGT 1.5 billion purchases of new products can 
be avoided by 2037 based on a continuous increase of repair rates, the CO2 savings by that 
date will be 47.7 million tons, corresponding to EUR 8 billion. Resource savings will amount 
to 5 million tons by 2037, corresponding to EUR 2.8 billion. The waste savings are estimated 
to be 8.7 million tons, which equals EUR 1.4 billion.  

Despite these positive developments, the overall problem of premature disposal of repairable 
consumer  goods  is  tackled  only  partially  by  the  ESPR  and  ECGT.  Significant  amounts  of 
consumer  goods  will  still  be  discarded  prematurely  by  consumers  due  to  the  remaining 
obstacles influencing the repair decisions and actions in the after-sales context, both within and 
beyond  the  legal  guarantee.  In  the  current  situation,  premature  disposal  of  viable  consumer 
goods leads to the use of around 10.5 million tons per year of valuable resources in the EU129, 
to around 57 million tons of unnecessary CO2-eq emissions yearly130 and to the production of 
unnecessary waste of 7.4 million tons per year in the EU131. If these yearly figures are placed 
in the context of the next 15 years, the environmental savings created by the ESPR and the 
ECGT due to increased repairs are not enough to take away the negative effects of the overall 
unsustainable  consumption,  largely  caused  by  the  drivers  of  this  initiative.  Negative 
environmental impacts relating to CO2 emissions, resource depletion and waste will therefore 
continue as a result of these remaining obstacles.  

CLUSTER I: Promoting repair and reuse within the legal guarantee 

Impacts of Option 1: Promoting repair within the SGD remedies system 

PO1A:  Prioritising  repair  if  cheaper  than 
replacement 

PO1B: Making repair the primary remedy 

  A. Effectiveness 

Both  POs  will  contribute  to  the  specific  objective  of  increasing  repairs  of  viable  consumer 
goods within the legal  guarantee by promoting repair over replacement within the remedies 

129 IA Study, Section 3.5.5, Table 3-9. 
130 For eight product groups assessed: Mobile/smartphones, televisions, refrigerators, laptops, clothing, shoes, 
cars and wooden furniture, IA Study, Section 2.1. 
131 IA Study, Section 3.5.5. 

38 

 
 
 
                                                 
system of the SGD. PO1A is estimated to lead to an increase in the take-up of repair within the 
legal  guarantee  of  74%  over  15  years132.  As  more  repairs  lead  to  less  production  of  new 
replacement goods, over 15 years PO1A will have a substantial positive environmental impact 
compared to the baseline: savings of CO2 emissions of around 5.3 million tons CO2-eq (11% 
increase of CO2 savings), reduced use of new resources by 0.7 million tons (13% increase in 
resource savings) and waste savings of 1 million tons (12% increase in waste savings). 

PO1B  is  the  more  restrictive  sub-option  removing  the  consumer’s  choice  to  request 
replacement and requires sellers to repair also if it is not the economically reasonable option. 
However, sellers have the possibility to offer to consumers a replacement product anyway.133 
In practice, this is likely to happen, when replacement is cheaper than repair, especially for 
low-value  goods.  In  light  of  the  consumer  preference  for  replacement,  it  is  also  likely  that 
consumers will agree. Due to this likely practice, the difference between the effectiveness of 
PO1A and PO1B is expected to be only minimal. It was conservatively assumed that the take-
up of PO1B is at least as high as PO1A and that at least as many tons of CO2 emissions, new 
resources  and  waste  could  be  saved  as  under  PO1A.  In  terms  of  impact  on  the  consumer’s 
decision-making  process,  both  POs  do  not  create  incentives  but  mandate  repair  by  law.  By 
limiting the choice between repair and replacement, the level of consumers’ economic rights is 
moderately  reduced  in  PO1A  (which  prioritises  repair  in  comparison  to  replacement)  and 
considerably  reduced  in  PO1B  (which  makes  repair  the  primary  remedy  and  removes  the 
choice  of  the  consumer).  Both  POs  could  entail  a  potential  reduction  in  consumer  trust,  if 
consumers are not able to replace a defective product when a defect becomes apparent early 
after the product has been bought. However, in the long run both POs are likely to make repair 
more accepted by  consumers as the level  of  experience with  repairs among  consumers will 
increase. 

Stakeholder views:134 A majority of responding stakeholders (54% - 180 out of 331) supported 
PO1A. While half of responding business stakeholders (50.4% - 53 out of 105) supported it, 
only a third of responding consumer organisations (30% - 3 out of 10) found the measure to be 
effective. Three quarters of respondents (75% - 247 out of 311) considered PO1B effective. 
The  measure  was  overwhelmingly  supported  by  environmental  organisations,  NGOs  and 
academic/research stakeholders as well as two thirds of business stakeholders (65% - 69 out of 
105) and consumer organisations (70% - 7 out of 10). MS that expressed views were overall 
positive: 7 MS out of 20 supported PO1A and 6 MS supported PO1B. The POs prioritising 

132 The take-up rate results in around 170.1 million avoided new goods over 15 years. 
133 It is a longstanding principle since the CSD of 1999 (Art. 7), which has been taken over by its successor, the 
SGD (Art. 21), that seller and consumer can agree amicable solutions, once the consumer is aware of the defect 
and remedies. This principle is an expression of the freedom of contract and is thus maintained. 
134 For this and all sections containing stakeholder views s. Annex 2. 

39 

 
 
                                                 
repair within the remedies system of the SGD were generally considered more effective than 
the POs providing incentives to consumers to choose repair. 

  B. Efficiency135 

Economic  impacts:  Both  POs  lead  to  considerable  gains  for  businesses,  in  particular 
producers/traders in the EU due to less replacement products that would be given for free to 
consumers (total cost savings of EUR 15.6 billion) and for EU repairers due to additional repair 
activities leading to an increase of EUR 4.9 billion in gross value added (GVA). Traders in the 
EU will have limited GVA loss of EUR 5.8 billion from missed resales of returned products 
for  refurbishment.  Producers  and  traders  in  the  EU  are  estimated  to  have  small  adjustment 
costs, with one-off costs of EUR 104.2 million for PO1A and EUR 87.6 million for PO1B and 
ongoing adjustment costs of EUR 758.1 million (over 15 years) in both POs. Neither of the two 
POs will influence consumer expenditure. 

Social impacts: Both POs could lead to an increase in jobs in the repair sector (~8,000) and to 
a loss of jobs in EU production and trade (~10,000), which results in a limited net loss (~1,300) 
over 15 years. 

Public administration: Both POs generate moderate implementation and enforcement costs 
(EUR 28 million for all MS over 15 years). The costs may in practice be lower, as enforcement 
authorities are familiar with the SGD, will need to adapt to only one change in its rules and 
there are strong synergies with already ongoing enforcement activities.  

  C. Coherence 

Both  POs  are  coherent  with  the  legal  framework  in  place  and  would  fit  in  the  existing 
provisions of the SGD.  They  would adapt  consumer remedies for lack of conformity to the 
needs  of  the  environment.  The  SGD  already  limits  the  consumer’s  choice  if  one  remedy  is 
impossible or disproportionately costly compared to the other. PO1A as well as PO1B adapt 
these already existing limitations with a different degree of intensity for achieving the objective 
of  sustainable  consumption.  Both  options  will  be  result  in  fully  harmonised  rules  ensuring 
coherence at EU and national level.  

Impacts of Option 2: Prolonging the liability period in repair context 

PO2A: Incentivising the consumer with a 
longer liability period to choose repair  
Variant 1: Additional year for repair only 

PO2B:  Extending  the  liability  period  for 
repair 

135 The detailed figures on efficiency for this and subsequent POs are provided in Annex 6. For most of the criteria 
the figures are the same for both PO1A and PO1B. For PO1B the take up-rate of PO1A has been chosen as the 
minimum take-up. 

40 

 
 
  
                                                 
Variant 2: Restarting the liability period for 
all available remedies 

  A. Effectiveness 

Both POs contribute to the specific objective to increase repairs within the legal guarantee by 
shifting consumer behaviour towards repair. 

While PO2A increases consumer rights overall, variant 2 increases consumer rights more than 
variant 1, as it grants consumers both repair and replacement remedies. Variant 2 is the more 
attractive incentive for consumers compared to variant 1, but – as evidenced by a behavioural 
experiment – consumers do not seem to act sufficiently on these incentives. Thus, it is estimated 
to lead to an increase in the take-up of repair of only 12% over 15 years136. As PO2A variant 2 
would only lead to a limited amount of additional repair, it would have only a limited positive 
environmental impact over 15 years compared to the baseline, with savings of CO2 emissions, 
of  around  0.9  million  tons  CO2-eq  (1.9%  increase  of  CO2  savings),  reduced  use  of  new 
resources by 0.1 million tons (2% increase in resource savings) and waste savings of 0.2 million 
tons (2% increase in waste savings). Given that the additional period serving as incentive in 
variant 1 is limited to repairs only, variant 1 is considered even less effective as an incentive to 
increase repairs within the legal guarantee than variant 2. In light of this limited impact, it was 
assumed that this figure is even lower and variant 1 was not even assessed.  

PO2B is estimated to lead to an increase in the take-up of repair of 21% over 15 years137 as 
consumers would have an extended liability period that allows them to request repair beyond 
the current two years. However, as the overwhelming majority of defects (96%)138 dealt with 
in the SGD (i.e. defects which are present at the time of delivery) appear already during the 
first two years after delivery, PO2B concerns only a minimal share of defects. Therefore, PO2B 
would have only a very limited positive environmental impact over 15 years compared to the 
baseline, with savings of CO2 emissions, of around 0.1 million tons CO2-eq (0.3% increase of 
CO2 savings), reduced use of new resources by 0.02 million tons and waste savings of 0.03 
million ton (<0.01% increase in resource/waste savings).  

Stakeholder views: The OPC consulted on PO2A variant 2 (restarting the liability period after 
repair).  66%  (218  out  of  331)  of  all  respondents,  including  in  particular  responding 
environmental  and  consumer  organisations,  agreed  that  restarting  the  liability  period  after 
repair  would  be  effective.  By  contrast,  among  responding  business  stakeholders,  half  of 

136 The take-up rate results in around 28.7 million avoided new goods. 
137 The take-up rate results in around 5.1 million avoided new goods. 
138 European Commission, Consumer Market Study to support the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing 
law,  Final  Report,  May  2017,  Section  1.3.3.2,  p.  171,  available  at  https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-
/publication/a8d7ca32-772c-11e7-b2f2-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF.  

41 

 
 
 
                                                 
respondents opposed the measure, finding it to be ineffective (50% - 53 out of 105). Only a 
limited number of MS supported PO2A variant 2, while more MS were against or doubtful.139 
As  regards  PO2B,  the  OPC  also  inquired  about  the  measure  of  providing  a  longer  liability 
period, but regardless of whether the extension applies only to repair as a remedy (larger scope 
than  in  PO2B).  Responding  consumer  organisations  strongly  supported  the  measure,  while 
only half of the responding environmental organisations found it effective. By contrast, half of 
responding business stakeholders (50% - 52 out of 105) did not support the measure.  

  B. Efficiency 

Economic impacts: Over 15 years, PO2A would only have a limited economic impact due to 
the limited take-up by consumers (i.e. low number of extended liability periods) and limited 
number of defects becoming apparent after 2  years.  Producers and traders in the EU would 
have total costs savings of EUR 2.6 billion following from less replacement with new goods, 
because  some  consumers  choose  repair  instead  of  replacement  within  the  liability  period. 
However, they will encounter some adjustment costs  – EUR 87.6 million one-off costs and 
EUR  2  billion  ongoing  costs  –  mainly  for  providing  additional  remedies  in  the  extended 
liability period. Besides, their GVA would be reduced due to loss of sales of new goods  as 
consumers benefit from  a longer liability period (EUR 95.3 million for producers and EUR 
727.5 million for traders). Due to an increase of repair activities, EU repairers will be able to 
grow their business to a certain extent (EUR 835.5 million additional GVA). Some consumers 
will gain (EUR 5.4 billion) when benefiting from a restarting liability period.  

The economic impact of PO2B is even more limited, because it concerns a very small number 
of cases (only limited number of defects  in  the third  year): Over 15  years, it  would lead to 
reduced  GVA  of  EUR  13.5  million  for  producers  and  54.8  million  for  traders  due  to  lost 
consumer sales of new goods in the extended liability period. Producers and traders in the EU 
will have minimal adjustment costs (EUR 43.8 million one-off costs and EUR 973.6 million 
ongoing costs over 15 years), among others, due to providing additional free repair in the third 
year. PO2B would lead to minimal gains for repairers (increase of EUR 137 million in GVA) 
and minimal gains for consumers (EUR 406.3 million) thanks to a longer liability period for 
repair.  

Social impacts: For both POs employment in the repair sector in the EU (in-house or third 
party) could increase minimally due to additional repairs (~1,400 jobs for PO2A and ~200 for 
PO2B) over 15 years. Both POs might lead to negligible loss of jobs in production (~200 for 
PO2A and ~20 for PO2B) and minimal losses in sales (~1,200 for PO2A and ~100 for PO2B) 
over  15  years,  due  to  reduced  consumer  purchases,  which  reduce  companies’  turnover  and 
GVA, leading to personnel cuts in some companies.  

139 A limited number of MS (3 out of 19 MS who took the floor) were supportive towards PO2A, variant 2, while 
twice as many MS (6 out of 19) were against or doubtful about this measure.  

42 

 
 
                                                 
Public  administration:  Both  POs  will  generate  moderate  enforcement  and  implementation 
costs (EUR 28.2 million total average for all EU MS over 15 years). In practice, the costs may 
be lower, as enforcement authorities are familiar with the SGD, would need to adapt to only 
one change in the rules and there are strong synergies with ongoing enforcement activities. 

  C. Coherence 

Both POs are coherent with the legal framework in place and would fit in existing provisions 
of the SGD by extending the liability period in different ways. Both options will result in fully 
harmonised rules ensuring coherence at EU and national level, while contributing to sustainable 
consumption.  

Impacts of Option 3: Replacement with refurbished goods 

Sub-option 3A: only during the extended 
liability period (under PO2B) 

Sub-option 3B: from the second year of the 
liability period 

  A. Effectiveness 

Both PO3A and 3B will contribute to the specific objective of increasing the reuse of goods 
under the legal guarantee. PO3 gives additional possibilities to the seller to remedy the defects 
appearing during the liability period under the legal guarantee. Consumers would not have the 
possibility to refuse replacement by a refurbished product, so the consumers’ willingness to 
take-up is not a decisive factor of this PO. It is difficult to give precise estimates on how many 
businesses would  actually  use the opportunity to replace with  refurbished products.  As this 
possibility  reduces  costs  for  sellers  compared  to  offering  new  products,  they  are  likely  to 
choose this option when possible, i.e. when refurbished products are available. In the OPC, 42-
43% of businesses perceived this measure as having high to very high potential. PO3A would 
somewhat increase consumer rights because it introduces an additional remedy in the extended 
liability  period.  It  will  have  a  minimal  impact  in  practice  though,  as  the  number  of  defects 
appearing in the third  year of extended liability is estimated to be  minimal140. PO3B would 
reduce consumer rights compared to the current SGD remedies system in the second year of 
the liability period. It would have a bigger, though still limited impact, as more non-conformity 
defects appear in the second year, but their number is still small.141 

140 Based on the assumed take-up of 42.5% and on the percentage of defects that are likely to occur in the third 
year of an extended liability period, the option is estimated to lead to avoided purchases of 10.4 million units over 
15 years.141 Based on this assumed take-up of 42.5% and on the percentage of defects that are likely to occur in 
the second year of the legal guarantee it is estimated to lead to avoided purchases of 23.4 million units over the 
same period. 
141 Based on this assumed take-up of 42.5% and on the percentage of defects that are likely to occur in the second 
year of the legal guarantee it is estimated to lead to avoided purchases of 23.4 million units over the same period. 

43 

 
 
 
                                                 
Both POs will produce positive environmental impacts, since the increased use of refurbished 
goods as replacements reduces the amount of new goods produced and purchased and will lead 
to an extended average consumption lifetime of consumer goods. Given the rather small share 
of defects concerned under both POs, the positive impact on CO2 emissions, use of resources 
and waste production will be minimal over 15 years. In particular, these measures will entail 
savings  of  CO2  emissions  of  around  0.3  (PO3A)  and  0.7  (PO3B)  million  tons  CO2-eq 
(respectively 0.61% and 1.37% increase of CO2 savings), reduced use of new resources by 
0.03 (PO3A) and 0.07 (PO3B) million tons (1% increase in resource savings in both cases) and 
waste savings of 0.05 (PO3A) and 0.1 (PO3B) million tons (1% increase in waste savings in 
both cases).  

Stakeholder views: The OPC did not distinguish between the PO3A and 3B, but inquired about 
replacement with refurbished goods in general. Half of all responding stakeholders agreed on 
the effectiveness of the measure (51% - 170 out of 331). 76% (16 out of 21) of responding 
environmental organisations and NGOs and half of responding business stakeholders (48.4% - 
51 out of 105) found the measure effective. However, the majority of consumer organisations 
did not support this option (60% - 6 out of 10). A few MS (3 out of 20 which expressed views) 
were  supportive,  while  6  MS  showed  some  conditional  support,  e.g.  subject  to  consumers’ 
agreement and putting in place certain safeguards.142 

B. Efficiency  

Economic impacts: PO3A does not result in cost savings for businesses as the liability period 
will be longer under this option. Businesses will face minimal adjustment costs, one-off costs 
of  EUR  150.6  million  and  ongoing  costs  of  EUR  78  million  over  15  years  for  providing 
refurbished goods as replacement. The costs are limited as only a minimal number of defects 
appears in the third year. Providing additional remedies during the extended liability period 
causes a minimal decrease in GVA of EUR 27.3 million for producers in the EU and EUR 111 
million  for  traders  in  the  EU,  as  less  new  products  would  be  bought.  The  EU  repair  and 
refurbishment  sector  will  have  a  EUR  277.3  million  increase  in  GVA  under  PO3A.  PO3A 
would bring consumer savings of EUR 822.2 million over 15 years, because consumers would 
get free replacement with refurbished goods in the extended liability period under this option. 

PO3B would bring total cost savings of EUR 2 billion for producers/traders in the EU over 15 
years, as they would not have to replace defective goods with new products from the second 
year of the liability period. They would only face minimal adjustment costs (one-off EUR 150.6 
million, EUR 175 million ongoing adjustment costs for providing refurbished goods). The EU 
repair and refurbishment sector would have a EUR 623.8 million increase in GVA under PO3B. 

142 Out of the 20 MS which expressed views on this option in a MS’ workshop, 3 MS were reluctant towards the 
measure; 8 MS did not have a position yet.   

44 

 
 
                                                 
Unlike PO3A, PO3B will not have any influence on consumer savings as the replacement with 
refurbished goods takes place in the second year of the liability period. 

Social impacts: PO3 could  lead to  a small  increase in  jobs  in  the repair and refurbishment 
industry in the next 15 years (~500 for PO3A and ~1,000 for PO3B). Job losses for producers 
and traders will be negligible (overall ~200 for PO3A) and none for PO3B, as replacement with 
refurbished goods instead of new ones within the same period is unlikely to affect the number 
of personnel.  

Public administration: Both POs would lead to similar enforcement costs as under PO1 and 
2 (EUR 28.2 million total average costs for all MS over 15 years) as they concern the same 
range of economic operators (sellers of consumer goods). Strong synergies are possible with 
the enforcement activities relating to the SGD and the costs may be lower in practice, if such 
synergies are implemented. 

C. Coherence 

PO3 would be coherent with the existing legal frameworks, especially with the SGD and the 
ESPR. It would be implemented by amending the SGD. Currently, only replacement with new 
products  is  possible  under  the  SGD.  Both  sub-options  of  PO3  would  add  an  additional 
dimension  on  refurbished  goods  to  the  existing  remedies  system.  It  will  also  build  on  the 
established definition of refurbishment in the ESPR. By strengthening the legal framework on 
refurbished goods, these POs are coherent also with the broader objectives of the ESPR and 
the  Circular  Economy  Action  Plan  in  the  context  of  the  European  Green  Deal.  However, 
consumers may not get coherent outcomes in similar circumstances in all cases, because sellers 
may not always have refurbished goods to offer as a replacement. 

Impacts of Option 4: Aligning the liability period for refurbished goods 

A. Effectiveness  

PO4 will contribute to the specific objective of increasing the reuse of viable consumer goods 
in the context of the legal guarantee. PO4 will have a moderate positive impact on consumers’ 
decision-making on refurbished goods at the point of sale and is estimated to lead to an increase 
of  the  take-up  of  refurbished  goods  of  13.3%143.  The  longer  liability  period  will  improve 
consumer  protection  and  can  increase  consumer  trust  in  the  MS  for  which  this  measure  is 
relevant. It may reduce quality concerns related to refurbished goods, thus increasing demand. 
This  in  turn  could  encourage  the  supply  of  refurbished  products.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
effectiveness of PO4 is limited due to the costs for traders, resulting from the longer liability 
period,  as  they  would  have  to  finance  additional  remedies  for  another  year.  This  may 
discourage some traders from adding refurbished products to their stock, while putting extra 

143 The take-up rate results in around 30.8 million avoided purchases of new goods over 15 years. 

45 

 
 
                                                 
cost burdens on existing trader in refurbished goods. The effectiveness of PO4 is also limited 
because it would extend the liability period for refurbished goods only in the half of the internal 
market144 where a shorter liability period is possible.  

PO4 will produce a positive environmental impact, as  a more active market for refurbished 
products will lead to reduced production and sales of new products and to an extended average 
lifetime of consumer goods that are refurbished. Over 15 years, the environmental impact will 
be limited: savings of CO2 emissions of around 1 million tons CO2-eq (2.02% increase of CO2 
savings),  reduced  use  of  new  resources  by  EUR  0.1  million  tons  (2%  increase  in  resource 
savings) and waste savings of EUR 0.2 million tons (2% increase in waste savings). 

Stakeholder views: In the OPC, aligning the liability period of new and refurbished goods was 
supported  by  62%  (206  out  of  331)  of  responding  stakeholders.  Views  among  stakeholder 
categories differed. 70% (7 out of 10) of responding consumer organisations found the measure 
effective, while only 38% (40 out of 105) of business stakeholders did. Only 37% (9 out of 24) 
of  environmental  organisations,  NGOs  and  academic/research  institutions  considered  the 
measure effective. Only a few MS (5 out of 19 who expressed views in the MS workshop) were 
supportive of the alignment of liability period of second-hand goods and new goods145.  

B. Efficiency 

Economic impacts: In the next 15 years producers/traders in the EU would have costs of EUR 
776.5 million for financing additional remedies for refurbished goods in the extended liability 
period. Producers and traders in the EU would have a small decrease in GVA of EUR 102.5 
million  and  EUR  200.2  million,  respectively,  due  to  forgone  sales  of  products,  which 
consumers would not buy, while they benefit from free remedies in the extended liability period 
for refurbished goods. Traders in the EU would sell more refurbished goods, but sales of new 
goods would decrease, the two effects almost balancing each other out. Producers and traders 
in the EU would have adjustment costs of EUR 91.3 million (one-off) and EUR 137.2 million 
(ongoing) over 15 years. These costs for financing extra-remedies for refurbished goods for an 
additional  year  are  likely  to  weigh  disproportionately  high  on  SME  traders  in  refurbished 
goods, who already operate at relatively low margins as the purchase price of refurbished goods 
is significantly lower than of news ones. PO4 would increase GVA of the repair/refurbishment 
sector by EUR 899 million. Consumers would benefit from PO4, as it would lead to a EUR 1.5 
billion consumer savings due to the longer liability period for refurbished goods. All in all, the 
economic impacts are small as the measure only concerns half the MS. 

144 13 MS have used Art. 10(6) SGD allowing the seller and the consumer to agree to a shorter liability period for 
second-hand goods, while 14 MS already have the same liability period. PO4 has thus an effect only in those 13 
MS.  
145  The  workshop  with  the  MS  did  not  distinguish  between  second-hand  goods  and  refurbished  goods  when 
discussing about aligning the liability periods. 

46 

 
 
                                                 
Social  impacts:  PO4  would  have  a  medium  positive  impact  on  the  demand  for  EU  repair 
services and increase employment in this sector in the next 15 years (~1,500 jobs). Meanwhile 
PO4 will lead to minimal losses of jobs for producers (~200) and traders (~300).  

Public  administration:  Enforcement  and  implementation  costs  will  be  minimal  (EUR  0.8 
million  total  average  for  the  whole  of  the  EU  over  15  years)  as  they  concern  only  a  small 
number  of  economic  operators  and  changes  in  the  legal  framework  only  for  some  MS. 
Furthermore,  the  enforcement  authorities  can  achieve  strong  synergies  with  ongoing 
enforcement activities relating to the SGD.   

C. Coherence 

PO4  would  be  coherent  with  the  existing  EU  framework,  especially  with  the  SGD  and  the 
ESPR. It would be implemented through amending the SGD, and would bring more coherence 
in the Single Market by aligning liability periods among Member States. It would also build 
on the established definition of refurbishment in ESPR. By strengthening the legal framework 
on refurbished goods, this PO is coherent also with the broader objectives of the ESPR and the 
Circular Economy Action Plan in the context of the European Green Deal. 

CLUSTER II: Facilitating and encouraging repair and reuse beyond the legal 

guarantee 

All POs in this cluster contribute to the general objective of sustainable consumption and the 
specific objective of increasing repair and reuse of viable consumer goods beyond the legal 
guarantee. As the larger share of defects occur beyond the legal guarantee (e.g. due to wear and 
tear or consumers own handling),146 the increase of repair will have a significant effect on the 
number of repaired goods. However, irrespective of the effectiveness of POs in this cluster, in 
certain  situations  most  consumers  would  still  refrain  from  repair,  because  this  is  not  an 
economically advantageous choice. This is the case particularly, where the repair price is above 
the range of 17%-27% of the value of the product147, the age of the product increases148 and 
when low value goods are concerned.149 The POs are expected to influence the behaviour of 
consumers  in  particular  in  the  segments  of  reluctant  replacers  and  reluctant  repairers  by 
removing obstacles. To a smaller extent, the POs could also encourage enthusiastic replacers 
and enthusiastic repairers to repair more, by making repair easier and more accessible. 

Impacts of Option 5: Information on where to repair 

Obligation 

on 
PO5A: 
producers to inform where to 
repair 

Matchmaking 
PO5B: 
platform on repair at national 
level 

Matchmaking 
PO5C: 
platform on repair at EU level  

146 IA Study, Annex 1.4, Consumer Survey, Section 3, p. 115, QC4. 
147 IA Study, Section 3.1. 
148 IA Study, Annex 1. 
149 IA Study, Section 3.3. 

47 

 
 
                                                 
A. Effectiveness 

All POs contribute to the specific objective of increasing repair and reuse of viable consumer 
goods  beyond  the  legal  guarantee.  All  POs  encourage  repair  by  making  available  repair 
services more transparent in terms of location, price and general conditions. By helping to find 
repairers offering services that suit the consumers’ needs, they facilitate consumer decision-
making  on  repair  and  improve  consumer  protection  by  increasing  transparency  on  key 
decision-making factors for repair. The POs do not have any negative impacts on consumers. 
All POs will have positive environmental effects. More repaired goods means a longer lifespan 
of repaired products and less new replacement products sold and produced.  

Under PO5A, producers would inform on their websites whether they provide repair services 
and  to  what  extent  (e.g.  for  which  products/models)  and,  if  combined  with  PO6C  or  6D, 
whether they have an obligation to repair a product. This PO would partially tackle the driver 
on availability and transparency of repair services. Thus, it would facilitate consumer-decision 
making and somewhat increase consumer protection by more transparency on available repair 
services. PO5A has  rather limited positive environmental  impacts over 15  years, because it 
would  lead  to  a  relatively  small  increase  in  repair  (take-up  increase  of  2%)  and  avoided 
purchases of products (25.1 million units). The respective savings of CO2 emissions are 0.7 
million  tons  CO2-eq  (2%  increase  compared  to  the  baseline),  the  use  of  new  resources  is 
reduced by 0.08 million tons (2% increase), and the waste savings are 0.1 million tons (2% 
increase).  

PO5B  would  inform  consumers  about  the  availability  of  repair  providers  and  make  key 
conditions  of repair  (e.g. average duration, price  ranges) more transparent. The information 
would cover a wide range of repair services as it would show availability of relevant repairers 
in  a  given  MS  and  cover  the  full  range  of  consumer  goods.  It  would  facilitate  consumer 
decision-making  and  improve  protection,  because  it  would  cover  key  factors  for  consumer 
decisions to repair, as well as a wide range of products and repair services.  It is estimated to 
increase  the  take-up  of  repair  by  6.7%150.  Over  15  years  this  results  in  a  moderate  positive 
impact  on  the  environment:  savings  of  CO2  emissions  are  2.5  million  tons  CO2-eq  (5% 
increase); the use of resources is reduced by 0.3 million tons (5% increase) and waste savings 
of 0.5 million tons (5% increase). 

PO5C would make conditions of repair (e.g. average duration, price ranges) more transparent. 
The EU level platform (EPREL+) would show relevant repairers across all MS, but the scope 
of repair services on EPREL+ would be limited to energy-labelled goods. The effectiveness of 
this PO would be enhanced by synergies with current functionalities of EPREL, which enables 
consumers to get product-related information by scanning the energy label. This information 

150 This take-up rate translates into avoided purchases of 84 million units. 

48 

 
 
 
                                                 
would then be complemented by a section on ‘repair this product’, raising awareness of repair 
possibilities, whenever consumers consult EPREL+ and encouraging them to choose repair. It 
would  therefore  facilitate  consumer  decision-making  on  repair  and  improve  protection,  but 
only to a limited degree, due to the scope limitation of this option. It is estimated to increase 
the take-up of repair by 6.7%. Due to the limited product scope of this option, this translates151 
into  less  avoided  purchases  than  under  PO5B,  i.e.  17.4  million  units.  The  environmental 
impacts over 15 years are moderately positive: the savings of CO2 emissions are 1.8 million 
tons  CO2-eq (4% increase);  there are 0.09 million  tons  resource savings  (2% increase)  and 
waste savings of 0.1 million (1% increase). 

Stakeholder  views:  These  options  are  largely  based  on  consumer  attitudes  and  draw  on 
experiences in other fields.152 Consumer behaviour suggests that transparency  on aspects of 
repair services, including price, conditions, quality assurance and availability of repair services 
relevant decision-making factor for repair decisions.153 When combined, they can have an even 
higher impact on consumer decisions to repair.154  

 B. Efficiency 

Economic impacts: Increased repair means longer lifespan of repaired products, leading to a 
decrease in sales of new products. Thus, over 15 years, PO5A would lead to EUR 62.2 million 
decrease in GVA for producers in the EU and EUR 286.6 million for traders in the EU due to 
forgone sales of new goods. The platform options PO5B and PO5C create bigger losses for 
producers  and  traders,  because  they  increase  repair  rates  more  and  result  in  more  avoided 
consumer purchases. Producers in the EU would have decreased GVA of EUR 208.3 million 
under PO5B and EUR 108.2 million under PO5C. Traders in the EU would lose EUR 960.1 
million (PO5B) and EUR 757.2 million (PO5C). The business adjustment costs for producers 
and traders in the EU would be minimal under PO5A (EUR 106.6 million one-off costs and 
EUR  160  million  ongoing  costs  over  15  years).  It  is  assumed  that  PO5B  and  PO5C  create 
negligible business adjustment and administrative costs, as registration on the platform would 
be voluntary and would be covered by the current costs for running a business by interested 
companies. The losses of GVA for producers and traders would not be evenly spread, as those 
focusing  on  ecodesign  products  may  gain  a  competitive  advantage  because  consumers  are 
increasingly likely to prefer sustainable repairable products. Overall, traders in the EU would 

151 Based on an increase in take-up rate of 6.25%, which is the same as under PO3B, based on a conservative 
assumption for 15 years. 
152 The OPC did not consult on these POs; they were introduced later in response to evidence from the IA Study. 
153 IA Study, Annex 1.5. 
154 Feedback from producers of home appliances also suggests that more visibility of repair services is warranted 
to encourage consumer demand. E.g. APPLiA calls for the introduction of a European registry of professional 
repairers (Position paper on the Commission initiative on the sustainable consumption of goods - promoting repair 
and 
reuse,  April  2022,  p.  2,  available  at  https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-
say/initiatives/13150-Sustainable-consumption-of-goods-promoting-repair-and-reuse/F3011268_en).  

49 

 
 
 
                                                 
lose more than producers in the EU, as many of the goods they are selling are  produced by 
third country producers. 

All  these  measures  are  beneficial  for  the  EU  repair  sector  due  to  the  increased  demand  for 
repair  services.  Independent  repairers,  producers  and  traders  offering  spare  parts  and  repair 
services would have additional revenue. The increase in GVA for EU repairers is EUR 722.6 
million  under  PO5A,  EUR  2.4  billion  under  PO5B  and  EUR  1.3  billion  under  PO5C.  All 
options  will  result  in  consumer  savings  as  consumers  will  spend  less  on  replacement 
products155. The expected  consumer savings  over 15  years are  EUR  10.5 billion for PO5A; 
EUR 35.2 billion for PO5B and EUR 21.7 billion for PO5C.  

Social  impacts:  All  POs  are  likely  to  have  an  overall  net  limited  positive  impact  on 
employment in the repair sector in the next 15 years. Minimal jobs would be lost in production 
in the EU (between ~100 and ~400, depending on the PO) due to a decrease in demand for new 
goods by consumers to replace defective goods that would be repaired. More jobs would be 
lost in trade (between ~500 and ~1,600 depending on the PO), because traders in the EU would 
see a decrease in sales also of goods imported from third countries. Increased demand for repair 
would secure  and create more jobs in repair (between  ~1,200 and ~4,000 depending on the 
PO). This would also benefit local communities, as many repairers are SMEs operating locally. 
New local employment in repair could benefit job seekers. Especially for repair activities that 
do not require long-term specialised training, short-term training courses could offer inclusive 
opportunities to job seekers with various backgrounds. Increased economic activity would have 
indirect positive benefits on local communities. 

Public  administration:  Public  administration  would  incur  moderate  enforcement  and 
implementation costs for monitoring compliance with PO5A (EUR 12.2 million total average 
for the EU for 15 years), as the PO only concerns producers. Medium implementation costs for 
IT development and ongoing costs for maintenance and updates would be necessary for PO5B 
(EUR 32 million total average for the EU for 15 years)156. These costs are rather minimal for 
PO5C as it concerns only one platform at EU level (EUR 4.5 million total average for the EU 
for 15 years)157. These costs for the creation of the platform options are factored into the public 
administration costs under ‘enforcement and implementation costs for public administration’ 
of options.158 

C. Coherence 

155 The scale of consumer savings will depend on the take-up of POs by businesses and consumers. 
156 The total cost estimate of EUR 32 million comprises one-off costs for the creation of the platform for the 27 
MS (EUR 8.6 million) and total ongoing costs for its maintenance over 15 years for the 27 MS (EUR 23.4 
million).  
157 The total costs of EUR 4.5 million comprises one-off costs for the creation of a single platform at EU level 
(EUR 1.5 million) and total ongoing costs for its management at EU level over 15 years (EUR 3 million). 
158 These costs are fully reflected in the CBA and MCA under the sub-criterion of ‘public administration’ costs, 
which comprise both enforcement and implementation costs of options. 

50 

 
 
                                                 
All  POs  would  contribute  to  sustainable  consumption,  the  circular  economy  and  European 
Green  Deal  by  increasing  repair  behaviours  among  consumers.  They  would  indirectly  also 
impact  producers’  circular  behaviour.  PO5A  is  coherent  with  EU  sectorial  ecodesign 
legislation,  which  introduces  such  an  information  requirement  for  specific  categories  of 
products. While product specific reparability rules will remain restricted in scope to specific 
product groups, this PO will expand the information requirement on repair services horizontally 
to consumer goods in general. PO5B and 5C contribute to greater digitalisation in the repair 
sector, in line with the digital and interoperable by default principle and use the advantages of 
the digital transition to promote the green transition objective. While MS have flexibility to 
implement PO5B in their national context, this option is somewhat more coherent than PO5C 
when it comes EU consumer law, because it takes a horizontal approach covering all consumer 
goods. PO5C brings coherence at EU level through a single repair platform, but has a more 
restricted scope compared to EU consumer law, because it builds on the existing EU platform 
EPREL, which is relevant for energy-related products.  

Impacts of Option 6: Enhance transparency/conditions for repair 

PO6A: 
commitments 
business at EU-level 

Voluntary 
of 

PO6B:  Obligation  to 
issue a repair quote on 
price  and  conditions 
a 
in 
repair 
for 
standardised form 

PO6C:  Obligation 
to 
repair  goods  that  are 
subject  to  reparability 
requirements  under  EU 
law (against a price)  

PO6D:  Obligation 
repair 
all 
(against a price)  

to 
products 

A. Effectiveness  

All POs contribute to the specific objective of increasing repair and reuse of viable consumer 
goods beyond the legal guarantee. All POs facilitate consumer decision-making on repair, by 
enhancing  consumer  confidence  and  trust  in  the  quality  of  repair  services.  While  PO6A 
envisages a voluntary quality standard to increase consumer trust, PO6B, 6C and 6D go further 
to strengthen consumer rights by creating new rights through regulatory intervention. All POs 
will have positive environmental  effects.  More repaired  goods means less new replacement 
products bought and produced. PO6A would have a small positive impact, PO6B and PO6C a 
substantial one and PO6D a high positive impact on the environment. 

PO6A would facilitate consumer decision-making on repair by addressing quality and to some 
extent inconvenience-related concerns. It would reassure consumers about the quality and ease 
of repair through  an EU  standard, visualised by  an  ‘easy repair’ label.  This  standard  would 
cover repair of all consumer goods, thus extending its useful impact to all sectors contributing 
to an increase in consumer trust. The take-up and respective effectiveness are limited due to 

51 

 
 
 
the voluntary nature for business.159 It is estimated to lead to a 4% increase in repair take-up 
by consumers. This translates into avoided purchases of 50.1 million units in the next 15 years. 
This  corresponds  to  savings  of  CO2  emissions  of  1.5  million  tons  CO2-eq  (3%  increase 
compared to the baseline); reduced use of new resources by 0.12 million tons (3% increase) 
and waste savings of 0.3 million tons (3% increase).  

Stakeholder views: A slight majority of responding stakeholders (52.5% – 174 out of 331) 
supported a voluntary commitment by business, while 28% (94 out of 331) found it ineffective. 
A slight majority of business stakeholders considered the measure effective (52.5% - 55 out of 
105), while a clear majority of responding environmental organisations (75% - 6 out of 8), as 
well as half of responding consumer organisations (50% 5 out of 10) opposed it. The views of 
public authority respondents were split among neutral (36% - 4 out of 11) and ineffective (45% 
- 5 out of 11).  

PO6B would tackle to some extent three drivers that deter consumers from repair beyond the 
legal guarantee: lack of transparency on conditions, inconvenience factors and price of repair. 
It  would  facilitate  consumer  decision-making  and  trust  by  increased  transparency  on  repair 
conditions,  including  key  inconvenience  factors  and  price.  Moreover,  this  PO  provides  the 
highest transparency on price by an individualised and binding price quote, thus effectively 
reacting to a key factor for repair decisions. It would cover repair for all consumer goods but 
its effectiveness still depends on the consumers’ decisions. This PO is estimated to increase the 
take-up of repair beyond the legal guarantee by 13.4%. In the next 15 years this translates into 
avoided  purchases  of  167.9  million  units  -  a  substantial  contribution  to  sustainable 
consumption. This corresponds to significant savings of CO2 emissions of 5 million tons CO2-
eq (10% increase in CO2 savings as compared to the baseline), reduced use of new resources 
by 0.5 million tons (10% increase in resource savings) and waste savings of 0.9 million tons 
(10% increase in waste savings).  

Stakeholder views:  Data from  a behavioural  experiment  suggests  that consumers are more 
likely to repair when they are given all key elements for a decision to repair: price, duration 
and conditions of repair.160 

PO6C would increase consumer trust and protection by strengthening consumer rights through 
a regulatory intervention, creating an enforceable consumer right. Moreover, it would improve 
availability  of  repair  services  by  requiring  manufacturers  to  provide  repair.  This  right  can 
realistically  be  made  enforceable  only  vis-à-vis  the  producer.  Sellers  may  not  have  repair 

159 The actual take-up will depend on the content of the standard. As in the OPC a slight majority of business 
respondents considered the measure effective, the business take-up is assumed to be 30-50%.  
160 IA Study, Annex 1, Data Collection, Section 3.3, Figure 69: When given all those key elements for a decision 
to repair, the likelihood to repair a smartphone is 0.67/1. For instance, repair chances drop to 0.37/1 when the 
price is missing. 

52 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
facilities and independent repairers may not have access to all necessary repair information, 
tools (including software) or spare parts. It is therefore likely to serve as a safety net where 
consumers cannot find a more advantageous repair service in the market. The effect of this PO 
will  be  subject  to  the  scope  of  goods  with  reparability  requirements  in  EU  law.  Some 
consumers would still be deterred by other factors, notably those relating to convenience and 
other conditions of repair, which this PO does not address. This PO would facilitate consumer 
decision-making  to  repair  and  is  estimated  to  increase  the  take-up  of  repair  by  consumers 
beyond the legal guarantee by 12.1%161. As this option is only relevant for products subject to 
reparability requirements, the relatively high take-up rate in the next 15 years translates into 
avoided purchases of 31.4 million units. This corresponds to savings of CO2 emissions of 3.2 
million tons CO2-eq (7% increase in CO2 savings as compared to the baseline), reduced use 
of new resources by 0.2 million tons (3% increase in resource savings) and waste savings of 
0.2 million tons (2% increase).  

PO6D  has  similar  effects  as  PO6C,  but  it  covers  all  sectors  and  consumer  products.  It  is 
estimated  to  increase  the  take-up  of  repair  by  consumers  by  15.2%.162  As  the  scope  of  this 
option covers all goods, in the next 15 years this translates into avoided purchases of 190.5 
million  units  -  a  substantial  contribution  to  sustainable  consumption.  This  corresponds  to 
savings  of  CO2  emissions  of  5.7  million  tons  CO2-eq  (12%  increase  in  CO2  savings  as 
compared to the baseline), reduced use of new resources by 0.6 million tons (12% increase) 
and waste savings of and 1 million tons (12% increase). 

Stakeholder views for PO6C and 6D: The OPC addressed stakeholders’ views on a possible 
obligation  to  repair  in  general.  A  slight  majority  of  respondents  (54.3%  -  180  out  of  331), 
including  all  responding  environmental  NGOs,  most  consumers  organisations  and  citizens, 
agreed that a possible new obligation should apply to all consumer product categories, while 
only 24% (25 out of 105) of business stakeholders shared this view. As to the features of this 
obligation, the majority of respondents agreed that its duration should depend on the type of 
product (60% - 201 out of 331) and that a minimum duration should be set by law (52.5% - 
174 out  of 331). A majority of respondents  agreed that the new  obligation  to  repair should 
apply  to  wear  and  tear  defects  (58%  -  193  out  of  331),  where  defects  occur  after  the  legal 
guarantee (52.5% - 174 out of 331) and almost a third of all respondents thought it should cover 
defects the consumer causes before the end of the legal guarantee (32% - 107 out of 331). Most 

161 The rate is estimated based on a conservative scenario in a behavioural experiment for a sample of popular 
electr(on)ic goods. PO6C mainly concerns electr(on)ic goods for which reparability requirements currently exist 
in EU law  or are expected. As consumer electr(on)ic goods are already popular repair items, the  potential  for 
increase in repair in this category is lower compared less popular repair items.  
162 The rate is estimated based on a conservative scenario in a behavioural experiment for a sample of popular 
electr(on)ic and non-electronic goods. The estimated increase in repair rates for PO6D is somewhat higher than 
for PO6C, as its scope covers all goods and non-electronic goods seem to have a higher potential for growth in 
repair as current repair rates are comparatively lower in this category.  

53 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
stakeholders preferred that the repair was done by the producer (39.5% - 131 out of 331). As 
to the price of repair, almost a third of respondents (32% - 106 out of 331) agreed that the price 
of repair should cover the cost of repair and include a reasonable margin of profit; an almost 
equal share (30% - 99 out of 331) thought it should only cover costs of the repair (e.g. labour 
costs, cost  of spare parts). A  clear majority of business stakeholders  (62% -  65 out  of 105) 
thought the price should include a reasonable margin of profit.  

B. Efficiency 

Economic impacts: All POs produce losses for traders and producers in the EU and gains for 
EU repairers.  

In the next 15 years, traders in the EU would experience losses due to decreased sales of new 
products. PO6A, which is non-binding and would lead to a moderate increase in repair, will 
cause EUR 573.2 million losses in GVA to traders in the EU. PO6B and PO6D are binding and 
concern  all products  and  thus  result in  higher losses respectively of 1.9  billion  (PO6B) and 
EUR 2.2 billion under (PO6D). PO6C is also binding, but concerns a smaller range of products 
(subject to EU reparability requirements) and thus results in smaller losses (EUR 1.4 billion). 
Producers in the EU would also lose due to decreased sales of new products, but the losses 
would be comparatively lower than for traders, because EU production accounts for a small 
share of all products sold in the EU. In the next 15 years producers in the EU would lose in 
GVA EUR 124.4 million under PO6A, EUR 416.6 million under PO6B, EUR 195.3 million 
under PO6C and EUR 472.6 million under PO6D. In the context of the obligations to repair 
(PO6C and 6D), producers in the EU would gain also benefits, as they would obtain profit from 
the repairs they offer. The obligations to repair would require the producers to create repair 
facilities, invest in existing facilities or sub-contract such services163. Producers would share a 
part of the repair sector gains from repair services, as they would be provided against a price.164  
Producers  and  traders  in  the  EU  will  face  adjustment  and  administrative  costs  of  various 
magnitude  under  the  different  POs.  The  costs  for  producers  in  the  EU  can  be  estimated 
concretely for PO6C and PO6D, as producers are the only addresses of these POs. As for PO6A 
and PO6B, the costs for repairers presented below concern all repair actors, including producers 
and  traders  in  the  EU  providing  repair  services  and  independent  repairers.  Under  PO6C, 
producers in the EU would face one-off adjustment costs of EUR 45.0 million and ongoing 
moderate adjustment costs of EUR 582.1 million over 15 years. Producers in the EU would 
also have small one-off administrative costs of EUR 69.8 million under PO6C. Under PO6D, 
producers in the EU would face one-off adjustment costs of EUR 674.4 million producers and 

163 The impact of these measures depends on their scope and on the current business model of producers, i.e. if 
they already have extensive repair networks or not. See Annex 6 for more detail. 
164 The percentage of gains from repair services cannot be estimated in a robust manner, as producers could set-
up in-house repair services, sub-contract repair activities to independent repairers or use a mix of the two 
models in different Member States where they operate. The revenue from assumed future sales of spare parts is 
factored into the GVA. 

54 

 
 
                                                 
significant  ongoing  adjustment  costs  EUR  3.3  billion.  They  would  also  have  one-off 
administrative costs of EUR 161.8 million.  

EU repairers would have substantial gains in GVA under each PO in the next 15 years. They 
amount to EUR 1.4 billion under PO6A, EUR 4.8 billion under PO6B, EUR 2.3 billion under 
PO6C, EUR 5.5 billion under PO6D. In the context of the obligations to repair (PO6C and 6D), 
it is however difficult to estimate to what extent the beneficial effect for the repair sector falls 
to  the  producers  and  to  the  independent  repairers.  While  repairers  affiliated  with  producers 
would have increased revenue because of the obligation to repair, independent repairers who 
are not sub-contractors of producers might lose market share. Third-country producers would 
also be subject to a repair obligation. Therefore it is likely that affiliations with EU repairers 
would be the most convenient solution for them to comply with this obligation, thus bringing 
increased benefits in the European repair sector. Under PO6B, repair service providers would 
have  considerable  adjustment  costs  of  EUR  475.4  million  (one-off)  and  EUR  5.9  billion 
(ongoing), assuming that they decide to bear the costs for the quote and provide it for free to 
consumers to gain a competitive advantage and more customers.  

As for consumer savings, PO6A has few positive impacts (EUR 21 billion) following from a 
rather limited increase in repair take-up. On the other hand, PO6B (70.5 billion), PO6C (39.2 
billion) and PO6D (79.9 billion) have more significant positive impact on consumer savings. 
The respective consumer savings would be fed back into the economy (e.g. as purchases of 
more (sustainable) products and services or as savings which could be used as credits for new 
investments or contribute to capital reserves reinforcing the financial system). 

Social  impacts:  All  POs  lead  to  loss  of  jobs  in  EU  trade  and  production,  but  bigger 
employment gains in the repair sector, which result in a net benefit for employment in the next 
15 years. The negative impact is higher in trade due to a larger decrease in sales of new products 
by traders in the EU, who largely sell goods from third countries (~1000 for PO6A, ~2,300 for 
PO6C, ~3,200 for PO6B and ~3,600 PO6D). Jobs in EU production would also decrease, but 
on a much smaller scale (~200 for PO6A, ~800 for PO6B, ~300 for PO6C, ~900 for PO6D). 
All POs would create more new jobs in the EU repair sector (~2,400 for PO6A, ~8,200 for 
PO6B, ~4,500 for PO6C, ~9,300 for PO6D). Some of the repair jobs created under PO 6C and 
PO 6D may be in-house repair jobs at producers or at sub-contracted independent repairers. 
This  would  depend  on  producers’  approaches  to  developing  repair  services  for  their  brand, 
which may vary. 

Public  administration:  Enforcement  costs  for  public  administration  in  PO6A  will  be 
negligible (EUR 2.5 million total average for the EU for 15 years) as enforcement authorities 
are  not  required  to  enforce  voluntary  commitments.  However,  consumers  may  occasionally 
alert them to possible cases of non-compliance via consumer complaints. In PO6B enforcement 
authorities  would  need  to  verify  compliance  of  repairers,  leading  to  moderate  enforcement 
costs (EUR 26.4  million total  average  for the EU for 15  years). PO6C  would concern only 
producers who are subject to reparability requirements under EU law, which would only cause 
negligible enforcement costs (EUR 4.5 million total average for the EU for 15 years). In PO6D, 

55 

 
 
enforcement costs would be higher than in PO6C (EUR 12.3 million total average for the EU 
for 15 years) as enforcement authorities would have to verify compliance by all producers. 

C. Coherence 

All POs have strong synergies with the current and future ecodesign measures. The POs will 
reinforce the ecodesign requirements concerning the production phase, by increasing demand 
for repair of ecodesign goods in the after-sales phase. They are also coherent with the ECGT, 
which facilitates sustainable consumer choices at the point of sale before purchasing a product. 
By  choosing  more  reparable  and  durable  products,  more  consumers  would  be  motivated  to 
avail themselves of repair opportunities under PO6A and 6B and invoke the obligation to repair 
defects under PO6C and 6D.  

All POs would contribute to the circular economy and the European Green Deal by increasing 
repair among consumers. They would indirectly also impact sellers’ and producers’ circular 
behaviour. The POs will also contribute to the Commission priority of an Economy that works 
for people, by enhancing consumer rights and creating more local jobs in the repair sector in 
the EU. PO6A would contribute to more coherence at national and EU level by promoting a 
recognisable standard/label of quality of repair services across the EU, as far as its voluntary 
nature allows. PO6B by design incorporates relevant information obligations from existing EU 
law (CRD and Services Directive) and would ensure coherent outcomes also at national level 
through a single standardised EU format on repair information. PO6C is directly linked to and 
therefore fully coherent with relevant EU rules on reparability; it would also achieve coherent 
outcomes at national level as a fully harmonised new EU right. While PO6D is coherent with 
the broader policy objectives, it is not coherent with EU rules on reparability requirements on 
product  design,  notably  under  the  ESPR,  because  PO6D  has  a  broader  scope.  Due  to  this 
mismatch in scope between the general obligation to repair and product specific requirements 
on spare parts and repair information, the obligation to repair may often lead to repair requests 
being turned down by the producer either because the good is not subject to reparability rules 
on product design or due to unavailability of spare parts, absence of available repair service 
etc., which are often pre-conditions for technical feasibility of repair. 

Impacts of Option 7: Adding a functionality on refurbished goods in the matchmaking 

platform for repair (PO5B) 

  A. Effectiveness  

PO7 would contribute to the specific objective of promoting the  reuse of goods outside the 
legal guarantee. It would facilitate consumer choices when their products become defective, by 
helping  to  search  and  identify  sellers  of  potential  refurbished  replacement  products.  The 
platform  would  bring  together  supply  and  demand  of  refurbished  goods  by  increasing 
consumer awareness and facilitating the search for specific categories of refurbished products. 
It would help sellers of refurbished goods gain visibility and contribute to competition. This 
could  also  promote  the  sellers’  interests  to  get  registered  in  the  platform.  Furthermore,  the 

56 

 
 
platform  would  also  facilitate  business  arrangements  for  selling  and  purchasing  viable 
defective  goods  for  refurbishment,  as  it  would  also  increase  visibility  of  existing  take-back 
services. More refurbished goods means a longer lifespan of products and less new replacement 
products produced and bought. 

The effectiveness of PO7 is limited, with an estimated increase in take-up rate for refurbished 
goods  of  0.6%  and  respectively  7.9  million  avoided  new  purchases  in  the  next  15  years. 
Because of the relatively low take-up, PO7 would have minimal, albeit positive environmental 
impacts. The limited take-up is due to the fact that the functionality this PO creates is likely to 
reach  primarily  consumers  looking  for  repair  or  refurbished  goods  and  thus  entering  this 
matchmaking  platform.  It  raises  consumer  awareness  of  refurbished  goods  as  a  sustainable 
consumption possibility, but leaves it to the consumer to decide if they want to proceed to the 
sales contract with sellers identified through the platform. PO7 also has potential to contribute 
to increase of business arrangements for resales of defective products for refurbishment, but 
these  benefits  cannot  be  estimated  in  a  robust  manner.    On  the  other  hand,  PO7  does  not 
produce negative impacts  (except  limited implementation costs). As  PO7 produces a strong 
synergy  with  PO5B  in  cluster  II,  it  is  best  implemented  as  a  sub-functionality  of  the 
matchmaking platform for repair, thus minimising the costs for PO7. Thus, the overall trade-
off is positive.  

Stakeholder views: Consumer attitudes and behaviour suggests that a share of consumers are 
guided by environmental considerations165 when buying refurbished goods166. An association 
representing the refurbishment industry in Europe suggests that refurbishers would welcome 
solutions that help identify and raise visibility of businesses active in refurbishment167.  

  B. Efficiency  

Economic impacts: In the context of PO7, forgone sales of new products (where consumers 
buy refurbished goods instead) would affect producers and traders in the EU selling new goods, 
translating into a limited decrease GVA in the next 15 years (EUR 19.6 million for producers 
in the EU and EUR 90.3 million for traders in the EU). The sellers of refurbished goods would 
gain  as a result of sales of more refurbished products. The repair and refurbishment sectors 
would  benefit  from  PO7  as  a  result  of  increased  demand  in  the  next  15  years  (EUR  227.6 
million GVA increase). PO7 would help achieve small consumer savings (EUR 1.9 billion) in 
the next 15 years as a result of purchasing cheaper refurbished products that serve the same 
purpose. 

165 When asked about reasons for buying a used product, 18% mentioned the carbon footprint and 16% concerns 
about waste, IA Study, Annex 1.4, Consumer Survey, Section 5, QE2, p. 131.  
166 The OPC did not inquire about this PO, as it was introduced at a later stage in response to evidence from the 
IA Study.  
167  European  Refurbishment  Association 
https://www.eurefas.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Eurefas-position-paper-on-right-to-repair-.pdf. 

(EUREFAS),  Position  Paper, 

available 

1, 

p. 

at 

57 

 
 
                                                 
Social impacts: PO7 is likely to have a limited positive impact on employment. A few jobs 
would be lost in EU production (~40) and trade (~200 jobs) due to a decrease in demand for 
new  goods.  However,  increased  demand  of  refurbished  products  would  create  new  jobs  in 
repair/refurbishment  and  sales  of  refurbished  products  (~400  jobs),  ultimately  leading  to  a 
minimal net benefit in EU employment in the next 15 years.  

Public administration: PO7 results in small enforcement and implementation costs (EUR 3.8 
million total average for all MS over 15 years). These include IT development and ongoing 
costs  for  maintenance,  updates  and  communication  campaign.  There  are  significant  cost 
synergies when adding this PO to the same IT platform as PO5B.  

  C. Coherence 

PO7  is  coherent  with  the  ESPR,  which  introduces  ‘refurbishment’  into  EU  legislation.  It 
corresponds to the objectives of the European Green Deal and the Circular Economy Action 
Plan.  

7.  How do options compare 

The comparison of impacts of different options is carried out based on the results of the multi-
criteria analysis (MCA) and the Cost-Benefit analysis (CBA).168 

Different scenarios in the MCA assign the weights of the impacts based on: 1) the magnitude 
of each impact, 2) ensuring a balanced distribution between costs and benefits and 3) ensuring 
a balance between the different stakeholder categories affected. The scenario below has been 
selected as the most balanced. It attributes equal weights (33% each) to the high level criteria 
of  effectiveness,  efficiency  and  coherence  and  ensures  a  balanced  distribution  of  weights 
between  costs  and  benefits,  as  well  as  among  the  main  stakeholder  groups  (consumers, 
business, society). Alternative scenarios in the sensitivity analysis confirm the ranking of the 
options (see Annex 4 on alternative scenarios). 

The  results  of  the  cost-benefit  analysis  (CBA)  are  included  in  the  MCA  via  different  sub-
criteria.169  Sub-criteria  of  the  MCA  comprise  the  relevant  impacts  of  the  POs,  allocated 
between  the  assessment  criteria  of  effectiveness,  efficiency  and  coherence.  The  sub-criteria 
under effectiveness (savings of resources, waste and CO2 emissions, as well as consumer trust, 
protection and decision-making) are almost entirely based on available quantitative data and 
reflect how far the POs achieve the objectives of sustainable consumption.170 The efficiency 
criteria are purely assessed on a quantitative basis relating to the impacts of the POs in terms 

168 For more information on how the CBA feeds into the MCA, see Annex 4.  
169 For example the calculated CO2 emission savings are taken into account in the percentage weight of the sub-
criterion ‘contributing to fighting climate change’. 
170 The sub-criteria under efficiency are further explained in Annex 4.  

58 

 
 
                                                 
of  monetised  costs  and  benefits  (e.g.  impacts  on  business,  consumers,  jobs  and  public 
administrations).  Coherence  is  assessed  qualitatively  in  relation  to  the  existing  EU  legal 
framework (based on the analysis in the assessment of options).  

Cluster I focuses on defects in the scope of the legal guarantee. While the share of defects 
tackled by this cluster is relatively small (11.6%)171, the willingness to repair such defects is 
high, because consumers are entitled to free remedies and the relevant defects occur relatively 
early in the lifespan of goods. The take-up rate of repair varies. PO1 triggers a high take-up 
rate of repair, because consumers have limited margin to request replacement. PO2 results in a 
lower take-up, in particular under PO2A where consumers are encouraged, but not required to 
choose repair. They can still obtain replacement goods as an easily accessible alternative. Due 
to the consumers’ prevailing preference for replacement goods, the effectiveness of PO2A is 
lower than PO1. PO2B grants consumers only repair as a possibility in the third  year of an 
extended  liability  period  and  consumers  will  take  it  up  given  the  absence  of  an  alternative 
remedy. However, as the share of non-conformity defects that manifest themselves in year 3 is 
minimal, PO2B concerns a very small number of cases and the effectiveness of this option is 
relatively low. 

POs 3 and 4 do not encourage consumers to repair their own goods, but promote the reuse of 
refurbished goods. Both PO3A and 3B score relatively low in terms of effectiveness, as they 
are only relevant either for a small number of cases (PO3) or a small share of consumers (PO4).  

PO3  applies  where  businesses  could  offer  refurbished  products  as  an  alternative  remedy  to 
repair under the legal guarantee. It is hard to estimate in how many cases refurbished goods 
would be available. PO3A, which enables refurbished goods as replacements only during the 
extended liability period would have a very small impact on sustainable consumption, as the 
number of defects appearing in the third year of extended liability is estimated to be minimal. 
PO3B, which applies to the second year of the current liability period, would have a slightly 
bigger, but still small impact, as the number of non-conformity defects appearing in the second 
year is still small.  

In encouraging the purchase of refurbished goods by means of an extended liability period as 
a quality assurance, PO4 has a limited group of potential beneficiaries. It is relevant only for 
those MS that currently allow for a shorter liability period for refurbished goods and only for 
those consumers who are deterred from purchasing refurbished goods due to concerns about 
the quality or length of the liability period, thus a limited number of consumers. At the same 
time, all traders of refurbished goods in the MS concerned would face extra costs for financing 
additional repair in the additional year of liability period. The costs are likely to be particularly 
burdensome for SMEs. They may discourage some providers from adding refurbished goods 
to their stock or even entering the business. 

171 IA Study, Section 5.3.2. 

59 

 
 
                                                 
The main impact figures on Cluster I POs, contributing to the cost-benefit analysis (CBA), are: 

PO 
1A 

1B 

2A 

2B 

Benefits 
-  Savings  in  production  costs:  EUR  ~15.6 
billion 
-  Monetised  resource  savings:  EUR  ~341.7 
million 
-  Monetised  waste  savings:  EUR  ~170.6 
million 
-  Monetised  CO2  emissions  savings:  EUR 
~958 million 

-  Savings  in  production  costs:  EUR  ~15.6 
billion 
-  Monetised  resource  savings:  EUR  ~341.7 
million 
-  Monetised  waste  savings:  EUR  ~170.6 
million 
-  Monetised  CO2  emissions  savings:  EUR 
~958 million 

jobs, 
in 

to  EUR  ~8.8  million 

-  Growth  and  investment  (in  Europe  -  GVA 
traders,  producers,  repairers):  EUR  ~12.7 
million 
-  Savings  in  production  costs:  EUR  ~2.6 
billion 
- Consumer savings: EUR ~5.4 billion 
-  Change 
jobs:  24 
in  no.  of 
corresponding 
personnel costs 
-  Monetised  resource  savings:  EUR  ~57.5 
million 
-  Monetised  waste  savings:  EUR  ~28.7 
million 
-  Monetised  CO2  emissions  savings:  EUR 
~161.3 million 
-  Growth  and  investment  (in  Europe  -  GVA 
traders,  producers,  repairers):  EUR  ~68.7 
million 
- Consumer savings: EUR ~406.3 million 
-  Change 
jobs, 
corresponding  to  EUR  ~41.9  million  in 
personnel cost 
-  Monetised  resource  savings:  EUR  ~9.2 
million 
- Monetised waste savings: EUR ~4.4 million 
-  Monetised  CO2  emissions  savings:  EUR 
~25.8 million 

in  no.  of 

jobs:  112 

in  no.  of 

jobs:  -1,287 

Costs 
-  Growth  and  investment  (in  Europe  -  GVA 
traders,  producers,  repairers):  EUR  ~-827.9 
million  
-  Business  adjustment  costs:  EUR  ~862.3 
million   
jobs 
-  Change 
corresponding  to  EUR  ~-482.6  million    in 
personnel costs 
-  Implementation  and  enforcement  costs  for 
public administration: EUR ~28.2 million  
-  Growth  and  investment  (in  Europe  -  GVA 
traders,  producers,  repairers):  EUR  ~-827.9 
million 
-  Business  adjustment  costs:  EUR  ~845.7 
million 
-  Change  in  no.  of  jobs:  -1,287  jobs, 
corresponding  to  EUR  ~–482.6  million  in 
personnel costs 
-  Implementation  and  enforcement  costs  for 
public administration: EUR ~28.2 million 
- Business adjustment costs: EUR ~2.1 billion 
-  Implementation  and  enforcement  costs  for 
public administration: EUR ~28.2 million  

- Business adjustment costs: EUR ~1 billion 
-  Implementation  and  enforcement  costs  for 
public administration: EUR ~28.2 million 

60 

 
 
 
3A 

3B 

4 

jobs:  226 

in  no.  of 

in  no.  of 

jobs:  1,040 

-  Growth  and  investment  (in  Europe  -  GVA 
traders,  producers,  repairers):  EUR  ~139 
million 
- Consumer savings: EUR ~822.2 million 
jobs, 
-  Change 
corresponding  to  EUR  ~84.9  million  in 
personnel cost 
-  Monetised  resource  savings:  EUR  ~18.6 
million 
- Monetised waste savings: EUR ~8.8 million 
-  Monetised  CO2  emissions  savings:  EUR 
~52.2 million 
-  Growth  and  investment  (in  Europe  -  GVA 
traders,  producers,  repairers):  EUR  ~623.9 
million 
- Savings in production costs: EUR ~2 billion 
jobs, 
-  Change 
corresponding  to  EUR  ~390.1  million  in 
personnel cost 
-  Monetised  resource  savings:  EUR  ~41.8 
million 
-  Monetised  waste  savings:  EUR  ~19.9 
million 
-  Monetised  CO2  emissions  savings:  EUR 
~117.4 million 
-  Growth  and  investment  (in  Europe  -  GVA 
traders,  producers,  repairers):  EUR  ~596.3 
million 
- Consumer savings: EUR ~1.5 billion 
- Change in no. of jobs: 1,004, corresponding 
to EUR ~376.4 million in personnel cost  
-  Monetised  resource  savings:  EUR  ~61.9 
million 
-  Monetised  waste  savings:  EUR  ~30.9 
million 
-  Monetised  CO2  emissions  savings:  EUR 
~173.5 million 

-  Business  adjustment  costs:  EUR  ~228.6 
million 
-  Implementation  and  enforcement  costs: 
EUR ~28.2 million 

-  Business  adjustment  costs:  EUR  ~326 
million 
-  Implementation  and  enforcement  costs  for 
public administration: EUR ~28.2 million 

-  Costs  for  financing  additional  remedies: 
EUR ~-776.5 million 
-  Business  adjustment  costs:  EUR  ~228.5 
million 
-  Implementation  and  enforcement  costs  for 
public administration: EUR ~0.7 million 

The MCA (including the CBA) leads to the following scores (range -5 to +5) for Cluster I POs, 
showing also the distribution among effectiveness, efficiency and coherence172: 

Policy Options 
PO1A 
PO1B 
PO2A 
PO2B 
PO3A 

Effectiveness 
0.71 
0.50 
0.25 
0.23 
0.15 

Efficiency 
-0.19 
-0.19 
-0.29 
-0.28 
-0.23 

Coherence 
1.67 
1.67 
1.67 
1.67 
1.33 

Total (MCA) 
2.19 
1.98 
1,63 
1.62 
1.25 

172 See full table in methodological Annex 4 and IA Study, Sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.4. 

61 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
PO3B 
PO4 

-0.01 
0.26 

-0.14 
0.06 

1.33 
1.67 

1.18 
1.99 

Cluster II POs tackle defects not covered by the legal guarantee, i.e. the very large majority 
of  defects.  Unlike  in  Cluster  I,  consumers  have  to  pay  for  repair  and  many  of  the  relevant 
defects appear later in the lifespan of products. Respectively, consumer willingness to repair is 
significantly  lower  and  it  decreases  with  the  age  of  the  product  or  a  higher  price  of  repair. 
Therefore, even if Cluster II POs could tackle a much bigger number of defects in absolute 
terms compared to Cluster I, due to the lower willingness to repair, their effectiveness is only 
partially higher compared to Cluster I.  

PO5 and 6  pursue the  specific objective of increasing  repair  beyond the legal  guarantee  by 
tackling different obstacles to consumer decisions to repair.173  

In  PO5,  PO5B  on  the  national  matchmaking  repair  platform  scores  the  highest,  because  it 
covers a wider range of goods compared to PO5C and provides a wider range of information 
compared to PO5A. It is therefore likely to influence repair decisions in more cases, resulting 
in a higher estimated increase in take-up of repair and respectively most avoided purchases 
compared to PO5A and PO5C.  

PO6 is overall more effective compared to PO5, because PO6 tackles more drivers - not only 
transparency related, but also inconvenience and price related, the latter being more significant 
drivers influencing more cases and consumer decisions to repair. PO6A has a relatively low 
effectiveness compared to other POs in this cluster, but scores decently high overall. This is 
because  a  voluntary  quality  standard  does  not  entail  much  cost,  but  brings  benefits  to  both 
business and consumers using it. PO6B triggers a significant increase in repair take-up, helping 
consumers identify repair providers and services that suit them most for all consumer goods. It 
provides  not  only  relevant,  but  also  individualised  information,  thus  tackling  most  key 
decision-making factors for repair, compared to the other POs. These benefits outweigh the 
business  costs  and  the  overall  result  is  clearly  positive,  ranking  this  options  highest  in  this 
cluster and overall. PO6C on the obligation to repair goods subject to reparability requirements 
is the option with the second highest overall scoring in this cluster and overall. Even though it 
concerns  a  smaller  range  of  goods  than  other  POs  in  this  cluster,  it  is  highly  effective  in 
increasing repair. It brings significant environmental benefits for the product range concerned 
(notably energy related products covered by ecodesign reparability requirements). It also brings 
consumer savings, jobs and gains for the repair sector thus outweighing the business adjustment 
costs  and  loss  of  turnover  and  GVA.  Furthermore,  PO6C  is  coherent  with  reparability 
requirements under EU law (notably under eco-design legislation) because its scope is directly 

173 PO6 tackles aspects of information (in particular PO6B) as well as quality/content of repair (including price). 
PO5 focuses on information-related drivers, i.e. transparency on repair providers (e.g. on location, general 
conditions). 

62 

 
 
 
                                                 
linked  to  these  requirements.  It  will  therefore  bring  legal  certainty  and  predictability  for 
producers, because the new obligation to repair goods upon consumers request will only be 
relevant  for  products  which  are  repairable  by  design  and  repair  is  technically  feasible.  As 
reparability requirements affecting the effectiveness of PO6C will be introduced gradually over 
time and only for those products which have an added value because sustainability benefits 
outweigh the costs, this decreases its effectiveness. In addition, once ecodesign rules are fully 
rolled out over the next decade, PO6C may have less added value, as repair services should 
generally evolve as a result of ecodesign reparability requirements. PO6D (obligation to repair 
all  products)  due  to  its  broader  scope  would  cover  more  products  compared  to  PO6C  and 
therefore is also effective. PO6D has higher benefits for the environment and the repair sector 
compared to PO6C. Under PO6D consumers do not need to wait for the obligation to repair to 
become  operational  progressively  for  different  product  groups.  PO6D  entails  however 
significant business adjustment costs and losses in forgone sales for traders and producers in 
the EU. Under PO6D also producers who manufacture products that do not need to comply 
with  reparability  requirements  would  incur  adjustments  costs.  These  costs  are  likely  to  be 
disproportionate  for  SME  producers  or  for  certain  sectors  (e.g.  low  value  goods  which 
consumers replace frequently).  

While under all Cluster II POs consumers would have to pay for repair to ensure that this is 
economically  viable,  consumer  savings  would  increase  because  consumers  would  achieve 
savings by repairing their goods and using them longer, instead of spending more money on 
replacement products. Businesses would have an interest to provide good quality services and 
reasonable  prices  to  tap  in  the  increased  consumer  demand  for  repair  in  order  to  gain  new 
customers.  

PO7 promoting the reuse of refurbished goods has a limited effectiveness compared to other 
POs. However, overall it gets a positive score, because it is coherent, the costs are very limited 
and it generates efficiency gains when combined with a repair platform. When combined with 
a repair platform, PO 7 potentially could benefit a wider range of consumers, because it would 
be visible to the broader segments of consumers interested in repair. Thus, it would promote 
refurbished  goods  as  a  sustainable  consumption  possibility  for  consumers  who  are  already 
considering more sustainable consumption choices.  

The main impact figures on Cluster II POs, contributing to the cost-benefit analysis (CBA), 
are:  

PO 
5A 

Benefits 
-  Growth  and  investment  (in  Europe  - 
GVA traders, producers, repairers): EUR 
~373.8 million 
- Consumer savings: EUR ~10.5 billion 
-  Change  in  no.  of  jobs:  631  jobs, 
corresponding to  EUR  ~236.5 million in 
personnel costs 

Costs 
- Business adjustment costs: EUR ~266.6 
million 
-  Implementation  and  enforcement  costs 
for  public  administration:  EUR  ~12.3 
million 

63 

 
 
- Monetised resource savings: EUR ~44.9 
million 
-  Monetised  waste  savings:  EUR  ~21.9 
million 
- Monetised CO2 emissions savings: EUR 
~134.2 million 
-  Growth  and  investment  (in  Europe  - 
GVA traders, producers, repairers): EUR 
~1.3 billion 
- Consumer savings: EUR ~35.2 billion 
-  Change  in  no.  of  jobs:  2,113  jobs, 
corresponding to  EUR  ~792.3 million in 
personnel costs  
-  Monetised  resource  savings:  EUR 
~150.4 million 
-  Monetised  waste  savings:  EUR  ~73.5 
million 
- Monetised CO2 emissions savings: EUR 
~449.6 million 
-  Growth  and  investment  (in  Europe  - 
GVA traders, producers, repairers): EUR 
~433.3 million 
- Consumer savings: EUR ~21.7 billion 
-  Change  in  no.  of  jobs:  1,067  jobs, 
corresponding to  EUR  ~400.2 million in 
personnel costs 
- Monetised resource savings: EUR ~99.4 
million 
-  Monetised  waste  savings:  EUR  ~16.5 
million 
- Monetised CO2 emissions savings: EUR 
~315.5 million 
-  Growth  and  investment  (in  Europe  - 
GVA traders, producers, repairers): EUR 
~747.7 million 
- Consumer savings: EUR ~21 billion 
-  Change  in  no.  of  jobs:  1,261  jobs, 
corresponding  to  EUR  ~473  million  in 
personnel costs 
- Monetised resource savings: EUR ~89.8 
million 
-  Monetised  waste  savings:  EUR  ~43.9 
million 
- Monetised CO2 emissions savings: EUR 
~268.4 million  
-  Growth  and  investment  (in  Europe  - 
GVA traders, producers, repairers): EUR 
~2.5 billion 

5B 

5C 

6A 

6B 

-  Implementation  and  enforcement  costs 
for  public  administration:  EUR  ~32 
million 

-  Implementation  and  enforcement  costs 
for  public  administration:  EUR  ~4.5 
million 

-  Implementation  and  enforcement  costs 
for  public  administration:  EUR  ~2.5 
million 

-  Business  adjustment  costs:  EUR  ~6.4 
billion 

64 

 
 
-  Implementation  and  enforcement  costs 
for  public  administration:  EUR  ~26.4 
million 

- Business adjustment costs: EUR ~627.1 
million 
-  Business  administrative  costs:  EUR 
~69.8 million 
-  Implementation  and  enforcement  costs 
for  public  administration:  EUR  ~4.5 
million 

-  Business  adjustment  costs:  EUR  ~3.9 
billion 
-  Business  administrative  costs:  EUR 
~161.8 million 
-  Implementation  and  enforcement  costs 
for  public  administration:  EUR  ~12.3 
million 

-  Implementation  and  enforcement  costs 
for  public  administration:  EUR  ~3.8 
million 

6C 

6D 

7 

- Consumer savings: EUR ~70.4 billion 
-  Change  in  no.  of  jobs:  4,227  jobs, 
corresponding  to  EUR  ~1.6  billion  in 
personnel costs 
-  Monetised  resource  savings:  EUR 
~300.8 million 
-  Monetised  waste  savings:  EUR  ~147 
million 
- Monetised CO2 emissions savings: EUR 
~899.2 million 
-  Growth  and  investment  (in  Europe  - 
GVA traders, producers, repairers): EUR 
~782.8 million 
- Consumer savings: EUR ~39.2 billion 
-  Change  in  no.  of  jobs:  1,928  jobs, 
corresponding  to  EUR  ~723  million  in 
personnel costs 
-  Monetised  resource  savings:  EUR 
~179.5 million 
-  Monetised  waste  savings:  EUR  ~29.7 
million 
- Monetised CO2 emissions savings: EUR 
~569.7 million  
-  Growth  and  investment  (in  Europe  - 
GVA traders, producers, repairers): EUR 
~2.8 billion 
- Consumer savings: EUR ~80 billion 
-  Change  in  no.  of  jobs:  4,795  jobs, 
corresponding  to  EUR  ~1.8  billion  in 
personnel costs 
-  Monetised  resource  savings:  EUR 
~341.2 million 
-  Monetised  waste  savings:  EUR  ~166.7 
million 
- Monetised CO2 emissions savings: EUR 
~1 billion 
-  Growth  and  investment  (in  Europe  - 
GVA traders, producers, repairers): EUR 
~117.8 million 
- Consumer savings: EUR ~1.9 billion 
-  Change  in  no.  of  jobs:  199  jobs, 
corresponding  to  EUR  ~74.5  million  in 
personnel costs  
- Monetised resource savings: EUR ~14.1 
million 
-  Monetised  waste  savings:  EUR  ~6.9 
million 

65 

 
 
- Monetised CO2 emissions savings: EUR 
~42.2 million 

The MCA leads to the following scores for the Cluster II POs174: 

Policy 
Options 
PO5A 
PO5B  
PO5C  
PO6A 
PO6B 
PO6C 
PO6D 
PO7 

Effectiveness 

Efficiency 

Coherence 

Total (MCA) 

0.26 
0.74 
0.27 
0.42 
1.38 
0.61 
1.63 
0.15 

-0.04 
0.00 
0.10 
0.14 
0.04 
0.06 
0.07 
-0.01 

1.33 
1.00 
0.67 
1.00 
1.67 
1.67 
-1.00 
1.00 

1.56 
1.74 
1.03 
1.57 
3.09 
2.33 
0.70 
1.14 

8.  Preferred Option 

PO 1A Repair when cheaper than replacement

PO5B  A matchmaking 
platform on repair at 

national level

PO 6A Voluntary 
commitments to an EU 
easy repair standard

(all repairers)

PO6B – Issuing a repair 
quote (all repairers)

PO5A Obligation to 
inform where to repair 
(producers)

PO 6C  Obligation to 
repair goods subject to 
repairability 
requirements 
(producers)

PO 7 Platform promoting refurbished goods

The preferred option package addresses both problems and contributes to achieving the general 
and specific objectives. The POs are chosen based on an analysis of effectiveness, efficiency 
and coherence (see section 6), a weighing of options based on the cost-benefit analysis (CBA) 
and  their  ranking  in  the  multi-criteria  analysis  (MCA)  comparison,  as  well  as  based  on 
considerations of subsidiarity and proportionality and in view of the synergies they produce. 

66 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
The preferred options package has an added value that is more than the sum of the individual 
elements,  because  some  options  produce  synergies  when  combined.  For  instance,  the 
matchmaking platform reinforces other POs by giving them a digital dimension, access to more 
repair  possibilities  for  consumers  and  a  wider  range  of  clients  for  business.  The  preferred 
options package includes elements from both Clusters, with a focus on Cluster II addressing 
repair beyond the legal  guarantee. This  focus is  guided by the  fact  that  the largest  share of 
defects appears in this scenario and hence the potential to increase repair is the highest in this 
Cluster.  The  detailed  figures  for  each  of  the  measures  in  the  preferred  option  package  are 
displayed in Annex 3 (preferred option) and Annex 4 (methodology).  

Cluster I: Preferred option:  

PO 1A Repair when cheaper than replacement

PO1A  has  been  selected  from  Cluster  I,  because  it  addresses  problem  1  effectively,  by 
considerably  increasing  repair  under  the  legal  guarantee.  It  scores  highest  in  the  MCA  in 
Cluster  I.  While  it  somewhat  reduces  consumers’  economic  rights  for  the  benefit  of  the 
environment, changes are proportionate and allow businesses to use the cheaper and therefore 
economically  preferable  remedy.  While  businesses  have  adjustment  costs,  they  are  clearly 
outbalanced by considerable business savings and benefits for the environment.  

PO1A respects subsidiarity, as MS cannot achieve this objective due to the full harmonisation 
under the SGD. PO1A is proportionate because it amends national laws only to the minimum 
extent necessary to increase repair under the legal guarantee and to achieve the objective of 
sustainable consumption. While the impact of PO1A and PO1B is similar, PO1A is preferable 
as it limits consumer rights less than PO1B. Due to the full harmonisation effect of the SGD, 
PO1A  ensures  that  rights  of  consumers  in  terms  of  choice  of  the  remedy  within  the  legal 
guarantee period are similarly guaranteed across the internal market, however allowing MS to 
keep their existing schemes on the length of the liability period. Unlike PO2 in this cluster, this 
option does not therefore require significant changes to national laws and does not interfere 
with well-established national arrangements on liability periods.  

Options not selected: Both sub-options of PO2 did not prove to be sufficiently effective to 
reach the specific objective of increasing repairs within the legal guarantee. PO3 scores very 
low on effectiveness and is likely to be of little relevance in practice due to the small number 
of cases concerned, while PO4 is relevant only for a limited number of consumers, i.e. in those 
MS that currently allow for a shorter liability period for refurbished goods and only for those 
consumers  who  are  deterred  from  purchasing  refurbished  goods  due  to  concerns  about  the 
quality or length of the liability period. However, it bears a risk of adverse impact on the supply 
of refurbished goods, as a higher liability period entails costs for sellers of refurbished goods 
and risks dissuading providers from entering the business or adding refurbished goods to their 

67 

 
 
 
stock. The costs for financing extra remedies would weigh disproportionately on SMEs, which 
operate at small margins.  

Cluster II Preferred options package  

PO5B  Platform with 
information on 
available repair 
services - national (all 

repairers)

PO 6A Voluntary 
commitments to an EU 
easy repair standard

(all repairers)

PO6B – Issuing a repair 
quote (all repairers)

PO5A Obligation to 
inform where to repair 
(producers)

PO 6C obligation to 
repair products subject 
to reparability 
requirements

(producers)

In PO5, the option scoring best, i.e. the national platform covering a broad scope of products 
(PO5B), increases transparency and facilitates the search for repair and produces significant 
net benefits. While the producers’ obligation to inform about repair (PO5A) has rather small 
effectiveness,  it  brings  benefits  to  consumers  from  increased  transparency  on  repair 
possibilities.  Overall,  PO5  contributes  to  sustainable  consumption  by  increasing  repair  as  a 
result of improved transparency on repair services. It contributes to EU growth, investment, 
and competition in repair services in the internal market, while bringing benefits to consumers 
and the environment, as well as jobs in the repair sector. 

Even  though  the  effectiveness  of  the  easy  repair  standard  (PO6A)  is  limited  due  to  the 
relatively small increase in repair, it has negligible costs and brings benefits to both the supply 
and  demand  side  of  repair.  It  is  a  useful  add-on  to  the  POs  introducing  binding  rules.  The 
obligation  to  issue  a  binding  repair  quote  (PO6B)  will  effectively  tackle  consumer  price 
concerns through transparency and predictability on the repair price. It will also help consumers 
identify repair conditions that best suit their needs, tackling the inconvenience driver behind 
the  reluctance  to  repair.  While  business  adjustment  costs  and  forgone  sales  for  traders  and 
producers in the EU in PO6B are rather high, the benefits in terms of consumer savings, gains 
for the repair sector, net  employment  and  environmental  gains  outweigh  these costs by far, 
resulting in top  ranking  of this  PO overall.  The  obligation to  repair  products  subject  to  EU 
reparability  requirements  (PO6C)  scores  high  in  Cluster  II.  PO6C  triggers  significant 
consumer savings and growth and investment gains driven by the repair sector, including jobs. 
It ensures that when it comes to goods subject to reparability requirements under EU law, for 

68 

 
 
 
 
instance eco-design goods, such as a refrigerator or a washing machine,175, consumers have a 
legally enforceable right to get their products repaired not only within the legal guarantee but 
also beyond the legal guarantee period. These benefits outbalance high losses due to forgone 
sales of new products as well as adjustment costs for producers and traders in  the EU. The 
environmental  impacts  are  among  the  highest  of  all  measures.  Overall,  PO6  contributes  to 
sustainable  consumption  by  increased  repair  as  a  result  of  improved  conditions  of  repair 
services.  It  contributes  to  EU  growth,  investment  and  competition  in  repair  services  in  the 
internal  market,  while  bringing  significant  benefits  to  consumers  and  the  environment  and 
creating jobs in the repair sector. 

While the effectiveness  of the refurbishment platform (PO7) is limited, there are almost no 
costs when it is an additional functionality of the repair platform under PO 5B. At the same 
time PO7 brings benefits both to the demand and supply side of refurbished goods. Overall, 
PO7 contributes to sustainable consumption by promoting the use of  refurbished goods as a 
result  of  increased  transparency  on  refurbishment  services  and  products.  It  contributes  to 
growth,  investment  and  competition  in  refurbishment  services  in  the  internal  market,  while 
bringing benefits to consumers and the environment. 

All  selected  POs  in  Cluster  II  produce  strong  synergies.  The  repair  platform  (PO5B)  will 
reinforce  the  easy  repair  standard  (PO6A)  by  giving  it  a  digital  dimension  and  increased 
visibility to its subscribers vis-à-vis a wide range of consumers. Similarly, the repair platform 
will help identify providers who can offer a quote (PO6B) for free or at a distance. Thus, it will 
help  consumers  gather  and  compare  more  offers,  while  increasing  repairers’  potential  of 
gaining new clients. The binding quote (PO6B) and repair platform will produce synergies with 
PO6C as producers that are subject to the obligation to repair could provide a binding quote to 
consumers on the platform and thus make their repair services more visible. The producers’ 
obligation to inform (PO5A) creates synergies with the obligation to repair (PO6C) by ensuring 
that consumers are aware of this obligation.  

Almost half of the POs (PO5B, PO6A, PO6B) aim at increasing transparency and therefore 
competition  in  the  market.  These  combined  POs  benefit  repair  service  providers,  including 
independent  repairers  and  SMEs  by  encouraging  repair  and  giving  their  services  more 
visibility. As consumers are more likely to look, for convenience reasons, for repairers in their 
proximity,  they  will  not  necessarily  go  to  producers  and  are  likely  to  first  seek  local  SME 
providers.  Thus,  independent  repairers  and  local  SMEs  are  well  placed  to  benefit  from  this 
package.  The  preferred  POs  combined  also  encourage  competition  in  repair  services  in  the 
internal market. Increased demand for repair would trigger increased demand and production 

175 The reparability requirements may relate e.g. to disassembly or availability of spare parts (see p. 4 on 
Ecodesign product groups covered by reparability requirements). This list of products is expected to expand 
over time, in particular because reparability requirements under the Ecodesign framework continue to be 
introduced on a product-by-product basis. 

69 

 
 
                                                 
of spare parts for more repair and refurbishment services. This would contribute to cross-border 
movement of spare parts and refurbished goods and benefit EU manufacturers and traders. 

The choice of preferred options in Cluster II is also based on subsidiarity and proportionality 
considerations. Harmonisation at EU level is limited only to those options, i.e. the quote and 
obligation to repair, which have an internal market dimension. The preferred policy option in 
Cluster II ensures that consumers across the internal market seeking repair possibilities (PO6B) 
or claiming   repair from the  producer (PO6C), have the same rights  irrespective of the MS 
where they reside or of the establishment of the seller or the producer. Where a national level 
solution is effective – as is the case of PO5B because a national platform is closer to consumer 
needs – this is the preferred choice. It also gives a large margin to MS in its implementation. 
The rights of consumers are however guaranteed in a similar manner across the internal market, 
so  that  consumers  can  achieve  the  same  result  across  the  EU:  finding  suitable  repair  or 
refurbishment  opportunities  for  their  defective  goods.  The  key  requirements  and  main 
functionalities  of  the  platform  are  regulated  by  the  EU  and  repair  providers  remain  free  to 
register  also  to  platforms  of  other  MS  where  they  can  provide  their  services.  Furthermore, 
where possible, the choice or design of a PO limits itself to what is necessary to increase repair. 
For  instance,  the  ‘easy  repair  standard’  is  shaped  as  a  voluntary  commitment  to  avoid  far-
reaching interference into national laws regulating services.  

Options not selected: The EU repair platform (PO5C) has limited effectiveness due to its more 
limited scope; its objectives may be better achieved at a national level. The obligation to repair 
all goods (PO6D) causes significant adjustment costs for business as well as significant losses 
in turnover and GVA. It also raises serious issues of coherence and proportionality due to a 
mismatch between the new consumer right it creates and the product specific reparability rules 
on  product  design  which  are  more  limited  in  scope.  This  incoherence  also  undermines  the 
practical application of this PO, as it leaves much uncertainty as to when the obligation applies 
given  that  many  products  would  remain  unregulated  and  could  be  irreparable  by  design. 
Ultimately,  this  option  is  not  proportionate,  because  it  would  impose  a  more  far  reaching 
obligation to repair in the after-sales phase, compared to the more targeted scope of ecodesign 
reparability rules ensuring that products are reparable by design. Finally, the specific objective 
and similar impacts can be achieved by means of less intrusive options. 

Main delivery risks of the preferred options 

While  the  take-up  rates  of  the  POs  are  based  on  representative,  robust  data  (e.g.  from 
behavioural experiments), consumer behaviour cannot be predicted with certainty. Therefore, 
a  delivery  risk  is  that  Cluster  II  POs  will  not  succeed  in  changing  consumers’  behaviour 
towards  repair  to  the  extent  expected  and  that  the  impacts  of  the  preferred  options  will  not 
materialise fully. However, while take-up rates may be in the short term lower than indicated, 
they are likely to be higher than indicated in the long run because citizens adjust to new policies 
and behaviour can change over time. This may mean that respondents who indicated that they 
would replace would repair instead, as the trend of sustainable consumption strengthens. In 

70 

 
 
addition, the ratio between costs and benefits will remain the same, i.e. the lower the benefits, 
the lower the costs and vice versa. Furthermore, the risk that one option will not be as successful 
compared  to  others  (e.g.  lower  take-up  of  easy  repair  standard  or  obligation  to  repair  than 
expected) is mitigated by the fact that all options are self-standing. Even if one option is not 
taken up widely, the others can still succeed independently. 

Another  delivery  risk  of  Cluster  II  POs  relates  to  consumer  awareness  on  their  rights,  e.g. 
consumers may not be aware of the obligation to repair. This risk is already factored into all 
estimates of impacts, by a conservative assumption that the take-up rates of all options will not 
reach their full potential in the first two years of application of the measures.176 Furthermore, 
the purpose of PO5A and 5B is precisely to mitigate this risk. In addition, these risks can be 
mitigated further by an obligation on MS to inform consumer on the new rights, which would 
be included in the proposal and the costs of which are factored into the implementation costs. 
Furthermore, a delivery risk linked to PO6A is that companies would be reluctant to voluntarily 
commit or subscribe to an EU repair quality standard, because of the higher level of service it 
would entail. However, this risk is mitigated by the increased sustainability awareness of both 
consumers,  sellers  and  producers  due  to  the  impacts  of  other  POs  and  circular  economy 
initiatives in general, leading to larger demand of durable and reparable products and therefore 
good  quality  repair  services.  Furthermore,  the  opportunity  to  display  a  quality  label  on  the 
repair platform would further increase visibility and attractiveness of such repairers. 

Combined impacts of the preferred option 

The  package  contributes  effectively  to  the  general  objective  and  specific  objectives  by 
encouraging  repair  as  well  as  promoting  the  reuse  of  goods  within  and  beyond  the  legal 
guarantee.  The  combination  of  preferred  options  is  designed  to  change  consumers’ 
consumption patterns towards sustainability (repair and reuse) in the long term: the measures 
create  incentives  for  consumers  to  spend  less  money  due  to  less  replacement  of  viable 
consumer goods, which benefits consumers and the environment as less products are purchased 
and produced in the first place. The behavioural change177 is driven by the removal of obstacles 
for consumers who are in principle open to repair, but hindered by obstacles that discourage 
them.178  

176 See Annex 4. 
177 The assumptions on behavioural change by consumers correspond to the increased take-up of repair or use of 
refurbished goods as a result of the preferred option. The calculated behavioural change can be assumed to 
extent to the whole segment of consumer goods that can potentially be repaired or refurbished, as the estimates 
have been extrapolated to the whole economy. See Annex 4 p. 4-9 for take-up rates and p. 14 and 25 for 
extrapolation.  
178 This is particularly relevant for reluctant replacers and reluctant repairers, as well as enthusiastic repairers 
who also occasionally face repair obstacles (see p. 10 for consumer segments). These consumers will get easier 
access to more attractive repair opportunities and will be able to get their preferred repair choices more 

71 

 
 
                                                 
Altogether  the  package  increases  consumer  protection.  The  partial  reduction  of  consumer 
remedies under PO1 is being outbalanced by introducing new rights and tools for consumers 
beyond the legal guarantee through the Cluster II POs. The main impact figures of the preferred 
option package are179: 

Benefits for 15 years 
CO2 savings: 18.5 million tons CO2-eq 
= EUR 3.3 billion 
Resource savings: 1.8 million tons 
= EUR 1.1 billion 
Waste savings: 3 million tons 
= EUR 493.4 million 
Total monetised: EUR 4.9 billion,  
Savings in production costs: EUR 15.6 billion 
Growth  and  investment  (in  Europe  -  GVA 
traders, producers, repairers): EUR 4.8 billion 
Consumer  savings:  EUR  176.5  billion    (25 
EUR per consumer per year) 

8,872 jobs, corresponding to EUR ~ 3.3 billion 
in personnel costs 

Environmental 
impact 

Economic 
impact 

Social impact 

on 

 Impact 
public 
administration 

Costs for 15 years 

Business  adjustment  costs:  EUR  8.1 
billion 
Business  administrative  costs:  EUR 
69.8 million 

Implementation and enforcement costs: 
EUR 105.5 million 

The environmental impact of the preferred option needs to be seen in comparison and together 
with other initiatives under the Green Deal. While for instance concerning CO2 savings within 
15 years, the ECGT will save 0.33-0.47 million tons, this initiative will save 18.4 million tons 
and the ESPR 471 million tons. The ESPR CO2 savings are naturally much higher since the 
ESPR is aiming for far-reaching changes in product manufacturing. Still, the preferred option 
would save several times more CO2 than the ECGT. It is however much more important to see 
the impact of the present initiative together with all other Commission initiatives in the green 
transition.180 This initiative is one building stone of the overall environmental impact that all 
the respective initiatives taken together are aiming to achieve, contributing to tackle a problem 
which is far too comprehensive to be dealt with by one or two separate initiatives. 

frequently. Furthermore, the behavioural experiments suggest that the preferred option has an impact on all 
consumer segments, including on enthusiastic replacers (albeit to a smaller extent) who may change their 
behaviour under attractive repair conditions.  
179 See details of the preferred option in Annex 3 and the methodology in Annex 4 as well as IA Study, Section 
5.3.4.  
180 The present initiative could also indirectly help the other initiatives generate their impact, the extent of which 
cannot be robustly assessed. 

72 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
In terms of economic impact, despite the losses in GVA for traders and producers in the EU, 
the  net  GVA  is  positive,  driven  by  significant  gains  by  EU  repairers  due  to  an  increase  in 
demand  for  repair  services.  Meanwhile,  significant  savings  in  production  are  achieved  by 
avoiding replacing a share of defective goods with new products. These savings result in an 
increase in competitiveness for EU business. The business adjustment costs are not inadequate 
given the substantial impact of the initiative. Gaining consumer savings of around EUR 176.5 
billion181 over 15 years outweighs the business adjustment and administrative costs by far. This 
figure  translates  into  25  EUR  savings  per  year  per  consumer  and  brings  therefore  tangible 
benefits  to  every  household.  While  consumer  savings  reflect  a  transfer  from  businesses 
revenues to consumers’ welfare, consumers will invest the saved money in the overall economy 
which in turn will lead to growth and investment.  

These impacts on the various economic operators (sellers, producers and repairers) are valid 
also for SMEs182. Although adjustment and administrative costs relative to business revenues 
are  disproportionately  higher  for  SMEs,  the  overall  balance  of  costs  and  benefits  under  the 
preferred  option  is  expected  to  be  beneficial  for  SMEs  as  a  whole.  This  however  masks  a 
difference between SMEs in repair, which will clearly benefit, and SMEs in manufacturing and 
retail,  which  will  be  somewhat  disadvantaged,  also  vis-à-vis  their  larger  competitors.  The 
overall impact on EU business is positive. 

The negative impact on third countries relates only to third-country producers. Despite decrease 
in turnover  from forgone sales (EUR 29.8 billion for 15 years), the longer-term global impact 
is likely to be positive, as third country producers could gain an incentive to switch production 
to more durable goods, contributing to a more sustainable use of resources and more sustainable 
business models. Third countries  will therefore also benefit from the preferred option, which 
will reduce the negative environmental consequences and associated costs resulting from the 
problems. 

In terms of social impact, the impacts on EU jobs is not significant, with an expected net job 
increase exceeding 8000 jobs, mainly in the repair sector. Additional spending by consumers 
is likely to create new jobs in other sectors, but these impacts cannot be estimated in a robust 
manner. 

In total, the benefits of the economic, social and environmental impacts outweigh the costs for 
businesses  and  public  administration.  The  preferred  option  will  contribute  to  avoiding  or 
reducing fragmentation of national rules as regards consumer sales of goods and repair services 

181 The consumer savings from longer use of repaired products over a period of 15 years amount to a considerable 
amount of cumulative savings for EU consumers. This amount is realistic considering that consumers often replace 
viable products that could potentially be used for twice as long. IA study, Annex 3.4. 
182 Almost all repairers in the EU are SMEs (99.7%), while in the retail sector their share in aggregate turnover 
and GVA is 51% (excluding motor vehicles). The impact of the preferred PO package is positive for SMEs. See 
Annex 8. 

73 

 
 
                                                 
in  the  internal  market,  pursuing  the  objective  of  improving  sustainable  consumption  and 
consumer protection. To that end, it will remove actual and potential obstacles for cross-border 
trade in goods and repair services in the EU. 

The  preferred  option  package  is  coherent  with  EU  legislation  and  EU  policy  priorities,  in 
particular  the  European  Green  Deal  and  the  Digital  Transition.  It  is  consistent  with  and 
complements the effect of the ESPR and the ECGT by encouraging repair in the after-sales 
phase. It is also conducive to fundamental freedoms, notably to free movement of goods and 
repair services. It contributes to cross-border competition in the single market. The package 
has a positive impact on fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. It 
promotes the right to environmental protection (Article 37) and it contributes to a high level of 
consumer protection (Article 38) by strengthening consumer rights beyond the legal guarantee. 
While  it  regulates  certain  business  practices  concerning  repair  in  view  of  the  sustainable 
consumption objective, it safeguards contractual freedom and is conducive to the freedom to 
conduct business (Article 16).  

‘One in, one out’ approach (OIOO) 

The  preferred  option  does  not  produce  any  administrative  cost  savings  for  businesses  or 
citizens/consumers  in  the  context  of  the  OIOO,  but  it  produces  direct  adjustment  costs  and 
administrative costs for businesses (total costs of the preferred option):  

  Direct  adjustment  costs:  EUR  731  million  (one-off)  and  EUR  7.4  billion  (recurrent 

costs over a period of 15 years)  

  Administrative costs: EUR 69.8 million (one-off) and no (recurrent) costs. 

Choice of instruments: The preferred instrument for the proposed options package is a self-
standing directive, also introducing an amendment to the SGD to implement PO1A. The “easy 
repair standard” (PO6A) will be implemented either by self-regulation (code of conduct) or a 
Commission standardisation mandate. 

9.  How will actual impacts be monitored and evaluated? 

the  effectiveness,  efficiency,  coherence  and  EU 
The  Commission  will  evaluate 
added  value  of  this  initiative  5  years  after  its  entry  into  application,  which  allows  for  the 
necessary period for application and evidence collection in MS. The progress will be monitored 
based on a set of indicators covering the package as a whole and its individual elements. These 
indicators are largely based on statistics that have been collected for the analysis of problems 
and POs in the IA.  

Objective  

Monitoring indicators 

Policy 
options 
– 
impacts 

74 

 
 
Sustainable consumption  

Overall 
effect of 
policy 
options 
package 

PO1A 

Increase repair 
(under legal guarantee) 

PO5A 

Increase repair (beyond the legal 
guarantee) 

PO5B 

Increase repair (beyond the legal 
guarantee) 

PO6A 

PO6B 

PO6C   

PO7 

Increase repair (beyond the legal 
guarantee) 
Increase repair (beyond the legal 
guarantee) 
Increase repair (beyond the legal 
guarantee) 
Increase  use  of 
goods 

refurbished 

% of consumers who have repaired their goods in the 
past 24 months 
%  of  consumers  who  have  bought  second-hand 
including refurbished goods in the past 24 months  
%  of  consumers  willing  to  repair  or  purchase 
refurbished products in the future.  
Number  of  repairs  conducted  in  the  year  (average 
annual data) 
% of sellers who provided repair as a remedy  under 
the legal guarantee 
% of cases when traders repaired products under the 
legal guarantee 
%  of  consumers  who  are  aware  of  the  obligation  to 
repair  
% of producers providing repair 
Number  of  ecodesign  product  groups  for  which  the 
obligation to repair exists 
Number of visits to the platform per year per MS with 
indication of users coming from other MS looking for 
cross-border repair 
% of successful repairs achieved via the platform 
% of repair businesses registered on the platform per 
MS per year with indication of businesses from other 
MS offering cross-border repair. 
%  of  businesses  displaying  quality  standards  on  the 
platform 
Number of new local repair businesses due to higher 
demand 
Number  of  refurbished  goods  purchased  via  the 
platform 
Number of refurbishment businesses registered on the 
platform 
Number of searches for refurbishment purchasers 
Number  of  repair  businesses  subscribing  to  the 
standard per MS per year 
Number of quotes requested by consumers 
% of repair providers offering quotes for free  
% of consumers who invoked the obligation to repair 
in a MS for the past 24 months 
Number of visits on platform for refurbished goods 
%  of  consumers  who  purchased  refurbished  goods 
over the past 24 months 
% of consumer willing to purchase refurbished goods 
in the future 
Number  of  refurbished  goods  purchased  in  the  EU 
(average annual data)  

Data on the transposition and application of the initiative will also feed into the evaluation. For 
that purpose, the Commission will also remain in contact with MS and stakeholders. 

75 

 
 
 
Annex 1: Procedural information 

LEAD DG, DECIDE PLANNING/CWP REFERENCES 

European  Commission  Directorate-General  Justice  and  Consumers,  DG  JUST,  Ref.  Decide: 
PLAN/2020/9848 – Sustainable consumption of goods – promoting repair and reuse, CWP 2020 

ORGANISATION AND TIMING 

Roadmap consultation period – 30 June to 28 July 2021 

Open public consultation period – 11 January 2022 – 05 April 2022 

The Call for Evidence was published on 11 January 2022, along with the OPC. The Call for evidence 
outlined the initiative’s context, objectives and policy options.  

There have been four ISSG meetings on the initiative between June and November 2022, including 
participation from SG, SJ, JUST, GROW, CNECT, COMP, ENER, ENV, JRC, INTPA. One ISSG 
written procedure was organised in December 2022, including participation from the same DGs.  

CONSULTATION OF THE RSB 

3.1. Upstream meeting with the RSB – 08 March 2022 

The  guidance  and  advice  provided  by  the  RSB  was  implemented  in  this  impact  assessment,  in 
particular: 

-  The interplay of this planned initiative with other relevant policy measures (in particular the 
Empowering consumers and SPI proposals) were addressed in close cooperation with other 
Commission services, to ensure that all initiatives serve consistent objectives and achieve 
synergies.  

-  The Board stressed the need to define a clear set of measures and to specify whether options 
are alternatives or complementary. This has been has been detailed throughout the IA. 

3.2. Opinions of the RSB and responses 

The  Impact  Assessment  report  was  reviewed  by  the  Regulatory  Scrutiny  Board.  It  received  a 
negative opinion on 30 September 2022. The Impact Assessment was revised to take into account 
the Board’s comments and resubmitted to the RSB on 15 December 2022. The RSB reviewed the 
revised Impact Assessment draft and delivered a second positive opinion with reservations on 24 
January 2023. The Impact Assessment was amended with further clarifications addressing the RSB 
comments.  

RSB opinion of 30 September 2022 

RSB Opinion – Section C: What to improve 
1)  The report should explain better the scope of 
the initiative and its coherence with other EU 
legislation  dealing  with  consumer  goods, 

DG JUST replies 
The  draft  impact  assessment  report  now  provides 
clarifications  on  the  scope  of  the  initiative  and 
explains more comprehensively its links with other 

76 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the  Ecodesign 

the  circular  economy, 
sustainability  and 
notably 
for  Sustainable 
Products  Regulation.  The  report  should  be 
clear on precisely which consumer goods are 
in the scope of the initiative. It should better 
explain 
the  business-to-
business  market 
is  affected  by  similar 
problems  and  if  so,  how  these  will  be 
addressed,  given  that  they  are  not  covered, 
while  ensuring  coherence  with  the  present 
initiative.  It  should  better  justify  why  the 
business segment is out of scope. 

to  what  extent 

2)  The report should explain better why the Sale 
of  Goods  Directive  is  the  correct  instrument 
to tackle the premature disposal of repairable 
consumer goods. It should explain better how 
the  problem  of  premature  disposal  after  the 
guarantee  period  fits  in  with  EU  consumer 
law.  
It  should  also  explain  better  how 
this 
articulation  would  work  in  practice  when 
consumers will be given a legally enforceable 
“right  to  repair”,  yet  not  all  products  are 
equally repairable in the years to come and not 
favoured  over 
all 
replacement.  It  should  further  develop  the 
intervention 
including  by  clearly 
explaining  and  substantiating  with  evidence 
on how the issue of refurnished products fits 
therein,  as  currently  there  is  no  clear  link to 
the identified  problems.  It  should be  clear if 
the  problem  is  specific  to  some  consumer 
goods categories. 

repairs  are  equally 

logic, 

EU  policy  initiatives  under  section  1.2  (policy 
context) and section 5 (baseline).  
The draft impact assessment report clarifies which 
consumer  products  are  within  the  scope  of  the 
initiative under section 2 on the problem definition 
(product coverage).  
The reasons for not including the B2B dimension 
in  the  scope  of  the  initiative  are  now  explained 
under 
the  policy  context 
(conclusions for the scope of this initiative), while 
pointing to other EU policy initiatives dealing with 
this dimension.  

section  1.2  on 

Section  1.2  (related  policy  initiatives  and  legal 
context,  reference  to  SGD)  explains  to  what 
situations  SGD  applies.  Section  5  on  available 
policy  options  (description  of  policy  options, 
Cluster I and options for instruments) explains why 
SGD  is  the  relevant  instrument  when  it  comes  to 
changes  within  the  legal  guarantee.  It  is  also 
explained  in  section  1.2 that  the  lack  of  repair  of 
consumer  goods  depends  on  decisions  made  by 
tools  of  EU 
that  regulatory 
consumers  and 
consumer law are able to influence such decisions. 
The  design  of  the  preferred  instrument  for  the 
proposed options package has been amended. It is 
a self-standing directive introducing new rules for 
defects beyond the legal guarantee as well as also 
providing  an  amendment  to  the  SGD  as  regards 
changes to the current legal guarantee rules (section 
8  on  the  preferred  policy  option,  choice  of 
instruments).  
The report now acknowledges the differences in the 
reparability  of  products.  Section  2  (product 
coverage) includes new data on consumer attitudes 
to repair of different product groups. Furthermore, 
reparability requirements under EU law are taken 
into  account  directly  when  designing  the  policy 
options  on  the  obligation  to  repair.  PO6C,  the 
relevant element of the preferred options package, 
specifically  imposes  an  obligation  to  repair  only 
goods  subject  to  reparability  requirements  under 
EU  law  (section  5  on  available  policy  options, 
PO6C). Section 6 on assessment of the impacts of 
options PO6C and PO6D (coherence) elaborates on 
the relationship of reparability rules on the product 
design phase and consumer rights to repair beyond 
the legal guarantee. This consideration is reflected 

77 

 
 
 
the 

in the reasoning and is one of the main elements for 
the choice of the preferred option (section 8). 
A  problem  tree  (figure  1)  has  been  introduced  in 
section  2  to  clarify  the  logic  of  the  problem 
analysis. The link with the refurbished goods aspect 
is explained as a horizontal issue relevant to both 
problems in section 2 (‘limited use of refurbished 
goods’ after the descriptions of problems 1 and 2). 
The intervention logic chart in Section 5 (figure 2) 
has  been  amended.  It  clarifies  the  relationship 
between  problems,  objectives  and  policy  options. 
Different color codes are used for the two problems 
and 
respective  drivers,  objectives  and 
corresponding  options  which  address  the  two 
problems. The cluster structure in the intervention 
logic  has  been  revised  (two  clusters  instead  of 
three) recognizing that refurbished  goods are part 
of  the  two  clusters  of  problems,  options  and 
specific  objectives  within  and  beyond  the  legal 
guarantee.  
The draft impact assessment report now presents a 
more  dynamic  baseline  scenario,  calculating  the 
impacts  of  the  policy  options  for  a  period  of  15 
years. The baseline scenario takes into account the 
impacts  of  other  circular  economy 
related 
initiatives, in particular the ESPR and the ECGT in 
section  5.  Based  on  additional  data,  robust 
projections  were  introduced  for  the  new  dynamic 
indicator of increase in repair rates for the next 15 
years. The quantitative estimates of the impacts of 
the baseline have been recalculated on this basis. A 
dynamic  assumption  on  the  projected  average 
growth  of  the  market  has  also  been  factored  in 
section  6  (impacts  of  the  baseline  scenario)  and 
Annex 4.  
The scale of the problem of premature disposal of 
repairable consumer goods (section 2, scale of the 
problem)  has  been  quantified  based  on  a 
conservative  estimate  of  the  size  of  the  market 
failure.  Differences  with  respect 
to  distinct 
consumer goods categories are reflected in the scale 
of the problem (section 2, product coverage). 
Furthermore,  section  2  (‘how  likely  are  the 
problems to persist’) explains why the problems are 
expected to persist and will not be resolved under 
the related initiatives under the baseline.  
Section 2 (on problem 2) clarifies that the problem 
focus  is  on  obstacles  that  deter  consumers  from 

78 

for 

fully 

reflect 

It  should 

Sustainable 

3)  The  report  should  present  a  more  dynamic 
baseline  scenario  with  a  more  realistic 
timeline  allowing  the  estimated  effects  to 
materialise. 
the 
expected  improvements  resulting  from  the 
Products 
Ecodesign 
Regulation  and  related  circular  economy 
measures, including by providing quantitative 
estimates and projections of some key impact 
indicators.  It  should  also  explain  why  the 
problem  of  premature  disposal  of  repairable 
consumer  goods  is  likely  to  increase  in  the 
next  decade  and  if  it  applies  to  specific 
consumer goods categories. 

4)  The  report  should  better  demonstrate,  based 
on  clear  and  robust  evidence,  how  a 

 
 
mandatory “right to repair” will significantly 
change  a  consumer’s  current  preference  for 
replacement.  It  should  analyse  better  how 
economic  operators  such  as  sellers  and 
producers, including SMEs, will be impacted 
by the “right to repair”. It should clarify how 
realistic and robust the assumed take-up rates 
for  the  various  measures  and  estimated 
consumer  savings  are,  given 
the  stated 
reluctance of consumers to change behaviours 
in the near future. 

5)  The 

report 

should  provide  a  clearer 
assessment  and  comparison  of  the  impacts 
and of the costs and benefits of all options, by 
integrating essential cost benefit estimates of 
measures  currently  presented  only  in  the 

repair, rather than on life-style choices (new driver 
6). Respectively, the ‘obligation to repair ‘(PO6C 
and  PO6D),  as  well  as  all  Cluster  II  options, 
influence  consumer  behavior  by 
removing 
obstacles  that  deter  consumers  from  repair  where 
they are in principle open and interested in repair.  
Take-up rates under options PO6C and PO6D have 
been adapted to reflect the different scope of these 
options. The take-up rates are estimated based on 
robust  data  from  behavioural  experiments  (see 
Annex  4,  section  I  on  effectiveness,  explanations 
on data robustness).  
The draft impact assessment report acknowledges 
that  in  the  context  of  the  obligation  to  repair  (as 
with any measure), there is no certainty of achieved 
changes  in  consumer  preference,  as  the  repair 
decision  beyond  the  legal  guarantee  is  ultimately 
left to the consumer. Section 8 identifies the main 
delivery risks and explains how they are factored in 
and mitigated (section 8, main delivery risks) 
The  take-up  rates  for  all  policy  options  are 
estimated  based  on  conservative  assumptions, 
reflected  in  Annex  4.  Take-up  rates  for  some 
options  have  been  revised  downwards,  based  on  
conservative assumptions (options POs 1A and 1B 
and POs 6C and 6D). The details and robustness of 
these take-up rates are explained under section 6 on 
the  impacts  of  the  policy  options  (effectiveness) 
and in Annex 4 (section 1 on effectiveness).  
The report provides further information on effects 
of  the  obligation  to  repair  on  the  economic 
operators,  including  SMEs  (section  6  on  the 
impacts of the policy options (efficiency/economic 
impacts of PO6C and 6D)).  
The  estimated  consumer  savings  presented  in 
section  6  (assessment  of  impacts)  are  realistic,  as 
they are linked to the increase in repair as a result 
of  options 
remove  obstacles  deterring 
consumers from repair. The consumer savings for 
some options have been reassessed based on a new 
the 
methodology 
projected increased number of repaired goods that 
these options trigger.  
Section 6 (impacts of the options) now provides the 
essential 
the 
assessment  of  efficiency  of  each  policy  option. 
Section  7  presents  cost-benefit  tables  for  both 
clusters of options. 

linking  savings  directly 

estimates,  under 

cost/benefit 

that 

to 

79 

 
 
annex. It should better detail the methodology 
and  assumptions  behind  the  results  of  the 
multi-criteria  analysis  and  justify  the  used 
weights  of  criteria,  their  allocation  to  the 
effectiveness  and  efficiency  dimensions  and 
how  overlaps  will  be  avoided.  It  should  be 
clearer  how  the  multi-criteria  analysis  feeds 
into the comparison of the options and how it 
relates  to  the  results  of  the  cost  benefit 
analysis. 

coherence 

6)  As  the  report  is  not  clear  on  the  preferred 
option regarding obligations to repair (i.e. all 
product scope vs eco-design product scope), it 
should describe in more detail what the pros 
and cons and relative differences in terms of 
the 
benefits  and  costs  are  as  well  as 
and 
implementation, 
proportionality  of  the  two  options  to  allow 
fully informed decision making. It should also 
explain why both options have the same take-
up  rates  given  that  under  the  policy  option 
with the eco-design product scope it should be 
easier  (and  cheaper)  to  opt  for  repair  for 
consumers and business alike. It should also 
better justify why the obligation to repair all 
products for a reasonable price could feature 
in the preferred option despite being described 
as the most incoherent option. 

7)  The  report  should  describe  better  what  the 
main  delivery  risks  are  of  the  preferred 
option(s) to succeed in changing consumers’ 
behaviour  towards  repair.  It  should  better 
explain  the  costs  and  cost  savings  of  the 
preferred  option(s)  in  scope  of  the  One  In, 
One Out approach. 

The MCA methodology has been revised to avoid 
any  risk of duplication between effectiveness  and 
efficiency  criteria  by  moving  all  environmental 
impacts  under  effectiveness.  Furthermore,  the 
MCA criteria have been streamlined and monetized 
input values have been used as far as possible with 
the exception of two sub-criteria that could only be 
assessed  qualitatively.  The  IA  report  uses  now  a 
scenario  with  a  balanced  distribution  of  weights 
between  effectiveness,  efficiency  and  coherence 
(33%),  as  well  as  among  different  stakeholder 
groups. 
The  methodology  and  assumptions  behind  the 
multi-criteria  analysis,  how  it  feeds  into  the 
comparison of options, the used weights of criteria 
and their allocation to the effectiveness, efficiency 
and coherence dimensions are now better explained 
in  section  7  on  the  comparison  of  options  and  in 
Annex 4.  
Section 8 (preferred option) now clearly specifies 
the preferred option (obligation to repair goods that 
are subject  to  reparability  requirements under EU 
law,  PO6C).  The  pros  and  cons  of  this  and  other 
options  are  explained  in  section  6  (assessment  of 
impacts),  section  7  (comparison  of  options)  and  
section 8 (preferred option).  
The draft impact assessment now provides different 
specific calculations for the take-up rates of the two 
obligations  to  repair  (PO6C  and  PO6D),  taking 
better account of the types of products they cover. 
While the take-up rates of these options are similar, 
the small difference is now reflected in the take-up 
rate  and  all  respective  estimates  of  impacts.  An 
explanation  on  how  these  take-up  rates  were 
calculated is included in Annex 4.  

The  draft  impact  assessment  report  now  clearly 
indicates the delivery risks of the preferred policy 
options package (section 8, main delivery risks of 
the preferred options). Key risks are factored in all 
estimates  presented  in  section  6  (impacts  of 
options). The IA also explains how these risks are 
mitigated  by  the  choice  of  the  preferred  options 
package. 
The  costs  and  cost  savings  related  to  the  One  in, 
One Out approach are now described in the main 
the 
impact  assessment  report  (section  8  on 

80 

 
 
 
 RSB opinion of 24 January 2023 
RSB comments: Section C - What to improve  DG JUST replies 
(1) The report should be clearer on successful 
repair rates (i.e. a percentage of goods 
successfully fixed by repairers) under the 
dynamic baseline. It should better explain how 
those rates were calculated and how they were 
factored into the dynamic baseline. It should also 
be more explicit that they are based on the 
preliminary data. 

(2)  The  report  should  better  demonstrate  the 
extent to which the preferred option will change a 
consumer’s  preference  for  replacement  over 
repair  taking  into  account  different  consumer 
goods  categories  and  different  consumer  types. 
The  report  should  clarify  to  what  extent  the 
preferred  option  envisages  a  legally  enforceable 
“right to repair” and whether this right applies to 
all  consumer  good  categories  envisaged  by  the 
initiative equally. 

the 
(3)  The  report  should  further  explain 
methodological  approach  to  estimate  consumer 
savings. It should clearly present two approaches 
–  the  approach  based  on  avoided  purchases  of 
new  goods  as  well  as  the  approach  based  on 
increased repair rates. It should be clear on how 
those  methodologies  differ  in  assumptions  and 
underlying  indicators  for  the  estimates.  For  the 
latter,  the  report  should  better  explain  how  the 
results  for  a  sample  of  assessed  products  were 
extrapolated to all consumer durables including a 
clearer justification of the extrapolation factor. It 
should also provide more explanation on how the 
increased number of additionally repaired goods 
and increased repair rates as a result of the policy 
options are reflected in the modelling. 

preferred policy option, ‘One in, one out’ approach 
(OIOO)), in addition to Annex 3. 

An explanation on the approach to calculating the 
successful repair rates from a technical perspective 
is  included  in  Annex  4  (section  II,  economic 
impacts). This includes a table with a breakdown of 
historic  data  on  the  basis  of  which  the  successful 
repair  rate projection was made. An explanation is 
included  on  how  the  data  is  factored  into  the 
dynamic baseline, as well as a clarification that the 
available data was  based on a preliminary extract 
from the Sharepair project database. The data was 
preliminary,  because  the  project  was  not  yet 
finalised at the time of drafting the IA. 
The  IA  report  (section    8),  clarifies  that  the 
behavioural  change  is  driven  by  the  removal  of 
obstacles for consumers who are in principle open 
to repair, but hindered by obstacles that discourage 
them.  The  behavioural  change  is  particularly 
relevant for consumer types of reluctant replaced, 
reluctant  repairers  and  enthusiastic  repairers  and 
concerns  all  goods.  The  IA  report  (section  8) 
clarifies that the obligation to repair (PO6C) creates 
a legally enforceable right and is relevant for goods 
that are subject to reparability requirements under 
Union law, also referring to goods that are currently 
subject to such requirements. 
The methodological approach to consumer savings 
is explained in more detail in Annex 4 (section on 
effectiveness  and section on efficiency, economic 
impacts).  It  clarifies  that  two  different  indicators 
are  used  for  comparing  options  in  Clusters  I 
(number  of  avoided  purchases)  and  in  Cluster  II 
(number of additionally repaired products) and that 
these indicators are also used for the quantification 
of  the  consumer-decision-making  sub-criterion  in 
the MCA. It is further clarified that the assumptions 
used  for  the  approach  to  consumer  savings  were 
refined to take account of specificities between the 
clusters, to ensure consistency of the estimate with 
other estimates in the report (notably on the market 
failure) and to ensure a more accurate estimate of 
consumer savings for a period of 15 years. Further 
a  section  on  the  product  sample  used  and  the 
approach  to  extrapolation  of  the  results  for  the 
whole  economic  segment  of  consumer  goods  is 

81 

 
 
 
robust 

(4)  The  report  should  be  clearer  about  the 
robustness  of  the  estimates  and  the  underlying 
assumptions, in particular the assumptions behind 
the  behavioural  change 
towards  repair  by 
consumers.  It  should  explain  to  what  extent 
experts  have  verified  the  data  robustness  and 
representativeness.  The  report  should  explain 
how 
in  both 
the  estimates 
methodological approaches. The level of certainty 
in the analysis and conclusions should be clear. 
(5)  The 
the 
methodology and assumptions behind the results 
of the multi-criteria analysis. It should be clearer 
how  the  multi-criteria  analysis  feeds  into  the 
comparison  of  the  options.  It  should  ensure 
consistency  between  the  multi-criteria  scores 
reported in the main text and the annexes. 

report  should  better  explain 

are 

(6) The report should better explain to what extent 
the  preferred  option  –  implemented  through 
amending the current Sale of Goods Directive and 
adding a new self-standing Directive – is likely to 
lead  to  differences  in  consumer  rights  across 
Member States and if so, what the impact(s) will 
be.  The  report  should  describe  better  what  the 
delivery  risks  are  of  the  other  instruments  of 
delivery: self-regulation (code of conduct) and/or 
Commission standardisation mandate. 
(7) The report should expand on the monitoring 
and  evaluation  arrangements  needed  to  monitor 
the  actual  impacts  of  an  information  exchange 
platform as envisaged by the initiative. The report 
should  explain  better  to  what  extent  these  costs 
are  vectored  in  in  the  cost  benefits  calculations 
under  enforcement  costs  by  Member  States’ 
administrations. 

included  in  Annex  4  (section  on  efficiency,  
economic impacts). 
Annex  4  (section  on  effectiveness)  includes  a 
section  on  the  robustness  of  estimates  based  on 
findings  from  the  behavioural  experiments  and 
assumptions behind, including the level of certainty 
in  the  findings  and  expert  verifications.  It  further 
specifies the methodology used for the selection of 
the product sample of consumer goods, in order to 
ensure that the sample is robust and representative 
and  captures  key  consumer  considerations  for 
repair.  
Annex 4 (section IV) includes a clarification on the 
assumptions behind the MCA analysis and how the 
sub-criteria  were  selected.  It  also  clarifies  the 
relationship  between  CBA  and  MCA.  Annex  4 
(section  IV)  also  includes  the  ‘selected  scenario’ 
for the MCA results that are presented in the main 
IA report (table on weight scenarios for sensitivity 
analysis and MCA results for sensitivity analysis).   
The  IA  report  (section  8)  explains  the  full 
harmonisation  nature  of  the  preferred  options 
package and how it will ensure and that the rights 
of  consumers  will  be  similarly  guaranteed  across 
the  internal  market.  It  also  specifies  the  main 
delivery  risks  for  the  option  of  an  EU  repair 
standard  in  view  of  its  voluntary  nature  and 
clarifies how these risks are mitigated. 

and 

range  of  monitoring 

The 
evaluation 
arrangements of the repair platform option (PO5B) 
in the IA report (section 9) has been expanded to 
ensure that the monitoring arrangements cover all 
key  aspects  of  the  platform,  notably,  also  its 
refurbishment  features.  The  IA  report  (section  6, 
efficiency  of  PO5B  and  PO5C)  explains  how  the 
costs  for  the  creation  of  these  repair  platform 
options are factored into the estimates of the public 
administration costs (‘namely as enforcement and 
implementation costs’), which are also reflected in 
the CBA and MCA.  

EVIDENCE, SOURCES AND QUALITY 

In view of preparing this IA, the Commission contracted a study to provide economic analysis and 
behavioral analysis. 

82 

 
 
 
 
The specific details of all these studies, their scope and methodology are described in Annex 4. 

The Impact Assessment was further based on the results of the public consultation, the 
feedback provided by stakeholders on the call for evidence, a survey with citizens (over 
8,000) done in the context of the behavioral economics study and numerous bilateral 
meetings with stakeholders and a workshop with MS. Annex 2 provides more details about 
these sources. 

83 

 
 
 
 
Annex 2: Stakeholder consultation 

A. Outline of the consultation strategy/process 

The  Commission  has  organised  both  public  and  targeted  consultations.  In  particular,  the 
following stakeholder categories were addressed by the consultation strategy: 

  Citizens; 
  Consumers and consumer organisations at EU and national level; 
  Businesses  comprising  large  companies  and  SMEs,  namely  producers,  retailers  and 

repair service providers; 

  Business  associations  representing  producers,  retailers,  and  the  repair  sector  at  EU, 

national and sectoral level; 

  Environmental  organisations  and  other  non-governmental  organisations  (e.g. 

representing social interests); 

  Academic experts and research bodies; 
  National authorities. 

Main consultation activities were: 

  A Call for evidence for a period of 12 weeks which resulted in 325 contributions; 
  An Open Public Consultation (OPC) for a period of 12 weeks which resulted in 331 

contributions; 

  A discussion and a targeted survey in the context of the European Consumer Summit 

2022; 

  Consumer  and  business  surveys,  behavioural  experiments  and  targeted  interviews 

carried out in the framework of a supporting study; 

  Targeted bilateral meetings with stakeholders;  
  A workshop with representatives of MS. 

B. Open Public consultation on Sustainable consumption of goods – promoting repair and 
reuse 

1.  Introduction  
The OPC was accessible between 11 January 2022 and 5 April 2022. It yielded a relatively 
high  response  rate,  331  replies,  out  of  which  166  were  EU  citizens.  A  large  number  of 
companies/business organisations (54) and business associations (51)183, representing a wide 
variety  of  interests  and  company  sizes,  contributed  to  the  consultation.  A  number  of 
associations  representing  environmental  interests  (8)  and  consumer  interests  (10)  at  EU  or 
national/regional  level,  also  contributed.  The  consultation  included  also  input  from  public 
authorities  (11,  both  national  and  regional),  NGOs  (13),  as  well  as  academic/research 
institutions (3) and trade unions (2). 

183  The  OPC  comprised  both  ‘companies/business  organisations’  and  ‘business  associations’  as  stakeholder 
category  options  open  to  respondents.  Hereinafter  these  categories  together  will  be  referred  to  as  ‘business 
stakeholders’. 

84 

 
 
 
                                                 
Respondents by stakeholder category
Academic/research 
institution; 1%

Non-EU citizen; 2%
Other; 2%

Environmental 
organisation; 3%

Trade union; 1%

NGO; 4%

Public authority; 3%

Consumer organisation; 
3%

Business association; 
15%

Company/Business 
organisation; 16%

EU Citizen; 50%

In terms of geographical representation, the consultation included contributions from 19 MS, 
as  well  as  from  third  countries.  The  geographical  coverage,  however,  was  broader  because 
some  associations  indicating  certain  countries  as  their  places  of  origin  also  represented 
stakeholders  from  other  MS  not  directly  mentioned  in  the  responses.  The  majority  of 
contributions came from Germany (95), followed by Belgium (53) and France (40). 91 position 
papers were also submitted in the OPC. 

2.  Summary of key results 

2.1. Problems and problem drivers 
The problem of the decrease in the time during which most consumer goods are used was 
confirmed by 70% of all respondents (233 out of 331). An especially high number of consumer 
organisations,  environmental  organisations  and  NGOs  (93.5%  -  29  out  of  31),  EU  citizens 
(87% - 149 out of 172) and public authorities (82% - 9 out of 11) were of this opinion, while 
only 37% of business stakeholders (39 out of 105) considered that the decrease exists. 

The  results  of  the  OPC  confirm  the  existence  of  the  problem  drivers  explained  in  this  IA. 
Concerning the causes of the decreased lifespan of consumer goods, the OPC confirmed as 
major causes among all stakeholder categories the difficulty for consumers to repair products 
themselves (54% - 179 out of 331), inconvenience or non-availability of repair services for 
consumers (50% - 166 out of 331) and expensive repair services for consumers (47% - 157 out 
of 331). In their responses, EU citizens agreed that these are the three major causes for the 
decreased  lifetime  of  products.  The  majority  of  the  responding  consumer  organisations 
considered the main causes of the decreased lifespan of consumer goods to be expensive repair 
services  for  consumers  and  the  inconvenience  or  non-availability  of  repair  services  for 
consumers  (both  at  70%  -  7  out  of  10).  Consumer  organisations  also  agreed  that  another 
important cause for the decreased lifespan of consumer goods is that consumers replace goods 
in view of the latest fashion, technological developments or new features (60% - 6 out of 10). 

85 

 
 
 
 
Half of the consumer organisations considered as a minor cause that for defective goods under 
the legal guarantee, sellers reject repair and only offer replacement (50% - 5 out of 10). The 
responding business stakeholders considered as the most important cause of the decreased 
lifespan  of  consumer  goods  that  consumers  replace  goods  in  view  of  the  latest  fashion, 
technological developments or new features (29% - 30 out of 105) (Unfortunately, 63% - 66 
out  of  105  business  stakeholders  did  not  provide  an  answer  on  this  question).  Public 
authorities considered the high price of repair services for consumer goods to be the major 
cause of the decreased lifespan of consumer goods, with 82 % agreeing with this statement (9 
out of 11 respondents). 

2.2. Objectives and possible policy interventions 
Objectives  

The OPC listed the following as the objectives of the initiative: providing incentives to repair 
products instead of replacing them in the case of defects that are covered by the legal guarantee, 
providing incentives to repair products instead of buying new ones in the case of defects not 
covered  by  the  legal  guarantee,  and  providing  incentives  to  buy  and  use  second-hand  and 
refurbished goods. 

Objectives to be pursued in order to promote sustainable 
consumption - overall responses

Provide incentives to repair products instead of buying
new ones in the case of defects that are not covered by
the legal guarantee

Provide incentives to buy and use refurbished goods

Provide incentives to repair products instead of replacing
them in the case of defects that are covered by the legal
guarantee

177

98

8
10

38

159

158

112

2
6

52

104

16

6

47

Provide incentives to buy and use second-hand goods

134

105

3
13

76

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Strongly agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

Neutral

A  very  large  majority  of  all  respondents  (83%  -  275  out  of  331)  agreed  that  providing 
incentives to  repair products  instead of buying new ones in  the case of defects that are not 
covered by the legal guarantee (e.g., when the legal guarantee period has expired, or the defect 
did not exist at the time of delivery) is an objective to be pursued in order to promote sustainable 
consumption.  Such  an  objective  should  be  achieved  at  EU  level  according  to  69%  of  all 
respondents (229 out of 331). An equal majority of all stakeholders (82% - 271 out of 331) 
also agreed that providing incentives to buy and use refurbished goods (i.e. second-hand goods 
that have been tested and, if necessary, repaired before they are sold) is an important objective 
for promoting sustainable consumption. Almost as many of all stakeholders (79% - 262 out 

86 

 
 
 
of 331) agreed that the objective of providing incentives to repair products instead of replacing 
them in the case of defects that are covered by the legal guarantee should be pursued. Three 
out of four of all respondents (74% - 246 out of 331) indicated the EU as the appropriate level 
for action. Almost as many of all respondents (71% - 239 out of 331) agreed that there should 
be  an  objective  to  provide  incentives  to  buy  and  use  second-hand  goods.  A  majority  of  all 
respondents  also  considered  that  the  objectives  of  incentivising  the  purchase  and  use  of 
refurbished and second hand goods are best achieved at EU level (65% - 215 out of 331 for 
refurbished goods and 56% - 184 out of 331 for second-hand goods). 

Objectives - Need for EU action - Overall responses

Provide incentives to repair products instead of
replacing them in the case of defects that are covered
by the legal guarantee

Provide incentives to repair products instead of
buying new ones in the case of defects that are not
covered by the legal guarantee

EU; 246

41

23

21

EU; 229

53

22

27

Provide incentives to buy and use refurbished goods

EU; 215

73

24

19

Provide incentives to buy and use second-hand goods

EU; 184

84

37

26

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

EU

National

No opinion

Not applicable

Policy options 

Policy option 1: Prioritising repair within the remedies system of the SGD 

87 

 
 
 
 
Repair as the primary remedy - overall responses

Rather ineffective; 
29; 9%

Very ineffective; 14; 
4%

Neutral; 41; 12%

Rather effective; 98; 
30%

Very effective; 149; 
45%

Very effective

Rather effective

Neutral

Rather ineffective

Very ineffective

The OPC confirmed that the option considered most effective among all stakeholder categories 
in extending the use period of goods, once purchased, was repair as the primary remedy. 
75% of all respondents (247 out of 331) considered this measure either very effective or rather 
effective  (45%  -  149  out  of  331  very  effective  and  30%  -  98  out  of  331  rather  effective). 
Environmental organisations and trade unions unanimously agreed on the effectiveness 
of  the  measure  (100%  very  effective).  In  addition,  NGOs  and  academic/research 
stakeholders agreed that repair as the primary remedy would be an effective measure (93.5% 
- 15 out of 16). It is notable that a very large majority of responding EU citizens also found 
this measure to be effective (80% - 138 out of 172). Two out of three business stakeholders 
agreed that this measure would be effective (65% - 69 out of 105), while only 16% (17 out of 
105) found it ineffective. Among responding public authorities, a slight majority agreed on 
the effectiveness of the measure (54% - 6 out of 11), while 27% (3 out of 11) found it to be 
rather ineffective. The only stakeholder group where a majority (70% - 7 out of 10) found this 
measure to be ineffective (50% very ineffective and 20% rather ineffective) were responding 
consumer organisations. 

88 

 
 
 
Proportionality test - overall responses

Very ineffective; 14; 
4%

Rather ineffective; 
58; 18%

Neutral; 79; 24%

Rather effective; 114; 
34%

Very effective; 66; 
20%

Rather effective

Very effective

Neutral

Rather ineffective

Very ineffective

The measure which determined repair as the consumer’s remedy when the repair cost is 
less than or equal to the replacement cost did not receive a similarly large support among 
stakeholders. Still, it was considered effective in extending the use of goods by a slight majority 
of all responding stakeholders (54% - 180 out of 331), while 21% of all respondents (72 out of 
331) found it ineffective. Views were nuanced among different stakeholder groups. 60% of EU 
citizens (104 out of 172) found the measure effective. 54% (6 out of 11) of responding public 
authorities also considered the measure effective. Half of responding business stakeholders 
also agreed with the effectiveness of the measure (50.4% - 53 out of 105), while only 18% (19 
out  of  105)  found  it  ineffective  and  31%  (33  out  of  105)  were  neutral  about  the  measure. 
However, only 30% of consumer organisations (3 out of 10) considered it effective, while 
70%  (7  out  of  10)  found  the  measure  to  be  very  or  rather  ineffective.  Similarly,  75%  of 
responding  environmental  organisations  (6  out  of  8)  considered  the  measure  rather 
ineffective, while only 25 % (2 out of 8) considered it rather effective. 

Policy option 2: Re-starting and extending the liability period within the SGD 

The  measures  of  re-starting  the  liability  period  after  repair  and  extending  the  liability 
period  showed  similar  trends  in  the  responses.  For  both  measures,  the  views  among 
stakeholder categories diverged, with clear majorities of responding consumer organisations, 
environmental organisations, NGOs and citizens agreeing on the effectiveness of the measures 
in  extending  the  use  of  purchased  goods,  while  half  of  the  business  respondents  were 
considering the measures ineffective. Public authorities largely agreed on the effectiveness of 
both measures with similar numbers (91%, 10 out of 11). 

89 

 
 
 
Re-starting the legal guarantee period after repair -
overall responses

Neutral; 42; 13%

Rather ineffective; 
25; 7%

Very ineffective; 46; 
14%

Very effective; 122; 
37%

Rather effective; 96; 
29%

Very effective

Rather effective

Very ineffective

Rather ineffective

Neutral

The overall responses showed that re-starting the legal guarantee period after repair was 
considered an effective measure in extending the use period of purchased goods, ranking the 
measure the second highest – after repair as the primary remedy - of all proposed measures 
(66%  -  218  out  of  331  effective  and  21%  -  71  out  of  331  ineffective).  All  responding 
environmental organisations (100 % (62% - 5 out of 8 indicating it rather effective) and 85% 
(146  out  of  172)  of  responding  EU  citizens  considered  the  measure  effective.  Among 
consumer organisations, the measure was considered effective by 80% (8 out of 10) of the 
respondents (40% (4 out of 10) of those indicating it very effective). On the contrary, among 
responding business stakeholders, only 25% (26 out of 105) considered the measure effective, 
while the biggest share of business respondents (50%, 53 out of 105) considered it ineffective.  

Extending the legal guarantee period - overall responses

Rather ineffective; 
23; 7%

Very ineffective; 46; 
14%

Neutral; 49; 15%

Very effective; 134; 
40%

Rather effective; 79; 
24%

Very effective

Rather effective

Neutral

Very ineffective

Rather ineffective

90 

 
 
 
 
The measure of providing a longer legal guarantee period was found effective in extending 
the period of use for purchased goods by 64% of all respondents (134 out of 331) and 21% (69 
out of 331) finding it ineffective. The strongest response came from responding EU citizens, 
84%  of  whom  (144  out  of  172)  found  the  measure  effective.  Likewise,  the  responding 
consumer organisations strongly agreed with the effectiveness of the measure (80% - 8 out 
of 10, with 70% very effective). Half of the responding environmental organisations (50% - 
4 out of 8) also considered the measure effective. By contrast, business stakeholders did not 
find the measure as effective in extending the use period of purchased goods, with only 29% 
(30  out  of  105)  agreeing  to  its  effectiveness,  while  half  of  them  (50%  -  52  out  of  105) 
considered it ineffective.  

Policy option 3: Promoting second-hand and refurbished goods within the SGD  

The measure of aligning the legal guarantee period of new and refurbished goods was also 
found effective in extending the use of goods purchased by consumers among all stakeholders, 
with  62%  (206  out  of  331)  of  responding  stakeholders  agreeing  on  its  effectiveness.  By 
contrast, respondents did not provide similar answers for offering the same liability period 
for new and second-hand goods, as less than half of all respondents (47% - 155 out of 331) 
considered the measure effective and a third of respondents agreed that such a measure would 
be ineffective (99 out of 331). 

Aligning the the legal guarantee period for new and 
refurbished goods 

Neutral; 62; 19%

Rather ineffective; 
37; 11%

Rather effective; 110; 
33%

Very effective; 96; 
29%

Very ineffective; 
26; 8%

Very effective

Very ineffective

Rather effective

Rather ineffective

Neutral

On providing the same legal guarantee period for new and refurbished goods, EU citizens 
strongly  agreed  on  the  effectiveness  of  the  measure  (79%  -  136  out  of  172).  Similarly, 
responding public authorities, 72% (8 out of 11) found the measure effective. Also responding 
consumer  organisations  (70%  -  7  out  of  10)  found  the  measure  effective.  By  contrast, 
business  stakeholders  were  equally  split:  38%  (40  out  of  105)  considered  the  measure 
effective, while the same share (38% - 40 out of 105) found the measure ineffective. Similarly, 
only  37%  (9  out  of  24)  of  environmental  organisations,  NGOs  and  academic/research 
institutions agreed on the measure’s effectiveness, while 58.3% (14 out of 24) were neutral.  

91 

 
 
 
The  measure  on  aligning  the  liability  periods  of  new  and  second-hand  goods  was  not 
similarly  found  as  effective  as  the  measure  on  aligning  the  liability  periods  of  new  and 
refurbished  goods  by  all  respondents.  A  majority  of  responding  EU  citizens  agreed  on  the 
effectiveness of (62% - 107 out of 172) this measure. Similarly, 60% of responding consumer 
organisations (6 out of 10) considered the measure effective in extending the use of period of 
goods, once purchased. On the other hand, only a quarter of business stakeholders found the 
measure effective (26%, 27 out of 105). Similarly, only a quarter of responding environmental 
organisations,  NGOs  and  academic/research  institutions  (25%  -  6  out  of  24)  found  the 
measure effective, while 46% (11 out of 24) found it ineffective.  

Replacement of defective products with refurbished goods

Very ineffective; 25; 
7%

Rather ineffective; 
47; 14%

Rather effective; 92; 
28%

Neutral; 89; 27%

Very effective; 78; 
24%

Rather effective

Very effective

Neutral

Rather ineffective

Very ineffective

Concerning the measure of replacing defective products with refurbished goods, half of all 
respondents agreed on the effectiveness of such a measure (51%  - 170 out of 331), while a 
quarter  of  all  of  the  respondents  (22%  -  72  out  of  331)  found  it  ineffective.  The  largest 
agreement on the effectiveness of the measure in extending the use of purchased goods came 
from environmental organisations and NGOs of whom three out of four found the measure 
effective (76% - 16 out of 21). EU citizens had a more split view, with a slight majority finding 
the  measure  effective  (53.4%  -  92  out  of  172).  Half  of  responding  business  stakeholders 
considered the measure effective (48.4% - 51 out of 105), while a quarter (25% - 26 out of 105) 
considered  it  ineffective.  Among  responding  public  authorities,  45%  (5  out  of  11)  were 
neutral about the measure. However, the majority of consumer organisations disagreed with 
the effectiveness of the measure (60% - 6 out of 10), while only 10% (1 out of 10) found it 
effective.  

92 

 
 
 
Other  options:  Measures  promoting  repair  outside  the  scope  of  the  SGD  (right  to 
repair)184 

On the measure of encouraging businesses to voluntarily commit to repairing goods and 
promoting second-hand/refurbished goods, half of overall respondents (52.5% - 174 out of 
331) agreed on the effectiveness of such a solution in extending the use period of purchased 
goods,  while  28%  (94  out  of  331)  found  the  measure  ineffective.  Among  business 
stakeholders there was a slight majority considering this measure effective (52.5% - 55 out of 
105). The majority of responding environmental organisations (75% - 6 out of 8) found the 
measure  ineffective.  Half  of  responding  consumer  organisations  (50%  -  5  out  of  10)  also 
found this measure ineffective. The views of  public authority respondents were more split 
among neutral (36% - 4 out of 11) and ineffective (45% - 5 out of 11).  

On the consultation section of a possible right to repair, the first question addressed which 
product  categories  should  be  covered  by  the  right  to  repair.  Categories  addressed  where 
electronics,  large  household  appliances,  all  consumer  products  categories,  vehicles,  small 
household  appliances,  furniture,  textiles  and  other.  Approximately  half  of  all  respondents 
(54.3% - 180 out of 331) agreed that a possible new right should apply to all consumer product 
categories. 44% of all respondents (146 out of 331) agreed that electronics should be included 
and 42% (139 out of 331) agreed on including large household appliances. Small household 
appliances gathered some support from all respondents to be covered (38.6% - 128 out of 331). 
On the opposite end, only 17% of all respondents (56 out of 331) agreed that a possible new 
right to repair should apply to textiles. 

All responding environmental organisations agreed that a possible new right to repair should 
cover all consumer product categories. A majority of responding EU citizens agreed that all 
consumer product categories should be included (68.6% - 118 out of 172). Among responding 
consumer organisations, more than half agreed that a new right to repair should apply to all 
consumer product categories (60% - 6 out of 10), electronics, large household appliances and 
small household appliances (60% - 6 out of 10). Business stakeholders had a different view. 
Half  of  business  respondents  agreed  that  a  new  right  to  repair  should  apply  to  product 
categories other than those mentioned in the consultation and 28.5% (30 out of 105) agreed 
that electronics should be included. Only 24% of business stakeholders (25 out of 105) agreed 
that a possible new right to repair should apply to all consumer product categories. 

184 The OPC, launched at an early stage of the process preparing for the initiative, did not include questions on 
all policy options considered in this IA.  

93 

 
 
                                                 
Situations in which a new right to repair should apply -
Overall respondents (331)

Where defects are only the result of wear and tear

Where defects occur after the legal guarantee expires

Where defects are caused by the consumer before the
end of the legal guarantee

Other

193

174

107

97

In which situations should a new right to repair apply - Overall respondents (331)

0

50

100

150

200

250

The consultation addressed in which situations a possible new right to repair should apply, 
listing following options as answer categories: where defects are not caused by the consumer 
but are the result of wear and tear, where defects occur after the legal guarantee expires, where 
defects are caused by the consumer before the end of the legal guarantee, and other situations. 
A slight majority of all respondents agreed that a possible new right to repair should apply 
where defects are not caused by the consumer but are the result of wear and tear (58.3% - 193 
out of 331). Half of all respondents (52% - 174 out of 331) found that it should also  apply 
where defects occur after the legal guarantee expires. Approximately a third of all respondents 
agreed  that  it  should  apply  where  the  consumer  causes  defects  before  the  end  of  the  legal 
guarantee (32% - 107 out of 331).  

All responding consumer organisations agreed that a possible new right to repair should apply 
where  defects  occur  after  the  legal  guarantee  expires.  There  was  also  strong  support  from 
consumer organisations  for the  right  to  repair to apply  where defects  are not  caused by the 
consumer but are the result of wear and tear (90% - 9 out of 10) or where defects are caused by 
the consumer before the end of the legal guarantee (80% - 8 out of 10). Contrastingly, 52% of 
responding business stakeholders (55 out of 105) considered that a new right to repair should 
apply to  other situations, while only 40%  (42 out of 105)  found that it should  apply  where 
defects are not caused by the consumer but are the result of wear and tear.  

Another aspect of a possible new right to repair concerned the period of time during which 
consumers could claim repair of goods. As regards the duration of this period, 61% of all 
respondents (201 out of 331) agreed that the duration should depend on the type of product. 
A slight majority (52.5% - 174 out of 331) also agreed that a minimum duration should be set 
by  law  and  longer  periods  should  be  a  competing  factor  on  the  market.  Only  17%  of 
respondents (57 out of 331) found that the duration should differ based on the cause of the 
defect and only a tenth of respondents (9.3% - 31 out of 331) agreed that the duration should 
be the same fixed period for all consumer goods.  

94 

 
 
 
The responses of business stakeholders followed a similar trend. The most preferred options 
by  consumer  organisations,  environmental  organisations  and  EU  citizens  were  also  the 
first two options mentioned above, i.e. that the duration should depend on the type of product 
as well as a minimum duration should be set by law and longer periods should be a competing 
factor on the market. 

Repair options preferred by all respondents

Repair by the manufacturer

66

61

73

131

Repair by an independent repairer

25

108

137

61

Repair by the seller

79

114

88

50

Self-repair by the consumer

161

48

33

89

0%

10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Least preferred (1)

Rather preferred (2)

Preferred (3)

Most preferred (4)

Another question addressed the repair options preferred by respondents. The most preferred 
option among all stakeholders was repair by the manufacturer (39.5% - 131 out of 331 most 
preferred), while self-repair by the consumer only gathered 27% (89 out of 331) support as the 
most  preferred  option.  Repair  by  independent  repairers  also  gathered  support  from  all 
respondents (19% - 61 out of 331 most preferred). Self-repair by the consumer was considered 
as the least preferred option by the biggest share of respondents (49% - 161 out of 331 least 
preferred).  The  most  preferred  option  by  consumer  organisations  was  also  repair  by  the 
manufacturer (80% - 8 out of 10). Most business stakeholders agreed that the most preferred 
option should be repair by the manufacturer (52.3% - 55 out of 105) and the least preferred 
option by business respondents was self-repair by the consumer (64.7% - 68 out of 105).  

95 

 
 
 
Possible obligation to repair - who should be obliged to 
repair the products? - Overall responses

Repair service of the 
seller; 29; 9%

Repair service of the 
manufacturer; 121; 
36%

Both the 
manufacturer and 
the seller; 181; 55%

When  asked  on  whom  an  obligation  to  repair  should  be  imposed,  a  majority  of  all 
respondents  agreed  that  both  the  manufacturer  and  the  seller  should  be  obliged  to  repair 
products (54.7% - 181 out of 331). More than a third of all respondents (37 % - 121 out of 331) 
instead  considered  that  the  repairs  should  be  done  by  the  manufacturer.  A  majority  of 
consumer  organisations,  environmental  organisations  and  NGOs  agreed  that  both  the 
manufacturer  and  the  seller  should  be  liable  for  the  repair  (77.4%  -  24  out  of  31).  Half  of 
responding business stakeholders (50.5% - 53 out of 105) agreed that both the manufacturer 
and the seller should be obliged to repair products.  

The OPC also addressed the reasonable price of repair for consumers under a possible new 
right to repair. Almost a third of all respondents (32% - 106 out of 331) agreed that the price 
of repair should cover the cost of repair and include a reasonable margin of profit. Slightly less 
(30% - 99 out of 331) supported the idea that the price of repair should cover only the costs of 
the repair (e.g. labour costs, cost of spare parts). A majority of business stakeholders (62% - 
65  out  of  105)  agreed  that  the  price  of  repair  should  cover  the  cost  of  repair  and  include  a 
reasonable margin of profit. On the other hand, almost a quarter of consumer organisations, 
environmental organisations and NGOs (22.6% - 7 out of 31) agreed that that the price of 
repair should cover only the costs of the repair, e.g. labour costs or cost of spare parts while 
only 6.5% (2 out of 31) agreed with the profit margin being covered).  

C. Other consultation activities 

Beside  a consumer survey  and a business  survey  run in  the context  of the supporting study  and 
targeted bilateral  meetings with  stakeholders, the Commission  published a  call for evidence and 
organised a workshop with MS. 

1.  Feedback on the published call for evidence for an impact assessment 
In total 325 stakeholders submitted feedback on the call for evidence during the feedback period 
between  11  January  2022  and  5  April  2022.  The  majority  of  responding  stakeholders  were  EU 
citizens  (64%  -  209  out  of  325).  Business  stakeholders  were  also  largely  represented  (71 
respondents). Several public authorities, NGOs and environmental organisations, as well as some 
academic  institutions  and  trade  unions  submitted  feedback.  One  consumer  organisation  also 

96 

 
 
 
participated. Most of the respondents to the call for evidence also provided their contributions in 
the OPC. 

Stakeholders  from  different  categories  (business  organisations/associations,  companies,  NGOs) 
supported the option of making repair the primary remedy. However, it was noted that repair is not 
always possible or may be too expensive. In this regard, stakeholders also supported the option of 
promoting repair where it is cheaper or at the same cost as replacement.  

Some  business  stakeholders  did  not  support  extending  the  liability  period  as  this  would  create 
additional costs for businesses, which would in turn lead to increased costs for products. It would 
also mean additional burdens, such as logistical burdens (spare parts storage etc.). Consequently, 
manufacturers and retailers would need to make allowances for a much higher volume of returns 
and requests for repair or replacement. One business organisation supported extending the liability 
period, allowing the seller to replace defective products within that period with refurbished goods 
instead of new goods.  

The  option  of  voluntary  commitments  found  support  among  a  majority  of  stakeholders.  It  was 
considered as a low intervention measure, still having the potential to facilitate circular economy 
and sustainability. Business stakeholders also mentioned that they often include into their business 
models and production lines practices that have low impact on the environment. However, there 
were  also  stakeholders  who  considered  voluntary  commitments  insufficient  in  achieving  the 
objective of a genuine right to repair and sustainable consumption of goods. 

With regards to the option on the ‘right to repair’, business stakeholders underlined that granting 
repair  for  free  beyond  the  legal  guarantee  and  for  cases  of  wear  and  tear  and/or  mishandling  of 
products does not incentivise good care and maintenance practices by consumers and takes away 
space for repairers to operate. It also risks a rise in product prices in general, if the repair costs are 
added equally to all consumers, independently of how they treat and maintain their own products. 
Many stakeholders, in particular from the business sector, highlighted that a repair necessary for a 
defect  falling  outside  the  non-conformity  legal  guarantee  should  not  be  for  free.  This  should 
encourage consumers to  properly use the products they have purchased. Concerning the right to 
repair for a ‘reasonable price’, a majority of stakeholders highlighted that a proper definition of the 
measure would be needed before it could be applied in practice, especially for the ‘reasonable price’ 
requirement.  

There  was  wide  support  for  the  option  of  allowing  the  replacement  of  defective  products  with 
refurbished goods instead of new goods. Stakeholders, especially business respondents, underlined 
that  especially  in  situations  where  the  product  is  replaced  after  a  long  period  of  use,  it  is 
unreasonable to demand the seller to provide a completely new product. However, it was mentioned 
that replacement with refurbished goods should not be mandatory and should be applicable on a 
case-by-case basis. 

2.  Workshop with Member States 
In the workshop with MS on 7 April 2022, some MS did not express their clear positions yet, 
while others conveyed only their preliminary observations.  

Need for EU action  

A majority of MS did not yet have a position on the need for EU action. Many MS however 
shared the view that it is important to address the negative impacts on the environment caused 

97 

 
 
by excessive consumption and that consumers might have a role to play in this context. A few 
MS (4 out of 20 MS who took the floor) expressed concerns about the timing of the initiative, 
as the SGD has just recently been transposed and started to apply in MS.  

Prioritising repair within the remedies system of the SGD  

One cluster of measures discussed concerned prioritising repair within the remedies system 
of the SGD. As some of the MS supported both variants, a slight majority of 11 MS (out of 20 
which took the floor) showed support for prioritising repair within the remedies system of the 
SGD. 8 MS (out of 20 which took the floor) did not have a position yet. Only 1 MS (out of 20 
which took the floor) was reluctant to support either of the two variants.  

Among the MS supporting prioritising repair, 6 MS supported the variant of simply making 
repair the primary remedy without giving a choice. Among those MS, a few mentioned that 
there should be certain safeguards introduced in favour of the consumer. 7 MS (7 out of 20) 
supported the other variant discussed, i.e. repair as the consumer’s remedy when the repair 
cost  is  less  than  or  equal  to  the  replacement  cost.  Two  MS  (out  of  20)  expressed  their 
concerns  about  such  measure,  noting  that  there  should  be  clear  criteria  in  order  to  avoid 
fragmentation when applying such a test. Some MS also pointed out that the proportionality 
test might be problematic in practice, as the seller does not have similar knowledge about the 
repair costs as the manufacturer.  

Several of the MS without a position mentioned that possible changes should not reduce the 
rights of the consumers.  

The measures prioritising repair within the remedies system of the SGD were generally more 
supported than measures providing other kind of incentives to consumers to choose repair (such 
as an extension of the liability period after repair, see below).  

Extending the liability period within the SGD 

Another cluster of measures concerned promoting repair by providing incentives to consumers. 
One of the measures discussed was an extension of the liability period of the good if repair 
is chosen as the remedy for a lack of conformity. A limited number of MS (3 out of 19 MS 
who  took  the  floor)  were  supportive  towards  this  measure.  One  of  these  MS  has  already 
introduced partly similar measures in its national legislation. Several MS (6 out of 19) were 
against or doubtful about this measure. One of these MS opposed the extension of the liability 
period for the goods as such, but expressed that the extension should be limited to the defect in 
question.  One  of  the  opposing  MS  expressed  concerns  that  an  extension  would  be  too 
burdensome for those MS who have already used the possibility provided in the SGD to extend 
the liability period over 2 years.  

Several MS (5 out of 19) mentioned that their position  will depend on the conditions under 
which this extension will be done. These MS were particularly concerned about price increases 
after any extension of the legal guarantee period, and they were doubtful that consumers would 
actually make their decisions on remedies based on the lengths of the liability periods. One MS 
did not have a position yet.  

Promoting second-hand and refurbished goods within the SGD 

98 

 
 
The  first  measure  discussed  was  about  allowing  sellers  to  use  refurbished  goods  as 
replacements when available. A few MS (3 out of 20 which took the floor) were supportive 
of this option. In addition, 6 MS (out of 20) showed some support for this option, however with 
reservations,  such  as  that  this  option  should  be  considered  only  if  the  replacement  with 
refurbished goods is approved by the consumer and that certain safeguards should be put in 
place (such as to prevent the use of refurbished goods with defects which may not be obvious). 
3 MS were reluctant towards the measure; 8 MS did not have a position yet.   

The MS also discussed the option of aligning the liability period of second-hand goods to 
that of new goods (the workshop questions did not distinguish between refurbished goods and 
second-hand  goods).  Several  MS  (5  out  of  19  who  took  the  floor)  were  supportive  for  this 
option. Three of these supporting MS do not differentiate between new and second-hand goods 
in their national legislation. 9 MS (out of 19) did not support such alignment. 4 of these MS 
were not supportive because their national legislations currently allow sellers to agree with the 
buyer on a liability period shorter than 2  years. These MS argued that aligning the liability 
periods could possibly have a discouraging effect on the sellers’ interest to market second-hand 
goods. 5 MS (out of 19) did not have a position yet.  

Other options: Measures promoting repair outside the scope of the SGD (right to repair) 

Measures imposing an obligation on the producer/seller to repair for a reasonable cost outside 
the scope of the SGD or an obligation on the producer/seller/repairer to issue a quote for repair 
outside the scope of the SGD were discussed.  

A majority of MS (10 out of 16 who took the floor) did not support imposing any obligations 
to repair. Some of them argued that an obligation would be an excessive burden and would 
likely increase costs of the goods.  

Only one MS (out of 16) fully supported this measure, as this MS has already introduced an 
obligation on the producer to provide technical service and spare parts during 10 years from 
manufacturing the product in its national legislation. In addition, one MS (out of 16) showed 
some  support,  but  also  pointed  out  that  repair  costs  should  not  be  increased  due  to  this 
obligation and that the producer has the responsibility of repair, not the seller.  

4 MS (out of 16) did not express their positions on this measure.  

On the measure on imposing an obligation to issue a quote for repair outside the scope of the 
SGD,  a  majority  of  MS  (12  out  of  16  who  took  the  floor)  did  not  have  a  position.  2  MS 
supported such a measure while 2 MS showed reluctance to support such a measure.  

99 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 3: Who is affected and how? 

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE INITIATIVE 

Consumers  would  be  positively  affected  by  the  initiative.  In  particular,  the  preferred  policy  option 
covering the period beyond the legal guarantee will bring availability and transparency of repair services 
as  well  as  enhance  consumer  confidence  and  trust  in  the  quality  of  repair  services,  consequently 
facilitating consumers’ possibilities to repair their defective products. The preferred policy option will 
also increase consumer awareness of options to purchase refurbished goods. The options proposed will 
help to achieve consumer savings as a result of prolonging the useful life of goods once purchased.  

The preferred option on the realm of the legal guarantee period will not have a direct positive impact on 
consumers’ decision-making process. This is because there will not be additional possibilities provided 
for consumers; the choice between repair and replacement will be limited in some cases compared to 
the existing situation under the legal guarantee. However, in the longer term, the option envisioned is 
likely to make repair more accepted by consumers, as they will become better aware and used to repair 
practices in the context of the legal guarantee.  

Overall,  consumers  will  benefit  from  the  preferred  policy  option.  Consumer  welfare  will  increase 
because  of  savings  achieved  due  to  the  possibility  to  repair  products  under  economically  favourable 
conditions and avoiding the need to purchase new products.  

The impacts of the preferred policy option would be positive also on the environment. More repaired 
goods means a longer lifespan of products and less new replacement products produced and purchased. 
This  will  lead  to  more  sustainable  consumption, benefiting  the  environment  in  form  of  a  substantial 
positive  impact  on  the  level  of  CO2  emissions,  use  of  resources  and  waste  production.  The 
environmental impact of the preferred option needs to be seen in comparison and together with other 
initiatives  under  the  Green  Deal.  For  instance  concerning  CO2  savings,  the  preferred  option  of  this 
initiative  would  produce  CO2  savings  of  18.4  million  tons  CO2-eq,  the  ECGT  will  save  0.33-0.47 
million tons and the ESPR 471 million tons. While the ESPR CO2 savings are naturally much higher 
since the ESPR is aiming for far-reaching changes in product manufacturing, the preferred option would 
save much more CO2 compared to the ECGT. It is however much more important to see the impact of 
the present initiative together with all other Commission initiatives in the green transition. This initiative 
is one building stone of the overall environmental impact all the respective initiatives taken together are 
aiming to achieve, contributing to tackle a problem which is far too comprehensive to be dealt with by 
one or two separate initiatives. 

The impact on sellers and producers varies depending on the measure. For the measures covering the 
legal guarantee period, the preferred policy option leads to gains for producers and sellers, in particular 
due  to  cost  savings  concerning  the  remedies  offered  to  consumers.  Measures  promoting  repair  and 
replacement  outside  the  legal  guarantee  lead  to  forgone  sales  of  new  products,  negatively  affecting 
producers and sellers in the EU185. Some losses of producers will be offset by increased earnings from 
the repair services they  offer. Moreover, the preferred policy option will help  sellers to  market  their 
refurbished products and create competition in this sector.  

185 Later referred to as ‘EU producers’ and ‘EU traders’.  

100 

 
 
                                                 
The repair/refurbishment sector will be positively impacted by the preferred policy option, as a result 
of  increased  demand  for  repair  services.  Increased  repair  will  contribute  to  competition  and  benefit 
various  repair  service  providers,  including  independent  repairers  and  SMEs.  The  beneficial  effect 
concerns also producers and traders offering spare parts and repair services, gaining additional income 
from this line of business.  

Public authorities are not expected to encounter considerable enforcement costs. For the measure under 
the  legal  guarantee,  public  authorities  will  not  confront  considerable  costs  as  authorities  are  already 
familiar  with  the  SGD.  The  moderate  enforcement  costs  concerning  the  measures  outside  the  legal 
guarantee include the competent authorities’ familiarisation with the new rules, and enforcement actions 
like  inspections.  Implementation  costs  are  particularly  relevant  for  option  5B,  i.e.  costs  for  IT 
development and ongoing maintenance of the platform, as well as awareness raising campaigns. 

SUMMARY OF COSTS AND BENEFITS186 

I. Overview of Benefits (total for all provisions) – Preferred Option 

Description 

Amount 

Direct benefits 

Consumer savings 

EUR 176.5 billion 

Environmental benefits  

CO2 savings: 18.5  million  tons  CO2-eq =  EUR 
3.3 billion 
Resource  savings:  1.8  million  tons  CO2-eq  = 
EUR 1.1 billion 
Waste  savings:  3  million  tons  CO2-eq  =  EUR 
493.5 million 
Total monetised: EUR 4.9 billion  

Comments 

Main beneficiaries: consumers 

Main beneficiaries: society  

cost 

Total 
production costs  

savings 

- 

- 

in 

EUR 15.6 billion 

Main beneficiaries: EU producers 

Indirect benefits 

Administrative cost savings related to the ‘one in, one out’ approach* 

II. Overview of costs – Preferred option 

Citizens/Consumers 

Businesses 

Administrations 

One-off 

Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

PO1A: 
Prioritisi
ng  repair 
whenever 
it 
is 
cheaper 

Direct adjustment 
costs 

- 

Direct 
administrative 
costs 

- 

- 

- 

EUR 
million 

104.2 

EUR 
million 
years) 

758.1 
(15 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

186 All figures stem from the IA Study. All benefits and recurrent costs are calculated and expressed for 15 
years. 

101 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
than 
replacem
ent   

PO5A: 
Obligatio
n 
inform 
where  to 
repair 

to 

PO5B: 
Platform 
with 
informati
on 
on 
available 
repair 
services 
(national 
level) 

PO6A: 
Voluntar
y 
commitm
ents to an 
EU 
common 
“easy 
repair 
standard
”   

PO6B: 
Obligatio
n  to  issue 
a  repair 
quote  on 
price  and 
condition
for 
s 
repair  in 
a 
standardi
sed form 

Direct regulatory 
fees and charges 

Direct 
enforcement costs 

Indirect costs 

Direct adjustment 
costs 

Direct 
administrative 
costs 

Direct regulatory 
fees and charges 

Direct 
enforcement costs 

Indirect costs 

Direct adjustment 
costs 

Direct 
administrative 
costs 

Direct regulatory 
fees and charges 

Direct 
enforcement costs 

Indirect costs 

Direct adjustment 
costs 

Direct 
administrative 
costs 

Direct regulatory 
fees and charges 

Direct 
enforcement costs 

Indirect costs 

Direct adjustment 
costs 

Direct 
administrative 
costs 

Direct regulatory 
fees and charges 

Direct 
enforcement costs 

Indirect costs 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

EUR 
million 

106.6 

EUR 
million 

160 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

EUR 
million 

0.5 

EUR 
million 

27.7 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

EUR 
million 

1.1 

EUR 
million 

11.2 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

EUR 
million 

8.6 

EUR 
million 

23.4 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

EUR 
million 

1 

EUR 
million 

1.5 

EUR 
million 

475.4 

EUR 5.9 billion  - 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

EUR 
million 

1.1 

EUR 
million 

25.4 

- 

- 

102 

 
 
 
 
 
 
PO6C: 
Producer
’s 
obligation 
to  repair 
goods 
that  are 
subject  to 
reparabili
ty 
requirem
ents 
under  EU 
law 
(against  a 
price) 

PO7: 
Promotin
g 
refurbish
ed  goods 
an 
on 
online 
platform 
via 
a 
functiona
lity under 
PO5B  

Direct adjustment 
costs 

Direct 
administrative 
costs 

Direct regulatory 
fees and charges 

Direct 
enforcement costs 

Indirect costs 

Direct adjustment 
costs 

Direct 
administrative 
costs 

Direct regulatory 
fees and charges 

Direct 
enforcement costs 

Indirect costs 

Direct adjustment 
costs  

Total   

Indirect 
adjustment costs 

Administrative 
costs (for 
offsetting) 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

EUR 
million 

45.0 

EUR 
million 

582.1 

EUR 
million 

69.8 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

EUR 
million 

1.1 

EUR 
million 

3.4 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

EUR 
million 

0.7 

EUR 
million 

3.2 

- 

- 

Costs related to the ‘one in, one out’ approach 

- 

- 

- 

EUR 
million 

731.26 

EUR 
billion 

7.39 

- 

- 

EUR 
million 

69.82 

- 

RELEVANT SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS 

III. Overview of relevant Sustainable Development Goals – Preferred Option(s) 
Relevant SDG 

Expected progress towards the Goal 

Comments 

SDG  no.  12  –  Responsible 
consumption and production 

The initiative is expected to lead to an increase of 
repair of defective viable consumer goods within 
and  beyond  the  legal  guarantee,  as  well  as  to  an 
increased  use  of  refurbished  goods  beyond  the 
legal  guarantee.  Consequently,  the  initiative  will 
contribute  to  more  sustainable  consumption,  as 
there will be a reduced amount of waste stemming 
from  discarded  products  and  less  demand  for 
resources used in manufacturing new products. 

103 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SDG no. 13 – Climate action  The initiative is expected to lead to CO2 savings, 
resource  savings  and  waste  savings,  therefore 
contributing to the climate change mitigation.  

104 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 4: Analytical Methods187 

I. 

IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF EFFECTIVENESS 

The  assessment  of  effectiveness  is  based  on  two  aspects:  first,  how  options  affect 
consumers and sustainable consumption choices in the form of repair or purchase of 
refurbished goods; second, how options affect the environment.   

1.  Effectiveness  with  respect  to  consumers  decisions  on  sustainable  consumption 

choices   

The  consumer  aspect  is  assessed  based  on  two  sub-criteria:  A)  consumer  decision-
making process and B) consumer trust and protection. These criteria are also the key 
factors  that  influence  consumer  decisions  towards  more  sustainable  consumption 
choices, which ultimately contribute to the sustainable consumption objective.  

1.1. Consumer decision-making process: options are assessed considering their influence 
on consumer decisions to avoid new purchases or repair more / buy more refurbished 
goods as a means to achieve the sustainable consumption objective. This criterion is 
quantified based on the projected take-up of options and number of avoided purchases 
of new goods or additionally repaired products as a result of each option. The avoided 
number  of  purchases  indicator  is  used  for  the  purpose  of  comparing  the  consumer 
impacts of Cluster I options. The additional number of repaired products is used for 
the  purpose  of  comparing  the  consumer  impacts  of  Cluster  II  options  (see  below 
explanation of indicators). 

a.  Assumed take-up rate of options and projected increase in repair or use 

of refurbished goods as a result of each option 

The assumed increase in “take-up rate” of repair as a result of the policy options takes 
account of several variables:  
  % of consumers who are likely to be affected or make use of a policy option;  
  % of businesses who would be willing to or be obliged to make use of each policy 

option;  

  Number of consumers who are likely to avoid new purchases as a result of remedies 
under the legal guarantee, decide to repair their products or buy refurbished goods 
as a result of each option.  

The assumed increase in take-up rates of repair as a result of each option has been estimated 
separately,  based  on  available  evidence  on  the  impacts  of  the  option  on  consumers  and 
business. Relevant data has been derived from the evidence base collected in the IA Study, 

187 All figures stem from the IA study. See on methodology, IA Study, Annex 3. 

105 

 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
namely by means of the consumer and business surveys and the two experiments on the SGD 
and the ‘right to repair’. Data from the open public consultation has been taken into account 
where relevant. The take-up rates also reflect the percentage of consumers who are likely to be 
affected by the option and respectively  repair or purchase refurbished  goods. The data also 
reflects the differences in impact of mandatory options (e.g. PO1A and PO1B) and voluntary 
options (PO5B, 5C and 6A), which will depend on take-up by both business and consumers. 

b.  Discount rate of impacts over 15 years 

A separate calculation was performed to obtain the take-up rate figure over a period of 15 years. 
Conservative assumptions were introduced for the take-up of options in Cluster I and II. An 
impact realisation profile was included, meaning that it would take 1-2 years for consumers to 
familiarise themselves with the measures. Thus, the assumption is made that the impact of all 
measures will be limited in the first two years of application. With respect to Cluster I, while 
the options will apply immediately, they will apply only to newly concluded sales contracts 
(i.e. concluded after the transposition date). That is why a conservative approach is followed, 
assuming  that  the  number  of  new  contracts  concerned  by  the  options  would  increase 
progressively  during  the  first  two  years  of  application,  before  reaching  the  full  projected 
numbers of transactions concerned in the third year. With respect to Cluster II options, it was 
assumed that it would take two years for consumers to become familiar with the new measures 
and take full advantage for the new rights and opportunities for repair contracts. Respectively, 
the number of repair contracts concerned would increase progressively in the first two years 
and would reach its full potential only in the third year. For these reasons, the projected take-
up rate was set at 33% for the first year and at 67% in the second. The discounted take-up rates 
in  the  first  two  years  result  in  a  discounted  overall  take-up  rate  for  the  period  of  15  years, 
compared to the projected full take-up rate for options which is expected to remain relevant 
from year 3 onwards. This conservative assumption has also been factored in all estimates of 
economic, social impacts and environmental impacts which are presented for the time-span of 
15 years.   

In the context of assessment of impacts, it is also relevant to mention that a discount rate has 
been also applied to the projected market failure within the next 15 years.  

The estimate of the annual scale of the market failure (EUR 5.1 billion per year) translates into 
a market failure of minimum EUR 62 billion over 15 years with a yearly discount rate of 3%. 
The scale of the market failure for 15 years is discounted based on the ‘net present value factor’. 

c.  Data robustness and representativeness  

The findings from the two behavioural experiments (SGD and ‘right to repair’) in the IA Study 
developed for the purpose of this impact assessment deliver robust and representative data. The 
methodological  approach  to  data  collection  and  the  set  up  of  behavioural  experiments  was 
verified and approved by experts from the Commission Joint Research Center, taking account 
of best practices in the EU and at international level.  

106 

 
 
 
 
 
 
On representativeness: The overall sample of behavioural experiments (8,000 participants for 
10 EU countries with an overall population of 360 million inhabitants) compares well to best 
practices at EU and world level188. The sample was selected to cover a broad variety of socio-
demographic profiles in terms of age, gender, region, with additional monitoring of soft quotas 
on  factors  like  education  and  income  within  each  country.  The  achieved  sample  is 
representative  for  the  general  population  18  years  and  older  in  each  of  the  countries.  On 
robustness: The behavioural experiments included 10, 000 participants in total. For example, 
the right to repair experiment tested 4 different policy options regarding the specification of 
conditions for the right to repair. With 10,000 participants in total, and each participant being 
exposed to one treatment, there are 2,500 participants per treatment, each participant making 
two decisions whether to repair or not. This sample size and number of treatments ensure that 
if  there  is  a  difference  of  5%  in  take-up  rate  between  treatments,  then  this  difference  is 
identified at the 5% significance level with probability of at least 95% (power of the study). 
This  compares  very  favorably  with  the  standard  recommended  minimum  80%  power  for 
experiments in social sciences. Finally, on the external validity of the behavioural experiments, 
the study was carried out by simulating as much as possible – given the constraints of budget 
and time – the situations that consumers would face in their real life. 

On  product  sample:    The  analysis  of  economic  impacts  is  carried  out  based  on  a  product 
sample  of  7  consumer  goods,  then  extrapolated  to  the  whole  of  the  economy  (see  detailed 
description  of  product  sample  and  extrapolation  approach  in  Section  II  on  Assessment  of 
economic impacts). 

The product  sample in the behavioural  experiments  includes refrigerators, smartphones  and 
shoes. This sample is sufficiently representative for the purpose of and within the constraints 
of a behavioural experiment. The selected popular consumer products comprise a variety of 
product characteristics which may play a role for consumer decisions to repair. Two products 
are  relevant  for  the  ecodesign  framework  and  reparability  requirements  under  EU  law 
(refrigerators  and  smartphones).  These  products  fall  in  the  group  of  electr(on)ic  goods  that 
consumers are more likely to repair and their relatively high modularity also results in relatively 
high technical reparability. Fridges cannot be moved easily and normally require technicians 
to perform repair at the consumer’s house, whereas smartphones and shoes are easily moveable 
items. On the other hand, shoes are a non-electronic product with relatively low modularity, 
representing a group of items that consumers are more likely to consider replacing rather than 
repairing. Finally, in terms of price, a fridge is a high-value item, shoes are a relatively low 
value item and smartphones on average rank in-between.  

d.  Number of avoided purchases of new goods/production of units  

This indicator is derived from the increase in take-up rate of repair and reflects the projected 
impact of each option in terms of new product purchases  that may be avoided as a result of the 
options.  Options  in  Cluster  I    lead  to  avoided  consumer  purchases  of  new  products  by 

188 The European Eurobarometer survey is based on a large country sample size of 1,000 observations, because of 
the two-fold reason that it often aims at exploring issues of general relevance (e.g., trust in EU) and at investigating 
cross-country differences. The World Value Survey is based on a similar sample size, but even for the largest 
countries (China or USA) the minimum sample size is 1,500 observations.  

107 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
encouraging  consumers  to  repair  their  own  products,  while  options  on  refurbished  goods 
encourage consumers to purchase refurbished products instead of new goods. The indicator is 
comparable for all options in Cluster I and is indicative of the differences in magnitude of their 
impacts. It has been used also as an input value for consumer decision-making for Cluster I 
options under the sub-criterion under ‘effectiveness’ in the MCA.   

e.  Number of additionally repaired products 

This indicator shows the number of products that would be additionally repaired as a result of 
consumer decisions to  repair their products  beyond the legal  guarantee.  In this scenario the 
consumer  is  the  ultimate  decision-maker  determining  the  numbers  of  additionally  repaired 
products,  because  the  consumer  is  the  party  paying  for  repair.  The  value  of  this  indicator 
therefore entirely depends on the increase in take-up rate of repair by consumers as a result of 
Cluster II options. This indicator is particularly relevant for the estimates of consumer savings 
as a result of Cluster II options in a given year, following the consumer decision to repair their 
defective goods (or alternatively buy refurbished goods). That is why this indicator is also used 
as  an  input  value  for  consumer  decision-making  sub-criterion  for  Cluster  II  options  under 
‘effectiveness’ in the MCA. 

The  values  of  both  indicators  (number  of  avoided  purchases  and  number  of  additionally 
repaired products) for each policy option is influenced  also by the scenarios in which an option 
applies as well as its scope. Even though some options have the same take-up rate (e.g. PO5B 
and PO5C), the scope of application of the options is different as they affect a different range 
of goods (e.g. PO5B covers all goods while PO5C covers only energy-labelled and ecodesign 
goods). Similarly, some options (e.g. PO2B) apply in a very narrow scenario and are relevant 
for a small number of cases in absolute terms. Finally, some options concern a different range 
and number of economic operators (e.g. PO6B concerns repairers of all consumer goods, PO6D 
concerns producers of all consumer goods, while PO6C concerns only producers of consumer 
goods subject to reparability requirements). Therefore, for some options even with a relatively 
higher  take-up  rate,  the  avoided  number  of  purchases  or  number  of  additionally  repaired 
products  may  be  relatively  small  compared  to  other  options,  as  less  cases  are  concerned  in 
absolute terms. 

108 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Take-up of policy options and avoided number of purchases 

Policy 
option 

Projecte
d take-
up rate 

Take-up 
rate for 
15 years 

Number of 
products 
additionally 
repaired for 
15 years 

Number of 
potentially 
avoided 
purchases of 
new goods for 
15 years 

Assumptions and evidence on expected take-up rates of options 

PO1A 

74.26% 

69.31% 

1,487,868,610 

PO1B 

74.26% 

69.31% 

1,487,868,610 

170,480,857  As this measure will require businesses by law to offer repair whenever it is cheaper, 100% compliance rate 
by companies is assumed. However,  some replacements will take place because repair is more expensive 
than replacement or because the product is technically impossible to repair. Therefore the assumed 100% 
compliance rate is discounted by the average % of ‘end of life’ products, which were not repaired because it 
was not possible or worth it. The data has been collected by the repair community in the framework of an 
EU funded Sharepair project for the period 2014-2021.189 This results in a take-up rate of 74%. This rate is 
further discounted to 69.42% for a 15 year period based on the conservative assumptions for the take-up in 
years 1 and 2. The business survey data in the IA Study has been used as an additional source to cross-check 
the robustness of the data. It confirms the assumption, suggesting that around 12% of products are replaced 
because repair is more costly.190 This percentage is lower than the figure on the end of life goods, because 
the latter also includes goods that are impossible to repair. The number of affected purchases is high because 
the overwhelming majority of non-conformity defects appear during the liability period of 2 years. Moreover, 
consumers are most likely to deal with these defects under this scenario, because products are relatively new 
and remedies under the legal guarantee are for free.  
The take-up rate is assumed on the same basis as for PO1A. Although PO1B being the more intensive option 
than PO1A, it can be expected that many sellers will offer consumers a replacement product anyway if such 
replacement  is  cheaper  for  them  and  that  consumers  will  agree  to  that.  Due  to  this  likely  practice,  the 
difference between the take-up of PO1A and PO1B is expected to be only minimal. As the concrete take-up 

170,480,857 

189 Interreg North-Weste Europe, Sharepair project, Version of 21 October 2022, EU specific data extracted by Yoko Dams.   
190 The 12% stems from the business survey where it is indicated that 29% of products were replaced. Other data from the business survey suggests that 41% of respondents 
agreed that costs are a reason for not repairing it. Multiplying 29% of replaced goods by 41% (meaning that in these cases costs might have been the reason for replacement) 
leads to 12%. 

109 

 
 
                                                 
 
PO2A 

12.0% 

11.22% 

250,462,692 

28,698,162 

PO2B 

21.0% 

19.63% 

48,170,404 

5,146,385 

PO3A 

42.5% 

39.73% 

97,487,723 

10,415,303 

rate of PO1B could not be assessed, it was assumed that the take-up of PO1B is at least as high as PO1A and 
that at least as many new goods could be avoided as under PO1A.  
The take-up figure is based on the results of the behavioural experiment among consumers (SGD experiment 
in IA Study). It compares the effect of the condition that consumers can benefit from a restart of the guarantee 
period after a repair against the likelihood to repair under the condition that such a restart is not offered. The 
percentage figure represents the average increase in the effect sizes. The results are explained in detail in the 
section 3.1 of the SGD experiment annex.  
The take-up figure is based on the results of the behavioural experiment among consumers (SGD 
experiment in IA Study). Under the condition that the legal guarantee period is extended for repairs only, 
but not for replacements, the likelihood of consumers to have their product repaired increases by this 
magnitude compared to the likelihood to repair under the condition that the legal guarantee period is not 
extended and thus neither repair nor replacement would be covered. The results are explained in detail in 
the section 3.2 of the SGD experiment annex. Despite this take-up rate, the number of affected purchases is 
low, because the number of non-conformity defects which are likely to manifest themselves in the 
extended liability period (year 3) is minimal (around 4%). 
Of all the measures tested in the business survey, this option is perceived to have a relatively high potential 
compared to the other measures (42-43% of manufacturers and sellers consulted said it had high to very high 
potential). While the take-up percentage by business is relatively high, this option would come into play in 
a very limited scenario and would concern a very small number of cases, because of the minimal number of 
defects that may occur in year 3.  

PO3B 

42.5% 

39.73% 

219,347,376 

PO4 

13.45% 

12.57% 

269,497,856 

30,897,222 

23,434,433  While the assumed take-up rate is the same as for PO3B, the number of replacements with refurbished goods 
under PO3A is higher, because it covers the second year of legal guarantee - a period when more defects are 
likely to arise (as more non-conformity defects manifest themselves in year 2 compared to year 3).  
The take-up figure is based on the results of the behavioural experiment among consumers (SGD experiment 
in IA Study). Overall, three products were tested and revealed considerable price differences. The average 
increases  in  willingness  to  pay  under  the  condition  of  an  aligned,  two-year  guarantee  period  for  highly 
refurbished products were the following: for a smartphone 33%, for a refrigerator 31%, and for shoes 20% 
(average across all three products: 26.5%). These are the relative increases in the amounts that consumers 
are willing to pay when highly refurbished products of these categories come with a guarantee period of 2 
years instead of 1 year. The results are explained in detail in the section 3.4 of the SGD experiment annex. 
However,  the  assumed  take-up  figure  is  discounted  to  take  account  of  the  fact  that  this  option  will  only 
benefit consumers in 14 MS where the liability period for refurbished goods can be lower than 2 years. As a 
result, this option will not impact all consumers in the EU, but only consumers in MS with shorter liability 
periods for refurbished goods. Therefore, its positive impacts on take-up rates affect a smaller number of 
purchases.    

110 

 
 
PO5A 

2.0% 

1.87% 

229,727,847 

25,061,632 

PO5B 

6.7% 

6.26% 

769,588,286 

83,956,466 

Consumers’  willingness  to  take  up  repairs  as  a  result  of  this  measure  was  not  tested  in  the  experiments. 
However,  it  is  assumed  that  its  effectiveness  would  be  the  lowest  compared  to  the  other  four  measures 
proposed outside the legal guarantee. In absence of other data, the behavioural experiment findings on  the 
quote (PO6B) are taken as a basis to estimate the likely  take-up rate  of other options that pursue similar 
objectives. The quote provides transparency on all key decision-making factors for consumers for repair: 
price display, repair location, comparability of offers and general repair conditions. On the other hand, PO5A 
informs consumers solely on the repair location and thus addresses only the barrier regarding “how to get 
the product repaired”. As it tackles only one factor for the decision to repair, it will influence less consumers 
and will not influence consumers who are held back from repair by other factors.  
This figure is based using a similar approach as for PO5A – i.e. based on the results of the Right to repair 
experiment for the quote combined with the insights from an existing platform in France.  
The platform will address fewer convenience barriers than the issuing of a quote, but more than the provision 
of information under PO5A. It will provide information on where to repair, but also on the general conditions 
of repair. By centralising the information on a platform, it will make it easier to find a suitable repair offer. 
The platform will also inform consumers about repair prices to some extent. On the other hand, the reach of 
the platform in the population might be limited and will depend on the quality of the platform and the reach 
of the communication campaigns. As mentioned above, a similar platform already exists in France. It has 
approximatively  127,000  repair  services  registered.  Considering  that  in  2019,  there  were  145,696  repair 
services available in France191, approximatively 87% of repair services were subscribed to the platform. The 
take-up rate will depend on the awareness campaigns carried out to engage businesses on the platform, as 
well as resources invested to keep the platform up to date. 

PO5C 

6.7% 

6.26% 

60,323,885 

PO6A 

4.0% 

3.74% 

459,455,693 

50,123,264 

17,410,692  While the assumed take-up rate is the same as under PO5B, the range of products covered is much more 
limited due to the limitations in the scope of  the platform  under PO5C to energy-labelled and ecodesign 
goods. Respectively, the number of affected purchases is smaller in absolute terms. 
For the take-up rate by consumers, the behavioural experiment data for PO5 is taken as a point of reference. 
Both measures are meant to improve transparency and consumers’ knowledge of repair conditions. While 
PO6B covers all key decision-making factors for repair, PO6A only addresses the quality of the repair service. 
Therefore, it tackles only one factor for the decision to repair: concerns about the quality of the service. While 
there is not sufficient data to estimate consumer willingness to repair as a result of this measure, it can be 
assumed that the measure could nudge those consumers that currently do not repair because they do not trust 

191 See Eurostat, NACE Rev. 2 under S95 - Repair of computers and personal and household goods. 

111 

 
 
                                                 
PO6B 

13.4% 

12.53% 

1,539,176,573 

167,912,933 

PO6C 

12,.1% 

11.31% 

108,943,135 

31,443,190 

the quality of repair192, but not those consumers who are deterred by other factors, such as price, or lack of 
information on location of providers, or specific information on conditions of repair. Respectively, the take-
up rate for this option is assumed to be lower compared to 6B, as it only covers a part of relevant factors for 
the decision to repair: estimated at 4.0% (or 30% of the willingness to take up under the conditions of PO6B).  
The results of the OPC suggest that 52% of businesses would favour such a measure. Based on the results of 
perceived effectiveness of the measure, it is assumed that between 30 and 50% of businesses for which this 
measure would be relevant would adhere to the voluntary commitment. It should be noted that consumers’ 
take-up of repair as a result of this measure would depend on various factors (i.e., the take-up of businesses, 
label presentation and content, etc.).  
This figure is based on the results of the behavioural experiments (‘Right to repair’, IA Study). This option 
addresses a range of convenience related barriers to the take-up of repair: difficulty to estimate the price of 
repair, availability of repair services, difficulty to find information on how to get the product repaired. It 
represents the increase in the share of consumers that would commission a repair when the prices for repair 
quotes are provided at no additional costs to consumers or are capped at a maximum of 5% of the product 
value. The details are documented in the R2R experiment Annex, Section 3.2. Businesses take-up among 
repairers is assumed to be at 100% as this will be legal obligation. The take-up rate assumption does not take 
into account a possible price threshold for the obligation to provide a quote.  
This take-up figure is derived from a behavioural experiment (‘Right to repair experiment’, IA Study). It 
compares the preference of consumers to have their product repaired under the condition of an obligation to 
repair against the average likelihood of consumers to have a defective product repaired when an obligation 
to repair is absent.  The overall product sample in the experiment includes refrigerators, smartphones and 
shoes. However, the take-up rate for this option has been refined to cover only a fridge and smartphone193, 
because of the more limited scope of PO6C, which concerns products covered by reparability requirements 
under  EU  law.  This  sample  is  sufficient  for  the  purpose  of  and  within  the  constraints  of  a  behavioural 

192 According to the consumer survey results, together with price, trust in the quality of repair is the most important aspect that refrains consumers from repairing (8.2 out of 
10). Business costs for the following options could not be quantified and are presented qualitatively in Annex 5: PO5B – Platform with information on available repair services 
- national; PO5C – Platform with information on available repair services - Europe; PO6A – Voluntary commitments to an EU common “easy repair standard”. 
193 Smartphones are assumed to be part of the ecodesign baseline and a product subject to reparability requirements. Even though smartphones are not yet subject to ecodesign 
EU rules, a proposal for a draft regulation for this product group has been published for public consultation in September 2022, Designing mobile phones and tablets to be 
sustainable – ecodesign (europa.eu). 

112 

 
 
                                                 
 
 
experiment. The two products included cover the various product characteristics relevant for this product 
group:  different  price  ranges,  varying  complexity  modularity,  different  ease  of  transportation  for  repair, 
different lifetime, which may play a role for consumer decisions to repair.  
The  relative  increase  of  the  repair  rate  represents  the  increase  under  a  conservative  yet  realistic  scenario 
including the following conditions for the obligation to repair: the need to bring the product to the shop for 
the smartphone, while for fridges it was assumed that a mechanic would go to the consumer’s house; a repair 
price  of  20%  of  the  original  price  of  the  product;  the  producer  as  the  party  responsible  for  the  repair;  a 
duration of the repair of four weeks. The details are documented in Section 3.3 of the R2R experiment annex. 
It is assumed that all businesses (manufacturers) will take up this measure as they will be required to do so 
by law. The four week duration of repair is deemed realistic in view of certain eco-design requirements that 
require spare parts to be provided within 2-3 weeks.  
Like for PO6C, this take-up figure is derived from the behavioural experiment (‘Right to repair experiment’, 
IA  Study).  In  view  of  the  broader  scope  of  this  option,  the  product  sample  includes  both  products  which  are 
subject to reparability requirements under EU law (fridge and smartphone) under the baseline and a product that 
is not (shoes). Thus, all considerations expressed above about the experiment apply also to PO6D.  

190,468,401 

PO6D 

15.2% 

14.21% 

1,745,931,635 

PO7 

0.63% 

0.59% 

72,364,272 

7,894,414 

This option results in a slightly higher increase in take-up compared to PO6C in view of the broader scope 
and respectively more diverse product sample used for this option. By adding shoes to the product sample 
the following aspects are captured: on average lower modularity, lower value, lower lifetime, non-electronic 
goods.   
The consumer willingness to take up was not tested specifically for this PO. The take-up rate was assumed 
based on other available data related to the platform already existing in France. It was assumed that 5.5% of 
consumers visit the repair platform and a percentage between 50%-65% of those consumers would not find 
a repair solution. As a next step, it was assumed that 15-25% of those consumers who did not find a repair 
solution would be attracted by the refurbishment function of the platform and buy refurbished goods as a 
replacement, resulting in the indicated take-up. 

113 

 
 
1.2. Consumer protection and trust: options are assessed considering the extent to which 
they decrease or strengthen consumer rights in trust. The assessment is based on the 
set-up of the option (described in Section 5) and assessment of the impacts (Section 
6). The qualitative assessment considers criteria such as scope of the option, its binding 
or voluntary nature and to what extent it restricts consumer rights (in the case of PO1A) 
or strengthens and creates new rights (e.g. PO6C) and new opportunities for consumers 
(e.g. PO5B).     

2.  Effectiveness with respect to environmental impacts 

Three sub-criteria have  been used to  measure the environmental impacts:  efficient  resource 
use, waste, CO2 emissions.  

Environmental impacts are considered highly relevant sub-criteria to measure the effectiveness 
in  achieving  the  sustainable  consumption  objective.  The  impacts  of  each  option  can  be 
quantified based on key environmental indicators used to illustrate the environmental impacts 
capture the whole life cycle of goods: 

  CO2 savings in tons and monetised 
  Resource savings in tons and monetised 
  Waste savings in tons and monetized 

The  environmental  impacts  of  all  options  are  positive,  because  all  options  contribute  to 
sustainable  consumption  by  way  of  repair  or  use  of  refurbished  goods.  The  environmental 
impacts  have  been  calculated  based  on  the  estimated  avoided  purchases  of  new  goods  as  a 
result of each option. It is assumed that reduced purchases will translate into reduced sales and 
production  of  new  goods.  This  in  turn  will  have  positive  environmental  impacts  linked  in 
particular to the production process (including use of resources and CO2 emissions) and waste 
disposa 

114 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Environmental impacts of the POs (part 1): 

The indicator of CO2 savings is relevant and has been used also in related initiatives, notably ESPR and ECGT. The indicator may give a general 
indication of the magnitude of impacts of each initiative, but is not fully comparable because of the different scope of the initiatives and respectively 
different scope of assumptions used to make projections on their future impacts. The CO2 savings for the purpose of this impact assessment have 
been calculated taking into account the number of avoided purchases as a result of the policy options assessed and the most relevant dynamic 
indicator for the scope of this initiative, projected increase in repair rates. This estimate is based on historic data on repair rates over 10 years 
collected by the repair community under the Sharepair project. 

IA results for  
- total of 
products  
 - conservative 
scenario 

Number  of  products 
whose  purchase  can 
potentially  be  avoided 
[pieces] 

CO2  savings  [tons 
CO2-eq] 

Monetisation 
savings [EUR] 

of  CO2 

Resource 
[tons] 

savings 

Monetisation 
savings [EUR] 

of 

resource 

PO1A 

PO1B 

PO2A 

PO2B 

PO3A 

PO3B 

170,480,857 

5,322,067.34 

957,972,120.67 

170,480,857 

5,322,067.34 

957,972,120.67 

28,698,162 

895,898.54 

161,261,736.54 

5,146,385 

143,272.11 

25,788,979.17 

10,415,303 

289,955.45 

52,191,981.65 

23,434,433 

652,399.77 

117,431,958.70 

661,597 

661,597 

111,371 

15,785 

31,946 

71,879 

341,732,597.69 

341,732,597.69 

57,526,091.78 

9,187,735.89 

18,5494,227.41 

41,837,011.66 

115 

 
 
 
PO4 

PO5A 

PO5B 

PO5C 

PO6A 

PO6B 

PO6C 

PO6D 

PO7 

30,879,222 

963,986.83 

173,517,628.52 

25,061,632 

745,650.87 

134,217,155.70 

83,956,466 

2,497,930.40  

449,627,471.60 

17,410,692 

1,752,543.18 

315,457,771.94 

50,123,264 

1,491,301.73  

268,434,311.40 

167,912,933 

4,995,860.80 

899,254,943.20 

31,443,190  

3,165,040.66 

659,707,319.48  

190,468,401 

5,666,946.57 

1,020,050,383.33 

7,894,414 

234,880.02 

42,278,404.05 

119,835 

76,305 

255,622 

89,625 

152,610 

511,244 

161,859 

579,919 

24,036 

61,898,074.75 

44,902,632.35 

150,423,818.36 

99,410,396.94 

89,805,264.,69 

300,847,636.72 

179,532,209.40 

341,260,00.83 

14,144,329.19 

116 

 
 
 
Environmental impacts of the POs (part 2): 

IA 
- 
- conservative scenario 

results 
of 

total 

for  
products  

PO1A 

PO1B 

PO2A 

PO2B 

PO3A 

PO3B 

PO4 

PO5A 

PO5B 

PO5C 

PO6A 

PO6B 

PO6C 

PO6D 

PO7 

Waste savings [tons] 

Monetisation 
savings [EUR] 

of  waste 

1,046,344  

1,046,344 

176,138 

26,772 

54,182 

121,910 

189,524 

134,596 

450,895 

100,972 

269,191 

901,791 

 182,353 

1,002,927 

42,398 

170,554,097.34 

170,554,097.34 

28,710,490.96 

4,363,900.46 

8,831,703.32 

19,871,332.47 

30,892,488.27 

21,939,084.37 

73,495,932.63 

16,458,459.09 

43,878,168.73 

146,991,865.26 

29,723,485.82 

166,737,041.19 

6,910,811.58 

117 

 
 
 
 
 
 
II. 

IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF EFFICIENCY 

1.  ECONOMIC IMPACTS 

  Product sample and extrapolation  

The analysis of the impact assessment covers the whole of the consumer goods segment of the 
economy.  It  is  based on  a step-by step approach: first,  an in-depth  assessment of a product 
sample of popular consumer goods; second - extrapolation of common trends and findings for 
the product sample for the whole of the consumer goods segment of the economy, based on an 
extrapolation factor (see below). 

The product sample was selected based on a preliminary analysis of 17 product types, which 
were then narrowed down to 8 product groups. The sample of 8 product groups enabled a more 
granular  analysis,  taking  account  of  product  specific  characteristics,  as  well  as  deriving 
common  trends  for  different  consumer  product  groups.  The  sample  was  selected  based  on 
several screening criteria: the limited useful (average) time, economic and social impacts, scale 
of the product stream and representativeness for category. Eventually 8 product groups were 
retained from the broader range of products screened: mobile phones/smartphones, televisions, 
laptops, refrigerators, clothing, shoes/footwear, wooden furniture, cars. It was considered that 
the 8 products sample is sufficiently representative and robust also in view of the heterogeneous 
characteristics of the 8 products included based on a number of factors relevant for repair of 
consumer  goods  (price,  technology,  lifetime,  modularity,  size  and  ease  of  repair,  etc.). 
Importantly, the sample covers the key product types and characteristics that may influence 
consumer decisions to repair, as confirmed by findings in the consumer survey of the IA study. 

The data collection methods under the IA study have collected specific data for each of the 
product groups included in the sample of 8 consumer goods. This product specific data helped 
identify specificities and refine the analysis in view of consumer repair behaviour for different 
product groups, such as electr(on)ic goods (mobile/smartphone, laptop, television, refrigerator) 
and non-electr(on)ic goods (shoes/footwear, clothing, wooden furniture) and cars. On the other 
hand, common trends were also identified for all product groups. On this basis, the sample data 
was extrapolated for the whole of the economy for the purpose of the analysis of all economic, 
social and environmental impacts. 

At  the  same  time,  product  specificities  were  taken  into  account  where  a  product  specific 
approach was warranted. In particular, this relates to the estimate of the market failure, which 
excludes  cars.    The  market  failure  estimate  is  based  on  conservative  approach  that  only 
considers failed repair attempts within a year by the consumer segment of reluctant replacers 
(9.2% of consumers) - namely consumers who ended up replacing a defective product because 
they could not repair it. Such cases are rare for cars because this is an expensive product with 
a relatively long life-time, which consumers repair the most compare to other product groups. 
Therefore, cars can be seen as an ‘outlier’ product category in view of the high rates of repair. 
Thus, cars are excluded from the quantification of the market failure (EUR 5.1 billion per year) 
to  avoid  overestimates.  However,  also  when  repairing  cars  consumers  may  not  get  their 

118 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
preferred  choice  and  repair  outcomes  as  regards  repair  price  and  conditions,  due  to  market 
obstacles and frictions. In this sense, cars are still a relevant product category in view of the 
problems and drivers this initiative tackles.  

All key analytical steps were carried out based on an in-depth analysis of this product sample 
data. For the purpose of the estimates, the sample was reduced to 7 products by excluding cars, 
because they are an outlier as regards consumer repair behaviour. Where relevant, cars were 
included in the extrapolated estimates - namely the estimates of all economic, environmental 
and  social  impacts  of  options.    Therefore,  cars  are  included  in  the  assessment  of  impacts, 
because car repairs would benefit from all measures of the initiative. For instance, the quote 
(PO6B) would be helpful for comparing offers of repair of cars, where repair are relatively 
costly  and  consumers  may  be  more  likely  to  shop  around  for  repair  offers.  In  addition, 
consumers could also look for car repairers on the repair platform (PO5B/C) and may prefer 
repairers adhering to a quality standard for repair. 

The same sample of 7 products was used as a basis for the extrapolation. Subsequently, the 
results for the product sample were extrapolated to give an indication of impacts on the whole 
of the economy when it comes to consumer goods. The extrapolation was done by a factor of 
5.74 , taking account of the share of the product sample in the overall consumer goods segment, 
excluding  goods  irreparable  by  their  nature  (e.g.  foods,  feed,  water,  medicines).  The 
extrapolated data therefore provides estimates on the whole consumer goods segment, covering 
all  consumer  goods  that  could  potentially  be  repaired  or  refurbished  (including  cars).  The 
analysis  of  economic  impacts  focuses  on  an  assessment  of  costs  and  benefits  for  key 
stakeholders  affected  by  the  initiative:  businesses  and  consumers  and  society  as  regards 
impacts on jobs. The most relevant sub-indicators to quantify the costs and benefits have been 
selected below in view of the stakeholder groups affected.     

  Successful repair rates  

The  indicator  reflects  successful  repair  rates  from  a  technical  perspective  (as  %  of  goods 
successfully  fixed  by  repairers),  based  on  data  collected  and  made  available  by  the  repair 
community. In particular, the data was collected by repair cafés in the framework of an ongoing 
EU financed project (Sharepair), which will be completed in March 2023. DG Justice requested 
and obtained an EU specific extract from the project database. The data presented in the table 
below is therefore based on preliminary findings as of 28 October 2022. Given that the project 
publication time is planned for the same month as the adoption of the proposal, which this IA 
report supports, it was not possible to use the final data from the project for the purpose of this 
impact assessment. 

The  data  covers  40  popular  consumer  goods  including  electr(on)ic  and  non-electr(on)ic 
products. The statistics suggest that repair rates have been growing over the time covered by 
the project data (2014-2021).  

Sharepair project - Preliminary data on successful repair rates between 2014 and 2021 in 
the EU   

Extract as of 28 October 2022. 

119 

 
 
 
Year  products that could be ‘fixed’ 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

2019 

2020 

2021 

Projected 
annual growth 
rate 

54,74% 

55,34% 

59,45% 

53,43% 

54,42% 

52,83% 

54,22% 

57,72% 

0,28% 

The purpose of the indicator is to enable a projection of future repair rates for the purpose of a 
dynamic  baseline.  It  is  factored  into  all  estimates  of  economic,  environmental  and  social 
impacts over the time-horizon of 15 years for all options.  

The  annual  average  repair  growth  rate  based  on  these  successful  repair  rates  between  2014 
(54.74%) and 2021 (57.72%) is 0.28%. To make the estimations dynamic, the assumption for 
our baseline period of 15 years (until 2037) is that repair rates will keep increasing each year 
by 0.28 percentage points.   

The assumption  on projected future growth of repair rates is also supported by the likely impact 
of  the  legislative  developments  under  the  eco-design  framework  which  will  make  repair 
increasingly  easier  from  a  technical  perspective  (e.g.  through  reparable  eco-design,  spare 
parts).194 The projected repair rate growth is conservative, as professional repairers are likely 
to have even higher repair rates, for instance, due to the broader access to spare parts and repair 
information  from  manufacturers  under  eco-design  rules.  For  example,  according  to  data 
collected  by  APPLiA,  Home  Appliance  Europe,  ‘By  the  Numbers:  The  Home  Appliance 
Industry in Europe’, 2020-2021 indicates that 91% requests to repair to manufacturers resulted 
in  successful  repair  in  2018.    However,  in  the  absence  of  systematic  data  collection  from 
professional  repairers,  more  comprehensive  data  on  repair  rates  by  professional  repairers 

194 See Annex for relevant extracts from IA. 

120 

 
 
 
                                                 
(including  manufacturers  providing  repair  services)  was  not  available  at  this  stage,  for  the 
purpose of this impact assessment. 

On  the  basis  of  available  data  and  considering  the  qualitative  assessment  on  the  expected 
positive impacts of eco-design legislation which will increase the technical reparability of key 
consumer goods, the IA assumes that repair rates will continue to grow also in the future.  

The dynamic baseline takes into account the change in the repair rate over the period 2023 to 
2037, which means that by 2037 the repair rate will have increased by 4.57 percentage points 
(from 57.72% in 2021 to 62.29% in 2037, in view of the projected repair rates explained in the 
response to point 1).195 

Other indicators, such as durability of goods and (potentially longer) useful consumption and 
absolute lifetimes of consumer goods that may be achieved as a result of ESPR in the future 
have been considered, but they could not be factored in due to the uncertainty about the actual 
product groups that will be covered by ESPR in the next 15 years. 

It should be noted that this indicator is applied and relevant of all impacts - economic, social 
and environmental ones.   

1.3. Business 

Three types of key stakeholders have been identified among businesses. Notably, the impacts 
of the initiative are not the same on different types of businesses and respectively the costs and 
benefits have been assessed for all separately. The key types of businesses include producers 
in the EU196, traders in the EU197 (including importers, retail and wholesale sellers) and EU 
repairers (including all providers of repair services: independent repairers, as well as producers 
and sellers who offer repair services). All options examined encourage either repair or the use 
of refurbished goods and respectively trigger less purchases of new products. The following 
indicators have been selected to indicate all key costs and benefits impacts on business:  

1.3.1.  Growth and investment in Europe (traders, producers, repairers, including 

SMEs)  

The key business indicators below show the projected positive or negative impacts on business 
by various measures.  

Turnover for producers:  

-  Sales of new products: the figure indicates projected impacts on sales of new goods 

(that are likely to decrease as a result of repair or use of refurbished goods). 

195 See Annex for relevant extracts from IA. 
196 Later referred to as ‘EU producers’.  
197 Later referred to as ‘EU traders’.  

121 

 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
-  Sales of returned products: this indicator is relevant only for some options and refers to 
potential  sales  of  returned  defective  products  under  the  legal  guarantee  that  may 
subsequently be resold at a lower price for refurbishment.  

Change  in  turnover  for  traders  (at  retail  margin):  indicates  the  turnover  for  retailers, 
wholesalers and importers. For the distribution network (importers, wholesalers, retailers) the 
turnover presented in the figures is not the total sales revenue but the margin they get over the 
cost of goods sold (i.e. the sales revenue minus the cost of goods sold). An average surplus of 
50% between producer prices and final retail prices is assumed. 

Change  in  turnover  for  repairers:  indicates  the  impacts  for  the  repair  industry,  including 
independent repairers, producers and sellers offering repair services. 

Gross Value Added (GVA) and Gross Operating Surplus (GOS): these indicators relate to 
sales of new products and are linked to the changes in turnover and are presented for all types 
of businesses affected (producers, traders and repairers). However, the ratio between turnover 
and GVA is not the same for different types of businesses (producers, traders and repairers) 
and this has been factored into the estimates.  

1.3.2.  Total costs savings (competitiveness) 

Total costs savings: This indicator is relevant for producers under some options. It relates to 
cost savings that can be achieved where new products are not provided as replacement for free, 
as  a  result  of  increased  repair  or  use  of  refurbished  goods  under  the  legal  guarantee.  This 
indicator is based on the following formula: savings from avoiding additional replacements - 
financing  additional  repair  (or  providing  refurbished  goods  as  a  replacement)=total  cost 
savings. Increased cost savings contribute to competitiveness. 

The  quantified  data  on  key  sub-indicators  for  business  is  presented  below.  The  data  also 
includes  third  country  producers,  who  are  particularly  affected  by  the  initiative  as  the 
manufacturers of a large share of new goods consumed in the EU. 

122 

 
 
 
 
Economic impacts Part 1 (all producers): 

Policy 
Options 

PO1A 

PO1B 

PO2A 

All producers 

Production/pur
chases  avoided 
(units) 

from 

Savings 
avoiding 
replacement 
products 

Financing 
additional repair 

TOTAL  COST 
SAVINGS 

Sales 
returned 
products 

from 

from 
Sales 
products/parts 

new 

CHANGE IN TURNOVER 

170,480,857 

57,195,883,386 

-12,871,720,600 

44,324,162,786 

-28,603,823,566 

170,480,857 

57,195,883,386 

-12,871,720,600 

44,324,162,786 

-28,603,823,556 

0 

0 

-28,603,823,566 

-28,603,823,556 

28,698,162 

9,617,631,020 

-2,175,245,567 

7.,442,385,454 

-1,755,217,661 

-1,171,998,689 

-2,927,216,350 

PO2B  

5,146,385 

PO3A 

10,415,303 

0 

0 

-349,051,358 

-349,051,358 

-706,417,319 

-706,417,319 

23,434,433 

7,064,268,505 

-1,589,460,414 

5,474,808,091 

0 

0 

0 

-164,831,612 

-164,831,612 

-333,586,600 

-333,586,600 

0 

0 

30,879,222 

119,224,263 

-2,331,063,916 

-2,211,839,653 

1,861,983,958 

-1,261,068,663 

600,915,294 

PO3B 

PO4  

PO5A  

25,061,632 

PO5B 

83,956,466 

PO5C  

17,410,692 

PO6A 

50,123,264 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

-848,725,901 

-848,725,901 

-2,843,098,453 

-2,843,098,453 

-2,471,487,181 

-2.471.487.181 

-1,697,417,942 

-1,697,417,942 

123 

 
 
 
PO6B  

167,912,933 

PO6C  

31,443,190 

PO6D  

190,468,401 

PO7  

7,894,414 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

-5,685,816,417 

-5,685,816,417 

-4,463,222,344 

-4,463,222,344 

-6,449,466,759 

-6,449,466,759 

-267,352,311 

-267,352,311 

Economic impacts Part 2 (EU producers): 

Policy 
options 

PO1A 

PO1B 

PO2A 

PO2B 

Production/
purchases 
avoided 
(units) 

from 

Savings 
avoiding 
replacement 
products 

Financing 
additional 
repair 

TOTAL  COST 
SAVINGS 

Sales 
returned 
products 

from 

Sales  from  new 
products or parts 

CHANGE 
TURNOVER 

IN 

Change 
(relates 
from 
products/parts) 

in  GVA 
sales 
to 
new 

Change in GOS 
(relates  to  sales 
from 
new 
products/parts) 

EU producers 

170,480,857 

20,76,065,221 

-4,517,949,486 

15,558,115,736 

-10,039,887,746 

170,480,857 

20,076,065,221 

-4,517,949,486 

15,558,115,736 

-10,039,887,746 

0 

0 

-10,039,887,746 

-10,039,887,746 

0 

0 

0 

0 

28,698,162 

3,372,825,145 

-766,203,406 

2,606,621,739 

-615,540,589 

-386,784,394 

-1,002,324,982 

-95,302,979 

-29,527,090 

5,146,385 

0 

0 

0 

0 

-57,543,007 

-57,543,007 

-13,481,896 

-4,284,149 

124 

 
 
 
 
PO3A 

PO3B 

PO4 

PO5A 

PO5B 

PO5C 

PO6A 

PO6B 

PO6C 

PO6D 

PO7 

10,415,303 

0 

0 

0 

23,434,433 

2,572,928,139 

-578,908,831 

1,994,019,308 

0 

0 

-116,455,678 

-116,455,678 

-27,284,691 

-8,670,269 

0 

0 

0 

0 

30,879,222 

41,732,699 

-818,212,995 

-776,480,296 

652,915,064 

-416,179,424 

236,735,641 

-102,545,859 

-31,771,104 

25,061,632 

83,956,466 

17,410,692 

50,123,264 

167,912,933 

31,443,190 

190,468,401 

7,894,414 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

-256,724,560 

-256,724,560 

-62,191,481 

-19,380,890 

-859,995,221 

-859,995,221 

-208,333,378 

-64,923,444 

-548,390,402 

-548,390,402 

-108,157,764 

-36,701,186 

-513,440,978 

-513,440,978 

-124,380,909 

-38,761,135 

-1,719,898,975 

-1,719,898,975 

-416,643,690 

-129,839,652 

-990,343,399 

-990,343,399 

-195,322,606 

-66,279,016 

-1,950,902,290 

-1,950,902,290 

-472,603,721 

-147,278,593 

-80,869,115 

-80,869,115 

-19,590,538 

-6,105,050 

Economic impacts Part 3 (EU traders and EU repairers): 

125 

 
 
 
Policy options 

EU traders 

EU repairers 

Production/purchases 
avoided (units) 

Change in turnover 
(retail margin) 

Change in GVA 

Change in GOS 

Change in 
turnover 

Change in GVA 

Change in GOS 

PO1A 

PO1B 

PO2A 

PO2B 

PO3A 

PO3B 

PO4 

PO5A 

PO5B 

PO5C 

PO6A 

170,480,857 

-21,452,867,667 

-5,792,274,270 

-2,145,286,767 

12,871,720,600 

4,964,336,209 

1,798,824,217 

170,480,857 

-21,452,867,667 

-5,792,274,270 

-2,145,286,767 

12,871,720,600 

4,964,336,209 

1,798,824,217 

28,698,162 

-2,694,488,115 

-727,511,791 

-269,448,811 

2,166,410,584 

835,541,646 

302,761,860 

5,146,385 

-203,142,070 

-54,848,359 

-20,314,207 

349,051,358 

137,002,394 

51,300,056 

10,415,303 

-411,120,856 

-111,002,631 

-41,112,086 

706,417,319 

277,268,235 

103,822,080 

23,434,433 

0 

0 

0 

1,589,460,414 

623,861,785 

233,602,666 

30,879,222 

-86,320,590 

-200,179,175 

-74,140,428 

2,331,063,916 

899,045,087 

325,772,523 

25,061,632 

-1,061,467,352 

-286,596,185 

-106,146,735 

1,855,762,660 

722,634,857 

262,807,487 

83,956,466 

-3,555,915,628 

-960,097,220 

-355,591,563 

6,217,234,588 

2,420,989,818 

880,460,679 

17,410,692 

-2,804,502,428 

-757,215,656 

-280,450,243 

3,834,387,730 

1,298,688,950 

350,023,332 

50,123,264 

-2,122,934,704 

-573,192,370 

-212,293,470 

3,711,634,453 

1,445,311,127 

525,629,096 

126 

 
 
 
PO6B 

PO6C 

PO6D 

PO7 

167,912,933 

-7,111,831,257 

-1,920,194,439 

-711,183,126 

12,435,695,449 

4,842,444,932 

1,761,079,990 

31,443,190 

-5,064,847,669 

-1,367,508,871 

-506,484,767 

6,925,427,747 

2,345,611,984 

632,190,488 

190,468,401 

-8,067,151,873 

-2,178,131,006 

-806,715,187 

14,106,535,982 

5,493,064,504 

1,997,691,344 

7,894,414 

-334,362,216 

-90,277,798 

-33,436,222 

584,553,467 

227,625,513 

82,782,835 

1.3.3.  Adjustment costs have been calculated for each option, indicating the costs businesses incur to put the option into practice. The 
costs are relevant for different types of businesses depending on the option: for instance, some options generate costs for producers, 
while others for repairers.  

o  One-off adjustment costs for introducing the option in the first year of its application  
o  Ongoing adjustment costs: including compliance costs where business obligations are introduced or costs for voluntary application, 

where options are voluntary.  

1.3.4.  Administrative costs have been calculated for options which create information requirements. However, in some cases these costs 
overlap with adjustment costs and have not been presented separately to avoid overlaps and double counting. Both one-off and ongoing 
administrative costs were considered where relevant. 

Business adjustment and administrative costs Part 1 (Cluster I): 

Type of cost 

Business  stakeholder 
affected* 

PO1A 

PO1B 

PO2A 

PO2B 

PO3A 

PO3B 

PO4 

Business adjustment costs 

127 

 
 
 
 
 
One-off 

Ongoing (15 years) 

Producers 
(manufacturers) - EU 

Traders 
retail, importers) 

(wholesale, 

69,429,972 

52,260,804 

52,260,402 

26,130,402 

44,732,766 

44,732,766 

28,195,789 

34,746,486 

35,358,113 

35,358,113 

17,679,056 

105,900,323 

105,900,323 

63,088,179 

Repair services 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

TOTAL 

104,239,458 

87,618,917 

87,618,917 

43,809,458 

150,633,089 

150,633,089 

91,283,968 

Producers 
(manufacturers) - EU 

Traders 
retail, importers) 

(wholesale, 

226,859,415 

226,859,415 

865,163,860 

839,927,375 

28,435,327 

63,979,486 

3,503,569 

531,296,829 

531,206,829 

1,177,582,366 

133,680,769 

49,483,644 

111,338,199 

133,691,382 

Repair services 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

TOTAL 

758,066,244 

758,066,244 

2,042,746,226 

973,608,144 

77,918,971 

175,317,685 

137,194,951 

Business administrative costs 

One-off 

Ongoing (annual) 

Producers 
(manufacturers) - EU 

Traders 
retail, importers) 

(wholesale, 

Repair services 

TOTAL 

Producers 
(manufacturers) - EU 

0 

0 

- 

0 

0 

0 

- 

0 

0 

0 

- 

0 

0 

0 

- 

0 

0 

0 

- 

0 

0 

0 

- 

0 

0 

0 

- 

0 

128 

 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Traders 
retail, importers) 

(wholesale, 

Repair services 

TOTAL 

0 

0 

- 

0 

0 

- 

0 

0 

- 

0 

0 

- 

0 

0 

- 

0 

0 

- 

0 

0 

- 

Business adjustment and administrative costs Part 2:  

Type of cost 

Business stakeholder affected 

PO6C 

PO6D 

PO6B 

PO5A 

Business adjustment costs 

One-off 

Producers (manufacturers) - EU 

7,106,581 

505,679,064 

Traders 
importers) 

(wholesale, 

retail, 

37,904,648 

168,766,299 

- 

- 

60,915,788 

45,707,583 

Repair services 

TOTAL 

- 

- 

475,389,670 

- 

45,011,229 

674,445,362 

475,389,670 

106,623,372 

Ongoing (15 years) 

Producers (manufacturers) - EU 

582,104,346 

3,261,834,396 

Traders 
importers) 

(wholesale, 

retail, 

Repair services 

TOTAL 

0 

- 

0 

- 

- 

- 

91,373,682 

68,561,375 

5,892,824,854 

- 

582,104,346 

3,261,834,396 

5,892,824,854 

159,935,057 

129 

 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Business administrative cost 

One-off 

Producers (manufacturers) - EU 

2,907,681 

68,928,673 

Traders 
importers) 

(wholesale, 

retail, 

66,910,529 

92,861,765 

Repair services  

- 

- 

TOTAL 

69,818,210 

161,790,438 

Ongoing (15 years) 

Producers (manufacturers) - EU 

Traders 
importers) 

(wholesale, 

retail, 

Repair services 

TOTAL 

0 

0 

- 

0 

0 

0 

- 

0 

- 

- 

0 

0 

- 

- 

- 

0 

- 

- 

- 

0 

- 

- 

- 

0 

Business adjustment and administrative costs Part 3: 

Type of cost 

Business stakeholder affected 

PO5B 

PO7 

PO5C 

PO6A 

Combined (PO1A, PO6C, PO6B, 
PO5A, PO5B, PO6A) 

Business adjustment costs 

One-off 

Producers (manufacturers) - EU 

- 

- 

- 

- 

137.515.342 

130 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Traders 
importers) 

(wholesale, 

retail, 

Repair services 

TOTAL 

Ongoing (15 years) 

Producers (manufacturers) - EU 

Traders 
importers) 

(wholesale, 

retail, 

Repair services 

TOTAL 

Business administrative costs 

One-off 

Producers (manufacturers) - EU 

Traders 
importers) 

(wholesale, 

retail, 

Repair services 

TOTAL 

Ongoing (15 years) 

Producers (manufacturers) - EU 

- 

- 

0 

- 

- 

- 

0 

- 

- 

- 

0 

- 

- 

- 

0 

- 

- 

- 

0 

- 

- 

- 

0 

- 

- 

- 

0 

- 

- 

- 

0 

- 

- 

- 

0 

- 

- 

- 

0 

- 

- 

- 

0 

- 

- 

- 

0 

- 

118.358.718 

475,389,670 

731.263.729 

900.337.443 

599.768.204 

5,892,824,854  

7.392.930.501 

2,907,681  

66,910,529  

0 

69,818,210  

0 

131 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Traders 
importers) 

(wholesale, 

retail, 

Repair services 

TOTAL 

- 

- 

0 

- 

- 

0 

- 

- 

0 

- 

- 

0 

0 

0 

0 

132 

 
 
 
 
 
1.4. Consumers 

Consumer savings take account of the average share of defects product owners experienced 
and  the  share  of  repaired  products  in  each  product  category  included  in  the  sample  of  7 
products. These figures are then extrapolated for the whole economy. They are also linked to 
the willingness of consumers to take up the policy options and the projected impacts as a result 
of increased repair or use of refurbished goods. The calculations of consumer savings reflect 
the  different  set-up  and  effects  of  policy  options  in  Clusters  I  and  II.  Thus,  two  different 
methods198  are  used  for  each  cluster:  avoided  purchases/production  (units)  and  products 
additionally repaired (units).  

The indicator of avoided number of purchases/production in units is used for the purpose of 
comparison of policy options in cluster I as regards their impacts on consumer savings. Cluster 
I options that result in consumer savings achieve this by offering consumers remedies for a 
defect  for a longer liability period. Thus, consumers avoid  purchases of new goods and the 
associated costs in an extended liability period, thanks to the free remedies that they get (in the 
form  of  repair  or  refurbished  goods).  The  consumer  savings  come  from  not  buying  a  new 
product and obtaining a repaired or a refurbished product from the seller within the liability 
period instead. In the case of PO4 the price difference for refurbished products is considered. 
Some Cluster I options do not result in any consumer savings because they do not extend the 
liability period, but change the type of remedy that consumers would receive within the same 
period  (i.e.  repair  instead  of  replacement  with  new  goods  or  replacement  with  refurbished 
products instead of replacement with new goods).  

Applying  the  indicator  of  number  of  avoided  purchases  was  not  considered  sufficiently 
accurate  for  Cluster  II  options.  As  this  indicator  and  calculation  approach  links  consumer 
savings  to  the  length  of  the  life-time  extension  of  goods  as  a  result  of  repair,  it  presents 
consumer savings in a long term perspective with a delayed effect. This causes a mismatch in 
view of the market failure, which is estimated with an immediate effect for every year and is 
particularly relevant for cluster II options, because the large majority of defects appear beyond 
the legal guarantee (and are tackled by cluster II options). While consumer detriment occurs 
immediately as a result of failed repair every year, consumer benefits under this approach are 
estimated to occur only in the long term as a result of longer use of repaired goods. In practice 
though,  repair  gives  immediate  positive  impacts  on  consumer  savings,  because  consumers 

198 The relationship between the two methods is: The estimated additional repair is based on the current repair 
rates for products in the sample (obtained from the consumer survey), then extrapolated to the whole economy, 
as well as the willingness to repair more due to the proposed measure. The number of avoided purchases is based 
on the  number of additionally repaired products, but then the lifetime extension factor is applied (per product 
group in the sample, extrapolated for the whole economy). The lifetime extension after repair differs per product 
group (e.g. 1 year for mobile phone, 4 years for a fridge, 5 years for furniture). Applying the factor of lifetime 
extension results in a significant reduction of the number of avoided purchases/production in units compared to 
the number of additionally repaired products. Then, additionally, a discount with recurrent defect rates happening 
directly after repair is applied. 

133 

 
 
                                                 
 
retain the saved amount from the avoided new purchase already at the point of repair and could 
spend it on other goods or invest it for other purposes. 

Therefore, another indicator - number of additionally repaired products - was introduced for 
the  purpose  of  comparison  of  policy  options  in  cluster  II  as  regards  impacts  on  consumer 
savings. All Cluster II options result in consumer savings. Consumer savings are linked to the 
additional number of products that consumers decide to repair or in the case of PO7 - from the 
purchase of refurbished goods at lower cost compared to new goods. The approach to consumer 
savings in cluster II assumes that consumers save immediately by not buying new goods but 
repairing their acquired goods. Consumer savings result already at the point of repair from the 
difference between the price of new goods (not purchased) minus the cost of repair. Repair 
gives immediate positive impacts on consumer savings, because consumers retain the saved 
amount from the avoided new purchase already at the point of repair and could spend it on 
other goods or invest it for other purposes. By repairing their products at any point in time, 
consumers  prolong  their  lifetime.  Having  made  the  investment  in  repair,  consumers  are 
expected to use their products longer and achieve significant savings as a result of longer use 
of their acquired products instead of buying new ones. This method better reflects the impacts 
of Cluster II options, where consumers repair at their own cost and their immediate savings 
directly result from the repair action. The calculations (except for PO7) also take account of 
the costs consumers would pay for repair (formula: change in consumer purchases (decrease) 
-  repair  costs  for  consumers  =  consumer  savings).  In  the  case  of  PO7  the  price  difference 
between new and refurbished goods is considered. The method for cluster II presents the full 
consumer  savings  for  a  given  time-frame,  reflecting  savings  for  each  year  within  the  time-
horizon  of  15  years.  Because  the  number  of  additionally  repaired  consumer  goods  is  high, 
especially for a period of 15 years, consumer savings are also high. 

The estimates of consumer savings under both approaches were also considered in the light of 
the market failure estimate. While the market failure cannot be lower than EUR 5 billion a year, 
it is probably rather in the range between EUR 5 and 25 billion/year, meaning that the NPV 
over 15 years would be between EUR 62.48 billion and EUR 307.4 billion overall. Consumer 
savings are plausible with respect to the order of magnitude of annual consumer expenditure 
and the scale of the market failure, as well as to the qualitative analysis of policy options. While 
the link between the market failure and consumer savings has not been explicitly modelled, the 
qualitative  assessment  suggests  that  the  preferred  options  package  effectively  addresses  the 
factors which cause the market failure. Therefore, also the consumer savings should be of a 
comparable order of magnitude to the avoided consumer detriment the market failure generates. 
The consumer savings  estimated (EUR 176.5 billion for 15  years) fit in  a plausible manner 
within this  range. Moreover, it is  more plausible  also  in  view of the order of magnitude of 
consumer expenditure on consumer goods (the value of repairable consumer durables in a year 
is EUR 792 billion). While the EUR 176.6 billion estimate may appear a massive benefit, it 
results in a yearly average consumer savings of EUR 25, when accounting for the 15 year 
time-span, number of consumers in the EU and the numbers of repaired goods. 

134 

 
 
 
 
 
2.  SOCIAL IMPACTS  

The key social impact identified is the impact on employment. The employment figures relate 
to jobs - both as regards employment in companies and self-employed activities, notably by 
self-employed repairers.  

The  impacts  on  employment  are  linked  to  variations  in  turnover  for  different  types  of 
businesses  and  related  impacts  on  personnel  costs.  For  instance,  a  decrease  in  turnover  for 
traders and producers is likely to result in cuts in personnel costs in these sectors. Conversely, 
an  increase  in  turnover  for  repairers  is  likely  to  result  in  growth  in  jobs  or  self-employed 
activities in the sector. The estimation of employment impacts departed from modelled changes 
in turnover yielded (using structural business statistics from Eurostat on turnover, GVA, gross 
operating  surplus  and  personnel  costs  for  the  sectors  concerned).  The  calculated  annual 
personnel cost changes in each sector have been translated into potential job losses or gains by 
using an average annual labour cost.  

The  estimated  job  loss  is  a  stock  indicator  reflecting  a  one-off  loss  of  jobs  (assuming  the 
impacts of the measures have fully unfolded) and are not aggregated. At the same time, the 
personnel cost savings are a flow indicator and should be aggregated over the 15-year time 
period. 

135 

 
 
 
15-year personnel costs 

Employment – personnel cost 

Policy options 

EU producers 

EU traders 

EU repairers 

TOTAL 

PO1A 

PO1B 

PO2A 

PO2B 

PO3A 

PO3B 

PO4 

PO5A 

PO5B 

PO5C 

PO6A 

PO6B 

PO6C 

PO6D 

0 

0 

-65,686,823 

-9,183,589 

-18,585,768 

0 

-70,678,921 

-42,704,209 

-143,053,610 

-71,102,703 

-85,407,023 

-286,091,562 

-128,404,630 

-324,516,997 

-3,646,987,503 

3,164,402,062 

-482,585,441 

-3,646,987,503 

3,164,402,062 

-482,585,441 

-458,062,979 

-34,534,152 

-69,890,546 

0 

-126,038,727 

-180,449,450 

-604,505,657 

-476,765,413 

-360,898,900 

532,592,983 

85,666,028 

173,372,670 

390,093,774 

573,071,564 

459,631,690 

1,539,873,559 

948,109,480 

919,290,658 

8,843,181 

41,948,287 

84,896,356 

390,093,774 

376,353,916 

236,478,032 

792,314,292 

400,241,364 

472,984,735 

-1,209,011,314 

3,080,053,626 

1,584,950,750 

-861,024,104 

1,712,417,035 

722,988,301 

-1,371,415,818 

3,493,885,650 

1,797,952,834 

136 

 
 
PO7 

Jobs 

POs 

PO1A 

PO1B 

PO2A 

PO2B 

PO3A 

PO3B 

PO4 

PO5A 

PO5B 

PO5C 

PO6A 

PO6B 

PO6C 

PO6D 

-13,451,976 

-56,841,577 

144,781,040 

74,487,488 

Producers in the EU 

Traders in the EU 

EU repairers 

Employment – jobs  

0 

0 

-175 

-24 

-50 

0 

-188 

-114 

-381 

-190 

-228 

-763 

-342 

-865 

-9,725 

-9,725 

-1,222 

-92 

-186 

0 

-336 

-481 

-1,612 

-1,271 

-962 

-3,224 

-2,296 

-3,657 

8,438 

8,438 

1,420 

228 

462 

1,040 

1,528 

1,226 

4,106 

2,528 

2,451 

8,213 

4,566 

9,317 

TOTAL 

-1,287 

-1,287 

24 

112 

226 

1,040 

1,004 

631 

2,113 

1,067 

1,261 

4,227 

1,928 

4,795 

137 

 
 
 
PO7 

-36 

-152 

386 

199 

4. IMPACTS ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 

The impacts on public administration concern enforcement and implementation costs. Enforcement costs have been calculated taking account of 
the type and number of economic operators concerned. For instance, some options concern sellers of consumer goods (PO1), other options concern 
only producers (PO5A, PO6C and PO6D), while others concern repairers (PO6B). The various enforcement and implementation activities that 
have been considered are presented in the tables below. The costs have been calculated for all options, focusing on an annual average calculated 
for a period of 15 years.  

1. Enforcement and implementation costs for PO1A, 1B, 2A, 2B and PO4: 

Category 

Cost items and assumptions 

based 

% 
Eurostat data 

on 

PO1A 

PO1B 

PO2A 

PO2B 

PO4 

Assumptions 

FTE - per MS (inspections) 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

Stakeholders affected: 

Producers (manufacturers, importers) - all 

Producers (manufacturers, importers) - Ecodesign 

Sellers (traders) - all products 

Sellers (traders) - second hand 

Repair services 

Manufacturers/sellers that offer repair services 

24% 

5% 

68% 

1% 

2% 

57% 

100% 

100% 

100% 

100% 

100% 

138 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enforcement (one-off) 

No. of familiarisation hours 

Labour cost per hour (EU average) [EUR] 

Total familiarisation cost (per MS) [EUR] 

Total familiarisation cost (EU) [EUR] 

8 

29 

464 

8 

29 

464 

8 

29 

464 

8 

29 

464 

8 

29 

464 

Total familiarisation cost (total) [EUR] 

12,528 

12,528 

12,528 

12,528 

12,528 

Enforcement (ongoing)  Operational (inspections) - per FTE [EUR] 

50,000 

50,000 

50,000 

50,000 

50,000 

Yearly monitoring cost (EU level) [EUR] 

Total enforcement cost (per MS) [EUR] 

68,378 

68,378 

68,378 

68,378 

Total enforcement cost (EU level) [EUR] 

0 

0 

0 

0 

600 

0 

Total enforcement cost [EUR] 

1,846,209 

1,846,209 

1,846,209 

1,846,209 

16,195 

Implementation costs 

Platform development (one-off) [EUR] 

Maintenance (ongoing) [EUR] 

Awareness raising (one-off) [EUR]  

500,000 

500,000 

500,000 

500,000 

500,000 

Total one-off costs (EU27 and EU level) - yearly average [EUR] 

512,528 

512,528 

512,528 

512,528 

512,528 

Total ongoing costs (EU27 and EU level) [EUR] 

27,693,138 

27,693,138  

27,693,138 

27,693,138 

242,922 

TOTAL (annual average all MS and EU) [EUR]  

28,205,666 

28,205,666 

28,205,666 

755,450 € 

28,205,666 

139 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Enforcement and implementation costs for PO3A, PO3B, PO6C, PO6D, PO6B and PO7: 

Category 

Cost items and assumptions 

based 

% 
Eurostat data 

on 

PO3A 

PO3B 

PO6B 

PO6C 

PO6D 

PO7 

Assumptions 

FTE - per MS (inspections) 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

Stakeholders affected: 

Producers (manufacturers, importers) - all 

24% 

100% 

Producers 
Ecodesign 

(manufacturers, 

importers) 

- 

5% 

100% 

Sellers (traders) - all products 

Sellers (traders) - second hand 

Repair services 

Manufacturers/sellers 
services 

100% 

100% 

68% 

1% 

2% 

100% 

100% 

that  offer 

repair 

57% 

Enforcement (one-off) 

No. of familiarisation hours 

Labour cost per hour (EU average) [EUR] 

Total familiarisation cost (per MS) [EUR] 

Total familiarisation cost (EU) [EUR] 

8 

29 

464 

8 

29 

32 

29 

32 

29 

32 

29 

464 

1,856 

1,856 

1,856 

Total familiarisation cost (total) [EUR] 

12,528 

12,528 

50,112 

50,112 

50,112 

50,112 

140 

 
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Enforcement (ongoing) 

Operational (inspections) - per FTE [EUR] 

50,000 

50,000 

50,000 

50,000 

50,000 

Yearly monitoring cost (EU level) [EUR] 

100,000 

100,000 

100,000 

Total enforcement cost (per MS) [EUR] 

68,378 

68,378 

58,943 

4,798 

23,992 

Total enforcement cost (EU level) [EUR] 

0 

0 

100,000 

100,000 

100,000 

Total enforcement cost [EUR] 

1,846,209 

1,846,209 

1,691,465 

229,559 

747,793 

60,245 

Implementation costs 

Platform development (one-off) 

Maintenance (ongoing) 

375,000 

150,000 

Awareness raising (one-off) [EUR] 

500,000 

500,000 

1,000,000 

1,000,000  

1,000,000 

250,000 

Total one-off costs (EU27 and EU level) - yearly average [EUR] 

512,528  

512,528 

1,050,112 

1,050,112 

1,050,112  

675.112 € 

Total ongoing costs (EU27 and EU level) [EUR] 

27,693,138 

27,693,138 

3,443,378 

25,371,971 
€ 

11,216,891 

TOTAL (annual average all MS and EU level) [EUR] 

28,205,666 

28,205,666 

4,493,490 

12,267,003 

26,422,083 

3.153.671 
€ 

3.828.783 
€ 

3. Implementation and enforcement costs for PO5A, PO5B, PO5C and PO6A: 

Category 

Cost items and assumptions 

based 

% 
Eurostat data 

on 

PO5A 

PO5B 

PO5C 

PO6A 

Assumptions 

FTE - per MS (inspections) 

2 

2 

2 

141 

 
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
100% 

Stakeholders affected: 

Producers (manufacturers, importers) - all 

Producers 
Ecodesign 

(manufacturers, 

importers) 

- 

Sellers (traders) - all products 

Sellers (traders) - second hand 

Repair services 

24% 

5% 

68% 

1% 

2% 

Manufacturers/sellers that offer repair services 

57% 

100% 

100% 

Enforcement (one-off) 

No. of familiarisation hours 

Labour cost per hour (EU average) [EUR] 

32 

29 

32 

29 

32 

29 

29 

Total familiarisation cost (per MS) [EUR] 

1,856 

1,856 

Total familiarisation cost (EU) [EUR] 

1,856 

1,856 

Total familiarisation cost (total) [EUR]  

50,112 

50,112 

1,856 

1,856 

Enforcement (ongoing) 

Operational (inspections) - per FTE [EUR] 

50,000 

50,000 

Yearly monitoring cost (EU level) [EUR] 

100,000 

100,000 

100,000 

Total enforcement cost (per MS) [EUR] 

23,992 

2,231 

 0 

0 

Total enforcement cost (EU level) [EUR] 

100,000 

0 

100,000 

100,000 

142 

 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
  
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
Total enforcement cost [EUR] 

747,793 

60,245 

100,000 

100,000 

Implementation costs 

Platform development (one-off) [EUR] 

Maintenance (ongoing) [EUR] 

7,500,000 

500,000 

1,500,000 

100,000 

Awareness raising (one-off) [EUR] 

1,000,000 

1,000,000 

1,000,000 

1,000,000 

Total one-off costs (EU27 and EU level) - yearly average [EUR] 

1,050,112 

8,550,112 

1,501,856 

1,001,856 

Total ongoing costs (EU27 and EU level) [EUR] 

11,216,891 

23,403,671 

3,000,000 

1,500,000 

TOTAL (annual average all MS and EU level) [EUR] 

12,267,003 

31,953,783 

4,501,856 

2,501,856 

143 

 
 
  
  
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
III.  ASSESSMENT OF COHERENCE 
Coherence  has  been  assessed  qualitatively  for  each  option  and  respective  qualitative  scores 
have been awarded for the comparison of options below. Coherence has been considered at 
three levels:  

In terms of broader key EU priorities (such as the EU Green Deal, digital transition) 

- 
-  Relevant initiatives: ESPR and Empowering consumers initiative  
-  Applicable EU legislation, notably EU consumer law. 

Coherence of rules at national level as well as coherence of outcomes for consumers in the 
same situation have been also been taken into account where relevant.   

IV.  COMPARISON OF OPTIONS 

The options are grouped in two clusters, which address the two different problems. The options 
are not mutually exclusive as each tackles different drivers and aspects of the problems. The 
comparison of options has been carried out based on a cost-benefit analysis (CBA), presented 
in section 7 of the IA report, as well as a multi-criteria analysis (MCA). Both the CBA and the 
MCA underpin the comparison of the impacts of policy options and respectively the selection 
of the preferred policy option package.  

The CBA includes only monetised impacts (costs and benefits of the policy options), which 
can be directly summed up to obtain the net benefit of an individual option and of the preferred 
policy package as a whole (total benefits – total costs).  

MCA is a more complex assessment tool than the CBA, as both quantitative and qualitative 
impacts  can  be  considered  by  standardising  the  results  and  applying  a  weight  scheme.  The 
MCA includes all the costs and benefits considered in the CBA, plus other quantitative and 
qualitative  impacts  (coherence,  consumer  decision-making,  consumer  trust  and  protection). 
Almost  all  impacts  reflected  in  the  MCA  could  be  monetised,  to  ensure  robustness  and 
comparability of the data. Only two sub-criteria under the assessment of effectiveness could 
not be quantified and are assessed qualitatively based on the legal assessment of these options: 
consumer trust and protection and coherence with other EU legislation. The consumer decision-
making  sub-criterion  has  been  quantified  based  on  the  indicators  used  for  the  estimates  of 
consumer  savings:  number  of  avoided  purchases  in  Cluster  I  and  number  of  additionally 
repaired products in Cluster II. 

The MCA has three high-level assessment criteria:  

- Effectiveness incorporates both qualitative and quantitative impacts.  

- Efficiency incorporates only quantifiable impacts.  

- Coherence with other EU legislation is assessed only qualitatively.  

The MCA analysis presented in the main report is based on the scenario with a most balanced 
distribution of weights (indicated as the ‘selected scenario’ in the MCA tables). This scenario 
was  also  selected  to  ensure  that  all  criteria  and  sub-criteria  are  covered  and  that  costs  and 

144 

 
 
 
 
 
benefits have equal weights.199 The chosen scenario awards the same weight (33%) to all three 
criteria  (effectiveness,  efficiency,  coherence)200.  It  also  ensures  a  balanced  distribution  of 
weights  among  different  stakeholder  groups  and  sub-criteria:  (i)  under  sub-criteria  under 
effectiveness,  it  reaches  a  balances  the  weights  awarded  to  consumers  and  society/  the 
environment201;  (ii)  under  efficiency,  it  ensures  balance  between  the  sub-criteria  related  to 
consumers and business. The MCA avoids duplications of criteria in estimates of impacts on 
effectiveness and efficiency, by applying all environmental sub-criteria under the effectiveness 
criterion. In addition, only the sub-criteria producing significant impacts are included, with a 
focus on the quantified sub-criteria. A sensitivity analysis has been carried out additionally. It 
considered  seven  alternative  scenarios,  awarding  different  weights  to  the  three  criteria  of 
effectiveness, efficiency and coherence and to the sub-criteria under them.202 The purpose was 
to verify that the ranking of the options does not change significantly when the weights are 
modified. The results indeed confirm this. 

199 The sub-criteria corresponding to benefits under efficiency are consumer savings, savings in production costs, 
change in employment, and growth and investment (in Europe - GVA traders, producers, repairers), each of which 
has a weight of 12.5%. Thus, the overall weight of benefits under efficiency is 50%. Likewise, the sub-criteria 
corresponding  to  costs  under  efficiency  are  business  adjustment  costs,  business  administrative  costs,  and 
implementation and enforcement costs, each of which has a weight of 16.67%. Thus, the overall weight of costs 
under efficiency is 50.01%. 
200 This allocation of weights follows the recommendation in the BR Guidelines to give equal weights (33%) to 
the three high-level criteria of effectiveness, efficiency and coherence.  
201  The  two  consumer-related  sub-criteria  under  effectiveness  are  consumer  decision-making  process  and 
consumer trust and protection. In the scenario selected, each of these sub-criteria is awarded a weight of 25%. 
Thus, overall, the consumer-related sub-criteria under effectiveness have a weight of 50%. The three environment-
related  sub-criteria  under  effectiveness  are  resource  savings,  waste  savings  and  CO2  savings.  In  the  scenario 
selected, each of these sub-criteria is awarded a weight of 17%. Thus, overall, the environment-related sub-criteria 
under effectiveness have a weight of 51%. 
202 IA Study, Annex 3.3. Weights 

145 

 
 
                                                 
The table below illustrates the weights given to all impacts criteria assessed under this study: 

MCA weights 

Weight scenarios for sensitivity analysis 
Effectiveness 

Fostering the efficient use of resources (renewable & non-
renewable) (resource savings in tons) 

Selected 
scenario 
33% 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

33% 

33% 

33% 

40% 

40% 

40% 

40% 

Society 

17% 

27% 

20% 

27% 

27% 

17% 

20% 

27% 

Waste production, generation and recycling (waste savings) 

Society 

Contribute to fighting climate change (CO2 emissions savings)  Society 

Consumer decision-making process 

Consumer trust and protection 

Consumers 

Consumers 

17% 

17% 

25% 

25% 

27% 

27% 

10% 

10% 

20% 

20% 

20% 

20% 

27% 

27% 

10% 

10% 

27% 

27% 

10% 

10% 

17% 

20% 

17% 

20% 

25% 

20% 

25% 

20% 

27% 

27% 

10% 

10% 

Efficiency 

Consumer savings 

33% 

33% 

33% 

33% 

40% 

40% 

40% 

40% 

Consumers 

12,50% 

12,50% 

50,00% 

71,17% 

12,50% 

12,50% 

50,00% 

71,17% 

Savings in production costs for manufacturers 

Businesses 

12,50% 

12,50% 

8,33% 

13,85% 

12,50% 

12,50% 

8,33% 

13,85% 

Change in employment 

Society 

12,50% 

12,50% 

8,33% 

1,60% 

12,50% 

12,50% 

8,33% 

1,60% 

Growth and investment (in Europe - GVA traders, producers, 
repairers) 

Businesses 

12,50% 

12,50% 

8,33% 

2,53% 

12,50% 

12,50% 

8,33% 

2,53% 

Business adjustment costs 

Businesses 

16,67% 

16,67% 

8,33% 

5,67% 

16,67% 

16,67% 

8,33% 

5,67% 

Business administrative costs 

Businesses 

16,67% 

16,67% 

8,33% 

0,14% 

16,67% 

16,67% 

8,33% 

0,14% 

146 

 
 
 
  
  
Implementation and enforcement costs 

Public 
administration 

16,67% 

16,67% 

8,33% 

0,03% 

16,67% 

16,67% 

8,33% 

0,03% 

Coherence 

33% 

33% 

33% 

33% 

20% 

20% 

20% 

20% 

Coherence with other EU legislation 

100% 

100% 

100% 

100% 

100% 

100% 

100% 

100% 

MCA Results for sensitivity analysis 

PO1A – Prioritising repair when it is cheaper than replacement 

PO1B – Repair as the primary remedy 

PO2A – Incentivise consumers with longer liability period 

PO2B – extending the liability period for repair 

PO3A - Replacement with refurbished goods in the extended liability period 

Selected 
scenario 

2,19 

1,98 

1,63 

1,62 

1,25 

PO3B - Replacement with refurbished goods from the second year of the liability period 

1,18 

PO4 - Aligning the liability period for refurbished goods with new goods 

PO5A – Obligation to inform where to repair 

1,99 

1,56 

1 

2,74 

2,66 

1,67 

1,51 

1,22 

1,30 

2,04 

1,53 

2 

2,48 

2,32 

1,88 

1,73 

1,38 

1,31 

2,04 

1,67 

3 

3,13 

3,05 

2,04 

1,78 

1,46 

1,48 

1,99 

1,72 

4 

5 

6 

7 

2,29 

1,63 

1,98 

2,76 

2,19 

1,38 

1,78 

2,66 

1,00 

1,02 

1,25 

1,45 

0,81 

0,95 

1,08 

1,14 

0,66 

0,72 

0,86 

0,96 

0,76 

0,62 

0,77 

0,98 

1,44 

1,46 

1,45 

1,39 

1,03 

1,07 

1,21 

1,27 

PO5B – A matchmaking platform with information on available repair services at national 
level 

1,74 

1,71 

2,08 

2,27 

1,46 

1,49 

1,90 

2,12 

PO5C – A matchmaking platform on repair at EU level 

PO6A – Voluntary commitments to an EU common “easy repair standard” 

1,03 

1,57 

1,06 

1,56 

1,22 

1,70 

1,30 

1,75 

0,87 

0,87 

1,06 

1,16 

1,27 

1,28 

1,44 

1,50 

PO6B – Obligation to issue a binding repair quote on price and conditions for repair in a 
standard form 

3,09 

3,10 

3,78 

4,07 

2,72 

2,71 

3,53 

3,88 

147 

 
 
  
  
 
PO6C – Producer’s obligation to repair goods that are subject to reparability requirements 
under EU law (against a price)  

2,33 

2,31 

2,71 

2,85 

1,77 

1,85 

2,25 

2,42 

PO6D – Producer’s obligation to repair all products (against a price)  

PO7 - Platform with refurbished goods via a functionality under PO5B or PO5C 

0,70 

1,14 

0,67 

1,09 

1,45 

1,15 

1,80 

1,13 

1,40 

1,43 

2,34 

2,76 

0,71 

0,77 

0,78 

0,76 

The tables below provide a detailed overview of the MCA and CBA results for all POs, respectively in Cluster I and Cluster II. 

Cluster I: MCA results 

High-level criteria 

Stakeholders 
affected 

Sub-criteria / impacts 

PO1A 

PO1B 

PO2A 

PO2B 

PO3A 

PO3B 

PO4 

Coherence 

Coherence  with  other 
EU legislation 

5 

5 

5 

5 

4 

4 

5 

Effectiveness 

Consumers 

Consumer 
decision-
making process (number 
of avoided purchases) 

170.480.857 

170.480.857 

28.698.162 

5.146.385 

10.415.303 

23.434.433 

30.879.222 

Effectiveness 

Consumers 

Consumer 
protection 

trust 

and 

-1 

-3 

1 

2 

1 

-1 

1 

148 

 
 
 
 
  
Effectiveness 

Society 

Effectiveness 

Society 

Effectiveness 

Society 

Fostering  the  efficient 
resources 
use 
of 
(renewable  & 
non-
renewable) 
(resource 
savings in tons) 

production, 
Waste 
generation and recycling 
(waste savings) 

Contribute  to  fighting 
climate  change 
(CO2 
emissions savings) 

661.597 

661.597 

111.371 

15.785 

31.946 

71.879 

119.835 

1.046.344 

1.046.344 

176.138 

26.772 

54.182 

121.910 

189.524 

5.322.067 

5.322.067 

895.899 

143.272 

289.955 

652.400 

963.987 

Efficiency 

Businesses 

Business 
costs 

adjustment 

862.305.702 

845.685.161 

2.130.365.143 

1.017.417.
602 

228.552.060 

325.950.774 

228.478.919 

Efficiency 

Businesses 

Business  administrative 
costs 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

Efficiency 

Public 
administration 

Implementation 
enforcement costs 

and 

28.205.666 

28.205.666 

28.205.666 

28.205.66
6 

28.205.666 

28.205.666 

755.450 

Efficiency 

Businesses 

Savings  in  production 
costs for manufacturers 

15.558.115.
736 

15.558.115.
736 

2.606.621.739 

0 

0 

1.994.019.3

-

Efficiency 

Consumers 

Consumer  welfare  and 
detriment 
(consumer 
savings) 

0 

0 

5.388.976.229 

406.284.1
40 

822.241.712 

08 

0 

776.480.296 

1.518.275.8

14 

149 

 
 
Society 

Change in employment 

-1.287 

-1.287 

24 

112 

226 

1.040 

1.004 

Businesses 

Growth  and  investment 
-  GVA 
(in  Europe 
producers, 
traders, 
repairers) 

-
827.938.061 

-
827.938.061 

12.726.876 

68.672.14
0 

138.980.913 

623.861.785 

596.320.073 

Efficiency 

Efficiency 

Cluster I: CBA 

High-level criteria 

Stakeholders 
affected 

Sub-criteria / 
impacts 

Source 

Direction 
(benefit = 1, 
cost = -1) 

PO1A 

PO1B 

PO2A 

PO2B 

PO3A 

PO3B  PO4 

Efficiency 

Businesses 

Efficiency 

Businesses 

Savings in production 
costs for 
manufacturers 

economic 
impacts 

Growth and 
investment (in Europe 
- GVA traders, 
producers, repairers) 

economic 
impacts 

Efficiency 

Consumers 

 Consumer savings 

Effectiveness 

Society 

Monetised resource 
savings 

based on 
the 
economic 
impacts  

environme
ntal 
impacts 

1  15.558.1
15.736 

15.558.11
5.736 

2.606.621.
739 

0 

0 

1 

-
827.938.
061 

-
827.938.0
61 

12.726.87
6 

68.672.1
40 

138.980.
913 

1.994.
019.3
08 

-
776.480.
296 

623.8
61.78
5 

596.320.
073 

1 

0 

0 

5.388.976.
229 

406.284.
140 

822.241.
712 

0 

1.518.27
5.814 

1  341.732.

598 

341.732.5
98 

57.526.09
2 

9.187.73
6 

18.594.2
27 

41.83
7.012 

61.898.0
75 

150 

 
 
 
 
Effectiveness 

Society 

Effectiveness 

Society 

Efficiency 

Businesses 

Monetised waste 
savings 

Monetised CO2 
emissions savings 

Business adjustment 
costs 

Efficiency 

Businesses 

Business 
administrative costs 

Efficiency 

Public 
administration 

Implementation and 
enforcement costs 

Efficiency 

Society 

Change in 
employment 
(measured as 
personnel costs)  

environme
ntal 
impacts 

environme
ntal 
impacts 

business 
costs 
assessmen
t 

business 
costs 
assessmen
t 

estimate 
of 
enforceme
nt costs 

economic 
impacts 

NET BENEFIT 

Cluster II: MCA 

1  170.554.

097 

170.554.0
97 

28.710.49
1 

4.363.90
0 

8.831.70
3 

19.87
1.332 

30.892.4
88 

1  957.972.

121 

957.972.1
21 

161.261.7
37 

25.788.9
79 

52.191.9
82 

-1  862.305.

702 

845.685.1
61 

2.130.365.
143 

1.017.41
7.602 

228.552.
060 

117.4
31.95
9 

325.9
50.77
4 

173.517.
629 

228.478.
919 

-1 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

-1  28.205.6

66 

28.205.66
6 

28.205.66
6 

28.205.6
66 

28.205.6
66 

28.20
5.666 

755.450 

1 

-
482.585.
441 

-
482.585.4
41 

8.843.181 

41.948.2
87 

84.896.3
56 

14.827.3
39.680 

14.843.96
0.222 

6.106.095.
535 

-
489.378.
086 

868.979.
168 

390.0
93.77
4 

2.832.
958.7
29 

376.353.
916 

1.751.54
3.328 

151 

 
 
  
  
  
  
 
High-level criteria 

Stakeholders 
affected 

Sub-criteria / impacts 

PO5A 

PO5B 

PO5C 

PO6A 

PO6B 

PO6D 

PO7 

Coherence 

Coherence  with  other  EU 
legislation 

4 

3 

2 

3 

5 

-3 

3 

Effectiveness 

Consumers 

Consumer  decision-making 
process 
of 
repaired 
additionally 
products) 

(number 

229.727.847 

769.588.286 

60.323.885 

459.455.693 

1.539.176.573 

1.745.931.635 

72.364.272 

Effectiveness 

Consumers 

Consumer 
protection 

trust 

and 

1 

2 

1 

1 

3 

4 

Effectiveness 

Society 

Effectiveness 

Society 

Effectiveness 

Society 

Fostering the efficient use of 
resources (renewable & non-
(resource 
renewable) 
savings in tons) 

Waste 
generation  and 
(waste savings) 

production, 
recycling 

to 
Contribute 
change 
climate 
emissions savings) 

fighting 
(CO2 

76.305 

255.622 

89.625 

152.610 

511.244 

579.919 

134.596 

450.895 

100.972 

269.191 

901.791 

1.022.927 

745.651 

2.497.930 

1.752.543 

1.491.302 

4.995.861 

5.666.947 

Efficiency 

Businesses 

Business adjustment costs 

266.558.429 

Efficiency 

Businesses 

Business 
costs 

administrative 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

6.368.214.524 

3.936.279.758 

0 

161.790.438 

1 

24.036 

42.398 

234.880 

0 

0 

152 

 
 
  
Efficiency 

Public 
administration 

Implementation 
enforcement costs 

and 

12.267.003 

31.953.783 

4.501.856 

2.501.856 

26.422.083 

12.267.003 

Efficiency 

Businesses 

Savings  in  production  costs 
for manufacturers 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

Efficiency 

Consumers 

 Cconsumer savings 

10.515.988.40
6 

35.230.996.
001 

21.728.197.
134 

21.032.595.
233 

70.468.940.87
7 

79.937.037.23
3 

Efficiency 

Society 

Change in employment 

631 

2.113 

1.067 

1.261 

4.227 

4.795 

3.828.783 

0 

1.948.511.5

57 

199 

Efficiency 

Businesses 

Growth  and  investment  (in 
Europe 
traders, 
-  GVA 
producers, repairers) 

373.847.191 

1.252.559.2
21 

433.315.530 

747.737.848 

2.505.606.802 

2.842.329.778 

117.757.177 

Cluster II: CBA 

High-level 
criteria 

Stakeholde
rs affected 

Sub-criteria / 
impacts 

Source 

Efficiency  Businesses 

Efficiency  Businesses 

Savings in 
production costs 
for 
manufacturers 

Growth and 
investment (in 
Europe - GVA 
traders, 

economic 
impacts 

economic 
impacts 

PO5A 

PO5B 

PO5C 

PO6A 

PO6B 

PO6C 

PO6D 

PO7 

Direct
ion 
(benef
it = 1, 
cost = 
-1) 

1 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

1 

373.847.191 

1.252.559.221 

433.315.530 

747.737.848 

2.505.606.802 

782.780.507 

2.842.329.778 

117.757.177 

153 

 
 
 
producers, 
repairers) 

Efficiency  Consumers  Consumer 

welfare and 
detriment 
(consumer 
savings) 

Effective
ness 

Society 

Monetised 
resource savings 

Effective
ness 

Society 

Monetised 
waste savings 

based on 
the 
economic 
impacts  

environme
ntal 
impacts 

environme
ntal 
impacts 

Effective
ness 

Society 

Monetised CO2 
emissions 
savings 

environme
ntal 
impacts 

Efficiency  Businesses 

Business 
adjustment costs 

Efficiency  Businesses 

Business 
administrative 
costs 

business 
costs 
assessmen
t 

business 
costs 
assessmen
t 

Efficiency  Public 

administrat
ion 

Implementation 
and 
enforcement 
costs 

estimate 
of 
enforceme
nt costs 

Efficiency  Society 

Change in 
employment 

economic 
impacts 

1 

10.515.988.
406 

35.230.996.00
1 

21.728.197.
134 

21.032.595.
233 

70.468.940.87
7 

39.244.090.
565 

79.937.037.23
3 

1.948.511.557 

1 

44.902.632 

150.423.818 

99.410.397 

89.805.265 

300.847.637 

179.532.209 

341.260.006 

14.144.329 

1 

21.939.084 

73.495.933 

16.458.459 

43.878.169 

146.991.865 

29.723.486 

166.737.041 

6.910.812 

1 

134.217.156 

449.627.472 

315.457.772 

268.434.311 

899.254.943 

569.707.319 

1.020.050.383 

42.278.404 

-1 

266.558.429 

-1 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

6.368.214.524 

627.115.575 

3.936.279.758 

0 

0 

69.818.210 

161.790.438 

0 

0 

-1 

12.267.003 

31.953.783 

4.501.856 

2.501.856 

26.422.083 

4.493.490 

12.267.003 

3.828.783 

1 

236.478.032 

792.314.292 

400.241.364 

472.984.735 

1.584.950.750 

722.988.301 

1.797.952.834 

74.487.488 

154 

 
 
(measured as 
personnel costs)  

NET 
BENEFI
T 

11.048.547.
069 

37.917.462.95
4 

22.988.578.
801 

22.652.933.
705 

69.511.956.26
8 

40.827.395.
113 

81.995.030.07
7 

2.200.260.984 

155 

 
 
  
  
  
  
V.  PREFERRED OPTION 

The  combined  impacts  of  the  preferred  option  are  shown  in  the  following  table.  When 
combining impacts the following assumptions were taken: 

Coherence: The whole set of measures is coherent with EU legislation and receives the highest 
value for coherence as the selected options have been specifically designed to ensure coherence 
with EU law. As most measures fall outside the SDG, filling for lack of current protection of 
consumers outside the legal guarantee. 

Consumer  decision-making  process:  The  value  of  this  indicator  is  quantified  based  on  the 
overall number of avoided purchases of new products that the combined package will achieve.  

Consumer trust and protection: PO1A might have a negative impact on consumer trust as it 
removes their right to choose for the remedy, in the case where the proportionality test shows 
that repair is  cheaper than replacement and  consumers actually prefer to  have their product 
replaced. The negative effect is balanced out by the other measures within the package which 
shall improve consumer trust and protection outside the legal guarantee.   

Business adjustment and administrative costs: Can be mostly added up. Small savings in costs 
between PO5A and PO6C can be achieved, as PO5A will inform consumers of the obligation 
to repair where it exists. PO6B can be fully added as different types of stakeholders are affected. 

Implementation and enforcement costs: Most costs can be added up, but savings are achieved 
in awareness raising expenditure (a total of EUR 106 million by eliminating overlaps).  

Environmental  impacts,  Consumer  welfare,  Employment,  Growth  and  investment:  Can  be 
added up, as different types of stakeholders are affected by PO1A, PO6C and PO6B. PO6B, 
PO5B  and  PO6A  affect  the  same  categories  of  stakeholders.  However,  these  measures  are 
implemented independently and take-up of repairs might not entail overlaps. For instance, the 
platform targets consumers that search for repair information online, while the repair quote and 
voluntary commitments target consumers at large but overlaps are difficult to assess due to lack 
of data.  

Impacts on third countries are presented in annex 6. They have not been included in the MCA. 
They concern mainly third country manufacturers and do not have a direct relevance for the 
assessment of impacts of options in the EU. Adding the impacts in most of the criteria is  a 
choice  that  was  made  consistently,  for  the  costs  (e.g.  adjustment  costs),  as  well  as  for  the 
benefits (consumer savings). 

156 

 
 
 
Preferred options: MCA 

High-level criteria 

Coherence 

Stakeholders affected 

Sub-criteria / impacts 

Weights 

Preferred  options  Combined 
(PO1A, 
PO5A, PO5B, PO6A, PO6B, PO6C, PO7) 

Coherence with other EU legislation 

33,33% 

5 

Effectiveness 

Consumers 

Consumer decision-making process 

Effectiveness 

Consumers 

Consumer trust and protection 

Society 

Society 

Society 

Businesses 

Businesses 

Fostering 
resources 
the  efficient  use  of 
(renewable & non-renewable) (resource savings 
in tons) 

Waste  production,  generation  and  recycling 
(waste savings) 

5,56% 

Contribute  to  fighting  climate  change  (CO2 
emissions savings) 

5,56% 

Business adjustment costs 

Business administrative costs 

8,33% 

8,33% 

5,56% 

5,56% 

5,56% 

4,17% 

Public administration 

Implementation and enforcement costs 

Businesses 

Savings in production costs for manufacturers 

4,17% 

Consumers 

Consumer  savings 

Society 

Change in employment 

4,17% 

4,17% 

Businesses 

Growth  and  investment  (in  Europe  -  GVA 
traders, producers, repairers) 

5,56% 

Effectiveness 

Effectiveness 

Effectiveness 

Efficiency 

Efficiency 

Efficiency 

Efficiency 

Efficiency 

Efficiency 

Efficiency 

4.594.760.145 

2 

1.843.274 

3.027.567 

18.452.732 

8.124.194.230 

69.818.210 

105.518.993 

15.558.115.736 

176.492.611.081 

8.872 

4.834.593.508 

157 

 
 
  
Preferred options: CBA 

High-level criteria 

Stakeholders affected 

Sub-criteria / impacts 

Source 

Direction (benefit = 1, cost 
= -1) 

Preferred options  
Combined (PO1A, PO5A, PO5B, PO6A, 
PO6B, PO6C, PO7) 

Efficiency 

Efficiency 

Efficiency 

Effectiveness 

Effectiveness 

Effectiveness 

Efficiency 

Efficiency 

Efficiency 

Efficiency 

NET BENEFIT 

Businesses 

Businesses 

Savings in production 
costs for manufacturers 

Growth and investment 
(in Europe - GVA 
traders, producers, 
repairers) 

Consumers 

Consumer  savings 

Society 

Society 

Society 

Businesses 

Businesses 

Public administration 

Society 

Monetised resource 
savings 
Monetised waste 
savings 
Monetised CO2 
emissions savings 
Business adjustment 
costs 
Business administrative 
costs 
Implementation and 
enforcement costs 
Change in employment 
(measured as personnel 
costs)  

economic impacts 

economic impacts 

based on the economic 
impacts  

environmental impacts 

environmental impacts 

environmental impacts 

business costs assessment 

business costs assessment 

estimate of enforcement 
costs 

economic impacts 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

-1 

-1 

-1 

1 

15.558.115.736 

4.834.593.508 

176.492.611.081 

1.121.388.488 

493.493.446 

3.321.491.726 

8.124.194.230 

69.818.210 

105.518.993 

3.327.130.669 

196.849.293.221 

158 

 
 
 
  
  
  
  
 
Annex 5: Detailed description of the Policy Options 

The options within and between the clusters are complementary, while the sub-options within 
each option are alternatives. 

Figure 1: Intervention logic 

CLUSTER I: Options to promote repair and reuse of goods within the legal guarantee 

viii.  Option 1: Prioritising repair within the remedies system of the SGD 
For prioritising repair within the remedies system of the SGD, there are two sub-options with 
different degrees of intervention:  

Sub-option 1A: Prioritising repair whenever it is cheaper than replacement 

In order to promote repair, this sub-option would limit the consumer choice of the remedy by 
leading to repair instead of replacement in all cases where repair is cheaper than or as costly as 
replacement. It will allow the consumer to request replacement only if repair is more expensive 
than replacement. This is different from the current rule in the SGD where the consumer can 
request replacement even if repair is cheaper, as long as the difference between the costs of the 
remedies is not disproportionately high.  

159 

Choice within the legal guarantee favours replacement with new goods in case of defectLack of transparency on availability and conditions of repairInconvenience factors dissuade consumers from repairRepair is not economically attractive for consumers outside the legal gauranteeProblem 1: Premature disposal of repairable consumer goods within the legal guarantee frameworkProblem 2: Premature disposal of repairable consumer goods beyond the legal guarantee framework DriversProblemsSpecific objectivesGeneral objectivePolicy optionsSustainable consumption: promoting repair and reuse of viable consumer goods in the Single MarketIncrease repair and reuse of viable consumer goods within the  legal guarantee Increase repair and reuse of viable consumer goods beyond the legal guarantee1. Promoting repair within the remedies system of the SGD 1A: Prioritising repair whenever it is cheaper than replacement  1B: Making repair the primary remedy2. Prolonging the liability period in repair context 2A: Incentivising the consumer with a longer liability period to choose repair2B: Extending liability period for repair3. Replacement with refurbished goods3A: In the extended liability period (PO2B)3B: From the second year of the liability period5. Information on where to repair 5A: Obligation to inform where to repair5B: A matchmaking platform on available repair services at national level 5C: A matchmaking platform on available repair services at EU-level6. Enhance transparency/conditions for repair6A: A common EU   easy repair standard    6B: Obligation to issue a binding standardised repair quote on price and conditions of repair 6C: Obligation to repair  products repairable under EU law 6D: Obligation to repair all products4. Aligning the liability period for refurbished goods 7. Promoting refurbished goods on an online platfom via an additional functionality under option 5B or 5CProducts are not designed to be reparableConsumer lifestyle choicesCluster I: Encouraging repair and reuse within the legal guaranteeCluster II: Encouraging repair and reuse beyond the legal gauranteeText 
 
 
The  refrigerator  example  in  Section  1.2.  of  the  Impact  Assessment  report  explains  the 
situation  under  current  rules.  Under  sub-option  1A,  the  consumer  can  only  request 
replacement, if for instance the replacement of the fridge costs EUR 400 and repair costs 
are EUR 420. However, if costs for replacement are EUR 400 and costs for repair are EUR 
380, the consumer can only request repair of the fridge. This is different from the current 
rule in the SGD which would allow consumers in the latter case to request replacement even 
if it is more expensive than repair (as long as the cost difference is not disproportionately 
high). 

Sub-option 1B: Making repair the primary remedy 

In this sub-option, repair would be the primary remedy for the consumer from the outset. Only 
if repair is not possible at all or causes disproportionately high costs in absolute terms for the 
seller could the consumer request replacement. That means that as long as the costs for repair 
have not reached the benchmark of being disproportionate in absolute terms, the seller would 
be obliged to repair the product even if it is not the economically more favourable option for 
the seller. This is different from the current system, which has a lower benchmark allowing 
replacement already when repair is disproportionately more costly compared to replacement.  

In the refrigerator example (purchase price of the refrigerator: EUR 400), under sub-option 
1B the consumer could only request replacement of the refrigerator if the repair costs are 
excessively high, e.g. EUR 800. However, if repair costs were lower, e.g. EUR 500, the 
consumer could only request repair. This is different from the current rule in the SGD which 
would allow the consumer in the latter case to request replacement as the costs of repair 
(EUR 500) are disproportionately high compared to replacement (EUR 400). 

Both sub-options 1A and 1B take the costs for repair as the benchmark for replacement. This 
is the current SGD approach, balancing the interests of consumers (freely choosing between 
repair  and  replacement)  and  sellers  (who  shall  not  be  economically  overburdened  by  that 
choice). While following the same approach, the sub-options have different effects on whether 
the consumer can choose replacement. Sub-option 1B has a higher threshold: the remedy of 
replacement can only be chosen if repair is excessively more costly. Compared to this, sub-
option 1A sets the hurdle lower. The remedy of replacement can already be chosen when repair 
is more costly, including a relatively minor difference in costs.   

However, for both sub-options, the possibility of the parties to agree on replacement remains 
unaffected.203 

203  Article  21(1)  SGD  allows  the  seller  and  the  consumer  to  agree  on  a  different  solution  after  the  lack  of 
conformity becomes apparent. 

160 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
ix.  Option 2: Prolonging the liability period in the context of repair  
Option 2 links the remedy of repair with an extension of the liability period. There are two sub-
options with a different approach of extending the liability period in the context of repair. For 
those MS that foresee a limitation period instead of a liability period204 the extension would 
apply to that period. 

Sub-option 2A: Incentivising the consumer with a longer liability period to choose repair 

In  this  sub-option,  once  a  defect  present  at  the  time  of  delivery  becomes  apparent  and  the 
consumer chooses repair, the liability period for the repaired product would be extended. The 
expectation of an additional liability period should incentivise the consumer to choose repair 
instead of replacement. The extension of the liability period could be done in different ways: 

Variant 1 extends the liability period by one year, added to the existing liability period. In the 
additional liability period, if a defect occurs again, the consumer would be entitled to request 
repair only (if repair is impossible or too costly in absolute terms, the other remedies would not 
apply). This does not prevent the parties to agree on replacement, which is likely to happen in 
cases  where  repair  is  more  expensive  than  replacement  or  businesses  want  to  keep  their 
customers. 

In the refrigerator example, a defect of the cooling system becomes apparent after 1.5 years. 
If the consumer chooses repair, the liability period would be extended by one year, leading 
to  an  overall  liability  period  of  three  years  from  delivery.  If  then  a  defect  of  the  door 
becomes apparent after 2.5 years, the consumer can request the seller to repair the door.  

For those MS205 that provide for longer liability periods (e.g. three  years instead of the two 
years foreseen by the SGD) one year would be added to that period (e.g. an additional fourth 
year where the consumer can only request repair). 

Variant  2  prolongs  the  liability  period  by  restarting  it  again  after  the  consumer  has  chosen 
repair. The liability period would start anew206 with all available remedies counting from the 
moment the consumer received the repaired product from the seller.  

204 For instance DE, IE. The liability period is the period after the delivery during which the defect has to appear. 
In the following, whenever the liability period is mentioned, this also applies to the limitation period, if MS foresee 
a limitation period instead of (Article 10(5) SGD) or combined with (Article 10(4) SGD) the liability period. A 
limitation period is the period within which the consumer has to exercise the remedy, e.g. bring a law suit.  
205 For instance ES, SE: 3-year liability period; IE: 6-year limitation period. 
206 A restart of the liability/limitation period applies currently in BE, CY, EE, DE, HU, IT, PL, SK, ES and SE. It 
applies to both repair and replacement in BE, CY, EE, DE, IT and PL. HU, SK and ES have a liability restart for 
replacements; SE for replaced parts. 

161 

 
 
 
                                                 
In the refrigerator example, a defect of the cooling system becomes apparent after 1.5 years. 
If the consumer chooses repair, the liability period of two years would start anew, leading 
to an overall liability period of 3.5 years. If a defect of the door becomes apparent after 3 
years,  the  consumer  can  request  the  seller  to  repair  the  door  or  replace  the  defective 
refrigerator with a new one (replacement only if it is not disproportionately costly compared 
to repair).  

Depending on when the lack of conformity becomes apparent, restarting the liability period 
could  lead  to  a  significantly  longer  liability  period,  in  particular  in  those  MS  that  already 
foresee a longer liability period. 

In both variants, the liability period would only be respectively added or restarted once to avoid 
continuous prolongation, which would lead to legal uncertainty and would be too burdensome 
for the seller. While the first variant leads to a liability period of three years (or more depending 
on a MS regime) and is limited to repair as a remedy, the second variant can lead to a liability 
period between 2 and 4 years (or more depending on MS regimes) allowing the consumer to 
exercise all available remedies during that time. 

Sub-option 2B: Extending the liability period for repair  

This  sub-option  does  not  aim  at  incentivising  consumers  to  choose  repair,  but  extends  the 
liability period, e.g. by one year, in all cases, independent from the consumer choosing repair 
when a defect occurs. However, the extension applies only to repair as a remedy, i.e. if a lack 
of conformity becomes apparent in the extended liability period, the consumer can only request 
repair  (if repair is  impossible or too  costly in  absolute terms,  the other remedies would not 
apply). As above, this does not prevent the parties to agree on replacement, which is likely to 
happen in cases where repair is more expensive than replacement or businesses want to keep 
their customers.  

In the refrigerator example, a defect of the cooling system becomes apparent after 2,5 years. 
Under sub-option 2B the consumer can request the seller to repair the cooling system.  

While both sub-options 2A and 2B extend the liability period, they follow a different approach: 
sub-option  2A  only  applies  when  the  consumer  chooses  repair  as  it  aims  at  incentivising 
consumers  to  choose  repair  instead  of  replacement  by  rewarding  them  with  an  additional 
liability period. Sub-option 2B, on the other hand, grants an extension of the liability period to 
all consumers in all situations, i.e. even if the consumer has chosen replacement in the first two 
years.  

Finally,  both  sub-options  2A  and  2B  could  be  combined  with  sub-option  6A  that  allows 
replacement with refurbished goods in the additional liability period (see further below).  

162 

 
 
 
 
x.  Option 3: Replacement with refurbished goods 

Refurbished  goods  are  a  specific  category  of  second  hand  goods  that  have  been  tested,  if 
necessary, repaired and certified before they are sold. It would depend on MS whether and to 
what extent refurbishment schemes, e.g. testing, repairing and certification would be created 
and whether this would be done by regulation or left to the market. The proposed measures 
would only apply if refurbished goods exist in the case at hand.  

Under the current SGD, if consumers choose replacement as a remedy for a lack of conformity 
of their purchased goods, the sellers have to replace them with new goods. To increase the use 
of refurbished goods, the SGD could be adapted allowing those sellers that have refurbished 
goods available to offer replacement with refurbished goods.  

Sub-option 3.A: Replacement with refurbished goods in the extended liability period 

This sub-option envisages a combination with the measure on prolonging the liability period 
in context of repair (PO 2A207 and PO 2B). The replacement with refurbished goods would be 
an alternative remedy to repair in cases where repair is impossible or causes excessive costs. 
This sub-option would only apply in the additional liability period going beyond the minimum 
liability period of two years (or more depending on MS regime). This option would not apply 
in the first two years of the liability period as the consumer may expect as fair replacement 
only the replacement with new goods during that period. After two years, replacement with 
refurbished goods – where available – could be justified as the goods have already been in use 
for a considerable time. 

Sub-option  3B:  Replacement  with  refurbished  goods  from  the  second  year  of  the  liability 
period 

To  boost  the  use  of  refurbished  goods  even  more,  this  option  would  allow  sellers  to  offer 
refurbished goods as a replacement from the second year of the liability period. When one year 
has passed, many products are likely to show signs of wear and tear. It could thus be considered 
as fair to grant the seller the additional possibility of replacing the defective product with a 
refurbished one, if available.  

xi.  Option 4: Aligning the liability period of refurbished goods with new goods 
To encourage consumers to buy refurbished goods, this measure would align the liability period 
for refurbished goods with the liability period for new goods (i.e. minimum two years). It would 
remove MS’ current possibility to provide that sellers and consumers can contractually agree 
to a shorter liability for refurbished goods. For those MS208 that made use of this option in their 
national laws this would mean that they could keep their current rule for second hand goods in 

207 Replacement with refurbished goods could be an alternative remedy in both variants of PO 2A.  
208 Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia 
and Spain.  

163 

 
 
                                                 
general, but they need to exclude refurbished goods from the possibility to agree on a shorter 
liability period.  

Aligning the liability period for refurbished goods and new goods would influence consumers’ 
choice to buy more refurbished goods. They would not be discouraged by quality concerns due 
to the shorter liability period and could rely on quality assurances as for new goods.  

CLUSTER II: Options to facilitate and encourage repair and reuse of goods beyond the 

legal guarantee 

xii.  Option 5: Information on where to repair 
Sub-option 5A: Obligation to inform where to repair  

The purpose of this option is to inform consumers on available repair services.  

Producers should inform on their website whether they themselves provide repair services and 
to what extent, e.g. for which specific products/models. If combined with PO6C or PO6D on 
the obligation to repair, producers should also inform to what extent the obligation to repair 
applies for specific goods they produce. This information can be provided when new products 
are placed on the market and updated only where changes occur. 

Sub-option 5B: A matchmaking platform on repair at national level 

This sub-option entails the creation of an online platform with a search engine, matchmaking 
consumers with repairers for key consumer goods at national level. The purpose is to facilitate 
the search of suitable repair services and provide more transparency on conditions of repair in 
order to incentivise consumers to choose repair. This would be an independent comparison tool 
helping end-users to assess the merits of different repair providers by means of standardised 
information facilitating comparison of prices and quality parameters. 

A  national  level  platform  could  be  modelled  on  the  “success  story”  of  such  a  platform 
sponsored by the French authorities.209 It would include a full range of popular consumer goods 
(e.g. energy-related products, textiles, shoes, furniture, jewellery) and provide matchmaking 
for  consumers  and  service  providers  operating  in  their  area.  In  addition,  it  would  include 
general  information  on  repair  conditions  offered  by  the  respective  repairer  (e.g.  average 
duration  of  repair,  cost  range,  availability  of  a  replacement  product,  pick-up/transportation 
service) but not relating to a concrete problem. MS could decide whether to make the platform 
accessible only to professional repairers, where professional qualifications are required under 
national law, or also to non-professional repairers (for those types of goods where there are no 
safety concerns). However, the providers registered on the platform would not be limited only 

209 Annuaire des réparateurs (artisanat.fr): The platform developed in France provides a brand “Répar’acteurs” 
and  included  in  May  2022  127,580  repair  providers.  It  enables  search  for  repair  services  for  a  wide  range  of 
consumer products and facilitates the search of suitable repairers in a given area. 

164 

 
 
                                                 
to high quality providers, in order to guarantee a wide choice and free competition for all who 
legally offer repair services. National platform should allow also online/distant repair services 
to offer their services. Where the market has created such platforms, which meet the quality 
criteria, or a relevant national platform already exists, MS should not create new ones.  

The national platforms could be interconnected at EU level with EPREL,210 which could sign-
post  to  them  under  ‘repair’.  It  could  potentially  be  listed  as  ‘assistance  services’  under  the 
Single  Digital  Gateway,  managed  by  the  Commission,  facilitating  access  to  such  services 
across the EU through the single-entry point of the Single Digital Gateway and information on 
Consumer Rights on Your Europe Portal. More synergies with the Your Europe Portal could 
be achieved by including there a reference to  ‘where to  repair’ and sign-posting to national 
matchmaking platforms.  

Sub-option 5C: A matchmaking platform on repair at EU level 

This sub-option entails the creation of a single online platform at EU level with a search engine 
matchmaking consumers with repairers for key consumer goods. As in PO5B, the purpose is 
to facilitate the search of suitable repair services and provide more transparency on conditions 
of repair in order to incentivise consumers to choose repair.  

The most efficient implementation would be adding new functionalities to the EPREL portal 
for  energy  labelled  products.211  This  could  be  done  by  adding  a  search  engine,  matching 
consumers with  repair services for  key  consumer goods within the scope of EPREL.212  For 
efficiency reasons, the repair information would be limited to the product categories already 
included  in  EPREL  or  regulated  under  the  Ecodesign  Directive/ESPR.  The  EPREL  portal 
requires producers to include product related information when placing a product on the market 
to  facilitate  market  surveillance.  Consumers  could  easily  access  the  portal  by  scanning  the 
energy label on their product (e.g. a refrigerator) and identify repairers nearby. The take-up is 
likely to increase as a result of this feature, even among consumers not yet aware of the EPREL 
portal. Repairers too could benefit by easy access to product information (including on specific 
models) when approached with a repair request. A platform at EU level could also enable more 
cross-border  repair,  especially  in  cross-border  regions  or  for  items  that  can  be  shipped  at 
acceptable  cost.  This  would  broaden  the  choice  of  repair  for  consumers  and  promote 
competition in the Single Market.  

More detailed overview of functionalities of PO5B and PO5C:    

210 EPREL - European Product Registry for Energy Labelling, EPREL Public website (europa.eu). 
211 EPREL Public website (europa.eu). 
212 EPREL currently covers 25 product groups. 

165 

 
 
 
                                                 
Sub-option 

PO5C:  A  matchmaking  platform  on 
repair  at  EU 
-  Extending 
functionalities of EPREL portal 

level 

PO5B:  A  matchmaking 
platform  on 
repair  at 
national level   

Implementation and management 

EU level 

Member States level 

Scope 

Energy labelled goods 

Consumer goods 

Eligibility to register on platform 

Registration in principle open to all repair actors (in the national platform 
MS have some possibilities to determine the scope)  

Population of database 

Open to registration by repairers themselves 

Possible function to extract data from existing national databases where 
available  

Conditions to register on platform 

Self-authentication via EU Login 

Identity management (i.e. eIDAS) 

Cost free 

Potential  fee  covering  the 
platform 
costs 
be 
management 
determined by MS 

of 

to 

Features / search criteria 

Display data on a map, including an automatic matchmaking function of 
consumers with repairers based on pre-defined search criteria for a given 
product (see below).  

Search location  

Country  of  repair  provider  +  postal  code/show  all  repairers  who  offer 
their services in a given area 

Search for product  

Product type and brand (e.g. washing machine of a specific brand) 

Search for conditions 

Indicated duration, availability of temporary replacement goods, pick-up 
or mobile repair services 

Search for quality assurances 

Registration requirements 

Availability of voluntary guarantees on repair; potential display of quality 
labels where available (e.g. European standard for repairers, French label  
Répar’acteurs) 

EU  Login 
identification  may  be 
necessary  to  report  problems  to  avoid 
abuse  

Identity management (eIDAS) 

Require company data 

how 
- 

to 
MS 
discretion 
self-
portal 
populate 
registration  or 
extraction 
from existing data-bases with 
consent of repairer 

166 

 
 
 
  
Data protection 

Only request company data.  

If  personal  data  (e.g.  “sole  trader” 
artisans),  ask  for  consent  and  put  in 
place compliant procedures 

MS to ensure data protection 
according to applicable law 

Interoperability 

Link to Single Digital Gateway 

With other platforms 

Link  to  relevant  national  platforms 
where available 

Accessibility 
through 
national  websites  connected 
to the Single Digital Gateway 

Maintenance /Up-dates 

Every 3 months general up-date 

MS discretion 

Communication campaigns  

Renewal  of  registration  by  each  repair 
actor (e.g. on annual basis) 

Raising  consumer 
  awareness  of 
platform  via  EPREL  and  Your  Europe 
portal  

MS campaigns 

xiii.  Option 6: Enhance transparency/conditions for repair 
Sub-option 6A: Voluntary commitments to an EU common “easy repair standard”   

This  option  involves  a  voluntary  commitment  to  observe  a  European  standard  of  quality  in 
repair services. The rationale is to boost consumer trust in repair services across the EU and 
avoid  market  barriers  for  business.  The  standard  would  be  applicable  to  all  repair  service 
providers.  In  terms  of  content,  it  would  cover  key  aspects  of  repair  services,  which  are 
important  “convenience”  factors  for  consumer  decisions  on  repair,  in  particular:  reasonable 
duration of the repair service, availability of a temporary replacement product, availability of 
pick-up/transportation service and any additional voluntary guarantee on the quality of repair. 
The commitment would set a standardised minimum level of quality on each aspect.  

As to the form, the standard213 could be negotiated as an industry code of conduct establishing 
minimum  standards  of  repair,  agreed  by  representative  business  associations  at  EU  level. 
Consumer organisations and civil society representatives would be involved to ensure that their 
legitimate interests are taken into account. The Commission would facilitate negotiations and 
help to provide publicity. The code would be open to all types of repair service providers across 
the  EU  (including  independent  repairers  and  producers).  To  ensure  visibility  and  consumer 
recognition,  a  standardised  “easy  repair”  label  could  be  made  available  to  all  subscribers. 

213 If the content and modalities of the standard qualify it as an industry standardisation agreement subject to the 
Horizontal Block Exemption Regulations and Guidelines on horizontal co-operation agreements, which are 
currently under review, it should comply with their requirements. https://ec.europa.eu/competition-
policy/public-consultations/2022-hbers_en 

167 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
Enforcement of the code would be monitored by the stakeholder group that negotiated the code. 
One  year  after  enacting  the  code,  the  group  would  take  stock  of  its  implementation,  to  be 
repeated  possibly  annually.  This  will  be  conducive  to  consumer  confidence,  as  consumers 
across the EU could trust that providers with this label address consumer concerns about repair 
in an effective manner. 

Alternatively, the standard could  be developed by  a European Standardisation Organisation 
(CEN – European Committee for Standardisation) according to Regulation (EU) 1025/2012 on 
European  standardisation.  The  European  Standardisation  Organisation  would  ensure  an 
appropriate  representation  and  effective  participation  of  all  relevant  stakeholders,  including 
SMEs,  consumer  organisations  and  environmental  stakeholders  in  their  standardisation 
activities (Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 1025/2012). 

Sub-option 6B: Obligation to issue a binding repair quote on price and conditions for repair in 
a standardised form 

This sub-option would introduce an obligation to issue a binding repair quote to the consumer 
in a standardised form, once the consumer expresses interest in obtaining a repair service. The 
obligation  would  apply  to  producers,  sellers  and  independent  repair  service  providers,  i.e. 
everybody  who  offers  repair,  to  allow  for  competition.  The  option  draws  on  experience  in 
sectorial  EU  law  to  facilitate  consumer  choices  by  standardised  comparable  pre-contractual 
information.214  This requirement relates to pre-contractual information to be provided before 
the conclusion of an after-sales repair service contract, and not to pre-contractual information 
to be provided before the purchase of the product itself. 
The repair quote would provide the consumer interested in repair with the relevant information 
on costs and key conditions of repair such as the price or maximum price,215 duration of repair, 
any  voluntary  commitment  on  quality  of  repair/duration  of  functioning  of  the  product  after 
repair on top of available legal remedies for non-performance of services contracts, availability 
of  a  temporary  replacement  product  during  the  time  of  repair  and  transportation.216  A 
standardised  form  on  a  durable  medium  would  allow  the  consumer  to  make  an  informed 
decision as well as easily compare offers. As far as the price for the quote is concerned, the 

214 Key information document for packaged retail and insurance based investment products (PRIIPs) under 
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/653; Contract summary template under Directive (EU) 
2018/1972 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code (Recast). 
215 The information on price in the quote will complement the Consumer Rights Directive, which creates an  
obligation to inform about the price or the manner it is calculated (e.g. hourly rate), applicable also to repair 
service contracts or a service contract whose objective is merely to estimate the cost of repair. The information 
on price will be combined with the content of the service, bringing transparency to what the price includes. 
Furthermore, the price estimate is likely to be given following an individual diagnostic of the defect.   
216 The IA study consumer survey results that all these elements influence consumer decisions to repair to 
different degrees.  

168 

 
 
                                                 
consumer should only be obliged to pay the direct costs incurred and necessary to issue the 
quote.  

Sub-option  6C:  Producer’s  obligation  to  repair  goods  that  are  subject  to  reparability 
requirements under EU law (against a price)  

This sub-option would introduce a producer’s obligation to repair, which would cover defects 
that are outside the legal guarantee, i.e. that were not present at delivery or became apparent 
after the liability period has elapsed. As far as the scope is concerned, the obligation to repair 
would apply to products for which reparability217 requirements in EU law exist or will be 
adopted, e.g. in context of the ecodesign framework. In this way, the producer’s obligation to 
repair will be limited in scope but be possible in practice, thanks to the legal instruments on the 
supply side, which establish the range of spare parts to be made available and the minimum 
periods  of  their  availability  for  specific  product  categories.  The  obligation  to  repair  would 
apply against producers as they are also addressees of existing reparability requirements under 
EU law and have generally the necessary spare parts, expertise and equipment to implement 
repair.218  Making  this  right  enforceable  against  other  repair  actors,  such  as  independent 
repairers and potentially sellers, could be problematic, as they may not have access to the spare 
parts  or  may  not  possess  the  necessary  know-how,  software  and  equipment  to  fulfil  this 
obligation. 

The consumer would have the right to have the product repaired for a price, taking into account 
labour costs, costs for spare parts, costs for operating the repair facility (e.g. tools, rent) and a 
profit for the producer. The price would not be regulated, but agreed in the contract between 
the consumer and the producer, done under the competitive pressure of independent repairers, 
therefore benefitting consumers and the  repair sector.219 Consumers could  seek other repair 
opportunities  in  order  to  be  able  to  compare  offers.  They  would  likely  approach  also  local 
independent repairers or the seller before reaching out to producers which may be located at a 
greater distance. 

Exemptions  would  need  to  be  formulated  for  defects  which  are  impossible  to  repair,  for 
instance, where goods are damaged in  a manner which makes repair technically unfeasible. 
The SGD (and its predecessor) already excluded the remedy of repair when it is impossible. 
National  implementation  law  and  related  national  and  European  case  law  applying  it  have 
already created elements allowing to assess when repair is impossible.  

Option 6D: Obligation to repair all products for a reasonable price 

217 Except where technically not feasible. 
218 APPLIA, Home Appliance Europe, ‘By the Numbers: The Home Appliance Industry in Europe’, 2020-2021): 
91% requests to repair to manufacturers resulted in successful repair in 2018.   
219 If the price were to be regulated, all the repair demand would be channelled to the producer and the independent 
repairers would be foreclosed. 

169 

 
 
                                                 
This option has the same rationale as option 6C, but a broader scope. It envisages a producer’s 
obligation to repair all products which are reparable by nature. It would cover defects that 
are outside the legal guarantee. Unlike goods that are subject to reparability requirements under 
EU law, not all products are reparable by design. Therefore, PO6D would include an exception 
linked  to  the  actual  possibility  to  repair  the  product.  Producers  could  invoke  this  exception 
when repair is not technically feasible, notably when products are not reparable by design. The 
assessment  of  the  actual  reparability  would  largely  depend  on  the  producer.  The  choice  of 
whether  to  request  repair  will  remain  with  the  consumer.  The  price  of  repair  would  be 
determined like in PO6C. 

xiv.  Option  7:  Adding  a  functionality  on  refurbished  goods  in  the  matchmaking 

platform for repair (PO5B and PO5C) 

To encourage supply and demand for refurbished goods, this option adds a functionality to the 
matchmaking platform suggested under PO5B and 5C to match-make consumers not only with 
repairers but also with sellers of refurbished consumer goods and purchasers of defective goods 
for refurbishment. The purpose is to facilitate the search for refurbished goods as a sustainable 
alternative  to  buying  new  products  outside  the  legal  guarantee  period.  It  also  facilitates 
arrangements between businesses that may wish to dispose of defective repairable goods and 
service  providers  that  are  looking  for  such  goods  for  refurbishment.  PO7  would  provide 
synergies with the functionalities of the repair platform. When the repair possibilities identified 
through the platform are not available or not satisfactory for the consumers’ needs, they may 
use the same platform to identify replacement products that are refurbished.  

While national level platforms would in practice mainly provide matchmaking for consumers 
and sellers of refurbished goods/purchasers of goods for refurbishment operating in their area, 
the access to such sellers and purchasers from other MS should also be open. The platform 
would  function  based  on  sellers’  and  purchasers’  self-registration.  As  PO7  would  be 
implemented as a functionality of the match-making platform for repair, the main technical 
characteristics  would  be  similar  to  those  of  PO5A  and  PO5B,  as  they  work  on  the  same 
matchmaking principle. If combined, they would be more cost efficient and produce synergies. 

Options for instruments 

The options set out above could be delivered via different legal instruments, depending on the 
nature of the option, including amendments  to  existing EU legislation, the adoption of new 
legal instruments or codes of conduct.   

In particular, the options in cluster I could entail amendments to the SGD or a new directive. 
The option for a European matchmaking platform (PO5C) would necessitate a regulation, a 
Commission  decision  or  an  amendment  to  relevant  existing  legal  instruments.  The  option 
concerning  voluntary  commitments  (PO6A)  can  be  delivered  via  a  code  of  conduct  or  a 
Commission mandate for a repair standard to standardisation bodies.  

170 

 
 
 
The concrete choice of instruments will be discussed in the context of the preferred option.  

Options discarded 

i. 

Extending the liability period in general 

The  option  extending  the  current  minimum  liability  period  of  2  years  to  3  years  has  been 
discarded.  Extending  the  liability  period  for  both  repair  and  replacement  has  a  detrimental 
effect because, given the choice, consumers would prefer replacement. This would not serve 
the  purpose  of  promoting  repair  but  rather  have  a  negative  impact  on  sustainability, 
contributing to increased waste and use of resources.  

ii. 

Aligning the liability period according to product’s durability/lifespan 

The  liability  period  could  be  extended  in  a  flexible  manner  by  linking  it  to  any  minimum 
durability/lifespan  requirements  introduced  under  the  ecodesign  framework.  However,  this 
approach has been discarded.  

Firstly, the purpose of liability periods is to provide legal certainty for all market participants. 
That is why almost all Member States have chosen one single period for all goods. If liability 
periods are defined according to the lifespan of different products, this would lead to a high 
number of different liability periods for different products (e.g. dozens of liability periods only 
in one product sector) instead of one period for all goods which is much easier to handle in 
practice. This would not create legal certainty, neither for consumers not for businesses.  

Secondly, the durability of goods also depends on the intensity and duration of use; durability 
requirements are defined thus in terms that account for the intensity of use220.  The definition 
of ‘durability’ in the ESPR proposal221 explicitly presumes the possibility that a durable product 
may still have to be repaired. Aligning the liability with the envisaged lifespan of a product 
(leading to  repair over its whole lifespan) would  contradict the ESPR approach and lead to 
incoherence. That is why, in order to provide legal certainty, the liability period in sales law 
starts from the moment of purchase and runs for a number of years, not factoring in intensity 
of use.  

Thirdly, aligning the liability with the envisaged durability of a product would pre-empt other 
tools  to  achieve  sustainable  consumption.  Under  the  present  SGD,  businesses  can  offer 
commercial durability guarantees. This means they have an interest to produce durable goods 
and use this durability as a competitive advantage. Aligning the liability with the lifespan of 
specific  products  could  lead  to  producers  and  sellers  of  durable  products  to  lose  such 

220 EU Ecodesign requirements for vacuum cleaners for instance establish a minimum operational motor lifetime 
of 500 hours; minimum durability of the hose (if any): still usable after 40 000 oscillations under strain.  
221 Article 2(21). 

171 

 
 
                                                 
competitive advantage. They would no longer have the incentive to produce and sell durable 
products. 

Finally,  this option would entail  a significant  increase in  costs for businesses, because they 
would need to repair a wider range of defects (also wear and tear) and for a longer period. This 
would penalise producers and sellers of durable products as they will have to repair them for 
free. This could discourage the development of durable products in the market, contrary to the 
objectives of the Circular Economy Action Plan.  

iii. 

Extension of the period of reversal of the burden of proof 

The SGD foresees that any lack of conformity which becomes apparent within one year after 
delivery shall be presumed to have existed at the time when the goods were delivered. Instead 
of the one-year period  MS may maintain or introduce a period of two years. Extending the 
period  for  the  reversal  of  the  burden  of  proof  was  discarded.  Extending  the  reversal  of  the 
burden of proof does not promote repair, as it would also apply to replacement. In addition, the 
SGD legislative process has shown that finding an agreement on the current rule has been very 
difficult. It is highly unlikely that the necessary majority in the legislative process for adopting 
a change to the reversal of the burden of proof rule could be found. 

iv. 

Suspension of the liability period during repair 

An  option  that  the  liability  period  would  be  suspended  during  the  time  of  repair  has  been 
discarded. Suspension means that the period of time for repair would be added to the liability 
period. For instance, if the seller needs three weeks to repair a product, these three weeks would 
be added to the applicable liability period, i.e. if the period is two years the suspension would 
lead to a period of 2 years and three weeks.222 Due to the insignificant extension of the liability 
period in most cases, this option was not considered an incentive for the consumer to choose 
repair. 

v. 

Regulating the conditions for repair outside the legal guarantee 

The contract about repair is a service contract. Regulating conditions for repair, such as the 
period  or  guarantee  for  repair  would  mean  regulating  service  contracts  at  EU  level.  This  is 
different  from  the  obligation  to  repair  as  it  would  concern  all  service  contracts  for  repair 
concluded voluntarily. This option is likely to interfere strongly with traditional structures of 
national  private  law  and  would  likely  be  very  controversial,  while  the  benefits  in  terms  of 
promoting repair would be uncertain. It has therefore been discarded. 

222 A suspension of the liability period applies currently in some MS, such as Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain. It applies to both repair and replacement e.g. in Belgium and Cyprus. The 
suspension applies only to repair e.g. in the Czech Republic and Portugal. 

172 

 
 
                                                 
vi. 

Aligning the liability period for second-hand goods with new goods 

Aligning  the  liability  period  for  second  hand  goods  with  new  goods  has  been  limited  to 
refurbished goods (see PO 4). Removing the option to reduce the liability period for second 
hand goods altogether has been discarded due to concerns of MS against such option during 
the  public  consultation.  Moreover,  concerns  were  also  raised  among  business  stakeholders. 
Almost half of them found the measure to be ineffective. Some mentioned that such a measure 
would lead to a disruption in the market for such goods. Hence, it is unlikely that the necessary 
majority in the legislative process for aligning the liability period for second hand goods in 
general with new goods would be found.  

173 

 
 
 
 
Annex 6: Detailed assessment of efficiency of policy options223 

I.  CLUSTER I: PROMOTING REPAIR AND REUSE OF GOODS WITHIN THE 

LEGAL GUARANTEE 

1.  Impacts of Option 1: Promoting repair within the remedies system of the SGD  
For most of the following criteria the indicated figures are the same for PO1A and PO1B. The 
reason is that for PO1B the take-up rate of PO1A has been taken into account as the minimum 
take-up. Hence, all the following figures need to be seen as minimum figures as far as PO1B 
is concerned. 

PO1B Making repair the primary remedy 

PO1A  Prioritising  repair  if  cheaper  than 
replacement 
ECONOMIC IMPACTS (EU economic operators): Both POs lead to considerable gains 
for businesses, in particular producers/traders due to cost savings because of a decrease in 
the production of replacement products that would be given to consumers for free and for 
repairers due to additional repair activities relating to defective goods under legal guarantee. 
Sellers  are  the  addressees  of  the  obligation  to  carry  out  the  remedies  under  the  SGD.  In 
practice,  sellers  will  aim  to  exercise  their  right  to  redress  against  the  producer  as  far  as 
possible. However, this will in the end depend on the contract between the seller and the 
producer. The economic burden for the repair will thus be placed on the contractually weaker 
party in this contract. For the sake of simplicity of the presentation, benefits in this context 
refer to producers in the EU, but in practice they are shared by sellers and producers via their 
B2B agreements.    
Benefits for business 
Value added and turnover  
Producers in the EU224 will achieve considerable overall cost savings as they will have to 
provide less new products for free as a replacement of returned defective goods under the 
legal guarantee. 
They will still incur some costs for the repair of defective goods under the legal guarantee, 
but these costs are lower than the gains from avoided replacement, resulting in significant 
cost savings of EUR 15.6 billion (avoiding replacement products minus financing additional 
repair).225  
Both producers and traders in the EU226 will face lower costs for stocking replacement goods, 
although these benefits are partly balanced out by expenses of stocking spare parts.  
EU repairers: Repairers, including independent repair service providers, will gain due to the 
increased demand for repair of defective goods. This includes in particular independent or 
other  repairers  who  may  be  subcontracted  to  repair  defective  goods  under  the  legal 

223 All figures presented stem from the IA Study. All benefits and costs are calculated and expressed for 15 years 
(with the exception of one-off costs specifically indicated). 
224 ‘Producers in the EU’ are further referred to as ‘EU producers’.  
225 See all economic impacts in table in Annex 4 and IA Study, Section 5.2.3. 
226 ‘Traders in the EU’ are further referred to as ‘EU traders’.  

174 

 
 
 
                                                 
guarantee.  EUR  12.9  billion  additional  turnover  =  EUR  5  billion  GVA  increase  due  to 
additional repair activities under the legal guarantee.  

Costs for business 
Losses 
EU producers will lose EUR 10 billion in turnover from missed resales of returned products 
for refurbishment.227  
EU traders: will lose EUR 21.5 billion in turnover = EUR 5.8 billion in GVA.  
Adjustment and administrative costs (EU producers and traders) 
One-off adjustment costs: EUR 104.2 million 
for  familiarising  with  new  rules,  adjusting 
company procedures/relationships/forms 
Ongoing  adjustment  costs  for  15  years: EUR 
758.1  million 
and 
managing additional repairs  

One-off adjustment costs: EUR 87.6 
million for familiarising with new rules, 
adjusting company 
procedures/relationships/ forms  

commissioning 

for 

Ongoing  adjustment  costs:  EUR  758.1 
million  commissioning  and  managing 
additional repairs including delivery 

Administrative costs: None 

Administrative costs: None  

Additional costs (e.g. SME, third countries) 
Third country producers will have losses in sales of returned products amounting to EUR 
28.6 billion. 
Costs and benefits for consumers 
Both  POs  aim  at  increasing  the  choice  of  repair  as  a  remedy  in  order  to  ensure  more 
sustainable consumption. Both POs somewhat restrict consumer rights by limiting the choice 
between repair and replacement under the legal guarantee. PO1B, which makes repair the 
primary remedy, restricts consumer rights more than PO1A.  
SOCIAL IMPACTS: Both POs could lead to an increase in jobs in the repair sector and to 
a loss of jobs in EU production and trade, which results in a limited net loss over 15 years. 
Employment in the EU (costs and benefit)  
Net loss of jobs= -1,287 
Jobs producers= 0 
Jobs  traders= -9,725 
Jobs repairers= +8,438 
IMPACT ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: Both PO1A and PO1B are not expected to 
incur more than moderate enforcement costs as authorities are already familiar with the SGD. 
Costs  could  be  linked  to  their  familiarisation  with  changes  brought  to  the  SGD  by  this 
measure  and  to  compliance  verification  of  sellers  in  those  MS  which  rely  on  public 
enforcement. Implementation costs include awareness raising of new rules.  
Enforcement and implementation costs:228  

227 As most defective products under the legal guarantee are returned relatively early, they are particularly suitable 
for refurbishment and can be resold at a lower price. As a conservative estimate, it is assumed that half of returned 
products are resold for refurbishment. 
228 The estimated costs regarding ‘Enforcement and implementation costs’ refer to the ‘total average costs for all 
Member States and the EU’ for all POs, including both the one-off costs and the ongoing costs over the period 

175 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
The estimated costs in both PO1A and PO1B amount to EUR 28.2 million. 

2.  Impacts of Option 2: Prolonging the liability period in the context of repair  

PO2B Extending the liability period for repair 

PO2A  Incentivising  the  consumer  with  a 
longer  liability  period  to  choose  repair  
Variant  1:  Additional  year  for  repair  only 
Variant 2: Restarting the liability period for all 
available remedies 
ECONOMIC  IMPACTS  (EU  economic  operators):  Both  POs  lead  to  some  costs  for  EU 
producers  and  EU  traders,  in  particular  due  to  financing  additional  repair  services  and  loss  of 
consumer sales. In the context of PO2B these costs are however very limited, as the overwhelming 
majority of defects dealt with in the SGD appear already during the first two years after delivery, 
so PO2B concerns only a minimal share of defects. Due to an increase of repair activities, repairers 
are able to grow their business to a certain extent. Consumers will achieve some consumer savings. 
Repairers will gain due to the increased demand for repair of defective goods. 
Benefits for business 
Value added and turnover  
EU  producers  will  achieve  moderate  overall 
cost savings as they will have to provide less 
new  products  for  free  as  a  replacement  of 
defective  goods  under the legal  guarantee, as 
they  will  repair  more  instead.  They  will  still 
incur  some  costs  for  the  repair  of  defective 
goods, but the overall costs are lower than the 
gains from avoided replacement. 
- EUR 2.6 billion total costs savings (EUR 3.4 
billion due to avoided replacement products in 
the liability period minus  EUR 766.2 million 
for financing additional repair).  
EU  repairers:  EUR  2.2  billion  increase  in 
turnover = EUR 835.5  million GVA increase 
due to additional repair services under the legal 
guarantee which are outsourced to independent 
repairers or done in-house repair at producers 
or sellers. 
Costs for business  
Losses (including annual turnover, GVA) (EU actors) 
EU producers:  
-  EUR  1  billion  decrease  in  turnover  (due  to 
less  sales  from  new  and  returned  products  in 
context of replacement, which could have been 
resold for refurbishment albeit at a lower price) 
= EUR 95.3 million GVA loss  

EU  repairers:  EUR  349.1  million  increase  in 
turnover = EUR 137 million GVA increase due to 
additional 
legal 
repair  services  under 
guarantee  which  are  outsourced  to  independent 
repairers or done in-house repair at producers or 
sellers). 
EU  producers  and  traders  do  not  have  any 
benefits (savings) under this option as there is an 
additional 
requiring 
producers/traders 
repair  which 
currently does not exist.  

EU producers: 
- EUR 57.5 million decrease in turnover (due to 
less sales from new products)= EUR 13.5 million 
GVA loss 
EU traders:  

to  provide 

liability 

period 

the 

of 15 years. As one-off costs occur in the beginning, overall costs then are higher and decrease over time, being 
limited to ongoing costs in the subsequent years. 

176 

 
 
 
                                                 
new 

rules, 

rules, 

adjusting 

adjusting 

individualised 

Administrative costs: None  

EUR 203.1 million decrease  in turnover = 54.8 
million GVA loss due to lost consumer sales 

Adjustment costs: 
One-off: EUR 43.8 million for familiarising with 
new 
company 
procedures/relationships/forms/websites 
Ongoing adjustment costs: EUR 973.6 million for 
commissioning  and  managing  repair  in  the 
additional liability period 

EU traders: EUR 2.7billion loss in turnover = 
727.5 million GVA loss due to lost consumer 
sales  
Administrative and adjustment costs (EU producers and traders)      
Adjustment costs: 
One-off:  EUR  87.6  million  for  familiarising 
with 
company 
procedures/relationships/ forms/websites 
Ongoing  adjustment costs: EUR  2 billion  for 
calculating 
extensions  of 
liability  for  each  case,  commissioning  and 
managing  additional  repairs  or  all  remedies 
(depending  on  variant)  during  extended 
liability period (including compliance costs for 
recording individual cases, and keeping track 
of the individual extended liability periods).  
Administrative costs: None  
Additional costs (third countries) 
Third countries: Non-EU producers’ sales of new products/parts would decrease. 
Third country producers will have losses in sales of new products amounting to EUR 785.2 million 
under PO2A, being outbalanced by cost savings from avoiding replacement products of EUR 6.2 
billion. Under PO2B the losses in sales for new products amount to EUR 107.3 million and the 
additional costs to EUR 349.1 million. 
Benefits for consumers 
Consumer savings: EUR 5.4 billion  
Consumer  detriment  is  reduced  during  the 
extended liability period as consumers can use 
products longer and are not forced to buy new 
goods  if  their  products  break  down  in  the 
additional  liability  period.  PO2A  gives  a 
choice related to the extended liability period 
for the consumer. 
SOCIAL IMPACTS: The social impact of both POs in terms of employment at EU level would 
be very minimal. As the number of avoided purchases is rather small in the scenarios covered by 
this option, the impacts on turnover of producers and retailers are also small. This means that the 
implications for possible reduction of personnel costs due to decreased turnover will translate in 
virtually no job losses at EU level. Employment in the repair sector (in-house or third party) could 
increase due to additional repairs, but minimally.  
Employment in the EU (costs and benefits).  
Net gains of jobs= 24 
Jobs  producers= -175 
Jobs  traders= -1,222 
Jobs repairers= +1,420 
IMPACT  ON  PUBLIC  ADMINISTRATION:  The  one-off  and  ongoing  enforcement  and 
implementation  costs  include  familiarization  with  the  new  rules  of  competent  authorities  and 
enforcement actions, including inspections as well as awareness raising campaigns. 

Consumer savings: EUR 406.3 million  
the 
Consumer  detriment 
prolonged liability period as consumers  can use 
products  longer  and  are  not  forced  to  buy  new 
goods  if  their  products  break  down  in  the  third 
year. Under PO2B all consumers benefit as they 
receive  an  additional  liability  independent  from 
the condition of choosing repair before. 

Net gains of jobs= 112 
Jobs producers= - 24 
Jobs  traders= -92 
Jobs repairers= +228 

is  reduced  during 

177 

 
 
 
Enforcement  and  implementation  costs:  Both  PO  are  not  expected  to  generate  considerable 
enforcement costs as authorities are already familiar with the SGD. As under PO 1 the estimated 
costs amount to EUR 28.2 million.  

3.  Impacts of option 3: Replacement with refurbished goods 

PO3B  from  the  second  year  of  the  liability 
period 

PO3A  only  during  the  extended  liability 
period (PO2B) 
ECONOMIC IMPACTS: PO3B would bring limited cost savings for EU producers and traders, as 
they would have the possibility to replace with a refurbished product during the second year of the 
liability period. PO3A causes a minimal decrease in GVA for EU producers and traders, as less new 
products would be bought. The repair and refurbishment sector would have limited increase in GVA 
under both POs.  
Benefits for business 
Value added and turnover 
EU  repair  and  refurbishment  sector:  Increase 
in  turnover EUR 706.4  million = EUR 277.3 
million p.a. increase in GVA.  

EU  producers  and  traders:  Total  cost  savings  of 
EUR  2  billion  over  15  years,  as  they  would  not 
have to replace defective goods with new products 
from  the  second  year  of  the  liability  period. 
Producers would also benefit from increased sales 
of 
for 
additional 
refurbishment. 
EU  repair  and  refurbishment  sector:  Increase  in 
turnover EUR 1.6 billion = EUR 623.9 million p.a. 
increase in GVA.  

spare  parts,  necessary 

in 

EUR 

Costs for business 
Losses (EU actors) 
EU  producers:  Decrease  in  turnover  of  EUR 
116.5  million  (taking  into  account  the  reduced 
sales of new products), translating into a decrease 
of 
GVA.  
27.3  million 
EU traders: Decrease in turnover of EUR 411.1 
million = EUR 111 million decrease in the GVA, 
resulting  from  the  decrease  in  sales  of  new 
products because the liability period is extended. 
Administrative and adjustment costs (EU producers and traders) 
Adjustment costs: 
One-off: EUR 150.6 million for familiarising 
with new rules; updating and aligning internal 
procedures and rules; making agreements with 
repair shops, setting out terms and conditions 
for repair and refurbishment,  
Ongoing:  EUR  77.9  million  for  checking 
the  definition  of 
fit 
whether  products 
refurbished  goods  and  ensuring  storage 
capacity, evaluating in each case whether use 
of  refurbished  goods  is  allowed  and  whether 
such goods are available 

EU producers: No changes in the turnover or the 
GVA.   
EU  traders:  No  changes  in  the  turnover  or  the 
GVA.  

rules;  updating  and  aligning 

Adjustment costs:  
One-off: EUR 150.6 million for familiarising with 
new 
internal 
procedures  and  rules;  making  agreements  with 
repair  shops,  setting  out  terms  and  conditions  for 
repair and refurbishment,  
Ongoing: EUR 175.3 million for checking whether 
products fit the definition of refurbished goods and 
ensuring storage capacity, evaluating in each case 
whether  use  of  refurbished  goods  is  allowed  and 
whether such goods are available 
Administrative costs: none 

178 

 
 
 
Administrative costs: None 

is 

reduced  because 

No  reducing  effect  on  consumer  detriment  or 
consumer savings. 

Additional costs (third countries) 
Third  countries:  Non-EU  sellers  would  need  to  comply  with  the  new  rules  and  ensure  that  the 
refurbished  products  they  commercialise  within  the  internal  market  fit  into  the  definition  of 
refurbished goods. Third country producers will have less sales from new products which amount to 
EUR 217.1 million under PO3A. 
Additional costs under PO3A: EUR 706.4 million while PO3B would bring cost savings of EUR 3.5 
billion. 
Benefits for consumers 
Consumer  detriment 
consumers have a prolonged liability period.  
Consumer savings: EUR 822.2 million 
SOCIAL IMPACTS: PO3 could lead to a marginal increase in jobs in the repair and refurbishment 
industry. Impacts are likely slightly bigger in PO3B, as the amount of refurbished products under 
this PO is larger than in PO3A. PO3A would have negligible negative impacts on the employment 
of traders and producers due to reduced production and sales of new goods.  
Employment in the EU (costs and benefits) 
Net gains of jobs= 226 
Jobs  producers= -50 
Jobs  traders= -186 
Jobs repairers= +462 
IMPACT  ON  PUBLIC  ADMINISTRATION:  PO3  is  not  expected  to  generate  more  than 
moderate  enforcement  costs  as  authorities  are  already  familiar  with  the  SGD  (as  under  PO1  and 
PO2). The familiarisation with the concept of refurbished goods causes some minor enforcement 
costs.  
Enforcement and implementation costs:  
The estimated costs amount to EUR 28.2 million. 

Net gains of jobs= -1,040 
Jobs producers= 0 
Jobs traders= 0 
New jobs repairers= +1,040 

4.  Impacts of option 4: Aligning the liability period for refurbished goods  

All the numbers below take into account that only approximately half of the internal market 
would be affected by PO4. 

PO4 Aligning the liability period for refurbished goods 
ECONOMIC  IMPACTS:  PO4  leads  to  medium  losses  for  EU  traders  due  to  additional 
costs for performing remedies over an extended liability period, as well as decrease in their 
sales of new goods. EU producers will consequently have a small loss of GVA. PO4 will 
increase revenues of the repair/refurbishment sector, as many to-be-refurbished products are 
also defective and need to be repaired and their functionality need to be verified.  
Benefits for business 
Value added and turnover (EU actors) 
Repair and refurbishment sector: Estimated increased turnover for the sector, including all 
actors  offering  repair  services  of  EUR  2.3  billion  =  GVA  increase  of  EUR  899  million. 
However, the positive impact on the repair and refurbishment sector depends on the amount 
of  defective  to-be-refurbished  products  that  need  repair/refurbishment,  as  well  as  on  the 
traders’ willingness to offer refurbished goods. 

179 

 
 
 
 
 
Costs for business 
Losses (EU actors) 
Producers: GVA losses to the amount of 102.5 million EUR and reduction of cost savings 
of EUR 776.5 million for financing additional repair. Producers’ sales of repaired products 
would increase, therefore setting-off part of the negative effects. 
Traders: Decrease in turnover of EUR 741.4 million = EUR 200.2 million decrease in GVA, 
due  to  diminished  sales  of  new  products.  However,  traders  can  compensate  this  by  an 
increased  sales  of  refurbished  goods.  Also,  traders’  overall  costs  of  performing  remedies 
during the legal guarantee period would increase by the new product category falling under 
the regular guarantee period. 
Administrative and adjustment costs (EU producers and traders) 
Adjustment costs: 
One-off:  EUR  91.3  million.  For  familiarisation  with  new  rules,  updating  and  aligning 
internal procedures and rules.  
Ongoing: EUR 137.2 million for checking whether products fit the definition of refurbished 
goods and ensuring storage capacity 
Administrative costs: None 

Additional costs (third countries) 
Third countries: Non-EU producers’ losses in sales of new products/parts would be EUR 
844.9 million, but the loss would be set-off by sales of returned products resulting in total 
profit of overall EUR 364.2. million. Third country traders would need to comply with the 
new rules and ensure that the refurbished products they commercialise within the internal 
market fit into the definition of refurbished goods.  

Costs and benefits for consumers 
Consumers would benefit from PO4 by having more fully functional products with extended 
liability period, but most likely with reduced prices, to choose from. This would result in 
consumer savings of EUR 1.5 billion.  

SOCIAL  IMPACTS:  To-be-refurbished  products  usually  need  to  undergo  some  quality 
checks and possible repairs, so PO4 would have a positive impact on the demand for repair 
and refurbishment services and therefore employment in this sector. On the other hand PO5 
would  lead  to  minor  losses  of  jobs  in  production  and  sales  due  to  avoided  consumer 
purchases of new goods.  
Employment in the EU (costs and benefits) 
Net gains of jobs: 1.004 
Jobs producers= -188 
Jobs traders= -336 (this figure does not take into account the positive effect on employment 
caused by the extended work on executing the remedies) 
Jobs repairers= +1.528 
IMPACTS  ON  PUBLIC  ADMINISTRATION:  PO4  is  not  expected  to  generate 
considerable enforcement costs as authorities are already familiar with the SGD. However, 
a minor increase of enforcement costs is assumed, because the enforcement authorities need 
to familiarise themselves with the concept of refurbished goods. | 
Enforcement and implementation costs:   
The estimated costs amount to EUR 0.8 million. 

180 

 
 
 
II.  CLUSTER II: ENCOURAGING REPAIR AND REUSE OF GOODS BEYOND 

THE LEGAL GUARANTEE  

5.  Impacts of Option 5: Information on where to repair 

PO5C: Matchmaking platform on 
repair at EU level  

PO5B: Match-making 
platform on repair at 
national level 

PO5A: Obligation on 
producers to inform 
where to repair 
ECONOMIC IMPACTS (EU economic operators) 
All options will help to achieve considerable consumer savings as a result of prolonging the useful 
life of goods consumers purchased. The scale of consumer savings will depend on the take-up of 
POs by businesses and consumers. As a result of the prolonged life span of repaired products, less 
new  replacement  products  will  be  bought  and  respectively  sold  and  produced.  This  results  in 
forgone sales of new products affecting EU producers and traders, translating into a decrease in 
annual turnover and GVA. The adjustment and administrative costs relating to the options will 
affect SMEs more relative to their turnover than large enterprises. The losses will not be evenly 
spread  across  all  producers  and  traders,  as  those  focusing  on  ecodesign  products  may  gain  a 
competitive  advantage  and  bigger  market  share  because  consumers  are  increasingly  likely  to 
prefer sustainable products that can be repaired. EU traders will lose more than EU producers, as 
many of the goods they are selling are not produced in the EU, but by third country manufacturers. 
The EU  repair sector, including independent  repair services, will  gain  as a result of increased 
demand for repair services. This also includes producers and traders offering spare parts and repair 
services, who could gain additional income from this line of business and adapt their business 
models accordingly, giving more prominence to repair.  
Benefits for business 
Value added and turnover  

EU  repairers:  increase  in 
turnover  of  EUR  1.9 
billion  =  EUR  722.6 
increase. 
million  GVA 
The  gains  are  not  evenly 
spread,  as  they  benefit 
those  professional 
only 
(including 
repairers 
repairers, 
independent 
producers 
traders 
offering  repair  services) 
who are part of producers’ 
repair networks.  

and 

increase 

EU  repairers: 
in 
turnover of EUR 6.2 billion = 
EUR  2.4  billion  GVA 
increase.  
The  gains  are  evenly  spread 
for all repairers as the option 
applies  to  all  sectors.  Also 
repairers 
non-professional 
could  benefit,  if  MS  allow 
them to register. 

EU  repairers:  increase  in  turnover 
EUR  3.8  billion  =  EUR  1.3  billion 
GVA increase. 
The gains are not evenly spread and 
only  repairers  of  energy  labelled 
products/  eco-design  goods  benefit, 
because  only  repair  services  within 
the  scope  of  the  EPREL  platform 
will be eligible to register on it. Also 
non-professional 
repairers  could 
benefit. 

EU  repairers  who  register  on  the  platform  will  gain  visibility  and 
potentially  new  clients  and  increased  revenue.  Both  platforms 
options would include a function filtering professional repairers, so 
that consumers can identify qualified repairers particularly for repair 
of products,  where safety  is  a concern (e.g. electric and electronic 
appliances). 

Costs for business 
Losses (including annual turnover, negative change in GVA) 
EU producers: decrease of 
EUR  256.7  million 
in 
turnover (due to less sales 

EU  producers:  decrease  of 
EUR 860 million in turnover 
(due  to  less  sales  of  new 

EU  producers:  decrease  of  EUR 
548.4 million in turnover (due to less 
sales  from  new  products/parts)  = 

181 

 
 
 
in 

have 

million, 

PO5B  and  PO5C  create  negligible  business  adjustment  and 
administrative  costs,  as  registration  on  the  platform  would  be 
voluntary and would be covered by the current costs for running a 
business by interested companies. No administrative costs.  

products/parts) = EUR 208.3 
million in GVA. 
EU  traders:  lose  EUR  3.6 
billion 
turnover  (retail 
margin)  =  decrease  of  960 
million EUR in GVA.  
The  losses  are  relevant  for 
producers  and  traders  in  all 
sectors.  

EUR  108.2  million  decrease  in 
GVAEU  traders:  lose  EUR  2.8 
billion in turnover (retail margin) = 
decrease  of  EUR  757.2  million    in 
GVA 
The  losses  are  relevant  for  energy 
labelled  and  ecodesigned  goods 
(estimated  for  simplicity  for  eco-
design goods) 

of  new  products/parts)  = 
EUR 
million 
62.2 
decrease in GVA. 
EU  traders:  lose  EUR  1 
billion  in  turnover  (retail 
margin)  =  decrease  of 
EUR  286.6  million 
in 
GVA. 
The losses are relevant for 
producers  and  traders  in 
all sectors. 
Administrative and adjustment costs for business 
EU  producers  and  traders 
will 
one-off 
adjustment  costs:  EUR 
for 
106.6 
adjusting 
company 
documentation/web-site 
to provide information on 
professional 
repair 
networks. 
Ongoing 
adjustment/ 
administrative  costs  for 
EU producers and traders: 
EUR  159.9  million.  They 
will  relate  to  up-dating 
information  on  existing 
repair network annually.  
No administrative costs.  
Additional costs (third countries) 
Limited  losses  for  third 
country producers due to a 
decrease  in  sales  of  new 
products which amount to 
EUR  592  million.  Those 
who  do  not  have  repair 
networks in all MS would 
have 
to 
difficulties 
comply effectively. 
Benefits for consumers 
Consumer  savings  EUR 
10.5  billion,  relevant  for 
all  sectors  of  consumer 
goods.  
SOCIAL  IMPACTS:  All  POs  are  likely  to  have  an  overall  net  limited  positive  impact  on 
employment in the repair sector in the next 15 years. Minimal jobs would be lost in production in 
the EU due to a decrease in demand for new goods by consumers to replace defective goods that 

Reduced  volume  of  imported  goods  into  the  EU  for  some  third-
country producers; losses due to a decrease in sales of new products 
which amount to EUR ~2 billion under PO5B and EUR ~1.9 billion 
under PO5C.  

Consumer 
savings:  EUR  21.7  
billion, relevant  for energy labelled 
and eco-design goods (for simplicity 
estimated for eco-design goods) 

Consumer savings: EUR 35.2 
billion, 
all 
relevant 
sectors of consumer goods 

for 

182 

 
 
 
 
 
 
would be repaired. More jobs would be lost in trade, because EU traders would see a decrease in 
sales also of goods imported from third countries. Increased demand for repair would secure and 
create more jobs in repair. This will also benefit local communities, as many repairers are SMEs’ 
operating  their  business  locally.  New  local  employment  in  the  repair  sector  could  benefit  job 
seekers irrespective of age group or gender. Especially for repair activities that do not require 
long-term specialised training, short-term training courses could offer inclusive opportunities to 
job-seekers of various backgrounds. The increased economic activity will have indirect positive 
benefits on local communities. 
Employment in the EU (costs and benefits)  
Net gains of jobs= -631 
Jobs producers= -114 
Jobs traders= -481 
Jobs repairers= +1,126 
IMPACTS ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: Public administration would incur moderate 
enforcement and implementation costs for monitoring compliance with PO5A, as the PO only 
concerns  producers.  Medium  implementation  costs  for  national  competent  authorities  for  IT 
development  and  ongoing  costs  for  maintenance  and  updates  and  awareness  raising  would  be 
necessary for PO5B. Similar costs are rather minimal for PO5C as it concerns only one platform 
at EU level. 

Net gains of jobs= 2,113 
Jobs producers= -381 
Jobs traders= -1,612 
Jobs repairers= +4,106 

Net gains of jobs: 1,067 
Jobs producers= -190 
Jobs traders= -1,271 
Jobs repairers= +2,528 

Enforcement and implementation costs:229 

The  PO  entails  one-off 
implementation costs of EUR 
8.6  for  all  MS  and  EU  to 
finance  the  IT  development 
of  the  platform  web-site  and 
communication 
campaigns 
for awareness raising. 
Ongoing implementation will 
to  maintenance, 
relate 
including 
back-office 
monitoring  of  the  platform 
and up-dates of software and 
business  processes  of  EUR 
23.4 million. 
Limited  enforcement  costs 
will  be  linked  to  monitoring 
activities  on  the  platform  by 
competent  authorities  and 
reacting to consumer alerts. 
The 
implementation 

estimated 
and 

total 

for 

PO 

entails 

one-off 
The 
implementation  costs  of  EUR  0.5 
million  to  add  a  search  engine 
interface  for  repair  providers  to  an 
existing  EU  web-site.  Further  one-
off  costs  of  EUR  1  million  are 
estimated 
communication 
campaigns for awareness raising. 
Ongoing  implementation  costs  will 
be  necessary 
for  maintenance, 
including back-office monitoring of 
the  platform  up-dates,  of  EUR  3.0 
million. 
Limited  enforcement  costs  will  be 
linked to monitoring activities on the 
platform  by  competent  authorities 
and reacting to consumer alerts. 
The  total  estimated  implementation 
and  enforcement  costs  amount  to 
EUR 4.5 million. 

229 The fact that PO5B is a national measure and PO5C one at the European level was taken into account. They 
create costs both for MS and EU level except for ongoing enforcement costs which will be borne by the MS for 
PO5B and by the EU for PO5C. 

183 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
enforcement costs amount to 
EUR 32 million.  

6.  Impacts of Option 6: Enhance transparency/conditions for repair 

PO6A: 
commitments 
business at EU-level 

Voluntary 
of 

PO6B:  Obligation 
to 
issue  a  repair 
quote  on  price  and 
for 
conditions 
repair 
a 
standardised form 

in 

PO6C:  Obligation 
to repair goods that 
to 
subject 
are 
reparability 
requirements under 
EU  law  (against  a 
price)  

PO6D:    Obligation  to 
repair  all  products 
(against a price)  

= 

ECONOMIC IMPACTS: All sub-options will have similar economic impacts as under option  5, but 
their  magnitude  will  be  greater,  depending  on  the  take-up  of  each  PO,  increasing  progressively  from 
PO6A.  This leads to significant losses for EU traders and producers under PO6D while repairers will 
have substantial gains. Especially PO6C and PO6D would lead to very large consumer savings 
Benefits for business 
Value added and turnover  
EU  repairers:  increase 
EUR  3.7  billion 
in 
turnover 
EUR 
1.4billion in GVA. 
The  gains  will  not  be 
evenly 
spread, 
benefitting  only  those 
repairers  who  subscribe 
to 
voluntary 
commitments. 
traders 
Producers  and 
providing  spare  parts 
and  repair  services  may 
gain 
additional 
customers. 

EU  repairers:  increase 
EUR  14.1  billion 
in 
turnover  =  EUR  5.5 
billion in GVA 
The  gains  will  not  be 
evenly spread. Similarly 
to  option  6C,  producers 
are likely to benefit from 
additional 
repair 
revenues  and  gain  a 
competitive  advantage 
compared 
to 
independent repairers in 
all sectors. 

EU 
repairers: 
increase  EUR  12.4 
billion  in  turnover  = 
EUR  4.8  billion  in 
GVA. 
The  gains  will  be 
evenly spread among 
all repair actors in all 
sectors,  as  the  quote 
will  be  a  mandatory 
requirement 
applicable 
repair actors.  

EU repairers: increase EUR 
6.9  billion  in  turnover  = 
EUR 2.3 billion in GVA. 
The  gains  will  not  be 
evenly  spread:  they  will 
benefit  only  repairers  of 
goods 
to 
requirements 
reparability 
under  EU  law.  Producers 
will need to invest in repair 
subcontract. 
services  or 
likely 
Producers  are 
to 
benefit 
additional 
from 
repair  revenues  and  gain  a 
advantage 
competitive 
compared  to  independent 
repairers. 

subject 

the 

all 

to 

Costs for business 

Losses  
EU  producers:  decrease 
of EUR 513.4 million in 
turnover  (due  to  less 
new 
sales 
from 
products/parts 
= 
decrease  of  EUR  124.3 
million  in GVA 
EU  traders:  decrease  of 
in 
EUR  2.1  billion 

) 

to 

EU 
producers: 
decrease of EUR 1.7 
turnover 
billion 
in 
less  sales 
(due 
from 
new 
= 
products/parts) 
decrease  of  EUR 
416.6  million 
in 
GVA 

EU  producers:  decrease  of 
in 
EUR  990.3  million 
turnover  (due  to  less  sales 
from new products/parts) = 
decrease  of  EUR  195.3 
million in GVA 
EU 
traders:  decrease  of 
EUR 5 billion in turnover = 
1.4 billion EUR in GVA 

EU  producers:  decrease 
of  EUR  1.9  billion  in 
turnover  (due  to  less 
sales 
new 
from 
products/parts)  =  EUR 
472.6 million in GVA  
EU  traders:  decrease  of 
in 
EUR 

billion 

8 

184 

 
 
 
 
 
 
turnover  =  decrease  of 
EUR  573.1  million    in 
GVA 

EU  traders:  decrease 
of EUR 7.1 billion in 
turnover    =  decrease 
of 1.9 billion in GVA 

turnover=  EUR 
billion GVA 

2.1 

in 

to 

label, 

repairers 
to 

Adjustment and administrative costs  
that 
The 
subscribe 
the 
voluntary  commitments 
quality 
standard  will 
incur one-off adjustment 
costs for negotiations on 
the  content  of  the  code. 
will 
Adjustments 
internal 
concern 
procedures, 
company 
adaptations 
the 
minimum  standard  of 
the 
possibly 
increasing  quality  of 
services  and  adapting 
company information to 
indicate that the repairer 
adheres  to  the  standard 
and  what  this  means. 
The  costs  cannot  be 
estimated  as  they  will 
depend on the content of 
the 
voluntary 
commitments 
negotiated  by  industry. 
In  any  case,  the  costs 
will  be  acceptable,  as 
only  then  repairers  will 
subscribe 
the 
standard. 
Small 
ongoing 
adjustment  costs  will 
relate  to  the  periodic 
review of the code based 
on  the  commitments  on 
the standard of the repair 
(e.g.  quality 
service 
and 
guarantee) 
to 
consumer 
answering 
queries 
the 
meaning  of  the  quality 
label. 

repairers  will 
EU 
incur 
costs 
(including  producers 
and traders who offer 
repair services). 
One-off  adjustment 
costs:  to  adapt  (e.g. 
website)  to  present 
information 
the 
format of the quote = 
EUR 475.4 million 
Ongoing  adjustment 
costs 
for 
the 
implementing 
option:  EUR  5.9 
billion. 
These  costs  reflect 
the  overall  costs  for 
providing 
information  on  all 
quotes  that  may  be 
requested.  The  cost 
relates  to  up-dating 
information 
as 
evolving 
regards 
prices and conditions 
for  repair  services. 
costs 
above 
The 
however  do  not  take 
into 
the 
account 
reduction  in  form  of 
the 
the  price 
that 
quote: 
businesses 
may 
provide 
the  quote 
against  a  price  and 
ongoing 
in 
particular would thus 
be  covered  by  the 
overall price paid for 
the 
repair 
transaction. 
Businesses 

about 

could 

costs 

i.e. 

for 

to 

to 

of 

will 

traders 

One-off  adjustment  costs 
for EU producers of goods 
reparability 
subject 
requirements under EU law 
and 
these 
products will incur one off 
adjustment  costs:  EUR  45 
million. 
Adjustments 
be 
necessary  to  adapt  to  the 
requirement  to  offer  repair 
services  beyond  the  legal 
guarantee.  This 
includes 
introducing  internal  repair 
infrastructure  at 
services 
producers  where 
not 
available, alternatively sub-
independent 
contracting 
repairers. 
The costs would be smaller 
in  scale  for  producers  who 
repair 
already 
provide 
services  (e.g.  under 
the 
legal  guarantee  based  on 
agreements  with 
B2B 
sellers) 
the 
equipment.  
Ongoing annual adjustment 
costs  for  implementing  the 
measure  will 
to 
storage  of  spare  parts, 
to 
equipment, 
service  products  over  a 
predefined  period  of  time; 
ensuring  available  spare 
parts  exist  for  different 
models  placed 
the 
market.  The  costs  will 
affect EU producers: 582.1 
million. 
The  costs  do  not  take  into 
account 
repair 
services  will  be  provided 

and  have 

software 

relate 

that 

the 

at 

will 

The  one-off  adjustment 
costs  for  EU  producers 
are 
traders 
and 
estimated at EUR 674.4 
million.  
They 
impact 
those 
particularly 
producers  who  do  not 
have 
repair 
infrastructure  in  place, 
as  they  will  have  to 
make 
significant 
investments  to  comply 
with this requirement. If 
an 
is 
exception 
introduced for producers 
which do not have repair 
facilities, the option will 
be 
substantially 
weakened.  There  will 
also  be  a  distortion  of 
competition 
among 
producers  as  those  with 
repair  facilities  would 
need to comply with the 
obligation 
repair, 
while  others  would  be 
exempt.  The  one-off 
costs  can  therefore  not 
be avoided. 
Ongoing adjustment and 
for 
compliance  costs 
implementing the option 
will  be  3.3  billion.  The 
costs  will 
to 
ensuring  availability  of 
spare parts and technical 
expertise 
repair 
models  placed  on  the 
market  over  a  specific 
and  handling 
period 
repair 
from 
requests 
consumers.  

relate 

to 

to 

185 

 
 
 
Administrative 
none. . 

costs: 

also  decide  to  offer 
the quote for free as a 
way  to  attract  more 
customers.  
Administrative costs: 
none  

costs: 
Administrative 
One-off  costs  for  EU 
producers and traders of 
EUR  161.8  million. 
Thecosts  will  relate  to 
updates  of the web-site. 

for a price, which will cover 
the  ongoing  costs 
for 
providing  the  service  for 
ensuring  availability  of 
spare  parts  and  technical 
expertise  to  repair  models 
placed on the market over a 
specific  period,  handling 
repair 
from 
requests 
consumers.  
Administrative costs:  
for  EU 
One-off  costs 
producers  and  traders  of 
EUR  69.8  million  will 
relate  to  updates  of  the 
web-site. 

Additional costs (for producers in third countries) 
A decrease in sales of new goods in the EU will affect producers in third countries. The losses for third 
country  producers  will  be  limited  for  PO6A  (EUR  1.6  billion),  medium  for  PO6B  (EUR  5.6  billion), 
significant for PO6C (EUR 4.4 billion) and most significant for PO6D (EUR 6.4 billion).  

No  direct  obligations  on 
third  country 
manufacturers,  as  options  only  concern  EU 
repairers.  Additional  costs  will  therefore  not 
apply to third country manufacturers if they do 
not offer repair services in the EU.  

to 

The  legal  obligation  to 
to 
repair 
applies 
of 
producers 
goods 
subject 
reparability 
requirements  under  EU 
law, 
third 
including 
country producers placing 
those  goods  on  the  EU 
market.  This  obligation 
entails  at  least  the  same 
adjustment 
for 
repair  arrangements  (via 
importers  or  by  sub-
contracting 
independent 
repairers in the EU).  

costs 

to 

The  legal  obligation  to 
all 
applies 
repair 
producers, including third 
country 
producers  
placing  goods  on  the  EU 
market.  This  obligation 
entails  at  least  the  same 
adjustment 
for 
repair  arrangements  (via 
importers  or  by  sub-
contracting 
independent 
repairers in the EU). 

costs 

Benefits for consumers: As more consumers will repair their products, they will make savings due to 
avoided purchases of new goods that would have replaced the repaired ones. 
 Consumer 
EUR 21billion  

Consumer  savings:  EUR 
39.2 billion 

Consumer savings: EUR 
79.9 billion  

Consumer 
EUR 70.5 billion  

savings: 

savings: 

trust 

in 
Consumer 
the 
repairers  with 
will 
label 
quality 
increase,  as 
it  will 
reassure them about  the 

trust 

Consumer 
in 
repair  services  will 
they 
increase, 
would 
better 
be 
informed  in  advance 
of  the  price  and  key 

as 

Consumer  confidence  will 
increase as a result of a new 
enforceable 
legally 
consumer  right  as  regards 
goods 
to 
requirements. 
reparability 

subject 

Consumers  will  benefit 
from  the  obligation  to 
repair in more cases and 
will make more savings 
from  avoided  purchases 
as  they  would  use  their 

186 

 
 
 
ease  of 
quality of the service.  

repair 

and 

conditions  for  repair 
before  concluding  a 
repair contract. Thus, 
consumers 
could 
the  most 
choose 
suitable conditions of 
is 
repair.  The  PO 
all 
relevant 
sectors  of  consumer 
goods. 

for 

The  new  consumer  right 
repair  more 
will  make 
attractive 
more 
and 
accessible  for  consumers, 
it  will  also  ensure 
as 
reasonable  prices  through 
increased  transparency  on 
repair price.  

to 

not 

and 

respect 

products 
repaired 
longer.  However,  some 
producers  will  not  be 
able 
the 
obligation  to  repair  for 
technical  reasons  (e.g. 
not  all  products  are 
spare 
reparable 
be 
parts  may 
for 
available 
all 
products). 
Therefore, 
to 
flexible  exceptions 
the obligation under this 
sub-option  will 
be 
necessary. As producers 
will have to invoke them 
in 
cases 
(compared 
to  PO6C), 
this  may  undermine 
consumers  overall  trust 
in  the  “right  to  repair”, 
that  they  cannot  always 
rely on. 

more 

SOCIAL IMPACTS (costs and benefits) 
All POs lead to loss of jobs in EU trade and production, but bigger employment gains in the repair sector, 
which result in a net benefit for employment in the next 15 years. The negative impact is higher in trade 
due  to  a  larger  decrease  in  sales  of  new  products  by  EU  traders,  who  largely  sell  goods  from  third 
countries. Jobs in EU production would also decrease, but on a much smaller scale. All POs would create 
more new jobs in the EU repair sector. Some of the repair jobs created under PO6C and PO6D may be 
in-house  repair  jobs  at  producers  or  at  sub-contracted  independent  repairers.  This  would  depend  on 
producers’ approaches to developing repair services for their brand, which may vary. The employment 
figures do not reflect potential indirect positive impacts on job creation as a result of consumer savings 
being spent elsewhere.  

Employment (costs and benefits) 
Net gains of jobs= 1,261 
Jobs producers= -228 
Jobs traders= -962 
Jobs repairers= +2,451 
The  new  jobs  in  repair 
will  be  concentrated  in 
that 
repair  companies 
subscribe 
the 
voluntary  commitments 
standard and thus attract 
customers 
more 
in  quality 
interested 

Net  gains  of  jobs= 
4,227 
Jobs producers= -763 
Jobs traders= -3.224 
repairers= 
Jobs 
+8,213 
New  jobs  in  repair 
are 
to  span 
evenly  across  EU 
regions, 
as 
consumers  are  likely 
look  for  repair 
to 

likely 

to 

Net gains of jobs= 1,928 
Jobs producers= -342  
Jobs traders= - 2,296 
Jobs repairers = +4,566  
Job losses would be limited 
to  businesses  dealing  with 
reparability 
goods  with 
requirements 
and  will 
particularly  affect  traders. 
The  negative  effects  on 
employment 
EU 
producers  would  to  some 

on 

Net gains of jobs= 4,795  
Jobs producers= -865 
Jobs traders= -3,657 
Jobs repairers  = +9,317 
As  in  PO6C,  job  losses 
will  affect  producers  of 
all 
in 
particular  traders.  The 
job losses for producers 
will at  least  partially be 
compensated by new in-
house repair jobs. Some 

goods, 

but 

187 

 
 
 
for 

repair 
assurances 
services.  This  increase 
in 
jobs  will  not  be 
evenly  spread  among 
repair actors. 

in 

their 
services 
proximity.  Losses  of 
jobs  will  be  evenly 
spread  among  EU 
producers and traders 
and  will  concern  all 
types of goods. 

extent  be  counterbalanced 
by  new  repair  jobs  they 
would  need  to  create  to 
ensure compliance with the 
repair.  Where 
right 
producers  decide  to  sub-
contract,  new  jobs  could 
in 
created 
also 
independent repairers. 

be 

to 

jobs  may  be 
repair 
created  at  independent 
repairers where they are 
sub-contracted 
by 
to  provide 
producers 
repair.  

IMPACTS ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: The national competent authorities will have to ensure 
effective application of the options in practice. This entails both one-off and ongoing enforcement and 
implementation costs. The enforcement costs in this cluster include familiarization with the new rules of 
competent  authorities  and  inspections.  Implementation  costs  include  awareness  raising  campaigns  to 
inform consumers of the new rights. 
Enforcement and implementation costs:   

required 

Enforcement  costs  for 
administration 
public 
negligible. 
are 
Enforcement  authorities 
are  not 
to 
enforce 
voluntary 
commitments. 
However, 
consumers 
may  occasionally  alert 
them to possible cases of 
non-compliance 
via 
consumer complaints. 
Furthermore, 
implementation costs on 
raising 
awareness 
campaigns  will 
be 
necessary 
ensure 
consumers  are  aware  of 
the label.  
The 
amount 
million  

costs 
to  EUR  2.5 

estimated 

to 

Enforcement 
costs 
will  be  relevant  to 
verify compliance of 
the 
repairers  with 
quote.  The 
target 
includes 
group 
all 
in 
repairers 
sectors.  
The  estimate  does 
not take into account 
price 
a 
threshold 
the 
obligation to provide 
a quote. 
The  estimated  costs 
amount to EUR 26.4 
million  

potential 

for 

to 
with 

Enforcement  costs  will  be 
relevant  for  enforcement 
verify 
authorities 
compliance 
the 
obligation  to  repair.    The 
target group for monitoring 
and  enforcement  actions  is 
producers 
limited 
to 
goods 
manufacturing 
reparability 
to 
subject 
requirements. 
The 
estimated  costs  amount  to 
EUR 4.5 million. 

by 

compared 
6C 

Enforcement  costs  will 
to  verify 
be  relevant 
the 
compliance  with 
obligation 
all 
producers. They will be 
higher 
to 
as 
option 
enforcement actions will 
have  to  cover  a  larger 
number  of  economic 
operators.  
The 
costs 
estimated 
amount  to  EUR  12.3 
million  While  the  type 
of  monitoring 
and 
inspections  is  the  same 
as  under  PO  6C,  the 
number  of  economic 
operators  is  higher,  as 
this  PO  applies  to  all 
products. 

188 

 
 
 
Impacts  of  Option  7:  Adding  a  functionality  on  refurbished  goods  in  the  match-making 
platform for repair (PO5B)  

PO7 Match-making platform promoting refurbished goods 
ECONOMIC  IMPACTS:  PO7  will  help  to  achieve  some  consumer  savings  as  a  result  of 
consumers purchasing refurbished goods cheaper than new goods (especially where consumers’ 
own goods cannot be effectively repaired). EU producers and traders of new goods would have 
losses  from  forgone  sales  of  new  goods,  translating  into  a  decrease  in  annual  turnover  and  a 
decrease in GVA. The sellers of refurbished goods gain benefits as a result of increased sales. 
The repair/refurbishment sector will gain as a result of increased demand for repair services.  
Benefits for business 
Value added and turnover   
EU repair/refurbishment sector will gain EUR 584.6 million in turnover = EUR 227.6 million 
increase in GVA, as more refurbished products will be purchased.  
EU sellers of refurbished goods who register on the platform will gain visibility and potentially 
new clients and increased revenue. 
Costs for business 
Losses (including turnover, negative change in GVA) 
EU  producers  will  lose  EUR  80.9  million  in  turnover  from  sales  of  new  products  where 
refurbished goods are bought instead. They will face a decrease in GVA of EUR 19.6 million. 
EU traders will lose EUR 334.4 million in turnover of sales of new products where refurbished 
goods are sold instead = decrease of EUR 90.3 million in GVA 
Administrative and compliance costs for business 
There are no estimated adjustment and administrative costs for businesses, as any costs are likely 
to be limited to self-registration and up-dates for refurbishment businesses participating in the 
platform. Any costs will depend on the take-up of the platform but these costs should be offset 
by the inflow of new customers. 
Additional costs (for third countries) 
Reduced volume of new imported goods into the EU for some third-country producers, as far as 
such  goods  are  replaced  by  purchases  of  refurbished  products;  losses  amount  to  EUR  186.5 
million due to a decrease in sales of new products.  
Benefits for consumers 
Consumer savings: EUR 1.9 billion 
PO7  encourages  consumers  to  purchase  a  refurbished  product  as  a  sustainable  consumption 
choice. It guides consumers towards relevant sellers of refurbished products by identifying offers 
with suitable conditions, notably quality assurance by a longer guarantee on refurbished goods. 
In combination with the match-making platform for repair under option PO5B, synergies would 
be  achieved  by  addressing  a  target  group  with  high  potential  to  contribute  to  sustainable 
consumption - consumers who have a defective product and are not immediately purchasing a 
new one. If they do not find a suitable repair offer under PO3B, PO7 would encourage them to 
consider a refurbished product instead as a sustainable consumption choice for a lower price. 
There are indications that a significant minority of consumers who purchased used goods did so 
for  environmental  considerations.230  As  the  platform  would  guide  consumers  towards  more 

230 IA Study, Annex 1.4, Consumer Survey, Section 5, QE2; reasons for buying a used product:  between 2 and 3 out of 
10 respondents said that they bought used goods (from a sample of popular consumer goods) due to the carbon footprint 
of the product and concerns about waste. 

 
 
                                                 
refurbished product providers, consumers would be more likely to identify  suitable offers for 
refurbished products they may not have considered.  
The  scale  of  consumer  savings  will  depend  on  the  take-up  of  the  PO  by  businesses  and 
consumers.   
Costs for consumers 
PO7 is limited to an online environment and therefore consumers who are not willing or able to 
search for sellers online would have less choice compared to others.  

SOCIAL IMPACTS: PO7 is likely to have a limited positive impact on employment in the EU. 
Some  jobs  will  be  lost  in  production  due  to  a  decrease  in  demand  for  new  goods  by  EU 
consumers. Jobs  will be lost also  in  trade,  due to decreased sales of new  products.  Increased 
demand of repair/refurbishment services will secure more jobs in the sector and create new jobs.  
Total job gains: 199 
EU producers: -36 
EU traders: -152 
EU repairers: +386 
IMPACTS ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: The public administration in MS will have to 
ensure  effective  implementation  and  application  of  this  option.  Implementation  costs  include 
costs for IT development and the ongoing maintenance of the refurbishment platform, as well as 
awareness  raising  campaigns.  Limited  enforcement  costs  will  relate  to  monitoring  potential 
irregularities on the platform. 
Enforcement and implementation costs 
The PO entails one-off implementation and enforcement costs of EUR 0.7 million for all MS to 
finance  the  IT  development  of  the  platform  web-site  and  for  communication  campaigns  for 
awareness raising. 
Ongoing  implementation  will  relate  to  maintenance,  including  back-office  monitoring  of  the 
platform and up-dates of software and business processes of EUR 3.2 million. 
The total estimated implementation and enforcement costs amount to EUR 3.8 million. 

190 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 7: Glossary 

Term or acronym 

Meaning or definition 

B2B 

B2C 

CEAP 

CO2-eq 

CRD 

CSD 

CWP 

Data Act 

Business-to-business 

Business-to-consumer 

“A New Circular Economy Action Plan for a cleaner and 
more  competitive  Europe”,  Communication  from  the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European  Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  the 
Committee  of 
the  Regions  Brussels,  11.3.2020 
COM(2020) 98 final  

Carbon dioxide equivalent 

Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of 
the  Council  of  25  October  2011  on  consumer  rights, 
amending  Council  Directive  93/13/EEC  and  Directive 
1999/44/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 
Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and 
Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council 

Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the sale 
of consumer goods and associated guarantees  

Commission Work Programme 

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on harmonised rules on fair access to and 
use of data (Data Act), 23.2.2022, COM(2022)68 final. 

Directive  on 
System of Value Added Tax 

the  Common 

Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on 
the  common  system  of  value  added  tax,  OJ  L  347, 
11.12.2006, pp. 1–118. 

Ecodesign Directive  

Directive  2009/125/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and 
of  the  Council  of  21  October  2009  establishing  a 

191 

 
 
Ecodesign Regulation for 
household dishwashers 

framework for the setting of ecodesign requirements for 
energy-related products (recast) 

Commission  Regulation  (EU)  2019/2022  of  1  October 
2019 laying down ecodesign requirements for household 
dishwashers pursuant to Directive 2009/125/EC of the EP 
and  of  the  Council  amending  Commission  Regulation 
(EC)  No  1275/2008  and 
repealing  Commission 
Regulation (EU) No 1016/2010 

ECGT 

EP 

EPREL 

ESPR 

GHG  

GVA 

IA 

ICT 

MCA 

MS 

amending  Directives 

Proposal for Proposal for a Directive of the EP and of the 
and 
Council 
2011/83/EU  as  regards  empowering  consumers  for  the 
green  transition  through  better  protection  against  unfair 
practices  and  better  information,  Brussels,  30.3.2022 
COM(2022) 143 final 2022/0092 (COD). 

2005/29/EC 

European Parliament 

European Product Registry for Energy Labelling 

Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation:  Proposal 
for a Regulation of the EP and of the Council establishing 
a  framework  for  setting  ecodesign  requirements  for 
repealing  Directive 
and 
sustainable 
2009/125/EC, Brussels, 30.3.2022 COM(2022) 142 final, 
2022/0095 (COD).  

products 

Greenhouse gas 

Gross Value Added 

Impact Assessment 

Information and communication technologies 

Multi-criteria analysis 

Member State(s) of the European Union 

192 

 
 
OIOO 

OPC 

p.a. 

PO 

One in, one out approach 

Open public consultation 

Per year 

Policy option(s) 

Refurbished goods 

Specific  category  of  second-hand  goods  that  have  been 
tested for their functionality and defects, so that they are 
proved to be fully functional. 

SGD 

SO 

TFEU 

UN 

VAT 

Directive (EU) 2019/771 of the EP and of the Council of 
20 May 2019 on certain aspects concerning contracts for 
the sale of goods, amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 
and  Directive  2009/22/EC,  and  repealing  Directive 
1999/44/EC 

Specific objective 

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union  

United Nations 

Value-added tax 

193 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 1/4: Identification of affected businesses 

ANNEX 8: SME TEST 

SMEs  are  included  in  the  scope  of  the  initiative,  as  they  account  for  the  vast  majority  of  businesses  in  the  EU, 
especially in the repair sector. According to Eurostat data, in 2019 businesses with less than 250 employees accounted 
for 99.7% of all enterprises, 77% of aggregate turnover, 80% of value added and 89% of employment in the repair 
sector.  
Overall, the  preferred PO package affects SMEs in a positive  way. It generates  new business in the repair sector. 
Increasing revenues for repair service providers will benefit SMEs disproportionately, as they have such a large share 
of the repair sector. In particular, PO1A (prioritising repair whenever it is cheaper than replacement) increases the 
amounts of repair in the context of the legal guarantee, therefore benefitting the repair sector. Cost savings gained by 
shifting remedies from replacement to less costly repair in the context of the legal guarantee will also benefit SMEs 
to a significant extent, as they account for over 60% of the total turnover in the manufacturing sectors of for instance 
footwear, clothing and furniture. In retail trade, which is also affected by the preferred PO package, the share of SMEs 
in aggregate turnover and GVA alike is 51% (excluding the sale of motor vehicles). This ratio is slightly higher for 
the sale of relevant consumer durables in specialised stores, for instance 53% in the case of ICT equipment. 
PO5B  (the  matchmaking  platform  on  repair  at  national  level)  will  give  more  visibility  to  SME  repairers  (once 
registered to the national platform). As SMEs would have more limited resources to advertise their services compared 
to bigger repair service providers, they would benefit comparably more from such advertising effect. The national 
platform also benefits SMEs, as they can only spend comparably less resources on search engine optimisation or on 
sponsored  web  search  results.  Likewise,  POs  6A  (voluntary  commitments)  and  6B (obligation  to  provide  a repair 
quote) will also positively affect SME turnover by enhancing the growth of the repair sector. Finally, PO7 (platform 
on refurbished products) will benefit the repair/refurbishment sector as a result of increased demand of refurbished 
goods, which in turn will help comparably more SMEs refurbishing products/selling refurbished products. 
SMEs in the manufacturing and retail of consumer durables will face some costs. The introduction of PO1A will cause 
adjustment  costs  that,  relative  to  business  revenues,  are  disproportionately  higher  for  SME  traders/producers. 
However, overall the benefits from the cost savings for SME traders/producers and the increased business for SME 
repairers outweigh the costs of implementing PO1A. Adjustment and administrative costs relating to PO5A (obligation 
to inform where to repair) and PO5B (a matchmaking platform on repair at national level) will affect SMEs more than 
large enterprises, relative to their turnover. PO6C (obligation to repair goods subject to reparability requirements under 
EU law) is likely to disadvantage a large number of SMEs in the repair sector, namely independent repairers, as the 
producers will conduct the repair work under this measure. However, as the producers will need to provide the repair 
work against a price, in reality also market actors other than the producers will have a possibility to compete for repair 
opportunities.  

Key question: To what extent is the initiative relevant for SMEs? (not relevant, relevant, highly 
relevant) 

This initiative is relevant for SMEs, as many SMEs operate in the sectors affected by the preferred PO package, namely 
the repair sector and the manufacturing sector for certain products. However, in the manufacturing sector of other 
products,  for  example  mobile  phones,  laptops  and  TVs,  which  are  very  relevant  for  achieving  more  sustainable 
consumption, SMEs only make up for less than 20% of the total turnover, which reduces the impact of this initiative 
on them. In the retail sector, SMEs account for 51% of sales according to available Eurostat data (their share is slightly 
above this value if only looking at the consumer durables concerned). 

Step 2/4: Consultation of SME Stakeholders 

The OPC captured input from SMEs and their representative organisations. SMEs that responded to the OPC were 
relatively supportive to PO1A, with 48% of responding SMEs considering it effective (in comparison, 50.4% of all 
responding business stakeholders considered the measure effective). The views of responding SMEs on PO6A varied, 
as 41% of SMEs considered the measure effective, 32% considered it ineffective and 26% were neutral (in comparison, 
52.5%  of  all  responding  business  stakeholders  considered  the  measure  effective).  In  some  position  papers,  SMEs 

194 

 
 
 
 
 
expressed that providing incentives for consumers to repair products or making repair services cheaper could extend 
the lifespan of consumer goods. SMEs further emphasised that repairers should receive from the manufacturers spare 
parts at fair price and a free access to technical documentation.  

The business survey carried out in the context of the IA Study gathered responses mainly from SMEs (83% - 195 out 
of 235 respondents). SMEs were positive about PO1A and PO6C. As regards PO1A, 62% of micro-sized companies, 
40% of medium-sized and 48% of small-sized companies surveyed considered the measure having high potential. As 
regards PO6C, 66% of small-sized companies, 57% of micro-sized companies and 50% of medium-sized companies 
considered  the  measure  having  high  potential.  SMEs’  interests  were  represented  also  by  the  business  associations 
interviewed in the IA Study.   

Step 3/4: Assessment of the impact on SMEs 
The IA study provided data on the role of SMEs in the sectors affected by the initiative and on the impacts that the 
initiative would have on them. The business input in the IA study was to a large extent shaped by SMEs, as they 
represented the clear majority of the respondents. The significance of SMEs in terms of number of enterprises, 
aggregate turnover, value added and employment was calculated based on the Eurostat data (Structural Business 
Statistics) for the relevant manufacturing sub-sectors, for repair and for retail trade. The IA study collected, via an 
online business survey, information from affected businesses on market practices regarding repair and replacement 
of defective goods, insights on the repair market as well as their views and observations on the proposed measures. 
The business survey was conducted in 12 Member States and gathered 235 valid responses, of which 83% (195 out 
of 235 respondents) were from SMEs. The modelling of costs and benefits in the IA study was not undertaken 
separately by business size, because of the relatively moderate overall costs and impacts expected and a 
disproportionate need for company information (or detailed assumptions) if the modelling had to be conducted not 
only for individual product groups but also for different company size classes thereunder. The study therefore made 
qualitative assessments in this regard.  

Step 4/4: Minimising negative impacts on SMEs 

Since SMEs have a large share of the repair sector, all POs promoting repair among all repair providers (POs 1A, 5B, 
6A, 6B and 7) have a positive impact on them, whereas PO5A and PO6C affect SMEs only if they are producers or 
independent repairers who are sub-contracted by producers. POs promoting a shift of remedies from replacement to 
less costly repair will also benefit stakeholders in the manufacturing sector in terms of cost savings. This will have a 
positive  effect  on  SMEs  in  the  manufacturing  sector  of  certain  products,  which  are  relevant  for  more  sustainable 
consumption  like  footwear,  clothing  and  furniture,  of  which  SMEs  account  for  over  60%  of  the  total  turnover. 
However, it will have a more limited impact on SMEs in the manufacturing sector of other products which are relevant 
for more sustainable consumption like smart phones, laptops and TVs, where SMEs are much less represented. PO7 
will  furthermore  benefit  SMEs  refurbishing  products  and  selling  refurbished  products.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
introduction of POs 1A, 5A and 5B will make SMEs face adjustment and administrative costs relative to business 
revenues that are disproportionately higher than for other enterprises. SMEs in retail sector (SMEs account for 51% 
of the sector) will lose in sales of new goods similarly as other businesses in the retail sector. 
The  option  on  the  obligation  to  repair  (PO6C)  and  information  obligations  (PO5A)  are  targeted  namely  to  the 
producers, so the increased demand of repair through these measures benefits namely the producers. This negative 
impact  on  other  repairers,  namely  independent  SME  repairers,  is  mitigated  via  the  measures  promoting  equal 
opportunities to repair among all repair service providers, such as the repair platform (PO5B) and the repair quote 
(PO6B).  

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