COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Analysis of coordinated demand reduction measures for gas Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL review on the functioning of Regulation (EU) 2022/1369 on coordinated gas demand reduction
Date: 2023-03-20
Institutions: Directorate-General for Energy, European Commission
Subjects: EU Member State, EU energy policy, energy consumption, energy crisis, energy demand, energy saving, gas supply, natural gas, security of supply, self-sufficiency in energy

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 20.3.2023  SWD(2023) 63 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Analysis of coordinated demand reduction measures for gas Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL review on the functioning of Regulation (EU) 2022/1369 on coordinated gas demand reduction {COM(2023) 173 final}  
 
 
I.  Executive Summary 

In  this  Staff  Working  Document,  the  Commission  provides  an  analysis  of  the  gas  demand 
reductions  since  August  2022,  a  scenario-based  analysis  of  storage  filling  projections  under 
different potential demand reduction extensions and a deep-dive into past reductions and upside 
and downside risks for 2023-2024. 

In the course of 2022, Russia used gas supplies as a political weapon.  In this context, the EU 
adopted  the  emergency  Council  Regulation  (EU)  2022/1369  in  August  2022,  to  reduce  gas 
demand by 15% until 31 March 2023 in a coordinated manner to ensure security of supply. The 
implementation  of the Regulation proved to  be a success,  as  the EU reduced its natural  gas 
demand  by  19.2%  (or  41.5  bcm)  between  August  2022  and  January  2023,  compared  to  the 
average  of  the  previous  five  years.  Estimations  indicate  that  in  the  August-December  2022 
period, households and industry each accounted for around one-half of the total gas demand 
reduction,  while  the  power  sector  made  only  small  savings  due  to  low  availability  of 
hydropower  and  nuclear  capacity.  In  the  absence  of  official  data  submitted  by  the  Member 
States to Eurostat, the analysis is based on national statistics. A more frequent (i.e. monthly) 
monitoring of the gas consumption, with more sectoral detailed reporting (industry, electricity, 
residential  and  tertiary  sector),  could  allow  for  a  better  understanding  of  the  nature  of  the 
reductions and possibly identify any sector-specific challenges.   

The analysis on storage filling projections is based on the following scenarios resulting from 
the potential demand reduction extensions: 

1)  If  demand  reduction  is  not  extended,  gas  storage  levels  would  be  fully  depleted  by 

February 2024.  

2)  In case demand reduction obligation are extended by the same 8-month period (August 
2023 to March 2024), storages would be filled too slowly, reaching only 80 bcm by the 
end of October 2023 resulting in security of supply concerns. 

3)  In case of an extension only for the summer (April to October 2023), storages would be 
sufficiently  filled by the end of  this  summer (95% by the end of October 2023), but 
depleted by the end of next winter causing security of supply concerns. 

4)  If the 15% demand reduction is extended by 1 year until March 2024, storage levels 
reach 95 bcm by the end of October 2023 and 43 bcm by the end of March 2024.  

Current gas prices and the market expectations until the end of next winter are around 3 to 4-
times  lower  than  the  prices  observed  during  the  autumn  of  2022.  Therefore,  gas  demand 
reductions in the residential, industry and power sector (coal-to-gas switch) will be significantly 
more  difficult  to  achieve  and  will  require  targeted  actions.  Furthermore,  demand  reductions 
remain necessary to minimise the risk of price spikes. 

A  continuation  of  the  15%  reduction  applied  to  the  average  annual  gas  consumption  in  the 
reference period 1 April 2017 to 31 March 2022 amounts to 60 bcm that needs to be saved in 
the period from 1 April 2023 to 31 March 2024.   

1 

 
 
 
 
There are additional downside risks to consider. These include the weather conditions affecting 
energy demand of households. In the power sector, consumption of gas strongly depends on the 
water levels for hydropower and the availability of nuclear capacity. 

Natural  gas  price  spikes  that  reached  levels  above  300  EUR/MWh1  reflected  infrastructure 
bottlenecks and market  uncertainty in  the aftermath  of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. 
However, very high price levels well above global prices did not lead to more LNG arriving at 
EU’s ports. A methodic management of the refilling season from private actors and Member 
States is key to avoid future price spikes, by avoiding Member States outbidding each other 
without any additional volumes arriving in the EU. This would guarantee full storages at the 
lowest cost. 

1 Historical and future TTF prices can be found here: Dutch TTF Natural Gas Futures | ICE (theice.com) 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
II.  Demand Reduction achieved so far 

The gas demand regulation foresees a voluntary demand reduction of 15% for the period August 
2022 to March 2023, relative to the average of the previous five years.  

Table 1 summarises the demand reductions achieved so far by the EU and its Member States.  

Table 1: Gas demand reductions August 2022 to January 2023 

Member State 

Aug. 

Sep. 

Oct. 

Nov. 

Dec. 

Jan.  Aug.-Jan. 

EU27 

Austria 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Croatia 

Cyprus 

Czechia 

-13.5% 

-14.0% 

-24.4% 

-25.0% 

-12.4% 

-22.2% 

-19.2% 

-26.7% 

-11.3% 

-24.0% 

-16.9% 

-13.6% 

-23.9% 

-19.2% 

-1.0% 

-6.0% 

-20.5% 

-29.7% 

-9.8% 

-18.3% 

-16.0% 

-14.9% 

-17.8% 

-32.7% 

-21.2% 

-21.8% 

-29.4% 

-23.9% 

-21.7% 

-23.1% 

-20.0% 

-25.6% 

-27.6% 

-24.2% 

-24.1% 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

-15.0% 

-9.1% 

-22.9% 

-18.8% 

-10.9% 

-24.0% 

-17.7% 

Denmark 

-21.7% 

-23.3% 

-31.1% 

-33.4% 

-13.7% 

-26.5% 

-24.9% 

Estonia 

Finland 

France 

-37.1% 

-31.7% 

-46.9% 

-32.3% 

-32.4% 

-38.0% 

-36.2% 

-35.7% 

-57.4% 

-62.6% 

-58.3% 

-65.1% 

-63.1% 

-58.5% 

1.6% 

-2.5% 

-27.8% 

-29.3% 

-8.3% 

-19.2% 

-17.1% 

Germany 

-28.0% 

-14.7% 

-28.6% 

-28.3% 

-4.7% 

-18.6% 

-19.4% 

Greece 

4.5% 

-26.3% 

-42.0% 

-23.0% 

-12.6% 

-36.7% 

-22.7% 

Hungary 

-18.7% 

5.0% 

-33.9% 

-19.8% 

-17.5% 

-27.4% 

-21.0% 

Ireland 

Italy 

Latvia 

11.3% 

2.1% 

-8.8% 

-10.3% 

9.5% 

-4.3% 

-0.3% 

-5.2% 

-14.0% 

-19.8% 

-22.7% 

-18.5% 

-22.7% 

-18.6% 

-42.6% 

-52.7% 

-72.7% 

-15.2% 

0.9% 

-37.0% 

-31.8% 

Lithuania 

-43.6% 

-45.0% 

-50.8% 

-46.0% 

-11.9% 

-51.5% 

-40.5% 

Luxembourg 

-36.4% 

-26.1% 

-35.5% 

-33.2% 

-17.5% 

-25.0% 

-27.7% 

Malta 

4.6% 

-1.1% 

-11.2% 

43.6% 

27.0% 

21.9% 

+12.1% 

Netherlands 

-29.7% 

-32.6% 

-33.3% 

-35.1% 

-17.5% 

-32.2% 

-29.5% 

Poland 

-26.7% 

-25.4% 

-23.7% 

-8.3% 

-5.3% 

-12.0% 

-14.9% 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Portugal 

Romania 

Slovakia 

Slovenia 

Spain 

Sweden 

-10.7% 

-17.0% 

-12.0% 

-8.9% 

-18.6% 

-34.9% 

-17.1% 

-25.2% 

-20.7% 

-27.5% 

-21.8% 

-15.9% 

-21.0% 

-21.2% 

10.6% 

5.5% 

2.1% 

-2.7% 

23.6% 

-7.8% 

+4.6% 

-13.7% 

-10.9% 

-22.2% 

-11.7% 

-12.4% 

-14.7% 

-14.2% 

2.6% 

0.7% 

-6.2% 

-21.8% 

-24.4% 

-23.9% 

-13.7% 

-27.3% 

-35.7% 

-41.8% 

-51.0% 

-38.0% 

-41.9% 

-40.2% 

Note: Change in gas consumption 2022 cf. 2017-2021 average. Cyprus does not use natural 
gas.  

Source:  ENER/CET  calculations  based  on  Eurostat  series  NRG_CB_GASM,  sub-series 
IC_CAL_MG in TJ (GCV) as of 7 March 2023, 11:00. 

The EU has reduced its natural gas demand by 19.2% or 41.5 bcm from August 2022 to January 
2023, compared to the average of the previous five years. It has thus so far exceeded its target 
of 15%, which would correspond to 32.5 bcm for the same period. Moreover, it has already 
achieved more than 90% of its overall target of just over 45 bcm reduction for the entire period 
of August 2022 to March 2023.  

All  Member  States  except  Ireland,  Malta  and  Slovakia2  (all  three  of  which  benefit  from 
exemptions) have achieved or almost achieved the 15% target. In addition, Poland, Slovenia 
and Spain have almost achieved the 15% target. Cyprus does not use natural gas. The remaining 
20 MS have all achieved the 15% reduction target so far.  

The next  section  analyses the outlook for the remainder of 2023  and next  winter;  while the 
following section analyses the nature of the reductions achieved so far and the implications this 
has for the immediate future, in terms of upside and downside risks for the EU gas market. 

2 It is important to note that EUROSTAT data for Slovakia are currently under review. 

4 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
III.  Outlook for gas consumption between 1 April 2023 and 

31 March 2024 

1)  Gas balance projections up to the end of the 2023/24 filling season 

Figure  1  presents  storage  filling  projections  under  different  potential  demand  reduction 
extensions, based on the latest available market intelligence and data.3   

Figure 1: Monthly storage levels depending on the extension of the demand reduction 

Monthly storage levels (bcm)

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

None

Same 8-month period (Aug '23 - Mar '24)

7-month summer (Apr-Oct '23)

Full year (Apr '23 - Mar '24)

Source: ENER/CET calculations. 

Figure 1 shows the following: 

  Scenario A: No extension: If instead there were no demand reduction, storage levels 
would only reach 69 bcm4 by the end of October 2023, significantly below the 90% 
(89.4 bcm) storage obligation. In addition, storage levels would be fully depleted by 

3  Assumptions: 

  Storage levels as of 7 March 2023 (58.5 bcm at the end of 5 March). 
  Non-Russian pipeline supply equal to the average of the last seven months of 2022. 
  LNG supply equal to the average of the last seven months of 2022, plus 15 bcm/a (1.25 bcm/month) from 

Apr. 2023. 

  No gas from Russia via pipeline. 
  Average demand of the reference period, applying percentage reductions as stated. 
  Exports to Switzerland as in 2021 (latest data available; 2.2 bcm/a, of which 1/3 in summer and 2/3 in 

winter). 

  Exports to Ukraine and Moldova of 0.5 bcm/month.  

4 Storage levels in percent are almost equal to the storage levels in bcm since the EU has a storage capacity of 99.3 
bcm, i.e. almost 100 bcm. 

5 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
February  2024,  implying  serious  security  of  supply  concerns  for  the  winter 
2024/2025. 

  Scenario B: 8-month extension from August 2023 to March 2024: In this scenario, 
storages would be filled too slowly, reaching only 80 bcm by the end of October 2023, 
significantly  below  the  storage  obligation.  In  addition,  storage  levels  would  drop  to 
below 30% by the end of next winter (28 bcm) at the end of March 2024), causing 
serious security of supply concerns and making it difficult to fill storages sufficiently 
for the following winter 2024/2025.  

  Scenario  C:  7-month  extension  for  summer  only;  April  to  October  2023:  In  this 
scenario, storages would be sufficiently filled by the end of this summer (95 bcm by the 
end of October 2023, reaching the 90% storage obligation). However, because demand 
even in a normal winter is twice as high as in summer, storages would be almost fully 
depleted by the end of next winter (9 bcm by the end of March 2024). This implies 
extremely  serious  security  of  supply  concerns  and  makes  it  very  difficult  to  fill 
storages sufficiently for the following winter 2024/2025. 

  Scenario D: 1-year extension: With a continued 15% demand reduction, storage levels 
reach 95 bcm by the end of October 2023, reaching the 90% storage obligation. The 
storage levels would be around 43 bcm by the end of March 2024. 

Table 2 summarises these findings.  

Table 2: Monthly storage levels depending on the extension of the demand reduction 

Scenario assumptions                    Storage (bcm) at the end of:  Oct. 2023  Mar. 2024 
A: No extension 
B: Extension for August 2023 to March 2024 
C: Extension for April 2023 to October 2023 
D: 1-year extension from April 2023 to March 2024 

69 
80 
95 
95 

0 
28 
9 
43 

  Source: ENER/CET calculations. 

There  are  additional  downside  risks  to  consider,  such  as  increased  global  LNG  demand,  a 
certain rebound of industrial gas demand driven by lower prices, or increased gas demand from 
the power sector due to low availability of hydro and nuclear and a reversal of the gas-to-coal 
switch experienced in 2022. A particularly significant uncertainty is the weather. According to 
ENTSOG, a very cold winter occurring with a probability of 5% would increase demand by 24 
bcm.5 

5 Figure 1 (with an assumed 15% demand reduction) in ENTSOG’s winter supply outlook 2022/2023, available 
at: 
  https://entsog.eu/sites/default/files/2022-10/SO0038-22_Winter%20Supply%20Outlook_2022-23_2.pdf.  
This is in line  with ENER/CET calculations of  28 bcm additional demand for the entire  year in case  the  15% 
demand reduction is applied not to the average demand of the past 5 years but to the highest demand of the 2014-
2021 period for each month (monthly data are not available for earlier years).   

6 

 
 
                                                           
Conclusion 1: 

This analysis calls for a continuation of an identical and proportionate gas reduction in the 
period  from  1  April  2023  to  31  March  2024.  Applying  15%  to  the  average  annual  gas 
consumption in the reference period 1 April 2017 to 31 March 2022 amounts to 60 bcm that 
need to be saved in the period from 1 April 2023 to 31 March 2024. 

2)  What are the price expectations? 

Figure 2: Natural gas prices – historic and futures (€/MWh) 

Source: ENER/CET using ICE data (futures) and Platts data (historic)6 

Two observations become apparent from this chart.  

First, current prices and the market expectations until the end of next winter are around 3-times 
to  4-times  lower  than  the  prices  observed  last  autumn  due  to  the  higher  storage  levels,  the 
demand reduction, the start of the removal of infrastructure bottlenecks, the lower uncertainty 
and the limits for Russia to further weaponise energy.  

Gas  demand  reductions  will  thus  be  significantly  more  difficult  to  achieve  and  will  require 
targeted actions. This price effect will impact all sectors (see also section IV.2):  

  Households have less of an incentive to save energy.  
  Some of the industrial demand destruction may be undone.  
  The gas-to-coal switch in power generation that occurred in the face of high gas prices 

may be reversed.  

6 Historic data is the monthly average of daily TTF month-ahead prices provided by Platts (for Jan. 2021 to Mar. 
2023).  Futures  data 
to  Mar.  2024): 
is  TTF  from  ICE  as  of  6  March  2023  (for  Apr.  2023 
https://www.theice.com/products/27996665/Dutch-TTF-Gas-Futures/data?marketId=5519350  
Technical note: data for February and March 2024 were not available and were thus inferred from the Jan. 2024 
and Q1 2024 data, as pFeb = pMar = pJan – ½ * (pJan – pQ1).  
7 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Second, the price expectations show that the market  expects  no physical  shortages this  year 
internalising the continuation of the current path on demand reduction, but the price increase 
by about 10 €/MWh in early 2024 indicates a likely tightening of the market next winter. This, 
as  well  as  the  downside  risks  mentioned  in  section  III.1,  indicates  that  demand  reductions 
remain necessary to minimise the risk of price spikes with their destructive effects on vulnerable 
households and industry.  

8 

 
 
 
IV.  Deep-dive  into  past  reductions  and  upside  &  downside 

risks for 2023-2024 

1)  Weather 

Last autumn and winter were relatively mild, leading to lower gas demand for space heating. 
According to Eurostat data, there were 8.3% fewer heating degree days (HDD) in Aug.-Dec. 
2022 compared to the 2017-2021 average.7  

The Commission has estimated the impact that this has had on EU gas demand. Of the 18.2% 
total gas demand reduction Aug.-Dec. 2022 (compared to Aug.-Dec. 2017-2021; January 2023 
HDD data are not yet available), around one-sixth was temperature induced. Put differently, 
gas demand was 3.0%-3.2% lower because of milder weather, with the remaining approx. 15% 
reduction being independent of weather.8 This corresponds to just over 5 bcm (out of a total 
demand reduction of 30 bcm Aug.-Dec.) being temperature-induced.  

In other words, even if next winter were just an “average” winter, demand would be approx. 5 
bcm higher next August to December compared to last year, other things equal. A very cold 
winter occurring with a probability of 5% would increase demand by a further 24 bcm for the 
entire  winter  season  according  to  ENTSOG.9  This  is  similar  to  our  calculations  of  28  bcm 
additional demand in case the 15% demand reduction is applied not to the average demand of 
the past 5 years but to the highest demand of the 8-year period 2014-2021 for each month.   

While HDD are a key driver of gas demand in winter, the weather affects gas demand in several 
other ways. First, it affects the demand for electricity for cooling, as measured by cooling degree 
days (CDD), thereby indirectly affecting the demand for gas for power generation. Second, it 
affects the availability of alternative power sources, in particular hydro (through water reservoir 
levels) and nuclear (through river levels and river temperatures, for those nuclear power plants 
that are cooled using river rather than sea water).10 The latter is analysed in section  of this note; 
the former is the subject of the next paragraph.   

7 ENER/CET calculations based on Eurostat series NRC_CHDD_M. Note that Eurostat states a HDD reduction 
of 4.1% for the EU27. However, this EU-total is calculated as the space-weighted (geographic) average of the data 
for the individual member states. In the context of the present analysis, such a weighting is inappropriate. We have 
therefore  re-calculated  an  EU  total  as  the  average  of  the  individual  member  states,  weighted  by  their  gas 
consumption  in  households  and  the  public  and  commercial  sector  in  2021  (latest  year  available;  series 
FC_OTH_HH_E and FC_OTH_CP_E respectively; as these are the sectors in which gas is used for space heating).  
8 Technical note: The relationship was estimated by one OLS regression per MS with heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors of gas consumption on HDD, with month fixed effects, GDP and Population as control variables, 
for the period Aug-Dec only, for all years with available Eurostat data. This coefficient was then multiplied by 
that MS’s difference in HDD Aug-Dec 2022 compared to the average of the previous 5 years.  
9 Figure 1 (with an assumed 15% demand reduction) in ENTSOG’s winter supply outlook 2022/2023, available 
at:  https://entsog.eu/sites/default/files/2022-10/SO0038-22_Winter%20Supply%20Outlook_2022-23_2.pdf  
10  The weather also affects power generation from solar and wind power, but this while this is highly variable in 
the short term, it is less variable at an annual level as the variations average out. Moreover, it is more difficult to 
forecast. This analysis therefore focuses on nuclear and hydro.  

9 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
Last summer was hot by historical standards. Partly this is due to global warming, which makes 
summers nowadays generally hot by historical standards. But even compared to the previous 5 
years, CDD were 23% higher in August-December 2022.11 However, there is no clear link in 
the  data  between  CDD  and  gas  demand.12  Therefore,  we  are  unable  to  reliably  quantify  the 
impact  this  has  had on gas demand. Nonetheless, last summer’s heat  wave is  likely to  have 
increased power demand. Gas demand for power generation could thus be somewhat lower next 
summer  than  last  summer,  if  next  summer  sees  average  temperatures.  However,  the  low 
availability of alternative power sources (see section IV.3) may outweigh this effect and lead 
to higher overall gas demand for power generation.  

In the power sector, weather conditions also have a significant impact on gas demand driven 
not  only  by  the  influence  on  electricity  demand  (heating/cooling)  but  increasingly  also  on 
variable renewable energy generation (wind, solar and hydropower). To assess the impact of 
different climatic conditions, the Commission13 modelled the effect of historical profiles14 for 
demand,  wind,  solar  and  hydropower  generation  on  the  projected  gas  demand  for  power 
generation in 2023. The analysis shows a projected average annual gas consumption of 98 bcm 
for 2023.  The effect of climatic conditions on gas consumption for power generation results in 
an average monthly range of 5 bcm and experiences seasonality, with moderatly a wider range 
in winter months. 

2) 

Break down by demand sector and type of reduction 

Currently, Eurostat publishes the monthly gas consumption (NRG_CB_GASM) with a delay 
of 55 days after the reference period. The sectoral detail is currently only reported annually, 
one year after the reference period. Without a frequent publication of sectoral gas demand, in-
depth analyses of gas demand reduction remain challenging. 

11 ENER/CET calculations based on Eurostat series NRC_CHDD_M. Note that Eurostat states a CDD increase of 
15.6% for the EU27. However, this EU-total is calculated as the space-weighted (geographic) average of the data 
for the individual member states. In the context of the present analysis, such a weighting is inappropriate. We have 
therefore re-calculated an EU total as the average of the individual member states, weighted by their respective 
population in 2021. 
12 The reason we find no link may be due to the fact that unlike HDD, CDD affect gas demand only indirectly, via 
electricity demand. In addition, CDD are likely correlated to other sources of power supply. Finally, CDD are 
negatively correlated to HDD, and HDD are a strong driver of gas demand. Technical note: We again ran one OLS 
regression per MS with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors of gas consumption on CDD, with month fixed 
effects, GDP and Population as control variables.  
13 DG Joint Research Centre together with ENER/CET, based on the METIS electricity model. 
14 Historical weather years (1982 to 2016) were used to perform Monte Carlo simulations on the EU 2023 
electricity market. 

10 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Conclusion 2: 

A more frequent, monthly reporting of the gas consumption, including the reporting of the 
sectoral  detail  (industry,  input  to  electricity  and  heat  production,  households  and  services 
sector), should allow the Member States and the European Commission to better understand 
the  nature  of  the  reductions,  possibly  identify  any  challenges,  and  design  more  targeted 
measures if necessary.  

The more frequent and more detailed monitoring and reporting would incur additional costs 
for  the  national  statistical  and  other  reporting  authorities.  However,  these  would  be 
outweighed by the benefits to achieve more efficiently the objectives of this proposal. 

For this SWD, the Joint Research Centre (JRC) conducted an analysis based on Eurostat data 
and  national  statistics  from  the  gas  transmission  system  operators.  Further,  external 
publications15 were used to underpin the work by the JRC. 

Breakdown by demand sector  

In the absence of official data submitted by the Member States to Eurostat, the JRC estimated 
the demand reduction per sector in August to December 2022 compared to the 5-year average 
based on data from Eurostat and the national gas transmissions system operators (Figure 3). It 
is important to note that the analysis focusses on seven Member States which together consume 
78% of gas in the EU: Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Romania. 
The  estimates  indicate  that  the  residential  sector  was  the  biggest  contributor  to  demand 
reduction in the EU (50%), followed by industry (43%). In relative terms, Spain contributed 
high shares of demand reduction in the industry (34%), only exceeded by Romania (53%). The 
German industry faced the highest reduction of gas consumption in absolute terms (around 40 
TWh or 4 bcm). The power sector was responsible for 7% of the total  demand reduction, a 
relatively low figure as gas-fired electricity generation in Spain significantly increased. 

15 Bruegel (2023): European natural gas demand tracker European natural gas demand tracker (bruegel.org) 
IEA (2023): Natural gas supply-demand balance of the European Union in 2023 Background note on the natural 
gas supply-demand balance of the European Union in 2023 – Analysis - IEA 

11 

 
 
 
                                                           
Figure  3:  Gas  demand  reduction  by  member  state  and  sector  in  the  period  August-
December 2022 

Source: JRC using Eurostat and ENaGaD database (based on national gas TSO data) 

Bruegel (2023)16 and IEA (2023)17 also estimated the split of gas demand reduction by sector 
using  auxiliary  data  from  ENTSOG,  EMBER  and  national  transmission  system  and  market 
operators.  

According to Bruegel, only the data to separate the gas consumed by electricity was available 
while  the  exact  distinction  between  industry  and  residential  cannot  be  disentangled  for  all 
Member States based on the mentioned data sources. Overall, gas demand decreased by 12% 
in  the  EU  compared  to  the  average  of  2019-2021.  The  demand  decreased  by  15%  in  the 
residential sector, by 15% in the industry sector and by only 2% in the power sector. In summer 
months,  most  of  the  overall  gas  demand  reduction  was  driven  by  the  industry  while  the 
residential sector contributed in October and November due to warmer than average weather.  

According to the IEA, gas demand decreased by 13% or 55 bcm in comparison to 2021. About 
half of the decline was attributable to the residential and commercial sector (28 bcm), the other 
half to industry (25 bcm). Gas consumption in the power sector remained relatively flat. 

JRC, IEA and Bruegel use different reference periods for comparison, so direct comparisons 
are challenging. However, all three agree that gas demand in the EU residential/commercial 
sector accounted for about 50% of the total gas demand reduction in 2022, while industry was 
responsible for somewhat below 50%. While gas demand in the power sector was only mildly 
affected in IEA and Bruegel estimations, the JRC estimated that 7% of the total reduction came 
from the power sector. 

16 Bruegel (2023): European natural gas demand tracker 
17 IEA (2023): Natural gas supply-demand balance of the European Union in 2023 

12 

 
 
 
                                                           
However, the power sector is the one sector for which recent official Eurostat data are available 
for  all  Member  States.  Using  these  data,  we  find  that  the  gas  demand  of  the  power  sector 
decreased by 2.1% or 0.8 bcm, thus accounting for only 2.6% of the total gas demand reduction 
of 30 bcm between August to December 2022.18  

What type of reduction? 

The type of gas demand reductions can be subdivided into savings (behavioural changes and 
energy efficiency), fuel-switching to carbon-intensive or clean fuels and demand destruction 
(production  curtailment  and  energy  poverty19).  Those  types  are  either  structural  or  non-
structural. Energy efficiency measures that lead to an overall decrease in energy demand and 
fuel-switching  from  carbon-intensive  to  clean  energy  are  structural  demand  reduction  types 
which  will  remain  while  a  fuel-switch  to  a  more  carbon-intensive  fuel  is  non-structural  as 
carbon  prices  will  make  them  unprofitable.  Production  curtailment  is  either  structural,  as 
production plants have been closed or relocated, or non-structural, as lower energy prices offset 
production  curtailment  in  some  industries.  Gas  demand  reductions  by  households  due  to 
warmer than average weather are also non-structural as changes in weather conditions might 
reverse the reductions.  

According to the IEA (2023)20, around half of the gas demand reduction compared to 2021 in 
industry occurred due to production curtailment while further reduction was achieved by fuel-
switching  and  energy  efficiency  measures.  According  to  Enerdata  (2023)21,  the  effect  of 
structural  energy  efficiency  measures  in  the  industry  is  small  while  fuel  switching,  and 
production  curtailment  accounted  for  most  gas  demand  reduction  in  the  industry.  However, 
energy efficiency measures take time to materialise, so the impact might increase in the coming 
years. Further, low energy prices in the beginning of 2023 already led to a rebound of industrial 
production (month-on-month) in Germany22. 

18 Eurostat series NRG_CB_GASM, subseries TI_EHG_MAP. This refers to both electricity and heat 
generation; no distinction is made between these two.  
19 Many vulnerable households kept their homes cold, or switched from gas to more polluting fuels. 
20 IEA (2023): Natural gas supply-demand balance of the European Union in 2023 
21 Enerdata (2023): Gas supply shock: how EU’s final consumers adapted?, 
https://www.enerdata.net/publications/reports-presentations/gas-prices-impact-europe.html  
22 According to Destatis, the production of chemical products increased by 13% from December 2022 to January 
2023. 

13 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
3) 

Power sector 

In the power sector, despite high gas prices, gas-fired electricity generation increased by 20 
TWh in 2022 compared to the 5-year average (Figure 4). The increase can be explained by the 
low availability of nuclear capacity (-113 TWh) and low hydropower generation (-48 TWh). 
The French nuclear capacity suffered from reactor outages for maintenance due to corrosion 
which resulted in the lowest nuclear output since 1988. Droughts in summer 2022 resulted in 
significantly less hydropower generation.23 Notably, coal-fired generation decreased by 7 TWh 
in comparison to the 5-year average due to a reduction in coal capacity in the past years, while 
generation increased by 12 TWh in comparison to 2021.  

Figure 4: Annual change in electricity generation by selected fuel in 2022 vs. the 5-year 
average and vs. 2021  

2022 vs 5y average

2022 vs 2021

93 

44 

20 

h
W
T

 120

 70

 20

-30

-80

-130

-48 

-7 

-113 

h
W
T

 120

 70

 20

-30

-80

-130

8 

25 

26 

30 

-64 

-120 

Source: ENER/CET using ENTSO-E Transparency Platform 
Note: Generation by solar energy does not account for behind-the-meter generation  

In  2023,  there  are  a  variety  of  risks  and  uncertainties  in  the  power  sector  affecting  gas 
consumption: 

Nuclear capacity 

Nuclear output in France reached 45 GW in early February 2023 but is still significantly below 
the  average  of  the  last  five  years  (Figure  5).  The  2023  maintenance  cycle  has  just  started, 
causing  capacity  to  drop  to  about  8  GW  below  the  5-year  average  and  4  GW  below  2022. 
According to the French transmission system operator RTE, the projected availability of the 
nuclear  fleet  reaches  the  5y  average  already  in  mid-March  and  will  even  significantly  start 
overshooting it in summer 2023. A potentially higher availability of nuclear capacity would 
reduce the use of gas in the power sector. However, in 2022, the expected availability of RTE 
was overly optimistic as it is difficult to clearly predict if new corrosion cases will arise and 
when the corrosion repairs will be carried out.24 In addition, uncertainties also remain about the 
river levels and river temperatures, which affect the generation capacity of river-cooled nuclear 

23 DG Energy (2023): Quarterly report on European electricity markets, market observatory for energy, volume 15 
(issue 3, covering the third quarter of 2022) 
24 RTE (2023): Réactualisation des perspectives pour le système électrique pour l’hiver 2022-2023 (février 2023) 
14 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
power plants. Therefore, any predictions about a higher availability of nuclear energy capacity 
should be treated with caution. 

Figure 5: French historical nuclear dispatch and projected availability (weekly average) 

 60

 50

 40

W
G

 30

 20

 10

 -

1

k
e
e

W

3

k
e
e

W

5

k
e
e

W

7

k
e
e

W

9

k
e
e

W

1
1

k
e
e

W

3
1

k
e
e

W

5
1

k
e
e

W

7
1

k
e
e

W

9
1

k
e
e

W

1
2

k
e
e

W

3
2

k
e
e

W

5
2

k
e
e

W

7
2

k
e
e

W

9
2

k
e
e

W

1
3

k
e
e

W

3
3

k
e
e

W

5
3

k
e
e

W

7
3

k
e
e

W

9
3

k
e
e

W

1
4

k
e
e

W

3
4

k
e
e

W

5
4

k
e
e

W

7
4

k
e
e

W

9
4

k
e
e

W

1
5

k
e
e

W

Avg 2017-2021

2022

2023 projected availabity

2023

Source:  ENER/CET  using  ENTSO-E  Transparency  Platform,  RTE  (retrieved 
energygraph.info on 06 March 2023) 

from 

Hydropower 

Current filling rates of water reservoirs and hydro storage plants in the EU are close to the 5-
year average and slightly above 2022 figures (Figure 6). In Spain and Portugal, filling rates in 
the first weeks of 2023 were 1 to 2 TWh and 0.5 to 1 TWh, respectively, above the 5-year 
average.  

In Italy, water levels in water reservoirs and hydro storage plants are following las year’s low 
filling rates. Early indications point to a developing drought in some areas, especially in the 
Northern region of the country due to only little rain and snowfall over the winter 2022/23. 
Norway is an important exporter of hydropower to the EU and was facing significantly lower 
water levels last year. Despite higher fill rates in early 2023, Norway remains vigilant and could 
reduce electricity exports if water levels continue to fall. 

15 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Aggregated filling rate of water reservoirs and hydro storage plants of EU and 
selected countries (weekly) 

Source: ENER/CET using ENTSO-E Transparency Platform 

*including EU Member States that have a significant amount of reservoir and hydro storage 
plants: Austria, Bulgaria, Spain, Finland, France, Croatia, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Portugal, 
Romania, Sweden, Slovenia and Greece 

Coal-to-gas switch  

While high gas prices in 2022 pushed coal-fired generation ahead of gas turbines in the merit 
order, the current drop in gas prices likely increases gas consumption due to a coal-to-gas switch 
in  the  power  sector,  i.e.,  electricity  generation  in  a  combined-cycle  gas  turbine  (CCGT)  is 
becoming cheaper than in a coal-fired power plant. The marginal costs depend on fuel prices 
and the prices for emission allowances. High prices for allowances benefit CCGTs versus coal-
fired generation due to a high emission factor of the latter. In order to reflect the interaction of 

16 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the three price components, Table3 depicts the price setting fuel as a function of coal and gas 
prices  and  a price  for  emission allowances of 93 EUR/tCO2 (as of 06  March 2023). At the 
current commodity price level – gas TTF price at 42 EUR/MWh and coal price at 132 EUR/t – 
CCGTs are cheaper than coal-fired power plants. 

Table 3: Fuel being used first assuming a ETS price of 93 EUR/tCO2 

120 

130 

140 

Coal price (EUR/t) 
160 

150 

170 

180 

30 

Gas 

Gas 

Gas 

Gas 

Gas 

Gas 

Gas 

40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 

Gas price 
(EUR/MW
h) 

Gas 
Gas 
Coal 
Coal 
Coal 
Coal 

Gas 
Gas 
Coal 
Coal 
Coal 
Coal 
Source: ENER/CET using TTF Natural Gas price, CIF ARA Coal price and EUA prices from 
Bloomberg (as of 06 March 2023). Note: median efficiency of a CCGT is at 50%; median 
efficiency of a coal-fired power plant is at 34% 

Gas 
Gas 
Coal 
Coal 
Coal 
Coal 

Gas 
Gas 
Coal 
Coal 
Coal 
Coal 

Gas 
Gas 
Gas 
Coal 
Coal 
Coal 

Gas 
Gas 
Coal 
Coal 
Coal 
Coal 

Gas 
Gas 
Gas 
Coal 
Coal 
Coal 

Figure 7: Marginal cost of gas- and coal-fired power generation based on historical and 
future prices 

h
W
M
R
U
E

/

 600

 500

 400

 300

 200

 100

 -

1
2
-
1
0
-
1
0

1
2
-
3
0
-
1
0

1
2
-
5
0
-
1
0

1
2
-
7
0
-
1
0

1
2
-
9
0
-
1
0

1
2
-
1
1
-
1
0

2
2
-
1
0
-
1
0

2
2
-
3
0
-
1
0

2
2
-
5
0
-
1
0

2
2
-
7
0
-
1
0

2
2
-
9
0
-
1
0

2
2
-
1
1
-
1
0

3
2
-
1
0
-
1
0

3
2
-
3
0
-
1
0

3
2
-
5
0
-
1
0

3
2
-
7
0
-
1
0

3
2
-
9
0
-
1
0

3
2
-
1
1
-
1
0

4
2
-
1
0
-
1
0

4
2
-
3
0
-
1
0

Gas turbine (historical)

Coal power plant (historical)

Gas turbine (future prices)

Coal power plant (future prices)

Source:  ENER/CET  using  historical  prices  from  S&P  Global  Platts,  future  prices  from 
Bloomberg (as of 03 March 2023) for CIF ARA Coal and EUA and the future price from ICE 
(as of 06 March 2023) for TTF Natural Gas 
Note: median efficiency of a CCGT is at 50%; median efficiency of a coal-fired power plant is 
at 34% 

Historical prices for the three components indicate that a coal-to-gas switch already happened 
in January 2023. Future prices for coal, gas and carbon (EUA) suggest that CCGTs will remain 

17 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cheaper than coal-fired power plants in 2023 (Figure 7). In winter, gas prices are expected to 
increase  again  to  53  EUR/MWh,  reducing  the  gap  of  the  technologies’  marginal  costs.  In 
general, the elasticity of gas-fired generation to the gas price depends on the availability of other 
flexibility providers, such as oil- and coal-fired generation.  

Renewables 

High  energy  prices  and  dedicated  policy  measures  already  had  a  measurable  effect  on  the 
deployment  of  renewable  energy.  In  2022,  56  GW  of  wind  and  solar  capacity  have  been 
installed in the EU (15 GW and 41 GWDC of wind and solar respectively). This represents a 
16% increase from 2021 installed capacity (353 GW) saving approximately 11 bcm of gas25. 

In 2023, new installed capacity is estimated at around 69 GW (16 GW for wind and 54 GWDC 
for  solar),  increasing  further  installed  capacity  by  17%  and  displacing  approximately  13 
additional bcm of gas. 

Figure 8: Wind and solar capacity in EU27 

Source: ENER/CET using Eurostat, WindEurope, Solar Power Europe 

4) 

Industry 

The diagrams in Figure 9 compare industrial output for different sectors 2022 to the 2017-2021 
average.  

Figure 9: Manufacturing output in the EU27; 2022 vs. 2017-2021 average 

25 Gas equivalent saved are estimated assuming a gas power plant efficiency of 55%, an utilisation rate for solar 
and wind of 1 GW respectively equivalent to around 1 TWh and 2 TWh of electricity generation annually, gas 
power generation can be replaced only 80% of the time. 

18 

 
 
 
 
                                                           
x
e
d
n
i
n
o
i
t
c
u
d
o
r
p

e
m
u
l
o
V

)
0
0
1
=
5
1
0
2
(

 115

 110

 105

 100

 95

 90

 85

x
e
d
n
i
n
o
i
t
c
u
d
o
r
p

e
m
u
l
o
V

)
0
0
1
=
5
1
0
2
(

 125
 120
 115
 110
 105
 100
 95
 90
 85

x
e
d
n
i

e
m
u
l
o
v
n
o
i
t
c
u
d
o
r
P

)
0
0
1
=
5
1
0
2
(

 125
 120
 115
 110
 105
 100
 95
 90
 85

Total manufacturing

Food products

x
e
d
n
i
n
o
i
t
c
u
d
o
r
p

e
m
u
l
o
V

)
0
0
1
=
5
1
0
2
(

 125
 120
 115
 110
 105
 100
 95
 90
 85

l
i
r
p
A

h
c
r
a

M

y
r
a
u
n
a
J

y
r
a
u
r
b
e
F

y
a
M

e
n
u
J

y
l
u
J

t
s
u
g
u
A

r
e
b
m
e
t
p
e
S

r
e
b
o
t
c
O

r
e
b
m
e
v
o
N

r
e
b
m
e
c
e
D

l
i
r
p
A

h
c
r
a

M

y
r
a
u
n
a
J

y
r
a
u
r
b
e
F

y
a
M

e
n
u
J

y
l
u
J

t
s
u
g
u
A

r
e
b
m
e
t
p
e
S

r
e
b
o
t
c
O

r
e
b
m
e
v
o
N

r
e
b
m
e
c
e
D

2022

Avg 2017-2021

2022

Avg 2017-2021

Paper products

y
a

M

e
n
u
J

y
l
u
J

l
i
r
p
A

h
c
r
a

M

y
r
a
u
n
a
J

y
r
a
u
r
b
e
F

t
s
u
g
u
A

r
e
b
m
e
t
p
e
S

r
e
b
o
t
c
O

r
e
b
m
e
v
o
N

r
e
b
m
e
c
e
D

Basic metals

x
e
d
n
i
n
o
i
t
c
u
d
o
r
p

e
m
u
l
o
V

)
0
0
1
=
5
1
0
2
(

 125
 120
 115
 110
 105
 100
 95
 90
 85

l
i
r
p
A

h
c
r
a

M

y
r
a
u
n
a
J

y
r
a
u
r
b
e
F

y
a
M

e
n
u
J

y
l
u
J

t
s
u
g
u
A

r
e
b
m
e
t
p
e
S

r
e
b
o
t
c
O

r
e
b
m
e
v
o
N

r
e
b
m
e
c
e
D

2022

Avg 2017-2021

2022

Avg 2017-2021

Chemicals

l
i
r
p
A

h
c
r
a

M

y
r
a
u
n
a
J

y
r
a
u
r
b
e
F

y
a
M

e
n
u
J

y
l
u
J

t
s
u
g
u
A

r
e
b
m
e
t
p
e
S

r
e
b
o
t
c
O

r
e
b
m
e
v
o
N

r
e
b
m
e
c
e
D

Non-metallic minerals

x
e
d
n
i

e
m
u
l
o
v
n
o
i
t
c
u
d
o
r
P

)
0
0
1
=
5
1
0
2
(

 125
 120
 115
 110
 105
 100
 95
 90
 85

l
i
r
p
A

h
c
r
a

M

y
r
a
u
n
a
J

y
r
a
u
r
b
e
F

y
a
M

e
n
u
J

y
l
u
J

t
s
u
g
u
A

r
e
b
m
e
t
p
e
S

r
e
b
o
t
c
O

r
e
b
m
e
v
o
N

r
e
b
m
e
c
e
D

2022

Avg 2017-2021

2022

Avg 2017-2021

Source: ENER/CET using Eurostat series  STS_INPR_M, as of 3 March 2023, 19:00. 

The diagrams show that on the one hand, total manufacturing output and the output of some 
sectors, such as food processing, remained stable. Indeed, the high energy prices have so far 
not caused a general recession. On the other hand, the output of some energy intensive sectors, 
such  as  paper  products,  basic  metals,  chemicals  and  non-metallic  minerals,  decreased 
significantly since the beginning of 2022.  

19 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According  to  the  ECB26,  producers  in  energy-intensive  sectors  started  substituting  own 
production  with  cheaper  imports.  However,  imports  increased  especially  for  intermediate 
products (rather than the final products). This helped companies to continue to produce final 
products domestically, thereby limiting the negative impact of the energy price rise (notably on 
employment). 

As regards gas markets, two conclusions follow from this analysis:  

  First, it is important to stabilise prices in order to allow energy-intensive industries in 
Europe to recover their recent production losses in order to maintain employment and 
economic stability.  

  Second, to  the extent that firms  in  energy-intensive industries  reduced production or 
switched  fuels  (rather  than  closing  or  moving  permanently  or  investing  in  energy 
efficiency; see also Section IV.2 above), one can expect gas demand from industry to 
bounce back as gas prices stabilise.  

Both of these conclusions call for continued demand reductions wherever possible.   

5) 

Did higher natural gas prices induce higher LNG imports in 2022? 

Conclusion 3: 

A methodic management of the refiling season from private actors and Member States is key 
to  avoid  future  price  spikes,  by  avoiding  Member  States  outbidding  each  other  for  no 
additional volumes. This would guarantee full storages at the lowest cost. 

Natural gas prices in Europe spiked in March 2022 and September 2022, briefly reaching levels 
above 300 €/MWh compared to a historic norm of around 10-20 €/MWh. These very high prices 
reflected both actual scarcity due to reduced Russian supplies and uncertainty about the future. 
In addition, there was a concern that high prices were necessary in order to attract LNG to the 
EU in the context of a global market where European buyers were competing with other, mostly 
Asian, buyers. However, even in the face of a high willingness to pay for gas in order to ensure 
security of supply, the physical capacity to import LNG was limited. It is therefore questionable 
whether these extremely high prices actually led to substantially higher imports of LNG.  

By comparing the evolution  of prices and  LNG import volumes over time, one  can analyse 
whether imports of LNG increased during periods of high prices and decreased during periods 
of lower prices.  

26 ECB (2023): Update on economic, financial and monetary developments, Economic Bulletin Issue 1, Economic 
Bulletin Issue 1, 2023 (europa.eu) (accessed 08 March 2023) 

20 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Figure 10 plots daily day-ahead prices at Europe’s TTF hub as well as daily imports of LNG 
into the EU.  

Figure 10: Daily data, day-ahead prices and LNG imports27 

In conclusion, higher gas prices significantly above global prices did not seem to have attracted 
higher import volumes of LNG.  
Essentially, the price signal at the ports seems not to have an impact on supplies. Instead, the 
spike in gas prices can likely be attributed to intra-EU competition for gas in the face of limited 
supply, constrained by infrastructure bottlenecks. Ultimately, higher prices might not have led 
to additional supplies, but benefited only those trading the assets. 
The global gas market will likely remain tight in 2023 while no physical shortages are to be 
expected if the demand reduction is extended. In order to prevent price spikes from happening 
again, major private actors and Member States should avoid buying in a rush at any price. 

27 The analysis in this section is based on LNG import data from the JRC and TTF prices from Platts. The 
diagrams display import volumes and prices on the same axis, but they are in different units (as per the legend).  
21 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
V.  ANNEX I – Gas demand in the reference period 

Table  4:  Average  gas  consumption  per  MS,  per  month  and  for  the Aug.-Mar.  existing 
reference period and Apr.-Mar. proposed reference period (bcm) 

Month: 

 4  

 5 

 6  

 7  

 8  

 9  

 10  

 11  

 12  

 1  

 2  

 3  

 8-3 

 4-3  

1.1 
2.1 
0.4 
0.3 
0.0 
1.1 
0.3 
0.1 
0.3 
5.5 

1.2 
2.3 
0.4 
0.4 
0.0 
1.2 
0.4 
0.1 
0.3 
5.9 

MS 
EU27 
Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czechia 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Lux. 
Malta 
Netherl. 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 

29.8  25.1  21.8  23.1  21.6  24.2  31.1  41.5  47.0  51.3  43.9  41.5  302.0  401.8 
9.1 
18.1 
3.1 
3.0 
0.0 
8.7 
2.9 
0.5 
2.4 
41.3 
90.6 
5.5 
10.5 
5.4 
73.8 
1.2 
2.3 
0.8 
0.4 
42.9 
21.6 
6.0 
11.8 
4.9 
0.9 
33.0 
1.1 
Source: ENER/CET calculations based on Eurostat series NRG_CB_GASM, sub-series IC_CAL_MG in mcm as 
of 7 March 2023, 11:00. 

1.0 
1.0 
2.0 
1.9 
0.3 
0.3 
0.3 
0.3 
0.0 
0.0 
1.0 
1.0 
0.3 
0.3 
0.1 
0.0 
0.3 
0.2 
4.9 
4.9 
9.9  10.4  12.0  10.6 
0.5 
0.5 
1.3 
1.1 
0.4 
0.5 
8.0 
7.2 
0.1 
0.1 
0.2 
0.2 
0.1 
0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
4.6 
4.3 
2.2 
2.1 
0.4 
0.5 
1.5 
1.2 
0.5 
0.5 
0.1 
0.1 
2.9 
3.2 
0.1 
0.1 

7.1 
13.6 
2.3 
2.3 
0.0 
6.8 
2.2 
0.4 
1.8 
32.4 
69.0 
3.9 
8.4 
3.6 
55.5 
1.0 
1.6 
0.6 
0.2 
31.8 
15.9 
4.0 
9.3 
3.7 
0.7 
23.3 
0.8 

0.5 
1.2 
0.2 
0.2 
0.0 
0.5 
0.2 
0.0 
0.1 
2.3 
5.8 
0.4 
0.5 
0.4 
4.3 
0.1 
0.2 
0.1 
0.0 
2.9 
1.5 
0.4 
0.6 
0.3 
0.1 
2.3 
0.1 

0.5 
1.1 
0.2 
0.2 
0.0 
0.4 
0.2 
0.0 
0.2 
2.0 
5.0 
0.4 
0.5 
0.4 
4.7 
0.1 
0.2 
0.0 
0.0 
2.7 
1.4 
0.6 
0.6 
0.2 
0.1 
2.5 
0.1 

0.4 
1.0 
0.2 
0.2 
0.0 
0.4 
0.1 
0.0 
0.1 
1.8 
4.6 
0.5 
0.4 
0.4 
4.7 
0.1 
0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
2.6 
1.3 
0.6 
0.6 
0.3 
0.0 
2.6 
0.1 

0.8 
1.4 
0.2 
0.3 
0.0 
0.7 
0.2 
0.0 
0.2 
3.1 
7.1 
0.4 
0.8 
0.4 
5.3 
0.1 
0.2 
0.1 
0.0 
3.3 
1.8 
0.5 
0.9 
0.4 
0.1 
2.7 
0.1 

0.4 
1.0 
0.2 
0.2 
0.0 
0.4 
0.1 
0.0 
0.1 
1.8 
4.4 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
4.2 
0.1 
0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
2.4 
1.2 
0.5 
0.6 
0.2 
0.0 
2.4 
0.1 

0.7 
1.4 
0.2 
0.2 
0.0 
0.6 
0.2 
0.0 
0.2 
3.0 
6.8 
0.4 
0.7 
0.5 
5.1 
0.1 
0.2 
0.1 
0.0 
3.3 
1.7 
0.4 
0.8 
0.4 
0.1 
2.4 
0.1 

0.4 
1.0 
0.2 
0.2 
0.0 
0.4 
0.1 
0.0 
0.2 
1.6 
4.2 
0.5 
0.4 
0.4 
4.0 
0.1 
0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
2.5 
1.3 
0.5 
0.6 
0.3 
0.0 
2.5 
0.1 

1.0 
1.8 
0.3 
0.3 
0.0 
1.0 
0.3 
0.1 
0.3 
4.5 
9.9 
0.5 
1.2 
0.5 
7.5 
0.1 
0.2 
0.1 
0.0 
4.3 
2.2 
0.5 
1.3 
0.6 
0.1 
2.8 
0.1 

0.6 
1.5 
0.5 
9.7 
0.2 
0.3 
0.1 
0.0 
5.3 
2.5 
0.5 
1.6 
0.6 
0.1 
3.5 
0.1 

0.5 
1.4 
0.5 
9.0 
0.2 
0.2 
0.1 
0.0 
4.9 
2.4 
0.5 
1.6 
0.5 
0.1 
3.2 
0.1 

22 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Reference consumption, target consumption (i.e., reference -15%) and actual 
consumption (Aug. 2022 – Jan. 2023); EU27 (bcm) 

Source: ENER/CET calculations based on Eurostat series NRG_CB_GASM, sub-series IC_CAL_MG in mcm as 
of 7 March 2023, 11:00. 

23 

 
 
 
 
 
 
VI.  ANNEX  II – Sensitivities and statistical analysis of the 
relationship between gas prices and LNG imports 

Figure 12 plots the same data as Figure 11, but using weekly averages to remove some of the 
noise.  

Figure 12: Weekly data, day-ahead prices and LNG imports 

Still, LNG imports did not appear to increase in response to high prices. 

Figure 13 plots month-ahead prices instead of day-ahead prices to account for the time it takes 
to place and deliver an order, again using weekly averages.  

24 

 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Weekly data, month-ahead prices and LNG imports 

The figure shows that also higher future prices did not induce additional LNG imports.  

A statistical tool to estimate whether two data series increase and decrease at the same time is 
the correlation coefficient, which can take values between -1 and +1. A correlation coefficient 
of +1 means that two series move in parallel; whenever one increases, the other one does too. 
A correlation coefficient of -1 means that two series move in opposite direction; whenever one 
increases,  the  other  decreases.  A  correlation  coefficient  of  0  means  that  two  series  are 
uncorrelated,  meaning  the  movement  of  one  series  does  not  influence  the  movement  of  the 
other. 

An  absolute  correlation  coefficient  below  0.5  is  generally  considered  to  indicate  low  or 
moderate  correlation,  while  an  absolute  correlation  coefficient  below  0.2,  0.25,  or  0.3  is 
generally considered to indicate negligible or no correlation, though there are no clear dividing 
lines on the continuum of possible values between -1 and 1.  

The correlation coefficient is close to zero (and in fact slightly negative, with values between -
0.22  and  -0.16)  for  all  three  pairs  of  series  analysed  in  the  main  text  and  this  Annex.  This 
indicates  negligible  correlation,  meaning  that  LNG  imports  did  not  increase  in  response  to 
higher prices.  

25