Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulations (EU) No 1227/2011 and (EU) 2019/942 to improve the Union’s protection against market manipulation in the wholesale energy market
Date: 2023-03-14
Institutions: Directorate-General for Energy, European Commission
Subjects: European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, consumer protection, electricity supply, energy cooperation, energy market, market abuse, market stabilisation, market supervision, renewable energy, wholesale trade

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   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Strasbourg, 14.3.2023  COM(2023) 147 final 2023/0076 (COD)  Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulations (EU) No 1227/2011 and (EU) 2019/942 to improve the Union’s protection against market manipulation in the wholesale energy market   (Text with EEA relevance) {SWD(2023) 58 final}  
 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 

1. 

• 

CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 

Reasons for and objectives of the proposal 

1.1. 

Policy context 

Energy  prices  significantly  increased  throughout  2021  and  2022.  This  resulted  from 

reductions in  gas supply, particularly after the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the 

weaponisation  of  energy  as  well  as  from  domestic  shortfalls  in  hydropower  and  nuclear 

power.  The  price  rises  also  resulted  from  increased  energy  demand,  as  the  global  economy 

picked up after the COVID-19 pandemic. These price rises were rapidly felt by households, 

industry and businesses across the EU, and governments immediately took steps to mitigate 

them.  At  the  European  level,  the  EU  swiftly  provided  an  energy  prices  toolbox1  with 

measures  to  address  high  prices,  in  particular  for  the  most  vulnerable  consumers  (including 

income  support,  tax  breaks,  gas  saving  and  storage  measures),  as  well  as  the  REPowerEU 

plan2 with further measures and funding to boost energy efficiency and renewable energy in 

order  to  reduce  dependence  on  Russian  fossil  fuels.  This  was  followed  by  the  creation  of  a 

temporary State Aid regime3 to allow certain measures to soften the impact of high prices, a 

strong  gas  storage  regime4,  effective  demand  reduction  measures  for  gas5  and  electricity6, 

faster  renewable  energy  and  grid  permitting  processes7,  and  price  limiting  regimes  to  avoid 

windfall profits in both the gas and electricity markets8.  

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Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, 
the  European  Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions  -  Tackling  rising 
energy prices: a toolbox for action and support, COM(2021) 660 final. 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions  - REPowerEU Plan, 
COM(2022)230. 
Communication from the Commission Temporary Crisis Framework for State Aid measures to support 
the economy following the aggression against Ukraine by Russia C 131 I/01, C/2022/1890. 
Regulation (EU) 2022/1032 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 June 2022 amending 
Regulations (EU) 2017/1938 and (EC) No 715/2009 with regard to gas storage, OJ L 173, 10.6.2022, p. 
17. 
Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1369 of 5 August 2022 on coordinated demand-reduction measures for 
gas, OJ L 206, 8.8.2022, p. 1. 
Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1854 of 6 October 2022 on an emergency intervention to address high 
energy prices, OJ L 261, 7.10.2022, p. 1.  
Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2577 of 22 December 2022 laying down a framework to accelerate the 
deployment of renewable energy, OJ L 335, 29.12.2022, p. 36. 
Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1854 of 6 October 2022 on an emergency intervention to address high 
energy prices, OJ L 261, 7.10.2022, p. 1. 

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These short-term measures helped Member States to deal with the immediate fall-out of the 

energy crisis. However, the crisis also showed how exposed consumers and industries are and 

our  lack  of  resilience  to  energy  price  spikes.  The  impact  of  fossil  fuel-based  generation  on 

setting  electricity  prices  was  seen  as  excessive  by  businesses  and  citizens,  while  Member 

States’  ability  to  cushion  short  term  prices  with  longer  term  contracts  appeared  inadequate. 

For  this  reason,  the  European  Commission  President  announced  in  the  2022  State  of  the 

Union Address9 the need for a fundamental reform of the electricity market design. 

Whilst  the  EU’s  internal  energy  market  delivers  huge  gains  and  growth  across  Europe,  the 

recent  energy  crisis  has  highlighted  that  the  energy  market  design’s  short-term  focus  can 

distract  from  broader,  longer-term  goals.  The  reflection  of  short-term  prices  in  consumers 

bills led to price shocks where energy bills of many consumers tripled or quadrupled, even as 

the costs of wind and  solar power were declining;  the sudden  exposure to  volatile and high 

prices  triggered  some  supplier  bankruptcies;  many  industrial  enterprises  in  energy  intensive 

sectors were obliged to shut down. Therefore, the proposal includes a set of measures aimed 

to  create  a  buffer  between  short-term  markets  and  electricity  bills  paid  by  consumers,  in 

particular  by  way  of  incentivizing  longer  term  contracting,  to  improve  the  functioning  of 

short-term  markets  to  better  integrate  renewables  and  enhance  the  role  of  flexibility  and  to 

empower and protect consumers.  

The  recent  price  volatility  has  also  highlighted  the  lack  of  flexibility  in  the  electricity  grid, 

with prices set too often by gas-fired generation and with a general lack of low carbon flexible 

supply, demand response and energy storage. As more wind and solar power enter the system, 

low-carbon flexible technologies will be needed to balance the variable supply with variable 

demand.  In parallel  with this proposal,  the Commission  is  making recommendations for the 

advancement of storage innovation, technologies, and capacities.  

More broadly, the sensitivity of the electricity price to fossil fuel prices highlighted the need 

to speed up the deployment of renewables together with the flexibility of the power system to 

displace  fossil  fuels.  REPowerEU  provides  such  a  boost  to  renewable  energy  and  with  it,  a 

boost to economic growth and quality jobs creation. It builds on the European Green Deal’s 

drive to improve European competitiveness through innovation and the transition to a net zero 

economy  and  is  closely  aligned  with  the  Commission’s  Green  Deal  Industrial  Plan.  To 

facilitate  the  investments  needed  in  the  face  of  recent  price  volatility,  uncoordinated 

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SPEECH/22/5493. 

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regulatory  interventions  and  grid  and  regulatory  barriers  to  entry,  fundamental  reform  is 

needed.  Finally,  in  the  Report  on  the  final  outcome  of  the  Conference  on  the  Future  of 

Europe,  citizens  asked  the  EU  institutions  to  take  measures  to  “Enhance  European  energy 

security, and achieve the EU’s energy independence” and to ‘Reduce dependency of EU from 

foreign actors in economically strategic sectors’, including energy10 

1.2. 

Objectives of the proposal 

The  proposal  is  addressing  consumer,  industry  and  investors’  concerns  over  exposure  to 

volatile short-term prices, driven by high prices of fossil fuels. It will optimize the electricity 

market  design by complementing the short-term  markets  with  a  greater role for longer-term 

instruments, allowing consumers to benefit from more fixed priced contracts, and facilitating 

investments in clean technologies. Ultimately, it will mean that less fossil fuel generation is 

needed and will lead to lower prices for consumers during future fossil fuel crisis due to the 

low operational costs of renewable and low carbon energy. 

The proposal is putting forward measures to protect consumers from such volatility, empower 

them with greater contract choice and more direct access to renewable and low carbon energy. 

To improve investment conditions for businesses, in particular those pursuing decarbonisation 

pathways. it proposes measures to counter exposure to short term price spikes through power 

purchase  agreements  and  more  prudential  obligations  for  energy  suppliers.  It  also  proposes 

measures to improve the way variable renewable and low carbon energies are integrated into 

the  short-term  market.  This  includes  measures  boosting  the  use  of  demand  response  and 

storage, among other forms of non-fossil flexibility. The proposal also improves and clarifies 

access  to  longer  term  contracts  for  developers  (both  State  supported  such  as  contracts  for 

difference, and private, such as power purchase agreements) in order to provide secure, stable 

revenues  for  renewable  and  low  carbon  energy  developers  and  bring  down  risk  and  capital 

costs while avoiding windfall profits in periods of high prices. 

Whilst the current market design has over many decades delivered an efficient, increasingly 

integrated market, the energy crisis has highlighted a number of shortcomings relating to: (i) 

insufficient  tools to protect  consumers, including  businesses, against high short term  prices; 

(ii)  the  excessive  influence  of  fossil  fuel  prices  on  electricity  prices  and  the  failure  for  low 

cost  renewables  and  low  carbon  energy  to  be  better  reflected  in  electricity  bills;  (iii)  the 

impact of extreme price volatility and regulatory interventions on investment; (iv) the lack of 

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Report on the final outcome of the Conference on the Future of Europe Report - Proposals 3 and 17  

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sufficient  non-fossil  flexibility  (such  as  storage  or  demand  response)  that  could  reduce 

dependence on gas-fired generation; (v) the limited choice of supplier contract types; (vi) the 

difficulties to directly access renewable energy though energy sharing; and (vii) the need for 

robust monitoring of the energy market to better protect against market abuse. 

To  protect  consumers  from  volatile  prices,  the  proposal  will  provide  for  the  right  to  fixed 

price contacts as well as dynamic price contracts, the right to multiple contracts and to better 

and clearer contract information. Consumers will be offered variety of contracts that best fits 

their circumstances.  In this  way, consumers, including small  businesses,  can lock in secure, 

long-term  prices  to  mitigate  the  impact  of  sudden  price  shocks,  and/or  they  may  choose  to 

have  dynamic  pricing  contracts  with  suppliers  if  they  wish  to  take  advantage  of  price 

variability  to  use  electricity  when  it  is  cheaper  (e.g.,  to  charge  electric  cars  or  use  heat 

pumps).  Such  a  combination  of  both  dynamic  and  fixed  pricing  allows  to  keep  market 

incentives  for  consumers  to  adjust  their  electricity  demand,  while  providing  more  certainty 

also  for  those  who  wish  to  invest  in  renewable  energy  sources  (rooftop  solar  panels  for 

instance)  and  stability  of  costs.  In  addition  to  the  existing  protection  framework  for  energy 

poor and vulnerable consumers, the proposal will also provide access to regulated retail prices 

for households and SME consumers in the event of a crisis and stabilise the supply industry 

by  requiring  that  suppliers  make  more  effort  to  guard  against  high  price  spikes  by  making 

greater  use  of  forward  contracts  with  generators  (locking  in  future  prices)  and  by  requiring 

Member  States  to  establish  a  supplier  of  last  resort  regime.  The  proposal  will  empower 

consumers by creating the right to share renewable energy directly, without the need to create 

energy communities. Greater energy sharing (e.g., sharing surplus roof top solar power with a 

neighbour)  can  improve  the  use  made  of  low  cost  renewable  energy  and  provide  greater 

access to direct use of renewable energy for consumers who might not otherwise have such 

access.  

To enhance stability and predictability of the cost of energy, thereby contributing to the 

competitiveness of the EU economy facing excessive volatile prices, the proposal intends to 

enhance  market  access  to  more  stable  longer-term  contracts  and  markets.  Power  purchase 

agreements (PPAs) - long-term private contracts between a generator (typically renewable or 

low  carbon)  and  a  consumer  –  can  protect  against  price  volatility,  but  they  are  currently 

mostly available only to large energy consumers in very few Member States. A barrier to the 

growth  of  this  market  is  the  credit  risk  that  a  consumer  will  not  always  be  able  to  buy  the 

electricity  over  the  whole  period.  To  address  this,  Member  States  should  ensure  that 

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instruments  to  reduce  the  financial  risks  associated  to  off-taker  payment  default  in  the 

framework  of  PPAs,  including  guarantee  schemes  at  market  prices,  are  accessible  to 

companies  that  face  entry  barriers  to  the  PPA  market  and  are  not  in  financial  difficulty.  To 

further encourage the growth of the market  for such agreements,  renewable and low carbon 

energy project developers participating in a public support tender should be allowed to reserve 

a  share  of  the  generation  for  sale  through  a  PPA.  In  addition,  Member  States  should 

endeavour to apply in some of these tenders' evaluation criteria to incentivise the access to the 

PPA  market  for  customers  that  face  entry  barriers.  Finally,  the  obligation  on  suppliers  to 

hedge appropriately may also boost demand for PPAs (which are a way of locking in future 

prices). 

Some  forms  of  public  support  guarantee  the  energy  producer  a  minimum  price  by  the 

government but allow for the producer to nevertheless earn the full market price even when 

this market  price is  very high. With the recent  high prices much (cheap) publicly supported 

energy  has  been  receiving  these  high  market  prices.  To  curb  this  and  so  stabilise  prices, 

investment  support  should  be  structured  as  “two-way”  (two-way  contract  for  difference), 

which set a minimum price but also a maximum price, so any revenues above the ceiling are 

paid back. The proposal will apply to new investments for the generation of electricity, which 

include  investments  in  new  power-generating  facilities,  investments  aimed  at  repowering 

existing  power-generating  facilities,  investments  aimed  at  extending  existing  power-

generating  facilities  or  at  prolonging  their  lifetime.  Moreover,  the  proposal  will  require  that 

such  money  is  then  channelled  to  support  all  electricity  consumers  in  proportion  to  their 

consumption to mitigate the effect of high prices.  

A further means of guarding against volatile prices is to use long term contracts that lock in 

future prices (“forward contracts”). This market shows low liquidity in many Member States 

but  could  be boosted  across  the EU, so that more suppliers or consumers can  guard  against 

excessively  volatile  prices  over  longer  periods  of  time.  The  proposal  will  create  regional 

reference prices via a hub to increase price transparency and oblige system operators to allow 

transmission rights longer than a year, so that if a forward contract is between parties across 

regions or borders, they can ensure transmission of the electricity.  

Finally,  to  ensure  markets  that  behave  competitively  and  prices  are  set  transparently, 

regulators’ ability to monitor energy market integrity and transparency will be enhanced.  

The  third  objective  is  to  boost  renewable  energy  investment,  in  order  to  ensure  that 

deployment triples, in line with European Green Deal goals. This will be achieved partly by 

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improving the markets for long term contracts. Power purchase agreements and contracts for 

difference  not  only  provide  consumers  with  stable  prices,  they  also  give  renewable  energy 

suppliers reliable  revenues. This  lowers their financial risk and  greatly  reduces their cost  of 

capital. This creates a virtuous circle where stable revenues lower costs and boost demand for 

renewable energy.   

Renewable  energy  is  also  a  better  investment  when  its  ability  to  produce  power  is  not 

curtailed  due  to  technical  constraints  in  the  system.  The  more  flexible  the  system  is 

(generation  that  can  rapidly  turn  on  or  off,  storage  that  can  absorb  or  put  power  onto  the 

system,  or responsive consumers who can increase or decrease their demand for power) the 

more stable prices  can be and the more renewable energy the system can integrate.  For this 

reason, the proposal requires Member States to assess their needs for power system flexibility, 

establish objectives to deliver on these needs. Member States can design or redesign capacity 

mechanisms  in  order  to  promote  low-carbon  flexibility.  Moreover,  the  proposal  opens  the 

possibility for Member States to introduce new support schemes for non-fossil flexibility such 

as demand side response and storage. 

System  operators  should  also  play  an  enhanced  role  integrating  renewables  into  the  grid, 

partly by increasing transparency surrounding availability of grid connection capacity. First, 

this  clearer  information  would  enhance  renewable  energy  developers’  ability  to  develop 

renewables in areas where the grid is less congested. Second, renewable energy can be more 

efficiently traded and balanced in  the system if trades between market  participants can take 

place  closer  to  “real  time”.  If  offers  to  supply  electricity  are  made  minutes  before 

consumption  rather  than  hours  before  consumption,  the  offers  from  wind  and  solar  power 

producers  are  more  accurate,  more  wind  and  solar  power  can  be  consumed  and  the 

“imbalance costs” of the system are reduced. Thus, trading deadlines will be brought closer to 

real time.  

Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area  

The  proposed  initiative  is  strongly  linked  and  complementary  to  the  legislative  proposals 

brought  forward  in  the  context  of  the  European  Green  Deal  Package  and  speed  up  the 

decarbonisation  objectives  laid  down  in  REPowerEU  Plan,  in  particular  as  regards  the 

proposal  to  revise  the  Renewable  Energy  Directive  (“RED  II”),  which  is  the  main  EU 

instrument  dealing  with  the  promotion  of  renewable  energy.  The  proposed  initiative  is 

complementary in  that it aims to  enable the acceleration in  the uptake of renewable  energy. 

The  proposal  seeks  to  ensure  more  stable  long-term  sources  of  revenue  to  unleash  further 

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renewable and low carbon energy investments, while improving the functioning of short-term 

markets, which are key for the integration of renewables in the electricity system. In addition, 

the proposal seeks to enable energy sharing to allow consumers to engage in the market and 

help to speed up the energy transition.   

Reducing energy consumption through price signals, energy efficiency measures or voluntary 

efforts  can  often  be  the  cheapest,  safest  and  cleanest  way  to  reduce  our  reliance  on  fossil 

fuels, to support security of supply and to reduce our energy bills. The proposal will facilitate 

the active participation of the consumers in the market and the development of their demand 

response. It will also enable non-fossil flexibility such as demand side flexibility and storage 

to compete on a level playing field so that the role of natural gas in the short-term market in 

providing  flexibility  is  progressively  reduced.  Therefore,  the  proposal  is  in  line  with  the 

proposed increase of the 2030 target for energy efficiency to 13%, as set out in the proposed 

amendments to Renewable Energy, Energy Performance of Buildings and Energy Efficiency 

Directives11 accompanying the REPowerEU Plan12.  

There  is  also  an  important  link  between  the  proposal  and  the  Energy  Performance  of 

Buildings  Directive  which  is  the  main  EU  instrument  to  help  reach  the  building  and 

renovation  goals  set  out  in  the  European  Green  Deal.  The  proposal  is  strongly  linked  in 

particular  to  provisions  on  sub-metering  and  demand  response  in  addition  to  the 

Commission’s proposal, as part of the European Green Deal Package and expressed under the 

EU  Solar  Strategy  Communication,  on  the  gradual  mandatory  integration  of  solar 

photovoltaic in order to make public, commercial and residential buildings climate neutral.  

• 

Consistency with other Union policies 

The proposal’s objectives to protect and empower consumers, improve competitiveness of EU 

industry  and  boost  renewables  and  low  carbon  investment  are  wholly  consistent  with  the 

framework  of  the  European  Green  Deal  and  coherent  and  complementary  to  current 

initiatives,  including  the  legislative  proposal  for  a  “Net-zero  Industry  Act”  which  is  being 

adopted  in  parallel.  It  responds  to  the  issues  that  were  identified  in  the  Commission’s 

Communication laying out a “Green Industrial Plan for the net-zero age” issued on 1 February 

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12 

Proposal  for  a  Directive  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  amending  Directive  (EU) 
2018/2001 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, Directive 2010/31/EU on the 
energy  performance  of  buildings  and  Directive  2012/27/EU  on  energy  efficiency,  COM(2022)  222 
final. 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions  - REPowerEU Plan, 
COM(2022) 230 final. 

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202313, namely that the competitiveness of many companies has been severely weakened by 

high energy prices and that long-term price contracts could play an important role to enable 

electricity users benefit from more predictable and lower costs of renewable power. Last but 

not  least,  the  legislative  proposal  is  complementary  to  the  ongoing  revision  of  relevant 

financial market regulations such as the Market Abuse Regulation14. The proposal also builds 

on  the  Council  Recommendation  on  ensuring  a  fair  transition  towards  climate  neutrality 

whereby  Member  States  are  invited  to  continue  to  mobilise  public  and  private  financial 

support to invest into renewable energy, tackle mobility challenges and promote cost-saving 

opportunities linked to the circular economy15. 

2. 

• 

LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY 

Legal basis 

The  proposal  is  based  on  Article  194(2)  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European 

Union  (TFEU),  which  provides  the  legal  basis  for  proposing  measures  aiming  inter  alia  to 

ensure the functioning of the energy market, promote energy efficiency and energy saving and 

the development of new and renewable forms of energy.16 In the field of energy, the EU has a 

shared competence pursuant to Article 4(2)(i) TFEU. 

• 

Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence)  

The need for EU action 

The  unprecedented  nature  of  the  energy  price  crisis  has  shone  a  spotlight  on  EU  electricity 

markets. Despite the growing shares of low-cost renewables electricity across the EU, there is 

a continuing influence of fossil-fuel generated electricity on overall energy bills. Households 

and businesses across the EU have experienced skyrocketing energy prices during the crisis. 

This is an issue of EU-wide relevance which can only be addressed with action at EU level. 

The  increased  integration  of  EU  electricity  markets  requires  closer  coordination  between 

national  actors,  also  in  the  context  of  market  monitoring  and  surveillance.  National  policy 

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16 

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, 
the  European  Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions  -  A  Green  Deal 
Industrial Plan for the Net-Zero Age, COM(2023) 62 final. 
Regulation  (EU)  No  596/2014  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  16  April  2014  on 
market  abuse  (Market  Abuse  Regulation)  and  repealing  Directive  2003/6/EC  of  the  European 
Parliament  and  of  the  Council  and  Commission  Directives  2003/124/EC,  2003/125/EC  and 
2004/72/EC, OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 1. 
Council Recommendation of 16 June 2022 (2022/C 243/04) 
Article 194(1) TFEU. 

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interventions in the electricity sector have a direct impact on neighbouring Member States due 

to  energy  interdependence,  grid  interconnections  and  ongoing  electricity  market  integration. 

To preserve the functioning of the electricity system and cross-border trade and investments 

and to accelerate, in a coordinated way, the energy transition towards a more integrated and 

more energy-efficient energy system based on renewable generation, a common approach is 

needed.  

The  amendments  proposed  set  out  a  balance  between  obligations  and  flexibility  left  to  the 

Member States on how to achieve the main objectives pursued of ensuring that the lower cost 

of renewable electricity will be reflected in consumer bills and of boosting the deployment of 

renewable energy. 

Furthermore,  the  objective  of  the  proposed  measures  can  only  be  achieved  by  action  at  EU 

level,  not  at  individual Member  States’  level,  since  the  proposed  action  requires  changes  to 

the existing EU-wide framework for the electricity market design as set out in the Electricity 

Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and the Electricity Directive (EU) 2019/944 as well as to existing 

REMIT framework. 

• 

EU added value 

EU action to address the shortcomings of the current electricity market design brings added 

value because it is more efficient and effective than individual Member States’ actions, thus 

avoiding  a  fragmented  approach.  The  measures  proposed  to  address  the  shortcomings 

identified will be more ambitious and cost-effective if driven by a common legal and policy 

framework.  In  addition,  action  at  Member  State  level  would  only  be  possible  within  the 

constraints of the existing EU-wide framework for the electricity market design as set out in 

the Electricity Regulation and Electricity Directive as well as REMIT Regulation and not be 

able to achieve the necessary changes to that framework. Consequently, the objectives of this 

initiative cannot  be achieved only by Member States themselves and this is  where action at 

EU-level provides an added value. 

• 

Proportionality 

The proposed amendments to the Electricity Regulation, the Electricity Directive, the REMIT 

Regulation and the ACER Regulation are considered proportionate.  

The proposed measures to incentivise the use of long-term contracts such as power purchase 

agreements and two-way contracts for differences may lead to increased administrative costs 

and burden for undertakings and national administrations. However, the envisaged economic 

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impacts  are  necessary  and  proportionate  to  achieve  the  objective  of  incentivising  the  use  of 

such  long-term  contracts  and  ensuring  that  the  energy  bills  of  European  households  and 

companies  as  well  as  the  revenues  of  non-fossil  fuel  technologies  with  low  variable  costs 

become more independent from the fluctuation of prices in short-term markets and thus more 

stable over longer periods of time. 

The measures envisaged to improve the liquidity and integration of markets may also generate 

some  short-term  impact  on  businesses,  as  these  would  have  to  be  adapted  for  new  trading 

arrangements.  These  are  however  considered  necessary  in  order  to  achieve  the  envisaged 

objectives  of  ensuring  better  integration  of  renewable  and  low  carbon  energy  and  reducing 

dependency  on  fossil  fuels  for  flexibility,  and  ultimately  reaching  carbon  neutrality  in  the 

Union with lower costs for consumers. They are also proportionate to these objectives, since 

the  impact  on  businesses  appears  minimal  compared  to  the  current  framework  and  the 

economic  gains  of  the  reform  would  largely  surpass  any  short  or  long-term  administrative 

reorganisation.  

It  is  also  proportionate  with  the  objectives  pursued  not  to  envisage  measures  amending 

existing provisions in the Electricity Regulation and the Electricity Directive where any issues 

identified  with  regard  to  existing  provisions  can  be  addressed  through  their  manner  of 

application or implementation. One such instance relates to the measures concerning resource 

adequacy in  Chapter  IV  of the Electricity Regulation, in  particular, the process  for Member 

States  to  introduce  capacity  mechanisms,  which  could  be  simplified  without  amending  the 

relevant provisions. 

The  measures  envisaged  to  strengthen  consumer  empowerment,  rights  and  protections  will 

expand  duties  and  obligations  placed  on  suppliers  and  network  operators.  However,  the 

additional  burdens  are  necessary  and  proportionate  to  achieve  the  objective  of  ensuring 

consumers have access to better information and variety of offers, decoupling their electricity 

bills  from  short  term  movements  on  energy  markets  and  rebalancing  the  risk  between 

suppliers and consumers.  

The  measures  envisaged  to  improve  the  REMIT  framework  may  increase  reporting 

obligations  for  market  participants  due  to  a  broader  scope  of  REMIT.  These  measures  are 

necessary to  achieve the objective of  increasing  transparency and monitoring  capacities and 

ensuring more effective investigation and enforcement of cross-border cases in the EU so that 

consumers and market participants have confidence in the integrity of energy markets, prices 

reflect  a  fair  and  competitive  interplay  between  supply  and  demand  and  no  profits  can  be 

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drawn  from  market  abuse.  They  are  also  proportionate  to  that  objective,  since  the  gains  in 

terms of quality of market monitoring and surveillance would surpass any short or long-term 

administrative costs.   

Finally,  the  overall  package  of  measures  proposed  is  considered  appropriate  given  the 

overarching imperative  of achieving  climate neutrality at  the least  cost  for consumers while 

ensuring security of supplies. 

• 

Choice of the instrument 

The  proposal  will  amend  the  Electricity  Regulation,  the  Electricity  Directive,  the  REMIT 

Regulation,  the  ACER  Regulation  and  the  Renewables  Energy  Directive.  Given  that  the 

proposal  aims  to  add  a  limited  set  of  new  provisions  and  amend  a  limited  set  of  existing 

provisions  in  these  instruments,  the  recourse  to  an  amending  act  is  adequate.  For  the  same 

reason,  it  also  appears  appropriate  to  use  the  instrument  of  an  amending  regulation  to 

introduce amendments both to existing regulations and existing directives. 

3. 

STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS AND STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 

• 

Stakeholder consultations 

In preparation for the present initiative, the Commission has conducted a public consultation 

from 23 January 2023 to 13 February 2023. The consultation was open to everybody. 

The  Commission  received  1369  replies  to  this  consultation.  More  than  700  of  those  have 

come  from  citizens,  around  450  from  businesses  and  business  associations,  around  40  from 

national  or  local  administrations  or  from  national  regulators  and  around  70  from  network 

operators.  Also,  around  20  energy  communities,  15  trade  unions  and  20  consumers 

organisations participated. A significant number of NGOs, think tanks and research or other 

academic organisations submitted responses as well. An overview of stakeholders’ opinions is 

available in the Staff Working Document accompanying this legislative initiative.  

In addition, the Commission organised an online targeted stakeholder consultation meeting on 

15  February  2023  which  counted  with  the  participation  of  around  70  market  actors,  non-

governmental  organisations,  network  operators,  ACER  and  national  regulators,  think  tanks 

and academics. The consultation overall highlighted that the stakeholders considered that:  

– 

Short-term markets and the pricing mechanism based on marginal pricing should be 

preserved, as they function well and provide the right price signals. Short-term (day-

ahead  and  intraday)  markets  are  well-developed,  and  they  result  from  years  of 

implementation of EU energy legislation. 

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– 

Short-term  markets  need  to  be  complemented  by  instruments  incentivizing  longer 

term price signals, such as the ones indicated in consultation by the Commission, in 

particular  power  purchase  agreements  (‘PPA’),  contracts  for  difference,  and 

enhanced forward markets.  The right  balance between the different  tools should be 

established. Nonetheless, there should not be mandatory schemes, and the freedom of 

choosing the relevant contracts should be preserved.   

– 

The benefits of non-fossil flexibility solutions such as demand response and storage 

were acknowledged, especially in the context of an increasing share of renewables. 

Their market participation should be facilitated. 

– 

The future electricity markets  will have to  be adapted to  a high share of renewable 

energy. Furthermore, there should be more emphasis on the local dimension and grid 

development. These challenges could be addressed by the solutions presented in the 

public consultation. 

– 

Consumer  protection  is  essential,  as  is  affordability  of  energy,  but  preserving  the 

signals for demand response is equally important. Emerging solutions such as energy 

communities, self-consumption, energy sharing should be enabled and incentivized. 

• 

Staff Working Document 

Given the urgency of the initiative, a Staff Working Document has been produced instead of 

an impact  assessment. The Staff Working Document underpinning the present  proposal  sets 

out the explanation and rationale behind the Commission’s proposals for a structural response 

to  the  high  energy  prices  experienced  by  households  and  businesses  and  to  ensure  secure, 

clean and affordable energy for households and businesses into the future as well as presents 

the available evidence of relevance for the proposed measures. 

The Staff Working Document concludes that the package of proposed reforms is expected to 

significantly  improve  the  structure  and  functioning  of  the  European  electricity  market.  It  is 

another building block to enable the delivery of the Green Deal objectives and in addition it 

takes stock of the shortcomings revealed by the energy crisis and seeks to address them. 

The document shows that the reform will contribute to protecting and empowering consumers 

currently  facing  high  and  volatile  prices  by  creating  a  buffer  between  them  and  short-term 

markets. This proposal  will decouple the high prices of fossil-fuel technologies operating in 

the  electricity  market  from  the  energy  bills  of  consumers  and  businesses.  More  long-term 

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contracting opportunities in  the form  of PPAs, contracts  for difference and forward markets 

will  ensure  that  the  part  of  the  electricity  bill  exposed  to  short-term  markets  can  be  greatly 

reduced.  In  addition,  including  a  hedging  obligation  on  suppliers  and  an  obligation  to  also 

offer  fixed  price  contracts  will  significantly  increase  the  options  to  reduce  the  exposure  of 

price  volatility  for  electricity  bills.  Consumers  will  also  have  better  information  on  offers 

before  signing  up  and  Member  States  will  have  an  obligation  to  establish  suppliers  of  last 

resort. Besides, they can enable access to regulated retail prices in a crisis. The right to share 

energy is a new feature that will empower consumers and support the decentralised rollout of 

renewable energy as it grants consumers more control over their energy bills.  

The Staff Working Document explains how this reform will also enhance the competitiveness 

of EU industry in  a way that is  fully  complementary  to  the Net-zero  Industry Act.  Member 

States will be required to ensure that the right  conditions exist for PPA markets to develop, 

thereby providing industry access to affordable and clean electricity over the long-term. The 

improvements  to  the  forward  markets  will  provide  far  greater  access  to  cross-border 

renewable  energy  for  industries  and  suppliers  up  to  three  years  in  advance,  a  significant 

improvement compared to today. Overall, public support schemes for renewable energy will 

increase the energy independence in Member States and the penetration of renewables into the 

system while supporting local jobs and skills. 

The document demonstrates that this reform will accelerate the rollout of renewables and tap 

into the full potential of firm generation capacity and flexibility solutions to enable Member 

States to integrate ever higher levels of renewables. The Commission proposes that Member 

States  assess  their  need  for  power  system  flexibility  and  allows  the  introduction  of  new 

support  schemes  for  demand  response  and  storage.  The  proposal  also  introduces  extra 

possibilities for renewables to trade closer to real time at cross-border and national level.  In 

this way, the market can better support the integration of renewables and the business case for 

flexibility solutions that can contribute to security of supply.  

Finally,  the  Staff  Working  Document  describes  how  this  proposal  responds  to  the  request 

from  the  European  Council  to  assess  ways  of  optimising  the  functioning  of  the  electricity 

market  design  in  the  context  of  the  energy  crisis.  It  aims  to  protect  consumers,  creating  a 

buffer between them and short-term  electricity  markets  through longer-term contracting and 

to make those short-term markets work in a more efficient way for renewables and flexibility 

solutions, with better regulatory oversight. This proposal ensures that the market rules remain 

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fit for purpose to drive the cost-effective decarbonisation of the electricity sector and increase 

its resilience to energy price volatility.  

• 

Collection and use of expertise  

The preparation of the present legislative proposal and the Staff Working Document is based 

on  a  large  body  of  material,  which  is  referenced  in  the  footnotes  in  the  Staff  Working 

Document, and on the responses to the public consultation.  

• 

Fundamental rights  

The present proposal may have an impact on a number of fundamental rights established by 

the Charter on Fundamental Rights of the EU, in particular: the freedom to conduct a business 

(Article 16) and the right to property (Article 17). As explained above, however, to the extent 

that  the  proposed  measures  limit  the  exercise  of  these  rights,  these  impacts  are  considered 

necessary and proportionate to achieve the objectives of the proposal and therefore constitute 

legitimate limitations of such rights as allowed under the Charter. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  proposal  enhances  the  protection  of  fundamental  rights,  such  as  the 

respect for private and family life (Article 7), the right to protection of personal data (Article 

8),  the  prohibition  of  discrimination  (Article  21),  access  to  services  of  general  economic 

interest  (Article 36), the integration of a high level  of environmental protection (Article 37) 

and the right to an effective remedy (Article 47), in particular through a number of provisions 

concerning consumer empowerment, rights and protection. 

• 

Regulatory fitness and simplification 

The proposed amendments to the Electricity Directive, the Electricity Regulation, the REMIT 

Regulation  and  the  ACER  Regulation  focus  on  what  is  considered  necessary  to  address  the 

shortcomings of the current electricity market design in the context of the energy crisis and to 

contribute in a cost-effective manner to the Union’s climate ambition. They do not constitute 

a full revision of these instruments. 

The  proposal  may  increase  administrative  requirements  for  national  administrations  and 

undertakings,  albeit  in  a  proportionate  way  as  explained  above.  For  example,  the  proposed 

measures to incentivise the use of long-term contracts such as power purchase agreements and 

two-way contracts for differences may lead to increased administrative costs and burden for 

undertakings  and  national  administrations.  However,  the  envisaged  economic  impacts  will 

positively benefit businesses and consumers. 

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The measures envisaged to improve the liquidity and integration of markets may also generate 

some  short-term  impact  on  businesses,  as  these  would  have  to  be  adapted  for  new  trading 

arrangements. These are however considered minimal compared to the current framework, as 

the economic gains of the reform would largely surpass any short or long-term administrative 

reorganisation. 

The measures envisaged to strengthened consumer empowerment, rights and protections will 

expand duties and obligations placed on suppliers and network operators with the objective to 

improve  choice,  increase  protection  and  facilitate  active  market  participation  by  consumers, 

notably households. However, the additional burdens are minimal because these frameworks 

are being rolled out across Europe and therefore streamlining of rules is needed. 

The  measures  envisaged  to  improve  the  REMIT  framework  may  increase  reporting 

obligations on certain  market  participants,  albeit  in  a proportionate way.  These are however 

considered  minimal  compared  to  the  current  framework  as  the  gains  in  terms  of  quality  of 

market  monitoring  and  surveillance  would  surpass  any  short  or  long-term  administrative 

costs.   

4. 

BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS 

The  budgetary  impact  associated  to  the  proposal  on  improving  the  EU’s  electricity  market 

design concerns the resources of the European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 

Regulators  (ACER)  and  of  DG  Energy  which  are  described  in  the  Legislative  Financial 

Statement  accompanying  the  proposal.    Essentially,  for  the  new  tasks  to  be  carried  out  by 

ACER  4  additional  full  time  equivalent  (FTE)  for  ACER  from  2025  onwards,  as  well  as 

corresponding financial resources will be required. DG Energy’s workload will increase by 3 

FTE. 

The budgetary impact associated to the proposal amending REMIT concerns the resources of 

the European  Union  Agency  for  the  Cooperation  of  Energy  Regulators  (ACER)  and  of  DG 

Energy  which  are  described  in  the  Legislative  Financial  Statement  accompanying  the 

proposal.   Essentially,  the  new  tasks  to  be  carried  out  by  ACER,  especially  regarding  the 

enhanced  investigatory  powers  require  a  phasing  in  of  25  additional  full  time  equivalent 

(FTE) in ACER from 2025, as well as corresponding financial resources, although most of the 

additional staff will be funded by fees. To this end Commission Decision (EU) 2020/2152 of 

17 December 2020 on fees due to ACER for tasks under REMIT will need to be adapted. DG 

Energy's workload will increase by 2 FTE. 

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5. 

• 

OTHER ELEMENTS 

Implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements 

The Commission will monitor the transposition and compliance of Member States and other 

actors  with  the  measures  that  shall  be  ultimately  adopted  and  take  enforcement  measures  if 

and  when  required.  For  monitoring  and  implementation  purposes,  the  Commission  will 

notably  be  supported  by  ACER,  in  particular  in  relation  to  the  REMIT  Regulation.  The 

Commission will also liaise with ACER and the national regulatory authorities in relation to 

the Electricity Regulation and the Electricity Directive.  

Moreover,  to  facilitate  the  implementation,  the  Commission  will  be  available  for  bilateral 

meetings and calls with Member States in case of specific questions.  

• 

Explanation of the specific provisions of the proposals   

The amendments concerning the Electricity Regulation provide clarifications to the scope and 

subject matter of the Regulation, emphasising the importance of undistorted market signals to 

provide for increased flexibility  as well as  the role of long-term investments  to  mitigate the 

volatility  of  short-term  market  prices  on  the  electricity  bills  of  consumers  including  energy 

intensive industries,  SMEs and households.  It  clarifies  certain  main principles  for trading in 

the day-ahead and intraday markets. It provides for new rules concerning the procurement by 

TSOs  of  demand  response  in  the  form  of  a  peak  shaving  product  and  rules  allowing 

transmission  system  operators  and  distribution  system  operators  to  use  data  from  dedicated 

metering  devices.  It  sets  out  new  rules  concerning  forward  electricity  markets,  to  improve 

their  liquidity.  It  includes  new  rules  aiming  to  clarify  and  incentivise  the  role  and  use  of 

longer-term  contracts  in  the  form  of  power  purchase  agreements  and  two-way  contracts  for 

difference.  It  provides  for  new  rules  regarding  the  assessment  of  the  flexibility  needs  by 

Member  States,  the  possibility  for  them  to  introduce  flexibility  support  schemes  and  design 

principles  for  such  flexibility  support  schemes.  It  also  introduces  new  transparency 

requirements  for  transmission  system  operators  as  regards  the  capacity  available  for  new 

connections in the grid. 

The amendments concerning the Electricity Directive provide for new rules on the protection 

and  empowerment  of  consumers.    The  amendment  regarding  Free  Choice  of  Supplier 

introduces new requirements to ensure that customers are able to have more than one supplier 

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on  their  premises,  by  enabling  multiple  meters  (sometimes  called  submeters)  for  a  single 

connection point.  

The amendments regarding consumer empowerment and protection ensure that customers are 

offered a variety of contracts that best fits their circumstances, by ensuring that all customers 

have a least one fixed term, fixed price offer. Furthermore, customers must be provided with 

clear pre-contractual information in relation to these offers.  

A  new  right  for  households  and  small  and  medium  sized  enterprises  is  also  established  to 

participate in energy sharing- that is the self-consumption by active customers of renewable 

energy  generated  or  stored  offsite  either  from  facilities  they  own,  lease,  rent  in  whole  or  in 

part or which has been transferred to them by another active customer. 

Important  new protections for customers are also  introduced to  ensure continuous supply of 

electricity–  including  the  requirement  for  Member  States  to  appoint  suppliers  of  last  resort 

who  take  responsibility  for  the  customers  of  failed  suppliers  and  protection  from 

disconnection for vulnerable customers.  Suppliers will also  be required to put  in  place risk 

management  to  limit  the  risk  of  failure,  by  implementing  appropriate  hedging  strategies. 

These will be overseen by national regulatory authorities.   

The  amendments  to  the  Electricity  Directive  introduce  new  transparency  requirements  for 

distribution system operators as regards the capacity available for new connections in the grid. 

It  clarifies  the  role  of  regulatory  authorities  regarding  the  single  allocation  platform 

established in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/1719. 

The  amendments  concerning  REMIT  Regulation  adapt  the  scope  of  REMIT  to  current  and 

evolving  market  circumstances  by  inter  alia  extending  the  scope  of  data  reporting  to  new 

electricity  balancing  markets  and  coupled  markets  as  well  algorithmic  trading.  It  ensures 

stronger, more established and  regular cooperation between energy  and  financial regulators, 

including ACER and ESMA regarding derivative wholesale energy products.  It  will as well 

improve  process  for  the  collection  of  inside  information  and  market  transparency  by 

enhancing  the  oversight  of  ACER  and  adjustment  of  inside  information  definition. 

Amendments  to  REMIT  Regulation  enhance  supervision  of  reporting  parties  such  as 

Registered Reporting Mechanisms (RRMs) and persons professionally arranging transactions 

(PPATs).  Amendments  improve  data  sharing  possibilities  between  ACER,  relevant  national 

authorities  and  the  Commission.  REMIT  amendment  introduces  stronger  role  for  ACER  in 

investigations  of  significant  cross-border  cases  to  fight  against  the  REMIT  breaches.  It  also 

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sets-out  the  framework  for  harmonisation  of  fines  set  by  regulatory  authorities  at  national 

level. 

The amendments concerning the ACER Regulation aim to clarify the role of ACER as regards 

the single allocation platform established in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/1719 and 

as regards the new rules introduced in the Electricity Regulation concerning forward markets 

and  flexibility  support  schemes.  It  also  clarifies  the  role  and  competences  of  ACER  in 

accordance  with  the  amendment  to  REMIT  Regulation.  The  amendment  RED  II  aims  to 

clarify  the  scope  of  application  of  the  rules  concerning  the  types  of  direct  price  support 

schemes for renewable energy sources that Member States may introduce. 

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2023/0076 (COD) 

Proposal for a 

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 

amending Regulations (EU) No 1227/2011 and (EU) 2019/942 to improve the Union’s 
protection against market manipulation in the wholesale energy market 

(Text with EEA relevance) 

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 

Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union,  and  in  particular 
Article 194(2) thereof, 

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission, 

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments, 

Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee,  

Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions,  

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, 

Whereas: 

(1) 

(2) 

17 

Open  and  fair  competition  in  the  internal  markets  for  electricity  and  for  gases  and 
ensuring  a  level  playing  field  for  market  participants  requires  integrity  and 
transparency  of  wholesale  energy  markets.  Regulation  (EU)  No  1227/2011  of  the 
European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  establishes  a  comprehensive  framework 
(‘REMIT’)  to  achieve  this  objective.  To  enhance  the  public’s  trust  in  functioning 
energy  markets  and  to  protect  the  Union  effectively  against  attempts  of  market 
manipulation, Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 should be  amended to further increase 
insufficient transparency and monitoring capacities as well as to ensure more effective 
investigation and enforcement of potential cross-border market abuse cases addressing 
the shortcomings identified in the current framework. 

Financial  instruments,  including  energy  derivatives,  traded  on  energy  markets  are  of 
increasing  importance.  Due  to  the  increasingly  close  interrelation  between  financial 
markets  and  energy  wholesale  markets,  Regulation  (EU)  No  1227/2011  should  be 
better  aligned  with  the  financial  market  legislation  such  as  Regulation  (EU)  No 
596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council17, including with  respect to 

Regulation  (EU)  No  596/2014  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  16  April  2014  on 
market abuse (market abuse regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament 

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the  definitions  of  market  manipulation  and  inside  information  respectively.  More 
specifically  the  definition  of  market  manipulation  in  Regulation  (EU)  No  1227/2011 
should be slightly adjusted to mirror Article 12 of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014. To 
that end, the definition of market manipulation under Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 
should be adjusted to capture the entering into any transaction, or issuing any order to 
trade,  but  also  any  other  behaviour  relating  to  wholesale  energy  products  which:  (i) 
gives, or is likely to give, false or misleading signals as to the supply of, demand for, 
or price of wholesale energy products; (ii) secures, or is likely to secure, by a person, 
or  persons  acting  in  collaboration,  the  price  of  one  or  several  wholesale  energy 
products at an artificial level, or (iii) employs a fictitious device or any other form of 
deception or contrivance which gives, or is likely to give, false or misleading signals 
regarding the supply of, demand for, or price of wholesale energy products. 

The definition of inside information should also be adjusted to mirror Regulation (EU) 
596/2014. In particular, where inside information concerns a process which occurs in 
stages, each stage of the process as well as the overall process could constitute inside 
information. An intermediate step in a protracted process may in itself constitute a set 
of  circumstances  or  an  event  which  exists  or  where  there  is  a  realistic  prospect  that 
they  will  come  into  existence  or  occur,  on  the  basis  of  an  overall  assessment  of  the 
factors existing at the relevant time. However, that notion should not be interpreted as 
meaning that the magnitude of the effect of that set of circumstances or that event on 
the prices of the financial instruments concerned must be taken into consideration. An 
intermediate step should be deemed to be inside information if it, by itself, meets the 
criteria laid down in this Regulation for inside information. 

 This  Regulation  is  without  prejudice  to  Regulations  (EU)  596/2014,  600/2014  and 
648/2012,  and  Directive  (EU)  2014/65  as  well  as  to  the  application  of  European 
competition law to the practices covered by this Regulation. 

Sharing  of  information  between  national  regulatory  authorities  and  the  national 
competent  financial  authorities  is  a  central  aspect  of  cooperation  and  detection  of 
potential breaches in both the wholesale energy markets and the financial markets. In 
the  light  of  the  exchange  of  information  between  competent  authorities  pursuant  to 
Regulation  (EU)  596/2014  at  national  level,  national  regulatory  authorities  should 
share  relevant  information  they  receive  with  national  financial  and  competition 
authorities. 

(3) 

(4) 

(5) 

(6)  Where  information  is  not,  or  no  longer,  sensitive  from  a  commercial  or  security 
viewpoint,  the  European  Agency  for  the  Cooperation  of  Energy  Regulators  (the 
‘Agency’  or  ‘ACER’)  should  be  able  to  make  that  information  available  to  market 
participants  and  the  wider  public  with  a  view  to  contributing  to  enhanced  market 
knowledge.  This  should  include  the  possibility  for  ACER  to  publish  information  on 
organised market  places,  IIPs,  RRMs  according to applicable  data protection  laws  in 
the  interest  of  improving  transparency  of  wholesale  energy  markets  and  provided  it 
does not distort competition on those energy markets. 

and of the Council and Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC (OJ L 173, 
12.6.2014, p. 1). 

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(7) 

(8) 

(9) 

Organised market places which carry out activities relating to the trading of wholesale 
energy products that are financial instruments under Article 4(1)(15) of Directive (EU) 
2014/65 shall be duly authorized pursuant to the requirements of that Directive. 

The  use  of  trading  technology  has  evolved  significantly  in  the  past  decade  and  is 
increasingly  used  on  the  wholesale  energy  markets.  Many  market  participants  use 
algorithmic  trading  and  high  frequency  algorithmic  techniques  with  minimal  or  no 
human intervention. The risks arising from these practises should be addressed under 
Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011.  

Compliance with the reporting obligations under  Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 and 
the  quality  of  the  data  that  the  Agency  receives  is  of  utmost  importance  to  ensure 
effective  monitoring  and  detection  of  potential  breaches  to  achieve  the  objective  of 
Regulation  (EU)  No  1227/2011.  Inconsistencies  in  the  quality,  formatting,  reliability 
and cost of trading data have a detrimental effect on transparency, consumer protection 
and  market  efficiency.  It  is  essential  that  the  information  received  by  the  Agency  is 
accurate and complete for it to effectively carry out its tasks and functions.  

(10)  To improve the Agency’s market monitoring and make data collection more complete, 
the  current  reporting  regime  needs  improvement.  The  data  collected  should  be 
expanded to  overcome  gaps in  the data collection and include  coupled  markets,  new 
balancing  markets,  contracts  for  balancing  markets  and  products  that  have  potential 
delivery in the Union. Organised market places should be required to provide the full 
order book data set to the Agency. Order book providers should also be designated as 
persons professionally arranging transactions subject to the obligation to monitor and 
report suspected breaches.  

(11) 

Inside Information Platforms (IIPs) should play an important role for the effective and 
timely  publication  of  inside  information.  It  should  be  mandatory  to  disclose  inside 
information on dedicated IIPs to make the information easily accessible and enhance 
transparency. To ensure trust in the IIPs they should be authorised and registered. 

(12)  To  streamline  and  make  the  reporting  of  data  to  the  Agency  more  effective,  the 
information  should  be  provided  through  Registered  Reporting  Mechanisms  (RRMs) 
and the operation of RRMs should be authorised by the Agency. The RRMs should at 
all  times  comply  with  the  conditions  for  authorisation  and  data  protection  law.  The 
Agency should also establish a register of all RRMs in the Union.   

(13) 

In order to facilitate monitoring to detect potential trading based on inside information 
and data quality of collected information, the collection of inside information needs to 
be aligned with the current processes for trade data reporting.  

(14)  Persons  professionally  arranging  and  executing  transactions  have  the  obligation  to 
report suspicious transactions in breach of the provisions on insider trading and market 
manipulation. To enhance the possibility of enforcement of such breaches, the persons 
professionally  arranging  transactions  should  also  have  the  obligation  to  report 
suspicious  orders  and  potential  breaches  of  the  obligation  to  publish  inside 
information.  Direct  electronic  access  providers  and  shared  order-book  providers 
should be considered as persons professionally arranging transactions. 

(15)  Commission  Regulation  (EU)  2015/1222  establishing  a  guideline  on  capacity 
allocation  and  congestion  management  foresees  the  possibility  of  third  country 
participation  in  the  Union  single  day-ahead  and  intraday  coupling  in  the  electricity 
sector. Since the market coupling operator uses a specific algorithm to match bids and 
offers in an optimal manner, this may result in orders to trade being placed in a third 

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(16) 

country  participating  in  the  Union  single  day-ahead  and  intraday  coupling  but 
resulting  in  a  contract  for  the  supply  of  electricity  with  delivery  in  the  Union.  The 
placing of such orders to trade in third countries participating in the Union single day-
ahead and intraday coupling that may result in delivery in the Union should be covered 
by the definition of wholesale energy product pursuant to this Regulation. 

In order to obtain an accurate, objective and reliable assessment of the price for LNG 
deliveries  to  the  Union,  the  Agency  should  collect  all  the  LNG  market  data  that  are 
necessary to establish a daily LNG price assessment. The price assessment should be 
undertaken based on all transactions pertaining to LNG deliveries to the Union. ACER 
should be empowered to collect this market data from all participants active in  LNG 
deliveries  to  the  Union.  All  such  participants  should  be  obliged  to  report  all  of  their 
LNG market data to ACER as close to real time as technologically possible either after 
the  conclusion  of  a  transaction  or  the  posting  of  a  bid  or  offer  to  enter  into  a 
transaction.  The  ACER  price  assessment  should  comprise  the  most  complete  dataset 
including transaction prices and, as of 31 March 2023, bids and offer prices for LNG 
deliveries to the Union. The daily publication of this objective price assessment, and 
of the spread established in comparison to other reference prices on the market in the 
form  of  an  LNG  benchmark,  paves  the  way  for  its  voluntary  uptake  by  market 
participants as the reference price in their contracts and transactions. Once established, 
the LNG price assessment and the LNG benchmark could also become a reference rate 
for derivatives contracts used for hedging the price of LNG or the difference in price 
between the LNG price and other gas prices.  

(17)  Delegation  of  tasks  and  responsibilities  can  be  an  effective  instrument  to  reduce 
duplication  of  tasks,  foster  cooperation  and  reduce  the  burden  imposed  on  market 
participants.  Therefore  a  clear  legal  basis  should  be  provided  for  such  delegation. 
National regulatory authorities should be able to delegate tasks and responsibilities to 
another national regulatory authority. Introducing specific conditions and limiting the 
scope  for  the  delegation  to  what  is  necessary  for  the  effective  supervision  of  cross-
border  market  participants  or  groups  should  be  possible.  Delegations  should  be 
governed  by  the  principle  of  allocating  competence  to  an  authority  which  is  best 
placed to take action on the subject matter. 

(18)  A uniform and stronger framework to prevent market manipulation and other breaches 
of  Regulation  (EU)  No  1227/2011  in  the  Member  States  is  necessary.  Penalties  for 
breaches  of  that  Regulation  should  be  proportionate,  effective  and  dissuasive  and 
reflect  the  type  of  the  breaches,  taking  into  account  the  ne  bis  in  idem  principle. 
Administrative  sanctions,  penalty  payments  and  supervisory  measures  are 
complementary parts of an effective enforcement regime. A harmonised supervision of 
the wholesale energy market requires a consistent approach among national regulatory 
authorities.   

(19)  To  date,  the  supervision  and  enforcement  of  activities  under  Regulation  (EU)  No 
1227/2011  have  been  the  responsibility  of  the  Member  States.  Market  abuse 
behaviours  are  increasingly  cross-border  in  nature,  often  affecting  several  Member 
States.  Enforcement  action  against  cross-border  market  abuses  can  present 
jurisdictional  challenges  relating  to  the  identification  of  the  national  regulatory 
authority that would be best placed to pursue the investigation in question.  

(20)  Market abuse cases involving multiple cross-border elements and market participants 
established  outside  the  Union  are  also  particularly  challenging  from  an  enforcement 
perspective. The current supervisory set-up is not appropriate for the desired level of 

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market  integration.  The  absence  of  a  mechanism  to  ensure  the  best  possible 
supervisory decisions for cross-border cases, where joint action by national regulatory 
authorities  and  the  Agency  currently  requires  complicated  arrangements  and  where 
there  is  a  patchwork  of  supervisory  regimes  must  be  addressed.  There  is  therefore  a 
need to set up an efficient and effective supervisory and investigatory regime for this 
type of market abuse cases, which cannot, due to its Union wide features, be addressed 
by Member State action alone.  

(21)  The investigation of breaches of this Regulation with a cross-border dimension should 
be carried out through a uniform process at  Union level. Complexity of cross-border 
cases and the need to ensure sufficient resources for such cases requires involvement 
of  the  Agency,  in  particular  in  more  integrated  energy  market.  Since  the  entry  into 
force of Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011, the Agency has gained significant experience 
in  monitoring  and  collecting  relevant  data  on  the  wholesale  energy  markets  in  the 
Union  to  ensure  their  integrity  and  transparency.  Building  on  this  experience,  the 
Agency should be empowered to carry out investigations to fight against the breaches 
of  the  provisions  of  Regulation  (EU)  No  1227/2011.  The  Agency  should  carry  out 
such  investigations  in  cooperation  with  the  national  regulatory  authorities  with  the 
purpose of supporting and complementing their enforcement activities. Equally, in the 
context  of  an  investigation  by  the  Agency,  where  necessary,  relevant  national 
regulatory authorities should cooperate amongst each other in assisting the Agency.  

(22)  The  Agency  should  be  empowered  to  carry  out  investigations  by  conducting  on-site 
inspections and by issuing requests for information to the persons under investigations, 
in particular where the suspected breaches of Regulation  (EU) No 1227/2011 have a 
clear  cross-border  dimension.  In  undertaking  the  on-site  inspections  and  in  issuing 
requests  for  information  to  the  persons  under  investigations,  the  Agency  should 
closely and actively cooperate with the relevant national regulatory authorities, which 
in  turn  should  provide  the  Agency  with  full  assistance,  including  where  a  person 
refuses  to  be  subject  to  the  inspection  or  to  provide  the  requested  information.  It  is 
important  that  the  procedural  guarantees  and  fundamental  rights  of  the  persons 
concerned  of  the  persons  subject  to  the  Agency’s  investigations  are  fully  respected. 
The  confidentiality  of  the  information  submitted  by  the  persons  subject  to  the 
investigation  should  be  safeguarded  exchanged  in  accordance  with  applicable  Union 
data protection rules.   

(23)  Since the objectives of this Regulation cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States, but  can be better achieved at  Union level, the Union may  adopt  measures, in 
accordance  with  the  principle  of  subsidiarity  as  set  out  in  Article  5  of  the  Treaty  on 
European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that 
Article,  this  Regulation  does  not  go  beyond  what  is  necessary  to  achieve  that 
objective, 

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HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 

Article 1 

Amendments to Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 

Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 is amended as follows: 

[1] Article 1 is amended as follows: 

[a] Second paragraph is amended as follows: 

2. This Regulation applies to trading in wholesale energy products. This Regulation is without 

prejudice  to  the  application  of  Directive  (EU)  2014/65,  Regulation  (EU)  600/2014  and 

Regulation  (EU)  648/2012  as  regards  activities  involving  financial  instruments  as  defined 

under  Article  4(1)(15)  of  Directive  (EU)  2014/65  as  well  as  to  the  application  of  European 

competition law to the practices covered by this Regulation. 

[b] In Article 1(3) the following second subparagraph is added: 

“The  Agency,  national  regulatory  authorities,  ESMA  and  competent  financial  authorities  of 

the Member States shall in particular exchange relevant information and data on a regular, at 

least  quarterly,  basis  regarding  potential  breaches  of  Regulation  (EU)  No  596/2014  of  the 

European Parliament and of the Council involving wholesale energy products covered by this 

Regulation. 

[2] Article 2 is amended as follows: 

[a] point (1) is amended as follows: 

in the second subparagraph, the following point (e) is added: 

“(e)  information  conveyed  by  a  client  or  by  other  persons  acting  on  the  client’s  behalf  and 

relating  to  the  client’s  pending  orders  in  wholesale  energy  products,  which  is  of  a  precise 

nature, relating directly or indirectly, to one or more wholesale energy products”;  

[b] the third subparagraph is replaced by the following: 

“Information  shall be deemed to  be of a  precise nature if it indicates a set  of circumstances 

which  exists  or  may  reasonably  be  expected  to  come  into  existence,  or  an  event  which  has 

occurred  or  may  reasonably  be  expected  to  do  so,  and  if  it  is  specific  enough  to  enable  a 

conclusion to be drawn as to the possible effect of that set of circumstances or event on the 

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prices of wholesale energy products. Information may be deemed to be of precise nature if it 

relates  to  a  protracted  process  that  is  intended  to  bring  about,  or  that  results  in,  particular 

circumstances or a particular event, including future circumstances or future events, and also 

if it relates to the intermediate steps of that process which are connected with bringing about 

or resulting in those future circumstances or that future event.  

An intermediate step in a protracted process shall be deemed to be inside information if, by 

itself, it satisfies the criteria of inside information as referred to in this Article.  

For the purposes of paragraph 1, information which, if it were made public, would be likely to 

significantly  affect  the  prices  of  those  wholesale  energy  products  shall  mean  information  a 

reasonable  investor  would  be  likely  to  use  as  part  of  the  basis  of  his  or  her  investment 

decision(s); 

[c] paragraph (2), point (a) is replaced by the following: 

(2) 

‘market manipulation’ means: 

(a) 

entering  into  any  transaction,  issuing  any  order  to  trade  or  engaging  in  any  other 

behaviour relating to wholesale energy products which: 

(i) 

gives, or is likely to give, false or misleading signals as to the supply of, demand for, 

or price of wholesale energy products; 

(ii) 

secures, or is likely to secure , by a person, or persons acting in collaboration, the price 

of  one  or  several  wholesale  energy  products  at  an  artificial  level,  unless  the  person  who 

entered into the transaction or issued the order to trade establishes that his reasons for doing 

so  are  legitimate  and  that  that  transaction  or  order  to  trade  conforms  to  accepted  market 

practices on the wholesale energy market concerned; or 

(iii) 

employs a fictitious device or any other form of deception or contrivance which gives, 

or is likely to give, false or misleading signals regarding the supply of, demand for, or price of 

wholesale energy products;  

or 

[d] in paragraph (2), the following point (c) is added and preceded by the word ‘or’ at 

the end of point (b): 

“(c)  transmitting  false  or  misleading  information  or  providing  false  or  misleading  inputs  in 

relation  to  a benchmark  where the person who  made the transmission or provided the input 

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knew  or  ought  to  have  known  that  it  was  false  or  misleading,  or  engaging  in  any  other 

behaviour which leads to the manipulation of the calculation of a benchmark.”;   

[e] at the end of paragraph (2) the following subparagraph is added: 

“Market  manipulation  may  designate  the  conduct  of  a  legal  person,  but  also,  in  accordance 

with European Union or national law, of the natural persons who participate in the decision to 

carry out activities for the account of the legal person concerned.”;   

[f] in paragraph (4), point (a) is replaced by the following: 

“(4)‘wholesale energy products’ means the following  contracts  and derivatives, irrespective 

of where and how they are traded: 

(a) 

contracts for the supply of electricity or natural gas where delivery is in the Union or 

contracts  for  the  supply  of  electricity  or  natural  gas  which  may  result  in  delivery  in  the 

Union;”; 

[g] paragraph (7) is replaced by the following: 

“(7) 

‘market participant’ means any person, including transmission system operators  and 

persons professionally arranging or executing transactions when trading on their own account, 

who  enters  into  transactions,  including  the  placing  of  orders  to  trade,  in  one  or  more 

wholesale energy markets;”; 

[h] the following new paragraph (8a) is inserted: 

“(8a) 

'person  professionally  arranging  or  executing 

transactions'  means  a  person 

professionally engaged in the reception and transmission of orders for, or in the execution of 

transactions in, wholesale energy products;”; 

[i] the following new paragraph (10a) is added: 

“(10a)  'the  Agency’  or  ‘ACER’  means  the  European  Union  Agency  for  the  Cooperation  of 

Energy Regulators;”; 

[j] the following points are inserted: 

“(16)  ‘registered  reporting  mechanism’  or  ‘RRM’  means  a  person  registered  under  this 

Regulation to provide the service of reporting details of transactions, including orders to trade, 

and fundamental data to the Agency on behalf of market participants; 

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(17) ‘inside information platform’ or ‘IIP’ means a person registered under this Regulation to 

provide the service of operating a platform for the disclosure of inside information and for the 

reporting of disclosed inside information to the Agency on behalf of market participants. 

(18)  ‘algorithmic  trading’  means  trading  in  wholesale  energy  products  where  a  computer 

algorithm automatically determines individual parameters of orders to trade such as whether 

to initiate the order, the timing, price or quantity of the order or how to manage the order after 

its submission, with limited human intervention  or no such intervention at all, not including 

any system that is only used for the purpose of routing orders to one or more organised market 

places or for the processing of orders involving no determination of any trading parameters or 

for the confirmation of orders or the post-trade processing of executed transactions; 

(19) ‘direct electronic access’ means an arrangement whereby a member, participant or client 

of an organised market place allows another person to use its trading code so the person may 

electronically  transmit  orders  to  trade  relating  to  a  wholesale  energy  product  directly  to  the 

organised  market  place,  including  arrangements  which  involve  the  use  by  a  person  of  the 

infrastructure of the member, participant or client, or any connecting system provided by the 

member,  participant,  or  client,  to  transmit  the  orders  to  trade  (direct  market  access)  and 

arrangements whereby such an infrastructure is not used by a person (sponsored access); 

(20)  ‘organised  market  place’  (‘OMP’)  means  an  energy  exchange,  an  energy  broker,  an 

energy  capacity  platform  or  any  other  person  professionally  arranging  or  executing 

transactions,  including  shared  order  book  providers  but  excluding  purely  bilateral  trading 

where two natural persons enter into each trade on their own account. 

(21) ‘LNG trading’ means bids, offers or transactions for the purchase or sale of LNG: (a) that 

specify  delivery  in  the  Union;  (b)  that  result  in  delivery  in  the  Union;  or  (c)  in  which  one 

counterparty re-gasifies the LNG at a terminal in the Union. 

(22) ‘LNG market  data’ means  records of bids,  offers or transactions  for  LNG trading with 

corresponding information as specified in the Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 

1348/2014. 

(23) ‘LNG market participant’ means any natural or legal person, irrespective of that person’s 

place of incorporation or domicile, who engages in LNG trading. 

(24)  ’LNG  price  assessment’  means  the  determination  of  a  daily  reference  price  for  LNG 

trading in accordance with a methodology to be established by ACER. 

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(25)  ‘LNG  benchmark’  means  the  determination  of  a  spread  between  the  daily  LNG  price 

assessment and the settlement price for the TTF Gas Futures front-month contract established 

by ICE Endex Markets B.V. on a daily basis.”; 

[3] in Article 3(1) the following second subparagraph is added: 

“The  use  of  inside  information  by  cancelling  or  amending  an  order  concerning  a  wholesale 

energy product to which the information relates, where the order was placed before the person 

concerned possessed the inside information, shall also be considered to be insider trading.”; 

[4] Article 4 is amended as follows: 

[a] in paragraph 1 the following 2nd subparagraph is added: 

“Market participants shall disclose the inside information through IIPs. The IIPs shall ensure 

that the inside information is  made public in  a  manner which enables  fast  access, including 

access  through  a  clear  application  programming  interface.  and  complete,  correct  and  timely 

assessment of the information by the public.”;  

[b] paragraph 4 is replaced by the following: 

The  publication  of  inside  information,  including  in  aggregated  form,  in  accordance  with 

Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 or (EC) No 715/2009, or guidelines and network codes adopted 

pursuant  to  those  Regulations  constitutes  ,  complete  and  effective  public  disclosure  but  not 

necessarily disclosure in a timely manner in the meaning of paragraph 1 of this Article. 

[5] The following Article 4a is inserted: 

“Article 4a 

Authorisation and supervision of IIPs  

1. 

2. 

IIPs shall register with  the Agency. An  IIP shall only operate after the Agency has 
assessed  whether  that  IIP  complies  with  the  requirements  of  this  Article  and  has 
authorised  the  operation.  The  register  of  IPPs  shall  be  publicly  available  and  shall 
contain information on the services for which the IIP is registered. The Agency shall 
regularly review the compliance of IIPs with this Regulation. Where the Agency has 
withdrawn  a  registration  in  accordance  with  paragraph  5,  that  withdrawal  shall  be 
published in the register for a period of five years from the date of withdrawal. 

An  IIP  shall  have  adequate  policies  and  arrangements  in  place  to  make  public  the 
inside information required under Article 4(1) as close to real time as is technically 
possible, on a reasonable commercial basis. The information shall be made available 
for all purposes free of charge. The IIP shall efficiently and consistently disseminate 

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such  information  in  a  way  that  ensures  fast  access  to  the  inside  information,  on  a 
non-discriminatory  basis  and  in  a  format  that  facilitates  the  consolidation  of  the 
inside information with similar data from other sources. 

3. 

The inside information made public by an IIP in accordance with paragraph 2 shall 
include, at least, the following details depending on the type of inside information: 

(a) 

the message ID and event status; 

(b) 

the publication date, the time and the start and stop of the event; 

(c) 

the market participant name and the market participant identification; 

(d) 

the bidding or balancing zone concerned; 

(e) 

(a) 

and, where applicable: 

the type of unavailability and the type of event; 

(b) 

the unit of measurement; 

(c) 

the unavailable, the available and the installed or technical capacity; 

(d) 

the reason for the unavailability; 

(e) 

(f) 

the fuel type; 

the affected asset or unit and its identification code. 

4. 

An IIP shall operate and maintain effective administrative arrangements designed to 
prevent conflicts of interest with its clients. In particular, an IIP who is also a market 
operator  or  market  participant  shall  treat  all  inside  information  collected  in  a  non-
discriminatory  way  and  shall  operate  and  maintain  appropriate  arrangements  to 
separate different business functions. 

An  IIP  shall  have  sound  security  mechanisms  in  place  designed  to  guarantee  the 

security  of  the  means  of  transfer  of  inside  information,  minimise  the  risk  of  data 

corruption and unauthorised access  and to  prevent  inside  information  leakage before 

publication. The  IIP shall maintain adequate resources and have back-up facilities in 

place in order to offer and maintain its services at all times. 

The  IIP  shall  have  systems  in  place  that  can  quickly  and  effectively  check  inside 

information  reports  for  completeness,  identify  omissions  and  obvious  errors,  and 

request re-transmission of any such erroneous reports. 

5. 

The Agency may withdraw the registration of an IIP where the latter: 

(a) 

does not make use of the authorisation within 12 months, expressly renounces 
the authorisation or has provided no services for the preceding six months; 

(b)  obtained the registration by making false statements  or  by any other irregular 

means; 

(c) 

no longer meets the conditions under which it was registered; 

(d)  has seriously and systematically infringed this Regulation. 

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When  the  registration  has  been  withdrawn,  the  IIP  concerned  shall  ensure  orderly 

substitution including the transfer of data to other IIPs and the redirection of reporting 

flows to other IIPs.  

The Agency shall, without undue delay, notify the national competent authority in the 

Member State where the IIP is established of a decision to withdraw the registration of 

an IIP. 

6. 

The Commission shall, by means of implementing acts, specify: 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

the means by which an IIP shall comply with the inside information obligation 
referred to in paragraph 2; 

the  content  of  the  inside  information  published  under  paragraph  2  in  such  a 
way as to enable the publication of information required under this Article; 

the  concrete  organisational  requirements  for  the  implementation  of  paragraph 
4. 

Those  implementing  acts  shall  be  adopted  in  accordance  with  the  examination 

procedure referred to in Article 21(2).”; 

[6] The following Article 5a is added: 

“Article 5a 

Algorithmic trading 

1. 

A market participant that engages in algorithmic trading shall have in place effective 
systems and risk controls suitable to the business it operates to ensure that its trading 
systems are resilient and have sufficient capacity, are subject to appropriate trading 
thresholds  and  limits  and  prevent  the  sending  of  erroneous  orders  to  trade  or  the 
systems otherwise functioning in a way that may create or contribute to a disorderly 
market.  The  market  participant  shall  also  have  in  place  effective  systems  and  risk 
controls to ensure that the trading systems comply with  this Regulation  and with the 
rules of an organised market place to which it is  connected. The market participant 
shall  have  in  place  effective  business  continuity  arrangements  to  deal  with  any 
failure of its trading systems and shall ensure its systems are fully tested and properly 
monitored to ensure that they meet the requirements laid down in this paragraph. 

2. 

A  market  participant  that  engages  in  algorithmic  trading  in  a  Member  State  shall 
notify this engagement to the national regulatory authorities of its Member State and 
to the Agency. 

The national regulatory authority of the Member State of the market participant may 

require the market participant to provide, on a regular or ad-hoc basis, a description of 

the  nature  of  its  algorithmic  trading  strategies,  details  of  the  trading  parameters  or 

limits to which the trading system is subject, the key compliance and risk controls that 

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it has in place to ensure that the requirement laid down in paragraph 1 are satisfied and 

details of the testing of its trading systems.  

The  market  participant  shall  arrange  for  records  to  be  kept  in  relation  to  the  points 

referred to in this paragraph and shall ensure that those records are sufficient to enable 

its national regulatory authority to monitor compliance with this Regulation.  

3. 

A  market  participant  that  provides  direct  electronic  access  to  an  organised  market 
place  shall  notify  the  competent  authorities  of  its  home  Member  State  and  the 
Agency accordingly.  

The national regulatory authority of the home Member State of the market participant 

may  require  the  market  participant  to  provide,  on  a  regular  or  ad-hoc  basis,  a 

description  of  the  systems  and  controls  referred  to  in  paragraph  1  and  evidence  that 

those have been applied.  

The  market  participant  shall  arrange  for  records  to  be  kept  in  relation  to  the  matters 

referred to in this paragraph and shall ensure that those records be sufficient to enable 

its national regulatory authority to monitor compliance with this Regulation. 

4. 

This article is without prejudice to obligations under  Directive (EU) 2014/65.”; 

[7] in Article 7, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:  

“1. ACER shall monitor trading activity in  wholesale energy products  to  detect  and prevent 

trading  based  on  inside  information  and  market  manipulation  or  attempts  thereof.  It  shall 

collect  the  data  for  assessing  and  monitoring  wholesale  energy  markets  as  provided  for  in 

Article 8.”; 

[] New articles from 7a to 7d are added: 

“Article 7a 

Tasks and powers of ACER to carry out price assessments and benchmarks 

1.  As  a  matter  of  urgency,  ACER  shall  produce  and  publish  a  daily  LNG  price  assessment 

starting no later than 13 January 2023. For the purpose of the LNG price assessment, ACER 

shall  systematically  collect  and  process  LNG  market  data  on  transactions.  The  price 

assessment  shall  where  appropriate  take  into  account  regional  differences  and  market 

conditions. 

2.  No  later  than  31  March  2023,  ACER  shall  produce  and  publish  a  daily  LNG  benchmark 

determined  by  the  spread  between  the  daily  LNG  price  assessment  and  the  settlement  price 

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for the TTF Gas Futures front-month contract  established by ICE Endex Markets  B.V. on a 

daily basis. For the purposes of the LNG benchmark, ACER shall systematically collect and 

process all LNG market data. 

3. By way of derogation from Article 3(4), point (b), of this Regulation, the market participant 

obligations and prohibitions  of  this  Regulation  shall apply to  LNG market  participants. The 

powers  conferred  on  ACER  under  this  Regulation  and  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  No 

1348/2014 shall also apply in relation to LNG market participants including the provisions on 

confidentiality. 

Article 7b 

Publication of LNG price assessments and benchmark 

1. The LNG price assessment shall be published daily, and by no later than 18.00 CET for the 

outright transaction price assessment. By 31 March 2023, in addition to the publication of the 

LNG price assessment, ACER shall also, on a daily basis, publish the LNG benchmark by no 

later than 19:00 CET or as soon as technically possible. 

2. For the purposes of this Article, ACER may make use of the services of a third party. 

Article 7c 

Provision of LNG market data to ACER 

1. LNG market participants shall submit daily to ACER the LNG market data in accordance 

with  the  specifications  set  out  in    the  Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  No 

1348/2014,  in  a  standardised  format,  through  a  high-quality  transmission  protocol,  and  as 

close  to  real-time  as  technologically  possible  before  the  publication  of  the  daily  LNG  price 

assessment (18:00 CET).  

2. The Commission may adopt implementing acts specifying the point in time by which LNG 

market  data  is  to  be  submitted  before  the  daily  publication  of  the  LNG  price  assessment  as 

referred to in paragraph 1. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the 

examination procedure referred to in Article 29. 

3. Where appropriate, ACER shall, after consulting the Commission, issue guidance on: 

(a) the details of the information to be reported, in addition to the current details of reportable 

transactions  and  fundamental  data  under  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  No  1348/2014, 

including bids and offers; and 

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(b)  the  procedure,  standard  and  electronic  format  and  the  technical  and  organisational 

requirements  for  submitting  data  to  be  used  for  the  provision  of  the  required  LNG  market 

data. 

4.  LNG  market  participants  shall  submit  the  required  LNG  market  data  to  ACER  free  of 

charge and through the reporting channels established by ACER, where possible using already 

existing and available procedures. 

Article 7d 

Business continuity 

ACER  shall  regularly  review,  update  and  publish  its  LNG  reference  price  assessment  and 

LNG  benchmark  methodology  as  well  as  the  methodology  used  for  LNG  market  data 

reporting and the publication of its LNG price assessments and LNG benchmarks, taking into 

account the views of LNG market data contributors.”; 

[8] Article 8 is amended as follows: 

[a] the following paragraph 1a is inserted: 

“(1a) For the purpose of reporting records of transactions, including orders to trade, entered, 

concluded or executed at organised market places, those market places shall make available to 

the Agency  data relating to  the order book or, upon  the Agency’s  request,  give  the  Agency 

access to the order book so that it is able to monitor trading.”;  

[b] in paragraph 2, the second subparagraph is replaced by the following: 

“Those  implementing  acts  shall  be  adopted  in  accordance  with  the  examination  procedure 

referred to in Article 21(2). They shall take account of existing transaction reporting systems 

for monitoring trading activity to detect market abuse.” 

[c] in paragraph 3, the first subparagraph is replaced by the following: 

3.  Persons  referred  to  in  points  (a)  to  (d)  of  paragraph  4  who  have  reported  transactions  in 

accordance with  Regulation (EU) 600/2014 or Regulation (EU) 648/2012 shall not be subject 

to double reporting obligations relating to those transactions. 

[d] paragraph 4 is amended as follows:  

(i) point (d) is replaced by the following: 

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(d)  an  organised  market  place,  a  trade-matching  system  or  other  person  professionally 

arranging or executing transactions; 

(ii) the following second subparagraph is added: 

“The information shall be provided through registered reporting mechanisms.”; 

[e] paragraph 5 is replaced by the following: 

“5.  Market  participants  shall  provide  ACER  and  national  regulatory  authorities  with 

information related to the capacity and use of facilities for production, storage, consumption 

or  transmission  of  electricity  or  natural  gas  or  related  to  the  capacity  and  use  of  LNG 

facilities,  including  planned  or  unplanned  unavailability  of  these  facilities,  and  with  inside 

information  publicly  disclosed  in  accordance  with  Article  4,  for  the  purpose  of  monitoring 

trading in wholesale energy markets. The reporting obligations on market participants shall be 

minimised by collecting the required information or parts thereof from existing sources where 

possible.”; 

[9] in Article 9, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: 

“1.  Market  participants  entering  into  transactions  which  are  required  to  be  reported  to 

ACER in accordance with Article 8(1) shall register with the national regulatory authority in 

the  Member  State  in  which  they  are  established  or  resident.  Market  participants  resident  or 

established  in  a  third  country  shall  declare  an  office  ,  in  a  Member  State  in  which  they  are 

active and register with the national regulatory authority of that Member State.”;  

[10] the following Article 9a is inserted: 

“Article 9a 

Authorisation and supervision of the Registered Reporting Mechanisms 

1. 

The  operation  of  an  RRM  shall  be  subject  to  prior  authorisation  by  the  Agency  in 
accordance with this Article.  

The Agency shall authorise parties as RRM where: 

(a) 

the RRM is a legal person established in the Union; and 

(b) 

the RRM meets the requirements laid down in this Article. 

The authorisation to operate as RRM shall be effective and valid for the entire territory 

of the Union, and shall allow the RRM provider to provide the services for which it 

has been authorised throughout the Union.  

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An  authorised  RRM  shall  comply  at  all  times  with  the  conditions  for  authorisation 

referred  to  in  this  Article.  An  authorised  RRM  shall,  without  undue  delay,  notify 

ACER of any material changes to the conditions for authorisation. 

The Agency shall establish a register of all RRMs in the Union. The register shall be 

publicly available and shall contain information on the services for which the RRM is 

authorised and it shall be updated on a regular basis. Where the Agency has withdrawn 

an authorisation of an RRM in accordance with paragraph 4, that withdrawal shall be 

published in the register for a period of five years from the date of withdrawal. 

2. 

3. 

The  Agency  shall  regularly  review  the  compliance  of  RRMs  with  this  Regulation. 
For this purpose, RRMs shall report on an annual  basis about  their activities to  the 
Agency. 

RRMs  shall  have  adequate  policies  and  arrangements  in  place  to  report  the 
information required under Article 8 as quickly as possible, and no later than within 
the  timing  laid  down  in  the  implementing  acts  adopted  pursuant  to  paragraph  5  of 
this Article.  

RRMs  shall  operate  and  maintain  effective  administrative  arrangements  designed  to 

prevent conflicts of interest with its clients. In particular, an RRM that is also an OMP 

or market participant shall treat all information collected in a non-discriminatory way 

and shall operate and maintain appropriate arrangements to separate different business 

functions. 

RRMs  shall  have  sound  security  mechanisms  in  place  designed  to  guarantee  the 

security and authentication of the means of transfer of information, minimise the risk 

of  data  corruption  and  unauthorised  access  and  to  prevent  information  leakage, 

maintaining  the  confidentiality  of  the  data  at  all  times.  The  RRM  shall  maintain 

adequate resources and have back-up facilities in place in order to offer and maintain 

its  services  at  according  to  the  timing  laid  down  in  the  implementing  acts  adopted 

pursuant to Article 8(2) and (6). 

RRMs  shall  have  systems  in  place  that  can  effectively  check  transaction  reports  for 

completeness, identify omissions and obvious errors caused by the market participant, 

and  where  such  error  or  omission  occurs,  to  communicate  details  of  the  error  or 

omission to the market participant and request re-transmission of any such erroneous 

reports. 

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RRMs  shall  have  systems  in  place  to  enable  the  RRM  to  detect  errors  or  omissions 

caused  by  the  RRM  itself  and  to  enable  the  RRM  to  correct  and  transmit,  or  re-

transmit as the case may be, correct and complete transaction reports to the Agency. 

4. 

The Agency may withdraw the authorisation of an RRM where RRM: 

(a) 

does not make use of the authorisation within 18 months, expressly renounces 
the authorisation or has provided no services for the preceding 18 months; 

(b)  obtained the authorisation by making false statements or by any other irregular 

means; 

(c) 

no longer meets the conditions under which it was authorised; 

(d)  has seriously and systematically infringed this Regulation. 

An  RRM  whose  authorisation  has  been  withdrawn  shall  ensure  orderly  substitution 

including the transfer of data to other RRMs and the redirection of reporting flows to 

other RRMs.  

The Agency shall, where relevant, without undue delay, notify the national competent 

authority in the Member State where the RRM is established of a decision to withdraw 

the authorisation of an RRM. 

5. 

The Commission shall by means of implementing acts specify : 

(a) 

(b) 

the  means  by  which  an  RRM  shall  comply  with  the  information  obligation 
referred to in paragraph 1; and  

the concrete organisational requirements for the implementation of paragraphs 
2 and 3. 

Those  implementing  acts  shall  be  adopted  in  accordance  with  the  examination 

procedure referred to in Article 21(2).”; 

[11] Article 10 is amended as follows: 

[a] paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: 

“1.  ACER  shall  establish  mechanisms  to  share  information  it  receives  in  accordance  with 

Article  7(1)  and  Article  8  with  the  Commission,  national  regulatory  authorities,  competent 

financial  market  authorities    national  competition  authorities,  ESMA  and  other  relevant 

authorities  at  Union  level.  Before  establishing  such  mechanisms,  ACER  shall  consult  with 

those authorities.”; 

[b] the following paragraph 1a is inserted: 

“(1a)  National  regulatory  authorities  shall  establish  mechanisms  to  share  information  they 

receive  in  accordance  with  Article  7(2)  and  Article  8  with  the  competent  financial  market 

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authorities, the national  competition  authorities, the national  tax authorities and EUROFISC 

and  other  relevant  authorities  at  national  level.  Before  establishing  such  mechanisms,  the 

national regulatory authority shall consult with the Agency and with those parties.”; 

[c] the following paragraph 2a is inserted: 

“2a.  National  regulatory  authorities  shall  give  access  to  the  mechanisms  referred  to  in 

paragraph  1a  of  this  Article  only  to  authorities  which  have  set  up  systems  enabling  the 

national regulatory authority to meet the requirements of Article 12(1).”; 

[13] Article 12 is amended as follows: 

[a] in paragraph 1, the second subparagraph is replaced by the following: 

“The  Commission,  national  regulatory  authorities,  competent  financial  authorities  of  the 

Member  States,  national  tax  authorities  and  EUROFISC,  national  competition  authorities, 

ESMA and other relevant authorities shall ensure the confidentiality, integrity and protection 

of  the  information  which  they  receive  pursuant  to  Article  4(2),  Article  7(2)  Article  8(5)  or 

Article 10 and shall take steps to prevent any misuse of such information including according 

to applicable data protection laws.”; 

[b] paragraph 2 is replaced by the following 

“2.  Subject  to  Article  17,  ACER  may  decide  to  make  publicly  available  parts  of  the 

information  which  it  possesses,  provided  that  commercially  sensitive  information  on 

individual  market  participants  or  individual  transactions  or  individual  market  places  are  not 

disclosed and cannot be inferred. ACER shall not be prevented from publishing information 

on organised market places, IIPs, RRMs according to applicable data protection laws.”; 

[14] Article 13 is amended as follows: 

[a] paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: 

“1.    National regulatory authorities shall ensure that the prohibitions set out in Articles 3 and 

5 and the obligations set out in Articles 4, 8, 9 and 15 are applied. 

National  regulatory  authorities  shall  be  competent  to  investigate  all  the  acts  carried  out  on 

their  national  wholesale  energy  markets  and  enforce  this  Regulation  thereto,  irrespective  of 

where  the  market  participant  registered  pursuant  to  Article  9(1)  carrying  out  those  acts  is 

resident or established.  

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Each Member State shall ensure that its national regulatory authorities have the investigatory 

and enforcement powers necessary for the exercise of that function . Those powers shall be 

exercised in a proportionate manner. 

Those powers may be exercised: 

(a) 

directly; 

(b) 

in collaboration with other authorities; or 

(c) 

by application to the competent judicial authorities. 

Where appropriate, the national regulatory authorities may exercise their investigatory powers 

in  collaboration  with  organised  markets, 

trade-matching  systems  or  other  persons 

professionally arranging or executing transactions as referred to in point (d) of Article 8(4).”; 

[b] the following paragraphs (3) to (9) are added: 

“3.  In  order  to  fight  against  breaches  of  the  provisions  of  this  Regulation,  to  support  and 

complement the enforcement activities of the national regulatory authorities, and to contribute 

to a uniform application of this Regulation throughout the Union, the Agency may carry out 

investigations by exercising the powers conferred onto it by and in accordance with Articles 

13a and 13b.  

4. The Agency may exercise its powers to ensure that the prohibitions set out in Article 3 and 

Article 5 and the obligations set out in Article 4 are applied where:  

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

acts  are  being  or  have  been  carried  out  on  wholesale  energy  products  for 
delivery in at least three Member States; or 

acts are being or have been carried on wholesale energy products for  delivery 
in  at  least  two Member States  and at  least  one of the natural  or legal  persons 
who  is  carrying  or  carried  out  these  acts  is  resident  or  established  in  a  third 
country but registered pursuant to Article 9(1); or 

the  competent  national  regulatory  authority,  without  prejudice 
the 
derogations  referred  to  in  Article  16(5),  does  not  immediately  take  the 
necessary  measures    in  order  to  comply  with  the    request  from  the  Agency 
referred to in  Article 16(4)(b); or 

to 

the relevant information as defined in Article 2(1) of this Regulation is likely to 
significantly  affect  the  prices  of  wholesale  energy  products  for  delivery  in  at 
least three Member States. 

5. The Agency may exercise its powers to ensure that the obligations set out in Article 15 are 

met  where  the  persons  are  professionally  arranging  or  executing  transactions  on  wholesale 

energy products for delivery in at least three Member States. 

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6. In exercising its powers, the Agency shall take into account the investigations in progress 

or already carried out in respect of the same cases by a national regulatory authority pursuant 

to this Regulation as well as the cross-border impact of the investigation. 

7.  Upon  completion  of  its  actions  taken  to  exercise  its  powers  pursuant  to  paragraph  4,  the 

Agency  shall  draw  up  a  report.  The  report  shall  be  made  public  taking  into  account 

confidentiality  requirements.  If  the  Agency  concludes  that  a  breach  of  this  Regulation  took 

place,  it  shall  inform  the  national  regulatory  authorities  of  the  Member  State  or  Member 

States  concerned  accordingly  and  require  that  the  breach  be  dealt  with  in  accordance  with 

Articles 18. The Agency may recommend certain follow-up to the relevant national regulatory 

authorities, and, where necessary, inform the Commission.”;  

[15] The following articles 13a to 13d are inserted: 

“Article 13a  

On-site inspections by the Agency 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

The Agency shall prepare and conduct on-site inspections in close cooperation with 
the relevant authorities of the Member State concerned. 

In order to  fulfil  its  obligations  under this  Regulation,  the  Agency may  conduct  all 
necessary  on-site  inspections  at  any  premises  of  the  persons  subject  to  the 
investigation. Where the proper conduct and efficiency of the inspection so require, 
the Agency may carry out that on-site inspection without prior announcement.  

The  officials  of  and  other  persons  authorised  by  the  Agency  to  conduct  an  on-site 
inspection may enter any premises of the persons subject to an investigation decision 
adopted by the Agency pursuant to paragraph 6 and shall have all the powers referred 
in  this  Article.  They  shall  also  have  the  power  to  seal  any  premises,  property  and 
books or records for the period of, and to the extent necessary for the inspection.  

In  sufficient  time  before  the  inspection,  the  Agency  shall  give  notice  of  the 
inspection to the national regulatory authority and other concerned authorities of the 
Member State where the inspection is to be conducted. Inspections under this Article 
shall be conducted provided that the relevant authority has confirmed that it does not 
object to those inspections.  

The  officials  of  and  other  persons  authorised  by  the  Agency  to  conduct  an  on-site 
inspection  shall  exercise  their  powers  upon  production  of  a  written  authorisation 
specifying the subject matter and purpose of the inspection.  

The persons referred in this Article  shall submit to on-site inspections ordered by a 
decision that shall be adopted by the Agency. The decision shall specify the subject 
matter  and  purpose  of  the  inspection,  appoint  the  date  on  which  it  is  to  begin,  the 
legal remedies available under Regulation (EU) 2019/942 as well as the right to have 
the decision reviewed by the Court of Justice. The Agency shall consult the national 
regulatory  authority  of  the  Member  State  where  the  inspection  is  to  be  conducted 
prior to adopting such decision. 

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7. 

8. 

9. 

Officials  of,  as  well  as  those  authorised  or  appointed  by,  the  national  regulatory 
authority of the Member State where the inspection is  to  be conducted shall, at  the 
request of the Agency, actively assist the officials of and other persons authorised by 
the Agency. To that end they shall enjoy the powers set out in this Article . Officials 
of  the  national  regulatory  authority  may  also  attend  the  on-site  inspection  upon 
request.  

Where the officials of, as well as those authorised or appointed by, the Agency find 
that  a  person  opposes  an  inspection  ordered  pursuant  to  this  Article,  the  national 
regulatory  authority  of  the  Member  State  concerned  shall  afford  them,  or  other 
relevant  national  regulatory  authorities,  the  necessary  assistance,  requesting,  where 
appropriate, the assistance of the police or of an equivalent enforcement authority, to 
enable them to conduct their on-site inspection.  

If the on-site inspection provided for in paragraph 1 or the assistance provided for in 
paragraphs  7  and  8  requires  authorisation  by  a  judicial  authority  according  to 
applicable  national  law,  the  Agency  shall  also  apply  for  such  authorisation.  The 
Agency may also apply for such authorisation as a precautionary measure.  

10. 

Where  the  Agency  applies  for  an  authorisation  as  referred  to  in  paragraph  9,  the 
national judicial authority shall verify: 

(a) 

(b) 

that the decision of the Agency is authentic; and 

that any measures to be taken are proportionate and not arbitrary or excessive 
having regard to the subject matter of the inspection.  

For the purposes of point (b) of the first subparagraph, the national judicial authority 

may ask the Agency for detailed explanations, in particular relating to the grounds the 

Agency  has for suspecting that a breach referred to  in Article 13(3) has  taken place, 

the  seriousness  of  the  suspected  breach  and  the  nature  of  the  involvement  of  the 

person  subject  to  the  investigation.  By  way  of  derogation  from  Article  28  of 

Regulation (EU) 2019/942, the Agency’s decision shall be subject to review only by 

the Court of Justice. 

Article 13b 

Request for information 

1. 

At the Agency’s request any person shall provide to it the information necessary for 
the  purpose  of  fulfilling  the  Agency’s  obligations  under  this  Regulation.    In  its 
request the Agency shall: 

(a) 

refer to this Article as the legal basis for the request; 

(b) 

state the purpose of the request; 

(c) 

(d) 

specify what information is required, and following which data format; 

set a time-limit, proportionate to the request, within which the information is to 
be provided; 

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2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

(e) 

inform  the  person  that  the  reply  to  the  request  for  information  shall  not  be 
incorrect or misleading.    

For  the  purpose  of  information  requests  as  referred  to  in  paragraph  1,  the  Agency 
shall  have  the  power  to  issue  decisions.  In  such  a  decision  the  Agency  shall,  in 
addition to the requirements in paragraph 1 indicate the right to appeal the decision 
before the Agency’s Board of Appeal and to have the decision reviewed by the Court 
of Justice in accordance with Articles 28 and 29 of Regulation (EU) 2019/942. 

The  persons  referred  to  in  paragraph  1  or  their  representatives  shall  supply  the 
information  requested.  The  persons  shall  be  fully  responsible  that  the  supplied 
information is complete, correct and not misleading.  

Where the officials of, as well as those authorised or appointed by, the Agency find 
that  a  person  refuses  to  supply  the  information  requested,  the  national  regulatory 
authority of the Member State concerned shall afford them, or other relevant national 
regulatory  authorities,  the  necessary  assistance  in  ensuring  the  fulfilment  of  the 
obligation referred to in paragraph 3, including through the imposition of penalties in 
accordance with applicable national law.  

Where the officials of, as well as those authorised or appointed by, the Agency find 
that  a  person  refuses  to  supply  the  information  requested,  the  Agency  may  draw 
conclusions on the basis of available information. 

The Agency shall, without delay, send a copy of the request pursuant to paragraph 1 
or the decision  pursuant  to  paragraph 2  to  the national  regulatory authorities of the 
concerned Member States.   

Article 13c 

Procedural guarantees  

1. 

The Agency shall carry out on-site inspections and request information in full respect 
of the procedural guarantees of market participants, including:  

(a) 

the right not to make self-incriminating statements; 

(b) 

the right to be assisted by a person of choice;  

(c) 

the right to use any of the official languages of the Member State where the on-
site inspection takes place;  

(d) 

the right to comment on facts concerning them; 

(e) 

the right  to  receive a copy of the record of interview and either approve it or 
add observations.  

The Agency shall seek evidence for and against the market participant, and carry out 
on-site  inspections  and  request  information  objectively  and  impartially  and  in 
accordance with the principle of the presumption of innocence.  

The Agency shall carry out on-site inspections and request information in full respect 
of applicable confidentiality and Union data protection rules. 

Article 13d  

Mutual assistance 

In  order  to  ensure  compliance  with  the  relevant  requirements  set  out  in  this 
Regulation, national regulatory authorities and the Agency shall assist each other.”;  

2. 

3. 

1. 

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[15] Article 15 is amended as follows: 

Obligations of persons professionally arranging or executing transactions 

“Article 15 

Any person professionally arranging  or executing transactions in  wholesale energy products 

who reasonably suspects that an order to trade or a transaction, including any cancellation or 

modification thereof, might breach Article 3, 4 or 5 shall notify the Agency and the relevant 

national regulatory authority without further delay. 

Persons professionally arranging or executing transactions in wholesale energy products shall 

establish and maintain effective arrangements and procedures to: 

(a) 

 identify breaches of Article 3, 4 or 5 ; 

(b) 

guarantee that their employees carrying out  surveillance  activities for the purpose of 

this Article are preserved from any conflict of interest and act in an independent manner.”; 

[16] Article 16 is amended as follows: 

[a] in paragraph 1, the fourth sub-paragraph is replaced by the following: 

“National  regulatory  authorities,  competent  financial  authorities  ,  the  national  competition 

authority and the national tax authority in a Member State may establish appropriate forms of 

cooperation  in  order  to  ensure  effective  and  efficient  investigation  and  enforcement  and  to 

contribute to a coherent and consistent approach to investigation, judicial proceedings and to 

the enforcement of this Regulation and relevant financial and competition law.”; 

[b] in paragraph 2, the following third subparagraph is added: 

“No  later  than  30  days  before  adopting  a  final  decision  on  a  breach  of  this  Regulation, 

national regulatory authorities shall inform the Agency and provide it with a summary of the 

case  and  the  envisaged  decision.  The  Agency  shall  maintain  a  public  list  of  such  decisions 

under this Regulation, including the date of the decision, the name of the persons sanctioned, 

the Article of this Regulation that has been breached and the sanction applied. For the purpose 

of  that  publication,  national  regulatory  authorities  shall  provide  this  information  to  the 

Agency within seven days of the issuance of the decision.”; 

[c] in paragraph 3, the following point (e) is added: 

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“(e) the Agency and the national regulatory authorities shall inform the competent national tax 

authorities and EUROFISC where they have reasonable grounds to suspect that acts are being, 

or  have  been,  carried  out  on  wholesale  energy  market  which  are  likely  to  constitute  a  tax 

fraud.”; 

[16] the following Articles 16a and 16b are inserted: 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

“Article 16a 

Delegation of tasks and responsibilities 

National regulatory authorities may, with the consent of the delegate, delegate tasks 
and responsibilities to other national regulatory authorities subject to the conditions 
set  out  in  this  Article.  Member  States  may  set  out  specific  arrangements  regarding 
the delegation of responsibilities that have to be complied with before their national 
regulatory authorities enter into such delegation agreements and may limit the scope 
of delegation to what is necessary for the effective supervision of market participants 
or groups.  

The national regulatory authorities shall inform the Agency of delegation agreements 
into  which  they  intend  to  enter.  They  shall  put  the  agreements  into  effect  at  the 
earliest one month after informing the Agency.  

The Agency  may  give an opinion on the intended  delegation  agreement  within one 
month of being informed.  

The  Agency  shall  publish,  by  appropriate  means,  any  delegation  agreement  as 
concluded  by  the  national  regulatory  authorities,  in  order  to  ensure  that  all  parties 
concerned are informed appropriately. 

Article 16b 

Guidelines and recommendations 

The  Agency  shall,  with  a  view  to  establish  consistent,  efficient  and  effective 
supervisory  practices  within  the  Union,  and  to  ensure  the  common,  uniform  and 
consistent  application  of  Union  law,  issue  guidelines  and  recommendations 
addressed  to  all  national  regulatory  authorities  or  all  market  participants  and  issue 
recommendations  to  one  or  more  national  regulatory  authorities  or  to  one  or  more 
market participants on the application of Articles 4a, 8 and 9a.  

The  Agency  shall,  where  appropriate,  conduct  public  consultations  regarding  the 
guidelines  and  recommendations  which  it  issues  and  analyse  the  related  potential 
costs  and  benefits  of  issuing  such  guidelines  and  recommendations.  Those 
consultations and analyses shall be proportionate to the scope, nature and impact of 
the guidelines or recommendations. 

The national regulatory authorities and market participants shall make every effort to 
comply with those guidelines and recommendations. 

Within two months of the issuance of a guideline or recommendation, each national 
regulatory authority shall confirm whether it complies or intends to comply with that 
guideline or recommendation.  If a national regulatory authority does not comply or 
does not intend to comply, it shall inform the Agency, stating its reasons. 

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5. 

6. 

7. 

The  Agency  shall  publish  the  information  that  a  national  regulatory  authority  does 
not comply or does not intend to comply with that guideline or recommendation. The 
Agency  may also  decide to  publish the reasons  provided by the  national  regulatory 
authority  for  not  complying  with  that  guideline  or  recommendation.  The  national 
regulatory authority shall receive advanced notice of such publication. 

If required by that guideline or recommendation, market participants shall report, in a 
clear and detailed way, whether they comply with that guideline or recommendation. 

The Agency shall include  the  guidelines and recommendations  that  it has issued in 
the report referred to in Article 19(1)(k) of Regulation (EU) 2019/942.”; 

[18] in Article 17, paragraph 3 is replaced by the following: 

“3.   Confidential information received by the persons referred to in paragraph 2 in the course 

of  their  duties  may  not  be  divulged  to  any  other  person  or  authority,  except  in  summary  or 

aggregate  form  such  that  an  individual  market  participant  cannot  be  identified,  without 

prejudice  to  cases  covered  by  criminal  law,  the  other  provisions  of  this Regulation  or  other 

relevant Union legislation.”; 

[19] Article 18 is replaced by the following: 

“1. The Member  States  shall lay  down the rules on penalties applicable  to  infringements  of 

this Regulation and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. The 

penalties provided for must  be effective, dissuasive and proportionate, reflecting the nature, 

duration  and  seriousness  of  the  infringement,  the  damage  caused  to  consumers  and  the 

potential gains from trading on the basis of inside information and market manipulation. 

Without  prejudice  to  any  criminal  sanctions  and  supervisory  powers  of  national  regulatory 

authorities  under  Article  13,  Member  States  shall,  in  accordance  with  national  law,  provide 

for  national  regulatory  authorities  to  have  the  power  to  adopt  appropriate  administrative 

sanctions  and  other  administrative  measures  in  relation  to  the  breaches  of  this  Regulation 

referred to in Article 13(1). 

The  Member  States  shall  notify,  in  detail,  those  provisions  to  the  Commission  and  to  the 

Agency and shall notify it without delay of any subsequent amendment affecting them. 

2.  Member  States  shall,  in  accordance  with  national  law,  and  the  ne  bis  in  idem  principle, 

ensure that the national regulatory authorities have the power to impose at least the following 

administrative sanctions and administrative measures relating to breaches of the provisions of 

this Regulation:  

(a) 

adopt a decision requiring the person to bring the breach to an end; 

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(b) 

the  disgorgement  of  the  profits  gained  or  losses  avoided  due  to  the  breaches 
insofar as they can be determined;  

(c) 

issue public warnings or notices; 

(d) 

adopt a decision imposing periodic penalty payments; 

(e) 

adopt a decision imposing administrative pecuniary sanctions;  

in respect of legal persons, maximum administrative pecuniary sanctions of at least: 

for  breaches  of  Articles  3  and  5,  15%  of  the  total  turnover  in  the 

i. 
preceding business year; 

for  breaches  of  Article  4  and  15,  2%  of  the  total  turnover  in  the 

ii. 
preceding business year; 

for  breaches  of  Article  8  and  9,  1%  of  the  total  turnover  in  the 

iii. 
preceding business year. 

in respect of natural persons, maximum administrative pecuniary sanctions of at 

least: 

i. 

ii. 

iii. 

for breaches of Articles 3 and 5, EUR 5 000 000; 

for breaches of Article 4 and 15, EUR 1 000 000; 

for breaches of Article 8 and 9, EUR 500 000. 

Notwithstanding paragraphs (e), the amount of the fine shall not exceed 20 % of the 

annual  turnover  of  the  legal  person  concerned  in  the  preceding  business  year.  In  the 

case  of  natural  persons,  the  amount  of  the  fine  shall  not  exceed  20  %  of  the  yearly 

income  in  the  preceding  calendar  year.  Where  the  person  has  directly  or  indirectly 

benefited financially from the breach, the amount of the fine shall be at least equal to 

that benefit.   

3. Member States shall ensure that the national regulatory authority may disclose to the public 

measures  or  penalties  imposed  for  infringement  of  this  Regulation  unless  such  disclosure 

would cause disproportionate damage to the parties involved.”; 

Article 2 

Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2019/942 

Regulation (EU) 2019/942  is amended as follows: 

[1] in Article 6, paragraph 8 is deleted. 

[2] in Article 12, point (c) is replaced by the following: 

(c) Pursue and coordinate investigations pursuant to  Articles 13, 13a, 13b  and Article 16 of 

Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011. 

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[3] in Article 32, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: 

“1.  Fees  shall  be  due  to  ACER  for  collecting,  handling,  processing  and  analysing  of 

information reported by market participants or by entities reporting on their behalf pursuant to 

Article 8 of Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 and for disclosing inside information pursuant to 

Articles  4  and  4a  of  Regulation  (EU)  No  1227/2011.  The  fees  shall  be  paid  by  registered 

reporting mechanisms and inside information platforms. Revenues from those fees may also 

cover the costs of ACER for exercising the supervision and investigation powers pursuant to 

Articles 13, 13a, 13b and Article 16 Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011.”. 

Article 3 

Amendments to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1348/2014  

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1348/2014 is amended as follows: 

[1] Article 7a is added: 

“Article 7a 

LNG market data quality 

1. 

LNG market data shall include: 

(a) 

the parties to the contract, including buy/sell indicator; 

(b) 

the reporting party; 

(c) 

the transaction price; 

(d) 

the contract quantities; 

(e) 

(f) 

(g) 

(h) 

(i) 

the value of the contract; 

the arrival window for the LNG cargo; 

the terms of delivery; 

the delivery points; 

the timestamp information on all of the following: 

(i)  

the date and time of placing the bid or offer; 

(ii)  

the transaction date and time; 

(iii)  

the date and time of reporting of the bid, offer or transaction; 

(iv)  

the receipt of LNG market data by ACER. 

2. 

LNG  market  participants  shall  provide  ACER  with  LNG  market  data  in  the 
following units and currencies: 

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(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

transaction, bid and offer unit prices shall be reported in the currency specified 
in  the  contract  and  in  EUR/MWh  and  shall  include  applied  conversion  and 
exchange rates if applicable; 

contract quantities shall be reported in the units specified in the contracts and 
in MWh; 

arrival windows shall be reported in terms of delivery dates expressed in UTC 
format; 

(d)  delivery point shall indicate a valid identifier listed by ACER such as referred 
to in the list of LNG facilities subject to reporting pursuant to Regulation (EU) 
No  1227/2011  and  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  No  1348/2014;  the 
timestamp  information  shall  be  reported  in  UTC  format;  (to  be  replaced  with 
cross-references as appropriate) 

(e) 

if relevant, the price formula in the long-term contract from which the price is 
derived shall be reported in its integrity.  

3. 

ACER  shall  issue  guidance  regarding  the  criteria  under  which  a  single  submitter 
accounts  for  a  significant  portion  of  LNG  market  data  submitted  within  a  certain 
reference  period  and  how  this  situation  shall  be  addressed  in  its  daily  LNG  price 
assessment and LNG benchmarks.”. 

Article 4 

Entry into force  

This Regulation shall enter into force on the  twentieth day following that of its publication in 
the Official Journal of the European Union. 

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. 

Done at Strasbourg, 

For the European Parliament 
The President 

For the Council 
The President 

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LEGISLATIVE FINANCIAL STATEMENT 'AGENCIES' 

FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE 

Title of the proposal/initiative 

Policy area(s) concerned 

The proposal/initiative relates to: 

Objective(s) 

1. 

1.1. 

1.2. 

1.3. 

1.4. 

1.4.1.  General objective(s) 

1.4.2. 

Specific objective(s) 

1.4.3.  Expected result(s) and impact 

1.4.4. 

Indicators of performance 

1.5. 

Grounds for the proposal/initiative 

1.5.1.  Requirement(s) to be met in the short or long term including a detailed timeline for roll-out of 

the implementation of the initiative 

1.5.2.  Added  value  of  Union  involvement  (it  may  result  from  different  factors,  e.g.  coordination 
gains,  legal  certainty,  greater  effectiveness  or  complementarities).  For  the  purposes  of  this 
point 'added value of Union involvement' is the value resulting from Union intervention, which 
is additional to the value that would have been otherwise created by Member States alone. 

1.5.3.  Lessons learned from similar experiences in the past 

1.5.4.  Compatibility  with  the  Multiannual  Financial  Framework  and  possible  synergies  with  other 

appropriate instruments 

1.5.5.  Assessment of the different available financing options, including scope for redeployment 

1.6. 

Duration and financial impact of the proposal/initiative 

1.7.  Method(s) of budget implementation planned 

2. 

MANAGEMENT MEASURES 

2.1.  Monitoring and reporting rules 

2.2.  Management and control system(s) 

2.2.1. 

2.2.2. 

Justification  of  the  management  mode(s),  the  funding  implementation  mechanism(s),  the 
payment modalities and the control strategy proposed 

Information  concerning  the  risks  identified  and  the  internal  control  system(s)  set  up  to 
mitigate them 

2.2.3.  Estimation and justification of the cost-effectiveness of the controls (ratio of "control costs ÷ 
value of the related funds managed"), and assessment of the expected levels of risk of error (at 
payment & at closure) 

2.3.  Measures to prevent fraud and irregularities 

3. 

ESTIMATED FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE 

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3.1. 

Heading(s)  of  the  multiannual  financial  framework  and  expenditure  budget  line(s) 
affected 

3.2. 

Estimated financial impact of the proposal on appropriations 

3.2.1. 

Summary of estimated impact on operational appropriations 

3.2.2.  Estimated output funded with operational appropriations 

3.2.3. 

Summary of estimated impact on administrative appropriations 

3.2.3.1.  Estimated requirements of human resources 

3.2.4.  Compatibility with the current multiannual financial framework 

3.2.5.  Third-party contributions 

3.3. 

Estimated impact on revenue 

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LEGISLATIVE FINANCIAL STATEMENT 'AGENCIES' 

1. 

FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE  

1.1. 

Title of the proposal/initiative 

Regulation  (EU)  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  amending  Regulation  (EU) 
No 1227/2011 and Regulation (EU) 2019/942 to improve the EU’s protection against market 
manipulation. 

1.2. 

Policy area(s) concerned 

Policy area: Energy 

Activity: European Green Deal 

1.3. 

The proposal relates to  

X a new action  
 a new action following a pilot project/preparatory action18  

X the extension of an existing action  

 a merger of one or more actions towards another/a new action  

1.4. 

Objective(s) 

1.4.1.  General objective(s)  

See explanatory memorandum 

1.4.2. 

Specific objective(s)  

See section “Grounds for the proposal initiative” below 

18 

As referred to in Article 58(2)(a) or (b) of the Financial Regulation. 

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1.4.3.  Expected result(s) and impact 

Specify the effects which the proposal/initiative should have on the beneficiaries/groups targeted. 

The additional resources will allow ACER and DG Energy to carry out the tasks necessary to fulfil 
their mandate under EU legislation as per the requirements under this proposal. 

1.4.4. 

Indicators of performance  

Specify the indicators for monitoring progress and achievements. 

See  explanatory  memorandum  as  regards  monitoring  progress  and  achievements  of  the 
initiative. 

(a)  Effectiveness  and  timeliness:  indicators  should  allow  to  monitor  performance  by 
providing  information  on  progress  on  a  regular  basis  and  on  achievements  along  the 
programming period. 

(b)  Efficiency:  processes  should  be  optimised  for  collection  and  processing  of  data, 

avoiding unnecessary or duplicative requests for information. 

(c)  Relevance of the indicators and the need to limit the associated administrative burden. 

(d)  Clarity:  indicators  should  be  delivered  in  a  clear  and  understandable  form,  with 
supporting metadata and in a form that facilitates proper interpretation and meaningful 
communication. 

1.5. 

Grounds for the proposal/initiative  

1.5.1.  Requirement(s) to be met in the short or long term including a detailed timeline for roll-out of 

the implementation of the initiative 

ACER  

Specific objective 1: Authorisation and supervisory powers over registered reporting mechanisms and 
platforms for the disclosure of inside information  

Under  this  legislative  proposal,  ACER  will  be  in  charge  of  authorizing  and  supervising  Inside 
Information  Platforms  (IIPs)  and  Registered  Reporting  Mechanisms  (RRMs)  which  goes  beyond  the 
current registration of these entities. 

The  supervisory  duties  would  consist  of  authorisation  of  IIPs  and  RRMs  and  day-to-day  supervision 
and  would  thus  be  aligned  with  ESMA’s  supervisory  powers  over  trade  repositories,  approved 
reporting  mechanisms  and  other  data  reporting  services.  ACER  will  also  have  direct  investigative 
powers  vis-a-vis  IIPs  and  RRMs  and  receives  additional  powers  for  issuing  guidelines  and 
recommendations to better clarify the perimeter of the data collection. 

IIPs  and RRMs  are  relatively new structures, and the number of  registrations is  expected to  be high. 
Given the large number of RRMs (104 as per 1 January 2023) and IIPs (19 as per 1 January 2023) and 
following the new legal framework, ACER will need to increase its supervisory efforts for the above-
mentioned new supervisory activities. Therefore, the Agency shall hire additional specialised staff for 

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the supervision of these entities. Those needs in term of human resources can be estimated at 5 FTEs 
(including 1 IT expert for running the respective business IT systems and their cyber security). 

Specific objective 2: Centralisation of collection of STORs at EU level at ACER and monitoring EU 
wide PPAETs at ACER  

The  current  Article  15  of  REMIT  led  to  a  decentralisation  of  knowledge  of  potential  situations  of 
market abuse across the EU as NRAs are not obliged to  share suspicious  transaction or order reports 
(STORs) that they receive under Article 15 with other NRAs nor with ACER (although some of them 
do).  At  the  same  time,  it  has  not  enabled  the  surveillance  team  from  ACER  to  benefit  from  the 
knowledge included in these STORs for the benefit of developing an EU wide monitoring strategy. 

The  proposed  REMIT  amendments  will  attribute  to  ACER  the  collection  of  all  STORs  from  all 
PPAETs across Europe (ACER as a central hub). 

In order to  calculate the  human resources necessary  for this activity, ACER estimated the number of 
STORs to be received from 2024 until 2026, departing from the number of STORs that it is aware for 
the year of 2022 (mostly STORs that are included in cases notified to the Agency), and correcting it by 
the additional scope of Article 15 (now also including suspicious breaches of Article 4 and all STORs). 
ACER estimated that the number of STORs would growth at 2/3 the yearly growth that was observed 
in the past 6 years.  The number of STORs to be received by ACER was then estimated at 236 in 2024, 
248 in 2025 and 260 in 2026. 

In order to fulfil the subtasks associated with this activity, ACER foresees the need to have 2 additional 
FTEs. 

As  regards  PPAETs,  ACER  will  have  the  responsibility  to  verify  whether  PPAETs  that  operate  EU 
wide  (i.e.,  offering  products  for  three  or  more  delivery  zones  in  different  member  states)  maintain 
effective arrangements and procedures to identify breaches of Articles 3, 4 and 5 of REMIT. 

In order to  calculate the  human resources necessary  for this activity, ACER estimated the number of 
PPAETs  that  ACER  would  be  monitoring  from  2025  until  2027.  ACER  departed  from  the  list  of 
current  PPAETs  and  identified  the  ones  that  fulfil  the  criteria  included  in  the  new  Article  15  (i.e., 
PPAETs arranging or executing transactions in at least three Member States). ACER expects then to be 
monitoring 34 PPAETs (i.e., less than 30% of the total number of PPAETs). 

In order to fulfil the subtasks associated with this activity (PPAET audits and PPAET coordination), it 
is estimated that 1 additional FTE is needed. 

Specific objective 3: ACER complementary powers to investigate and to enforce potential breaches of 
REMIT  

REMIT  is  amended  so  that  ACER,  under  specific  circumstances  (at  least  three  products  delivered  in 
different Member States are affected; or two or more products delivered in different Member States are 
affected  and  the  legal  or  natural  person  carrying  out  the  acts  is  registered  or  established  in  a  third 
Member State or outside the EU), can ensure that the prohibitions set out in Article 3 and Article 5 and 
the obligations set out in Article 4 are applied. 

These powers will result in a new set of tasks  for the Agency, including all the procedural tasks related 
to  the  investigation  opening,  information  gathering  (processing  of  requests  of  information,  oral 
hearings,  and  organisation  of  inspections,  …),  information  analysis,  and  preliminary  conclusions  on 
infringements (reports).  

At the end of 2022, there were 13 cases in stock  that would fulfil this criteria (around 3.7% of the total 
stock of cases), 9 of which notified in 2022. The annual growth rate of the number of new cases that 
would  follow  under  ACER  jurisdiction  for  the  period  2024  to  2026  was  estimated  at  13.  6%/year, 

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which  corresponds  to  two  thirds  of  the  annual  growth  rate  observed  between  2017  and  2022  for  the 
same type of cases. Based on these assumptions, the stock of cases that would be ACER jurisdictional 
can then be estimated as 19 in 2024, 21 in 2025, and 24 in 2026. At the same time, ACER will also 
have  the  discretion  to  investigate  the  most  significant  cases  among  those  that  fulfil  the  criteria 
mentioned above.  

Using experience with similar tasks performed by DG COMP, in order to fulfil the subtasks associated 
with this activity it is estimated that ACER needs 11 additional FTE. 

Taking into account possible difficulties in recruiting qualified staff, the in total 19 additional FTE will 
be phased in from 2025 to 2027. 

Overhead  

Those additional FTE as described above do not include overhead. Applying an overhead ratio of 30%, 
this  means  additional  6  FTE,  which  should  take  the  form  of  3  ASTs  and  3  AST/SCs  preferably  to  
replace  interim  staff.  Those  additional  FTE  are  inter  alia  needed  for  recruiting  the  additional  staff, 
hence they are needed from 2025 onwards. 

ENER  

Currently less than 0.5 FTE work on REMIT in DG Energy. Given the more prominent role of REMIT 
against the background of the current energy crisis, workload in ENER has increased, hence around 2 
FTE are needed. 

1.5.2.  Added  value  of  Union  involvement  (it  may  result  from  different  factors,  e.g.  coordination 
gains,  legal  certainty,  greater  effectiveness  or  complementarities).  For  the  purposes  of  this 
point 'added value of Union involvement' is the value resulting from Union intervention which 
is additional to the value that would have been otherwise created by Member States alone. 

See explanatory memorandum  

1.5.3.  Lessons learned from similar experiences in the past 

The experience with previous legislative proposals has shown that staffing needs of ACER are 
easily  underestimated.  In  order  to  avoid  a  repeat  of  the  experience  with  the  third  internal 
market  package  of  2009,  where  underestimating  the  staffing  needs  resulted  in  structural 
understaffing  (only  comprehensively  solved  starting  with  the  EU  budget  for  2022),  for  this 
proposal staffing needs are estimated for several years into the future.  

1.5.4.  Compatibility  with  the  Multiannual  Financial  Framework  and  possible  synergies  with  other 

appropriate instruments 

This  initiative  is  included  in  the  Commission  Work  Programme  for  2023  as  part  of  the 
European Green Deal. 

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1.5.5.  Assessment of the different available financing options, including scope for redeployment 

The  FTE  are  needed  for  additional  tasks  while  existing  tasks  will  not  decrease  in  the 
foreseeable  future.  The  proposal  also  provides  for  extending  permanently  ACER’s  power 
related  to  the  implementation  of  the  LNG  benchmark  (5  FTE  under  the  LFS  accompanying 
Commission proposal COM(2022)549 of 18.10.2022). 

As  far  as  legally  possible,  additional  FTE  will  be  financed  by  the  existing  fee  scheme  for 
ACER’s tasks under REMIT. To this end the proposal extends ACER’s fee raising powers to 
the  newly  introduced  inside  information  platforms  and  clarifies  that  also  costs  for  ACER 
exercising  its  enhanced  investigation  and  enforcement  powers  shall  be  eligible  for  being 
funded by fees. The deletion of the current point (a) of Article 32(1) does not reduce ACER’s 
revenues,  since  so  far  no  use  has  been  made  of  this  clause,  since  due  to  the  low  number  of 
cases  the  administrative  costs  of  setting  up  and  implementing  a  fee  scheme  would  be 
disproportionate. 
Subject  to  the revision of the fees decision19, it is estimated that around  2/3  of the additional 
FTEs would be covered by fees.  

19  Commission  Decision  (EU)  2020/2152  of  17  December  2020  on  fees  due  to  the  European  Union  Agency  for  the 
Cooperation  of  Energy  Regulators  for  collecting,  handling,  processing  and  analysing  of  information  reported  under 
Regulation (EU) 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and the Council. 

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1.6. 

Duration and financial impact of the proposal/initiative 

 limited duration  

 Proposal/initiative in effect from [DD/MM]YYYY to [DD/MM]YYYY  

 Financial impact from YYYY to YYYY 

X unlimited duration 

Implementation with a start-up period from YYYY to YYYY, 

followed by full-scale operation. 

1.7.  Method(s) of budget implementation planned20  

X Direct management by the Commission through 

 executive agencies  

 Shared management with the Member States  

X Indirect management by entrusting budget implementation tasks to: 

 international organisations and their agencies (to be specified); 

the EIB and the European Investment Fund; 

X bodies referred to in Articles 70 and 71; 

 public law bodies; 

  bodies  governed  by  private  law  with  a  public  service  mission  to  the  extent  that  they  are 
provided with adequate financial guarantees; 

  bodies  governed  by  the  private  law  of  a  Member  State  that  are  entrusted  with  the 
implementation  of a public-private partnership and that are provided with  adequate financial 
guarantees; 

  bodies  or  persons  entrusted  with  the  implementation  of  specific  actions  in  the  CFSP 
pursuant to Title V of the TEU, and identified in the relevant basic act. 

Comments 

20 

Details  of  budget  implementation  methods  and  references  to  the  Financial  Regulation  may  be  found  on  the 
https://myintracomm.ec.europa.eu/corp/budget/financial-rules/budget-
BUDGpedia 
implementation/Pages/implementation-methods.aspx 

site: 

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2. 

MANAGEMENT MEASURES  

2.1.  Monitoring and reporting rules  

Specify frequency and conditions. 

According to its financial regulation, ACER has to provide, in the context of its Programming 
Document,  an  annual  Work  Programme  including  details  on  resources,  both  financial  and 
human, per each of the activities carried out. 

ACER  reports  monthly  to  DG  ENER  on  budget  execution,  including  commitments,  and 
payments by budget title, and vacancy rates by type of staff. 

In addition, DG ENER is directly represented in the governance bodies of ACER. Through its 
representatives  in  the  Administrative  Board,  DG  ENER  will  be  informed  of  the  use  of  the 
budget and the establishment plan at each of its meetings during the year. 

Finally, also in line with financial rules, ACER is subject to annual requirements for reporting 
on  activities  and  the  use  of  resources  through  the  Administrative  Board  and  its  Annual 
Activity Report. 

The  tasks  directly  implemented  by  DG  ENER  will  follow  the  annual  cycle  of  planning  and 
monitoring,  as  implemented  in  the  Commission  and  the  executive  agencies,  including 
reporting the results through the Annual Activity Report of DG ENER. 

2.2.  Management and control system(s)  

2.2.1. 

Justification  of  the  management  mode(s),  the  funding  implementation  mechanism(s),  the 
payment modalities and the control strategy proposed 

While  ACER  will  have  to  develop  new  expertise,  it  is  nevertheless  most  cost-effective  to 
allocate  the  new  tasks  under  this  proposal  to  an  existing  agency  which  already  works  on 
similar tasks. 

DG  ENER  established  a  control  strategy  for  managing  its  relations  with  ACER,  part  of  the 
2017  Internal  Control  Framework  of  the  Commission.  ACER  revised  and  adopted  its  own 
Internal Control Framework in December 2018. 

2.2.2. 

Information  concerning  the  risks  identified  and  the  internal  control  system(s)  set  up  to 
mitigate them 

Main risk are wrong estimates as regards the workload created by this proposal, given that it 
introduces  new  tasks.  This  risk  needs  to  be  accepted,  since,  as  experience  has  shown,  if 
additional resources needs are not included in the initial proposal, it is very difficult to remedy 
this situation later on. 

That the proposal includes several new tasks mitigates this risk, since while the workload of 
some future tasks may be underestimated, others may be overestimated,  providing scope  for 
possible future redeployment. 

EN 

56 

  EN 

 
 
 
2.2.3.  Estimation and justification of the cost-effectiveness of the controls (ratio of "control costs ÷ 
value of the related funds managed"), and assessment of the expected levels of risk of error (at 
payment & at closure)  

The allocation of additional tasks to the existing mandate of ACER is not expected to generate specific 
additional  controls  at  ACER,  therefore,  the  ratio  of  control  costs  over  value  of  funds  managed  will 
remain unaltered. 

Similarly, the tasks assigned for DG ENER will not result in additional controls or change in the ratio 
of control costs. 

2.3.  Measures to prevent fraud and irregularities  

Specify existing or envisaged prevention and protection measures, e.g. from the Anti-Fraud Strategy. 

ACER  applies  the  anti-fraud  principles  of  decentralised  EU  Agencies,  in  line  with  the 
Commission approach. 

In March 2019 ACER adopted a new Anti-Fraud Strategy, repealing Decision 13/2014 of the 
Administrative Board of ACER. The new strategy, spanning over a three-year period, is based 
on  the  following  elements:  an  annual  risks  assessment,  the  prevention  and  management  of 
conflicts  of  interest,  internal  rules  on  whistleblowing,  the  policy  and  procedure  for  the 
management of sensitive functions, as well as measures related to ethics and integrity. 

DG ENER also adopted a revised Anti-fraud Strategy (AFS) in 2020. The ENER AFS is based 
on the Comission Anti-fraud Strategy and a specific risk assessment carried out internally to 
identify  the  areas  most  vulnerable  to  fraud,  the  controls  already  in  place  and  the  actions 
necessary to improve DG ENER’s capacity to prevent, detect and correct fraud. 

Both  the  ACER  Regulation  and  the  contractual  provisions  applicable  to  public  procurement 
ensure  that  audits  and  on-the-spot  checks  can  be  carried  out  by  the  Commission  services, 
including OLAF, using the standard provisions recommended by OLAF. 

EN 

57 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
 
3. 

3.1. 

ESTIMATED FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE  

Heading(s)  of  the  multiannual  financial  framework  and  expenditure  budget  line(s) 
affected  

Existing budget lines  

In order of multiannual financial framework headings and budget lines. 

Budget line 

Type of  
expenditure 

Contribution  

Heading of 
multiannual 
financial 
framework 

Number  

Diff./Non-
diff.21 

from 
EFTA 
countries
22 

from 
candidate 
countries 
and 
potential 
candidates
23 

From 
other 
third 
countries 

other assigned 
revenue  

02 

02 10 06 and ITER Budget line 

Diff./Non-
diff. 

YES/NO  YES/NO  YES/NO 

YES/NO 

New budget lines requested  

In order of multiannual financial framework headings and budget lines. 

Budget line 

Type of 
expenditure 

Heading of 
multiannual 
financial 
framework 

Number  

Diff./non-
diff. 

from 
EFTA 
countries 

Contribution  

from 
candidate 
countries 
and 
potential 
candidates 

from 
other 
third 
countries 

other assigned 
revenue  

[XX.YY.YY.YY] 

YES/NO  YES/NO  YES/NO 

YES/NO 

21 
22 
23 

Diff. = Differentiated appropriations / Non-diff. = Non-differentiated appropriations. 
EFTA: European Free Trade Association.  
Candidate countries and, where applicable, potential candidates from the Western Balkans. 

EN 

58 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3.2. 

Estimated impact on expenditure  

3.2.1. 

Summary of estimated impact on expenditure  

Heading of multiannual financial  
framework  

01 

[Single Market, Innovation and Digital 

EUR million (to three decimal places) 

ACER 

Year 
2024 

Year 
2025 

Year 
2026 

Year 
2027 

Enter as many years as 
necessary to show the duration 
of the impact (see point 1.6) 

TOTAL 

Title 124: 

Title 2: 

Title 325: 

TOTAL appropriations 
for ACER 

Commitments 
Payments 

Commitments 

Payments 

Commitments 

Payments 

Commitments 

Payments 

(1) 

(2) 

(1a) 

(2a) 

(3a) 

(3b) 

=1+1a 
+3a 

=2+2a 

+3b 

0,684 
0,684 

0,946 
0,946 

1,288 
1,288 

0,684 

0,946 

1,288 

0,684 

0,946 

1,288 

2,918 
2,918 

2,918 

2,918 

24 

25 

Expenditure under Title 1 corresponds to staff to be funded under EU Contribution. The remaining two thirds of the staff required should be funded via Fees 
and Charges. 
Expenditure foreseen under Title 3 of EUR 4,2 million over 2025-2027 should be funded via Fees and Charges. 

EN 

59 

EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Heading of multiannual financial  
framework  

7 

‘Administrative expenditure’ 

Year 
2024 

Year 
2025 

Year 
2026 

Year 
2027 

Enter as many years as 
necessary to show the duration 
of the impact (see point 1.6)  

TOTAL 

EUR million (to three decimal places) 

DG: ENER 

 Human Resources  
 Other administrative expenditure  

0,342 

0,342 

0,342 

TOTAL DG ENER 

Appropriations  

0,342 

0,342 

0,342 

TOTAL appropriations 
under HEADING 726 
of the multiannual financial framework  

(Total  commitments  = 
Total payments) 

0,342 

0,342 

0,342 

1,026 

1,026 

1,026 

Year 
202427 

Year 
2025 

Year 
2026 

Year 
2027 

Enter as many years as 
necessary to show the duration 
of the impact (see point 1.6) 

TOTAL 

EUR million (to three decimal places) 

TOTAL appropriations  
under HEADINGS 1 to 7 
of the multiannual financial framework  

Commitments 

Payments 

1,026 

1,288 

1,630 

1,026 

1,288 

1,630 

3,944 

3,944 

26 

27 

EN 

The  appropriations  required  for  human  resources  and  other  expenditure  of  an  administrative  nature  will  be  met  by  appropriations  from  the  DG  that  are 
already assigned to management of the action and/or have been redeployed within the DG, together if necessary with any additional allocation which may be 
granted to the managing DG under the annual allocation procedure and in the light of budgetary constraints. 

Year N is the year in which implementation of the proposal/initiative starts. Please replace "N" by the expected first year of implementation (for instance: 2021). The 
same for the following years. 

60 

EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
3.2.2.  Estimated impact on ACER’s appropriations  

 The proposal/initiative does not require the use of operational appropriations  

 The proposal/initiative requires the use of operational appropriations, as explained below: 

Year 
N 

Year 
N+1 

Year 
N+2 

Year 
N+3 

OUTPUTS 

Amounts in EUR million (to three decimal places) 

Enter as many years as necessary to show the 
duration of the impact (see point 1.6) 

TOTAL 

o
N

Cost 

o
N

Cost 

o
N

Cost 

o
N

Cost 

o
N

Cost  N

o

Cost 

o
N

Cost 

Total 
No 

Total 
cost 

Indicate 
objectives and 
outputs  

 

Type
28 

Avera
ge 
cost 

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE No 129… 

- Output 

- Output 

- Output 

Subtotal for specific objective No 1 

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE No 2 ... 

- Output 

Subtotal for specific objective No 2 

TOTAL COST 

Where applicable, amounts reflect the sum of the Union contribution to the agency and other revenue of the agency (fees and charges).

28 
29 

Outputs are products and services to be supplied (e.g.: number of student exchanges financed, number of km of roads built, etc.). 
As described in point 1.4.2. ‘Specific objective(s)…’ 

EN 

61 

EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3.2.3.  Estimated impact on ACER’s human resources  

3.2.3.1.  Summary  

 The  proposal/initiative  does  not  require  the  use  of  appropriations  of  an 

administrative nature  

X  The  proposal/initiative  requires  the  use  of  appropriations  of  an  administrative 

nature, as explained below: 

EUR million (to three decimal places) Where applicable, amounts reflect the sum of the Union contribution to 
the agency and other revenue of the agency (fees and charges). 

Year 
2024 

Year 
2025 

Year 
2026 

Year 
2027 

TOTAL 

Temporary agents (AD 
Grades) 

Temporary 
(AST grades) 

agents 

Temporary 
(AST/SC grades) 

agents 

Contract staff 

Seconded National 
Experts 

0,855 

1,710 

2,565 

5,130 

0,513 

0,513 

0,513 

1,539 

0,513 

0,513 

0,513 

1,539 

0,091 

0,273 

0,364 

0,728 

TOTAL 

1,972 

3,009 

3,955 

8,936 

Staff requirements (FTE): 

Year 
2024 

Year 
2025 

Year 
2026 

Year 
2027 

TOTAL 

Temporary agents (AD 
Grades) 

Temporary 
(AST grades) 

agents 

Temporary 
(AST/SC grades) 

agents 

Contract staff 

Seconded National 
Experts 

0 

0 

0 

5 

3 

3 

1 

10 

15 

3 

3 

3 

3 

3 

4 

15 

3 

3 

4 

TOTAL 

12 

19 

25 

25 

EN 

62 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Planned recruitment date for the FTEs is the 1 January of the respective year.  

Of which are funded by the EU contribution (FTE)30: 

Year 
2024 

Year 
2025 

Year 
2026 

Year 
2027 

TOTAL 

0 

2 

1 

1 

3 

1 

1 

1 

5 

1 

1 

1 

5 

1 

1 

1 

Temporary agents (AD 
Grades) 

Temporary 
(AST grades) 

agents 

Temporary 
(AST/SC grades) 

agents 

Contract staff 

Seconded National 
Experts 

TOTAL 

0 

4 

6 

8 

8 

30  Each  year,  in  accordance  with  Article  3(1)  of  Commission  Decision  (EU)  2020/2152,  ACER  will  identify 
those  costs,  including  staff  costs,  which  are  eligible  for  funding  by  fees  and  present  the  result  in  its  draft 
programming  document.  In  accordance  with  Article  20  of  Regulation  (EU)  2019/942,  the  Commission 
provides an opinion on ACER’s draft programming document, including the Agency’s proposals as regards 
which costs are considered as eligible for funding by fees and the scope for thereby reducing the burden on 
the EU budget. 

EN 

63 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3.2.3.2.  Estimated requirements of human resources for the parent DG 

 The proposal/initiative does not require the use of human resources.  

 The proposal/initiative requires the use of human resources, as explained below: 

Estimate to be expressed in full amounts (or at most to one decimal place) 

Year 
2024 

Year 
2025 

Year 
2026 

Year 
2027 

Enter as many years as 
necessary to show the 
duration of the impact (see 
point 1.6) 

2 

2 

2 

 Establishment plan posts (officials and 

temporary staff) 

20 01 02 01 and 20 01 02 02 
(Headquarters and Commission’s 
Representation Offices) 

20 01 02 03 (Delegations) 

01 01 01 01 (Indirect research) 

10 01 05 01 (Direct research) 

 External staff (in Full Time Equivalent 
unit: FTE)31 

20 02 01 (AC, END, INT from the 
‘global envelope’) 

20 02 03 (AC, AL, END, INT and 
JPD in the Delegations) 

Budget 
line(s) 
(specify) 
32 

- at 
Headquarters33 

- in 
Delegations  

01 01 01 02 (AC, END, INT – 
Indirect research) 

10 01 05 02 (AC, END, INT – 
Direct research) 

Other budget lines (specify) 

TOTAL 

2 

2 

2 

The human resources required will be met by staff from the DG who are already assigned to 
management of the action and/or have been redeployed within the DG, together, if necessary, 

31 

32 
33 

AC = Contract Staff; AL = Local Staff; END = Seconded National Expert; INT = agency staff; JPD = 
Junior Professionals in Delegations.  
Sub-ceiling for external staff covered by operational appropriations (former ‘BA’ lines). 
Mainly  for  the  EU  Cohesion  Policy  Funds,  the  European  Agricultural  Fund  for  Rural  Development 
(EAFRD) and the European Maritime Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF).   

EN 

64 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
with any additional allocation which may be granted to the managing DG under the annual 
allocation procedure and in the light of budgetary constraints.  

EN 

65 

  EN 

 
3.2.4.  Compatibility with the current multiannual financial framework  

 The proposal/initiative is compatible the current multiannual financial framework. 

X  The  proposal/initiative  will  entail  reprogramming  of  the  relevant  heading  in  the 

multiannual financial framework. 

The  initiative  has  been  triggered  by  the  current  energy  crisis  and  hence  was  not 
factored  in  when  the  MFF  headings  were  calculated.  This  specific  initiative  being 
new, it will require reprogramming both for the line of the contribution to ACER and 
the line that will support additional work within DG ENER. To the extent that they 
cannot  be  covered  by  fees,  the  budgetary  impacts  on  ACER  as  decribed  in  this 
legislative  financial  statement  will  be  offset  by  a  compensatory  reduction  on 
programmed spending in ITER budget line.  

 The proposal/initiative requires application of the flexibility instrument or revision 

of the multiannual financial framework34. 

Explain what is required, specifying the headings and budget lines concerned and the corresponding 
amounts. 

3.2.5.  Third-party contributions  

The proposal/initiative does not provide for co-financing by third parties.  

The proposal/initiative provides for the co-financing estimated below: 

EUR million (to three decimal places) 

Year 
N 

Year 
N+1 

Year 
N+2 

Year 
N+3 

Enter as many years as necessary 
to show the duration of the 
impact (see point 1.6) 

Total 

Specify  the  co-financing 
body  

TOTAL 
co-financed  

appropriations 

34 

See  Articles  12  and  13  of  Council  Regulation  (EU,  Euratom)  No  2093/2020  of  17  December  2020 
laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027. 

EN 

66 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3.3. 

Estimated impact on revenue  

X  The proposal/initiative has no financial impact on revenue. 

 The proposal/initiative has the following financial impact: 

 

 

on own resources  

on other revenue  

 please indicate, if the revenue is assigned to expenditure lines  

Appropriation
s available for 
the current 
financial year 

Budget revenue line: 

Article …………. 

EUR million (to three decimal places) 

Impact of the proposal/initiative35 

Year 
N 

Year 
N+1 

Year 
N+2 

Year 
N+3 

Enter as many years as necessary to 
show the duration of the impact (see 
point 1.6) 

For miscellaneous ‘assigned’ revenue, specify the budget expenditure line(s) affected. 

Specify the method for calculating the impact on revenue. 

35 

As regards traditional own resources (customs duties, sugar levies), the amounts indicated must be net 
amounts, i.e. gross amounts after deduction of 20 % for collection costs. 

EN 

67 

  EN