JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defence
Date: 2023-03-10
Institutions: Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space, European Commission
Subjects: EU strategy, competitiveness, defence policy, extra-atmospheric space, innovation, international cooperation, militarisation of space, space policy, space technology, use of outer space

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY Brussels, 10.3.2023  JOIN(2023) 9 final  JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defence  
 
 
INTRODUCTION – SPACE AS A STRATEGIC DOMAIN 

Europe is a global space power. The European Union (EU) owns and operates space assets 
for  positioning,  navigation  and  timing  (PNT  -  Galileo)  and  earth  observation  (EO  - 
Copernicus) and will launch a third constellation, Union Security Connectivity Programme 
(IRIS²), for secure communications. Member States own and operate national space assets, 
including assets that serve security and defence purposes. The EU Satellite Centre (SatCen) 
provides a unique geospatial intelligence analysis capability, to support decision-making 
and actions of the EU and its Member States. 

Space  is  critical  for  the  strategic  autonomy  of  the  EU  and  its  Member  States.  The 
functioning of economies, citizens and public policies increasingly relies on space-related 
services  and  data,  including  those  in  the  field  of  security  and  defence.  Space  also 
contributes  to  achieving  the  EU’s  political  agenda,  enabling  the  digital  and  green 
transitions, and enhancing its resilience. 

Yet, space is an increasingly contested area. 

Some space powers have the capabilities  to  target  critical  space infrastructure. Some of 
them have developed and tested anti-satellite capabilities that can disrupt or destroy space 
systems  and  services.  Most  recently,  in  November  2021,  Russia  tested  an  anti-satellite 
(ASAT) weapon against one of its own satellites, generating a large amount of space debris. 

China  pursues  its  geopolitical  agenda  through  its  growing  presence  in  space  and  is 
developing extensive space programmes and counterspace capabilities. 

In a geopolitical context of increasing power competition and intensification of threats to 
the EU and its Member States, EU leaders have identified space as a strategic domain in 
the Strategic Compass1 and have called for an EU Space Strategy for security and defence. 
The  EU  Security  Union  Strategy2  recognises  space  infrastructure  as  essential  services 
which must be adequately protected against current and anticipated threats and be resilient. 

The  EU  and  its  Member  States  will  continue  to  promote  the  preservation  of  a  safe  and 
secure space environment and the peaceful use of outer space on an equitable and mutually 
acceptable basis. The EU recognises outer space as a global commons. It is committed to 
the  mutually  reinforcing  role  of  transparency  and  confidence-building  measures,  by 
reducing the risks of misperception, miscalculation, and unintended conflict escalation. 

Additional measures are needed to defend the EU’s strategic interests and to deter hostile 
activities  in  and  from  space.  While  privileging  international  cooperation  and  promoting 
responsible  behaviours  in  space,  the  EU  will  also  strengthen  its  strategic  posture  and 
autonomy  in  the  space  domain.  It  will  make  space  systems  and  services  more  resilient, 
respond to any hostile activities or threats and further develop space-enabled services for 
security and defence. 

1 A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence - For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests 
and contributes to international peace and security 
2 COM(2020) 605 final 

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1.  THE SPACE THREAT LANDSCAPE 

1.1.  Defining the space domain 

The space domain includes any element relevant for the functioning of space systems and 
the delivery of space-based services in the EU and the Member States, e.g.: the outer space 
environment,  the  various  relevant  orbits  and  spacecraft  and  related  information  on  the 
systems they belong to, the ground and launch infrastructure, radio frequency links, user 
terminals and cyber. It also includes the underlying industrial space sector. 

1.2.  Counterspace and threats in the space domain  

Unlike safety risks arising from technical incidents, accidents and natural hazards, space 
threats are intentionally hostile activities through counterspace capabilities.  

Counterspace is used to demonstrate capabilities, deter competitors, deny them the use of 
their space systems or gain an information advantage. They are directed to space assets in 
orbit, their supporting ground infrastructure, and the data links between them.  

The effects of counterspace are to intentionally disrupt, degrade, destroy, deceive, or deny 
the use of space systems, and to inspect, manipulate, eavesdrop, or intercept corresponding 
data as well as deny access or freedom of movement in the space domain. The effects of 
counterspace may be reversible or irreversible 
Counterspace capabilities can take many different forms, such as kinetic measures3 against 
spacecraft  or  ground  infrastructure,  or  directed  energy4.  The  specific  features  of  space 
infrastructure – both in orbit and on the ground – also make it particularly vulnerable to 
cyberattacks. Beyond space systems, counterspace can interfere with the space sector as a 
whole, including underlying supply chains and radiofrequency spectrum. 

Several  third  countries  have  been  developing  and  maintaining  counterspace  capabilities 
and  related  doctrines.  However,  since  most  space  technologies  are  dual  use,  what 
constitutes a space threat cannot be identified by observing space objects, technologies or 
space capabilities in isolation, but by taking into account behaviour. 

Assessing  space  threats  requires  a  comprehensive  analysis  of  capabilities  and  related 
behaviours  in  orbit,  on  the  ground  and  in  the  cyber  domain  based  on  a  thorough 
understanding of counterspace capabilities.  

1.3.  Towards a shared understanding of space threats 

The Single Intelligence Analysis Capability (SIAC) under the High Representative, along 
with Member States military and civilian intelligence services, will increase their strategic 
understanding of space threats and counterspace. Such strategic understanding should also 
support the EU space programmes, as well as benefiting from information collected by the 
Commission through the monitoring of the EU space components. 

Way forward 

3 This can include ASATs such as missiles launched directly from ground (direct ascent ASAT), or spacecraft activated 
when already in orbit (co-orbital ASAT), including robotic arms or projectile objects. 
4 For example, electronic warfare, lasers and other directed energy to dazzle satellites, damage their on-board electronic 
systems or jam or spoof their signals or intrude into their communications networks. 

2 

 
 
 
                                                 
  The  High  Representative,  with  the  support  of  the  SIAC,  will  prepare  a  classified 
annual space threat landscape analysis that includes the evolution of counterspace 
capabilities. This would also benefit from the Commission’s monitoring of its EU 
space components.   

2.  ENHANCING THE RESILIENCE AND PROTECTION OF SPACE SYSTEMS 

AND SERVICES IN THE EU 

Space systems and services in the EU provide essential services for societal functions and 
economic  activities.  Thus,  they  need  to  be  increasingly  resilient  and  protected.  The  EU 
recognises space as a critical sector in its existing legislation on the resilience of critical 
entities  (CER  Directive5)  and  cybersecurity  (NIS2  Directive6),  covering  ground  based 
infrastructure of Member States, including in the EU outermost regions,   and of private 
operators  as well as satellites used for delivering telecommunication services7. Still, the 
level of resilience and protection of national space assets varies across Member States.  

2.1.  An  EU-wide  security  framework  for  the  protection  of  space  systems, 

information sharing and cooperation on space security incidents 

Some  Member  States  have  put  national  rules  in  place  to  regulate  space  operations, 
including  security  aspects.  Without  a  common  framework,  these  rules  may  differ.  This 
divergence could affect the competitiveness of the EU space industry and the security of 
the EU. 

To ensure a consistent EU-wide approach, and building on the joint communication on an 
EU Approach for Space Traffic Management8, the Commission will consider proposing an 
EU Space Law. While protecting national security interests, such legislative proposal could 
provide the framework to collectively enhance the level of resilience of space systems and 
services in the EU and ensure coordination between Member States, including in remote 
strategic ground infrastructure locations such as the EU outermost regions. 

It could provide a comprehensive and consistent framework for resilience of space systems 
and services in the EU, together with the NIS 2 and CER Directives. The Commission will 
take  as  a  starting  point,  for  stakeholder  consultation  and  impact  assessment  of  options, 
certain  key  features  of  those  existing  regimes,  and  the  experience  in  their  application, 
where relevant. For example, Member States could be required to identify essential9 space 
systems  and  services.  This  could  include  major  supply  chain  actors,  to  define  and 
implement a common minimum level of resilience for critical space services and to develop 
coordinated  national  preparedness  and  resilience  plans  and  emergency  protocols.  The 
initiative  could  also  extend  to  developing  security  monitoring  centres,  to  allow  for  the 
notification of security incidents in a systematic manner.  

5 Directive (EU) 2022/2557 on the resilience of critical entities 
6 Directive (EU) 2022/2555 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, repealing Directive 
(EU) 2016/1148. 
7 Cf recital 5 of Directive 2022/2557: “… The space sector falls within the scope of Directive (EU) 2022/2557 with 
respect to the provision of certain services that depend on ground-based infrastructure owned, managed and operated 
either by Member States or by private parties; consequently, infrastructure owned, managed or operated by or on behalf 
of the Union as part of its space programme does not fall within the scope of this Directive.” 
8 JOIN(2022) 4 final 
9 Essential is to be understood as crucial for the functioning of economic activities, security and safety in Member States. 

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The Commission could also consider requirements to make sure that security, including 
cyber-security, is part of the design of all space systems delivering essential services.  It 
could propose the more systematic integration of relevant security standards in the early 
design phase of these systems. 

Moreover,  the  Commission  would  incentivise  the  exchange  of  information  on  threats 
targeting space assets or their supply chain, focusing on actionable information to relevant 
security operation centres (SOCs). Building on its experience for Galileo, the EU Space 
Programme  Agency  (EUSPA)  would  ensure  a  consistent  security  monitoring  of  all  EU 
space  programmes.  In  close  cooperation  with  the  Commission,  the  Computer  Security 
Incident Response Team of all the EU institutions (CERT-EU) and the European Union 
Agency  for  Cybersecurity  (ENISA)10,  EUSPA  will  play  a  key  role  as  space  security 
monitoring  and  operations  centre  in  the  EU.  On  request,  it  may  also  assist  operators  of 
essential space systems and services in Member States. 

Space  services  are  provided  by  public  and  private  operators,  with  an  increasing  and 
dynamic  role  for  New  Space11.  A  common  understanding  of  what  the  essential  space 
services  are  is  necessary  to  share  relevant  security  information,  coordinate  actions  and 
facilitate EU cooperation.  

In  complement  to  such  a  possible  legislative  proposal,  the  Commission  would  raise 
awareness  and  facilitate  the  exchange  of  best  practices  among  commercial  entities  on 
resilience  measures,  including  cyber-related  ones.  Such  supporting  measures  would  be 
especially relevant for SMEs, including New Space. In this context, the Commission, with 
the support of EUSPA, would consider establishing an Information Sharing and Analysis 
Centre  (ISAC),  bringing  together  commercial  entities,  and  relevant  public  entities, 
including possibly the European Space Agency (ESA). 

In addition, the implementation of the NIS 2 Directive and the upcoming Cyber Resilience 
Act12, as well as other existing cybersecurity frameworks13,  will incentivise the uptake of 
cybersecurity  requirements  for  critical  digital  products  that  are  used  in  space.  Specific 
cybersecurity standards and procedures in the space domain could be considered as part of 
the EU Space Law where relevant. 

Finally,  greater  steering  of  the  EU  in  the  development  of  standards  and  its  better 
representation  in  international  standardisation  organisations  are  crucial,  in  particular  to 

10 https://www.enisa.europa.eu/ 
11  11 New Space qualifies the emerging private space industry, driven by a series of technological trends and business 
model innovations and leading to a reduction in costs of space systems, shorter lifecycles in delivery and more risk taking. 
12 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for 
products with digital elements and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1020, COM (2022) 454 final 
13  This  currently  includes  the  delegated  regulation  of  the  Radio  Equipment  Directive,  adopted  in  October  2021  and 
imposing  obligations  to  the  manufacturers  of  wireless  devices  to  improve  their  level  of  cybersecurity,  privacy  and 
protection from fraud. 

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protect  the  security  interests  of  the  EU  and  its  Member  States.  Coherence  with  North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) standards will be encouraged. 

2.2.  Strengthening the technological sovereignty of the EU space sector 

To increase the resilience of space infrastructure and ensure security of supply14, the EU 
will strengthen its technological sovereignty by reducing strategic dependencies on third 
countries and boosting the resilience of critical industrial value chains. 

Horizon Europe and the European Defence Fund (EDF)15 will be fully leveraged to achieve 
this. The Commission, the European Defence Agency (EDA) and ESA will coordinate and 
synchronise activities in critical space technologies, building on a re-energised Joint Task 
Force (JTF)16. Building upon its expertise, the EUSPA could also contribute to this work. 
The activities of the JTF will also feed into the EU Observatory of Critical Technologies17. 

On the basis of the activities of the JTF and the EU Observatory of Critical Technologies, 
the  Commission,  together  with  Member  States  and  industry,  will  assess  the  need  to 
establish  new  industrial  alliances  related  to  technologies  that  are  relevant  for  space  and 
defence, in compliance with the EU competition rules. The Important Projects of Common 
European  Interests  (IPCEI)  are  also  a  tool  that  industry  and  Member  States  can  use  to 
develop space technologies in areas where it addresses a clearly identified and significant 
strategic dependency, while ensuring important positive spillovers beyond the participating 
countries and firms. 

The  Space  Programme,  the  EDF  and  Horizon  Europe,  as  well  as  Member  States’ 
collaborative projects and programmes support the technological maturation of resilience-
related capabilities. Developing further synergies in programming and funding can ensure 
continuity in the development of technologies up to systems. To strengthen the protection 
and  resilience  of  EU  space  systems,  the  Commission  will  promote  joint  programming 
through enhanced coordination between relevant EU programmes. 

The  Commission  should  be  able  to  avail  of  the  possibility  to  re-programme  short-term 
actions in support of critical technologies  in the face of major crises.  It will ensure that 
space is more systematically taken into account in relevant EU policies and initiatives, such 
as on quantum technologies, or artificial intelligence, but also by ensuring access to raw, 

14 This includes access to raw, processed and advanced materials 
15  Including  its  precursors  programmes  the  European  Defence  Industrial  Development  programme  (EDIDP)  and  the 
Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) 
16 The Commission-ESA-EDA Joint Task Force on critical space technologies for European non-dependence created in 
2008. 
17 COM(2021)70 final 

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advanced,  and  processed  materials  and  to  semi-conductors  through  for  instance  the 
European Critical Raw Materials Act18 and the Chips Act19. 

The  Commission  will  continue  working  with  ESA  on  the  development  of  EU  space 
technologies, including security-related ones. To enhance this role, it is crucial that ESA 
puts in place relevant measures and mechanisms to ensure the protection of the security 
interests  of  the  EU  and  its  Member  States.  Close  cooperation  will  ensure  the 
complementarity and synchronisation of activities. 

2.3.  Addressing risks to security in the space sector in the EU 

Ensuring the EU’s security also relies on the protection of its supply chains. To that end, 
certain  controls  are  already  in  place,  i.e.  dual-use  export  control  and  Foreign  Direct 
Investments  (FDI)20  screening.  The  Commission  will  evaluate  the  FDI  Screening 
Regulation by October 202321. 

To be able to better assess the risks associated to FDI transactions in the space sector, the 
Commission will ensure it has access to information  on direct and indirect providers of 
goods and services to EU space programmes, including when managed by ESA. Risks for 
the EU’s security and public order relating notably to emerging and critical technologies 
for  its  space  infrastructure  should  also  be  better  detected  and  mitigated.  Consideration 
should also be given to the economic and financial circumstances in which EU companies 
with strategic technologies may be vulnerable to foreign investments representing risks for 
security or public order; as well as to security of supply. As a mitigating measure, multiple 
sourcing of the most critical technologies and components will reduce the risks posed by 
certain foreign acquisition and ensure internal competitiveness.  

Additionally, protecting EU security and its strategic interests requires procurement rules 
that fully guarantee security of supply. The Commission will ensure that EU competition 
rules and international trade instruments are fully applied to tackle new challenges faced 
by the EU space and defence sectors, such as the risk of distortive foreign subsidies. This 
should include investigating certain acquisitions of EU companies active in these sectors, 
which  may  be  facilitated  by  illegal  third  country  subsidies.  If  needed,  prohibiting  the 
acquisition  or  accepting  binding  commitments  from  the  companies  concerned  could  be 
considered to remedy the distortions caused by these foreign subsidies. 22 

2.4.  Developing capabilities, including EU autonomous access to space, to increase 

resilience 

There are many capabilities that can enhance the resilience of space systems and services 
such as self-protective infrastructure, versatile and responsive launchers, space situational 
awareness  services,  in-orbit  servicing  and  secured  sovereign  cloud  dedicated  to  space 
services. Such capabilities can make space assets stronger, protect them better, extend their 
lifetime, or replace them quickly. 

18 European Critical Raw Materials Act (europa.eu) 
19 European Chips Act (europa.eu) 
20 Regulation (EU) 2019/452 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union 
21 Article 15 of the Regulation 
22  Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market. 

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EU autonomous access to space is essential for the resilience of space infrastructure in the 
EU,  including  for  the  replenishment  of  constellations,  the  replacement  of  individual 
satellites or the deployment of future constellations. 

Responsiveness and versatility in access to space are essential for ensuring that growing 
military and defence needs are met. Beyond consolidating current launch capabilities, the 
development  of  launch  systems  in  the  EU  needs  to  be  stimulated,  including  micro-
launchers  and  reusable  launchers,  along  with  an  agile  manufacturing  industry.  The 
Commission will incentivise the development of standardised interfaces (covering security 
aspects)  between  satellites  and  responsive  launch  systems  to  ensure  future  satellites’ 
interoperability and access to space solutions, and to support the development of innovative 
in-orbit  transportation  solutions.  The  EU’s  outermost  regions  of  interest  for  automous 
access to space should be fully exploited. 

Way forward 

  To enhance the level of security and resilience of space operations and services in 
the  EU,  as  well  as  their  safety  and  sustainability,  the  Commission  will  consider 
proposing  an  EU  Space  Law.  It  will  encourage  the  development  of  resilience 
measures in the EU, foster information-exchange on incidents as well as cross-border 
coordination and cooperation. 

  By the end of 2023, the Commission, with the support of EUSPA, will establish an 
Information  Sharing  and  Analysis  Centre  (EU  Space  ISAC)  to  strengthen  the 
resilience  of  capabilities  of  the  EU  space  industry  (upstream  and  downstream), 
including New Space. 

  By mid- 2024, the Commission, in close coordination with EDA under the authority 
of the High Representative and with ESA, will propose a roadmap to reduce strategic 
dependencies on technologies that are critical for ongoing and future space projects 
in the EU and EU space programmes.  

  The Commission will develop joint programming between the EDF, the EU Space 
Programme and Horizon Europe to accelerate the development of capabilities that 
are relevant for the resilience of space systems. 

  The Commission will take space and defence needs systematically into account in 
future initiatives, including assessing the need to establish industrial alliances.  

  The Commission will ensure that broader EU initiatives, including the Chips Act and 
the Critical Raw Materials Act, are applied in a manner that strengthens security of 
supply and the resilience of space systems and services. 

  The Commission will take actions to stimulate the responsiveness, versatility of EU 
access  to  space  by  boosting  new  EU  launcher  systems,  by  proposing  preparatory 
actions to ensure long-term EU autonomous access to space and by addressing, in 
particular, security and defence needs, together with Member States. 

3.  RESPONDING TO SPACE THREATS 

Given  the  increase  in  space  threats  and  counterspace,  there  is  a  need  to  enhance  the 
capability to detect, characterise and attribute a threat in the space domain and to react to 
it in a timely, proportionate, and coherent manner both nationally and at EU level. 

7 

 
 
3.1.  Detecting and characterising space threats 

Any  EU  response  to  a  space  threat  requires  both  the  EU  and  its  Member  States,  as 
appropriate, to have access to timely, accurate and actionable information as a basis for 
their decision-making.  

Besides the need to regularly update the space threat landscape, it is necessary to collect 
and  analyse  in  near  real  time  security  incidents  that  affect  the  space  systems  and  could 
signal  a  space  threat.  Complementary  to  security  information  collected  through  the 
monitoring  of  the  EU  space  programme,  an  information  exchange  network  could  be 
established through the EU Space Law and would provide through EUSPA a first level of 
analysis and reporting of these weak signals. 

The EU and its Member States also need to develop a shared understanding of the overall 
situation in orbit to address irresponsible or hostile behaviours in outer space. 

Space  Domain  Awareness  (SDA)  consists  of  detecting,  identifying  and  characterising 
space objects of interest in near real time, describing and understanding their behaviours23, 
and connecting this information to underlying doctrines and related space systems. SDA 
feeds in real time the recognised space pictures of space commands, relying on intelligence 
on space manoeuvres and intents.  

SDA is key for attributing space threats in orbit and triggering a potential EU response. 
Member States that own and develop the relevant capabilities should provide the necessary 
SDA services to the EU to ensure its strategic autonomy in the space domain.  

3.2.  Attributing and reacting to hostile behaviours in the space domain  

Attributing a space threat to a third country and deciding on a possible response is a highly 
political decision. 

The Council Decision on the security of systems and services deployed, operated and used 
under  the  Space  Programme24  lays  down  operational  provisions  enabling  the  EU25  to 
attribute and respond to threats to or through systems set up and services of the EU Space 
Programme, if such threats would affect the security of the EU and/or of its Member States. 
The Decision foresees the possibility for the High Representative to take urgent provisional 
action. The European External Action Service (EEAS) operates the Space Threat Response 
Architecture supporting the implementation of the Decision.  

In  view  of  the  growing  threats,  the  High  Representative  would  propose  amending  the 
Council  Decision  so  that  it  becomes  the  cornerstone  of  the  EU  response  in  the  space 
domain.  

The scope of the Decision should be extended to cover threats in the space domain that 
may affect the security of the EU. The Space Threat Response Architecture could become 
the  recipient  at  EU  level  of  space  security  incidents  through  the  Space  Programme’s 

23 Including manoeuvres and payload operations 
24 Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/698 of 30 April 2021 on the security of systems and services deployed, operated and 
used  under  the  Union  Space  Programme  which  may  affect  the  security  of  the  Union,  and  repealing  Decision 
2014/496/CFSP 
25 Through a unanimous Decision of the Council on proposal from the High Representative. 

8 

 
                                                 
Security  Monitoring  Centre  and  the  SDA  services.  It  would  partner  with  the  SIAC  to 
support the attribution of space threats and the adequate response. 

Complementary  to  the  cyber  diplomacy  toolbox  and  the  hybrid  toolbox,  the  amended 
Council Decision would also facilitate the mobilisation of a dedicated toolbox. As part of 
the response, relevant EU tools could include: 

- 

- 

- 

at technical level, the use of specific operational response modes developed as part of 
the security design of the space systems; 

at diplomatic level, discussions in multilateral forums, outreach through appropriate 
channels, and statements by the EU and by Member States to prevent and respond to 
irresponsible behaviours in the space domain; 
at economic level, tools including sanctions26. 

EU Military Staff would also prepare a military contribution to the EU’s response in the 
space domain. 

The creation of a horizontal group under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
would enable the prompt mobilisation of relevant expertise when confronted with a space 
threat.  It  would  support  the  Council  in  its  response  to  space  threats,  including  for  their 
attribution. 

Any Member State can invoke the mutual assistance clause enshrined in the EU Treaties 
(Article 42.7 of the Treaty of the European Union), should a space threat or incident amount 
to an armed attack on its territory. 

3.3.  Space exercises for readiness and interoperability 

The High Representative, together with the Commission and the Member States, will set 
up regular exercises in the space domain or exercises with a space domain component to: 

- 

- 

test, develop and validate the EU’s response to space threats, 

test and explore concrete solidarity mechanisms in case of attacks from space or threats 
to space systems, and 

-  develop synergies with partners and allies in space security and defence. 

Way forward 

  The  High  Representative  and  the  Commission  will  explore  with  Member  States 
owning SDA capabilities the modalities to use SDA in support of an EU response. 

   The  High  Representative  will  propose  amending  Council  Decision  (CFSP) 
2021/698 to respond to all threats in the space domain that may affect the security of 
the EU and its Member States, with a view to ensure that all available EU tools can 
rapidly be mobilised, thereby improving its Space Threat Response Architecture. 

  The High Representative, the Commission  and  Member States will  participate in, 
develop,  and  conduct  relevant  space  exercises  including  the  use  of  solidarity 
mechanisms. 

26 The Commission may propose complementary economic measures falling within its competence, such as export control 
requirements. 

9 

 
                                                 
4.  ENHANCING THE USE OF SPACE FOR SECURITY AND DEFENCE 

Space  systems  and  services  play  an  increasing  role  in  support  of  defence  and  security. 
Dual-use  services  provided  by  EU  space  programmes  and  by  commercial  entities, 
including New Space, will be further developed to increase the strategic autonomy of the 
EU and its Member States. 

4.1. 

 EU space systems and services supporting security and defence  

More  systematic  cross-fertilisation  between  EU  space,  defence  and  security  initiatives 
would facilitate the development  of  dual-use EU  space  components  taking into account 
defence and security needs under an overarching capability-driven approach27. 

EU space flagship initiatives can support security and defence capabilities. It is therefore 
necessary to explore to what extent they can provide secure and reliable services. 

While  respecting  the  civilian  nature  of  EU  space  programmes,  specific  and  tailor-made 
rules  for  the  delivery  of  security-sensitive  services,  applications  and  data  will  be 
established to provide the appropriate level of trust for security and defence users (such as 
priority  rights  and  access  control  -  including  in  the  context  of  military  operations,  the 
anonymisation of requests, the restriction of the dissemination policy). 

The  Commission  will  embed  military  and  security  user  requirements  in  the  design  of 
relevant new EU space systems and the upgrade of relevant existing systems. It will rely 
on the support from relevant EU agencies, namely EDA and EUSPA. EDA will continue 
to play a key role in identifying military requirements28, defining capability priorities and 
fostering  cooperation  among  Member  States,  including  through  the  ‘Defence  in  Space 
Forum’. EUSPA will support the identification of security-related needs, the accreditation 
and exploitation of dual-use systems and services. In addition, the EU Military Staff will 
take forward the conceptual developments required at military level for the use of space in 
EU operational engagements. 

When preparing the  future development  of the EU  space  programmes, the Commission 
will consider the long-term defence and security user requirements (time horizon 2035), in 
close cooperation with Member States. It will consider system interoperability and piggy 
backing payload options for defence as well as security on existing or future space systems.  

To  this  end,  synergies  will  be  encouraged  through  EDF,  so  that  defence  research  and 
development can accelerate the deployment of payloads enabling services for defence. In 
addition,  the  different  governmental  services  enabled  by  EU  space  programmes  will  be 
consistently operated and exploited. 

4.1.1.  Positioning Navigation and Timing (PNT) 

Resilient PNT services such as  the  Galileo Public Regulated Service  (PRS), are  critical 
enablers  for  military  operations.  The  continuous  evolution  of  PRS  and  complementary 
payloads in orbit will make it more robust. Building on PESCO projects such as the EU 
Radio Navigation Solution (EURAS) or future defence Navigation Warfare (NAVWAR), 

27 In accordance with the Action Plan on synergies between civil, defence and space industries.  
28  EDA  contributed  to  the  definition  of  military  user  requirements  for  the  GOVSATCOM  and  Space  Situational 
Awareness (SSA) components of the EU Space Programme. 

10 

 
                                                 
surveillance capabilities will enable the creation of a consolidated situational picture, and 
to cope with situations where access to PRS is contested. In this context, the EDF supports 
activities related to an unlimited and uninterrupted access to PRS worldwide to strengthen 
the security and defence component of the EU’s PNT capabilities. 

4.1.2.  Earth Observation  

Space-based Earth Observation supports autonomous assessment and decision–making. It 
is  a  key  enabler  for  security  and  defence.  It  has  proven  to  be  a  game-changer  for  the 
Ukrainian Armed Forces to resist the Russian attacks. 

SatCen provides a unique geospatial intelligence analysis capability to support high-level 
decision-making  and  action  of  the  EU  and  its  Member  States,  and  also  supports  EU 
policies.  

Although Copernicus delivers security services, it was not designed to comply specifically 
with defence requirements. 

Therefore,  as  part  of  the  evolution  of  Copernicus  services,  and  as  already  presented  to 
Member  States,  an  EU  Earth  Observation  governmental  service  would  be  beneficial  to 
provide a fully reliable, highly resilient, and continuously available situational awareness 
service. To provide added-value, it would complement national, commercial and European 
satellite  imagery  infrastructure,  for  instance  through  new  sensors,  frequent  revisit  and 
advanced  processing  techniques29.  The  Commission  will  gradually  implement  this 
evolution of Copernicus services, starting with a pilot in the current Space Programme.   

The  development  of  such  service  will  leverage  the  complementarity  of  the  SatCen  and 
EUSPA. Building on its expertise, EUSPA, under the supervision of the Commission, will 
play  a  key  role  in  the  security  accreditation,  security  monitoring  and  contract 
implementation of the future system’s space segment. The SatCen will play a key role in 
contributing  to  the  identification  of  user  needs  in  geospatial  intelligence  and  in 
disseminating sensitive products and services. 

4.1.3.  Secure Communication 

Uninterrupted,  worldwide  access  to  secure  and  highly  resilient  communications  can 
support defence and security missions and operations. In addition to regional  govsatcom 
Member States’ assets, IRIS² will provide added value services such as anonymity of use, 
low latency and flexibility. Member States will have effective control through mechanisms 
equivalent to those used in Galileo PRS. 

29 It will leverage Research and Development (R&D) activities of the EDF, including advanced payload technologies and 
data  processing  techniques,  and  be  complemented  in  the  future  by  highly  reactive  small  satellites  for  space-based 
Intelligence,  surveillance,  and  reconnaissance.  Synergies  with  PESCO  Projects,  such  as  the  Common  Hub  for 
Governmental Imagery (CoHGI), will be considered. 

11 

 
                                                 
IRIS² services will include space data relays able to interconnect  Member States’ space 
capabilities (including defence) permanently and securely. These services can be used by 
space-based  national  or  multinational  defence  capabilities  such  as  Earth  Observation 
systems  to  improve  their  operational  effectiveness.  The  Commission  will  fully  exploit 
upcoming low earth orbit (LEO) constellations for new capabilities, including augmented 
services  that  may  be  of  use  to  the  military  by  offering  piggybacking  payloads.  The 
Commission will further explore the extent to which IRIS² can support the establishment 
of an EU critical communications system30.  

The EDF supports the development of technological building blocks for resilient space-
based communications31 implementable through IRIS² and their uptake by defence end-
users, through  actions targeting the user segment (e.g. standardising of the interfaces to 
facilitate their integration into land, sea and air vehicles32). 

4.1.4.  Space Domain Awareness and Space Surveillance and Tracking 

The  synergies  between  Space  Domain  Awareness  (SDA)  and  the  already  existing  EU 
Space  Surveillance  and  Tracking  (SST)  system  are  high  to  detect  space  objects  with 
dedicated sensors.  

Increased  performances  for  SST  are  required  to  reinforce  the  precision  of  advanced 
collision avoidance manoeuvres and of fragmentation and re-entry analysis. Those Member 
States  developing  SDA,  who  are  also  SST  partners,  will  therefore  benefit  from  more 
performant SST assets, including defence assets, to detect and track smaller and more agile 
spacecraft through the SST component of the EU Space Programme. Additional sensors 
and analysis capabilities for defence and intelligence will be needed to support SDA. 

EU  budget  could  support  Member  States  in  the  development  of  SDA  sensors  and 
capabilities provided that: 

- 

- 

complementarity with the existing mechanism supporting SST is ensured, and 

the necessary flow of SDA information and services is made available to support the 
EU Space Threat Response, including to protect EU satellites. 

SST  partners  benefitting  from  SDA  support  would  in  turn  help  improving  SST  by 
improving  the  identification  of  spacecraft,  thereby  contributing  to  an  autonomous  EU 
catalogue of space objects, an objective of the EU Space Programme. 

30 A ground-based broadband system intended to link Member States next generation communications systems for civil 
security  and  safety  organisations,  allowing  them  to  operate  throughout  the  EU  and  Schengen  countries.Based  on  the 
Horizon 2020 BroadMap and BroadWay projects, as well as the Internal Security Fund BroadNet Preparation project 
31 EDF-2021-SPACE-D-EPW  
32 EDIDP –DA- ESSOR  

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4.2.  Fostering innovation and competitiveness 

Beside  large  industrial  players,  New  Space  plays  an  increasing  role  in  service-delivery, 
including  for  security  and  defence.  It  can  propose  new  ideas,  solutions,  disruptive 
technologies  and  efficient  industrial  processes,  which  can  also  support  security  and 
defence. Member States increasingly rely on commercial services to complement national 
assets, test new capabilities, or develop public assets. 

A competitive industry is essential for strengthening the EU’s resilience and capabilities. 
The Commission will stimulate New Space to scale up in the EU with the support of the 
CASSINI  programme33.  This  will  include  a  more  systematic  development  of  anchor-
customer  contracts,  further  mobilisation  of  grants-loans-equity  with  the  support  of  the 
European Innovation Council, the European  Investment Bank, the European Investment 
Fund,  synergies  with  the  EU  Defence  Innovation  Scheme,  and  the  organisation  of 
space/defence hackathons and challenges on a yearly basis. 

The  Commission  will  incentivise  more  collaborative  work  between  space,  security  and 
defence start-ups in the areas of research and development. Technologies developed with 
the  support  of  Horizon  Europe,  for  example  for  the  development  of  Quantum  Space 
Gravimetry, On-Orbit-services or access to space, could be further developed for defence 
purposes. The Commission will expand its In-Orbit-Validation / In-Orbit-Demonstration 
programme to space technologies of relevance to security and defence users. The EDA’s 
Capability Technology group on space will also foster cooperation between Member States 
and their industries in space research. 

4.3.  Developing skills, education and training 

Both  the  EU  and  its  Member  States,  face  a  shortage  of  expertise  in  space  security  and 
defence.  The  Commission  and  the  High  Representative  will  mobilise  existing  tools  to 
support skilling, upskilling and reskilling. 

To  meet  Member  States’  demand,  EDA,  will  map  all  EU  and  national  educational  and 
training activities relating to space security and defence, to develop skills relevant both for 
policy design and at technical level. In close coordination with the European Security and 
Defence  College  (ESDC),  it  will  promote  the  exchange  of  best  practices  and  define 
curricula. 

To meet industry demand, the Commission will contribute to up- and reskilling in the space 
industry, focusing in particular on space for security and defence, also aiming at increasing 
women’s participation34. It will support concrete initiatives organised at EU, national and 
regional level. It will build on the existing large-scale partnership for aerospace and defence 
skills of the Pact for Skills35. It is also working with stakeholders to develop a new large-
scale  partnership  to  further  enhance  upskilling  and  reskilling  activities  of  students  and 
professionals  required  by  the  downstream  industry,  including  to  cover  extra  needs  for 

33 CASSINI is the European Commission’s initiative to support entrepreneurs, start-ups and SMEs in the space industry. 
https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-space-policy/space-entrepreneurship-initiative-cassini_en 
34 Communication “A Union of Equality: Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025”. COM/2020/152 final 
35 https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=23220&langId=en 

13 

 
                                                 
qualified workers. With the support of the EUSPA, the Commission will develop the EU 
Space Academy to create space development programmes related to security. 

Way forward 

To enhance the use of space systems and services for defence purposes: 

  By  the  end  of  2024,  the  Commission,  in  close  cooperation  with  the  High 
Representative, will propose a pilot for the delivery of initial SDA services in support 
of EU response and to explore synergies with the SST subcomponent of the Space 
Programme, with a view to future developments. 

  When  developing  future  EU  space  programmes,  the  Commission  will  take  into 
account  long-term  military  requirements  (time  horizon  2035)  for  space-based 
defence services with the support of EDA. 

  The Commission will consider military needs and requirements when defining of the 

service portfolio of IRIS². 

  In order to support the autonomous decision-making and action of the EU and its 
Member  States,  the  Commission  will  work  towards  the  gradual  set-up  of  a  new 
Copernicus  governmental  service,  starting  with  a  pilot.  It  will  build  on  the 
complementary role of SatCen and EUSPA. 

  The  Commission  will  incentivise  collaborative  work  between  space,  security  and 

defence start-ups to develop disruptive services for security and defence. 

  By the end of 2024, the High Representative and the Commission, with the support 
of EDA, EUSPA and ESDC, should improve the skills of public administration and 
industry  to  further  develop  space  services  for  security  and  defence,  including 
through:  the  mapping  of  space  security  and  defence  training  activities,  and  the 
skilling of downstream space industry, including through the establishment of a new 
large-scale partnership. 

5.  PARTNERING FOR RESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOURS IN OUTER SPACE 

Forging strong external partnerships is essential to promote a common vision for peaceful 
and responsible behaviours in space, respond to space threats and support the use of space 
services for security and defence 

5.1.  Promoting norms rules and principles for responsible behaviours in outer space  

Avoiding an arms race in outer space and preventing it from becoming an area of conflict 
is crucial to safeguard the long-term use of the space environment for peaceful purposes. 

The 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the principles  developed in  the United  Nations (UN) 
framework  are  the  cornerstone  of  the  global  governance  of  outer  space,  together  with 
relevant resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly. 

In  complementarity,  a  non-legally  binding,  transparency  and  confidence-building 
instrument  would  be  an  effective  tool36.  Additional  measures  should  supplement  the 
relevant traditional disarmament and arms control tools to address irresponsible behaviours 
that  may  lead  to  escalation,  including  due  to  misunderstanding,  misinterpretation,  or 

36 For example the Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC) against the proliferation of ballistic missiles. 

14 

 
                                                 
miscalculation.  In  this  regard,  the  commitment  of  the  United  States  (US)  not  to 
conduct destructive,  direct-ascent  ASAT  missile  testing,  which  has  been  joined  by 
Germany and France, is a pragmatic, concrete, and measurable step forward. The EU and 
all its Member States supported the corresponding Resolution37 approved at the 77th session 
of the UN General Assembly in October 2022. 

5.2.  Engaging with the United Nations on space and security 

The EU will take full benefit of its permanent observer status in the United Nations (UN) 
to  act  side  by  side  with  its  Member  States  in  discussions  on  outer  space.  The  EU  will 
continue to participate in and actively contribute: 

- 

- 

to the UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and its subsidiary 
bodies and to the Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee) 
of the UN General Assembly for issues pertaining to space safety; and 

to  the Conference of Disarmament and the Disarmament  and  International  Security 
Committee (First  Committee) of the UN General  Assembly  for issues  pertaining to 
space safety and security. 

The  EU  and  its  Member  States  support38  the  Open-Ended  Working  Group  on  reducing 
space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours (OEWG)39, as 
a  pragmatic  step  that  helps  build  a  common  understanding  of  what  can  be  considered 
responsible and irresponsible behaviours. 

The main challenge for the EU and its Member States together with likeminded partners is 
to  convince  the  vast  majority  of  UN  member  countries  of  the  relevance  of  a  normative 
approach.    The  EU  and  its  Member  States  will  work  towards  broadening  international 
support for their position on outer space. 

The EEAS has launched a ‘bottom-up’ public diplomacy initiative to build support for a 
Safe, Secure and Sustainable Outer Space (3SOS), promoting a sustainable approach to 
space by encouraging collision avoidance, reducing the creation of long-lived orbital debris 
and  promoting  transparency  and  confidence-building  measures.  This  will  contribute  to 
reducing mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust. 

5.3.  Partnering with the US on space security and defence 

The  Strategic  Compass  recalls  that  the  EU’s  partnership  with  the  US  is  of  strategic 
importance for the deepening of EU-US security and defence cooperation in a mutually 
beneficial way. The US has a privileged relationship with the EU and some of its Member 
States in this area.  

Since  2009,  the  US  and  the  EU  have  held  a  space  security  dialogue  based  on  close 
collaboration  beyond  civilian  areas.  The  discussions  have,  for  example,  allowed  their 
respective  Global  Navigation  Satellite  Systems  to  move  from  perceived  competition 
towards growing complementarity, interoperability, and redundancy. 

37 “Destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing” (document A/C.1/77/L.62).  
38 The EU has made several joint contributions, and several of its Member States have submitted national or cross-regional 
working papers. 
39 Adopted by UNGA Resolution 76/231 

15 

 
                                                 
A similar approach can be envisaged for space situational awareness and other areas, where 
the EU could  move from  a dependence on US space services to  a partnership based on 
mutual interest. 

5.4.  Dialogue with third countries on space security 

Transparent and open communication between different actors in space (including civilian 
and military) is crucial to avoid conflicts and contributes to confidence building. 

A  growing  number  of  third  countries  have  reviewed,  or  are  reviewing,  their  defence 
organisations and doctrines to recognise the importance of space for security and defence. 
Several  third  countries,  including  allies  but  also  strategic  competitors,  have  developed 
space  security  and  defence  strategies  to  develop  domestic  capabilities  and  foreign 
partnerships with likeminded countries. 

The EU is increasingly addressing space security and defence in its political discussions 
with third countries. The EEAS and relevant Commission services will set up staff-to-staff 
dialogues  between  the  EU  and  the  relevant  authorities  of  other  third  countries,  such  as 
Canada and Norway, as is already the case with the US and Japan. 

These  space  security  dialogues  are  an  opportunity  to  engage  with  partners  and  allies, 
discuss  their  space  and  security  strategies,  establish  partnerships  for  the  exchange  of 
information, share best practices on how to increase the resilience of space infrastructure 
and establish norms and standards, identify areas for possible cooperation and coordinate 
action in multilateral forums.  

Space and security dialogues can also be key to promoting EU positions and approaches in 
multilateral forums. They may constitute a diplomatic channel the EU can activate to de-
escalate tensions or convey warning messages to deter further actions –, especially when 
confronted with irresponsible behaviour in the space domain. 

5.5.  Partnership with NATO on space security and defence 

The  Strategic  Compass  sets  clear  objectives  for  the  EU-NATO  strategic  partnership  - 
political dialogue and practical cooperation across all agreed areas of interaction, including 
new work strands such as space. 

In the third joint declaration on EU-NATO cooperation of 10 January 2023, the institutional 
leaders  of  the  EU  and  NATO  confirmed  their  commitment  to  expand  and  deepen  their 
cooperation  on  space,  based  on  the  agreed  principles  underpinning  their  strategic 
partnership. 

EU-NATO cooperation continues to rely on mutual openness and transparency, reciprocity 
and inclusiveness, in full respect of the decision-making autonomy and procedures of both 
organisations, and without prejudice to the specific character of the security and defence 
policy of any Member State. 

Both organisations are contemplating the evolution of space from a capability in support 
of  military  and  civilian  operations  into  a  strategic  domain.  The  EU’s  and  NATO’s 
responses to space incidents and threats will be complementary and mutually reinforcing. 

The two organisations will jointly explore new areas of cooperation in the space domain 
through  regular  exchanges,  including  staff-to-staff  talks,  cross-briefings  and  reciprocal 

16 

 
invitations to events. Parallel and coordinated exercises organised by the EU and NATO 
staff could also include a space domain component.  

Way forward 

  The EU will support multilateral efforts to reduce space threats through norms, rules 
and principles for responsible behaviours, including through the work of the OEWG 
established by the UN General Assembly. 

  The High Representative together with the Commission will step up the 3SOS public 

diplomacy campaign for Safety, Security and Sustainability in Outer Space. 

  The  High  Representative  and  the  Commission  will  deepen  cooperation  in  space 

security with the US.   

  The High Representative and the Commission will develop space security dialogues 
with  like-minded  partners  and  allies,  where  relevant.  In  close  cooperation  with 
Member States, they will consider dialogue with non-like-minded countries. 

  The High Representative and the Commission will develop cooperation with NATO 

in space security.  

6.  CONCLUSION 

Space systems and services in the EU contribute to the strategic autonomy of the EU and 
its  Member  States.  They  are  key  assets  that  will  contribute  to  shaping  the  future 
competitiveness, prosperity and security of the EU for next generations. 

The Space Strategy for security and defence demonstrates the EU’s commitment to protect 
its  security  interests  while  preventing  an  arms  race  in  outer  space,  and  accelerating 
synergies between space, security and defence. 

The EU is committed to strengthening the resilience of the value chains that underpin the 
space ecosystem and to  supporting the innovation  and competitiveness  of the EU  space 
industry.  The  Commission  and  the  High  Representative  will  report  to  the  Council  on  a 
yearly basis on the progress achieved and potential further actions. 

17