The Russian Federation, military service : country of origin information : December 2022.
Date: 2023-01-02
Institutions: European Union Agency for Asylum
Subjects: Russia, data collection, human rights, political situation, professional army, report, voluntary military service, war

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2 The Russian Federation - 

Military service                                                                                          

 
 
 
 
Manuscript completed in December 2022 

Neither the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) nor any person acting on behalf of the 
EUAA is responsible for the use that might be made of the information contained within this 
publication. 

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2022 

PDF 

ISBN 978-92-9400-745-2  doi: 10.2847/54356  BZ-09-22-620-EN-N 

© European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), 2022 

Cover photo: ‘Rank of Russian soldiers in winter uniforms’, DIMUSE © Istock 182026411, 2012, 
url 

Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. For any use or reproduction 
of photos or other material that is not under the EUAA copyright, permission must be sought 
directly from the copyright holders. 

 
 
 
THE  RUSSIAN  FEDERATION  – MILITARY SERVICE   

Acknowledgements 

This report was written by the EUAA COI Sector together with the following national asylum 
and migration departments:  

•  Germany, Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), Country Analysis 

•  France, Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA), 

Information, Documentation and Research Unit (DIDR) 

 The following departments and organisations have reviewed the report, together with EUAA: 

•  Sweden, Swedish Migration Agency, Country of Origin Information, Section for 

Information Analysis 

•  The Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  

•  The Netherlands, Office for Country Information and Language Analysis, Ministry of 

Justice (OCILA) 

The review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or organisations contributes to 
the overall quality of the report but does not necessarily imply their formal endorsement of the 
final report, which is the full responsibility of EUAA. 

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EUROPEAN  UNION AGENCY  FOR  ASYLUM 

Contents 

Acknowledgements............................................................................................................ 3 

Contents ............................................................................................................................ 4 

Disclaimer .......................................................................................................................... 6 

Glossary and abbreviations ................................................................................................ 7 

Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 8 

Methodology................................................................................................................................................ 8 

Defining the terms of reference (ToR)............................................................................ 8 

Collecting information.......................................................................................................... 9 

Quality control ........................................................................................................................ 9 

Sources .......................................................................................................................................................... 9 

Structure and use of the report........................................................................................................... 10 

Maps ................................................................................................................................. 11 

Background ...................................................................................................................... 12 

1. 

The Russian Armed Forces ..................................................................................... 14 

1.1.  Overview of the Russian Armed Forces ..................................................................................14 

1.2.  Military service ..................................................................................................................................15 

1.2.1.  Conscription and conditions of military service.............................................15 

1.2.2.  Exemptions and deferrals from military service ............................................19 

1.2.3.  Alternative civil service......................................................................................... 20 

1.3.  Contract military service ................................................................................................................21 

1.4.  Reserve ...............................................................................................................................................22 

2. 

Mobilisation .......................................................................................................... 26 

2.1.  The scope of the ‘partial’ mobilisation ....................................................................................26 

2.2. Legal framework of the mobilisation order............................................................................28 

2.2.1.  Exemptions and deferrals.....................................................................................28 

2.2.2. Legal ways to avoid mobilisation.......................................................................29 

2.3. Implementation of the mobilisation order ............................................................................. 30 

2.3.1.  Irregularities reported during the mobilisation .............................................32 

2.3.2. Lodging complaints ................................................................................................33 

2.3.3. Drafting of ethnic minorities ................................................................................34 

2.3.4. Protests .......................................................................................................................35 

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THE  RUSSIAN  FEDERATION  – MILITARY SERVICE   

3. 

Russian military forces in Ukraine ......................................................................... 37 

3.1.  Use of conscripts in the war in Ukraine .................................................................................. 37 

3.2. Deployment to Ukraine and conditions of service of persons drafted under the 
mobilisation order ....................................................................................................................................39 

3.3. Volunteer battalions and mercenaries ................................................................................... 40 

3.3.1.  Volunteer battalions .............................................................................................. 40 

3.3.2. Mercenaries...............................................................................................................42 

3.4. Recruitment of prison inmates ...................................................................................................43 

4. 

Conscription and military recruitment in Chechnya ............................................... 47 

4.1.  Conditions of conscription and use of Chechen fighters in Ukraine............................ 47 

4.2. Methods of recruitment..................................................................................................................51 

5. 

Draft evasion, desertion, and violation of order ..................................................... 55 

5.1.  Criminal Code ...................................................................................................................................55 

5.2. Punishments under the law ......................................................................................................... 57 

5.2.1.  Evasion of mobilisation.......................................................................................... 57 

5.2.2. Desertion and abandonment of a military unit .............................................58 

5.2.3. Refusals of deployment to Ukraine...................................................................59 

5.2.4. The National Guard................................................................................................ 60 

5.3. Treatment of deserters by Russian forces in Ukraine ........................................................61 

Violations of humanitarian and international human rights law by Russian military 

6. 
forces in Ukraine .............................................................................................................. 63 

Annex 1: Bibliography....................................................................................................... 67 

Oral sources, including anonymous sources ................................................................................. 67 

Public sources ........................................................................................................................................... 67 

Annex 2: Terms of Reference ..........................................................................................104 

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EUROPEAN  UNION AGENCY  FOR  ASYLUM 

Disclaimer 

This report was written according to the EUAA COI Report Methodology (2019). The report is 
based on carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced. 

The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with 
utmost care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, 
person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has 
not taken place or that the person or organisation does not exist. 

Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particular 
application for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as 
indicative of a particular legal position. 

‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal 
sense as applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. 

Neither the EUAA, nor any person acting on its behalf, may be held responsible for the use 
which may be made of the information contained in this report. 

On 19 January 2022 the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) became the European Union 
Agency for Asylum (EUAA). All references to EASO, EASO products and bodies should be 
understood as references to the EUAA. 

The drafting of this report was finalised on 15 November 2022. Additional information was 
added during the quality review process up until 30 November 2022. More information on the 
reference period for this report can be found in the Methodology section of the Introduction. 

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THE  RUSSIAN  FEDERATION  – MILITARY SERVICE   

Glossary and abbreviations 

Term 

AFU 

Definition 

Armed Forces of Ukraine 

BARS 

National Army Combat Reserve, Boevoy Armeyskiy Rezerv Strany 

DNR 

FSB 

ISW 

Self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic 

Federal Security Forces 

Institute for the Study of War 

Kadyrovites 

Paramilitary units under direct control of Ramzan Kadyrov, the 
Head of the Chechen Republic (kadyrovtsy) 

LNR 

MoD 

OMON 

PMC 

RAF 

Self-proclaimed Luhansk People’s Republic 

Ministry of Defence 

Special Purpose Mobile Unit (Otryad Mobilny Osobogo 
Naznacheniya)  

Private military company 

Russian Armed Forces 

RFE/RL 

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 

Rosgvardia 

Russian National Guard 

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EUROPEAN  UNION AGENCY  FOR  ASYLUM 

Introduction 

The purpose of this report is to provide information regarding military service in the Russian 
Federation for international protection status determination, including refugee status and 
subsidiary protection, and in particular for EUAA Country Guidance on the Russian Federation.  

The report focuses on military service in the Russian Federation after Russia’s invasion in 
Ukraine on 24 February 2022. It describes ‘military service’ in a broad sense: as one -year 
obligatory military service, professional army contract service, military service under the 
‘partial’ mobilisation — an exceptional event announced by the Russian president the first time 
since the end of the World War II,1 as well as contract service and military use of volunteer 
battalions, mercenaries, and prison convicts in hostilities. The report outlines conditions of 
recruitment and focuses on deployment of each group to Ukraine. For conscripts  — young 
men aged 18-27 participating in obligatory military service — and people mobilised under the 
mobilisation order, the topics of exemption and deferrals from military service are particularly 
addressed. The report also covers military service in the Republic of Chechnya and instances 
of violations of humanitarian and human rights law by Russian military forces in Ukraine. 

The reference period of the report is 24 February 2022 – 15 November 2022. Some important 
events up to 30 November were included during the finalisation of the report. 

Methodology 

The report was drafted and reviewed in line with the EUAA COI Report Methodology (2019)2 
and the EASO COI Writing and Referencing Style Guide (2019) 3. 

This report was jointly drafted and reviewed by EUAA and national COI departments in EU+ 
countries4 mentioned in the Acknowledgements section. 

Defining the terms of reference (ToR) 

The terms of reference for this report were defined by EUAA based on discussions held and 
input received from country of origin information (COI) and policy experts in EU+ countries 
within the framework of a Country Guidance development on the Russian Federation. The 
terms of reference for this report can be found in Annex 2: Terms of Reference. 

The drafting period finished on 15 November 2022, peer review occurred between 17 – 23 
November 2022, and additional information was added to the report as a result of the quality 
review process during the review implementation up until 30 November 2022. 

1 Al Jazeera, Russia completes  partial mobilisation  of citizens  for Ukraine war, 1 November  2022, url  
2 EUAA, EASO  Country  of  Origin Information (COI)  Report  Methodology,  June  2019, url 
3 EUAA, EASO  Writing and Referencing  Guide for  EASO  Country  of Origi n Information  (COI) Reports,  June  2019, url 
4 EU Member  States  plus Norway  and Switzerland. 

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Collecting information 

This report is based on publicly available information in electronic and paper -based sources 
gathered through desk-based research. It also contains information from several oral sources 
with ground-level knowledge of the situation in the Russian Federation who were interviewed 
specifically for this report. For security reasons, oral sources are anonymised unless they have 
chosen to be named in relation to the organisation represented.  

Quality control 

The report was peer reviewed by COI specialists from EU+ countries mentioned in the 
Acknowledgements section, and internally by EUAA. All comments made by reviewers were 
taken into consideration and most of them were implemented in the final draft of this report. 
EUAA has performed the final quality review and editing of the text. 

Sources 

In accordance with EUAA COI methodology, a range of different published sources has been 
consulted on relevant topics covered by this report. These include COI reports by EU+ 
authorities, information from civil society and advocacy groups and NGOs, UN reports, 
academic publications, and media sources.  

In addition to publicly available sources, EUAA interviewed two external experts for this report. 
On 9 November 2022, EUAA conducted an online interview with Alexander Pomazuev, a 
lawyer at Anti-Corruption Foundation (Fond borby s korruptsiey, FBK). FBK was established in 
2011 by Alexey Navalny to investigate and make public instances of corruption among high-
ranking Russian officials.5 

On 11 November 2022, EUAA conducted an online interview with a well-established human 
rights lawyer in Russia, who preferred anonymity for security reasons. The expert was 
contacted by email also on 25 November 2022 for further clarifications. 

Additionally, EUAA contacted Dr. Huseyn Aliyev, a researcher in Security Studies at Central & 
Eastern European Studies (CEES) at the University of Glasgow, who provided his input related 
to military service and recruitment in Chechnya through email communication on 13 and 17 
November 2022. 

Due to the Russia’s invasion in Ukraine on 24 February 2022, research limitations during the 
drafting of this report were faced, including: restricted media coverage, closing of local media 
outlets, and increased censorship. On the day of the invasion, the Russia’s media regulator, 
Roskomnadzor, instructed Russian media outlets to use solely information from official Russian 
sources for their reporting, under the threat of fines and having their websites blocked.6 Media 

5 FBK, Anti-Corruption  Foundation,  n.d., url  
6 OSCE,  Media Freedom  Representative  strongly  denounces  Russian authorities’ restriction  on freedom  of the 
media and  freedom  of  information, 24 February  2022, url; Russia, Roskomnadzor, Вниманию  средств  массовой 
информации  и иных  информационных  ресурсов  [To  the  attention  of  the media  and other  information resources], 
24 February  2022, url 

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EUROPEAN  UNION AGENCY  FOR  ASYLUM 

was banned from using the terms ‘war’, ‘invasion’, or ‘assault’ when describing the situation in 
Ukraine.7 In March 2022, new legislation was introduced in the Code of Administrative 
Offences and the Criminal Code to punish dissemination of ‘false’ information and discrediting 
of Russian military and state institutions.8 Moreover, along with hundreds of journalists, human 
rights organisations and defenders were registered as ‘foreign agents’ and targeted and/or 
dissolved as a result.9 

The sources used in this report are further described in Annex 1: Bibliography. 

Structure and use of the report  

The report is structured in line with the terms of reference and is divided into six chapters. The 
first chapter presents an overview of the structure of the Russian Armed Forces (RAF) and 
focuses on three aspects of military service: obligatory military service, contract military 
service, and reserve of the RAF. In the subchapter on the obligatory military service, the report 
describes the organisation of a regular semi-annual conscription, exemptions and deferrals 
from military service, and possibilities of alternative civil service.  

The second chapter focuses on the scope and implementation of the ‘partial’ mobilisation, 
ordered by a decree of President Putin on 21 September 2022. The chapter gives information 
about the legal basis of the mobilisation, exemptions and deferrals, and legal ways to avoid 
mobilisation as well as on irregularities that were reported during the implementation of the 
mobilisation order. 

The third chapter describes various military personnel who has been deployed to Ukraine. In 
separate subchapters, the following groups are described: conscripts – men aged 18-27– who 
were deployed to Ukraine during their obligatory military service, persons drafted under the 
mobilisation order, volunteers and mercenaries, and prison convicts. The chapter further 
underlines the difference in the status of the abovementioned groups.  

The fourth chapter of the report describes conscription and military recruitment in the 
Chechen Republic.  

The fifth chapter focuses on the situation of military evaders, deserters, and people who 
violate an order by a superior. It also introduces the newest legislation introduced in 
September 2022 concerning these groups.  

The sixth chapter gives information on reported violations of humanitarian and international 
human rights law by Russian military forces in Ukraine.  

7 DW, Viral protests:  Russians continue  to denounce  war, risking imprisonment, 16 March 2022, url; Frontline 
Defenders,  Escalating  Crackdown  on  human rights defenders  and organisations,  19 April 2022, url 
8 Politico, Russia expands  laws criminalizing ‘fake news,’ 22 March 2022, url 
9 UN OHCHR, Human  Rights Committee  Considers  Report  of the  Russian Federation  in the  Absence  of  a 
Delegation, Experts  Raise Issues  on the  Persecution  of  Journalists  and the  Arrests  of Protesters,  20 October  2022, 
url 

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Maps 

Map 1. The Russian Federation10 

10 Map 1: UN, Russian Federation  -  Map No. 3840, January  2004 

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EUROPEAN  UNION AGENCY  FOR  ASYLUM 

Background 

In February 2022, prior to the invasion, it was estimated that 190 000 Russian troops were 
stationed on the border with Ukraine.11 On 24 February 2022, Russia started a large-scale 
military invasion of Ukraine, targeting Kyiv as well as Kharkiv, Dnipro, Mariupol, 12 and Odesa.13 
President Vladimir Putin named the invasion a ‘special military operation’,14 aimed to protect 
the self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ (DNR) and ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ 
(LNR).15 One day before the invasion, the Federation Council of the Russian Federation 
authorised the use of the Russian military outside Russia, as was requested by President 
Putin.16  

Following referendums on annexation of their territories to the Russian Federation held 
between 23 and 27 September,17 Russia-occupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and 
Zaporizhzhia, were formally annexed by Russia.18 The referendums were named illegal by 
Ukraine and the Western governments 19 and the UN General Assembly demanded an 
immediate withdrawal of Russian military forces from Ukraine.20 On 19 October, Russia 
imposed martial law in the mentioned occupied territories21 and ‘medium response’ and ‘high 
alert’ in Central and Southern federal districts of Russia. The governors of ‘high alert’ regions 
were given such powers as ‘the right to control entry and exit from their regions.’22   

By the end of September, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) said that Russia’s military 
losses in Ukraine had reached around 6 000 personnel.23 On 27 October 2022, the General 
Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) estimated the number of Russia’s military fatalities 
at 69 220.24 

On 21 September 2022, President Putin signed a ‘partial mobilisation’ order to offset military 
losses and the failure of recruitment efforts, including the recruitment of mercenaries and 
convicts,25 and to call up additional military personnel from the reserve of the Russian Armed 

11 Al Jazeera, Explainer: How  does  conscription  work in Russia?, 5 May  2022, url 
12 BBC, Ukraine conflict:  Russian forces  attack from  three  sides, 24 February  20 22, url; International Crisis Group, 
War in Europe:  Responding  to  Russia’s Invasion of  Ukraine, 24 February  2022, url 
13 International Crisis Group, War in Europe:  Responding  to  Russia’s Invasion of  Ukraine, 24 February  2022, url 
14 BBC, Ukraine: Ukraine: Putin  announces  special military operation  in TV  declaration, 24 February  2022, url 
International Crisis Group, War in Europe:  Responding  to  Russia’s Invasion of  Ukraine, 24 February  2022, url 
15 TASS,  Russian troops  launch special  military operation  to  defend  Donbass  republics  — top  brass, 24 February 
2022, url 
16 Reuters, Putin  gets  green  light to  deploy  troops  to  eastern  Ukraine, 22 February 2022, url  
17 Economist  (The), Vladimir Putin  declares  a partial mobilization, 21 September  2022, url 
18 Euronews,  Ukraine war: Russia illegally annexes  four regions  in east  Ukraine, 30 September  2022, url 
19 RFE/RL, Kyiv Slams Results  Of 'Sham'  Vote  In Russian-Occupied  Lands As  'Null And  Worthless’, 28 September 
2022, url  
20 UN, With 143 Votes  in Favour, 5 Against, General  Assembly  Adopts  Resolution  Condemning  Russian Federation’s 
Annexation  of Four  Eastern  Ukraine Regions,  12 October  2022, url  
21 Euronews,  Putin  imposes  martial law in four  Russia-annexed  regions  of Ukraine, 19 October  2022, url  
22 Pertsev,  A., How  Martial Law Will Change  the  Workings of  the  Russian Government,  Carnegie  Endowment  for 
International Peace,  26 October  2022, url  
23 Reuters, Russia calls up 300,000 reservists, says  6,000 soldiers killed in Ukraine, 21 September  2021, url 
24 Kiyv Independent  (The), Putin  claims Russia’s war casualties  are 10 times  less than Ukraine’s, 27 October  2022, 
url  
25 Economist  (The), Vladimir Putin  declares  a partial mobilization, 21 September  2022, url 

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Forces.26 A day before the mobilisation order was signed, the State Duma, the lower chamber 
of the Russian Parliament, approved a bill to increase ‘punishments for desertion, damage to 
military property, looting, defection, and insubordination if they are committed during military 
mobilisation or combat situations.’27 On 24 September, after the amendments were passed by 
the Federation Council, they were signed by President Putin.28 Early October, Forbes Russia 
reported that 700 000 people had left Russia in less than the first two weeks after the 
mobilisation was announced.29   

On 11 November 2022, Ukrainian forces retook Kherson. Before retreating, the Russian military 
destroyed the region’s critical infrastructure.30 After weeks of intense Russian bombardment 
since mid-October, which severely damaged Ukraine’s energy systems, the country faces a 
humanitarian disaster.31 According to UN OHCHR, 6 557 Ukrainian civilians were killed and 
10 074 injured from 24 February to 14 November 2022.32 

26 Conversation  (The), Russian army: Putin  details the  next  stage  of  the Ukraine war and  who  is being  called  up, 22 
September  2022, url  
27 RFE/RL, Russian Lawmakers Approve  Bill Toughening  Punishment  For Crimes During Mobilization, 20 September 
2022, url  
28 RFE/RL, Russia Toughens  Penalty  For  Voluntary  Surrender, Refusal  To Fight, 24 September  2022, url  
29 Forbes,  Россию  после  21 сентября  покинули  около  700 000 граждан  [Some  700,000 citizens  have  left Russia 
since  21 September],  4 October  2022, url  
30 AP, Explainer: How  important  is a Russian retreat  from Kherson,  11 November  2022, url  
31 Washington  Post  (The), Ukrainian energy  systems  on brink of collapse  after  weeks of  Russian bombing,  23 
November  2022, url  
32 UN OHCHR, Ukraine: civilian casualty  update  14 November  2022, 14 November  2022, url  

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EUROPEAN  UNION AGENCY  FOR  ASYLUM 

1. 

The Russian Armed Forces 

1.1.  Overview of the Russian Armed Forces 

The Russian Armed Forces (RAF) have a hybrid structure, consisting of professional soldiers 
employed under term contracts and conscripts drafted for one-year compulsory military 
service. 33 As a part of military reforms initiated following the invasion in Georgia in 2008, 34 
Russia has focused on the professionalisation of its armed forces and has reduced the term of 
the compulsory military service from two years to one year.35 While the share of the 
professional soldiers has reportedly doubled between 2012 and 201936 and the number of 
conscripts has decreased from 307 000 in 2016 to 261 150 in 2021,37 conscripts still constitute 
around 25 %38 – 30 %39 of active-duty personnel of the RAF. After completing compulsory 
military service conscripts are enlisted in the reserve, whose size is estimated at around 
25 million.40 

The total size of the RAF is estimated at 1.9 million.41 The number of combat personnel was set 
at 1.013 million by a presidential decree of November 2017.42 On 25 August 2022, another 
presidential decree was signed to increase the size of the RAF from 1.9 million to 2.04 million 
and the size of combat personnel to 1.151 million. The decree should take effect on 1 Janu ary 
2023.43 In its 2021 overview, the Military Balance44 estimated the actual number of RAF military 
personnel at 900 000.45 According to US-based researcher Pavel Luzin,46 the size of combat 
personnel of the RAF could be estimated at around 740 000 – 780 000 as of the beginning of 
2022.47 By the type of service, as conveyed by the Military Balance, 280 000 servicemen 

33 CSIS,  The  Best  or Worst of  Both  Worlds?, 23 September  2020, url; ISW, Explainer  on Russian Conscription, 
Reserve,  and Mobilization, 5 March 2022, url, p. 1 
34 Congressional  Research  Service:  Russian Armed  Forces:  Military Modernisation  and  Reforms, 20 July  2020, url, 
p. 1; CSIS,  The  Best  or Worst of  Both  Worlds?, 23 September  2020, url 
35 CSIS,  The  Best  or Worst of  Both  Worlds?, 23 September  2020, url  
36 EPRS,  Russia’s armed forces,  Defence  capabilities and policy,  March 2021, url, p. 2 
37 Statista,  Number of  military conscripts  in Russia from  2012 to 2022, by draft, 2 November  2022, url  
38 Freeman, S.B and  Kjellström Elgin K., What the  use  of Russian conscripts  tells us  about  the  war in Ukraine, 
Politico, 17 March 2022, url; EPRS, Russia’s armed  forces,  Defence  capabilities and  policy,  March 2021, url, p. 3 
39 TASS,  Conscripts’  share in Russian Army  declines  to  30%, says  lawmaker, 15 March 2021, url; LWJ, Ukraine’s 
Counteroffensives  in Kharkiv and Kherson  and  the Road  Ahead,  16 September  2022, url  
40 BBC, Ukraine war: Putin  orders partial mobilisation after facing  setbacks,  21 September  2022, url 
41 Reuters, Putin  signs  decree  to  increase  size of  Russian armed forces,  25 August  2022, url 
42 EPRS,  Russia’s armed forces,  Defence  capabilities and policy,  March 2021, url, p. 2; Reuters, Putin  signs decree  to 
increase  size of  Russian armed forces,  25 August  2022, url; Luzin, P., Russia’s Military Manpower  Crunch  Will 
Worsen, CEPA,  21 September  2022, url 
43 Reuters, Putin  signs  decree  to  increase  size of  Russian armed forces,  25 August  2022, url; Luzin, P., Russia’s 
Military Manpower  Crunch  Will Worsen, CEPA,  21 September  2022, url 
44 The  Military Balance is an ‘annual authoritative  assessment  of the  military capabilities and  defence  economics 
worldwide’ by  the  International Institute  for  Strategic  Studies,  see  Taylor  & Francis Online, The  Military Balance, 
n.d., url  
45 EPRS,  Russia’s armed forces,  Defence  capabilities and policy,  March 2021, url, p. 3; Regional  trends  in 2021, The 
Military Balance, Vol. 122, 2022 p. 164 
46 Pavel  Luzin holds a doctorate  in international relations from  the Institute  of  World Economy  and International 
Relations (IMEMO). He is an expert  on Russia’s politics, defence  affairs, and  global security,  see  Foreign  Policy 
Institute,  Pavel Luzhin, n.d., url  
47 Luzin, P., Russia’s Military Manpower  Crunch  Will Worsen, CEPA,  21 September  2022, url 

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were listed in the Army, 180 000 in the Command and Support, 165 000 in the Air forces, 
150 000 in the Navy, 50 000 in the Strategic Rocket Force, 45 000 in the Airborne forces, 
29 000 in the Railway Forces, and 1 000 in the Special Operations Forces. The number of 
Gendarmerie and Paramilitary forces was estimated at 554 000.48  

1.2.  Military service 

1.2.1.  Conscription and conditions of military service 

Conscription has historically constituted ‘the main source of military manpower’ of the RAF49 
since it is used to ensure that Russia would have a military reserve that can be used in case of 
a major war.50 According to Article 59 of the Constitution, all Russian citizens have ‘a duty and 
obligation’ to defend the country. The same Article stipulates that every citizen is obliged to 
‘carry out military service according to the federal law.’ The right to alternative civil service is 
guaranteed by paragraph 3 of the same Article and the way of its realisation is set to be 
regulated by the federal law.51 For information on alternative civil service, please refer to the 
chapter 1.2.3 Alternative  civil  service. 

General regulations 

One-year military service is compulsory for all Russian men aged 18 – 27.52 The MoD notes 
that completing compulsory military service is a prerequisite for a career in the public sector 
and governmental institutions.53 The number of men eligible to be drafted for military service 
is estimated at 1.2 million each year and around half of this number receives a draft notice 
requiring them to present themselves at a local military recruitment office (voenkomat).54 

Prior to conscription into obligatory military service, young men aged 16 – 17 undergo an initial 
military registration, which is carried out by military recruitment offices. As stated by MoD, the 
purpose of the initial registration is ‘to identify the number of pre-conscripts and define if they 
are medically fit for military service’ as well as to evaluate their level of education for further 
education or training. During the medical examination, pre-conscripts are assigned categories 
defining their physical and psychological fitness for military service.55  

As stipulated by Article 25 of the Federal Law on Military Duty and Military Service, the military 
draft is organised upon a presidential order and is carried out semi-annually: between 1 April 
and 15 July and between 1 October and 31 December. Three groups of Russian nationals have 
different conscription periods: residents of the Far North or certain areas equated to the Far 

48 Regional trends  in 2021, The Military Balance, Vol. 122, 2022, p. 193 
49 Luzin, P., Russia’s Military Manpower  Crunch  Will Worsen, CEPA,  21 September  2022, url 
50 Freeman, S.B and  Kjellström Elgin K., What the  use  of Russian conscripts  tells us  about  the  war in Ukraine, 
Politico, 17 March 2022, url; Al-Jazeera, Explainer: How  does  conscription  work in Russia?, 5 May  2022, url; Luzin, 
P., Russia’s Military Manpower  Crunch  Will Worsen, CEPA,  21 September  20 22, url 
51 Russia, The  Constitution  of  the  Russian Federation,  n.d., url 
52 Al Jazeera, Fearing front-line  deployment,  some  Russians  resist conscription,  18  March 2022, url, Freeman, S.B 
and Kjellström Elgin K., What the  use of  Russian conscripts  tells us about  the war in Ukraine, Politico,  17 March 
2022, url 
53 Russia, MoD, Conscription  service,  n.d., url  
54 ISW, Explainer on  Russian Conscription,  Reserve,  and  Mobilization, 5 March 2022, url, p. 1 
55 Russia, MoD, Military registration, url  

15 

 
EUROPEAN  UNION AGENCY  FOR  ASYLUM 

North (from 1 May to 15 July and from 1 November to 31 December), conscripts living in rural 
areas and engaged in sowing or harvesting works (only fall conscription with the dates from 15 
October to 31 December is carried out), and teaching staff (conscription is organised only in 
spring, between 1 May and 15 June).56  

According to the law, Russian men aged 18 – 27 who are subject to statutory military service 
must notify their local military recruitment office about the place of their residence. 57 Military 
recruitment officers were reported to have regularly visited homes (official addresses where a 
person is registered) and workplaces of reservists.58 A failure to inform military officials about a 
change of one’s place of residence as well as a failure to present oneself at a military 
recruitment office is an administrative offence under Article 21.5 of the Code of Administrative 
Offences and is punishable by a fine in the amount of 500 – 3 000 roubles [8 – 50 EUR].59  

Article 31 of the Federal Law on Military Duty and Military Service requires that a draft notice is 
handed in person and that a person must sign for it upon receipt.60 After receiving the draft 
notice, the person is obliged to report to the military recruitment office, where he must 
undergo a medical commission. If proven fit for military service, the person must present 
himself at a recruitment commission, whose role is to decide whether he will be conscripted, 
granted exemption or deferral from military service, or admitted to the reserve (zapas). If the 
commission decides that the person will be conscripted, he will be notified about the location 
of his military service. The recruitment commission also decides on requests to serve 
alternative civil service.61  

Article 328 part 1 of the Criminal Code stipulates that ‘evasion of conscription in the absence 
of lawful grounds for release from the military service’ is punishable by either a fine up to 
200 000 roubles [3 272 EUR], or in the amount of the wage or salary, or any other income of 
the convicted person for a period up to 18 months,62 or by compulsory labour for a period up 

56 Russia, Законы,  кодексы  и нормативно-правовые  акты Российской  Федерации  [Laws, codes  and regulations 
of  the Russian Federation],  Федеральный  закон  от 28.03.1998 N 53-ФЗ  (ред.  от 24.09.2022) "О воинской 
обязанности  и  военной  службе"  [Federal Law of  28 March 1998 N 53-FZ  (version of  24 September  2022) On 
Military Duty  and Military Service],  url 
57 Meduza,  ‘Prepare to  stand  up  for your  convictions’  During mobilization, escaping  the  draft is a legal problem  for 
many  Russians. Here’s a military lawyer’s advice  for those  who  don’t  want  to fight., 22 September  2022, url 
58 Moscow  Times (The), ‘I Don’t Trust  What They  Say’: Russian Draft Dodgers  Stay  in Hiding Even  as Putin 
Announces  Mobilization’s End, 2 November  2022, url  
59 Russia, Кодекс  Российской  Федерации  об  административных  правонарушениях,  от  30.12.2001 N 195-ФЗ 
(ред. от  04.11.2022) ["Code of Administrative  Offences  of  the Russian Federation,  of  30.12.2001 No 195 -FZ 
(amended  on 04.11.2022), n.d., url  
60 Russia, Законы,  кодексы  и нормативно-правовые  акты Российской  Федерации  [Laws, codes  and regulations 
of  the Russian Federation],  Федеральный  закон  от 28.03.1998 N 53-ФЗ  (ред.  от 24.09.2022) "О воинской 
обязанности  и  военной  службе"  [Federal Law of  28 March 1998 N 53-FZ  (version of  24 September  2022) On 
Military Duty  and Military Service],  url 
61 Garant.ru, Повестка  в военкомат:  содержание,  порядок  вручения,  обязанности  и ответственность  [Draft 
notice  to  report  to military enlistment  office:  contents,  delivery  procedure,  duties  and responsibilities], 20 October 
2022, url  
62 Russia, The  Criminal Code  of  the Russian Federation  No. 63-FZ  of June  13, 1996, IMOLIN, 28 December  2004, 
url; Russia, Уголовный  кодекс  Российской  Федерации  от  13.06.1996 N 63-ФЗ (ред.  от  24.09.2022) [Criminal 
Code  of the  Russian Federation  of  13.06.1996 N 63-FZ (version  24.09.2022)], 24 September  2022, url 

16 

 
THE  RUSSIAN  FEDERATION  – MILITARY SERVICE   

to two years,63 by arrest for up to six months, or by up to 2 years in prison.64 The criminal 
responsibility under Article 328 applies only in cases when the person has been found a draft 
evader by a court. The charges can be initiated in cases if a person deliberately ignores draft 
notices and calling-up for military service.65 As explained by a Prosecutor’s office of 
Chelyabinsk region, a failure to report to military recruitment office after having received a 
draft notice or a failure to report to a place of assembly for a departure to a military unit are 
understood as draft evasion. The source explained further that actions such as self-inflicted 
injury to avoid military service, a failure to present oneself for a medical examination, or a 
failure to receive draft notices sent by a military recruitment office as well as obtaining fake 
documents to get an exemption from military service are considered draft evasion.66 

After being drafted, conscripts receive a one- to two-month basic training, followed by 
advance training lasting from three to six months, after which they are sent to their designated 
units.67 Not all conscripted young men are assigned directly to the armed forces, with some 
sent to serve at Rosgvardia or the Ministry of Emergency Situations.68 The number of 
conscripts varies according to the type of service and units69 but they constitute about a 
quarter of the Special Forces (spetsnaz).70 

Conscripts can sign a contract with the RAF after three months of obligatory military service. 
Those who decide to continue their obligatory military service instead of enlisting with the RAF 
on a contract basis are used, as summarised by researcher Joris Van Bladel,71 as personnel 
whose tasks are to ensure ‘the functioning of the garrisons in their day-to-day routine’: 
maintenance workers, drivers, security, and kitchen staff.72 After completing obligatory military 
service, former conscripts are registered in the reserve.73 

Many Russian young men, especially from a wealthier social class74 and residents of large 
cities, such as Moscow and St Petersburg, try to avoid conscription. Legitimate ways to do this 
is to use a deferral due to studies or medical exemptions,75 other options include paying 
bribes and forging university attendance.76 Although the law requires that a draft notice must 

63 Russia, Уголовный  кодекс  Российской  Федерации  от  13.06.1996 N 63-ФЗ (ред.  от  24.09.2022) [Criminal Code 
of  the Russian Federation  of 13.06.1996 N 63-FZ (version  24.09.2022)], 24 September  2022, url 
64 Russia, The  Criminal Code  of  the Russian Federation  No. 63-FZ  of June  13, 1996, IMOLIN, 28 December  2004, 
url; Russia, Уголовный  кодекс  Российской  Федерации  от  13.06.1996 N 63-ФЗ (ред.  от  24.09.2022) [Criminal 
Code  of the  Russian Federation  of  13.06.1996 N 63-FZ (version  24.09.2022)], 24 September  2022, url  
65 Russia, Дальнереченский  муниципальный  район  [Dalnerechensk  municipal district], 30 November  2020, url  
66 Prokuratura Chelyabinskoy  oblasti, Evasion  of military service,  4 December  2020, url  
67 ISW, Explainer on  Russian Conscription,  Reserve,  and  Mobilization, 5 March 2022, url, p. 1  
68 Regional trends  in 2021, The Military Balance, Vol. 122, 2022 p. 164 
69 Freeman, S.B and  Kjellström Elgin K., What the  use  of Russian conscripts  tells us  about  the  war in Ukraine, 
Politico, 17 March 2022, url 
70 CSIS,  The  Best  or Worst of  Both  Worlds?, 23 September  2020, url 
71 Joris Van Bladel is a researcher  at Egmont  Royal Institute  for International Relations whose  areas of specialisation 
include  Russian military and strategic  culture, see, Egmont,  Joris Van Bladel, n.d., url  
72 Bladel, J. Van, Russian Spring  2022 Recruitment  Cycle  – Putin’s  Camouflaged  Referendum?  Egmont  Policy  Brief 
284, July 2022, url, pp. 2-3 
73 Human rights  lawyer, Online  interview with EUAA,  11 November  2022  
74 Conversation  (The), Russian army: Putin  details the  next  stage  of  the Ukraine war and  who  is being  called  up, 22 
September  2022, url 
75 EU Reporter,  More Russian men  look to  avoid military service,  some  lawyers and  rights groups  say, 12 July  2022, 
url  
76 Al Jazeera, Fearing front-line  deployment,  some  Russians  resist conscription,  18  March 2022, url 

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EUROPEAN  UNION AGENCY  FOR  ASYLUM 

be delivered in person and signed upon receipt, recruitment officials used to leave draft 
notices in mailboxes which also offered potential conscripts a legitimate way to avoid 
conscription.77 The unpopularity of the military service is reportedly connected to hazing 
(dedovshchina), which has created ‘the complete domination of junior soldiers by their elders 
and results ‘in a widespread culture of robbery, torture, and sexual assault.’ 78 

Conscription in 2022 

In 2022, conscripts receive a monthly allowance ranging from 2 086 to 4 300 roubles [around 
35 to 70 EUR], depending on duties and conditions of service.79 The number of conscripts to 
be drafted for military service in 2022 was set at 254 000,80 which is the lowest in the last ten 
years and 7 150 persons less than in 2021.81 

On 31 March 2022, President Putin signed a decree ordering the spring draft to be conducted 
between 1 April and 15 July and stipulating that 134 000 conscripts would be drafted during 
the exercise.82 The MoD underlined that the spring conscription was not related to the special 
operation in Ukraine and that the conscripted men would not be sent to any ‘hot spots’,83 
which is a reported euphemism for the armed conflict in Ukraine.84 By 11 July, 89 000 
conscripts were reportedly assigned to their military units.85 The launch of the spring 
conscription campaign sparked fears that new conscripts would be sent to Ukraine 
notwithstanding the statements by the authorities and many reached out to NGOs for legal 
support to avoid military service.86  

On 30 September 2022, Putin signed a decree to start the autumn conscription to draft 
120 000 men. The conscription was set to take place from 1 November to 31 December.87 The 
autumn draft started one month later than usual due to the ‘partial mobilisation’, 88 which was 
officially held between 21 September and 31 October 2022.89 Similarly to the spring campaign, 
MoD said that the draft was not ‘in any way related to the special operation.’90 The General 
Staff of the RAF, said that conscripts would not be used in hostilities in Ukraine and ‘the 
conscripts that are discharged upon the end of their service will be sent home.’ 91 According to 
the law, residents of 24 municipalities across five regions in Russia – Yakutia, Chukotka, 

77 Meduza,  A history  of forced  conscription  - A  history  of forced  conscription  Russia's first military draft of  2022 
ends  soon.  That  could  spell danger  for recent  college  graduates,  26 February  2022, url  
78 Post  (The), The  Russian army’s number  one  problem?  Hazing, 29 March  2022, url  
79 Neprizovnoy.ru,  Размер  зарплаты  в РФ  срочникам  [Salary for conscripts  in the army  of RF], n.d., url  
80 Reuters, Russia drafts  134,500 conscripts  but  says  they  won't  go to  Ukraine, 31 March 2022, url; TASS,  Russia to 
start fall conscription  on November  1, plans to  call up  120,000 people,  30 September  2022, url 
81 Statista,  Number of  military conscripts  in Russia from  2012 to 2022, by draft, 2 November  2022, url  
82 Reuters, Russia drafts  134,500 conscripts  but  says  they  won't  go to  Ukraine, 31 March 2022, url 
83 Reuters, Russia drafts  134,500 conscripts  but  says  they  won't  go to  Ukraine, 31 March 2022, url 
84 Al-Jazeera,  Explainer: How does  conscription  work in Russia?, 5 May 2022, url 
85 Luzin, P., Russia’s Military Manpower  Crunch  Will Worsen, CEPA,  21 September  2022, url 
86 Washington  Post  (The), As Russia drafts  young  men, some  fear endi ng  up on  Ukraine’s front  line, 2 April 2022, 
Factiva 
87 TASS,  Russia to  start fall conscription  on  November  1, plans to  call up  120,000 people, 30 September  2022, url  
88 Lenra.ru, В России  с  1 ноября  начинается  осенний  призыв.  Где  будут  служить  срочники  и кому  положена 
отсрочка?  [The  autumn  conscription  starts in Russia on 1 November.  Where will conscripts  serve  and who  is 
entitled  to  deferment?],  1 November  2022, url 
89 Reuters, After  weeks  of  chaos, Russia says  partial mobilisation  is complete,  31 October  2022, url  
90 Reuters, Russia's  Putin signs  decree  on routine  autumn  conscription  – TASS,  30 September  2022, url 
91 TASS,  Russia to  start fall conscription  on  November  1, plans to  call up  120,000 people, 30 September  2022, url  

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THE  RUSSIAN  FEDERATION  – MILITARY SERVICE   

Transbaikal, Kamchatka and Khabarovsk territories – are drafted only in the spring draft. 
According to the authorities, there would be no conscription in the occupied DNR, LNR, 
Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions.92 As of 27 November 2022, no information that the 
persons in abovementioned occupied regions would be still drafted under semi-annual 
conscription was found. In a separate process, self-appointed leaders of DNR and LNR have 
ordered mobilisation of their population on 19 February 2022.93 

1.2.2.  Exemptions and deferrals from military service  

The reasons for draft exemption are defined by Article 23 of the Law on Military Duty and 
Military Service of 1998. The exemption is made for persons who were found unfit due to 
health-related reasons, persons who have completed the obligatory military service or 
alternative service, persons with an academic degree, and persons whose father or brother 
died while performing military service or training or as result of an injury received during 
military service. Other groups exempted from military service are convicts serving their 
sentence, persons with an outstanding criminal record, or persons under investigation.94 

There is a list of medical illnesses that disqualify a person from entry to military service.95 The 
list is a part of a regulation on army medical examination of 4 July 2013. Based on the 
assigned category, which is designated by the first five letters of the Cyrillic alphabet (A, Б, В, 
Г, Д),96 some of the listed medical conditions exempt the person from military service and 
others limit the person’s military duty to service in a certain branch of military forces or give a 
temporary exemption.97 

Deferral conditions are stipulated in Article 24 of the Law on Military Duty and Military Service 
of 1998. Deferral is granted if a person is found temporarily unfit for military service (up to one 
year) or is a full-time student. Deferral is also provided if a person delivers care for their 
relatives who need constant assistance or supervision on health grounds, has been assigned 
as a permanent custodian or guardian of his underage sibling, is a single father, has two or 
more children, has a child with a disability under the age of three,98 or has a child and a 
pregnant wife (over 22 weeks). Employment with certain institutions can also provide a ground 
for deferral from military service. These institutions comprise the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the 
Federal Fire Service, law enforcement agencies, customs authorities, and Rosgvardia. Deferral 

92 Lenra.ru, В России  с  1 ноября  начинается  осенний  призыв.  Где  будут  служить  срочники  и кому  положена 
отсрочка?  [The  autumn  conscription  starts in Russia on 1 November.  Where will conscripts  serve  and who  is 
entitled  to  deferment?],  1 November  2022, url 
93 Reuters, Separatist  leaders in eastern  Ukraine declare  full military mobilisation, 19 February  2022,  url  
94 Russia, MoD, Draft exemption  and  determents,  n.d., url; Russia, Законы,  кодексы  и нормативно-правовые  акты 
Российской  Федерации  [Laws, codes  and regulations  of  the Russian Federation],  Федеральный  закон  от 
28.03.1998 N 53-ФЗ  (ред. от  24.09.2022) "О воинской  обязанности  и военной  службе"  [Federal  Law of  28 
March 1998 N 53-FZ  (version of  24 September  2022) On Military Duty  and  Military Service],  url 
95 Al Jazeera, Explainer: How  does  conscription  work in Russia?, 5 May  2022, url 
96 Fontanka.ru, Болезнь  по расписанию.  Рассказываем,  что  дает  отсрочку  от  мобилизации  и кто признается 
годным  к службе  [Desease  on the  table. We tell you  what  gives  you  a deferral  from mobilisation and  who is 
deemed  fit to serve],  23 September  2022, url  
97 Prizyva.net,  Расписание  болезней:  инструкция  [Table  of diseases:  the  instructions],  n.d., url  
98 Russia, MoD, Draft exemption  and  determents,  n.d., url; Russia, Законы,  кодексы  и нормативно-правовые  акты 
Российской  Федерации  [Laws, codes  and regulations  of  the Russian Federation],  Федеральный  закон  от 
28.03.1998 N 53-ФЗ  (ред. от  24.09.2022) "О воинской  обязанности  и военной  службе"  [Federal  Law of  28 
March 1998 N 53-FZ  (version of  24 September  2022) On Military Duty  and  Military Service],  url 

19 

 
EUROPEAN  UNION AGENCY  FOR  ASYLUM 

is also granted to persons elected as deputies in the State Duma, the legislative bodies of the 
state authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, or local government (for 
the time of the employment) or persons registered as an office seeker of federal or local 
authorities.99  

In March 2022, a deferral from statutory military service was granted to IT specialists 100 who 
have a university degree in such fields as mathematics, computer science, physics, etc., are 
employed full-time, and have worked in the profession at least for 11 months or had started to 
work within 1 year after completion of studies. The employer must submit the documents 
about the employment to the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass 
Media, which then forwards them to MoD.101 This deferral was granted under the governmental 
regulation of 28 March which was issued in compliance with the presidential order [informal 
translation] ‘On measures to ensure the accelerated development of the information 
technology industry in the Russian Federation.’102 

1.2.3.  Alternative civil service 

Conscientious objectors have a right to substitute active military service with alternative civil 
service (alternativnaya grazhdanskaya sluzhba, AGS).103 This right is stipulated by Article 59.3 
of the Russian Constitution and is applied if a person’s ‘convictions or religious beliefs 
contradict military service’104 or ‘in other cases envisaged by the federal law.’105 The right to 
substitute military service with alternative civil service is also applicable to young men from 
small indigenous ethnic minorities who pursue a traditional way of life.106 Alternative civil 
service is regulated by the Federal Law ‘On Alternative Civil Service.’107 The period of 
alternative civil service is either 18 or 21 months, depending on the profile of the organisation 
where it is performed.108 As explained by MoD, 18-month service is applied if a person is 
engaged as civilian personnel at the RAF or other military institutions. 109  

A person who wants to choose alternative service on the grounds of religious beliefs or 
personal convictions must follow a bureaucratic procedure,110 which consists of a written 
application, substantiated by documentation and/or witness statements.111 As noted by Sergey 

99 Russia, Законы,  кодексы  и нормативно-правовые  акты Российской  Федерации  [Laws, codes  and regulations 
of  the Russian Federation],  Федеральный  закон  от 28.03.1998 N 53-ФЗ  (ред.  от 24.09.2022) "О воинской 
обязанности  и  военной  службе"  [Federal Law of  28 March 1998 N 53-FZ  (version of  24 September  2022) On 
Military Duty  and Military Service],  url 
100 Economic  Times, Russia 'postpones'  military service  for IT specialists, 29 March  2022, 29 March 2022, url  
101 Prizyva.net,  Призыв  в армию  в 2022 году [Conscription  in 2022], 3 November  2022, url 
102 Russia, Правительство  Российской  Федерации  – Постановление  от  28 марта  2022 года, No 490 [The 
Government  of  the Russian Federation  – Regulation  of 28  March 2022, No. 490], 28 March  2022, url  
103 Al Jazeera, Fearing front-line  deployment,  some  Russians  resist conscription,  18  March 2022, url; Al-Jazeera, 
Explainer: How  does  conscription  work in Russia?, 5 May 2022, url 
104 Russia, The  Constitution  of  the  Russian Federation,  n.d., url; Al Jazeera, Explainer: How  does  conscription  work 
in Russia?, 5 May 2022, url 
105 Russia, The  Constitution  of  the  Russian Federation,  n.d., url 
106 TASS,  Farewell to  Arms: Russia's 'alternative'  to  military service, 1 April 2017, url; Al Jazeera, Fearing  front-line 
deployment,  some  Russians resist  conscription,  18  March 2022, url 
107 Russia, MoD, Alternative  service,  n.d., url 
108 Prizyva.net,  Призыв  в армию  в 2022 году [Conscription  in 2022], 3 November  2022, url 
109 MoD, Alternative  Service  in the  Armed  Forces  of the  Russian Federation,  n.d.,  url  
110 Al Jazeera, Fearing front-line  deployment,  some  Russians  resist conscription,  18  March 2022, url 
111 Prizyva.net,  Призыв  в армию  в 2022 году [Conscription  in 2022], 3 November  2022, url 

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THE  RUSSIAN  FEDERATION  – MILITARY SERVICE   

Krivenko, the head of the human rights group Citizen. Army. Law., in his interview with the 
Danish Immigration Service (DIS) in May 2022, the right to apply for alternative service is used 
only during enlistment and it does not apply to people already undergoing military service.112 
For information on alternative civil service under the ‘partial’ mobilisation order, see chapter  
2.2.2. Legal ways to avoid mobilisation. 

According to data from MoD, as reported by Al Jazeera in May 2022, the yearly number of 
applications for alternative service is around 2 000, with an estimated half of them receiving a 
positive decision.113 According to the statistics of the Federal Service of Labour and 
Employment, 1 152 young men were enrolled in alternative civil service as of 1 February 
2022.114  

According to Article 328.2 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, evasion from 
alternative civil service is ‘punishable by a fine in the amount of up to 80 thousand roubles 
[1 310 EUR], or in the amount of the wage or salary, or any other income of the convicted 
person for a period up to six months, or by compulsory labour for a term of 180 to 240 hours, 
or by arrest for three to six months.’115 

As reported by Jehovah’s Witnesses Office of Public Information to UN OHCHR in March 
2022, there have been instances in which conscripts, fearing to reveal their religious 
affiliation, have requested alternative civil service on the grounds of personal convictions  
which has made the substantiation of their requests more difficult. The source also reported 
that the conscripts requesting alternative civil service on the grounds of their religious beliefs 
have been threatened by members of recruitment commissions and their requests have been 
rejected.116 Jehovah’s Witnesses was banned in Russia as an ‘extremist’ organisation and its 
members face raids, detentions, and arrests.117 

1.3.  Contract military service 

Contract soldiers are concentrated in the cadre and elite units, especially the airborne units.’ 118 
As explained by MoD, servicemen who are to join the forces under contract are to pass ‘the 
rigid multi-level system of selection of candidates’, which includes mandatory instruction in 
training centres of educational institutions in preparation for contracts. 119 

112 Denmark, DIS, Rusland – Militærtjeneste [Russia – Military Service],  July  2022, url, p. 61 
113 Al Jazeera, Explainer: How  does  conscription  work in Russia?, 5 May  2022, url 
114 News.ru, Сознательные  отказчики:  у призывников  вырос  интерес  к альтернативной  службе  [Conscientious 
objectors:  interest in alternative  service  among  conscripts  increased], 16 May 2022, url 
115 Russia, The  Criminal Code  of  the Russian Federation  No. 63-FZ  of June  13, 1996, IMOLIN, 28 December  2004, 
url; Russia, Уголовный  кодекс  Российской  Федерации  от  13.06.1996 N 63-ФЗ (ред.  от  24.09.2022) [Criminal 
Code  of the  Russian Federation  of  13.06.1996 N 63-FZ (version  24.09.2022)], 24 September  2022, url  
116 Jehovah’s  Witnesses, Office  of Public  Information, Information  on Conscientious  Objection  to  Military Service 
Involving  Jehovah’s  Witnesses, Contribution  for  OHCHR  Quadrennial Analytical Report  on  Conscientious  Objection 
to  Military Service,  21 March  2022, url, p. 12  
117 USCIRF, Russia’s Persecution  of  Jehovah’s  Witnesses,  14 October  2022, url  
118 ISW, Explainer on  Russian Conscription,  Reserve,  and  Mobilization, 5 March 2 022, url 
119 Russia, MoD, Contract  service,  n.d, url 

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EUROPEAN  UNION AGENCY  FOR  ASYLUM 

There are two ways to enlist in contract service with the RAF. Russian men from the age of 18 
can join the ranks of contract soldiers by applying at a military enlistment office,120 signing a 
temporary contract with MoD.121 Moreover, former conscripts are offered to sign a contract 
after completing their one-year obligatory military service and the employment at the RAF is 
accepted by many.122 If a conscript has obtained a university degree or completed a vocational 
education by the time he has started obligatory military service, he can opt to enlist as a 
contract soldier instead of starting the obligatory one-year military service and is offered to do 
so by recruitment officers. Conscripts can also sign a contract with the RAF after completing 
three months of their military service (instead of continuing the obligatory one-year service) 
and are ‘pressed by their commanders to do this.’123  

Before May 2022, the age limits for signing a first contract with RAF were 18 – 40 for Russian 
nationals and 18 – 30 for foreign nationals.124 In May 2022, the State Duma approved a bill to 
raise the upper age limit for enlistment in the RAF on a contractual basis.125 Signed by the 
president, the new law removed the upper age limit of 40 126 and enabled men up to the age of 
65 to enlist.127 As explained by Russian lawmakers, the change of the legislation was made to 
attract ‘highly professional specialists’ who would use ‘high-precision weapons and operate 
weapons and military equipment’128 as well as medical personnel and engineering 
specialists.129  

1.4. 

Reserve  

There are two types of reserves (Zapas Vooruzhennyh Sil) in the Russian military system.130 
The general reserve is defined as ‘inactive mobilisation reserve’ or ‘mobilisation human 
resource.’131 It consists of persons who: 

•  were discharged from the RAF and then enrolled in the reserve of the RAF; 
•  have completed their military service or alternative civil service; 
•  have completed studies at a military educational institution or a training at military 

training centers at state educational institutions;  

•  have been exempted from military service or have obtained a deferral from military 

service until reaching the age of 27;  

•  have not been subjected for military service because of reaching the age of 27;  

120 Russian Federation,  MoD, Contract  Service  – Terms of  admission, n.d., url 
121 DW, Russian soldiers  being  jailed in occupied  Donbas, 8  April 2022, url  
122 Human rights  lawyer, Online  interview with EUAA,  11 November  2022 
123 Luzin, P., Russia’s Military Manpower  Crunch  Will Worsen, CEPA,  21 September  2022, url; Pavel Chikov, 
Telegram, 2 March 2022, url 
124 RFR/RL, Russian Duma Approves  Bill Raising Age  Limit For Military Personnel  To  65, 25 May 2022, url; Reuters, 
Russia scraps  age  limit for new troops  in Ukraine push, 29 March  2022, url  
125 RFR/RL, Russian Duma Approves  Bill Raising Age  Limit For Military Personnel  To  65, 25 May 2022, url  
126 Reuters, Russia scraps  age  limit for new  troops  in Ukraine push,  29 March 2022, url  
127 Reuters, Russia scraps  age  limit for new  troops  in Ukraine push,  29 March 2022, url  
128 Moscow  Times (The), Russian Lawmakers Scrap  Upper  Age  Limit for  Military Service,  25 May 2922, url  
129 RFR/RL, Russian Duma Approves  Bill Raising Age  Limit For Military Personnel  To  65, 25 May 2022, url; 
130 Global Security.org,  Russia – Military, Reserves, n.d., url; Russia, Законы, кодексы  и нормативно-правовые 
акты Российской  Федерации  [Laws, codes  and regulations  of  the Russian  Federation], Федеральный  закон  от 
28.03.1998 N 53-ФЗ  (ред. от  24.09.2022) О воинской  обязанности  и военной  службе  [Federal Law of 28 March 
1998 N 53-FZ  (version  of  24 September  2022) “On Military Duty  and  Military Service”],  url, see  Article 51.2. 
131 Cranny-Evans,  S., Understanding  Russia’s Mobilisation, RUSI, 28 September  2022, url  

22 

 
THE  RUSSIAN  FEDERATION  – MILITARY SERVICE   

•  have not completed obligatory military service without having a legal basis for 

exemption; 

•  women who have acquired military specialisations.132  

While the head of MoD claimed that there were 25 million people with combat experience in 
the RAF’s reserve, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) noted that this was a ‘wildly’ 
exaggerated number.133 Article 53 of the Federal Law on Military Duty and Military Service 
divides persons in the RAF’s reserve into three categories, as displayed in the table below:  

Table 1. Persons in the RAF’s reserve 

Age of Russian nationals in the RAF’s 
reserve 

First tier 

Second tier  Third tier 

Soldiers, sailors, sergeants, petty officers, 
warrant officers, and midshipmen 

up to 35 

up to 45 

up to 50 

Junior officers 

up to 50 

up to 55 

up to 60 

Majors, Captains of the 3rd rank, Lieutenant 
Colonels, Captains of the 2nd rank 

up to 55 

up to 60 

up to 65 

Colonels, Captains of the 1st rank 

up to 60 

up to 65 

Superior officers 

up to 65 

up to 70 

Source:  Federal  Law  on Military Duty  and  Military Service,  informal translation134 

The indication of a category of person in the RAF’s reserve is indicated in the person’s military 
service record card. In case of a mobilisation, the persons who have an indication of a first tier 
in their card are to be called to the service first.135 According to Article 53, women in the RAF’s 

132 Obyasnyaem.rf.  Чем отличаются  военнообязанные,  находящиеся  в запасе, от  резервистов?  [What is the 
difference  between  the  people  in the reserve  and reservists?],  26 September  2022, url  
133 ISW, Russian Defense  Minister Sergei  #Shoigu’s  interview offers  more  insight into what  the  Russian “partial 
mobilization”  really means. We will unpack  some  of  the  key points  in this thread, Twitter,  21 September  2022, url  
134 Russia, Законы,  кодексы  и нормативно-правовые  акты Российской  Федерации  [Laws, codes  and regulations 
of  the Russian Federation],  Федеральный  закон  от 28.03.1998 N 53-ФЗ  (ред.  от 24.09.2022) "О воинской 
обязанности  и  военной  службе"  [Federal Law of  28 March 1998 N 53-FZ  (version of  24 September  2022) On 
Military Duty  and Military Service],  url, see  Article 53. 
135 Sluzhba  podderzhki,  Telegram,  21 September,  url 

23 

 
 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN  UNION AGENCY  FOR  ASYLUM 

reserve are assigned the third category. Women in officer rank remain in the reserve until 
reaching the age of 50, others remain until they reach the age of 45. 136  

Next to the general reserve described above, there is also an active mobilisation reserve, 
defined as ‘mobilisation human reserve’137, which consists of persons who have completed 
military service and acquired a military rank or have completed military training for army 
officers in reserve138 and signed a contract with a military unit commander.139 Persons included 
into the active mobilisation reserve commit to taking part in military training, for which they 
receive financial compensation.140 The first contract is signed for three years. Every 
subsequent contract is signed for a period of three or five years, or for a shorter period if a 
person reaches the age limit to be included in the reserve.141 According to International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, Russia’s reserve was estimated at two million people.142 
However, as noted by ISW, the country had not been able to ensure a regular training for the 
reservists.143 

In August 2021, an initiative ‘to create a high-readiness mobilisation reserve force’ called 
BARS-2021 (National Army Combat Reserve, Boevoy Armeyskiy Rezerv Strany) was launched 
in the Southern Military District144 (previously, the North Caucasus Military District, to which 
Crimea was added in 2014145), which has the headquarters in Rostov-on-Don.146 Within the 
initiative aimed at recruiting, it was planned to recruit 38 000 reservists, who were to sign a 
three-year contract ‘as reserve soldiers, sergeants, and officers’ and become assigned to a 
specific military unit. 147 As reported by ISW, based on Russian-language sources, ‘[e]ligible 
reservists included soldiers younger than 42, junior officers younger than 47, colonels younger 
than 57, and other senior officials younger than 52.’148 It was planned that the reservists ‘would 
attend military-training camps for three weeks’ once a year.149 According to researcher Sam 
Cranny-Evans,150 9 000 contracts within BARS initiative were signed in the Central Military 

136 Russia, Законы,  кодексы  и нормативно-правовые  акты Российской  Федерации  [Laws, codes  and regulations 
of  the Russian Federation],  Федеральный  закон  от 28.03.19 98 N 53-ФЗ  (ред.  от 24.09.2022) "О воинской 
обязанности  и  военной  службе"  [Federal Law of  28 March 1998 N 53-FZ  (version of  24 September  2022) On 
Military Duty  and Military Service],  url 
137 Global Security.org,  Russia – Military, Reserves, n.d., url 
138 Russia, Ofitsialny  sait goroda  Novosibirska, О  мобилизационном  резерве  [About  the  mobilisation reserve], 24 
February  2022, url  
139 Riamo, Военный  призыв  весной  2022 года: что  нужно  знать [Military draft  in the  spring  of 2022: what you 
need  to  know], 21 May  2022, url  
140 Pavel  Chikov, Telegram,  10 March  2022, url  
141 Russia, Ofitsialny  sait goroda  Novosibirska, О  мобилизационном  резерве  [About  the  mobilisation reserve], 24 
February  2022, url 
142 How  Do the Militaries of  Russia and  Ukraine Stack  Up?, 4  February 2022, url  
143 ISW, Explainer on  Russian Conscription,  Reserve,  and  Mobilization, 5 March 2022, url, p. 2 
144 Regional trends  in 2021, The Military Balance, Vol. 122, 2022 , p. 168 
145 OSW,  Eyes  west!  A shift in focus  in Russia’s Southern  Military District, 8  September  2020, url  
146 Regional trends  in 2021, The Military Balance, Vol. 122, 2022, p. 188 
147 Regional trends  in 2021, The Military Balance, Vol. 122, 2022, p. 168 
148 ISW, Explainer on  Russian Conscription,  Reserve,  and  Mobilization, 5 March 2022, url, p. 2 
149 Regional trends  in 2021, The Military Balance, Vol. 122, 2022, p. 168 
150 Sam Cranny-Evans  is a Research  Analyst  at Royal United  Services  Institute  (RUSI), see,  RUSI, Sam  Cranny-Evans, 
url 

24 

 
THE  RUSSIAN  FEDERATION  – MILITARY SERVICE   

District,151 which has headquarters in Yekaterinburg.152 BARS reservists have been reportedly 
deployed to Ukraine to participate in the hostilities.153 

151 Cranny-Evans,  S., Understanding  Russia’s Mobilisation, RUSI, 28 September  2022, url 
152 Regional trends  in 2021, The Military Balance, Vol. 122, 2022, p. 203 
153 Cranny-Evans,  S., Understanding  Russia’s Mobilisation, RUSI, 28 September  2022, url 

25 

 
EUROPEAN  UNION AGENCY  FOR  ASYLUM 

2.  Mobilisation 

2.1. 

The scope of the ‘partial’ mobilisation 

On 21 September 2022, President Putin signed an order on a ‘partial mobilisation in the 
Russian Federation’. According to the presidential order, Russian nationals called for military 
service would have the status of contract servicemen.154 The mobilisation was named ‘partial’ 
as it had to be applied to only those Russian nationals who had previously served in the 
Russian military forces and had acquired certain specialisations,155 such as riflemen, tank 
operators, artillery gunners, drivers, and driver-mechanics.156  

According to MoD, the mobilisation aimed at calling to the service 300 000 reserve 
servicemen,157 which constituted 1.2 % of the number of the people listed in the reserve.158 As 
explained by a rear admiral, who spoke with the independent news outlet Meduza as an 
official representative of the RAF, mobilisation was to ‘affect rank-and-file soldiers up to 35 
years old, junior officers up to 50 years old, and senior officers up to 55 years old’. According 
to the source, the first reservists who would be drafted were those with the most required 
military skills and combat experience. The source also noted that the need for medical 
support, in which women could be engaged, was minimal.159  

The mobilisation order was met with criticism because of lack of transparency. Critics said that 
despite the mobilisation was named ‘partial’, the non-classified articles of the order contained 
no definitions according to which the drafting of the reservists could be limited.160 The 7th 
paragraph of the decree, which is supposed to have the target number of people to be 
drafted under the mobilisation order, is classified.161 According to Novaya Gazeta, this 
paragraph would allow to draft up to one million reservists,162 while Meduza, referring to its 
sources in ‘one of the country’s federal ministries,’ gave a number of 1.2 million.163 The Kremlin 
has denied these claims.164 

154 Russia, President  of Russia, Executive  Order on  partial mobilisation in the  Russian Federation,  21 September 
2022, url 
155 RUSI, Vladimir Putin’s  Speech  – Scrutinised,  22 September  2022, url 
156 Meduza,  Russia's not-so-partial  'partial mobilization'  More details emerge  about  the  Kremlin’s draft, 22 
September  2022, url  
157 Garant.ru, Частичная  мобилизация  – 2022: краткие ответы  на важные вопросы  [Partial mobilisation - 2022: 
short  answers  to important  questions],  22 September  2022, url 
158 Vazhnye  Istorii, Какие регионы  отдали  больше  всего  мужчин  на войну  [Which regions sent  more  men to  the 
war], 5 October  2022, url 
159 Meduza,  Russia's not-so-partial  'partial mobilization'  More details emerge  about  the  Kremlin’s draft, 22 
September  2022, url 
160 Radio Svoboda,  На сухопутных  пограничных  пунктах  в России  – очереди  из автомобилей  [Car queues  at 
Russian land border  checkpoints],  22 September  2022, url; Alexander Pomazuev,  interview  with EUAA, 9 
November  2022 
161 Meduza,  Rostov  and  Kursk governors  announce  ‘second  wave’  of mobilization, 11 October  2022, url  
162 Novaya  Gazeta, Kremlin source:  hidden  article in Putin’s  mobilisation order allows Russia to  draft one  million 
people,  22 September  2022, url  
163 Meduza,  Russia to conscript  1.2 million people,  23 September  2022, url  
164 RFE/RL, Russia Continues  Crackdown  On  Spreading  Anti-Mobilization  Protests  As Draft Criticism Grows, 26 
September  2022, url 

26 

 
THE  RUSSIAN  FEDERATION  – MILITARY SERVICE   

Uncertainty about the profiles of people who would be mobilised created a panic across the 
country.165 Novaya Gazeta reported that 261 000 Russian men left the country between 21 and 
24 September 2022.166  

On 4 October 2022, MoD reported that 200 000 people had been drafted under the 
mobilisation order of 21 September.167 Research by independent media project Vazhnye Istorii 
(Stories that Matter, alternatively Important Stories) and Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT), 
published on 5 October 2022, found that 212 200 people were drafted in 53 out of 85 
administrative regions of Russia, which suggested that the number of people drafted across 
the country should be higher.168 Independent news outlet Mediazona has calculated, based on 
the number of marriages that were registered after the announcement of the mobilisation, that 
492 000 men were drafted country-wide by mid-October.169 EUAA was not able to verify the 
methodology used by the source. 

As reported by Meduza, there were no official quotas on the number of people to be drafted. 
However, each federal subject of the Russian Federation had a ‘separate target’ for the 
number of servicemen to draft, which was based on ‘existing human mobilisation reserves.’ 170 
Several regions reported applying additional mobilisation quotas.171 On 11 October 2022, the 
governor of Rostov region said that the regional authorities had received ‘a new mobilisation 
assignment’. The same day, a start of a ‘second wave’ of mobilisation was announced by the 
government of Kursk region.172 In mid-October, additional quotas were also announced by the 
authorities of Voronezh region and Udmurtia.173 According to a human rights lawyer, 
interviewed by EUAA in November 2022, the target numbers for people to be drafted during 
the mobilisation had been adjusted on several occasions. According to the source, the initial 
target for Tatarstan comprised 10 000 men and was reduced to 3 000 after a wave of public 
dissent; after some time, the target was raised to 8 000. The source said that this has likely 
happened also in other regions, in which there was concern about the public’s reaction.174 

On 28 October 2022, the Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu announced that the mobilisation 
was completed. The minister reported that 82 000 of 300 000 drafted persons were 
deployed to Ukraine and 218 000 were undergoing training.175 Legal experts have noted that 
the mobilisation can be completed only with a presidential order, as the order about the 

165 Klain D., Mobilization Can’t Save  Russia’s War, FP,  4 October  2022, url 
166 Novaya  Gazeta, Sources:  FSB  reports  260,000 men left Russia, wants  to  close  borders,  26 September  2022, url 
167 Meduza,  Rostov  and  Kursk governors  announce  ‘second  wave’  of mobilization, 11 October  2022, url  
168 Vazhnye  Istorii, Какие регионы  отдали  больше  всего  мужчин  на войну  [Which regions sent  more  men to  the 
war], 5 October  2022, url; Meduza, A new  report  shows  discrepancies  in Russian draft statistics  213,000 have  been 
mobilized  in Russia — but  this only  accounts  for  two-thirds  of  its regions, not  the  whole nation,  as claimed by 
Shoigu,  5 October  2022, url 
169 Mediazona,  Married and  drafted.  Almost  half a million Russian men  were mobilised  in a month  based  on a spike 
in marriages, 25 October  2022, url.  
170 Meduza,  Russia's not-so-partial  'partial mobilization'  More details emerge  about  the  Kremlin’s draft, 22 
September  2022, url 
171 Novaya  Gazeta, Mobilisation  gets  dodgy,  14 October  2022, url; A human  rights lawyer, Online interview  with 
EUAA,  11 November  2022 
172 Meduza,  Rostov  and  Kursk governors  announce  ‘second  wave’  of mobilization, 11 October  2022, url 
173 Novaya  Gazeta, Mobilisation  gets  dodgy,  14 October  2022, url 
174 A human  rights lawyer, Online interview  with EUAA,  11 November  2022 
175 Reuters, Russia's  partial mobilisation is complete,  Shoigu  says, 28 October  2022, url  

27 

 
EUROPEAN  UNION AGENCY  FOR  ASYLUM 

beginning of the mobilisation has no end date.176 According to Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry 
Peskov, there was no need for a presidential decree to end the mobilisation  and there 
would be no new mobilisation  wave  in the framework of the existing presidential decree.177  

2.2. 

Legal framework of the mobilisation order 

The legal basis for mobilisation is laid down by two federal laws: on Mobilisation Preparations 
and Mobilisation and on Military Duty and Military Service.178 The draft process is carried out at 
regional and municipal levels via conscription commissions dealing with mobilisation. Prior to 
the conscription under the mobilisation, a commission must carry out a medical examination, 
based on which a draftee is assigned one of the categories , designated by first five letters of 
the Cyrillic alphabet: A – ‘fit for military service’; Б – ‘fit with minor restrictions’; В – ‘fit with 
limitations’; Г – ‘temporarily unfit for military service’; Д – ‘unfit for military service.’ People 
recognised as ‘temporarily unfit’ get a deferment from conscription for six months and people 
who were established to be ‘unfit’ are not conscripted and removed from the reserve. 179 

2.2.1.  Exemptions and deferrals 

According to Article 18 of the Federal Law on Mobilisation Preparations and Mobilisation, a 
deferral from conscription under mobilisation conditions is granted to people who: 

•  are found unfit for military service (the deferral is up to 6 months);  
•  provide care for family members in need of constant assistance on health grounds; 
•  were assigned as a permanent custodian or a guardian for their minor sibling;  
•  have 4 or more dependent children under the age of 16 or are a single father of at 

least one child under the age of 16 (for women: have at least one child under the age 
of 16 or are over 22 weeks pregnant); 

•  have a pregnant wife (over 22 weeks) and 3 dependent children under the age of 16;  
•  have 4 or more siblings under the age of eight raised only by a mother;  
•  are members of the Federation Council or the State Duma.180  

On 4 November 2022, the abovementioned law was amended to include deferral for people 
who joined volunteer military formations.181  

176 Novaya  Gazeta, At  least 100 Russian conscripts  drafted  to  fight in Ukraine confirmed  dead  so far, 1 November 
2022, url 
177 Novaya  Gazeta, Kremlin: there  is no ‘need’ for  presidential decree  on end  of  mobilisation in Russia, 1 November 
2022, url; Fontanka.ru, Указ об  окончании  мобилизации  —  нужен  или нет?  «Фонтанка» посоветовалась  с 
юристами  [Is the decree  on ending  mobilisation necessary  or not?  "Fontanka talks to  lawyers], 1 November  2022, 
url  
178 Russia, President  of Russia, Executive  Order on  partial mobilisation in the  Russian Federation,  21 September 
2022, url 
179 Pavel  Chikov, Telegram,  22 September  2022, url  
180 Lidings, Deferral from Conscription  for  Military Service  on  Mobilisation, 19 October  2022, url 
181 Russia, Федеральный  закон  от  26 февраля  1997 г. N 31-ФЗ  "О мобилизационной  подготовке  и 
мобилизации  в Российской  Федерации"  (с  изменениями  и дополнениями)  [Federal Act  No. 31 -FZ  of  26 
February  1997 on mobilization training and  mobilization in the Russian Federation  (as amended)], 4  November 
2022, url  

28 

 
THE  RUSSIAN  FEDERATION  – MILITARY SERVICE   

According to Article 18, a deferral is also to be granted to ‘other citizens or certain categories 
of citizens’ who would be given a right for a deferral by a presidential order. 182 A decree 
signed by President Putin on 21 September granted exemption from the mobilisation draft to 
people employed by defence sector companies.183 On 24 September, deferrals were granted 
to full-time and part-time students ‘enrolled in educational programmes of a corresponding 
level for the first time,’184 in the amended version of the order, a deferral was extended to such 
groups as post-graduate students and researchers.185  

On 23 September, MoD announced that IT sector employees, bankers, and state media 
journalists would not be drafted under the mobilisation order. MoD stated that employers are 
to be asked to prepare a list of employees who meet the criteria and submit it to MoD 
offices.186  

On 3 October, fathers of three and more children under the age of 16 were exempted from the 
draft.187  

According to military officials, other groups which were exempted from conscription under the 
mobilisation were retired veterans removed from the draft register as well as Russian nationals 
who lived abroad and were removed from the draft register in Russia.188 For information on 
implementation of the rules on exemptions and deferrals, see chapter 2.3.1. Irregularities 
reported during the mobilisation. 

2.2.2.  Legal ways to avoid mobilisation  

Lawyers and NGOs reported being ‘overwhelmed by demands for support’ on how to avoid 
the draft under the mobilisation order.189 Anti-mobilisation activists advised Russian men to 
avoid reporting to military recruitment offices to avoid being drafted immediately.190  

Similar to delivery of a draft notice for obligatory military service, draft notice under the 
mobilisation terms must be delivered in person and signed upon receipt. 191 Leaving a draft 
notice in a mailbox or handing it to relatives is against the law, and a failure to follow a draft 
notice delivered in this way would bring ‘no legal consequences or liability.’ A draft notice may 
be also served to a person at their work or study place.192 Failure to receive a draft notice is 
punishable in accordance with Article 21.5 of the Code of Administrative Offences with a fine 

182 Lidings, Deferral from Conscription  for  Military Service  on  Mobilisation, 19 October  20 22, url 
183 Russia, President  of Russia, Executive  Order on  partial mobilisation in the  Russian Federation,  21 September 
2022, url 
184 Russia, President  of Russia, Executive  Order On  Deferment  of  Conscription  for Military Service  during 
Mobilisation, 24 September  2022, url  
185 Russia, President  of Russia, Amendments  to Executive  Order On  Deferment  of  Conscription  for Military Service 
during Mobilisation, 6 October  2022, url  
186 BBC, Ukraine war: Russia reveals exemptions  as men  flee call -up, 23 September  2022, url 
187 Novaya  Gazeta  Europe,  Drafted  Russian father of  three  killed in Ukraine, 21 October  2022,  url  
188 Meduza,  Russia's not-so-partial  'partial mobilization'  More details emerge  about  the  Kremlin’s draft, 22 
September  2022, url 
189 Reuters, Lawyers  overwhelmed  by  requests  to help  Russians avoid  fighting  in Ukraine, 4 October  2022, url  
190 Guardian (The), Kremlin attempts  to calm Russian fury  over  chaotic  mobilization, 1 October  2022, url 
191 Moscow  Times (The), ‘I Don’t Trust  What They  Say’: Russian Draft Dodgers  Stay  in Hiding Even  as Putin 
Announces  Mobilization’s End, 2 November  2022, url  
192 ALRUD, Answers  to  the  most  common  questions  about  partial mobilisation, 7 October  2022, url, p. 4  

29 

 
EUROPEAN  UNION AGENCY  FOR  ASYLUM 

of up to 3 000 roubles [50 EUR].193 According to a human rights lawyer, interviewed by EUAA 
in November 2022, there were ‘just a few such cases’ as they must be initiated by military 
recruitment offices, and they have no resources for that.194 

Article 21 of the Federal Law on Mobilisation Preparations and Mobilisation stipulates that the 
Russian nationals who are subject to mobilisation should report to assembly points ( sborny 
punkt) as specified in mobilisation orders, draft notices, or orders by relevant authorities . It 
also prohibits the Russian nationals appearing on the draft register from leaving their place of 
residence without a special permission by relevant authorities. 195 However, the law does not 
stipulate a punishment for leaving one’s place of residence.196 

As explained by a human rights lawyer in November 2022, a draft notice requires a person to 
report themselves to a military recruitment office for a medical examination. Following the 
decision of the medical commission, the person is either sent back or receives instructions to 
come at a certain date to an assembly point, after which he is considered a military man. After 
this, a person can be punished in accordance with the current legislation on military service. 197   

According to the experts interviewed by EUAA in November 2022, alternative civil service 
was not granted to people who had received a draft notice under the mobilisation order.198 
The same information was provided on the official portal ‘Explain.rf’.199  

2.3. 

Implementation of the mobilisation order 

Local authorities started issuing draft notices immediately after the announcement of the 
mobilisation.200 The day after the mobilisation was announced, media reported that draft 
notices were delivered to eligible men in the middle of the night,201 after which they were 
given an hour to pack their things and appear at enlistment centres.202 Media sources 

193 Russia, Кодекс  Российской  Федерации  об  административных  правонарушениях,  от  30.12.2001 N 195-ФЗ 
(ред. от  04.11.2022) ["Code of Administrative  Offences  of  the Russian Federation,  of  30.12.2001 No 195 -FZ 
(amended  on 04.11.2022), n.d., url  
194 Human rights  lawyer, Online  interview with EUAA,  11 November  2022 
195 Russia, Федеральный  закон  от  26 февраля  1997 г. N 31-ФЗ  "О мобилизационной  подготовке  и 
мобилизации  в Российской  Федерации"  (с  изменениями  и дополнениями)  [Federal Act  No. 31-FZ  of  26 
February  1997 on mobilization training and  mobilization in the Russian Federation  (as amended)], 4  November 
2022, url  
196 Meduza,  ‘Prepare to  stand  up  for your  convictions’  During mobilization, escaping  the  draft is a legal problem  for 
many  Russians. Here’s a military lawyer’s advice  for those  who  don’t  want  to fight., 22 September  2022, url 
197 Human rights  lawyer, Online  interview with EUAA,  11 November  2022 
198 Alexander  Pomazuev,  Online interview  with EUAA,  9 November  2022; Human rights lawyer, Online interview 
with EUAA,  11 November  2022 
199 Russian Free Press,  The  Russian authorities  said that alternative  service  during mobilization  is not  provided,  25 
September  2022, url  
200 Meduza,  ‘Prepare to  stand  up  for your  convictions’  During mobilization, escaping  the  draft is a legal problem  for 
many  Russians. Here’s a military lawyer’s advice  for those  who  don’t  want  to fight., 22 September  2022, url; 
Caucasian  Knot, Elderly  reserve  officer  mobilized in Volgograd  Region  despite  conclusion  of doctors,  23 
September  2022, url; Bathon, R., Putin’s  cannon  fodder,  IPS,  28 September  2022, url 
201 Guardian (The), ‘It’s a 100% mobilisation: day  one  of  Russia’s drive  to build its army, 22 September  2022, url; 
Mediazona,  Son‑in‑law, husband,  son, father. First days  of  the special  mobilisation operation  in the  Republic of 
Buryatia, 1 October  2022, url 
202 Guardian (The), ‘It’s a 100% mobilisation: day  one  of  Russia’s drive  to build its  army, 22 September  2022, url 

30 

 
THE  RUSSIAN  FEDERATION  – MILITARY SERVICE   

reported that draft notices had been distributed at factories.203 In Nizhny Novgorod, 37 
workers were reportedly ‘mobilised’ while at work and sent to a military unit for training.204 In 
mid-October, it was reported that draft notices requiring men to report to a military recruitment 
office were handed out at passport offices in St. Petersburg and Leningrad region.205 

During the first week since the announcement of the mobilisation order, thousands of men 
across the country were reportedly drafted into the RAF.206 On 22 September, the Guardian 
noted that ‘more than 100 potential draftees’ had boarded the plane in Khurba, Khabarovsk 
region in Russia’s Far East. In Neryungri, the second largest town in the Republic of Sakha 
(Yakutia), ‘dozens of men’ were reportedly brought to a football stadium and ‘loaded onto 
busses bound for recruitment centres.’207 The next day, the Caucasian Knot reported that first 
groups had been deployed from Makhachkala and Kaspiysk (Dagestan) as well as from 
Krasnodar.208 In Buryatia, ‘buses with mobilised men’ from all over the region were reportedly 
arriving at the recruitment centre in the regional capital Ulan-Ude.209  

In Moscow and St. Petersburg, police and enlistment officers reportedly organised 
conscription raids at entrances to metro stations.210 In Moscow, a reporter at Sota.Vision news 
outlet said that draft notices to report at military recruitment offices were given to people 
taking part in anti-mobilisation protests on 21 September.211 In a city in the Moscow region, law 
enforcement officers reportedly blocked a restaurant exit to distribute draft notices to men.212 
In Moscow, conscription raids were also reportedly organised in hostels, 213 with people ‘with 
DNR passports’ given draft notices next to Russian nationals.214 More than 200 men were 
reportedly taken to an enlistment center during a night raid on dormitories of a construction 
company and ‘dozens’ were reportedly rounded up in a raid on a Moscow shelter for 
homeless.215  

203 Mediazona,  Конвейер.  Как заводы  и  другие  крупные  предприятия  сотнями  отправляют  своих  сотрудников 
в армию  [Conveyor.  How factories  and  other  large enterprises  send  their employees  by  the  hundreds  to the  army], 
28 September  2022, url; RBK, Сотрудники  рассказали  о массовой  выдаче  повесток  на территории  «Зингера» 
[Staff  said draft notices  were distributed  at Singer  premises], 6 October  2022, url  
204 Mediazona,  Конвейер.  Как заводы  и  другие  крупные  предприятия  сотнями  отправляют  своих  сотрудников 
в армию  [Conveyor.  How factories  and  other  large enterprises  send  their employees  by  the  hundreds  to the  army], 
28 September  2022, url 
205 Insider (The), В Петербурге  повестки  выдают  мужчинам,  которые  пришли  получать  загранпаспорт  [In St 
Petersburg,  draft notices  are issued  to men  who  come  to  receive  a foreign passport],  15 October  2022, url  
206 DW, Russia's  partial mobilization: Conscripts  report  chaos,  30 September  2022, url  
207 Guardian (The), ‘It’s a 100% mobilisation: day  one  of  Russia’s drive  to build its army, 22 September  2022, url 
208 Caucasian  Knot,  Elderly  reserve  officer  mobilized  in  Volgograd  Region  despite  conclusion  of  doctors,  23 
September  2022, url  
209 Mediazona,  Son‑in‑law, husband,  son,  father. First days  of the  special  mobilisation operation  in the Republic  of 
Buryatia, 1 October  2022, url 
210 Moscow  Times (The), Telegram,  14 October  2022, url; Washington Post  (The), Russia is grabbing  men off  the 
street  to  fight in Ukraine, 16 October  2022, url  
211 Guardian (The), ‘It’s a 100% mobilisation: day  one  of  Russia’s drive  to build its army, 22 September  2022, url 
212 SOTA,  Telegram,  7 October  2022, url  
213 Washington  Post  (The), Russia is grabbing  men  off  the street  to fight  in Ukraine, 16 October  2022, url; Al Jazeera, 
How  Russia is rounding  up  reluctant  army recruits for  Ukraine, 19 October  2022, url  
214 SOTA,  Telegram,  7 October  2022, url  
215 Washington  Post  (The), Russia is grabbing  men  off  the street  to fight  in Ukraine, 16 October  2022, url 

31 

 
EUROPEAN  UNION AGENCY  FOR  ASYLUM 

2.3.1. 

Irregularities reported during the mobilisation  

Sources reported on numerous irregularities in the implementation of the mobilisation order,216 
including drafting people above the age stipulated for mobilisation according to particular 
military ranks;217 people who have passed the draft age;218 people physically unfit for military 
service,219 and who had been previously exempted from military service for health reasons;220 
people who had not performed military service before;221 people who were enrolled as full-
time students;222 fathers of three223 or four or more children.224  

As noted by a human rights lawyer in an interview with EUAA on 11 November 2022, MoD 
issued no specific regulations on the ‘partial’ mobilisation, and no normative acts were 
published prior to the announcement of the mobilisation order. Conditions of exemptions and 
deferrals were changed several times, which created a situation, in which military recruitment 
offices across the country were applying different reasoning for the conscription under the 
mobilisation order.225 According to Alexander Pomazuev, interviewed by EUAA on 9 
November 2022, the mobilisation was ‘total’: even if the authorities tried to limit it by applying 
some categories, this was not possible to implement in practice due to the fact that the 
legislation and procedures are designed ‘for a total mobilisation.’226 

Alexander Pomazuev also stated that in practice officials in military recruitment offices ignored 
the lists of employees that were granted deferrals as the legislation on mobilisation did not 
provide for an exemption for these groups. Moreover, according to the source, military officials 
had no technical means to distinguish people non-eligible for mobilisation due to deferrals. He 
also noted that such exemptions were applied only to chief specialists.227  

216 DW, Russia's  partial mobilization: Conscripts  report  chaos,  30 September  2022, url; RFE/RL, Join, Flee, Or Resist: 
Russia Pushed  To  The Brink Amid Putin's  Chaotic  Mobilization Order, 2 October  2022, url  
217 Caucasian  Knot, Elderly  reserve  officer mobilized  in Volgograd  Region  despite  conclusion  of  doctors,  23 
September  2022, url; Caucasian Knot, Relatives succeed  in seeking demobilization  of  Krasnodar resident,  30 
September  2022, url; DW, Russia's partial mobilization: Conscripts  report chaos,  30 September  2022, url  
218 RFE/RL, Russia Continues  Crackdown  On  Spreading  Anti -Mobilization  Protests  As Draft Criticism Grows, 26 
September  2022, url; BBC, Ukraine war: Russia admits  mobilisation errors, amid growing  public opposition,  26 
September  2022, url; DW, Russia's partial mobilization: Conscripts  report chaos,  30 September  2022, url; RFE/RL, 
Join, Flee, Or Resist: Russia Pushed  To  The Brink Amid Putin's  Chaotic  Mobilization Order, 2 October  2022, url 
219 BBC  News, Ukraine war: Russia admits  mobilisation errors, amid growing  public  opposition,  26 September  2022, 
url; Guardian (The), Kremlin attempts  to calm Russian fury  over  chaotic  mobilization, 1 October  2022, url; RFE/RL, 
Join, Flee, Or Resist: Russia Pushed  To  The Brink Amid Putin's  Chaotic  Mobilization Order, 2 October  2022, url;  
220 BBC, Ukraine war: Russia reveals exemptions  as men  flee call -up, 23 September  2022, url 
221 RFE/RL, Russia Continues  Crackdown  On  Spreading  Anti -Mobilization  Protests  As Draft Criticism Grows, 26 
September  2022, url; BBC News,  Ukraine war: Russia admits  mobilisation errors, amid growing  public  opposition, 
26 September  2022, url; Caucasian Knot, Relatives  succeed  in seeking  demobilization  of Krasnodar resident,  30 
September  2022, url 
222 Insider (The), Students  snatched  from classes  in Ulan-Ude as part of  mobilization, 22 September  2022, url; 
RFE/RL, Join, Flee, Or Resist: Russia Pushed  To The  Brink Amid Putin's  Chaotic  Mobilization Order, 2 October 
2022, url  
223 Novaya  Gazeta  Europe,  Drafted  Russian father of  three  killed in Ukraine, 21 October  2022, url  
224 Bumaga, “Officers  are shocked  to see  the  kind of people  sent  their way.” Drafted  Saint Petersburg  man, whohas 
four children, tells about  the chaos  at the military base and  a soldier’s suicide, 30 October  2022, url  
225 Human rights  lawyer, Online  interview with EUAA,  11 November  2022 
226 Alexander  Pomazuev,  Online interview  with EUAA,  9 November  2022 
227 Alexander  Pomazuev,  Online interview  with EUAA,  9 November  2022 

32 

 
THE  RUSSIAN  FEDERATION  – MILITARY SERVICE   

Contrary to the requirements stipulated by the law on mobilisation, newly drafted persons 
reportedly received no medical examination at a military recruitment office to determine 
whether they were medically fit for military service.228 As explained by Alexander Pomazuev, 
the legislation requires that all Russian men in the age group of 18 – 50 years keep informing 
military recruitment offices about their health status; however, no one does this in practice. 
Therefore, the records in the mobilisation system indicate an outdated information on 
people’s health condition, and everyone can get a draft notice. The source also noted that 
military recruitment offices have no human resources to check the medical conditions of 
draftees.229 

2.3.2.  Lodging complaints 

Media sources reported on instances where men drafted under the mobilisation order were 
returned home following complaints to the authorities filed by their relatives or lawyers. Such 
was the case of a 38-year-old resident of Krasnodar who was initially conscripted despite 
suffering from visual impairment and having a specialty that allowed a deferral from the 
military service.230 Other cases involved a 42-year-old person in the army reserve who had no 
combat experience,231 a 59-year-old surgeon with several medical conditions, and a 21-year-
old full-time university student.232  

On 22 September, the head of human rights NGO Agora, Pavel Chikov, stated via Telegram, 
that a person who disagrees with a decision of the recruitment commission or the conclusion 
of the medical examination can initiate a court procedure by filing a request with a municipal 
court at a location of the military recruitment office. Simultaneously, a person should request 
preliminary protection measure since in the conditions of mobilisation — and differently from 
challenging a decision on obligatory military service or military training — filing a complaint 
with the court does not suspend the obligation to join the military forces.233 In October 2022, a 
city court in Gatchina, Leningrad region, granted a preliminary protection measure to a person 
challenging his draft under mobilisation. The person described as ‘Evangelical Christian’ had 
reportedly completed his alternative civil service in 2019-2021 and received a draft notice on 
24 September 2022. After reporting the next day to a military enlistment office, he was 
immediately drafted: his request for alternative civil service was ignored and no medical 
examination took place. The court suspended the decision of the military recruitment 
commission until the hearing scheduled for 15 November.234 No information about the court 
decision was found in the time constraints for this report. 

In an interview with EUAA on 11 November, a human rights lawyer noted that there were 80 
cases challenging a mobilisation decision in St. Peterburg only. According to their estimation, 

228 DW, Russia's  partial mobilization: Conscripts  report  chaos,  30 September  2022, url  
229 Alexander  Pomazuev,  interview  with EUAA, 9 November  2022  
230 Caucasian  Knot  (The), Relatives succeed  in seeking  demobilization  of  Krasnodar resident, 30 September  2022, 
url  
231 DW, Russia's  partial mobilization: Conscripts  report  chaos,  30 September  2022,  url  
232 RFE/RL, Join, Flee, Or Resist: Russia Pushed  To The  Brink Amid  Putin's  Chaotic  Mobilization  Order, 2 October 
2022, url  
233 Pavel  Chikov, Telegram,  22 September  2022, url 
234 Kommersant, Mobilization  will be tested  for convictions,  19 October  2022, url  

33 

 
EUROPEAN  UNION AGENCY  FOR  ASYLUM 

there should be hundreds of such cases across the country.235 According to Alexander 
Pomazuev, the legal ways to make an effective claim against mobilisation decision were 
‘practically non-existent’ as people who were already recruited didn’t have technical means to 
do so (for instance access to smartphones, pens, etc.). Moreover, the legal procedure to prove 
the illegality of the draft was lengthy and, in some cases, persons who were drafted and sent 
to the frontlines were killed before lawyers received a positive decision on their cases. 236 Such 
was, for instance, the case of a 33-year-old IT specialist employed at one of the main Russian 
banks, who had been drafted despite he had the right for an exemption due to his job 
position. This person was drafted on 23 September, deployed to the combat area near 
Svatovo, Luhansk region, on 7 October, and killed on 13 October.237  

2.3.3.  Drafting of ethnic minorities 

In October 2022, the media reported that ethnic minority populations of Siberia and the North 
Caucasus238 as well as Crimean Tatars 239 were disproportionally affected during the 
mobilisation. On 5 October, citing the research by Vazhnye Istorii and CIT, Meduza reported 
that the percentage of people drafted under the mobilisation order reached 5.5 % in the 
Krasnoyarsk region, 4 % in Sevastopol, 3.7 % in Buryatia, 2.6 % in Dagestan, and 2.2 % in 
Kalmykia. It was also noted that poorer regions had mobilised a larger share of the reserve. 
Thus, 23 out of 26 regions that have drafted more than 1 % of their reservists had lower per 
capita average income than the national average.240 Poorer regions have a higher number of 
people with military experience since the contract with the RAF is one of the few employment 
opportunities in these areas. According to researcher Sam Cranny-Evans as well as Meduza, 
this could explain why the higher number of reservists conscripted under the mobilisation 
order was in poorer regions.241 The same ethnic groups reportedly had disproportionate 
numbers of war casualties.242 

Activists in Buryatia reported on intense recruitment following the announcement of the 
mobilisation order. According to the head of the Free Buryatia Foundation, Alexandra 

235 Human rights  lawyer, Online  interview with EUAA,  11 November  2022 
236 Alexander  Pomazuev,  lawyer at FBK, Online interview  with EUAA,  9 November  2022 
237 Meduza,  В Украине  погиб  мобилизованный  айтишник  «Райффайзенбанка».  Ему  полагалась  отсрочка,  но 
его  забрали  в армию  и через  две  недели  отправили  на войну  [ A mobilised  IT employee  of Raiffeisenbank  died 
in Ukraine. He was supposed  have  a deferral  but was  drafted  into the  army and  sent  to war two  weeks  later], 21 
October  2022, url 
238 Guardian (The), ‘It’s a 100% mobilisation’: day  one  of Russia’s drive to  build its army, 22 September  2022, url; 
RFE/RL, Join, Flee, Or Resist: Russia Pushed  To The  Brink Amid Putin's  Chaotic  Mobilization Order, 2 October 
2022, url 
239 Guardian (The), ‘A way to  get  rid of us’: Crimean Tatars decry  Russia’s mobilisation, 25 September  2022, url; 
RFE/RL, Join, Flee, Or Resist: Russia Pushed  To The  Brink Amid Putin's  Chaotic  Mobilization Order, 2 October 
2022, url; IWPR, Russia Targets  Crimean Tatar Community,  4 October  2022, url 
240 Meduza,  A new  report  shows  discrepancies  in Russian  draft statistics  213,000 have  been  mobilized  in Russia  — 
but  this only  accounts  for two-thirds  of its regions,  not  the whole  nation, as claimed  by Shoigu,  5 October  2022, url  
241 Cranny-Evans,  S., Understanding  Russia’s Mobilisation, RUSI, 28 September  2022, url; Meduza, A new  report 
shows  discrepancies  in Russian draft statistics  213,000 have been  mobilized  in Russia  — but  this only  accounts  for 
two-thirds  of its regions,  not the  whole  nation, as claimed by  Shoigu,  5 October  2 022, url 
242 Guardian (The), ‘It’s a 100% mobilisation’: day  one  of Russia’s drive to  build its army, 22 September  2022, url; 
RFE/RL, Join, Flee, Or Resist: Russia Pushed  To The  Brink Amid Putin's  Chaotic  Mobilization Order, 2 October 
2022, url; Meduza, A new  report  shows  discrepancies  in Russian draft statistics  213,000 have  been  mobilized  in 
Russia — but  this only  accounts  for two-thirds  of  its regions, not  the  whole nation, as claimed  by  Shoigu,  5 October 
2022, url; Washington Post  (The), Russia is grabbing  men off  the  street  to fight  in Ukraine, 16 October  2022, url 

34 

 
THE  RUSSIAN  FEDERATION  – MILITARY SERVICE   

Garmazhapova, more than 3 000 draft notices were delivered in the republic within the first 
day of the mobilisation.243 Dorjo Dugarov, one of the leaders of the Buryat National 
Democratic Movement, told TV Rain (Dozhd TV) ‘that up to five thousand people were 
mobilised overnight.’244 The mobilisation efforts were reportedly organised ‘more like a raid,’ 
with draft notices being delivered late at night ‘and handed out indiscriminately to 
everyone.’245 In one of the villages, 450 people were reportedly mobilised within the first 24 
hours.246 According to Victoria Maladaeva, vice president of the foundation Svobodnaya 
Buryatia (Free Buryatia), 20-30 men were drafted from every village. The local authorities 
admitted that draft notices had been issued to 70 fathers of large families: all of them were 
reportedly returned home following clarifications, even though some of them had already 
been assigned to respective military units. In one of the reported cases, a draft notice was 
issued for a man who died two years ago. 247 

Disproportionately high numbers of the mobilised men were reported also for the Crimean 
Tatar community,248 who constitute around 13 % of the 2 million population of Russia-occupied 
Crimea.249 A Ukrainian human rights NGO Crimea SOS, as reported by the Guardian on 25 
September, estimated that 90 % of draft notices in Crimea were issued to Crimean Tatars.250 
No other sources were found to corroborate on this figure. 

2.3.4.  Protests 

Mobilisation caused protests across Russia,251 including in regions with high ethnic minority 
populations, such as Dagestan and Yakutia.252 According to UN OHCHR, around 2 400 people 
were arrested across the country during protests in the period between 21 and 26 September. 
Some protests included attacks on military recruitment offices and administrative buildings. 253 
On 21 September 2022, protesters set fire to an administrative building in Togliatti (Samara 
region) and threw a Molotov cocktail at military recruitment office in Nizhny Novgorod. 254 
According to Mediazona, which maps arson attacks across the country, the mobilisation order 
triggered a second wave of such attacks: out of total 75 arsons, registered between 24 
February and 2 November, 41 were committed after the announcement of mobilisation. 
Buildings that were targeted include military recruitment and enlistment offices, police offices, 

243 Guardian (The), ‘It’s a 100% mobilisation’: day  one  of Russia’s drive to  build its army, 22 September  2022, url  
244 Telekanal Dozhd,  Telegram, 22 September  2022, url; Mediazona, Son‑in‑law, husband,  son,  father. First days  of 
the  special mobilisation operation  in the  Republic  of Buryatia, 1 October  2022, url 
245 Mediazona,  Son‑in‑law, husband,  son,  father. First days  of the  special  mobilisation operation  in the Republic  of 
Buryatia, 1 October  2022, url 
246 Guardian (The), ‘It’s a 100% mobilisation’: day  one  of Russia’s drive to  build its army, 22 September  2022, url  
247 Mediazona,  Son‑in‑law, husband,  son,  father. First days  of the  special  mobilisation operation  in the Republic  of 
Buryatia, 1 October  2022, url 
248 Guardian (The), ‘A way to  get  rid of us’: Crimean Tatars decry  Russia’s mobilisation, 25 September  2022, url; 
RFE/RL, Join, Flee, Or Resist: Russia Pushed  To The  Brink Amid Putin's  Chaotic  Mobilization Order,  2 October 
2022, url; IWPR, Russia Targets  Crimean Tatar Community,  4 October  2022, url 
249 Politico, ‘A kind of  murder’: Putin’s  draft targets  Crimea’s Tatars, 4  October  2022, url  
250 Guardian (The), ‘A way to  get  rid of us’: Crimean Tatars decry  Russia’s mobilisation, 25 September  2022, url  
251 OVD-info,  Списки  задержанных  в связи  с акциями  против  мобилизации  21 сентября  [Lists of  people 
detained  in connection  with anti-mobilisation rallies on  21 September],  21 September  2022, url; FT, Anti-
mobilisation protests  spread  in Russia, 25 September  2022, url  
252 France  24, ‘Danger to  the  regime’? Russia faces  anti -mobilisation protests  among  ethnic  minorities, 30 
September  2022, url  
253 UN OHCHR, Arrests  in Russia at protests  over troop  mobilisation, 27 September  2022, url  
254 Bathon,  R., Putin’s cannon  fodder,  IPS, International Politics  and Society,  28 September  2022, url 

35 

 
EUROPEAN  UNION AGENCY  FOR  ASYLUM 

offices of FSB and Rosgvardia as well as administrative buildings.255 On 26 September, in Ust-
Ilim town in the Irkutsk region an enlistment officer was shot and seriously injured by a 25-
year-old local resident.256 

The organisation of the mobilisation process caused ‘rare-complaints by pro-Kremlin 
voices.’257 Already on 26 September 2022, amid public opposition, the irregularities in the 
drafting process under the mobilisation order were admitted both at federal258 and local 
levels.259 The Kremlin laid the responsibility for the failure to follow the criteria for conscription 
and exemptions on local institutions.260 Several governors admitted mistakes committed by 
local military recruitment offices and promised to discharge people who had been drafted by 
mistake.261 Several military commissioners were reportedly dismissed from their duties: for 
instance, in Magadan region and in Khabarovsk region, where half of several thousand drafted 
men were returned home after being found unfit for military duty.262 

255 Mediazona,  Fire! As Russians  set fire to  draft offices,  we  map the  arson attacks,  13 October  2022 , updated  2 
November  2022, url  
256 Moscow  Times (The), Russian Enlistment  Officer  Shot,  Recruitment  Centers  Torched  as  Kremlin Admits 
Mobilization 'Errors', 26 September  2022, url  
257 RFE/RL, Russia Continues  Crackdown  On  Spreading  Anti -Mobilization  Protests  As Draft Criticism Grows, 26 
September  2022, url 
258 BBC  News, Ukraine war: Russia admits  mobilisation errors, amid growing  public  opposition,  26 September 
2022, url; Washington Post  (The), Russia is grabbing  men off  the  street  to fight  in Ukraine, 16 October  2022, url 
259 DW, Russia's  partial mobilization: Conscripts  report  chaos,  30 September  2022, url 
260 ISW, Russian Offensive  Campaign, 26 September  2022, url; Bathon, R., Putin’s cannon  fodder,  IPS, 28 
September  2022, url 
261 DW, Russia's  partial mobilization: Conscripts  report  chaos,  30 September  2022, url 
262 Al Jazeera, Thousands  of  mobilised Russians  sent  home, deemed  unfit for  duty,  3 October  2022, url 

36 

 
 
THE  RUSSIAN  FEDERATION  – MILITARY SERVICE   

3. 

Russian military forces in Ukraine 

According to US-based researcher Pavel Luzin, the military forces used by the Russian 
Federation in Ukraine consist mainly of RAF units, which are supported by Rosgvardia (the 
second largest military formation in Russia) and its Chechen units, loyal to Ramzan Kadyrov, 
the head of the Chechen Republic, paramilitary units of the Federal Security Service (FSB), 
mercenary units, and recruited soldiers from DNR and LNR.263 As noted by researcher Joris 
van Bladel in July 2022, the variety of military actors used by Russia in Ukraine gives a 
‘taxonomy of Russian soldiers’ in which ‘each category of soldiers has a different recruitment 
method, pay schedule, command & control channel, and mission resulting in a kaleidoscope 
of varying warfighting cultures.’264  

3.1.  Use of conscripts in the war in Ukraine  

The current legislation of the Russian Federation allows the deployment of conscripts to 
armed conflict zones after they complete four months of military training.265 This is stipulated 
by Article 2.3 of the Presidential Order no 1237 Regulations on the Procedure for Performing 
Military Service, adopted on 16 September 1999 and revised on 4 October 2022. 266 After 
completing three months of compulsory military service, a person can sign a contract with the 
RAF and can be sent to combat areas. A person can also sign a contract after one month of 
his military service, if his previous education allows for it.267 When used during hostilities, 
conscripts who have signed contracts with the RAF are generally involved in tasks that require 
‘less technical expertise,’ such as positions in logistics, due to their limited period of 
training.268 

Several days before Russia announced the beginning of the ‘special military operation’ on 24 
February 2022, the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers reported on phone calls from parents of 
conscripted soldiers, stating that their sons had either been forced to sign contracts with the 
RAF or were deployed to military units on the Russia-Ukraine border, with the majority being 
sent to the military bases in Belgorod region.269 In March 2022, independent TV channel 
Current Time reported on instances in which conscripts in Belgorod region were pressured to 

263 Luzin, P., Russia’s Military Manpower  Crunch  Will Worsen, CEPA,  21 September  2022, url 
264 Bladel, J. Van, Russian Spring  2022 Recruitment  Cycle  – Putin’s  Camouflaged  Referendum?  Egmont  Policy  Brief 
284, July 2022, url, pp. 3-4   
265 Human rights  lawyer, Online  interview with EUAA,  11 November  2022 
266 Russia, Указ Президента  РФ  от  16.09.1999 N 1237 (ред. от  04.10.2022) "Вопросы прохождения  военной 
службы"  [Order  of the  President  of RF as of  16.09.1999 No. 1237 (version of 4.10.2022 Regulations  on the 
Procedure  for  Performing  Military Service],  url  
267 Meduza,  ‘I’m panicking — where  is my child?’ Conscript  soldiers  are being sent  to  fight  against Ukraine, their 
relatives say. Here’s  what their families told  Meduza,  25 February  2022, url 
268 Freeman, S.B and  Kjellström Elgin K., What the  use  of Russian conscripts  tells us  about  the  war in Ukraine, 
Politico, url 
269 Meduza,  ‘I’m panicking — where  is my child?’ Conscript  soldiers  are being sent  to  fight  against Ukraine, their 
relatives say. Here’s  what their families told  Meduza,  25 February  2022, url  

37 

 
EUROPEAN  UNION AGENCY  FOR  ASYLUM 

sign contracts with the Russian Armed Forces and those who refused to go to Ukraine were 
threatened with the articles on desertion of the Criminal Code.270  

Early March, a member of the Federation Council, Lyudmila Narusova, spoke about 100 
conscripts who were sent to Ukraine after being forced to sign a contract with the RAF; 
according to her, only four of them survived.271 On 8 March 2022, President Putin said that 
conscripts were not used in hostilities in Ukraine, noting also that there would be ‘no 
additional call-up of reservists.’272 The next day, MoD acknowledged that some conscripts had 
been deployed to combat zones in Ukraine, noting that ‘some of them, serving in supply units 
had been taken prisoner by the Ukrainian army.’273 The spokesperson of Kremlin, Dmitry 
Peskov, said that Putin had ordered the Military Prosecutor’s Office to investigate the 
deployment of conscripts to Ukraine and to punish the officials responsible for it.274  

On 7 June 2022, a military prosecutor of the Western Military District said that 600 conscripts 
had been sent to Ukraine and that around 12 army officers were prosecuted in connection 
with their deployment; some of the officers were dismissed from service.275  

Since Russia’s invasion in Ukraine, Ukrainian media have reported about Russian conscripts 
captured or killed during the fighting.276 According to investigative group Agenstvo, conscripts 
might have constituted more than half of the crew of the Russian flagship Moskva, which sank 
in the Black Sea on 14 April.277 A sailor who served his military service278 as a cook on the ship 
at the time of the incident279 was confirmed dead in August.280 

On 11 November, a human rights lawyer told the EUAA that they were not aware of any recent 
involvement of conscripts in hostilities in Ukraine. The source noted that, although the law 
allows the use of conscripts, there have been many reassurances from the authorities that 
they would not be used. However, as further explained by the source, conscripts were ‘widely 
moved to the border regions’, such as Belgorod, Kursk, Bryansk, Rostov, Krasnodar, and 
Russia-occupied Crimea. According to this source, there were no reports of conscripts being 
deployed to the newly annexed territories in Ukraine.281 

270 Nastoyaschee  vremya, "Они  не  хотят  туда  ехать, их  пугают  уголовной  статьей  о дезертирстве".  Мать 
российского  военного  – об  "учениях"  и угрозах  в армии  [“They  don’t  want  to go  there,  but they  are threatened 
with a criminal code’s  article on  desertion.”  A  mother  of a Russian serviceman  – about  “exercises”  and threats  in 
the  army], 3 March  2022, url  
271 AP, War in Ukraine fuels fears among  draft-age  Russian youths,  2 April 2002, url  
272 Reuters, Putin  says  will not use  conscript  soldiers in Ukraine, 8 March  2022, url  
273 Reuters, Russia acknowledges  conscripts  were part  of Ukraine operation,  some  are POWs,  9 March 2022, url  
274 RFE/RL, Russian Defence  Ministry Confirms Presence  Of Conscripts  In Ukraine War For First Time, 9 March 
2022, url; Reuters, Russia acknowledges  conscripts  were  part of Ukraine operation, some  are POWs,  9 March 
2022, url 
275 Moscow  Times (The), Russia Prosecutes  12 Officers  Over  Conscript  Deployments  to  Ukraine, 7 June  2022, url  
276 Moscow  Times (The), Russia Prosecutes  12 Officers  Over  Conscript  Deployments  to  Ukraine, 7 June  2022, url 
277 Agenstvo.Novosti,  Telegram,  4 May 2022, url; Ukrainska Pravda, More than  half the crew  of  the cruise  ship 
"Moskva"  might have  consisted  of  conscripts  - the  media, 4 May 2022, url 
278 RFE/RL, Отец  "пропавшего"  на крейсере  "Москва"  получил  свидетельство  о  смерти  сына  [Father of  missing 
person  on  Moskva  cruiser received  a death  certificate], 2 August  2022, url  
279 Al Jazeera, Explainer: How  does  conscription  work in Russia?, 5 May  2022, url 
280 RFE/RL, Отец  "пропавшего"  на крейсере  "Москва"  получил  свидетельство  о  смерти  сына  [Father of  missing 
person  on  Moskva  cruiser received  a death  certificate], 2 August  2022, url  
281 Human rights  lawyer, Online  interview with EUAA,  11 November  2022 

38 

 
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3.2.  Deployment to Ukraine and conditions of service 

of persons drafted under the mobilisation order 

On 28 October, the Minister of Defence Sergey Shoigu said that 82 000 men drafted under 
the mobilisation order were deployed to combat areas in Ukraine;282 on 1 November, Shoigu 
stated that 87 000 men were mobilised.283  

Persons drafted under the mobilisation order cannot decline their deployment to the 
frontlines, and the time of their military service is not limited by any end date. 284 Newly drafted 
persons were promised monthly salaries of 135 000 – 200 000 roubles [2 210 – 3 272 EUR], 
depending on their rank. On 28 September, the State Duma passed a bill that ‘freezes loan 
repayments, including mortgages and consumer loans’ for men conscripted under the 
mobilisation order and other military personnel participating in the war in Ukraine. 285 

Sources reported on deployments of the ‘new recruits’ to the frontlines almost 
immediately  after they were drafted,  without being examined by a medical  commission 286 
or provided any substantial  training.287  As noted by researcher Pavel Luzin, as of 14 October, 
around 16 000 newly mobilised men were taking part in hostilities in Ukraine after having 
received between 5 and 15 days of military training.288 It was also reported that the recruits 
were not provided equipment and supplies 289 and had to buy these themselves.290  

Referring to the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, ISW 
reported on 3 November that the newly drafted personnel were used in offensives near 
Bakhmut, Vuhledar, and Avdiivka in Donetsk region, next to mercenaries and former 
inmates.291  

On 1 November 2022, Novaya Gazeta Europe reported that more than a hundred of mobilised 
men had been killed since 21 September, both on the frontlines and in Russia. 292 According to 

282 Reuters, Russia's  partial mobilisation is complete,  Shoigu  says, 28 October  2022, url  
283 Novaya  Gazeta, Russia’s Defence  Minister Shoigu:  87,000 draftees  out  of  300,000 deployed  to  combat  zones,  1 
November  2022, url  
284 Economist  (The), Vladimir Putin  declares  a partial mobilization, 21 September  2022, url 
285 RFE/RL, Sweetening  A Bitter  Pill: Russia Offers  Debt  Breaks, Other  Benefits  To  Entice  Draftees, 28 September 
2022, url  
286 Moscow  Times (The), Russia Sends  Mobilized  Men to  Ukraine Front  After  Days of  Training – Activists,  27 
September  2022, url 
287 Moscow  Times (The), Russia to  Send  Conscripts  to Ukraine With Little Training, Old  Equipment,  29 September 
2022, url; New York Times  (The), ‘Coffins  Are Already  Coming’: The  Toll of  Russia’s Chaotic  Draft, 16 October  2022, 
url  
288 Luzin, P., Is Mobilization Really Over  in Russia?, The  Jamestown  Foundation,  Eurasia Daily Monitor,  Vol. 19, Issue 
164, 3 November  2022, url 
289 Moscow  Times (The), Russia to  Send  Conscripts  to Ukraine With Little Training, Old  Equipment,  29 September 
2022, url; Klain D., Mobilization Can’t  Save  Russia’s War, FP, 4 October  2022, url; New York Times (The),  ‘Coffins 
Are Already  Coming’:  The Toll of  Russia’s Chaotic  Draft, 16 October   2022, url  
290 RFE/RL, 'Everyone's  Drunk. No Uniforms. No Food.'  Inside The  Confusion  Greeting  Some  Of  Russia's Newly 
Mobilized  Troops,  9 October  2022, url; Guardian (The), ‘The army has  nothing’: new  Russian conscripts  bemoan 
lack of supplies,  20 October  2022, url  
291 ISW, Russian Offensive  Campaign  Assessment,  3 November  2022, url  
292 Novaya  Gazeta  Europe,  At least  100 Russian conscripts  drafted  to fight  in Ukraine confirmed  dead  so  far, 1 
November  2022, url. For the  information on  people  killed in Ukraine, see  also Washington  Post  (The), Russia is 
grabbing  men  off the  street  to  fight in Ukraine, 16 October  2022, url 

39 

 
EUROPEAN  UNION AGENCY  FOR  ASYLUM 

the source, 23 drafted persons died during training because of ‘physical altercations, alcohol, 
drugs, suicide, and accidents.’293 The service Siberia.Realities of Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty (RFE/RL) reported that many deaths were recorded as suicides and some as 
‘unexplained’.294 On 15 October, two men, whom MoD later defined as nationals from a former 
Soviet Union republic, who volunteered to go to fight in Ukraine, opened fire during a training 
session in Belgorod region, killing 11 and injuring 15 people.295 

3.3.  Volunteer battalions and mercenaries  

3.3.1.  Volunteer battalions 

During the period between July and August 2022, Russia reportedly started to recruit 
volunteers to be deployed in Ukraine. Volunteer battalions were to be formed in all 85 federal 
subjects.296 The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) cited Russian war correspondent and 
military blogger Maksim Fomin, who stated that Russia had started a ‘volunteer mobilization’ 
by demanding every region to provide at least one volunteer battalion (dobrobat in 
Russian297). ISW further reported that volunteer battalions were formed instead of calling for a 
mobilisation of reservists.298 According to Nikolai Petrov, senior Research Fellow at Russia and 
Eurasia Programme of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, ‘volunteer battalions’ started 
to be established since April and May 2022 throughout Russia.299 As of 8 August 2022, over 
40 volunteer battalions within 20 regions had been established. In some areas the process 
was at recruiting level while in other areas the recruited individuals were at training phase or 
‘unit cohesion’ and in other areas the recruited individuals were already deployed into combat 
zone.300 

Chechen groups have been fighting in Ukraine since the start of the war in February 2022301 
and the Chechen leader later revealed the formation of four additional battalions (namely 
North-Akhmat, South-Akhmat, West-Akhmat and East-Akhmat).302 At least 1 200 Chechen 
fighters (known as Kadyrovtsy or Kadyrovites) were deployed to Ukraine in late February 303 
and ‘two Chechen divisions of Russian Guard’ in September 2022.304 For information on 
recruitment in the Chechen Republic, see chapter 4. Conscription and military recruitment in 
Chechnya. 

293 Novaya  Gazeta, At  least 100 Russian conscripts  drafted  to  fight in Ukraine confirmed  dead  so far, 1 Novembe r 
2022, url 
294 RFE/RL, 'Everyone's  Drunk. No Uniforms. No Food.'  Inside The  Confusion  Greeting  Some  Of  Russia's Newly 
Mobilized  Troops,  9 October  2022, url  
295 BBC, Belgorod  shooting:  Gunmen  kill 11 in attack  on Russian  trainee soldiers, 16 October  2022, url  
296  Russia.Post,  Volunteer  battalions:  from  offense  to  (territorial) defense?,  19  August  2022,  url;  CNN,  Russia  is 
recruiting  thousands  of  volunteers  to  replenish  its ranks in  Ukraine. Prior experience  isn’t  always  required,  29 July 
2022, url 
297 Russia.Post,  Volunteer  battalions: from  offense  to  (territorial) defense?,  19 August  2022, url 
298 ISW, Russian offensive  campaign  assessment,  13 July  2022, url, p. 1 
299 Russia.post, Volunteer  battalions: from offense  to  (territorial) defense?,  19 August  2022, url 
300 Russia.Post,  Volunteer  battalions: from  offense  to  (territorial) defense?,  19 August  2022, url 
301 Al Jazeera, Chechen  leader, a Putin  ally, says  his forces  deployed  to  Ukraine, 26 February  2022, url 
302 Russia.Post,  Volunteer  battalions: from  offense  to  (territorial) defense?,  19 August  2022, url 
303 Al Jazeera, The  real role of  pro-Russian  Chechen  in Ukraine, 18 August  2022, url 
304 The  Odessa  Journal, Kadyrov  announced  the  dispatch  of  the  National Guard  from Chechnya  to  the  war in 
Ukraine, 8 September  2022, url 

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THE  RUSSIAN  FEDERATION  – MILITARY SERVICE   

The republic of North Ossetia-Alania deployed one of the first volunteer battalions in Ukraine 
in February 2022, called 'Alania'. They later announced the creation of another yet unnamed 
battalion in June 2022.305 In August 2022, the head of North Ossetia reportedly stated that 
two additional volunteer battalions would be created and go under the names ‘Alagir’ and 
‘Nogir’ (districts of North Ossetia).306 As of July 2022, thousands of volunteers were recruited 
by Russia to expand its ranks.307 The formation or deployment of volunteer battalions in Kursk, 
Primorskyi Krai, Republic of Bashkortostan, Chuvashia Republic, Chechnya, Republic of 
Tatarstan, Moscow City, Perm, Nizhny Novgorod, and Orenburg regions were reported end of 
June and beginning of July 2022. On 7 July 2022, the Tyumen region’s authorities reported 
on the formation of volunteer units.308 As of 31 July 2022, Russian officials started to recruit 
volunteers in Leningrad region for the Nevsky and Ladoga Battalions.309 The head of Republic 
of Bashkortostan declared that the ‘Shaimurato’ and ’Dostavalov’ volunteer battalions, for 
which recruitment was announced around end of May 2022, were sent to Ukraine on 29 
August 2022.310  

Regional officers reportedly recruited men aged up to 50 (or 60 for separate military 
specialties),311 who were contracted for a duration of six months and being offered an average 
monthly salary of 220 000 to 350 000 roubles [around 3 600 to 5 725 EUR]. In addition, 
separate subjects offered an immediate recruitment bonus of an average 200 000 roubles 
[3 272 EUR], which was provided ‘from the region’s budget and social benefits for the 
servicemen and their families’.312 A Russian volunteer from Tatarstan who had reportedly 
returned from the Ukraine war indicated that volunteer fighters were paid 205 000 roubles 
[3 355] per month. According to him, they were not paid their daily combat pay of 8 000 
roubles [130 EUR] per day.313 

Russian assigned officials in the occupied regions of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia reportedly 
‘announced the formation of “volunteer” units to fight with the Russian military against 
Ukraine’.314 Earlier in June 2022, over 200 volunteers were recruited 315 in the occupied 

305 Ukrainska Pravda, Russia announces  sending  new "Ossetian  volunteer  battalion" to  Ukraine, 19 September 
2022, url; The Odessa  Journal, Russia is going  to  send  an Ossetian  volunteer  detachment  to  Ukraine, 19 
September  2022, url 
306 ISW, Russian offensive  campaign  assessment,  August  29, 29 August  2022, url, p. 13; RFE/RL, Kavkaz.Realii, 
Глава Северной  Осетии  поручил  подготовить  именные  батальоны  для  участия  в войне  в Украине, [informal 
translation ‘The  head  of North  Ossetia  instructed  to  prepare  personal  battalions for  participation in the  war in 
Ukraine’], 29 August  2022, url 
307 CNN,  Russia is recruiting  thousands  of  volunteers  to  replenish  its  ranks in Ukraine. Prior experience  isn’t always 
required, 29 July  2022, url 
308 ISW, Russian offensive  campaign  assessment,  13 July  2022, url, p. 1 
309 ISW, Russian offensive  campaign  assessment,  31 July  2022, url, p. 2 
310 ISW, Russian offensive  campaign  assessment,  29 August  2022, url, p. 13 
311 Telegraph  (The), Russian army needs  34,000 more soldiers to  restore  full force  in Ukraine, 14 July 2022, url; 
Atalyar, Russia calls on  volunteers  and mercenaries  after Ukrainian counteroffensive,  19 September  2022, url 
312 ISW, Russian offensive  campaign  assessment,  13 July  2022, url, p. 1 
313  RFE/RL,  'We  Were  Nothing  To  Them':  Russian  Volunteer  Reservists  Return  From  War  Against  Ukraine Feeling 
Deceived,  12 August  2022, url 
314 CT, Russian offensive  campaign  assessment,  20 September  2022, url 
315 TASS,  Volunteer  battalions  begin to  be  formed  in Zaporozhye  Region  — authorities,  15 June  2022, url 

41 

 
EUROPEAN  UNION AGENCY  FOR  ASYLUM 

Ukrainian city of Zaporizhzhia.316 No further information on the recruitment of volunteers in 
Zaporizhzhia could be found within the consulted sources.  

3.3.2.  Mercenaries  

As part of the general mobilisation, Russia made use of both the conventional draft and 
recruitment of mercenary companies such as the Wagner group.317 According to the Russian 
MoD, a military contract can be signed with Russian nationals and foreign nationals. 318 
Individuals deployed to Ukraine ‘as part of a private military contractor’ are considered as 
mercenaries.319 

As of March 2022, the President Putin reportedly called on foreign volunteers to fight in 
Ukraine and the head of MoD indicated that 16 000 volunteers (including Chechens and 
mercenaries joining Wagner group from Syria and Libya320) were ready in the Middle East to 
fight together with RAF in Ukraine.321 Russia reportedly recruited mercenaries from Syria and 
Libya and offered each fighter between 300 and 600 dollars [around 300 – 600 EUR]. ISW 
cited Ukrainian intelligence reporting that following the opening of 14 recruitment centres in 
Syria, where mercenaries received training, Russia reportedly transferred them to Chkalovsky 
airbase (in Moscow region). Russia allegedly assembled ‘thousands’ of Syrian forces 
(belonging to Syrian ‘National Defense Forces and 5th Corps’), mostly the ones ‘specialized in 
heavy artillery and sniper weapons’.322 As of 13 March 2022, Russian armed forces reportedly 
instructed its base in Hmeimim (Syria) to deploy on a daily basis up to 300 fighters from Syria 
to Ukraine.323 However, ISW reportedly has not perceived ‘any deployments of cohesive units 
of Syrian or Libyan fighters’, and the reported recruitments appeared to be ‘individual fighters 
operating under the umbrella of the Wagner Group’.324 

In April 2022, there were reportedly between 300 to 500 Syrian and Libyan mercenaries in 
Popasna (eastern Ukraine).325 CNN cited ‘Andrii Yusov, a spokesperson for Ukraine’s defense 
intelligence agency who has been monitoring Wagner in Ukraine’, stating that as of 7 October 
2022, at least 5 000 mercenaries linked to Wagner group were operating alongside the 
Russian armed forces in Ukraine.326 

On 11 November 2022, the head of the Wagner Group announced that the group started 
training civilians in Belgorod and Kursk regions of Russia to create a militia at the border with 

316 Al Jazeera, Mapping  the  occupied  Ukrainian regions  Russia is formally annexing,  21 September  2022, url 
317 Le Monde,  The  hunt  for 'volunteers,'  a priority  for the Russian  army to hang  on  in Ukraine, 25 July  2022, url 
318 Russia, Ministry of  Defence  of the  Russian Federation,  n.d., url 
319 TSC,  Special  report, foreign  fighters,  volunteers,  and mercenaries,  Non-state  actors  and narratives  in Ukraine, 4 
April 2022, url, p. 4 
320 ICCT,  Foreign  Fighters, Foreign  Volunteers  and Mercenaries  in the  Ukrainian Armed Conflict,  11 Jul y  2022, url; Al 
Jazeera, Ukraine: Why  is Russia encouraging  foreign  fighters  to  join?, 23 March 2022 , url 
321 BBC, Ukraine war: Putin  seeks foreign  volunteers  to fight  in Ukraine, 11 March 2022, url 
322 ISW, Russian offensive  campaign  assessment,  13 March  2022, url, p. 3 
323 ISW, Russian offensive  campaign  assessment,  17 March 2022, url, pp. 1-2 
324 ISW, Russian offensive  campaign  assessment,  20 April 2020, url, p. 5 
325 ISW, Russian offensive  campaign  assessment,  20 April 2022, url, p. 5; Pradva,  Ukrainian defenders  in Popasna 
kill a detachment  of fighters  from Libya  and Syria – Danilov, 21 April 2022, url 
326 CNN, Morale is plummeting  in Putin’s  private  army as Russia’s war in Ukraine falters, 7 October  2022, url 

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Ukraine.327 The Wagner group has been present in Ukraine since 2014. As of October 2022, 
reportedly 1 000 of its mercenaries supported pro-Russian fighters in Luhansk and Donetsk.328 

3.4.  Recruitment of prison inmates 

Since spring and, on a large scale, since summer 2022,329 convicts from prison facilities have 
been exposed to recruitment efforts by private military companies (PMCs), among them 
primarily the Wagner Group, Russia’s largest PMC (hereafter “Wagner”),330 along with a few 
smaller companies such as Redoubt.331. Following their example and approach, the Russian 
Ministry of Defence has begun to recruit prisoners in late September 2022, offering money 
and early release from prison in exchange for participation in the war in Ukraine. 332 According 
to Vladimir Osechkin, founder of the human rights project Gulagu.net, Russian judges have 
been instructed to no longer grant parole but instead to refer the prisoners to the PMCs and 
the regular forces.333 In an interview on 21 October 2022, Olga Romanova from the prisoner 
advocacy organisation Russia Behind Bars (RBB) estimated that a total of more than 20 000 
inmates had been recruited since the beginning of the war,334 an estimate that corresponds to 
data from other human rights organisations.335  

As of September 2022, Wagner employees alone had visited at least 44 penitentiaries across 
the country,336 some more than once,337 recruiting on average 20 % of the population of each 
colony affected, as estimated by RBB in August 2022.338 According to reports from inmates 
and human rights activists, Wagner is particularly interested in prisoners convicted for murder, 

327 RFI, Wagner  mercenaries say  forming  border  militia, 11 November  2022, url  
328 BBC, What is Russia’s Wagner mercenary  group  in Ukraine?, 3  October  2022, url 
329 Verstka, Новые  солдаты  российской  армии:  ЧВК Вагнера завербовала  больше  тысячи  заключённых 
в 17 колониях  страны  [New Russian army soldiers: PMC  Wagner  recruits more  than a thousand  prisoners  in 17 
colonies], 5 August  2022, url; The Moscow  Times, Video  shows  Prigozhin  recruiting Russian prisoners  for Ukraine 
fight, 16 September  2022, url; The Moscow  Times, Russia recruits prisoners  en  masse for  Ukraine deployment  – 
NGO, 11 July 2022, url   
330 Doxsee,  C., Putin’s Proxies:  Examining  Russia’s Use  of Private  Military Companies,  CSIS,  21 September  2022, url  
331 Novaya  Gazeta  Europe,  Зона  поражения.  Российские  заключённые  – новое  топливо  войны  в Украине 
[Zone  of  defeat:  Russian prisoners  – The  new  fuel for the  war in Ukraine], 10 November  2022, url. For further 
examples  see  Romanova  (@oooromanova),  [Telegram], posted  on: 11 October  2022, url     
332 Important  Stories,  Минобороны  России  теперь  тоже  вербует  зэков  на фронт  [The  Russian Defence  Ministry 
now  also recruits convicts  to the  front], 11 October  2022, url; Meduza, The  Wagner Group’s  ‘best  practices’  go 
mainstream, 11 October  2022, url    
333 We can  explain, Отказавшихся  воевать  заключенных  могут  просто  расстрелять.  Владимир  Осечкин. 
Gulagu.net  [Prisoners who  refuse  to  fight can  simply be  shot. Vladimir Osechkin.  Gulagu.net] , Youtube,  28 October 
2022, url  
334 Agency.News,  [Telegram], posted  on: 21 October  2022, url   
335 Avtozak  Live, [Telegram], posted  on: 13 October  2022, url; Agency.News,  [Telegram], posted  on: 21 October 
2022, url    
336 Russia Behind Bars and  European  Prison  Litigation Network, Submissions  concerning  the  recruitment  and 
participation  of the  Russian convicted  prisoners  in the  war in Ukraine, September  2022, url, p. 2  
337 Russia Behind Bars and  European  Prison  Litigation Network, Submissions  concerning  the  recruitment  and 
participation  of the  Russian convicted  prisoners  in the  war in Ukraine, September  2022, url, p. 4; The  Insider, 
Wagner PMC  recruited  a cannibal in a Russian prison, head  of  Russia Behind Bars reports,  15 September  2022, url  
338 DW, Ольга  Романова:  Заключенных  россиян  бросают  в бой  первыми  [Olga Romanova:  Russian prisoners 
are thrown  into battle  first], 12 August  2022, url; Verstka, Новые солдаты  российской  армии: ЧВК Вагнера 
завербовала  больше  тысячи  заключённых  в 17 колониях  страны  [New Russian army soldiers: PMC  Wagner 
recruits more  than  a thousand  prisoners  in 17 colonies],  5 August  2022, url 

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EUROPEAN  UNION AGENCY  FOR  ASYLUM 

grievous bodily harm, and robbery.339 Further reports indicate that the PMC also contracts 
inmates suffering from diseases like HIV and hepatitis C,340 the former being particularly 
widespread in Russian prisons,341 as well as inmates holding the nationality of other CIS 
countries like Belarus and Tajikistan.342 However, certain criteria tend to disqualify for 
recruitment, notably advanced age,343 Ukrainian citizenship,344 and a conviction for terrorism or 
extremism.345 Some sources noted that persons convicted of sexual and drug offences were 
also recruited.346  

Based on various reports from inmates and their relatives published by independent Russian 
media and on the Telegram channel of Gulagu.net, prisoner recruitment at Wagner usually 
follows a set pattern which includes the following steps: a small group of ar med Wagner 
employees, among them on occasion the PMC’s head himself, Yevgeny Prigozhin, 347 enters 
the prison (sometimes via helicopter)348 accompanied by members of the Federal Penitentiary 
Service (FSIN) and the FSB.349 During a subsequent speech by representatives of the PMC in 
the courtyard, prisoners are offered a military service contract with the company and 
demanded to ‘defend the motherland’ in return for which they are promised a monthly salary 
of 100 000 to 200 000 roubles [1 635 – 3 272 EUR] (plus a compensation of 5 million roubles 

339 DW, Ольга  Романова:  Заключенных  россиян  бросают  в бой  первыми  [Olga Romanova:  Russian prisoners 
are thrown  into battle  first], 12 August  2022, url; SOTA,  Telegram, 17 September  2022, url; Disinfo, Убийства, 
порнография,  разбой.  За что  сидели  отправленные  на войну  российские  зэки [Murder, pornography,  robbery. 
What Russian convicts  sent  to war were  imprisoned for], 26 October  2022, url  
340 Ukraine, Defence  Intelligence  of  the  Ministry of Defence  of Ukraine, Wagner  Group  recruits large number  of 
prisoners  with HIV and hepatitis,  25 October  2022, url; Gulagu.net (@ NetGulagu), 12 October  2022, url; Gulagu.net 
(@ NetGulagu), 17 October  2022, url 
341 Strzelecki, J., Russia behind  bars: the peculiarities of  the  Russian prison system,  OSW,  7 February  2019, url 
342 Agency.News,  Telegram,  21 October  2022, url   
343 DW, Ольга  Романова:  Заключенных  россиян  бросают  в бой  первыми  [Olga Romanova:  Russian prisoners 
are thrown  into battle  first], 12 August  2022, url; Verstka, Новые солдаты  российской  армии: ЧВК Вагнера 
завербовала  больше  тысячи  заключённых  в 17 колониях  страны  [New Russian army soldiers: PMC  Wagner 
recruits more  than  a thousand  prisoners  in 17 colonies],  5 August  2022, url 
344 DW, Ольга  Романова:  Заключенных  россиян  бросают  в бой  первыми  [Olga Romanova:  Russian prisoners 
are thrown  into battle  first], 12 August  2022, url 
345 CNN, Russia dangles  freedom  to  prisoners  if they  fight in Ukraine. Many are taking the  deadly  gamble, 9 August 
2022, url; BBC News, "Из них  такое  поперло,  что  никто  не ожидал".  Как заключенные  реагируют  на призывы 
вступить  в "ЧВК Вагнера" ["It came  out  of them  in a way  that  no one  had  expected."  How  prisoners  react to  calls to 
join the "PMC  Wagner"], 17 September  2022, url  
346 BBC  News, "Из них  такое  поперло,  что  никто  не  ожидал". Как заключенные  реагируют  на призывы 
вступить  в "ЧВК Вагнера" ["It came  out  of them  in a way  that  no one  had  expected."  How  prisoners  react to  calls to 
join the "PMC  Wagner"], 17 September  2022, url; Verstka, Секс  с малолетней  и групповое  изнасилование.  За 
какие преступления  сидели  заключённые,  которых  ЧВК Вагнера  завербовала  для войны  в Украине  [Sex 
with a minor and gang  rape. What  crimes were the  prisoners  that  the Wagner  PMC  recruited  for the  war in Ukraine 
imprisoned  for?], 16 September  2022, url   
347 Verstka, Новые  солдаты  российской  армии:  ЧВК Вагнера завербовала  больше  тысячи  заключённых 
в 17 колониях  страны  [New Russian army soldiers: PMC  Wagner  recruits more  than a thousand  prisoners  in 17 
colonies], 5 August  2022, url; Mediazona, “We are most  interested  in murderers  and bandits.  You’ll like it in our 
squad.”,  10 August  2022, url 
348 Important  Stories,  “Нужны  добровольцы  на грязную  работу:  убивать  по приказу,  не задавая  вопросов» 
["We need  volunteers  for the  dirty work: to kill on command,  without  asking questions."], 20 July 2022, url; 
Mediazona,  “We are most  interested  in murderers  and  bandits. You’ll like it in our squad.”,  10 August  2022, url 
349 Important  Stories,  “Нужны  добровольцы  на грязную  работу:  убивать  по приказу,  не задавая  вопросов” 
["We need  volunteers  for the  dirty work: to kill on command,  without  asking questions."], 20 July 2022, url; Verstka, 
Новые  солдаты  российской  армии:  ЧВК Вагнера  завербовала  больше  тысячи  заключённых  в 17 колониях 
страны  [New Russian army soldiers: PMC  Wagner  recruits more  than a thousand  prisoners  in 17 colonies], 5 August 
2022, url  

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[81 800 EUR] for their families in case of death) and a presidential pardon after six months of 
service. Those who volunteer have to pass a personal interview, i.e., about their motivation to 
go to war, a physical fitness test and a polygraph test to assess their political attitude and 
inclination to desert.350 After the selection process, admitted prisoners are separated from 
their fellow inmates.351 RBB noted that their lawyers were not allowed to visit persons they 
knew had been drafted. The drafted convicts were reportedly transferred to the Rostov 
region.352 Rostov’s penal colony IK-2 has reportedly been converted into a military training 
camp for recruited convicts.353  

Due to the difficult prison conditions in Russia, characterised by violence and a lack of 
perspective, there is a strong willingness among prisoners to join Wagner and other military 
actors, according to Olga Romanova from RBB.354 However, there are also reports suggesting 
that prisoners who decline the offer are sometimes exposed to pressure, reprisals such as 
solitary confinement and to forced deployment. Thus, a September 2022 joint NGO report 
states that inmates collaborating with the prison administration (so-called ‘activists’) ‘were 
pressuring’ those who had not volunteered into signing a contract in penal colonies IK-6 and 
IK-7 in Leningrad region, following a visit by Wagner.355 An inmate from another penitentiary 
reported in a similar case that the prison administration itself had threatened non-volunteers 
with ‘shuddering and suffering’.356  

According to an article published by the independent Russian news portal Verstka on 5 
August 2022, prisoners who did not take the deal were sent to solitary confinement in at least 
two facilities, namely penal colonies IK-7 (Republic of Karelia) and IK-19 (Komi Republic). After 
initially expressing their willingness to join the fight, they had eventually decided not to sign 
the contract.357 In another case of inmates changing their mind, which occurred in IK-2 in 
Yaroslavl region shortly before the volunteers were transferred from the colony, the two 

350 Verstka, Новые  солдаты  российской  армии:  ЧВК Вагнера завербовала  больше  тысячи  заключённых 
в 17 колониях  страны  [New Russian army soldiers: PMC  Wagner  recruits more  than a thousand  prisoners  in 17 
colonies], 5 August  2022, url; Important Stories,  «Нужны добровольцы  на грязную  работу:  убивать  по  приказу, 
не задавая  вопросов»  ["We need  volunteers  for  the dirty  work: to  kill on command,  without  asking questions."],  20 
July 2022, url; Mediazona, “We  are most  interested  in murderers  and bandits.  You’ll like it in our squad.”,  10 August 
2022, url; Gulagu.net (@ NetGulagu),  Telegram, 10 October  2022, url 
351 Novaya  Gazeta  Europe,  Convicts  in arms, 12 November  2022, url; Gulagu.net (@ NetGulagu), posted  on: 12 
October  2022, url   
352 Verstka, Новые  солдаты  российской  армии:  ЧВК Вагнера завербовала  больше  тысячи  заключённых 
в 17 колониях  страны  [New Russian army soldiers: PMC  Wagner  recruits more  than a thousand  prisoners  in 17 
colonies], 5 August  2022, url 
353 Russia Behind Bars and  European  Prison  Litigation Network, Submissions  concerning  the  recruitment  and 
participation  of the  Russian convicted  prisoners  in the  war in Ukraine, September  2022, url, p. 9; Neue  Züricher 
Zeitung,  Courting  people  from the  margins of  society:  How  prisoners are being  recruited  for the  war in Ukraine, 23 
August  2022, url  
354 Neue  Züricher Zeitung,  Courting  people  from  the margins of  society:  How  prisoners  are being recruited  for the 
war in Ukraine, 23 August  2022, url; The Insider, Wagner  PMC  recruited  a cannibal in a Russian prison, head  of 
Russia Behind  Bars reports,  15 September  2022, url 
355 Russia Behind Bars and  European  Prison  Litigation Network, Submissions  concerning  the  recruitment  and 
participation  of the  Russian convicted  prisoners  in the  war in Ukraine, September  2022, url, p. 4 
356 Gulagu.net  (@ NetGulagu), Telegram,  10 October  2022, url 
357 Verstka, Новые  солдаты  российской  армии:  ЧВК Вагнера завербовала  больше  тысячи  заключённых 
в 17 колониях  страны  [New Russian army soldiers: PMC  Wagner  recruits more  than a thousand  prisoners  in 17 
colonies], 5 August  2022, url 

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EUROPEAN  UNION AGENCY  FOR  ASYLUM 

inmates concerned were beaten up by the prison staff.358 Finally, in terms of forced 
deployment, the independent news outlet SOTA reported on 17 September 2022 that Wagner 
had begun to recruit and relocate murderers and other violent offenders from penal colony IK-
4 (Mari El Republic) against their will.359 Within the time constraints for drafting this report, no 
further accounts of actions taken against convicted inmates unwilling to join Wagner were 
found in the sources consulted. 

Compared to Wagner, fewer details are known about the recruitment campaign of the MoD, 
which was not launched until late September 2022. Depending on the source, the ministry 
mainly360 or exclusively361 recruits in so-called ‘red’ penal colonies, where former members of 
the law enforcement and security agencies serve their sentences.362 As of 2020, there were 
21 such colonies in Russia.363 The prisoners are offered a six-month contract with the ministry 
and afterwards a presidential pardon if they join the Storm battalion, a newly created unit of 
enlisted convicts.364 According to a prisoner’s account published on Gulagu.net, inmates of 
‘red’ penal colony IK-11 in Nizhny Novgorod region were put under pressure by ministry staff to 
join the battalion under threat of forced recruitment and solitary confinement for the rest of 
their prison term.365 No information could be found among the sources consulted on whether 
the ministry has put these threats into practice.  

358 Gulagu.net  (@ NetGulagu), Telegram,  September  2022, url  
359 SOTA,  Telegram,  17 September  2022, url 
360 Novaya  Gazeta  Europe,  Convicts  in arms, 12 November  2022, url 
361 Important  Stories,  Минобороны  России  теперь  тоже  вербует  зэков  на фронт  [The  Russian Defence  Ministry 
now  also recruits convicts  to the  front], 11 October  2022, url 
362 Important  Stories,  Минобороны  России  теперь  тоже  вербует  зэков  на фронт  [The  Russian Defence  Ministry 
now  also recruits convicts  to the  front], 11 October  2022, url  
363 Russia, Federal  Penitentiary  Service  (FSIN): Как отбывают  наказание  бывшие  сотрудники  - силовики, 
правоохранители  [How former  employees  - law enforcement  officers,  law enforcement  officers  -  serve  their 
sentences],  24 March 2020, url  
364 Important  Stories,  Минобороны  России  теперь  тоже  вербует  зэков  на фронт  [The  Russian Defence  Ministry 
now  also recruits convicts  to the  front], 11 October  2022, url; Novaya Gazeta  Europe,  Convicts  in arms, 12 November 
2022, url 
365 Gulagu.net  (@ NetGulagu), Telegram,  4 October  2022, url  

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4.  Conscription and military recruitment in 

Chechnya 

4.1.  Conditions of conscription and use of Chechen 

fighters in Ukraine 

The situation of conscription and military recruitment in Chechnya (officially, the Chechen 
Republic) is partly different from the rest of the Russian Federation. Conscription into 
obligatory military service of young Chechens was suspended after the fall of the Soviet 
Union366 due to the armed conflict between the Chechen separatists and the Russian 
Federation.367 Following several failed attempts of conscription, especially in 2001 and 
2007,368 military service was reinstated in Chechnya in 2014,369 after an agreement between 
the head of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov, and Russian MoD was reached for 
drafting 500 conscripts per year.370 

Chechnya has a large security force of about 30 000 men, mainly attached to the Russian 
National Guard (Rosgvardia) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.371 In practice, some units 
answer directly to Ramzan Kadyrov, and are usually referred to as Kadyrovites (kadyrovtsy).372 
The Kadyrovites, who are accused of numerous abuses committed with complete impunity,373 

366 Aliyev, H., Russian Army  Increases  Numbers  of  North Caucasian  Conscripts,  The  Central Asia-Caucasus  Analyst, 
11 November  2014, url; Vatchagaev,  M., Chechnya's  Exclusion  from Military Conscription  Shows  Moscow's  Weak 
Hold over  Region,  Jamestown  Foundation,  4 October  2013, url  
367 Aliyev, H., Russian Army  Increases  Numbers  of  North Caucasian  Conscr ipts,  The  Central Asia-Caucasus  Analyst, 
11 November  2014, url 
368 Vatchagaev,  M., Chechnya's  Exclusion  from Military Conscription  Shows  Moscow's  Weak Hold over  Region, 
Jamestown  Foundation,  4  October  2013, url; Kavkazskiy Uzel, Чеченские  призывники  будут  служить  только  в 
Чечне  [Chechens  conscripts  will serve  only  in Chechnya],  4 June  2008, url 
369 Vatchagaev,  M., Kadyrov  Succeeds  in Pressuring  Moscow  to  Renew  the  Military Draft in Chechnya,  The 
Jamestown  Foundation,  Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 11, Issue 169, 25 September  2014, url; Kavkazskiy Uzel, Первые 
призывники  отправлены  в армию  из Чечни  [The first conscripts  from  Chechnya  were  sent  to the  army], 18 
October  2017, url 
370 Vatchagaev,  M., Kadyrov  Succeeds  in Pressuring  Moscow  to  Renew  the  Military Draft in Chechnya,  The 
Jamestown  Foundation,  Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 11, Issue 169, 25 September  2014, url; RFE/RL, Russian Army 
Drafting Men  From Chechnya  For  First Time In 20 Years, 1 October  2014, url; Kavkazskiy Uzel, Первые 
призывники  отправлены  в армию  из Чечни  [The first conscripts  from  Chechnya  were  sent  to the  army], 18 
October  2017, url 
371 Denmark, DIS, Security  and human  rights in Chechnya  and  the situation  of Chechens  in the Russian Federation  – 
residence  registration, racism and false accusations,  January  2015, p. 32, url; Belgium, CGVS,  Tchetchenie: 
Situation  sécuritaire, 24 July 2019, p. 11-13, url 
372 Belgium, CGVS,  Tchetchenie:  Situation  sécuritaire, 24 July 2019, p. 11 -13, url ; Newsline institute  for strategy  and 
policy,  The Kadyrovtsy:  Putin’s  Force  Multiplier or Propaganda  Tool?,  4 March 2022, url; Chambers  H., One  month 
on  in the  Ukraine war: what role for the  kadyrovtsy?,  Fondation  pour la recherche  stratégique,  6 April 2022, url  
373 Belgium, CGVS,  Tchetchenie:  Situation  sécuritaire, 24/07/2019, p. 11-13, url; Novaya  Gazeta,  Я служил  в 
чеченской  полиции  и не хотел  убивать  людей  [I served  in Chechen  police  and I didn’t want  to kill peoples],  15 
March 2021, url; Newsline institute  for strategy  and policy,  The  Kadyrovtsy:  Putin’s Force  Multiplier or Propaganda 
Tool?,  4 March 2022, url  

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EUROPEAN  UNION AGENCY  FOR  ASYLUM 

such as arbitrary detentions, torture or extrajudicial executions,374 were the first units deployed 
from Chechnya to Ukraine, especially within the troops of the National Guard.375  

In April 2022, Ramzan Kadyrov announced his plan to recruit376 and train 200 volunteers per 
week.377 The latter, from Chechnya, other Russian regions378 or CIS countries,379 reportedly 
receive a few days' training in the Russian Special Forces University in Gudermes  (Chechnya), 
established in April 2022,380 before being deployed to Ukraine.381 At the beginning of the 
conflict, according to several sources, volunteers were promised a commitment bonus of up to 
300 000 roubles [4 930 EUR], 382 plus usual remunerations established by the Russian MoD for 
contract soldiers.383 According to RFE/RL’s service Kavkaz.Realii, they were assigned a 
monthly salary ranging from 200 000 to 300 000 roubles384 [3 172 to 4 930 EUR]. They were 
also promised a payment of 50 000 to 300 000 roubles [820 to 4 930 EUR] for each combat 
vehicle destroyed.385 Reportedly, the promises of salaries were not always kept386 and there 

374 Memorial, Северный  Кавказ и Украина: 20 недель  ‘специальной  военной  операции’  [North Caucasus  and 
Ukraine: 20 weeks  of  ‘special military operation’], 15 July  2022, p. 16, url 
375 Memorial, Северный  Кавказ и Украина: 20 недель  ‘специальной  военной  операции’  [North Caucasus  and 
Ukraine: 20 weeks  of  ‘special military operation’], 15 July  2022, p. 17, url; Ratelle, J.-F., The  North Caucasus  and the 
Russian War in Ukraine, Ponars  Eurasia, 12 October  2022, url 
376 Kavkaz.Realii, В Чечне  неработающих  местных  жителей  заставляют  объяснять  отказ  от  службы  в армии  [In 
Chechnya,  unemployed  locals are forced  to  explain their refusal to  serve  in the  army], 26 July 2022, url 
377 Meduza,  ‘Anything  but  a hawk’ Elena  Milashina has been  writing about  Chechnya  for years  - and  thinks that 
Ramzan Kadyrov  is trying  to protect  it from the  worst,  4 October  2022, url  
378 Memorial, Северный  Кавказ и Украина: 20 недель  ‘специальной  военной  операции’  [North Caucasus  and 
Ukraine: 20 weeks  of  ‘special military operation’], 15 July  2022, pp. 18, 21 and 24, url 
379 Memorial, Северный  Кавказ и Украина: 20 недель  ‘специальной  военной  операции’  [North Caucasus  and 
Ukraine: 20 weeks  of  ‘special military operation’], 15 July  2022, pp. 18, 21 and 24, url 
380 Meduza,  ‘Anything  but  a hawk’ Elena  Milashina has been  writing about  Chechnya  for years  — and  thinks that 
Ramzan Kadyrov  is trying  to protect  it from the  worst,  4 October  2022, url  
381 Memorial, Северный  Кавказ и Украина: 20 недель  ‘специальной  военной  операции’  [North Caucasus  and 
Ukraine: 20 weeks  of  ‘special military operation’], 15 July  2022, p. 18, url; Meduza, ‘Anything  but  a hawk’ Elena 
Milashina has been  writing about  Chechnya  for years  — and  thinks that  Ramzan Kadyrov  is trying to  protect  it from 
the  worst, 4 October  2022, url  
382 Memorial, Северный  Кавказ и Украина: 20 недель  ‘специальной  военной  операции’  [North Caucasus  and 
Ukraine: 20 weeks  of  ‘special military operation’], 15 July  2022, p. 18-19, url; Radio Ozodi, Глава  Чечни пообещал 
300 тысяч  рублей  каждому,  кто  поедет  воевать  в Украину  [The  head  of Chechnya  has promised  300,000 
roubles  to anyone  who  goes  to  fight in Ukraine], 20 April 2022, url; Aliyev H., Email correspondence  with EUAA,  14 
November  2022; Perild, “They  gave  300 thousand  from  Ramzan’s pocket.”  “Important  stories”  told  how volunteers 
were  recruited  in Chechnya  for the  war with  Ukraine, 12 October  2022, url  
383 Memorial, Северный  Кавказ и Украина: 20 недель  ‘специальной  военной  операции’  [North Caucasus  and 
Ukraine: 20 weeks  of  ‘special military operation’], 15 July  2022, p. 18-19, url; Aliyev H., Email correspondence  with 
EUAA,  14 November  2022; Perild, “They  gave  300 thousand  from Ramzan’s pocket.”  “Important  stories”  told how 
volunteers  were recruited  in Chechnya  for  the war with Ukraine, 12 October  2022, url 
384 Kavkaz.Realii, За оружием  и деньгами:  зачем  из Чечни  едут  воевать  в Украину  [For weapons  and  money: 
why  people  go  from Chechnya  to  fight in Ukraine], 8 June  2022, url 
385 Memorial, Северный  Кавказ и Украина: 20 недель  ‘специальной  военной  операции’  [North Caucasus  and 
Ukraine: 20 weeks  of  ‘special military operation’], 15 July  2022, p. 18-19, url; Kavkaz.Realii, За оружием  и 
деньгами:  зачем  из  Чечни едут  воевать  в Украину  [For weapons  and money:  why  people  go from  Chechnya  to 
fight  in Ukraine], 8 June  2022, url; Perild, ‘They  gave  300 thousand  from Ramzan’s pocket.’  ‘Important  stories’ told 
how  volunteers  were recruited  in Chechnya  for the  war with Ukraine, 12 October  2022, url  
386 Aliyev  H., Email correspondence  with EUAA,  14 November  2022 

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were reports of relatives complaining that they had not received the promised financial 
support and medical care after their male relatives were injured387 or killed in Ukraine.388 

The legal status of these volunteers is unclear. Some sources reported that initially they had 
been deployed without a contract,389 whereas other sources mentioned that volunteers had 
been mainly deployed within the Chechen volunteer battalion Akhmat,390 attached to the 
MoD.391 From June 2022, volunteers became attached to military units,392 to private military 
companies such as Wagner, or to the National Guard on short contracts, sometimes signed 
retrospectively in their absence.393 For information on volunteer fighters in Ukraine, please see 
chapter 3.3 Volunteer battalions and mercenaries. 

On 26 June 2022, Ramzan Kadyrov announced the establishment of four exclusively Chechen 
volunteers’ battalions attached to the MoD: South-Akhmat, North-Akhmat, West-Akhmat and 
East Akhmat.394 However, facing the lack of recruits, men of these regiments come mainly 
from the Chechen police forces and the National Guard395 and, according to Ramzan Kadyrov, 
they all already had received combat experience in the Donbass.396 At the same time, Kadyrov 

387 Kavkazskiy Uzel, Аналитики  спрогнозировали  лояльное  отношение  к добровольцам  после  жалобы 
Кадырову  [Analysts  predict  loyal attitude  towards  volunteers  after complaint  to  Kadyrov] , 15 June  2022, url  
388 Insider (The), ‘Threatening  mothers  and  sisters.’ How  Chechen  ‘volunteers’  are forcibly  sent  to  fight in Ukraine, 
15 June  2022, url; Kavkaz.Realii, За оружием  и деньгами:  зачем  из  Чечни  едут  воевать  в Украину  [For weapons 
and money:  why people  go  from Chechnya  to  fight  in Ukraine], 8 June  2022, url 
389 Memorial, Северный  Кавказ и Украина: 20 недель  ‘специальной  военной  операции’  [North Caucasus  and 
Ukraine: 20 weeks  of  ‘special military operation’], 15 July  2022, p. 17 -22, url; Perild, “They  gave  300 thousand  from 
Ramzan’s pocket.”  “Important  stories”  told  how  volunteers  were  recruited  in Chechnya  for the  war with Ukraine, 12 
October  2022, url 
390 Novaya  Gazeta  Europe,  To  war or to  prison?, 12 August  2022, url; Meduza, ‘Anything  but  a hawk’ Elena 
Milashina has been  writing about  Chechnya  for years  - and  thinks that  Ramzan Kadyrov  is trying to  protect  it from 
the  worst, 4 October  2022, url; Aliyev H., Email correspondence  with EUAA,  14 November  2022.  
391 Aliyev  H., Email correspondence  with EUAA,  14 November  2022.  
392  Memorial, Северный  Кавказ  и  Украина:  20  недель  ‘специальной  военной  операции’  [North  Caucasus  and 
Ukraine: 20 weeks  of  ‘special  military operation’], 15 July  2022, p. 17 -22, url; Perild, “They  gave  300 thousand  from 
Ramzan’s pocket.”  “Important  stories”  told  how  volunteers  were  recruited  in Chechnya  for the  war  with Ukraine, 12 
October  2022, url 
393 Perild, “They  gave  300 thousand  from  Ramzan’s pocket.”  “Important  stories”  told how  volunteers  were  recruited 
in Chechnya  for the  war with Ukraine, 12 October  2022, url 
394  Ramzan  Kadyrov  (@RKadyrov_95),  Telegram,  26  June  2022 url; Memorial,  Северный  Кавказ  и  Украина:  20 
недель  ‘специальной  военной  операции’  [North  Caucasus  and  Ukraine: 20 weeks  of  ‘special military operation’], 
15 July  2022, p. 22, url; Kavkazskiy Uzel, Кадыров  анонсировал  формирование  четырех  военных  батальонов  
[Kadyrov  annonced  the  formation  of four  military bataillons], 27 June  2022, url 
395 Meduza,  ‘Anything  but  a hawk’ Elena  Milashina has been  writing about  Chechnya  for years  - and  thinks that 
Ramzan Kadyrov  is trying  to protect  it from the  worst,  4 October  2022, url; Kavkaz.Realii, В Чечне неработающих 
местных  жителей  заставляют  объяснять  отказ  от  службы  в армии  [In Chechnya,  unemployed  locals are forced 
to  explain their refusal to  serve  in the  army], 26 July 2022, url 
396 Meduza,  ‘Anything  but  a hawk’ Elena  Milashina has been  writing about  Chechnya  for years  - and  thinks that 
Ramzan Kadyrov  is trying  to protect  it from the  worst,  4 October  2022, url; Ramzan Kadyrov  (@RKadyrov_95), 
Telegram, 10 September  2022, url 

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launched a wave of recruitment among the republic's security forces.397 The first servicemen 
from these battalions were deployed to Ukraine in September 2022.398 

In mid-September, Ramzan Kadyrov signed a conscription order for men aged 18 to 27, which 
triggered demonstrations in Grozny.399 On 23 September, Kadyrov stated that a ‘partial 
mobilisation,’ ordered by President Putin, would not be applied in Chechnya, as the republic 
had already exceeded the quota for personnel to be drafted.400 According to the Chechen 
authorities, Chechnya has already deployed more than 20 000 troops since the beginning of 
the hostilities and around 9 030 Chechens were reportedly fighting in Ukraine as of 15 
November 2022.401 According to Huseyn Aliyev, the numbers of Chechen fighters deployed to 
Ukraine, which are officially communicated by Chechen authorities, ‘are likely to be inflated’.402 
In October 2022, the Chechen authorities announced that 500 volunteer medical workers 
would be sent to Ukraine.403 

Poorly equipped for artillery combat,404 the Kadyrovites were mainly employed for urban 
combat,405 securing Russian occupied territories,406 guarding prisoners of war,407 and 
preventing the desertion of Russian soldiers.408 The Kadyrovites suffered heavy losses in 
northern Ukraine in February and early March 2022, and, according to Ukrainian intelligence, 
withdrew from the region in mid-March.409 In March 2022, according to the Chechen 

397 Meduza,  ‘Anything  but  a hawk’ Elena  Milashina has been  writing about  Chechnya  for years  - and  thinks that 
Ramzan Kadyrov  is trying  to protect  it from the  worst,  4 October  2022, url; Kavkaz.Realii, В Чечне неработающих 
местных  жителей  заставляют  объяснять  отказ  от  службы  в армии  [In Chechnya,  unemployed  locals are forced 
to  explain their refusal to  serve  in the  army], 26 July 2022, url 
398 Meduza,  ‘Anything  but  a hawk’ Elena  Milashina has been  writing about  Chechnya  for years  - and  thinks that 
Ramzan Kadyrov  is trying  to protect  it from the  worst,  4 October  2022, url; Kavkazskiy Uzel, Кадыров  отчитался  об 
отправке  в Донбасс  бойцов  ‘Юг-Ахмата’  и добровольцев  [Kadyrov  reports  sending  Iug-Akhmat  fighters  and 
volunteers  to Donbass],  27 September  2022, url 
399 Meduza,  ‘Anything  but  a hawk’ Elena  Milashina has been  writing about  Chechnya  for years  - and  thinks that 
Ramzan Kadyrov  is trying  to protect  it from the  worst,  4 October  2022, url; RFE/RL, Russia's Chechnya  Gets  Ready 
For 'Fall Mobilization' As  Moscow  Faces  Major Setback  In Ukraine War, 15 September  2022, url 
400 Ratelle J.-F, The North  Caucasus  and the  Russian War in Ukraine, Ponars  Eurasia, 12 October  2022, url; Meduza, 
‘Anything  but  a hawk’ Elena Milashina has been  writing about  Chechnya  for years  - and  thinks that  Ramzan Kadyrov 
is trying to  protect  it from the  worst, 4 October  2022, url; Novaya Gazeta  Europe,  Kadyrov:  no mobilisation in 
Chechnya,  23 September  2022, url; ISW, Russian Offensive  Campaign  Assessment,  23 September  2022, url 
401 Caucasian  Knot, Daudov  announces  participation of  9000 fighters  from Chechnya  in battles  in Ukraine, 15 
November  2022, url; 
402 Aliyev  H., Email correspondence  with EUAA,  14 November  2022. 
403 Caucasian  Knot, Kadyrov  confirms  predictions  about  sending  medical  workers from Chechnya  to  Donbass, 11 
October  2022, url 
404 Memorial, Северный  Кавказ и Украина: 20 недель  ‘специальной  военной  операции‘  [North Caucasus  and 
Ukraine: 20 weeks  of  ‘special military operation’], 15 July  2022, p. 25 -26, url; 
405 Memorial, Северный  Кавказ и Украина: 20 недель  ‘специальной  военной  операции‘  [North Caucasus  and 
Ukraine: 20 weeks  of  ‘special military operation’], 15 July  2022, p. 25 -26, url; 
406 Memorial, Северный  Кавказ и Украина: 20 недель  ‘специальной  военной  операции‘  [North Caucasus  and 
Ukraine: 20 weeks  of  ‘special military operation’], 15 July  2022, p. 25 -26, url; 
407 Kavkaz Realii, За оружием  и деньгами:  зачем  из  Чечни едут  воевать  в Украину  [For weapons  and money: 
why  people  go  from Chechnya  to  fight in Ukraine], 8 June  2022, url; 
408 Memorial, Северный  Кавказ и Украина: 20 недель  ‘специальной  военной  операции‘  [North Caucasus  and 
Ukraine: 20 weeks  of  ‘special military operation’], 15 July  2022, p. 25 -26, url; Chambers  H., One  month  on in the 
Ukraine war: what role for the  kadyrovtsy?,  Fondation  pour  la recherche  stratégique,  6 April 2022, url 
409 Memorial, Северный  Кавказ и Украина: 20 недель  ‘специальной  военной  операции’  [North Caucasus  and 
Ukraine: 20 weeks  of  ‘special military operation’], 15 July  2022, p. 26 -27, url; Kyiv Independent  (The), The 
destruction  of  a convoy  of  Chechen  special forces  near Hostomel  on  Feb. 26 officially confirmed  by  the President's 
Office., 27 February  2022, url 

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authorities, the Kadyrovites were also present in the Donetsk region, notably in Mariupol, as 
well as in the Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, Luhansk and Kherson regions.410 Between March and 
June, they participated in urban battles for the capture of Rubizhne, Sieverodonetsk and 
Lysychansk in the Luhansk region.411 In September 2022, according to the Ukrainian army and 
the Warsaw institute, up to 1 300412 or 1 500413 troops from Chechnya were sent to Kherson 
region.414 

According to both researcher Huseyn Aliyev, and human rights lawyer interviewed by EUAA in 
November 2022, no NGOs working to help drafted persons were present in Chechnya.415 
Moreover, as noted by the human rights lawyer, there were ‘no signs of anyone talking [about 
military drafting and deployment] and complaining’.416 

4.2.  Methods of recruitment  

In Chechnya, recruitment of fighters for warfare against Ukraine was reported to have been 
organised in a general atmosphere of coercion and in violation of human rights standards.417 
Ramzan Kadyrov has regularly reported on deployments of volunteers to Ukraine.418 Similarly, 
the president of Chechen Parliament Magomet Daudov also reported the same.419 In June 
2022, upon inquiry by RFR/RL’s service Kavkaz.Realii, employees of Chechen enlistment 
offices stated that only volunteers were accepted for deployment to Ukraine.420 In July, as 
reported by Caucasian Knot, the Chechen leader said on air of the state TV Grozny that 
anyone who would refuse to go to Ukraine ‘will get into the hell’.421 At the end of August 2022, 
Kadyrov reportedly ‘called the refuseniks [people who refused deployment] parasites’ and 

410 Chambers,  H., One  month  on  in the  Ukraine war: what role for  the kadyrovtsy?,  Fondation  pour  la recherche 
stratégique,  6 April 2022, url 
411 Memorial, Северный  Кавказ и Украина: 20 недель  ‘специальной  военной  операции’  [North Caucasus  and 
Ukraine: 20 weeks  of  ‘special military operation’], 15 July  2022, p. 28, url; Rarelle J.-F., The  North  Caucasus  and  the 
Russian War in Ukraine, Ponars  Eurasia, 12 October  2022, url 
412 RFE/RL, Russia's Chechnya  Gets Ready  For  'Fall Mobilization' As  Moscow  Faces  Major Setback  In Ukraine War, 
15 September  2022, url  
413 Warsaw institute, Why  Ukraine War Matters For  Chechnya’s  Kadyrov,  20 September  2022, url;  
414 RFE/RL, Russia's Chechnya  Gets Ready  For  'Fall Mobilization' As  Moscow  Faces  Major Setback  In Ukraine War, 
15 September  2022, url; Warsaw institute, Why  Ukraine War Matters For  Chechnya’s  Kadyrov,  20 September   2022, 
url 
415Aliyev  H., Email correspondence  with EUAA,  14 November  2022; Human rights  lawyer, Online  interview with 
EUAA,  11 November  2022 
416 Human rights  lawyer, Online  interview with EUAA,  11 November  2022 
417 Insider (The), “Threatening  mothers  and  sisters.” How  Chechen  “volunteers”  are forcibly  sent  to  fight in Ukraine, 
15 June  2022, url; RFR/RL, Authorities  In Chechnya  Use Aggressive  Shaming To  Boost  Number  Of  Volunteers  For 
Russia's Ukraine War, 10 November  2022, url 
418 Caucasian  Knot, New  group  of volunteers  leaves  Chechnya  for Ukraine, 1 October  2022 , url; Caucasian  Knot, 
Kadyrov  announces  dispatch  of  another  detachment  of  volunteers  to  Ukraine, 21 October  2022, url  
419 Kavkaz.Realii, В Чечне  назвали  число  отправленных  на войну  против  Украины  жителей  республики 
[Chechnya  names  number  of Chechens  sent  to  war against  Ukraine], 7 June  2022, url 
420 Kavkaz.Realii, В Украине  убит  похищенный  кадыровцами  и насильно  отправленный  на войну  житель 
Чечни  [Chechen  man kidnapped  by  Kadyrov  and  forcibly  sent  to war killed in Ukraine], 11 June  2022, url 
421 Caucasian  Knot, Recruitment  to  Chechen  battalions  goes  amid Kadyrov's  threats  of  hell for those  who  refuse  to 
go  to Ukraine, 18  July 2022, url  

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EUROPEAN  UNION AGENCY  FOR  ASYLUM 

stated that low-income families whose young members would refuse the enrolment in the 
Chechen military units should be denied social benefits.422  

During the reference period, media sources, human rights activists and bloggers  — referring 
to the statements of Chechen men and their relatives — have reported on numerous instances 
of forced recruitment.423 The methods used for forced recruitment included inducement,424 
threats,425 and kidnapping.426 The Europe-based human rights NGO Vaifond, reported in May 
2022 that, among the people who were forced to volunteer, were people with disabilities as 
well as people who had no previous connection to the state- or low enforcement-bodies. 
According to the source, some civil servants were also forced to apply to join the volunteer 
battalions.427 During the same month, Kavkaz.Realii reported that, based on the information of 
the opposition movement 1ADAT, around 130 people were kidnapped and detained to force 
them to volunteer for the units.428 On 15 June, an independent media outlet The Insider, 
reported that a brother of a Chechen opposition blogger Khasan Khalitov was abducted by 
the Chechen security forces and taken to Ukraine.429 In some instances, men were reported to 
have had to pay a high ransom to avoid recruitment430 or to choose between signing a 
contract to be deployed to Ukraine and facing made-up criminal proceedings.431  

As noted by the chairman of the Civil Assistance Committee (Grazhsanskoe sodeystvie) 
Svetlana Gannushkina, persons refusing to take part in the hostilities in Ukraine, as well as 
their family members, could face persecution by the authorities.432 Based on information from 
human rights NGOs, The Insider noted on the use of family members for recruitment 
purposes. The source reported on instances involving threats to abduct and detain relatives, 

422 Caucasian  Knot, Kadyrov  orders  not  to  pay social  allowance to  families of  those  who  refused  to  serve, 26 
August  2022, url 
423 Kavkaz.Realii, Жителей  Чечни массово  задерживают  для отправки  "добровольцами"  в Украину  – 
правозащитники  [Chechen  residents  detained  en  masse to  be  sent  as "volunteers"  to  Ukraine - human  rights 
activists], 17 May 2022 2022, url; Insider (The), “Threatening  mothers  and  sisters.” How  Chechen  „volunteers“  are 
forcibly  sent  to fight  in Ukraine, 15 June  2022, url 
424 Insider (The) “Threatening  mothers  and sisters.” How  Chechen  “volunteers”  are forcibly  sent  to fight  in Ukraine, 
15 June  2022, url; Kavkazskiy Uzel, Родственники  контрактников  из Чечни  рассказали  об  уловках  рекрутеров 
[Relatives of  Chechen  contract  servicemen  told of  recruiters'  tricks], 28 July  2022, url 
425 RFI, Une ONG  dénonce  des  recrutements  forcés  en Tchétchénie  pour  la guerre  en Ukraine, 20 July 2022, url; 
Kavkaz.Realii, За оружием  и деньгами:  зачем  из  Чечни едут  воевать  в Украину  [For Weapons  and  Money:  Why 
Chechens  are Coming  to Fight  in Ukraine], 8 June  2022, url 
426 RFI, Une ONG  dénonce  des  recrutements  forcés  en Tchétchénie  pour  la guerre  en Ukraine, 20 July 2022, url; 
Insider (The), “Threatening  mothers  and  sisters.” How  Chechen  “volunteers”  are forcibly  sent  to  fight  in Ukraine, 15 
June  2022, url 
427 Kavkaz.Realii, В Чечне  мужчин  похищают  на войну  против  Украины: как Кадыров  ищет  солдат  для Путина 
[Men kidnapped  in Chechnya  for war against Ukraine: How  Kadyrov  is looking for soldiers  for  Putin], 25 May  2022, 
url 
428 Kavkaz.Realii, Жителей  Чечни массово  задерживают  для отправки  "добровольцами"  в Украину  – 
правозащитники  [Chechen  residents  detained  en  masse to  be  sent  as "volunteers"  to  Ukraine - human  rights 
activists], 17 May 2022 2022, url 
429 Insider (The), “Threatening  mothers  and  sisters.” How  Chechen  “volunteers”  are forcibly  sent  to  fight in Ukraine, 
15 June  2022, url 
430 RFI, Une ONG  dénonce  des  recrutements  forcés  en Tchétchénie  pour  la guerre  en Ukraine, 20 July 2022, url 
431 Kavkaz.Realii, От чеченских  наемников  до ростовских  чиновников:  как изменилась  "скрытая 
мобилизация"  [From Chechen  mercenaries  to  Rostov  officials: how  "covert  mobilisation" has  changed],  30 June 
2022, url; Kavkaz.Realii, За оружием  и деньгами:  зачем  из  Чечни едут  воевать  в Украину  [ For Weapons  and 
Money:  Why  Chechens  are Coming  to  Fight  in Ukraine], 8 June  2022, url 
432 Kavkazskiy Uzel, Слова  о тысяче  добровольцев  на Украине  вызвали  сомнения  в правдивости  Кадырова 
[Words about  a thousand  volunteers  in Ukraine have  raised doubts  about  Kadyrov's  veracity],  21 March 2022, url 

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threats to abduct a young man who refused to go to Ukraine addressed to his parents, and 
threats with molestation of female relatives. According to the Insider, state actors use 
kidnappings for extortion.433  

Persons persecuted by law enforcement and convicted prisoners were also reported to be 
among the involuntary recruits.434 Human rights activists reported that interned men who 
refused their deployment to Ukraine were threatened with contrived criminal proceedings. 435 
Among recruited personal there were also alleged criminals and prison inmates who preferred 
deployment to Ukraine to criminal proceedings and prison detention.436 Persuasive methods 
were also reportedly used: these methods did not use coercion directly but attempted to gain 
persons’ consent to the deployment, for instance, by ‘reminding’ people about their past 
criminal records437 and threatening with imprisonment.438  

In September 2022, there were reports on recruitment of male relatives of women who 
protested against the ‘partial mobilisation’ order.439 For example, male relatives of women who 
wanted to hold a protest rally against mobilisation measures were reportedly taken to the 
Russian Special Troops University in Gudermes for the training prior to their deployment to 
Ukraine. After the case attracted public attention, law enforcement authorities reportedly 
demanded that a family of a man deployed to Ukraine would deny that his deployment was 
forced on camera.440  

On 10 October 2022, Kadyrov announced an additional deployment of medical personnel, 
comprising more than 500 volunteers with medical training, to Donbass. The deployment was 
preceded by an apology by a nurse who was publicly reprimanded by the Minister of Health in 

433 Insider (The), “Threatening  mothers  and  sisters.” How  Chechen  “volunteers”  are forcibly  sent  to  fight in Ukraine, 
15 June  2022, url 
434 Kavkaz.Realii, Жителей  Чечни массово  задерживают  для отправки  "добровольцами"  в Украину  – 
правозащитники  [Chechen  residents  detained  en  masse for  sending  "volunteers"  to  Ukraine -  human rights 
activists], 17 May 2022, url 
435 Kavkaz.Realii, От чеченских  наемников  до ростовских  чиновников:  как изменилась  "скрытая 
мобилизация"  [From Chechen  mercenaries  to  Rostov  officials: how  "covert  mobilisation" has  changed],  30 June 
2022, url; Insider (The), “Threatening  mothers  and  sisters.” How  Chechen  “volunteers”  are forcibly sent  to  fight  in 
Ukraine, 15 June  2022, url; Kavkaz.Realii, В Украине убит  похищенный  кадыровцами  и насильно  отправленный 
на войну  житель  Чечни  [Chechen  man kidnapped  by  Kadyrov  and forcibly  sent  to  war killed in Ukraine], 11 June 
2022, url 
436 Kavkaz.Realii, В Украине  убит  похищенный  кадыровцами  и насильно  отправленный  на войну  житель 
Чечни  [Chechen  man kidnapped  by  Kadyrov  and  forcibly  sent  to war killed in Ukraine], 11 June  2022, url; 
Kavkaz.Realii, За оружием  и деньгами:  зачем  из  Чечни едут  воевать  в Украину  [For Weapons  and  Money:  Why 
Chechens  are Coming  to Fight  in Ukraine], 8 June  2022, url 
437 Kavkazskiy Uzel, Родственники  контрактников  из  Чечни рассказали  об  уловках  рекрутеров  [Relatives of 
Chechen  contract  servicemen  told  of recruiters'  tricks], 28 July  2022, url; Insider (The)  “Threatening  mothers  and 
sisters.” How  Chechen  “volunteers”  are forcibly  sent  to fight  in Ukraine, 15 June  2022, url 
438 Insider (The) “Threatening  mothers  and sisters.” How  Chechen  “volunteers”  are forcibly  sent  to fight  in Ukraine, 
15 June  2022, url 
439 Caucasian  Knot, Eyewitnesses  report  details of  suppressing  rally against mobilization in Grozny,  22 
September  2022, url; Kavkazskiy Uzel, Очевидцы  сообщили  подробности  срыва  митинга  против 
мобилизации  в Грозном  [Eyewitnesses  give  details of  the disruption  of  a rally against mobilisation in Grozny], 22 
September  2022, url 
440 Caucasan  Knot,  Grozny  protester's  husband  dies  after sending  their son to  Ukraine, 4 October  2022, url; 
Kavkazskiy Uzel, Муж участницы  протестов  в Грозном  умер  после  отправки  сына  на Украину  [The  husband  of 
a female protester  in Grozny  died after  sending  his son  to Ukraine], 4 October  2022, url 

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EUROPEAN  UNION AGENCY  FOR  ASYLUM 

Chechnya for an audio recording in which she spoke about a mobilisation of medical personal 
in Chechnya and expressed to go to Ukraine voluntarily.441   

441 Caucasian  Knot, Kadyrov  confirms  predictions  about  sending  medical  workers from Chechnya  to  Donbass, 11 
October  2022, url; Kavkazskiy Uzel, Кадыров  подтвердил  прогнозы  об  отправке  в Донбасс  медработников  из 
Чечни  [Kadyrov  confirmed  forecasts  of Chechen  medical workers being  sent  to  the  Donbass], 10 October  2022, url 

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5.  Draft evasion, desertion, and violation 

of order 

5.1.  Criminal Code 

‘Crimes against the established order of military service’ are outlined in Chapter 33 ‘Crimes 
against military service’ of the Criminal Code of the Russia Federation 442 (Articles 331 – 
352.1).443 The Criminal Code was amended on 24 September 2022444 to include concepts like 
‘mobilisation,’ ‘martial law,’ and ‘wartime’ as well as to administer punishments committed 
under those circumstances.445 For the text of relevant parts of the Criminal Code prior to the 
amendments of 24 September 2022, see EUAA COI query Treatment of military deserters by 
state authorities since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.  

The newly introduced articles are the following: 

•  Article 352.1 ‘Voluntary surrender’, which stipulates punishment of 3 to 10 years in 

prison, ‘if there are no signs of treason.’446 A serviceman who has committed this crime 
for the first time ‘may be exempted from criminal liability if he took measures for his 
release, returned to his unit or place of service and did not commit other crimes while 
in captivity.’ 447  

•  Article 356.1 ‘Looting’, which stipulates a punishment of up to 15 years in prison.448 

Desertion and abandonment of a military unit 

On 24 September 2022, Article 337 ‘Unauthorised abandonment of a military unit or a place 
of military service’ was amended. Under the new legislation, unauthorised abandonment of a 
military unit for a period between 2 and 10 days is punishable by up to 5 years in prison; 
abandonment for a period of 10 days to 1 month is punishable by up to 7 years in prison; 

442 Russia, The  Criminal Code  of  the Russian Federation  No. 63-FZ  of June  13, 1996, IMOLIN, 28 December  2004, 
url 
443 Russia, Уголовный  кодекс  Российской  Федерации  от  13.06.1996 N 63-ФЗ (ред.  от  24.09.2022) [Criminal 
Code  of the  Russian Federation  of  13.06.1996 N 63-FZ (version  24.09.2022)], 24 September  2022, url 
444 Russia, Федеральный  закон  от  24.09.2022 № 365-ФЗ "О внесении  изменений  в Уголовный  кодекс 
Российской  Федерации  и  статью  151 Уголовно-процессуального  кодекса  Российской  Федерации"  [Federal 
Law No. 365-FZ of  24.09.2022 on Amendments  to  the  Criminal Code  of  the  Russian Federation  and  to Article 151 
of  the Code  of  Criminal Procedure  of the  Russian Federation],  24 September  2022,  url 
445 Moscow  Times (The), Russia Introduces  Harsh Punishments  for  Wartime Desertion,  Refusal to  Serve, 24 
September  2022, url  
446 Perild, Putin approved  “military” amendments  to  the  Criminal Code  of the  Russian Federation.  Now for  desertion 
and voluntary  surrender  will be imprisoned  for up  to 10 years, 24 September  2022, url 
447 Moscow  Times (The), Russia Introduces  Harsh Punishments  for  Wartime Desertion,  Refusal to  Serve, 24 
September  2022, url  
448 Russia, Федеральный  закон  от  24.09.2022 № 365-ФЗ "О внесении  изменений  в Уголовный  кодекс 
Российской  Федерации  и  статью  151 Уголовно-процессуального  кодекса  Российской  Федерации"  [Federal 
Law No. 365-FZ of  24.09.2022 on Amendments  to  the  Criminal Code  of  the  Russian Federation  and  to Article 151 
of  the Code  of  Criminal Procedure  of the  Russian Federation],  24 September  2022, url 

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EUROPEAN  UNION AGENCY  FOR  ASYLUM 

abandonment for a period of more than 1 month is punishable by 5 to 10 years in prison.449 The 
law specifies that these punishments are applicable to conscripts or contract soldiers who are 
fulfilling their duties during the period of mobilisation or martial law as well as during wartime 
and in conditions of an armed conflict or combat operations.450 The amended Article further 
explains that the first-time offenders [informal translation] ‘may be exempted from criminal 
liability if such unauthorised absence from his unit or place of service, or failure to report for 
duty without valid reasons, were the consequence of a combination of exceptional 
circumstances.’451  

Article 338 ‘Desertion’ was also amended to specify that desertion by a single person or a 
group of persons committed during mobilisation or martial law period as well as during 
wartime or in conditions of an armed conflict or combat operations would be punishable by a 
prison term of 5 to 15 years. An exemption from criminal liability can be applied if the action of 
desertion was committed for the first time and was ‘a consequence [informal translation] of a 
combination of exceptional circumstances’.452  

Failure to execute an order and resistance to a superior 

Article 332 ‘Failure to execute an order’ was amended to stipulate that failure to comply with 
the order by a superior during the period of martial law, wartime, or in conditions of an armed 
conflict or combat operations, as well as refusal to participate in military or combat operations 
is punished by a prison term of two to three years.453 In case if failure to comply with a 
superior’s order, under the conditions described above, was committed by a group of people 
or caused severe consequences, it is punishable by a prison term from 3 to 10 years. 

Article 333 ‘Resistance to a superior or forcing him to violate his duties of military service’ as 
well as Article 334 ‘Violent actions against a superior’ were similarly amended to include the 
mentioning of the circumstances of mobilisation, martial law, wartime, armed conflict or 

449 Perild, Putin approved  “military” amendments  to  the  Criminal Code  of the  Russian Federation.  Now for  desertion 
and voluntary  surrender  will be imprisoned  for up  to 10 years, 24 September  2022, url 
450 Russia, Федеральный  закон  от  24.09.2022 № 365-ФЗ "О внесении  изменений  в Уголовный  кодекс 
Российской  Федерации  и  статью  151 Уголовно-процессуального  кодекса  Российской  Федерации"  [Federal 
Law No. 365-FZ of  24.09.2022 on Amendments  to  the  Criminal Code  of  the  Russian Federation  and  to Article 151 
of  the Code  of  Criminal Procedure  of the  Russian Federation],  24 September  2022,  url 
451 Ivar’s Blog, Russian  Soldiers Worried As  Putin  Signs Law Which  Frowns  Against  Desertion And  Surrender,  24 
September  2022, url  
452 Russia, Федеральный  закон  от  24.09.2022 № 365-ФЗ "О внесении  изменений  в Уголовный  кодекс 
Российской  Федерации  и  статью  151 Уголовно-процессуального  кодекса  Российской  Федерации"  [Federal 
Law No. 365-FZ of  24.09.2022 on Amendments  to  the  Criminal Code  of  the  Russian Federation  and  to Article 151 
of  the Code  of  Criminal Procedure  of the  Russian Federation],  24 September  2022,  url 
453 Perild, Putin approved  “military” amendments  to  the  Criminal Code  of the  Russian Federation.  Now for  desertion 
and voluntary  surrender  will be imprisoned  for up  to 10 years, 24 September  2022, url; Russia, Федеральный 
закон  от  24.09.2022 № 365-ФЗ "О внесении  изменений  в Уголовный  кодекс  Российской  Федерации  и 
статью  151 Уголовно-процессуальног о  кодекса  Российской  Федерации"  [Federal Law No. 365-FZ of 
24.09.2022 on Amendments  to  the  Criminal Code  of  the  Russian Federation  and  to Article  151  of the  Code  of 
Criminal Procedure  of  the  Russian Federation], 24 September  2022,  url 

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combat operations. Under these circumstances, the punishment for breaching the law is a 
prison term for a period from 5 to 15 years.454 

Article 286.1 ‘Failure to execute an order by a worker of a body of Internal Affairs’, applied for 
personnel employed outside the RAF, e.g., Rosgvardia,455 was not amended under the 
presidential bill of 24 September. The maximum punishment under Article 286.1 is a prison 
term for up to two years for individuals and up to five years for ‘a group of people in 
preliminary collusion’ or in cases when such action ‘has entailed grave consequences.’ 456 

5.2.  Punishments under the law 

On 25 November, in email communication with EUAA, a human rights lawyer noted that the 
implementation of legislation amended on 24 September 2022 was ‘still very rare and 
consisted of several individual cases’.457 

5.2.1.  Evasion of mobilisation 

On 5 October a first criminal case for evading conscription under the mobilisation order was 
initiated in Penza. The charges under Article 328 of the Criminal Code were initated against a 
32-year-old man who refused to sign a draft notice and was detained by the OMON (Special 
Purpose Mobile Unit) police forces.458 On 7 October, it was reported that the Prosecutor’s 
office in Penza region refused to initiate the criminal proceedings.459 As reported by 
independent media, based on the opinion by Pavel Chikov, Article 328 should apply ‘only to 
citizens who evade conscription for military service,’ as was previously clarified by the 
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.460  

On 6 October, a regional military commissioner of Chelyabinsk region noted that 15-20 
instances of desertion and draft evasion during the mobilisation period were being ‘checked’ 
in the region.461  

454 Russia, Федеральный  закон  от  24.09.2022 № 365-ФЗ "О внесении  изменений  в Уголовный  кодекс 
Российской  Федерации  и  статью  151 Уголовно-процессуального  кодекса  Российской  Федерации"  [Federal 
Law No. 365-FZ of  24.09.2022 on Amendments  to  the  Criminal Code  of  the  Russian Federation  and  to Article 151 
of  the Code  of  Criminal Procedure  of the  Russian Federation],  24 September  2022,  url 
455 EUAA, COI  query  – Russian Federation,  Treatment  of  military deserters  by state  authorities since  the  February 
2022 invasion of  Ukraine (1 February  2022 – 4 April 2022), 5 April 2022, url, p. 13 
456 Russia, Федеральный  закон  от  24.09.2022 № 365-ФЗ "О внесении  изменений  в Уголовный  кодекс 
Российской  Федерации  и  статью  151 Уголовно-процессуального  кодекса  Российской  Федерации"  [Federal 
Law No. 365-FZ of  24.09.2022 on Amendments  to  the  Criminal Code  of  the  Russian Federation  and  to Article 151 
of  the Code  of  Criminal Procedure  of the  Russian Federation],  24 September  2022,  url 
457 Human rights  lawyer, Email communication  with EUAA, 25 November  2022  
458 Pavel  Chikov, Telegram,  5 October  2022, url; Russian Free Press,  In Penza  opened  the  first criminal case for 
evading  mobilization, 5 October  2022, url  
459 Novaya  Gazeta  Europe,  Prosecutor’s  office  of  Russia’s Penza  drops  first criminal charges  in Russia for dodging 
mobilisation, 7 October  2022, url 
460 Russian Free Press,  In Penza  opened  the  first criminal case  for evading  mobilization, 5 October  2022, url  
461 74.RU, Военком  рассказал,  сколько  на Южном  Урале  уклонистов  и дезертиров  [Military commander  reveals 
how  many deserters  and  evaders  there  are in the  South  Urals], 6 October  2022, url  

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For the information on punishments for draft evasion in case of obligatory military service, see 
chapter 1.2.1. Conscription and conditions of military service 

5.2.2.  Desertion and abandonment of a military unit 

In August 2022, privately-owned TV station RTVi reported that, based on data from garrison 
courts, the number of persons charged under Article 337 ‘Unauthorised abandonment of a 
military unit or a place of military service’ in Russia during the period from February 2022 to 
August 2022 showed a 45 % increase compared to the same period in 2021 (343 and 227 
cases respectively). According to lawyer Maksim Grebenyuk interviewed by RTVi, servicemen’ 
decision not to return to their military units after a taken leave might have been related to their 
intention to avoid deployment to Ukraine. According to RTVi, the initiation of court cases 
related to desertion remained rather rare: 8 persons were charged under Article 338 
‘Desertion’ in Russia between February and August 2022 compared to 10 persons in the same 
period in 2021.462 

On 14 June 2022, RFE/RL’s service Kavkaz.Realii reported that a dozen of criminal cases, 
initiated under ‘Articles on abandonment of a military unit,’ was pending in garrison courts in 
the southern regions of Russia. Two of these cases were instigated on the grounds of 
desertion. It was unknown whether these cases were related to the Russia’s invasion in 
Ukraine.463  

According to a report of NGO Agora and the project Setevye Svobody (Net Freedoms), the 
first case of desertion after the Russia’s invasion in Ukraine was reported at the end of March 
2022.464 This desertion case involved a 25-year-old contract soldier stationed at a military unit 
at the Russia-Ukraine border in Belgorod region. Meduza reported that this person left his 
place of service due to beatings by a senior official. Afterwards, he reportedly filled in a 
resignation report while in hospital, in which he indicated as the reasons for the abandonment 
of his unit both the beatings as well as the fact that the fighting in Ukraine contradicted his 
personal convictions.465 

Ukrainian sources have published numerous reports on instances of desertion by Russian 
servicemen.466 For instance, on 6 May, the Ukrainian Defence Intelligence reported that 15 

462 RTVi, В России  после  начала вооруженного  конфликта  на Украине  военных  стали  чаще судить  за 
самоволку  [After  the  start of  the armed  conflict  in Ukraine, servicemen  in Russia started  being  more frequently 
charged  for AWOL], 26 August  2022, url  
463 Kavkaz.Realii, "Не знают,  за  что воюют".  Как на  Кавказе и Юге заводят  дела  о дезертирстве  ["They  don't 
know  what they  are fighting  for". On desertion  cases  in the  Caucasus  and  the  South],  14 June  2022, url  
464 Agora  and Setevye  Svobody,  Россия:  права  человека  на военном  положении  [Russia: Human Rights  under 
the  Martial Law: The  first month  of the  armed  conflict  in Ukraine], March 2022, url, p. 15 
465 Meduza,  «Никто  не понимал,  что  происходит.  Мы думали  — учения».  «Медуза»  рассказывает  историю 
Альберта  Сахибгареева  — российского  контрактника,  который  дезертировал  с войны  в Украине  [“No  one 
understood  what was  happening.  We thought  these  were  drills.” Meduza  tells a story  of Albert  Sakhibgareev,  a 
Russian contract  soldier who  deserted  from the  war in Ukraine], 23 March 2022, url  
466 Unian, В российской  армии  стало  больше  дезертиров  – Генштаб  [The number  of  deserters  in the  Russian 
army increased  -  General Staff], 5 April 2022, url; ZN,UA, Все  больше  военных  РФ становятся  дезертирами  – 
разведка  [Increasing  number  of Russia's military personnel  is defecting  - intelligence], 6 May 2022, url; ZN, UA, 
Дезертиров  и пьяниц  в рядах  российской  армии  становится  все  больше  – Генштаб  [The number  of  deserters 
and drunks  in the Russian army  is increasing  - General Staff], 13 July  2022, url 

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Russian soldiers deserted in a village in Kherson region.467 In June, 60 servicemen reportedly 
deserted from their quarters in a village in Zaporizhzhia.468 In July, Ukrainian Defence 
Intelligence reported on instances of desertion in Kherson region, in which deserters were 
trying to reach Crimea.469 On 4 October, a ‘Ukraine intelligence spokesperson’ stated that the 
number of calls received by the Ukrainian hotline ‘I want to live’ — a hotline for Russian 
servicemen who consider surrendering to the AFU, launched on 19 September 2022 470— had 
increased since the start of the mobilisation on 21 September, with more than 2 000 calls 
received.471 

The amended Article 337 (Part 3.1) was used to initiate a criminal case against a resident of 
Yakutia, who had been drafted under the mobilisation order and left his military unit in 
Buryatia for a period of under one month.472 

5.2.3.  Refusals of deployment to Ukraine 

As reported by BBC News on 3 June 2022, there was an instance when a commander in 
northern Russia requested the initiation of criminal proceedings against his subordinate who 
had refused to return to the frontlines. However, a military prosecutor refused this request. 
Human rights activist Sergei Krivenko, interviewed by BBC News, told he was ‘not aware of 
any prosecutions of those refusing to return to the front.’473  

On 6 June, a garrison military court in Grozny (Chechnya) sentenced ‘an employee of the 
military commandant’s office’ to ten days of arrest because of his refusal to go on a mission ‘to 
the area where special tasks are being performed’. The court documents did not mention 
Ukraine as a specific country of the mission.474  

International and independent Russian media sources have reported on numerous instances 
when contract soldiers refused deployment to Ukraine or left Ukraine to return to their military 
units on the territory of the RF.475 At the end of March, 300 contract soldiers from Dagestan 
are reported to have returned from the self-proclaimed region of DNR to their military base in 
Buynaksk, where they initiated the procedures to terminate their contracts. Reportedly, they 
were met in their town as ‘deserters’ and, due to the pressure from their families and local 

467 Ukraine, Golovne  upravlinnya  pozvidki  MO Ukraini, Telegram, 6 May  2022, url  
468 24 Kanal, Из общежития  на Запорожье  сбежали  60 российских  военных  [Sixty  Russian soldiers  run away 
from a hostel  in Zaporozhye],  18 June  2022, url  
469 Ukraine, Defence  Intelligence  of  the  MoD of  Ukraine, Invaders Try  to  Flee from the  Site  of Hostilities to  Crimea 
through  Arabat  Spit, 1 July  2022, url; General Staff  of the  Armed  Forces  of  Ukraine, Facebook,  19 July 2022, url  
470 Ukraine, National resistance  center,  A 24-hour  hotline has been  launched  for Russian soldiers  who  want to 
surrender, 19 September  2022, url  
471 Kyiv Post,  Over  2,000 Russian Conscripts  Seek  Surrender  – Intelligence, 5 October  2022, url  
472 Pavel  Chikov, Telegram,  26 October  2022, url  
473 BBC, The  Russian soldiers refusing  to  fight in Ukraine, 3 June  2022, url  
474 Caucasian  Knot, Court  in Chechnya  arrests  contractor  for his refusal to  go on  business  trip, 6 June  2022, url  
475 See  for instance,  DW, Russian soldiers  being  jailed in occupied  Donbas,  8 April 2022, url; BBC, The  Russian 
soldiers refusing  to  fight in Ukraine, 3 June  2022, url; Mediazona, «Никто  не подписывался  быть  мясом».  Автор 
паблика  «Военный  омбудсмен»  — о том,  как в России  отказываются  воевать  (таких  случаев  уже  сотни)  ["No 
one  signed  up  to be  cannon  food".  Social  media project  "Military Ombudsman"  on  how Russians  are refusing to 
fight  (there are hundreds  of such  cases  already)], 6 April 2022, url  

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authorities, some of them returned to Ukraine.476 At the same time, ‘some’ contract soldiers 
from self-proclaimed South Ossetia are reported to have left the frontlines and returned to 
their unit.477 On 6 April, a local media source reported that around 60 servicemen from Pskov 
refused deployment to Ukraine. According to the source, the majority of them faced dismissal 
from service but some were threatened with criminal proceedings.478 In July, around 150 
soldiers from Buryatia reportedly returned to the republic after refusing to fight in Ukraine.479 
Free Buryatia Foundation stated that some of them were kept in a camp located in a territory 
of the self-proclaimed LNR and were threatened with criminal prosecution.480  

At the end of October 2022, the Investigative Committee of Russia initiated a first criminal 
case against a contract soldier who had refused to go on a work mission to participate in a 
combat operation under Article 332 (Part 2.1) of the amended Criminal C ode.481 

5.2.4.  The National Guard 

A human rights defender, contacted by EUAA in March 2022, noted in email correspondence 
that Chapter 33 of the Russian Criminal Code would not be applied to the National Guard 
(Rosgvardia) members because of their status as police force, adding that Rosgvardia officers 
may be charged under the Article 286.1 ‘Failure to execute an order by a worker of a body of 
Internal Affairs’ of the Russian Criminal Code.482 

At the end of March 2022, media sources reported that some members of Rosgvardia and 
police forces refused deployment to Ukraine.483 The first group for which refusal became 
public484 was a group of 12 guardsmen from an OMON group of Rosgvardia in Krasnodar.485 
According to their lawyer Mikhail Benyash, the group was stationed in Crimea and was to be 
sent to Ukraine on 25 February, which they refused. After a review procedure, their contracts 
were terminated ‘due to their failure to carry out orders’ which they decided to challenge in a 
court. As was explained by Benyash, in the situation of ‘special military operation’ the 

476 Moscow  Times (The), Сотни  дагестанцев  сложили  оружие  и отказались  воевать  в Украине  [Hundreds  of 
Dagestanis  laid down  their weapons  and  refused  to  fight in Ukraine], 18 July 2022, url  
477 Mediazona,  «Это  не пушечное  мясо,  нас и так мало».  Часть  военнослужащих  из  Южной Осетии  отказались 
участвовать  в войне  с Украиной  и вернулись  домой  ["Not cannon  fodder,  there  are already few  of us". Some 
servicemen  from South  Ossetia  refused  to  take part in the  war with Ukraine and  returned  home], 31 March 2022, url  
478 Pskovskaya  gubernia, Telegram, 6 April 2022, url 
479 Agenstvo.Novosti,  Telegram,  11 July  2022, url; Moscow  Times (The), 150 Siberian  Soldiers Refuse  Ukraine 
Deployment,  Activist  Says,  12 July 2022, url  
480 Agenstvo.Novosti,  Telegram,  11 July  2022, url  
481 Pavel  Chikov, Telegram,  27 October  2022, url 
482 A human  rights defender  in Russia, email, 19 March  2022 in EUAA,  COI Query  – Russian Federation,  Query, 
Treatment  of military deserters  by  state  authorities since  the  February  2022 invasion of Ukraine, 5 April 2022, url, 
p. 13  
483 Kavkaz.Realii, Сотни  военных  обратились  за помощью  после  отказа  росгвардейцев  из  Краснодара 
отправиться  в Украину  [Hundreds  of  servicemen  appealed  for help after  the  Krasnodar Russian Guard refused  to 
go  to Ukraine], 25 March  2022, url; FT, Sacking  of Russian guardsmen  reveals dissent  over going  to  fight  in 
Ukraine, 2 April 2022, url  
484 Kavkaz.Realii, Сотни  военных  обратились  за помощью  после  отказа  росгвардейцев  из  Краснодара 
отправиться  в Украину  [Hundreds  of  servicemen  appealed  for help after  the  Krasnodar Russian Guard refused  to 
go  to Ukraine], 25 March  2022, url 
485 Kavkaz.Realii, Большинство  отказавшихся  ехать  в Украину  росгвардейцев  из  Краснодара  передумали 
судиться  с начальством  [Most  of  the Krasnodar  Russian Guard officers  who  refused  to  go  to Ukraine have 
changed  their minds to  sue  their superiors], 29 March 2022, url  

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changing of a contract of Rosgvardia officers to send them outside Russia was not permitted 
by the law.486 After this first public case, other employees of Rosgvardia and the MoD 
reportedly asked for legal aid in similar circumstances. According to a source of Kavkaz.Realii, 
several appeals were received from the Southern Military District, including the republics of 
the North Caucasus.487 On 4 April, Novy Fokus, an online media source published in 
Khakassia, reported on the refusal of 11 members of OMON of Rosgvardia of Khakassia to take 
part in the ‘special operation’. According to the source, they were facing dismissal from the 
service.488  

On 25 May, a court in Nalchik, the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria, rejected the lawsuit of 115 
Rosgvardia members, who challenged their dismissal from service after refusing to participate 
in hostilities in Ukraine and returned to a duty station. According to the court decision, as 
quoted by the Guardian, they were ‘rightfully fired for “refusing to perform an official 
assignment” to fight in Ukraine’.489 Associated Press (AP) referred to this case as ‘the first 
official confirmation’ of servicemen refusing to participate in the war.490  

On 25 November 2022, the human rights lawyer has clarified in an email communication with 
EUAA that ‘all known court cases’ where Rosgvardia was involved ‘ended with decisions that 
their dismissal was legal.’ He also explained that ‘one case went through the appeal instance, 
and two more are still waiting for the second instance to be reviewed.’491 

5.3.  Treatment of deserters by Russian forces in 

Ukraine 

In April 2022, DW reported on instances of alleged ‘unlawful detention, torture, and inhumane 
treatment’ in Russian controlled areas of Ukraine of contract soldiers who had refused to fight 
and expressed their wish to leave Ukraine. These cases were reported on the territory of LNR, 
including in the towns of Popasna, Alchevsk, Stakhanov, and Krasny Luch, as well as ‘near the 
frontline in Svitlodar.’492  

On 12 March, the Ukrainian Defence Intelligence claimed that a captured Russian soldier 
‘spoke about the use of “execution squads”’ to eliminate deserters in the midst of rising unrest 
in the Russian military.493 In July 2022, Ukrainian media outlet Obozrevatel reported that 

486 Meduza,  ‘Refusing to  kill people  isn’t a crime’ The  Russian National Guard is firing officers  who  refuse  to join the 
war in Ukraine, 30 March  2022, url  
487 Kavkaz.Realii, Сотни  военных  обратились  за помощью  после  отказа  росгвардейцев  из  Краснодара 
отправиться  в Украину  [Hundreds  of  servicemen  appealed  for help after  the  Krasnodar Russian Guard refused  to 
go  to Ukraine], 25 March  2022, url 
488 Novy  Fokus,  «Отказники»  или  почему  11 бойцов  ОМОН  Росгвардии  по Хакасии  отказались  от  участия  в 
«спецоперации»  в Украине  ["Refuseniks" or why  11 OMON  riot policemen  of  Rosgvardiya  in Khakassia refused  to 
participate  in a "special  operation"  in Ukraine], 4 April 2022, url 
489 Guardian (The), 115 Russian national guard  soldiers sacked  for refusing  to  fight in Ukraine, 27 May  2022, url  
490 Moscow  Times (The), Russia Confirms  Sacking  100 Servicemen  for Refusing  to Fight  in Ukraine, 26 May 2022, 
url 
491 Human rights  lawyer, Email communication  with EUAA, 25 November  2022 
492 DW, Russian soldiers  being  jailed in occupied  Donbas, 8  April 2022, url  
493 Interfax-Ukraine, SBU: Riots kick off among  Russian military, army leadership  uses  tactics  of  ‘firing squads’, 12 
March 2022, url  

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Russian soldiers opened fire at around 30 members of their military unit attempting 
desertion.494 On 4 November, UK Ministry of Defence noted via its official Twitter account that 
— based on UK Defence Intelligence — ‘Russian forces have probably started deploying 
“barrier troops” or “blocking units” to Ukraine’. According to the source ‘[t]hese units threaten 
to shoot their own retreating soldiers in order to compel offensives and have been used in 
previous conflicts by Russian forces.’495 

494 Obozrevatel,  В российской  армии  начали  расстреливать  дезертиров:  панику вызвал  страх  "бесшумной 
смерти"  [Russian army starts  shooting  deserters:  fear of "silent death"  causes  panic], 11 July  2 022, url  
495 UK, Ministry of  Defence,  Twitter, 4 November  2022, url 

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6.  Violations of humanitarian and 

international human rights law by 
Russian military forces in Ukraine 

On 24 February 2022, Russia attacked Ukraine from north, east and south shelling several 
missiles and air strikes on Ukrainian cities.496 On 25 February 2022, it was reported that 
Russian forces advanced ‘on four primary axes’ including ‘Kyiv Axis’, ‘Northeast Axis’, ‘Donbas 
Axis’, and ‘Crimea Axis’497 and ‘Russian ground forces entered regions across Ukraine, bombs 
fell on major cities’498 including ‘heavy artillery against central Kharkiv’ as of 28 February 
2022.499 As of March 2022, over 150 000 Russian troops were reportedly ‘involved in the war 
in Ukraine’. Air strikes reportedly targeted civilian infrastructure in Ukrainian cities, including in 
residential buildings, hospitals, and schools.500  

On 26 March 2022, UN OHCHR stated that the Russian attacks against Ukraine ‘led to a grave 
deterioration in the human rights situation across the country'.501 On 2 September 2022, the 
Ukrainian authorities stated that they had documented over 22 000 Russian attacks in the 
country impacting over 24 000 civilian targets, killing 7 000 civilians and injuring other 5 500 
since the start of the Russia’s invasion in Ukraine.502 The UN Independent International 
Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine at UN OHCHR reported that 6 557 civilians were killed and 
10 074 were injured in the period from 24 February to 14 November 2022. 503 UN OHCHR has 
reportedly verified these cases and ‘believes that the actual figures are considerably 
higher’.504   

On 3 March, the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor launched an investigation into 
possible war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide, committed by any part in Ukraine 
from 21 November 2013 [the start of the Maidan protest movement505] onwards.506 Between 1 
April and 25 June 2022, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 

496 Guardian (The), War in Ukraine: where  has Russia attacked?,  24 February  2022, url 
497 ISW, Ukraine, conflict  update,  25 February  2022, url, p. 1; UC  Louvain, Europe.Russie.DEBATS,  Russia’s war in 
Ukraine: A short  assessment  from the  perspective  of ‘principle of  war’, 24 February  2022, url 
498 NEWS, Ukraine attacked:  Map of  sites targeted  by  Russia’s invasion, 25 February  2022, url 
499 ISW, Ukraine, conflict  update,  28 February  2022, url, p. 1  
500 New York Times  (The), As Russian troop  deaths  climb, morale becomes  an issue, officials say, 16 March 2022, 
url 
501 UN OHCHR, Update  on  human  rights situation in Ukraine, 26 March  2022, url, p. 1 
502 Ukrainska Pravda, Ukraine's Interior Ministry reveals number  of  civilians killed or  injured by  Russians, 2 
September  2022, url 
503 UN OHCHR, Ukraine: civilian casualty  update  14 November  2022, 14 November  2022, url  
504 UN OHCHR, Ukraine, civilian casualty  update,  7 November  2022, 7 November  2022, url 
505 The  Maidan protest  movement  (The Maidan revolution/uprising  or Euromaidan)  began  21 November  2013 when 
the  Ukrainian government  announced  it was withdrawing  plans to  join the EU, causing  three  months  of  protests  by 
Ukrainians and violent  attacks  on  protesters  by police  that  resulted  in about  100 deaths  mainly by  police  sn ipers. 
Then-President  Yanukovych  who  was  seen  as responsible,  was forced  out and  a new president  elected.  In the 
months  afterwards,  Russia seized  Crimea and  in April 2013, Donbas  region broke  out  into fighting  the  support  of 
Russian forces  backing  the  ‘separatist’ movement  there.  Pifer, S., Ukraine: Looking  forward, five years  after the 
Maidan Revolution,  Brookings  Institute, 22 February  2019, url 
506 ICC, Statement  of ICC  Prosecutor,  Karim A.A. Khan QC, on  the  Situation  in Ukraine: Receipt  of  Referrals from 39 
States  Parties and  the Opening  of  an Investigation,  2 March  2022 , url 

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conducted an investigative mission in Ukraine on potential violations of international 
humanitarian law and international human rights law, war crimes and crimes against humanity 
committed in Ukraine and reportedly found ‘clear patterns of serious violations’ of 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) mostly attributed to RAF.507 In its October 2022 report,  
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine attributed responsibility for the 
vast majority of the identified ‘war crimes, violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian law’ to RAF, in the initial phase of its investigation of events of late February and 
March 2022 in the regions of Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Sumy.508 

According to Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) data records, between 
the start of the war on 24 February 2022 and 3 November 2022, 2 454 incidents of the total 
2 558 events recorded as targeting civilians were attributed to RAF.509 Associated Press (AP) 
and Frontline have set up a ‘war crimes tracker’ on Ukraine where evidence of potential war 
crimes in Ukraine are gathered, verified and documented.510 As of 7 November 2022, 558 
incidents of ‘potential’ war crimes in Ukraine have been documented by the source.511 

Russia has reportedly used a wide range of weapons in Ukraine carrying out airstrikes512 using 
war planes513 dropping cluster munitions514 that are difficult to control515 and have been banned 
in many parts of the world based on the Convention on Cluster Munitions516 to which, 
however, Russia and Ukraine are not parties.517 Russian forces have also used other explosive 
weapons such as rockets, missiles, artillery shells, aircraft bombs that are not prohibited, but 
which have been used in densely populated areas thereby affecting civilians.518 In addition, 
Russian forces reportedly used weapons such as ‘the 2S19 Msta-s 152mm tracked self-
propelled howitzer’,519 ‘self-propelled 203-mm Peony and 152-mm Hyacinth and Acacia self-
propelled howitzers’,520 S-300 missiles, Kalibr missile (cruise missiles launched from ships and 
submarines positioned in the Black Sea), KH-101 missile521 and Iskander missiles (with 
‘powerful warheads capable of destroying large buildings and some fortified facilities’).522 
Moreover, Russian forces used ‘loitering munitions’  such as the KUB and Lancet523  and 
Iranian drones (‘remote-controlled and programmable weapons) including ‘Shahed-136 

507 OSCE,  ODIHR, Report  on  violation of International  Humanitarian and  Human Rights Law, war crimes and  crimes 
against humanity,  14 July 2022, url, p. 3 
508 UN OHCHR, Report  of  Independent  International Commission  of  Inquiry on Ukraine, 18 October  2022, url, p. 2 
509 ACLED, Ukraine Crisis, events  targeting  civilians: perpetrators,  data  extracted  on  14 November  2 022, url 
510 AP  and FRONTLINE,  War Crimes Watch  Ukraine Reporting  Methodology,  n.d.,  url 
511 AP  and FRONTLINE,  War Crimes Watch  Ukraine, data  consulted  on 7 November  2022, url 
512 Euronews,  Ukraine war : What weapons  are being  used  in Russia’s invasion?, 8  March 2022, url 
513 Euronews,  Ukraine war : What weapons  are being  used  in Russia’s invasion?, 8  March 2022, url 
514 UN OHCHR, Update  on  human  rights situation in Ukraine, 26 March  2022, url, para. 7 
515 Harvard University, Harvard Law Today,  Russian forces  are using weapons  widely  banned  across  the  world, says 
Harvard Law expert,  3 March  2022, url 
516 Convention  on cluster  munitions, n.d., url 
517 HRW, Growing  civilian toll from Russian Cluster  Munition attacks,  25 August  2022, url 
518 Harvard University, Harvard Law Today,  Russian forces  are using weapons  widely  banned  across  the  world, says 
Harvard Law expert,  3 March  2022, url 
519 Army  Recognition  Group,  Russian army 2S19 Msta-S  152mm self-propelled  howitzer  is a nightmare  for Ukrainian 
army, 4 July 2022, url 
520 Euronews,  Ukraine war : What weapons  are being  used  in Russia’s invasion?, 8  March 2022, url 
521 BBC, War in Ukraine: Is Russia’s stock  of weapons  running  low?, 14 October  2022, url 
522 Euronews,  Ukraine war : What weapons  are being  used  in Russia’s invasion?, 8  March 2022, url 
523 CFR, Can  Iranian Drones Turn  Russia’s Fortunes  in the Ukraine War?, 26 October  2022, url 

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drones’.524 According to the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), these Iranian drones are 
loitering munitions rather than kamikaze or suicide drones.525  

Russian troops reportedly had ‘shot civilians, indiscriminately shelled schools and apartment 
buildings and terrorised towns and villages they have occupied’.526 Since the beginning of the 
war, ‘mass graves’ have been reportedly uncovered in Bucha, Izium, and Mariupol. 527 On 13 
November 2022, Reuters cited the Ukrainian president stating that over 400 cases of war 
crimes were recorded during investigations in the city of Kherson after it was taken back from 
Russian occupation, including civilian dead bodies.528 

The investigation by International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine revealed a ‘pattern of 
summary executions in areas temporarily occupied by Russian armed forces in February and 
March 2022’. According to the source, many executions took place in Bucha, Kyiv region.529 In 
Bucha, eight bodies were discovered in the back yard of a house used as a base by Russian 
troops before their withdrawal from the town, and ten bodies of civilians on the street and five 
other bodies in a basement. Some of the dead bodies were reportedly discovered with hands 
tied in the back with signs of torture and gunshot wounds.530  

On 3 April 2022, HRW reported on having documented ‘several cases’ of ‘apparent war 
crimes’ committed by Russian armed forces against civilians including ‘a case of repeated 
rape and two cases of summary execution’ in occupied areas of Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Kyiv 
regions of Ukraine between 27 February and 14 March 2022. Russian soldiers were reportedly 
involved in ‘looting civilian property’ during the same period.531 On 21 April 2022, HRW 
reported on ‘summary executions, other unlawful killings, enforced disappearances, and 
torture’ in Bucha during the occupation of the town between 4 and 31 March 2022. 
Researchers from the organisation reportedly discovered 278 dead bodies (mainly civilians) 
following the withdrawal of Russian forces from the town.532  

AP referred to Ukrainian prosecutors saying that Russian soldiers responsible for ‘the 
violence’ at 144 Yablunska street in Bucha, where 40 dead bodies were found by the police, 
belonged to the Russian 76th Guards Airborne Assault Division.533 In August 2022, Al Jazeera 
cited [Ukrainian] survivors, police and rights groups reporting on the Chechen Kadyrovtsy 
fighters being involved in the ‘killings of hundreds of civilians in Bucha, other Kyiv suburbs and 
occupied areas’.534  

524 New York Times  (The), The  Iranian Drones in Ukraine’s Already  Crowded  Skies, 19 October  2022, url 
525 CFR, Can  Iranian Drones Turn  Russia’s Fortunes  in the Ukraine War?, 26 October  2022, url 
526 NPR, Meet  the  Chechen  battalion joining Ukraine to  fight  Russia – and  fellow Chechens,  5 September  2022, url 
527 BBC, Ukraine war: Russia guilty of  war crimes  in Kherson,  says  Zelensky,  14 November  2022, url 
528 Reuters, Ukraine's Zelenskiy:  More than  400 Russian war crimes  in freed  Kherson,  13 November  2022, url 
529 UN OHCHR, Report  of  Independent  International Commission  of  Inquiry on Ukraine, 18 October  2022, url, para. 
65–66 
530 UN OHCHR, Report  of  Independent  International Commission  of  Inquiry on Ukraine, 18 October  2022, url, para. 
66 
531 HRW, Apparent  war crimes in Russian controlled  areas, 3 April 2022, url 
532 HRW, Ukraine: Russian forces’  trail of death  in Bucha,  21 Apr il 2022, url 
533 AP, How  Russian soldiers ran a ‘cleansing’ operation  in Bucha, 3  November  2022, url 
534 Al Jazeera, The  real role of  pro-Russian  Chechen  in Ukraine, 18 August  2022, url 

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According to HRW, Russian troops and other forces under their command reportedly 
subjected detained individuals to ‘electric shock, waterboarding, severe beatings, threats at 
gunpoint, and being forced to hold stress positions for extended periods’ in about seven 
locations in Izium City (Kharkiv region) during the Russian occupation from March to early 
September 2022. Facilities in which such methods were used reportedly included schools, a 
private home, a police station, a railway polyclinic, an optical and mechanical plant and the 
Izium Municipal Industrial Water Supply and Sewerage Company.535  

During its investigation of events in Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv and Sumy regions in February and 
March 2022, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine received 
information of Russian soldiers subjecting girls and women to rape. The ages of the affected 
girls and women ranged from 4 to 80 years. According to the same source, Russian soldiers 
raped Ukrainian women in their homes or in unoccupied buildings. The source further 
indicated that there had been other cases of ‘sexual violence’ against girls, women and 
men.536 Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch also have reported on Russian forces 
subjecting civilian women to rape in Kyiv and in Malaya Rohan village of Kharkiv region.537  

Amnesty International (AI) reported on ‘forcibly transferred and deported civilians from 
occupied areas of Ukraine’ by Russian forces, which according to AI ‘amounted to war 
crimes’.538  

535 HRW, Russian forces  tortured  Izium detainees,  19 October  2022, url 
536 UN OHCHR, Report  of  Independent  International Commission  of  Inquiry on Ukraine, 18 October  2022, url, para. 
88 
537 AI, Ukraine: Russian forces  extrajudicially executing  civilians in apparent  war crimes  – new  testimony,  7 April 
2022, url; HRW, Apparent  war crimes in Russian controlled  areas, 3 April 2022, url;  
538 AI, Ukraine: Russia’s unlawful transfer of  civilians a war crime and  likely a crime against humanity  – new report, 
10 November  2022, url 

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Annex 1: Bibliography 

Oral sources, including anonymous sources 

  Alexander Pomazuev, Online interview with EUAA, 9 November 2022. Alexander Pomazuev is 
a lawyer at FBK (Anti-Corruption Foundation), established by Alexey Navalny in 2011. FBK was 
established in 2011 by Alexey Navalny and to investigate corruption among high-ranking 
Russian government officials.539 

  Human rights lawyer, Online interview with EUAA, 11 November 2022. The source is based in 
Russia and has first-hand information on implementation of Russian legislation. The contact 
wishes to remain anonymous for security reasons. The source also provided further 
clarifications via email correspondence with EUAA on 25 November 2022. 

Aliyev, Huseyn, Email correspondence with EUAA, 14 November 2022. Dr. Huseyn Aliyev is a 
Lecturer and Research Fellow in Security Studies at the Central & Eastern European Studies 
(CEES) at the University of Glasgow. 

Public sources 

24 Kanal, Из общежития на Запорожье сбежали 60 российских военных [Sixty Russian 
soldiers run away from a hostel in Zaporozhye], 18 June 2022, https://24tv.ua/ru/iz-
obshhezhitija-zaporozhe-sbezhali-60-rossijskih-voennyh_n2034394, accessed 11 November 
2022 

74.RU, Военком рассказал, сколько на Южном Урале уклонистов и дезертиров [Military 
commander reveals how many deserters and evaders there are in the South Urals], 6 October 
2022, https://74.ru/text/gorod/2022/10/06/71713169/, accessed 15 November 2022 

ACLED (The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project), Data Export Tool, fatalities data 
covering the period 23 February – 4 November 2022, https://acleddata.com/data-export-tool/, 
14 November 2022 

ACLED (The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project), Ukraine Crisis, events targeting 
civilians: perpetrators, https://acleddata.com/ukraine-crisis/, accessed 10 November 2022 

Agency.News, Telegram, 21 October 2022, https://t.me/agentstvonews/1663, accessed 11 
November 2022         

Agenstvo.Novosti, Telegram, 11 July 2022, https://t.me/agentstvonews/926, accessed 12 
November 2022 

Agenstvo.Novosti, Telegram, 4 May 2022, https://t.me/agentstvonews/405, accessed 25 
November 2022  

539 FBK, Anti-Corruption  Foundation,  n.d., url  

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Agora and Network Freedoms, Россия: права человека на военном положении [Russia: 
Human Rights under the Martial Law: The first month of the armed conflict in Ukraine], March 
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AI (Amnesty International), Russia: Kremlin’s ruthless crackdown stifles independent journalism 
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AI (Amnesty International), Ukraine: Russia’s unlawful transfer of civilians a war crime and likely 
a crime against humanity – new report, 10 November 2022, 
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AI (Amnesty International), Ukraine: Russian forces extrajudicially executing civilians in 
apparent war crimes – new testimony, 7 April 2022, 
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Al Jazeera, Chechen leader, a Putin ally, says his forces deployed to Ukraine, 26 February 
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Al Jazeera, Explainer: How does conscription work in Russia?, 5 May 2022, 
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Al Jazeera, Fearing front-line deployment, some Russians resist conscription, 18 March 2022, 
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Al Jazeera, How Russia is rounding up reluctant army recruits for Ukraine, 19 October 2022, 
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Al Jazeera, Mapping the occupied Ukrainian regions Russia is formally annexing, 21 
September 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/21/mapping-the-ukraine-regions-
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Al Jazeera, Russia completes partial mobilisation of citizens for Ukraine war, 1 November 
2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/1/russia-completes-partial-mobilisation-of-
citizens-for-ukraine-war, accessed 20 November 2022 

Al Jazeera, Russia stiffens penalty for desertion; replaces top general, 24 September  2022, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/24/putin-toughens-penalty-for-surrender-refusal-to-
fight-in-ukraine, accessed 25 October 2022 

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Al Jazeera, The real role of pro-Russian Chechen in Ukraine, 18 August 2022, 
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Al Jazeera, The real role of pro-Russian Chechen in Ukraine, 18 August 2022, 
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Al Jazeera, Thousands of mobilised Russians sent home, deemed unfit for duty, 3 October 
2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/3/thousands-of-mobilised-russians-sent-
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Aliyev, H, Russian Army Increases Numbers of North Caucasian Conscripts, The Central Asia-
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ALRUD, Answers to the most common questions about partial mobilisation, 7 October 2022, 
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BD%D1%84%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%BD
%D1%8B%D0%B5_%D0%BF%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%8C%D0%BC%D0%B0/ALRUD_Answers_to
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AP (Associated Press) and FRONTLINE, War Crimes Watch Ukraine, 
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AP (Associated Press), Explainer: How important is a Russian retreat from Kherson, 11 
November 2022, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-kyiv-europe-moscow-
7dcca261a8af0641f9a3c11cc7f644b0, accessed 12 November 2022 

AP (Associated Press), How Russian soldiers ran a ‘cleansing’ operation in Bucha, 3 November 
2022, https://apnews.com/article/bucha-ukraine-war-cleansing-investigation-
43e5a9538e9ba68a035756b05028b8b4, accessed 15 November 2022 

AP (Associated Press), War in Ukraine fuels fears among draft-age Russian youths, 2 April 
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0553c8ac5981758826f973e2103348e0, accessed 5 November 2022 

Army Recognition Group, Russian army 2S19 Msta-S 152mm self-propelled howitzer is a 
nightmare for Ukrainian army, 4 July 2022, https://www.armyrecognition.com/ukraine_-
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propelled_howitzer_is_a_nightmare_for_ukrainian_army.html, accessed 15 November 2022 

Atalyar, Russia calls on volunteers and mercenaries after Ukrainian counteroffensive, 19 
September 2022, https://atalayar.com/en/content/russia-calls-volunteers-and-mercenaries-
after-ukrainian-counteroffensive, accessed 29 November 2022 

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Avtozak Live, Telegram, 13 October 2022, https://t.me/avtozaklive/16251, accessed 11 
November 2022         

Bathon, R., Putin’s cannon fodder, IPS (International Politics and Society), 28 September 2022, 
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BBC News, "Из них такое поперло, что никто не ожидал". Как заключенные реагируют на 
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BBC News, Belgorod shooting: Gunmen kill 11 in attack on Russian trainee soldiers, 16 October 
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BBC News, Ukraine war: Russia to open war enlisting hub on Georgia border, 27 September 
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BBC News, What is Russia’s Wagner mercenary group in Ukraine?, 3 October 2022, 
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Belgium, Commissariat Général aux Réfugiés et aux Apatrides, COI Focus, Tchetchenie: 
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Kavkaz.Realii, "Пинают во всех инстанциях". Как кадыровские наемники возвращаются из 
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Kavkaz.Realii, В Чечне неработающих местных жителей заставляют объяснять отказ от 
службы в армии [In Chechnya, unemployed locals are forced to explain their refusal to serve 
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Kavkaz.Realii, Глава Северной Осетии поручил подготовить именные батальоны для 
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Kavkazskiy Uzel, Более ста человек осуждены после протестов в Махачкале [More than a 
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Kavkazskiy Uzel, Первые призывники отправлены в армию из Чечни [The first conscripts 
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Kavkazskiy Uzel, Родственники контрактников из Чечни рассказали об уловках 
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these were drills.” Meduza tells a story of Albert Sakhibgareev, a Russian contract soldier who 
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mobilised IT employee of Raiffeisenbank died in Ukraine. He was supposed have a deferral 
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Annex 2: Terms of Reference 

1. Compulsory military service and official conscription – legal framework and background 
on implementation  

•  Military and reserve service 
•  Exemptions from military service  
•  Conscientious objectors (including on religious grounds, e.g., Jehovah Witnesses)  
•  Conditions of military service 

2. Contract military service  

3. Recruitment during the reference period (methods of recruitment and regional 
differences, including in Chechnya) 

4. Mobilisation 

•  Legal basis and implementation (including regional differences and reports on 

irregularities)  

5. Deployment to Ukraine  

•  Deployment and duties of conscripts and reservists 
•  Deployment to Ukraine of conscripts, reservists, and contract servicemen 
•  Other groups deployed to Ukraine (including police forces, Rosgvardia, and volunteer 

fighters) 

6. Consequences of draft evasion, military desertion, and defection 

•  Legislation per group and implementation  

7. Human rights violations committed by Russian forces in Ukraine  

104