Opinion of the European Central Bank of 21 December 2022 on the implementation of the recommendations of the ECB convergence report concerning central bank independence (CON/2022/45)
Date: 2022-12-21
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: legal basis

EN 

ECB-PUBLIC 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 21 December 2022 

on the implementation of the recommendations of the ECB convergence report concerning 

central bank independence 

(CON/2022/45) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On 24 November 2022 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Българска народна 

банка  (Bulgarian  National  Bank  (BNB)),  acting  on  behalf  of  the  Bulgarian  Minister  for  Finance,  for  an 

opinion  on  a  draft  law  amending  the  Law  on  BNB  and  the  Law  on  counter-corruption  and  unlawfully 

acquired assets forfeiture (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). 

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 

Functioning of the European Union and the third indent of Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC 1, as 

the  draft  law  relates  to  BNB.  In  accordance  with  the  first  sentence  of  Article 17.5  of  the  Rules  of 

Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion. 

1.

Purpose of the draft law

As explained in the consultation letter, the draft law aims to address certain issues identified in the

2022 Convergence Report of the ECB with regard to the independence of BNB. In this respect, the

draft law proposes to amend the Law on BNB 2 and the Law on counter-corruption and unlawfully

acquired assets forfeiture (hereinafter the ‘Law on counter-corruption’) 3 in respect of, inter alia, the

matters set out below.

1.1  Grounds for removal from office in case of a conflict of interest 

The draft law proposes to amend Article 80(1) of the Law on counter-corruption in order to provide 

that  the  ascertainment  of  a  conflict  of  interest  in  accordance  with  that  Law  will  be  a  ground  for 

removal  from  office  of  a  senior  public  office  holder,  unless  otherwise  provided  for 

in 

the Constitution,  in  the  Statute  of  the  European  System  of  Central  Banks  and  of  the  European 

Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’) or in special legislation. 

1.2  The right of national courts to review a decision to dismiss any member, other than the Governor, 

of the decision-making bodies of BNB 

The draft law aims to ensure the right of access to effective legal remedies for any member of the 

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2 
3 

Council  Decision  98/415/EC  of  29 June  1998  on  the  consultation  of  the  European  Central  Bank  by  national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 
Law on BNB (Закон за Българската народна банка, обн. ДВ, 46 от 10.06.1997 г.). 
Law  on  counter-corruption  and  unlawfully  acquired  assets  forfeiture  (Закон  за противодействие  на  корупцията и 
за отнемане на незаконно придобитото имущество, обн. ДВ, бр. 7 от 19.01.2018 г.). 

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Governing  Council  of  BNB,  other  than  the  Governor,  in  cases  concerning  their  dismissal.  To  this 

end  the  draft  law  proposes  to  introduce  a  new  provision  in  Article  14  of  the  Law  on  BNB  in 

accordance with which the grounds for relieving a Deputy Governor or another member of the BNB 

Governing  Council,  except  for  the  Governor,  from  office  must  be  established  by  decision  of  the 

BNB  Governing  Council.  That  decision  is  adopted  according  to  a  procedure  determined  by  the 

Governing  Council  of  BNB.  The  decision  has  the  immediate  effect  of  suspending  the  respective 

member  from  the  exercise  of  their  duties.  The  decision  is  subject  to  appeal  before  Върховния 

административен  съд  (the  Supreme  Administrative  Court)  within  7  days  and  that  court  has  14 

days to issue a final ruling on the appeal. The final ruling of the Supreme Administrative Court on 

the  appeal  is  sent  to  the  national  authority  which  has  the  competence  to  relieve  from  office  the 

members of the BNB Governing Council. 

2. 

General observations 

2.1  The ECB welcomes the draft law’s efforts to achieve the required level of legal convergence as set 

out in the recommendations for Bulgaria contained in the 2022 Convergence Report of the ECB. 

2.2  The ECB notes that the compatibility of Bulgarian legislation – including the Law on BNB and the 

Law on counter-corruption – with the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB will be assessed in the 

ECB’s next convergence report, as required by Article 131 of the Treaty. 

3. 

Specific observations 

3.1  Grounds for removal from office in case of a conflict of interest 

3.1.1. In accordance with Article  12 of the  Law  on BNB,  the Governor  and the three Deputy Governors 

are  appointed  by  the  National  Assembly,  while  the  other  three  members  of  BNB’s  Governing 

Council are appointed by the President of the Republic. Article 14(1) of the Law on BNB provides 

that the appointing authority may remove a member of the Governing Council from office if one of 

the grounds it lists for removal from office is established. The ECB therefore understands that the 

competence  to  take  a  decision  to  remove  a  member  of  BNB’s  Governing  Council  from  office  is 

vested  solely  in  the  appointing  authority:  either  the  National  Assembly  or  the  President  of  the 

Republic.  In  accordance  with  Article  14(1)  of  the  Law  on  BNB  the  grounds  for  removal  are  met 

where: (i) the member no longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of their duties or 

(ii) the member has been found guilty of serious misconduct 4. 

3.1.2. However, the Law on counter-corruption also applies to the Governor, the Deputy Governors and 

the other members of the Governing Council of BNB as senior public office holders5. The Law on 

counter-corruption  provides  that  Комисията  за  противодействие  на  корупцията  и  за  отнемане 

на  незаконно  придобитото  имущество  (the  Counter  Corruption  and  Unlawfully  Acquired  Assets 

Forfeiture Commission) may establish by means of a decision the existence of a conflict of interest 

with regard to senior public office holders 6. As a consequence of such a decision7, the respective 

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5  
6  

See paragraph 3.1 of Opinion CON/2021/2. All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex. 
Point 12 of Article 6(1) of the Law on counter-corruption. 

Article 74 of the Law on counter-corruption. 

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senior public office holder may be removed from office in accordance with Article 80(1) of the Law 

on  counter-corruption.  Against  this  background,  the  Law  on  counter-corruption  establishes  a 

ground for relieving from office that is in addition to the two grounds contained in Article 14.2 of the 

Statute of the ESCB8. 

3.1.3. Therefore, the ECB has noted in its Convergence Report that the Law on counter-corruption needs 

to be further adapted in view of the following9. According to Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB, 

a Governor may only be relieved from office on either of the two grounds contained in that Article 10. 

As regards the other members of the decision-making bodies of national central banks (NCBs), the 

same  rules  for  the  security  of  tenure  and  grounds  for  relieving  Governors  from  office  also  apply, 

safeguarding  the  personal  independence  of  those  persons.  The  provisions  of  Article  14.2  of  the 

Statute of the ESCB are not restricted to the security of tenure of Governors, and Article 130 of the 

Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB refer to ‘members of the decision-making bodies’ of 

NCBs rather than to Governors specifically. This is legally required, in particular, when a Governor 

is a ‘first among equals’ with colleagues with equivalent voting rights or where such other members 

are  involved  in  the  performance  of  tasks  related  to  the  European  System  of  Central  Banks 

(ESCB)11.  

3.1.4. Against  this  backdrop,  the  ECB  understands  that  the  intention  of  the  proposed  amendment  to 

Article  80(1)  of  the  Law  on  counter-corruption  is  to  ensure  that  the  ascertainment  of  a  conflict  of 

interest in accordance with that Law would not be a ground for removal from office of the Governor 

and  the  other  members  of  the  Governing  Council  of  BNB,  because  this  would  be  contrary  to  the 

Treaty, the Statute of the ESCB and the Law on BNB. In this regard the ECB understands that the 

proposed reference to ‘special legislation’ in Article 80(1) of the Law on counter-corruption is to be 

understood  as  referring,  in  particular,  to  Article  14(1)  of  the  Law  on  BNB.  The  ECB  further 

understands  that  this  reference  entails  that  Article  80(1)  of  the  Law  on  counter-corruption  cannot 

apply in relation to the Governor and the other members of the Governing Council of BNB because 

the  proposed  amendment  to  Article  80(1)  of  the  Law  on  counter-corruption  ensures  that  the 

ascertainment of a conflict of interest in accordance with that Law will not be a ground for removal 

from office of a senior public office holder where it is otherwise provided for in special legislation, 

such as the Law on BNB. 

3.2  The right of national courts to review a decision to dismiss any member, other than the Governor, 

of the decision-making bodies of BNB 

3.2.1. As  noted  in  the  ECB’s  Convergence  Report  2022  the  rationale  of  personal  independence  is  to 

shield  the  members  of  the  decision-making  bodies  of  ESCB  central  banks  from  political 

interference when exercising the powers conferred upon them by the Treaty and the Statute of the 

ESCB12. Therefore, Article 130 of the Treaty, which guarantees the independence of members of 

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10  

11  

See  Chapter  8,  Section  VI  of  Law  on  counter-corruption,  titled  ‘Consequences  upon  Conflict  of  Interest 
Ascertainment’. 
See paragraph 3.1 of Opinion CON/2021/2. 

See ECB’s Convergence Report 2022, paragraph 7.1.2. 
This was confirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union in its judgment of 26 February 2019, Rimšēvičs v 
Latvia, joined cases C-202/18 and C-238/18, EU:C:2019:139, paragraphs 88 and 89. 

See ECB’s Convergence Report 2022, paragraph 2.2.3. 

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the decision-making bodies of BNB, requires that they have access to effective legal remedies for 

cases concerning their dismissal, including – but not limited to – compensation. 

3.2.2. The ECB  understands that the  draft amendment  to  Article 14 of the Law on BNB aims to ensure 

that within the administrative procedure for dismissal of any member, other than the Governor, of 

the  decision-making  bodies  of  BNB,  it  is  possible  to  request  a  review  by  national  courts  of  the 

decision of the BNB Governing Council establishing the grounds for relieving a Deputy Governor or 

another member of the BNB Governing Council, except for the Governor, from office. The judicial 

review of such a decision may lead to its annulment. 

3.2.3. While in accordance with the draft law, this possibility to request judicial review does not pertain to 

the  decision to dismiss the relevant  member of the  BNB Governing Council,  which is adopted  by 

the respective appointing authority 13, the ECB understands that the decision of the BNB Governing 

Council  is  nevertheless  an  indispensable  step  in  the  procedure  for  the  adoption  of  a  dismissal 

decision  and  the  appointing  authority  may  not  act  in  its  absence.  Thus,  the  annulment  of  the 

decision of the BNB Governing Council establishing the grounds for relieving a Deputy Governor or 

another member of the BNB Governing Council, except for the Governor, from office precludes the 
adoption  of  a  decision  by  the  appointing  authority  to  dismiss  the  relevant  member  of  the  BNB 

Governing  Council.  In  addition,  the  ECB  understands  that  when  deciding  on  the  dismissal,  the 

appointing  authority  cannot  consider  and  adopt  additional  grounds  for  dismissal  that  were  not 

established in the decision of the BNB’s Governing Council. 

3.2.4. The ECB further understands that in accordance with general administrative law, an appeal before 

the  Supreme  Administrative  Court  could  suspend  the  application  of  the  decision  of  the  BNB 

Governing Council14. 

3.2.5. Based on the above understanding of the proposed amendment to Article 14 of the Law on BNB, 

the ECB has no further comments regarding this provision. 

This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex. 

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 21 December 2022. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Christine LAGARDE 

12  
13  
14  

See ECB’s Convergence Report 2022, paragraph 7.1.2. 
See paragraph 3.1.1. above. 
Article 166(4) of the Code of Administrative Procedure (Административнопроцесуален кодекс, обн. ДВ, бр. 30 от 
11 Април 2006 г.). 

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