European Parliament resolution of 15 December 2022 on the military junta crackdown on peaceful demonstrations in Chad (2022/2993(RSP))
Date: 2022-12-15
Institutions: European Parliament
Subjects: Chad, corruption, coup d'état, democracy, human rights, military regime, right to demonstrate, right to justice, torture, violence








C_2023177EN.01010101.xml










17.5.2023   


EN


Official Journal of the European Union


C 177/101






P9_TA(2022)0446
Military Junta crackdown on peaceful demonstrations in Chad
European Parliament resolution of 15 December 2022 on the military junta crackdown on peaceful demonstrations in Chad (2022/2993(RSP))
(2023/C 177/11)

The European Parliament,






—


having regard to its resolutions of 20 May 2021 on the situation in Chad (1) and of 16 September 2020 on EU-African security cooperation in the Sahel region, West Africa and the Horn of Africa (2),










—


having regard to the statement by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 April 2021 on the death of President Idriss Déby Itno,










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having regard to the statement of 19 October 2022 by the Delegation of the European Union to Chad,










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having regard to the statement by the spokesperson for the United Nations Secretary-General of 20 April 2021 on Chad,










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having regard to the report of the fact-finding mission to Chad of the African Union Peace and Security Council, which took place from 29 April to 6 May 2021,










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having regard to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram, mandated by the African Union Peace and Security Council and supported by the EU African Peace Facility,










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having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2359 (2017) on deployment of the Group of Five for the Sahel Joint Force (FC-G5S),










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having regard to the joint declaration of the members of the European Council with the Member States of the G5 Sahel of 28 April 2020 on security, stability and development of the Sahel,










—


having regard to the Council conclusions of 16 April 2021 on the European Union’s integrated strategy in the Sahel, which reaffirmed the importance of a solid and long-term partnership between the EU and the Sahel,










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having regard to the European Development Fund 2014-2020 National Indicative Programme for Chad,










—


having regard to the Constitution of Chad,










—


having regard to the partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 (3) (Cotonou Agreement),










—


having regard to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which was adopted on 27 June 1981 and entered into force on 21 October 1986,










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having regard to the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, adopted on 30 January 2007,










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having regard to the revised Transition Charter of Chad,










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having regard to the 2019 Global Terrorism Index,










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having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,










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having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,










A.


whereas since the death of former President Idriss Déby Itno in April 2021, Chad has been led by his son, Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno; whereas the Transitional Military Council (TMC) had previously suspended the constitution and dissolved the government and the national assembly;










B.


whereas the TMC pledged to hold democratic elections within 18 months of assuming power; whereas on 1 October 2022, measures were formally adopted by the national dialogue, which announced that the elections would be delayed by an additional two years; whereas the African Union issued conditions, including the rejection of any extension of the original 18-month transition timetable, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms;










C.


whereas a national dialogue was organised to set out the transition process; whereas not all opposition groups participated in this process; whereas the dialogue concluded with recommendations to postpone the transition process and not exclude anyone, in particular the current president, from running in future elections;










D.


whereas Chadian civil society organisations have produced a transitional plan to bring an end to the crisis; whereas certain Chadian civil society organisations have recommended that international support should take the form of a stabilisation mechanism aiming at reinstating the constitutional order and supporting the transition plan;










E.


whereas between 13 March and 8 August 2022, 53 political military movements, of which only 6 were genuine, were convoked to Doha by the Government of Chad to negotiate a peace agreement;










F.


whereas the TMC convoked to N’Djamena more than 1 300 delegates, of which almost all were directly appointed by the government to attend the so-called National Inclusive and Sovereign Dialogue;










G.


whereas these two events were boycotted by the most important political parties, civil society organisations and real political military groups;










H.


whereas on 20 October 2022, thousands of people protested across Chad to demand an immediate return to democratic rule; whereas in anticipation of this, on 19 October 2022, the minister of public security prohibited all demonstrations in the country; whereas in response to the protests police fired live ammunition and tear gas at peaceful protesters in a continued and widespread crackdown throughout the country;










I.


whereas the authorities also announced the temporary suspension of the activities of seven political groups; whereas they also decreed that the activities of major opposition groups and the civil society coalition ‘Wakit Tamma’ were to be banned nationwide; whereas several cities and neighbourhoods suffered internet restrictions;










J.


whereas on 4 November 2022, at the meeting of the United Nations Committee against Torture, rapporteur Sébastien Touzé estimated that between 50 and 150 people had died, 150 to 184 had disappeared, 1 369 had been arrested, and between 600 and 1 100 had been transported to Koro Toro high security prison in the desert, some 600 kilometres from the capital, as a result of the anti-government protests;










K.


whereas 400 of those detained were all judged in four days, in the absence of any defence lawyer; whereas on 5 December 2022, 262 detained protesters were sentenced to up to three years in prison, 80 were given suspended sentences and 59 were acquitted;










L.


whereas the trials were held with no transparency or public information available; whereas protesters were denied access to justice; whereas the Chad Bar Association called the trial a ‘parody of justice’ and has appealed the court’s decision, and whereas its lawyers therefore boycotted the trials;










M.


whereas the UN Committee against Torture concluded in its observation that the prevalence of prison violence, including violent acts committed by prison staff against detainees, was alarming and asked that state authorities undertake investigations into all deaths in custody and all allegations relating to acts of torture and ill-treatment by prison personnel;










N.


whereas the security situation in the Sahel region has significantly deteriorated in recent years, posing a serious threat to regional and international security; whereas human rights violations and mass killings are widespread and rising food insecurity, corruption, extreme poverty and flooding have added to the insecurity; whereas the Sahel saw the most rapid increase in violent extremist activity of any region in 2019;










O.


whereas, in its integrated strategy in the Sahel, adopted by the Council on 16 April 2021, the EU committed to supporting key moments for democracy in the region, to paying specific political attention to efforts in the areas of governance and the rule of law and to continuing to call for internal security forces to have a more central role in strengthening trust between people and the state;










P.


whereas according to the UN, Chad has received over 577 000 refugees from, among others, Darfur, the Central African Republic, Nigeria and Cameroon, in addition to having 381 000 internally displaced people; whereas the stability of Chad is crucial for the Sahel and northern and eastern Africa;










Q.


whereas Chad is located in a strategic region and is facing severe security challenges given the country’s proximity to regional militant strongholds, particularly around the Lake Chad region where Islamic State West Africa Province and Boko Haram, a Nigeria-based Islamist militant group, operate; whereas Chad plays a key role in regional peacekeeping efforts as part of the G5 Sahel joint force as well as the MNJTF;












1.


Deplores the deadly violence and repression perpetrated against pro-democracy protesters in the protests of October 2022, and deeply regrets the loss of life; reiterates its condemnation of the military coup d’état perpetrated on 20 April 2021 by the TMC and the subsequent suspension of the Constitution of Chad and the dissolution of the national assembly and the government;












2.


Condemns the restriction of the fundamental right to demonstrate and the use of violence against protesters and civil society in Chad; strongly regrets that these measures taken by the government risk undermining the ongoing process towards democracy; urges the authorities to fully respect the country’s national and international commitments, notably the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association, and the right to physical integrity;












3.


Calls for the opening of an independent and impartial investigation by the UN and the African Union into the reported violence, including reports of torture in Chadian prisons, in order to prosecute the perpetrators of violence against individuals and civil society; calls for those responsible for the violence and killings to be held accountable and urges the Chadian authorities to ensure that the Chadian military, gendarmes and police are trained in, and abide by, the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials;












4.


Condemns the prosecution of pro-democracy protesters in mass trials that failed to adhere to international standards on transparency and access to justice; calls for the sentences to be overturned and the protesters to be released;












5.


Strongly urges the government to ensure that all those charged following the 20 October 2022 protests have full access to legal protection; underlines that the EU will very closely follow the continuation of the legal proceedings and that the outcome will also be a key determinant of future EU-Chad relations;












6.


Deeply regrets the failure of the regime to uphold its commitment to a democratic transition; reiterates the importance of a rapid return to constitutional order and of a time-bound civilian-led transition that guarantees respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, recalling that meaningful engagement with all civil and political actors is essential in order to guarantee the credibility and legitimacy of the ongoing process;












7.


Calls urgently for new transparent, inclusive and credible legislative and presidential elections to be organised as soon as possible, which fully respect the national constitution and international electoral standards including by providing for the full participation of opposition parties; notes the importance of an independent and transparent national electoral commission and cooperation with international partners in this regard; deeply regrets the ruling authorities’ disregard for the clear directive of the African Union Peace and Security Council based on the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and the TMC’s previous public commitment that its leaders would not be candidates in upcoming elections;












8.


Recalls that genuine democratic transition and reform must be civilian-led and allow for the full and active involvement of civil society organisations, opposition parties, women and young people, and the free press, which must be able to operate without fear of violence, intimidation or restrictions;












9.


Deplores the continual violence and terrorist attacks which are still taking place in Chad; reiterates its concern about the protracted crisis in the country and the volatile security situation in the north, and strongly condemns the repeated violations of human rights and international and humanitarian law;












10.


Calls on the government to seek the support of national and international mediators, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the African Union, the EU Special Representative for the Sahel, the Economic Community of Central African States and other international organisations, in order to overcome the current deadlock and advance the national dialogue and democratic transition process;












11.


Is extremely concerned by the continuing high levels of corruption and impunity in Chad; notes that the failure to address impunity for human rights violations contributes to the continuation of such abuses and to the weakening of public trust in state institutions;












12.


Calls on the Commission, the European External Action Service and the Member States to increase their support for independent non-governmental organisations, human rights defenders and independent media active in Chad, including through funding and support for those in need of protection;












13.


Urges the EU and its Member States to raise these human rights concerns with the Chadian authorities, to provide technical support to Chad throughout the transition period, and to consider opening a procedure under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, which may lead, as a last resort, to the suspension of EU development cooperation with Chad until legitimate constitutional order is re-established;












14.


Recalls that climate change, food insecurity, population growth, exploitation of natural resources, poverty and a lack of educational and economic opportunities are root causes driving instability, violence and terrorist recruitment across the Sahel; emphasises that coordination of security, development, humanitarian and democracy-support assistance is necessary to ensure lasting sustainable development across the region;












15.


Notes that regional cooperation and initiatives including the African Union and G5 Sahel group are key to supporting an Africa-led strategy to address terrorism and instability in the Sahel; underlines its support for the European Peace Facility and its cooperation with the MNJTF;












16.


Welcomes the regionalisation of the common security and defence policy presence in the Sahel region, which aims to reinforce the regional approach of the EU’s work in the region in order to support cross-border cooperation in the Sahel and among regional cooperation structures, and to enhance the national capacities of the G5 Sahel countries; calls for the EU and its Member States to rapidly implement the proposal of a Team Europe initiative for Chad on governance, democratisation, peace and security;












17.


Calls for the EU, its Member States and the international community to urgently respond to the humanitarian situation arising from the human rights situation in Chad and to provide the country with the necessary assistance to rapidly address its urgent needs for the protection of internally displaced people and refugees;












18.


Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the African Union and its institutions, and the Government and National Assembly of Chad.






(1)  OJ C 15, 12.1.2022, p. 166.

(2)  OJ C 385, 22.9.2021, p. 24.

(3)  OJ L 317, 15.12.2000, p. 3.