Labour market and wage developments in Europe : annual review 2022.
Date: 2022-12-13
Institutions: Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion
Subjects: EU Member State, EU employment policy, activity report, euro area, labour market, labour mobility, labour shortage, wage cost, wage determination

Annual review

2022

Labour  
Market  
and Wage 
Developments  
in Europe

European Commission 

Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 

Labour Market and Wage 
Developments in Europe, Annual 
Review 2022 

 
 
 
 
Manuscript completed in October 2022 

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ISBN 978-92-76-56628-1  doi: 10.2767/128906  KE-07-22-980-EN-N 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 

This report was prepared in the Directorate-General of Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion under 
the supervision of Joost Korte (Director-General), Barbara Kauffmann (Director, Employment and Social 
Governance,  Analysis  Directorate)  and  Nathalie  Darnaut  (Head  of  Unit,  Labour  market  and  wages, 
Eurofound). 

The main contributors were Alfonso Arpaia, Anita Halász, and Edouard Turkisch. They were supported 
by  Marco  Cantalupi,  Matteo  Duiella,  Leire  Ormaetxea  Igarzabal,  Joé  Rieff,  Annachiara  Tanzarella  and 
Alkistis Zavakou. Marco Cantalupi and Michaela Vahovska provided statistical and editorial assistance. 

The report has benefited from useful comments and suggestions received from Anais Gradinger, Tillmann 
Heidelk,  Imad  Auge  Kanjou,  Gabor  Katay,  David  Kunst,  Luca  Pappalardo,  Victor  Ruiz  Salgado,  and 
Daniel Woehl, in the Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, as well as Aron 
Kiss and Anneleen Vandeplas, in the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs and Sarah 
Schinazi and Maeva Roulette in the Secretariat-General. 

The  analysis  is  based  on  statistical  information  available  through  October  15,  2022.  Comments  on  the 
report would be gratefully received at the following E-mail address: 

EMPL-F2-UNIT@ec.europa.eu 

ii 

 
FOREWORD 

Russia’s  war  of  aggression  against  Ukraine  has  caused  devastation  and  widespread 
suffering on the Ukrainian people. It has also brought severe repercussions on the EU 
economy.  The  price  of  gas  has  surged  to  all-time  highs  following  the  Russian 
invasion  of  Ukraine.  Inflation  has  reached  levels  unseen  in  decades,  fuelled  by 
energy and food prices, which has wide-ranging consequences for our economy and 
EU citizens.  

As shown in this report, the high cost of energy entails risks for the European labour 
market. It endangers the viability of many firms and many jobs if not addressed by 
effective  policies.  It  raises  the  input  costs  of  many  EU  firms,  in  particular  energy-
intensive ones and SMEs. Moreover, the high inflation erodes the purchasing power of European citizens 
and  their  families,  with  a  negative  impact  on  consumption.  The  low-income  households,  but  also  an 
increasing share of the middle-income ones, are particularly affected. There is a real risk that inequality 
and poverty will increase as a result. 

Despite  the  increase  in  the  cost  of  living  and  the  high  labour  shortages,  wage  growth  has  remained 
moderate  so  far  and  has  fallen  short  of  inflation.  Looking  forward,  the  deterioration  of  the  economic 
situation  and  the  increase  in  firms’  production  costs  are  likely  to  further  restrain  wage  growth  in  real 
terms.  Nevertheless,  this  report  shows  that  there  is  room  for  wage  increases,  especially  for  low  wages, 
though the situation varies across firms and sectors, in order to mitigate the losses in purchasing power 
without exacerbating inflationary pressures. Minimum wage policies and strong collective bargaining at 
all levels should play a key role in managing the negative consequences of the energy price crisis. In this 
regard, the recently adopted EU Directive on adequate minimum wages creates a positive momentum for 
enhancing their adequacy and coverage.  

To address the immediate consequences of higher energy prices, a tailored policy response is needed to 
support  those  households  and  businesses  particularly  affected.  It  is  important  that  support  measures 
become more targeted to vulnerable households and retain the incentives to reduce energy consumption. 
Furthermore,  in  the  event  of  an  economic  slowdown,  the  renewed  use  of  job  retention  schemes  should 
help  to  preserve  employment  and  firm-specific  human  capital.  These  schemes  should  be  designed  in  a 
way that supports restructuring processes, notably by easing job transitions, including via upskilling and 
reskilling,  in  line  with  the  Commission  Recommendation  for  Effective  Active  Support  to  Employment 
(EASE) and the additional impulse that will be brought about by the 2023 European Year of Skills. The 
rapid  implementation  of  coherent  policy  packages  to  accelerate  the  green  and  digital  transformations, 
including  through  the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  and  the  REPowerEU  Plan,  will  improve  the 
resilience  of  the  EU  energy  systems  and  address  energy  poverty.  The  continued  implementation  of  the 
European  Pillar  of  Social  Rights  will  help  advance  the  achievement  of  the  2030  EU  targets  on 
employment, skills, and poverty reduction. 

While  the  slowing  down  of  economic  growth  will  mitigate  labour  shortages,  it  nevertheless  remains 
important that policies address their main structural drivers, such as ageing, skills shortages, and, in some 
sectors  and  occupations,  poor  working  conditions.  This  can  ensure  that  in  the  medium  to  long  run 
shortages  do  not  constrain  sustainable  progress  on  productivity  and  competitiveness  and  the  twin 
transition. With the 2023 European Year of Skills, the Commission will support investments in training, 
reskilling and upskilling, including through the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+), to make it easier to 
match people's aspirations and skill sets with opportunities on the job market. Finally, broad-based policy 
efforts  should  be  pursued  to  facilitate  the  labour  market  integration  and  social  inclusion  of  the 
beneficiaries  of  temporary  protection  from  Ukraine.  Several  European  initiatives  aim  to  improve  the 
matching between available jobs and skills, including the new guidelines to facilitate the recognition of 
‘professional’ qualifications obtained in Ukraine. In addition, the recent EU Talent Pool pilot online tool 
will help people fleeing Russia's invasion of Ukraine to successfully integrate into the EU labour market. 

iii 

 
 
 
 
 
 
CONTENTS 

Summary and main findings 

1. 

General labour market conditions in the EU and its Member States 

1.1. 

The EU labour market under the strain of geopolitical tensions 

1.2.  General labour market conditions in the EU before Russia’s war Against Ukraine 

1.3. 

Labour market consequences of the war in Ukraine 

1.4. 

The impact of refugees on the supply of labour 

1.5.  Policy measures to deal with the labour market implications of the war in Ukraine 

1.6.  Conclusions and policy implications 

1.A1.  Annex to the chapter 1 

2. 

Wages and labour costs developments in the EU and its Member States 

2.1. 

Introduction 

2.2.  Wages in the EU: Recent and expected developments 

2.3. 

The challenges ahead and the room for some wage increases 

2.4.  Policy measures taken so far to soften the impact of inflation on workers 

2.5. 

 Conclusions and policy implications 

2.A1.  Annex to the chapter 2 

3. 

Short- and long-run determinants of labour shortages 

3.1. 

Introduction: Why should policy makers be concerned about labour shortages? 

3.2. 

The evolution of labour shortages 

3.3. 

The short- and long-term determinants of labour shortages 

3.4.  Policies to address labour shortages 

3.5.  Conclusions 

3.A1.  Annex to the chapter 3 

References 

Statistical annex 

A.1. 

Statistical annex 

1 

7 

8 

9 

14 

26 

30 

33 

36 

49 

50 

50 

56 

67 

71 

73 

81 

81 

82 

88 

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101 

103 

112 

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v 

 
LIST OF TABLES 

1.1.  Unemployment, compensation per employee and GDP growth in the euro area and the EU 
1.2. 
1.3.  Employment embedded in exports of intermediate products to Russia as % of total 

Share of domestic employment embedded in Russian final demand 

employment (2018) 

1.4.  Direct employment activated by imports of intermediate products from Russia (2018): share 

in total employment 

1.5.  Elasticity of labour demand with respect to the relative price of gas and electricity 

(reduction in the demand for labour in % for an increase of the relative price by 1%) 

1.6. 

Temporary protection registrations and the change in labour shortages 

1.A1.1. Labour demand by sector 
2.1.  Gap of wage growth relative to its benchmark 

2.A1.1. Real gross wages and salaries and real compensation per employee by Member States 

(annual % change, 2019-2021, forecasts for 2022 and 2023) 

2.A1.2. Nominal compensation per employee, productivity growth, unit labour costs, inflation 

(annual % change, 2021) 

3.1. 
The determinants of labour shortages – panel estimation 
3.2.  Wage growth and labour shortages - regression analysis 

3.A1.1. Indicators of sectoral labour shortages: year-on year changes in employment, hours 

worked and the compensation of employees between Q1 2021 and Q1 2022. 

3.A1.2. The main determinants of labour shortages. 

LIST OF GRAPHS 

Labour market slack in the EU 

1.1.  Employment, GDP, hours worked and productivity in the EU 
1.2. 
1.3.  Employment and unemployment in the EU, 2001Q1-2022Q2 (millions) 
1.4.  Contribution of temporary, permanent and self-employed to the growth of total 

employment 

Trade flows of the EU with Russia (as % of total exports/imports):1995-2018 

1.5.  Employment, hours by sector and age groups and labour shortages 
1.6. 
1.7. 
1.8.  Growth of foreign value added (as % of gross exports) embedded in exports of EU countries: 

Trade flows of Member States with Russia: 2018 

1995-2018 

Trade interconnectedness with Russia through global value chains 

1.9. 
1.10.  Sectors with the highest share of employment embedded in imports of intermediate 

products from Russia (as % of total EU employment) 

1.11.  Dutch TTF natural gas price and energy consumer price index (2017=100) 
1.12.  Share of EU total employment by sector ranked according to the energy intensity, 2019 
1.13.  Share of employment in the most energy-intensive sectors by country, 2019 

vi 

10 
16 

18 

18 

26 
29 
44 
62 

75 

76 
91 
95 

109 
110 

10 
10 
11 

12 
12 
15 
16 

17 
17 

19 
19 
20 
20 

 
 
1.14.  Impact of a 10% cut in the gas supply on employment due to decline in gross value added 

according to input-output simulations 

1.15.  Response of key EU macro variables one year after an hypothetical shock doubling the 

price of selected commodities 

1.16.  Relation between the largest negative employment response unexplained by the change 

in GDP and real wages to a gas price shock and total gas intensity 

1.17.  Consumers’ and employers’ confidence indicators, January 2007-October 2022 
1.18.  Employment expectations over the next three months in the EU, January 2013-October 2022 
1.19.  Distribution of temporary protection registrations in Europe, October 2022 
1.20.  Employment rate of temporary protection beneficiaries 

1.A1.1. Employment and unemployment in the Member States, million persons, 2009Q1-2022Q2 

1.A1.2. Employment and unemployment in the EU, million persons, 2009Q1-2022Q2 

1.A1.3. Eurostat labour market slack indicator (as % of the extended labour force), 2008Q1-2022Q2 

1.A1.4. Employment by sector group, index (2019Q4=100) 

1.A1.5. Temporary employment, shares on total employees, 2008Q1-2022Q2 

1.A1.6. Share of domestic employment by industry embedded in Russian final demand in most 

exposed countries (as % of total employment in each industry) 

1.A1.7. Share of domestic employment by industry embedded in Russian final demand in most 

exposed countries (as % of total employment in each industry) 

1.A1.8. Share of domestic employment by industry embedded in Russian final demand in most 

exposed countries (as % of total employment in each industry 

1.A1.10. Relation between the largest employment response unexplained by the change in GDP 

and real wages to a oil price shock and total oil intensity 

1.A1.11. Response to a 10% oil and gas price shock 

1.A1.12. Largest response of value added, employment and real wages to a shock to the price of 

oil and the price of gas by 13% 

1.A1.9. Share of EU employment in manufacturing by industry ranked according the energy 

intensity, 2019 

1.A1.13. Employment expectations over the next three months in the Member States, Jan. 2021 – 

Oct. 2022 

1.A1.14. Intermediate consumption of energy (as % of total output), 2018 
2.1.  Nominal compensation per employee (annual % change, 2020, 2021, Q3 2022) 
2.2.  Nominal compensation per employee per sector (annual % change, 2019, 2020, 2021) 
2.3.  Nominal compensation per hour worked, EU27, quarterly 
2.4.  Real wages per employee, deflator GDP (annual % change; 2020, 2021 and Q3 2022) 
2.5.  Negotiated wages in the euro area 
2.6.  Contribution to wage growth of actual changes in variables over time 
2.7. 
2.8.  Real Unit Labour Costs (annual % change, 2013-2021, forecasts for 2022 and 2023) 
2.9. 
2.10.  Response of growth of real wages to inflation shocks: full adjustment versus adjustment 

Inflation and short- and long-term inflation expectations 

In-work poverty in EU Member States, 2020, 2021 (%) 

implied by historical practice 

20 

22 

22 
26 
26 
27 
28 
36 
37 
38 
40 
40 

42 

42 

42 

43 
44 

44 

45 

46 
46 
51 
51 
52 
52 
53 
54 
58 
59 
60 

60 

vii 

 
2.11.  Response of wages to a shock of inflation, and persistence of inflation, based on historical 

relations between variables (left panel) and on based on a full compensation of wages to 

inflation (right panel) 

2.12.  Gross profit share of non-financial corporations in the euro area and the European Union 
2.13.  Real energy prices for non-consumers, 2008Q1-2021Q1 
2.14.  Changes in statutory minimum wages, in real and nominal terms 

2.A1.1. Wage and salaries per employee, by sectors, annual changes (%) 

2.A1.2. Nominal compensation per employee, productivity growth, inflation, by Member States 

(annual % change), 2013 - 2021, forecasts 2022 and 2023 

2.A1.3. Nominal unit labour cost on persons 

2.A1.4. Developments in productivity versus real compensation per employee, 2021 and Q3-2022 

2.A1.5. Real Unit Labour Costs by Member States (annual % change, 2020, 2021, forecasts for 2022 

and 2023) 

2.A1.6. Real wages growth and productivity growth (annual % change, 2003-2021, forecasts for 

3.2. 
3.1. 
3.3. 

2022 and 2023) 

Labour shortages in the EU by sector and by country 

The change of the vacancy-unemployment ratio from Q1 2020 to Q1 2022 

The evolution of macroeconomic skills and occupational mismatch in the EU (2005Q1 - 

2022Q2) 

3.4.  Heatmap of labour shortages in industry, 2022Q4 
3.5.  Heatmap of labour shortages in services, top 10 subsectors, 2022Q4 
3.6. 
3.7. 

Labour shortages and their link to unemployment in industry (Q2 2022) 

The contribution of short- and long-term drivers to labour shortages in industry (top) and 

construction (bottom) 

3.8. 

The share of managers indicating that 60% or more of their newly recruited employees did 

not have the required skills needed in the job (2019) 

3.A1.1. The Beveridge curve in EU Member States, 2013Q1-2022Q4, quarterly data, industry 

3.A1.2. The Beveridge curve in EU Member States, 2013Q1-2022Q4, quarterly data, industry, cont. 

3.A1.3. The Beveridge curve in EU Member States, 2013Q1-2022Q4, quarterly data, services 

3.A1.4. The Beveridge curve in EU Member States, 2013Q1-2022Q4, quarterly data, services, cont 

3.A1.5. Heatmap of labour shortages in services, 2022Q4 

3.A1.6. Labour shortages and their link to unemployment in construction (Q2 2022) 

3.A1.7. Labour shortages and their link to unemployment in services (Q2 2022) 

3.A1.8. The response of labour shortages to the cyclical component of value added 

LIST OF BOXES 

1.1. 

The macroeconomic impact of oil price shocks 

1.A1.1. Estimating employment related to intermediate exports and imports to Russia 
2.1.  Wage growth and high inflation. 
3.1. 

The calculation of the macroeconomic and occupational skills mismatch indicators 

viii 

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63 
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73 

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79 

80 
83 
83 

85 
87 
88 
89 

90 

92 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
108 
111 

24 
48 
64 
86 

 
 
3.2. 

Labour shortages and digital skills 

92 

ix 

 
 
SUMMARY AND MAIN FINDINGS 

Economic growth and 
labour markets in the 
EU showed strength 
ahead of Russia’s war 
of aggression against 
Ukraine  

The war in Ukraine has 
led to soaring energy 
prices, exacerbated 
trade disruptions and 
contributed to 
inflationary pressures 

As a result of the war, 
gas and electricity 
prices have risen 
sharply across the EU  

The high cost of 
energy entails major 
risks for employment, 
especially in energy 
intensive sectors  

Increases in the price 
of gas raise the input 
costs for firms and 
reduce employment  

The  Russian  invasion  of  Ukraine  unfolded  when  the  EU  economy  had  just 
returned to its pre-pandemic levels, following a sharp recovery in the second 
half of 2021 on the back of an improved epidemiological situation. EU labour 
markets  were  performing  strongly,  with  robust  employment  growth  and 
record-low  unemployment.  At  the  end  of  2021,  employment  had  overtaken 
its pre-pandemic level. In February 2022, unemployment reached the lowest 
rate  (6.2%)  since  January  2000.  Notwithstanding  a  slowdown  in  the  second 
half of the year, in the first half of 2022 employment growth remained above 
2%  and  the  unemployment  rate  further  decreased  to  6%  in  July.  Yet,  job 
creation  in  manufacturing  was  particularly  subdued  due  to  supply  chain 
bottlenecks.  High  labour  shortages  emerged  fast  in  this  recovery,  and  kept 
growing in services during 2022. 

Russia’s  war  of  aggression  against  Ukraine  has  further  driven  up  energy 
prices, which were increasing since mid-2021 due to both the strong rebound 
in  demand  and  supply  chain  bottlenecks.  Price  pressures  have  broadened 
from  energy  to  other  products,  such  as  food  items,  and  brought  inflation  to 
levels  unseen  in  decades.  The  war,  together  with  the  sanctions  imposed  on 
Russia,  has  resulted  in  a  disruption  of  supply  chains  for  certain  products, 
which has fed inflationary pressures. In October, EU inflation reached 11.5% 
while energy inflation stood at 38.7%.  

Russia's war against Ukraine has brought about an energy crisis, initiated by 
the  disruption  of  Russia’s  gas  deliveries  to  Europe,  triggering  a  gas  price 
shock and creating a risk of gas shortages. The Dutch Title Transfer Facility 
(TTF), the EU’s main gas price benchmark, increased from less than EUR 10 
per  MWh  in  the  pre-pandemic  period  to  the  record  level  of  EUR  230  per 
MWh  in  August  2022.  The  surge  in  gas  prices  was  compounded  by 
turbulence  in  electricity  markets  over  the  summer,  related  to  the  impact  of 
droughts  on  electricity  generation  by  hydropower  and  the  impact  of  severe 
heat  on  electricity  demand.  These  factors  have  made  the  price  of  electricity 
more  reactive  to  the  price  of  gas  and  hence  led  to  a  sharp  increase  in 
electricity prices.  

The high cost of energy is primarily affecting energy-intensive manufacturing 
sectors  (i.e.  coke,  basic  metals,  chemicals  and  fertilisers,  paper,  other  non-
metallic  mineral  products,  fertilisers,  wood  and  food).  These  account  for 
around 5% of total employment. However, it also affects industries that rely 
on inputs from these more energy-intensive industries, such as motor vehicles 
or hospitality.  Labour demand is likely to decline first in these sectors. The 
effect  on  services  might  be  delayed,  but  may  involve  a  large  number  of 
workers.  Indeed,  for  this  sector,  which  accounts  for  the  largest  share  of 
employment,  the  adjustment  of  hours  worked  per  worker  is  constrained  by 
the high share of temporary contracts and the less frequent use of short-time 
work schemes.  

The empirical analysis presented in this report shows that a shock to the price 
of  energy  has  a  negative  effect  on  GDP,  employment  and  real  wages.  A 
doubling of the natural gas price, which corresponds to the increase observed 
between March and August 2022, may reduce output on average by 3% after 
one  year  and  employment  by  1.5%.  Public  policies  may  contribute  to 
cushioning  the  impact  on  growth  and  jobs.  By  country,  the  drop  in 
employment  depends  on  the  response  of  output  and  real  wages  to  the  price 

1 

 
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

shock,  on  the  gas  intensity,  and  on  other  structural  characteristics  of  the 
labour  market,  such  as  the  share  of  temporary  contracts,  the  share  of 
employment in manufacturing and the openness of the economy. In a cross-
country  comparison,  the  response  of  employment  to  a  gas  price  shock 
depends  on  how  the  shock  affects  output  and  real  wages.  Latvia,  Hungary, 
Slovakia,  Bulgaria  and  Estonia  are  among  the  countries  where  the  high  gas 
dependency is likely to entail relatively larger job losses. A large decline of 
employment  could  also  be  expected  in  the  case  of  Spain,  Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Germany, Malta and Denmark, in part reflecting the high share 
of  temporary  contracts  and  of  employment  in  manufacturing  as  well  as  the 
openness of their economies.  

Persistently  high prices for natural gas, key  for electricity  production, could 
prolong  the  increase  in  electricity  prices,  weighing  on  labour  demand.  An 
increase  in  the  relative  price  of  electricity  has  a  stronger  impact  on  hours 
worked per worker than on employment, compared to gas. Estimates suggest 
that an increase in the cost of gas for companies by 50% – which corresponds 
to  the  average  increase  between  end  2020  and  end  2021  –  reduces  the 
demand for labour by 2.5%, with no change in hours worked per worker. The 
same percentage increase in the cost of electricity could reduce the number of 
workers by 1% and hours worked per worker by close to 4%. This difference 
reflects the importance of gas as a direct factor of production and as an input 
in the production of electricity. It highlights the importance of facilitating the 
adjustment  of  hours  worked  to  mitigate  the  drop  in  employment  in  the 
presence of a shock to the price of gas. 

Rising  gas  and  electricity  prices  have  started  to  trigger  a  decline  in 
production. Many European firms in energy-intensive sectors cannot pass on 
the  full  increase  in  energy  prices  to  consumer  prices,  due  to  the  overall 
reduction  in  demand.  This  could  force  them  to  slow  down  or  to  fully  shut 
down  their  production  eventually.  This  can  in  turn  lead  to  workers  being 
furloughed or laid off in large numbers across Europe, which may require the 
renewed  use  of  short-time  work  schemes,  which  might  be  designed  to 
accompany  restructuring  and  reskilling  processes.  This  negative  trend  in 
employment does not appear in the European labour market statistics of the 
second  quarter  of  2022.  Yet,  economic  confidence  indicators  show  a 
significant drop in the hiring intentions of companies by October 2022, along 
with a sharp rise in the unemployment expectations of consumers. In the third 
quarter  of  2022,  employment  growth  remained  resilient  despite 
the 
weakening of economic activity. 

Wage  growth  has  been  moderate  so  far  in  spite  of  high  inflation.  In  2021, 
compensation  per  employee  expanded  by  4.2%,  well  above  the  average  of 
1.7%  in  the  period  2013-2019.  This  wage  growth,  however,  reflected  the 
rebound  in  working  hours  after  the  pandemic.  In  the  first  three  quarters  of 
2022,  both  compensation  per  employee  and  compensation  per  hour  worked 
accelerated  at  a  similar  pace,  expanding  by  4.4%  and  3.8%  in  the  third 
quarter (on a yearly basis). Wages expanded below inflation, thus real wages 
declined.  This  led  to  a  deterioration  of  the  purchasing  power  for  many 
workers,  and  notably  low  wage  earners.  Despite  substantial  increases  (in 
nominal  terms),  as  of  October  2022,  statutory  minimum  wages  have 
decreased in real terms in most Member States where they exist. 

Electricity price hikes, 
as compared to gas 
price shocks, result in 
a smaller decline in 
employment and a 
larger adjustment of 
hours worked  

Although the labour 
market has been 
resilient to the shock, 
first signs of 
deterioration are 
visible 

Despite high inflation, 
wage growth has 
remained moderate  

2 

 
Summary and main findings 

With the slowdown of 
the EU economy, 
wage growth is likely 
to remain subdued, 
leading to a further 
decline in real wages 

The room for wage 
increases varies across 
firms and sectors 

During the rebound 
from the Covid-19 
recession, labour 
shortages rose to very 
high levels. 

Looking ahead, the prospects for wage developments are mixed. On the one 
hand, the losses in purchasing power caused by inflation are expected to raise 
demands  for  higher  wages  in  wage  negotiations.  On  the  other  hand,  wage 
growth  may  be  restrained  by  the  large  increases  in  firms’  production  costs 
and overall deterioration in economic activity,  while inflation plays a lesser 
formal  role  in  wage  setting  than  in  the  past.  Thus,  whereas  nominal  wage 
growth  might  stay  above  the  pre-pandemic  average,  it  is  likely  that  real 
wages will continue to decline in 2022 and 2023 in the EU. The prospects for 
wage  developments  also  vary  across  sectors.  In  particular,  activity  in 
manufacturing  is  constrained  by  rising  input  costs  and  persistent  supply 
bottlenecks,  which  is  expected  to  limit  wage  growth  to  a  larger  extent.  The 
sharp deterioration in the terms of trade is also putting European companies 
at a competitive disadvantage relative to other regions, as it increases further 
the costs of some inputs (including energy) vis-à-vis other competitors. 

Future  wage  developments  will  need  to  strike  a  balance between  mitigating 
losses  in  workers’  purchasing  power  and  preserving  employment  and 
economic  activity.  Some  wage  adjustment,  focused  on  low  wages,  would 
support  poorer  households  with  potentially  limited  impacts  on  inflation.  By 
contrast, large wage increases, for instance aimed at recovering all or most of 
past  inflation  and  applying  to  most  wages,  would  make  inflation  more 
persistent  and  lead  to  adverse  macroeconomic  consequences.  In  some 
services  sectors,  where  low-wage  earners  are  relatively  more  represented, 
firms  may  have  more  room  for  increasing  wages  than  in  manufacturing 
sectors  more  exposed  to  cost  pressures.  Policies  aimed  at  supporting  low 
wages,  notably  through  increases  in  adequate  minimum  wages  and  the 
promotion of collective bargaining, can mitigate the purchasing power losses 
while  preserving  positive  productivity  developments.  In  this  regard,  the  EU 
Directive  on  adequate  minimum  wages  is  expected  to  create  a  positive 
momentum for measures enhancing their adequacy and coverage. In addition, 
temporary budgetary support measures targeted at low wage earners can help 
to alleviate the loss of purchasing power due to the energy crisis. 

By  the  end  of  2021,  labour  shortages  reached  or  exceeded  pre-pandemic 
levels  in  several  EU  countries,  amid  a  decline  in  both  unemployment  and 
labour  market  slack.  In  2022,  after  the  start  of  the  Russian  aggression  on 
Ukraine,  shortages  in  the  European  economy  kept  rising,  especially  in 
services,  with  some  signs  of  lessening  in  manufacturing.  The  largest  labour 
and skills shortages are concentrated in few sectors and occupations, such as 
health  care,  hospitality,  construction  and  ICT.  The  pandemic  contributed  to 
the  rise  in  shortages  by  accelerating  digitalization  and  by  driving  workers 
away from occupations affected by containment measures and with difficult 
working conditions. However, in spite of the increase in labour shortages, the 
efficiency of labour market matching did not deteriorate, thus suggesting no 
apparent  increase  in  structural  unemployment  at  the  EU  level.  In  the  short 
run,  and  in  the  absence  of  structural  barriers  to  filling  shortages,  excess 
labour  demand  can  improve  workers’  access  to  higher  wages  and  better 
working  conditions,  while  also  adding  to  the  cost  and  competitiveness 
pressures in some sectors. 

3 

 
 
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Labour shortages 
have structural drivers, 
which should be 
addressed by policies 
in a forward-looking 
way  

As the economy slows 
down, shortages are 
likely to diminish, yet 
policies should keep 
addressing their 
structural causes 

The integration of the 
millions of displaced 
persons from Ukraine 
can have a positive 
impact on the labour 
market and the 
economy in the 
medium to long term 

As a response to the 
energy crisis, the EU 
has taken measures to 
reduce its 
dependency on 
Russia’s fossil fuels  

Labour  shortages  are  driven  not  only  by  cyclical  factors,  but  also  by 
structural changes, such as ageing, skills shortages in the context of the twin 
transitions,  changes  to  labour  mobility  and  migration  patterns,  and  poor 
working  conditions  in  some  sectors  and  occupations.  Indeed,  the  cross-
country and cross-sectoral patterns of  labour shortages in the recovery  have 
followed  pre-pandemic  trends.  If  not  addressed,  structural  labour  shortages 
will reduce Europe’s economic potential, including in the context of the twin 
transitions,  and  jeopardise  the  sustainability  of  the  economic  recovery  from 
the  pandemic  and  the  energy  crisis.  Shortages  in  one  occupation  can  also 
reduce the opportunities of growth in linked and complementary occupations 
and sectors.  

While  the  deterioration  of  the  economic  situation  may  partially  mitigate 
labour shortages in some sectors and countries, especially in manufacturing, 
policies  addressing  their  structural  drivers  should  be  pursued.  This  includes 
improvements  in  education,  activation,  skills,  regular  migration  and  labour 
mobility  policies,  measures  supporting  labour  market  transitions  and  efforts 
to improve working conditions. Stepping up policy efforts therefore remains 
essential to ensure that labour shortages do not constrain innovation, growth 
prospects and the ongoing green and digital transitions, while preserving the 
improvements in working conditions and productivity that can be expected to 
arise from a situation of constrained labour supply.  

Another consequence of Russia’s war on Ukraine is Europe’s biggest refugee 
crisis  since  the  Second  World  War.  The  majority  of  people  fleeing  the  war 
are  women,  accompanied  by  children,  elderly  people  and  other  vulnerable 
individuals, whereas men are mostly staying in Ukraine for military service. 
Following  the  activation  of  the  Temporary  Protection  Directive,  Ukrainians 
fleeing  the  war  can  select  the  country  in  which  they  intend  to  settle  and 
receive  temporary  protection.  This,  and  their  relatively  high  skill  level,  can 
ease their access to the labour market. However, they first need humanitarian 
aid and access to supportive services. In particular, language classes and the 
recognition  of  their  skills  are  needed  to  realise  their  employment  potential 
while residing in the EU and to support their broader integration in society. In 
the  medium  to  long  run,  the  labour  market  integration  of  Ukrainians  who 
wish to stay will have a positive impact on GDP and employment in the EU.  

The  EU  and  the  Member  States  took  several  measures  to  respond  to  the 
energy crisis. To accelerate the transition away  from  volatile and expensive 
fossil  fuels,  the  REPowerEU  plan  presented  a  comprehensive  set  of  actions 
and  resources  to  strengthen  the  resilience  of  the  energy  system,  increase 
energy  efficiency  and  the  use  of  renewable  energy  sources.  A  new  Gas 
Storage Regulation was adopted to secure gas storage levels of at least 80%, 
accompanied  by  a  Gas  Demand  Reduction  Plan.  In  addition,  the  Council 
agreed  on  an  emergency  intervention  in  EU  energy  markets  to  tackle  the 
surge in gas and electricity prices and alleviate cost pressures on households 
and  companies.  It  introduced  electricity  consumption  reduction  targets,  an 
EU-level cap on the revenues of companies that produce electricity at a low 
cost,  and  a  temporary  solidarity  contribution  from  fossil  fuel  energy 
companies. Member States will use these funds to protect consumers. On 18 
October,  the  Commission  proposed  an  energy  package  with  measures  to 
support  joint  gas  purchasing  at  EU  level,  to  make  gas  prices  more 
predictable, to ensure solidarity between Member States in dealing with gas 

4 

Summary and main findings 

To support businesses 
and households in the 
context of rising 
energy prices and 
inflation, Member 
States have 
implemented a broad 
range of measures 

Targeted and 
temporary measures 
can help viable firms 
in the current energy 
crisis 

Existing EU initiatives 
and instruments 
underpin national 
policies to address 
rising labour shortages 

supply  shortages  and  to  ensure  demand  reduction  and  the  stepping-up  of 
energy  efficiency.  Furthermore,  it  proposed  that  unused  cohesion  policy 
funding  from  the  2014-2020  programming  period  can  be  used  to  support 
small  and  medium  businesses,  vulnerable  households,  employees  and  the 
self-employed to cope with the rise in energy prices. 

Since inflation started to pick up, Member States have adopted measures to 
protect  households  and  businesses  from  the  spike  in  energy  prices.  The 
majority  of  price  measures  and  national  income  support  policies  are  not 
targeted  to  vulnerable  households  with  low  or  lower  middle  incomes.  For 
instance,  many  Member  States  introduced  generalised  price  caps  and/or 
reductions in network and distribution costs, or VAT and energy taxes.  Such 
generalised  measures tend to  be costly  for public budgets  and ineffective at 
protecting vulnerable households. Depending on their design and levels, they 
can also undermine the necessary incentives to reduce energy demand and to 
contain inflation. Finally, several Member States have substantially increased 
statutory minimum wages and adopted measures related to public wages. In 
this  regard,  both  wage  and  non-wage  policies  to  support  households’ 
purchasing  power  need  to  be  well-articulated.  They  can  be  seen  as 
complementary  in  supporting  households,  notably  in  the  short  run.  The 
composition  of  policies  notably  depends  on  firms’  competitiveness,  as  well 
as on Member States’ fiscal space. 

So far, the increase in energy prices has not led to a deterioration in overall 
employment and unemployment levels. Energy-intensive industries – such as 
non-ferrous metals, ferro-alloys and fertilizers −, usually capital intensive and 
highly  productive,  and  the  transport  sector  have  seen  a  fall  in  output  and 
employment.  If  the  high  energy  prices  and  the  deterioration  in  the  terms  of 
trade  persist  over  time,  some  companies  are  likely  to  cut  output  and 
employment, either temporarily or permanently depending on their individual 
situation.  Short-time  work  schemes  should  then  play  an  important  role,  in 
order  to  preserve  employment  in  otherwise  viable  firms,  and  to  accompany 
potential restructuring processes. Compared to the pandemic, this time, short-
time  work  schemes  should  be  targeted  to  firms  facing  acute  increases  in 
energy costs or related inputs and should focus on reskilling and upskilling, 
as  well  as  job-to-job  transitions  in  the  case  of  firms  or  sectors  undergoing 
restructuring.  

The  EU  has  put  forward  a  set  of  policies  to  help  Member  States  address 
rising  labour  shortages,  based  on  the  principles  in  the  European  Pillar  of 
Social  Rights  Action  Plan.    In  addition  to  skills  and  active  ageing  policies, 
to 
the  Commission  Recommendation  on  Effective  Active  Support 
Employment and the Council Recommendation on ensuring a fair transition 
towards  climate  neutrality  provide  policy  guidance  on  managing  labour 
market  transitions,  which  supports  structural  change  and  improves  the 
efficiency  of  matching  in  the  labour  market.  The  Directive  on  Adequate 
Minimum  Wages  and  the  European  Care  Strategy  can  both  contribute  to 
addressing labour shortages by improving working conditions. In the domain 
of  migration,  the  Commission’s  recently  proposed  a  Skills  and  Talent 
package  provides  the  framework  for  supportive  national  policies  to  attract 
talent,  which  can  ensure  an  effective  right  to  mobility  for  third-country 
nationals  and  simplify  admission  procedures  for  all  workers  from  non-EU 
countries.  Financial  support  for  national  policies  to  tackle  labour  shortages 

5 

 
 
 
 
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Among EU actions 
that address labour 
shortages, there is a 
specific focus on 
addressing skills 
shortages and 
mismatches  

The EU and Member 
States took measures 
to foster the labour 
market integration of 
people displaced 
from Ukraine  

has been available  from the  Recovery and  Resilience Facility and other EU 
instruments, such as the European Social Fund Plus and Invest EU. 

The  2020  European  Skills  Agenda  is  the  main  EU  policy  framework  to 
promote skills policies, which are crucial to address labour shortages. As part 
of  this,  the  Council  Recommendation  on  individual  learning  accounts  can 
support  the  adaptation  of  workers  to  changes  in  their  jobs  and  their  re-
training  to  fill  shortage  occupations.  Furthermore,  the  recent  Council 
Recommendation  for  an  EU  approach  to  micro-credentials  for  lifelong 
learning  and  employability  holds  promise  to  address  skills  shortages  by 
facilitating  the  recognition  of  skills  acquired  during  short  and  modular 
training.  In  the  domain  of  migration,  the  Commission’s  recently  proposed 
Skills  and  Talent  package  provides  the  framework  for  supportive  national 
policies  to  attract  talent.  It  will  streamline  and  reinforce  legal  pathways  for 
migration and establish channels for skilled labour migration to the EU. The 
2023  European  Year  of  Skills  will  further  contribute  to  the  promotion  of 
policies to address the skills shortages underlying labour shortages.  

The  Commission  has  put  emphasis  on  the  labour  market  integration  and 
social  inclusion  of  displaced  people  from  Ukraine.  The  CARE  and  FAST 
CARE initiatives provide flexibility in the use of cohesion policy funding to 
support Member States  hosting these people. EU guidance  was also offered 
on  access  to  the  labour  market,  vocational  education  and  training  and  adult 
learning. Moreover, several EU initiatives have been implemented to improve 
the matching between available jobs and skills. Member States have provided 
targeted  support  measures  to  facilitate  the  labour  market  integration  of  the 
beneficiaries of temporary protection, including the provision of counselling, 
job-search  assistance  and  language  courses,  the  validation  of  skills  and 
recognition  of  qualifications,  support  to  childcare  as  well  as  fast-track 
integration programmes. 

6 

1.  GENERAL LABOUR MARKET CONDITIONS IN THE EU AND 

ITS MEMBER STATES 

Before  Russia’s  war  of  aggression  against 
Ukraine,  the  EU  economy  was  on a  solid  footing. 
Even with the spread of new Covid-19 variants in 
the  economy  was  remarkably 
winter  2021, 
resilient.  Unemployment 
the  pre-
fell  below 
pandemic  rates  and  in  February  2022  reached 
6.2%,  while  job  creation  brought  employment 
above  pre-pandemic  levels.  Notwithstanding  a 
slowdown  in  the  second  half  of  2021  and  in  the 
first  quarter  of  2022,  employment  growth 
remained  above  2%  due  to  the  strong  momentum 
observed  at  the  beginning  of  the  year.  Yet,  in 
manufacturing 
job  creation  was  particularly 
subdued due to the insufficient supply of goods and 
services by critical upstream providers.  

the 

economy. 

In February 2021, when the war broke out, the EU 
labour market was benefitting from the reopening 
the 
of 
unemployment rate fell to the historical low rate of 
6%  (6.5%  for  the  euro  area).  Job  vacancies  in 
many  sectors  hinted  at  some  unfilled  demand  for 
labour. 

In  October  2022, 

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has brought hardship 
to Ukrainian people. It has also radically changed 
increased 
the  EU  economic  outlook.  It  has 
substantially the price of commodities, including of 
gas.  The  war  is  affecting  the  labour  market 
through 
inflation  and 
its 
confidence.  

impact  on 

trade, 

The  collapse  of  the  EU  trade  with  Russia  is 
disrupting  supply  chains  already  strained  by  the 
strong  economic  rebound  and  China’s  lockdown 
measures. Its impact is relatively limited in light of 
the  relatively  small  bilateral  trade  flows  between 
Russia  and 
the  EU,  with  differences  across 
countries. Depending on the country, some sectors 
and 
(e.g., 
transport in general) are also more vulnerable. 

pharmaceuticals, 

transport, 

air 

The  effects  of  the  war  on  the  costs  of  energy  are 
compounded  by  the  turbulence  in  the  electricity 
markets  related  to  the  impact  of  droughts  and 
extreme  heat  on  electricity  generation  by 
hydropower  and  nuclear  plants.  These  factors 
have  made  the  price  of  electricity  for  final 
consumers  more  reactive  to  the  price  of  natural 

gas – a major input in electricity generation – and 
led to a sharp increase in its prices.  

levels, 

storage 

increasing 

The EU has taken a number of measures to tackle 
the  recent  steep  rise  in  energy  prices.  These 
measures  aim  at  phasing  out  Russian  fossil  fuel 
imports, 
and 
accelerating  the  green  transition.  In  addition,  the 
Council  agreed  on  an  emergency  intervention  in 
EU  energy  markets  to  tackle  the  dramatic  energy 
price  increases.  These  measures  are  reducing  the 
European dependence on Russian fossils fuels, the 
demand for gas, and its price. On 18 October, the 
Commission  proposed  an  energy  package 
to 
address  high  gas  prices  in  the  EU  and  ensure 
security of supply.  

The high cost of energy entails risks for the labour 
market.  It  is  primarily  affecting  energy-intensive 
manufacturing  sectors  (including  coke,  basic 
metals, chemicals and fertilisers, paper, other non-
metallic mineral products, wood and food). These 
account for about 5% of total value added and 5% 
of 
in  energy-
intensive  manufacturing  sectors  is  likely  to  be  hit 
first.  The  effect  on  services  might  be  delayed,  but 
may involve a large number of workers.  

total  employment.  Employment 

The  results  of  an  empirical  simulation  based  on 
historical  data  suggest  that  a  doubling  of  the 
natural  gas  price,  i.e.  close  to  the  increase 
observed  between  March  and  August  2022,  might 
reduce  output  by  3%  after  one  year  and 
employment  by  1.5%.  This  simulation  does  not 
take into account the effect of the policy response 
adopted to mitigate the effect of the shock.  

By  country,  the  drop  in  employment  is  not  only 
related to gas intensity; it also depends on labour 
market  features  (e.g.  the  share  of  temporary 
contracts,  the  strictness  of  dismissal  rules,  wage 
flexibility, the use of short-time work schemes) that 
make  employment  more  reactive  to  the  economic 
cycle. Taking into account these factors and based 
on  past  evidence,  there  is  still  a  negative  relation 
across  countries  between  gas 
intensity  and 
employment  after  a  gas  price  shock;  Latvia, 
Bulgaria,  Hungary  and  Czechia  are  countries 
where 
the  high  gas  dependency  may  entail 
relatively  larger  job  losses.  Results  based  on  past 

7 

European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

evidence  should  be  interpreted  with  caution  as 
the 
empirical 
do 
repercussions  of  a  shock 
those 
observed historically. 

capture 
than 

not 
larger 

estimates 

Persistently  high  prices  for  natural  gas,  key  for 
electricity  production,  could  prolong  the  increase 
in  the  electricity  prices,  weighing  on  the  demand 
for  labour.  An  increase  in  the  relative  price  of 
electricity has a stronger impact on hours worked 
per worker than on employment, compared to gas. 
Estimates based on the historical relation between 
gas/electricity prices and employment suggest that 
an  increase  in  the  cost  of  gas  for  companies  by 
almost  50%  reduces  the  demand  for  labour  by 
2.5%, with no change in hours worked per worker. 
The  same  percentage  increase  in  the  cost  of 
electricity would reduce the number of workers by 
1%  and  hours  worked  per  worker  by  3.7%.  This 
difference reflects the importance of gas as direct 
factor  of  production  and  as  an  input  in  the 
production  of  electricity. 
the 
importance  of  facilitating  the  adjustment  of  hours 
worked  to  mitigate  the  drop  in  employment  in  the 
presence of a shock to the price of gas.  

It  highlights 

fleeing  from  Ukraine 

Another  consequence  of  the  war  is  the  large 
inflows  of  people 
into 
European  countries.  By  mid-September  2022, 
around  10  million  people  have  been  registered 
crossing  the  border  between  Ukraine  and  the  EU 
since  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  In  the  short  term, 
their  impact  on  employment  is  likely  to  be  small. 
Integration 
care 
challenges,  medical 
assistance,  and  language  barriers  can  be  an 
obstacle  to  employment.  However,  employment 
opportunities may exist in the service sector where 
linguistic  barriers  and  skills  recognition  are  less 
prominent.  

and 

The  medium-term  prospects  for  labour  market 
integration  of  people  from  Ukraine  who  wish  to 
stay  in  the  EU  are  quite  favourable  due  to  their 
relatively  high  educational  attainment  and 
employment  in  the  Ukrainian  labour  market.  The 
the  Temporary  Protection 
implementation  of 
Directive (1) will contribute to their labour market 
integration.  It  is  estimated  that  countries  with  a 
higher share of temporary protection registrations 
over  total  population  benefitted  from  a  reduction 
of labour shortages in services. 

(1)  Council Directive 2001/55/EU of July 2001. 

8 

For  EU  countries,  the  energy  crisis  represents  a 
major  common  shock  with  asymmetric  effects 
across  countries  and  sectors.  The  policy  response 
needs  to  be  tailored  to  specific  sectors  and 
workers.  In  the  short  term,  it  is  crucial  that  good 
job  matches  are  preserved,  i.e.,  avoiding  labour 
shedding  because  of  a  temporary  lack  of  energy 
sources  or  of  their  high  costs.  Short-time  work 
schemes may be needed to preserve employment in 
otherwise viable firms, and to accompany potential 
restructuring  and  reskilling  processes.  Coherent 
policy  packages  can  help 
job 
to  structural  change  and 
transitions  related 
promote 
transitions. 
Ensuring  a 
towards  climate 
transition 
neutrality will require equal access to quality and 
inclusive education, training and lifelong learning, 
fair  tax-benefit  and  social  protection  systems  and 
access 
to  affordable  essential  services  and 
housing. 

the  green  and  digital 

to  manage 

fair 

1.1. 

THE  EU  LABOUR  MARKET  UNDER  THE 
STRAIN OF GEOPOLITICAL TENSIONS 

Job 

creation 

recovery. 

Before  Russia’s  military  aggression  against 
Ukraine,  economic  growth  in  the  EU  was  on  a 
solid recovery path from the Covid-19 crisis. In 
2021,  the  improvements  of  the  epidemiological 
situation and supportive policies led to a V-shaped 
economic 
brought 
unemployment to an all-time low level and a sharp 
rise  in  job  vacancies  was  reported  in  several 
Member States.  In parallel, the global recovery led 
to  a  surge  in  commodity  and  energy  prices, 
exacerbated by supply bottlenecks. ( 2) The price of 
oil, which collapsed during the pandemic, returned 
to its pre-pandemic levels in summer 2021. On the 
back of a strong recovery and rising energy prices, 
consumer  price  inflation  increased  sharply  –  from 
0.2%  in  November  2020  to  5.3%  in  December 
2021. 

The  war  has  led  to  a  more  uncertain  and 
gloomy  economic  outlook,  further  aggravating 
inflationary 
supply 
pressures. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine represents 
a  negative  supply  shock  with  wide-ranging 

tensions 

chain 

and 

(2)  Low  levels  of  gas  storage  have  also  contributed  to  the 
volatility  of  energy  prices.  The  European  Commission 
proposed a minimum storage obligation for Member States 
to reinforce security of gas supply - COM(2022) 135 final. 

                                                           
                                                           
ramifications, which make its economic and labour 
market  impact  highly  uncertain.  The  economic 
fallouts  from  the  war  depend  on  the  duration  and 
the  extent  of  the  war  and  its  implications  for  the 
supply of energy, and commodities of  which both 
Russia  and  Ukraine  are  key  exporters,  including 
wheat, nickel and fertilizers.   

some 

The impact of the shock varies across countries 
and  sectors.  Member  States  have  different 
exposure  to  various  energy  sources  and  to  the 
disruption  of  trade  flows.  The  type  of  industrial 
countries  more 
specialisation  makes 
vulnerable  to  bottlenecks  in  the  supply  of  certain 
raw  materials  and  energy 
inputs.  Similarly, 
disruptions  in  the  provision  of  gas  and  rising 
energy  prices    are    felt  more  by  countries  with 
higher  energy  dependency  from  third  countries. 
These  differences  in  countries’  exposure  to  the 
war-induced  shock  may  result  in  different  labour 
market outcomes.  

Russia’s  invasion  of  Ukraine  has  triggered  a 
humanitarian  crisis.  In  response  to  a  large-scale 
the  European 
displacement  of  population, 
Commission  has 
the  Temporary 
activated 
Protection  Directive. Its  application  has  helped  to 
address  the  humanitarian  crisis  and  foster  the 
integration  of  those  fleeing  Ukraine  in  the  EU 
labour  markets.  The  large  inflow  of  people  is  an 
opportunity  for  the  EU  economy,  as  people 
deciding to stay may increase the labour supply. At 
the same time, the arrival of displaced people from 
Ukraine  also  involves  labour  market  integration 
challenges  related  to  the  availability  of  childcare, 
education,  housing,  and  related 
language 
to 
barriers and the transferability of skills.  

the  main 

Against this background, this chapter discusses 
how  the  EU  labour  markets  might  respond  to 
Russia's  war  of  aggression  against  Ukraine. 
labour  market 
Section  2  reviews 
developments before the Russian invasion changed 
the  economic  outlook.  Section  3  discusses  the 
main  mechanisms  through  which  the  war  may 
affect  the  labour  market.  It  investigates  which 
sectors  and  countries  are  more  likely  to  be 
impacted by the fallout from the Russia’s invasion 
of  Ukraine.  It  estimates  the  impact  of  soaring 
energy prices on employment. Section 4 discusses 
the effect of the large inflow of refugees on labour 
supply.  Section  5  reviews  the  policy  options  to 
deal  with  the  labour  market challenges created by 

General labour market conditions in the EU and its Member States 

Chapter 1 

the  Russia’s  invasion  of  Ukraine  and  the  policy 
response  implemented  at  the  Member  State  level. 
Section 6 summarises the main findings and draws 
policy implications.  

1.2.  GENERAL  LABOUR  MARKET  CONDITIONS 
IN THE EU BEFORE RUSSIA’S WAR AGAINST 
UKRAINE 

In  2021  and  in  the  first  two  months  of  2022,  a 
robust labour market recovery took place in the 
EU.  The  strong  economic  recovery  that  followed 
the Covid-19 recession was accompanied by strong 
job  creation  (Graph  1.1)  and  a  decline  in  the 
number  of  unemployed  people. (3)  In  December 
2021,  the  EU  unemployment  reached  6.4%,  with 
the  gap between the lowest  unemployment rate in 
Czechia  (2.2%)  and  the  highest  in  Greece  and 
Spain  (13%  and  13.4%)  standing  at  around  11 
pps. (4)  By  the  end  of  the  year,  the  labour  market 
slack – a measure of underutilisation of the labour 
force  – caused  by  the  Covid-19  shock  was  re-
absorbed  (Graph  1.2);  the  indicator  of  slack 
decreased to 13% of the extended EU labour force 
in  the  fourth  quarter  of  2021,  2.7  pps  below  the 
rate  recorded  at  the  peak  of  the  recession. In 
parallel with the increase in labour demand, the job 
vacancy rate rose from 2.3% of the last quarter of 
2019  to  2.8%  in  the  last  quarter  of  2021.  In  all 
Member  States,  many  firms  reported  hiring 
difficulties  notably  in  the  sectors  of  health  care, 
hospitality,  construction,  and  ICT. In  the  first 
months of 2022, the unemployment rate continued 
to  decline  reaching  in  February  6.2%,  the  lowest 
rate since January 2000. 

(3)  EU  employment  expanded  by  2.4  million,  up  by  1% 
compared  to  one  year  earlier,  while  the  number  of 
unemployed dropped by about 2 million (between January 
and  December  2021). 
three  quarters, 
In 
employment  expanded  year-on-year  at  2%;  this  is  the 
highest rate since the first quarter of 2008.  

last 

the 

(4)  This is the lowest gap since October 2008. The maximum 

difference (23.2%) was reached in July 2013.  

9 

                                                           
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Table 1.1: 

Unemployment, compensation per employee and GDP growth in the euro area and the EU 

Quarter over same quarter of previous year, % and pps

Quarter over previous quarter, % and pps

Unemployment rate

Unemployment 
growth
Growth of nominal 
compensation per 
employee

GDP growth

Employment growth

2020
8
EA
EU
7.2
EA
3.1
EU 4.7

2021
7.7
7.0
-1.8
-1.5

EA -0.7

EU -0.3
EA -6.4
EU -5.9
EA -1.5
EU -1.4

4.1

4.2
5.3
5.3
1.1
1.2

2020Q3 2020Q4 2021Q1 2021Q2 2021Q3 2021Q4 2022Q1 2022Q2 2022Q3
-0.9
-0.7
-10.4
-10.1

-1.4
-1.2
-15.2
-15.2

-1.0
-0.9
-10.7
-10.6

-1.2
-1.0
-12.4
-12.5

-1.4
-1.3
-14.5
-15.0

1.0
1.0
12.9
14.3

0.8
0.9
10.3
12.4

0.8
0.8
9.1
10.9

0.4
0.2
7.0
6.0

2020Q3 2020Q4 2021Q1 2021Q2 2021Q3 2021Q4 2022Q1 2022Q2 2022Q3
-0.1
-0.6
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
-6.3
-0.9
-6.5

0.8
0.6
12.2
10.9

-0.4
-0.3
-4.7
-4.6

-0.2
-0.2
-2.8
-2.6

-0.3
-0.3
-3.3
-3.3

-0.1
-0.1
-1.7
-1.7

-0.1
0.0
-1.0
-0.3

-0.1
-0.2
-0.9
-1.6

2.1

2.2
-3.8
-3.7
-2.0
-1.9

1.6

1.7
-4.1
-3.9
-1.6
-1.5

2.2

2.4
-0.8
-0.8
-1.5
-1.3

11.7

11.6
14.2
13.7
2.3
2.4

3.0

3.2
3.9
4.2
2.4
2.4

3.6

3.8
4.8
5.1
2.4
2.4

5.1

5.2
5.5
5.6
3.0
2.8

4.2

4.6
4.2
4.3
2.6
2.4

2.7

3.3
2.3
2.5
1.8
1.5

10.8

10.2
12.4
11.5
1.1
1.0

-0.3

-0.1
-0.3
-0.1
0.6
0.6

-0.4

-0.2
-0.1
0.2
-0.1
0.0

1.5

1.6
2.0
1.9
0.7
0.8

2.2

1.8
2.3
2.2
1.2
1.0

0.3

0.6
0.5
0.7
0.5
0.5

1.0

1.1
0.6
0.7
0.5
0.4

0.7

1.0
0.8
0.7
0.3
0.3

0.7

0.7
0.3
0.4
0.3
0.2

(1) EU-27 from 2020Q1. Seasonally adjusted data. For the unemployment rate, changes are in pps. 
Source: Eurostat 

Graph 1.1: 

Employment, GDP, hours worked and 
productivity in the EU 

15

10

5

0

-5

-10

-15

Productivity growth
GDP growth
Employment growth
Growth of total hours worked per person employed

1
Q
2
0
0
2

1
Q
4
0
0
2

1
Q
6
0
0
2

1
Q
8
0
0
2

1
Q
0
1
0
2

1
Q
2
1
0
2

1
Q
4
1
0
2

1
Q
6
1
0
2

1
Q
8
1
0
2

1
Q
0
2
0
2

3
Q
2
2
0
2

Source: Eurostat, National Accounts 

1.2.1.  General 

trends  of  post-pandemic 

employment recovery   

This good performance was broad-based across 
countries.  At  the  end  of  2021,  the  labour  market 
slack declined in all EU countries and remained at 
a  very  low  level  throughout  the  first  half  of  2022 
(Graph 1.2 and Graph 1.A1.3 in the annex), hinting 
at  a  generalised  drop  in  labour  market  tightness. 
Reductions  larger  than  5  pps  were  registered  in 
Greece, Ireland, Finland, Italy, Austria, Latvia, and 
Croatia.  

Graph 1.2: 

Labour market slack in the EU 

50

40

30

20

10

0

2,5

1,5

0,5

-0,5

-1,5

-2,5

-3,5

1
Q
0
1
0
2

1
Q
1
1
0
2

1
Q
2
1
0
2

1
Q
3
1
0
2

1
Q
4
1
0
2

1
Q
5
1
0
2

1
Q
6
1
0
2

2
Q
7
1
0
2

2
Q
8
1
0
2

2
Q
9
1
0
2

2
Q
0
2
0
2

2
Q
1
2
0
2

2
Q
2
2
0
2

Labour market slack
Number of countries with increasing slack
Change in the labour market slack (pps), rhs

(1)Labour  market  slack  sums  the  unemployed,  part-time 
workers  who  want  to  work  more  hours,  people  who  are 
available  to  work  but  are  not  looking  for  work,  and  people 
who  are  looking  but  are  not  immediately  available  as  a 
share  of  the  extended  labour  force.  The  latter  sums  the 
employed with the previous categories. 
Source: Eurostat 

The  labour  market  remained  resilient  to  the 
economic  slowdown  at  the  end  of  2021.  The 
recovery was particularly strong in the first half of 
the  year,  but  GDP  growth  decelerated  in  the 
second half (Table 1.1). Several factors contributed 
to  this  slowdown,  including  supply  bottlenecks, 
the increase in the cost of energy and commodities, 
the  broadening  of  inflation  across  sectors  and 
renewed  Covid-19  restrictions  in  some  sectors  or 
countries  (e.g.  China).  Yet,  the  labour  market 
continued to expand; employment reached its pre-
pandemic  level  at  the  end  of  the  year,  amidst  a 
tightening  labour  market  in  all  Member  States 
(Graph  1.2).  After  reaching  6.4%  in  December 
2021,  the  unemployment  rate  dropped  to  6.1%  in 
April 2022 and hovered around 6% up to October. 
For  comparison,  it  took  nearly  six  years  for  the 
labour market to rebound after the 2008 recession.  

10 

 
   
  
 
   
 
Graph 1.3: 

Employment and unemployment in the EU, 
2001Q1-2022Q2 (millions) 

230

220

210

200

190

180

30

20

10

1
Q
0
0
0
2

1
Q
2
0
0
2

1
Q
4
0
0
2

1
Q
6
0
0
2

1
Q
8
0
0
2

1
Q
0
1
0
2

1
Q
2
1
0
2

1
Q
4
1
0
2

1
Q
6
1
0
2

1
Q
8
1
0
2

2
Q
0
2
0
2

2
Q
1
2
0
2

3
Q
2
2
0
2

Employment (NA) EU 27
Employment: linear projection based on 2013Q1-2019Q4 growth
Unemployment 15-74 (rhs)
Unemployment: linear projection based on 2013Q1-2019Q4 growth

Source: Eurostat, National accounts and LFS, seas. adj. data 

In spite of the strong job creation, employment 
and  labour  supply  were  below  what  would  be 
expected  based  on  the  buoyant  pre-pandemic 
trend. In the  first  half of 2022, the labour  market 
was  quite  strong.  Yet,  in  the  second  quarter  of 
2022,  there  was  still  a  gap  of  3  million  jobs 
relative  to  the  trend  of  the  2013-2019  period 
(Graph  1.3);  similarly,  the  number  of  people 
unemployed  was  about  1.6  million  higher.  After 
the  recession,  many  individuals  re-entered  the 
labour  market;  the  activity  rate  increased  from 
70.7% in the second quarter of 2020 to 74% in the 
fourth of 2021. Yet, by the end of 2021, there were 
around  1.6  million  more  inactive  persons  than 
expected  based  on  pre-pandemic  trends. ( 5) The 
number of hours worked also picked up, but stayed 
below pre-pandemic levels. Employment remained 
below the pre-pandemic trends in more than half of 
the  Member  States  -  notably  in  Bulgaria,  Cyprus, 
Czechia,  Germany,  Estonia,  Spain,  Croatia, 
Hungary,  Italy,  Latvia,  Malta,  Romania,  Slovenia 
and Slovakia (Graph 1.A1.1). In the first quarter of 
2022,  the  labour  market  slack  increased  only 
slightly 
labour 
low 
underutilisation,  which  indicates  a  tight  labour 
market. 

from  very 

levels  of 

1.2.2.  Trends  of  post-pandemic  employment 

recovery across sectors  

Employment growth varied within services. The 
resurgence  of 
the  pandemic  and  on-and-off 
lockdowns to tackle the Omicron variant were felt 
strongly by contact-intensive sectors (Graph 1.5a). 

(5)  This  may  be  due  to  a  number  of  factors  including 
remaining restrictions and poor working conditions in some 
jobs.  

General labour market conditions in the EU and its Member States 

Chapter 1 

retail, 

wholesale 

At the end of 2021, employment in such services – 
i.e., 
transport, 
and 
accommodation,  arts,  and  households’  activities  – 
was  1.4%  below  the  level  of  the  last  quarter  of 
2019. Conversely, in low contact intensive services 
it  expanded  rapidly  and  was  2.6%  above  the  pre-
crisis level.  

In  parallel  with  the  increase  in  employment, 
labour shortages reached new highs. Throughout 
the  pandemic,  labour  demand  increased  at  a  rapid 
pace  also  in  industries  that  rely  on  face-to-face 
interactions  but  were  less  restrained  by  Covid-19 
containment measures, such as construction, health 
and education. These increases in employment met 
rising  constraints  of  labour  supply.  At  the  end  of 
2021, in the EU27 an estimated 23% of companies 
reported  hiring  difficulties  in  industry,  27%  in 
services  and  31%  in  construction.  In  spite  of  this 
differentiated  pattern,  labour  shortages  both  in 
industries  and  services  increased  throughout  the 
recovery.  In  services,  the  share  of  employers 
reporting labour as a factor limiting their business 
activities increased from 7% in the second quarter 
of  2020  to  29%  in  the  second  quarter  of  2022 
(Graphs 1.5f). (6) 

in 

have 

labour 

to  rising 

the  availability  of 
inputs 

shortages, 
In  addition 
some 
bottlenecks 
intermediate 
weakened 
employment  growth  in  manufacturing.  After  a 
drop  in  the  second  quarter  of  2020,  labour 
shortages in industry increased sharply. In the last 
quarter of 2021, about 27% of employers reported 
lack  of  workers  as  a  factor  limiting  production. 
The  indicator  continued  to  increase  reaching  28% 
in  the  first  quarter  of  2022;  about  one  year  and  a 
half  earlier,  it  was  less  than  10%.  This  is  a  large 
change,  but  not  comparable  with  the  fivefold 
increase of shortages of material and equipment in 
industry  (Graph  1.5  e).  Thus,  while  demand  for 
products  was  expanding  rapidly,  producers  were 
intermediate  goods  and 
struggling 
services 
and 
transports). (7) Although  employment  had  well 
recovered to pre-crisis level at the end of 2021, it 
was  more  than  2.5%  below  in  manufacturing 

to  source 
as 
(such 

semiconductors 

(6)  See  Chapter  3  “Short-  and  long-  term  determinants  of 

labour shortages”. 

(7)  This  scarcity  of  supply  of  goods  and  services  by  crucial 
upstream  suppliers  has  subtracted  5  pps  from  EU 
manufacturing output growth between January and October 
2021 (Axioglou et al. 2022). 

11 

  
                                                           
                                                           
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

(Graph  A1.3 

(Graph  1.5). (8)  This  gap  was  larger  in  about  ten 
countries 
including 
Germany and other countries with strong ties with 
its  manufacturing  sector  (e.g.,  Czechia,  Slovakia 
and Poland).  

in  annex), 

Graph 1.4:  Contribution of temporary, permanent and 

self-employed to the growth of total 
employment 

4

3

2

1

0

-1

-2

-3

2
Q
6
0
0
2

2
Q
7
0
0
2

2
Q
8
0
0
2

2
Q
9
0
0
2

2
Q
0
1
0
2

2
Q
1
1
0
2

2
Q
2
1
0
2

2
Q
3
1
0
2

2
Q
4
1
0
2

2
Q
5
1
0
2

2
Q
6
1
0
2

2
Q
7
1
0
2

2
Q
8
1
0
2

2
Q
9
1
0
2

2
Q
0
2
0
2

2
Q
1
2
0
2

2
Q
2
2
0
2

Temporary

Permanent

Self-employed

Total employment

Source: Eurostat 

in 

temporary 

total  employment  growth 

In  2021,  employment 
jobs 
expanded  more  than  in  previous  recoveries, 
despite  weak  growth  in  industries  still  affected 
by containment measures. In previous recoveries, 
permanent  employment  accounted  for  the  largest 
share  of 
(Graph 
1.4).   Between  the  first  quarter  of  2014  and  the 
fourth  quarter  of  2017,  temporary  employment 
accounted  on  average  for  30%  of  total  yearly 
employment  growth,  while  it  represented  about 
60%  of  total  employment  growth  between  the 
second  quarter  of  2020  and  the  fourth  quarter  of 
2021. (9)  Indeed,  during  the  recession,  the  decline 
in  total  hours  worked  by  temporary  workers 
occurred  mainly  through  job  losses,  while  for 
permanent workers it resulted from a drop in hours 
temporary 
per  worker.  The 
employment  during  the  recovery  also  reflects  the 
impact  of  pent-up  demand  for  services  and  non-
durable goods caused by the restrictions introduced 
the  pandemic.  The  contribution  of 
during 
temporary  employment 
total  employment 
growth  dropped  to  25%  as  the  effect  of  pent-up 
demand  gradually  waned  out.  Yet,  not  all  lost 
temporary  jobs  were  recovered.  Compared  to  the 
last quarter of 2019, there was a shortfall of about 

increase 

to 

in 

(8)  In  addition  to  supply  chain  disruptions,  the  Covid-19 
in 

recessions  may  have 
manufacturing, possibly of low-skilled occupations. 

job  destruction 

triggered 

(9)  A notable exception to this pattern is that of Spain where a 
massive shift of employment from temporary to permanent 
jobs was observed after the labour market reform of 2021.  

12 

largely  due 

job  creation 
and 

to  weak 
accommodation 

1.2 million of temporary jobs in the last quarter of 
2021, 
in 
food, 
manufacturing, 
trade. (10) 
construction,  wholesale  and  retail 
Conversely,  the  demand  for  temporary  jobs  was 
quite strong in services such  as health, education 
and  public  administration  but  also  in  the  ICT 
sector that is at the core of the twin transition. 

Russia’s  invasion  of  Ukraine  exacerbated  the 
weaknesses  that  existed  before  the  military 
aggression,  notably  supply  bottlenecks  and  the 
high  share  of  temporary  jobs.  Pandemic-related 
shortages  and  the  recovery  have  highlighted  the 
importance of supply bottlenecks for the economy 
and the labour  market. This is particularly evident 
for highly productive activities that are at the core 
of  the  twin  transition,  such  as  renewable  energy 
production  and  ICT–  the  latter  being  also  the 
sector  with  the  most  dynamic  job  creation  post 
Covid-19.  The  good  employment  dynamics  in 
accommodation,  food  and  wholesale  and  retail 
trade contributed to a rise in employment to a level 
well  above  the  pre-pandemic  one.  Without  job 
creation  in  these  sectors,  EU  employment  would 
have been stuck below the peak reached in the last 
quarter  of  2019.  Nonetheless, 
that 
temporary  employment  is  high  in  these  sectors  is 
not  without  risks,  including  because  it  makes 
employment  highly  volatile  over  the  cycle.  The 
fact that  many employed in these sectors are low-
skilled  and  young  is  an  additional  element  of 
concern. (11)  

the  fact 

(10)  These  industries  account  for  respectively  53.5%,  27.7%, 
temporary 
the 

19.9%  and  18.3%  of 
employment in 2021Q4 relative to 2019Q4.  

total  gap  of 

(11)  While  temporary  contracts  can  facilitate  the  entry  in  the 
labour market of low skilled and young workers, there is a 
risk  that  they  do  not  move  to  more  stable  and  permanent 
jobs. 

  
                                                           
 
                                                           
106

104

102

100

98

96

94

12.0

7.0

2.0

-3.0

-8.0

-13.0

-18.0

General labour market conditions in the EU and its Member States 

Chapter 1 

Graph 1.5: 

Employment, hours by sector and age groups and labour shortages 

a) Employment: 2019Q4=100  (1)

b) Hours per person employed: 2019q4= 100 (1)

105

100

95

90

85

80

75

High-contact, Affected

High-contact, Less affected

Low-contact, Services

Low-contact, Other

High-contact, Affected

High-contact, Less affected

Low-contact, Services

Low-contact, Other

Total

Total

c) Contribution to total temporary employment growth (1)

d) Employment growth by age and sector 2019Q4-2022Q1

50-64
25-49
15-64
15-24

Information, finance and real estate

Public administration, education

Health

Professional,  activities

TOTAL

Industry and Construction

Wholesale and retail trade

Transportation

Arts

Administrative activities

Accommodation and food

Agriculture

-15.0

-10.0

-5.0

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

2009Q1

2011Q1

2013Q1

2015Q1

2017Q1

2020Q1

High-contact affected sectors

High-contact less affected sectors

Low-contact services

Low-contact other

Total growth of temporary employees

e) Factors limiting production ( shortages): Industry 

f) Factor limiting production (shortages): Services 

55

45

35

25

15

5

55

45

35

25

15

5

-5

2004Q1
-5

2008Q1

2012Q1

2016Q1

2020Q1

Labour

Material and equipment

Labour

Material and equipment

(1) High-contact affected sectors: wholesale and retail; transports, accommodation, arts, households’ activities. High-contact 
less  affected  sectors:  construction,  public  administration,  health,  education.  Low-contact  services:  information  and 
communication,  financial,  professional  activities,  real  estate.  Low-contact  other:  manufacturing,  mining,  water  and 
agriculture. For graph d, figures should be read with caution as in 2021 there is a break in Eurostat series following the entry in 
force from 1 January 2021 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1700. Except for a) and b) all data are from EU LFS. 
Source: Eurostat and ECFIN - Business and Consumer Survey 

13 

  
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

1.3. 

LABOUR MARKET CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
WAR IN UKRAINE 

The Russian war against Ukraine has weakened 
the  EU  economic  outlook. In  the  first  half  of 
2022,  real  GDP  and  employment  growth  were 
quite  robust  as  consumers  resumed  spending 
following  the  easing  of  Covid-19  containment 
measures. In the third quarter of 2022, the effect of 
reopening  faded  away  and  the  impact  of  higher 
energy  prices  started  to  be  felt,  with  historically 
high  inflation  impacting  negatively  on  consumer 
confidence.  Although,  on 
a  yearly  basis 
employment  growth  declined,  on  a  quarter-on-
quarter basis it remained quite resilient despite the 
weakening  of  economic  activity  (Table  1.1  and 
Graph  1.1).  The  European  Commission  Autumn 
forecast 
for  2023 
revised  economic  growth 
downwards  from  1.4%  to  0.3%,  while  that  for 
2022  was  slightly  revised  upwards  from  2.7%  to 
3.3%,  in  the  light  of  the  stronger  than  expected 
growth in the second half of the year. Inflation has 
been revised upwards and is predicted to reach an 
all-time high rate of 9.3% in 2022, before receding 
to  7%  in  2023  and  3%  in  2024.  In  2022, 
employment is expected to expand by 1.8% − well 
above the average growth of the 2013-2019 period. 
In 2023, employment growth is expected to almost 
come to a standstill (0.1%) before increasing again 
to 0.5% in 2024.  

The  war  hinders  job  creation  through  four 
main macroeconomic channels.  

A  direct  trade  channel.  Lower  exports  to  Russia 
reduce 
negative 
labour  of 
repercussions  on 
exporting firms.  

potential 
the  demand  for 

output  with 

countries.  Output 

An indirect trade channel. The expansion of global 
value  chains  has  tightened  the  links  between 
intermediate trade and the flows of value added of 
the  different 
final 
consumption  is  made  of  imports  and  reimported 
exports coming from bilateral or multilateral trade 
relationships.  Russia  and  Ukraine  are  integrated 
into  global  value  chains.  Disruptions  in  upstream 
industries  can  cascade  beyond  bilateral  trading 
relations and have a direct effect on the European 
their 
economies  and 

relying  on 

industries 

for 

14 

imports. (12)  By  constraining  productive  capacity, 
they affect the demand for labour. 

An  inflation  channel.  At  the  outbreak  of  the  war, 
gas imports from Russia accounted for about 40% 
of  EU  gas  imports.  This  heavy  dependence  gave 
Russia  a  high  leverage  in  influencing  the  price  of 
energy, notably of electricity. The EU has taken a 
number  of  measures  to  reduce  its  dependence  on 
Russia’s gas supplies and to tackle the steep rise in 
energy prices. (13) These measures are reducing the 
demand  for  gas  and  its  price.  By  late  September 
2022, the share of  Russian  gas in EU gas imports 
was  down  to  9%,  while  the  natural  gas  price (14) 
was less than EUR 200 MWh, 45% below its peak 
in  August.  The  rise  in  the  cost  of  energy  has 
brought  consumer  inflation  to  levels  unseen  in 
decades,  heavily  weighing  on  companies  (in 
particular those in energy intensive sectors) and on 
their spending on energy, notably those in the low- 
and middle-income deciles. ( 15)  

about 

the  duration  of 

A  confidence  channel.  The  war  has  raised 
uncertainty 
supply 
disruptions in the medium term, which may induce 
firms  to  delay  hard-to-reverse  decisions  such  as 
hiring  and 
investment.  Consumers  may  also 
postpone the purchase of durable goods.  

The  overall  effect  of  these  channels  on  the  EU 
economy is difficult to assess and their importance 
might  differ  across  countries.   Yet,  they  all  play 
out  in  the  direction  of  reducing  the  demand  of 
labour.  

(12)  The effects can also travel back upstream to other suppliers 
whose  (intermediate)  goods  are  less  in  demand  because  
there is no demand for the final products. 

(13)  These  measures  aim  at  phasing  out  Russian  fossil  fuel 
imports,  increase  storage  levels  and  accelerate  the  green 
transition.  See  COM  (2022)  230  final  of  18  May  2022, 
Regulation  (EU)  2022/0090  of  the  European  Parliament 
and  of  the  Council  of  29  June  2022.  On  14  September 
2022,  the  Commission  proposed  emergency  measures  to 
alleviate  the  burden  of  high  energy  prices  on  households 
and firms, including a reduction in electricity consumption, 
a  temporary  revenue  cap  on  infra-marginal  electricity 
temporary  solidarity  contribution on 
producers  and  a 
excess  profits generated  from  activities  in  fossil  fuel 
activities. 

(14)  Natural gas EU Dutch Title Transfer Facility 
(15)  See Chapter 2. 

                                                           
1.3.1.  The labour market impact 

This  sub-section  discusses  how 
the  different 
macro-channels of the impact of Russia’s invasion 
of Ukraine may affect the demand for labour. (16)  

1.3.1.1.  The direct trade channel 

The  bilateral  trade  flows  between  Russia  and 
the  EU  are  relatively  small.  Before  the  war 
(2018,  last  available  figure),  exports  to  Russia 
accounted  for  less  than  4%  of  total  EU  exports, 
while imports represented less than 7% of total EU 
imports.  The  trade  flows  with  Russia,  mostly  in 
intermediate products, have also been falling after 
the sanctions introduced in 2014 in response to the 
Russian  illegal  annexation  of  Crimea  (Graph  1.6) 
By  looking at the exported value added generated 
by all domestic firms, the value added exported to 
Russia  only  accounts  for  4%  of  total  value  added 
exported by the EU.  

Graph 1.6: 

Trade flows of the EU with Russia (as % of total 
exports/imports):1995-2018 

Exports to Russia 

Imports to Russia 

10

8

6

4

2

0

1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 201520181995 1999 2003 2007 2011 20152018

Gross importsof final products

Gross imports of intermediate products

Gross exports of final products

Gross exports of intermediate products

(1)  Exports  and  imports  come  from  the  row  sum  of  the 
international  trade  flows  in  the  OECD  Inter-Country  Input-
Output tables. 
Source: TiVA, OECD 

Exposure  appears  to  be  limited  to  a  few 
countries  and  key  sectors.  Concerning  exports, 
apart  from  Cyprus,  differences  across  Member 
States  are  small.  Yet,  the  Russian  market  remains 
more  important  for  the  Baltic  countries  and 
Finland.  For  some  Member  States,  the  risk  of  an 
interruption  of  trade  with  Russia  involves  several 
industries  that  account  for  significant  shares  of 
their total employment, notably in Bulgaria (42%), 
Cyprus  (39%),  Finland  (28%)  and  the  Baltic 

(16)  Section  1.4  discusses  the  effect  of  the  large  inflow  of 
refugees on the supply of labour in hosting countries. 

General labour market conditions in the EU and its Member States 

Chapter 1 

countries (26%) (Graph 1.6-1.8 in the Annex). (17) 
Differences in the share of imports from Russia are 
more  prominent,  mainly  due  to  the  imports  of 
intermediate products. Also in this case, the Baltic 
countries  and  Finland  are  more  exposed  to  the 
risks  of  a  reduction  of  trade  flows  with  Russia, 
notably of intermediate products.  

Only a small share of employment is dependent 
on  Russian  final  demand,  with  differences 
across  countries.  According  to  OECD  data,  less 
than  1%  of  EU  employment  is  sustained  by 
Russian  final  demand  (Table  1.2).  Yet,  in  some 
countries  and  sectors,  the  share  of  employment 
embedded in Russian final demand is slightly more 
important. For example, in the case of Cyprus 5% 
of  total  employment  is  directly  linked  to  Russian 
final  demand. The  Baltics,  Bulgaria  and  Finland 
have a higher dependency in some sectors, notably 
air  transport,  computer  electronic  and  optical 
equipment,  and  chemical  products  (see  Graphs 
1.A1.6-1.A1.8  in  the  Annex).  However,  these 
direct  links  do  not  capture  the  effects  of  the 
disruption  of  important  segments  of  the  global 
value  chains  in  which  Russia  is  involved,  which 
are discussed in the next section. 

(17)  This  represents  the  share  of  employment  of  the  five  most 
exposed sectors measured in terms of the share of domestic 
employment  embedded  in  Russian  final  demand  with  the 
most  detailed  available  NACE  classification  of  sectors. 
This  relatively  high  share  of  employment  linked  to  a 
relatively low share of imports is due to the latter being of 
intermediate  products  used  in  the  final  production.  The 
more exposed industries vary across countries (see Graphs 
1.6-1.8 in the Annex). 

15 

   
                                                           
                                                           
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Graph 1.7: 

Trade flows of Member States with Russia: 2018 

20

15

10

5

0

Exports to Russia 

Imports from Russia 

Y
C

I

VF
L

T
L

E
E

G
B

I

KS
S

L
E

Z
C

L
P

R
H

T

I

O
R

E
D

E

I

R
F

U
H

T
A

S
E

E
S

K
D

L
N

T
M

E
B

T
P

U
L

G
B

T
L

Y
C

I

VF
L

E
E

L
E

K
S

L
P

U
H

Z
C

T
OI
R

E
S

L
N

E
D

I

KS
D

R
H

R
F

T
M

T
P

E
B

T
A

S
E

E

I

U
L

Gross exports of intermediate products Gross exports of final products

Gross imports of intermediate products Gross imports of final products

(1) Gross exports and imports come from the row sum of the international trade flows in the OECD Inter-Country Input-Output 
tables. They are consistent with National Accounts estimates of total exports and imports of goods and services, adjusted for 
re-exports, as well as estimates for GDP. 
Source: TiVA 

Table 1.2: 

Share of domestic employment embedded in 
Russian final demand 

1.3.1.2.  Indirect trade channel  

The  indirect  effects  are  determined  by  the 
connection  of  European  companies  with  global 
value chains of which Russian firms are a part. 
In  particular,  Russia  is  a  major  exporter  of 
intermediate inputs widely used at an early stage of 
production  of  several  European  firms  (Graphs  1.8 
and  1.9).  Bottlenecks  in  the  supply  of  primary 
goods may affect more than one industry and cause 
systemic  disruptions).  For  example,  Russia  is  a 
major  exporter  of  neon,  gas,  palladium  and 
krypton,  which  are  inputs  in  the  production  of 
semiconductors 
and 
electronics,  thereby  affecting  industries  such  as 
transport  equipment  and  electronic  appliances. 
Similarly,  Russia’s  exports  of  crop  fertilizers  are 
relevant for agriculture.  

automotive 

used 

in 

Total  

Manufacturing 

AT
BE
CZ
DK
EE
FI
FR
DE
EL
HU
IE
IT
LV
LT
LU
NL
PL
PT
SK
SI
ES
SE
BG
HR
CY
MT
RO

EU27

0.8
0.4
1.4
0.5
2.0
1.6
0.5
0.7
1.2
1.0
1.0
0.6
2.0
2.1
1.3
0.7
0.9
0.4
1.3
1.4
0.5
0.5
2.3
0.9
5.2
0.7
0.6

0.8

1.4
0.7
2.3
0.9
3.1
3.0
0.9
1.3
1.4
1.8
1.0
1.2
3.5
3.0
6.8
1.0
1.9
0.9
2.2
2.2
0.7
1.5
2.4
1.2
4.4
0.7
1.5

1.4

Electricity, gas, 
steam and air 
conditioning ,  
Water supply  
0.8
0.5
0.8
0.4
1.6
1.7
0.2
0.6
0.5
0.7
0.4
0.4
1.5
1.4
0.0
0.5
0.7
0.4
0.5
0.9
0.4
0.6
1.3
0.4
2.0
0.0
0.4

0.6

Construction

Business 
Sector 
Services

0.2
0.1
0.4
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.0
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.5
0.2
0.5
0.6
0.6
0.1
0.4
0.1
0.4
0.7
0.1
0.1
0.6
0.3
2.4
0.0
0.1

0.2

1.1
0.8
1.7
0.8
3.0
2.4
0.8
1.0
1.8
1.3
1.7
0.8
3.1
3.2
2.1
1.2
1.1
0.5
1.8
1.9
0.7
0.7
3.2
1.3
8.0
1.1
0.7

1.1

(1)    Estimates  of  employment  embodied  in  foreign  final 
demand  reveals  the  extent  to  which  a  country's  workforce 
depends  on  its  integration  with  another  country.  Indicators 
calculated  using  the  2021  edition  of  the  OECD's  Inter-
Country Input-Output. Data not available for Ukraine. 
Source: OECD, Trade in Employment and Trade in Value 
added 

16 

 
 
  
 
    
    
  
General labour market conditions in the EU and its Member States 

Chapter 1 

Graph 1.8:  Growth of foreign value added  (as % of gross 
exports)  embedded in exports of EU countries: 
1995-2018 

Graph 1.9: 

Trade interconnectedness  with Russia through 
global value chains 

25

20

15

10

5

0

-5

World

Russia

E
E

T
L

R
H

V
L

Y
C

E
S

E
B

T
M

S
E

I

O F
R

T

I

T
P

I

E S

I

R
F

K
D

E
D

L
N

T
A

L
P

K
S

L
E

Z
C

G
B

U
H

U
L

Source: OECD, Trade in Value added database 

less  direct.  Exports 

The employment linked to intermediate exports 
of  European  countries  to  Russia  is  small. The 
production 
fragmentation  along  global  value 
chains  makes  the  link  between  trade  flows  and 
influence 
employment 
employment not only in the exporting sectors, but 
also  in  the  rest  of  the  economy. (18)  The  share  of 
EU  employment  related  to  exports  to  Russia  is 
total 
small,  about  0.3%  of 
relatively 
employment  (Table  1.3).  Looking  at  individual 
Member States, France, Spain and Ireland or small 
and  open  economies  such  as  Cyprus  have  a 
relatively  high  dependence  on  exports  of 
intermediate  goods  and  services 
to  Russia. 
Usually, 
share  of  employment 
contained  in  exports  of  intermediate  products  to 
Russia is in market services. (19) 

largest 

the 

its 

(18)  The  employment  content  of  exports  and  imports  can  be 
computed  on  the  basis  of  input-output  tables  (see  Box 
1.A1.1 in the Annex for the methodology).   

(19)  In  all  countries  mentioned, 

the 

largest  share 

in 
administrative  and  support  services;  wholesale  and  retail 
trade;  repair  of  motor  vehicles.  A 
large  share  of 
employment  is  in  professional,  scientific  and  technical 
activities  (Cyprus  and  Lithuania);  IT  and  financial 
insurance  services  (Cyprus);  land  transport  and  transport 
via pipeline (Lithuania).  

is 

(1)  Flow  1:  exports  to  Russia  and  Ukraine  of  value  added 
produced  by  European  firms  as  %  of  total  exports;  Flow  2: 
import  of  Russian  valued  added  into  European  countries 
and foreign value added that flows via Russia in the EU as % 
of total foreign value added imported; Flow 3: imports in the 
EU  of  both  Russian  value  added  and  foreign  value  added 
that  flows  in  the  EU  via  Russia  and  is  used  by  European 
companies for export  
Source: De Nederlandsche Bank 

than 

larger 

is  slightly 

The employment linked to intermediate imports 
from  Russia 
the 
employment  impact  of  intermediate  exports  of 
European  countries  to  Russia.  Table  1.5  shows 
the  share  of  employment  that  is  dependent  on 
imports of intermediate products from Russia. (20) 
Compared  to  the  share  of  employment  linked  to 
exports,  imports  from  Russia  activate  a  relatively 
larger  share  of  employment  (0.6%  of  total  EU 
employment). 
In  cross-countries  comparison, 
imports  of  intermediate  products  from  Russia  are 
associated  with  higher  shares  of  employment  in 
Greece,  Cyprus,  Latvia,  Lithuania  and  Bulgaria. 
By sector, the share of employment is  the highest 
in  wholesale  and  retail  trade;  administrative  and 
support  services;  land  transport  and  transport  via 
pipelines  (Graph  1.10).  The  same  analysis  has 
been  conducted  focusing  only  on  intermediate 
imports  from  Russia  of  the  electricity,  gas,  steam 
and  air  conditioning  supply  sector  (there  are  no 
data  for  gas  only).  Differences  with  the  results  of 
Table  1.3  are  negligible,  suggesting  that  most  of 
imports of intermediate goods are from this sector.   

(20)  See Box 1.A1.1 for the methodology. 

17 

  
                                                           
 
                                                           
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Table 1.3: 

Employment embedded in exports of 
intermediate products to Russia as % of total 
employment (2018) 

Table 1.4: 

Direct employment activated by imports of 
intermediate products from Russia (2018): 
share in total employment 

AT

BE

BG

CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE

EL

ES

EU

FI

FR

HR

HU

IE

IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL

PL

PT

RO

SE

SI

SK

Industry

Market services

0.2%

0.1%

0.1%

0.4%

0.0%

0.2%

0.0%

0.0%

0.2%

0.4%

0.0%

0.0%

0.5%

0.0%

0.0%

0.2%

0.1%

0.4%

0.3%

0.3%

0.1%

0.1%

0.1%

0.1%

0.0%

0.0%

0.4%

0.2%

0.3%

0.2%

0.2%

4.1%

0.0%

0.2%

0.0%

0.0%

0.5%

1.1%

0.1%

0.1%

1.3%

0.0%

0.0%

1.2%

0.1%

1.3%

0.3%

0.9%

0.3%

0.5%

0.1%

0.1%

0.0%

0.0%

0.4%

0.2%

Total

0.5%

0.3%

0.3%

4.6%

0.0%

0.4%

0.0%

0.1%

0.8%

1.6%

0.3%

0.1%

1.9%

0.0%

0.0%

1.4%

0.3%

1.8%

0.6%

1.3%

0.4%

0.6%

0.2%

0.2%

0.1%

0.1%

0.9%

0.4%

AT
BE
BG
CY
CZ
DE
DK
EE
EL
ES
EU
F
FI
HR
HU
IE
IT
LT
LU
LV
MT
NL
PL
PT
RO
SE
SI
SK

Industry Market services

0.1%
0.2%
1.3%
0.8%
0.0%
0.2%
0.0%
0.1%
1.5%
0.3%
0.2%
0.5%
0.1%
0.2%
0.0%
0.2%
0.2%
1.6%
0.1%
1.0%
0.2%
0.2%
0.2%
0.1%
0.1%
0.0%
0.4%
0.5%

0.2%
0.3%
1.6%
3.7%
0.0%
0.3%
0.0%
0.1%
4.2%
0.7%
0.3%
1.2%
0.1%
0.0%
0.0%
0.2%
0.3%
1.7%
0.2%
1.2%
1.1%
0.4%
0.2%
0.1%
0.1%
0.1%
0.6%
0.5%

Total
0.4%
0.6%
3.5%
4.9%
0.1%
0.6%
0.1%
0.1%
7.8%
1.2%
0.6%
2.0%
0.2%
0.2%
0.0%
0.4%
0.6%
3.8%
0.3%
2.7%
1.7%
0.7%
0.5%
0.3%
0.2%
0.1%
1.2%
1.1%

Source: Own calculations on OECD Input Output Tables. See 
Box 1.A1.1 for methodology 

Source: Own calculations on OECD Input Output Tables. See 
Box 1.A1.1for methodology. 

18 

 
    
 
 
 
   
 
 
General labour market conditions in the EU and its Member States 

Chapter 1 

11.5% year-on-year (10.6% for the euro area out of 
which  4.4  pps  were  due  to  the  increase  in  energy 
prices  and  2.4  pps  due  to  the  increase  in  food 
prices).  These  developments  weigh  on  production 
costs  and  households’  budgets.  Moreover,  while 
the  price  of  oil  corrected  for  inflation  remains 
below  the  peaks  of  the  1970s,  energy  prices  have 
reached all-time highs.  

There  are 
important  differences  with  the 
experience  of  the  1970s. (21)  At  that  time,  large 
increases  in  the  cost  of  oil  and  food  prices  were 
feeding  into  higher  inflation  expectations  and 
rising  wages  led  to  persistent  inflation  and  lower 
output  and  employment.  Nowadays,  the  economy 
is  more  resilient  to  oil  shocks  than  it  was  during 
the  1970s.  Most  studies  conclude  that  the  impact 
of oil has declined strongly over time,  for various 
reasons. First, production has become more energy 
efficient. Second, the hard lessons learned from the 
oil  crisis  have  led  to  less  prevalent  automatic 
backward-looking  wage  indexation  mechanisms, 
in order to reduce the scope for wage-price spirals. 
Finally,  the  central  banks’  commitment  to  stable 
inflation  has  contributed  to  stabilising  inflation 
expectations  by  giving  to  wage  setters  a  clear 
framework  for  wage  negotiations.  These  elements 
reduce  the  risks  that  large  increases  in  the  cost  of 
raw  inputs  feed  inflation  expectations  and  wages, 
leading in turn to persistent inflation, lower output 
and employment. 

in 

intensive 

that  are 

The  share  of  employment  is  relatively  high  in 
sectors 
the 
less 
consumption  of  energy.  The  five  most  energy-
intensive  sectors account  for  one  quarter  of  total 
employment  in  the  EU  (Graph  1.12).  These  are: 
electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply; 
manufacturing;  transportation  and  storage;  mining 
and  quarrying;  agriculture,  forestry  and  fishing. 
Within  manufacturing,  the  seven  most  energy-
intensive  industries  represent  about  one  third  of 
employment in the sector (see Graph 1.A1.9 in the 
Annex) and about 5% of total employment, half of 
which  is  in  food  and  beverages. In  addition, 
disruptions  in  the  energy-intensive  sectors  may 
affect downstream industries that use their outputs 
as inputs of production. 

Graph 1.10:  Sectors with the highest share of employment 

embedded in imports of intermediate products 
from Russia (as % of total EU employment) 

Accommodation and food service…

Warehousing and support activities for…

Basic metals

Fabricated metal products

Electricity, gas, steam and air…

Agriculture, hunting, forestry

Construction

Land transport and transport via pipelines

Professional, scientific and technical…

Administrative and support services

Wholesale and retail trade; repair of…

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

Source: Own calculations based on OECD Input – output 
tables. See Box 1.A1.1for methodology. 

1.3.1.3.  The inflation channel  

The  major  risks  for  the  labour  market  come 
from  the  rise  in  energy  and  commodity  prices. 
The disruptions to international trade and Russia’s 
role  as  a  major  exporter  of  fossil  fuels  have  put 
renewed  pressure  on  the  energy  price  fuelling 
global  inflation. While  energy  prices  had  already 
been  on  the  rise  since  mid-2021  (as  supply 
struggled  to  keep  up  with  the  strong  global 
rebound from the Covid-19 pandemic), the war in 
Ukraine  pushed  natural  gas  prices  to  new  highs. 
By  the  end  of  2021,  the  price  of  natural  gas  had 
surged  to  EUR  70  per  MWh,  about  six  times  the 
average  price  of  the  previous  10  years;  in  August 
2022,  it  reached  the  record  level  of  EUR  340  per 
MWh (Graph 1.11).  

Graph 1.11:  Dutch TTF natural gas price and energy 

consumer price index (2017=100) 

300.0

250.0

200.0

150.0

100.0

50.0

0.0

TTF gas price

HICP energy, right scale

8
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130
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110
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(1)  The Title Transfer Facility (TTF) is a virtual trading point for 
natural gas  in  the Netherlands.  TTF  serves as a pricing proxy 
for the overall European LNG import market. 
Source: investing.com, Eurostat 

to 
Price  pressures  have  been  broadening 
various products, including  food and non-energy 
industrial  goods  and  services.  In  2022,  EU 
inflation  continued  to  rise  reaching  in  October 

(21)  See Chapter 2. 

19 

  
  
                                                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Graph 1.12:  Share of EU total employment by sector 

ranked according to the energy intensity, 2019 

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

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(1)    Number  on  the  bars  are  the  energy  intensity  measures 
as Terajoule [TJ] per value added. 
Source: Eurostat  

represents  between  8%  and  10%  of 
total 
employment  compared  to  about  18%  for  Bulgaria 
Estonia and Romania. 

to 

the  past,  making 

Dependency  on  gas  makes  the  EU  economies 
more  vulnerable  to  rationing  or  to  increases  in 
its prices. Gas and other commodities play a larger 
the  EU 
role  compared 
economy  more  vulnerable  to  interruptions  in  its 
distribution:  the  pipelines  connecting  Russia  with 
the  EU  and  the  need  to  upgrade  and  increase  the 
number  of  liquefied  natural  gas  terminals  make  it 
more  difficult  to  find  substitutes  for  gas  than  for 
oil.  In particular, while petroleum-based energy is 
the  most  consumed,  mainly  because  of  its  role  in 
the  transport  sector,  natural  gas  is  a  key  energy 
resource in the industrial sector and for households 
and non-transport services.  

Graph 1.13:  Share of employment in the most energy-

intensive sectors by country, 2019 

Graph 1.14: 

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

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B

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(1) Data show the share of employment in the sectors with a 
consumption of energy per value added above the median 
based on one digit industry classification.  
Source: Eurostat  

the  most  vulnerable.  For 

There  are  differences  across  countries  in  the 
share  of  employment  in  the  most  energy-
intensive  sectors.  In  about  half  of  the  Member 
States, more than half of employment is in energy-
intensive  sectors  (Graph  1.13).  With  more  than 
60%  of  total  employment  in  energy-intensive 
sectors,  Bulgaria,  Estonia,  Romania,  Croatia  and 
Portugal  are 
these 
countries,  a  high  share  of  employment  in  energy-
intensive 
in  manufacturing  and 
wholesale  and  retail  trade  and,  only  for  Bulgaria 
and  Romania,  in  agriculture.  Conversely,  most  of 
the employed in the Netherlands, Denmark, France 
and  Belgium  are  in  less  energy-intensive  sectors. 
This  difference  across  countries  reflects  not  only 
the  energy  efficiency  of  production,  but  also  the 
structure  of  the  economy;  for  example,  in  the  last 
group  of  countries,  employment  in  manufacturing 

sectors 

is 

20 

Impact of a 10% cut in the gas supply on 
employment due to decline in gross value 
added according to input-output simulations 

LV
IT
EL
LT
NL
BE
FR
SI
FI
CY
LU
EA
EE
DE
ES
MT
PT
SK
AT

0.0

-0.1

-0.2

-0.3

-0.4

-0.5

-0.6

-0.7

-0.8

-0.9

-1.0

(1) Impacts are  obtained from  the  elasticity of employment 
to gross value added estimated by country over the period 
2010Q1-2022Q1. Impact on valued added estimated by the 
ECB  comparing  the  output  derived  from  an  input-output 
structure  with  full  coefficients  and  the  output  derived  from 
an input-output structure where the output of the electricity, 
gas, steam and air conditioning supply sector for production 
purposes in the euro area is 10% less (ECB, 2022). 
Source: Own calculations based on ECB (2022) 

Simulations  suggest  that  a  gas  rationing  shock 
would  translate  into  employment  losses.  An 
ECB  (2022)  study  estimates  that  the  impact  of  a 
hypothetical  10%  gas  rationing  shock  would 
reduce output in the euro area by 0.7%. (22) It does 
not  provide  an  employment  impact;  however, 
calculations based on the historical relation linking 
employment  to  output  suggest  that  this  reduction 
could translate into a drop of employment by 0.4% 

(22)  For  Germany,  a  gas  rationing  might  cause  a  reduction  of 
GDP  by  3.3%  in  the  first  year  of  rationing  (Bundesbank, 
2022); this calculation does not take into account that some 
of these effects can be reduced through imports.  

       
 
       
  
                                                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Graph 1.14). (23) This simple simulation does not 
incorporate  the  impact  of  a  gas  rationing  on 
electricity prices and how this would affect relative 
prices. Restrictions to the deliveries of key energy 
products  will  further  increase  the  price  of  energy 
and  trigger  a  further  downward  adjustment  of 
employment  and  GDP.  Disruption  in  the  gas 
supply from Russia may hit particularly hard those 
countries  and  sectors  that  are  more  dependent  on 
the provision of gas from Russia.  

The increase in gas storage will help to mitigate 
the  negative  economic  impact  of  the  reduction 
in Russian gas supplies. In line  with the EU Gas 
Storage  Regulation, (24)  Member  States  had  on 
average filled their storage facilities up to 86% by 
September  2022. (25)  Member  States (26)  that  had 
reached  the  80%  target  set  by  the  regulation 
accounted  for  more  than  85%  of  EU  GDP  and 
employment.  

The  impact  of  the  high  energy  prices  varies 
across  sectors.  It  has  been  larger  in  those  sub-
sectors  with  more  energy  dependent  production 
processes (e.g.,  non-ferrous  metals,  ferro-alloys, 
fertilisers  and  glass  producers)  as  well  as  the 
transport  sector. (27)  At  the  same  time,  the  high 
energy  costs  have  knock-on  effects  on  most 
sectors, from chemicals and automotive industries 
to  agri-food  (via  fertilisers),  construction  (via 
concrete,  steel  and  wood)  and  other  productive 
industries, to retail (via energy-intensive storage). 

The  rest  of  this  section  will  evaluate  the 
response of employment to a change in the price 
of  energy. (28)  The  first  part  of  the  section 

(23)  This  simulation  is  based  assuming  a  drop  by  10%  of  the 
output  of  the  electricity,  gas,  steam  and  air  conditioning 
sector,  which  is the  largest  direct  consumer  of  gas  and  its 
activity  largely  consists  of  distributing  natural  gas  and 
transforming it into electricity. 

(24)  Regulation (EU) 2022/1032 of 29 June 2022.  
(25)  According 

the  Aggregate  Gas  Storage  Inventory 

to 

published by Gas Infrastructure Europe.  

(26)  Belgium,  Croatia,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  France, 
Germany,  Italy,  Netherlands,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania, 
Slovakia, Spain and Sweden. 

(27)  Fernandéz  Cerezo  and  Prades  (2022)  Manufacturing  in 
Spain:  recent  developments;  Bank  of  Spain,  “Quarterly 
report on the Spanish economy“ for 2022Q3. 

(28)  An 

increase 

in  the  price  of  energy,  or  any  other 
commodity,  cannot  be  interpreted  as  a  shock  (i.e.  an 
unexpected  deviation  of  its  price  from  the  average  value 
unrelated  to  changes  in  its  demand),  because  energy 
demand varies over the cycle affecting its price. Statistical 
tools  can  help  to  identify  shocks. An  energy  price  shock 

General labour market conditions in the EU and its Member States 

Chapter 1 

examines the evolution of employment over a one- 
year horizon in response to a shock in the price of 
natural  gas  and  compares  it  to  the  price  of  other 
commodities. In the second part of the section, the 
response of the labour demand to an increase in the 
price  of  electricity  and  gas  for  companies  will  be 
estimated  both  at  the  aggregate  and  sectoral 
level. (29)  This 
looking  at  both 
is  done  by 
employment and hours worked. 

1.3.1.4.  The dynamic response of employment 

to an energy shock 

on 

impact 

demand 

domestic 

Energy  price  shocks  exert  a  negative  effect  on 
employment  and  output.  This  occurs  through 
their 
and 
productivity (30).  The  effects  of  an  increase  in  the 
price  of  energy  and  other  commodities  has  been 
evaluated  with  econometric  techniques  –  see  Box 
1.1  for  the  methodology. Following  an  oil  price 
shock,  employment  reacts  with  a  delay  of  about 
two  quarters,  but  its  response  is  persistent.  On 
average,  a  10%  increase  in  oil  prices  leads  to  a 
reduction  of  output  by  0.5%  after  two  years  –  in 
line  with  the  literature  (Bjornland  2022)  –,  while 
employment  declines  by  0.3%.  The  increase  in 
nominal wages following the shock is smaller than 
the increase in inflation (i.e., real wages fall).  

A  shock  to  the  price  of  gas  triggers  a  slightly 
more  negative  response  of  key  macroeconomic 
variables  than  a  shock  to  the  oil  price.  Graph 
1.15  shows  the  estimated  response  after  one  year 
of  EU  employment,  output,  consumer  prices  and 
wages  to  a  hypothetical  shock  to  the  price  of 
natural  gas,  oil,  energy,  precious  metals  and  to  a 
measure  of  global  supply  chain  tensions.  (31)  All 
shocks  lead  to  a  recession  with  a  synchronised 
decline of output and employment and increase in 

does not affect employment directly but through its impact 
on inflation, wages and output. This is done by modelling 
the  contemporaneous  relationship  between  six  variables 
namely  energy  prices,  GDP  deflator,  consumer,  prices, 
output and employment.  

(29)  Since price data are available only from 2007 and on a bi-
annual  basis,  it  is  not  possible  to  study  the  dynamic 
response  of  employment to  a  shock to  the  price  of  energy 
for non-households final consumers. 

(30)  When  an  energy  shock  causes  an  increase  in  the  price  of 
raw  materials  that  complement  labour  and  capital  in 
production, also productivity falls. This causes a decline of 
profits and real wages that trigger a reduction of investment 
and of productivity (Bruno, 1982).  

(31)  The same analysis run on EU data has been conducted for 

each single Member State (Graph A1.6). 

21 

                                                           
                                                                                   
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

in 

inflation  and  nominal  wages. (32)  Compared  with 
other  shocks,  the  impact  of  a  natural  gas  price 
shock  on  output  and  employment  is  relatively 
the  gas  price,  which 
larger.  A  doubling 
corresponds  to  the  increase  observed  between 
March and August 2022, would lead after one year 
to  a  drop  of  output  and  employment  respectively 
by  almost  3%  and  1.5%  –  i.e.,  a  drop  of 
productivity  by  1.5%  –  and  to  a  decline  in  real 
wages by 2%. A gas price shock is more persistent 
than an oil price shock,  with  a faster reaction and 
steeper  decline  of  employment.  The  gas  price 
shock  has  a  stronger  impact  on  employment 
because  it  is  less  substitutable  in  production  than 
oil. This simulation does not take into account the 
effect  of  the  policy  response  adopted  to  mitigate 
the effect of the shock.   

Graph 1.15:  Response of key EU macro variables one year 
after an hypothetical shock doubling the price 
of selected commodities 

%

2

1

0

-1

-2

-3

Compensation
per employee

Value added

Consumer
prices

Employment

Real wages

Oil

Energy

Natural Gas

Precious Metal Global supply chain tensions

(1)  See Box 1.1. Energy includes crude oil, natural gas, coal 
and  propane.  Precious  materials  include  palladium.  Global 
supply  chain  pressures  are  measured  with  the  GSCPI  index 
created by the Federal Reserve bank of New York. 
Source: Own calculations 

intensity. (33)  Graph  1.16  shows 

The  employment  impact  of  a  gas  price  shock 
might differ across countries depending on their 
the 
energy 
relation  between  the  total  gas  intensity  and  the 
drop  in  employment  following  an  energy  price 
shock. ( 34)  Countries  with  higher  gas  intensity 

(32)  Since  the  size  of  the  shock  may  differ  for  the  different 
variables,  each  shock  is  rescaled  so  it  doubles  its  level 
relative to historical mean.  

(33)  Total energy intensity is the ratio of total gas to gross value 
added  that  is  embodied  in  the  global  value  chains  of 
products  purchased  by  residents  for  final  use  (i.e. 
consumption, 
including 
through  intermediate  inputs,  independently  of  where  they 
were produced.  

investment  and 

inventories), 

(34)  This takes into account the response of employment to the 
change  in  output  and  real  wages  caused  by  the  gas  price 
shock.  

22 

have  also  a  relatively  high  drop  in  employment. 
Graph 1.A1.10 in the Annex shows that a negative 
relationship  exists  also  for  an  oil  price  shock.  In 
the medium term, reducing the energy dependency 
would  make  the  labour  demand  more  resilient  to 
energy shocks. 

factors  may  explain 

these 
A  number  of 
differences in the employment response to a gas 
price  shock  across  countries.  First, 
labour 
markets  with  a  high  share  of  temporary  contracts 
are more volatile over the business cycle. Second, 
a  higher  employment  share  of  the  manufacturing 
sector,  which 
is  usually  also  more  energy-
intensive,  may  explain  why  employment  in  some 
countries may fall more than in others. Finally, the 
openness  of  the  economy  may  make  certain 
countries  relatively  more  exposed  to  the  drop  of 
GDP of their main trading/neighbouring partners. 

Graph 1.16:  Relation between the largest negative 

employment response unexplained by the 
change in GDP and real wages to a gas price 
shock and total gas intensity 

(1)  The  horizontal  axis  shows 
the  “largest”  negative 
employment  response  following  a  gas  shock,  controlling  for 
the  response  of  value  added  and  real  wages.  This  is 
obtained  as  follows:  1)  for  each  country,  the  response  of 
value added, real wages and employment to an oil shock is 
simulated;  2)  it  is  estimated  the  response  of  employment  to 
an oil shock accounted by the response of real wages and 
value  added  to  the  same  shock.  The  assumption  is  that  an 
oil  shock  affects  employment  through  the  determinants  of 
labour  demand.  The  chart 
response  of 
employment unexplained by the change in real wages and 
value added, i.e. the “excess response” to the shock. 
Source: Own simulations. 

shows 

the 

An  electricity  price  shock  may  have  broader 
and more severe economic repercussions than a 
gas price shock. While the impact of gas rationing 
would be asymmetric (affecting specific industries 
in  specific  Member  States),  possible  spikes  in 
electricity prices (and the risk of black-outs) could 
have wide-ranging economic repercussions. 

   
                                                           
 
General labour market conditions in the EU and its Member States 

Chapter 1 

The  rise  in  gas  prices  has  led  to  a  surge  in 
electricity prices for final consumers. In addition 
to the disruptions in gas supplies from Russia, the 
reduced  capacity  of  French  nuclear  power  plants 
(due  to  maintenance)  as  well  as  of  hydroelectric 
plants  (due  to  the  drought)  have  increased  the 
response  of  the  price  of  electricity  to  the  price  of 
gas.  In  the  second  quarter  of  2022,  electricity 
prices  increased  everywhere  in  the  EU.  The 
increase in the  gas price has  been the  main driver 
behind  changing  expectations  of  future  electricity 
prices. 

23 

European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Box 1.1: The macroeconomic impact of oil price shocks 

Oil shocks affect aggregate output and employment through various channels. From the supply side, an 
increase  in  the  oil  price  is  transferred  to  other  commodities,  which  then  rises  the  costs  of  inputs  that 
complement capital and labour. This reduces productivity, profits and real wages and triggers a reallocation 
of labour that could bring to higher unemployment. From the demand side, inflation reduces consumption and 
investments.   

This  Box  describes  the  method  used  to  examine  the  effect  of  oil  shock  on  prices,  value  added, 
employment and wages. The response of the value added, employment and wages to a supply shock cannot 
be assessed in isolation from the interactions between them.  Using econometric techniques it is possible to 
disentangle  the  change  in  the  price  of  energy  due  to  exogenous  shocks  and  simulate  its  impact  on  key 
macroeconomic variables. The procedure consists in running a sequence of predictive regressions, where each 
variable is considered endogenous (so-called vector autoregressive model), for different prediction horizons, 
the so-called local projection method (Jordà, 2005). The estimation is made over the period 1996Q1-2021Q4. 
We  track  the  effect  of  the  oil  price  on  five  macro-economic  variables  up  to  3  years  (i.e.  12  quarters).  The 
variables  considered  are  the  value  added  and  its  deflator,  the  harmonised  consumer  price  index  (HICP), 
compensation per  employee  and employment.  Since  the oil  price responds  also  to demand  shocks,  it  is not 
possible  to  interpret  all  of  its  changes  as  exogenous  supply  shocks.  Hence,  to  evaluate  the  effect  of  price 
shocks  it  is  necessary  to  isolate  the  component  of  price  changes  that  is  unrelated  to  fluctuations  over  the 
business  cycle.  A  simple  solution  is  to  identify  the  shock  as  the  price  of  oil  unexplained  by  the  variables 
above –i.e. an identification of the shocks à la Choleski (e.g. Blanchard and Gali 2007).  

An oil shock has persistent negative effects on output, the level of employment, and real wages.  Figure 
1 shows the response to an increase in the oil price by 13%, (i.e. the size of the oil shock identified by the 
model which is close to the 14% one standard deviation shock identified by Bjornland 2000). This is close to 
what found in the literature (Bjørnland 2020). Since all variables are in logs, the responses are interpreted as 
elasticities. The consumer price rises on impact by 0.2% reaching a maximum after one year before starting to 
decline to reach the pre-shock level at the end of the second year. On impact, wages increase only by 0.1%. 
During the first two  years, the rise in consumer prices exceeds that of nominal wages, leading to a drop of 
real wages. Real  wages start to recover only at the end of the second year,  when the path of the decline in 
consumer prices becomes more pronounced. The value added responds with a lag of two quarters, but then 
starts decreasing significantly and persistently reaching a maximum after about two years, which is consistent 
with  recent  findings  (e.g.  Bjørnland,  2022).  The  drop  of  GDP  is  accompanied  by  a  moderate  decline  of 
employment - by 0.5% after three years - i.e. a fall in labour productivity. Finally, the response of the value 
added deflator is quite muted while consumer prices increase; this leads to an increase of the profit margins 
(profits)  during  the  adjustment  to  the  shock.  Chart  1.12  in  the  main  text  shows  the  values  reached  after  4 
quarters  following  the  shock.  To  give  an  order  of  magnitude  to  the  recent  increase  in  the  oil  price,  a  30% 
increase  such  the  one  experienced  so  far  will  reduce  EU  GDP  after  2  years  by  1.4%  and  employment  by 
0.9%.  

The impact of an oil shock  

Oil prices

Consumer prices

Deflator of value added

0

1

2

3

4

5

7

6
quarters following the shock 

8

9

10

11

12

Compensation per employee

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

quarters following the shock

0.4%

0.3%

0.2%

0.1%

0.0%

-0.1%

-0.2%

0.1%

-0.1%

-0.3%

-0.5%

-0.7%

-0.9%

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Value added

9

8
quarters following the shock 

10

11

12

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

quarters following the shock 

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

quarters following the shock 

Employment

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

quarters following the shock

0.4%

0.3%

0.2%

0.1%

0.0%

-0.1%

-0.2%

0.1%

-0.1%

-0.3%

-0.5%

-0.7%

-0.9%

20.0%

15.0%

10.0%

5.0%

0.0%

-5.0%

0.4%

0.3%

0.2%

0.1%

0.0%

-0.1%

-0.2%

-0.3%

24 

 
 
    
 
 
 
 
1.3.1.5.   The  response  of  labour  demand  to  a 
change  in  the  price  of  electricity  and 
gas  

An  increase  in  energy  prices  for  companies 
reduces  the  labour  demand.  The  impact  of 
energy prices (gas and electricity) on employment 
has  been  investigated  estimating  a  demand  for 
labour, whereby employment or hours worked are 
explained  by 
the  price  of  energy  for  non-
households relative to the price of output, the cost 
of labour and GDP. (35) The objective is to explore 
the adjustment of the demand for labour – both at 
the intensive (hours worked per worker) and at the 
extensive  (number  of  workers)  margin  –  to  an 
increase  in  the  cost  of  electricity  and  gas  for 
companies. (36)  

An  increase  in  the  cost  of  gas  reduces  the 
demand of labour only at the intensive margin, 
while  both  employment  and  hours  worked 
change  when  the  cost  of  electricity  rises.  The 
results  in  Table  1.6  show  that  an  increase  in  the 
cost  of  gas  relative  to  the  price  of  the  output  by 
10%  reduces  employment  by  0.5%,  with  no 
change 
the  hours  worked  per  worker.  
Compared to gas, an increase in  the relative price 
of  electricity  has  a 
total 
employment  (0.2%). (37)  However,  the  decline  of 
hours worked is larger (0.9%); this is almost twice 
the effect of gas.  (38) These estimations imply that 
an  increase  in  the  relative  cost  of  gas  by  almost 

impact  on 

lower 

in 

(35)  This  ratio  moves  in  the  opposite  direction  of  real  unit 
revenues.  Estimates  are  made  to  allow  countries  to  have 
different employment levels to reflect their population size. 
The  elasticity  of  labour  demand  to  the  relative  price  of 
energy is conditional on output. Data on the cost of energy 
for  non-households  are  from  Eurostat.  They  refer  to  the 
price of energy (including taxes and levies) for final users. 
Since prices are for different bands of consumption in Giga 
Joule, an average of the price for different bands is used in 
the estimate of the labour demand.  

to 

the  energy  shock.  All 

(36)  The  response  of  employment  depends  also  on  how  wages 
the 
and  prices  responds 
interactions  between  the  variables  are  considered  in  the 
analysis behind Graph 1.12 and Box 1.2 where the focus is 
on the impact of a shock to the price of key commodities. 
(37)  The different impact of gas and electricity prices depend on 
the  pass-through  from  market  gas  prices  to  retail  gas  and 
electricity  bills  (e.g.  European Commission  (2022)  Winter 
Forecast).  It  also  depends  on the  structure  of  national  and 
regional energy markets. 

(38)  This  difference  might  be  determined  by  gas  being  a 
primary  source  for  the  production  of  electricity,  while  the 
latter  can  be  produced  from  various  sources.  The 
possibility  to  diversify  energy  sources  may  improve  the 
resilience  of  the  economy,  and  hence  mitigate  the  impact 
on job destruction during recessions. 

General labour market conditions in the EU and its Member States 

Chapter 1 

50% – i.e., the increase observed between the last 
quarter  of  2020  and  the  last  quarter  of  2021  – 
would reduce the demand for labour by 2.5%, with 
no  change  in  the  hours  worked  per  worker.  The 
same  increase  in  the  relative  cost  of  electricity 
would  reduce  employment  by  1%  and  hours 
worked by 3.7%. 

The  effect  differs  across  sectors,  as  electricity 
accounts  for  a  different  share  of  production 
costs. (39) In manufacturing and services, a rise in 
electricity prices is mainly absorbed by a reduction 
in hours worked per worker. Following an increase 
in the cost of electricity, the drop of employment is 
larger  in  construction  than  in  manufacturing  or 
services.  Relative  to  the  drop  of  employment, 
hours  worked  decline  more  in  manufacturing  or 
services 
the 
in  construction, 
widespread  use  of  short-time  work  schemes, 
especially in the former sector.  

reflecting 

than 

1.3.1.6.  The confidence channel  

The  war  in  Ukraine  has  drastically  increased 
households’  concerns  about  their  financial 
situation.  In  parallel  with  the  surge  of  inflation 
and  geopolitical  tensions  caused  by  the  conflict, 
households  have  become  more  concerned  about 
the  erosion  of  their  purchasing  power  and  their 
savings  due  to  high  inflation  and  consequently 
have  delayed  their  purchases  of  major  goods. 
Households’  intentions  to  make  major  purchases, 
on a downward trend since the peak of June 2021, 
plunged  in  March  2022  when  Russia’s  invaded 
Ukraine;  they  continued  to  decline  throughout  the 
year as the energy crisis erupted. (Graph 1.17). (40) 
The  deterioration 
their  expected  financial 
situation  occurred  in  a  context  of  worsening 
unemployment  expectations  over  the  next  twelve 
months. 

in 

(39)  According to 2018 input-output tables, spending on energy 
accounts  for  7.7%,  1.2%  and  1.9%  of  total  output  in, 
respectively, industry, construction and services. By sector, 
the  share  of  intermediate  consumption  of  energy  differs 
across countries See Graph 1.A1.8 in the Annex. 

(40)  In  the  EU  Business  and  Consumer  Survey  the  question 
addressed  to  consumers  is  “In  view  of  the  general 
economic  situation,  do  you  think  that  now  it  is  the  right 
moment  for  people  to  make  major  purchases  such  as 
furniture,  electrical/electronic  devices,  etc”.  Therefore 
major purchases is interpreted as durable goods. 

25 

                                                           
                                                           
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Table 1.5: 

Elasticity of labour demand with respect to the relative price of gas and electricity (reduction in the demand for 
labour in % for an increase of the relative price by 1%) 

Hours

Employment 

Hours

Employment 

Price of gas for non households relative to price deflator

Construction
-0.1***
(0.02)
-0.08***
(0.015)

Manufacturing 
-0.06***
(0.008)
-0.04
(0.006)

Business sector 
services 
-0.03***
(0.009)
-0.04***
(0.007)

Total economy 
-0.05***
(0.008)
-0.05***
(0.005)

Price of electricity for non households relative to price deflator

Construction
-0.1***
(0.02)
-0.12***
(0.02)

Manufacturing 
-0.09***
(0.01)
-0.04***
(0.009)

Business sector 
services 
-0.03***
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.007)

Total economy 
-0.09***
(0.01)
-0.02***
(0.005)

(1)    Estimates  based  on  a  panel  of  EU  member  States  over  the  period  2008q1-2021q4.  See  table  in  the  annex  with  whole 
estimates of the labour demand 
Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat 

Graph 1.17:  Consumers’ and employers’ confidence 

indicators, January 2007-October 2022 

70

50

30

10

-10

-30

-50

7
0
0
2

8
0
0
2

9
0
0
2

0
1
0
2

1
1
0
2

2
1
0
2

3
1
0
2

4
1
0
2

5
1
0
2

6
1
0
2

7
1
0
2

8
1
0
2

9
1
0
2

0
2
0
2

1
2
0
2

Employers' employment expectations , industry (reverse scale)

2
2
0
2
n
a
J

2
2
0
2

t
c
O

Consumers' unemployment expectations over the next 12 months

Financial situation over the next 12 months

Major purchases over the next 12 months

Source: European Business and Consumers Survey 

In  an  uncertain  environment,  employers’ 
incentives  to  hire  and  keep  workers  weaken. 
Survey  indicators  hint  at  a  weakening  of  firms’ 
hiring  intentions,  albeit  from  historically  high 
levels (Graph 1.18). In October, a deterioration in 
managers’ appraisal of employment expectations is 
observed  in  all  sectors,  notably  in  services  and 
industry.  Relative  to  the  peak  reached  in  2021,  in 
October 2022 hiring intentions in retail declined in 
all  Member  States  –  notably  in  Poland,  Denmark, 
Germany,  Finland,  Slovenia  and  Latvia.  A  large 
deterioration  of  employment  expectations 
in 
industry  is  observed  in  almost  all  countries, 

notably  in  Belgium,  Germany,  Denmark  Estonia, 
Lithuania,  Latvia,  Czechia,  Denmark  and  Greece. 
Labour demand in services is expected to be more 
resilient,  except  in  Hungary,  Greece,  Germany, 
Finland and Ireland.  

Graph 1.18:  Employment expectations over the next three 
months in the EU, January 2013-October 2022 

3

2

1

0

-1

-2

-3

-4

-5

-6

Industry
Services
Retail
Construction
Long-term average

3
1
0
2

4
1
0
2

5
1
0
2

6
1
0
2

7
1
0
2

8
1
0
2

9
1
0
2

0
2
0
2

1
2
0
2

2
2
-
n
a
J

2
2
-
t
c
O

(1)    Standardised  data  to  correct  for  differences  in  means 
and  standard  deviations.  The  zero  axis  represents  the  long-
term average 
Source: European Business survey 

1.4. 

THE IMPACT OF REFUGEES ON THE SUPPLY 
OF LABOUR  

The 
inflow  of  people  fleeing  Ukraine  can 
increase labour supply of receiving countries in 
the medium- to long-run. Between February and 
mid-November  2022,  around  12.5  million  people 
have  been  registered  crossing  the  border  between 
Ukraine  and  the  EU.  This  captures  significant 

26 

 
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
circular  cross-border  movements  by  people 
arriving  from  Ukraine 
into  neighbouring  EU 
Member  States:  almost  7.8  million  people  have 
been  registered  crossing  the  border  from  the  EU 
towards  Ukraine.  At  the  same  time,  many  people 
are  settling  in  the  EU.  In  particular,  around  3.8 
million  people  have  registered  for  temporary 
protection (41).  The  majority  of  those  fleeing  the 
war  in  Ukraine  are  women,  accompanied  by 
children,  elderly  people  and  other  vulnerable 
individuals.  According  to  a  survey  of  UNHCR 
conducted between May and September 2022 (42), 
in the near future, a large majority of them (63%) 
intend  to  stay  in  their  current  host  country,  with 
safety, 
ties,  asylum  procedure  and 
employment  as  the  main  reasons.  Only  13%  plan 
to  return  to  Ukraine  in  the  near  future,  yet  this 
would change should the war end.  

family 

The existence of Ukrainian communities had an 
influence on the distribution of refugees within 
the  EU.  Poland,  Germany  and  Czechia  have 
recorded  the  largest  number  of  registrations  for 
temporary  protection,  while  the  rest  of  displaced 
persons  are  settling  relatively  evenly  across  the 
other  Member  States,  albeit  not  proportionally  to 
either  population  or  GDP  (see  Graph  1.20).  This 
pattern  may  have  been  driven  by  the  pull  of  the 
existing  Ukrainian  community (43).  Geographical 
proximity seems to be a less relevant reason, with 
the  exception  of  Poland,  as  there  have  been 
relatively  fewer  registrations  in  some  of  the 
(Hungary,  Romania  and 
bordering  countries 
Slovakia).  

(41)  Information as of mid-November.  
(42)  UNHCR  Profiles,  Needs  and  Intentions  of  Refugees  from 
Ukraine.  See  also:  UNHCR  (2022):  Lives  on  Hold. 
Intentions and Perspectives of Refugees from Ukraine.  
(43)  In  2021,  countries  with  the  highest  stocks  of  migrant 
population with Ukrainian citizenship were  Italy, Czechia, 
Poland, Germany and Spain. Source: Eurostat and UN. 

General labour market conditions in the EU and its Member States 

Chapter 1 

Graph 1.19:  Distribution of temporary protection 

registrations in Europe, October 2022 

(1)  For  CZ  and  HU  data  is  not  publicly  available.  This  is 
because the data collection by Eurostat is carried out on a 
voluntary  basis,  so  the  completeness  of  data  may  vary.  For 
DK,  DE,  IE,  FR,  HR,  CY,  LU,  NL,  PT,  RO,  SI,  FI  and  SI  data 
reported refers to September.  
Source: Eurostat, [MIGR_ASYTPSM]. 

In  the  short  run,  the  contribution  of  displaced 
persons  from  Ukraine  to  employment  is  likely 
to  be  small.  After  a  few  months  of  leaving  the 
country,  many  refugees  will  be  unlikely  to  work 
due  to  trauma,  lack  of  suitable  accommodation, 
care  facilities  or  schools. (44)  Refugees  also  face 
other  integration  challenges,  such  medical  issues, 
language  barriers,  lack  of  overall  information  on 
options  or  legal  and  social  support.  They  are  also 
at risk of entering undeclared work. (45) They will 
need access to a broad range of supportive services 
to  facilitate  integration.  The  uncertainty  about  the 
duration  of  the  war  and  their  stay  in  hosting 
countries  could  also  weigh  upon  their  willingness 
to  integrate.  Unemployment  can  increase  due  to 
search  frictions,  while  the  costs  of  integrating 
people  fleeing  a  war  (typically  higher  than  the 
costs of integrating migrant workers (46) will have 
to be borne by  the hosting countries. At the same 
time, the labour market integration of refugees can 

(44)  Indeed,  in  Germany  a  major  bottleneck  hindering  the 
employment of refugees will be the availability of places in 
childcare. 

(45)  Signs  of  the  employment  of  refugees  in  the  shadow 
economy  have  already  been  reported  in  some  Member 
States (Germany). 

(46)  According  to  the  OECD,  the  cost  of  processing  and 
accommodating an asylum seeker is ca. EUR 10 000 in the 
first year, and declines 10% per year thereafter and can be 
lower in Eastern Member States (Astrov et al. 2022). 

27 

                                                           
  
                                                           
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

already  in  the  short  term  alleviate  some  labour 
shortages.  

Graph 1.20:  Employment rate of temporary protection 

beneficiaries 

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

L
N

T
L

Z
C

K
D

L
P

T
P

K
S

S
E

R
F

O
R

T
A

U
L

G
B

I

E S
B

(1)  The  value  reported  for  the  Netherlands  is  likely  to  be 
biased  upwards,  as  it  is  based  on  the  official  numbers  of 
registered  exemptions  from  the  work  permit,  declared  by 
employers to the Dutch Employee Insurance Agency (UWV). 
This implies a possible double-counting of displaced persons 
who  have  multiple  jobs  or  work  for  multiple  employment 
agencies.  
Source: Member States' reporting to the Commission, August 
2022. 

In  the  medium  term,  several  factors  suggest 
that  prospects  of  labour  market  integration  of 
displaced  persons  who  wish  to  stay  in  the  EU 
are  relatively  favourable.  First,  compared  to  the 
EU, the educational attainment of Ukrainian labour 
force  in  the  pre-war  period  has  been  relatively 
high,  although  with  differences  in  the  structure  of 
qualifications.  A  survey  of  UNHCR (47)  at  the 
borders of the EU finds that respondents (who are 
mostly  women)  hold  higher  levels  of  education 
(49%  with  university  or  higher  education  degrees 
and  27%  vocational  training)  and  have  diverse 
professional  experiences,  particularly  in  services 
and  trade  related  sectors,  in  education  and  in 
healthcare.  Second,  Ukrainian  people  in  the  EU 
had a high employment rate before the war. Third, 
since refugees can choose the countries where they 
would activate temporary protection, they move to 
those  where  existing  networks  of  Ukrainians  can 
integration. 
ease 
Furthermore,  the  refugees  are  integrating  into  a 
labour  market  that  is  still  relatively  tight,  with 
important labour shortages in certain sectors.  

their  economic  and  social 

(47)  UNHCR  Profiles,  Needs  and  Intentions  of  Refugees  from 

Ukraine. 

28 

Still some factors may temper the expectation of 
a  rather  smooth  labour  market  integration  of 
refugees. In Ukraine before the war, labour market 
outcomes  did  not  vary  significantly  across  groups 
by  educational  attainment,  signalling  potential 
shortcomings  of  the  quality  of  higher  education 
and a mismatch between the skills of graduates and 
the  needs  of  the  Ukrainian  economy.  In  the  EU, 
the  displaced  workers  might  face  additional 
barriers linked to the transferability of their skills, 
language  barriers 
the 
recognition of qualifications. Refugees with higher 
qualifications may struggle to find posts matching 
their  skills  and  end  up  in  jobs  for  which  they  are 
overqualified.  

and  differences 

in 

Moreover,  experience  suggests  that  immigrant 
women  are  less  likely  to  find  a  job  and  more 
likely to be at risk of poverty, both compared to 
women born  in the  EU and to immigrant  men. 
In  2020,  the  employment  gap  between  immigrant 
and native women was 14%, and on a rising trend 
since  2010.  Similarly, 
the  employment  gap 
between  male  and  female  immigrants  (18%  in 
2020,  unchanged  since  2010)  exceeds  the  gender 
employment gap of natives (which decreased from 
17% 
in  2020).  Moreover, 
employed  immigrant  women  are  more  likely  than 
immigrant  men  or  native  women  to  be  in  the 
bottom  decile  of  the  national  income  distribution. 
These  patterns  arise  as  immigrant  women  are 
likely 
low-skill 
occupations  (in  hospitality  and  care), (48)  and  are 
not  explained  by  the  level  of  education  of  these 
immigrant women (Frattini and Solmore, 2022).  

low-pay  and 

to  work 

in  2005 

to  11% 

in 

Current  estimates  point  to  a  labour  force 
participation of displaced persons from Ukraine 
around  23.5%,  with  large  differences  across 
countries. As of the beginning of September, 54% 
of the beneficiaries of temporary protection are of 
working  age  (46%  women  and  8%  men) (49). 
Based on the information provided by (a subset of) 
Member States over the  summer, the employment 
rate of beneficiaries of temporary protection (aged 
18-64)  ranged  between  more  than  75%  in  the 

(48)  In  Italy  where  a  significant  number  of  Ukrainian  women 
were  employed  before  2022,  the  share  of  immigrant 
women in the bottom decile of the income distribution has 
reached 25% in 2020. 

(49)  As  of  end October, 64% of the beneficiaries of temporary 
protection  are  adults  (e.g.  working  age  or  older)  and  35% 
minors, 63% are female and 33% male (of all age groups).  

  
                                                           
                                                           
Netherlands  and  more  than  60%  in  Lithuania,  to 
less  than  5%  in  countries  such  as  Bulgaria, 
Belgium  and  Slovenia.  Overall,  around  370  000 
people were registered as employed in 15 Member 
States  by  August  2022.  This  information  is  based 
on  administrative  social  security  records,  and 
hence  it  does  not  take  into  account  possible 
informal  activities.  In  view  of  past  episodes  of 
large  migration  flows,  in  the  medium  term  the 
labour force participation rate of displaced persons 
can  in  general  be  expected  to  fall  in  a  range 
between 25% and 55% – a level already reached in 
some  Member  States. (50)  As  discussed,  refugees 
from  Ukraine  are  expected 
to  have  better 
employment  outcomes 
than  previous  refugee 
waves.  Thus,  on  the  basis  of  the  current  stock  of 
refugees,  the  EU  labour  force  could  increase  at 
least by 0.3% to 0.6%. 

in 

line  with 

In the long run, the integration of beneficiaries 
of  temporary  protection  is  expected  to  have  a 
positive impact on GDP and employment in the 
EU.  Simulations  suggest  that  an  inflow  of  one 
million  refugees,  who  would  be  spread  across 
their  respective 
Member  States 
population shares, is expected to increase GDP by 
0.2% over a period of 20 years in a scenario of full 
integration  (that  is,  with  refugees  attaining  a 
similar  pattern  of  skills  as  the  native  population, 
and their employment corresponding to their level 
of qualification). (51) While the employment of the 
refugees  may  put  downward  pressure  on  real 
wages  in  the  medium  term,  average  real  wages 
should in principle return (close) to their pre-shock 
levels  after  some  time  with  both  a  higher  number 
of employees and capital stock. (52)  

The positive effect of the integration of refugees 
on GDP and employment depends on their skill 
level  and  on  whether  they  occupy  jobs  that 
match their skills. In a scenario where the level of 
that  of 
refugees 
qualifications  of 

is  below 

labour  market 

(50)  Botelho  (2022).  The  lower  bound  (25%)  is  based  on  the 
experience  of 
integration  of  previous 
refugees’  waves  in  Europe  within  two  years.  The  upper 
bound (55%) takes into account the participation rate of all 
working-age  women  with  migrant  background  in  the  EU 
before the war. 

(51)  See  Box  1.2  Chapter  1  of  “Employment  and  Social 

Developments in Europe” (2022).  

(52)  An  increase  in  the  supply  of  labour  reduces  the  capital-
labour  ratio,  productivity  and  real  wages.  As  firms 
reconstitute  their  desired  capital-labour  ratio,  employment 
and real wages increase. 

General labour market conditions in the EU and its Member States 

Chapter 1 

nationals, the average labour productivity is likely 
to  fall,  and  the  increased  labour  supply  of  lower 
educated  people  could  exert a  downward  pressure 
on the wages of low skilled people.  

language  and 

Refugees  could  alleviate  labour  shortages  to 
some  extent  in  sectors  and  occupations  where 
skills 
barriers  posed  by 
transferability are the lowest. One would expect 
these  barriers  to  be  lower  in  the  services  sector, 
where  there  are  currently  important  shortages, 
notably  in  hospitality  and  in  health  care. (53) 
Regression analysis suggests that labour shortages 
in services have slightly declined in Europe linked 
to the inflow of refugees, but shortages in industry 
and construction have not been affected (see Table 
1.6). The other current shortage occupations in the 
EU  (software  professionals,  construction,  and 
engineering  craft  workers)  employ  a  larger  share 
of  men,  with  medium  levels  of  qualifications 
in  construction  and 
(vocational  qualifications 
engineering) (54).  Yet  the  majority  of  refugees  are 
women,  and  their  qualifications  may  not  match 
those  needed 
these  shortage  occupations. 
Finally, the war in Ukraine also led to an increase 
in labour shortages in some countries and sectors, 
via  the  return  of  migrant  male  workers  from 
Ukraine to their country due to mobilisation (55).  

in 

Table 1.6: 

Temporary protection registrations and the 
change in labour shortages 

Dependent variable: change in labour shortages in services (1)

TP status as % of population
Unemployment rate  (2)
Constant
Observations
R-squared

-4.41**

-1.23**
13.82***
26
0.59

Dependent variable: change in labour shortages from Q1 to 
Q2 2022, April 2022 
Source: EU-BCS, Eurostat and Commission 

(53)  Language and skills barriers are lower in hospitality than in 

health care.  
(54)  McGrath (2021). 
(55)  For  instance,  10%  of  Ukrainian  men  working  in  Czechia 
before the war had departed by June 2022, according to the 
Czech Trade and Tourism Association. Also, in Poland, the 
departure of Ukrainian men is having the largest impact in 
the  construction,  manufacturing  and  transport  sectors.  As 
of  beginning  of  April,  around  90,000  workers  in  the 
construction  sector  had  requested  to  return  to  Ukraine, 
according  to  the  Polish  Association  of  Construction 
Industry Employers.  

29 

                                                           
 
  
 
                                                           
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

1.5. 

POLICY  MEASURES  TO  DEAL  WITH  THE 
LABOUR  MARKET  IMPLICATIONS  OF  THE 
WAR IN UKRAINE 

For  EU  countries,  the  war  in  Ukraine  and  its 
impact  on  energy  markets  is  a  major  common 
shock  with  asymmetric  effects  across  countries 
and  sectors.  Public  policies  can  contribute  to:  i) 
cushioning the economic impact of the war and of 
rising  energy  prices  for  companies  in  the  EU;  ii) 
mitigating the effect of rising inflation and energy 
prices  on  the  financial  situation  of  vulnerable 
households,  and  iii)  managing  the  large  inflow  of 
displaced persons from Ukraine to the EU. 

1.5.1.  Measures  to  cushioning  the  economic 

impact of the war in Ukraine 

The economic impact of the Ukraine crisis calls 
for  temporary  and  targeted  measures.  In  2020, 
coordinated  policy  action  at  EU  level  allowed 
withstanding  the  shock  of  the  Covid-19  pandemic 
and  paved  the  way  for  a  robust  recovery  in  2021. 
While  different  in  nature,  the  Russia’s  aggression 
against  Ukraine  represents  another  major  and 
external shock.  While the support provided to the 
economy  during  the  Covid-19  crisis  was  broad-
based,  the  current  crisis  calls  for  temporary  and 
targeted  measures.  Measures  can  help  companies 
to deal with supply chain disruptions and potential 
gas  shortages.  For  households,  measures  can 
ensure access to energy services in the short run, to 
support  households  most  vulnerable  to  energy 
poverty  amidst  high  energy  price  increases,  and 
they  can  support  a  reduction  in  the  demand  for 
energy in the longer term.  

In 2022 Member States have implemented swift 
but  largely  untargeted  actions  to  cushion  the 
economic and social impact of increasing energy 
prices. As reported in the 2023 Annual Sustainable 
Growth  Survey (56),  these  measures  are  currently 
expected to amount to 1.2% of GDP for the EU as 
a  whole  in  2022.  While  the  measures  have  been 
implemented  in  a  timely  manner,  more  than  70% 
of them, such as lower VAT rates or excise duties, 
or  changes  to  levies  and  subsidies  on  energy 
products,  were  not 
focused  on  vulnerable 
households  and  exposed  firms  and  two  thirds  of 
them  did  not  provide  incentives  to  reduce  energy 
demand.  It  is  increasingly  important  for  measures 

(56)  Annual Sustainable Growth Survey 2023.  

30 

to  focus  on  vulnerable  households  and  exposed 
businesses and to remain temporary. 

Member States’ support to companies can help 
to preserve jobs but needs to be targeted and in 
line with state aid rules (57) to protect the single 
market.  Member  States  have  provided  targeted 
financial  support  in  the  form  of  guarantees  or 
subsidies to companies and specific sectors, under 
economic strain due to supply chain disruptions or 
rising  energy  prices.  The  Italian  government  has 
provided EUR 130 million in non-repayable grants 
to  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  that  have 
suffered  losses  in  turnover  as  a  result  of  falling 
demand  due  to  the  war  in  Ukraine.  Similarly,  the 
French  government  has  adapted 
state-
the 
to  support 
(PGE) 
guaranteed 
companies  with  cash-flow  difficulties.  Some 
Member  States,  such  as  Italy  and  France,  have 
introduced  subsidies  or 
targeting 
energy-intensive  sectors,  and  companies  with 
energy expenses above a certain threshold. Finally, 
several  countries  –  including  Belgium,  Germany, 
Spain,  France  and  Italy  –  have  extended  (or  re-
introduced) emergency short-time work support, to 
protect employment and support business activities 
in sectors most affected by the conflict.  

loan  scheme 

tax  credits 

Member  States  are  implementing  temporary 
emergency measures in support of consumers to 
address  the  spike  in  energy  prices.  Between 
September  2021  and  September  2022,  Member 
States  have  earmarked  over  EUR  280  billion  for 
this  purpose.  Indeed,  the  current  crisis  aggravates 
the  persistent  problem  of  energy  poverty  in  the 
EU,  which  affects  not  only  low  income,  but  also 
middle  income  households,  and  which  is  a  multi-
dimensional  problem,  with  diverse  situations 
across  Member  States. ( 58)  The  emergency 
schemes  that  complement  structural  measures  to 
tackle  energy  poverty  can  be  grouped  into  four 
broad  categories:  i)  income  support,  ii)  price 
regulation,  iii)  tax  reductions  of  VAT  on  energy 
and  of  energy  taxes,  and  iv)  measures  to  ensure 
in  kind 
basic  uninterrupted  supply  or  other 

(57)  The State aid Temporary Crisis Framework (adopted on 23 
March 2022 and amended on 20 July and 28 October 2022) 
enables  Member  States  to  support  the  economy  in  the 
context of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, notably to provide 
compensation  to  companies  for  damages  directly  suffered 
due to the exceptional circumstances and to implement the 
measures outlined in the REPowerEU Communication.  
(58)  An  upcoming  report  of  the  Commission  on  access  to 
essential services will analyse these issues in further detail.   

                                                           
                                                           
benefits. (59)  Chapter  2  discusses  income  support 
policies.  

A  relatively  large  share  of  national  policies 
implemented in the crisis can be categorised as 
price policies. Price caps at retail price level have 
been  introduced  in  Austria,  Bulgaria,  Croatia, 
France,  Hungary,  Malta,  Romania,  Slovenia,  and 
Spain, at wholesale price level in France, Portugal 
and Spain and through a reduction in network and 
distribution costs in Estonia, Finland, Italy, Latvia, 
Luxembourg,  Poland,  Portugal,  Slovakia  and 
Spain.  With  a  similar  effect,  reductions  in  VAT 
and  in  energy-related  taxes  are  implemented  in 
Austria,  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Cyprus, 
Czechia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
the  Netherlands,  Poland,  Portugal, 
Ireland, 
Romania,  Slovakia,  Slovenia,  Spain  and  Sweden. 
Such measures typically have a universal coverage 
and aim  to reduce energy-related costs for all end 
users  in  the  economy.  These  measures  have  been 
implemented  in  a  timely  way,  and  cushioned  the 
general impact of the increase in energy prices for 
households and businesses. At the same time, they 
have  been  expensive,  as  most  of  them  have  not 
been sufficiently targeted to vulnerable households 
and  exposed  firms.  Furthermore,  it  is  increasingly 
important  for  these  measures  to  be  carefully 
designed  to  not  undermine  the  goal  of  reducing 
energy demand (for example, by using caps on the 
amount of consumption at the reduced price). (60) 

Member  States  have  also  taken  measures  to 
reduce  household  expenditure  on  energy, 
including by mobilising investments into energy 
efficiency and renewable energy. Member States 
have launched information campaigns to stimulate 
the 
voluntary  energy  savings 
REPowerEU Plan, while some Member States put 
in  place  energy  savings  requirements  for  specific 
activities to reduce demand. Through financing of 
the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility,  Member 
States  invest a total of EUR 71.6 billion in energy 
efficiency  (29%  of  expenditure  under  the  green 

line  with 

in 

(59)  Such measures are implemented by Romania and Portugal 
(measures 
to  secure  basic  uninterrupted  supply),  by 
Romania,  Denmark,  Greece  and  Croatia  (such  as  advice), 
and by Belgium, Denmark and Lithuania (solutions to defer 
the payment of energy bills and of other loans).  

(60)  Such  caps  need  to  be  designed  carefully,  to  take  into 
account  different  dimensions  of  energy  poverty,  including 
situations  when  people  have  higher  than  average  energy 
costs,  yet  not  having  the  means  to  implement  energy 
efficiency investments.   

General labour market conditions in the EU and its Member States 

Chapter 1 

transition  pillar) (61)  and  EUR  34  billion 
in 
renewable  energy  and  networks  (14%  under  the 
green  transition  pillar),  for  instance  through  the 
renovation  and  rehabilitation  of  private  and  social 
energy 
housing 
efficiency 
and 
programmes  decarbonising 
the  energy  sector 
(Croatia).  

(France) 

in  2020  during 

At  EU  level,  several  measures  were  taken  to 
give Member States room to fight the economic 
consequences  of  the  crisis  and  to  address  the 
impact of the war on energy supply and prices. 
The  general  escape  clause  of  the  Stability  and 
Growth  Pact,  activated 
the 
pandemic,  has  been  extended  through  2023,  to 
allow  governments  to  support  those  most  affected 
by  rising  energy  prices  and  preserve  public 
investment  needed  for  the  green  transition  while 
safeguarding  the  stability  of  public  finances,  in 
particular 
in  high-debt  Member  States,  and 
limiting the growth of current expenditure to avoid 
fuelling  up  inflation. (62)  In  addition,  the  funds 
under  cohesion  policy  and  the  Recovery  and 
Resilience  Facility  (RRF)  remain  a  key  tool  to 
strengthen Member States' resilience, including by 
financing  investments  accompanied  by  to  reduce 
the  dependency  on  fossil  fuels. (63) This  objective 
has been further strengthened with the adoption of 
the REPowerEU Plan, which has put forward a set 
of  actions  to  save  energy,  diversify  supplies,  and 
substitute  fossil  fuels  by  accelerating  Europe’s 
clean energy transition. ( 64) To address gas supply 
shortages  and  high  increases  in  energy  prices,  the 
Commission Communication ‘Save Gas for a Safe 
Winter’  of  20  July  2022  has  proposed  a 
coordinated  gas  demand  reduction  plan,  while  on 
30  September  2022, 
the  Council  adopted  a 
Regulation  on  emergency  market  intervention  to 
reduce  the  energy  bills  for  Europeans. (65)  On  18 
October,  the  Commission  proposed  an  energy 
package  to  address  high  gas  prices  in  the  EU  and 
ensure security of supply, and on 22 November, it 
proposed  a  Market  Correction  Mechanism  to 
protect  EU  businesses  and  households  from 
episodes  of  excessively  high  gas  prices  in  the 

(61)  For the 25 national plans adopted and with the information 

on the green dimension of measures so far. 

(62)  At  the  same  time,  as  reported  in  the  2023  Annual 
Sustainable Growth Survey, an overall neutral fiscal stance 
in  2023  for  the  EU  and  the  euro  area  as  a  whole  appears 
appropriate in the current economic context.  

(63)  Additional information about the RRF can be found here. 
(64)  Details about RepowerEU can be found here. 
(65)  COM/2022/360 final and COM/2022/473 final 

31 

                                                           
                                                           
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

EU (66).  These  measures  will  make  gas  prices 
more  predictable,  ensure  solidarity  between 
Member  States  in  case  of  supply  shortages  and 
step-up  energy  efficiency.  Furthermore,  it  also 
proposes a targeted flexible use of Cohesion Policy 
funding to tackle the impact  of the current energy 
crisis on citizens and businesses, using up to 10% 
of  the  total  national  allocation  for  2014-2020, 
worth close to €40 billion. (67) 

1.5.2.  Labour  market  integration  of  displaced 

persons from Ukraine 

The  activation  of  the  temporary  protection 
Directive  for  Ukrainians  eases  their  access  to 
the  EU  labour  markets. (68)  On  this  basis, 
Member  States  have  adopted  legislative  measures 
in  view  of  enacting  temporary  protection  at  the 
national  level  to  provide  immediate  support  to 
refugees.  These  measures  include  acts  to  simplify 
visa,  residence  and  work  permit  procedures,  to 
limit the administrative steps that refugees need to 
take 
labour  market. 
to 
Accordingly, in many countries, Ukrainian citizens 
that  have  registered  for  temporary  protection  can 
access  the  labour  market  without  having  to  apply 
for a work permit. (69)  

to  get  access 

the 

include 

Member  States  started  to  provide  specific 
support  measures to ease the process of labour 
integration  of  the  beneficiaries  of 
market 
temporary  protection.  These 
the 
provision of counselling, job-search assistance and 
language  courses,  the  validation  of  skills  and 
recognition  of  qualifications,  as  well  as  fast-track 
integration  programmes.  Dedicated  websites  and 
job-offers  portals  provide  access  to  the  national 
to 
labour  market  and 
beneficiaries of temporary protection. In a number 
of countries, beneficiaries of temporary protection 
have  access  to  the  ‘standard’  services  offered 

information 

targeted 

(66)  COM/2022/668 final  
(67)

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/e

n/ip_22_6225 

(68)  Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 of 4 March 
2022  establishing  the  existence  of  a  mass  influx  of 
displaced  persons  from  Ukraine  within  the  meaning  of 
Article 5 of Directive 2001/55/EC, and having the effect of 
introducing temporary protection. 

(69)  In  some  Member  States,  additional  procedural  steps  may 
apply, such as in Austria, where displaced persons have to 
register  also  with  the national  public  employment  service. 
For an overview over the implementation of the temporary 
proection Direction by Member States, see here. 

32 

include 

protection 

(Lithuania, 

either  to  all  job-seekers  (e.g.  Belgium,  Bulgaria, 
Cyprus,  Germany,  Estonia,  Spain,  Croatia,  Italy 
and Poland), to other refugees and beneficiaries of 
the 
international 
Netherlands),  or  to  non-native  speakers  (Finland). 
Such  services 
individual  counselling 
measures,  including  developing  individual  ‘career 
development  plans’. ( 70)  Persons  under  temporary 
protection  may  access  education  and  training, 
including language courses. Around half of people 
arriving to Germany have been attending language 
courses,  while  participation  has  been  lower  in 
other  Member  States. ( 71)  Furthermore,  displaced 
persons  from  Ukraine  also  receive  access  to 
childcare for their children.  

in 

While  a  large  number  of  temporary  protection 
beneficiaries  has  enrolled  in  language  courses, 
participation 
labour  market 
active 
programmes  has  been  more  limited  so  far.  As 
knowledge  of  the  host  country’s  language  is  key 
for  a  successful  integration  in  society,  migration 
authorities 
in  several  Member  States  offer 
dedicated  cost-free  courses  for  displaced  persons. 
Participation  in  labour-market  programmes  (such 
as counselling or vocational training), is lower, as 
this  generally  requires  being  registered  with  the 
public  employment  services.  The  number  of 
registrations,  very  low  at  the  beginning,  has  been 
gradually 
increasing.  In  November,  342  000 
displaced  people  from  Ukraine  were  registered 
with  the  public  employment  services  across  24 
countries. (72)  

financial 

Member  States  also  adopted  measures  for 
to  hire  persons  under 
employers  seeking 
the 
temporary  protection.  These 
included 
the 
establishment  of  dedicated  portals  and 
provision  of 
incentives.  Companies 
across  different  Member  States  have  announced 
job  openings  for  Ukrainian  refugees,  while  also 
providing  food  and  accommodation. In  some 
Member States, employers  have set  up projects to 
gather 
employment 
opportunities for displaced persons from Ukraine.   

information 

about 

Evidence  on  past  policies  to  support  the 
integration of refugees in Europe offers insights 

(70)  As in the case of Slovenia for example. See case SI-2022-

11/2274 of Eurofound Policywatch database. 

(71)  Member  States  reporting  to  the  Commission,  Summer 

2022. 

(72)  Information from Public Employment Services.  

                                                           
 
                                                           
General labour market conditions in the EU and its Member States 

Chapter 1 

adult  learning  for  people  fleeing  Russia’s  war 
against Ukraine. (75) It provides measures that can 
be  taken  by  Member  States,  based  on  lessons 
learnt and best practices that have been gathered so 
far, and highlights EU funded projects in this area 
as an inspiration. Several initiatives have also been 
implemented  to  improve  the  matching  of  skills. 
The  Commission  has  published  new  guidelines  to 
facilitate 
‘professional’ 
recognition  of 
the 
in  Ukraine. (76)  These 
qualifications  obtained 
qualifications  give  access  to  regulated  professions 
such  as  doctors,  nurses  and  architects.  The 
European  Training  Foundation  has  created  an 
information hub, through  which displaced persons 
from Ukraine can get information about accessing 
training,  education  and  the  labour  market  in  the 
EU. (77) Furthermore,  the  recent  EU  Talent  Pool 
pilot  online  tool  will  help  people  fleeing  Russia's 
invasion  of  Ukraine  to  successfully  integrate  into 
the EU labour market.  

1.6.  CONCLUSIONS 
IMPLICATIONS  

AND 

POLICY 

In 

from 

The  strong  economic  recovery 
the 
pandemic  crisis  hides  differentiated  patterns 
across  sectors. 
face  of  heightened 
the 
uncertainty,  the  swift  economic  rebound  from  the 
Covid-19  recession  and  strong  aggregate  labour 
market performance are key factors of resilience of 
the  EU  economy  in  2021  and  2022. This  strength 
masked  some  differences  across  sectors.  Job 
creation  in  activities  more  affected  by  risks  of 
infections  such  as  hospitality  was  lagging  behind. 
In manufacturing, employment was also below the 
pre-pandemic  peak  on  the  back  of  bottlenecks  in 
the  supply  of  primary  raw  materials.  Meanwhile, 
the  dynamism  of  employment  in  less  contact- 
intensive  services,  where  tasks  can  usually  be 
completed  via  IT  tools  as  well  as  in  health  and 
education brought total employment above its pre-
pandemic  level  and  revealed  important  labour 
shortages.  

invasion  of  Ukraine  has  caused 
Russia’s 
destruction  and  human  suffering  in  Ukraine 
and a refugee crisis. The response coordinated by 
the EU has been crucial to alleviate the burden of 

training, 

information 
support 

training  are  essential  for 

for the current situation. Policies that support the 
employment of refugees in jobs that correspond to 
their skill levels are key to maximise the individual 
and  societal  economic  gains  of  the  labour  market 
integration  of  refugees.  Active  labour  market 
to 
policies 
that  provide 
refugees  and  employers,  and 
the 
recognition of qualifications can lead to better job 
matches.  This  is  already  promoted  by  Member 
States actions, supported by EU initiatives. . More 
specifically,  the  experience  of  the  past  refugee 
waves  suggests  that  language  training  and  on-the-
labour  market 
job 
integration.  .  Availability  of  cheap  housing  could 
provide an incentive for displaced people to move 
away  from  agglomerations,  yet  lower  costs  of 
accommodation  are  also  linked  to  worse  local 
labour  market  conditions,  and  this  may  hence 
undermine  the  labour  market  integration  of  these 
people.  Finally,  welfare  benefits  should  not  be 
withdrawn  too  early,  i.e.  before  the  refugees 
possess  sufficiently 
for  a 
successful labour market integration (Dustmann et 
al.  2022).  Availability  of  affordable  and  quality 
childcare and of education can allow  women  with 
children to work.  

transferable  skills 

At  EU  level,  the  Commission  stressed  from  the 
outset  the  importance  of  the  labour  market 
integration  and  social  inclusion  of  displaced 
people  from  Ukraine.  The  CARE  initiative, 
provides  additional  flexibility  in  cohesion  policy 
funding  to  support  Member  States  hosting  people 
fleeing  from  the  war  in  Ukraine. (73)  The  FAST 
CARE initiative of 29 June 2022 further increases 
flexibility in the use of EU Cohesion Policy funds 
to  channel  resources  towards  actions  addressing 
migratory  challenges  resulting  from  Russia’s  
aggression  against  Ukraine.  It  also  provides 
additional 
2021-27 
the 
flexibility 
Multiannual Financial Framework. ( 74) 

under 

EU initiatives provide guidance and  support to 
Member States in view of facilitating the labour 
market  integration  of  displaced  persons  from 
Ukraine. On 14 June 2022, a Communication was 
adopted  on  guidance  for  access  to  the  labour 
market,  vocational  education  and  training  and 

(73)  For  instance,  it  extends  the  possibility  of  100%  EU  co-
financing  for  2014-2020  cohesion  policy  funding  will  be 
extended for  the  accounting  year  2021-2022.  For  further 
details, see here. 
(74)  COM(2022) 325. 

(75)  See here. 
(76)  See here. 
(77)  See here. 

33 

                                                           
                                                           
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

the 

and 

assistance 

recognition 

forced displacement and promote a fast integration 
in  the  EU  labour  markets.  Nonetheless,  language 
barriers,  the  need  for  accommodation  and  child-
of 
care 
qualifications  continue  to  be  obstacles  for  a  fast 
labour  market  integration.  Yet,  in  the  medium-
term, the relatively high educational attainment of 
the  refugees  and  the  presence  of  strong  networks 
may assist migrants from Ukraine who wish to stay 
in the EU to find a job and contribute to alleviating 
labour  shortages,  especially  in  occupations  where 
the above- mentioned barriers are less binding. 

Public employment services can play a key role 
in  supporting  the  labour  market  integration  of 
displaced  people  from  Ukraine.  They  can 
provide  information  on  jobs,  offer    the  necessary 
training and act as matchmakers between refugees 
and  employers.  Displaced  people  from  Ukraine 
could  be  encouraged  to  seek  help  from  PES.  The 
active labour market policy offer of the PES can be 
further  tailored  to  the  needs  and  profile  of 
Ukrainian  displaced 
jobseekers  and  can  be 
combined with flexible solutions for childcare. 

The  war  in  Ukraine  has  exacerbated  pre-
existing  supply  bottlenecks  and  inflationary 
pressures.  This  is  having  serious  repercussions, 
which  can  hinder  economic  growth  and  job 
creation.  The  strong  global  rebound  from  the 
Covid-19  crisis  was  already  causing  a  rapid 
in  commodity  and  energy  prices, 
increase 
supply  chain 
logistics  and 
aggravated  by 
bottlenecks, which resulted in a drastic increase of 
consumer  price  inflation.  Russia’s  invasion  of 
Ukraine is now exacerbating these developments.  

Although  trade  flows  between  the  EU  and 
Russia are small, for some countries and sectors 
their  decline  might  be  more  important.  The 
invasion  of  Ukraine,  the  sanctions  to  Russia  and 
the  withdrawal  of  private  companies  from  that 
market  have  de  facto  closed  Russia  to  European 
exporting firms. In light of the small share of final 
goods  exported  to  Russia  the  effect  on  the  EU 
labour  demand  is  likely  to  be  small.  Yet,  war-
related 
impact  some 
Member  States  more  than  others  (notably  the 
Baltics,  Bulgaria,  Finland,  Czechia,  Slovakia, 
Slovenia  and  Poland).  For  these  countries,  sectors 
such as air transport, pharmaceutical and chemical 
products, computer, and IT services might be more 

trade  disruptions  may 

34 

affected  because  of  the  relatively  more  important 
Russian final demand. 

in 

inputs 

the  availability  of 

inputs 
Bottlenecks 
imported from Russia may weaken the demand 
for  labour.  Russia  and  Ukraine  provide  key 
intermediate 
to  European  companies. 
Analysis based on input-output tables suggests that 
the  share  of  employment  related  to  imports  of 
intermediate  goods  and  services  from  Russia 
accounts for 0.6% of total employment. For some 
countries 
(e.g.,  Greece,  Cyprus,  Bulgaria, 
Lithuania,  Latvia),  shortages  in  the  provision  of 
intermediate  inputs  can  be  more  constraining  for 
the labour demand.  

The  war  in  Ukraine  impacts  the  EU  economy 
mainly  through  high  energy  prices  and  more 
generally,  high  inflation.  The  sharp  rise  in  the 
price  of  energy  and  other  commodities  caused  a 
rise  in  consumer  price  inflation  that  had  not  been 
observed  since  the  late  1970s.  Rising  inflation 
reduces the demand for labour because consumers 
delay or reduce their purchases and, in a context of 
high uncertainty, firms delay hiring and investment 
decisions.  To  put  an  end  to  Russia’s  influence  on 
the cost of energy, the EU Gas Storage Regulation 
– proposed by the Commission in March 2022 and 
swiftly  adopted  by  the  Energy  Council  in  May 
2022  –  requires  the  EU  Member  States  to  fill 
storage facilities to 80% of capacity by November 
this  year  and  to  90%  in  the  years  after.  The 
REPowerEU initiative sets out a series of measures 
to  reduce  dependency  of  Russian  gas  and  oil  and 
accelerate  the  green  transition.  In  a  similar  spirit, 
the  Commission  put  forward  the  ‘Save  Gas  for  a 
Safe Winter’ initiative by asking Member States to 
reduce  their  gas  demand  by  15%  until  the  next 
winter.  These  measures  will 
reduce  EU 
dependency  on  Russia’s  natural  gas  and  ease  the 
pressure  on  its  price  and  on  inflation  more 
generally.  

Yet  the  rise  in  the  cost  of  energy  has  brought 
consumer  inflation  to  levels  unseen  in  decades, 
labour  market.  Many 
with  risks  for  the 
European firms in energy-intensive sectors cannot 
pass  on  the  full  increase  in  energy  prices  to 
consumer  prices,  due  to  the  deterioration  in  the 
terms  of  trade  and  overall  reduction  in  demand. 
This constrains them to slow down or to fully shut 
down  their  production.  This  is  likely  to  have  a 
negative  impact  on  employment.  The  simulations 

reported  in  this  chapter  show  that  employment  is 
likely  to  decline  in  response  to  the  energy  shock. 
The drop in employment is larger in the case of a 
natural gas shock than in the case of an oil shock. 
The  increase  in  consumer  inflation  that  follows 
from  this  shock  would  exceed  the  response  of 
nominal wages, i.e., real wages would fall.  

The  increase  in  the  cost  of  energy  may  take  a 
toll on labour demand. An increase in the relative 
price of electricity has a stronger impact on hours 
worked per worker than on employment, compared 
to  gas.  Estimates  based  on  the  historical  relation 
between  gas/electricity  prices  and  employment 
suggest  that  an  increase  in  the  cost  of  gas  for 
companies by almost 50% reduces the demand for 
labour  by  2.5%,  with  no  change  in  hours  worked 
per  worker.  The  same  percentage  increase  in  the 
cost  of  electricity  would  reduce  employment  by 
1%  and  hours  worked  per  worker  by  3.7%.  This 
difference reflects the importance of gas as a direct 
factor  of  production  and  as  an  input  in  the 
production  of  electricity. 
the 
importance  of  facilitating  the  adjustment  of  the 
hours  worked to mitigate the drop of employment 
in the presence of a shock to the price of gas. The 
labour  demand 
the  most  energy-intensive 
manufacturing  sectors is likely to be  hit  first. The 
effect  on  services  might  be  delayed,  but  may 
involve a large number of workers. 

It  highlights 

in 

The  policy  response  needs  to  be  targeted, 
temporary  and  tailored  to  specific  sectors  and 
workers. (78)  The  increase  in  the  price  of  energy, 
aggravated  by  the  war  in  Ukraine,  is  taking  a 
bigger toll on the most energy intensive industries, 
usually  capital  intensive  and  highly  productive. 
The risk is that viable firms in these sectors suffer 
liquidity constraints that force them to reduce their 
capacity  and  employment  permanently.  In  the 
short-term,  it  is  crucial  that  good  job  matches  are 
preserved, i.e. avoiding labour shedding because of 
the  lack  of  energy  sources  or  of  their  high  costs. 
Short-time  work  schemes  are  an  effective  tool  to 
reduce  the  volume  of  labour  input,  saving  jobs  in 
the  most  productive  firms.  They  need  to  be 
complemented  by  coherent  policy  packages  that 
support labour market transitions.  

(78)  Chapter  2  discusses  the  policy  options  to  alleviate  the 

burden of inflation on households’ incomes. 

General labour market conditions in the EU and its Member States 

Chapter 1 

Viable firms should be the main beneficiaries of 
these targeted measures. The conflict in Ukraine 
has increased geopolitical risks and the tendencies 
to  change  the  structure  of  supply  chains  in  the 
direction of reshoring,  which  can also put  upward 
pressure  on  consumer  prices.  The  effects  on  the 
structure  of  the  EU  economy  are  difficult  to 
predict,  but  they  may  entail  some  reallocation 
between sectors.  

In  the  spirit  of  the  European  Commission 
recommendation  on  an  effective  active  support 
to  employment (79),  coherent  policy  packages 
can  help  to  manage  job  transitions  related  to 
structural change, address skill shortages and thus 
promote  the  green  and  digital  transitions.  To 
complement  this  labour-market  specific  policy 
guidance  with  a  broader  policy  outlook,  the 
recommendation  on  ensuring  a  fair  transition 
towards  climate  neutrality (80)  also  emphasizes 
equal  access  to  quality  and  inclusive  education, 
training  and  lifelong  learning,  fair  tax-benefit  and 
social  protection  systems  and  access  to  affordable 
essential  services  and  housing.  Financial  support 
for the implementation of such policies is available 
from  the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  (for 
those  countries  having  included  them  in  their 
national  recovery  and  resilience  plans)  from  the 
European  Social  Fund  Plus,  as  well  as  the  Just 
Transition Fund. 

(79)  European Commission Recommendation (2021), C/ 1372.  
(80)  Council Recommendation of 16 June 2022, 2022/C 243/04. 

35 

                                                           
                                                           
APPENDIX 1 

Annex to the chapter 1 

Graph 1.A1.1: Employment and unemployment in the Member States, million persons, 2009Q1-2022Q2 

AT

BE

BG

4800
4700
4600
4500
4400
4300
4200
4100
4000

500
480
460
440
420
400
380
360
340

3200

3100

3000

2900

2800

2700

500

450

400

350

300

250

200

150

2
q
9
0
0
2

2
q
0
1
0
2

2
q
1
1
0
2

2
q
2
1
0
2

2
q
3
1
0
2

2
q
4
1
0
2

2
q
5
1
0
2

2
q
6
1
0
2

2
q
7
1
0
2

2
q
8
1
0
2

2
q
9
1
0
2

2
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
1
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

CY

80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

2
q
9
0
0
2

2
q
0
1
0
2

2
q
1
1
0
2

2
q
2
1
0
2

2
q
3
1
0
2

2
q
4
1
0
2

2
q
5
1
0
2

2
q
6
1
0
2

2
q
7
1
0
2

2
q
8
1
0
2

2
q
9
1
0
2

2
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
1
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

5200

5000

4800

4600

4400

4200

4000

5600
5500
5400
5300
5200
5100
5000
4900
4800
4700

2
q
9
0
0
2

2
q
0
1
0
2

2
q
1
1
0
2

2
q
2
1
0
2

2
q
3
1
0
2

2
q
4
1
0
2

2
q
5
1
0
2

2
q
6
1
0
2

2
q
7
1
0
2

2
q
8
1
0
2

2
q
9
1
0
2

2
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
1
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

CZ

2
q
9
0
0
2

2
q
0
1
0
2

2
q
1
1
0
2

2
q
2
1
0
2

2
q
3
1
0
2

2
q
4
1
0
2

2
q
5
1
0
2

2
q
6
1
0
2

2
q
7
1
0
2

2
q
8
1
0
2

2
q
9
1
0
2

2
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
1
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

DK

EE

750

700

650

600

550

500

240

220

200

180

160

140

120

2
q
9
0
0
2

2
q
0
1
0
2

2
q
1
1
0
2

2
q
2
1
0
2

2
q
3
1
0
2

2
q
4
1
0
2

2
q
5
1
0
2

2
q
6
1
0
2

2
q
7
1
0
2

2
q
8
1
0
2

2
q
9
1
0
2

2
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
1
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

2
q
9
0
0
2

2
q
0
1
0
2

2
q
1
1
0
2

2
q
2
1
0
2

2
q
3
1
0
2

2
q
4
1
0
2

2
q
5
1
0
2

2
q
6
1
0
2

2
q
7
1
0
2

2
q
8
1
0
2

2
q
9
1
0
2

2
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
1
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

500

450

400

350

300

250

200

150

450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

3900

3800

3700

3600

3500

3400

3300

47000
46000
45000
44000
43000
42000
41000
40000
39000
38000
37000

4900
4800
4700
4600
4500
4400
4300
4200
4100
4000
3900

22000

21000

20000

19000

18000

17000

16000

15000

1900
1800
1700
1600
1500
1400
1300

7000

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0

2850
2800
2750
2700
2650
2600
2550
2500
2450
2400
2350
2300

2
q
9
0
0
2

2
q
0
1
0
2

2
q
1
1
0
2

2
q
2
1
0
2

2
q
3
1
0
2

2
q
4
1
0
2

2
q
5
1
0
2

2
q
6
1
0
2

2
q
7
1
0
2

2
q
8
1
0
2

2
q
9
1
0
2

2
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
1
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

2
q
9
0
0
2

2
q
0
1
0
2

2
q
1
1
0
2

2
q
2
1
0
2

2
q
3
1
0
2

2
q
4
1
0
2

2
q
5
1
0
2

2
q
6
1
0
2

2
q
7
1
0
2

2
q
8
1
0
2

2
q
9
1
0
2

2
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
1
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

HR

HU

400

300

200

100

0

5000

4500

4000

3500

2
q
9
0
0
2

2
q
0
1
0
2

2
q
1
1
0
2

2
q
2
1
0
2

2
q
3
1
0
2

2
q
4
1
0
2

2
q
5
1
0
2

2
q
6
1
0
2

2
q
7
1
0
2

2
q
8
1
0
2

2
q
9
1
0
2

2
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
1
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

2
q
9
0
0
2

2
q
0
1
0
2

2
q
1
1
0
2

2
q
2
1
0
2

2
q
3
1
0
2

2
q
4
1
0
2

2
q
5
1
0
2

2
q
6
1
0
2

2
q
7
1
0
2

2
q
8
1
0
2

2
q
9
1
0
2

2
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
1
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

30000
29500
29000
28500
28000
27500
27000
26500
26000
25500
25000

600
500
400
300
200
100
0

2700
2500
2300
2100
1900
1700
1500

500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100

2
q
9
0
0
2

2
q
0
1
0
2

2
q
1
1
0
2

2
q
2
1
0
2

2
q
3
1
0
2

2
q
4
1
0
2

2
q
5
1
0
2

2
q
6
1
0
2

2
q
7
1
0
2

2
q
8
1
0
2

2
q
9
1
0
2

2
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
1
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

DE

2
q
9
0
0
2

2
q
0
1
0
2

2
q
1
1
0
2

2
q
2
1
0
2

2
q
3
1
0
2

2
q
4
1
0
2

2
q
5
1
0
2

2
q
6
1
0
2

2
q
7
1
0
2

2
q
8
1
0
2

2
q
9
1
0
2

2
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
1
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

EL

2
q
9
0
0
2

2
q
0
1
0
2

2
q
1
1
0
2

2
q
2
1
0
2

2
q
3
1
0
2

2
q
4
1
0
2

2
q
5
1
0
2

2
q
6
1
0
2

2
q
7
1
0
2

2
q
8
1
0
2

2
q
9
1
0
2

2
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
1
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0

1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0

2
q
9
0
0
2

2
q
0
1
0
2

2
q
1
1
0
2

2
q
2
1
0
2

2
q
3
1
0
2

2
q
4
1
0
2

2
q
5
1
0
2

2
q
6
1
0
2

2
q
7
1
0
2

2
q
8
1
0
2

2
q
9
1
0
2

2
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
1
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

IE

400

300

200

100

0

2
q
9
0
0
2

2
q
0
1
0
2

2
q
1
1
0
2

2
q
2
1
0
2

2
q
3
1
0
2

2
q
4
1
0
2

2
q
5
1
0
2

2
q
6
1
0
2

2
q
7
1
0
2

2
q
8
1
0
2

2
q
9
1
0
2

2
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
1
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

ES

FI

FR

Employment (lhs)

Employment (lhs)

Employment (lhs)

Employment: linear projection based on 2014-2019 growth rates

Employment: linear projection based on 2014-2019 growth rates

Employment: linear projection based on 2014-2019 growth rates

Unemployment

Unemployment

Unemployment

Unemployment: linear projection based on 2014-2019 growth rates

Unemployment: linear projection based on 2014-2019 growth rates

Unemployment: linear projection based on 2014-2019 growth rates

Source: Eurostat, National accounts and LFS, seasonal adjusted data   

36 

 
    
General labour market conditions in the EU and its Member States 

Chapter 1 

Graph 1.A1.2: Employment and unemployment in the EU, million persons, 2009Q1-2022Q2 

IT

LT

LU

26000

25500

25000

24500

24000

23500

23000

22500

2
q
9
0
0
2

2
q
0
1
0
2

2
q
1
1
0
2

2
q
2
1
0
2

2
q
3
1
0
2

2
q
4
1
0
2

2
q
5
1
0
2

2
q
6
1
0
2

2
q
7
1
0
2

2
q
8
1
0
2

2
q
9
1
0
2

2
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
1
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

3500
3300
3100
2900
2700
2500
2300
2100
1900
1700
1500

1500
1450
1400
1350
1300
1250
1200
1150
1100

2
q
9
0
0
2

2
q
0
1
0
2

2
q
1
1
0
2

2
q
2
1
0
2

2
q
3
1
0
2

2
q
4
1
0
2

2
q
5
1
0
2

2
q
6
1
0
2

2
q
7
1
0
2

2
q
8
1
0
2

2
q
9
1
0
2

2
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
1
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

300

600

250

500

200

400

150

300

100

200

50

0

100

0

30

25

20

15

10

5

2
q
9
0
0
2

2
q
0
1
0
2

2
q
1
1
0
2

2
q
2
1
0
2

2
q
3
1
0
2

2
q
4
1
0
2

2
q
5
1
0
2

2
q
6
1
0
2

2
q
7
1
0
2

2
q
8
1
0
2

2
q
9
1
0
2

2
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
1
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

LV

MT

NL

960
940
920
900
880
860
840
820
800
780

250

200

150

100

50

0

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

10500

10000

9500

9000

8500

8000

2
q
9
0
0
2

2
q
0
1
0
2

2
q
1
1
0
2

2
q
2
1
0
2

2
q
3
1
0
2

2
q
4
1
0
2

2
q
5
1
0
2

2
q
6
1
0
2

2
q
7
1
0
2

2
q
8
1
0
2

2
q
9
1
0
2

2
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
1
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

2
q
9
0
0
2

2
q
0
1
0
2

2
q
1
1
0
2

2
q
2
1
0
2

2
q
3
1
0
2

2
q
4
1
0
2

2
q
5
1
0
2

2
q
6
1
0
2

2
q
7
1
0
2

2
q
8
1
0
2

2
q
9
1
0
2

2
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
1
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

2
q
9
0
0
2

2
q
0
1
0
2

2
q
1
1
0
2

2
q
2
1
0
2

2
q
3
1
0
2

2
q
4
1
0
2

2
q
5
1
0
2

2
q
6
1
0
2

2
q
7
1
0
2

2
q
8
1
0
2

2
q
9
1
0
2

2
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
1
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

17500

17000

16500

16000

15500

15000

14500

5400
5200
5000
4800
4600
4400
4200
4000

PL

PT

RO

2000
1800
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0

5200

5000

4800

4600

4400

4200

4000

2
q
9
0
0
2

2
q
0
1
0
2

2
q
1
1
0
2

2
q
2
1
0
2

2
q
3
1
0
2

2
q
4
1
0
2

2
q
5
1
0
2

2
q
6
1
0
2

2
q
7
1
0
2

2
q
8
1
0
2

2
q
9
1
0
2

2
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
1
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

2
q
9
0
0
2

2
q
0
1
0
2

2
q
1
1
0
2

2
q
2
1
0
2

2
q
3
1
0
2

2
q
4
1
0
2

2
q
5
1
0
2

2
q
6
1
0
2

2
q
7
1
0
2

2
q
8
1
0
2

2
q
9
1
0
2

2
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
1
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

1000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0

9300
9100
8900
8700
8500
8300
8100
7900
7700
7500

2
q
9
0
0
2

2
q
0
1
0
2

2
q
1
1
0
2

2
q
2
1
0
2

2
q
3
1
0
2

2
q
4
1
0
2

2
q
5
1
0
2

2
q
6
1
0
2

2
q
7
1
0
2

2
q
8
1
0
2

2
q
9
1
0
2

2
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
1
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

SE

SI

SK

550

500

450

400

350

300

1150
1100
1050
1000
950
900
850
800

2
q
9
0
0
2

2
q
0
1
0
2

2
q
1
1
0
2

2
q
2
1
0
2

2
q
3
1
0
2

2
q
4
1
0
2

2
q
5
1
0
2

2
q
6
1
0
2

2
q
7
1
0
2

2
q
8
1
0
2

2
q
9
1
0
2

2
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
1
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

2
q
9
0
0
2

2
q
0
1
0
2

2
q
1
1
0
2

2
q
2
1
0
2

2
q
3
1
0
2

2
q
4
1
0
2

2
q
5
1
0
2

2
q
6
1
0
2

2
q
7
1
0
2

2
q
8
1
0
2

2
q
9
1
0
2

2
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
1
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

120
100
80
60
40
20
0

2600
2500
2400
2300
2200
2100
2000
1900

2
q
9
0
0
2

2
q
0
1
0
2

2
q
1
1
0
2

2
q
2
1
0
2

2
q
3
1
0
2

2
q
4
1
0
2

2
q
5
1
0
2

2
q
6
1
0
2

2
q
7
1
0
2

2
q
8
1
0
2

2
q
9
1
0
2

2
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
1
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

500

400

300

200

100

0

Employment (lhs)

Employment (lhs)

Employment (lhs)

Employment: linear projection based on 2014-2019 growth rates

Employment: linear projection based on 2014-2019 growth rates

Employment: linear projection based on 2014-2019 growth rates

Unemployment

Unemployment

Unemployment

Unemployment: linear projection based on 2014-2019 growth rates

Unemployment: linear projection based on 2014-2019 growth rates

Unemployment: linear projection based on 2014-2019 growth rates

Source:  Eurostat, National accounts and LFS, seasonal adjusted data  

37 

 
   
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Graph 1.A1.3: Eurostat labour market slack indicator (as % of the extended labour force), 2008Q1-2022Q2 

AT

CZ

EL

FR

IT

MT

RO

16

14

12

10

10

8

6

4

2

35

30

25

20

15

20

18

16

14

30

25

20

12

10

8

6

4

20

15

10

5

BE

DE

ES

HR

LT

NL

SE

16

14

12

10

14

12

10

8

6

35

30

25

20

30

25

20

15

10

25

20

15

10

25

20

15

10

18

16

14

12

BG

DK

EU27

HU

LU

PL

SI

25

20

15

10

16

14

12

10

8

20

18

16

14

12

20

15

10

5

16

14

12

10

20

15

10

5

20

15

10

5

CY

EE

FI

IE

LV

PT

SK

30

25

20

15

10

25

20

15

10

25

20

15

25

20

15

10

40

30

20

10

25

20

15

10

20

15

10

5

1
q
8
0
0
2

1
q
0
1
0
2

1
q
2
1
0
2

1
q
4
1
0
2

1
q
6
1
0
2

1
q
8
1
0
2

1
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

1
q
8
0
0
2

1
q
0
1
0
2

1
q
2
1
0
2

1
q
4
1
0
2

1
q
6
1
0
2

1
q
8
1
0
2

1
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

1
q
8
0
0
2

1
q
0
1
0
2

1
q
2
1
0
2

1
q
4
1
0
2

1
q
6
1
0
2

1
q
8
1
0
2

1
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

1
q
8
0
0
2

1
q
0
1
0
2

1
q
2
1
0
2

1
q
4
1
0
2

1
q
6
1
0
2

1
q
8
1
0
2

1
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

(1)    According  to  Eurostat’s  definition,  labour  market  slack  is  the  sum  of  unemployed  persons,  underemployed  part-time 
workers, persons seeking work but not immediately available and persons available to work but not seeking, expressed as a 
percentage of the ‘extended labour force’, which adds up the aforementioned sum and the employed persons 
Source: Eurostat 

38 

 
 
General labour market conditions in the EU and its Member States 

Chapter 1 

Graph 1.A1.4: Employment by sector group, index (2019Q4=100) 

AT

CZ

EL

HR

LT

NL

SE

105

100

95

90

105

100

95

110

105

100

95

90

110

105

100

95

90

130

120

110

100

90

110

105

100

95

110

105

100

95

BE

DE

ES

HU

LU

PL

SI

104

102

100

98

104

102

100

98

96

105

100

95

90

85

110

105

100

95

110

105

100

95

110

105

100

95

110

105

100

95

BG

DK

FI

IE

LV

PT

SK

110

105

100

95

90

110

105

100

95

110

105

100

95

90

120

110

100

90

80

100

95

90

85

80

110

105

100

95

90

105

100

95

CY

EE

FR

IT

MT

RO

105

100

95

90

110

105

100

95

90

110

105

100

95

105

100

95

115

110

105

100

95

105

100

95

90

2020q1

2021q1

2022q12022q3

2020q1

2021q1

2022q12022q3

2020q1

2021q1

2022q12022q3

2020q1

2021q1

2022q12022q3

High-contact, Affected

Low-contact, Services

High-contact, Less affected

Low-contact, Other

(1) High-contact affected sectors: wholesale and retail; transports, accommodation, arts, households’ activities. High-contact 
less  affected  sectors:  construction,  public  administration,  health,  education.  Low-contact  services:  information  and 
communication,  financial,  professional  activities,  real  estate.  Low-contact  other:  manufacturing,  mining,  water  and 
agriculture. 
Source: Eurostat 

39 

 
 
 
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Graph 1.A1.5: Temporary employment, shares on total employees, 2008Q1-2022Q2 

AT

CZ

EL

FR

IT

MT

RO

BE

DE

ES

HR

LT

NL

SE

11

10

9

8

15

14

13

12

11

30

28

26

24

22

25

20

15

10

3

2.5

2

1.5

1

30

25

20

15

17

16

15

BG

DK

EU27

HU

LU

PL

SI

6

5

4

3

14

12

10

8

16

15

14

13

12

10

8

6

10

8

6

30

25

20

15

20

15

2
q
8
0
0
2

2
q
2
1
0
2

2
q
6
1
0
2

2
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

14

2
q
8
0
0
2

2
q
2
1
0
2

2
q
6
1
0
2

2
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

10

2
q
8
0
0
2

2
q
2
1
0
2

2
q
6
1
0
2

2
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

20

18

16

14

12

5

4

3

2

16

14

11

10

9

8

8

6

4

2

24

22

20

18

16

10

8

6

4

9.5

9

8.5

8

10

9

8

7

6

13

12

11

10

17

16

15

14

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2.5

2

1.5

1

CY

EE

FI

IE

LV

PT

SK

2
q
8
0
0
2

2
q
2
1
0
2

2
q
6
1
0
2

2
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

(1) Moving average on seasonally adjusted data 
Source: Eurostat  

40 

 
General labour market conditions in the EU and its Member States 

Chapter 1 

Graph 1.A1.6: Share of domestic employment by industry embedded in Russian final demand in most exposed countries  (as 

% of total employment in each industry) 

Lithuania

Slovakia

Construction
Agriculture
Water supply; sewerage, waste management
Financial and insurance activities
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply
Wood and products of wood and cork
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles
Telecommunications
Real estate activities
Motor vehicles
Fabricated metal products
Other non-metallic mineral products
Food products, beverages and tobacco
Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear
Mining and quarrying
IT and other information services
Postal and courier activities
Administrative and support services
Electrical equipment
 Manufacturing nec; repair and installation of machinery
Rubber and plastics products
Land transport and transport via pipelines
Professional, scientific and technical activities
Other transport equipment
Publishing, audiovisual and broadcasting activities
Paper products and printing
Warehousing and support activities for transportation
 Accommodation and food service activities
Machinery and equipment, nec
Water transport
Air transport

Construction

Mining and quarrying

Other non-metallic mineral products

Transportation and storage

Basic metals

IT and other information services

Textiles,  leather and footwear

Computer, electronic and optical equipment

Rubber and plastics products

Fabricated metal products

Motor vehicles

Pharmaceuticals

0

5

10

15

20

25

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Slovenia

Construction

Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply

Postal and courier activities

Warehousing and support activities for transportation

Basic metals

Publishing, audiovisual and broadcasting activities

Other non-metallic mineral products

Electrical equipment

Chemical and chemical products

Pharmaceuticals

Bulgaria

Construction
Agriculture
Real estate activities
Water supply; sewerage, waste management
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply
Mining and quarrying, energy producing products
Wood and products of wood and cork
Mining and quarrying, non-energy producing products
Food products, beverages and tobacco
Telecommunications
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles
Financial and insurance activities
Professional, scientific and technical activities
IT and other information services
Administrative and support services
Manufacturing nec; repair and installation of machinery
Postal and courier activities
Paper products and printing
Publishing, audiovisual and broadcasting activities
Electrical equipment
Textiles, leather and footwear
Chemical and chemical products
Land transport and transport via pipelines
Machinery and equipment, nec
Warehousing and support activities for transportation
Water transport
Accommodation and food service activities
Pharmaceuticals
Air transport

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

(1)  The  chart  shows  the  share  in  total  employment  of  the  employment  embedded  in  Russian  final  demand  for  sectors  that 
have this share that is larger than the third quartile of the distribution of 41 sectors by country 
Source:  Trade in Employment database, OECD 

41 

 
 
  
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Graph 1.A1.7: Share of domestic employment by industry embedded in Russian final demand in most exposed countries  (as 

% of total employment in each industry) 

Finland

Czechia

Real estate activities
Water supply; sewerage, waste management
Mining and quarrying non-energy products
Telecommunications
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply
Agriculture
Postal and courier activities
Food products, beverages and tobacco
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor…

Professional, scientific and technical activities

Warehousing and support activities for…

IT and other information services
Administrative and support services
Basic metals
Publishing, audiovisual and broadcasting activities
Fabricated metal products

Manufacturing nec; repair and installation of…
Land transport and transport via pipelines
Paper products and printing
Electrical equipment
Computer, electronic and optical equipment
Coke and refined petroleum products
Rubber and plastics products
Machinery and equipment, nec
Water transport
Chemical and chemical products
Motor vehicles
Textiles, leather and footwear
Other transport equipment
Air transport

Water supply; sewerage, waste management

Agriculture

Mining and quarrying, energy products

Financial and insurance activities

Wood and products of wood and cork

Food products, beverages and tobacco

Mining and quarrying, non-energy producing products

Distributive trade, transport, accommodation and food…

Other non-metallic mineral products

Basic metals

Motor vehicles

Fabricated metal products

Rubber and plastics products

Computer, electronic and optical equipment

Other transport equipment

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

8.0

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

Estonia

Latvia

Real estate activities
Food products, beverages and tobacco
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply
Financial and insurance activities
Other non-metallic mineral products
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles
Paper products and printing
Textiles, leather and footwear
Postal and courier activities
Professional, scientific and technical activities
Fabricated metal products
Mining and quarrying, energy producing products
Land transport and transport via pipelines
Water supply; sewerage, waste management
Manufacturing nec; repair and installation of machinery
Accommodation and food service activities
Rubber and plastics products
Electrical equipment
Telecommunications
Warehousing and support activities for transportation
Administrative and support services
Chemical and chemical products
Publishing, audiovisual and broadcasting activities
Water transport
Machinery and equipment, nec
Air transport
Computer, electronic and optical equipment

Construction
Agriculture
Real estate activities
Water supply; sewerage, waste management
 Other non-metallic mineral products
Telecommunications
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply
Food products, beverages and tobacco
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles
Transport equipment
Postal and courier activities
Professional, scientific and technical activities
Warehousing and support activities for transportation
Chemical and chemical products
Manufacturing nec; repair and installation of machinery
Administrative and support services
Fabricated metal products
Land transport and transport via pipelines
IT and other information services
Financial and insurance activities
Computer, electronic and optical equipment
Information and communication
Accommodation and food service activities
Paper products and printing
Rubber and plastics products
Textiles, leather and footwear
Machinery and equipment, nec
Electrical equipment
Pharmaceuticals
Publishing, audiovisual and broadcasting activities
Air transport

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

(1)   The chart shows  the share  in total employment of  the employment embedded in  Russian final demand for sectors  that 
have this share that is larger than the third quartile of the distribution of 41 sectors by country.  
Source:  Trade in Employment database, OECD 

Graph 1.A1.8: Share of domestic employment by industry embedded in Russian final demand in most exposed countries  (as 

% of total employment in each industry 

Cyprus

Agriculture

Construction

Food products, beverages and tobacco

Real estate activities

Water supply; sewerage, waste management

   Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles

Chemicals and pharmaceutical products

Other non-metallic mineral products

Wood

Manufacturing nec; repair and installation of machinery

Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply

Warehousing and support activities for transportation

Telecommunications

Postal and courier activities

Paper products and printing

Accommodation and food service activities

Administrative and support services

Professional, scientific and technical activities

Financial and insurance activities

Publishing, audiovisual and broadcasting activities

Land transport and transport via pipelines

IT and other information services

Air transport

Poland

Mining and quarrying, energy producing products

Fishing and aquaculture

Wood

Coke and refined petroleum products

Mining and quarrying, non-energy producing products

 Motor vehicles

Basic metals

Water transport

Chemical and chemical products

Electrical equipment

Other transport equipment

Computer, electronic and optical equipment

Machinery and equipment, nec

Mining support service activities

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

(1)  The  chart  shows  the  share  in  total  employment  of  the  employment  embedded  in  Russian  final  demand  for  sectors  that 
have this share that is larger than the third quartile of the distribution of 41 sectors by country.  
Source:  Trade in Employment database, OECD 

42 

 
   
   
General labour market conditions in the EU and its Member States 

Chapter 1 

Graph 1.A1.9: Share of EU employment in manufacturing by industry ranked according the energy intensity, 2019 

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

55.22 41.82

19.65

11.37

32.76

1184.72

5.41

2.06

0.99

1.24

2.70

3.54

1.42

1.48

2.68

1.75

0.70

0.82

0.93

l

i

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a
c
m
e
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a
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m
c
s
a
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i

l

m
u
e
o
r
t
e
p

d
n
a

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k
o
C

s
t
c
u
d
o
r
p

r
e
p
a
p

d
n
a

r
e
p
a
P

l

a
r
e
n
m
c

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i
l
l

a
t
e
m
-
n
o
n

r
e
h
t
O

d
o
o
W

d
n
a

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g
a
r
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v
e
b
,
d
o
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F

o
c
c
a
b
o
t

c
i
t
s
a
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(1)  Number on the bars are the energy intensity measures as Terajoule per value added. 
Source: Eurostat 

Graph 1.A1.10: 

Relation between the largest employment response unexplained by the change in GDP and real wages 

to a oil price shock and total oil intensity 

0

0

R² = 0.3104

o

t

e
s
n
o
p
s
e
r

t

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-0.5

k
c
o
h
s

l
i

o

-1

-1.5

-2

4

DK

DE
IT

FR

AT
NL

PT

ES

IE

SE
BE

MT

LU

8

12

SI

CZ

HU

SK

LT

HR
FI

CY

RO

LV

EL

PL

EE

Total energy intensity 

BG

(1)  The horizontal axis shows the “largest“ negative employment response following an oil shock, controlling for the response 
of  value  added  and  real  wages.  This  is  obtained  as  follows:  1)  for  each  country,  the  response  of  value  added,  real  wages 
and employment to an oil shock is simulated; 2) it is estimated the response of employment to an oil shock accounted by the 
response of real wages and value added to the same shock. The assumption is that an oil shock affects employment through 
the determinants of labour demand. The chart shows the response of employment that is not explained by the change in real 
wages and value added, I.e. the “excess response” of employment to the shock. 
Source: Own simulations  

43 

 
 
     
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Graph 1.A1.11: 

Response to a 10% oil and gas price shock 

20

15

10

5

0

-5

-10

0.15

0.05

-0.05

Prices  (Oil/(Natural gas)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

Quarters

OIL

GAS

Compensation per employee

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

Quarters

-0.15

OIL

GAS

-0.25

Consumer prices 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

Quarters

OIL

GAS

Employment

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

Quarters

OIL

GAS

0.25

0.15

0.05

-0.05

-0.15

1

0

-1

-2

-3

(1)  The  chart  shows  the  median  response  of  the  different  variables  computed  over  the  response  of  all  27  Member  States. 
Each response is computed with the local projection method (see Box1.1) 
Source:  Own simulations 

Graph 1.A1.12: 

Largest response of value added, employment and real wages to a shock to the price of oil and the 

price of gas by 13% 

0

-0.4

-0.8

-1.2

0.2

-0.2

-0.6

-1

-1.4

-1.8

-2.2

-2.6

Oil price shock

Oil price shock

0

-0.4

-0.8

-1.2

-1.6

-2

-2.4

0

-0.4

-0.8

-1.2

-1.6

-2

-2.4

T
L

O
R

I

Z F
C

G
B

L
N

R
H

Y
C

T

I

T
P

T
A

E
S

K
D

S
E

V
L

I

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B

E
D

L
P

L
E

E
E

U
H

T
M

K
S

R
F

U
L

E

I

Real wages (HICP deflated)

Gas price shock 

S
E

E
E

T
L

Z
C

Y
C

I

T S
M

L
P

R
H

K
S

K
D

I

O F
R

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B

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A

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L

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B

E
D

L
P

L
E

E
E

U
H

T
M

K
S

R
F

U
L

E

I

Value added

Employment

Gas price shock

S
E

E
E

T
L

Z
C

Y
C

I

T S
M

L
P

R
H

K
S

K
D

I

O F
R

U
L

E
B

U
H

T
A

T

I

T
P

L
E

L
N

R
F

E
S

V
L

E
D

G
B

E

I

Value added

Employment

Real wages

(1) The chart shows the largest response obtained by means of a local projection method from country specific VAR (Vector 
autoregression)  models  with  variables  the  oil  price,  value  added  deflator,  harmonised  consumer  prices,  compensation  per 
employee, value added and employment 
Source:  Own simulations 

44 

 
 
 
  
  
Table 1.A1.1:  Labour demand by sector 

sample 2008Q1-2021Q4

Real labour costs

Value added at constant prices 

Price of gas for non households 
relative to price deflator
Country fixed effect 
Period fixed effects
Observations 
R-squared

Real labour costs

Value added at constant prices 

Price of electricity for non 
households relative to price deflator
Country fixed effect 
Period fixed effects
Observations 
R-squared

(1) Panel estimation on 26 EU countries 
Source: Own estimates 

Construction
-0.3***
(0.02)
0.5***
(0.02)
-0.08***
(0.015)
Yes 
Yes
1434
0.99

Construction
-0.3***
(0.02)
0.5***
(0.014)
-0.12***
(0.02)
Yes 
Yes
1568
0.99

General labour market conditions in the EU and its Member States 

Chapter 1 

Dependent varaible: Employment
Business sector 
services 
-0.3***
(0.02)
0.3***
(0.02)
-0.04***
(0.007)
Yes
Yes
1434
0.99

Manufacturing 
-0.03***
(0.014)
0.3***
(0.011)
-0.04
(0.006)
Yes
Yes
1434
0.99

Total economy 
-0.2***
(0.014)
0.3***
(0.014)
-0.05***
(0.005)
Yes
Yes
1434
0.99

Dependent variable: Employment
Business sector 
services 
-0.3***
(0.02)
0.3***
(0.02)
-0.01
(0.007)
Yes
Yes
1568
0.99

Manufacturing 
-0.02*
(0.01)
0.3***
(0.01)
-0.04***
(0.009)
Yes
Yes
1568
0.99

Total economy 
-0.4***
(0.01)
0.5***
(0.01)
-0.02***
(0.005)
Yes
Yes
1568
0.99

45 

 
 
   
 
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Graph 1.A1.13: 

Employment expectations over the next three months in the Member States, Jan. 2021 – Oct. 2022 

AT

CZ

EL

FR

IT

MT

RO

2

1

0

-1

1
0
-1
-2
-3

3
2
1
0
-1

2

1

0

-1

1
.5
0
-.5
-1

5

0

-5

2

1

0

-1

BE

DE

ES

HR

LT

NL

SE

3
2
1
0
-1

2

1

0

-1

2

1

0

-1

2

1

0

-1

2

1

0

-1

2

1

0

-1

3

2

1

0

-1

BG

DK

EU

HU

LU

PL

SI

1.5

1

.5

0

-.5

2
1
0
-1
-2

1.5

1

.5

0

-.5

2

1

0

-1

3

2

1

0

-1

.5

0

-.5

-1

2
1
0
-1
-2

CY

EE

FI

IE

LV

PT

SK

.5
0
-.5
-1
-1.5

2

1

0

-1

2
1
0
-1
-2

4

2

0

-2

1
.5
0
-.5
-1

1
.5
0
-.5
-1

1
0
-1
-2
-3

1
m
1
2
0
2

6
m
1
2
0
2

1
m
2
2
0
2

6
m
2
2
0
2

0
1
m
2
2
0
2

1
m
1
2
0
2

6
m
1
2
0
2

1
m
2
2
0
2

6
m
2
2
0
2

0
1
m
2
2
0
2

1
m
1
2
0
2

6
m
1
2
0
2

1
m
2
2
0
2

6
m
2
2
0
2

0
1
m
2
2
0
2

1
m
1
2
0
2

6
m
1
2
0
2

1
m
2
2
0
2

6
m
2
2
0
2

0
1
m
2
2
0
2

Building

Industry

Services

Retail

(1)    Standardised  data,  to  correct  for  differences  in  means  and  standard  deviations.  The  zero  axis  represents  the  long-term 
average. 
Source: European business and consumer survey 

46 

 
 
General labour market conditions in the EU and its Member States 

Chapter 1 

Graph 1.A1.14: 

Intermediate consumption of energy (as % of total output), 2018 

y
r
t
s
u
d
n

i

,
n
o
i
t
p
m
u
s
n
o
c

y
g
r
e
n
e

i

e
t
a
d
e
m
r
e
t
n

i

t
i
n
U

5

4

3

2

1

0

BG

LT

PT

MT

EL

PL

HR

HU

LV

SK

RO

FI

EE

CZ

ES

IT

DK

DE

SE

CY

NL

AT

BE

FR

LU

SI

IE

0

5

10

15

20

25

Unit intermediate energy consumption, services

(1) Energy branches are: D05T06, D19 and D35 
Source: Own computations on OECD Input-Output Tables (IOTs)2021 ed 

47 

 
  
 
 
 
 
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Box 1.A1.1: Estimating employment related to intermediate exports and imports to Russia

Input-output  tables  at  the  world  level  connect  all  transactions  between  and  within  all  industries  and  final 
users across all countries. This allows tracing the country of origin of intermediate goods exported or used 
by  domestic  firm  and  the  domestic  value  added  embodied  in  exports  or  imports  of  intermediate  products 
from  abroad.  It  is  then  possible  to  quantify  the  domestic  employment  embedded  in  trade  in  intermediate 
products with Russia (both exports and imports). In global trade, intermediate goods dominate compared to 
end  products  so  that  the  demand  for  intermediate  products  plays  a  growing  importance  for  the  labour 
markets  of  the  EU.  This  Box  summarizes  the  methodology  used  to  estimate  with  input-output  tables  the 
employment activated by intermediate exports/imports to Russia. 

In the Leontief approach, national employment levels – to be properly understood as the direct and indirect 
labour  demand  embodied  in  the  import  or  export  of  intermediate  goods  to  Russia–  is  determined  by  the 
equation 

−1

where L is a diagonal matrix of unit labour coefficients for all pairs country/sector; 
 is the Leontief 
inverse, which is based on the A matrix of intermediate input coefficients; and E is the aggregated vector of 
the intermediate exports/imports to Russia. It is important to note that this computation assumes that labour 
input coefficients of exports/imports coincide with those at the production level. 

(𝐼𝐼 − 𝐴𝐴)

−1

𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = 𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼 − 𝐴𝐴)

𝐸𝐸

Data are retrieved  from the 2018 OECD Harmonised national Input-Output Tables, which quantify for 45 
sectors  the  inter-industrial  flows  of  goods  and  services  produced  domestically  and  imported  in  current 
prices.  Sectoral  employment  levels,  needed  to  derive  the  employment/output  coefficients,  were  extracted 
from an auxiliary file - WIOD Socio Economic Accounts - of the 2016 WIOD release (Timmer et al. 2015)). 
WIOD  (world  input-output  tables)  is  the  outcome  of  a  research  project  financed  by  the  European 
Commission in the context of the 7th Framewok Programme. 

48 

 
 
   
 
 
 
2.  WAGES AND LABOUR COSTS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EU 

AND ITS MEMBER STATES 

Inflationary  pressures  were  fuelled  by  the  strong 
recovery  in  2021  and  further  boosted  by  the 
implications  of  Russia’s  war  against  Ukraine. 
Inflation  in  the  EU  reached  11.5%  in  October 
2022,  after  5.3%  in  2021.  The  high  inflation  has 
been eroding the purchasing power of households. 

Growth  in  nominal  compensation  per  employee 
reached  4.0%  in  2021,  well  above  the  pre-
pandemic  average  of  1.9%  from  2013  to  2019. 
This  reflected  the  rebound  in  hours  worked  in 
2021, after a collapse in 2020. Beyond the effect of 
hours worked, wage developments remained muted 
in  2021,  despite  the  tightening  of  labour  markets 
following the pandemic and an increased inflation. 
Such  limited  response  of  wages  can  be  linked  to 
the  pace of  wage  negotiations,  which  experienced 
delays  during  the  pandemic,  as  well  as  to  the 
remaining  uncertainty  in  some  sectors  due  to  the 
sanitary  situation.  In  the  first  quarter  of  2022 
nominal  wages  started 
to  accelerate  more 
markedly,  in  a  context  of  higher  inflation  and 
labour market tightening. 

Real  wages  rebounded  by  1.5%  in  2021,  after  a 
decline  by  0.8%  in  2020,  also  driven  by  the 
recovery  in  hours  worked.  However,  as  inflation 
picked  up,  real  wages  have  been  decreasing 
significantly in the first three quarters of 2022. By 
the third quarter of 2022, nominal wages, although 
accelerating,  fell  short  of  inflation  by  5.1%  on  a 
yearly basis. 

the 

ahead, 

prospects 

Looking 
for  wage 
developments  are  mixed.  On  the  one  hand,  a 
higher and more persistent inflation is expected to 
contribute  to  higher  wage  growth.  The  possible 
losses 
in  purchasing  power  associated  with 
inflation  can  be  expected  to  raise  demands  for 
higher  wage  increases  in  wage  negotiations.  On 
the other hand, wage growth may be restrained in 
most  Member  States  by  the  deterioration  of  the 
economic  situation  and  terms  of  trade,  ,  while 
inflation plays a lesser formal role in wage setting 
than 
for  wage 
the  past.  The  prospects 
developments also vary across sectors. Activity, in 
particular  in  manufacturing,  is  constrained  by 
supply 
rising 
bottlenecks.  Overall,  whereas  nominal  wage 
growth  is  expected  to  be  significantly  above  the 

costs  and  persistent 

input 

in 

pre-pandemic  average,  real  wages  are  set  to 
decline significantly in 2022. 

The fall in real wages entails social risks for many 
workers.  Low  wage  earners  are  more  likely  to  be 
affected  since  they  spend  a  higher  share  of  their 
income on energy and food, the two elements that 
are  primarily  driving  the  currently  high  inflation. 
In  real  terms,  minimum  wages  have  also  been 
severely  hit  by  inflation.  In  addition,  the  losses  in 
purchasing power may have a negative impact on 
aggregate demand. 

Whereas firms retain some ability to absorb wage 
increases  by  reducing  their  profit  margins,  they 
also 
in 
face  growing  headwinds,  notably 
manufacturing.  Against  this  background,  general 
wage  increases  to  offset  losses  in  purchasing 
firms’ 
power  due 
competitiveness. In this regard, in the first half of 
2022,  the  growth  of  nominal  compensation  per 
employee  has  been 
labour 
productivity growth, leading to further increases in 
nominal  unit  labour  costs  in  several  Member 
States. 

inflation  may  affect 

sizably  above 

to 

Some  wage  adjustment,  notably  for  low  wages, 
would help to cushion the impact of high inflation 
on  workers’  purchasing  power  with  potentially 
limited effects on competitiveness and inflation. In 
particular,  in  some  services  sectors,  where  low-
wage  earners  are  relatively  more  represented, 
firms  may  have  more  room  for  increasing  wages 
than in manufacturing sectors most exposed to cost 
pressures.  Indeed,  those  firms  are  relatively  less 
affected by current headwinds, and are also more 
able  to  raise  consumer  prices.  By  contrast,  large 
wage increases aimed at recovering all or most of 
past  inflation  and  applying  to  most  wages  could 
affect the competitiveness of some firms and could 
make  inflation  more  persistent,  with  possible 
adverse macroeconomic consequences. 

Since  inflation  started  to  pick  up  in  mid-2021, 
Member  States  have  adopted  measures  related  to 
wages to protect the purchasing power of workers. 
In  addition  to  wage  policies,  Member  States  have 
also  supported  the  income  of  households  through 
direct  transfers  and  tax  reductions  and  have 
that 
to 
implemented  policies 

the  price 

limit 

49 

European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

households  pay  for  energy.  However,  so  far  most 
of  these  non-wage  policies  are  not  sufficiently 
targeted  and  may  reduce  incentives  to  contain 
energy 
energy 
efficiency.  

consumption 

increase 

and 

2.1. 

INTRODUCTION 

the 

from 

the  pandemic  recession, 

After 
the  strong 
recovery 
in  aggregate  demand  has  fuelled 
inflationary  pressures.  The  EU 
rebounded 
recession.  
pandemic 
vigorously 
However,  the  aggregate  demand  expanded  at  a 
higher  pace  than  supply,  which  was  hampered  by 
shortages of raw material and basic inputs as well 
as  supply  chain  bottlenecks.  This  started  to  fuel 
inflation  in  2021.  A  sharp  increase  in  energy 
demand  pushed  up  energy  prices, 
further 
exacerbating  the  price  pressures.  In  March  2022, 
consumer  price  inflation  reached  7.8%,  compared 
to  2.2%  in  June  2021;  this  increase  was  strongly 
spurred by energy inflation, which rose from 2% in 
March 2021 to 16.8% in March 2022. 

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has 
boosted  inflationary  pressures.  Food,  oil  and 
many other commodity prices have soared globally 
since the start of the war in Ukraine. European gas 
and  electricity  prices  have  skyrocketed  over  the 
summer  amidst  gas  supply  disruptions,  a  shortfall 
of  nuclear  power,  reduced  hydropower  generation 
linked  to  severe  drought,  and  high  demand.  In 
August  2022,  energy  inflation  reached  38.6%  in 
the EU while headline inflation stood at 10.1%.  

For all Member States’ economies, the increase 
in the price of energy represents a deterioration 
of  the  terms  of  trade.  Imported  inputs  become 
more  expensive  relative  to  the  price  at  which 
output  is  exported.  There  is  therefore  a  negative 
effect  on  national  incomes  and  a  transfer  of 
purchasing  power  towards  energy  exporters. (81) 
Household  income  tend  to  be  affected  by  this 
deterioration,  notably  in  the  sense  that  wages  do 
not  catch  up  with  the  high  inflation,  leading  to  a 
decline in their purchasing power. The profitability 
of  firms  is  also  affected,  as  they  face  higher 

(81)  The  terms-of-trade  decline  is  estimated  to  have  curbed 
domestic  income  by  1.6  pps  of  GDP  between  the  second 
quarter  of  2021  and  the  first  quarter  of  2022  (European 
Central Bank, 2022b). 

50 

production costs, a slowdown in domestic demand 
and  lose  export  markets  to  competitors  in  other 
jurisdictions.  This  raises  the  question  of  how 
wages  might  evolve  over  the  coming  months  and 
the year ahead.   

Against  this  background,  this  chapter  reviews 
wage developments in the current environment 
inflation.  Section  2.2  provides  an 
of  high 
overview  of  the  recent  developments  in  nominal 
and  real    wages,  and  looks  into  possible  future 
developments  in  wages,  amid  a  high  uncertainty. 
Section  2.3  examines,  on  the  one  hand,  the 
challenges  brought  by  high  inflation  in  terms  of 
losses  of  purchasing  power,  particularly  for  low 
wage  earners,  and,  on 
the 
macroeconomic  risks  that  large  wage  increases 
may  trigger.  It  then  discusses  the  possibility  for 
wage increases to limit losses in purchasing power. 
Section  2.4  reviews  the  policies  implemented  by 
Member States to support workers’ incomes. 

the  other  hand, 

2.2.  WAGES 

IN 

THE  EU:  RECENT  AND 

EXPECTED DEVELOPMENTS 

recent 

section 

This 
wage 
describes 
developments  and  discusses  their  main  drivers 
over  the  foreseeable  future.  It  first  explains  the 
apparent rebound in wages in 2021, but shows that 
overall,  wage  growth  remained  subdued  in  2021 
and  have  started  to  accelerate  at  the  beginning  of 
2022.  However,  it  falls  significantly  short  of 
inflation.  The  section  then  underlines  that,  while 
inflation would contribute to higher nominal wage 
growth,  real  wages  are  expected  to  decrease 
significantly.  The  section  also  highlights  some 
differences  between  the  current  energy  shock  and 
past oil shocks. 

2.2.1.  Recent  nominal  and 

real  wage 

developments 

Growth in nominal compensation per employee 
in  2021  was  well  above  the  pre-pandemic 
average. It reached 4.0% in the EU in 2021,  well 
above  the  average  of  1.9%  from  2013  to  2019. 
Throughout  2021,  nominal  compensation  per 
employee  increased  in  all  Member  States  (Graph 
2.1).  A  growth  rate  above  6%  was  registered  in 
Lithuania,  Bulgaria,  Latvia,  Croatia,  Estonia, 
Hungary,  Slovenia,  and  Slovakia,  consistent  with 
the  catching-up  of  their  economies,  as  well  as  in 

                                                           
Wages and labour costs developments in the EU and its Member States 

Chapter 2 

Graph 2.1:  Nominal compensation per employee (annual % change, 2020, 2021, Q3 2022) 

2020

2021

2022Q3

25

20

15

10

5

0

-5

-10

T
L

G
B

V
L

R
H

E
E

I

U S
H

K
S

T

I

U
L

Z
C

T
M

R
F

O
R

E
S

E
B

T
P

7
2
U
E

9
1
A
E

Y
C

L
P

E
D

I

K F
D

E

I

L
E

L
N

(1)  Wages  are  measured  by  the  indicator  ‘Nominal  compensation  per  employee’,  which  is  calculated  as  a  total 
compensation  of  employees  divided  by  total  number  of  employees.  The  total  compensation  is  defined  as  the  total 
remuneration,  in  cash  or  in  kind,  payable  by  an  employer  to  an  employee  in  return  for  work  done  by  the  latter  during  the 
accounting period and it has two components: i) Wages and salaries payable in cash or in kind; and ii) Social contributions 
payable  by  employers.  (2)  All  the  data  used  are  national  accounts  data.  The  indicators  are  based  on  national  currency 
values. (3) Countries are ranked in descending order of nominal wage growth in 2021. (4) For graph readibility, BG value for 
2022Q2 (22.7%) is dropped, and BG value for 2022(Q3) is not available. 
Source: European Commission, AMECO database. For Q3 2022: EMPL calculations based on Eurostat data 

Italy and  Luxembourg. By contrast, compensation 
per  employee  grew  by  less  than  3%  in  seven 
Member  States  (the  Netherlands,  Greece,  Ireland, 
Spain, Austria, Finland and Denmark). 

The increase in nominal compensation reflected 
the  rebound  in  hours  worked  in  2021,  after  a 
collapse in 2020. On an annual basis, hours rose in 
the  EU  by  2.1%  in  the  last  quarter  of  2021, 
compared to a drop by 1.5% in the last quarter of 
2020. Such a quick rebound was notably linked to 
the  reopening  of  activity  following  the  pandemic. 
It was also facilitated by the intensive use of short-
time  work  schemes  in  2020  and  their  subsequent 
phasing-out  in  2021,  in  Austria,  Belgium,  France, 
Germany,  Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Portugal  and 
Slovakia.  The  relaxation  of  restrictions  linked  to 
the  pandemic  also  contributed  to  higher  wages, 
notably 
services,  nominal 
compensation  per  employee  increased  by  5.3%  in 
2021  after  a  decrease  of  1.8%  in  2020.  As  for 
industry  (respectively  construction),  the  growth 
rate  in  2021  amounted  to  4.9%  (respectively 
in  2020  a  reduction  of  1.9% 
4.8%),  while 
(Graph 
(respectively  1.4%)  was 
2.2).  (82) 

registered 

services. 

In 

in 

(82)  In  Austria,  Belgium,  Germany,  Italy  and  Slovakia,  the 
swing  in  nominal  compensation  per  employee  was  by 
contrast more evident in industry or construction, reflecting 
a  wider  use  of  job  retention  schemes  and  a  less  intense 

Graph 2.2:  Nominal compensation per employee per 

sector (annual % change, 2019, 2020, 2021) 

6
5
4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2

2019

2020

2021

Industry

Construction

Services

the 

indicator 

‘Nominal 
(1)Wages  are  measured  by 
compensation per employee’, which is calculated as a total 
compensation  of  employees  divided  by  total  number  of 
employees.  The  total  compensation  is  defined  as  the  total 
remuneration, in cash or in kind, payable by an employer to 
an employee in return for work done by the latter during the 
accounting  period  and  it  has  two  components:  i)  Wages 
and  salaries  payable  in  cash  or  in  kind;  and  ii)  Social 
contributions payable by employers. 
Source: EMPL calculations based on Eurostat data  

Beyond  the  effect  of  hours  worked,  wage 
developments remained muted in 2021. Until the 
last  quarter  of  2021,  the  strong  rebound  in  labour 
demand  following  the  pandemic, ( 83)  record  high 

labour shedding in these sectors than in services (details by 
Member States are shown in Graph 2.A1.1 in Annex) 
(83)  Following  the  easing  of  the  lockdown  measures  and  the 
swift  economic  recovery,  job  vacancies  started  to  rise 
again,  getting  closer  to  pre-pandemic  levels  in  the  second 
quarter of 2021. 

51 

                                                           
 
  
                                                                                   
  
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

labour  shortages, (84)  and  an  already  increasing 
inflation did not lead to any noticeable acceleration 
in  wages.  This  can  be  linked  to  the  staggered 
nature  of  wage  agreements,  amplified  during  the 
pandemic by delays in negotiations and a reduction 
in 
the  number  of  wage  agreements  being 
concluded, (85)  and  the  remaining  uncertainty  in 
some  sectors  due  to  the  sanitary  situation.  As  the 
post-pandemic recovery stabilised, the effect of the 
rebound  in  hours  worked  on  wages  faded  away, 
revealing  trends  in  wage  developments  aligned 
with  their  historical  trends.  By  the  last  quarter  of 
2021,  average  hourly  wages  in  the  EU  grew  by 
around  1.8%  (on  an  annual  basis),  slightly  below 
the  pre-pandemic  average  of  around  2%  (Graph 
2.3). 

Graph 2.3:  Nominal compensation per hour worked, 

EU27, quarterly 

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

3
q
3
1
0
2

3
q
4
1
0
2

3
q
5
1
0
2

3
q
6
1
0
2

3
q
7
1
0
2

3
q
8
1
0
2

3
q
9
1
0
2

3
q
0
2
0
2

3
q
1
2
0
2

3
q
2
2
0
2

(1)  Annual  change,  quarter  to  the  same  quarter  of  the 
previous year 
Source: Own computations on Eurostat data 

In  the  first  quarter  of  2022  nominal  wages 
started  to  accelerate  more  markedly.  This 
notably  reflected  the  increase  of  inflation  and  the 
tightening  of  labour  markets.  At  the  beginning  of 
the  year,  the  effects  of  wage  renegotiations  for 
some sectors became visible, as well as updates of 
wage  rates  according  to  provisions  foreseen  in 

(84)  Labour  shortages  have  a  significant  positive  effect  on 
nominal wages. At the same time, part of labour shortages 
are  structural  (see  Chapter  3  for  details  on  the  regression 
and 
labour  shortages).  Higher 
structural  labour  shortages  may  not  be  accompanied  by 
they  can  be  associated  with  an 
higher  wages,  as 
underutilisation 
structural 
unemployment. 

the  characteristics  of 

higher 

labour 

and 

of 

existing  contracts. (86)  By  the  third  quarter  of 
2022,  nominal  compensation  per  employee  grew 
on a yearly basis by 4.4% in the EU.  The increase 
was between 3% and 9% in a majority of Member 
States 
(Slovakia,  Croatia,  Estonia,  Belgium, 
Latvia,  Finland,  Slovenia,  Luxembourg,  Czechia, 
Austria,  France,  Portugal,  Italy,  Cyprus,  Ireland,  
Sweden  and  Germany).  Nominal  compensation 
grew  by  more  than  9%  in  Bulgaria,  Poland, 
Hungary, Lithuania and Romania, but by less than 
3%  in  Greece,  Malta,  the  Netherlands,  Spain  and 
Denmark  (Graph 2.1). (87) 

Similarly,  developments  in  negotiated  wages 
have  remained  limited  since  early  2021  but 
started to accelerate in the first quarter of 2022. 
Negotiated wages (88) in the euro area, that are not 
sensitive  to  the  number  of  hours  worked  and  in 
some sectors represent a wage floor rather than the 
actual  wage  paid,  increased  in  2021  by  1.5%, 
slightly below the average of the period 2013-2020 
(1.7%), despite the strong rebound in employment 
following  the  pandemic  (Graph  2.5).  In  the  first 
quarter of 2022, negotiated wages in the euro area 
grew by 2.8% in nominal terms on a yearly basis, 
after  1.6%  in  the  fourth  quarter  of  2021.  At 
level, ( 89) 
increases 
Member  States 
occurred  in  the  first  quarter  of  2022  notably  in 
Germany  (yearly  growth  of  4.0%),  Belgium 

sizable 

(86)  See  Molina  (2022).  Outside  the  regular  renegotiations, 
contracts 
to  update  wages 
automatically,  for  instance  to  index  wage  growth  to 
inflation  or  to  update  wages  when  inflation  reaches  a 
certain threshold. 

contain 

clauses 

can 

(87)  For  Bulgaria,  data  refer  to  the  second  quarter  of  2022  as 
data for the third quarter were not available yet. Data about 
nominal  wages  and  salaries  per  worker  by  Member  State 
are presented in annex. 

to  other 

indicators 

(88)  The  ECB  indicator  of  negotiated  wages  for  the  euro  area 
represents  a  weighted  average  of  national  year-on-year 
growth  rates  of  collectively  agreed  wages  for  most  euro 
area  countries.  In  contrast 
like 
compensation per employee, it is in particular not affected 
by  developments  in  hours  worked.  As  a  general  rule,  the 
indicator  also  excludes  bonuses,  overtime  and  other 
individual  compensation  that  is  not  linked  to  collective 
bargaining,  and  in  some  Member  States  it  represents  a 
wage  floor 
the  actual 
compensation paid by firms. The index of negotiated wages 
has some caveats, including coverage across countries and 
methodology  harmonisation,  including  the  treatment  of 
certain types of bonuses. 

in  some  sectors  rather 

than 

(85)  Wage  agreements  are  staggered 

that 
renegotiations  take  place  at  different  points  in  time,  while 
the  related  decisions  on  wages  are  valid  for  a  certain 
period. For the effect of the pandemic, see Molina (2021). 

the  sense 

in 

(89)  The country specific data are based on national sources and 
definitions  (not  harmonized).  National  sources  used 
include:  Destatis  (Germany),  Banque  de  France  (France), 
De  Nederlandsche  Bank 
and 
Oesterreichische  Nationalbank  (Austria),  Ministerio  de 
trabajo y economia social (Spain), ISTAT (Italy). 

(The  Netherlands), 

52 

  
                                                           
                                                           
Wages and labour costs developments in the EU and its Member States 

Chapter 2 

Graph 2.4: 

Real wages per employee, deflator GDP (annual % change; 2020, 2021 and Q3 2022) 

10

6

2

-2

-6

-10

-14

V
L

R
H

T
L

E
E

G
B

U
L

I

T S

I

T
M

U
H

R
F

Y
C

K
S

T
P

E
S

E
B

Z
C

9
1
A
E

7
2
U
E

2020

2021

2022q3

K
D

S
E

L
E

T
A

I

E F
D

L
N

O
R

L
P

E

I

(1) Real gross wages and salaries per employee, deflator private consumption (for annual data). For Q3 2022, deflator is HICP. 
Source:  European Commission, AMECO database and own computations on Eurostat data. 

(4.8%), France (around 3%), Austria (2.6%), Spain 
(2.6%  in  the  second  quarter  of  2022),  or  the 
Netherlands  (2.4%).  By  contrast,  negotiated  pay 
growth  was  muted  in  Italy  (estimated  around 
0.6%).  There  were,  however,  disparities  across 
sectors,  with  wage  growth  lower  in  high-contact 
services and industry in several Member States. 

Graph 2.5:  Negotiated wages in the euro area 

4

3

2

1

0

1
Q
8
0
0
2

1
Q
9
0
0
2

1
Q
0
1
0
2

1
Q
1
1
0
2

1
Q
2
1
0
2

1
Q
3
1
0
2

1
Q
4
1
0
2

1
Q
5
1
0
2

1
Q
6
1
0
2

1
Q
7
1
0
2

1
Q
8
1
0
2

1
Q
9
1
0
2

1
Q
0
2
0
2

1
Q
1
2
0
2

3
Q
2
2
0
2

Source: European Central Bank 

Real wages rebounded in 2021 in the EU as well 
as in most Member States but real hourly wages 
have  been  decreasing  since  end  2021.  For  the 
EU, real wages per employee increased by 1.5% in 
2021,  after  a  decline  by  0.8%  in  2020.  The 
rebound  was  particularly  strong  in  Italy  (+4.6% 
after -4.5% in 2020), France (+3.1% after -3.8% in 
2020),  Malta  (+3.7%  after  -1.9%  in  2020),  and 
Belgium (+2.1% after  -2.9%  in 2020). In Estonia, 
Latvia,  Lithuania, and Bulgaria, real  wage growth 
increased by more than 4% both in 2020 and 2021. 
In  2021  real  wages  decreased  only  in  Ireland,  the 
Netherlands,  Poland  and  Romania  (Graph  2.4). 
However,  in  the  second  half  of  2021,  already 

inflation 

before  the  outbreak  of  the  war  in  Ukraine,  real 
hourly wages started to decrease on the back of an 
accelerated  inflation.  This  decline  in  real  wages 
was  particularly  pronounced  in  the  last  quarter  of 
reached  4.6%  while 
2021,  where 
compensation  per  hour  only  grew  by  2.1%  (on  a 
yearly  basis).  As  concerns  individual  Member 
States,  in  the  last  quarter  of  2021,  real  hourly 
wages decreased by more than 4% in Spain and the 
Netherlands  (on  a  yearly  basis),  and  about  3%  in 
Germany and Italy. 

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has 
exacerbated  inflation,  leading  to  a  significant 
decrease in real wages in the first half of 2022. 
Inflation  reached  11.5%  in  October  2022,  after 
5.3%  in  2021,  amplifying  the  decline  in  real 
wages. By the third quarter of 2022, wages fell in 
real  terms  in  the  EU  (by  5.1%  on  a  yearly  basis), 
as  well  as  in  25  Member  States.  Decreases  larger 
than  6%  (and  up  to  12.7%)  were  recorded  in 
Latvia,  Estonia,  Czechia  and  Lithuania  (despite 
high  increases  in  nominal  terms),  as  well  as  in 
Greece,  the  Netherlands,  Denmark  and  Spain. 
Reductions  were  milder  (below  2%)  in  Finland 
Belgium,  France,  Romania  and  Hungary,  amid 
higher  increases  in  nominal  wages  and  somewhat 
less exacerbated inflation. By contrast, real  wages 
increased  in  Poland  and  Bulgaria.  It  should  be 
noted  that  in  real  terms  the  compensation  per 
employee, which also includes non-wage and non-
salary costs for firms, decreased more mildly in the 
EU  (by  0.7%  in  the  third  quarter  of  2022),  and 
only  in  21  Member  States  (Graph 2.A1.4  with 
details by Member States in Annex). 

53 

   
  
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

2.2.2.  How  nominal  and  real  wage  growth 
current 

react 

may 
the 
macroeconomic conditions? 

to 

inflation 

is 
A  higher  and  more  persistent 
expected  to  result  in  higher  nominal  wage 
growth. Empirical evidence suggests that inflation 
(lagged  and  expected),  productivity  growth  and 
unemployment  developments  (also  taken  as  a 
measure  of  labour  market  tightness)  explain  well 
wage  growth  over  time  (see  Graph  2.6,  and  Box 
2.1  for  details).  With  productivity  gains  expected 
to  decrease  and  unemployment  to  remain  broadly 
stable  (despite  the  economic  slowdown),  inflation 
is set to be the main driver of wage growth in the 
foreseeable  future.  According  to  the  Commission 
Autumn  Forecast,  inflation  is  projected  to  peak  at 
the  end  of  2022  before  gradually  easing  and 
reaching  3%  for  2024.  There  are  also  factors  that 
could  contribute  to  a  more  persistent  inflation, 
including  energy  shortages,  higher  commodity 
costs and broader price pressures. (90) The possible 
losses 
in  purchasing  power  associated  with 
inflation  may  contribute  to  raising  demands  for 
higher wage increases in wage negotiations. 

Graph 2.6:  Contribution to wage growth of actual 

changes in variables over time 

Other
Unemployment gap
Productivity growth
1-year ahead inflation expectations
Lagged inflation
Lagged wage growth

5
0
0
2

6
0
0
2

7
0
0
2

8
0
0
2

9
0
0
2

0
1
0
2

1
1
0
2

2
1
0
2

3
1
0
2

4
1
0
2

5
1
0
2

6
1
0
2

7
1
0
2

8
1
0
2

9
1
0
2

3
Q
1
2
0
2

4
Q
1
2
0
2

1
Q
2
2
0
2

2
Q
2
2
0
2

3

2

1

0

-1

Source: : Own estimations 

By  contrast,  the  deterioration  of  the  economic 
situation  and  the  increased  uncertainty  are 
expected  to  restrain  wage  growth  in  most 
Member States. The growth slowdown is notably 
expected  to  weigh  on  the  demand  for  labour,  in 
turn 
In  an 
environment  of  heightened  economic  uncertainty, 
concerns about job security  may also prevail over 
pay  increases  in  wage  deals,  despite  tight  labour 
markets. 

limiting  nominal  wage  growth. 

(90)  Di Bella et al. (2022). See also Alvarez and Barret (2022). 

54 

Furthermore,  institutional  factors  will  affect 
wage  growth  in  most  Member  States.  This 
notably  concerns  the  role  of  inflation  in  wage-
setting  and  the  pace  and  coverage  of  collective 
bargaining  for  wage  setting.    Automatic  wage 
indexation  is  no  longer  common  in  the  EU  as  it 
was  in  the  1970s.    It  affects  only  about  3%  of 
private  sector  employees  in  the  euro  area  and 
concerns  a  large  share  of  the  economy  only  in 
Belgium,  Cyprus,  Malta,  and  Luxembourg. (91)  In 
some  countries,  inflation  indexation  is  used  for 
updating  specifically  statutory  minimum  wages 
(e.g., France), but usually this covers only a small 
indexation 
part 
employment.  Beyond 
mechanisms, 
feeding 
formally  into  wage  negotiations  apply  only  to 
around  18%  of  private  sector  employees  in  the 
euro  area,  for  instance  in  the  form  of  an  explicit 
inflation  benchmark  guiding  negotiations. (92) (93) 
Second, the pace of wage renegotiations may delay 
wage increases. In the EU, for a majority of firms 
wage renegotiations take place only once a year or 
less frequently, and it will take some time for new 
contracts  to  take  into  account  the  increase  in 
inflation. (94)  In  this  regard,  the  situation  differs 
widely across Member States. (95) 

inflation  developments 

of 

(91)  Usually 

in 

these  regimes, 

is 
backward-looking  and  includes  energy.  In  Belgium,  the 
relevant  inflation  index  excludes  petrol,  tobacco  and 
alcohol.  

inflation  measure 

the 

(92)  This  concerns  mostly  forward-looking  inflation  measures 
that exclude energy, which in the current context limits the 
role  of  inflation.  The  most  prominent  example  is  Italy, 
where  the  Italian  National  Institute  of  Statistics’  annual 
three-year forecast of the Consumer Price Index excluding 
energy  is  the  central  benchmark  for  wage  agreements  at 
sectoral level. 

(93)  The  role  of  inflation  in  wage-setting  has  decreased  over 
time  (see  Koester  and  Grapow,  2021).  However,  in  a 
context  of  high  inflation,  wage  negotiations  may  take  into 
account  such  high  inflation  irrespective  of  its  formal  role. 
Nevertheless, in a context of high uncertainty, job security 
may  prevail  and  that  the  absence  of  a  formal  role  for 
inflation may ultimately weigh on wage developments. 

(94)  See Fabiani et al. (2010), information based on a survey. 
(95)  In  Germany,  about  one  quarter  of  the  45  million  German 
employees  have  their  contracts  renewed  in  2022,  most  of 
them in the last quarter of 2022. A number of sectors will 
not  have  wide  negotiations  in  2022,  including  the  retail, 
hospitality  and  construction.  In  Italy,  around  30%  of 
contracts  are  expected  to  expire  in  the  period  between 
December 2021 and December 2022.In Spain, for 2022 and 
2023,  some  of  the  negotiations  concluded  in  2021  settled 
on wage growth in line with pre-Covid-19 growth rates in 
some  key  sectors  (e.g.  manufacturing  sector  in  Madrid  or 
construction  workers 
in  Catalonia  and  Madrid).  In 
Denmark,  the  last  round  of  collective  bargaining  in  the 

  
                                                           
                                                           
lockdowns 

The prospects for wage developments also vary 
across  sectors  and  Member  States.  Activity, 
particularly  in  manufacturing,  is  constrained  by 
input  costs  (in  particular  energy)  and 
rising 
persistent  supply  bottlenecks, (96)  associated  with 
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, surges 
in  Covid-19  infections  in  different  parts  of  the 
in  Asian  ports.  Such 
world,  and 
constraints  are  less  prevalent  in  most  services 
(although  some  may  be  energy-intensive,  such  as 
retail and hospitality). Moreover, in some services 
sectors  (notably  in  IT-related  services),  persistent 
labour  shortages  are  expected  to  contribute  to 
higher wages. High and volatile energy prices also 
affect  Member  States  to  a  various  extent,  and  in 
particular  to  a  greater  extent  those  with  a  higher 
(notably 
share  of  energy-intensive 
Central  and  Eastern  European  Member  States). 
Therefore, wage growth is expected to vary greatly 
across  Member  States,  mainly 
reflecting 
in  some  cases 
inflation  and 
differences 
productivity  gains.  (details  by  Member  States  are 
presented in Graph 2.A1.2 in Annex). 

industries 

in 

Overall, nominal wage growth is expected to be 
significantly  above  the  pre-pandemic  average 
over the forecast horizon. The growth of nominal 
compensation  per  employee  in  the  EU  is  set  to 
remain  well  above  its  pre-pandemic  average  over 
the  period  2013-2019.  The  Commission  Autumn 
2022 forecast  estimated that wages would increase 
by 4.6% in 2022, 5.2% in 2023 and 3.9% in 2024, 
significantly  above  the  yearly  average  of  1.7% 
over  the  period  2013-2019. At  the  same  time,  the 
forecast  points  to  a  high  uncertainty  for  future 
wage  growth,  reflecting  the  overall  economic 
uncertainty.  

Nevertheless,  real  wages  are  set  to  decline 
sizably  in  2022  and  2023.  Nominal  increases  are 
expected  to  fall  short  of  inflation,  amidst  a  large 
deterioration  in  the  terms  of  trade  and  business 
profits.  According  to  the  Commission  Autumn 

private sector ended in March 2020 and the next round will 
take place in 2023. 

significant 

(96)  Evidence indeed suggests a link between wage growth and 
global  supply  chain  pressures,  with  some  heterogeneity 
across  sectors  and  countries.  The  link  is  negative  and 
highly 
services  and 
construction  (with  heterogeneity  across  sectors)  for  the 
group of the 16 non-Central and Eastern European Member 
States.  Supply  chain  bottlenecks  may 
indeed  affect 
production,  lowering  labour  demand  and  affect  profit 
margins, ultimately affecting wages. 

in  both 

industry, 

Wages and labour costs developments in the EU and its Member States 

Chapter 2 

Forecast, in 2022 real wages would decline for all 
Member  States  but  Bulgaria  and  Hungary  (-3.0% 
at the EU level, from -0.5% in France to -8.8% in 
Slovenia). Decreases in real wages are expected to 
remain  limited  (below  2%)  only  in  Belgium, 
France, Luxembourg, Malta and Portugal. In 2023, 
real wages are expected to decline at the EU level 
(by  1.1%),  as  well  as  in  18  Member  States. 
Decreases  are  expected  to  be  larger  than  2%  in 
Slovakia,  Czechia,  Hungary,  Lithuania,  Greece, 
Italy,  Sweden,  the  Netherlands  and  Malta  (details 
by Member States are presented in Table 2.A1.1 in 
Annex). 

Such  expected  developments  in  nominal  and 
real  wages  are  consistent  with  past  oil  shocks. 
Past  oil-price  shocks  (in  1973,  1978,  1990  and 
2003) similarly resulted in a substantial decline in 
real  wages  for  all  sectors. (97)  The  1970s’  oil 
shocks  were  also  accompanied  by  an  elevated 
inflation  and  generalised  high  nominal  wage 
growth, which resulted in negative feedback loops 
(so-called  price-wage  spirals)  that  prolonged  the 
recession and hurt in particular vulnerable workers 
and households.   

However, the current energy crisis differs from 
past  ones  in  several  aspects,  leading  to  a  more 
limited  reaction  of  nominal  wages  and  at  the 
same  time  lower  losses  in  real  wages. (98) (99) 
First,  compared  to  the  1970s,  the  EU  economies 
have become less energy dependent (including due 
to a lower share of industries and a higher energy 
efficiency);  therefore  the  shock  may  affect  the 
economy to a lesser extent than in the 1970s. This 
contributes  to  a  lower  effect  on  real  wages. 
Second,  the  response  of  nominal  wages  to  higher 
energy  prices  decreased  over  time.  As  mentioned 
above,  the  role  of  inflation  in  wage-setting  is  no 
longer  prevalent  in  the  EU.  Expectations  that  the 
shock  is  temporary  and  the  efforts  of  monetary 
policy  to  reduce  inflation  and  keep  inflation 
expectations  well  anchored  may  also 
limit 
demands  for  wage  increases.  For  instance,  the 
literature  shows  that  the  oil-price  shock  of  2003 
got passed through to wages and non-energy prices 
much  less  than  it  has  been  the  case  in  the  1970s 
(1973,  1978),  in  part  because  wage  earners  and 

(97)  See Keane and Prasad (1996), based on US data.  
(98)  Blanchard and Gali (2007). 
(99)  Blinder  and  Rudd 
Orphanides (2013). 

(2013).  See  also  Bordo  and 

55 

                                                                                   
                                                           
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

trade  unions  were  less  inclined  to  try  to  maintain 
real wages, as they expected oil price increases to 
be temporary, contrary to the 1970s. (100) 

The  current  energy  shock  has  also  taken  place 
during  the  strong  post-pandemic  recovery, 
which  may  smooth  the  effect  of  the  shock. 
Evidence  suggests  that  for  the  2003  oil  shock 
(compared  to  previous  shocks),  the  relatively 
better  cyclical  macroeconomic  environment  when 
the shock occurred played a role in mitigating the 
adverse  effects  on  inflation,  and  limited  losses  in 
real wages. ( 101) 

2.3. 

THE CHALLENGES AHEAD AND THE ROOM 
FOR SOME WAGE INCREASES 

This  section  discusses  the  challenges  raised  by 
the  recent  and  expected  wage  developments.  It 
first examines the social and  economic challenges 
associated with the significant losses in purchasing 
power  of  workers.  In  turn,  it  underlines  that 
potential  wage  increases  aimed  at  compensating 
for  real  wage  losses  and  supporting  domestic 
demand  need  to  be  balanced  with  the  risks  that 
such increases may trigger for competitiveness and 
employment,  as  well  as  in  terms  of  further 
inflationary  pressures.  The  section  then  assesses 
the  potential  room  for  further  wage  increases.  It 
highlights 
it  varies  significantly  across 
Member  States  and  sectors.  The  section  also 
presents the possible policy responses. 

that 

2.3.1.  The challenges 

is  raising 

The  rapid  erosion  of  the  purchasing  power  of 
social  and  economic 
workers 
challenges  Many  workers  can  find  themselves 
facing  significant  social  risks  to  pay  for  essential 
goods  and  services,  especially  low  wage  earners. 
increase  poverty  and 
This 
inequalities,  and  dampen  domestic  demand  in 
particular  from  the  first  deciles  of  the  income 
distribution.  

situation  could 

At  the  same  time,  excessive  nominal  wages 
increases  may  be  counterproductive.  Wage 
growth  aimed  at  fully  offsetting  the  effect  of 

(100) For the 1990 oil-price shocks, the pass-through was higher 

in the US than in many EU Member States. 

(101) Nordhaus (2007). 

56 

inflation  for  all  wages  may  trigger  losses  in 
competitiveness  and  jobs,  as  well  as  a  higher  and 
more  persistent  inflation,  hurting  in  particular 
vulnerable workers and households. 

The losses in purchasing power of workers 

The  fall  in  real  wages  entails  social  risks  for 
many  workers.  Workers  are  increasingly  relying 
on  savings  or  run  into  debt  in  order  to  cover 
current expenditure needs. Based on the European 
Business and Consumer Surveys, the proportion of 
workers  reporting  financial  distress (102)  increased 
for  all  Member  States  between  August  2021  and 
August 2022, with the exception of Cyprus. More 
precisely, in  August 2022 (latest available data) it 
stood  at  14.1%  for  the  EU  i.e.,  4.4  percentage 
points  higher  than  one  year  ago  (9.7%)  and  2.3 
percentage points higher than in the pre-pandemic 
period  (11.8%). The  highest  increases  of financial 
distress among workers between August 2021 and 
August 2022 were recorded in Belgium and Malta 
(14  percentage  points),  Estonia  (13  percentage 
points), France (9 percentage points) and Greece (7 
percentage points).  

income  of 

inflation.  On  average, 

Low  wage  earners  are  particularly  affected 
depending  on 
the 
the  overall 
they  are  part  of.  Low-income 
household 
households  are  expected  to  be  proportionately 
more  affected  by  the  price  increases,  since  they 
spend a higher share of their income on energy and 
food,  the  two  elements  that  are  primarily  driving 
the  current 
in  2020 
European  households  already  devoted  25.4%  of 
their  total  spending  to  food  and  13.0%  to  energy 
provision. ( 103) With higher increases in the prices 
of these products compared to others, this share is 
set  to  have  risen  since.  However,  this  share  of 
expenditure  is  even  much  higher  among  low-
income  households.  According  to  a  study  by  the 
JRC, (104) 
low-income  households  spend  on 
average  10.8  percentage  points  more  on  these 
items 
the  highest-income  households. 
Between January and August 2022, the increase in 

than 

(102) Reported  financial  distress  is  defined  as  the  need  to  draw 
on savings or to run into debt to cover current expenditures. 
For  details  on  Business  and  Consumer  Surveys,  including 
consumer  survey's  question  on  the  current  financial 
see 
situation 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/surveys
/index_en.htm 

households, 

of 

(103) JRC calculations based on Eurostat data.  
(104) Menyhert (2022). 

                                                           
                                                           
the cost of living for the lowest income quintiles is 
also estimated to range  from  7% in Malta to 31% 
in  Estonia.  The  difference  in  the  increase  in  the 
cost  of  living  between  the  lowest  and  highest 
income  quintiles  is  estimated  at  1.1  percentage 
point  in  the  EU,  but  it  ranges  between  3  and  5 
percentage  points  in  Estonia,  Italy  and  Latvia.  At 
the  national  level,  large  differences  are  mainly 
driven  by  the  divergence  in  households’  energy 
expenditure share. 

Minimum  wages  decreased  in  real  terms  in 
2021  as  well  as  in  the  first  half  of  2022.  In  real 
terms, statutory minimum  wages declined in 2021 
in  most  Member  States,  where 
they  exist. 
Minimum  wages  are 
indeed  often  updated 
annually,  at  the  beginning  of  the  year,  and  they 
were  usually  overtaken  by  the  rising  inflation 
throughout  2021.  Such 
terms 
contrasted with the increase in average real wages 
in  2021  in  all  Member  States  except  Ireland  and 
the  Netherlands.  Between  January  and  August 
2022, statutory minimum wages in real terms also 
decreased  due  to  the  higher  inflation  in  all  the 
Member  States  where  they  exist,  except  Belgium, 
France,  Greece,  Hungary  and  Romania. ( 105) 
Section  2.4  provides  further  details  on  minimum 
wage  developments  in  both  nominal  and  real 
terms. 

falls 

real 

in 

In  2021, 

In  addition,  in-work  poverty  increased  in  2021 
in  some  Member  States,  amplifying  fairness 
eight  Member  States 
concerns. 
(Romania,  Luxembourg,  Spain,  Italy,  Greece, 
Portugal, Bulgaria and Estonia) recorded levels of 
in-work  poverty  equal  to  or  larger  than  10% 
(Graph 2.7). (106) While it has been on a downward 
trend between 2016 and 2021, from 9.8% in 2016 
to  8.9%  in  2021,  in  the  post-pandemic  period 
several  countries  are  experiencing  increases  in  in-
work  poverty,  with  the  largest  increases  being 
recorded  in  Portugal  (1.7  percentage  points), 
Latvia  and  Luxembourg  (1.6  percentage  points), 
and Greece (1.2 percentage points). In the EU, in-
work poverty slightly increased from 2020 to 2021  
(0.1  percentage  point)  but  increased  more  when 
considering  households  with  a  not-very-low  work 

(105) This  includes  the  updates  of  minimum  wages  of  January 

2022. 

(106) 2021 SILC data. Data on in-work poverty for a given year 

are based on income for the previous year.  

Wages and labour costs developments in the EU and its Member States 

Chapter 2 

intensity (107)  and  dependents  (0.3  percentage 
points). (108) 

While the current crisis affects living standards 
for  all  workers,  its  impact  on  in-work  poverty 
will vary across Member States. In-work poverty 
depends  inter  alia  on  the  respective  developments 
of  lower  wages  compared  to  the  median  wages. 
The  majority  of  low  wage  earners  works  in  the 
services  sector,  while  industry  employs  a  higher 
share of middle wage earners in most countries. As 
the  energy  crisis  tends  to  hamper  industry  to  a 
larger extent (hence potentially middle wages), the 
impact  on 
limited. 
However, the share of low wage earners employed 
in  industry  is  higher  in  some  Central  and  Eastern 
European  Member  States, ( 109)  which  may  lead  to 
a higher effect of the crisis on in-work poverty in 
these countries.  

in-work  poverty  may  be 

(107) Work  intensity  is  considered  as  not  very  low  when  the 
adults of the household had a working time more than 20 % 
of  their  total  combined  work-time  potential  during  the 
previous year. Such selection allows not to consider almost 
inactive households.  

(108) Overall,  income  inequality  (as  measured  by  the  Gini 
coefficient) increased in half of the Member States in 2021. 
The  highest  increases  compared  to  2020  were  recorded  in 
Portugal  (1.8  percentage  points),  Latvia  (1.2  percentage 
points),  Greece,  Spain  and  Croatia  (1  percentage  point). 
The pandemic also exacerbated pre-existing inequalities in 
the  labour  market,  largely  because  the  ability  to  work 
remotely  is  highly  correlated  with  education,  and  hence 
with  pre-pandemic  earnings.  Other  measures  of  inequality 
include  income  ratios.  In  2021  on  average,  the  income 
received  by  the  20%  of  the  population  with  the  highest 
income  was  almost  five  times  as  high  as  the  income 
received  by  the  20-%  of  the  population  with  the  lowest 
income. 

(109) European Commission (2020b). 

57 

                                                           
                                                           
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Graph 2.7: 

In-work poverty in EU Member States, 2020, 
2021 (%) 

20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

2021

2010

2020

O
R

U
L

S
E

T

I

L
E

T
P

G
B

E
E

V
L

7
2
U
E

L
P

E
D

Y
C

T
L

U
H

T
A

T
M

R
F

E
S

K
D

I

L S
N

R
H

E

I

E
B

I

Z F
C

K
S

(1)  Persons  at  risk  of  poverty  are  those  living  in  a  household 
with  an  equivalised  disposable  income  below  the  risk-of-
poverty  threshold,  set  at  60%  of  the  national  median 
equivalised disposable income (after social transfers). 
(2) For 2021, data missing for SK.  
Source: Eurostat 

inflation 

rates  may 

inflation  and 

link)  between 

The literature points to mixed results regarding 
the  effect  of  high  inflation  on  overall  wage 
inequality.  On  the  one  hand,  some  empirical 
studies found that there is a non-linear relation (U-
shaped 
income 
inequality,  suggesting  that  the  current  level  of 
inflation may lead to a decrease in wage inequality 
at  the  EU  level,  while  Member  States  with  the 
highest 
experience 
increases. ( 110)  On  the  other  hand,  other  studies 
taking  into  account  the  specificities  of  past  oil-
price  shocks  suggest  that  the  current  crisis  may 
result in an increase in wage inequality. While the 
past shocks resulted in a decline in real wages for 
almost  all  workers,  the  relative  wage  of  skilled 
workers increased. As these workers are generally 
not  at  the  bottom  of  the  income  distribution,  this 
would increase  wage inequality. ( 111) However, as 
underlined  in  the  previous  section,  the  current 
crisis differs from past oil-price shocks. Therefore, 
estimated  effects  based  on  past  oil-prices  shocks 
may  not  apply  now,  and  future  developments  in 
wage  inequality  would  depend  on  the  policy 
responses, notably with regard to minimum wages 
(see section 2.4). 

(110) See  Monnin  (2014).  The  study  is  based  on  10  OECD 
countries  over  the  period  1970-2010.  It  finds  that,  as 
inflation goes up, inequality decreases, reaches a minimum 
with  an inflation  rate  of  about 13%, and  then  starts  rising 
again.  Other  studies  also  highlight 
this  non-linear 
relationship,  see:  Galli  and  van  der  Hoeven  (2001); 
Bulir (2001); Auda (2010). 

(111) See  Keane  and  Prasad  (1996).  Other  studies  find  that  oil 
supply shocks may lead to higher income inequality in the 
short  term,  but  possibly  lower-income  inequality  in  the 
medium and long terms, see Sheng and Gupta (2022). 

58 

Losses  in  purchasing  power  for  low  wage 
earners  have  a  larger  effect  on  aggregate 
demand. (112) As lower income households have a 
higher  propensity  to  consume  (at  least  for  certain 
consumption  categories),  decreases  in  real  wages 
at  the  lower  end  of  the  wage  distribution  tend  to 
weigh 
aggregate 
to 
consumption. (113) 

extent  on 

larger 

a 

risks  of  wage 

The 
competitiveness and inflationary pressures 

increases 

in 

terms  of 

While  wage  adjustments  to  price  developments 
would limit the losses in purchasing power, they 
may  entail  some  economic  risks.  First,  wage 
increases  entail  higher  costs  for  firms,  which  are 
already  facing  higher  costs  for  energy  and  a 
deterioration in the terms of trade. As higher costs 
weigh  on  firms’  profitability,  competitiveness  can 
be affected. The ability of firms to increase wages 
varies  significantly  across  sectors  and  Member 
States.  Furthermore,  if  the  wage  increases  do  not 
take sufficiently into account conditions at the firm 
level,  some  firms  may  need  to  decrease  their 
labour  demand,  leading  to  employment  losses. 
Second,  while  inflation  can  drive  nominal  wages 
up,  wage  increases  can  in  turn  feed  inflationary 
pressures.  Facing  higher  costs,  firms  may  raise 
consumer  prices  if  market  conditions  allow.  The 
main  risk  would  occur  if  inflation  expectations 
become  de-anchored.  In  turn,  a  higher  and  more 
persistent 
adverse 
macroeconomic consequences, notably in terms of 
GDP,  employment,  and  real  wages,  hurting  the 
more vulnerable workers and households. 

inflation 

have 

can 

The risks in terms of competitiveness and jobs 

In a context of limited productivity growth, unit 
labour  costs  have  significantly  increased  in 
several  EU  Member  States.  Overall,  nominal 
compensation per employee has been accelerating, 
while  productivity  growth  has  remained  in  line 
with  the  yearly  average  over  2020  and  2021  and 
slightly  above  the  pre-pandemic  average  over 

(112) Aggregate  demand  consists  of  consumption,  investment, 

government spending and net exports.  

(113) This is only true ceteris paribus. If the wage increase at the 
lower  end  of  the  wage  distribution  leads  to  a  loss  in 
employment  that  has  a  stronger  negative  impact  on 
aggregate  demand  than  the  positive  impact  resulting  from 
the  higher  wage,  the  total  effect  on  aggregate  demand 
would be negative. 

  
                                                           
                                                           
2013-2019  period  (details  by  Member  State  in 
Graph 2.A1.2 in Annex). As a result, nominal unit 
labour  costs  (NULC)  increased  sizably  in  most 
Member States, and by  more than 5% in the third 
quarter  of  2022  (on  a  yearly  basis)  in  Belgium, 
Bulgaria,  Estonia,  Finland,  France,  Croatia, 
Hungary,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Latvia,  Poland, 
Romania and Slovakia (details by Member State in 
Graph 2.A1.3 in Annex). Such increases in NULC 
are  significantly  above  the  pre-pandemic  average 
increase over 2013-2019, except for Romania. (114)  

Further  wage  increases  to  offset  losses  due  to 
inflation  may  affect  the  cost  competitiveness  of 
some firms.  Higher growth rate of nominal wages 
would increase ULC further. In this context, firms 
which  are  less  able  to  pass  on  higher  wages  to 
consumers  through  higher  prices,  notably  in  the 
tradable  sector,  may  face  decreasing  profitability 
due to rising labour costs, notably if they are also 
in 
affected  by 
manufacturing). (115)  Other  firms  that  can  pass 
wage  increases  on  to  consumer  prices  (notably  in 
services)  may  also  face  a  decline  in  demand,  in  a 
context of a diminishing purchasing power. 

rising  energy  costs 

(e.g. 

to 

to 

real 

real 

Average  prices  have  been  growing  at  a  higher 
pace than ULC, suggesting more room for some 
increase  wages  depending  on 
firms 
profitability. Real unit labour costs (RULC, or the 
ratio  of 
labour 
labour  costs 
productivity)  have  been  decreasing  since  2021.  In 
2022,  RULC  are  expected  to  decline  by  1.8%  in 
the  EU  (1.7%  in  the  euro  area)  (Graph  2.8,  and 
details  by  Member  States  in  Graph  2.A1.5  in 
Annex). Such decline in RULC suggests that some 
firms  have  more  capacity  to  increase  wages, 
although  they  may  have  also  been  following 
anticipation  of 
cautious  wage  policies 
decreasing  profitability.  Where 
the  consumer 
prices  for  their  products  increase  more  than  the 
cost  of  production,  firms  may  have  more  room  to 
increase  wages.  In  the  opposite  situation  (notably 

in 

(114) ULC  has  witnessed  a  mixed  picture  in  2021,  after  high 
rises  in  2020  (see  Graph 2.11).  In  2021,  ULC  declined  in 
nine Member States, by up to 9% Romania, an increased in 
seventeen Member States, by up to 7.3% in Lithuania (see 
Table  2.A1.2  in  Annex).  ULC  has  showed  similar  swings 
as nominal compensation per employee from 2020 to 2021, 
reflecting the swing in hours worked. 

(115) Depending  on  the  sector  and  how  product  markets  work, 
wage  increases  can  be  passed  on  to  consumer  prices,  but 
firms in the tradable sectors are generally less able to do so, 
as they are subject to international competition. 

Wages and labour costs developments in the EU and its Member States 

Chapter 2 

in  energy-intensive  sectors),  firms  may  face  more 
difficulties to increase wages. 

Graph 2.8: 

Real Unit Labour Costs (annual % change, 
2013-2021, forecasts for 2022 and 2023) 

3

2

1

0

-1

-2

-3

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

(1)  Ratio  of  compensation  per  employee  to  nominal  GDP 
per person employed 
Source: European Commission, AMECO database. 

The risks in terms of inflationary pressures 

and 

So  far,  second-round  effects  of  wages  on 
inflation  have  been  limited.  Large  second-round 
effects  of  wage  increases  on  inflation,  that  may 
occur  if  firms  translate  higher  wages  into  higher 
prices,  could  trigger  a  more  persistent  inflation, 
with adverse macroeconomic effects. Barro (2013) 
found  that  a  protracted  inflation  may  notably 
weigh  on  growth  and  investment,  therefore  on 
ultimately 
productivity, 
employment 
the  purchasing  power  of  workers, 
worsening 
in  vulnerable 
hurting  most 
those 
situations. (116)  Similarly,  Braumann 
(2000) 
underlined  that  high  inflation  tended  to  contract 
employment  and  lead  to  a  significant  decline  in 
real  wages,  as  well  as  to  a  real  depreciation,  all 
affecting  purchasing  power. (117)  However,  pass-
through  from  prices  to  wages  are  so  far  moderate 
in the EU though the situation requires monitoring 
to avoid that risks materialise. (118) 

already 

The  main  risk  would  materialize  if  large  and 
generalised nominal wage growth leads to a de-
anchoring of inflation expectations. This in  turn 
could feed a  wage-price spiral,  with a  much  more 

(116) Barro, R. J. (2013). Inflation and economic growth. Annals 
of Economics & Finance, 14(1). See also: Akinsola, F. A., 
&  Odhiambo,  N.  M.  (2017).  Inflation  and  economic 
growth: A review of the international literature. 

(117) See:  Braumann,  Benedikt,  Real  Effects  of  High  Inflation 
(May  2000).  IMF  Working  Paper  No.  00/85.  The  study 
also  corroborates  contractionary  effects  on  GDP  and 
investment and employment.  
(118) Commission Summer Forecast. 

59 

                                                           
  
                                                           
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

persistent 
increased 
inflation,  as  well  as  an 
downward  real  wage  rigidity. (119)  In  such  a  case, 
an  increase  in  inflation  would  imply  lower  output 
and  higher  unemployment  (and  likely  also  higher 
interest  rates  in  response),  hurting  in  particular 
those  workers  and  households 
in  already 
vulnerable  positions..  A  de-anchoring  of  inflation 
expectations  depends,  however,  on  a  broad  set  of 
policies  (including  monetary  and  fiscal),  and  not 
only on wage developments.  

So  far,  there  is  no  sign  of  a  de-anchoring 
inflation  expectations  in  the  EU  (Graph  2.9).  In 
the third quarter of 2022, the inflation expectations 
in  the  euro  area  for  the  third  quarter  of  2024  (2 
years ahead) by the respondents to the ECB survey 
of Professional Forecasters stood at less than 2.4%, 
close to the 2% target. 

Graph 2.9: 

Inflation and short- and long-term inflation 
expectations 

2.11,  left  panel;  Box  2.1  for  details).  By  contrast, 
adjusting  all  wages  to  fully  offset  the  current 
increases  in  inflation, ( 121)  could  lead  to  a  sizably 
higher  and  more  persistent  inflation  (see  Graph 
2.11, right panel).This  may even entail the risk of 
triggering  further  decreases  in  real  wages  (see 
Graph  2.10).  This  may  also  affect 
inflation 
expectations, depending on  whether  wages are set 
with  an  expectation  that  prices  will  continue  to 
grow,  and  on  whether  the  overall  macroeconomic 
conditions  contribute  to  inflation.  Ultimately  this 
could set off a wage-price spiral. The next section 
looks  in  greater  detail  at  such  room  to  increase 
wages  without  triggering  unintended  inflationary 
pressures,  notably  by  showing  that  inflation  is 
currently not reflected in wages to the same extent 
as in the past. 

Graph 2.10:  Response of growth of real wages to inflation 

shocks: full adjustment versus adjustment 
implied by historical practice 

11.00

9.00

7.00

5.00

3.00

1.00

-1.00

HICP, Target period ends 12 months after survey cycle begins

HICP, Target period ends 24 months after survey cycle begins

HICP

6
0
-
p
e
S

7
0
-
p
e
S

8
0
-
p
e
S

9
0
-
p
e
S

0
1
-
p
e
S

1
1
-
p
e
S

2
1
-
p
e
S

3
1
-
p
e
S

4
1
-
p
e
S

5
1
-
p
e
S

6
1
-
p
e
S

7
1
-
p
e
S

8
1
-
p
e
S

9
1
-
p
e
S

0
2
-
p
e
S

1
2
-
p
e
S

2
2
-
p
e
S

3
2
-
p
e
S

4
2
-
p
e
S

(1) The survey covers the euro area  
Source: ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) 

A partial adjustment of wages to inflation  may 
mitigate  purchasing  power  losses  with  limited 
inflationary  pressures.  Own  simulations  using  a 
VAR  model  taking  into  account  the  interactions 
between  wage  developments  and  its  key  drivers 
(including inflation) suggests that adjusting wages 
to  partially  compensate  for  an  inflationary  shock 
would not lead  to a  much  higher inflation,  should 
this  wage adjustment be consistent  with the effect 
of  inflation  on  wages  in  the  past (120)  (see  Graph 

0.2

0

-0.2

-0.4

-0.6

-0.8

-1

1

2

3

4

Full adjustment to inflation

Adjustment based on historical practice

(1) The shock consists of a standard deviation of lagged and 
expected inflation. 
(2)  The  X-axis represents  quarters.  The  Y-axis  represents 
percentage changes. 
Source: Own calculations. 

(121) Weights  applied  to  lagged  and  forecast  inflation  are  80% 
and  20%,  mimicking  the  18%  share  of  employees  in  the 
euro  area  with  forward-looking  inflation  expectations 
officially considered in wage negotiations. 

(119) Goette,  L.,  Sunde,  U.,  &  Bauer,  T.  (2007).  Wage  rigidity: 
Measurement,  causes  and  consequences. The  Economic 
Journal, 117(524),  F499-F507.  See  also:  Chen,  P.,  & 
Flaschel,  P.  (2005).  Keynesian  dynamics  and  the  wage–
downward 
price 
rigidities. Computational Economics, 25(1), 115-142. 
(120) i.e. same coefficients linking inflation and wages as in the 
past,  while  taking  into  account  the  currently  higher 
inflation. 

identifying 

spiral: 

60 

   
                                                           
    
 
                                                           
Wages and labour costs developments in the EU and its Member States 

Chapter 2 

Graph 2.11:  Response of wages to a shock of inflation, and persistence of inflation, based on historical relations between 
variables (left panel) and on based on a full compensation of wages to inflation (right panel) 

Response of wage growth 

Response of wage growth 

2.5

2

1.5

1

0.5

0

3.5

3

2.5

2

1.5

1

0.5

0

1

2

3

4

+/-1s.e.

Persistence of inflation 

2.5

2

1.5

1

0.5

0

3.5

3

2.5

2

1.5

1

0.5

0

1

2

3

4

+/-1s.e.

Persistence of inflation 

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

+/-1s.e.

+/- 1s.e.

(1) The shock consists of a standard deviation of lagged and expected inflation. 
(2) The X-axis represents quarters. The Y-axis represents percentage changes. 
Source: Own calculations 

2.3.2.  The room for further wage growth 

the 

rate 

based 

predicted 

Wage  growth  is  expected  to  stand  significantly 
below 
on 
macroeconomic  fundamentals 
in  almost  all 
Member  States  in  2022,  as  well  as  in  most 
Member  States  in  2023.  The  growth  of  nominal 
compensation per employee ( 122) can be compared 
to  a  benchmark 
in 
inflation,  productivity  growth,  and  the  changes  in 
the  unemployment  rate,  and  considering  past 
relations  between 
those  variables  and  wage 
developments. ( 123)    In  2022,  wage  growth  is 

reflecting  developments 

(122) It  includes,  besides  gross  wages,  employer  contributions. 
This means that some tax reforms may affect wage growth. 
Absent changes in employer contributions, the growth rate 
of nominal compensation per employee will be the same as 
the growth rate of gross wages and salaries.   

levels  are  regressed  on 

(123) The  estimation  proceeds  in  two  steps.  In  the  first  step, 
wage 
levels  of  prices  and 
productivity as well as unemployment. This represents the 
long-term  relationship  between  the  wage  levels  and  its 
drivers  (price,  productivity  and  unemployment).  In  the 
second  step,  wage  growth  is  regressed  on  price  inflation, 
productivity  growth  and  the  change  in  unemployment,  as 
well  as  on  a  term  that  represents  the  deviation  of  wage 
level  from  its  predicted  level.  This  represents  more  short-
term  deviations  of  wages  from  their  long-term  trend.  This 

expected  to  be    more  than  2  percentage  points 
below  its  benchmark  in  all  Member  States  but 
Luxembourg (with a gap of less than 2 percentage 
points) and Bulgaria (with a sizable positive gap). 
For  2023,  wage  growth  would  remain  below  its 
benchmark  in  21  Member  States,  with  a  gap  of 
more  than  2  percentage  points  in  13  Member 
(Czechia,  Germany,  Greece,  Croatia, 
States 
Hungary, 
Italy,  Lithuania,  Poland, 
Portugal,  Romania,  Sweden  and  Slovakia). 
Positive  gaps  are  expected  only  in  six  Member 
States 
(Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Estonia, 
Luxembourg and Latvia). (Table 2.1). 

Ireland, 

prediction  is  based  on  a  panel  regression  of  EU  Member 
States  estimated  on  yearly  data  over  the  period  2000  to 
2019. The sample does not go beyond 2019 to avoid the the 
disturbances  due  to  the  pandemic,  and  the  fact  that 
developments  in  unemployment  were  mild  due  to  the 
intensive use of short-time work schemes. 

61 

                                                           
                                                                                   
   
costs  by  reducing  profit  margins,  in  particular 
where  price  increases  preceded  wage  inflation, 
depending  on  profitability,  and  in  sectors  where 
firms have monopsony power. (124) Some firms are 
also  able  to  pass  higher  production  costs  on  to 
consumers  through  higher  prices,  though  this 
would  in  turn  contribute  to  inflation.  This  would 
be  the  case  to  a  greater  extent  of  firms  in  non-
tradable sectors, notably services. 

Firms’  profitability  remained  high  in  early 
2022, suggesting some room for accommodating 
wage  increases,  but  it  is  set  to  decline.  By  the 
end  of  2021,  the  aggregate  profitability  and  debt 
positions  of  firms  had  recovered  to  pre-pandemic 
levels,  thanks  to  the  solid  recovery  seen  in  the 
second half of 2021. (125) Businesses’ profitability 
still  appeared  strong  at  the  beginning  of  2022 
(Graph  2.12).  However,  firms  have  been  facing 
growing  headwinds  since 
in 
production  costs  (notably  energy)  and  persistent 
supply  chain  pressures  may  weigh  on  their  profit 
margins,  notably  in  the  manufacturing  sector.  For 
producers, energy prices appear notably to increase 
more  than  the  value  added,  which  contributes  to 
reduce  their  profit  margins  (Graph 2.13).  The 
deterioration  of  the  demand  outlook  is  also  set  to 
weigh  on  companies’  profit  margins. ( 126)  This 
the 
limit 
environment  would 
challenging 
possibility for firms to absorb wage increases. 

then.  Increases 

(124) International  Monetary  Fund  (2022),  p.  9.  A  monopsony 
occurs  when  there  is  a  sole  or  a  dominant  employer  in  a 
labour market. This increases the employer’s  wage-setting 
power. 

(125) See  respectively:  European  Central  Bank  (2022c),  chapter 

1.3 and European Central Bank (2022a).  

(126) For  details,  see  European  Commission  2022  Summer 

Forecast.  

European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Table 2.1: 

AT
BE
BG
CY
CZ
DE
DK
EE
EL
ES
FI
FR
HR
HU
IE
IT
LT
LU
LV
MT
NL
PL
PT
RO
SE
SI
SK

Gap of wage growth relative to its benchmark 
2022
-6.3
-5.9
4.7
-7.1
-8.7
-4.9
-4.2
-5.3
-9.4
-8.3
-4.6
-2.9
-7.0
-3.3
-11.0
-6.2
-5.4
-1.1
-2.8
-3.7
-9.8
-5.6
-7.4
-5.8
-5.7
-9.1
-4.4

2023
-0.6
1.5
4.6
0.5
-3.2
-2.3
-0.1
3.7
-4.8
-1.6
-1.8
-0.9
-2.9
-3.3
-5.1
-4.9
-3.4
3.2
1.1
-1.7
-1.1
-5.5
-3.1
-3.4
-2.2
-1.5
-8.3

2021
-1.1
-2.3
7.1
-2.5
0.2
-1.6
-0.7
2.0
-3.5
-2.8
0.5
-0.4
-0.8
-1.3
-5.8
0.4
4.8
2.1
5.3
0.5
-2.7
-5.6
0.8
-0.5
0.0
2.0
1.3

(1)  Wage  benchmark  is  predicted  by  developments  in 
inflation, productivity and unemployment rate. 
Source: Own calculations based on AMECO. 

This  suggests  some  room  for  wage  increases  in 
many  Member  States,  to  mitigate  losses  in 
purchasing  power  while  avoiding  inflationary 
pressures.  The  negative  gap  of  wage  growth 
relative  to  the  wage  benchmark  indicates  that  the 
factors  that  have  historically  driven  wage  growth 
are currently not reflected as they were in the past. 
This  mainly  concerns  the  rising  inflation  in  the 
current  context.  Higher  wage  growth  better 
reflecting  inflation  developments  would  allow  to 
mitigate losses in real  wages,  while not triggering 
large  inflationary  pressures  (as  shown  in  the 
previous section). 

The  capacity  to  increase  wages  varies  across 
firms  and  sectors.  It  depends  on  whether  firms 
can either absorb those wage increases by reducing 
profit margins, or raise product prices. Some firms 
may  have  some  ability  to  absorb  higher  labour 

62 

 
  
 
                                                           
Graph 2.12:  Gross profit share of non-financial corporations 

in the euro area and the European Union 

Euro area

European Union

43

42

41

40

39

38

1
q
2
0
0
2

1
q
4
0
0
2

1
q
6
0
0
2

1
q
8
0
0
2

1
q
0
1
0
2

1
q
2
1
0
2

1
q
4
1
0
2

1
q
6
1
0
2

1
q
8
1
0
2

1
q
0
2
0
2

1
q
2
2
0
2

(1)  Gross  operating  surplus  as  percentage  of  gross  value 
added, based on four-quarter-cumulated sums 
Source: Eurostat and ECB 

Against  this  background,  there  could  be  some 
room  for  further  adjusting  wages  to  price 
developments,  notably  for  low  wages,  though 
the  situation  varies  across  sectors.  Low  wage 
earners  are  more  represented  in  services  sectors, 
whose firms tend to be less affected by the current 
headwinds than in manufacturing. The situation is 
however sector-specific. For instance, firms in the 
hospitality or retail sectors can be energy intensive 
and also face high energy costs. By contrast, firms 
in  the  IT  sector  have  also  seen  their  activity 
increasing significantly since the pandemic and are 
particularly  benefiting  from  the  on-going  digital 
transition. 

Graph 2.13:  Real energy prices for non-consumers, 

2008Q1-2021Q1 

4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2

Gas price for non-households consumers

Electricity price for non-households consumers

1
q
8
0
0
2

1
q
9
0
0
2

1
q
0
1
0
2

1
q
1
1
0
2

1
q
2
1
0
2

1
q
3
1
0
2

1
q
4
1
0
2

1
q
5
1
0
2

1
q
6
1
0
2

1
q
7
1
0
2

1
q
8
1
0
2

1
q
9
1
0
2

1
q
0
2
0
2

1
q
1
2
0
2

(1)  Ratio  of  gas  and  electricity  prices  for  non-household 
consumers to GDP deflator. Variables are normalised. 
Source: EMPL calculations based on Eurostat data. 

Labour  shortages  in  some  service  sectors  can 
lead  to  such  wage  adjustment,  while  reflecting 
sectoral  conditions.  Sizable  labour  shortages  are 
persistent  in  services,  whereas  there  are  signs  of 
attenuation in manufacturing. (127) Wage increases 

(127) See chapter 3 for details. See also: Duval et al. (2022). 

Wages and labour costs developments in the EU and its Member States 

Chapter 2 

in 
to 
the  services  sector  could  contribute 
improving  the  attractiveness  of  some  essential 
occupations,  such  as  in  long-term  care,  thereby 
reducing labour shortages. 

63 

  
  
                                                           
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Box 2.1: Wage growth and high inflation.

Wage growth can be  affected  by past  and future inflation, wage inertia, labour  market tightness  and 
labour productivity. In a low inflation environment, past wage growth may be a useful benchmark to strike 
an  agreement  without  incurring  in  lengthy  negotiations.  The  situation  differs  in  a  context  of  high inflation. 
Since wages are set for a specific duration, high inflation tends to erode the purchasing power, absent clause 
adjusting  wages  to  inflation.  Wage  negotiations  can  then  incorporate  (past  and/or  expected)  inflation 
developments. The strength of the labour market also influences the balance between social partners, with a  
tighter labour markets shifting the balance in favour of workers. Wage growth can also be affected by labour 
productivity developments, since they affect firms’ profitability, hence their ability to provide higher wages. 

A  standard  relation  linking  wage  growth  to  its  determinants  can  be  estimated,  similar  to  the  Philips 
curve  (Blanchard  and  Katz,  1999;  Gali,  2011).  Such  estimates  confirm  that  labour  market  tightness  and 
productivity  growth  increase  wage  growth,  respectively  by  0.2%  and  0.1%.  In  addition,  a  1%  increase  in 
inflation  expectations  has  a  higher  impact  on  wage  growth  than  a  1%  increase  in  lagged  wage  growth  or 
lagged inflation (although wide 90% confidence intervals imply that both a small and a larger response may 
apply). The sum of the coefficients of lagged and expected inflation (0.4) suggests that only 40% of higher 
inflation is transferred into higher wages. However, these results give only a static perspective and discard the 
multiple feedbacks between the variables considered. 

Considering  a  dynamic  perspective,  the  estimation  of  a  VAR  suggests  that  a  correction  of  wages 
consistent with past practice could mitigate the loss in real wages, while not affecting much inflation. (1) 
The effect of inflation shocks on the different variables estimated on the basis of the historical relationship 
linking  them  is  shown  in  Graph  1.  In  response  to  a  temporary  inflation  shock,  wage  growth  and  inflation 
expectations  increase  respectively  by  0.2%  and  0.1%.  Inflation  starts  to  decline  from  the  fourth  quarter. 
Throughout the adjustment, wage growth rises less than inflation which keeps the unemployment rate almost 
unchanged at its structural level (i.e. no change in unemployment due to the cycle). 

Graph 1 Response to a standard shock of inflation, based on historical relationship between variables 

Response of unemployment gap to inflation shock

Persistence of inflation 

0,1

0

-0,1

-0,2

-0,3

-0,4

-0,5

-0,6

1,3

1,1

0,9

0,7

0,5

0,3

0,1

3,5

3

2,5

2

1,5

1

0,5

0

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

+/-1s.e.

+/-1s.e.

Response of 1-year ahead inflation expectations

Response of wage growth 

2,5

2

1,5

1

0,5

0

-0,1

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

+/-1s.e.

+/-1s.e.

Note: X-axis: quarters following the shock; Y-axis: percentage changes. 

(1)  A VAR considers the dynamic relationships among the variables and evaluates the dynamic response of each variable 
to an inflation shock taking into account the correlations between the variables. Shocks are identified with a Cholesky 
scheme with the following order: unemployment gap, inflation, inflation expectations, and wage growth. This order 
implies that each variable responds with a lag of one quarter to a shock in any variable that is preceding. However, an 
inflation shock in one quarter impacts inflation expectations and wage growth in the same quarter. 

(Continued on the next page) 

64 

 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                           
Wages and labour costs developments in the EU and its Member States 

Chapter 2 

Box (continued) 

By contrast, a full adjustment of wage growth to inflation can be self-defeating. Graph 2 simulates the 
response  to  a  shock  modifying  the  historical  relationship  between  the  four  variables,  assuming  that  wage 
growth responds fully to a change in inflation and inflation expectations within two successive quarters. In 
this  case,  following  a  temporary  shock  to  inflation,  there  is  a  stronger  persistence  of  inflation  and inflation 
expectations  which  lead  to  higher  wage  growth.  Despite  the  temporariness  of  the  inflation  shock,  the 
variables do not go back to the pre-shock average. As a consequence from the stronger persistent of inflation, 
from  the  third  quarter  after  the  shock,  real  wages  decline  more  than  when  there  is  a  partial  adjustment  of 
wages to inflation (Graph 3).  

Graph 2 Response to a standard shock of inflation, assuming lagged and expected inflation fully 
transferred on higher wage growth 

Response of unemployment gap 

Persistence of inflation 

0

-0,1

-0,2

-0,3

-0,4

-0,5

-0,6

1,2

1

0,8

0,6

0,4

0,2

0

1

2

3

4

+/- 1 s.e.

Response of 1-year ahead inflation expectations

3,5

3

2,5

2

1,5

1

0,5

0

2,5

2

1,5

1

0,5

0

1

2

3

4

+/- 1s.e.

Response of wage growth 

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

+/-1s.e.

+/-1s.e.

Note: X-axis: quarters following the shock; Y-axis: percentage changes. 

Graph 3 Response of real wages growth to an inflation shock 

1

2

3

4

0.2

0

-0.2

-0.4

-0.6

-0.8

-1

Full adjustment to inflation

Adjustment based on historical practice

Note: X-axis: quarters following the shock; Y-axis: percentage changes. 

65 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

2.3.3.  Policies 

to 
theoretical aspects 

increase 

low  wages  – 

Member  States  have  different  policy  tools  at 
their  disposal  to  support  low  wages.  The  most 
direct  instrument  for  countries  with  a  statutory 
minimum wage in place is minimum wage policy, 
which directly impacts the wages of minimum and 
low-wage 
collective 
earners.  Strengthening 
bargaining  on  wage  setting  can  support  general 
wage  developments,  including  low  wages.  As  a 
direct employer, the public sector also needs to pay 
particular attention to low-wage earners. 

Minimum wage policy 

Minimum wage protection can be provided via 
statutory minimum wages or through wages set 
by collective agreements. Sound rules, procedures 
and  effective  practices  for  setting  and  updating 
statutory minimum wages are necessary to deliver 
adequate  minimum  wages. (128)  This 
includes 
establishing  clear  criteria 
to  set  and  update 
statutory minimum wages, regularly assessing their 
adequacy,  establishing  rules  to  update  them  on  a 
regular basis and ensuring the timely and effective 
involvement  of  social  partners.  Moreover,  in  all 
the  promotion  of  collective 
Member  States, 
the 
bargaining  on  wage  setting  (as  well  as 
coverage  thereof)  can  also  contribute  to  more 
adequate minimum wage protection. 

the  minimum  wage  will  also 

An  increase  in  the  minimum  wage  can  directly 
affect  the  lowest  wages,  and  incentivise  the 
inactive to enter the labour market. Around 4% 
of  employees  in  the  EU  earn  wages  close  to 
minimum wage floors and can be directly affected 
by increases in minimum wages. (129) An increase 
in 
increase 
reservation  wages  for  jobseekers  (the  minimum 
wage 
to 
the  worker  requires 
participate  in  the  labour  market),  thereby  leading 
to  increases  in  low  wages  somewhat  beyond  the 
minimum  wage 
increasing 
minimum  wages  can  increase  incentives  to  work 
for the inactive. 

floor.  Moreover, 

in  order 

that 

of  wages  through  spill-over  effects.  Minimum 
wage  increases  can  play  an  important  role  as  a 
general  benchmark  for  sectoral  wage  agreements, 
though  this  may  not  be  the  case  in  a  context  of 
high  inflation. (130)  Analysis  conducted  by  the 
European Commission shows that, across Member 
States  between  2006  and  2014,  minimum  wage 
increases  significantly  affected  the  wages  at  the 
bottom of the wage distribution. (131) Evidence (in 
a lower inflation environment) shows that in some 
Member  States,  spill-overs  could  even  extend  to 
higher wage tranches, e.g. up to the third decile of 
the wage distribution in Ireland, (132) and up to the 
seventh decile in France. (133) 

Strengthening collective bargaining 

Collective bargaining systems that cover a high 
share  of  workers  not  only  support  low  wages, 
but  also  general  wage  developments.  Overall, 
Member  States  with  high  collective  bargaining 
coverage  tend  to  have  higher  wages  than  other 
Member  States,  as  well  as  a  lower  share  of  low-
wage  workers  and  lower  wage  inequality.  In 
particular,  sectoral  and  multi-level  collective 
bargaining  systems  are  associated  with  wage 
inequality that is around 20-25 percent lower. (134) 
In  addition,  decreases  in  collective  bargaining 
coverage  have  been  found  to  have  a  negative, 
although transitory, effect on wage growth. (135) 

While the exercise of collective bargaining falls 
under the responsibility of social partners, there 
are  some  actions  that  national  authorities  can 
undertake to promote it. Among others, Member 
States  can  set 
the  conditions  for  collective 
bargaining  to  function  well  by  supporting  the 
capacity  of  social  partners,  guaranteeing  that  they 
have  access  to  relevant  information,  and  protect 
workers  and  trade  union  representatives  against 

in 

(130) See  Fougère,  D.,  Gautier,  E  and  S.  Roux,  “Wage  floor 
industry-level  agreements:  Evidence  from 

rigidity 
France”, Labour Economics, Vol. 55, September 2018. 
(131) European  Commission  (2018):  “Labour  market  and  wage 
developments 
in  Europe,  Annual  Review  2018”, 
Directorate-General  for  Employment,  Social  Affairs  and 
Inclusion, pp. 134-135. 

Beyond low wages, increases in minimum wages 
also  have  the  potential  to  affect  other  tranches 

(128) See  Directive  2022/2041  of  19  October  2022  on  adequate 

minimum wages in the EU.  

(129) Eurofound (2022). 

(132) Redmond,  P.  (2020):  Minimum  wage  policy  in  Ireland. 

Budget perspectives 2021 paper 2, May 2020.   

(133) Aeberhardt, R., Givord, P., & Marbot, C. (2012). Spillover 
effect  of  the  minimum  wage  in  France:  An  unconditional 
quantile  regression  approach. Document  de  travail  de 
l’INSEE, (G2012/07). 

(134) OECD (2018). 
(135) See European Commission (2018b), Chapter II.1. 

66 

                                                           
                                                           
any adverse consequences of  their participation in 
collective bargaining. ( 136) 

Wages in the public sector 

Finally,  another  policy 
instrument  through 
which national authorities can support wages is 
by  adopting  measures  on  public  wages.  Public 
employment  can  represent  a  sizable  share  of  total 
employment,  with  more  than  20%  in  Sweden, 
Denmark, Finland, Croatia, Estonia, Lithuania and 
France,  but  less  than  15%  in  Germany,  the 
Netherlands,  Luxembourg,  Italy  and  Portugal.  
Increases  in  public  sector  wages  can  support  the 
purchasing power of these employees, in particular 
the low wage earners. At the same time, they entail 
a cost for public finances, and can have spill-over 
effects  on  the  private  sector.  In  some  Member 
States,  public  sector  wages  tend  to  lead  wage 
developments in other  sectors.  (137) These factors 
need  to  be  taken  into  account  when  deciding  on 
pay rises in the public sector, notably in a context 
of tight public finances, inflationary pressures, and 
risks on competitiveness. 

2.4. 

POLICY  MEASURES  TAKEN  SO  FAR  TO 
SOFTEN  THE  IMPACT  OF  INFLATION  ON 
WORKERS 

2.4.1.  Wage measures taken so far 

Since  inflation  started  to  pick  up  in  mid-2021, 
Member States have adopted wage measures to 
protect  the  purchasing  power  of  low  wage 
workers.  Most  Member  States  increased  their 
statutory  minimum  wages,  not  only  to  react  to 
inflation, but in some cases also more generally to 
support their adequacy, especially where minimum 

(136) The  Directive  on  adequate  minimum  wages  includes 
requirements on the adequacy of statutory minimum wages 
as  well  as  on  the  strengthening  of  collective  bargaining. 
For additional details on the Directive, see Section 2.4.  
(137) Camarero  et  al.  (2014)  tested  for  wage  leadership  across 
four  macroeconomic  sectors  in  10  euro  area  Member 
States,  based  on  data  until  2011.  It  suggested  that  public 
lead  wage 
sector  wage  developments 
determination  in  the  economy  in  Germany,  Belgium  and 
Greece.  For  10  Central  and  Eastern  European  Member 
States, D'Adamo (2014) also showed that  over the period 
2000-2011, non-traded and public sector wages were often 
leaders  in  wage  determination  or  at  least  affect  traded 
sector  wages  in  the  short  run.  Telegdy  (2018)  also  finds 
high spill-overs from public sector wages to private sector 
wages in Hungary.  

tended 

to 

Wages and labour costs developments in the EU and its Member States 

Chapter 2 

wages  were  too  low  compared  to  other  wages. 
Moreover,  action  was  also  taken  in  relation  to 
public  wages 
bargaining 
frameworks.  

collective 

and 

In 

several 

inflation 

countries, 

In  more  than  half  of  the  Member  States  with 
statutory  minimum  wages,  inflation  is  taken 
into  account  directly  or  indirectly  to  update 
(or, 
them. 
alternatively,  changes  in  the  cost  of  living),  is  set 
by law as a criterion to update statutory minimum 
wages.  These  countries  are  Belgium,  Croatia, 
Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,  France,  Greece,  Ireland, 
Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Malta,  Portugal,  Poland, 
Spain,  Slovenia  and  Slovakia. (138)  In  other 
Member States, the link between inflation and the 
statutory  minimum  wage  is  more  indirect:  for 
example, 
the  Netherlands  or  Germany, 
collectively  agreed  wages  are  taken  into  account 
for updating minimum wages, which means that in 
inflation 
case 
developments, minimum wages will also reflect it. 
In  most  cases,  the  statutory  minimum  wages  are 
updated only in January every year, without further 
interventions throughout the rest of the year.    

react  quickly 

former 

the 

to 

in 

for  measures  enhancing 
and 

The  EU  Directive  of  19  October  2022  on 
adequate  minimum  wages  in  the  European 
Union (139)  is  expected  to  create  a  positive 
momentum 
their 
coverage.  This  Directive 
adequacy 
establishes  a  framework  for  the  adequacy  of 
statutory  minimum  wages,  promoting  collective 
bargaining  on  wage  setting,  and  enhancing  the 
effective  access  of  workers  to  minimum  wage 
protection.  It  aims  at  improving  the  adequacy  of 
minimum  wages,  among  others  by  taking  into 
account  the  cost  of  living  as  a  criterion  for 
updating  statutory  minimum  wages  (where  they 
exist),  in  a  timely  manner,  and  by  strengthening 
collective  bargaining  on  wages  in  all  countries.  It 
will  contribute  to  enhancing  the  predictability  of 
minimum  wage  developments,  which  can  be 
crucial  to  both  workers  and  businesses.  In  the 
current  context,  a  frontloaded  implementation  of 
the  Directive  would  contribute  to  offering  timely 
support to the  most  vulnerable. Moreover, next to 
minimum  wage  earners,  the  Directive  is  also 
expected  to  indirectly  benefit  other  workers,  in 

(138) European Commission (2020b). 
(139) Directive  2022/2041  of  19  October  2022 on  adequate 

minimum wages in the European Union. 

67 

                                                           
                                                           
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

particular  by  supporting  collective  bargaining  on 
wages  and  encouraging  competition  in  the  Single 
Market based on innovation and productivity. 

minimum wage by around 7% in July 2022 (which 
was  then  complemented  by  a  further  increase  of 
almost 15% in October 2022).   

In addition, a few Member States have already 
announced  or  are  considering  substantial 
minimum  wage  increases  in  late  2022  or  early 
2023.  For  instance,  Latvia  has  announced  its 
intention  to  increase  its  statutory  minimum  wage 
by  40%  as  of  2023.  The  Netherlands  has 
announced  that  the  minimum  wage  will  increase 
by  10.15%  from  1  January  2023.  In  addition,  the 
Spanish  government  is  considering  raising  the 
statutory minimum wage by 10% in 2023, instead 
of 5% as initially envisaged. As for Romania, as of 
1 January 2023, the minimum wage will be raised 
to 50% of the gross average wage. 

stable 

in  Bulgaria,  France 

The  increases  in  statutory  minimum  wages 
conducted  or  announced  so  far  do  not  fully 
compensate  for  the  high  inflation.  In  2021, 
minimum wages in real terms had decreased in 14 
out of the 21 EU countries with statutory minimum 
wages,  increasing  only  in  four  countries  (Latvia, 
Portugal,  Slovenia  and  Slovakia)  and  remaining 
broadly 
and 
Luxembourg.  Inflation  has  continued  to  surge  in 
2022,  reaching  10.1%  in  the  EU  as  a  whole  in 
August  2022.  Up  to  August  2022,  declines  of 
minimum  wages  in  real  terms  took  place  in  all 
countries  except  Belgium,  Hungary,  Greece  and 
Romania,  while  in  France  it  remained  broadly 
unchanged. (144) While the largest decreases in real 
terms  in  2022  have  been  registered  in  Latvia 
(14.7%),  Malta  (9.4%)  and  the  Czech  Republic 
(7.7%),  decreases  below  2%  occurred  in  Croatia 
(0.4%),  Lithuania  (0.7%),  Germany  (1.2%) (145), 
Portugal (1.6%) and Bulgaria (1.8%). 

(144) Eurofound  calculations  using  minimum  wage  data  from 
Eurofound's  Network  of  Correspondents  and  HICP  data 
from Eurostat. 

(145) In the case of Germany, the statutory minimum wage is set 
to  increase  in  real  terms  in  October,  after  the  statutory 
minimum wage was raised by almost 15% on 1 October.  

their 

Between  January  2021  and  August  2022, 
Member  States 
statutory 
increased 
minimum  wages.  The  most  substantial  increases 
were  recorded  in  those  countries  with  the  highest 
inflation rates. (140) The largest statutory minimum 
wage  increase  in  nominal  terms  occurred  in 
Hungary  (19.5%),  and  considerable  increases  also 
took place in Lithuania (13.7%), Belgium (13.3%), 
Estonia (12%), Romania (10.8%), Croatia (10.3%),  
Greece  (9.7%),  Bulgaria  (9.2%),  France  (8%), 
Poland  (7.5%),  and  Germany  (7.2%).  Smaller  but 
still  significant  increases  were  introduced  in  the 
Czech  Republic  (6.5%),  Portugal  (6%),  Spain 
(5.3%),  Luxembourg  (5.1%),  and  Slovenia  (5%). 
The 
the 
Netherlands  (4.2%),  Slovakia  (3.7%),  Ireland 
(3%), and Malta (1%). (141) 

increases  were  recorded 

lowest 

in 

the 

some  countries, 

throughout  2022  (namely 

In 
increases  reflect 
additional  updates  throughout  the  year  on  top 
of the annual update in January 2022. (142) The 
most  noteworthy  case  is  Belgium,  where  three 
automatic updates of the statutory minimum wage 
were  conducted 
in 
January,  March  and  May),  in  addition  to  a 
substantial  increase  agreed  by  social  partners  in 
April. The Greek government decided to raise the 
statutory minimum wage by more than 7% in May 
2022 (on top of the regular annual update of 2% in 
January 2022). The Netherlands also implemented 
an additional increase of 2% in July, on top of the 
automatic  increase  in  January  2022. (143)  Finally, 
the  statutory 
the  German  government  raised 

(140) This does not include the update of January 2021.  
(141) In  Hungary  and  Lithuania,  the    process  to  consult  and 
negotiate  with  social  partners  to  update  the  statutory 
minimum  wage  differed  from  previous  years,  as  in  both 
cases  the  government  made  a  proposal  for  a  sizable 
increase 
instead  of  promoting 
negotiations between them as per usual practice. In the rest 
of  the  Member  States,  the  procedures  to  update  the 
statutory  minimum  wage  remained  in  line  with  previous 
years. 

social  partners, 

to 

(142) Eurofound  calculations  using  minimum  wage  data  from 
Eurofound's  Network  of  Correspondents  and  HICP  data 
from Eurostat. 

(143) France  and  Luxembourg  also  have  automatic  indexation 
mechanisms  in  place  and  that  led  to  additional  statutory 
minimum  wage  increases  throughout  2022  to  respond  to 
inflation.  However, 
further 
discretionary updates were implemented. 

these  countries  no 

in 

68 

                                                           
 
                                                           
Wages and labour costs developments in the EU and its Member States 

Chapter 2 

Graph 2.14:  Changes in statutory minimum wages, in real and nominal terms 

25
20
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
-15
-20

Nominal 2021

Nominal 2022 (up to Aug)

Real 2021

Real 2022 (up to Aug)

E
B

U
H

L
E

O
R

R
F

R
H

T
L

E
D

T
P

G
B

S
E

L
P

I

S

E

I

U
L

E
E

L
N

K
S

Z
C

T
M

V
L

(1) Member States are ranked in ascending order of the magnitude of the increase in statutory minimum wages in real terms 
in 2022.  
Source: Eurofound own calculations using minimum wage data from Eurofound's Network of Correspondents and HICP data 
from Eurostat 

In  addition  to  the  increases  in  the  levels  of 
statutory minimum wages, some Member States 
have  implemented  or  announced  reforms  to 
their minimum wage frameworks. Most notably, 
Cyprus  has  decided  to  put  in  place  a  statutory 
minimum  wage  of  EUR  940,  which  amounts  to 
about  60%  of  the  median  gross  wage  and  will 
apply  as  of  January  2023.  Another  noteworthy 
reform  was  adopted  in  Romania,  that  has  set  an 
upper  limit  of  24  months  to  the  period  during 
which a worker may receive the minimum wage, a 
period after which a higher wage must be paid. In 
Croatia, 
the  Minimum  Wage  Act  has  been 
amended  in  order  to  enhance  the  enforcement  of 
the  rules  related  to  the  statutory  minimum  wage, 
among  others  by  amending  the  penalties  for 
offenders  and  strengthening 
the  control  by 
inspection bodies. In Malta, the newly established 
Low  Wage  Commission  is  expected  to  issue  its 
first  recommendations  for  a  new  mechanism  to 
update  the  minimum  wage  in  2023.  Finally, 
Ireland  has  decided  to  put  in  place  a  living  wage 
which will apply as of January 2023 and which has 
to amount to 60% of the median wage in any given 
year,  and  is  considering  the  removal  of  variations 
that  set  lower  statutory  minimum  wages  for 
younger workers. 

Beyond  minimum  wages,  some  Member  States 
have adopted measures to support public sector 
wages.  In  France,  a  3.5%  pay  increase  for  civil 
servants  as  of  July  2022  has  been  decided,  to 
cushion the impact of inflation (6.1% in July 2022) 
the 
on 

the  purchasing  power. 

In  Latvia, 

government  has  decided  to  allocate  bonuses  for 
social  workers  due  to  higher  workload  with 
Ukrainian  refugees.  In  Croatia,  the  collective 
agreement  for  civil  servants  and  civil  employees 
was renewed in May 2022 notably to increase the 
salary  base  by  4%  and  revise  upwards  some 
allowances. 

Finally,  some  reforms  of  collective  bargaining 
on  wage  setting  have  been  or  are  about  to  be 
introduced.  Notably,  Spain,  as  part  of  its  labour 
market  reform  entering  into  force  as  of  January 
2022, has amended the Workers' Statute to i) give 
precedence  to  sector-level  agreements  over  firm-
level  agreements  in  matters  related  to  salary  and 
allowances,  and  ii)  establish  that  an  expired 
agreement is extended indefinitely until a new one 
is negotiated. In addition, Germany plans to adopt 
a new set of laws to promote collective bargaining 
(dealing  among  others  with  the  compliance  of 
collective 
public 
procurement). 

and  with 

agreements 

2.4.2.  Other 

their 
support  measures  and 
interplay  with  the  promotion  of  wage 
increases 

Beyond wage policies, Member States have used 
other  policy  tools  to  support  households.  Some 
of these measures directly support income, thereby 
acting as a complement to wage policies, as is the 
case for income policies such as direct transfers or 
tax  reductions.  Further  details  on  these  measures 
are outlined below. At the same time, the majority 

69 

  
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

of  support  measures  undertaken  by  EU  countries 
consisted of price policies, regulating the prices of 
energy  (e.g.  through  price  caps)  or  reducing 
energy-related  taxes  for  households,  with  the  aim 
to  reduce  the  final  price  that  end  users  pay  for 
energy during the present crisis. Overall, the large 
majority of those support policies are not targeted 
and  may  distort  the  price  signal  and  reduce 
incentives  to  contain  energy  consumption  and 
increase  energy  efficiency. (146)  While  price 
pressures  are  spreading  beyond  energy,  and  fiscal 
resources 
increasingly 
limited, 
important  that  support  measures  are  targeted  to 
vulnerable  households  and 
retain 
incentives  to  reduce  energy  consumption  and 
promote energy efficiency. ( 147) 

remain 

they 

that 

is 

it 

When  it  comes  to  measures  to  improve  the 
income  of  households,  the  policy  tool  that 
Member  States  have  used  more  extensively  are 
transfers.  They  mostly  take  the  form  of  cash 
transfers,  but  vouchers  and  in-kind  benefits  have 
also  been  used  by  some  countries.  All  Member 
States  but  Bulgaria,  Hungary  and  Slovakia  have 
to 
adopted  measures 
these 
vulnerable  households.  While  some  of 
actions 
are 
all  households,  others 
specifically  targeted  to  particular  groups  (for 
instance,  low-income  households  or  households 
with a particular household composition). 

to  provide 

transfers 

target 

of 

vulnerable  workers 

Furthermore,  Member  States  can  support  the 
through  
income 
taxation. Tax-related measures included replacing 
flat personal income tax schemes with progressive 
ones (Czechia), increasing minimum thresholds for 
income  tax  exemption  (Austria,  Germany),  tax 
breaks  for  specific  groups  (like  families  with 
children in Slovakia), and making the tax brackets 

(146) In  2022,  roughly  two  thirds  of  energy  measures  adopted 
have  been  price  measures.  More  than  70%  of  supporting 
measures  have  not  been  targeted.  This  lack  of  targeting 
concerns  price  policies  to  a  larger  extent  than  income 
support  policies.  See  Annual  Sustainable  Growth  Survey 
2023, COM(2022) 780 final. 

(147) Between September 2021 and September 2022, funding of 
measures  to  shield  households  and  businesses  from  high 
energy  prices  are  estimated  to  have  ranged  from  0.2%  of 
GDP  in  Ireland  up  to  4.1%  and  3.7%  of  GDP  in  Croatia 
and  Greece  respectively.  Italy  and  Latvia  dedicated  over 
3%  of  GDP  to  these  measures,  while  Belgium,  Estonia, 
Cyprus,  Slovenia,  Finland,  Sweden  and  Ireland  spent  less 
than  1%  of  GDP.  Fourteen  Member  States  dedicated 
between 1% and 3% of GDP to these measures. For details 
of  measures,  see:  Sgaravatti,  Tagliapietra  and  Zachmann 
(2022). 

70 

more inflation-neutral (as the tax system results in 
an  increase  of  tax  rates  when  nominal  income 
rises)  (Austria).  These  measures,  however,  were 
not restricted to workers, but tend to help them in 
particular,  as  labour  income  is  generally  the  main 
source  of  income  for  vulnerable  households  that 
are in working age and not already tax-exempted.  

Measures  aimed  at  supporting  the  income  of 
households  are  not  the  only  ones  that  Member 
States  have  put  in  place. In  terms  of  price 
policies,  price  caps  at  retail  price  or  at  wholesale 
price  level,  reductions  in  VAT  and  in  energy-
related taxes were swiftly introduced, but typically 
are  not  targeted  (see  Chapter  1  for  details). 
Moreover,  Member  States  have  mobilised 
investments  into  energy  efficiency  and  renewable 
energy,  which  will  reduce  household  expenditure 
for energy in the medium and long term. Over the 
medium run, measures to improve productivity and 
increase  energy  efficiency  can  also  help  support 
Productivity-enhancing 
purchasing 
measures  may 
firms’  profitability, 
therefore  providing  them  more  room  for  wage 
increases.  Measures  related  to  energy  efficiency 
may  also  reduce  production  costs  for  firms  (as 
energy 
for 
and 
households  (e.g.  if  housing  is  renovated  and  less 
energy-consuming).  Details  about  price  policies 
and  policies  to  support  the  green  transition  in  the 
field  of  energy  can  be  found  in  Chapter 1  of  this 
report.   

energy  bills 

consumers), 

increase 

power. 

It 

included  measures 

To guide action at national level, the EU has put 
forward  several 
initiatives  to  mitigate  the 
negative  impacts  for  vulnerable  households. 
Notably, already in October 2021, the Commission 
issued  a  dedicated  Communication  that  set  out  a 
toolbox  of  specific  measures 
through  which 
Member  States  can  address  the  most  immediate 
impact  of  the  situation,  in  particular  on  the  most 
such  as 
vulnerable. 
emergency income support to households, state aid 
for  companies,  and  targeted  tax  reductions.  In 
March  2022,  the  Commission  highlighted  options 
to  mitigate  high  energy  prices  with  common  gas 
purchases and storages obligations. As high energy 
prices  continue 
further 
exacerbated by Russia’s war of aggression against 
Ukraine, in May 2022 the Commission adopted the 
RePowerEU  Plan,  which  set  out  measures  to 
further  reduce  the  EU's  dependence  on  Russian 
fuels,  which  will  ultimately  protect 
fossil 

to  persist,  and  are 

                                                           
Wages and labour costs developments in the EU and its Member States 

Chapter 2 

households from large and unpredictable increases 
their  energy  bills.  More  recently,  on  30 
in 
September, 
the  Council  adopted  a  proposal 
initially  put  forward  by  the  Commission  which 
included  a  temporary  solidarity  contribution  on 
excess  profits  made  in  the  oil,  gas,  coal  and 
refinery sectors to support energy consumers. 

hampered by different factors, including shortages 
of raw material and basic inputs, as well as logistic 
disruptions.  As  a  result,  real  wages  already 
decreased  in  the  second  half  of  2021.  In  turn, 
nominal wages started accelerating more markedly 
in the first quarter of 2022, in a context of  higher 
inflation and labour market tightening. 

the 

losses 

to  mitigate 

Both wage and non-wage policies can be seen as 
complementary in supporting households in the 
short  run.  The  composition  of  policies  notably 
depends on competitiveness as well as on the fiscal 
space  of  Member  States.  The  more  firms  can 
increase wages, the less fiscal transfers (or reduced 
taxes)  are  needed 
in 
purchasing  power  of  households.  This  depends  in 
particular  on  productivity  gains,  as  they  can 
facilitate wage increases. By contrast, should firms 
have  less  room  to  increase  wages,  e.g.  due  to 
higher  energy  bills,  then  an  income  support  to 
households  help  preserve  their  purchasing  power 
without  directly  increasing  labour  costs.  Such 
complementarity also depends on the time horizon. 
Indeed,  transfers  and  tax  reductions  aimed  at 
supporting  households’  purchasing  power  should 
be  targeted,  temporary  and  should  not  entail  a 
permanent  burden  on  public  finances.  Better 
targeting  allows  those  measures  to  be  effective  in 
preventing  energy  poverty  and  poverty  in  general 
from  rising,  while  not  adding  to  inflation  and 
limiting the budgetary impact. Moreover, measures 
that target disadvantaged groups perform better in 
terms  of  macroeconomic  stabilisation.  In  the 
longer  run,  wages  could  catch  up  losses  in 
purchasing power thanks to productivity increases. 
Overall,  the  mix  of  wage  increases  and  fiscal 
support  measures 
to 
protecting low earners and vulnerable households, 
preserving incentives to reduce energy demand and 
avoiding fuelling inflation. 

should  be  conducive 

2.5. 

 CONCLUSIONS 
IMPLICATIONS 

AND 

POLICY 

Wage growth has overall remained limited since 
the  pandemic.  In  2021  growth 
in  nominal 
compensation  per  employee  stood  well  above  the 
pre-pandemic 
this  mainly 
levels.  However, 
reflected  the  rebound  in  hours  worked  in  2021, 
after a collapse in 2020. At the same time, inflation 
started increasing in 2021, as a result of a vigorous 
in  demand  and  supply  still  being 
rebound 

is  expected 

Looking  ahead,  nominal  wage  growth  is  set  to 
increase but to stay well below inflation in 2022. 
Nominal  wage  growth 
to  stay 
significantly  above  the  pre-pandemic  average  in 
2022  and  2023,  driven  by  a  higher  and  more 
persistent  inflation.  However,  wage  growth  is 
expected  to  fall  short  of  inflation,  as  it  is 
constrained,  notably  by  a  challenging  economic 
environment,  high  energy  prices  and  the  fact  that 
profit  levels  in  some  companies  and  sectors  are 
under  stress.  As  a  result,  real  wages  are  set  to 
decline  further  in  2022,  leading  to  significant 
losses in purchasing power. 

While  all  workers  stand    to  be  affected  by  the 
higher  cost  of  living,  low-wage  earners  are 
significantly  more  vulnerable.  They  spend  a 
higher  share  of  their  income  on  energy  and  food. 
In 2021, minimum  wages in  real terms decreased, 
as updates tended to occur at the beginning of the 
year, while inflation increased throughout the year. 
In  2022,  some  Member  States  implemented  large 
updates of their minimum wages, but the latter still 
fell in real terms in almost all Member States, as a 
result of the high inflation. 

The  analysis  presented  in  this  chapter  suggests 
that  there  could  be  some  room  for  further 
increasing  wages,  notably  low  wages,  though 
the  situation  varies  across  sectors.  While  wage 
increases play a major role in mitigating the losses 
in purchasing power, their impacts in terms of both 
competitiveness  losses  and  inflationary  pressures, 
have to be considered. First, firms have still room 
to  absorb  such  wage  increases,  notably  in  some 
services sector as they tend to face less headwinds 
than  in  the  manufacturing  sector  and  have  more 
capacity  to  pass  on  higher  wages  to  consumer 
prices.  They  also  employ  a  higher  share  of  low 
wage  earners.  In  addition,  wage  increases  could 
contribute to addressing high and persistent labour 
shortages  in  some  sectors.  The  situation  varies 
however  significantly  across  sectors  and  Member 
States.  Second,  moderate  adjustments  of  wages  to 

71 

European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

inflation  do  not 
pressures. 

risk 

triggering 

inflationary 

struggling  with  the  effects  of  the  high  and 
persistent inflation.  

Both  wage  and  non-wage  policies  to  support 
households’  purchasing  power  need  to  be  well 
articulated.  They  can  be  seen  as  complementary 
in supporting households, notably in the short run. 
The  composition  of  policies  notably  depends  on 
competitiveness  of  firms,  as  well  as  on  the  fiscal 
space  of  Member  States.  In  some  Member  States, 
lagging  productivity  and  high  public  debt  make 
policy  choices  more  challenging.  In  addition, 
income  support  and  price  policies  aimed  at 
supporting  households’  purchasing  power  should 
be  targeted  and  temporary.  As  a  whole,  so  far 
policies  have  not  been  well  targeted,  and  may 
reduce  incentives  to  contain  energy  consumption 
and  increase  energy  efficiency.  They  should  not 
entail  a  permanent  burden  on  public  finances  and 
should  preserve 
to  reduce  energy 
incentives 
consumption.  Overall,  while  it  is  important  that 
fiscal  and  wage  policies  operate  in  a  coordinated 
manner  to  contain  inflation,  complementing  the 
efforts  of  monetary  policy  to  reduce  inflation  and 
keeping  inflation  expectations  well  anchored,  it  is 
also  important  to  protect  the  purchasing  power  of 
low earning workers and households. Furthermore, 
in  a  context  of  low  productivity  gains,  over  the 
run  productivity-enhancing  measures 
medium 
(including  those  related  to  energy  efficiency)  can 
increase the firms’ ability to provide higher wages, 
thereby  supporting 
the  purchasing  power  of 
workers. 

Policies to promote wage adjustments should be 
well  calibrated.  Member  States  have  different 
policy tools at their disposal to support wages (and 
notably  low  wages).  This  includes  the  minimum 
wage policy, notably for countries with a statutory 
minimum  wage  in  place,  as  well  as  policies  to 
support  public  wages  (in  particular  for 
low 
earners)  and 
strengthening 
those  aimed  at 
collective bargaining. While the latter have only an 
indirect  effect  on  wage  developments  (as  wages 
are  merely  negotiated  by  social  partners  or  at  the 
individual  level),  minimum  wages  and  public 
wages  can  have  spill-over  effects  on  other  wage 
tranches  or  sectors,  which  need  to  be  considered 
carefully. If not well calibrated, these wage-related 
measures  risk  failing  to  meet  their  objective  of 
protecting  the  bottom  deciles  of  the  income 
distribution against the detrimental impacts of high 
inflation, affect overall employment levels, lead to 
further  deteriorations 
trade  and 
in 
competitiveness, and potentially fuel higher energy 
prices and overall inflation. This calls for policies 
that  are  country-  and  sector-specific  and  are 
combined with other support policies for firms and 
workers. 

terms  of 

losses 

Member  States  have  taken  measures  to  bolster 
wage  growth  for  low  earners,  as  well  as  other 
measures  that  can  mitigate  the 
in 
purchasing power for households. With regard to 
wage  policies,  Member  States  have  notably 
increased their minimum wages, although this does 
not offset the elevated inflation. In this regard, the 
EU  Directive  on  adequate  minimum  wages  is 
expected  to  create  a  positive  momentum  for 
measures  enhancing  their  adequacy  and  coverage. 
Some  Member  States  have  also  adopted  measures 
to  support  public  sector  wages  or  to  strengthen 
that  can  support  wages  under 
mechanisms 
collective  bargaining.  In  addition,  Member  States 
have implemented other income and price policies 
to  protect  the  purchasing  power  of  households. 
These consist of a range of tools, including income 
and prices policies. While many of these measures 
do not concern workers only, some de facto affect 
them  in  particular,  e.g.,  those  related  to  direct 
taxation. In addition, transfers that usually targeted 
the  inactive,  now  also  concern  broader  categories 
of households, as they become vulnerable and are 

72 

APPENDIX 1 

Annex to the chapter 2 

Graph 2.A1.1: Wage and salaries per employee, by sectors, annual changes (%) 

AT

BE

BG

CY

4

3

2

1

0

8

6

4

2

0

-2

5

0

-5

-10

10

5

0

-5

10

5

0

-5

-10

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

20

15

10

5

0

10

5

0

-5

2019

2020

2021

2019

2020

2021

CZ

DE

4

2

0

-2

-4

5

0

-5

-10

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

40

30

20

10

0

2019

2020

2021

ES

2019

2020

2021

HR

2019

2020

2021

LT

2019

2020

2021

2019

2020

2021

EL

2019

2020

2021

FR

2019

2020

2021

IT

2019

2020

2021

MT

NL

4

3

2

1

0

6

4

2

0

2019

2020

2021

SE

2019

2020

2021

2019

2020

2021

RO

2019

2020

2021

15

10

5

0

4

3

2

1

0

6

4

2

0

-2

15

10

5

0

10

5

0

-5

10

8

6

4

2

0

8

6

4

2

0

2019

2020

2021

DK

2019

2020

2021

EE

5

0

-5

-10

25

20

15

10

5

0

2019

2020

2021

2019

2020

2021

EU27

FI

2019

2020

2021

HU

2019

2020

2021

LU

2019

2020

2021

PL

2019

2020

2021

SI

4

3

2

1

0

8

6

4

2

0

10

8

6

4

2

0

5

4

3

2

1

0

8

6

4

2

0

2019

2020

2021

IE

2019

2020

2021

LV

2019

2020

2021

PT

2019

2020

2021

SK

2019

2020

2021

2019

2020

2021

Construction

Industry

Services

(1)Wages  are  measured  by  the  indicator  ‘Nominal  compensation  per  employee’,  which  is  calculated  as  a  total 
compensation  of  employees  divided  by  total  number  of  employees.  The  total  compensation  is  defined  as  the  total 
remuneration,  in  cash  or  in  kind,  payable  by  an  employer  to  an  employee  in  return  for  work  done  by  the  latter  during  the 
accounting period and it has two components: i) Wages and salaries payable in cash or in kind; and ii) Social contributions 
payable  by  employers.  (2)  All  the  data  used  are  national  accounts  data.  The  indicators  are  based  on  national  currency 
values. 
Source:  Own computations on Eurostat 

73 

 
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Graph 2.A1.2: Nominal compensation per employee, productivity growth, inflation, by Member States (annual % change), 

2013 - 2021, forecasts 2022 and 2023 

AT

CZ

EL

FR

IT

MT

RO

10

5

0

-5

15
10
5
0
-5

10
5
0
-5
-10

5

0

-5

-10

10

5

0

-5

5

0

-5

-10

15

10

5

0

8
0
0
2

2
1
0
2

6
1
0
2

0
2
0
2

10

5

0

-5

10

5

0

-5

10
5
0
-5
-10

10
5
0
-5
-10

20

10

0

-10

10

5

0

-5

10

5

0

-5

8
6
4
2
0

8
6
4
2
0

5

0

-5

-10

6
4
2
0
-2

6
4
2
0
-2
-4

6

4

2

0

40
30
20
10
0

4
2
0
2

BE

DE

ES

HR

LT

NL

SE

8
0
0
2

2
1
0
2

6
1
0
2

0
2
0
2

BG

DK

EU-27

HU

LU

PL

SI

8
0
0
2

2
1
0
2

6
1
0
2

0
2
0
2

10

5

0

-5

20

10

0

-10

10

5

0

-5

20

10

0

15
10
5
0
-5

10

5

0

-5

15
10
5
0
-5

16
14
12
10
8
6

5
4
3
2
1

5
4
3
2
1
0

15
10
5
0
-5

6

4

2

0

12
10
8
6
4
2

8
6
4
2
0
-2

4
2
0
2

15

10

5

0

10

5

0

-5

10

5

0

-5

15
10
5
0
-5

10

5

0

-5

15

10

5

0

10

5

0

-5

10

5

0

-5

6

4

2

0

6
4
2
0
-2

10

5

0

-5

15
10
5
0
-5
-10

5
4
3
2
1
0

4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2

4
2
0
2

CY

EE

FI

IE

LV

PT

SK

8
0
0
2

2
1
0
2

6
1
0
2

0
2
0
2

10

5

0

-5

10

5

0

-5

4
3
2
1
0
-1

6
4
2
0
-2
-4

20

10

0

-10

4
2
0
-2
-4

8

6

4

2

4
2
0
2

Harmonised consumer price index (All-items)

Gross domestic product at 2015 reference levels per person employed

Nominal compensation per employee; total economy

(1)  Nominal  compensation  per  employee  is  calculated  as  a  total  compensation  of  employees  divided  by  total  number  of 
employees. The total compensation  is defined as the  total  remuneration,  in cash or in kind, payable by an employer to an 
employee  in  return  for  work  done  by  the  latter  during  the  accounting  period  and  it  has  two  components:  i)  Wages  and 
salaries  payable  in  cash  or  in  kind;  and  ii)  Social  contributions  payable  by  employers.  (2)  All  the  data  used  are  national 
accounts data. The indicators are based on national currency values. 
Source: European Commission, AMECO database 

74 

 
 
 
Wages and labour costs developments in the EU and its Member States 

Chapter 2 

Table 2.A1.1:  Real gross wages and salaries and real compensation per employee by Member States (annual % change, 

2019-2021, forecasts for 2022 and 2023) 

Real gross wages and salaries per 
employee, deflator private 
consumption

Real compensation per employee, 
deflator GDP

2019 2020 2021 2022* 2023* 2019 2020 2021 2022* 2023*

AT

BE

1.2

0.7

BG 4.7

CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE

EL

ES

FI

FR

3.0

4.3

1.7

0.8

4.9

0.1

1.2

0.6

1.3

HR -0.4

HU

IE

IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL

PL

PT

3.2

1.7

0.4

33.7

0.8

4.0

2.2

-0.1

6.3

3.8

RO 6.1

SE

SI

SK

0.9

3.6

3.4

0.3

-2.9

7.8

-0.5

-1.1

-0.7

1.8

6.5

1.3

-0.8

0.9

-3.8

1.5

1.5

3.3

-4.5

5.3

0.0

4.4

-1.9

3.2

1.9

1.0

1.6

1.4

3.6

1.6

0.5

2.1

5.2

3.0

1.8

0.2

1.0

5.6

0.5

0.7

0.1

3.1

7.8

3.1

-1.4

4.6

6.9

4.9

7.9

3.7

-1.1

-1.2

2.7

-1.2

2.3

4.3

2.8

-4.1

-1.7

4.0

-4.2

-7.2

-2.0

-6.0

-7.4

-3.5

-7.5

-3.1

-0.5

-2.1

1.2

-2.4

-2.9

-6.7

-1.7

-5.3

-2.0

-3.4

-3.5

-1.3

-3.5

-5.0

-8.8

-4.5

-0.1

3.6

1.4

2.0

-4.5

-1.2

-0.3

2.8

-2.5

-1.6

-0.5

0.2

0.3

-3.6

0.2

-2.4

-2.6

1.0

-1.0

-2.1

-2.1

-1.9

0.4

-1.7

-2.2

-1.0

-6.7

1.2

0.2

1.6

3.1

3.2

1.3

0.9

3.9

-0.5

1.6

-0.2

-1.3

-1.6

2.1

0.2

0.3

7.7

0.5

5.1

1.4

-0.2

5.4

3.0

3.8

0.4

2.6

4.2

-0.7

-3.0

2.8

0.8

-1.1

-1.4

0.0

6.7

0.2

-0.7

-1.0

-5.3

0.5

-3.2

5.3

-5.6

4.7

-3.3

4.0

-2.2

2.8

1.0

-0.5

-0.1

0.5

2.1

1.5

0.8

1.2

3.9

1.0

1.6

0.0

0.2

3.6

1.0

0.4

0.4

3.3

8.2

1.9

2.0

5.6

5.1

-0.1

3.9

2.9

-0.3

-1.3

2.7

-0.9

1.4

5.2

4.0

-1.7

-0.3

2.8

0.1

-1.4

-0.8

-0.1

-4.0

-3.4

-0.6

-1.8

1.9

2.1

4.9

-5.6

1.2

-4.8

-0.6

-0.3

-1.5

0.0

-1.6

1.0

-2.9

-3.3

-4.1

0.0

0.7

3.9

4.6

2.5

-1.5

-1.3

0.3

2.6

-1.6

0.7

-0.2

-0.4

0.5

2.8

0.6

-0.3

-2.4

0.5

0.9

-1.6

-0.5

0.1

-0.8

-1.3

-0.7

0.0

-5.5

(1)  The  nominal  compensation  per  employee  includes,  besides  gross  wages,  employer  contributions.  Absent  changes  in 
employer contributions, the growth rate of nominal compensation per employee will be the same as the growth rate of gross 
wages and salaries. 
Source:  European Commission, AMECO database. 

75 

 
  
 
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Table 2.A1.2:  Nominal compensation per employee, productivity growth, unit labour costs, inflation (annual % change, 2021) 

Compensation 
per employee

Labour 
productivity

NULC, per 
person

GDP 
deflator

LT
LV
BG
HU
EE
IT
SK
RO
HR
SI
FR
LU
PL
CZ
MT
CY
SE
BE
PT
DE
AT
DK
FI
ES
IE
NL
EL

11.9
11.1
11.3
8.3
9.8
6.2
6.5
4.4
10.4
7.9
4.7
6.0
3.6
5.0
4.8
3.8
4.4
4.1
4.1
3.1
2.8
2.9
2.9
2.7
2.6
2.2
2.3

4.7
6.8
7.4
6.0
7.9
6.1
3.6
3.2
11.7
6.8
4.2
2.1
5.3
3.2
7.2
5.3
3.8
4.2
3.5
2.5
2.5
2.3
-0.3
3.0
7.1
2.8
5.6

6.8
4.0
3.6
2.1
1.8
0.0
2.8
1.2
-1.2
1.1
0.5
3.9
-1.6
1.8
-2.2
-1.4
0.5
-0.1
0.6
0.6
0.3
0.6
3.3
-0.3
-4.2
-0.6
-3.1

6.5
6.9
7.1
6.3
6.0
0.5
2.4
5.4
2.0
2.6
1.3
6.2
5.1
3.3
1.8
2.9
3.0
2.9
1.4
3.1
1.9
2.8
2.5
2.3
0.7
2.5
1.3

(1) Countries are ranked in descending order of compensation per employee. (2) The growth of nominal unit labour costs per 
person  (NULC)  is  the  difference  between  the  growth  of  nominal  compensation  per  employee  and  the  growth  of  labour 
productivity. 
Source:  Eurostat, National Accounts, and ECB 

76 

 
 
     
 
Wages and labour costs developments in the EU and its Member States 

Chapter 2 

Graph 2.A1.3: Nominal unit labour cost on persons 

15

10

5

0

-5

10

5

0

-5

10
5
0
-5
-10

10

5

0

-5

6

4

2

0

-2

20

10

0

-10

15

10

5

0

-5

AT

CZ

EL

FR

IT

MT

RO

3
q
4
1
0
2

3
q
6
1
0
2

3
q
8
1
0
2

3
q
0
2
0
2

3
q
2
2
0
2

10

5

0

-5

10

5

0

-5

15

10

5

0

-5

15

10

5

0

-5

15

10

5

0

15

10

5

0

-5

10

5

0

-5

(1) Year-over-year changes 
Source: Eurostat 

BE

DE

ES

HR

LT

NL

SE

3
q
4
1
0
2

3
q
6
1
0
2

3
q
8
1
0
2

3
q
0
2
0
2

3
q
2
2
0
2

20

15

10

5

0

10

5

0

-5

10

5

0

-5

15

10

5

0

-5

10

5

0

-5

15

10

5

0

-5

15

10

5

0

-5

BG

DK

EU27

HU

LU

PL

SI

CY

EE

FI

IE

LV

PT

SK

10

5

0

-5

15

10

5

0

5

0

-5

10

0

-10

-20

10

5

0

20

10

0

-10

10

5

0

3
q
4
1
0
2

3
q
6
1
0
2

3
q
8
1
0
2

3
q
0
2
0
2

3
q
2
2
0
2

3
q
4
1
0
2

3
q
6
1
0
2

3
q
8
1
0
2

3
q
0
2
0
2

3
q
2
2
0
2

77 

 
 
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Graph 2.A1.4: Developments in productivity versus real compensation per employee, 2021 and Q3-2022 

10

8

6

4

2

0

0

-2

6

4

2

0

1
2
0
2

,
h
t
w
o
r
g

y
t
i
v
i
t
c
u
d
o
r
P

3
Q
2
2
0
2

,
h
t
w
o
r
g

y
t
i
v
i
t
c
u
d
o
r
P

EE

CY

BG

BE

HU
EL

PL

NL

RO

CZ

LU

IE

45 degree line

MT

LV

SE

IT

EU27

EA19

PT

SI

LT

FR

DE

ES

AT

DK

FI

3

6

9

Real compensation growth, 2021

IE

45 degree line 

PL

HU
SI

DK

EL

CZ

MT

SE

RO

CY

PT
DE

HR
ES

AT

EA19

FI
LU

EU27

SK

NL

IT

BE

FR

BG

-2

LV

-4

-6

LT

EE

-9

-7

-5

-3

-1

1

3

5

7

Real compensation growth, 2022Q3

(1)   Real compensation  is nominal  compensation per employee deflated  with  the GDP deflator.  (2)  On  the 45 degree line, 
real wage growth equals productivity growth. Points above (below) the line represent countries where productivity growth is 
above  (below)  real  wage  growth.  For  graph  readibility,  RO  value  for  2021  (16.5%  for  productivity  growth,  1.9%  for  real 
compensation growth) is dropped. 
Source: European Commission, Eurostat data. 

78 

 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Wages and labour costs developments in the EU and its Member States 

Chapter 2 

Graph 2.A1.5: Real Unit Labour Costs by Member States (annual % change, 2020, 2021, forecasts for 2022 and 2023) 

AT

BE

BG

CY

4

2

0

-2

-4

4

2

0

-2

-4

10

5

0

-5

-10

2

1

0

-1

-2

1.5

1

.5

0

-.5

-1

10

5

0

-5

2

0

-2

-4

-6

-8

4

2

0

-2

-4

1

0

-1

-2

3

2

1

0

-1

-2

4

2

0

-2

-4

2

1

0

-1

-2

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

CZ

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

EL

4

2

0

-2

-4

2

1

0

-1

-2

8

6

4

2

0

-2

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

DE

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

ES

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

FR

HR

10

5

0

-5

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

IT

LT

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

DK

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

EU27

4

2

0

-2

-4

4

2

0

-2

-4

1

0

-1

-2

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

EE

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

FI

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

HU

IE

0

-2

-4

-6

-8

-10

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

LU

LV

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

MT

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

RO

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

1

0

-1

-2

-3

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

NL

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

PL

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

SE

SI

5

0

-5

-10

4

2

0

-2

-4

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

PT

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

SK

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

(1)  Ratio of compensation per employee to nominal GDP per person employed 
Source:  European Commission, AMECO database. 

79 

 
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Graph 2.A1.6: Real wages growth and productivity growth (annual % change, 2003-2021, forecasts for 2022 and 2023) 

BE

DE

ES

HR

LT

NL

SE

AT

CZ

EL

FR

IT

MT

RO

2
0
-2
-4
-6

5

0

-5

10
5
0
-5
-10

5

0

-5

-10

5

0

-5

-10

10
5
0
-5
-10

15

10

5

0

2
1
0
-1
-2

6
4
2
0
-2
-4

5

0

-5

5

0

-5

5

0

-5

5

0

-5

-10

-10

4
2
0
-2
-4
-6

5

0

-5

-10

6
4
2
0
-2

20

10

0

-10

10

5

0

-5

10
5
0
-5
-10

4
2
0
-2
-4

6
4
2
0
-2

BG

DK

EU-27

HU

LU

PL

SI

2
1
0
-1
-2
-3

2
1
0
-1
-2

4

2

0

-2

4
2
0
-2
-4
-6

15
10
5
0
-5

3
2
1
0
-1

4

2

0

-2

6
4
2
0
-2

4

2

0

-2

5

0

-5

5

0

-5

5

0

-5

6
4
2
0
-2

10

5

0

-5

10
8
6
4
2
0

2

1

0

-1

2
1
0
-1
-2

10
5
0
-5
-10

2

0

-2

-4

8
6
4
2
0
-2

6
4
2
0
-2

5

0

-5

10

5

0

-5

5

0

-5

20

10

0

10

5

0

-5

5

0

-5

-10

10

5

0

-5

CY

EE

FI

IE

LV

PT

SK

6
4
2
0
-2
-4

15
10
5
0
-5

3
2
1
0
-1
-2

5

0

-5

15
10
5
0
-5

4
2
0
-2
-4

8
6
4
2
0

3
0
0
2

7
0
0
2

1
1
0
2

5
1
0
2

9
1
0
2

3
2
0
2

3
0
0
2

7
0
0
2

1
1
0
2

5
1
0
2

9
1
0
2

3
2
0
2

3
0
0
2

7
0
0
2

1
1
0
2

5
1
0
2

9
1
0
2

3
2
0
2

3
0
0
2

7
0
0
2

1
1
0
2

5
1
0
2

9
1
0
2

3
2
0
2

Real labour productivity

Real compensation per employee deflator GDP; total economy

Source:  European Commission, AMECO database. 

80 

 
 
3. 

SHORT- AND LONG-RUN DETERMINANTS OF LABOUR 

SHORTAGES 

With  the  swift  economic  recovery  in  2021,  labour 
shortages  re-emerged  quickly.  This  is  not  a  new 
phenomenon,  as  high  shortages  were  reported 
already in 2019, and their decline in the pandemic 
was  only  temporary,  due  to  the  restrictions  to 
the  containment 
economic  activity 
measures.  By  the  end  of  2021,  labour  shortages 
reached  or  even  exceeded  pre-pandemic  levels  in 
several  EU  countries.  After  the  start  of  Russia’s 
aggression  against  Ukraine,  shortages  in  the  EU 
kept rising, especially in services, with some signs 
of lessening in industry. 

linked 

to 

in 

Labour and skills shortages are the most severe in 
a few sectors and occupations, such as health care, 
hospitality, 
and 
particular 
accommodation,  construction  and  ICT.  In  2021, 
the  main  occupational  groups  with  shortages  in 
in  healthcare-related 
the  EU  have  been 
occupations,  software  professionals,  construction, 
and engineering craft workers. 

restaurants 

While shortages have been on the rise in the post-
pandemic recovery, the efficiency of job matching 
has  not  deteriorated,  and  so  far  no  increase  in 
structural  unemployment  can  be  observed  at  the 
EU  level.  This  suggests  that  the  economic  cycle 
plays  a  strong  role  in  driving  up  shortages. 
However,  in  some  Member  States  (Spain  and 
Greece),  the  steep  rise  in  shortages  has  taken 
place  at  relatively  higher  levels  of  unemployment 
and labour market slack. 

The  cross-country  and  cross-sectoral  patterns  of 
labour  shortages  in  the  recovery  have  followed 
pre-pandemic  trends,  suggesting  that  next  to  the 
cyclical  drivers,  long-term  factors  have  shaped 
shortages  already  before  the  pandemic.  These 
factors  include  ageing,  skills  shortages  driven  by 
the  twin  transitions  and  other  ongoing  structural 
changes,  changes 
labour 
mobility,  migration  as  well  as  poor  working 
conditions 
in  some  sectors  and  occupations. 
Among  skills  shortages,  the  availability  of  digital 
skills 
labour 
shortages. 

is  of  particular  relevance 

the  patterns  of 

for 

to 

The  Covid-19  pandemic  accelerated  digitalization 
and modified consumer and employee preferences, 
triggering  reallocation  pressures.  It  temporarily 

reduced 
labour  mobility.  The  uncertainty  of 
business  continuity  and  the  health  risks  of  high-
contact occupations led to increasing shortages on 
top  of  the  low  attractiveness  of  some  occupations 
with  already  poor  working  conditions  (e.g.,  in 
hospitality and health care). 

Russia’s  invasion  of  Ukraine  and  its  geopolitical 
repercussions  including  on  energy  markets  could 
lead  to  a  decline  in  production  in  the  EU  and 
labour demand, which can in turn dampen labour 
shortages.  Moreover,  in  the  medium  to  long  run, 
the  inflow  of displaced persons  fleeing  the  war  in 
Ukraine  may  help  ease  shortages  in  sectors  with 
the  lowest  barriers  to  skills  transferability.  Still, 
the  inflow  of  people  fleeing  the  war  is  unlikely  to 
solve  the  underlying  structural  problems  that 
strongly influence shortages in the EU. 

improve 

to 
and 

Policies tackling the structural causes of shortages 
are necessary to ensure that growth prospects and 
innovation are not limited in the medium and long 
run. Moreover, they should support labour market 
job 
transitions 
matching 
skills 
anticipate 
imbalances  stemming  from  the  twin  transition. 
Activation  and  skills  policies  as  well  as  the 
law  can  help  reduce 
enforcement  of 
shortages. 
labour  mobility  and 
migration policies can also contribute to reducing 
skill shortages. 

labour 
In  addition, 

the  efficiency  of 

potential 

EU  policies,  in  particular  under  the  European 
Pillar  of  Social  Rights  Action  Plan  and  the 
European  Semester  and  EU  instruments  such  as 
the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility, 
the 
European  Social  Fund  Plus  and  the  Invest  EU 
support a broad range of policies that can be used 
to reduce labour shortages. 

3.1. 

INTRODUCTION:  WHY  SHOULD  POLICY 
MAKERS BE CONCERNED ABOUT LABOUR 
SHORTAGES? 

Labour  shortages  exist  when  employers  cannot 
find  the  workers  they  need  to  fill  vacancies. 
They  occur  when  the  demand  for  labour  exceeds 
the  available  supply  for  a  given  skill  set,  at  the 
particular  level  of  wages  and  working  conditions, 

81 

European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

at  a  specific  location,  and  point  of  time. (148)  It  is 
useful  to  distinguish  quantitative  from  qualitative 
shortages.  In  the  former  case,  the  total  supply  of 
labour  (i.e.,  for  all  sectors  and  occupations)  is 
below  the  total  demand  for  labour.  Qualitative 
shortages  occur  if  labour  demand  exceeds  labour 
supply  in  a  specific  sector,  occupation,  or  at  a 
specific  skill  level.  Skill  shortages  are  a  major 
driver  of  labour  shortages.  Labour  shortages  can 
have  a  seasonal  pattern  (e.g.,  in  services  or 
agriculture).  Geographical 
imbalances  between 
labour  demand  and  supply  can  also  drive  labour 
shortages. 

a 

major 

There  is  an  increasing  evidence  of  labour 
shortages in the EU. The European Business and 
Consumer  Surveys  (EU-BCS)  collects  quarterly 
data  from  employers  in  manufacturing,  services 
and construction, asking  whether labour shortages 
are 
their 
factor 
production. (149) (150)  According  to  the  EU-BCS, 
shortages  reached  a  peak  at  the  end  of  the  past 
the 
decade.  This 
pandemic,  but 
forcefully 
shortages  have  emerged 
thereafter.  Labour 
increasingly  on  the  policy  agenda,  amid  concerns 
by  policy  makers  and  social  partners  about  their 
effects on employment and economic growth. 

trend  was 
it  has 

interrupted  by 

reappeared 

limiting 

economic 

Persistent  labour  shortages  may  have  several 
Skills 
negative 
mismatches  can  worsen  with  the  recruitment 
challenges. Firms can find it  increasingly difficult 
to  meet  regulatory  and  quality  requirements. 

consequences. 

(148) Barnow, Trutko and Piatak, 2013 
(149) The question posed to employers is of the type: “what main 
factors  are  currently  limiting  your  production?”  and 
respondents  can  indicate,  among  others,  “shortage  of 
labour  force”.  The  coverage  is  all  EU  Member  States  and 
the  five  candidate  countries.  Information  from  this  survey 
can be used to proxy the information on vacancies as well 
(150) There are other sources of information available on labour 
shortages  as  well.  Next  to  the  EU-BCS,  the  chapter  relies 
also  on  job  vacancy  statistics  by  the  Eurostat  (Job 
vacancies  -  Labour  Market  (incl.  LFS)  -  Eurostat 
(europa.eu), published since 2010. Other surveys on labour 
shortages exist beyond the EU-BCS, yet each are less well-
suited than the EU-BCS at the current moment to provide a 
comprehensive  and  timely  update  on  labour  shortages. 
Eurofound’s  European  Company  Survey  (ECS)  is  carried 
out  every  four  years,  its  latest  wave  is  from  2019.  The 
ManpowerGroup  Talent  Shortage  Survey  provides  timely 
information,  yet  it  does  not  cover  all  EU  Member  States. 
The OECD Skills for Jobs database is not survey-based, it 
quantifies  skill  shortages  based  on  objective  criteria,  and 
provides  a  single  year  cross-sectional  dataset  published  in 
2018.  

82 

Countries  with  labour  and  skills  shortages  may 
face  competitiveness  challenges  and  be 
less 
attractive  places  for  investment.  Lack  of  workers 
in specific occupations could worsen the quality of 
the  services  provided,  most  prominently  in  health 
care. At the individual  level,  labour shortages can 
represent  an  opportunity  for  improvements  in 
wages  and  working  conditions.  At  the  same  time, 
employees may also face higher work intensity and 
work-life  balance  conflicts.  While  employers  and 
employees  have  a  crucial  role  to  play  in  tackling 
labour  shortages,  public  policies  can  provide 
support 
economic 
information 
coordination  among 
the 
structural causes of labour shortages. 

them  and  address 

actors, 

to 

This  chapter  focuses  on  the  determinants  of 
labour shortages and discusses the implications 
for  policies.  The  chapter  is  structured  as  follows. 
First,  it  provides  an  overview  of  ongoing  trends 
and  developments  in  labour  shortages  across  the 
EU  and  Member  States.  Second,  it  analyses  the 
influence of the short- and long-term determinants 
of  labour  shortages,  also  based  on  findings  from 
regression  analysis.  Third,  it  discusses  the  links 
between labour shortages and wages at the current 
juncture. Fourth, it reviews recent developments in 
EU  policies  addressing 
labour  shortages  and 
reflects  on  the  consequences  of  the  Russian 
invasion of Ukraine. 

3.2. 

THE EVOLUTION OF LABOUR SHORTAGES 

the  years  2013 

The  economic  recovery  from  the  Covid-19 
pandemic has been characterised by a steep rise 
in labour shortages across  most EU economies. 
Prior  to  the  pandemic,  labour  shortages  had  been 
increasing in the course of the economic expansion 
and were at a historical peak across the EU. In the 
course  of 
the 
employment  rate  in  the  EU  rose  from  67.5%  to 
73.2%, there was an increasing evidence of labour 
shortages. The proportion of businesses indicating 
that 
limiting 
in  construction, 
production 
quadrupled  in  industry  and  more  than  doubled  in 
the  service  sector.  The  unmet  demand  for  labour, 
as expressed by the job vacancy rate, rose over the 
same  period  to  2.3%  in  the  EU  –  reaching  its 

labour  shortages  were  a  factor 
increased  fivefold 

to  2019  as 

                                                           
highest value since 2006. (151) Shortages rose both 
in Central and Eastern European Member States as 
well  as 
in  North-West  EU  countries,  while 
Southern  European  Member  States  were  less 
affected  (Darvas  and  Raposo,  2018).  In  2020, 
shortages  fell 
in  almost  all  Member  States. 
Containment measures linked to the pandemic and 
the resulting economic disruptions led to a decline 
in  labour  shortages  as  many  firms  withdrew  their 
job  openings,  although  the  decline  was  not  as 
pronounced as during the 2008-2009 economic and 
financial crisis. With the swift economic recovery, 
due  to  the  rapid  rise  in  labour  demand,  labour 
shortages 
re-emerged  quickly.  While  Spain, 
Greece  and  Italy  seem  to  have  lower  levels  of 
reported  shortages  across  almost  all  sectors, ( 152) 
the  shortages  are  comparatively  high  given  the 
extent  of  underutilized  labour  force  in  these 
economies.  This  can  be 
indicative  of  some 
underlying  skills  and  geographical  mismatches  in 
these  Member  States.  By  the  second  quarter  of 
2022,  the  job  vacancy  rate  in  the  EU,  which 
measures  the  proportion  of  total  posts  that  are 
vacant, reached 3%. 

to  unemployment 

After  a  steep  rise  in  2021,  in  2022  labour 
shortages  in  the  EU  exceed their  pre-pandemic 
levels  and  their  pattern  follows  pre-pandemic 
ratios, 
trends.  Vacancy 
quantifying the number of vacancies available per 
unemployed,  increased  from  the  first  quarter  of 
2020  to  the  first  quarter  of  2022  in  the  large 
majority of EU Member States (Graph 3.1). Albeit 
the  growth  of  labour  shortages  slowed  down 
somewhat  in  the  second  half  of  2022,  its  level  is 
still  relatively  high:  in  the  fourth  quarter  of  2022, 
26% of employers in industry, 30% in services and 
31%  in  construction  (EU-BCS)  state  that  labour 
shortages  are  one  of  the  main  factors  hampering 
their  business  activity  (Graph  3.2).  During  2021, 
labour  shortages  rose  faster  in  manufacturing  and 

(151) Employment  and  Social  Developments 

in  Europe: 

Quarterly Review March 2019.  

(152) In  the  second  quarter  of  2022,  in  manufacturing,  5%  of 
employers  reported  labour  shortages  in  Italy,  8% in  Spain 
and 7% in Greece, compared to the EU average of 27%. In 
services,  13%  of  employers  reported  labour  shortages  in 
Italy, 11% in Spain and 9% in Greece, compared to the EU 
average  of  29%.  In  construction,  11%  of  employers 
reported  labour  shortages  in  Italy,  12%  in  Spain  and  42% 
in Greece, compared to the EU average of 31%. Shortages 
in  services  rose  in  each  of  these  countries  in  the  third 
quarter of 2022 and started to decline by the fourth quarter. 
In  Greece,  shortages  in  construction  remained  high  in  the 
second half of 2022.  

Short- and long-run determinants of labour shortages 

Chapter 3 

construction,  while  in  services,  more  severely  hit 
by  the  Covid-19  lockdowns,  shortages  increased 
more  slowly.  However,  by  the  end  of  2021, 
shortages  exceeded  their  pre-pandemic  levels  on 
average 
three  macro-sectors.  Across 
countries and sectors, the 2021 levels of shortages 
show  a  strong  positive  correlation  with  their  pre-
pandemic  levels,  suggesting  that  processes  that 
have shaped shortages already before the pandemic 
are still driving the patterns. 

in  all 

in 

recovery, 

the  post-pandemic 

In 
labour 
shortages  have  been  increasing  in  a  context  of 
significant  decreases  in  unemployment.  In  the 
second quarter of 2022, the unemployment rate in 
the EU reached 6.1% of the labour force (6.6% in 
the euro area, for the age group 20-64), below pre-
pandemic  levels  (6.5%  and  7.3%,  respectively,  in 
the  last  quarter  of  2019).  At  the  same  time,  the 
employment rate of people aged 20 to 64 stood at 
74.8%  of  the  total  population  in  the  EU  and  at 
74.3% 
the  euro  area  (age  group  20-64, 
seasonally  adjusted  data).  These  indicators  are 
better  than  any  time  in  the  last  decade.  Labour 
market  slack,  the  indicator  to  better  capture  the 
unmet  need  for  employment,  which  includes  next 
to the unemployed also the part-time workers who 
want  to  work  more,  people  who  are  available  to 
work but do not look for work, and people who are 
looking 
immediately 
available,  also  decreased,  at  12.1  %  of  the 
extended labour force (age 15-74) in the EU and at 
13.5%  in  the  euro  area  in  the  second  quarter  of 
2022  (compared  to  13.4%  in  the  last  quarter  of 
2019 in the EU and 15% in the euro area).   

for  work  but  are  not 

Graph 3.1: 

The change of the vacancy-unemployment 
ratio from Q1 2020 to Q1 2022 

150
130
110
90
70
50
30
10
-10
-30

T
L

E

I

O
R

Y
C

L
E

A
E

L
N

T
A

R
F

S
E

T

I

T
P

T
M

G
B

E
B

E
E

I

E S
S

R
H

K
S

L
P

Z
C

(1)  Data  on  LU  an  outlier  (above  400%)  and  hence  not 
included in the chart. (2) Some elements of data missing on 
other countries not included, not allowing for the calculation 
of  the  change.  (3)  In  CZ,  as  an  exception  in  the  EU,  the 
vacancy-unemployment 
the  pandemic 
exceeded  the  current  ratio,  as  the  CZ  labour  market  was 
exceptionally tight in 2019.  
Source: Eurostat job vacancy statistics (jvs_q_nace2) and 
Eurostat LFS (une_rt_q), own calculations 

ratio  before 

83 

                                                           
   
 
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Graph 3.2: 

Labour shortages in the EU by sector and by country 

In the EU-BCS, the category 'services' excludes wholesale and retail trade and public services. 
Y axis: the % of employers who report that the availability of labour is a factor limiting production.  
Source: European Commission, EU-BCS 

While labour shortages have been rising, labour 
market matching has not deteriorated in the EU 
as  a  whole.  The  efficiency  of  labour  market 
matching  (i.e.,  the  process  linking  vacant  jobs  to 
unemployed  people)  can  be  assessed  using  the 
Beveridge  curve.  The  Beveridge  curve  plots 
unemployment  and  job  vacancies  (as  proxied  by 
labour shortages based on the EU-BCS). A rise in 
vacancies coupled with a decline in unemployment 
is  indicative  of  the  emergence  of  quantitative 
labour shortages, likely of a cyclical nature. On the 
other hand, rising vacancies coinciding with rising 
unemployment  (or,  remaining  the  same)  could  be 
indicative  of  emerging  matching  problems. (153) 

(153) In  some  cases  vacancies  and unemployment  may  move  in 
the  same  direction  temporarily,  without  a  deterioration  of 
matching  efficiency.  This  is  because  vacancies/shortages 
react  rapidly  to  changes  in  the  business  cycle,  while 

Graphs  3.A1.1  and  3.A1.2  show  the  Beveridge 
curves based on labour shortages in industry, while 
Graphs  3.A1.3  and  3.A1.4  show  the  Beveridge 
curves  based  on  labour  shortages  in  services  by 
Member  State.  Since  2013,  in  most  Member 
States,  developments  in  labour  shortages  and 
in  opposite 
rates  have  gone 
unemployment 
directions:  between  2013  and  the  pandemic,  as 
well  as  following  the  pandemic,  unemployment 
decreased  while  labour  shortages  increased. (154) 
During  the  pandemic,  unemployment  increased 
while 
the 
labour  shortages  decreased.  Since 
pandemic,  labour  shortages  have  increased  again 

unemployment reacts only with a time lag – in particular, it 
takes time to fill newly created vacancies. 

(154) Denmark is an exception, with an almost vertical segment 
in  the  Beveridge  curve  over  the  last  quarters  both  in 
industry and services.  

84 

                                                           
                                                                                   
 
Short- and long-run determinants of labour shortages 

Chapter 3 

Graph 3.3: 

The evolution of macroeconomic skills and 
occupational mismatch in the EU (2005Q1 - 
2022Q2) 

Occupational mismatch

Educational mismatch

2

1

0

-1

-2

-3

2
q
5
0
0
2

2
q
6
0
0
2

2
q
7
0
0
2

2
q
8
0
0
2

2
q
9
0
0
2

2
q
0
1
0
2

2
q
1
1
0
2

2
q
2
1
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2

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q
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1
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2

2
q
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1
0
2

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q
5
1
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2

2
q
6
1
0
2

2
q
7
1
0
2

2
q
8
1
0
2

2
q
9
1
0
2

2
q
0
2
0
2

2
q
1
2
0
2

2
q
2
2
0
2

(1) See Box 3.1 for a definition of the mismatch indicators.  
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat, LFS 

while  unemployment  has  declined  (albeit  with  a 
delay).  While  many  factors  may  interplay,  this 
suggests  that  there  is  no  evident  signal  of  rising 
structural  unemployment  at  the  current  juncture. 
The  econometric  analysis  of  Kiss,  Turrini  and 
Vandeplas (2022) reaches the same conclusion.  

the  skills  of 

Indicators  of  skills  mismatch  also  show  no 
deterioration  linked  to  the  current  rise  of 
labour  shortages.  Mismatch  indicators  measure 
the  discrepancy  between 
the 
population  and  the  skills  required  by  the  labour 
market  (macroeconomic  skills  mismatch (155)  and 
those  required  by  their  occupation  (occupational 
mismatch).  Box  3.1  provides  further  details  about 
the  calculations  of  these  indicators  and  the  data 
sources.  The  two  indicators  displayed  similar,  yet 
slightly different trends over  the past decades. Up 
to 
the  2008  financial  crisis,  both  mismatch 
indicators  declined.  Between  2008  and  2010,  the 
skills mismatch rose and remained unchanged until 
the end of 2013, while the occupational mismatch 
kept  rising.  During  the  2013-2019  recovery,  both 
mismatch indicators improved before deteriorating 
during  the  pandemic  (Graph  3.3).  The  increase  in 
occupational  mismatch  was  particularly  steep, 
which 
the  heterogeneous 
occupational  impact  of  the  pandemic.  However, 
this  increase  was  only  temporary  and,  by  the  end 
of 2021, occupational mismatch started to decline, 
suggesting  that  the  efficiency  of  labour  market 
matching  did  not  worsen  as  a  consequence  of  the 
Covid-19 shock. 

is  consistent  with 

(155) Kiss,  A.,  and  Vandeplas,  A.  (2015).  Measuring  skills 

mismatch. DG EMPL Analytical webnote, 7, 2015. 

85 

                                                           
  
 
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Box 3.1: The calculation of the macroeconomic and occupational skills mismatch 
indicators

The  macroeconomic  skill  mismatch  indicator  (SMI)  is  a  measure  of  the  relative  dispersion  of 
employment  share  across  the  three  skill  groups  as  proxied  by  ISCED  education  levels.  It  is 
calculated  as  the  sum,  over  three  skill  groups,  of  the  absolute  difference  between  the  share  of  a 
skill group in employment and their share in the working age population.  

Thus, macroeconomic skills mismatch can be calculated as 

, where 

 and 

3
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼 = ∑ �

𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖
𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇 −

𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖
𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇�

𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇

  and 

are respectively the number of individuals with skill level i in employment and in the population; 
𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖
  are  the  total  employment  and  the  total  population.  Skill  groups  are  proxied  by 
educational  attainment:  low  skills  are  defined  as  pre-primary,  primary  and  lower  secondary 
𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇
education (ISCED levels 0-2), medium skills as upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary 
education (levels 3 and 4), while high skills are defined as tertiary education (levels 5 and 6).  
The  indicator  is  low  if  the  skill  composition  of  the  employed  reflects  the  population’s  skill 
composition, while the indicator is high if the education groups that are highly represented in the 
population are not in terms of employment, and vice versa.  

𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖

The occupational mismatch indicator (OMI) can be calculated in a similar way, it is a measure 
of the relative dispersion of the employment share across the nine occupational groups (based on 
ISCO).  It  is  calculated  as  the  sum,  over  nine  occupational  groups,  of  the  absolute  difference 
between  the  share  of  an  occupational  group  in  employment  and  their  (potential)  share  in  the 
working age population.  

In  symbols,

,  where 

  and 

are  respectively  the  number  of  individuals 

�

9
𝑗𝑗 =1

𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗
𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇�

 𝑂𝑂𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼 = ∑

𝑂𝑂𝑗𝑗
with occupation j in employment and in the population and 
𝑂𝑂𝑇𝑇 −
population. 
Unfortunately, data do not quantify the population with occupation j (e.g. the number of potential 
managers in the population).  
This  is  estimated  assuming  that  the  population  of  skill  level  i  (
is  distributed  among  the 
different occupational categories proportionally  to  the  share of employment in occupation j  with 

 total employment and total 

 and 

𝑂𝑂𝑇𝑇

𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗  

𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇

𝑂𝑂𝑗𝑗

𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ) 
,  where 

  is  the  number  of 

skill  level  i  in  total  employment  with  skill  level  i, 

individuals  employed  in  occupation  j  and  with  skill  levels  i.  Putting  together  the  last  two 

3
𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗 = ∑ 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖=1

𝑂𝑂𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖

𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖

𝑂𝑂𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖

expressions gives 

. 

9
𝑗𝑗 =1

𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖
𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇�

𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖
𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇 −

𝑂𝑂𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼 = ∑

3
𝑖𝑖=1
�∑ �

𝑂𝑂𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖
Thus,  the  potential  share  is  computed  as  a  weighted  sum  of  the  share  of  each  skill  group  in  the 
𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 �
working age population, with weights equal to the share of individuals employed with that specific 
skill level in each occupational category, in employment with this specific level of education. E.g. 
the share of ‘potential’ managers equals the sum of three components: 1) the share of low skilled 
in  the  population,  multiplied  by  the  share  of  those  low  skilled  in  employment  who  actually  are 
managers, plus 2) the share of medium skilled, multiplied by the share of those medium skilled in 
employment who are managers, plus 3) the share of high skilled, multiplied by the share of those 
high skilled in employment who are managers. 
It  can  be  shown  that  by  construction  OMI  is  always  smaller  than  SMI.  Occupational  groups  are 
defined based on the international standard classification of occupation (ISCO). 

86 

 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Short- and long-run determinants of labour shortages 

Chapter 3 

Graph 3.4:  Heatmap of labour shortages in industry, 2022Q4 

Heatmap of labour shortages, based on Business and Consumer Survey

Wood
Wearing apparel
Tobacco
Textiles
Rubber and plastic
Repair and installation of machinery
Printing and reproduction of recorded media
Pharmaceutical
Paper
Other transport equipment 
Other non-metallic mineral products 
Other manufacturing 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
Machinery and equipment 
Leather
Furniture
Food
Fabricated metal products
Electrical equipment
Computer, electronic and optical products
Coke and refined petroleum
Chemicals
Beverages
Basic metals

Source: Own computations on Ecfin BS

score

20

16

12

8

4

0

-4

T
A

E
B

G
B

Y
C

Z
C

E
D

K
D

E
E

L
E

I

S F
E

R
F

R
H

U
H

E

I

T

I

T
L

U
L

V
L

T
M

L
N

L
P

T
P

O
R

I

E S
S

K
S

(1) Colouring suggests the severity of shortages. Date for cells in white are missing. Labour shortages scores are normalised, in 
terms standard deviations, with means the historical averages (2000Q1-2021Q4). 
Source: Own computations on European Commission EU – BCS data 

Across  the  EU,  the  largest  labour  and  skills 
shortages are concentrated in a few sectors and 
occupations.  According  to  the  country  reports  of 
the  European  Centre  of  Expertise, (156)  these 
sectors  include  health  care  (Germany,  Denmark, 
Belgium,  France,  Croatia,  Romania,  Sweden), 
hospitality (Germany, Croatia, Cyprus, Spain) and 
in  particular 
restaurants  and  accommodation 
(HORECA  sector),  as  well  as  construction 
(Ireland, Luxembourg, Poland) and ICT (Germany, 
Spain, Poland). The main occupation groups in the 
EU  in  2021  with  shortages  have  been  healthcare-
professionals, 
related 

occupations, 

software 

representing  more 

construction,  and  engineering  craft  workers. (157) 
Occupations  in  healthcare  and  ICT  are  showing  a 
high  magnitude  of  shortages,  with  the  lack  of 
workers 
of 
employment  in  both  occupations.  Occupations 
with  shortages  employ  workers  with  a  medium 
level  of  education  (among  them  with  vocational 
qualifications in construction and engineering) and 
a  larger  share  of  men  (with  the  exception  of 
shortages in healthcare occupations, as some have 
a larger share of women). ( 158) 

than 

3% 

(156) This  chapter  relies  on  the  country  reports  of  the  2022 
Thematic  Review  of  the  European  Centre  of  Expertise 
(ECE)  in  the  field  of  labour  law,  employment  and  labour 
market policies, on ’Skills shortages and structural changes 
in the labour market during the Covid-19 pandemic and in 
the  context  of  the  digital  and  green  transition’.  Country 
examples across the chapter, if not indicated otherwise, are 
quoted from these reports. 

(157) McGrath (2021): Report on labour shortages and surpluses. 
European Labour Authority, 2021. These four occupational 
groups  account  for  21  of  the  28  identified  shortage 
occupations in the report. 

(158) McGrath (2021). 

87 

                                                           
                                                           
 
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Graph 3.5:  Heatmap of labour shortages in services, top 

10 subsectors, 2022Q4 

examining the links between  labour shortages and 
wages. 

Warehousing

Services to buildings/landscape  

Other personal service  

Legal and accounting  

Land transport

Food/beverage

Financial 

Computer programming

Architectural/engineering

Accommodation

score

10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3

T
A

E
B

G
B

Y
C

Z
C

E
D

K
D

E
E

L
E

I

S F
E

R
F

R
H

U
H

E

I

T

I

T
L

V
L

T
M

L
N

L
P

T
P

O
R

I

E S
S

K
S

Colouring  indicates  the  severity  of  shortages.  Data  for  cells 
in white are missing. Labour shortage scores are normalised, 
in  terms  standard  deviations,  with  means  the  historical 
averages (2000Q1-2021Q4).  
In  the  EU-BCS,  the  service  sector  excludes  trade  and  the 
public  sector.  The  ten  sub-sectors  in  this  graph  are  the  sub-
sectors with the highest share from total employment (based 
on  national  accounts  data),  and  represent  18.5%  of  total 
employment in the EU (36.6 mn).  
Source: Own computations on European Commission EU – 
BCS data. 

3.3. 

SHORT- 

THE 
DETERMINANTS OF LABOUR SHORTAGES 

LONG-TERM 

AND 

Labour  shortages  are  determined  by  an 
interaction  of  short-term  (cyclical)  and  long-
term  (structural)  factors.  The  increase  in  labour 
shortages  may  derive  from  changes  in  economic 
activity over the business cycle. In addition, long-
term  trends,  not  influenced  by  the  business  cycle, 
may increase the level of unfilled vacancies. These 
long-term drivers of shortages include (i) a decline 
in  the  labour  force  related  to  ageing,  (ii)  skills 
shortages and sectoral or occupational mismatches 
linked  to  the  twin  transitions  and  to  the  possible 
structural 
the 
influence  of  labour  mobility  and  migration,  and 
(iv)  poor  working  conditions,  which  make  people 
refrain from accepting some jobs. (159) This section 
discusses  how  each  of  these  short-  and  long-term 
trends  influences  labour  shortages.  The  section 
also  discusses  how  the  pandemic  has  shaped  the 
drivers  of  shortages  and  how  the  invasion  of 
Ukraine  may  influence  them  and  concludes  by 

the  pandemic,  (iii) 

impact  of 

(159) While  working  conditions  are  likely  to  have  an  influence 
on  labour  and  skills  shortages,  data  that  would  allow  to 
quantify their influence is lacking. 

88 

shortages  can 

The cyclical and the structural determinants of 
interact.  Employers 
labour 
typically  encounter  more  challenges  to  recruit  the 
"right" workers at times of economic growth. The 
employment  of  low-qualified  workers  tends  to  be 
more sensitive to the economic business cycle than 
the  employment  of  the  high-qualified.  Empirical 
evidence  supports  the  view  that  employers  adjust 
wages upwards and/or recruitment standards (such 
for  hiring) 
as  minimum  qualification 
downwards  during  economic  upturns  when  job 
applications  become  scarcer  (Devereux,  2002; 
Büttner et al., 2010). This allows them to adjust to 
cyclical changes, but the options for employers to 
adjust to shortages caused by structural factors are 
much more limited. 

levels 

in 

production) 

short-  and 

influence  of 

the  age  dependency 
in 

long-term 
The 
determinants  on  labour  shortages  is  estimated 
using a panel regression. The dependent variables 
are  the  labour  shortages  (the  share  of  firms 
indicating that the availability of labour is a factor 
limiting 
manufacturing, 
construction and services, using data from the EU-
BCS.  The  explanatory  variables  are  the  deviation 
of  sectoral  value  added  from  trend,  the  sectoral 
labour  productivity,  the  share  of  low  skilled  in 
ratio  and 
employment, 
employment 
intensity 
occupations  relative  to  high  routine  intensity 
occupations. ( 160)  To  allow  for  robust  inference 
with  sufficient  degrees  of  freedom,  estimation  is 
performed  on  a  panel  of  EU  countries.  Since 
labour  shortages  across  EU  countries  exhibit 
to 
persistent  differences  possibly  attributable 
country-specific factors which may not be captured 
in  available  statistics  and  indicators,  fixed  effects 
are  included.  For  the  regression  output,  see  Table 
the  Annex].  The 
3.1  [and  Table  3.A1.2 
description  of  the  regression  findings  across  the 
chapter, 
rely  on 
if  not 
specification (6). 

stated  otherwise, 

routine 

task 

low 

in 

(160) These  explanatory  variables  do  not  explain  fully  the 
observed labour shortages. Even accounting for all of them, 
there are countries that in 2021 had labour shortages above 
the  level  predicted  based  on  these  variables.  (Graph 
3.A1.6). It is clear that this ‘excess’ of labour shortages is 
larger in manufacturing than in services.  

 
                                                           
                                                           
3.3.1.  The  role  of  the  business  cycle  in  driving 

shortages 

The  recent  rise  of  labour  shortages  in  the 
recovery is partly due to the strong increase in 
demand  after  the  end  of  the  Covid-19  related 
lockdown.  This  expansion  arrived  after  a 
downturn  in  which  short-time  work  schemes 
their  firm-specific 
allowed  firms 
human capital in house, which was clearly in their 
interest  after  a  period  of  intense  labour  shortages 
leading  up  to  the  pandemic.  The  post-pandemic 
surge  in  labour  demand  was  fast,  and  the  rise  in 
vacancies  preceded  a  drop  in  unemployment  and 
labour market slack. 

to  maintain 

in 

industry. ( 161)  The  weaker 

Labour  shortages  in  industry  and  construction 
are  more  responsive  to  the  business  cycle  than 
shortages  in  services.  Graph  3.6  depicts  this 
association  between  unemployment  and  labour 
link 
shortages 
between  shortages  and  unemployment  in  services 
suggests that the relative role of cyclical drivers of 
shortages,  as  compared  to  structural  drivers,  may 
be  the  least  relevant  in  services.  Given  that 
services  have  the  largest  share  of  employment 
across  EU  economies,  this  observation  underpins 
towards 
the 
addressing 
labour 
analysis 
shortages.  Furthermore, 
confirms  that  labour  shortages  in  manufacturing 
are most responsive to the business cycle, followed 
by construction. Graph 3.7, based on specification 
(6)  of  the  regression  analysis,  shows  that  in 
manufacturing, upswings in the business cycle led 
to 
the 
pandemic  and  in  the  recovery.  This  has  also  been 
the case in construction prior to the pandemic. 

importance  of  orienting  policies 
structural  causes  of 

in  shortages,  both  prior 

regression 

increases 

the 

to 

factors 
Other  short-term  pandemic-related 
have  also  shaped 
in  the 
labour  shortages 
recovery  besides  the  increase  in  demand.  In 
2021,  due  to  remaining  border  restrictions  and 
selective  lockdown,  intra-EU  mobility  remained 
low, causing vacancies in certain sectors to remain 
unfilled.  For  instance,  in  Member  States  such  as 
Greece,  the  harvesting  and  planting  season  was 
disrupted  in  2020,  as  seasonal  workers  could  not 
travel 
reach 

their  destinations  due 

the 

to 

(161) This relationship in construction and services is depicted in 
Graphs 3.A1.6 and 3.A1.7 in the Annex. The link between 
labour  market  slack  and  shortages  across  sectors  reveals 
the same pattern.  

Short- and long-run determinants of labour shortages 

Chapter 3 

since 

restrictions.  Moreover, 
containment 
measures  and  policy  support  were  only  gradually 
phased out, the incentives for job-to-job transitions 
may  have  increased  less  than  what  would  have 
otherwise  been  the  case.  Finally,  health  concerns 
kept people from returning to work; this concerned 
mostly  the  high-contact  sectors  and  occupations 
for  which  telework  is  not  possible  (such  as  for 
example hospitality). 

Graph 3.6: 

Labour shortages and their link to 
unemployment in industry (Q2 2022) 

EL

IT

CY

t
n
e
m
y
o
p
m
e
n
U

l

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

ES

SE

FR

FI

PT

RO

LV

AT

HR
EA

SK

EE

BE

LU

CZ

y = -0,1304x + 9,0819
R² = 0,4635

EU

LT

BG
DE
NL

SI

PL

DK

HU

MT

IE

50

60

0

10

20

30
Labour shortages in manufacturing (%)

40

Source: European Commission, EU-BCS 

3.3.2.  The  role  of  long-term  trends  in  driving 

shortages 

Population ageing contributes to a decline in the 
labour  force  and  drives  up  shortages.  The  old-
age  dependency  ratio  (compiled  as  the  ratio 
between  the  number  of  persons  aged  65  and  over 
and  the  number  of  persons  aged  between  15  and 
64) increased in the EU from 26.3 in 2010 to 32.5 
in  2021. (162)  It  reached  high  levels  in  Italy  (37), 
Finland  (36.8),  Greece  (35.6),  Portugal  (35),  as 
well  as  in  Germany  (34.2),  Bulgaria  (34.1)  or 
France 
regression 
analysis,  an  increase  in  the  dependency  ratio  is 
linked  to  rising  labour  shortages  in  all  three 
economic  sectors,  as  potential  output  growth  is 
constrained  by  a  shrinking  labour  force.  Ageing 
has contributed to the increase in labour shortages 
in  the  main  economic  sectors  in  the  recovery 
(Graph 3.7). 

(33.6).  According 

the 

to 

(162) According  to the 2021  Ageing  Report  of  the  EU,  the  old-
age  dependency  ratio is  expected  to reach 62.5% by  2070 
(63.7% in the euro area).  

89 

                                                           
   
                                                           
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Graph 3.7: 

The contribution of short- and long-term drivers to labour shortages in industry (top) and construction (bottom) 

5

3

1

-1

-3

-5

-7

5

3

1

-1

-3

-5

-7

2
Q
5
1
0
2

3
Q
5
1
0
2

4
Q
5
1
0
2

1
Q
6
1
0
2

2
Q
6
1
0
2

3
Q
6
1
0
2

4
Q
6
1
0
2

1
Q
7
1
0
2

2
Q
7
1
0
2

3
Q
7
1
0
2

4
Q
7
1
0
2

1
Q
8
1
0
2

2
Q
8
1
0
2

3
Q
8
1
0
2

4
Q
8
1
0
2

1
Q
9
1
0
2

2
Q
9
1
0
2

3
Q
9
1
0
2

4
Q
9
1
0
2

1
Q
0
2
0
2

2
Q
0
2
0
2

3
Q
0
2
0
2

4
Q
0
2
0
2

1
Q
1
2
0
2

2
Q
1
2
0
2

3
Q
1
2
0
2

Cycle

Probability of employment in low- relative to high- routine task intensive occupations

Dependency ratio

Share of low skilled

Labour productivity

Labour shortages

Labour shortages estimated

2
Q
5
1
0
2

3
Q
5
1
0
2

4
Q
5
1
0
2

1
Q
6
1
0
2

2
Q
6
1
0
2

3
Q
6
1
0
2

4
Q
6
1
0
2

1
Q
7
1
0
2

2
Q
7
1
0
2

3
Q
7
1
0
2

4
Q
7
1
0
2

1
Q
8
1
0
2

2
Q
8
1
0
2

3
Q
8
1
0
2

4
Q
8
1
0
2

1
Q
9
1
0
2

2
Q
9
1
0
2

3
Q
9
1
0
2

4
Q
9
1
0
2

1
Q
0
2
0
2

2
Q
0
2
0
2

3
Q
0
2
0
2

4
Q
0
2
0
2

1
Q
1
2
0
2

2
Q
1
2
0
2

3
Q
1
2
0
2

Cycle

Probability of employment in low- relative to higjh- routine task intensive occupations

Dependency ratio

Share of low skilled

Labour productivity

Labour shortages

Labour shortages estimated

Source: Own calculations based on European Commission, EU-BCS 

90 

 
 
  
Table 3.1: 

The determinants of labour shortages – panel 
estimation 

Manufacturing

Specifications

Value added cyclical component  

Labour productivity trend 

Share of low skilled

Share of low skilled*occupational mismatch

Age dependency ratio

Probability of employment in low RTI 
occupations relative to high RTI 
occupations (lagged)
Country fixed effect
Period effects
Observations
R-squared- adjusted

4

5
23.4*** 27.1*** 12.3***
(4.3)

(3.9)

(5.6)

6

10.6*** 11.9*** 22.6*

(2.5)
0.1***
(0.05)

(3.7)
0.1**
(0.05)
0.01**
(0.004)
0.2*** 0.3***
(0.07)
(0.06)

Y
Y
2122
0.62

Y
Y
1807
0.65

(14.1)
0.2*
(0.14)

0.4**
(0.20)

-0.05**

(0.02)

Y
Y
692
0.82

(1)  Further  details  on  the  estimation  are  included  in  the 
Annex, in Table 3.A1.2.  
Source: Own calculations based on EU-BCS and Eurostat 

Labour  shortages  increase  with  productivity, 
but only in  manufacturing. As a sector becomes 
more  efficient,  in  principle  one  would  expect  that 
the number of workers needed for a given level of 
demand  would  decrease.  However,  with  skill-
biased technological change and wage rigidity, the 
increase  in  productivity  can  be  accompanied  by  a 
shift of employment towards high-skilled workers, 
and  this  can  in  turn  raise  labour  shortages  and 
skills  mismatches.  The  regression  analysis  finds  a 
positive  effect  of  trend  productivity  on  labour 
shortages in manufacturing but not for construction 
or  services:  this  is  consistent  with  the  literature 
suggesting  that  skill-biased  technical  progress 
plays a role in skill-intensive sectors, in industry. 

tasks 

are  both 

indicators  of 

The  availability  of  a  skilled  workforce  can 
reduce  the  extent  of  labour  shortages  in  all 
sectors.  At  the  macroeconomic  level,  the  decline 
in  the  share  of  low-skilled  employees  and  the 
increase in the share of workers employed in non-
an 
routine 
improvement  of  the  average  skill  level  of  the 
workforce.  Estimates  suggest  that  these  processes 
reduce labour shortages, especially in construction, 
but also in services.  Furthermore, a relatively  low 
skilled  workforce  exacerbates 
impact  of 
occupational mismatches on firms’ reported labour 
shortages,  as  specification  (5)  in  Table  3.A1.2 
indicates. On the other hand, the results show that 
Member  States  with  a  higher  labour  productivity 
(and better overall skills levels) also exhibit higher 

the 

Short- and long-run determinants of labour shortages 

Chapter 3 

needs for skilled labour and are experiencing skills 
shortages when the supply of these skilled workers 
is insufficient. ( 163) 

Skills  shortages  were  observed  already  before 
the  pandemic  and  are  strongly  influenced  by 
the  availability  of  digital  skills.  According  to 
Eurofound’s  European  Company  Survey, (164)  in 
2019  managers  of  a  large  share  of  companies 
across  the  EU  indicated  that  at  least  60%  of  their 
newly  recruited  employees  did  not  have  the 
required  skills  for  their  jobs  (Graph  3.8).  Skills 
shortages  measured  this  way  were  higher  in 
construction  (39%)  and  smaller  in  manufacturing 
(28%)  and  services  (22%).  Across  the  EU  the 
share  of  employers  who  reported  in  2019  to  have 
difficulties finding workers with the required skills 
ranged  from  about  10%  in  Denmark  to  46%  in 
Romania.  Furthermore,  smaller  companies  appear 
to  have  more  difficulties  to  find  workers  with  the 
right  skills  as  compared  to  larger  establishments. 
In  Member  States  with  a  larger  share  of  the 
workforce  with  above  basic  digital  skills,  a  lower 
share  of  employers  reported  difficulties  finding 
workers  with  the  right  skills.  Furthermore,  digital 
skills needs are not homogenous: labour shortages 
can  be  reduced  by  an  overall  increase  in  basic 
digital skills, accompanied by an increase of higher 
level  IT  and  programming  skills.  Box  3.2  offers 
further  insights  on  the  links  between  labour 
shortages and the evolution of digital skills. (165) 

(163) Vandeplas and Thum-Thysen (2019): Skills mismatch and 
productivity  in  the  EU.  European  Economy,  Discussion 
Paper 100, July 2019.  

(164) European  Company  Surveys  |  Eurofound  (europa.eu)  The 
survey  is  conducted  every  four  years  and  its  latest  round 
provides information on 2019.  

(165) Based on the country reports of the 2022 Thematic Review 
of  the  European  Centre  of  Expertise (ECE) in  the  field  of 
labour  law,  employment  and  labour  market  policies,  on 
’Skills  shortages  and  structural  changes  in  the  labour 
market during the Covid-19 pandemic and in the context of 
the digital and green transition’.  

91 

    
 
                                                           
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Box 3.2: Labour shortages and digital skills

Digital  skills  are  particularly  relevant  to  support  the  digital  transition,  yet  related  skills 
shortages  are  spreading  beyond  the  ICT  sector.  In  Belgium,  experts  report  that  there  is  an 
increased demand for a highly skilled labour force with digital skills in construction and related to 
green innovations. In Bulgaria, relatively high wages of the export-oriented ICT related sector are 
drawing employees with IT skills away from other occupations, where these skills are reported to 
be  missing.  In  Cyprus,  digital  skills  shortages  are  reported  in  the  industry  and  manufacturing 
sector,  the  food  sector,  the  services  industry,  the  marketing  and  advertisement  sector,  the  tourist 
and  recreational  sector.  In  Germany,  the  demand  for  ICT  has  increased  during  the  pandemic,  to 
improve  infrastructure  for  online  sales  and  to  support  companies  to  implement  mobile  working 
infrastructure. Digital skills are also increasingly needed for workers in mechanical engineering. In 
Austria, the low participation of older workers in trainings contributes to a lack of knowledge for 
programming more modern applications.  

The  future  labour  force  will  have  more  digital  skills,  which  may  reduce  the  gap  between 
digital  skills  demand  and  supply.  Whereas  the  share  of  individuals  with  above  basic  level  of 
digital skills is below 20% across the EU for retired and inactive people, it is above 60% in more 
than half of the EU Member States for students. In the entire EU, 65.5% of students have above 
basic  level  of  digital  skills  against  37.4%  of  employees  and  self-employed  and  only  9%  of  the 
retired and inactive. The fact that the share of students having above basic digital skills is close to 
twice as high as this share in the current labour force suggests that the future labour force will be 
better  equipped  to  meet  the  demand  for  digital  skills.  This  may  reduce  the  gap  between  digital 
skills demand and supply. However, due to ageing, the size of the younger cohorts is relatively 
smaller. 

Graph 3.8: 

The share of managers indicating that 60% or 
more of their newly recruited employees did 
not have the required skills needed in the job 
(2019) 

45%

40%

35%

30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

T
P

O
R

V
L

Y
C

L
S

K
D

Z
C

R
H

K
S

R
F

U
L

E
B

L
E

S
E

T

I

U
H

E
E

T
M

T
A

L
N

K
U

L
P

E
D

T
L

I

E F

I

E
S

G
B

Source: Own calculations based on the European Company 
Survey (ECS), Eurofound 

The  determinants  of  skills  shortages  are  multi-
dimensional. Experts from fifteen Member  States 
have  reported  some  degree  of  mismatch  between 
the  skills  provided  by  the  national  education  and 
training  system  and  the  needs  of  the  labour 
market. ( 166) In certain countries, a relatively small 

take-up of vocational education and training (VET) 
contribute to skills shortages. A mismatch between 
skills  supply  and  demand  may  start  developing 
already  in  secondary  education  where  students  do 
not  receive  adequate  vocational  guidance  and 
information  on  the  needs  of  the  labour  market. 
Vocational  schools’  graduates  may  lack  certain 
basic practical skills. In some countries, the design 
of  tertiary  education  is  also  contributing  to  a 
mismatch  of  skills  supply  and  demand.  Skills 
mismatches  may  rise  among  others  due  to  a  low 
participation  rate  in  training  and  adult  learning. 
The  older  generation  of  workers  may  have 
difficulties to adapt to digitalization. 

The  impacts  of  labour  mobility  on  labour 
shortages  are  country-specific.  As  many  of  the 
most  widespread  and  most  severe  occupational 
shortages  described  in  Section  2  are  common 
across  Member  States, (167) 
the  potential  of 
mobility  to  address  labour  shortages  is  limited  in 
these areas. This can be one factor explaining why 

(166) These  examples  from  the  ECE  thematic  review  represent 
recent  opinions  of  Member  States’  experts.  A  detailed 
analysis  of  how  Member  States’  education  and  training 

systems  contribute  to  skills  shortages  is  beyond  the  scope 
of this note.  
(167) McGrath (2021) 

92 

 
  
                                                           
                                                                                   
 
 
  
 
 
the regression analysis did not find any significant 
links between changes in intra-EU labour mobility 
and  the  evolution  of  labour  shortages  in  the  main 
sectors. ( 168)  Furthermore, 
the 
economic 
medium  to  long  term,  ongoing  wage  convergence 
within the EU will gradually weaken the incentives 
to move from low- to high-income countries.  

in 

the 

Immigration  can  also  contribute  to  addressing 
labour  shortages.  The  2021  report  of 
the 
European  Labour  Authority  on  labour  shortages 
and surpluses conducted a preliminary exploration 
labour 
link  between  migration  and 
of 
shortages. It looked at the share of workers with a 
migrant  background (169)  in  the  four  main  skills 
groups associated with shortage occupations across 
Europe,  in  countries/regions  which  reported  no 
shortages, some or severe shortages. According to 
this  analysis,  in  the  four  main  skills  groups 
associated  with  labour  shortages,  workers  with  a 
to  be 
migrant  background  are  more 
employed in countries/regions with no shortages or 
with  limited  (not  severe)  shortages.  This  pattern 
may be due to various factors which suggests that 
further  analysis  in  the  role  of  immigrants  in 
alleviating  shortages  is  warranted. (170)  Section 
3.3.4.  further 
labour  market 
into 
integration of displaced persons from Ukraine and 
its potential impact on shortages.  

likely 

looks 

the 

3.3.3.  The  influence  of  the  pandemic  on  the 

long-term drivers of shortages  

for 

increased  demand 

The ongoing digital and green transitions imply 
a need for the reallocation of labour, potentially 
amplifying  skills  mismatches.  In  the  pandemic, 
the 
information  and 
communication  work  has  boosted  the  demand  for 
digital  skills,  both  in  the  ICT  sector  and  in  other 
sectors.  While  the  twin  transition  would  lead  to 
competitiveness gains, the speed and effectiveness 
of such reallocation depends on the adaptability of 
the  skills  of  workers.  These  structural  changes 
require  transitions  between  sectors,  which  may 
pose  more  important  challenges  in  terms  of  skills 

(168) Hence,  mobility  has  not  been  retained  as  an  explanatory 
variable  for  the  estimation  specifications  included  in  this 
chapter. 

(169) Residents  of  the  reporting  country  who  were  not  born  in 

the reporting country.  

(170) The forthcoming 2022 ELA report on labour shortages and 
surpluses  will  provide  further  in-depth  analysis  of  this 
issue.  

Short- and long-run determinants of labour shortages 

Chapter 3 

needs than transitions between occupations  within 
the  same  sectors.  This  could  entail  a  slower 
reallocation,  increased  skills  mismatches  and  lead 
to disruptions of the process linking vacant jobs to 
jobless  people.  The  structural  weaknesses  in  the 
adult learning systems of most Member States risk 
amplifying  those  skills  mismatches.  In  turn,  the 
skills  mismatches  triggered  by  the  twin  transition 
can  lead  to  longer  unemployment  spells  and 
eventually  a  higher  structural  unemployment, 
slowing  down  the  transition  itself.  These  risks 
should  be  anticipated  and  addressed  by  policies, 
with  an  increased  focus  on  the  provision  of  the 
skills  needs  of  the  twin  transition  and  on  the 
management of labour market transitions.  

In 

notably 

services, 

The  pandemic  had  some  persistent  effects  in 
terms  of  economic  restructuring,  potentially 
contributing  to  a  rise  in  labour  shortages.  The 
effects of the pandemic on consumers’ preferences 
and  labour  supply  have  proven  lasting  in  some 
sectors. 
high-contact 
occupations,  a  part  of  the  workforce  may  have 
reconsidered  returning  to  their  previous  jobs,  due 
the  virus  and 
to  concerns  of  contracting 
uncertainties of business continuity in case of new 
lockdowns. These new developments added to the 
problem of low wages in some service sub-sectors, 
attractiveness. (171) 
their 
worsening 
Activity  in  manufacturing  has  also  been  less 
resilient 
in  some  Member  States  (including 
Germany), reducing the related labour demand and 
to  other 
contributing 
activities.  Once  employed  in  a  new  activity, 
employees are less likely to return to their previous 
occupations. ( 172)  

reallocation 

further 

labour 

to 

The  pandemic  is  likely  to  have  exacerbated 
poor  working  conditions  in  some  occupations 
and  created  new  demands  for  job  quality  in 
others.  Worsening  working  conditions  in  health 
care reduced the supply of labour that was already 
previously  insufficient. (173)  They  drove  health 

(171) Due  to  travel  restriction  and  closures  of  restaurants  and 
bars, parts of the labour force have been driven out of the 
hospitality  sector  in  Belgium,  Denmark,  Italy,  Sweden  or 
the Netherlands. 

(172) In  the  Italian  hospitality  sector  (hotel,  restaurants),  the 
increased  uncertainty  about  the  possibility  of  work  during 
the  pandemic  has  incentivised  workers  to  search  an 
occupation in other sectors. This caused a shortage of staff 
after the restriction were lifted.  

(173) Eurofound  (July  2021),  Tackling  labour  shortages  in  EU 

Member States | Eurofound (europa.eu) 

93 

                                                           
                                                           
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

in 

sector 

care workers out of their profession for example in 
Denmark  and  Croatia.  During  lockdowns,  when 
activities 
(hotels, 
the  hospitality 
restaurants  and  catering)  were  interrupted,  part  of 
the  employees  of  the  sector  switched  jobs,  and  in 
the recovery, they were not attracted to return, also 
due  to  poor  working  conditions,  and  due  to  the 
available  opportunities  elsewhere  in  the  tight 
labour  markets  of  Europe.  Poor  working 
conditions have also been reported in the IT sector 
lack 
in  Spain,  where  ICT  specialists  often 
upskilling  or  reskilling  opportunities,  and 
in 
Germany, where IT specialists reported challenges 
in terms of work intensity. (174) Yet the new global 
trend  of 
in  which 
employees quit their jobs in search of job quality, 
flexibility  and  better  work-life  balance,  does  not 
affect a sizeable part of the workforce in the EU at 
the  current  juncture.  Such  resignation  has  been 
reported  only  in  some  sectors  and  some  Member 
States,  for  example  in  the  construction  sector  in 
Italy (with voluntary quits driven by the search for 
a better work-life balance, including the possibility 
of  teleworking,  and  for  better  career  development 
options). Altogether, the movement of workers out 
of  occupations  and  sectors  with  poor  working 
conditions  may  contribute  to  increasing  skills 
imbalances. 

resignation’, 

‘great 

the 

3.3.4.  The  outlook  on  shortages  amid  the 

arrival of Ukrainian refugees in the EU  

The  impact  of  the  Russian  invasion  of  Ukraine 
could lead to an economic downturn which may 
in  turn  reduce  labour  shortages.  Supply  chain 
bottlenecks,  trade  disruptions,  rising  energy  and 
commodity  prices  affect  production  and  labour 
demand  negatively.  Energy  prices  already  started 
to  increase  before  the  war,  and  supply  chain 
the  pandemic.  The 
shortages  emerged  after 
Ukraine  conflict  aggravated 
these  problems, 
especially due to its impact on energy prices. The 
deterioration of the economic situation can, at least 
in the short run, dampen labour shortages.  

is  experiencing  an  unprecedented 
The  EU 
inflow  of  refugees,  which  can  in  principle 
increase  the  labour  supply  in  some  Member 
States.  By  mid-September,  around  10  million 

(174) E.g. a larger share of employees in IT than in other types of 
services perceive that the tasks they were given were often 
or very often not doable within the given time frame.  

94 

people  had  fled  the  Russia’s  war  of  aggression 
against  Ukraine, (175)  with  close  to  4.2  million 
people having registered for temporary protection. 
Ukrainian  refugees  can  travel  without  visa  for  90 
days  before  the  issuance  of  their  residence  permit 
under  the  Temporary  Protection  Directive  (TPD). 
Thus  they  can  choose  the  Member  State  in  which 
they  want  to  trigger  their  rights  attached  to 
temporary protection. Once they have received the 
temporary  protection  status,  they  have  immediate 
access  to  the  labour  market  of  the  host  Member 
State and labour mobility does not apply. Refugees 
with  temporary  protection  can  be  employed  or 
self-employed  and  should  receive  equal  treatment 
with  nationals  in  terms  of  pay  and  other  working 
conditions. 

However,  the  access  of  Ukrainian  refugees  to 
the  EU  labour  market  may  involve  multiple 
challenges. Early employment can have a positive 
impact on the lives of the newly arrived, allowing 
them  to  be  economically  independent  and  to 
integrate  into  the  local  community,  while  at  the 
same  time  reducing  the  economic  burden  in  the 
hosting  communities.  A  smooth  integration  into 
regular  employment  can  reduce  the  risk  that  the 
refugees resort to undeclared work (as a temporary 
solution), which would increase their vulnerability 
and  expanding  the  share  of  the  black  economy  in 
the  Member  States  in  the  longer  term.  Yet  the 
majority of the refugees are women, accompanied 
by  children,  elderly  people  and  other  vulnerable 
temporary 
individuals.  Many  beneficiaries  of 
protection  will  unlikely  be  able  to  work  in  the 
short  run  due 
lack  of  suitable 
trauma, 
accommodation,  care  facilities  or  schools.  They 
will face also other integration challenges, such as 
in 
language  barriers,  medical 
recognition  of  qualifications,  skills  mismatches, 
lacking  overall  information  on  options,  or  legal, 
social  support.  The  uncertainty  about  the  duration 
of  the  war  and  their  potential  return  to  Ukraine 
may also affect their willingness to integrate. 

issues,  barriers 

to 

Refugees  could  alleviate  labour  shortages  to 
some  extent  in  sectors  and  occupations  where 
barriers  posed  by 
skills 
transferability are the lowest. One would expect 
these  barriers  to  be  lower  in  the  services  sector, 
where  there  are  currently  important  shortages  in 

language  and 

(175) This  information  is  based  on  all  border  crossings,  which 
includes circular movements between the EU and Ukraine.  

                                                           
                                                           
Short- and long-run determinants of labour shortages 

Chapter 3 

Table 3.2: 

Wage growth and labour shortages - 
regression analysis 

Dependent variable:
Nominal wage growth

Inflation

Global supply chain pressure index

Labour shortages

Observations
R-squared

Manufacturing

Construction

EU11
1

EU16
2

EU11
3

EU16
4

1.01*** 0.78*** 0.95*** 0.76***
(0.14)
(0.07)
 -0.7***
 -2.0
(0.26)
(0.55)
0.03***
0.2***
(0.009)
(0.02)
1010
952
0.09
0.49

(0.08)
 -0.7***
(0.19)
0.02
(0.03)
1148
0.11

(0.13)
 -0.3
(0.7)
0.2***
(0.03)
884
0.17

health  care  and  in  hospitality.  The  regression 
analysis  presented  in  Chapter  1  suggests  that 
labour shortages in services have slightly declined 
in  Europe  linked  to  the  inflow  of  refugees,  but 
shortages  in  industry  and  construction  have  not 
been  affected.  At  the  same  time,  the  war  in 
Ukraine  has  also  led  to  an  increase  in  labour 
shortages  in  some  countries  and  sectors,  via  the 
return  of  migrant  male  workers  from  Ukraine  to 
their country due to mobilisation. 

3.3.5.  Labour 

shortages 

and 

wage 

Source: Eurostat and national accounts, own calculations.  

developments 

Chapter  2  of  the  report  provides  a  detailed 
analysis  of  wage  developments  in  the  EU.  This 
section  provides  additional  insights  on  the  links 
between wage developments and labour shortages.  

The  emerging 
labour  shortages  may  put 
pressure  on  employers  to  increase  wages  and 
offer  better  working  conditions.  Wage  hikes, 
improvements  to  the  quality  of  workplaces  or 
investments  in  training  can  help  firms  attract  or 
retain  employees.  While  in  the  private  sector  it 
may be possible to meet such demands, this could 
be  more  difficult  in  the  public  sector due  to  more 
rigid  recruitment  and  staff  management  policies. 
However, until the first half of 2022, the tightening 
labour  market  has  not  triggered  noticeable  wage 
increases. This  has been due  to a lagged response 
of wages to changing labour market conditions.  

in  construction,  as  well  as 

Regression  analysis  reveals  a  link  of  wage 
growth with labour shortages in industry and in 
construction  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe 
[see  Table  3.2].  The  link  is  positive  and  highly 
in 
significant 
manufacturing for the group of the eleven Central 
and  Eastern  European  Member  States,  where  the 
labour  market is  tighter on average. However, the 
link  is  not  significant  in  manufacturing  for  the 
group  of  the  sixteen  non-Central  and  Eastern 
European  Member  States.  In  addition,  while 
structural  drivers  may  keep  labour  shortages  high 
in some countries and sectors, notably in services, 
the economic slowdown may ease labour shortages 
in  manufacturing.  This  suggests  that  while  labour 
shortages  may  trigger  increases  in  wages  in 
in  some 
services  and  possibly  construction 
Member  States,  it  is  less  likely  to  happen  in 
manufacturing. 

3.4. 

POLICIES 
SHORTAGES  

TO 

ADDRESS 

LABOUR 

3.4.1.  Policies at the EU level  

facilitating 

EU  policies  and  instruments  support  a  broad 
range  of  measures  that  can  be  used  to  reduce 
labour  shortages.  Such  measures  include  among 
others  active  labour  market  policies  to  increase 
labour  force  participation,  policies  addressing 
skills  shortages  and  mismatches  that  cause  labour 
shortages,  support  to  transitions  in  the  labour 
market,  policies  to  improve  working  conditions, 
and  actions 
labour  mobility  and 
level  actions  are 
migration.  The  main  EU 
encompassed  in  the  European  Pillar  of  Social 
Rights  Action  Plan.  Guidelines 
the 
employment  policies  of  the  Member  States (176) 
and  the  country-specific  recommendations  under 
the  European  Semester,  in  line  with  the  Annual 
Sustainable  Growth  Survey  2023 (177),  promote 
policies  that  have  an  influence  also  on  labour 
shortages,  notably  in  the  areas  of  activation 
measures that increase the participation of women 
and vulnerable groups, flexible retirement policies 
that  contribute  to  labour  force  participation  and 
skills policies.  

for 

The  European  Skills  Agenda  constitutes  a 
concerted  effort 
individuals  and 
to  help 
businesses develop more and better skills and to 
put  them  to  use.  Large  scale  efforts  to  match 
skills  demands  to  skills  supply  should  target  the 
entire  working  age  population  with  a  view  to 

(176) Council  Decision  (EU)  2022/2296  of  21  November  2022 
on  guidelines  for  the  employment  policies  of  the  Member 
States  

(177) Annual Sustainable Growth Survey 2023 

95 

 
   
 
                                                           
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

and 

cross-industry 

ensuring  they  have  the  skills  needed  for  their 
current  job  or  transitions  to  future  employment, 
while  paying  particular  attention  to  those  most  in 
need.  As  part  of  the  Skills  Agenda,  the  Pact  for 
Skills provides for a shared engagement model for 
skills  development  in  Europe,  with  companies, 
workers,  national,  regional  and  local  authorities, 
sectoral 
social  partners, 
organisations,  education  and  training  providers, 
chambers  of  commerce  and  employment  services 
working  together  towards  this  shared  objective. 
The  Council  Recommendation  on 
individual 
learning  accounts (178)  adopted  in  May  2022  can 
support  the  re-training  of  workers  to  fill  shortage 
occupations. Short and modular training leading to 
micro-credentials have a huge potential to address 
skills  shortages  and  enhance  employability.  A 
Council  Recommendation  for  an  EU  approach  to 
micro-credentials 
and 
employability  was  adopted  in  June  2022. (179) 
Within  Member  States,  the  Public  Employment 
Services, employers and trade unions could step up 
their  cooperation  at  the  local and  sectoral  level  to 
identify  and  organise  up-  and  reskilling  solutions 
labour  shortages. (180)  The  2023 
to  address 
European  Year  of  Skills  will  further  contribute  to 
the  promotion  of  policies  to  address  the  skills 
shortages underlying labour shortages. 

learning 

lifelong 

for 

The Commission Recommendation on Effective 
Active  Support  to  Employment (181)  (EASE) 
remains  relevant  to  help  manage  reallocation 
pressures, also related to the twin transition. In 
the  course  of  2021,  Member  States  took  up  the 
suggestions of EASE. (182) The RRF has provided 
an 
these  policy 
developments.  The  measures  promoted  by  the 
EASE  recommendation  are  still  appropriate  for 
addressing  ongoing  labour  market  reallocation,  to 
stimulate  job  creation  and  to  facilitate  job-to-job 
transitions. They can also contribute to addressing 
some of the structural drivers of labour shortages, 

important  contribution 

to 

(178) Council Recommendation on individual learning accounts 
(179) Council  recommendation  on  a  European  approach  to 
micro-credentials for lifelong learning and employability 
(180) A conclusion of the PES Network Stakeholder Conference, 

7-8 April 2022. 

(181) Commission  Recommendation  (EU)  2021/402  on  an 
effective  active  support  to  employment  following  the 
Covid-19 crisis (EASE)  

(182) Chapter  3  of 

the  2021  Labour  Market  and  Wage 
Developments  report  of  DG  EMPL  provides  a  detailed 
overview  of  the  measures  that  have  been  implemented  by 
Member States.  

96 

and the new reallocation pressures generated by re-
shoring  in  the  energy  crisis.  In  June  2022,  the 
Commission  adopted  a  proposal  for  the  Council 
Recommendation  on  ensuring  a  fair  transition 
towards  climate  neutrality, (183)  which  together 
with  the  resources  of  the  RRF,  aims  to  support 
Member  States’  policies  and  investments  that 
facilitate  the  adaption  of  the  labour  market  to  the 
green and digital transitions. 

Financial  support  for  EU  and  national  policies 
with an impact on labour shortages is available 
the  policies 
from  the  EU  budget.  Namely, 
discussed above can benefit from support from the 
Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  (RRF)  and  from 
cohesion  policy  funds,  including  the  European 
Social  Fund  Plus,  the  Just  Transition  Fund  and 
Invest  EU,  which,  as  highlighted  by  the  Annual 
Sustainable  Growth  Survey  2023,  all  aim  to 
support  fair  and  inclusive  growth  in  the  EU. 
Labour  law  and  its  enforcement,  including  by 
current EU initiatives, could effectively address 
poor working conditions. In the healthcare sector, 
the  European  Care  Strategy ( 184)  could  contribute 
to  improved  job  quality.  Furthermore,  actions  in 
the  domain  of  occupational  health  and  safety, 
supported by the EU strategic framework on health 
and  safety  at  work  2021-2027  also  contribute  to 
ensure  safe  working  conditions.  The  Directive  on 
adequate  minimum  wages ( 185)  can  support  wage 
increases for low wage earners, thereby increasing 
their  living  standards,  and  hence  contributing  to 
addressing some labour shortages. 

Labour  mobility  can  contribute  to  reducing 
skill  shortages.  The  European  Labour  Authority 
and EURES aim to ensure that people who wish to 
move  from  one  Member  State  to  another  do  not 
encounter any obstacles in light of the right of free 
movement  and  can  benefit  from  the  system  of 
social  security  coordination.  The  revised  Posting 
of  Workers  Directive  as  well  as  the  Transparent 
and  Predictable  Working  Conditions  Directive 
support intra-EU labour mobility, by ensuring that 

(183) Proposal  for  a  COUNCIL  RECOMMENDATION  on 
towards  climate  neutrality 

transition 

ensuring  a  fair 
COM/2021/801 final 

(184) Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European 
Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European  Economic  and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the 
European  care  strategy,  COM  (2022)  440,  Brussels, 
7.9.2022. 

(185) Directive  2022/2041  of  19  October  2022  on  adequate 

minimum wages in the European Union.  

                                                           
                                                           
Short- and long-run determinants of labour shortages 

Chapter 3 

mobile  workers  enjoy  comparable  working 
conditions  as  other  local  workers  and  are  fully 
informed  about  their  rights  and  obligations. (186) 
The  implementation  of  the  Directive  on  the 
recognition of professional qualifications could be 
reviewed,  to  assess  whether  changes  to  this 
Directive  would  be  needed  to  support  labour 
mobility to fill labour shortages across the EU. 

Migration  policy  can  address  ageing  and  skills 
shortages  in  the  European  labour  market  by 
filling  the  gaps  with  workers  from  outside  the 
EU. Currently, third-country nationals do not have 
the same rights as EU nationals to move and reside 
in other Member States and experience issues with 
validation or recognition of skills acquired through 
formal or informal learning. The Skills and Talent 
package ( 187)  will  streamline  and  reinforce  legal 
pathways  for  migration  and  establish  channels  for 
skilled  labour  migration  to  the  EU.  Furthermore, 
the  EU  Talent  Partnerships (188)  will  promote 
cooperation  with  third  countries  in  this  domain. 
The  Skills  OVATE  tool (189)  can  support  the 
potential  of  third  country  workers  to  fill  sectoral 
and regional labour and skills shortages. 

In  the  short  and  medium  run,  the  EU  and  the 
Member  States  will  work 
intensively  on 
the  employment  of  Ukrainian 
supporting 
refugees in the EU. In its Communication adopted 
on  23  March, (190)  the  Commission  recommends 

(186) Directive  (EU)  2018/957  of  the  European  Parliament  and 
of  the  Council  of  28  June  2018  amending  Directive 
96/71/EC  concerning  the  posting  of  workers  in  the 
framework of the provision of services and Directive (EU) 
2019/1152 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of  20  June  2019  on  transparent  and  predictable  working 
conditions in the European Union.  

(187) The  package,  proposed  by  the  Commission  on  27  April 
2022,  builds  on  the  New  Pact  on  Migration  and  Asylum 
adopted  on  23  September  2020  and  is  complementary  to 
earlier  initiatives,  such  as  the  revision  of  the  ‘Blue  Card’ 
Directive,  governing  entry  and  residence  conditions  for 
highly  qualified  non-EU  nationals.  It  will  consist  of  a 
communication on Skills and Talent, including options for 
developing an EU Talent Pool, a recast of the single permit 
Directive,  a  recast  of  the  Directive  on  long-term  residents 
and the digitalisation of visa procedures. 

(188) https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/policies/migration-and-

asylum/legal-migration-and-integration/talent-
partnerships_en 

(189) Skills-OVATE offers detailed information on the jobs and 
job 

employers  demand  based  on  online 

skills 
advertisements in EU countries. 

(190) 

Welcoming those fleeing war in Ukraine: Readying 
Europe  to  meet  the  needs.  Communication  from  the 
Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  European 
Council,  the  Council,  the  European  Economic  and  Social 

that Member States interpret the rights granted by 
the  Temporary  Protection  Directive  to  access  the 
EU  labour  market  in  the  broadest  possible  way, 
applying  exceptions  to  free  movement  in  the 
internal  market 
justified 
circumstances.  The  Commission  has  been 
mobilising its networks, including for instance the 
European  Network  of  Public  Employment 
Services,  to  ensure  effective  support  to  those  on 
the ground and share good practices. 

duly 

only 

in 

EU initiatives provide guidance and  support to 
Member States in view of facilitating the labour 
market  integration  of  displaced  persons  from 
Ukraine. On 14 June 2022 a Communication was 
adopted  on  guidance  for  access  to  the  labour 
market,  vocational  education  and  training  and 
adult  learning  for  people  fleeing  Russia’s  war.  It 
provides  measures  that  can  be  taken  by  Member 
States,  based  on  lessons  learnt  and  best  practices 
that  have been  gathered so  far, and highlights EU 
funded  projects  in  this  area  as  an  inspiration. 
Several  initiatives  have  also  been  implemented  to 
improve  the  matching  of  skills.  The  Commission 
has  published  new  guidelines  to  facilitate  the 
recognition 
qualifications 
obtained  in  Ukraine.  These  qualifications  give 
access  to  regulated  professions  such  as  doctors, 
nurses  and  architects.  Furthermore,  the  European 
Training  Foundation  has  created  an  information 
hub, through with which displaced Ukrainians can 
get information about accessing training, education 
and  the  labour  market  in  the  EU.  The  recent  EU 
Talent  Pool  pilot  online  tool  will  help  people 
fleeing  Russia's 
to 
invasion 
successfully integrate into the EU labour market. 

‘professional’ 

of  Ukraine 

of 

These  policies  should  be  accompanied  by  the 
provision of services to support the employment 
of Ukrainian refugees. Policies could support the 
access  of  refugees  to  housing.  Language  classes, 
their 
services  could 
trainings  and 
integration in the society, and childcare, education, 
elderly  care  and  medical  assistance  can  ensure 
their  participation  both  in  these  trainings  and  also 
in employment. 

support 

The Commission increased the flexibility in the 
use  of  EU  funds,  in  particular  the  European 
Social  Fund,  to  support  the  integration  of 

Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2022) 
131 final, Brussels, 23 March 2022.  

97 

                                                           
                                                                                   
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

into 

from  Ukraine 

displaced  persons 
the 
European  labour  market.  The  CARE  initiative 
has  provided  additional  flexibility  in  cohesion 
policy  funding  to  support  Member  States  hosting 
people fleeing from the war in Ukraine. The FAST 
CARE initiative of 29 June 2022 further increases 
flexibility in the use of EU Cohesion Policy funds 
to  channel  resources  towards  actions  addressing 
migratory  challenges  resulting  from  Russia’s 
military  aggression  against  Ukraine.  The  2021-27 
Multiannual Financial Framework is also available 
to finance such measures. 

3.4.2.  Policies at the Member State level 

Member  State  measures  that  can  influence 
labour shortages are embedded in a framework 
of effective policy coordination at the European 
level.  As  discussed  in  section  3.4.1,  the  Recovery 
and Resilience Facility, integrated in the European 
Semester  of  economic  and  employment  policy 
coordination,  remains  key  for  supporting 
the 
reform and investment agendas in the years ahead. 
Together with cohesion policy, InvestEU and other 
funding  programmes  such  as  Horizon  Europe  or 
Digital  Europe,  it  is  accelerating  the  twin  green 
and digital transition, boosting social and territorial 
cohesion  and 
thereby  strengthening  Member 
States’  resilience.  This  includes  the  forthcoming 
introduction  of  dedicated  REPowerEU  chapters 
into  the  recovery  and  resilience  plans  to  tackle 
immediate  energy-related  priorities,  in  addition  to 
actions  supported  by  cohesion  policy  and  other 
national  or  EU  funds.  At  the  same  time,  the 
Operational  Programmes 
the 
European Social Fund Plus, under cohesion policy, 
contribute  to  the  financing  for  skills  policies, 
activation, support to labour market transitions, all 
crucial  for  tackling  labour  shortages.  This  section 
provides  further  details  on  those  national  policies 
that  have  the  potential  to  reduce  labour  shortages 
in  the  short,  medium  or  longer  term,  notably 
education, training, mobility, migration, activation, 
and measures to improve working conditions.  

supported  by 

National  education  and  vocational  education 
and  training  systems  (VET)  are  important 
pillars  to  tackle  labour  and  skills  shortages. 
Reforms  of  VET  systems  should  be  aligned  with 
labour  market  changes  and  respond  to  changing 
labour market demands. Moreover, social partners, 
the Public Employment  Services, the chambers of 
commerce  also  play  a  crucial  role  in  providing 

98 

training  for  working-age  people.  Work-based 
learning  and  apprenticeships  are  particularly 
effective approaches to ensure VET’s relevance for 
the  labour  market.  VET  programmes  should  be 
personalised  and  flexible  to  suit  individual  needs. 
Additionally,  VET  programmes  should  make  use 
of  innovative  and  moderns  learning  environments 
focussing on digitalisation. Training and education 
systems  should  enable  and  promote  pathways 
between  VET,  general  school  education,  higher 
and  adult  education.  Life-long 
the 
implementation  of  short  courses  targeted  at  the 
needs  of  the  labour  market  are  seen  as  crucial 
elements  to  address  labour  shortages  across  most 
Member States. Finland has recently re-oriented its 
training offer, to better focus on short courses and 
on  the  skills  needs  in  bottleneck  sectors.  The 
digital  strategies  of  Bulgaria  and  Czechia  include 
updating  and  modernizing  the  national  education 
and VET systems. 

learning, 

integrated 

national 
their 

strategies, 
Through 
Member  States  adapt 
training  and 
education  systems  to  improve  digital  skills  of 
the  workforce.  More  than  one  third  of  the 
Member  States  has  adopted  national  digitalization 
strategies,  in  order  to  equip  young  students  with 
digital  skill  through  national  education  systems, 
and to up- and reskill the existing workforce. (191) 
These  plans  provide  for  the  inclusion  of  digital 
skills  related  courses  into  the  national  VET  and 
education  programmes.  Since  2020,  the  Czech 
government  is  implementing  a  new  education 
policy,  which  pays  particular  attention  to  the 
development  of  digital  skills  of  pupils  as  well  as 
teachers.  Some  national  digital  strategies  (e.g. 
Ireland  and  Austria)  include  a  particular  focus  on 
skills  related  to  science,  technology,  engineering 
and mathematics (STEM), both in initial education 
and  training  and  in  adult  learning. (192)  Other 
Member  States,  such  as  Greece  or  Luxembourg, 
developed strategies that aim to teach digital skills 
to  the  broader  population.  Access  to  training  is 
either  provided  through  courses  provided  free  of 
charge  to  all  citizens (193)  or  through  tailor  made 
training  plans  for  employees  in  companies  that 

(191) Including  digital  growth  and  digital 

transformation 

strategies. See here.  

(192) See here for the respective countries: Austria, Belgium and 

Ireland.  

(193) As in the case of the Greek digital skills academy initiated 

by the Greek Ministry of Digital Governance. 

                                                           
undergo  digital  transformation  organised  by  the 
national PES. (194) 

In 
the  Action  Programme 

Sector specific initiatives promote skills needed 
to advance the green transition. The construction 
sector plays a pivotal role in greening the economy 
- new innovations to promote energy efficiency of 
buildings  increase  the  need  for  specific  skills  of 
construction  workers.  Member  States  support 
specific  training  opportunities  to  develop  skills 
needed  for  energy  efficient  construction.  These 
trainings  mostly  focus  on  the  current  workforce, 
including  actors  along  the  entire  value  chain,  for 
instance  in  Luxembourg,  Malta  and  Sweden. ( 195) 
Trainings  are  oftentimes  provided  by  national 
(Latvia,  France)  or 
construction  associations 
the 
through  private  public  partnerships. 
framework  of 
for 
Construction  Quality  and  Energy  Transition,  the 
French  Ministry  of  Housing  supported  the  skills 
development  of  the  labour  force. (196)  Among 
other  aims,  this  programme  financially  supports 
regional governments and training organisations to 
organise 
to  environmentally 
friendly construction. In Austria, the promotion of 
qualifications of specialists to advance the national 
climate  strategy  is  part  of  an  environmental 
‘Klimaaktiv’. (197) 
protection 
Furthermore,  Austria  also  supports  the  labour 
market  integration  of  people  with  a  migrant 
background  while  aiming 
its  green 
transition objectives. Migrant people and refugees 
into  vocational  education  and 
are 
training,  to  provide  them  with  formal  green 
economy  qualifications.  These 
trainings  are 
financed by the government and businesses. 

initiative,  called 

trainings  related 

recruited 

to  meet 

Labour  mobility  and  migration  can  contribute 
to  reducing  labour  shortages  in  the  EU  labour 
market. Member States have enacted measures to 
support  intra-country  geographical  mobility.  For 
support 
example, 
commuters,  either  provided  by  the  government 
through tax allowances for example, for instance in 
Austria and Germany, or by employers as a part of 

commuting 

allowances 

(194) Luxembourg Digital Skills Bridge 
(195) European  Construction  Sector  Observatory 

(2020): 

Improving the human capital basis.  

(196) Programme  d’Action pour  la  qualité  de  la  Construction  et 

la Transition Energétique - PACTE  

(197) Klimaaktiv 

Short- and long-run determinants of labour shortages 

Chapter 3 

a 

from 

regions  with 

inter-regional  mobility 

a  benefit  package. ( 198)  Employers  provide 
assistance  in  the  preparation  of  tax  return,  cover 
transportation 
commuting 
costs  or  provide 
premia. ( 199) Potential further measures to promote 
within-country 
could 
involve relocation subsidies, along with temporary 
and  targeted  subsidies  to  companies  recruiting 
higher 
workers 
unemployment.  In  relation  to  labour  mobility 
within the EU, Member State measures include the 
provision of information for mobile workers about 
accommodation, medical services and childcare, or 
also  assistance  with  administrative  procedures 
during resettlement, as in the case of the  Austrian 
‘Welcome Tyrole’ service  for instance. (200) More 
recently,  Member  States  have  also  focused  on 
return  mobility,  aiming  to  incentivize  emigrated 
nationals to return to their country of origin. These 
programs provide assistance to reintegrate into the 
labour market and financial incentives in the form 
of tax breaks for instance. To anticipate the impact 
of ageing on labour shortages, Member States aim 
to attract foreign talents. Germany and Finland are 
implementing policies to attract skilled workers in 
the  global  competition  for  talents  and  to  ensure 
that these workers stay in their country in the long 
run.  For  highly  qualified  third  country  workers, 
expatriate 
in some 
tax  breaks  are  available 
Member  States.  To  cover  seasonal  peaks  Member 
States  have  set  up  simplified  procedures  and 
cooperation  agreements 
to  attract  short-term 
(seasonal) workers from third countries. (201) 

National  measures  focus  on  the  activation  of 
underutilized  resources.  Low  participation  rates 
of  disadvantaged  groups  may  be  due  to  a  lack  of 
support  or  discrimination,  or  be  related  to  work-
life  balance  conflicts.  Measures  focus  on  the  one 
hand on updating skills of the  workers, as  well as 
providing for the necessary possibilities to improve 
their  work-life  balance.  With  the  transposition  of 
the  Work-life  balance  directive, ( 202)  Member 

(198) For more detail in Austria, see  here  and for Germany, see 

here. 

(199) See the survey of Deloitte  
(200) See Annual report on Intra- EU Labour mobility 2021. 
(201) European  Migration  Network  (2020).  Attracting  and 
protecting the rights of seasonal workers in the EU and the 
United  Kingdom  –  Synthesis  Report.  Brussels:  European 
Migration Network. 

(202) Directive (EU) 2019/1158 of the European Parliament and 
of  the  Council  of  20  June  2019  on  work-life  balance  for 
parents  and  carers  and  repealing  Council  Directive 
2010/18/EU. 

99 

                                                           
                                                           
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

to 

increase 

taken  action 

States  have 
the 
possibilities  for  parental  leave.  For  instance,  in 
Spain, parental leave is increased to 16  weeks for 
both,  mother  and  fathers,  and  will  be  non-
the  parents. (203)  Other 
transferrable  between 
measures  aim  to  facilitate  the  integration  of 
workers  with  limited  capacities  to  work  or  who 
had  dropped  out  of  the  labour  market  due  to 
disability or long-term illness. Related actions may 
include 
individual  counselling,  setting  up  an 
individual  action  plan  and  finding  appropriate 
public  measures  to  support  the  workers  and 
employers  in  the  reintegration  process. (204)  The 
Netherlands aims to encourage increasing working 
hours  among  the  part-time  workers.  Hungary 
provides  a  temporary  wage  subsidy  to  firms 
recruiting  disadvantaged  people  and  also  provides 
training to them. 

staff 

aggravated 
instance, 

Member States are enacting policies to improve 
working conditions, which can in turn also have 
an  influence  on  labour  shortages.  This  includes 
ensuring  fair  wages,  as  well  as  appropriate 
benefits,  including  compensation  for  overtime, 
pension  and  health  benefits.  Member  States  took 
action  in  the  health  care  sector,  where  working 
due 
conditions  were 
the 
to 
pandemic. (205)  For 
the  Romanian 
government  introduced  a  temporary  increase  of 
wages  for  medical  personnel  as  well  as  for 
administrative 
hospitals.  German 
of 
authorities,  together  with  social  partners  and  civil 
society  developed  a  concerted  action  plan  to 
increase  the  attractiveness  of  the  health  sector, 
including  elements  on  pay  and  collective 
bargaining. (206)  Additionally,  adapting  working 
times,  by 
the 
attractiveness  of  the  sector. (207)  Telework  can 
make  an  important  contribution  to  increasing 
working time flexibility, in sectors where telework 
can  be  enacted.  Telework  has  the  potential  to 
increase productivity and to enhance the work-life 
balance  of  workers. ( 208)  However,  it  has  to  be 
ensured  that  telework  remains  a  choice  of  the 
worker, having the right to disconnect. 

increasing  flexibility,  adds 

to 

Employment  services  can  coordinate  various 
policy actions to tackle labour shortages. Public 
employment services can provide information and 
advice  to  firms  and  employees,  to  broaden  their 
search  options,  and  to  propose  a  broad  range  of 
adjustment  options,  such  as  for  example  lowering 
the  skills  requirements  of  vacancies  by  recruiting 
for  entry-level  positions  and  filling  positions 
requiring  more  experience  within  the  firm.  They 
can  collect  timely  information  on  up-  and  re-
skilling  needs,  and  support  both  jobseekers  and 
companies  in  meeting  these,  with  organizing 
training 
trainings  and  also  with  supporting 
participation. Artificial intelligence could be relied 
upon to augment guidance and counselling. France 
is already implementing such an approach. Next to 
public  employment  services,  private  employment 
services also have a role to play, and the actions of 
these organizations would need to be coordinated. 
In  some  Member  States,  the  Public  Employment 
Services  have  better  information  on  the  low-  and 
medium-skilled  segment  of  the  labour  force.  In 
these cases, the PES could improve their outreach 
to other segments of the labour market, to improve 
the  underlying  information  basis  to  guide  skills 
intelligence. 

Through  collective  bargaining,  social  partners 
address  shortages,  in  addition  to  individual 
employer  initiatives.  In  several  Member  States, 
such  as  Italy,  Slovenia,  Czech  Republic  and 
Germany for example, social partners form part of 
national  initiatives  to  promote  vocation  education 
and  training.  They  provide  their  expertise  in 
national labour observatories, which conduct work 
for  the  anticipation  and  identification  of  skills 
needs ( 209) and provide information to workers and 
skills 
employers 
matching. (210)  Social  partners  promote  training 
activities  and  up-  and  reskilling  of  workers  by 
managing  dedicated  funds. (211)  They  promote 
VET  and  training  through  sectoral  collective 
bargaining  agreements  and  by  providing  expertise 
in  view  of  updating  curricula  of  VET  and 
education systems to meet the current needs of the 

improving 

view 

of 

in 

(203) Under Royal Decree-Law 6/2019. 
(204) As in the case of the Austrian Fit2Work initiative.  
(205) See here. 
(206) GEO no. 131/2020 Art. 1 
(207) OECD  (2020), Who Cares?  Attracting  and  Retaining Care 
Workers  for  the  Elderly,  OECD  Health  Policy  Studies, 
OECD Publishing, Paris. 

(208) See OECD. 

(209) ETUC Promoting Social Partnership in Employee Training 

– France Country Report  

(210) Notably  in  NL,  where  among  others  the  FNV  trade  union 
and  the  AWVN  employer  organisation  are  part  of  the 
House of skills in the Amsterdam Metropolitan Area.  
(211) Examples for the funds are: Fund Fonarcom; Fondo For.te 
or  Fondimpresa.  For  further  details,  see  ECE  thematic 
review Italy country report.  

100 

                                                           
                                                           
Short- and long-run determinants of labour shortages 

Chapter 3 

new 

created 

pressures 

the  pandemic  reduced  labour  shortages  due  to  its 
negative  cyclical  economic  impact,  it  accelerated 
digitalisation, 
for 
influencing  consumers’  and 
reallocation  by 
employees’ preferences, and thereby increased the 
likelihood  for  skills  mismatches  triggered  by 
transitions  between  sectors.  It  had  an  impact  on 
labour  supply  by  reducing  labour  mobility  and 
migration,  and  it  led  to  a  worsening  of  working 
conditions  in  some  sectors.  In  the  coming  years, 
the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience 
Plans  and  of  the  cohesion  policy  funds,  including 
the  European  Social  Fund  Plus  and  the  Just 
Transition Fund may on the one hand boost labour 
demand  in  some  sectors  including  green  and 
digital  ones,  and  can  on  the  other  hand  provide 
support  to  up-  and  re-skilling  and  to  increasing 
labour supply via active labour market policies. 

developments  may 

At the current juncture, the European economy 
is  threatened  by  a  steep  rise  of  energy  prices 
and high inflation, with an economic downturn 
looming  on  the  horizon.  As  highlighted  in  the 
Autumn  2022  Economic  Forecast, (216) 
these 
dampen 
macroeconomic 
shortages  but  not  lead  to  a  significant  increase  in 
unemployment in the short term. At the same time, 
in the medium to long run, the inflow of Ukrainian 
displaced  persons  can  increase  the  labour  supply 
and  help  to  ease  shortages  in  sectors  with  the 
lowest  barriers  to  skills  transferability  such  as 
services.  Still,  in  light  of  the  broad  needs  of  the 
EU,  the  inflow  of  people  fleeing  the  war  in 
Ukraine  is  insufficient  to  solve  the  underlying 
structural  problems 
influence 
that 
shortages  in  the  EU.  Yet  policies  should  continue 
to  address 
labour 
shortages,  regardless  of  whether  an  economic 
downturn  temporarily  alleviates  them.  This  can 
ensure that in the short run, the positive impact of 
shortages  on  wages  and  working  conditions 
prevails,  and  that  in  the  medium  to  long  run, 
shortages  (of  workers  and  skills)  do  not  constrain 
innovation and growth prospects. 

the  structural  drivers  of 

strongly 

Policies  at  the  national  level,  supported  by  EU 
initiatives  and  funding,  can  effectively  address 
the  main  causes  of  labour  shortages.  Activation 
policies  could  help  reduce  shortages  and  also 
reduce potential additional wage pressures, thereby 

labour  market.  German  social  partners  have 
committed to promoting apprenticeships and hiring 
apprentices  at  the  end  of  their  training. (212)  In 
France,  social  partners  were  involved  in  the 
creation  of  personal  training  accounts  (compte 
professionel  de  formation)  allowing  workers  to 
participate 
training 
activities. ( 213) 

vocational 

funded 

in 

To  address  the  reduction  of  the  labour  force 
due to ageing, automation and robotisation can 
also be supported. This could involve investments 
in  labour  saving  technologies.  Automation  and 
robotisation  can  replace  routine-intensive  tasks, 
Such 
especially 
adjustments  entail  the  risk  of  job  losses  and  of 
rising skills  mismatches. (215) However, combined 
with re-skilling, they could ease the pressure in the 
labour  market  in  those  sectors  and  occupations 
where  automation  and 
less 
feasible. 

manufacturing. (214) 

robotisation  are 

in 

Most  national  actions  to  address  the  structural 
causes  of  labour  shortages  will  have  a  delayed 
impact. This is the case especially for policies that 
target  the  labour  market  relevance  of  initial 
education  and  training.  Yet  it  is  important  to 
implement  both  policies  with  a  short-term  impact 
improve  matching, 
(such  as  PES  actions 
migration policies or short training courses), in line 
with structural policies with a long-term impact on 
labour  shortages, 
including  structural  policies 
affecting the provision of adult learning. 

to 

3.5.  CONCLUSIONS  

To a large extent, the current labour shortages 
are not new: their patterns closely follow those 
of  the  pre-pandemic  period,  and  they  have 
important  underlying  structural  drivers.  These 
include,  inter  alia,  ageing,  the  influence  of  skills 
shortages and mismatches, the ongoing digital and 
green  transitions,  migration  and  poor  working 
conditions in some sectors and occupations. While 

(212) Tarifabschluss IG Metall 2021 
(213) Perez, C. and A. Vourc'h (2020).  
(214) European  Commission:  Employment 

Social 
Developments  in  Europe  2018,  Chapter  2.  A  new  labour 
market with new working conditions: future jobs, skills and 
earnings. 

and 

(215) European  Commission:  Labour  Market  and  Wage 
Developments in Europe 2019, Chapter 4: The relationship 
between polarisation and skills mismatches.  

(216) Autumn  2022  Economic  Forecast  of 

the  European 

Commission. 

101 

                                                           
                                                           
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

to 

can 

risk  of 

pressures 

contribute 

inflationary 

the  potential 

shortages 
alleviating 
or 
contributing 
competitiveness 
losses.  Skills  policies  could 
address  the  main  root  causes  of  labour  shortages, 
with  the  contribution  of  migration  policies.  There 
is  scope  to  step  up  policies  supporting  transitions 
in  the  labour  market  and  promoting  quality  of 
to 
work.  Labour  mobility 
addressing labour shortages to some extent. In the 
domain  of  migration,  the  Commission’s  recently 
proposed  Skills  and  Talent  package  provides  the 
framework  for  supportive  national  policies  to 
attract talent, which can ensure an effective right to 
mobility  for  third-country  nationals  and  simplify 
admission procedures for all workers from non-EU 
countries. Finally, in line with the activation of the 
Temporary Protection Directive by the Council on 
4 March, a broad range of measures (language and 
training  policies,  access  to  education,  care  and 
healthcare 
labour  market 
measures  such  as  profiling,  counselling,  and 
employment  subsidies  and  measures  to  prevent 
undeclared  work)  could  support  the  integration  of 
displaced  persons  from  Ukraine  into  the  labour 
market  of  their  host  societies.  Improved  policy 
coordination between the different policy domains 
affecting  labour  shortages  (activation  policies, 
education  and  training,  mobility  and  migration 
policies) could contribute to better addressing this 
macroeconomic challenge. 

services, 

targeted 

102 

APPENDIX 1 

Annex to the chapter 3 

Graph 3.A1.1: The Beveridge curve in EU Member States, 2013Q1-2022Q4, quarterly data, industry 

AT

2022q4
21
18

19

16

20

13

14

BE

2022q4
21

19

18

20

5
2

0
2

5
1

0
1

5

0
4

0
3

0
2

0
1

16

14

13

BG

16

18
19
2022q4
21

20

4

5

6

7

5

6

7

8

9

5

CY

CZ

19

2022q4
18

21

20

16

13 14

18
19

16

212022q4
20

0
4

0
3

0
2

0
1

0

14

13

2022q4

21

18

19

0
4

0
3

0
2

0
1

14

13

15

10

DE

16

20

14

13

5

10

15

20

2

4

6

8

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

EA19

EE

2022q4
21

18

19

20

16

14

13

0
4

0
3

0
2

0
1

21

18

19

2022q4

1416

20

13

6

8

10

12

4

6

8

10

14

7

13

8

14

13

16

25

30

10

15

13

14

25

16

20

FR

0
2

5
1

0
1

5

2022q4

21

19

18

16

1314

20

20
13

16

14

EU27_2020

2022q4
21

18

19

20

16

14

13

6

8

10

12

HU

18

16

19

21
2022q4
20

14

13

0
3

0
2

0
1

0

0
8

0
6

0
4

0
2

7

8

9

10

7

8

9

10

11

4

6

8

10

Unemployment rate

2013q1-2022q4

DK

21

2022q4

18

19

20
16

4

5

6

2022q4

21

10

15

EL

20
19

18

20

FI

21
2022q4

18

19

5
2

0
2

5
1

0
1

5

8

6

4

2

0

ES

2022q4

18

21

19

20

s
s
e
n
h
g

t

i
t

t

e
k
r
a
m

r
u
o
b
a

l

f

o

t

r
o
a
c
d
n

i

I

0
2

0

6

4

2

0

0
4

0
3

0
2

0
1

0

5
1

0
1

5

0

0
3

0
2

0
1

0

Industry

(1) Share of manufacturing firms indicating that labour is a “factor limiting production” 
Source: European Commission based on Eurostat data and EU-Business and Consumer Survey 

103 

 
 
 
 
 
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Graph 3.A1.2: The Beveridge curve in EU Member States, 2013Q1-2022Q4, quarterly data, industry, cont. 

HR

2022q4

19
21

18

20

16

14
13

0
5

0

21
2022q4

18

19

16

20

5

10

15

20

5

IE

10

LU

IT

2022q4

21

19

18
20

16
13 14

6

4

2

0

15

8

10

12

14

21

2022q4

18

19

LT

16

20

14

0
3

0
2

0
1

13

0

2022q4
21

0
3

5
2

0
2

5
1

0
1

20

19

1416

18
13

LV

21
1819
2022q4

20

16

14

13

6

8

10

12

4

5

6

7

6

8

10

12

21

18
19

2022q4

MT

16

20

14

13

3

4

5

6

PT

212022q4
19
18
20

16

14

13

0
4

0
3

0
2

0
1

0

5
1

0
1

5

0

NL

2022q4
21

1819

20

16

13 14

18

19
212022q4
20

PL

16

0
5

0
4

0
3

0
2

0
1

14

13

4

6

8

10

2

4

6

8

10

1819

2022q4
21

RO

20

16

0
2

5
1

0
1

5

0

14

13

SE

2022q4

18

21

16

19

14

13

20

5

10

15

20

5

6

7

8

9

6

7

8

9

SI

2022q4
18
21

19

20

16

SK

16

18

21
2022q4
19

20

0
4

0
3

0
2

0
1

0

14

13

14

13

4

6

8

10

6

8

10

12

14

Unemployment rate

2013q1-2022q4

s
s
e
n
t
h
g
i
t

t
e
k
r
a
m

r
u
o
b
a

l

f
o

r
o
t
a
c
d
n
I

i

0
4

0
3

0
2

0
1

0

0
3

5
2

0
2

5
1

0
1

0
6

0
4

0
2

0

5
1

0
1

5

0

0
4

0
3

0
2

0
1

Industry

(1) Share of manufacturing firms indicating that labour is a “factor limiting production” 
Source: European Commission based on Eurostat data and EU-Business and Consumer Survey 

104 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Short- and long-run determinants of labour shortages 

Chapter 3 

Graph 3.A1.3: The Beveridge curve in EU Member States, 2013Q1-2022Q4, quarterly data, services 

AT

22q4
21

19

18

16

20

13

14

BE

BG

0
4

0
3

0
2

0
1

2122q4

19

18

20

16

14

13

22q4
19

18

21

16

20

14

0
3

0
2

0
1

0

4

5

6

7

5

6

7

8

9

5

CY

CZ

19

20
22q4

18

21

16

13 14

19
18

21

22q4

20

16

0
2

5
1

0
1

5

0

22q4

21

19

18

0
5

0
4

0
3

0
2

0
1

14

13

13

15

10

DE

16

20

14

13

5

10

15

20

2

4

6

8

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

DK

EA19

EE

22q4

21

1819

0
4

0
3

0
2

0
1

22q4

21

19

18

16
20

14

13

0
4

0
3

0
2

0
1

18

19

21
22q4

16
14

16

20

14

13

4

5

6

7

8

6

8

10

12

4

6

20

8

13

10

EL

18

20
19

20

FI

21
22q4

10

15

22q4
21
1819

14

16

13

0
2

5
1

0
1

5

0

ES

22q4

21
1819

20

25

30

10

15

16

20

13

0
1

14

25

6

EU27_2020

0
3

0
2

22q4

21
19

18

FR

22q4

21

19

18

20

16

1314

5
2

0
2

5
1

0
1

5

18

16

19
2122q4

20

0
4

0
3

0
2

0
1

0

20

13

16

14

14

13

12

10

20

8

16

HU

14

13

s
s
e
n
t
h
g
i
t

t
e
k
r
a
m

r
u
o
b
a

l

f
o

r
o
t
a
c
d
n
I

i

0
4

0
3

0
2

0
1

0

6

4

2

0

0
4

0
3

0
2

0
1

0

5
1

0
1

5

0

0
4

0
3

0
2

0
1

7

8

9

10

7

8

9

10

11

4

6

8

10

Unemployment rate

2013q1-2022q4

Services

(1) Share of services firms indicating that labour is a “factor limiting production” 
Source: European Commission based on Eurostat data and EU-Business and Consumer Survey 

105 

 
 
 
 
 
 
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Graph 3.A1.4: The Beveridge curve in EU Member States, 2013Q1-2022Q4, quarterly data, services, cont 

HR

22q4

18

19
21

16

20

1314

0
6

0
4

0
2

0

22q4
21

1819

16

20

5

10

15

20

5

IE

10

LV

IT

22q4

21

19

18

20

14

16

13

0
2

5
1

0
1

5

0

15

8

10

12

14

LT

22q4

21
1819

16

20

14

13

22q4

21
1819

0
2

5
1

0
1

5

20

16

14

13

6

8

10

12

6

8

10

12

NL

22q4

21

1819

20

16

13 14

0
3

0
2

0
1

0

PL

18

19
2122q4

20

16

14

13

MT

22q4
21

18
19

16

20

14

13

3

4

5

6

PT

22q4

21
1819

20

16

14

13

0
8

0
6

0
4

0
2

0

8

6

4

2

4

6

8

10

2

4

6

8

10

5

10

15

20

19
18

22q4

21

RO

20

16

0
5

0
4

0
3

0
2

0
1

14

13

SI

SE

22q4

18

16

19

0
4

0
3

0
2

0
1

0

21

14

13

20

22q4

21
1819

20

16

14

13

5

6

7

8

9

6

7

8

9

4

6

8

10

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2013q1-2022q4

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(1) Share of services firms indicating that labour is a “factor limiting production” 
Source: European Commission based on Eurostat data and EU-Business and Consumer Survey 

106 

 
 
 
 
 
Short- and long-run determinants of labour shortages 

Chapter 3 

Graph 3.A1.5: Heatmap of labour shortages in services, 2022Q4 

Heatmap of labour shortages, based on Business and Consumer Survey

Water transport
Warehousing
Veterinary  
Travel agency
Telecommunications
Sports
Services to buildings/landscape  
Security and investigation  
Scientific/technical  
Scientific R&D
Repair
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Postal
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Motion picture
Management consultancy  
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Land transport 
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Source: Own computations on Ecfin BS

score
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in terms of standard deviations, with means corresponding to the historical averages (2000Q1-2021Q4). Outliers are replaced 
by missing.  
Source: Own computations on European Commission EU – BCS data 

107 

 
 
 
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Graph 3.A1.6: Labour shortages and their link to unemployment in construction (Q2 2022) 

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Source: European Commission, EU-BCS 

108 

  
 
   
 
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Short- and long-run determinants of labour shortages 

Chapter 3 

Graph 3.A1.8: The response of labour shortages to the cyclical component of value added 

(1) The chart shows the standardised coefficient of the regression in the table above obtained by multiplying the estimated 
coefficients    by  the  standard  deviation  of  the  cyclical  component  of  value  added  in  construction,  manufacturing  and 
services.  
Source: Regression analysis, see output in Table 3.A1.2  

111 

 
REFERENCES 

Aeberhardt,  R.,  P.  Givord,  P.  and  C.  Marbot 
(2012), “Spillover effect of the  minimum  wage in 
France:  An  unconditional  quantile  regression 
approach”,  Document  de  travail  de  l’INSEE, 
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Statistical annex 

 
 
APPENDIX 1 

Statistical annex 

Belgium

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

1
2

3

- Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)
- Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)

- Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.)

4

- Activity rate (% of population 15-64)

5

-

 Employment rate (% of population 15-64)

(% of total population)

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

6
7

8

9

- Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.)
- Employment growth (%, National accounts)

Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)

- Self employed (15-64, % of total employment )

Male

Female

Male

Female

- Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment)

10

- Part-time (15-64, % of total employment )

11
12

Involuntary part-time (15-64, % of total employment)

- Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-49)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Female

13
14

- Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment)
- Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours)

15

- Sectoral employment growth (% change)

Male

Female

Agriculture

Building and construction

Services

Manufacturing industry

16

-

Indicator board on wage developments (% change)

Compensation per employee

Real compensation per employee based on GDP

Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)

Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)

Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)

120 

11375
7266
63.9
4940
2652
2289
68.0
28.1
84.8
51.3
68.3
65.8
72.8
30.6
90.0
56.9
63.2
25.4
79.6
45.8
63.1
22.7
79.5
48.3
35.5
65.1
82.2
64.1
56.6
67.5
24.4
84.4
53.8
58.7
20.9
74.6
42.8
4587.2
1.6
1.0
1.2
0.9
13.1
16.3
9.3
10.4
9.7
11.2
24.5
10.2
41.2
1.9
7.2
19.3
6.2
5.9
14.8
7.2
4.3
6.2
14.0
7.2
7.1
48.8
39.3
38.8
38.7

-1.3
0.9
1.8
0.7

1.9
0.1
1.2
1.9
0.1

11427
7289
63.8
5000
2664
2335
68.6
29.6
85.0
52.6
69.0
66.0
72.8
31.4
89.6
57.9
64.3
27.8
80.3
47.4
64.5
25.0
80.4
50.3
35.5
66.6
83.4
65.4
57.9
68.2
26.4
84.5
55.1
60.7
23.5
76.2
45.6
4699.4
1.5
2.4
1.4
3.7
12.7
15.8
9.1
10.7
9.8
11.7
24.5
10.0
41.0
1.7
6.0
15.8
5.4
4.3
13.3
6.0
3.5
5.2
12.2
6.4
5.6
48.7
39.3
38.9
38.8

0.3
2.5
1.6
0.7

1.8
0.3
1.6
2.2
0.4

11489
7307
63.6
5044
2681
2362
69.0
31.0
84.8
54.3
69.6
65.0
73.1
32.5
89.3
59.8
64.9
29.4
80.3
48.9
65.3
26.6
80.8
52.1
36.0
67.6
83.8
66.3
58.2
68.9
27.3
84.7
57.3
61.7
25.8
76.8
47.0
4770.7
1.6
1.5
1.2
1.8
12.9
16.1
9.2
10.8
10.2
11.5
24.9
10.5
41.0
1.4
5.5
14.2
4.8
4.1
12.2
5.3
3.2
4.8
10.3
5.9
5.0
43.5
39.3
38.8
38.7

0.8
1.1
1.7
0.7

2.0
0.2
2.0
2.6
0.5

11544
7326
63.5
5022
2670
2352
68.6
28.4
84.5
55.6
69.2
63.7
72.6
30.3
88.7
61.5
64.5
26.5
80.3
49.8
64.7
24.1
80.3
53.3
34.8
65.9
83.5
65.8
57.1
68.4
25.6
84.2
58.7
61.0
22.5
76.4
48.0
4740.6
0.0
-0.6
-0.4
-0.9
13.4
16.8
9.4
10.1
9.6
10.7
24.4
10.5
40.1
1.1
5.8
15.3
5.0
4.2
12.3
5.8
3.5
5.0
10.4
6.0
5.5
41.6
38.4
38.9
37.6

0.7
1.2
-1.0
-0.6

-1.5
-2.7
1.6
1.5
-5.7

11589
7345
63.4
5118
2718
2400
69.7
30.3
85.4
57.1
70.1
66.7
73.7
32.2
89.7
62.5
65.7
28.2
81.1
51.8
65.3
24.8
80.7
54.5
34.0
64.4
84.0
66.2
59.2
68.7
25.8
84.6
59.3
61.8
23.7
76.9
49.6
4794.7
1.8
1.1
0.8
1.5
13.0
16.4
9.2
10.3
9.5
11.1
24.1
10.4
39.5
5.2
6.3
18.2
5.5
4.6
14.7
7.0
3.6
5.6
11.2
6.6
5.9
42.5
37.8
37.4
36.9

1.5
1.8
2.1
0.3

4.2
-0.1
1.2
1.2
4.4

2020-2021
0.4 %
0.3 %
-0.1 pps
1.9 %
1.8 %
2.0 %
1.1 pps
1.8 pps
0.9 pps
1.5 pps
0.9 pps
2.9 pps
1.1 pps
1.9 pps
1.0 pps
1.0 pps
1.2 pps
1.7 pps
0.8 pps
1.9 pps
0.6 pps
0.7 pps
0.5 pps
1.1 pps
-0.7 pps
-1.5 pps
0.5 pps
0.4 pps
2.1 pps
0.4 pps
0.2 pps
0.4 pps
0.7 pps
0.8 pps
1.2 pps
0.5 pps
1.6 pps
1.1 %
1.8 pps
1.8 pps
1.2 pps
2.4 pps
-0.3 pps
-0.4 pps
-0.2 pps
0.2 pps
-0.1 pps
0.4 pps
-0.3 pps
-0.1 pps
-0.6 pps
4.0 pps
0.5 pps
2.9 pps
0.5 pps
0.4 pps
2.4 pps
1.2 pps
0.1 pps
0.6 pps
0.8 pps
0.6 pps
0.4 pps
0.9 pps
-1.6 %
-3.9 %
-1.9 %

0.8 pps
0.6 pps
3.1 pps
0.9 pps

5.7 pps
2.6 pps
-0.4 pps
-0.3 pps
10.1 pps

  
Bulgaria

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

1
2

3

- Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)
- Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)

- Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.)

4

- Activity rate (% of population 15-64)

5

-

 Employment rate (% of population 15-64)

(% of total population)

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

6
7

8

9

- Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.)
- Employment growth (%, National accounts)

Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)

- Self employed (15-64, % of total employment )

Male

Female

Male

Female

- Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment)

10

- Part-time (15-64, % of total employment )

11
12

Involuntary part-time (15-64, % of total employment)

- Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-49)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Female

13
14

- Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment)
- Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours)

15

- Sectoral employment growth (% change)

Male

Female

Agriculture

Building and construction

Services

Manufacturing industry

16

-

Indicator board on wage developments (% change)

Compensation per employee

Real compensation per employee based on GDP

Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)

Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)

Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)

7076
4595
64.9
3278
1751
1526
71.3
26.3
84.3
61.8
71.4
57.8
75.4
30.5
88.0
66.8
67.1
21.8
80.5
57.3
66.9
22.9
79.4
58.2
33.4
71.7
85.5
66.9
53.2
70.6
26.5
82.8
62.5
63.1
19.1
75.8
54.3
3073.4
1.8
4.0
4.4
3.6
10.8
13.5
7.6
4.4
4.9
3.9
2.2
2.0
2.4
1.3
7.2
12.9
5.9
5.9
18.3
5.3
3.1
6.2
0.0
7.4
6.9
55.0
40.4
40.6
40.0

6.4
0.1
0.6
1.1

10.5
5.4
12.4
12.3
1.0

7025
4531
64.5
3240
1737
1503
71.5
23.7
84.3
63.7
71.5
55.9
75.9
27.9
88.3
69.1
67.0
19.3
80.2
58.7
67.7
20.7
80.1
60.7
34.8
72.4
86.1
67.8
53.9
71.5
24.2
83.5
65.4
63.9
17.0
76.5
56.4
3068.9
-0.1
-0.1
-0.1
-0.2
10.6
13.4
7.3
4.0
4.4
3.7
1.8
1.7
2.0
1.0
6.2
12.7
5.0
4.6
15.7
4.6
2.4
5.3
0.0
6.7
5.6
58.5
40.2
40.5
39.9

-6.1
5.2
1.3
0.5

9.7
5.2
7.1
6.8
2.8

6976
4474
64.1
3276
1755
1521
73.2
23.9
85.8
66.9
73.3
56.0
77.6
27.6
90.0
72.0
68.7
20.0
81.4
62.2
70.1
21.8
82.3
64.4
38.4
74.6
88.5
70.1
56.0
74.1
25.0
86.0
69.2
66.0
18.4
78.3
59.9
3136.3
0.3
2.2
2.3
2.0
9.9
12.5
6.9
4.3
4.6
4.0
1.9
1.7
2.1
1.0
5.2
8.9
4.1
3.9
13.2
3.4
1.9
4.3
0.0
5.6
4.8
57.1
39.9
40.2
39.7

-4.4
6.0
1.7
-0.8

6.9
1.6
11.3
11.1
3.7

6934
4417
63.7
3190
1714
1477
72.2
21.9
84.7
67.1
72.2
59.4
76.8
25.3
89.1
72.6
67.6
18.2
80.1
62.0
68.5
18.8
80.5
64.2
35.2
72.7
87.6
68.5
0.0
72.5
21.7
84.4
69.4
64.3
15.7
76.4
59.4
3024.3
-2.3
-3.6
-3.3
-3.9
10.1
12.8
7.1
3.5
3.9
3.1
1.8
1.6
2.1
1.0
6.1
14.2
4.9
4.3
14.2
4.8
2.5
5.2
0.0
6.5
5.7
45.3
39.7
40.0
39.4

-0.2
-1.7
-3.9
-4.8

7.2
2.8
6.3
6.3
-2.1

6889
4383
63.6
3155
1689
1466
72.0
20.0
84.7
67.9
72.0
55.2
76.2
24.2
88.4
73.5
67.7
15.5
80.7
62.7
68.1
16.8
80.4
64.8
34.0
71.5
88.7
68.2
55.2
72.0
20.3
83.9
69.9
64.2
13.1
76.7
60.1
2986.7
0.2
-1.2
-1.5
-1.0
10.1
12.6
7.3
3.4
3.9
2.9
1.6
1.3
1.8
0.8
5.3
15.8
5.0
4.5
16.3
5.0
2.0
5.3
0.0
5.5
5.0
49.5
39.6
39.9
39.6

-6.1
1.8
1.3
0.9

9.5
3.1
7.7
8.3
4.0

Statistical annex 

2020-2021
-0.6 %
-0.8 %
-0.1 pps
-1.1 %
-1.4 %
-0.7 %
-0.2 pps
-1.9 pps
0.0 pps
0.8 pps
-0.2 pps
-4.2 pps
-0.5 pps
-1.1 pps
-0.7 pps
0.9 pps
0.1 pps
-2.7 pps
0.6 pps
0.7 pps
-0.3 pps
-2.0 pps
-0.1 pps
0.6 pps
-1.2 pps
-1.2 pps
1.1 pps
-0.3 pps
55.2 pps
-0.5 pps
-1.3 pps
-0.5 pps
0.5 pps
-0.1 pps
-2.6 pps
0.3 pps
0.7 pps
-1.2 %
2.5 pps
2.3 pps
1.8 pps
2.9 pps
0.0 pps
-0.2 pps
0.2 pps
-0.1 pps
0.0 pps
-0.2 pps
-0.2 pps
-0.3 pps
-0.3 pps
-0.2 pps
-0.8 pps
1.6 pps
0.1 pps
0.2 pps
2.1 pps
0.2 pps
-0.5 pps
0.1 pps
0.0 pps
-1.0 pps
-0.7 pps
4.2 pps
-0.3 %
-0.3 %
0.5 %

-5.9 pps
3.5 pps
5.3 pps
5.7 pps

2.4 pps
0.3 pps
1.4 pps
2.0 pps
6.1 pps

121 

  
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Czechia

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

1
2

3

- Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)
- Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)

- Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.)

4

- Activity rate (% of population 15-64)

5

-

 Employment rate (% of population 15-64)

(% of total population)

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

6
7

8

9

- Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.)
- Employment growth (%, National accounts)

Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)

- Self employed (15-64, % of total employment )

Male

Female

Male

Female

- Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment)

10

- Part-time (15-64, % of total employment )

11
12

Involuntary part-time (15-64, % of total employment)

- Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-49)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Female

13
14

- Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment)
- Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours)

15

- Sectoral employment growth (% change)

Male

Female

Agriculture

Building and construction

Services

Manufacturing industry

16

-

Indicator board on wage developments (% change)

Compensation per employee

Real compensation per employee based on GDP

Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)

Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)

Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)

122 

10590
6917
65.3
5248
2912
2336
75.9
31.7
89.1
63.6
75.7
82.0
82.9
36.5
95.7
73.2
68.7
26.6
82.1
54.5
73.6
29.1
86.7
62.1
26.1
78.9
84.2
73.5
79.9
80.9
33.8
93.7
71.7
66.2
24.3
79.3
53.0
5093.9
1.5
1.6
1.3
1.8
16.1
19.8
11.6
9.6
7.8
11.7
6.2
2.4
10.9
0.6
2.9
7.9
2.7
2.4
13.3
2.7
1.5
2.9
2.6
2.3
3.6
35.0
40.2
41.7
38.8

0.5
0.0
1.5
1.5

7.2
5.8
7.8
7.8
3.6

10626
6879
64.7
5267
2915
2352
76.6
30.4
89.3
66.5
76.4
83.6
83.3
34.4
95.9
75.3
69.6
26.2
82.3
58.0
74.8
28.4
87.5
65.1
26.5
80.1
85.6
74.7
81.8
81.8
32.2
94.4
74.0
67.6
24.3
80.1
56.6
5146.8
1.3
1.0
0.7
1.5
16.0
19.9
11.1
8.4
6.5
10.6
6.3
2.6
10.9
0.4
2.2
6.7
2.0
2.0
10.8
2.1
1.2
2.3
2.1
1.8
2.8
30.6
40.1
41.4
38.9

1.3
1.2
1.4
0.8

8.1
5.4
7.7
7.8
1.9

10669
6856
64.3
5259
2914
2345
76.7
29.7
89.1
68.0
76.5
83.9
83.4
33.4
95.9
76.2
69.8
25.8
81.8
60.1
75.1
28.0
87.4
66.7
28.1
80.7
84.9
75.0
81.9
81.9
31.6
94.5
74.7
68.1
24.3
80.0
58.9
5151.0
0.2
0.1
0.0
0.1
15.7
19.5
11.1
7.8
6.2
9.6
6.3
2.8
10.6
0.4
2.0
5.6
1.8
2.0
10.9
1.8
1.0
2.0
2.5
1.7
2.4
30.0
40.0
41.4
38.7

-3.1
1.2
0.4
-0.6

7.2
3.2
7.9
7.7
2.8

10700
6838
63.9
5224
2909
2315
76.4
27.3
88.7
69.6
76.2
83.0
83.3
32.9
95.8
76.5
69.2
21.4
81.1
62.8
74.4
25.1
86.5
68.2
27.6
80.0
83.9
74.2
80.7
81.4
30.5
93.8
75.2
67.1
19.4
78.8
61.3
5086.9
-1.7
-1.2
-0.7
-1.9
15.8
19.4
11.2
7.0
5.9
8.2
5.7
2.4
9.9
0.3
2.6
8.0
2.4
2.0
10.7
2.4
1.5
2.6
2.8
2.2
3.0
22.0
38.7
39.7
37.8

0.8
-1.2
-2.0
-3.7

3.1
-1.1
4.7
6.8
-3.9

10697
6810
63.7
5216
2898
2318
76.6
27.0
88.7
71.6
76.4
82.8
83.3
31.8
95.8
78.1
69.6
21.9
81.1
65.2
74.4
24.8
86.3
69.9
25.7
79.7
84.8
74.2
80.5
81.3
29.4
93.8
76.5
67.1
19.9
78.4
63.3
5066.1
0.4
-0.4
-0.4
-0.4
15.1
18.6
10.6
6.5
5.3
7.9
5.7
2.5
9.6
1.0
2.8
8.2
2.6
2.4
13.2
2.7
1.4
2.9
2.8
2.3
3.4
27.6
39.1
40.1
38.2

-0.7
0.4
0.2
-0.1

5.0
1.6
4.5
3.7
3.2

2020-2021
0.0 %
-0.4 %
-0.3 pps
-0.1 %
-0.4 %
0.1 %
0.2 pps
-0.3 pps
0.0 pps
2.0 pps
0.2 pps
-0.2 pps
0.0 pps
-1.0 pps
0.0 pps
1.5 pps
0.4 pps
0.5 pps
0.0 pps
2.4 pps
0.0 pps
-0.3 pps
-0.2 pps
1.7 pps
-1.9 pps
-0.3 pps
0.9 pps
0.0 pps
-0.2 pps
0.0 pps
-1.1 pps
0.0 pps
1.3 pps
0.1 pps
0.4 pps
-0.4 pps
2.0 pps
-0.4 %
2.1 pps
0.8 pps
0.3 pps
1.5 pps
-0.7 pps
-0.8 pps
-0.6 pps
-0.5 pps
-0.6 pps
-0.3 pps
0.0 pps
0.1 pps
-0.3 pps
0.7 pps
0.2 pps
0.2 pps
0.2 pps
0.4 pps
2.5 pps
0.3 pps
-0.1 pps
0.3 pps
0.0 pps
0.1 pps
0.4 pps
5.6 pps
1.0 %
1.0 %
1.1 %

-1.5 pps
1.6 pps
2.1 pps
3.6 pps

1.9 pps
2.8 pps
-0.2 pps
-3.1 pps
7.1 pps

  
Denmark

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

1
2

3

- Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)
- Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)

- Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.)

4

- Activity rate (% of population 15-64)

5

-

 Employment rate (% of population 15-64)

(% of total population)

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

6
7

8

9

- Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.)
- Employment growth (%, National accounts)

Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)

- Self employed (15-64, % of total employment )

Male

Female

Male

Female

- Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment)

10

- Part-time (15-64, % of total employment )

11
12

Involuntary part-time (15-64, % of total employment)

- Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-49)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Female

13
14

- Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment)
- Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours)

15

- Sectoral employment growth (% change)

Male

Female

Agriculture

Building and construction

Services

Manufacturing industry

16

-

Indicator board on wage developments (% change)

Compensation per employee

Real compensation per employee based on GDP

Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)

Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)

Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)

5765
3684
63.9
2870
1501
1369
77.9
60.4
85.8
70.9
78.6
70.8
80.7
59.6
89.3
75.0
75.1
61.2
82.2
66.7
73.2
52.9
81.4
68.2
52.9
78.3
85.5
74.3
62.1
76.0
51.9
85.0
72.2
70.5
53.9
77.7
64.4
2698.1
1.5
1.1
1.0
1.3
7.4
10.0
4.5
12.3
11.2
13.4
24.7
15.3
35.0
3.3
5.8
12.4
5.1
3.7
10.0
4.8
4.7
5.5
12.3
5.6
6.1
20.9
39.0
40.1
37.3

1.0
3.5
2.4
1.2

1.7
0.5
1.9
1.6
1.3

5794
3695
63.8
2892
1514
1378
78.2
60.1
86.1
71.8
78.9
71.3
81.1
59.4
89.6
76.5
75.3
60.8
82.6
67.2
74.1
53.7
82.2
69.2
52.9
79.4
86.1
75.2
62.9
76.9
52.4
85.9
73.8
71.3
55.2
78.5
64.6
2739.3
1.5
1.5
1.6
1.5
7.2
9.7
4.3
10.7
9.3
12.0
23.9
14.5
34.3
2.8
5.1
10.5
4.5
3.6
8.9
4.2
4.3
4.7
11.8
4.9
5.3
19.6
38.6
39.7
37.1

-1.9
3.4
1.8
1.5

1.6
0.9
2.2
2.2
0.5

5817
3704
63.7
2930
1534
1395
79.1
61.1
86.5
73.8
79.8
71.6
82.0
60.5
90.1
78.4
76.1
61.8
82.8
69.3
75.0
55.0
82.6
71.3
53.2
79.9
87.2
75.9
65.1
78.0
54.2
86.3
75.8
72.0
55.8
78.8
66.9
2779.1
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.3
7.4
9.9
4.7
10.8
9.6
12.0
24.2
15.3
33.9
2.6
5.0
10.1
4.5
3.4
8.7
4.2
4.2
4.8
9.1
4.8
5.3
16.9
38.2
39.3
36.6

-0.8
1.8
1.5
1.8

1.9
0.9
2.1
2.1
0.1

5830
3700
63.5
2921
1528
1393
79.0
60.2
86.3
74.6
79.5
74.0
81.8
60.1
89.7
79.1
76.0
60.4
82.9
70.1
74.4
53.2
82.1
71.4
52.1
78.6
87.1
75.2
66.6
77.3
52.5
85.8
75.8
71.4
54.0
78.3
67.1
2752.8
-1.1
-0.9
-1.0
-0.9
7.5
10.0
4.8
10.9
9.3
12.5
23.4
14.8
32.9
2.7
5.6
11.6
4.9
4.2
9.7
4.9
4.7
5.4
9.9
5.3
6.0
16.7
38.1
39.1
36.7

-2.6
1.4
-2.0
-3.0

2.6
0.0
1.8
2.5
-0.9

5854
3690
63.0
2938
1536
1402
79.6
60.4
87.1
75.3
80.0
76.2
82.6
60.9
90.5
79.8
76.6
59.9
83.7
70.9
75.5
53.9
83.5
72.3
53.6
79.4
87.4
76.1
69.4
78.4
54.3
86.8
76.4
72.6
53.4
80.0
68.3
2786.9
2.4
1.2
1.0
1.5
7.7
10.3
4.9
10.9
9.4
12.5
23.9
15.2
33.5
2.2
5.1
10.8
4.2
4.0
8.8
4.5
4.0
4.8
8.9
5.0
5.2
19.9
38.7
39.7
37.3

-1.8
4.6
2.3
1.4

2.9
0.2
4.0
2.7
2.3

Statistical annex 

2020-2021
0.4 %
-0.3 %
-0.4 pps
0.6 %
0.5 %
0.6 %
0.7 pps
0.2 pps
0.8 pps
0.8 pps
0.5 pps
2.2 pps
0.8 pps
0.8 pps
0.8 pps
0.7 pps
0.5 pps
-0.4 pps
0.8 pps
0.8 pps
1.1 pps
0.6 pps
1.4 pps
0.9 pps
1.5 pps
0.8 pps
0.3 pps
1.0 pps
2.8 pps
1.1 pps
1.8 pps
1.0 pps
0.6 pps
1.2 pps
-0.6 pps
1.7 pps
1.1 pps
1.2 %
3.5 pps
2.2 pps
1.9 pps
2.5 pps
0.2 pps
0.3 pps
0.0 pps
0.0 pps
0.1 pps
0.0 pps
0.5 pps
0.4 pps
0.6 pps
-0.5 pps
-0.5 pps
-0.8 pps
-0.7 pps
-0.2 pps
-0.9 pps
-0.4 pps
-0.7 pps
-0.6 pps
-1.0 pps
-0.3 pps
-0.8 pps
3.2 pps
1.6 %
1.5 %
1.6 %

0.8 pps
3.2 pps
4.2 pps
4.4 pps

0.4 pps
0.2 pps
2.2 pps
0.2 pps
3.2 pps

123 

  
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Germany

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

1
2

3

- Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)
- Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)

- Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.)

4

- Activity rate (% of population 15-64)

5

-

 Employment rate (% of population 15-64)

(% of total population)

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

6
7

8

9

- Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.)
- Employment growth (%, National accounts)

Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)

- Self employed (15-64, % of total employment )

Male

Female

Male

Female

- Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment)

10

- Part-time (15-64, % of total employment )

11
12

Involuntary part-time (15-64, % of total employment)

- Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-49)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Female

13
14

- Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment)
- Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours)

15

- Sectoral employment growth (% change)

Male

Female

Agriculture

Building and construction

Services

Manufacturing industry

16

-

Indicator board on wage developments (% change)

Compensation per employee

Real compensation per employee based on GDP

Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)

Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)

Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)

124 

82657
53797
65.1
42094
22504
19590
78.2
49.9
87.3
72.6
79.8
68.2
82.4
51.3
91.9
77.9
74.0
48.3
82.5
67.5
75.2
46.5
84.2
70.1
47.6
79.5
88.1
77.3
62.7
78.9
47.4
88.4
75.0
71.5
45.5
80.0
65.4
40481.6
1.4
0.8
0.8
0.7
9.1
11.2
6.6
12.9
13.0
12.9
26.9
9.7
46.4
3.0
3.6
6.8
3.5
3.4
9.7
3.4
2.0
3.2
8.1
3.9
3.1
41.9
41.0
41.8
39.7

-1.3
1.2
1.5
0.8

2.6
1.1
3.3
3.0
1.3

82906
53524
64.6
42094
22485
19609
78.6
50.3
87.7
73.6
80.1
70.0
82.9
52.5
92.3
78.7
74.3
47.8
82.9
68.6
75.9
47.2
84.9
71.4
48.3
80.2
88.5
77.8
64.8
79.7
48.8
89.0
76.1
72.1
45.4
80.6
66.9
40635.7
1.4
0.4
0.3
0.5
8.8
10.9
6.3
12.6
12.9
12.4
26.8
9.6
46.3
2.7
3.2
6.2
3.2
2.9
9.0
2.9
1.9
2.9
7.5
3.6
2.8
41.3
40.8
41.6
39.7

-1.1
1.5
1.3
1.6

2.9
0.9
2.8
2.7
-0.4

83093
53545
64.4
42427
22619
19809
79.2
51.4
88.0
74.7
80.6
71.6
83.5
54.2
92.7
79.5
74.9
48.4
83.3
70.0
76.7
48.5
85.4
72.7
49.4
80.8
89.0
78.4
66.7
80.5
50.6
89.6
77.1
72.8
46.1
81.1
68.4
41065.1
0.9
1.1
0.9
1.2
8.5
10.7
6.1
12.0
12.3
11.7
27.2
9.9
46.7
2.5
3.0
5.8
3.0
2.7
8.1
2.8
1.9
2.6
6.9
3.3
2.6
38.1
40.7
41.4
39.6

-1.6
1.4
0.5
0.6

3.4
1.2
2.7
2.8
0.1

83161
53229
64.0
41806
22241
19565
78.5
51.8
87.3
74.0
79.9
70.6
82.5
53.7
91.8
78.1
74.5
49.9
82.6
69.8
75.4
48.1
84.0
71.7
49.4
79.4
87.0
77.4
64.0
78.9
49.6
88.0
75.5
71.9
46.5
79.9
67.8
40155.2
-0.8
-2.2
-2.4
-2.0
7.8
9.7
5.7
10.8
10.8
10.8
27.8
10.2
47.8
2.1
3.7
7.1
3.7
3.1
9.4
3.3
2.6
3.1
9.4
4.0
3.3
29.3
39.5
40.2
37.9

-3.0
1.6
-1.7
-2.5

0.4
-1.4
2.2
2.3
-2.9

83196
52967
63.7
41674
22179
19495
78.7
52.3
87.4
74.1
80.3
69.9
82.7
55.1
91.6
78.6
74.6
49.2
83.1
69.7
75.8
48.7
84.5
71.8
50.4
79.9
87.8
77.9
64.5
79.3
51.1
88.2
75.9
72.2
46.1
80.7
67.8
40153.7
0.1
0.0
0.1
-0.1
7.6
9.6
5.5
11.4
11.6
11.2
27.9
10.6
47.4
2.0
3.6
6.9
3.3
3.0
7.9
3.2
2.5
3.0
7.7
3.9
3.2
32.5
39.5
40.3
38.2

-3.3
1.0
-0.3
-1.3

3.1
0.4
1.2
1.2
2.5

2020-2021
0.0 %
-0.5 %
-0.3 pps
-0.3 %
-0.3 %
-0.4 %
0.1 pps
0.4 pps
0.1 pps
0.1 pps
0.4 pps
-0.7 pps
0.2 pps
1.5 pps
-0.3 pps
0.4 pps
0.1 pps
-0.7 pps
0.5 pps
-0.2 pps
0.4 pps
0.5 pps
0.4 pps
0.2 pps
1.0 pps
0.5 pps
0.8 pps
0.4 pps
0.6 pps
0.4 pps
1.5 pps
0.2 pps
0.4 pps
0.3 pps
-0.5 pps
0.7 pps
-0.1 pps
0.0 %
0.9 pps
2.2 pps
2.5 pps
1.9 pps
-0.1 pps
-0.1 pps
-0.2 pps
0.6 pps
0.8 pps
0.4 pps
0.1 pps
0.4 pps
-0.4 pps
-0.1 pps
-0.1 pps
-0.2 pps
-0.4 pps
-0.1 pps
-1.5 pps
-0.1 pps
-0.1 pps
-0.1 pps
-1.7 pps
-0.1 pps
-0.1 pps
3.2 pps
0.0 %
0.2 %
0.8 %

-0.3 pps
-0.6 pps
1.4 pps
1.2 pps

2.7 pps
1.8 pps
-1.0 pps
-1.1 pps
5.4 pps

  
Estonia

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

1
2

3

- Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)
- Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)

- Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.)

4

- Activity rate (% of population 15-64)

5

-

 Employment rate (% of population 15-64)

(% of total population)

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

6
7

8

9

- Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.)
- Employment growth (%, National accounts)

Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)

- Self employed (15-64, % of total employment )

Male

Female

Male

Female

- Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment)

10

- Part-time (15-64, % of total employment )

11
12

Involuntary part-time (15-64, % of total employment)

- Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-49)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Female

13
14

- Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment)
- Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours)

15

- Sectoral employment growth (% change)

Male

Female

Agriculture

Building and construction

Services

Manufacturing industry

16

-

Indicator board on wage developments (% change)

Compensation per employee

Real compensation per employee based on GDP

Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)

Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)

Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)

1401
839
59.8
657
339
318
78.4
44.0
88.3
72.2
78.2
79.0
81.8
45.8
92.9
71.9
75.0
42.1
83.6
72.3
73.7
38.7
83.6
67.9
45.1
75.9
85.4
74.1
71.0
76.5
39.0
88.0
66.3
70.9
38.2
79.2
69.2
617.8
2.7
1.8
1.2
2.5
9.7
13.2
6.0
3.2
3.4
2.9
9.6
6.0
13.4
0.7
5.8
12.2
5.3
5.9
11.3
6.7
3.4
5.3
10.1
6.3
5.1
34.5
40.3
40.9
39.6

-9.0
3.1
6.1
3.5

7.1
3.4
7.7
7.9
3.0

1401
836
59.7
659
340
318
78.7
46.2
88.2
72.4
78.7
79.0
82.1
47.4
93.1
70.6
75.4
45.1
83.0
73.9
74.4
40.6
84.0
68.5
45.9
77.2
85.4
75.0
71.2
77.5
41.3
89.0
65.6
71.4
39.9
78.8
70.8
622.4
0.9
0.7
1.5
0.0
10.2
13.9
6.2
3.5
3.6
3.4
11.0
7.1
15.2
0.6
5.4
12.1
4.7
5.4
10.9
5.7
3.5
4.7
9.7
5.6
5.2
23.8
39.7
40.7
38.8

-0.4
5.5
-0.3
0.1

9.4
4.4
5.6
5.7
2.8

1393
837
60.1
657
339
318
78.5
43.5
87.5
74.9
78.4
78.5
81.4
44.2
92.1
72.6
75.5
42.7
82.6
76.7
74.8
38.4
83.9
71.9
42.3
78.0
86.4
75.2
72.5
78.0
39.2
89.1
69.1
71.6
37.5
78.5
74.3
626.0
1.3
0.6
1.0
0.1
10.6
14.4
6.6
3.2
3.1
3.2
11.3
7.1
15.9
0.7
4.5
11.7
4.0
4.0
10.2
4.9
2.8
4.1
7.6
4.1
4.8
20.3
39.9
40.7
39.1

-3.2
2.4
1.6
-1.2

7.2
5.1
7.2
7.1
2.4

1393
836
60.0
659
341
317
78.8
41.9
87.8
76.5
78.5
80.3
81.8
42.9
92.5
74.3
75.8
41.0
83.0
78.5
73.2
34.2
82.5
71.3
39.5
76.5
84.6
73.3
72.0
75.8
35.0
87.0
68.4
70.5
33.5
77.8
74.0
611.5
-2.7
-2.3
-2.5
-2.1
10.5
14.5
6.2
2.8
2.8
2.9
12.3
8.1
16.8
0.8
6.9
18.5
6.0
6.7
13.8
7.6
4.9
6.6
10.3
7.1
6.6
17.4
39.2
40.0
38.5

-10.2
0.8
-5.7
-2.5

6.2
5.6
1.5
1.8
2.2

1393
833
59.8
659
340
319
79.1
40.3
88.8
76.6
79.2
78.8
81.4
40.6
91.9
76.0
76.8
40.0
85.4
77.0
74.0
33.5
84.0
71.6
40.1
76.0
87.1
74.7
70.0
75.6
33.1
86.6
70.2
72.3
34.0
81.1
72.9
616.1
0.1
0.8
-0.4
1.9
10.6
14.8
6.3
1.7
1.8
1.6
12.2
7.6
16.9
1.9
6.2
16.7
5.4
6.4
15.0
7.1
3.6
5.7
11.2
6.8
5.6
25.1
39.0
39.1
38.4

-13.0
-4.3
0.4
-1.3

9.8
2.0
6.3
6.1
7.9

Statistical annex 

2020-2021
0.0 %
-0.4 %
-0.2 pps
0.0 %
-0.6 %
0.6 %
0.3 pps
-1.7 pps
0.9 pps
0.1 pps
0.6 pps
-1.4 pps
-0.4 pps
-2.3 pps
-0.5 pps
1.7 pps
1.0 pps
-1.0 pps
2.4 pps
-1.5 pps
0.9 pps
-0.7 pps
1.4 pps
0.3 pps
0.5 pps
-0.5 pps
2.5 pps
1.3 pps
-2.0 pps
-0.2 pps
-2.0 pps
-0.4 pps
1.8 pps
1.9 pps
0.5 pps
3.3 pps
-1.0 pps
0.8 %
2.8 pps
3.1 pps
2.1 pps
4.1 pps
0.1 pps
0.3 pps
0.1 pps
-1.1 pps
-1.0 pps
-1.3 pps
-0.1 pps
-0.5 pps
0.1 pps
1.1 pps
-0.7 pps
-1.8 pps
-0.6 pps
-0.3 pps
1.2 pps
-0.5 pps
-1.3 pps
-0.9 pps
0.9 pps
-0.3 pps
-1.0 pps
7.7 pps
-0.5 %
-2.3 %
-0.3 %

-2.8 pps
-5.1 pps
6.1 pps
1.2 pps

3.7 pps
-3.5 pps
4.8 pps
4.3 pps
5.7 pps

125 

  
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Ireland

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

1
2

3

- Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)
- Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)

- Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.)

4

- Activity rate (% of population 15-64)

5

-

 Employment rate (% of population 15-64)

(% of total population)

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

6
7

8

9

- Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.)
- Employment growth (%, National accounts)

Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)

- Self employed (15-64, % of total employment )

Male

Female

Male

Female

- Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment)

10

- Part-time (15-64, % of total employment )

11
12

Involuntary part-time (15-64, % of total employment)

- Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-49)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Female

13
14

- Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment)
- Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours)

15

- Sectoral employment growth (% change)

Male

Female

Agriculture

Building and construction

Services

Manufacturing industry

16

-

Indicator board on wage developments (% change)

Compensation per employee

Real compensation per employee based on GDP

Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)

Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)

Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)

126 

4802
3141
65.4
2282
1227
1055
72.7
46.7
82.9
62.0
72.0
76.1
78.8
47.8
90.1
70.8
66.6
45.5
75.9
53.3
67.7
40.0
78.0
58.4
37.0
67.5
84.2
67.1
70.4
73.0
40.2
84.5
66.5
62.4
39.7
71.7
50.3
2125.1
2.8
2.8
2.7
3.1
13.4
19.1
6.8
9.1
8.8
9.4
20.1
10.9
30.6
4.7
6.7
14.4
5.8
5.8
12.6
8.6
4.1
6.8
7.5
7.1
6.3
46.4
41.6
42.5
37.1

-1.7
8.7
2.6
1.3

3.2
2.0
2.2
2.2
6.0

4861
3176
65.3
2316
1241
1075
72.9
46.7
83.2
63.3
72.0
78.0
78.8
48.4
90.0
72.1
67.1
45.0
76.7
54.7
68.6
40.3
79.2
60.4
37.0
69.4
84.6
67.9
72.6
74.1
41.2
85.7
68.5
63.3
39.4
72.9
52.3
2180.0
2.8
2.6
2.6
2.5
12.9
18.3
6.8
9.9
9.5
10.4
19.5
10.6
29.9
3.5
5.8
13.8
4.8
4.6
10.8
7.1
3.8
5.7
6.9
5.8
5.7
37.1
41.9
42.8
37.6

-3.0
11.2
3.1
-1.1

2.9
1.8
3.1
3.4
5.6

4927
3219
65.3
2358
1264
1094
73.3
47.1
83.5
64.1
72.5
77.2
79.2
48.2
90.6
72.5
67.4
45.9
76.7
55.9
69.5
41.2
80.1
61.8
37.7
70.3
85.2
68.9
72.7
75.0
41.4
86.7
69.9
64.2
41.0
73.6
53.9
2238.5
3.0
2.7
2.5
2.9
12.5
17.5
6.6
9.7
8.9
10.4
19.7
10.1
30.6
3.2
5.0
12.5
4.1
3.6
9.7
6.1
3.2
4.9
5.7
5.2
4.7
33.0
41.7
42.5
37.2

-4.3
2.5
3.1
2.0

3.8
0.2
3.7
3.4
2.4

4980
3254
65.3
2339
1253
1086
71.9
43.7
82.5
64.4
71.2
75.1
77.7
44.3
89.5
72.7
66.2
43.1
75.6
56.4
67.7
37.0
78.7
61.8
35.4
66.3
83.8
67.4
69.6
73.2
37.5
85.3
69.6
62.4
36.5
72.2
54.3
2203.9
-2.8
-1.5
-1.4
-1.7
12.3
16.7
7.2
9.0
8.4
9.5
18.2
9.6
28.2
2.5
5.9
15.3
4.6
4.0
9.1
7.1
4.2
5.5
7.3
5.8
5.9
23.7
40.8
41.6
36.4

-0.2
-7.9
-4.2
2.7

3.7
5.3
-3.6
3.4
9.3

5019
3277
65.3
2444
1289
1155
74.6
50.2
84.3
66.4
73.9
77.9
79.4
50.4
90.2
73.6
69.9
50.0
78.5
59.5
69.8
42.9
80.0
62.8
36.0
67.8
85.0
69.4
72.1
74.3
43.1
85.5
69.4
65.5
42.8
74.7
56.3
2289.0
6.0
3.9
2.2
5.8
11.3
15.6
6.6
9.4
9.0
9.8
19.8
11.0
29.6
2.5
6.2
14.5
5.0
5.5
11.6
8.0
4.3
6.1
7.3
6.3
6.2
29.8
40.5
41.3
37.0

4.7
2.5
5.4
6.9

2.6
2.0
4.2
4.5
7.1

2020-2021
0.8 %
0.7 %
0.0 pps
4.5 %
2.9 %
6.3 %
2.7 pps
6.5 pps
1.8 pps
2.0 pps
2.7 pps
2.8 pps
1.7 pps
6.1 pps
0.7 pps
0.8 pps
3.7 pps
6.9 pps
2.9 pps
3.1 pps
2.1 pps
5.9 pps
1.4 pps
1.0 pps
0.6 pps
1.5 pps
1.2 pps
2.0 pps
2.5 pps
1.1 pps
5.6 pps
0.2 pps
-0.1 pps
3.1 pps
6.2 pps
2.5 pps
2.0 pps
3.9 %
8.8 pps
5.4 pps
3.6 pps
7.5 pps
-1.0 pps
-1.1 pps
-0.7 pps
0.4 pps
0.6 pps
0.3 pps
1.6 pps
1.4 pps
1.4 pps
0.0 pps
0.3 pps
-0.8 pps
0.4 pps
1.5 pps
2.5 pps
0.9 pps
0.1 pps
0.6 pps
0.0 pps
0.5 pps
0.3 pps
6.1 pps
-0.7 %
-0.7 %
1.6 %

4.9 pps
10.4 pps
9.6 pps
4.2 pps

-1.1 pps
-3.4 pps
7.8 pps
1.1 pps
-2.2 pps

  
Greece

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

1
2

3

- Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)
- Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)

- Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.)

4

- Activity rate (% of population 15-64)

5

-

 Employment rate (% of population 15-64)

(% of total population)

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

6
7

8

9

- Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.)
- Employment growth (%, National accounts)

Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)

- Self employed (15-64, % of total employment )

Male

Female

Male

Female

- Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment)

10

- Part-time (15-64, % of total employment )

11
12

Involuntary part-time (15-64, % of total employment)

- Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-49)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Female

13
14

- Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment)
- Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours)

15

- Sectoral employment growth (% change)

Male

Female

Agriculture

Building and construction

Services

Manufacturing industry

16

-

Indicator board on wage developments (% change)

Compensation per employee

Real compensation per employee based on GDP

Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)

Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)

Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)

10755
6886
64.0
4701
2605
2096
68.3
25.1
85.0
46.7
68.0
71.9
76.4
26.2
93.0
59.8
60.3
23.9
77.0
34.9
53.5
14.1
67.4
38.3
39.8
51.8
70.8
53.6
51.9
62.7
15.9
77.5
49.6
44.4
12.4
57.2
28.0
3682.7
-0.5
2.0
2.2
1.7
29.4
34.4
22.4
11.4
9.9
13.3
9.7
6.6
14.1
6.8
21.8
43.6
20.7
18.1
24.8
24.0
16.6
21.2
27.8
18.2
26.4
72.7
43.4
44.0
42.3

0.7
-3.3
-0.6
-1.5

1.5
1.2
2.5
1.4
1.6

10733
6831
63.6
4657
2590
2068
68.2
23.3
85.0
48.5
68.0
70.9
76.6
25.1
93.2
61.4
59.9
21.5
76.7
36.8
54.9
14.0
68.9
41.1
39.9
53.1
73.3
55.1
51.8
64.7
15.9
79.6
53.3
45.3
12.0
58.2
30.0
3751.1
4.6
1.9
2.4
1.1
29.1
34.0
22.1
11.3
9.5
13.5
9.1
6.1
13.2
6.4
19.7
39.9
18.9
15.3
22.8
21.9
14.3
19.0
26.9
15.8
24.7
70.3
43.3
43.7
42.2

0.8
1.6
6.8
6.6

-3.8
-3.6
2.5
2.0
-2.8

10722
6771
63.1
4634
2571
2063
68.4
22.5
85.4
49.8
68.2
72.1
76.7
23.9
93.2
63.8
60.4
21.0
77.6
37.3
56.5
14.6
70.8
43.2
39.0
55.1
75.2
56.7
53.0
65.9
15.9
80.8
56.1
47.3
13.2
60.8
31.6
3824.6
0.9
2.0
0.9
3.5
27.9
32.9
21.1
12.6
10.9
14.5
9.1
5.9
13.5
6.0
17.9
35.2
17.1
13.4
21.6
19.7
12.3
16.8
26.5
14.4
22.4
70.0
42.9
43.5
41.1

-1.8
-0.5
1.5
1.5

0.6
0.4
3.3
2.1
0.9

10710
6719
62.7
4526
2514
2013
67.4
21.2
84.0
50.8
67.2
70.7
75.5
23.1
91.6
64.5
59.4
19.3
76.3
38.6
56.3
13.8
70.4
44.6
37.7
54.8
74.5
56.6
50.4
65.2
15.9
79.7
57.0
47.5
11.7
61.1
33.5
3780.3
-1.2
-1.2
-1.8
-0.3
27.9
32.9
21.2
10.1
8.8
11.7
8.6
5.5
12.7
5.6
17.6
35.0
16.2
12.2
19.8
18.6
12.2
15.7
28.7
14.6
21.5
66.5
42.1
42.9
40.7

-2.6
-2.0
-2.5
0.7

-0.7
0.1
4.0
4.0
-7.9

10669
6678
62.6
4492
2486
2006
67.3
20.7
83.1
54.4
67.2
68.3
75.0
22.6
90.6
66.5
59.6
18.8
75.4
43.6
57.2
13.4
71.1
48.3
38.9
55.0
75.1
57.5
52.1
66.4
15.6
80.8
60.7
48.2
11.1
61.3
37.3
3822.8
0.5
1.1
1.4
0.7
27.8
33.2
20.6
10.2
8.3
12.4
8.2
5.0
12.5
4.6
14.7
35.5
14.4
11.1
17.4
17.1
11.2
14.5
23.7
11.4
18.9
62.7
42.0
42.4
40.4

6.4
1.3
-1.1
5.0

1.4
-0.6
2.0
2.1
7.8

Statistical annex 

2020-2021
-0.4 %
-0.6 %
-0.1 pps
-0.8 %
-1.1 %
-0.3 %
-0.1 pps
-0.5 pps
-0.9 pps
3.6 pps
0.0 pps
-2.4 pps
-0.5 pps
-0.5 pps
-1.0 pps
2.0 pps
0.3 pps
-0.5 pps
-0.9 pps
5.0 pps
1.0 pps
-0.4 pps
0.7 pps
3.7 pps
1.2 pps
0.1 pps
0.6 pps
0.9 pps
1.7 pps
1.2 pps
-0.3 pps
1.1 pps
3.7 pps
0.7 pps
-0.6 pps
0.2 pps
3.7 pps
1.1 %
1.7 pps
2.3 pps
3.2 pps
1.0 pps
-0.1 pps
0.3 pps
-0.6 pps
0.1 pps
-0.5 pps
0.7 pps
-0.4 pps
-0.5 pps
-0.2 pps
-1.1 pps
-2.9 pps
0.5 pps
-1.8 pps
-1.1 pps
-2.4 pps
-1.5 pps
-1.0 pps
-1.2 pps
-5.0 pps
-3.2 pps
-2.6 pps
-3.8 pps
-0.2 %
-1.2 %
-0.7 %

9.0 pps
3.3 pps
1.5 pps
4.3 pps

2.2 pps
-0.7 pps
-2.0 pps
-1.9 pps
15.7 pps

127 

  
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Spain

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

1
2

3

- Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)
- Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)

- Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.)

4

- Activity rate (% of population 15-64)

5

-

 Employment rate (% of population 15-64)

(% of total population)

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

6
7

8

9

- Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.)
- Employment growth (%, National accounts)

Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)

- Self employed (15-64, % of total employment )

Male

Female

Male

Female

- Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment)

10

- Part-time (15-64, % of total employment )

11
12

Involuntary part-time (15-64, % of total employment)

- Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-49)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Female

13
14

- Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment)
- Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours)

15

- Sectoral employment growth (% change)

Male

Female

Agriculture

Building and construction

Services

Manufacturing industry

16

-

Indicator board on wage developments (% change)

Compensation per employee

Real compensation per employee based on GDP

Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)

Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)

Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)

128 

46533
30531
65.6
22558
12064
10495
73.9
33.3
87.0
59.6
73.5
76.8
78.9
35.1
92.0
67.9
68.8
31.5
82.0
51.8
61.1
20.5
73.2
50.5
49.6
59.8
79.4
61.4
58.5
66.5
21.2
79.2
57.8
55.7
19.7
67.1
43.5
18648.5
2.6
2.6
2.5
2.6
15.7
19.3
11.4
26.8
26.0
27.6
14.9
7.2
24.1
9.1
17.2
38.6
15.9
15.3
25.2
17.0
10.0
16.4
23.9
15.7
19.0
44.4
40.1
41.1
38.7

2.9
4.3
2.9
2.7

0.7
-0.6
0.8
0.8
0.3

46729
30671
65.6
22607
12089
10518
73.7
33.0
86.9
60.5
73.4
76.1
78.8
35.1
91.9
68.4
68.6
30.8
81.8
52.9
62.4
21.7
74.7
52.2
51.3
60.6
80.1
62.8
59.5
67.9
22.7
80.8
59.7
56.9
20.5
68.6
44.9
19136.3
2.2
2.6
2.5
2.7
15.2
18.6
11.1
26.9
26.0
27.8
14.5
6.7
23.9
8.1
15.3
34.3
14.0
13.8
22.3
15.5
9.0
14.4
21.9
13.7
17.0
41.7
40.3
41.3
38.9

0.0
6.8
1.5
2.2

1.6
0.4
1.8
1.9
0.1

47105
30909
65.6
22804
12145
10659
73.8
33.0
87.0
61.6
73.5
75.9
78.5
35.1
91.7
69.2
69.0
30.7
82.3
54.4
63.3
22.3
75.8
53.8
52.2
61.1
80.3
63.7
60.7
68.7
24.3
81.6
61.1
57.9
20.1
69.9
46.9
19567.9
2.8
2.3
2.0
2.6
14.9
18.2
11.0
26.3
25.4
27.3
14.5
6.8
23.7
7.9
14.1
32.5
12.9
12.6
20.5
14.5
8.7
13.3
20.1
12.5
16.0
37.8
39.9
40.9
38.6

-3.9
7.1
4.3
1.3

2.3
1.0
2.2
1.8
-0.7

47354
31110
65.7
22475
11961
10513
72.2
29.9
85.5
62.5
72.1
73.5
76.9
32.2
90.1
69.6
67.6
27.5
80.8
55.7
60.9
18.5
73.1
54.7
49.5
57.6
78.2
61.8
55.3
66.1
20.3
78.8
61.6
55.7
16.6
67.4
48.0
18957.5
-4.1
-3.1
-3.1
-3.1
15.3
18.5
11.4
24.2
22.7
25.7
13.9
6.5
22.6
7.3
15.5
38.3
14.5
12.5
21.9
16.6
10.3
14.2
24.7
13.9
17.4
32.0
39.1
40.1
38.0

-7.8
-0.9
-5.5
-5.7

-1.4
-2.4
3.9
3.1
-7.0

47327
31066
65.6
22906
12081
10825
73.7
31.5
87.1
64.4
73.6
74.8
77.8
33.1
91.3
70.9
69.7
29.9
83.0
58.3
62.7
20.6
75.4
55.8
48.9
59.1
79.7
63.5
57.5
67.5
21.8
80.7
62.5
57.9
19.3
70.1
49.3
19493.0
2.4
2.8
2.0
3.8
15.0
18.4
11.0
25.2
22.9
27.6
13.7
6.3
22.3
7.3
14.8
34.8
13.5
13.4
21.6
16.1
9.3
13.6
23.2
13.1
16.7
41.6
38.9
39.9
37.7

1.9
4.7
2.1
-2.3

2.9
0.7
-0.1
0.4
2.7

2020-2021
-0.1 %
-0.1 %
-0.1 pps
1.9 %
1.0 %
3.0 %
1.5 pps
1.6 pps
1.6 pps
1.9 pps
1.5 pps
1.3 pps
0.9 pps
0.9 pps
1.1 pps
1.2 pps
2.1 pps
2.4 pps
2.2 pps
2.6 pps
1.8 pps
2.1 pps
2.3 pps
1.1 pps
-0.6 pps
1.5 pps
1.5 pps
1.7 pps
2.2 pps
1.4 pps
1.5 pps
1.9 pps
0.9 pps
2.2 pps
2.7 pps
2.7 pps
1.3 pps
2.8 %
6.5 pps
5.9 pps
5.1 pps
6.9 pps
-0.3 pps
-0.2 pps
-0.4 pps
1.0 pps
0.2 pps
1.9 pps
-0.2 pps
-0.2 pps
-0.3 pps
0.1 pps
-0.7 pps
-3.5 pps
-1.0 pps
0.9 pps
-0.3 pps
-0.5 pps
-1.0 pps
-0.6 pps
-1.5 pps
-0.8 pps
-0.7 pps
9.6 pps
-0.5 %
-0.5 %
-0.8 %

9.7 pps
5.6 pps
7.6 pps
3.4 pps

4.2 pps
3.1 pps
-4.0 pps
-2.7 pps
9.7 pps

  
France

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

1
2

3

- Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)
- Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)

- Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.)

4

- Activity rate (% of population 15-64)

5

-

 Employment rate (% of population 15-64)

(% of total population)

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

6
7

8

9

- Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.)
- Employment growth (%, National accounts)

Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)

- Self employed (15-64, % of total employment )

Male

Female

Male

Female

- Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment)

10

- Part-time (15-64, % of total employment )

11
12

Involuntary part-time (15-64, % of total employment)

- Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-49)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Female

13
14

- Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment)
- Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours)

15

- Sectoral employment growth (% change)

Male

Female

Agriculture

Building and construction

Services

Manufacturing industry

16

-

Indicator board on wage developments (% change)

Compensation per employee

Real compensation per employee based on GDP

Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)

Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)

Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)

67116
40846
60.9
29207
15119
14088
71.5
36.9
87.4
54.9
72.1
63.9
75.5
40.3
92.6
56.9
67.6
33.5
82.5
53.1
64.7
28.7
80.0
51.3
39.7
66.2
82.9
65.8
52.0
68.4
31.0
85.0
52.8
61.2
26.4
75.2
49.9
26434.3
1.1
0.7
1.1
0.4
10.8
13.8
7.7
16.8
16.2
17.4
18.2
7.7
29.5
7.9
9.4
22.1
8.5
6.6
17.3
10.1
5.3
8.8
18.6
9.5
9.4
45.4
35.9
36.3
37.6

-0.4
-0.7
2.6
-0.6

2.0
1.4
1.3
1.8
1.1

67449
40791
60.5
29316
15128
14189
71.9
37.5
87.6
56.0
72.3
66.2
75.7
41.0
92.4
58.4
68.2
33.9
83.1
53.9
65.3
29.7
80.5
52.3
39.5
66.7
82.8
66.2
55.1
68.9
32.2
85.2
54.2
61.9
27.2
76.1
50.4
26646.1
1.0
0.8
0.5
1.1
10.9
14.0
7.6
16.6
16.1
17.2
18.0
7.8
28.8
7.5
9.0
20.8
8.1
6.8
16.3
9.7
5.5
8.5
16.7
9.0
9.0
42.0
36.0
36.3
37.5

0.3
1.5
2.1
0.0

1.7
0.7
2.7
2.0
0.9

67762
40730
60.1
29192
15007
14185
71.7
36.8
87.4
57.0
72.2
65.5
75.3
39.6
91.9
59.5
68.2
33.9
83.1
54.6
65.6
29.6
80.9
53.1
38.8
66.2
83.3
66.4
55.7
68.8
31.4
85.2
55.5
62.5
27.8
76.8
50.9
26710.9
1.2
0.2
-0.3
0.8
11.3
14.5
8.0
16.2
15.9
16.6
17.5
7.6
28.0
6.6
8.4
19.5
7.4
6.8
15.7
9.2
5.1
8.0
15.0
8.5
8.4
40.3
35.8
36.3
37.4

-0.1
3.0
1.2
3.0

0.0
-1.3
1.7
1.7
0.6

68004
40692
59.8
28902
14846
14056
71.0
35.6
86.9
57.1
71.5
65.5
74.5
38.2
91.5
59.4
67.6
33.1
82.6
54.9
65.3
28.5
80.8
53.8
38.8
64.8
82.5
66.1
55.7
68.5
30.4
85.0
56.0
62.2
26.5
76.7
51.8
26563.1
-0.7
-0.6
-0.6
-0.5
11.6
14.5
8.6
15.3
14.7
15.9
17.0
7.6
27.0
6.5
8.0
20.2
7.1
5.8
14.2
8.9
5.3
7.6
14.9
8.1
8.0
36.8
35.3
35.9
36.8

-0.4
1.7
-1.5
-1.2

-2.7
-5.3
2.4
3.3
-7.1

68217
40558
59.5
29620
15125
14495
73.0
39.7
88.0
59.7
73.6
66.5
76.2
41.7
92.3
61.7
70.0
37.7
84.0
57.9
67.2
32.2
82.1
55.9
38.0
67.8
84.2
68.1
57.2
70.1
33.8
86.0
57.7
64.5
30.6
78.3
54.3
27273.9
2.5
2.7
2.0
3.4
11.8
14.7
8.7
15.0
14.3
15.6
17.3
7.6
27.4
4.9
7.9
18.9
6.8
6.3
14.6
8.5
5.3
7.5
14.0
8.0
7.8
29.4
35.7
36.1
37.2

-0.4
3.7
3.6
0.2

4.7
3.8
0.7
0.9
4.2

Statistical annex 

2020-2021
0.3 %
-0.3 %
-0.4 pps
2.5 %
1.9 %
3.1 %
2.0 pps
4.1 pps
1.1 pps
2.6 pps
2.1 pps
1.1 pps
1.6 pps
3.5 pps
0.8 pps
2.2 pps
2.4 pps
4.6 pps
1.4 pps
2.9 pps
2.0 pps
3.8 pps
1.3 pps
2.1 pps
-0.9 pps
3.0 pps
1.7 pps
2.0 pps
1.5 pps
1.6 pps
3.4 pps
1.0 pps
1.7 pps
2.3 pps
4.1 pps
1.6 pps
2.6 pps
2.7 %
3.2 pps
3.2 pps
2.7 pps
3.8 pps
0.1 pps
0.2 pps
0.1 pps
-0.3 pps
-0.4 pps
-0.3 pps
0.3 pps
0.0 pps
0.4 pps
-1.6 pps
-0.1 pps
-1.3 pps
-0.3 pps
0.5 pps
0.4 pps
-0.4 pps
0.0 pps
-0.1 pps
-0.9 pps
-0.1 pps
-0.2 pps
-7.4 pps
1.1 %
0.6 %
1.1 %

0.0 pps
2.0 pps
5.1 pps
1.4 pps

7.4 pps
9.2 pps
-1.7 pps
-2.4 pps
11.3 pps

129 

  
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Croatia

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

1
2

3

- Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)
- Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)

- Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.)

4

- Activity rate (% of population 15-64)

5

-

 Employment rate (% of population 15-64)

(% of total population)

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

6
7

8

9

- Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.)
- Employment growth (%, National accounts)

Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)

- Self employed (15-64, % of total employment )

Male

Female

Male

Female

- Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment)

10

- Part-time (15-64, % of total employment )

11
12

Involuntary part-time (15-64, % of total employment)

- Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-49)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Female

13
14

- Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment)
- Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours)

15

- Sectoral employment growth (% change)

Male

Female

Agriculture

Building and construction

Services

Manufacturing industry

16

-

Indicator board on wage developments (% change)

Compensation per employee

Real compensation per employee based on GDP

Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)

Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)

Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)

130 

4130
2720
65.9
1807
973
835
66.4
35.7
83.3
43.6
66.5
43.7
71.5
40.9
86.7
52.8
61.4
30.2
79.9
35.1
58.9
25.9
74.9
40.4
24.4
62.6
81.5
59.0
42.5
63.8
29.8
78.7
49.0
54.0
21.8
71.1
32.3
1603.0
2.4
2.3
2.7
1.9
10.5
12.6
7.9
20.7
20.6
20.7
4.8
3.8
6.0
1.7
11.2
27.4
10.1
7.5
20.5
11.7
7.2
11.3
0.0
10.6
11.9
42.0
39.9
40.4
39.1

-6.2
-1.4
5.5
2.4

0.2
-0.9
5.0
5.0
0.9

4091
2689
65.7
1783
953
829
66.3
33.5
83.4
44.8
66.3
67.5
70.9
37.9
86.4
53.4
61.7
28.8
80.3
36.7
60.6
25.6
77.0
42.8
25.8
63.9
81.5
60.6
58.1
65.4
30.5
80.4
51.0
55.9
20.3
73.5
35.2
1630.2
2.6
1.7
1.3
2.2
10.2
12.2
7.8
19.9
19.4
20.6
5.2
3.8
6.8
1.8
8.5
23.7
7.7
4.4
12.1
9.2
6.1
8.5
14.2
7.7
9.4
41.6
39.7
40.0
39.2

-8.6
12.2
1.3
3.4

3.9
1.8
6.5
6.6
0.3

4067
2658
65.4
1768
951
818
66.5
33.2
83.6
45.5
66.5
69.9
71.5
38.8
86.9
54.2
61.5
27.3
80.2
37.5
62.1
27.7
78.3
44.0
26.7
65.5
81.8
62.1
61.4
67.0
33.2
81.7
52.6
57.1
21.9
74.9
35.9
1649.6
3.1
1.2
1.4
1.0
10.5
13.3
7.2
18.1
16.9
19.3
4.8
3.1
6.7
1.4
6.6
16.6
6.3
3.4
9.6
7.0
5.4
6.7
0.0
6.2
7.2
37.2
39.5
39.8
38.8

1.3
5.7
0.4
5.3

0.4
-1.5
3.2
3.8
0.4

4047
2629
64.9
1764
955
809
67.1
32.5
83.9
47.8
67.1
55.7
72.6
39.2
88.1
55.7
61.6
25.3
79.8
40.4
62.0
25.6
78.3
45.5
25.3
64.9
83.4
62.0
54.4
67.1
31.9
82.0
53.4
56.9
19.0
74.5
38.2
1629.8
-1.2
-1.2
-0.9
-1.5
11.0
14.3
7.2
15.2
14.3
16.2
4.5
3.2
6.1
1.3
7.5
21.1
6.8
4.7
10.3
8.2
5.4
7.6
0.0
7.5
7.6
28.9
39.1
39.3
38.4

-1.3
5.5
-1.4
-1.3

2.1
2.3
-2.6
-1.7
-7.0

3889
2600
66.9
1785
957
828
68.7
33.0
85.3
50.8
68.7
65.3
73.6
38.4
89.3
57.4
63.7
27.2
81.2
44.6
63.4
25.8
79.4
48.6
27.4
66.1
84.1
63.5
46.7
68.2
31.1
83.4
55.1
58.6
20.0
75.4
42.7
1649.2
1.2
1.2
0.5
2.0
11.1
14.7
6.8
13.5
11.7
15.5
4.7
3.7
5.8
1.6
7.6
21.9
6.9
4.2
10.9
8.4
4.9
7.6
29.2
7.3
8.0
37.4
39.0
39.5
38.3

8.7
6.3
0.1
1.8

5.6
2.3
2.7
2.7
8.9

2020-2021
-3.9 %
-1.1 %
1.9 pps
1.2 %
0.3 %
2.4 %
1.6 pps
0.5 pps
1.4 pps
3.0 pps
1.5 pps
9.6 pps
1.0 pps
-0.9 pps
1.3 pps
1.7 pps
2.2 pps
1.9 pps
1.5 pps
4.3 pps
1.4 pps
0.1 pps
1.2 pps
3.1 pps
2.1 pps
1.2 pps
0.7 pps
1.5 pps
-7.8 pps
1.1 pps
-0.8 pps
1.4 pps
1.6 pps
1.8 pps
1.0 pps
0.9 pps
4.5 pps
1.2 %
2.4 pps
2.4 pps
1.4 pps
3.6 pps
0.0 pps
0.5 pps
-0.4 pps
-1.7 pps
-2.6 pps
-0.7 pps
0.2 pps
0.5 pps
-0.3 pps
0.4 pps
0.1 pps
0.8 pps
0.1 pps
-0.5 pps
0.6 pps
0.2 pps
-0.5 pps
0.0 pps
29.2 pps
-0.2 pps
0.4 pps
8.5 pps
-0.3 %
0.5 %
-0.3 %

10.0 pps
0.8 pps
1.5 pps
3.1 pps

3.5 pps
0.0 pps
5.3 pps
4.4 pps
15.9 pps

  
Statistical annex 

Italy
1
2

- Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)
- Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)

3

- Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.)

4

- Activity rate (% of population 15-64)

5

-

 Employment rate (% of population 15-64)

(% of total population)

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

6
7

8

9

- Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.)
- Employment growth (%, National accounts)

Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)

- Self employed (15-64, % of total employment )

Male

Female

Male

Female

- Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment)

10

- Part-time (15-64, % of total employment )

11
12

Involuntary part-time (15-64, % of total employment)

- Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-49)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Female

13
14

- Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment)
- Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours)

15

- Sectoral employment growth (% change)

Male

Female

Agriculture

Building and construction

Services

Manufacturing industry

16

-

Indicator board on wage developments (% change)

Compensation per employee

Real compensation per employee based on GDP

Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)

Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)

Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

60002
38726
64.5
25340
14467
10873
65.4
26.2
77.9
55.4
64.8
70.8
75.0
30.0
88.5
67.0
55.9
22.1
67.3
44.5
58.0
17.1
69.4
52.2
43.4
64.1
78.2
57.7
60.6
67.1
20.1
79.9
62.8
48.9
13.9
59.0
42.3
22443.6
1.2
0.9
0.6
1.3
20.8
25.2
14.9
15.5
15.1
16.0
18.5
8.3
32.5
11.6
11.3
34.7
10.9
5.8
15.8
10.6
6.5
11.1
14.4
10.4
12.4
59.3
40.2
40.9
37.0

-1.7
-0.9
2.5
0.6

0.4
-0.3
0.6
0.4
0.5

59877
38588
64.4
25327
14450
10877
65.6
26.1
77.9
57.0
65.0
71.2
75.1
29.9
88.4
68.6
56.2
21.9
67.4
46.1
58.5
17.7
69.8
53.7
43.8
64.3
78.7
58.2
61.2
67.6
20.8
80.3
64.2
49.5
14.3
59.4
43.9
22585.7
0.9
0.6
0.6
0.7
20.6
24.8
14.9
17.1
16.6
17.7
18.4
8.0
32.4
12.1
10.6
32.2
10.3
5.7
14.9
10.2
6.1
10.4
14.1
9.7
11.7
59.6
40.2
40.9
37.1

1.9
0.0
1.3
1.0

2.0
0.9
1.7
1.0
0.0

59729
38428
64.3
25254
14367
10887
65.7
26.1
78.1
57.4
65.1
70.9
75.0
29.8
88.5
68.6
56.5
22.0
67.8
47.0
59.0
18.5
70.5
54.3
44.0
64.9
78.9
58.8
61.0
68.0
21.5
80.8
64.6
50.1
15.2
60.1
44.6
22687.1
0.5
0.4
0.2
0.8
20.4
24.4
14.9
17.1
16.8
17.5
18.7
8.2
32.9
12.3
9.9
29.2
9.8
5.4
14.1
9.6
5.9
9.7
13.9
9.1
11.1
57.5
40.0
40.6
37.4

-1.3
-0.1
1.0
0.6

1.3
0.3
2.4
1.8
0.0

59439
38261
64.4
24520
14035
10485
64.1
23.8
76.5
57.1
63.9
66.0
73.5
28.5
87.0
68.0
54.7
18.8
66.0
46.9
58.1
16.8
69.6
54.2
43.0
63.5
78.0
58.2
57.3
67.2
20.5
80.1
64.5
49.0
12.8
59.1
44.6
22222.7
-2.1
-2.0
-1.6
-2.7
20.2
24.3
14.6
15.2
14.9
15.5
18.2
8.0
32.1
12.0
9.3
29.4
9.0
5.0
13.1
8.9
5.5
8.9
13.2
8.6
10.4
53.1
38.9
39.6
36.5

0.0
1.9
-3.7
-1.1

-5.1
-6.4
4.0
4.4
-7.1

59110
37526
63.5
24198
13782
10416
64.5
24.9
77.3
56.5
64.1
67.6
73.6
29.4
87.3
67.2
55.4
20.1
67.3
46.5
58.2
17.5
70.2
53.4
42.7
63.7
79.2
58.3
57.8
67.1
21.3
80.2
63.4
49.4
13.5
60.1
44.0
21849.2
0.6
-1.7
-2.1
-1.1
19.6
23.6
14.2
16.6
15.8
17.4
18.2
8.4
31.5
11.4
9.5
29.7
9.2
5.5
13.7
9.3
5.2
9.1
14.5
8.7
10.6
58.0
39.1
39.8
36.8

-0.1
5.9
0.4
-0.1

6.0
5.5
-1.9
-1.5
6.0

2020-2021
-0.6 %
-1.9 %
-0.9 pps
-1.3 %
-1.8 %
-0.7 %
0.4 pps
1.1 pps
0.8 pps
-0.5 pps
0.3 pps
1.6 pps
0.1 pps
0.9 pps
0.3 pps
-0.8 pps
0.7 pps
1.3 pps
1.3 pps
-0.4 pps
0.1 pps
0.7 pps
0.6 pps
-0.8 pps
-0.3 pps
0.2 pps
1.2 pps
0.1 pps
0.5 pps
-0.1 pps
0.7 pps
0.1 pps
-1.1 pps
0.4 pps
0.7 pps
1.0 pps
-0.6 pps
-1.7 %
2.7 pps
0.4 pps
-0.5 pps
1.5 pps
-0.6 pps
-0.7 pps
-0.4 pps
1.4 pps
0.9 pps
1.9 pps
0.0 pps
0.4 pps
-0.6 pps
-0.6 pps
0.2 pps
0.3 pps
0.2 pps
0.5 pps
0.6 pps
0.4 pps
-0.3 pps
0.2 pps
1.3 pps
0.1 pps
0.2 pps
4.9 pps
0.5 %
0.5 %
0.8 %

-0.1 pps
4.0 pps
4.1 pps
1.0 pps

11.1 pps
11.9 pps
-5.9 pps
-5.9 pps
13.1 pps

131 

  
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Cyprus

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

1
2

3

- Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)
- Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)

- Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.)

4

- Activity rate (% of population 15-64)

5

-

 Employment rate (% of population 15-64)

(% of total population)

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

6
7

8

9

- Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.)
- Employment growth (%, National accounts)

Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)

- Self employed (15-64, % of total employment )

Male

Female

Male

Female

- Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment)

10

- Part-time (15-64, % of total employment )

11
12

Involuntary part-time (15-64, % of total employment)

- Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-49)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Female

13
14

- Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment)
- Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours)

15

- Sectoral employment growth (% change)

Male

Female

Agriculture

Building and construction

Services

Manufacturing industry

16

-

Indicator board on wage developments (% change)

Compensation per employee

Real compensation per employee based on GDP

Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)

Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)

Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)

132 

860
564
65.6
417
215
202
73.9
36.6
87.5
60.0
73.7
74.8
78.8
33.2
93.0
71.6
69.3
39.9
82.5
48.9
65.6
27.5
78.4
55.3
41.7
66.4
79.1
65.2
67.1
70.0
24.2
83.6
64.9
61.4
30.7
73.5
46.2
369.8
5.4
4.5
4.6
4.4
11.4
13.7
8.9
15.3
12.0
18.6
12.2
9.1
15.6
8.2
11.1
24.7
10.4
7.8
14.9
11.6
9.8
11.5
10.5
10.9
11.3
40.7
40.7
41.9
39.2

-1.3
15.0
6.4
5.9

1.5
0.5
2.3
2.7
0.4

870
568
65.3
426
220
207
75.0
39.2
87.2
64.7
75.3
73.6
79.9
36.5
92.8
75.2
70.4
41.7
82.1
54.7
68.6
31.3
80.4
60.9
44.2
69.8
80.8
68.8
67.5
73.3
27.3
86.2
70.3
64.2
35.1
75.0
52.0
389.7
5.3
5.4
5.7
5.0
11.7
14.1
9.1
13.8
10.5
17.2
10.8
7.5
14.4
6.9
8.4
20.2
7.8
5.8
10.4
8.9
7.7
8.6
8.3
8.1
8.8
31.6
40.2
41.3
38.9

-2.0
13.9
5.7
6.3

1.5
0.5
3.6
3.6
0.3

882
572
64.9
435
226
209
76.0
38.8
88.3
65.2
75.9
76.8
81.5
37.6
93.4
76.7
71.0
39.8
83.5
54.2
70.5
32.4
82.6
61.1
46.2
70.9
83.2
70.1
72.2
76.2
30.4
88.4
72.0
65.2
34.1
77.1
50.8
403.5
3.8
3.5
4.9
2.1
12.0
14.4
9.3
13.7
9.5
18.2
10.2
6.3
14.6
5.8
7.1
16.6
6.4
6.3
8.2
8.1
6.2
7.6
6.1
6.3
8.0
29.2
39.8
40.8
38.6

1.0
9.6
3.4
3.7

4.4
3.3
4.7
2.9
1.4

892
579
64.9
439
231
208
75.8
38.3
87.9
64.8
75.4
77.0
82.3
40.3
93.2
77.7
69.7
36.7
82.7
52.2
69.9
31.3
81.7
61.0
47.3
68.5
83.1
69.8
70.3
75.9
30.5
87.1
73.2
64.3
32.2
76.4
49.3
404.8
-0.5
0.3
0.9
-0.2
12.1
14.9
9.1
13.4
8.9
18.1
10.0
6.8
13.6
5.7
7.6
18.2
7.1
5.8
7.8
8.6
7.1
7.5
8.8
7.6
7.6
28.2
39.5
40.4
38.4

-0.2
2.8
-2.2
0.9

-3.2
-2.1
-1.8
-1.5
-4.5

900
589
65.4
452
235
217
76.7
42.0
87.7
67.0
76.2
78.5
82.7
44.5
93.1
78.9
71.1
39.6
82.7
55.2
70.8
34.8
81.5
63.4
46.3
69.3
83.7
70.8
70.8
76.7
36.5
86.9
74.9
65.3
33.2
76.5
52.1
417.0
1.2
3.0
2.3
3.8
9.9
11.5
8.0
13.0
9.2
17.0
10.1
7.8
12.7
4.7
7.5
17.1
7.1
5.3
9.0
8.8
6.4
7.0
9.8
7.1
7.9
34.2
39.5
40.3
38.5

0.7
2.1
1.2
0.9

4.7
1.9
6.8
6.0
4.3

2020-2021
0.9 %
1.7 %
0.5 pps
2.9 %
1.7 %
4.1 %
0.9 pps
3.7 pps
-0.2 pps
2.2 pps
0.7 pps
1.5 pps
0.4 pps
4.1 pps
-0.1 pps
1.3 pps
1.4 pps
2.9 pps
0.0 pps
3.0 pps
0.9 pps
3.5 pps
-0.2 pps
2.4 pps
-1.0 pps
0.8 pps
0.6 pps
1.0 pps
0.6 pps
0.8 pps
6.0 pps
-0.2 pps
1.7 pps
1.1 pps
1.0 pps
0.0 pps
2.8 pps
3.0 %
1.7 pps
2.7 pps
1.4 pps
4.0 pps
-2.3 pps
-3.4 pps
-1.0 pps
-0.4 pps
0.3 pps
-1.1 pps
0.1 pps
1.0 pps
-0.9 pps
-1.1 pps
-0.1 pps
-1.1 pps
0.0 pps
-0.5 pps
1.2 pps
0.2 pps
-0.7 pps
-0.5 pps
1.0 pps
-0.5 pps
0.3 pps
6.0 pps
0.0 %
-0.2 %
0.3 %

0.9 pps
-0.7 pps
3.4 pps
0.0 pps

7.8 pps
3.9 pps
8.6 pps
7.5 pps
8.8 pps

  
Latvia

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

1
2

3

- Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)
- Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)

- Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.)

4

- Activity rate (% of population 15-64)

5

-

 Employment rate (% of population 15-64)

(% of total population)

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

6
7

8

9

- Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.)
- Employment growth (%, National accounts)

Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)

- Self employed (15-64, % of total employment )

Male

Female

Male

Female

- Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment)

10

- Part-time (15-64, % of total employment )

11
12

Involuntary part-time (15-64, % of total employment)

- Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-49)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Female

13
14

- Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment)
- Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours)

15

- Sectoral employment growth (% change)

Male

Female

Agriculture

Building and construction

Services

Manufacturing industry

16

-

Indicator board on wage developments (% change)

Compensation per employee

Real compensation per employee based on GDP

Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)

Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)

Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)

1941
1230
63.3
946
475
471
77.0
39.7
88.5
67.9
77.5
73.4
79.8
42.8
91.8
69.2
74.3
36.6
85.4
66.9
70.1
33.0
81.2
62.3
35.8
70.5
86.9
70.9
64.5
71.9
35.0
83.5
62.4
68.4
30.9
79.0
62.2
861.9
0.0
0.0
0.7
-0.8
11.8
13.9
9.8
3.0
3.7
2.4
7.7
4.8
10.6
2.7
8.7
17.0
8.3
8.3
19.2
10.4
4.0
8.5
12.1
9.8
7.7
37.5
40.0
40.3
39.4

-3.4
5.4
-0.2
0.0

7.6
4.5
6.6
6.6
3.3

1926
1216
63.1
945
475
470
77.7
37.7
89.1
70.8
78.2
74.3
80.4
40.6
92.1
72.5
75.1
34.8
86.0
69.4
71.8
33.1
82.7
65.4
35.1
72.7
88.9
72.7
65.9
73.6
35.5
84.6
66.4
70.1
30.6
80.7
64.6
873.3
1.5
1.3
1.5
1.2
11.0
12.9
9.1
2.7
3.0
2.4
7.3
4.7
9.8
2.4
7.4
12.2
7.2
7.6
16.8
8.7
3.8
7.1
11.4
8.4
6.5
42.0
40.0
40.3
38.8

-0.1
9.4
1.7
1.1

8.1
4.0
12.1
10.7
2.5

1913
1204
62.9
931
468
463
77.3
36.3
88.3
72.1
77.7
74.1
79.8
39.6
91.2
73.0
75.0
32.8
85.5
71.4
72.3
31.8
83.1
67.3
36.4
72.4
89.0
72.8
68.4
73.9
33.9
85.2
67.6
70.7
29.6
81.0
67.1
870.3
-0.1
-0.3
-0.1
-0.5
11.0
12.7
9.3
3.2
3.9
2.5
8.4
5.8
10.9
1.8
6.3
12.4
5.9
6.6
14.1
7.3
3.7
6.3
7.7
7.2
5.4
37.9
39.5
39.9
39.5

0.8
2.4
-0.8
0.6

7.8
5.1
7.2
7.1
2.6

1901
1190
62.6
931
469
461
78.2
34.8
89.3
74.7
78.2
78.0
80.7
38.0
92.0
76.8
75.8
31.5
86.6
72.9
71.6
29.7
82.2
68.6
35.3
72.4
86.3
71.9
69.8
73.1
32.5
83.8
69.5
70.2
26.7
80.6
67.9
852.2
-2.3
-2.1
-2.1
-2.1
12.2
14.0
10.5
2.8
3.0
2.6
8.9
6.5
11.3
2.1
8.1
14.9
7.9
8.1
18.9
9.1
5.3
8.1
10.5
9.1
7.1
27.4
39.3
39.5
39.2

0.4
-4.5
-3.4
-3.3

5.5
5.6
5.7
5.9
-1.5

1883
1177
62.5
892
454
438
75.8
32.7
87.1
72.2
76.1
74.2
78.8
35.3
90.9
73.2
73.0
30.0
83.3
71.4
69.9
27.9
80.4
67.8
31.7
69.9
85.7
70.4
65.9
71.9
30.1
82.9
68.5
68.0
25.5
77.9
67.1
822.0
-2.6
-3.5
-2.6
-4.4
12.2
14.6
9.8
2.8
3.3
2.3
7.8
5.6
10.0
2.7
7.6
14.8
7.8
6.2
15.1
9.3
4.8
7.4
11.2
8.5
6.6
30.1
39.6
39.8
39.4

-2.4
-3.4
-4.8
4.6

11.0
3.9
3.4
4.1
7.2

Statistical annex 

2020-2021
-0.9 %
-1.1 %
-0.1 pps
-4.1 %
-3.3 %
-4.9 %
-2.4 pps
-2.1 pps
-2.2 pps
-2.4 pps
-2.2 pps
-3.8 pps
-1.9 pps
-2.7 pps
-1.1 pps
-3.6 pps
-2.8 pps
-1.5 pps
-3.3 pps
-1.5 pps
-1.8 pps
-1.8 pps
-1.8 pps
-0.8 pps
-3.7 pps
-2.5 pps
-0.6 pps
-1.5 pps
-3.9 pps
-1.3 pps
-2.4 pps
-0.9 pps
-1.0 pps
-2.2 pps
-1.1 pps
-2.7 pps
-0.8 pps
-3.5 %
-0.3 pps
-1.5 pps
-0.6 pps
-2.3 pps
0.0 pps
0.7 pps
-0.7 pps
0.0 pps
0.3 pps
-0.3 pps
-1.1 pps
-0.9 pps
-1.3 pps
0.6 pps
-0.5 pps
-0.1 pps
-0.1 pps
-1.9 pps
-3.8 pps
0.2 pps
-0.5 pps
-0.7 pps
0.7 pps
-0.6 pps
-0.5 pps
2.7 pps
0.8 %
0.8 %
0.5 %

-2.8 pps
1.1 pps
-1.4 pps
7.9 pps

5.5 pps
-1.7 pps
-2.3 pps
-1.8 pps
8.7 pps

133 

  
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Lithuania

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

1
2

3

- Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)
- Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)

- Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.)

4

- Activity rate (% of population 15-64)

5

-

 Employment rate (% of population 15-64)

(% of total population)

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

6
7

8

9

- Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.)
- Employment growth (%, National accounts)

Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)

- Self employed (15-64, % of total employment )

Male

Female

Male

Female

- Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment)

10

- Part-time (15-64, % of total employment )

11
12

Involuntary part-time (15-64, % of total employment)

- Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-49)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Female

13
14

- Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment)
- Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours)

15

- Sectoral employment growth (% change)

Male

Female

Agriculture

Building and construction

Services

Manufacturing industry

16

-

Indicator board on wage developments (% change)

Compensation per employee

Real compensation per employee based on GDP

Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)

Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)

Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)

134 

2828
1854
65.6
1408
697
711
75.9
35.0
89.3
71.3
76.0
73.9
77.4
37.8
90.4
73.3
74.6
32.2
88.1
69.6
70.4
30.4
83.3
66.1
20.9
68.8
90.0
70.4
71.2
70.6
32.3
83.1
67.1
70.2
28.4
83.6
65.2
1305.6
-0.7
-0.9
-1.1
-0.7
10.9
13.8
8.1
1.7
2.1
1.3
7.6
5.7
9.4
2.3
7.1
13.3
6.6
7.3
21.6
9.6
3.0
7.3
0.0
8.6
5.7
37.7
39.4
39.9
39.1

-3.0
-3.5
-0.6
-0.6

9.5
5.1
9.6
8.8
5.0

2802
1828
65.2
1413
704
709
77.3
36.5
89.6
73.9
77.3
77.5
78.9
38.7
91.0
76.2
75.8
34.1
88.3
72.0
72.4
32.4
84.6
68.5
22.7
71.0
90.5
72.4
73.2
73.3
34.1
85.2
70.5
71.6
30.6
84.1
67.0
1323.7
1.4
1.4
2.9
0.0
10.8
13.4
8.3
1.6
1.7
1.4
7.1
5.2
8.9
1.7
6.2
11.1
5.6
7.2
18.5
8.2
2.9
6.3
0.0
6.9
5.4
32.2
39.6
39.9
39.5

-6.3
3.2
1.7
5.3

7.9
4.3
10.0
9.7
2.6

2794
1814
64.9
1416
707
709
78.0
37.3
90.3
73.5
78.0
80.6
79.2
38.9
91.4
74.6
76.9
35.7
89.2
72.5
73.0
32.9
85.1
68.4
23.2
70.6
90.8
73.0
77.1
73.5
33.4
85.4
69.4
72.5
32.3
84.8
67.5
1324.3
0.6
0.0
0.2
-0.1
10.9
14.2
7.7
1.5
1.5
1.4
6.4
4.7
8.0
1.5
6.3
11.9
5.8
6.9
18.8
8.6
3.0
6.5
0.0
7.1
5.5
30.6
39.5
39.9
38.7

-9.8
3.3
2.0
0.0

10.6
7.7
3.0
38.2
4.0

2795
1812
64.8
1423
719
704
78.5
36.6
90.4
75.0
78.5
81.4
79.9
38.9
91.4
76.6
77.2
34.2
89.4
73.6
71.6
29.4
83.7
67.6
22.7
68.4
89.5
71.6
77.1
72.2
30.5
84.0
68.4
71.0
28.3
83.4
66.9
1297.6
-1.6
-2.0
-0.9
-3.1
11.1
14.4
7.7
1.2
1.4
1.1
6.1
4.8
7.5
1.8
8.5
19.6
7.4
9.9
23.3
11.9
4.2
8.9
0.0
9.3
7.7
29.0
39.0
39.5
38.7

-11.7
-4.9
-0.8
-1.3

7.3
5.7
6.1
9.9
1.5

2803
1808
64.5
1414
717
698
78.2
36.3
90.1
74.0
78.2
77.8
79.2
38.2
91.0
74.1
77.2
34.3
89.2
74.1
72.4
31.1
84.3
68.0
25.1
69.3
89.3
72.5
71.0
72.9
32.8
84.6
67.6
71.9
29.3
83.9
68.4
1309.8
1.2
0.9
1.6
0.3
10.7
12.9
8.5
1.9
1.9
1.9
6.0
4.3
7.6
1.5
7.1
14.3
6.5
8.2
16.9
9.7
4.2
7.4
8.5
7.6
6.6
36.7
39.5
39.8
39.2

-5.3
3.2
2.1
5.5

11.4
4.6
12.3
10.6
3.8

2020-2021
0.3 %
-0.2 %
-0.3 pps
-0.6 %
-0.4 %
-0.9 %
-0.3 pps
-0.3 pps
-0.3 pps
-0.9 pps
-0.3 pps
-3.5 pps
-0.7 pps
-0.7 pps
-0.4 pps
-2.6 pps
0.1 pps
0.1 pps
-0.2 pps
0.4 pps
0.8 pps
1.7 pps
0.6 pps
0.4 pps
2.5 pps
0.9 pps
-0.2 pps
0.9 pps
-6.1 pps
0.7 pps
2.3 pps
0.6 pps
-0.8 pps
0.9 pps
1.0 pps
0.5 pps
1.4 pps
0.9 %
2.8 pps
3.0 pps
2.4 pps
3.5 pps
-0.4 pps
-1.5 pps
0.8 pps
0.7 pps
0.5 pps
0.8 pps
-0.1 pps
-0.5 pps
0.1 pps
-0.3 pps
-1.4 pps
-5.3 pps
-0.9 pps
-1.7 pps
-6.4 pps
-2.2 pps
0.0 pps
-1.5 pps
8.5 pps
-1.7 pps
-1.1 pps
7.7 pps
1.3 %
0.8 %
1.3 %

6.4 pps
8.1 pps
2.9 pps
6.8 pps

4.1 pps
-1.2 pps
6.2 pps
0.7 pps
2.3 pps

  
Luxembourg

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

1
2

3

- Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)
- Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)

- Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.)

4

- Activity rate (% of population 15-64)

5

-

 Employment rate (% of population 15-64)

(% of total population)

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

6
7

8

9

- Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.)
- Employment growth (%, National accounts)

Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)

- Self employed (15-64, % of total employment )

Male

Female

Male

Female

- Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment)

10

- Part-time (15-64, % of total employment )

11
12

Involuntary part-time (15-64, % of total employment)

- Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-49)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Female

13
14

- Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment)
- Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours)

15

- Sectoral employment growth (% change)

Male

Female

Agriculture

Building and construction

Services

Manufacturing industry

16

-

Indicator board on wage developments (% change)

Compensation per employee

Real compensation per employee based on GDP

Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)

Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)

Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)

597
407
68.2
286
153
133
70.2
30.5
88.0
41.0
65.7
74.4
74.0
32.5
91.9
46.7
66.2
28.2
84.0
35.2
66.3
25.8
83.7
39.7
42.0
67.8
84.0
63.2
69.2
69.9
26.8
87.4
45.3
62.6
24.7
79.8
34.0
269.9
3.5
4.0
1.8
6.7
8.9
9.7
8.0
9.1
8.8
9.4
19.6
6.1
35.3
2.6
5.5
15.4
4.9
3.3
8.9
5.3
3.9
3.9
6.9
5.6
5.5
39.7
41.0
41.7
39.8

-0.6
2.9
4.0
0.2

3.1
0.9
2.6
4.0
-2.1

609
415
68.1
295
158
137
71.1
33.1
88.4
41.9
66.1
75.8
74.7
33.8
92.2
47.4
67.4
32.2
84.5
36.2
67.1
28.4
83.9
40.5
44.8
67.6
83.7
63.2
70.8
70.6
28.5
88.0
45.5
63.4
28.4
79.7
35.0
278.4
3.6
3.1
3.1
3.1
7.5
8.4
6.4
9.8
9.1
10.7
17.8
5.8
31.8
2.2
5.6
14.2
5.0
3.6
8.4
5.6
4.3
4.4
6.6
5.3
5.9
25.5
40.6
41.3
39.8

-0.4
3.8
4.1
1.5

2.8
1.1
2.0
2.2
-1.6

622
423
68.0
304
165
140
72.0
34.6
88.5
45.0
66.9
76.9
76.4
37.9
92.8
51.2
67.4
31.5
84.0
38.5
67.9
28.7
84.3
43.1
44.2
66.7
84.7
64.1
71.6
72.1
31.2
88.6
48.8
63.6
26.2
79.9
37.1
287.3
3.5
3.2
4.2
2.2
7.4
8.4
6.4
9.2
9.3
9.1
17.0
5.6
30.4
2.2
5.6
17.0
4.7
4.1
8.9
6.3
3.6
4.1
6.9
5.7
5.5
24.5
40.6
41.3
39.3

-0.9
3.9
3.8
0.4

1.9
1.3
2.7
2.7
-0.2

631
431
68.3
311
166
146
72.2
32.4
89.1
45.9
67.4
76.8
75.4
33.8
92.9
49.7
68.7
30.9
85.3
41.8
67.2
24.9
84.0
44.1
44.0
66.7
83.2
64.2
70.2
70.4
25.2
88.0
47.2
63.9
24.3
80.0
40.5
290.0
1.9
0.9
-0.4
2.5
7.8
9.0
6.4
7.7
7.1
8.3
18.1
6.8
31.0
2.1
6.8
23.2
5.7
4.1
11.5
6.9
4.7
4.8
8.6
6.6
7.0
26.8
39.9
40.6
38.8

0.0
3.7
1.2
-1.4

0.4
-3.7
0.9
0.5
-3.6

641
437
68.1
320
170
150
73.2
35.3
89.2
48.8
69.0
77.4
76.4
36.2
92.5
54.5
69.9
34.4
85.9
42.8
69.4
29.4
85.4
46.5
46.5
66.9
84.1
66.1
72.5
72.6
29.8
89.1
51.5
66.0
28.9
81.6
41.5
302.8
3.1
4.4
4.5
4.4
8.3
9.1
7.4
9.2
8.3
10.1
18.1
7.0
30.9
1.7
5.3
16.9
4.3
4.6
8.6
5.5
4.0
4.2
6.3
4.9
5.6
34.0
38.8
39.8
37.4

1.1
3.9
2.7
-0.9

5.1
-1.6
1.6
1.9
3.7

Statistical annex 

2020-2021
1.6 %
1.2 %
-0.2 pps
2.7 %
2.7 %
2.8 %
1.1 pps
2.9 pps
0.1 pps
2.9 pps
1.6 pps
0.6 pps
1.0 pps
2.4 pps
-0.4 pps
4.7 pps
1.2 pps
3.5 pps
0.6 pps
1.0 pps
2.1 pps
4.4 pps
1.4 pps
2.5 pps
2.5 pps
0.2 pps
0.9 pps
1.9 pps
2.4 pps
2.2 pps
4.6 pps
1.2 pps
4.3 pps
2.1 pps
4.6 pps
1.6 pps
1.0 pps
4.4 %
1.2 pps
3.5 pps
4.8 pps
1.9 pps
0.5 pps
0.1 pps
1.0 pps
1.5 pps
1.2 pps
1.8 pps
0.0 pps
0.2 pps
-0.1 pps
-0.4 pps
-1.5 pps
-6.3 pps
-1.4 pps
0.5 pps
-2.9 pps
-1.4 pps
-0.7 pps
-0.6 pps
-2.3 pps
-1.7 pps
-1.4 pps
7.2 pps
-2.8 %
-2.0 %
-3.6 %

1.1 pps
0.2 pps
1.5 pps
0.5 pps

4.8 pps
2.2 pps
0.7 pps
1.4 pps
7.3 pps

135 

  
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Hungary

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

1
2

3

- Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)
- Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)

- Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.)

4

- Activity rate (% of population 15-64)

5

-

 Employment rate (% of population 15-64)

(% of total population)

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

6
7

8

9

- Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.)
- Employment growth (%, National accounts)

Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)

- Self employed (15-64, % of total employment )

Male

Female

Male

Female

- Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment)

10

- Part-time (15-64, % of total employment )

11
12

Involuntary part-time (15-64, % of total employment)

- Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-49)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Female

13
14

- Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment)
- Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours)

15

- Sectoral employment growth (% change)

Male

Female

Agriculture

Building and construction

Services

Manufacturing industry

16

-

Indicator board on wage developments (% change)

Compensation per employee

Real compensation per employee based on GDP

Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)

Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)

Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)

136 

9788
6415
65.5
4565
2485
2080
71.2
32.4
86.9
53.6
71.2
62.5
78.2
36.5
93.3
64.5
64.2
28.2
80.4
44.3
68.2
29.0
83.7
51.7
38.5
73.1
84.3
68.2
60.6
75.2
32.9
90.1
62.5
61.3
24.8
77.2
42.4
4373.4
1.9
1.5
2.2
0.6
9.7
11.5
7.5
8.8
8.2
9.5
4.3
2.7
6.3
1.2
4.0
10.7
3.7
3.6
11.2
3.8
1.6
4.2
0.0
3.8
4.3
40.4
39.3
39.5
38.6

2.8
8.8
1.9
4.3

7.0
2.8
9.3
13.4
2.3

9776
6370
65.2
4582
2500
2083
71.9
32.3
87.0
55.8
72.0
64.1
79.1
37.1
93.3
67.1
64.9
27.2
80.7
46.3
69.2
29.0
84.1
54.4
39.4
73.7
85.1
69.3
60.3
76.3
33.4
90.4
65.5
62.3
24.3
77.7
44.9
4410.7
2.3
0.9
0.9
0.8
9.7
11.6
7.4
7.3
6.7
7.9
4.2
2.5
6.3
1.0
3.6
10.2
3.4
2.6
10.4
3.4
1.5
3.7
0.0
3.5
3.7
38.6
38.8
39.0
38.1

-1.7
11.1
2.4
2.6

6.4
1.5
9.0
11.3
3.0

9771
6327
64.8
4595
2521
2074
72.6
32.2
87.0
58.0
72.6
72.4
80.0
37.3
93.4
70.6
65.3
26.9
80.6
47.2
70.1
28.5
84.4
56.7
39.4
74.8
85.2
70.1
69.2
77.3
32.8
90.8
69.0
63.0
24.0
78.0
46.2
4436.0
1.1
0.6
1.0
0.1
10.1
12.2
7.5
6.6
6.1
7.1
4.4
2.5
6.8
0.9
3.3
11.4
3.0
2.2
9.8
3.0
1.6
3.4
0.0
3.4
3.3
32.0
39.1
39.2
38.6

-2.3
5.4
2.0
0.7

6.9
2.1
10.1
11.0
3.4

9750
6280
64.4
4572
2518
2054
72.8
31.2
86.2
61.4
72.8
72.5
80.3
35.3
93.1
74.0
65.3
26.9
79.1
50.6
69.7
27.2
82.9
59.6
37.7
74.3
85.2
69.7
66.5
77.0
31.1
89.8
71.6
62.3
23.1
75.9
49.2
4375.8
-1.1
-1.4
-0.8
-2.0
11.2
13.4
8.6
5.9
5.3
6.5
4.8
2.8
7.3
0.9
4.1
12.8
3.8
3.0
11.1
4.1
1.9
4.3
8.2
4.1
4.2
26.1
38.9
39.2
38.5

1.9
4.3
-1.0
-3.7

3.0
-3.2
7.1
8.1
-3.4

9710
6207
63.9
4728
2516
2212
76.2
31.8
90.1
64.7
76.2
76.4
81.1
35.1
93.6
76.6
71.2
28.3
86.6
54.3
73.1
27.5
87.0
62.8
39.2
77.1
89.9
73.1
73.7
77.9
30.9
90.4
74.1
68.2
23.9
83.4
52.9
4535.4
2.0
3.6
0.1
8.0
11.6
13.9
9.0
5.9
5.6
6.2
4.6
2.7
6.7
1.1
4.1
13.5
3.5
2.9
11.1
4.0
1.7
4.1
0.0
3.9
4.2
31.4
39.0
39.1
38.6

-2.8
7.7
1.6
2.4

9.2
2.2
5.9
7.2
5.0

2020-2021
-0.4 %
-1.2 %
-0.5 pps
3.4 %
-0.1 %
7.7 %
3.4 pps
0.6 pps
3.9 pps
3.3 pps
3.4 pps
3.9 pps
0.8 pps
-0.2 pps
0.4 pps
2.6 pps
5.9 pps
1.4 pps
7.5 pps
3.7 pps
3.4 pps
0.3 pps
4.1 pps
3.2 pps
1.5 pps
2.8 pps
4.7 pps
3.4 pps
7.2 pps
0.9 pps
-0.2 pps
0.7 pps
2.5 pps
5.9 pps
0.8 pps
7.5 pps
3.7 pps
3.6 %
3.1 pps
5.0 pps
0.9 pps
10.0 pps
0.4 pps
0.6 pps
0.3 pps
0.0 pps
0.3 pps
-0.3 pps
-0.2 pps
-0.1 pps
-0.6 pps
0.1 pps
0.0 pps
0.7 pps
-0.3 pps
-0.1 pps
0.0 pps
-0.1 pps
-0.2 pps
-0.2 pps
-8.2 pps
-0.2 pps
0.0 pps
5.3 pps
0.3 %
-0.3 %
0.3 %

-4.7 pps
3.4 pps
2.7 pps
6.1 pps

6.3 pps
5.4 pps
-1.2 pps
-0.9 pps
8.4 pps

  
Statistical annex 

Malta
1
2

- Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)
- Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)

3

- Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.)

4

- Activity rate (% of population 15-64)

5

-

 Employment rate (% of population 15-64)

(% of total population)

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

6
7

8

9

- Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.)
- Employment growth (%, National accounts)

Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)

- Self employed (15-64, % of total employment )

Male

Female

Male

Female

- Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment)

10

- Part-time (15-64, % of total employment )

11
12

Involuntary part-time (15-64, % of total employment)

- Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-49)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Female

13
14

- Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment)
- Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours)

15

- Sectoral employment growth (% change)

Male

Female

Agriculture

Building and construction

Services

Manufacturing industry

16

-

Indicator board on wage developments (% change)

Compensation per employee

Real compensation per employee based on GDP

Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)

Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)

Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

469
313
66.9
226
135
91
72.2
52.9
84.6
48.3
70.6
80.8
83.4
54.3
96.1
66.1
60.2
51.4
71.9
30.5
69.2
47.3
81.8
47.2
55.9
73.0
90.2
67.9
76.5
80.1
48.6
93.1
64.5
57.6
45.9
69.4
29.8
216.8
8.0
6.0
5.0
7.4
14.4
18.6
8.1
6.0
5.3
6.9
13.7
6.3
24.6
1.5
4.0
10.6
3.2
2.5
6.2
3.5
2.0
3.8
5.3
3.8
4.3
50.8
40.9
41.8
38.1

3.3
3.7
10.3
2.0

2.5
0.4
3.5
3.2
2.7

485
326
67.1
243
144
100
74.7
56.0
86.1
51.9
72.7
82.9
84.8
55.7
96.4
69.5
63.8
56.3
74.6
34.0
71.9
50.9
83.6
50.1
59.7
73.1
90.7
70.3
78.4
81.5
49.3
93.5
67.2
61.5
52.7
72.5
32.7
234.4
6.0
8.1
6.9
10.0
13.7
17.6
8.0
7.9
7.3
8.6
13.2
6.5
22.8
1.3
3.7
9.1
2.9
3.3
5.5
3.5
1.9
3.3
5.4
3.8
3.5
48.1
41.1
42.0
38.6

2.3
5.2
7.5
2.9

3.8
1.6
2.7
2.9
0.1

505
341
67.5
259
153
105
75.9
55.9
87.2
51.9
74.1
82.3
85.3
56.6
96.6
67.2
65.5
55.1
76.5
36.1
73.2
50.7
84.5
51.1
62.4
73.5
88.3
71.8
77.5
82.4
50.9
93.9
66.2
62.8
50.8
73.7
35.4
249.3
5.7
6.4
7.2
5.2
15.0
18.9
9.2
9.1
7.8
10.8
12.2
5.9
21.4
1.0
3.6
9.3
3.2
1.5
4.7
3.8
2.6
3.0
5.7
3.4
4.0
25.2
41.7
42.8
39.9

-2.4
11.8
8.3
-0.6

3.9
1.5
-0.3
-0.2
0.2

516
347
67.2
267
158
110
77.1
53.9
88.2
54.8
74.8
84.2
85.4
55.4
95.9
69.4
67.6
52.2
79.1
39.7
73.7
48.0
85.0
52.8
62.5
72.9
89.3
72.0
79.1
81.7
48.2
92.7
67.1
64.6
47.8
75.9
37.7
255.5
2.8
2.5
1.6
3.8
15.5
19.8
9.3
8.0
6.1
10.4
11.2
4.7
20.5
0.8
4.4
10.9
3.7
3.6
6.1
4.3
3.0
3.8
6.1
4.3
4.5
25.3
40.4
41.0
38.6

2.6
11.5
2.3
-1.8

-0.7
-2.2
3.8
3.7
-10.8

519
349
67.2
271
159
112
77.8
53.0
89.1
53.7
75.8
83.9
85.7
54.0
96.5
67.8
68.8
51.9
80.5
38.8
75.0
48.0
86.6
51.7
61.9
77.0
89.0
73.2
80.4
82.4
47.1
93.6
65.8
66.5
48.5
78.3
37.1
261.6
2.9
2.4
1.5
3.5
14.7
19.4
8.1
7.4
5.7
9.4
11.3
5.6
19.2
1.1
3.5
9.6
2.9
3.6
5.2
3.9
1.9
3.4
4.2
3.7
3.3
23.3
38.6
40.2
38.1

4.3
5.7
2.4
1.9

4.8
3.1
1.4
1.2
7.2

2020-2021
0.5 %
0.5 %
0.0 pps
1.5 %
1.0 %
2.2 %
0.7 pps
-0.9 pps
1.0 pps
-1.0 pps
1.0 pps
-0.3 pps
0.3 pps
-1.4 pps
0.6 pps
-1.6 pps
1.2 pps
-0.3 pps
1.4 pps
-0.9 pps
1.4 pps
0.0 pps
1.6 pps
-1.0 pps
-0.6 pps
4.1 pps
-0.4 pps
1.2 pps
1.3 pps
0.8 pps
-1.0 pps
0.9 pps
-1.3 pps
2.0 pps
0.7 pps
2.4 pps
-0.6 pps
2.4 %
0.1 pps
-0.1 pps
-0.1 pps
-0.2 pps
-0.9 pps
-0.4 pps
-1.2 pps
-0.6 pps
-0.4 pps
-1.0 pps
0.1 pps
0.9 pps
-1.3 pps
0.3 pps
-0.9 pps
-1.3 pps
-0.8 pps
0.0 pps
-0.9 pps
-0.4 pps
-1.1 pps
-0.4 pps
-1.9 pps
-0.6 pps
-1.2 pps
-2.0 pps
-4.5 %
-2.0 %
-1.3 %

1.7 pps
-5.8 pps
0.1 pps
3.7 pps

5.5 pps
5.3 pps
-2.4 pps
-2.5 pps
18.0 pps

137 

  
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Netherlands

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

1
2

3

- Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)
- Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)

- Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.)

4

- Activity rate (% of population 15-64)

5

-

 Employment rate (% of population 15-64)

(% of total population)

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

6
7

8

9

- Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.)
- Employment growth (%, National accounts)

Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)

- Self employed (15-64, % of total employment )

Male

Female

Male

Female

- Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment)

10

- Part-time (15-64, % of total employment )

11
12

Involuntary part-time (15-64, % of total employment)

- Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-49)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Female

13
14

- Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment)
- Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours)

15

- Sectoral employment growth (% change)

Male

Female

Agriculture

Building and construction

Services

Manufacturing industry

16

-

Indicator board on wage developments (% change)

Compensation per employee

Real compensation per employee based on GDP

Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)

Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)

Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)

138 

17131
11044
64.5
8805
4659
4146
79.7
68.3
86.7
69.5
80.4
68.4
84.2
67.0
91.3
79.0
75.2
69.7
82.0
60.2
75.8
62.3
83.5
65.7
58.8
78.0
87.8
76.7
62.8
80.4
61.0
88.4
74.8
71.3
63.6
78.6
56.6
8376.4
2.4
1.9
1.5
2.3
15.5
18.4
12.2
21.7
20.4
23.1
49.8
27.0
75.8
4.1
5.9
8.9
3.7
5.5
8.5
4.8
2.9
4.7
8.2
5.4
6.4
40.0
41.5
42.2
39.9

1.0
3.3
3.0
0.8

1.0
-0.3
1.4
1.6
0.5

17232
11070
64.2
8884
4699
4185
80.3
68.9
87.0
70.8
81.0
68.7
84.7
68.0
91.7
80.0
75.8
69.8
82.4
61.8
77.2
63.9
84.6
67.7
60.4
79.1
88.5
78.1
63.8
81.6
62.8
89.2
76.6
72.8
65.2
79.9
58.8
8543.3
2.7
2.0
1.7
2.3
15.4
18.4
12.0
21.4
19.9
23.0
50.1
27.5
75.6
3.5
4.9
7.2
2.8
4.5
6.7
3.6
2.4
3.6
7.2
4.7
5.1
36.8
41.2
41.9
39.7

1.0
4.7
3.1
2.1

1.9
-0.5
2.3
2.1
-0.4

17345
11116
64.1
8993
4745
4247
80.9
70.0
87.4
72.0
81.6
70.7
85.1
69.7
91.5
81.0
76.7
70.3
83.3
63.1
78.2
65.3
85.2
69.7
61.3
80.2
88.6
79.1
66.1
82.2
64.7
89.3
78.3
74.1
66.0
81.1
61.2
8689.2
2.3
1.7
1.4
2.1
15.4
18.4
12.0
20.2
19.0
21.4
50.2
27.9
75.2
2.7
4.4
6.7
2.6
3.2
5.9
3.2
2.2
3.1
6.6
4.3
4.5
30.1
41.2
41.9
39.7

0.5
5.1
1.6
2.2

2.8
-0.2
2.5
2.1
-0.3

17442
11160
64.0
9030
4752
4278
80.9
68.7
87.6
73.0
81.8
69.0
84.8
67.7
91.5
81.5
77.0
69.9
83.7
64.4
77.8
62.5
85.1
71.0
60.2
79.2
88.4
78.8
63.9
81.6
61.4
89.0
79.4
73.9
63.6
81.2
62.6
8681.0
-0.5
-0.1
-0.2
0.1
15.8
18.9
12.4
18.0
17.0
19.0
50.8
28.6
75.5
3.0
4.9
9.1
2.9
2.7
7.0
3.7
2.6
3.6
7.4
4.6
5.1
23.4
40.3
41.0
38.6

1.0
2.5
-2.5
-0.2

4.8
2.8
0.9
5.9
-3.4

17533
11200
63.9
9372
4900
4472
83.7
79.1
88.7
73.8
84.5
73.2
87.1
76.8
92.2
82.1
80.2
81.4
85.1
65.6
80.1
71.7
85.9
71.4
65.5
81.5
88.4
81.1
66.8
83.6
69.4
89.7
79.4
76.6
74.1
82.1
63.5
8975.1
2.0
3.4
2.8
4.0
14.3
17.8
10.6
27.4
25.6
29.2
42.7
22.5
65.0
1.6
4.2
9.3
3.1
3.3
7.2
4.0
2.9
3.9
8.7
4.0
4.5
19.6
38.0
39.5
35.4

1.5
2.7
1.9
-0.1

2.2
-0.3
3.3
0.9
2.8

2020-2021
0.5 %
0.4 %
-0.1 pps
3.8 %
3.1 %
4.5 %
2.8 pps
10.3 pps
1.1 pps
0.9 pps
2.7 pps
4.1 pps
2.3 pps
9.2 pps
0.7 pps
0.6 pps
3.2 pps
11.5 pps
1.4 pps
1.1 pps
2.4 pps
9.2 pps
0.9 pps
0.4 pps
5.3 pps
2.3 pps
0.0 pps
2.3 pps
2.9 pps
2.0 pps
8.0 pps
0.8 pps
0.0 pps
2.7 pps
10.5 pps
0.9 pps
0.9 pps
3.4 %
2.5 pps
3.5 pps
3.1 pps
3.9 pps
-1.5 pps
-1.1 pps
-1.8 pps
9.4 pps
8.6 pps
10.2 pps
-8.1 pps
-6.1 pps
-10.5 pps
-1.5 pps
-0.7 pps
0.2 pps
0.2 pps
0.6 pps
0.2 pps
0.3 pps
0.3 pps
0.3 pps
1.3 pps
-0.6 pps
-0.6 pps
-3.8 pps
-5.7 %
-3.7 %
-8.3 %

0.5 pps
0.2 pps
4.4 pps
0.1 pps

-2.6 pps
-3.2 pps
2.4 pps
-5.0 pps
6.2 pps

  
Austria

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

1
2

3

- Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)
- Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)

- Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.)

4

- Activity rate (% of population 15-64)

5

-

 Employment rate (% of population 15-64)

(% of total population)

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

6
7

8

9

- Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.)
- Employment growth (%, National accounts)

Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)

- Self employed (15-64, % of total employment )

Male

Female

Male

Female

- Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment)

10

- Part-time (15-64, % of total employment )

11
12

Involuntary part-time (15-64, % of total employment)

- Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-49)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Female

13
14

- Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment)
- Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours)

15

- Sectoral employment growth (% change)

Male

Female

Agriculture

Building and construction

Services

Manufacturing industry

16

-

Indicator board on wage developments (% change)

Compensation per employee

Real compensation per employee based on GDP

Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)

Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)

Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)

8795
5800
65.9
4433
2350
2083
76.4
56.1
88.7
53.6
77.3
72.6
81.0
58.4
92.3
63.0
71.8
53.7
85.0
44.5
72.2
50.6
84.1
51.3
46.9
74.5
84.6
73.8
64.8
76.2
52.1
87.2
60.1
68.2
49.0
81.0
42.8
4185.3
1.6
1.0
1.0
1.1
10.6
12.9
7.9
9.2
9.2
9.2
27.9
10.6
47.2
3.5
5.9
9.8
5.1
4.2
13.3
5.1
3.2
4.5
10.8
6.5
5.3
33.3
40.7
38.7
39.6

-2.4
2.4
1.9
1.3

1.6
0.6
3.5
2.7
0.6

8838
5809
65.7
4461
2369
2092
76.8
56.6
88.5
56.2
77.4
74.2
81.6
59.5
92.1
66.0
72.0
53.8
84.8
46.6
73.0
51.3
84.5
54.0
48.2
75.4
84.5
74.4
66.9
77.4
53.9
87.8
63.5
68.6
48.7
81.3
44.8
4241.1
1.7
1.3
1.8
0.8
10.4
12.6
7.9
9.1
8.8
9.4
27.3
10.0
46.9
2.9
5.2
9.4
4.4
3.9
11.6
4.3
3.3
3.9
9.8
5.5
4.9
28.9
40.8
38.6
39.7

-6.3
2.5
2.2
2.6

2.9
1.1
3.3
2.9
0.8

8878
5819
65.5
4484
2378
2106
77.1
56.4
89.0
56.4
77.8
73.7
81.8
60.3
92.4
65.6
72.3
52.5
85.7
47.4
73.6
51.6
85.3
54.5
48.2
76.1
84.7
75.0
67.0
78.0
54.8
88.5
63.1
69.2
48.4
82.1
46.0
4280.2
1.1
0.9
0.8
1.0
10.6
12.9
8.1
8.7
8.5
8.9
27.2
9.5
47.1
2.4
4.8
8.5
4.2
3.4
10.8
4.0
3.0
3.6
9.1
5.1
4.6
25.1
40.7
38.8
39.5

-4.6
2.9
1.4
1.5

2.8
1.2
2.6
2.9
0.3

8917
5835
65.4
4467
2362
2105
76.6
56.1
88.3
57.0
77.2
73.8
81.0
59.5
91.4
65.5
72.1
52.8
85.1
48.8
72.4
50.2
83.9
54.7
47.5
74.1
84.6
74.1
65.3
76.5
52.7
86.9
62.7
68.3
47.8
80.8
47.0
4224.0
-1.6
-1.3
-1.6
-1.0
10.5
12.7
7.9
8.2
8.3
8.1
27.2
9.7
46.9
2.5
6.0
10.5
5.0
4.0
12.5
5.0
3.4
4.1
11.6
6.1
5.9
24.5
38.7
37.5
37.4

1.8
-0.1
-3.4
-1.4

1.7
-0.6
5.9
6.1
-5.2

8955
5845
65.3
4515
2396
2119
77.2
56.3
89.0
58.4
77.6
75.7
81.9
61.1
92.3
66.4
72.6
51.5
85.6
50.7
72.4
50.1
83.8
55.4
47.6
73.8
84.7
73.8
66.7
76.7
54.6
86.9
62.6
68.1
45.7
80.7
48.3
4231.8
2.1
0.2
0.6
-0.3
10.0
12.2
7.6
8.8
9.0
8.7
28.7
10.5
49.2
2.6
6.2
11.0
5.8
5.2
14.0
5.8
4.1
4.9
11.9
6.3
6.1
31.5
38.6
37.2
37.4

1.6
5.1
2.1
0.5

3.4
2.1
1.2
0.9
2.5

Statistical annex 

2020-2021
0.4 %
0.2 %
-0.2 pps
1.1 %
1.4 %
0.7 %
0.7 pps
0.2 pps
0.7 pps
1.4 pps
0.4 pps
1.9 pps
0.9 pps
1.7 pps
0.8 pps
0.9 pps
0.5 pps
-1.3 pps
0.6 pps
1.9 pps
0.0 pps
-0.1 pps
-0.1 pps
0.7 pps
0.1 pps
-0.3 pps
0.1 pps
-0.3 pps
1.4 pps
0.2 pps
1.9 pps
0.0 pps
0.0 pps
-0.2 pps
-2.1 pps
-0.1 pps
1.3 pps
0.2 %
3.7 pps
1.5 pps
2.2 pps
0.8 pps
-0.5 pps
-0.5 pps
-0.4 pps
0.6 pps
0.7 pps
0.6 pps
1.5 pps
0.8 pps
2.3 pps
0.1 pps
0.2 pps
0.5 pps
0.8 pps
1.2 pps
1.5 pps
0.8 pps
0.7 pps
0.8 pps
0.3 pps
0.2 pps
0.2 pps
7.0 pps
-0.3 %
-0.8 %
0.0 %

-0.2 pps
5.2 pps
5.5 pps
1.9 pps

1.8 pps
2.7 pps
-4.7 pps
-5.2 pps
7.7 pps

139 

  
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Poland

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

1
2

3

- Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)
- Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)

- Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.)

4

- Activity rate (% of population 15-64)

5

-

 Employment rate (% of population 15-64)

(% of total population)

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

6
7

8

9

- Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.)
- Employment growth (%, National accounts)

Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)

- Self employed (15-64, % of total employment )

Male

Female

Male

Female

- Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment)

10

- Part-time (15-64, % of total employment )

11
12

Involuntary part-time (15-64, % of total employment)

- Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-49)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Female

13
14

- Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment)
- Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours)

15

- Sectoral employment growth (% change)

Male

Female

Agriculture

Building and construction

Services

Manufacturing industry

16

-

Indicator board on wage developments (% change)

Compensation per employee

Real compensation per employee based on GDP

Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)

Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)

Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)

140 

38422
24317
63.3
16919
9304
7616
69.6
34.8
84.9
50.1
69.5
77.5
76.6
39.7
91.1
60.8
62.6
29.7
78.7
40.5
66.1
29.6
81.4
48.3
23.3
67.0
86.8
66.1
71.2
72.8
33.9
87.3
58.3
59.5
25.2
75.3
39.3
16078.8
1.3
1.1
1.2
1.0
17.4
21.8
12.0
26.1
25.6
26.6
6.6
3.7
10.0
1.4
5.0
14.8
4.2
3.7
12.6
5.7
2.5
5.0
8.3
5.0
5.0
31.0
40.7
41.9
39.2

-2.4
-0.2
1.6
4.4

5.8
3.9
6.6
6.6
3.4

38413
23941
62.3
16790
9213
7577
70.1
35.1
85.2
50.3
70.1
78.3
77.0
39.2
91.0
61.9
63.3
30.7
79.3
39.9
67.4
31.0
82.4
48.9
23.6
68.1
87.6
67.4
74.0
74.0
34.7
88.1
59.8
60.8
27.0
76.5
39.1
16133.4
0.5
0.3
0.1
0.6
17.4
21.6
12.3
24.3
23.5
25.1
6.4
3.8
9.7
1.0
3.9
11.7
3.4
2.8
10.3
4.5
2.0
3.9
5.5
3.9
3.9
26.9
40.0
41.2
38.6

-5.6
2.5
0.9
1.5

8.1
6.8
7.0
7.0
4.8

38386
23596
61.5
16650
9167
7483
70.6
35.2
85.3
50.7
70.5
80.4
77.7
39.2
91.5
62.6
63.4
31.0
79.0
40.0
68.2
31.7
82.9
49.5
24.7
68.6
87.9
68.2
75.5
75.3
35.4
89.2
61.0
61.1
27.8
76.4
39.2
16094.1
0.0
-0.2
0.4
-1.0
17.4
21.6
12.3
21.7
20.6
22.9
6.1
3.5
9.3
0.9
3.3
9.9
2.9
2.4
8.6
3.7
2.0
3.3
6.0
3.1
3.6
21.5
40.1
41.1
38.7

-5.1
4.9
1.1
-1.7

7.3
4.0
6.1
6.1
4.8

38354
23372
60.9
16583
9154
7429
71.0
31.8
85.6
52.9
70.9
80.6
78.3
36.1
92.1
65.3
63.6
27.4
79.1
41.7
68.7
28.4
83.3
51.8
24.1
69.0
88.1
68.6
76.6
75.9
32.3
89.7
63.7
61.5
24.2
76.7
41.0
16049.3
0.0
-0.3
-0.2
-0.4
17.9
22.5
12.3
18.4
17.4
19.5
5.9
3.4
8.9
0.8
3.2
10.8
2.8
2.1
8.8
3.5
2.0
3.2
0.0
3.1
3.3
20.1
39.8
40.5
38.3

4.5
1.3
-1.4
-4.0

5.6
1.3
5.3
5.3
-2.1

38162
23101
60.5
16815
9184
7631
72.8
31.0
87.4
56.0
72.7
85.4
79.5
35.7
92.5
69.3
66.1
26.1
82.1
44.0
70.3
27.3
84.8
54.7
24.7
70.7
89.9
70.2
81.5
76.8
31.6
89.9
67.4
63.8
22.8
79.6
43.1
16237.1
1.5
1.2
0.0
2.6
18.1
22.5
12.7
14.8
14.4
15.3
5.2
3.3
7.6
0.7
3.4
11.9
2.9
2.5
8.4
4.0
1.8
3.4
0.0
3.4
3.4
26.6
40.9
41.6
39.6

-11.2
1.2
4.1
-1.1

5.0
-0.8
7.9
7.9
4.4

2020-2021
-0.5 %
-1.2 %
-0.4 pps
1.4 %
0.3 %
2.7 %
1.8 pps
-0.8 pps
1.8 pps
3.1 pps
1.8 pps
4.8 pps
1.2 pps
-0.4 pps
0.5 pps
4.0 pps
2.5 pps
-1.3 pps
3.1 pps
2.3 pps
1.6 pps
-1.1 pps
1.6 pps
2.9 pps
0.6 pps
1.8 pps
1.9 pps
1.6 pps
4.9 pps
0.9 pps
-0.8 pps
0.2 pps
3.7 pps
2.4 pps
-1.4 pps
2.9 pps
2.1 pps
1.2 %
1.5 pps
1.4 pps
0.2 pps
3.0 pps
0.1 pps
0.0 pps
0.5 pps
-3.6 pps
-3.0 pps
-4.2 pps
-0.7 pps
-0.1 pps
-1.3 pps
0.0 pps
0.2 pps
1.1 pps
0.1 pps
0.4 pps
-0.4 pps
0.5 pps
-0.2 pps
0.2 pps
0.0 pps
0.3 pps
0.1 pps
6.5 pps
2.8 %
2.7 %
3.4 %

-15.7 pps
-0.1 pps
5.5 pps
2.9 pps

-0.6 pps
-2.0 pps
2.6 pps
2.6 pps
6.5 pps

  
Portugal

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

1
2

3

- Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)
- Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)

- Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.)

4

- Activity rate (% of population 15-64)

5

-

 Employment rate (% of population 15-64)

(% of total population)

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

6
7

8

9

- Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.)
- Employment growth (%, National accounts)

Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)

- Self employed (15-64, % of total employment )

Male

Female

Male

Female

- Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment)

10

- Part-time (15-64, % of total employment )

11
12

Involuntary part-time (15-64, % of total employment)

- Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-49)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Female

13
14

- Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment)
- Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours)

15

- Sectoral employment growth (% change)

Male

Female

Agriculture

Building and construction

Services

Manufacturing industry

16

-

Indicator board on wage developments (% change)

Compensation per employee

Real compensation per employee based on GDP

Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)

Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)

Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)

10300
6659
64.6
4972
2506
2466
74.7
34.0
89.6
61.5
74.6
79.5
77.9
35.6
92.3
69.2
71.6
32.3
87.0
54.6
67.8
25.9
82.5
56.2
59.8
70.5
83.5
67.8
68.6
71.1
27.6
85.6
63.0
64.8
24.1
79.7
50.2
4515.4
3.3
3.3
3.4
3.2
13.4
16.6
10.1
22.0
22.3
21.7
8.9
6.1
11.7
4.2
9.2
23.9
7.9
8.5
10.2
10.0
6.6
9.1
13.6
8.8
9.6
49.6
40.4
41.6
39.4

-1.5
4.6
5.2
3.6

2.3
0.8
2.0
2.1
0.2

10284
6623
64.4
4976
2499
2477
75.1
34.2
89.8
63.4
75.1
77.1
78.1
36.6
92.6
69.0
72.4
31.7
87.3
58.4
69.7
27.2
84.3
59.2
61.3
72.0
85.5
69.7
68.8
72.7
29.3
87.5
64.5
66.9
25.1
81.4
54.6
4615.0
2.3
2.2
1.8
2.6
13.1
16.2
9.8
22.0
22.0
22.0
8.1
5.7
10.5
3.7
7.2
20.3
6.1
6.5
7.7
8.3
5.4
7.2
10.9
6.9
7.6
43.4
40.2
41.4
39.2

-2.6
4.6
3.8
3.4

3.9
2.0
1.9
1.9
0.5

10286
6603
64.2
4987
2495
2493
75.5
34.3
90.3
64.4
75.4
80.0
78.3
36.0
92.7
70.9
72.9
32.4
88.0
58.8
70.5
28.0
85.2
60.4
61.2
73.3
85.5
70.5
70.7
73.6
30.4
88.1
66.5
67.6
25.5
82.5
55.1
4652.9
0.8
0.8
0.7
1.0
13.6
16.6
10.5
20.8
20.6
21.1
8.1
5.4
10.9
3.5
6.7
18.3
5.7
6.2
7.2
7.3
5.4
6.5
11.7
6.0
7.3
42.2
40.0
41.3
38.9

-8.2
4.8
2.4
-0.6

4.8
3.0
1.1
1.0
1.9

10297
6603
64.1
4905
2444
2460
74.3
30.2
89.5
64.5
74.1
78.4
76.9
32.2
91.8
70.3
71.8
28.0
87.4
59.5
69.0
23.4
84.2
60.7
60.1
69.3
84.4
69.0
68.2
71.6
25.5
86.7
65.6
66.6
21.2
81.8
56.5
4557.4
-1.9
-2.1
-2.9
-1.2
13.4
16.3
10.5
17.8
17.4
18.1
7.5
4.9
10.1
3.3
7.0
22.6
6.0
5.9
6.9
8.5
5.9
6.9
12.9
6.8
7.2
33.0
39.1
40.1
38.0

-0.6
2.2
-4.1
-2.2

2.0
0.0
7.6
8.5
-6.7

10292
6592
64.0
4957
2474
2483
75.2
29.7
90.4
66.9
75.1
80.0
77.7
32.2
92.3
73.3
72.8
27.2
88.7
61.3
70.1
22.8
85.3
63.4
59.9
69.1
85.9
70.1
71.9
72.7
25.4
87.5
68.9
67.7
20.0
83.3
58.6
4622.6
2.1
1.4
1.7
1.2
13.2
16.0
10.4
17.0
16.7
17.2
6.9
4.7
9.1
2.8
6.6
23.4
5.7
5.2
6.9
8.0
5.4
6.7
10.1
6.3
6.9
43.3
39.1
40.3
38.3

-5.1
5.6
3.2
1.1

3.8
3.1
2.1
1.4
2.8

Statistical annex 

2020-2021
0.0 %
-0.2 %
-0.1 pps
1.1 %
1.2 %
0.9 %
0.9 pps
-0.4 pps
0.9 pps
2.4 pps
1.0 pps
1.6 pps
0.8 pps
0.0 pps
0.4 pps
3.0 pps
1.0 pps
-0.8 pps
1.4 pps
1.9 pps
1.1 pps
-0.6 pps
1.1 pps
2.6 pps
-0.2 pps
-0.2 pps
1.5 pps
1.1 pps
3.7 pps
1.1 pps
-0.1 pps
0.7 pps
3.3 pps
1.1 pps
-1.2 pps
1.5 pps
2.1 pps
1.4 %
4.0 pps
3.5 pps
4.5 pps
2.4 pps
-0.2 pps
-0.3 pps
-0.1 pps
-0.8 pps
-0.7 pps
-0.9 pps
-0.6 pps
-0.2 pps
-1.0 pps
-0.5 pps
-0.4 pps
0.8 pps
-0.3 pps
-0.7 pps
0.0 pps
-0.5 pps
-0.5 pps
-0.2 pps
-2.8 pps
-0.5 pps
-0.3 pps
10.3 pps
0.0 %
0.5 %
0.8 %

-4.5 pps
3.4 pps
7.2 pps
3.3 pps

1.8 pps
3.1 pps
-5.5 pps
-7.1 pps
9.5 pps

141 

  
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Romania

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

1
2

3

- Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)
- Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)

- Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.)

4

- Activity rate (% of population 15-64)

5

-

 Employment rate (% of population 15-64)

(% of total population)

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

6
7

8

9

- Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.)
- Employment growth (%, National accounts)

Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)

- Self employed (15-64, % of total employment )

Male

Female

Male

Female

- Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment)

10

- Part-time (15-64, % of total employment )

11
12

Involuntary part-time (15-64, % of total employment)

- Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-49)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Female

13
14

- Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment)
- Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours)

15

- Sectoral employment growth (% change)

Male

Female

Agriculture

Building and construction

Services

Manufacturing industry

16

-

Indicator board on wage developments (% change)

Compensation per employee

Real compensation per employee based on GDP

Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)

Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)

Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)

142 

19593
13095
66.8
8812
5034
3778
67.3
29.9
83.4
46.0
67.3
74.5
76.2
34.6
92.2
57.4
58.2
25.0
74.2
35.7
63.9
24.5
79.9
44.5
42.5
67.5
87.9
63.9
68.2
71.8
28.4
87.6
55.3
55.8
20.4
71.8
34.9
8363.2
2.4
2.4
1.6
3.5
16.4
21.1
10.1
1.2
1.4
0.9
6.8
6.7
6.9
3.8
6.1
18.3
4.2
3.2
7.6
5.2
2.4
5.1
0.0
6.8
5.1
41.5
39.3
40.2
39.9

0.3
3.2
3.2
3.5

14.8
9.7
14.3
14.2
4.8

19477
12930
66.4
8761
5036
3725
67.8
29.5
83.6
47.5
67.8
72.1
76.9
34.6
92.5
59.7
58.3
24.2
74.2
36.4
64.8
24.7
80.6
46.3
42.6
68.6
88.4
64.8
68.6
73.2
29.0
88.7
57.9
56.2
20.3
72.1
35.7
8381.8
0.1
0.2
1.0
-0.8
15.5
19.9
9.8
1.1
1.2
0.9
6.5
6.2
6.9
3.5
5.3
16.2
3.6
2.5
6.6
4.4
2.1
4.3
0.0
5.8
4.5
44.3
39.4
40.0
39.8

-0.1
-2.7
2.6
-0.5

12.9
6.4
12.4
33.1
4.4

19376
12774
65.9
8761
5049
3712
68.6
29.6
84.1
48.9
68.6
0.0
78.0
35.7
93.1
61.6
58.9
23.3
74.6
37.3
65.8
24.7
81.4
47.8
44.4
68.6
89.2
65.8
0.0
74.6
29.8
89.7
60.1
56.8
19.3
72.7
36.5
8407.9
0.1
0.3
0.7
-0.2
15.2
19.6
9.4
1.4
1.7
1.0
6.1
6.0
6.2
3.4
4.9
16.8
3.2
2.4
7.0
4.0
1.6
4.0
0.0
5.3
4.3
42.5
39.5
40.2
39.9

-4.2
6.1
1.9
-1.9

10.9
3.8
12.3
12.3
4.1

19269
12611
65.4
8723
5040
3683
69.2
29.7
84.3
50.2
69.2
0.0
78.7
35.5
93.6
62.5
59.3
23.6
74.5
38.8
65.6
24.6
80.6
48.5
43.4
68.1
88.8
65.6
0.0
74.4
29.2
89.3
60.4
56.5
19.7
71.4
37.5
8272.2
-1.8
-1.6
-1.2
-2.2
15.1
19.4
9.3
1.2
1.6
0.8
5.9
5.8
6.0
3.4
6.1
17.3
4.4
3.4
9.0
5.2
2.2
5.2
0.0
6.3
5.7
29.9
38.4
39.8
39.4

-5.6
3.9
0.9
-6.0

2.6
-1.2
8.1
7.8
-2.0

19202
12385
64.5
8125
4752
3373
65.6
26.8
80.6
45.6
65.6
60.9
75.6
32.9
90.7
57.9
55.3
20.4
70.0
34.1
61.9
21.2
76.9
43.8
34.7
64.3
88.4
61.9
59.2
71.1
26.0
86.2
55.4
52.5
16.1
67.1
33.0
7667.6
-8.9
-7.3
-6.3
-8.6
11.6
15.3
6.5
2.4
3.3
1.1
3.7
4.1
3.0
2.4
5.6
21.0
4.6
3.9
14.0
5.1
2.1
5.6
0.0
6.0
5.1
36.5
40.5
40.5
39.8

-44.4
2.8
2.2
-1.3

5.7
0.3
6.0
6.0
16.2

2020-2021
-0.4 %
-1.8 %
-0.9 pps
-6.9 %
-5.7 %
-8.4 %
-3.6 pps
-2.9 pps
-3.7 pps
-4.6 pps
-3.6 pps
60.9 pps
-3.1 pps
-2.6 pps
-3.0 pps
-4.6 pps
-4.0 pps
-3.2 pps
-4.4 pps
-4.7 pps
-3.7 pps
-3.4 pps
-3.7 pps
-4.7 pps
-8.7 pps
-3.7 pps
-0.4 pps
-3.7 pps
59.2 pps
-3.4 pps
-3.2 pps
-3.2 pps
-5.0 pps
-4.0 pps
-3.6 pps
-4.3 pps
-4.5 pps
-7.3 %
-7.1 pps
-5.7 pps
-5.1 pps
-6.5 pps
-3.5 pps
-4.1 pps
-2.8 pps
1.2 pps
1.7 pps
0.3 pps
-2.2 pps
-1.7 pps
-3.0 pps
-0.9 pps
-0.5 pps
3.7 pps
0.2 pps
0.5 pps
5.0 pps
-0.1 pps
-0.1 pps
0.4 pps
0.0 pps
-0.3 pps
-0.6 pps
6.6 pps
5.5 %
1.8 %
1.0 %

-38.8 pps
-1.1 pps
1.3 pps
4.7 pps

3.1 pps
1.5 pps
-2.1 pps
-1.8 pps
18.2 pps

  
Slovenia

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

1
2

3

- Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)
- Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)

- Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.)

4

- Activity rate (% of population 15-64)

5

-

 Employment rate (% of population 15-64)

(% of total population)

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

6
7

8

9

- Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.)
- Employment growth (%, National accounts)

Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)

- Self employed (15-64, % of total employment )

Male

Female

Male

Female

- Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment)

10

- Part-time (15-64, % of total employment )

11
12

Involuntary part-time (15-64, % of total employment)

- Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-49)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Female

13
14

- Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment)
- Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours)

15

- Sectoral employment growth (% change)

Male

Female

Agriculture

Building and construction

Services

Manufacturing industry

16

-

Indicator board on wage developments (% change)

Compensation per employee

Real compensation per employee based on GDP

Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)

Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)

Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)

2066
1362
65.9
1011
538
473
74.2
39.1
91.9
45.6
74.1
76.0
77.1
42.9
93.4
51.7
71.2
34.9
90.2
39.5
69.3
34.7
86.1
42.7
35.4
70.7
86.2
69.3
69.0
72.5
38.6
88.5
48.0
65.8
30.4
83.5
37.4
943.5
2.9
4.5
4.6
4.5
11.4
14.3
8.1
17.6
16.4
18.9
10.3
6.7
14.5
1.1
6.6
11.2
6.3
6.4
11.5
6.8
5.3
6.5
9.2
5.8
7.5
47.5
39.9
39.9
39.2

-1.0
2.3
3.8
3.7

3.0
1.6
5.6
5.1
1.9

2072
1352
65.3
1015
544
470
75.0
38.5
92.0
49.5
75.1
74.3
78.2
42.4
94.0
55.1
71.7
34.4
89.9
43.9
71.1
35.1
87.5
47.0
36.3
72.8
88.0
71.3
68.6
74.5
38.8
90.1
52.2
67.5
31.0
84.8
41.9
961.9
3.2
2.0
2.5
1.3
12.1
15.4
8.3
15.7
14.4
17.1
9.7
5.9
14.3
0.6
5.1
8.8
4.9
4.9
9.1
5.6
3.7
5.1
7.6
4.6
5.7
42.9
40.1
40.0
39.3

-0.4
6.5
3.2
4.6

3.9
1.7
3.3
3.6
1.2

2089
1350
64.6
1015
546
469
75.2
36.2
92.4
50.9
75.2
75.6
78.0
39.1
94.4
55.8
72.2
32.9
90.3
46.0
71.8
33.3
88.6
48.6
34.4
73.2
89.5
71.9
70.3
74.8
36.2
90.9
53.2
68.6
29.9
86.0
44.0
969.7
2.5
0.8
1.0
0.6
11.8
15.2
7.8
13.2
11.7
14.9
8.4
4.8
12.7
0.4
4.4
8.1
4.2
4.5
9.9
4.7
3.0
4.4
7.1
4.0
5.0
43.0
40.1
39.8
39.3

-0.6
9.1
2.1
2.6

5.0
2.7
4.8
4.9
1.0

2103
1362
64.7
1016
547
469
74.6
31.5
92.4
52.4
74.4
78.4
77.1
33.9
94.2
56.3
71.9
28.7
90.3
48.5
70.9
27.0
88.1
50.5
30.4
70.9
89.4
70.7
72.7
73.7
29.6
90.4
54.3
67.8
24.1
85.6
46.6
964.7
-0.7
-0.5
-0.3
-0.8
10.7
13.4
7.6
10.8
9.5
12.2
8.3
5.1
12.1
0.5
5.0
14.2
4.6
3.7
11.5
5.6
3.2
4.9
7.3
4.4
5.7
38.8
40.4
39.7
39.9

-3.0
2.5
-1.7
-1.9

3.4
2.2
1.9
2.8
-3.7

2108
1336
63.4
1002
540
462
75.0
33.9
92.2
54.9
75.0
76.3
77.8
36.4
94.1
59.3
72.0
31.0
90.1
50.6
71.4
29.6
88.3
52.7
31.4
70.0
88.5
71.5
70.4
74.5
32.2
90.6
57.1
68.1
26.5
85.7
48.5
954.3
1.3
-1.1
-1.1
-1.1
11.9
15.6
7.6
11.8
10.3
13.3
9.2
6.2
12.8
0.9
4.8
12.8
4.2
4.0
9.5
5.4
3.4
4.6
7.6
4.3
5.3
39.2
40.2
40.1
39.7

-1.2
4.4
0.7
1.7

7.9
2.8
6.3
5.2
6.8

Statistical annex 

2020-2021
0.2 %
-1.9 %
-1.4 pps
-1.3 %
-1.3 %
-1.4 %
0.4 pps
2.4 pps
-0.2 pps
2.5 pps
0.6 pps
-2.2 pps
0.7 pps
2.4 pps
-0.1 pps
3.0 pps
0.1 pps
2.3 pps
-0.2 pps
2.1 pps
0.6 pps
2.6 pps
0.2 pps
2.2 pps
1.0 pps
-0.9 pps
-0.9 pps
0.8 pps
-2.2 pps
0.8 pps
2.5 pps
0.2 pps
2.7 pps
0.4 pps
2.5 pps
0.2 pps
1.9 pps
-1.1 %
2.0 pps
-0.6 pps
-0.8 pps
-0.3 pps
1.2 pps
2.2 pps
0.0 pps
1.0 pps
0.8 pps
1.1 pps
0.9 pps
1.1 pps
0.7 pps
0.4 pps
-0.2 pps
-1.4 pps
-0.4 pps
0.3 pps
-2.0 pps
-0.2 pps
0.2 pps
-0.3 pps
0.3 pps
-0.1 pps
-0.4 pps
0.4 pps
-0.5 %
1.0 %
-0.5 %

1.8 pps
1.9 pps
2.4 pps
3.6 pps

4.6 pps
0.6 pps
4.4 pps
2.4 pps
10.5 pps

143 

  
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Slovak Republic

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

1
2

3

- Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)
- Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)

- Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.)

4

- Activity rate (% of population 15-64)

5

-

 Employment rate (% of population 15-64)

(% of total population)

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

6
7

8

9

- Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.)
- Employment growth (%, National accounts)

Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)

- Self employed (15-64, % of total employment )

Male

Female

Male

Female

- Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment)

10

- Part-time (15-64, % of total employment )

11
12

Involuntary part-time (15-64, % of total employment)

- Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-49)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Female

13
14

- Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment)
- Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours)

15

- Sectoral employment growth (% change)

Male

Female

Agriculture

Building and construction

Services

Manufacturing industry

16

-

Indicator board on wage developments (% change)

Compensation per employee

Real compensation per employee based on GDP

Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)

Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)

Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)

144 

5438
3781
69.5
2726
1489
1237
72.1
33.2
86.6
56.4
72.1
79.4
78.2
39.6
93.1
60.0
65.9
26.5
79.8
53.0
66.2
26.9
80.0
53.0
21.4
72.5
78.5
66.2
74.8
72.0
32.4
86.3
56.6
60.3
21.1
73.4
49.6
2502.1
2.2
1.2
0.2
2.5
15.0
19.0
10.2
9.4
9.1
9.8
5.8
4.0
8.0
1.8
8.1
18.9
7.6
6.0
29.9
7.6
4.2
8.2
0.0
7.7
8.5
62.4
39.7
40.5
38.7

-0.3
2.3
1.8
3.9

5.1
3.8
6.7
6.1
0.8

5446
3749
68.8
2713
1487
1225
72.4
32.3
86.5
57.2
72.3
78.1
78.7
39.7
93.2
61.1
65.9
24.5
79.7
53.7
67.6
27.5
81.2
54.2
21.1
74.1
79.3
67.6
68.8
73.9
34.0
87.9
58.4
61.2
20.6
74.4
50.4
2533.3
2.0
1.2
1.8
0.6
14.6
18.7
9.6
8.1
7.5
8.7
4.9
3.2
7.0
1.3
6.5
14.9
6.1
5.3
30.0
5.8
3.1
6.6
0.0
6.0
7.1
61.7
39.8
40.5
38.6

-0.2
2.3
2.9
1.7

6.0
3.9
6.6
6.5
1.8

5453
3718
68.2
2702
1478
1223
72.7
29.7
86.5
59.8
72.6
80.6
78.8
36.8
93.2
62.9
66.4
22.2
79.6
57.0
68.4
24.9
82.0
57.0
20.7
75.0
80.6
68.4
76.3
74.4
31.6
88.3
60.4
62.4
17.8
75.3
53.9
2543.8
1.0
0.4
0.0
1.0
14.8
19.1
9.7
7.8
7.1
8.6
4.5
2.9
6.5
1.2
5.7
16.1
5.3
4.7
31.3
4.9
2.5
5.8
0.0
5.5
6.0
58.2
39.8
40.6
38.6

0.1
5.2
0.6
0.2

6.8
4.2
7.1
7.0
1.5

5461
3689
67.6
2672
1459
1213
72.4
28.1
85.9
61.3
72.4
70.9
78.3
34.9
92.2
64.5
66.4
21.0
79.3
58.3
67.5
22.7
80.6
58.3
18.2
73.3
80.2
67.5
62.7
73.3
28.5
86.9
61.7
61.7
16.5
74.0
55.2
2490.9
-1.9
-2.1
-2.2
-2.0
14.7
19.1
9.4
6.5
5.8
7.3
4.6
2.7
6.8
0.9
6.7
19.3
6.2
4.8
30.7
6.4
3.5
6.8
0.0
6.2
7.1
47.7
39.2
39.9
38.2

-2.6
-0.7
-1.9
-4.3

3.6
1.2
5.6
8.5
-2.5

5451
3631
66.6
2709
1437
1272
74.6
26.2
88.8
64.1
74.5
88.0
78.6
31.9
92.4
67.7
70.6
20.2
85.0
60.7
69.4
20.8
83.2
60.6
13.7
74.9
85.4
69.4
81.2
73.3
25.6
86.8
64.2
65.6
15.8
79.4
57.3
2521.7
-0.6
1.2
-1.8
4.9
14.6
20.2
8.3
4.1
3.9
4.3
3.1
1.8
4.6
0.6
6.8
20.6
6.3
5.4
42.1
6.4
3.0
6.9
0.0
6.7
7.0
56.6
38.5
39.2
37.6

-4.6
0.4
0.0
-1.4

5.9
3.4
5.3
5.5
3.6

2020-2021
-0.2 %
-1.6 %
-0.9 pps
1.4 %
-1.5 %
4.9 %
2.2 pps
-1.9 pps
2.8 pps
2.8 pps
2.1 pps
17.1 pps
0.3 pps
-3.0 pps
0.1 pps
3.2 pps
4.1 pps
-0.7 pps
5.7 pps
2.5 pps
1.9 pps
-1.9 pps
2.6 pps
2.3 pps
-4.5 pps
1.6 pps
5.2 pps
1.9 pps
18.5 pps
0.0 pps
-2.9 pps
-0.1 pps
2.6 pps
3.9 pps
-0.8 pps
5.4 pps
2.1 pps
1.2 %
1.3 pps
3.3 pps
0.4 pps
6.9 pps
-0.1 pps
1.1 pps
-1.1 pps
-2.4 pps
-1.9 pps
-3.0 pps
-1.5 pps
-0.9 pps
-2.2 pps
-0.3 pps
0.1 pps
1.3 pps
0.1 pps
0.6 pps
11.4 pps
0.0 pps
-0.5 pps
0.1 pps
0.0 pps
0.5 pps
-0.1 pps
8.9 pps
-1.8 %
-1.8 %
-1.6 %

-2.0 pps
1.1 pps
1.9 pps
2.9 pps

2.3 pps
2.3 pps
-0.3 pps
-3.0 pps
6.1 pps

  
Finland

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

1
2

3

- Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)
- Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)

- Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.)

4

- Activity rate (% of population 15-64)

5

-

 Employment rate (% of population 15-64)

(% of total population)

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

6
7

8

9

- Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.)
- Employment growth (%, National accounts)

Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)

- Self employed (15-64, % of total employment )

Male

Female

Male

Female

- Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment)

10

- Part-time (15-64, % of total employment )

11
12

Involuntary part-time (15-64, % of total employment)

- Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-49)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Female

13
14

- Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment)
- Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours)

15

- Sectoral employment growth (% change)

Male

Female

Agriculture

Building and construction

Services

Manufacturing industry

16

-

Indicator board on wage developments (% change)

Compensation per employee

Real compensation per employee based on GDP

Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)

Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)

Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)

5508
3434
62.3
2635
1362
1273
76.7
53.2
86.8
67.8
77.1
68.9
78.5
52.3
89.8
67.5
74.9
54.2
83.6
68.2
70.0
42.5
80.6
62.5
38.5
71.1
84.4
70.5
58.3
71.4
41.3
83.3
61.6
68.5
43.7
77.9
63.4
2402.6
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.9
11.6
15.0
8.1
15.8
12.9
18.6
15.1
9.9
20.5
4.8
8.7
20.1
7.1
7.8
18.9
9.6
5.3
8.6
15.3
9.1
8.3
24.5
38.9
40.0
37.0

-3.2
3.6
1.4
0.0

-1.1
-1.9
-0.7
0.4
2.1

5516
3421
62.0
2665
1375
1290
77.9
53.1
87.8
70.3
78.3
68.8
79.5
51.5
90.8
69.7
76.3
54.7
84.6
70.8
72.1
44.0
82.5
65.4
39.5
73.2
86.2
72.7
57.7
73.5
42.6
85.3
64.3
70.6
45.5
79.5
66.5
2464.8
2.5
2.6
2.6
2.6
11.6
14.8
8.2
16.2
13.1
19.2
15.1
10.0
20.6
4.8
7.5
17.0
6.0
6.9
16.7
8.4
4.3
7.2
16.2
7.7
7.2
22.6
38.6
39.7
37.0

-3.4
4.5
3.2
1.7

1.3
-0.7
1.4
2.1
-1.3

5522
3410
61.7
2669
1379
1290
78.3
53.9
87.7
71.5
78.7
68.4
79.9
54.3
90.3
70.5
76.6
53.5
84.9
72.4
72.9
44.6
83.2
66.8
39.0
74.4
86.2
73.5
59.8
74.1
44.1
85.6
64.8
71.8
45.1
80.7
68.7
2487.0
1.8
0.9
0.6
1.2
11.8
14.9
8.6
15.5
12.7
18.2
15.5
10.1
21.3
4.8
6.8
17.2
5.1
6.6
17.1
7.3
4.0
6.6
12.6
7.3
6.2
18.1
38.3
39.9
36.9

-0.1
-1.7
2.4
0.2

1.2
-0.2
0.8
1.5
-0.6

5531
3401
61.5
2662
1377
1285
78.3
52.2
87.5
72.9
78.6
71.3
80.0
53.1
90.0
72.4
76.5
51.3
84.9
73.5
72.1
41.1
82.4
67.5
36.6
72.1
86.2
72.6
61.2
73.4
40.7
84.7
66.6
70.7
41.4
80.0
68.4
2450.4
-1.9
-1.5
-1.1
-1.8
11.8
15.1
8.2
14.6
12.0
17.1
14.8
10.2
19.8
4.8
7.7
21.4
5.8
7.5
20.0
9.1
4.4
7.7
14.2
8.1
7.4
15.7
38.3
39.5
36.8

2.2
-2.2
-3.9
-1.7

0.4
-1.0
0.2
1.4
-0.3

5542
3399
61.3
2679
1388
1291
78.8
52.9
87.9
73.8
79.1
74.3
80.3
53.1
90.0
73.8
77.2
52.7
85.6
73.9
72.7
43.8
82.3
68.4
41.0
73.9
87.3
73.3
63.2
73.6
43.7
83.7
67.9
71.7
44.0
80.8
68.8
2469.5
3.3
0.8
0.6
0.9
12.2
15.7
8.5
16.0
13.4
18.5
16.9
11.0
23.2
5.3
7.7
17.1
6.4
7.4
17.6
8.2
4.7
7.4
15.0
8.2
7.1
24.3
38.0
39.1
36.2

-1.2
3.0
3.3
1.7

2.9
0.3
3.8
2.9
-0.3

Statistical annex 

2020-2021
0.2 %
0.0 %
-0.2 pps
0.6 %
0.8 %
0.4 %
0.5 pps
0.7 pps
0.4 pps
0.9 pps
0.5 pps
3.0 pps
0.4 pps
0.1 pps
0.1 pps
1.4 pps
0.7 pps
1.3 pps
0.7 pps
0.4 pps
0.6 pps
2.8 pps
-0.1 pps
0.9 pps
4.4 pps
1.8 pps
1.0 pps
0.7 pps
2.0 pps
0.2 pps
2.9 pps
-1.0 pps
1.3 pps
1.0 pps
2.6 pps
0.8 pps
0.4 pps
0.8 %
5.2 pps
2.3 pps
1.8 pps
2.8 pps
0.5 pps
0.7 pps
0.3 pps
1.4 pps
1.4 pps
1.4 pps
2.1 pps
0.8 pps
3.4 pps
0.6 pps
0.0 pps
-4.3 pps
0.6 pps
-0.1 pps
-2.4 pps
-0.9 pps
0.3 pps
-0.3 pps
0.8 pps
0.1 pps
-0.3 pps
8.6 pps
-0.8 %
-1.0 %
-1.6 %

-3.4 pps
5.2 pps
7.2 pps
3.4 pps

2.5 pps
1.4 pps
3.6 pps
1.5 pps
0.0 pps

145 

  
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

Sweden

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

1
2

3

- Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)
- Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)

- Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.)

4

- Activity rate (% of population 15-64)

5

-

 Employment rate (% of population 15-64)

(% of total population)

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

6
7

8

9

- Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.)
- Employment growth (%, National accounts)

Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)

- Self employed (15-64, % of total employment )

Male

Female

Male

Female

- Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment)

10

- Part-time (15-64, % of total employment )

11
12

Involuntary part-time (15-64, % of total employment)

- Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-49)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Female

13
14

- Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment)
- Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours)

15

- Sectoral employment growth (% change)

Male

Female

Agriculture

Building and construction

Services

Manufacturing industry

16

-

Indicator board on wage developments (% change)

Compensation per employee

Real compensation per employee based on GDP

Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)

Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)

Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)

146 

10058
6290
62.5
5190
2709
2481
82.5
54.7
91.2
80.5
83.2
75.9
84.3
54.1
93.6
83.2
80.7
55.4
88.8
77.8
76.9
44.9
86.3
76.4
46.5
82.6
88.1
78.6
59.8
78.3
43.9
88.5
78.4
75.4
46.0
84.1
74.4
4833.9
2.5
2.1
2.3
1.8
8.6
11.8
5.1
16.1
14.5
17.7
23.3
13.1
34.4
6.3
6.8
17.9
5.4
5.1
19.4
5.2
4.1
5.5
21.3
7.1
6.6
19.6
39.1
40.3
38.0

0.1
7.5
2.9
2.3

2.1
-0.1
2.8
2.3
0.1

10175
6347
62.4
5251
2739
2513
82.7
54.1
91.3
81.7
83.6
74.5
84.4
52.8
93.6
84.7
81.0
55.5
88.9
78.6
77.4
44.7
86.6
78.0
46.8
83.0
88.6
79.4
58.8
78.8
43.0
88.8
80.4
75.9
46.4
84.2
75.7
4910.2
1.6
1.6
1.7
1.5
8.6
11.9
5.0
15.9
14.3
17.6
22.6
12.9
33.3
5.5
6.5
17.4
5.2
4.4
19.5
4.7
3.7
5.1
21.1
6.6
6.4
18.3
39.0
40.3
38.0

-2.8
3.5
1.9
2.6

3.9
1.4
2.0
1.6
0.3

10279
6404
62.3
5310
2773
2538
82.9
55.0
91.3
81.5
83.9
74.6
84.6
53.9
93.7
84.1
81.2
56.2
88.7
78.9
77.1
43.9
86.4
77.7
46.0
82.5
88.8
79.2
59.5
78.8
42.9
89.0
79.8
75.4
45.1
83.7
75.6
4938.5
0.6
0.6
1.0
0.1
8.7
12.2
5.0
15.7
14.0
17.3
22.5
13.4
32.5
5.2
7.0
20.1
5.3
4.7
21.6
5.1
3.8
5.5
20.2
6.9
7.1
14.3
38.7
39.9
37.7

0.4
0.1
1.2
-0.5

2.9
0.4
2.6
2.8
1.4

10353
6443
62.2
5317
2791
2525
82.5
52.1
91.2
82.4
83.3
75.5
84.6
52.2
93.8
85.4
80.3
51.9
88.4
79.4
75.5
39.6
85.0
77.6
41.9
81.0
88.0
77.8
56.5
77.4
39.2
87.7
79.8
73.5
40.1
82.2
75.3
4862.6
-1.3
-1.5
-1.1
-2.0
8.6
11.8
5.0
14.8
13.2
16.5
22.3
13.8
31.7
5.1
8.5
23.9
6.8
5.8
25.8
6.5
4.8
6.7
25.2
8.6
8.5
14.4
37.7
38.9
36.8

1.6
-0.9
-2.8
-1.7

2.5
0.5
0.5
2.1
-0.8

10416
6438
61.8
5334
2792
2542
82.9
54.0
91.1
82.5
83.4
77.9
84.8
53.3
93.9
85.1
80.8
54.9
88.2
79.9
75.4
40.7
84.7
76.9
41.1
80.3
88.4
77.1
59.4
77.4
39.8
87.9
78.5
73.3
41.6
81.4
75.2
4852.7
1.2
-0.2
-0.2
-0.2
8.5
11.8
4.8
14.4
12.5
16.3
20.4
12.0
29.7
5.1
8.8
24.7
7.0
6.8
29.4
6.8
4.4
7.5
23.7
8.5
9.1
24.3
38.3
39.6
37.4

-0.2
1.0
2.6
-0.4

4.4
1.2
3.1
2.7
3.8

2020-2021
0.6 %
-0.1 %
-0.4 pps
0.3 %
0.0 %
0.7 %
0.3 pps
2.0 pps
-0.1 pps
0.1 pps
0.0 pps
2.4 pps
0.2 pps
1.0 pps
0.1 pps
-0.3 pps
0.5 pps
3.0 pps
-0.2 pps
0.5 pps
-0.1 pps
1.1 pps
-0.3 pps
-0.7 pps
-0.8 pps
-0.7 pps
0.4 pps
-0.6 pps
2.9 pps
0.0 pps
0.6 pps
0.2 pps
-1.3 pps
-0.2 pps
1.6 pps
-0.7 pps
-0.1 pps
-0.2 %
2.5 pps
1.3 pps
1.0 pps
1.8 pps
-0.1 pps
-0.1 pps
-0.1 pps
-0.4 pps
-0.7 pps
-0.2 pps
-1.9 pps
-1.8 pps
-2.0 pps
0.0 pps
0.3 pps
0.8 pps
0.2 pps
1.0 pps
3.6 pps
0.3 pps
-0.4 pps
0.8 pps
-1.5 pps
-0.1 pps
0.6 pps
9.9 pps
1.6 %
1.8 %
1.6 %

-1.8 pps
1.9 pps
5.3 pps
1.3 pps

1.9 pps
0.7 pps
2.6 pps
0.6 pps
4.6 pps

  
Euro Area

1
2

3

- Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)
- Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)

- Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.)

(% of total population)

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

4

- Activity rate (% of population 15-64)

5

-

 Employment rate (% of population 15-64)

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

6
7

8

9

- Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.)
- Employment growth (%, National accounts)

Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)

- Self employed (15-64, % of total employment )

Male

Female

Male

Female

- Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment)

10

- Part-time (15-64, % of total employment )

11
12

Involuntary part-time (15-64, % of total employment)

- Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-49)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Female

13
14

- Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment)
- Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours)

15

- Sectoral employment growth (% change)

Male

Female

Agriculture

Building and construction

Services

Manufacturing industry

16

-

Indicator board on wage developments (% change)

Compensation per employee

Real compensation per employee based on GDP

Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)

Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)

Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)

Statistical annex 

2017

340575
218479
64.1
159642
85554
74088
73.1
39.8
85.5
61.3
73.4
70.2
78.5
42.0
91.4
68.1
67.7
37.4
79.6
54.9
66.4
32.3
78.1
57.1
45.6
70.3
83.0
67.1
60.3
71.5
33.9
84.1
63.3
61.2
30.6
72.2
51.3
144970.3
1.6
1.3
1.3
1.3
13.5
16.8
9.7
16.1
15.6
16.5
21.6
9.4
35.7
6.3
9.1
18.8
8.6
6.8
16.8
8.2
5.5
8.7
14.1
8.8
9.5
49.0
40.3
41.2
38.6

-0.4
1.2
2.2
1.0

1.7
0.6
2.1
2.2
1.0

2018

341462
218080
63.9
160011
85661
74351
73.4
40.0
85.6
62.6
73.6
71.1
78.7
42.6
91.4
69.3
68.0
37.3
79.8
56.3
67.3
33.2
79.0
58.8
46.3
71.1
83.6
67.9
61.9
72.4
35.1
84.8
65.0
62.1
31.2
73.1
52.9
146715.5
1.6
1.2
1.1
1.3
13.3
16.6
9.5
16.2
15.7
16.7
21.3
9.3
35.3
5.9
8.2
16.9
7.8
6.2
15.2
7.4
5.1
7.8
12.9
7.9
8.6
47.0
40.3
41.2
38.6

-0.4
2.6
2.0
1.6

2.1
0.6
2.5
2.3
0.2

2019

342508
218115
63.7
160565
85734
74831
73.6
40.1
85.8
63.6
73.9
71.6
78.8
42.7
91.4
70.2
68.5
37.4
80.2
57.5
68.0
33.8
79.7
60.0
46.7
71.5
84.0
68.6
63.0
73.0
35.8
85.3
66.1
63.0
31.7
74.0
54.2
148248.2
1.3
1.0
0.8
1.4
13.3
16.5
9.5
15.8
15.4
16.1
21.4
9.3
35.3
5.6
7.6
15.7
7.2
5.7
14.1
6.9
4.8
7.2
12.0
7.3
8.0
44.1
40.2
41.0
38.5

-2.4
2.6
1.5
1.0

2.1
0.4
2.4
2.5
0.3

2020

343069
217834
63.5
158372
84544
73828
72.7
38.7
84.9
63.8
73.0
69.9
77.8
41.1
90.5
70.0
67.7
36.1
79.4
57.9
66.9
32.0
78.6
60.2
45.7
69.7
82.8
67.7
60.3
71.8
33.9
84.1
66.0
62.0
29.9
73.0
54.6
145703.4
-1.5
-1.7
-1.8
-1.7
13.2
16.3
9.6
14.3
13.7
14.8
21.3
9.4
35.1
5.3
8.0
17.4
7.5
5.6
14.2
7.4
5.4
7.3
13.8
7.7
8.3
38.0
39.2
40.0
37.6

-2.2
0.9
-2.7
-2.1

-0.6
-2.3
2.6
3.3
-4.7

2021

343145
216612
63.1
159693
84868
74825
73.7
40.8
85.8
64.9
74.1
70.7
78.5
43.1
90.9
70.8
69.0
38.3
80.6
59.2
67.9
33.9
79.6
61.0
45.8
70.7
83.9
68.8
61.5
72.6
35.9
84.8
66.7
63.3
31.9
74.4
55.6
147180.5
1.3
1.0
0.6
1.5
12.9
16.0
9.2
15.3
14.6
16.0
20.9
9.2
34.3
4.9
7.7
16.8
7.2
6.0
14.0
7.3
5.2
7.2
13.0
7.4
8.1
41.1
39.2
40.0
37.6

0.0
3.2
1.4
-0.4

3.9
2.0
1.0
1.0
3.9

2020-2021
0.0 %
-0.6 %
-0.4 pps
0.8 %
0.4 %
1.4 %
1.0 pps
2.1 pps
0.8 pps
1.1 pps
1.1 pps
0.8 pps
0.7 pps
2.0 pps
0.4 pps
0.9 pps
1.3 pps
2.2 pps
1.3 pps
1.2 pps
1.1 pps
2.0 pps
1.0 pps
0.8 pps
0.2 pps
1.0 pps
1.1 pps
1.0 pps
1.2 pps
0.8 pps
2.0 pps
0.6 pps
0.6 pps
1.3 pps
2.0 pps
1.4 pps
0.9 pps
1.0 %
2.8 pps
2.7 pps
2.4 pps
3.1 pps
-0.3 pps
-0.2 pps
-0.3 pps
1.0 pps
0.9 pps
1.2 pps
-0.4 pps
-0.2 pps
-0.8 pps
-0.4 pps
-0.3 pps
-0.6 pps
-0.3 pps
0.4 pps
-0.2 pps
-0.1 pps
-0.2 pps
-0.1 pps
-0.8 pps
-0.3 pps
-0.2 pps
3.1 pps
0.0 %
0.0 %
0.0 %

2.2 pps
2.3 pps
4.1 pps
1.7 pps

4.5 pps
4.3 pps
-1.6 pps
-2.3 pps
8.6 pps

147 

  
European Commission 

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2022 

European Union (27 countries)
- Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)
- Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)

1
2

3

- Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.)

4

- Activity rate (% of population 15-64)

5

-

 Employment rate (% of population 15-64)

(% of total population)

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-54)

Older (55-64)

6
7

8

9

- Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.)
- Employment growth (%, National accounts)

Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)

- Self employed (15-64, % of total employment )

Male

Female

Male

Female

- Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment)

10

- Part-time (15-64, % of total employment )

11
12

Involuntary part-time (15-64, % of total employment)

- Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Young (15-24)

Prime age (25-49)

Older (55-64)

Low-skilled (15-64)

Medium-skilled (15-64)

High-skilled (15-64)

Nationals (15-64)

Non-nationals (15-64)

Male

Female

13
14

- Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment)
- Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours)

15

- Sectoral employment growth (% change)

Male

Female

Agriculture

Building and construction

Services

Manufacturing industry

16

-

Indicator board on wage developments (% change)

Compensation per employee

Real compensation per employee based on GDP

Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)

Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)

Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

445996
286511
64.2
208331
112222
96109
72.7
39.1
85.5
59.8
72.9
70.4
78.3
41.7
91.5
67.2
67.1
36.3
79.6
52.8
66.7
32.0
79.0
56.1
43.9
70.4
83.8
67.3
60.5
72.1
34.0
84.9
62.9
61.3
29.9
73.1
49.7
191088
1.6
1.4
1.4
1.4
13.7
17.1
9.6
15.7
15.2
16.3
18.5
8.5
30.2
5.4
8.3
18.0
7.6
6.2
16.2
7.3
4.9
7.8
14.1
8.0
8.6
46.8
39.7
41.3
38.8

-0.2
1.5
2.2
1.6

2.2
0.9
2.5
2.6
1.2

446839
285462
63.9
208577
112267
96310
73.1
39.1
85.7
61.2
73.2
71.3
78.7
41.9
91.5
68.6
67.5
36.2
79.9
54.2
67.7
32.8
79.9
57.8
44.7
71.3
84.3
68.2
62.1
73.0
35.0
85.7
64.7
62.3
30.5
74.0
51.3
193137
1.5
1.1
1.0
1.2
13.5
16.8
9.5
15.5
15.0
16.2
18.3
8.3
29.9
5.0
7.4
16.1
6.8
5.5
14.6
6.5
4.5
6.9
13.0
7.1
7.7
45.0
39.5
41.2
38.7

-1.7
2.6
1.9
1.5

2.4
1.0
2.9
2.9
0.6

447849
284908
63.6
209114
112398
96716
73.4
39.3
85.9
62.3
73.6
71.8
78.9
42.1
91.6
69.6
67.9
36.3
80.2
55.4
68.4
33.4
80.5
59.1
45.2
71.7
84.7
68.9
63.1
73.7
35.7
86.3
66.0
63.0
31.0
74.7
52.6
194841
1.1
0.9
0.8
1.0
13.4
16.7
9.5
15.0
14.5
15.5
18.3
8.4
29.9
4.7
6.8
15.1
6.3
5.1
13.6
6.0
4.3
6.3
12.1
6.5
7.2
42.0
39.4
41.1
38.7

-3.3
3.1
1.5
0.5

2.4
0.7
2.8
2.9
0.7

448308
284123
63.4
206665
111154
95511
72.7
37.8
85.2
62.9
73.0
70.3
78.2
40.5
91.0
69.9
67.3
34.8
79.4
56.2
67.5
31.4
79.6
59.6
44.0
70.3
83.8
68.2
60.5
72.8
33.7
85.3
66.3
62.2
29.0
73.8
53.4
191757
-1.4
-1.6
-1.5
-1.6
13.4
16.7
9.5
13.5
12.9
14.2
18.2
8.4
29.6
4.5
7.2
16.8
6.6
5.2
13.9
6.5
4.8
6.6
13.9
7.0
7.6
35.8
38.7
40.1
37.9

-1.5
1.1
-2.5
-2.7

-0.3
-2.0
2.7
3.5
-4.3

447964
282224
63.0
207788
111192
96596
73.6
39.3
86.0
64.0
73.9
71.1
78.7
42.0
91.2
70.8
68.5
36.4
80.6
57.5
68.4
32.7
80.4
60.5
43.9
71.0
84.9
69.0
61.8
73.3
35.0
85.7
67.0
63.4
30.3
75.1
54.3
192962
1.3
0.6
0.1
1.2
13.0
16.3
9.2
14.0
13.3
14.8
17.7
8.1
28.8
4.1
7.0
16.6
6.4
5.5
14.1
6.5
4.6
6.6
13.1
6.7
7.4
39.5
38.8
40.2
38.1

-1.4
3.0
1.6
-0.3

4.1
1.7
1.5
1.5
3.9

2020-2021
-0.1 %
-0.7 %
-0.4 pps
0.5 %
0.0 %
1.1 %
0.9 pps
1.5 pps
0.7 pps
1.1 pps
0.9 pps
0.8 pps
0.5 pps
1.4 pps
0.2 pps
1.0 pps
1.2 pps
1.6 pps
1.2 pps
1.3 pps
0.9 pps
1.3 pps
0.8 pps
0.9 pps
-0.1 pps
0.7 pps
1.2 pps
0.8 pps
1.3 pps
0.6 pps
1.3 pps
0.4 pps
0.7 pps
1.2 pps
1.3 pps
1.3 pps
1.0 pps
0.6 %
2.7 pps
2.2 pps
1.7 pps
2.8 pps
-0.4 pps
-0.4 pps
-0.3 pps
0.5 pps
0.4 pps
0.6 pps
-0.5 pps
-0.3 pps
-0.8 pps
-0.3 pps
-0.2 pps
-0.2 pps
-0.2 pps
0.3 pps
0.2 pps
0.0 pps
-0.2 pps
0.0 pps
-0.8 pps
-0.3 pps
-0.2 pps
3.7 pps
0.3 %
0.2 %
0.5 %

0.1 pps
1.9 pps
4.1 pps
2.4 pps

4.4 pps
3.7 pps
-1.2 pps
-2.0 pps
8.2 pps

148 

  
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