Opinion of the European Central Bank of 28 November 2022 on amendments to the Law on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (CON/2022/40)
Date: 2022-11-28
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: legal basis

EN 

ECB-PUBLIC 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 28 November 2022 

on amendments to the Law on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank  

(CON/2022/40) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On 7 October 2022, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Hungarian Ministry of 

Finance for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank 1. On 17 November 

2022 the ECB received from the Ministry of Finance an updated version of the draft law (hereinafter the 

‘draft law’).  

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 

Functioning of the European Union and the second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth indents of Article 2(1) of 

Council  Decision  98/415/EC2,  as  the  draft  law  concerns  means  of  payment,  the  Magyar  Nemzeti  Bank 

(MNB),  the  collection  of  statistics,  payment  and  settlement  systems,  and  rules  applicable  to  financial 

institutions  insofar  as  they  materially  influence  the  stability  of  financial  institutions  and  markets.  In 

accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, 

the Governing Council has adopted this opinion. 

1. 

Purpose of the draft law 

1.1.  The main purpose of the draft law is to modify certain provisions of the Law on the MNB. 

Cash infrastructure network 

1.2.  The draft law3 proposes to extend the regulatory and administrative responsibilities of the MNB to 

require  it  to  rate  the  infrastructure  network  of  credit  institutions  and  post  offices  used  to  carry  out  cash 

transactions-flows  in  accordance  with  the  regularity  and  criteria  to  be  set  out  in  a  Decree  of  the  MNB 

Governor governing the conditions for cash distribution. The MNB shall, on the basis of this rating, require 

credit  institutions  and  post  offices  to  establish  an  infrastructure  network  that  meets  the  requirements 

assigned to the rating.  

1.3.  According to the detailed justification accompanying the draft law, these new powers are created for 

the MNB in order to the requirement that, in the development, maintenance and operation of the Hungarian 

cash infrastructure network, considerations of the security of supply and the optimisation of the network at 

1 A Magyar Nemzeti Bankról szóló 2013. évi CXXXIX. törvény. 
2  Council  Decision  98/415/EC  of  29 June  1998  on  the  consultation  of  the  European  Central  Bank  by  national  authorities 
regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 
3 See paragraphs 3 and 10 of the draft law (introducing new Articles 23A and 45(d) of the Law on the MNB). 

 
 
 
 
 
 
the level of society as a whole must be applied, in addition to the aspects of commercial policy of operators 

ECB-PUBLIC 

of the network.  

Statistics 

1.4. 

In accordance with the existing provisions of the Law on the MNB4, the MNB operates a central bank 

information system in order to perform the MNB’s tasks, including the compilation of statistics. In this context 

the draft law5 provides that the MNB shall process in the central bank information system the personal data 

essential for the performance of the MNB’s monetary policy, payment and securities settlement system and 

supervisory tasks and that are necessary for the assessment of creditworthiness, the identification of credit 

risks, related to assets used as security and deposits held with a credit institution or the Treasury, and for 

the purpose of exercising ongoing supervision, with the proviso that the reporting of supervisory data may 

not  relate  to  the  natural  identity  data,  special  data,  identification  code  or  identification  document  of  the 

person concerned.  

1.5. 

In order to carry out its tasks to collect and publish statistical information in order to fulfil the MNB’s 

statistical reporting obligations towards the  ECB  under Article of the Statute of the European System of 

Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’) 6, the draft law7 

provides that the MNB shall operate a statistical system as part of the central bank information system, for 

which it may receive from a member of the Official Statistical Service, in a manner that is uniquely identified, 

personal data necessary for assessing creditworthiness, identifying credit risks, and related to assets used 

as security and deposits held with a credit institution or the Treasury, excluding the data subject’s natural 

identity data, special data, identification code or identification document.  

1.6.  The draft law8 provides that in the case of data provision and receipt of personal data, the MNB shall, 

by  means  of  pseudonymisation,  separate  the  data  enabling  the  identification  of  the  natural  person 

concerned  from  other  data  relating  to  the  data  subject,  and  shall  provide  the  data  so  separated  with  a 

technical  identifier  protected  in  accordance  with  specified  security  measures,  without  which  the  link 

between the data provided or received and the natural person concerned can no longer be restored, except 

by the MNB on a temporary basis for the purpose of achieving the MNB’s tasks as set out above and for 

the necessary period.  

Macroprudential policy 

1.7.  Under  the  existing  provisions  of  the  Law  on  the  MNB9,  the  MNB  Governor  may  issue  a  decree 

pursuant to a decision of the Hungarian Financial Stability Council specifying measures required to reduce 

the risk of excessive outflows of credit. In such decree the Governor shall establish rules that relate to, inter 

alia,  contracts  concluded  with  natural  persons  in  Hungary  in  the  course  of  credit  and  money  lending 

activities and govern the maximum coverage ratio for real estate loans, vehicle financing loans and financial 

4 See Article 30(1) of the Law on the MNB. 
5 See paragraph 6 of the draft law (introducing a new Article 30(2) of the Law on the MNB). 
6 See Article 4(6) of the Law on the MNB. 
7 See paragraph 6 of the draft law (introducing a new Article 30(2a) of the Law on the MNB). 
8 See paragraph 6 of the draft law (introducing a new Article 30(2d) of the Law on the MNB). 
9 Article 32(1) and (2) of the Law on the MNB. 

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leasing transactions, and the maximum debt-to-income ratio.  

1.8.  The draft law10 proposes to extend the MNB Governor’s regulatory power with regard to contracts 

concluded with natural persons in the framework of credit and money lending and financial leasing activities 

in Hungary to include the following macroprudential tools: (a) a maximum instalment amount in proportion 

to income; and (b) a maximum permitted loan or lease-related debt amount as a proportion of income. 

1.9.  As noted in the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law, it is appropriate to introduce 

debt-to-income  limits  also  in  line  with  the  proposal  for  legal  harmonisation  and  principles  set  out  in  the 

European Systemic Risk Board’s Recommendation on intermediate objectives and instruments of macro-

prudential policy 11.  

Oversight and supervision of financial market infrastructures 

1.10.  Under the existing provisions of the Law on the MNB, the MNB shall oversee payment and securities 

settlement systems, including overseeing the operations of the system and of the organisation performing 

the activity of a central counterparty, in order to ensure the sound and efficient functioning of these systems 

and the smooth circulation of cash12. Furthermore, under the Law on the MNB, the MNB shall supervise 

the  financial  intermediary  system13.  The  Law  on  the  MNB  further  specifies14  the  MNB  shall  implement 

Regulation (EC) No 924/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council 15 (on cross-border payments 

in  the  Union)  and  Regulation  (EU)  No  260/2012  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council16  (on 

establishing technical and business requirements for credit transfers and direct debits in euro), and carry 

out  the  functions  and,  as  the  designated  national  competent  authority,  perform  tasks  relating  to  the 

implementation of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council 17 (on OTC 

derivatives,  central  counterparties  and  trade  repositories)  and  Regulation  (EU)  No  909/2014  of  the 

European Parliament and of the Council  18 (on central securities depositories).    

1.11.  The draft law 19 introduces a technical modification to these provisions whereby the specific duties 

and functions relating to the implementation of the aforementioned EU regulations are set out within the 

framework of the MNB’s supervisory duties only, and no longer within the additional framework of the MNB’s 

oversight duties.  

10 See paragraph 7 of the draft law (introducing a new Article 32(2)(a) of the Law on the MNB). 
11  Recommendation  ESRB/2013/1  of  the  European  Systemic  Risk  Board  of  4  April  2013  on  intermediate  objectives  and 
instruments of macro-prudential policy (OJ C 170, 15.6.2013, p. 1). 
12 See Article 4(5) of the Law on the MNB. 
13 See Article 4(9) of the Law on the MNB. 
14 See Articles 28(4), 28/A, 29, 40(4), 40(8) and 40(16) of the Law on the MNB. 
15  Regulation  (EC)  No  924/2009  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  16  September  2009  on  cross-border 
payments in the Community and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2560/2001 (OJ L 266, 9.10.2009, p. 11).  
16 Regulation (EU) No 260/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 establishing technical and 
business requirements for credit transfers and direct debits in euro and amending Regulation (EC) No 924/2009 (OJ L 94, 
30.3.2012, p. 22).  
17 Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central 
counterparties and trade repositories (OJ L 201, 27.7.2012, p. 1). 
18  Regulation  (EU)  No  909/2014  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  23  July  2014  on  improving  securities 
settlement in the European Union and on central securities depositories and amending Directives 98/26/EC and 2014/65/EU 
and Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 (OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p.1). 
19 See paragraphs 8(1) to (3) and (4) (introducing new Articles 40(4), 40(8), 40(16) and 40(39) of the Law on the MNB) and 
30(b) to (d) of the draft law (repealing Articles 28(4), 28/A and 29 of the Law on the MNB). 

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Remuneration of the MNB Governor, Deputy Governor, members of the Monetary Council and members 

of the Supervisory Board 

1.12.  Under the existing provisions of the Law on the MNB, the monthly remuneration of the MNB Governor 

is  5  million  forints,  and  the  remuneration  or  honorarium  of  the  Deputy  Governor,  the  Chairman  of  the 

Supervisory Board, and the members of the Monetary Council and the Supervisory Board is 90%, 70% and 

60%, respectively, of the MNB Governor’s monthly remuneration20. The draft law21 amends those existing 

provisions regarding the MNB Governor by providing that the MBN Governor’s monthly basic salary shall 

be equal to the monthly salary of the Chairman of the State Audit Office, resulting in a reference value that 

would be twelve times the national monthly average gross salary for the year preceding the given year, as 

officially published by the Central Statistical Office22. 

Miscellaneous provisions 

1.13.   The  draft  law23  contains  miscellaneous  provisions  that  include  amendments  concerning:  (a)  the 

administrative  procedures  of  the  MNB;  (b)  the  performance  of  the  MNB’s  supervisory  tasks;  (c)  the 

enforcement  of  fines  and  procedural  costs;  (d)  the  extension  of  the  time  limit  (from  15  to  30  days)  for 

opening  market  surveillance  procedures  related  to  the  EU  short-selling  regulation;  (e)  changes  to  the 

deadline for, and the content of, the notification related to the opening of a market surveillance procedure; 

and (f) commemorative and collectors’ coins.   

2. 

Remuneration of the MNB Governor, Deputy Governor, and members of the Monetary Council 

2.1.  The ECB would like to emphasise that, although Member States with a derogation – such as Hungary 

– do not yet participate in the third stage of economic and monetary union, they have a legal duty to adapt 

the statutes of their national central banks (NCBs) to ensure compatibility with the Treaty24 and the Statute 

of the ESCB. Any legislative reform in non-participating Member States should aim to gradually achieve 

consistency with Eurosystem standards 25. 

2.2.  Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB expressly prohibit the ECB, the 

NCBs, and the members of their decision-making bodies from seeking or taking instructions from Union 

institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body, 

on the one hand, and prohibits those Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies and any government of 

a Member State from seeking to influence the members of the decision-making bodies of the ECB and the 

NCBs  in  the  performance  of  their  tasks,  on  the  other.  The  intention  of  these  provisions  is  to  shield  the 

European  System of Central Banks (ESCB) from all  political pressure in order to enable  it effectively to 

20 See Article 149 of the Law on the MNB. 
21 See paragraph 21 of the draft law (introducing a new Article 149(1) of the Law on the MNB). 
22 See Article 20 of the Act LXVI of 2011 on the State Audit Office (az Állami Számvevőszékről szóló 2011. évi LXVI. törvény).  
23 See paragraphs 1, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 25 and 26 of the draft law (introducing new Article [86/A(5), 90(6), 91(5)] of the 
Law on the MNB). 
24  See Article 131 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
25  See,  e.g.,  paragraph  3.4  of  Opinion  CON/2008/34  and  paragraph  2.1  of  Opinion  CON/2017/17.  All  ECB  opinions  are 
published on EUR-Lex. 

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pursue  the  objectives  ascribed  to  its  tasks,  through  the  independent  exercise  of  the  specific  powers 

conferred on it for that purpose by primary law 26. National rules therefore cannot, without infringing Article 

130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB, place the NCB concerned in a situation where it 

is  potentially  exposed  to  political  pressure  or  which  in  any  way  undermines  its  ability  to  carry  out 

independently a task falling within the scope of the ESCB27.  

2.3.  With this in mind, the ECB observes that the Member States may not amend legislation affecting the 

remuneration of the members of the NCBs’ decision-making bodies with the purpose of seeking to influence 

them. The ECB understands that the impact of the draft law on the actual remuneration of the Governor, 

the Deputy Governor, and the members of the Monetary Council will be limited. Against this background, 

and as previously noted by the ECB to other Member States 28, the ECB invites the legislator to consider 

applying  the  new  provisions  on  the  determination  of  such  renumeration  only  to  Governors,  Deputy 

Governors, and members of the Monetary Council who are appointed after the entry into force of the draft 

law. 

3. 

Cash infrastructure network 

3.1. 

The ECB understands that there is growing concern regarding access to cash in Hungary as cash 

in  circulation  continues  to  grow  and  cash  demand  remains  robust  while  the  credit  institutions’  cash 

infrastructure  has  not  been  adapting  to  this  evolution.  Cash  is  a  well-established  means  of  payment 

providing for immediate settlement of debts and direct control over the payer’s spending. Furthermore, the 

ability to pay in cash remains particularly important for certain groups in society that, for various legitimate 

reasons,  prefer  to  use  cash  rather  than  other  means  of  payment,  or  who  are  unable  to  use  digital 

technology. Additionally, cash payments facilitate the inclusion of the entire population in the economy by 

allowing it to settle any kind of financial transaction in this way. The ECB notes that cash could play an 

important role in the event of a contingency or crisis29. 

3.2. 

Notwithstanding that the ECB holds a positive view of further innovation and development in the 

field of electronic payment instruments 30, it also welcomes the core objectives of the draft law, namely to 

facilitate the continuity and security of cash supply and accessibility to Hungarian society by ensuring an 

adequate level of access to cash services throughout Hungary31. The ECB also welcomes that the MNB 

will  be  empowered  to  assess  and  rate  the  adequacy  of  the  cash  infrastructure  and  to  require  credit 

institutions  and  postal  offices  to  take  measures  in  case  of  insufficient  geographical  coverage  of  cash 

services to the general public.  

26  See, e.g., judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 February 2019, Rimšēvičs and ECB v Latvia, Joined Cases C-202/18 
and C-238/18, EU:C:2019:139, paragraph 47. 
27 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 13 September 2022, Banka Slovenije, Case C-45/21, EU:C:2022:670, paragraphs 97 
and 104. 
28 See paragraph 3.5.2. of Opinion CON/2021/9. 
29 See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2019/41; paragraph 2.3 of Opinion CON/2020/21. 
30 See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2019/41. 
31 See paragraph 2.4 of Opinion CON/2020/21. 

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3.3. 

The ECB considers it important that all Member States, including non-euro area Member States, 

take appropriate measures to ensure that credit institutions and branches operating within their territories 

provide adequate access to cash services, in order to facilitate the continued use of cash 32. 

3.4. 

Finally, the  ECB would  welcome  a clarification regarding the possibilities for  interventions and 

sanctions  that the home supervisory authority would  have  if a branch of a foreign  EEA credit  institution 

were in breach of the draft law33. 

4. 

Statistics 

4.1. 

Assisted by the NCBs, the ECB has the right to collect statistical information within the limits of 

the  reference  reporting  population  and  of  what  is  necessary  to  carry  out  the  tasks  of  the  ESCB.  This 

reference reporting population may comprise natural persons as reporting agents, provided that the other 

relevant conditions which define the relevant reporting population are met. Thus, it is envisaged that the 

ECB and NCBs may in certain circumstances collect personal data directly from natural persons, based on 

the  relevant  provisions  of  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  2533/9834,  which  applies  without  prejudice  to 

Regulation (EU) 2016/678 of the European Parliament and of the Council35 (hereinafter the ‘General Data 

Protection Regulation’ or ‘GDPR’) and the equivalent legal act that applies to the EU institutions 36.  

4.2. 

Against  this  background,  the  draft  law  should  not  apply  in  a  manner  that  is  prejudicial  to  the 

GDPR. The question of whether the Law on the MNB is prejudicial to the GDPR falls within the jurisdiction 

of the relevant competent authorities.  

4.3. 

The Law on the MNB must ensure that when these data fall under the scope of both statistical 

confidentiality and personal data protection rules, the authorised users of such data fulfil their respective 

obligations as recipients of personal data and as recipients of confidential statistical information in relation 

to the applicable security rules that are in place at national and/or Union level.  

5. 

Macroprudential policy 

5.1.  As a national macroprudential authority, the MNB has conferred on it macroprudential tasks in order 

to maintain the stability of the banking system. The draft law does not confer new tasks on the MNB in this 

field, but rather specifies certain new macroprudential tools that the MNB may use when discharging its 

macroprudential responsibilities37. 

5.2.  From  a  financial  stability  perspective,  the  ECB  welcomes  and  supports  the  extension  of  the 

macroprudential toolkit of the MNB, as  it is  aimed at  promoting responsible  borrowing and  lending, and 

increasing the transparency of credit institutions’ activities, thus safeguarding the stability of the financial 

system as a whole by strengthening its resilience and preventing and mitigating systemic risks. 

32 See paragraph 2.3 of Opinion CON/2019/41; paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2020/21. 
33 See paragraph 2.4 of Opinion CON/2019/41. 
34  See  Article  2  of  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  2533/98  of  23  November  1998  concerning  the  collection  of  statistical 
information by the European Central Bank (OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 8). 
35 Regulation (EU) 2016/678 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons  with  regard  to  the  processing  of  personal  data  and  on  the  free  movement  of  such  data  and  repealing  Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1). 
36 See Article 8c of the Regulation (EC) No 2533/98.  
37  See paragraph 9.2.1 of Opinion CON/2021/9. 

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5.3.  The draft law establishes a legal basis for imposing maximum limits on the amount of loan or lease 

debt as a proportion of income. The introduction of borrower-based measures is in line with the principles 

set  out  in  the  European  Systemic  Risk  Board’s  Recommendation  on  intermediate  objectives  and 

instruments  of  macro-prudential  policy  –  in  particular  with  regard  to  the  objectives  of  mitigating  and 

preventing excessive credit growth and leverage – as it should contribute to strengthening credit institutions’ 

lending practices, whilst also ensuring consistency in assessment of borrowers’ creditworthiness. The ECB 

highlights the need for constant monitoring and updating of relevant limits, and recommends that they be 

subjected to a thorough assessment of their appropriateness, as well as to a regular review to take account 

of changes in macroeconomic and financial conditions. 

6. 

Oversight and supervision of financial market infrastructures 

The ECB welcomes the draft law’s technical clarification regarding the distinction between the oversight 

and supervision responsibilities of the MNB as regards Union legislation relating to credit and debit transfers 

in euro, central counterparties and central securities depositories.  

This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.  

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 28 November 2022. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Christine LAGARDE 

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