COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on import, export and transit measures for firearms, their essential components and ammunition, implementing Article 10 of the United Nations' Protocol against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UN Firearms Protocol) (recast)
Date: 2022-10-27
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: UN convention, arms trade, export licence, fight against crime, firearms and munitions, illicit trade, import licence, non-proliferation of arms, protocol to an agreement, transit

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 27.10.2022  SWD(2022) 298 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT  IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT  Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on import, export and transit measures for firearms, their essential components and ammunition, implementing Article 10 of the United Nations' Protocol against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UN Firearms Protocol) (recast) {COM(2022) 480 final} - {SEC(2022) 330 final} - {SWD(2022) 299 final}  
 
 
Table of contents 

1. 

2. 

INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT ............................................................... 5 

PROBLEM DEFINITION .................................................................................................................... 6 

2.1    Problem I: Lack of data ......................................................................................................................... 8 
2.2    Problem II: firearms trafficking into and from the EU .......................................................................... 9 
2.3    Problem III: administrative burden for the legal movement of civilian firearms ................................. 19 

3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? ........................................................................................................ 22 

3.1     Legal basis .......................................................................................................................................... 22 
3.2     Subsidiarity: Necessity and added value of EU action ....................................................................... 23 

4.  OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? ............................................................................... 23 

4.1      General objectives ............................................................................................................................. 23 
4.2      Specific objectives ............................................................................................................................. 24 

5.  WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? .................................................................... 27 

5.1.  WHAT IS THE BASELINE FROM WHICH OPTIONS ARE ASSESSED? .................................... 27 

5.2.  DESCRIPTION OF THE POLICY OPTIONS ................................................................................... 29 

5.2.1. OPTION 1: SOFT-LAW APPROACH ............................................................................................... 29 

5.2.2. OPTION 2: CLARIFICATION OF THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK ................................ 31 

5.2.3. OPTION 3: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS ............................................................................. 33 

5.2.4. OPTION 3 BIS: NEW PROVISIONS WITHOUT CHANGE TO THE INTERPLAY WITH 

THE COMMON POSITION .............................................................................................................. 37 

5.3.  ELEMENTS DISCARDED AT AN EARLY STAGE ....................................................................... 37 

6.  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? ........................................................... 38 

6.1.  METHODOLOGY .............................................................................................................................. 38 

6.2.  SOCIAL IMPACTS ............................................................................................................................ 39 

6.2.1. IMPACTS ON CITIZENS .................................................................................................................. 39 

6.2.2. SECURITY IMPACTS ....................................................................................................................... 39 

6.3.  IMPACT ON DIGITALISATION ...................................................................................................... 40 

6.4.  ECONOMIC IMPACT ....................................................................................................................... 41 

6.4.1. IMPACTS ON THE OVERALL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY .............................................................. 41 

6.4.2. IMPACT ON SMES AND COMPETITIVENESS ............................................................................. 41 

6.4.3. IMPACTS ON NATIONAL AND EU ADMINISTRATIONS .......................................................... 42 

6.5.  IMPACT ON THE ENVIRONMENT ................................................................................................ 42 

6.6.  IMPACT ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ........................................................................................ 43 

7.  HOW DO OPTIONS COMPARE? ..................................................................................................... 44 

7.1.  NECESSITY / ADDED VALUE ........................................................................................................ 53 

7.2.  EFFECTIVENESS .............................................................................................................................. 54 

7.3.  PROPORTIONALITY / EFFICIENCY .............................................................................................. 56 

7.4.  COHERENCE ..................................................................................................................................... 59 

1 

 
 
7.5.  FEASABILITY ................................................................................................................................... 60 

7.6.  ECONOMIC IMPACT ....................................................................................................................... 62 

8. 

PREFERRED OPTION ...................................................................................................................... 63 

8.1.  OPTION 3: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS ............................................................................. 63 

8.2.  REFIT (SIMPLIFICATION AND IMPROVED EFFICIENCY) ....................................................... 64 

8.3.  APPLICATION OF THE ‘ONE IN, ONE OUT’ APPROACH ......................................................... 65 

9.  HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? .................................. 66 

ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ............................................................................................ 69 

1 

2 

3 

4 

LEAD DG, DECIDE PLANNING/CWP REFERENCES .................................................................. 69 

ORGANISATION AND TIMING ...................................................................................................... 69 

CONSULTATION OF THE RSB....................................................................................................... 69 

EVIDENCE, SOURCES AND QUALITY ......................................................................................... 69 

ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION (SYNOPSIS REPORT) ................................................ 71 

1. 

CONSULTATION STRATEGY ........................................................................................................ 71 

1.1.  Mapping of stakeholders ......................................................................................................... 71 
1.2.  Methods and forms of consultation ......................................................................................... 71 

2. 

CONSULTATION ACTIVITIES ....................................................................................................... 72 

The Inception Impact Assessment ........................................................................................... 72 
2.1. 
2.2. 
The public consultation ........................................................................................................... 74 
2.3.  Data collection......................................................................................................................... 76 
2.4.  Confidential survey ................................................................................................................. 76 
2.5.  Meetings .................................................................................................................................. 78 

ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW? .......................................................................................... 84 

1. 

2. 

3. 

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE INITIATIVE..................................................................... 84 

SUMMARY OF COSTS AND BENEFITS ....................................................................................... 98 

RELEVANT SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS ............................................................. 101 

ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL METHODS ................................................................................................... 102 

ANNEX 5: CASE STUDIES ...................................................................................................................... 121 

ANNEX 6: TRACEABILITY CHECK-LIST ............................................................................................ 129 

ANNEX 7: PUBLIC CONSULTATION AND CONFIDENTIAL CONSULTATION ............................ 133 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
Glossary 

Term or acronym 

Meaning or definition 

AEO 

CN 

COARM 

CRMS 

DUeS 

ECRIS 

Authorised Economic Operator 

Combined  Nomenclature:  EU  customs  classification  of 
goods 

Council Working Group on Conventional Arms Exports 
/ Conventional arms export control information system 

EU Common Risk Management System 

Dual-Use electronic System: the EU electronic system to 
exchange 
to  grant  export 
authorisations for dual-use goods 

information  on  refusals 

European  Criminal  Record 
System 

Information  exchange 

EU CSW-CERTEX 

EU  Customs  Single  Window  Certificates  Exchange 
System 

HS 

ICS 

SIENA 

SIS 

Surveillance 

Harmonised  System:  customs  classification  of  goods  of 
the World Customs Organisation 

Import Control System 

Secure Information Exchange Network Application 

Schengen Information System 

TARIC 

TARif Intégré Communautaire: the EU Customs Tariff 

3 

 
 
 
 
UNODC 

WCO 

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 

World Customs Organisation 

4 

 
 
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT 

Regulation  (EU)  No 258/2012  establishing  export  authorisation,  and  import  and  transit 
measures for firearms, their parts and components and ammunition was adopted to enable 
the ratification by the EU of the United Nations Protocol on the illicit manufacturing of 
and trafficking in firearms, their parts, components and ammunition.1 It is part of the EU 
international responsibility to properly regulate the trade of firearms in order to prevent 
trafficking of firearms. 

Regulation  (EU)  No 258/2012  implements  article  10  of  the  United  Nations  Protocol 
which  provides  for  general  requirements  for  export,  import  and  transit  licensing  or 
to  grant  export 
authorisation  systems.  The  Regulation  makes 
authorisations only if the countries of transit or destination authorized the import. It lists 
out  the  information  required  for  the  tracing  of  firearms,  establishing  simplified  export 
procedures  (notably  with  no  prior  authorisation  for  hunters  or  sport  shooters  with  a 
European  Firearms  Pass  and  the  possibility  for  Member  States  to  establish  additional 
simplifications). The Regulation also provides that authorisations should not be granted 
to  those who have a criminal  record and provides for  compulsory  mutual  exchanges of 
information  between  national  authorities  about  exporters  whose  application  for  an 
authorisation is refused.  

it  compulsory 

The  Regulation  does  not  apply  to  military  firearms  (such  as  assault  rifles),  to  weapons 
which were prohibited inside the EU when the Regulation was adopted, or to deactivated 
firearms. With respect to firearms which are “specially designed for military use”, export 
controls  are  subject  to  the  2008  Council  Common  Position  on  exports  of  military 
technology  and  equipment.2  This  Decision  applies  to  items  mentioned  in  the  EU 
Common Military List.3 

The Regulation complements for imports and exports the intra-EU rules of the Firearms 
Directive.4  While  the  Directive  was  revised  in  2017  (and  consolidated  in  a  new  legal 
instrument  in  2021),5  the  revision  of  the  Regulation  was  announced  in  the  EU  Action 

1  

2  

3  
4  

5  

by  Council  Decision  2014/164/EU  of  11  February  2014  on  the  conclusion,  on  behalf  of  the 
European  Union,  of  the  Protocol  against  the  Illicit  Manufacturing  of  and  Trafficking  in  Firearms, 
Their  Parts  and  Components  and  Ammunition,  supplementing  the  United  Nations  Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime (OJ L 89, 25.3.2014, p. 7). The Protocol against the Illicit 
Manufacturing  of  and  Trafficking  in  Firearms,  their  Parts  and  Components  and  Ammunition  was 
adopted by resolution 55/255 of 31 May 2001 at the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly of 
the United Nations and it entered into force on 3 July 2005. 
Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing 
control of exports of military technology and equipment 
Common Military List of the European Union; ST/5802/2019/INIT; OJ C 95, 12.3.2019 
Directive  2008/51/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  21 May  2008  amending 
Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons, OJ L 179, 
8.7.2008. 
Directive  (EU)  2021/555  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  24 March  2021  on 
control of the acquisition and possession of weapons, OJ L 115, 6.4.2021. 

5 

 
 
 
                                                 
Plan  against  firearms  trafficking  2020-2025.6  This  revision  was  included  in  the 
Commission Work Programme 2021 annex II. 

The  evaluation  report  of  the  application  of  Regulation (EU)  No  258/20127  identified 
loopholes  due  to  a  lack  of  homogeneous  implementation.  In  particular,  the  evaluation 
stressed  that  the  Regulation’s  added  value  was  limited  by  the  absence  of  a  genuine 
harmonisation  of  national  rules  and  processes.  The  Regulation  was  ineffective  in 
distinguishing between military and civilian firearms, in ensuring the full traceability of 
weapons, and in ensuring proper exchanges of information (notably of refusals to grant 
export  authorisations).  The  Regulation  was  also  inefficient  in  terms  of  reduction  of 
administrative  costs  for companies.  The  Regulation  was  considered  to  lack  consistency 
with  other  legislation,  notably  the  revised  Firearms  Directive  and  the  EU  Common 
Position on the export of military technologies. 

The  evaluation  was  followed  in  April  2018  by  a  Recommendation  calling  for 
strengthening the implementation of EU rules to improve traceability and the security of 
export and import control procedures of firearms and the cooperation between authorities 
in the fight against firearms trafficking.8 

2.  PROBLEM DEFINITION 

As a general principle, the Regulation seeks to balance the security risk associated with 
the  circumvention  of  export  and  import  rules  of  firearms,  their  components  and 
ammunition  with  the  need  to  protect  both  the  commercial  interests  of  legitimate 
producers and traders and the rights of users who legally acquire firearms for legitimate 
purposes such as hunting or sport shooting.  

This  initiative  focuses  on  the  risks  of  diversion  or  smuggling  and  difficulties  linked  to 
non-commercial  movements  and  transactions  between  civilians.  Risks  and  difficulties 
linked  to  sales  to  the  armed  forces  or  public  authorities,  or  government-to-government 
transactions, are not addressed by this initiative due to their geopolitical specificities and 
relations to the common foreign and security policy. 

Problems 

Problem I:  

Lack of data 

Specific drivers 

Specific objectives 

-  Sensitivity of data 
-  Absence centralised data 
collection at national level 

Objective I 

data 
Systematise 
collection 
about 
international  movements 
of  firearms  for  civilian 
use,  as  well  as  seizure 

6  
7  
8  

COM(2020)608 final, 24.7.2020. 
COM(2017) 737 final, 12.12.2017. 
C(2018) 2197 final, 17.4.2018. 

6 

 
 
                                                 
data 

Objective II 

Improve  controls,  risk 
and 
assessments 
traceability  measures  to 
prevent  smuggling  and 
diversion  of 
firearms 
into and from the EU 

Objective III 

Simplify  procedures  to 
limit  the  administrative 
burden, 
creating 
by 
unified  processes  and 
control mechanisms 

Problem II (security):  

to 

Existing  rules  on  firearms 
are  circumvented  which 
leads 
firearms  being 
smuggled  and  diverted 
into  the  EU.  These  illicit 
firearms  are  a  means  to 
conduct  criminal  offences 
including 
terrorism.  At 
export,  there  is  a  risk  of 
firearms, 
of 
diversion 
which  fuels  global  illicit 
and 
firearms 
instability 
contributes 
and 
crime 
worldwide. 

trafficking 

organised 

to 

- 

- 

- 

lack of exchange of 
information on 
intelligence, seizures, 
transit of firearms, refusals 
to grant export 
authorisations 
lack of control and risk 
assessment to discover 
security problems and 
trends, and to ascertain the 
proper end-use of exported 
firearms 
insufficient cooperation 
between customs and 
licensing authorities to 
check convertible or 
deactivated weapons, to 
prevent diversion and 
check the validity of 
authorisations 

Problem 
concern):  

III 

(market 

to 

operators 
Economic 
continue 
face 
administrative burden in the 
imports  and  exports  of 
civilian firearms  

- 

-  unclear legal framework 
creating inconsistencies, 
differences of interpretation 
by competent authorities 
-  unclear legal framework, 
which leaves room for 
divergent national 
interpretations and rules.  
lack of harmonization 
between Regulation (EU) 
No 258/2012  and other EU 
and national firearms 
legislation 
insufficient cooperation 
between customs and 
licensing authorities 
creating administrative 
burden for legitimate 
producers and traders  

- 

7 

 
 
2.1 Problem I: Lack of data 

2.1.1 What is the problem? 

In  order  to  create  a  consistent  policy  on  firearms  trafficking,  it  is  important  to  have 
precise  data.  Quantifying  the  problem  constitutes  major  limitation,  as  the  absence  of 
accurate, reliable data is itself part of the problem. All studies and research papers in the 
field  of  firearms  point  to  the  impossibility  to  collect  accurate,  comprehensive  and 
comparable data on trafficking of firearms.9 In addition, traffickers of firearms make no 
distinction  between  firearms  initially  sold  to  the  armed  forces  or  firearms  sold  to 
civilians, so that trafficking of firearms extends well beyond civilian firearms only. The 
best estimate available accounts for 35 million illicit firearms owned by civilians in the 
EU in 2017. This would correspond to 56% of the estimated total of firearms10. 

In order to prevent the trafficking of firearms, it is important to keep track of all firearms. 
Therefore, qualitative data is needed on imported firearms. The recommendations issued 
by the Commission on 17 April 2018 requests, among other things, that "by 1st July each 
year, Member States  should  collect  detailed statistics of the preceding  year”. When the 
Commission asked for the data on the number of authorisations, refusals, the quantities 
and  values  of  firearms  exports  and  imports,  by  origin  or  destination,  only  10  Member 
States  sent  data,  and  only  one  Member  State  sent  all  data  asked.  Annex  4  contains  a 
comparison between the data received from the Member States and the available data in 
the  Eurostat  international  trade  database.  The  discrepancies  between  the  two  datasets 
demonstrate the bad quality and unreliability of available statistics. 

Furthermore,  as  there  are  no  technical  specificities  that  enable  to  distinguish  military 
firearms  from  civilian  firearms,  there  is  an  overlap  between  both,  since  some  Member 
States  account  firearms  as  military,  while  others  will  categorise  the  same  weapons  as 
civilian  ones.  Establishing  statistics  of  the  respective  shares  of  military  and  civilian 
firearms markets is therefore impossible.  

2.1.2 What are the problem drivers? 

One of the main problem  drivers is  the  absence of centralised data at  national  level. 
Member  States  have  been  requested  to  send  data  on  import  and  export  of  civilian 
firearms  multiple  times  and  the  2018  recommendations  included  a  provision  on  this 
statistical  data,  with  only  one  Member  State  which  sent  all  requested  data  for  the  year 
2020.  It  is  possible  that  the  lack  of  uptake  of  these  requests  and  the  2018 

9  
See for instance SAFTE study (Studying the acquisition of illicit firearms by terrorists in Europe  
performed  by  the  Flemish  Peace  institute  (https://flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/safte/publications.html)  and  
UNODC  Global  study  on 
protocol/firearms-study.html)] 
10  

(https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/firearms-

trafficking  2020 

firearms 

8 

 
 
 
                                                 
recommendations  is  linked  to  its  non-mandatory  nature.  However,  it  would  have  also 
involved  additional  work  and  a  change  of  administrative  habits.  Authorisations  for 
import and export are not always managed centrally or the data is not stored in a central 
database.  Therefore,  the  lack  of  data  can  result  from  a  weak  administrative  capacity  to 
collect the data.  

Another of the main drivers is the lack of transparency due to the sensitivity of the data. 
Member States are especially reluctant to share data on the export and import of military 
firearms, as  this data is  defence-related. Without  this data, it is  impossible to  know the 
total  amount  of  firearms  in  the  EU.  Furthermore,  as  there  are  no  technical  differences 
between some of the military and civilian firearms, it is difficult to distinguish between 
then to collect the correct data. The Council does gather yearly data on military weapons 
and  publishes  this  in  the  Annual  report  on  Council  Common  Position  2008/944/CFSP. 
However,  this  data  is  fragmented,  incomplete  and  differs  from  one  Member  State  to 
another.  Annex  4  provides  an  estimate  of  the  data.  The  data  in  the  report  does  not 
correspond  to  the  data  on  exports  that  can  be  found  in  the  Eurostat  international  trade 
database.  

Furthermore,  it  has  also  proven  difficult  to  obtain  reliable  and  concrete  data  from  the 
firearms industry. Although several stakeholders  complained on the high administrative 
burden of the current procedures, the industry never provided concrete data. Furthermore, 
data on transactions, size of shipments etc. was considered as sensitive and confidential 
business information.  

Additionally, data on firearms seizures are an important indicator to estimate the scale of 
firearms trafficking. Information on seizures is also important to create targeted policies 
for specific regions and treats. However, the data on seizures is currently fragmented and 
often not accessible for policy makers. Despite an obligation of Member States subject to 
the  Schengen  acquis  to  provide  statistics  of  firearms  seizures  pursuant  to  the  1999 
Decision of the Executive Committee on the illegal trade in firearms,11 the Commission 
was never a recipient of such information. 

2.1.3 How will the problem evolve without intervention? 

Even  though  Member  States  have  been  repeatedly  asked  to  provide  statistical  data  on 
import  and  export  of  civilian  firearms,  this  data  is  still  not  available.  Furthermore,  the 
argument that some of this data is too sensitive to share will not change either. Therefore, 
without intervention the lack of data will continue to hinder the development of targeted 
policies and research in the field of firearms trafficking, without a complete intelligence 
picture of the risks.  

2.2 Problem II: firearms trafficking into and from the EU 

The import, export and transit of firearms, their  parts and components and ammunition 
bring risks of diversion to the illicit market.  

11  

SCH/Com-ex (99) 10 

9 

 
 
                                                 
At import, the main risks are linked to the circumvention of unclear rules that enable the 
import of “semi-finished” firearms and components, as well of alarm and signal weapons 
convertible into lethal firearms. 

At  export,  the  main  risk  lies  in  the  diversion  of civilian  firearms  shipped  to  a  non-EU 
country and being re-exported to countries subject to embargoes or sold to criminals and 
armed forces due to lack of controls and supervision before and after the export process. 
Once diverted, those firearms may contribute to  destabilisation near the EU borders, or 
be eventually smuggled back into the EU. 

The  circumvention  of  rules  and  diversion  of  firearms  contribute  to  the  trafficking  of 
firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, which is a global  problem and a 
serious threat to the security of European citizens. Firearms trafficking facilitates violent 
crimes and the criminal activities of Organised Crime Groups (OCGs) as the demand for 
firearms  “is  largely  driven  by  criminals”.12  According  to  a  study  published  in  2018,13 
firearms were the lethal means in more than 50% of all homicides in 49 of 195 countries 
in  2016;  251,000  people  died  globally  from  firearm  injuries  in  2016  (excluding  deaths 
from armed conflicts, terrorism and at hands of police), and the majority of firearm injury 
deaths were homicides (an estimated 64%, corresponding to some 161,000 deaths).14 The 
negative  effect  of  firearms  trafficking  on  stability  and  development  has  been 
internationally  acknowledged  in  the  new  United  Nations  Agenda  for  Sustainable 
Development,15  whose  Target  16.4  commits  states  to  significantly  reduce  illicit  arms 
flows by 2030. Moreover, over recent years, firearms trafficking contributed to providing 
terrorists  with  the  means  to  perpetrate  their  acts  of  terror,  with  23  mass-shooting 
incidents  in  the  (semi-)  public  space  in  Europe  in  the  period  2009-2018,  killing  341 
people.16   

Although the lack of data does not support a precise quantification of the phenomenon, 
recent  studies  on  firearms  trafficking  in  Europe  highlighted  the  preponderance  of 
firearms  supposedly  made  for  civilian  use  vis-à-vis  military-grade  weapons,17  whose 
availability remains more limited. However, it is impossible to make a clear distinction 

12  

13  

14  

15  

16  

17  

the 

report 

Union; 

analysis 

regional 

European 

UNODC    Illicit  Trafficking  in  Firearms  their  Parts,  Components  and  Ammunition  to,  from  and 
(2020), 
across 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/firearms-protocol/2020/UNODC-EU-Report-A8_FINAL.pdf 
The Global Burden of Disease 2016 Injury Collaborators (2018), Global Mortality from Firearms, 
1990-2016. JAMA. 2018;320(8):792–814 (link).  
The Global Burden of Disease 2016 Injury Collaborators (2018), Section ‘Results’ (link). 
UNSDG  (2015),  Transforming  our  World:  The  2030  Agenda  for  Sustainable  Development. 
Resolution 70/1 of 25 September. A/RES/70/1 of 21 October. 
See  for 
(https://vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Report_Armed_to_kill_web.pdf); 
Europol, 
(https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-events/main-reports/tesat-report) 
See notably UNODC (2020), Global Study on Firearms Trafficking, Vienna: UNODC, available at 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/firearms-protocol/firearms-study.html.  In  the  EU  in  2016-2017, 
shotguns  accounted  on  average  for  30%  of  seizures,  followed  by  pistols  (22%),  rifles  (15%)  and 
revolvers (8%), with submachine guns and machine guns accounting for most of the remainder (2%) 

instance  Flemish  Peace  Institute,  Armed 

to  kill,  Brussels,  3  October  2019 

Terrorism 

TE-SAT 

Report 

Trend 

2017: 

and 

EU 

10 

 
 
                                                 
based on technical characteristics between civilian and military firearms, since many of 
them can indistinctly be used by civilian and the military (inside the EU, civilians may in 
exceptional  circumstances  acquire,  possess  and  trade  military-grade  firearms,  such  as 
automatic  rifles  or  pistols).  This  is  reflected  in  the  latest  version  of  Directive  (EU) 
2021/555 (the Firearms Directive), which in exceptional cases allows civilians to acquire 
prohibited firearms (e.g. for sport shooting competitions or for the protection of critical 
infrastructure).  Besides,  some  manufacturers  produce  firearms  for  the  civilian  market, 
which on purpose look like military assault rifles.  Handguns (pistols and revolvers) are 
the  type  of  firearm  most  commonly  available  on  the  criminal  markets,  as  they  are 
portable and easier to use and to conceal relative to long guns. It is estimated that more 
than half of the firearms in civilian hands in Europe are illegally held.18 

2.2.1 What is the problem? 

Europol’s Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2021 pointed out that illegal 
firearms originate from within the EU but also from weapon stocks outside the EU.19 The 
project  “Studying  the  Acquisition  of  illicit  Firearms  by  Terrorists  in  Europe”  (SAFTE) 
stated that in  the EU, external  supply channels  are more important  than internal  supply 
channels  in  fuelling  illicit  firearms  markets.  In  particular,  cross-border  smuggling  of 
firearms from non-EU countries was considered the most important supply mechanism.20 
The durability of firearms means that, once smuggled into a Member State, weapons can 
remain inside the EU for many years and easily circulate across borders.21 A recent study 
from UNODC showed that the traditional closed character of the illicit firearms market in 
the EU is eroding due to continuing cross-border smuggling of firearms into the EU from 
post-conflict  countries,  the  increased  availability  of  easily  reactivated  or  converted 
weapons  and  increased  access  to  firearms  through  online  markets.  As  a  result,  various 
types  of  firearms  have  become  more  easily  available  for  criminals,  including  terrorists 
with the right criminal connections.22   

With respect to imports, the Operational Action Plan for Firearms 2022 states that “the 
import from some non-EU countries of semi-finished essential components (usually 80% 
finished polymer frames of handguns or 80% finished metal barrel of long firearms)” is 
an  identified  threat.  “They  are  not  declared  as  essential  components  of  firearms  and 
usually  enter  the  European  Union  via  fast  parcel  and  carrier  services.  They  are 
accompanied  with  instructions  on  how  to  complete  their  transformation  into  firearms 

18  

19  
20  
21  
22  

Small Arms Survey, “Estimating Global Civilian-held Firearms Numbers”, Briefing Paper, June 
2018. Dataset available under 
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/Weapons_and_Markets/Tools/Firearms_holdings/
SAS-BP-Civilian-held-firearms-annexe.pdf 
SOCTA 2021 : p. 57 
Duquet, N. and Goris, K. (2018), SAFTE project cit., p. 104 (link). 
See final report of UE funded project FIRE, p. 21 (link). 
UNODC    Illicit  Trafficking  in  Firearms  their  Parts,  Components  and  Ammunition  to,  from  and 
p.17 
regional 
across 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/firearms-protocol/2020/UNODC-EU-Report-A8_FINAL.pdf  

European 

analysis 

Union; 

(2020) 

report 

the 

11 

 
 
                                                 
with ordinary tools.”23 The action plan also stresses that “homemade conversion of alarm 
and signal weapons into firearms […] into more lethal, live-firing firearms is increasingly 
sophisticated,” which is major concern as those weapons were traditionally manufactured 
outside of the EU and are imported into the EU.  

As regards exports, according to UNODC, Europe (in particular the EU) is reported as 
the main region of manufacturing of firearms seized across the world.24 This means that 
legally  EU-manufactured  firearms  were  at  some  point  diverted  into  the  illegal  market, 
which could be exploited for criminal purposes (e.g. gang violence, terrorist attacks, and 
other serious crimes). The 2017 evaluation study had noted that “international trafficking 
of firearms remains a major concern.” The EU therefore has a particular responsibility to 
fight  this  threat  through  its  own  legislation,  and  notably  to  control  exported  firearms. 
Furthermore, research has shown that exported firearms from  the EU have ended up in 
the arsenals of various non-State armed groups across the globe.25 The EU has issued a 
number of arms embargos; the diversion of firearms supports the circumvention of these 
embargos.  Back  in  2016,  several  reports  documented  transfers  of  large  quantities  of 
firearms to the Middle East, which were re-exported to armed groups in Syria.26 The fact 
that many firearms can indistinctly be classified as civilian or military means that there is 
also a high risk of diversion of civilian weapons, as demonstrated by the recent case of 
German-manufactured  (non-specifically  military)  handguns  used  by  armed  forces  in 
Belarus.27  More  recently,  during  the  third  EU-Mexico  High  Level  Dialogue  on  Justice 
and  Security,28  Mexican  authorities  estimated  that  more  than  230,000  weapons  entered 
illegally  through  Mexico’s  northern  border  each  year.  Overall,  30%  of  illicit  firearms 
seized in Mexico were traced to European manufacturers.  

23  

24  

25  

26  

27  

28  

Operational  Action  Plan  2022:  Firearms  trafficking,  Council  Document  13596/21,  14.11.2021  - 
LIMITED 
UNODC Global study on Firearms Trafficking 2020 p.32; https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-
and-analysis/Firearms/2020_REPORT_Global_Study_on_Firearms_Trafficking_2020_web.pdf  
UNODC Global study on Firearms Trafficking 2020 p.18; https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-
and-analysis/Firearms/2020_REPORT_Global_Study_on_Firearms_Trafficking_2020_web.pdf; 
UNODC,  “Illicit  Trafficking  in  Firearms,  their  Parts,  Components  and  Ammunition  to,  from  and 
across  the  European  Union”,  Vienna,  2020  p.  103  https://www.unodc.org/documents/firearms-
protocol/2020/UNODC-EU-Report-A8_FINAL.pdf 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/27/weapons-flowing-eastern-europe-middle-east-
revealed-arms-trade-syria; 
euros-arms-pipeline-to-middle-east-07-26-2016/. 
“Deutsche  Waffen 
deutsche-waffen-fuer-diktator-lukaschenko-100.html, use of Sig-Sauer P 226 
held by videoconference on 11 May 2021. 

für  Lukaschenko”,  8.09.2020,  https://www.zdf.de/politik/frontal/belarus-

https://balkaninsight.com/2016/07/27/making-a-killing-the-1-2-billion-

12 

 
 
                                                 
Case-study: EU firearms in Mexico 

Between 2015 and 2020, 96,948 firearms (worth $38 Mio) [source: https://comtrade.un.org/data/] 
were exported from the EU to Mexico. In addition, many EU firearms exported to the USA are 
re-exported  or  trafficked  to  Mexico,  which  estimates  that  half  of  EU  firearms  brands  seized  in 
Mexico were either imported or trafficked from the U.S. 
During the period 2010-2020, 61,242 firearms  were seized of which 2,744 were Italian, mostly 
Beretta  pistols [source:   http://stopusarmstomexico.org/deadly-trade/].  During the period 2015-
2020,  2,749  German-made  firearms  were  seized  in  Mexico,  more  than  twice  as  much  as  the 
official exports to this country. 
Data provided by the Mexican authorities do not enable the establishment of statistics based on 
tracing results. There is no data about the year of manufacture of the EU firearms seized, or about 
their point of diversion. It shows however that EU-made firearms (including civilian firearms) do 
end up in the wrong hands in high quantities, and that the current EU export control system does 
not prevent it. 

The diversion of civilian firearms during authorised international transfers can take place 
at different stages of the firearms transfer chain. Diversion techniques include the use of 
forged  or  falsified  documentation  (e.g.  shipping  documents,  commodity  descriptions, 
personal  information  about  the  shipper  and  the  recipient)  or  the  creation  of  shell 
companies  and  straw  purchaser  to  hide  the  real  identities  of  the  parties  involved  in  a 
transaction. Specific diversion risks arise in relation to each stage of the transfer chain.29 

2.2.2 What are the problem drivers? 

Most of the drivers are common to both imports and exports, in particular when it comes 
to the lack of coordination between licensing authorities, and between licencing and law 
enforcement authorities (including customs).  

The  circulation  of  firearms  is  facilitated  by  the  fact  that  law  enforcement  authorities 
across  the  EU  still  do  not  operate  as  one,  and  that  exchanges  of  information  and 
intelligence  amongst  them  is  not  sufficient.  However  and  despite  its  name,  the 
Regulation does not create common rules and procedures for import authorisations. The 
2017  evaluation  report  stressed  that  “the  Regulation  does  not  establish  a  harmonised 
licensing system for imports and therefore has little relevance in this respect.”  

At import 

Save  for  a  few  generic  provisions  (recital  11  and  the  definition  of  illicit  trafficking  in 
article 2, both referring to the rules of the Firearms Directive), the Regulation does not 
regulate import authorisations.   

Insufficient  exchange  of 
information  and  uncoordinated  controls  and  risk 
assessments of  firearms imports lead to  ineffective risk profiling  between customs  and 
between import licensing authorities, as the Regulation does not establish the conditions 
for  such  cooperation  and  does  not  include  any  provision  in  relation  to  imports.  Risk 

29  

https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/2021-09/Diversion%20infographic.pdf 

13 

 
 
 
                                                 
profiling is critical to prevent firearms from being smuggled into the EU. However, there 
is  currently  no  systematic  sharing  of  intelligence  at  EU  level  and  there  is  a  lack  of 
available data on past firearms seizures and their follow-up investigations, which would 
enable  evidence-based  detection  of  trends,  both  at  import  and  export.  The  Regulation 
does not include any provision to that effect. Existing systems (such as the EU’s Customs 
Risk Management System –CRMS- or Europol’s Secure Information Exchange Network 
Application  –SIENA-)  are  not  interconnected  (and  cannot  be  under  the  current 
framework), and law enforcement authorities are under no obligation, or do not have the 
possibility,  to  systematically  use  them  (customs  typically  do  not  rely  on  SIENA-based 
information and police does not feed into, or rely on the CRMS). When they are, national 
authorities  do  not  always  include  sufficient  information  to  compare  data.  Finally, 
information  gathered  during  the  follow-up  investigation  under  the  authority  of  the 
judiciary is typically not shared through those channels for future risk assessments. 

Moreover, firearms can be smuggled into the EU through the misdeclaration of goods. 
Such misdeclaration result from different ways to interpret current EU law, due to its lack 
of  precision.  Even  though  firearms  parts  and  components  are  subject  to  administrative 
control,  the  EU  faces  the  unchecked  import  of  semi-finished  “80%”  components. 
These can be used to replace elements of firearms, but also to (illegally) modify weapons 
and even to assemble firearms in their entirety.30 The fact that they are still imported into 
the EU shows that there is an unclear legal framework. In the confidential consultation of 
national  competent  authorities,  13%  of  respondents  concerned  by  import  declared  that 
such elements need to be declared as firearms parts (CN code 9305) but not marked, and 
13% that they are not even considered as firearms parts and are not subject to declaration. 
This  means  that  in  26%  of  cases,  traceability  of  those  semi-finished  products  is  not 
ensured.  At  the  moment,  even  when  such  semi-finished  components  are  declared  as 
firearms for customs purposes, they are not automatically considered as such by licencing 
authorities, which can enable the import of such elements by non-authorised individuals.  

Recital 11 of the Regulation states that firearms, their parts and essential components and 
ammunition,  when  imported  from  third  countries,  are  subject  to  Union  law  and,  in 
particular,  to  the  requirements  of  Directive  91/477/EEC  (codified  by  Directive  (EU) 
2021/555). As a result, convertible alarm and signal weapons need to be declared and 
classified  as  firearms.  Nevertheless,  since  2010,  those  converted  foreign-made  blank-
firing weapons have been seized in the European Union, which shows that they had not 
been  imported  and  declared  as  firearms  as  they  should  have  been.31  Despite  recent 
changes in the legislation of the main producing country of those weapons, they are still 

30  

31  

Operational Action Plan 2022: Firearms trafficking, Council Document 13596/21, 14.11.2021 - 
LIMITED 
From 2016 to 2020, 15 949 alarm and signal weapons of the brands Ekol,  Zoraki and Bruni  were 
seized  by  the  Member  States,  most  of  them  within  operation  CONVERSUS  from  EMPACT 
firearms,  with  contribution  of  Europol.  (Report  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament 
and the Council on the application of Firearms Directive C(2021)647 final). 

14 

 
 
                                                 
considered  as  being  easily  convertible  into  firearms.32  These  weapons  are  commonly 
used  in  gun  crime  across  Europe.33  The  current  legal  framework34  does  not  provide  a 
legal basis to ensure a uniform approach to certifying the compliance of  these weapons 
with EU standards on non-convertibility. Consequently, customs or licensing authorities 
of  different  Member  States  may  treat  differently  imported  alarm  and  signal  weapons, 
with  some  considering  that  they  are  convertible  into  firearms,  and  others  that  they 
comply with EU-level standards.  

Finally,  it  appears  that  existing  customs  simplifications  can  easily  be  used  to  avoid 
customs  checks.  The  reduced  dataset  used  for  e-commerce  and  the  low  quality  of  data 
provided  by  postal  operators  severely  affects  the  traceability  of  imported  firearms  and 
components.  Besides,  under  customs  simplifications  (Simplified  Declarations,  Entry  in 
the  Declarants  Record),  the  full  customs  declarations  are  only  submitted  after  a  month 
and  controls  can  only  be  performed  ex-posts  and  most  probably  be  only  documentary 
controls. As a consequence, the room for diversion of imported firearms is very high. 

At export 

At export, problems directly stem from the vagueness of the regulation, rather than issues 
of enforcement. 

Similarly, controls and risk assessments when exporting firearms from the EU vary 
in  nature  and  quality  from  one  Member  State  to  another  –  they  are  in  any  case 
insufficiently shared and coordinated between Member States, as the 2017 evaluation of 
the Regulation  identified. This  aspect  is  not  governed by the Regulation  and left  to  the 
discretion of Member States.  An exporter does  not  always  need to  provide evidence of 
import  in  the  country  of  destination,  end-user  certificates  are  often  not  requested  and 
there  is  currently  no  systematic  post-shipment  controls.  This  leaves  room  for  the 
diversion  of  firearms  between  the  export  and  the  arrival  at  the  destination  country,  as 
well  as  to  re-export  or  unauthorized  used  after  arrival  in  the  destination  country.  This 
appears  as  the  main  source  of  the  problem,  since  “in  the    overwhelming    majority    of  
known  cases,  these  firearms  were  legally transferred from the European Union to the 
intended  recipient  in  another  part    of    the    world    and    subsequently    diverted    in    the  

32  

33  

34  

Washington 

“Border  Patrol  seizes  $19,000  worth  of  blank  firing  pistols  from  Turkey  at  Dulles  International 
Airport”, 
2021 
Post, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2021/06/02/border-patrol-pistols-dulles/ 
UNODC,  “Illicit  Trafficking  in  Firearms,  their  Parts,  Components  and  Ammunition  to,  from  and 
across  the  European  Union”,  Vienna,  2020,  p.25  https://www.unodc.org/documents/firearms-
protocol/2020/UNODC-EU-Report-A8_FINAL.pdf 
Commission  Implementing  Directive  (EU)  2019/69  of  16  January  2019  laying  down  technical 
specifications for alarm and signal weapons under Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the 
acquisition and possession of weapons; OJ L 15, 17.1.2019. 

June 

2 

15 

 
 
                                                 
destination  countries  or  retransferred  to  other  countries  without  the  approval  of  the  
exporting  European Union Member State.”35  

Furthermore,  the  different  interpretations  of  the  vaguely  worded  export  control 
procedures  in  the  Regulation,  and  the  existence  of  inconsistencies  between  the 
Regulation  and  other  pieces  of  EU  legislation  concerning  firearms  such  as  the  EU 
Firearms Directive (2021/555), leave room for potential security loopholes. For instance, 
the  Regulation  merely  states  that  Member  States  must  refuse  to  grant  an  export 
authorisation if the applicant has a criminal record concerning an offence covered by the 
rules  on  the  European  Arrest  Warrant  (money  laundering,  corruption,  trafficking  of 
human  beings,  murder  etc.).  How  and  when  criminal  records  are  checked  currently 
remains completely subject to national legislation and practice. The absence of detailed 
provisions  on  what  document  to  check  before  granting  an  export  licence  has  led  to 
persisting  differences  across  Member  States  in  performing  background  checks  on  non-
residents  (in  the  confidential  consultation  of  competent  authorities,  68,76%  of 
respondents concerned36 indicated they only request or check their own national criminal 
record,  not  necessarily  that  of  other  countries).  This  might  enable  an  applicant  with 
relevant  criminal  records  in  a  Member  State  to  obtain  an  export  license  from  another 
Member State. 

Additionally,  the  rules  are  not  sufficiently  clear  to  ensure  that  customs  or  licensing 
authorities perform the checks of the non-convertibility of alarm and signal weapons, 
and ensure that firearms are not wrongly declared as alarm and signal weapons to avoid 
export authorisations and customs checks. This is particularly the case for exports from 
Member States, which do not subject the acquisition and possession of alarm and signal 
weapons  to  any  authorisation.  The  reactivation  of  deactivated  firearms  is  also  a  known 
threat, which leads to the diversion of firearms. Because deactivated firearms fall outside 
of  the  scope  of  the  Regulation,  these  weapons  can  be  exported  without  the  proper 
marking that is needed to improve the traceability of firearms. As a consequence, in the 
confidential consultation of national competent authorities,37 3 Member States indicated 
that  neither  export  licensing  authorities  nor  customs  authorities  have  to  control  the 
effective  deactivation  of  firearms.  This  was  noted  by  the  2017  evaluation  of  the 
regulation, which stressed that “the absence of any provisions for export markings in the 
case of deactivated weapons or alarm weapons makes traceability impossible”.  

Problems are also linked to the insufficient exchange of information and cooperation 
between  licensing  authorities.  The  Regulation  created  the  obligation  to  exchange 
information  on  the  refusals  of  export  authorisations.  However,  the  Regulation  did  not 
specify  via  which  channels  this  information  needs  to  be  exchanged.  The  most  widely 
used  –  and  single  available  –  platform  is  the  online  system  of  the  Council’s  Working 

35  

36  

37  

UNODC,  “Illicit  Trafficking  in  Firearms,  their  Parts,  Components  and  Ammunition  to,  from  and 
across  the  European  Union”,  Vienna,  2020  p.  106  https://www.unodc.org/documents/firearms-
protocol/2020/UNODC-EU-Report-A8_FINAL.pdf 
50% of respondents did not reply to this question (mostly because they are not involved in export 
processes) 
Annex 2, point 2.4 

16 

 
 
                                                 
Party on Conventional Arms Exports (COARM). The 2017 evaluation of the Regulation 
stressed  that  its  “provisions  have  proved  insufficient  to  meet  the  objective  pursued.” 
Currently, the fact that some denials are not uploaded on COARM and different channels 
are  used  to  exchange  information  on  denials  creates  the  risk  that  export  authorisation 
decisions  are  taken  on  an  incomplete  evidence  base.  The  Commission  observed  in  its 
report on the implementation of the Regulation that “43 % of national authorities report 
having  already  granted  an  export  authorisation  to  exporters  for  essentially  identical 
transactions  which  had  been  refused  by  another  Member  State.”  Moreover,  it  increases 
the  risk  of  undercutting  of  decisions  taken  by  other  Member  States  and  eventually 
increase the security risks related to the circulation of firearms consignment for unlawful 
purposes.  In  other  words,  information  asymmetry  that  is  not  addressed  through  timely 
and effective information exchange leaves room for the risk that suspect or problematic 
export operations are authorised. 

External-transit 

Besides, Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 does not regulate the traceability of shipments of 
firearms coming from, or destined to third countries during transit operations through the 
customs territory of the Union (external transit). This absence of EU rules on the matter 
result  in  a  lack  of  tracing  and  lack  of  communication  between  customs  authorities  to 
ensure  efficient  checks.  A  2017  analysis  of  the  Commission  services38  underlined  that 
“there is a systemic tendency to treat a consignment of firearms as any other consignment 
in  transit,  with  no  special  measures  related  to  the  nature  of  these  particular  goods.” 
Shipments of firearms are managed as any other cargo in transit, rather than as sensitive 
consignments.  Therefore,  Member  States  have  no  specific  obligation  to  notify  the 
Member States of transit that the goods in transit are firearms, that the consignment has 
arrived at destination, or that the procedure is closed. This leaves the transit vulnerable 
for  the  diversion  of  firearms.  The  Commission  highlights  that  practices  related  to  the 
place, time and nature of the customs controls vary significantly from one Member State 
to another, thus leaving room for potential security issues. This results directly from the 
absence of any provision in that respect in the regulation. The analysis found that “some 
MS are making controls only at destination, some at entry, some at unloading but there is 
no  common  approach  about  the  type  (documentary,  physical)  and  moment  of  the 
controls. Some Member States make controls systematically for firearms, some based on 
risks.”  This  was  reflected  in  the  2017  evaluation  of  the  regulation,  which  stressed  that 
“the traceability of the consignments is not guaranteed during transit operations through 
the  customs  territory  of  the  European  Union.”  It  was  confirmed  by  the  2022  Council 
Report  on  firearms  trafficking,39  which  stressed  that  “little  information  was  shared  on 
domestic transhipments.” 

38  

39  

“Conclusions on the strengths, gaps and weaknesses in the customs legislation, procedures and risk-
based controls practices related to the illicit trafficking of firearms”;  PCA FIREARMS, April 2017,  
TAXUD/B2/031/2017, Ref. Ares(2017)2932774 - RESTRICTED 
op. cit., Council Document 4763/1/21, 3.01.2022 - LIMITED 

17 

 
 
                                                 
2.2.3. How will the problem evolve without intervention? 

Without a targeted and limited intervention, an increasing number of illicit firearms risk 
being  smuggled  into  the  EU,  in  particular  semi-finished  firearms  and  convertible 
weapons. This is confirmed by general view of stakeholders consulted during the public 
consultation on the overall future evolution of trafficking. 47% of respondents considered 
that  without  further  EU  intervention,  there  would  be  an  increase  of  smuggling  of 
firearms, their components, and convertible weapons into the EU and increased exports 
(or  diversion)  of  firearms  to  conflict  zones  and  authoritarian  regimes.  Among  the  12 
business representatives which had an opinion, 50% also considered the situation would 
deteriorate (50% had no opinion). This view was shared by law enforcement authorities: 
during  the  confidential  consultation  of  competent  authorities,  one  third  of  customs  and 
police respondents  considered that the situation would deteriorate (26% had no opinion 
and 20% considered that it would remain unchanged).  

Firearms  are  extremely  durable  products,  and  illicit  firearms  imported  in  the  EU  can 
therefore circulate in the Member States for decades. As EU law enforcement authorities 
do  not  operate  as  one,  there  is  a  high  risk  that  they  will  fail  to  fully  prevent  the  illicit 
movements  of  firearms  from  one  Member  State  to  another,  once  they  have  been 
smuggled into the EU territory. Trafficking of firearms is a source of major concern for 
the  security  of  European  citizens.40  By  fuelling  violence  and  organised  crime  and 
providing terrorists with the means  to  conduct  attacks on European soil,  illicit firearms 
pose a serious threat to internal security.41  

The risks of diversion of exported firearms would at the very least remain the same, and 
the  appetite  for  EU-made  firearms  or  the  need  to  circumvent  embargoes  will  probably 
increase the threat. This risk has already materialised, since the media recently reported 
diversion  cases of  firearms  exported in  2020 from  the EU to  Moldova, from  which the 
weapons  were immediately  re-exported to  Russia and Belarus, two countries subject  to 
arms embargoes.42 This is confirmed by the Operational Action Plan for Firearms 2022, 
which  states  that  “firearms  are  also  trafficked  from  the  EU  towards  Ukraine  and 
Libya.”43 

40  
41  

42  

43  

Europol (2017), cit., p. 54. 
European Commission (2018), Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. 
Elements towards an EU Strategy against illicit Firearms, Small Arms & Light Weapons and their 
Ammunition.  "Securing  Arms,  Protecting  Citizens",  JOIN(2018)  17  final,  Brussels,  Section  1 
‘Introduction,’ p. 1. 
“EU 
to 
firms 
arms 
https://euobserver.com/world/153145 
Operational  Action  Plan  2022:  Firearms  trafficking,  Council  Document  13596/21,  14.11.2021  - 
LIMITED 

Belarus 

Russia 

trying 

ban”, 

6.10.2021,  

flout 

and 

18 

 
 
                                                 
2.3 Problem III: administrative burden for the legal movement of civilian 

firearms 

2.3.1 What is the problem? 

Economic  operators  continue  to  face  different  national  rules,  procedures  and  practices 
when trying to obtain an export or import authorisation. This means that EU businesses 
are  subject  to  different  requirements  and  administrative  procedures,  and  therefore  bear 
different costs, depending on the Member State in which they operate. They are notably 
faced  with  burdensome  paper-based  procedures.  According  to  the  results  of  the  survey 
conducted during the 2019 study on improvement of the EU rules on imports and export 
of  firearms,  each  enterprise  employs  from  4  to  12  hours  each  month  to  deal  with  the 
export authorisation processes. Consequently, despite a degree of harmonisation brought 
by  the  introduction  of  the  Regulation  with  respect  to  exports,  EU  producers,  exporters 
and  importers  do  not  yet  operate  in  a  truly  unified  control  environment  with  a  level 
playing field, especially as the regulation does not provide for common rules with respect 
to imports.  

2.3.2. What are the problem drivers? 

The  main  problem  driver  is  an  unclear  legal  framework.  One  of  the  main  original 
objectives of Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 was to ensure a harmonised implementation 
of the provisions across all Member States, in line with Article 10 of the United Nations 
Firearms  Protocol.  The  2017  evaluation  report  of  Regulation  (EU)  No  258/2012 
highlighted the existence of areas of inconsistent and heterogeneous application that lead 
to obstacles to international trade, and movement of civilian firearms. Such areas relate to 
the  vagueness  of  the  Regulation  (e.g.  no  definition  or  specifications  on  simplified 
procedures,  the  general  nature  of  the  provisions  governing  information  exchanges  and 
administrative  cooperation,  controls  for  refusals  of  essentially  identical  transactions, 
check  of  the  criminal  record),  which  does  not  enable  a  unified  implementation  by 
Member States. The regulation also includes many optional provisions (e.g. the adoption 
of a single procedure for military and non-military firearms, or whether or not to assume 
the tacit agreement of third countries of transit) and references to national provisions (e.g. 
confirmation  of  receipt).  The  evaluation  report  therefore  stated  that  “allowing  the 
competent authorities to choose is a weakness of the Regulation, whose implementation 
and  interpretation  should  in  principle  be  uniform.”  Because  the  Regulation  does  not 
indicate specific procedures or systems to manage applications for and issuance of export 
and import licenses, each Member State is free to decide on the adoption of an electronic 
or paper-based procedure, and on the application of a fee for such procedure, according 
to  national  practice.  Therefore,  channels  used  for  the  application  and  licensing  process 
(and related costs) differ across Member States.  

Besides, the Regulation currently mainly focuses on export controls, thus leaving import-
related  processes  to  national  legislation.  It  notably  harmonises  deadlines  to  national 
authorities  to  reply  to  applications  only  for  export  authorisations  and  not  for  import 
authorisations. 

19 

 
 
the  Regulation  sought 

Additionally, 
to  harmonise  pre-existing  rules  on  prior 
authorisation  of  transit  of  firearms  in  third  countries.  The  evaluation  of  the  Regulation 
revealed  that  transit-related  provisions  have  a  relatively  large  impact  on  costs.44  More 
specifically,  economic  operators  reported  difficulties  in  identifying  who  the  competent 
authority  is  in  the  country  of  transit  to  file  their  request.  Resulting  delays  increase  the 
time  for  obtaining  an  export  authorisation  and  the  costs  borne  by  economic  operators 
(e.g. the storage of firearm shipments blocked in airports). Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 
aimed  to  mitigate  the  possible  negative  impact  of  the  transit  measures  required  by  the 
United  Nations  Firearms  Protocol  by  introducing  the  possibility  for  Member  States  to 
apply the principle of implied consent, thereby assuming approval of the third country of 
transit  if  no  objections  to  the  transit  are  received  within  20  days.45  This  optional 
provision  aimed  at  balancing  the  business  interest  in  speeding  up  the  process  with  the 
security  interest  of  ensuring  an  adequate  deadline  for  the  transit  states  to  react  to  the 
exporter’s request.46 Despite this opportunity, not all Member States apply the principle 
of implied consent, thus creating an uneven playing field. 

legislation  creates  confusion,  which  enhances 

Furthermore, the complex articulation between Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 and other 
EU  and  national  firearms 
the 
inconsistencies.  The  definitions  and  categories  of  firearms  (prohibited,  subject  to 
authorisation, subject to declaration) were initially the same in the Firearms Directive and 
in the Regulation. The Firearms Directive 91/477/EEC was revised in 2017 and codified 
in March 2021 by Directive (EU) 2021/555. The revision of the Firearms Directive led to 
inconsistencies specifically in the scope and definitions (e.g. removal of the definition of 
‘part’  and  the  modification  of  the  definition  of  ‘essential  component’).  The  revision  of 
the  Firearms  Directive  significantly  modified  the  firearms  categories,  in  particular  by 
introducing new items (notably bringing deactivated firearms and firearms converted into 
blank-firing,  salute  and  acoustic  weapons  into  scope)  and  moving  certain  types  of 
weapons  (such  as  certain  semi-automatic  firearms)  to  a  more  stringent  regime  of 
possession.  Furthermore,  some  players  (notably  collectors,  museums  and  brokers), 
previously excluded, are now included in the scope of the Firearms Directive. Therefore 
the Regulation currently has a more limited scope than the Directive: it does not regulate 
exports  by  collectors,  by  museums,  the  activities  of  brokers,  the  exports  of  deactivated 
firearms,  or  the  exports  of  category  A  firearms  even  when  they  are  legally  owned  by 
sport shooters or arms dealers in the EU. 

Moreover, there exists a “grey area” of overlap between the scope of Regulation (EU) No 
258/2012    and  the  scope  of  the  Common  Position  2008/944/CFSP,  leaving  room  for 
divergent interpretations and inconsistencies in the application of the correct (military or 
civilian) export regime to items that fall in this area. While the Regulation excludes from 
its scope only “specially designed for military use and, in any case, firearms of the fully 
automatic firing type”, 47 it nevertheless provides for the possibility for Member States to 

44  
45  
46  
47  

EY, SIPRI and RAND (2017), cit, p.43. 
Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 258/2012. 
COM(2010)273 final. 
Article 3, paragraph 1, letter b of the Regulation 

20 

 
 
                                                 
“use a single procedure to carry out the obligations imposed on them by this Regulation 
and  by  that  Common  Position.”48  This  opening  has  been  interpreted  by  some  Member 
States as a possibility to subject  to  the Common Position  all weapons falling under the 
Common  military  list,  even  if  they  are  not  specially  designed  for  military  use.  The 
evaluation of the Regulation revealed that Member States tend to interpret the scope of 
such overlaps differently. The main problem is the lack of clear objective criteria  set in 
legislation to establish whether firearms or ammunition are military or civilian.49 When 
requested  to  provide  data  on  imports  and  exports  of  civilian  firearms,  many  Member 
States  proved  unable  to  distinguish  them  from  military  weapons,  and  sent  statistics 
covering  both  military  and  civilian  firearms.  Besides,  the  customs  tariff  classification 
includes  categories  of  firearms,  which  can  be  either  military  or  non-military.50  This  is 
most often the case for types of short firearms and semi-automatic firearms, and related 
ammunitions.  Additionally,  the  civilian  and  military-grade  export  control  regimes  fall 
under  the  remit  of  different  national  administrations  in  most  of  the  Member  States.51 
Furthermore, the possibility to apply a single procedure52 results in some Member States 
applying an identical procedure and identical criteria to all exports of weapons (both civil 
and military). Consequently, transactions regarding substantially the same items  can be 
treated  differently  across  the  EU,  as  some  Member  States  might  decide  to  apply  the 
export  licensing  procedure  for  civilian  firearms,  while  others  might  adopt  the  single 
procedure.53  

2.3.3. How will the problem evolve without intervention? 

In  the  public  consultation,  53%  of  all  respondents  considered  that  without  further  EU 
intervention,  the  situation  will  deteriorate,  with  economic  operators  and  legitimate 
firearms  owners  likely  to  be  faced  with  increasingly  heterogeneous  national  rules  and 
procedures.  In  this  consultation,  the  replies  of  the  12  businesses  and  business 
representatives  were  inconclusive,  with  one  third  having  no  opinion,  25%  considering 
that  the  situation  will  improve,  16%  that  it  would  remain  unchanged  and  25%  that  it 
would deteriorate.  

In any event, the inconsistencies between the scope of Regulation (EU) No 258/2012, the 
Firearms  Directive  (EU)  2021/555  and  the  overlap  with  the  Common  Position 
2008/944/CFSP  will not  be solved without intervention. Without  clear descriptions and 
agreed upon procedures,  divergent  national  requirements and administrative procedures 

48  
49  
50  
51  
52  

53  

Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Regulation 
Survey feedback: 47% (n=9) of the NCA responding to survey question 11. 
Headings 9302, 9303, 9305. 
EY, SIPRI and RAND (2017), cit., integrated with further desk research. 
Article 4(2) of Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 allows Member States to adopt a single procedure if 
an  export  is  subject  to  authorisation  requirements  in  accordance  with  both  Regulation  (EU) 
No 258/2012 and the Common Position 2008/944/CFSP. 15 Member States (AT, BG, CY, DE, DK, 
ES, FI, HR, LU, LT, LV, MT, SE, SK and UK) and the BWR opted for a single procedure to issue 
export  authorisations.  Source:  EY,  SIPRI  and  RAND  (2017),  complemented  by  information 
collected through the field visits.  
2019, Study on the improvement of the EU system of export authorisation, and import and transit 
measures for civilian firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, p. 35 

21 

 
 
                                                 
will stay in place and continue to be an obstacle to the establishment of a unified export 
and import regime for civilian firearms within the EU Customs Union. This will result in 
an uneven playing field  between  EU importers and  lead to  divergent  costs  for firearms 
export companies. National differences in the procedures will continue to be an obstacle 
to the establishment of a uniform export and import regime for civilian firearms, and will 
go  against  the  objectives  pursued  within  the  EU  Customs  Union  where  customs 
procedures  are  already  centralised.54  In  particular,  national  non-harmonised  licencing 
systems will not be able to connect to the EU Single Window Environment for customs, 
thus preventing economic operators from making use of this tool to complete all border 
formalities in a single portal. 

3.  WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? 

3.1 Legal basis 

The legal basis for acting in this area is Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU) on the common commercial policy. Provisions adopted in 
this area fall under the exclusive competence of the EU. This was also the legal basis for 
Regulation (EU) 258/2012.55 All firearms covered by the EU Customs tariff56 fall under 
the exclusive competence of the European Union.  The differences in export, import and 
transit authorisation procedures and controls across Member States  are at odds with the 
very concept of exclusive EU competence in external trade.57 

As an area without internal borders in which goods and persons circulate freely, having 
common  rules  on  the  import  and  export  of  firearms,  their  parts  and  components  and 
ammunition  is  of tantamount  importance. Addressing the issues mentioned can only be 
done at EU level, as Member States may not exercise this external competence, since this 
would directly affect the effectiveness and uniform interpretation of internal EU law (the 
Firearms Directive), irrespective of whether the firearms are designed for military or for 
civilian  use.  It  would  also  create  regulatory  divergences  and  legal  loopholes  which 
criminals could avail themselves of. The description of the problems and their drivers (in 
particular  problem  2  linked  to  the  administrative  burden)  demonstrate  the  need  for 
harmonised EU rules on imports and exports of firearms for civilian use.  

Besides, considering the need to address extensively aspects of exchanges of information 
and cooperation between customs authorities, between customs and competent licencing 
authorities,  and  between  those  authorities  and  the  Commission,  the  legal  basis  of  this 
initiative should also include article 33 TFEU. 

54  

55  
56  

57  

Centralised clearance is a simplification that authorises importers/exporters to lodge at the customs 
office  where  they are established, a  customs declaration  for goods  which are presented  at another 
customs office within the customs territory of the Union. 
Resolution 55/255 of 31 May 2001. 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and 
on the Common Customs Tariff, section XIX, chapter 93 
Article  3(1)  of  the  TFEU  establishes  that  the  EU  has  exclusive  external  competence  over  the 
Common Commercial Policy, and Article 207 of the TFEU outlines its scope. 

22 

 
 
                                                 
3.2 Subsidiarity: Necessity and added value of EU action 

A subsidiarity check is not required in an area of EU exclusive competence; however, the 
need for EU action is clear. 

The objective of the legislation is to ensure that no legal loophole in EU import, export 
and transit legislation concerning firearms, their parts and components and ammunition 
facilitates this diversion. 

The  UN  Firearms  Protocol  provides  for  a  framework  for  States  to control  and  regulate 
licit  arms  and  arms  flows,  prevent  their  diversion  into  the  illegal  circuit,  facilitate  the 
investigation and prosecution of related offences without hampering legitimate transfers. 
By adopting the Regulation in 2012, the EU was able to ratify the Firearms Protocol in 
2013.  It  is  therefore  up  to  the  EU  to  keep  fighting  and  preventing  the  diversion  of 
firearms, especially as the EU is a key manufacturing region. Once a firearm is diverted, 
it remains a threat for decades.  

During  the  public  consultation,  respondents  clearly  stressed  the  need  for  EU  action. 
Almost  70%  of  respondents  (75%  of  business  representatives)  considered  important  or 
very important to have common EU rules on imports of civilian firearms from outside of 
the  EU  and  on  exports  of  civilian  firearms  to  non-EU  countries.  62%  considered  that 
there  is  a  need  for  EU  intervention  on  current  rules  on  import,  export  and  transit  of 
civilian  firearms  and  59,5%  considered  that  there  is  need  for  new  tools  to  improve 
current  rules  on  import,  export  and  transit  of  civilian  firearms.  National  authorities 
themselves  expressed  an  even  higher  support.  During  the  closed  and  confidential 
consultation  of  competent  and  law  enforcement  authorities,  76,66%  of  respondents 
considered  it  important  or  very  important  to  have  common  EU  rules  on  imports  of 
civilian  firearms  from  outside  of  the  EU  and  83,3%  on  exports  of  civilian  firearms  to 
non-EU  countries.  The  analysis  of  the  free  text  contributions  shows  an  overwhelming 
request for uniform EU rules rather than addition of national procedures.  

During the public consultation, many stakeholders (mostly individual firearms users such 
as  hunters  and  sport  shooters)  considered  in  the  free  text  contributions  that  EU 
intervention  was  not  necessary  because  smugglers  and  traffickers  do  not  declare  their 
activities, and that consequently EU legislation would only harm legitimate traders and 
would  continue  to  be  disregarded  by  criminals.  This  argument  ignores  the  fact  that, 
except  for  home-made  firearms,  firearms  used  in  criminal  acts  were  initially  legally 
manufactured and sold, and were diverted at some point of their life cycle.  

4.  OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? 

4.1 General objectives 

The strategic objective of this initiative is to close legal loopholes that can facilitate the 
circumvention  of  rules,  smuggling  and  the  trafficking  of  firearms  for  civilian  use  by 
ensuring  a  uniform  application  of  the  rules  on  imports  and  exports  of  firearms  the  UN 
Firearms  protocol.  It  is  essentially  a  trade  policy  initiative  aiming  at  better  regulating 
import and export controls for firearms, their components and ammunitions.   

23 

 
 
Due to their specificities in relation to defence, national security and the implementation 
of  the  common  foreign  and  security  policy,  this  initiative  does  not  address  sales  to  the 
armed  forces  or  public  authorities,  or  government-to-government  transactions.  Export 
controls  of  firearms  for  military  use  should  remain  addressed  by  the  Council  Common 
Position 2008/944/CFSP, governing exports of all military technology and equipment. 

4.2 Specific objectives 

To  achieve  the  strategic  objective,  based  on  the  evaluation  of  the  Regulation,  on  the 
public consultation as well as targeted consultations with stakeholders, the Commission 
identified three specific objectives:  

The  first  objective  is  to  improve  the  systematise  data  collection  about  international 
movements  of  firearms  for  civilian  use,  as  well  as  seizure  data.  This  implies  receiving 
annual  data  by  Member  States  on  the  number  of  authorisations,  refusals,  the  quantities 
and  values  of  civilian  firearms  exports  and  imports,  by  origin  or  destination. 
Furthermore,  receiving  seizure  data  will  allow  targeted  policies  to  prevent  and  tackle 
firearms trafficking.  

The  second  objective  is  to  enable  coordinated  controls  and  risk  assessments.  This 
implies first to ensure the traceability of firearms. Tracing, according to article 2(16) of 
the  Regulation,  “means  the  systematic  tracking  of  firearms  and,  where  possible,  their 
parts and essential components and ammunition from manufacturer to purchaser for the 
purpose  of  assisting  the  competent  authorities  of  Member  States  in  detecting, 
investigating and analysing illicit manufacturing and trafficking.” Both at import and at 
export, the current framework needs to be improved in that respect, since loopholes have 
been  identified  in  both  inwards  and  outwards  movements.  This  applies  notably  to  the 
proper recording of firearms-related information and to the need to improve the work of 
customs  authorities  in  detecting,  while  at  export  it  concerns  more  the  work  of  export 
licencing  authorities.  For  both  types  of  movements,  the  cooperation  between  law 
enforcement  authorities  (including  customs)  and  licensing  authorities  should  be 
improved. 

The  third  specific  objective  is  to  ensure  a  level  playing  field  and  reducing  the 
administrative burden placed on economic operators and firearms users. Here, the 
focus is on ensuring a uniform application of EU law and of the UN Firearms Protocol, 
instead  of  the  current  situation  with  economic  operators  being  faced  with  27  different 
types  of  rules  and  lack  of  legal  certainty  despite  the  application  of  the  regulation 
currently in force.  

These  objectives  are  fully  compatible  with  other  EU  policies  and  with  the  Charter  of 
Fundamental  Rights.  They  are  notably  fully  aligned  with  the  EU  commitment  to 
“continue  to  promote  responsible  and  effective  arms  export  control  in  the  EU’s 
neighbourhood, in accordance with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP for military-grade 

24 

 
 
weapons and Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 for civilian firearms.”58 They are also in line 
with the approach taken in the modernisation of the export control mechanism for dual-
use goods under Regulation (EU) 2021/82159. 

58  

as  mentioned  in  the  Joint  Communication  of  the  Commission  and  of  the  High  Representative 
“Elements towards an EU Strategy against illicit Firearms, Small Arms & Light Weapons and their 
Ammunition”  JOIN(2018)17 of  13.6.2018  and  in  the  Council  Conclusions  on  the  Adoption  of  an 
EU  Strategy  Against  Illicit  Firearms,  Small  Arms  &  Light  Weapons  &  Their  Ammunition, 
9.11.2018. 

59   
Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting 
up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-
use items (recast), OJ L 206 11.6.2021 

25 

 
 
 
                                                 
Intervention logic 

26 

 
 
 
 
 
5.  WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? 

5.1.  WHAT IS THE BASELINE FROM WHICH OPTIONS ARE ASSESSED? 

In the baseline scenario, the current regulatory framework would remain unchanged, as  described 
essentially in the evaluation report of the application of Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 of December 
2017.60 Consequently, the problem description would also be unaffected. 

With respect to semi-finished firearms and essential components, Rule 2(a) of the World Customs 
Organisation’s  General  rules  for  the  interpretation  of  the  harmonized  system  (i.e.  the  world-wide 
customs  classification  of  goods)61  already  apply  and  customs  must  already  treat  semi-finished 
receivers as essential components of firearms, as according to this rule “any reference in a heading 
to an article shall be taken to include a reference to that article incomplete or unfinished, provided 
that, as presented, the incomplete or unfinished article has the essential character of the complete or 
finished article.” This provision would continue to be unevenly applied, with many semi-finished 
firearms and components being declared as other types of goods. 

As mentioned in the above-mentioned report, some Member States will continue to apply the rules 
and  procedures  of  the  Regulation  to  weapons,  which  are  currently  excluded  from  its  scope 
(deactivated  firearms,  alarm  and  signal  weapons).  The  overlap  with  the  Common  Position  would 
continue, and each Member State would continue to have its own rules and procedures regarding 
firearms  that  are  legally  owned  and  acquired  by  civilians  but  which  they  consider  as  “military”. 
National  competent  authorities  will  continue  facing  difficulties  in  determining  the  civilian  or 
military  nature  of  firearms  (in  particular  as  regards  weapons  in  category  ML1)62  based  on  their 
technical characteristics. 15 Member States opted for a single procedure (see section 2.1.2) to issue 
export authorisations, the arrangements for which vary greatly from one Member State to  another. 
The methods for submitting authorisation requests will remain in the hands of the Member States, 
with burdensome paper-based procedures remaining a majority.63  

In  application  of  article  55  of  the  implementing  provision  of  the  Union  Customs  Code,  the 
Commission collects data regarding the import and export of firearms in the Customs Surveillance 
System (Military shipments are not subject to submitting declarations and therefore are not subject 
to customs Surveillance).64 The data collected could be used at aggregated level (without personal 

60  
61  

62 

63  

64  

COM(2017) 737 final, 12.12.2017. 
General  rules  for  the  interpretation  of  the  harmonized  system  https://www.wcotradetools.org/en/harmonized-
system/rules 
The  ML1  list  includes  smooth-bore  weapons  with  a  calibre  of  less  than  20 mm,  other  arms  and  automatic 
weapons with a calibre of 12.7 mm or less and accessories. 
In  the  confidential  consultation  of  national  authorities,  only  one  third  of  respondents  mentioned  the  use  of 
electronic  import  authorisation  processes,  and  only  40%  indicated  the  use  of  electronic  export  authorisation 
processes. 
Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  2015/2447  of  24  November  2015  laying  down  detailed  rules  for 
implementing  certain  provisions  of  Regulation  (EU)  No  952/2013  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 
Council laying down the Union Customs Code, OJ L 343, 29.12.2015. 

27 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
data), for the development of an EU-level analysis of the licit flows of civilian firearms to and from 
the European Union, which would facilitate a better knowledge of the threat and contribute to more 
efficient risk profiles and targeting of checks. However, as mentioned in section 2.1.2, customs data 
do  not  enable  a  distinction  between  military  and  civilian  firearms;  or  between  the  different 
categories (prohibited, subject to authorisation, subject to declaration) of firearms according to the 
Regulation. Publicly available data are not comparable and different sources contradict one another 
(see below section 6.1 and annex 4).  

The  following  issues  would  remain  unresolved  in  a  “no  action”  scenario.  The  absence  of  any 
provisions  in  the  Regulation  for  export  markings  in  the  case  of  deactivated  weapons  or  alarm 
weapons  makes  traceability  impossible.  Moreover,  the  traceability  of  the  consignments  is  not 
guaranteed  during  transit  operations  through  the  customs  territory  of  the  European  Union.  The 
disparate  practices  in  national  records  (no  single  national  register)  adversely  affect  traceability. 
Similarly,  the  absence  of  interconnectivity  between  intra-EU  transfer  files  and  files  for  export 
licences  complicates  the  full  reconstitution  of  movements  of  firearms.  Data  about  trade, 
authorisations, denials and enforcement would continue to be gathered in an uncoordinated way. 

An extract from the criminal record is not systematically requested when submitting an application 
for an export authorisation, as it is not expressly required by the regulation. There is no indication 
that the existence of a crime or an infringement justifying the refusal of the authorisation is always 
checked  either  in  the  national  criminal  records,  or  a  fortiori  in  the  criminal  records  of  the  other 
Member States.  Many national  authorities will continue to  grant  export authorisations  even when 
identical  transactions  have  been  refused  by  another  Member  State.  During  the  confidential 
consultation  of  national  authorities,  only  12%  of  respondents  (three  replies)  mentioned  that  they 
check  the  criminal  record  of  the  applicant  in  European  Criminal  Records  Information  System 
before granting an authorisation or that they request the applicant to submit a copy of the national 
criminal  record  of  another  relevant  country.  The  baseline  scenario  therefore  maintains  a  major 
security gap. 

As mentioned in the 2017 evaluation report of the Commission, the regulatory and administrative 
landscape  will  also  remain  disparate  because  of  the  lack  of  clarity  of  some  provisions,  complex 
articulations with other instruments, the leeway given to the Member States in their administrative 
procedures,  in  evaluating  authorisation  requests  and  in  whether  or  not  to  recognise  the  tacit 
agreement  of  third  countries  of  transit,  and  the  general  nature  of  the  provisions  governing 
information exchanges and administrative cooperation. As the Commission is not an addressee of 
the information exchanges on authorisation refusals, it will remain unable to monitor the situation 
at  European  level  and  alert  the  competent  authorities  in  cases  where  their  respective  approaches 
diverge.  

In the baseline scenario, imports procedures and authorisation processes will remain completely out 
of the scope of the Regulation, although this is an exclusive competence of the EU, which Member 
States are in principle precluded to regulate. 

It  is  likely  that  the  2018  Recommendation  of  the  Commission  on  immediate  steps  to  improve 
security  of  export,  import  and  transit  measures  for  firearms,  their  parts  and  essential  components 
and ammunition65 will continue to  be ignored by  Member States, as  it has been so far. The main 
reason for the lack of uptake of the 2018 Recommendation is likely to be its non-mandatory nature. 
In  addition,  implementation  of  the  recommendation  would  have  involved  additional  work  and  a 

65  

C(2018) 2197 final 

28 

 
                                                 
change of administrative habits. This is particularly the case for the lack of provision of statistical 
data,  which  can  result  from  a  conjunction  of  both  a  difficulty  in  distinguishing  military  from 
civilian firearms and a weak administrative capacities to collect the data. The Recommendation was 
in any case not sufficiently specific to address the disparate practices between Member States. As a 
result,  exporters  will  continue  to  face  a  non-unified  import  and  export  control  mechanism  for 
firearms. 

With  respect  to  seizures  of  firearms,  it  is  unlikely  that  Member  States  subject  to  the  Schengen 
acquis would substantially improve their provision of statistics pursuant to the 1999 Decision of the 
Executive Committee on the illegal  trade in  firearms, since the Commission is  not aware of such 
communications.66   

In the baseline scenario, since 15 March 2021, customs authorities will have a better oversight of 
firearms  and  firearms  parts  imported  in  the  EU  through  fast  parcel  shipment,  since  relevant 
operators  are  now  under  the  obligation  to  issue  a  summary  entry  declaration  in  the  EU’s  Import 
Control System (ICS)2 for all goods shipped to the EU. 

5.2.  DESCRIPTION OF THE POLICY OPTIONS 

5.2.1.  OPTION 1: SOFT-LAW APPROACH 

Option  1  is  based  on  a  soft-law  approach,  which  would  focus  on  complementing  the  2018 
Recommendation  of  the  Commission  on  immediate  steps  to  improve  security  of  export, 
import  and  transit  measures  for  firearms,  their  parts  and  essential  components  and 
ammunition,67  with  additional  more  detailed  guidance  and  stepping  up  enforcement  of  the 
already applicable legislation. 

Import 

With  respect  to  traceability  of  firearms  the  2018  Recommendation  notably  encourages  Member 
States, in addition to the unique marking required by the Firearms Directive, to make an additional 
and simple marking with the identification of the country of import and year of import, as required 
by the UN Firearms Protocol. 

With respect  to  semi-finished firearms and essential  components, the Commission  would  provide 
guidance  building  on  Rule  2(a)  of  the  World  Customs  Organisation’s  General  rules  for  the 
interpretation  of  the  harmonized  system.68  The  Guidance  would  build  on  those  principles 
specifically in relation to firearms, by providing a working definition of semi-finished firearms and 
components, and requesting Member States to report on how they implement those principles. 

The  Guidance  would  include  detailed  criteria  for  the  correct  customs  classification  of  weapons 
either as alarm and signal weapons or as firearms. 

Export 

The Recommendation also calls on Member States to verify systematically that all firearms, which 
are deactivated in  the EU and are exported to  third countries as deactivated firearms, are marked 

66  
67  
68  

SCH/Com-ex (99) 10 
C(2018) 2197 final 
see above in the baseline scenario 

29 

 
                                                 
and  that  owners  are  issued  a  deactivation  certificate  in  accordance  with  EU  law.69  In  addition, 
Member  States  would  be  encouraged  to  apply  the  standards  of  non-convertibility  of  alarm  and 
signal weapons70 to exported alarm and signal weapons, in addition to their existing obligation to 
check imported alarm and signal weapons pursuant to Implementing Directive 2019/69. 

This option would include more specific guidance, listing out the particulars that firearms licensing 
authorities should trace and record at export (notably the name of the manufacturer or the brand, the 
country  or  place  of  manufacture,  the  serial  number  and  year  of  manufacture  and  if  possible  the 
model). 

Improved cooperation and exchanges of information between competent authorities 

With  respect  to  law  enforcement  cooperation  and  exchange  of  information,  this  option  would 
complement the 2018 Recommendation: 

-  with  more  detailed  templates  for  the  provision  of  annual  statistics  about  the  number  of 
authorisations, refusals, the quantities and values of firearms exports and imports, by origin 
or destination, in order to develop a better picture of the movements; 

-  by  asking  them  to  report  on  the  use  of  the  European  Criminal  Records  Information 

Exchange System (ECRIS) when checking the criminal background of applicants; 

-  by asking them to report on the type of inspection systems and processes to check whether 

the conditions for granting an export authorisation continue to be met; 

-  by upgrading and improving the COARM System, in order to adapt it to civilian firearms, 
and ensure that Regulation (EU) No 258/2012  is  correctly mentioned  as  the legal  basis in 
the system, and asking Member States to report on checks and notifications in COARM; 

In addition to the new guidance, the Commission would step up exchanges of information through 
the meetings of the Firearms Export coordination group by requesting Member States to report in 
that context 

-  on exchange risk information related to the movement of firearms through the customs risk 

management system; 

-  on exchange of information about the classification of imported alarm and signal weapons 

To  improve  the  implementation  of  the  1999  Decision  of  the  Executive  Committee  on  the  illegal 
trade  in  firearms,71  the  Commission  would  provide  an  update  of  the  categories  and  type  of 
information  about  seizures to  be reported  annually.  It would  also  call on Member States to  share 
those data annually according to an updated template with Europol. 

69  

70  

71  

Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  2015/2403,  amended  by  Commission  Implementing  Regulation 
(EU)  2018/2403  establishing  common  guidelines  on  deactivation  standards  and  techniques  for  ensuring  that 
deactivated firearms are rendered irreversibly inoperable (Text with EEA relevance) 
Commission Implementing Directive (EU) 2019/69 of 16 January 2019 laying down technical specifications for 
alarm and signal weapons under Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the acquisition and possession of 
weapons 
SCH/Com-ex (99) 10 

30 

 
                                                 
With  respect  to  the  coordination  of  risk  assessment  and  customs  controls,  in  view  of  the  future 
releases of the Import Control System 2 (ICS2)72, the Commission would review the Common Risk 
Criteria  and  standards  (CRC)  for  pre-arrival73  and  improve  the  targeting  of  firearms  trafficked  in 
commercial shipments, including postal and express consignments, with criteria aimed at prohibited 
and  restricted  items.  The  new  set  of  CRC  would  be  applied  to  the  Entry  Summary  Declarations 
submitted by the economic operators to the customs office of first entry, for all goods entering the 
EU external borders. Moreover, new analytics capabilities (Safety and Security Analytics – SSA) to 
complement and enhance the risk analysis will be introduced as per Release 2 of ICS2. 

Under  Horizon  2020,  the  Commission  will  fund  activities  to  improve  notably  the  detection  of 
weapons,  with  non-intrusive  inspection  of  cargo  or  packages  and  Artificial  intelligence  image 
recognition.74 

Administrative simplifications 

Under  this  option,  the  Commission  would  also  facilitate  the  activities  of  economic  operators  by 
publishing a non-binding list of competent authorities in non-EU countries, that would help them 
determine who to reach out to in order to get the required import or transit authorisations. 

Furthermore, the new guidance of the Commission would include recommendations, based on best 
practices  of  Member  States,  on  the  use  of  simplified  procedures.  This  would  notably  concern 
temporary  imports  and  temporary  exports  currently  not  covered  by  the  Regulation.  It  could  also 
include  specific  guidance  for  facilitations  in  favour  of  Authorised  Economic  Operators  with  the 
Safety and Security element (AEO-S or AEO-F), subject to integration in TARIC.  

Such  new  guidance  would  also  include  the  use  of  systematic  e-licencing  procedure.  Besides,  the 
Commission  would  provide  for  Member  States  a  free-of  charge  voluntary  e-licensing  procedure, 
building  on  and  expanding  the  e-licensing  platform75  (currently  dedicated  to  exports  of  dual-use 
goods) to cover imports and exports of firearms. This e-licensing platform could also support the 
data collection.  

5.2.2.  OPTION 2: CLARIFICATION OF THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK 

Option  2  provides  for  a  legislative  clarification,  which  would  remove  ambiguities  in  the 
interpretation  of  the  applicable  legislation  (e.g.  type  of  information  to  be  recorded, 
classification  of  certain  weapons  and  components  as  firearms),  an  express  legal  basis  to 
require competent authorities to use  existing systems to exchange information, harmonising 
existing simplified procedures, aligning deadlines, clarifying roles of importers and exporters, 

72  
73  

74  

75  

Release 2 on 1st March 2023 (air general cargo) and Release 3 on 1st March 2024 (all other means of transport). 
Commission Decision No C (2011) 5170 of 22. July 2011 amending the Decision C (20019) 2601 of 15. April 
establishing  common  risk  criteria  and  standards  for  security  and  safety  risk  analysis  for  the  harmonised 
application of certain customs controls pursuant to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 
ENTRANCE: fficient Risk-based Inspection of freight Crossing borders without disrupting business (entrance-
h2020.eu);  C-BORD  Project  -  Effective  Container  Inspection  at  BORDer  Control  Points  (cbord-h2020.eu); 
ACXIS: Automated  Comparison  of  X-ray  Images  for  cargo  Scanning;  MULTISCAN3D: Laser-plasma  based 
source  3D  Tomography  for  cargo  inspection;  SilentBorder Cosmic  Ray  Tomograph  for  Identification  of 
Hazardous and Illegal Goods hidden in Trucks and Sea Containers  
https://webgate.acceptance.ec.europa.eu/frontoffice/welcome. Expanding this e-licensing platform, managed by 
DG Trade, should not include a large cost. It is estimated that this will cost a couple of thousand euros.  

31 

 
                                                 
and  aligning  the  scope  of  the  Regulation  with  the  Firearms  Directive.  This  option  would 
essentially translate most of the measures mentioned in option 1 in the text of the Regulation. 

Import 

With respect to imported alarm and signal weapons, it would fill a gap resulting from the unclear 
legal framework and the ensuing lack of proper import controls, which could not be addressed by 
the Commission Implementing Directive (EU) 2019/69 because of the limitation of the delegation 
of power. It would provide for a compulsory classification as firearms of alarm and signal weapons 
not complying with the Firearms Directive and the implementing directive, as early as the stage of 
the customs declaration. Member States  would also have to designate the authorities in charge of 
checking compliance with the implementing directive before the release into free circulation, if it 
differs from the authorities designated under the implementing directive. 

Export 

To  support  national  licensing  authorities  in  ensuring  the  tracing  of  exported  firearms,  this  option 
includes  an  explicit  reference  to  the  possibility  to  use  the  opportunities  of  the  tools  for 
administrative and investigative cooperation in third countries, provided by article 20 of the 1997 
Regulation on mutual assistance.76 

Improved cooperation and exchanges of information between competent authorities 

This option would provide for a compulsory check of  criminal records in ECRIS and provide for 
exchange  of  risk  information  related  to  the  movement  of  firearms  by  using  the  customs  risk 
management system. 

It would also make it compulsory to notify refusals in a common electronic system and check for 
refusals issued by other Member States before granting an authorisation. This system could either 
be COARM or an extension of the Dual-Use electronic System (DUeS)77 to cover not only exports 
of dual-use goods but also imports and exports of firearms. The Commission would have delegated 
powers to determine such a system.78 The relevant provision could be similar to that of articles 4(7) 
and  23(6)  of  the  dual-use  regulation.79This  digitalisation  and  compulsory  checks  of  a  common 
electronic system would contribute to the collection of some data. However, this option would not 
oblidge Member States to gather and send in any additional data regarding the export and import 
authorisations, their value and destination.  

In addition, this option would create a legal basis to enable export licensing authorities to check, in 
case  of  suspicion  (e.g.  when  the  firearm  was  not  previously  registered  in  the  national  data-filing 

76  

77  

Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  515/97  of  13  March  1997  on  mutual  assistance  between  the  administrative 
authorities of the Member States and cooperation between the latter and the Commission to ensure the correct 
application of the law on customs and agricultural matters 
The  Dual Use System (DUeS) offered by the Commission  is  used by all the  Member States in order to share 
information on Dual Use export transactions and enforce the controls at European level. DUeS communications 
are  exchanged over the secured TESTA network thereby ensuring the appropriate level of data  confidentiality 
and integrity.  

Extending these systems to incorporate refusals issued by Member States on granting an authorisations, will 

78  
take time. During the implementation, DG HOME will take into account the view and limitations of other services. 
79  

Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union 
regime  for  the  control  of  exports,  brokering,  technical  assistance,  transit  and  transfer  of  dual-use  items,  OJ  L 
206, 11.6.2021. 

32 

 
                                                 
system or was not just recently manufactured) whether an exported firearm has been reported lost 
or stolen in another Member State by checking the Schengen Information System before granting 
an export authorisation. 

Under this option, the Regulation would also make applicable the whistle-blower-protection regime 
put in place with Directive (EU) No 2019/193780 to persons who report breaches of the Regulation. 
The Regulation was not included in the list of Union act to which the Directive applies because of 
an incompatibility between the legal  bases, which would be solved by a  specific provision  in  the 
Regulation. Besides, in order to clarify the legal framework, it would complement the definition of 
trafficking of article 2 (15) of the regulation with an additional provision in article 16 (devoted to 
sanctions), establishing an express incrimination of arms trafficking. 

Administrative simplifications 

The  revised  regulation  would  clarify  definitions  and  categories  of  firearms  to  bring  them  in  line 
with those of Directive (EU) 2021/555. It would for instance apply to brokers and collectors. The 
list of prohibited weapons to which the Regulation currently does not apply would be expanded to 
include the whole category A of the most dangerous firearms. The overlap between the Regulation 
and the Common Position would be solved by building on the logic of the current Regulation – and 
actually  further restricting its scope, thus  subjecting the firearms that have been prohibited inside 
the  EU  since  the  amendment  to  the  Firearms  Directive  in  2017  only  to  the  Council  Common 
Position 2008/944/CFSP. This would mean that many weapons currently in the “grey zone” would 
only be subject to the Common Position. 

To  harmonise  administrative  procedures  and  provide  economic  operators  with  a  unified,  simpler, 
regulatory  environment,  the  Regulation  would  include  new  provisions  clarifying  the  roles  and 
responsibilities of importers and exporters, similar to those currently in force with respect to market 
surveillance  and  compliance  of  products  under  article  4  of  Regulation  (EU)  2019/1020  (making 
sure  the  right  marking  is  applied  to  imported  firearms,  duty  of  cooperation  with  competent 
authority, duty to inform authorities in case of suspected violation of the rules, etc.). 

The  Regulation  would  align  deadlines  for  granting  import  authorisations  to  deadlines  for  export 
authorisations  (60  days  and  exceptionally  90  days).  It  would  establish  harmonised  simplified 
procedures  for temporary  exports not  currently covered by the Regulation (such as exhibitions  or 
repairs). It would repeal the possibility for a global authorisation, which is almost never used. 

Finally, the Regulation would turn the current option for Member States to assume implied consent 
of the third country of transit (if it has not replied within 20 days) into the default option. Member 
States would have to expressly notify the requirement of an express agreement of the third country 
of transit. 

5.2.3.  OPTION 3: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS 

Option 3 would build on and complement option 2, and add to it new legislative provisions to 
ensure  the  full  traceability  of  imported  and  exported  firearms  (e.g.  compulsory  import 
marking,  limiting  imports  of  semi-finished  components  to  dealers,  computerised  data-filing, 
post-shipment  checks),  for  national  authorities  to  share  statistics  and  improve  exchanges  of 

80  

Directive  (EU)  No  2019/1937  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  23  October  2019  on  the 
protection of persons who report breaches of Union law, OJ of 26.11.2019, L 305/17. 

33 

 
                                                 
information  between  licencing  and  customs  authorities,  to  establish  new  simplifications 
(temporary  imports,  general  export  authorisation,  e-procedures),  and  to  remove  the  scope 
overlaps  with  Common  Position  2008/944/CFSP  by  applying  exclusively  to  all  civilian-to-
civilian transactions. 

Import 

At  import,  the  Regulation  would  establish  a  clearer  rule  than  under  the  current  Directive  (EU) 
2021/555, providing that no firearm or essential component could be released into free circulation 
or placed on the market without the unique marking required by the Directive (under the Directive, 
marking must take place “without delay after import”). To avoid that unmarked firearms end up in 
the wrong hands in third country, such unmarked firearms would have to be destroyed.  

To avoid diverging analyses from one Member State to another, the Regulation would establish an 
EU-level mechanism to ensure that a given model of alarm and signal weapon is classified under 
the same position of the customs combined nomenclature throughout the EU. For imported alarm 
and signal  weapons, the  regulation  could  also  establish a  list  of non-convertible alarm  and signal 
weapons  that  are  compliant  with  implementing  directive  2019/69,  thus  ensuring  that  the  import 
authorisation of such weapons would be automatically recognised throughout the EU.  

Under this option, the Regulation would provide a common definition of semi-finished firearms and 
essential components  and limit their import to licensed arms dealers; such semi-finished products 
would therefore not be available anymore to private individuals.  

Finally, in  order to  avoid any legal  loopholes facilitating misdeclaration of goods, the Regulation 
would  provide  that  customs  simplifications  are  not  applicable  to  firearms  and  their  essential 
components. 

Export 

To  ensure  full  traceability  at  export,  the  Regulation  would  make  it  compulsory  for  exporters  to 
provide evidence of final import in the country of destination. It would also provide a legal basis 
enabling  Member  States  to  entitle  third  parties  to  conduct  post-shipment  controls  in  their  name, 
notably through the implementation of Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2191.81 

In  order  to  take  into  account  the  need  to  ensure  full  traceability  of  firearms  which  could  also  be 
used for military purposes or for internal repression, and to compensate for removal of the overlap 
with  Council  Common  Position  2008/944/CFSP  (see  below  –  administrative  simplifications),  the 
Regulation  would  create  for  weapons  prohibited  (category  A)  and  subject  to  authorisation 
(category B) an obligation for the exporter to provide an end-user certificate. The Regulation would 
include the particulars and characteristics of such an end-user certificate. To limit the administrative 
burden,  and  in  line  with  the  User's  Guide  to  Council  Common  Position  2008/944/CFSP  defining 
common  rules  governing  the  control  of  exports  of  military  technology  and  equipment,82  only  the 
actual importer of civilian firearms (i.e. the arms dealer) in the third country would be considered as 

81  

82  

Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2191 of 19 December 2019 in support of a global reporting mechanism on illicit 
conventional arms and their ammunition to reduce the risk of their diversion and illicit transfer 
“in the case of an export to a firm which resells the goods on the local market, the firm will be regarded as the 
end-user”;  

 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST%209241%202009%20INIT/EN/pdf;  

34 

 
                                                 
the  end-user.  The  end-user  certificate  would  include  a  commitment  not  to  re-export  firearms 
without prior approval of the EU licensing authority and not to sell it to non-civilian users. 

 Improved cooperation and exchanges of information between competent authorities 

To  ensure  proper  record-keeping,  the  Regulation  would  require  Member  States  to  establish 
computerised  data-filing  systems  for  import  and  export  authorisations.  This  would  effectively 
create digital continuity with internal data-filing systems, which are already computerised pursuant 
to  the  Firearms  Directive.  Furthermore,  this  would  facilitate  the  systematic  data  collection  of  the 
Member States.  

In  this  option,  the  Regulation  would  include  detailed  provisions  on  the  exchange  of  information 
between  licensing  authorities  and  customs  authorities,  to  clarify  their  respective  roles  and 
responsibilities, and ensure good coordination especially when the customs office of entry or of exit 
is in a different Member State than the import or export licensing authority. The Regulation would 
notably clarify the roles of customs authorities in the case of external transit of firearms, including 
in the case of transit (i.e. movements of non-EU goods). Except for temporary imports and exports, 
where  the  declaration  would  include  the  particulars  of  individual  firearms  or  components  (see 
below),  the  role  of  customs  would  limit  itself  to  the  traceability  of  shipments.  The  Regulation 
would only provide for customs checks based on risk assessment. 

Until  e-licences  and  the  full  inter-connection  with  the  EU  Single  Window  Environment  for 
Customs  are  rolled  out,  it  would  notably  apply  to  the  Regulation  article  25  of  Regulation  (EU) 
1020/2019 on market surveillance with respect to controls on products entering the Union market.83  

It would also draw inspiration from the rules proposed by: 

the 2021 proposal for a Regulation on deforestation:84 

  article 24 in  relation  to  the organisation  of controls,  in  particular the check by customs of 

the relevant import or export licence before release for free circulation or export; 

the 2021 proposal for a Regulation on shipments of waste:85 

  article  35,  paragraph  3,  points  a)  to  e)  with  respect  to  transit  of  firearms  between  the 
customs office of entry and the customs office of import or the customs office of export and 
the customs office of exit;  

  article  54  with  respect  to  firearms  shipped  through  Member  States  from  and  to  third 

countries 

The Regulation would provide a legal basis for the sharing of intelligence by licensing authorities 
with customs authorities.  

83  

84  

85  

Regulation  (EU)  2019/1020  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  20  June  2019  on  market 
surveillance  and  compliance  of  products  and  amending  Directive  2004/42/EC  and  Regulations  (EC)  No 
765/2008 and (EU) No 305/2011, OJ L 169, 25.6.2019. 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the making available on the Union 
market as well as export from the Union of certain commodities and products associated with deforestation and 
forest degradation and repealing Regulation (EU) No 995/2010, COM/2021/706 final 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on shipments of waste and amending 
Regulations (EU) No 1257/2013 and (EU) No 2020/1056, COM/2021/709 final 

35 

 
                                                 
To improve the knowledge of trends and exchanges of information between licencing and customs 
authorities, Member States would be required to submit annually their statistics on the number of 
authorisations, refusals, as well as value, amounts, countries of origin and of destination of imports 
and exports to the Commission. Besides, the obligation currently stemming from the 1999 Decision 
of the Schengen Executive Committee on the illegal trade in firearms86 to “submit each year their 
national annual data for the preceding year on illegal trade in firearms” would be enshrined in the 
Regulation, thus applying to all EU Member States and EFTA countries. The digitalisation of the 
different procedures should support the Member States in this task.  

Administrative simplifications 

The  Regulation  would  provide  a  legal  basis  to  use  the  EU  Single  Window  Environment  for 
customs,87  enabling  a  connection  between  customs  systems  and  import  and  export  e-licensing 
systems through an EU database via the EU Single Window Environment for customs via the EU 
Customs Single Window Certificates Exchange System (EU CSW-CERTEX)88. To further simplify 
authorisation  procedures  for  economic  operators,  systematic  e-procedures  (electronic  licensing 
system)  would  be  made  compulsory  (as  a  complement  to  the  e-licensing  system  provided  by  the 
Commission under option 1). 

In order to provide economic operators and competent authorities with a simpler, unified regulatory 
framework, this option would address one of the most-mentioned problems, namely the grey zone 
between  the  civilian  firearms  of  the  Regulation  and  the  firearms  “specially  designed  for  military 
use”  subject  to  the  procedures  of  the  Common  Position  2008/944/CFSP.  Under  this  option,  the 
scope of the Regulation would be fully aligned with the scope of the Firearms Directive (including 
the category A of most dangerous firearms). As mentioned in section 4.1 above, State-to-State (i.e. 
government-to-government) transactions, as well as direct sales to the armed forces, the police, or 
public authorities would still be excluded from the scope of this initiative, and would continue to be 
subject to Common Position 2008/944/CFSP. All other transactions would be considered of civilian 
nature, and be subject only to the rules and procedure of this Regulation.  To summarize, the new 
Regulation would: 

1.  regulate all civilian transactions (the Common position would not apply to them any more) 

2.  establish for prohibited firearms and firearms subject to authorisation substantive rules that 

are similar to those of the Common Position. 

Under  this  option,  the  Regulation  would  also  set  out  harmonised  simplifications  for  temporary 
imports and exports (for repairs, expertise or exhibition), as well as re-imports following temporary 
export or re-exports following temporary imports. In this option, the mere release of the goods by 
customs authorities would amount to an import or export authorisation. 

The  Commission  would  have  the  power  to  adopt  delegated  acts  establishing  a  general  export 
authorisation  for  arms  dealers  which  are  Authorised  Economic  Operators  with  the  Safety  and 
Security element (AEO-S or AEO-F) under customs rules. This would essentially replace the global 
authorisation  repealed  in  option  2.  The  exact  scope  of  the  authorisation  would  be  defined  in  the 
delegated  act.  As  an  illustration,  it  could  be  limited  to  intra-group  movements  (i.e.  exports  of 

SCH/Com-ex (99) 10 
COM(2020) 673 final 

86  
87  
88 The creation of this interconnection will be a coordination exercise between different services of the Commission. It 
will be important to keep a realistic timeframe in mind 

36 

 
                                                 
firearms to a subsidiary of an EU-based company in a third country), or it could cover exports to 
authorised economic operators in third countries recognised by the Member State in application of 
an agreement of mutual recognition. 

In  this  option,  fees  for  authorisations  and  transit  (except  escorting)  would  be  prohibited,  thus 
alleviating the financial burden on economic operators. 

5.2.4.  OPTION 3 BIS: NEW PROVISIONS WITHOUT CHANGE TO THE INTERPLAY  WITH 

THE COMMON POSITION 

Option  3  bis  would  be  substantially  similar  to  option  3,  with  one  exception:  instead  of 
following the logic of the Firearms Directive for the distinction between military and civilian 
transaction, the Regulation would maintain the reference to “firearms specially designed for 
military use”. 

Under this option, avoiding the overlap between the Regulation and the Council Common Position 
2008/944/CFSP would require the establishment of the technical characteristics which would define 
whether the firearms owned by civilians must be considered as military or civilian ones. Currently 
this assessment is done at national level on a case by case basis. 

Under this option, the Commission would adopt an implementing or a delegated act listing out the 
characteristics  of  the  firearms,  and  could  even  issue  Decisions  to  classify  a  given  firearm  model 
into either the civilian or military category.  

5.3.  ELEMENTS DISCARDED AT AN EARLY STAGE 

Considering  their  wide  range  and  realistic  nature,  no  option  could  be  discarded  as  a  whole  at  an 
early  stage.  However,  the  Commission  considers  that  some  individual  elements  of  the  options 
should in any case not be implemented. They were therefore excluded from the assessment of the 
options. 

The UN Firearms provides that State parties establish import marking with the marking of the first 
country of import and the year of import. Such a measure would concretely not genuinely improve 
the  traceability  of  firearms  imported  in  the  EU.  Within  the  EU  customs  union,  traceability  is 
already ensured by the existence of the unique marking provided by the Firearms Directive and the 
registration in national computerised data-filing systems, effectively enabling the full traceability of 
firearms as required by the Firearms Protocol. When a weapon is seized and cannot be traced back 
in  the national  system of the  country of seizure, national  law enforcement  authorities will send  a 
tracing request to relevant countries of suspicion, in connection with the case (based on the visible 
markings of the weapons, the country of the nationality of the perpetrator or any relevant contextual 
element). If that does not yield any result, a search in the Schengen Information System will show 
whether the firearm was lost or stolen elsewhere in the EU. Finally, a last resort option is to send a 
tracing request to all Member States through Europol’s Secure Information Exchange Network.  A 
search  in  Interpol’s  iArms  database  may  also  determine  whether  the  firearm  was  lost  or  stolen 
outside of the EU. In most cases, the tracing is ensured in the two first options and do not require 
additional  information  such  as  the  country  or  year  of  import.  Besides,  firearms  imported  into  the 
EU are unlikely to be re-exported and diverted outside of the EU, thus making such import marking 
unnecessary  for  traceability  purposes.  Neither  the  UNODC  Global  Firearms  Study  nor  any  other 
case studies point to any weapons imported into the EU, which were then re-exported and diverted, 

37 

 
and for which the import marking would have made a difference.  In fact, most firearms exported 
from the EU have been manufactured in the EU and therefore would in any case not bear an import 
marking. As 19 Member States89 already require import markings, the additional costs of imposing 
such  marking  on  the  remaining  Member  States  would  amount  to  2,4  million  euro  per  year. 
Consequently  the  administrative  and  economic  burden  of  imposing  additional  import  marking 
would be out of proportion with the security advantages it would provide in terms of traceability or 
with the role-model that the EU could play at international level.  

The  idea  to  request  an  entry  summary  declaration  even  in  personal  luggage  was  considered  a 
disproportionate  burden.  To  avoid  the  risk  of  smuggling  of  firearms  in  personal  luggage,  the 
Regulation would have made compulsory an Entry Summary Declaration for firearms in line with 
article 127 of the Union Customs Code,90  effectively disapplying the  exemption  of article 104 of 
Delegated  Regulation  2015/2446.  Such  an  option  would  have  required  prior  customs  declaration 
before  the  arrival  on  the  EU  customs  territory.  It  would  not  have  provided  a  specific  benefit 
compared to  the  current  obligation to  declare the firearms at  arrival, and  would in  any  case have 
been  easily  circumvented  by  fraudsters,  who  would  have  continued  to  smuggle  firearms  and 
essential components through that channel. 

6.  WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? 

6.1.  METHODOLOGY 

Annex  4  describes  the  methodological  constraints  faced  during  this  impact  assessment  in  the 
collection of governmental and company data.  

The  main  issue  that  has  been  encountered  consistently  since  2017  is  the  lack  of  reliable  and 
consistent  data  that  would  enable  a  quantification  of  the  problems  and  of  the  impact  of  options. 
This  is  due  to  inadequate  data  collection  at  national  level  (several  Member  States  do  not  collect 
centrally data on import or export authorisations,91 or are unable to distinguish between civilian and 
military firearms,92 the statistics about the latter being sometimes confidential) and the reluctance of 
economic  operators  to  share  data  about  what  they  consider  is  sensitive  information,  despite  the 
Commission  recommendation  to  share  such  data  in  2018.  Besides,  available  business  statistics 
relate  only  to  EU  arms  manufacturers  but  not  all  arms  dealers,  which  are  the  most  relevant  ones 
when it comes to imports into the EU. 

The  Commission  (and  its  contractor)  repeatedly  attempted  to  collect  accurate  information  during 
the 2017 evaluation of the Regulation, during the 2019 study on improvement of the EU rules on 
imports and export of firearms, during the 2021 consultation of stakeholders and the consultation of 
Member States (official letters of August 2021 and February 2022, targeted questionnaires, face-to-
face interviews). This notwithstanding, the data collection is not comprehensive. 

89        BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, HR, HU, IT, LT, LU, PL, PT, RO, SE, SI and SK 
90  

Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down 
the Union Customs Code 

91         Especially the largest players such as Germany or Italy. Belgium does not collect data on actual exports. 
92         The German national report on firearms policy of 2020 explains that the numbers for ML1 are higher than the   
            total value of individual small arms licenses because ML1 also covers civilian firearms (revolvers, pistols)  
            hunting and sporting weapons    
(https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Publikationen/Aussenwirtschaft/ruestungsexporte-bmwi-070221.pdf). 

38 

 
                                                 
As a consequence, much of the statistics and figures had to be extrapolated from the scant available 
data,  or  based  on  a  median  figure  on  a  range.  For  instance,  the  analysis  assumes  that  the 
stakeholders concerned by exports are the 1000 EU-based firearms manufacturers, although not all 
manufacturers carry out exports, and some retailers of firearms or individual users may also export 
firearms. The analysis assumes that the stakeholders concerned by imports are the estimated 20.000 
arms  dealers  in  the  EU  (based  on  an  estimation  of  industry  associations  since  no  official  data  is 
available,  annex  4  gives  more  information).  As  not  all  such  arms  dealers  carry  out  imports  from 
non-EU countries, the costs of the measures introduced are bound to be an over-estimation93. 

6.2. 

SOCIAL IMPACTS 

6.2.1.  IMPACTS ON CITIZENS 

Individual  citizens  will  be  primarily  affected  in  their  capacity  of  firearms  users,  be  they  hunters, 
sport  shooters,  or  collectors.  The  vast  majority  of  them  only  operate  within  the  EU,  and  will 
therefore  not  be  affected  by  EU  rules  on  exports  and  imports.  In  the  public  consultation,  several 
respondents used the free text questions to explain that import and export procedures are currently 
so burdensome that they do not engage in such operations. The vast majority of respondents (90% 
being individual citizens) considered that they would benefit from a genuinely unified export and 
import  control  system  for  firearms,  which  was  confirmed  in  replies  to  the  free  text  questions. 
Establishing  unified  EU  rules  for  administrative  simplifications  for  temporary  exports  and 
reimports (and temporary imports and re-exports) is a strong request.  

Option  1  would  have  the  lowest  impact  on  citizens,  as  it  would  not  change  the  legal  framework. 
The current  rules on the use of the European Firearms Pass  for temporary exports of hunters and 
sport shooters would continue to apply, and those firearms users would not be affected by the new 
requirement to provide an end-user certificate at export under option 3. This would in any case not 
apply to firearms subject to mere declaration (category C).  

Option 2 and 3 would only marginally affect individual citizens, as they already benefit from the 
simplifications  linked  to  the  European  Firearms  pass.  They  would  only  be  affected  by  the 
prohibition  to  import  semi-finished  firearms  and  essential  components,  and  would  not  be  able  to 
import convertible alarm and signal weapons as easily as they used to. Citizens would benefit from 
the clarity of harmonised EU rules (deadlines, harmonised simplifications, e.g. for exhibitions).   

Option 3 bis could potentially affect individual citizens more. Especially if those citizens received 
an  exception  to  own  a  prohibited  firearm  (Category  A).  Multiple  of  these  weapons  could  fall 
exclusively  under  the  scope  of  the  Common  Position,  which  increases  the  difficulty  of  the 
procedure to import and export these weapons.  

6.2.2.  SECURITY IMPACTS 

All options would have positive security impacts, although those of option 1 would be dependent 
on whether or not Member States fully implement the detailed guidelines. As they already failed to 
implement the 2018 Recommendation of the Commission in any substantive way, it is  unclear to 
which  extent  option  1  would  have  a  major  impact.  New  written,  more  comprehensive  guidance, 

93  

For example in Spain only 98 dealers and manufacturers are involved in import and 127 in export, on a total of 
1190 manufacturers and dealers. In Slovenia, 115 of the 152 dealers have a licence to export and import 
firearms. 

39 

 
                                                 
combined  with  a  more  intensive  use  of  the  Firearms  export  coordination  group  to  exchange 
information, the provision of a non-compulsory e-licensing tool and the development of Common 
Risk Criteria and standards (CRC) for pre-arrival, supported by more harmonised data collection of 
seizures,  would  nevertheless  provide  noticeable  added-value  compared  to  even  a  “dynamic” 
baseline. 

Options  2  and  3  would  have  more  noticeable  impacts,  as  they  would  address  existing  legal 
loopholes, including by turning into law many of the elements of the guidelines in option 1.  

They would notably ensure a unified approach of customs authorities with regard to imported alarm 
and  signal  weapons,  making  sure  that  they  are  duly  declared  as  firearms  when  they  should.  The 
express classification of semi-finished firearms and essential components as the finished product – 
and  even  more  the  prohibition  made  to  others  than  arms  dealers  to  import  such  semi-finished 
components  –  would  close  a  major  legal  loophole,  which  so  far  enabled  criminals  and  extremist 
groups  to  legally  import  such  products  in  order  to  manufacture  unmarked  firearms.  They  would 
also  substantially  improve  exchanges  of  information  between  licencing  authorities  and  between 
licencing authorities and customs, in particular across borders. This will have a very positive impact 
on sharing of intelligence and on risk assessments for individual import and export procedures.  

Extending the whistle-blower protection regime to persons who report breaches of the Regulation 
would  encourage  the  fight  against  smuggling  and  diversion  of  firearms,  as  it  would  encourage 
employees of the company to provide information to law-enforcement authorities. 

6.3. 

IMPACT ON DIGITALISATION 

Responding  to  an  overwhelming  support  of  stakeholders  in  the  public  consultation94  and  in  the 
confidential  consultation  of  competent  authorities,95  the  digitalisation  of  import  and  export 
authorisations  of  the  preferred  option  will  have  a  major  impact  on  stakeholders  and  public 
administrations,  which  often  (more  than  half  of  the  respondents  in  the  confidential  consultation) 
still operate with paper authorisations. Digitalisation will enable full digital integration of the whole 
import and export cycle, in connection with the ongoing digitalisation of customs processes through 
the  Single  Window  environment  for  customs.  It  will  also  enable  the  connection  with  the 
computerised  data-filing  systems  for  firearms  registers,  which  are  being  established  by  Member 
States as part of the implementation of Directive (EU) 2021/555 on the acquisition and possession 
of  weapons.  This  digitalisation  will  also  facilitate  the  systematic  data  collection  by  the  Member 
States.  

The  following  authorisations/certificates  may  be  put  in  scope  of  the  EU  Single  Window 
Environment for Customs: 

 

Import authorisations 

  Export authorisations 

Any document, which is meant to be checked by customs as a precondition for customs clearance 
via  the  Single  window,  shall  be  available  in  a  central  Union  database  to  be  established  by  the 
Commission. 

94  
95  

69% supported e-procedures 
75% supported e-procedures 

40 

 
                                                 
The  technical  developments  that  might  be  required  at  national  level  could  be  offset  by  the 
availability of a single e-licencing portal provided free of charge by the European Commission. 

6.4.  ECONOMIC IMPACT 

6.4.1.  IMPACTS ON THE OVERALL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 

Evaluating the impact on the overall economic activity is a sensitive exercise, due to the limitations 
explained  in  the  methodology  section  (6.1)  and  in  annex  4.  Only  figures  about  firearms 
manufacturers  are  available,  but  not  data  about  arms  dealers  in  the  EU,  which  are  the  main 
importers of weapons. In addition, not all firearms manufacturers export their production, and they 
also import weapon parts. Besides, it is currently not possible to quantify actual exports or imports 
of civilian firearms, due to the lack or inconsistency of data provided by Member States. However, 
the EU sold production of civilian firearms, alarm and signal weapons, their parts and components, 
and ammunition accounts for (only) 0.09% of the EU27 total sold production value. Furthermore, 
firearms represent only 0,027% of the total value of imports into the EU and 0,069% of the total 
value of the export out of the EU.  Therefore, the impact of the initiative on the overall economic 
activity is bound to be negligible. 

During  the  public  consultation  and  the  targeted  interviews  of  business  stakeholders,  a  clear 
consensus emerged in favour of a more uniform EU import and export control system for civilian 
firearms. Therefore, the economic impact of the options is expected to be positive, as it would meet 
the expectations of businesses in terms of simplification. In particular, common rules on temporary 
exports  and  imports  would  facilitate  work  of  firearms  manufacturers  in  their  daily  operations 
(repairs).  The  main  positive  impact  would  be  linked  to  digitalisation  (see  above)  and  to  the 
clarification of the legal framework with respect to the scope of applicable rules. 

The  clarification  of  roles  and  responsibilities  of  importers  and  exporters,  along  the  lines  of  those 
currently in force with respect to market surveillance and compliance of products under article 4 of 
Regulation  (EU)  2019/1020,  would  not  create  new  obligations,  since  it  would  reflect  obligations 
they already meet under national legislation when applying for an authorisation. 

6.4.2.  IMPACT ON SMES AND COMPETITIVENESS 

The various options are particularly relevant for small operators, which constitute 90% of the total 
number of the economic operators involved. However, 82% of the total manufacturing turnover of 
firearms  is  made  by  large  companies  (and  80%  of  all  firms  are  located  in  only  six  Member 
States),96 so SMEs would only be marginally affected by the measures. 

Neither options 1 or 2 have any specific impact on SMEs, since they do not substantially change the 
current  regulatory  framework  or  create  new  obligations.  They  are  either  recommendations  or 
clarifications of the legal framework. 

SMEs, like the rest of arms dealers, would only incur (limited) costs under option 3. This concerns 
notably systematically providing a proof of import in the third country of destination. This would 
not  add  a  specific  burden  on  exporters,  as  this  is  an  information  that  is  already  at  hand,  and  that 
they generally already keep in their record in case of future checks. 

96   More information on the market structure can be found in Annex 4 

41 

 
                                                 
The  perspective  to  require  an  end-user  certificate  for  exported  category  A  and  B  weapons  in 
option 3 worries business representatives, who have, however, proven unable to quantify the impact 
of such a measure. The main concern lies in the impossibility to determine the actual end-user in 
the  country  of  destination.  This  concern  is  unfounded  because  option  3  would  limit  the 
administrative burden on exporters by stating that only the actual importer of civilian firearms (i.e. 
the arms dealer) in the third country would be considered as the end-user. The main burden would 
lie in the need to obtain from the importer an authenticated commitment not to re-export firearms 
and  not  to  sell  it  to  non-civilian  users.  This,  however,  would  not  substantially  differ  from  the 
existing  practice  for  military  firearms,  which  are  already  subject  to  end-user  certificates  under 
Council  Common  Position  2008/944/CFSP.  In  fact,  during  stakeholder  interviews,  business 
representatives  explained  that  many  exporters  applied  for  military  export  licences  (with  end-user 
certificate),  in  case  they  had  reached  the  maximum  number  of  authorisations  for  civilian  export 
licences. This would demonstrate that the end-user requirement does not create a disproportionate 
burden on exporters. 

6.4.3.  IMPACTS ON NATIONAL AND EU ADMINISTRATIONS 

The  clarification  of  the  legal  framework  and  the  provisions  clarifying  the  respective  roles  of 
customs and licencing authorities would overall imply a greater involvement of customs to ensure 
the  oversight  of  firearms  shipments.  Customs  will  be  called  on  to  enforce  sectorial  firearms 
legislation, by ensuring  notably that imported alarm  and signal  weapons are adequately classified 
and accompanied with the required documentation, or that semi-finished components can only be 
imported by arms dealers. Considering the small extent of firearms imports and exports (0,027% of 
imports and 0,069% of exports), and the fact that customs do not carry out systematic controls, but 
only  conduct  physical  checks  based  on  risk  profiles,  or  only  ex-post  documentary  checks,  the 
impact is deemed to be limited. 

Similarly, the impact of making a compulsory use of a specific platform to exchange information 
on refusals to grant authorisations would be limited, in view of the small number of denials issued 
each year (around 30 refusals per year97). 

Establishing  computerised  data-filing  systems  for  imports  and  export  authorisations  is  likely  to 
require one-off IT investments in most Member States. Although no Member State seemed ready to 
provide an estimate, Member States  consulted in the targeted consultation all considered that this 
would be a practicable  exercise. The cost  would  be largely offset  by the  advantage of enabling a 
direct connection with national data-filing systems of legal owners of firearms and the registers of 
firearms dealers. 

The planned interoperability of the databases of authorisations and certificates with the EU Single 
Window environment for Customs will require additional financial resources, which will be made 
available to DG TAXUD by DG HOME to enable the decided interconnection. Currently, the level 
of appropriate resources for such work cannot be determined with certainty, but a cost estimate is 
provided in annex 3, point 1. 

6.5. 

IMPACT ON THE ENVIRONMENT 

None of the options has any particular impact on the environment.  

97  

Extrapolated from data received of 11 Member States, more information in annex 4 

42 

 
                                                 
6.6. 

IMPACT ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 

By addressing the threat of firearms trafficking, all envisaged options will have a positive impact on 
ensuring the security of the EU citizens. 

The  protection  of  personal  data,  enshrined  in  article  8  of  the  Charter,  is  mostly  regulated  by  the 
General  Data  Protection  Regulation,98  which  allows  the  processing  of  such  data  when  it  “is 
necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official 
authority vested in the controller” (article 6). In addition, the human rights impact should be offset 
with the alignment of the new legislative measure with Directive 2016/68.99 

In this case, processing of data will be protected by strong safeguards, notably through: 

-  prior consultation of the European Data Protection Supervisor  
- 
- 

ensuring access to the databases exclusively on a need-to-know basis 
limiting access in the databases to basic personal information enabling the identification of 
the person concerned, any additional information (e.g. on the reasons for refusal) having to 
be exchanged on a bilateral basis between competent authorities 
limiting statistical collection about authorisations, exports and imports, and seizures only to 
non-nominative data for the purpose of building a comprehensive intelligence picture 

- 

Article 16 of the Charter recognises the freedom to conduct a business “in accordance with Union 
law and national laws and practices.” The regulation will not affect the right to conduct business as 
only authorised arms dealers are already allowed to trade firearms.  

It is settled case-law that the right to property enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter is not absolute 
and is subject to proportionate restrictions in furtherance of objectives of general interest. None of 
the envisaged options would deprive legal owners of their property. The provision that would make 
it  illegal  for  others  than  licensed  arms  dealers  to  import  semi-finished  firearms  and  essential 
components would not have retroactive effect (assuming that the previously imported semi-finished 
firearms or components have been duly declared under the current legal framework). 

Finally, the envisaged options would fully respect the objectives of article 45 of the Charter with 
respect  to  the  right  of  movement  of  EU  citizens,  since  it  would  confirm  their  possibility  to 
temporarily leave the EU (and come back) with their personal firearm, when travelling for sport or 
hunting purposes. Additional simplifications for collectors or museums should also facilitate their 
right of movement. 

98  

99  

Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural  persons  with  regard  to  the  processing  of  personal  data  and  on  the  free  movement  of  such  data,  and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016. 
Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the 
prevention,  investigation,  detection  or  prosecution  of  criminal  offences  or  the  execution  of  criminal  penalties, 
and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA,  OJ L 119, 
4.5.2016. 

43 

 
                                                 
7.  HOW DO OPTIONS COMPARE?100 

In  order  to  assess  and  compare  the  different  options,  each  option  will  be  rated  for  necessity,  effectiveness,  proportionality  and  efficiency,  coherence, 
feasibility  and  economic  impact.  This  will  be  scored  from  0  to  1  by  the  coherence  of  the  option  with  the  problems  identified  under  point  2  and  the 
objectives as described under point 4. The more an option solves the problems identified, the higher the score. The underneath table gives an overview of 
the different scores, the second table gives a short content summary of the assessment and then the full assessment can be read underneath.  

Assessment criteria  
(for civilian firearms transactions only) 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 3 

Necessity / Added value  Data collection 

Security objective 

Simplification objective 

Effectiveness 

Data collection 

Security objective 

Simplification objective 

Proportionality 
Efficiency 

/ 

Data collection 

Security objective 

0,2 

0,2 

0,2 

0,1 

0,1 

0,1 

0,1 

0,2 

0,2 

0,5 

0,5 

0,2 

0,6 

0,5 

0,1 

0,7 

1 

1 

1 

0,9 

0,8 

0,7 

0,9 

0,9 

100  

Each option is assessed, for each criteria, on a range from 0 to 1 with respect to its contribution to each policy objective. 0 is the lowest score and 1 is the highest score. 

44 

 
 
 
                                                 
Simplification objective 

Coherence 

Data collection 

Security objective 

Simplification objective 

Feasibility 

Data collection 

Security objective 

Simplification objective 

Economic impact 

Data collection 

Security objective 

Simplification objective 

Total (average) 

0,3 

0,1 

0 

0 

0,2 

0,5 

0,5 

NA 

NA 

0 

0,18 

0,6 

0,1 

0,7 

0,4 

0,2 

0,8 

1 

NA 

NA 

0,1 

0,45 

0,9 

1 

1 

1 

0,7 

0,7 

0,7 

NA 

NA 

0,2 

0,84 

45 

 
 
 
 
Assessment 
criteria101  

Necessity / Added 
value 

Data 
collection 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 3 

Option 3bis 

Added value is limited due 
to  continued 
focus  on 
voluntary  data  collection 
and limited digitalisation 

Added value is limited 
albeit slightly better due to 
some increase in 
digitalisation 

High added value due to 
compulsory data collection 
and digitalisation 

Same as Option 3 

Slight  added  value  due  to 
the  upgrade  of  COARM, 
however  it  does  not  need 
to be systematically used 

Hardly  any  added  value 
due  to  not  addressing  the 
vagueness 
the 
regulation  

of 

Security 
objective 

Simplification 
objective 

There is added value as 
some security loopholes 
will be closed due to the 
clarification of the 
regulation 

The clarification of the 
regulation will increase the 
harmonisation of rules 
needed and therefore 
create an added value 
However, the overlap with 
the Common Position will 
remain.  

High added value due to 
the inclusion of alarm and 
signal weapons, semi-
finished components, end-
user certificates etc.  

High added value due to 
the new simplifications 
introduced responding to 
the requests of 
stakeholders. Overlap with 
the Common Position will 
be solved.  

Same as Option 3 

Same as Option 3 

101  for civilian firearms transactions only 

46 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Effectiveness 

Assessment 
criteria101  

Data 
collection 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 3 

Option 3bis 

Not effective due to the 
continued focus on 
voluntary data collection 
and limited digitalisation 

Not very effective albeit 
slightly better due to some 
increase in digitalisation 

Very effective due to 
compulsory data collection 

Same as Option 3 

Security 
objective 

Not effective due to an 
unlikely uptake of the 
recommendations by the 
Member States. Slight 
improvement due to 
COARM update 

Positive effect due to 
adding of semi-finished 
components, compulsory 
checks of ECRIS, 
notification of refusals etc.  

Slight improve of the 
situation due to the 
clarification of the roles 
however no uniform rules. 

Simplification 
objective 

Slight effect due to 
common deadlines 
however no real 
harmonisation of rules 

47 

High effect due to EU 
classifications of alarm 
and signal weapons, 
import of semi-finished 
components limited to 
economic operators and 
improve of traceability due 
to central database and 
end-user certificates 

High effectiveness due to 
Authorisation and 
declaration processes 
linked to a central database 
of firearms import and 
export authorisations, 
connected to the EU single 
window environment for 
customs. 

Same as Option 3 

Overlap with the Common 
position solved but the 
technical definition of 
what is a military firearm 
could create issues of 
interpretation or the 
establishment of a list of 
military firearms could 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assessment 
criteria101  

Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 3 

Option 3bis 

Proportionality  / 
Efficiency 

Data 
collection 

Low efficiency due to the 
availability of an e-
licencing system, this 
would still require work of 
the Member States to 
collect data.  

Low efficiency and bad 
proportionality due to low 
digitalisation, which could 
help the Member States 
gather data 

Increase in digitalisation 
will support the Member 
States in efficiently 
collecting data.  

give rise to legal disputes. 

Same as Option 3 

Low efficiency as many 
security problems are not 
addressed. 

Security 
objective 

Low efficiency as the 
administrative burden due 
to the different rules 
remains however there are 
a few simplifications such 

Simplification 

Positive efficiency and low 
burden for many Member 
States as some already 
implement certain 
measures and many 
measures are easy to 
implement, due to the 
alignment with the 
firearms Directive. 

The introduced 
simplifications such as 
temporary export, implied 
consent etc. Have a 
positive effect on the 
simplification objective. 
However not yet a uniform 

48 

Increase efficiency due to 
EU list of non-convertible 
alarm and signal weapons, 
allowing third parties to 
conduct post-shipment 
controls etc.  

Same as Option 3 

Increased simplification 
and full digitalised 
procedures will result in 
high efficiency gains.  

The technical definition of 
military firearms is likely 
to be a burdensome and 
complex exercise, which 
could end up with issues of 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assessment 
criteria101  

Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 3 

Option 3bis 

objective 

as the e-licensing system 

system 

Coherence 

Data 
collection 

Security 
objective 

Simplification 

Low coherence as only 
Member States subject to 
Schengen acquis are 
obliged to provide data on 
seizures. Coherence might 
increase due to uniform 
template. 

Low coherence as only 
Member States subject to 
Schengen acquis are 
obliged to provide data on 
seizures. Coherence might 
increase due to uniform 
template. 

Low coherence because 
the scope of the regulation 
will not align with the 
Directive and continuous 
overlap with the Common 
Position. 

Increased coherence with 
firearms Directive and 
Common Position (all 
Category A firearms 
would be military) 

No coherence as there are 
no harmonised rules in the 
EU 

The overlap with the 
Common Position is not 
sufficiently solved and will 
decrease coherent 
approach. Clarifying the 
roles and responsibilities 
of exporters will increase 
the coherence 

49 

Standardised data 
collection will be 
mandatory, which will 
have a high impact on 
coherence 

Full coherence with the 
Firearms Directive and the 
Common Position, no 
more overlap will 
reinforcing substantive 
provisions from the 
Common Position. 

Consistency with customs 
rules ensured and 
harmonised rules 
throughout the EU would 
improve coherence. 

issues of interpretation. 

Same as Option 3 

Coherence with the 
Common Position would 
be fully ensured, but not 
with the Firearms 
Directive: Firearms 
authorised for civilian 
possession and use inside 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assessment 
criteria101  

objective 

Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 3 

Option 3bis 

the EU could be classified 
as military and therefore 
subject to the Common 
position and not the 
Regulation for export 
purposes: therefore some 
firearms would be 
considered non-military 
inside the EU but military 
for export purposes. 

Feasibility 

Data 
collection 

Low feasibility as the lack 
of digitalised procedures 
hinders data collection. 
Good feasibility to create 
uniform template. 

Low feasibility as the lack 
of digitalised procedures 
hinders data collection. 
Good feasibility to create 
uniform template. 

The digitalisation will 
increase the feasibility to 
collect data significantly.  

Same as Option 3 

The different elements are 
easy to implement. Except 
the Common Risk Criteria, 
as the Member States are 
reluctant to share risk 
profiles 

High feasibility with some 
possible problems 
difficulties regarding the 
update of COARM. 

Extra provisions will 
require some extra tasks 
for exporters and firearms 
authorities and customs 

The different elements are 
easy to issue however the 

Very high feasibility due 
to the clarification of 

Establishing data-filing 

Security 
objective 

Same as Option 3 

50 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assessment 
criteria101  

Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 3 

Option 3bis 

Simplification 
objective 

Economic impact  Data 

collection 

Security 
objective 

Simplification 
objective 

implementation by the 
Member States might be 
limited 

legislation instead of 
changing the regulation.  

systems will create a cost. 
An e-licensing system 
could be provided at EU 
level, free of charge, which 
would increase the 
feasibility.  

The distinction  between 
military and civilian 
firearms would be 
technically feasible, but 
would be artificial and not 
reflect the reality of the 
usage of the weapons. 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

As the uptake of measures 
will be voluntary for the 
Member States, the 
economic impact might be 
negligible and cannot be 
assessed. 

No noticeable economic 
impact as it mostly relates 
to clarifications of the 
legal framework. There are 
some simplifications 
which might have small 
impacts such as the clear 
deadlines, implied consent 
of third country of transit 
etc.  

The main savings for 
economic operators are 
expected due to the 
digitalisation and the link 
with the EU Single 
Window Environment for 
customs. Furthermore, fees 
will be prohibited.  

Providing for a technical 
definition of military 
firearms will likely subject 
to the Common position 
firearms of the “grey area” 
which are currently legally 
owned by civilians inside 
the EU: hunters and sport 
shooters will be prevented 
from using administrative 
simplifications (European 
firearms pass) for those 
exports and no 
simplifications will apply 
for individual exporters 

51 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assessment 
criteria101  

Option 1 

Option 2 

Option 3 

Option 3bis 

(including no digitalisation 
of procedure). 

52 

 
 
 
7.1.  NECESSITY / ADDED VALUE 

All options respond to a need, as they all seek to address problems identified.  

Being limited to soft-law intervention, option 1 would provide only limited added value, compared 
to the existing set of recommendations in the baseline scenario (hence an overall rating of 0.2 with 
respect  to  the  three  objectives).  The  vagueness  of  the  current  Regulation  and  the  references  to 
national legislation and procedures would not be addressed.  

In  particular,  data  provided  both  during  the  evaluation  of  the  Regulation  and  during  this  impact 
assessment  proved  to  be  so  heterogeneous102  that  it  was  impossible  for  the  Commission  to 
determine  clear  trends  on  the  movements,  authorisations  and  denials  of  imports  and  exports  of 
firearms.  However,  detailed  templates  for  data  provision  could  incrementally  improve  data 
provision, although it would be long and hypothetical. 

More guidance on the definition of semi-finished firearms and on the correct customs classification 
of alarm and signal weapons would facilitate a consistent approach across the EU. 

The upgrade of the Conventional  arms export control information  system (COARM) for refusals, 
.annulments,  suspensions,  modifications or revocations of  export authorisations  by other Member 
States  would  provide  more  transparency  about  whether  an  entry  relates  more  to  civilian  than 
military weapons, but it will not per se lead to it being systematically used. 

The  provision  of  an  e-licensing  platform  to  Member  States  who  would  accept  to  use  it  would 
facilitate the work of exporters, but as procedures and rules would not be harmonised, it would not 
address the regulatory heterogeneity. Furthermore, this e-licensing platform could facilitate the data 
collection,  however  the  voluntary  nature  remains.  It  is  unlikely  that  the  Member  States  will  put 
more effort into data collection as this was already asked multiple times before.  

Option 2 ranges higher in terms of necessity, although several of the envisaged clarifications are 
already implemented by several Member States, for which it would not create a major added value. 
In addition it does not address all the problems identified.  

For  instance,  the  impact  of  applying  the  standards  of  non-convertibility  of  alarm  and  signal 
weapons to exported alarm and signal weapons would be fairly limited, since 48% of respondents, 
corresponding  to  14  Member  States103  and  46%  of  the  exports  in  the  confidential  consultation 
indicated that exported alarm and signal weapons are either considered as firearms under national 
legislation  and  are  subject  to  the  same  rules  (29%)  or  that  they  must  comply  with  Commission 
Implementing Directive (EU) 2019/69 to avoid being subject to export authorisations (19%). 

Most  of  the  elements  of  option  2  would  respond  to  the  need  of  clarification  of  the  regulation’s 
provisions,  which  would  contribute  to  a  more  homogeneous  implementation  and  therefore  more 
simplicity for stakeholders. However, keeping with the initial logic of the regulation of excluding 
from  its  scope  all  category  A  firearms,  the  alignment  of  categories  with  those  of  the  firearms 
directive would mean that the revised regulation would govern even less firearms than is currently 

102    See Annex 4 on methodology 
103  

BE, CZ, EE, FI, IT, LT, LV, NL, PL, PT, RO, SE, SL, SK 

53 

 
 
                                                 
the  case:  as  the  Firearms  Directive  moved  several  types  of  firearms  from  category  B  (subject  to 
authorisation)  to  category  A  (prohibited  except  in  specific  cases),  the  current  scope  of  the 
regulation (only categories B and C) would be smaller than today. All category A firearms would 
be governed by Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and the regulation would not provide an added 
value  in  their  respect.  Some  of  these  obligations  such  as  the  compulsory  check  of  ECRIS  could 
provide some data however the added value is expected to be low. 

Hence the overall rating with respect to both the security and the simplification is considered to be 
0.5 and only 0.2 for data collection. 

Option 3 would on the contrary have the highest EU added value. The full alignment of the scope 
with  that  of  the  firearms  directive  would  mean  that  the  regulation  would  govern  all  civilian 
transactions  of  firearms,  including  civilian  trade  of  automatic  firearms,  semi-automatic  firearms 
with  high-capacity magazines or semi-automatic long firearms with  a  folding or telescopic stock. 
As in the firearms directive, transactions between governments, or sales to the military or the armed 
forces would remain excluded from the regulation, which means the security and the simplification 
objectives could only be achieved for civilian firearms. The new simplifications introduced would 
respond  to  the  requests  of  stakeholders  to  alleviate  their  administrative  burden  and  provide  a 
uniform EU approach. Furthermore, the Member States would be obliged to provide annual data.  

Option  3 bis  would have a similarly high  added  value, as the overlap with  the Common Position 
would also be solved. 

7.2.  EFFECTIVENESS 

Option 1 would be the least effective. The full implementation of the 2018 Recommendation of the 
Commission  would  be  unlikely  to  have  a  different  impact  from  the  baseline  scenario.  A  mere 
recommendation to provide annual statistics will not be effective in improving security, as Member 
States  already  did  not  implement  the  current  recommendation.  Similarly,  the  European  Criminal 
Records Information Exchange System (ECRIS) will continue to be under-used. Risk information 
related  to  the  movement  of  firearms  will  only  partially  be  exchanged  through  the  customs  risk 
management system. A technical improvement of the COARM system could marginally facilitate 
exchanges  of  information.  With  respect  to  the  simplification  objective,  option  1  would  slightly 
improve  the  situation  (by  providing  a  list  of  competent  authorities  in  third  country).  However,  it 
would  not  be  effective  in  establishing  the  uniform  import  and  export  control  mechanism  that 
stakeholders are calling for. 

Option 2 would slightly contribute to both the security and the simplification objectives. It would 
only marginally improve the traceability of exported signal and alarm weapons, since the share of 
alarm  and  signal  weapons  is  more  than  double  for  import  than  for  export.104  At  import,  a 
compulsory  classification  as  firearms  of  alarm  and  signal  weapons  not  complying  with  the 
implementing directive, including in the customs declaration, will also contribute to the legibility of 
legislation. It will clarify the role of customs authorities, and the need to check the conformity with 
harmonised  EU  law  before  the  release  of  the  goods  into  free  circulation.  However,  digitalisation 
and automation of process will continue to vary from country to country, with uneven application, 
with different risk strategies. 

104  

See annex 4. 

54 

 
                                                 
Requiring the classification of semi-finished firearms and essential components as firearms would 
have  an  impact  beyond  current  customs  rules,  as  it  would  also  apply  to  licensing  authorities  and 
would  therefore  limit  their  import  and  trigger  more  controls.  Providing  a  common  definition  of 
semi-finished  firearms  and  essential  components  would  increase  legal  clarity  and  contribute  to  a 
common approach of customs authorities at import. 

Listing out in the Regulation the particulars describing firearms that should be traced and recorded 
would marginally improve the traceability of firearms, as it would facilitate and harmonise access 
to information that already exists in different formats and in other databases. 

Under this option, a compulsory check of criminal records in ECRIS and provision for exchange of 
risk information related to the movement of firearms by using the customs risk management system 
would improve the risk assessment capacities of licencing and law enforcement authorities without 
creating any specific additional burden. The obligation for export licensing authorities to check in 
the Schengen Information System whether exported firearms were reported lost or stolen in another 
Member  State  would  further  increase  security,  as  it  would  increase  their  access  to  relevant 
databases, which would facilitate their risk assessment.  

Similarly, a compulsory notification of refusals in a common electronic system would also ensure 
that licencing authorities are always informed of denials issued by other Member States. 

Applying the whistle-blower-protection regime put in place with Directive (EU) No 2019/1937 to 
persons who report breaches of the Regulation would support the fight against diversion, notably by 
protecting  employees  of  companies  importing  or  exporting  firearms  when  they  detect  risks  of 
smuggling  or  diversion.  In  addition,  a  clear  legal  provision  requiring  Member  States  to  establish 
criminal  sanctions  for  the  trafficking  of  firearms  would  substantially  address  the  gaps  in 
incrimination.  It  would  require  several  Member  States  to  adapt  their  legal  framework  to  fully 
comply with article 5 of the UN Firearms Protocol. 

With  respect  to  the  simplification  objective,  similar  deadlines  for  granting  import  authorisations, 
harmonised  simplified  procedures  (including  the  default  implied  consent  of  the  third  country  of 
transit)  would  partially  contribute  to  providing  a  more  predictable  and  uniform  regulatory 
environment for economic operators. 

The  annual  statistical  collection  would  remain  voluntary  and  therefore  the  effectiveness  remains 
low.  

Option 3 would be substantially more effective.  The EU-level mechanism to ensure that a given 
model of alarm and signal weapon is classified under the same position of the customs combined 
nomenclature  throughout  the  EU  would  provide  additional  security  safeguards,  avoiding  that 
convertible models are nevertheless not declared as firearms in certain Member States. Establishing 
a  EU  list  of  non-convertible  alarm  and  signal  weapons  that  are  compliant  with  implementing 
directive 2019/69, would ensure that the automatic recognition of the certification of such weapons 
throughout  the  EU.  This  would  increase  the  security  of  imports  with  the  guarantee  that  only 
weapons accompanied with such a certificate are not firearms. 

Preventing  private  individuals  from  importing  semi-finished  firearms  and  essential  components 
would  be  the  most  effective  course  of  action  to  avoid  diversion  and  the  illicit  manufacture  of 
unmarked firearms. 

55 

 
The traceability of firearms (and therefore the security of the trade) would be greatly improved by 
the  full  computerisation  of  the  data-filing  systems.  This  will  in  its  turn  facilitate  the  annual 
collection of statistics.  

Authorisation  and  declaration  processes  would  be  substantially  facilitated  by  the  creation  of  a 
central database of firearms import and export authorisations, connected to the EU single window 
environment for customs. 

Requiring exporters to provide evidence of final import in the country of destination would improve 
the traceability of exported firearms and reduce the risk of diversion. 

The  clarification  of  the  scope  and  the  establishment  of  EU  uniform  procedures  (in  particular  e-
licencing processes) would respond to the demands of the vast majority of private stakeholders, be 
they  private  firearms  users  or  commercial  exporters.  However,  the  maintenance  of  strict 
authorisations  procedures  means  that  such  a  Regulation  cannot  be  fully  effective  with  respect  to 
simplifications (which would imply a total absence of authorisation procedures). 

As a consequence, this  option rates higher with  respect  to  the security objective (0,8) than to  the 
simplification objective (0,7). 

Option 3 bis rates just a bit lower  (0,6) with respect to the simplification objective. Although the 
overlap with the Common position would be solved, the overall effectiveness could be hampered 
by  disputes  of  interpretation  on  the  technical  definition  of  what  is  a  military  firearm.  Similarly, 
establishing  a  list  of  firearms  deemed  to  be  military  (by  make/model)  could  give  rise  to  legal 
disputes, as exporters might oppose the grounds for the classification. 

7.3. 

PROPORTIONALITY / EFFICIENCY 

Being the less invasive solution, the soft-law approach of option 1 ranges high in proportionality. 
However,  it  would  be  inefficient  as  the  absence  of  specific  obligations  or  administrative  burden 
would  be  largely  offset  by  the  continued  impossibility  to  address  the  problems  identified.  This 
option  would  provide  only  a  few  positive  simplifications  for  companies  (possible  e-licencing, 
guidance  on  Authorised  Economic  Operators,  list  of  third  country  authorities)  but  not  enough  to 
rank  high.  It  will  also  have  very  limited  efficiency  regarding  data  collection  as  lack  the 
digitalisation will hinder the Member States. They would have to put a lot of effort to collect the 
data, which is  not  proportionate regarding  administrative burden. Therefore, this  option ranks 0,1 
with  respect  to  data  collection,  0,2  with  respect  to  the  security  objective  and  0,3  with  respect  to 
simplification. 

Option  2  would  have  a  slightly  positive  impact  on  the  security  of  transactions,  by  generalising 
practices that already exist in many Member States. As such, in most Member States, the legislative 
change would be fairly limited. For instance, requiring Member States to verify systematically that 
deactivated firearms are properly marked and owners issued a deactivation certificate would clarify 
the already existing practice of Member States. 61% of respondents to the confidential consultation 
mentioned that they already require such marking.105 Besides, the obligation already exists for all 
deactivated firearms transferred to another Member State or placed on the market, which constitute 

105  

48% responded that deactivated firearms  must be  marked in accordance  with  Regulation (EU) 2015/2403 and 
accompanied  with  a  deactivation  certificate  even  if  deactivated  before  8  April  2016  and  13%  only  when 
deactivated after 8 April 2016. 

56 

 
                                                 
the overwhelming majority of transactions,106 so that this extension to exported firearms would not 
substantially  change  the  legal  framework.  If  anything,  this  extension  would  further  reduce  the 
attractiveness  of  exports  of  deactivated  firearms.  It  could  have  marginally  positive  impact  on 
international security and tracing of weapons, since for those Member States, which do not regulate 
the  export  of  deactivated  firearms,  it  would  ensure  that  they  cannot  be  reactivated  outside  of  the 
European Union. 

The  designation  of  authorities  in  charge  of  checking  compliance  of  imported  alarm  and  signal 
weapons with the implementing directive before the release into free circulation, if they differ from 
the  authorities  designated  under  the  implementing  directive,  will  not  create  additional  burden 
compared  to  that  of  the  directive.  It  will  mostly  be  a  new  obligation  on  Member  States  which 
currently classify those weapons as firearms and therefore do not check their compliance with the 
technical standards of the implementing directive. 

With respect to semi-finished firearms and essential components, in the confidential consultation of 
competent authorities, 74% of respondents involved in import processes replied that such elements 
need to be declared as firearms essential components and marked accordingly, while 13% said they 
need to be declared as firearms parts (CN code 9305) but not marked and another 13% that they are 
not  considered  as  firearms  parts  and  not  subject  to  specific  declaration.  Therefore,  a  change  of 
legislation  would  require  customs  authorities  to  check  the  existence  of  dealer’s  licence  to  import 
such goods, but would not substantially affect the work of 87% of them. There too, the measure is 
considered to be highly proportionate. 

Listing out in the Regulation the particulars describing firearms that should be traced and recorded 
at export would have no significant impact on licensing authorities, since the information related to 
the name of the manufacturer or the brand, the country or place of manufacture, the serial number 
and year of manufacture are already part of the unique marking under the Firearms Directive. This 
information  is  consequently  already  available  in  national  data-filing  systems  and  on  the  firearms 
present  in  the  EU.  The  only  impact  would  be  to  ensure  that  data-filing  systems  for  export 
authorisations include the same information. 

The  reference  to  the  possibility  to  use  the  opportunities  of  the  tools  for  administrative  and 
investigative  cooperation  in  third  countries,  provided  by  article  20  of  the  1997  Regulation  on 
mutual assistance107 will not add any burden for national authorities or private stakeholder, since it 
merely recalls an already existing possibility to request the support of the Commission to conduct 
post-shipment controls. 

Compared to the absence of notification, providing for a compulsory exchange of information about 
denials  on  a  common  database  would  slightly  add  to  the  administrative  burden  of  licensing 
authorities,  although  in  a  very  limited  way,  considering  the  low  number  of  denials  each  year 
(around 30 refusals per year). If this system is the same as the one currently used for dual-use goods 
(DUeS), the added burden would be very low, since most export licensing authorities already have 
access to DUeS. 

106  

107  

In  the  public  consultation  and  during  stakeholder  interviews,  stakeholders  considered  that  the  EU  rules  on 
deactivation  currently  make  it  unattractive  to  sell  deactivated  firearms,  since  in  their  views  the  deactivation 
standards affect too much the integrity of the firearms to preserve its commercial value. 
Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  515/97  of  13  March  1997  on  mutual  assistance  between  the  administrative 
authorities of the Member States and cooperation between the latter and the Commission to ensure the  correct 
application of the law on customs and agricultural matters 

57 

 
                                                 
The  obligation  for  export  licensing  authorities  to  check  in  the  Schengen  Information  System 
whether  exported  firearms  were  reported  lost  or  stolen  in  another  Member  State  would  be 
proportionate, since it would only apply in case of suspicious cases and not for weapons registered 
in the data-filing system of the Member State of export, or for newly-manufactured firearms. 

This  option  introduces  several  simplifications  (temporary  exports,  implied  consent),  which 
therefore  positively  affect  the  efficiency  of  the  regulation  with  respect  to  the  simplification 
objective, although they  do not  go as far as to  provide a genuinely uniform  system  for economic 
operators, and does not meet their request for e-procedures. 

With regards to data collection, this option scores low as the work for the Member States would be 
disproportionate due to the absence of full digitalised procedures.  

For those reasons, this option ranks very low (0,1) for data collection but  ranks higher (0,7) with 
respect to the security objective than for the simplification objective (0,6). 

Option 3 would provide additional efficiency gains, making it even more proportional. Establishing 
a  EU  list  of  alarm  and  signal  weapons  that  are  compliant  with  implementing  directive  2019/69 
would reduce the administrative burden of both national authorities and economic operators. 

Limiting  the  import  of  semi-finished  firearms  and  essential  components  to  licensed  arms  dealers 
(and  conversely  prohibiting  them  for  private  individuals)  would  marginally  increase  the 
enforcement costs of customs. Considering the limited share of firearms imports in the overall trade 
and  the  fact  that  customs  carry  out  targeted  checks  based  on  risk  assessments,  this  impact  is 
considered negligible. The efficiency of the measure would therefore be very high. 

As all exports are matched by a corresponding import in a non-EU country, providing a copy of the 
import  declaration  would  not  create  any  additional  burden,  except  in  countries  with  endemic 
corruption  or  failing  administrative  structures.  Enabling  Member  States  to  entitle  third  parties  to 
conduct  post-shipment  controls  in  their  name  would  facilitate  post-shipment  controls  without 
adding administrative burden on national administrations or on economic operators. 

The  new  simplifications  introduced  in  this  option  (connection  to  the  EU  Single  Window 
Environment,  scope  clarification,  further  simplified  procedures,  including  with  respect  to 
Authorised Economic Operators) would give this option a high efficiency score. Furthermore, these 
digital procedures will increase the efficiency of the annual data collection by the Member States.  

As a consequence, this option rates 0,9 out of 1 for all three objectives. 

Option  3  bis  ranges  a  bit  lower  with  respect  to  the  simplification  objective  (0,8).  The  technical 
definition of military firearms is likely to be a burdensome and complex exercise, which could end 
up with issues  of interpretation. As in practice neither firearms users nor firearms traffickers make 
a clear distinction between military and non-military firearms, the dividing line between the two is 
bound to be based on arbitrary (albeit objective) criteria, which will inevitably lead to long debates 
and possibly unsatisfactory compromise solutions. 

7.4.  COHERENCE 

Option  1  will  not  improve  the  consistency  with  other  policies  and  sets  of  legislation:  overlaps 
between the regulation and the Common position will continue, and the scope of the regulation will 
not be aligned with that of the Firearms Directive. 

58 

 
Under option 1, if Member States subject to the Schengen acquis were to comply with their existing 
obligation to provide statistics of firearms seizures, this could have some major security advantages 
for a common threat assessment, albeit limited to the Schengen area. As Member States so far did 
not  implement  this  obligation,  this  would  probably  create  administrative  burden  linked  the  new 
reporting  requirements,  as  well  as  force  the  Commission  to  step  up  enforcement  actions  against 
Member States who do not. 

Therefore, option 1 ranks 0 in terms of coherence. 

In  option  2,  coherence  with  the  Firearms  Directive  and  with  the  Council  Common  Position 
2008/944/CFSP will increase, automatically subjecting all category A firearms only to the Common 
Position,  irrespective  of  their  civilian  use.  There  would  however  not  be  guarantee  that  remaining 
firearms  subject  to  authorisation  could  not  be  subject  to  the  rules  for  military  firearms  under 
national legislation and the Common position. Overlaps with the Common Position would therefore 
remain and coherence with the Firearms Directive could be questionable, since weapons that can be 
owned and traded by individuals inside the EU would be subject to the rules for military firearms at 
export. 

Consistency  with  the  whistle-blower-protection  regime  put  in  place  by  Directive  (EU)  No 
2019/1937 would be substantially enhanced. 

Making  an  express  reference  to  the  obligation  to  submit  an  entry  summary  declaration  for  the 
import  of  firearms  after  the  deployment  of  the  Import  Control  System  (ICS),  version  2  will  not 
create any additional consequence beyond the impact of implementing decision (EU) 2019/2151. It 
will however contribute to the clarity of legislation. 

Additionally,  the  express  provisions  on  the  roles  and  responsibilities  of  exporters  would  be  fully 
consistent  with  similar  provisions  in  other  sectorial  pieces  of  legislation  (namely  article  4  of 
Regulation  (EU)  1020/2019  on  market  surveillance  with  respect  to  controls  on  products  entering 
the Union market). 

Finally, as in option 1, only the Member States subject to the Schengen acquis need to comply with 
the existing obligation to provide statistics of firearms seizures. The Commission would provide a 
template  to  make  this  more  coherent.  However,  the  annual  statistics  on  the  import,  export  and 
transit  of  civilian  firearms  would  remain  voluntary  and  not  coordinated  through  digitalised 
procedures.  

Therefore, although consistency would lead to a rating of 0,7 with respect to the security objective, 
the  continued  overlaps  with  the  Common  Position  would  mean  that  it  would  rate  low  (0,4)  with 
respect  to  the  simplification  objective  and  the  lack  of  digitalisation  and  an  obligation  to  report 
annual statistics means that it would rate low (0,1) with respect to data collection.  

In  Option  3,  coherence  with  both  the  Firearms  Directive  and  the  Council  Common  Position 
2008/944/CFSP would be fully ensured, by having consistent rules and provisions, and no overlap.  

For those weapons of the current “grey area” and which would in the future only be subject to the 
Regulation,  many  substantive  provisions  of  the  Common  Position  would  be  preserved  and  be 
reinforced by the new Regulation. Those are notably : 

- 

the requirement of an end-user certificate for the export of category A and B firearms 

59 

 
- 

- 

- 

the need to  take into account  the 8 criteria of the Common position when granting export 
authorisations  (e.g.  respect  for  human  rights,  risks  of  diversion,  existing  embargoes  and 
sanctions) 

the possibility to conduct post-shipment checks 

sharing of information on denials and on statistics 

In  that  sense,  by  doing  so,  the  new  Regulation  could  be  seen  as  making  directly  enforceable 
provisions of the Common Position,  which are currently binding but  not  directly  enforceable and 
the implementation of which is not unified.  

Consistency  with  customs  rules  would  be  fully  ensured,  through  the  clarification  of  the  role  and 
responsibilities of customs authorities, which would be similar to those established by article 35 of 
the  2021  proposal  for  a  Regulation  on  shipments  of  waste,108  as  well  as  with  the  customs  single 
window environment. Expressly regulating semi-finished firearms and essential components would 
be fully consistent with section ML16 of the EU Common Military List,109 which subjects to export 
controls “forgings, castings and other unfinished products”.  

The obligation to annually report statistics with clear objectives of these statistics, together with the 
increase  digitalisation  of  the  procedures  will  increase  the  coherence  of  the  data  collection 
significantly.  

As a consequence, this option rates 1 with respect to all three objectives. 

Option 3 bis would rate lower with respect to the simplification objective (0.8), as coherence with 
the  Common  Position  would  be  fully  ensured,  but  not  with  the  Firearms  Directive.  Firearms 
authorised  for  civilian  possession  and  use  inside  the  EU  could  be  classified  as  military  and 
therefore  subject  to  the  Common  position  and  not  the  Regulation  for  export  purposes:  therefore 
some firearms would be considered non-military inside the EU but military for export purposes. 

7.5. 

FEASABILITY 

Under  option  1,  reviewing  the  Common  Risk  Criteria  (CRC)  and  improving  the  targeting  of 
firearms trafficked in commercial, postal and express shipments will prove a particularly difficult 
exercise,  linked  to  the  fact  that  Member  States  are  currently  reluctant  to  share  their  own  risk 
profiles with the Commission. Furthermore, the feasibility to collect annual statistics will be low, as 
the Member States will not have the support of digitalised procedures. An update of the template 
for data collection of seizures could help somewhat. All other elements of the option will be easy to 
issue and publish, although their actual implementation by Member States would be unlikely. For 
this reason, this option has a low rating of 0,2  for data collection  and medium rating of 0,5 with 
respect to both other objectives. 

Under option 2, the clarification of the legal framework, which does not bring about a revolution in 
the  current  system  for  export  control  of  civilian  firearms  (and  which  would  even  take  several 
categories of weapons out of the scope of the regulation), would be easy to implement and would 

108  

109  

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on shipments of waste and amending 
Regulations (EU) No 1257/2013 and (EU) No 2020/1056, COM/2021/709 final 

Common Military List of the European Union, ST/5470/2020/INIT 

60 

 
 
                                                 
not  be  opposed  by  Member  States  and  stakeholders.  Politically,  it  could  be  contested  in  the 
European  Parliament  as  not  being  sufficiently  ambitious,  which  in  contrast  demonstrates  its  very 
high feasibility. 

In this option, establishing a specific legal basis for the use of a specific system for  exchange of 
information  about  denials  could  be  complex  and  politically  sensitive  due  to  the  focus  of  this 
database on military goods and the desire of Member States to concentrate of exchanges linked to 
exports of firearms under the COARM. Linked to a clarification of the scope of the regulation, an 
extension  of  the  Dual-Use  electronic  System  (DUeS)  to  cover  imports  and  exports  of  firearms 
would be practically feasible and convenient for licencing authorities, which often already use the 
DUeS, and since it could also apply at imports.  

For those reasons, this option ranks higher in terms of feasibility with respect to the simplification 
objective  (1)  than  with  respect  to  the  security  objective  (0,8).  No  extra  support  and  there  for  no 
increase in feasibility for the collection of data (0,2). 

Option 3 ranks highly in feasibility. During the targeted interviews with private stakeholders and 
public  authorities,  the  envisaged  option  received  wide  appreciation.  Questions  and  concerns  will 
however  be  raised  with  respect  to  the  need  to  revise  and  adapt  national  processes  (notably  to  go 
towards digital licencing procedures). Besides, Member States are likely to prove reluctant to step 
up  their  reporting  obligations.  This  option  can  easily  be  implemented  in  national  administrative 
frameworks  where  the  ministry  of  foreign  affairs  is  closely  involved  in  all  decisions  for  export 
authorisations  of  firearms  (as  is  the  case  for  instance  in  Germany  or  Spain).  Therefore,  the 
clarification of the scope between the Regulation and the Common position should not prevent the 
continued  involvement  of  Ministries  of  Foreign  Affairs  in  the  assessments  of  applications  for 
export  authorisation  of  firearms  only  covered  by  the  Regulation,  provided  Member  States  put  in 
place adequate processes for the cooperation/coordination between those ministries and the export 
control agencies.  

Establishing  computerised  data-filing  systems  for  imports  and  export  authorisations  is  likely  to 
require one-off IT investments in most Member States. Although no Member State seemed ready to 
provide an estimate, Member States  consulted in the targeted consultation all considered that this 
would be a practicable exercise. As a point of  reference, in  Italy the  Integrated System for  Arms 
Management and Mobilisation (SIGMA) enabling the lodging of licence applications for intra-EU 
transfers, imports and exports of firearms, was developed at a cost EUR 800.000. Besides, this type 
of IT development is an expense eligible under the EU’s Internal Security Fund, which can alleviate 
the  budgetary  costs  of  the  measure  for  national  authorities.  At  EU-level,  an  e-licencing  system 
could  be  provided  free-of  charge  to  Member  States.  It  would  substantially  improve  the  full 
traceability of firearms along their life-cycle, by enabling some interoperability with internal data-
filing  systems,  which  are  already  computerised  pursuant  to  the  Firearms  Directive.  This  would 
make the annual collection of data feasible for the Member States.  

With the application of the licensing/certifications scheme, TARIC documents codes will activate 
backup measures, the EU Single Window Environment for Customs will consult the central Union 
system which will need to be established, and will need to host authorisations/certificates/licences 
that need to be checked by customs, and send the result back to the customs systems. 

The  main  concern  expressed  by  public  authorities  was  that  the  EU  would  regulate  imports  and 
exports of military firearms, which was addressed by the limitation of the scope of the initiative to 
transactions between civilians. There will however remain wariness linked to the fact that firearms 
for civilian use currently included in the Common Military List of the European Union would from 

61 

 
now on only be governed by the Regulation. This will be addressed by the fact that category A and 
B  firearms  would  require  an  end-user  certificate  and  that  the  foreign  policy  and  security 
considerations of article 2 of the Common Position 2008/944/CFSP would continue to apply when 
granting  authorisations.  The  main  concern  expressed  by  private  stakeholders  was  linked  to  the 
possibility  of  imposing  the  obligation  to  provide  an  end-user  certificate  for  certain  exported 
firearms.  They  were  however  reassured  by  the  clarification  that  the  actual  importer,  not  the  final 
user  of  the  weapon,  could  be  declared  as  the  end-user,  provided  the  certificate  includes  a 
commitment  not  to  use  the  weapon  for  non-civilian  purposes  or  to  re-export  them  without 
authorisation. 

For those reasons, this option rates 0,7 in terms of feasibility with respect to all three objectives. 

Option 3 bis rates just a bit lower (0,6) with respect to the feasibility objective because although the 
distinction  between  military  and  civilian  firearms  would  be  technically  feasible,  it  would  be 
artificial and not reflect the reality of the usage of the weapons. As a consequence, discussions at 
technical  level  on  the  technical  criteria  to  differentiate  military  from  civilian  firearms,  or  to 
establish a list of military firearms by make or model might prove to be very contentious, with split 
views of national experts. 

7.6.  ECONOMIC IMPACT 

The economic impact of option 1 is negligible and cannot be assessed, since it would not derive per 
se from the recommendations, but from the willingness of Member States to implement them. If all 
recommendations were implemented, the impact would be similar to that of option 2.  

Option  2  is  not  considered  to  have  any  noticeable  economic  impact,  as  it  mostly  relates  to 
clarifications  of  the  legal  framework.  For  instance,  interviewed  representatives  of  firearms 
manufacturers did not consider that applying the standards of non-convertibility of alarm and signal 
weapons to exported alarm and signal weapons would create a specific administrative burden. Out 
of the 12 businesses or business representatives that replied to the public consultation, 50% did not 
reply to the question on the impact of such a measure, and 25% of the remaining considered that 
such  a  measure  would  not  have  any  impact  on  them.  During  the  public  consultation,  44%  of 
respondents  considered  that  a  compulsory  classification  as  firearms  of  imported  alarm  and  signal 
weapons  not  complying  with  the  implementing  directive  would  have  no  or  a  positive  impact  on 
their administrative burden, and only had 17% considered the impact would be negative.  

The envisaged simplifications (implied consent  of the third country of transit as a default option, 
clear deadlines for import authorisations, clarifications of the simplifications for temporary exports) 
are too marginal to have a noticeable economic impact. 

This  option  therefore  rates  0,1  with  respect  to  the  simplification  objective.  The  data  and  security 
objective is not relevant. 

Under  option  3,  with  respect  to  the  limitation  of  import  of  semi-finished  firearms  and  essential 
components  to  licensed  arms  dealers  (and  conversely  its  prohibition  for  private  individuals),  a 
relative majority of respondents to the public consultation (37%) considered that this option would 
have no or a positive impact (with 24,7% considering that it would have a negative impact and 38% 
not  replying  to  the  question.)  No  stakeholder  provided  an  estimate  of  the  cost  of  this  measure, 
although this was specifically asked in the online questionnaire and during bilateral interviews.  It 
would  in  any  case  not  harm  competition,  since,  already  today,  only  licensed  firearms  dealers  are 
allowed  to  manufacture  or  modify  firearms.  It  could  however  slightly  reduce  innovation  by 

62 

 
individuals  developing  custom-made  “desktop”  firearms  since  they  would  be  prevented  from 
importing such products without going through a licensed dealer. 

The main savings for companies would be linked to the use of the EU Single Window Environment 
for  customs,,  in  conjunction  with  the  e-licensing  system,  to  the  clarification  of  the  scope  (which 
would  simplify  the  regulatory  framework  and  the  relevant  paperwork),  the  possibility  to  grant  a 
general export authorisation  for arms dealers which are Authorised Economic Operators  – Safety 
and  Security  (AEO-S)  under  customs  rules,  and  the  prohibition  of  fees  for  authorisations  and 
transit. With respect to the latter, the fees currently apply only in 9 Member States,110 which affects 
at most 383 companies. The removal of this obligation is estimated to save 86.000 euro a year at 
EU level. 

Overall, considering the small proportion of firearms in the overall trade and economic activities, 
this option is considered to have a small positive impact with respect to the simplification objective 
(0,2). 

Option 3 bis ranges even lower with respect to the simplification objective (0,1), as the provision of 
a technical definition of military firearms will likely subject to the Common position firearms of the 
“grey area” which are currently legally owned by civilians inside the EU. As a consequence, 
hunters and sport shooters will be prevented from using administrative simplifications (European 
firearms pass) for their temporary exports. This would be a step back compared to the current 
Regulation. In addition, commercial exporters would not be able to benefit from the various 
administrative simplifications envisaged by the Regulation: temporary exports or import would 
remain subject to national legislation on military weapons. In some Member States, such operations 
do not require prior authorisations, while in others importers or exporters have to go through a full 
authorisation processes. Most importantly, the digitalisation of procedures (e-licensing, single 
window environment for customs) would not apply to military firearms, even for transactions 
between civilians. As a consequence, most of the economic benefits of the Regulation would be 
lost. 

8.  PREFERRED OPTION 

8.1.  OPTION 3: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS 

On balance, the option to go beyond mere clarifications of the legal framework and move towards a 
genuinely uniform control system for the import and export authorisations of firearms for civilian 
use appears to be the most positive one on all counts but one (option 2 ranging higher only in terms 
of feasibility). 

Option  3  contributes  best  to  both  policy  objectives:  security  and  simplification.  With  respect  to 
security,  it  addresses  fully  the  identified  challenges  for  imports  and  exports.  With  respect  to 
simplification,  it  provides  the  necessary  clarity  to  the  existing  regulatory  framework,  by 
establishing a genuinely uniform control system of civilian transactions of firearms. 

Option 3 meets the necessity test, as it fully responds to the call of the majority of stakeholders, all 
categories included, for a uniform control system.  

110  

CZ, EE, IT, LT, PL, PT, SE, SK, SL 

63 

 
                                                 
It  effectively  ensures  the  proper  tracing  of  imported  and  exported  firearms,  and  provide  the  right 
tools  for  effective  cooperation  between  licencing  authorities,  and  between  licencing  and  customs 
authorities. It would close a number of legal loopholes and clarify legislation, thus contributing to 
uniform application of the rules. 

It is proportionate and therefore efficient (i.e. the legislative intervention would be commensurate 
with  the  benefits),  as  it  provides  for  more  tracing  tools,  more  simplifications,  extended  e-
procedures, and stricter security provisions. 

Option 3 ensures the highest consistency with other legal texts, in particular the Firearms Directive 
and  the  Council  Common  Position  2008/944/CFSP,  thus  addressing  one  of  the  main  problems 
identified in the 2017 evaluation. It solves the overlap with the common position, and would ensure 
full complementarity and concordance of concepts, definition, personal and substantive scope with 
the Firearms Directive. It ensures full consistency with customs legislation and clarifies the role and 
duties of customs authorities when applying sectorial legislation. 

Creating  more  obligations  for  Member  States  than  option  2,  option  3  might  be  contested,  but  it 
however  ranks  high  in  feasibility,  as  it  takes  into  account  the  main  concerns  of  Member  States 
(concerning the scope that  still excludes transactions with  governments  and armed forces) and of 
companies (which feared a higher burden linked to end-user certificates). 

The overall economic impact of the option 3 would be slightly positive (i.e. with a slight reduction 
of  administrative  burden), 
introduction  of  new  administrative 
simplifications. 

into  account 

taking 

the 

8.2.  REFIT (SIMPLIFICATION AND IMPROVED EFFICIENCY) 

Per  the  Commission’s  Regulatory  Fitness  and  Performance  Programme  (REFIT),  all  initiatives 
aimed  at  changing  existing  EU  legislation  should  aim  to  simplify  and  deliver  the  stated  policy 
objectives more efficiently (i.e. by reducing unnecessary regulatory costs). The analysis of impacts 
suggests that the preferred option is anticipated to limit the overall burden on Member States.  

Improved exchanges of information and targeted controls imply an additional workload notably for 
customs authorities, but the competent authorities interviewed considered that this workload will be 
moderate,  especially  considering  the  fact  that  checks  will  remain  targeted  and  risk-based  and  not 
systematic.  Besides,  the  trade  of  civilian  firearms  constitutes  a  negligible  fraction  of  the  overall 
imports and exports. Additional checks of licencing authorities will include the obligation to: 

- 
- 
- 
- 

- 

systematically check refusals issued by other Member States 
check the Schengen Information System in case of suspicion 
check the European Criminal Record Information System 
reply to a request for an import authorisation within a set deadline of 60 days (exceptionally 
90 days) 
submit annual statistics 

Besides, the preferred option includes measures to alleviate the workload of competent authorities. 
This is notably the case for: 

- 

the  establishment  of  simplified  procedures  for  temporary  imports  or  exports,  which  will 
alleviate the workload of licencing authorities to such simple movements 

-  EU list for the import of alarm and signal weapons in a central database, facilitating checks 

by customs authorities 

64 

 
-  possibility  to  entitle  third  parties  to  conduct  post-shipment  controls  in  the  name  of 

- 

competent authorities 
full  digitalisation  of  import  and  export  licensing  will  remove  the  need  for  manual  entries 
and checks of paper requests 

On substance, with the requirement of an end-user certificate, the new export licencing system for 
category A and B firearms would be substantially similar to that already in place under the Council 
Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, thus creating no additional burden for public administrations. 

The prohibition of fees to process authorisations will have no significant budgetary impact on the 
administrations (EUR 86.000 per year for the EU as a whole). 

8.3.  APPLICATION OF THE ‘ONE IN, ONE OUT’ APPROACH 

The overall economic for businesses and citizen’s impact of the preferred option is considered to be 
negligible, considering the small share of production of firearms for civilian use in the overall EU 
GDP,  and  the  share  of  imports  and  exports  of  such  firearms  in  the  overall  extra-EU  trade  of  the 
EU.111 Under the current legal framework (be it Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 or national rules and 
procedures),  companies  already  incur  most  of  the  required  obligations.  Most  of  the  provisions 
introduced in the preferred option therefore affect national administrations rather companies.  

In any event, applying the “one in, one out” approach to this initiative lead to the assessment, based 
on the limited available statistics, of a positive overall balance of EUR 791.560112 per year for the 
whole of the EU. The full calculation details can be found in Annex 4.  

The biggest cost saving will happen due to the digitalisation of the import and export authorisations 
via the e-licensing system. According to the external study of 2019113, the current export procedure 
takes  between  maximum  12  hours  of  work  per  authorisation  for  the  exporters.  In  Italy,  there  is 
already  an  e-licencing  tool  used,  which  leads  to  around  6  hours  of  work  per  authorisation.  The 
study estimated that there are 1.000 manufacturers active in the EU and that annually 7.000 export 
authorisations  are  requested.  However,  import  authorisations  are  mainly  requested  by  dealers 
(estimation  of  20.000  dealers  in  the  EU).  There  are  only  have  as  many  import  authorisations 
requested; around 3.500. When taking into account an average cost for a FTE employee of €25,7 
per hour, then introducing an e-licensing procedure would create a cost saving of €1.603.680.  

Similar cost savings will result from the implied consent of third countries for the transit of firearms 
after 20 days. Not all export authorisations need such an implied consent, assuming that 4.000 out 
of the 7.000 annually do need it and following this estimation of the EY study that the follow-up to 
obtain a written “no objection” to the transfer took about one hour, this should lead to a cost saving 
of €56.540 

111  
The  EU  sold  production  of  civilian  firearms,  alarm  and  signal  weapons,  their  parts  and  components,  and 
ammunition accounts for only 0.09% of the EU27 total sold production value. Firearms represent only 0,027% of the 
total value of imports into the EU and 0,069% of the total value of the export out of the EU. 
112 Explanations on how these calculations were conducted can be found in annex 4 
113 EY (2019), Study on the improvement of the EU system of export authorisation, and import 
and transit measures for civilian firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, Annex I, 
p. 156  

65 

 
                                                 
If no authorisations for specific operations, such as temporary import and export, would be needed 
for  institutions  such  as  museums,  collectors  etc.  then  this  would  decrease  the  costs.  Such  an 
authorisations takes on average 6 hours, however the frequency is very low. The estimation is that 
this  could  concern  all  arms  dealers  however  it  would  only  happen  0.01  time  a  year.  Therefore, 
abolishing the need for such authorisations, would amount to a saving of €30.840. 

The  biggest  additional  cost  for  companies  will  be  the  requirement  to  use  an  end-user  certificate. 
Based on the number of hours for the whole export authorisation procedure, it is estimated that end-
user certificate procedures will not take longer than 4 hours. Following the above numbers of 1.000 
manufacturers and 7.000 export authorisations, this extra cost would amount to €719.600. 

Furthermore,  if  companies  would  have  to  provide  evidence  of  the  final  import  certificate,  this 
would  also  contain  some  costs.  However,  these  certificates  should  already  be  used,  the  only 
difference would be that these certificates would be sent to a central bureau or database. Therefore, 
this task should not take more than one hour. Based on the same calculation as above, this would 
amount to a cost of €179.900. 

9.  HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED? 

One  of  the  core  measures  of  the  initiative  is  to  provide  –  currently  non-existent  –  tools  for  an 
adequate monitoring and evaluation of impacts, based on hard data. This requires the development 
of reliable, comprehensive and comparable data-collection at national level, both from the side of 
legal trade (number of authorisations, or denials, countries, type of weapons and values concerned, 
customs data on actual exports and imports) and on the side of law enforcement (seizure data with 
information about the type of firearms seized). Comprehensive data will enable the Commission to 
identify threats based on uncommon or suspicious shipments (e.g. a sudden change of a country of 
destination for a specific type of firearm after the imposition of sanctions against a non-EU country 
could reflect an attempt to circumvent an embargo). 

The  establishment  of  a  reliable  data-collection  system  in  Member  States  might  require  some 
adaptation  time, with  a delayed application of the relevant  provisions in  the new regulation. This 
would  enable  Member  States  to  upgrade  (or  create)  their  national  data-filing  systems,  and  to 
establish  a  reliable  data-collection  tool  for  seizures  of  firearms.  No  valuable  reporting  on  the 
implementation  of  the  regulation  should  take  place  before  those  systems  are  fully  operational, 
realistically not less than 5 years after the entry into force of the amended regulation. 

Besides,  the  role  of  the  current  Firearms  export  coordination  group  established  by  the  current 
regulation  will  be  substantially  enhanced  to  enable  continuous  monitoring  of  the  situation,  and 
discussions based on concrete examples (for instance different decisions to classify imported alarm 
and signal weapons) or on transparent commercial trends. 

There are multiple data that will be gathered to monitor the successful implementation:  

-  The  yearly  collection  of  statistical  data  (number  of  import  and  export  authorisations,  of 
denials, of actual imports and exports, and of seizures, broken down by category of weapon) 
gathered  by  the  Member  States  should  improve.  The  expected  improvement  will  derive 
from  its  mandatory  nature,  from  digitalisation  of  the  import  and  export  authorisation 
processes, the harmonisation in classification of firearms etc. The completeness of this data 
will be monitored yearly, and it will result in a more complete and stable collection of data 
for all Member States, which will allow for actual comparison between the years. This data 
can then feed into the policy work.  

66 

 
- 

In general, the digitalisation of procedures will allow for a more efficient monitoring. These 
digital  tools  allow  for  yearly  statistical  overviews  to  monitor  their  use  by  the  different 
Member States, e.g. the monitoring of the obligation to check the criminal records in ECRIS 
will  be  done  through  requesting  the  statistical  data  of  ECRIS.  This  data  can  then  be 
compared to the data of the e-licensing system on export authorisations in order to check if 
the  obligation  was  met.  The  same  data  gathering  will  be  possible  for  e.g.  the  compulsory 
notification of refusals in a common electronic system.  

-  Multiple  measures  have  a  customs  component  to  them.  In  order  to  operationalise  these 
measures,  interconnections  between  systems  will  be  created.  When  these  connections  are 
created,  it  will  also  be  possible  to  gather  yearly  statistics  on  their  use.  For  instance,  on 
limiting  import  of  semi-finished  firearms  and  essential  components  to  licenced  firearms 
dealers:  in  order  to  implement  this  measure,  customs  will  be  able  to  check  the  lists  of 
licences  firearms  dealers.  When  this  system  is  operational,  it  will  be  possible  to  gather 
yearly data on how often customs consulted the lists of licenced firearms dealers. This will 
on the one hand show if the measure is  consequently implemented, but  on the other hand 
will also allow for analyses on which Member States import the most semi-finished firearms 
and  essential  components.  This  information  can  then  be  linked  to  operational  firearms 
trafficking cases.  

The  following  criteria  and  indicators  following  the  above  monitoring  will  be  used  to  assess  the 
success of the new Regulation. These will include: 

  number of import and export authorisations (objectives 1 and 3) 

  number of refusals (objectives 1 and 2) 

  quantities and values of actual imports and exports (objectives 1, 2 and 3) 

  number of seizures (objectives 1 and 2) 

  number of searches in ECRIS (objective 2) 

  number of checks  in  the Schengen  Information  System  and in  Interpol’s iArms about  lost 

and stolen firearms (objective 2) 

  number of customs authorities connected to SIENA (objective 2) 

  number of Risk Information Fiches entered in CRMS (objective 2) 

  number of Member States having a fully digitalised licensing system (objective 3) 

  number of post-shipment checks carried out (objective 2) 

  changes to the national criminal codes to criminalise trafficking of firearms (objective 2) 

  number of temporary import and export declarations granted (objective 3) 

  number of operators benefiting from a general export authorisation (objective 3) 

The review of the implementation of this Regulation will be done through  

  an interim application report within 5 years after the entry into force of the Regulation; 

  a full report within 10 years, notably to take into account the time needed to full roll-out the 
digitalisation of procedures and the interconnection with the single window environment for 
customs.   

Those  will  include  a  specific  stakeholder  consultation  to  assess  the  success  of  the  regulation. 
During  that  consultation,  the  effects  of  replacing  the  global  authorisation  by  a  general  export 

67 

 
authorisation  for  Authorised  Economic  Operators,  the  simplified  temporary  exports  and  imports, 
the  implied  consent  of  the  non-EU  country  of  transit  as  a  default  option  and  the  digitalisation  of 
processes will be assessed from the viewpoint of the industry. 

68 

 
 
 
ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION 

1  LEAD DG, DECIDE PLANNING/CWP REFERENCES 

The  lead  DG  is  the  Directorate-General  for  Migration  and  Home  Affairs  (DG  HOME)  for  the 
preparation  of  the  initiative  and  the  work  on  the  evaluation  and  impact  assessment.  The  agenda 
planning  reference  is  PLAN/2020/8730.  This  revision  was  included  in  the  Commission  Work 
Programme 2021 annex II. 

2  ORGANISATION AND TIMING 

The inception impact assessment was published on 4 June 2021. Within this framework, the impact 
assessment was prepared. 

An  Inter-Service  Group  was  set  up  in  May  2021  with  the  participation  of  the  following 
Commission  Directorates-General:  Secretariat-General  (SG);  Legal  Service  (LS);  Taxation  and 
Customs  Union  (TAXUD),  External  Trade  (TRADE),  Neighbourhood  and  Enlargement 
Negotiations  (NEAR);  International  Partnerships  (INTPA)  and  the  European  External  Action 
Service (EEAS). The Inter-Service Group met on 3rd December 2021 to discuss the main outcomes 
of the public consultation, the description of problems and of options and on 2nd February 2022 to 
discuss  the  revised  description  of  problems  and  options,  the  assessment  of  the  options  and  the 
impact of the preferred option.  

3  CONSULTATION OF THE RSB 

On 4 March 2022, the Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs submitted the present 
impact assessment report to the Regulatory Scrutiny Board, in view of its meeting on 6 April 2022. 
Underneath  table  shows  how  the  comments  of  the  Regulatory  Scrutiny  Board  were  taken  into 
account.  

Comment RSB 

Addressed through:  

The report had to  better  describe the expected 
evolution of the problems 

Extending  the  explanation  of  the  baseline  in 
section 5.1 

Clarify the value of the soft-law option (option 
1)  and  consider  sub-options  if  policy  choices 
need to be made 

The  explanation  linked  to  option  1  in  section 
5.2.1 was increased and option 3 bis was added 
in section 5.2.4 

Recognize  the  lack  of  reliable  data  as  a  fully-
fledged problem 

Develop  the  section  on  future  monitoring  and 
evaluation.  

The problem description and the description of 
to 
options  were 
the 
accommodate the comment.  

adjusted 

policy 

The  section  9  has  been  enhanced  and 
the 
indicators  were  added 
development  of the success  of the Regulation. 
A first interim application report will be sent to 
Council  and  Parliament  5  years  after  the 

to  monitor 

69 

 
 
adoption 

Clarify  the  estimates  of  the  administrative 
costs 

Annex  4  was  increased  to  better  explain  the 
calculations of the administrative costs.  

The  report  should  compare  the  options  more 
clearly in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and 
coherence.  It  should  explain 
the  scoring 
methodology. 

The full section 7 was adopted to explain better 
the comparison of the different options.  

4  EVIDENCE, SOURCES AND QUALITY 

The impact assessment is notably based on the stakeholder consultation (see annex 2) and the two 
external  evaluation  studies.  The  Commission  applied  a  variety  of  methods  and  forms  of 
consultation,  ranging from  consultation  on the  Inception  Impact  Assessment,  which sought  views 
from  all  interested  parties,  to  targeted  stakeholders’  consultation  by  way  of  questionnaires,  a 
confidential  survey  towards  public  authorities  and  experts’  interviews,  which  focused  on  subject 
matter experts, including practitioners at national level.  

In 2017, the Commission carried out an evaluation of the Firearms Regulation114 which concluded 
that  while  it  has  reached  to  a  large  extent  its  objectives,  its  effectiveness  and  added  value  would 
improve if its content was further specified and updated, reflecting also the evolution of the arms 
trafficking policy framework. It was followed by a Commission recommendation of 17 April 2018 
on  immediate  steps  to  improve  security  of  export,  import  and  transit  measures  for  firearms,  their 
parts  and  essential  components  and  ammunition.115  Other  data  and  evidence  gathered  by  the 
Commission  will  feed  into  the  analysis.  Initial  consultation  of  stakeholders  already  took  place  in 
those contexts. 

The Commission also took into account the findings of the ‘Study on the improvement of the EU 
system of export authorisation, and import and transit measures for civilian firearms, their parts and 
components and ammunition’. This study was commissioned by DG HOME and developed by the 
contractor  based  on  desk  research  and  the  following  stakeholder  consultation  methods:  surveys, 
interviews  with  subject  matter  experts,  questionnaires,  and  practical  case  studies  through  focus 
groups. 

114  
115  
security/20180417_commission-recommendation-immediate-steps-improve-security-firearms-ammunition_en.pdf  

COM(2017)737, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2017:0737:FIN:EN:PDF  
C(2018)2197, 

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/default/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-

70 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION (SYNOPSIS REPORT) 

This  annex  provides  a  synopsis  report  of  all  stakeholder  consultation  activities  undertaken  in  the 
context of this impact assessment. 

1.  CONSULTATION STRATEGY 

The main objective of the consultation was to receive addition input from stakeholders to enable an 
evidence-based revision of the Firearms Regulation. The consultation strategy aimed at improving 
and updating the evidence gathered so far. More specifically, the consultation sought to gather data 
and analyses of stakeholders: 

  on the problems they consider should be addressed in the initiatives; 
  on  the  roles  of  different  actors  in  the  actions  to  be  taken  and  the  level  of  action  needed, 

taking into consideration the principle of subsidiarity;  
  on challenges and shortcomings, but also best practices; 
  on the possible options to tackle the problems and the impact thereof; 
 

to fill any data gaps in the evidence base. 

While using the data collected and analyses already available, the consultation activities  sought to 
achieve a balanced and comprehensive assessment of the policy options and their impacts.  

In  this  regard,  a  major  challenge  existed  in  the  fact  that  Member  States  do  not  always  have  the 
relevant  statistical  data,  and  when  they  do,  are  reluctant  to  provide  it,  both  on  legal  trade  and  on 
seizures of firearms, which affects the analysis of the threats  and of the problems. On the side of 
manufacturers and arms dealers, data collection has also so far proven difficult, with complaints or 
assessments of administrative burden which are unsupported by any figures, or which do not relate 
to the implementation of the Regulation itself. 

1.1.  Mapping of stakeholders 

In  preparing  the  initiative,  Commission  services  carried  out  an  initial  mapping  of  stakeholders. 
Three  main  categories  of  stakeholders  that  may  have  an  interest  in  the  revision  of  the  firearms 
regulation on import, export and transit. 

 

the competent authorities at Member State level:  

o  administrative bodies in charge of import and export licences (customs, ministry of 

o 

trade, export agency etc.) 
law-enforcement authorities (police, customs)  
firearms users, in particular sport shooters, hunters, collectors 

 
  economic operators, notably arms dealers, including manufacturers and brokers 

1.2.  Methods and forms of consultation 

In view of the crisis due to the coronavirus, it was difficult to interact with stakeholders in physical 
meetings.  Therefore,  the  consultation  activities  focused  on  alternatives  such  as  online  surveys, 
semi-structured phone interviews, as well as meetings via video conference. 

71 

 
 
The  consultation  activities  started  with  the  publication  of  the  Inception  Impact  Assessment116. 
The  objective  was  to  gather  feedback  by  the  public  on  the  outline  for  the  initial  structure  of  the 
project. The consultation period lasted for 4 weeks from 4 June until 2 July 2021.  

A public consultation was launched for 14 weeks117, in order to give the possibility to the wider 
public to share their views on the functioning of the existing exports, imports and transit of civilian 
firearms  regulation,  on  the  need  for  EU  action  and  possible  policy  options  and  their  impact.  The 
questionnaire for public consultation was available in all languages.  

Targeted consultation activities were aimed to build on the consultation activities that took place in 
the  course  of  the  two  external  studies  mentioned  in  annex  1118.  Stakeholders  were  invited  in 
meetings and through an online questionnaire to complete their submissions with additional written 
contributions. Specific focus was given to Member States’ authorities; two requests119 were sent out 
to collect detailed statistics of the preceding year about the number of authorisations, refusals, the 
quantities and values of firearms exports and imports, by origin or destination and a confidential 
survey  was  distributed  to  gather  data  from  the  competent  law  enforcement  agencies.  Meetings 
were carried out with some Member States and representatives from manufacturing associations.  

With the exception of the public consultation, the consultation activities were conducted in English, 
French and German.  

2.  CONSULTATION ACTIVITIES 

2.1.  The Inception Impact Assessment 

The  Inception  Impact  Assessment  was  published  for  feedback  by  all  interested  parties  on  the 
Commission’s ‘Have your say’ portal. Respondents were invited to provide online comments.  

A total of 27 contributions were submitted over the 4-week feedback period. The division of these 
answers  according  to  category  of  respondent  and  by  country  can  be  seen  in  the  following  two 
graphs.  

116 The Inception Impact Assessment consultations are available here.  
117 12 weeks extended by 2 weeks due to the summary holidays.  
118 The study on ‘the evaluation of the Firearms Regulation’ and the ‘Study on the improvement of the EU system of 
export authorisation, and import and transit measures for civilian firearms, their parts and components and ammunition’ 
119 In August 2021 and in February 2022 

72 

 
                                                 
By category of respondent

By country

7%

26%

19%

22%

26%

7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

business
associations

EU citizen

NGO

company/business
organisation

academic/research
institution

There is a large discrepancy between the views of the respondents. Six respondents expressed their 
concern regarding stricter rules as these might have negative effects on sport shooting and hunting. 
This  specifically  concerned  the  need  to  still  be  able  to  import  and  export  their  firearms  for 
competition or to be able to buy spare parts. The simplified procedure was considered useful.  

Nevertheless,  four  respondents  are  supportive  of  the  Commission’s  initiative  to  strengthen  the 
current  rules.  One  respondent  stated  that  there  is  a  need  for  both  legislative  and  non-legislative 
actions  and  three  respondents  indicated  that  there  was  a  need  to  train  custom  officers  in  the  EU. 
Additionally,  nine  respondents  specifically  agreed  with  the  Commission  on  the  need  for 
harmonisation  within  the  EU  as  the  current  legislation  was  seen  as  too  unstable.  The  comments 
made focused on the need for a uniform implementation of the legislation, the need to streamline 
the procedures and the need to use the same documents in the whole of the EU. Suggestions were 
also  raised  about  the  need  to  streamline  the  scope  of  the  Firearms  Directive  and  Regulation  258, 
specifically linked to deactivated firearms and alarm and signal weapons. It was also clear from the 
answers  that  not  all  respondents  could  distinguish  between  the  Firearms  Directive  and  the 
Regulation 258 as some answers focused on inter-EU transit or on the categorisation of firearms.  

The  majority  of  respondents  gave  suggestions  and  comments  on  specific  proposals.  Four 
respondents  shared  the  need  for  improving  the  data  collection;  however,  two  other  respondents 
expressed  their  concern  on  possible  vulnerabilities  if  data  is  stored  in  a  centralised  way.  Six 
respondents  expressed their concern about  the vagueness  of the proposals linked to  semi-finished 
parts  as  these  are  different  from  essential  components  and  are  therefore  not  well  defined. 
Furthermore,  the  proposals  regarding  the  marking  of  semi-finished  parts  were  looked  at 
suspiciously,  as  these  could  entail  additional  costs  and  delays.  Nine  respondents  were  concerned 
about  the  proposals  linked  to  streamlining  military  and  civilian  firearms.  The  consensus  was  that 
the  trade  of  these  two  kinds  of  firearms  are  very  different  and  therefore  should  remain  separate. 
Three respondents expressed their concern about the possible political sensitivity of post-shipment 
controls. Furthermore, three business organisations expressed the need for the involvement of the 
industry in the process of changing the legislation. Additionally, five businesses requested a clear 
maximum duration for the proceedings regarding export and import of firearms.  

73 

 
 
2.2.  The public consultation 

The European Commission launched a public consultation on 5 July 2021, which aimed to gather 
feedback and collect opinions on the effectiveness of the current legislation and policy framework 
and on existing problems and possible options  for future initiatives. The consultation closed after 
14 weeks on 11 October 2021. 

Methodology 

The public consultation was conducted through an online questionnaire published on the internet in 
all EU languages. It was advertised on the European Commission’s website120 and the Commission 
sent  out  emails  to  stakeholders  (hunters  associations,  shooting  clubs  and  industry),  to  EMPACT 
firearms, to the European Firearms Expert group (EFE) and to the Firearms committee to alert them 
of the public  consultation.  The questionnaire  consisted of a series of 27  mainly closed questions, 
along with a limited number of open questions to allow for clarifying remarks and/or remarks of a 
more general nature.  

It  should  be  noted,  as  a  disclaimer,  that  the  questions  that  were  presented  to  the  respondents 
depended  on  the  profile  they  had  indicated  (as  depicted  in  Annex  6).  This  explains  why  the 
questions  on  trafficking  of  firearms  only  have  19  answers,  as  only  firearms  specialists  and  EU 
National competent authorities were presented with them. Furthermore, it is important to note that, 
even  though  the  consultation  specifically  excluded  intra-EU  movements,  many  of  the  written 
comments seemed to mix intra-EU movements with imports to, and exports out of the EU. 

The respondents 

227 valid contributions were received. 78% of all contributions came from individual EU citizens. 
5% of respondents were business associations or individual companies. 4,6% of  respondents were 
academics, think tanks and other NGOs. Only  7 national  competent authorities replied (2,95% of 
replies).  This  low  number  of  participating  national  competent  authorities  was  anticipated  in  the 
consultation strategy. It was mediated by setting up specific meetings and by creating a confidential 
survey.  

Most  respondents  came  from  the  Netherlands  (25%),  Belgium  (21%),  Romania  (17%),  Germany 
(13%) and Sweden (5%). 65.82% of the respondents indicated that they were a firearms user such 
as hunter, sport shooter and collector.  

Main findings 

A  vast  majority  of  respondents  consider  that  more  uniform  EU  rules  for  imports  and  exports  of 
firearms are needed. 47% considered that without further EU intervention, there will be an increase 
of  exports  (or  diversion)  of  firearms  to  conflict  zones  and  dictatorships,  as  well  as  smuggling  of 
firearms, their components, and convertible weapons into the EU. And 53% considered that without 
such  intervention,  economic  operators  and  legitimate  firearms  owners  will  be  faced  with 
increasingly heterogeneous national rules and procedures.  

The respondents were especially vocal about challenges that could hamper the legal movement of 
civilian firearms. The Commission had identified a number of these challenges and for almost all of 
these,  the  majority  of  respondents  indicated  that,  indeed  these  challenges  created  a  high  to  very 
high burden for legal movements of civilian firearms. When asked to identify additional challenges, 

120 See DG HOME weOnlibiste. 

74 

 
                                                 
most  respondents  reiterated  the  need  for  harmonised  rules  and  for  digitalisation.  However,  four 
respondents  commented  on  the  lack  of  knowledge  by  officers  involved  in  the  procedure  and 
therefore the need for training of these officers.  

% of respondents indicating high to very high burden for legal 
movements of civilian firearms

70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

When the focus of the survey shifted to identifying risks for firearms trafficking, the responses are 
less  decisive.  The  highest  risks  perceived  where  inadequate  controls  of  the  end-use  of  exported 
firearms,  poor  coordination  amongst  export  authorities  and  between  customs  and  licensing 
authorities. 

When focusing on possible policy options  linked to  improving legal  import, export and transit of 
civilian  firearms,  the  majority  of  respondents  indicated  that  digital  import  and  export  licences 
(59%), clear rules for ‘simplified procedures’ (63%) and publishing a list of competent authorities 
(50%)  would  have  a  high  to  very  high  impact.  While  having  the  same  licensing  procedure  for 
civilian  as  for  military  firearms  was  considered  not  at  all  or  only  to  a  small  extent  important  to 
improve the legal import, export and transit of civilian firearms.  

When discussing policy options to improve the fight against trafficking of firearms, the respondents 
perceived that almost all of the options would have a high to very high impact. The only options on 
which the respondents were indecisive where the systematic checking of criminal records in other 
MS before granting an import/export licence, imposing marking of the first country of import and 
limiting imports of unmarked semi-finished essential components.  

A  large  majority  of  respondents  identified  many  issues  as  creating  a  high  or  very  high 
administrative  burden  on  their  operations.  However,  except  a  tiny  number  of  replies,  almost  no 
respondent  was  in  a  position  to  provide  quantitative  estimates  (in  monetary  terms  or  in  full-time 
equivalent)  of  the  costs  of  the  current  rules  or  of  any  of  the  options  put  forward.  When  asked  to 

75 

 
 
 
evaluate  the  policy  options  effect  on  the  administrative  burden,  positive  impact  was  expected  for 
digitalisation,  clear  and  simple  rules  for  ‘simplified  procedure’,  removing  the  obligation  to 
translate,  publishing  information  and  clarifying  the  role  of  competent  authorities  and  especially 
homogenising  the  process  for  requesting  import  and  export  licenses.  On  the  other  hand,  negative 
impact  was  expected  for  having  the  same  licensing  procedure  for  civilian  and  military  firearms, 
limiting  import  of  unmarked  semi-finished  essential  components  and  stepping  up  post-shipment 
controls.  

The  majority  of  the  written  comments  focused  on  the  need  for  harmonisation  of  rules  at  the  EU 
level  to  support  trade  of  firearms.  The  highest  amount  of  requests  focused  on  the  need  for 
digitalisation  and  simplified  procedure.  However,  many  replies  of  individual  citizens  considered 
that strengthening import and export controls of firearms would not have any impact on trafficking. 
Instead, these responded focused on the need for effective law enforcement response.  

2.3.  Data collection 

The  2019  Study  on  the  improvement  of  the  EU  system  of  export  authorisation,  and  import  and 
transit  measures  for  civilian  firearms,  their  parts  and  components  and  ammunition121  was  mostly 
based on desk and field research (including national case studies, interviews and web survey). The 
data  collection  was  faced  with  limitations  that  prevented  a  reliable  estimate  of  the  scale  of 
trafficking of firearms, with the absence of EU statistics concerning the civilian firearms. In general 
it was difficult to engage stakeholders in consultation activities, and stakeholders found it difficult 
to quantify and qualify costs. 

In August 2021, the Commission sent a letter to the Member States,122 requesting them to collect 
and sent  detailed statistics of the preceding  year about  the  number of authorisations,  refusals,  the 
quantities and values of firearms exports and imports, by origin or destination. 10 Member States123 
sent (some of) the information requested.  

The quality and completeness of the information differs greatly between the Member States. Some 
Member States  only sent  data regarding export of civilian firearms;  other Member Stated did  not 
sent the value of shipments or information regarding origin or destination countries.  

Faced  with  continued  lack  of,  or  unsatisfactory  data,  the  Commission  sent  an  additional  letter  to 
Member States in February 2022.124 

Annex 4 contains an analysis of this data, together with data from open sources such as Eurostat, 
data sent to the Commission by stakeholders and data from past evaluation reports.  

2.4.  Confidential survey 

A confidential survey was organised to entice more EU National authorities to reply, as there were 
little  responses  in  the  public  consultation.  This  confidential  survey  also  allowed  for  more  details 
questions  than  the  public  one.  The  confidential  survey  was  sent  to  all  national  authorities 
responsible  for  Regulation  (EU)  258/2012  on  1  October  2021.  They  were  asked  to  reply  by  30 

2019, Study on the improvement of the EU system of export authorisation, and import and transit measures for 

121  
civilian firearms, their parts and components and ammunition not published 
122  
123  
124  

Ares(2021)5101296 
BG, EL, ES, FR, HR, LT, NL, PL, RO, SI 
Ares(2022)1143821 

76 

 
                                                 
October  2021.  It  contained  75  mainly  closed  questions,  along  with  a  limited  number  of  open 
questions. The full questionnaire can be found in annex 6. 

In total 32 answers were received from 20 EU Member States125. Most respondents represented the 
police  (11),  customs  (5),  Ministry  of  trade  (5),  Ministry  of  justice  or  home  affairs  (5)  and  other 
export licensing authorities (5).  

The answers of the confidential survey confirm the lamentation of the non-harmonised import and 
export  procedures  voiced  by  the  public  consultation.  Exemplary  of  this  are  the  16  respondents 
stating  that  a  specific  import  authorisation  form,  according  to  national  legislation,  9  respondents 
indicating that there is no simplified procedure for temporary imports, 3 respondents stating that the 
export authorisation model established by Regulation 258 is not used. Furthermore, 18 respondents 
stated that the MS uses a paper-based import and export process, 15 respondents stated that there 
are  fees  linked  to  the  authorisations  etc.  There  are  also  large  differences  observed  regarding  the 
time between a request and an import authorisation. There are 3 respondents stating that there is not 
maximum time stated in the legislation, the other respondents declared maximum times between 9 
months and 10 days. The respondents also indicated average process times between 5 days and 1,5 
months.  

However,  the  findings  of  the  confidential  survey  are  especially  interesting  regarding  the  drivers 
identified with trafficking of firearms. When it comes to exchange of information, only 25% of the 
respondents declared that they sent systematic SIENA messages for data in relation to smuggling of 
firearms  into  the  EU  and  12%  creates  systematic  Risk  Information  Fiches  (RIF)  in  the  Customs 
Risk  Management  System  (CRMS).  Furthermore,  when  a  refusal  or  withdrawal  of  an  export 
authorisation  is  issues,  only  40%  of  the  respondents  indicated  that  this  is  always  uploaded  in 
COARM.  

This also has an influence on the uncoordinated controls and risk assessments, as only 49% of the 
respondents stated that they systematically check the COARM system to see if similar transactions 
have been refused in other MS. 12% of the respondent even state that they never check COARM. 
When  establishing  risk  profiles  to  check  firearms  imports  34%  uses  their  own  national  statistics, 
22% rely on experiences shared in CRMS and 28% use SIENA-based information.  

Furthermore,  12%  of  the  respondents  stated  that  there  are  no  specific  checks  about  the 
convertibility  of  alarm  and  signal  weapons  when  they  are  imported.  Additionally,  9%  of  the 
respondents  stated  that  P80-  branded  ‘80%’  receivers  are  not  considered  as  a  firearm  part  and 
therefore no specific declaration is  needed when  importing them. When export authorisations  are 
granted, 25% of the respondents check criminal records in the national database, 3% checks ECRIS 
and 12% requests national  criminal  records.  Lastly, when  exporting deactivated firearms, 12% of 
the respondents states that no specific rules apply and 22% state that no specific rules apply when 
exporting signal and alarm weapons.  

125  

AT, BE, CY, CZ, EE, FI, FR, DE, IT, LV, LT, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, ES, SE 

77 

 
                                                 
There  is  also  a  problem  with  the  cooperation  between  customs  and  licencing  authorities  as  56% 
indicated that they do not have access to EU customs information system. Also when licences are 
withdrawn, suspended, modified or revoked, 9% of the licencing authorities do not inform customs.  

The Commission had identified a number of policy options which could have an impact on the fight 
against  firearms  trafficking.  For  almost  all  of  these,  the  majority  of  respondents  indicated  that, 
indeed  these  policy  options  could  have  a  high  to  very  high  impact  on  the  fight  against  firearms 
trafficking. Requiring end-use certificates at export scored the highest.  

% of respondents indicating high to very high impact on fight 
against firearms trafficking

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

2.5.  Meetings 

List  of  meetings  with  stakeholders  during  the  2019  Study  on  the  improvement  of  the  EU 
system of export authorisation, and import and transit  measures for  civilian  firearms, their 
parts and components and ammunition.126 

Name 

Experts 
Daniel Prins 

Entity/ 
Organisation 

Position 

Specific topics 

United Nations 
Office for 

Director of 
Conventional Arms 

PoA on small arms and its ITI 
International Small Arms 

126  
civilian firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, not published 

2019, Study on the improvement of the EU system of export authorisation, and import and transit measures for 

78 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
Name 

Entity/ 
Organisation 

Position 

Specific topics 

Disarmament Affairs  Branch 

Simonetta Grassi  United Nations 

Office on Drugs and 
Crime 

Head of Global 
Firearms Programme 

Nicholas Marsh 

Nils Duquet 

Peace Research 
Institute, Oslo 
(PRIO) 

Flemish Peace 
Institute 

Research Fellow 

Senior researcher 

Nicolas Florquin 

Small Arms Survey 

Senior Researcher 

Paul Holtom 

Small Arms Survey 

Senior Researcher 

Non-EU countries: 

Control Standards 
Arms Trade Treaty 
United Nations Convention 
Against Transnational 
Organized Crime 
Firearms Protocol 
Global trends in firearms 
trafficking 
Arms export and transfer 
controls 
Illicit firearms markets in the 
EU 
Terrorist access to illicit 
firearms markets in the EU 
Illicit firearms markets in the 
EU 
Converted firearms in the EU 
Risk of diversion in Europe 

  Australia:  three  representatives  from  the  Department  of  Defence  and  Department  of  Home 

Affairs. 

  Brasil:  one  representative  from  the  Divisão  de  Repressão  a  Crimes  contra  o  Patrimônio  e  ao 

Tráfico de Armas. 

  Canada: two representatives from Global Affairs Canada’s Trade Export Control department. 

  USA: five representatives from the US State Department and Department of Justice. 

Regional/international regulatory frameworks: 

  Arms Trade Treaty: one representative from the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat. 

  Modular  Small-arms-control  Implementation  Compendium  (MOSAIC):  two  representatives 

from the Conventional Arms Branch of the Office for Disarmament Affairs. 

  The  Inter-American  Convention  Against  the  Illicit  Manufacturing  of  and  Trafficking  in 
Firearms,  Ammunition,  Explosives,  and  Other  Related  Materials  (CIFTA):  one  representative 
from the Department for Public Safety of the OAS. 

  Wassenaar Arrangement: two representatives from the Wassenaar Arrangement Secretariat. 

EU Member States 

MS 

Stakeholder 
category 

BE 

NCA 

Entity/ Organisation 

Flanders - Flemish Department of 
Foreign Affairs — Strategic Goods 
Control Unit 
Wallonie - Public Service of Wallonia 
Operational Directorate-General for the 
Economy, Employment and Research 

Field research 
activity 
Phone interview, 
11th December 2018. 

Questionnaire, 
14th March 2019 

79 

 
MS 

Stakeholder 
category 

Entity/ Organisation 

Field research 
activity 

Firearms Licensing Directorate — 
Administrative assessment and 
implementation 
Belgian Federal Police 

Customs - Operational Expertise 
Legislation and Regulations  
Browning International  

Royal Union of Shooting Societies of 
Belgium 
Ministry of Industry and Trade - 
Licensing Office 
Ministry of Interior- Police and Firearms 
Unit 
Customs Administration 

LEA 

Customs 

Producers/exporte
rs 

Users’ association 

NCA 

LEA 

Customs 

Phone interview, 
18th February 2019. 
Phone interview, 
22nd February 2019. 
Phone interview,  
5th February 2019. 
Phone interview,  
12nd December 2018. 
Prague,  
29th January 2019 
morning session 

Prague,  
29th January 2019 
morning session 

CZ 

Producers/exporte
rs 

Czech Association of Arms & 
Ammunitions Producers and Sellers 
Sport & Defence 

Prague, 
29th January 2019, 
afternoon session. 

Users’ 
associations 

Czech Shooting Federation 

Association of Czech Hunters  

DE 

ES 

Producers/exporte
rs 

Users’ 
associations 

NCA 

LEA 

Customs 

Association of Hunting, Sporting and 
Ammunition Manufacturers  
Manfred Alberts GmbH 
Walther Arms, Inc. 
L & O Holding GmbH & Co. KG 
J. P. Sauer & Sohn GmbH 
Ruag Ammotec GmbH 
Frankonia Handels GmbH & Co. KG (2 
participants) 
National German Hunters Association  

Association of Legal Gun Owners 

Secretariat of State for Commerce- 
International Trade in Defense Material 
and Dual Use 
Civil Police 
State Agency of Tax Administration 
(AEAT) 

80 

Phone interview,  
22nd January 2019  
Phone interview,  
12th February 2019 
Munich, 
18th January 2019 

Phone interview, 
11st February 2019 
Phone interview,  
21st February 2019 
Questionnaire, 
7th February 2019 

 
 
 
 
 
 
MS 

Stakeholder 
category 

Entity/ Organisation 

Producers/exporte
rs 

Users’ association 

NCA 

Producers/exporte
rs 

Users’ association 

NCA/LEA 

Producers/exporte
rs 

Users’ 
associations 

NCA 

LEA 

Customs 

Producers/exporte
rs 

FI 

IT 

LT 

PT 

NCA/LEA 

Asociación Armera 
Beretta-Benelli Iberica S.a. (2 
participants) 
Dikar S.c.l. 
Grulla Armas S.l. 
Rade tecnologias S.l. 
Maxam Outdoors S.a. 
Trust Eibarres S.a. 
Carmusa 
National Association of Spanish 
Weapon- Asociación Nacional del Arma 
de España 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs 

Lynx Rifles 

Sport Shooters Association 

Ministry of Interior – Public Security 
Department 
Benelli Armi 
Tanfoglio S.r.l. 
Pedersoli Davide & C. 
Cheddite Italy S.r.l. 
Fiocchi Munizioni S.p.a. 
ANPAM Association (2 participants) 
Association for the defence of the rights 
of legal holders of arms  
Italian Hunting Federation  

Field research 
activity 
Eibar,  
5th February 2019 

Phone interview, 
15th January 2019 

Phone interview, 30th 
January 2019 
Phone interview, 30th 
January 2019 
Phone interview,  
30th January 2019 
Phone interview,  
9th January 
Rome, 4th December 

Phone interview, 21st 
January 2019 
Phone interview, 
4th December 2018. 
Vilnius,  
23rd January 2019, 
morning session 

Police Department - License Division  
(2 participants) 
Ministry of Interior - Division of Public 
Security Police (2 participants) 
State Border Guard Service  
Customs Department - Procedures 
Division  
Guns Merchants Association of Lithuania  Vilnius,  
Oksalis 
Zala Arms 
Vollit 
Lithuanian Defence and Security Industry 
Association (2 participants) 
Police - Firearms and Explosives 
Department 
(3 participants) 

23rd January 2019, 
afternoon session 

Lisbon, 
8th February 2019,  
morning session 

81 

 
MS 

Stakeholder 
category 

Entity/ Organisation 

Customs 

Tributary and customs authority 

Producers/exporte
rs 

Browning Viana (2 participants) 
BRG - Portugal 
Cartuchos Sulbeja, Lda 

Users’ 
associations 

NCA/LEA 

RO 

Customs 

Producers/exporte
rs 
Users’ 
associations 

NCA 

NCA 
LEA 
Customs 

UK127 

Portuguese Federation of Hunting 

National Confederation of Portuguese 
Hunters 
Ministry of Home Affairs - General 
Inspectorate of the Romanian Police - 
Weapons, Explosives and Dangerous 
Substances Unit 
National Agency for Fiscal 
Administration - Directorate-General for 
Customs (2 participants) 
S.C. Interarms Impex S.r.l. 
S.C. Lotus Distribution & Service S.r.l. 
General Association of Hunting and 
Fishing Athletes  
Department for International Trade 

Department for International Trade 
National Crime Agency 
Formerly HR Customs & Excise 
EGADD: Export Group for Aerospace, 
Defence, and Dual-Use 
Helston Gunsmiths 

Producers/exporte
rs 

RPA International 

Gun Trade Association (GTA) Ltd 

D&B Militaria 

Users’ 
associations 

Formerly British Association for 
Shooting and Conservation 

Field research 
activity 

Lisbon, 
8th February 2019,  
afternoon session 

Lisbon, 
8th February 2019,  
afternoon session 

Phone interview,  
20th February 2019 
Questionnaire, 
22nd February 2019 
Bucharest,  
22nd January 2019 

Bucharest,  
14th December 2018 

Bucharest,  
22nd January 2019 
Bucharest,  
18th December 2018 
Phone interview, 28th 
January 2019 
London, 25th January 
2019 

Phone interview, 23rd 
January 2019 
Questionnaire, 
8th February 2019 
Phone interview, 
28th January 2019 
Phone interview, 15th 
January 2019 
Phone interview, 15th 
January 2019 
Phone interview, 15th 
January 2019 

127  During  the  2019  study  on  the  improvement  of  the  EU  system  of  export  authorisation,  and 
import and transit measures for civilian firearms, their parts and components and ammunition,  the 
UK was still part of the EU.  

82 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
MS 

Stakeholder 
category 

Entity/ Organisation 

Law Enforcement International 

Field research 
activity 
Phone interview, 15th 
January 2019 

List of meetings with stakeholders during the impact assessment. 

Throughout October and November 2021, the Commission organised 10 meetings with a variety of 
stakeholders128. During these meetings, the stakeholders gave further comments and suggestions on 
policy  options  presented  by  the  Commission.  The  meetings  allowed  the  Commission  to  get 
information  from  about  the  different  procedures  and  difficulties  in  the  Member  States  and 
experienced by business associations. 

Each of the meetings with the Member States focused on the answers provided by the Member 
States in the confidential survey. The various options and comments were discussed in order to get 
a thorough understanding of the needs and responsibilities of the various actors. The meetings with 
the business associations focused mainly on trying to quantify the administrative burden of the 
various options.  

-  21/10/2021: meeting with the Austrian authorities  
-  21/10/2021: meeting with Olivier Verstraeten, Secretary General of the Association of 

European Manufacturers of Sporting Firearms aisbl 

-  22/10/21: meeting with the Belgian authorities (law enforcement and licensing authorities) 
-  28/10/2021: meeting with the Italian authorities (customs, police) 
-  29/10/2021: meeting with Mauro Silvis, representative of the Italian national association of 
manufacturers of sport and civilian weapons and munitions (ANPAM) and of the – Institut 
Européen des Armes de Chasse et de Sport (EU transparency register 169603610073-70) 

-  03/11/2021: meeting with the Czech authorities 
-  05/11/2021: meeting with the Swedish authorities 
-  15/11/2021: meeting with the Dutch authorities 
-  3/12/2021: meeting with the German authorities 

128 Association of European Manufacturers of Sporting Firearms aisbl, Italian national association of manufacturers of 
sport  and  civilian  weapons  and  munitions  (ANPAM),  Institut  Européen  des  Armes  de  Chasse  et  de  Sport  (EU 
transparency  register  169603610073-70),  Austrian,  Belgian,  Italian,  Czech,  Swedish,  Dutch,  German  and  Spanish 
authorities 

83 

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW? 

1.  PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE INITIATIVE 

The preferred option is option 3, which includes both clarifications to the existing legislation and new legislative provisions. The following table sets out 
the different measures it includes and how they affect various stakeholders. 

Description of the measure 

Import/export licensing 
authorities 

Law enforcement 
authorities 

Firearms users 

Arms dealers (retailers 
and manufacturers) 

Imports 

Compulsory classification as 
firearms of alarm and signal 
weapons not complying with 
Directive 
Implementing 
(EU)  2019/69  +  EU  list  of 
non-convertible  alarm  and 
signal weapons 

EU-level  mechanism 
for 
harmonised  classification  in 
case 
disagreements 
of 
between authorities 

Import  licencing  authorities 
issue  an 
would  have 
import 
for 
alarm  and  signal  weapons 
which are convertible 

to 
authorisation 

NA 

Customs  authorities  would 
have to check the validity of 
the certificate accompanying 
the customs declaration. The 
necessary  human  resources 
will need to be provided. 

Importers  of  alarm  and 
signal  weapons  would  need 
to make sure that checks are 
preformed  to  establish  the 
non-convertibility  if they  do 
not  want 
the 
firearms  at 
weapons  as 
import. 

to  declare 

Licencing  authorities  would 
inform  the  Commission  of 
their  decisions  to  issue  or 
declare  an  alarm  and  signal 
weapon  as  non-convertible.  
rely  on  a 
They  could 
Commission 
decision 
determining whether a given 

Customs  could  rely  on  a 
decision 
Commission 
determining whether a given 
model  of  alarm  and  signal 
weapon 
is  convertible  or 
not. 

Importers could complain to the Commission if they notice 
diverging approaches between Member States in relation to 
the same alarm and signal weapon. 

84 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Description of the measure 

Import/export licensing 
authorities 

Law enforcement 
authorities 

Firearms users 

Arms dealers (retailers 
and manufacturers) 

model  of  alarm  and  signal 
weapon 
is  convertible  or 
not. 

of 

the 
Designation 
authorities 
in  charge  of 
checking  compliance  with 
the  implementing  directive 
before  the  release  into  free 
circulation 

The designation of authorities will enable customs, in case 
of doubt (e.g. risk of forgery), to double check the validity 
of the certificate with the issuing authority.  

Importers  will  have  clarity  as  who  to  turn  to  in  order  to 
receive the compliance certificate. 

import  of 
Limit 
firearms 
finished 
essential 
components 
licenced firearms dealers 

semi-
and 
to 

Import  licensing  authorities 
will  only  grant  an  import 
licence  to  licensed  firearms 
dealers. 

Customs  will  only  check 
whether  the  importer  has  a 
valid licence. 

the 

They  will  also  have  to  fully 
implement the customs rules 
by classifying the unfinished 
components  as 
final 
product.  This  will  require  a 
strong  risk  assessment  to 
avoid  misdeclaration 
of 
goods. The necessary IT and 
human  resources  will  need 
to be provided. 

to 

them 

Private  individuals  will  not 
be  able 
import  such 
products  anymore,  which 
will  prevent 
from 
creating  their  own  custom-
made  firearms.  Legitimate 
users  will  have  to  ask  a 
licensed  arms  dealers 
to 
create the final product. 

Arms  dealers  are  unaffected 
by  this  measure.  Retailers 
are likely to benefit from the 
effect,  with 
substitution 
individuals 
private 
requesting  their  services  to 
unfinished 
import 
and 
product 
the 
manufacture/assemble 
finished firearm. 

the 

60-day  deadline 

to  grant  Import  licensing  authorities 
establish 
have 

will 

to 

NA 

Importers  will  have  clarity  about  deadlines  and  will  enjoy 

85 

 
Description of the measure 

Import/export licensing 
authorities 

Law enforcement 
authorities 

Firearms users 

Arms dealers (retailers 
and manufacturers) 

import authorisations 

Exports 

Exporters 
provide 
to 
evidence  of  final  import  in 
the country of destination 

the same conditions throughout the EU. 

to  deal  with 
processes 
the 
set 
requests  within 
deadline.  As 
for  export 
authorisations  currently,  the 
countdown  would  only  start 
once 
the  necessary 
supporting  documents  and 
information 
been 
received by the authority. 

has 

all 

the 

The  authority  will  received 
the  copy  of 
import 
declaration  in  the  non-EU 
country. National authorities 
will have to establish proper 
procedures to check after the 
deadline  that  the  evidence 
has  been  provided.  If  it  has 
not, 
inform 
should 
immediately 
the  customs 
offices of export and of exit, 
start  tracing  the  firearm  to 
recover  it,  and  withdraw  or 
suspend 
export 
the 
authorisations. 

it 

NA  as  firearms  users  carry 
out temporary exports 

provided 

Customs  and  relevant  law 
authorities 
enforcement 
should 
immediately 
be 
notified  if  the  evidence  is 
not 
this 
information  should  be  fed 
into  the  national  and  EU  
customs  risk  management 
to  control  with 
systems 
attention 
similar 
movements. 

– 

86 

Exporters  will  have 
to 
follow-up  their  exports  and 
make sure that the importers 
the  non-EU  countries 
in 
provide 
the 
them  with 
evidence  of  import.  If  they 
do  not,  the  exporters  might 
forgo  unreliable 
have 
clients  who  are  not  able  to 
provide evidence of imports. 
This  is  unlikely  to  be  an 
issue 
professional 
traders,  who  work  with 
trustworthy  arms  dealers 
abroad. 

for 

to 

 
Description of the measure 

Import/export licensing 
authorities 

Law enforcement 
authorities 

Firearms users 

Arms dealers (retailers 
and manufacturers) 

Member  States  may  entitle 
third parties to conduct post-
shipment controls 

This  provision  would  create 
a  legal  basis  to  support  the 
work of licensing authorities 
post-
conducting 
when 
a 
in 
controls 
shipment 
context 
constrained 
of 
budgets and short staffing. 

The  outcome  of  negative 
post-shipment 
controls 
would  contribute  to  a  more 
precise  knowledge  of  the 
threat.  More  post-shipment 
checks  provide  a  better 
understanding  of  diversion 
mechanisms. 

NA 

certificate 

End-user 
for 
exported  category  A  and  B 
firearms 

check 

granting 

They  will 
the 
presence  of  the  certificate 
the 
before 
authorisation,  which  would 
align  the  rules  for  civilian 
firearms with those currently 
for  military 
in 
weapons. 

place 

of 

presence 

Customs  will  have  to  check 
the 
the 
an 
certificate 
as 
supporting 
accompanying 
document 
export 
declaration.  The  necessary 
human  resources  will  need 
to  be  provided  for  these 
checks. 

for 

NA  (they  benefit  from  the 
simplification 
the 
European Firearms Pass) 

of 

This  requirement  will  only 
create  a  new  obligation  in 
Member States which do not 
already  apply  the  rules  of 
the 
Common 
Position to those firearms. 

Council 

Exporters  will  be  dependent 
on the trustworthiness of the 
importer  and 
the  public 
authorities  in  the  country  of 
destination. They might lose 
commercial opportunities by 
written 
demanding 
commitment  not  to  sell  the 
firearms to the armed forces 
or not to re-export them. The 
clarification  of  scope  means 
that  arms  dealers  aiming  at 

a 

87 

 
Description of the measure 

Import/export licensing 
authorities 

Law enforcement 
authorities 

Firearms users 

Arms dealers (retailers 
and manufacturers) 

selling  weapons  for  military 
use  will  have  to  do  it  under 
national 
and 
procedures  of  the  Council 
Common Position.  

rules 

Cooperation and exchanges of information 

compulsory 
criminal records in ECRIS 

check 

of 

NA 

NA 

NA 

In  addition  to  requesting  a 
copy  of  the  criminal  record 
from 
the 
the  applicant, 
authority  will 
competent 
have 
to  proactively  (and 
ideally  automatically)  check 
whether  an  applicant  has  a 
criminal  record  in  another 
Member State. 

compulsory  notification  of 
common 
a 
refusals 
electronic system 

in 

affected 

Competent  authorities  will 
differently 
be 
depending  on  the  type  of 
system 
used. 
eventually 
COARM would enable joint 
analysis  of 
for 
military  and  non-military 
transactions,  while  DUeS 
would  be  an  easy  platform 
already  used  by  competent 

refusals 

NA 

NA 

88 

exchanges 

Increased 
of 
between 
information 
authorities  might  have  an 
indirect  effect  on  exporters, 
as  they  would  be  treated 
more equally across the EU, 
compared 
the  current 
situation 

to 

 
Description of the measure 

Import/export licensing 
authorities 

Law enforcement 
authorities 

Firearms users 

Arms dealers (retailers 
and manufacturers) 

Possible check of the SIS 

authorities 

This would further reinforce 
threat  assessment  for 
the 
unusual 
or 
suspicious 
requests 

NA 

NA 

NA 

Whistle-blower 
regime 

protection 

Competent  authorities  and  law  enforcement  would  benefit 
from  inside  information,  which  could  facilitate  the  risk 
assessment. 

NA 

to 

Arms  dealers  already  have 
to implement Directive (EU) 
2019/1937  on the protection 
of  persons  who 
report 
breaches of Union law , with 
respect 
the  Firearms 
Directive (for intra-EU rules 
acquisition 
on 
and 
firearms). 
of 
possession 
They  would  not 
face  a 
substantive  change  in  their 
internal 
processes  with 
respect  to  whistle-blowing 
in the context of imports and 
exports. 

Clarification of the roles and 
responsibilities  of  customs 
and licencing authorities. 

inform 

the 
Customs  will 
competent 
licensing 
authority that the goods have 
left  the  customs  territory  of 
the  Union;  at  import  they 

Customs 
controls  will 
continue  to  be  risk-based; 
customs  will  check 
the 
presence  of  the  appropriate 
import or export declaration, 

NA 

NA 

89 

 
Description of the measure 

Import/export licensing 
authorities 

Law enforcement 
authorities 

Firearms users 

Arms dealers (retailers 
and manufacturers) 

will  contact  the  licensing 
authority  in  case  of  doubt 
about 
the  conformity  of 
imported goods.  

transit, 

the  EU 

list  of  non-
or 
convertibility  for  imported 
alarm  and  signal  weapons. 
In  case  of 
the 
customs authorities of transit 
and  of  export  will  exchange 
relevant 
information.  The 
necessary  human  resources 
will  need  to  be  provided  to 
implement 
risk-
assessments. 

these 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

(Regulation 

Reference shall be made to article 47 of the Union Customs 
(EU)  No 952/2013).  Competent 
Code 
authorities  and  law  enforcement  authorities,  including 
customs  will  also  be  expressly  entitled  to  exchange 
information about ongoing investigations for the purpose of 
tracing firearms and to improve the threat assessment. 

Member  States  will  have  to 
centralise  information  about 
numbers  and  values  of 
import 
export 
and 
authorisations; 
they  will 
have  to  collect  accurately 
data  about  actual  imports 

Law enforcement authorities 
customs)  will 
(including 
have  to  establish  systematic 
data-collection  of  firearms 
seizures,  and  if  necessary 
internal 
their 
modify 
processes, 
reporting 

90 

Legal  basis  for  intelligence 
sharing  between  customs 
and licencing authorities 

Submission 
statistics  on 
seizures 

of 

annual 
and 

trade 

 
  
Description of the measure 

Import/export licensing 
authorities 

Law enforcement 
authorities 

Firearms users 

Arms dealers (retailers 
and manufacturers) 

for 

exports, 

each 
and 
category of firearms, notably 
by  monitoring  whether  and 
how  authorisations  are  used 
or 
for 
exports.   

imports 

actual 

possibly 

by 
including 
creating a database of seized 
firearm. They might have to 
adapt  the  categories  used  in 
their  current  system  to  the 
type of data requested. Data-
collection  will  have  to  be 
centralised  and  not  be  kept 
only  the  local  customs  or 
police offices. The necessary 
IT and human resources will 
need to be provided. 

Administrative simplifications 

Alignment  of  the  personal 
scope  with  Directive  (EU) 
2021/555 

NA 

NA 

Collectors 
and  museums 
will be included in the scope 
of  the  Regulation,  meaning 
they  will  be  subject  to  its 
obligations and benefit from 
the  simplifications,  instead 
of  being  subject  to  their 
national laws only.  

Brokers  will  be  subject  to 
the same obligations as arms 
dealers  when  importing  and 
exporting 
firearms. 
However,  they  were  already 
considered  as  “exporters” 
under  the  current  version  of 
the  regulation,  which  means 
they  would  not  be  affected 
by the clarification. 

91 

 
 
Description of the measure 

Import/export licensing 
authorities 

Law enforcement 
authorities 

Firearms users 

Arms dealers (retailers 
and manufacturers) 

of 

the 
Clarification 
substantive  scope,  covering 
only 
transactions  between 
civilians  and  removing  the 
overlap  with  Common 
Position 2008/944/CFSP 

NA 

Licensing  authorities  will 
have  to  clearly  distinguish 
the  procedure  for  exports  of 
military  firearms  from  the 
procedure  for  exports  in  the 
context  of  transactions  of  a 
civilian  nature.  They  will 
however  not  be  profoundly 
affected on substance, since: 

to 

  sales 

foreign 
or 
governments 
forces  will 
armed 
the 
remain  under 
Common 
Position 
and  existing  national 
law; 
  civilian 

transactions 
of  category  A  or  B 
firearms  will 
still 
require  an  end-user 
certificate  and 
the 
respect of the foreign 
and  security  policy 
considerations  of  the 
Common Position. 

will 
clarification 
This 
greatly  benefit  commercial 
exporters, as they will all be 
faced with identical rules for 
authorisations, 
export 
irrespective  of  the  Member 
State  in  which  they  lodge 
the 
authorisation. 
They  will  know  exactly 
which  type  of  procedure  to 
apply,  depending  on  who  is 
the end-user of the sale. 

export 

from 

Many  firearms  users  will 
benefit 
this 
clarification,  as  many  of 
them  had 
to  undergo  a 
burdensome  procedure  for 
temporary 
exports 
(including  holders  of  a  
European  Firearms  Pass),  in 
which 
States 
Member 
the  export  of 
subjected 
civilian 
the 
firearms 
standard  rules  of  military 
exports. 
European 
The 
Firearms  Pass  will  be  more 
automatically 
recognised, 
without the need for a priori 
authorisation. 

to 

92 

 
Description of the measure 

Import/export licensing 
authorities 

Law enforcement 
authorities 

Firearms users 

Arms dealers (retailers 
and manufacturers) 

NA 

to 

the 
applied 

the 
Express  reference 
roles  and  responsibilities  of 
exporters 
and 
importers 
right 
sure 
(making 
to 
is 
marking 
imported  firearms,  duty  of 
cooperation  with  competent 
authority,  duty 
inform 
of 
in 
authorities 
suspected  violation  of  the 
rules, etc.) 

to 
case 

a 

Replace global authorisation 
by 
export 
general 
authorisation  for  Authorised 
Economic Operators 

Licencing  authorities  will 
benefit 
reduced 
from 
administrative  burden,  as  a 
authorisation  will 
global 
apply to specific operators in 
specific 
thus 
removing  the  obligation  to 
individual 
process 
applications 
grand 
and 
individual licences. 

conditions, 

hold 

Law enforcement authorities 
will  be  more  easily  entitled 
to 
responsible 
importers  and  exporters  for 
the  lack  of  compliance  with 
the rules, if the due diligence 
obligations 
not 
respected. This will facilitate 
for 
incriminations 
the 
firearms trafficking. 

are 

Importers  (in  particular  commercial  importers)  will  face 
standard  reporting  and  due  diligence  obligations,  making 
sure  in  particular  that  imported  firearms  respect  the 
applicable  legislation.  As  Member  States  already  by  and 
large  transposed  the  Firearms  Directive,  similar  rules 
already apply at national level. The Regulation will reflects 
those  obligations  in  the  directly  applicable  EU  legal  order 
for clarity and transparency. 

to 

The  impact  on  customs  will 
depend  on  the  exact  scope 
and modalities of the general 
be 
authorisation, 
determined in a delegated or 
the 
implementing  act. 
relevant 
are 
in  a  centralised 
recorded 
database,  the  checks  would 
automatically 
be 
the  EU  Single 
through 
Window  Environment  for 
customs. 

operators 

done 

If 

NA 

in 

and 

would 
from 
to 

trustworthy 
Regular 
be 
exporters 
the 
exempted 
lodge 
obligation 
export 
individual 
applications 
specific 
cases. One of the conditions 
would  be  for  them  to  be 
certified  by  customs  as 
Authorised 
Economic 
Operators  with  the  Safety 
and  Security  element.  The 
other  conditions  could  be 
linked  to  the  countries  of 
the 
destinations, 
specific  end-users,  or  for 

or 

to 

93 

 
Description of the measure 

Import/export licensing 
authorities 

Law enforcement 
authorities 

Firearms users 

Arms dealers (retailers 
and manufacturers) 

specific  processes  (such  as 
intra-group transactions). 

Harmonised  simplifications 
for  temporary  exports  and 
imports 

This  simplification  would 
the 
take  away  part  of 
administrative  burden  of 
licensing  authorities,  who 
would  not  have  to  grant 
in 
prior 
specific  cases  (exhibitions, 
repairs etc.) 

authorisations 

Customs  would  have  to  pay 
particular  attention  to  the 
effective  re-imports  or  re-
exports  after  the  period  of 
discharge,  and  ensure  that 
the 
the 
firearms  concerned  appear 
expressly  on  the  import  or 
declaration.  The 
export 
necessary  human  resources 
will need to be provided. 

particulars 

of 

would 

Collectors 
or  museums 
would  particularly  benefit 
from  this  measure  as  the 
import 
mere 
export  or 
declaration 
be 
temporary 
for 
sufficient 
imports.  They 
exports  or 
would  have 
to  mention 
expressly  all  the  particulars 
of the weapons concerned in 
the declaration (brand, serial 
number, 
their 
etc.) 
declaration. 

in 

(for 

Manufacturers  (in  the  case 
of  temporary  imports)  and 
retails 
temporary 
exports),  in  particular  for 
repair  purposes,  or 
for 
fairs,  would 
international 
only  need  export  or  import 
for 
declaration 
temporary 
imports.  They 
exports  or 
would  have 
to  mention 
expressly  all  the  particulars 
of the weapons concerned in 
the declaration (brand, serial 
number, 
their 
etc.) 
declaration. 

in 

Implied  consent  of  the  non-
EU  country  of  transit  as  the 
default option 

Member  States  would  have 
to 
the 
expressly  notify 
Commission  if  they  do  not 
the  absence  of 
recognise 
reply of the third country  of 
transit 
implicit 
agreement to the transit. 

an 

as 

(unless  expressly  disapplied  by 
The  default  option 
competent  authorities)  would  ease  the  burden  placed  on 
exporters, who complain that waiting for the consent of the 
third country of transit constitutes one of the main costs of 
current processes. After 20 days without reply, the consent 
of the third country of transit will be deemed to have been 
granted,  and  the  exporter  will  be  able  to  lodge  its 
application for an export authorisation. 

NA 

94 

 
Description of the measure 

Import/export licensing 
authorities 

Law enforcement 
authorities 

Firearms users 

Arms dealers (retailers 
and manufacturers) 

This  measure  responds  to  a  strong  request  from  all 
stakeholders, who will be faced with a uniform multilingual 
digital  environment,  providing  them  direct  and  immediate 
connection with the licencing and the customs authorities. It 
will remove much of the burden of the obligation to provide 
additional paper supporting documents.  

digitalisation 
Full 
(computerised 
data-filing 
systems,  e-licencing,  use  of 
the  EU  Single  Window 
Environment for customs) 

Import  licencing  authorities 
will  either  have  to  digitalise 
application 
whole 
the 
use 
process 
the 
or 
e-licencing 
Commission’s 
platform,129  which  will  be 
provided  to  them  free  of 
charge. 

Member  States  which  still 
operate  a  decentralised  (and 
paper-based) 
sometimes 
application system will need 
to centralise and digitalise it. 
They  will  be  encouraged  to 
link  this  new  system  to  the 
central  data-filing  systems 
that they are bound to set up 
in 
the 
Firearms Directive. 

application 

of 

be 
instead 

authorities 
will 
from 

in 
Customs 
greatly 
particular 
benefit 
the 
digitalisation process, linked 
to  the  rolling  out  the  EU 
Single 
Window 
Environment  for  customs. 
This  means  that  most  of  the 
documentary 
customs 
fully 
checks  will 
of 
automatized: 
the 
checking  manually 
presence (and validity) of an 
import/export  authorisation, 
this  authorisation  issued  by 
the  licencing  authority  will 
be  automatically  linked  to 
the 
declaration 
through  a  central  database. 
The 
the 
authorisation  will  lead  to  an 
automatic  rejection  of  the 
customs declaration.  

customs 

absence 

of 

129  

Based on the platform for dual-use goods: https://webgate.acceptance.ec.europa.eu/frontoffice/welcome 

95 

 
                                                 
Description of the measure 

Import/export licensing 
authorities 

Law enforcement 
authorities 

Firearms users 

Arms dealers (retailers 
and manufacturers) 

Prohibition  of 
authorisations and transit 

fees 

for 

NA 

a 

The  prohibition  would  only 
affect 
few  Member 
States.130  When  these  fees 
are abolished, these Member 
States  will  have  to  adapt 
their  procedure  and  forgo 
income.  The  Commission 
estimates 
annual 
to  public 
budgetary 
finances 
to 
86.000  euro  per  year  at  EU 
level. 

the 
loss 
to 

amount 

By prohibiting fees, firearms 
users 
affected 
Member  States  will  receive 
equal treatment.  

the 

in 

By  prohibiting  fees,  arms 
dealers 
affected 
Member  States  will  receive 
equal treatment. 

the 

in 

The proposal will entail extra checks by licensing authorities and customs. However, the actual impact will be limited as the market share is very small 
for civilian firearms. The creation of interoperability of systems will also envisage a simplification of customs control.  

The  proposal  will  provide  that  in  the  future  the  interoperability  of  the  database  for  import  and  export  authorisations  with  the  EU  Single  Window 
environment for Customs will be ensured. Such work will need financial resources devoted to it and made available to DG TAXUD to provide for the 
decided interconnection to be made possible. Currently, the level of appropriate resources for such work cannot be determined with certainty, but it is 
estimated that it could require a maximum estimated budget of 0.950 million EUR over a 5-year period, while a maintenance fee of 0.100 million EUR 
will be needed annually thereafter. It is further estimated that DG TAXUD would require 1,5131 FTE during the first five years of implementation and 0.2 

Czech Republic (€20), Estonia (€13), Italy (€32), Lithuania (€14), Poland (€19), Portugal (at import: for private citizen €25,6/firearm, for gunsmiths €12,8/firearm; at export 

130  
€3,8/firearm), Slovakia (at least €33, but normally 0,1% of the value of the products), Slovenia (€49,8) and Sweden (€120) 
131 0,5 FTE for policy work and 1 FTE for work on the Single Window 

96 

 
 
                                                 
FTE for the maintenance of the interconnection with the EU Single Window Environment for Customs. As the development investment will be carried 
out over a 5-year period, the amount to be charged in the period 2024-2027 will be proportional to the effort made. 

97 

 
 
2.  SUMMARY OF COSTS AND BENEFITS 

I. Overview of Benefits (total for all provisions) – Preferred Option 

Description 

 Import:  Existing  rules  on 
import  will  be 
firearms 
harmonized 
and 
to 
strengthened 
prevent 
firearms  at 
diversion  of 
import  and  to  establish  a 
level  playing  field  for  all 
importers.  

risk 

 Export:  reinforcing  rules 
firearms  export  will 
on 
decrease 
of 
the 
diversion of firearms, which 
fuel  global  illicit  firearms 
trafficking  and  contributes 
to  instability  and  organised 
crime worldwide 

Administrative 
simplification to harmonize 
the existing EU rules and to 
facilitate 
of 
the 
firearms. 

trade 

98 

Amount 

Direct benefits 

Comments 

directive 

2019/69. 

An EU  list  will be created  containing the alarm 
and  signal  weapons  which  are  compliant  with  
implementing 
The 
compulsory  checks  and  classification  of  these 
alarm and signal weapons will prevent the entry 
of convertible alarm and signal weapons into the 
EU,  where  they  can  be  used  in  criminal  or 
terrorist  offences.  Limiting  import  of  semi-
finished  firearms  and  essential  components  to 
licenced  firearms  dealers  will  also  prevent 
illegal  manufacturing  of  firearms  which  could 
then be used for criminal or terrorist offences.  

the 

increase 

in  security  cannot  be 
While 
quantified,  the  SOCTA  clearly  indicates  these 
imports  as  a  threat  for  the  security  of  EU 
citizens.  The  case  studies  on  these  imports 
reinforce  this  picture.  By  increasing  the  import 
regulations, these threats will decrease.  

to  check 

Creating  a  uniform  EU  certificate,  designating 
authorities 
the  compliance  and 
establishing  a  60-day  deadline  to  grant  import 
authorisations  will  also  result  in  a  level  playing 
field  for  all  importers.  Due  to  the  lack  in  data 
received  from  the  firearms  industry,  it  is  not 
possible  to  quantify  this,  however  during  the 
consultations the need for harmonisation was the 
main focus of the stakeholders.  

are 

and 

exports 

followed-up 

When 
through 
providing  evidence  of  final  import,  end-user 
certificates 
conducting  post-shipment 
controls  the  risks  of  diversions  will  decrease. 
While  such  an  increase  cannot  be  quantified, 
examples  such  as  those  in  Mexico  (96.948 
firearms  seized  during  2015-2020  with  a  worth 
of  $38  million)  show  the  large  monetary  value 
of  diverted  firearms.  Furthermore,  the  cases  of 
circumvention  of  embargos  through  Moldova 
shows the international responsibility of the EU 
to strengthen export controls.  

During the stakeholder consultation, the need for 
harmonisation  and  administrative  simplification 
was 
recurring  comment.  This 
simplification will be obtained by creating a full 
export 
digitalisation 

the  most 

import 

and 

of 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and 

export 

authorisations, 

authorisations. This will lead to a yearly benefit 
of €1.603.680 for the arms dealers (retailers and 
manufacturers).  
Furthermore,  the  prohibition  of  fees  for  the 
import 
as 
implemented by some Member States, will be a 
yearly  direct  saving  of  €86.175  for  the  arms 
dealers.  
Harmonising  and  simplifying  the  temporary 
exports  and 
imports  will  save  museums, 
collectors and dealers around €30.840 each year. 
Furthermore,  implementing  the  implied  consent 
of  the  non-EU  country  of  transit  as  the  default 
option saves the arms dealers annually €56.540.  

Cooperation and exchange 
of  information:  improving 
the  cooperation  between 
licencing 
customs 
and 
authorities  and 
increasing 
the exchange of information 
on  firearms  authorisations, 
refusals and trade will allow 
for better risk assessments.  

Indirect benefits 

The  clarification  of  the  role  and  responsibilities 
of customs and licensing authorities and a  legal 
basis  for  intelligence  sharing  will  enable  both 
authorities to improve the risk assessments. This 
will support the prevention of firearms diversion 
at import and export.  

Increasing  the  cooperation  and  exchange  of 
information  might  have  an  indirect  effect  on 
exporters, as they would be treated more equally 
across the EU, compared to the current situation. 
Due  to  the  lack  in  data  received  from  the 
firearms  industry,  it  is  not  possible  to  quantify 
this,  however  during  the  consultations  the  need 
for  harmonisation  was  the  main  focus  of  the 
stakeholders.   

Administrative cost savings related to the ‘one in, one out’ approach* 

cost  reduction  through  the 
use  of  e-licencing  system 
for 
export 
authorisations 

import 

and 

€ 1.603.680 

Implied  consent  of 
countries for transit 

third 

€ 56.540 

No  prior  authorisation  for 
special 
temporary 
operations 

€ 30.840 

II. Overview of costs – Preferred option 

99 

When import and export authorisations can 
be processed through an e-licensing system, 
this will reduce the amount of time spent on 
each  authorisation,  for  the  firearms  dealers 
and  the  authorities  who  need  to  assess  the 
authorisations. 

If implied consent of third countries for the 
transit  of  firearms  is  always  granted  after 
20  days,  this  would  decrease  the  costs  for 
firearms dealers.  

If no authorisations for specific operations, 
such  as  temporary  import  and  export, 
would  be  needed  for  institutions  such  as 
museums,  collectors  etc.  then  this  would 
decrease the costs for these stakeholders. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Citizens/Consumers 

Businesses 

Administrations 

One-off 

Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

One-off 

Recurrent 

NA 

NA 

NA 

EU 

Creating 
an 
central 
database 
for  import 
and export 
authorisati
on 

final 
in 

Exporters 
to  provide 
evidence 
of 
import 
the 
country  of 
destinatio
n 

End-user 
certificate 
for 
exported 
category 
A  and  B 
firearms 

Direct adjustment 
costs 

NA 

Direct 
administrative 
costs 

NA 

NA 

Direct regulatory 
fees and charges 

NA 

Direct 
enforcement costs 

NA 

Indirect costs 

Direct adjustment 
costs 

Direct 
administrative 
costs 

NA 

NA 

NA 

Direct regulatory 
fees and charges 

NA 

Direct 
enforcement costs 

NA 

Indirect costs 

NA 

Direct adjustment 
costs 

NA 

Direct 
administrative 
costs 

Direct regulatory 
fees and charges 

NA 

NA 

Direct 
enforcement costs 

NA 

Indirect costs 

NA 

Direct adjustment 
costs 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

extending 
current  e-
licensing 
system  of 
DG 
TRADE    

Direct 
administrative 
costs 

NA 

NA 

Direct regulatory 
fees and charges 

NA 

Direct 
enforcement costs 

NA 

Indirect costs 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

100 

€179.900 

NA 

€  950.000 
(DG 
TAXUD 
estimate) 

€100.000 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

Rough 
estimate  of 
couple 
of 
thousand 
euro 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

€719.600 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Costs related to the ‘one in, one out’ approach 

Direct adjustment 
costs  

NA 

NA 

Total   

Indirect 
adjustment costs 

NA 

NA 

Administrative 
costs (for 
offsetting) 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

€ 899.500 

(1)  Estimates  (gross  values)  to  be provided  with  respect  to  the  baseline;  (2)  costs  are  provided  for  each  identifiable 
action/obligation of the preferred option otherwise for all retained options when no preferred option is specified; (3) If 
relevant  and  available,  please  present  information  on  costs  according  to  the  standard  typology  of  costs  (adjustment 
costs,  administrative  costs,  regulatory  charges,  enforcement  costs,  indirect  costs;).  (4)  Administrative  costs  for 
offsetting as explained in Tool #58 and #59 of the ‘better regulation’ toolbox. The total adjustment costs should equal 
the sum of the adjustment costs presented in the upper part of the table (whenever they are quantifiable and/or can be 
monetised). Measures taken with a view to compensate adjustment costs to the greatest extent possible are presented in 
the section of the impact assessment report presenting the preferred option. 

3.  RELEVANT SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS 

III. Overview of relevant Sustainable Development Goals – Preferred Option(s) 
Relevant SDG 

Expected progress towards the Goal 

Comments 

reduce 

SDG  no.  16.4  –  By  2030, 
significantly 
illicit 
financial  and  arms  flows, 
strengthen  the  recovery  and 
return  of  stolen  assets  and 
combat 
of 
organized crime 

forms 

all 

no 

accurate 

comprehensive, 

As 
or 
comparable  statistics  in  relation  to  firearms 
seizures are available either worldwide or at 
EU  level,  the  progress  towards  the  goal 
cannot  be  measured  against  sound  baseline 
data. 

Establishment  of  an  EU-level  harmonised  data-
collection level enabling the identification of the 
proportion  of  seized,  found  or  surrendered  arms 
whose illicit origin or context has been traced or 
established by a competent authority in line with 
international instruments; 
Revised  Serious  and  Organised  Crime  Threat 
Assessment  stating  a  reduction  of  the  threat  of 
imported  convertible  alarm  and  signal  weapons 
and 
essential 
components; 
New issue of the UNODC Global Firearms Study 
identifying  a  reduction  of  illicit  firearms  of  EU 
origin seized in non-EU countries. 

semi-finished 

firearms 

and 

101 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5  ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL METHODS 

Methodology for the overall study 

In order to conduct this study, data was gathered in a number of manners: 

-  A letter was sent to Member States to gather detailed statistics of 2020 about the number of 
authorisations, refusals, the quantities and values of firearms exports and imports, by origin 
or destination; 132 Following the missing or inaccurate information from many Member 
States, this letter was complemented by a last sent to Member States in February 2022.133 

-  Businesses were asked to provide quantitative evidence of administrative burden in the 

public consultation; 

-  During meetings with manufacturing associations, more detailed statistics were asked; 
-  Public datasets, as used by the two external studies, were consulted. 

This came in addition to the data-collection exercise conducted  

-  During the 2017 evaluation of the regulation.134 
-  During the 2019 Study on the improvement of the EU system of export authorisation, and 

import and transit measures for civilian firearms, their parts and components and 
ammunition135 

Difficulties gathering the data 

In August 2021, the Commission sent a letter to all Member States requesting to  receive detailed 
statistics of 2020 about the number of authorisations, refusals, the quantities and values of firearms 
exports  and  imports,  by  origin  or  destination.  The  Member  States  were  reminded  of  the 
recommendations  issued  by  the  Commission  on  17  April  2018,  which  requested  Member  States 
taking immediate steps to improve the security of export, import and transit measures for firearms, 
their parts and essential components and ammunition. One of these recommendations provides that 
"by 1st July each year, Member States should collect detailed statistics of the preceding year”.  

Even  though  this  recommendation  was  at  the  time  three  years  old,  only  10  Member  States136 
answered to the letter of the Commission. Furthermore, only one Member States (Spain) sent all the 
data asked. The remaining Member States sent partial data; some sent only information on export, 
others included the quantities of firearms imported and exported but not  the value, others did not 
include the quantities and often the origin and destination countries were missing. Additionally, the 
same  data  had  already  been  asked  multiple  times  before,  notably  for  the  two  external  evaluation 
studies in 2015 and 2017.  

Furthermore, when  comparing the data received  by the Member States,  with  public data used for 
the market analysis, there are clear discrepancies (table1). The differences between the data where 
at times so large, that the researchers decided to only focus on the public data, as this was also used 

132  
133  
134  
135  
136  

Ares(2021)5101296 
Ares(2022)1143821 
COM(2017) 737 final, 12.12.2017 and its accompanying staff working document SWD(2017) 442 final 
EY (2019), not published 
BG, EL, ES, FR, HR, LT, NL, PL, RO and SI 

102 

 
 
                                                 
by  the  two  external  studies  and  provides  data  for  all  Member  States.  Nevertheless,  as  explained 
below, this data is most likely a major underestimation. The poor quality of available data regarding 
import  and  export  of  firearms,  their  parts  and  components  and  ammunition  is  a  known  fact.  It 
remains  important  to  change  this,  as  good  data  is  necessary  to  calculate  the  impact  of  policy 
options.  

Table 1 - Value of import and export in 2020 for four different Member States according to 
data  provided  by  that  Member  State  and  to  public  data  (Eurostat  International  Trade 
Database) 

In  order  to  estimate  the  costs  of  policy  options,  it  was  also  important  to  get  information  on  the 
administrative  costs  for  businesses  and  public  authorities  involved  in  the  export  and  import  of 
firearms, parts and components, alarm and signal weapons and ammunition. Calculating this costs 
is especially important as multiple businesses and manufacturing companies have complained about 
high  administrative  costs.  However,  calculating  the  actual  costs  has  proven  difficult  in  the  past. 
Therefore, businesses and manufacturing companies were asked to give an estimate about this cost 
in the public consultation. From the 12 business organizations and associations, only one was able 
to  provide  some  estimate.  In  the  aftermath  of  the  meetings  organized  by  the  Commission  with 
business associations, there was one association, which did provide more information.  

The  European  Commission  also  organized  meetings  with  public  authorities  to  gather  more 
information  for  this  study.  During  these  meetings,  most  public  authorities  stated  that  the 
administrative  costs  were  not  that  high  notably  because  civilian  firearms  are  only  a  tiny  part  of 
licensing processes (dual use goods and military weapons were considered much more important).  

The market analysis 

Even though the above proves that the publically available data is not reliable or representative of 
the firearms market, this report does include a market analysis. It is based on the best available data 
for  the  EU,  which  is  the  public  customs  data.  This  section  presents  the  analysis  of  the  civilian 
firearms  sector  in  terms  of  size,  structure  (including  employment  and  level  of  investment),  and 
extra-EU trade (including import and export flows and international competitiveness). 

Methodology for the market analysis 

Following the two external studies, this analysis focuses on the same dimensions deemed relevant 
to  have  an  overview  of  the  market  of  firearms  for  civilian  use,  parts,  essential  components  and 
ammunition. In particular, the topics covered were: 

-  Market size; 

-  Market Structure, Employment and Investment; 

103 

firearmspartsammunitionfirearms parts ammunitiondata provided by MS36.304.561 €495.939 €97.985.430 €98.054.860 €49.036.758 €195.353.269 €public data1.209.915 €5.895.850 €8.135.188 €38.501.820 €4.603.454 €72.213.331 €data provided by MS10.646.833 €5.870.547 €17.298.035 €1.932.338 €75.041 €15.389.547 €public data9.229.684 €7.445.348 €11.368.777 €2.096.157 €2.072.250 €70.964.905 €data provided by MS2.412.082 €447.539 €334.904 €2.807.011 €public data399.406 €7.490.460 €131.141 €3.157.596 €data provided by MS3.209.562 €9.728.000 €11.431.154 €1.924.375 €24.760.603 €public data3.208.637 €3.610.375 €1.039.441 €1.728.682 €2.741.986 €ESFRLTPLValue of importValue of export 
 
-  Extra-EU trade; 

When referring to the EU market, it is intended to mean the EU27. 

Due to the limits of the data received from the Member States, official sources have been analysed. 
The same indicators and sources were used as the two external studies. Furthermore, the analysis 
uses  the  same  detailed  list  of  products  covered,  except  for  the  extra-EU  trade.  For  this  topic,  the 
analysis uses the harmonized system (HS) classification, instead of the Standard International Trade 
Classification as used by the external studies. Following the use of DG TAXUD in TARIC, the HS 
code appeared to be the most adequate to select the correct categories.  

However,  even  with  the  use  of  the  HS  codes,  the  impossibility  to  distinguish  between  firearms, 
parts  and  components,  and  ammunition  for  the  civilian  firearms  market  from  those  for  law 
enforcement  agencies  remains  a  limitation.  As  a  result  the  sector  figures  represent  an 
overestimation. For some units of analysis it was possible to distinguish products which fall within 
the  scope  of  Regulation  258  from  products  which  do  not,  while  for  others  this  was  not  possible. 
Identified statistical codes often include more goods than those within the scope of Regulation 258. 
For  instance,  the  “Parts  and  accessories”  code,  which  includes  both  firearms  parts  -which  are 
covered by Regulation 258- and accessories which are not essential to the functioning of a firearm 
and are therefore not within the scope of Regulation 258. 

Furthermore,  while  the  analysis  of  the  market  size  and  the  extra-EU  trade  could  be  focused  on 
civilian  firearms,  this  was  not  feasible  for  the  analysis  of  the  market  structure,  which  can  only 
provide  an  aggregated  picture  of  the  whole  firearms  sector  (including  both  civilian  and  military 
firearms). 

The table below summarises the dimensions of the analysis, and which sources and indicators have 
been used to provide a descriptive assessment of the context in which the firearms, their parts and 
components  are  produced,  exported  and  imported.  Together  with  this,  a  detailed  list  of  products 
covered by each dimension is added. 

Market 
Dimension 

Market Size 

Indicators 

Sources 

Products Covered 

Sold 
production 
quantity 
and value 

Eurostat 
PRODCOM 
database, 
WFSA137 

Firearms 

NACE  Rev.2  –  25401230  –  Revolvers  and 
Pistols 

NACE  Rev.2  –  25401250  -  Shotgun,  rifles, 
carbines and muzzle loaders 

NACE  Rev.2  –  25401270 
(explosive charge) 

-  Firearms 

137 World Forum on the Future of Shooting Activities. 

104 

 
 
                                                 
Alarm and signal weapons 

NACE Rev.2 - 25401290 

Parts and components 

NACE  Rev.2  –  25401400  –  Parts  and 
accessories  for  revolvers,  pistols,  non-
military firearms and similar devices 

Ammunition 

NACE  Rev.2  –  25401300  –Cartridge  and 
other ammunition 

NACE  Rev.2  –  20511130  –  Propellant 
Powders 

NACE  Rev.2  –  20511270  –  Percussion  or 
igniters  and  electric 
detonating  caps, 
detonators 

Market 
Structure, 
Employment 
and Investment 

Extra-EU trade 

Turnover, 
Number 
and size of 
firms, 
Number  of 
employees 

Export-
EU27 
export and 
import 
in 
quantity 
and value 

Eurostat SBS 

Firearms,  Parts  and  components,  and 
Ammunition138 

NACE  Rev.2  –  2540  –Weapons  and 
Ammunition 

Eurostat 
International 
Trade  Database, 
UN  COMTRADE 
database 

Firearms 

HS 9302 – Revolvers and pistols, other than 
those of heading 9303 or 9304 

HS  9303  –  Other  firearms  and  similar 
devices  which  operate  by  the  firing  of  an 
explosive  charge  (for  example,  sporting 
shotguns 
rifles,  muzzle-loading 
firearms,  Very  pistols  and  other  devices 
designed  to  project  only  signal  flares, 
pistols  and  revolvers 
firing  blank 
ammunition,  captive-bolt  humane  killers, 

and 

for 

138 Such a dimension of analysis considers all the sectors 2540 of NACE Rev.2, including also military weapons. The 
granularity  of  available  data  did  not  give  the  possibility  to  extrapolate  more  detailed  information  related  to  civilian 
firearms. 

105 

 
 
                                                 
line-throwing guns) 

-  Excluding HS 9303 90 – Other 

Alarm and signal weapons 

HS 9303 90 – Other  

HS 9304 – Other arms (for example, spring, 
air  or  gas  guns  and  pistols,  truncheons), 
excluding those of heading 9307 

Parts and components 

HS 9305 – Parts and accessories of articles 
of headings 9301 to 9304 

-  Excluding HS 9305 91 – Of military 

weapons of heading 9301 

Ammunition 

HS  9306  –  Bombs,  grenades,  torpedoes, 
mines,  missiles  and  similar  munitions  of 
war and parts thereof; cartridges and other 
ammunition  and  projectiles  and  parts 
thereof, including shot and cartridge wads 

-  Excluding HS 9306 30 30 – for 

military weapons 

-  Excluding HS 9306 90 10 – for 

military weapons 

The results of the market analysis 

Market size 

The EU sold production of civilian firearms, alarm and signal weapons, their parts and components, 
and ammunition reached over €4.3 billion in 2020, which accounts for (only) 0.09% of the EU27 
total sold production value.  

Ammunition represents the largest share, on average around 51% of the EU sold production since 
2011.  However,  the  highest  percentage  was  reached  in  2015  when  64%  of  the  total  EU  sold 
production was taken up by ammunition. By 2020, this decreased to only 39% of the total EU sold 

106 

 
 
 
 
production. Parts and components shows a significant increase since 2016, both in absolute values 
(compared to previous years) and relative to the other categories of products (Figure 1).  

Figure 1 - Annual sold production of firearms for civilian use, alarm and signal weapons, 
parts and components, and ammunition for EU27 (left) and trend per type of product (right).  

s
n
o

i
l
l
i

M
€

5.000 €
4.500 €
4.000 €
3.500 €
3.000 €
2.500 €
2.000 €
1.500 €
1.000 €
500 €
0 €

1
1
0
2

2
1
0
2

3
1
0
2

4
1
0
2

5
1
0
2

6
1
0
2

7
1
0
2

8
1
0
2

9
1
0
2

0
2
0
2

Firearms

alarm and signal weapons

parts and components

ammunition

s
n
o

i
l
l
i

M
€

1.500

1.000

500

0

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Revolvers and Pistols NACE Rev. 2 - 25401230

Shotgun, rifles, carbines and muzzle loaders NACE Rev. 2 - 25401250

Firarms (explosive charge) NACE Rev.2 - 25401270

alarm and signal weapons NACE Rev.2 - 25401290

Parts and accessories NACE Rev.2 - 25401400

Cartridge and other ammunition NACE Rev.2 - 25401300

Propellant powders NACE Rev.2 - 20511130

Precussion or detonating gaps NACE Rev.2 - 20511270

Source: Eurostat Prodcom 

Six Member States together accounted for 71% of the total EU27 value in 2020: Italy ranked first, 
with  at  total  sold  production  accounting,  for  38.9%  of  the  EU27  production,  followed  by  France 
(11%), Czechia (7.5%), Germany (7.4%), Spain (4.1%), and Croatia (2.5%).  

Market structure 

The  EU  firearms  sector  is  rather  concentrated.  Most  European  firms  operating  in  the 
manufacturing sector of weapons and ammunition139 are micro firms,140 82% of the total turnover is 
made  by  large  enterprises,  which  account  for  less  than  3%  of  the  total  number  of  enterprises141 
(Error! Reference source not found.).  

139  Following  EY,  SIPRI  and  RAND  (2017),  Study  in  view  of  a  report  evaluating  the  implementation  of  Regulation 
258/2012,  the  analysis  of  the  market  structure  relates  to  weapons  and  ammunition  in  general  without  distinguishing 
between civilian and military firearms. 
140  Considering  the  following  classification  of  firms:  micro  <10  employees;  small  10-49  employees;  medium  50-249 
employees; large >250 employees. 
141 According to Structural Business Statistics database (SBS), there are 1,110 firms operating  in the Manufacture  of 
weapons and ammunition sector in the EU, including 52 large, 79 medium, 135 small and 868 micro firms. 

107 

 
 
                                                 
 
 
Figure  2  –  Shares  of  number  of  enterprises  and  turnover  in  2019142  (left),  and  share  of 
enterprises per MS in 2019143 (right) 

100,0%

80,0%

60,0%

40,0%

20,0%

0,0%

78,1%

82,1%

20%

1,3%

12,3%

3,2%

13,4%

6,6%

2,8%

Micro

small

medium

large

number of enterprises

turnover

8%

7%

7%

Germany

Spain

Italy

Austria

Poland

Sweden

31%

5%

22%

other EU MS

 Source: Authors’ calculations based on Eurostat SBS  

The sector is also concentrated in terms of geographic presence of enterprises, with around 80% of 
firms located in only six Member States144, with Italy and Germany hosting the highest number 
of  firearms-related  companies.  According  to  the  Eurostat  database  a  little  less  than  1.000 
manufacturing companies operate within the EU. In terms of employment, in 2019 the weapons and 
ammunition sector included an estimated figure of 57.028 people working in the civilian firearms 
and ammunition sector. The evaluation study of the EU Firearms Directive 2021/555 estimated that 
there were around 20.000 arms dealers and brokers and about 100.000 employees in the EU145. 

In  January  2022,  the  Commission  asked  the  Member  States  to  provide  more  detailed  data  on  the 
number of manufacturers, retailers and employees in their respective countries. 13 Member States 
answered and they reported a total of 7.898 retailers active in their Member States. Based on this 
number,  it  can  be  stated  that  the  estimate  of  20.000  arms  dealers  and  brokers  seems  correct. 
However,  the  Commission  did  receive  information  that  not  all  these  dealers  and  brokers  are 
actually  involved  in  import  and  export  from  and  outside  the  EU.  For  example  in  Spain  only  98 
dealers  and  manufacturers  are  involved  in  import  and  127  in  export,  on  a  total  of  1190 
manufacturers and dealer. In Slovenia, 115 of the 152 dealers have a licence to export and import 
firearms.  

Underneath data shows the discrepancies between the data received and the public data on the total 
amount of manufacturing companies in the respective Member States. As the Commission did not 
receive the data from all Member States, it was decided to use the database of Eurostat, although it 
is likely that this data is an underestimation.  

142 For the number of employees, the last available year was taken in order to include as many companies as possible. 
143 Calculations for 2016 consider the sum of enterprises reported for all MS as the total number of enterprises in the 
EU, since no aggregated value for EU28 is provided. 
144  Data  from  multiple  Member  States  such  as  Belgium  and  France  is  missing,  these  two  countries  do  have  a  large 
firearms industry. 
145  COM  (2015)  751  final  evaluation  of  Council  Directive  91/477/EC  of  18  June  1991,  as  amended  by  Directive 
2008/51/EC of 21 May 2008, on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons, p. 25 

108 

 
 
                                                 
Table 2: total amount of manufacturer in 2020 according to data provided by that Member 
State and to public data (Eurostat SBS) 

total manuf. 
according to data 
MS 

total manuf. 
According to public 
data 

9 

821 

39 

136 

31 
2 
9 

42 

3 

221 

36 

26 

17 
8 
0 

15 

CY 

DE 

ES 

FI 

HU 
PT 
RO 

SI 
Extra-EU trade 

The  EU27  is  a  net  exporter  of  civilian  firearms,  alarm  &  signal  weapons,  their  parts  and 
components  and  ammunition  to  third  countries. The  total  value  of  exported  good  reached  €1.342 
million  in  2020,  while  the  value  of  imported  goods  was  around  €462  million.  This  represents 
0,027% of the total value of import into the EU and 0,069% of the total value of the export out of 
the EU.  

The  export  has  mostly  stagnated  and  import  has  grown  (Figure  3)  between  2015  and  2020.  The 
import has an annual growth rate of 4.1%. A decreased in export occurred between 2016 and 2019. 
This is a large difference with the data of the external study of 2019, which discovered a trend of 
8.8% annual growth in export between 2010 and 2017.  

Figure 3 - Overall trend of Extra-EU trade in civilian firearms, alarm & signal weapons, parts and 
components and ammunition 

1.600.000.000 €

1.400.000.000 €

1.200.000.000 €

1.000.000.000 €

800.000.000 €

600.000.000 €

400.000.000 €

200.000.000 €

0 €

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

import

Export

Linear (import)

Linear (Export)

Source: Eurostat International Trade Database 

109 

 
  
 
Civilian firearms make up about 50% of the export of the EU27 and ammunition consist of around 
30%  (Figure4).  While  in  import,  civilian  firearms  have  the  smallest  share  and  ammunition  the 
largest with 39% (Figure5). The share of alarm and signal weapons is more than double for import 
than  for  export.  This  is  important  considering  the  fact  that  the  confidential  consultation  revealed 
that 12% of imported alarm and signal weapons are not checked for compliance with Commission 
Implementing Directive 2019/69.  

Figure  4 -  Share of civilian firearms, alarm and signal weapons, parts and components and 
ammunition in the export of EU27 

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

civilian firearms

alarm and signal weapons

parts and components

ammunition

Source: Eurostat International Trade Database 

Figure  5 -  Share of civilian firearms, alarm and signal weapons, parts and components and 
ammunition in the import of EU27 

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

civilian firearms

alarm and signal weapons

parts and components

ammunition

Source: Eurostat International Trade Database 

110 

 
 
 
 
Extra-EU export 

The EU is not a only a net exporter but is, on aggregate, the first exporter of civilian firearms, alarm 
and signal weapons, parts and components, and ammunition in the world in terms of export value 
(2020) followed by the USA. The bulk of the extra-EU export value is made by five Member States 
(Error! Reference source not found.), accounting for over 75% of total extra-EU export with Italy 
ranking first.  

Figure 6 - Share of extra-EU exports per MS (2020) 

23%

12%

18%

28%

11%

8%

Czechia

Germany

Spain

Croatia

Italy

Other EU

International Trade Database 

Source: Eurostat 

Central  and  North  America  are  the  main  destination  markets  (54,18  %  of  the  total  EU27  export 
value in 2019 – Figure 7) with the US being the main destination country and accounting for 48 % 
of the total export value. This data is confirmed by the previous external studies. Furthermore, the 
share  of  Central  and  North  America  only  amounted  to  45,81  %  in  2017.  Therefore,  Central  and 
North  America  is  becoming  an  increasingly  important  destination  market.  Smaller  shares  are 
represented by exports to Middle-east (12,9 %), non-EU European countries (10,84 %) and Eastern 
Asia (9,13 %). 

111 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 - Destination of EU28 export of civilian firearms, alarm and signal weapons, parts 
and  components  and  ammunition  in  2019  (left)  and  share  of  export  per  main  destination 
market (right) 

rest of the world

Western Asia

South America

Oceania

Middle-East

Europa (non EU)

Eastern Asia

Central and North America

Carribbean and Bahamas…

Africa

USA

switserland

Saudi Arabia

Canada

Australia

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

firearms

alarm and signal weapons

0

400.000.000 800.000.000

parts and components

ammunition

Source: UN COMTRADE 

Europe’s world share of exports is deteriorating. Between 2007 and 2020, the EU28146 overall share 
of exports of firearms, parts and components and ammunition reduced by around 11,1 percentage 
points  moving  from  42.2%  in  2007  to  38.5%  in  2017  to  31.1  %  in  2020.  The  external  studies 
contributed  this  decrease  to  a  gradual  loss  of  competitiveness  of  the  EU  compared  to  non-EU 
countries 

Extra-EU import 

146 The UK was added to the numbers of 2020 in order to make a comparison possible.  

112 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
In terms of import, the bulk of the value is 
also concentrated in five Member States 
(Figure 8). Germany imports the largest share 
of the European level from extra-EU 
countries accounting alone to over one 
quarter of total import (26%).  

The USA remains the main country of origin 
imported  firearms,  alarm  and  signal 
of 
weapons, 
and 
ammunition in the EU. 

components 

parts 

and 

Figure  8  -  share  of  extra-EU  import  per  MS 
(2020)

7%

42%

26%

9%

11%

5%

Belgium
Germany
France
Lithuania
Poland
Other EU

Data analysis 

Share of civilian firearms 

The share of civilian firearms in relation to the overall turnover of firearms manufacturers (which 
also  sell military  weapons) is  a central  indicator, as it would reflect  the actual  amount of civilian 
firearms and therefore allow calculations on the impact of policy changes on businesses.  

Each  year  the  Council  publishes  an  Annual  report  on  Council  Common Position  2008/944/CFSP 
defining common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment 147. 
This report is based on data provided by Member States on their arms exports. In theory, this data 
should be should be consistent with the information on the Eurostat international trade database148. 
Table 3 proves the differences between the public data for military weapons and the data used in 
the annual report on Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP. Furthermore, the data in the table 
also shows that the export value for civilian firearms is much higher than for military firearms. This 
is  not  what  the  researchers  expected,  as  it  is  generally  assumed  that  the  export  value  of  military 
weapons is higher than for civilian firearms.  

It is possible that data of firearms for military use became mixed in with data on civilian firearms. 
Due to the possibility to use a single procedure (article 4 of the Regulation), military firearms in the 
ML1 category of the Common military list of the European Union149 can include firearms subject to 
the Regulation and vice versa. Furthermore, during an informal meeting with business association 

147  Twenty-Third  Annual  Report  according  to  Article  8(2)  of  Council  Common  Position  2008/944/CFSP  defining 
common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment, document ST/12189/2021/INIT, 
OJ C 515, 21.12.2021. 
148 The main custom code for military firearm is 9301 (Military weapons, incl. sub-machine guns (excl. revolvers and 
pistols of heading 9302 and cutting and thrusting weapons of heading 9307)(2002-2500);Military weapons, incl. sub-
machine guns (excl. revolvers and pistols of heading 9302 and cutting and thrusting weapons of heading 9307)(1988-
2001)) together with 9305 91 (parts and accessories of military weapons of heading 9301), 9306 30 30 (cartridges and 
parts thereof for military weapons) and 9306 90 10 (bombs grenades, torpedos, mines, missiles and other ammunition 
and projectiles and parts thereof for military purposes). 
149  Smooth-bore  weapons  with  a  calibre  of  less  than  20 mm,  other  arms  and  automatic  weapons  with  a  calibre  of 
12,7 mm (calibre 0,50 inches) or less and accessories, as follows, and specially designed components  

113 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
ANPAM150, it became clear that it is sometimes the company itself, which decides whether to apply 
for  a  military  or  a  civilian  authorisation.  If  they  had  an  export  license  for  1000  civilian  firearms 
under Regulation 258, and get an additional order, they can ask for a military  authorisation under 
the Common position for exactly the same type of firearm. The German national report on firearms 
policy of 2020 explains that the numbers for ML1 are higher than the total value of individual small 
arms licenses  because ML1 also  covers  civilian firearms (revolvers, pistols) hunting and sporting 
weapons151.  

Furthermore,  table  3  shows  clear  gaps  in  data  of  military  weapons.  For  multiple  Member  States, 
data  is  missing.  Amongst  these  Member  States  are  some  countries  that  have  large  firearms 
industries such as Germany, France, Belgium and Italy. There is more information on the value of 
the licenses granted for the export of ML1. However, based on the differences between the column 
showing the actual value of export and the value of licenses, it is clear that this last data cannot be 
used to calculate the total turnover. Furthermore, the German national report states that the approval 
values  for  licenses  of  weapons  of  war  cannot  be  directly  linked  to  the  value  for  actual  export  of 
weapons of war. The German national report states that this is the result of the validity period of 
licenses,  the  fact  that  the  granting  of  a  license  and  the  actual  export  may  fall  into  a  different 
calendar year or because despite the authorisation granted, the export does not take place.152 

Table 3 Extra-EU Export value for the year 2020 of all EU Member States based on custom 
codes and on the annual report on Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP 

export 
according 
custom 
for 
weapons 

value 
to 
codes 
military 

321.191.242 
0 
0 
285.970 
2.470.263 
0 
0 
50 
175.529.010 
0 
6.716.010 
0 
0 
8.000 
2.060.180 
188.610 

of 

value 
licenses 
granted  for  the 
export of ML1 

export  value 
to 
according 
custom  codes 
for 
civilian 
firearms 

2.148.830.533  1.342.106.983 
12.053.934 
0 
167.169.573 
7.488.084 
235.164.370 
1.122.023 
189.316 
143.892.414 
78.440.802 
101.530.351 
382.476.093 
3.648.421 
176.816 
3.292.970 
26.753 

126.287.938 
46.902.342 
5.585.183 
563.399 
141.838.116 
346.596 
49.160 
12.244.606 
6.211.272 
444.092.125 
68.956.348 
403.937 
24.000 
567.383 
0 

ML1  value  of 
export 

487.267.833 
0 
42.234.210 
20.385.210 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5.321.193 
0 
66.367.892 
0 
0 
0 
26.516.348 
0 

REPORTER/PERIOD 
European  Union  -  27 
countries  

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Czechia 

Denmark 

Germany  

Estonia 

Ireland  

Spain  

France  

Croatia 

Italy  

Cyprus 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Luxembourg 

150 Italian national association of manufacturers of sport and civilian weapons and munitions 
151 https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Publikationen/Aussenwirtschaft/ruestungsexporte-bmwi-070221.pdf, p Page 32 
152  

Entwurf eines Dritten Gesetzes zur Änderung des Waffengesetzes und weiterer Vorschriften, p. 28 

114 

 
                                                 
export 
according 
custom 
for 
weapons 

value 
to 
codes 
military 

1.108.423 
0 
50.513.548 
9.657.301 
24.956.288 
672.121 
0 
2.962.107 
26.875.895 
1.010.396 
16.177.070 
0 

of 

value 
licenses 
granted  for  the 
export of ML1 

export  value 
to 
according 
custom  codes 
for 
civilian 
firearms 

28.871.589 
9.265 
1.287.403 
974.320.831 
152.604.255 
76.279 
7.921.489 
74.390.611 
37.185.006 
17.534.504 
556.896 
0 

28.469.458 
9.577 
1.973.137 
15.732.697 
10.777.312 
32.706.783 
0 
7.321.030 
25.264.837 
52.020.060 
24.624.290 
6.535.882 

ML1  value  of 
export 

1.597.093 
9.577 
582.384 
281.636.387 
16.041.636 
73.779 
11.625.049 
2.419.955 
11.282.107 
693.106 
481.907 
0 

REPORTER/PERIOD 

Hungary 

Malta 

Netherlands 

Austria 

Poland 

Portugal 

Romania 

Slovenia 

Slovakia 

Finland 

Sweden 

Greece 

The  lack  of  data  could  be  mitigated  by  focusing  on  national  reports  sent  to  parliaments  on  arms 
import  and  exports.  When  zooming  in  on  Belgium,  it  is  also  peculiar  that  this  country  is  not 
included in the top five Member States for extra-EU export (as  established by underneath market 
analysis). Belgium, specifically the Walloon region, hosts FN Herstal, which is one of the largest 
firearms  producers  in  the  EU.  According  to  both  the  public  data  and  the  data  from  COARM, 
Belgium had zero export value of military firearms  during 2020153. Even for the 2019 report, the 
focus of the published data is on the value of the licenses granted to export ML1 weapons. In order 
to establish the overall turnover and the share for military and civilian firearms, it is important to 
know  the  actual  export.  The  only  published  numbers  in  this  regards,  is  the  overall  export  of  all 
military firearms, so not specifically for ML1. According to the 2019 Walloon report154, 76% of the 
value of the licenses is actually exported. As the Walloon region is  responsible for about 90% of 
Belgians total export, this number can be used to extrapolate the value of ML1 for all of Belgium. 
This would mean that the value of Belgium ML1 export would amount to €95.978.832,88. 

However,  if  the  same  exercise  is  done  for  France,  a  completely  different  picture  emerges. 
According  to  the  French  national  report155,  only  8,8%  of  the  value  of  all  the  licenses  is  actually 
exported156.  The  French  national  report  does  not  give  numbers  on  the  actual  export  for  ML1, 
therefore it is not possible to calculate this  number without using the overall percentage of 8,8%. 
Based on this, the value of France ML1 export would amount to €546.591,94. 

https://dirupo.wallonie.be/files/Rapport%20armes%20annuel%202019.pdf  
https://www.defense.gouv.fr/fre/content/download/585007/9955311/RAP%202020-Parties%201-2-

153 The lack of data is also reinforced by the fact that the Walloon region has not yet published their regional report on 
the export of arms of 2020. The situation even triggered a petition to address this alleged lack of transparency. 
154  
155  
3%2Bannexes%20BD_29ao%C3%BBt20.pdf  
156 This low number could be due to the different kind of industry in France. The French defence industry’s focus is not 
on small and light  weapons.  Therefore, if one order, for example for aircrafts, does not go through, the effect on the 
overall percentage of actual export can be high. 

115 

 
 
                                                 
The  German  national  report  gives  a  lot  of  information  on  the  licenses  granted  and  rejected. 
Furthermore, there is detailed information to be found on the strict rules regarding export to third 
countries. However, when it comes to the value of actual exports, the same lack of transparency is 
notable; only the overall exports of military firearms is published. As a result of the lack of data on 
the  actual  export  of  ML1,  the  same  calculation  as  above  shows  that  23,6%  of  the  value  of  all 
licenses is actually exported. Extrapolating this percentage to the value of ML1 export, this would 
amount to €33.473.795,38. 

If  the  data  based  on  the  above  calculations  is  added  to  the  available  data  on  the  export  of  ML1 
weapons,  the  total  value  would  amount  to  €617.267.052.  However  this  still  does  not  include  the 
data  of  all  Member  States.  The  reason  for  such  a  lack  of  transparency  by  the  Member  States  is 
unknown.   

Another  way  to  calculate  the  total  amount  of  ML1  exported  value  is  to  focus  on  the  data  that  is 
known from  the other Member States  and  extrapolate this to  the missing data. The percentage of 
actual  exported  ML1  weapons  compared  to  the  licenses  granted  ranges  from  3,3%  (Slovenia)  to 
4673,4%  (Lithuania).  Based  on  these  numbers,  the  average  would  be  that  383,2%  of  all  licenses 
granted  result  in  actual  export.  Based  on  the  numbers  in  table  …,  this  would  amount  to 
€1.808.084.528.  However,  the  percentage  of  Lithuania  (4673,4%)  is  so  exceptional  that  it 
extensively influences the numbers. If this exceptionally large percentage is ignored, an average of 
71,6% of licenses granted results in actual export. If this percentage is extrapolated on the missing 
data, the overall turnover for the export of ML1 weapons would amount to €734.059.261.  

As  can  be  seen  in  the  table3  and  with  the  explanation  of  the  calculations  possible  to  fill  in  the 
missing  data,  the  exact  calculation  for  the  total  turnover  for  military  and  civilian  firearms  is  not 
possible.  According  to  the  public  data  using  custom  codes,  the  value  of  civilian  firearms  exports 
amounts  to  1.342  billion  euro.  The  value  of  the  licenses  granted  for  the  export  of  ML1  weapons 
amounts  to  2.148  billion  euro.  Due  to  the  missing  data,  the  value  of  the  actual  export  of  ML1 
weapons  ranges  somewhere  between  734  million  and  1.808  billion  euro.  Therefore,  based  on  the 
calculations made, this study will conclude that the share of civilian firearms compared to military 
firearms  is  about  50-50.  It  is  important  to  realize,  that  this  is  not  a  scientifically  sound  way  of 
statistical analysis, however it was the only available method due to the available data.  

Administrative costs for national competent authorities, companies and citizens 

Administrative costs for national competent authorities (NCA) 

The “Study on the improvement of the EU system of export authorisation, and import and transit 
measures  for  civilian  firearms,  their  parts  and  components  and  ammunition”  calculated  that  each 
NCA  spends  from  8  to  15  hours  to  complete  all  the  pre-authorisation  activities  for  each 
authorisation request. According to Eurostat157, the average wage for national civil servants in the 
EU is 2.658 Euro/month. Based on a 38 hours workweek, this amounts to an average cost for a FTE 
civil servant of 25,70 euro per hour. Therefore, the cost for the pre-authorisations activities ranges 
between €205,6 and €385,5 for one authorisation.  

157 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/prc_rem_avg/default/table?lang=en  

116 

 
                                                 
Furthermore,  the  study  of  2017  also  computed  that  on  average  a  NCA  needs  to  employ  between 
0.55  and  0.95  FTEs  to  comply  with  all  requirements  of  the  Regulation158  (the  pre-authorisation 
steps and the information exchange activities).159 

Fees 

According to the “Study on the improvement of the EU system of export authorisation, and import 
and  transit  measures  for  civilian  firearms,  their  parts  and  components  and  ammunition”  and  the 
results  of  the  confidential  survey  published  in  October  2021,  most  Member  States  do  not  charge 
any  fees  to  apply  for  an  export  authorisation.  However,  there  were  some  exceptions  highlighted: 
Czech  Republic  (€20),  Estonia  (€13),  Italy  (€32),  Lithuania  (€14),  Poland  (€19),  Portugal  (at 
import:  for  private  citizen  €25,6/firearm,  for  gunsmiths  €12,8/firearm;  at  export  €3,8/firearm), 
Slovakia  (at  least  €33,  but  normally  0,1%  of  the  value  of  the  products),  Slovenia  (€49,8)  and 
Sweden (€120). Unified EU rules could harmonise this and reduce the costs for producers/exporters 
and citizens in those countries.  

According to underneath table of the study160, if the option of including a fee was  abolished, this 
would create an overall annual benefit of €86.301,4161 for companies. 

Table  4  –  Number  of  export  authorisations  of  firearms,  parts  essential  components  and 
ammunition to third countries granted per year and number of companies registered in 2018 

MS 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

average 

AT 

BE 

CY 

CZ 

DE 

ES 

FR 

HU 

IE 

IT 

LT 

MT 

PL 

PT 

RO 

SE 

67 

5 

82 

916 

10 

532 

1,142 

1,569 

873 

1005 

969 

889 

8 

163 

983 

757 

498 

491 

2 

16 

10 

223 

797 

746 

558 

479 

0 

27 

7 

278 

986 

0 

726 

511 

5 

22 

771 

409 

430 

4 

9 

672 

714 

1,018 

1,243 

0 

0 

0 

5 

0 

9 

26 

0 

22 

16 

0 

12 

2,027 

1,262 

1,714 

1,912 

10 

286 

10 

353 

10 

280 

10 

310 

6 

190 

801 

0 

827 

0 

8 

19 

955 

18 

0 

14 

777 

10 

217 

181 

506 

0 

0 

18 

646 

0 

0 

0 

0 

10 

17 

Number 
of 
companie
s 
45 

15 

3 

95 

207 

42 

115 

16 

0 

167 

1 

0 

50 

10 

0 

55 

786 

8 

245 

1046 

409 

587 

318 

3 

19 

875 

11 

0 

10 

1282 

10 

244 

158 Annex I, p. 157 
159 Based on the average of 98 export authorisations as can be seen in table4  
160 2019, Study on the improvement of the EU system of export authorisation, and import and transit measures for 
civilian firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, Annex I, p. 156 
161 EE, PT and SL not included 

117 

 
 
                                                 
MS 

SK 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

2017 

2018 

average 

32 

46 

35 

36 

40 

61 

42 

Number 
of 
companie
s 
26 

2706 

total 
Source:  Study  on  the  improvement  of  the  EU  system  of  export  authorisation,  and  import  and  transit 
measures for civilian firearms, their parts and components and ammunition. 

4792 

7691 

6179 

5895 

6951 

7047 

847 

Administrative burden for companies 

As  stated  above,  collecting  the  data  on  the  administrative  burden  of  the  EU  procedures  for 
companies has proven difficult. One business answered in the public consultation that about 10 % 
162 of the value of a contract goes to the management of EU procedures. Based on the data of the 
market  analysis  and  extrapolating  this  singular  business  information  to  all  businesses  this  would 
account for around € 180.411.889.  

The  Study  on  the  improvement  of  the  EU  system  of  export  authorisation,  and  import  and  transit 
measures  for  civilian  firearms,  their  parts  and  components  and  ammunition,  together  with 
information received from ANPAM,163 does however present a different picture. According to the 
study, producers/exporters indicated that it takes between 4 and 12 hours of work per authorisation 
request. ANPAM indicated that it takes on average about 6 hours of work.  With an average costs 
for a FTE employee of 25,7 euro per hour. Therefore, the costs for one export authorisation request, 
according to the study would be between €102,8 and €308,4. According to the data of ANPAM the 
cost would be around €154,2. 

ANPAM  reported  that  in  Italy  around  1.500  export  authorisations  are  requested  each  year.  The 
external study of 2019 reported an average of 875164 export authorisations each  year. As a result, 
the cost of the procedure to apply for export authorisations vary between €89.950 and €462.600. If 
only the ANPAM data is considered, then the costs amounts to  €231.300. A study from  2017 by 
ANPAM and the Carlo Bo University of Urbino165, estimated that the total turnover of the Italian 
firearms  industry  in  2017  amounted  for  €581.022.940.  Therefore,  the  costs  of  the  procedure  to 
apply for export authorisations amount to 0.04% of the total turnover. 

According  to  the  market  analysis,  Italian  firearms  industry  amounts  for  18%  of  the  firearms 
industry in the  EU. If the Italian numbers are extrapolated to the entire EU166, this would mean that 
the costs for the producers of firearms to apply for export authorisations range between €499.722 
and €2.570.000 per year.  

162 ESFAM also informed the Commission that they expect the costs to be between 4 and 10 % of the total costs of their 
members.  
163 The  Commission  had an informal  meeting  with Italian  national association of  manufacturers of  sport and civilian 
weapons and munitions (ANPAM), after which ANPAM sent data on authorisations and costs to the Commission.  
164 See table…  
165 https://a9bdafc9-266f-4ac0-bde4-ac366975cd51.filesusr.com/ugd/3fd127_38a861c3fa0a4f1297594f8ef4f1747d.pdf  
166  As  Italy  uses  SIGMA,  the  extrapolation  of  Italian  numbers  might  result  in  an  underestimation.  SIGMA,  Sistema 
Integrato  di  Gestione  e  Movimentazione  Armi  (Integrated  System  for  Arms  Management  and  Mobilisation)  is  an 
industry-led  initiative  launched  and  developed  to  allow  a  faster,  more  accurate  and  more  efficient  processing  of  all 
requests  for  licenses  (for  both  intra-EU  and  extra-EU  transfers).  The  portal,  powered  by  a  dedicated  software,  was 
entirely developed and funded by 15 Italian industries (at a cost of about €800,000) and is accessible to relevant local 
(Questura) and national (Ministry of Interior) authorities to share and access information more effectively 

118 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Furthermore,  the  external  study  of  2019  estimated  that  on  average  a  producer/exporter  needs  to 
employ between 0.4 and 0.9 FTEs to comply with all requirements of the Regulation167. The study 
also  focused  on  the  length  of  the  authorisation  procedure  which  was  considered  having  an 
important negative impact on the business of companies exporting civilian firearms. It was however 
not possible to quantify this.  

If an e-licensing system would be used to process the export authorisation requests, the time needed 
for manufacturers to obtain an authorisation should decrease. As Italy is already using a system and 
they  estimate  that  it  takes  6  hours  for  one  export  authorisation,  this  is  a  difference  of  6  hours 
between the highest estimate of the EY study and the highest estimate from Italy. Therefore, the use 
of  an  e-licensing  system  could  be  a  saving  of  €1.079.400  (average  cost  for  FTE  €25,7  per  hour 
multiplied by a frequency of 7 authorisations per manufacturer, multiplied by 1.000 manufacturers 
in the EU).  

Additionally, if implied consent of third countries for the transit of firearms is always granted after 
20 days, this would decrease the costs.  Not all export authorisations  imply the transit of firearms 
through  third  countries,  assuming  that  4  out  of  7  do  and  according  to  the  EY  study  on  firearms 
improvements, the follow up to obtain the written “no objection” to the transfer takes on average 
about one hour. Therefore, the savings for the 1.000 manufacturers in the EU combined would add 
up to €56.540.  

According  to  table  …,  847  companies  handed  in  5.985  authorisation  request  during  2018.  On 
average,  this  amounts  to  just  under  7  requests  for  each  company.  If  end-user  certificates  would 
become  mandatory  then  this  would  entail  an  extra  costs  for  businesses.  Based  on  the  amount  of 
hours  for  the  whole  export  authorisation  procedure,  it  is  estimated  that  end-user  certificate 
procedures  will not take longer than 4 hours.  Based on the average  costs for a  FTE employee of 
€25,7 per hour, one end-user check would cost around €102,8. If each company has to perform this 
on average 7 time a year and knowing that there are around 1.000 manufacturers active in the EU, 
this would amount to a cost of €719.600. 

Furthermore,  if  companies  would  have  to  provide  evidence  of  the  final  import  certificate,  this 
would  also  contain  some  costs.  However,  these  certificates  should  already  be  used,  the  only 
difference would be that these certificates would be sent to a central bureau or database. Therefore, 
this task should not take more than one hour. Based on the same calculation as above, this would 
amount to a cost of €179.900. 

Administrative burden for citizens 

During  the  public  consultation,  citizens  were  asked  to  quantify  the  administrative  burden  they 
experienced  when  exporting  or  importing  firearms.  The  general  consensus  was  that  the 
unharmonised  rules  were  too  complicated.  Many  citizens  complained  that  it  took  hours  to  go 
through the whole administrative procedure. The few monetary quantifications stated that the costs 
amounted somewhere between €250 and €500 for one export authorisation.   

Administrative burden for museums, collectors etc.  

If no authorisations for specific operations, such as temporary import and export, would be needed 
for  institutions  such  as  museums,  collectors  etc.  then  this  would  decrease  the  costs.  Such  an 

167  

EY (2019), not published, Annex I, p. 160 

119 

 
                                                 
authorisations takes on average 6 hours, however the frequency is very low. The estimation is that 
this  could  concern  all  arms  dealers  however  it  would  only  happen  0.01  time  a  year.  Therefore, 
abolishing the need for such authorisations, would amount to a saving of €30.840.  

Administrative burden linked to import 

The  data  for  import  is  even  more  limited  than  for  export  as  until  now,  there  are  hardly  any 
provision  in  the  Regulation.  The  data  on  the  amount  of  import  authorisations  received  from  the 
Member  States  was  linked  to  the  import  share  of  that  Member  States  in  order  to  calculate  that 
around 3.511 import authorisations are granted each year.  

Furthermore, based on the data from Eurostat, 62.099.451 pieces of firearms were imported into the 
EU in 2020. As there are around 20.000 dealers, this would mean an annual import of about 3.105 
pieces of firearms by each dealer. All these weapons should be provided with an import marking. 
According to the German national impact assessment168, an import marking takes 0,425 minutes. At 
an  average  cost  for  a  FTE  employee  of  €25,7  per  hour,  one  marking  would  cost  less  than  €0,43 
(calculated  by  using  1  minute  time).  If  all  firearms  receive  an  import  marking,  this  would  cost 
€26.702.763,91.  However  according  to  the  EY  study  on  firearms  improvements,  19  Member 
States169  are  already  requiring  import  markings.  A  further  three  Member  States170  require  proof 
marks  of  a  recognised  Proof  House.  The  remaining  6  Member  States171  did  not  provide  enough 
information. These 6 Member States imported172 5.567.690 firearms during 2020. If these Member 
States require import marking, this would lead to an ‘new’ cost of €2.394.106,7.  

If an e-licensing system would be used to process the import authorisation requests, the time needed 
for dealers to obtain an authorisation should decrease. As Italy is already using a system and they 
estimate that it takes 6 hours for one export authorisation, this is a difference of 6 hours between the 
highest estimate of the EY study and the highest estimate from  Italy.  As there are 20.000 dealers 
active in the EU and there are 3.511 import authorisation granted each year, each of these dealers 
only has 0.17 authorisation request each year. Therefore, the use of an e-licensing system could be 
a  saving  of  €524.280  (average  cost  for  FTE  €25,7  per  hour  multiplied  by  a  frequency  of  0.17 
multiplied by 20.000).  

German 

Entwurf 

Bundestag, 

168 
und weiterer Vorschriften, Drucksache 19/13839, 09.10.2019, p. 125, https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/19/138/1913839.pdf 
169 BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, HR, HU, IT, LT, LU, PL, PT, RO, SE, SI and SK 
170 BE, FR and UK 
171 AT, EL, IE, LV, MT and NL 
172 There are 91 manufacturers in these 6 Member States.  

Änderung 

Gesetzes 

Dritten 

eines 

zur 

des  Waffengesetzes  

120 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
ANNEX 5: CASE STUDIES 

In order to mediate the lack of data, case studies have been added to this annex. These 
case  studies  focus  on  the  security  risks  related  to  export  and  import  of  firearms,  alarm 
and signal weapons and semi-finished components.  

Case studies related to the export of firearms 

Case-study: EU firearms in Mexico 

Between 2015 and 2020, 96,948 firearms (worth $38 Mil)173 were exported from the EU 
to  Mexico.  In  addition,  many  EU  firearms  exported  to  the  USA  are  re-exported  or 
trafficked to Mexico, which estimates that half of EU firearms brands seized in Mexico 
were either imported or trafficked from the U.S. 

During the period 2010-2020, 61,242 firearms were seized of which 2,744 were Italian, 
mostly  Beretta  pistols.174  During  the  period  2015-2020,  2,749  German-made  firearms 
were seized in Mexico, more than twice as much as the official exports to this country. 

Data  provided  by  the  Mexican  authorities  do  not  enable  the  establishment  of  statistics 
based  on  tracing  results.  There  is  no  data  about  the  year  of  manufacture  of  the  EU 
firearms  seized,  or  about  their  point  of  diversion.  It  shows  however  that  EU-made 
firearms  (including  civilian  firearms)  do  end  up  in  the  wrong  hands  in  high  quantities, 
and that the current EU export control system does not prevent it. 

Case-study: EU firearms in Brazil 

The  National  Firearms  Focal  Point  of  Brazil  provided  the  European  Commission  with 
data,  according  to  which  65956  firearms  were  seized  in  2018,  of  which  3433  (i.e  5%)  
were  EU-made  firearms,  most  of  them  from  Austria  –Glock-  (some  of  them  could  be 
from EU brands manufactured in USA or exported to USA and re-exported or trafficked 
to Brazil). By type, 69% were pistols, 12% revolvers and 8% assault rifles. 

The  same  year,  4826  firearms  (worth  $1,4  Mil)  [source:  https://comtrade.un.org/data/] 
were  exported  from  the  EU  to  Brazil,  only  18  from  Austria  while  the  same  year  1329 
Austria-made firearms were seized. 

During the period 2014-17 the National Firearms Focal Point traced around 11000 seized 
firearms,  of  which  950  were  of  Austrian  manufacture,  546  from  Czech  Republic,  231 
from Italy, 230 from Belgium, 191 from Germany, 153 from Spain, 147 from Romania, 
43 from Hungary, which represented the 22,64% of total number. During that period of 
time,  21260  firearms  (worth  $5  Mil)  [source:  https://comtrade.un.org/data/]  were 
exported from the EU to Brazil. 

173  
174  

https://comtrade.un.org/data/ 
http://stopusarmstomexico.org/deadly-trade/ 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
The Firearms Focal Point obtained positive results of investigations on traceability from 
1735 firearms, which mean it was possible to know the last known record of legal owner. 
1480  of  them  (85%)  where  from  countries  neighbouring  or  from  the  same  continent, 
including EU-made firearms.  

Case study: circumvention of embargos through Moldova 

The EU imposed arms embargoes on Belarus and Russia in 2011 and 2014. 

Czech Republic-Moldova- Russian Federation 

During 2019 and 2020 the Czech Republic exported rifles and pistols to Moldova.175 The 
same  year,  Moldavian  authorities  received  and  authorised  the  request  of  a  Moldovan 
company  to  export  pistols  to  Russian  Federation,  same  of  them  from  the  above  import 
operation. 

The shipment included 'CZ TSR'-model sniper rifles, which can be used for sport or by 
special police.176 

Slovakia-Moldova-Belarus 

On  25  September  2019,  Moldavian  authorities  received  the  request  to  import  130.000 
cartridges  from  Slovakia,  the  same  day  the  same  authorities  received  the  request  to 
export the same amount of cartridges to Belarus.  

Case studies related to the import of firearms and semi-finished components 

Case study: circumvention of embargos via Kyrgyzstan to Lithuania.177 

On 1st of June 2021, a large-scale Russian weapons trafficking scheme was exposed and 
four  people  were  detained  in  Vilnius  (Lithuania).  In  addition,  more  than  300  SAIGA 
rifles and semi-automatic carbines and 12 000 pieces of ammunition were seized during 
raids. The total value of firearms and ammunitions has been estimated at around 335 000 
EUR. 

The detained individuals are suspected of creating and taking part in a scheme seeking to 
circumvent international sanctions imposed in 2014 on Russian arms manufacturers. As 
part  of  the  scheme,  brand  new  Russian  firearms  were  exported  via  Kyrgyzstan  to 
Lithuania and then sold both in the country and in other EU MS. Officers estimate that 

175   Meeting with Moldavian authorities. RESTRICTED 
176  

arms 

“EU 
to 
firms 
https://euobserver.com/world/153145 
EMPACT firearms “bulletin” newsletter number 17. October 2021. EU LIMITED. 

Belarus 

Russia 

trying 

flout 

and 

177  

ban”, 

6.10.2021,  

 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
the  Lithuanian  company  involved  in  the  criminal  activity  might  have  imported  around 
1.500 semi-automatic carbines. 

Although  the  arms  were  bought  in  Russia,  their  documents  stated  that  they  were 
purchased from the Central Asian country in order to bypass international sanctions. 

Once the arms reached Lithuania, the weapons would be legalised and sold in Lithuania 
as well as other EU member states, mainly Germany and Austria.178 

Details seized weapons: 

154 Shotgun “Saiga-12”, calibre 12 mm; 

155 semi-automatic rifle “Saiga”, calibre 5.45 mm; 

2 submachine guns “Saiga-9”, calibre 9 mm; 

2 smoothbore hunting carbine “TR3”, calibre 7.62 mm; 

4 semi-automatic carbines Saiga Tigr”, calibre 7.62 mm; 

16 776 pieces of Tulammo ammunition, calibre 5,45x18. 

Case study: imports of convertible alarm and signal weapons into the EU 

Some alarm and signal weapons can easily be converted into lethal firearms with simple 
tools and minimum knowledge. This modus operandi was identified as a particular threat 
by the competent  authorities of the Member States and the Commission179. Based on it 
operation CONVERSUS focus on that threat within the EMPACT firearms, focus on the 
traceability of imported alarm  and signal  weapons in  EU, which have been proved that 
are easily converted to live firearms and used in criminal activities.  

The main reasons of the threat are the following: 

  Before  the  update  of  the  Firearms  Directive  in  2017,  alarm  and  signal  weapons 
were  not  included  in  the  scope  of  the  Directive  nor  in  the  Regulation  on 
import/export of civilian firearms, so not specific control of them. 
In 2018 the Implementing Directive 2019/69 on technical specifications of alarm 
and signal weapons entered into force, but due to the delay of transpositions, there 
are thousands of alarm and signal weapons with previous technical specifications 
already in the market. 

 

178  

179  

https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1425297/large-scale-russian-arms-trafficking-scheme-
busted-in-lithuania 
EU  SOCTA  2021:  pag.  68  and  operational  action  plans  of  the  EMPACT  FIREARMS  since  2014 
(EU RESTRICTED) 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
  The current legal framework180 does not provide a legal basis to ensure a uniform 
approach  to  certifying  the  compliance  of  these  weapons  with  EU  standards  on 
non-convertibility.  Consequently,  customs  or  licensing  authorities  of  different 
Member  States  may  treat  differently  imported  alarm  and  signal  weapons,  with 
some  considering  that  they  are  convertible  into  firearms,  and  others  that  they 
comply with EU-level standards.  

From  2016  to  2020,  15  949  alarm  and  signal  weapons  were  seized  and  contributed  to 
EUROPOL, most of them imported from Turkey (brands Ekol and Zoraki) but also Italy-
made brand Bruni. 181 

These seizures were contributed by Member States to EUROPOL, where there are some 
significant facts and figures182: 

 

 

 

In Denmark, converted alarm and signal weapons were in top 3 (total of 123) of 
seized firearms in the country in 2019. 
In Sweden, 30% of the seized weapons are converted alarm and signal weapons 
and  10%  of  the  shooting  recorded  were  made  with  these  kind  of  converted 
weapons. 
In the Netherlands, roughly 40% of the seized weapons are converted alarm and 
signal weapons. 

Bulgaria, Spain and Slovakia  provided data to EUROPOL in the framework of operation 
CONVERSUS,  showing  gas  and  alarm  weapons  imported  from  Turkey  and  sold  to 
individuals from 2016 to 2021:  

2021 

2020 

2019 

2018 

2017 

2016 

TOTAL 
BY MS 

Bulgaria 

2989 

4067 

375 

Spain 

279 

Slovakia 

20 

81 

653 

1861 

48 

3288 

4801 

2284 

TOTAL 
BY 
YEARS 

5 

3 

451 

459 

1267 

3197 

11900 

524 

2088 

395 

749 

3143 

4009 

3879 

4341 

19052 

180  

181  

182  

Commission  Implementing  Directive  (EU)  2019/69  of  16  January  2019  laying  down  technical 
specifications for alarm and signal weapons under Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the 
acquisition and possession of weapons; OJ L 15, 17.1.2019. 
Source EUROPOL, reflected in the report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on the application of Firearms Directive C(2021)647 final. 
Source: data from EUROPOL (EU RESTRICTED) 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
The results of the operations are the following: 

2016:  556  alarm  and  signal  weapons  seized  and  245  arrests  in  a  series  of  international 
actions in 10 Member States.183 

2018:  222  alarm  and  signal  weapons  seized  and  112  arrests  in  a  series  of  international 
actions in 16 Member States. 

2020:  1776  alarm  and  signal  weapons  seized  and  11  arrests  in  a  series  of  international 
actions in 25 Member States.184 

2021: 1534 alarm and signal weapons were seized in a series of international actions in 
24 Member States.185 

Case study: import of semi-finished components 

French authorities reported on the risk linked to the import of semi-finished components 
in the country186.  

These  semi-finished  components  are  imported  from  USA,  particularly  semi-finished 
frames of Glock-type semi-automatic pistols and of semi-finished lower receivers of AR-
15 type rifles. 

Currently semi-finished essential components of firearms are not regulated in France, so 
their acquisition is out of regulation of firearms. 

Among many models, the POLYMER 80 kit marketed by the company of the same name 
is the most present on the French illegal market. The price is around 160 USD.187  

This kit consists of (e.g. for the PF940V2 model for Glock 17 type guns): 

  an integral but incomplete and non-functional frame since  holes must still be 

made and material must be removed in certain places (1) ; 

  a plastic jig with holes serving as drilling / filing guides into which the frame 

is inserted (2) ; 

  a  locking  /  unlocking  block  comprising  the  front  breech  rails,  while  for 
original Glock pistols the breech rails are integrated into the receiver (3) ; 
  a removable metal block comprising the rear rails, which receives the ejector, 

and the rear trigger module (4) ; 
thus, due to the tools: 2 pin-pins (5) , 2 drill bits (6) and a milling cutter (7). 

 

https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/operation-bosphorus-against-firearms-

https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/1-776-firearms-seized-in-international-

183 
trafficking-results-in-nearly-250-arrests-in-2016 
184 
sweep-against-illegal-trafficking-of-manufactured-weapons 
185 
europol-coordinated-operation 
186 EMPACT firearms “bulletin” newsletter number 14. RESTRICTED 
187 www.polymer80.com 

https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/over-1-530-firearms-taken-streets-in-

 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
The user of the kit must then: 

  drill 2 holes allowing the locking / unlocking unit to be fitted with the front 

rails; 

  drill 1 hole for mounting the rear unit (rear rails, ejector, trigger module) ; 
  milling material inside the frame to allow mounting of the barrel ; 
 

file  the  future  location  of  the  cylinder  head  rails  to  allow  mounting  of  the 
cylinder head. 

Making these “80% kits” functional is an easy operation that requires no specialized tools 
and  can  be  completed  in  a  short  time.  Once  completed,  the  receiver  can  be  assembled 
with generic or original cylinder heads and barrels. 

According to French´s contributions to EUROPOL,188 there is an upsurge in the seizures 
of  Glock-type  firearms,  where  some  of  them  were  assembled  using  P80-branded  80% 
receives,  notable  those  commercialized  in  France  by  a  specific  company.  The  rest  of 
essential components of these firearms where imported illegally from USA (barrels and 
slides) French´s  contribution to  EUROPOL informed of the seizure of a  Glock 19-type 
Parabellum  9mm  pistol  and  a  Glock  35-type  Smith  and  Wesson  40  calibre  pistol 

188 French contribution to EUROPOL on 21 June 2020. CONFIDENTIAL 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
although other short firearms may have been assembled and sold. Other types of kits in 
the market are semi-finished receivers from Colt 1911 and Sig P320-type semi-automatic 
pistols. 

Another French´s contribution to EUROPOL189 informed of the seizured of 3 AR 15-type 
assault rifles in overseas territories with semi-finished lower receivers. 

189 French contribution to EUROPOL on 22 October 2020. CONFIDENTIAL 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
ANNEX 6: TRACEABILITY CHECK-LIST  

Article 2(16) of Regulation (EU) 258/2012 defines tracing as “the systematic tracking of 
firearms and, where possible, their parts and essential components and ammunition from 
manufacturer  to  purchaser  for  the  purpose  of  assisting  the  competent  authorities  of 
Member  States  in  detecting,  investigating  and  analysing  illicit  manufacturing  and 
trafficking.” 

One  of  the  objectives  of  the  Regulation  and  of  its  proposed  revision  is  to  improve  the 
traceability of firearms and their essential components to ensure more efficient controls 
and avoid diversion and smuggling. 

The  following  check-list  summarizes  the  various  measures  included  in  the  preferred 
option, that ensures increased firearms traceability. 

In  all  cases  (except  automated  verifications),  the  role  of  customs  is  risk-based  and  not 
systematic. Checks may be either documentary (e.g. with respect to the authorisation) or 
physical (e.g. with respect to the presence of the required marking). 

Type of measure 

Role 
for 
authorities 

licensing 

Role for customs 

Others / comments 

Import 

authorisation 
Import 
(for 
and 
finished 
unfinished  firearms  and 
components) 

Assess  request,  grant 
authorisation 
to 
import  firearms  and 
essential  components 
(within 60 days) 

Check  the  presence 
of the authorisation  – 
the  responsible 
ask 
authorities  in  case  of 
doubt 

Firearms  may  not  be 
the 
placed 
on 
market/released 
into 
free  circulation  without 
the appropriate marking 

Alarm 
signal 
and 
weapons:  list  of  non-
convertibility 

that 

all 
Ensure 
imported  firearms  are 
marked  with  name  of 
the  manufacturer 
/ 
brand, country / place 
of  manufacture, serial 
number  and  year  of 
manufacture 

list  of  non-

Create 
convertibility 

Temporary imports 

the 
Register 
temporary  export  and 
monitor  its  actual  re-
exports. 

the 

Check  the  presence 
of 
required 
marking    –  otherwise 
ask  that  the  shipment 
under 
be 
customs 
another 
regime 
as 
warehousing) 

placed 

(such 

Check  the  presence 
of  alarm  and  signal 
weapon  on  the  list  – 
the  responsible 
ask 
authorities  in  case  of 
doubt 

Grant  the  temporary 
import  authorisation 
on the ATA carnet or 
the 
Single 
Administrative 
Document,  provided 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
includes 

the  description  of  the 
goods 
the 
information 
necessary  for  tracing 
the firearms. 

import 
the 
Inform 
licencing  authority  of 
the  temporary  export 
and  about  the  actual 
(after 
re-import 
discharge 
the 
ATA  carnet  or  the 
SAD) 

on 

as 

into 

soon 

As 
the 
shipment  has  been 
released 
free 
circulation,  customs 
import 
office 
of 
informs 
the 
competent  authority 
of  dispatch  and  the 
import 
licencing 
authority 

by 

Copy 
the 
of 
movement  document 
provided 
the 
carrier to the customs 
office  of  entry  and 
the customs office of 
import. 

Transit  (between  point 
of  entry  and  point  of 
import) 

Competent  authority 
sends 
of 
transit 
acknowledgment 
of 
receipt  to  the  notifier 
and  copies  to  other 
competent authorities. 

transit 

Competent authorities 
ensure 
of 
that the 
customs 
office of entry and the 
office  of 
customs 
import  are  informed 
of  their  decisions  to 
consent 
the 
shipment. 

to 

Release  of  the  goods 
into free circulation 

NA 

Export 

End-user certificate 

Export licence 

Licensing authority to 
check  the  presence  of 
end-user 
the 
when 
certificate 
assessing 
the 
application 

Issue 
licence 

the 

export 

In case of Global export  NA 

Contact  the  licensing 
authority  in  case  of 
the 
doubt 
conformity 
of 
imported goods 

about 

NA 

Check  the  presence 
of the authorisation  – 
the  responsible 
ask 
authorities  in  case  of 
doubt 

To  be  determined 
the 
depending  on 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
authorisation 

Temporary exports 

Register 
the 
temporary  export  and 
monitor  its  actual  re-
import. 

scope  of  a  delegated 
or implementing act 

Grant  the  temporary 
export  authorisation 
on the ATA carnet or 
Single 
the 
Administrative 
Document,  provided 
the  description  of  the 
the 
goods 
information 
necessary  for  tracing 
the firearms. 

includes 

Inform 
export 
the 
licencing  authority  of 
the  temporary  export 
and  about  the  actual 
(after 
re-import 
discharge 
the 
ATA  carnet  or  the 
SAD) 

on 

as 

soon 

As 
the 
shipment  has  left  the 
customs 
Union, 
office  of  exit informs 
the 
competent 
authority of dispatch 

by 

Copy 
the 
of 
movement  document 
the 
provided 
carrier to the customs 
office  of  export  and 
the customs office of 
exit. 

Transit  (between  point 
of  export  and  point  of 
exit) 

Competent  authority 
of 
sends 
transit 
of 
acknowledgment 
receipt  to  the  notifier 
and  copies  to  other 
competent authorities. 

transit 

Competent authorities 
ensure 
of 
customs 
that the 
office  of  export  and 
the  customs  office  of 
exit  are  informed  of 
to 
their 
consent 
the 
shipment. 

decisions 
to 

Release of the goods for 
exports 

NA 

Inform  the  licensing 
authority 
the 
goods  have  left  the 
customs territory 

that 

Provide  evidence  of 
final  import  in  country 
of destination 

NA 

Check  that  evidence 
has  been  provided 
and 
the 
inform 
customs  offices  of 
export  and  exit  if  it 
has not been 

Post-shipment controls  Conduct 

post-
shipment  controls  (or 

NA 

Exporters 
to  make 
sure that the importer 
provide 
them  with 
the evidence 

 
 
 
 
 
 
delegate  this  task  to 
third parties) 

Transit in the EU of a shipment between two non-EU countries 

The customs office of 
exit, as  soon  as  the 
shipment  has  left  the 
Union, 
the 
competent 
authority(ies) 
transit 

informs 

of 

first  and 

The 
last 
authority 
competent 
of transit in the Union 
that 
ensure 
the 
customs 
office  of 
entry and the customs 
office  of  exit  are 
informed 
their 
respective  decisions 
the 
to  consent 
shipment  

of 

to 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 7: PUBLIC CONSULTATION AND CONFIDENTIAL CONSULTATION  

1. questionnaire of the web-based public consultation 

The questionnaire is structured in three main parts: 

-  Part I: Questions concerning current problems 
-  Part II: Need for EU action and possible policy options 
-  Part III: Evaluation of the impact of options 

The table below shows the detailed list of questions included under each section with indication of the specific category of stakeholders the questions are 
addressed to. 

Survey question 

Survey answer 

Type  

stakeholder190 

General questions 

1. 

Please indicate what  is  your interest 
in this initiative 

C
N

S
U

A

C
E

R

E
P
S

O

T
O

H

Dropdown list 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

2.   Country of origin 

Dropdown list   x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

Part I: Questions concerning current problems 

3. 

How important it is to have common 
EU  rules  on  imports  of  civilian 

o  Not important  

Multiple 
choice – single 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

190 Stakeholders are : National competent authorities (NCA), Firearms users (USR), Economic operators (ECO), Firearms specialists (SPE) and Others (OTH) 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

firearms from outside of the EU? 

How important it is to have common 
EU  rules  on  exports  of  civilian 
firearms to non-EU countries? 

is 

important 

How 
the  current 
administrative  burden  created  for 
you  personally  by  current  EU  rules 
on exports of civilian firearms? 

If  you  have  replied  “important”  or 
“very  important”,  can  you  quantify 
this  impact  (in  monthly  full-time 
equivalent and costs)? 

Please explain the extent of the risks 
of  firearms  trafficking  for  each  of 
the  following  types  of  movements 
(do  not  include  in  your  assessment 
transfers  of  firearms  within 
the 
European Union)? 

- 

Import (entry and release in 

o 
Slightly important 
o  Moderately important 
o 
Important 
o  Very important 
o 

I do not know 

o  Not important  
o 
Slightly important 
o  Moderately important 
o 
Important 
o  Very important 
o 

I do not know 

o  Non-existent  
o 
Slight 
o  Moderate 
o 
Important 
o  Very important 
o 

I do not know 

o  No risk 
o  Small risk 
o  Moderate risk 
o  High risk 
o  Very high risk 
o 
I do not know 

response 

Multiple 
choice – single 
response 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

Multiple 
choice – single 
response 

x 

x 

x 

Open  

x 

x 

x 

Multiple 
choice – single 
response 

x 

x 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. 

free circulation) 

-  Export (release of the goods 

and exit) 

-  Transit (and transshipments) 

inside the EU191 

-  Transit  (and transshipments) 

outside the EU192 

could  hamper 

The  Commission  has  preliminarily 
identified  a  number  of  challenges 
that 
legal 
movement  of  civilian  firearms.  For 
each  of  them,  can  you  mention  to 
what  extent,  in  your  view,  they 
create a burden for legal movements 
of civilian firearms? 

the 

Multiple 
choice – single 
response 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

o  Not at all 
o  Small extent 
o  Moderate extent 
o  High extent 
o  Very high extent 
o 
I do not know 

-  Non uniform rules on 

exports 

-  Non uniform rules on 

imports 

-  Lack of a clear distinction 

between civilian and military 
firearms (and lack of clarity 
about the applicable 
procedure) 

-  Single market rules apply to 

191  
192  

Movement of EU or non-EU goods on the EU customs territory, in line with articles 226 to 236 of Regulation (EU) nr 952/2013 
Movement of goods leaving the customs territory of the EU across a non-EU country before reaching the destination in another non-EU country. 

 
 
 
 
                                                 
more goods (e.g. deactivated 
firearms, automatic firearms) 
and persons (brokers, 
collectors) than 
import/export rules 

- 

-  The need to have the express 
prior authorisation of transit 
countries before granting an 
export licence 
Insufficient unified EU rules 
for simplified procedures 
(hunters, sport shooters, 
repair, exhibition, etc.) 
-  Paper-based procedures 
-  Obligation to submit 

translations of supporting 
documents 
-  Fees for export 

authorisations or transit 
inside the EU 

9. 

-  No use of the global export 

authorisation 

If  you see additional challenges that 
may  hamper  legal  movements  of 
civilian  firearms,  can  you  please 
describe  them  here  along  with  their 
relative importance? 

10.  Without  further  EU 
intervention, 
legal 
how  do  you 
movements  of  civilian  firearms  will 

think 

the 

Open 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

Multiple 
choice – single 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

o 

The  situation  will  improve:  the 
current framework will be enough 
legal 
to 

seamless 

ensure 

 
 
 
response 

develop in the next 5-10 years? 

o 

o 

o 

firearms, 

of 
cooperation 

and 
movement 
increased 
and 
exchanges  of  best  practices  will 
bring  more  consistency  in  the 
application of the rules. 
The 
remain 
situation  will 
unchanged: the current framework 
will  be  enough  to  ensure  legal 
movement of firearms, but current 
difficulties will not be overcome. 
The  situation  will  deteriorate: 
economic operators and legitimate 
firearms  owners  will  be  faced 
with  increasingly  heterogeneous 
national rules and procedures. 
I don’t know 

11.  The  Commission  has  preliminarily 
identified a number of aspects which 
could  create 
firearms 
trafficking.  For  each  of  them,  can 
you  mention  to  what  extent  they 
increase those risks? 

risks  of 

o  Not at all 
o  Small extent 
o  Moderate extent 
o  High extent 
o  Very high extent 
o 
I do not know 

Multiple 
choice – single 
response 

x 

x 

- 

Imports into the EU of 
unmarked signal and alarm 
weapons 

-  Lack of marking identifying 
the first country of import 
into the EU 
Imports into the EU of 
unmarked semi-finished 
essential components of 
firearms 

- 

 
 
 
 
 
 
-  Risk of export of firearms 

- 

used in crimes 
Inadequate controls of the 
actual end-use of exported 
firearms 

-  Available statistical data 
does not enable evidence-
based detection of trends 
-  Poor coordination amongst 
export licensing authorities 
(possibility to grant export 
licences when similar 
transactions where 
authorised) 

-  Poor coordination between 
customs and licensing 
authorities 

12. 

If  you see additional challenges that 
increase  risks  of  firearms 
could 
trafficking,  can  you  please  describe 
them  here  along  with  their  relative 
importance? 

13.  Without  further  EU 
do 

intervention, 
how 
firearms 
trafficking  will  develop  in  the  next 
5-10 years? 

think 

you 

Open 

x 

x 

Multiple 
choice – single 
response 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

o 

o 

The  situation  will  improve:  the 
current framework will be enough 
to  ensure  increased  cooperation 
law-enforcement 
amongst 
agencies,  more 
intelligence 
gathering, and increased detection 
of smuggling of firearms. 
The 
remain 
unchanged: the current framework 

situation  will 

 
 
 
 
 
 
will  be  enough  to  ensure  proper 
law  enforcement  cooperation,  but 
intelligence-based targeted checks 
at  import  and  export  will  remain 
defective. 
The  situation  will  deteriorate: 
exports  (or  diversion)  of  firearms 
to 
and 
dictatorships,  and  smuggling  of 
firearms  and  convertible  weapons 
into the EU will increase. 
I don’t know 

conflict 

zones 

o 

o 

14. 

Is  there  anything  else  you  would 
wish  to  add  or  mention  on  the 
problems 
imports  and 
exports  of  civilian  firearms  to  and 
from the European Union? 

regarding 

Part II: Need for EU action and possible policy options 

15. 

In your view, is there a need for EU 
intervention  on  current  rules  on 
import, export and transit of civilian 
firearms? 

16.  Do you see the need for new tools to 
improve  current  rules  on  import, 
transit  of  civilian 
export  and 
firearms? 

17.  For 

the 

please 

two  previous  questions, 
detailed 
provide  more 

o  Yes 
o  No 
o 

I don’t know 

o  Yes 
o  No 
o 

I don’t know 

Open 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

Multiple 
choice – single 
response 

Multiple 
choice – single 
response 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

Open 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

 
 
 
 
o  Uniform import/export procedures 
o 
o 
o 
o  Other 

Tracing of firearms 
Exchange of information 
Trade facilitation 

Multiple 
choice – single 
response 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

Open 

Multiple 
choice – single 
response 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

o  Not at all 
o  Small extent 
o  Moderate extent 
o  High extent 
o  Very high extent 
o 
I do not know 

considerations 

18. 

If  EU  intervention  was  considered 
necessary,  what  should  be  its  main 
focus? 

-  Non-legislative measures 

(guidelines, 
recommendations) 
-  Clarification of existing 

legislation 

-  New legislative provisions 
-  Other 
- 

I do not know 

19. 

If you selected other, please explain 

20.  To  what  extent  do  you  think  the 
following measures could contribute 
to improved legal import, export and 
transit of civilian firearms? 

-  Clarifying the distinction 

between military and civilian 
firearms 

-  Having for civilian firearms 
the same licensing procedure 
as for military ones 
-  Digital import and export 

licenses 

-  Set out clear rules for 

“simplified procedures” 

 
 
 
 
-  Linking simplified 

procedures to the status of 
Authorised Economic 
Operator Safety/Security 

-  Replace the global 

authorisation by a general 
export authorisation for 
specific countries and 
exporters (authorised 
economic operators) 

-  Systematically assuming the 

agreement of non-EU 
country of transit in the 
absence of a reply 

-  Removing the obligation to 
provide translations of 
supporting documents 

-  Publishing a list of 

competent authorities 
(including in non-EU 
countries) 

-  No fees for authorisations 

and transit 

-  Other 

21.  Please explain why 

22.  To  what  extent  do  you  think  the 
following measures could contribute 
to improved fight against trafficking 
of firearms? 

o  Not at all 
o  Small extent 
o  Moderate extent 
o  High extent 

Open 

Multiple 
choice – single 
response 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

 
 
 
 
 
 
o  Very high extent 
o 
I do not know 

-  Ensuring that convertible 

alarm and signal weapons are 
always classified as firearms 
at import 

-  Ensuring tracing of 

deactivated or converted 
firearms, regulating the 
activities of brokers 

-  Homogenising the 

processing of requests for 
imports licenses 
-  Homogenising the 

processing of requests for 
exports licenses 

-  Systematic check of criminal 
records in other EU Member 
States before granting an 
import/export licence 

-  Exchange of information on 
refusals to grant import or 
export authorisations 
-  Computerised data-filing 

systems of import or export 
authorisations (and exchange 
of information) 
Imposing marking of the first 
country of import 
-  Limiting imports of 

- 

unmarked semi-finished 
essential components 

 
 
 
-  Sharing and analysing 

general statistics on imports, 
exports and seizures of 
firearms 

-  Clarifying the role of 
customs authorities 
-  Clarifying the roles of 
competent authorities 

-  Requiring end-use 

certificates at export 
-  Stepping up post-shipment 

controls at export 

-  National inspection systems 

to check whether the 
conditions of an export 
licence continue to be met 

-  Other 

23.  Please explain why 

Part III: Evaluation of the impact of options 

24.  For each of the measures mentioned 
below,  please  indicate  how  they 
would affect, for you personally, the 
administrative burden. 

-  Clarifying the distinction 

between military and civilian 
firearms 

-  Having for civilian firearms 
the same licensing procedure 

Open 

x 

x 

Multiple 
choice – single 
response 

x 

x 

x 

o  Very negative impact 
o  Negative impact 
o  No impact 
o  Positive impact 
o  Very positive impact 
o 
I do not know 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
as for military ones 
-  Digital import and export 

licences 

-  Set out clear rules for 

“simplified procedures” 

-  Linking simplified 

procedures to the status of 
Authorised Economic 
Operator Safety/Security 

-  Replace the global 

authorisation by a general 
export authorisation for 
specific countries and 
exporters (authorised 
economic operators) 

-  Systematically assuming the 

agreement of non-EU 
country of transit in the 
absence of a reply 

-  Removing the obligation to 
provide translations of 
supporting documents 

-  Publishing a list of 

competent authorities 
(including in non-EU 
countries) 

-  No fees for authorisations 

and transit 

-  Ensuring that convertible 

alarm and signal weapons are 

 
 
always classified as firearms 
at import 

-  Ensuring tracing of 

deactivated or converted 
firearms, regulating the 
activities of brokers 

-  Homogenising the 

processing of requests for 
imports licenses 
-  Homogenising the 

processing of requests for 
exports licenses 

-  Systematic check of criminal 
records in other EU Member 
States before granting an 
import/export licence 

-  Exchange of information on 
refusals to grant import or 
export authorisations 
-  Computerised data-filing 

systems of import or export 
authorisations (and exchange 
of information) 
Imposing marking of the first 
country of import 
-  Limiting imports of 

- 

unmarked semi-finished 
essential components 
-  Sharing and analysing 

general statistics on imports, 

 
 
exports and seizures of 
firearms 

-  Clarifying the role of 
customs authorities 
-  Clarifying the roles of 
competent authorities 

-  Requiring end-use 

certificates at export 
-  Stepping up post-shipment 

controls 

-  National inspection systems 

to check whether the 
conditions of an export 
licence continue to be met 
for 

25.  Where  possible, 

the  above 
measures,  could  you  provide  a 
quantitative  estimate  of  the  impact 
on  administrative  burden  (average 
monthly full-time equivalent, costs)? 

26. 

to 

add 

If  you  wish 
further 
information  —  within  the  scope  of 
this questionnaire — please feel free 
to do so here. 

Open 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

Open 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

27.  Please  indicate  here  whether  you 
would  agree  to  be  contacted  to 
discuss  your  answers  and  provide 
more detailed replies 

-  Yes 
-  No 

Multiple 
choice – single 
response 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

 
 
 
 
28.  Please  feel  free  to  upload  a  concise 

document, such as a position paper. 

Open 

x 

x 

x 

x 

x 

2. Questionnaire of the confidential consultation 

Survey question 

Survey answer 

Type  

1. 

What body do you represent? 

-  Police 
-  Customs 
-  Ministery of foreign affairs 
-  Ministery of trade 
-  Ministry of justice or home affairs 
-  Other export licensing authority 
-  other 

2. 

3. 

Country of origin 

How do you mark firearms at import? 

-  with  the  unique  marking  of  Directive  (EU) 

2021/55 (the Firearms Directive) only 

Multiple  choice  – 
single response 

Dropdown list 

Multiple  choice  – 
single response 

-  with  an 

import  marking  enabling 

the 
identification  of  the  country  of  import  and 
the year of import 

4. 

Please  explain  and 
relevant legislation 

indicate 

the 

Open question 

-  other 
-  NA (eg; I only deal with exports) 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. 

What  form  of import authorisation  do 
you have? 

-  The  standard  authorisation  to  acquire  or 
transfer  a  firearm  under  Directive  (EU) 
2021/555? 

Multiple  choice  – 
single response 

-  A specific import authorisation 
-  A mere customs declaration 
- 

I do not know 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

Please explain 

Please  upload  a  template  of  your 
import authorisation 

What is the maximum time between a 
request and an import authorisation 

At  import,  who  checks  compliance  of 
alarm  and  signal  weapons  (CN  Code 
9304)  with  EU  standards  on  non-
Implementing 
of 
convertibility 
Directive  2019/69  before  release  into 
free circulation? 

-  Customs 
-  Ballistic laboratory 
-  Test bench 
-  Nobody 
-  Other 
-  NA (eg. I only deal with export) 

Open question 

Uploaded document 

Open question 

Multiple  choice  – 
single response 

10. 

imports  of 
How  do  you  regulate 
“80%” 
unmarked 
receivers 
semi-
automatic  pistols,  or  lower  receivers 
of AR-15-type assault rifles)? 

P80-branded 
(e.g.Glock-type 

-  Need  to  be  declared  as  firearms  parts  (CN 

code 9305) but not marked 

Multiple  choice  – 
single response 

-  Need  to  be  declared  as  firearms  essential 
components  (CN  code  9305)  and  marked 
accordingly 

-  Not  considered  as  firearms  parts  -  no 

specific declaration 

-  NA (eg. I only deal with exports) 

 
 
 
 
 
11. 

Are  you  aware  of  a  risk  of  firearms 
being 
third 
legally  exported  from 
countries 
the  EU,  but  kept 
undeclared at arrival in hold luggage? 

into 

-  Yes 
-  No 
-  NA (eg. I only deal with exports) 

Multiple  choice  – 
single response 

12. 

How do you regulate/check imports of 
firearms in hold luggage? 

-  We request a entry summary declaration 
-  We  demand  a  standard  import  authorisation 

Multiple  choice  – 
single response 

but no advance notification of customs 

13. 

Please explain 

14.  Will  the  Import  Control  System  2 

(ICS 2) make a difference? 

15. 

Please  explain 

16. 

How do you share data at EU level in 
relation  to  smuggling  of  firearms  into 
the EU? 

-  Other 
-  We don’t 
- 

I do not know 

-  Yes a big one 
-  Yes, a bit 
-  No difference 
- 
I do not know 

-  Systematic SIENA message 
-  Occasional SIENA message 
-  Systematic Risk Information Fiches (RIF) in 
the  Customs  Risk  Management  System 
(CRMS) 

-  Occasional RIF in CRMS 
-  Regular  sharing  with  Europol  of  general 

seizure data 

-  Regular  sharing  with  Europol  of  detailed 
seizure  statistics  (by  CN  code,  type  of 

Open question 

Multiple  choice  – 
single response 

Open question 

Multiple  choice  – 
single response 

 
 
 
 
misdeclaration,  country  of  origin,  category 
of firearms etc.) 

-  Regular sharing with European Commission 

(DG TAXUD) of general seizure data 

-  Regular sharing with European Commission 
(DG  TAXUD)  of  detailed  seizure  statistics 
(by  CN  code, 
type  of  misdeclaration, 
country of origin, category of firearms etc.) 
-  Mere  bilateral  exchanges  with  Member 

States concerned 

-  Other 
-  NA (eg. I only deal with exports) 

17. 

Please explain 

18.  When  establishing  risk  profiles  to 
check  firearms  imports,  do  you  take 
into consideration for your assessment 
imports  and  smuggling  statistics  into 
the EU? 

-  We use our own national statistics 
-  We  rely  on  experience  shared  in  CRMS 

Multiple  choice  – 
single response 

Open question 

(Risk Information Fiches) 

-  We use SIENA-based information 
-  We use other sources of intelligence 
-  We have EU-level statistics on which to base 

our risk assessment 

-  NA (eg. I only deal with exports) 

19. 

Please explain 

20.  What  would  be 

the 

impact  of 
subjecting  firearms  to  Surveillance 
(article 
Implementing 
of 
Regulation (EU) 2015/2447)? 

55 

-  Very positive impact 
-  Slightly positive impact 
-  No impact 
-  Slightly negative impact 
-  Very negative impact 

Open question 

Multiple  choice  – 
single response 

 
 
 
 
21. 

Please explain 

22. 

Do you have simplified procedures for 
temporary 
re-imports 
imports,  or 
following temporary exports? 

Open question 

Multiple  choice  – 
multiple response 

- 

I do not know 

-  No  -  they  are  subject  to  standard  import 

authorisations 

-  Yes, for sport shooters 
-  Yes, for hunters 
-  Yes, for exhibition purposes 
-  Yes, for repair purposes 
-  Yes,  for  imports  from  specific  (non-EU) 

countries 

-  Yes,  for  Authorised  Economic  Operators  – 

safety and security 

-  Yes, other 
-  NA (eg. I only deal with exports) 

23. 

Please explain 

Open question 

24. 

25. 

26. 

For  Export  authorisations,  do  you  use 
the  model  established  in  the  annex  of 
Regulation 258? 

-  Yes 
-  No 
-  NA  (eg.  not  involved  in  granting  export 

Multiple  choice  – 
single response 

authorisations) 

Please upload a template of the export 
authorisations you use 

Before 
authorisations, do you: 

granting 

an 

export 

- 

- 

systematically  check  the  criminal  record  of 
the applicant in your national database 
systematically  check  the  criminal  record  of 
the applicant in  European  Criminal  Records 

Upload document 

Multiple  choice  – 
single response 

 
 
 
 
 
Information System (ECRIS) 

- 

- 

-  your  national  criminal  record  system  does 
automatic searches in the European Criminal 
Records Information System (ECRIS) 
request  the  applicant  to  submit  a  copy  of 
his/her criminal record in your country 
request the applicant to submit a copy of the 
national  criminal  record  of  another  relevant 
country 
residence  or  of 
nationality) 
check  in  the  Schengen  Information  System 
(SIS)  if  the  firearms  concerned  are  sought 
for seizure elsewhere in the EU 
systematically  check  if  the  applicant  is 
involved  in  any  present  or  past  criminal 
investigation 

(country  of 

- 

- 

27. 

Similar transactions, do you 

Multiple  choice  – 
single response 

-  NA  (eg.  not  involved  in  granting  export 

authorisations) 

-  Systematically check the COARM system to 
see 
transactions  have  been 
refused/revoked/modified  in  other  Member 
States 

if  similar 

-  Occasionally  check  the  COARM  system  to 
see 
transactions  have  been 
refused/revoked/modified  in  other  Member 
States 

if  similar 

-  Always  ask  another  authority  (Ministry  of 

Foreign Affairs) to check in COARM 

-  Sometimes  ask  another  authority  (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs) to check in COARM 

 
 
-  Never check in COARM 
-  NA  (eg.  not  involved  in  granting  export 

authorisations) 

28. 

For  refusals  (or  withdrawal  of  export 
authorisations), do you: 

-  Always  upload 

them 

(or  have 

them 

uploaded) in COARM 

Multiple  choice  – 
single response 

29. 

After  having  granted  an  export 
authorisation, do you: 

-  Sometimes  upload  them  (or  have  them 

uploaded) in COARM 

-  Never upload them (or have them uploaded) 

in COARM 

-  NA  (eg.  not  involved  in  granting  export 

authorisations) 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

regularly  check  the  criminal  record  of  the 
person concerned? 
conduct reviews of existing authorisations to 
check if conditions are still met? 
reassess/withdraw  authorisations in the light 
of new risks of diversion? 
always  request  the  exporter  to  confirm 
import in the country of destination? 
conduct  regular  post-shipment  checks  to 
verify the weapon have not been illicitely re-
exported or diverted? 

-  NA (not involved in the export authorisation 

process) 

Multiple  choice  – 
single response 

30. 

Please explain 

Open question 

31. 

How  do  you 

control 

exported 

-  They  are  not  subject  to  any  specific  rule  at 

Multiple  choice  – 

export 

 
 
 
 
deactivated firearms? 

32. 

Please explain 

33. 

How  do  you  control  exported  signal 
and alarm weapons? 

34. 

Please explain 

35. 

Please  explain  how  you  organize  the 
national  control  system  and  which 
designated  national  authority  chairs 
the national control system pursuant to 

(EU) 

2015/2403 

-  They  must  be  marked  in  accordance  with 
Regulation 
and 
accompanied  with  a  deactivation  certificate 
even if deactivated before 8 April 2016 
-  They  must  be  marked  in  accordance  with 
Regulation 
and 
accompanied  with  a  deactivation  certificate 
only when deactivated after 8 April 2016 

2015/2403 

(EU) 

-  Other 
- 

I do not know 

-  They  are  not  subject  to  any  specific  rule  at 

export 

-  They  are  considered  as  firearms  under 
national  legislation  and  are  subject  to  the 
same rules 

-  They  must  comply  with  Commission 
Implementing  Directive  (EU)  2019/69  to 
avoid being subject to export authorisations 

-  Other 
- 

I do not know 

single response 

Open question 

Multiple  choice  – 
single response 

Open question 

Open question 

 
 
 
 
 
 
36. 

37. 

article 5 of the Arms Trade Treaty. 

explain  which 

are 
the 
Please 
competent 
national 
designated 
authorities  and  if  all  of  them  are 
involved in the national control system 
pursuant to article 5 of the Arms Trade 
Treaty. 

Do  you  apply  a  Single  Procedure  for 
firearms  covered  both  by  Regulation 
(EU) 2012/258 and Common Position 
2008/944/CFSP? 

38. 

Please explain 

Please  explain  the  difference  between 
the two 

39. 

40. 

Open question 

-  Yes:  the  same  procedure  is  applied  to  all 

firearms 

Multiple  choice  – 
single response 

-  Yes:  mere  consultation  of  the  ministries 

responsible (foreign affairs/defence) 

-  Yes: single form/website for the application, 

but different types of licences 

-  Yes: other 
-  No 
- 

I don’t know 

Open question 

Open question 

Do you have simplified procedures for 
re-exports 
exports,  or 
temporary 
following temporary imports? 

-  Yes,  for  sport  shooters  and  hunters  (as 

required by Reg. 258) 

Multiple  choice  – 
multiple response 

-  Yes,  for  exhibition  purposes  (temporary 

exports) 

-  Yes, for repair purposes (temporary exports) 
-  Yes,  for  exports 
to  specific  (non-EU) 

countries 

 
 
 
 
 
-  Yes,  for  Authorised  Economic  Operators  – 

safety and security 

-  Yes for re-exports after temporary admission 
-  Yes, other 
-  NA (eg. I only deal with exports) 

- 
electronic import processes 
-  paper-based import processes 
- 
electronic export processes 
-  paper-based export processes 
- 

I don't know 

-  Yes, for import 
-  Yes, for export 
-  Yes, also for refusals 
-  No 
- 

I do not know 

-  Yes, at import (they are customs authorities) 
-  Yes, at import (non-customs authorities) 
-  Yes, at export (they are customs authorities) 
-  Yes, at export (non-customs authorities) 
-  No 
- 

I do not know 

Open question 

Multiple  choice  – 
multiple response 

Multiple  choice  – 
multiple response 

Multiple  choice  -  - 
single response 

Open question 

41. 

Please explain 

42. 

Do  you  have  electronic  import  and 
export authorisation processes? 

43. 

Do  you  have  a  computerised  data-
filing  system  for  record-keeping  of 
import and export authorisations? 

44. 

import  and  export 

Do 
licensing 
authorities  have  access  to  the  EU 
Customs Information System? 

45.  When 

your 

customs 

authorities 
discover  an  illicit  movement,  please 
explain  how  they  communicate  with 
the competent authority which granted 

 
 
 
 
 
-  Yes, within the same Member State 
-  Yes,  to  the  authorities  of  the  Member  State 

Multiple  choice  -  - 
single response 

the  export  authorisation  (in  your 
country or in other Member States) 

46. 

an 

export 

authorisation 

is 
If 
withdrawn,  suspended,  modified  or 
revoked,  does  your  export  licencing 
authority 
customs 
administration? 

inform 

the 

47. 

Please explain 

48. 

Do  you  impose  fees  for  import  and 
export authorisations? 

of exit 
-  Other 
-  No 
- 

I don’t know 

-  Yes, for import authorisations 
-  Yes, for export authorisations 
-  Yes, for transit inside the EU 
-  Yes, escorting fees only 
-  Other 
-  No. None of the above 

49. 

50. 

How  much? 
authorisation,  or  according 
quantities concerned) 

(indicate  price  per 
the 

to 

In  your  view,  how  important  it  is  to 
have common EU rules on imports of 
civilian  firearms  from  outside  of  the 
EU? 

-  Not important 
-  Slightly important 
-  Moderately important 
- 
Important 
-  Very important 
- 
I do not know 

Open question 

Multiple  choice 
multiple response 

- 

Open question 

Multiple  choice 
single response 

- 

 
 
 
 
51. 

In  your  view,  how  important  it  is  to 
have  common  EU  rules  on  exports  of 
civilian firearms outside of the EU? 

52. 

53. 

54. 

is 

the 

important 

current 
How 
administrative  burden  created  for  you 
personally by  current  EU  rules  on 
exports of civilian firearms? 

If  you  have  replied  “important”  or 
“very  important”,  can  you  quantify 
this 
impact  (in  monthly  full-time 
equivalent and costs)? 

The  Commission  has  preliminarily 
identified a number of challenges that 
could  hamper  the  legal  movement  of 
civilian  firearms.  For  each  of  them, 
can  you  mention  to  what  extent,  in 
your  view,  they  create  a  burden  for 
legal movements of civilian firearms?: 

-  Non uniform rules on exports 
-  Non uniform rules on imports 
-  Lack  of  a  clear  distinction 
between  civilian  and  military 

-  Not important 
-  Slightly important 
-  Moderately important 
- 
Important 
-  Very important 
- 
I do not know 

-  Non-existent 
-  Slight 
-  Moderate 
- 
Important 
-  Very important 
- 
I do not know 

-  not at all 
- 
small extent 
-  moderate extent 
-  high extent 
-  very high extent 
- 
I do not know 

Multiple  choice 
single response 

- 

Multiple  choice 
single response 

- 

Open question 

Multiple  choice 
single response 

- 

 
 
 
firearms  (and  lack  of  clarity 
about 
applicable 
procedure) 

the 

-  Single  market  rules  apply  to 
more  goods  (e.g.  deactivated 
firearms,  automatic  firearms) 
and 
(brokers, 
collectors)  than  import/export 
rules 

persons 

-  The  need  to  have  the  express 
prior  authorisation  of  transit 
countries  before  granting  an 
export licence 

-  Different  national  rules  for 
simplified procedures (hunters, 
sport 
repair, 
shooters, 
exhibition, etc.) 

-  Paper-based procedures 
-  Obligation 
translations 
documents 

of 

to 

submit 
supporting 

55. 

-  Fees  for  export  authorisations 

or transit inside the EU 

-  No  use  of  the  global  export 

authorisation 

If  you  see  additional  challenges  that 
may  hamper 
legal  movements  of 
civilian  firearms,  can  you  please 
describe  them  here  along  with  their 
relative importance? 

Open question 

 
 
 
 
56.  Without  further  EU  intervention,  how 
do  you  think  the  legal  movements  of 
civilian  firearms  will  develop  in  the 
next 5-10 years? 

Multiple  choice  – 
single response 

-  The  situation  will  improve:  the  current 
framework  will  be  enough 
to  ensure 
seamless  legal  movement  of  firearms,  and 
increased cooperation and exchanges of best 
practices  will  bring  more  consistency  in  the 
application of the rules. 

-  The  situation  will  remain  unchanged:  the 
current  framework will be enough to  ensure 
legal  movement  of  firearms,  but  current 
difficulties will not be overcome. 

-  The  situation  will  deteriorate:  economic 
operators  and  legitimate  firearms  owners 
will 
increasingly 
heterogeneous national rules and procedures. 
I do not know 

faced 

with 

be 

- 

-  no risk 
- 
small risk 
-  moderate risk 
-  high risk 
-  very high risk 
- 
I do not know 

57. 

Please  explain  the  extent  of  the  risks 
of  firearms  trafficking  for  each  of  the 
following types of movements (do not 
include in your assessment transfers of 
firearms within the European Union).: 

- 

Import  (entry  and  release  in 
free circulation) 

-  Export  (release  of  the  goods 

and exit) 
-  Transit  (and 
inside the EU 
-  Transit  (and 
outside the EU 

transshipments) 

transshipments) 

Multiple  choice  – 
single response 

 
 
58. 

create 

The  Commission  has  preliminarily 
identified  a  number  of  aspects  which 
could 
firearms 
trafficking. For each of them, can you 
mention  to  what  extent  they  increase 
those risks?:  

risks  of 

-  not at all 
- 
small extent 
-  moderate extent 
-  high extent 
-  very high extent 
- 
I do not know 

Multiple  choice  – 
single response 

- 

into 

Imports 
the  EU  of 
unmarked  signal  and  alarm 
weapons 

-  Lack  of  marking  identifying 
the first country of import into 
the EU 
Imports 
unmarked 
essential 
firearms 

the  EU  of 
semi-finished 
of 

components 

into 

- 

-  Risk of export of firearms used 

- 

in crimes 
Inadequate  controls  of 
the 
actual  end-use  of  exported 
firearms 

-  Available  statistical  data  does 
evidence-based 

enable 
not 
detection of trends 
-  Poor  coordination 

export 
(possibility 
licences 

amongst 
licensing  authorities 
to  grant  export 
similar 
when 

 
 
 
-  Poor 

transactions where authorised) 
coordination  between 
licensing 

and 

customs 
authorities 

59. 

increase 

If  you  see  additional  challenges  that 
could 
firearms 
trafficking,  can  you  please  describe 
them  here  along  with  their  relative 
importance? 

risks  of 

60.  Without  further  EU  intervention,  how 
do  you  think  firearms  trafficking  will 
develop in the next 5-10 years? 

-  The  situation  will  improve:  the  current 
to  ensure 
law-
intelligence 
increased  detection  of 

framework  will  be  enough 
increased 
enforcement  agencies,  more 
gathering,  and 
smuggling of firearms. 

cooperation 

amongst 

Open question 

Multiple  choice  – 
single response 

-  The  situation  will  remain  unchanged:  the 
current  framework will be enough to  ensure 
proper  law  enforcement  cooperation,  but 
intelligence-based  targeted  checks  at  import 
and export will remain defective. 

-  The  situation  will  deteriorate:  exports  (or 
diversion)  of  firearms  to  conflict  zones  and 
dictatorships,  and  smuggling  of  firearms, 
their  components,  and  convertible  weapons 
into the EU will increase. 
I do not know 

- 

61. 

Is there anything else you would wish 
to  add  or  mention  on  the  problems 
imports  and  exports  of 
regarding 

Open question 

 
 
 
 
62. 

63. 

64. 

65. 

civilian  firearms  to  and  from  the 
European Union? 

In  your  view,  is  there  a  need  for  EU 
intervention  on  current 
rules  on 
import,  export  and  transit  of  civilian 
firearms? 

-  Yes 
-  No 
- 

I do not know 

Do  you  see  the  need  for  new  tools  to 
improve  current  rules  on 
import, 
export and transit of civilian firearms? 

-  Yes 
-  No 
- 

I do not know 

For the two previous questions, please 
provide more detailed considerations 

If  EU  intervention  was  considered 
necessary,  what  should  be  its  main 
focus?:  

-  Non-legislative 

measures 
(guidelines, recommendations) 
existing 

of 

-  Clarification 
legislation 

-  Uniform import / export procedures 
-  Tracing of firearms 
-  Exchange of information 
-  Trade facilitation 
-  Other 

-  New legislative provisions 
-  Other 
- 

I do not know 

66. 

Please explain 

67. 

To  what  extent  do  you  think  the 
following  measures  could  contribute 
to  improved  legal  import,  export  and 

-  not at all 
- 
small extent 
-  moderate extent 

Multiple  choice  – 
single  response 

Multiple  choice  – 
single response 

Open question 

Multiple  choice  – 
single response 

Open question 

Multiple  choice  – 
single response 

 
 
 
 
-  high extent 
-  very high extent 
- 
I do not know 

transit of civilian firearms?:  

-  Clarifying 

distinction 
the 
between  military  and  civilian 
firearms 

-  Having  for  civilian  firearms 
the  same  licensing  procedure 
as for military ones 

-  Digital 
licences 

import  and  export 

-  Set 

out 

clear 

rules 

for 

“simplified procedures” 

-  Linking  simplified  procedures 
to  the  status  of  Authorised 
Operator 
Economic 
Safety/Security 

-  Replace 

global 
the 
authorisation  by  a  general 
for 
export 
specific 
and 
exporters 
(authorised 
economic operators) 
-  Systematically  assuming 

authorisation 
countries 

the 
agreement  of  non-EU  country 
of  transit  in  the  absence  of  a 
reply 

-  Removing  the  obligation  to 
of 

translations 

provide 
supporting documents 

-  Publishing  a  list  of  competent 
authorities  (including  in  non-

 
 
EU countries) 

-  No  fees  for  authorisations  and 

transit 
-  Ensuring 

convertible 
that 
alarm  and  signal  weapons  are 
always classified as firearms at 
import 

-  Ensuring tracing of deactivated 
firearms, 
the  activities  of 

converted 

or 
regulating 
brokers 

-  Homogenising  the  processing 
of requests for import licenses 
-  Homogenising  the  processing 
of requests for export licenses 
-  Systematic  check  of  criminal 
records  in  other  EU  Member 
States  before  granting  an 
import/export licence 

-  Exchange  of  information  on 
refusals  to  grant  import  or 
export authorisations 

-  Computerised 

data-filing 
systems  of  import  or  export 
authorisations  (and  exchange 
of information) 
Imposing  marking  of  the  first 
country of import 

- 

-  Limiting  imports  of  unmarked 
essential 

semi-finished 

 
 
components 

-  Sharing  and  analysing  general 
statistics  on  imports,  exports 
and seizures of firearms 

-  Clarifying  the  role  of  customs 

authorities 
-  Clarifying 

the 

roles 

of 

competent authorities 

-  Requiring  end-use  certificates 

at export 

-  Stepping  up  post-shipment 

controls at export 

-  National  inspection  systems  to 
check  whether  the  conditions 
of  an  export  licence  continue 
to be met 

-  Other 
Please explain why 

For  each  of  the  measures  mentioned 
below, please indicate how they would 
the 
affect, 
administrative burden.:  

for  you  personally, 

-  Clarifying 

distinction 
the 
between  military  and  civilian 
firearms 

-  Having  for  civilian  firearms 
the  same  licensing  procedure 
as for military ones 

-  Digital 

import  and  export 

68. 

69. 

Open question 

Multiple  choice  – 
single repsonse 

-  very negative impact 
-  negative impact 
-  no impact 
-  positive impact 
-  very positive impact 
- 

I do not know 

 
 
 
 
licences 

-  Set 

out 

clear 

rules 

for 

“simplified procedures” 

-  Linking  simplified  procedures 
to  the  status  of  Authorised 
Economic 
Operator 
Safety/Security 

-  Replace 

global 
the 
authorisation  by  a  general 
for 
export 
and 
specific 
exporters 
(authorised 
economic operators) 
-  Systematically  assuming 

authorisation 
countries 

the 
agreement  of  non-EU  country 
of  transit  in  the  absence  of  a 
reply 

-  Removing  the  obligation  to 
of 

translations 

provide 
supporting documents 

-  Publishing  a  list  of  competent 
authorities  (including  in  non-
EU countries) 

-  No  fees  for  authorisations  and 

transit 
-  Ensuring 

convertible 
that 
alarm  and  signal  weapons  are 
always classified as firearms at 
import 

-  Ensuring tracing of deactivated 

 
 
converted 

firearms, 
the  activities  of 

or 
regulating 
brokers 

-  Homogenising  the  processing 
of requests for import licenses 
-  Homogenising  the  processing 
of requests for export licenses 
-  Systematic  check  of  criminal 
records  in  other  EU  Member 
States  before  granting  an 
import/export licence 

-  Exchange  of  information  on 
refusals  to  grant  import  or 
export authorisations 

-  Computerised 

data-filing 
systems  of  import  or  export 
authorisations  (and  exchange 
of information) 
Imposing  marking  of  the  first 
country of import 

- 

-  Limiting  imports  of  unmarked 
essential 

semi-finished 
components 

-  Sharing  and  analysing  general 
statistics  on  imports,  exports 
and seizures of firearms 

-  Clarifying  the  role  of  customs 

authorities 
-  Clarifying 

the 

roles 

of 

competent authorities 

 
 
-  Requiring  end-use  certificates 

at export 

-  Stepping  up  post-shipment 

controls at export 

-  National  inspection  systems  to 
check  whether  the  conditions 
of  an  export  licence  continue 
to be met 

-  Other 

70.  Where  possible, 

for 

the 

above 
measures,  could  you  provide  a 
quantitative estimate of the impact  on 
administrative 
(average 
monthly full-time equivalent, costs)? 

burden 

71. 

72 

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